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**Beyond Anti-Hegemonism to Security Regime:  
China's Perspectives, Institutions and Engagement in the  
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty**

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The dissertation is dedicated to my mother, Gu-Hee Lim, on Earth and my father, Tae-Suk Cha in Heaven.

## **DECLARATION**

This thesis is presented in accordance with the regulations for the degree of doctor of philosophy. The work described in this thesis is entirely original and my own, unless otherwise indicated. The author also confirms that this thesis has not been submitted for a degree at another university.

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Chang Hoon Cha

20 June 2002



## ABSTRACT

This research analyzes China's socialization in the international Arms Control and Disarmament (ACD) field. Constructing the theoretical framework of "dynamic interaction between state and institution" in order to reconcile the "problem of agent and structure" debated in IR, the research identified the formative effects on China during the last two decades in general and in the post-CTBT (Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty) period in particular, which engaged China in the international ACD institutions and regimes. The socialization effects on China are recognized at the three levels: China's norm internalization (perspective), institutionalization (domestic institutions) and comprehensive participation in the international ACD regimes and institutions.

The evidence based on documentary works and a few interviews suggests that the engagement in international institutions is promoting a Chinese nexus in these institutions, creating new Chinese interests and socializing China into building consensus to resolving international ACD issues. The evolution and differentiation of Chinese perspectives on ACD issues resulted into the view that stresses China's role and responsibility within the regimes. The "new security concept" based on mutual security and restructuring of domestic ACD institutions in the late 1990s were the products of the socialization that "dynamic interaction" fostered. During the CTBT talks, China showed the norm-complying and establishing attitude. China also committed to the nuclear test ban norm by sustaining the nuclear test moratorium since 1996. The socialization process led China to more comprehensive and constructive participation in the international ACD institutions and regimes as China joined the Zangger Committee and supported the FMCT (Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty) after its accession to the CTBT.

As constructivists argue that state can reshape structure by process, China reconstituted its interests and identities throughout the interaction with the international ACD institutions. China's more proactive role within ACD institutions and regimes will give it more constitutive socialization influence, but the role is basically entrenched in "state enhancement functionalism."

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## ABBREVIATIONS

<b>ABM</b>	Anti-Ballistic Missile
<b>ACD</b>	Arms Control and Disarmament
<b>AMS</b>	Academy of Military Science
<b>ARF</b>	ASEAN Regional Forum
<b>ASEAN</b>	Association for South-East Asian Nations
<b>BTWC</b>	Biological and Toxin Weapon Convention
<b>CACNS</b>	Centre for Arms Control and Nonproliferation Studies
<b>CAEA</b>	China Atomic Energy Authority
<b>CAEP</b>	China Academy of Engineering Physics
<b>CASS</b>	Chinese Academy of Social Sciences
<b>CBMs</b>	Confidence Building Measures
<b>CCP</b>	Chinese Communist Party
<b>CD</b>	Conference on Disarmament
<b>CDSTIC</b>	China Defence Science and Technology Information Centre
<b>CIA</b>	Central Intelligence Agency
<b>CIAE</b>	China Institute of Atomic Energy
<b>CICA</b>	Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia
<b>CICIR</b>	China Institute of Contemporary International Relations
<b>CIIS</b>	China Institute for International Studies
<b>CISS</b>	China Institute of International Strategic Studies
<b>CLL</b>	US-China Lab-to-Lab Technical Exchange Program
<b>CMC</b>	Central Military Committee
<b>CNNC</b>	China National Nuclear Corporation
<b>COSTIND</b>	Commission on Science, Technology and Industry for National Defence
<b>CPAPD</b>	Chinese People's Association for Peace and Disarmament
<b>CSCAP</b>	Council for Security Cooperation in Asia Pacific
<b>CTBT</b>	Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
<b>CTBTO</b>	Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization
<b>CWC</b>	Chemical Weapons Convention
<b>EIF</b>	Entry-into Force
<b>FALSG</b>	Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group
<b>FAO</b>	Foreign Affairs Office
<b>FMCT</b>	Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty
<b>GAD</b>	General Armament Department
<b>GATT</b>	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
<b>GLD</b>	General Logistics Department
<b>GPD</b>	General Political Department
<b>GSD</b>	General Staff Department
<b>HEU</b>	Highly Enriched Uranium
<b>IAEA</b>	International Atomic Energy Agency
<b>IAPCM</b>	Institute of Applied Physics and Computational Mathematics
<b>IAS</b>	Institute of American Studies
<b>IDC</b>	International Data Centre

<b>IMF</b>	International Monetary Fund
<b>IMS</b>	International Monitoring System
<b>IR</b>	International Relations
<b>ISS</b>	Institute for Strategic Studies
<b>IWEP</b>	Institute of World Economics and Politics
<b>MFA</b>	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
<b>MFN</b>	Most Favoured Nation
<b>MFTEC</b>	Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economics Cooperation
<b>MIIS</b>	Monterey Institute of International Studies
<b>MIRV</b>	Multiple Independently Targeted Re-entry Vehicles
<b>MNI</b>	Ministry of Nuclear Industry
<b>MPELG</b>	Military Product Export Leading Group
<b>MRVs</b>	Multiple Re-entry Vehicles
<b>MTCR</b>	Missile Technology Control Regime
<b>NATO</b>	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
<b>NDU</b>	National Defence University
<b>NEACD</b>	Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue
<b>NFU</b>	No-First-Use
<b>NINT</b>	Northwest Institute of Nuclear Technology
<b>NMD</b>	National Missile Defence
<b>NPC</b>	National People's Congress
<b>NPT</b>	Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
<b>NSA</b>	Negative Security Assurance
<b>NSC</b>	New Security Concept
<b>NSG</b>	Nuclear Suppliers Group
<b>NTM</b>	National Technical Means
<b>OSI</b>	On-Site Inspection
<b>PBSC</b>	Politburo Standing Committee
<b>PLA</b>	People's Liberation Army
<b>PNEs</b>	Peaceful Nuclear Explosions
<b>PRC</b>	People's Republic of China
<b>PSNSS</b>	Programme for Science and National Security Studies
<b>PTBT</b>	Partial Test Ban Treaty
<b>PVTS</b>	Program for Verification Technologies Studies
<b>R&amp;D</b>	Research and Development
<b>SACMPT</b>	State Administrative Committee on Military Products Trade
<b>SCOSTIND</b>	State Commission on Science, Technology and Industry for National Defence
<b>SIIS</b>	Shanghai Institute for International Studies
<b>START</b>	Strategic Arms Reduction Talks/Treaty
<b>TMD</b>	Theatre Missile Defence
<b>TTBT</b>	Threshold Test Ban Treaty
<b>UN</b>	United Nations
<b>UNGA</b>	United Nations General Assembly
<b>UNSSOD</b>	United Nations Special Session on Disarmament
<b>WMD</b>	Weapons of Mass Destruction
<b>WMPCS</b>	Workshops on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea
<b>WTO</b>	World Trade Organization

## CHAPTER 1. Introduction

*A more dangerous source of a global intercivilizational war is the shifting balance of power among civilizations and their core states. If it continues, the rise of China and the increasing assertiveness of this “biggest player in the history of man” will place tremendous stress on international stability in the early twenty-first century. The emergence of China as the dominant power in East and Southeast Asia would be contrary to American interests as they have been historically construed (Samuel P. Huntington 1996: 312-3).*

*Once we have accomplished the four modernizations and the national economy has expanded...The question is whether or not China will practice hegemony...China will still not practise hegemony and it will still belong to the Third World (Deng Xiaoping May 1978 from Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping II 1994: 111-2).*

*There is no “logic” of anarchy apart from the practices that create and instantiate one structure of identities and interests rather than another; structure has no existence or causal powers apart from process. Self-help and power politics are institutions, not essential features of anarchy. Anarchy is what states make of it (Alexander Wendt 1992: 394-5).*

The research starts from a broad but simple question of whether China has adjusted itself to the international order during the last two decades' modernization. China with a huge population and territory, sometimes regarded as a “civilization” rather than a country, has become a meaningful actor in making of world history after colonialism and its self-imposed isolation in the 20<sup>th</sup> century. The Chinese rhetoric of “anti-hegemonism” symbolized its previous denial of the established international system (it even appears in recent official statements). Throughout the modernization period, has China been socialized enough to find a convergence with the international community? Or, has China become a threatening factor in global and regional stability as the rapidly rising power did in modern history? The research will give an

answer to the questions by investigating China's engagement in the specific field of arms control and disarmament (ACD).

### ***1.1. China Threat and Arms Control and Disarmament Institutions***

Since the demise of the Soviet bloc in international relations, one of the most challenging questions for the international community has been how a rising China would be managed within the international system. The history of world politics tells us that the international system has found it difficult to adjust to the rise of new powers. Great power transition was never easy and the question of how successful the established great powers have been in managing and peacefully assimilating rising, dissatisfied challengers into the international order has occupied historians and IR theorists. For Waltz, China is one of the candidates whose action could restore a balance in transition from the current unipolarity of the United States to multipolarity in the post cold war era (Waltz 1997: 915-6). More problematic for the "soft landing" transition is that China's perspective on international relations is premised on immutable state sovereignty, the Westphalian definition of international affairs, which conflicts with global interdependence in which national boundaries are "highly permeable and eroding" (Shambaugh 1992: 92-3). Even to the Chinese leadership, this is a crucial task: to navigate in the globalization-driven post-Cold War era in the name of "socialism with Chinese characteristics." As modern China's difficulty of adjustment to the international order of nation-states in the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> centuries came partly from the obstinate preoccupation with the great tradition of the Chinese

world order (Fairbank 1968: 4), China encounters great difficulty in accommodating itself to the international system in 21<sup>st</sup> century.

The “China threat” debate in the early to mid-1990 was the first step toward resolving the problem among the international community regarding the matter. The main question was whether and to what degree, China, with rising economic and military capacity, threatens its international neighbours and community. The terms coined at this time such as “constructive engagement” (Clinton administration), “weaving the net” (Shinn 1996), “tying China into the international system” (Segal 1995a), and “living with China” (Vogel 1997) implicitly reflect the problematic consciousness of how to deal with an emerging China. Some are dissatisfied with China’s recalcitrant behaviour in relation to international norms and rules and its irredentist claims over regional territory. They are worried about China’s authoritative political system and hypersensitive nationalism which replaced the communist ideology in the reform era. These traits are considered as incompatible with Western values of identity. To reduce the danger, the rest of the world should stand firm against China and should contain its expansionist tendencies. On the other hand, others are more patient and sympathetic. They argue that it is important to engage China and integrate it into the international system in order to encourage cooperative behaviour. The socializing effect on China will be sustained in the long run through the internalization process of the principles of multilateralism, even though the degree and pace of learning are still insatiable.

The divergence among observers'<sup>1</sup> arguments lies in, firstly, the perception of the extent of China's economic and military rise; secondly, the understanding of China's domestic political process and development associated with an authoritative political system; and finally, how the observers view the nature of the international system in general, and China's relationship with the world, in particular. This thesis concerns the third point of difference that relates China and the international system. In a way, the China threat debates diverged from the views of whether China could be fundamentally engaged in international institutions to whether it should adapt its interest and policy to be suitable for international norms and rules. On the basis of the IR theoretical position and attitude towards international institutions (either neoliberalist or neorealist) observers articulated their arguments. Thus, China's participation in international institutions would illuminate some aspects of key variables of the phenomenon. It would be a litmus test for evaluating China's cooperation and it would provide an intelligible tenet for the China threat debates.

Since the late 1970s, China's economic modernization drive has opened a window of intercourse with international society and inescapably has led to increased interaction with international institutions. This in turn has exposed China to a wide range of global issues under the pressure of international regimes and organizations. China's participation in international regimes and institutions has grown greatly. China has been compelled to develop more suitable and concrete policy responses to international standards and rules. As Kim argues, "the politics of mutual adjustment –

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<sup>1</sup> The term, 'observers,' that I use, means the analysts and scholars who are involved in Chinese affairs. They are inevitably limited to seeing the "Chinese phenomenon in international relations" by their epistemological boundary.



how the world organization might adjust to the ambitions and prerogatives of a rising China and how a rising China might adjust to the principles, norms, and objectives of the world organization” - poses one of the major challenges of the post-cold war world order (Kim 1999: 44).

However, like the dichotomy in the “China threat debate,” the evaluations of the process of China’s enmeshment in international regimes and institutions are divergent. The negativists argue that although China is increasing its cooperative international behaviour, it “surely does not include engagement in its asserted, implied, or enacted policies” (Robinson 1998: 200). The dominant character of Chinese behaviour in international organizations has been described as “state enhancing functionalism.” A neo-mercantilist realist approach that rejects many of the cooperative and transnational implications, indicates that the learning is “conditional and partial” (Yahuda 1997: 14). While the criticism of negativists is based on a rigorous assessment of China’s overall international behaviour in absolute terms, the positivists are rather relative and restrained about the change in Chinese behaviour. Some observers note that, compared, historically, to other expansionist powers at similar stages of their ascent, China has been unusually cooperative (Economy and Oksenberg 1999: 20).

China’s engagement in international regimes and institutions has facilitated information exchange and social learning, apparent changes in China’s domestic institutions, policies, organizations, legal frameworks and attitudes toward the world in relative terms. One of these fields is China’s arms control and disarmament (ACD) policy. China’s longtime mistrust and suspicion of the NPT regime was replaced by a

more cooperative policy toward international nonproliferation norms and rules. Following the UN General Assembly's decision to replace the Taiwan representative with one from China on October 25 in 1971, the PRC finally joined the U.N.-centred global system with an accompanying engagement in the myriad activities of multiple international institutions. As one of these processes, China participated in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in 1980.

From the late 1950s to the 1970s, China was a radical challenger to the superpower nuclear monopoly and the Western-dominated nonproliferation regime. For example, China rejected the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) and the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) on the grounds that they were discriminatory and helped to maintain the superpower monopoly of the Western bloc in nuclear affairs. From the mid-1980s, when the Chinese leadership readjusted its foreign policy toward to a more pragmatic course, the longtime mistrust and suspicion of the nonproliferation regime began to melt away. During the 1990s, China began to participate more fully in a range of international arms control and disarmament (ACD) institutions, mainly within the UN system.

China has signed the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT, 1992), the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC, 1992) and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT, 1996). China has agreed to bring its technology export practices more fully into compliance with international norms. In 1997 China joined the Zangger Committee, which, under the NPT, coordinates nuclear export policies. China accepted more safeguards in the MTCR (Missile Technology Control Regime). There is no question

that its current arms control and nonproliferation practices are significantly closer to international principles than they were a decade ago.

## **1.2. *Research Questions and Overall Purpose of the Research***

In fact, China's participation in the international ACD institutions has been brought by its open-door policy since the late 1970s. The participation in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) corresponds approximately with Deng Xiaoping's re-evaluation of Mao's "People's War" thesis. This revision itself was related to the need to build a peaceful international environment for domestic economic development. However, the participation has not been designed and performed by China's consistent grand strategy or blueprint with a clear purpose as the Chinese economy has grown out of its plan (Naughton 1996; Lardy 1998).<sup>2</sup> Moreover, security issues are believed to be more difficult to draw cooperative behaviour among states than economic issues by IR scholars. It is hard to believe that China's participation has been concomitant with a strategic objective in its unwilling engagement in the security regimes, which might undermine China's ambition of military modernization ingrained in its growing nationalism.

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<sup>2</sup> For example, Naughton argues that Chinese leadership did not foresee or design economic reforms in advance. So, reforms have been gradual and evolutionary, and so the elements of the reform have inescapably been time-dependent. China's reform without a blueprint, neither the process nor the ultimate objective, are encapsulated in the Deng Xiaoping's catchphrase, "groping for stones to cross the river" (Naughton 1996: 5).

Those two explanations justify starting to raise the first research question in *how-based* terms rather than *why-based* terms. How gradually but significantly has China participated in the international ACD institutions and regimes? Chinese engagement in international security regimes was conspicuous in the 1990s. This shift over time led to accession to both the most general treaty, the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1992, and the most restrictive one, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1996. In what mechanism has the engagement increased in the international ACD institutions in contrast with general concern about China's worrisome military modernization? To find the mechanism of the engagement, the research bases its theoretical framework on the metatheoretical debates in IR rather than an individual IR theory, which limits itself to one variable for explaining the interplay between China and international institutions. The explanation for the significant engagement will illuminate the key policy option of how to accommodate the rising China to the international system in the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

Evolving perspectives and institutions of China's nuclear arms control and disarmament (ACD) community suggest a clue to identifying the mechanism of engagement. They have been created and fostered by the increasing interactions with international ACD regimes and institutions. The specific record of China's expanding involvement in ACD regimes reveals a wide variety of motivations and calculations and raises the question of the impact on the restructuring of Chinese perspectives and domestic institutions. Thus, the second research question is to identify the realization and evaluate the internalization of international ACD norms in China, both at the Chinese perspective and the institution level.

More specific question can be raised in *why-based* terms, given the mechanism of explaining the China's engagement in the international ACD institutions. Why China agreed to join the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1996 is the third research question. Above all, the CTBT was the most complicated and difficult one, because the treaty significantly constrains China's nuclear development programme and security interest that China primarily considers an inalienable dimension of sovereignty. Although the CTBT has not entered into force so far, the accession to the CTBT means that China accepted an inferiority of nuclear weapons capability to the US and Russia. In fact, this strategic importance made many observers wonder if China would join the CTBT finally, because they regarded China's military ambition as strong and threatening. The importance of the CTBT, a case study of this dissertation, also lies in the fact that it was the first multilateral framework in which China participated and negotiated from beginning to end. By analyzing Chinese discourse and negotiating behaviour, the third research question will be answered.

The previous three research questions raise the fourth question of the Chinese way of socialization into the norms and rules of the international system: how China reasons, learns, and utilizes knowledge in one specific issue area; arms control and disarmament (ACD). This will unravel the riddle of how China can accommodate itself to the international system on the one hand, while aspiring to become a great power on the other hand. The problem is how to measure the socialization effects on China. The exposure to and the participation in a multilateral negotiation process provide unique experiences, which bridge subsequent negotiations with which the international ACD institutions are concerned. Thus, the consequent developments of the CTBT participation are presumed to entail a constitutive process in nurturing

Chinese perspectives and developing domestic institutions. The distinctive feature of both levels in the post-CTBT period suggests the critical role of the interaction between China and the international ACD institutions. By investigating the post-CTBT developments in China's ACD field, the research will show the way China has been socialized into and has internalized international ACD norms.

### ***1.3. The Organization of the Thesis***

The organization of the thesis has two branches. One is the examination of the Chinese ACD perspective and institutions, which has developed as a consequence of engagement with international ACD frameworks throughout the last two decades. The other is the case study of Chinese activities in the CTBT and the investigation of its impact on China. Although the constitutive developments in China regarding ACD policy in the post-CTBT period cannot necessarily be regarded as the direct consequence of the CTBT participation, they are products of dynamism between China and international institutions. They are also overarching products of the whole interacting process between China and these institutions (or regimes) during the last two decades.

The thesis is comprised of 9 chapters, which broadly deal with, literature review, the theoretical framework, methodology, and main content chapters, the intermediate variables at different levels and the case study of the research work, China's ACD participation in the CTBT. Chapter 1 presents the research question and overall

purpose. It problematizes the China phenomenon in the international arena and introduces the research questions of how to explain China's increasing engagement in the international ACD institutions. The last section of chapter 1 addresses the research methodology. The pertinence of qualitative and case study methodology to the research is examined and the unit of analysis is set out. This section is also concerned with the use of documentation and interviews for data collection and how the analysis was undertaken.

In chapter 2, the literature on Chinese foreign policy in general will be explored in theoretical terms. This is followed by an examination of the literature that focuses on China's involvement in international institutions in general and ACD institutions in particular. Throughout the process, the thesis tries to distance itself from the previous literature and suggest a perspective based upon the theoretical framework in chapter 3. The domestic/external linkage is argued to be the most appropriate approach to explain the increasing participation in the international ACD institutions. Chapter 3 begins by exploring the theoretical arguments in International Relations (IR), which provide the theoretical framework of the thesis. Neorealism, neoliberalism and constructivism will be analyzed in terms of their distinct implications for grasping the phenomenon of the emergence of China in the post-Cold War era. From the analyses of these various perspectives, "dynamic interaction" between state and international institutions is suggested as a theoretical framework. This dynamism is proposed to reconcile the metatheoretical "problem of state and structure" debated in IR theory.

Chapter 4 deals with China's ACD at the epistemological level. Given the fact that it is not easy to interpret the epistemological shift or adjustment responding to the developing institutional engagement and its feedback effect, the changing ACD perspective in 1990s will be broadly compared with one in 1980s. However, the various views of the Chinese ACD experts and IR scholars will be presented in accordance with the ACD issues. Various views, their overarching prevalence, increasing discourse and the changing pattern of the discourse in 1990s will be demonstrated.

Chapter 5 explores the institutional level of China's ACD policy. The establishment and development of China's domestic ACD institutions will be explored in this chapter. In the 1990s, Chinese domestic institutionalization of the ACD field has been conspicuous. Its evolutionary pattern has been deeply associated with the international interplay with international ACD institutions. Domestic ACD institutions interact with China's increasing engagement in international regimes and institutions. In other words, the structural re-arrangements at the international level in turn, shape the new domestic institutions that foster new interests and the ACD policy-bargaining process at the domestic level. For logical sequence, the influence of China's CTBT participation on domestic institutions is examined in Chapter 8, as well as the CTBT impact on Chinese perspectives.

In chapters 6-7, China's participation in ACD at the international level will be explored. Because China's engagement in the CTBT is considered as path-dependent rather than programmed or planned with a blueprint, China's pre-CTBT development will be explored. The evolution of China's ACD policy and the NPT accession will



be described as a precondition of the CTBT. In addition, current Chinese engagement in international ACD frameworks and regional security dialogues will be demonstrated. This suggests a strengthened involvement consequent upon the “dynamic interaction” of the 1990s. Chapter 7 discusses the case study of China’s participation in the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) negotiation process. By investigating Chinese activities in the negotiations, the overall Chinese attitude toward norm-complying and norm-creating behaviour will be examined. China’s behaviour and standpoint in the CTBT participation are explained according to the constructivist point of view.

Chapter 8 discusses the direct and indirect consequences of China’s CTBT participation. Those consequences, the distinctive features between *China t1* (in the pre-CTBT period) and *China t2* (in the post-CTBT period) will be analyzed at both the perspective and the institutional level. China’s utilization of the “common security concept” and restructuring domestic ACD institutions will be illustrated. In addition, Chinese security interests regarding Theatre Missile Defence (TMD) will be also examined, given that the CTBT severely constrains Chinese nuclear weapons development. As a path-dependence logic, a mechanism of engagement, the enforcing engagement in international ACD frameworks will also be illustrated in the post-CTBT period. The CTBT’s reconstructing effects at the domestic and international level will be analyzed under the theoretical conceptualization of the “dynamic of state and institution.” The developing phenomena, that increasing Chinese participation in the international ACD institutions brought in the post-CTBT period, are identified and evidenced for the justification and usefulness of the theoretical framework.

The last chapter summarises the key findings. It goes on to examine why and by what mechanism international ACD institutional forces led to the deeper enmeshment of China in the international community; how dynamic interaction works and how Chinese domestic institutions may be brought in. It suggests a model of how the socialization effects on China can be identified. It concludes by emphasizing the need to integrate institutional dynamism into future IR and Chinese foreign policy research. “Dynamic interaction” grasps how past policies produced particular (often unanticipated) structural arrangements that in turn shaped the new interests and interactions of different actors. The concluding chapter will also provide the theoretical implications of the research and set out briefly an agenda for future research based on its findings.

## **1.4. Research Methodology**

### **1.4.1. Qualitative Research**

Given the research questions raised, the analytic framework and hypothesis to be tested, an attempt will be made to put the dynamic interactions between China and international ACD institution or regime into context. The interaction’s constitutive force on *China t1* results in the qualitative change in *China t2*. This process is not clear-cut but often ambiguous. It is an aggregating conceptualization in a certain time period. Being permeated by intersubjective meaning of the international ACD norms in the dynamic interaction at the international level, a state (China) would be

encouraged to internalize a norm and establish domestic institutions in which the norm is embodied accompanying and creating domestic interests in transition. This process is incremental and, sometimes, difficult to find. What we are seeking to establish is not a simple correlation between the state and international arrangements with the direction of causal relationship left unknown. An attempt will be made, in this research, to demonstrate that the state qualitatively transforms itself into a state of converged identity that other actors might share with common interest. The constitutive impact on the state at different levels and the processes are not unidirectional but interactive and dynamic in multiple ways over time.

Appreciating what these constitutive processes are like and how they work involves investigating what is going on within the “second image reversed.”<sup>3</sup> Moreover, the tracking of changing patterns in a constitutive process and the knowledge of what has brought about such changes, requires a historical approach. The research into these un-quantifiable social processes and relationships requires qualitative analysis. Changing intertwined process from *state t1* to *state t2* can only be understood through analytical inferences based on more informed and in-depth research methods. Any significant differences between ostensibly similar phenomena in the different contexts may then be appreciated. The appropriate research strategies for examining them justify adopting a qualitative approach. Qualitative research strategies will be implemented by adopting a case study approach.

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<sup>3</sup> The term reflects the distinction and correlation between international relations and domestic politics. The second image termed by Waltz means domestic politics, while the first image is the international system. For Waltz, domestic politics is an independent or at most intervening variable for international relations. In contrast, Gourevitch stressed the interpenetrated quality of international relations and domestic politics in that domestic politics is also causal resource of international relations (Waltz 1979; Gourevitch 1978).

Given the aim of the research, appropriate strategies will now be identified. The unit of analysis and case selection will also be dealt with in the following section. The last section will concern methods of data collection and analysis.

#### **1.4.2. Research Strategies**

##### ***Levels of Analysis and Case Study Approach***

To discover the distinctive features of *China t2* as compared with *China t1* to which its dynamic interaction with international ACD arrangements have given rise, the analysis is divided into three levels; a) the Chinese perspective on ACD affairs, b) domestic ACD institutions and c) international participation in ACD arrangements. The evolutionary developments of the three domains, during the last decade, reveal the internalization of the international ACD agenda and reflect the “second image reversed” of the constitutive process facilitated by dynamic interaction. In reality, the developments of each level evolved and interacted with each other in a holistic way. However, for the convenience of tracking the phenomena of the distinction between *China t1* and *China t2*, the present state of each level and its evolutionary pattern will be examined.

The second strategy, to capture the distinctive features in China, is a case study. The case study will be employed to illuminate the concreteness of the constitutive process by dynamic interaction. The case study is an appropriate approach to this research because its usefulness is in attempting to understand or explain the phenomena by placing them in their wider context. Given the research question and analytical framework suggested earlier, questions of how and why China is engaged

in a security regime, about which the literature has little to say, can be best addressed by case studies which examine the social process and causal relationships between a number of variables. The case study approach helps us to understand complex and dynamic interactions between state and international institutions or regimes in a holistic perspective. This approach, in examining the dynamics involved in those interactions, also enables us to explore the constitutive processes of changes in three levels, perspective, domestic institution and international engagement, which distinguish the post-case (CTBT in the thesis) from the pre-case state itself.

#### **1.4.3. Methods of Data Collection and Analysis**

For accuracy and clarity of factual evidence, multiple sources of data such as documentation and interviews were used.

##### ***Documentation***

The main method of data collection was documentary work. Chinese articles in main journals, books, and newspapers were used for the research. Given the limited availability of resources in UK, fieldwork in Taipei and Beijing was necessary. Two weeks were spent finding material at the Institute of International Relations (IIR) in National Chengchi University in Taiwan. The IIR, founded to research cross-strait relations, possesses a large amount of material related to mainland China. Especially, the scrapbooks that were assiduously collected cover many issues about mainland China's foreign affairs and were very useful. They saved time tracking facts later. The second fieldwork was implemented in Beijing for two months. The Renmin

University library was available for finding Chinese articles published by main journals. Access to the China National Library made it possible to investigate salient data including early Chinese ACD discourse. Given that Chinese publications are available for an extremely short time in bookshops, it is difficult to find materials other than the most recently published ones. The library also made easy access to the Chinese military newspaper, *Jiefang junbao*, which contains military voices on international ACD issues.

However, regarding the military sector, the fieldwork was not as successful as hoped because the associated military expertise and institutes were relatively inaccessible to a foreign observer. To complement the failure of the military part of the fieldwork, a personal network in Beijing was mobilized to collect materials, especially the journal *International Strategic Studies*. Some data was also gained at the Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security (IFANS) in Korea.

The UN Information Centre in London has a collection of the documents of the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva, which are invaluable for an investigation of the records of China's participation. Some websites are also available for collecting materials, because they are readily accessible. Among these, there are non-governmental organizations, such as the Arms Control Association and the Monterey Institute of International Studies, which develop and update the international ACD issues in detail and make them available for web-surfing.

The examination of how the formative process led by the dynamic interaction fostered change in China itself through feeding in ideas and institutionalization, was

also carried out by tracking and updating many secondary sources such as book chapters, journal articles and newspaper articles on the relevant themes concerning the issues. Especially, it should be said that domestic ACD institutionalization (Chapter 5) relied significantly upon secondary sources.

### ***Interviews***

In addition to the documentation, interviews were conducted during the fieldwork. But the interview method was fundamentally limited and supplementary to the documentary research. Two interviews were done during the fieldwork in Beijing. The two Chinese interviewees were each associated with the China Institute of International Studies (CIIS) and the newly-established CACNS (Centre for Arms Control and Nonproliferation Studies) under the Chinese Academy of Social Science (CASS), respectively. Both interviewees had had long ACD-related social careers and delegation experiences in CD since China's initial participation in international ACD frameworks. The limited data collected from the interviews are evidenced in this dissertation.

### ***Methods of Analysis***

A database was created from the data collected through documentation and interviews by using "Procite," a reference management programme. The database created was very useful for producing new ideas or categories grounded on data. Multiple data sources have led to richer findings and a deeper understanding of management strategies; the constitutive process of the impact of restructuring perspective, domestic institutions and the next engagement in international ACD frameworks. In order to grasp the direction and emerging patterns of changes in

*China t2*, a historical approach as well as a current snapshot one is presented. The research sought to track how the current instantiations in perspective and domestic institution came into being by looking at the process of evolutionary developments over the last decade. The testing of the distinction between *China t1* and *China t2* makes sense only when the evolving patterns or trends of both analytical levels are compared.

In the thesis, the research tries to contribute to the field in both theoretical and practical terms. In theoretical terms, it takes the state (China) as the main analytical unit (unlike most constructivists) and explores the role of norms in international relations. Instead of focusing on the norms' influence on the international arena, this dissertation focuses on their attitudinal internalisation within the Chinese regime and within individual institutions. A norm, however, is not a simple given but it reconstitutes ideational and material conditions in the domestic milieu. In this sense, the thesis employs "constitutive" logic rather than "causation" logic (Wendt 1998). . How the norms of Arms Control and Disarmament (ACD) interact with each other and how they reshape a state's interests and identity are an empirically new question. That is the core of this dissertation.

By demonstrating their constitutive effects upon the state, the thesis demonstrates ways in which norms come to permeate the state and its institutions. How this has occurred in the case of China will be a unique contribution to the studies of international relations. In earlier decades Maoist China sought to create an alternative world order and wanted to play as small a part as possible in sustaining the existing one. Since the re-emergence of Deng Xiaoping China has moved towards a more co-



operative and constructive relationship with the existing world order. China's socialization into the norms of the ACD field has come to counter-balance the traditional *realpolitik* view of a China aiming to maximise its power capabilities in foreign policy. This thesis argues that China reconstituted its interests and identities as a result of the interaction with international institutions.

In practical terms, the research also takes a position on the best way of dealing with China, which was the essence of the mid-1990s China debate in the West, even though the research is not primarily policy-oriented. It analyses China's socialization in the international Arms Control and Disarmament (ACD) field. The qualitative changes that the interaction between China and international ACD institutions have brought during the 1990s indicate the socialization influence of ACD norms. By showing their constitutive effects on China, it is argued that the interaction played a definite, critical role in reconstituting the state's interest and identity. The dynamic role of the interaction and its constitutive effects reveal how important the international institutions and regimes are now to China and how they transform the state's interest and perception of its identity.

It argues that the most effective way of affecting China's national interest is not to contain China by means of power politics but to engage China in international institutions or regimes. This approach also encourages the convergence of national interests by sharing subjective meanings with each other, the international ACD norms in this case. The proliferation of the ACD norms and their acceptance by China in the 1990s will be an excellent barometer to demonstrate the validity of a policy of engagement in the China threat debate. The shift of Chinese perspectives on

international ACD issues, Chinese domestic ACD institutionalization and China's growing participation in the international ACD frameworks vindicate the engagement policy in the international community.

The process and outcomes of China's socialization in the ACD field suggest that the dynamic interaction between China and international ACD institutions (and regimes) can be theoretically conceptualised and practically analysed. The ways in which the dynamics of the interaction between state and international institutions (or regimes) form new state behaviour will be demonstrated in the case of China in the following chapters.

## CHAPTER 2. Literature Review

*The field today is fragmented into a variety of judgements about where China is heading. There is no authoritative view which might serve as the basis for consensus...The challenge in applying contemporary social science theories to China calls for great creativity in recalibrating the concepts so as to be sure that they are measuring or highlighting comparable things (Lucian W. Pye 1992: 1161-2).*

Sinologists and specialists in Chinese foreign policy have analyzed and explained China's international behaviour using material and resources accessible from China and the theoretical framework established in IR theory. The literature on Chinese foreign policy has developed in parallel with IR theoretical trends. Kim categorized these approaches as external/systemic, domestic/societal and domestic/external linkage processes (Kim 1994; 1998). Chapter 2 will contain a review of the literature on Chinese foreign policy in two directions, theoretical and practical. Theoretical endeavours and trends employed in the previous studies of Chinese affairs will be examined. The literature on China that has been concerned with the issues of China's involvement in international system will be reviewed afterwards. For the clarification of my theoretical point, I will argue that we need a more comprehensive theory that embraces interactive and co-constitutive processes of external and domestic factors for the "phenomenon of emerging and engaging China."

## **2.1. Introduction**

The evolution of contemporary studies of Chinese foreign policy, broadly China studies, has been a theory-seeking and applying process in order to understand and interpret China's development since China "stood-up" in Mao's term in 1949. In the early days, however, the field had tended to stress Chinese cultural and historical uniqueness rather than generalize on the basis of social science theory. The legacies of the sinologist tradition were criticized by Richard Wilson for its conceptual impoverishment, its indifference to developments in the social science, and its stubborn adherence to China's uniqueness (Wilson 1971: 305-15). In fact, many scholars have been dissatisfied with the applications of social science theories to Chinese studies and the field has been assessed to be a few steps behind the mainstream of the social sciences (Boardman 1974, Bobrow 1967, Johnson 1965; 1982, Wei 1985, Harding 1982; 1984; 1993; 1994, Goodman 1985, Pye 1992, Kim 1994).

The study of Chinese foreign policy remained "almost completely untouched by the procedures of the social science" (Boardman 1974: 2)" and "on the whole PRC-specific" (Goodman 1985: 344). The reason can be traced to the lack of available data and to the political turbulence in China. The sources and material have been collected mainly from refugee reports, accounts by the regime's sympathizers and official propaganda (Johnson 1982: 921, Halpern 1993: 120) and the prejudice and bias of researchers have swung between unwarranted admiration and excessive denigration (Harding 1982: 955; Wei 1985: 323). The fundamental problem is that the concepts and theories favoured in the field were developed from assumptions

about systems which operate quite differently from China. Therefore, the task of challenge in applying social science theories to China requires “great creativity in recalibrating the concepts” (Pye 1992: 1161-2), “theory-specific studies in terms of precondition for take-off” (Johnson 1965: 257-8) and “more thorough analysis of the spatial and sectoral variations within China” (Harding 1994: 703). Kim also argues that “there is as yet no widely accepted metatheory that explains the well-springs of Chinese behaviour in any succinct and persuasive fashion.” He further calls for more “integrated and synthetic theoretical approaches” that will “cross-fertilize and invigorate” the study of Chinese foreign policy (Kim 1994: 10-1).

Despite the criticism of the lack of rigour of the studies of Chinese foreign policy in theoretical terms, there has been a clear tendency among China specialists to move from the historical-cultural approach to more empirically oriented studies, and from pure area studies to social science-oriented research. Extensive efforts have been made to generate testable hypotheses by building both deductive models and inductive research designs. A gradual merging of the theories and methods of various branches of the social sciences has occurred in the field, producing a mass of literature. Stimulating and productive scholarly debates have taken precedence over the relative importance of domestic and international factors in influencing Chinese foreign policy (Ross and Godwin 1993: 138). In this chapter, those theoretical trends will be categorized in three different ways: external/systemic, domestic/societal and domestic/external linkage approach.

## **2.2. *The Theoretical Resources of Chinese foreign policy***

### **2.2.1. The External/Systemic Approach<sup>4</sup>**

Harry Harding explains that China studies in the 1980s paid greater attention to the structural constraints on the actions of agents in contrast to those of the 1970s which had tried to come to terms with the behavioural revolution in the social sciences. According to him, the prevailing 1980s paradigm in the literature on Chinese foreign policy was structuralism with greater attention to the constraints that the international political and economic systems imposed on Chinese decision-makers (Harding 1993: 28-9). Apparently, this trend was coupled with the prevailing realist thinking in IR theory, which contributed to making unitary-actor/rational-choice approaches attractive and feasible for the study of Chinese foreign policy. This literature considers China's foreign policy as a search for security in an environment in which its options are severely limited by international circumstances over which it has little control. The literature from this strategic perspective has examined important developments in China's policy as a reflection of change in PRC security, developing from shifting trends in the balance of power between the superpowers. This work focuses on the impact of the bipolar world and superpower policies toward the PRC in explaining Chinese policy.

Ng-Quinn argues that "if everything counts as equally important, no analysis will

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<sup>4</sup> The term external/systemic approach does not necessarily mean the neorealist approach in IR. It is just used to indicate one approach that gives a weight to causation from outside of a state, system. However, a number of works that concentrate on external causation heavily rely on balance-of-power perspective.

be necessary and the key to understanding international relations, therefore, lies in differentiation and prioritization” (Ng-Quinn 1984: 84). He explains the structural logic which Chinese foreign policy necessarily faces as follows,

In order to survive bipolar competition, a state being courted by both poles usually must choose sides. Choosing sides does not preclude the possibility of subsequently shifting and reshifting sides, although higher costs may result owing to a relative loss of trust. Nor does choosing sides necessarily mean a total loss of freedom; Within a coalition (tight or loose) centred around a pole, variety or polycentricity may still be permissible in areas not directly related to central strategic concerns...Structural constraints and coalition may decrease the freedom of states and diminish their opportunities, but they also minimize costly uncertainties and surprises. Interaction among states is likely to be relatively stable (Ng-Quinn 1984: 96-7).

According to him, the strength of the neorealist approach is “its ability to provide a general or strategic outline of a Chinese foreign policy” (Ng-Quinn 1983: 221). Constrained by bipolarity, Chinese foreign policy fell within a narrow range of choices. At any given time, China might lean toward either the United States (as in the mid-1940s and the 1970s) or the Soviet Union (the late 1940s and the 1950s). Having an alternative between the two poles, China had bargaining leverage and the ability to shift sides also prevented the two poles from considering China as a permanent part of the enemy’s camp. Eventually, the only uncertainties were China’s choices of with whom to align and the extent of that alignment. The patterned continuity can be distinguished from the other variables in analyzing specific policies and events (Ng-Quinn 1984: 102).

A number of studies concentrated on the international constraints of Chinese foreign policy with specific purposes. In an effort to formalize understanding of China's role between the superpowers, scholars have tried to generalize, using such concepts as bipolarity and alternatively the US-Soviet-China "triangle" (Segal 1980; Garver 1980; Dittmer 1981; Yahuda 1983; Pollack 1984; Sutter 1986; Kim 1987; Cumings 1989; Ross 1995; Tow 1994; Nathan and Ross 1997). The literature on China and the superpowers is in some aspects a discussion of alliance politics, emphasizing China's rational-choice approach to security relationships. China's regional security policy has been seen as also strictly tied to bipolar competition and, in the context of PRC security concern vis-à-vis its superpower adversary (Ross and Godwin 1993: 148). As a result of China's strategic participation in a balance of power game, China has been considered as "a firm believer in security as a function of power, alliance and manipulation of friends and enemies" (Robinson 1994: 560).

However, there is self-reflection in the field that admits that the limit and reductionism of this approach leaves room for a more comprehensive and supplementary framework. The systemic/external approach cannot account for variations and details within a given pattern (Ng-Quinn 1983: 221). This shortcoming basically results from the "lack of differentiation and overdetermination in stressing the continuity of a single pattern of world politics" (Kim 1994: 29). Thus, to presume that capabilities are the driving force behind China's foreign policy is to risk the danger of reducing the whole dynamic process of Chinese policymaking to one "systemic" variable which does not conform with the past history of the PRC (Wu 1980: 57). The research efforts to consider the timing and content of particular initiatives and major decisions in Chinese foreign policy have not been made and



some more dynamic domestic variables in certain sensitive issues and relationships have not been sufficiently attended to (Yu 1994: 240-1). For example, the Chinese government's ability to maintain a neutral position in some issues or an independent foreign policy has been underplayed (Zhao 1996: 14)

Johnston argues that most of these kinds of studies tend to “fudge the causal weight attributed to structural effects or balance of power consideration.” According to him, Nathan and Ross (1997), for example, start from an “avowedly neorealist perspective but rely on ideological and domestic political variables, the very un-neorealist concept of obligation to international rules,” to explain variations in Chinese foreign policy (Johnston 1998: 82). He problematizes the traditional balance-of-power perspective in the study of Chinese foreign policy and proposes that a “normative structure” might be employed, which would create other external conditions that limit the policy options available to Chinese decision-makers. Adopting a social constructivist perspective in IR which is ontologically separate from material structure, Johnston argues that

Neorealists are right, but not especially insightful when they argue that for all these different basic foreign policy strategies...China is using membership in prominent international institutions to enhance its identity as a high-status major power...Distributions of material capabilities and their systemic effects are indeterminate; their effects are determined by intersubjective interpretation. Normative structures are the shared expectations about appropriate behaviour held by a community of actors...So for constructivists, generally speaking, neorealists get only half the story when they refer to the constraining effects of structure. There are also enabling or empowering effects, where normative structures provide tools and incentives for actors to try to change, ameliorate, and alter the constraints (Johnston 1998: 68-9).

The normative structure is assumed to be the causal factor of Chinese foreign policy. Chinese status is measured in part by participation in international institutions that increasingly has created a tension between China's desire to appear a responsible major power and to minimize commitments and constraints. It is an interesting finding for IR theory and Chinese foreign policy studies. The application of theory to the study of China can contribute to IR theory (Johnston 1998: 77).

China's foreign policy options are delimited not only by international power structures but also by international norms. International norms affect Chinese foreign policy behaviour in at least two obvious ways. First, international norms define the terms of the international discourse in which states seek to justify their policy or action, in addressing the puzzle of why powerful states obey the seemingly powerless international rules. Legitimacy is defined in terms of the normative potency of a rule or rule-making institution. International institutions influence the participants toward compliance even among powerful states because their functions accord with generally accepted principles of right process. Second, Chinese foreign policy behaviour is affected, in varying degree, through international socialization and subsequent changes in domestic decision-making structures and processes. With China's growing participation in multilateral regimes comes a more solid empirical base for testing various theories – learning theory, epistemic community theory, neoliberal institutional theory, and social constructivist theory – to see how and why old norms compete with new norms in the course of China's social interactions with other actors in various international regimes and how and why some norms are jettisoned, where

others are reproduced in the input, output, and feedback processes of the Chinese foreign policy system.

Given that China has been subject to all the external pressures and dynamics that are characteristic of an increasingly interdependent and interactive world, the literature that concentrates on the centripetal pressure of global integration rather than balance-of-power perspective is relatively small and only recently pursued. In the 1990s, the striking economic growth and enhanced international position of China attracted increasing concerns regarding the management of a rising China. The literature which has explored China's position in the world system and the international community will be reviewed in the third section.

### **2.2.2. The Domestic/Societal Approach**

Scholars of Chinese foreign policy have made efforts to seek the causal relationship between specific foreign policy and any unique and characteristic domestic aspects of China. Ideologies such as Marxism-Leninism, Maoism and nationalism, factional coalition, elite beliefs and perceptions and decision-making processes have been given primacy in the shaping of Chinese foreign policy. The focus of this approach has been developed from the central level of elites and bureaucratic institutions to the sub-level elites and institutions in parallel with the gradual opening of China's reform policy and the greater access by outsiders to policy-making institutions and to some of their key personnel.

In the early days, the prevailing paradigm of the approach was the “Mao-in-command” model of the 1950s and early 1960s, or the factionalism of the late 1960s and 1970s, both of which focused almost entirely on the central elite. The leadership of Mao’s ideology and policy preferences was analyzed as having a dominant impact upon Chinese foreign policy (Kim 1977; Oksenberg 1976). The factionalism focused on the struggle in political circles over the appropriate PRC response to external challenges. For example, the domestic origins of US-China rapprochement were explored by the factionalism approach (Garver 1982). However, as Ross argues, the relevance of factionalism and the influence of policy debates among their servants remains marginal, while the overarching role of the preeminent leadership of Mao and Deng was considered as determining by these scholars (Ross 1989).

With relatively more open access to materials and resources in China since the mid-1980s the domestic approach has developed the field in two different directions. One was to examine the policy-making mechanism of specific sectors below the top-level decision-makers. The other was to explore the debates and writings of foreign policy specialists and illuminate their perceptions, which presumably reflect the deeper structure of Chinese thinking and its impact on Chinese foreign policy. These works were an embodiment of the changing pattern of Chinese foreign policy decisions, “from vertical to horizontal authoritarianism,” which, as Quansheng Zhao argues, are now made by several discrete power bases coordinated at the centre with multiple command channels reflecting different interests and policies of bureaucratic organization (Zhao 1992).

The growing bureaucratic interests and institutionalization that the reform policy fostered has been captured in a model of “fragmented authoritarianism.” This model was employed to explain the characteristics of the bureaucratic structure of Chinese authority and decision making in which consensus-building is central and a policy process is protracted, disjointed, and incremental (Lieberthal and Oksenberg 1988; Lampton 1987; Lieberthal 1992; Shirk 1992; Hamrin and Zhao 1995). The literature on policy formulation and implementation highlights the extent to which decision-making in post-Mao China has become incremental in nature. The need for leaders to build consensus and maintain balance among various functional and geographical interests that would otherwise resist central initiatives, consumes time and waters down policy outcomes. In the absence of well-institutionalized mechanisms for conflict resolution, leaders must rely on ad hoc measures such as boundary-spanning conferences or the exploitation of personal connections. The result is a policy process where the most insidious aspects of bureaucratic politics reinforce a traditional political culture that emphasizes the personal ties of *guanxi* (Lampton 1987: 16-7; Shirk 1992: 76).

A more sophisticated explanation has been sought in order to understand Chinese policy-making mechanism and institutions. The first comprehensive map of Chinese foreign policy institutions and processes was initiated by Barnett in 1985. Following Barnett’s pioneering work, the specific bureaucracies began to be analyzed. The role of foreign investment and trade bureaucracy was separated from diplomatic and strategic affairs with the result of economic reform process. The extension of the foreign trade bureaucracy into domestic bureauccies was discussed (Breslin 1990; Halpern 1989). The detailed work on China’s national security research institutions

was endeavoured (Shambaugh 1987). The military's role and involvement in national security policymaking was illuminated and military influences over foreign policy were also probably on the rise, as military views were increasingly expressed (Swaine 1996). In the arms control and disarmament field, Johnston researched China's growing arms control community as a consequence of transnational linkage to an international epistemic community (Johnston 1996).

Equally, ground-breaking efforts to understand Chinese foreign policy have been made to identify the politically significant perceptions/misperceptions of the foreign policy community and to determine how they actually influence policymakers (Rozman 1987; Whiting 1989; Shambaugh 1991). This literature examines the mind-set of the Chinese toward Soviet Union, Japan and the United States respectively. Shambaugh's work is not purely perceptual in that he identifies the structure and interrelationship between various agencies of China's foreign policy-making community and the perceptions of them. Thus his work bridges both institutional and cognitive approaches and offers more dynamic and plausible implications for Chinese foreign policy toward United States (Yu 1994: 247-8). The interpretation of Chinese foreign policy in psycho-analytic terms has been followed by more sophisticated works that have focused on specific aspects of the changing Chinese perspectives such as nationalism, identity and redefinition of national interests that have been reformulated by a persistent reform policy (Dittmer and Kim 1993; Unger 1996; Deng and Wang 1999; Zheng 1999). China's strategic thinking has been explored by heavily detailed documentary works of two different periods, ancient and contemporary (Johnston 1995a; Pilisbury 2000). Chinese perspectives on arms control resulting from the increasing involvement in multilateral security institutions

have been analyzed (Garrett and Glaser 1995). Those researches into the Chinese mind-set on security issues have concluded that Chinese strategic thinking remains dominated by *realpolitik*.

In sum, the studies of Chinese foreign policy that focus upon causation from domestic factors have moved from the early politics-centred approach toward a specific and sophisticated research agenda of growing and conflicting bureaucratic institutions and perspectives with vested interests.

### **2.2.3. Domestic/External Linkage**

The theoretical review of the literature on Chinese foreign policy demonstrates that all the previous achievements are stepping stones of attempts to integrate domestic and external variables into a more comprehensive theoretical framework.

Quansheng Zhao suggests a demarcation of levels of analysis into macro and micro levels. His analytical lens departs from the “symbolic macrostructure” of Beijing’s interpretation of the external environment via institutional analyses such as rules, norms and mechanisms of the policy-making process, sources of power, the issue of legitimacy and foreign policy strategies and tactics (Zhao 1996: 26-7). However, his division of these dimensions has not taken into account the centripetal forces of external factors. China’s growing involvement in the international community, for example, multilateral economic institutions as the subject of IR theories, would be not considered as determinant and restructuring variables in Chinese foreign policy. Hence, his approach is not sufficient for understanding the

dynamics of Chinese foreign policy because he stresses the mutual influences and mechanisms among the elements at the micro and macro levels only (Zhao 1996: 27). The dimensions should be open and the interplay should be not only between micro-and-macro levels but also between internal-and-external levels.

Kim argues that the impact of globalization dynamics on Chinese foreign policy requires the intensification of the domestic and external linkage approach. The factors that influence Chinese foreign policy behaviour no longer “fall neatly into the dichotomous categories of domestic/societal and external/systemic variables” (Kim 1998: 22).

Chinese foreign policy is seen here as the outcome of a continuing interplay between decisionmakers’ perceptions of needs, interests and beliefs and their perceptions of and responses to international material and normative pressures...This approach recognizes the restructuring impact of external pressures on foreign policy decisionmaking, but it also stresses the importance of domestic political institutions and policies in the timing and framing of specific responses to such external pressures (Kim 1998: 23)

The increasingly demanding domestic/external linkage approach has been addressed by other scholars. Bin Yu argues that more relevant studies of Chinese foreign policy will be needed to focus on the interplay between policy-making institutions and individuals and the broader societal and systemic factors. Consideration should be given to when international and domestic factors will affect each other because of the changing perceptions of decision-makers and specialists (Yu 1994: 259). Ferdinand indicates that the external factors might re-allocate domestic power relationship between central government and provincial governments



during China's open-door policy. The provinces have been able to attract extra capital, technology and know-how and expanded their economic interest and links with the rest of Asia, which increasingly return to affect Chinese foreign policy making, especially in regional affairs. This analysis shows that the provincial and domestic regional factor, boosted by external factors, has become a much more important component in Chinese foreign policy (Ferdinand 1990: 135-58).

The domestic/external linkage approach is conspicuous in the literature that considers China's involvement in international institutions. In the next sub-chapter, the recent literature on these issues will be reviewed.

## ***2.3. The Literature on Emerging and Engaging China***

### **2.3.1. China Threat Debates**

It is not clear why and by whom China threat debates were initiated abruptly in 1990s. When the American news media published numerous articles that fuelled fears of a rising Chinese military threat in 1995, the debates began to attract public concern.<sup>5</sup> The policy-analysts and scholars expressed their views and discussed it in the Soviet-disintegrated global arena and then the discourse expanded to the public and to China's neighbouring countries. Here, the debates will not be wholly explored in detail, but addressed for their theoretical implications. On the surface, the debates

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<sup>5</sup> On those numerous articles published in the news media, see David Shambaugh (1996a : 33-4).

considered the policy directions necessary to deal with China but, in fact, each articulation has its own implied theoretical position in nature.

Scholars of international relations and specialists of East Asia argue that East Asia could be the most destabilizing region of the post Cold War era with the increasing importance of China which has a huge territory and rapidly growing economy since the reform policy in 1979 (Scalapino 1991-2: 26-36; Calder 1996: 12; Betts 1993-4: 34). East Asia is characterized by major shifts in the balance of power, skewed distributions of economic and political power within and between countries, political and cultural heterogeneity, growing but still relatively low levels of intraregional economic interdependence, poor security institutionalization, and widespread territorial disputes that combine natural resource issues with postcolonial nationalism. In a milieu with these characteristics, the growing concerns about an emerging China have been highlighted over the debate between the containment school and the engagement school.

The containment school foresees the rise of a belligerent power, a process that will inevitably destabilize Asia and challenge vital US interests. It argues that a powerful China will be intent on achieving a long list of unrealized territorial and political ambitions, and insists that the United States must respond to China's rise by strengthening its alliances on the Chinese periphery and increasing U.S. military deployments in Asia to put Chinese influence in check. Only if pressure is maintained, will China's policy remain softer. So far China's involvement in international institutions has done little to modify and constrain its behaviour. China is not prepared to accept the constraints inherent in real interdependence with the

outside world. Therefore, a policy intended to constrain China should be much more like the one that managed relations with the Soviet Union (Kristof 1993; Roy 1994; Bernstein and Munro 1997).

The containment school subscribes to the realistic logic that a rapid rise of a new power may lead to dangerous consequences. In the past the emergence of all the great powers was accompanied by wars, as with Germany and Japan, or intense struggle, as in the case of the Soviet Union and the Cold War. It follows that a rising power such as China will inevitably find the existing system nonconducive to its interests, which in turn necessarily conflicts with those of the reigning hegemon, the United States.

Furthermore, a widely accepted democratic peace theory has provided an additional framework to interpret the phenomenon of rising China. The thrust of the theory holds that democracies never resort to force against other democracies, even though internally democracies may not necessarily be more peaceful than nondemocracies. Logically, in the eyes of democracies nondemocracies are the major threat to democracies (Russett 1993). The democratic peace tenet has made significant inroads in the official thinking guiding the U.S. foreign policy in the post-Cold War era. The Chinese communist regime that repressed the democratic movement of Tiananmen Square could not be respected as a democratic country. A great deal of Chinese international behaviour has been criticized by this school. China's arms sales and unabated human rights abuses reflect the recalcitrance to the rules and norms of international society. Moreover, according to the school, China in transition may be even more dangerous, to the extent that the coexistence of the legacies of the old

regime and the fragility of new institutions may unleash destructive nationalism and chauvinism beyond any control (Mansfield and Snyder 1995).

Using the same theoretical assumption of a theory of “democratic peace”, the engagement school is more optimistic about the transformation of Chinese society. A more open and democratic China can be achieved by further domestic reform and international interdependence. International enmeshment facilitates China’s social learning in terms of the values, norms, principles, and rules of the international system and creates China’s stake in the existing institutions and order. China’s worldview and definition of national interests can be modified toward greater compatibility with the international community within the context of transnational activities and networks, including tourism, academic and cultural exchanges, and commercial ties. Susan Shirk shows how internationalization has generated domestic social groups, sectors, and regional interests in support of continued reform in China: “Once the wall between China and the world economy was partially dismantled, international economic forces evoked positive domestic responses to China’s reform drive.” (Shirk 1996: 196). According to this optimism, the changes are noteworthy and are fundamentally transforming Chinese society.

The engagement school agrees that China is growing stronger but argues that Chinese intentions remain fluid and that premature adoption of belligerent policies risks creating a self-fulfilling prophecy: treat China as an enemy and it will be one. They assert that expanded economic relations and official dialogues on security issues, human rights, and the global norms will maximize the prospect that China will use its power in a manner conducive to U.S. interests. The Chinese government has

sought to assure the region that China does not seek hegemony now, nor will it do so in the future, even when it is economically developed (Shambaugh 1994a; 1996a; 1996b; Christensen 1996; Ross 1997; Andrey and Patrick Cronin 1996).

Johnston and Ross define the term “engagement” as

The use of non-coercive methods to ameliorate the non-status-quo elements of a rising major power’s behaviour. The goal is to ensure that this growing power is used in ways that are consistent with peaceful change in regional and global order (Johnston and Ross 1999: xiv).

“Non-coercive methods” include such strategies as accommodation of legitimate interests, transformation of preferences, and entanglement in bilateral and multilateral institutional constraints. In contrast to “containment,” it is argued that “engagement” seeks neither to limit, constrain, nor delay increases in China’s power nor prevent the development of influence, commensurate with its greater power. Rather, it seeks to socialize the rising power by encouraging its satisfaction with the evolving global or regional order (Johnston and Ross 1999: xv).

They both share the perception that the rising China is a new challenger in the region. In both the theoretical and the historical view, the worrying point is that, at first, there is a historical precedent which clearly suggests that nations in economic transition tend to be externally assertive, and that accommodating a rising power into the established order has proved difficult and disruptive. Continuing overexpansion of industrialized power led finally to war as world history has experienced in 20<sup>th</sup> century (Snyder 1991; Rosecrance and Stein 1993). And there is a strong correlation

between states in political transition from authoritarian to democratic systems and the incidence of war. Both schools share the similar objective of wanting to make China less recalcitrant and more adaptive to enmesh it into the international regime and institutions, even though their methods are different.

However, the notions of engagement and containment are, as Segal noted, inherited from the legacies of Cold War, and for that reason alone they are insufficient categories of analysis for the special problem of coping with a rising China (Segal 1996: 108).<sup>6</sup> The international order has been undergoing profound systemic change at the very time that the post-Cold War and international system is itself in great flux. The international agenda and balance of power are increasingly dominated by global issues and international regimes, which China finds onerous given its emphasis on strict state sovereignty and non-interference in what it deems “internal affairs.” Furthermore, this debate lacks a sophisticated analytical framework, research and evidence, in part because the China issue has emerged so quickly and suddenly on to the official and academic stage, and in part because Chinese foreign policy is a severely understudied subfield of international relations. In this sense, studies of Chinese foreign policy need to be reinvigorated by IR theory.

The debates over the China threat and the relevant policy considerations reflect a dilemma faced by leadership and policy-makers of the related countries, especially the United States. Both sides suffer from the lack of much solid empirical evidence. The next sub-chapter will review the limited and recently undertaken works to illuminate

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<sup>6</sup> Segal was uncomfortable with the dichotomous terms of engagement and containment. Instead, he proposed a new term, “constraint,” that combines elements of both (Segal 1996).

the relationship between Chinese foreign policy behaviour and international institutions.

### **2.3.2. China and International Institutions**

The politics of mutual adjustment – how international institutions or regimes might adjust to the ambitions and prerogatives of a rising China and how a rising China might adjust to the principles, norms, and objectives of them poses one of the major challenges of the post-cold war world order (Kim 1999: 44).

The literature on China's involvement with international institutions has been developed more recently. The consistent outcomes of its reform policy and the economic entanglement with the global economy necessarily have produced the corresponding examinations about the ongoing phenomena of China's involvement with the international community and the concomitant problem of management and adjustment. The interest of this literature is to analyze how China's involvement in international institutions and regimes has affected its foreign policy behaviour. Those works assesses the extent to which PRC membership in international institutions is promoting a Chinese nexus in these institutions, creating new Chinese interests and socializing China into building consensus to resolving international conflicts.

Kim, in his article, assesses the reciprocal impacts of China's growing and widening engagement with the United Nations and U.N.-sponsored global conferences (Kim 1999). He explores a number of policy shifts over such global issues as arms control and disarmament, U.N. peacekeeping, North-South relations,

human rights, science and technology, and environmental protection and sustainable development. He evaluates the most significant impact of Chinese participation in U.N. activity as its learning effects rather than enforced ones like supervision of implementation and imposing sanctions. The standard-setting, norm-clarifying and lawmaking processes of U.N., if initially engaged, engendered the continuing repetitive process of China's multilateral integration into each of the U.N. organs and conferences (Kim 1999: 82). Because of high normative pressures and image costs, China can be forced more easily to shift in more cooperative directions and to restructure certain policies, principles and even institutions and policy-making mechanisms.

Practically all the multilateral economic, science, and technology regimes in the U.N. have been utilized as sources of China's modernization drive. A critical factor in China's efforts to construct a modern economy has been to gain access to foreign loans, credits, investment and trade, jettisoning the principle of self-reliance of the communist model. An important aspect of China's adoption and integration into the global economic system has been its active participation in a number of international economic institutions. The development of China's involvement with international economic institutions has drawn attention to China's growing economy and the implications for world economy.

Jacobson and Oksenberg trace the evolution of China's attitude to the IMF, the World Bank and GATT, the considerations that made China wish to join them and its subsequent dealing with them since the United Nations agreed to give China the seat previously occupied by Taiwan in 1971 (Jacobson and Oksenberg 1990). They



illuminate the contingent and problematic process of China's participation in those key global economy organizations. The initiated contact, the process of engagement, internal preparations and negotiations are empirically described. They argue that the three broad factors: a propitious international environment; wise leadership and epistemic communities on both sides make for mature and sensitive approaches (Jacobson and Oksenberg 1990: 18-20).

Feeney follows Jacobson and Oksenberg's efforts with more detail about the period following China's engagement in the international economic arena. Feeney explores the historical evolution of China's relationship with the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the World Bank Group (WBG) – the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) or World Bank, and its affiliated agencies the International Development Association (IDA) and the International Finance Corporation (IFC). Feeney argues that China's participation has been “an important hedge in China's shift to a market economy” (Feeney 1994: 247). He mainly explores the benefits that the membership of these institutions has endowed. Membership enabled China to draw upon valuable foreign professional economic expertise to analyze the strengths and weaknesses of the Chinese economy, for example, to draft jointly a long-range development blueprint and broad and diversified training for large numbers of Chinese experts and officials. Those institutions provided a huge pool of lending capital in grants, loans, and concessionary rate credits. Thus, China could cope with temporary monetary and trade imbalances and finance an ambitious array of infrastructure and development projects. Through close personal and professional contact with foreign experts, China's bureaucratic,

technical, and emerging entrepreneurial elite has been trained and fostered not only to implement policy requisites of successful economic development but also to create vested career interests (Feeney 1998: 260). Overall, Feeney argues that those economic institutions have functioned to enmesh China more firmly into the international community.

In contrast to Feeney, Pearson concerns himself more with the domestic effects of the international institutions. On the basis of the yardstick of Johnston's conceptualization of "engagement," Pearson argues that the efforts of multilateral economic institutions appear to have been successful in encouraging China to play by the rules of the game (Pearson 1999a: 207). First, the engagement strategy employed by the major institutions is not the only cause of China's expanded cooperative behaviour in the global economic regime. Discipline imposed by the global market, bilateral pressure from the United States government, and especially the desires of domestic political actors, have also promoted China's cooperative behaviour. Second, its impact is not direct, but rather is channelled through domestic perceptions and domestic structures. Pearson's analysis finds positive evidence that mechanisms for engagement implicit in regime theory and transnationalism are at work, but also that domestic political structures and politics are crucial for mediating the effect of external influences on China. Evaluating the engagement strategy of international institutions, Pearson is still doubtful of Chinese cooperative behaviour. He argues that China's behaviour is "not totally cooperative compared with other major powers. Furthermore, it is difficult to conclude that the engagement is a crucial factor because cooperation increased when Chinese leaders were already moving in the direction of

cooperation and an ideology shift already eliminated the hindrance of the penetration of the norms of institutions” (Pearson 1999a: 229).

In another article, Pearson discusses the empirical record of China’s integration into the international trade and investment regime between 1978 and 1996 and examines the impact on both China and the regime itself (Pearson 1999b). He identifies that the factor most responsible for integration into the regime was the Chinese leadership’s willingness and commitment. The gridlock of negotiation over China’s entry into WTO reflected the difficulty of deeper integration attributable to Chinese leadership’s cautious approach and a growing cognizance of the costs. However, even if this external factor remains only marginal in influence, he proposes that Chinese policy-makers eventually respond to international market forces that coercive foreign pressures are relatively effective in obtaining Chinese cooperation (Pearson 1999b: 191-6).

By the same token, China’s increasing participation in international financial markets has been explored (Lardy 1999). Lardy assesses that China has conformed to the implicit norms of the international financial system. He identifies the impact on the Chinese economy that interactions with the IMF provided not only long-term funding but also technical assistance and strategic advice on China’s economic transformation. For example, the IMF played an advisory role in encouraging China to move towards achieving current account convertibility by the end of 1996 (Lardy 1999: 210). He also points out that China’s exposure to international financial regime brought restructuring impacts on the domestic economy, for example banking and the establishment of financial institutions.

### 2.3.3. China and International ACD Institutions

Unlike the international economic institutions, which provide useful information and an environment congruent with the interest of China's economic modernization, the arms control and disarmament (ACD) institutions, which would supposedly constrain China's security interest, appear to be quite controversial. Their intellectual assessment and examination basically depend on the Chinese attitude toward their practical and functional utility. In this sense, the various views on Chinese ACD behaviour are another version of the contending theoretical streams in IR. The subject of China's engagement in international ACD institutions has a potential contribution to make to the development and sophistication of IR theory.

The neorealist approach<sup>7</sup> does not give much credit to international ACD institutions or regimes for inducing China's cooperative behaviour. Malik demonstrates that there has been little substantive change in China's operational policy. Malik argues that China's nuclear arms control policy is instrumental rather than purposive serving for its strategic objective. China's ACD policy is still "oriented towards enhancing its nuclear capacities rather than reducing its arsenal." China even utilized the ACD process as a means to reduce and weaken US and Russian forces, because the Chinese perspective on ACD remain "basically unchanged." For Malik, national security policy provides the best perspective from which to "analyze, measure and predict" Chinese behaviour (Malik 1995). Malik's

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<sup>7</sup> The terms are coined as neorealist, neoliberalist, and constructivist approach. The scholars do not designate their approach in their research. Nonetheless, I use those terms here to distinguish and recognize the various views on China's engagement in international ACD institutions. This would lead on to the theoretical distinction as explored in chapter 3.

security-first approach has explanatory power, in that the Chinese leadership has long sought for its security and it has developed the nuclear bomb for that reason. However, this approach narrowed down the research scope and failed to predict China's accession to the CTBT and support for the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) which are, in Malik's words, "seen as damaging to Chinese security." Thus, he focused on China's security strategy in dealing with China and its engagement in institutions or regimes to an extreme degree. Security is one of cost-benefit calculations. Even the concept of security is changing.

Even after China committed itself to several treaties in the 1990s, the neorealist approach finds Chinese ACD behaviour vague.

"But this mindset has evolved in recent years, as has China's understanding of arms control issues. The truth is that Beijing's arms control policies are ambiguous and in flux. Beijing may see arms control as part of an integrated set of policies aimed at enhancing national security and international stability. It may also view arms control negotiations as a way to increase leverage in bilateral ties with Washington, or as part of a larger effort to impose constraints on American freedom of action. And finally, it remains possible that Beijing pursues arms control at the rhetorical level but not in a way that has any actual impact on military decision" (Roberts, Manning and Montaperto 2000: 61).

China has provoked worries for the international community, violating international rules and norms in its clandestine arms sales. China's foreign and domestic motives for missile exportation supercede the commitment to the regime (Mullins 1995: 152). China has hesitated to join the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and has denounced it as discriminatory. In a sense, this has

introduced into the suspicion and ambiguity over Chinese ACD behaviour the image of untrustworthiness.

Rather than treating China as an unitary actor, which has personified intention, some observers locate the reason for the deficiency of Chinese implementation at the institutional level. They attribute the violation to the weakness of its export control system and domestic military establishment interests (Hu Weixing 1994; Davis 1995). For example, Davis explains the gap between China's declared nonproliferation policy and its failure to end controversial exports, by examining China's nascent export control system. He argues that political and military officials regulate exports within the limits of their authority, which results in two different arms control systems, civilian commodities and military-sensitive exports (Davis 1995: 595-600).

Lewis, Hua Di and Xue Litai also focus on domestic institutions, China's defence establishment, to find a means for "solving the arms-export enigma." The military-industrial establishment and its economic-political incentives seek for hard cash for modernization by arms exports (Lewis, Hua Di and Xue Litai 1991). John Lewis and Hua Di also noted that the technologies, strategies, and goals relating to China's missile programmes must be better understood by the concerned international community, in order to overcome its confrontational stance with China and to build a cooperative regime. Just as the Chinese leadership no longer considers complete self-reliance a necessary or wise policy for its modernization efforts, including those related to strategic and tactical missiles, so, too, does it no longer place itself outside the global norms of peace and cooperation. It would therefore be a mistake to regard

China's aspirations towards defence development as being any more sinister than those of other great powers (Lewis and Hua Di 1992: 39)

Nonetheless, overall, China's ACD behaviour is regarded by neorealists as the maxi/mini strategy – maximization of its security interests by benefiting the superpowers' ACD negotiation and minimization of its own commitments and costs (Kim 1994: 420). It is very much circumscribed by a “neo-mercantilist realist approach” that rejects many of the cooperative and transnational implications (Yahuda 1997: 14). Thus, the learning effect, which can be expected from China's engagement in international ACD institutions, is conditional and partial. Johnston takes the position that China's ACD behaviour can be read as adaptation, rather than learning, which accompanies a paradigmatic shift of perspective. On the basis of his two previous researches about Chinese nuclear strategic thinking and the Chinese arms control community (Johnston 1995b; 1996), Johnston examines Chinese involvement in arms control regimes. In a joint article with Michael Swaine, he proposes that China's increasing involvement in arms control regimes “consists primarily of *realpolitik* adaptation to a changing security environment” rather than learning. Evidence for the transmission of the concept of common security, or the security dilemma, remains “murky,” although the growing Chinese arms control community and its contact with Western arms control experts contributed to the development of an interagency decision-making process and worked in favour of the signing of the NPT and CTBT in 1996 (Swaine and Johnston 1999: 117-8). Overall, Swaine and Johnston argue that China's greatly expanded participation in various forms of arms control, basically expressed in their adaptation policy and *realpolitik* approach to the changing international arms control agenda, has occurred alongside an

attempt to minimize constraints on its own military capabilities. However, Johnston admitted the function of ACD institutions for constraining China's security interest in the long term. *Ceteris paribus*, he argues that "the primary constraint on China's nuclear modernization will come from multilateral arms control processes" (Johnston 1997: 311).

Neoliberalists evaluate the effect of ACD institutions and regimes on China more positively. Frieman argues that "open channels of communication and dialogue are generally preferable to isolated camps of mutual suspicion". The ultimate effect will be whether China changes its view to support national security rather than undermine it despite its constraints on sovereignty (Frieman 1996: 28-9). Hu Weixing argues that China has moved up "a steep learning curve" on ACD policy since it joined the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1984, concentrating upon China's growing compliant behaviour. Hu gives a broad sketch of China's access to NPT as a learning effect rather than a simple policy adaptation.<sup>8</sup> He argues that China consciously adjusted its policy to NPT regimes through a learning process.

The socialization with the nonproliferation regime requires conscious efforts to adjust behaviour to international standards. Because of China's distinct strategic and tactical culture in dealing with the international society, the process of learning and socialization with international nuclear regime is slow and unique (Hu Weixing 1999: 127)

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<sup>8</sup> The concept of "learning" is distinguished from "adaptation" in that policy change is fundamental and shifts the central paradigm. New information about the external environment is internalized by decision-makers, meanwhile adaptation means tactical adjustment to changing external conditions. Tactical learning involves change in means but not in ends; whereas cognitive learning involves a modification of goals as well as means (Levy 1994).



The development of regulation of China's nuclear export control exemplifies China's efforts to meet the safeguards laid down by IAEA. According to Hu, in the learning process, the U.S. role served as an "inducer and enforcer" to facilitate China's involvement in the NPT. The nuclear experts in institutions like the CNNC (China National Nuclear Corporation), played the role of agents for change. For instance, they introduced internationally shared nonproliferation concepts (safeguards, export controls and inspection) into the policymaking process. Hu also regards the accession of the NPT as a "major shift in Beijing's perceptions of the NPT regime as well as its approaches to arms control and international security" (Hu Weixing 1999: 119).

On the basis of the broad and detailed interview with the Chinese ACD experts, Garrett and Glaser further argue that China is now beginning to accept "limited security interdependence." China's decision to the CTBT "would constitute an unmistakable signal of Chinese acceptance, however limited, of security interdependence" (Garrett and Glaser 1995: 76). The above assessment has been supported by Lampton since China joined the CTBT.

"More broadly, China's agreement to join the NPT represents a major shift in thinking about security, moving toward the recognition that security cannot be achieved solely through unilateral action. China's agreement to the CTB in late 1996 signals an even larger step in this direction" (Lampton 1997: 127-8)

Indeed, China's accession to the CTBT has been a watershed to evaluate Chinese ACD policy and behaviour. It raises the question of a major shift in China's perspective on ACD but also generates a normative approach. The implication of the

treaty is that it freezes China's nuclear modernization programme and China accepts international norms and the concept of limited security interdependence. Chinese analysts also regard it as "China's sacrifice for the CTBT." Zou Yunhua stressed that the treaty will have a significant impact on China's "fundamental security interest." The treaty will impose "severe limitations on any further modernization of the Chinese nuclear arsenal" (Zou Yunhua 1998a: 26-7). Sun Xianli<sup>9</sup> analyzes the relationship between China's nuclear strategy and its desire for testing and explores the reason why China decided to join the CTBT. Sun concludes that a CTBT would place greater constraints on China's nuclear programme than on those of the other treaties. Sun suggests that the progress of international arms control negotiations, a further reduction of nuclear arsenals of nuclear powers, no-first-use (NFU) commitment by all nuclear states, and adherence to the ABM treaty, would reduce China's concern and encourage China to make even greater contributions in the post-CTBT era (Sun Xiangli 1997: 12-4).

Given the fact that the CTBT constrains China's security interest, some scholars attribute the reason for China's acceding, to the international "normative structure" or pressure. Facing the unprecedented events of China's accession to the CTBT, analysts tried to suggest how China might adjust to the principles, norms and objectives of international institutions and this has become the focal point of Chinese ACD studies. Jia Hao explains China's nuclear nonproliferation policy within the framework of regime theory (Jia Hao 1999a). He deduced that the evolution of China's nuclear arms control policy was significantly influenced by international

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<sup>9</sup> Sun Xiangli is a research fellow in the Arms Control Research Division of the Institute of Applied Physics and Computational Mathematics (IAPCM) in Beijing.

regimes and he used the NPT, the CTBT and the MTCR as chosen case studies. He employed three variables, China's cost/benefit calculations, its policy coordination between bureaucratic institutions and each regime's normative power to explain China's policy and behaviour. He argues that the international regime's normative power, in the case of the CTBT treaty, made China join, albeit reluctantly, because it constrained China's relative power and froze the future possibility of upgrading its nuclear capacity (Jia Hao 1999a: 340).

Johnston also finds the international "normative structure" to be the reason for China's CTBT accession. In pursuing its *realpolitik* interests in military modernization, China inescapably became sensitive to its international image as a peaceful leader of less-developed countries. The traditional sovereign-centric identity with modern Chinese nationalism has made China act as a responsible power. This new identity has created the desire to present itself as an active participant in international institutions and to avoid being isolated (Johnston 1997: 311-2; Swain and Johnston 1999: 120). Johnston and Evans argue that its image concerns might play a more important role in eliciting cooperation in high-profile multilateral institutions rather than in lower profile bilateral relationships. They suggest that the image costs might explain China's agreement on CTBT, sacrificing relative nuclear power costs (Johnston and Evans 1999: 252-3). Therefore scholars argue that multilateral engagement is very effective because it capitalizes on China's desire to be included as a "great power" and to be perceived as a responsible world leader (Kan and Davis 1994: 159-60).

Johnston further develops his approach with “path-dependence” logic. In a joint article, Johnston and Evans explore the process of Chinese involvement especially in CTBT on a global level and ARF (ASEAN Regional Forum) on a regional level. They find no evidence of material incentives (promises of technology transfers, threat of economic or technological sanctions) for China’s involvement and argue that “a path-dependent” process has eased the evolutionary development of participation. The concept of “path-dependence” is employed to explain an incremental engagement over time. According to them, “path-dependence” means that China’s initial involvement in international security institutions placed China in an environment where there were incentives to becoming more involved. Increasing levels of involvement lead to increasing returns from participation. These returns can entail everything from organizational gains from increased participation and access to new information and resources of use to these organizations, to social backpatting from participation in a large, highly legitimate community (Johnston and Evans 1999: 239-40).

For instance, the development of arms control expertise in the nuclear weapons community helped China to develop the research infrastructure and interagency process necessary for serious participation. The concept of mutual security has been introduced in Chinese debates since China actively participated in ARF and CSCAP (the Council for Security Cooperation in Asia Pacific). They anticipate that the gradual changes that “a path-dependent” evolution has brought about would extend to a rethinking of Chinese interests and a normative devaluation of some of the costs of commitments, given that the Chinese arms control policy making process is extremely inaccessible. They suggested that far more research will be needed to focus on the

evolving thinking of policy makers and the mechanism of the policy making process in arms control. Involvement in the CD and accession to treaties require that China act, speak and negotiate. The intellectual and organizational requirements of participation in international security institutions entail research, expertise and content. In turn, this requires institutional support for this behaviour. China's participation in multilateral global international security institutions has not driven the agenda or evolution of these institutions themselves. China has been relatively passive in this respect, preferring to respond to processes, as these are pushed by others, but the frequency of these responses has increased over time (Johnston and Evans 1999: 244).

Gill and Medeiros suggest that a balanced approach to viewing the various external and internal factors influencing China's arms control and nonproliferation policies should be developed (Gill and Medeiros 2000). They analyze the foreign and domestic influences on Chinese decision-making related to arms control and nonproliferation and argue that China is relatively concerned over prestige and image rather than absolute gains in security, in signing the CTBT. They identify the multilateral and unilateral pressures and domestic context of Chinese decision-making, influencing Chinese arms control and nonproliferation policy through three case studies: China's negotiations and participation in the CTBT, China's military technology exports to Iran, and China's views on military transparency in its publication of white papers in 1995 and 1998. China's decision to join the CTBT appeared to be driven largely by international pressures and a fractious internal debate which ended favourably for the sake of China's international image and some possibly relative, long-term gains in Chinese security (Gill and Medeiros 2000: 68-9).

They argue that the internal “fractious” debates over signing the CTBT were divided into PLA and MFA groups. The Chinese leadership was convinced by the MFA argument, and decided against the military’s recommendation for continued testing. They denied the view that the Chinese perspective on “mutual security” and more relaxed internationalism, would play some role in this decision and instead argue that the reasons for this decision “were couched in the language of Chinese national interests” (Gill and Medeiros 2000: 90).

In sum, the literature of China’s engagement in international ACD institutions can be categorized in two different ways, pessimism and optimism, like the China threat debates. Those who place more credit on the effect of a multilateral framework are optimistic about the paradigmatic shift of China’s perspective and policy. They believe that the multilateral institutions have a socializing function and learning effect. A wide range of contacts, regular meetings, negotiation, the policy advisory roles of the staff and training programme of the institutions in their Chinese counterparts, all of these have made Chinese policy-makers familiar with the international norms and procedures of institutions and enabled them to understand the concepts and information provided by participation.

Those who suspect Chinese intentions from the hard *realpolitik* perspective are pessimistic. This suspicion comes partly from the configuration of China’s identity with growing nationalism and its enthusiasm to be a great power, mainly from confirmation that Chinese perspectives and interests have not changed fundamentally and the effect of restructuring on policies are insufficient to define the process as learning. They argue that China is not likely to assimilate international norms and its

intention always lies in cost-benefit calculation. Even when China accepted the limited security interdependence, China was reluctantly persuaded by international pressure.

## **2.4. Conclusion: Critique and Research Agenda**

### *Achievements and Critique*

The recent literature on Chinese foreign policy has expanded its research scope to the “second image reversed.” The process of domestic politics initiated by external factors and interplay between China and international institutions has been tracked down in parallel with China’s increasing engagement in international community. The works previously examined has developed the external/domestic linkage approach by investigating the domestic impacts caused by China’s exposure to and interaction with international regimes and institutions. They have committed to find the key clue for recognizing the mechanism of how China might be socialized and accommodated to the international system.

In particular, there are some successful achievements in the literature on China’s ACD policy. Firstly, the protagonists of the normative approach to China’s accession to the CTBT opened a new horizon for interpreting Chinese foreign policy within the norm-bound framework, constructivism. Given China’s increasing interaction with the international institutions, the normative approach started to regard international ACD norms as a variable to explain the shift of China’s ACD policy (Jonston 1997, 1998; Jia Hao 1999a). For example, Johston argues that the function of international

ACD institutions lies in constraining China's security interest in the long term (Jonston 1997: 311).

Secondly, the domestic-external linkage approach has advanced the field. According to this approach, the socialization and learning process are mediated, facilitated and consolidated by the domestic internalization process. New ideas and knowledge transmitted through frequent contacts with epistemic communities in transnational relationships foster the spreading of expertise in the domestic arena. Policy coordination for specific issues creates institutions to deal with them and with vested bureaucratic interests. The developments of the "second image reversed" in China's ACD field have been explored in the various sectors, such as perspective (Garrett and Glaser 1995) and institutions (Lewis, Hua and Xue 1991; Lewis and Hua 1992; Johnston 1996; Johnston and Evans 1999; Gill and Medeiros 2000).

Those works opened the black box of a "unitary actor" (state) and illuminated how Chinese ACD domestic process operated. For example, Lewis and Hua Di substantiate that the gap between China's declared ACD policy and its actual practice caused by the domestic institutional mechanism violated the international norm (Lewis and Hua 1992). Gurtov and Hwang identify two main conflicting perspectives in Chinese foreign policy. They recognize that both "nationalist and internationalist," the dual characteristics in China's foreign policy, are rooted in domestic political priorities. China's foreign behaviour is a revelation and manifestation of domestic political process. This view offers a more appropriate framework, rather than seeing China an inseparable unit and an impersonified actor like a "calculated ambiguity to mask ambitions." This framework enables us to see different views and policy



options, while Chinese internationalists and nationalists share certain norms and perspectives in foreign and military affairs. They differ in their policy preferences with respect to the fundamental question, which concerns the optimum strategic environment that will enable socialist modernization to succeed in China (Gurtov and Hwang 1998: 57)

Thirdly, there is a little advancement in explaining the socialization effects in the field, but in terms of unsubstantiated argument. Johnston's "path dependence" logic articulates the process of how engagement can be realized. The logic is more sophisticated than his previous "normative approach." It is similar to Kim's "entrapment effect" (Kim 1999: 81) of enmeshment with international institutions. This further developed approach adds a time variable and places a case in the context of overall involving process in international ACD frameworks. He claims now that one step forward in international ACD institutions inevitably requires the readjustment or restructuring of Chinese policy. The policy readjustment effect also comes from the impact of the previous policy on the perspective and bureaucratic restructuring. The sequential cause-effect gradually becomes conspicuous and finally brings a significant change of perspective, institutions and policy. However, his argument remains untestified and needs empirical research.<sup>10</sup>

Despite the theoretical and methodological development of the approach, some

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<sup>10</sup> Johnston subsequently develops his argument about socialization process, arguing that predominant IR theories "ignore the possibility of socialization or are unprepared or unwilling to theorize about it." He proposes to treat international institutions as social environment in which socialization occurs by microscopic process, such as persuasion and social influence (Johnston 2001). However, this dissertation concerns the macro-process of socialization effects rather than micro-process that Johnston brought in.

limitations still remain. Firstly, the field lacks objectivity in dealing with the evolution of China's ACD policy. Basic attitudes toward the object (China's ACD policy) are inevitably subjective, being occupied by their values and beliefs. Overarchingly, however, most scholars concerned with the subject are very limited to their epistemological boundary, because they start by seeing the object in policy-oriented terms, *how to deal with China* rather than *how to see a fact in China*. China's long isolation and the allegedly provocative violation of rules made the pessimists see China as a defector and free-rider. So, China is a pupil to teach and tame so that it complies with the rules. Thus, the pedagogic approach sincerely tried to find a way of admonishing and taming China, a way of making the Chinese learn to comply. Davis notes an epistemological point while dealing with China.

The evolution of China's nonproliferation policy is not unlike that of other countries, including the United States...From a comparative and historical perspective, China's nonproliferation policy is not unique but it is at an earlier stage of development than the policies of the established members of the regime. The challenge for the United States and other proponents of nonproliferation will be to foster rapid progress to the next stage of China's policy. The success or failure of China's export controls could determine the fate of the nonproliferation regime (Davis 1995: 603).

Although he does not forget to suggest a policy instruction, he argues that China's ACD policy is "not unique" and is not different from that of the US. China's ACD policy and its engagement in international ACD frameworks are at the initial stage. The obsession with Chinese *realpolitik* character might make observers miss the positive and developmental aspects of them. This approach would treat China as a passive object that should be consistently constrained by international pressure and

led eventually to an external structure-determinant answer, as the literature on Chinese foreign policy sought for system-constraining factors.

Secondly, the way of dealing with norm as a variable is not appropriate. The works only focused on the norms' constraining function to China's ACD policy (Johnston 1997; 1998; Jia Hao 1999a). Johnston's "normative structure" is nothing less than the systemic/external approach, when Johnston gave an answer about why China joined the CTBT. Johnston defined China's ACD policy as an adaptation policy, rather than a learning one. He turned to and relied on the international "normative structure," or pressure when China joined the CTBT that are supposed to constrain China's security interest seriously. As Bachman noted, China's accession to the CTBT is "hard to imagine," and "such anomalies" (Bachman 1998: 46-48). Jia Hao also attributes the uneven course and performance of China's ACD policy to the regime's "normative power," which resulted in the relative effectiveness in case of the CTBT compared with the MTCR. According to him, because the MTCR is seen by Chinese leadership as a Western countries-created and controlled by the United States, China "feels little multilateral normative pressure" (Jia Hao 1999a: 340-1).

In other words, the policy-oriented approach that considers China as an object of constraining or taming, has focused necessarily on the external factors and failed to capture the positive and developmental factors, which might be more determinant sometimes. Thus, the case of the CTBT is seen as an anomaly. An external factor, "normative structure" (a mixing word, norm and structure) is suggested to explain it. Moreover, it is also noteworthy that China's "image concern" caused by international pressure is neither a norm nor a shared norm. Constructivists imply that by treating

institutions as social institutions “around which actor expectations converge” the socialization becomes the process by which this intersubjective convergence takes place (Kratochwill and Ruggie 1986). The point is how the intersubjective meaning of norms is internalized and in what ways the internalized norms can be assessed. The norm-internalization process suggests a methodological solution for dealing with China’s ACD policy.

Wu Yun criticized Johnston’s view that made the Chinese passive and subject to external pressure. He argues that China probably used the pressure as a chance to declare a change of policy rather than pressure forcing change, because the guiding principle of China’s arms control and disarmament policy is that no arms control and disarmament measures should undermine China’s security. Although it is undeniable that China is not immune to outside pressure, it is also hard to consider that outside pressure could force China to do something that would undermine its fundamental interest. Thus if outside pressure changed China’s policy, this change must have been seen to be in China’s interest (Wu Yun 1996: 605). Wu Yun’s argument shows a different way of dealing with China, passivity or activity and subjectivity or objectivity.

In sum, the above-mentioned literature on China’s ACD field does not provide substantial evidence of Chinese shared norms. Instead, It stresses international pressure, especially from developing countries, which the Chinese leadership might face in the context of international isolation after the Tiananmen Incident. In this respect, Garrett and Glaser’s works based on the massive interview with the Chinese ACD experts enriched the subjectivity of *how China is thinking* in the field (Garrett

and Glaser 1995). They explored Chinese ACD perspectives, mostly in military sector, on the specific issues associated with the CTBT negotiation. The sketched works well illuminated the Chinese thinking at that historical time. However, their works did not shown the evolutionary pattern of Chinese thinking related with the engagement in the international institutions.

Therefore, thirdly, in the field, there is no objective method to evaluate the degree of China's socialization and learning effects fostered by the international institutions. For instance, preoccupied with Chinese hard *realpolitik*, no literature adequately predicted China's accession to the CTBT, even though the field does not require acumen of prediction necessarily. The assessments are based on arbitrary sense and instinct. They defined China's ACD policy as a policy adjustment (Johnston 1995b, 1996; Malik 1995; Swaine and Johnston 1999; Gill and Medeiros 2000), a positive learning (Hu Weixing 1999), or a relative vageness couched in the middle-ground term "limited interdependence" (Garrett and Glaser 1995; Lampton 1997; Godement 1997). It is quite striking to see the underdevelopment of method to evaluate the socialization effects on China, ACD policy in particular, in spite of their achievements in the field, as examined before. Inability of demonstrating the socialization effects is caused by the way of treating the international institutions. One reason is that the approach regarded the international institutions as only a constraining factor in China's policy in a given situation. The other reason is that observers have not been concerned about investigating the interrelationship between the subsequent domestic developments in China's ACD sector, both perspective and institution, and China's participation in the specific institutions. The previous researches on the issues - both China's ACD perspective (Garrett and Glaser 1995) and institutions (Johnston 1996;

Gill and Medeiros 2000) - illuminated the general developments in broad terms, but have not identified the dynamic effects by the international institutions. They have not demonstrated the socialization effects.<sup>11</sup>

### ***Research Agenda***

The limitations of the previous literature illustrate the research agenda. The alternative approach on this issue covers the following research agenda. First, the research concerns the comprehensive evaluation of China's ACD norm internalization during the last decade. The Chinese ACD perspective on a specific issue needs to be examined in depth. How have the Chinese perspectives evolved and become differentiated? A detailed perspective on a specific issue can be reviewed and interrelated in the broader overview of slightly changing general concepts, such as national interest and interdependence, which involve the basic mainstream perceptions of the Chinese leadership. The various bureaucratic branches and arms control communities have apparently a variety of policy opinions and preferences. And the evolutionary pattern and the shift of Chinese perspectives on the issues should be explored. Those characteristics of the perspectives might be interrelated with China's interplay with the international ACD institutions. The broad exploration of Chinese ACD perspectives might lead to the differentiation among the various views avoiding recognizing them in a unitary way.

Second, these perceptions can be integrated with institutional development

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<sup>11</sup> This is not to say that their empirical works are not important or negligible. In fact, this research is inspired by their pioneering achievements. The point is how to demonstrate the socialization effects brought in by the international institutions, which is being treated as a simple constraining factor by them.

associated with specific issues. Johnston and Evans did ground-breaking work to unearth Chinese arms control institutionalization but Chinese intra-policy coordination and mechanism is still unclear. Most of their findings depend upon interviews with Chinese arms control experts, so more documentary work would be necessary to gain the whole picture of China's ACD institutionalization. This agenda will require to combine with the literature on Chinese foreign policy bureaucratic institutions and to integrate into the previous achievements about the Chinese ACD institutions.<sup>12</sup>

Third, socialization effects will be demonstrated. As have been argued, the previous literature has not successfully specified the socialization effects of the international ACD institutions. The dynamic impact on China caused by the engagement in the certain regime indicates the socialization effects. How a specific regime or norm might influence the Chinese ACD perspectives and institutions? In this research, a norm is not a simple constraint factor. It creates new interests and materializes their foundation by restructuring domestic institutions. The heuristic effects of the specific engagement expand the scope of a norm variable to a constitutive process. The dynamic interaction between China and international institutions over the negotiation will be explored by the case study of the CTBT. This agenda requires to research more empirical evidence in the recent development of the field.

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<sup>12</sup> It should be said that the chapter 5 is dedicated to synthesize and re-interpret the previous works of China's foreign policy bureaucracy in general and the ACD institutions in particular.

Fourth, China's norm-boundary behaviour will be examined throughout the CTBT negotiation process. How the international institutions might adjust to the ill-disciplined and prejudiced behaviour of nationalistic Chinese policy-makers and how they might adjust to the principles, norms and objectives of the institutions and regimes will be explored in the dynamic context. This will give an answer to the question why China joined the CTBT.

Fifth, China's engagement in the international ACD regimes and institutions will be explored comprehensively. The previous works tended to evaluate Chinese ACD behaviour based on the specific ACD regime like the MTCR and the CTBT. They failed to catch a whole picture of the engagement. The eclectic way of evaluation is, somehow, due to policy-oriented approach and inescapable in order to deal with the specific issues. However, the overall evaluation of Chinese ACD policy and behaviour has not been so much concerned about. Under the United Nations system or other ACD and nonproliferation regimes, the degree of how much China has participated will provide the objective yardstick to evaluate China's ACD policy.

This research will embrace the above agenda. The development of Chinese ACD perspectives, institutionalization, participation in the international ACD frameworks and its dynamic effects on China as socialization will be examined overall and in the context of the case study of the CTBT. The above research agenda is believed to demonstrate the mechanism of socialization occurred when China has been engaged in the international ACD institutions and regimes. That suggests a model of socialization process through which practices can create and instantiate one structure of interests and state preferences. The research is also careful in dealing with the



object (China's ACD field) to avoid treating China as a passive actor constrained by external factors. The problem is a way of embodying the dialectics of structure (history) and agent (volition). Certainly, it leads to the subject of how to construct the theoretical framework of the research. The next chapter deals with this issue.

### **CHAPTER 3. Theoretical Framework: Dynamism of State and International Institutions**

*Theories of social morality are always the product of a dominant group which identifies itself with the community as a whole (E. H. Carr 1981: 74).*

The main theoretical ontology of international relations has been global force which has fundamentally driven international territory over modern times rather than regional force, or local force in which one country is engaged. Critical phenomena such as bipolarity, cooperation, interdependence and regime have been identified and the explanations have been labelled variously by theorists of IR as: “explaining and understanding”(Hollis and Smith 1990), “objectivist and subjectivist”(Onuf 1989) and “rationalism and reflectivism”(Keohane 1989). In this respect, Chinese foreign policy and behaviour has not attracted theoretical consideration throughout the development of IR theory. China’s relative isolation from the international scene has meant that the “China factor” has remained peripheral in the development of IR theory. However, China’s rapidly growing military capacity and economic development has generated debates within the international community where policy analysts, scholars and neighbour countries have increasingly viewed China as a rising threat, posing the need for a new structural readjustment in the international system and creating a new empirical reservoir to develop present IR theory.

### **3.1 Introduction**

To construct a theoretical framework is highly problematic, because existing IR theories contain ontological and epistemological differences in their nature. Seen against the larger context of order-building practices in contemporary world politics, the epistemological biases of cooperation under problematic anarchy are particularly glaring (Alker 1996: 379-80). Furthermore, such so-called scientific activities are actually promotional ones in disguise, consciously or unconsciously reinforcing the self-understandings and tactics of only one pattern of world order-building practice.

Neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism present different views of international institutions and regimes. These differences need to be explored because China's entry into the CTBT affects the interpretation and understanding of the regime. More substantially in theoretical terms, the structure-agent problem will be reviewed. This was initially proposed by Wendt (Wendt 1987) and caused "third debates" among IR scholars since the late 1980s. Keohane labelled "third debates" in the 1980s "rationalists and reflectivists" (Keohane 1989), what others have seen as the advent in IR of continental philosophy, postmodernism and the humanities (Lapid 1989; Neufeld 1993). Metatheoretical issues will be addressed here, along with constructivism in order to attempt to bridge the gap between state-centrism and rational institutionalism in the presentation of the theoretical framework for this research, which will try to reconcile the controversy between structure and agent in the concept of "dynamic of state and institution."

## **3.2. Do International Institutions or Regimes matter?**

The longstanding and fundamental metaphor used to characterize international systems is the state of “anarchy.” Hobbes’ phrase of “war of all against all” has been interpreted to mean that there is no authority in international society, which has therefore been termed “anarchy.” On the shared premise of anarchy and identically operated rationalism, neorealism and neoliberalism investigated the evolution of co-operation and whether international institutions or regimes matter.

### **3.2.1. The Approach of Neorealism**

Despite the end of bipolarity and realism’s inability to predict it, many IR scholars believe that realism is not likely to disappear and it is currently the most pervasive and powerful research paradigm (Jervis 1998; Waltz 1993; 1997). For Waltz, structure, specifically the anarchic nature of the international system, is presented as the single most important factor affecting all other behaviour (Waltz 1995: 74). For Waltz, like Morgenthau, a fundamental law of international politics is the balancing of power, revealing certain repeated and enduring patterns. He believes that a self-help system “stimulates states to behave in ways that tend toward the creation of a balance of power” and that these balances tend to form, whether or not some or all of the states consciously aim to establish them (Waltz 1979: 116-28). Yet Waltz sees the balances as automatic whereas Morgenthau posited that balances are consciously intended and must be sought by the statesmen who produce them.

In this sense, for Waltz, classical realists are “reductionists” because they were not careful enough to distinguish sufficiently between subjective and objective aspects of international political phenomena. They explained the “attribute” of actors’ subjective perceptions as an important factor in constructing and re-constructing the international “system.” They thereby failed to grasp the general law as an objective social fact in international politics (Waltz 1979: 62-7). Furthermore, as Ashley acknowledged it, classical realist “concepts and knowledge” never reach Popper’s “third world of objective knowledge,” because classical realists thought that the truth and law of international politics can be discovered and interpreted only in the situation-bounded context (Ashley 1984: 231). For the neorealists, however, the state is ontologically prior to the international system. The system structure is produced by defining states as individual units. The international system is formed by “coaction of self-regarding units” (Waltz 1979: 91) or “an aggregation of diverse entities united by regular interaction according to a form of control” (Gilpin 1981: 26).

Waltz’s neorealist research paradigm gained great currency because of its simplified state-system causation and gave rise to much empirical research which resulted in the refinement and clarification of concepts and it also enabled new issues to be considered (Rosecrance and Stein 1993; Walt 1987; Schweller 1997). However, some scholars argue that it suffers from “proliferating emendations” (Vasquez 1997). One of its central assumptions is that states are unitary actors and must be treated as an unproblematic unity. The assumption treats the unitary actor as exogenously given, which means that the state’s existence, boundaries, constituencies, legitimations, interests, identity and capacities to make self-regarding decisions can be unquestioned.

The state-centrism of neorealism has been criticized by another school of IR theorists. For example, acknowledging that the reasoning of the neorealists school is in very large measure attributable to structuralist tenets, Ruggie argues that Waltz ignored one important analytical component (Ruggie 1983: 261-4). Ruggie considers that there are three analytical components of Waltz's political structure – an organizational principle, the differentiation of units and the degree of concentration of the state's capabilities. According to him, a dimension of change is missing from Waltz's model because he drops the second analytical component of political structure, the differentiation of units, when discussing international systems. Furthermore, he ignores this component because his interpretation of the sociological term "differentiation," is inappropriate. He takes it to mean that which denotes difference rather than that which denotes "separatedness" (Ruggie 1983: 273-4). And in so doing, Waltz eliminates the attributes of the state as a unit of analysis. The analysis of domestic politics and bureaucracy falls outside the neorealist approach.

Ruggie's critiques were not primarily about methodology, but about the neorealists' image of the world, their alleged state-centrism, preoccupation with power, and indifference to domestic and transnational processes of world politics beyond the state's political–military sphere. Therefore, international institutions are unavailable to the neorealists as analytical units because "institutions are basically a reflection of the distribution of power in the world." They are "based on the self-interested calculations of great powers, and they have no independent effect on state behaviour" (Mearsheimer 1994: 7). Moreover, neorealists believe that the interests of the nation-state also supercede the collective interests of the international community

and therefore of supranational institutions like the United Nations, which serve primarily as arenas for the pursuit and exercise of national power and should never be allowed to become a substitute for national units or to compromise national sovereignty. By making national interests sacrosanct and global interests subservient, neorealism eschews supranational institutions that limit the freedom and independence of national competitors. For instance, Krasner argued that the nature of institutional arrangements is better explained by the distribution of national power capabilities than by efforts to solve problems of market failure. “Changes in the relative power of states have led to changes in international regimes” (Krasner 1991: 336).

Critics of neorealism believe that it distorts and severs classical realism from its critical roots and converts it into a problem-solving device for the foreign policy makers of the most powerful states. According to these critics, neorealism, which is very largely an American product of the Cold War, attempts to construct a technology of state power. It computes the components of the power of individual states, and assesses the relative chances of moves in the game of power politics. Its epistemology is positivist and it lacks any dimension of historical structural change. The world of inter-state relations is a given world, identical in its basic structure over time. There are no changes of the system, only changes within the system (Cox 1986: 208-10; 1992: 169). Seen in the context of its historical emergence, neorealism is a coherent tradition demarcated by denying basic and qualitative progress in international relations in contrast with neoliberalism. Neorealism has found different ways to argue human nature, structure, philosophy of history, and pessimism of knowledge (Waeber 1992: 33-49).

### 3.2.2. The Approach of Neoliberalism

The growing interdependence of the world economy creates pressures for common policies, and hence for procedures whereby countries discuss and coordinate action. The need to interpret these procedures was phrased in terms of regional integration, transnationalism, interdependence, and a pluralist system of numerous sub-state and trans-state actors. Hence, the structural condition of anarchy does not necessarily lead to a complete “war of all against all” (Keohane 1983: 148) and neorealism “can be modified progressively to attain closer correspondence with reality” (Keohane 1986: 191). Patterns of cooperation and discord can be understood only in the context of the institutions and regimes that help define the meaning and importance of state action and affect incentives facing states (Keohane 1989: 11). At the root of Wilsonian idealism and tradition of liberal philosophy, international institutions and regimes<sup>13</sup> began to be conceived as possessing a changed condition of materialistic reality, an intensification of interdependence in the international economy.

The neoliberal institutionalists basically argue that even if the neorealists are correct in believing that anarchy constrains the willingness of states to cooperate, nevertheless, states can work together and can do so especially with the assistance of international institutions. Interdependence can create shared values, meanings, rights,

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<sup>13</sup> International regimes are defined as implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue-area (Krasner 1983: 2). Keohane defines institutions as persistent and connected sets of rules that prescribe behavioural roles, constrain activity, and shape expectations (Keohane 1988: 383). In this dissertation, those terms will be given the same meaning here but the concept of international institution will include any substantive organizational entity whereas this will not necessarily be the case with “regime.”



and obligations and within the anarchic condition, interdependence can pave the way for a redefinition of the interests of states in ways that can embrace human interests (Puchala 1981; Crawford 1991; Rosenau 1990). International institutions enhance cooperation by improving the quality of information, reducing transactions costs, facilitating tradeoffs among issue-areas, facilitating enforcement of accords, and enhancing ethical concerns of states (Keohane 1984: 257). Regimes make it more sensible to cooperate by lowering the likelihood of being double-crossed, so they incorporate the norm of reciprocity and delegitimize defection (Axelrod and Keohane 1985: 234-38; Keohane 1984: 77).

Regimes are examples of cooperative behaviour, and facilitate cooperation, but cooperation can take place in the absence of established regimes (Haggard and Simmons 1987: 495). Regimes facilitate the making of substantive agreements by providing a framework of rules, norms, principles, and procedures for negotiation. Regimes are much more important in providing an established negotiating framework (reducing transactions costs) and in helping to coordinate actor expectations (improving the quality and quantity of information available to states). The most important functions of these arrangements are to establish stable mutual expectations about the patterns of behaviour of others and to develop working relationships that will allow the parties to adapt their practices to new situations. International regimes perform the function of reducing uncertainty and risk by linking discrete issues to one another and by improving the quantity and quality of information available to participants. Another means of reducing problems of uncertainty is to increase the quantity and quality of communication. Keohane suggests the possibility that international institutions can help to compensate for eroding hegemony by reducing

organization costs and other transaction costs associated with international negotiations (Keohane 1983: 166). Once established, then, regimes often prove robust when confronted with challenges stemming from changes in the perceived benefits and costs of living up to commitments, the distribution of power among the participants and the overall relationship of the parties (Levy, Young, and Zurn 1995: 290). Cooperation mediated by institutions, however, “may be unattainable because of domestic intransigence, not because of the international system” (Milner 1992: 493).

Neoliberal institutionalism is basically a market oriented theory: on the basis of an analysis of relative prices and cost-benefit calculations, actors decide which regimes to buy into. Despite Grieco and Keohane’s disagreement over whether states are relative or absolute gain calculators (Grieco 1990), in general, states are expected to join those regimes in which, for them, the benefits of membership will outweigh the costs. Neoliberal institutionalism, however, has not covered all the historical issue areas. The cost-benefit exchange of rationality is not enough to explain on its own why international institutions were created in some issue areas rather than in others. Empirical research shows that historically, opportunism and defections produced higher interest rates. Thus, Keohane admits that the neoliberalist approach “leaves open the issue of what kinds of institutions will develop, to whose benefit, and how effective they will be” (Keohane 1988: 388).

From the outside, neoliberal institutionalism has been criticized for not taking into account the impact of social processes of reflection or learning on the preferences of individuals or on the organizations that they direct. Nye argues that regimes may

foster organizational learning by creating or reinforcing institutional memory. “The reason that regimes play a larger role in incremental learning is because they establish standard operating procedures, constrain certain ideologies and reward others, and provide opportunities for contacts and bargaining among leaders” (Nye 1987: 398). More specifically, he posits that “the institutionalization of regimes can, first, change standard operating procedures for national bureaucracies, second, present new coalition opportunities for subnational actors and improved access for third parties, third, change participants’ attitudes through contacts within the framework of institutions, and fourth, provide a means of dissociating changes in a particular issue from the overall political relationship by regular, formal meeting” (Nye 1987: 400-1).

The analysis of neoliberal institutionalism tends to be limited to regional groupings and the Western alliance system. Its predecessor, integration theory and functionalism, were also articulated when the United States, in cooperation with its European allies, was “putting a clearly liberal normative stamp on the international institutions, the nongovernmental networks, and the national political system of the noncommunist world” (Ruggie 1992). On the other hand, while within the Western world there was a growing image of liberal interdependence, outside of that sphere there was an acceptance of *realpolitik* (Zacher and Matthew 1995: 138-9).

### **3.3. *The Problem of Reconciling Agent and Structure***

While neorealism and neoliberalism were becoming more commensurable with the shared rationalist research paradigm using game theory, the reflectivists, as they were called by Keohane, emerged in the mainstream of IR (Keohane 1988: 382). Criticizing the rationalist approach in IR, they initiated metatheoretical debates and identified agent-structure problems in IR.<sup>14</sup> This articulation is fundamentally, ontologically and methodologically different from the rationalist programme, and implies a new theoretical alternative to interpret world politics. Put more generally, all social scientific theories embody, at least, an implicit solution to the agent-structure problem. The reflectivists in IR launched the criticism against solutions of the problem which make either agent or structure the sole ontological primitive, and then attempt to explain the other by reduction to it.

#### **3.3.1. *The Unbearable heaviness of structure***

Singer raised the problem of the levels of analysis in IR. This has to do with determining which level of social arrangements offers the most promise for building theories that explain the behaviour of state actors: the nation state or the international system, and, in subsequent extension of Singer's framework, domestic politics, bureaucratic politics or individual psychology (Singer 1961). The articulation of the reflectivists is slightly different from that of Singer who simply proposed the divided

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<sup>14</sup> Despite many different terms such as agent-structure, parts-wholes, actor-system, and micro-macro, there are imperatives to conceptualize the relationship between social actors and the circumstances that surround them in social science. For this research, the term "agent-structure" which was raised by Wendt in IR (Wendt 1987) has been selected.

dimension of objects for analytical sophistication. According to them, the agent-structure problem contains ontological features which emerge from two noncontentious truths about social life: first, that human agency is the only moving force behind the actions, events, and outcomes of the social world; and second, that human agency can be realized only in concrete historical circumstances that condition the possibilities for action and influence its course (Dessler 1989: 443). These truths impose two demands on our scientific explanations: first, they acknowledge and account for the properties of agents and second, they recognize the causal relevance of structural factors, that is the conditions of action. The agent-structure problem refers to the difficulties of developing a theory that successfully meets both demands. “The problem with all this is that we lack a self-evident way to conceptualize these entities and their relationship” (Wendt 1987: 338).

For Wendt, Waltz’s definition of the structure of the international system is heavily based on the attributes of the agent (state) and the distribution of power. Furthermore, Wendt argues that Waltz’s structure has the function of constraining the agent’s choice rather than generating features of the agent’s action. Thus, Waltz’s way of solving the agent-structure problem is by “situational determinism, by a model of action in which rational behaviour is conditioned or even determined by the structure of choice situations” (Wendt 1987: 342; 1991: 389). In fact, by this theoretical simplification, as Waltz says, neorealism lays bare the essential elements in play and indicates the necessary relations of causation and interdependency (Waltz 1979: 1-13; 1997: 913). However, Waltz’s reduction to structure at the expense of the agent has been central to the critique of the other research paradigm. Because of “utilitarian statism” (Ashly 1984), neorealism fails to provide a basis for developing

an explicit theory of the state (Jervis 1988: 324-5; Wendt 1987: 342; Hollis and Smith 1990; Dessler 1989) and retards the development of a cumulative research paradigm focused on domestic politics in IR (Milner 1998: 766-7).

### **3.3.2. The Approach of Constructivism: the third way, possibility and limit**

A structural approach then suffers from an inability to identify adequately the nature and sources of interests and preferences because these are unlikely to derive solely from the structure of the system. Therefore a theoretical framework is needed which will explain interests and preferences. Constructivism posits that there is a mutually causal relationship between general values or regimes on the one hand, and the nature of actors and their interests on the other hand (Ruggie and Kratochwil 1986; Wendt 1987, 1992a; Kratochwil 1989; Onuf 1989). It seeks to identify the common norms, principles and knowledge that orient action across states and shape actor preferences themselves. Constructivists argue that the epistemological position of the regimes of the neoliberals, positivistic in orientation, fundamentally contradicts the ontology. Because “international regimes are commonly defined as social institutions around which expectations converge in international issue-areas,” convergent expectation recognizes their constitutive basis as “an inescapable and intersubjective quality.” Hence, “the ontology of regimes rests upon a strong element of intersubjectivity” (Kratochwil and Ruggie 1986: 764; Dunne 1995: 380). John Ruggie makes this point in his critique of neorealism, that it ignores changes in the values or intersubjective understandings that distinguish international systems by analyzing the transition from the medieval to the modern international system. According to him, the shift from the medieval to the modern international system,

implying a fundamental change from a “heteronomous” institutional framework to an international system defined in terms of “sovereignty,” constituted nothing less than a fundamental redefinition of the nature and power of the actors in this system (Ruggie 1986: 141-6). The state gained its present currency only as a consequence of this institutional revolution of the international system. It is a recognition of both the historically contingent and mutually constitutive nature of the agent-structure issue in state-to-state interactions.

Constructivism maintains that the world is socially constructed by human practice, and seeks to explain how this construction takes place by stressing the importance of intersubjective meanings and understandings and the interaction between agent and structure (Powell 1994: 322). As recognizable patterns of rules and related practices, institutions make people into agents and constitute an environment within which agents conduct themselves rationally. We more commonly think of agents as operating in an institutional context that gives them at least some opportunities for choice. Any stable pattern of rules, institutions, and unintended consequences gives society a structure, recognizable as such to any observer.

Regimes and the balance of power in international relations are both regarded as “rules and related practices” (Onuf 1989: 70; 1997: 7-17). The norm is the keyword for constructivist explanation of the transactional phenomenon of world politics. The norm is defined as “the collective expectations for the proper behaviour of actors with a given identity” (Katzenstein 1996: 5). The norm is more ideational than material. Identity is incalculable and goes beyond the neo-utilitarianist’s world. In short, constructivism is about human consciousness and its role in international life (Ruggie,

1998: 856). Norms may be shared, or commonly held, across some distribution of actors in a system. Alternatively, however, norms may not be widely held by actors but may nevertheless be collective features of a system – either by being institutionalized (in procedures, formal rules, or law) or by being prominent in the public discourse of a system. Norms backed by a great power are more likely to become widespread and effective than otherwise similar norms, originating in a small country (Katzenstein 1996: 490-1; Onuf 1989: 70). Norms create patterns of behaviour in accordance with their prescription and can be articulated in discourse because they are “intersubjective and collectively held” (Finnemore 1996a: 22-4).

The constructivists argue that international society should be regarded not as anarchy but as “imagined society.” Through intersubjective understanding and practices of norms, agents (states) and structures are mutually constituted, whereas constructivism treats identity as an empirical question to be theorized within an historical context (Hopf 1998; Wendt 1992a). Thus, from a constructivist perspective, international structure is determined by the international distribution of ideas. Shared ideas, expectations, and beliefs about appropriate behaviour are what provide the world structure, order, and stability. In ideational international structure, idea shifts and norm shifts are the main vehicles for system transformation (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 894).

Constructivists have succeeded in broadening the theoretical contours of IR. By exploring the issues of identity and interest bracketed together by neoliberalism and neorealism, they have demonstrated that their sociological approach leads to new and meaningful interpretations of international politics. Moreover, they are set to rescue



the exploration of identity from postmodernism's deconstruction of IR theory. Nevertheless, constructivism lacks a theory of agency. Risse-Kappen argues that "ideas do not float freely" and they must be mediated (Risse-Kappen 1994). Constructivism overemphasizes the role of social structures like norms at expense of the agents who help create and change them in the first place. Checkel argues that "without more sustained attention to agency, these scholars will find themselves unable to explain where their powerful social structures (norms) come from in the first place and, equally important, why and how they change over time" (Checkel 1998: 325). Without a theory of agents, especially at the domestic level, constructivists will not be able to explain in a systematic way how social construction actually occurs or why it varies across nations.<sup>15</sup> In this sense, constructivism lacks the point that norms are sometimes created and evolved among states which seek national interests within structural constraints like a balance of power. Norms themselves can be formed and developed in close relationship with rational calculation, as neoliberal institutionalists stress in the name of "regime."

More sophisticated research is needed to find out under what conditions norms can be operated and facilitated in both the structural and agential process. A more extended view of norm could allow the analysis to reach strategic interaction among states within regimes and might shed more light on China's engagement process in international security regime and how China has redefined her identity since reform policy was launched. Variation and changes in state identity affect the national security interests and policies of a state. The configuration of a state's identity affects

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<sup>15</sup> Exceptionally, for Wendt, the state is still the unit for analysis. Wendt hopes to construct an identity and interest formation theory with the states' interaction (Wendt 1994, 1999).

interstate normative structures like security regimes or security communities. Henceforth, as Desch argued, constructivism may not offer general theories of all state behaviours but may suggest theories for a particular state's foreign policy behaviour over time (Desch 1998: 155).

### **3.4. *Theoretical Framework: The Dynamic of State and Institution***

#### **3.4.1. Resuscitating the state**

Many IR scholars have identified deficiencies in both the neorealist and constructivist approaches in explaining the mechanism whereby engagement in international institutions influences the internal policymaking practices of states and the internationalization of states (Cox 1986; Gourevitch 1978; Putnam 1988). Milner suggested that there are three reasons why a consideration of domestic politics is important in this context. Firstly, it elucidates how preferences are aggregated and national interests constructed. Secondly, it explains the strategies states adopt to realize their goals. Thirdly, it traces the process of domestic ratification that governments face after cooperative agreements (Milner 1992: 493).

For many purposes it may be appropriate to develop a level of analysis for variables that fit between structural and agential characteristics. The problem is how to find the linkage, which stands basically between structural force and agential

characteristics. Haas suggests that “transnational epistemic communities” reshape their state’s definition of national interest (Haas 1992). An epistemic community is “a network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain and issue-area” (Haas 1992: 3). He identifies a transnational epistemic community and argues that it works through the domestic political arena to change national preferences enabling greater compliance with internationally agreed practices.

Like Haas, Putnam tries to revitalize the state as agent in another direction. For Putnam, the politics of many international negotiations can usefully be conceived as a two level game, interpreting the term “state” as “central decision-makers” (Putnam 1988: 430). At the national level, domestic groups pursue their interests by pressuring the government to adopt favourable policies, and politicians seek power by constructing coalitions among those groups. At the international level, national governments seek to maximize their own ability to satisfy domestic pressures, while minimizing the adverse consequences of foreign developments. Neither of the two games can be ignored by “central decision-makers,” so long as their countries remain interdependent, yet sovereign (Putnam 1988: 434). Instead of eliminating the state as an analytical unit, Putnam’s two-level approach recognizes the inevitability of domestic conflict about what the national interest requires. It recognizes that the “central decision-makers” strive to reconcile domestic and international imperatives simultaneously. The implication of this approach is to give weight to the process of the agent’s reaction which constitutes structure. Through this process, the state could be resuscitated from and relieved of reification of structure.

### 3.4.2. De-neutralizing the Institution

Carr emphasized that “theories of social morality are always the product of a dominant group which identifies itself with the community as a whole” (Carr 1981: 74). Certainly, the rationalist approach which operates in neoliberal institutionalism does not completely abandon the power relationship between states: Keohane stated that “hegemonic structures of power, dominated by a single country, are most conducive to the development of strong international regimes, whose rules are relatively precise and well-obeyed” (Keohane 1980: 251). Yet, their assumption that regimes are cooperative, even though benefits might accrue to the coerced actors, ends with the identification of national interests. Their concern stops at the threshold of an institution’s functional efficacy for cooperation. So, they necessarily and unconsciously, neutralize the power relationship and implicitly accept the prevailing order as their own framework (Cox 1986: 230).

Cox criticizes the “unconscious ideology of positivism” because of its pretensions to escape from history, because “it claims to transcend history and propound some universally valid form of knowledge” (Cox 1986: 247). He argues that in a hegemonic order, the dominant power makes certain concessions or compromises to secure the acquiescence of lesser powers to an offer that can be expressed in terms of a general interest. It is important, in appraising a hegemonic order, to know both that it functions mainly by consent in accordance with universalist principles, and that it rests upon a certain structure of power and serves to maintain that structure. Whether Cox’s point is always true or not, he accentuates the power relationship implicitly embedded in world order. In that sense, the neorealists’ claim that international

institutions and regimes are nothing but a reflection of power-seeking products seems straightforward and persuasive, even though obsessed with one power variable and one reified structure of power concept. For the purpose of this thesis, institutions will be regarded as terrains of power-seeking practices de-neutralizing the concept of international institutions and regimes. In part, this conceptualization will be necessary because the Chinese epistemological world works mostly in an orbit of power relationships with a strong passion for modernization after long historical humiliation.

### **3.4.3. The Dynamic of State and Institution**

The discussion of “the agent-structure problem” has illuminated the claims that, at any given moment, agents and structure are the products of continuously constitutive co-determination. The problem is to how to avoid reducing one to the other and to embody satisfactory research in the reality of “duality of structure.”<sup>16</sup> Here an attempt will be made using the concept of the “dynamics of state and institution.”

In one way, the state is still the most important unit to be analyzed in IR, despite the outstanding feature of interdependent world politics and the global economy. Susan Strange senses “the state and national governments as the final determinants of outcomes” and criticizes the “woolly and obfuscated” concept of regime (Strange 1983: 338-51). As she says, underneath “regime,” there are conspicuous actions and

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<sup>16</sup> According to Anthony Giddens, the duality of structure means the essential recursiveness of social life, as constituted in social practices: “structure is both medium and outcome of the reproduction of practices. Structure enters simultaneously into the constitution of the agent and social practices, and exists in the generating moments of this constitution” (Giddens 1979: 5).

bargains between states. On the one hand, sovereign states have their own self-respecting perspective and interest in the decision making process while this perspective and interest would interact dynamically with external arrangements; for example, regimes and international institutions. For analytical purposes, the attributes of the state should be explored first of all in terms of its perception and interest in specific issues. Then, the attributes of the state should be analyzed as they evolve over time not only their codetermination with structure but also their internalization, domestic politicization. Dynamic interaction, the state's internalization of structural pressure and vice versa will be explored with the instrumental linkage of "epistemic community" for instance.

In another way, the sovereign state is continuously conditioned and constrained by external arrangements such as a balance of power, international regimes and institutions. The phenomena have been described by the scholars in IR, as "system effect" (Jervis 1997), "structural causation" (Waltz 1979), and "generative deep structure" (Wendt 1987; Buzan 1993). As pointed out by Keohane, "the way in which leaders of states conceptualize their situations is strongly affected by the institutions of international relations: states not only form the international system, they are also shaped by its conventions, particularly by its practices" (Keohane 1989: 6). The various international institutions or regimes at all times underlie and underwrite state praxis within the international system. A number of questions arise: How do they precondition the policy choice of a state? How do they interact with a state's preferences and interests? How do they impact on domestic politicization? How can an individual state strategically interact with other states within an operating regime?

How should the state's actions be distinguished between regime-bounded action, or power-struggle? How do they constitute a state's interest and identity in the long run?

All these questions must be addressed in conceptualizing the process of dynamic interaction between state and institution. In order to develop a framework for analyzing foreign policy actions in terms of a dynamic account of the ways in which such actions are continually being constrained and enabled by contextually defined structures, and how these in turn are affected by human agency, the practice of viewing foreign policy in terms of separate and distinct actors possessing discrete, divisible, and comparable properties, whose behaviour can be encapsulated inductively in terms of discontinuous event-behaviours proceeding serially in temporal increments must be jettisoned. As Ruggie has written, "the relevant facts for analysis here are institutional facts, and institutional facts inherently are intersubjective facts, not brute or palpable facts, requiring that we probe beyond the palpable here-and-now until we come to see the historicity – the historically contingent subjectivities – of the pertinent social grouping as they see it themselves" (Ruggie 1989: 29). In such a context, history embodies its destiny of not only the extensive periodicity but also its inherently systemic character: the quality that provides structures with their constitutive nature, defining the essentially institutional character of agential understanding (Ashley 1984: 254-61).


Such a synthesis relates to the way of making analytically operational the core assumption that both agents and structures interact reciprocally in determining the foreign policy behaviour of sovereign states. It could lead to a fruitful re-examination of shifts in preferences and interests that emerge from complex interactions between

the operation of international institutions and the processes of domestic politics. Both Waltz’s “second image” and Gourevitch’s “second image reversed” need to be taken account of, in different ways (Waltz 1979; Gourevitch 1978).


Figure 3.1. demonstrates the distinctive world view that the IR approaches and the “dynamic of state and institution” present.

**Figure 3.1. Different images of IR Theories**

**Neorealist Approach**




**Neoliberalist Approach**





## Dynamics of State and Institution (or Regime)

History of Institution or Regime: Constitutive Process in time  $tn$  (process 1)



Neorealists see the world as consisting of states (agents) and system (structure). The distribution of power among states constitutes a system, which plays a determinant role in constraining state action or behaviour. Thus, states (agents) are seriously under the influence of system (structure) and the states' behaviour and choices are basically constrained by the previously given "structure." This paradigm provides a research option for illuminating the structural constraint that states face and prescribes the state policy and behaviour. There is no room for international institutions or regimes (another agent or structure) to be allowed to play a constitutive role in world politics. The system is constant and always anarchic. It is not given any momentum to change, as Ruggie criticized. Regarding the question of how and why China entered into international ACD regimes, such as NPT and CTBT, the neorealists would view China's engagement with the lens of economically rational behaviour under the constraints of system. In their eyes, China is using these

international organizations to maximize its global status and access to multilateral aid, information, and technology while minimizing sovereignty-restricting conditions. The broad point here is not China's normative conversion to a functional approach to world order but its discovery in the post-Mao era of the new self-serving truth, that international organizations can be transformed into positive enabling and empowering instruments in the service of Chinese national interests.

Unlike the neorealist approach, the neoliberalist approach recognizes the increasingly important role of regimes and institutions in highly interdependent world politics. Incentives to cooperation, such as gaining information and obliterating uncertainty, make states converge on the expected procedures of praxis, which draw states' cooperation and make the system not just competitive but cooperative in a given condition. Despite the consistently untransformative anarchic system, the neoliberalist approach makes efforts to find the condition in which states cooperate with each other based on utilitarian cost-benefit calculation, rationalism. Thus, by the distribution of ideas (rationalist calculation), states can reduce the uncertainty and competitiveness that anarchy brings. The continuously patterned procedures of praxis (norm or regimes) further facilitate cooperation.

The neoliberalist approach could divide its focus into two directions, domestic and international. Those who focus on domestic institutions could argue that China's joining international ACD institutions and regimes resulted from the independent and strategic interaction between domestic actors with various interests. The main task of this research is to highlight and characterize this interaction and its strength is that it illuminates the preferences of the actors. A state (an agent) is no more seen as a

passive actor constrained by the international system (structure). Foreign policy in this approach is now a result of the explicit aggregation of diverse domestic preferences within political institutions, and the collective systemic outcome is a function of the explicit strategic interaction among these groups. Those who have more concern with the independent life of regimes or international institutions are interested in their influencing effect on state's behaviour. International regimes and institutions would create a readjustment of China's interest by providing information and other benefits. The realization of "market failure" would be assumed by Chinese calculation and readjusted behaviour can be examined in the context of regimes' feasibility.


"Dynamic of state and institution" (or regime) presents a co-constitutive effect on both agent (state) and structure (institution or regime) on a time-sequence axis in order to reconcile the problem of agent and structure. Avoiding reducing one to the other, each actor (state and regime) has its own individual structural development in the process, while the system (whole structure) itself also evolves during the process. As figure 3.1. demonstrates, dynamic interaction provides state and regime with constitutive momentum. During the interactive process, *state t1* changes into *state t2* (*process 1*), meanwhile the *regime t1* developed into *regime t2* (*process 2*). *Process 3* concerns the entire evolutionary process of system (whole structure) transformation. *System tn* is the result of dynamic interaction between *state tn* and *regime tn*, and symbolizes the complete convergence among interest and identity of *state tn*.

In this theoretical framework, it is useful to rethink the achievements that the constructivists exploited. The constructivist approach assumes that the given system

(structure) is not immortal. It is transformed by the interaction of state (agent) and system (structure). The international system is unceasingly changing under the condition that the interaction constitutes both state (agent) and system (structure). Ruggie and Wendt are interested in reconstructing the *process 3* in IR history. As explored in the previous section, Ruggie captured the concept of “sovereignty”, as the constitutive norm in modern state history and tracked down its historicity, which has been a key element of modern states in forming international system. For Wendt, whether a system is conflictual or peaceful is a function not of anarchy and power but of the shared culture created through cultural instantiation that the interaction constitutes. Anarchy has no determinant logic, only one of embodiments of cultural instantiations. States can reshape structure by process and they can reconstitute interests and identities toward more other-regarding and peaceful means and ends (Wendt 1992b). In other words, the constructivist approach added a time variable, by which process states reshape structure in history. Anarchy, the concept of the neorealist, is just a historical product that states created. But, by extending shared culture, and intersubjective meaning, such as norms, beliefs, and values, states can converge on homogeneous identity that reconstitutes a new structure, no more anarchic in nature. Finnemore is much concerned about norm or regime itself (*process 1*). Thus, the condition in which certain norms can animate their development is more concerned by Finnemore (Finnemore 1996a; 1996b). In sum, the constructivist approach counters that structural realism misses what is often a more determinant factor, namely the “intersubjectively shared ideas” that shape behaviour by constituting the identities and interests of agents (Copeland 2000: 187).

As far as this research is concerned, *process 2* will be the main domain of the theoretical framework, the dynamic of state and institution (or regime). In other words, China's dynamic interaction with international ACD regimes will be presented by way of illuminating distinctive developments (socialization) of *state t<sub>2</sub>* (China in the post-CTBT period) from *state t<sub>1</sub>* (China in the pre-CTBT) and. Figure 3.2. indicates this process.

**Figure 3.2. Dynamic interaction of China and International ACD regimes**



China's interaction with international arrangements will be construed in terms of an intersubjective and constitutive process. The distinction between *China t<sub>1</sub>* and *China t<sub>2</sub>* will be presented on the bases of two different parameters, perspective and domestic institutions. The framework assumes that the dynamic interaction between *China t<sub>1</sub>* and international ACD arrangements would reconstitute *China t<sub>2</sub>*, which acquires a constitutive feature by the interaction and will be presumably assessed by its degree of development in perspective and domestic institutions. The first main focus of the research will be China's internalization of norms and rules and the learning effect through interaction with international ACD arrangements (Chapter 4). Norms and rules will be handled as a mediator to create China's interest and identity

as a result of China's participation in the international ACD frameworks (a nuclear test ban norm in the case of the CTBT).

The second wave of the constitutive process is its impact on the domestic institutions (Chapter 5). The institutionalists, rationalist and constructivist, argue that the strength of a norm is a function of its level of "institutionalization," which means the embedding of the norm's tenets in the state's constitutional, regulative, or judicial system (Cortell and Davis 2000: 67-8). Development of domestic institutions is an institutional embodiment of a certain norm in an internal process and it gives consistent procedures of norm-bounding praxis, which conditions access to the policy-making process.

Agents (states) and structure (institutions) are the products of continuously constitutive co-determination. The measurement of the distinction between *China t1* and *China t2* will involve investigation of changes in the national discourse (*perspective t2*), the states' institutions (*domestic institution t2*) and state policies in ACD arrangements in the post-CTBT period as the research is concerned (chapter 8). This framework will lead to a better understanding of the domestic base of support for international institutions, a significant weakness of existing neoliberalist regime theory. This framework will also meet the requirement of an "external/domestic linkage" approach explored in the previous chapter.

In sum, the "dynamic interaction of state and institution" has been provided to reconcile the problem of agent and structure discussed in metatheoretical debates in IR. Agents and structure are the products of continuously constitutive co-

determination, avoiding reducing one to another. The constitutive effects on the state by the dynamic interaction are recognizable when the state is resuscitated by way of developing a level of analysis in domestic norm-internalization process. The research divides the internalization process into the perspective level and the institution level. The state transforms itself by this process of the dynamism. At both levels, the constitutive effects on China will be tracked down and discussed as a result of the dynamic interaction with international institution (the CTBT).

Identifying the constitutive effects on the state enables us to recognize the socialization that the “dynamic interaction of state and institution” brought in. The task substantiates the socialization effects in a specific and historical context, which the “dynamism” operates in. Thus the theoretical framework of “dynamic interaction of state and institution” provides a model of socialization process through which a state transforms its interests, preferences and identity after all.

In the research, the way of treating the international institutions and regimes is distinguished from both the neoliberalism and the constructivism, which identify the norm as a variable to explain international relations. The international institutions are an environment not only in which socialization takes place but also in which strategic interaction among states competes. By de-neutralizing international institutions and regimes, the research will keep the state (China) an analytic unit to find its strategic interests and preferences. That also helps identify China’s reaction objectively over and against the view that China is a passive actor constrained by the external factors. From the next chapter, Chinese volition will be discussed as a consequence of dynamic interaction with the international ACD institutions.

## **CHAPTER 4. Evolution and Differentiation: the Chinese perspectives on ACD**

*If self-interest is not sustained by practice, it will die out (Alexander Wendt 1999: 369).*

*Preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is in China's interest (Li Peng, a statement during a visit to Japan in 1991).*

### **4.1. Introduction**

A study of perceptions becomes important because people in the same situation behave differently (Jervis 1976). The problem of causal linkages between perceptions and actual behaviour has been an interesting topic. For example, why do Chinese leaders see events differently from leaders of other states? What are the determinants of their distinctive perceptions? Ng-Quinn confines himself to a discussion of three specific variables as possible determinants of Chinese perceptions: culture, ideology and idiosyncrasy (Ng-Quinn 1983: 206). Wang Fei-Ling also gives determining credit to a perspective level, “intentions” rather than “capacities” in characterizing China’s emergence. He criticizes western scholars’ China threat theory and their inaccuracies in estimating Chinese power and its impact, which was arguably caused by “western analysts’ epistemological limits or their evil intentions of manipulating world opinion and hurting China” (Wang Fei-Ling 1999: 22-7). Whether his point is right or not, he regards the intentions of the rising power as the main factor that determines whether the rising power is challenging and able to be accommodated or disastrous.



Chinese international behaviour suggests that security calculations remain an inherent force in the minds of Chinese foreign policy decision-makers. “A siege mentality” in the PRC government has demonstrated a profound concern bordering on a strong sense of insecurity (Shambaugh 1994b). Thus it is true that many scholars argue that Chinese leaders, officials, and foreign policy institute analysts still view the world in largely balance-of-power, *realpolitik* terms. They have an innate belief that the history of international relations consists of repetitive cycles of rising and falling hegemons. This orientation underlies China’s foreign policy and military strategy in general and its nuclear weapons programme in particular. There is also widespread support in China for the view that the development of a strong military capability, including substantial nuclear forces, will enhance China’s comprehensive national strength, thus enabling China to assume its rightful place as a great power. However, given the process of reform and open-door policy in the last decades, China has increasingly become a part of a larger world that provides opportunities for, as well as constraints on, its policy options. Chinese policy-makers have become more and more sensitive to China’s position in the changing international environment, as China has taken part in more and more multilateral frameworks. The end of the Cold War has also left China room for greater international assertiveness by enhancing China’s external security.

This chapter will examine the Chinese perspective on the international ACD and its agenda. Since China joined the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1992, the way the Chinese think and assess this new field has significantly evolved. In fact, the multilateral ACD frameworks have functioned as an interacting point between China

and international community in the security area. The development of the Chinese ACD perspective has been interwoven with the development of Chinese cooperative security arguments justifying increased participation in ACD. It is evident that a range of the perspectives exists among military and civilian leaders and analysts (Glaser 1993; Johnston, 1996; Shambaugh 1999a). The ingrained realist approach is rejected by a growing body of Chinese experts that view the world as increasingly interdependent in both economic and security terms.

Thus, identifying China's new perception of "interdependence" becomes increasingly important because it is the necessary first step to analyze China's ACD policy. As have seen in Chapter 2, previous works lack a systematic evaluation of the evolution of the Chinese ACD perspectives during the last decade. This chapter will also explore three different but interrelated dimensions of the Chinese perspective, national interest, military doctrine and multilateralism. China's ACD perspectives are rooted in and influenced by the shift in these basic mindsets. However, although these perspectives are apparent in numerous articles and interviews, it is difficult to recognize any influence on the Chinese leadership and policy-making process. It is also difficult to recognize that international norms and rules might influence the beliefs and behaviour of domestic actors. Instead, this chapter will demonstrate the significant change in Chinese discourse on the international ACD and the related three dimensions which was fostered by entanglement with international ACD institutions.

## **4.2. Growing New Paradigm of Chinese perspective**

### **4.2.1. Debate over Interdependence: nationalism versus internationalism**

For the last two decades, the practice of an open-door policy for economic development necessarily brought with it interdependence with the outside world. This interdependent phenomenon became one of the most controversial subjects not only for outside observers but also for the Chinese leadership. The following Chinese official pronouncement shows their wariness over the encroachment of external powers and indicates their fundamental attitude about “interdependence.”

Historical experience tells us that to ensure the security of all countries, apart from disarmament and arms control, what is more important is that the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of a country should be respected and maintained, in particular that the big, rich and strong countries should respect the independence and sovereignty of the small, weak and poor ones, and that all acts of hegemonism, aggression and expansion in whatever form should be opposed and prevented. This is the key to and a prerequisite for ensuring regional security (Qian Qichen, Chinese foreign minister at the UN Conference on Disarmament and Security Issues in the Asia-Pacific Region in Shanghai on August 17, 1992, *Beijing Review* Aug.31-Sep.6 1992).

For the Chinese leadership, immutable state sovereignty and strict non-interference is the abiding norm in implementing foreign affairs. This sensitivity to external influence and a Westphalian definition of international affairs has grown out of China’s modern historical and revolutionary experience. A proud Chinese civilization suffered from long historical humiliation and colonialism. Mao’s revolution was intended to restore China’s dignity and its rightful place in the world

by unifying the territory of greater China, expelling neocolonial influences and transforming China into a modern socialist country (Shambaugh 1992: 92). Therefore, the concept of “interdependence” was regarded as western encroachment on Chinese sovereignty or a Western strategy of “peaceful evolution” to subvert communist rule until the early 1990s. But subsequent events in the late 1980s and early 1990s, such as the Tiananmen Incident, the disintegration of the Soviet bloc, the resultant end of the Cold War and the Gulf War seriously called into question at least some of the underpinnings of this way of thinking. The new era of multilateralism and cooperation in international affairs has been assumed since then. As the 1990s proceeded, the terms of “interdependence,” and “multipolarity” became increasingly frequent in Chinese discourse.

Huan Xiang, the former director of the Centre for International Studies, defines the current era as an age of “peace and development,” originally formulated by Deng Xiaoping. He characterizes contemporary international relations as a cycle of competition-conflict-cooperation and argues that “conflict can not be inescapable but cooperation is more fundamental to avoid greater loss” (Huan Xiang 1987: 33). Jiang Zemin, the president of PRC, made a speech at the Special Commemorative Meeting on the Occasion of the 50<sup>th</sup> Anniversary of the UN. He expressed the view that “countries’ economic interdependence and mutual complementarity of relative advantages have grown all the more obvious as they become increasingly closer in their relations” (*Beijing Review* 6-12 Nov. 1995). He further stated that “the internationalization of economic life requires that all countries conduct extensive exchanges and cooperation in the economic, technological, financial, trade and other fields”. In Chinese IR writings, there is also an identifiably growing recognition of

interdependent reality in the world. Chinese analysts further propose that China should play a more activist international role and assume greater responsibility for global and regional security. They maintain that increased willingness, by many countries, to seek political solutions to regional conflicts demands that China actively participates in the peace process.<sup>17</sup>

Although Chinese analysts have started to recognize the reality of “interdependence,” this does not mean that their neorealist approach can be automatically discarded. Most Chinese analysts are suspicious of “interdependence.” They doubt the nature of the interdependence phenomenon and maintain that “interdependence” can accentuate interstate conflict by trampling on the sovereignty of nation-states, by preventing them from controlling their economic, military, and political resources, and by providing opportunities for states to interfere in the internal affairs of others. The reality is that systemic anarchy renders all interdependence asymmetric, and asymmetric relationships are essentially zero-sum power struggles (Zhao Huaipu and Lu Yang 1993: 36). It is wrong to stress only peace, cooperation and mutual interest, which discard various conflicts and collisions in international relations. The seriousness and complicity of various conflicts and competition cannot be underestimated. Cooperation alone cannot solve the problem of anti-hegemonism and power politics. In spite of today’s deepening interdependence, power politics still exists. Hegemonism cannot vanish in this stage of history and international conflicts cannot be extinguished in a day (Zhao Yi 1996: 17-9).

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<sup>17</sup> These liberal views that concern “interdependence” or “globalization” are Wang Yizhou (1995), Zhu Wenli (1996), Wang Jisi (1995), Yan Xuetong (1993), and Li Shenchi (1994).

Nonetheless, the growing legitimacy of “interdependence” in the age of globalization has generated a powerful compliance pull, undermining the validity of Chinese *realpolitik* views. In the late 1990s, Chinese debates over interdependence evolved into the concept of “globalization.” Trying to interpret a newly emerging globalization phenomenon, Chinese arguments have been refined and have converged into the concept of the “complexity (*fuzahua*)” of international relations. In some sense, the term, “complexity,” reflects their controversial dichotomy (Song Yimin 1999; Wang Hu 2000). The dilemma of “interdependence,” in other words, reconciling external encroachment and state sovereignty is posing a challenge for Chinese intellectuals. Observers describe the two contradictory Chinese intellectual tendencies as a dichotomy; internationalism & nationalism (Gurtov and Hwang 1998), continentalist & maritime (“browns and blues”, Yahuda 1997) and globalism & nationalism (Hughes 1997). For example, Gurtov and Hwang offer a distinction between the Chinese perspectives, internationalism and nationalism (Gurtov and Hwang 1998: 7-8).<sup>18</sup>

The multipolarization of world political economy, the regionalization of economic growth, and especially the distribution of scientific and technological power are considered central issues in China’s ability to achieve peace and development. For Chinese internationalists, those issues make it impossible to secure China with military capabilities alone, since economic and technological forces will profoundly shape the PRC’s ability to catch up with the top-ranked industrialized states

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<sup>18</sup> Gurtov and Hwang are indifferent to the distinction between concepts of “Chinese nationalism.” In fact, there are various concepts of “Chinese nationalism,” positively defined, such as “affirmative nationalism” (Whiting 1995), “confident nationalism” (Oksenberg 1986) and “pragmatic nationalism” (Wang Jisi 1994). Gurtov and Hwang’s nationalism is more generally xenophobic in nature, the same as “assertive nationalism” distinguished by Whiting (Whiting 1995: 295-316).

eventually. Internationalists stress the need for “comprehensive security” (*zonghe anchuan*) or “comprehensive national strength” (*zonghe guoli*), which emphasized the non-military dimensions of national power. Such a perspective puts a premium on international cooperation such as through diplomacy, trade, and technology transfers, to provide the “quiescent international environment” that is conducive to China’s modernization. To the extent that Chinese foreign-policy makers are able to demonstrate the usefulness of relying on global interdependence to modernize China, they are more likely to gain domestic support for abiding by international agreements and norms – provided that China is party to the making of the rules. Such seemed to be the case during most of the 1980s when the internationalists, led by Deng Xiaoping, pursued modernization at the expense of China’s military budget and manpower, China began to show some interest in multilateral arms control, reflecting the new belief, which was formalized by its joining the NPT, which prevents the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. On the other hand, nationalists centred in the defence establishment headed by the CMC (Central Military Committee), apply narrower national interest calculations to security issues. Nationalists see themselves as the guardians of Chinese patriotism; protecting China’s national identity and upholding its sovereignty within China’s overall strategic objective of making the international arena safe for socialist development and restoring China’s rightful place in the world. They sometimes disparage the workings of diplomacy and maintain the readiness to use force to meet the new kinds of security problems China confronts.

The interplay of the two tendencies makes Chinese security and foreign policy more complicated and less predictable. It is accompanied by the politicization of bureaucratic interests, which has been fostered by the process of economic

development. Nonetheless, China's increasing enmeshment in multilateral institutions has facilitated information exchange and social learning. This trend becomes more and more evident in the experts' perspectives (chapter 4.4.), domestic institutions (chapter 5), and participation in international institutions (chapters 6 and 7). The growing prevalence of the "interdependence" discourse demonstrates that those views are gaining some legitimacy in the Chinese conception of the world, facilitating at least tactical even if not cognitive learning. The following sections will examine those discourses.

#### **4.2.2. Reassessment of the New Security Environment**

The international security and military policy of China has three major goals. In order of priority these are: (1) maintenance of internal political stability; (2) maintenance of external security against invasion or encroachment; (3) achievement of great power status in the international system, regionally and globally. The end of the Cold War and the collapse of communism in the Soviet bloc created two fundamental challenges for these matters. (1) how to maintain their legitimacy when confidence in Marxism has vanished, and (2) what role to play on the world stage, now that Moscow is no longer an immediate threat and the United States has emerged as the unipolar superpower. On the first matter, the Chinese leadership seeks to assure the internal security of the existing party-state primarily by fostering economic growth. Jiang Zemin, in his speech at the closing meeting of Fifth Plenary Session of the 14<sup>th</sup> CPC Central Committee in 1995, placed the relationship between reform, development and stability as the first priority in the 12 relationships of the principles of the modernization drive. He stressed that,



practice has shown that by handling properly the relationships between reform, development and stability, we will be able to grasp the overall situation and ensure a smooth economic and social development. ...Development is indispensable in enhancing China's comprehensive strength and improving people's lives, consolidating and improving the socialist system and maintaining stability... (*Beijing Review* 6-12 Nov. 1995).

There is a broad consensus among the Chinese leadership that the current leadership is basing much of its appeal on continued high levels of economic growth (Denoon and Frieman 1996: 422). Economic interests and domestic priorities are playing important roles in transforming China's security agenda, because the Chinese leadership now views them as both the means and ends of national security. National security is now more broadly defined. The objective of national security policy is not just war, peace, and national survival. Military modernization can only be realized by increasing "comprehensive" national strength in which military power is a dependent rather than an independent variable (Hu Weixing 1995: 118-21). While the internal security priority preconditioned the external security, China began to view world peace and development as the main themes of today's world affairs. With the prevalence of pragmatism, the Chinese leadership emphasized that foreign policy must serve domestic priorities and work for China's modernization programmes. The goal of Chinese foreign policy was defined as

to strive for a favourable international environment for China's reforms, opening to the outside world and economic construction (in Jiang Zemin's political report to the 14<sup>th</sup> CCP Congress, *Renmin ribao* 21 Oct. 1992)

This inside-out way of foreign policy thinking provides a totally new foundation for future security policy and defence strategy. For example, in 1985, Deng Xiaoping's strategic changes in the guiding thoughts of national defence constructions and army building abandoned the perception that a world war and massive invasion of China were imminent. China's strategic military began to shift away from preparing for "early, large, and nuclear war" with the Soviet Union. With the breakup of the Soviet Union, China's strategic military concern is changing toward how to deal with regional instabilities and territorial disputes on China's east, southeast and southwest periphery. Furthermore, the new cooperative approach to the resolution of border disputes with neighbour countries in early 1990s demonstrates a redefinition of the main threat to Chinese security in the new international strategy environment. The need for improved relations with neighbours and for a stable regional environment was indispensable since rapid economic development was addressed. The disengagement of the region from superpower rivalry also gave China's leaders the opportunity to develop a regional policy for the first time, and the opportunity was provided by the reluctance of countries within the region to follow the Western lead of imposing sanctions on China in the wake of the Tiananmen crisis (Yahuda 1997: 18).

While this changing view provides a new role and responsibility to participate in international institutions for the sake of economic interests, China's assessment of the post-Cold War era also outlines a foundation for it. According to Chinese official characterization, the international system in the post-Cold War era is in transition from the bipolar structure of international politics to a multipolar world system (*Renmin ribao* 30 July 1991). Suisheng Zhao argues that China's perception of a

multipolar system is an wishful purpose rather than a reality. Because China perceived the multipolar system as its goal, China made efforts to encourage multipolarity (Zhao Suisheng 1992: 71-82). China has found a unipolar reality in the post-Cold War era and has accommodated to it through its foreign policy readjustment. In fact, China suspects that U.S. forces are increasingly deployed against a resurgent China, and there are hardliners in the US government who are trying to manufacture China as a principal threat to replace the Soviet Union and justify some of its nuclear forces against China, with the continued maintenance of troops in Japan and Korea as evidence of an emerging containment strategy against China (Shambaugh 1994b: 7). The fact that China has adjusted its policy priority to the Asia-Pacific region and has taken cooperative actions in international institutions may be interpreted as China's understanding of the need for a regional base and to be an independent but responsible partner in a multipolar world. From this perspective, it may be asserted that China might participate more actively in multilateral frameworks to transform a unipolar reality into a multipolar alternative while making rules at the negotiating table and constructing a new international order.

#### **4.2.3. Redefinition of National Interest**

Exploring Chinese views on national interests provides China's broad assessment of the nature of international relations and the paradigmatic thinking governing its foreign policy. It also provides the basic outline for an ACD policy in the prism of "national interests." How the Chinese leadership defines and redefines its national interest depends on the reordering of the state's internal and external requirements. As Peter Katzenstein argued, cultural and institutional norms shape state identity.

which in turn affects the definition of a state's national security and national interest (Katzenstein 1996: 52-65). Many scholars criticized the Chinese government for its allegedly narrow-minded and backward view, especially on issues concerning human rights and irredentist claims. The Chinese *realpolitik* worldview has little ingrained liberal thinking and maintains that the international system consists essentially of atomistic nation-states locked in a perpetual struggle for power. China's foreign policy is based on an outmoded Westphalian notion of sovereignty in a world where state sovereignty is being eroded and the traditional notion of national interest is being undermined by the unprecedented phenomenon of "interdependence." Nonetheless, it can be said that China's identity is in transition from being a revolutionary power promoting a world ideology, to an Asian power reorienting itself toward regional interests and to a prospective world power participating in multilateral cooperation (Chung Chien-peng 2000: 176).

In the post Mao era, the concept of national interest, which was regarded as the interest of the ruling class, was freed from an ideological perception and reformulated independently. National interests are interpreted as the embodiment of the nation as a whole and their pursuit is the natural and inalienable right of the nation-state. Furthermore, many Chinese scholars argue that national interests are ontologically existent and should be studied with "scientific methods." Deng Xiaoping's major intellectual contribution was his emphasis on national interests as the "highest principle" of resolving problems and governing international relations. Deng was hailed as being single-handedly responsible for shifting China's erstwhile approach in drawing its foreign policy lines according to the social system and ideology to a rightful emphasis on dealing with international relations based on national interests.

Wei Yang stresses that national interests take precedence over everything, since the fierce competition among states for comprehensive national power has been based on the nation state unit since the Cold War (Wei Yang 1997: 1). Xu Wenquan argues that national interest is the precondition of national survival and development. It is a recurring feature of a nation's overall behaviour. Xu explores the several conceptual attributes of national interests: abstraction/ concreteness, universality/particularity, heterogeneity/homogeneity, dynamic/static and class/nationalism. The author concludes that national interest does not equal the interest of the dominant class because national interest represents the common interest of all the people (Xu Wenquan 2000: 34-6).

Viewing international politics as essentially a struggle for power, the Chinese have not found it difficult to acquire the concept of national interest as it is defined in a Westphalian world of modern states. Deng Xiaoping just dispelled the ideological colour that Mao Zedong had painted in the name of "revolution." A Chinese scholar even argues that the Chinese are more accustomed to analyze international relations from the perspective of practical interests than westerners. They are less likely to believe that some spiritual beliefs (values, religions and ideologies) can also be a driving force behind diplomacy. The Chinese see international exchanges more in terms of the motives of interest and their gains-losses (Wang Jisi 1995: 189-90). However, the redefinition of "national interest" implies that "national interest" exists out there to be empirically tested by the modernization process. Because the epistemological foundation of this conceptualization is fundamentally empirical, the guideline of "seeking truth from facts" leaves room for a new argument to be tested. In the 1990s, the realist definition of national interest is coming under increasing

challenge, stemming from emerging new norms prevailing in international society. Responding to them, there are emerging perspectives on national interest, which interpret it in cooperative terms rather than in realist terms. For example, Yan Xuetong argues that Deng Xiaoping's perspective on national interest is different from the narrow chauvinistic national interest of nationalism. According to him, Deng Xiaoping recognized the necessity of interest conflicts among nations. He understood that the way to resolve conflicts is to seek for common things and mutual interests which can lead to cooperation (Yan Xuetong 1994: 31-2).

#### **4.2.4. Reformulation of Military and Nuclear Doctrine<sup>19</sup>**

Military doctrine is an important indicator of military's intention and capabilities. It reflects China's views on global strategy and the nature of war and the military follows these in preparing for war. China's first military doctrine was "people's war" as formulated by Mao Zedong. It was developed through the experience of revolutionary war. The key tenets of the doctrine were the primacy of people over weapons, the strategy of using a weak force against a strong force, the mobilization of the masses to fight a protracted war against invasion, and the multiple roles of the People's Liberation Army (PLA). The Maoist doctrine of the "people's war" was later complemented by Deng's doctrine of the "people's war under modern conditions" (Joffe 1987; Godwin 1987; Li Nan 1997). The revision of the concept depended on three assumptions. First, the military concluded that a future war would

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<sup>19</sup> Scholarship on Chinese military doctrine and security strategy has been hindered by the inaccessibility of authoritative materials. But in recent years some research has been done with the relative flood of military journals and books published by strategists associated with the Academy of Military Sciences, the National Defence University, the General Staff Department, and the Strategic Missile Forces of the PLA. This section relies partly on those achievements of research.

be large-scale and employ sophisticated weapons. Second, the war would inevitably escalate, making China a main battlefield. Finally, at the beginning of the war, the enemy would possess highly technologically advanced arms. The elements of “people’s war” remain and the war would be prolonged and costly, but in the end the people would prevail (Lewis and Xue 1994: 212).

By the late 1980s, with the eroding Soviet bloc and the new regional environment, new thinking emerged concerning military doctrine and modernization related to national economic development. The new Asian-Pacific environment has changed China’s threat perception and helped to form a consensus on the kind of war for which the PLA should prepare in the future. The overall trend in world politics was toward a multipolar system and further diminution of superpower pre-eminence created quite distinct dangers in the future. The growing military strength and relative independence of regional powers in a multipolar world could increase the incidence of local wars. PLA decided to abandon the state of combat readiness for “an early war, an all-out war, and a nuclear war.” The Chinese leadership abandoned the perception that a world war and massive invasion of China are imminent. Instead, to meet the security challenges arising from regional instabilities and territorial disputes, the PLA’s military strategy is now more oriented toward dealing with what is called “*jubu zhanzheng*” (local war) and “*tufa shijian*” (contingencies) around China’s periphery (Hu Weixing 1995: 124).

In early 1986, the Central Military Commission (CMC) decreed that global nuclear war was no longer inevitable. For the foreseeable future, the world scene would be characterized by “limited and regional wars” (Deng Xiaoping’s speech on

April 24, 1986 in *Renmin ribao*, FBIS-CHI-86-144, July 28, 1986 from Jencks 1994: 70). The characteristics of local war are quite different from those “people’s war” traditions. The concept of “people’s war” emphasized protraction, attrition, large land manoeuvres, and the mobilization of the whole society, while local war is associated with speed, surprise, a short duration, and limited scope, which require high quality military training, and a lethality and variability in the weapons used. Only advanced modern weapons can provide the long-range power projection, mobility, rapid reaction, and off-shore manoeuvrability which the PLA needs to meet the challenge of local war. But all these are key weaknesses of the Chinese armed forces, and reasons why the Chinese leaders consider defence modernization in the post-cold war era to be both urgent and necessary. The Gulf war quickly became a lesson for the PLA’s modernization programmes. General Liu Huaqing, China’s most senior officer and the military official responsible for overseeing the technical updating of China’s armed forces, stated in 1993 that the PLA “failed to meet the needs of modern warfare and this is the principal problem with army-building” (*Jiefangjun bao* 6 August 1993 from Godwin 1997: 209-10). This problem would be met, he stated, by the “vigorous” importation of foreign technology and accelerating the modernization of weapons and equipment through improvements in China’s own defence industries and R&D.

Unlike military doctrine, it is striking to see no evidence that nuclear doctrine had been developed and appropriately positioned in military doctrine until the late 1980s (Lin 1988; Lewis and Xue 1988; Lewis and Hua 1992; Johnston 1995b; 1997; Gurtov and Hwang 1998). It was because Chinese strategists were unable to reconcile nuclear weapons with Mao’s doctrine that preferred people’s power over nuclear



weapons. Mao himself and the Chinese leadership evaluated nuclear weapons as a general military and political utility in the face of the nuclear threat by the United States in the Korean War and Soviet military threat in 1960s. In his “On the Ten Great Relationships,” Mao said that China

does not need more airplanes and cannon but needs atomic bombs. If we are not to be bullied in this world, we cannot do without the bomb (Wang Xiaohua and Wang Wei 1999: 20).

Nuclear weapons had been regarded as improving both China’s influence and status in international politics, as well as its ability to deter the US and Soviet threat. As a result, the ballistic missile and nuclear weapons programme has been a top priority of the state scientific technology, and military bureaucracies, which, according to the CIA, consumed about two-thirds of military R&D funds through the late 1970s (Johnston 1995b: 8). Lewis and Xue argue that Mao’s stress on “people’s war” “seemed immutable and increasingly unrelated to China’s actual defence program.” They demonstrated that Chinese defence programme from 1955 to the 1970s rigidly adhered to Mao’s earlier aspiration for the atomic bomb (Lewis and Xue 1994: 217). Henceforth, neither the government statements nor articles by Chinese military strategists discussed China’s nuclear deterrence theories after its first nuclear experiment in 1964. Lewis and Hua argued that technology rather than nuclear strategy determined the direction and pace of China’s nuclear weapons development programme (Lewis and Hua 1992: 19-20).

Traditionally, Chinese analysts denied nuclear deterrence strategy. They criticized it by saying that it aggravated the US-Soviet relationship, caused the nuclear

arms race and increased tension during the Cold War. For example, Chen Peiyao regarded nuclear deterrence strategy as an actual factor in power politics and hegemonism which had been unfavourable to the multilateral development of international politics and harmful to the independence and the equality of the security system (Chen Peiyao 1987: 44). From the late 1980s, Chinese strategists increasingly accepted and used the concept of “deterrence” to characterize the mission of Chinese nuclear forces. “To construct deterrent power, it is necessary to study deterrence theory” (Chen Weimin 1989: 47). Some analysts introduced western deterrence theory in order to enlarge recognition of the concept of nuclear deterrence in China’s nuclear strategy. Li Zhengxin accepts that nuclear deterrence has definitely played a positive role in international relations. According to him, however, this operation is not necessarily the subjective intention of the nuclear superpowers (Li Zhengxin 1990b: 55). Chinese analysts refined descriptions of China’s deterrent strategy, variously calling it “defensive,” “counterattack,” “minimum,” and “limited.”<sup>20</sup> Chinese strategists argue that China’s nuclear strategy is defensive and limited in nature and offers minimum nuclear retaliation against the first strike. After exploring the nuclear strategy of the US and the Soviet, Wu Zhan stresses that China has always pursued a policy of minimum nuclear security. “China’s nuclear capacity is similar to that of Britain and France in that it is for defence,” and the number of nuclear weapons are small. He justifies China’s possession of nuclear weapons for breaking the superpowers’ nuclear monopoly, protecting its own independence and security, and preserving world peace. He concludes that Chinese nuclear strategy can be called

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<sup>20</sup> ‘Minimum deterrence’ means that a small number of warheads sufficient to inflict unacceptable damage on a handful of enemy cities constitute a credible deterrent. Meanwhile, the term, ‘limited deterrence,’ which appeared in 1987, stands between two extremes, minimum and maximum. ‘Limited deterrence means having enough capabilities to deter conventional, theatre, and strategic nuclear war, and to control and suppress escalation during a nuclear war (Johnston 1995b: 19).

a kind of deterrence, but it is against hegemonic threat and has no threatening intention (Wu Zhan 1988: 44-9).

Maximum deterrence is denounced as a doctrine for hegemonistic powers because its stress on first strike capability would be inconsistent with China's defensive intentions. However, some Chinese strategists now argue that the minimum deterrence capabilities are in practice too vulnerable to a disarming first strike, and thus have little deterrent value. China "should seek for constructing a nuclear capability with an unlimited nuclear deterrent mindset" which can effectively deter great war intentions (Chen Weimin 1989: 49). Johnston argues that the Chinese debates about nuclear deterrence ironically disclose that there is a large gap between limited nuclear doctrinal arguments and China's present nuclear war-fighting capability. It implicitly suggests that Chinese strategists are not as confident as in the past. The deterrent is frail and more concerted efforts will be needed for military capability (Johnston 1995b: 31-7). Gurtov and Hwang also argue that China's promotion of a No-First-Use (NFU) pledge might be perceived as suggesting Chinese vulnerability, utilizing the NFU to assist its deterrence (Gurtov and Hwang 1998: 125-6).

It is not clear that limited deterrence has been explicitly endorsed by the most senior political and military leaders. In contrast, He Zuoxin claims support for his minimum deterrence view, from numerous specialists in many fields whose views were solicited by the top party leaders (interview with He Zuoxin from Gurtov and Hwang 1998: 125-9). In sum, despite the request of Chinese strategists for nuclear

doctrine revision, nuclear strategic doctrine still remains “minimum deterrence” until the requirements for “limited deterrence” can be met.

### ***4.3. New perspectives on Security Interdependence***

In the 1990s, a “security interdependence” perspective among Chinese analysts became conspicuous. A growing number of Chinese analysts and officials accepted the mutual security notion that one’s own security is more assured only when other states also feel secure. They also started to advocate multilateral collective security as they believed it would enhance China’s national interests. They are still a minority and their views are fundamentally based on, what Yahuda calls, “state enhancing functionalism,” while most Chinese scholars and analysts remain deeply rooted in the realist approach of “balance of power.” “Security interdependence” is nevertheless playing an increasingly important role in China’s national security and foreign policies. The Chinese have come to realize that a self-help approach alone is inadequate as well as politically untenable for ensuring a peaceful and stable international environment in which they can pursue their top national priority of economic development and modernization interdependence (Garrett and Glaser 1995: 76). These perspectives are rapidly growing in Chinese security discourse and influencing Chinese regional security policy and ACD policy. Those perspectives were eventually formalized by the Chinese government in 1997, after the participation in the CTBT, in the name of the “New Security Concept” (NSC, Chapter 8.3.1.). This section explores the logic and implications of nascent Chinese mutual security

discourses, which would be a necessary preliminary for analyzing Chinese perspectives on ACD.

#### **4.3.1. The nascent mutual security perspective**

Chinese security analysts used to take a zero-sum view of alliances and the mutual security concept was unacceptable to Chinese *realpolitik* security thinking. Moreover, Chinese analysts strongly suspected that the alliances involving United States in the Asia-Pacific region, like the US-Japan alliance are aimed at containing China. However, the mutual security concept does present the most systemic and official exposition of the Chinese prescriptive view of how international relations should be conducted and security maintained in parallel with Chinese views that pay more attention to globalization and interdependence in the post-Cold War era. Yan Xuetong, director of the Centre for Foreign Policy studies at the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations, recognizes two different security systems. First, under an individual security system, the individual state's security depends on its own strength. Second, under a collective security system, the security of the individual state is protected by collective security arrangements as well as the state's own defence. He further develops his arguments and distinguishes a collective security system from a military alliance. A collective security system differs from a military alliance in that the former does not target a predetermined third party (Yan Xuetong 2000: 91-110). Tang Tianri's article also demonstrates the interdependent perspective of security. He describes the world as a "global society with high interdependence where one country's security and other countries' interests are

crucially interrelated.” Protecting the common interest of global security is increasingly becoming a universal concord.” (Tang Tianri 1997: 44).

There is growing support in China for the view that cooperative security to reduce mutual threats can provide meaningful complements to self-help measures to enhance Chinese security as well as being politically useful in deflecting criticism of China’s nuclear weapons policies. This nascent “security interdependence” perspective has been influenced in part by the exposure of Chinese nuclear scientists, military strategists, and civilian analysts to Western concepts of arms control through education in the United States and interaction with US scientists and arms control experts (Johnston 1996). The tension between engaging in security interdependence arrangements and relying solely on self-help measures thus lies at the heart of Chinese thinking about, and debates over, nuclear arms control regimes and initiatives. The various and nascent mutual security concepts were merged into and officially formulated as the “New Security Concept” at the post-CTBT era.<sup>21</sup>

#### **4.3.2. Security Multilateralism**

Multilateralism has become a clear trend in the Asia-Pacific region since the end of the Cold War, China actively participated in not only economic but also security related multilateral frameworks. China’s cooperation in the regional multilateral frameworks is a new trend of Chinese foreign policy in 1990s (Hu Weixing 1993; Monteperto and Binnendijk 1997; Shambaugh 1999a; Wang Hongying 2000). Chinese leaders found that it was necessary in order to be an influential and

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<sup>21</sup> The ‘New Security Concept’ will be explored in Chapter 8 as a consequence of China’s CTBT entry.

responsible power while promoting national interest. The Chinese perspective on multilateralism has been derived from indigenous Chinese IR theories. The “*liangge zhenying*” (two camps) in 1950s and the “*fandui di xiu fan*” (opposing imperialism, revisionism and reactionism) were the guiding principles of Chinese foreign policy. Both theories rejected Soviet revisionism and American imperialism. Necessarily, both ideology-oriented policies dismissed the existing phenomenon of multilateralism, so multilateral organizations were defined as instruments for imperialism. There was no legitimate reason for China to participate in them. The “*sange shijie*” (the three world) theory of the 1970s left room for selective and symbolic involvement in international organizations, particularly the United Nations, where third-world countries made up the majority and were increasingly assertive in pursuit of their interests. Substantive multilateralism, however, had no place in any of these three IR theories. Each clearly defined the enemy and prescribed differentiated policies toward various international groups.

It was not until the 1980s, under the framework of “*heping yu fazhan*” (peace and development), that Chinese scholars and policy analysts began to treat multilateralism as a legitimate subject of research. As has been presented in Chapter 4.2.2., the Chinese have frequently emphasized the multipolar nature of the world to counter the US-unipolar world. A Chinese analyst argues the necessity of a new order that would place greater reliance on multilateral cooperation (Liang Shoude 1998: 1-6). Multilateralism is consistent with the multipolar structure of the Asia-Pacific region. Huang Zhengji proposes that “a new multipolar world would be one in which various forces can play a role” and requests that the Third World countries including China should be given full scope in the creation of “a new international political order and a

new international economic order” (Huang Zhengji 1996: 39). Security multilateralism would also enhance mutual understanding and thus promote stability in the region (Xu Yimin 1996: 16-24; Shi Yongmin 1996: 41-7; 1997: 44-9).

The promotion of multilateralism is now seen as consistent with national interests rather than sacrificing national sovereignty. Nonetheless, the Chinese leadership still stresses the independent nature of Chinese foreign policy, whereas it accepts the principles of multilateralism serving the national interest, as they put a great deal of emphasis on the principle of state sovereignty. The difficulty of reconciling the multilateralism and state sovereignty produces China’s gradualism in facilitating multilateral institutions. For example, Jiang Zemin made clear the Chinese position of gradualism on multilateral frameworks and suggested, at the 1993 Seattle Conference of APEC, that China wants to cooperate only in,

an open, flexible and pragmatic forum for economic cooperation and consultation mechanism, rather than a closed, institutionalized economic bloc (*Beijing Review* 19 Nov.-5 Dec 1993).

China insists that regional security arrangements should follow a gradual approach, taking into account the widely diverse situations of the region. Such arrangements should continue to be informal and flexible forums for dialogue and resist the pressure to become institutionalized. Arguing that “oriental” concepts of international order, based on coexistence and opposition to power politics, are more appropriate to regional security than are the western hierarchical system, that problems should be approached from bilateral to multilateral processes. China maintains the attitude toward regional security that regional countries should first



solve their problems bilaterally, and regional security cannot be established until hegemony and power politics are eliminated from the region (Guo Zhenyuan 1994: 20-2). China's reluctance is largely attributable to its suspicion of the United States' dominant role in the region. China actively utilizes multilateralism to counterbalance regional military alliances and to undermine US dominance in the region. In a sense, multilateralism is treated as an instrument to transform old patterns of Asian-Pacific relations to a new one in the post-Cold War era, where the US influence is neutralized.

Although Chinese perceptions still maintain the tactical views of pursuing *realpolitik*, their perceptions are based on a multipolar trend of reality and their writings show an appreciation of underlying norms like the concept of mutual security concept and military transparency. For instance, China's support of ASEAN is partially because the role of ASEAN and the "ASEAN way" reflects "the trend of global multipolarization" (Wang Jianwei 1999: 91). In sum, compared to China's foreign policy before the 1990s, there is no doubt that multilateralism and collective security have increased in legitimacy and gained credit in China's post-Cold War foreign policy thinking and behaviour. Behind the changes are some new understandings of international relations. First, since the late 1980s, Chinese leaders and elites increasingly have accepted the fact that the world in which China exists is characterized by a high degree of interdependence, not just in economic terms but also in security terms. China has realized that it is only natural that a high degree of world interdependence and strategic multipolarity will be accompanied by a new mode of security. In other words, multipolarization and multilateralism are closely linked and

compatible. Attention is being paid more and more to multilateral institutional mechanism by the Chinese ACD experts in particular.

#### ***4.4. Analysis on the Chinese ACD perspectives***

##### **4.4.1. Introduction**

There has been a proliferation of Chinese ACD articles in the last decade, largely as a result of participation in international ACD institutions since 1990s. As the Chinese leadership began to face questions, such as whether to join the NPT or the CTBT, the leadership came to recognize that China would have to participate directly in international arms control regimes and thus would need to develop expertise on the technical and security issues involved. Chinese scientists, diplomats and military analysts were encouraged to go abroad to study ACD issues and become involved in international ACD activities like the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva (CD). Many small ACD groups were established in scientific and military organizations as well as in foreign policy research institutes at the behest of the Chinese leadership (Chapter 5). The new awareness of the impact of ACD on Chinese economic, diplomatic and security interests has developed throughout the 1990s, in which China joined more and more international ACD regimes and institutions.

This section shows that the way that the Chinese perspective on ACD evolved is significantly interrelated with China's engagement in international ACD regimes.

The articles about ACD in the prominent and influential Chinese journals are first examined and their increasing number and pattern will be demonstrated. The contents of Chinese ACD discourse then will be explored in the context of the three IR theories, the neorealist, neoliberalist and constructivist approaches, which have been argued in Chapter 3.

#### **4.4.2. The Patterns of Publishing in Journals: a quantitative analysis**

The development of the Chinese ACD perspective in the 1990s was remarkable. To look for patterns in ACD discourses among Chinese analysts, one could examine journals, which are the most direct measure of the subject itself. The following table compares the distribution of articles' published in the 1980s and 1990s in representative journals in China.<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>22</sup> To investigate Chinese discourses on ACD, three Chinese institutions such as government, academia and military&defence establishments are considered and six prominent and influential journals have been chosen. In the government sector, *International Studies* (*Guoji wenti yanjiu*), a journal of the Institute of International Studies associated with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and *Contemporary International Relations* (*Xiandai guoji guanxi*), a journal of the Institute for Contemporary International Relations associated with the State Council is chosen to examine. The *World Economics and Politics* (*Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi*) and the *American Studies* (*Meiguo yanjiu*) represent Chinese academia, while each journal is published by the sub-institutes, the Institute of World Politics and Economics and the Institute of American Studies respectively, under the Chinese Academy of Social Science. The *Contemporary Military* (*Xiandai junshi*) and the *International Strategic Studies* (*Guoji zhanlue yanjiu*) express Chinese military and defence establishment views on ACD issues. The *Contemporary Military* is published by the China Defence Science and Technology Information Centre (CDSTIC) associated with the Commission of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defence (COSTIND), the most powerful China's Defence establishment institute. *The International Strategic Studies* is published, but not available to the public, by the China Institute of International Strategic Studies which is known to be linked to PLA General Staff Department (GSD) and contains military views in general. An investigation of the whole series of the *International Strategic Studies* proved impossible in China. The journal was collected at the Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security (IFANS) in Korea from 1997 to 2000.

**Table 4.1. Distribution of Chinese ACD articles in 1980s and 1990s**

	International Studies	Contemporary International Relations	World Economics & Politics	American Studies	Contemporary Military	International Strategic Studies	Total
1980s	10	4	8	4	-	-	26
1990s	16	11	17	9	21	13	87

*Note: International Studies* was firstly published by MFA in 1982.

*Contemporary International Relations* was internally circulated until 1985 and openly published from 1986. The internal circulated version is still not open to researchers.

*World Economics & Politics* was internally circulated from 1981 and openly published in July 1987. The internally circulated version (*Shijie jingji yu zhengzhe neican*) is now open to researchers.

*American Studies* was first published in 1987.

*Contemporary Military* was first published in 1992.

*International Strategic Studies* was first published in 1986.

In all six journals for all years investigated (1981-2000), the 1980s account for 26 published articles on ACD issues, while the 1990s account for 87. The great surge of publishing in 1990s indicates China's increasing interest in the international ACD agenda in China's main prominent journals. Certainly, the discrepancy might occur because most journals do not fully cover the whole period in 1980s. However, as the case of *International Studies* and *World Economics & Politics*, covering the whole 1980 period, illustrate the overall increase of ACD issues in Chinese discourses. These journals account for 60 percent and 112.5 percent rate of the increase respectively. Given the fact that international ACD activities substantively began to take place from the late 1980s, a significant increase in Chinese articles in 1990s is very apparent. Table 4.2. shows the evolutionary pattern of Chinese discourse on ACD issues by the year.

**Table 4.2. Annual Distribution of Chinese ACD articles**


	86'	87'	88'	89'	90'	91'	92'	93'	94'	95'	96'	97'	98'	99'	00'	total
International Studies		3	1	1	1		4	2	2	2		1	1	2	2	22
Contemporary International Relations	1	2		1			1	1	1	2	1	1	2		2	15
World Economics&Politics	1	1	3		2	2	4	3	3	2	1		2	1	1	26
American Studies			1	2	1		1		1		1		2	2	2	13
Contemporary Military							3	1	2	2	6	3	1	1	2	21
International Strategic Studies													1	3	5	3
Total	2	6	5	4	4	2	13	7	9	9	9	6	11	11	12	110

*Note:* Three articles in the *International Studies* (83', 85') and *World Economics&Politics* (83') are not calculated in the table.

Chinese writings on ACD issues initially started in the mid-1980s and frequently appeared in those journals in the late 1980s. Given the fact that Chinese journals were much more concerned with bilateral relationship issues like the Sino-Soviet and the Sino-US relationships rather than international topics in general, the ACD issues came to attract Chinese readers, modestly, since then. The reason why the governmental and academic journals seemed to focus more on the ACD issues than the military journals in the early days is not clear. The absence of published numbers in the early years of the military journals (*Contemporary Military* and *International Strategic Studies*) is due to their late launch of publication and the inaccessibility of the materials. In contrast, the gradually increasing numbers of publications in military journals in recent years indicate that the Chinese military is demonstrating more and more interest in the international ACD process. The most dramatic and significant change in the pattern of Chinese ACD discourse is the explosive number of

publications in 1992. China joined the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1992 and the increase in publications (12) in 1992 is explicable by this event. The figure 4.1. demonstrates this vertical increase in Chinese ACD writings in 1992.

**Figure 4.1. Annual Distribution of Chinese ACD articles in Chinese journals**



*IS = International Studies*                      *CIS = Contemporary International Relations*  
*WEP = World Economics&Politics*        *AS = American Studies*  
*CM = Contemporary Military*                *ISS = International Strategic Studies*

More significantly, since 1992, the number of Chinese articles in those journals continues now to increase steadily. In the late 1990s, the number of publications is in double digits. This suggests that the international ACD issues became no longer just propaganda criticizing the superpowers but rather a crucial agenda to be enthusiastically and carefully discussed (chapter 4.4.3.). The quantitative increase in Chinese discourse on international ACD issues, galvanized by China's joining the NPT in 1992, heralded a qualitative shift in the late 1990s. The contents of the Chinese ACD perspective and its development will be explored in the next section.


#### **4.4.3. The Evolution and Diversification of ACD perspective: a qualitative analysis**

All articles appearing in these journals for the last two decades have been sorted into four main categories which characterize the two decades. The categories, as shown in Figure 4.2., are (1) the US-Soviet (Russia) disarmament negotiations; (2) the general trend of international ACD; (3) the analyses of the individual international ACD agenda; (4) the US ACD policy. Although these four categories are rough and some classifications involve difficult judgements, the result is striking enough to indicate the growing pattern of the Chinese ACD discourse. Actually, the most complicated and recurrent problem is to distinguish clearly between category (2) (the general trend of international ACD) and the category (4) (US ACD policy). The strong sense of the realist approach of Chinese analysts usually viewed the international ACD developments in the framework of US ACD policy initiatives. Sometimes, the distinction is unclear. To resolve this problem, categories (2) and (4) have been sorted in terms of article titles and will be discussed separately, although there is a certain overlap in their content. The following figure shows an interesting pattern of the ACD subjects that Chinese analysts have been concerned with in the 1980s and the 1990s.<sup>23</sup>

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<sup>23</sup> Various other topics besides the Chinese ACD articles appear in the journals investigated. The topics of them are arms transfer in the Middle East, international law, Indian nuclear test, the US-China cooperation in the ACD field and etc. Those articles appeared once or twice in the journals.

**Figure 4.2. The Distribution of ACD subjects in Chinese journals, 1981-2000**



Chinese interest to arms control and disarmament (ACD) was sparked by the external factor, the US-Soviet disarmament negotiation, in the 1980s. As observers, Chinese analysts had kept their eyes on the process of the negotiation since the US-Soviet talks of START I. The category of the US-Soviet disarmament negotiations accounted for 73 percent of all the articles investigated in the 1980s. Most articles in the 1980s made an effort to analyze and evaluate the US-Soviet nuclear disarmament talks. In contrast, as the international ACD agenda penetrated China, the general interest in the international ACD rose to become the main topic of concern and accounted for 42 percent in the 1990s. In parallel with this, the category of individual treaty and the US ACD policy also attracted the Chinese analysts while these two subjects accounted for 22 percent and 11 percent respectively. The diversification of the Chinese discourse on the international ACD provided the opportunity for the issues to become internalized in Chinese thinking.



The early Chinese writings can be characterized as the realist approach. They mainly focused on the evaluation of the US-Soviet nuclear disarmament negotiation. Explaining the US-Soviet nuclear cuts in the 1980s under the changed international circumstances, Wu Zhan argued that China might join the talks and discuss the problem in due time given the imbalance of nuclear weapons between China, the US and Russia. He suggested the precondition that, if the US and Russia reduced 90-95 percent of their nuclear weapons, China might join the nuclear disarmament discussion (Wu Zhan 1992: 26-40). Liu Huaqiu assessed the content of the US-Soviet's START I agreement as "relatively big progress" but argued that START still had its defects. It covered only tactical nuclear warheads and the United States and the Soviet still had a huge number of strategic nuclear warheads, 9000 and 7000, respectively, i.e. more than 95 percent of strategic nuclear warheads in the world. Liu Huaqiu accused the US and the Soviet of their unwillingness to abandon the nuclear deterrence strategy for the complete destruction of nuclear weapons (Liu Huaqui 1992: 14-5). Negating the superpowers' nuclear deterrents and demanding complete nuclear disarmament was the main Chinese rhetoric in the early days (Chu Yuansheng 1993: 62-5; Feng Changhong 1993: 48-52). In the Chinese view, hegemonism and power politics are basically underpinned by the nuclear deterrence strategy. Whatever the outcomes of the superpowers' disarmament negotiations, they still have a "very long way to go on the road to complete nuclear disarmament" (Chu Yuansheng 1993: 65).

With the progress of international ACD activities, the Chinese began to understand the inevitability of Chinese participation in ACD. The term "international

disarmament” first appeared in *International Studies* in 1989. The subjectivity of the ACD issues then transcended the span of the superpowers’ interest and turned out to be an objective and universal reality in the Chinese mindsets. Xia Liping overviews the features of ACD after the end of the Cold War and stresses that “international arms control and disarmament have developed into an important stage.” The ACD issues “already exceed the boundary of US-Soviet relations and have become the field of international political and military competition” (Xia Liping 1994: 64-7). The initial but mainstream understanding of the “universal reality” of the ACD issues, however, lingered on its realist approach. The realist approach of the Chinese perspective on the ACD reality understood the international ACD only in the context of the US policy initiative. After the end of the Cold War, the United States made technology transfer and proliferation of nuclear, biological, chemical weapons and missiles critical issues of foreign policy and brought up a “counter-proliferation” policy. Chinese analysts clearly understood the strategic motive behind the US policy change (Tan Han 1992: 24-30; 1993: 18-22; Li Weiguo 1992: 42-7; Wang Ling 1994: 15-7; Zhang Yeliang 1996: 76-93).

Many authors preserved the realist approach even though they accepted that the international ACD trend was necessary and important for the stability of international peace. They criticize the asymmetry of operating regimes among the states. For example, Wang Ling argues that the Clinton administration’s nonproliferation policy after the Cold War brought new contradictory developments between the US and the Third World because of its unfairness and double standards (Wang Ling 1994: 17). Liu Huaqiu also expresses a strong complaint that the defect of the NPT lies in its discriminative nature. On the one hand, the superpowers restrain nuclear weapons

development in the non-nuclear states. On the other hand, the superpowers expand their nuclear arsenals. Liu compares this situation to the saying that “allows government to set a fire and does not allow the people to light a lamp” (Liu Huaqiu 1995: 16).

As a co-authored article put it, the realist approach came to accept that the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction was the key issue of world arms control. They believed that the arms control model has been changed from “traditional US-Soviet competition model to security cooperation model,” which, nonetheless, simply defended the western countries’ national interests. In their view, the main objective of the international ACD was increasingly trying to control the Third World countries (Zhao Jingzeng, Pan Jusheng and Liu Huaqiu 1996: 15-6). Some authors were alerted by the US Theatre Missile Defence (TMD) plan, which it was argued would be an obstacle to other nuclear powers participating in the nuclear disarmament process. Because the Chinese are worried about and strongly critical of the use of TMD for strategic containment of China, the issue of the US TMD/NMD plan frequently appeared in the journals. Ironically, the Chinese analysts denounced the United States on the basis that the nature of the TMD infringes the international norms of the international ACD regimes (Liu Huaqiu and Qin Zhongmin 1993: 1-6; Tan Han 1994: 27-31).

The realist approach was relatively and strongly sustained by the military sector in the late 1990s. Most military analysts consider the international regimes as a tool of the United States which has the primary purpose of “having other countries locked on the curve of nuclear knowledge” (Hu Yumin 1997: 11-8). The US ACD policy is

a “major component of its national security strategy and an important tool” to guarantee the US military superiority and national security interests (Wang Zhenxi and Zhao Xiaozhuo 1998: 31-42).

The common recognition of the “universal reality” of the international ACD regimes created more flexible perspectives on the issues. Rather than perceiving the international ACD regimes as US policy initiatives, they focused more on individual regimes, such as the NPT and the CTBT, in which the Chinese came to sit at the negotiation table. The liberalist approach, a new emergent paradigm, has frequently and carefully posited its views on the Chinese ACD discourse. Xia Liping and Zhang Wuping analyze several factors that led to the proliferation of traditional and nuclear weapons in the Asia-Pacific region. They stressed that the NPT was useful for constraining proliferation (Xia Liping and Zhang Wuping 1991: 50-5). Some authors recognize the problems of global arms transfer and proliferation. Thus, nuclear nonproliferation became one of the most important issues of international society (Wu Peng 1994: 51-5; Xia Liping 1993: 43-6). A Chinese scholar, associated with the Academy of Chinese Social Sciences, divides the nuclear age into three periods. “The most important feature of the third period is the passionate seeking for nuclear weapons and proliferation at the whole global level and this new game rule is not established.” The scholar argues that the nuclear proliferation reality made foreign policy and military strategy change and stresses the necessity of establishing a cooperative way through “institution” and “regime”.

If the willingness and the behaviour of the world countries could afford to manage and actively implement readjustment of the new problem in

international affairs, the establishment of institutions and regimes, a cooperative method of resolving this new periodical nuclear proliferation, will prevent a nuclear clash. Those two achievements interact with each other and can secure prolonged world peace in the next century (Hong Yuan 1995: 63)

China's participation in the international ACD frameworks, like the NPT (1992) and the CTBT (1996), gave the Chinese analysts momentum to rethink the ACD issues inside the regimes. In the mid 1990s, many authors devoted themselves to the analysis of the ongoing negotiations of the ACD agenda such as the CTBT (Wang Ling 1993: 24-6; 1996: 16-9; Zou Yunhua 1994: 5-12), the NPT (Wang Ling 1995: 27-31; Lu Yusheng 1995: 63-8; Tan Han 1995a: 14-7), the CWC (Yu Zhongzhou 1997: 6-10) and the MTCR (Zhang Zuqian 1994: 42-6). The Chinese analysts came to see the international ACD agenda as enhancing China's security as well as global security. The experiences and the rethinking of the international ACD agenda raised a new question about the role which China should play. Wang Ling expressed these needs in her article.

Along with the deep-going and enlarging international arms control and disarmament, the United States and western countries need more and more China's participation and cooperation with more right to speak (Wang Ling 1997: 22).

China's more constructive role in the ACD agenda stems from the following self-examination. Wang Yizhou characterizes the international ACD trends as "still an unfair world." He argues that today's peace and disarmament is a kind of "hegemonic peace" and "forced disarmament," because the western countries, led by the United

States, take a superior position and the developing countries cannot help but passively accept the rules and institutions, which are made and arranged by them. He questions China's long term purpose and responsibility while "we (Chinese) search, adjust and establish our international strategy" in the international ACD (Wang Yizhou 1998: 52-3).

In the late 1990s, there are increasing numbers of the Chinese analysts who stress Chinese "responsibility" and an "active role" in setting the ACD agenda. Gu Guoliang, the present director of the Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament under the CASS, suggests that a "new attitude, positive and active participation in the international arms control and nonproliferation, attracts international praise and enhances the international reputation (of the Chinese)," while he assesses the achievements of the US-China cooperation in the ACD agenda (Gu Guoliang 1999: 12). An author is also concerned about Chinese responsibility for the international ACD agenda. Jia Hao proposes that China keeps the CTBT and nuclear nonproliferation policy and encourages international ratification for the early efficiency of the CTBT despite the United States Congress's failure to ratify the CTBT, as well as the nuclear tests in 1998 by India and Pakistan. This is not only beneficial for China's security and international stability but also for the enhancement of China's status and influence as a responsible power. The author further argues that the moment is a "historical opportunity to take the leadership of responsibility for the global nuclear agenda (Jia Hao 1999b: 18-21).

The evolution of a Chinese perspective on ACD has featured three kinds of approach to the ACD agenda since the first article appeared in *International Studies* in

1983. Two fundamental questions arose about the divergent variables for distinguishing between the three approaches. These were whether the international ACD regimes are acceptable to “us” (Chinese) or not, and, if so, what role “we” (Chinese) can play in those regimes. The first question was the process by which the Chinese came to acknowledge international ACD activities. The early balance-of-power oriented approach (realist approach) that had denied the international regime and its norms found a little different view inside the discourse. For some analysts, the regime and its norms were perceived to be ontologically existent and universal for international peace (liberalist approach). The 1990s’ increasing participation in international ACD frameworks strengthened the belief in the regime and raised the further question of the role of China in the international arena (constructivist approach). Since the late 1990s, the Chinese ACD analysts have tried to seek a more influential and responsible role.

Although Chinese argument has still been challenging the fairness of the rules under the ACD regimes, like the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the shift of perspective embraces the international ACD regimes and norms in general rather than dismissing the regime itself. This is not to say that the constructivist approach has been more conspicuous in the late 1990s than two other approaches. In fact, there are mixed tendencies of those approaches, even in the same author’s article. However, these three approaches have been derivatively and distinctively developed in Chinese ACD discourse in parallel with China’s engagement in multilateral ACD frameworks. Among the Chinese analysts, the constructivist approach is gaining more and more credit in dealing with international ACD issues. For example, even a military analyst regards the proliferation of massive destructive weapons and delivery

missiles as a global problem not just for the US security strategy. He assesses China's role from a state-enhancing perspective.

China was actively unfolding its all-out diplomacy and took arms control and nonproliferation as a key link of the adjusting the relationship between big powers, which in turn enhanced the leverage of China (Hu Yumin 1999a: 17).

Although the constructivist approach is motivated by Chinese "state enhancing functionalism," it can be distinguished from the *realpolitik* approach. The Chinese analysts recognize that the international ACD agenda would serve China's interest. They are also beginning to internalize the international ACD norms, as it has been argued that the Chinese came to see the issue as "an universal reality" for global security. The active participation in rule-making processes is believed by some Chinese ACD experts to create more constitutive condition for China's modernization process. This is combined with the Chinese pragmatism and aspiration to be a responsible power. As the *realpolitik* was embedded in "state enhancing functionalism," likewise, the constructivist approach is being sought by it in response to the international ACD agenda.<sup>24</sup>

Based on an overall reassessment of the world strategic environment, the Chinese leadership has realized that the growing danger of horizontal nuclear proliferation will

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<sup>24</sup> The constructivist approach of Chinese ACD discourse, the term that I use here, is not the same as the one in IR. I use it because some Chinese arguments about ACD issues, first, accept the international ACD norms, second, stress the process and participation in rule-making and, third, are concerned about trying actively to create a momentum in which China might play a role at the international issues. This perspective is similar to the constructivists in IR, in that both lay stress on the constitutive process by action. Interestingly, in China, numerous articles about constructivism have been published and introduced in Chinese IR journals recently.



erode China's security interest. Many Chinese policy analysts have acknowledged that a greater number of nuclear states mean a greater probability of nuclear war. They have also recognized that the pursuit of egalitarianism in international relations is at the expense of world stability and national security. Instead, Chinese analysts are seeking for a more responsible and influential role in the making of rules in the ACD multilateral frameworks. The CTBT was, as a Chinese analyst put it, the first multilateral nuclear arms control treaty negotiation that China participated in.

#### ***4.5. Conclusion: New Ideas, A Dynamic of State and Institutions***

Since ideas, such as values, beliefs, culture and information attracted the IR theorists, their roles and influences in international relations have not been underestimated. Recently, both the neoliberals and the constructivists have employed international norms and made efforts to explain it as a mediating factor, which can glue the relationship with common interests among states. In theoretical IR debates, one of the important questions is how a norm penetrates the boundary of states to become accepted. The framework of the “dynamic of state and institution (regime)” was demonstrated in Chapter 3. As an aggregate of the interaction between states and international institutions (regimes) in a certain time span, the concept of a “dynamic between state and institution” illuminates how the individual state's interest could be influenced and transformed, whether that is evaluated as learning or adjustment, at the moment.

Chapter 4 has shown how the Chinese perspective on the international ACD has diversified and significantly transformed in a more norm-oriented direction. Unlike general skepticism over whether China has learned the international ACD norms cognitively, the Chinese analysts came to understand and believe in the necessity of the nonproliferation regime in the post-Cold War period. The norm-bound belief spreads more and more among the ACD experts once the ACD regimes won “universal reality” which international society approved. This seemingly paradigmatic shift of the Chinese attitude is deeply related to what Yahuda called the “state enhancing functionalism.” When the advocates of the state-centric realist approach realized that they could hardly achieve national interest outside regimes, the Chinese seemed to decide to step into the regime and actively participate. Aspiring to become a responsible and influential power, the Chinese ACD analysts rethought the international ACD field as a cooperative, as well as, a competitive battlefield.

However, there was also some evidence of enthusiastic confidence about the “interdependent security” among the Chinese analysts. Those perspectives were deeply entrenched in the reality of globalization, which inevitably drove China to respond to the external centripetal force of globalization. The Chinese are recognizing, more and more, the importance of the mutual security concept. The “new security concept” exemplified the development of the mutual security concept in the post-CTBT period. It was substantively activated in the bilateral relationship with Russia, the Sino-Russian relationship, which approved the “no-first-use” (NFU). China’s new idea is argued here to have been significantly fostered by its experience of engaging in international ACD frameworks during the last decade.

## **CHAPTER 5. Institutionalization: China's ACD Institution**

*These internal developments are marked by greater openness to change and outside opinion, less ideological rhetoric, the establishment and strengthening of agencies concerned with nonproliferation and arms control, a diffusion of expertise, and more sophisticated and pragmatic assessments and policies (Gill and Medeiros 2000: 82).*

### **5.1. Introduction**

This Chapter explores how Chinese domestic ACD institutions developed and penetrated the inter-agency bargaining process in China and also how the external factors such as regimes or international institutions fostered the domestic institutional structure. The arguments of the “China threat” debates and IR theory questioned whether and how “international institutions or regimes” matter (Chapter 2 and 3). The advocates of institutions and regimes argue that regimes create new interests and preferences, through readjusted calculation of costs and benefits, even for states with opportunistic, prisoner’s dilemma-like payoff preferences. They further argue for the constructivist approach that international institutions can socialize states. Institutions provide new opportunities for experience and help to realize new interests through a complex set of ideational channels including transnational linkages and domestic constituency-building, which, eventually, can transform the state’s identity.

In parallel with the evolution of Chinese ACD perspectives (Chapter 4), there has been an institutionalization of Chinese domestic ACD-related fields in the last decade,

largely as a result of the engagement in the international ACD frameworks. Many small ACD expert groups were established in scientific and military organizations as well as in foreign policy research institutes at the behest of the Chinese leadership, whose interest in ACD issues came to a head in the 1990s with a new awareness of the impact of ACD on Chinese economic, diplomatic, and security interests. The institutional development of China's ACD related section runs parallel with China's participation rates in global ACD institutions (Chapter 6).

China first entered the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva (CD) in 1980. The requirements for participation in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) and related activities led to the creation of domestic institutions, a formal process of policy coordination between these institutions and the growth of ACD experts in the MFA, the PLA and the science and defence establishment.

## ***5.2. Development of Individual Institutions***

Mao's paramount leadership and the dominant role of Zhou Enlai, in Chinese foreign affairs influenced China's foreign and security policy in general and ACD policy in particular in the early years of the PRC. Party and military leader Mao Zedong initiated and dominated almost all of the important foreign and national security policies including the ACD issues. Meanwhile, Zhou Enlai, during his period as a foreign minister, from 1949 to 1976, implemented routine foreign policy. The personal characteristics of the policy-making process, rather than institutional ones,


were the crucially determining factors in the ACD decisions. Moreover, China's self-imposed isolation in global affairs blanked out the interaction with international institutions and the concomitant institutionalization of the associated issue areas. Thus China's development of ACD institutions took place in the post-Mao era.

Many observers distinguish the bureaucratic interests of the MFA from those of the military in foreign and security policy (Swaine 1997; Lu Ning 1997; Gurtov and Hwang 1998; Shambaugh 1999a; Johnston and Evans 1999). The impact of economic development on bureaucracy, especially the ACD associated organs, created different vested interests and put the MFA and military on opposite sides. The MFA favoured a flexible response to the international ACD agenda to facilitate greater cooperation with the western countries on economic and security issues, and to avoid the other countries' protests against the violation of international norms or rules. In contrast, the Chinese military found that dramatic changes in military technology required enhanced Chinese defence spending. Facing cuts in the military budget since the early 1980s, the PLA has promoted the sale of military hardware, including nuclear technology and missiles, to Third World countries as a way to fund China's military modernization. China's attempt to increase its share of the world market for missiles and other heavy weapons, in turn, heightened concern about proliferation and strained China's relations with the United States. However, it is not always easy to establish a distinction between the policies of the MFA and the military. Swaine argues that it is an "exaggeration to state that the military and civilian wings of this subarena (security research) are entirely separate from one another." The greatest level of interaction occurs between the strategists of the military and civilian research units. They think that the communications and

information exchange influence the views of both, in part because their impact on the thinking of senior leaders increases appreciably if they can achieve some level of consensus (Swaine 1997: 125).

At any rate, in China today, bureaucratic entities, scientific institutions and strategic research organizations are broadening their engagement in ACD research and policy implementation. Figure 5.2. shows the basic structure of the Chinese domestic ACD institutions. The Chinese Communist Party's Politburo Standing Committee, the highest decision-making body, controls the overall ACD agenda. Like other foreign and security policies in the past, under the Party, the MFA (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and the PLA (People's Liberation Army) are the most important and competent units regarding China's ACD policy now.

**Figure 5.1. Structure of China's ACD Policy-Making Decision**



*Note:* ..... indicates a consultative and competitive relationship.  
 --- indicates a professional relationship.

The institutionalization of China's ACD field is marked by the internal development of sub-institutes under the two main individual institutions, the MFA and the PLA. The COSTIND (the Commission of Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defence) is officially supervised by the State Council but is believed to be


largely controlled by the PLA. The establishment and strengthening of agencies concerned with the ACD issues are showing greater openness to change and outside opinion, and less ideological rhetoric. Consequently, a diffusion of expertise, and more sophisticated and pragmatic assessments and policies are being implemented. A greater degree of intra- and inter-agency bargaining takes place along cross organizational lines. Indeed, the very need for China to be more active in the increasingly dynamic and complex international ACD agenda of the post-Cold War era has created a basic demand for more institutions, individuals and sources of experts. While it is certainly necessary to protect and to promote Chinese interests, this diffusion of expertise within Chinese domestic institutions has also contributed to the diversification and opening-up of the decision-making process inside China and the exposure of a growing cadre of specialists and specialized institutions to the international community.

### **5.2.1. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)**

Since China's newly adjusted foreign policy focused on "peace and development" for propitious economic development and Chinese modernization, the MFA's most important task was supposedly, to make and sustain a peaceful environment in both regional and global terms. So the MFA had an institutional interest in maintaining good relations with other countries and derived little material benefit from controversial issues like arms sales abroad. The MFA became one of the most influential governmental agencies in the process of China's foreign and national security policy-making including ACD domains. According to the research of a former MFA official, the official number of the MFA's staff exceeded that of the

Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (MFTEC), i.e. 3201 and 937 respectively. The MFA is responsible to and reports directly to the Party's Politburo Standing Committee, through the head of the Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group (FALSG), which coordinates and formulates national foreign and security policy. Moreover, the staff office of the FALSG (FAO), which is under the State Council, has been taken the almost entirely by officials from the MFA and headed, without exception by former or current high-ranking MFA officials. Lu Ning noted that "the office (FAO) is often regarded as a bastion of MFA influence" (Lu Ning 1997: 108). Figure 5.3. indicates the flow of the policy-making process in which the MFA positioned.

**Figure 5.2. MFA ACD institution**



*Note:* .....indicates a subordinate relationship to the FALSG.

*Acronym:* FALSG, Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group; FAO, staff office of FALSG.

*Source:* Johnston 1996; Frieman 1996; Johnston and Evans 1999; Hsu 1999; Gill and Medeiros 2000.



The department of Arms Control and Disarmament now consists of four divisions and these are the Nuclear Division, the Chemical and Biological Division, the Conventional Weapons and Missile Division and the Research Division. This new establishment is led by Sha Zukang, a Chinese Ambassador on CD and the head of the department (*zhongguo waijiaobu junkongsi* from <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/chn>).<sup>25</sup> The new organization is the most active in the international ACD-negotiated treaties and regimes. The development of ACD institutions under the MFA started late and did not attract significant concern until the 1990s. Before the ACD department was upgraded to department status in 1997, the fourth division within MFA's Department of International Organization and Conferences dealt with China's ACD issues and interaction with multilateral ACD institutions. This department was set up in the early 1980s to handle UN-related multilateral arms control. The technical and personal expertise of participation in the CD and related activities led to the creation of a group of ACD experts in MFA. It contained fewer than 20 overworked officials in the mid-1990s. A US government expert on China's ACD policy noted that the only office in the MFA whose budget was increased in 1993-4 was the fourth division of MFA along with the department (Johnston 1996: 40). The staff of this department was extremely well-informed about both technical and policy issues. This might be the only agency in the bureaucracy where technical and policy expertise were combined.

The department of Arms Control and Disarmament defined its responsibility as the implementation and management of foreign policy in the field of arms control.

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<sup>25</sup> As a Consequence of the CTBT, the reorganization of the MFA's ACD branch will be discussed in Chapter 8 in detail.

disarmament, nonproliferation and arms transfer in both regional and global areas (*zhongguo waijiaobu junkongsi* from <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/chn>). The institutional function of the MFA is defined as the processing of information and reporting to the superior decision-making body, not as the general coordinator of China's ACD policy. This is because of the traditional responsibility and role of the MFA, given the fact that Chinese political system featured two bureaucratic organs (the State Council and PLA) under the Party. The MFA, therefore, competed with other bureaucratic interests such as the PLA and the COSTIND in dealing with the ACD issues. Its limited technical expertise was also an undermining factor in enforcing the ACD regime or norms in the Chinese ACD milieu. With the growing activities in the multilateral frameworks, the MFA realized that few had real expertise in the areas of economy and trade, military strategy, arms control and the environment, while foreign policy became increasingly complicated (Wang Hongying 2000: 488-9). When China's arms sales and its regime violations were disclosed, the MFA was locked into the awkward position of being caught between the protests from abroad and criticism at home from the military. The necessity for reorganization of the MFA's ACD area was suggested inside the MFA. The following statement shows the necessity of reorganizing the MFA and enhancing its role.

In 1988 I attended as a Chinese official representative a US-Soviet international conference in Moscow on the inspection issue of INF Treaty. After the meeting, I submitted a report to the leadership of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In the report, while stating that our (China's) current research and policies on arms control have lagged much behind of the situation, I suggested in particular: (1) to strengthen both the research and coordination on arms control issues; (2) to set up a special institution responsible for arms control affairs – under the jurisdiction of either the

MFA or the Party Central Committee's Leading Small Group of Foreign Affairs. The report was approved by then Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian, but was disapproved by the Senior Vice Minister Qian Qichen who at the time was in charge of arms control affairs at the Ministry. Qian's main concern was possible opposition from the Chinese military and to be seen as "overstepping MFA's authority" (Jia Hao's interview, Jia Hao 1999a: 103).


The idea of establishing an independent and "special institution" for international ACD matters, like the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in the United States, has not materialized so far. One of the reasons for this is the difficulty created by the fragmented interests of Chinese bureaucracy. The military is a very serious part of this difficulty.

### **5.2.2. The Military (PLA)**

The influence of the PLA has traditionally been powerful in national security policy-making. Given the fact that the international ACD issues could affect the PLA's interests in defence posture, military doctrine and military modernization, the PLA represents a strong voice about views on ACD issues. Michael Swaine's examination of Chinese national security policymaking shows that the military's presence and influence in central-level party organs are even stronger in the post-Deng era. He concludes that,

"Military involvement is evident in all four policy subarenas, albeit to widely varying degrees (from virtual total control over defence policy to limited but significant influence over foreign policy). Overall, the dividing line between military and civilian spheres in the formulation and implementation of national security policy is not as clear and absolute as in the past" (Swaine 1997: 126).

**Figure 5.3. PLA ACD Institution**



*Note:* ..... indicates the PLA's influence on Chinese ACD decision-making process

*Acronym:* PBSC, Politburo Standing Committee; CMC, Central Military Commission; PLA, People's Liberation Army; FALSG, Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group.

*Source:* Johnston 1996; Frieman 1996; Johnston and Evans 1999; Hsu 1999; Gill and Medeiros 2000.

The PLA's organizations had a strong influence on China's ACD policies, especially on questions of arms transfer and military transparency. The PLA's ACD experts were attached to military intelligence in the General Staff Department (GSD). A few of the military experts on arms control served in the GSD, had experience as foreign military attaches, and also were attached, at some point, to the China Institute of International Strategic Studies (CISS). They were assumed to be connected with the GSD's military intelligence office, the Second Department (G-2). According to Johnston, G-2 officers and other PLA personnel had been sent to the Fourth Division to gain expertise on arms control (Johnston's interview, Johnston 1996: 41). While the GSD was representative in articulating the military perspectives on ACD issues, the National Defence University (general background research and doctrine analysis) and the Commission of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defence (COSTIND) also influenced the ACD issues "in bits and pieces" (Lewis, Di and Xue 1991: 90). In the mid-1990s, the PLA set up a small leading ACD group in the

Central Military Commission (CMC) and GSD. This group's task was to coordinate arms control policy research across the GSD system. The GSD's key role in the ACD policies might be replaced by another newly established military institute. The General Armaments Department, which takes charge of China's procurement of the various weapons, was set up in 1998. This institute also has a voice in ACD issues (Chapter 8).

There are some structural factors that enhance or reduce the military's influence on ACD issues. It is the military's representation in the highest decision-making body, the Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group (FALSG) and the Party's Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC), that affects its degree of influence. The FALSG and the PBSC are the most important communicating and coordinating bodies in Chinese foreign and security policy. The Party's Central Committee General Office (CCGO) serves to co-ordinate and facilitate routine bureaucratic information flows among the FALSG, the CMC and the PBSC. When it comes to making decisions on critical issues, the Chinese high command probably gathers at the level of the PBSC, not the FALSG. Decision-oriented contacts of a more routine nature might take place in the CCGO or through personal communications among the PBSC members (Swaine 1997: 42-3).

Through much of the 1980s, the military had no official representation at the FALSG and PBSC. A. Doak Barnett described:

“One striking thing about the core membership of the group (FALSG) is that it is composed entirely of key government leaders dealing with foreign affairs” (Barnett 1985: 45).

The PLA's representation at this level appeared since the military began to empower its political credit since the early 1990s. Defence Minister Qin Jiwei's membership was significant at the 14<sup>th</sup> Party Congress in 1992 since it was the first time that the FALSG was represented by a professional soldier of the PLA. Lu Ning argues that the PLA's involvement in the Chinese foreign policy decision-making structure had its origin in China's arms sales in the international market (Lu Ning 1997: 123). The international criticism and blame for China's arms transfers made PLA officials take part in the coordination of the foreign policy process. The PLA's representation was primarily intended to ensure a regular information flow regarding relatively routine policy areas that might overlap or produce conflict (Swaine 1997: 110). Qin's membership was necessary for better policy coordination between the military and the government under the Party system. It also gave rise to the emergence of the PLA with deeply entrenched vested bureaucratic interests in ACD policy as well as foreign policy in general. The PLA thus became entangled in Chinese ACD policy decision-making.<sup>26</sup>

The PLA's more critical input into the high-profile decision making process was also substantiated at the Party's 14<sup>th</sup> National Congress. General Liu Huaqing (CMC deputy head) joined in the Party's PBSC after the Tiananmen Incident. While Liu's

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<sup>26</sup> There was also large military representation in the CCP Central Committee. In the 14<sup>th</sup> Central Committee, military leaders represented 24 percent of the total, with 46 of the 189 full seats. By contrast, only 17 percent of the full members of the 13<sup>th</sup> CCP Central Committee were military leaders. The figures show that military elites in 1992-1997 occupied the highest percentage in the Central Committee since 1977 (Gurtov and Hwang 1998: 37).

rise can be interpreted politically as Jiang Zemin's political coalition to strengthen and secure his position (Saich 1992), Liu's representation in the PBSC meant an increasing role for the PLA in China's foreign policy, including the ACD policy. The PLA also had a representative in the Central Committee General Office (CCGO). General Wang Ruilin, Deputy Director of the General Political Department (GPD) and a member of the CMC and senior secretary to Deng Xiaoping, was deputy head of the CCGO.

However, it is important to note that the influence of PLA is basically constrained by the external (the MFA) and the internal (the COSTIND) division of labour. In fact, in formulating and implementing China's ACD policies, the responsibility is, in principle, allocated to the MFA and the PLA has not encroached on it. The PLA's duty is, therefore, very restrictive (Lu Ning 1997: 165). The only field that the PLA was concerned about was that of arms sales, regarding military modernization. That is one of the reasons why China has been so critical of the MTCR and reluctant to accept the regime. The PLA's influence in ACD policy remains only in inter-agency policy bargaining and in the high-ranking policy-making decision area. However, those influential points started to erode in the late 1990s when the PLA lost its seat on the PBSC due to retirement of General Liu Huaqing. And the CCGO came to be headed by Zeng Qinghong, Jiang Zemin's close protégé. The administrative office of the FALSG, the Office of Foreign Affairs (FAO) under the State Council, was reinstated and given higher status under the Party's Central Committee. Liu Huaqing, a high ranking official of the MFA became head of the new FAO that reports to high command leaders of the FALSG (Shambaugh 1998: 9-11). The PLA itself lacked

technological expertise in the ACD issues. The COSTIND had been the main actor taxed with ACD issues within the PLA.

### **5.2.3. Science and Defence Establishment (COSTIND)**

As an institutional branch of the PLA, the Commission of Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defence (COSTIND) played a substantial role in ACD issues with its technical and scientific expertise.<sup>27</sup> The COSTIND supervised virtually all of China's military research, development and production. While it was officially administered by the State Council, the CMC provided professional leadership. The predecessor of the COSTIND was founded by a group of renowned military leaders such as the late Marshall Nie Rongzhen and General Zhang Aiping. The middle and top officials had military ranks and the personnel interchange and overlapping continued until the mid-1990s. For instance, General Liu Huaqing, a retired former First Vice Chairman of the CMC, was once the minister of the COSTIND.


Although the COSTIND was formed by military personnel, the institute was never fully under military control. In the 1950s and 1960s, then-Premier Zhou Enlai's intimate involvement with the nuclear weapons programme gave the COSTIND's predecessors their own channel of communication with China's leadership. Since its creation, COSTIND had always been led by a protégé of Marshal Nie Rongzhen (Pollack 1992: 173-8).

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<sup>27</sup> The COSTIND was formed in 1982 by merging its predecessor, the National Defence Science and Technology Commission (NDSTC) with the National Defence Industries of the State Council and the Science, Technology and Equipment Commission of the CMC, so as to facilitate the management and coordination of the respective ministries (Ostrov 1991).



**Figure 5.4. COSTIND ACD Institution**



*Note:* The shadowed sub-institutes of the COSTIND were reorganized as the sub-institutes of the new General Armament Department (GAD) under the PLA in 1998.

*Acronym:* SCOSTIND (State Commission on Science, Technology and Industry for National Defence); ACO (Arms Control Office of the COSTIND); CNNC (China Nuclear National Corporation); CAEA (China Atomic Energy Authority); CAEP (China Academy of Engineering Physics); IAPCM (Institute of Applied Physics and Computational Mathematics); NINT (Northwest Institute of Nuclear Technology); CDSTIC (China Defence Science and Technology Information Centre).

*Source:* Johnston 1996; Frieman 1996; Johnston and Evans 1999; Hsu 1999; Gill and Medeiros 2000.

ACD research within the nuclear establishment was led by COSTIND. The Arms Control Office coordinated all such research within COSTIND and the nuclear weapon laboratories. The COSTIND had been involved in and influenced China's ACD policies in three ways: arms export control, training and communicating ACD agenda and technical consultation, and participation in multilateral institutions like the CD on behalf of the PLA. First, the COSTIND was involved in arms export control, supervising China's defence industries (Lewis, Di and Xue 1991; Pollack 1992; Hu Weixing 1994). In the nuclear arena, China became a member of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1984, and acceded to the NPT in 1992. These commitments required a bureaucracy to administer China's interactions with the IAEA and foreign states. When the Ministry of Nuclear Industry (MNI) existed, it

was natural to have the ministry handle the interactions with IAEA. But when the MNI was reorganized as the China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) in 1988, it meant that a commercial entity would be representing the state in important international matters. To endow CNNC with the proper authority, it was given another name: the China Atomic Energy Authority (CAEA). The CNNC brochure stated that “CNNC is also known as CAEA to deal with matters between China and IAEA” (Hsu 1999: 156). While this dual representation of the institute reflected a mixing of government functions and commercial activities, the CNNC (or CAEA by 1998) carried out the authority to review and issue licences for nuclear materials since the COSTIND had been granted the authority to supervise and manage the trade in military products of the entire defence industry in 1986. (Lu Ning 1997: 128).<sup>28</sup>

The movement away from a central budgetary system opened a wide array of commercial opportunities for the individual units of the military system. The defence-industrial complex was characterized by decentralization among its organizational units and this decentralization had a profound impact on the formulation of Chinese export control policy. The compartmentalized nature of the Chinese political-military structure explained why the assurances of the MFA meant little in the face of foreign condemnation of China’s arms transfers (Lewis, Di and Xue 1991: 96; Pollack 1992: 171; Mullins 1995: 149). For instance, Poly Technologies was one of the most successful arms sale corporations. The MFA

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<sup>28</sup> The downsizing of the PLA from 4.2 million to 3.4 million in 1984 and drastic cuts in the defence budget provided a new environment for the military and defence establishment. The Chinese government allowed the military and the defence industry to sell its surplus arms and military products in the international market in line with general economic reform. The military and defence industry had to find new sources of revenue to alleviate the pains of the budgetary cuts and to accomplish “military modernization.” For economic reform and Chinese military, see Shambaugh and Yang (1997) and Segal (1995b).

warned the corporation to be more prudent in selling relatively sophisticated weapons and military equipment to sensitive regions and to consider the possible impact of arms sales on subtle diplomatic relationships with foreign countries. In theory, the corporations must consult with the MFA and other ministries. The Premier of the State Council is responsible by law for settling disputes between the ministry and corporations. Nonetheless, in reality, the corporations affiliated with the GSD and the COSTIND, which were assigned to produce weapons and military technologies for scheduled deliveries, had the final say on where and what to sell.<sup>29</sup>

Second, the scientists under the sub-units of the COSTIND played an important role in setting up the ACD programme for disseminating new ideas and information related to ACD issues and training and nurturing the arms control community in China (Johnston 1996; Frieman 1996; Garrett and Glaser 1995). This was one of the most conspicuous contributions to China's ACD area. Like other countries, the new ideas and norms of the ACD issues were introduced by scientists rather than politicians or the military. Research on more specific nuclear ACD issues, such as deterrence, treaty provisions and verification systems, was conducted at the nuclear weapons research laboratories.

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<sup>29</sup> Personal and family networks with Chinese leadership explains the success of Poly Technologies' untouchable arms business. The most of the key players in the firm are connected with the high-ranked Chinese political leaders. He Pengfei (the first president), the son of the late Marshal He Long, was concurrently the head of the PLA General Staff's Directorate of Equipment and held the position as deputy chief of the GSD and vice commander of the PLA Navy later. Wang Jun (Chairman of the Board of Directors), the son of Wang Zhen (the former state's vice president), later became president and chairman of the Chinese International Trust and Investment Corporation (CITIC). He Ping (the former second president and president) is Deng Xiaoping's son-in-law. Wang Xiaochao (executive vice president) is the son of the former state's president, Yang Shangkun (Lewis, Di and Xue 1991: 93-4).

The Institute of Applied Physics and Computational Mathematics (IAPCM) became a pathfinder when Hu Side founded the ISODARCO-Beijing Seminar on Arms Control in 1988 with the help of organizers from the Italian International School on Disarmament and Research on Conflicts (ISODARCO).<sup>30</sup> IAPCM and the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations have since jointly hosted this seminar once every other year in China. IAPCM also set up the Program for Science and National Security Studies (PSNSS) in 1988 with the goal of promoting research on ACD issues, training younger scientists and enhancing ties with domestic and foreign organizations. Out of this also came a regular series of more informal academic seminars on technical and policy issues attended by ACD experts from the technical community, the GSD, and the MFA. This series was important in developing cross-unit contacts and in floating new ideas and proposals. During the CTBT negotiations, several scientists from IAPCM provided technical support to the Chinese delegation. The PSNSS was replaced by a new Arms Control Research Office in the IAPCM in 1996. The new office focused on CTBT OSI, fissile material production cut-off, verification, and nuclear non-proliferation (Johnston 1996: 40-3; Frieman 1996: 16-8).

Under the COSTIND, the Chinese Academy of Engineering Physics (CAEP) was an umbrella organization which was comprised of institutes specializing in various

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<sup>30</sup> Hu Side, a Chinese ACD specialist, in 1985, was inspired to recommend that China's weapons community set up a working group to focus on arms control research, when he attended a major conference on the 'nuclear winter' hosted by the ISODARCO in Italy. He thought that it could be useful for China's arms control diplomacy. In the 1980s, China's perception of the destabilizing effect of the US Strategic Defence Initiative pushed its top leaders to develop a position on arms control (Glaser and Garrett 1996: 28-44).

aspects of nuclear weapons research and development.<sup>31</sup> These institutes were compartmentalized, with little horizontal integration across bureaucratic lines. The technical experts at the CAEP, mostly civilian scientists and engineers, clearly had a technical consultant role in formulating Chinese positions on ACD agenda. The CAEP reports to the COSTIND, whose purview was considerably broader than nuclear weapons. When Hu Side was promoted to director of CAEP, he also helped to form the Program for Verification Technologies Studies (PVTS). This programme was launched in 1995 to investigate technical solutions to support arms control verification. Within the COSTIND, the ACD Program served as a clearing house for arms control information (Hsu 1999: 157).

Another institute controlled by COSTIND was the China Defence Science and Technology Information Centre (CDSTIC). Its role has been to gather, collate, and disseminate materials relevant to national security. The Northwest Institute of Nuclear Technology (NINT) has been the laboratory in charge of conducting and analyzing nuclear tests. It is known that it has the lead role in handling on-site inspections for CTBT verification.

Third, the COSTIND itself sent technical experts to represent Chinese positions and joined Chinese international negotiation teams (led by the MFA) and provided consultation, mainly at the United Nations' ACD forum and the Conference on

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<sup>31</sup> These institutes included the Southwest Institute of Fluid Physics (SIFP); the Southwest Institute of Nuclear Physics and Chemistry (SINPC); the Southwest Institute of Chemical Materials and Technology; the Southwest Institute of Electronic Engineering; the Southwest Institute of Structural Materials; the Southwest Institute of Applied Electronics; the Southwest Institute of Computer Application; the Southwest Institute of Environmental Testing; the Shanghai Institute of Optics and Fine Mechanics (SOFM) High Power Laser Laboratory; the Shanghai Institute of Nuclear Research (SINR) (Frieman 1996: 16-8).

Disarmament (CD) in Geneva (Johnston and Evans 1999; Jia Hao 1999a). In general, the COSTIND personnel and CAEP scientists seemed less informed about foreign policy and the larger context of their work than their counterparts in other countries. They were called on primarily for technical assistance. However, the PNE (peaceful nuclear explosion) issue that Chinese government tried to put on the agenda in the CTBT negotiation demonstrates that Chinese ACD policy-making process was, to some extent, influenced by the technical experts from the COSTIND (Chapter 7). This fact indicates that the COSTIND's role in China's ACD policy was increasing. Modern science and technology complicated the ambiguous and controversial nature of many technologies related to weapons of mass destruction, while China became further involved in the multilateral ACD process. With the MFA's lack of technological expertise, the reliance on the COSTIND was expected to have a significant impact on China's ACD policy in the future. Yet, regarding China's ACD policy, the COSTIND's institutional power was weakened by the reorganization of the bureaucracy in 1998. The extensive shakeup and dismantling of the COSTIND in the wake of General Liu's retirement was testimony to its waning influence. Most important research organs, such as CAEP, IAPCM and CDSTIC, are now under the PLA's GAD (Chapter 8).

#### **5.2.4. Research Institutes**

In general, China's foreign and security research institutes have less influence on the policy-making process than the prominent think-tanks in other countries. It is mainly because the development of the research institute has been constrained by the Chinese leaders' traditional distrust and a brain-drain problem that the political

turmoil like “Cultural Revolution” caused. Frieman observes the current stage of China’s ACD field that,

A serious shortage of trained people inside and outside the government compounds this problem. The field arms control as a profession and an area of professional specialization or scholarly inquiry is just beginning to emerge in China. No single organization has more than a handful of knowledgeable individuals in this field; most of the people are either over 60 or under 40. One reason for the small supply of experts is the absence of a training program, curriculum, and open source information. Universities can offer courses in U.S. or Russian security policy, but not in Chinese security policy. Texts and primary source materials are difficult to obtain, especially outside the military complex (Frieman 1996: 16).

Policy-makers in general do not find any necessity to consider the outcomes of the research institutes because they have their own research arm inside the organization. An even more difficult problem than the inaccessibility to various levels of information and decision makers is the political sensitivity of the field, especially ACD issues. In this context, the research institute affiliated with government, the party and military bureaucracy played a relatively more significant role rather than that of academia. This was largely because bureaucracy-affiliated institutions have better access – (1) to processed, often confidential information generated through the bureaucratic system, such as diplomatic cables for the MFA affiliated institute, and (2) to top decision makers through well-established bureaucratic channels (Lu Ning 1997: 131).

Increasingly during the 1980s, experts in the ACD field grew and emerged in several institutes under the government and military. The inter-agency and

transnational conferences provided a place for learning and exchanging new ideas and information about the ACD field. The ACD training programme was also committed to the production of experts. This expertise has spread into a number of institutions, which have a certain degree of vested interest in parent-bureaucracy. The following table shows the Chinese research institutes in the ACD field.

**Table 5.1. China's ACD Research Institutes**

	<b>Institute</b>	<b>Journal</b>	<b>Associated Institute</b>
<b>Government</b>	CICIR	<i>Contemporary International Relations</i>	State Council
	CIIS	<i>International Studies</i>	MFA
<b>Military</b>	CIISS	<i>International Strategic Studies</i>	GSD
	ISS	-	NDU under PLA
	AMS	-	PLA
	CDSTIC	<i>Contemporary Military</i>	GAD
<b>Academic</b>	IWEP	<i>World Economics &amp; Politics</i>	CASS
	CACNS	<i>American Studies</i>	IAS under CASS

Acronym: CICIR, China Institute of Contemporary International Relations; CIIS, China Institute of International Studies; CIISS, China Institute for International Strategic Studies; ISS, Institute for Strategic Studies; NDU, National Defence University; AMS, Academy of Military Science; CACNS, Centre for Arms Control and Nonproliferation Studies; IWEP, Institute of World Economics & Politics; IAS, Institute of American Studies; CASS, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.

Within the State Council, the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR) is currently the most prominent and influential civilian research institute. It publishes the journal *Xiandai guoji guanxi (Contemporary International Relations)*. Through this journal, the institute articulates the ACD issues and mostly represents the position of the MFA. The MFA also has its research institute, the China Institute of International Studies (CIIS). The latter's significant influence on formulating foreign policy has eroded since the political decline of Zhao Ziyang and death of Huan Xiang, the head of the institute (Lu Ning 1997: 166). Currently, the



role of the CICIR has become more prominent than that of the CIIS. However, the CIIS also represents the MFA's voice on ACD issues in its journal *Guoji wenti yanjiu* (*International Studies*).

Several research institutes are affiliated to the PLA – the China Institute of International Strategic Studies (CIISS, formerly BIIS); the Institute for Strategic Studies at the National Defence University; and the Academy of Military Sciences (AMS). These research institutes analyze international ACD proposals and conventions as they affect Chinese defence posture, force planning, strategy, doctrine, training, and tactics. The CIISS is linked to the Second Directorate of the GSD. Its periodical, *Guoji zhanlue yanjiu* (*International Strategic Studies*), increasingly contains articles on ACD issues and generally represents the PLA's interests on these issues. In order to improve the general quality of ACD research for the military, the AMS set up an ACD group in its Strategy Department. The group is researching the history of arms control, the conceptual basis of arms control, the content and scope of ACD processes, guiding principles in the international ACD struggle and models of decision-making (Johnston and Evans 1999: 243). It is known that the military research institutes played an important role in releasing the Chinese white paper regarding military transparency and booklets on ACD.<sup>32</sup> The CIISS and AMS participated in the military-led inter-agency drafting team which included experts from the GSD, the new department of the MFA and the Information Office of the State Council (Gill and Medeiros 2000: 73). Technical research was implemented by several institutes under the COSTIND. These institutes have now been associated

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<sup>32</sup> These books are 'China: Arms Control and Disarmament' (1995), and 'China's National Defence' (1995 and 1998), both published by the Information Office of the State Council.

with the PLA since its reorganization in 1998. Among them, the China Defence Science and Technology Information Centre (CDSTIC), founded in March 1959 and staffed by near 500 scientific and technical personnel of various specialties, plays a key role in processing technical expertise and integrating it within the ACD issues in general (<http://www.cdstic.canet.cn>).

In contrast to the research institutes affiliated with bureaucracies, a small number of Chinese academic organizations address national security and ACD issues, independently. Within the Chinese Academy of Social Science (CASS), the Institute of World Economics and Politics (IWEP) addresses political-military issues at a very general level in its research papers and conferences. In addition, the CASS witnessed an emergence of a new research organ in the ACD field recently. The Arms Control Centre at the Institute for American Studies was established in early 1999 under the CASS. The American Centre at Fudan University in Shanghai is unique in its establishment of an academic programme of instruction and research focused on national security policy and arms control.<sup>33</sup> The ACD experts affiliated with the Centre have a solid understanding of the issues, but seem to have only limited access to individuals and information from other official sectors.<sup>34</sup>

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<sup>33</sup> There are only two Chinese universities (Fudan university and Beijing university) that have arms control programmes (programme in Arms Control and Regional Security at Fudan university; programme in Arms Control and Disarmament at Beijing university) with only limited and rudimentary teaching and research personnel (Hsu 1999: 157).

<sup>34</sup> One of them is Zhu Mingquan. He was a deputy director of the American Centre at Fudan University. In 1995, he published a book titled 'Nuclear Proliferation: Danger and Protection,' which was one of rare books about the ACD field in China. He asserted the necessity of nonproliferation in the post-Cold War for the sake of China's interest as well as global stability (Zhu Mingquan 1995: 178-95).

The largest assembly of arms control personnel (in pure numbers) was found in the Chinese People's Association for Peace and Disarmament (CPAPD). This was a mass organization rather than a research institute. Its main task was to organize the international conference on ACD field where the Chinese participants in the Conference were known by the name of the CPAPD rather than that of the institute to which the individuals were actually affiliated with. For example, members of the Scientists Group on ACD issues have, since 1991, held bilateral, annual conferences between the CPAPD and the Committee on International Security and Arms Control of the U.S. National Academy of Science (Garrett and Glaser 1995: 60). The effort to establish a coordinating body for the ACD issues was made recently. In August 2001, there was the first meeting for establishing the China's Association of Arms Control and Disarmament (CAACD). It was initiated by the Chinese People's Association for Peace and Disarmament (CPAPD), the China Institute of International Studies (*Guojiwenti yanjiusuo*) and the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations (*Xiandaiguojiguanxi yanjiusuo*) (Interview with a Chinese expert 18<sup>th</sup> July 2001).<sup>35</sup>

In conclusion, most of these institutions do research on ACD related subjects. The discussion of ACD subjects necessarily led to sensitive issues such as nuclear doctrine and operational strategy. Yet, it was hindered by the leadership's view that publicly criticizing the government's foreign and security policy was to challenge China's "national interest." Moreover, the general deference to the PLA on those

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<sup>35</sup> This information was given a month before the initial meeting actually took place. The progress of the establishment has not been available while the research is done. According to the interviewee, China's institutional agency "less communicates each other (than the US agency) and this institution will coordinate the ACD function, exchange studies and discuss the issues."

questions are major barriers to demilitarizing the discussions. Henceforth, “the political space for independent, fundamental criticisms of Chinese arms control policy is extremely narrow” (Johnston 1996: 60).

### **5.3. Inter-Agency Institutions for Arms Export Control**

As most observers have noted, the PLA’s most critical interest lies in the control of the export of the weapons within ACD policy. It has been asserted that the sales of arms by the Military has been promoted by arms corporations (such as Poly Technologies and New Era Corporation) without paying attention to the MFA’s interest in the maintenance of good relations with other countries. By the early 1990s, China had become one of the top arms merchants in the Third World. Before China joined the NPT, in 1991, China ranked fourth place in major conventional weapons exporters sharing 9.1% of total exports (*SIPRI Yearbook* 1992: 272-3). Chinese nuclear, missile, and chemical-warfare technology and materials also began to be transferred to Iran and Pakistan, apparently in violation of international treaties. In the face of international criticism and US-China disputes on China’s arms transfers, an inter-agency administrative body for arms export control was created, at the time when the role of the PLA was increasing in importance after the Tiananmen Incident in 1989. The Military Products Exports Leading Group (MPELG, *Junpin chukou lingdao xiaozu*) was formed in September 1989. Its main task was to oversee China’s foreign arms sales. It consisted of leaders from the CMC, the PLA, the COSTIND, the MFA and the former defence industry. It met regularly to discuss arms sales and sensitive exports and made decisions on disputed arms export issues. With its office

(known as the 703 office) at the General Office of the CMC and the composition of participants, PLA clearly exerted prominent dominance over the MPELG, even though the organization was under the dual leadership of the State Council and the CMC (Jia Hao 1999a: 104-6).

In the early 1990s, with the eclipse of Yang Shangkun and Yang Baibing, the brothers who had influenced the organization, the MPELG was downgraded and put under the jurisdiction of the PLA's GSD. Instead, a new administrative organization and operating mechanism was substituted for the role and functions of the MPELG. The State Administrative Committee on Military Products Trade (SACMPT), under the leadership of the State Council and the CMC, took charge of the centralized control of the transfers of military equipment and related technologies. Its main function was to draft laws and policies governing such transfers. It was comprised mainly of leading personnel from the MFA, the GSD, the COSTIND, MFTEC and other relevant departments. As the administrative arm of the SACMPT, the State Bureau of Military Products Trade was responsible for handling day to day affairs (*China: Arms Control and Disarmament* 1995: 22-3). A Chinese official statement adds the following instruction,

Governmental departments and companies engaged in transfers of military equipment and technologies must be authorized, registered and approved by the government. Their business activities must remain strictly within the scope of operation approved. Contracts for transfer of military equipment and technologies require approval before gaining effect. Major transfer items and contracts must be examined by the SACMPT and approved by the State Council and the CMC. Stern legal sanctions shall be taken against any company or individual who transfers

military equipment and technologies without proper governmental examination and approval (*China: Arms Control and Disarmament* 1995: 19).

Meanwhile, regarding arms export control, two new important policy-consulting and coordinating organizations were established in the 1990s. The “Arms Control Group” and the “Inspection Group,” were created under the jurisdiction of the COSTIND. These groups took over the MPELG and the replacement was related to the decline of the “Yang Brothers” in Chinese politics. These COSTIND-affiliated groups were distanced from direct involvement with the PLA, for some time, but later transferred to new Department of the PLA, the GAD (Chapter 8).

## **5.4. Institutionalization for Policy Coordination**

### **5.4.1. Horizontal Linkage: Inter-Agency Channel**

China’s entanglement with multilateral ACD frameworks necessarily made the Chinese experts build up inter-agency channels to exchange information and coordinate ACD policy. After the Chinese took part in the Conference on Disarmament under the United Nations (CD), a small group of Chinese experts gathered to discuss current ACD issues. Although the early channels were scattered rather than regularized and specialized, the more regularized and institutionalized inter-agency channels had their origin in these early meetings.

According to Johnston's research, in the early 1980s, there were meetings between MFA's Fourth Department, the GSD and COSTIND specialists to discuss the drafting of documents and papers that China presented at the CD. Within the COSTIND there was an umbrella group of senior scientists and experts that set up working groups on several topics, including non-proliferation, nuclear testing, major reductions in nuclear weapons, arms control in space and military conversion. The Arms Control and Disarmament Program, which was set up by the COSTIND's CDSTIC in 1983, became an inter-agency channel in 1990s. When the ACD agenda, like the CTBT, became a hot issue among the institutions, this programme was assigned the responsibility for organizing most of the cross-unit exchanges on arms control in Beijing and brought together experts from NDU, CIIS, CICIR, MFA, Nuclear Materials Association, CAEP and the Aerospace Ministry. The COSTIND also sponsored conferences on the global arms market, controlled arms transfers, and major reductions in strategic nuclear weapons. These have drawn on experts from the IIR in the MFA, the PLA's Strategic Missile Forces, the Ninth Academy, the Beijing Institute of Systems Engineering, the IAPCM, and the Arms Control and Disarmament Program in the COSTIND's CDSTIC. Johnston also tracked down the MFA-hosted inter-agency meetings to discuss international ACD issues. These meetings took the form of "preliminary meetings" (*wu xu hui*) and discussed the implications of new international issues as the first step in devising a policy response. These particular *wu xu hui* usually included about 30-40 people from different agencies (Johnston 1996: 42-3)

Seemingly, the first major inter-agency conference, the "Conference on Disarmament Issues," was held in October 1986 and most Chinese ACD institutions

participated.<sup>36</sup> The fourth Division of the MFA, the CICIR, the CIIS, the IWEP, the GSD, the NDU, the AMS, the CDSTIC, and the Beijing Association of International Strategic Studies all took part in the Conference. In advance of the newly emerging US-Soviet disarmament negotiations, 50 Chinese ACD experts discussed international disarmament “struggle” and made efforts to establish the Chinese position during the ongoing negotiation. Its importance above all was that for the first time, the Chinese government, military and academic sectors officially launched the inter-agency channels and exchanged their ideas and information. Most presenters at the conference reflected the previous Chinese ACD policies that had been described in international disarmament talks as “pseudo-disarmament” and the “real arms race.” Being emancipated from “leftism,” Chinese ACD policy suggested that Chinese security interests and world peace would be served by the new international ACD trends (Pan Zhenqiang 1987: 21-8; Wang Shuzhong 1987: 68-9).

A co-authored article from the CICIR stressed the necessity for China’s disarmament strategy. The authors asked for the break-up of the leftist dogma, which denounced the US-Soviet disarmament negotiations in the 1960s and 1970s. According to them, the phenomenon of international disarmament was so complicated and grand that cooperation between the individual ACD institutions would be necessary. They made three proposals for expanding horizontal channels for the future: 1) a national conference on disarmament to discuss the whole issue of international disarmament trends and policy options; 2) intensive research on urgent

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<sup>36</sup> By the CICIR, the articles of the conference were published in 1987. The book title was *International Disarmament Struggle and China (Guoji Caijun Douzheng yu Zhongguo)*. The term ‘struggle’ (*douzheng*) used in the book reflected the Chinese *realpolitik* view in some sense. In English, there is no accepted term like ‘disarmament struggle.’ The Chinese seemed to use the term in



items on the disarmament agenda; 3) an exchange of information and research material among the individual institutes (Huang Tingwei and Song Baoxian 1987: 6). Another Chinese expert stressed the need for cooperative and comprehensive research between the three sectors, foreign policy, national defence and academia. “The enhancement of lively ideas (among the three sectors) will be needed to provide policy options and consultations and nurture the experts for disarmament negotiation and research” (Xu Guangyu 1987: 49).

These suggestions demanded information exchange through inter-agency channels from the government side and the PLA was blamed for not being more forthcoming with ACD-related information. Because the technical information and materials on ACD issues was, by its nature, handled by the COSTIND that belonged to the PLA, the government side relied heavily on this expertise. It was still difficult to set up communication between the military establishment and civilian institutions.<sup>37</sup> Others in the ACD community complained that the top leadership did not understand or pay much attention to ACD, and they believed that this hampered the expansion and professionalization of the community. Yet, since the government’s disarmament policy was to restore the importance of foreign policy priorities and recover them from the influence of “leftism,” training young experts would be necessary (Pan Zhenqiang 1987: 24-6).

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an extended sense of ‘arms race’ (struggle). The term that viewed the disarmament as a kind of race disappeared in the 1990s.

<sup>37</sup> To circulate information within the community, the COSTIND’s CDSTIC published a few internal journals; the *Arms Control Bulletin* (*Junkong tongxun*), the *Bulletin on arms control research* (*Junbei kongzhi yanjiu tonxun*), the *Short reports on arms control information* (*Junkong xinxi jianbao*) and the *Selected Readings in Arms Control and Disarmament*. New channels of information was set up to disseminate arms control-related information and research (Johnston and Evans 1999: 244).

This inter-agency channel evolved into a decision-making agency involving the MFA, the GSD (PLA) and the COSTIND in 1990s. Indeed, for the CTBT negotiations, the MFA's fourth division, COSTIND's testing community (CAEP and IAPCM scientists) and the GSD held regular, intensive, policy coordination meetings, prior to and after each session of the CD in Geneva (Interview with a Chinese expert 18<sup>th</sup> July 2001).

#### **5.4.2. Policy Coordination: Fragmented Institutions**

The literature on Chinese bureaucracy recognized the fragmented and disjointed nature of policy coordination (Lieberthal and Oksenberg 1988; Lampton 1987). Ng-Quinn attributed it to:

A lack of effective functional differentiation within the Party and government bureaucracy [which] often means overlapping of responsibilities and loyalties (Ng-Quinn 1984: 211).

Due to this bureaucratic structure, informal politics seemed to be more persuasive in explaining the Chinese policy process (Fewsmith 1996). The second characteristic of Chinese policy coordination was the relatively dominant role of the PLA in the security arena. Many observers argue that in this top policy coordination process, the PLA's influence was highly significant in decisions on the national security agenda (Frieman 1996; Johnston 1996; Swaine 1997; Lu Ning 1997; Shambaugh 1999b; Wang Hongying 2000). For example, Wang Hongying attributes the fact that China's socialization into the principles of multilateralism is limited to the influence of those who have experience of the international scene. He argues that "MFA officials are far

less influential than military leaders, who have long championed strengthening China's unilateral defence capabilities" (Wang Hongying 2000: 488-9). For the most part the security policy remains indebted to the interests of portions of the military. While such military views, on occasion, were over-ridden, the PLA still preserves a powerful, sceptical and unilateralist voice on ACD (Johnston 1996: 60).

In Chinese ACD policy coordination, it is clear that in some respects it is adequate but in others inadequate. First, China lacks the bureaucratic procedures and personnel required for negotiating and enforcing the ACD agenda. Policy coordination often encompasses sharply competing notions of which policies best serve the national interest. Consensus on the role of ACD in China's overall national strategy appears to be poorly developed at this time (Manning, Montaperto and Roberts 2000: 72). There is no single and overarching government agency in China (comparable to the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in the United States) with experts and a specialized mandate on ACD issues. There are about two dozen organizations within China that play some role in formulating the Chinese position on the international ACD agenda. The prestige and influence of the different organizations continue to shift. It can be argued that Avery Goldstein's characterization of China's institutions, "institution for those durable organizational practices that undergird the structure of a stable political system" (Goldstein 1994: 720), does not make sense. Instead, there is weak policy-coordination process with fragmented institutions entrenched in the vested interests created by the economic reform. Inefficient policy-coordination was reflected in the process of the CTBT talks without overall purpose and strategy (Chapter 7). This was partly because the state is beginning a new stage and the field is developing, and partly because personal

prestige and networks are often much more important than institutional mechanisms. In Chinese circumstances, a single individual can easily determine the status of an institution.

Individual Chinese individual institutes have some role in formulating policy. Each unit can be assigned to one of several categories; academic think tanks, a department of the MFA, units involved in nuclear weapons research and production, a department of the PLA, industrial ministries, or a mass organization. Nonetheless, each unit has begun to play some role in formulating ACD policy with its newly vested interest, fostered by the process of economic reform and development. Initially, throughout the early 1980s, China's ACD policy was relatively simple, and, primarily, the responsibility of the fourth division of International Organization Department of the MFA. By the mid-1990s, however, there was a relatively well-developed routine process for devising bargaining positions on CD-related issues in particular. The Ambassador for the CD affiliated with the MFA now takes the lead in organizing the interagency meetings. Senior political leaders now interfere in the process only to resolve disputes among the three groups of actors and to establish broad parameters for policy (Gill and Medeiros 2000: 87-93; Johnston and Evans 1999: 240-4). As has been mentioned, the Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group (FALSG) and the Party's Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC) are the highest point for coordination and decision making in the Chinese political system. The FALSG functions as the key policy coordination, communication, supervision and consultation mechanism. Regarding the ACD agenda, the MFA, the GSD of the PLA and the COSTIND take part in the FALSG meeting over ACD agenda in general. When agreement could not be reached about a critical issue (eg. whether to join the

CTBT), the head of the FALSG would either make a decision or submit a proposal to the PBSC for ratification or approval. However, the continual and contentious competition among the three actors (the MFA, the GSD and the COSTIND) exacerbated the efficiency of policy coordination and made it more complicated.

It is difficult to stress the influence or predominance of the PLA's role in the Chinese ACD policy coordination process as in other security issues. The multilateral ACD agenda was always implemented and formulated by not the PLA but the MFA. The PLA's influence could permeate the policy coordinating bargaining process among the institutions and the high-profile decision-making process. The military's vociferous nationalist voice and its suspected arms sales in the Middle East made the military appear to have dominant bargaining power over the MFA. This was the main reason why observers did not expect China to join the CTBT by the end of 1996 (Malik 1995; Johnston 1996; Bachman 1998). According to them, the PLA, especially the COSTIND was not expected to agree with the test ban, which would freeze China's nuclear development and modernization and would leave China a long way behind the United States and Russia. In reality, the decision was already fixed by the top party decision-making process in the early 1990s (Chapter 6). Moreover, General Liu Huaqing's retirement weakened the influence of the military in the PBSC.

In conclusion, the bureaucratic in-fighting in the Chinese context may be moderated by the "unitary decision system," where a small group of top leaders from the PBSC act as a unit that checks bureaucratic infighting and controls the bargaining process by a more rational and comprehensive calculation of the national interest. A

new development in Chinese political leadership might provide such a “unitary decision system” in the post-CTBT period (Chapter 8).

### ***5.5. Conclusion: Institutionalization, a dynamic of state and institutions***

The development of Chinese ACD institutions during the last decade suggests that an external factor, the international ACD agenda, penetrated Chinese institutions and played some role in nurturing Chinese domestic ACD institutions. Since the international ACD agenda became a critical issue in the late 1980s, each security-related institution researched the issues and developed its own expertise. With its own bureaucratic interests, the MFA, the PLA and the COSTIND emerged as main actors and exchanged their views at the inter-agency bargaining process. The nascent domestic institutions were in flux and vulnerable to a new need for reorganization, which was brought about by the incremental participation in multilateral frameworks at the international level.

Despite these developments, the overall ACD and nonproliferation community appeared disjointed and lacking cohesiveness. Each organization had parts of the relevant knowledge, but the insulated and compartmentalized nature of Chinese organizations hindered the formation of a centralized system. Furthermore, the intermixing of government and commercial functions resulted in a regulatory approach that relied more on good faith than on setting comprehensive guideline for enforcement (Hsu 1999: 156).

Like other institutions in China, the fragmented character of domestic ACD institutions, means that two main domestic agencies have played and will play key roles in the policy-coordinating process of China's ACD policy. While the MFA mainly formulates and implements the ACD policy, the PLA, with a sophisticated backup from the COSTIND and with vested interests preoccupied with arms export and military modernization, will not abandon its grip on security-related issues. However, its direct influence on the ACD decision-making process seemed to have been eroded. Thus its influence would only be indirect. Participation in the inter-agency bargaining process was the only avenue of influence open to it.

The state's participation in the international ACD framework has had an impact on the restructuring of domestic institutes. This dynamic interaction has been presented in this chapter. The case of the CTBT, more concretely, elucidates these impacts. The negotiating consequences for the ACD institutions of the CTBT will be illustrated in Chapter 8.

## CHAPTER 6. Participation and Pre-CTBT Development

*We now see the NPT as enhancing China's security" as well as global security. After the NPT treaty came into effect, in such fields as the prevention of nuclear proliferation, the promotion of nuclear disarmament and the peaceful use of nuclear energy, it has played a key role. To maintain this treaty is of great importance to the enhancement of the international non-proliferation mechanism (Bu Ran, A Chinese ACD expert).*

### 6.1. Introduction

China's ACD policy has been described as ambivalent or contradictory. Like other parts of Chinese foreign policy, the discrepancy between its declared policy and actual behaviour made it ambiguous. Thus, observers reserve their clear evaluation of China's ACD behaviour. Frieman states that China's participation over the 15 years does not "demonstrate a clear pattern of either compliance or violation" (Frieman 1996: 28). In spite of its declaratory policy adjustment, China's behaviour "remained inconsistent with non-proliferation norms in the post-Cold War period" (Davis 1995: 595). The adaptation feature of Chinese ACD policy has not seriously changed (Segal 1997; Johnston 1996), and this is mainly because the Chinese perspective "still aimed at keeping the Chinese nuclear deterrent out of arms control negotiation" (Malik 1995).

In fact, those critics in the international community who were not happy with the ACD behaviour were more concerned with China's arms transfer behaviour than China's increasing participation in the major multilateral frameworks. Since its first



nuclear test in 1964, China has gradually developed its nuclear capabilities, including the deployment of intercontinental ballistic missiles. During this period, the Chinese government's declaratory policy supported nuclear proliferation as a means of "breaking the hegemony of the superpowers." As the Chinese defence industries and technological sector developed, commercial factors have also become more important. This is particularly true with respect to nuclear missile-related technologies, and in the past decade, the role of the Chinese military-industrial complex in such exports has increased. China's behaviour with regard to weapons transfers as well as the production of certain classes of weapons leaves room for doubt about how fully it is complying with international regime and treaties (Lewis, Di and Xue 1991; Hu Weixing 1994; Gurtov and Hwang 1998).<sup>38</sup>

Nonetheless, it is remarkably true that Chinese involvement in international ACD institutions has dramatically increased in many respects over the last two decades. The number of treaties to which China is a party, as well as the number of ACD negotiations in which China participates, has been growing. China speaks more often and tables more presentation proposals. The question is not whether China supports the norm of ACD, but rather, how China embodies its national interest within the rules of the game. One of China's historical complaints about ACD issues was that the rules had been made by the great Western powers and then imposed on the rest of the world. Now, China is deliberately and strategically becoming involved in multilateral frameworks in order to form part of the international regime and seek for its national interest. This shift of behaviour is apparently congruent with the

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<sup>38</sup> China ranked at sixth position in the arms suppliers of major conventional weapons from 1992-1996. China possessed the 3.6 percent of whole arms trade during the period (*SIPRI Yearbook 1997*: 268).

constructivist approach which is gaining more credit among Chinese ACD experts (Chapter 4).

This chapter is concerned with Chinese external ACD policy and behaviour at the international level. Two approaches to the evolution of China's ACD policy are described. The clear distinction between Mao's and Deng's approach indicates a significant shift in the ACD policies. The shift brought growing participation in the multilateral ACD frameworks. The scope and pattern of the current participation in the multilateral ACD institutions will be explored in both global and regional terms. The precondition for moving towards the CTBT, that is, China's accession to the NPT and the formation of its international normative structure will be examined in the following sections. These were conducive to creating China's path towards entry to the CTBT.

## ***6.2. The Evolution of China's ACD Policy***

### **6.2.1. Mao's Ideological Approach since 1949**

Prior to 1978, the historical record of China's participation in ACD regime was extremely thin and was described by Johnston as at best dismissive (Johnston 1996: 34). Given the fact that the Soviet Union was the "big brother" in the socialist camp and played the monopolizing role in the ACD talks with the United States, China's interest lay in strengthening the security of the socialist camp. It was natural that China followed the Soviet Union's views. However, with the deterioration of Sino-

Soviet relations China began to distance itself from the Soviet Union. The ACD deals between two superpowers were likely to undermine its security and China's support for the Soviet Union on the ACD issues came to an end completely when the Soviet Union signed the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT, 1963) with the US (Wu Yun 1996: 578-9).

Mao Zedong was the paramount leader in charge of foreign policy. He saw the world as highly polarized between the East and West. He once simply regarded the atom bomb as one form of conventional weapon and held the view that the atom bomb could be countered by the "people's war." While developing nuclear weapons, he considered their development as support for the world's "oppressed people" (Zhu Mingquan 1997: 40-2). China regarded the regimes established by the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT, 1963), the NPT (1968) and the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT, 1974) as targeted at preventing China from gaining nuclear weapons or improving its nuclear arsenal. China denounced the multilateral process as well as the US-Soviet bilateral ACD agreements as "sham" disarmament in order to institutionalize and perpetuate superpower hegemony. The Chinese government often criticized the major military powers for recklessly engaging in nuclear testing and transfers of advanced-weapons technologies. It sought to act as the Third World's spokesperson for disarmament, on the argument that since the superpowers were the chief source of nuclear threat, they should be the first to reduce and destroy nuclear weapons thoroughly. Its long-standing official position, dating from the year before the Chinese first atomic test in October 1964, called for the "complete prohibition and thorough destruction" of nuclear weapons under a system of general and complete disarmament (Gurtov and Hwang 1998: 238).

Regarding China's ACD behaviour and policy in this period, one important thing was that China pronounced its NFU (no first use) policy. The next day after China successfully tested its first atom bomb, the Chinese government made its NFU assurance to the world. It said that,

The Chinese government declares solemnly: At any time and under any situation, China will not use nuclear weapons first (Zhu Mingquan 1997: 44).

In fact, the NFU was a strategic choice to complement the inferiority of its nuclear weapons to those of the US and the Soviet in terms of deterrent strategy. However, China recognized that it had made a serious commitment, unilaterally, as a first step toward the goal of the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. Since then, China consistently insisted that other nuclear weapon states should follow this Chinese step, and as a prerequisite to Chinese cooperation in the international ACD agenda.

Once China successfully tested its own weapon, it said that pending the creation of a disarmament system, lesser powers like China would have to develop nuclear forces to break the great powers' "nuclear monopoly." Agreements such as the one that the United States and the Soviet Union had concluded on the PTBT were unacceptable to China, inasmuch as they amounted to a freeze on nuclear-weapons development in order to maintain the superpower monopoly. The Chinese government argued then and since that China's nuclear force is defensive in nature, as illustrated by its small size and its consistent support of the principle of no-first-use of

nuclear weapons.<sup>39</sup> China criticized the discriminatory nature of the NPT reached in 1968 and refused to adhere to it. Instead, China declared that it would avoid nuclear proliferation and would not help other states in their efforts to develop nuclear weapons. As a result, China remained isolated from arms control activities in the international regime. During this period, the only international ACD regime that China supported was the establishment of nuclear weapon-free zones. China signed the treaty for the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America and Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco) in 1967.

### **6.2.2. Deng's Constitutive Approach since 1978**

As in other sectors in China, Deng Xiaoping's paradigmatic shift of foreign policy brought a gradual change in China's position on international ACD regimes. With the open-door policy, China recognized that a peaceful environment would be necessary for economic development and modernization. The arms reduction treaties between the United States and the Soviet Union such as START I and START II made substantial progress in disarmament. Moreover, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, China realized that, in the absence of a major superpower competition, it would be wiser to try to influence the international ACD process rather than remain isolated from it by doing nothing. The intricate verification regimes might offer China potential access to technologies, and at least Chinese scientists would have an

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<sup>39</sup> Segal distinguished China from the medium nuclear powers, such as Britain and France. According to him, China is the only poor peasant state to have achieved the status of a nuclear power and it is also the only nuclear power to have been at war with both the Soviet Union and the United States. China is also distinctive for having engaged in a number of territorial disputes with its neighbours and it has frequently displayed a willingness to use military force against them. Segal called these features "maverick qualities," which make China unique compared with other nuclear powers (Segal 1991: 189).

opportunity to benchmark their capacities against other countries. For instance, one Chinese scientist, the director of the Shanghai nuclear engineering research and development institute, acknowledged that since China joined the IAEA in 1984, it had benefited from the many technical and safety standards for nuclear power stations established by the organization (*Beijing Review* 23-29 Dec. 1991). By participation in the multilateral ACD framework, China would present its commitment to other countries, especially developing countries, as a major power.

China has enunciated the key principles of its ACD policy several times since 1978, when Deng Xiaoping took office. The preconditions for China's participation in the international ACD were withdrawn in stages on the basis of the US-Soviet strategic arms negotiations. First the total destruction, then substantial reduction (without defining them) and finally 50 percent reduction of all types of nuclear weapons and means of delivery were suggested. Even after the US-Soviet strategic arms negotiation reached a reduction of over 70 percent, China remained unwilling to join multilateral ACD negotiations, requesting that the US and Soviet cut their nuclear arsenal to the level of China's arsenal until the Chinese government joined the NPT in 1992 (Malik 1995; Zhu Mingquan 1997).

Despite the Chinese rhetoric on the surface, China prepared to abandon the general disarmament precondition that it had insisted on and called upon the superpowers to take a lead in disarmament. In the early 1980s, China made quiet inquiries at the UN about possible participation in the IAEA. Table 6.1. demonstrates the modest increase in the interaction with the international ACD agenda during the 1980s. The early treaties, such as the NPT, the TTBT, the PTBT and the BTWC,

were agreed by China in late 1980s and the early 1990s. In 1992, China joined the NPT that it had rejected in 1968. In 1996, China also agreed to accession to the CTBT, which is the highest nuclear test ban treaty that covers the content of the PTBT and TTBT.

**Table 6.1. China's participation in international ACD institution in 1980s**

year	Participation	Non-participation
1963		PTBT
1968		NPT
1972		BTWC
1974		TTBT
1978	UN Special Session on Disarmament	
1980	The UN First Committee on Disarmament (Conference on Disarmament, CD)	
1981	Inhumane weapons	
1983	Antarctic Treaty, Outer Space Treaty	
1984	IAEA, BTWC	
1986	PTBT	
1992	NPT	
1996	CTBT	

*Acronym:* Biological and Toxin Weapon Convention (BTWC); Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT); Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT)

*Source:* Monterey Institute of International Studies 2000, *Inventory of International Nonproliferation Organizations and Regimes.*

Since China first took part in the UN special session on disarmament in 1978, Chinese engagement in and interaction with multilateral ACD frameworks has increased gradually and continuously. In 1980, China joined the UN Committee on Disarmament (now, CD). More significantly, China gradually started to develop its overall cooperation with a group of international nuclear safety arrangements associated with the international non-proliferation regime. China formally joined the IAEA, stating that it would apply IAEA safeguards to any nuclear technology exports. In 1985, China declared that it would, of its own free will, submit part of its civilian nuclear facilities to the IAEA for safeguards. In 1988 China and the IAEA signed an

agreement on voluntary safeguards, under which China provided the IAEA with a listing of facilities subject to such safeguards. In November 1991, China officially announced that it would report to the IAEA on a regular basis any exports to or imports from non-nuclear weapon states involving nuclear materials of one effective kilogram or more (*China: Arms Control and Disarmament* 1995).

Johnston argues that China's participation necessarily involved formative "learning" (Johnston 1996: 34). It had a substantial constitutive effect on changing and formulating China's ACD behaviour and policy. More involvement with the international ACD institutions brought China a more challenging agenda and technical information. That process certainly required more Chinese experts and domestic ACD institutions that could deal with ACD issues. The constitutive shift resulted in China's accession to the NPT in 1992 and to other international institutions and treaties later on. The shift culminated in China's entry to the CTBT, which could freeze China into a permanent position of inferiority with respect to a given type of nuclear weapons system or technology. The detailed chronology of China's incremental participation and engagement in the multilateral ACD framework will be explored in the next section.



## **6.3. China's Growing Participation in Multilateral ACD Institutions**

### **6.3.1. Participation in International Institutions**

China, a nuclear-weapon state since 1964, opened itself to wider international exchange not only of trade but also in the security area in the late 1970s. China began to export arms and military technology on a significant scale and it also became a supplier of sensitive nuclear technology. China's exports posed major problems for the international ACD regimes because of China's failure to apply the safeguards and controls exercised by states complying with the NPT. As a result, the international community sustained efforts to draw China into the international ACD regimes through the multilateral ACD frameworks step by step. Over more than two decades, China's interaction with multilateral frameworks has achieved incremental but important progress. The engagement posture with China has produced Chinese participation in a number of international ACD frameworks. Table 6.2. shows details of China's overall participation.

### ***Major International Regimes***

Since China opened its doors, it has joined two important major international regimes, the CD (1980)<sup>40</sup> and the IAEA (1984).<sup>41</sup> The CD is a multilateral

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<sup>40</sup> The Conference on Disarmament (CD) was formed in 1979 as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum of the international community after agreement was reached among member states during the first special session of the UN General Assembly (UNGA) devoted to disarmament in 1978.

<sup>41</sup> The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was established in 1957 and consists of all 130 member states. Its functions are to encourage and assist the research development and practical application of atomic energy for peaceful uses throughout the world. To achieve the purpose, the IAEA established and administers safeguards designed to ensure that such activity, assisted by the Agency, is not used in such a way as to further any military purpose.

**Table 6.2. China's participation in the international ACD frameworks**

	Name of the Regime/Treaty	Year China joined	Year established	Member-ship
International Regimes	International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)	1984	1957	130
	Conference on Disarmament (CD)	1980	1979	66
Supplier Regimes	Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)	n	1975	38
	Zangger Committee (ZAC)	1998	1971	35
	Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)	n	1987	32
	Australia Group (AG)	n	1985	30
	Wassenaar Arrangement (WASS)	n	1995	33
International Treaties	NPT	1992	1968	187
	CTBT	1996	1996	155
	PTBT	n	1963	131
	Moon Agreement	n	1979	15
	Antarctic Treaty	1983	1959	44
	Outer Space Treaty	1983	1967	123
	Seabed Treaty	1991	1971	116
	BTWC	1984	1972	162
	Geneva Protocol	1929	1925	133
	CWC	1993	1993	172
	Inhumane Weapons Convention	1981	1981	79
	Convention on the Physical Protection	1989	1980	110
	Convention on Nuclear Safety	1996	1994	118
UN Register of Conventional Arms	1992	1992	* <sup>42</sup>	
Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones	Treaty of Tlatelolco	1973	1967	
	Treaty of Rarotonga	1987	1985	
	Bangkok Treaty	n	1995	
	Treaty of Pelindaba	1996	1996	

*Acronym:* Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies (WASS); Treaty Banning Nuclear-Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water (PTBT); Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Moon Agreement); Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Outer Space Treaty); Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof (Seabed Treaty); Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Biological and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (BTWC); Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous, or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (Geneva Protocol); Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (CWC); Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (Inhumane Weapons Convention); Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (Physical Protection); Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco); South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone (Treaty of Rarotonga); Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (Bangkok Treaty); African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Pelindaba Treaty).

*Note:* n means China's non-participation.

*Source:* Monterey Institute of International Studies 2000 *Inventory of International Nonproliferation Organizations and Regimes*; *China's National Defence* 1998; Arms Control Association *Fact Sheets*.

<sup>42</sup> All UN member states were invited to participate by providing information for each calendar year. The purpose of the UN Register of Conventional Arms is to serve as a universal and non-discriminatory confidence-building measure designed to give early warning and to prevent the excessive and de-stabilizing accumulation of arms. China has consistently contributed annual submissions of its arms imports and exports, and China has participated in subsequent reviews of the treaty process (<http://domino.un.org/register.nsf>).

Disarmament negotiating forum of the international community. The importance of the CD lies in its special relationship with the UN. The CD adopts its own rules of procedure and its own agenda, taking into account the recommendations made by the UNGA and the proposals presented by its members. It also reports to the UNGA annually and is funded by the UN. The agenda of the CD covers all multilateral arms control and disarmament issues. China participated in the CD in the early days of its activities in 1980, just one year after its establishment in 1979. This was a significant first step in China's engagement in the multilateral ACD frameworks. The CD negotiated such critical and numerous multilateral ACD agreements as the NPT, the Seabed treaties, the BTWC, the CWC and the CTBT during the last two decades and China's subsequent accession to those treaties had its origin in its prior participation in CD. Participation in the CD made the Chinese delegation aware of the international ACD issues and encouraged the Chinese ACD expert community to make China rethink its national interest.

The CD provided China with the negotiating opportunities of the ACD agenda. The IAEA, however, is a regulating body which applies safeguards to relevant activities at the request of member states under the NPT and other international treaties. The Agency's safeguard system made China reluctant to comply with it. Since China joined the IAEA in 1984, on many occasions, it was suspected of transferring missile and nuclear weapons technology to Pakistan and other sensitive technologies to the Middle East (Steinberg 1998). In 1992 China's ratification of the NPT made China commit itself to obtaining IAEA approval and safeguards for any exports of nuclear reactors and other major facilities covered under the NPT/IAEA system. In the face of international criticism, China formally announced that it would

not provide further assistance to nuclear facilities which were not subject to full IAEA safeguards in 1996. In addition, China tightened its export policy in 1997 (Chapter 8).

### *Supplier Regimes*

China long regarded participation in the Supplier Regimes as unattractive. China only joined the Zangger Committee, formed in 1971, in 1997. The regimes have limited membership and are concerned with the control of transferring sensitive weapons and technology.<sup>43</sup> The Supplier Regimes have no multilateral enforcement or verification mechanism. Moreover, the lack of “universality” among its membership freed the Chinese from considering themselves as representing the Third World states. The control exercised by the supplier regimes was not in China’s interest, especially concerning military defence establishment who wished to gain currency from weapons sales for military modernization. China’s reluctance to join the MTCR not only illustrates this but is also very controversial in evaluating Chinese ACD behaviour and cooperation. China frequently denounced the regime as a means whereby the US and western states were trying to impose their rule on China. China

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<sup>43</sup> The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) was established in 1975 and popularly referred to as the ‘London Club.’ The NSG seeks to restrict the export of sensitive items that can contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Zangger Committee was formed in 1971 when Claude Zangger drafted a ‘trigger list.’ The list covers sources of special fissionable materials and equipment or materials especially designed or prepared for the processing, use, or production of special fissionable materials. The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) was established in 1987. Initially, France, Germany, Italy, UK, and US gathered and discussed controlling the proliferation of nuclear capable ballistic missiles, including dual-use missile items. The MTCR’s goal is to limit the risks of proliferation of mass destruction (i.e. nuclear, chemical and biological weapons), by controlling the transfers that could make a contribution to delivery systems for such weapons. The Australia Group is an informal association to limit the spread of Chemical and Biological Weapons (CBW) through the control of chemical precursors, CBW equipment, and BW agents and organisms. The Wassenaar Arrangement succeeded to the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM) and promotes transparency and greater responsibility with regard to transfers of conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies.

believed that the regime was drawn up to target China, which was criticized for its missile sales to Middle Eastern states, such as Saudi Arabia, Iran and Syria.<sup>44</sup>

In 1992, under pressure from the US, the Chinese government agreed in writing that it would observe the MTCR's guidelines. However, those guidelines were less restrictive than those accepted by the members of the regime, and included only partly revised guidelines. From the Chinese point of view, the MTCR applied double standards in that it did not cover fighter aircraft, which is a major source of American and European export income, nor the military buildup of Taiwan, while it did cover missile technology, a main Chinese export. It is clear that China is not likely to change its policies in the near future and that the MTCR as a regime, therefore, has failed to obtain Chinese cooperation. In evaluating Chinese ACD policy and behaviour, China's violation of the MTCR and its recalcitrance is of most importance to observers. No sign of cognitive acceptance of the MTCR has most observers assess China's ACD policy as an adjustment rather than cognitive learning, even though the Chinese have learned what the MTCR involves. They have not incorporated it in their policies.

### ***International Treaties***

In contrast to the supplier regimes, China signed a number of international treaties. The percentage of all possible agreements which it has been eligible to sign, has increased rapidly over the last two decades, when the total number of signed treaties has increased to 14. By 2000, the only international treaties that China had

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<sup>44</sup> Significantly, China's White Paper on arms control and disarmament in 1995 made no mention of the MTCR, even though it specifically addressed China's commitment to a number of other

not signed were the PTBT and the Moon Agreement.<sup>45</sup> However, China unilaterally committed itself to the PTBT, pledging to end atmospheric testing in 1986. The PTBT became meaningless in 1996 when it was substantially replaced by the new CTBT. In the 1980s, China acceded to the Antarctic Treaty, the Outer Space Treaty, the BTWC and Inhumane Weapons Convention. Some accessions were not significant because they did not require a dramatic shift of China's ACD policy or constrain China's military power. China's agreement to the BTWC and the Inhumane Weapons Convention indicate a potential commitment to further constraints on military options.<sup>46</sup>

In the 1990s, China's ACD policy and behaviour featured more conspicuous participation in the multilateral frameworks. Following its entry into the NPT in 1992, China signed numerous contemporary ACD treaties and took part in many negotiating processes. China has formally acceded to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC, 1993), the UN Register of Conventional Arms (1993), the CTBT (1996) and the Convention on Nuclear Safety (1996). China also supported multilateral negotiations on a fissile-material production cutoff convention. Among those agreements, the accession to the NPT was one of the most critical landmarks of China's ACD policy. China opposed the NPT vociferously, prior to 1992, because of its "discriminative nature," placing no constraints on nuclear powers while severely

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international ACD regimes (*China: Arms Control and Disarmament* 1995).

<sup>45</sup> The Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and other Celestial Bodies (Moon Agreement) was opened for signature in 1979 following an initiative by the Soviet Union. The treaty confirmed the demilitarization of the Moon and also prohibited the use or threat of use of force on the Moon, which is reserved exclusively for peaceful activities.

<sup>46</sup> China is nonetheless believed to have maintained the offensive biological warfare programme it had prior to its accession to the convention, including the manufacture of biological warfare agents. The US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) recently reported that it was highly probable that China remains noncompliant with its obligations (*Tracking Nuclear Proliferation* 1998: 60).

restraining the activities of non-nuclear states. At the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, China supported the consensus that the Treaty should continue in force indefinitely. China's accession to the NPT also created the potential for the negotiation of subsequent treaties, like the CTBT and the CWC, which entailed a high cost for China's military modernization. In particular, Chinese adherence to the CTBT was both a major Chinese step toward the acceptance of constraints on its nuclear arsenal and a significant international ACD accomplishment. Being far behind the United States and the former Soviet Union in nuclear weapons development, China argued that it was sacrificing its nuclear capability. The case study of the CTBT will be explored in Chapter 7.

### ***Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones***

China signed the regional nuclear weapons-free zone treaties soon after they were opened for signature. Like other nuclear powers, China had no reason to hesitate to join the treaties, given the fact that the treaties would not restrain China's nuclear power. In the case of the Bangkok Treaty, none of the nuclear-weapon states has yet signed the Protocols. The parties to the treaty are mostly the Southeast Asian countries.

### **6.3.2. Participation in Regional Institutions**

Since *heping yu fazhan* (peace and development) has been the most primary catchphrase of the last two decades, regional stability has become the most critical security interest for the Chinese modernization drive. After the end of the Cold War, China readjusted its foreign policy on a regional level, the Asian-Pacific region. The

centrifugal regionalization that resulted from the breakup of bipolarity fostered regional security dialogues. Emerging multilateral security mechanisms in the Asia-Pacific region could be important vehicles for promoting long-term peace and stability. China has actively participated in regional security frameworks since then.

**Table 6.3. China's participation in the regional security frameworks**

Name	Year China joined	Year established	Membership
ARF	1994	1994	22
CICA	1993	1993	15
CSCAP	1996	1993	16
NEACD	1993	1993	6
WMPCS	1991	1990	11
APSF	n	1997	
KP		1988	

*Acronym:* ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF); Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA); Council on Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region (CSCAP); Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD); Workshops on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea (WMPCS); Asia-Pacific Security Forum (APSF); Kathmandu Process (KP).

*Source:* <http://faculty.law.ubc.ca>; <http://www.kazakhemb.org>; <http://www.aseansec.org>; <http://www.cscap.org>; China's National Defence 2000).

China's involvement in the regional arrangements has been significant. It has been party to the ARF since the beginning.<sup>47</sup> China has also made itself available for multilateral non-governmental dialogue on security issues through a number of other regional forums, such as the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA), and Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD).<sup>48</sup>

<sup>47</sup> The ARF was initiated by the ASEAN countries and established in 1994 to intensify its external dialogue on political and security matters as a means of building cooperative ties with states in the Asia-Pacific region. Its main objective is to foster constructive dialogue and consultation on political and security issues of common interest and concern; and to make significant contribution to efforts to CBMs and preventive diplomacy in the region (<http://www.aseansec.org>). For China's participation in ARF, see Johnston (1999).

<sup>48</sup> The NEACD was organized by the University of California's Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC). The aim of NEACD is to enhance mutual understanding, confidence, and cooperation through meaningful but unofficial dialogue among China, Japan, Russia, the United States and both South and North Korea. Although North Korea has not participated in any of the eight formal NEACD meetings held since 1993, the NEACD brought together senior officials and academicians and security specialists from the other five countries for dialogue on political, security, and economic issues of concern to all parties.



China also began to attend the multilateral security dialogue on maritime issues like the workshops on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea. At the end of 1996, China also joined the largely non-governmental Council for Security and Cooperation in the Asian Pacific region (CSCAP), which focuses on security dialogue and includes individual Taiwanese scholars and security specialists in their private capacities.<sup>49</sup>

China also participated in the unofficial meetings, known as the “Kathmandu Process” (KP) that the UN Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific has sponsored for the past ten years. Regional scholars and government officials gather in Kathmandu to discuss various regional and global disarmament issues. China did not join the APSF, which was established in 1997 and sponsored by the Taiwan Institute for National Policy Research. Its agenda includes PRC-Taiwan cross-straits relations, a topic which is specifically not on the agenda of any dialogue in which China participates formally.

China is gradually coming to accept the usefulness of military transparency, Confidence Building Measures (CBMs), and preventive diplomacy, especially on territorial questions. More significantly, China has taken concrete steps toward enhancing security on a multilateral basis. For instance, in April 1996, China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan signed an agreement on confidence-building in military matters that concern their mutual border areas.<sup>50</sup>

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<sup>49</sup> The CSCAP has been described as ‘the most ambitious proposals to date for a regularizing non-governmental process on Asia-Pacific security matters. It is now looking forward to consolidating its links to the ARF (<http://www.cscap.org>).

<sup>50</sup> In April 1996, China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan met in Shanghai for the first time and signed the Agreement on Confidence-Building in the Military Field Along the Border Areas.

Multilateral regional security forums provide a framework for enhanced US involvement in Asian security that complements the United States' current bilateral security arrangement. In a similar way, China's active involvement can be interpreted as supporting both sides of the coin. China's White Paper describes China's position on regional security frameworks:

China supports regional security dialogue and cooperation at different levels, through various channels, in different forms and in a step-by-step manner pursuant to the principles of participation on an equal footing and reaching consensus through consultation in the spirit of seeking common ground while reserving differences (*China's National Defence* 2000: 51).

The above paragraph indicates that China supports the relaxed form, "consultation," of regional security cooperation. Given the kaleidoscopic opportunities in the region, China sought to reorganize the regional political and security terrain while keeping a sharp lookout for the rapid institutionalization of the dialogue. Stressing the "equal footing" and "consensus," the White Paper made clear the object of its caution.

China maintains that the multilateral security dialogue and cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region should be oriented toward and characterized by mutual respect instead of the strong bullying the weak, cooperation instead of confrontation, and seeking consensus instead of imposing one's own will on others (*China's National Defence* 2000: 51).

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One year later, the five states also signed the Agreement on Mutual Reduction of Military Forces in the Border Area (*China's National Defence* 2000: 53-56).

In this paragraph, the white paper states that the “dialogue” and “cooperation” should be based on mutual respect and opposed to hegemonic intervention like the “strong bullying the weak” and “imposing one’s own will on others.” Even though the paper does not elucidate who bullies and imposes, it alludes to and targets the United States which has woven the political and security structure in the Asia-Pacific region. China wanted to expand its influence in the region and to counterbalance the United States’ dominance by encouraging a multipolar system in the region. Moreover, the Asia-Pacific region allows more room for China to be a new stakeholder because the region can develop the flexible and consultative type of multilateral framework which China favours.

In the face of the developing unipolar world order after the Gulf War, China launched an initiative to promote a multipolar system in the region. In 1992, China made a five-point proposal on the Asian Pacific security order. The proposal included the following principles: no foreign military bases; no military alliances against third parties; peaceful resolution of territorial disputes; prevention of arms race; and no first use of nuclear weapons (*Renmin ribao* 19 August 1992). Qian Qichen’s proposal was further articulated by Sha Zukang, the Chinese ambassador to the UN Conference on Asia Pacific Security and Mutual Confidence Building (*Renmin ribao* 3 Feb. 1993). Although the proposal expressed the general principles of the Chinese position, it was a clear indication that China would play an active role in regional security dialogues and seek to reorganize the regional political and security structure. The Chinese government has called for the abandonment of the cold war mentality and the establishment of a “new security concept” under which security would be based, not on military alliances and arms build-ups, but rather on the principles of mutual trust

and serving the common interest. Countries should cooperate and promise to solve disputes and conflicts by peaceful means (Chapter 8).

China's approach to regional-security cooperation would seem to serve its interests quite well. It aligns China with regional sentiment in favour of nurturing the "habit of dialogue" through gradual confidence building founded on economic and other kinds of nonmilitary cooperation. To defuse U.S. influence in the region, which is backed by security treaties, China seeks to establish multipolar "cooperation" and the "equality" of states as norms of political relations.

### **6.3.3. An Evaluation of China's International Participation**

A recent study of China's involvement in multilateral ACD institutions concluded that China "is at a crossroads" in this matter (Evans 1996). An evaluation of China's ACD policy gave more credits to "adaptation" than to "learning" (Chapter 2.3.3.). China's involvement in the international ACD frameworks already extends for two decades. One can wonder if it is not likely to remain indefinitely at this crossroads. China's contradictory behaviour confused observers over the question of "learning" or "adaptation." The contrast between the participation rate and the reluctance to adhere to specific regimes (as have seen in most supplier regimes) is an ambiguous factor in evaluating China's ACD policy.

Some observers paid more attention to the optimistic reasons. Inspired by the "epistemic community" theory, the role of the growing Chinese ACD community and its transnational linkage has increased over time and hypothetically has resulted in the

shift of China's ACD policy (Johnston 1996; Godement 1997). Others have focused on the epistemological level and made efforts to characterize the Chinese ACD perspective (Garrett and Glaser 1995). There are also observers who seek for the institutional factors that caused China's contradictory ACD behaviour and crippled its international reputation to apply norms (Lewis, Xue 1994; Lewis, Hua and Xue 1991; Hu Weixing 1994; 1999).

It is not clear that the growth of China's ACD expert community which has presented more flexible and norm-oriented views has been salient to Chinese discourse. There is no evidence that the discourse has decisively influenced the China's ACD decision-making process or that it has produced a significant paradigmatic shift in China's policy. Nonetheless, over time, there is a record of China's having turned passive or negative participation into more constructive moves as has been demonstrated. As the chronological evidence indicates, there is no doubt that there has been a dramatic increase in China's participation in the numerous multilateral ACD frameworks.

Chinese participation in the international ACD frameworks has been a complicated process which has entailed a reconsideration of the state's preferences and interests, unless they were given exogenously. The explanation may be found in the broad and the long term. Johnston developed this argument and explained the dramatic increase in participation with a path-dependent logic. He argued that China's initial involvement in international security institutions "placed China in an environment where there were incentives to become more involved." Increasing levels of involvement lead to increasing returns from participation. These returns

included access to new information and resources of use to these organizations, and social backpatting from participation in a legitimate community (Johnston and Evans 1999: 239-40).

Expanding Johnston's conceptualization, the "dynamic of state and institution" contains two logical steps: the previous impact on the *state t0* by *dynamic interaction t1*; and the impact on the *state t1* by *dynamic interaction t2*. For instance, when the question about why China joined the CTBT (*institution t2*) is raised, the answer is to seek for what the important footpath to the CTBT (the NPT, *institution t1*) was. The next question would be about how the Chinese CTBT experience (*Dynamic interaction t2*) might affect China itself (*state t1* -----> *state t2*) and led to the next engagement step (*institution t3*). Historically, China's participation in the CD in 1980 corresponded to the subsequent participation growth in the UN agenda. Once engaged in the CD, this gave some incentives to stay there, for example, information and prestige, as a responsible power. The incentive structure consolidates the relationship between the state and the institution. The continuous interaction between the state and the institution features a dynamic influence on the state itself; domestic institutions and perspectives. Participation in the CD required and fostered a level of expertise and sophistication in the domestic institutions, which, in turn, influence and play some role in the decision-making process at the next step on the international ACD agenda.

In the next section, the question of why China joined the CTBT will be explored at an international level. There are some factors at the international level that influenced China's decision to agree to join the CTBT in international level. First, as

a footpath to the CTBT, China's accession to the NPT (institution1) will be described. Then, the normative structure that underpinned the CTBT negotiations will be explored along with the US regime leadership which was also an important factor in creating the momentum to proceed to the CTBT negotiation.

## **6.4. *The International Engaging Force for the CTBT***

### **6.4.1. Entry into the NPT: the pathway to the CTBT**

The Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is the fulcrum of the international nonproliferation regime, with a universal membership of 187 countries in 2000. The relative universality that more countries have ratified the NPT than any other ACD agreement gives the treaty preeminent significance. Membership of the NPT was, itself, not seriously onerous for China and it gave China the potential for further ACD negotiation. The CTBT was one of the critical debates at the NPT conference. The linkage between CTBT and NPT was the issue that had consistently generated disputes during the conferences to review the NPT since the 1980s (Rauf and Johnson 1995; Howlett and Simpson 1992). China's entry into NPT was a stepping stone to the CTBT agreement.

China had criticized the NPT as "the discriminatory treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons," even though China formally pronounced as its basic position that it would not "advocate, encourage or engage in nuclear proliferation." The "imbalanced and unfair" relationship between nuclear and non-

nuclear states was the main point of Chinese argument, because, from the Chinese point of view, the treaty only limited “the horizontal proliferation” but imposed no limit to “the vertical proliferation” (the continuing development and improvement of the nuclear arsenals of the nuclear states). Thus the treaty was thought to be a rationale for imposing unreasonable restrictions on the nuclear cooperation of the Third World countries (Yu Zhiyong 1988b; Tan Han 1992). Deng Xiaoping’s ACD policy, as explored in the previous section, made an adjustment to its policy on the Treaty in 1990s. With the end of the Cold War, the Chinese government, trying to break through the international isolation brought about by the Tiananmen Incident, sent its first observer delegation to the 1990 NPT Review Conference. At the Conference, the Chinese submitted a favourable statement titled “Document on Basic Positions.” The Chinese ambassador Hou Zhitong also gave a favourable speech at the conference on September 11, 1990. He remarked that “the treaty has played a positive role in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons” (Van Doren and Bunn 1990: 8-12).

China’s accession to the NPT was pushed by international pressure. The worldwide nonproliferation sentiment was stirred by China’s violation of the NPT regime in the early 1990s. The April 1991 revelations about China’s secret reactor project in Algeria put China in an awkward position. And the announcement by French President Mitterrand in June 1991 that France would join the NPT, also pressured China to accept the NPT regime. These events were factored into a contentious US Congressional debate over China’s most favoured nation (MFN) trade status. The MFA signalled the change, stating that “China has not yet decided whether or not to join the nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty,” but was continuing to



study the question of participating (Xinhua News Agency 27 June 1991 from Jia Hao 1999a: 151). The turning point came in August 1991 when Li Peng stated China's decision "in principle" to join the NPT when he met the then Japanese Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu. Chinese leaders also promised the Secretary of State, Baker, during his November 1991 trip to Beijing, that China would join the NPT by April 1992. It was approved by the 144-member Standing Committee of the National People's Congress at the end of 1991, and took place on March 9, 1992 (*Beijing Review* 13-19 Jan. 1992).<sup>51</sup> China became the fourth acknowledged nuclear-weapon state to accede to the NPT before the French accession which came five months later, in August.

Accession to the NPT was an important landmark in China's ACD policy and behaviour. The NPT is the most influential and cooperative regime of the international non-proliferation frameworks. This meant that China's long detachment from the international ACD regimes would be ended and that Chinese behaviour would be restrained by the NPT regime.<sup>52</sup> As a "responsible" nuclear weapon state and a new member of NPT, the post-NPT ACD policy and behaviour would conflict potentially with the domestic institutions' vested interests, mostly the PLA, in arms sales. It would also lead to the unprecedented involvement in future negotiations of international ACD agenda like the CTBT.

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<sup>51</sup> In his speech at the Standing Committee, Li Peng said that "China's participation would clearly demonstrate its independent foreign policy of peace and expand its image of reform as well as promote the treaty's role in world peace and stability" (*Beijing Review* 13-19 Jan. 1992).

<sup>52</sup> Before the entry into the NPT, the only international constraints on Chinese arms sales were the IAEA's safeguards. However, the IAEA was a cooperative body regarding nuclear weapons rather than an established regime with effective verification tools. Since 1984, China officially was a member of the IAEA and accepted its safeguard obligations, but was frequently suspected of violating them by international society.

China's calculations and motives for joining the NPT are complicated. Most observers regarded them as showing a cost-free and benefit-seeking attitude, given the Chinese *realpolitik* approach. According to these views, China's calculation and motivation lay in some categories, such as securing the US MFN status for potential economic benefits and concern about its image as a responsible power.

First, without the NPT membership, China would remain the only acknowledged nuclear-weapon state not to be a party to the treaty, and would continue to share non-NPT status with threshold nuclear states such as India, Pakistan, and Israel. Not only would this associate China with lesser powers in a general sense, it would also link Beijing with its arch rival, New Delhi, as the main critics of the treaty. With world interest in nonproliferation growing, the prospect of observing the 25-year NPT Review and Extension Conference in 1995 with the same status as India, was probably distasteful. China found the marginal rewards of joining the NPT as a nuclear-weapon state preferable to continued isolation and China also hoped to deflect criticism from its nuclear export policy.

Second, signing the NPT was a step toward securing normal MFN trade status from the United States, as the signature removed the possibility that MFN status could be denied if Congress were to link MFN with NPT membership. In trying to promote a constructive bilateral relationship, President Bush supported China's accession to the treaty and its increased support for global nonproliferation efforts when he recommended normal trade tariffs for China in June 1992 and vetoed legislation to tie conditions to MFN status in September 1992.

Third, NPT membership would secure China's ability to purchase nuclear goods and services for Chinese nuclear power plants, particularly from France and other countries increasingly unwilling to sell nuclear technology to non-NPT states. The loosening of some U.S. controls over sensitive exports to China and new reactor deals with France, Canada, Japan, Russia, and South Korea in 1994 seemed to confirm the benefit in Beijing's signing the NPT.

Fourth, China would accept the NPT on account of its security. China was concerned about the dangers of nuclear proliferation in volatile ethnic, religious, cultural and political conflicts and the NPT could contribute to China's security (Davis 1995: 587-94; Johnston 1996: 50-1). Many Chinese ACD experts were enthusiastically concerned with the proliferation problem on a global level (Chapter 4.4.). Whatever concrete cost-benefit calculation was evaluated by Chinese government, in the long term, Chinese analysts confirmed that joining the NPT would be more advantageous to China than remaining outside the NPT regime (Garrett and Glaser 1995: 50). The policy change meant that China would play an active role in the game of the international ACD regimes.

China's objective can be interpreted in a constructivist fashion from its official statement. On October 21, 1992, at the First Committee of the 47<sup>th</sup> Session of the UNGA, the Chinese Ambassador Hou Zhitong acknowledged China's accession to the NPT and stated that,

China is ready to put forward the following proposals...NPT is one of the most **universally accepted international instruments** in the field of arms control.

Although **not free from defects and inadequacies**, it plays a positive role in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons...We believe that in order to increase the universality of NPT and **strike a balance between the rights and obligations of its states parties**, it would be of the utmost importance for the major nuclear weapon powers to accelerate the process of nuclear disarmament and abandon the policy of nuclear deterrence, for all nuclear weapon states to provide security assurances to non-nuclear states and unconditionally undertake the obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, for nuclear industry capable states to actively promote international co-operation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy in benefit of the economic and social development of various countries, and for the international non-proliferation regime **to be strengthened with the full participation of non-nuclear-weapon states** (*Beijing Review* 9-15 Nov. 1992).<sup>53</sup>

It was important for China to accept the NPT as a substantive entity rather than to dismiss it as a discriminatory one. China began to admit that the NPT was a “universally accepted international instrument” and played “a positive role” in international ACD efforts. Apparently, this acceptance was associated with China’s active involvement in UN activities. Since the open-door policy, China has recognized the importance of the UN as a “focus of China’s multilateral diplomacy.” China has actively participated in many UN activities (Kim 1999) and now the next step had to be decided. “With a constructive attitude,” China defined its role as a balancer “between the rights and obligations of its states parties,” identifying itself with the non-nuclear weapon states (mostly, the developing countries). China requested the nuclear weapon states to “undertake the obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons” (NFU) and to abandon their nuclear deterrence policy and to thoroughly destroy their nuclear arsenals for the non-proliferation regime. Apparently, China targeted the US policy and expressed the right to participate on an

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<sup>53</sup> The emphasis is added to the phrases by making words bold in the dissertation.

equal footing in the ACD discussion rather than let it be monopolized or manipulated by a few big powers. The Chinese delegate continually reiterated that,

In order to enhance international peace and security and to promote disarmament process, **hegemonism** and **power politics** must be completely removed from international relations and all states... Such a practice of double standards and breach of faith in the field of arms control is both typical of **hegemonism** and **power politics**, and is detrimental to international peace, security and stability (*Beijing Review* 9-15 Nov. 1992).

The above statement was the Chinese traditional argument in dealing with international affairs and targeting the superpowers, chiefly the United States, in the post-Cold War era. The propagandist opposition to “hegemonism” and “power politics” can be understood in the sense of the Chinese *realpolitik* rhetoric, which deprecates the infringement of sovereignty and interference in internal affairs by foreign powers. Observers found the origin of this in the humiliating experiences of China’s colonial history (Hunt 1996). Although the rhetoric was used as an excuse and propaganda to avoid condemnation from the international community, the rhetoric was also China’s own principal aim in the international arena when China moved in a cooperative way. In some sense, it was intended to create a counter-ideology or elicit support from other countries, checking and undermining the US regime leadership at international level. As a matter of fact, it is not clear how much the rhetoric succeeded in attracting international opinion, especially from the Third World. However, it is apparent that the rhetoric was unwelcome in the United States.

China speculated that joining the NPT would be beneficial whereas isolation from it was alienating from the international ACD discussion and negotiations. This hardly

legitimized China's earlier counter-attack against international pressure and criticism and undermined China's reasons and reputation. However, China decided to play inside rather than outside the international arena. Certainly, China could gain the benefits of an insider, such as technical information and security. Notwithstanding, the most important thing was no more alienation but rather, participation in the game. China could have a voice in international ACD decision-making and could hope strategically to influence the process with the leverage of support from the developing countries. However, the consequences went beyond the expectations of the Chinese government. Once engaged in the NPT regime, a path-dependence phenomenon was generated. With the emergence of the subsequent agenda on the ACD table, China had to play as a responsible actor and the cost was more than it ever expected, namely acceding to the CTBT.

#### **6.4.2. Formation of the International Normative Structure**

##### ***Linkage of NPT and CTBT***

While the NPT regime was almost universally supported, a few states did wish to acquire nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. In the 1990s, the NPT regime was facing a number of severe challenges. In 1991, the Gulf War disclosed that Iraq, an NPT signatory, had conducted a nuclear weapons programme under the IAEA safeguards. This revelation made the international community rethink the efficiency of the NPT rules. Moreover, the break-up of the Soviet Union generated fears that its nuclear weapons and the vast stockpiles of fissile material might not be secure and that the potential proliferants could purchase those materials and technology. Thus, the NPT regime was given the highest importance by the

international community (Department for Disarmament Affairs of the United Nations 2000: 2-4; Bunn 1994: 52-60).

The CTBT had been a controversial issue in the NPT review conference and it failed to reach an agreement until 1995.<sup>54</sup> At the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, the five nuclear-weapon states finally agreed to conclude the CTBT “no later than 1996” under the pressure of non-nuclear weapon states. The non-nuclear weapon states further pressed for a continuation of the moratorium on testing at the NPT extension conference. In fact, numerous non-nuclear states had long appealed for the conclusion of the CTBT. They viewed the CTBT as an essential step in disarmament and critical to stopping the nuclear arms race. Indeed, concluding the CTBT as soon as possible became a condition for maintaining an indefinitely effective NPT regime (Dhanapala 1996; Rauf and Johnson 1995). The signing of the CTBT by the five nuclear states would not only demonstrate their good faith in Article VI of the NPT,<sup>55</sup> but also show their willingness to forego an essential means to develop nuclear weapons. Though technically the CTBT can only play a limited role in preventing nuclear proliferation, the CTBT supposedly gave important symbolic significance to the NPT regime, which was beneficial to all countries including China.

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<sup>54</sup> Technically, the NPT required one review conference five years after treaty entry into force, and allowed for additional review conferences to be scheduled every five years, if desired by a majority of NPT signatories (NPT Article VIII.3). The CTBT was clearly a major consideration at each review conference.

<sup>55</sup> Article VI designates the duty of each of the Parties for nuclear disarmament. “Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control” (Monterey Institute of International Studies 2000 *Inventory of International Nonproliferation Organization and Regimes*: 104).

## *Nuclear Test Moratoria*

The international atmosphere of the CTBT negotiations had been established by the pronouncements of a nuclear testing moratorium by the nuclear weapon states except China. As a preliminary step toward the CTBT negotiations, four nuclear weapon states, the United States, the Soviet Union, France and the United Kingdom, created the momentum and contributed the norm (CTBT)-setting in the international community. The normative structure put significant pressure on China.

**Table 6.4. Nuclear Tests and the International Nuclear Moratorium**

<b>year</b>	<b>USSR (Russia)</b>	<b>US</b>	<b>UK</b>	<b>France</b>	<b>China</b>
1985	10	17	1	8	-
1986	-	14	1	8	-*
1987	23	14	1	8	1
1988	16	15	-	8	1
1989	7	11	1	9	-
1990	1	8	1	6	2
1991	-	7	1	6	-
1992	-	6	-	-	2
1993	-	-	-	-	1
1994	-	-	-	-	2
1995	-	-	-	5	2
1996	-	-	-	1	2
<b>Total nuclear test</b>	<b>713</b>	<b>1,032</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>210</b>	<b>45</b>

*Note:* \* China announced halting atmospheric nuclear tests on March 21, 1986. In fact, it had ceased since 1981. All Chinese nuclear tests were conducted underground since then.

*Source:* SIPRI Yearbook 1997: 434-5

Table 6.4. demonstrates that the nuclear weapon states gradually and seriously reduced the number of nuclear tests from late 1980s and started the nuclear test moratorium in early 1990s. The Soviet Union, which had unilaterally halted its nuclear tests in 1985, declared an immediate one-year moratorium on testing in 1991.



The United Kingdom and France replied to the nuclear test moratorium in 1992. The United States joined the moratorium in 1993.

Given the fact that nuclear tests were required not only for developing new types of warheads, but also for improving warhead safety and maintaining the reliability of weapons, the nuclear weapon states had prepared for test moratorium. For example, the United States had started an extensive science-based Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program to include many experimental facilities. With these efforts, the United States was believed to have high confidence in its enduring stockpile with nuclear testing (Collina 1997: 5-8).<sup>56</sup> France from 1991 also invested huge money in the PALEN (Preparation for Limitations on Nuclear Testing) project to verify the quality and safety of the weapons in service in laboratory experiments. The United Kingdom had long enjoyed a broad range of technology sharing with the US, including data on weapons performance as well as on safety and reliability, since its tests were conducted jointly with the US at the Nevada Test Site in 1962 (*SIPRI Yearbook* 1997: 432). Russia could not implement an expensive stockpile stewardship programme for political and economic reasons, but with rich data and experiences from many tests it would have had fewer worries about the safety or reliability of its stockpile.<sup>57</sup>

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<sup>56</sup> The Letter of Submittal by Madeleine Albright to President Clinton confirmed this fact. In the letter, Madeleine Albright pointed that "the US decision to pursue actively a comprehensive test-ban was conditional on having the capability to ensure a high level of confidence in the safety and reliability of the US stockpile" (*Letter of Submittal* 20 September 1997 from <http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/ctbtpage>).

<sup>57</sup> This technical preparedness for the CTBT was, in a way, China's excuse for the six nuclear tests during the negotiation process from 1994 to 1996. And also it was China's justification for the request for technical support in securing warhead reliability and safety in the post-CTBT era (Sun Xiangli 1997: 6-10).

It is not clear how and why the CTBT norm prevailed in the 1990s. However, the CTBT had long been an aspiration, since international efforts on regulating the nuclear tests achieved the PTBT, in 1963. Since the agenda of CTBT had been debated at the NPT review conference in 1980s, the normative structure of the CTBT in UN activities had been conspicuous. The efforts to explore the verification needs for the CTBT were undertaken by the Group of Scientific Experts in the CD, while strong calls were made for negotiation on a test ban by many non-nuclear weapon states. As early as in December 1990, the UNGA resolution called for the conclusion of the CTBT, which was favoured by 140 countries (Resolution 45/51, *UN General Assembly* 1990: 52-3). In November 1993, the UN First Committee approved the test ban draft resolution with the unprecedented support of 157 countries. This was adopted by the UNGA on December 16 without a vote (Resolution 48/70, *UN General Assembly* 1993: 72-3).

### **6.4.3. US Regime Leadership**

With the rise of a normative structure in the UN, the United States played an important role in agenda-setting.<sup>58</sup> After the demise of the Soviet Union, the United States was the only remaining major power with the ability to assure the functioning and further development of the existing institutions dealing with nuclear non-proliferation. Though a nuclear attack on US territory was not very likely, the United States wanted to prevent the spread of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD), especially in regions of conflict, where American troops abroad and those of

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<sup>58</sup> Hegemonic stability theory ascribes an important role to powerful actors, or 'hegemons,' in upholding cooperating. Even in institutional theory, where the existence of a hegemon is neither sufficient nor necessary to explain the rise and stability of institutions, support by powerful states is still important for the stability of the regime (Gilpin 1987; Krasner 1991).

their allies could be threatened or where the American reputation in the region could be seriously impaired.

In contrast to the Bush administration's reluctant policy on a nuclear test moratorium, the Clinton administration saw a CTBT as primarily a nonproliferation tool, throwing a roadblock into the path of nations intent on developing nuclear weapons. In the newly adapted US "nonproliferation policy package", the Clinton administration proposed to initiate multilateral talks on CD and supported an early conclusion of the CTBT. In April 1993, US President Clinton and Russia President Yeltsin agreed at the Vancouver Summit that negotiations on a multilateral nuclear test ban should commence at an early date and that two governments would consult with each other accordingly. After debates over testing policy with the Energy Department, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the White House Science Advisor, in July 3, 1993, President Clinton announced that the US would extend the moratorium, at least, through 1994 unless another nation conducted a test and would pursue completion of a CTBT by September 1996 (*Chronology of key events in the Effort to End Nuclear Weapons Testing: 1945-1999*, <http://www.clw.org/coalition>).

The US committed itself to set the agenda and, on August 10, 1993, the CD finally decided to give its ad hoc committee on a Nuclear Test Ban a mandate to begin negotiations on the CTBT in January 1994. However, it should be noted that there was dichotomy between the CTBT's goal as perceived by the US and that of the non-aligned states (G-21). The US believed that achievement of a CTBT would be a major step toward further constraining the spread of nuclear weapons –

“nonproliferation,” while the G-21 countries considered the CTBT as an indispensable measure to put an end to the nuclear arms race and achieve the complete elimination of those weapons - “disarmament” (Mallin 1995: 4-5). In the CTBT submittal letter to US President, the US interest in CTBT was made clear.

The decision to support a concerted effort to conclude a comprehensive test ban was thus based on the careful assessment that any possible risks were outweighed by the benefits to United States of nonproliferation and other security objectives in constraining the spread and improvement of nuclear weapon capability (*Letter of Submittal* by Department of State 20 September 1997 from <http://www.state.gov/global/arms/ctbtpage>).

This dichotomy was at the root of many of the challenges in successfully negotiating the CTBT. China was the only nuclear weapon state to argue from a disarmament perspective. China repeatedly declared that it has maintained its position of complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons and a CTBT in this context. Therefore, China’s rationale for the CTBT negotiation was ambiguous in that a CTBT needs to be considered as one of a series of measures aimed at halting nonproliferation and leading to eventual nuclear disarmament. The next chapter will explore Chinese negotiating behaviour at the CTBT talks in CD.

## CHAPTER 7. China and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

*Although the final draft of the treaty probably did not totally satisfy any country, it was in general balanced...The Completion of the test ban treaty would be an important and practical step in the gradual process of achieving complete nuclear disarmament (Renmin ribao 27 August 1996).*

### 7.1. Introduction

#### 7.1.1. The Process and Nature of the CTBT

A comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT) has long been on the nuclear arms control agenda from the 1960s to the 1980s. A ban on nuclear weapon tests was first put on the international disarmament agenda in 1954 by Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, after the United Kingdom had joined the United States and the Soviet Union in conducting nuclear tests. Public opinion was gravely concerned not only about the escalating nuclear arms race but also about radioactive fallout and the consequent health and environmental damage (Hoffmann 1997). However, multilateral talks in Geneva throughout the Cold War era were deadlocked over the competing security interests of the United States and the Soviet Union and the practical problems of establishing an intrusive monitoring and inspection system for the treaty (Johnson 1996b: 55). Little progress was achieved in this period beyond the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT, 1963) and the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT, 1974).<sup>59</sup> Since a group of non-aligned states demanded that the nuclear powers

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<sup>59</sup> The three states, the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union, settled for the PTBT that covered only nuclear explosions in the atmosphere, outer space, and under water, abandoning the attempt to establish an intrusive and mutually-acceptable verification regime. The TTBT proposed that

committed themselves to a timetable for negotiation of a CTBT in the 1990 NPT Review Conference, pressures for a CTBT began to mount. With the disintegration of the Soviet Union and growing concern over nonproliferation, some nuclear powers started to pursue the cause of a test ban treaty. They considered it as seriously performing a nonproliferation function rather than as disarmament that would constrain their own capacity, while appeasing the non-nuclear weapon states in the run-up to the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference.

After negotiations toward a CTBT were placed on the international ACD agenda in the wake of the Clinton-Yeltsin summit in April 1993, the five permanent members of the UN Security Council joined 156 countries in adopting a consensus resolution in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) that endorsed a mandate for the Conference on Disarmament (CD) to negotiate for a CTBT (UNGA Consensus Resolution 48/70). For the first time in its fourteen-year history, the CD was given a mandate to negotiate a nuclear test ban treaty, and all the nuclear powers made a commitment to engage in the negotiations (Herby 1993: 1). The mandate,

to negotiate intensively a universal and multilaterally and effectively verifiable comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty, which would contribute effectively to the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects, to the process of nuclear disarmament and therefore to the enhancement of international peace and security (CD/1238).

was formally adopted. The CTBT represented a major departure from the practice of

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the United States and the Soviet Union limit test yields, but it was never ratified (*SIPRI Yearbook* 1997: 531, 545).

the CD, which normally sought the consensus of all its members before recommending a treaty. The CTBT talks started formally in January 1994 and ended in August 1996. To accelerate progress, the UNGA, in 1995, passed a resolution urging the negotiators to complete the treaty text no later than 1996, so as to make it ready for signature before its 51<sup>st</sup> session, in September 1996 (UNGA Resolution 50/65, *UN General Assembly 1995*: 84-5). On September 10, 1996, the UNGA voted 158 to 3 to adopt the treaty and the CTBT was opened for signing on September 24 1996 (Cerniello 1996: 21). By October 18, 2001, 161 states had signed the treaty and 84 states had ratified it (Arms Control Association *Fact Sheet 2001*). In order to bring it into force, the treaty had to be ratified by all the forty-four CD participating states on June 18, 1996 (CTBT Article XIV). Three of the forty-four states have not signed the treaty: India, Pakistan and North Korea. This leaves the CTBT with an inherent weakness for its coming into force.<sup>60</sup>

Despite the absence of above three countries' signatures and the subsequent nuclear weapon tests by India and Pakistan in May 1998, the CTBT marked an important landmark in preventing nuclear proliferation and in advancing the cause of nuclear disarmament. The rationale for the CTBT was that it would constrain the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons; end the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons; contribute to the prevention of nuclear proliferation and the process of nuclear disarmament and strengthen international peace and security.

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<sup>60</sup> The CTBT's very demanding entry into force (EIF) requirement stands in the way of its entry into force and therefore prevents full implementation of the extensive monitoring and on-site inspection system established by the treaty.

Firstly, CTBT demonstrated that the nuclear test ban norm prevailed globally and unprecedentedly in the nuclear age. For the first time in history, all five declared nuclear weapon states, three threshold nuclear states (India, Pakistan and Israel), and the non-nuclear weapon states joined together to cooperate over nuclear disarmament issues and to establish a legal instrument to ban all kinds of nuclear testing. Secondly, the CTBT has a significant role in preventing the development of any new, more sophisticated nuclear weapons. For the advanced nuclear weapon states, seeking a new generation of highly sophisticated special effects or special purpose weapons and for threshold states improving on untested first generation designs, the CTBT has constraining consequences. Furthermore, the CTBT will also significantly constrain the qualitative improvement of existing nuclear arsenals. Thirdly, the CTBT will strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime which has been criticized by the non-nuclear weapons states because of the NPT's discriminatory division between nuclear "haves and have nots". The linkage between the NPT and the CTBT vindicated all NPT members that they made correct decision in agreeing to the NPT's indefinite extension by demonstrating that the five major nuclear powers were serious about their commitment, within the NPT, to nuclear arms control and disarmament. Thus, by strengthening support for the NPT, the CTBT will help prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons and elicit the obligation of non-nuclear weapons states, under the NPT, not to conduct nuclear tests. The CTBT stands as one of the most prominent treaties of the nuclear era (Bell 1998: 3-10).

Some critics doubted that the treaty would totally prevent qualitative improvements of existing nuclear arsenals, or the development of new weapon designs, given the technological capabilities of the established nuclear-weapons states



to experiment without fission testing (Johnson 1997: 78; Wu Zhan 1998b). But it is widely recognized that the CTBT, once it comes into force, will be a major advance in restraining the nuclear arms competition and inhibiting nuclear weapons proliferation.

### **7.1.2. The Implications for China**

The CTBT negotiation marked the first important international negotiation for a multilateral disarmament treaty in which China participated from beginning to end. China's agreement to sign the CTBT in 1996 marked its first multilateral agreement to cap its own weapons capabilities under verifiable conditions. Given Chinese reluctance to participate in multilateral negotiations, it provided a litmus test for Chinese cooperation in international ACD efforts. China participated in the "ground work" of the institutional bargaining for a global and crucial nuclear treaty with commitment to observe the international norm which it embodies.

Because China valued its nuclear arsenal as a symbol of its great power status and as the ultimate guarantor of its sovereignty against "nuclear blackmail and hegemony", China had consistently refused to take part in real disarmament negotiations such as the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) which would quantitatively reduce its nuclear arsenal. Therefore, for the Chinese government, the CTBT was "a more complicated decision" (Garrett and Glaser 1995: 53) than joining the NPT and "perhaps the most difficult arms control issue" (Johnston 1996: 39). The NPT does not infringe China's ambition for self-help security and military modernization, although it does restrict the ability of the Chinese to export nuclear weapons technology. In contrast, the CTBT would restrict China's ability to develop

a wider range of warhead designs. Thus, the CTBT has serious consequences for China, given the disparities in size and sophistication between the Chinese nuclear forces and those of Russia and the United States. Because China does not have sophisticated computers to simulate nuclear weapons, testing is critical to weapons modernization, as well as safety and reliability (Frieman 1996: 24).

Necessarily, there was an undercurrent of anxiety over the implications of the CTBT agreement for China's security. Chinese commentaries on the CTB cautioned that both the United States and Russia had already conducted enough nuclear tests and amassed sufficient experimental data so that they could design and produce weapons of this generation without testing (Wu Zhan 1994: 11). One article noted that the United States, Russia, France and Britain had long been preparing for a total nuclear test ban because "mock non-nuclear explosions in laboratories" are sufficient substitutes for nuclear explosion tests (Wang Ling 1993: 8-9).

## **7.2. China's Policy Evolution toward the CTBT**

The Copernican turn of the open-door policy, which started in 1978, brought the necessity for the readjustment of Chinese foreign policy, specifically in the ACD field. Deng Xiaoping personally decided that China should send a delegation to the UN Special Session on Disarmament (UNSSOD I) and China sent an observer delegation in 1979. In the spring of 1980, China sent a formal delegation to the CD in Geneva for the first time (*China: Arms Control and Disarmament* 1995: 4).

Up to the mid-1980s, the Chinese government maintained that international peace and security would not derive benefit from a nuclear test ban without a drastic reduction in nuclear weapons, because the nuclear test ban and nuclear disarmament were interrelated. China argued that the key to success in disarmament lay in the positions of the two superpowers and they should take the lead in nuclear disarmament. Thus, China criticized the nuclear test ban treaties, the PTBT of 1963 and TTBT of 1974, reached by the US and the Soviet Union, as discriminatory and claimed that those treaties would only serve to consolidate the superpowers' nuclear superiority (Xia Yishan 1989; 1990). Consequently, China refused to participate in any ad hoc working groups on test bans at the CD.

In 1985, the year of the fortieth anniversary of the founding of UN, the Chinese Ambassador Qian Jiadong signalled China's policy shift at the CD Plenary, that China would "be willing to reconsider its position" if the Nuclear Test Ban Ad Hoc Committee were to be established that year (CD/PV.292). At that time, China took part in the work of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to detect seismic events relating to nuclear test ban verification measures. In March 1986, China declared that it "has not conducted nuclear tests in the atmosphere for many years and will no longer conduct atmospheric nuclear tests in the future" (Zhao Ziyang's statement at the Chinese People's Rally for World Peace, *China: Arms Control and Disarmament* 1995: 4-5).

After negotiations toward a CTB were placed on the international ACD agenda in the wake of the Clinton-Yeltsin summit in April 1993, the Chinese government announced that it would "take an active part in the negotiating process and work

together with other countries to conclude this treaty no later than 1996.” China, for the first time, showed a willingness to participate in negotiations for the CTBT. On September 29, Foreign Minister Qian stated, at a meeting of the UN General Assembly, that China supported “an early start of negotiations for a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty.” (*Beijing Review* 11-17 October 1993). Initially, China maintained a very low profile on test ban discussions and contributed no working papers, even after the mandate to negotiate a treaty was formally given to the CD in August 1993. When China conducted an underground nuclear test on October, 5, 1993, the Chinese government reaffirmed in a statement that “China has always stood for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons and a world wide comprehensive ban on nuclear tests.” At the same time, China pledged to work together with other countries in trying to conclude the CTBT no later than 1996 (*Beijing Review* 18-24 October 1993). As the pace of negotiations picked up in mid-1994, China began to issue detailed working papers on the articles of the treaty, but these papers still left China’s bottom line as an enigma.

### **7.3. China’s Participation in the CTBT**

#### **7.3.1. The Rules of Procedure of the Conference on Disarmament**

The Conference on Disarmament (CD), established in 1979 as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum of the international community, was a result of the first Special Session on Disarmament of the United Nations General Assembly held in 1978. It succeeded other Geneva-based negotiating forums, which

included the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament (1960), the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (1962-68), and the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (1969-78). As originally constituted, the CD had 40 members. Subsequently its membership has been expanded to 66 countries so far.<sup>61</sup> The CD invites other UN member states that express a desire to participate in the CD's substantive discussions. The CD adopts the UN's Rules of Procedure, taking into account the recommendations of the UN General Assembly and the proposals of its members. It reports to the General Assembly annually (<http://www.unog.ch/disarm>).

The Conference has an annual session divided into three parts of 10 weeks, 7 weeks and 7 weeks respectively. The first part begins in the penultimate week of the month of January. The conference decides the actual dates of the three parts of its annual session at the close of the previous year's session. The work of the Conference is conducted in plenary meetings, as well as under any additional arrangements agreed by the Conference, such as informal meetings. The Conference may establish subsidiary bodies, such as ad hoc sub committees, working groups, technical groups or groups of governmental experts, open to all member states of the Conference. The meetings of the subsidiary bodies are informal unless the Conference decides otherwise. The Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban was established to negotiate "intensively a universal and multilaterally and effectively verifiable comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty." Taking into account all existing

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<sup>61</sup> The members of the CD became organized into three groupings during the Cold War: the Group of Western States and Others; the Group of Eastern European States and Others; and the G-21 Group of Non-Aligned States. The groupings are not necessarily relevant to states' real interests and alliances. However, appointments and consultations are still on the basis of group membership. China, with Sweden, is outside any of the groups, although Sweden is a member of the European Union, and so is close to the Western Group (Monterey Institute of International Studies *2000 Inventory of International Nonproliferation Organizations and Regimes*: 25-30).

proposals and future initiatives, the Ad Hoc Committee was requested to establish the necessary working groups in order to carry forward effectively the negotiating process. In discharging its mandate, the Ad Hoc Committee decided to establish two Working Groups, one on Verification and one on Legal and Institutional Issues (CD/1436). At the beginning of each annual session, the Conference adopts its agenda for the year. In doing so, the Conference takes into account the recommendations made to it by the UN General Assembly, the proposals presented by the member states of the Conference and the decisions of the Conference. Any member state of the Conference can raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference at a plenary meeting and have a full opportunity of presenting its views on any subject which it may consider merits attention.

### **7.3.2. Treaty Text and China's Activities**

The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty consists of a preamble, 17 Articles, two Annexes and a Protocol. The preamble outlines the significance of the treaty. It stresses that the CTBT serves the goals of both non-proliferation and disarmament and reiterates the international commitment to the “ultimate goal” of eliminating nuclear weapons. The 17 articles make up the main content of the treaty, such as Basic Obligations,<sup>62</sup> Treaty Organization, Verification, Consultation and Clarification, On-Site Inspections, Confidence-Building Measures, Compliance, Settlement of Disputes, Amendments, Review and Entry into Force. The Protocol describes the

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<sup>62</sup> Article I notes Basic Obligations: 1. Each State Party undertakes not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion, and to prohibit and prevent any such nuclear explosion at any place under its jurisdiction or control; 2. Each State Party undertakes, furthermore, to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion.

verification procedures and contains two annexes. One annex lists the 337 facilities comprising the International Monitoring System (IMS) and the other annex describes parameters for standard event screening by the International Data Centre (IDC). The treaty provides for the establishment of the CTBT Organization in Vienna, and an intricate verification regime, including an international monitoring system and on-site inspections (CTBTO *The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty at a Glance* 2001: 2-4).

During the negotiating process, the key controversies were whether peaceful nuclear explosion (PNEs) would be permitted, the conditions for intrusive verification, and the terms of entry into force. To a greater extent, the CTBT negotiations focused on a “rolling” text of basic treaty language on main provisions. The rolling text contained elements of a draft text of the treaty, with alternative proposals and wording in square brackets. The square brackets would be deleted once consensus was reached. The rolling text was revised over and over again as the negotiations went on. When the negotiations started in early 1994, the infrastructure of the rolling text was based largely on informal drafts submitted by the Australian and Swedish delegations.

Until mid-1994, China kept a low profile in the discussion and contributed no official working papers in the CD, even after the mandate to negotiate a treaty was formally given to the body in August 1993 and CTBT negotiations were supposed to begin in January 1994. As the negotiations were heated, the Chinese delegation in mid-1994 began to table a total of 14 official working papers on the articles of the treaty (CD/NTB/WP. 121-8). By September 1994, the Chinese delegation had made

several proposals, which were added to the rolling text to be considered by its counter-parts at the CD (Johnson and Howard 1994: 3). The Chinese delegation made proposals with respect to treaty provisions in the Preamble, Verification, Entry into Force, Duration and Withdrawal, Scope, PNEs, Amendment, Review, Organizational Structure, and Security Assurances for State Parties sections, as well as their proposed wording. Approximately half of the brackets in the rolling text are China's. During the whole negotiating process lasting about two and half years, the Chinese delegation raised almost half of the total 1,200 treaty brackets in the CTBT rolling text. They reflected some major policy differences, including China's insistence on conducting peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs) and its objection to the use of national technical means for triggering on-site inspections.

According to one observer, it would seem that China may have initially entered the CD talks with the hope that they would fall apart. Certainly, it appeared that China tabled a number of mere "place-holding" proposals in the early phase of negotiations and did not politically commit itself to a test ban treaty or fully address the security and technical implications of the treaty's options on vital provisions (such as scope and verification) until early in 1996. In the final months, China seemed more engaged in the negotiations, fighting for its positions with greater openness and seeking to win allies and specific concessions (Johnson 1996b: 57).

The Chinese delegation attached great importance to the verification regime of the treaty (Zou Yunhua 1998a: 8). Indeed, the Chinese delegation put forward its stances on many key issues regarding the rolling text at different stages of the negotiations.



### 7.3.3. Nuclear Testing behind Negotiation

During the CTBT talks, China conducted six nuclear tests from 1993 to 1996. Surprisingly, those tests were conducted on dates adjacent to negotiations. The first test occurred on October 5, 1993 just prior to commencement of negotiations in Geneva, the second test on June 10, 1994, in the middle of the second session of the CD, and the third test on May 15, 1995, less than forty-eight hours after the end of the NPT Review Extension Conference. Although, at the Conference, all nuclear-weapons states pledged to act with the “utmost restraint” in nuclear testing, China conducted the third nuclear test before the delegations departed for their capitals (Lewis 1996: 10). In fact, Beijing’s official position was that China would end nuclear testing once a CTBT entered into force. The Chinese government announced in a statement that an underground nuclear test was conducted on October 5 1993. The statement confirmed China’s position on international nuclear issues and said,

“China fully understands the sincere desire of the non-nuclear states for an early conclusion of a CTBT through negotiations and believes that such a treaty has positive significance. The government pledged to take an active part in negotiating a CTBT and to work together with other countries in trying to conclude the treaty no later than 1996” (*Beijing Review* 18-24 October 1993).

When China carried out its last two tests in 1996, it reaffirmed its support for the deadline and commitment to the CTBT. After the fifth test on June 8, 1996, China announced that it would conduct only one more test for the safety of its nuclear weapons and that thereafter it would impose a moratorium on nuclear testing (*Beijing Review* 24-30 June 1996). The last test on July 29 took place on the first day of the

resumption of the last negotiation session of the CTBT and China announced the commencement of its moratorium on nuclear testing (*Renmin ribao* 30 July 1996).

China's nuclear testing during the negotiation process provoked sharp criticism and suspicion about its commitment, especially from the Asian states. Following China's atomic explosion in October 1994, neighbouring Kazakhstan expressed concerns about the medical, biological, and environmental impact of Chinese nuclear tests. Kazakhstan, sandwiched between nuclear powers Russia and China, denounced the blast of the nuclear test in October 1994 as undermining the NPT (*China Post* 12 December 1994). The Japanese government announced its decision to freeze most grant aid to China for the 1995 fiscal year, based on the fact that China continued nuclear testing. China expressed deep regret and warned that the move "could very possibly be detrimental to the sound development of Sino-Japanese relations (*Beijing Review* 18-24 Sept. 1995).

However, China rationalized the inevitability of the tests to ensure the safety and reliability of its nuclear weapons illustrating that it had exercised the most restraint by conducting the fewest tests of the five nuclear powers. When the negotiations began in 1994, the number of nuclear tests of the five nuclear powers were as follows.

**Table 7.1. Nuclear testing of 5 nuclear powers by 1994**

Country	Tests
The United States	1,029
Russia (Soviet Union)	715
France	191
U.K.	45
China	39

Source: SIPRI Yearbook 1994

Zou Yunhua<sup>63</sup> argues that China exercised the utmost restraint by conducting only limited nuclear tests to ensure the safety and reliability of its weapons before it finally ended nuclear testing, given that the CTBT “caught China in the middle of its nuclear weapons program” unlike the United States, Russia, and Britain, all of which had completed several development cycles. Zou argues that China consistently expressed support for the CTBT in spite of the ongoing tests which were to ensure that China would be ready for the CTBT. She even regards the last test, which was conducted hours before the resumption of the last negotiating session of the CTBT, as a “masterpiece of political timing” (Zou Yunhua 1998a: 4-5). Based on an interview with Chinese officials and arms control experts, Garrett and Glaser counter-argue the official argument that China’s testing programme was also aimed at developing a smaller, more powerful warhead, although Chinese officials insisted that Beijing was continuing to conduct nuclear tests solely to improve nuclear warhead safety and reliability. According to them, some Chinese scientists and arms control experts acknowledged that China was seeking to modernize its nuclear warheads before a CTBT was finalized. They maintained that China planned its programme for development of a high yield-to-weight warhead to be completed before the end of 1996. Once China had confidence in its warhead design, a halt to nuclear testing would not prevent development of advanced nuclear weapon systems to enhance survival, accuracy, targeting flexibility, and response time. In addition, warhead design may be further refined through computer modeling, and hydronuclear testing

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<sup>63</sup> Zou Yunhua is a senior research fellow in the Foreign Affairs Bureau at the General Armaments Department of the PLA (formerly the COSTIND) and the coordinator of its Programme on Arms Control. Zou attended the CD in Geneva as a member of the Chinese delegation, serving as a negotiator and expert on the Chinese delegation to the CTBT negotiations. She has also represented China as a number of important international meetings related to non-proliferation.

(Garrett and Glaser 1995: 56). Gupta also argued that the China would not end nuclear testing until its modernization programme was complete. China's support for a nuclear test ban starting in 1996 indicated that the nuclear testing component of the upgrade would finish before 1996 (Gupta 1994: 31-4).<sup>64</sup>

#### **7.4. China's Standpoints and Negotiations on the CTBT Agenda**

Under the instructions of the Chinese government, the Chinese delegation participated in the two-and-a-half year course of the negotiations in a joint attempt with other parties, to conclude the final text of treaty by August 14, 1996. About several issues, the Chinese delegation proposed different views from the others. Table 7.2. demonstrates the overall distinction that China presented at the negotiation.

**Table 7.2. China's standpoint in CTBT negotiations**

<b>Issue</b>	<b>China's Proposal</b>	<b>Result</b>	<b>Assessment</b>
Preamble	NFU	dropped	Not supported
Scope	PNEs	Zero-yield	Not supported
Technical means	IMS	IMS plus NTM	compromised
OSI decision	2/3 (34 votes)	3/5 (26 votes)	compromised
EIF	IAEA list	44 nations	compromised

*Source: CD.PV. 666-756; ACRONYM 1994; 1995; 1996; 1997.*

##### **7.4.1. No-First Use (NFU): Suggesting a norm in the international agenda**

Delegations from some states first proposed the structural outline of a treaty for

<sup>64</sup> The allegation that Chinese nuclear testing during the CTBT negotiation was for sake of developing nuclear warheads is widely supported by most observers (Norris 1996; Goldstein 2000: 239-47).

the CTBT talks and later, the Chinese delegation put forward a working paper entitled “Basic Structure of a Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty” dated March 30, 1994 (CD/NTB/WP.121-8). In this paper, the Chinese listed all the key elements of a draft treaty beginning with the Preamble, Scope and Verification. In the Preamble, China listed disarmament principles and objectives while other countries considered it unnecessary to list them as articles of the CTBT. Because the Preamble established the overall political context of the treaty, the Chinese delegation stressed China’s basic, consistent and traditional stance on nuclear disarmament.

When a rolling text for the Preamble to the treaty was added to the NTB Committee’s report in the September 1994 revision, China urged the adoption of a no-first-use (NFU) policy, security assurances and a recognition of the particular responsibilities of the nuclear-weapon states to undertake thorough nuclear disarmament. For three decades, the Chinese government had consistently made those principles a precondition to China’s involvement in arms control talks. China urged the other four nuclear weapon powers to follow China’s lead and commit themselves to not being the first to use nuclear weapons against any other nuclear weapon state and not to use nuclear weapons, or the threat of nuclear weapons, against non-nuclear weapon states or a nuclear-free zone at any time or under any circumstances (negative security assurances, NSA). For example, even after the CTBT was reached, Chinese MFA minister Qian Qichen stressed China’s standpoint at the 51<sup>st</sup> Session of the UNGA in 1996.

We always stand for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. In our view, CTBT is only the first step in the entire process of

comprehensive nuclear disarmament. There are still huge stockpiles of nuclear arms in the world. Some nuclear powers still refuse to pledge not to be the first to use such weapons. We still have a long way to go and must continue to work strenuously in order to achieve the ultimate goal of total elimination of nuclear weapons (*Beijing Review* 14-20 Oct. 1996).

However, there was little support for the proposal, as one Chinese delegate conceded (Zou Yunhua 1998a: 9). Instead, the Chinese delegation agreed to the relevant reference from the “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament” adopted by the NPT Review and Extension Conference (CD/PV.717).

#### **7.4.2. Scope: Peaceful Nuclear Explosions (PNEs)**

The issue of peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs) was proposed in the Scope of the treaty, the name of which was changed to “Basic Obligations.” The Scope, or Basic Obligations, defined what the CTBT would prohibit or permit. Throughout the whole negotiation process, China was the only country that supported PNEs.<sup>65</sup> China’s strategy on scope was altogether different from the other nuclear weapon states. China opposed any threshold whatsoever, while the others wanted threshold tests for marginal use in ensuring stockpile safety. Making a distinction between nuclear explosions for military and civilian purposes, China proposed that PNEs should not be prohibited, but rather should be subject to rigorous authorization and verification procedures (Johnson 1996a: 4).

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<sup>65</sup> Originally, there was some support from Algeria and Iran for these as an option but both states came to the conclusion in the summer of 1994 that PNEs should be prohibited in the treaty (Lewis 1996: 11).

In the Chinese working document entitled “CTBT Article on the Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions” dated August 23, 1994, the Chinese text defined the condition for preparing and conducting the explosions as “purely for scientific research or civilian applications”, and underlined the “inalienable right” of the state to nuclear energy for nonmilitary purposes. As the term PNEs covered the use of nuclear devices for large excavations and incineration of waste, the Chinese working paper on PNEs remarked that no legally binding international document on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation “should obstruct or restrain the development and peaceful uses of science and technology, nor impair the legitimate right of states parties, the mass of developing countries in particular, to make peaceful use of nuclear energy” (CV/NTB/WP.167). China believed that PNEs had extensive prospects for applications to purposes that would benefit mankind (especially for China) and did not want PNEs to be banned, for economic reasons (Zou Yunhua 1998a: 10).

There were many rumours of behind-the-scenes-support from Russia and considerable cooperation between Chinese scientists and Russian scientists, who were, allegedly, providing extensive data purporting to back China’s claim that the PNEs could be safe and economically viable for a developing country (Lewis 1996: 12). In an interview with Sha Zukang, Chinese ambassador at the CD, confirmed the fact by saying that “we have been told by their (Russian) scientists that PNEs have been very successful and can be useful for oil extraction etc.” (Welsh 1995: 18-9). China failed to gain support for this issue. Most states, even Pakistan, wanted the CTBT to ban all nuclear explosions and would not accept a treaty with any provision

for PNEs. The non-nuclear weapon states opposed PNEs and wanted nuclear explosions to be comprehensively banned, with no thresholds or exceptions.

Apart from environmental damage,<sup>66</sup> the main reason for opposition to PNEs from most states was the possibility that they could be used as a cover for a clandestine nuclear weapons testing programme. Because every explosion produced a critical piece of information, the explosion could not be prevented from providing information. Moreover, China's PNEs proposal only permitted the declared nuclear states to conduct the PNEs, which ironically was "discriminatory" and was in China's political interest in relations with the developing countries and the non-nuclear weapon states. There was some doubt that PNEs were a ruse to carry on developing nuclear weapons. Others suggested that the issue of PNEs was merely a negotiating tactic to be used as leverage throughout the negotiations.<sup>67</sup> When the US, the UK and France resolved the threshold dispute by committing to a true zero ban as the last session of the CD in 1995, China had not moved on PNEs.

In fact, the Chinese delegation was apparently sincere in articulating the benefits of PNEs, although China has never used PNEs and has no plan to do so. China was merely keen to preserve the right to do so.

"I sincerely believe that we should not completely close this option (PNEs)...Since a CTBT will be indefinite in duration, and science and technology are continuing to

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<sup>66</sup> In the past, the Soviet Union carried out more than a hundred explosions, most for large scale excavation and construction work. The drawback to the explosions, however, was the concern over long-living radioactive isotopes.

<sup>67</sup> Rebecca Johnson noted that "the PNEs were always intended to provide a grand smokescreen and a dramatic flourish of flexibility so that China could avoid giving in too far on the issues it regarded as fundamental to its national security, such as monitoring and inspections" (Johnson 1996b: 58).



develop, we should keep the option of PNEs open while ensuring that it is not misused. Misuse can be avoided by appropriate procedures of applications for PNEs and on-site verification” (Interview with Sha Zukang, Welsh 1995: 19).

The possibility of PNEs was preferred by China because China would need a tremendous supply of energy for economic development. The main impetus for being seen to preserve the PNEs in the CTBT stemmed from Chinese scientists who had argued that PNEs should not be permanently banned because PNE was potentially valuable (Tian Dongfeng and Hu Side 1996; Liu Huaqiu 1995). Many Chinese nuclear scientists were confident that PNEs would be technically feasible and economically cost-effective for exploiting oil reserves. For instance, in the early 1980s, the Ministry of the Petroleum Industry requested that Chinese experts probe the application of PNEs to oil recovery for increasing the oil output of the Daqing oil field.

In the endgame of the CD, PNEs became one of the obstacles to treaty agreement. Many were afraid that China had invested too much in the demand for PNEs to relinquish it. Canada put forward an alternative paragraph under article VIII as a face-saving formula. “On the basis of a request by any State Party, the Review Conference shall consider the possibility of permitting the conduct of underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. If the Review Conference decides by consensus that such nuclear explosions may be permitted” (CTB Treaty Article VIII). The Chinese concession, announced at the CD in a speech by Sha Zukang, abandoned its demand that an international treaty to ban nuclear testing should exempt PNEs and it accepted the “zero-yield” formula in the treaty (*International Herald Tribune* 7 June 1996). The CTBT could ban nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes temporarily

and that issue would be discussed at a future treaty review conference. On June 1996, the Chinese Ambassador, Sha Zukang, stated a compromise at the CD Plenary.

In order to facilitate the conclusion of the treaty within the time frame as planned, the Chinese delegation is now ready to go along with a temporary ban on PNEs (CD/PV.737).

China finally conceded the “zero-yield” formula on PNEs. Nevertheless, it was important for China that the “nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes” was included as an issue that could be raised in the future (Johnson 1997: 27).

#### **7.4.3. The Verification Regime**

The purpose of the verification regime was to provide, at reasonable cost, a system for the detection and location of a possible nuclear test. The treaty’s verification regime, like that of other treaties was one of the most important parts of its credibility. The Chinese delegation recognized this and regarded the verification regime as the most essential part of the treaty and stated that it “touches upon the security interests of all states parties” (Sha Zukang, 7 June 1996 FBIS-CHI-96-111). The verification regime consisted of four basic elements: the International Monitoring System (IMS), consultation and clarification, on-site inspections (OSI), and confidence building measures.

The most disputed issues of the verification regime during the three years of negotiation were: (1) which technologies should be incorporated into the International Monitoring System (IMS); (2) the role, if any, of national technical means (NTM) or

intelligence information; (3) the decision-making procedure and the level of intrusion of the OSI; (4) how much analysis and interpretation should be provided from the International Data Centre (IDC) to state parties; and (5) the costs surrounding the above issues (Johnson 1997: 39).

### ***International Monitoring System (IMS) and National Technical Means (NTM)***

The CTBT negotiations established the International Monitoring System (IMS) which comprised a network of 50 primary and 120 auxiliary seismological monitoring stations, 80 radionuclide stations, 16 radionuclide laboratories, 60 infrasound-acoustic stations, and 11 hydro-acoustic stations (CTB Treaty Annex 1). The IMS consists of the agreed four technologies (seismic, radionuclide, hydroacoustic, and infrasound monitoring). The Chinese delegation, backed by Pakistan additionally, insisted that an international network of satellites and electromagnetic pulse sensor (EMP) technology should be included, to ensure coverage of upper atmospheric and space nuclear explosions. The Chinese believed that satellite monitoring was the most effective, timely and reliable means of detecting atmospheric and space nuclear explosions and that the EMP was also a useful verification technique because of its high sensitivity, precise location, and prompt response (Chinese statement, NTB Ad Hoc Committee, Aug. 17, 1994 CD). Therefore, the Chinese delegation provided detailed technical explanations in various meetings to support its argument and proposed treaty language for the rolling text for these two techniques from an early stage of the negotiation in 1994 (CD/1364: 97-8; CD/NTB/WP.217).

One observer speculated that, in advocating a multilateral satellite monitoring system, “China’s principal concern” was “the desire to have unrestricted access to

high-resolution satellite images of an intelligence quality.” information already available the US and Russia (Johnson 1995: 45-6). In fact, for China and Pakistan, the satellite question was interlinked with the issues of NTM (national technical means). The disagreement surrounding the IMS and NTM reflected the disparity in the technological development of the parties. Whether the NTM should include intelligence gathering technology, specialist satellites, signals and communications interception caused controversy. The technologically-advanced states, such as the US, Russia and Western and Eastern European states, argued that the information could be of relevance for detection and, without it, it would be easy for a cheat to calculate the chance of detection and design its clandestine explosion accordingly. In contrast, China and several non-aligned states were more worried about NTM being available to only a few states, and used in exclusive or discriminatory ways. They opposed to any incorporation of NTM, favouring instead their demand for dedicated international satellite and EMP monitoring networks as part of the IMS.

However, most states considered that these two technologies would be prohibitively expensive and burdensome for the treaty verification system. As for the EMP, a technological problem was raised about its high false-alarm rate. Furthermore, the more techniques the IMS included, the more complicated the negotiations would become, and the more time would be needed to establish the monitoring system.<sup>68</sup> After the G-21 countries (non-aligned state group in the CD)

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<sup>68</sup> Another source of disagreement that Chinese delegation maintained was the issue of adding a noble gas monitoring system to the atmospheric radionuclide monitoring network. The Chinese delegation objected that adding noble gas monitoring would be superfluous and technically not proved to be effective because it was not in widespread use. They also argued the noble gas monitoring would significantly increase the whole cost to the atmospheric monitoring network (Zou Yunhua 1998a: 15-6). Eventually, the IMS included the noble gas monitoring in the treaty language. Chinese delegation showed its discomfort and displeasure and expressed the need for “adequate technical studies and

recognized that NTM could provide cost-effective enhancement of the deterrent and detection capabilities of the verification regime and most non-aligned delegations were more interested in restricting its potential for abuse than in banning NTM. They came to accept the NTM data, which could be verified or corroborated by IMS information and used as a basis for an On-Site Inspection (OSI) request to supplement and reinforce the IMS data in a request or evaluation.

In the end, the chairman's text permitted any relevant technical information, including NTM, providing it was obtained in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law. The text also contained safeguards against abuse including any OSI request. Because IMS data would be provided under the auspices of the CTBT Organization, which meant that the weight for using NTM-based information might be lessened, many state parties, including China, regarded the text as more objective and accessible.<sup>69</sup>

### ***On-site Inspection (OSI): Sovereignty-preserving attitude***

The role of OSI is to inspect the area of a suspected event and to provide compelling evidence of violation. Given this function, OSI has the potential to be politically sensitive and intrusive in the security interest of a individual state. The OSI issue contained divergent views about how the provisions could be robust enough to deter anyone from running the risk of cheating (backed by most advanced

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mutual agreement on the relevant technologies" (Sha Zukang's statement NTB Ad Hoc Committee, Aug.13 CD 1996, Zou Yunhua 1998a: 16).

<sup>69</sup> One observer predicted that China, in the future, might come to regret its stance on NTM. According to him, China's own capability in this regard was growing and it might well be advantageous to China that they allow the inclusion of some form of data from NTM for the triggering of OSI (Lewis 1996: 13).

countries) and also be prudent enough to prevent unnecessary intrusion and manage legitimate access (backed by China, India, Pakistan and several G-21 countries). Negotiating provisions exposed deep differences over national security, equal access to information and what constituted a timely and effective inspection regime.

The Chinese ambassador Sha Zukang pointed out that OSI was crucial to the “success or failure of the talks on the treaty” and the “the most essential part of the treaty” (*Beijing Review* 16-22 Sept. 1996). The Chinese delegates took an active part in this issue and concentrated their energy on obtaining a more stringent decision-making process for inspection. The Chinese delegation maintained that OSI should be the last resort of the verification system under extreme circumstances and the treaty should provide necessary procedures of consultation and clarification to avoid unnecessary OSI as well as to establish a stringent decision-making process for the Executive Council (EC) of the CTBT Organization to review and approve requests for an OSI and to prevent any abuse of the OSI (CD/PV.737).

The trigger mechanism of OSI contains two key issues: one is the information basis for requesting OSI and the other is the decision-making procedure of the Executive Council (EC). The United States, Britain and France wanted to ensure the prompt collection of time-critical evidence and quick access to any suspect site and proposed that OSI be initiated with the use of information obtained through not only IMS but also national technical means (NTM). In contrast, China, India and several developing countries objected to any incorporation of NTM fearing that the NTM included image satellites, signals intelligence, communication intercepts and even

human and illegal intelligence sources. The Indian ambassador stated opposition to NTM on behalf of G-21 countries that,

The judgment by the Organization (regarding OSI) should be based on data received from the IMS. The three main concerns over the inclusion of NTM in the verification regime of the CTBT were: the disparity of technical capability between states; the possible use of information obtained from spying; and the potential for mischief-making in the triggering of OSI through NTM information (CD/PV.710; Lewis 1996: 13).

China considered that “only a small number of developed countries possess NTM suitable for the treaty, and abuses may lead to discrimination against developing countries” (FBIS-CHI-96-111 7 June 1996). According to the Chinese view, the incorporation of NTM for treaty verification placed developing countries in an extremely unequal position and it would be unacceptable to them. The Chinese ambassador argued that it would be unacceptable to any country that one country, implying the US, or a number of countries should “take advantage of their exclusive NTM and monopolize international verification in disregard of the IMS with a self-assumed mandate as world police” (CD/PV.717; CD/PV.733).

Many countries agreed with the United States that NTM should be applicable to trigger OSI because the IMS could not be expected to be infallible, especially in detecting very low-yield explosions, given the financial constraints that crippled the capacity of the IMS to carry out verification according to the requirements of the treaty. The Chinese delegation conceded the applicability of NTM, if it was considered as having “a supplementary role to play” (CD/PV.737).

Another key issue of the triggering mechanism was how to organize the decision making procedure for OSI. The Executive Council (EC) of the treaty organization would be responsible for OSI decisions. Borrowing the terms from the CWC negotiations, “red light” and “green light” procedures were debated. The “red light” procedure means that an OSI request would be carried out by the Technical Secretariat, who would seek to clarify an anomalous event unless the EC countermanded it. The “green light” procedure meant that no inspection could go ahead unless specifically authorized by a majority decision of the EC (Johnson 1996a: 23). The United States advocated a simple decision-making process to ensure quick access, while China, India, Pakistan, Russia, Israel and a number of G-21 countries were more concerned about the abuse of OSI procedures. They wanted a much more stringent process in which no inspection could be carried out without the specific authorization of a two-thirds or three-quarters majority of the EC. In an attempt to provide a compromise solution, France suggested that an OSI request, based solely on NTM, should be subject to a “green light” process, whereas a request based on IMS should trigger OSI automatically, unless cancelled by a “red-light” decision (Johnson 1996a: 23).

The Chinese delegation favoured the idea that each phase should be subjected to a separate “green light” decision and argued that “triggering OSI through an automatic or simplified procedure will make OSI vulnerable to possible abuse” (CV/PV.733). During the intensive P-5 negotiations over a package of agreements, Britain, France and Russia indicated their willingness to agree with the “green light” process, which China was also prepared to accept. The US refused to agree to the simple majority of the trigger procedure. The issue was discussed in the endgame of US-China bilateral



negotiations. A deal was agreed by both sides that decisions on inspection would be made by a majority of 30 states out of the 51-state Executive Council.

#### **7.4.4. Entry into Force (EIF)**

The CTBT should enter into force 180 days after the forty-four states, named in Annex 2 of the treaty deposit instruments of ratification, but not less than two years after the treaty was opened for signature. The 44 states were participating members of the CD and appeared in the 1995 and 1996 IAEA lists of countries with nuclear research or nuclear power reactors respectively. Under Article XIV, the CTBT will not enter into force until it has been signed and ratified by 44 states – including the five nuclear weapon states (P-5, the United States, Russia, Britain, France and China) and the three “threshold states” (India, Pakistan and Israel) – listed by name in Annex 2.

The EIF requirements were a subject of dispute in the negotiations, especially in the last few months. During 1994-5, little attention was paid to the provisions for the treaty to enter into force. Most diplomats considered this as an endgame issue (Johnson 1996a: 47-53). The early proposal can be categorized as a list of specific states, such as the IAEA identification of 68 countries, a simple number, as in the CWC entry-into-force provision and a list plus a waiver mechanism, such as a percentage of a list or a conference which could be convened to waive certain conditions, if the treaty had not entered into force by a certain date. The political challenge of the issue lay in balancing the universality and early implementation of the treaty. The dispute came to be over whether the three “threshold states” should

have to ratify the treaty before it could enter into force. China, with Russia, Britain, Pakistan and Egypt, made clear its requirement that all nuclear test capable states (assumed to be the P-5, India, Israel and Pakistan) should accede to the treaty before it enters into force, while the US favoured a simple number of 40 plus P-5.

The most popular proposal was ratification by the list of sixty-eight states identified by the IAEA, meanwhile the United States preferred to limit the specific requirement to the 5 nuclear weapon states. The US feared that this would give too many states the power to hold the treaty hostage regarding early implementation. Concerning India, the Chinese delegation opposed the 5 declared nuclear weapon states requirement for ratification. They argued that it would be inappropriate to single out the P5 from the perspective of political equality (CD/PV.733). This issue indicates that the CTBT was perceived by China as an important back door route to bring the non-NPT states (like India) into the non-proliferation regime. At the same time China was acting like a representative of the developing countries during the negotiation process.

China, in September 1995, dropped its requirement that all CD member states and all nuclear-capable states, as specified in the relevant IAEA list, ratify the treaty. China accepted the 44 states provision that bound the “five plus three” declared and undeclared nuclear weapon states. On June 20, 1996, India conveyed an unmistakable warning that it was preparing to exercise its veto unless the EIF provision was made less specific. This provision provided India with a reason for vetoing the CTBT.

#### **7.4.5. Endgame and US-China bilateral negotiations**

On June 28, 1996, the last day of the second session, the chairman's text was tabled indicating that the CTBT negotiations had been concluded. The Chinese delegation responded to the "final text" and stated that the chairman's text did not reflect China's positions on some important issues, such as NTM, the basis for OSI and the decision-making procedure of the Executive Council on OSI (CD/ 1436). For China's part, NTM and the decision-making procedures of OSI were politically sensitive and inalienable issues because they gave room for subjective abuse and the possibility of infringement of a state's sovereignty. Furthermore, on June 6, China made a number of significant compromises, dropping its proposals about PNEs and NFU, and including satellite and EMP monitoring for verification. In a Chinese delegate's view, China "showed varying degrees of compromise and flexibility on almost every important issue in the treaty in order to facilitate its scheduled conclusion" (Zou Yunhua 1998a: 22).

At the June 28 meeting, the twenty-eight nonaligned countries in the CD, including India, Pakistan, Iran and Mexico, also challenged the chairman's declaration that negotiations were concluded that day. The Chinese delegation requested amendments of the chairman's text in the interest of "safeguarding its own legitimate security interests and other countries' concerns about relevant issues." Meanwhile, the United States decided to support the treaty text, as it was early July and it hoped to discourage any further negotiations. The United States then secured public declarations of support for the draft treaty from Britain, France, Russia, Indonesia and others (Johnson 1997: 16).

Before the last session resumed on July 29, there was a one-month break. The deadlock needed the top leadership's intervention from China and US. In the interest of US, it was necessary to negotiate with China over the OSI issue. In reply to US President Clinton, China's president Jiang Zemin raised the remaining question of OSI in his letter:

I am afraid that China and the US still have some differences over the trigger basis and decision-making procedure of on-site inspections...It is my hope that the two sides can reach agreement on this matter prior to the resumption of the Conference on Disarmament on 29 July, with a view to avoiding the reopening of talks on the chairman's text during the resumed meeting and to facilitating the signing of a CTBT within this year (Zou Yunhua 1998a: 24).

The US side soon discarded Jiang's suggestion and remained opposed to the revision of the chairman's treaty text. Instead, the US side proposed that US-China bilateral talks be held in Geneva before the resumption of the CD meetings in late July. Intensive discussion between US and China took place in the first weeks of August. Facing the Chinese delegation's firm stance and the pressure from the other nuclear weapon states, the US finally agreed to the alternative that Britain, France and Russia had accepted, over a package of agreements, the "green light" process, requiring approval by three-fifths of the EC members. In return, China agreed to allow information from NTM as a "truly technical, verifiable and substantial" basis for triggering an OSI (Johnson 1997: 16).

Drawing on their personal experiences, several Chinese diplomats added that the height of US-China bilateral cooperation occurred when the United States and China

met during the end-procedures for on-site inspections; these consultations were directly between the United States and China and included no other parties. Chinese officials developed a compromise formula which was accepted by the US. The Chinese participants argued that without cooperation between the United States and China, the CTBT would never have been concluded (Medeiros 2000 *Conference Report*: 7).

## **7.5. Making Sense of Chinese CTBT Activities**

### **7.5.1. Filibustering: Tactical Delaying<sup>70</sup>**

During the negotiation process, many observers and some delegates were puzzled about China's real intentions for the CTBT talks. China's subsequent 6 nuclear tests made this question even more doubtful. However, one observer of the talks described China's negotiating behaviour as follows:

During the first 18 month of negotiations, China played a back-seat role... Based on China's negotiation posture, it would seem that Beijing may have initially entered the CD talks with the hope that they would fall apart. It appeared that China tabled a number of mere "place-holding" proposals in the early phase of negotiations and did not politically commit to a test ban treaty or fully address the security and technical implications of the treaty's options on vital provisions (like verification) until early in 1996. In the final month, China seemed more engaged in the negotiations, fighting

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<sup>70</sup> Observers argued that China conducted a delaying strategy to avoid or block the CTBT results. Instead of the term, 'delaying strategy', 'tactical delaying' will be referred in the dissertation. China's delaying behaviour was not strategical since that China overarchingly supported and assisted the establishment of the CTBT norm during the negotiation process.

for its positions with greater openness and seeking to win allies and specific concessions (Johnson 1996b: 57).

China's incrementally active participation culminated in the endgame related to OSI agenda, as explored in the previous section. John Holum, a director of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, considered the sheer number of China's brackets in the rolling text as "a more fundamental policy question" than the simply negotiable technical question. It was thought that the intention was to hold up the treaty until all China's nuclear tests were done (Holum 1996: 4). Rebecca Johnson also confirmed that China's fundamentally different approach from the majority of states on several key issues was making agreement very difficult (Johnson 1996a: 29-34). According to Garrett and Glaser's interview, some Chinese experts recognized that some of Chinese proposals, like PNEs, for the CTBT might have the effect, "if not the intention," of prolonging the negotiations. They conceded that China's negotiators raised the PNE issue in the CTBT talks as part of a "strategy" to delay the signing of the CTBT. They further stated that the reason China presented the working paper that proposed a number of alternative verification regimes was that people would explore and discuss all of them and not reach an accord by 1996 (Garrett and Glaser 1995: 55). Without doubt, China basically adopted a "delaying tactic" to aim at winning time to conclude its planned series of nuclear tests.

Johnston also confirms that "the various Chinese positions on agenda appear designed to delay the creation of a CTBT regime" (Johnston 1997: 304-5). He even argues that almost all China's proposals, such as the NFU, the PNEs and the verification regime were "designed to slow down the process."

“For instance, China has insisted that the treaty include language whereby the nuclear states would pledge no-first-use. None of the other nuclear states has accepted this proposal, though developing states support this position. China has also insisted that the treaty allow states to conduct peaceful nuclear explosions, which, it argues, might be useful for large-scale public works or resource development projects. On this issue, it is virtually alone...China’s position on verification has also slowed down negotiation. It has proposed a very expensive international satellite monitoring system for verifying whether nuclear explosion have occurred – a system that a number of states believe is unnecessary” (Johnston 1996: 56).

However, it is too simple to see China’s whole proposals and negotiating activities at the CD as designed only to delay the talks in order to implement its nuclear modernization programme. This view reduces all aspects of China’s negotiation behaviour to one motive, a delaying tactic, based on the given perception of China’s *realpolitik*. This view perceives China’s participation as negative rather than positive and norm-conflicting rather than norm-complying. China’s negotiation stance and manoeuvres were much more complicated than those simply able to be explained overall as “delaying strategy.”

Zou Yunhua declared that the “Chinese delegation had always adhered to two main objectives for the CTBT: the promotion of nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear proliferation” (Zou Yunhua 1998a: 21). The “prevention of nuclear proliferation” was the prime purpose of the CTBT talks. The “promotion of nuclear disarmament” was also sought at the CTBT talks and proposed for inclusion in the Preamble of the treaty. The Chinese delegation, backed by Chinese nuclear scientists, tried to make efforts to preserve the utility of the PNEs.

China showed a norm-complying attitude against a nuclear test ban during the negotiations. China also made its own agenda for the talks, trying to create a new norm in multilateral ACD frameworks. The NFU, China's longstanding proposal on the international disarmament agenda from the time of its first nuclear test, could be interpreted in this sense. A preference for IMS rather than NTM was a necessary result of China's traditional foreign policy behaviour which rejected anything which was seen as infringing sovereignty. In promoting its own disarmament norms or agenda, China was working to establish the CTBT at the CD. China's proactive participation cannot be defined simply as a delaying strategy. It should be understood in the context of all China's CD behaviour in the negotiating process.

### **7.5.2. Norm (CTBT)-Establishing Behaviour**

Given the definition of regimes as "sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations" (Krasner 1983: 2), norms are international prescriptions for state action in situations of choice. Treaties epitomize the idea that states must, themselves, consent to norms and cannot otherwise be obliged to observe them. The regimes created by some treaties can affect state behaviour and make states see norms in their security interest, to prevent other signatories from violating the norms, for instance, conducting nuclear weapon tests, in the case of the CTBT. Whether a state accepts the norm can be analyzed by looking at its behaviour and, additionally, by examining the discourse with which it justifies its actions of identifying and emphasizing the norm's importance (Finnemore 1996a: 140).



A norm against nuclear weapon tests has developed over the last 45 years and has its origin in the request of Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru for a ban on nuclear testing. This was followed by 40 years' intermittent negotiations that produced agreement only on partial, non-comprehensive bans on testing until the CTBT was signed in 1996. This norm has arisen from the practices of states and from the beliefs expressed in connection with their votes for UN General Assembly resolutions and their decisions to join the NPT and the CTBT.<sup>71</sup> Indeed, like other signatories, China's final signature to the CTBT text, itself, indicates that China had maintained norm-complying or norm-establishing behaviour throughout the negotiations.<sup>72</sup> Chinese leaders set for themselves the expected deadline for concluding the treaty – “cut-off date” - of “no later than 1996.” From the outset of the CTBT negotiations, top Chinese leaders and officials consistently maintained their desire to conclude a treaty by the end of 1996, which suggests that a political decision to sign the treaty in principle had been made by 1993 or earlier. In the early 1990s, Chinese leaders posed several preconditions for successful completion of a CTBT. One was that the other nuclear powers adopt a policy of “no-first-use” with respect to nuclear weapons. Another precondition was further reductions in U.S. and Soviet strategic forces, presumably to levels below those stipulated in the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) agreements, although the Chinese generally declined to give specific targets (Zhu Mingquan 1997: 40-8).

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<sup>71</sup> George Bunn demonstrated that “a strong international norm against nuclear weapon testing exists” even though the CTBT has not yet entered into force and India and Pakistan conducted nuclear tests in 1998. He argued that the strong existence of this norm is reflected not just in treaty texts, but also in widely supported UN resolutions and international condemnations against the 1998 tests by India and Pakistan (Bunn 1999: 20-32).

In practice, however, the Chinese have proceeded with negotiations despite the fact that their preconditions have not been met. Before the CTBT talks actually started on January 25, 1994, China's commitment to establish the CTBT norm was clear. Its participation in the negotiation process, its wish to join the treaty, its support of an expected deadline for the treaty's conclusion and its decision to abide by the treaty, once it "came into effect," are all on record (Chapter 7.2.). Frieman describes this situation as "a no-win situation for the Chinese leadership," which means that China was reluctant to accept the CTBT negotiation and could not credibly maintain even a rhetorical commitment to disarmament without supporting the goals and the process of a CTBT (Frieman 1996: 24). The Chinese leadership overruled the military's (mainly Second Artillery and COSTIND) recommendation for continued testing and accepted a countervailing recommendation from the MFA. China announced a nuclear test moratorium in June 8, 1996.

The compromises that China made in the plenary sessions in 1996 were important ones. Unlike India, the Chinese delegation made compromises on controversies, such issues as EIF, NTM and OSI, as explored in the previous section. In the endgame, China also assisted the US and other nations in circumventing India's opposition.

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<sup>72</sup> A speech by US President Clinton pointed out that the signatures would "create an international norm against testing, even before the treaty formally enters into force" (President Clinton, Address to the UN General Assembly, September 24, 1996 <http://www.clw.org/coalition>).

### 7.5.3. Norm (NFU)-Creating Behaviour

In the early discussions of the CD, the Chinese delegation insisted that NFU and NSA should be included in the Preamble of the treaty text, which demonstrated the principle and objective of the CTBT.

Chinese negotiators argued that since the CTBT treaty was a major step toward completely eliminating nuclear weapons, the preamble of the treaty therefore should include NFU and reflect the universal aspirations of the international community by pointing out that more efforts were needed to achieve the goal of eliminating all nuclear weapons after concluding the CTBT treaty (*UN Disarmament Yearbook* 1995: 38).

Most of the countries, including the United States, regarded the NFU, as being beyond the scope of the CTBT, while the NFU might be favoured by non-nuclear states. It is tactically true that the NFU and NSA could be utilized by the Chinese delegation to delay the talks. However, this explanation cannot cover the Chinese insistence on the NFU as a norm-value in the international disarmament agenda. For three decades, China has urged the other four nuclear-weapon powers to follow its lead and commit themselves to not being the first to use nuclear weapons against any other nuclear weapon state; and not to use nuclear weapons, or the threat of nuclear weapons, against any non-nuclear country or nuclear-free zone at any time or under any circumstances (Negative Security Assurance NSA). Chinese leaders consistently argued this position at UN disarmament meetings including UNGA. Chinese arms control experts firmly held the view that halting nuclear testing would have less significance than other measures aimed at curbing the spread and preventing the use of nuclear weapons. Chinese analysts and officials maintain, for example, that

although a CTBT will contribute to international security, it will play a less significant role than a five-power pledge of no-first-use (NFU) and negative security assurances (NSA), or the extension of the NPT. Most Chinese arms controllers would agree with Foreign Minister Qian Qichen's 1993 statement that

granted that a nuclear test ban is necessary, to undertake not to use nuclear weapons at all is far more crucial, because this will not only make their testing, development, production or deployment devoid of any meaning, but will give a great impetus to nuclear disarmament, which will contribute tremendously to world peace and security (*Beijing Review* October 11-17, 1993).

They sincerely believe that the benefits of an NFU treaty would include reduced risk of war, enhanced security of the five nuclear-weapon states, greater mutual trust, reduced likelihood of nuclear proliferation, and advancement toward the goal of complete nuclear disarmament (Chapter 4). Because the Chinese also view a country's willingness or unwillingness to make an NFU pledge as a key indicator of its political and strategic intentions, they would feel more secure with NFU pledges from the other nuclear powers. Given that the fact of adopting NFU would require the nuclear weapon states to abandon extended nuclear deterrence, China tried to gain bilateral NFU pledges. China has consistently sought for a US pledge for NFU after being threatened in the past.<sup>73</sup> China suggested NFU when John Holum, the director of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, visited China on October 7 1996, just after the CTBT talks concluded. It was reported that the proposal was turned down and China and the US only agreed to the non-targeting of strategic nuclear

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<sup>73</sup> During and after the Korean War, the United States deployed nuclear-armed B-29 bombers to Guam for possible use against targets in China. The United States also deployed nuclear-capable weapons systems, presumably with nuclear warheads, on Taiwan in the 1950s (Lewis and Xue 1988: 11-34).

weapons against each other (*Beijing Review* Oct. 28-Nov. 3 1996). Meanwhile, China and Russia pledged not to use nuclear weapons against each other and not to aim nuclear weapons at each other in a joint communique on September 3, 1994, during Chinese President Jiang Zemin's visit to Moscow (*Renmin ribao* 5 Sept. 1994).

China's NFU card in the international disarmament agenda was also intended to achieve political objectives, as the Chinese acknowledged. One Chinese ACD expert noted that "China's role in leading the Third World has been less prominent recently" and asserted that by actively suggesting NFU and NSA for non-nuclear states China could "demonstrate a leadership role" (Garrett and Glaser 1995: 66-67). By suggesting NFU on behalf of the interests of the developing states, China strategically tried to draw their support and spread the NFU idea and construct it as a new norm. However, many western analysts dismiss NFU pledges as political statements with little security significance and credibility in a crisis. In the CTBT talks, the contents of NFU were thought to be beyond the CTBT agenda and thus inappropriate, by many delegations. The NFU was therefore dismissed when the final version of the treaty draft was reached. The Chinese ambassador, Sha Zukang complained that the treaty Preamble "did not reflect that more efforts are needed to achieve the goal of eliminating all nuclear weapons after concluding the CTBT treaty" (Zhou Xin 1996: 7).

#### **7.5.4. State Identity in Transition: Some Contradictions at the CTBT Negotiations**

Constructivists counter that structural realism misses what is often a more determinant factor, namely, the intersubjective ideas, which shape a state's behaviour by constituting the identities and interests of actors (Copeland 2000: 187). Alexander Wendt seeks to challenge the core neorealist premise that anarchy forces states into recurrent security competitions. According to Wendt, whether a system is conflictual or peaceful is a function not of anarchy or power but of the shared culture created through cultural instantiations. Anarchy has no permanent determinant "logic," only different cultural instantiations. Because each actor's conception of self (its interests and identity) is a product of the others' diplomatic gestures, states can reshape structure by process; through new gestures, they can reconstitute interests and identities toward more other-regarding and peaceful means and ends (Wendt 1992a; 1994).

Chinese foreign policy has always recognized itself as a supporter or guardian of the developing Third World states. Armstrong termed this character as "revolutionary diplomacy" and argued that the self-identification with the developing countries was the legacy of Mao's revolutionary experiences (Armstrong 1977; 1993: 176-84). Deng Xiaoping stressed in his article that,

the reason I lay special emphasis on the Third World is that opposition to hegemonism and safeguarding world peace are of special significance to the Third World. Who are the victims of hegemonism?...Although the Third World is poor, its international political influence has increased considerably (Deng Xiaoping *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping II* 1994: 415-7)

He summed up the directions that Chinese foreign policy should sustain in world politics in three phases: opposing hegemonism; safeguarding world peace; and strengthening unity and cooperation with the Third World. As for Chinese foreign policy, the above three points have been the basic political line in dealing with foreign affairs since Deng Xiaoping took office. During the CTBT negotiation process, the Chinese delegation always tried to gain the support of the developing countries. Over the issues of NTM and OSI, anxiety about an arbitrary inspection by the US-supported trigger mechanism that might infringe Chinese sovereignty, the Chinese delegation preferred IMS to be incorporated in On-Site Inspection and opposed NTM. In the decision-making procedures, China also opposed the “red light procedure.” In search for any possible technical benefit, China proposed that the international network of satellites and electromagnetic pulse sensor (EMP) technology should be included in IMS. The logic of the Chinese insistence upon preserving the right for PNEs was for the sake of the “developing countries.” All these Chinese bargaining positions stemmed from the self-imposed recognition that China should be in line with the developing countries.

However, there was another conspicuous feature of Chinese behaviour at the CD. China acted with double standards in terms of the self-identity of the state. Many observers agreed that one of main factors that engaged China in the CTBT negotiations was China’s hope to be regarded as a responsible major power. Especially, the position of the MFA was in line with this argument. The MFA argued that China’s international stature and image as a responsible great power were at stake and that China’s political and diplomatic manoeuvrability and progress required a

constructive position in the CTBT. In addition, it was argued that China would gain certain concrete benefits from signing the treaty: specifically, that supporting the CTBT, would be beneficial to China's great power image. This shift of self-identity indicated that China was no longer one of the developing countries and desired to be respected as a major power in global politics. Zhao Suisheng observed the change in Chinese foreign policy in the early 1990s, creating a regional power base diplomacy, harmony with the West and growth of UN activities. He pointed out that,

the fact that Beijing has adjusted its policy priority to the Asia-Pacific region and has taken cooperative actions in international activities may be interpreted as China's understanding of the need for a regional base and to be an independent but responsible partner in a multipolar world (Zhao Suisheng 1992: 81-2).

Promoting this image, China unintentionally disclosed a self identity discrepancy between that of a responsible power and that of a guardian of the developing countries at the CTBT talks. The case of the PNEs where China failed to gain support was an example. Over the issues, the Chinese delegation suggested that only the declared nuclear weapon states should be permitted to conduct PNEs. From the beginning to the end of the CTBT talks, PNEs were the only issue that isolated China from all other countries. China was not able to win support here even from its closest ally, Pakistan, which supported all other proposals tabled by China at the talks. The United States and Russia had already abandoned the PNEs, and NPT parties unanimously shared the view that the potential benefits of PNEs were questionable. It was technically impossible to detect the difference between explosions for peaceful or military uses, and, moreover, the inclusion of PNEs in the treaty would greatly complicate the verification regime. Therefore, many observers considered PNEs as a



“bargaining ploy or blocking decoy” (Johnson 1995). In contrast, Chinese scientists strongly believed that PNEs might be proven useful at some time in the future, even though China had never used PNEs, nor did China have any plan to do so in the foreseeable future. The Chinese science establishment associated with the defence industry pushed the argument during the decision-making process of the CTBT (Garrett and Glaser 1995: 60-2).

PNEs were clearly “inherently discriminatory,” which ran counter to Deng Xiaoping’s basic foreign policy line and damaged the image of China’s relations with the non-nuclear developing countries. It made China’s moral argument illegitimate and undermined the image which China wished to promote, that China cannot allow a politically discriminatory treaty because China speaks for the developing countries. Facing the indifferent response from the developing countries, China insisted that PNEs should be included as one way to help developing countries in peaceful uses of nuclear energy. But this was called “unwanted help” and dismissed by many developing countries as “not warranted under the new circumstances” (*UN Disarmament Yearbook* 1995: 16).<sup>74</sup>

In a way, PNEs might be judged “a policy failure” due to the poor policy-coordinating mechanism to “generate more inconsistent and controversial policy and behaviour” (Jia Hao 1999a: 248-54). In a broader sense, China took a political cost in order to attempt to gain potential technological and economic advantages as a nuclear

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<sup>74</sup> Meanwhile, it also concomitantly brought China’s other proposals like NTM into question. China’s criticism against NTM on account of technical disparity between the developing countries and the advanced countries looked groundless. That disparity inherent in NTM was a critical argument of the Chinese delegation. At this time, China self-recognized itself as a developing country.

weapon state. PNEs in the CTBT talks reflected China's split identity as a state which took part in and expressed the voice of its own interests in the negotiation process of the international institutions. Although only a middle-level power, aspiring to be a major power, China began to behave as a major power in international bargaining, which would create more tensions and contradictions in Deng Xiaoping's basic line and China's traditional challenge against hegemonic powers.

## CHAPTER 8. Post CTBT Dynamics

*They (all countries) should seek the point where their common interests converge, expand mutually beneficial cooperation and work together to take up the challenge facing mankind for survival and development...We should take an active part in multilateral diplomatic activities and give full play to China's role in the United Nations and other international organizations (Jiang Zemin's report delivered at the 15<sup>th</sup> National Congress of the Communist Party of China on September 12, 1997).*

The dynamic impact on China of the CTBT will now be examined as the framework of this thesis has been proposed in chapter 3. The pre-CTBT period and two and half years of the negotiation process have had a great impact on China, in a constructive way. The “dynamic interaction” penetrated the state as it was (*state t1*) and created the state as it is (*state t2*). The developments in the post-CTBT period suggest that China's increasing participation in international ACD institutions and regimes constitutively reconstruct the state itself, although it is not now clear whether these developments are the direct result of the CTBT experience. They might have been brought about by the overall interaction with international ACD institutions and regimes during the 1990s.

First of all, Chinese evaluation of the CTBT and the Chinese attitude toward the test ban norm is a direct indicator of how China has complied with the treaty norm and whether China's accession to the treaty has entailed cognitive learning in the post-CTBT period. Then the indirect and resultant developments in China's ACD policy will be traced and identified at both perspective and domestic institutional level. In addition, the CTBT dynamism encouraged and accelerated Chinese

engagement in international ACD frameworks. The processes and consequences of the dynamism will also be discussed.

### **8.1. *China's Evaluation of the Final CTBT***

It is important to examine China's own evaluation of its achievements and dissatisfactions regarding the CTBT results because of its impact on China's attitude towards compliance in the post-CTBT period and because it also indicates what China learned throughout the whole negotiating process. In Chinese rhetoric, China's main political argument, that of creating norms and spreading policies like the NFU was maintained and pronounced repeatedly.

After the CTBT was concluded in Geneva, Sha Zukang, the Chinese disarmament ambassador, showed China's basic attitude toward the results of the treaty. He pointed out that the CTBT text "represents the results" of the CD negotiations over the preceding two and a half years; it "basically embodies" the actual conditions of the negotiations and "is balanced as a whole." He also stressed that the treaty was not entirely satisfactory, because it did not reflect the legitimate demands and rational proposals of many developing countries, including China (CD/1436). The OSI and the NTM were the main problem issues, as examined in chapter 7. Although the Chinese delegation expressed its discontent with the treaty, most Chinese ACD experts evaluated China's participation positively. They regarded the CTBT as the first multilateral nuclear arms control treaty negotiation that China conducted and participated in. During the talks, China was seen to demonstrate its genuine interest

and willingness to put forward constructive propositions and to show the necessary flexibility and compromising spirit. They thought that China had finally gained a good reputation and enhanced its negotiating stature (Wang Ling 1997; Zou Yunhua 1998a).

Most Chinese ACD experts accepted that the CTBT was indispensable and universal, in that the developing countries had been longing for its achievement for the long time. They regarded the importance of the CTBT as the embodiment of prevention of qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons (Zou Yunhua 1994; Liu Huaqiu 1995; Wang Ling 1996; Wu Zhan 1998a). However, there were some Chinese criticisms of the CTBT, especially from the military side. One author in a military-associated journal, criticized the NTM and argued that China could not dismiss the interference of the hegemonic powers in other countries' domestic affairs. He also pointed out that the United States and the other nuclear powers rejected the NFU and maintained a nuclear deterrence strategy. In this sense, he understood that the US tried to utilize the CTBT to strengthen its nuclear supremacy and undermine the positive implications of the CTBT (Xia Zhiqian 1997: 44-5). Other Chinese observers deprecated the implications of the CTBT, warning that the US retained the capability of computerised nuclear testing, new information technology and NMD. He argued that "we (the Chinese) need counter-measures and the speeding-up of military modernization," because the western military superpowers "are seeking for new nuclear testing methods, which can introduce a new and more sophisticated nuclear arms race" (Sun Xuegui 1997: 25). The Chinese *realpolitik* view considered the CTBT to be the instrument of consolidation of the US nuclear superiority "by restricting other nuclear states." Although the CTBT was a major attempt to

strengthen the international nonproliferation regime and to prevent both the vertical and the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons, “the so-called “cooperation” is cooperation with the US at the centre and the so-called “arms control” is arms control with the maintenance of US military superiority as the prerequisite” (Wang Zhenxi and Zhao Xiozhuo 1998: 31-40).

The official standpoint about the results of the CTBT was voiced in the statement of the MFA minister, Qian Qichen, at the 51<sup>st</sup> Session of UNGA. He assessed China’s active participation in the CD positively and argued that China “displayed maximum flexibility” in order to facilitate the final conclusion of the treaty. From the Chinese point of view, he indicated a further way to head for arms control and disarmament in the post-CTBT era.

We still have a long way to go and must continue to work strenuously in order to achieve the ultimate goal of total elimination of nuclear weapons...All nuclear states should assume the obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time or under any circumstances; they should unconditionally renounce the use of the threat of use of such weapons against non-nuclear states or nuclear-free zones; and should conclude international instruments to this effect without delay (*Beijing Review*, 14-20 Oct. 1996).

Qian, in his statement, reiterated China’s traditional position on nuclear disarmament. He suggested that other nuclear powers (especially the United States) “renounce their policy of nuclear deterrence”. Henceforth their nuclear arsenals and stockpiles should be continuously cut back, even though by how much was not mentioned. Then he reiterated the NFU argument that China had proposed in the Preamble of the rolling text of the CTB treaty at an early stage of negotiation.

## **8.2. China's Post-CTBT Commitment**

While the negotiations were completed in the requisite time, as mandated by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the NPT, actual implementation of the treaty is unlikely in the short term and uncertain in the long term. The standard of commitment should be actual implementation, if not effective implementation. In this sense, tracking down the Chinese commitment to the CTBT is a necessary litmus test for judging Chinese ACD behaviour and for identifying to what extent China has complied with the norm of the CTBT regime. Their commitment can also suggest the dynamic interaction that the state (China) has demonstrated in the post-CTBT period.

Even though the goals of the CTBT would contribute significantly to efforts to create a new global security order, based on arrangements that are universal in scope and employ extensive verification measures, these goals will be unattainable if the international community cannot bring the CTBT into force and implement it effectively. For the CTBT to enter into force, the group of 44 states identified by Article XIV must first ratify the treaty.<sup>75</sup>

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<sup>75</sup> Annex 2 of the CTBT identifies a group of 44 states. The list of countries was defined as those countries that formally participated in the work of the 1996 session of the Conference on Disarmament and are identified by the International Atomic Energy Agency as possessing nuclear power reactors or research reactors.

**Table 8.1. CTBT Ratification Status**

	<b>Number Signed</b>	<b>Number Ratified</b>
<b>Required States</b> (44 states)	41	31
<b>World Total</b> (192 states)	161	84

*Source: Arms Control Association Fact Sheet 18 October 2001*

China has not ratified the CTBT like other countries, such as the United States, Russia, India, Pakistan and Israel. China affirmed its CTBT position in a joint statement at the October 1997 China-US summit. “The United States and China agree to work to bring the CTBT into force at the earliest possible date” (*Beijing Review* 10-16 November 1997). China has reaffirmed its willingness to ratify several times. For example, at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, Chinese President, Jiang Zemin, indicated that the Chinese government “will soon officially submit the treaty to the National People’s Congress for ratification” (Jiang Zemin’s address at the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva, March 26 1999 <http://www.clw.org/coalition/jiang99.htm>). It is believed by many observers that China will not move to deposit its instrument of ratification until the United States does so (Bunn 1999; Parachini and Birmingham 1999).

Despite China’s delay in ratification, China has implemented its two commitments to the CTBT since it signed in 1996, first its active participation in preparation for the entry of the CTBT into force and second, its position on a nuclear test ban norm, although India and Pakistan conducted nuclear weapon tests in 1998 and the US Senate rejected the CTBT for ratification in 1999.



China actively participated in the Preparatory Commission for the CTBT and made joint efforts with other signatories to facilitate the process of the entry into force of the treaty.<sup>76</sup> For instance, in order to cooperate with the IMS network, China provided its 12 IMS-related stations, including seismic, radio-nuclide, and infrasound stations. Upon entry into force, state parties to the agreement will be able to make use of the various compliance measures provided for by the treaty. Under the terms of the treaty, a global verification regime to monitor compliance must be operational at the time that the treaty enters into force (CTBTO 2001: 5). Under the CTBT China is also setting up a National Data Centre as part of the treaty's global international monitoring system.

China has sustained the nuclear test moratorium since 1996. China has also made a commitment to the ban on nuclear weapon testing even when the norm was undermined by the May 1998 nuclear tests by both India and Pakistan. The South Asian nuclear tests raised questions concerning the sustainability of the NPT and the possibility of obstructing ratification of the CTBT in the US congress and START II in the Russian Duma. These tests threaten the institutions, norms and political cooperation supporting nuclear ACD and nonproliferation, worldwide. Since a signature to the CTBT created an international norm against testing, even before the treaty formally enters into force, China did not follow the South Asian nuclear tests and preserved its moratorium on nuclear tests. This reinforced China's norm-

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<sup>76</sup> The Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO Preparatory Commission) was established on 19 November 1996 by a Resolution adopted by the Meeting of States Signatories at the UN. The PreCom had a strong technical focus to prepare the establishment of the global verification regime. It consisted of two organs: a plenary body composed of all the state signatories and the Provisional Technical Secretariat (PTS) (CTBTO 2001).

complying commitment.<sup>77</sup> Although the South Asian nuclear tests may seem to have derailed the cause of the CTBT and the nuclear nonproliferation regime, concerted action, informed by the appreciation of the new circumstances, offers reasonable hope of placing nonproliferation efforts on a course consistent with the prerequisites of global peace and security in the twenty-first century.

In a major setback to the test ban norm and US credibility, the US Senate decisively rejected the CTBT in October, 1999, by a vote of 51-48. President Clinton pledged that he would keep fighting for the CTBT and that the US would continue its moratorium on nuclear testing. Despite his assurances, the result of the vote sent shock waves throughout the world, drawing strong condemnation from Russia and China as well as Europe and Asia (Cerniello 1999). Nonetheless, China supported the CTBT and its test ban norm. Sha Zukang, director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Department of the MFA, stated, in his interview with Xinhua New Service, that China had not changed its position on the test ban (Arms Control Association *Factsheets* December 1999).

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<sup>77</sup> There was some Chinese discourse on the consequences of May 1998 nuclear tests by India and Pakistan. Chinese observers were worried over the possible disrupting impact on regional security and the international nuclear nonproliferation mechanism, of the tests (Yang Haisheng 1998). Some argued that, despite the undermining effect, “the prospect for the CTBT’s effectiveness is not at risk” (Wu Zhan 1998b: 27) and China should “keep the treaty and nuclear nonproliferation policy and encourage international ratification for the early effectiveness of the treaty” (Jia Hao 1999b: 18-21).

### **8.3. The CTBT's Impact on the Construction of China's ACD**

#### **8.3.1. The CTBT's Impact on China's Security Perspective: the "New Security Concept"**

It is quite difficult to recognize the impact on the Chinese perspective which Chinese participation in the CTBT might bring in. It is difficult to measure the specific and concrete consequences of CTBT participation in the Chinese epistemological prism on ACD issues. Instead, broadly, as has been argued in Chapter 4, growing Chinese participation in the international ACD agenda brought about the evolutionary development of various Chinese views, some of which (in the late 1990s) went far beyond the traditional Chinese *realpolitik* and internalized the liberalist or constructivist views in IR theory. It has also been argued that there has also developed an increasing appreciation of the mutual security perspective. In the post-CTBT period, the most conspicuous shift of Chinese perspective has been in the nascent Chinese perspective on mutual security that was formulated and officially pronounced in the name of the "*xin anquan gainian*" (new security concept). The "new security concept (NSC)" represents the Chinese government's official articulation of its vision for a future post-Cold War security environment. This concept is still being debated among Chinese analysts in various journals. It raises very complicated questions not only for Chinese security analysts but also for external observers.

The new Chinese security vision, the "new security concept" (NSC), was first put forward by Foreign Minister Qian Qichen at the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1997. Qian Qichen proposed that security should rely on mutual trust and linked

common interest rather than military build-up and military alliance (*Renmin ribao* 28 July 1997). Since then, the NSC repeatedly surfaced in Chinese discourse until it was formulated in a white paper, *China's National Defence* issued in July 1998. When Jiang Zemin and Yeltsin issued a joint statement in Moscow in April 1997, the statement was hailed by China as a new mode of security differing from the Cold War mentality. In the statement, China and Russia declared that they will “strive to promote the multipolarization of the world and establishment of a new international order.” “Both sides stand for the establishment of a new and universally applicable security concept” (Beijing Review 5-11 May 1997). Following the publication of Yan Xuetong’s article in *Contemporary International Relations* (*Xiandai guoji guanxi*) in the civilian sector, the PLA published a long editorial entitled, “The World Needs a New Security Concept” (*Jiefangjun bao* 24 December 1997). The authors argued that the tenet of the security concept in the Cold War era “based one’s security on the other’s insecurity,” and that the necessity for NSC has been embodied in three new modes of security, international peace, a security dialogue and a security treaty, in the post-Cold War era (Li Qinggong and Wei Wei 1997).

The White Paper on *Chinese National Defence in 1998*, released by the Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China in July 1998, reaffirmed China’s support for this new mode of security thinking that sought to enhance mutual security without targeting any third country (*China's National Defence* 1998). In the White Paper, on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, the new security concept was articulated in the following paragraph.

All countries should promote mutual understanding and trust through dialogue and cooperation, and seek the settlement of divergences and disputes among nations through peaceful means. These are the realistic ways to guarantee peace and security. **Security is mutual, and security dialogues and cooperation should be aimed at promoting trust, not at creating confrontations,** still less at directing the spearhead against a third country or infringing upon the security interests of any other nation (*China's National Defence* 1998: 6-7).

Viewed from the perspective of military doctrine and security concepts, the White Paper integrated several ideas that were mentioned in the regional discussion. These ideas included “comprehensive security,” “mutual security,” “equal security,” “cooperative security,” and “common security.”<sup>78</sup> The 1998 document was also devoted to China’s participation in regional and global Confidence Building Measures (CBMs). The document stated that China placed great stress on and actively promoted security dialogue and cooperation at different levels, through various channels and in different forms. China’s recent agreement with neighbouring countries on CBMs and the reduction of military forces in border areas were used to illustrate the “new security concept.”

In fact, there was marked progress in China’s acceptance of CBMs during the late 1990s. China also embarked on a very ambitious use of protocol visits as CBMs to further its foreign policy objectives, including high level diplomatic visits and military exchanges at all levels.<sup>79</sup> For instance, Chi Haotian, the vice-chairman of the CMC

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<sup>78</sup> These are discussed in a thoughtful Chinese article (Chu Shulong 1997)

<sup>79</sup> One of the primary goals of China’s military exchange programme is to gain access to foreign defence equipment and technology, particularly with the United States, Russia, France and Italy. However, this Chinese activities illustrates that China began to accept the CBMs or military transparency and utilize them in order to enhance China’s position. The White Paper, *China's Defence in 2000*, demonstrates the significantly increasing military exchange in 1999 to 2000 (Information Office 2000 *China's Defence in 2000*: 77-86).

and Defence Minister, visited Japan and called for the “new security concept” to seek a “lasting peace.” Outlining the NSC at Japan’s National Institute for Defence Policy, he stressed that China and Japan should enhance trust through dialogues and seek security by cooperation (*Beijing Review* 2-8 March 1998). China came to see clear advantages for CBMs, such as agreements with Russia and Central Asia on border demarcations and subsequent troops reductions, which, in turn, provided a stable external environment in order to facilitate remarkable economic progress.<sup>80</sup>

### ***The Justification of the “New Security Concept” (NSC)***

From a strategic point of view, as some observers argued, the NSC was formulated in direct response to the revised US-Japan alliance and the expansion of NATO, the efforts made by the United States to strengthen its alliances and security ties worldwide (Shambaugh 1999a; Finkelstein 1999). According to these observers, the NSC was proposed by the Chinese government with the purpose of countering the dominant presence of US military forces and its enhancement of its military alliances, which culminated in the promulgation of the US-Japan Revised Guidelines for Defence Cooperation, in 1997. The NSC was a response to the Chinese assessment that, in the long term, the US will maintain or increase its lead in developing and fielding military forces and the advanced technology weaponry needed to underwrite and sustain the US position as the sole superpower for the foreseeable future. Chinese arguments about “common security” that denounce the military alliance as the legacy of the Cold War mentality evince such a strategic view. Moreover, the military’s involvement made this argument more persuasive. The top PLA leadership actively

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<sup>80</sup> For the Chinese views on the CBMs and China’s commitment to the CBMs, see Liu Huaqiu and Zheng Hua (1997) and Xia Liping (1997).

promoted the NSC in the course of its foreign military diplomacy. This role has been taken up most visibly by Minister of Defence Chi Haotian and he regularly expounded the idea to visiting foreign guests in Beijing.

Certainly, China's "manifesto" of the NSC was motivated by strategic thinking that helped to counter the US unipolarity, which was being consolidated by NATO expansion and the lately revised U.S. security treaty with Japan. Nonetheless, as an analyst observed, "China's change of mind, however, reflecting tactical rather than cognitive learning, is quite remarkable," given Beijing's long-standing opposition to the idea of security multilateralism (Deng Yong 1999: 57). The "new security concept" is not a simple rhetoric or tactical gesture to alleviate the other countries' concern that culminated in 1990s with the "China threat debates." It is a sort of blueprint or grand strategy to re-construct China's security environment for "peace and development." It can even be argued that the strategic thinking contained cognitive learning about mutual security. China began to accept mutual security and utilize mechanisms, such as CBMs, military transparency and military exchange. Through two decades of integration into the international system and its increasing engagement in international ACD frameworks, China came to recognize the utility of common security. Now China made efforts to realize the new idea by applying it to the regional and global security milieu in order to re-establish its bilateral relationships and to undermine the entrenched security system of the US military bloc and its influence. In the late 1990s China's establishment of partnerships with other countries illustrates its constructive strategy to weave its own relationship net (see table 8.2.). Although the partnerships have not actually formed a security partnership, they indicate China's intention or readiness to do so.

**Table 8.2. China's Construction of Partnerships in the late 1990s**

<b>Partner</b>	<b>Bilateral Relationship</b>	<b>Year</b>
Russia	Cooperative Strategic Partnership	1996 (April)
France	Comprehensive Cooperative Partnership	1997 (May)
U.S.	Constructive Strategic Partnership	1997 (October)
ASEAN	Good-neighbourly Partnership of Mutual Trust	1997 (December)
EU	Long-term and Stable Constructive Partnership	1998 (April)
Great Britain	Enhanced Comprehensive Partnership	1998 (October)
Japan	Partnership of Friendship and Cooperation for Peace and Development	1998 (November)
South Korea	Cooperative Partnership for the 21 <sup>st</sup> Century	1998 (November)

*Source:* Finkelstein 1999.

Chinese discourse on the NSC discloses its epistemological and theoretical background. The arguments indicate the theoretical and strategic intentions of the NSC. Since 1997 there have been numerous articles dealing with the new security concept, theoretically and practically. Most of them have imported the achievements of western security studies, such as Jervis's "security dilemma," zero-sum game and mutual security. They have re-interpreted the most advanced security concept, the so called "comprehensive security", in the context of China's security environment and multilateralism in the post-Cold War era.<sup>81</sup> Table 8.3. outlines the arguments.

Three points need to be made. First, Chinese analysts sought objectivity, the material foundation for the NSC in the new international development after the Cold War. According to them, the NSC emerged in keeping with the trend of development of the world situation and it was inevitable that the development of the trend of multipolarization and the democratization of international relations would gradually gain momentum. Economic globalization will prompt major powers to seek



cooperative relationships for common security based on common interests and to find solutions to conflicts through coordination (Li Ying 1998; Gao Hang 2000). Owing to the interdependence of all nations in the world, the ideal of “common security” will finally become a reality and will require a change from Cold War security thinking to post-Cold War security thinking. Thus, they believe that the new security theory will surely and gradually replace traditional Cold War thinking and that this process will be evolutionary and slow but it will eventually be accepted by the majority of nations.

**Table 8.3. Chinese New Security Concept**

	<b>Traditional Security Concept (Cold War)</b>	<b>New Security Concept (Post-Cold War)</b>
<b>Content of security</b>	Military security *the confusion of friend and foe e.g. US and NATO target at Russia in post-Cold War era * exaggeration of the level of threat e.g. China Threat fallacy	Comprehensive security Common security Cooperative security
<b>Methods of preserving security</b>	Deterrence Strategy Military Alliance Collective Security	No aim against the third party Equal consultation Peaceful solution No interference
<b>Security Theory</b>	Balance of Power Hegemonic Stability	Cooperative security
<b>Historical example</b>	NATO, Warsaw Pact, US-Japan Alliance	ARF, CSCA China-Russia partnership

Based on the recognition of an objective change in the post-Cold War international milieu, a Chinese analyst unfolds the argument with Hegelian teleology and strongly demands the necessity of new thinking that:

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<sup>81</sup> For the articles that examine the theoretical trends of common security in western academic, see Wang Liang (1998), Su Changhe (1998), Chu Shulong and Peng Chuyang (1999) and Han Li (2000). Cai Tuo (2000) relates the security concept to globalization.

When mankind enters the new century, the main trend of peace and development in the world is becoming stronger and stronger. People can certainly do away with the obsolete viewpoints that conflicts are unavoidable and wars eternal (Luo Renshi 2000: 16).

Second, this teleological aspiration for NSC explains a way of achieving “real” security. The analysts distinguish NSC from the traditional security concept. Cooperative security advocates solution of disputes through equal consultation, while the traditional security concept applied the deterrence strategy and military alliance policy based on military strength. The threat came from the hegemonic and interventionist behaviour that targeted other countries. They implied that military alliances (US-Japan) or collective security (NATO) should be replaced by the cooperative security channels based on common security and interests (Yan Xuotong 1995; 1997; Chen Fengjun 1997). According to them, security cooperation embodying the NSC could be realized in two ways: the establishment of bilateral strategic partnership between certain countries which would be the preliminary practice for common security. And also multilateral frameworks which should be based on four principles; 1) not to target other countries; 2) not to interfere in their domestic affairs; 3) peaceful solution to disputes; 4) equal consultation. They put forward the ARF (ASEAN Regional Forum) and the CSCAP (Council on Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region) as the embodiment of cooperative security.

Third, the Chinese analysts do not hide their strategic motives for NSC and express their dissatisfaction with regional security. For example, Chu Shulong argues

that the main threat to Asia-Pacific regional security and stability is hegemonism and power politics. Instead of the NSC thinking, “the Cold War thinking still exists and leads to military build-up, military alliance and intervention to domestic affairs” (Chu Shulong 2000: 7-10). The Chinese analysts regard the purpose of US military presence in the region as enforcing deterrence strategy and consolidating the military alliance which, it is argued, will not maintain world security but help to establish the “new world order under the American leadership.” They strongly suspect that US alliances in the Asia-Pacific region are aimed at China (Ye Zicheng 2000; Zhu Yinchang 2000).

In sum, the NSC contains a very positive and advanced security concept in security studies. The Chinese government imported the common security concept and officially formulated and pronounced it as the guidelines for Chinese security policy in both the global and the regional security milieu. Yan Xuetong, the most prominent campaigner of NSC, noted that,

After the Cold War, China recognized that the Cold War thinking was not appropriate to keeping world peace and regional security...China considers that there is a need to establish a new and universal security concept. This kind of security concept will be not only admitted by the absolute number of countries in the world, but also will gradually develop the primary security concept in transition to multilateralism in the post-Cold War era (Yan Xuetong 1997: 28).

China proclaimed NSC as the constructive approach in the post-Cold War security environment recognizing that cooperative security is a superior concept to the previous “traditional” security concept that most countries including the United States adhered to. Shambaugh confirmed that NSC “does represent the most systematic and

official exposition of China's prescriptive view to date, of how international relations should be conducted and security maintained" (Shambaugh 1999a: 67). In fact, NSC reflects the very vulnerable mindset of Chinese strategic thinking. It denounces the Cold War thinking and the security system, such as the military alliance and collective security, implying that the US alliance system in the Asia-Pacific region should be replaced. This siege mentality made the Chinese create and implement their own security vision. The NSC was designed to build a security framework, "cooperative security," which could undermine and act as a countermeasure to the US-dominated alliance system in the region. China is trying to establish its own security structure by utilizing the concept of common security, intersubjective meaning in security studies, whether this concept contains cognitive learning or not. This approach was expected to alleviate the neighbouring countries' growing concern about a rising China, and to be "appropriate, effective and promising for world peace and development in the post-Cold War era" (Zhang Yiping 1997).<sup>82</sup>

Jiang Zemin's report at the 15<sup>th</sup> National Congress of the Chinese communist party evinces the Chinese constructivist approach to security strategy. Jiang exhorted his civilian and military cadres to adhere to the principles of maintaining Deng Xiaoping's theory and keep an initiative in their hands. In the report, he stressed that "we (China) should take an active part in multilateral diplomatic activities and give full play to China's role in the United Nations and other international organizations"

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<sup>82</sup> For example, in his article, Chu Shulong proposed China's regional security strategy. Chu divided security concept into 5 competitive systems; hegemonic stability; alliance security; equilibrium stability, collective security and cooperative security. He argued that China should form its characteristic security strategy based on 'cooperative security.' This strategy included comprehensive security strategy, bilateral and multilateral security cooperation and limited defence capacity (Chu Shulong 1997: 2-7).

(*Beijing Review* 6-12 October 1997). The White Paper in 1998 also noted that it is “the aspiration of the Chinese government and people to lead a peaceful, stable and prosperous world into the new century” (*China’s National Defence* 1998: 1). Indeed, China’s activity in foreign policy started to take on a high profile.

### **8.3.2. The CTBT’s Impact on Institutions: The Restructuring of China’s Domestic ACD Institutions**

The extent of the development of China’s ACD institutions during the last decade was remarkable (Chapter 5). It was initiated by a group of scientists to disseminate new ideas and information and it produced a significant number of ACD communities. These developments were mirrored by the expanding roles and growing influence of a number of new bureaucratic actors devoted to examining its participation in the international ACD and nonproliferation regime. The three years’ experience of participation in the CTBT talks and subsequent challenge of new international ACD agenda encouraged Chinese leaders to reconsider China’s systemic and institutional problem for ACD policy. The institutional feedback of the CTBT in turn led to restructuring China’s domestic ACD institutions. Interpreting those changes provides a key clue for understanding the forthcoming direction of China’s ACD policy.

Beginning in autumn 1997 and accelerating through 1998, the Chinese leadership carried out an extensive restructuring of China’s military and government bureaucracies including the administration of its defence industries.<sup>83</sup> In parallel with

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<sup>83</sup> It should be recognized that the primary motive for restructuring was to ensure that Chinese economic growth would be sustained into the foreseeable future. The main purpose of the restructuring

this, the domestic ACD institutions were also reorganized. The atmosphere of transformation in the ACD field is noteworthy after China's CTBT experience. An observation describes the spirit of institutionalization as follows:

A greater degree of growth, openness, and flux characterizes the Chinese nonproliferation and arms control community at present and for the foreseeable near-term future. This period of creative germination and development offers promising opportunities to engage this community more constructively (*US-China Conference Report 1997: 10*).

**Table 8.4. Restructuring Chinese ACD Institutions in the post-CTBT period**

	<b>New Institute</b>	<b>Former Institute</b>	<b>Head of Institute</b>	<b>Note &amp; Year</b>
<b>MFA</b>	Department of Arms Control and Disarmament	Fourth Division of International Organization Department	Sha Zukang	Promoted to department status in 1997
<b>PLA</b>	General Armament Department	Equipment Bureau of GSD, Sub-institutes of COSTIND (ACO, CAEP, IAPCM, NINT, CDSTIC)	Cao Gangchun	Merged and newly created in 1998
<b>COSTIND</b>	SCOSTIND	COSTIND	Liu Jibin	Civilianized in 1998
<b>CAEA under COSTIND</b>	CAEA	CNNC or CAEA	Zhang Huazhu	Functionally reorganized in 1998
<b>CASS</b>	Centre for Arms Control and Nonproliferation Studies		Gu Guoliang	Newly created under the CASS in 1998

plan was to establish the new relationship between the government and state enterprises. According to Li Peng, "unwieldy organization and failure to separate the functions of the government from those of enterprises have given rise to bureaucracy, promoted unhealthy practices and created a heavy financial burden" (Li Peng Report on the Work of the Government 1998 from *Beijing Review* 6-12 April 1998). By the government restructuring during the first session of the 9<sup>th</sup> National People's Congress held March 5-19 in 1998, the number of ministries and commissions under the State Council was being cut from 40 to 29. The 1998's change in military sector was, indeed, the fifth major restructuring of the Chinese defence industry establishment. For the separation of Chinese defence industry from military, see Frankenstein and Gill (1997) and Lieberthal (1995).

The shift covered not only the main bureaucratic actors such as the MFA, the PLA and the COSTIND, but also the creation of a new research institute and the re-establishment of an arms export control system.

First, the Chinese government re-arranged the institutional status and re-distributed the institutional power relations among the main triangle of actors, the MFA, the PLA and the COSTIND. Most notably, the organ of the MFA that was in charge of the international ACD agenda was raised to the status of a department. In 1997, the fourth division (*chu*) of the International Organization and Conferences Department, under the MFA was upgraded to a department (*si*) with bureaucratic status, exclusively devoted to ACD issues. Mainly due to the recognition by the Chinese leaders and also because of the expanded workload of the division, the ACD field was entitled to more organizational credit for implementing China's ACD policy more systematically, given the reality that the agenda of the multilateral frameworks of the ACD showed increasing changes (Interview with a Chinese ACD expert 18<sup>th</sup> July 2001). Furthermore, the creation and subsequent expansion of this new department occurred at a time when the overall government bureaucracy, including the MFA, was downsizing. In principle, this not only meant the potential expansion of the number of people working in the ACD field, but also indicated that the MFA would possibly have more authority in the interagency bargaining process. The Chinese ambassador at the CD in Geneva, during the CTBT negotiation, Sha Zukang, is now a department head. This makes him approximately equivalent in rank to Qian Shaojun, the former official head of the arms control community in the COSTIND (now transferred to the newly created General Armaments Department). Sha's

elevation to department head makes him bureaucratically superior to Qian (Johnston and Evans 1999: 241).

The department of Arms Control and Disarmament consists of the Nuclear Division, the Chemical and Biological Weapons Division (CBW), the Conventional and Missile Division and the Comprehensive Research Division. The Nuclear Division takes charge of nuclear issues, such as nuclear testing, nuclear nonproliferation, fissile material issues and nuclear export controls. The CBW Division covers chemical and biological issues such as China's compliance with the CWC and export controls. The Conventional and Missile Division's task covers China's position on anti-personnel land mines, missile exports and the MTCR. The last division is doing research on ACD issues but also covers South-East Asian security issues. The concentration of ACD expertise in the new ACD department within the MFA will further entrench the role of politics and foreign policy in China's ACD policy-making (<http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/chn>), for example, on a formal level, the MFA's limited involvement in policy making process on exports of controlled items (such as nuclear, chemical, missile and military goods). Its influence on this process has changed in recent years as China's export control system has become more formalized and institutionalized. China's growing acceptance of the MTCR reflects the gradual increase in importance of the MFA's role.

Second, there have also occurred important changes in the PLA bureaucratic apparatus. By the government institutional restructuring during the first session of the 9<sup>th</sup> National People's Congress in 1998, the COSTIND was dissolved and some of its responsibilities assigned to a new State COSTIND (SCOSTIND) under the State



Council. The restructuring plan explained that the role of the SCOSTIND was to take over the management of the defence industries that had been assumed by COSTIND, the National Defence Department of the State Planning Commission, and the government functions that had been assumed by the military corporations (*Xiandai Junshi* April 1998). The new SCOSTIND was headed by civilian leaders,<sup>84</sup> and given the task of overseeing civilian defence production directives. Unlike the COSTIND in the past, the SCOSTIND would report only to the State Council and not to the military. This procedure meant that the long process of civilianization of the defence industry was finalized. The Chinese term *jundi fenjia* is used to indicate the separation of military from civilian departments. The military's programme of armament and equipment has been separated from the nation's defence industry, leaving the SCOSTIND to be led and staffed entirely by civilian officials (*Jiefangjun bao* 9 April 1998).<sup>85</sup>

Third, military reorganization was achieved in April 5, 1998. The new military department, the General Armament Department (*Zong zhuangbei bu*) was created under the Central Military Commission with the same bureaucratic rank as the GSD, the GPD and the GLD. The GAD took over virtually all of the former ACD functions of the COSTIND and the Military Equipment Bureau that used to be under the GSD. Its main role encompasses arms procurement, overseeing management of the weapons, and contributing to discussions in the ACD negotiations affecting the PLA. For the first time, all aspects of weapons and equipment management became unified

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<sup>84</sup> The new minister of SCOSTIND was Liu Jibin, a former vice minister of Finance and has civilian working career for the defence industry.

<sup>85</sup> Six vice-ministers were later nominated to help Liu conduct the new tasks of the organization. These ministers were former high officials of the five major defence industries and the State Planning Commission (*Jiefangjun bao* 17 April 1998).

under one command merging compartmentalized organs into the one newly created department.

The main resources of the GAD's influence on the ACD issue lie in the fact that it now controls the "old" COSTIND's arms control division which conducts research on the full spectrum of ACD issues. The Arms Control Division within the former COSTIND's Foreign Affairs Office was moved to the newly established PLA General Armament Department (GAD). In addition, the China Defence Science and Technology Information Centre (CDSTIC) which, among other tasks, conducts research on ACD issues, now reports to the GAD. The results of this research are presumably communicated to the office of the Chief of the GAD in inter-agency discussions and to PLA representatives in the field at overseas embassies and at multilateral disarmament organization such as within the United Nations. The largest grouping of Chinese ACD experts in the military is now concentrated in the GAD.

The transfer of bureaucratic experts to the GAD makes observers predict that the COSTIND's role will lose its former prominence in policy-making. Its role might be limited to the realm of assisting technical advice and the export control process (Jia Hao 1999a: 113; Gill and Medeiros 2000: 85). The expectation that the GAD will play a key role in inter-agency bargaining is reinforced because of its personnel position in the GAD. It is headed by General Cao Gangchun,<sup>86</sup> who was also appointed to the CMC in October 1998. His return to a military position from being the minister of the former COSTIND meant the "civilianization" of the COSTIND

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<sup>86</sup> Cao's background was in the ranks in the Military Equipment Bureau of the GSD. Before his appointment to the head of the COSTIND, he was previously a deputy chief of the GSD.

and its distancing from military influence. Two other prominent and influential scientists on ACD issues became members of the Science and Technology Committee within the GAD. Both Qian Shaojun<sup>87</sup> and Zhu Guangya<sup>88</sup> were involved in the arms export control group before they got new jobs. Both of them presided over and played an important role in two consulting and coordinating bodies, respectively the “Arms Control Group,” and “Inspection Group,” which were established within the COSTIND for the purpose of increasing control over the arms export system in the 1990s.<sup>89</sup>

These recent changes make it difficult to ascertain the precise channels of authority within the PLA on ACD decision-making. Especially, it is uncertain whether the GAD will replace the GSD as the representative in inter-agency discussion. However, as the decision-making structure diversifies and demand for expertise grows, the sheer number of PLA-related specialists will be likely to assure those organizations a continuing strong influence in the decision-making process, especially on emerging questions of proliferation and military transparency. In the long term, one possible consequence of restructuring would be the consolidation of the military ACD expert group into a single unit that speaks for the whole military. The concentration of all the main ACD experts within the GAD could serve to promote consensus-building within the military. A division of labour between the

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<sup>87</sup> Qian is one of the few Chinese scientists serving as a high-ranking officer in the PLA. He has a technical background in nuclear engineering and was the sixth commander of China’s main nuclear testing base in Xinjiang. Many Chinese ACD experts consider him one of the military’s leading voices on ACD issues.

<sup>88</sup> Dr. Zhu Guangya is a prominent nuclear scientist recognized for his special contribution to China’s first atomic bomb (Lewis and Xue Litai 1988: 143-6). He has had very prestigious careers such as, president of China’s National Association of Science and Technology and the Chinese Academy of Engineering (Jia Hao 1999a: 110-1).

PLA and the COSTIND no longer exists. Its disappearance could stimulate the development of a more formal and institutionalized ACD entity within the military.

Another possible benefit of the new structure would be to allow the ACD expert group a more open access to nuclear weapon management issues. There was a report that suggested that the GAD would have the responsibility of managing the full lifecycle of all weapon systems (*Liaowang* 25 May 1998). This responsibility would include management of nuclear weapons and material stockpiles, their storage, maintenance, transport and retirement. Chinese ACD experts admitted that the decision to join the CTBT brought tremendous tasks for China (Sun Xiangli 1997). If China becomes involved in future multilateral ACD negotiations, it must be prepared to face and deal with even more technically complicated choices than those posed by the CTBT. The GAD, with broader knowledge of nuclear weapons management issues and procedures, would help the military to approach the future multilateral ACD agenda with confidence rather than scepticism. Thus it is expected that the role of the GAD will be to expand and to vitalize a broader and more insightful debate on ACD issues within the military (Interview with a Chinese expert 9 July 2001).

However, in the national scene of policy-making and bargaining, the prospect of a military voice will erode as the power of Jiang Zemin is consolidated and that of the military is separated from the Party. General Liu Huaqing's retirement from the Party's Poliburo Standing Committee at the CCP's 15<sup>th</sup> Congress in late 1997 again

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<sup>89</sup> These two groups consisted of the COSTIND's technical experts and administrative staff affiliated with the CAEP and the CDSTIC. The 'Arms Control Group' was headed by General Qian Shaojun and the 'Inspection Group' was headed by Zhu Guangya (Jia Hao 1999a: 108-9).

left the PLA no representation among the seven main members of the Politburo Standing Committee, the nation's most important decision making body.<sup>90</sup> This development was accompanied by a decline (from 23% to 18%) in the military membership of the new Party's Central Committee elected by the 15<sup>th</sup> CCP Congress. At the Congress, Jiang Zemin's technocratic leadership strengthened his power and he emerged unrivalled, with the stepping-down of Qiao Shi. The PLA's new leadership reflected its rising professionalism, which were unmistakably set it further apart from the party (Baum 1997; Shambaugh 1998).<sup>91</sup> There was also an important development in Chinese foreign policy making and coordination. President Jiang Zemin acquired control. This had been manifested by the fact that Li Peng stepped down from the premiership in the spring of 1998 and Jiang formally assumed the position of head of the FALSG with the new Premier, Zhu Rongji, and the first deputy and vice Premier, Qian Qichen. Jiang and his allies have tried to strengthen China's foreign and national security policy coordinating mechanism.

Fourth, along with the accession to the Zangger Committee, in September 1997, China promulgated comprehensive nuclear export control regulations: the "PRC Regulations on Nuclear Export Control," and the Nuclear Export Control list (*Renmin ribao* 12 September 1997). Subsequently, in June 1998 it also issued the "PRC Regulations for Controlling the Export of Dual-Purpose Nuclear Goods and Relevant Technologies" (*China's National Defence* 1998). These new regulations were a major step towards the rule of law for nuclear export control and brought China's

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<sup>90</sup> Two military officials were elected to make 15 full members of the politburo at the CCP's fifteen Congress. Chi Haotian, the Vice-Chairman of the CMC and Minister of National Defence, and Zhang Wannian, Vice-Chairman of the CMC, were two newly elected members (Shambaugh 1998: 6-7).

export control system closer to the internationally accepted standards. The improved regulation provided principles, application and review procedures and expanded the scope of China's nuclear export controls. The CAEA (China Atomic Energy Authority) was detached from the CNNC (China National Nuclear Corporation) and singled out in both regulations to play a central role in the export control approval process. This reorganization, resulting from the concomitant dissolution of the COSTIND by the government restructuring in 1998, meant that the two overlapping names of the institute ended with a functional distinction between the governmental and commercial representation. The CAEA could begin to take a more comprehensive approach to regulating the nuclear power industry. In reviewing nuclear export applications, the CAEA came to possess the authority to approve or reject them with consultation with the COSTIND, Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation and MFA (Hsu 1999: 163-4).

Fifth, under the CASS (China Academy of Social Sciences), a new institution was created in 1998. The Centre for Arms Control and Nonproliferation Studies (CACNS) was established by Gu Guoliang,<sup>92</sup> deputy director of the Institute of American Studies. Given the fact that the academic research institute has had less influence on the Chinese policy setting than the government or the military-associated institutes, the centre's direct influence seems to be limited. However, it is the first

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<sup>91</sup> David Shambaugh assessed that "in general, Jiang and the Party leadership can count on PLA support," although the traditional "interlocking directorate" of the Party and the military is being broken and the future relationship is uncertain (Shambaugh 1998: 13).

<sup>92</sup> Gu Guoliang's career is interesting in that he worked for both the MFA and the military, and now he has a position at CASS, the academic sector. He also joined the Chinese delegation to the CD from 1990 to 1995 after he finished arms control studies at Johns Hopkins University in 1986. It seems that his varied social background helped him establish a social network, which could realize the Centre's energetic activities.

civilian institute under the CASS to research the international ACD issues in the context of Chinese security and foreign policy. The centre notes that China lacked the capacity, experts and academic exchange in the ACD field, whereas international ACD was becoming increasingly important for China's security and economic development, readjusting "Chinese defence policy, diplomatic strategy and national unification struggle" ([http://www.cass.net.cn/s29\\_mgs/center/center.htm](http://www.cass.net.cn/s29_mgs/center/center.htm)). It has put its effort into international and domestic academic exchanges and has hosted a domestic conference on ACD issues every year since 1999. Many Chinese ACD experts from most ACD institutions gathered to discuss the current issues, for example "Arms Control and the US-China Relationship" (Fan Jishe 1999; 2000a; 2000b). The participants came from the MFA, government-associated research institutes and the most military institutes, such as the GSD, the GAD, the CDSTIC, the National Defence University and the Academy of Military Science. By hosting the inter-agency conference and establishing this channel, the centre, which has no specific bureaucratic interest related with international ACD issues, will certainly play a role in Chinese ACD policy-bargaining process in the future.

### **8.3.3. The CTBT's Impact on Security: China's Post CTBT Security Concern**

#### ***Impact on Nuclear Weapons Modernization***

The obligations of the CTBT will have an impact on the signatory state's fundamental security interest. The Preamble of the CTBT recognizes an effective measure of nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation "by constraining the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and ending the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons" (*CTB Treaty*: 1). Without

doubt, the CTBT will impose severe limitations on any further modernization of the nuclear weapons programme.

Allegedly, China required at least a few more tests to ensure the reliability and safety of its nuclear weapons. The tests conducted by China represent only two percent of the total nuclear tests conducted in the world. It was argued that China did not have enough opportunity to devote its nuclear testing to the enhancement of the safety and reliability of nuclear weapons. As a matter of fact, while the MFA urged cessation of testing under pressure from the international community, during the negotiation process, the PLA pressed for more tests because China's nuclear testing objective had not yet been attained (Garrett and Glaser 1995: 58-9).

Many observers speculated that the real purpose of China's nuclear testing programme, which had continued despite an international moratorium and pressure to discontinue nuclear testing was to modernize China's nuclear forces. In spite of China's argument that the purpose of its test was to ensure the safety and reliability of its nuclear arsenal, it was suspected that the purpose of its nuclear tests during the CTBT negotiation process was to upgrade its nuclear warheads so as to make missiles available appropriate to the maintenance of a strategic weapon programme. Many believe that China was testing miniaturized warheads, which potentially give China a MIRV capability (Caldwell and Lennon 1995: 30; Gurtov and Hwang 1998; Hua Di 1997: 10; Ding 1999: 98).

The technical gap between China and the other nuclear powers was frozen forever by the ban on testing (Zou Yunhua 1998a: 27). Indeed, officials in the



Chinese nuclear weapons establishment explicitly argued that such a treaty would freeze the asymmetries in nuclear capability that currently existed between middle-power nuclear weapon states like China and the superpowers (Chen Xueyin 1993 from Jonston 1996: 55). Further they even argued that the overall effect of the CTBT, in preventing proliferation, had been exaggerated by its proponents, since crude weapons could be developed without testing. In addition, other nuclear powers have made considerable efforts to prepare for a CTBT, including the use of computational simulation and experimental capabilities in the laboratory so that they can design and produce new generations of weapons without testing (Wang Ling 1993: 26; Frieman 1996: 24).

No testing logically gives China three alternatives regarding a post-CTBT nuclear modernization programme; 1) to develop a new delivery system with fixed warhead designs; 2) to increase the number of its existing warheads; 3) to cooperate in order to enhance the safety and reliability of nuclear stocks. First, a delivery vehicle designed to accommodate an existing warhead would be constrained by the features of this warhead. Because the delivery systems are much more expensive than the warheads, using existing, rather than custom-designed, warheads is usually said to be less cost-effective. A relevant option for China would probably be to improve the penetrability of its strike force by means of developing MRVs (multiple re-entry vehicles) and MIRVs (multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles). Considering the fact that the other four nuclear states all possess MIRV missiles, China is likely to adopt a similar option. If so, nuclear tests may be needed to develop miniaturized warheads and the observers considered this to be the main reason for the Chinese nuclear tests during the CTBT negotiations.

Second, an increase in the number of warheads and missiles could compensate for the weakness of less advanced nuclear weapons, to a certain degree. Given that the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) will curtail the amount of stored nuclear material, China, supporting the early conclusion of the FMCT, would not consider increasing the number of warheads as complementing the restraint of the CTBT and it might not have sufficient fissile materials according to its perceptions in a post-CTBT period. Third, cooperative programmes between China and other nuclear states for the safety and reliability of nuclear warheads would apparently be needed. According to a Chinese expert, China's nuclear programme should meet the "new challenge of maintaining the nuclear arsenal under a no-test regime" (Sun Xiangli 1997: 12). He called for technological cooperation in diagnostics and computer simulation between China and other nuclear weapon states for a stockpile stewardship programme.

In sum, the CTBT will impede China's nuclear modernization programme and the technical gap will be perpetuated in the future. Garrett and Glaser observed that

agreeing to a comprehensive and permanent nuclear test ban is a more complicated decision for Beijing than joining the NPT. A CTBT would involve restrictions on China's freedom of action in a core area of national security, the viability of the Chinese nuclear deterrent. Signing and implementing a CTBT would be the first substantial decision by Beijing regarding nuclear arms control that reflected limited security interdependence, not just free-riding (Garrett and Glaser 1995: 53).

As they put it, "limited security interdependence" now characterizes China's approach to international ACD and nonproliferation issues. They continue by stressing that "the Chinese realize that a self-help approach alone is inadequate – as

well as politically untenable – for ensuring a peaceful and stable international environment” (Garret and Glaser: 76). Thus, China’s acceptance of the CTBT, despite objections to some of its provisions, signalled that Beijing began to see the benefits of international security cooperation outweighing the restraints it will impose on its nuclear-weapons development.<sup>93</sup>

With the disappearance of the unifying Soviet threat, China enjoyed its most benign international security environment in many decades. “*Heping yu fazhan*” (peace and development) sometimes sounds banal in Chinese rhetoric. Nonetheless, it adequately sums up the current objective of China’s international strategy for its modernization. In regional security, one of the most serious concerns is about the US-Japan alliance and its security relationship. China initially worried that conflicting interests could eventually result in the reemergence of a more fully armed, activist Japan. The US TMD plan reinforces the Chinese suspicion.

### ***Post-CTBT Security Interest***

Although the CTBT would not fundamentally change China’s security policy, which currently focuses on its conventional forces, with the nuclear deterrent, China’s most serious concern about security is the rapid development and likely deployment of the advanced US TMD system under the CTBT restraint.<sup>94</sup> The TMD is believed

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<sup>93</sup> In addition, there was a positive benefit for China in terms of technology and information that Keohane considered as the most important benefit of state’s motive based on utilitarianist calculations for cooperation among states. China reached agreement with the United States on nuclear cooperation in 1997, which was one of the Chinese benefits from cooperation with the US. This will be examined in the next section.

<sup>94</sup> Part of the US concern and the justification of the military-oriented US response is that both China and North Korea have exhibited a clear desire to develop new and longer-range missiles to threaten US friends and allies (Moltz 1997: 64). The threat of Chinese use of its short-range missiles has been raised to date largely in the context of the Taiwan Crisis in 1995 to 1996 (Ferdinand 1996; Zhao Suisheng 1999).

by Chinese analysts to degrade China's limited retaliatory capability. Over the last several years, the Chinese have become increasingly apprehensive about the implications of US ballistic missile defence systems, both theatre and national. Until recently, the Chinese leadership had focused on theatre missile defences (TMD) as a perceived threat to China's core national interest. The Chinese foreign minister Qian Qichen expressed his concern about the possible deployment of TMD in his statement at the CTBT-concluded 51<sup>st</sup> UNGA on September 25, 1996.

All states should refrain from developing or deploying weapon systems in outer space and missile defence systems that undermine strategic security and stability (*Beijing Review* Oct. 14-20 1996).

Especially after China came under the restraint of the CTBT, it has strongly voiced its serious concern over the development and the deployment of theatre missile defence systems (TMD) in East Asia. Chinese arguments about TMD can be summarized into three categories; 1) its offensive nature; 2) its effects on regional stability, especially on Taiwan; 3) its retreat from international ACD regimes. Firstly, many Chinese experts point out that some advanced TMD actually have the capability of strategic missile defence. Chinese analysts see that, basically, the TMD can be considered an offensive as well as a defensive system because it has defensive capability, as an integral part of an overall offensive design, in that TMD technology can be easily converted into offensive missiles.<sup>95</sup> China is concerned that a successfully developed and deployed TMD system may constitute a threat to its

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<sup>95</sup> China fears that the US might overdesign the capability of the TMD interceptor so that it can fly at greater speed. A high-speed TMD interceptor, in combination with the US-proposed NMD system and powerful space-based surveillance and tracking systems, could substantially increase the impact of the missile defence system and enable it to intercept strategic ballistic missiles. For the Chinese argument in this regard, see Wen Deyi (1997), Luo Renshi (1999) and Liu Jianmin (1999).

strategic security. The TMD may neutralize China's second strike retaliation capability, discrediting China's minimum deterrence strategy (Chapter 4.2.4.). Thus despite US reiteration that TMD is of a purely defensive nature, the Chinese leadership sees it as enhancing the capability of the US strategic missile force, which will shake the regional strategic balance (Zou Yunhua 1998b; Zhu Feng 1999).

According to the Chinese arguments, the development and deployment of such systems run counter to the principle of the ABM Treaty, for they set obstacles to further nuclear disarmament, cause a new arms race and jeopardize world strategic stability. The cooperation between the US and other countries on TMD will lead to the proliferation of missile technology and impose a threat to regional security and stability (Hu Yimin, 1999: 51). In the eyes of the Chinese, TMD has become one of the "most important security issues in Northeast Asia and a major source of contention between the US and China" (Zhu Feng 1999; Chu Shulong 2000). The Chinese view is that the TMD will undermine Northeast Asian security cooperation, encourage the development of preemptive strike capabilities, and set off a dangerous arms race in the region.

Secondly, China has continuously voiced its opposition to TMD, especially in that the US may deploy or transfer TMD technology to Taiwan. China has stated that such action would contradict the basic norms of international law and seriously violates the principles set out in the three Sino-US joint communiques. From the Chinese point of view, a country that does not possess advanced offensive missile technology and receives TMD from another state might be tempted to convert the defensive technology of TMD to offensive missiles, if this turned out to be a plausible

way to upgrade their offensive missile capability. Awareness of this fact creates concern in China that TMD could be used as part of a US pre-emptive strike doctrine in other regional conflicts. The Chinese leadership also worries that Taiwan's inclusion in the TMD programme will restore an alliance relationship between the US and Taiwan and strengthen the US position in the Asia-Pacific region. More and more internationalization of the Taiwan issue means foreign interference in China's sovereignty and territorial integration. China believes that TMD systems could be politically or strategically used by the US to undermine China's efforts at reunification with Taiwan (Xia Wenqing 2000; Ding 1999; Garrett 2000).

China fears that such a linkage might bring the further consequence of neutralizing China as the US pursues its own hegemonic ambitions at the expense of Chinese security and interests. Japan's participation in TMD in 1998 was regarded as "preparation to become involved in potential military conflicts" in the Taiwan Strait because of the new guidelines signed by Japan and the US in September 1997 (Yan Xuetong 1999: 70).<sup>96</sup> As long as China is excluded from the US-Japan joint TMD programme, China will feel targeted by the US-Japan alliance as a common enemy and will be cautious about taking steps in the direction of China-US-Japan trilateral security cooperation (Yan Xuetong: 72). Eventually, TMD would exacerbate strategic instability in the Asia-Pacific region. The TMD issue will undermine possible positive cooperation between China and the US. The TMD system will also make Russia hesitate to enter the planned START III talks.

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<sup>96</sup> Yan Xuetong implies that excluding Taiwan is China's highest priority regarding the US TMD plan. He stresses that China's opposition "rests largely on its concern over Taiwan's potential separation," including the potential usage of Japan's TMD in a Taiwan Strait conflict. "TMD would cause fewer suspicions between China and the US or Japan if Taiwan were excluded from the US TMD programme" (Yan Xuetong 1999: 72).

Thirdly, Chinese officials are also concerned that US deployment of even a limited NMD system would undermine the progress made in US-China ACD cooperation over the last decade, a period during which, they say, “Washington and Beijing often worked closely together.” In their view, although the US and China have sometimes attacked each other’s position publicly, they have in fact worked to achieve the same ends on arms control and non-proliferation. Chinese ACD officials now feel betrayed by the US pursuit of an NMD system that would directly threaten China’s national security by undermining its nuclear deterrent. Many Chinese officials are left wondering why they should bother cooperating with the US. This implies that the US TMD programme might weaken the position and voice of Chinese ACD experts and institutions in dealing with their national security decision making (*Conference Report on the Second US-China Conference on Arms Control, Disarmament and Nonproliferation 1999*). The director of the MFA’s new department of arms control and disarmament, Sha Zukang, remarked at the US-China Conference on Arms Control, Disarmament and Nonproliferation in 1999 as follows:

China will be forced to take some steps which it is reluctant to take. It is quite possible for China to review its policies on various arms control, disarmament and nonproliferation issues, including the FMCT negotiations (Sha Zukang 1999 from his opening remarks at the US-China Conference).

The US TMD programme is still under development and it will take at least a decade to accomplish the goal originally set. During this period, China will keep US-China security dialogue open and seriously reconsider its security strategy. China might pay more attention to the role of ACD in its security policies. From now on,

there will be more items on the international ACD agenda that require China's participation and cooperation, such as the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty and disarmament talks among the five nuclear states. China would have to pay greater attention to the role of arms control negotiations in the post-CTBT era for the purpose of safeguarding its security interests while promoting international security, and it is likely that the Chinese government would attach greater importance to the domestic ACD institutions assigned to work on international ACD negotiations. The signing of the CTBT was a great step for China in participating in the international ACD regime. In a post-CTBT period, China's ACD policy would play a more important role in its security strategy than at any earlier time.

In fact, China is seeking for countermeasures to check the US TMD system in international ACD regimes. China repeated its call for outer space talks in CD in order to check the US TMD efforts. The Chinese ambassador, in October 2001, Hu Xiaodi requested that negotiations to prevent an arms race in outer space should begin. He claimed that the current US effort to amend the ABM treaty will lead to its total abolition and such a development would bring the weaponization of and arms race in outer space, as well as "trigger off global weapons proliferation" (Arms Control Association *Fact Sheets* October 2001: 3).<sup>97</sup> Some Chinese officials

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<sup>97</sup> Ambassador Hu Xiaodi concluded that the CD would eventually need to undertake negotiations on the disarmament of outer space if negotiations do not start now to prevent the weaponization of outer space. Meanwhile, the United States, which is seeking to modify the ABM Treaty to permit a limited US national missile defence (NMD), maintains that there is no arms race in outer space and that the 1967 Outer Space Treaty banning the stationing of weapons of mass destruction in outer space is sufficient (Arms Control Association *Fact Sheets* October 2001).



suggested that if the US were to forego NMD development, China would work more closely with the US and the other nuclear weapon states to negotiate a new missile non-proliferation regime or turn the MTCR into a treaty, dropping its long opposition to the MTCR (*Conference Report on the Second US-China Conference on Arms Control, Disarmament and Nonproliferation 1999*).

The broader concern facing the TMD debate on East Asia is the ultimate goals of the US and its allies. One option for the US is to move ahead with unilateral military measures, despite the likely political costs. The other one is to pursue a new security framework that seeks to overcome regional threats, through cooperation and the building of norms. In this context, China's "new security concept" (NSC) challenged the notion that the US security alliances and military presence in Northeast Asia have been the key components of the region's stability. This was intended to counter what the Chinese termed the "Cold War spirit," the deep-rooted influence of the traditional balance of power security views by the Chinese contenders.

#### ***8.4. One Step forward: Further Engagement in ACD Frameworks***

During the 1990s, China demonstrated its growing involvement and support for international ACD norms and regimes, as has seen in Chapter 6. In 1992 China acceded to the NPT and subsequently promised to abide by the MTCR guidelines in 1994. China supported efforts to negotiate a fissile material cutoff treaty (FMCT) in the CD and voted in favour of indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995. In July 1996,

it ended its nuclear testing and signed the CTBT in September 1996. The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) was ratified in 1997. The progressive chain of consequences of China's ACD policy in the post-CTBT period suggests that dynamic interaction between the state and the international institutions (regime) not only penetrates the state itself (perspective and domestic institution level) but also galvanizes the state's next step at the international level. Even though it is difficult to verify the distinct linkage of China as it was (*China t1*) and China as it is (*China t2*) at an international level, progress achieved in the next step virtually indicates further engagement in international ACD frameworks. After China went through the CTBT negotiation, there were significant developments in Chinese ACD policy in both multilateral and bilateral terms.

#### **8.4.1. Enhancement of Participation in Multilateral ACD Frameworks**

One of the path-dependent effects on China's ACD policy in the post-CTBT period was its support for the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT). An FMCT would serve both nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation objectives, as a logical complement to the NPT and the CTBT. The FMCT and CTBT together would place a quantitative freeze on the amount of nuclear material available for weapons and a qualitative freeze on nuclear weapon design development by stopping testing and by banning production of plutonium and highly enriched uranium for such weapons (Bunn 1998). By signaling each state's willingness to accept such constraints, an FMCT would also provide greater confidence to the nuclear weapon states as they consider and implement further reductions in their nuclear arsenals. It would also

offer a promising possibility of bringing the “threshold states” into the international nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament regime.

In 1993, the UN General Assembly, for the first time, adopted a resolution by consensus calling for the FMCT. By then, both Russia and the US had stopped producing plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU). Though they have declared no moratorium, the five nuclear weapon state parties were all believed to have stopped producing plutonium and HEU. China, like other nuclear weapon states, supported negotiations for an FMCT at the CD. China expressed a willingness to participate in FMCT negotiations. When Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen visited the United States in October 1994, China agreed to the “earliest possible achievement of FMCT in a joint US-China statement on stopping production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons (<http://www.dosfan.lib.uic.edu/acda/factshee/wmd/nuclear/fissile>).

In March 1995, the CD agreed, by consensus, to establish an ad hoc committee with a mandate to negotiate a FMCT based on the 1993 UNGA resolution. In May 1995, the NPT conference that extended the NPT indefinitely called for “the immediate commencement and early conclusion” of FMCT negotiations as the next priority after finishing negotiation of the CTBT (Rauf and Johnson 1995). The CD members failed to agree on a negotiating committee for FMCT negotiations until 1998. There were divergent views of what the scope of the treaty should be concerning the production of fissile material. Some wanted it to deal with “future production” after the cut-off date. Others wanted it to include “stocks.” No nuclear weapon state was going to accept that the size of its nuclear forces should be affected

by the FMCT having responsibility for stocks. Moreover, members of the non-aligned movement, led by India, linked work on a cutoff treaty to negotiations on a timebound framework for nuclear disarmament, a condition unacceptable to the nuclear weapon states. Most non-aligned states agreed with Egypt that a treaty would only be effective if it included stockpiles. Otherwise, the treaty would merely be another nonproliferation mechanism that has no “real disarmament value” since the five declared nuclear weapon states have already reportedly stopped production of fissile material for weapons purposes (Boese 1998).

A breakthrough occurred in the aftermath of the Indian and Pakistan nuclear tests of May 1998, when both countries retracted their position. In August 1998, the CD decided, by consensus, to establish an ad hoc committee to negotiate a FMCT. In his speech at the CD in March 1999, Jiang Zemin reaffirmed China’s support for the FMCT saying that “negotiations should be conducted as soon as possible for the conclusion of a universal and verifiable FMCT” (<http://www.clw.org/coalition>). If negotiations were to start in near future, the MFA, the GAD and SCOSTIND would be expected to be important players in this negotiation process. The MFA, with Ambassador Sha Zukang heading the Department of Arms Control and Disarmament, will continue to lead the ensuing negotiations. The GAD, through its nuclear weapons research laboratories, will be likely to provide technical support during negotiation. The SCOSTIND is expected to have a voice in the verification scope and approach for such a treaty to ensure that the needs and concerns of CNNC are met (Hsu 1999: 164).

Another milestone that China marked in the post-CTBT period was its joining the Zangger Committee. The multilateral efforts to control the proliferation of nuclear weapons are based on suppliers regimes that were formed three decades ago. As has been shown in Chapter 6, China was not a party to these regimes until 1997. They consist primarily of the 1968 NPT, the Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers Group. Shortly after the NPT came into force in 1970, a number of nuclear supplier countries began consultations on the implementation of the limitations on the transfer of nuclear facilities and related materials to non-nuclear weapon states. This group became known as the Zangger Committee, and in 1974, the members adopted export guidelines covering a list of items (the “trigger list”). The Zangger Committee established the principle that nuclear-supplier nations should consult and agree among themselves on procedures to regulate the international market for nuclear materials and equipment in order to prevent nuclear proliferation (Schmidt 1994).

During the last two decades China has continued to provide weapon-related aid to Pakistan and has exported materials and facilities that were useful for weapon production to other countries. Even after China joined the NPT in 1992, Chinese policy regarding the transfer of dual-use nuclear technology did not change. China emerged as a major supplier of technology for Iran’s civilian nuclear programme. Under intense US pressure, in May 1996, the Chinese government formally announced that it would not provide further assistance to nuclear facilities, which were not subject to full IAEA safeguards (*SIPRI Yearbook* 1997: 351). In May 1997, China promulgated a new regulation on nuclear exports, “Circular on Strict Implementation of China’s Nuclear Export Policy,” which covered the export of nuclear and nuclear related dual-use items on an interim basis. In addition, China

issued more specific nuclear export control regulations beyond the dual-use technologies covered in the earlier declaration. The consolidation of arms export control was a major step that brought its nuclear export controls close to the internationally accepted standard. Both control lists were substantively identical to the “trigger list” of the Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers Group respectively (*Renmin ribao* 12 September 1997).

In parallel with strengthening China’s arms export control system, in late July 1997, the Chinese Foreign Minister, Qian Qichen, told the Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright during a meeting in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, that China would formally join the Zangger Committee at its next meeting in mid October (Diamond 1997). At that time, China was the only declared nuclear weapon state that was not a member of the 31 nation exporters group. China joined the Zangger Committee and began to take part in the October 1997 meeting, after it had attended as observer in May 1997. China indicated that it was not prepared to reverse its policy of not requiring comprehensive safeguards as a condition of supply, apparently because of its continued civil nuclear trade with India and Pakistan. Hence the Committee’s earlier plan to adopt this requirement by the turn of century was deferred (*Tracking Nuclear Proliferation* 1998: 307).<sup>98</sup>

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<sup>98</sup> The Committee meets in Vienna twice a year, in May and in October. These meetings are informal and confidential. The members also exchange confidential annual reports in April detailing actual exports and the issue of any export licences to any non-nuclear weapon states not party to the NPT. The Zangger Committee merely requires safeguards on the items supplied and the facilities in which they are used. The Committee has held discussions on introducing the full-scope safeguards requirement as a condition of supply around the year 2000. However, since China opposed this requirement, introducing this requirement was delayed (*Tracking Nuclear Proliferation* 1998: 307-10).

However, China has not yet joined the Wassenaar Arrangement, which seeks to promote transparency and greater responsibility in the transfer of conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies. China has also avoided joining the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) because it is unwilling to end its peaceful nuclear cooperation with Pakistan and India. The MTCR still remains a perennial source of controversy in US-China relations, even though China agreed, in the US-China summit statement in June 1998, to “actively study” MTCR membership (Hu Yumin 1999a: 17). China’s steps to improve the transparency of its nonproliferation commitments would still leave some distance to bolster its credibility in these supplier regimes.

#### **8.4.2. The Enlargement of US-China Bilateral ACD Cooperation**

Despite China’s controversial and doubtful commitment to the international supplier regimes in the late 1990s, China participated positively in the international ACD frameworks whose function was to improve and enlarge US-China bilateral ACD cooperation in the late 1990s. From the US point of view, China is indispensable to international efforts to preserve nonproliferation regimes by virtue of its status as a nuclear-weapon state; its standing as a permanent member of the UN Security Council; its role as a major nuclear supplier and its diplomatic influence. It is important to persuade China that it shares a common interest with other world powers in curbing the spread of weapons of mass destruction. In the 1990s, China continued to participate in multi-level US-China dialogue on ACD issues. The US engagement with China on the international ACD agenda was greatly improved and enlarged by various channels. The US policy toward China on nonproliferation and arms control issues contributed to a more positive trend for change on the part of

China, making these issues a more regularized aspect of discussions between the two countries. Thus, the bilateral US-China cooperation will be likely to push these positive trends further and should be an important long-term priority for both countries.

With high level strategic dialogue, the US and China reached a nuclear cooperation agreement in 1997. In October 1997, Jiang Zemin visited the United States and the agreement on nuclear nonproliferation was one of the few concrete results coming out of the summit. In the China-U.S. joint statement issued after the summit, the two countries agreed to cooperate in implementing the (nonproliferation) convention within a multilateral framework. At the summit, nuclear cooperation was among the most salient issues on the agenda, and the Chinese leadership sought approval for the bilateral Peaceful Nuclear Co-operation Agreement that was originally signed 1985 but did not take effect due to both Chinese export policy and the June 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre. On March 18, 1998, the 1985 Agreement for Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation between the United States and China took effect, 30 legislative days after President Clinton certified that China had met the nonproliferation requirements of US laws.<sup>99</sup> Under this agreement, US firms and institutions are allowed to provide technology and assistance to the Chinese civil nuclear power programme. The Chinese declarations regarding nuclear exports led the Clinton Administration to agree to implement this agreement (Weeks 1997).

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<sup>99</sup> On January 12, the US administration submitted to Congress a package of reports and certificates regarding the exclusively peaceful use and security of transferred US nuclear technology and the improvements and evolution of China's nonproliferation practices. Congress could have blocked the implementation of the nuclear agreement by passing a resolution of disapproval by a veto-proof margins (Arms Control Association *Fact Sheet* March 1998).



China's accession to the Zangger Committee and the declaration by its representative Ambassador, Li Changhe, of the Chinese government's new policy regarding nuclear related dual-use technologies, seemed to be linked to the visit of Chinese President Jiang Zemin to Washington in October 1997 and the summit meeting with President Clinton. By taking steps to meet the US legal requirements for nuclear trade, such as joining the Zangger Committee for nuclear exports, China would become more tightly integrated into the international non-proliferation regimes, which would help to alleviate the suspicion about Chinese commitment to the regimes held by US Congress. The Clinton administration argued that implementing the nuclear cooperation agreement with China would provide a continuing source of leverage to prevent China from backsliding on its nonproliferation commitments (Arm Control Association *Fact Sheet* March 1998). In fact, both countries had economic interests, the positive incentives for the agreement, behind the surface nonproliferation justification. China is a big emerging market and also energy is a big emerging sector in China. The US Commercial Department predicted that China would spend as much as \$65 billion between 1995 and 2000 on energy and power projects, including eight nuclear plants. US companies are estimated to earn as much as \$55 billion from the Chinese market over the next 30 years. On the Chinese side, China wanted access to US nuclear technology to help meet its rapidly growing electricity needs. China planned to add 20 gigawatts of new capacity by the year 2010, a tenfold increase (Weeks 1997).

During the US-China summit in June 1998, Clinton and Jiang Zemin announced that the two sides had reached agreements on the detargeting of strategic nuclear weapons and a Chinese commitment to "actively study" joining the MTCR. These

agreements were diplomatic gestures and, in fact, were rejections of requests by both sides. The US sought for China's full membership in the MTCR in the summit meanwhile China requested the "no-first-use" policy for nuclear weapons.<sup>100</sup> However, confirming the bilateral cooperation, the US and China issued a "Joint Statement on South Asia". By agreeing that "our respective policies are to prevent the export of equipment, materials or technology that could in any way assist programmes in India or Pakistan for nuclear weapons or for ballistic missiles capable of delivering such weapons, and that to this end, we will strengthen our national export control system," China appeared to make efforts to remove all remaining uncertainty about its commitment to halt all further missile assistance to Pakistan. Both countries confirmed their cooperation in the following statement.

Close coordination between the United States and China is essential to building strong international support behind the goals to which we are committed in response to nuclear testing by India and Pakistan. We will stay closely in touch on this issue (Joint Statement On South Asia 1998 <http://www.clw.org/coalition>).

The US-China cooperation also developed in a vertical direction. The US State Department of Energy (DOE) launched the "US-China Lab-to-Lab Technical Exchange Program" (CLL) to establish scientific interactions with China in support of US arms control and nonproliferation policy in 1996. The US and China each recognized that the unique professional relationships which their nuclear scientists fostered through the CLL would provide a vehicle for increasing trust and developing common approaches on issues of concern to national and international security. Both

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<sup>100</sup> The detargeting arrangements are interpreted as not verifiable and largely symbolic proposal because the missiles can be retargeted in a matter of minutes (Diamond 1998). The no-first use was certainly unacceptable to the US side, because it was believed to undermine US deterrence strategy.

countries attach great importance to the ACD issues and agree that ACD issues call for international cooperation and mutual exchange. However, there was much less technical ACD experience in the Chinese institutes. The US technical community has over 30 years experience in developing, deploying and maintaining verification and monitoring regimes for bilateral treaties with Russia, as compared to a limited engagement of China's technical community in the last decade. The disparity set the objectives of a programme that focuses on technical training and implementation issues for China. Particular emphasis was given to demonstrating technical means for sharing selected information on nuclear materials and facilities to comply with international agreements and to participate in confidence-building measures, while at the same time, protecting sensitive national security information. The three primary counterpart institutions in China to the US are the Chinese Academy of Engineering Physics (CAEP), the Northwest Institute of Nuclear Technology (NINT)<sup>101</sup> and the China Institute of Atomic Energy (CIAE, the research arm of the China National Nuclear Corporation, CNNC). The three CLL project areas have been initiated to date in the areas of nuclear materials management, verification technologies and nuclear export control.<sup>102</sup>

Apart from technical collaboration to generate important and unique common interests between the US and China, there has developed in the post-CTBT period a joint conference attended by prominent key players in the ACD field inside each country. The China Institute of International Studies (CIIS) under the MFA and the

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<sup>101</sup> This institution is known for its developing a key role for verification of the CTBT in China. In the past, the NINT was responsible for conducting and analyzing China's nuclear testing programme. Since China signed the CTBT, the institution has emerged with the primary responsibility for China's field implementation of the technologies for the International Monitoring System (IMS) (Prindle 1998: 113).

Centre for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies (MIIS) co-organized a conference titled “US-China Conference on Arms Control, Disarmament and Nonproliferation in 1998.” The CIIS-MIIS track 1½ bilateral conference was the first of its kind ever to be held between the ACD communities of the US and China. It was the beginning of a series of substantive discussions about sensitive ACD and security issues between high level officials and experts from both countries.<sup>103</sup> The conference covered issues ranging over the role of nuclear weapons and nuclear disarmament; nuclear export controls; missile proliferation; theatre missile defence in Asia; US arms sales to Taiwan and the CTBT (<http://cns.miis.edu/cns/projects/eanp/research/beijing>).<sup>104</sup> As Chinese Ambassador to the CD, Sha Zukang mentioned, during his speech at the farewell banquet, the conference was an historic and unprecedented milestone in the US-China bilateral relationship and the conference will play an important role in developing an unofficial channel of dialogue among Chinese and US experts and officials.

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<sup>102</sup> For more details, see Prindle (1998).

<sup>103</sup> Track 1 is used to call multilateral forum that involves governmental officials while track 2 involves academic scholars. The track 1 ½ means that both governmental officials and academic scholars participate in the forum. Chinese participants were drawn from the MFA, the research institutes and several military-associated institutions, such as the National Defence University, the CDSTIC, the CWC Implementation Office, the CAEP and the China Aerospace Corporation. The US participants came from the Department of Defence, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), the Department of Energy, national laboratories and scholars from universities.

<sup>104</sup> The US-China Conference on Arms Control, Disarmament and Nonproliferation has been held annually since 1998. The Second (titled ‘Missiles, Theatre Missile Defence, and Regional Stability’) and Third conference (titled ‘US-China Arms Control and Nonproliferation Cooperation: Progress and Prospects’) were held in 1999 and 2000 respectively.

## CHAPTER 9. Conclusion

*How much of a role we can play in international affairs depends on how much we achieve our economic construction. If our country developed and became more prosperous, we could play a larger role in international affairs. Our current role in international affairs is not small; but if our material basis and material capabilities are enhanced, our role will be even larger (Deng Xiaoping Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping II 1986: 204)*

This research started with the question of whether China has adjusted itself to the international order during the last two decades. In the international Arms Control and Disarmament (ACD) field, China's socialization occurred in a constructive way as a result of its participation in international ACD institutions, like the CTBT. By investigating the Chinese perspective and its domestic ACD institutions, whereby "dynamic interaction" between China and international ACD institutions or regimes was fostered during 1990s, this study aims to find whether the evolution and development of this interaction was context-bound and caused by the permeation of the ACD norms by intersubjective meaning. The CTBT was used as a case study to contextualise and concretise this dynamic interaction and its constitutive processes in China before and after it joined the CTBT (from *China t1* to *China t2*). The dynamic interaction between China and international ACD institutions resulted in changes in perspective both towards domestic ACD institutionalization and in the growth of participation in international ACD frameworks.

The next section will briefly summarise the key findings from the research. As the result of dynamic interaction, the reconstruction entailed a change in perspective,

domestic institutions and participation in the international ACD frameworks; the differentiation in Chinese ACD perspective, domestic ACD institutionalization and the growth of participation in international ACD frameworks. The findings of the case study of the CTBT will be discussed in the context of those three levels. This is followed by a section that discusses the theoretical and practical implications of the findings and suggests that a new theoretical model is needed, which integrates dynamic interaction between state and international institutions or regimes. The last section sets out the limits of the research and suggests possible directions for future research.

### ***9.1. Key Findings: Constitutive Reconstruction by Dynamic Interactions***

During the last decade, China's increasing participation in international ACD frameworks necessarily brought into existence Chinese ACD experts and institutions that could deal with the ACD issues. The Chinese came to recognize ACD issues as being in the interest of their own security and they established appropriate institutions to consider them beyond their ideology-driven mindset, anti-hegemonism, which had denounced the ACD agenda as attempts at control by superpower hegemonism. By investigating Chinese discourse and domestic ACD institutions, it is possible to examine the ways and processes by which both sectors changed and developed as the international ACD norms permeated China's domestic milieu. The key findings from the current research can be summarised as follows.

First of all, at the level of perspective, the dynamic interaction forced Chinese leaders, officials and analysts to internalize international ACD norms during recent decades. The great surge of publishing ACD issues in 1990s indicated that China's increasing interest in the international ACD agenda was growing in parallel with its involvement with the frameworks. A most dramatic and significant change in the pattern of Chinese ACD discourse was shown by the explosive number of publications in 1992, when China joined the NPT. More significantly, since 1992, the number of Chinese articles on this subject in the journals has increased steadily so far.

In the late 1990s, the quantitative increase in associated publications heralded a qualitative shift. The dominant realist approach to ACD issues, which had been typical, has encountered the newly emerging liberalist and constructivist approaches within the Chinese discourse. The differentiation and diversification of the Chinese discourse on the international ACD provided the momentum for the issues to become internalized in Chinese thinking. These three approaches to Chinese ACD discourse were derived and evolved distinctively in parallel with China's engagement in multilateral ACD frameworks. The constructivist approach is gaining more and more credit in dealing with international ACD issues among Chinese analysts. For example, even a military analyst regards the proliferation of massive destructive weapons and delivery missiles as a global problem (not simply for the US security strategy) and assesses China's role within regimes from a state-enhancing perspective.

Based on an overall reassessment of the world strategic environment, the Chinese leadership has realized that the growing danger of horizontal nuclear proliferation will erode China's security environment. It has also recognized that the pursuit of anti-

hegemonism in international relations is at the expense of world stability and national security. Instead, Chinese analysts are seeking for a more responsible and influential role in the making of rules in the ACD multilateral frameworks. The CTBT was, as a Chinese analyst put it, the first multilateral nuclear arms control treaty negotiation in which China participated.

Second, the developments of Chinese ACD institutions during the last decade suggest that an external factor, the international ACD agenda, influenced Chinese institutions and played some role in nurturing Chinese domestic ACD institutions. Since the international ACD agenda became a critical issue in the late 1980s, each security-related institution researched the issues and developed its own expertise. With its own bureaucratic interests, the MFA, the PLA and the COSTIND emerged as the main actors and exchanged their views in the inter-agency bargaining process. Those institutions provided new opportunities for experience and helped to realize new interests through a complex set of channels, which eventually might transform China's identity.

Like other institutions in China, the fragmented character of domestic ACD institutions meant that the two main domestic agencies played and will play key roles in the policy-coordinating process of China's ACD policy. While the MFA mainly formulates and implements the ACD policy, the PLA, with a sophisticated backup from the newly merged sub-institutes detached from the former COSTIND and with vested interests, occupied by arms export and military modernization, will not abandon its grip on security-related issues. Chinese domestic institutions are nascent in nature. They are in flux and vulnerable to a new need for reorganization, which



might be brought about by incremental participation in multilateral frameworks at the international level. The case of the CTBT, more concretely, elucidates these impacts.

Third, there is a record of China turning its passive or negative participation to a more constructive one in international ACD institutions or regimes, as has been demonstrated in Chapter 6. As the chronological evidence indicates, without doubt, there has been a dramatic increase in China's participation in the numerous multilateral ACD frameworks. The current degree of Chinese participation in multilateral ACD frameworks virtually suggests that intersubjective ideas reconstituted Chinese interest and behaviour. China joined two important major international regimes, the CD (1980) and the IAEA (1984). In the 1990s, China's ACD policy and behaviour featured more conspicuous participation in the multilateral frameworks. From the start of the NPT entry in 1992, China signed numerous contemporary ACD treaties and took part in many negotiating processes. China formally acceded to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC, 1993), the UN Register of Conventional Arms (1993) and the CTBT (1996). Among the international ACD treaties, by 2000, the only international treaties that China had not signed were now the PTBT and the Moon Agreement. China is also actively participating in regional security dialogues, such as the ARF and the CSCAP.

Despite enthusiastic participation, the contrast between the participation rate and the reluctance to adhere to specific regimes (as has been seen with most Supplier Regimes), is an ambiguous factor in evaluating China's ACD policy. The regimes have limited membership and they are concerned with the control of transferring of sensitive weapons and technology. The lack of "universality" in their membership

was a deciding factor that relieved the Chinese from considering entry. Neither feature met the Chinese military interest, especially that of the military defence establishment, which had endeavoured to gain currency with weapons sales for military modernization. China's reluctance to join the MTCR not only illustrated this but also hindered Chinese cooperation. China believed that the regimes had been set up by the US and western states to impose their rule on China.

Fourth, China's participation and activities indicated that China would play a more active role in international ACD frameworks. The delaying tactics of China, while it carried out its 6 nuclear tests, turned to active negotiation during the last several months before the CTBT agreement in Geneva. China basically adopted a delaying tactic to win time to conclude its planned series of nuclear tests. China participated in the CTBT talks with two objectives, as a Chinese observer noted. One was the promotion of nuclear disarmament and the other was the prevention of nuclear proliferation. For the "prevention of nuclear proliferation," China showed a norm-complying attitude against a nuclear test ban during the negotiations. Unlike India, the Chinese delegation made compromises on controversial issues, such as EIF, NTM and OSI, as explored in Chapter 7. In the endgame, China also assisted the US and other nations in circumventing India's opposition.

China also pursued the "promotion of nuclear disarmament" at the CTBT talks. China put no-first-use (NFU), China's longstanding proposition on the international disarmament agenda from the first nuclear test, in talks to create a new norm in multilateral ACD frameworks. The Chinese sincerely believe that the benefits of an NFU treaty would include reduced risk of war; enhanced security of the five nuclear-

weapon states; greater mutual trust; a reduced likelihood of nuclear proliferation and advancement toward the goal of complete nuclear disarmament. By suggesting NFU in the interest of the developing states, China strategically drew their support, tried to spread the NFU idea and to make it a new norm. However, many western analysts dismissed NFU pledges as a political statement with little significance for security or credibility in a crisis. In the CTBT talks, the contents of NFU were thought by many delegations to be beyond the CTBT agenda and thus to be inappropriate.

During the talks, the Chinese delegation showed sensitivity to issues of sovereignty and sought technical benefits. At the issues of NTM and OSI, worrying over an arbitrary inspection by the US-supported trigger mechanism that might infringe Chinese sovereignty, the Chinese delegation preferred IMS and opposed NTM to be incorporated in On-Site Inspection. In the decision-making procedures, China also opposed the “red light procedure.” Searching for any possible technical benefit, China proposed that the international network of satellites and electromagnetic pulse sensor (EMP) technology should be included in IMS. China also proposed peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs) for peaceful purposes.

During the CTBT negotiation process, the Chinese delegation always tried to gain the support of the developing countries. The logic of Chinese insistence on preserving the right of the PNEs was for the sake of the “developing countries.” All the Chinese bargaining positions stemmed from the self-imposed position that China should be identical and in line with the developing countries. Promoting this image, China unintentionally disclosed the discrepancy in its position as a responsible power and as a guardian of the developing countries at the CTBT talks. At the PNEs issues,

the Chinese delegation raised the proposal that only the declared nuclear weapon states should be permitted to conduct PNEs. This gained no support from the developing countries.


In a way, the PNEs might be judged a policy failure due to poor policy-coordinating mechanism which generated “more inconsistent and controversial policy and behaviour” (Hao Jia 1999: 248-54). An alternative view is that China took a political cost in order to avail itself of the advantages of the technological and potential economic interest as a nuclear weapon state. The PNEs in the CTBT talks reflected China’s transitional identity towards a state which takes part in and expresses its own voice in the negotiation processes of international institutions. While only a middle-ground power, China started to take advantage of major power status in terms of technology and economy in international bargaining, which came to contradict to Deng’s foreign policy line and China’s traditional challenge to the hegemonic powers.

## **9.2. *The Post –CTBT Dynamism: An Explanation of Socialization in China’s ACD policy***

As given the research questions raised in chapter 1, figure 9.1. provides the macro-process model of socialization that shows how China came to engage in the international ACD institutions. The figure configures the CTBT dynamism and the constitutive reconstruction in *China t2*. The dynamic interaction provides a process by which norms (a nuclear test ban norm) penetrate *state t1* and create *state t2*. In the

post-CTBT period, the developments in China's ACD policy demonstrate the constitutive reconstruction of *state t2*.

**Figure 9.1. Interactive processes of CTBT dynamism**



*Note:* a. nuclear test ban norm history (from norm to CTBT regime); b<b1. international engaging force; c. transition in identity; d. dynamic force.

The CTBT dynamism brought significantly positive elements to China's ACD policy in the late 1990s. Firstly, by sustaining the nuclear test moratorium since 1996, China made a commitment to the treaty norm, even after the norm was undermined by

the May 1998 nuclear tests by both India and Pakistan and the US Senate rejection of the CTBT ratification in October, 1999, by a vote of 51-48.

Secondly, as has been broadly argued in Chapter 4, growing Chinese participation in the international ACD agenda brought about the evolutionary development of Chinese views in late 1990s, which went far beyond the traditional Chinese *realpolitik* and internalized either liberalist or constructivist views in IR theory. It has also been argued that an increasing appreciation of a mutual security perspective was developing. In the post-CTBT period, the most conspicuous shift was in that the nascent Chinese perspective on mutual security was formulated and officially pronounced in the name of the “new security concept” (NSC). Since it repeatedly surfaced on Chinese discourse, it was finally formulated in a white paper, *China’s National Defence*, issued in July 1998.

Certainly, China’s “manifesto” of the NSC was motivated by strategic thinking which helped to counter the US unipolarity, which was being consolidated by NATO expansion and the revised US-Japan security treaty with Japan. Nonetheless, the NSC is not a simple rhetoric or tactical gesture to counter the US security architecture in the Asia-Pacific region and to alleviate the other countries’ concern that culminated in the 1990s with the “China threat debates.” It is a blueprint or grand strategy to reconstruct the Chinese security environment for “peace and development.” It can also be argued that the strategic thinking contained cognitive learning about mutual security. The NSC contains a very positive and advanced security concept in security studies. The Chinese government imported the concept of common security and officially formulated and pronounced it as the guidelines of Chinese security policy in

both the global and regional security environment. China began to accept the need for mutual security and to utilize its mechanisms, such as CBMs, military transparency and military exchange. Throughout two decades of integration into the international system and its increasing engagement in international ACD frameworks, China came to recognize the utility of common security. Now, China is making an effort to achieve the new idea by applying it to the regional and global security milieu in order to re-establish its bilateral relationship and to undermine the entrenched security system of the US military bloc and its influence. In the late 1990s, China's establishment of partnerships with other countries illustrates China's constructive strategy using the "new security concept."

In fact, NSC reflects the very vulnerable aspects of Chinese strategic thinking. It denounces the Cold War thinking and security systems, such as the military alliance and collective security, implying that the US alliance system, in the Asia-Pacific, region should be replaced. This siege mentality made the Chinese create and implement its own security vision. The NSC was designed as a security structure, cooperative security, which could undermine and act as a countermeasure to the US-dominant alliance system in the region. Utilizing the common security concept, a highly intersubjective concept of security, whether the Chinese concept embraces cognitive learning or not, China is trying to establish its own security structure.

Thirdly, the CTBT dynamism led China to restructure its domestic ACD institutions. The Chinese government has re-arranged the status of institutions and re-distributed the institutional power relations among the main triangle of actors, the MFA, the PLA and the COSTIND. Interpreting these changes provides a key to

understanding future direction of China's ACD policy. The MFA's newly-upgraded department of arms control and disarmament (1997) and the new General Armament Department of the military (1998) will play a key role in China's ACD policy in the future, while the COSTIND's role might be limited to the realm of assisting technical advice and the export control process. Besides, the concentration of all the main ACD experts within the GAD could serve to promote consensus-building within the military. However, at the national scene of policy-making and bargaining processes, the prospect of a military voice will erode because of the consolidation of Jiang Zemin's power and the separation of the military from the Party. Under the CASS (China Academy of Social Sciences), a new institution, the Centre for Arms Control and Nonproliferation Studies (CACNS), was created in 1998, which has enthusiastically hosted inter-agency conferences among the Chinese institutes.

Fourthly, the progressive chain-linking consequence of China's ACD policy in the post-CTBT period suggests that dynamic interaction between state and institution (regime) not only permeates state itself (perspective and domestic institution level) but also galvanizes the state's next step at the international level. Even though it is difficult to verify the distinct linkage of *engaging force b* and *b<sub>1</sub>* (see figure 9.1.) at international level, the progress achieved in the next step virtually indicates the further entrapped engagement in international ACD frameworks. After China went through the CTBT negotiation, there were significant developments in Chinese ACD policy in both multilateral and bilateral terms. One of the path-dependent effects on China's ACD policy in the post-CTBT period was its support for the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT). The other was China's joining the Zangger Committee, one of the supplier regimes, which China had long dismissed as "discriminatory."



Positive Chinese participation in international ACD frameworks worked to improve and enlarge US-China bilateral ACD cooperation in the late 1990s. At a high level of strategic dialogue, the US and China reached a nuclear cooperation agreement in 1997 during Jiang Zemin's visit to the United States. The US-China cooperation also developed in a horizontal direction involving various channels. The US State Department of Energy (DOE) launched the "US-China Lab-to-Lab Technical Exchange Program" (CLL) to establish scientific interactions with China in support of the US arms control and nonproliferation policy, in 1996. Apart from technical collaboration to generate an important and unique common interest between the US and China, there has developed in the post-CTBT period a joint conference that has been gathered by prominent key players in the ACD field in each country. The CIIS-MIIS track 1 ½ bilateral conference was the first of its kind ever held between the ACD communities of the US and China. It was the beginning of a series of substantive discussions about sensitive ACD and security issues among the high level representatives, officials and experts from both countries.

Although the CTBT would not fundamentally change China's security policy, which currently focuses on its conventional forces with the nuclear deterrent, China's most serious concern about security is the rapid development and likely deployment of the advanced US TMD system under the CTBT restraint. The TMD is believed by Chinese analysts to degrade China's limited retaliatory capability. Since China came under the restraint of the CTBT, China has strongly voiced its serious concern over the development and the deployment of theatre missile defence systems (TMD) in East Asia. The Chinese arguments about TMD can be summarized into three

categories; 1) its offensive nature; 2) its effects on regional stability, especially concerning Taiwan; 3) its retreat from international ACD regimes. Regarding ACD matters, Chinese officials are concerned that the US deployment of even a limited NMD system would undermine the progress made in US-China ACD cooperation over the last decade. Chinese ACD officials now feel betrayed by the US pursuit of an NMD system that would directly threaten China's national security by undermining its nuclear deterrent. Many Chinese officials are left wondering why they should bother cooperating with the US. This implies that the US TMD programme might weaken the position and voice of Chinese ACD experts and institutions in their dealings with their national security decision making.

China would have to pay greater attention to the role of arms control negotiations in the post-CTBT era for the purpose of safeguarding its security interests while promoting international security. It is likely that the Chinese government would attach greater importance to the domestic ACD institutions assigned to work on international ACD negotiations. In fact, China is seeking for a countermeasure to check the US TMD system in international ACD regimes. China has repeated its call for talks on outer space in CD in order to check US TMD efforts. The Chinese ambassador Hu Xiaodi requested that negotiations to prevent an arms race in outer space should begin. He claimed that the current US effort to amend the ABM treaty will lead to its total abolition and that such a development would bring the weaponization of and an arms race in outer space, as well as "trigger off global weapons proliferation" (Arms Control Association *Fact Sheets* October 2001: 3). Some Chinese officials suggested that, if the US were to forego NMD development, China would work more closely with the US and the other nuclear weapon states to

negotiate a new missile non-proliferation regime or to turn the MTCR into a treaty, and would drop the longstanding Chinese opposition to the MTCR. The signing of the CTBT was a great step for China in participating in the international ACD regime. In the post-CTBT period, China's ACD policy could play a more important role in its security strategy than at any earlier time.

### ***9.3. Theoretical Implications***

The finding that the development of Chinese ACD perspectives and institutions were fostered and nurtured by China's increasing participation and engagement in international ACD frameworks, may have important theoretical implications for the "third debates," metatheoretical debates about structure and agent in IR theory. The dynamic interaction between state and international institution (or regime) suggests a theoretical model that may avoid making either agent or structure the sole ontological primitive, and then attempt to explain the other by reduction to it. The difficulties of developing a theory that successfully meets both demands lies in a lack of a "self-evident way to conceptualize these entities and their relationship" (Wendt 1987: 338).

Firstly, by tracking the constitutive effects on the state (agent), the "dynamism of state and institute" strives to find a resolution of reductionism of the "heaviness" of structure. Waltz sees the resolution lie in the state's (agent) strategic choice under the constraint rather than generating features of the agent's action. Thus, a model of action is conditioned or even determined by the structure of choice situations, whereas the dynamism of state and institute tries to reconcile the problem of structure and agent by way of investigating generative features of interaction between agent (state)

and structure (international ACD institution). The implication of “dynamism” is to give weight to the process of the agent’s reaction which constitutes structure. Through this process, the state may be resuscitated from and relieved of the reification of the structure. The constitutive developments in the post-CTBT period indicate the generative feature of interaction between China and international institution.

Secondly, constructivists counter that structural realism misses what is often a more determinant factor, namely, the intersubjective ideas that shape behaviour by constituting the identities and interests of actors (Copeland, 2000: 187). Because each actor’s conception of self (its interests and identity) is a product of the others’ diplomatic gestures, states can reshape structure by process. Through new gestures, they can reconstitute interests and identities toward more other-regarding and peaceful means and ends. They try to identify adequately the nature and sources of interests and preferences, which were untouched and left as a “blackbox.” By analyzing a state (China in this case) as a unit, the “dynamism” makes it possible to identify the norm-permeation process through which agent (state) reconstitutes its epistemological map. It complements the constructivist’s inability or indifference to explaining “agent” (state), which overemphasizes the operating norms or ideas among states and eliminates the state as an analytical unit.

Wendt asserts that “if self-interest is not sustained by practice, it will die out” (Wendt 1999: 369). According to him, anarchy has no determinant “logic.” Anarchy is only different cultural instantiations. However, until self-interest dies out and anarchy completely deconstructs it, the state (agent) is the most important unit and vehicle for generating the phenomenon of international relations. Until then, norms

are created and evolved among states which seek national interests within structural constraints. They are also digested within the state (agent) organ itself. The dynamism recognizes that the state is an inalienable unit to be analyzed. By elucidating the evolution of the Chinese perspective on ACD perspectives, it has been shown that norms can be formed and developed in close relationship with international institutions and regimes. This focus on the state (agent) has used dynamism to reveal China's constructive approach within international ACD institutions and regimes in the late 1990s. Based on its "state enhancement functionalism," China's more proactive role within institutions and regimes has given it more formative influence and made it vulnerable to intersubjective meaning.

Such dynamism relates to how to make analytically operational the core assumption that both agents and structures interact reciprocally in determining the foreign policy behaviour of sovereign states. It could lead to a fruitful re-examination of shifts in preferences and interests that emerge from complex interactions between the operation of international institutions and the processes of domestic politics. Both Waltz's "second image" and Gourevitch's "second image reversed" are integrated in different ways (Waltz 1979; Gourevitch 1978).

#### ***9.4. Research Limitations and the Direction of Future Research***

The current research has been conducted within a definite time scale and has been subject to some limitations in research methodology and scope. The issues which it seeks to address are limited by the accessibility of materials. Since the CTBT case

study was selected, it is very difficult to verify its effects and to disentangle other factors from it. For example, the institutional reorganization of the domestic ACD institutions should be understood as part of overall government restructuring in 1997 to 1998 and not specifically for the CTBT experience itself. There is no evidence of a causal relationship between participation in the CTBT and the reorganization. Nonetheless, overall, the reorganization was apparently the product of China's increasing engagement in international ACD frameworks during the last decade. When given the momentum or motive to restructure the Chinese governmental organization, how the Chinese leadership dealt with the ACD associated institutions implied something. In this sense, the reorganization is recognized as the consequence of the dynamic interaction of state and institution (or regime). It can be even inferred that the CTBT experience, by its nature, China's first participation in negotiation within a multilateral framework for two years, made the Chinese leadership rethink its institutional organization.

A shortcoming of the research is that the salience of the international ACD norms to the Chinese perspective has not been fully addressed. The evaluation of the Chinese perspective was dependent on the accessible materials in openly-published journals. The analysis was limited to the general evolutionary pattern of the perspectives. Moreover, the "CTBT effect" on the Chinese perspective cannot be assessed in the limited time available. However, the research demonstrates the Chinese utilization of "common security," the "new security concept" (NSC), as evidence of a learning effect of the "dynamic interaction," even though whether the China's NSC entails a genuine cognition about common security is questionable.

More substantial access to more relevant materials will be required for future research. The inaccessibility of the source materials for the investigation of the Chinese domestic policy-making process, in the case of the CTBT, has made the research weaken in saying nothing about Chinese politics. Configuration of the policy-making process would have made the research rich and the theoretical framework rigorous. The mechanism of the interchange of intersubjective norms and the reconciliation of the cost-benefit calculation of Chinese leaders and officials would have been elucidated. To capture the process whereby the tension between and intersubjective norms and “state enhancing functionalism” melts away remains the task of future research. The weakness undermines the third question of the research (chapter 1), the question of why China joined the CTBT. Instead, the research strives to show the socialization process, the mechanism of the engagement in international institutions and China’s constructive activities in the negotiating process of the CTBT.

If the research had encompassed other dynamic areas, its outcomes would have been richer and complete. For example, the research focused on the formative effects in one state (China  $t_1$  to China  $t_2$ ) of “dynamism.” If the research had focused on interactions among states in the scene of a specific international institution (or regime) or on the historical evolution of norms and the regimes themselves, the “dynamism” might have demonstrated different aspects of the phenomenon. Each of these could be a further research topic with a different analytic unit. The formation of regimes and strategic interactions among states would also show the mechanism whereby states can reshape structures by process: through intersubjective meanings, how they can reconstitute interests and identities toward other-regarding and peaceful means and ends.

The current US TMD plan will set the future research agenda. The US TMD plan might influence on the recent development of China's arms control and disarmament policy. Given the US structural pressure to balance China, what direction China might choose will be an important question not only for the international arms control and disarmament but also for strategic cooperation between two countries. As for China, how the socializing effects on China by the "engagement," both growing Chinese arms control community and domestic institutions, will be influenced is a critical variable for China's policy decision. The research also raises a theoretical point where both neorealism and constructivism intersect. Given the socializing effects on China, how China might react to the US power-balancing policy will provide the theoretical test and process that both the variables, power and norms, might collide and become reconciled with each other. As constructivists argue, the creative use of multilateral institutions explains the emergence of stable and cooperative relations between the United States and the other major powers. However, the US NMD/TMD plan might undermine growing domestic support for the "limited interdependent security concept" in China.

The formulation and promotion of the "new security concept" (NSC) also raise future research issues regarding the security arrangements in the Asia-Pacific region. Multilateral regional security forums provide a framework for enhanced US involvement in Asian security that complements the United States' current bilateral security arrangement. In a similar way, China's active involvement can be interpreted as supporting both sides of coin. China has shown itself increasingly open to working within multilateral security arrangements as a way of countering the US influence on the global and regional scenes as have seen in chapter 6. Will China's promotion of



the new security concept be effective enough to restructure the regional security arrangement? What has been the NSC's impact on making security arrangement in the region? The aim of the research is to explore the regional countries' response to China's promotion of the "new security concept" in the late 1990s. We can expect continued Chinese efforts to expand its diplomatic influence through such channels as a means to create some balance in its relations with the United States. Thus the findings of the research will provide the effects of the promotion based on "common security," at least in its rhetoric.

The dynamic of state and institution (or regime) makes interactions between state and norms more dynamic and complex. The dynamism which integrates the social structuring of international relations by reconstructing the state (agent) and the international system (structure), provides a tool for comparative analysis which differs from existing rationalist approaches. This would make it possible for IR researchers to draw a more complete picture of the interaction in interdependent world undergoing sovereignty-blurring phenomenon. It also enables observers to see how China will emerge in and accommodate itself to the international system. The picture provided might be an evolutionary construction of the long term rather than a cross-sectional view of a moment.

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