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Kant and the Politics of Enlightenment: Reason, Faith, and Revolution

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In the December 1783 issue of the *Berlinische Monatsschrift* the theologian and educational reformer Johann Friedrich Zöllner, having noted that “under the name of enlightenment the hearts and minds of men are bewildered,” went on to ask:

What is enlightenment? This question, which is almost as important as what is truth, should indeed be answered before one begins enlightening!
And still have I never found it answered!

Zöllner would soon have no shortage of answers. Within a year, the *Berlinische Monatsschrift* — which served as the leading organ of the Berlin Enlightenment — published responses from Moses Mendelssohn and Immanuel Kant. By the end of the decade, the question could scarcely be avoided. Indeed, Christoph Martin Wieland began his contribution to the discussion by recalling how one day, seated upon his toilet, he glanced at the piece of waste-paper he had picked up to complete his task and found himself staring a list of questions that began “What is Enlightenment?”.

The period during which this debate raged was the most productive of Immanuel Kant’s life. In the ten years after he offered his now-familiar answer that “Enlightenment is man’s exit from his self-imposed immaturity,” Kant managed not only to bring his critical philosophy to completion with the *Critique of Practical Reason* (1788) and *Critique of Judgment* (1790), but also to publish a host of articles on scientific, philosophical, religious, and political subjects, most of them appearing in the *Berlinische Monatsschrift*. While it has been noted that some of these essays anticipate arguments in his later works and that others explore certain points that his major works had only touched on, they have generally been treated as random thoughts, spun off
at leisure, with little or no relationship to one another. I will suggest here that at least some of these essays are more closely related to one another than has sometimes been assumed, and that they might best be viewed as a continued exploration of the ramifications of the question Zöllner had opened. In what follows, I will trace the trajectory of the debate over the question “What is Enlightenment?” in the decade after it was first posed and show how Kant continued to explore its implications in the articles he contributed to the Berlinische Monatsschrift. By exploring how the question of enlightenment was transformed and how Kant’s subsequent essays responded to the development of the question, we will see that the question “What is Enlightenment?” was a good deal more complex, and Kant’s essays in the essays in the Berlinische Monatsschrift a good deal more integrated, than might at first might appear.

We can distinguish three broad phases to the discussion of the question “What is Enlightenment?” At first attention was primarily directed to the issue of how much enlightenment of the citizenry was possible or desirable and, more specifically, whether a further liberalization of censorship regulations was advisable. These questions took on a new urgency in the second phase of the debate, which commenced with Woellner’s Religion and Censorship of Edicts of 1788. The debate on censorship was now intimately intertwined with the question of the possible tensions between enlightenment and faith. Finally, with the outbreak of the French Revolution — and especially after the execution of Louis XVI in January 1793 — the emphasis shifted to the question of whether enlightenment necessarily undermined public authority and thus led to political turmoil. As the question “What is Enlightenment?” took on new implications during this turbulent decade, Kant found himself forced to return again and again to the issues he first addressed late in 1784.

Enlightenment and the Limits of Publicity

On December 17, 1783 — the month Zöllner’s request for a definition appeared in the pages of the Berlinische Monatsschrift — J. K. W. Möhsen read a paper to the Berlin
Mittwochsgesellschaft — a secret society of “Friends of the Enlightenment” — on the question “What is to be done towards the Enlightenment of Fellow Citizens?” that urged his colleagues to determine more precisely “what is Enlightenment?” Möhsen was a man of wide-ranging historical and scientific interests as well as the personal physician to Frederick the Great. His colleagues in the Mittwochsgesellschaft included Zöllner, Mendelssohn, and a number of other important members of the Berlin intelligensia. Discussion of the topic continued into the next year, with Mendelssohn drafting a response in May 1784 that served as the basis of his subsequent article in the Berlinische Monatsschrift. To understand the specific concerns that lie behind Zöllner’s question, we need to look briefly at the debate within the Mittwochsgesellschaft.

In his lecture, Möhsen was far from sanguine about the future prospects for enlightenment in Prussia and suggested that one of the most crucial tasks facing the Mittwochsgesellschaft was to determine why the ideals of enlightenment had been resisted by much of the public. Behind the question “What is enlightenment?” stood the more troubling question of “why enlightenment has not progressed very far with our public, despite more than forty years of freedom to think, to speak, and also to publish….” The “forty years” of which Möhsen speaks refers to the reign of Frederick II, which had begun with an easing of censorship laws and a toleration of divergent views on religious questions. Political dissent, however, was less welcome and, as Gotthold Ephraim Lessing bitterly observed, all that Frederick’s reforms ultimately amounted to was a freedom “to make as many idiotic remarks against religion as one wants.” Contrasting what could be said in Prussia about political issues with what was being written in Vienna, France, and Denmark, Lessing concluded that Frederick ruled over “the most enslaved land in Europe.” By the 1780s calls for a loosening of censorship had begun to appear in the press, including an anonymous essay (subsequently determined to have been written by the jurist and Mittwochsgesellschaft member Ernst Friedrich Klein) in the Berlinische Monatsschrift in which the author, speaking in words taken from the writings of the young Frederick, implicitly
criticized the policies of the older Frederick by subtly urging the aging monarch to follow the example of his younger self.\textsuperscript{14}

Möhsen’s lecture launched a discussion within the \textit{Mittwochsgesellschaft} on the question of how far the removal of restrictions on the freedom of press should proceed. At issue was the concern that a free and unrestricted discussion of religious, moral, and political concerns might undermine the customs and beliefs on which society rested.\textsuperscript{15} This tension between the agenda of enlightenment and the exigencies of society lay at the heart of the essays Mendelssohn and Kant wrote in response to Zöllner’s question. Mendelssohn’s essay distinguished “civil enlightenment” [\textit{Bürgeraufklärung}], which must adjust itself according to the ranks of society it addresses, from “human enlightenment” [\textit{Menschenaufklärung}] which, addressing “man as man” and not “man as citizen,” paid heed neither to social distinctions nor to the maintenance of social order. “Certain truths,” he argued, “which are useful to man, as man, can at times be harmful to him as citizen”.\textsuperscript{16} In a short article published a year later in the \textit{Berlinische Monatsschrift} he was even more leery of the abusive tone of some of his contemporaries’ comments on religion. “Nothing is more opposed to the true good of mankind,” he cautioned, “than this sham enlightenment, where everyone mouths a hackneyed wisdom, from which the spirit has already long vanished; where everyone ridicules prejudices, without distinguishing what is true in them from what is false”.\textsuperscript{17}

In his response to the question Kant sought to balance the demands of enlightened reason and civil order by distinguishing between “public” and “private” uses of reason.\textsuperscript{18} By “public” use, Kant meant that “use which anyone may make of it as a man of learning addressing the entire reading public [\textit{ganzen Publikum der Leserwelt}]”. It is contrasted to that “private” use “which a person may make of it in a particular civil post or office which he is entrusted”.\textsuperscript{19} In one’s private use of reason, one behaves “passively”, bound by an “artificial accord” to advance or to defend certain “public ends”. One functions as “part of a machine”, and here it is “impermissible to argue.” In contrast, in one’s public use of reason, one acts as “a member of
the complete commonwealth [ganzes gemeinen Wesen] or even of a cosmopolitan society [Weltbürgergesellschaft]”. Here an individual “may indeed argue without harming the affairs in which he is employed in part in a private capacity”. Restrictions on the private use of reason in no way contradict the goal of enlightenment, but the public use of reason must remain free, since “it alone can bring about enlightenment among men.”

The theoretical foundation for Kant’s rejection of restraints on the public use of reason rests on a reformulation and extension of the doctrine of the social contract. Examining the question of whether it might be possible for a “society of clergymen” to “commit itself by oath to a certain unalterable set of doctrines,” Kant answered decisively:

I reply that this is quite impossible. A contract of this kind, concluded with a view to preventing all further enlightenment of mankind for ever, is absolutely null and void, even if it is ratified by the supreme power, by Imperial Diets and the most solemn peace treaties.

Such a contract is void because it fails the test which any proposed legislation must pass if it is to be legitimate. Anticipating his subsequent interpretation of the social contract as an “Idea” against which laws are to be tested, Kant explained, “To test whether any particular measure can be agreed upon as a law for a people, we need only ask whether a people could well impose such a law upon itself.” When we apply this test to the proposal to restrict religious belief to a fixed set of doctrines, we find that while it might be possible for a people to agree to such restrictions on free inquiry for a short period of time, “as a means of introducing a certain order, pending, as it were, a better solution,” even in this case individuals — “as scholars” — would retain the right to put forward alternative views. Thus, while individual religious confessions might require their members to conform to a fixed set of doctrines, it would be impermissible for the state to use its coercive power to prevent the criticism of these doctrines in books and articles.
At the close of the essay, Kant explained — almost in passing — that he had presented “matters of religion” as the “focal point of enlightenment” because it was both the “most pernicious and dishonorable” form of “immaturity” and the area where rulers were most likely to assume the role of “guardians” over their people. But he went on to suggest that a truly enlightened ruler would not only permit free inquiry in matters of religion, but would also allow his subjects the freedom to criticize the laws by which they were governed. In highlighting religion and legislation as the two central concerns of enlightenment, Kant was doing something more than laying the basis for the effusive praise of Frederick with which the essay closes. He was also indicating the primary interests of his subsequent contributions to the *Berlinische Monatsschrift*. But these essays would appear in a dramatically different political climate.

**Faith and Reason**

Frederick II died in August, 1786 and was succeeded by his nephew Frederick William II, whose ascent to the throne prompted considerable anxiety within the Berlin Enlightenment. In the early 1780s Frederick William had been drawn to Christian mysticism and had come increasingly under the influence of opponents of the Enlightenment such as his most trusted advisor, Johann Christoph Woellner. The year before Frederick William became king, Woellner sent him a treatise on religion which stressed the importance of Christian faith for the Prussian state, denounced the malevolent influence of such “apostles of unbelief” as Friedrich Gedike and Johann Erich Beister (the publishers of the *Berlinische Monatsschrift*), and called for the replacement of K. A. Zedlitz, the enlightened head of the Prussian Ecclesiastical Department. Nor did Woellner shrink from criticizing Frederick himself, charging that Frederick’s public display of his lack of religious faith was the chief cause of the irreligion and unbelief that was rife in Berlin.

The first Sunday after his ascent to the throne, Frederick William made it clear that he intended to set a different example from that of his predecessor. He attended services at the
Marienkirche, from whose pulpit Zöllner delivered one of his typically unorthodox and enlightened sermons. It is unlikely that Frederick William was pleased by what he heard, nor could subsequent visits to the churches where Johann Joachim Spalding and Friedrich William Sack preached have made him any more comfortable with the religious teaching that had flourished under Frederick’s aegis. Zöllner, Spalding, Sack, along with other members of the Berlin clergy combined historical and critical approaches to the interpretation of scripture with a theology that emphasized the primacy of the moral and practical dimensions of Christian teaching. While they continued to maintain the importance of revelation as the basis for Christian faith, they assumed that the doctrinal content of this revelation contained nothing beyond the fundamental tenets of “natural religion,” and hence was completely accessible to natural human reason. Any parts of the scriptures which presented problems for them — for example, the notions of original sin, eternal punishment, or predestination — were shown through historical and philological criticism to be of dubious authenticity and were typically avoided as a subject for sermons. In their view, there was no necessary conflict between enlightened reason and Christian faith. Enlightenment battled superstition, fanaticism, and prejudice — and, properly understood, Christianity had nothing to do with superstition, fanaticism, or prejudice. The goal of their preaching and writing was to purge superstition from the minds of the faithful and to instill a sense of moral rectitude and social responsibility that often extended to such political matters as the loyalty of subjects to the crown.27

The first two years of Frederick William’s reign were difficult to distinguish from that of his uncle.28 The break came only after Woellner consolidated his position within the court, eventually replacing Zedlitz as minister of justice on July 3, 1788 and assuming responsibility over the Ecclesiastical Department. Six days later he issued his Religious Edict, which criticized Protestant clergy for reviving “the miserable, long refuted errors of the Socinians, deists, naturalists, and other sectarians” and disseminating them among the people in the name of “Aufklärung.” While allowing clergy to believe privately whatever they wished, the edict
required that they adhere to the Bible and the “symbolic books” in their teaching. Those “so-called Enlighteners [Aufklärer]” who refused to conform were threatened with dismissal and future candidates for pastoral and teaching positions were to be carefully scrutinized so that there would be no doubts as to their “internal adherence to the creed they are employed to teach.”

The reaction to Woellner’s edict was immediate and intense. Prominent members of the Berlin clergy including Teller, Sack, Spalding, and Zöllner requested that their preaching responsibilities be terminated, and in September of the next year five of the six clerical members of the Lutheran Upper Consistory resigned their positions in protest. A flood of pamphlets denounced the Edict. In one of the most widely read polemics, Andreas Riem, co-editor of the Berlinisches Journal der Aufklärung and pastor at the Friedrichshospital launched a passionate attack on the central assumption behind the Edict — that restrictions on the spread of enlightenment were necessary in order to prevent an undermining of the customary religious faith which ultimately provided the most secure ground for public order. Listing the atrocities spawned by religious fanaticism, Riem argued that only enlightenment could provide a secure foundation for political rule.

In hopes of silencing his critics, Woellner issued an edict on censorship in December of 1788 stipulating that books and articles dealing with religious matters had to be submitted for approval to a censorship commission. While this measure did prompt the Berlinische Monatsschrift and Nicolai’s Allgemeine Deutsche Bibliothek to leave Berlin, implementing the Censorship Edict proved to be difficult, since most of the censors were drawn from the same enlightened group of councillors who had opposed Woellner’s Religion Edict in the first place. In order to secure a more energetic enforcement, Woellner established a Summary Commission of Inquiry [Immediat-Examinations-Komission] in May 1791 which was entrusted with the task of examining the fitness of clergy and teachers as well as with the responsibility for censoring theological books and articles. But here too his actions met with considerable, and often successful, opposition and whatever hopes Woellner might have had for a decisive victory
remained frustrated. Nevertheless, his efforts were not without consequence. Carl Friedrich Bährdt, one of the most outspoken opponents of religious orthodoxy was briefly imprisoned in the fortress at Magdeburg for his satirical farce *Das Religions-Edikt* and Riem was exiled in 1793 from Prussia for his criticisms of the regime. But the most prominent thinker to run afoul of Prussian authorities was undoubtedly Kant himself.

It is probably a tribute to Kant’s stature as a thinker that it took as long as it did for Woellner to move against him. The contractarian argument Kant had constructed in defense of the public use of reason had expressly denied that Woellner’s measures could have any legitimacy and Kant demonstrated that he was quite willing to put his beliefs into practice. A number of his subsequent essays in the *Berlinische Monatsschrift* engaged in an almost recklessly enlightened reinterpretation of scripture. Prior to Frederick’s death, he published a reading of *Genesis* that reinterpreted the Fall as a process of enlightenment involving mankind’s exit from the “guardianship of nature” and entry into “the state of freedom.”

In September of 1791, three years after the issuing of the Religion Edict, this essay “On the Failure of All Philosophical Attempts at Theodicy” employed an idiosyncratic interpretation of the story of Job to denounce the sorts of oaths of conformity that had now become common practice under the Woellner regime. The next April the *Berlinische Monatsschrift* published his unorthodox exploration of the notion of the original sin, which argued that of all the possible explanations for the spread of moral evil to all members of the human race, “the most inept is that which describes it as descending to us as an inheritance from our first parents.”

Kant had intended his essay on the problem of radical evil to be the first of a four part exploration of the relationship between religion and morality — a theme that he first announced at the close of his essay on Job. When Biester was unable to obtain permission from the censor to publish the second article in the series, he returned the remaining three essays to Kant. In a letter discussing the fate of the articles, Kant explained that Hillmer, the censor who dealt with philosophical articles, refused to permit the second article in the series to be published because it
“ventured into the area of biblical theology” — Kant noted, with a tinge of sarcasm, that “for some unknown reason he thought the first part did not.” Indeed, Hillmer could well have made the same complaint about any of Kant’s essays on religious matters. But Kant, undeterred by Hillmer’s action, took the unusual step of obtaining approval from the philosophical faculty at Jena to publish the three returned articles, along with the already published article on radical evil, as *Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone* in 1793. The following June he published the last of his articles on religion in the *Berlinische Monatsschrift* — an essay that went so far as to describe a passage from *Revelations* as “nonsense.” Four months later, he received a letter informing him that Frederick William had “long observed with great displeasure how you misuse your philosophy to distort and disparage many of the cardinal and basic teachings of the Holy Scriptures and of Christianity.” Threatened with “unpleasant measures” should he continue in his “obstinacy,” Kant responded by defending his conduct, but promised “as Your Majesty’s most loyal subject” to refrain from further writing or teaching on religion, thus breaking off the discussion of “matters of religion” that he had launched in “What is Enlightenment?”

Yet, even as he appeared to yield, Kant was still plotting future engagements. When he republished his letter to Frederick William in *The Conflict of the Faculties* (1798) he noted that he had chosen the expression “as Your Majesty’s most loyal subject” with care “so that I would not renounce my freedom to judge in this religious suit forever, but only during His Majesty’s lifetime.” And even if Kant was willing to bide his time and remain silent on religious questions until Frederick William’s demise, nothing in his letter prevented him from taking up the other great concern he had marked out for scrutiny at the close of “What is Enlightenment?”: the question of “legislation.”

*Enlightenment and Revolution*

At the moment when Kant promised to refrain from writing on religious subjects, the discussion of the question “What is Enlightenment?” had already moved to a third phase, in which
the central issue became the relationship of enlightenment to the political upheavals in France. Writing in 1794, Kant’s disciple Johann Heinrich Tiefrunk observed

> We now live in a century of enlightenment. Should this be said to be an honor or a disgrace for our century? We also live in a century of revolutions. Is it enlightenment which currently undermines the peace of states?[^43]

The possibility that too much or too rapid an enlightenment of the citizenry might rend the social fabric had haunted discussions of the question “What is Enlightenment?” from the outset. But after the summer of 1792, when the Revolution moved into its most radical phase, it seemed as if the worst fears about enlightenment were being confirmed daily.

A notice in an August 1793 issue of the *Oberdeutsche Allgemeine Literaturzeitung*, the leading journal of the Catholic *Aufklärung* in Austria, suggests how disturbing the news from Paris must have been for some of those who supported the cause of enlightenment.

> The empire of ignorance and superstition was moving closer and closer towards its collapse, the light of the *Aufklärung* made more and more progress, and the convulsive gestures with which the creatures of the night howled at the dawning day showed clearly enough that they themselves despaired of victory and were only summoning up their reserves for one final demented counter-attack. Then the disorders in France erupted: and now they reared again their empty heads and screeched at the tops of their voices: 'Look there at the shocking results of the *Aufklärung*! Look there at the philosophers, the preachers of sedition!' Everyone seized this magnificent opportunity to spray their poison at the supporters of the *Aufklärung*.[^44]
As the Revolution turned to Terror, conservative critics of the Enlightenment were transformed, in T.C.W. Blanning’s words, “from outmoded alarmists into farsighted prophets.”

The idea that there is a connection between the Enlightenment and the French Revolution is by now so hackneyed that it is difficult to imagine how disturbing the connection must have seemed in early 1790s. Because we tend to assume a natural affinity between the Enlightenment and liberal politics, we forget that many Aufklärers were not liberals, that some of the more ardent liberals were by no means well-disposed towards the Enlightenment, and that it was not obvious that political revolution advanced the cause of enlightenment. In the years immediately after 1789, a good deal needed to be sorted out.

If liberalism is defined as a conception of politics which gives priority to “rights” over the “good” and holds that the chief end of the state is to secure individual liberty, then few of the leading figures in the Berlin Enlightenment could be classified as liberals. They accepted Christian Wolff’s view that it was the duty of the state to undertake those measures which would further the common well-being of its citizens, and viewed as legitimate the police powers that the state exercised over the material and spiritual lives of its citizens in pursuit of this goal. Moses Mendelssohn’s writings on politics exemplify such commitments. Solidly based on Wolff and hearkening back to Aristotle, he saw the ultimate purpose of political life as residing in the greatest possible expansion of the capacities of its citizenry. Such a conception of politics was willing to accept a degree of state intervention in the lives of its citizenry that Kant would later reject as “paternalistic.”

Just as it was possible in eighteenth century Prussia to embrace enlightenment but eschew liberalism, so too it was possible to advocate liberalism while attacking enlightenment. No thinker illustrates this more forcefully than Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi. His reading of David Hume and Thomas Reid convinced him that reason cannot attain certainty about the existence of external objects. Our experience of such objects, he argued, takes the form of a revelation that is
completely beyond argument, which he described as “faith.” 50 Carrying this dichotomy between
the spheres of faith and knowledge into the sphere of theology, he rejected the attempts by
enlightened theologians to reconcile faith and reason, insisting that reason alone can never lead
us to certainty of God’s existence. In his famous discussions with Lessing that sparked the
“Pantheism Dispute,” he argued that Spinoza’s philosophy demonstrated that any attempt to
proceed on the basis of reason alone inevitably resulted in a completely deterministic and
fatalistic system that denied both the possibility of human freedom and the existence of a
personal divinity. 51

Jacobi’s disgust with the Berlin Enlightenment — which he dubbed the “morgue
berlinoise” and whose members’ “magisterial, self-satisfied demeanour” he despised 52 —
extended to their politics. Appalled by “the stupidity of people who in our century regard
superstition as more dangerous than the growing power of unrestrained autocracy,” he was one
of the earliest and most vigorous advocates of liberalism in Germany. 53 His 1782 essay
“Something Lessing Said” argued that civil society was “a mechanism of coercion” whose
function should be simply “to secure for every member his inviolable property in his person, the
free use of all his powers, and the full enjoyment of the fruits of their employment.” 54 Attempts
to justify a more extensive state intervention in the life of its citizens — whether justified by
appeals to “interests of state” or the “welfare of the whole” — led only to “the advancement of
self-interest, money-grubbing, indolence; of a stupid admiration of wealth, of rank, and of
power; a blind unsavory submissiveness; and an anxiety and fear which allows no zeal and
tends toward the most servile obedience.” 55

It was also possible to support enlightened absolutism yet welcome the French
Revolution — as the example of Ewald Friedrich von Hertzberg, who served in the foreign
ministry of both Frederick and his successor in addition to pursuing a career as a man of letters in
his role as Curator of the Berlin Academy, demonstrates. Hertzberg argued that the French
monarchy had been despotic, since it ruled without restraint. Prussian monarchs, however, were
restrained by ancient rights and corporative privileges. As long as the revolution in France appeared to be nothing more than attempt to set constitutional limitations on the monarch, it was possible to see it as little more than an effort to bring about a state of affairs that long existed in Prussia.\textsuperscript{56} It was only when it became clear that the institution of the monarchy itself was under attack that the Revolution became something more troubling.

Some supporters of Enlightenment, in contrast, viewed the very idea of revolution as suspect. Writing a year before the Revolution, Andreas Riem viewed the “Patriot Rebellion” in Holland as the work of “unenlightened demagogues” and held that the American Revolution was a misfortune that could have been avoided had there been more enlightened leadership in England and the colonies.\textsuperscript{57} Johann Heinrich Tieftrunk came to much the same conclusion in his 1794 essay, “On the Influence of Enlightenment on Revolutions.” Far from promoting violent revolutions, he argued, “True enlightenment … is … the only way to work against them successfully.” Enlightenment instructs citizens to obey their princes and teaches princes how to improve their nations. The threat to public order comes from a “pseudo-enlightenment” that “mocks, doubts, and speaks with arrogant self-assurance about everything others hold sacred and venerable.” It is this “pseudo-enlightenment” which must bear the blame for events in France. For if France had been “truly enlightened,” it “would either never have begun its revolution or else certainly have carried it out better.”\textsuperscript{58}

Johann Adam Bergk, a younger and more politically radical follower of Kant than Tieftrunk, came to different conclusions in his 1795 essay “Does Enlightenment Cause Revolutions?” For Bergk revolutions — which he distinguished from “insurrections” by isolated individuals and from “rebellions” by a majority — could occur only if the “moral enlightenment” of a people had evolved to the point where they were capable of recognizing rights and duties. Mere “speculative enlightenment” would produce, at best, a “cunning, clever, refined, selfish, and still cowardly” nation that out of fear of violence “quietly endures all insults to its inalienable rights.” This, Bergk argued, was the state of Europe before the French Revolution.
In the French Revolution — and, equally importantly, in Kant’s moral philosophy — Bergk saw evidence of a transition to a new level of moral development. Now it was possible for peoples to see that material conditions “correspond with the pronouncements of conscience,” and “if the nation recognizes or senses the injustices that burden it and mock its humanity, then a revolution is unavoidable.” Enlightenment thus stands “justly accused as the cause of revolutions.” But there can be no question of restraining enlightenment, since “once enlightenment spreads its roots in a nation, it is easier to exterminate mankind than to exterminate enlightenment.” For Bergk the age of revolutions and the age of enlightenment pointed to a common goal: a state that rejected the paternalistic concern with improving its citizenry and instead dedicated itself to the preservation of liberty.  

These questions of the proper scope of political rule and the legitimacy of a “right to rebellion” stand at the heart of Kant’s essay “On the Common Saying: ‘This May be True in Theory, But it Does not Apply in Practice.’” The essay, which occupied eighty-three pages of the September 1793 issue Berlinische Monatsschrift, was by far the lengthiest of Kant’s contributions to the journal. Although the essay fell into three discrete sections — and thus could easily have been spread over three issues as was the journal’s normal practice with articles this length — Kant nevertheless insisted that Biester publish the essay “all in one piece, in a single issue.” It would seem that Kant, reflecting on the fate suffered by the sequel to his essay on the problem of “radical evil,” must have reasoned that while the first part of the essay — a defense of his moral philosophy — would likely easily pass the censor, the second part, which addressed the more sensitive question of the nature of the “civil constitution,” might meet with fewer problems if it did have to come up for approval on its own.  

Aside from a 1785 essay in the Berlinische Monatsschrift on legal issues concerning book piracy, “On the Common Saying …” was Kant’s first essay dealing with questions of law or politics since his response to Zöllner’s question. In the second part of the essay he carved out a peculiar position for himself, rejecting political paternalism as emphatically as Jacobi had a
decade earlier — but without retracting his own earlier criticisms of Jacobi’s attack on enlightenment — and denouncing the idea that there could be such a thing as a “right to revolution” in general — while leaving himself a way to applaud the French Revolution in particular. Kant insisted that a “paternal government,” established on the principle of “benevolence” towards its people, represented “the greatest conceivable despotism.” He called instead for a “patriotic government” in which each citizen is pledged to defend the individual’s right to liberty. His rejection of a general “right to revolution” followed from this rejection of “public well-being” as a proper concern of political legislation: Kant argued that defenses of a right to revolution typically invoke the principle of happiness as the end for which civil society is founded.

Kant’s most extended treatment of the French Revolution, however, was reserved for the book that he withheld from publication until Frederick William’s death: The Conflict of the Faculties. The second part of this book was devoted to an examination of a question that had already been considered in his argument with Moses Mendelssohn in the last part of “On the Common Saying …”: whether we have reason to believe that the human race was progressing towards a better moral condition. While the discussion of Mendelssohn was content to repeat the general argument of Kant’s 1784 essay “Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose,” in the Conflict of the Faculties Kant rested his defense of progress on his ability to locate a “sign” within history that demonstrates the presence of a principle at work in history that would allow us to have hope for the future moral development of the species. For Kant, such a sign was to be found in the enthusiasm with which the French Revolution was greeted, even though the very utterance of this sympathy was “fraught with danger.” What is notable here is that Kant has shifted the grounds of the debate from a consideration of the course of Revolution to a consideration of the reaction of spectators to the event. Through this move, the actual success or failure of the Revolution becomes irrelevant to the question of moral progress. For Kant, the Revolution marked the moment in history when there was an actual effort to put into
practice the goal which nature had dictated to the species: the achievement of a Republican form of constitution. What mattered was not the ultimate success or failure of that attempt, but rather the fact that the attempt prompted such enthusiasm among those who first beheld it.

Kant’s treatment of the French Revolution in 1798 thus echoed his treatment of Enlightenment in 1784. In “What is Enlightenment?” he described his age as “an age of Enlightenment” rather than an “enlightened age,” thus implying that his readers should think of Enlightenment as ongoing process, rather than an actual achievement. In The Conflict of the Faculties he urged his readers to think of the Revolution not as an historical fact, but rather as a sign that testified to the possibility of moral progress. Thus for Kant, the ultimate meaning of both Enlightenment and Revolution was to be sought in the future they opened.

**Enlightenment and the End of Immaturity**

Werner Schneiders has argued that the “chief impulse” for the German enlightenment’s consideration of the question “What is Enlightenment?” was that of a “self-defense” against both the false images of enlightenment promoted by its enemies and the “false enlighteners” in its own ranks. The brief survey offered here suggests that the character of this defense varied considerably during the decade after Zöllner first posed the question. What began in 1784 as a discussion of whether the reforms initiated by Frederick II might be safely extended became, after the Wöllner edicts, an argument over the legitimacy of Frederick William’s attempt to reverse the course opened by his uncle. Thus, while one could — like the members of the Mittwochsgesellschaft — defend enlightenment in 1784 while maintaining a loyalty to the monarchy, by 1788 too emphatic a defense of enlightenment could lead — as Andreas Riem discovered — to censure and exile. And by 1792, those who defended enlightenment had to respond to the charge that events in France proved that enlightenment paved the way “to destruction, immorality, and depravity, … to the dissolution and ruin of all civil society, and to a war of the human race within itself, that begins with philosophy and ends with scalping and
cannibalism." As the decade wore on, enlightenment’s defenders were forced either to become more vigilant in ruling out certain options as not falling within the locus of what was considered “true enlightenment” or more radical in their understanding of what enlightenment implied.

Against this changing background, Kant was able, to a remarkable degree, to remain faithful to the conception of enlightenment he first offered in 1784. The definition of enlightenment as “man’s exit from his self-imposed immaturity” was, at least for Kant, something more than a striking piece of rhetoric. It seems to have implied a rather specific program that he managed to execute, despite increasing political difficulties, in the pages of the *Berlinische Monatsschrift*. The yoke of immaturity could be broken only by securing the free public use of reason and by focusing public reasoning on the two great concerns of enlightenment: religion and legislation. In his essays in the *Berlinische Monatsschrift* Kant confronted both issues. In a series of essays commencing with “Conjectures on the Beginning of Human History” he managed to reinterpret scripture in such a way as to confirm his own project. The expulsion from the Garden of Eden, Job’s responses to his comforters, and even the doctrine of original sin were seen by Kant as containing traces of the same story that he had announced in “What is Enlightenment?”: man’s exit from immaturity. While he was unable to devote the same attention to the other great concern of enlightenment, Kant did manage, at a moment when the political situation could not have been less promising, to draw out the political implications of his understanding of enlightenment: states should not treat their subjects as children whose happiness must be secured, but instead as citizens who rights must be respected. In both religion and politics, enlightenment meant the end of immaturity.
Notes


3 For a discussion of these essays see H. B. Nisbet, “‘Was ist Aufklärung?’: The Concept of Enlightenment in Eighteenth Century Germany,” Journal of European Studies XII (1992) pp. 77-95 and Werner Schneider, Die wahre Aufklärung (München: Karl Alber, 1974), which includes a comprehensive bibliography. Mention should also be made of Schneider’s Hoffnung auf Vernunft: Aufklärungsphilosophie in Deutschland (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1990) which provides an overview of the treatment of the notions of “enlightenment”, “reason,” and “philosophy” in the years before Zöllner’s question. A translation of some of the essays in response to Zöllner’s question will be included in James Schmidt, ed. “What is


For a thorough discussion of the background of this phase of the debate, which includes extensive citations from important archival materials, see Eckhart Hellmuth, “Aufklärung und Pressefreiheit: Zur Debatte der Berliner Mittwochsgesellschaft während der Jahre 1783 und 1784”, Zeitschrift für historisches Forschung 9 (1982), pp. 315-345.

For a comprehensive recent overview of this phase of the discussion see Steven Lestition, “Kant and the End of the Enlightenment in Prussia” Journal of Modern History 65 (March 1993) pp. 57-112. For a collection of essays responding to Woellner’s edicts which
includes a helpful introductory discussion of the controversy, see Zwi Batscha, ed. *Aufklärung und Gedankenfreiheit* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1977).


Norbert Hinske, “Mendelssohns Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklärung? oder Über die Aktualität Mendelssohns” in Norbert Hinske, ed., *Ich handle mit Vernunft ... : *

12 Keller, p. 74


15 For a discussion of the debate within the Mittwochsgesellschaft, see Eckhart Hellmuth, “Aufklärung und Pressefreiheit.”

16 Mendelssohn, Gesammelte Schriften 6/1:117.


AA VIII:37 [Kant, “What is Enlightenment?” in Political Writings, p. 56]

For Kant’s clearest account of his understanding of the “original contract” see his Rechtslehre §47 [Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals in Political Writings, p. 140]. For a discussion of the importance of Kant’s reinterpretation of contract theory, see Patrick Riley, “On Kant as the Most Adequate of the Social Contract Theorists” Political Theory 1 (1973) pp. 450-471.

AA VIII:38-39 [Kant, “What is Enlightenment?” in Political Writings, p. 57]. In taking up this example, Kant was joining an ongoing discussion of the status of the “Symbolic Books” to which Lutheran clergy were supposed to swear conformity. Mendelssohn had already criticized such oaths in his Jerusalem as well as in an earlier article in the Berlinische Monatsschrift. See my discussion in “What Enlightenment Was” pp. 95-98.

AA VIII:39-40 [Kant, “What is Enlightenment?” in Political Writings, pp. 57-58].

AA VIII:41 [Kant, “What is Enlightenment?” in Political Writings, p. 59]
Frederick’s death had been anticipated for some time. An anonymous article published in the *Berlinische Monatsschrift* a year earlier suggested that while a great monarch such as Frederick could leave his mark after his death through the laws he gave his people, these laws could be secured against the actions of his successors only if the form of the regime itself was transformed into a republic, with the head of the ruling family serving merely as “president.” See “Neuer Weg zur Unsterblichkeit für Fürsten,” *Berlinische Monatsschrift* 5 (1785) p. 239-247. As early as 1784, Kant’s former pupil F. V. L. Plessing reported rumors of forthcoming restrictions on freedom of expression; see his letter of March 15, 1784 in Kant, *Philosophical Correspondence, 1759-99* translated by Arnulf Zweig (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967) p. 113-115.

For an abbreviated version of the essay, see Paul Schwartz, *Der erste Kulturkampf in Preussen um Kirche und Schule, 1778-1798* (Berlin: Weidmann, 1925) pp. 73-92.


Carl Friedrich Bahrdt, an outspoken champion of freedom of the press, equated the positions of the Frederick and Frederick William in his 1787 pamphlet *Über Pressfreyheit und deren Gränzen: Zur Beherzigung für Regenten Censoren und Schriftsteller* (Züllichau: N. G. Fromann’s Heirs, 1787) p. 149.


Nicolai’s *Allgemeine Deutsche Bibliothek* devoted an entire issue (CXIV:2) to a review by H. P. C. Henke of the literature on the controversy.


See Epstein, pp. 362-363.

See Brunschwig pp. 168-170 and Epstein pp. 363-369 for a discussion of the work of the commission and resistance to it.

AA VIII:114-115 [Kant, “Conjectures on the Beginning of Human History,” trans. in *Political Writings*, p. 226]


AA VIII:267
39 Letter to C. F. Stäudlin of May 4, 1793 [trans. in *Philosophical Correspondence* p. 206].


42 *Conflict of the Faculties* p. 19.


45 Blanning, p. 126.


47 On the problem of the relationship between liberalism and Enlightenment in Germany, see Frederick C. Beiser, *Enlightenment, Revolution, and Romanticism* pp. 15-26, 309-317


50 Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi’s most extended discussion of Hume is found in his *David Hume über die Glaube, oder Idealismus und Realismus* in *Jacobs Werke* (Leipzig: Fleischer, 1812) II:127-288, esp. pp. 152-153 and 156-163.


relevant portion of the letter is not reproduced in the versions of Jacobi’s reply reprinted in Jacobis Werke or in Scholz. Jacobi’s disgust with the Berlin Enlightenment did not, however, extend to his views on its individual members. He respected Wilhelm Dohm, a member of the Mittwochsgesellschaft known for his energetic support of the civil and political rights of the Berlin Jewish community. Dohm served as an intermediary between Jacobi and Mendelssohn in the Pantheism Dispute.


56 See James van Horn Melton, “From Enlightenment to Revolution: Hertzberg, Schlözer, and the Problem of Despotism in the Late Aufklärung.” Central European History XII:2 (1979) pp. 103-123.

57 Riem, “Über Aufklärung” [Batscha p. 149]


Biester’s letter to Kant of October 5, 1793, summarizes Kant’s requests with regard to the publication of the essay [translated in Philosophical Correspondence p. 208]. The third part of the essay was a response to Moses Mendelssohn on the question of whether it is possible to speak of the “progress” of humanity in general which repeats certain arguments Kant had advanced in “Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose,” an article he published in the Berlinische Monatsschrift a month before his response to Zöllner’s question, and anticipates some of the themes of his 1795 treatise, “Perpetual Peace.”

AA VIII:291 [“On the Common Saying: ‘This May be True in Theory but it does not Apply in Practice” in Political Writings, p. 74]


Schneiders, Hoffnung auf Vernunft p. 163.