Politics of Histories and Memories
and Conflicts in Central and East European Countries and Russia

(Proceedings of the Tallinn Workshop, 25-26 August 2014)

Edited by Nobuya HASHIMOTO

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Kwansei Gakuin University
Nishinomiya, Japan
Preface

This publication contains proceedings of the international workshop on “Politics of Histories and Memories and Conflicts in Central and Eastern European Countries and Russia” held in Tallinn, Estonia, on 25-26 August 2014. The workshop was organised in the framework of a research project of the same title, which was subsidized by Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS, “Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research”, 2013-2015, No.21653087).

The project aims to grasp the historical narratives in Central and Eastern Europe and Russia after their regime transition, especially the transformation of histories and memories on their historical experiences under the WWII and socialist regime, focusing on the development of “politics of histories and memories” in each country and the mutual cooperation and conflicts between them. Thereby we pay attentions to the fact that the confrontation between Baltic and CEE countries’ historical perceptions and memories on the ground of concepts of “occupation” and “totalitarianism” on the one side, and Russian ones of “Great Patriotic War” on the other hand, has become the controversial issue not only for these countries but also for European international community and organizations. Alongside of it we suppose that insights into European experiences will bring the important suggestions and lessons for East Asian countries, where more and more antagonistic opposition of histories and memories is prevailing, as is in the western part of Eurasian Continent.

The workshop composed of two parts: on the first day, we had a small conference at Tallinn University, and participants from Estonia (3), Poland (1) and Japan (10) made and listened to presentations and discussed about our theme; on the second day we organized an excursion of “Disputable Sites of Memory and History in Estonia”, including Bronze Soldier, a symbolic monument of “memory war” in Estonia and memorials of Nazi concentration camp in the suburb of Tallinn.
At the conference of the first day, four speakers gave presentations on our theme from their own viewpoints, and Japanese colleagues brought comments to them. Professor Yuri Kostyashov from Kaliningrad sent his report on the experience of “trialogue” between Kaliningrad, Torun and Frankfurt am Oder to the conference, and Professor Konrad Hugo Jarausch of The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill kindly sent his forthcoming paper for our discussion and gave his oral comments to papers via Skype. Dr Małgorzata Pakier also offered her paper co-written by Dr. Joanna Wawrzyniak on the memory studies in Eastern Europe for our discussion. Professor Siobhan Kattago kindly attended at the conference and wrote her general comments on these presentations and papers.

I would like to say my deepest gratitude to all the participants and contributors, and ones who supported our workshop and publication, especially to Professor Raivo Vetik who hosted the workshop and Ms. Triin-Ketlin Siska who coordinated the excursion.

The project will continue for one more year, and we will have an international conference on the politics of Histories and Memories and the conflict from the viewpoint of comparison between East and West of Eurasia in November 2015. I hope that this publication will contribute to deepen our consideration on our difficult theme.

Nobuya Hashimoto
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Contributors

Nobuya Hashimoto Professor of Kwansei Gakuin University, Japan

Raivo Vetik Professor of Tallinn University, Estonia

Olaf Mertelsmann Associate Professor of the University of Tartu, Estonia

Hiromi Komori Professor of Waseda University, Japan

Małgorzata Glowacka-Grajper Assistant Professor of University of Warsaw, Poland

Yury Kostyashov Professor of Immanuel Kant Baltic Federal University, Russia

Jun Yoshioka Associate Professor of Tsuda College, Japan

Mari Nomura Professor of Kanazawa University, Japan

Siobhan Kattago Associate Professor of Tallinn University, Estonia

Yoko Tateishi Research Fellow of Japan Society for the Promotion of Science, Japan
Part I

Experiences of Estonia
Discursive Reproduction of Conflict in Estonian-Russian Relationship

Raivo Vetik

Abstract

Aggravation of the Estonian-Russian conflict during and after the ‘Bronze Soldier crisis’ in April 2007 indicates that collective historical memories constitute a major aspect of the relationship between these two states. It is therefore important to study, in addition to so called ‘objective’ factors of conflict, dominating in the mainstream literature, also the ways how collective historical memories are reproduced and particularly, what exactly facilitates inter-state conflict within these processes. The first section of the paper discusses literature on collective historical memory, including the contributions of Maurice Halbwachs, James Wertsch and Jeffrey K. Olick. Two analytical units – 'eventual chain of events' and 'conceptual chain of events' – are introduced for analyzing the cognitive mechanisms informing reproduction of inter-state conflicts. The second section of the paper investigates discursive reproduction of the contents of the Russian and Estonian collective historical memories by analysing how respective ‘conceptual chains of events’ are essentialized into the narrative of ‘true history’ either along the story lines related to ‘civilizing mission’ (the Russian side) or the ‘liberation struggle of a small people’ (the Estonian side). The third section of the paper discusses how such essentialized narratives are utilized by conservative political forces, on the one hand, and deconstructed by liberal political forces, on the other hand, in Estonian domestic power-politics.

This paper discusses discursive reproduction of conflict in the Estonian-Russian relationship. Worsening of Estonian-Russian relationship since Estonia joined the EU, particularly the so called ‘Bronze Soldier crisis’ in April 2007 in Tallinn, indicates that different interpretations of history tend to take even secondary disagreements between the states to an existential ground, resulting in aggravation of their conflictual relationship. It is therefore urgent to investigate, in addition to the so called ‘objective’ factors representing the mainstream of conflict studies, also cognitive mechanisms behind discursive reproduction of collective historical memories, which can be manipulated for political gain.

The paper is divided into three sections. The first one focuses on the
structure of collective historical memory, by introducing the analytic units the 'eventual chain of events' and the 'conceptual chain of events' as its elements. The second section investigates the substantive content of the Russian and Estonian collective historical memories by focusing on how the respective conceptual chains are essentialized into the narrative of true history, either along the hierarchical or anti-hierarchical apprehension of history. The third section introduces the narrative of ‘many histories’ as a contrast and discusses how conservative or liberal ends of political spectrum use these different narratives in Estonian domestic power-politics.

**Theoretical background**

Estonian-Russian relationship represents a puzzle for the students of international relations. One trend in the literature focuses on the confrontational character of these relations in the last two decades, relating it to close linkages between security and identity issues in post-Soviet politics and international relations (Kuus, 2002; Merritt, 2000). Another line of thought highlights the signs of decline of such discords, particularly during Estonia’s accession to the EU, explaining these as the effects of socializing processes (Aalto, 2003; Morozov, 2004; Noreen & Sjöstedt 2004). Years since 2005 display remarkable sharpening of the relations between Russia and many of its neighboring states, including Estonia, which appears to provide more credence to the former point of view in literature.

Literature on ‘subjective’ factors in post-Soviet politics and international relations has grown fast in recent years. Eva-Clarita Onken (2007) has developed a three-level framework for analyzing these phenomena, focusing on the World War II commemorations in Moscow in 2005. Jörg Hackmann and Marko Lehti have edited a volume in the ‘Journal of Baltic Studies’ on the so called ‘Bronze War’ between Estonia and Russia in April 2007, discussing the linkages of collective memory to current political and inter-ethnic relationships (Hackmann & Lehti, 2008). Eiki Berg and Piret Ehin (2009) have edited a volume with Ashgate on memory politics as a key element of Baltic-Russian relationship. There is a number of other
contributions in the field uncovering different aspects of the Estonian-Russian relationship in the recent years (Burch & Smith, 2007; Petersoo & Tamm, 2008, etc).

The studies of Russia by James V. Wertsch (2008) are of particular importance to the argument of this paper, as these are devoted to cognitive aspects of memory politics. He has introduced the notion of ‘deep collective memory’, which is mediated by cultural tools and socio-cultural context of inter-group relations. These cultural tools, especially in the form of narrative templates, shape thinking about the past and can be regarded an essential aspects of inter-group conflict (Wertsch, 2008). Marek Tamm (2008) has studied in the same line how the memories of different groups are conveyed and sustained, by analyzing the narrative templates as cognitive mechanisms in the Estonian national historiography.

Research on subjective aspects of inter-group conflict reveals that collective historical memory functions not only in the form of remembering, but also in the form of forgetting certain events (Smith, 1991; Iggers, 1997, Olick, 2005). A famous remark by Ernst Renan in this regard goes as follows: ‘Forgetting, I would even go so far as to say historical error, is a crucial factor in the creation of a nation, which is why progress in historical studies often constitutes a danger to nationality’ (Renan 1996: 45). Thus, manipulation is an important ingredient of cognitive processes related to the nation building processes. The basis for such a selective memory is a set of psychological patterns that are similar to those, which guide individual actors in construing their self-image – individuals, as a rule, tend to highlight the facts that contribute to their positive self-image and to hide those facts that hinder it (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). There are exceptions to that rule in inter-state relations, like apologizing for the past injustice carried out towards another state. German president, for example, has apologized for Germany’s initiating of the World War II and actions during the war. A few years ago, the president Putin of Russia expressed apologies to Poland for the Katyn massacres during the World War II. However, Russia has not apologized for annexation of the Baltic States in 1940, as well as the injustice and suffering
caused to those nations by the Soviet regime, during the half-century to follow.

What is the reason behind such a difference? The key conceptual idea of this article holds that inter-state conflict can be represented as a cognitive phenomenon, due to the fact that in applying meaning to a conflict, reality is replaced by a description. As different actors have different historical experiences, their descriptions of history tend to be different, which can be utilized in domestic power-politics. Such tension in inter-group relations is a common research topic in human and social sciences, that has been scrutinized in literature through dichotomies like ‘truth and method’, ‘reality and interpretation’, ‘history and memory’, and so on (Halbwachs, 1992; Le Goff, 1992; Olick & Robbins, 1998). In all those binary oppositions, the analytical levels of the 'language of observation' and the 'language of interpretation' are distinguished, which represent different levels of cognition and which complement each other. The argument of this paper holds that the analysis of how actors manipulate the narratives located in these two levels has a potential to illuminate the political mechanisms behind reproduction of inter-group conflict.

Theoretical foundation for the analysis carried out in this paper is based on the analytic distinction between the notions of 'eventual chain of events' and 'conceptual chain of events' in the structure of collective historical memory (Zolian, 1994). This distinction represents another example of the oppositional pairs mentioned above. The eventual chain is formulated in the language of observation and represents just a formal chronology of historical events. Thus, the term ‘eventual chain of events’ does not signify ‘real’ history in the positivistic sense, but cognitive representation of reality on the level of empirical observation. ‘Conceptual chain of events’, on the other hand, represents a more general account reality that adds an extra interpretative dimension to the ‘chain of events’. ‘Conceptual chain of events’ highlights systematic patterns and teleological representation of the historical processes, which could have been realized in other ‘eventual chains of events’ as well.
Reproduction of the Russian and the Estonian collective historical memories

I will argue in this section that mutual replacement of ‘eventual chain of events’ by respective ‘conceptual chain of events’ in reproduction of collective historical memories is one of the two basic cognitive mechanisms behind recent sharpening of conflict in the Estonian-Russian relationship. It results in denial of the facts in the ‘eventual chain of events’ that do not suit one's own ‘conceptual chain of events’, but carry, however, significance for the counterpart in the relationship. Such a replacement brings about mutual allegations regarding distortions of history by the other side and tends to take even marginal disagreements to an existential level.

Let us give few examples of such a replacement. The first example is related to signing of the Tartu Peace Treaty in February 2nd, 1920. This event is a very significant element in the ‘conceptual chain of events’ in the Estonian historical memory and lays the groundwork for assigning meaning to most following (and in many ways also the preceding) ‘eventual chains of events’. However, in the Russian collective historical memory, the agreement is rather a secondary and in a way even a negative fact in the ‘eventual chain of events’. There are attempts to erase it from history by claiming that since the Bolsheviks rule was illegal, the treaties signed that time could not be considered of fundamental importance either (Illiashevich, 2007). Perception of Estonia in the ‘conceptual chain of events’ in the Russian historical memory is based rather on the Peace of Uusikaupunki of 1721. This treaty defines Estonian territory as a part of Russian Empire, which, however, is, a like to the ‘conceptual chain of events’ in the Estonian historical memory. Such a negation of certain events, which are important to the counterpart, inevitably obstructs a constructive dialogue between the two sides.

The second example, directly related to recent sharpening of Estonian-Russian relationship, is interpretation of the arrival of the Soviet Army in Tallinn in September 22nd, 1944. Despite the fact that both sides agree that such a fact took place in the ‘eventual chain of events’, their ‘conceptual chains of events’ are in contradiction. In the collective memory of the
Russians, it was Tallinn's liberation from fascists that took place that day; Estonians, on the other hand, interpret it as occupation by the Soviet Union (Smith, 2008). Replacing the 'eventual chain of events' with the 'conceptual chain of events' by both counterparts inevitably leads to the perception that the the other side lies. As a result, there are mutual allegations of distortion of history, which can become an independent factor aggravating tensions even further. For example, escalation of conflict in the Estonian-Russian relationship after removal of the Bronze Soldier monument in Tallinn in April 2007 reached a highpoint where senior officials started reproaching their counterparts for fascist sympathies, on the one hand, and the attempt to reoccupy Estonia, on the other. As a result, a rather secondary disagreement over the proper location of the monument developed into an existential conflict.

As one of the functions of collective historical memory is to promote positive self-concept of the actor, it is to a large extent unavoidable that on the level of common sense only the description of history of one's own group is perceived as 'real'. The cognitive mechanism behind the both cases described above is replacement of the 'eventual chains of events' by the 'conceptual chains of events' in reproduction of the collective historical memories. However, there is another cognitive mechanism as well, contributing to aggravation of conflicts in inter-group relations, stemming from the substantive contents of collective historical memories. It consists in specific representation of the contents of the collective memory, i.e. deriving it from the 'natural course of things', which can not be altered in principle. Such an essentializing of the 'conceptual chain of events' of one's own collective historical memory contributes to the assumption of 'true history' in which the own-group is represented in terms of 'good', while the outgroup in terms of 'evil'.

Operation of these two cognitive mechanisms described above does not mean that 'conceptual chain of events' in collective historical memory is fundamentally static. As a social representation enforcing hegemony of the own-group in domestic politics, certain elements of 'conceptual chain of events'
can be dynamic as well, in response to changes in political context. However, existence of certain archetypes, is still relatively stable and informs basic dispositions of in-group towards outgroup over a longer period of time (Wertsch, 2008; Tamm, 2008). Let us try to uncover, in the following subsection, the nature of such archetypes in the functioning of both Russian and Estonian collective historical memories.

*The 'conceptual chain of event' in Russian collective historical memory*

Russian collective historical memory emphasizes uniqueness of Russia – she represents neither East nor West, but a higher type of civilization, aiming to combine the best qualities of both (Duncan, 2005; Kaiser, 1994). The most well-known ideological concept to depict such a cultural hierarchy is the notion of 'Russian Idea', which postulates Russia's civilizing mission in global culture and politics (Gorskii, 1977; Longworth, 2005). Concrete goals of this mission have varied over time, but it can be interpreted, at its essence, as a desire to bring Russia's deeper culture and true liberty to other nations as well. The first ‘beneficiaries’ or rather targets of such a missionary ideology have been the peoples in the vicinity of Russia's border area, due to their geographical proximity. It is symptomatic, in the context of such an ideology, that in the Russian Empire the latter were perceived as the 'not-yet-Russians', inhabiting a lower level of cultural hierarchy and characterized by a civilizational retardation (Buldakov, 1995). Throughout history Russia has had a tendency to view its bordering nations not so much as sovereign subjects, but rather as satellites, *i.e.*, the relationship of Russia to its neighbours has tended to be not partnership but an attempt to make them 'forcefully' happy, instead (McDaniel, 1996).

One should notice, however, that the idea of the 'civilizing mission' that is based on the concept of a hierarchy of cultures, is politically and psychologically contradictory, as its successful enforcement may threaten the privileged position of the 'civilizer' herself. Hence, in addition to the 'civilizing' efforts, that equalize cultures, means have been sought to reinforce hierarchies between Russia and its neighbours. Such a dualism has been
essential element in the policies of state building in Russia. For example, the metaphor of 'Holy Russia', which can be considered a mental equivalent of its territorial expansion (Averintsev, 1991), does not refer to the egalitarian idea of popular sovereignty along the lines of Rousseau, forming the basis of national integration in the Western countries, but rather the privileged position of Russian culture, compared to other cultures. As Russia failed to create a nation-state before creating an empire, a kind of pre-nationalist ideology developed as the basis for state integration. It does not aim to melt other ethnic groups into itself through universalizing citizenship, but intends to engage them, on the one hand, and to preserve the cultural-political hierarchy of the Russian centre and the non-Russian periphery, on the other hand (Kuzio, 2002).

As a result, the Russian expansion and adjoining the peripheral regions and cultural groups to the centre has been fundamentally different, compared to the most Western nations. It has not been targeted on assimilating these cultural groups into a unitary Russian nation, but rather on their symbolic integration around Russia's cultural and political core. However, such a pre-nationalist concept of nation building has made Russia's conquests, due to the size of its territories as well as the administrative incapacity to organize it as a unitary state, in many ways only imaginary. The most vivid confirmation of that statement is offered by the fact how quickly Soviet Union vanished from the world map in December 1991 – a state that had existed over 70 years collapsed only in a few days (Medvedev, 1995).

A similar pattern of the pre-nationalism has expressed itself during Soviet time in the ideology of 'Soviet people'. Unitary Soviet nation did not presume smaller nations to dissolve into the Russian nationality, but to integrate around humanistic values and political goals formulated in the Marxism-Leninism ideology (Iivonen, 1990). The above-mentioned controversy, which has political as well as psychological content, can also be witnessed here – on the one hand, equality of all cultures was declared, but on the other hand, a clear hierarchy was imposed as well, which is expressed
in such concepts in the Soviet era like ‘elder brother’, ‘leading nation’ etc related to Russians. As Russian language and culture were perceived to form the core of the public sphere in the Soviet Union, uniting all peoples and ensuring the hierarchy of centre and periphery, the ideology of the ‘Soviet people’ can be viewed as just another manifestation of the ‘civilizing’ mission that is the subject matter of the ‘Russian Idea’ (Kuzio, 2002). Eventually, due to its internally contradictory nature, the concept of ‘Soviet people’ appeared to remain as imaginary as the entire Soviet Union.

The ideology of the ‘civilizing’ mission and utilizing it for political purposes is expressed in the Russian post-Cold War politics towards its neighbours as well. The very term ‘near abroad’, which refers to the former Soviet republics, is an example of it. It implies, that Russia treats the other post-Soviet republics as semi-foreign and hence semi-independent entities (Kozhemakin & Kanet, 1998). Especially vivid was such a treatment of Estonian state during the 'Bronze Soldier' crisis. According to the interpretation of Russia the Bronze Soldier monument represents the victory of the Soviet Union over fascism in the World War II, conveying general human values like the desire for freedom, resistance to foreign conquerors and self-sacrifice for the sake of the whole humankind. In the ‘conceptual chain of events’ of Russian collective memory the Bronze Soldier is a symbol to support their positive self-image, for it is related to a great victory, whereas the removal of the statue from its dignified location in the Tallinn centre, and particularly the way it was carried out by the Estonian government, is perceived as entirely incomprehensible and demeaning (Lavrov, 2007).

Thus, victory of the Soviet Union over fascist Germany is an element to convey central meaning in the current collective historical memory in Russia, that is interpreted not just as defending one's own country from invaders, but liberating the entire humankind from fascism (Tumarkin, 1994). In such a context, the remainder of the war-related ‘eventual chains of events’ are reduced to marginal role in the context of broader historical processes. Estonia’s incorporation into the Soviet Union, for example, is not interpreted in this ‘conceptual chain of events’ as a violent act (like it is done by the
Estonians), but as one element of the broader liberating mission, where acquisition of the Estonian territory was necessary for security reasons and self-defence (Ken & Rupasov, 2000). In the ‘eventual chain of events’ related to the incorporation, seemingly 'unpleasant' facts occurred as well – like deportations of the local people to Siberia – but in the context of the ‘conceptual chain of events’ in Russian collective historical memory, these acts are justified by struggle for liberating the whole humankind, in the context of which such sacrifices were unavoidable.

As a result, Russia has difficulties with comprehending the complains of Estonians regarding Soviet occupation, since from the standpoint of her own collective historical memory, Russia deserves Estonia's recognition for the liberation from fascism, instead. Thus, Russians tend to overlook the other side of the story and the fact that for majority of Estonians the end of World War II meant beginning of a new occupation, that brought about new suffering to hundreds of thousands people for half a century. In the framework of the ‘conceptual chain of events’ in Russian collective historical memory the question is not posed why most Estonians see in the Bronze Soldier monument a symbol of the Soviet power or how the Estonians’ feel about the Soviet time. In the context of hierarchical concept of culture, the policies of the Estonian state towards its minorities are reduced to pursuing retribution for the Soviet period, which, in the name of restoration of the Estonian nation state, discriminates against Russians (Semjonov, 2002).

Thus, two cognitive mechanisms are operating in the reproduction of the Russian collective historical memory. First, by substituting the ‘eventual chain of events’ to her ‘conceptual chain of events’ other possible versions of history and even debate over historical issues is outruled. Second, by essentializing her own version of history as a series of acts of liberation, a strategy of cultural hierarchization is utilized, which privileges Russia and represents her version of history as the ‘natural order of things’ and in this sense the ‘true’ history.
The conceptual chain of the Estonian collective historical memory

Such a representation is, however, in an unavoidable dissonance with the content of the Estonian collective historical memory, remaining from the viewpoint of the latter as illusory as the concept of the 'Soviet people' was. The core element of the ‘conceptual chain of events’ in the Estonian collective historical memory is struggle of a small people for liberation in the context of expansive neighbouring powers (Lauristin, 1997; Kuus, 2002; Tamm, 2008). It represents an anti-hierarchical mirror image of the concept of culture found in the ideology of the 'Russian Idea'. Estonians hold that despite the centuries-long foreign rule, their will for national self-determination survived and led to the foundation of their own state in February 1918. Such a pursuit for freedom is naturalized in the Constitution of the Republic of Estonia by the statement according to which the ‘aim of the independent Estonian state is to protect Estonian nation, culture and language’.

At the same time, Estonians believe that Estonia's sovereignty continues to be threatened, due to the factors like smallness of its population, vulnerable geographical location and the painful historical experiences (Hiio, 2007). These threat perceptions are an essential part of the Estonian collective historical memory even after the country has become a member of EU and NATO in 2004. It would have been safe to assume that after admission into these institutions a change would have followed in the national security discourse. But this has not happened, rather 'the transition has taken place not from exclusive to inclusive understanding of security, but from exclusions based on the notion of military threat to those invoking culture and values' (Kuus, 2002: 297).

Russia represents the primary source of threat perceptions among Estonians, due to geographic as well as historical reasons, being the negative 'other' in comparison to whom most of the positive features of 'us' are construed (see also Neumann, 1999, Petersoo, 2007). Two cognitive mechanisms reproducing such perceptions in the Estonian collective historical memory are, first, the placement of facts in 'eventual chain of events' (e.g. the Estonian citizenship policy, lack of the Estonian-Russian
border agreement, the construction of the Russian-German pipeline in the Baltic Sea, recent Russian-Georgian war, etc.) to the perspective of the ‘conceptual chain of events’ described above, and, second, the certitude that Russian state is incapable of becoming a democracy, and that the need to dominate is encoded into its very essence. Thus, a black-and-white world is construed, populated by the forces of ‘good’ and ‘evil’. The ‘evil Russia’ is essentialized in such a discourse as a structural principle found in its core, and extrapolated to future. It is predicted, within such a ‘conceptual chain of events’ that as Russia has performed injustice towards Estonia in the past, it will do it again in future, if allowed. This, in turn, necessitates Estonian preparations to defend herself against Russia through all possible means (see for example Aasmäe, 2004).

Such dispositions are constantly reproduced not only in the Estonian public debate, but in the academic discourse as well. This makes the latter somewhat anachronistic, in the light of theoretical advancement of the recent decades (see Brubaker, Loveman & Stamatov, 2004), in which essentialist presumptions are avoided, as a rule. A popular conceptual expression of such an essentialism is found in the description of the Estonian-Russian relations by the metaphor of clash of the civilizations’, which encodes fundamental difference of ‘our’ norms, values and ideals from ‘theirs’ (Saar, 1998). It is worth noting that this kind of disposition has a long tradition in the Estonian national and theoretical thought. For example, Jüri Uluots, a past prime minister, wrote about Russians as being aggressive by nature, which is determined by their ‘anthropological substance’ (Uluots, 1990). One of the leading ethnographers of the pre-war Estonia, Oskar Loorits scrutinized the Estonian self-consciousness in the terminology of contradictions between the Ural and Aryan origins (see Tedre, 1999). In the modern social-theoretical literature, such essentialism is reproduced by the primordial conceptualization of nations, based on principles of ‘methodological nationalism’ (see Wimmer & Schiller, 2003). It is done, for example, by interpreting different types of nationalism in the tradition initiated by Hans Kohn as different phases of nationalism. The ethnic-cultural nationalism as a specific type in
the original conceptualization of Kohn is, thus, interpreted not in terms of the exclusion of the 'other', but as carrier of liberal values, instead. However, one should add, there is also criticism of such a theoretical position found in Estonian academic discourse, holding that in such a naive framework, 'the transition from ethnos to nationality is unequivocal and problem-free as the awakening of a sleeper' (Piirimäe, 2007: 101).

**Collective historical memory in domestic politics in Estonia**

Essentializing tendencies in the collective historical memory are forcefully reproduced in the Estonian domestic politics as well, as conservative parties tend to amplify the 'Russian threat', as a part of their power strategy (Meikar, 2009). It is characteristic, in this respect, that the discourse of the 'Russian threat' in Estonia tends to focus not on the objective socio-economical processes and their possible political outcomes, but rather on discussing personality issues, like the KGB past of its current leaders, which is presumed to confirm the fundamental 'evil' of Russia (Aslund, 2005). What we are dealing with in this case is the attribution of motives to the counterpart that derives from one's own fears. Presuming that Russia cannot, in principle, be democratic, a vicious circle is created, where things to be prevented are discursively reproduced.

A vivid example of such a circle is abortion of signing of the Estonian-Russian border treaty, in 2005. After a settlement was reached by the foreign ministers of the two states, the Estonian Parliament unilaterally added new clauses to the preamble, referring to the Tartu Peace Treaty. It was justified by the argumentation of the need to prevent possible hostile action of Russia, based on the treaty, in the future (see also Berg & Oras, 2004). As such an addition was a violation of the foreign ministers' prior agreement, Russia claimed to have no other alternative than to freeze the ratification of the treaty. Thus, a prediction of the counterpart's motives, deriving from one's fears (and party-political calculations to use it for vote gain), turned into a 'self-fulfilling prophecy', through a preventive action of the other side. By behaving as an enemy, exactly such a role was imposed on the opponent.
The most remarkable example of essentializing of the ‘Russian threat’, as a part of domestic politics, can be found in the abovementioned Bronze Soldier Crisis. Ten months before Parliamentary elections in 2007, the leader of Reform Party Andrus Ansip declared that Soviet monuments do not belong in centre of Tallinn. His promise to remove the Bronze Soldier mobilized ethnic Estonians, and, as a result, the Reform Party received two times more votes at the elections in March 2007, compared to previous parliamentary elections (Anvelt, Poom & Ojakivi, 2007). After such a landslide victory it was difficult to withdraw the promise of removal, without losing face. Hence the new government started works on ground immediately after the elections, to relocate the Bronze Soldier monument, under the pretext of alleged plans from Russia to organise massive riots in Estonia on May 9th, which would threaten Estonian nationhood (Ansip, 2007). Preparations to remove the Bronze Soldier by government, however, provoked demonstrations in front of the monument among the Russian-speaking population in Estonia. The confrontation grew into vandalizing in Tallinn’s old town on April 26 during which over 1000 people were arrested (Vetik, 2008).

The plotting and execution of the monument removal by Estonian government mobilized the entire society on ethnic grounds (Astrov, 2007). The events acquired the proportions of an international conflict after deputies of Russian Duma arrived in Tallinn to meet the Estonian MPs started requesting resignation of the Estonian government. In addition, the Estonian Embassy in Moscow was attacked by the Kremlin-lead ‘Nashi’ youth movement, and the massive cyber-attacks against Estonian official Internet sites took place (Ehala, 2010). As a result, the depicted events actualized the essentialist interpretations both among the ethnic Estonians as well as Estonian Russians, which substantially intensified ethnocentric attitudes in society (Vetik, 2007).

The given example indicates that the essentializing of the ‘Russian threat’ tends to take even secondary disagreements to an existential ground, reducing the opportunities for a constructive relationship. Another consequence of such essentialism is spill-over of the threat perception related
to Russian state also to Estonian Russians. One of the most extreme examples of such spill-over in the recent years has been an open appeal to the international public, signed by a number of prominent Estonian cultural figures, as a reaction to Russia's continuous allegations about the violations of human rights in Estonia. In the appeal a very strong terminology reminiscent of Cold War, such as 'civil occupation' and 'persistence of aggression' was used, in signifying the Estonian Russians (Vahtre et al, 2005). Even though there is no doubt that Russia's foreign policy utilizes the accusation of minority discrimination in its opportunistic interest, raising the issue when it suits her (Cohen & Volk, 2004), the use of the 'persistence of aggression' rhetoric in the open letter instantly after the Estonian admission to the EU and NATO shows the deepness of threat perceptions encoded into the Estonian historical memory, as well as the ability of the conservative wing of the political spectrum to utilize it in domestic politics.

As a result of strong threat perceptions among Estonians, misperceptions have emerged not only in the Estonian-Russian relationship, but in Estonian relationship to the West. The writings of the former Estonian ambassador to Russia Mart Helme are particularly vivid in this respect, an example of which reads as follows: 'What we should definitely promote and support, is the replacement of the European big states' current realpolitik by politics that have a realistic attitude towards Russia as an imperialist state, the most important element of which is the idea that sacrifices should not be made to a voracious Moloch, however small and irrelevant those wouldn't seem' (Helme, 2004: 6). In a similar manner, a former Estonian ambassador to NATO, Harri Tiido iterates: 'The West occasionally seems to express a multilevel chain of unwishfulness. Firstly – truthful information is not desired about Russia. Secondly, in case it is received, it is not believed. Thirdly, if it is believed, it is not utilized for political purposes. The situation is occasionally quite depressing and it appears that not us, but instead many of our partners, tend to live in the past' (Tiido, 2005: 15).

Thus, the conservative wing of the Estonian politics is perplexed – why the West does not understand what is going on and why does the EU or the
US do not stand sufficiently for the Estonian interests in connection to Russia (see also ‘Open letter to Barrack Obama’, 2009 in this regard)? Such a phrasing in Estonian public debate itself indicates that the field of international affairs is perceived along essentialist terminology of wisdom/ignorance, whereas the position of wisdom is ascribed to oneself. Dwelling from the position of the wise, it is concluded that Estonian partners in the West need to be ‘enlightened’ about ‘what Russia is really about’, as it seems that they are not clever enough to see through the ‘Russian tricks’. In such a mode, for example, the editor in chief of an Estonian foreign policy magazine ‘Diplomaatia’ complains that ‘Things could be slightly different, if the European powerful states were led by somewhat more daring and principle people – the state of affairs with its leaders is rather poor at the moment ’ (Liik, 2005: 16; for comparison see Lyne, 2006).

In short – replacement of the ‘eventual chain of events’ with ‘conceptual chain of events’ in the collective historical memory is a cognitive form utilized to reproduce the narrative of ‘true history’ in Estonian public debate. The interpretation of whatever ‘eventual chains of events’ in terms of ‘Russian threat’ is the strategy utilized utilized by the conservative wing of political spectrum in Estonia. However, as the previous section revealed, such a substitution and interpretation is in discrepancy not only with the position of Russia, but often also the position of the West. This is the reason why Estonia is often perceived as a ‘one theme country’, incapable of reconciling with its past (Tiido, 2008).

One of the factors contributing to the capability of the conservative wing of the political spectrum to hold its hegemony in domestic affairs in Estonia, by invoking the ‘Russian threat’, has been confrontational US-Russia relationship since the presidencies of Vladimir Putin and George W. Bush. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, a transformation ideology dominated in the US foreign policy discourse, aiming to support Russia in establishing democracy and market economy. However, later on the US interest in the Russian direction weakened, for Russia had become an ideologically harmless and an economically inferior state. Even though a possibility for a new start
in the US and Russia's interests arose after September 11th 2001, it did not develop into strategic cooperation, but faded into the 'democratization' of the Moslem world by the US, and new expansionism by Russia. Thus, on the one hand, the strategy of the Bush administration has been to be stronger than the possible existing adversaries and use military force, if necessary, to maintain its privileged position in world affairs (Kagan, 2003), which unavoidably impacted also the Estonian-Russian relations. On the other hand, under Putin’s rule Russia started to utilize symbolism of the Soviet era, which has created new threat perceptions among its neighbours.

The argument of this paper holds that uncovering of the cognitive mechanisms behind reproduction of collective historical memories can contribute to better understanding of current tensions between Estonia and Russia. The previous analysis confirms that at the core of the conceptual chain of Russia's historical memory is a hierarchical concept of culture. Any divergence of the Estonian viewpoint from the Russian one is interpreted as expression of ethno-centric nationalism, within such a framework. There is no doubt that ethno-centric attitude exists in Estonia, to a certain extent, as in any other country. However, it is important to notice, that framing the Estonian policies towards Russian-language minorities exclusively in such terms is beneficial to the conservative wing of the Estonian political spectrum. Accusations of Russia towards Estonian policies inevitably increase threat perceptions among ethnic Estonians, which in turn generates ethno-centrism and strengthens the social basis of the conservative political agenda. Thus, a self-fulfilling prophecy comes into effect here – Russia's interpretation of the Estonian policies as exclusively ethno-centric contributes to the increase of ethno-centrism in Estonian society and politics, which is something Russia allegedly seeks to prevent. The boost in conservative ethnocentric dispositions among ethnic Estonians after the Bronze Soldier crisis confirms this unequivocally.

On the other hand, at the core of the ‘conceptual chain of events’ in the Estonian historical memory there is the notion of ‘liberation struggle of a small people’ and particularly opposition to the hierarchical concept of culture
of Russia. In such a framework, anything Russia does or does not, tends to be interpreted as an attempt to enforce its dominance over neighboring countries. Here a self-fulfilling prophecy comes into effect as well. Even though there is no doubt, that Russia often has a tendency to view its national interests through domination over the former satellites, perceiving Russia exclusively in such a framework is counterproductive to Estonia’s national interest. The issue of signing of the Estonian-Russian border treaty in 2005, described above, is only one example of the pattern, where naturalizing the ‘Russian threat’ the Estonian side reproduces domination that the Estonian political elite allegedly seeks to prevent.

Thus, gaining vote in Estonian domestic politics is heavily involved in the reproduction of the discourses of the Russian ‘civilizing mission’ or the ‘Russian threat’. At the same time, opposition to such conservative discourse exist as well, even though the role of the discourse has remained marginal so far. Let us take as an example of the liberal discourse an article written by former foreign minister Toomas Hendrik Ilves 'The Europeanization of Estonian Politics' (Ilves, 1997). One can find the following lines in the article, aiming towards for constructive steps in Estonian-Russian relationship: 'Several Estonian-Russian problems emerge from misinterpretation, but also from Russia's domestic political debate. Some of their circles gather domestic political recognition through attacks towards Estonia, but these should not be strengthened by our own unfounded assaults. Rather, we would need positive steps. Every Estonian should understand that the more we support the democratic tendencies in Russia with our balanced and benevolent behaviour, the smaller the chances are for the imperialist-minded to push their own program through' (Ilves, 1997: 13).

The narrative of Ilves that time diverged sharply from the conservative mainstream in Estonia. Reason behind confrontation in the Estonian-Russian relationship is not attributed to Russia's internal ‘evil’ in the article, but rather to contextual factors. It means that Russia's aggressive attitudes towards their neighbours do not have an essentialist ground, deriving from some deeper essence, but are rather a result of certain political and social
circumstances. Among those are Russia's domestic politics, where xenophobic moods are exploited, as well as the fact that Russia has faced serious economic and social setbacks after the Soviet Union disintegration. For example, the economic reforms in Russia launched at the beginning of the 1990s did not succeed, as western-minded reformists acted temerariously, not assuring the national support for the changes. The privatization process was corrupt, turning a thus far very egalitarian society into an extremely stratified one. In the course of the first ten years after dismantling of the Soviet Union, the Russian GDP sank threefold, falling from the third place in the world, to sixteenth (Graham, 2000). The way the market reforms were executed as a whole, gave rise to social setbacks that to many were comparable with the nationalizing carried out by Bolsheviks in 1920s. For example, according to the 'Human Development Report 2005' the rise in men's mortality rate in Russia during 1991-2002 brought up to 3 million additional deaths. This is history's largest human sacrifice in conditions of no war, famine or epidemics (United Nations Development Programme, 2005).

The narrative of Ilves unorthodoxically claims that even though Russia can be characterized by a strong internal need to construct 'enemies' in their neighbours, due to post-Soviet political and social hardships, it is not in the Estonia's interest to reciprocate by similar type of counter-attacks. This does not imply the renouncing of one's historical memory, but rather an attempt to exit a vicious circle, where mutual blame tends to reproduce confrontation. The narrative thus presumes that attempts to 'enlighten' the other side and to explain what 'really' happened in history cannot serve as a foundation for the constructive Estonian-Russian relationship. Rather, it should be substituted by the disposition of reflexive empathy, which demonstrates the ability to put oneself in the counterpart's shoes and project oneself into it's apprehension of the world (see Ross, 1995 in this regard). This represents an attempt to understand the other side, instead of attributing features from one's own fears to their psyche. Such an attempt does not mean agreeing to the other side, however, it creates an opportunity for a dialogue to decrease mutual misperceptions and undesired escalation of confrontation.
What follows is an example of an issue in the current Estonian-Russian relationship, which can be interpreted either from conservative or reflexive empathy position. The most typical confrontation in the Estonian-Russian relationship during the period after dismantling of the Soviet Union is the alleged discrimination of the Estonian Russians. According to the mainstream Estonian position, which is based on the presumption of ‘true history’ being on the Estonian side, Russia utilizes a conscious lie with this allegation, as ‘in Estonia there in fact is no discrimination’ (Estonian Bureau of the Minister of Population, 2008). However, from the perspective of the discourse of reflexive empathy, which is based on the concept of ‘multiple histories’, one can notice that such claims of Russia are not alien to experiences of many Estonian Russians, and are interpreted along the ‘conceptual chain of events’ in their collective historical memory. Russia holds that people who migrated to Estonia during Soviet period are not co-responsible for the policies of the Soviet regime. Thus, after Estonia regained independence, these migrants should have obtained Estonian citizenship automatically, similarly to the ethnic Estonians. However, the Estonian citizenship law of 1992 made them stateless. Loss of citizenship and, as a result, decrease in opportunities to succeed in the public sphere and labour market, created a feeling among many Estonian Russians of being discriminated against. One can note that exclusion and discrimination is felt not only by stateless persons, but by the Russian-speaking community as a whole, including top intellectuals (see Issakov, 2006). Such a feeling could be interpreted, from the position of the narrative of ‘true history’, as an expression of the hierarchy archetype of the Russian historical memory, due to which ‘Russians are finding it difficult to come to terms with being defined as a „national minority“’ (Kuzio, 2002: 247). However, from the position of the discourse of ‘multiple histories’, based on reflexive empathy, it can be regarded a normal psychological reaction of people in such a condition. The fact is that 25 million people strong diaspora remained in the former Soviet Union republics after the disintegration of the USSR (Heleniak, 2004). One can argue from the standpoint of reflexive empathy, that if the well-being of
the Finno-Ugric nations living in Russia is emotionally relevant to many Estonians (Valton, 2008), then, why not to appreciate, that the well-being of the Russian diaspora could also be emotionally relevant to Russia.

Conclusion

The purpose of this paper was to highlight the strategic role discursive reproduction of collective historical memories plays in the current Estonian-Russian relationship. The paper asserts that shift towards reflexive empathy in the relationship would presume deconstruction of collective historical memories to 'eventual chain of events' and 'conceptual chain of events'. Interpretation of the former should follow the discourse of 'multiple histories', rather than the discourse of the true history', if one is interested in resolution of conflicts.

However, such a shift is not on the agenda in the current stage of the Estonian-Russian relationship, particularly in the light of current Ukrainian-Russian crisis. Russia's role in the world affairs has weakened significantly during the past few decades, its current condition could be described as an empire's reluctant retreat from former domains of influence (Trenin, 2005). Such a condition is hard to cope by definition, both politically as well as psychologically. It is expressed, among other things, by the endeavour to maintain as extensive control over the 'near abroad' as possible by Russian authorities. However, history has witnessed empires with a very strong messianistic ideology, that have gradually been able to refrain from it - such as France (Revel, 2007). Thus, Russia stands on the crossroad and the direction she will take in future depends, besides geopolitical, socio-economic and other 'objective' factors (Light, 2003), also on the ways how she reproduces her collective historical memory.

On the other hand, in the Estonian domestic politics a strong anti-Russian sentiment is still dominating. A vivid example is the statement of the chief editor of a cultural weekly ‘Sirp’ that ‘even if an apology (for the occupation, RV) should arrive from the East, we could by no means accept it' (Tarand, 2009). Thus, the tendency to interpret whatever 'eventual chains of events' in terms of the
Russian ‘civilizing mission’, on the one hand, and the ‘Russian threat’, on the other hand, is strong in the Estonian public debate. The conservative wing of the political spectrum takes little interest in a constructive dialogue, as the conflict tend to play to their hand and can be utilized in the domestic power-politics.

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Academic and Popular Representations of the Recent Past on the Example of Estonia

Olaf Mertelsmann

As author of this short essay, I should acknowledge my own subjectivity on this topic. I was born and raised in West Germany, studied at the University of Hamburg and started my work as a historian with research on the German war economy of World War I. In 1994, I taught for the first time Estonian students at the University of Tartu. Only at my postdoctoral stage, I began research on Estonian history and was hired a couple of years later, in 2005, as associate professor in contemporary history by the University of Tartu. Thus, I am influenced through my German training and the upbringing on the other side of the Iron Curtain. In comparison to Estonian colleagues of my age, I never lived under Socialism. I only visited Socialist countries. In Estonia, I started as an outsider turning over the years into an insider being now for more than a decade involved in researching the country’s recent past. As a professional historian working at a university, I am probably full of prejudice towards popular history writing.

Everywhere in the world, there are tensions between academic and popular history writing. Popular representations of the past as the name indicates reach a larger share of the audience, while academic works often remain the literature for much smaller circles and might influence the public more on the long run for example through school curricula and more slowly disseminating knowledge. Only on rare occasions, the findings of academic history reach a larger audience through bestselling books, longer coverage in the media or TV-documentaries. Partly academic historians are themselves responsible for not being read due to their unreadable style or because they follow too much the traditions of their field. In popular history, we meet trained historians, journalists or amateur historians. They write more accessible often reducing the complexity of the past, constructing identities or
creating myths. While virtually nobody would go voluntarily to an amateur dentist, amateur historians might become quite successful. For example the most influential popular “expert” on German contemporary history is Guido Knoop, a TV-journalist holding also a PhD in history. ¹ Nevertheless, professional historians sometimes envy popular historians silently for reaching much larger audiences and being more influential.

In the case of Estonia, which might be seen as somehow typical for post-socialist countries, the roots of today’s popular and academic writing on the recent past go back to the same period – the late 1980s, the time of perestroika or the last years of socialism. The main protagonists might have achieved already an acknowledged position or they were in their formative years.

Some short remarks on Estonian recent history are necessary. ² Estonia was an independent state in 1918–40 after fighting successfully in a War of Independence against Bolshevik Russia and until 1934 a democracy. The Republic of Estonia was annexed like Latvia and Lithuania by the Soviet Union in 1940, occupied by the Germans during World War II in 1941–44 and regained independence only in 1991. All this influences the view on the recent past. Although the country was governed by a homegrown authoritarian regime since 1934, the interwar period witnessed enormous improvements for the broad population from culture and education to levels of wellbeing and increasing social equality. The violent time of Stalinism was such a shock that even the German occupation was seen by the majority of the population as a lesser evil.³ After the death of Stalin, the situation improved steadily and life became bearable. Still, the regaining of independent statehood and

¹ See Jörg Baberowski, ‘Geschichte für Trottel’ [History for Fools], Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 30.05.2014.
² As a first introduction to the history of Estonia and the other two Baltic states I recommend: Andres Kasekamp, Baruto sangoku no rekishi: esutonia ratovia ritoania sekki jidai kara gendai made (Tōkyō: Akashishoten, 2014).
the generally successful post-socialist transformation made it nearly impossible that Soviet nostalgia could evolve on a larger scale during the last two decades. If we want to explore representations of the past, we should not ignore the direct life experience of the audience or the knowledge transmitted to younger members of society through family and friends.

Due to the historical experience, there is a widespread image of Estonians as victims of history. Several commissions and groups of volunteers did the painstaking work of singling out the individual fate of forcefully mobilized, arrested, deported or executed citizens of Estonia under Soviet and Nazi rule. Huge volumes with the available data have been published.\(^4\) Meanwhile, collaboration with Nazis or Soviets or the role of Estonians as perpetrators is far less discussed. Those questions turned up only by the late 1990s. Quite recently the topic of violence, of “Red” and “White” terror during the War of Independence appeared.\(^5\) The heroes of Estonia’s recent past are clear in public opinion – those, who fought for independence in 1918–20, against the Soviets on the German side of the Eastern Front in 1941–44 or in armed resistance against Stalinism.

Under late Socialism, there were three competing narratives of Estonia’s contemporary history. The first was the official one strongly censored by the Communist Party, still allowing for some variations and slightly critical voices. Those historians possessed limited access to the archives. One should not make the mistake to throw all those works into the dustbin. Some of them contained highly valuable information.\(^6\) Other authors published interesting sources.\(^7\) We should not forget that Western historiography of Socialist countries during the Cold War was mainly based

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\(^4\) For example Leo Õispuu has edited more than ten volumes with the findings of his voluntary research group alone.


on those censored publications, because most of the archives were not easily accessible for western scholars. The main problem with the official Soviet version of Estonia’s recent part was the fact that it had to tell a success story, which was at least partly contradicting the life experience of the audience. Given the fact that nearly every Estonian family had members, who fled to the West, were arrested, deported or even shot by the Soviets, and that most families had suffered during collectivization it seems to be understandable, why the official version could not be shared by everybody.

The second narrative was the voice of the exile with virtually no access to primary sources, but as we know today being less biased and more accurate than Soviet Estonian historians. The exile produced many valuable works like one entire series of volumes on Estonia during the war.\(^8\) Two journals became an international platform for the Baltic exile, the German language *Acta Baltica* (1962–1997) and the publication of the Association for the Advancement of Baltic Studies, the *Journal of Baltic Studies* (since 1972). The best example for exile historiography on the recent past is Romuald Misiuuanas’ and Rein Taagepera’s “The Baltic States: Years of Dependence” (London: Hurst, 1983)\(^9\) — a path breaking book still influential today. Of course, the exile did not speak with one voice, but old and new ideological differences continued.

The third narrative was the private one being transmitted in family or friendship circles.\(^10\) It varied enormously as we can see in Estonian life stories written in the late 1980s.\(^11\) Very often, this private understanding of

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\(^8\) Richard Maasing et al. (eds.), *Eesti riik ja rahvas Teises maailmasõjas* [The Estonian State and Nation in World War II], vol. 1-10 (Stockholm: EMP, 1954–1962).

\(^9\) The second edition of 1993 covered also the period until 1990. An Estonian translation was published in 1997.


\(^11\) The Estonian Literary Museum in Tartu is the main collector of Estonian life stories today. Several thousand are gathered there and many edited volumes of life stories have been published in Estonian, but also in English or Russian. For example Rutt Hinrikus and Tiina Kirss, *Estonian Life Stories* (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2009). Life stories were also published together with scholarly interpretations: Ene Kõresaar (ed.), *Soldiers of Memory: World War II and its Aftermath in Estonian Post-Soviet Life Stories* (New York-Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2011).
history challenged the official way. It greatest success was the publication of “Kodu lugu – Home Story” in two volumes by Mart Laar, Lauri Vahtre and Heiki Valk in 1989, a national minded account of Estonian history, which had been prepared years earlier. Approximately 30,000 copies were sold, the best result for any history book in Estonian. This publication found its way into nearly one tenth of all Estonian speaking households. In 1989, Vahtre already held a candidate degree in history; Valk would later receive a doctorate in archaeology and Laar in history. All three had studied and received their degrees at the University of Tartu. Valk stayed in archeological research, while Vahtre and Laar became conservative politicians and among other things, popular history writers. The influence of “Home Story” cannot be underestimated. It appeared at the right moment, when historians debated the recent past in newspapers and the public did not always know what to believe about the past. Exile publications were not yet reprinted and appeared only slowly from the closed sectors of libraries. The more academic “The Estonian Nation and Stalinism” by Kaarel Haav and Rein Ruutsoo was published one year later and a couple of important source collections did not reach such a broad audience. In that sense, “Home Story” turned into the most influential history book of the late Soviet and the early independence period. It is definitely not an academic account of Estonia’s past, partly because of the restrictions in libraries. But we deal with a fluent narrative written by three history students in their twenties based on what they could read and what they have heard of. Under the conditions of the 1980s, this was a great accomplishment.

Academic history writing suffered during the 1990s from the problems
of post-socialist transformation. The universities and the Estonian Academy of Science were restructured, research was not well funded and professional historians faced serious problems to continue their work. Single important publications on Estonian contemporary history appeared, but only since the late 1990s with the formation of different history commission, especially the presidential commission, research took really off. A new generation of historians with some international experience started to work through the vast amount of material in Estonian and foreign archives. Some older historians like Jüri Ant, Mati Graf, Toomas Karjahärm and Väino Sirk or Olaf Kuuli contributed with valuable research. New series like “Between Peace and War”, “Estonian History”, single influential edited volumes or

20 There will be six volumes in this series covering the entire Estonian history. Publication started in 2003.
the findings of the presidential commissions\textsuperscript{22} and numerous articles in new history journals like “Ajalooline Ajakiri – The Estonian Historical Journal”, “Tuna – Past”, “Acta Historica Tallinnensia” and the German language “Forschungen zur baltischen Geschichte – Research on Baltic History” increased our knowledge enormously. Academic life at the universities consolidated also in this period. Libraries started buying book and journals from abroad. International contacts intensified and after economic consolidation Estonian historians could spend longer periods abroad. In addition, academic and popular books on history were increasingly translated into Estonian. New methods and approaches began to spread.

Estonian contemporary history did not remain a field reserved only for Estonians, but with Ruth Bettina Birn\textsuperscript{23}, Karsten Brüggemann\textsuperscript{24}, David Feest\textsuperscript{25}, myself\textsuperscript{26}, Seppo Zetterberg\textsuperscript{27} and Elena Zubkova\textsuperscript{28} four German

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\textsuperscript{27} Seppo Zetterberg, \textit{Eesti ajalugu} [Estonian History], (Tallinn: Tänapäev, 2009);
historians, one Finnish and one Russian historian contributed with important works on Estonian contemporary or general history. Actually, Zetterberg’s account is the best overview on Estonia’s history written by one author. One important factor was and is the openness of Estonian academia. The internationalization of universities and research is one of the aims of state research policy. This means that foreigners are more easily hired than in many other Central Eastern European countries. For example, foreign Estonian historian Andres Kasekamp became professor of political science in Tartu, Brüggemann turned into professor in Tallinn, I am associate professor in Tartu, and German historian Ulrike Plath is now professor in Tallinn. Estonian historiography internationalized, too, and leading contemporary historians like Tõnu Tannberg, Jaak Valge or Aigi Rahi-Tamm published increasingly abroad. In comparison to the situation some 25 years ago, the development was tremendous, not only concerning the increase of knowledge about the recent past but also in relation to the variety of methods and views. In addition, while in the 1990s only few persons finished a PhD in history, the numbers have increased steadily. Furthermore, a couple of young researchers from Estonia obtained a PhD from abroad and returned home like Kaarel Piirimäe, now professor at the Estonian Military


33 Kaarel Piirimäe, Roosevelt, Churchill, and the Baltic Question: Allied Relations
Academy, or moved further on like Anton Weiss-Wendt. Thus, nowadays, there is a critical mass of competent researchers on contemporary history.

Crucial questions of the recent past were Stalinism and World War II. This was reflected in the topics of research. The German occupation during the war became important somehow later, when Estonia applied for member status in the European Union and NATO. One reason for the establishment of history commissions in the Baltic states was to demonstrate that those countries were “coming to terms with the past”. Another important field of research is the founding of the independent state and the interwar period. The First World War was discovered only recently in relation to the 100th anniversary. Those important topics of academic research are also mirrored in popular publication.

Nevertheless, the Estonian public did not always note the improvement in scholarly research. Of course, in Estonia, academic historians are valued: they appear regularly on television, in newspapers or on the radio, but like elsewhere popular historians reach wider audiences. Partly this is related to the language of publications of some academic researchers – English, Russian or German does not really reach Estonian readers, but this is required by the Estonian research funding system. The probability of being funded or of finding a job simply increases with publications abroad. But mainly, popular history writers are easier understood and fulfill better the

requirements of the audience. Of course, even here are exceptions. Magnus Ilmjärv’s academic book on Baltic interwar foreign policy sold well and was available even in supermarkets, although it is a brickstone with nearly 1,000 pages and not that easy to read.38

Exile historiography reached Estonia mainly in the early 1990s, when those works were reprinted and the closed parts of libraries were opened. Since the old Estonian exile is slowly withering away, this influence was not long lasting. Today’s massive work migration includes, of course, also some historians, but in this case it is yet hard to see a real difference between Estonians living abroad or in their native country.

Several publishers today are specialized in popular history and memoirs, especially from World War II, for example Grenader. There is a memory boom39 ongoing, which is visible entering any larger bookstore and looking at the shelves for history. Academic accounts are clearly in the minority. Popular historians like Laar40, Vahtre41 or economist and journalist

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39 In this essay I do not intend to cover the quickly expanding field of memory studies in Estonia. I just mention some of the important authors from different fields: Terje Anepaio, Karsten Brüggemann, Rutt Hinrikus, Siobhan Kattago, Tiina Kirss, Ene Kõresaar and Marek Tamm.

have produced dozens of books, while academic writers are much slower. This is not to say that Laar and Vahtre did not publish academic texts as well. Lovers of brickstones will prefer for example Reigo Rosenthal and his retelling of archival sources. Military history is served by Mati Õun and Hanno Ojalo. Some authors stress the victimization of Estonians like Imbi Paju. The audience is really interested in history, in consumable history, and popular writers fulfill the demand. In the worst case, an author might be completely unqualified like Lembo Tanning and delivers a very strange

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Estonia] (Tallinn: Varrak, 2014). This is only a selection and Laar's numerous booklets are not included here.


\textsuperscript{44} The first has published more than fifty and the second more than twenty books on military history.

\textsuperscript{45} Imbi Paju, \textit{Memories denied} (Helsinki: Like, 2009). This book has been published in six languages already.
picture of the past.\footnote{Lembo Tanning, \textit{Euroopa probleem ... Teine maailmasõda} [Europe’s Problem ... The Second World War] (Tallinn: Infotrükk, 2006).} Without doubt, as elsewhere, the perspective of Estonian society on the recent past is influenced by popular writers much more than by academic authors.

School textbooks also influence the image of the recent past. In the late 1980s or early 1990s, history teachers in Estonia did barely have acceptable textbooks especially on contemporary history. They worked with newspaper cuttings, photocopies and their own notes. When the first post-socialist textbooks appeared, one could divide the authors broadly into two groups: popular and academic authors. Mart Laar and Lauri Vahtre became, in fact, extremely successful textbook authors. Many students confessed to me that their impression of history was severely influenced by Laar and Vahtre until they studied in university and realized that the interpretation of history was far more differentiated. Still many academic authors mentioned here have also published successfully school textbooks like Tõnu Tannberg. In general, one might state that Estonian history textbooks have improved over the last two decades. One unsolvable problem remains: the country is too small and has too few potential textbook writers to cover all topics and periods in schoolbooks adequately. This is also the reason, why some textbooks on general history have been simply translated from other languages.

Since Estonia has one Estonian language and one Russian language school network another question arises. Is it appropriate to use the same history textbooks in both systems only in different languages or should the Russian speaking pupils should use textbooks, which bear their situation and past in mind. At the moment, the same textbooks are used and it seems somehow strange to burden Russian students with details of Estonia’s peasant history, while Russian history comes often too short. Furthermore it is questionable whether for example Mart Laar’s and Lauri Vahtre’s textbooks are always adequate.

Another field creating an image of the recent past is the media. The best example of the influence of popular history in the media is the 12-part-
TV-series “Tuulepealne maa – Windward Land”. Lauri Vahtre was responsible for the historical parts of the scenario. The series is primitive, presents a nationalist simplified interpretation of Estonian history of the interwar period and I was unable to watch it completely, because I felt it was simply too terrible and awful. Nevertheless, it became popular and reached a wide audience, which thought – this is the real story of Estonia’s past. One has to add that most comments in the press were highly critical. In this case we see the difference between intellectuals not accepting this simplified and nationalist view on the past and an audience thinking that this was “historical truth”.

There are other films in the same vain. “Detsembri kuumus – The Heat of December” depicts the Communist uprising in Tallinn in 1924 and “Nimed marmortahvlil – Names in Marble” the heroic undertakings during the Estonian War of Independence. Even a Finnish film, “Puhdistus – Purge” based on the novel by Finnish writer Sofi Oksanen follows a similar pattern by looking into Soviet Estonia especially in the postwar period. “Risttuules – In the Crosswind” on the Soviet mass deportations tries to use

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47 This mini series was first aired on Estonian Television in 2008. Creators were Lauri Vahtre and Mihkel Ulman, director was Ain Prosa. The program can be viewed at the digital archives of Estonian TV at https://arhiiv.err.ee/seeria/tuulepealne-maa/lavastuslik/31. Part 13 covering World War II was broadcasted in 2013 on the 95th anniversary of the Estonian declaration of independence.

48 This film reached the cinemas in 2008. Asko Kase served as director and the scenario was written by the same authors as “Windward Land” – Lauri Vahtre and Mihkel Ulman.

49 The movie came to the cinemas in 2002. The senario was written by Elmo Nüganen, the director, and Kristian Taska, the producer. The film is based on the patriotic novel by Albert Kivikas (1936). It was obviously the most successful Estonian movie after the regaining of independece.

50 While the novel is a nice piece of literature with certain flaws concerning historical accuracy, the movie seems to me to be a failure. It was released in 2012, directed by Antti Jokinen and received some positive acclaim.

51 Sofi Oksanen is an excellent writer and received a couple of literature prizes. As a piece of literature her novel “Purge” is of high quality as her other works on Estonian topics. One weakness lies in the inaccurate way she deals with history. Together with Imbi Paju she has also edited a volume on Soviet Estonian history, Behind Everything was Fear, bestelling in Finland and Estonia. The volume contains popular and academic articles, sometimes the footnotes have been omitted.

52 The movie was released in 2014 and directed by Martti Helde. The film promises to be of a documentary character, which is supported by being in black and white, but it
a more aesthetic and interesting approach, but the historical message remains as pathetic as with the above-mentioned movies. A positive example of how to deal with the recent past was set by Mati Talvik with his TV-program “Eesti aja lood – Stories from Estonian Time”. Talvik, who was a successful TV-journalist, already under the Soviets interviewed in his documentaries about the recent past a variety of historians, eyewitnesses and popular historians. He also added a lot of historical film footage. While a historian might be critical towards some of the programs, others are really well done considering the low budget available. The program was aired at prime time and won a large audience and positive acclaim. Several of those documentaries have also been published on DVD.

Of course, nowadays a lot of information on the past is spread through the internet. In the Estonian language web serious, popular and rather dubious pages can be found as everywhere else. Academic journals like “The Estonian Historical Journal” or “Past”, several books and academic articles are available free of charge on the web. Institutions like the Estonian Institute attempt to present Estonia’s past with short texts written by professional historians. However, judging by the contents of webpages some of my students have used for their essays, there is a lot of highly dubious material online available.

Up to now my remarks have been basically concerned with the Estonian language audience. The Russian-speaking minority of about 30 percent of the population, which does not only consist of ethnic Russians, is a different case. In Russian language schools, as mentioned above, basically the same history textbooks are used as in the Estonian schools, only they have been translated into Russian. For native speakers and also for Estonians with good command of the language Russian television channels and the Russian language Internet are extremely attractive, because the choice of programs, websites or sources is understandably much larger. A certain share of the Russian minority is only living in a Russian media and Internet sphere and is littered with outright mistakes.
concerning Estonia’s recent past this might lead to a completely wrong understanding according to the Kremlin’s wishes. We should not forget that an information and propaganda war against the Baltic states is ongoing since more than a decade. The news agency Regnum (http://www.regnum.ru/news/estonia/) or the Foundation “Historical Memory” headed by Aleksandr Diukov (www.historyfoundation.ru/) offer a very strange and often propagandistic view on the history of the Baltic states. In academic life, the books published by “Historical Memory” are often ignored or highly criticized because of their deficiencies, but they can be downloaded free of charge by everyone interested in Baltic contemporary history. Provocatively one might interpret those popular accounts in Russian as a counterweight to the patriotic works by Laar, Vahtre and others. Of course, on the Russian book market there are also very solid publications on Baltic history available.

Whether a member of the Russian-speaking minority is able to build up a decent view on Estonia’s recent past depends also on language knowledge. Does she or he is able and willing to read in Estonian about history or even to read academic writings or is a person living completely in a Russian language sphere of information. The understanding of the past seems to be also a test for the successful integration of the so-called minority, which is in a couple of towns actually in the majority. The events in Tallinn in April 2007, riots related to the removal of a Soviet war memorial,53 would at first glance indicate that the popular understanding of the recent past of Estonians and Russians is completely different. Nevertheless, on the long run over the last two decades the overall tendency is more positive. Differences between the two groups in interpreting history became obviously smaller. According to a recent opinion poll in November 2014, the support of Russian speakers in Estonia for belonging to the European Union did increase due to the recent events in Ukraine.54

54 See the full report in Estonian ‘Elanikkonna suhtumine ja teadlikkus Euroopa Liidu küsimustes’ [The Attitude of the Population and the State of Knowledge towards European Union Questions], November–December 2014: https://riigikantselei.ee/
To conclude this rather subjective essay, like elsewhere popular history is extremely influential in Estonia and shapes the popular understanding of the recent past. In addition, we should not forget that there is a Russian speaking minority, too. Academic history writing has severely improved over the last two decades, but does not reach the masses to such an extent. Exile historiography is not important anymore today. The case of Estonia seems to be thus very typical for post-socialist countries. The greatest similarities are expected to be found with Latvia and Lithuania.

Popular history is serving both identity constructing and economic purposes. Concerning the latter, we should not forget that some authors create additional income through their works or could secure their jobs. In regards to identity construction Mart Laar and Lauri Vahtre might be called quite successful. But we should not ignore one of the rules of popular history; the public is consuming what it does expect. Buying a book by one of the well-known authors, the reader knows that there will be some new and unknown facts or details, but also those conclusions she or he is expecting. This is evident for Laar and Vahtre, but also for Russian propagandist Aleksandr Diukov.
How much should the latest research achievements be reflected in history textbook?

Hiromi KOMORI

Introduction

What type of history should be taught in schools? Since the 19th century, this has been a crucial issue for teachers and historians, as well as for politicians, at least in Europe. Especially for countries that have experienced changes in political regimes more than once, such as Estonia, historiography has always been expected to unite society. Thus, history education was and is problematic.

As is the case with many other countries, history education in Estonia is sometimes politicized. One of the significant polemical themes has been Estonia’s relationship with Russia and the Russians. When Estonia regained independence in 1991, numerous Russian-speaking residents lived there. Many were not automatically provided with Estonian citizenship of the state, where they lived at that time. Their knowledge of Estonian as the state language was quite limited or almost nonexistent. Besides, their perceptions of Estonian history differed from perceptions of the majority in Estonia. These problems are intertwined and inseparable. Therefore Estonian society faces the challenge of social integration, and history education is expected to function as a medium to promote it.

However evaluation of history education’s achievements in the 1990s, and later, is not the purpose of this short essay. My intention is to consider whether the content of history textbooks differs from that of scholarly written historiography, and if so, to examine the gap between them. One has observed that current history textbooks are written almost exclusively by a handful of historians regarded as popular historians in present days Estonia.

In what follows, I examine three descriptions that address
“Russification” in the late 19th century in anticipation of further discussion, which hopefully, follows this essay in the near future. Since “Russification” encompasses very broad phenomena, I focus the narratives on its consequences.


Mart Laar (1960-) is a politician and a historian. He has served as the prime minister twice and headed the national-conservative party “Isamaa (Fatherland)” (since 2003, Isamaa ja Res Publica Liit) for many years. He received his doctorate in history in 2005. His dissertation deals with the “national awakening” in the 19th century. Laar has published a large number of history books, most of them may be classified as popular history. Lauri Vahtre (1960-) is also a politician and a historian, although he is not so successful a politician as Laar, he does belong to the same party. Using historical materials, Vahtre has also written novels and scripts for a television drama and a film.

The effect of Russification became appeared in the national organizations and the presses. The Russian authority closed down publications that took too much of an independent or national course, such as the newspaper *Virulane*, the editor of which, Jaak Järve, was expelled from the country. In 1881, the Aleksander School opened as a Russian-medium town school despite the Estonians’ protests. Russian officials expected Estonians to become Russified and believed that Estonian mothers would already be singing their children to sleep with Russian lullabies. This expectation was based on the rather favorably inclined attitude of Estonians toward the Russian central authority and the Russians, who were regarded as supporters in struggles against German landowners.

Here, however, the Russification policy arrived late, and the Estonians were in the process transforming into a modern nation. By driving away the Germans and the German language from public life, Russification made room for Estonians. Thus, at that time, the evaluation of Russification was indeed controversial. First, it negatively influenced the Estonian educational system: many intellectuals from the older generation were removed from public life and national writing was strongly suppressed. Second, the ideology of Russification repelled Germans, which in turn rebuffed the demand for Germanization, the more serious competitor in the formation of national identity. Third, however, under Russification a series of reforms implemented during the reign of Aleksander II was introduced to the Baltic provinces. Thus various remnants from the medieval times in the administration of courts and police disappeared first; then, so did the spheres of governance and legislation in towns. (translated by H. K.)


“Period of Russification: Consequences of the reforms” (author of this section: Toomas Karjahärm)

*Eesti Ajalugu* is a general history series on Estonia whose first, second, and third volumes were published before World War II. The chief editor of this series was Hans Kruus, the first professional historian of Estonian origin. However this publication project was interrupted due to the war. After Estonia regained independence, then president, Lennart Meri initiated a renewal of the series. In general, Estonians are very interested in their own history. In 2013, the rewritten third volume was awarded a prize as the best history book in 2013.

Several historians contributed to the renewed general history series.

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Toomas Karjahärm (1944–) wrote the chapter translated here. His main research interest lies in nationalism and Russification in the 19th century, while his scholarly work extends more broadly; for instance, toward the history of intellectuals. As is the case with other historians, he could not escape academic criticism by fellow scholars, but no one can deny that Karjahärm is one of the best historians dealing with Russification in the Baltic provinces.

In the Baltic provinces as a whole, reforms of Russification made the influence and presence of Russia stronger; it diffused Russian culture and science, as well as social-political thoughts, including the radical idea that would break the existing order. Russification of Estonians proved unsuccessful in terms of denationalization, as their ethnic identity based on their own culture had been so strengthened through the process of the national movement that a large part of Estonians could no longer be assimilated. The rise of Estonian nationalism was a more significant element than Russification. Indeed, Russian culture and education were exploited but people did not want to be Russian. As an ideology, Russification did not have an idea or model that would have made Russification desirable for Estonians. Since there were no prominent Russian society and culture, from which people could find a model, cultural Russification was neither prestigious nor attractive for Estonians. In this sense, it was different from Germanization. German cultural influence, accumulated for a long time in Estonia, could not be excluded by short lived Russification, and the Baltic provinces’ German appearance remained afterward. With the Russification policy, the government lost support from the national movement in the Baltic provinces. At the turn of the century, Estonian and Latvian liberal nationalism that looked toward the individual and national rights, was directed against both German and Russian oppression. (translated by H. K.)

Finally, I examine *Estonia and the Estonians*, written by Toivo U. Raun (1943-), professor at Indiana University since 1990. He was born in Tartu, but escaped to Germany in 1944, with his family, and then went to the United States of America in 1949. He specializes in Baltic provinces’ national movement during the late 19th and beginning of the 20th century. Raun’s *Estonia and the Estonians* is essential literature for people interested in Estonia, including history students.

The cultural level of the Estonian population had already advanced too far by the mid-1880s for denationalization to be a serious question any longer. (p. 66)

Among the Estonian intelligentsia in the second half of the 1890s, a new generation that had received its secondary and higher education in the Russian language began to reach maturity. These intellectuals were no more Russified than earlier ones had been Germanized: on the contrary, their sense of Estonian identity appears to have been heightened by the pressure of cultural Russification, and the changed educational system opened up new cultural avenues…. (p. 67)

4. Tentative conclusion

Hence, this comparison of three descriptions about Russification clarified that there are more commonalities than differences between general history and content in history textbooks.⁴ As we have dealt with textbook and general history above, it is unfair to blame simplification of explanation. Simplification is sometimes required to make the text understandable for readers. In addition, as both history textbooks and general history are a type

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⁴ You might come to a different conclusion, if you took up a different subject.
of narrative, they are usually compelled to choose a certain perspective or a specific frame as such. This does not necessarily mean distortion of history.

In his academic volume, Karjahärm rightly put the question: Had every people’s initiative national motivation, whether it was the establishment of a temperance society, a voluntary fire brigade or a kind of occupational organization, just because that was made by Estonians in the era of the national movements and had the name of such an initiative with (not always) the word “Estonia”? …Is the membership of such a society or an organization enough to be an activist, or is it still well perceived conscious positioning and a deed in the name of the nation? Through this question, Karjahärm obviously thinks that the national identity “Estonians,” in the 19th century, was not self-evident as described in general history. As Woodworth observes, they were no longer peasants as much as Estonians in the beginning of the 20th century. However, Estonians could act as peasants as well as laborers, if the situation required, as we saw in the events of 1905. Karjahärm seems to be inspired by the situational approach of Aleksei Miller, or he unknowingly shares his research interest with Oliver Zimmer, who argues that national identity is a public project, rather than a fixed state of mind and claims that the mechanisms social actors use as they reconstruct the boundaries of national identity at a particular point in time should be elucidated.

It is probably safe to say that, in general, authors adjust their

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8 Aleksei Miller, Between Local and Inter-Imperial: Russian Imperial History in Search of Scope and Paradigm, Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History, 1, 2004, pp. 7-26.
content and make it comprehensive to readers. This does not mean that authors are allowed to distort history for purposes of readability. Rather, scholars must acknowledge the contradiction between academic sincerity and plainness of description, which is necessary to influence the people’s historical perceptions.
Part II

Conflicts and Dialogues
Memory and Identity:
Memory conflicts in Polish-Ukrainian and Polish-Russian relations in the opinion of Polish society

Małgorzata Głowacka-Grajper

1. The memory of recent history in Polish society

In the social scientists’ opinion, history and memory are in the opposition to each other. One of the researchers on processes of commemoration, Pierre Nora said: “History is always problematic and incomplete reconstruction of what had passed. Memory is therefore a phenomenon constantly present, the ongoing relationship with the past, while history is only its representation” (after: Kończal 2009: 209). The late twentieth and early twenty-first century is a period of “memory boom” in the social sciences. In many countries the processes of commemoration gain strength and become the object of scientific reflection. Social memory has two basic functions: shaping identity (allows groups and individuals define who they are by reference to the events of the past) and legitimating the state power (determines who and why should exercise authority in the group) (see Szacka 2009). The fall of communism in Poland and other countries of Central and Eastern Europe meant that social memory has been “unlocked” – people could officially start talking about the events of the past, which were suppressed during the communist period. This led to numerous disputes about the interpretation of the past, and therefore – about the nature of Polish identity in the twenty-first century.

Piotr Kwiatkowski (2009) identified three main characteristics of Polish memory discourse in the times of transition:
• return to old topics means revision of fixed image of the past – change of interpretation and the rules of discourse (public confrontation of opinions) do not serve reconciliation, but fuelling conflicts,
• discourse memory has a practical nature – it serves gaining advantage in the present,
• bringing back to the fore Polish relationships with other nations – complex and emotional discourse.

The latter discourse is of particular identity importance and refers to the most important events of the twentieth century, including primarily World War II, which today defines the nature of the Polish relationship with neighbouring countries.

Throughout the period of communist, events of World War II were constant points of collective memory (cf. Kwiatkowski 2008). Although after 1989 an important place in the canon of everyday national memory took the collapse of communism, the war is still alive and important part of social memory in Poland (Table 1).

Table 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Which events from the history of Poland of last a hundred years do you consider the most important?</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The overthrow of communism in Poland</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Events of World War II</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The choice of Karol Wojtyla as Pope</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restoration of independence in 1918</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joining European Union</td>
<td>15</td>
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<tr>
<td>August 1980 and rise of „Solidarity”</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marshall law</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I don't know, hard to say</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Elaborated by the Author on the base of CBOS Report BS/166/08, November 2008, open question, representative random sample of adult Polish inhabitants of 1107 persons, data are given in percent.*

The strong position of the war in Polish social memory other researchers also highlight: “The memory of World War II is a living history, which is subject to family transmission and discussions with witnesses. According to 72% of the

1 In this article empirical data comes from Polish public opinion researches based on reports of Public Opinion Research Center (CBOS). Researches on social memory are not conducted periodically, but only on the anniversaries of various events.
respondents of CBOS survey conducted in 2009, World War II for them is ‘still a vital part of the Polish history, which should be constantly reminded.’ (…) The Polish-German and Polish-Ukrainian debates directly affects the respondents’ declarations, as well as specifies the contents of their memory.” (Nijakowski 2010: 241). A characteristic feature of Polish social memory is a common belief that members of one’s family were participants in the events and processes that are important to the history of the entire nation. Most of them are the events of World War II – as many as 86% of Poles indicates that members of their families took part in it (cf. Kwiatkowski, 2008: 188-189). Therefore, World War II is still the element of the past, which contemporary Poles can identify with. It has a strong emotional overtones for them as it is closely connected with the history of their families. Harms suffered during the war by the Poles are therefore harms of the most important people for individual respondents – family or friends.

The war in Polish social memory has first of all heroic and martyrological aspects, which means that the image of an enemy is of great importance in it. The image of a hostile state allows, through the opposition, to determine the characteristics of one’s own group and thus its collective identity, and the memory of sufferings caused by the enemies allow to maintain this identity. The memory of World War II is part of a series of traumatic events present in the Polish social memory and thus that war becomes another example of “Polish fate”, and even is seen as its culmination.

In Poland in the nineteenth century the Roman Catholic Church became the biggest depositary of history, culture and tradition as well as collective memory of Poles (Casanova 2005: 165). Territory of Poland was the region of ethnic, national and religious borderlands what in the times of the beginnings of the modern nation formation had initiated the process of melting the national and religious identity. The Polish state form XIV century to the second half of the XVIII century embraced many different ethnic groups which later by the processes of nationalisation were transformed into national groups endeavouring to create their own state with Ukrainians among them. In response to these processes Polish national identity were also reinforced by an intelligentsia and catholic clergy (see Snyder 2003). In the face of the absence of statehood in the
nineteenth century and remaining under the rule of the state foreign not only because of national, but also religious aspect, the Roman Catholic Church has become a mainstay of Polish-ness, and the concept of “Poland as Christ of nations” had fulfilled the process of melting religious and national elements. An important role in strengthening this relationship played also a period of communism.

The impact of tragic experiences of World War II has a fundamental influence on memory and identity of contemporary inhabitants of Poland. These events were radically incomprehensible but in the same time required very clear interpretation. The reference to the known mechanisms of interpreting reality and the values that were present in the traditional society, resulted in identifying the tragic events with the persecution that the early Christians met, which was particularly easy in times of war and communist regime which consciously and openly fought against religion and Church institutions.

In the modern world we can observed clear shift towards the stories of victims and perpetrators (so called, victimhood nationalism). However, we can distinguish between two radically different types of victims. In his article historian Jie-Hyun Lim shows that on the one hand we have to deal with the victim par excellence, senseless, nameless, led to the slaughter, killed during the pacification of cities, vanishing in religious and ethnic civil wars (Jie-Hyun Lim 2010). On the other hand we have a victim actively operating and vanishing in the name of higher, often nationwide values. Such kind of victim should be rather described by the word “sacrifice” then “victim”.

Millions of victims who died in a mass killings, because of starvation or exhaustion in the Central and Eastern Europe were therefore victims par excellence (see Snyder 2010). But the description of their suffering by the scheme of nationalist ideologies – these people were dying, because they were members of a particular nation – seems insufficient. Their death must be given the status of supreme sacrifice, having almost eschatological significance, because only then any discussion about the purposefulness of the victims’ sufferings loses its

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2 In the 80’s of XX c. in some church parishes were laid plaques commemorating the victims of the Katyn massacre and they were the only places where such commemorations could be made.
meaning. Secular language is not the right words, metaphors and ways of constructing a narrative to describe and explain the mass sacrifice of people killed without a fight, victims of mass persecutions, purges and mass executions. Here a religious language is needed – the language saying that there is no unnecessary and incomprehensible suffering – every pain can be part of martyrdom and in the sphere of the Christian religion has fundamental importance. In this way, the category of “martyrdom” gets a new dimension – with national content, but the same time universal significance. What is also important, religious language of commemoration of victims of war produces and maintains strong emotions. It also facilitates the transmission of the memory of them, since the tragic events are entered in the universal scheme of the martyrrological victims, who make the life of successive generations possible. According to such an interpretation, memory becomes a social obligation and an important element of collective identity. But remembering victims means also remembering perpetrators of their suffering and the religious interpretation requires seeing them as the part of evil which Christians should always oppose to. When this interpretation is transferred on the relation with the neighbouring nations, the memory conflicts are escalated, especially among these social groups which fully agree with such an interpretation.

2. Events of the past structuring modern memory conflicts

“Central Europe in the second half of the twentieth century is thus not only Europe of murdered people, but also displaced ones: Europe of lost loved ones and lost fellow citizens, but also of lost homes and homelands.” (Wylegala 2014: 9). Memories of violence that the individuals and societies have in Central and Eastern Europe include the displacement on a massive scale – one of the largest in history. As a result of World War II, millions of people were forced to leave their local homelands. There were also among them people from the territory of former Polish Eastern Borderlands (called Kresy3) which after the

3 “Kresy” is the name of pre-war eastern borderlands of the Second Republic of Poland. Its meaning was changing in time – it was used earlier to the territories even further in the east, but in contemporary Polish culture it is used almost exclusively for territories lost
World War II became the part of Lithuanian, Belorussian and Ukrainian Soviet Republics (cf. Ciesielski 2004, Piskorski 2010). After the war many Poles from these territories have been resettled to new Polish state and nowadays about 5 millions of their descendant live in Poland.

Poland suffered a huge loss of life – in time of war more than 5.5 million of Polish citizens were killed. The country was ruined, his capital city almost completely destroyed, and the borders were changed. Many Poles remained outside Polish borders, and because of the difficult political situation could not return to the homeland. In this situation, the war and the changes that it had caused, have become key elements in the relations with these neighbours, which the Poles consider to be the perpetrators of their suffering during the war, that is, the Germans, Russians and Ukrainians. However, while the majority of disputes about memory in Polish-German relations have been regulated, and the German state took on the responsibility for World War II, in Polish-Russian and Polish-Ukrainian relations many conflicts have been left unresolved. In communist times they were frozen, but after the democratic changes become vivid again.

2.1 Polish-Russian relations

Polish-Russian relations are largely determined by the events of the past. This applies to a similar extent to the relationship between the states and to the way of looking at the Russians by the Poles. The most important are the conflicts of the twentieth century. However, while the Polish-Bolshevik war of 1919-21, although brought many casualties and destruction on the Polish side, is seen as a victory for the Poles, and therefore does not burden the social memory negatively4, after the World War II. This term covers varied lands and local societies but is the only one which allows to talk about their common experiences – being borderland territories and being lost.

4 In the social memory, there is a picture of atrocities committed by the Red Army soldiers in 1919-1921. It appears also in Polish literature and cinema. Moreover, it is the memory of aggression – the Red Army entered Polish territory to „export the revolution“ to the West. In the interwar period also strong was the living memory of „social cleansing“, which the Bolsheviks made on land that became part of their state but before the partitions belonged to the First Republic of Poland. Polish nobility of these sites have been exiled or murdered or deported to labour camps, and the mansions have been destroyed (noble mansions destroyed by the Bolsheviks on land that became part of the Soviet Union has been party
the World War II and the communist era are remembered as a time of harm and suffering. One of the perpetrators of these sufferings is Russia (equated with the Soviet Union). Past events that give rise to the strongest memory conflicts in Polish-Russian relations are mainly the Soviet Union’s aggression against Poland on 17 September 1939 and the Katyn massacre of 1940. Conflicts do not concern only difference in opinions on these events, but also a range of activities from the communist era, which were aimed at blurring the memory of them in Polish society and the attitude of the Russian state to these events nowadays. These are the same time events that are part of the image of Russia formed back in the days of the First Republic as a country threatening the existence of the Polish state that is ready to commit any crime to achieve the imperial objectives. It should be noted that this is the image of the Russian state and rather not of so called “ordinary Russians”, who by some Poles are also seen as the victim of the Russian/Soviet state.

2.1.1. Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact and the invasion of Poland on 17 September 1939 – the forgotten memory conflict

The Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact (Treaty of Non-aggression between Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) was signed in Moscow on 23 August 1939. The pact was officially a guarantee of non-belligerence by either country towards the other and a commitment that neither country would ally itself to or aid an enemy of the other. The treaty included also a secret protocol

catalogued in four volumes of work „Memento kresowe” developed by Andrzej Urbański in 1928-1929, and all lost and destroyed residences in these areas, including the areas being lost by Poland after 1939, have been catalogued and described by Roman Aftanazy in 11 volumes of work „Dzieje rezydencji na dawnych Kresach Rzeczypospolitej” published in 1991-1997). Then also other layers of society, including peasants, were repressed. The repression affected the Polish populations from the Belarusian and Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic within the framework of the so-called “Great Purge” of 1935, and the so-called “Polish operation” of the NKVD in the years 1937-1938 (carried out in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic). Some people were killed and the rest were sent into the interior of Soviet Union – mainly to Siberia and Kazakhstan. However, after World War II, the memory of the Polish victims and losses from the years 1919-1939 has been almost completely destroyed, and now the vast majority of Polish society has no knowledge on this subject. However, the memory of the Polish-Bolshevik war is still vivid, especially memory of the victory in the Battle of Warsaw in 1920. However, it is rather the memory of a triumph than the memory of the victims.
that divided territories of Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Finland and Romania into Nazi and Soviet spheres of influence, anticipating potential territorial and political rearrangements of these countries. Thereafter, Germany invaded Poland on 1 September 1939 and Soviet Union on 17 September 1939.

Public opinion polls conducted on the 70th anniversary of the outbreak of World War II show that the vast majority of Polish society (76%) believe that the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact contributed to the outbreak of World War II (Table 2). The Russian state was thus considered to be one of those (along with Nazi Germany), which contributed to the greatest suffering that has happened to the Poles in the twentieth century.

Table 2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>To what extent, in your opinion, had Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact contributed to the outbreak of World War II?</th>
<th>15</th>
<th>76</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>If the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact was not written, Germany may not decide to attack Poland</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact facilitated Hitler's decision to attack Poland</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact had no effect on Hitler's decision to attack Poland</td>
<td>Hard to say</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Elaborated by the Author on the base of CBOS Report BS/124/2009, September 2009, representative random sample of adult Polish inhabitants of 1086 persons, data are given in percent.

During the period of communism date of September the 17 did not appear in school textbooks and official public discourse. If it was mentioned, it was said that this was the entrance of fellow troops in order to protect the local population against the Germans. It was, however, present in the consciousness of a part of Polish society, and the memory of that date was transmitted mainly in families (mostly in families resettled from the former eastern borderlands of the Second Republic), and was an important element of memory in the opposition circles (was presented in the publications issued in the samizdat, taught about in secret lectures of history). However, after the beginning of transition in 1989, information about the Soviet invasion of Poland in 1939 began to be widely disseminated and placed in the school textbooks. In 1990 all the soldiers who died in battles with the Red Army were honoured with the plaque on the Tomb of the
Unknown Soldier in Warsaw\textsuperscript{5}. However, even though the events of 17 September 1939 are the part of official discourse in Poland, a large group of Polish society (21\%) is still not sure how to interpret them (Table 3).

Table 3.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>On 17 September 1939 the Red Army entered Polish territory. Which of the views of this event is closer to your opinion?</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>It was the annexation of part of the territory of Poland made in accordance with an earlier agreement between Germany and the USSR</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It was a measure designed to prevent or delay Hitler’s attack on the Soviet Union</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hard to say</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Elaborated by the Author on the base of CBOS Report BS/124/2009, September 2009, representative random sample of adult Polish inhabitants of 1086 persons, data are given in per cent.

Most people think that the invasion of the Red Army on Poland was an attack aimed at the seizure of Polish lands. However, almost one fifth of Poles (19\%) sees in these events Soviet Union’s defensive actions. Interestingly, as the authors of these studies noticed, such interpretation share primarily young people (33\% of those aged 18-24). This may be a result of the perception of the war primarily in terms of strategic and not political actions, less pervasive among younger generation image of Russia as a country with imperial ambitions and a lower sense of connection with areas taken by the USSR, which after the war have not returned to Poland.

In times of Peoples’ Republic of Poland (PRL) date 17 September 1939 was one of elements of the democratic opposition’s combat for commemorating Polish history. Currently, the dispute has expired, because the Soviet Union’s attack on Poland is the part of history, about which one can talk openly. In the Polish-Russian relations no one disputes that such an attack took place, and the differences are in the interpretation of its causes and consequences. In addition, since the Soviet Union collapsed, the memory of the consequences of these events is less disputed in Polish-Russian relations, and more in the Polish-Belarusian

\textsuperscript{5}Tomb of the Unknown Soldier in Warsaw commemorates all the major battles and wars in the history of Poland, starting from the tenth century.
and Polish-Ukrainian ones. However, there is one element of the Soviet attack on Poland, that still arouses strong emotions. It is the Katyn massacre.

2.1.2. Katyn massacre – the struggle for repentance

The Katyn crime was a series of mass executions of Polish officers serving in different types of state institutions and members of intelligentsia carried out by the People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD) in April and May 1940. The massacre was prompted by NKVD chief Lavrentiy Beria’s proposal to execute all captive members of the Polish Officer Corps, dated 5 March 1940, approved by the Soviet Politburo. 21,857 Poles were killed (among them about 8,000 army officers taken prisoner during the 1939 Soviet invasion of Poland and about 6,000 police officers). The victims from prisoner camps of Ostashkov, Kozel’sk and Starobil’sk were murdered and buried in the Katyn Forest and Mednoe in Russia, Kharkiv and Bykivnia in Ukraine and probably in Belarus, in Kupropaty. The government of Nazi Germany announced the discovery of mass graves in the Katyn Forest in 1943 (see Etkind, Finnin et al. 2012). The Soviet Union claimed the victims had been murdered by the Nazis, and continued to deny responsibility for the massacres until 1990, when it officially acknowledged and condemned the perpetration of the killings by the NKVD, as well as the subsequent cover-up by the Soviet government. Investigation conducted by the Prosecutor General’s Office of the Soviet Union (1990–1991) and the Russian Federation (1991–2004), confirmed Soviet responsibility for the massacres, but refused to classify this action as a war crime or an act of genocide. On 26 November 2010, 7 months after the crash of President Lech Kaczyński’s plane near Smoleńsk, the Russian State Duma approved a declaration blaming Stalin and other Soviet officials for having personally ordered the massacre.

6 The date of 17 September 1939 is especially important in Belorussia because the Soviet Union’s attack on Polish state is interpreted as act of consolidation of two parts of Belorussia – Western Belorussia that was in the Polish state and Eastern Belorussia that was in the Soviet Union. From that day Belorussia is united – first as the Soviet Republic and then as an independent state. That is why it is the one of important days in the national calendar of contemporary Belorussia and the field of conflict with Poland which interprets it as the beginning of the tragedy and not the happy and successful event.
During communist time, the Katyn massacre was the most important part of the memory guarded by the opposition, and one can even say that it was part of a sacred memory. A special role was played by families of officers killed in Katyn and other places. The determinant of the idea of remembering the crimes have become the words of the poem “Dziady” by Adam Mickiewicz, written at the time of partition of Poland: “If I forget about them, You, God in heaven, forget about me.” In 1992, these people established a nationwide organization “Federation of Katyn Families”, which activity has played a key role in the dissemination of knowledge about the Katyn massacre. At the end of the PRL almost one fifth of Poles never heard of this crime, and after 10 years only 7%, with twice the percentage of people who claim to have heard a lot about this crime (Table 4).

Table 4.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Have you heard about the crime committed during the Second World War on Polish prisoners of war in Katyn?</th>
<th>1987</th>
<th>2008</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes, I've heard a lot about it</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, I've heard about it</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I know nothing about it</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Elaborated by the Author on the base of CBOS Report BS/702008, May 2008, representative random sample of adult Polish inhabitants of 1101 persons, data are given in per cent.

However, very important event for the memory of Katyn in Polish society was the crash of President Lech Kaczynski’s plane on 10 April 2010 near Smolensk, on the way to the ceremony commemorating the 70th anniversary of the Katyn massacre. While in 2008, 67% of the Polish population felt that the crime is an obstacle to Polish-Russian relations, and 14% had no opinion on the matter, after the plane crash near Smolensk, 80% of respondents thought the Katyn massacre to be an obstacle in Polish-Russian relations, and only 6% had no opinion on the matter (Table 5 and 6).

View of the Katyn massacre in Poland and Russia is well illustrated by the official nomenclature used in both countries. In Poland, people speak of “mord katyński” (Katyn massacre) or “zbrodnia katyńska” (Katyn crime), and the name used in Russia is “Катынский расстрел” (Katyn shooting). Although the State
Table 5.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Do you think that the Katyn crime still burdens contemporary Polish-Russian relations or currently is not significant to them? (2008)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Definitely does</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rather does</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rather does not</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Definitely does not</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hard to say</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Elaborated by the Author on the base of CBOS Report BS/70/2008, May 2008, representative random sample of adult Polish inhabitants of 1101 persons, data are given in percent.

Table 6.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Do you think that the Katyn crime still burden contemporary Polish-Russian relations or currently is not significant to them? (2010)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Definitely does</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rather does</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rather does not</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Definitely does not</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hard to say</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Elaborated by the Author on the base of CBOS Report BS/67/2010, May 2010, representative random sample of adult Polish inhabitants of 1000 persons, data are given in percent.

Duma officially admitted that Stalin is responsible for ordering the murder of Polish officers at Katyn, according to the Polish society Russia still has not done much to redress this crime. According to a study from 2010, 66% of Poles think that the Russian authorities should disclose the documents from the Russian archives, 58% demands official recognition of the murdered officers as the victims of the crime of genocide, and 46% believe that Russia should officially apologize for the committed crimes.

In Poland the memory of Katyn is clear – the Polish society knows exactly who is the innocent victim and who is the executioner and how to evaluate the whole event. The authors of „Remembering Katyn” state: „In Poland, Katyn has long been read metonymically, as the part of the country’s history meant to stand for the whole. (…) In the words of Donald Tusk, ‘in a sense, we Poles are one, big Katyn family’” (see Etkind, Finnin et al. 2012: 8). For Poles, it is therefore not only an important part of their past, but also part of their identity – the identity of a nation that has experienced a lot of suffering and persecution, but never forgot about the victims and is not afraid to remind others about them.
The name “Katyn” has become a symbol of the atrocities of the totalitarian system also for other nations – the victims of the Soviet regime – such as the Lithuanians, Latvians, Estonians, Belarusians and Ukrainians7. The Russian state acknowledged its responsibility for the crime in Katyn, but from the point of view of the Polish people it is not enough. Poland has not obtained an apology. There was not also disclosure of all documents on the crime8. In this context, in Poland often the words inspired by Catholic theology are cited: “First we need a repentance, confession and telling the whole truth, and only then forgiveness is possible.” Therefore, the Katyn massacre is still a field of conflict of memory, which exists on one hand in the sphere of knowledge (information disclosure), and on the other hand in the sphere of moral obligation (repentance).

2.2. Polish-Ukrainian relations

2.2.1. The ambiguous legacy of Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the Second Republic of Poland in relations with Ukraine – the memory of the Kresy

The territories, which are now part of western Ukraine, were under the control of the Polish state from the tenth century and since then has been a subject of rivalry between Poland and Rus’. In the following centuries, the Poles settled farther in the east, until over ¾ areas of modern Ukrainian state were part of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. After the partition of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the current western part of Ukraine (Eastern Galicia) was taken by Austria-Hungary, and the areas in the east – by Russian Empire. The differentiations of these territories which started to develop after the partition, had its consequences for the Ukrainians and the Polish-Ukrainian relations in the next years and has them to this day. In Eastern Galicia both Polish and Ukrainian modern national movement was shaped and they were remaining in constant conflict. In the eastern part of these territories the Russian authorities suppressed aspirations for independence, which particularly affected

7 For example, Vinnytsia is called „Ukrainian Katyn”.
8 The most important is „the Belarusian Katyn list” containing the names of 3870 Poles carried on the territory of Belorussia, whose place of burial is not known.
the Poles after subsequent uprisings. They were subjected to oppression, and their property were confiscated.

World War I brought hope of the independence to both Poles and Ukrainians. Immediately, however, conflict on the border line in Eastern Galicia broke out. In the Treaty of Riga in 1923, signed after the Polish-Bolshevik War, the border has been established on the river Zbrucz – Poland returned in the east to the same border as before the third partition with a small correction to the east (fragments of Volyn and Polesie). During the Second Republic of Poland local Polish-Ukrainian conflict had deepened. Ukrainian national movement had become stronger and more radical and a Polish policy towards national minorities had been tightening. The tragic climax of Polish-Ukrainian conflict occurred during World War II. There were Volyn massacre and ethnic cleansing in the province of Lviv, Tarnopol and Stanisławów (Eastern Małopolska) made by the troops of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, other Ukrainian organizations and the local population. When in 1944 Poland signed an agreement with the USSR on the evacuation of the Polish population, the vast majority decided to leave\(^9\). Remembering recent events they have not seen the possibilities of living in the USSR. Areas that before World War II were in the Polish state and after the war became a part of Lithuania, Belarusian and Ukrainian Soviet Republic, are named in contemporary Poland with the common term of “Kresy”. The problem of Kresy in contemporary memory of Polish society and in Polish-Ukrainian relations brings together several aspects, which become ground for memory conflicts. Firstly, it is a problem of lost Polish lands, the second – the problem of an attitude to the Ukrainians inhabited these areas (sometimes referred to as the problem of “postcolonialism” – see Kudela-Świątek, Świątek 2012) and arising the strongest emotions topic of massacre of Poles living in the area during World War II.

Over a period of communism, the memory of Kresy was successfully pushed to the margins of social life but after the beginning of democratic changes

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\(^9\) During the first wave of repatriation, until 1947 the Polish attracted 784 524 people, and during the second (until 1959) – 76 059 Poles and Jews have come to Poland (Misztal, 1997: 64).
in Poland we have witnessed the “explosion” of memory of Kresy (cf. Handke 1997, Kasperski 2007, Kolbuszewski 1996, Szaruga 2001). It was manifesting itself mainly in the large number of published memoirs, novels, documentaries, albums, and the emergence of many organizations of persons displaced from Kresy and their descendants. However, the memory of the Kresy was considered an obstacle in Polish relations with the newly established countries on its eastern border, and therefore very quickly (even before the creation of independent states in the east – see Snyder 2003) has been marginalized in political and public life (cf. Kolbuszewski 1996, Kasperski 2007).

In this situation, the transmission of the memory of Kresy takes place under specific conditions. State support for this message is ambiguous (cf. Szpociński 2006). On the one hand, it supported the exploration and rectifying of the Polish history, especially in relation to the Second Republic of Poland, which in PRL were evaluated critically, and after 1989 became a kind of „ideological reservoir”. It also tried to help the Poles, who still live in areas of the former Kresy and aware the public opinion in Poland of their existence. On the other hand, the memory of the Kresy has been marginalized, fragmented and reduced to a set of ethnographic curiosities or the general framework of „multiculturalism” (cf. Kasperski 2007, Szaruga 2001).

Loss of memory of the Kresy among Polish society is not associated exclusively with the historical policy of the state. Very important is the aspect of resettlement. Community based on ties with the local territory and people living there has little chance to survive in case of detachment from their own territory and moving in a different social context. As Jan Assmann wrote: „Forgetting is conditioned by the change the framework, the total metamorphosis of living conditions and social relations” (Assmann 2008: 237).

From the Polish point of view, Kresy are of fundamental importance for the history, culture and identity of Polish society. They are part of a vast number

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10 It should be noted that although there are many organizations in Poland grouping people from different parts of the former Kresy, there is no one strong organization of the people from Kresy. It would have to bond various types of locality, which would be possible only if the state willed to play a unifying role and arbitrarily defined Kresy as a separated whole based on one identity and one kind of interest.
of cultural production – from literature, painting and film to the folk and national tradition. Some places, such as Lviv, were even considered to be the centre of Poland, and not a frontier, not only because of the location of the city, but also of a significant Polish majority in these areas, and the importance of Lviv to the Polish culture and science. In contemporary society, Polish memory of these lands is slowly disappearing. The only exceptions are those who have in their families people form Kresy and local communities, where people evacuated from these territories form particularly high percent (e.g. in western Poland). From time to time this subject comes to the fore again upon subsequent anniversaries, disputes about the destruction and rebuilding of Polish cemeteries in Kresy11, recalling the problems of Poles living in the former Soviet Union or publicized by the media actions of the Ukrainian national movement12. From the Ukrainian point of view, these areas are the cradle of an independent Ukrainian state, and Poland is seen as a former colonial empire. Disputes about the memory of Polish-Ukrainian relations, Ukrainian identity and place of the Polish minority in contemporary Ukrainian society are therefore sometimes interpreted as postcolonial discourse13. The Kresy associations from Poland disagree with such an interpretation, because for them Kresy are not areas of colonial expansion, but the indigenous Polish lands.

2.2.2 The memory of the massacre Volyn – hot but limited conflict

The massacres of Poles in Volyn and Eastern Galicia were part of an ethnic cleansing operation carried out in Nazi German-occupied Poland by the

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11 The memory of the dead is crucial in Polish culture. 1 November, which is in Poland the day of memory of the dead is the most celebrated holiday – even more popular then Christmas. Taking care of the graves is a duty, no matter how far these graves are located. In Poland, every year a lot of action are taken to help restore and protect Polish cemeteries in the East. 1 November is also always the day of collection of funds for such actions, and they meet with a huge social response.

12 Recently Polish media informed about the Ukrainian political party „Svoboda” which leaders demand the return of the city of Przemyśl to the Ukrainian state.

13 The term “Kresy” itself is also disputed. Some people think that its use in a contemporary Polish discourse is an expression of Polish imperial aspirations. The dispute concerns also other names. For example, the eastern part of Galicia can be determined from the Polish point of view as “Eastern Małopolska” or from the Ukrainian point of view as “Western Ukraine”. The use of specific names is another instalment of the memory conflict.
Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA)’s North Command in the regions of Volyn and their South Command in Eastern Galicia. Killings started in March 1943 and lasting until the end of 1944 with the peak in July and August 1943. The massacres, performed in an atrocious way on men, women and children, were directly linked with the policies of the Bandera fraction of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and its military arm – UPA, whose goal was to purge all non-Ukrainians from the future Ukrainian state. UPA also wanted to erase all traces of sustained Polish presence in these areas.

Historians estimate that during the massacres from 50 to 60 thousand Poles were killed in Volyn and from 20 to 70 thousand in Eastern Galicia. Moreover, over 300 thousand people of Polish nationality fled from this last area (Motyka 2011; Siemaszko, Siemaszko 2000). In Poland, these events are called “rzeź wołyńska” (Volyn slaughter), while in the Ukrainian discourse they are referred to as “Волинська трагедія” (Volyn tragedy). The tragic events of World War II in Polish relations with Russia and especially Germany were said out loud, and efforts at the state level to their explanation and remembrance have been made. However, there were almost no such efforts concerning tragic events in Polish relations with its eastern neighbours, especially Ukraine, because of the fear of damaging the relations with them, which is seen as very dangerous for Polish state.

Associations of people from Kresy, with the support of other social organizations are demanding an official recognition of the day of 11 July as the Remembrance of Kresy Martyrdom Day. 11 July 1943 was “bloody Sunday”, during which the UPA invaded the 99 Polish villages, killing more than 3000 people, in many places in the churches during mass. Although each year on 11 July is celebrated as Memorial Day dedicated to these events, also with the participation of local and national authorities, the Parliament has not adopted a law establishing formally that date as Remembrance Day of murders in Volyn and Eastern Galicia, but also in other places of the Kresy. In communist times remembrance of these events was forbidden, as they were in conflict with the thesis of “the brotherhood of nations” in the communist bloc and after a democratic transformation Polish authorities were anxious about recalling these
events, because Poland’s *raison d’état* was an establishing good relations with independent Ukraine. In this situation, knowledge of the events in Volyn was not widespread in Polish society (Table 7 and 8).

Table 7.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Who was the victim of crimes committed in 1943 in Volyn?</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Poles</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Association with Katyn</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poles and Ukrainians</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainians</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other nationalities</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other answers</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I don’t know, hard to say</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Elaborated by the Author on the base of CBOS Reports: BS/117/2003, July 2003, representative random sample of adult Polish inhabitants of 952 persons, BS/93/2013, July 2013, representative random sample of adult Polish inhabitants of 1010 persons, data are given in percent.*

Table 8.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Who was the perpetrator of the crimes committed in 1943 in Volyn?</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainians</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainians and Poles</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The occupants: Germans, the Soviets</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other answers</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I don’t know, hard to say</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Elaborated by the Author on the base of CBOS Reports: BS/117/2003, July 2003, representative random sample of adult Polish inhabitants of 952 persons, BS/93/2013, July 2013, representative random sample of adult Polish inhabitants of 1010 persons, data are given in percent.*

In 2003, on the 60th anniversary of the Volyn massacre, almost half of Poles did not know anything about these events, and 9% confuse them with the murder at Katyn. One can see, however, that information campaigns conducted by social organizations and the Institute of National Remembrance after some years began to bring effects. 10 years later, the percentage of people who do not know anything about these events decreased significantly, more people also deepened their knowledge about the victims and the perpetrators of these massacres. Still, a very high percentage of Polish population (about 30%) have very little knowledge on the subject, and the others confuse the Volyn massacre
with other tragic events of World War II. In comparison, for example, to the case of the massacre in Katyn, this is a significant difference in the level of knowledge. We can observe, moreover, similar situation in the Ukrainian society. Jaroslaw Hrycak states that in the period of communism “the Soviet regime imposed the radical national amnesia upon the Ukrainians” (2009: 118), which meant that the memory of the Volyn massacre simply did not exist. Public opinion polls in 2003, which Hrycak cites, show that 48,9% of the Ukrainian society knew nothing about Volyn massacre, and 28,4% “heard something, but cannot say anything about it” (ibid.).

Although not whole Polish society remembers the events in Volyn, there are “memory groups” in Poland, for which it is a key event of the World War II. They consider struggling for the memory of the Volyn massacre their duty for three reasons – because of the enormous scale of the genocide, which happened there, and secondly – because of the lack of indication of the guilty persons and condemnation of them by the Ukrainian state and, the third – due to the still insufficient commemoration the victims. Activities in the field of commemoration of the victims of the Volyn massacre in recent years in Poland have increased, especially on the celebration of the 70th anniversary of these events in 2013.

Public opinion polls in Poland show that the majority of the population (54%) believe that the past divides Polish and Ukrainian nations, and only one quarter (24%) believe that it unites them (CBOS Report 2013). Most Poles believe, however, that the Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation is possible (Table 9).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Do you think that reconciliation between Poles and Ukrainians is:</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Possible</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impossible</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hard to say</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Elaborated by the Author on the base of CBOS Reports: BS/117/2003, July 2003, representative random sample of adult Polish inhabitants of 952 persons, BS/93/2013, July 2013, representative random sample of adult Polish inhabitants of 1010 persons, data are given in percent.*

While the percentage of people who say that the Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation is possible remains at the same level, the number of people who
think that it is impossible decreased. And a new group of respondents has appeared – persons who do not have specified opinion on the subject. In 2003, the opinions were very clearly polarized. In addition, the view in this case also depends on the age. The oldest persons, including those remembering the times of war from personal experiences, believe that such a reconciliation is not possible. The opposite view are mostly represented by younger people, especially pupils and students.

At the level of state institutions attempts were made to gain official Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation, but none of them has brought lasting results. In May 1997, Polish and Ukrainian Presidents signed the “Joint Declaration on peace and reconciliation”, which commemorated the victims of Polish-Ukrainian conflict, and on 10 July 2003 the Polish and Ukrainian parliaments adopted a mutual statement condemning the murders in Volyn, however, during the central ceremony in Poryce (Pawliwka) President Leonid Kuczma has not expressed contrition on behalf of the Ukrainian people. Although after the “Orange Revolution”, Polish and Ukraine relations have got closer, the issue of Volyn massacre was still open. In 2006 there was another solemn reconciliation act with the participation of the presidents of both countries in Pawlokoma on Polish territory, where the Ukrainian population was murdered by Polish Home Army troops. This ceremony passed almost unnoticed by Polish public opinion and was quickly forgotten (cf. Wigura 2011: 93-104), and another ceremony, which took place in 2009 on the territory of Ukraine in Huta Pieniacka, not only did not lead to the reconciliation, but has ignited another conflict of memory. In Huta Pieniacka, where the SS-Galicia troops in cooperation with the UPA murdered 1100 persons on 28 February 1944, a monument commemorating the massacre was unveiled in 2005, but there was no inscription on it saying who is the perpetrator of this crime. In 2009 there was even a ceremony attended by the presidents of Poland and Ukraine, however, the Ukrainian president has been criticized for taking part in it, and every year the ceremony at the monument is disrupted by the members of the party “Svoboda”. Another element of reconciliation is an action on commemorating the “Ukrainian Righteous”, that is, Ukrainians, who saved Poles during the massacres carried out by the UPA (cf.
Non-governmental organizations, together with the Institute of National Remembrance honour the persons trying to save the Poles in a similar way in which Israel commemorates the “Righteous Among the Nations”, but in the Polish society it is very little known initiative.

The events that took place in Volyn and Eastern Galicia in 1943 and 1944 are not widely known both in Polish society, as well as in Ukrainian. In both societies, however, there are groups that are fighting with each other for the memory of those events. In Poland they also struggle for a transmission of knowledge on the subject in the country and beyond its borders. This conflict is very hot, because it touches the foundations of national identity of both nations. For Ukraine, the memory of the UPA is an important part of the memory of the struggle for independence, and the Poles are seen as one of the danger for Ukrainian independence. In turn, for Poland it is essential that all crimes committed against the Poles in the twentieth century would been explained in details, and guilty persons indicated and condemned. Of particular importance is also the fact that the massacre of the Polish population were made on the territories belonging for hundreds of years to the Polish state, and lost after World War II, making it impossible to commemorate all the places by the Poles alone.

3. The consequences of the war for the Polish-Ukrainian and Polish-Russian relations in the opinion of Polish society

The memory of World War II is still alive in the Polish society and perceived as one element of the past, which constantly affects the present, including in particular the relationship with neighbouring countries (Table 10).

Table 10.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Do you think the events of World War II now have an impact on relations between Poles and:</th>
<th>Russians</th>
<th>Ukrainians</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Definitely negative impact</td>
<td>24,0</td>
<td>11,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rather negative impact</td>
<td>35,5</td>
<td>22,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have no impact</td>
<td>25,5</td>
<td>45,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rather positive impact</td>
<td>6,7</td>
<td>8,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Definitely positive impact</td>
<td>1,6</td>
<td>1,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hard to say</td>
<td>6,8</td>
<td>11,4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Elaborated by the Author on the base of Nijakowski 2010: 284, data are given in percent.*
Very few people point to the positive impact of war on relations both with Russians and with the Ukrainians. However, the evaluation of relations with the Russians are more unequivocal. The vast majority (59.5%) believe that World War II has a bad influence on contemporary Polish-Russian relations, and 7% had no opinion on the matter. However Polish-Ukrainian relations and the impact of war on them are more difficult for respondents to assess. Over 11% of Polish society does not know how to assess this impact, and almost half (45%) believe that World War II had no effect on the Polish-Ukrainian relations. An important element in attitude to the Russians and Ukrainians is an assessment of the sufferings during the war (Table 11).

Table 11.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>How do you scale sufferings and sacrifices during the World War II of:</th>
<th>Poles</th>
<th>Russians</th>
<th>Ukrainians</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No sufferings</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small sufferings</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>16.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average sufferings</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>29.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Big sufferings</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>38.5</td>
<td>69.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great sufferings</td>
<td>68.4</td>
<td>31.4</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hard to say</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>13.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Elaborated by the Author on the base of Nijakowski 2010: 251-252, data are given in per cent.

According to the Poles, it is they who suffered most during the war. The sufferings of Russians they evaluate as much smaller (although most believe that they suffered a lot). In contrast, Ukrainians are not generally seen as a significant casualties of war. Only less than 40% believe that they suffered a lot. Once again, it appears that Ukrainians are a nation that is for Poles relatively difficult to assess – almost 14% of respondents did not know how to comment on them. Nijakowski summarizing his research states: “In the collective memory of Polish society, some nations fill the positive role of allies, others of “villains” – enemies who caused suffering of Polish people. According to the declarations of the respondents in the memory of their families survived bad memories mainly of three nations: Ukrainians, Germans and Russians.” (2010: 285).

In the Polish public discourse often appear two issues: of differences in the interpretation of history in different countries and of lack of knowledge of
Polish history, as well in Polish society as among others. Joint historical commissions to study the common history of Polish and Germany, Russia and Ukraine have been established, however, the opinions of Poles on how to agree on a common version of the history with the neighbouring countries are deeply divided (Table 12).

Table 12.

| Do you think that it is possible to agree on a common opinion on the most important events in recent history, and for example create a common version of the history textbook for schools in both countries? |
|---|---|---|
| **Poland and Russia** | | |
| Definitely possible | 12 | 48 |
| Rather possible | 36 | |
| Rather impossible | 30 | 40 |
| Definitely impossible | 10 | |
| Hard to say | | 11 |
| **Poland and Ukraine** | | |
| Definitely possible | 10 | 45 |
| Rather possible | 35 | |
| Rather impossible | 30 | 39 |
| Definitely impossible | 9 | |
| Hard to say | | 16 |
| **Poland and Germany** | | |
| Definitely possible | 11 | 52 |
| Rather possible | 41 | |
| Rather impossible | 28 | 36 |
| Definitely impossible | 8 | |
| Hard to say | | 12 |

*Source: CBOS Report BS/67/2010 May 2010, representative random sample of adult Polish inhabitants of 1000 persons, data are given in per cent.*

Establishing a common vision of the past in the Polish-Ukrainian relations is relatively least likely according to the respondents (45% say that this is possible), and the most likely is agreement with the Germans (52%). However, most people say that such arrangements are not possible in the case of Polish-Russian mutual history (40%). In terms of developing a common opinion relating to the events of a recent history, however, the Poles are very divided – almost the same number of people say that this is possible and that this is unlikely to happen. Perhaps such an approach is also due to the age of the respondent and his or her individual experience. These studies, however, show that for a large
group of Poles public memory of the events of the last century still rather separate Poland and its largest neighbours than unite them.

**Summary**

The memory of the events of World War II in Poland is still part of living memory, because there are still people who remember the war from their own experience or from eyewitnesses with whom they were strongly emotionally connected. The memory of the war is a memory of conflicts with neighbours and memory of immense suffering and the struggle for survival of individuals and of nation. It was a struggle not only for biological survival, but also for saving the identity. In addition, the war was of fundamental importance for the fate of Poland – it has changed its boundaries, ethnic composition, social structure and handed it over for more than 40 years to the communist regime based on Soviet patterns. Communism was also period of “frozen” social memory, when a lot of things were not allowed to talk about. After the changes initiated in 1989 in Poland there has been “an explosion of memory” – actions to commemorate all of this, what was hushed up in the communist era. In time, it was considered that the state should conduct specific “historical policy” in response to the historical policy of neighbours, which also had an impact on the attitude of Polish society to the past.

Return to the past, which takes place in the process of remembering, is essential for collective identity. As Leszek Szaruga puts it: “It is indeed a paradox that we return to the places where there is no return to. But this is an apparent paradox. In fact Brody, Radziwiłł, Krzemieniec, Wilno (...) everything of it still exists. It exists in a collective memory, in a collective experience, in a culture (...) Our ‘returns’ are not in fact any returns, but reaching out to the different sources of our identity. The problem occurs when these existing outside of time spaces begin to be recognized in terms of the historical and political categories. When – in other words – we force a contemporaneity to move to the past.” (2001: 66). Memory of the war affect the Polish collective identity in two ways. First, by recalling the atrocities of war, and the figure of an innocent victim, often immersed in the Roman Catholic patterns of thinking, and the perpetrator, who
has not expressed remorse for his guilt. Second, by recalling the image of the world, which was lost forever. Therefore, the memory of war still burdens the Polish-Russian and Polish-Ukrainian relations. The importance of wartime memory may be decreased with the diminishing interest in the past in Polish society and the emergence of successive generations who will not have such a strong emotional attitude to World War II. However, it is also possible that events in the international arena again will recall those emotions.

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Trialog: the Experience of Cooperation of the Universities in Kaliningrad, Torun and Frankfurt (Oder) in the humanities

Yury Kostyashov

All the last years researchers in different countries pay more and more attention to the content, features, mechanisms of formation and functioning of historical memory, which is one of the basic elements of collective and individual identity. In this context, unique situation in the Russian-Polish-German space from the Oder to the Neman provides rich and fruitful material for understanding of the problems of collective historical consciousness in general and in its regional component.

One of the main problems of the historical memory of the population of the region is the attitude to the historical and cultural heritage. How was it formed under the influence of politics of memory in the past and now? How was the alien pre-war past (mainly German) included to the collective consciousness of new inhabitants (Polish and Russian) in the postwar period? What kind of barriers on this path were raised up by the official policy of the states (the USSR and the Polish People's Republic) and how they had been overcome? What factors determine the content of the cultural memory of the inhabitants of the region today? Participants of the international project Trialog tried to give the answers to these questions.

“Trialog” is an international research project created in cooperation of the three universities: European University Viadrina in Frankfurt (Oder), (Germany), Nicolaus Copernicus University in Torun (Poland) and Immanuel Kant Baltic Federal University in Kaliningrad (Russia). The purpose of the project is to strengthen inter-university cooperation in the field of humanities through the establishment of common communication networks aiming to contribute to a better mutual understanding of Poles, Russians and Germans.
This project was initiated in 2010 by the EUV and got the financial support from the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD). Coordinator and Project Manager is Dr Olga Kurilo from EUV. The author of this publication was the coordinator from the Russian side. Ministries of Foreign Affairs of Germany, Poland and Russia promote and support Trialog. The project organizers hold conferences and summer schools for undergraduate and graduate students every year; the results of the activities are reflected in the books, collections of articles and other publications. The project has an interdisciplinary nature: it involved historians, linguists, sociologists, political scientists, lawyers, geographers and historians of architecture.

The main object of studying is historical space of coast of Southern Baltic, the vast region between the Oder and the Neman rivers which was exposed to the Polish, German and Russian influences at various times.

The first Trialog conference was held in Frankfurt, in November 2010 and was devoted to various aspects of mobility in the region between the Oder and the Neman in different historical periods. At the same time mobility and regional relations in the past and now were examined during the conference as a historical heritage, left in that space by representatives of the three cultures: German, Polish and Russian. The participants of conference visited several towns and fortresses in the Polish-German border which are still actual places of memory for people of the three countries. Since the first conference the Baltic multinational cultural heritage and its influence on regional identity were one of the leading topics among the participants of the Trialog.

This tendency was represented more widely at the second conference entitled “Borders and border crossings in the history and contemporary culture”, which was held in September 2011 in Torun (Poland). Speakers from the three countries discussed a wide range of problems, considering the concept of “border”

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2 Olga Kurilo (Hrsg.), Mobilität und regionale Vernetzung zwischen Oder und Memel: Eine europäische Landschaft neu zusammensetzen, Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, Berlin 2011, 255 S.
in the philosophical, historical and cultural sense. The following issues were in the spotlight: the establishment, opening and disappearance of borders, openness of cognition and borders, borders and people, culture and borders, boundaries between people, between “ours” and “alien”. One of the conclusions of the discussion was that in the contemporary world borders continue to be an important paradigm of thinking and, despite the disappearance of borders in Europe, problem of borders still exists, but it is moved from policy to the sphere of social, cultural and individual life. Some speeches of the participants were directly related to the problems of historical memory and regional identity.3

Finally, the third conference of the Trialog held in Kaliningrad (Russia) in April 2012, was devoted entirely to the historical memory and the politics of memory of inhabitants of the region between the Oder and the Neman.

During the preparation for the conference, the following concerns and field of studies were identified:

1. Historical memory of local communities from the Oder to the Neman and the politics of memory: content, features and mechanisms of functioning

   Formation of the local/regional historical (cultural) memory – ideas about the past recorded in the collective memory. Historical myths and stereotypes of mass consciousness. Historical memory and national/regional identity. Church, religion and historical memory.

2. Politics of memory: national and regional aspects

   The politics of memory as a means of power legitimization or means to change an established order. National versions of regional history in school education. The problem of overcoming historical traumas: scientific and moral aspects. Interaction of history and historical memory. The role of literature, art, mass media, communities of fans of history, regional specialists and “reconstructors” in the formation of historical memory. History in cyberspace.

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3 Jurij Kostjašov, Olga Kurilo, Piotr Zariczny (Hrsg.), Grenzen und ihre Überwindung im deutsch-polnisch-russischem Raum, Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, Toruń 2012, 212 S.
3. Monuments, symbols, rituals as factors of historical memory shaping and nurturing of civil identity

Factors of formation of historical memory: monuments and memorials, symbolic rituals, formal and informal celebrations, museum exhibitions, heritage education. Government policies and public initiatives. *Places of memory* (P. Nora) and cemeteries of the past wars. The phenomenon of the “war of monuments”.

4. Sources of memory: memories, diaries, interviews


In the context of these directions there were presented papers on the results of three years researches of the Trialog participants. There is no possibility to name all themes and retell the contents of 32 papers, so I would like to identify briefly priorities and illustrate them a few examples.

The majority of the papers were devoted to various aspects of regional historical memory as one of the main structural elements of individual and collective identity. Valery Galtsov (Kaliningrad) first systematized and analyzed the Russian Internet sites devoted to the history of East Prussia and the Kaliningrad region. These materials are the most representative picture of the “chaotic” state of the historical memory of Kaliningradians. According to the author, digital resources on the Web are very far from scientific bases of professional historical science, they often bear false ideas or dangerous stereotypes that first effect on younger generation.

Dr Olga Kurilo (Frankfurt (Oder)) has put the issue of historical and contemporary “landscapes of memory” on the example of Samland spas through

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4 Юрий Костяшов, Ольга Курило (ред), *Между Одером и Неманом: проблемы исторической памяти*, Издательство Балтийского федерального университета им. И. Канта, Калининград 2012, 211 с.
out the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. She revealed that although the Baltic coast of Sambia Peninsula after World War II lost the previous value of the European cultural landscape, but the continuity of the Sambia cultural traditions has been keeping in some degree in the Kaliningrad region, and this has been reflected on the identity of Kaliningradians.

Dr Ilya Dementiev (Kaliningrad), analyzing the historical memory of the inhabitants of the Kaliningrad region, used the category of “places of memory” by Pierre Nora and offered his own list of such places of memory in the region. The ratio of historical memory and the Kaliningrad toponymy was investigated in the Pavel Polch’s paper (Kaliningrad).

Dr Hans-Christian Pust (Stuttgart) set the tone in the discussion of politics of memory, he told about a forgotten German tradition since the First World War, when wooden monuments were installed, intended for nailing (“Nagelungsdenkmäler”). Wooden figure of a warrior or a military leader, for example, Field Marshal Hindenburg, were exhibited in the central square, then everyone could score a nail into the wood. Thus, a wooden sculpture gradually covered by iron shell. Thousands of people were involved in this action, which had a very strong emotional impact. By the way, nails were sold out to all comers, and the “Hammering nails” was accompanied by collecting donations, so Germans felt their involvement in the nationwide affair because thus they contributed victory.

Dr Piotr Zariczny (Torun) analyzed the German press to show how it forms the historical and contemporary image of Poland and how the media involved in the instrumentalization of collective memory in the context of German-Polish relations after Poland’s accession to the European Union. Dr Patryk Wawrzyński (Torun) presented his study “Politics of memory in the foreign policy of Poland in XXI century”. He drew attention to rivalry of the concepts of the policy of historical memory of brothers Kaczynski with the “paradigm of oblivion” of Adam Michnik and “Gazeta Wyborcza” in present-day Poland.

Within the framework of the next direction “Monuments, rituals, symbol” Konrad Tschäpe (Frankfurt (Oder)) studied artistic and mental images of the
enemy on the example of German and Soviet propaganda during the Second World War and identified opportunities of the comparative analysis of stereotypes of the enemies. Dr Gennady Kretinin (Kaliningrad) examined the conditions of military memorials and cemeteries in the Kaliningrad region. He followed changes in attitudes towards the German military places of memory on the part of the Russian population and underlined the importance of this factor in the constitution of the collective historical memory. Dominika Czarnecka (Torun) touched the sensitive topic of the “War of monuments” in Poland in the first years after the fall of communism (1989-1993). She showed how decisions were made about the fate of the monuments to the Red Army after 1989 and what variants their using or liquidation were implemented in the post-Soviet period. Dr Irina Belintseva (Moscow) investigated how the perception of the architectural heritage of East Prussia was changed in the Kaliningrad region – from total negation to recognition it as “native”. The conference participants perceived with the great interest the presentation of the research project of several students of the historical faculty of the Kaliningrad University under the title of “Historical signs and symbols in the urban space of Kaliningrad”.

The last section of the conference was dedicated to the memory sources (memoirs, diaries, interviews, music). Dr Beata Lakeberg (Bad Zwischenahnh) analyzed the content of the “Silesian local history calendars”, published in the FRG for settlers from Silesia. The purpose of her study was to define the ratio between regional and national identities. Dr Larisa Gavrлина (Moscow) reviewed a number of literary texts, focused on the creating a kind of the “portrait” of Kaliningrad. Dr Yury Kostyashov (Kaliningrad) examined the diaries and memoirs of Russian travelers to East Prussia as a source for study of the historical stereotypes and intercultural experience. Methods of study of historical memory through music became the research topic “Epitaph and a funeral march. German-Polish military musical culture” by organist and musicologist Michael F. Runowski (Berlin).

So-called “summer schools” (i.e., education projects for Russian, Polish and German students) were the second and, as it was represented, the most interesting component of the Trialog project. During 2011-2012 three such
schools took place lasting approximately 10 days. They were held by turns in the three countries on the following subjects: “Tourism and the seaside resorts of Sambia”, Kaliningrad, April 2011; “The border areas and historical experience”, Torun, September – October 2011; “The boundaries of memories. Places of memory in the area of the Oder River”, Frankfurt (Oder), September 2012.

Participants of the schools were 10 students and 2–3 teachers in a role of curators from each of the universities. The peculiarity of the Trialog summer schools is that one way or another they simulate the research community and use the method of case study as the basis of the educational program. At the beginning of the work, the students are divided into four international research groups of 7-8 people with equal representation from the each university. Each group is given a separate creative task in the certain direction for the whole period of the work. During the week, students work out their own program under the supervision of the curator, define research methods, and collect information by studying the literature, press, Internet resources. In addition, they perform a visual observation, make photo and video, interview respondents, consult to experts, conduct experiments, etc. Then the raw data are studied comprehensively and structured. During collective discussion students formulate several points of view on the studied problem using creativity techniques (Brainstorming). In conclusion, the results of the group research are reported in the form of the presentations at the final plenary session, as well as presented in the form of essays, travel guides, exhibitions and publications in mass media.

Thus, during the Kaliningrad summer school a group of students was given the task to develop practical recommendations for local authorities to conserve and use the architectural heritage of resort towns Zelenogradsk, Svetlogorsk and Otradnoe (German names: Kranz, Raushen, Georgenswalde). In the process, they studied: maps and plans of towns, urban planning ideas and their implementation; historical and modern buildings, architectural styles, a combination of natural landscape and architecture, functioning of recreational areas, local tourist attractions, historical and cultural objects (buildings and structures, temples, museums, monuments and memorials, commemorative plaques, park sculpture, etc.). The task was to make a comparative analysis of
the spatial and landscape development of the seaside resorts in Sambia before and after 1945, as well as to make an examination of use of built heritage with concrete examples, to evaluate the practice and the quality of the restoration works. Part of the task was to find traces of German architectural competition (1911), which was devoted to the creation of the project on the best construction of a country house in Sambia. On the basis the archival documents of more than 100 architectural projects, students had to find real objects on the terrain, to fix and describe the buildings constructed on the projects of this contest.

The final result of the work of this group was “The guidebook to the architectural, historical and cultural sights of the seaside resorts of the Kaliningrad seashore”, as well as recommendations to the local authorities for the conservation and use of the architectural heritage, proposals for development of the landscape and urban design, renovation of old and creation of new recreational areas, ideas on installation of original monuments and creation of other cultural objects.

Creating the concept of the use of the railway station building in the small town Aleksandrów Kujawski was one of the tasks for the students of the summer school in Torun. Aleksandrów was the final point on the border of Prussia and Russia at the time when Poland was a part of the Russian Empire. Tsar Alexander II built a huge and luxurious station on the eve of the opening of the railway between St. Petersburg and Berlin in 1862. It carries the name “The station of two monarchs” in memory of the meeting of the Tsar with German Emperor Wilhelm I in 1879. After boundary changes as a result of the First World War Aleksandrów appeared very far from frontiers of Poland, and the station turned into a provincial railway station. Today the well-preserved huge building is almost never used; meanwhile it is potentially a major tourist attraction and the greatest value of the town. This station is one of the elements of the cultural heritage and it weighs on the formation of historical townspeople memory. During the conducted research, students not only examined the

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5 Olga Kurilo (Hrsg.), *Tourismus und die Seebäder Samlands*, no 1, Avinus-Verlag, Berlin 2011, 52 S.
building in detail and studied its history, but also developed some variants of the concept of using the object as a tourist and cultural center⁶.

During the summer school in Frankfurt, it was offered to one of the groups to explore “the landscape of memory”. This term refers to the specific symbolic system which records traces of historical events and causes certain emotions. Among other objects, the students visited a few old cemeteries preserved traces of the turbulent events of the XX century, during which there were massive population displacements, accompanied by violent rupture of cultural tradition. They found a number of tombstones and monuments that were used repeatedly by the new settlers after the deportation of Germans. The previous “landscape of memory” was not recognized by the new inhabitants after the Second World War, the old “symbols of memory” were reused, often by new, aggressive and sometimes barbarous way⁷.

A series of the photo exhibitions based on their research assignments were prepared by the students. It was another practical result of the summer schools. The exhibitions demonstrated in turn at three universities and attracted a large public attention. For reviews of the students the Trialog summer schools became the most interesting and memorable events in their university life.

Summing up the results of Trialog in 2010-2012 we should recognize that this scientific and educational project proved very effective interaction between the scientists and the students of the three countries. Trialog allowed not only to exchange knowledge and experience of researches of the past in the region from the Oder to the Neman, but also contributed to overcome interdisciplinary, methodological, national and mental barriers, and thus enriched all the sides with valuable scientific experience.

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⁶ Olga Kurilo (Hrsg.), Grenzmarken und historische Erfahrung in der Region Toruń/Thorn, no 2, Avinus-Verlag, Berlin 2012, 63 S.

⁷ Olga Kurilo (Hrsg.), Erinnerungslandschaften und Identitäten im Oderraum, no 3, Avinus-Verlag, Berlin 2013, 64 S.
Триалог: опыт сотрудничества в области гуманитарных наук университетов в Калининграде, Торуне и Франкфурте на Одере

Юрий Костяшов

В последние годы внимание исследователей всё больше привлекают вопросы содержания, особенностей, механизмов формирования и функционирования исторической памяти, которая относится к числу основных формообразующих элементов коллективной и индивидуальной идентичности. При этом уникальность ситуации, сложившейся на российско-польско-немецком пространстве от Одера до Немана, представляет богатый материал для осмысления проблемы коллективного исторического сознания вообще и его региональной составляющей.

Одной из главных проблем исторической памяти жителей этого региона является отношение к историко-культурному наследию. Как складывалось это отношение под влиянием политики памяти в прошлом и настоящем? Как происходило включение чужого (немецкого по преимуществу) дооценного прошлого в массовое сознание новых жителей (русских, поляков и литовцев) в послевоенные годы? Какие барьеры были установлены на этом пути официальной политикой государств (СССР и Польской Народной Республики) и как они преодолевались? Какие факторы сегодня определяют содержание культурной памяти жителей региона? Ответы на эти вопросы пытались дать участники международного проекта Триалог.

«Триалог» – это исследовательский проект, который объединил три университета: Европейский Университет Виадрина во Франкфурте на Одере (Германия), Университет им. Николая Коперника в Торуне (Польша) и Балтийский федеральный университет им. Иммануила Канта в Калининграде (Россия). Цель данного проекта – развить и улучшить кооперацию между тремя университетами в области гуманитарных дисциплин посредством создания общих коммуникационных сетей и тем самым внести весомый вклад во взаимопонимание между тремя странами. Этот проект был инициирован в 2010 году университетом Виадрина и финансово поддержан Немецкой службой академических обменов (DAAD). Содействие проекту оказывают министерства иностранных дел России, Германии и Польши. Координатор и главный менеджер проекта – д-р Ольга Курило (Университет Виадрина). Автор настоящей публикации был координатором с российской стороны.
В рамках проекта проходят ежегодные конференции ученых и летние школы для студентов и аспирантов: результаты каждого из мероприятий отражаются в публикациях. Проект имеет междисциплинарный характер: в нем принимают участие историки, филологи, социологи, политологи, юристы, географы и историки архитектуры.

Объектом изучения является историческое пространство Южной Балтии – обширный регион между реками Одер и Неман, который в разные эпохи подвергался польскому, немецкому и русскому влияниям. Первая научная конференция Триалога состоялась во Франкфурте на Одере в ноябре 2010 г. и была посвящена разнообразным аспектам мобильности в регионе между Одером и Неманом в различные исторические периоды.

При этом мобильность и региональные связи прошлого и настоящего рассматривались в рамках данной конференции в качестве исторического наследия, оставленного в этом пространстве тремя культурами: немецкой, польской и русской. Участники конференции посетили несколько городов и крепостей в польско-немецком пограничье, которые до сих пор являются актуальными местами памяти для представителей трех культур. Уже с первой конференции тема отношения к многонациональному культурному наследию Южной Балтии и его влияние на региональную идентичность стала одной из ведущих в исследованиях участников Триалога.

Еще более эта тенденция проявилась на второй конференции под названием «Границы и пересечение границ в истории и современной культуре», которая состоялась в сентябре 2011 г. в Торуни (Польша). Докладчики из трех стран обсуждали очень широкий круг проблем, рассматривая понятие границ в философском, историческом и культурологическом значении. В центре внимания оказались такие вопросы, как установление, открытие и исчезновение границ, открытость познания и границы, границы и человек, границы и культура, границы между людьми, между «своим» и «чужим». Один из выводов дискуссии состоял в том, что в современном мире границы продолжают быть важной парадигмой мышления и, несмотря на исчезновение границ в Европе, проблема границ остается, только перемещается из области политики в сферу общественной, культурной и

2 Olga Kurilo (Hrsg.), Mobilität und regionale Vernetzung zwischen Oder und Memel: Eine europäische Landschaft neu zusammensetzen, Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, Berlin 2011, 255 S.
индивидуальнйй жизни. Некоторые выступления участников были прямо связаны с проблемами исторической памяти и региональной идентичности.

Наконец, третья конференция Триалога, которая состоялась в Калининграде (Россия) в апреле 2012 г., была полностью посвящена политике памяти и исторической памяти жителей региона между Вислой и Неманом.

При подготовке конференции были выделены следующие проблемные вопросы и поля исследования:

1. Историческая память локальных сообществ от Одера до Немана и политика памяти: содержание, особенности и механизмы функционирования

Формирование локальной/региональной исторической (культурной) памяти – представлений о прошлом, зафиксированных в коллективной памяти. Исторические мифы и стереотипы массового сознания. Историческая память и национальная/региональная идентичность. Церковь, религия и историческая память

2. Политика памяти: общенацональные и региональные аспекты

Политика памяти как средство легитимации власти или средство изменения существующего порядка. Национальные версии региональной истории в школьном образовании. Проблема преодоления исторических травм: научный и моральный аспекты. Взаимодействие исторической науки и исторической памяти. Роль литературы, искусства, средств массовой информации, сообществ любителей истории, краеведов и «реконструкторов» в формировании исторической памяти. История в киберпространстве.

3. Памятники, символы, ритуалы как фактор формирования исторической памяти и воспитания гражданской идентичности

Факторы формирования исторической памяти: памятники и памятные места, символические ритуалы, праздничные дни, музейные экспозиции, через которые осуществляется образование наследием (heritage education). Государственная политика и общественные инициативы. Памятные места и кладбища прошедших войн. Феномен «войны памятников».

4. Источники памяти: воспоминания, дневники, интервью

Этого-документы как источник для исследования проблем исторической памяти. Путешествия как опыт межкультурного взаимодействия. Представления о своем и чужом, этнические стереотипы, построение культурных границ, этнокультурная и региональная идентичность. Соседи глазами друг друга в прошлом и настоящем.

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3 Jurij Kostjašov, Olga Kurilo, Piotr Zariczny (Hrsg.), Grenzen und ihre Überwindung im deutsch-polnisch-russischem Raum, Wydawnictwo Adam Marszalek, Toruń 2012, 212 S.
Мемуарная литература о великих войнах XIX – XX веков. Метод устной истории (oral history) в изучении прошлого региона.

В русле этих направлений были представлены доклады по результатам трехлетних исследований участников Триалога. Не имея возможности назвать все темы и пересказать содержание докладов всех 32 участников конференции, хотел бы лишь кратко обозначить приоритетные темы и проиллюстрировать их несколькими примерами.

Наибольшее количество докладов было посвящено различным аспектам региональной исторической памяти как основных элементов индивидуальной и коллективной идентичности. Валерий Гальцов (Калининград) впервые систематизировал и проанализировал сайты русского сегмента Интернета, посвященные истории Восточной Пруссии и Калининградской области, которые являются наиболее репрезентативной картиной «хаотического» состояния исторической памяти калининградцев. По его мнению, размещенные в Интернете ресурсы очень далеки от научных основ профессиональной исторической науки и часто становятся проводником ложных представлений и опасных стереотипов, которые в первую очередь воздействуют на молодое поколение.

Д-р Ольга Курило (Берлин) на примере курортов Замланда (современного Калининградского полуострова) поставила проблему исторических и современных ландшафтов памяти на протяжении XIX и XX веков. Она показала, что хотя Балтийское побережье Самбии после Второй мировой войны потеряло прежнее значение европейского культурного ландшафта, но преемственность культурных традиций Самбии сохранилась в какой-то степени в Калининградской области, и это отражается на идентичности калининградцев.

Д-р Илья Дементьев (Калининград) при анализе исторической памяти жителей Калининградской области использовал категорию места памяти Пьера Нора и предложил свой список мест памяти в регионе. Соотношение исторической памяти и калининградской топонимики было исследовано в докладе Павла Полха (Калининград).

Тон в обсуждении политики памяти был задан докладом д-ра Ганс-Христиана Пуста (Штутгарт), который рассказал о забытой сегодня немецкой традиции с времен Первой мировой войны по установке деревянных памятников, предназначенных для забивания в них гвоздей („Nagelungsdenkmäler”). Деревянные фигуры воина или полководца, например, Гинденбурга, выставлялись на центральных площадях

4 Юрий Костяшов, Ольга Курило (ред), Между Одером и Неманом: проблемы исторической памяти, Издательство Балтийского федерального университета им. И. Канта, Калининград 2012, 211 с.
городов и всем желающим предлагалось забить в дерево гвоздь со шляпкой. Таким образом, деревянная скульптура постепенно покрывалась железной оболочкой. Тысячи людей были привлечены к этой акции, которая имела очень сильное эмоциональное воздействие. Кстати, гвозди для вбивания продавались всем желающим, а кампания сопровождалась сбором пожертвований, так что немцы чувствовали и свою причастность к общенациональному делу: тем самым они вносили свой вклад в победу.

Др Петр Заричны (Торунь) проанализировал немецкую прессу, чтобы показать как в ней формируется исторический и современной образ Польши, и как СМИ участвуют в инструментализации коллективной памяти в контексте германо-польских отношений после вступления Польши в Европейский союз. Патрик Вояжинский (Торунь) в докладе «Присутствие политики памяти во внешней политике Польши в XXI веке» обратил внимание на то, что в современной Польше наблюдается соперничество концепций политики исторической памяти братьев Качинских с «парадигмой забвения» Адама Михника и круг архитекторов, связанных с «Газетой Выборчей».

В рамках следующего направления «Памятники, ритуалы, символы» Конراد Чене (Франкфурт-на-Одере) исследовал художественные и ментальные образы врага на примере немецкой и советской пропаганды времен Второй мировой войны и определил возможности сравнительного анализа стереотипов врагов. Др Генадий Кретинин (Калининград) рассмотрел состояние воинских мемориалов и кладбищ в Калининградской области, проследил изменения отношения современных жителей к немецким военным местам памяти покрывалась постепенно образом, железной скульптурой города и подчеркнул значение этого фактора в конституировании коллективной исторической памяти. Доминика Чарнецка (Франкфурт на Одере) затронула болезненную тему «войны памятников» в Польше в первые годы после крушения коммунизма (1989–1993 гг.). Она показала, как принимались решения о судьбе памятников Красной Армии после 1989 г. и какие варианты их применения или ликвидации были осуществлены в постсоветский период. Др Ирина Белицева (Москва) проследила, как менялось в Калининградской области восприятие архитектурного наследия Восточной Пруссии – от тотального отрицания до признание его «своим». С большим интересом участники конференции встретили презентацию исследовательского проекта группы студентов-историков Университета имени И. Канта «Исторические знаки и символы в городском пространстве Калининграда».

Последний раздел конференции был посвящен источникам памяти (воспоминания, дневники, интервью, музыка). Др Беата Лакеберг (Ольденбург) проанализировала содержание «Силезских краеведческих календарей», выходивших в ФРГ для переселенцев из Силезии, с целью установления соотношения между
региональной и национальной идентичностями. Др Лариса Гаврилина (Москва) проанализировала группу литературных текстов, ориентированных на создание своеобразного «портрета» Калининграда. Др Юрий Костяшов (Калининград) рассмотрел дневники и воспоминания русских путешественников по Восточной Пруссии в качестве источника изучения исторических стереотипов и опыта межкультурного взаимодействия. Методика изучения исторической памяти посредством музыки стала темой доклада «Оптика и траурный марш. Немецко-польская музыкальная военная культура» организатора и музыковеда Михаэля Руновски (Берлин).

Второй и, как представляется, наиболее интересной составной частью проекта Триалог были так называемые «летние школы» – образовательные проекты для русских, польских и немецких студентов. В течение 2011–2012 годов состоялись три таких школы продолжительностью около 10 дней, которые проводились по очереди в трех странах по следующей тематике:

"Туризм и морские курорты Смбины", Калининград, апрель 2011 г.
"Пограничные области и исторический опыт", Торунь, сент.–окт. 2011 г.
"Границы воспоминаний. Места памяти в районе реки Одр", Франкфурт на Одре, сентябрь 2012 г.

Участниками школ были по 10 студентов и по 2–3 преподавателя в роли кураторов от каждого из университетов. Особенность летних школ Триалога состоит в том, что они в той или иной мере моделируют научное сообщество и используют метод конкретного исследования в качестве основы образовательной программы. В начале работы студенты разбиваются на четыре международные исследовательские группы по 7–8 человек с паритетным представительством от каждого университета. Каждая группа получает отдельное творческое задание по определенному направлению на весь период работы школы. В течение недели студенты под руководством куратора самостоятельно разрабатывали программу, определяли методы исследования, занимались сбором информации с помощью изучения литературы, прессы, Интернет-ресурсов, осуществляли визуальное наблюдение, производили фото- и кинофиксацию, интервьюировали респондентов, консультировались со специалистами, устраивали эксперименты и т. д. Затем исходные данные всесторонне изучались и структурировались и во время коллективного обсуждения с использованием методик креативности (creativity techniques) формулировались несколько точек зрения на изучаемую проблему. В завершении результаты групповых исследований представлялись в качестве презентаций на заключительном пленарном заседании участников школы, а также представлялись в виде экза, путеводителей, выставок, публикаций в СМИ.

Так, во время Калининградской школы группа студентов получила задание
разработать практические рекомендации местным властям по сохранению и использованию архитектурного наследия курортных городов Зеленоградск, Светлогорск и Отрадное (нем. Кранц, Рашен и Георгенсвальде). В процессе работы они изучали карты и планировку этих городов, градостроительные идеи и их реализацию: историческую и современную застройку, архитектурные стили, сочетание природного ландшафта и архитектуры, функционирование рекреационных зон, местные туристические достопримечательности и историко-культурные объекты (здания и сооружения, храмы, музеи, памятники и памятные места, мемориальные доски, парковая скульптура и пр.). Задание состояло в том, чтобы сделать сравнительный анализ пространственного и ландшафтного развития морских курортов Самиби до и после 1945 года, а также провести экспертизу использования объектов архитектурного наследия на конкретных примерах, оценить практику и качество реставрационных работ.

Составной частью задания был поиск следов проведенного в Германии архитектурного конкурса 1911 года по созданию проекта на лучшую постройку дачного домика на Самиби. На основании сохранившихся архивных документов более 100 участвовавших в конкурсе архитектурных проектов студенты должны были обнаружить на местности, зафиксировать и описать построенные по конкурсным проектам здания.

Конечным результатом работы этой группы стал «Путеводитель по архитектурным и историко-культурным достопримечательностям морских курортов Калининградского взморья», а также рекомендации местным властям по сохранению и использованию архитектурного наследия, предложения по развитию ландшафта и градостроительства, реконструкции старых и созданию новых рекреационных зон, идеи о строительстве оригинальных памятников и других культурных объектов5.

Одним из заданий для участников школы в Торуне было создание концепции использования здания железнодорожного вокзала в небольшом городке Александров Куявски (Aleksandrów Kujawski). Во времена вхождения Польши в состав Российской империи это был конечный пункт на границе Пруссии и России. Царь Александр II построил здесь огромный и роскошный вокзал к открытию в 1862 году железной дороги между Петербургом и Берлином. Он носит название «Вокзал двух монархов» в память о встрече здесь царя с германским императором Вильгельмом I в 1879 г. После изменения границ в результате Первой мировой войны и воссоздания польского государства город Александров оказался очень далеко от государственных границ Польши, а вокзал превратился в малозначимую провинциальную

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5 Olga Kurilo (Hrsg.), Tourismus und die Seebäder Samlands, no 1, Avinus-Verlag, Berlin 2011, 52 S.
железнодорожную станцию. Сегодня великолепно сохранившееся огромное здание почти не используется, а между тем потенциально это главная достопримечательность и самая большая ценность города. Он является одним из элементов культурного наследия, формирования исторической памяти жителей города. В результате проведенного исследования студенты не только детально обследовали здание и изучили его историю, но и разработали несколько вариантов концепции использования этого объекта как туристического и культурного центра.

Во время школы во Франкфурте одной из групп было предложено изучить ландшафт памяти. Данный термин обозначает определенную символическую систему, которая хранит следы исторических событий и вызывает определенные эмоции. В числе других объектов студенты посетили несколько старых кладбищ, которые сохранили следы бурных событий XX века, во время которых имели место массовые перемещения населения, сопровождаемые насилиственным разрывом культурной традиции. Они обнаружили надгробные плиты и памятники, которые использовались повторно новыми поселенцами после депортации немцев. Прежний сложившийся ландшафт памяти не был распознан новыми жителями после Второй мировой войны, старые символы памяти были использованы повторно, часто новым, агрессивным и иногда варварским способом.

Еще одним практическим результатом летних школ была серия фотовыставок, которые были подготовлены силами студентов по мотивам своих исследовательских заданий, которые по очереди демонстрировались в трех университетах и привлекали большое внимание публики. По отзывам студентов, летние школы Триалога стали самыми интересными и запоминающимися событиями для них за всё время обучения.

Подводя итоги работы Триалога за 2010–2012 гг. следует признать, что он оказался очень эффективным средством взаимодействия ученых и студентов трех стран, что позволило не только обменяться знаниями и опытом исследований прошлого в регионе от Одера до Немана, но способствовало преодолению междисциплинарных, методологических, национальных и ментальных барьеров, а значит обогатило все стороны ценным научным опытом.

6 Olga Kurilo (Hrsg.), Grenzmarken und historische Erfahrung in der Region Toruń/Thorn, no 2, Avinus-Verlag, Berlin 2012, 63 S.
7 Olga Kurilo (Hrsg.), Erinnerungslandschaften und Identitäten im Oderraum, no 3, Avinus-Verlag, Berlin 2013, 64 S.
I read Dr. Głowacka-Grajper’s paper by analogy with capitalistic consumption society. Under the free market economy, anyone can put goods on the market and people can freely choose and buy goods in accordance with their preference. Then a question as to what item gains popularity and how it can achieve sales is an object of seller’s concern. In the analogy between memory conflicts and consumption society, historical views, perception of history, or package of memories correspond to commodities provided to consumers. How should memories be packaged in order to be hot items? Dr. Głowacka-Grajper shows that in Poland, where memories of the Second World War still functions as a burden, a memory package of antagonism against her neighbors appeals to more people than a memory package of reconciliation does.

During the communist era, in Central and Eastern European countries, including Poland, where people had much fewer choices of goods than the contemporary western consumers did, the only one package of goods as to historical narrative or the perception of history could be sold, so to speak, in state-managed stores. That is the Soviet type of historical narrative or the Soviet standard. It can also be called Great Patriotic War-centered historiography.

The Soviet type of historical narrative consists of such elements as World War II as an anti-fascist war of liberation, the Soviet Union as a liberator, and Germany as categorical loser. In this narrative, the following two processes of liberation were emphasized as a Soviet achievement: liberation from the fascist rule (national liberation) and one from old evils of the prewar regime (people’s liberation). According to this view, while the prewar regime was branded as a wartime collaborator, communists were described as the true liberator. On the other hand, however, this narrative overlooked such facts as injustices to the
Germans, participation of local population in the Holocaust, or communist oppression of people.

After the collapse of the communist regimes in Central and Eastern European countries, this Soviet standard lost its appeal. Parallel to the process of opening a market and of economic liberalization, perception of history too opened a market and liberalizing. In Poland, as building relations with neighboring and new independent countries became a difficult task, concealed past or memories flew out and market was full of “histories”.

Nowadays, the wide and global spread of internet and social network services (SNS) like Facebook or Twitter has accelerated this process. Today anyone can write a history in his version and can easily upload it. It is no exaggeration to say that everyone can be a historian. It is true, however, that these ordinary “historians” do not always present their view on the basis of documents or archival works which professional historians do. In many cases, they choose and imitate any of narrative package suitable for them from affluent of “histories”.

So, it is important for us to analyze media which provide ordinary “historians” with the narrative or cognitive package. We can list as such media family, church, SNS, historical novels, popular history, TV programs, films, new type of historical museum like Warsaw Uprising Museum in Poland and so on. Here, to consider influence on relationship between states, I would like to focus the argument on the types of historical narrative that is introduced as some sort of state policy.

In the former Soviet-bloc countries, roughly two types of narrative package could replace the Soviet type of historical narrative. The first was an ethnocentric type of historical narrative or the national standard. It consists of such elements as revaluation of old regimes denied by the Soviet standard, emphasis on injustices committed by the Soviet, and silence about injustices to the Germans. The second type of narrative package was an EU type of historical narrative or the EU standard. Its contents include emphasis on universal values, evaluation of the EU as a community of reconciliation, relativization of state borders, and acceleration of reconciliation between nations. The EU standard
faces up to such inconvenient facts as participation of local population in the Holocaust, injustices to the Germans, or wartime collaboration and so on.

Did people in the former Soviet-bloc countries accept these packages of historical narrative? To what degree have these packages become widespread? I would like to examine the case of Poland, Ukraine, and Russia, which Dr. Głowacka-Grajper mentioned in her paper. The following diagram shows the pattern of that each country has traced since the Soviet type of historical narrative ceased to function (“S” means the Soviet standard, “E” the EU standard, and “N” the national standard).

Poland:  S → E ≥ N
Western Ukraine : S → N > E
Eastern Ukraine : S → [absence of both N and E]
Russia:  S → S and/or N? [at least, categorical absence of E]

Poland accepted the EU standard for herself as a state policy (as a kind of political correctness) in the process of the accession to the EU. It is true that the national standard of historical narrative has never been weak in Poland, but it could be said that there has been a tendency for the EU standard to deter an explosion of ethno-centric behavior. The EU standard that facilitates reconciliation between nations, however, has not reached either Ukraine with a few exceptions of pro-European intellectuals, or Russia. This seems to demonstrate Dr. Głowacka-Grajper’s assumption about non-optimistic vision of future relations between Poland and Ukraine or Russia from a different angle.

Dr. Głowacka-Grajper also reports an interesting fact that opinion in the Polish society is divided on the matter whether Poland should foster the policy of reconciliation with conflicting neighbors. Now I would like to question whether this division of opinion reflects any social background. In this globalizing world, critical fault-line exists not only between nations, but also within the nation. This fault-line divides and is more and more dividing a nation into two groups, the one is the winner, the educated who understand global or European standard and can get access to the global or European market, and the other is the loser, left
behind the former. This problem seems to have an importance because it is related to possibility and provability of division of historical consciousness within a nation. In this sense, estrangement between professional historiography and mass historical consciousness can become a critical issue. Will deepening the gap of historical consciousness within a nation mean an increase the number of those who would be susceptible to populist identity politics? Will the former Soviet-bloc countries like Poland, Ukraine and Russia develop identity politics of memory, or will they continue or begin to develop the policy of reconciliation?

It is true that a reconciliation between states is one thing, and a reconciliation between nations another. But it is worth considering how and to what degree can the reconciliation of states as a policy have an influence on a reconciliation of nations. Furthermore, it deserves greater attention to consider mutual influence between state policies of reconciliation and local, rather niche, but very important attempts from below like Kaliningrad–Toruń–Frankfurt (Oder) trialog as Professor Kostyashov presented.
Part III

Comparison
A Comparative Framework of History and Memory
Conflicts between Eastern Europe and Eastern Asia

Nobuya Hashimoto

Introduction

The aim of this presentation is to explore a comparative framework for inquiry into history and memory conflicts in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and Eastern and South-eastern Asia, and to show a way to cultivate a unified and consistent understanding of history and memory politics in both areas in the post-Cold War period. Since the 1990s, histories and memories have been more and more mobilized by national states and other political agencies in order to claim their legitimacy in domestic politics and international relationships: to demand recognition of ‘historical truth’, restoration of ‘justice’, apology, and compensation, for several reasons: to rationalize territorial claims to regions or islands that the states concerned consider they have the right to possess, and to raise and strengthen ‘national’ aggregation against a backdrop of economic globalisation and the weakening of state sovereignty. National states and agencies sometimes try to rewrite and re-comprehend their official histories and reorganize national memories of ordinary people. Such political manipulation (falsification in some cases) of histories and memories often provokes repulsion from neighbouring nations and may lead to the development of regional conflicts.

In fact, claims for the historical legitimacy of possession of very tiny (seemingly meaningless) islands and reefs have caused severe antagonism among several nations in East and Southeast Asia. The ‘disputable’ topics of the Nanjing Massacre, Comfort Women, Colonisation of the Korean Peninsula, and so on have repeatedly caused and accelerated not only political and diplomatic strains between governments, but also mutual hatred and disgust among

1 In practice, one of the ex-Prime Ministers of Japan once asserted that they should have been blown up to remove possibilities of territorial conflict in future.
‘ordinary’ people. We usually observe racist hate-speech against Korean minorities and counter demonstrations by opponents to racism in Japan in these days. These are new phenomena that we had never experienced prior to ten years ago. The situation seems to have become more and more acute in these ten years, as hawkish and nationalistic political forces have gained more and more power and repeated coercive behaviour in Eastern Asia.

One influential myth of history and memory conflicts has prevailed in Japan since the 1980s: Europeans have struggled to develop a dialogue on disputable historical events and antagonistic memories for getting over the distrust and hostility that had long been the cause of successive wars since the creation of the modern sovereign states system, while hostile perceptions of histories and memories have multiplied among Asian nations and are aggravating international distrust and uncomfortable relationships, especially with Japan. Willy Brandt’s begging for forgiveness on bended knee in a Warsaw Ghetto and Richard von Weizsäcker’s famous speech at Bundestag have been repeatedly admired and referred to as instructive models for politicians by liberal and left wing activists and academics in Japan. In contrast, some of the Prime Ministers and a lot of right wing politicians in Japan officially (or unofficially) visit and worship at Yasukuni Shrine, in which dead combatants and officers including such class-A War Criminals as Hideki Tojo (the General and Prime Minister who started the Pacific War with the USA, Britain, and the Netherlands in 1941) were deified and applauded as fallen national heroes. Lasting and stubborn prosecution of Nazi criminals in West Germany was settled against the inauguration of the Prime Minister’s office by one of the former class-A War Criminals (Nobusuke Kishi, a grandfather of the present PM) in Japan. Experiences of the ‘Remembrance, Responsibility and Future’

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2 A few decades ago, a Christian woman appealed to the Justice Court of Japan to delete the ‘soul’ of her dead husband, who was a member of the Self-Defense Force of Japan and died in the procedure of an official mission, from Yasukuni Shrine on the ground of her own (not her husband’s) religious belief. Yasukuni Shrine refused her claim on the basis of its doctrine that a dead soul once unified and merged into the Body of Gods of the Shrine is never detached. The Supreme Court of Japan dismissed her claim in 1988. Some Christian groups raised the problem of deifying Christian soldiers who had died in WWII and other wars in Yasukuni Shrine.
Foundation in Germany were introduced to the Japanese public sphere against a backdrop of Japanese Courts’ rejection of claims by Chinese and Korean forced labourers for apologies and compensation from Japanese enterprises and the government.

These contrasts between two defeated Axis Powers of WWII are very symbolic. Some dissidents and intellectuals in Japan have consistently thought that ‘unrepentant’ attitudes of their government manifest as political backwardness and immature democracy in Japan. Right-wing politicians’ acts have been often criticized and condemned by neighbouring states and the US government, too. According to their statements, these imprudent deeds show that leading Japanese politicians never reflect Japan’s taking responsibility for war and colonisation: furthermore, they might disturb regional cooperation and destabilise international relationships in Eastern Asia. The contrast itself seems to remain valid and useful for recognising the political culture in contemporary Japan, and such a situation promotes the mythicisation of European experiences of the shared history and memory of its tragic past, and reconciliation through dialogue and mutual understanding.

We can discern one example of the mythicisation and idealisation of European experiences in the general preface for a authentic series on the Modern and Contemporary History of Eastern Asia.

Unlike Europe, where the collapse of Soviet Union and dismantlement of the Cold War régime had accelerated the integration and unification of the region, Eastern Asia, in which even divided nations still exist, has never succeeded in healing the scars of colonialism, wars, and the Cold War, and has rather provoked the conflicts of historical perception and territorial possession, stirring up antagonistic feelings [among ordinary people – N.H.]. We can discern a situation in which the development of globalisation, ironically enough, functions ‘to increase [national] closedness’ and inspires nationalism. 3

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3 Ken’ichi Goto et al. (eds.), Iwanami Koza: Higashi Azia Kingendai Tsushi (Iwanami
When they seek dialogue and reconciliation among Asian nations, historians and intellectuals usually refer to German-Polish dialogue on history textbooks, compilation of common textbooks by German and French specialists, and international commissions of historians, in order to facilitate a mutual understanding and mutual adjustment of histories. Of course, these European experiences were very significant for building a peaceful and integrated Europe, but they also brought important instructions and suggestions to Japan and Eastern Asia. However, the scheme of ‘dialogue and reconciliation in Europe / hostility and confrontation in Asia’ is, in my opinion, very superficial and fails to grasp the real situations in Europe, since Japanese historians and intellectual who oppose to increasing tendencies of nationalistic historical revisionism in Japan do not acknowledge the confused and antagonistic situation of histories and memories among European nations. However, in practice, as many authors and researchers (including our colleagues on this project) point out, ‘contested’ or ‘conflicted’ histories and memories of WWII and other critical issues have widely arisen and prevailed in Europe, too. The alleged ‘European space of common history and memory’ is actually diverged into some history and memory regimes that have been difficult to arbitrate after the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the dissolution of the Soviet Union. History policies developed by some European governments (especially CEE countries) often induce domestic and international disputes, and challenge the authentic representation of WWII as a ‘War of Democracy against Fascism’, which was the official western slogan in wartime and during the Cold War. Conflict of histories and memories is not ‘a patented article’ of Eastern Asia, but a more widely prevailed symptom of these decades. Therefore, this phenomenon demands a more globalised investigation. This is the reason why I have developed a comparative framework of CEE and Eastern Asia.


4 In fact, some professional commissions of historians were organized between China, South Korea, and Japan, and collaborative studies of the common past were promoted under governmental support or as voluntary projects.
To advance and deepen the discussion, I will adopt two areas of consideration. The first part of this presentation addresses the historiographical thinking about post-WWII Japan’s comparison between Germany and Japan, and takes an old and savant historian with whom I am very familiar as an example. This will provide us with a prerequisite for a comparison between CEE and Eastern Asia. The second part addresses the contemporary contexts in which history and memory conflicts rise and grow more intense in both CEE and East Asia.

II. Comparative history of Germany and Japan: The case of Professor Yukio Mochida

II-1. Comparing Germany and Japan: A historiographical discussion

Comparing Germany and Japan has been customary in Japanese historiography. Germany had been a model of modernisation for Japan since the Meiji Ishin (Restoration), and there have been many topics and subjects that deserved comparison between the two nations. Herein, I will present one good example from the introductory chapter of a small book that was written by Professor Yukio Mochida (1931-) nearly half a century ago.

There is an opinion that Japan is Germany in Asia. It addresses not only the common partial features of both countries’ history, but also the recognition that the whole way of their historical progress in the modern era had a common framework, and that they followed a common fatal path. It is common criminal acts against human beings by Nazism of [Germany] and militaristic Fascism [of Japan] in World War II that brought this recognition most recently.  

Herein, prerequisites and key criterions for an effective comparison are settled in the common criminal acts of World War II. As similarity and commonness are indispensable for a meaningful comparison, the commonness of

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5 Yukio Mochida, Hikaku Kindaishi no Ronri: Nihon to Doitsu (A Logic of Comparative Modern History: Japan and Germany), Minerva Shobo Publishing, 1970, p.3.
German Nazism and the Japanese model of Fascism should have been the prerequisite to make the comparison significant for Professor Mochida.

Another viewpoint from which to draw a comparison is *Vergangenheitsbewältigung* (Coming to terms with the Past). Professor Yuji Ishida (1957-) of the University of Tokyo writes in his noteworthy monograph:

> It is possible to say that *Vergangenheitsbewältigung* of post-war Germany has contributed to the recovery of its international reliability and improvement of status, and made the German nation regain self-confidence. In contrast to it, Japan has never come to terms with the ‘negative legacies’ of its aggressive wars and illegal acts of the past, which remain a ‘stumbling block’ in Japan’s relationships with East-Asian countries, although Japan carried out World War II in combination with Germany and together with it became the defeated states.⁶

‘(West) Germany’s *Vergangenheitsbewältigung* as remorse for tragic events in the recent past and Japan’s lack of repentance for its own responsibility and guilt for colonisation and wars’ is the basic tone of his comparison, and it composes the key element of the above-mentioned scheme of ‘dialogue and reconciliation in Europe / hostility and confrontation in Asia’.

This type of comparison between Germany and Japan has provoked various disputes. On the one hand, right-wing historical revisionists in Japan, who are severely opposed to this scheme, have often tried to distinguish Japan’s ‘honourable’ (in their distorted opinion) war for the liberation of Asian nations out of European colonialism from Germany’s shameful and barbarous war and Holocaust. According to their way of thinking, the comparison between Germany and Japan in itself is misleading and nonsensical, and left-wing historians who insist on treating them as equal are possessed by ‘masochistic historical views’. On the other hand, Ian Buruma elaborated upon the comparison on the grounds of his own observation of both societies, narrating them in a more miscellaneous

and impressive fashion\textsuperscript{7}. His discussion seems to be more nuanced and distanced from the idealisation of German politics. In any way, the comparison between Germany and Japan has been a hot topic of contemporary history in our historiography and public opinion on WWII\textsuperscript{8}.

II-2. Yukio Mochida and post-war historiography in Japan

Dr Yukio Mochida, Professor Emeritus of Doshisha University in Kyoto is famous for two fields of his historical studies. One is the social history of elite education and the formation of ‘qualification/certification society’ in modern Germany. He is a pioneering historian of this field in Japan and many historians and pedagogues of younger generations, including me, have developed socio-historical research on education and schools and produced abundant works under his instruction and supervision. Another field in which Professor Mochida has engaged is comparative modern and contemporary history of Germany and Japan, whose scope ranges from the formation of modern statehood in the nineteenth century to the war and post-war responsibilities of both states in WWII. He has published or contributed articles to more than 80 books within both fields, and translated significant foreign (English and German) books on German history and the Holocaust into Japanese: a controversial monograph on the Holocaust written by Daniel Goldhagen (\textit{Hitler’s willing executioners: ordinary Germans and the Holocaust}, Knopf, 1996), \textit{The Destruction of the European Jews} by Raul Hilberg, \textit{The Holocaust Encyclopedia} edited by Walter Laqueur, and so on. The co-existence of these two research subjects, which do not have anything in common at first glance, or rather seem to be contrary in character to one another, is the essence of my consideration.


\textsuperscript{8} Among memories of ordinary people on WWII in Japan, \textit{Hiroshima, Nagasaki}, and air bombing in major cities had long been focal points of their narratives as well as the difficulty of obtaining food in evacuation, dangerous repatriation of colonists from the Korean Peninsula and Manchuria, and forced labour of POWs in Siberia. All of these experiences composed the core of victimhood nationalism in Japan, and it is only after the 1980s or 90s that the Japanese public began to talk openly and concretely about their own infliction and perpetration on Asian nations in the first half of 20\textsuperscript{th} century.
Yukio Mochida was born in Kofu of Yamanashi Province in Central Japan in 1931. Though he had been a militaristic-minded boy (‘Gunkoku Shonen’ in Japanese) who had been eager to enter a military preparatory school (Cadet Corps) in wartime, he grew up in the prevailing ‘democratic’ atmosphere of Japan following its defeat in 1945, and was influenced by Koza’ha Marxist9 theory in his secondary school days. Soon he entered Kyoto University. He depicted its intellectual milieu, which surrounded him in his student days, in his autobiographical book:

In 1951, I entered the Department of History in the Faculty of Letters, Kyoto University. Here public lectures by Shima Yasuhiko, Eiichi Horie, Tatsuya Naramoto, and so on were successively held. All these scholars were Koza’ha Marxists. They advocated that Meiji Ishin (Restoration) was not a bourgeois revolution, but the establishment of the autocratic Ten’no-sei (Emperor System in Japan) regime and absolutism, which had opened the way to subsequent militant dictatorship, wars, and invasions into neighbouring countries. At the same time, they regarded Germany having allowed Nazi rule as equivalent to Japan. Thus, the modernity of darkness in Germany and Japan rose up on one side, and, on the opposite side, British, American, and French modernity was referred to as ‘brilliant hope’ in their understanding of history.10

Under the drastic turn of political and intellectual milieus in post-war Japan, Yukio Mochida became a radical leftist activist, left the university before graduation, and directly joined political activities at the beginning of the 1950s. It

9 There were two major schools of Marxism in pre-WWII Japan. Koza’ha School, which was under the influence of the illegal underground Japan Communist Party and Comintern, emphasised that the Meiji Restoration was not a bourgeois revolution, and it established an absolutist monarchy with capitalistic development in Japan. It thought of this way of development as Japanese Sonderweg. Another school, Rono’ha, had relationships with other socialist-labour parties and grasped the Meiji Restoration as a typical bourgeois revolution. These two schools had great influence on social sciences and historiography in post-war Japan.

10 Yukio Mochida, Futatsu no Sengo, Futatsu no Kindai: Nihon to Doitsu (Two Post-War Ages, Two Modernities: Japan and Germany), Minerva Shobo Publishing, 2009, p.3.
was the spring of 1956 when young Mochida came back to lecture rooms and began to engage with the preparation for his graduation thesis on the ‘Formation of Gutsherrschaft in Germany’. We should take into consideration the fact that the political situation and party system in Japan changed drastically in 1955: the Liberal Democratic Party was organised, uniting some conservative parties and hoisting ‘the establishment of self-made Constitution’ as its urgent (though unfulfilled until now) political agenda; Left and Right Socialist Parties were reunited into one socialist party (Social Democratic Party of Japan); the Japan Communist Party abandoned its extremist adventurous program of violent revolution after Khrushchev’s criticism against Stalin at the Twentieth Congress of Communist Party of Soviet Union in February 1956, escaped from Soviet and Communist China’s influences, and turned into a (permanent opposition) party of parliamentary democracy. Recently, one social historian of modern and contemporary Japan pointed out that this political reorganisation coincided with the turning point of post-war historiography in Japan from the Marxist paradigm of ‘general law of development in World History’ to a methodological revision and reflection of this paradigm. Since then, Japanese historiography has endeavoured to change its viewpoints and methodologies through the acceptance of mass society theory and other social scientific ways of thinking, conflicts between the old and new left in the student riots in the 1960s, the global regime of the Cold War and Vietnam War, and the reception of social history and theory of world systems and so on. Y. Mochida’s theoretical departure from Koza-ha Marxism was one of these historical turns.

II-3. Professor Mochida’s method of comparative history of Germany and Japan

Professor Mochida claims that he has long been confronted with the dual ‘position warfare’ against both right and left wings since he returned to historical

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studies: one front criticizes historically both Japan and Germany’s dark pasts, which were enfolded with successive wars and anti-democratic regimes until 1945; the other criticizes the dominant historical thinking about German and Japanese modernity that left-liberals including Koza-ha Marxists insisted upon. The ultimate goal of his research activities has consistently been configured and fixed at the realisation of a ‘peaceful and democratic’ world and Japan. He has been motivated to engage with this goal through his own experience of WWII and the memory of Fascism and Nazism since his young days. As a former post-war left-wing activist, he has shared the sentiments of the ‘Community of Remorse’ (Masao Maruyama) among Japanese intellectuals who reflect upon and regret their recent past of militarism and colonialism.

On the other hand, Professor Mochida has severely criticized the Koza-ha Marxist theory of modern history as well as Rono-ha Marxist historians and other modernist historians, including the New Kyoto School. Though he called the dominant attitude among post-war Japanese historians ‘Modern History of Remorse’, naming it after Maruyama’s formulation, and confessed his own emotional sympathy to it, he struggled to escape from its scholarly influence. The critical point, according to him, was that all these schools of historians shared the idea that revolutionary events in Western Europe (England and France), typically the French revolution in 1789, should be regarded as models for, and yardsticks by which to measure the normal path of historical development and modernity. He emphasised that historical developments in modern Japan had been measured in the light of the standard scales of the Western European model by Marxists and modernists, just as German history had been compared and judged with the Western model of development (cf. German Sonderweg thesis). He argued, however, that both Fascism in Japan and Nazism in Germany should not be interpreted and explained by reduction of their political, economic, and social backwardness, which were represented on the basis of Western Europe as

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12 Masao Maruyama (1914-1996) was the most influential political scientist and liberal intellectual in post-war Japan, and a professor at the University of Tokyo.
13 New Kyoto School: a liberal and modernist school of humanities. The Institute for Research in Humanities, Kyoto University, was its centre.
a model’. He set up his agenda as a historian in establishing an alternative framework for historical thinking of modernity in Germany and Japan against the ‘Modern History of Remorse’.

In the 1960s, Y. Mochida was engaged with the political history of modern Germany; his early works addressed disputes on the constitutional regime between the Parliament and Bismarck in Prussia. In these works, he established his own approaches to political history, in which he rejected the reductionism of political processes on economic bases, recognized the former’s comparative independence from the latter, and grasped political processes as results or functions of struggles between different political powers (groups) and their choices at each critical moment. These pragmatic approaches were, of course, a novelty for a former Marxist and a challenge against the prevailing dogmatism among left wing historians and activists. Concretely, he tried to re-examine the thesis that modern Germany was politically and economically backward because of the rule by Junkers as a semi-feudal landowning class in Prussia, and he demanded to revise the formula that the rise of Nazism was ultimately attributable to this backwardness and immature democracy in Germany. The cause of Nazism in Germany (and Fascism in Japan), in his opinion, should have been investigated not in the backwardness but in the more concrete phases of political and social struggles in both states.

Taking these approaches, Professor Mochida’s academic career proceeded from political history to the social history of German militarism (1970s), and to the social history of elite education (Gümnasium) and the formation of a ‘certification / qualification society’ in Germany (1980-90s). His later works focused on the history of Gümnasium, university professors, liberal professions, and intellectual civil society. Thus, the Junker-centred description of history was substituted by the cultural hegemony of citizens who received classical education in Gümnasium and professional training in university. This type of elite formation was a phenomenon similar to those observed in the public schools of England and lycées and grandes écoles of France. The transformation of German society was parallel to that of Western Europe, according to this new paradigm. He established a new formula of his theoretical framework for investigation:
'From Junkers' Germany to Bildungsbürgertum's Germany'. In short, he found the social history of education to be a method to overcome the reductionist theory on the social structure and dominant ruling classes by Marxists.

Parallel to these advancements in his research activities, Professor Mochida continuously published many works (including popular ones) and translations on the Holocaust, Nazism, the Neo-Nazi movement, war crimes, and war responsibility, and inquired into the methodologies of comparative modern and contemporary history of Japan and Germany. His 'position warfare' against right and left wing political stances was consistently maintained in these works. One of his contributions as a historian consists of the popular works for ordinary readers in which he discusses these heavy and troublesome topics using the vocabulary of everyday language. Though he never wrote a monograph on the Holocaust and WWII itself, he directed the investigations of his younger colleagues through these translations and popular works.

We witness a very interesting scene therein, as, on the one hand, the formula of 'the political and economic backwardness of Germany as a cause of Nazism', which was criticized by Y. Mochiada, is at the very core of the Deutsche Sonderweg thesis developed by the German School of Social History led by Hans-Ulrich Wehler, and, on the other hand, Y. Mochida depended on investigations into modern secondary and university education, which historians of this School developed. It means that Y. Mochida criticised and tried to overcome the German School of Social History by means of the same School's accomplishments on the social history of education. The key to understanding this question is, in his opinion, located in the theoretical similarity and functional equivalence between post-war historiography in Japan and the Deutsche Sonderweg thesis in Germany. He believes that the authentic post-war historiography in Germany easily recurred to the pre-Hitler (Rankean) tradition of historical studies and did not take Germany’s responsibility for the war and Holocaust into consideration seriously. It was only after the emergence of the School of Social History that German historians of new generations began to talk about these serious problems, at the end of the 1960s. This means that the German School of Social History advocating Deutsche Sonderweg played the
same function of self-criticism as the ‘Modern History of Remorse’ had done in Japan in the 1950s, prior to the Germans. But, at the same time, some branches of the German School of Social History developed another thesis on relationships between the educational system and class structure, especially Bildungsbürgerntum, in Germany. This is the very reason why Y. Mochida could rely on the social history of education to overcome the ‘Modern History of Remorse’ in Japan (hence the Sonderweg thesis in Germany).

II-4 Limitations of a comparison between Germany and Japan

Professor Mochida’s approaches include some difficulties as well as possibilities. These approaches have already brought many important insights and contributions not only to the history of education but also to educational sciences, resonating with sociological studies of education (e.g. Pierre Bourdieu and his successors). They may imply the theoretical potential to criticise Euro-Centrism based on English-French modernisation models (hence the admiration of western liberal democracy). On the other hand, his scope of views has been inevitably framed and confined by the Cold War regime because of his time of apprentice as a historian, and limited to the scope of historiography in West Germany. He has failed or avoided to settle the experiences of dictatorship in East Germany and socialism in his conceptualisation of German history as a whole. His comparative history of Germany and Japan has been based on the national history of both countries, and constructed apart from CEE (Timothy Snyder’s ‘Bloodlands’) and East Asian contexts, into which these two nations were respectively embedded. Therefore, in spite of his acute insights on the comparison between modern Germany and Japan, his discussion inclines to get involved in the norm of ‘(West) Germany’s Vergangenheitsbewältigung as remorse for tragic events in the recent past and Japan’s lack of repentance for its own responsibility and guilt’ scheme. The scheme itself, as I referred to above, has never lost its moral significance for the Japanese political situation, and so we cannot merge it into the background. But as a historical perception, it seems to become antiquated and lose its appropriateness in the post-Cold War period. As a historian of Russia and Baltic countries, I am aware of the recent tendency
of CEE and Baltic countries to refuse to accept the ‘myth’ of German “Vergangenheitsbewältigung” based on the thesis of Nazi and Holocaust crimes as the sole and incomparable evil against humanity. They are challenging the dominant historical narratives of WWII in Western Europe and demanding they be reorganised, pointing out Soviet and communist crimes as the bigger evil. Their challenge is to sway the fundamental prerequisite on which the comparison between Japan and Germany was established. Therefore, the comparison between Japan and Germany should be, in my opinion, consciously re-examined and reconfirmed, taking their geopolitical and historical contexts and preconditions of East Asia and East-Central Europe into consideration. Thus in the next part, I will pick up some topics in East Asia that deserve comparison with experiences in CEE countries.

III Perspectives for comparison: CEE and East Asian contexts

III-1 Differences as prerequisites for comparison

If we try to enlarge the scope of comparison, from between Germany and Japan to between CEE and Eastern Asia, we need to discern some common features between these two regions. If there were no common situations and characters between them, the comparison itself would be meaningless. In fact, we can find the similarities in two phases: the history of World War II and occupation, and the regime transition from dictatorship to democracy as the prerequisites for history and memory politics since the 1990s.

Of course, there are some fundamental differences between the historical contexts of eastern parts of Europe and those of East Asia. At first, most of East and Southeast Asian nations (except for China, Mongolia, and Thailand) remained under colonial rule by great European and American imperialistic (though liberal-democratic!) powers and the ‘Empire of Japan’ in the interbellum period. In China, some rival military cliques established local governmental authorities, and the dominant influence of the National Government over all its territory could not prevail. The north-eastern part of China (Manchuria) was occupied by the Japanese army, and a puppet (semi-colonial) government was founded in 1932 by Japanese occupiers with the last emperor of the Qing dynasty.
as its state head (then emperor). In contrast to this, CEE countries had gained independence from Russian, Habsburg, and Ottoman imperial rule under the Versailles regime and their independence was maintained until German and Soviet annexation and occupation. These are fundamental differences that should be taken into consideration, comparing CEE and Asia. But, at the same time, German invasion into CEE countries and the Japanese occupation and colonisation of East Asia shared common logic for their legitimacy, that is, the direct relationship between German occupational policies and the Japanese concept of ‘Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere (Dai Toa Kyoeiken in Japanese)’ in the period of WWII. According to the recent work on this concept, the latter was not only stimulated by the Nazi-German ideology of Lebensraum, it originated with Japanese bureaucrats through their negotiations with Germany and Italy on the Tripartite Pact in order to exclude the possibility that a victorious Nazi-Germany might reorganise European colonies in Southeast Asia\(^{14}\). Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan were mutually facilitating and restraining each other’s imperialistic strategies.

Another difference between these two regions was how the Cold War regime was constructed and experienced in Europe and in East Asia. As is well known, the Cold War regime in Asia was never confined to a ‘Cold’ one, but turned into ‘Hot Wars’ on the Korean Peninsula, Vietnam, and so on. International relationships and cross-national structures completely differed between Europe and Asia: regional integration on the basis of liberal democracy and market economy was pursued and progressed in the western part of Europe soon after the war, and, on the opposite side, the eastern part constituted the communist block under Soviet intervention and coercion. On the contrary, colonial rule by great Western powers was restored and maintained in Southeast Asia for a while after the defeat of Japan, and it was only after the successive liberation movements and wars against colonial powers that these Southeast

Asian nations gained independence. Most of these newly independent states became authoritarian and militant developmental dictatorships under the auspices of the liberal-democratic United States of America. Meanwhile, Chinese, Vietnamese, and Korean nations that came out from under Japanese colonisation and occupation were divided into two hostile parallel states, communist states on one side, and developmental dictatorships on the other. Though some of these new states concluded friendship pacts with the USSR and were supported by the latter economically and politically, Asian socialist states had a different character form Eastern European ones. It is noteworthy that they have kept their outward socialist regime even after the collapse of the USSR, having transited to a market economy system under the dictatorial rule of a communist party\(^\text{15}\). It is very suggestive that not only Asian socialist states but also capitalist states under the auspices of the USA adopted an authoritarian dictatorship as their political regime after gaining independence. This means that the structure of the Cold War in Asia never coincided with the axis of confrontation between illiberal non-democratic socialism and liberal democracy. It is worthwhile recalling that Hungarian exile thinkers of critical Marxism such as F. Fehér, A. Heller, and G. Márkus called North Korea an identical twin brother of its Southern counterpart on the Peninsula because of its explicit disregard of human rights and very solid hierarchy\(^\text{16}\) at the beginning of the 1980s. South Korea had not yet accomplished its democratising revolution at that time.

Finally, the different ways of constructing the Cold War regime brought about dissimilar ways of its closure in eastern and western parts of the Eurasian Continent. As mentioned above, Asian socialist states have retained their existence with many capitalist adjustments and reforms, while Soviet and East European socialist states have fully vanished and turned into capitalist ones.

\(^{15}\) It is a very difficult question if we can call the regime of North Korea a communist or socialist one. Dictatorship in North Korea has its own background theory/ideology (\textit{Juche}), which is officially likened to Marxism-Leninism originally developed by Kim Il-sung but seems to have its own Asian or Korean origin.

Some of the parallel states divided under the Cold War in Asia are surviving and causing regional strains even in the twenty first century, while East Germany was incorporated into its western counterpart, and a united Germany has come into a position of leadership in an integrated Europe. Although various schemes of regional integration in East Asia (East Asian Community) had often been proposed and discussed under the influence of a successful European integration until some years ago, they lacked concrete perspectives, and today there seems to be no possibility of their realisation in the near future. Rather, political conflicts are actualised and hampering economic integration. The post-Cold War regimes in Asia and Europe seem to differ from each other fundamentally.

In spite of these differences, we can discern common or similar events and historical developments between CEE and East Asia. In this section, I will pick up some remarkable topics on East Asia that indicate any similarities or commonness with CEE nations, and will show the possibility of comparison.

III-2 Experience of war, occupation, and colonisation

a. Forced labour and exploitation

Forced labour in German enterprises, commandeering for military service, and collaboration with the Nazi regime in territories occupied by Nazi Germany have been topics of heated argument in Europe since the 1990s. The German government and companies that had profited from forced labour established the ‘Remembrance, Responsibility and Future’ Foundation and began to compensate individual victims who had been obliged to migrate from occupied CEE countries and engage in forced labour in Germany and other places. The Nazi administration in occupied territories utilised local inhabitants for Hilfspolizei (auxiliary police) and other security forces, and not a few citizens of occupied countries voluntarily or compulsorily joined the Waffen SS and other German military units. War crimes and crimes against humanity of these collaborators have been acutely argued in these years.

As Małgorzata Pakier and Bo Stråth have accurately pointed out, the question of collaboration could be posed for the experiences of Nazism and the
Second World War and for the experiences of colonialism and imperialism. As their discussion focused just on European experiences of WWII, the Holocaust, communism, and colonialism, they did not refer to East Asian experiences of war, colonialism, and imperialism. Asian experiences, nevertheless, are appropriate to their points. Many Korean and Chinese labourers were compelled to come to Japan, including Sakhalin and other northern Islands, and work at factories and mines. According to my elderly mother’s memory, Korean women workers laboured at my grandfather’s small textile factory in the northern part of Kyoto Province in the 1930s and 1940s. The Oeyama Nickel Mine functioned nearby his factory, and it was famous for using forced labour of not only Chinese and Korean workers, who had been deported from the Continent and Korean Peninsula, but also POWs captured in Southeast Asia.

As this example of my family’s factory and the mine in Kyoto Province distinctly show us, forced labourers who had been deported from colonial Korea, Taiwan, and occupied regions in China were widely observed and became the norm in the interbellum and wartime Japan, as was also the case of Ost-Arbieters in Germany. The usage of forced labour aimed at complementing the shortage of Japanese labour forces that resulted from excessive military mobilisation and commandeering in the Japanese homeland. The number of Chinese deportees who were brought to Japan was estimated at about 40,000 persons, of which more than 6,000 died from cruel treatment.

In occupied Southeast Asia (the Philippines, Malaya, Burma, Indonesia, and so on) also, the Japanese military government utilised local labour forces and POWs for military constructions and the production of food and dairy necessities.

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18 Some former Chinese labourers demanded from the Japanese government and Nippon Yakin Industrial Company an apology and compensation through the Japanese Court in 1998. Plaintiffs reconciled with the company in 2005, obeying the court’s recommendation, but the Japanese government refused this and the Supreme Court rejected the accusation against the government at the end of 2007.

19 Cf. Frank Evans, Roll Call at Oeyama: P.O.W. Remembers, J.D. Lewis and Sons, 1985. It is said that most POWs in Oeyama were survivors from the well-known Bataan Death March.
According to the ‘The Procedure of Administration in Occupied Regions in the South’ decided by the Imperial Headquarters and the Cabinet of Japan in 1941, occupied regions should have been utilised for ‘the acquisition of military resources and the achievement of self-support by occupation troops’, and the military government should have ‘let [inhabitants] endure the inevitable heavy pressure of civil life and welfare’\(^{20}\). Colonial and occupational administrators of Japan exercised coercive powers for procuring labour forces in the regions under the Japanese military government. The experiences in Vietnam were noteworthy, because Indochina under French colonial rule was governed jointly by France and Japan after the Vichy government was established in France. The reason why Japan did not directly occupy Vietnam was because of the expectation of support from the pro-German Vichy government for Japanese military actions and the acquisition of natural resources. Under the joint governance, Vietnam was exploited thoroughly of its food and natural resources, which provoked the tragic great famine in 1944 and 1945 through the coercive forage of rice and the decrease of food production resulting from the demand for the military usages. The number of victims was estimated at over one million\(^{21}\).

b. Commandeering for military service

As Nazi-Germany mobilised the inhabitants of occupied territories for security and military actions and organised them into Nazi ethnic/national military units (foreign legions of Waffen SS, Police Battalions, and so on), Japanese colonial and occupational administrations utilised local inhabitants for the same purposes in various ways.

At first, the Japanese colonial administration was negative towards the utilisation of Koreans and inhabitants of Taiwan for military aims. It was only in 1943 in the midst of the Pacific War that compulsory conscription of Koreans to the Japanese army and navy was introduced. In Taiwan, conscription was established at the last stage of the war in January 1945. This meant that Japan

\(^{20}\) JACAR. Ref.B02032867900 (A-7-0-291) // http://www.jacar.go.jp/DAS/meta/listPhoto

was obliged to change its strategy in terms of the conditions of ‘total war’ and general mobilisation, especially because of the worsening situation of war and the deficit of military personnel. The reason for the initial cautious attitudes to compulsory conscription in colonial territories was the Japanese establishment’s anxiety about the armament of colonised nations, especially the possibility of an armed insurgency against the colonial government and Japan. Incidentally, it is very interesting that Okinawa (islands in Southwest Japan), which had been incorporated into the Empire of Japan soon after Meiji Ishin, was the only province in which the Japanese army never stationed any fortress nor permanent army troops until the beginning of the Pacific War in December 1941\textsuperscript{22}. This indicates Okinawa’s peculiar position as an inner colony of the Empire, which remains as such into the twenty first century. As is well known, a great number of bases of American military forces and their massive troops are located in Okinawa, and local inhabitants’ burdens and sufferings because of them are infinitely greater than in other provinces.

One of the most tragic stories of military mobilisation in colonies and occupied territories was the fate of Korean criminals of war of class-B and C, who were sentenced to the death penalty\textsuperscript{23}. Many Korean soldiers that were conscripted to the Japanese army and assigned to its POW camps as prison guards were often accused of alleged violent and cruel treatment of POWs in Southeast Asia after the end of the war. They did not receive any training on international law for the treatment of POWs, and they themselves were violated and abused in their troops, as Koreans were situated at the lowest layer of the Japanese army\textsuperscript{24}. Therefore, they had no knowledge of any of the necessary

\textsuperscript{22} Takaoka Hiroyuki and N. Hashimoto, Tokushu ni Atatte: Kenihisuberuku kara Kariningurado e (Introduction to a Special Edition ‘From Königsberg to Kaliningrad’), Russian Eurasian Economy & Society, No.948, 2011, p.4.

\textsuperscript{23} 148 Koreans were judged as class-B and C war criminals, and 23 of them were sentenced to the death penalty. Aiko Utsumi, Kimu wa Naze Sabakareta noka: Chosen Jin B C Kyu Senpan no Kiseki (Why Kim was Judged: the Locus of Korean War Criminals of Class-B and C), Asahi Shinbun Publishing, 2008, pp.6-9. The numbers of criminals sentenced to the death penalty were different in various materials.

\textsuperscript{24} Discrimination against Korean soldiers of the Japanese army remained in the post-war era. While former Japanese soldiers including war criminals of class-B and C were
concepts concerning the treatment of POWs and, in fact, sometimes violated the international norm, just as their Japanese counterparts did. This was the reason why they were executed by the tribunal. The very complex and delicate problem here is whether they were victims of colonial rule by Japan, or collaborators with Japanese war criminals. In 2004, a governmental commission of South Korea recognised all the former Korean criminals of war of class B and C as ‘victims of coercive mobilisation’ and restored their honours nearly 60 years after their executions. In spite of the rehabilitation of these war criminals, some Koreans who fought as soldiers for the Japanese army are still met with severe disgust and criticism. When some Japanese erected a monument for mourning and praising Korean soldiers of ‘Kamikaze Tokko Tai’, who had died in suicide attacks to American floats, and tried to hold an unveiling ceremony in 2008, local inhabitants protested it and the monument was removed. Though they recognized the soldiers of suicide attack units as ‘victims of war’, leaders of the local opposition campaign pointed out, ‘We cannot accept the memorial for persons who pledged and exerted absolute loyalty to Tenno (Emperor of Japan)’. Though their criticism was mainly directed toward the imprudent (apparently post-colonial) behaviour behind the goal to ‘re-establish Japanese soul and spirit in South Korea’ through the monument, local attitudes against their compatriots-collaborators seem very sensitive and include both hatred and compunction.

**c. Collaboration and nationalist liberation movements**

As was the case in territories occupied by Nazi Germany in Europe, collaboration with the colonial and occupational administration of Japan prevailed all over territories where Japan established colonial and occupational rule. As the colonial administration and business activities of Japanese financially compensated and supported by the government for their sufferings in the war, Koreans jailed in Sugamo Prison in Tokyo as war criminals of the Japanese army were refused the same support. The reason was that they lost their citizenship of Japan automatically when Japan recovered its independence and recognized the independence of Korea at the effectuation of the San Francisco Peace Treaty. This means that persons who were accused as Japanese citizens were deprived of their legal rights because they were not actually Japanese citizens. Cf., Utsumi, *op. cit.* chapter 7.
enterprises offered occasions for bureaucratic promotion and economic profits for local elites in Korea and Taiwan, not a few people voluntarily and positively tried to collaborate with colonial rulers, sharing the imperialistic ambition of Japan. Others, including the above-mentioned war criminals, were obliged to obey oppressive colonialist policies, and were unwillingly involved in the general mobilisation for wars.\textsuperscript{25}

Collaboration with the imperialistic strategies and military operations of Japan in East and Southeast Asia brought very troublesome questions not only to the pro-Japanese ‘puppet’ local government in China (Ex. Wang Jingwei regime in Nanjing), but also to national liberation movements in Southeast Asia under Western colonial rule. This is because Japan heralded the liberation of Asian nations from Western imperialism and colonialism, unification of Asia under Japanese leadership (\textit{Hakko Ichiu} in Japanese, which means literally ‘the whole world under one roof’), and the formation of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere (\textit{Dai Toa Kyoeiken}) as the general cause for its military actions. In fact, the Japanese government that was proud of its mission as liberator and leader of Asian nations sometimes promised and promoted the ‘independence’ of some Asian nations (José Paciano Laurel’s Republic of the Philippines, Ba Maw’s State of Burma, Chandra Bose’s Free India, and so on) under its military auspices and patronage. In fact, some leaders of nationalist liberation movements shared or outwardly accepted the Ideology of (Pan-)Asianism\textsuperscript{26} that was raised and developed in pre-war Japan, and they supported

\textsuperscript{25}According to Prof. Takeshi Fujinaga, a neoconservative and historical revisionist trend of New Rights in South Korea exaggerates that all Koreans (except for a small number of anti-Japanese fighters) that inhabited the colonial Korean Peninsula supported Japanese colonial rule and justified it, obeying it even though passively. According to their opinion, the very fact that he/she was a citizen (more precisely, a subject) of the Empire of Japan was a pro-Japan act, and, therefore, it is meaningless to question the responsibility of pro-Japan collaborators. Takeshi Fujinaga, Kankoku ni okeru ‘Shinnichi’ Seisan Mondai no Iso (Phases of problems of coming to terms with ‘pro-Japanese actions’ in South Korea), \textit{Rekishigaku Kenkyu (Journal of Historical Studies)}, No.872, 2010, p.17.

\textsuperscript{26}This ideology had been elaborated in modern Japan since the Meiji era, and it influenced the expansionist and hegemonist project of \textit{Dai Toa Kyoeiken}, which was based on the principle that it denied the absoluteness and equality of the sovereignty of independent states, and that international relationships in East Asia should be composed of Japan as a leading state and other subordinate states disposed hierarchically. It is pointed out that
Japan’s military actions in their lands in anticipation of the regression of Western colonial powers and realisation of their own independence. In 1943, for example, Japan proclaimed a decree on the organisation of the volunteer corps of Indonesians, and more than 40,000 persons applied to it. The Indonesians found a way to achieve national independence from Dutch colonial rule through collaboration with Japan, and responded positively to the decree. The Japanese army trained them and taught them the usage of weapons. These volunteers became the main force for the Independent War in Indonesia against the Netherlands after the end of WWII. The joint front of Japanese imperialist and Indonesian nationalist movements against western powers was established. These instances remind us of ‘independent’ Slovakia and Croatia under Nazi’s patronage, or the state projects of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists.

On the other hand, nationalist movements in Asia diverged into some confrontational tendencies, and they were never unified to the pro-Japanese coalition. Anti-Japan campaigns and battles by Asian communist groups were organized not only in China and the Korean Peninsula\(^\text{27}\), but also in Southeast Asia. Some groups chose to struggle together with colonialist suzerain states against Japan and organise guerilla operations. Pro-Japan nationalists also turned anti-Japanese as soon as the violent, cruel nature of Japanese occupational rule was exposed to them and the strategic situations of the Japanese army worsened. Their military activities turned into an armed struggle for national liberation against colonial rulers, even while accompanied by their internal conflicts and battles among nationalists, as soon as Japan was defeated

though this project was influenced by the imperialistic block economy of Western states and \textit{Lebensraum} of Nazi-Germany, it coincided with the tributary state system in pre-modern East Asia. Cf. Shn’ichi Yamamuro, \textit{Shisou Kadai to shite no Azia: Kijiku, Rensa, Toki (Asia as a Project of Thoughts/Ideology: Axis, Links and Projections)}, Iwanami Shoten Publishing, 2001, p.611.

\(^{27}\) The Far eastern region of Russia was one of the important bases for the anti-Japanese movements of Koreans since the Russo-Japanese war and the incorporation of Korea into the Empire of Japan (1910), and many Koreans who disliked Japanese colonial rule emigrated there. It is noteworthy that Koreans in the Russian Far East including Korean communists were deported to Central Asia in 1937, prior to the deportation of other national groups including Baltic peoples. About the deportation of Koreans, see, for example, \textit{Анатолий Тимофеевич Кузин}, 
by the Allied Powers. The implications of collaboration and resistance were very complicated and variable according to the situations, as Professor Ken’ichi Goto has pointed out:

It is not easy to generalise the various attitudes and responses of nationalist leaders in Southeast Asia toward the idea of the ‘liberation of Asia’ proclaimed by Japan, as they were differentiated and diverged into some paths according to previous policies of the nationalist movements in each region, colonial policies of their suzerain states, past relationships with Japan, and so on. Nevertheless, some nationalist leaders of Eastern Asia found an agenda in terms of how they should utilise the energies of Japan in a southward advance as tools to drive wedges in the solid colonial rule [of western powers]. Speaking in a simplified manner, their political and psychological distances from Japan proclaiming the ‘liberation of Asia’ were dependent on whether they 1) kept ‘independence’ as the greatest goal of nationalist movements (in the case of Thailand), 2) acquired promises on ‘independence’ or ‘autonomy’ from suzerain states (in the case of the Philippines and Burma), or whether 3) national independence or autonomy was a faraway dream. On the contrary, their distances from Japan influenced the measures of Japan toward the regions of Southeast Asia. They were bidirectional and interactive. 28

These considerations have made dubious the simplified binary formula of WWII as ‘the war of the anti-fascist coalition (the Allied Powers) against the Fascist Axis’ that was prescribed in the Atlantic Charter and proclaimed in Western Europe and Russia (Soviet Union). We need the more prudent way of thinking that enables a revision of the formula, and a disclosure of the contradictory complex features of WWII. At least in an Asian context, the binary scheme should be replaced by a multiple scheme consisting of Fascist Japan as a colonial and occupational power, anti-fascist Allied Powers, in which dichotomous

features of colonialist-imperialist powers equivalent to Japan and liberal democratic ones coexisted, and several (sometimes hostile to each other) tendencies of nationalist liberation movements. This complexity of the Asian context of WWII is one of the reasons why history and memory conflicts occurred and accelerated in East Asia. If we refer to experiences of CEE nations and the existence of the Soviet Union as well as Asian experiences, the scheme should be more complicated and elaborated upon further and further: the composition and character of WWII in the ‘Bloodlands’ was as entangled as in Asia.

**III-3 Regime transition in CEE states and the democratisation of authoritarian dictatorships in Asia**

Another dimension of comparison between CEE and East Asia is their tremendous political and economic transformations in these decades. If we agree with the following statement by Tony Judt on the discontinuation and transformation in Europe between the periods before and after 1989 as prerequisites for changing representations of the recent past, we should look for the parallel process of transformation in Asia, equivalent to the fall of the Berlin Wall, to understand the causes of aggravated history and memory conflicts:

The revolutions of 1989 have forced open the east European past, just as the historiographical transformations in the West have removed decades-long taboos on parts of wartime memory. There will be infinite revisions and re-interpretations, but the recent past will never look the same again, anywhere. 29

Just as historical perception and memories frozen under the Cold War were defrosted in CEE countries after the Eastern European revolution in 1989 and the collapse of the USSR, the history and memory landscape in Asia also has been transformed on a large scale against a backdrop of political democratisation and/or economic growth in various countries of this region.

The democratisation and breakaway from the developmental dictatorship of Asian countries began in the second half of the 1980s, prior to democratic revolutions in Eastern Europe in 1989: in the Philippines, the revolution broke out at the moment of the Presidential election in 1986, when Corazón Aquino superseded Ferdinand Marcos, the dictatorial President who had proclaimed Marshal Law and suspended the Constitution with support from officers of the National Force. The revolution in the Philippines soon stimulated the democratisation of South Korea. Korean civil society organised a large-scale demonstration against prolonged military governments with the participation of a million citizens in June 1987, which made Chun Doo-hwan resign from the presidency; in Taiwan, Lee Teng-hui, who succeeded the Presidency of the Republic of China (Taiwan) from Chiang Ching-kuo, a son of Chiang Kai-shek, commenced a democratisation and ‘Taiwanisation’ movement. Though political democratisation, which should have been parallel to economic reform in the Peoples’ Republic of China, was at a standstill after the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989, and such dictatorial states as North Korea and Burma retained their authoritarian rule, the political situation in East and Southeast Asia changed completely. The United States changed its strategic attitude from supporting military dictatorships toward admitting and rather facilitating democratisation in Asia. The most remarkable change was the striking growth of the Chinese economy: it became the second largest economic power in the world in 2010. The splendid growth of the Chinese economy marginalised the Japanese economy among global markets, and it has provoked the inward attitudes and loss of self-confidence among Japanese politicians and ordinary people that became the basic elements for the escalation of hollow nationalistic bravado.

The synchronicity of revolutionary upheaval both in East Europe and East Asia is noteworthy for a comparative analysis between these two regions. Even though Eastern European revolutions and the collapse of the Soviet Union were definitely significant for European viewpoints of historical inquiry, this very

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30 The fact that many dictatorial rulers of these governments were trained for officership in the Japanese Cadet Corps or military schools before WWII and hold pro-Japanese sentiments is noteworthy.
synchronicity deserves our attention from the viewpoint of comparison, and moreover, from the perspective of global history.\footnote{Although a series of democratisations in South America and South Africa should most likely have been included in the list of this synchronicity, it is beyond the scope of this presentation and my competence to detail them. Such topics as transitional justice and Truth-reconciliation Commissions in these regions and countries seem very important for our theme.}

Just as the democratic revolution in 1989 defrosted and liberated contemporary histories and memories in CEE countries, hidden histories and repressed memories in East Asia burst out from the storehouse of past events that had been sealed by dictatorial regimes, and they swayed the representation of the past and ‘historical truth’ that had been stabilised under the Cold War. The most symbolic event that impressed upon us the changing situation in East Asia was the revelation by Kim Hak-sun of her own experiences and sufferings as a former Korean ‘comfort woman’ in 1991. Growing civil societies and especially feminist movements in South Korea and Japan have supported former ‘comfort women’ and organised activities to protest and condemn the Japanese government, and have continued until now. As mentioned above, compensation for individual (personal) sufferings from colonial rule and military actions began to be demanded by victims and their descendants in Korea and China. Japanese detainees in Siberia who had been exploited for forced labour under the Stalinist regime also began to publicly demand the Japanese government for compensations for their tragic fate in post-war Siberia. Though the Japanese government has insistently refused all of their demands, administrative litigations for official apologies and compensation have been repeatedly submitted to the Courts in Japan and China. We should pay attention to the fact that demands for official compensation for forced labourers from colonies and occupied regions began to be brought forward almost simultaneously in the 1990s in both CEE countries and East Asia, though the fact is often overlooked in Japan because of the idealisation of German experiences of ‘Vergangenheitsbewältigung’. Since the end of the twentieth century, the existence of hidden victims became known, and their earnest voices for apology, compensation, and restoration of human dignity came to echo loudly not only in
CEE countries but also in East Asia. This tendency coincided with similar movements for apologies and compensation in other areas all over the world\textsuperscript{32}.

In democratised Korea, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and other governmental commissions investigating historical events and memories of the recent past have been established, and its government legislated laws for the interrogation of crimes and compensation for victims. Notably enough, these commissions dealt with not only events of injustice and collaborators under Japanese colonial rule, but also events of the Korean War and political crimes by the post-war dictatorial regime in South Korea. These commissions’ activities, especially the examinations of pro-Japanese collaborators’ crimes and responsibilities, have provoked domestic disputes and conflicts in South Korea, and they were over-politicised and turned into an issue of factional struggles between opposite political parties, as pro-Japan politicians and bureaucrats had been dominant in the post-war dictatorship of South Korea, and right-wing politicians disliked clarifying the truth of the past dictatorship. History and memory conflicts and disputes are international and, at the same time, domestic in Korea (and Japan), too.

The Japanese governments of the 1990s seemed to grope for adequate ways to respond to these trends. They tried to hand Prime Ministers’ letters and ‘gifts of money’ in order to produce moral apologies for ‘comfort women’ in the Philippines, Indonesia, the Netherlands, Taiwan, and South Korea, endeavouring to cautiously avoid contradictions to the fundamental political (bureaucratic?) principle that Japan as a state was not burdened with any legal obligation to officially compensate any individual victims of war and other political crimes of the state except former Japanese officers and soldiers\textsuperscript{33}. In


\textsuperscript{33} The Japanese government insists on its official standpoint that the individual (personal) rights of citizens of China and South Korea to demand official compensation from the Japanese government vanished, when interstate treaties on diplomatic relations were concluded between these states. Because of this attitude of the Japanese government, the majority of former ‘comfort women’ in South Korea rejected receiving ‘gifts of money for moral apology’. In fact, the governments of China and Korea abandoned their rights to claim interstate compensation from Japan in these treaties. The disputable point is
1995, Tomiichi Murayama, Prime Minister of a short-lived coalition cabinet of Social Democrats and Liberal Democrats, published a statement of apology on colonial rule, military aggression, and occupation of neighbouring nations at the 50th anniversary of the end of the Pacific War. These acts provoked fierce criticism from rightist political forces, and it seems that these events have accelerated an aggressive rightist turn in Japanese politics. Since then, the influence of historical revisionists who demand a withdrawal of the apology to ‘comfort women’ and neighbouring nations, and try to justify past colonisation and wars by the Empire of Japan, seems to have become stronger and stronger. In fact, the Japanese governments of the first half of 1990s also acknowledged the changes in history and memory politics that democratisation in East Asia and the end of the Cold War had brought to international relationships, and tried to more or less engage in new global trends of ‘politics of apology, compensation, and reconciliation’. However, they failed to accomplish their aim of improving relationships with neighbouring countries and forming domestic agreements on the responsibility of the state and the public for past events of wars and violation of human rights, because of the national political culture and increasing inward attitudes among ordinary people. Civil society in Japan seems to be split into segments concerning the histories and memories of recent past events: the comparative majority of aggressive nationalists who supported the present government with rightist inclinations, minority groups that face up to crimes in the recent past and hope for good relationship with neighbouring nations, and the overwhelmingly majority of indifferent or passive supporters of nationalist sentiments who are interested only in the economic growth of Japan and hope to recover the pride of global economic power.

**Conclusion**

The majority of professional historians and critical intellectuals who are whether or not the abandonment of right for claims by states at the same time includes the abandonment of individual rights of their citizens. Besides this, as mentioned above, soldiers from colonial Korea and Taiwan were excluded from the objects of compensation given to former Japanese soldiers and officers, as they had lost Japanese citizenship at the moment of its recovery of independence.
engaged in the contemporary history of Asia and Japan has tried to investigate and clarify the historical facts of our recent past on the basis of the academic procedure of identifying documental materials and testimonies of perpetrators, victims, and witnesses. Nevertheless, their works have been of little account in politics or, in worse cases, attacked violently by rightist politicians, and these historians and intellectuals have had a very weak influence among public spheres in mass society. In this context, historians, intellectuals, and activists have often referred to German experiences of ‘Vergangenheitsbewältigung’ and tried to throw contrasts between Germany and Japan into relief. It is along with this context that the representation of Germany as a model for Japanese politics and the (misleading) formula of ‘dialogue and reconciliation in Europe / hostility and confrontation in Asia’ have been constructed. Professor Mochida’s historical works, to which I referred in this presentation, have tried to correct and elaborate upon this contrast, rejecting the oversimplified mythicisation of German experiences.

Professor Mochida has tried to discuss the problem of war and post-war responsibilities in a comparative way through a historical analysis between Germany and Japan on the basis of the West German framework of thinking since the 1970s, cautiously avoiding the reductionist temptation to find the origins of evils in the fatal backwardness and immaturity of each nation. He has tried to settle the focus of his comparison on historical conditions and the concrete developments at each critical moment from the standpoint of the perpetrating (German and Japanese) nations in WWII. His works have brought valuable (although less influential) knowledge to the Japanese public and inspired younger generations of historians. However, his scope and style of thinking were confined by the historiography of West Germany under the Cold War, and, therefore, is less adequate when applied to the renewed circumstances of the post-Cold War period.

Opposite to this, our comparative framework of CEE and East Asian countries aims to consider how people in both areas, including German and Japanese people, who were either coercively or voluntarily involved in colonisation and warfare by Hitler’s Germany, Stalin’s Soviet Union, Imperial
Japan, and the Western Powers, responded to the situation before, in the midst of, and after WWII. We also try to grasp how they are reorganising and rewriting their histories and memories of the recent past in the renewed circumstances after the process of democratisation and regime transitions. In other words, we try to write a comparative history of lands and peoples that experienced colonisation, occupation, and war. From this perspective, perpetrator-hood (accopmplice-hood) and victimhood overlap and are interchangeable. Simplified binary formulas such as evil and good, Axis and Allied, Fascist and Democrat are challenged and replaced by more complicated and puzzling compositions of several forces. It is noteworthy that a simplified binary formula is often politicised, and utilised as the medium to distinguish ‘we’ and ‘they’, ‘friends’ and ‘enemy’, and to exclude ‘them’.

These two approaches are most likely not exclusive of each other, but rather complementary. They should be articulated to each other and incorporated into one greater paradigm of inquiry of contemporary history, in which we are able to re-examine and re-evaluate the complex composition of meanings of WWII. Then, it is important to cautiously reject any deterioration into a historical revisionist way of thinking and wrong value relativism, which might become indulgent of past evils. Our consideration is only a first step in establishing a new framework and approach for investigating experiences of WWII and post-WWII world history from the viewpoint of historiography in Japan.
History and Memory Conflicts:  
A Comparison of Germany and Japan to the Regions of Eastern Europe and East Asia

Mari Nomura

To begin with, let us look at an example demonstrating the level of historical awareness amongst contemporary Japanese youth regarding the war of aggression that Japan conducted against China. If I were to ask a class in university, ‘What happened on 7 July 1937?’, just how many students would be able to reply correctly? They might answer that July 7th is the date of ‘Tanabata’ (the Star Festival), but most would be unaware that the 7th of July, 1937 was the date of the Lugou Bridge Incident. It is also doubtful how much students might know about the Nanjing Massacre perpetrated by the Imperial Japanese Army in December of that year.

In China, the Lugou Bridge Incident is called the July 7th Incident. On that day, the Japanese Imperial Army and the Republic of China’s National Revolutionary Army clashed on the Lugou Bridge, located in the south-west of Beijing, setting off the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945). The history of the era of Japanese colonial rule is taught in detail in Chinese schools, and in China, there are probably no university students ignorant of the July 7th Incident and the Nanjing Massacre. This does not indicate conflicting historical memories or awareness, but the vast difference between the emphasis these historical events are given in schools in China and how they are taught in Japan.

In the 1990s, when the existence of the comfort women came to light, the absence or belatedness of post-war Japan’s ‘struggle to come to terms with the past’ (Vergangenheitsbewältigung) began to attract the attention of the Japanese people. Consequently, Japanese scholars of both Japanese and German contemporary history naturally focused on post-war West German historical policies as a model for Japanese historical policies.
Through its wars of aggression, Germany inflicted immense human and material destruction on the countries to its east and west, and slaughtered an estimated six million Jews in the Holocaust. For these reasons, Germany was convicted for crimes against peace and against humanity at the Nuremberg trials. Expressing remorse and apologies for these crimes, as well as making amends through practical war reparations and compensation, were the absolute conditions for Germany’s resumption of its place in the international community. Germany’s struggle to come to terms with its past is comprised of the following four points: Compensation for victims of Nazi persecution; continuing prosecutions of Nazi crimes; policing of neo-Nazis; and the teaching of history with an emphasis on the twentieth century.

However, this struggle to come to terms with the past was not met with enthusiasm by the German people. According to a public opinion survey conducted in 1949 by the Allensbach Institute for Public Opinion Research, in response to the question ‘Has anti-Semitism become stronger or weaker since 1945?’, 19 per cent answered that it had ‘become stronger’, while 13 per cent replied that it ‘remains strong’, a total of 32 per cent. On the other hand, the percentage of people who replied that it had ‘weakened’ was 32 per cent, showing that anti-Semitism still remained strongly rooted in German society. Similarly, another survey conducted by the Allensbach Institute in the same year found that 58 per cent of the respondents agreed with the statement ‘Naziism was good in principle, but was carried out badly’.

Because the policy of compensating victims of Nazi persecution created a huge financial burden for Germany, it was strongly opposed by the general public and within the Bundestag. Konrad Adenauer, West Germany’s first post-war Chancellor, sidestepped this opposition and resolutely implemented the compensations policy. Under Adenauer’s government, the Reparations Agreement between Israel and West Germany (the Luxemburger Abkommen, or Luxembourg Agreement), was signed with Israel in 1952, and the German Restitution Laws (Bundesentschädigungsgesetz) were passed in 1953 and 1956.

However, it must be noted that prior to enforcing the compensations policy, Adenauer implemented a large number of policies granting amnesty to those found guilty of Nazi crimes and war crimes in German courts under the Allied occupation, as well as policies reappointing civil servants dismissed from their posts during the occupation. In order to obtain a national consensus for compensations, it was necessary to restore a national spirit wounded by Germany's war of aggression and subsequent defeat.

Despite these complications, as Germany’s post-war recovery progressed and the lives of its people stabilised, its struggle to come to terms with the past did achieve national consensus as well as international recognition. In Germany, surely no university student would now be unable to answer correctly when asked, ‘What happened on 1 September 1939?’ or ‘What occurred at Bełżec and Treblinka?’

As Professor Hashimoto points out, Germany’s struggle to come to terms with its past has at times been overly idealised by Japanese scholars and liberal intellectuals, who continue to struggle with conflicting emotions regarding Japan’s own recent history. Unlike the Nuremberg trials, the Tokyo Trials only dealt with crimes against peace and war crimes, and there is no comparable example of prosecution for crimes against humanity in a Japanese context. The Nanjing incident was denounced as a war crime, and accordingly Japan was not forced to implement compensation policies comparable to Germany’s Luxembourg Agreement or restitution laws; by taking care of the issue of war reparations to former enemy countries, Japan resumed its place in international community. This of course does not mean that Japan should not express regrets or apologise, particularly to the people of Asia, after having inflicted vast damage and suffering on many countries through colonial rule and invasion. However, while on one hand the Japanese people were intensely conscious of being the world’s first victims of atomic bombs, on the other their awareness of Japan’s responsibility as a perpetrator of colonial rule and a war of aggression remained shallow. The Japanese government’s humble acceptance of the historical fact of aggression, their painful expressions of feelings of deep remorse and heartfelt apologies, all came about after the exploitation of comfort women was
acknowledged in the 1995 Murayama Statement (Statement by Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama “On the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the war’s end”, 15 August 1995).

Even after the Murayama Statement, it is still difficult to say whether the country’s responsibility as an aggressor is being sufficiently acknowledged in Japanese educational settings. If anything, under the current Abe administration Japan’s struggle to come to terms with the past is actually regressing. When the current state of affairs is observed in Japan, it is evident that criticisms of the Japanese historical policies modelled on German policies have still not lost their practical relevance, which Professor Hashimoto does not deny. However, beyond this, Hashimoto emphasises that we must now take research to the next step. He asserts that we need to recognise the ideological nature of the historical viewpoints that form the basis of German and Japanese historical policies; that we need to move beyond comparing the historical policies of two countries (Germany and Japan) to regional comparisons of historical awareness among central and eastern European countries (including Germany) and east/southeast Asia (including Japan); and that we must move towards comparisons broader in scope than comparisons merely between two countries. German and Japanese historical policies are predicated on the historical view of the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials; although Nazism, the Holocaust, and Japanese militarism are regarded as absolute evils, Soviet oppression in regions that came under their control via the secret protocol of the Treaty of Non-Aggression with Germany in 1939 and Western countries’ responsibility for colonial rule in Asia are overlooked.

For example, the three Baltic states of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia came under Soviet control under the secret protocol of the Treaty of Non-Aggression between Germany and the Soviet Union. Though they were occupied by Nazi Germany during its war with the Soviets beginning in 1941, their incorporation into the Soviet Union was fixed after the war. After the revolutions of 1989, these three countries began to raise fierce objections to the then-prevalent Soviet historical view of the Great Patriotic War, in which the Soviet Union was seen as a liberator against Nazi Germany. In the German
historical context, Nazism and the Holocaust were seen as absolute evils, incomparable to other political regimes or genocides. Considering Nazism and Communism as two comparable totalitarian systems was strictly repudiated as an attempt to relativise the crimes committed by the Nazis. In contrast to this, the three Baltic states saw Soviet Communism as equivalent to Nazism, and at times as an even more repressive form of totalitarianism, and demanded apologies from Russia (the Soviet Union’s successor state) for atrocities committed by the Soviets against their people.

After the beginning of Nazi Germany's war with the Soviet Union, nationalists of the Baltic states saw the invading German Army as liberators and joined the Nazi Waffen-SS in order to fight the Soviets. Even after the defeat of Nazi Germany in 1945, this group continued their underground armed resistance against the Soviet regime, and were secretly dubbed the ‘Forest Brothers’ by the people of these three nations. While it was taboo to speak of the Forest Brothers during the Soviet era, following the dissolution of the USSR and the restoration of independence to the Baltic states, the rebels enjoyed a restoration to fame. It goes without saying that this move by the Baltic states agitated the Soviets. For the Soviet Union, which viewed the Great Patriotic War as the centre of its national identity, the repudiation of that war was difficult to tolerate. Furthermore, as some members of the Forest Brothers were Holocaust collaborators, the revival of their fame triggered an intense Jewish backlash.

Nazi Germany was an occupier of the Baltic states during the Second World War, but was seen as a liberator when compared to another occupier, the Soviet Union. This type of skewed representation is also apparent in evaluations of Japan’s war of aggression. In the Asian countries that had been Western colonies, Japan was simultaneously invader and liberator, doing away with Western colonial rule. As such, some citizens of these former Western colonies collaborated with the Imperial Japanese Army during the Asian nationalist independence movement.

In the Baltic states, historical judgments regarding the Nazi German and Soviet occupations are divided variously amongst Baltic nationalists, Jews and Russian nationalist groups. Similarly, memories and assessments of the
Japanese invasion of Asian countries also differ depending on the standpoint of those involved. In central and eastern Europe, as well as in east and southeast Asia, a number of different historical understandings of the Second World War are presently in marked conflict. For Professor Hashimoto, this type of historical conflict should not be cause for intolerance or the exclusion of those with differing historical understandings. Rather, the question is how do we foster peaceful co-existence among people with conflicting historical perceptions? Professor Hashimoto’s question is something that we must seriously consider.
Part IV

Discussions
Coming to Term with the Past in Democratic societies

Siobhan Kattago

The summer workshop in Tallinn on the politics of history and memory in CEE countries and Russia offered a chance for participants to develop a comparative framework for analyzing processes of coming to terms with the past after World War II and the fall of communism. The wide-ranging papers analyzed various aspects of the memory boom – from border conflicts, academic and popular representations of history to politics of regret and attempts at reconciliation. Although not explicitly addressed, an underlying theme of the workshop was the global connection between democracy, education and the politics of memory. As Nobuya Hashimoto outlined in this opening remarks, a comparative framework helps one to analyze both the historical particularities of a specific case and the processes common among nations and regions, whether in the Eastern or Western parts of the world.

In the first part of the workshop, Raivo Vetik focused on how certain historical events are remembered differently. In particular, he examined how representations of the past cause a permanent reproduction of conflict between Estonia and Russia. As a political scientist, Vetik's presentation raised methodological questions of the objective and subjective perception of historical events by distinguishing “eventual change” from “conceptual change.” If the former focuses on the chronology of historical events, the latter highlights the subjective meaning given by actors to those same events. It is precisely the shift from objective to subjective definitions of historical events that enables distortions of history and the denial of facts. Hence, one might have the same date, for example, 22 September 1944: however, one group recalls the date as the liberation of Tallinn, the other as the occupation of that same city. Vetik’s presentation set the stage for the large and ambiguous space between an historical event and the subjective meanings, associated with it. Collective
memory emerges precisely within this ambiguous zone between subjective and objective constructions of the past.

In an age of mass tourism and rapid technological change, the writing of history is both an academic and popular activity. As a professional historian, Olaf Mertelsmann criticized how popular history tends to simplify historical events for the sake of emotional appeal and a good story. By distinguishing Estonian popular representations of the past from academic ones, we are better able to recognize the use of the past for political agendas. In agreement with Vetik, Mertelsmann highlighted the distortions that tend to occur on the subjective level of attaching feelings to historical events. He drew attention to the fact that key Estonian political activists during the 1980s and 1990s were also historians. It is important to note that influential members of the conservative Pro Patria party (Isamaa), such as Mart Laar (former Prime Minister) and Lauri Vahtre (parliamentarian) are also the primary writers of Estonian school history textbooks. Hence, their combination of political activism and popular history has a lasting impact on the Estonian understanding of recent history.

The second part of the workshop emphasized the importance of “regional frameworks of memory” in the work of Wawrzyniak & Pakier, Hashimoto, Glowacka-Grajper and Kostyashov. Such regional analysis is a way in which to compare historical experience while avoiding the limitations of the nation. Moreover, it extends Halbwachs’ original insight of the social frameworks of memory to a regional framework of memory.

In their article, “Memory Studies in Eastern Europe: Key Issues and Future Perspectives.” Joanna Wawrzyniak and Malgorzata Pakier were critical of “Western imperialism” within memory studies and emphasized the regional nuances of the East European memory landscape. Similar to Hashimoto, the authors presented a comparative regional approach to memory studies. In their opinion, East European memory studies are often overshadowed by Western historiography and sociological study. Recent attempts to write a transnational European memory emphasize the importance of learning how to confront the past for the sake of reconciliation (Daniel Levy, Natan Sznaider, Gesine Schwan, Claus Leggewie, Aleida Assmann). Hence the European project has its roots in
West German debates of coming to terms with the past (Vergangenheitsbewältigung). It is at this point that the authors complement the work of Nobuya Hashimoto and Konrad Jarausch. National reckonings and coming to terms with the past are cast in a “narrative of progress” and enlightened maturity. While Western European memory is Holocaust-centered, East Europeans focus on their communist past and victimization. Doubtful of a single common European memory or of a monolithic Eastern European memory, the authors suggested a regional focus of Baltic States, Central Europe, Balkans and Russia/ Belarus.

Malgorzata Glowacka-Grajper’s paper and presentation emphasized the importance of memory conflicts in relations between Poland and Ukraine and Poland and Russia. Her questionnaires demonstrated how people react emotionally to historical events. World War II and communism were the most important historical events in the recent past for citizens of Poland, Ukraine and Russia. Arguing that memory conflicts draw from fixed images of the past, she highlighted the important role of religion in Polish memory. Images of victims are similar to Christian martyrs and form moral patterns of commemoration. As a sociologist, she emphasized how painful memories create a social sense of solidarity. Polish social memory is associated not only with symbolic places like Katyn, Kresy and Volyn, but also with dates like 23 August 1939 (Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact) and 17 September 1939 (invasion of Poland). If communism was a period of what she calls, “frozen” social memory, then there has been a veritable explosion of hot memory after 1989.

As an example of cooperation between regions, Yury Kostyashov’s paper, “Trialog: the Experience of Cooperation of the Universities in Kalingrad, Torun and Frankfurt (Oder) in the Humanities” concentrated on how cooperation between universities can foster reconciliation between Poles, Russians and Germans. As an international project, Trialog strengthens research and teaching in the humanities within the region. If academics have common communication networks, they increase opportunities for mutual understanding and the overcoming of long-standing prejudices. Via conferences and summer schools, students meet and talk with one another. Trialog is an example of the vital link
between education and historical consciousness. Moreover, the project brings philosophical and political ideas into practice across two generations and three countries.

In both their papers and workshop comments, Jarausch and Hashimoto addressed the concept of *Vergangenheitsbewältigung* in Germany, Eastern Europe and Eastern Asia. As Jarausch argued in this paper, “Contemporary History as Critical Perspective: American-German Debates about *Vergangenheitsbewältigung*,” confrontation with the past was given its strongest “impulse” with the Nuremberg Trials. The collection of documents, testimony and codification of “crimes against humanity” was unprecedented. Even if the Nuremberg trials were partially “victor’s justice,” they coincided with a growing sense of democratization and attempt to overcome past wrongs. Moreover the Eichmann trial (1961) and West German broadcast of the American TV-series, Holocaust (1979) signaled a “cultural shift” in which Jewish genocide became the center of German memories of World War II. In his comments, Jarausch cautioned against a competition of victimhood and the dangers of using one’s suffering to create new enemies. Moreover, he was wary of using Germany as an exemplary model for how nations should come to terms with their past.

In a similar vein, Hashimoto cautioned against facile distinctions between Europe as a model of reconciliation and Asia, as one of conflict. He pled for a more “globalized horizon” of analysis. Like Jarausch, Hashimoto focused on *Vergangenheitsbewältigung*, or a process of coming to terms with the past that includes confrontation, discussion, education, regret and remorse. In contrast to other presentations, Hashimoto highlighted the complicated role of collaboration and national liberation movements. Going against the grain of a “simplified binary formula,” he raised moral questions about the “bloodlands” of Eastern Europe and Eastern Asia. In short, both Hashimoto and Jarausch cautioned against oversimplifying or mythologizing the German model of coming to terms with the past. Under the careful organization of Hashimoto, the workshop in Tallinn established a new comparative framework for transitions to democracy and the politics of regret on a regional level. Interesting enough we may be coming full circle. If democratization was a key area of studies in the 1990s in the
work of Samuel Huntington, Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, scholarship in recent decades has focused on the politics of memory and regret. The workshop in Tallinn indicates the need for more research on the connections between democracy, the politics of memory and education.
Memory of World War II and the education of history in Putin’s Russia

Yoko Tateishi

1. Introduction

Recollections of war with Germany are the mainstay of Russian political ideology, and its policies concerning the depiction of WWII still attract scholarly attention. Earlier studies of this issue address two main topics: (1) how Russia’s democratization since the 1990s affects its depiction of the Soviet era and (2) how differing interpretations of the events during and after WWII affect Russia’s interactions with Western and former Soviet satellites in the mid-2000s. Among the former scholarship, Kora Andrieu examines Russian policy concerning Soviet history under Putin from the perspective of transitional justice, arguing that destruction of civil society during 70 years of communist rule impairs the acknowledgement and investigation of crimes by the Soviet regime. Andrieu further argues that Russians find it difficult to regard the communist regime as an enemy imposed externally, and he views modern Russia as a case of “failed” transitional justice that “chooses not to confront its violent past.” Among the latter group of studies, Nikolai Koposov examines Russian policy toward historical memory in 2009–2010 in relation to the international conflict

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3 Andrieu, An Unfinished Business, pp. 205, 218. As an example of similar view, see, Adler, In Search of Identity.
concerning interpretation of WWII finding that the emergence of interest in the Soviet past during the late 1980s declined during the 1990s and is now reviving.4

These studies show that depictions of the Stalinist period, including WWII, remain politically and ideologically controversial in Russia. However, studies of Russian democratization analyze the controversy over official interpretations of Russian history only from the view of the “authoritarian” Putin administration and the failed democratization of Russian society. They disregard the influence of the policies of foreign countries concerning history. On the other hand, studies of conflicting international interpretations of WWII during the mid-2000s disregard how Russia’s political and social reforms since the 1990s affect current official policies and public opinion.

Therefore, present scholarship needs to focus on both Russia’s international situation and internal political, social, and educational reforms since the 1990s to examine the present controversies concerning depiction of Russian history. As a first step, this study analyzes the controversies concerning WWII in Russia by focusing on educational policy, considering Russia’s internal political and social reforms since the 1990s and Russia’s international situation in the 2000s.

2. History Textbooks during the 1990s

How Soviet history should be interpreted and depicted is a subject that attracted attention from historians, politicians, and ordinary people during perestroika. After the Soviet Union collapsed, the Ministry of Education and other authorities continued to reform education. In 1992, the Russian Ministry of Education and international organizations such as the Cultural Initiative launched “the reform of education of humanities in Russia” with support from the Soros Foundation.5 The program sought to diversify and liberalize textbooks. In this sense, educational reform during the 1990s reflected a rejection of the educational system of Soviet Russia. As a result of the rapid change in Russia’s

4 Копосов, Мемориальный закон. p.265.
educational system, numerous history textbooks were published during the 1990s; some preserved official Soviet interpretations, whereas others distanced themselves from Soviet interpretations or radically denied them.\(^6\)

The 1992 textbook edited by Igor Dolutskii for 10th grade students emblematized the shift occurring during the 1990s. Its introduction announced “There is no unified view in this textbook.” Readers can “select the most reliable view” for themselves and “the most similar view to theirs” from various views or they can “show their own interpretation.”\(^7\) For example, the summary of the section about WWII juxtaposes the official Soviet interpretation and the view of Western scholars. The former insisted the USSR was crucial in the victory against fascist Germany and Imperial Japan; the latter viewed the USA as “a builder of the victory” and “arsenal of the democracy.” In addition, Dolutskii asked students to examine which view is more relevant by dividing WWII into periods and comparing each.\(^8\)

In short, representative history texts during the 1990s sought to displace the legacy of Soviet officialdom and to give students materials with which to interpret events themselves. However, such drastic reform rendered confusion as educational quality is dependent on teaching ability, and made standardized examinations difficult.\(^9\) Moreover, like Dolutskii’s textbook, many texts present conflicting interpretations of events. Therefore, unifying the content of textbooks became the important task of education policy at the end of the 1990s. In 1999, the Ministry of Education took over the secondary school educational program and began to assess textbooks. The following year, the General Institute of Education of the Russian Federation published its draft of “the concept of


\(^{9}\) Vera Kaplan, History teaching, p. 262.
teaching history.” Although the concept was not adopted, the education reform after 1991 was criticized for the first time.\textsuperscript{10} This situation influenced educational reforms during the 2000s significantly.

3. Unification of textbooks? The reform of history education during the 2000s

The 2000s began with Putin’s inauguration as president in May. However, educational policy did not start anew in 2000. Rather, it assumed the trajectory of the 1990s. On August 30, 2001, the Ministerial Conference discussed Russian modern history textbooks. Prime Minister Mikhail Kasianov criticized them as “hopelessly abstract” and their “excessive politicization” and called for texts that show “one historical space that was tightly combined by a common historical mission and one state.” Minister of Education Vladimir Fillippov insisted that officially recommended textbooks present the official state view of Russian modern history, not authors’ views.\textsuperscript{11}

In 2003, the Ministry of Education began to list officially recommended textbooks. To be included, textbooks had to pass review by the Academy of Sciences and the Russian Academy of Education. Schools could buy “recommended” textbooks at government expense.\textsuperscript{12} Soon after the introduction of the list, Dolutskii’s textbook was excluded for its description of the Putin era. It quoted a journalist who described Russia under Putin as an “authoritarian dictatorship” and “police state” and asked students whether they agreed. Putin mentioned Dolutskii’s textbook at the meeting with historians and said that “negative descriptions of Soviet history during the Yeltsin era were understandable because at that time the task was to change from the old regime; however, Russia now faces new constructive tasks.” Criticisms also arose from historians and veterans. They demanded a more positive description of Soviet

\textsuperscript{10} Vera Kaplan, History teaching, pp. 262-264.


\textsuperscript{12} Alexei Miller, Russia: Power and History, \textit{Russian Politics and Law}, vol. 48, no. 4, July-August 2010, p. 33.
history, in textbooks in 2002 and 2003. For example, historian Ludmilla Akakasashkina sympathized with the Ministry of Education resolution, saying that Dolutskii’s text lacked respect for the tragic aspect of Soviet history.13

In addition, the textbook was considered too difficult for students to study by themselves. Liberal historian and author of Ministry-approved textbooks Areksandr Morozov, who taught history in the early 1990s, fondly recalls the early 1990s when everyone could teach freely. Under such circumstances, however, the quality of class depends on teachers and textbook authors, and therefore, he said, governmental control of education is necessary. In his opinion, the government needs to define a framework for content while maintaining the variety of textbooks.14 As his remarks show, many intellectuals support the creation of a framework for textbook content but not that of a single textbook, as during the Soviet period.

4. Internationalization of the evaluation of WWII and the publication of textbooks

The 60th anniversary ceremony of the victory against Germany in Moscow in May 2005 escalated evaluations of WWII to an international controversy. The president of Latvia attended and insisted on using their own official historical images. Moreover, Latvia lobbied the European Parliament and other international organizations for a reinterpretation of European history of WWII. On May 22, the European Parliament adopted a resolution: “The Future of Europe Sixty Years after the Second World War.” This resolution highlighted the “renewed tyranny inflicted by the Stalinist Soviet Union” on East European nations after the end of WWII. It also confirmed that the European Parliament present a united front against “all totalitarian rule of whatever ideological persuasion.” Many Russian politicians expressed displeasure against these actions. Sergei Iastrzemski, ambassador to the European Union, refused to consider calls for Russia to admit that the Soviet Union had illegally annexed the

13 Sherlock, Historical Narratives, p. 173.
14 Interview with Morozov on December 18, 2013.
Baltic states in 1940, insisting that their incorporation was peaceful, voluntary, and in complete accordance with international law.\textsuperscript{15}

In 2007, a textbook for teaching history was published in Russia at the direct request of the Presidential department and Ministry of Education and Science.\textsuperscript{16} The editor, Fillipov was the vice-director of the National Institute of Foreign Policy, a think tank tied to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.\textsuperscript{17} After the book’s publication in 2007, Putin met with teachers of history and social science and criticized that many textbooks were published by grants from foreign governments. He said,

There are horrible pages in our history. Remember the events since 1937 and do not forget them. But there were similar events in other countries ... We have never used the nuclear weapon on humankind. We have never used chemical weapons like in Vietnam. There were no other black pages in our history, such as, for example, Nazism ...

He also emphasized the necessity for uniform standards for textbooks.\textsuperscript{18}

Isak Karina, director of the department of state policy and normative-lawful regulation within the Ministry of Education, also insisted that “100% of the textbooks of Russian history should be home products ....ontent of textbooks is one important means of molding the Russian nation, and it should not be imported goods.”\textsuperscript{19}

Publication of Fillipov’s textbook was considered a “scandal” in Russian media. Although its contents are not especially biased, it focuses on the

integration and strengthening of the Russian State. The editorial department of the journal Bol’shoi Gorod invited Fillipov, other historians, and teachers to discuss the textbook. Many attendees criticized it for interpreting Russian history, especially the Stalin period, too positively. A lecturer at Moscow State University, A. A. Levandovskii, said the book gave the impression of rationalizing Stalin’s repression by emphasizing the rearing of cadre as a result of the Great Terror. He added that it describes that modern Russia achieved the democratization “against truth.” Editor-in-chief A. G. Kazakov called it irrelevant to describe the role of Gulag as a labor force in Russian industrialization. At the end of the meeting, Fillipov acknowledged he “went to excess” because he tried to escape “threatening morality.” Finally Fillipov’s textbook did not become the dominant one. If its official purpose was to control the content of textbooks, it was unsuccessful.

Another attempt to unify the interpretation of history was the establishment of the Presidential Commission of the Russian Federation to Counter Attempts to Falsify History to the Detriment of Russia’s Interests (the Presidential Commission) in May 2009. The Presidential Commission was headed by S. Naryshkin, director of the Presidential Administration and most of its members were politicians and government officials. It attracted intellectuals and the media from Russia and other countries; many researchers have analyzed this Presidential Commission unfavorably as the beginning of direct political control over the teaching of history. At the Presidential Commission’s first meeting, members discussed history textbooks, but direct intervention into education never materialized, perhaps because of criticism by Russian and foreign intellectuals. In February 2012, the Commission suddenly disappeared.

In about two years, the Presidential Commission edited the materials concerning WWII, released archival materials, supported the publication of books, and held an international conference about history textbooks. Reflecting on the

20Vladimir Solonari, Normalizing Russia, Legitimizing Putin, Kritika: Explorations is Russian and Eurasian History, vol. 10, No. 4, Fall 2009.
Presidential Commission, Alexander Dyukov, director of the Historical Memory Foundation, argued that it was useless to counter the “distortion of history” in Eastern Europe because many Commission members were not historians but bureaucrats, and could not determine the direction of its activities. He added that, despite one of the members, Nikolai Svanidze, who was a liberal journalist and member of the Public Chamber of the Russian Federation, officially stating that the incorporation of Baltic States to USSR in 1943 was an “occupation” by the USSR, the Commission did not react to his statement. In his opinion, Russia should create a more powerful governmental institution like the Institution of National Memory of Ukraine. However, Aleksandr Chubarian, member of the Presidential Commission and director of the Department of General History of the Academy of Sciences of Russia, evaluated its activities positively. That the Commission supported books contradicting the evaluation of WWII, he said, showed that its members could discuss freely without political pressure. Although their evaluations of the Commission differed strikingly, both showed that the Commission worked for two years without a consistent policy.

5. The Russian Historical Society and creation of the “standard” for textbooks

Abolishing the Presidential Committee did not end authorities’ attempts to counter a hostile historical image of Russia. As early as March 2011, Regnum reported that the Presidential Committee would reconvene in the State Duma, headed by Naryshkin, in December 2011. On November 19, 2012, the Council of the Federation Committee on the Federal Structure, Regional Policies, Local Self-Governance, and Affairs of the North held a roundtable to discuss attempts to falsify history to the detriment of Russian interests, inviting delegates of the Federal Assembly, government agencies, archives, mass media, and historians. The conference concluded that the Presidential Commission did not resolve all

distortions of history, such as identifying Nazism with Stalinism, denying the longstanding friendship of nations incorporated into Russia and the significance of their incorporation, and that the Russian Historical Society, a semi-government organization that was established in 2012, should succeed the Presidential Commission.

The Society's official aims are to disseminate national and global history and to integrate Russian society, government, academe, artists, and historians by preserving national memory. Naryshkin, the chair of the State Duma and ex-director of the Presidential Commission, was appointed Representative of the Society. Historian and ex-member of the Commission Chubarian was appointed co-representative. In an interview with Latvian media, Chubarian said that countering distortions of history is only a part of the Society's goals. However, countering distortions of history apparently remains significant for political authorities. At the Council for Interethnic Relations on February, 14, 2013, Putin called for common textbooks that present and respect all Russian history without inconsistency. In addition, Putin said, the Russian Historical Society and Society of Military History should participate in making such textbooks.

Thereafter the Society created a 35-member working group for a “standard of textbooks” that included the Ministry of Education, historians, and artists. The working group was headed by Naryshkin and Chubarian as well as the Association of Russian History. However, according to Sergei Arkhangerov, a member of the Society and director of the State Central Museum of Contemporary History of Russia, drafting of “the standard” started two years

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24 http://rushistory.org/?page_id=23
earlier by 18 historians at the Academy of Sciences. Therefore, creating the “standard of textbooks” began at least in 2012, when the Presidential Commission ceased to exist.

The draft was unveiled on July 1 at the websites of the Russian Historical Society, Society of Military History of Russia, the Society of Teachers of History and Social Studies, and the official website of the Ministry of Education and Science on Live Journal. More than 1,000 people, including veterans, parents, and teachers participated in discussion. Meetings to discuss the standard also were held throughout the republics and autonomous republics. According to the Society, many reactions focused on the history of the 20th century. After these meetings, the draft of “the standard” was approved at a meeting of the Association of Russian Historians in October 2013. The approved standard, “the concept of new studying-methodological books of national history” (the concept) declared its aim as creating a “social consensus” about Russian history. “The concept” outlines each historical period and important events and figures that should be depicted in Russian history textbooks, but it does not present specific interpretations of each historical event. Moreover, a list of 32 “difficult problems of Russian history” is attached to “the concept” as problems about which there are fierce discussions and that are difficult to teach.

Sergei Lukashevsky, director of the Sakharov Center in Moscow, says that although “the concept” was made by eminent historians, they avoided difficult problems in Russian history. According to Lukashevsky, this evasion leaves room for free discussion, but it also reflects the present lack of a common view about national history in Russia. As his comment conveys, “the concept” rather shows specific views about each historical event or period than lists numerous

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28 Interview with Arkhangerov on December 19, 2013.
important historical events. Historian Morozov, who prepared the list of “difficult problems in Russian history,” called a single textbook a dangerous idea, although he acknowledged the necessity for a framework for writing history texts. Now the content of textbooks based on “the concept” is being planned; however, it is yet uncertain whether “the concept” will become a means to politically control the content of history textbooks. Political authorities seem to understand quite well the possibility of invoking antagonism among intellectuals if they intervene in the education of history. At the meeting of the authors of “the concept,” President Putin emphasized that the creation of “the standard” does not mean unification of interpretations of national history by the government or the end of academic discussion. In addition, Naryshkin denied the speculation that they were making a “New Short Course.” Therefore, “the concept” will very likely not be a means for compulsion of a certain interpretation of history in textbooks, at least in the near future.

6. History textbooks for ninth grade general school

As we have seen, the Russian administration keeps trying to standardize Russian history textbooks, and the system of “recommended” textbooks is part of that attempt. Among the many school history textbooks in present Russia, some are officially “recommended” or “permitted” every year. Russian schools teach 20th-century national history in ninth and eleventh grades. Students study ancient history (China, Greece, and India) in fifth grade and world and national history in grades six through nine. In grades 10 and 11, they repeat world and national history. History education during these grades is tied to the entrance

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31 Interview with Morozov on December 18, 2013.
examination for higher education. This section examines textbooks used in ninth grade. Ten textbooks appear on the list recommended by the Ministry of Education and Sciences for the 2013/2014 school year. I could not find one of the textbooks, therefore I examine nine books below.

The Stalin period generally, including the Great Patriotic War, is presented critically in most textbooks, including descriptions of forced collectivization and the Great Terror. The Great Terror is explained not only as a repressive political policy but also as a social condition, such as the rise intention of ordinary people, personal antagonisms, hope to get residential. Students are required to think about why many in the 1930s believed people repressed during the Great Terror were guilty. Moreover, students must examine the fate of repressed people using materials in the electronic database “Recollections of the Gulag and their Authors.” Another textbook asks students their opinion of why repressed people later recollect the Stalin regime positively.

The situation of villages during the Stalin era is emphasized negatively. The textbook edited by Izmozik, Zhuravleva, and Rudnik explains that National Socialism sought to create strong military industries, to increase the population of cities, and to improve education in a short period. However, cities were developed at the expense of rural districts, and the cost included the deaths of millions through starvation and repression. Therefore, the textbook says, the achievements of the Stalin era spark bitter controversies. In addition, the textbook tasks students to listen to stories from family about their relatives and friends during the 1930s.

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34 Interview with Morozov on December 18, 2013.
37 Д. Д. Данилов, Д. В. Лисейцев и др. История России. Учебник. 9 класс. XX – начало XXI века. Москва: Баллес, 2013. С. 182.
The effort to inspire students to construct the meaning of historical events is evident in the textbooks’ use of historical document and questions and tasks for students. The textbook edited by Sukhov, Morozov, and Abdulaev tries to help students understand widespread famine in the villages and that other countries interpret Russian historical events differently. It asks students, “What is the reason for the famine in 1932–33?,” “What is the famine in the Ukraine called?,” and “Was it a coincidence that the famine spread in a specific region?” Other textbooks ask students whether the results of the industrial revolution and collectivization justify the sacrifices by Soviet citizens and asks them to interview older Russians about this problem. The textbook edited by D.D. Danilov and Liseitsev asks students to compare Stalin’s speech about the constitution in 1936 with the secret report of the NKVD about the distress in villages.

Although international interpretations of WWII that call the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany totalitarian states offended the Russian government, certain textbooks use “totalitarianism” to describe the Stalin era. For example, the textbook edited by D.D. Danilov et al. asks students whether “Mussolini’s ideal of the relation between the state and society” fits 1930s Soviet society, whether the Soviet political system in 1930 was “totalitarian”, and whether it was a “democracy or dictatorship”.

All textbooks describe WWII and the Great Patriotic War in detail. As many scholars point out, it is one of the core events that created a Russian identity. One similarity among textbooks is their evaluation of the Munich Agreement in 1938—namely, that European leaders believed appeasement would free Germany to attack the Soviet Union and allow Europe to escape the war. It was no secret that the West pushed Germany toward war against the USSR and that Hitler tried to dominate Eastern lands. However, the textbooks

39 Сухов, Морозов, Абдулаев. История России. С. 183.
41 Д. Д. Данилов, Лисейцев и др. История России. С. 173.
42 Д. Д. Данилов, Лисейцев и др. История России. С. 182.
43 А. Ф. Киселев, В. П. Попов. История России. ХХ – начало XXI века. 9 класс. 2-е изд. Москва: Дрофа, 2013. С. 144.
do not merely rationalize Soviet political policy. The textbook edited by A. A. Danilov says that the price the Soviet people paid for war was also the result of wrong policies by Soviet political leaders.44

Many textbooks also urge students to find their own interpretation of the Soviet-German Nonaggression Pact of 1939. The textbook edited by Shestakov, Gorinov, and Viazemskii asks students why the evaluation of the Soviet-German Nonaggression Pact in 1939 remains controversial.45 This approach appears in other textbooks. The textbook edited by Sukhov, Morozov, and Abdulaev tasks students to compare descriptions in other textbooks and academic writings about the Munich Agreement in 1938, the Soviet-France negotiations, and the German-Soviet Nonaggression Pact and to discuss their views on these events.46

Many textbooks are critical of the 1939 incorporation of the Baltic countries. The textbook edited by Zagradin et al. indicates that authorities in Poland and the Baltic sought no agreement with the Soviet Union because they regarded it as their major enemy.47 The textbook edited by A. A. Danilov et al. says that “Faced with the fear of establishment of complete military control,” the governments of Baltic countries were compelled to agree with demands of the Soviet Union.48 Textbooks edited by Sukhov et al. indicate that Poland was “betrayed” and “fell victim to the confrontation between the Soviets and Germany.” After the incorporation of the Baltic countries into Soviet Union, many Baltic people were repressed and expelled to Siberia. In addition, the decline in living standards disappointed those who initially welcomed the Soviet army. The election was held under forced intervention by the USSR, and supporters of opposition candidates were arrested. People were forced to vote: a

44 А. А. Данилов. История России в XX — начале XXI века. 3-е изд. Москва: Просвещение, 2011. С. 130.
45 Шестаков, Горинов, Вяземский. История России. С. 165.
46 Сухов, Морозов, Абдулаев. История России. С. 200.
seal was stamped on their passports at polling places, and absence of a seal denoted an “enemy of the people.”

As somehow exceptional description, the textbooks edited by Shestakov et al. say that countries other than the Soviet Union adopted policies that pushed Hitler to war. Even Poland and the Baltic countries, the first sacrifices of the Soviet-German Pact, sought an anti-Soviet agreement with Germany and it made possible for Germany to invade the USSR. A different view appears in the textbook edited by Izmozik. It says that in 1939 Soviets in western Ukraine and western Belarus asked to participate in the USSR and that the Baltic countries participated in the USSR with the support of their people.

As for Poland, the Katyn Massacre is explained in every textbook except that edited by Zagradin et al. The textbook edited by Izmozik states that the genuine document concerning the Katyn Massacre was not published until 1993. The textbook edited by D. D. Danilov says that Stalin wanted communists in power in postwar Poland and did not support the 1944 Warsaw uprising, which as a result was suppressed by the German Army.

One prominent similarity in descriptions of WWII is the emphasis on the moral and political solidarity of a multinational USSR. For example, the text edited by A. A. Danilov explains that Hitler falsely believed the multinational Soviet people would collapse under military attack. On the other hand, all textbooks mention collaboration with the German army and forced emigrations by Soviet authorities. The textbook edited by A.A. Danilov details the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and other movements in west Belorussia, the Baltic, Crimea, and the mountainous regions in Chechen-Ingush; collaboration with the German army; and forced emigration. These textbooks

49 Сухов, Морозов, Абдулаев. История России. С. 183, 201.
50 Шестаков, Горинов, Вяземский. История России. С. 164.
51 Иzmозик, Жuравлёва, Рудник. История России. С. 128.
52 Иzmозик, Жuравлёва, Рудник. История России. С. 127.
53 Д. Д. Данилов, Лисейцев, Клоков и др. История России. С. 254.
54 А. А. Данилов. История России в XX – начале XXI века. С. 116.
agree that rigorous repression triggered new post-war national movements.\textsuperscript{55}

The textbook edited by Izmozik et al. also explains that Stalinist repression and forced collectivization prompted collaboration with Germany by citizens of the USSR, who regarded German soldiers as liberators from Bolshevism. In addition, the textbook edited by Izmozik et al. notes that entire nations and people loyal to the USSR shouldered betrayals by only some groups.\textsuperscript{56}

The textbook edited by D. D. Danilov explains the forced emigrations were accepted “as the crime for fellow Soviet citizens” in the 1980s and asks students whether they agree with the decision and why.\textsuperscript{57} Textbooks edited by Morozov et al. refer to collaboration with the German army not only by non-Russians but also by Russians in the Soviet Union, such as the movements led by Vlasov and Russian refugees abroad.\textsuperscript{58} The textbook edited by A.A. Danilov, Kosulina, and Brandt tasks students to study the troops that Germany formed from the Soviet people, and to consider the causes that pushed people to participate in such troops. In addition, students are asked to seek information about the fate of nations forcefully emigrated during the war. After describing the forced emigrations, it quoted a 1946 speech in which Stalin said that the multinational Soviet Union resolved the incorporation of nations better than other multinational countries and asks students their opinion about his speech.\textsuperscript{59} Only the textbook edited by Kiselev et al. does not criticize the forced deportations and explains that “official documents said” these measures were intended to root out anti-Soviet activities, bandits, spies, and German collaborators.\textsuperscript{60}

Many textbooks explain the post-war repression of anti-Soviet partisans in western Ukraine and the Baltic countries, the repression of ex-war prisoners returning from Germany, the heightened dissident mood after the war, and the

\textsuperscript{55} А. А. Данилов, Косулина, Брандт. История России. С. 237-238
\textsuperscript{56} Измозик, Журавлёва, Рудник. История России. С. 170, 184.
\textsuperscript{57} Д. Д. Данилов, Лисейцев, Клоков и др. История России. С. 252.
\textsuperscript{58} Сухов, Морозов, Абдулаев. История России. С. 219.
\textsuperscript{59} А. А. Данилов, Косулина, Брандт. История России ХХ – начало ХХI века. С. 260.
\textsuperscript{60} Киселев, Попов. История России. С. 189.
number of people sent to gulags. The textbook edited by Izmozik says that Stalin considered all ex-prisoners traitors, and their reputations were restored only in 1956. The textbook edited by Shestakov explains that soldiers who had fought in Eastern and Central Europe had seen higher standards of living and their convictions formed in 1920–30 had weakened. Moreover, the textbook uses the word “totalitarianism” to explain the final years of the Stalin era. The textbook edited by A.A. Danilov et al. asks students to collect Soviet placards and pamphlets published within 10 years after the war and consider the aims of official propaganda during those days.

We have seen that Russian textbooks recommended by the Ministry of Education and Science are not mere political tools, as generally supposed. They have also inherited the nature of textbooks published in the 1990s, which emphasized the teaching of multiple interpretations and on making students think about the meaning of historical events on their own. All textbooks contain primary materials, such as photos, diaries, letters, and recollections, to allow students to discuss and evaluate historical events. In addition, they require students to interview their grandparents or relatives regarding their experiences. Russian researcher Guzenkova offers three classifications of WWII in history textbooks of ex-Socialist countries: (1) those similar to Soviet textbooks, (2) transformed versions, and (3) radical reconsiderations. Textbooks from Kazakhstan, Armenia, and Belorussia fall under type (1); those from Russia, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Azerbaijan correspond to type (2); and those from the Baltic countries, Ukraine, Georgia, and Poland belong to type (3). Guzenkova asserts that type (2) show more diverse and complicated aspects of WWII than type (1) textbooks and describe negative events in their own countries. Compared with type (3) textbooks, they take a conciliatory approach and reconsider Soviet textbooks more mildly. Type (3) textbooks rewrite WWII history, often describing collaboration with Germany as “liberation movements” and USSR policy after

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61 For example, Шестаков, Горинов, Вяземский. История России. С. 229-230, 235-236.
62 Измозик, Журавлёва, Рудник. История России. С. 170.
63 Шестаков, Горинов, Вяземский. История России. С. 200, 236.
64 А. А. Данилов, Косулина, Брандт. История России XX – начало XXI века. С. 265.
1944 as invasive. General Vlasov, considered a "traitor" in type (2) textbooks, is a hero in type (3).\textsuperscript{65}

However, we have seen that Russian textbooks are closer to the third than the second type, especially concerning the incorporation of Baltic countries, western Ukraine, and Belarus. Therefore, it might be better to classify Russian textbooks as an independent type or as hybrids of types (2) and (3).

Conclusion

Today’s Russian political authorities continue to try to control the education of history, although earlier attempts yielded no results, and current history textbooks present views of the Stalin era and WWII at odds with views of political authorities. They inherit the spirit of texts published during the 1990s, which emphasized the teaching of plural interpretations and encouraged students to examine the meaning of historical events.

Russian intellectuals like Morozov and others who remember the freedom of teaching in the 1990s oppose reviving the Soviet era “uniform textbook,” although they embrace governmental intrusion into education as necessary for quality and support a framework that defines content while maintaining the variety of perspectives. In addition, Russia’s largest publishers oppose a single textbook.\textsuperscript{66} Therefore, it is unlikely that government will set the content of textbooks in the near future.

On the other hand, we must understand that Russia’s political authorities and its society share a wish to unify the textbooks, a tendency that arises from recollections of the educational confusion of the 1990s. Other factors also are involved. As Linan notes, Russia faces more difficulty constructing a national identity than other ex-Soviet and Socialist countries because of the long


\textsuperscript{66} Interview with Morozov on December 18, 2013.
Socialist era and its penetration into society. Russia, the successor state of the USSR, finds it difficult to regard Soviet authorities as “others” and to name criminals and victims. In addition, the decline of living standards and Russia’s international position, widening disparities, and rising crime and unemployment during the 1990s created identity crises among the Russian people and nostalgia for the Soviet period even before Putin became president. If these internal situations combine with the international disagreements over interpretations of WWII, the most important historical event for Russian political authorities and citizens, it could stoke desires for uniform textbooks that depict national history more positively.

At the same time, as Tomas Sherlock points out, Russian civil organizations, such as the Memorial Human Rights Center, have a role in blocking the rehabilitation of Stalin, and nostalgia for the Soviet period does not mean affirmation of the Soviet system. Moreover, political elites understand that attempts to applaud the Stalin era unconditionally would “open unhealed wounds” in society. Irina Shcherbakova, director of the department of youth and educational program of the Memorial, says that the Memorial struggles to retain the diversity of history textbooks, which is the legacy of the educational reform in the 1990s, and that it is vital to teach people that history is not just black or white and that the world is complex.

In addition, the internal changes in Russia during the 1990s seem to have created better conditions for discussing the Stalin era and WWII in Russia today. According to Irina Galkova, Deputy Director for Research, Museum of GULAG in Moscow, notes an increased interest in the museum and a changed mood about the history of the Stalin era. People are less emotional and start to talk quietly.

70 Sherlock, Confronting the Stalinist Past, p. 94.
71 Interview with Irina Shchelbakova on December 16, 2013.
and undertake productive dialogs in the first couple of years. She believes that economic growth and social stability during these years enabled them to rest and think about serious topics again.\(^\text{72}\)

Sherlock also points out that Russia intended to cooperate with the West throughout the 1990s and during Putin’s first year, but the West failed to embrace Russia. He argues that high oil prices and NATO expansion, the unilateralism of the Bush administration, and the “color revolutions” in Ukraine and Georgia moved Russia toward more conservative policies concerning historical memory. In his opinion, ex-Soviet and Socialist countries and Western countries should not politicize the interpretation of history and should support Russia in confronting the history of Stalinism by academic means, such joint research.\(^\text{73}\)

The relationship of Russia with Ukraine, the EU, and the USA intensified after the March 2014 annexation of Crimea by Russia. The Russian claim to the Crimean Peninsula correlates back to Crimea’s colonization since the reign of Catherine II, while Ukrainian politicians and historians emphasize its ties to Cossack mythology.\(^\text{74}\) Although analysis of these collective memories are beyond the scope of this article, we should continue to study the impact on the conflict between Russia and Ukraine that results from the political use of each country’s national history. Popular opinion that has grown throughout Ukraine since 1991 tends to illustrate their national minorities—such as Russians, Jews, Poles, and Germans—as aggressors, oppressors, and exploiters in the struggle that ultimately resulted in the birth of the Ukrainian nation. One of the most important tasks of Ukrainian historical science is to study and write a multiethnic history of Ukraine to share with not only ethnic Ukrainians but also other ethnic groups in Ukraine, including Russians and Russian-speaking Ukrainians. In addition, this task is important for Russia and other ex-USSR countries with long-spanning ancient histories consisting of multicultural and

\(^{72}\) Interview with Irina Galkova on December 13, 2013.

\(^{73}\) Sherlock, Confronting the Stalinist Past, pp. 95-96, 106-107.

\(^{74}\) Serhii Plokhy, Ukraine & Russia: Representations of the Past, Tronto; Buffalo; London: University of Toronto Press, 2008, p. 11.
multiethnic exchanges similar to Ukraine. According to Plokhy, currently there are some positive developments in such approaches to academic studies by Ukrainian historians. Therefore, international support promoting academic discussions among Ukrainian historians and encouraging dialogue among Russian counterparts over historical identities while trying to refrain two countries from using history for political purposes is needed.

As we have seen in examining the situation concerning history textbooks in the 2000s, many Russian intellectuals resist abolishing pluralist historical interpretations in schools, and their resistance could prevent vigorous official intervention into education. In addition, internal changes within Russia compared with 1990s improve conditions for examining the Stalin era and WWII. Therefore, future conflicts over Soviet history depend on how Russia’s neighbors promote dialog and engage Russia by scholarly rather than political means.

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75 Plokhy, *Ukraine & Russia*, p. 289.