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# **More than Fighting for Peace?**

**An examination of the role of conflict resolution in  
training programmes for military peacekeepers**

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Submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Department of Peace Studies

University of Bradford

2010

## **Volume I of II**

## **Abstract.**

**David Manus Curran**

**More than Fighting for Peace?:**

**An examination of the role of conflict resolution in training programmes for military peacekeepers**

**Keywords: peacekeeping, conflict resolution, cosmopolitan, military, training, United Nations, peacebuilding, peace**

The purpose of this research project is to examine the role of conflict resolution in training programmes for military peacekeepers. It offers a significant contribution to the conflict resolution literature by providing contemporary analysis of where further manifestations exist of the links between military peacekeeping and the academic study of conflict resolution.

The thesis firstly provides a thorough analysis of where conflict resolution scholars have sought to critique and influence peacekeeping. This is mirrored by a survey of policy stemming from the United Nations (UN) in the period 1999-2010. The thesis then undertakes a survey of the role of civil-military cooperation: an area where there is obvious crossover between military peacekeeping and conflict resolution terminology. This is achieved firstly through an analysis of practitioner reports and academic research into the subject area, and secondly through a fieldwork analysis of training programmes at the UN Training School Ireland, and Royal Military Training Academy

Sandhurst (RMAS). The thesis goes on to provide a comprehensive examination of the role of negotiation for military peacekeepers. This examination incorporates a historical overview of negotiation in the British Army, a sampling of peacekeeping literature, and finally fieldwork observations of negotiation at RMAS. The thesis discusses how this has impacted significantly on conceptions of military peacekeepers from both the military and conflict resolution fields.

The thesis adds considerably to contemporary debates over cosmopolitan forms of conflict resolution. Firstly it outlines where cosmopolitan ethics are entering into military training programmes, and how the emergence of institutionalised approaches in the UN to 'human security' and peacebuilding facilitate this. Secondly, the thesis uses Woodhouse and Ramsbotham's framework to link the emergence of cosmopolitan values in training programmes to wider structural changes at a global level.

## **Acknowledgments**

It is a great honour to contribute to the academic field of peace and conflict research. There are a number of people who have helped make this possible, and thus I would like to thank.

I would first like to thank my family. My mum (Jennifer), dad (Denis), sister (Janis), and brother-in-law (Andrew), have been nothing but supportive and encouraging (and have also been a considerable source of financial bail-out). They have provided practical support and advice when things first appear to be too difficult or demanding, and I have always been safe in the knowledge that a trip to Abergavenny or Stockton Heath will mean a period of rest and enjoyment (even when the cat needs taking care of). I am also grateful for the kind words and encouragement from the wider Curran family. This includes my godmother, Agnes, and Grandad, Manus, who both passed away during the course of this research. I am sure that they have a good seat to watch this go to the printers.

The Department of Peace Studies is a fantastic place to work on a PhD. On a scholarly level, I would like to thank staff and students from the Department. They have provided a considerable level of insight and critique when I have presented my ideas to them. This has done nothing but benefit my research and my confidence in presenting it. Apart from my supervisor (see below), Jim Whitman, Mike Pugh, Mandy Turner and David Lewis have helped greatly here.

Thanks to my friends. I have always been fortunate in having good people around me, be it in Abergavenny or through my undergraduate years at

Bradford. Luckily this has continued through undertaking the PhD programme at Peace Studies. Friends who I have met as a result of this have been (and continue to be) a rich source of inspiration, encouragement, cups of tea and pints of beer. I was lucky to start the PhD with a fantastic group of individuals. As the PhD has grown, so has the number of people who I have been fortunate enough to come across. As a result, I know that there are friends who I have met over the past 5 years who I will never lose touch with. I thank them all for making this all the more enjoyable. In particular, I would like to thank James Revill (and his unusually strong cups of coffee) for continued encouragement, intellectual debate, and eagerness to watch Six Nations rugby.

It may sound strange to thank a football club, but I thank Peace Studies FC for being a constant source of enjoyment. Regardless of my future, I will always know where I want to be on a Friday at 3pm.

Thanks to Michelle, Rosemary, Emma and the other non-academic staff in the Department for helping my time as a student here to be so enjoyable. Whenever a problem has arisen, they have been happy to help out. Thanks to Michelle at the print unit for her considerable help in getting my work looking neat and tidy (not an easy job). Thanks greatly to Yvette Selim for providing her proofreading skills. By doing so, she has helped tighten my writing no end and provided great clarity to my thinking.

I would like to thank Dr. Betts Fetherston, who (in 1999) was the first person I spoke to from the Department of Peace Studies. It was largely through Betts'

friendly approach that I felt that going to Bradford as an undergraduate student would be a positive step. This has certainly been the case. Though I must admit that I did not know then that I would end up writing a PhD based largely on her early work.

Thanks to all who have offered paid work to help fund this project. From working on a highly stimulating Chevening Programme to coordinating an e-learning programme, the work that has been sent my way has let me develop skills and knowledge. It has also helped me financially solvent. Thanks also to the Abergavenny Food Festival, which is theoretically about as far removed from military peacekeeping as can be, but has been brought much closer thanks to employing me for one month per annum, thus funding research trips.

I am grateful to those who have assisted me in my fieldwork. Academic and military staff at the Royal Military Training Academy Sandhurst (in particular, Dr. Deborah Goodwin) were exceptionally accommodating in allowing access to a highly active training programme. Staff at the United Nations Training School, Ireland (Lt. Col. Thomas Doyle in particular) showed a great deal of openness and warmth in their attitudes towards my research project. Meetings at the United Nations HQ in New York provided great insights into the inner workings of the organisation, and the trials and tribulations that UN staff went through. Finally, further insights were gained through meetings at the NATO School, Oberammergau (in particular, Rupert Forrest). All those who took time out to talk in an open and honest manner deserve thanks.

My final thanks goes to my supervisor, Professor Tom Woodhouse. Tom is an incredible source of inspiration, encouragement and intellect, who has significantly helped in turning a 3-page project proposal into a full-blown PhD. Moreover, Tom's unique ability to bring coherence to the most daunting of tasks must be noted. A five-minute supervision meeting can sort out three months worth of thesis troubles. I am lucky enough to know Tom as a friend, and I am grateful that discussions about peacekeeping, conflict resolution, and cosmopolitanism have been supplemented by equally fervent debates over Leeds United, Peace Studies FC, and Lionel Messi. Thank you Tom, and I hope it wasn't me that pushed you to taking retirement...

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## List of Abbreviations

<b>Abbreviation</b>	<b>Full Title</b>
ASF	African Standby Force
AU	African Union
CIMIC	Civil-Military Cooperation (British and NATO Definitions)
CMCOORD	Civil-Military Coordination (United Nations Definition)
CPTM	Core Pre-Deployment Training Materials
EU	European Union
FPU	Formed Police Unit.
IAPTC	International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centres
IASC	Inter Agency Standing Committee
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
INGO	International Non-governmental Organisation
INTERFET/UNMIT	International Force East Timor/United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste
JWP 3-50	Joint Warfare Publication 3-50
MCDA Guidelines	UN Guidelines On The Use Of Military And Civil Defence Assets To Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities In Complex Emergencies
MINURCAT	United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad
MINUSTAH	United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti
MONUC	United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unites en République démocratique du Congo),
MPSO	Multi-functional Peace Support Operation
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
OASEA	Office for Addressing Sexual Abuse and Exploitation
ONUB	United Nations Mission in Burundi

ONUC	United Nations Operation in Burundi
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
POTI	Peace operations Training Institute
PSO	Peace Support Operation
QIP	Quick Impact Project
RMAS	Royal Military Academy Sandhurst
SEA	Sexual Exploitation and Abuse
SGTM	Standard Generic Training Materials
SHIRBRIG	Standard High Readiness Brigade
SRSG	Special Representative of the Secretary General
UN	United Nations
UNAMID	African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur
UNAMSIL	United Nations Assistance Mission for Sierra Leone,
UNAMSIL	United Nations Assistance Mission for Sierra Leone
UNEF	United Nations Emergency Force (Middle East).
UNEPS	United Nations Emergency Peace Service
UNHCR	Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees
UNIF I	Phase 1 UN Intervention Force
UNIFIL	United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
UNIOSIL	United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone
UNIPSIL	United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone
UNMEE	United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea
UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia,
UNMIS	United Nations Mission in Sudan
UNOCI	United Nations Operation in Cote d'Ivoire
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force
UNTAET	United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor
UNTSI	United Nations Training School Ireland

*“Soldiers came in their thousands wearing the distinctive blue beret of the United Nations (UN), and they brought with them people from Asia, Latin America, the Antipodes, as well as from the countries of the former Soviet Union. They were not there as imperialists to fight a war, nor to defend a people or their territory. They came as peacekeepers whose purpose was to alleviate the suffering of all the peoples of the Balkans and to try, through peaceful means, to bring about an end to the war. This demanded of them the same fighting qualities that soldiers need in battle: guile, courage, determination and endurance; but without the clarity of purpose of a war, perhaps peacekeeping demanded more of them than fighting ever did. Peacekeeping was their mandate, and it is on this that they must be judged.”*

**General Sir Michael Rose**  
**Force Commander United Nations Protection Force 1994-1995**

## **Introduction:**

Under the working title 'An examination of the role of conflict resolution in training programmes for military peacekeepers', this thesis examines military training for peacekeeping operations to investigate the links between military forms of peacekeeping and the academic discipline of conflict resolution. It shows where such links exist, whether they have strengthened, and what this means for militaries and future conceptions of military peacekeeping. The thesis accomplishes this through examining a number of case studies, backed up by a considerable review of the academic and practitioner literature emanating from a number of disciplines. With peacekeeping operations - particularly those sanctioned by the United Nations (UN) - continuing to be a highly used means to attempt to manage and resolve conflict, the requirements for soldiers to understand how to carry out their work in a more proficient manner, and also contribute to the wider transformation of conflict zones into ones where positive peace can flourish, is paramount. This thesis adds to the understanding of how the discipline of conflict resolution has contributed to training programmes aimed to assist military peacekeepers in appreciating and improving their capacities. It further contributes by outlining areas where this need is most pertinent, and what this means for international conflict resolution efforts.

This thesis offers a multi-layered synthesis of where conflict resolution and military training for peacekeeping interlink, and contributes to the conflict resolution literature by outlining the important links that exist between the fields.

It further adds to the emerging cosmopolitan literature, through examining the emergence of cosmopolitan principles in military preparedness for peacekeeping operations, as well as cosmopolitan motivations for intervention and cosmopolitan actions once deployed. Finally, it contributes to the peacekeeping literature by offering a contemporary assessment of current training programmes and UN policies. To start, this introductory section outlines a brief overview of the 'backdrop' to this work, by giving a considered analysis of the emergence of the concept of 'human security' in UN policy circles.

### ***The development of the Human Security Agenda***

It is the belief of this research project that the emergence of a 'human security' framework has informed much of the present debate about peacekeeping operations. The evolution of human security may also offer a first step to more radical future conceptions of the role of peacekeeping in global politics; namely, that peacekeeping operations will soon come to represent a cosmopolitan international agenda, led by a strong and accountable UN.

Initially, it appears that the proponents of the human security paradigm have difficulty in defining exactly what the concept of 'human security' means. A good example of a short definition can be found in the United Nations' Commission on Human Security meaning - 'to protect the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and human fulfilment' (sic) (UN, 2003a; 4). Broadening this, the Human Security Centre outlines 'narrow' and 'broad' concepts of human security. It finds that:

Proponents of the 'narrow' concept of human security focus on violent threats to individuals, or, as UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan puts it, 'the protection of communities and individuals from internal violence'. Proponents of the broad concept of human security argue that the threat agenda should include hunger, disease and natural disasters because these kill far more people than war, genocide and terrorism combined.

(HSC, 2005; viii)

The broader conception of human security has invited a degree of critique, as it covers such a vast area. It is thus understandable that it leads to the critique that 'if human security is all these things, then what is it *not*?' (Paris, 2001; 92). Such a wide definition also leaves itself open to accusations that there are greater interests at play with regards to keeping the broader definitions of human security vague, with critics suggesting that a coalition of 'middle power' states, development agencies and nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) wish to 'shift attention and resources away from conventional security issues and towards goals that have traditionally fallen under the rubric of international development' (Paris, 2001). It also frustrates those in the policy field, who argue that if human security was defined more narrowly, it would 'accrue greater analytical and policy value' (Thomas and Tow, 2002; 178).

While the broader definition has drawn a degree of critique, narrower definitions have gained more policy traction in the UN, where notions of security dominant throughout the Cold War - that a state has absolute authority on what goes on within its borders, and the international community is bound by rules of non-

interference - have been challenged. Throughout the 1990's UN Secretary General Boutros Ghali – who 'tirelessly promoted the concept that peace, development and democracy are interlinked' (Newman, 2001; 51) – oversaw the evolution of human security in the UN. Arguing that the 'concept of security has been for too long interpreted narrowly' (UNDP, 1994), the 1994 *Human Development Report* offered the first interpretation of this new security agenda, and outlined the first real definitions of human security and how it linked to human development.

Ghali's successor, Secretary General, Kofi Annan, took this a stage further and oversaw a development of the more narrow concepts of human security: namely the protection of civilians in armed combat. In September 1999, Annan reported to the UN Security Council (hereafter referred to as 'Security Council') on that very issue (UN, 1999c), stating that the international community was unable to stop belligerent groups repeatedly breaking International Humanitarian Law by attempting to target civilian populations in conflict zones. His report offered a number of recommendations to the Security Council to improve the UN's capacities to protect. The recommendations included a call for a 'climate of compliance' with international laws protecting civilians in armed conflict (through individual states ratifying international conventions), more accountability for War Crimes; increased use of conflict prevention tools, further protection for civilian populations' access to Humanitarian aid, special protection requirements for women and children to be adhered to in peacekeeping operations, and adherence to international law by peacekeeping forces. Annan took the debate further through the publication of The Secretary

General's Millennium Report, *We the Peoples: The Role of the United Nations in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*. This once again argued that the requirements of security were to 'embrace the protection of communities and individuals' from internal violence. It also challenged critics of this new approach, in particular those who argued that state sovereignty and non-interference protects the smaller states in the international system:

But to the critics I would pose this question: if humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica—to gross and systematic violations of human rights that offend every precept of our common humanity?

(Annan, 2000; 48)

Ghali and Annan, through their respective periods in office, facilitated the development of the human security agenda so that by the end of the decade it was at the forefront of the developments in the UN. The human security agenda most notably linked with new approaches to peacekeeping in the *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*, or as it is more widely known, the 'Brahimi Report'. This is outlined in greater depth in Chapter 2, but at this point it is worth noting that a main theme throughout the report was developing UN structures, policy, and practice to meet the 'new demands' in a conflict environment, including countering attacks on civilian elements by armed groups. Alongside the Brahimi Report, two Security Council Resolutions were passed which dealt specifically with threats to civilian populations during

internal conflict. In passing Resolutions 1265 and 1296, the Security Council brought peacekeeping operations firmly into the sphere of human security<sup>1</sup>. Resolution 1265, passed in September 1999, was the first clear indication of this. The resolution expressed the Security Council's willingness to:

respond to situations of armed conflict where civilians are being targeted or humanitarian assistance to civilians is being deliberately obstructed, including through the consideration of appropriate measures at the Council's disposal in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.

(UN, 1999f)

Furthermore, Resolution 1265 tasked the Security Council to 'consider how peacekeeping mandates might better address the negative impact of armed conflict on civilians' (UN, 1999f). In April 2000, the Security Council passed Resolution 1296. This resolution is a further indication of the UN's drive to underpin its peacekeeping operations on a human security agenda with the protection of civilians in armed conflict at the core. The Resolution noted that:

the deliberate targeting of civilian populations or other protected persons and the committing of systematic, flagrant and widespread violations of international humanitarian and human rights law in situations of armed conflict may constitute a threat to international peace and security.

(UN, 2000d)

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<sup>1</sup> These resolutions are discussed in Chapter three, which deals with developments in the UN.

As the ‘threat to international peace and security’ is a requirement for the Security Council to invoke Chapter VII of the UN Charter (UN, 1945)<sup>2</sup>, this resolution made clear the possible consequences of systematic targeting of civilian populations in conflict zones. As well as adding a number of tasks to peacekeeping operations<sup>3</sup>, Resolution 1296 further gave UN peacekeeping forces increased flexibility in using force in the protection of civilians by expressing the need to ‘adopt appropriate steps’ to deal with such threats to international peace and security. Significantly, this was the first time in the 60-year history of the organisation when the Security Council passed resolutions specifically designed for the protection of civilians. In 2005, Secretary-General Annan highlighted the impact of these Resolutions by stating that they ‘marked a significant milestone, reflecting the international community’s growing commitment to better address the tragic plight of civilians trapped in situations of armed conflict’ (UN, 2005c; 1).

The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) report, *The Responsibility to Protect*, strengthens the narrow definition of human security. Published in December 2001, the report is a culmination of research into issues over humanitarian intervention, state sovereignty and the right to intervene. Recognising the new shift in notions of international peace and security, the report argues:

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<sup>2</sup> Article 42 of the UN Charter refers directly to threats to international peace and security - ‘Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations’.

<sup>3</sup> Important developments included rapid deployment, a focus on Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR), and an increased role for punishment of war criminals.

The emerging principle in question is that intervention for human protection purposes, including military intervention in extreme cases, is supportable when major harm to civilians is occurring or imminently apprehended, and the state in question is unable or unwilling to end the harm, or is itself the perpetrator.

(ICISS, 2001; 16)

The *Responsibility to Protect* argues that the concept of sovereignty, which had traditionally referred to a state protecting its borders, had now evolved to the state protecting the people who live in the territory itself. If that state failed to protect the people from suffering then the responsibility turns to the international community and its 'responsibility to protect'. There are three 'essential components' to ensuring a responsibility to protect is given to populations who are at risk: the responsibility to prevent human catastrophe; the responsibility to intervene; and the responsibility to rebuild. This incorporates the full spectrum of conflict management tools, conflict prevention, intervention, and peacebuilding. The report goes on to outline this spectrum:

it is important to emphasize from the start that action in support of the responsibility to protect necessarily involves and calls for a broad range and wide variety of assistance actions and responses. These actions may include both long and short-term measures to help prevent human security-threatening situations from occurring, intensifying, spreading, or persisting; and rebuilding support to help prevent them from recurring; as

well as, at least in extreme cases, military intervention to protect at-risk civilians from harm

(ICISS, 2001)

The conceptual backdrop that the more narrow definition of the human security agenda provides gives the report a framework for recommending military intervention. Although seeing military intervention as a last resort, the *Responsibility to Protect* finds that there is general agreement that it would be warranted in certain 'exceptional cases of human risk' and defines six thresholds to intervention: Right authority; Just cause; Right intention; Last resort; Proportional means and; Reasonable prospects. (ICISS, 2001). Furthermore, the report urges the Security Council to consider the 'Principles for military intervention' to govern responses to requests for intervention. Security Council 'Permanent Five'<sup>4</sup> members were also asked not to use their veto (in matters where vital state interests are not involved) to 'obstruct the passage of resolutions authorizing military intervention for human protection purposes for which there is otherwise majority support' (ICISS, 2001).

The report's focus on the 'responsibility to rebuild' also provides impetus to the institutionalisation of peacebuilding mechanisms in peacekeeping operations, furthering links between the military and civilian aspects of an operation. The report finds a number of problematic areas which characterised previous interventions, namely poorly managed exit strategies, inadequate help with reconstruction projects, an inability to address the root causes of conflict, and

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<sup>4</sup> China, France, Russia, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America.

insufficient recognition of any responsibility to rebuild after an intervention. From this, the *Responsibility to Protect* argues that there should be a 'genuine commitment' to building 'a durable peace, and promoting good governance and sustainable development', with international organisations working with local authorities. In a reference to the importance of cooperation between the military and civilian actors of a peacekeeping operation, the military component provides one instrument in a 'broader spectrum of tools designed to prevent conflicts and humanitarian emergencies from arising, intensifying, spreading, persisting or recurring.' However, the report places most emphasis on the need for local involvement in order to fully meet the peacebuilding needs. It finds:

True reconciliation is best generated by ground level reconstruction efforts, when former armed adversaries join hands in rebuilding their community or creating reasonable living and job conditions at new settlements. True and lasting reconciliation occurs with sustained daily efforts at repairing infrastructure, at rebuilding housing, at planting and harvesting, and cooperating in other productive activities. External support for reconciliation efforts must be conscious of the need to encourage this cooperation, and dynamically linked to joint development efforts between former adversaries (ICISS, 2001; 39).

Importantly, this shows strong links to the conflict resolution literature, which advocates that peacekeeping operations are used to provide space for peacebuilding initiatives to flourish. Throughout this thesis, there is reference to

the development of military capacities to deal effectively with peacebuilding at the local level.

When looking at the overall picture of how security has evolved, *The Responsibility to Protect* is a key component. It forms a foundation to UN initiatives, such as the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (UN, 2004a) and the formation of the Human Security Commission (UN, 2003a). Speaking in 2005, Annan once again re-iterated the importance of the protection of civilians of armed conflict and the role that the international community plays:

if national authorities are unable or unwilling to protect their citizens, then the responsibility shifts to the international community to use diplomatic, humanitarian and other methods to help protect the human rights and well-being of civilian populations.

(UN, 2005b; 31)

In following current peacekeeping operations, it is therefore important to understand this conceptual backdrop. What can be observed from the 'operationalisation' of a closer human security agenda is an increased emphasis on the role of military peacekeeping forces to protect civilians, but also a desire to further link the aspects of positive peace (a responsibility to rebuild), to negative peace (responsibility to intervene). Peacekeeping mandates and policy have come to reflect this change in practice, with operations becoming more robust, an increased emphasis on protecting

civilians in conflict environments, and a more systematic approach to peacebuilding. This has a further impact on the training needs of military peacekeepers.

The development of the human security agenda also indicates an emergent set of cosmopolitan principles and values in the international system. Cosmopolitan democracy, as described by Held, 'says that we live in a world where we must come to enjoy multiple citizenships: in our own communities, in the wider regions in which we live and in a form of cosmopolitan global community' (Held, 1997; 28). Within this framework, institutions are required to develop in order to 'reflect the multiplicity of issues, questions and problems which affect and bind people together irrespective of whether they are in one nation-state or another'. Such institutions should also exist to protect civilians and be able to uphold a 'global responsibility actively to protect individuals from being deprived of their rights and to aid them when protection has failed'. This strongly links the development of cosmopolitanism to the human security agenda (Elliot, 2004). Woodhouse and Ramsbotham, writing in 2005, argue that the cosmopolitan agenda offers a framework for the development of peacekeeping operations for two reasons; firstly because it offers a post-westphalian response to crises; and secondly:

It provides a way of consistently applying international humanitarian standards (the duty to protect civilians) through a consistent

rationalization, legitimation and operationalization of concepts of human security.

(Woodhouse and Ramsbotham, 2005; 141)

When applying this to peacekeeping, one can ask how much current peacekeeping operations can operationalise such cosmopolitan ideals shown above. This thesis addresses this question, and adds to the emerging body of literature on cosmopolitan conflict resolution. It achieves this by investigating whether current military training for peacekeeping is reflecting a growing cosmopolitan dimension in international forms of conflict resolution. A further assessment of the cosmopolitan literature is made in the following chapter.

### **The training dimension**

The development of human security therefore provides a backdrop to this thesis. The current context asks that peacekeepers possess certain skills beyond what is seen as traditional military techniques. A journalist recently noted the range of new techniques after a chance meeting with a group of soldiers on a Pan-African training course for UN Observer Missions in Mali:

What was more interesting for me, as a former English language training specialist, was the focus on communication skills and the types of activity I was familiar with: team-work, role-play, dealing with the unexpected, how to behave in difficult encounters with interlocutors from different cultures. It all made sense: from paralinguistics (how to recognise danger - the tone of voice, the facial expression, and how these give signs of

suspicion, fear, aggression...), to response (how to show peaceful intentions, submission, hold up your hands, step back, back down...).

(Daniel, 2006)

These are not what are defined as 'traditional' military skills, and are found mainly in the conflict resolution literature. This thesis therefore charts where there is an identified need for skills such as those outlined above, and how that need is met through training programmes. Training in the military, as described by Arbuckle, is outlined below:

An important aspect of the military organizational culture is training: if you want to do something, you train for it. There is individual training, which imparts the skills and the knowledge to do the job. Collective training builds the attitudes, skills and knowledge required to assemble an effective team. In professional advancement training, individual potential is built and tested, not for the present job but for future employment, thereby building collective capacities on the enhanced potential of individuals. Refresher training is designed to maintain skill levels especially where they may have been unused for a period. There is also lateral training, in which new equipments and techniques are introduced to experienced practitioners: a pilot changing aircraft types may undergo up to a year of cross-training to the new type.

(Arbuckle, 2006; 151)

Thus, a number of different *types* of training exist within the military structure. Following this outline, the thesis focuses on levels of collective training, as well as 'professional advancement training'. Peacekeeping is not at the core of military training: it is an addition to the central military skills. Where this addition is incorporated is an area for debate, as in some cases it is incorporated at an earlier stage than others. However, this thesis does not aim to examine the holistic cycle of military training, and where peacekeeping training fits into it; instead, the focus is on what the trained encompasses insofar as the requirements of specific peacekeeping skills. The thesis conclusions offer thoughts on the wider implications of peacekeeping training. The peacekeeping field is exceptionally large, with a high number of soldiers, training organisations, and training regimes. This makes it considerably difficult to gain a grounded idea in how training is carried out, and what influences it. Although not wishing to sell itself as a 'definitive account' of training, this thesis provides a valuable contribution to the literature through offering a broad selection of military organisations, and investigating to what extent conflict resolution influences and informs the training regimes on offer.

## ***Thesis and research questions***

The following research questions inform the thesis. Supplementary questions are italicised:

- 1) In what ways does military peacekeeping training show evidence of conflict resolution theory and practice?

*1a) In what direction has training for military peacekeeping developed since 1994<sup>5</sup>?*

- 2) In light of the new roles and responsibilities placed on military peacekeepers, is there evidence that training in non-traditional military skills assists military peacekeepers adapt to the changing nature of deployment zones?

- 3) Does this indicate evidence of a cosmopolitan conception of peacekeeping?

*3a) Can we find evidence - both practically and in the peacekeeping literature - of the emergence of a different type of soldier more aligned with cosmopolitan ideals?*

In order to inform the answers to these questions, the thesis offers both a thorough analysis of academic and practitioner sources, as well as official documentation and policy. It is further based on a number of case studies,

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<sup>5</sup> Fetherston's 1994 project (entitled *Towards a theory of United Nations Peacekeeping*), examined the role of conflict resolution in training for peacekeeping. As this thesis shows – particularly in the following chapter – Fetherston's thesis is still relevant now, particularly with regards to the overarching frameworks to conceptualise peacekeeping operations, but also with regards to how she outlines the specific conflict resolution skills to assist peacekeepers in their duties.

informed by field-based visits, which include interviews and observations. The case studies are:

- United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) - in particular the Integrated Training Service;
- Royal Military training Academy, Sandhurst (RMAS) - where officer cadets are trained to become Officers in the British Army' and
- United Nations Training School, Ireland (UNTSI) - which runs specialised courses in peacekeeping for military officers.

In addition to these case studies, the following case studies have assisted in the development of this work:

- The International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centres (IAPTC);
- The NATO School, Oberammergau, Germany; and
- The UK Ministry of Defence.

A number of factors influence the choice of where the field study takes place. Firstly, my MPhil research into peacekeeping doctrine offers a solid foundation of peacekeeping doctrine and practice in both the United Kingdom (UK) and UN (Curran, 2004). With regard to the UK, this helped considerably with the choosing the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst as a case study. Although the UK in policy terms has moved away from providing the UN with peacekeeping troops, its position as a doctrinal 'leader' means that making the link between

doctrine and practice is pertinent here. Previous study has also meant that the author of this thesis has a sound understanding of UN's peacekeeping apparatus, particularly with regard to peacekeeping operations since the publication of the Brahimi Report. The second influence was financial constraints. The impact of this factor was the need to seek fieldwork 'closer to home' and possibly for shorter periods of time. Fortunately, the training events which were observed (such as the exercise in Sandhurst, or training at UNTSI), were both concise and in-depth, offering an excellent opportunity for considered analysis. These visits were also complimented by funded visits to the UN headquarters in New York, which provided opportunities for interviews with DPKO staff. Finally, a degree of creativity has helped with the fieldwork. Without attending the IAPTC conference in 2007, there would have been little chance of establishing strong links with UNTSI, and the NATO School. Furthermore, many of the interviews in the UN led to further meetings with other personnel.

This brings the chapter to the methodology and methods. Although there has been a shift towards quantitative methods and methodologies (Johnstone, 2005, Bennet et al., 2005), and in the cases of some research projects, a mix of both qualitative and quantitative methods (Tomforde, 2005), this research design for this project follows a predominately qualitative methodology. There are a number of reasons for this. Firstly, a fundamental critique of quantitative methodology is that it does not 'capture the real meaning of social behaviour', and although quantitative research gives a solid statistical account of particular issues involved in peacekeeping (Fortna, 2008), a qualitative approach in this particular case offers a greater depth to the issues involved. Understanding the

role of conflict resolution skills requires a great deal of observation and interview, and focus on qualitative methods. Secondly, time and financial constraints on the research project mean that it is unfeasible to carry out a large-scale survey as well as in depth interviews and observation. Thirdly, the research is not intended to turn participants into 'objects' or 'units'. A quantitative approach does run the risk of creating such conditions (Sarantakos, 1998). As the research examines the incorporation of conflict resolution training into peacekeeping training, a significant amount of work is based on experiences in training establishments, interviewing practitioners and observing training. Therefore, distancing the researcher from those being researched will prove to have a negative effect.

The research follows a 'case study' approach - arguably the most popular method of social science research (Burton, 2000) which offers the opportunity to cover a wide range of data collection methods, both qualitative and quantitative. Bell explains the case study approach as being an 'umbrella' for a number of research methods. She argues that it does not exclude any data collection method and allows for any to be called upon in any circumstance (Bell, 1993). This *multi method* approach (Gillham, 2000) reflects this particular project, which employs a number of data-collection techniques. In particular there are four main strands. First, a considered review of existing literature and library-based research was carried out, predominantly at the JB Priestly Library, University of Bradford<sup>6</sup>. Secondly is the use of interviews. The majority of my interviews lasted for one hour, and followed a semi-structured approach mainly

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<sup>6</sup> A number of other libraries are planned to be used, in particular those which focus on similar areas (for example, Kings College London). The British library catalogue backs up this research.

consisting of open-ended questions, offering interviewees an opportunity to fully explain issues (supported by prompts and follow up questions should the need arise). This gave adequate time to explore a number of key issues in the research, and provided a manageable amount of data to be transcribed. Thirdly, the thesis is informed by observations of specific courses run at training institutions, with field based studies forming a key component of the research. Finally, and leading from the observations, a comprehensive set of field notes have been kept. These notes form the background to my experiences on fieldwork, provide a record of interviews, a description of the observations themselves, and a detailed description of the events I partook in.

With all large research projects there are inevitable obstacles in achieving the goals set out. As this research project has relied on access to military training institutions, consideration has been paid to possible difficulties in access to data and participants. There are specific regulations that the military must work within, such as the Official Secrets Act<sup>7</sup>. These have been followed throughout the research and writing up of the thesis, and strong links have been made with those who have assisted access. Although quotations and references to interviews are noted, they are not directly attributed to a named individual. As well as respecting anonymity, the research has also required solid background knowledge of the institutions' work. As they have put a certain degree of trust in me, it was felt that it should be reciprocated.

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<sup>7</sup> Found at [http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts1989/Ukpga\\_19890006\\_en\\_1.htm](http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts1989/Ukpga_19890006_en_1.htm) (file accessed 01 August 2010)

When undertaking this research project, it was important to show awareness of the assumptions, 'truths' and knowledge that I brought to the research. Acknowledging such assumptions has required *reflexivity* in the research. This is explained by Robson as '[a]n awareness of the ways in which the researcher as an individual with a particular social background has an impact on the research process' (Robson, 2002; 172). Researching in an organisation such as the military also brings its own set of assumptions. Higate and Cameron's work on reflexivity when researching the military raises important issues to be aware of when in the field. One such issue is the interaction between military and civilian and the creation of 'insider and outsider' categories between the military and civilian researchers:

the "them" and "us" dichotomy may impact on the practical problem of access to the organization and the nature of the interaction civilian researchers might have with their military participants  
(Higate and Cameron, 2006; 224)

Understanding this offers a greater chance for preparation for research, and the authors advise on an increased awareness of the 'autobiography' used when talking to those in the military. Furthermore Higate and Cameron argue that understanding a more reflexive approach offers 'greater potential for both transparency and, ultimately, accountability in the research process' (Higate and Cameron, 2006; 220). Thus careful consideration has been given to the institutions and personalities who are chosen. With regard to the researcher, this research takes account of the fact that it has been carried out by

somebody of a relatively young age, who has had no military experience, or experience as part of a peacekeeping operation. Nevertheless, one must not only look at these perceived 'weaknesses' when carrying out the research project, as a number of strengths have been brought to the research by the author, in particular, knowledge and experience of approaches to conflict resolution, a sound knowledge of peacekeeping doctrine and policy, and a considerable academic background. Although these skills do not compensate for the experiences which the military practitioners possess, they complement the 'on-the-ground' knowledge and experiences of the military practitioner.

Finally, careful consideration is given to ethical issues and implications, and the University of Bradford Codes of Conduct for research ethics and other relevant codes are followed. In particular, attention is given to the Article 2.6 of the University Codes which requires the researcher to 'ensure in particular that appropriate arrangements are made to obtain informed consent from each participant' and article 2.8, which requires the researcher 'report any conflict of interest' (Bradford, 2003; 2)

Social Constructionism provides the philosophical and epistemological background to this research. Peacekeeping, without any formal definition in the UN Charter, has been open to debate since its inception since 1956. The development of the Peace Support Operation, with the marriage of peace enforcement and traditional peacekeeping, has once again brought the definition into debate. The Human Security paradigm is also keenly contested among academics and practitioners, and is a field which is characterised by

having an open definition. Furthermore, as Chapter 4 shows, concepts of civil-military cooperation are keenly contested, with different organisations defining the concept of the military working alongside civilian agencies in a number of different ways, each with differing consequences. This research is therefore aware of the multiple social constructions that exist within peacekeeping operations in the training programmes that are examined. The task of a researcher, according to Robson, is to understand the multiple social constructions of meaning and knowledge (Robson, 2002; 17). Furthermore, Bellamy proposes a that those who research peacekeeping use a 'social constructivist' lens in how it is theorised:

Subjectivist approaches... argue that as the social world is constructed rather than 'given', and that the nature and salience of 'problems' in troubled places and commonsense solutions to them are shaped by social actors rather than objective facts. In the case of the changing nature of peace operations in the 1990s, it was the predilections of the interveners themselves rather than the emergence of new problems that provided the impetus for change. Moreover, the narrow temporal frames produced by objectivist approaches obscure complex relationships between peace-makers, peacekeepers and peacebuilders and their targets and the long-term and structural consequences of their activities.

(Bellamy, 2004; 29)

Work by Bellamy and Williams (Bellamy, 2004, Bellamy and Williams, 2004), who have pushed for new ways to theorise peacekeeping operations is kept in

mind when throughout this research. Furthermore, work by those in the social constructionist field, such as Vivien Burr (Burr, 1995) and Kenneth Gergen (Gergen, 1999, Gergen, 2003), informs this research.

### ***The chapters***

The following chapter offers a survey of the conflict resolution literature, and how it relates to the field of military peacekeeping. It begins by looking at the wider field of conflict resolution, before focussing on research from the Centre for Conflict Resolution at the Department of Peace Studies (University of Bradford). This adds to the existing literature by outlining the development of a 'Bradford model' of peacekeeping research, set within a distinctive conflict resolution framework. It also examines how Peace Studies scholars contribute to contemporary debates of future conceptions of peacekeeping, in particular critical approaches to peacekeeping operations, and cosmopolitan conceptions.

Before the following chapter, there is a overview of current peacekeeping doctrine and practice. This leads into **Chapter two**, which outlines the current working nature of peacekeeping in the UN. It pays particular attention to how the organisation has reacted to the publication of the Brahimi Report, the increasing institutionalisation of peacebuilding mechanisms, the impact of cross-cutting mandates, and the reorganisation of the structures within the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). With these larger structural changes influencing the DPKO and Integrated Training Service (ITS), the chapter analyses the ITS training strategy and strategic needs assessment of peacekeeping operations, the most up-to-date survey which asks specifically

what military personnel expect from their training. After this, the new UN training materials (the Core Pre-Deployment Training Materials, hereafter CPTMs) are introduced, as well as debates within the UN over future needs for peacekeeping. An understanding of the decision-making structures that are behind peacekeeping policy and practice is crucial. Therefore, this chapter is integral insofar as understanding the training needs on military peacekeepers.

Chapters three and four study the phenomenon of civil-military cooperation, in particular how the military interacts with civilian elements of a peacekeeping operation. This is of great importance in both effective functioning in peacekeeping operations, but also has increased importance if the aspects of peacekeeping operations can effectively open up space for peacebuilding. Therefore, these chapters add to both the conflict resolution and cosmopolitan literature by contributing to debates on the impact of civil military cooperation training on the ability of military peacekeepers to engage effectively with new avenues of power. **Chapter three** analyses much of the academic theory and practitioner analysis of civil-military cooperation. This chapter is split into two main parts. First is an analysis of the relationship between the military and civilian organisations within the peacekeeping operation. Second is an investigation of more contemporary debates in civil-military cooperation, namely the relationship between the military and civilian population within the deployment zone. Finally, the chapter looks at where training has been espoused as a key instrument to be used to facilitate more positive relations between the military and civilian organisations.

**Chapter four** takes these debates and links them up to fieldwork observations, in the form of simulations and lectures given to soldiers at training institutions. Fieldwork undertaken at UN Training School Ireland, Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, and the UN is used here, as is an examination of the current UN Core Pre-deployment Training Materials. Through doing this, this chapter investigates how the observed militaries are adopting conflict resolution skills and terminology to assist them in their ability to effectively carry out civil-military cooperation strategies, and also how current UN training uses conflict resolution to enhance its civil-military cooperation training. Furthermore, Chapter four examines the new forms of civil-military cooperation outlined in the previous chapter, and how training organisations are attempting to deal with creating, maintaining, and at times repairing, positive relations with the local population. From this, the thesis contributes by providing an illustration of how the theory of civil-military cooperation is put into practice with soldiers, whether it represents a further manifestation of the links between peacekeeping and conflict resolution, where there may be problematic areas, and what impact this may have on international forms of conflict resolution.

**Chapter five** expands on the fieldwork investigation element of the thesis by examining a number of different training approaches to non-traditional skills. It starts by offering an in-depth survey of the development of negotiation skills for military peacekeepers through a review of peacekeeping literature (outlining where negotiation has been noted in the literature), and also a brief (but in-depth) history of how both practitioners and academics have noted the evolution of negotiation practice in peacekeeping operations. Then a fieldwork

observation of negotiation training at RMAS is used to illustrate the complexities involved with military peacekeepers negotiating at the tactical level. To help understand this, the negotiation exercise is linked to conflict resolution theory, both in the skills needed to assist the negotiator, but also in framing the negotiation in a wider framework.

**Chapter six** brings the data gathered from the previous chapters, and examines exactly what this means for military peacekeeping. It relates to the five thematic areas which were set out in this introduction, and uses them as a springboard for a discussion on the role of military peacekeepers. This chapter therefore examines to what extent conflict resolution links with military peacekeeping operations, and how observed militaries are reacting to this. Following on, the chapter moves outwards and asks wider questions about possible developments in cosmopolitan forms of conflict resolution: most notably whether the development of soldiers' capabilities lend themselves to more cosmopolitan ethics, and whether this means that there are signs that there is movement towards the operationalisation of cosmopolitan forms of international conflict resolution. This adds once again to the conflict resolution literature, as it contributes to a cutting-edge debate of the conflict resolution capacities (both current and desired) of military peacekeepers, as well as outlining where there exists solid manifestations of the links between military peacekeeping and conflict resolution. It adds to the emerging cosmopolitan literature by using training as a means to examine whether militaries are moving towards cosmopolitan ethics, and what barriers exist which may hinder that progress. Finally, it adds to the peacekeeping literature, by examining the

pressures that peacekeeping operations put on military peacekeepers, and how training in 'non-traditional' areas affects the performance of soldiers who undertake peacekeeping duties.

## **Peacekeeping Doctrine: explaining the development of the practice**

When writing such a large body of work that focuses on the development of training programmes for military peacekeepers it is worth understanding what exactly is meant by the term 'peacekeeping'.

Although military observer missions had been deployed in the Middle East (the UN Truce Supervision Organisation) and on the India-Pakistan border (UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan), the dawn of what was seen as traditional peacekeeping was seen with the deployment of the UN Emergency Force in the Suez Canal in 1956. Peacekeeping during this time was widely seen to be an activity which involved the deployment of small, lightly armed, UN sanctioned, 'blue helmets' to patrol buffer zones and politically agreed ceasefire lines. Hillen adds:

in the main... these operations consisted of no more than a few thousand lightly armed troops, structured around light infantry battalions. These troops were generally deployed in linear buffer zones between belligerents and used military force only in a passive manner  
(Hillen, 2000; 79)

What became known as 'traditional' or 'first generation' operations were characterised by the Hammarskjöld/Pearson Model of peacekeeping, which

relied heavily upon five key principles (Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, 1999; 93-4):

- i. The principle of consent from the combating parties for the establishment of the mission;
- ii. The non-use of force by the peacekeeping mission except for in circumstances of self defence;
- iii. The principle of voluntary contributions from small, neutral countries to participate in the force;
- iv. The principle of an impartial peacekeeping force; and
- v. The principle of peacekeeping operations being controlled by the Secretary General.

Peacekeeping operations which worked under such principles were generally seen as a successful tool of international conflict resolution, and in 1988 this was recognised as United Nations Peacekeeping Forces were collectively awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1988 (Nobel, 1988). With the endings of the Cold War, the enthusiasm that surrounded peacekeeping gave rise to a huge increase in the number of operations. Conceptual developments were also being undertaken with the publication of Secretary General Boutros Ghali's *Agenda for Peace* in 1992 (Ghali, 1992), and developments in the human security agenda. This 'second generation' of peacekeeping saw a considerable rise in the number of deployments (from five operations in 1988 to fourteen operations in 1994), and an enormous increase in the number of military and police (9,605 in 1988 to 75,523 in 1994) (Ramsbotham et al., 2005; 135). These

operations offered a wide number of tasks that covered far more than the traditional observation tasks and ceasefire monitoring (leading to them being referred to as *multifunctional operations*). Mandates covered issues such as police reform, electoral processes and increased coordination with Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs). This led to observers noting that UN peacekeeping operations were involving themselves in nation building (Jett, 1999; 28). Such operations – and the complex nature these tasks involved – resulted in military peacekeepers being asked to liaise with a much wider number of civilian organisations, as well as learn to negotiate with local armed groups and facilitate agreements over ceasefires, aid delivery, and the return of refugees (Stewart, 1993). Doctrine at this point also developed to reflect the wider approaches to peacekeeping, with one such example being the UK publication *Wider Peacekeeping*<sup>8</sup>. United Nations peacekeeping was also deploying into more volatile environments, with operations deploying in intra-state conflict, characterised by failing state structures and a higher number of belligerent groups, paramilitaries and armed forces<sup>9</sup> (Wilkinson, 2000b; 65).

Though the UN and its peacekeeping mechanisms experienced limited success in the 1990's, the decade was overshadowed by a number of catastrophic failures in protecting civilians. In Rwanda, the UNAMIR operation was unable to prevent or stop a mass genocide of over 800,000 Tutsi civilians, which occurred over a period of four months in 1993 (Dallaire, 2003, Gourevitch, 1998). In

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<sup>8</sup> *Wider Peacekeeping* is referred to in more detail in chapter five

<sup>9</sup> Wilkinson describes intra-state conflicts as being 'conducted by irregular and undisciplined troops who are often indistinguishable from the people at large', and adds that 'all too often the ordinary people of the opposing ethnic group who become the targets of the militia gangs and human rights abuses, including incidents of genocide may become widespread' (Wilkinson, 2000b; 65)

Bosnia, UN 'safe areas' defined in Security Council Resolutions (UN, 1993b, UN, 1993a) were over-run by belligerent forces. The most prominent being Srebrenica, where Serb Paramilitaries killed up to 8,000 Bosnian civilians in July 1995. While both of these failures were blamed on the UN for showing a lack of 'teeth' in the face of aggression, UN peacekeeping failed in Somalia (the UNOSOM II mission) largely due to over-aggression. In October 1993, Forces from the United States of America (who were deployed in support of the operation), entered into a fierce fire-fight with armed groups loyal to a local warlord, resulting in the deaths of 18 US soldiers. This led to the withdrawal of the US from Somalia (and resulting in US ambivalence towards UN peacekeeping outlined in Presidential Decision Directive 25), and the withdrawal of the operation in early 1995. It was these failures which largely informed practitioners, academics and defence academies in their reconceptualisation of peacekeeping doctrine.

### ***JWP 3-50 and Beyond: The Third Generation of Peacekeeping***

#### **Operations**

The practice of peacekeeping towards the end of the 1990's had changed radically since the Nobel Peace Prize in 1988. Hammarskjold and Pearson's five principles were now under severe scrutiny, in particular those of consent (in the light of US peacekeepers crossing what came to be known as the 'Mogadishu Line' in Somalia) (Rose, 1999b; 354) and minimal use of force (particularly after lightly armed troops were unable to protect the 'Safe area' of Srebrenica). Furthermore, serious debate took place over whether there was a

'middle ground' between peaceful interventions (under Chapter VI of the UN mandate), and forceful, robust intervention (under Chapter VII).

As a result of these debates and the experiences of those on the ground in peacekeeping operations (Rose, 1999b, Stewart, 1993), a new doctrine was formulated. This was first outlined in the UK doctrine *Joint Warfare Publication 3-50: Peace Support Operations* (JDDC, 1998) (hereafter referred to as JWP 3-50). This doctrine was able to offer one solution to the debates that were taking place over the nature of peacekeeping operations. As a starting point, it ascertained that the term 'Peace Support Operation' (PSO) covered all peace-related operations, including conflict prevention, peace making, peacebuilding, and humanitarian operations.

Peace support operations were designed to be robust from the outset, and have been described as being '[s]ufficiently flexible, robust and combat-capable to deal with a wide range of scenarios, including operating in a non-permissive environment' (Wilkinson, 2000a; 1). Experiences in Bosnia, where the UN was unable to effectively protect civilians, led observers to believe that peacekeeping should be deployed with a robust posture from the outset, with the aim of decreasing the level of force as the mission went on. Former UNPROFOR Force Commander General Sir Michael Rose was once quoted as saying: 'With hindsight it is a tragedy for the people of Bosnia that the NATO and UNPROFOR did not deploy in the reverse sequence!' (Rose, 1999a). Such use of force though would not be used in the way in which traditional military tactics would be used to achieve victory over an opposing army. JWP 3-50

clearly stated that the use of force be used 'to set the conditions for the development of peace in the long term, rather than the means of defeating a designated enemy' (JDDC, 1998; 4-6).

The robust force posture also offers a strong indication of the role of consent in PSOs. In effect, PSO doctrine understands that a force is to be deployed in an area of low consent, a radical step when examined against the Hammarskjold/Pearson model. Instead, PSO doctrine places emphasis on the role of impartiality in the early stages of a PSO:

The impartial nature of a PSO, and in their reference to and international mandate and International Humanitarian Law (IHL), rather than directly to national interests, makes them distinct. PSO are neither in support of, nor against a particular party, but they are designed to restore peace and ensure compliance with the mandate in an even-handed manner.

(JDDC, 1998; 3-1)

However, the use of force in an impartial manner is not the main goal of PSO doctrine, which is to gain consent of the local population for the peacekeeping operation. A 'carrot and stick' approach was adopted, where the 'stick' represented the use of force to punish those who 'spoiled' the peace process (through the use of force) and the 'carrot' represented consent-promoting incentives to the local population to follow a peace process. Here, JWP 3-50 drew heavily from non-traditional military skills, in particular the conflict resolution field. Skills such as negotiation, mediation, civil affairs and

confidence building measures with the local population were highlighted as positive steps for an operation to be successful.

The need to work alongside civilian groups also led PSO doctrine to seek to understand the wider complexities of peacebuilding. JWP 3-50 recognised that the military function of a PSO is not its only asset, and a large number of NGOs, civilian groups and political actors all feature heavily in a peace process. Thus the defined end goal of peace support operations is to hand over the operation to a civilian-led peacebuilding operation once the security is guaranteed. Here JWP 3-50 identified the multifunctional aspect of the operation and the need for the PSO forces to work effectively alongside these civilian agencies. This would require increased sensitivity to civil-military relations and the incorporation of training programmes to enhance soldier's awareness of the issues involved.

JWP 3-50 has had a significant impact on how peacekeeping is conceptualised. An increasing number of military organisations have taken PSO doctrine on board, including national militaries and regional organisations such as NATO. It is now believed that PSO has 'consequently become the doctrinal basis for the launching of many modern peacekeeping operations' (Ramsbotham et al., 2005; 143). At the centre of this is the coupling of robust military actions (the stick) and soft-end skills more often seen in the conflict resolution literature (the carrot). Crucially, for the military to effectively adapt to such changes the role of training must evolve, particularly with regards to an increased incorporation of conflict resolution skills.

The United Nations Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) was the first operation to be characterised by a PSO-style robust force being employed to create a secure area for a civilian-led peacekeeping and peacebuilding operation. Therefore it is worth investigating in order to understand where peacekeeping deployments have found themselves in this current context. Following the UN's focus on human security, the UNAMSIL mandate specifically covered the protection of civilians - UN Resolution 1270, which created the operation stated:

14. Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, decides that in the discharge of its mandate UNAMSIL may take the necessary action to ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel and, within its capabilities and areas of deployment, to afford protection to civilians under imminent threat of physical violence.

(UN, 1999g)

Although the operations mandate was strongly worded, the operation looked like it could fail in its initial stages. A weak peace agreement, coupled with non-compliance by parties (in particular, the Revolutionary United Front, hereafter RUF), led to continued human rights abuses and ceasefire violations. Although the mandate emphasised the use of force under Chapter VII, UNAMSIL, as a fighting force, had severe difficulties in enforcing the peace agreement. Problems arose through disagreements from Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) on what level of force to use, with many of the TCCs not subscribing to PSO doctrine (Ramsbotham et al., 2005; 152) (CDS, 2003). It was not long

before rebel groups took advantage of this lack of agreement. This culminated in the kidnapping of 500 UNAMSIL peacekeepers.

It was at this stage the United Kingdom (UK) decided to become involved, sending a robust, unilateral combat capable force to evacuate UK citizens (CDS, 2003; 73). Although the force was not within the UN's chain of command, it assisted UNAMSIL in securing the capital, Freetown. The force secured the airport for the UN forces, and used robust force against rebel militias to release UK soldiers taken hostage in August 2000. Furthermore, the UK force created a secure zone in and around Freetown, which gave the UNAMSIL operation a stable area to deploy and expand from. Through this action, the UK forces were able to conduct 'operations across the complete spectrum of PSO and partial enforcement operations' (Wilkinson, 2000a), and it was able to evolve from an evacuation force, to stabilisation force, to combat search and rescue force, to a training body for the national Armed forces (CDS, 2003; 77).

The establishment of the United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL) under UN Security Council Resolution 1620 (UN, 2005f) is seen as a marker of success for the proponents of PSO doctrine. What began as a peacekeeping force under a Chapter VII mandate was able to hand over to a civilian-led peacebuilding operation. However, this has not been without difficulties. The force was underprepared from the outset, and suffered the embarrassment of having five hundred troops taken hostage. Furthermore, the operation opened new debates over the division of labour in PSO operations where individual nations and 'coalitions of the willing' to carry out the robust

tasks and UN forces carry out the 'softer tasks' of peacebuilding. Significantly, the UNAMSIL/UNIOSIL operations demonstrate a commitment to linking the processes of peacekeeping operations (led by the military) with peacebuilding operations (led by civilian groups). This certainly encourages considerable awareness of civil/military relations in peacekeeping operations, and highlights the importance of non-traditional skills in the military.

The UNAMSIL operation is not the only UN mission to be created since the evolution of PSO doctrine. Operations in Liberia<sup>10</sup>, Cote d'Ivoire<sup>11</sup>, Haiti<sup>12</sup>, Burundi<sup>13</sup>, the South of Sudan<sup>14</sup> and Darfur<sup>15</sup>, as well as Timor Leste<sup>16</sup>, have all been deployed since 2000 and carry features of PSO doctrine. Furthermore, the MONUC operation in the DRC has relied heavily on its robust stance, with mandates relating strongly to the protection of civilians and protecting human rights (Månsson, 2005; 504). Although this operation is drawing down (and is now known as MONUSCO), it is seen as another example of the robust end of peacekeeping.

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<sup>10</sup> United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL)

<sup>11</sup> United Nations Operation in Cote d'Ivoire (UNOCI)

<sup>12</sup> United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)

<sup>13</sup> United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUC)

<sup>14</sup> United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS)

<sup>15</sup> African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID)

<sup>16</sup> International Force East Timor/United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (INTERFET/UNMIT)

## **Chapter 1.**

### **The Academic Community**

As the introductory chapter outlined, this research project aims to understand the role conflict resolution plays in the training for military peacekeepers, and the ways the training of military peacekeepers represents a further manifestation of the links between the two fields. In order to gain a solid conceptual base, this chapter examines where academic texts have noted the need for training in peacekeeping operations, the reasons, and also whether the needs are matched. What is drawn from such a survey is the first step towards a multi-levelled synthesis in order to locate where the call for increased conflict resolution training for peacekeepers is coming from, which is complemented by a survey of the 'policy literature' in United Nations (UN) documentation and practice, and practitioner and academic understandings of civil-military cooperation.

The chapter offers an important contribution to the literature by exploring the contribution of the Department of Peace Studies to debates in the field, in particular, academics and PhD students within the department's Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR). This frames this particular research project within the research 'culture' of the CCR. Finally, the chapter touches on critical approaches to the study of peacekeeping and one particular response to these approaches: cosmopolitan peacekeeping. This growing field has come from work from Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, who link it to conflict resolution

approaches, as well as research from outside the CCR by Cheeseman and Elliot, on the changing nature of militaries to fit into a cosmopolitan framework. From this, the research also locates itself within this growing literature on cosmopolitan forms of peacekeeping.

### **A Sceptical Standpoint**

To start, it is worth taking a more critical view of envisaging the military as peacekeepers. Gordenker and Weiss' 1991 study of peacekeepers in disaster zones offers a useful critique of the military being a tool for humanitarian assistance. In particular, the authors argue that 'in the best of all worlds, use of the military should probably be avoided in disasters', as militaries:

- 1) Care little about undermining local cultures and values;
- 2) Do not make maximum use of available local infrastructures for managing and distributing aid;
- 3) Increase dependence from the local population on external sources of assistance;
- 4) Do not Harmonize with local development efforts;
- 5) Do not Contribute to the resolution of conflicts.

(Gordenker and Weiss, 1991; 10)

This is a particularly negative assessment of what the military bring (or fail to bring) to a disaster zone. Interestingly, points 2, 3 and 4 link with many current debates on the impact of peacekeepers on local populations. More importantly for the purpose of this study, is the observation that military peacekeepers are

likely to undermine local cultures and values (1), and have little or no ability to contribute to the resolution of conflict (5). Written in 1991, it could be argued that this view is somewhat dated in a Cold War framework where peacekeeping and conflict resolution was not high on the agenda of many national militaries. However, it does offer a starting point for this chapter.

Moskos' study of military peacekeepers in the UN force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) is also sceptical. However, unlike the authors above, Moskos believes that the military possess sufficient training to intervene as third party peacekeepers (indeed, Gordenker and Weiss could actually look towards these arguments as justification of their scepticism about military involvement). Moskos' research leads him to the conclusion that the level of training that military contingents receive makes little difference to their performance as peacekeepers, and notes that for the UNFICYP operation, each different nationality received a different level of training, from the most in depth (such as Canada and Sweden), to virtually no training at all (such as the United Kingdom). However, this training had a minimal impact when compared with the learning process of the troops once deployed. Moskos adds:

It is important to stress the generalization that the constabulary ethic was primarily engendered by on-duty, in-the-field peacekeeping experiences. This is also to say that informal learning arising out of the field situation was a more determining factor in forging the constabulary ethic than was peacekeeping training prior to arrival in Cyprus.

(Moskos Jnr, 1976; 96-97)

If anything, Moskos argues, the formulation of pre-deployment training for peacekeeping operations may 'retard' the emergence of a constabulary ethic amongst soldiers. Moskos contends that such training could lead to peacekeepers operating under false expectations of how they are accepted by the local population, or will lead troops to 'believe the peacekeeping force will be fully efficacious in realizing permanent solutions' (Moskos Jnr, 1976; 134). This is indeed a strong criticism of notions of training for peacekeeping operations. Possibly this view can be understood in the context in which it was written: the UNFICYP case study was (and still is) a traditional operation, and many of the tasks bestowed upon peacekeepers were in fact to keep belligerents apart along a designated ceasefire line. However, the 'constabulary ethic' that Moskos speaks about is still very much apparent in peacekeeping operations, so this argument must not be thrown away as a 'dated logic'. As this thesis shows though, writings from Fetherston and Galtung offer substantial critique of the argument that specialised training is not a necessity for peacekeeping.

### **Existing Studies in the Field**

Galtung's study of Norwegian peacekeeping troops stationed in Lebanon and the Congo offers a counter-balance to the argument put forward by Moskos, as well as offering an early attempt to link the fields of peacekeeping and conflict resolution. In the study, Galtung asked soldiers their opinions on 'how UN forces should be better able to carry out their job?' In response, troops asked not for 'better military training', but for 'better police training'. Moreover (and

linking to the 'constabulary ethic outlined by Moskos) a number of the soldiers felt that 'participants [soldiers] should be better informed about the conflict', and 'better trained in dealing with people from other countries'. Taking this a step further, Galtung concludes that by mixing the peacekeeping role of a UN soldier, the peacemaking function of a mediator, and the peacebuilding function of a Peace Corps volunteer, deployments will be far more effective at bringing sustainable peace. This highlights a strong bond between the traditional functions of a military peacekeeper in promoting the 'negative peace' and the peacebuilding function of operations, which promote the 'positive peace'. Such issues are still being grappled with in present deployments, in particular through civil military coordination within the peacekeeping force, to wider UN developments such as the Peacebuilding Commission and subsidiary bodies which have attempted to institutionalise peacebuilding as a component of peacekeeping operations (Galtung, 1976a; 278-9).

Galtung's study also reveals that although soldiers felt that they needed the skills outlined above to facilitate closer relations with the local population, they found that better arms and equipment were just as critical in bringing about success in a peacekeeping operation. Thus Galtung reasons that soldiers felt that their military role was 'inadequate' for the closeness needed with the population in low temperature situations (where this closeness would be needed to really understand the social and human conditions of the deployment area), and their level of arms was inadequate for situations when there was a high likelihood of combat: peacekeepers were sat uncomfortably in the middle. This logic leads Galtung to believe that the peacekeeping troops were in fact

not asking to be 'disarmed military forces', but 'armed police forces'. He observes that:

On the one hand there is a relatively clear minimum role definition in terms of guard and observation duty, keeping the parties apart with a very modest display of arms, showing behaviour rather than attitude. On the other hand there is another type of role: being involved, being apart and party to the entire conflict system, showing attitude as well as behaviour, but trying to mediate and trying to help build a new social structure encompassing the antagonists. The former role is possible but not very effective, the second is very effective but not possible.

(Galtung, 1976a; 278)

However, it is worth noting that like the two studies previous to Galtung's, this study was within the traditional peacekeeping Cold War context. Although it does note some early signs of the role of conflict resolution in peacekeeping operations, this was set within the traditional peacekeeping context.

Like Galtung, Thakur observes the similarities between peacekeeping and armed police roles. Thakur (writing in 1988) notes that peacekeepers have no military objectives, are barred from active combat, are located between rather than in opposition to hostile elements, and they negotiate rather than fight. However, this is acknowledged by a small number of UN member states, and the special preparation and training required for such deployments is not adequately provided (Thakur, 1988; 184-5). What is worthy of attention is the

emphasis placed on peacekeeping as a 'constabulary' role. This 'policing' value that is attached to peacekeeping is a critical debate to examine when looking at perceptions of peacekeepers and the role they carry out.

Diehl, Druckman and Wall's analysis of peacekeeping operations offers a more quantitative approach to understanding the differing roles of peacekeepers (Diehl et al., 1998). Reflecting on the peacekeeping experiences of the 1990's, the authors found that in addition to conflict control mechanisms, peacekeeping had been extended to take account of peacebuilding and peacemaking. This had in turn led to an increased emphasis on mediation, facilitation, consultation, conciliation, and communication: important parts in the 'modern peacekeepers toolbox'(Diehl et al., 1998; 36). They then went on to scale, through a framework derived from the conflict resolution literature<sup>17</sup>, the interrelationships between different peacekeeping functions, and found that the development of this 'toolbox' has serious implications on training. After outlining the relationships between a number of different aspects of peacekeeping, the authors note that each peacekeeping operation<sup>18</sup>, has a 'mix and match' of different skills. For example, some operations will have a higher emphasis on observation and monitoring, others would have increased emphasis on the restoration of civil institutions. The majority of skills that are inherent in these operations are non-traditional skills, and the minority of the overall skills needed are drawn from military and combat fields. This therefore has an influence on

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<sup>17</sup> More specifically, by emphasizing two dimensions: 1) what roles do managers assume in the conflict and; 2) what is their bargaining orientation

<sup>18</sup> The 12 Types outlined were: Traditional Peacekeeping; Observation; Collective enforcement; election supervision; humanitarian assistance during conflict; state/nation building; pacification; preventative deployment; arms control verification; protective services; intervention in support of democracy.

how training is conceptualised and carried out. However, in a significant finding, Diehl, Druckman and Wall found that this expanded toolbox was not being reflected in the programmes that train peacekeepers. Through an examination of the practices of 79 peacekeeping training programmes, the authors found that only 13% of the training activities involved non-traditional skills (Diehl et al., 1998; 51-2). This is important as it shows the first real attempt to chart the wide range of training programmes. Crucially, it also shows the low priority given to non-traditional skills at the end of the era of second generation peacekeeping: a period where military personnel were required to use this expanded toolbox more than ever before.

Wall and Druckman expanded on this in 2003, through their examination of the importance of mediation in peacekeeping operations. They did this through an analysis of factors influencing and constraining peacekeepers in mediation scenarios with groups in conflict zones. The authors interviewed seven U.S. civil affairs officers and Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs) who had recently returned from peacekeeping duty in Bosnia and twenty-seven Canadian officers who had completed peacekeeping duties in Bosnia or other UN operations, asking the interviewees to recount a situation where they had to mediate a dispute. The statistics show that a high number of peacekeepers enter mediation situations. In the first round of interviews (34 peacekeepers), 100% reported mediations; the second round (16 peacekeepers) 63%; and the third round of interviews (79 peacekeepers), 55% reported having a mediation experience (Wall and Druckman, 2003; 703). Each account was logged and put into a table (outlined in Box 1.1 below). From this, the authors found 28 different

reactions to mediating the dispute. Only in three of these cases did the reaction involve the threat of force or the preparation to use force (cases entitled 'threaten', 'set security', and 'force') (Wall and Druckman, 2003; 693-705).

**Box 1.1: Peacekeepers Mediation techniques (taken from Wall and Druckman's analysis on Mediation in Peacekeeping Missions)**  
(Wall and Druckman, 2003; 695)

<b>Meet separately:</b>	Peacekeeper meets with disputant separately.
<b>Listen to disputant's side:</b>	Peacekeeper has disputants state their points.
<b>Argue for concessions:</b>	Peacekeeper argues for or proposes a specific concession or agreement point or negotiates a compromise.
<b>Gather information:</b>	Peacekeeper collects or asks for information from the disputants or others and does research to obtain information.
<b>Educate/advise:</b>	Peacekeeper educates, persuades, or advises on disputant as to how he or she should think or act.
<b>Have third party assist:</b>	Peacekeeper offers or gets third party's assistance for the disputants or the peacekeeper and also gathers information or advice from the third party.
<b>State other's point of view:</b>	Peacekeeper presents or argues other disputant's point of view and asks a disputant to see the other disputant's point of view.
<b>Meet together with disputants:</b>	Peacekeeper meets together with disputants or puts them together.
<b>Apologize:</b>	Peacekeeper has one disputant apologize or acknowledge his or her faults.
<b>Peacekeeper assists:</b>	Peacekeeper personally offers or gives assistance and takes a specific action.
<b>Relax:</b>	Peacekeeper makes specific statements to calm the disputants.
<b>Break time:</b>	Peacekeeper stops the quarreling and has disputant rest.
<b>Peacekeeper's data:</b>	Peacekeeper provides objective data about the dispute or the environment.
<b>Threaten:</b>	Any threat from the peacekeeper
<b>Criticize:</b>	Peacekeeper criticizes a disputant's person, attitude, and behavior or uses a specific label (e.g., "You are rude.").
<b>Call for empathy:</b>	Peacekeeper enhances the other disputant or calls for respect of the other; peacekeeper puts a positive face on the other disputant, noting he or she is a good person.
<b>Cite dependency:</b>	Peacekeeper expresses similarities or interdependence in disputants' goals, fates, and needs (includes mentioning personal costs of disagreement and benefits of agreement).
<b>Have drink with disputants:</b>	Peacekeeper has a drink with the disputants prior to agreement.
<b>Analyze the disputants:</b>	Peacekeeper analyzes disputants and grasps each disputant's characteristics.
<b>Example:</b>	Peacekeeper cites example or similar case.
<b>Praise disputants:</b>	Peacekeeper praises the disputant who is being addressed.
<b>Quote law or rule:</b>	Peacekeeper quotes a specific law or rule that is relevant to the dispute.
<b>Written agreement:</b>	Peacekeeper has disputants sign a quasi-legal written agreement governing their future behavior.
<b>Separate disputants:</b>	Peacekeeper separates the disputants.
<b>Call higher authority:</b>	Peacekeeper communicates with his headquarters to report information or ask for advice.
<b>Set security:</b>	The peacekeeper takes steps to establish security for himself or his troops.
<b>Force:</b>	The peacekeeper uses coercive force in some manner.
<b>Monitor:</b>	Peacekeeper observes the disputants, their interaction, or factors in the Environment.

The vast majority of responses focus on non-traditional skills, and a first glance of these techniques would highlight a number of conflict resolution techniques,

including conflict analysis (through the technique of 'analyze the disputants'), negotiation ('Meet together with disputants'), active listening ('listen to the disputant's side'), and conflict de-escalation ('relax', 'break time', 'have drink with the disputants'). This framework therefore offers a clear outline of how conflict resolution skills are utilised in an operational environment. This is of crucial importance. Wall and Druckman's analysis does however find that not all of the techniques on this list are compatible with operating orders given to peacekeepers, and many were an *ad hoc* reaction to specific circumstances. Out of the original 28 techniques, 14 remained after an examination of the operating orders for the particular missions<sup>19</sup>.

The authors then studied influencing factors on such mediation efforts. In particular, they found three factors which would affect mediation processes. They are: dispute severity; time pressure and; peacekeepers rank. The analysis of these three factors resulted in the following hypotheses. These – and whether the evidence collated by Wall and Druckman support or reject them - are outlined in Box 1.2

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<sup>19</sup> The cut down list is: separate disputants, meet separately, meet together with disputants, listen to a disputant's side, gather information, have third-party assist, relax, have a break, threaten, quote law or rule, call higher authority, force, monitor, and set security.

**Box 1.2: Wall and Druckman's Seven Hypothesis on Peacekeeping and whether they are supported by the empirical evidence**

(Wall and Druckman, 2003)

**Hypothesis 1:** Peacekeepers will use more mediation techniques (i.e., a more complex and costly approach) in severe disputes than in nonsevere ones. SUPPORTED

**Hypothesis 2:** Peacekeepers, on average, will use more of these techniques in severe (compared to nonsevere) disputes. SUPPORTED

**Hypothesis 3:** Peacekeepers will more frequently use the set security techniques (bringing the security of their troops in line with current conditions) in severe (vs. nonsevere) disputes SUPPORTED

**Hypothesis 4:** The "monitor" technique will be used more frequently in disputes that are not severe (vs. severe). SUPPORTED

**Hypothesis 5:** The effects for the severe (vs. nonsevere) disputes will be greater when there is no time pressure (vs. when there is time pressure). REJECTED

**Hypothesis 6:** Officers will report mediating more disputes while on peacekeeping duty than will NCOs. SUPPORTED

**Hypothesis 7:** It is expected that the officers will use more of the techniques permitted by orders than will the NCOs. SUPPORTED

What the above findings show is that peacekeepers will be more likely to resort to a wider amount of mediation techniques in severe disputes, including those which are more costly and complex. This indicates a gamble by peacekeepers in such situations. Furthermore, this is backed up with a possible increase in security for the peacekeeping troops. This indicates a link to the doctrinal developments which outline the use of consent promoting measures backed up by robust force.

Furthermore, it is apparent from the findings that officers are more likely to decide to mediate and use a wide range of mediation skills on deployments than the NCOs beneath them. This indicates a critical link in peacekeeping operations, where the officer is placed. Much thought has gone into this from

defence academies, with terms such as the 'soldier diplomat' (Goodwin, 2005), and 'the strategic corporal' (Byrne, 2007), being two such examples. Diehl also notes on this critical link. Writing in 2008, Diehl outlines his concern that the micro-level disputes caused by a lack of training has real effects on the overall mission. He argues that:

The lack of appropriate negotiation skills at a roadblock inspection of vehicles could damage relations and cooperation with the local population; it might also undermine trust in the operation by other conflict actors who rely on peacekeepers to detect weapons smuggling.

(Diehl, 2008; 165)

This role of the 'soldier diplomat' in such an operational environment is discussed at greater length in Chapter six.

Diehl's recent addition to the literature outlines military training for peacekeeping operations as one of ten challenges that face peacekeeping in the twenty-first century. Here, he notes how the expansion of peacekeeping operations has created missions more akin to peacebuilding, meaning that the skills needed for traditional operations need to be developed. While traditional military training might be sufficient for some operations, Diehl argues that other missions 'depend for their effectiveness on a complex set of what has been referred to as "contact" (more diplomatic) skills' (Diehl, 2008; 164). Operations which attempt to work through the whole cycle of peacekeeping-peacebuilding require a

much broader range of skills, including interpersonal and intergroup relations, communications, negotiation, and, in the case of military operations, a mix of combat and political skills.

(Diehl, 2008; 164)

From this analysis, Diehl draws two critical questions. The first is whether soldiers are actually being trained in these contact skills. Although noting that militaries have developed training for peacekeeping over the past decade, Diehl argues here that there is a 'significant gap' between training and practice in peacekeeping operations. This is a key observation, as Diehl (in his 1998 paper) had already assessed training programmes. This provides him with a historical anchor on which to make these claims. Secondly, he asks whether the different types of training received by military personnel on peacekeeping are compatible, and whether soldiers can shift techniques and orientations, as missions evolve. In particular, Diehl asks what impact the development in these skills has on the traditional war fighting skills of military personnel. This question is also of crucial importance, as it asks to what extent soldiers can be peacekeepers. This is discussed at greater length in Chapter six (Diehl, 2008; 164).

Leeds's study into culture, conflict resolution and peacekeeping finds that the role of the peacekeeper requires a considerable amount of training into different skills in peacekeeping operations. Noting the variety of tasks that are involved in current peacekeeping operations, including civil administration, monitoring

elections and human rights enforcement, Leeds finds that peacekeepers need to be equipped with particular skills drawn out of the conflict resolution field. In particular, these activities 'require cultural sensitivity and self awareness, and also basic communication, negotiation and mediation skills'. Once again, this places a considerable emphasis on the role of conflict resolution training for peacekeeping operations (Leeds, 2001; 92).

The work of Stephen Ryan in formulating serious links between peacekeeping and conflict resolution is key to understanding the role that conflict resolution has in peacekeeping training. In 1998, Ryan argued that the division between conflict management and conflict resolution must be rejected, and more thought be put towards creating comprehensive peace strategies (Ryan, 1998). In 2000, he takes this a stage further through outlining the difficulties of separating peacekeeping and peacebuilding due to the development of second-generation peacekeeping operations assuming many of the tasks of peacebuilding under the guise of military-led peacekeeping. Furthermore, Ryan notes how military peacekeeping may be essential in the early stages of the peacebuilding enterprise. Though he mainly restricts this to the provision of security for returning refugees, humanitarian relief, civilian projects, and election monitors, there is a recognised need for the military to work closely with non-military components. This importance, Ryan asserts, shows peacekeepers 'acting less like a conflict manager and more like a midwife at the birth of a new society' (Ryan, 2000; 40).

Williams' 1998 study of peacekeeping and civil military relations reflects on the nature of post-1990 deployments, and states that military training must be specifically geared to 'peacekeeping's demands', adding that appropriate military training and education is 'essential' if peacekeeping deployments are to be effective. In particular, Williams draws attention to the need to emphasise the 'softer aspects of military science', such as managing resources, civilian control and human rights and that peacekeeping units should be trained in humanitarian reporting and assessment, mediation and conflict resolution techniques (Williams, 1998; 72). Williams also finds that lessons from Bosnia and Somalia have taught the valuable lesson that peacekeepers need to be better prepared for the cultural challenges faced in deployment areas. This can be rectified to some extent through peacekeepers being made aware of cultural norms of behaviour. Underlying this, Williams argued, was the 'importance of collaboration with civilians, both within missions and on their fringes' (Williams, 1998; 73). The issues raised in Williams' and Ryan's research are key to the thesis as both authors provide valuable analysis of the complex nature of peacebuilding tasks in post conflict environments, and the effects that this has on military peacekeepers. As stated, this thesis examines the role of conflict resolution in training for military peacekeepers. The intricate nature of peacebuilding requires military peacekeepers to possess number of skills drawn from the conflict resolution field. In turn, training programmes have developed to meet such demands. This is most clearly seen in Chapters 3 and 4, which analyse civil-military cooperation theory and practice.

Tillett's analysis of training practiced in the Australian Defence forces offers an example of the practical application of conflict resolution theory, in training for military peacekeepers. He argues that there needs to be a serious re-evaluation of training for UN operations, stating that for those preparing to undertake peacekeeping operations 'training in conflict resolution is essential' (Tillett, 1996; 10). Informing this, Tillett argues, is the number of challenges which military peacekeeping personnel face. These include a lack of power to coerce, no way of easily identifying the status or power of the person with whom they are dealing, a limit to the amount of communication with the local population, and that they are 'subject to instructions which require them to act in a policing rather than a military role' (Tillett, 1996; 3). Furthermore, he notes the considerable challenges that being deployed on a peacekeeping operation can pose to a soldier trained in traditional skills, and what is required in the soldiers' toolbox in order to meet such challenges. Tillett explains:

...[peacekeeping] involves the psychological change from an adversary to a pacific role; from confrontation to third party imposition. In peacekeeping there is no enemy: the object is to avoid hostilities, to improve communication between the parties, and to advance the process of reconciliation. This necessitates a full understanding of the causes of the conflict—political, military and economic—as well as the social and cultural environment.

(Tillett, 1996; 3)

Tillett outlines the training process that Australian forces undertook to incorporate conflict resolution processes in order to prepare them for deployment. The training consisted of three components: 1) An introduction to conflict and conflict resolution; 2) the concept of analytical problem solving; 3) the application of the concept. In particular, Tillett focussed on incorporating Burton's *Problem Solving* approach to the training. This was done through participants being asked to develop an inventory of potential conflict areas within the experience of peacekeeping operations, and then to identify and explore options for eliminating, minimising, or surviving each incident of conflict. This involved identifying appropriate resources, personal and interpersonal skills and support mechanisms. Tillett adds that this process was not just an exercise in developing a list of potential problems and their solutions: it gave 'the participants practical experiences in an analytical and (to use Burton's term) preventive approach to conflict resolution' (Tillett, 1996; 6).

Goodwin also works extensively on training the military in non-traditional skills. In particular, her work specialises on negotiation skills for soldiers in the British military, whom she trains at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst. Much of this has informed her work, especially on the emergence of the 'Soldier Diplomat'. This important body of work forms a central pillar of Chapter 5, which deals with the training of negotiation skills to military peacekeepers. Goodwin underlines differences between the tasks of peacekeeping and war fighting, stating that emphasis is on 'talking, liaising and negotiating one's way out of a difficult situation', as well as 'building working relationships within an operational area'(Goodwin, 2005; 129), which indicates the need for 'contact skills' to look

for non-violent solutions to conflict (negotiating out of a difficult situation) as well as for relationship building with civilian actors and NGOs in a deployment zone. Moreover, Goodwin finds that peacekeeping duties demands that soldiers have to modify pre-existing knowledge of conventional warfare. This means that soldiers can either adapt the knowledge, or 'learn new, related skills'. This links to the argument put forward by Diehl *et al* for an expansion of the peacekeepers 'toolbox', to incorporate a greater breadth of skills.

To a small extent Goodwin agrees with Moskos, by contending that pre-deployment training has its limitations when compared with actual deployment on the ground. However, she is clear in stating that there is an important role in training soldiers for peacekeeping purposes, in particular negotiation skills, arguing that good negotiation training 'increases one's ability to understand and handle human conflict and its resolution' (Goodwin, 2005; 138). Goodwin goes on to say that:

Any pre-deployment training ought to replicate, as explicitly as possible, the mutability of the peacekeeping role and the emphasis on negotiating skills, tempered with military knowledge.

(Goodwin, 2005; 137)

Goodwin is concerned that 'speedy' briefings in a deployment zone (with little preceding deployment) may result in soldiers entering a country with a limited knowledge of the culture, customs and even the political situation. Furthermore, a reliance on such briefings leaves soldiers with little or no practice in what she

terms as 'essential peacekeeping skills', such as negotiation (Goodwin, 2005; 136).

### ***Work in the Department of Peace Studies***

This section deals with research from the Centre for Conflict Resolution and Department of Peace Studies, but it is worth firstly to locate this research within debates in the wider peacekeeping literature. Within the field of peacekeeping research, critics find shortcomings due to research being too occupied with particular needs and operations. Paris argues that the literature on peace operations is 'too limited in the scope of its enquiry and devotes too much attention to "policy relevance"' (Paris, 2000; 27), and that there is a serious lack of engagement with the central theoretical debates of International Relations. Furthermore, Whitworth's analysis contends that peacekeeping research throughout the 1990's focussed on short-term operational responses, and as a result has overlooked 'larger critical questions that could be posed'(Whitworth, 2004; 24). What studies have failed to achieve, Bellamy argues, is to 'place the evolving practices and conceptions of peace operations within a global concept' (Bellamy, 2004; 18). Much of this is based on critiques of the 'problem solving' approach which has characterised the majority of peacekeeping research. According to such critiques, the problem solving approach - which has been successful at identifying problems, proposing strategies and ways forward for decision makers - ultimately fails to address key issues such as the 'extent to which dominant peacekeeping or peacemaking practices... actually help reproduce the social structures that cause violent conflict in the first place' (Bellamy, 2004; 19).

However, one can see that these micro-level debates can be aligned with larger scale understandings of the role of peacekeeping. Before looking at how this is done in the Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, it is worth returning to Galtung. His research considered that a basic dilemma for peacekeeping is distinguishing between, and reacting to, different *types* of violent conflict. Peacekeeping, for example, can work effectively to deal with *horizontal conflicts*, which he defines as conflict between 'equals with no element of dominance' (i.e. between two states). However in conflicts where both parties are not equal (i.e. a conflict between the centre and periphery within a state), peacekeeping runs the danger of preserving a *status quo* as a result of intervening. Galtung argues that the peacekeeping force is actually taking a side in the conflict through the preservation of the *status quo* (Galtung, 1976c; 284).

Looking at international peacekeeping, Galtung notes how peacekeeping, at least during the Cold War, is an activity for the *periphery* (areas outside of the influence of the major powers). Galtung sees that this needs to be addressed either through bringing peacekeeping to the *centre* (the great powers,) or by excluding the *centre* from peacekeeping in *periphery* areas. Interestingly Galtung notes that doctrines of non-intervention in the affairs of a state must be rejected. Through rejecting these doctrines, Galtung argues that peacekeeping operations would 'unequivocally... break through these artificial walls called regions and states mankind has built around itself' (Galtung, 1976c; 286). From this, Galtung examined three ways which peacekeeping is conceptualised in the

context of how it should react to *vertical conflict* (conflict between a strong centre and weaker periphery):

1. the *formalistic stand* (third party intervention which will handle any war in the same way);
2. the *let-it-work-itself-out stand* (with no third party intervention);
3. the *use-peacekeeping-on-the-side-of-peace stand* (where third party intervention seeks to remove both direct *and* structural violence).

Galtung rejects the first two approaches outright, and chooses to explore the third strand. Although he outlines problems in it, Galtung argues in favour of the *use-peacekeeping-on-the-side-of-peace* approach. He states that:

A peacekeeping operation in a vertical conflict should be more like a one-way wall, permitting the freedom fighters out to expand the liberated territory, but preventing the oppressors from getting in.

(Galtung, 1976c; 288)

This certainly takes away the consent-based impartiality of peacekeeping operations, and may lead to peacekeepers taking very obvious sides in a conflict. It is also particularly difficult in determining the nature of a 'freedom fighter'. However, it could well be seen that with peacekeeping mandates pushing for the protection of civilians, that a type of one-way wall is being created; possibly not for the 'freedom fighters' but for the civilian population.

This provides a critical insight. Importantly, Galtung was able to link the negative peace aspects of military peacekeeping to the pursuit of positive peace and removal of structural violence. This was very much incorporating peacekeeping to conflict resolution theory, and places military forms of peacekeeping into a wider project of transformation. It is also cosmopolitan in nature, as it outlines a desire to use peacekeeping to protect alternative sources of power. This thesis revisits Galtung's conceptions later in this chapter when examining cosmopolitan approaches to peacekeeping.

Very much following in this tradition, ongoing work within the Department of Peace Studies link the micro- and macro-level debates -through linking particular 'policy areas' of peacekeeping with wider theoretical debates in the field of conflict resolution - and has cultivated an in-depth research culture into peacekeeping and conflict resolution. Much of this literature provides the conceptual foundations of this particular research project. To start, Fetherston, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse's analysis of the UNPROFOR operation in 1994 offers a solid point of departure<sup>20</sup>. There has been a number of studies into peacekeeping operations in the former Yugoslavia -with some of the more popular pieces written by the peacekeepers themselves (Stewart, 1993, Rose, 1999b). However, this particular analysis posed a number of areas where the field of conflict resolution could contribute to improving the operation<sup>21</sup>, including the need to re-evaluate existing methods of training for peacekeepers. The authors found that military peacekeepers, who are trained for war, are placed in

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<sup>20</sup> The impact of the UNPROFOR operation is revisited in Chapter 5.

<sup>21</sup> The areas were: the nature of conflict; stages and types of conflict intervention; levels of conflict intervention; 'hard' and 'soft' power intervention options at macro- and micro- levels; relations with conflict parties; relations between military and non-military mission components; multinationalism and multiculturalism; the training of peacekeepers.

highly unstable situations where they are unable to resort to the use of military means, and asserted that peacekeepers lacked the necessary skills needed to facilitate what is ultimately a peaceful conflict management role. It is here where Fetherston *et al* argued that conflict resolution could make a serious contribution. They pointed towards the need for *contact skills*, defined as ‘those skills which support activities which support involving direct contact with armies and militias, civilian populations, humanitarian agencies, and other contingents of the peacekeeping force’ (Fetherston et al., 1994; 196). The relevance of *contact skills* for this thesis is outlined below in this chapter. Noting the considerable reorganisation of national training programmes, Fetherston *et al* argued that tried and tested concepts of conflict resolution can greatly inform such programmes. However, it was recognised that there was still some way to go before the specific contact skills required for micro-level peacekeeping activity would be fully incorporated into wider programmes.

The article outlines important contributions that conflict resolution can make in other areas. There are three such areas outlined in this paper which contribute to this particular research project. Firstly, a great deal can be learned from using conflict resolution practices to help understand how peacekeepers relate to the parties to a conflict. This is particularly relevant in the pre-deployment stage, where peacekeepers benefit greatly from understanding the social dynamics of belligerent groups, as well as the dynamics of groups they are sent to protect. Training military peacekeepers to understand this is crucial if they are to provide security and open up avenues for peacebuilding. It also raises the chances that operations will engage with groups who may *not* have had access to power

structures during the conflict. Secondly, the help that conflict resolution can provide in facilitating relations between the military and non-military components of the operation. This aspect of training for peacekeeping operations, (what is now termed CIMIC, or Civil Military Cooperation), is something which this research project focuses on in the Chapters three and four. Finally, in developing an understanding of the multinational and multicultural aspects within peacekeeping deployments, Fetherston *et al* firmly place conflict resolution as a tool which can develop understanding between contingents and nationalities. The importance of this cannot be understated. Peacekeeping is still a global undertaking (more-so than in 1994). For peacekeeping operations to effectively function, there is a requirement for military peacekeepers to understand cross-cultural communication, *within* the operation, as well as towards external actors.


Fetherston's work also provides a solid conceptual base to understand the impact of conflict resolution in training for peacekeeping operations. Firstly, in linking her research to wider debates about the role of peacekeeping in conflict resolution, Fetherston's critique suggests that definitions of peacekeeping are 'inadequate' because they 'have not been placed within a larger framework'. From this, Fetherston attempts to offer a theoretical framework to 'analyze the utility of peacekeeping as a third party intervention and as a tool of conflict management' (Fetherston, 1994b; 139-40). She further argues that:

It is not enough to send a force into the field with a vague notion that they should be impartial and help to facilitate settlement. To act as a third

party in a protracted violent, polarized conflict is an extremely difficult and delicate task. Diplomats, academics and others who have acted in the capacity of a third party are generally well trained, highly experienced individuals with a good base of knowledge about the particular conflict. On the whole, peacekeepers have limited preparation and experience. (Fetherston, 1994b; 140)

Noting that peacekeeping operations represent a form of third party intervention (incorporating both conflict resolution and conflict settlement strategies), and that there exists no framework for understanding when to intervene, (and how interventions can be effective), Fetherston links peacekeeping to Fisher and Keashly's contingency model. Arguing that it 'seems to offer the best possibility for a more effective management of conflict' (Fetherston, 1994b; 123), Fetherston uses this contingency approach as it offers a suitable 'middle ground' between those highly empirical forms of conflict analysis, and the school of thought which argues against any formulated analysis of intervention. The contingency model, as outlined in Fisher and Keashly's 1990 research, is a model devised to match third party intervention to certain characteristics of the conflict. Fisher and Keashly's research outlines four main stages of a conflict: (1) Discussion, (2) Polarization, (3) Segregation, and (4) Destruction. From this, they match third party strategies to each stage. Stage 4 of this (destruction) is where peacekeeping is the strategy of choice, to 'assist in the separation of the parties and the control of violence'. This is the first stage of intervention at the most destructive level, which aims to give space for other forms of third party intervention (Fisher and Keashly, 1991). Fisher follows this up in his 1994

research which espouses the important role of peacebuilding as a bridge between peacekeeping and peacemaking. Fisher's diagram (in Box 1.3) helps to illustrate this



Thus, in order for peacekeeping to be effective in this model, Fisher argues that the sooner that the need 'to control overt violence is followed by other interventions', the better. Fetherston agrees with this assessment in her investigation and advocates that effective coordination must be made between the traditional security aspects and the civilian peacebuilding aspects of the operation. Without this, in Fetherston's view, operations face 'insurmountable

odds' of moving beyond controlling violence and maintaining a *status quo*<sup>22</sup> (Fetherston, 1994b; 150). Within this framework, peacekeeping can be visualised in a two-tiered approach. Firstly one can see the peacekeepers 'working in the area of operation at the micro-level facilitating a more positive atmosphere', and secondly peacekeeping operations 'cooperating and coordinated with peacemaking and peacebuilding efforts at the macro-level' (Fetherston, 1994b; 150). Fetherston suggests that peacekeeping can play a valuable role in the successful resolution of conflicts by creating an environment that is conducive to a further resolution of conflict (much like the important role of pre-negotiation). She finds that:

Co-ordinating peacekeeping at the micro-level at least begins the groundwork of what might be called a 'pre-resolution' or a 'pre-peacebuilding' phase. This has taken the form of coordination of local level resolution processes, either at the initiative of local people or at the initiative of the peacekeepers.

(Fetherston, 1994b; 151-2)

Examples of such local level resolution initiatives were observed in both Namibia and Cyprus, where efforts went beyond 'dealing with one specific problem at one point in time and tried to establish a longer-term process which would deal with future problems', thus linking up the micro- and macro-level of peacekeeping (Fetherston, 1994b; 157).

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<sup>22</sup> This argument is also analysed in Chapter 4 which deals with civil-military cooperation.

Thus, peacekeepers were seen as a critical interface between micro- and macro-approaches to conflict resolution. Fetherston emphasises the importance of 'contact skills' for peacekeepers. In this, there are two types of contact skills – skills in conflict resolution, such as mediation, negotiation, conciliation, and the skills important for effective cross-cultural interaction. Fetherston emphasises the importance of these contact skills for deployed peacekeepers, arguing that the 'essence of peacekeeping as a third party intervention must be contact skills' (Fetherston, 1994b; 219). She adds:

It is through the use of communication skills, methods of negotiation, facilitation, mediation, and conciliation that peacekeepers de-escalate potentially violent or manifestly violent situations and facilitate movement toward conflict resolution. Non-contact skills are functional and differ depending on the specific mandate of the specific mission. It is also the case that contact skills require more time and effort on the part of the trainer and the trainee.

(Fetherston, 1994b; 219)

Fetherston's findings show that there is a lack of training in contact skills for military peacekeepers, and where these skills are covered, it is usually a minimal contribution (so minimal, that Fetherston questions its usefulness). Her findings also support the view that there is great importance in 'providing specific training to effect a shift from a military to a peacekeeping attitude and to learn and practice contact skills'(Fetherston, 1994b; 217). Moreover, Fetherston outlines a contradiction in the justifications for this lack of contact skills training

for peacekeeping operations. She finds that although there is recognition of the third-party role played by peacekeepers, it is widely believed that junior levels already have these skills, thus not justifying the need for specialist training. Much of this is due to a fundamental contradiction in peacekeeping operations, where military peacekeepers keep 'distance' from the conflict parties, yet have to demonstrate 'closeness' in their third party conflict resolution based roles (Fetherston, 1994b; 223). These findings echo Galtung's conclusions (from his study of Norwegian peacekeepers outlined above), which also illustrated the difficult position of peacekeepers in a conflict zone.

Fetherston's work goes on to examine training initiatives for the Canadian Forces, Irish Defence Forces, and regional cooperation between Nordic Countries. Through examining these specific case studies, Fetherston reasons that the training for peacekeeping heavily overlaps training for traditional military roles, leaving the peacekeeper unprepared for his or her role as a third party intervener. More specifically, Fetherston outlines four key problems with the training approaches:

- 1) a lack of standardization;
- 2) a lack of coherence in training and in the development of training programmes;
- 3) a lack of evidence and research supporting training goals based on training needs; and

4) a lack of clear objectives and methodology which directly reflect a wider approach to the peaceful resolution of conflict and which are then related directly to peacekeeping activities.

(Fetherston, 1994b; 203-208)

This work is supplemented by Fetherston's 1994 article *Putting the peace back into peacekeeping* (Fetherston, 1994a). In it, Fetherston outlines the importance of training for peacekeepers. She argues that a lack of training for peacekeepers means that the task that peacekeepers undertake in representing the international community's message of 'non-violent consensual conflict management', becomes increasingly difficult. Fetherston finds a number of problems exist in training arrangements. Mainly, the findings point to generally poor training for deployment to new missions, for officers for specific UN Military Observer (UNMO), and UN Staff Officer (UNSO) positions, and that training for peacekeeping outside the top-seven contributors is 'generally poor or non-existent'. Finally, Fetherston finds that there is little standardisation of training or empirical research to confirm the effectiveness of training and how it relates to activities in the field. In a 1998 article, she warns that without basic work in thinking about what peacekeepers do and why they do it 'training will continue to be inconsistent and inappropriate'. She added '[i]f we only prepare people for war it is far more likely that is what we will get' (Fetherston, 1998; 178). Fetherston's work is of key importance when framing this particular project. Her work establishes an important link between the micro-level issues such as military negotiation, civil-military cooperation, and 'pre-peacebuilding', with wider debates about the role and function of peacekeeping operations.

furthermore, through outlining contact skills, Fetherston defined a set of non-traditional techniques that are critical into the effective functioning of a peacekeeping operation. Throughout this thesis there will be referral to Fetherston's *contact skills*. Finally, like Diehl, Fetherston provided a substantial analysis of arrangements of the provision of training for military peacekeepers. This thesis provides an updated analysis, and asks where developments exist in training provision.

Duffey provides an important analysis of the difficulties of training for peacekeepers, particularly in the light of the changing nature of peacekeeping mandates at the beginning of the 1990's. Because of such changes, Duffey, like Fetherston, advocates the incorporation of *contact skills* into military training for peacekeeping operations (Duffey, 1998; 106). Her thesis argues that military peacekeepers preparing for Cold War operations received virtually no specialised peacekeeping training in 'mediation, negotiation and other conflict resolution skills'. Because of this, they would often find themselves in 'dangerous and stressful situations unprepared to effectively handle them' (Duffey, 1998; 129).

Of importance to this thesis, one of the conclusions of Duffey's analysis is that cultural training is an essential element in peacekeeping training. This training should have two components. Firstly is *culture-general training*, which focuses on basic understandings of culture (including how culture influences one's own assumptions, values, actions and reactions, including intercultural communication skills, and developing an awareness of other organisational

cultures). Secondly is *culture specific training*, which would concentrate developing an understanding of the specific culture in which the intervention will take place (i.e. the host culture, origins of the parties to the conflict, history, local customs, language and religion, and the 'indigenous conceptions of conflict and traditional methods of responding to conflict') (Duffey, 1998; 270). Duffey finds that this second step requires further research and evaluation of how feasible it is to incorporate pre-deployment cultural training for military peacekeepers. Overarching this, Duffey finds is the need for all involved in peacekeeping (including the military, civilian agencies and conflict resolution scholars) to carefully consider the 'culturally appropriate ways of re-evaluating and reforming peacekeeping' (Duffey, 1998; 271).

Duffey's work on culture and peacekeeping provides one of the contributions to Ramsbotham and Woodhouse's 2001 publication *Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution*. The publication is an important contribution of conflict resolution in the peacekeeping field, as it offered the viewpoints of both academics, who applied conflict resolution theory to peacekeeping practices, and 'experienced military peacekeepers seeking to enrich peacekeeping by uses of conflict theory' (Woodhouse and Ramsbotham, 2000; 6). David Last's contribution to this collection asserted that there is a 'peacebuilding capability gap' in the international community's response to conflict between stopping the violence (putting the hawks back in the box) and pursuing positive peace (letting the doves out of their box). Much of this is due to interveners not being completely successful in deploying necessary skills for (what Last sees as) the four major peacebuilding requirements: Security; Governance; Relief and Development;

Reconciliation. Last goes on to contend that although the military can deploy quickly ‘they lack key peacebuilding skills, particularly those involving language, culture and relationship building’ (Last, 2000; 87). This is an important observation, particularly in terms of this thesis. It also links to the critiques raised at the beginning of this chapter by Gordenker and Weiss.

Byrne and Keashly’s contribution to *Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution* highlights non-traditional military training as a positive step for effective conflict resolution. The authors note that ‘training and education’ is one of a number of integral interlinked strategies which contributes to the transformation of war-torn societies into peaceful societies. The authors find that research, training and education are a ‘critical’ component of any peacebuilding system ‘because these efforts attempt to influence perceptions and attitudes, and build a culture of peace’ (Byrne and Keashly, 2000; 108). The authors cite the positive steps made by the Canadian Government in the creation of the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre (PPC). They find that the PPC acts as a tool to assist national and international dialogue concerning peacekeeping issues through workshops, training and educational courses. Furthermore, Byrne and Keashley are enthusiastic about the role of the internet as a positive tool for peacebuilding, and make a strong case for a robust internet system. They argue that a world-wide Internet system would promote ‘cross-regional fertilization’ by:

broadening the scope of shared knowledge and experience, and by promoting participation in the gathering and analysis and rapid dissemination of early warning information from a variety of multiple sources.

(Byrne and Keashly, 2000; 113)

This provides a good opportunity to discuss Levy's research on the Internet. This research shows how the practitioner/academic focus of the CCR has been strengthened through translating theories of peace, violence and conflict into practical tools (in this case the internet), to work with war-torn communities. Levy's work also provides an opportunity to discuss further doctoral research at the CCR. After providing an overview of Levy's thesis, the chapter examines two bodies of doctoral research that are both important in outlining the research activity at CCR: Yuka Hasegawa's research on UNAMA and Andreu Sola i Martin's analysis of UN mission in the Western Sahara (MINURSO).

Levy sought to document the real-world uses of the Internet by organisations operating in the post-conflict context of Kosovo in the period 2000-2003 (under an overall research question 'in what ways can the Internet contribute to post-conflict peacebuilding?'). She considers five topics (the digital divide; democracy and governance; civil society; organisational change and knowledge management; education), which show the potential impact of Information and Communications Technology (ICT) on peace and conflict issues. Levy then offers practical examples of how the Internet has been used as a vehicle of change in the working practices of peacebuilding organisations, and how it

already functions as a tool and a space for peacebuilders (Levy, 2004; 61-97). Informing this is the importance Levy attaches to 'the emergent uses of ICTs in this environment [post-conflict Kosovo], in order to formulate ideas on how ICTs could be best used to build stable, peaceful and just societies in the aftermath of war' (Levy, 2004; 1-2).

In terms of peacekeeping, Levy links the role of ICTs to recommendations in the UN's Brahimi Report (UN, 2000c), which was explicit in making the case for ICTs to be used to link together peacekeeping operations. Levy notes that the Brahimi Report found that information sharing between the UN, military and civilian agencies in post-conflict missions had been impeded by a lack of common data formats, integrated computer systems, field training and dedicated staff members. Furthermore, Levy highlights the positive role of the Internet as a tool to harmonise work done by military peacekeepers and civilian agencies, through citing the example of Geographic Information Systems (GIS). This tool provides the humanitarian community with a standardised way for collecting and disseminating information. The GIS Data can, for example, be used to add mine locations, road and house reconstruction, and other activities onto a shared map to be used by all agencies. This 'interoperability' has already been used in Kosovo, Iraq, Afghanistan and Liberia and is widely seen as a valuable utensil to enhance Civil-military coordination (Levy, 2004; 108). As Chapter 6 discusses, ICTs play a valuable role in current training provision for military peacekeeping, with the CCR currently providing a e-learning course for military peacekeepers.

Yuka Hasegawa's research focuses on the UN operation in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and considers the role of the UN in dealing with conflicts, through an examination of the role of peace operations in the protection and empowerment of human security. Hasegawa relates the conflict transformation framework to UN Peacekeeping operations. In this framework, the role of the third party can be 'understood as a contributing factor in transforming conflict and a manifestation of the will to transform violent conflict into a peaceful situation' (Hasegawa, 2005; 27-28). In this framework, peacekeeping operations can be seen as being a more effective method of conflict resolution than the appointment of mediators. Hasegawa's research asserts the importance of UN peacekeeping forces as a third party intervener, with its impartiality based on the value of human security (as a 'satisfyer' of Burton's *Human Needs* theory). Impartiality, according to Hasegawa, is derived from the UN's pursuit of basic human security, and this impartiality is the most important fact to peacekeeping operations. In the case of UNAMA, the pursuit of its impartiality was key in its effectiveness (Hasegawa, 2005; 337).

Hasegawa concludes that the significance of UN peacekeeping missions is that they represent a collective means to address issues of human security, as opposed to it being 'yet another tool with which to coordinate various interests both at the global and micro levels' (Hasegawa, 2005; 332-337). Through addressing issues of human security, UN peace operations derive their impartiality: a fundamental aspect of how effective a peace operation can be. This provides an important conceptual foundation to the thesis. In many ways it can be seen as a positive response to critiques from the critical theory school,

which contend that peacekeeping operations are tools to replace the existing global order which caused the outbreak of violent conflict in the first place.

Sola i Martin's research offers a sound analysis of MINURSO. His analysis seeks to understand why the mission failed to provide space for transformative conflict resolution (and the achievement of positive peace), after the successful reduction of violent conflict. Sola i Martin finds that the constraints on the operation as a result of power politics (and Morocco's unwillingness to allow the UN to organise a process of self determination for the Western Saharan people). Thus the UN, according to the author, needs to strengthen mechanisms to protect communal groups (Sola i Martin, 2004; 22).

The second part of the research examines the potential of new theoretical ideas in peacekeeping research, in particular, through the use of a Foucauldian analysis of power/knowledge to assess peacekeeping operations in relation to power relations at a local and international level. Sola i Martin finds that through the examination of the parties' production of power/knowledge, conflict resolution can have a larger impact on peacekeeping research. In particular, through exploring how power politics influences peacekeeping 'as an institution, and to what extent peacekeeping and its projection of power/knowledge in some cases... serve the interests of politico-military elites' (Sola i Martin, 2004; 241-244).

Sola i Martin's work shows how the failure to pursue peace with positive change has meant that the MINURSO peacekeeping operation is frozen at the stage of

negative peace. Through his exploration of theoretical critiques of power/knowledge relations and how they affect understandings of peacekeeping operations, Sola i Martin outlines issues of power politics on operations. Importantly, he highlights the importance of conflict resolution as a tool to understand peacekeeping operations as an alternative to the power politics model. Like Hasegawa, Sola i Martin emphasises the transformative nature of peacekeeping operations, and also emphasises how an increased focus on culture has led conflict resolution to adapt to local understandings of conflict and ensure participation from all levels of the social ladder.

The three examples of PhD research show the 'conflict resolution culture' which is cultivated at the CCR. This culture means that CCR research into peacekeeping operations is unique in its appreciation of peacekeeping operations having the potential to be part of a wider transformation of positive change from violence to peace. This research project is firmly embedded in this approach.

Providing a background to research on peacekeeping and conflict resolution at CCR is the continual analysis of peacekeeping operations undertaken by Professor Tom Woodhouse. Work undertaken by Woodhouse (often with Professor Oliver Ramsbotham) has led to peacekeeping being increasingly conceptualised alongside conflict resolution.

At a theoretical level, Woodhouse has firmly established the links between military forms of peacekeeping and the theoretical field of conflict resolution. A

number of books and articles can be cited here. The 1996 paper (alongside Ramsbotham) *Terra Incognita: Here be Dragons*, applied Azar's Protracted Social Conflict theory to contemporary conflict. From this, Woodhouse and Ramsbotham suggested that peacekeeping operations deployed in International-social conflict (ISC): a conflict neither purely inter-state, nor intra-state, but somewhere between the two. Using this framework, Woodhouse and Ramsbotham's response to the failures of peacekeeping deployments was to advocate the use of the 'middle ground' between peacekeeping and peace enforcement (Woodhouse and Ramsbotham, 1996). The 2000 publication *Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping: Critiques and Responses* identified strong critiques of peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations existent in the literature, and provided a robust response, drawn strongly from the conflict resolution literature (Woodhouse, 2000a). Most recently, Woodhouse has contributed to theoretical understandings of peacekeeping through exploring cosmopolitan conceptions of conflict resolution. This new addition to the literature will be explored below in the chapter.

Alongside *Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution*, Woodhouse offers a considerable contribution to the literature through *Contemporary Conflict Resolution*. This contribution (also written with Miall and Ramsbotham) gives a comprehensive understanding of the conflict resolution field and the role of peacekeeping within it. Contemporary peacekeeping and the development of the PSO has been incorporated, with an emphasis on the impact on conflict resolution processes, and new areas identified where conflict resolution can be promoted. Looking forward, the authors aim towards a cosmopolitan vision

where conflict resolution theory (and peacekeeping) forms a critical part of international conflict management.

As well as work at the theoretical level, research by Woodhouse has provided analysis in national policies, such as the development of UK doctrine and practice, (Woodhouse, 1999b). The body of research offers contributions to understandings of specific operations, such as UNPROFOR (outlined above) and UNAMSIL (Fetherston et al., 1994, Curran and Woodhouse, 2007). As referred to in Chapter 6, Woodhouse further contributes to the psychological aspects of peacekeeping, and the requirements for military personnel to understand conflict resolution concepts and techniques (Woodhouse, 1998).

Tom Woodhouse's work has covered a considerable amount of the conflict resolution spectrum. However it is work done alongside the military, in the training and preparation for peacekeeping with is particularly pertinent to this thesis. Woodhouse's work in (a) charting and (b) advancing the influence of conflict resolution on peacekeeping operations has opened up opportunities for projects such as this to further bring peacekeeping and conflict resolution together.

A considerable number of references in this thesis will be drawn from *International Peacekeeping* (in particular, Chapter 5 reviews a sample of articles to understand how Negotiation practice has been theorised). Created and edited by current Professor at the CCR, Professor Michael Pugh, the journal is a cornerstone when examining contemporary debates in the field. It has

succeeded in becoming an 'important source of analysis and debate for academics, officials, NGO workers and military personnel' (Pugh, 1994), with a number of cutting edge articles and eyewitness reports from the field. Furthermore, it has become a useful testing ground for new theoretical concepts in peacekeeping operations, and a number of 'special editions' have been able to focus on areas which have reflected the changing nature of peacekeeping operations (Gender in Peacekeeping, Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution, Thinking Anew About Peacekeeping Operations, Peacebuilding and Police Reform, to name a few). *International Peacekeeping* has greatly informed the background to this research. In particular, the post-Brahimi picture of peacekeeping has been greatly reflected in the journal, covering aspects from deployments on the ground (and the development of PSO) to theoretical debates over how peacekeeping is understood in the context of global politics. Throughout this research, the journal is a considerable source of information.

### ***The Critical Theory Approach***

The challenges to 'accepted' understandings and theories of peacekeeping have come mainly from the critical theory background. Paris critiques the 'problem solving' approaches to peacekeeping, arguing that the focus on design, conduct and outcome of operations have paid little attention to 'broader implications of peace missions for our understanding of international politics' (Paris, 2000; 29). Bellamy and Williams take these critiques a stage further in their edited edition of *International Peacekeeping* (Bellamy and Williams, 2005). The edition examines peacekeeping from a critical theory standpoint, challenging many of the overarching conceptions of peacekeeping. Bellamy and

Williams begin by offering a substantial critique of *problem solving* approaches to peacekeeping operations:

By failing to question the ideological preferences of interveners... problem-solving theories are unable to evaluate the extent to which dominant peacekeeping or peacemaking practices may actually help reproduce the social structures that cause violent conflict in the first place.

(Bellamy, 2004; 19)

The authors therefore suggest that critical approaches to peace operations will open up a 'new stage' in how they are theorised. Previous thinking in peacekeeping operations, the authors argue, has taken a 'value free' approach to the role of peacekeeping in the global order. One such 'value free' assumption was that "good" governance equates to Western-style statehood, democratization, neo-liberal economics and the existence of an active civil society (Bellamy, 2004; 19). Without challenging these assumptions and examining the structural causes of violent conflict (such as the liberal based global economy), the authors argue that any attempts of reassessing peacekeeping would be as useful in the long run as 'rearranging deckchairs on the Titanic' (Bellamy, 2004; 21). Pugh elaborates on this line by arguing that peacekeeping operations are not 'neutral', but serve an existing global order within which problem solving adjustments can occur. In this framework, peacekeeping can be considered 'as forms of riot control directed against the unruly parts of the world to uphold the liberal peace' (Pugh, 2004; 41).

Furthermore, Pugh argues that the 'enfeeblement' of the UN in dealing robustly to threats to peace and security and the strengthening of regional arrangements and national militaries only adds to the strengthening of regional and international hegemons (such as the US). This, according to Pugh, is strengthened by the UN's willingness to enter into regional 'partnerships'.

Although assessments from the critical theory perspective play a crucial role in deepening understandings about the role of peacekeeping, a difficulty with such an approach is a lack of concrete proposals to move peacekeeping within this transformative framework. Bellamy and Williams's work is of great importance in order to understand the pitfalls in the international system which lead to the situations where peacekeepers are deployed. However, this thesis contends that that Bellamy and Williams do not offer material steps forward for peacekeeping operations to take. The techniques espoused for the development of peacekeeping operations, as argued by Bellamy and Williams are: Dialogue ethics ('free and open dialogue about what constitutes 'good practice'); Inclusivity ('dialogue should include all parties that might be affected by the course of action under discussion') and; Fallibility (where 'theorists and practitioners of peace operations must recognize that their most dearly held beliefs are fallible and therefore open for revision') (Bellamy, 2004; 33). These recommendations are far away from clear policy and operational changes. As Woodhouse and Ramsbotham argue, although highlighting such debates and the need to 'think anew' is essential, calls for a radical transformation of peacekeeping are not elaborated sufficiently on how 'this might be achieved in policy or other operational terms' (Woodhouse and Ramsbotham, 2005; 152).

This may not be the case for all who argue from this critical theory standpoint. Pugh finds a role for deployments akin to peace support operations (PSO) in a transformative framework. He argues that PSOs will be likely to be increasingly subtle and flexible in responding to crises, providing expert teams similar to disaster relief specialists, providing preventative action, economic aid and civilian protection. Pugh contends that this may only happen if such forces are released from the 'state-centric control system', making them 'answerable to a more transparent, democratic and accountable institutional arrangement' (Pugh, 2004; 53). Moreover, Pugh finds that such a scheme would be based on a permanent military volunteer force 'recruited directly among individuals predisposed to cosmopolitan rather than patriotic values' (Pugh, 2004; 53).

### ***A Cosmopolitan Framework***

This moves the discussion onto Woodhouse and Ramsbotham's work on cosmopolitan peacekeeping. The framework of cosmopolitan peacekeeping, the authors state, is situated in conflict resolution theory and practice, and provides a concrete way forward for peacekeeping operations, engaging with peacekeeping in a way in which the authors believe critical theory does not (Woodhouse and Ramsbotham, 2005; 141). Woodhouse and Ramsbotham note that the revival of UN peacekeeping operations since the dilemmas in the mid-1990's, where the number of peacekeepers has risen (the rise has been apparent throughout the life of this research project; the number of peacekeepers in December 2005 was 69,838 (UNDPKO, 2005a); in December 2007 84,309 peacekeepers were deployed (UNDPKO, 2007a); in April 2010 the

figure is 101,882 (UNDPKO, 2010a)), and note that this shows a commitment by the international community to peacekeeping as a 'vital instrument in pursuing conflict resolution goals internationally' (Woodhouse and Ramsbotham, 2005; 142).

Within this cosmopolitan framework, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse point to two distinct areas where capacity building is required and empowerment needed or the development of a cosmopolitan framework for peacekeeping. Box 1.4 (below) explains in more detail and shows the direction where this capacity building is required.

**Box 1.4: Conflict Levels and Focal Points in the Development of Cosmopolitan Peacekeeping**  
(Woodhouse and Ramsbotham, 2005; 143)



**Key: Arrows show desired direction of capacity building and empowerment needed for the development of cosmopolitan peacekeeping**

Through investigating training in 'non traditional skills' such as Civil Military Coordination, negotiation and mediation, this particular research project can be situated at point (5) of the framework, as the role of training is key to developing a positive base for peacebuilding activities.

Importantly, there are strong links between all levels of this model. Therefore this research project considers national and sub-regional efforts to enhance peacekeeper training, and looks towards the development of international capacities for carrying out cosmopolitan-based peacekeeping deployments. In order to situate the research here, it is the view of this thesis that peacekeeping is a form of international conflict resolution. Taking note of Hasegawa's work, peacekeepers and the operations which they represent are part of a transformative process which sees war-torn societies move towards societies based on values of social justice and positive peace.

Looking towards future debates over the development of peacekeeping, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse see five main standpoints<sup>23</sup>. One such standpoint is *Cosmopolitanism*, which 'argues for deeper reforms, an accountable permanent rapid reaction or a standing UN force and an enhanced resolution capacity, including gender and culture aware policy and training' (Woodhouse and Ramsbotham, 2005; 152). This particular research fits into this analysis by examining how the researched militaries are enhancing conflict

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<sup>23</sup> The full list is: **Realism** which rejects the whole concept of enhanced UN peacekeeping; **Pluralism** which only countenances a limited form of traditional first generation peacekeeping; **Pragmatic solidarism** which favours the incremental development of existing arrangements; **Cosmopolitanism** which argues for deeper reforms, an accountable permanent rapid reaction or a standing UN force and an enhanced resolution capacity, including gender and culture aware policy and training; and **Transformation** which argues for radically reconstructed peacekeeping configurations.

resolution capacities while maintaining their peace enforcement capabilities, what this means for conflict resolution, and whether there is an emergence of militaries with cosmopolitan ethics.

Woodhouse follows this work on in an article with Curran, (Curran and Woodhouse, 2007) which investigates the emergence of a cosmopolitan ethic in African peacekeeping through the emergence of the African Union's (AU) standby brigades and conflict prevention network, as well as the response to the peacekeeping and peacebuilding operation in Sierra Leone. The authors find that African developments to create standby brigades (in particular policy following the Joint G8–African Union Plan to Enhance African Capabilities to Undertake Peace Support Operations) can be conceptualised in a cosmopolitan framework. Curran and Woodhouse argue that the emergence of thinking and institutional capacity in Africa takes theorizing about peacekeeping closer to a cosmopolitan ethic, based on safeguarding Human Security. Furthermore, they conclude that peacekeeping in general, and African Peacekeeping in particular is seen as a:

...force in the making for cosmopolitan governance, characterized by an impartial, universal, democratic, cosmopolitan community which promotes human security (positive peace) over national security and state-centric interest

(Curran and Woodhouse, 2007; 1070)

Linking this to further work in the Department of Peace Studies, João Gomes Porto's co-authored book (with Ulf Engel) provides a comprehensive analysis of the development of African peace and security architecture. The collection analyses a number of facets of the architecture including the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, Panel of the Wise, Continental Early Warning System, and the African Standby Force (ASF) initiative. Significantly, Engel and Porto reflect on the 'multi-dimensionality and pluralism' of regionalism on the African continent. They suggest that:

In a situation where the African state is often the main threat to the security of its citizens as well as its neighbors, a perspective on security which transcends the traditionalist view of security as the business of the state and the state alone is surely called for.

(Porto and Engel, 2010; 144)

The authors further outline the 'profound' link between security and development as a key guideline to move the organisation towards a human security framework to work under.. Engel and Porto's edited collection shows the clear links between theoretical developments in human security, and the operationalisation of conflict resolution capacities based on protecting civilians. For example, Cilliers and Pottgeiter's discuss the evolution of the African Standby Force (ASF). Through doing so, they provide a quality overview of the historical development of the ASF, what is envisaged of the force, and the challenges that it currently faces. Their article also links the six defined

scenarios under which the ASF would be deployed<sup>24</sup> with the realities of training, equipping, financing and preparing multinational deployments. Included in this assessment is the training design for the organisation, which the authors note is designed around 'technical, tactical and specialized knowledge in a multinational environment' (Cilliers and Pottgieter, 2010; 118). Significantly, this edited collection indicates an emergence of cosmopolitan norms and values in African security frameworks. It is important not only in highlighting further work from the Department of Peace Studies, but also shows that cosmopolitan values can be operationalised in regional security architecture.

Cheesman and Elliot offer an important contribution to this debate. Their edited collection of articles examines the role of the military in a cosmopolitan framework, with the aim to explore the idea that militaries can, or should, be used to 'defend the moral community of humankind' as well as defending 'territorially bounded political communities' (Elliot and Graeme, 2004; 1). The authors find that this framework would alter military structures and tasks, and point out that militaries could soon be required to 'become the security guarantors for the whole process of civil reconciliation and reconstruction' (Elliot and Graeme, 2004; 4).

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<sup>24</sup> Scenario 1) AU/Regional military advice to a political mission deployed within 30 Days of a mandate provided by the PSC; Scenario 2) An AU observer mission codeployed with a UN peacekeeping mission deployed within 30 days of a mandate; Scenario 3) A stand-alone AU observer mission deployed within 30 days of a mandate; Scenario 4) A peacekeeping or preventative deployment mission under Chapter VI of the UN charter, deployed within 30 days of a mandate; Scenario 5) An Au peacekeeping force for complex multidimensional peacekeeping missions, including those involving low-level spoilers, is deployed within 90 days of an AU mandate, with the military component being able to deploy in 30 days; Scenario 6) An AU intervention, for example in genocide situations where the international community does not act promptly. Here, it is envisaged that the Au would have the capability to deploy a robust military force within 14 days.

This has implications for training. Elliot argues that forces deployed for cosmopolitan purposes are expected to train for 'contact' as well as combat roles, referring very much to Fetherston's concept of contact skills for the military espoused in her early work (Elliot, 2004; 26). Furthermore, Cheeseman and Elliot conclude that military forces, in order to carry out the new tasks and roles designated to them, require soldiers to 'posses skills and attributes that extend well beyond the values and duties normally associated with the profession of arms'. This in turn, the authors find, would require a considerable rethinking of existing doctrine, force structures, command and control, ideological structures and training regimes (Cheeseman and Elliot, 2004; 278).

Cheeseman and Elliot's contribution here is important when attempting to understand developments in military forces as a result of cosmopolitan frameworks for international conflict management. Their work is further analysed in this research project, in particular when examining differences between traditional conceptions of the military and where the military is situated in a cosmopolitan framweork.

To achieve cosmopolitan ends, peacekeeping operations must be part of a wider process to remove the causes of structural violence in societies. Earlier in this chapter, Galtung argued strongly against peacekeeping operations being placed in positions where they are unassumingly supporting the *status quo* in vertical conflicts. For peacekeeping to be effective, he argued, it must be to protect those who are trying to alter the status quo and remove the violent structures that are creating the conflict. This is also an area where theorists

from critical theory have made an important contribution to ongoing research into the area. The critical theory school argues that without a strong body of research into the role of peacekeeping in global politics and the global economy, it will more likely fail to alter the status quo.

Woodhouse and Ramsbotham's work on cosmopolitan peacekeeping provides a possible answer to these issues. Through linking peacekeeping operations directly to cosmopolitan values, it links strongly to wider initiatives associated with removing structural causes of violence. Their work has also carried the initiatives in Bradford's Peace Studies Department a stage further. Furthermore, it elaborates on Galtung's 'one-way wall' concept of peacekeeping operations, but instead of protecting what Galtung termed the 'freedom fighter', it protects the vulnerable groups within conflict zones as well.

## **Conclusions**

This chapter examines how the academic field of conflict resolution understands and contributes to the practice of peacekeeping operations. It contributes to the thesis by offering a solid conceptual base to further study training for peacekeeping, and also by understanding how - through the academic study of peacekeeping - there are further manifestations between the two fields. When revisiting the research questions<sup>25</sup> that outline this research

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<sup>25</sup> 1) In what ways does military peacekeeping training show evidence of conflict resolution theory and practice? (*In what direction has training for military peacekeeping developed since 1994?*) 2) In light of the new roles and responsibilities placed on military peacekeepers, is there evidence that training in non-traditional military skills assists military peacekeepers adapt to the changing nature of deployment zones? 3) Does this indicate evidence of a cosmopolitan conception of peacekeeping? (*Can we find evidence - both practically and in the peacekeeping literature - of the emergence of a different type of soldier more aligned with cosmopolitan*

project, this chapter also goes some way to answering the first question - In what ways does military peacekeeping training show evidence of conflict resolution theory and practice? (and the supplementary question: *In what direction has training for military peacekeeping developed since 1994?*). As well as this, further conclusions can be reached with regards to the academic survey undertaken.

### **The role of *contact skills* in the academic literature**

A number of the authors outlined above note the increased need for contact skills for peacekeepers. First encapsulated by Fetherston in 1994, it is apparent that the need has not diminished. Duffey has linked the need for contact skills to her work on culture, arguing that such skills be incorporated to assist peacekeepers to be more culturally sensitive towards those they are charged to protect. Diehl sees such skills as being 'more diplomatic', taking into account a political awareness of such actions (Diehl, 2008; 164).

Fetherston's initial description of contact skills as being 'communication skills, methods of negotiation, facilitation, mediation, and conciliation' has conflict resolution aspects, placing a great deal of emphasis on non-violent solutions to conflict situations (Fetherston, 1994b; 219). It may be worth noting that the political emphasis that Diehl places on contact skills, as well as emphasis from other corners may end up shifting the emphasis of contact skills away from the non-violent options for the soldier and towards managing the political

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*ideals?*)

consequences of using force. This is an interesting dilemma and may link to the further securitisation aspects of peacekeeping operations (which is further discussed in Chapter 4 which examines relation to civil-military coordination strategies).

Furthermore, Fetherston's work on contact skills is now almost fifteen years old. Yet still there is much being written about the need for increased contact skills for the military. Although it is heartening to see that the issue is still very much being written about, there is still too much of an emphasis on the introduction of contact skills, rather than amending existing programmes of contact skills. This brings us now to the next conclusion

#### **The existing provision of training**

As stated, there is still too much of an emphasis on the introduction of contact skills as opposed to amending existing programmes. Galtung's research indicated an early desire for such training from soldiers deployed in the Middle East, and Tillett's work showed how training could practically be incorporated with the Australian Defence Forces. Furthermore, Byrne and Keashly's work, like Fetherston, highlighted the emergence of peacekeeping training centres which dealt with the wider aspects of training for peacekeeping. Most authors agreed that training had come a long distance since the early 1990's, and now soldiers are at least being trained to expand the 'toolbox' of skills. However there still remain problems. Fetherston's work highlighted the lack of existing training programmes in the military. Diehl, Druckman and Wall's 1998 study of 79 peacekeeping training programmes worldwide found that only 13% of the

training activities offered involved non- traditional skills. This, the authors argue, is problematic. Diehl's 2008 study brings the debate up to date, and finds that even now not enough is being done to train soldiers in the unique skills needed for peacekeeping deployments.

Some of the articles outlined above indicate possible reasons why training is not accepted as a necessary prerequisite. For example, Moskos finds that the level of training is not important when it comes to peacekeeping deployments, arguing that the skills are cultivated purely in the deployment zone. One can see reliance here on the perceived suitability of the 'natural skills' of the soldiers deployed in a peacekeeping environment. This reliance gives critics of such training a foundation to argue from. Fetherston finds this misleading assumption as a key obstacle in training peacekeepers effectively. The 'nature' versus 'nurture' debate is examined in Chapter 6, with an analysis of whether traditional military cultures are able to adapt to the demands of contemporary peacekeeping deployments.

Finally, the perceived lack of standardisation in training regimes for peacekeeping requires further attention. This issue has been outlined by Fetherston's extensive work on training for UN operations. A lack of standardisation creates significant difficulties for the UN, at a time when it desperately needs military peacekeepers. In effect, what is being seen is that different contributors are offering troops which have vastly different training backgrounds. As the following chapter shows, this problematic area was key in the development of the UN's Brahimi Report.

## **The conceptual location**

The conceptual location of this research has been explored in this chapter. Foremost, this is located within the field of conflict resolution research. Informing this is research emanating from Bradford's Centre for Conflict Resolution. Much of this existing research takes international peacekeeping as a form of positive conflict resolution and transformation. This greatly informs the thesis, which starts with the underlying assumption that peacekeeping is a mechanism to facilitate a positive change from violent war-torn societies, to societies of peace. However, there has been a valuable contribution from the critical theory field, especially in exploring the existing assumptions of peacekeeping. Having a critical, reflexive approach benefits the research, as does the understanding of the multiple social constructions of peacekeeping, what defines success, and what different groups define as priorities for military peacekeepers.

As well as contributing to the field of conflict resolution, this thesis aims to contribute to literature on cosmopolitan peacekeeping. The research project builds on existing work by Woodhouse and Ramsbotham, as well as Cheeseman and Elliot to explore how increased awareness of conflict resolution skills benefits a cosmopolitan model of peacekeeping. Elliot asserts that training is a key step in the creation of the 'cosmopolitan soldier', just as Goodwin outlines the importance of negotiation training for the 'soldier diplomat'. In both cases, they observe a development of roles for military peacekeepers which are more in line with the cosmopolitan ideals espoused by

Woodhouse and Ramsbotham. Within the cosmopolitan framework, there exists an increase in non-traditional training for the military, to prepare soldiers for increased interaction with civilian groups and actors, as well as preparing them for being what Fetherston described as the 'non-violent consensual conflict management' face of the international community (Fetherston, 1998; 178). If there is to be a cosmopolitan system based on the spread of positive peace, then it is military peacekeepers who are critical to the development from peacekeeping to peacebuilding. Ryan's assertion of military peacekeepers being the 'midwives' at the birth of new societies testifies to this.

### **Next steps**

Next, this project provides an analysis of another layer of this multi-level synthesis: the UN. Here, the thesis examines the calls made for increased training of peacekeepers from practitioners and policy makers in the organisation. It outlines steps made within the UN to enhance training programmes, and how these developments are set within a larger development of UN policy which aims to incorporate peacebuilding mechanisms into operations, as well as incorporating cross-cutting themes to mandates. Through offering this, the chapter provides a consideration of the desire within the UN community to enhance conflict resolution skills for military peacekeepers.



## **Chapter 2.**

### **The development of training structures in the United Nations**

This chapter outlines how developments in the United Nations (UN) have impacted on training for peacekeeping operations, and UN documentation, policy, and guidelines that highlight an increased need for training in skills from the conflict resolution field. As the first chapter demonstrates, there is an emergent recognition from within the academic literature of the links between military forms of peacekeeping and conflict resolution. This chapter examines to what extent the policy community – in this case, the UN – reflects that recognised need. In doing so, this chapter demonstrates that room exists within the policy community for increased interaction between the fields of military peacekeeping and conflict resolution, particularly through the area of training soldiers for peacekeeping operations. In doing so, it provides a solid base for the subsequent chapters of the thesis, and adds to the multilayered synthesis of academics and practitioners who call for closer collaboration between these two disciplines.

Although peacekeeping is now undertaken by a multitude of actors at a national and regional level, it is important to focus on the UN for two main reasons. The first reason is the figure of deployed personnel. The number of UN peacekeepers has grown exponentially since 2000. In 2006, the Under-Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations stated that the UN 'operates

the second largest global military deployment' (Guéhenno, 2006), and currently the UN has (according to its April 2010 figures) 101, 882 peacekeepers in the field, with 86, 357 being military personnel (DPKO, 2010). In addition, observers note that although its administrative capacities are relatively small in size, the UN currently deploys and supports more troops in the field than any other actor in the world (other than the United States Department of Defense), and that current UN deployments are larger than the cumulative numbers of deployed personnel from the UK, France, Russia and China (Jones et al., 2009; 35). Thus with such a large deployment, understanding how the UN is organised in terms of peacekeeping operations is essential.

Secondly is the role of the UN as a 'legitimate' source of peacekeeping. This links both to conflict resolution and cosmopolitan scholars, who understand the role of the UN as a legitimate third party intervener in conflict. Goulding argues that the UN's peacekeeping activities 'can include military tasks which are wholly or partly cosmopolitan in nature'. Such activities, in Goulding's view, involve coercive action against a government or illegal regime 'for reasons that are at least partly cosmopolitan', protection of humanitarian and civilian operations, guarding vital institutions, threatened communities, prominent personalities, using force to uphold human rights, and demining activities (Goulding, 2004; 108). Cheeseman and Elliot note that the UN Charter 'resounds in cosmopolitan values', possesses a membership which is 'broadly representative', and highlights a shifting balance from the importance of the rights of states to the rights of the individual to the extent that 'humanitarian intervention may have become an accepted, if still somewhat qualified, norm in

international relations' (Cheeseman and Elliot, 2004; 278). Furthermore, cosmopolitan authors see the UN as a stepping-stone to more cosmopolitan conceptions of international relations. Archibugi examines reform proposals of the UN - in particular an 'Assembly of the Peoples', reform to the International Court of Justice, and modifications to the Security Council - to establish a stronger sense of democracy in international society, as a way of incorporating a more cosmopolitan set of mechanisms to confront the 'ills of the world'(Archibugi, 1995). Held's assessment of the ideas and principles of the UN highlight the cosmopolitan nature of the institution. He argues that

The UN Charter system has been distinctively innovative and influential in a number of respects. It has provided an international forum in which all states are in certain respects equal, a forum of particular value to developing countries and to those seeking a basis for 'consensus' solutions to international problems. It has provided a framework for decolonisation, and for the pursuit of the reform of international institutions. Moreover, it has provided a vision, valuable in spite of all its limitations, of a new world order based upon a meeting of governments and, under appropriate circumstances, of a supranational presence in world affairs championing human rights. Indeed, this vision, if carried to its logical extreme, challenges the whole principle that humankind should be organized as a society of sovereign states above all else. (Held, 1995; 88-89)

From the conflict resolution field, Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall also find that the UN as a 'manifestation of clear progress having been made over the last fifty years', and make the case that the UN may evolve as 'the only genuinely global political institution capable of delivering authoritative endorsement of fundamental international values, and of conferring legitimacy on the most difficult international undertakings' (Ramsbotham et al., 2005; 326). Thus, in their view and for those engaged in conflict resolution, the UN offers a framework that is essential for the realisation of conflict resolution goals.

Rubenstein sees the legitimacy of the UN embedded in the 'root metaphor' of the organisation. He argues (in an article outlining a cultural approach to understanding peacekeeping operations) that the legitimacy of the UN rests on it symbolising a world order 'not dominated by national interests', and goes on to say that within such a world order:

The weak are empowered, the hungry fed, disease conquered, and conflicts settled peacefully.

(Rubenstein, 2005; 356-357)

Peacekeeping, as a function of the UN has therefore manifested itself within this root metaphor, using a 'military without weapons in the service of peace' to reinforce an image of an international community 'acting in a neutral, consensual manner to sustain a stable world economy' (Rubenstein, 2005; 356-357). Rubenstein does argue, however, that the root metaphor of the UN is in some doubt due to the radical changes seen in peacekeeping operations. For

instance, Rubenstein deems the peacekeeping 'failures' in the 1990's - in particular, operations in Somalia, Rwanda and the Former Yugoslavia - and the range of reasons for such failures occurring as being one reason why operations have 'lost much of their culturally constituted and symbolically achieved legitimacy, standing, and authority' (Rubenstein, 2005; 539). Moreover, UN responses to more violent operating environments - usually through the acceptance that peacekeepers will use more force themselves - has in turn taken peacekeeping to work 'outside of the core meanings of the symbols of peacekeeping' and have 'come close to, if not crossed, the edge of what the root metaphor can support' (Rubenstein, 2005; 539). Rubenstein asserts that there seems to be a tacit agreement that the organisation represents a considerable step forward in terms of pursuing conflict resolution and cosmopolitan goals, however, its actions through the post cold war period, have tarnished that image. This is important for this thesis, as it highlights the difficulties of allying the core principles of the UN to the difficult operating environments into which its peacekeeping operations are deployed. This chapter will revisit Rubenstein's argument in its conclusions, and try to understand to what extent current UN policy meets its 'root metaphors'.

This chapter examines a number of different areas of the UN system, and charts what impact they have on peacekeeping operations. The point of departure is the 2000 'Report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations', more commonly known as the *Brahimi Report*. The chapter then examines the increasing institutionalisation of peacebuilding and the development of the 'integrated missions' concept and mechanisms within the UN. Both of which are

of critical importance when examining peacekeeping operations and have influenced the role of peacekeepers, and their subsequent training needs. The second main area of study is the role of mandates and Cross Cutting Resolutions, as both illustrate where the decisions made at a Security Council level have serious ramifications on the activities of military peacekeepers. Finally, this chapter analyses how the developments within the UN system have manifested into the new Integrated Training Service, and updated training strategy. From this survey, the thesis outlines a considerably up-to-date account of training within the UN system, and shows where there is space in the 'policy community' for increased training in conflict resolution skills for military peacekeepers.

### ***The Brahimi Report and subsequent change***

With the recognised failure of the UN to protect civilians in Rwanda and Srebrenica (examined in self-critical reports into the failures (UN, 1999b, UN, 1999d)), Secretary General Kofi Annan commissioned the Brahimi Report in order to 'assess the United Nations ability to conduct peace operations effectively, and to offer frank, specific and realistic recommendations for ways in which to enhance that capacity' (UN, 2000a). It was contended that '[w]ithout significant institutional change, increased financial support, and renewed commitment on the part of Member States' (UN, 2000c; viii). The report argued, 'the United Nations will not be capable of executing the critical peacekeeping and peace-building tasks that the Member States assign it in coming months and years' (UN, 2000c; viii). In March 2000, the Brahimi report was presented to the Security Council, containing some 57 explicit recommendations and over

100 implicit recommendations which covered areas such as doctrine, deployment, staffing and the use of Information technology (Guéhenno, 2002; 73). Much of the recent change in the UN has stemmed from the Brahimi Report.

A key area of the Brahimi recommendations was to develop peacekeeping doctrine. In this respect, the effects of Peace Support Operations<sup>26</sup> (PSO) doctrine were clearly felt. Like PSO doctrine, Brahimi recognised that consent was a phenomenon that could easily be manipulated by belligerent groups. It examined the characteristics of intra-state conflict, such as smaller fighting forces and paramilitary groups with little or no ties to political structures, and found that such types of groups would be less likely to offer full consent to the deployment of UN peacekeepers<sup>27</sup>. Therefore, in understanding the ‘fluidity’ of consent in war zones, the Brahimi Report proposed that UN peacekeepers use force in an impartial manner against what it termed as ‘spoilers’ to a peace process<sup>28</sup>. Furthermore, in a significant development for peacekeeping operations, this use of force was not only to protect UN peacekeepers but it was now also used to protect civilians. The Report argued that:

Rules of Engagement should not limit contingents stroke-for-stroke responses but should allow ripostes sufficient to silence a source of deadly fire that is directed at United Nations troops or at the people they are charged to protect and, in particularly dangerous situations, should

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<sup>26</sup> Developments in doctrine leading up to and involving PSO doctrine are outlined on page 43.

<sup>27</sup> The experience of the UNPROFOR intervention in Bosnia, where consent was manipulated by some groups to create ‘breathing space’ to re-arm, was an influencing factor here.

<sup>28</sup> The term ‘spoilers’ also being used in the UK peacekeeping doctrine *JWP-3-50 Peace Support Operations*.

not force United Nations Contingents to cede the initiative to their attackers.

(UN, 2000c; 9)

This was a significant step forward in the light of the UN's failures to protect civilians in Rwanda and Srebrenica . Reports into failures in both cases had been damning about the inability of the UN to prevent catastrophe and the mass killing of civilians. Furthermore, the Brahimi Report outlined that the use of force in an *impartial* manner was essential for the success of UN peacekeeping. Impartiality, defined in the Brahimi Report, was the adherence to the 'principles of the [UN] Charter and to the objectives of a mandate that is rooted in those Charter principles' (UN, 2000c; 9). Once again, this showed a clear development of the proposals outlined in JWP 3-50. More importantly, it is a proposal that carries a considerable impact on the need for soldiers to understand the level of force that can be used, and how force - when employed in what can be considered as a non-impartial manner - can have an effect on the operation.

Looking at the preparedness of peacekeepers, a trend was noted in peacekeeping operations where member states were finding it more difficult to convince national legislatures and public of the need to deploy into peacekeeping operations. Coupled with downsizing of militaries and a growth in regional peacekeeping initiatives, this led the report to reason that this trend was indicative of a depletion in the 'pool of well-trained and well-equipped military contingents from developed countries to serve in United Nations-led

operations' (UN, 2000c; 18). It went on to outline the frailties in peacekeeping operations:

Troops may be untrained in peacekeeping operations, and in any case the various contingents in an operation are unlikely to have trained or worked together before. Some units may have no personnel who can speak the mission language. Even if language is not a problem, they may lack common operating procedures and have differing interpretations of key elements of command and control and of the mission's rules of engagement, and may have differing expectations about mission requirements for the use of force.

(UN, 2000c; 18)

This, in the view of the report's authors, posed a considerable challenge to effective peacekeeping. Not only did it challenge the UN's guidelines of quick and effective deployment, but it also impacted on effective mandate implementation and the ability of a peacekeeping operation to foster 'secure local environment for peacebuilding' (UN, 2000c; 5).

It was partly because of this explanation of the operational environment that led the panel to propose the idea of Brigade Size forces to be constituted from member states to be ready for effective deployment for a 'traditional operation' (30 days after a mandate was passed) and/or a 'complex operation' (60 days after a mandate was passed). This assessment also led the panel to recommend that in order to operate as a coherent force, troop contributors, at

the very least, should 'have been trained and equipped according to a common standard, supplemented by joint planning at the contingents' command level' (UN, 2000c; 19). The Brahimi Report advised on common standards, placing responsibility with the UN Secretariat in particular recommending that the UN establish 'the minimum training, equipment and other standards required' for forces to participate in operations. It also recommended that better equipped member states assist troop contributors from 'less developed countries' to enable them to reach the UN's minimum standards (UN, 2000c; 19). Finally, the Report recommended that the Secretariat should send a training team to confirm the level of preparedness of each potential troop-contributing country to 'meet the provisions of the memoranda of understanding on the requisite training and equipment requirements, prior to deployment'. In the report's view, those states who do not meet the UN's standards 'must not deploy' (UN, 2000c; 20).

Concerns over the preparedness of military peacekeepers in the Brahimi report were heavily influenced by the near-failure of the UNAMSIL operation in Sierra Leone, which suffered as a result of poorly trained and equipped troops, although it was mandated by a particularly strong resolution from the Security Council. This is reflected in the report, where it noted that the problems of command and control that arose in that particular operation was the 'most recent illustration of what cannot be tolerated any longer', and strongly advised that troop contributors ensure that the troops which they provide fully understand the' importance of an integrated chain of command, the operational

control of the Secretary-General and the standard operating procedures and rules of engagement of the mission' (UN, 2000c; 45).

Importantly, it was not only in the remit of military doctrine where the Brahimi Report made recommendations for training and preparedness. In the field of human rights training, the Report identified that there was a need for peacekeeping personnel to be trained in fostering a greater understanding of the intricacies of the area. It recommended that the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 'coordinate and institutionalize' human rights field work in peacekeeping operations, and organize human rights training for all personnel in peace operations (UN, 2000c; 41). Importantly, the Report finished with a profound note to what peacekeepers need to understand with regards to gender and culture issues. Though this does not necessarily result in an outright recommendation, it highlights the need for UN peacekeepers to be sensitive to the conflict environment:

United Nations personnel in the field, perhaps more than any others, are obliged to respect local norms, culture and practices. They must go out of their way to demonstrate that respect, as a start, by getting to know their host environment and trying to learn as much of the local culture and language as they can. They must behave with the understanding that they are guests in someone else's home, however destroyed that home might be, particularly when the United Nations takes on a transitional administration role. And they must also treat one another with

respect and dignity, with particular sensitivity towards gender and cultural differences.

(UN, 2000c; 45-46)

Such a statement illustrates a recognized need for effective training programmes in what Fetherston outlined as 'contact skills' for military peacekeepers (Fetherston, 1994b; 219)<sup>29</sup>. Although there is no specific recommendation, the Report clearly refers to the need for cultural awareness, a deep understanding of the deployment zone, and an awareness of gender issues.

Following the Brahimi Report, there were three separate Secretary General Reports, which specifically dealt with the implementation of Brahimi's recommendations. The main developments of training pertained to structural changes, and creation of new material in human rights and gender.

An obvious impact of the Brahimi report was a considered restructuring of the UN's capabilities, particularly with regards to the need for strengthening the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (An outline of the initial recommendations will be outlined now, before a more detailed examination later in the chapter). The main change involved improving training capacities, with the Secretary General (in his first report to the Security Council), outlining his desire to 'enhance the Secretariat's capacity to assist Member States with training initiatives' as well as his request for additional resources to facilitate

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<sup>29</sup> Fetherston outlines contact skills as 'the use of communication skills, methods of negotiation, facilitation, mediation, and conciliation that peacekeepers de-escalate potentially violent or manifestly violent situations and facilitate movement toward conflict resolution'.

these changes (UN, 2000b; 16). This meant that there was a recognised need to strengthen and expand the DPKO's Training Unit – a recommendation made in 2000<sup>30</sup> (UN, 2000b; 24). The Secretary General also advocated the development of the UN Military Staff College, which aimed to train middle level mission leadership in the UN system (UN, 2000b; 16). In response to the recommendation about sending teams out to assess peacekeeping personnel, the Secretary General stated that the costs of sustaining contingents who do not have necessary training or equipment 'is an unnecessary expense to the organisation, both in financial terms, and to its reputation' (UN, 2000b; 17). His report added that in some of the instances where a training team was sent out to a troop contributing country (in the pre-deployment phase), there has been prevention of deployments that would be otherwise 'premature' (UN, 2000b; 17). Such calls were expanded upon in 2001, when the Secretary General stated that a 'much greater effort' needed to be devoted to enhancing and improving programmes for facilitating Member States' training of personnel before deployment (UN, 2001a; 16).

In December 2001, the Secretary General reported that there was movement in a number of UN structures that dealt with training of military peacekeepers. Progress was noted in the translation and dissemination of official UN training publications, so that all publications would be in the official languages of the UN, and 'material reaches all those responsible for peacekeeping training' (UN,

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<sup>30</sup> The Secretary General said in his report: 'I am proposing not only to strengthen the Military Division, but to extensively restructure it as well, as described in the request for additional resources. In summary, the Military Division would consist of the following: (a) Office of the Military Adviser; (b) Current Military Operations Service; (c) Military Planning Service; (d) Force Generation and Military Personnel Service (including United Nations standby arrangements system management); (e) Training and Evaluation Service' (UN, 2000b; 24).

2001b; 12). Further progress was noted in training personnel in mission, with the creation in Mission Training Cells in a number of UN operations. Furthermore, the December 2001 report added that the DPKO would further develop the Standard Generic Training Modules, as well as improving 'train the trainer' courses, and revitalising the DPKO website. Finally, the December 2001 report noted that the DPKO was working on developing pre-deployment training assessment standards, as well as understanding methodologies to assess contingents prior to deployment (UN, 2001b; 12-13).

Responding to the issue of increased training for UN personnel in human rights, the June 2001 follow-up report was critical of the UN's capacities to effectively train personnel in human rights, stating that support provided to Human Rights components in operations was 'inadequate', due to the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) having insufficient staffing or resources. It recommended that OHCHR needed to be in a position where it is closely involved in planning peacekeeping operations which address human rights. The Secretary General argued that:

If such operations are to have effective human rights components, OHCHR should be able to coordinate human rights fieldwork in peacekeeping operations; second personnel to integrated mission task forces in New York; recruit human rights field personnel; organize human rights training for all personnel in peacekeeping operations, including the law and order components; and create model databases for human rights field incorporating gender perspectives throughout.

(UN, 2001a; 44)

The need for effective training in gender issues was highlighted in the June 2001 response, with the report noting that as a result of insufficient attention being paid to gender issues, strained relations had developed between 'peacekeeping personnel and the host communities, between internationally and locally recruited staff and among internationally recruited staff themselves' (UN, 2001a; 29). By the time of the December 2001 report, the Secretary General noted that the DPKO had developed a training curriculum on 'gender awareness and sensitivity' for military and police contingents which had been tested four operations<sup>31</sup>. Such packages went hand in hand with packages designed for members of civilian UN staff. Both these areas have been assisted by the UN mandates that specifically address human rights and gender issues (discussed further below).

### **The institutional development of Peacebuilding in the UN**

Following on from the Brahimi Report, there has been a number of initiatives in the UN that attempt to institutionalise the peacebuilding components of operations, taking them far beyond the 'securitisation' tasks of traditional military peacekeeping. In turn, and significantly for this thesis, importance is attached to training as an 'enabler' for peacekeeping to transfer to peacebuilding. As outlined in the previous chapter, Last noted that there were two 'capability caps' in peacekeeping operations. The first was to control violence, or putting the

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<sup>31</sup> The operations were UNTAET (East Timor), UNMEE (Ethiopia/Eritrea), MONUC (DRC), and UNAMSIL (Sierra Leone).

'hawks in a box'; and, the second was 'our ability to rebuild the trust that permits cooperation *between* parties and lets the doves out of their boxes'. He argues that there is a gap between the skills of the organisations involved in peacekeeping operations and their physical capabilities. Whilst finding that the NGO communities have skills needed for peacebuilding but not the capabilities to reach small areas, Last finds that 'military peacekeeping deployments quickly reach small communities, but lack key peacebuilding skills, particularly those involving language, culture and relationship building' (Last, 2000; 85-87).

It is in this nexus where training needs go beyond the remit of the 'traditional military skills' of security and military operations. This crossover has most clearly been seen in the development of peacekeeping operations in Burundi and Sierra Leone. As the peacekeeping component of the UNAMSIL operation has been examined above, an overview of the peacebuilding component of the operation is now provided. On the 1<sup>st</sup> January 2006, The Peacekeeping operation, UNAMSIL was replaced by the peacebuilding operation, UNIOSIL (UN Integrated Office in Sierra Leone)<sup>32</sup>. At the heart of the UNIOSIL operation was a civilian-led peacebuilding mandate, which was designed to build on the negative peace of the UNAMSIL operation. UN Security Council Resolution 1620 mandated the operation to assist the government of Sierra Leone in a number of peacebuilding measures including:

building the capacity of State institutions to address further the root causes of the conflict, provide basic services and accelerate progress

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<sup>32</sup> UNIOSIL has since been replaced (after Security Council Resolution 1829 (2008)) by the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL).

towards the Millennium Development Goals through poverty reduction and sustainable economic growth, including through the creation of an enabling framework for private investment and systematic efforts to address HIV/AIDS.

(UN, 2005f)

The transition from the UNAMSIL operation, which at its height involved the deployment of over 17,000 peacekeepers, to the politically-led UNIOSIL operation demonstrates the new phase in peacekeeping operations, where the crossover between the military and political sections are crucial to the success of the operation. Speaking in 2005, Secretary General Kofi Annan noted that the UNAMSIL exit strategy gave a clear space for the establishment of UNIOSIL:

The Mission's exit strategy, which was based on a carefully calibrated gradual drawdown of the Mission's military component and guided by specific benchmarks, was also an innovative approach by the Security Council. This approach gave Sierra Leone the requisite security space to consolidate peace over the past three years.

(UN, 2005d)

Linking this to Last's observation made above, military peacekeepers are directly involved in the transition from security related tasks to those which promote development. In Sierra Leone, this was the case. In addition, a number of contingents deployed throughout the country applied their skills to develop

local capacities, both through providing extra security and through Quick Impact Projects<sup>33</sup> (UN, 2003b; 28). The UNAMSIL public opinion survey noted this:

Sierra Leoneans described that the UN peacekeepers had built roads and bridges, road networks, shelters, health centers, radio stations, schools, mosques, churches, and market structures. They gave out free medical care and medicine, free school supplies, food, and clothing. They built quality water wells, rehabilitated prisons, carried out night patrols, and built town clocks. All of this builds good will and trust with the local population. Building roads, schools, and other development projects enables people to strengthen their own capacities to be productive and return to normal life, ultimately contributing to peace.

(Kranso, 2005; 9)

Furthermore in 2005, General Assembly Resolution 60/180 and Security Council Resolution 1645 established the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) and Peacebuilding Fund (PBF). This again illustrates the drive to institutionalise peacebuilding in the UN. The PBC (which is supported by the PBSO and PBF) is comprised of 31 member countries<sup>34</sup>, and is mandated to:

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<sup>33</sup> Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) are small-scale projects carried out predominantly by military personnel. The Sierra Leone Lessons Learned report notes how QIPs were commonly used in 'potentially volatile areas', so that 'a peace dividend could be seen immediately' (UN 2003a; 28).

<sup>34</sup> The Full list of member countries: Seven from the Security Council (including the five permanent members); Seven from the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), giving particular consideration to countries with experience in post-conflict recovery; Five from the top 10 financial contributors to the UN budgets, including voluntary contributions to UN agencies and programs and the Peacebuilding Fund; Five from the top 10 providers of military personnel and civilian police to UN missions; and Seven additional members, to redress geographical imbalance and include countries with post-conflict experience, to be elected by the General Assembly.

focus attention on the reconstruction and institution-building efforts necessary for recovery from conflict and to support the development of integrated strategies in order to lay the foundation for sustainable development.

(UN, 2005g)

The crossover between peacekeeping and peacebuilding is apparent here, and can be linked to the UN's 'integrated missions' concept (outlined below) and developments in civil-military relations (outlined in the Chapter 3).

Therefore, at an institutional level, the UN is attempting to develop a 'system' to cover the development from peacekeeping to peacebuilding. Importantly, this highlights the importance the UN places on the transfer of 'negative peace' into 'positive 'peace'. Through these policies, the UN has also acknowledged that there is a fundamental shift of how long-term security is perceived and that this is based on more than a traditional military response. This development means there is an increased need for training to account for the crossover between the military and civilian aspects of peacekeeping operations. The effects that this has on the changing nature of UN training are discussed below, and the impact it has on specific training regimes is referred to throughout this thesis.

### **The integrated mission concept**

Linked to the developments outlined above, the integrated missions concept represents an institution-wide attempt by the UN Secretariat to offer a more

holistic approach to operations, and is related to attempts made in the UN to address causes of conflict (the peacebuilding tasks) whilst the peacekeeping deployment is taking place. It is important to recognise when examining UN practices, that the drive to integrate the security and civilian/political aspects of operations is high on the agenda. The integrated mission concept is a development from the 'linear' model of peacekeeping-peacebuilding which dominated UN thinking since Boutros-Ghali's *Agenda for Peace*, into a much more holistic concept, where peacebuilding activities begin as soon as an operation is deployed. The UN's 2006 *Integrated Missions Planning Process Guidelines* describe integration (in the context of a peacekeeping operation) as:

the guiding principle for the planning, design and implementation of complex UN operations in post-conflict situations, for linking the different dimensions of peace support operations (political, development, humanitarian, human rights, rule of law, social and security), and integrating the imperatives of each dimension into its strategic thinking and design;

(UN, 2006b; 3)

The development of this approach comes from the UN Secretariat wishing to implement structures to the *ad hoc* nature of relationships that have been built up in peacekeeping operations. It is also viewed by UN policymakers as a pragmatic response to difficulties encountered throughout the 1990's when the UN began attempts to develop its peacekeeping mechanisms so that operations could provide an increasingly all-encompassing approach to address

underlying causes of the conflict as well as providing the negative peace aspects. However, difficulties encountered in operations such as Somalia (which required a significant amount of aid delivery as well as the traditional security tasks) meant that the UN had to call on a much wider range of expertise than once envisaged. Jennings and Kaspersen argue that the impulse to move to integrated missions grew out of 'a conviction that the peacekeeping failures of the 1990's were at least partly attributable to the various elements of the UN acting separately, and occasionally at cross purposes' (Jennings and Kaspersen, 2008a; 445). The Brahimi Report noted these challenges and called for *integrated mission task forces* to coordinate peacekeeping operations. The task forces would comprise of a number of agencies including OCHA, DPA, UNHCR, and UNDP to name a few (UN, 1999a; 34). This process of linking the UN agencies has led to the concept of the integrated mission.

Since the Brahimi Report, the UN has placed increased emphasis on this concept of integrated missions. In 2005, the UN Executive Committee on Humanitarian Affairs (ECHA) commissioned a report to study the effectiveness of integrated missions, entitled *Report on Integrated Missions: Practical Perspectives and Recommendations*. This report found that integrated missions were an instrument needed to address situations which require 'a system-wide UN response' which encompasses a number of actors and approaches 'within an overall political-strategic crisis management framework'(Eide et al., 2005;

14). In 2006, Secretary General Kofi Annan outlined integrated missions as being based on a 'common strategic plan and a shared understanding of the priorities and types of programme interventions that need to be undertaken at various stages of the recovery process' (UN, 2006a; 1). His report, *Note of Guidance on Integrated Missions* develops this idea, commenting that clear understanding of the roles and responsibilities of different actors is required in order to ensure effective coordination between the mission, UN agencies and other external bodies. Though this concept places emphasis on the peacebuilding aspect of operations, the larger picture of military peacekeeping - as one component of a larger-scale operation (as seen in PSO doctrine) - is essential. This in turn emphasises the need for cooperation amongst different actors in a deployment. Secretary General Annan added that:

Successful recovery from conflict requires the engagement of a broad range of actors, including the national authorities and the local population, in a long-term peacebuilding effort. The rationale for the integration of activities undertaken by the United Nations is to assist countries to make this transition from conflict to sustainable peace. The UN's presence must therefore be based on a clear and shared understanding of priorities and willingness by all actors to contribute toward the achievement of peace.

(UN, 2006a; 1)

This process led to the adoption in 2006 of the *Integrated Missions Planning Process Guidelines*, as well as structural changes in the UN, including the

splitting of the DPKO into two different cells (which is discussed below) and the creation of Joint Mission Analysis Centres (JMACs) and Joint Operation Centres (JOCs). These changes have led Jennings and Kaspersen to conclude that integration 'seems to have become an entrenched principle that will guide the planning, development and implementation of UN peace operations in years to come' (Jennings and Kaspersen, 2008a; 446). In De Conning's view, the integrated mission concept provides a strong bond between the security functions of peacekeeping with wider peacebuilding tasks

integrated missions thus refers to 'integration' across the UN System, in that it combines the peace and security responsibilities of a UN peace operation with the development and humanitarian mandates typically represented in the UN Country Teams that are present in most developing countries, even in the absence of a conflict or natural disaster.

(De Conning, 2007)

This series of changes to the institutional culture at the UN shows the development of a more encompassing view of peacekeeping operations, which also incorporates the development of the PBC. However, like the development of peacebuilding, it also brings challenges to understandings of civil-military cooperation within a peacekeeping operation, and the consequences for training - an aspect of the integrated mission concept explored in the following chapter. Nevertheless, in order to outline the 'working culture' of the UN, it is

important to understand that integration is a driving force behind much of the operational developments in the organisation.

### ***UNSC Mandates and Cross cutting resolutions***

Analysing Security Council Resolutions is important for two reasons. Firstly, Security Council Resolutions create UN peacekeeping missions, give missions a series of objectives, and dictate how the mission should achieve those objectives. Secondly, Resolutions also offer norms and guidelines for peacekeepers to work under. This may be through specific Resolutions mandating operations, or through more general Resolutions, which cover thematic issues. Colonel Bob Stewart, who commanded the first British deployment in the UNPROFOR operation, said of UN mandates:

A founding principle of the United Nations is unanimity of purpose. But unanimity is impossible without compromise in any political system and the United Nations is most certainly that. For us in the field this means that any instructions we receive are likely to be a compromise between the aspirations of all the nations drafting out instructions. Mandates will thus normally be the sum of the 'bottom line' option that each state can accept. This is a fact of life and it is no good ranting and railing about it. We have to get on with the job. In my view people should be realistic and thankful when a mandate can be agreed. It is up to us in the field to implement the mandate in a practical way and interpret events on the ground in a way perhaps the Security Council cannot.

(Stewart, 1993; 315)

Security Council mandates are not always perfect. Mandates will continue to be, as Stewart said a 'bottom line' of the consensus of the Security Council, and the values they promote, will have a continued impact on what military peacekeepers need to know and how they carry out their tasks. A recent Foreign policy magazine article outlining the '10 Worst U.N. Security Council Resolutions Ever', included resolutions on sanctions, terrorism, land disputes, and the internal structures of the UN Peacekeeping operations which constituted four of the ten on the list, with two contemporary operations (Darfur and Somalia), and two 1990's operations (Rwanda and Bosnia) also highlighted (Lynch, 2010).

A small sample was taken of current UN missions to see where training appears<sup>35</sup>. This sample shows that training most notably appears in two distinct areas. Firstly, UN mandates refer to training as part of wider security sector reform programmes, or in building national capacities. For the MINURCAT operation, much reference was given to training the *Détachement intégré de sécurité* (DIS) (the Chadian gendarmerie) (UN, 2009j), as well as supporting efforts 'aimed at strengthening the capacity of the Governments of Chad and the Central African Republic and civil society' through training in international human rights standards (UN, 2007d). The UNAMID mandate (set out in the 2007 report of the Secretary General and the Chairperson of the African Union Commission), mandates UNAMID to train community police in camps for IDPs, as well as supporting the Government of Sudan in reconstructing the police

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<sup>35</sup> Operations were chosen at random from the 'current operations' section of the DPKO website: MINURCAT (Chad), UNAMID (Darfur), UNMIS (Sudan), UNMIL (Liberia), MONUC (DR Congo), MINUSTAH (Haiti).

force, which involves a degree of training and mentoring (UN, 2007a). Requests for training to support police reform were outlined in UNSCR 1812 which formed the basis of the UNMIS operation, (UN, 2008e) UNSCR 1509, which outlined the UNMIL operation (UN, 2003e), Resolutions 1493 and 1756, on the MONUC operation (UN, 2003d, UN, 2007c), and resolutions 1542 and 1780 , which both concerned the MINUSTAH operation in Haiti (UN, 2004e, UN, 2007e). Some resolutions are more explicit on what they wish to see trained: for example, resolution 1906 regarding the MONUC operation asked MONUC to provide military training in areas of human rights, international humanitarian law, child protection and the prevention of gender-based and sexual violence (UN, 2009m).

The second main area is linked to the UN's policy on prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse by UN personnel in the field. This is tackled in more detail in the next chapter, but it is worth noting that a considerable amount of reference to training is made with regard to training being one of a number of strategies designed to stop peacekeepers transgressing. Resolution 1712 (UNMIL) offers an example of the wording used with regards to training:

6. Welcomes the efforts undertaken by UNMIL to implement the Secretary-General's zero tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuse and to ensure full compliance of its personnel with the United Nations code of conduct, and requests the Secretary-General to take all necessary action in this regard and to keep the Security Council informed, and urges troop-contributing countries to take appropriate

preventive action, including the conduct of predeployment awareness training, and to take disciplinary and other action to ensure that allegations of sexual exploitation or abuse against their personnel are properly investigated and, if substantiated, punished  
(UN, 2006d)

In varying degrees, this appears in all resolutions that mandate operations. It may be more direct in some cases, such as in the case of MONUC where allegations were made against UN troops serving in that particular mission, but it remains a constant feature in all operations.

Returning to the UNAMSIL operation, one mandate that specifically mentioned training was the resolution establishing UNAMSIL. Resolution 1270, passed under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, was very specific about what training should be carried out for UNAMSIL personnel. The Security Council underlined the importance of training UNAMSIL personnel in 'international humanitarian, human rights and refugee law, including child and gender-related provisions, negotiation and communication skills, cultural awareness and civilian-military coordination' (UN, 1999g). This resolution appears to be the exception rather than the rule on UN mandates, and (as was shown in the Brahimi report) it is debatable how effective the mandate was in influencing the deployment of fully trained troops throughout the mission, as it suffered almost catastrophic failure in the summer of 2000.

In addition to the two recurring themes within mandates, there has been the evolution of what have been termed 'cross cutting resolutions'. These resolutions are focussed on three overarching themes: Children in armed conflict; Protection of civilians in armed conflict; Women and peace and security and will be examined below.

### **Children in armed conflict**

This thematic area has seen eight resolutions passed through the UN Security Council, beginning with UNSCR 1261 (UN, 1999e), which requests that the Secretary General ensure that UN peacekeeping personnel have access to 'appropriate training on the protection, rights and welfare of children', and urges states, regional and international organisations to ensure that 'appropriate training' is included for personnel involved in similar activities. Security Council Resolution 1314 (UN, 2000e) builds on this by calling for child protection staff to be included in operations, and the provision of training to personnel about the rights of women and children. In 2001, UNSCR 1379 added that training is required in where international human rights, humanitarian and refugee law has a relevant impact on children (as well as assessing at the impact of HIV/AIDS) (UN, 2001c).

Since UNSCR 1379, the Security Council has mainly passed resolutions that reiterate the need for effective measures to deal with children in armed conflict. Resolution 1460, passed in 2003, calls for an 'era of application' of international norms and standards pertaining to the protection of children affected by armed conflict, and repeated the need to have effective training in child protection

issues (UN, 2003f). However, Resolution 1539 (passed in April 2004), noted with some concern the lack of progress on the ground, where 'parties to conflict continue to violate with impunity the relevant provisions of applicable international law relating to the rights and protection of children in armed conflict' (UN, 2004d). Despite three more resolutions being passed after Resolution 1539, it was only Resolution 1612 which dealt specifically with training. However, this was (like many of the mission-specific mandates), as part of a wider call for UN peacekeeping to deal with allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse (UN, 2005e).

### **Protection of civilians in armed conflict**

As the introduction to this thesis outlines, mandates pertaining to the protection of civilians in armed conflict was a watershed moment in international peacekeeping efforts. Linked to the development of more narrow conceptions of human security, these resolutions also offer a good indication of what the Security Council deems to be adequate training for effective protection of civilians in conflict zones. Importantly, Resolutions 1265 and 1296, give a quality outline, offering an opening for 'contact skills' in operations. This is a critical statement in charting the impact of non-traditional skills in policy circles. Resolution 1265 states the following:

14. *Requests* the Secretary-General to ensure that United Nations personnel involved in peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace-building activities have appropriate training in international humanitarian, human rights and refugee law, including child and gender-related provisions,

negotiation and communication skills, cultural awareness and civilian-military coordination, and urges States and relevant international and regional organizations to ensure that appropriate training is included in their programmes for personnel involved in similar activities; (UN, 1999f)

Resolution 1296 develops this by further requesting that the Secretary General to ensure that UN personnel have appropriate training, and urging that member states to disseminate 'appropriate instructions' and to 'ensure appropriate training' is included for peacekeeping personnel (UN, 2000d). Resolutions 1674 and 1738 (both passed in 2006) make little reference to training for military peacekeepers, focussing mainly on protection of journalists and media personnel and calling on parties to respect civilian protection issues (UN, 2006c, UN, 2006e). On the tenth anniversary of Resolution 1265, the Security Council passed Resolution 1894, which restated the need for appropriate training for personnel in issues of civilian protection, as well as requesting member states to configure training programmes to raise awareness and responsiveness to issues of civilian protection, and, reflecting the 'trends' in mandates since UNSCR 1265, 'including training on HIV/AIDS and zero tolerance of sexual exploitation and abuse in UN peacekeeping missions' (UN, 2009l).

### **Women and peace and security**

Four resolutions have been passed on the topic of 'women and peace and security' since the landmark UNSCR 1325, passed in 2000. Resolution 1325

made a direct reference to training for peacekeeping operations, requesting the Secretary General to:

provide to Member States training guidelines and materials on the protection, rights and the particular needs of women, as well as on the importance of involving women in all peacekeeping and peace-building measures,

It also invited member states to incorporate such elements into training, as well as HIV/AIDS training, into national training programmes (UN, 2000f). Resolution 1820, passed in June 2008 focused on women being targets of violence, and requested the Secretary General (alongside Security Council, the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and its Working Group and relevant States) to develop training programmes to help peacekeepers 'better prevent, recognize and respond to sexual violence and other forms of violence against civilians'. Furthermore, it also requested the Secretary General to develop training as part of a strategy to combat sexual exploitation and abuse, to ensure 'full accountability in cases of such conduct involving their personnel' (UN, 2008f).

Resolution 1888 reiterated the need for training and guidance for personnel in the area of addressing sexual violence in conflict zones, as well as asking for greater training in terms of combating sexual exploitation and abuse. In addition, the resolution encouraged member states to deploy a greater number

of female military (and police) personnel, and to provide peacekeepers with adequate training to 'carry out their responsibilities' (UN, 2009k).

Such cross-cutting resolutions have an influence on deployed operations, and have impacted the training needs for military peacekeepers. Immediately, one can identify an increased need to understand international humanitarian and human rights law, particularly pertaining to civilians in armed combat, and women and children. Furthermore, the responsibility to protect civilians in areas of armed combat has led to increased training requirements, with soldiers being required to provide a greater deal of accompaniment to civilians, as well as increasing patrols in civilian areas. This is apparent in the Secretary General's 2009 progress report on the MONUC operation, in which the Secretary General stated that as part of the protection of civilians mandate, the mission 'has also continued to patrol key axes to facilitate the safe delivery of humanitarian assistance, and has provided armed escorts on market days to ensure that villagers can travel to and from the marketplace' (UN, 2009c). This has led to a notable development in the training requirements for UN peacekeepers. At a recent United Nations Association Conference, the Special Representative of the Secretary General for the MONUC operation, Alan Doss, explained that such accompaniment and protection has led to a recognised need for contingents to communicate on a more regular basis with the civilian population, and this has led to a development in training (Doss, 2010). Nevertheless, intentions from the Security Council can be vague, and gaps remain over *how* operations implement protection mandates. A DPKO

commissioned report into the operationalisation of measures designed to meet the needs of civilian protection notes how this impacts on training.

These gaps [in understanding the Security Council's intentions] also manifest themselves in the extremely limited training that... uniformed personnel receive on the protection of civilians prior to deployment. This leaves senior mission leaders and contingent commanders to make decisions about mission strategy and tactics in the absence of clear guidance from the Council, the Secretariat, Member States or the General Assembly's Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C-34). Even the ability of talented senior leaders to craft coherent approaches is compromised by issues of preparedness, as they often serve without a clear understanding of what protection of civilians mandates mean, how it is to be addressed and whether it is a priority (Holt and Taylor, 2009; 8)

Thus through the Brahimi recommendations, the incorporation of peacebuilding at an institutional phase, the process of integrated missions, and the cross cutting resolutions, a picture emerges illustrating the driving force behind the internal processes in the UN. It is now worth examining how these have impacted the set up of bodies to assist peacekeeping operations in the organisation, and how the UN's training body is institutionally placed to deal with new challenges.

### **Further restructuring of the DPKO**

In his 2007 report to the General Assembly, Secretary General Ban Ki-moon<sup>36</sup> reported that the 'aggressive reform' of the UN peacekeeping machinery instigated by the Brahimi Report had by and large brought 'large successes' to the organisation, and the missions that it deploys. The Secretary General further added that with the expansion in operations in the immediate aftermath of the Brahimi Report, there was a need for a new five-year agenda to be coordinated. This came in the form of 'Peace Operations 2010', which identified five areas that required 'priority attention'. These were: doctrine; personnel; partnerships; organisation and; resources.

A significant change to the UN's capacities came at the headquarters' level, with a reconfiguration of the DPKO itself, and creation of the Department of Field Support. The following section highlights these changes in order to demonstrate how the UN, at a structural level, has placed training within the wider scheme of the DPKO. Firstly, the descriptions of these new departments are provided. Box 2.1 (below) outlines what the Secretary General envisages as the new setup of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations:

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<sup>36</sup> Ban Ki-moon replaced Kofi Annan as Secretary General of the UN in January 2007.

**Box 2.1: DPKO and Field Support, as outlined by the Secretary General in the Comprehensive report on strengthening the capacity of the United Nations to manage and sustain peace operations<sup>37</sup>**

(UN, 2007b; 24)

**The DPKO**

*The Department of Peacekeeping Operations would continue to plan, direct, manage and provide political and substantive guidance to all field operations currently under the responsibility of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. The Department would lead the integrated planning process, assisting in the development of a comprehensive United Nations approach to the resolution of conflict and ensuring that all components of mission planning — policy, support, military, police and civilian elements — work together to provide efficient and coherent support to the field as well as an identifiable and accountable interlocutor for Member States and both United Nations and non-United Nations partners. The Department would be responsible for the conduct and management of peacekeeping operations and policy issues, including the continued development of best practices, guidance and procedures that would form the basis for the design and delivery of peacekeeping training programmes. It would manage the Secretariat's interaction with troop- and police-contributing countries and reporting to the Security Council as well as to the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations.*

**The DFS**

*The Department of Field Support would be responsible for delivering dedicated support to United Nations field operations, including on personnel, finance, procurement, logistical, communications, information technology and other administrative and general management issues. The Department of Field Support would be a provider of services to the Departments of Peacekeeping Operations and Political Affairs. To strengthen the efficiency and coherence of support provided to the field and to ensure effective oversight, existing Headquarters capacities related to field operations would be consolidated and assigned to the Department of Field Support*

Thus the DPKO is separated into two distinct divisions: one division to deal with the policy of peacekeeping, and the other to deal with the logistics and procurement aspects. Between these two departments is the 'Policy, Evaluation

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<sup>37</sup> The descriptions are taken directly from the report.

and Training Division'. This division, as described by the Secretary General provides an

integrated capacity for the development of peace operation doctrine and policy, informed by the systematic capturing of best practices and lessons learned, the standardization, design and delivery of training based upon doctrine and/or policy and the evaluation of mission performance in implementing mandates.

(UN, 2007b; 21)

The rationale for creating the division was the continued call from member states to have lessons learned capacities closely allied with creating common doctrine and training. The division remains central to the two Departments, and is planned to facilitate the sharing of 'policy development, common doctrine, best practices and evaluation and training capacities', and ensure that 'common approaches and standards' are applied in both the DPKO, DFS, and also within missions. Thus a number of departments (the Peacekeeping Best Practices Section and the Integrated Training Service as well as new Evaluation and Partnerships Sections) were amalgamated into one that is responsible for the evaluation of best practices, lessons learned, doctrinal guidance, and development of common training standards. This change is significant, as it has placed training at the centre of the DPKO. Consequently, this means that the Integrated Training Service is ideally placed to draw on lessons from operations and have a critical impact on DPKO practices.

## ***The impact: The ITS Training Strategy and Strategic Training Needs Assessment***

Within the new structure, the Integrated Training Service (now part of the Policy, Evaluation and Training Division) developed a training strategy. The strategy, created in May 2008, had six main areas:

- Centralised structure focussing on defined strategic priorities
- Set standards, develop policies and provide guidance
- Oversight
- ITS role in training development and delivery
- Decentralisation of substantive or technical training
- Link training to doctrine
- Leverage information technology and partnerships

The first stage of this plan was to assess training needs, to 'identify current and future training priorities' (UN, 2008d; 3) in the field. This would mean a regular training evaluation exercise (every three or five years), resulting in the development of training standards. The strategy also outlined how it would enhance support to field missions and member states, how to develop leadership and management training, how training will become 'integrated and prioritized' in the UN system, and finally how partnerships and information technology will be used effectively. In order for the ITS to demonstrate its

progress, there is now a permanent web link to the progress made in the ITS' strategic planning<sup>38</sup> (UN, 2008d).

The first step in this re-envisaging of peacekeeping was the *Strategic Training Needs Assessment*, which was carried out in order to identify gaps in the skills and knowledge required for peacekeepers to be able to carry out their jobs effectively and also to identify where training has succeeded in equipping peacekeepers. This also illustrates the desire of military peacekeepers for increased levels of training aligned with conflict resolution skills.

Almost 6,000 peacekeepers from seventeen different operations responded to the web survey, which constituted a major part of the data collection<sup>39</sup>. From this figure, 11% came from the military, 64% from civilian backgrounds, and 25% from the Police. Military respondents covered a wide range of professions within the UN system, ranging from higher-ranking soldiers on secondment to the UN, to members of a contingent, observers, and commanders<sup>40</sup>.

In order to continue charting the training requirements of military peacekeepers, this chapter therefore focuses on the military respondents. It is important to

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<sup>38</sup><http://www.peacekeepingbestpractices.unlb.org/pbps/Pages/Public/viewprimarydoc.aspx?docid=757> - referenced 4<sup>th</sup> May 2010.

<sup>39</sup> Data for the needs assessment was gathered in the following ways: Interviews and panel meetings held with peacekeeping personnel in the field and headquarters, including senior leadership, IMTC field trainers, and UN peacekeeping partners; Web-based survey for all peacekeeping personnel; Surveys collected from member states and national and regional peacekeeping training institutions; Consultations held with member states and national and regional peacekeeping training institutions as well as IMTC field trainers.

<sup>40</sup> The full list of military professions who responded: On secondment at the D level or above to UN HQ or to a Peacekeeping mission by a member state; On secondment at the P level to UN HQ or to a peacekeeping mission by a member state; International staff contracted at the D level or above (employed by the UN); International staff contracted at the P level (employed by the UN); Contingent member; Contingent commander; Military observer; Staff officer in a PKO/UNHQ.

recognise the importance of this particular training survey, insofar that it is one of the few training surveys which has taken into account the views of a wide range of military peacekeepers from a number of contingents in a number of operations (UN, 2008b; 4).

### **A note about Standard Generic Training Materials**

The Standard Generic Training Materials (SGTMs) were the principle pre-deployment training modules for UN peacekeepers up until May 2009. The SGTMs were focussed on three main areas, dependant on the level of military personnel being trained. Level 1 SGTMs were aimed at soldiers at officer level, and consisted of thirteen modules<sup>41</sup> covering a wide range of topics pertinent to peacekeeping operations.

The authors of the assessment found that there were significant weaknesses in the provision of pre-deployment training, as provided by the SGTMs. The authors found that that the SGTM content 'is too generic and voluminous, and does not adequately address key operational and mission-specific challenges' (UN, 2008b; 7). This was based on the finding in the report that less than 40% of military and police personnel indicated that the topics in the SGTMs were 'useful and applicable' to their jobs.

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<sup>41</sup> The list is as follows: 1a - The UN system; 1b - UN peacekeeping operations; 2 - structure of UN Peacekeeping Operations; 3 - Legal frameworks for UN peacekeeping operations; 4 - Stress management; 5a - Code of Conduct/Code of Conduct Case Studies; 5b - Cultural awareness; 5c - Gender and peacekeeping; 5d Child protection; 6 - Personal security awareness; 7 - Landmines and UXO Awareness; 8 - Human rights for peacekeepers (inc. human rights roles for peacekeepers and human rights exercise; 9 - Humanitarian assistance; 10 - UN Civil-military coordination; 11 Communication & Negotiation; 12; Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration; 13 - Media relations.

On the issue of what topics were addressed by the UN and how this relates to the training needs of personnel, Tables 2.1 and 2.2 offer an insight into the training needs identified by soldiers when compared to the level of training that they are receiving. Table 1 examines the top five topics that military personnel have received training on:

**Table 2.1: Top five topics which military personnel have received training on**

<b>Topics - TOP 5</b>	<b>I received training on this topic</b>
HIV/AIDS	84.10%
Prevention of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse	83.10%
Code of Conduct	82.90%
Introduction to United Nations Peace Operations	80.70%
Introduction to the United Nations System	80.20%

(UN, 2008a; 7):

Notable in this list is HIV/AIDS training, training in Prevention of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse, and the Code of Conduct. This is linked to developments in UN policy and mandates, which all strongly emphasise the need for a comprehensive approach to prevention of indiscretion from peacekeepers (as seen above). Thus the impact of these policies and mandates has had on the training regime can be observed. However, if one looks at Table 2.2, which examines the Top five subjects which military

peacekeepers deem to be ‘relevant’ to their work, a different conclusion can be reached:

**Table 2.2: Top five topics which military personnel deem to be relevant to their work**

<b>Topics - TOP 5</b>	<b>Training on this topic is relevant to my job</b>
Introduction to United Nations Peace Operations	40.10%
Structure of UN peace Operations	38.40%
Communication and Negotiation	37.20%
Introduction to the United Nations System	36.70%
Code of Conduct	36.60%

(UN, 2008a; 7)

Here, it is immediately obvious that the need to train military personnel in HIV/AIDS and Prevention of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse is not shared by the personnel who have responded to the questionnaire. One can speculate about the absence of training on prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse: possibly because of the relatively small (but significant) number of peacekeepers who were involved in the abuse scandals may not be representative of the wider military community; or it could represent a trend in the military that sexual exploitation and abuse is not seen as important as it is to other parts of the UN. Nevertheless, training is still of critical importance on this topic and is examined further in Chapter 4.

Also notable from this list is that 'Communication and Negotiation' is in the top five of subjects which military personnel believe to be pertinent to their job. This can be linked to a question in the survey which asked peacekeeping training institutions whether there were any additional topics to be added to the pre-deployment training roster. One topic which was cited was 'communication and language skills (UN, 2008b; 8). Taking this on board, one can conclude that there exists a recognised need in the military community for communication and negotiation skills to be taught to soldiers. This desire for better training in communication skills certainly echoes much of the academic theory discussed in Chapter two, and is a constant theme throughout this thesis - whether it is improving civil military cooperation, relating with the local population, or in negotiation contexts.

Furthermore, soldiers were asked a more open-ended question pertaining to what subjects were more and less relevant to their jobs. These are outlined in tables 2.3 and 2.4 below:

**Table 2.3: Training Relevance**  
(UN, 2008a; 15)

<b>Training on this topic is less relevant for my job</b>
Results-based budgeting
Contract management
Managing human resources (including recruitment)
Procurement rules and regulations
Gender Mainstreaming
Project Management
Project Development
Project Implementation
Reducing exposure to the risks of fraud and abuse
Compliance with financial and other accountability rules and regulations

Much of Table 2.3 pertains to ‘administrative tasks’ such as budgeting, contracts management, human resources and procurement, but also involves two areas which at first would appear to be important to military personnel - ‘Gender mainstreaming’ and ‘Reducing exposure to the risks of fraud and abuse’. However, it is in table 2.4 where there appears another considerable gap in the training needs for military personnel in peacekeeping operations. This table shows the areas that constitute a ‘top priority’ for peacekeepers:

**Table 2.4: Training Priorities**  
(UN, 2008a; 15)

<b>Training on this topic is a top priority for my job</b>
Mission Mandate/DPKO and DFS Role/Mandate
Different cultural norms of mission staff and host country customs
Code of Conduct of UN peacekeeping staff
Cross-cultural communication skills
Team building
Security in the field
Conflict Resolution skills
Report Writing
Authority, command and control in the mission
Negotiation skills

Importantly, this table highlights a considerable number of areas akin to skills drawn from the conflict resolution field (including one topic entitled ‘conflict resolution skills’). Understanding cultural norms and customs (and how to communicate effectively between them), team building, and negotiation skills all point to non-traditional skills being at the forefront of the needs of military personnel in peacekeeping operations. This is a critical finding, as it demonstrates (alongside Table 2.2) that military peacekeepers feel that they require further ‘contact skills’ in order to carry out their job effectively, and that gaps still exist in training provision for non-traditional skills. Through analysing training programmes in negotiation, cross cultural communication (manifested in civil-military cooperation and negotiation with the host population), and

understanding different cultural norms (most clearly illustrated in civil-military cooperation), this thesis contributes by providing analysis of these critical areas.

As well as looking at the topics and skill-sets related to peacekeeping, the survey also examines the methods of teaching peacekeeping skills to military (and other) personnel. Survey respondents were asked to indicate from a list of learning methods that were the ones they considered to be most effective for peacekeeping training. The military responses are outlined below in Table 2.5.

**Table 2.5: Learning Methods**  
(UN, 2008a; 26)

<b>This learning method would be effective for peacekeeping learning</b>
"Lessons learned" case studies
Simulations or scenario-based learning
Teaching others/sharing my experience
Cross-training/exchange with other sections
Exchange programmes between field and HQ

Added to this, table 2.6 illustrates firstly what peacekeeping training centres' believe to be the most effective forms of training peacekeepers, and to what extent such methods are used:

**Table 2.6: The most effective learning methods for delivering peacekeeping pre-deployment training according to PKTI<sup>42</sup> respondents**

<b>Learning method</b>	<b>This method is effective</b>	<b>Our institution uses this method</b>
Encouraging participants to share their experiences	63%	77%
Inviting guest experts and specialists	63%	82%
Classroom instruction	63%	83%
Simulation or scenario based learning	58%	70%
Lessons learned case studies	57%	67%
Audio-visual/CD/DVD/Tape	57%	77%
Hands-on Practice	55%	63%
Mentoring/coaching system	33%	40%
Exchange programmes	32%	32%
Facilitating the shadowing of experienced personnel	27%	43%
Distance Learning	23%	17%
E-learning programmes	22%	25%

(UN, 2008a; 46)

These tables demonstrate that understanding *how* programmes train military peacekeepers is a critical facet of any wider attempt to understand training. The results of both tables reveal a preference for a wide range of learning methods.

<sup>42</sup> Peacekeeping Training Institute.

Hence there is a defined need to understand to what extent methods of learning assist military peacekeepers. The analysis of civil-military cooperation in the following chapter illustrates a desire for joint training with military and civilian bodies. Observations of training programmes to enhance soldiers' awareness of civil-military cooperation training and negotiation highlight the benefits of simulations/scenario-based learning. They also show that room exists for what Lederach terms as *elicitive* responses, based on the knowledge of the participant, as opposed to the trainer<sup>43</sup>. The thesis further contributes by outlining the development of e-learning programmes in Chapter six. There is also significance attached to the type of learning for military peacekeepers, and how more *elicitive* approaches aid the development of military peacekeepers. This critical area will be analysed in Chapter six.

From this assessment, the report's authors found that there exists a 'strong belief' amongst peacekeeping personnel - including military, civilian and police - that training is 'essential to carrying out their tasks effectively' (UN, 2008b; 20). The authors also found that although there is a keen interest in peacekeeping training, there exists 'serious gaps' at all levels of provision. Thus there was a need to 'review, update and streamline' the existing pre-deployment curriculum, in order for it to reflect DPKO/DFS policy and doctrine. It was also found that additional specialist pre-deployment training materials covering mission specific information (UN, 2008b; 20). Moreover, there appeared to be a development into the e-learning field from the training needs assessment. The conclusions of the report outlined the desire to develop an 'online toolbox' for peacekeepers,

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<sup>43</sup> Lederach's *elicitive* approach is analysed in more depth in Chapter 4.

which would include case studies, videos, photos, testing and evaluation tools, and e-learning tools. In addition, was the concept of developing 'online communities of practice', and using the Internet to facilitate communication between operations and personnel.

## **The Core Pre-Deployment Training Materials**

A significant result of the needs assessment was the replacement, in May 2009, of the SGTMS with the Core Pre-Deployment Training Materials (CPTMs). The CPTMs thus provide the latest attempt to impart the 'essential knowledge' required for peacekeeping personnel - military, police and civilian - to function effectively in a UN operation, and provide them with a 'shared understanding of the basic principles, guidelines and policies of UN peacekeeping to ensure that UN peacekeeping operations can function effectively in a coherent manner' (UN, 2009b; 1). They have been in use since 2009, when they were introduced to replace the Standard Generic Training Modules, resulting from a recognised need in the DPKO that 'training materials needed to be updated to reflect newly developed policies within DPKO and DFS and made more relevant to the work of peacekeeping personnel in the field' (UN, 2009b; 1)<sup>44</sup>.

Thus, as part of the overhaul of training that has been undertaken in the UN, the CPTMs form one part of a set of 'comprehensive pre-deployment training standards' for all categories of personnel, and are designed to go hand in hand

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<sup>44</sup> Although the SGTMs have been replaced, they represent a considerable amount of the *existing* knowledge that is in the UN system at the present time, so throughout the thesis, specific SGTM modules are referred to. However, as this chapter is examining the recent changes that are being undertaken in the UN, it focuses specifically on the CPTM programme.

with what are termed as ‘specialized training materials’, which will focus on specific skills. The materials are not intended to be as specialised as the SGTMs, which had a curriculum of more specific modules, and thus cover a more broad range of topics<sup>45</sup>. They are split into four distinct units. These are described in Box 2.2 below:

**Box 2.2 : UN CPTM Units - official descriptions**

(UN, 2009b)

**Unit 1: A Strategic Level overview of United Nations Peacekeeping**

‘Addresses strategic level issues and outlines the basic definitions and rationale for United Nations peace and security activities, while familiarizing participants with the fundamental principles of UN peacekeeping.’

Part 1 - Introduction to UN Peacekeeping

Part 2 - Fundamental Principles of UN Peacekeeping

**Unit 2: The Establishment and functioning of UN Peacekeeping Operations**

‘Moves from the strategic to the operational level, by explaining how the Security Council establishes mandates for UN peacekeeping operations and how those are operationalized by the UN Secretariat and the mission leadership. It also familiarizes participants with key elements of command and control in UN peacekeeping and mission management structures.’

Part 1 - Establishment and Operationalization of Security Council Mandates in Peacekeeping Operations

Part 2 - How United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Function

**Unit 3: Effective Mandate Implementation**

‘Addresses those cross-cutting issues which all peacekeeping personnel must know to implement their mandate effectively at the operational level to ensure sustainable peace and an eventual handover to local actors and the UN Country Team (UNCT).’

Part 1a - International Law Relevant to Peacekeeping Operations

Part 1b - Human rights Protection in UN Peacekeeping Operations

Part 1c - Women, Peace and Security: The Role of UN Peacekeeping Operations

Part 1d - Protection of Children: the Role of UN Peacekeeping Operations

Part 2 - Working with Mission Partners

**Unit 4: Standards, Values and Safety of UN Peacekeeping Personnel**

‘Addresses policies and procedures related to individual peacekeeping personnel. (Tactical level issues will be addressed primarily in induction training because they are mandate-specific.)’

Part 1 - Conduct and discipline

Part 2 - HIV/AIDS and UN Peacekeeping Operations

Part 3 - Respect for Diversity

Part 4 - Safety and Security

<sup>45</sup> The CPTMs are to be supplemented by ‘Specialised Training Materials’ (STMs), but at the time of writing they have not become available.

The contents of the CPTMs illustrate how the UN has responded to the needs assessment explained above. The CPTM curriculum contains a great deal of information on how peacekeeping operations work at a strategic level, and the impacts this has on the ground. Returning to Table 2.2 (outlined above), the five topics that military personnel felt were the most relevant to their job were:

- Introduction to UN peace operations
- Structure of UN peace operations
- Communication and negotiation
- Introduction to the United Nations system
- Code of conduct

The modules in the CPTMs reflect this to some extent, with the first two units explaining the background of peacekeeping operations at the strategic level, and the third unit explaining the impact of the UN's cross cutting resolutions on peacekeeping operations. It also reflects the need outlined by Colonel Bob Stewart (discussed earlier in the chapter) for the 'bottom line' nature of UN mandates to be further understood. In turn, units three and four examine the more operational aspects of peacekeeping deployment, and how to put some of the more strategic policies, such as increased awareness of human rights and international humanitarian law, into practice. Throughout the fieldwork chapters of this thesis there is reference to specific parts of the CPTM programme, in particular where it covers civil-military cooperation, negotiation skills, and the requirements for cross-cultural communication.

With regard to assessment and supplementary work, the CPTMs encourage tutors and instructors to supplement units with their own activities and resources, plus offer the option of assessment to be a more formal or informal process (the informal being based on group discussion amongst participants). Moreover, the CPTM package advises that different training modules have different instructor profiles. Such profiles range from instructors who understand the UN, and its history, those who have had personal experience in the UN, those who have a 'thorough understanding' of international humanitarian and human rights law - particularly in relation to the rights of women and children, and those who have had dealings with cases of misconduct. Although this is a tough challenge to get such a range of instructors, it does at least show that in the training guidelines, the UN is asking trainers to take seriously their obligations to training for peacekeeping operations (UN, 2009b; 3-7). The CPTMs are referred to through the thesis, notably in Chapters four and five, which specifically deal with fieldwork case studies.

### **United Nations' Principles and Guidelines**

Linked to the changes in training, the DPKO created the 'United Nations Principles and Guidelines', (which in its earlier guises was known as the 'Capstone Doctrine'). The intention of the Principles and Guidelines is to 'articulate the principles and concepts for the full spectrum of the multi-dimensional UN peacekeeping Operations conducted today' (Solinas, 2007). In doing so, they offer an indication of what the DPKO believes to be the current and future projections are in peacekeeping operations - what they term as the 'scope and core business' of deployment (UN, 2008c; 9). However, the

Principles and Guidelines is clear in its restrictions, outlining that it is not a doctrine which seeks to override military doctrines of individual member states, or a doctrine which covers military tactics, techniques and procedures. This has led some to question their doctrinal strength (Gowan, 2008; 466).

The main intention of the Principles and Guidelines is 'to support civilian, police and military personnel who are training and preparing to serve in United Nations peacekeeping operations' (UN, 2008c; 9-10). Throughout, there are references to the need for awareness of a whole host of issues that are common in deployment zones, but not fully related to the traditional needs of soldiers.

To start, the Principles and Guidelines outline the 'Normative Framework' of UN peacekeeping operations, and what this framework means for peacekeepers. As well as outlining the three cross cutting themes<sup>46</sup>, the principles and guidelines are clear in stating that peacekeepers must possess a 'clear understanding of the principles and rules of international humanitarian law and observe them in situations where they apply' (UN, 2008c; 15-16).

The Principles and Guidelines then move onto defining the spectrum of peace operations, and offers the following definitions for peacekeeping, peacebuilding and peace-enforcement.

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<sup>46</sup> Women and Peace and Security, Children in Armed Conflict, Protection of civilians in armed conflict.

**Box 2.3: How the UN Principles and Guidelines Define Peace operations<sup>47</sup>**  
(UN, 2008c; 18)

*Peacekeeping is a technique designed to preserve the peace, however fragile, where fighting has been halted, and to assist in implementing agreements achieved by the peacemakers... peacekeeping has evolved from a primarily military model of observing cease-fires and the separation of forces after inter-state wars, to incorporate a complex model of many elements – military, police and civilian –working together to help lay the foundations for sustainable peace.*

*Peace enforcement involves the application, with the authorization of the Security Council, of a range of coercive measures, including the use of military force. Such actions are authorized to restore international peace and security in situations where the Security Council has determined the existence of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression. The Security Council may utilize, where appropriate, regional organizations and agencies for enforcement action under its authority.*

*Peacebuilding involves a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and to lay the foundation for sustainable peace and development. Peacebuilding is a complex, long-term process of creating the necessary conditions for sustainable peace. It works by addressing the deep-rooted, structural causes of violent conflict in a comprehensive manner. Peacebuilding measures address core issues that effect the functioning of society and the State, and seek to enhance the capacity of the State to effectively and legitimately carry out its core functions.*

Added to this (in the glossary) is the definition of ‘robust peacekeeping’. This is an important addition to the peacekeeping lexicon. It is defined as:

The use of force by a United Nations peacekeeping operation at the tactical level, with the authorization of the Security Council, to defend its

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<sup>47</sup> Definitions taken directly from the Principles and Guidelines.

mandate against spoilers whose activities pose a threat to civilians or risk undermining the peace process.

(UN, 2008c; 98)

This demonstrates an attempt to define the 'grey area' between peacekeeping and peace enforcement, carrying a serious impact on the peacekeepers themselves and the rules of engagement that they are sent out to employ whilst deployed. The Principles and Guidelines outline this by stating the differences: robust peacekeeping maintains the consent of the host government and/or the main parties to the conflict; peace enforcement may involve the use of force at a 'strategic or international level'. However, the Principles and Guidelines recognise that the line between robust forms of peacekeeping and peace enforcement may become 'blurred' at some times, especially when in the midst of a deployment. The level of force in a peacekeeping operation is not the only 'blurred line' that the Principles and Guidelines outline. Every activity - be it peacekeeping, robust peacekeeping, or peacebuilding - operates in a fluid environment, and according to the Principles and Guidelines although they mutually reinforce each other when carried out effectively, the system has limitations in combining such activities, which has caused critical gaps in the international response, resulting in further threats to international peace and security. Thus it is critical that peacekeepers understand the inherent difficulties that they are deployed into (UN, 2008c; 19). Leading on from this is research into the 'type' of soldier this is creating - one who has a more nuanced view of the complexities and 'grey areas' of the deployment zone<sup>48</sup>. This again has a

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<sup>48</sup> This is further discussed in Chapter six.

critical impact on training, and also has an impact on decision-making frameworks for the soldiers themselves.

The issue of rules of engagement and use of force returns again when the Principles and Guidelines examine the principles that direct UN peacekeeping operations. The basic values which the Principles and Guidelines offer are similar to some of the fundamental ideas that have guided operations since their inception, but with one notable difference. The principles espoused are: consent of the parties; impartiality; non-use of force except in self-defence and defence of the mandate (UN, 2008c; 31). Notable here is the add-on of 'defence of the mandate' as an exception to the non-use of force. This is where more open interpretations of the use of force are introduced into the Principles and Guidelines. There are a number of areas where this can be pointed out. With regard to consent, the Principles and Guidelines offer a similar approach to that of the Brahimi Report by arguing that:

Universality of consent becomes even less probable in volatile settings, characterized by the presence of armed groups not under the control of any of the parties, or by the presence of other spoilers.

(UN, 2008c; 32)

Bearing this in mind, the Principles and Guidelines argue that deployment zones are often characterised by the 'presence of militias, criminal gangs, and other spoilers who may actively seek to undermine the peace process or pose a threat to the civilian population' (UN, 2008c; 34). Therefore there is an identified

need for robust forms of peacekeeping to be deployed, where mandates will ask the operation to use 'all necessary means' to deter attempts to disrupt an agreed peace process, protect civilians, or assist local authorities in maintaining law and order. The Principles and Guidelines offer a positive outline of how force can be used:

By proactively using force in defense of their mandates, these United Nations peacekeeping operations have succeeded in improving the security situation and creating an environment conducive to longer-term peacebuilding in the countries where they are deployed.

(UN, 2008c; 34-35)

The military must therefore be able to show a high degree of discretion in the use of force, and possess a considerable knowledge of when force can be used 'proactively' in order to help a peace process. One could argue though that this 'proactive' use of force to support peacebuilding tasks fits into cosmopolitan conceptions of using force to protecting civilians and cosmopolitan peacebuilders (Elliot, 2004). It again fits into Galtung's concept of peacekeeping being used as a wall of protection for 'freedom fighters' as outlined in Chapter 2.

It is not only in relation to the use of force that military peacekeepers require a further understanding of their surroundings. In outlining how missions operate, the Principles and Guidelines outline what it terms as the 'core business of United Nations peacekeeping' (UN, 2008c; 20). In order to do this, the doctrine

outlines what it believes to be the 'typical' types of conflict zones into which UN operations deploy:

Multi-dimensional United Nations peacekeeping operations deployed in the aftermath of an internal conflict face a particularly challenging environment. The State's capacity to provide security to its population and maintain public order is often weak, and violence may still be ongoing in various parts of the country. Basic infrastructure is likely to have been destroyed and large sections of the population may have been displaced. Society may be divided along ethnic, religious and regional lines and grave human rights abuses may have been committed during the conflict, further complicating efforts to achieve national reconciliation

(UN, 2008c; 19)

From this, the Principles and Guidelines outline what it believes to be the 'core functions' of such an operation. They are:

- Create a secure and stable environment while strengthening the State's ability to provide security, with full respect for the rule of law and human rights;
- Facilitate the political process by promoting dialogue and reconciliation and supporting the establishment of legitimate and effective institutions of governance; and

- Provide a framework for ensuring that all United Nations and other international actors pursue their activities at the country-level in a coherent and coordinated manner.

(UN, 2008c; 23)

Military peacekeepers predominantly fit into the first function - the creation of a secure and stable environment. However, in order to facilitate the second and third points, military personnel must enter into the 'spirit' of dialogue, reconciliation, coherence and coordination. This is outlined by the Principles and Guidelines, which state that multidimensional operations play a 'catalytic' role in critical peacebuilding activities, such as DDR, Mine action, SSR, protection of human rights, electoral assistance, and support to restoration of state authority. This also links the Principles and Guidelines to the institutionalisation of peacebuilding and integrated missions discussed earlier in the chapter (UN, 2008c; 26). Furthermore, the Principles and Guidelines offer advice on the role of Quick Impact Projects<sup>49</sup> (QIPs) - described as:

small-scale projects, designed to benefit the population... to support the mission's objectives, by building confidence in the mission's mandate and the peace process

(UN, 2008c; 30)

Although intended to primarily effect the population, the QIPs (and other related tasks) demonstrate how military actors need to enter into a peacebuilding

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<sup>49</sup> Described above in the context of the UNAMSIL operation.

mindset from the moment of deployment. This also links to civil military conceptions of coordination and coherence amongst military and civilian actors. Thus although there is a need to be able to provide security, the ‘blurred lines’ between peacekeeping and peacebuilding mean that the military must be able to show fluidity in their actions.

In order to maintain consent to the operation, the Principles and Guidelines make reference to the need for peacekeepers to show specific awareness of certain issues familiar to the conflict resolution field. In particular, the Principles and Guidelines, (as the Brahimi report did ten years previously), suggests that a UN peacekeeping personnel

have a thorough understanding of the history and prevailing customs and culture in the mission area, as well as the capacity to assess the evolving interests and motivation of the parties.

(UN, 2008c; 32)

The Principles and Guidelines further ask that Peacekeepers understand the cultural misunderstandings that exists between civilian and military actors in an operation, as well as showing awareness of the importance of national and local ownership of peace processes as a multiplier of legitimacy of the peacekeeping force. This directly relates to the civil-military dimension of operations, where a need is identified in training programmes to understand issues of local and national ownership of a peace process<sup>50</sup>.

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<sup>50</sup> CPTM modules on such topics are examined in more detail in Chapter 4.

Finally, the Principles and Guidelines advise that serious attention is paid to managing the impacts of the mission itself. The Principles and Guidelines split this up into three distinct areas:

- Social impact (for example, in the conduct and behavior of staff);
- Economic impact (for example, on housing and staple foods and materials);  
and
- Environmental impact (for example, waste management or water usage).

The document makes it very clear that personnel should be alert to 'potential, unforeseen or damaging consequences of their actions and manage these as quickly and effectively as possible'. Without doing this, the Guidelines and Principles argue, the legitimacy and credibility of the mission will be jeopardised, and its popular support lost. The most obvious example of this is the 'social' impact, created by scandals such as sexual exploitation and abuse. Thus it is essential, in the view of the Principles and Guidelines, that UN peacekeeping personnel must adhere to national laws (where these do not violate fundamental human rights standards), respect local culture, and maintain the highest standards of personal and professional conduct (UN, 2008c; 81-82). This also reflects a degree of awareness of the growing literature on the unintended consequences of UN peacekeeping operations, which examines both social and economic consequences of deployment (Pouliny, 2006).

The potential impact of the Principles and Guidelines remains unclear. What can be seen from the document is that it, like many other UN documents produced in the past ten years, has followed the path treaded by the Brahimi Report. Through outlining 'robust peacekeeping', and the absence of consent in conflict zones, there is a clear link between the message of the Brahimi Report and the Principles and Guidelines. Furthermore, the Guidelines follow UN policy on integration, cross-cutting themes (as outlined in the mandates), and the need to stamp out sexual exploitation and abuse. Although the document is not designed to offer tactical guidance and there is little direction to the particular difficulties that military personnel will encounter whilst deployed, it does offer a wider summary of the number of challenges that UN personnel are placed in. In turn, therefore, one can see again the considerable range of training needs that are required in order to create effective military peacekeepers.

### ***The future? The New Horizons Project***

The most recent initiative at the DPKO is the 'New Horizons Project'. The project's report - prepared by the DPKO and DFS - is described as a contribution to the 'dialogue' on the future direction of peacekeeping operations, intended to stimulate discussion leading up to the 2010 Session of the General Assembly. The Horizons paper starts by noting five 'critical operational challenges':

- **Supporting a ceasefire between two or more parties**

Here, the New Horizon paper picks up on the longer-standing 'frozen missions' of the UN, such as operations in Cyprus, the Middle East, or the

Kashmir, which has led to the criticism that the presence of UN peacekeepers create a form of stability which does not encourage belligerent groups to find a more permanent solution.

- **Supporting a peace process and national authorities after civil conflict**

This refers to the pressing demands on peacekeeping operations (particularly in DRC and the Sudan), where operations are 'struggling to strengthen' political processes which are dependent on regional and international support. Here also, the New Horizons paper picks up on the capability gap between efforts to protect civilians, the limited capabilities and agreement on what robust peacekeeping can and is expected to achieve.

- **Extending initial Security and Stability gains into longer Term Peacebuilding**

This refers to the need for peacekeeping operations to not only focus on the security aspects of their deployment, but also the peacebuilding aspects. The paper argues that because the military exit strategy highly depends on a secure and stable environment, 'UN peacekeepers must improve their ability to contribute to peacebuilding and, where called upon, to coordinate a broader effort'(UN, 2009a; 5).

- **Providing Security and protection in response to conflict**

The Chad and Darfur operations are relevant here, where peacekeepers are primarily involved in activities pertaining to humanitarian aid delivery and protection of civilians. Such operations are in highly remote areas and are

operating under political uncertainty. With such problems, the paper argues that 'mitigating the conflict and preventing mission failure are the only viable strategies' (UN, 2009a; 5).

- **Supporting other Peace and Security Actors, including through capacity building**

This directly emanates from the UN's efforts to assist the African Union in deployments in Darfur, Sudan and Somalia, as well as the DPKO's efforts in providing experts in a number of fields (military, police, judicial, prison, DDR, SSR and mine action) to other parts of the UN system. Although there is high demand for this, the paper finds that UN peacekeeping is 'currently not configured to consistently deliver comprehensive support to others' (UN, 2009a; 5).

In response to these challenges, the New Horizons report proposes a broad strategy with three main 'prongs' - the Security Council, Member States and the Secretariat - which has been termed the 'Global Partnership'. At the Security Council level, there is a requirement for 'achievable and credible mandates' allied to unified political efforts to keep parties 'on the path to peace' and encourage support for peacekeeping operations from member states. Member states are encouraged to provide resources (troops, police and finances) in a timely manner and to the required levels as required by the mandates. The Secretariat on the other hand is asked to 'retain confidence' through providing appropriate information and advice 'and ensure its systems for planning and managing operations meet the highest standards' (UN, 2009a; 6-7). The 'global

partnership' is much more strategic, but it is predicted to have a serious impact on the requirements of deployed peacekeepers, and on how they are trained.

These impacts come in three areas: peacebuilding, protection of civilians, and robust peacekeeping. Where peacebuilding is concerned, the New Horizons Paper notes the critical role that peacekeepers play in building peace immediately after a conflict, in the establishment of conditions for 'recovery and development activities', as well as some of tasks essential to stabilization and 'early consolidation of peace' (UN, 2009a; 22). However, it finds that due to the high visibility of peacekeepers on the ground, they face unrealistic expectations of what they can achieve in terms of peacebuilding (much like what Galtung found in his 1977 study outlined in Chapter 1). This leads to peacekeepers attempting 'to fill gaps' in the provision of international support in areas where they have little capacity or resources, resulting in 'overstretch'. With a safe and secure environment being a precondition for the exit of military peacekeepers, there is a further need for peacekeepers to be effective in their peacebuilding tasks, in order not to prolong the operations (UN, 2009a; 23).

On the protection of civilians, there is a disparity noted between the goals set by the UN and the capabilities that peacekeepers have to carry them out. The Horizons paper notes that national militaries do not traditionally maintain proactive civilian protection doctrines, operating concepts or tactics 'beyond the requirements of international humanitarian law' (UN, 2009a; 20). When peacekeepers are therefore deployed into conflict zones, expectations of what

they can perform are often set high, from both the international community and the host population. The Horizon Project argues that operations:

are regularly assigned a broad range of tasks that go well beyond providing physical security, including support for the voluntary return of refugees and displaced persons, and protection of civilians from sexual violence. These tasks require the engagement of all parts of the mission, whether military, police or civilian.

(UN, 2009a; 20)

Yet the mismatch between the declared policies and the lack of concrete abilities and capabilities on the ground, results in a 'significant credibility challenge' to the UN. Linked to this are difficulties arising from the development and institutionalisation of what the Principles and Guidelines referred to as 'Robust Peacekeeping'. The Horizons paper finds that there has been a vagueness about the role and functions of 'robust peacekeeping', arguing that a lack of shared understanding amongst Member States has prevented a full examination of the operational impacts of robust peacekeeping on missions, partners, and local populations. This has potentially dangerous consequences with operations resorting to robust postures without 'political consensus and practical support' necessary to fulfill such tasks (UN, 2009a; 22).

Thus many of the reform proposals made in the Brahimi Report and subsequent doctrinal publications are still to be fully realised. To combat this, the paper proposes that regular joint training and exercises in the field are required, as

well as scenario-based planning. Furthermore, there is a call in the Horizons Project for soldiers to develop a number of skills, in particular delegated authority to 'take difficult decisions in the field', informed by 'enhanced situational awareness and risk analysis' (UN, 2009a; 21). As with much of the UN's documentation outlined throughout this chapter, developments in training are given critical importance. Attached to this is the desire to enhance the situational awareness of military peacekeepers. As Chapter six illustrates, training military peacekeepers to effectively develop their decision-making capacities requires a considerable understanding in conflict resolution skills and techniques.

The Horizons paper also noted that soldiers were still deployed in the field without effective preparations (much like the Brahimi report). Such under-preparation, the paper notes, is particularly acute in 'challenging and remote environments' where units are immediately asked to begin operations on deployment (such as Darfur). Moreover there are other factors which influence the performance of the operation that can be avoided by improved training. The paper finds that the level of morale and good conduct of peacekeepers has important repercussions on the mission. Arguing that the success or failure of a mission relies on the good conduct of its personnel, the New Horizons paper argues that:

The United Nations pledges a duty of care to its military, police and civilian personnel, who deploy in some of the most harsh and insecure conditions. In turn, these personnel pledge a duty of service, through the

dedicated performance of their duties and dignified and ethical professional and personal conduct. Failure of either side to keep its pledge harms not only the United Nations and those who serve under its flag, but, more important, it harms those we are meant to serve.

(UN, 2009a; 34)

Finally, there is a need for peacekeepers to be 'good communicators', at a global and local level. In terms of local communication, the paper notes that 'every component' of an operation impacts on the perceptions and lives of the people in the deployment area. In the past, ineffective information and communication - linked to a limited understanding of local culture, or diversity of views, ethnicities, and gender distinctions in a conflict zone - has hampered the success of operations. At worst, the paper noted that operations had failed 'to manage expectations, to adapt to real and perceived needs on the ground, and to sustain local support'. Thus, the New Horizons paper argues that peacekeepers need to communicate to host authorities and population as much as possible through public information strategies. Thus, a further incorporation of *contact skills* in training programmes is essential to facilitate effective communication strategies. With regards to how training can best be disseminated, the New Horizons report looks towards sharing training practice amongst member states, and suggests that states with more peacekeeping practice to share experiences with less developed states (UN, 2009a; 15).

## **Conclusions**

This chapter illustrates the current state of peacekeeping strategy at the UN, and argues that there exists a fundamental need to ensure that training for peacekeeping covers far more than traditional military skills. It reviews current peacekeeping policy, in addition to the academic review in the previous chapter, and illustrates another connection between the fields of conflict resolution and military peacekeeping - in this case, through the increasing focus on the peacekeeping-peacebuilding link, and a commitment to protection of civilians.

Some themes are present throughout the documents analysed. Firstly, the peacekeeping/peacebuilding nexus is firmly entrenched in UN thinking. Whilst conceptually this is still the subject of debate - particularly the economic models introduced, and the drive for 'democratisation' - it represents a considerable change to the role and function of military peacekeepers. At a minimum, greater understanding of the peacebuilding functions of an operation is now required in the military. Any further tasks - including liaising with civilian components, providing assistance to civilian organisations, understanding the needs of the civilian population within the deployment zone, and when to actually *provide* a form of peacebuilding in the guise of Quick Impact Projects (such as was seen in Sierra Leone) - is arguably not an uncommon feature of a modern peacekeeping operation. Thus the role of 'civil-military cooperation' is becoming increasingly important in peacekeeping operations. This is discussed, both conceptually and with fieldwork examples, in the following two chapters.

The chapter demonstrates the recognised need for peacekeepers to show an increased understanding of legal norms and customs pertaining to the protection of civilians in armed conflict. Although militaries are subject to a number of conventions and legal norms, the cross-cutting mandates have tasked military peacekeepers to be even more aware of issues pertaining to children in armed conflict and women, peace and security. Again, this poses another challenge on training institutions and programmes to ensure that those soldiers who are to be deployed at least have an understanding of the cross cutting issues that appear in their mandates. Added to this, and with the example of the MONUC operation in mind, there exists within mandates pertaining to the protection of civilians a need for peacekeepers to understand that such protection mandates will mean more than using robust force against 'spoilers' to the peace process. The example of the resolution for the UNAMSIL operation is a notable example of what mandates can include when the Security Council seeks to place considerable emphasis on training for peacekeeping operations.

Furthermore, the chapter illustrates the desire from within the UN to enhance knowledge of cultural awareness and sensitivity to local ownership in their peacekeeping operations. The Brahimi Report still resonates some ten years after its publication. This can be seen in both a positive and negative light. On the positive side, it is encouraging that the UN still encourages peacekeepers to possess a deeper understanding of the cultures that they are to be deployed into. However, like the previous chapter demonstrates, mistakes are still being made, and the recommendations of the Brahimi Report are still relevant today.

It is difficult, however, to chart progress and impact of cultural awareness training, and this should be borne in mind. It is worth highlighting what the UN's own lessons learned reports elucidate about a lack of cultural awareness. The 1995 Lessons Learned report from UNOSOM (Somalia) identified that contingents arrived in the mission area without the 'slightest knowledge' of Somalia, its history, culture and conditions on the ground. Although it does not point to anything more specific than the standardisation of training as a solution, there is a recognised deficiency in skills outside of the traditional military sphere (UN, 1995; 17). The UNAMIR (Rwanda) lessons learned report also offers an indication of the need to have peacekeepers trained in a wider number of skills. Although the mission ultimately suffered catastrophically as a result of being deployed during the Rwandan Genocide of 1994, the lessons learned report did focus on a range of issues. One such issue was training. In particular, the report highlighted the need for an expanded set of briefings to supplement traditional military skills. The expanded briefings would include:

The history, culture and traditions of the host country, the nature of the conflict, the mandate of the mission, and the role and functions of the different components and agencies that are operating in the area, and on the standards of behaviour expected of United Nations staff in the conflict area.

(UN, 1996; 12)

Both of these lessons learned reports illustrate the importance attached to cultural training for military peacekeepers. This is further investigated in the

following two chapters, which outline approaches to civil-military cooperation training. As part of the wider assessment of civil-military cooperation, the chapters explain the importance of understanding the cultural nuances of the host population.

The training needs assessment offers similar lessons. Again, it is encouraging to see that peacekeepers are proactively requesting an increase in 'contact skills' in their training programmes, with a desire for increased negotiation and communication skills being a constant theme running through the results. However, like the conclusions of the previous chapter, this desire is still apparent many years after Fetherston argued for increased 'contact skills' for military peacekeepers. This can be explained by the high turnover of peacekeepers, and the higher turnover of nationalities taking part in peacekeeping - the current list of contributing nations being at 115 (UNDPKO, 2010b). With such a considerable change in personnel, difficulty exists in the capacities for training to be fully effective. However, referring to the training needs assessment, the top five topics which were taught to the soldiers did not include negotiation skills, meaning there is to some extent, organised ongoing pre-deployment training which does not focus on contact skills.

The developing role of the soldier as a peacekeeper is another important finding in this chapter. The New Horizons project report suggest that soldiers become better prepared to for taking 'difficult decisions in the field', informed by 'enhanced situational awareness and risk analysis' (UN, 2009a; 21). Additionally, the Principles and Guidelines indicate that there is an increasing

number of 'grey areas' in peacekeeping operations which soldiers will have to decipher, particularly the blurred lines between peacekeeping and peacebuilding. Most importantly in this area is the blurred distinction between peacekeeping, robust peacekeeping, and peace enforcement. Since the Brahimi Report, the UN has attempted to clarify this area through the Principles and Guidelines and Security Council mandates. However, it is still up to the troop commander and soldiers under his/her command to understand the situation, context, and consequences of the level of force to be used. This poses a particular challenge to peacekeepers themselves, and also to the UN, which is at times mandated to 'protect civilians' at times with pre-emptive force, but must also not stray too far away from what Rubenstein referred to as its 'root metaphor'. UN Lessons Learned Reports point to the need of developments in understanding the levels of force. The report for *Operation Artmedis*, the EU's intervention in the Bunia region of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (alongside the UN operation, MONUC) finds that peacekeeping training should 'consistently and clearly address' the authority to use force in peacekeeping. The report states that:

UN peacekeeping training materials on mandates, rules of engagement and the use of force for the protection of civilians in peacekeeping operations should be reviewed to ensure clarity and a more active focus on the use of force in UN peacekeeping operations under both chapters VI and VII of the Charter.

(UN, 2004b; 8)

In the case of Sierra Leone, the UN's 2003 Lessons Learned Report had strong words on the role of training for robust peacekeeping operations. When referring to the crisis of May 2000 (when UN forces were being attacked in Freetown), the report pointed to training as a main cause of the crisis:

One of the causes of the May 2000 crisis was the lack of proper pre-deployment training for incoming contingents. For many there was simply no time for preparation as their deployment plans had to be speeded up. Some contingents were ignorant of the conflict situation and were mentally not prepared to be in the midst of an ongoing conflict. Poor knowledge of the mandate and the rules of engagement further contributed to their uncertainty when faced with hostile actions.

(UN, 2003b; 38)

The requirement for soldiers to understand the appropriate levels of force (if any) to achieve particular ends is reflected in research undertaken by conflict resolution and cosmopolitan scholars. Fieldwork observations of training programmes (in Chapters four and five) outline programmes which allow soldiers to reflect more on the operating environment and context of their actions. This is reflected on, with reference to work undertaken in the conflict resolution and cosmopolitan fields, in Chapter six.

On a conceptual level, it is important to ask to what extent the UN follows Rubenstein's 'root metaphor', outlined at the beginning of this chapter. The principle, as outlined by Rubenstein is that the legitimacy of the UN rests on it

symbolising a world order 'not dominated by national interests', where 'The weak are empowered, the hungry fed, disease conquered, and conflicts settled peacefully' (Rubinstein, 2005; 356-357). Within this root metaphor, peacekeeping is a 'military without weapons in the service of peace' designed to reinforce an image of an international community 'acting in a neutral, consensual manner to sustain a stable world economy' (Rubinstein, 2005; 357). Today it is difficult for UN peacekeeping to be referred to as a 'military without weapons in the service of peace'. Both where the UN deploys and the post-Brahimi language of *robust peacekeeping* means that its 'neutral' and 'consensual' image is slightly disfigured. However, there is enough to suggest that the root metaphors still exist to a certain extent. Firstly through the cross-cutting mandates, where the UN Security Council - a body which failed in the mid 1990's to offer any protection to the civilians of Rwanda and the Safe Areas of Bosnia - has mandated itself and the UN organisation to place the protection of civilians as a high priority. Although it is apparent that peacekeepers are now far from the 'military without weapons', they still possess through the mandates pertaining to the protection of civilians a 'legitimate', and possibly 'cosmopolitan' reason to recourse to the use of force. Again, this must be carried out responsibly and thus the pressure is transferred to the force commander, contingent commander, or infantry soldier, but there is a spirit and a framework that offers some sense of legitimacy. A 2009 report commissioned by the DPKO into the protection of civilians states that protection is 'central to the legitimacy and credibility of the entire UN system' (Holt and Taylor, 2009). Further, mandates pertaining to the protection of children, as well as the role of women in international peace and security mean that as an institution, the UN is setting

itself values which directly relate to its Charter. Linked to the conflict resolution field, the UN appears to be attempting to align its institutional mechanisms with the peacebuilding needs of an operation. This must be welcomed and seriously considered, as it illustrates recognition that sustainable peace will not be built if it is based purely on the security requirements of the military component. Finally, the organisation is still regarded as a considerably robust organisation in terms of how it deals with threats to international peace and security with few resources, a limited logistical capability, and a limited budget. If its shackles are removed, it may once again come close to Rubenstein's root metaphor where the 'weak are empowered, the hungry fed, disease conquered, and conflicts settled peacefully' (Rubinstein, 2005; 357).

Through this and the previous chapter, this thesis offers a significant contribution to the literature by offering multi-layered synthesis which outlines where - in both the academic and policy fields - there is a desire to see enhanced conflict resolution skills in training programmes for military peacekeepers. This also provides a springboard for the remainder of this thesis. The following chapter examines the issue of civil-military cooperation. The desire to further link peacekeeping and peacebuilding components of an operation is highlighted throughout this chapter, and Chapter three analyses how the phenomenon has appeared, how it is conceptualised, where the problem areas are, and how training in conflict resolution skills can assist military peacekeepers in carrying out civil-military functions effectively. Chapter four develops this analysis by outlining fieldwork investigations and observations of civil-military relations theory. Chapter five focuses on

negotiation training for military peacekeepers, contributing to debates over the 'grey areas' of operations with relation to the limited use of force.

## Chapter 3.

### **Working with non-military entities in a conflict zone: implications for training**

The previous chapter outlines policy at the UN level which has emphasised the development of non-traditional training for military peacekeepers. It also illustrates steps taken in the UN to 'institutionalise' the peacebuilding component in operations, requiring a greater effort on the part of the military to understand and cooperate with their civilian counterparts. This chapter explores civil-military cooperation: a feature of modern operations described as a 'front line' for military personnel in their interactions with civilians and civilian organisations (Sandhurst, 2008a). Civilian actors, which form a considerable part of any peacekeeping operation, can take a multitude of forms including Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) International Non-Governmental Organisations (INGOs), local NGOs, and the civilian population who live in the deployment area.

This chapter examines the training requirements of this relationship (hereafter referred to as *civil-military cooperation*<sup>51</sup>), through an analysis of key documentation, practitioner experience, and academic study. It does this firstly through an examination of formal relationships between military and civilian organisations. The chapter sets the scene by looking at the convergence of

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<sup>51</sup> *Civil-military cooperation* is used, except where policy refers to it a different name.

civilian and military organisations in conflict zones. It then provides an analysis of attempts to formalise these encounters, and of difficulties experienced by both military and civilian actors in relations with each other. Within this, the integrated missions concept – a recent phenomenon in UN operations referred to in the previous chapter – is scrutinised. The second part of the chapter examines the less formal - but equally important - relationships that are fostered with the host population. Literature pertaining to relations between the military and the local population is surveyed, including an investigation of cultural clashes as well as the impacts of allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse against UN peacekeepers. This section of the chapter deals with more recent literature on the topic, which takes an approach from the views of the civilian population. To conclude, the chapter evaluates where increased training has been presented as a technique designed to assist the military in relating with civilian groups, NGOs and the local population.

This chapter adds to the expanding literature on civil-military cooperation, particularly in terms of drawing together existing concepts (which built on the formal relationships between NGOs and Military peacekeepers) and new concepts (built on the experiences of the civilian population in the deployment zone). It provides a conceptual foundation for the following chapter, which examines fieldwork studies of civil-military cooperation training. The chapter contributes to the conflict resolution field in three ways: firstly by charting where such skills have entered the military discourse in peacekeeping operations; secondly, through addressing the question of how increased training in *contact skills* can be used to make the relationship better coordinated; and thirdly, by

dealing with *how* effective conflict resolution training for military peacekeepers can facilitate the change from peacekeeping to peacebuilding. It also contributes to the literature by continuing to identify calls from the practitioner community for the increased awareness and understanding of conflict resolution skills and techniques in training programmes for military peacekeepers.

Before entering the debates about civil-military cooperation, the chapter charts where the phenomenon can be placed within larger debates about the role of peacekeeping operations. As explored in the previous chapter, peacekeeping has undergone a number of theoretical assessments which has critiqued its role in global politics. From the critical theory perspective, the function of peacekeeping operations is far removed from any issues of empowerment of alternative discourses and forms of power. Pugh's analysis offers a robust examination of this, arguing that peacekeepers are a form of 'riot control', projected against 'unruly' parts of the world which do not fit into the liberal, market-dominated international society. These 'trouble shooters', in Pugh's view inherently favour an international society which 'structures inequalities and fails to fulfil human needs' (Pugh, 2004; 40). In terms of promoting alternative avenues of power, Pugh argues that there is little to suggest that peacekeeping adequately pursues this task. The process of peacekeeping and the function of peacekeepers, in his view, are to replicate normative and ideological assumptions that enable the dominant states to manage the system 'in their own image' (Pugh, 2004; 55).

Linked to this is Richmond's insightful critique of peace operations, as a means to create a meaningful and lasting peace, which examines the historical developments of peacekeeping as a maker of 'peace'. Returning to the traditional era of peacekeeping, Richmond argues that peacekeeping missions sought to restore to an earlier version of 'peace' (i.e. the peace existed before the outbreak of violent conflict in the host countries). For Richmond, this is problematic because it was an interveners interpretation of the right kind of peace to be achieved, as 'often there was not a local peace that could be revived, unless one looked back before the advent of colonial powers or regional conflicts' (Richmond, 2005; 92). Thus, UN mandates implemented a view of peace heavily based on colonial processes, and not associated with the disagreement of the conflicting parties on the ground. Emanating from this, in Richmond's view, has been the emergence of the liberal peace theory, which has been normalised through Security Council Resolutions in the traditional era.

Richmond further argues that initial peace agreements that occur in immediate post-conflict environments are based on 'balancing of interests, issues, and resources, perhaps dependent upon external guarantors' (Richmond, 2005). This 'negative peace' in Richmond's view, is based on a perpetual and relative balance, and is thus closer to a victor's peace in the favour of the dominant party or even the third party intervener, who will use notions of neutrality, impartiality and consent 'to disguise the fact that third parties are self interested' and look for a type of peace that is defined by their own interests (Richmond, 2005). Therefore, the 'negative peace' aspects brought on by peacekeeping

either brings a victor's peace for the stronger disputant, or a 'suitable' peace for the third party. This 'suitable peace' is the liberal peace. Richmond argues that:

Effectively, peacekeeping, and the complexity of tasks now associated with it became part of a nascent form of global governance where conflict zones provide interveners the opportunity to construct a liberal peace.

(Richmond, 2005; 96)

Such interpretations suggest that peacekeepers are no more than the faces of the western neo-liberal system, the riot shields of a process which keeps the powerful at the top and the not so powerful at the bottom. However, this thesis argues that developments in peacekeeping operations have demonstrated that they can play a more transformative role. In the view of this particular thesis, the space where the military meets the non-military – be it INGOs, local NGOs, religious leaders, or local civil society groupings – is a key area where the more transformative processes can begin.

From the conflict resolution literature, Lederach argues that peace processes must focus on more than the short-term challenges of getting belligerents to the negotiating table (which, by itself links to Richmond's assessment of the problems of balancing power), and 'must include tasks like broader transformation, reconciliation and social reconstruction' (Lederach, 1995; 203). In order to achieve this, a comprehensive approach that targets all levels of the society is required, from the political leaders at the top, through the local leaders in the middle, down to the local grassroots and combatants at the

bottom. Lederach argues that for a fully transformative model to work, it must intentionally devise frameworks for integrating people at *all* levels of the conflict setting. Critical to this is the bottom level, where the vast majority of the population are based, and local indigenous empowerment can take place between the local population and outsiders. Lederach argues that conflict transformation (in this case, peacekeeping) must 'actively envision, include, respect, and promote the human and cultural resources from within a given setting', and thus not see the insiders as the 'problem' and outsiders as the 'answer' (Lederach, 1995; 213). This involves an international effort to 'identify, validate and support' peace making processes, in the form of people and 'cultural processes' that are rooted within the conflict setting (Lederach, 1995; 220). As outlined in the academic survey of conflict resolution theory and peacekeeping practice, Fetherston asserts that military peacekeeping plays an important role in setting the right conditions for peacekeeping - a 'pre-resolution phase'. This is where peacekeeping operations can make a valuable contribution to conflict resolution efforts, and where forms of civil-military cooperation, if carried out correctly, can effectively coordinate micro-level initiatives which will feed into macro-level structures (Fetherston, 1994b; 157). As Chapter two stated, Fetherston highlights a need to coordinate the conflict settlement approaches of peacekeeping with the conflict resolution activities of peacebuilding organisations. She argues that:

Peacekeeping operations are not equipped to mediate settlement packages or to put into place large-scale socio-economic programmes. Peacekeeping should be seen in much the same way that pre-

negotiation is, as laying the groundwork for more comprehensive peacebuilding and peacemaking activity, or in providing the first crucial phase of an already negotiated settlement package. This is also in line with the philosophy of many humanitarian aid organisations which see emergency aid as the first step toward re-establishing self-reliance.

(Fetherston, 1994b; 153)

Civil-military cooperation can also be located in the cosmopolitan literature, particularly with regards to cosmopolitan forms of conflict management. Kaldor argues that any effective response to what she terms as 'new wars' has to be based on an 'alliance between international organisations and local advocates of cosmopolitanism' in order to construct legitimacy (Kaldor, 2001; 122). She urges that local groups need to be supported, and that their advice, proposals and recommendations be taken seriously. This requires a serious commitment by intervening forces to create a joint partnership with the local population. Elliott argues that in addition to defending societies from violence, cosmopolitan peacekeeping missions may be expected to, where necessary:

Restore civil society especially in areas where it is under threat from criminal activities or various destructive forms of particularist politics, and to engage in rebuilding local legitimacy and pluralist democratic practices.

(Elliott, 2004; 25)

Civil-military cooperation can therefore be located in the cosmopolitan and conflict resolution literature. Therefore success (or failure) in this area not only has implications on the success of the mission (and the 'policy relevant' literature), but it also feeds into the wider peacekeeping and conflict resolution literature.

### **Do positive relations improve chances for overall success?**

Before assessing the complex network of doctrine, interactions and problematic areas, it is worth briefly exploring a study which qualitatively goes some way to arguing that 'effectiveness of contemporary peace operations will depend on the collaboration of military and civilian actors' (Kofi Abiew, 2003a; 7). In 1998, the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) undertook a sizeable study into issues of training for peacekeeping operations. As well as examining civil-military relations, the study explored a number of different topic areas, under the more general themes of 'weapons control, disarmament and demobilization' during peacekeeping operations (Gamba, 1998; 4-5). The data was predominately compiled from the military, which made up 90.47% of the 171 respondents (the civilian components of the mission make up the other 9.53%)<sup>52</sup>. Although the study is over ten years old, and questions covering civil-military relations cover a small part of the overall questionnaire, it offers insight into attitudes to the relationship between the military and civilian organisations.

A brief analysis of Gamba's research into the UNIDIR questionnaire shows a

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<sup>52</sup> Within the military respondents, the majority are observers (43.45%), followed by HQ staff (20.83%) and infantry (16.07%).

valuable link between the level of cooperation between the military and civilian elements and the performance of operations. The study cites responses to a UNIDIR questionnaire which asked: *“Would you consider the relationship between humanitarian elements/organizations and the military personnel during the mission to have been very good, adequate, or inadequate?”* Out of the responses 23% agreed that the relationship was very good, 42% that it was adequate and 35% that it was inadequate. This shows a significant number of respondents felt that a less than adequate relationship existed in operations (Gamba, 1998; 6).

Furthermore, Gamba’s interpretation of the UNIDIR study finds that in operations that were deemed as a ‘success’ in the eyes of the UN, the majority of respondents felt that the relationship between the military and civilian components was very good. In the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia, generally considered from within the UN to be a successful intervention, the proportion of interactions reported as adequate was 85% versus 15% for interactions classified as inadequate. However, in operations that struggled to find success, the vast majority of respondents felt the relationship to be inadequate. In the case of Somalia, 16% of the respondents considered civil-military interactions to be good or adequate, whereas 84% of respondents found them to be inadequate (Gamba, 1998; 7). These statistics led Gamba to argue that:

It is possible to say without doubt that the two principal problems that have emerged in the context of civilian-military interactions in MPSO's are those related to a) the lack of coordination between these components, and b) the extent to which each is able to accommodate the other before and during an MPSO<sup>53</sup>.

(Gamba, 1998; 7)

Gamba adds that if missions suffer from a lack of coordination as well as negative perceptions, suspicions and inability for one side to accommodate the other (or both sides refusing to accommodate each other), then the success of the mission itself is in jeopardy (Gamba, 1998; 4).

### ***Doctrinal Definitions of Civil-military Cooperation***

This chapter now surveys different definitions of civil-military relations, by analysing policy and doctrine from an international organisation (the UN), an international military organisation (NATO), a regional organisation (European Union) and two national militaries (the United Kingdom and Ireland). The differing ideas of what constitutes civil-military cooperation has been formalised through policy, working papers and doctrine. It is yet to be seen whether these attempts to formalise what has traditionally been an *ad hoc* series of engagements have been successful. It is worth understanding, that such differences are important, with organisations keeping themselves distinctive from others. The UN offers the clearest 'warning' on wrongly defining civil-military cooperation:

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<sup>53</sup> MPSO - Multi-Functional Peace Support Operation.

In the area of civil-military interaction there has been a proliferation of conflicting and inappropriate titles, job descriptions, and training standards. This creates confusion in responsibilities (particularly with civilian counterparts in the humanitarian community), inhibits understanding, and ultimately decreases efficiency and effectiveness. In addition, some of the titles have conceptual meanings that detract from the UN integrated approach. The term “CIMIC” is an example of this, as it is generally accepted to refer to interaction that is purely related to achievement of a military commander’s military mission (i.e. it may not take into account the wider objectives of a UN integrated mission).


(UNDPKO, 2008; 4)

The UN has devoted much time to developing a working relationship in the field between the civilian and military bodies. Following the strategic developments outlined in the previous chapter, there has been a series of policy developments designed to encompass peacekeepers in the field. The very make-up of the UN, and its deployments in the field, has meant that serious attention has been given to harmonising efforts whilst deployed in a peacekeeping operation. Thus, there has been the development of a multitude of policy papers, guidelines and memorandums to guide peacekeepers (whether they be military, civilian or police) whilst in the field. Ultimately, this has led to the UN defining their version of civil-military cooperation as CMCoord, or Civil-Military Coordination. Box 3.1 offers a good guideline to ‘background documentation’ for the development of UN CMCoord policy. The information is derived from the 2008 publication *Civil*

*Military Guidelines and Reference for Complex Emergencies* (IASC, 2008)

Although these guidelines are mainly for a humanitarian audience, they give a comprehensive overview of the development of the policy:

**Box 3.1: The UN's Applicable Civil-Military Guidelines, Concepts, Standards and Law<sup>54</sup>**  
(IASC, 2008; 18)



A plethora of different documents exist, which in varying degrees outline the UN's policy on civil-military coordination. However, a difficulty is encountered when examining the definition from both a civilian perspective and a military perspective. This can be seen clearly in two definitions from different wings within the UN: the Inter Agency Standing Committee (IASC) and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. Firstly, the Inter Agency Standing Committee's (IASC) definition offers this understanding of CMCoord:

<sup>54</sup> MCDA Guidelines – UN Guidelines On The Use Of Military And Civil Defence Assets To Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities In Complex Emergencies  
IASC – Inter Agency Standing Committee.

The essential dialogue and interaction between civilian and military actors in humanitarian emergencies that is necessary to protect and promote humanitarian principles, avoid competition, minimize inconsistency, and when appropriate pursue common goals. Basic strategies range from coexistence to cooperation. Coordination is a shared responsibility facilitated by liaison and common training.

(IASC, 2004; 5)

The weight of importance is attached to the protection and promotion of humanitarian principles. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) offers its own interpretation of CMCoord. This interpretation could possibly be aimed at a military audience. CMCoord is defined as:

The system of interaction, involving exchange of information, negotiation, de-confliction, mutual support, and planning at all levels between military elements and humanitarian organizations, development organizations, or the local civilian population, to achieve respective objectives.

(DPKO, 2002; 1-2)

Thus, on the one hand, through the IASC, civil-military coordination is aimed towards the humanitarian community; and on the other hand, the DPKO points towards the military stakeholders. This highlights an inherent difficulty in attempting to specify an acceptable definition of the phenomenon within the UN. With so many agencies covering civilian and military issues, it is hardly surprising that there is divergence. However, the DPKO (an organisation which

deals most with military issues) does offer a level playing-field definition of civil-military cooperation, which is a less militarised view than other military organisations which, as is suggested below, emphasise the special importance of *military* control in civil-military cooperation.

European Union (EU) led deployments in Democratic Republic of the Congo, Chad and the Balkans have prompted the organisation to work on its own definition of civil-military cooperation to guide EU forces (both military and civilian) when deployed. This definition states that:

Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC) is the co-ordination and co-operation, in support of the mission, between military components of EU-led Crisis Management Operations and civil actors (external to the EU), including national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organisations and agencies.

(EU, 2002)

Within this definition, the EU concept has three key strands of CIMIC: Firstly, *Civil-Military Liaison*, which identifies liaison between military components and civilian organisations; secondly, *Support to the Civil Environment*, which refers to the use of military resources or activities to sustain the humanitarian needs of the host population or to support a civil authority or organisation; and finally *Support to the Military Force*, which covers arrangements and activities needed to ensure the maximum co-operation of civil authorities, organisations and populations in supporting the mission of the military force and sustaining its

presence in a crisis situation. This offers a holistic approach to the area, with relations with humanitarian actors, the local civilian population and the civil authority being paid equal attention. The final facet is more akin to a 'hearts and minds' approach, which aims to maintain high levels of consent for the peacekeeping force. The second point is also an interesting area, as it focuses on the role the military can play in *providing* assets for humanitarian purposes.

Though this thesis does not explicitly examine NATO versions of peacekeeping, it is worth presenting how a predominately military organisation sees civil-military cooperation and how this can have an influence on the development of national doctrine and practice. The NATO definition is:

The co-ordination and co-operation, in support of the mission, between the  
NATO Commander and civil actors, including national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organisations and agencies.

Rollins, a Lieutenant Colonel in the UK army, emphasises this NATO view, asserting that in order for civil-military cooperation to work effectively, a military force commander effectively 'controls' the project. He argues that civil-military cooperation is the coordination and cooperation that 'a NATO Commander employs with all the civilian actors within his area of operations in order to carry out his mission' (Rollins, 2001; 123). The NATO definition of civil-military cooperation has had a strong influence on how the process is conceptualised in

the United Kingdom (UK). The UK's definition, as outlined in *Joint Warfare Publication 3-90: Civil Military Cooperation* deems civil-military cooperation to be:

The coordination and co-operation, in support of the mission between the [NATO] Commander and civil actors including the national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organisations and agencies.

(JDDC, 2003; 1-2)

The UK's definition has three main functions: firstly, *liaison between military and civil agencies*, which is liaison between the military and NGOs and INGOs; secondly, *support to the force*, which argues that cooperation will be used to find resources, supplies, infrastructure and expertise of the indigenous population to support the force; and thirdly, *support to the civil environment*, which spans a wide range of support for the civil community or a civilian organisation. However, this support generally comes 'where and when it is required to create conditions necessary for the fulfillment of the military mission... and/or because the appropriate civil authorities and agencies are unable to carry out the task'(JDDC, 2003; 1-4).

The UK's definition of 'CIMIC' is in support of the military mission, and like the NATO definition, is at the opposite end of the spectrum to the IASC definition in terms of how civil-military cooperation is carried out. In one respect, it encompasses the military taking care not to compromise the humanitarian

principles of humanitarian agencies, while it also emphasises military control over civilian agencies in order to support the mission. The DPKO definition is placed in between the UK and IASC definition.

What ties the definitions from the EU, NATO and the UK together are the words 'in support of the mission'. Different interpretations of what the 'mission' is and who controls it may have consequences for the relationship between the military and civilian organisations. If the military is controlling the mission, then this could mean that the civilian aspect of the mission is marginalised. This is what Rollins would argue about NATO operations and the importance of the commander's intent. Whoever is in 'control' of the mission will be of great importance. What may also be occurring is that this divergence of 'all encompassing' views on civil-military coordination can lead to a level of confusion amongst soldiers deployed. For example a regular soldier from an EU member state with NATO Membership may find him/herself 'jumping' from one working definition of CIMIC to another.

Considerable debates also exist within national militaries over the role and understanding of civil-military cooperation doctrine. One of the observed case studies - the Irish Defence Forces (DF) - is currently undergoing internal debate over its civil-military coordination structures. Current Irish CIMIC doctrine is outlined below, and mainly follows the NATO lead:

CIMIC is co-operation in support of the Mission, between components of EU and UN-led Crisis Management Operations/Peace Support

Operations and the civil actors in theatre which includes the national population and local authorities as well as international, national and non-governmental organisations and agencies.

(O'Shea, 2010; 85)

Such doctrine requires there to be continued cooperation between the military and civilian components of the mission, as well as civilian authorities and populations in order to 'create the best possible moral, material and tactical conditions for the achievement of the mission' (O'Shea, 2010; 86). O'Shea, who has carried out extensive research on civil-military cooperation, finds that the DF place their own approach somewhere between EU and NATO doctrines, and even referred to it as the 'soft face' of the NATO doctrine (O'Shea, 2010; 95). This 'soft face' however brings difficulties. O'Shea highlights a 2008 report by the University of Hull and the Calrow Centre Institute of Technology, entitled *Strengthening Partnership in Humanitarian Supply Chains*, which argues that there is a critical need for the DF to develop their own CIMIC doctrine, as opposed to officially operating under a contested NATO definition:

unless the DF develops its own CIMIC doctrine, reflecting DF values and experience in the area of humanitarian-military relations, it runs the danger of subscribing to an effort which is currently seen as alienating the very community that it is designed to facilitate. A divide exists between the "softer face" of CIMIC that is part of DF identity and experience, and the doctrine that it subscribes to and teaches. Mimicry

of the NATO doctrine does not reflect the DF concept and practice of CIMIC.

(Heaslip et al., 2008; 12)

The report identifies that the DF should review its own CIMIC doctrine and it encourages major consultation with civilian organisations, which have been alienated (in its view) by NATO doctrine and practice. A significant point is contributed here. Taking this example, it is clear that within the doctrine (which in itself looks solid and non-negotiable) there exists a great deal of debate and conjecture on what exactly the term 'civil-military cooperation' actually means. This, in turn highlights the difficulties that exist in achieving effective coordination between military and civilian actors.

Whether there *can* be a working definition of civil-military cooperation, CIMIC, CMCoord or any of the other guises that this relationship officially works under is unlikely. This chapter demonstrates that each actor within a peacekeeping operation has their own constructed opinion of how this relationship works, how it is meant to work, and how it can fail. At best, one can hope for a minimum understanding based on examples and working practice.

What can be agreed, as a minimum, would be a definition of what civil-military cooperation *cannot* be; i.e. starting from fundamentally correct and incorrect procedures, as in the following UN definition that in a civil-military partnership:

Humanitarian workers must never present themselves or their work as

part of a military operation, and military personnel must refrain from presenting themselves as civilian humanitarian workers.

(IASC, 2008; 11)

This basic understanding of the job roles may offer a starting point for how civil-military cooperation in peacekeeping operations is conceptualised.

### ***Military and civilian organisations: Recognition that they work together***

Although there is no solid definition shared amongst actors, there exists recognition at a strategic level of an increased amount of cooperation on an *ad hoc* basis. The 1996 UN DPKO paper *Multidisciplinary Peacekeeping: Lessons Learned from Recent Experience* gave an early indication of the need to formalise relations between the civilian and military components. In particular, it advocated the use of guidelines which would include 'information on the role, function and organisation of coordination mechanisms, such as a joint civilian-military coordination or operations centre' (DPKO, 1996; 4). This was an early attempt to give the *ad hoc* nature some structure.

UN policy reflects the fact that military peacekeepers provide relief and services to local populations and, at the same time, a significant number of humanitarian actors in war zones are subject to greater risks in the field, thus requiring an increased security presence from military forces on a case-by-case basis. The UN's IASC, created to enhance cooperation between humanitarian agencies in

complex emergencies, notes this. Their 2004 reference paper, (written in tandem with the Office of the Coordinator for Humanitarian Affairs) recognises that through recent interventions, 'practical realities on the ground have gradually necessitated various forms of civil-military coordination for humanitarian operations' (IASC, 2004; 3).

Slim's seminal 1996 paper on civil-military cooperation noted the changing nature of militaries involved in second generation peacekeeping operations. In these deployments, military peacekeepers attempted to incorporate a number of new roles including emergency provision of water and medical care, protection of relief agencies or supplies, and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes. Because of this crossover, Slim's article likens the military to a 'relief agency' (Slim, 1996; 129-130). Moreover, Slim finds common ground shared by the military and civilian components of peacekeeping operations, which requires increased dialogue between both groups. This 'dialogue' represents an effort to incorporate joint training programmes which would create common standards within and between civilian and military components (Slim, 1996; 139). Similarly, Kofi Abew argues that the military needs to support its traditional tasks of controlling violent conflict with support and coordination of civilian instruments, in order to achieve the goal of peace and stability. Problems arise however, when the military acts outside of its 'comfort zone' and enters into the humanitarian sphere of operations. This is inevitable, since political, humanitarian, security, socio-economic, legal, and other issues 'cannot be separated into watertight compartments and are inextricably linked' (Kofi Abiew, 2003b; 28). Gamba highlights this through her

study of the UNIDIR questionnaire and argues that the civil-military relationship in the field will be affected by the *type* of humanitarian role that the military adopts, whether it is one of technical assistance or of security provision (Gamba, 1998; 8).

In addition, Spence notes that the size of problems which operations encounter are too large for one single component to address. Spence finds that a coordinated strategy is needed to enable a sustainable resolution to a crisis. In order to achieve and sustain positive peace, a complementary approach involving political, economic, military, humanitarian and administrative components is required (Spence, 2002; 165). Linking the framework to a more generalised view of peace support operation (PSO) doctrine, Spence sees the aim of the military role in such deployments is to hand over assumed 'civilian tasks' to the appropriate authorities at the earliest possible opportunity. This work emphasises where doctrinally, the civilian-military interface is being incorporated. The UK has highlighted CIMIC in both their main peace support operation doctrine (outlined in Joint Warfare Publication 3-50) and also the doctrine publication on Civil Military Cooperation. The UK's approach to CIMIC is based on the premise that '[m]ilitary success alone will achieve little beyond containment of a situation unless the conditions for the pursuit of civil objectives by civil actors are created' (JDDC, 2003; 1-1), emphasising the need for transformation from negative to positive peace.

The UK's overarching peace support operations doctrine urges the force commander to liaise with a full range of civilian actors, including international

organisations and NGOs, local authorities, civilian leaders, and the general population. It does have a particularly military mindset, stating that CIMIC is an 'important military element' in the planning for a deployment, and asserts that liaison is a necessary aspect of operations in order to 'manage the impact of the civil sector on the military operation (and vice versa), and to harmonise plans and activities in support of the civil environment, both to reduce friction and to increase effectiveness' (JDDC, 2004; 5-11). PSO Doctrine also states that CIMIC should be fully integrated into all levels of the mission as it 'enables the interface for cooperation, co-ordination, mutual support, joint planning and information exchange' between the military and civilian components (JDDC, 2004; 5-11). This complements the approach that the CIMIC doctrine publication took, which emphasised the different levels of where CIMIC is evident (strategic, operational, tactical). On the tactical level (where this thesis focuses), the CIMIC doctrine publication states that:

This is the level at which interaction between the military and civilian sectors takes place on the ground and hence is the concern of all military personnel. It is the level at which the CIMIC process and activity have the most immediate effect and may have implications through to the strategic level.

(JDDC, 2003; 2-1)

It is significant that CIMIC Doctrine emphasises the importance of this level, as it is at this stage where differences in culture, opinion and working practices are first noticed, and most felt.

The inevitable consequence of such close cooperation, mixed with multiple different constructions of the term 'civil-military cooperation', has been an uneasy working relationship between the military and civilian actors. Gamba's analysis finds that the interactions between the military and civilian organisations can impact the 'normal course' of the civilian agencies work. This is because, she argues, the 'humanitarian objectives of different agencies and NGOs cannot be separated from military and political objectives', and that humanitarian aid is now an aspect of military objectives. (Gamba, 1998; 6). Pugh also picks up on this point, and makes the argument that:

The coercive orientation of peace support operations means that the civil-military relationship is more politically and ethically ambiguous than in traditional peacekeeping.

(Pugh, 2000; 229)

This ambiguity has led to a great deal of frustration, disagreement and negative stereotyping between the civilian and military actors in peace operations. This is due to a number of factors. The UN's *Challenges Project*<sup>55</sup>, argues in its first report that 'fundamental obstacles' to close relations between the two groups exist in peace operations. Most pertinent are 'major differences in culture, mandates, resources, levels of authority and experience, as well as problems of personality (in leadership) and functional areas of responsibility'(TCP, 2002; 146-147). Byman argues that humanitarian emergencies are commonly

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<sup>55</sup> The International Forum on the Challenges of Peace Operations was set up in 1997 to promote dialogue over sharing best practice amongst 16 partner countries. It has created two reports, referred to as *Challenges I*, and *Challenges II*.

hamstrung by a 'lack of prior coordination, limited military familiarity with relief agencies and strategic and operational chaos' (Byman, 2001; 98). Hugo Slim's analysis notes that on a technical level, relations are characterised by issues of competence and competition. With both components essentially working towards the same goal, the military are criticised for crossing over into work essentially designated for humanitarian organisations. (Slim, 1996; 134-138). This chapter now analyses two important areas which impinge effective civil-military coordination strategies: culture and consent.

## **Culture**

Culture clashes have frequently been highlighted as a major stumbling block for effective civil-military cooperation. Duffey's findings outline relations strained by inherent institutional culture clashes and mutual unfamiliarity between the military and civilian actors, resulting in each actor forming 'ill informed' stereotypes. She explains:

The military is often characterized as an insensitive, ill informed, controlling, and inflexible war-machine, while NGO personnel are often seen as sandal-wearing, two faced, undisciplined and uncoordinated liberals.

(Duffey, 2000a; 149)

These cultures frequently clash in methods of decision making, accountability, operational and management styles, use of force, approaches to time and success, media styles, and relationships with the local population. Pouligny's

more recent assessment of the daily culture clashes between civilian and military organisations notes that the 'infinite variety' of training and professional careers, cultural origins, interstate factors, and differences in communication and language, combine to complicate interactions. Additionally, Pouligny points out that missions now have almost one hundred different nationalities working within the civilian side. Added to the multitude of nationalities in the military deployment, the chances for cultural harmonisation becomes smaller and smaller (Pouligny, 2006; 133). Gamba observes that the make-up of humanitarian organisations can lead to negative interpretations of the other group. She finds that international humanitarian organisations 'tend to be made up of people who have deep reservations about militarism', and thus 'at a profound moral level, the humanitarian has more problems with the military than the military with the humanitarian' (Gamba, 1998; 7). Gamba also finds that although there is a generally recognised principle that long-term political and developmental issues need to be resolved, military and civilian approaches to achieving this may appear radically different. She argues:

The military operational approach is not geared to implement development activities. The military aim to do something for, rather than with, people and tend to give little thought to the long term management implications of what they construct or repair, Civilian agents on the other hand – particularly NGO's – are very much aware of such differences.

(Gamba, 1998; 9)

Rubenstein, Keller and Scherger expand on this cultural approach, particularly the 'disparate understandings of the meanings of partnership and cooperation' (Rubenstein et al., 2008; 543). They argue that the dominance of military concerns in mission planning has exacerbated these cultural misunderstandings, which have 'complicated the search for interoperability' (Rubenstein et al., 2008; 544). The authors offer an example of the barriers which were put up by both military and civilian actors in the field, which is worth quoting at length:

...during field research we frequently listened to conversations between civilian humanitarians and their military counterparts concerning the need for coordination. These conversations had a distressing commonality, regardless of location, as if following a script. The conversations always began with professions of respect for one another's concerns and an expression of a desire to work as partners. This was followed by a discussion of the practicalities of operating together, which inevitably revealed differing preferences and incentives. The stumbling points could be at any level, including the humanitarians' concern for the preservation of humanitarian space as a key symbolic component of their world view, the military's concern for unitary command and coordination also as a key symbol of their world view, and disagreements about the proper site for mission activities. At this impasse, the earlier professions of respect and partnership were repeated. The conversation resumed with an examination of the practicalities involved, only to clash once again. Depending on the patience and will of the interlocutors, this pattern of

profession of respect and partnership, followed by disagreement, returning to a profession of respect and partnership, could continue for some time. But, nearly universally, the conversations we observed ended with the parties failing to reach genuine agreement – reaching a false consensus, at best. Typically, the military interlocutor would communicate, directly or by indirection, the idea that ‘yes, we want to partner with you, as long as you follow our lead and instructions’ – not an expression of respectful partnership but an assertion of dominance and control.

(Rubinstein et al., 2008; 544)

This raises a number of important issues. Firstly, one can see that Rubenstein *et al* find that there is no ‘genuine agreement’ found with regard to a common approach to civil-military cooperation, and at best one can expect to find a ‘false consensus’. This can be linked to questions over whether there can ever be an overall arching ‘doctrine’ for civil-military cooperation. Next, is the claim that the military assume dominance over the model - a claim reinforced when looking at the NATO and UK doctrine for civil-military cooperation.

To a certain extent, UN documentation understands the culture clashes outlined above. The *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines*, (referred to in Chapter 3) notes the ‘significant’ cultural differences that exist between components in an operation. Providing a significant obstacle is the management culture of each organisation. The Principles and Guidelines notes that while civilian organisations function with ‘a high degree of tolerance

for ambiguity and highly flexible management models', military organisations 'tend to seek to minimize ambiguity by making informed assumptions within a strong planning culture'. Therefore, in order for missions to be effective, the *Principles and Guidelines* suggests that such different institutional cultures need to be reconciled, however without stifling the 'cultural diversity that constitutes one of the United Nations main strengths' (UN, 2008c; 71).

## **Consent**

Underlying the clashes in culture is the danger of a loss of consent to the military presence. Slim argues that the essential component to the success of civil-military cooperation is the level of consent to the military presence, and when levels of consent drop (as they do in peace operations) humanitarian organisations attempt to distance themselves from the military. Gamba also finds that when a peacekeeping operation becomes unwelcome and unpopular, civilian staff attempt to distance themselves from both the civil affairs officers of the mission and from the international military force (Gamba, 1998; 9). Though this distancing (often seen in a flurry of press releases and statements) is required from a humanitarian standpoint, it often has a baffling effect on the military actors, and gives humanitarian actors 'something of a reputation in military circles for equivocation' (Slim, 1996; 131-132).

The issue of consent is now even more pertinent largely due to the development of robust peacekeeping and the impact that this has had on the practice of UN peacekeeping deployments. With the evolution of third generation peacekeeping, the principle of consent in UN peacekeeping is no

longer the 'Rubicon' that it once was. In the Brahimi Report, consent is raised as an issue which could be 'manipulated' by combatants and belligerent groups and accordingly, this has led to peacekeeping forces to expect a loss of consent from 'spoilers' to a peace process. This could be problematic, as deployments where military peacekeepers are encouraged to rely on the impartial use of force as opposed to ensuring consent, run the risk of hampering the ability of humanitarian organisations to carry out their work in a consent-based environment. Gordon argues that:

The convergence of peacekeeping doctrines on more robust approaches, combined with the increasing prevalence of integrated missions, is likely to have profound and unintended consequences in terms of the maintenance of humanitarian space generally.

(Gordon, 2007; 116)

This is a significant finding, and one which UN operations are still learning to deal with. In operations with numerous belligerent groups who do not align themselves to a formal peace process, there exists a fine balance between attempting to defeat such groups militarily, and risk losing the support of the civilian actors. Such a balance places a high amount of pressure on military peacekeepers, and those who command them. Consequently, this has a significant impact on the decision making frameworks on soldiers and the requirements of training programmes designed to prepare them.

## ***Taking relations a stage further: The integrated mission concept***

The previous chapter outlined the development of the integrated missions concept<sup>56</sup> and the efforts in the UN to integrate the political, humanitarian, and security aspects of their operations under one overall umbrella. Although it is in its early stages, the process carries with it serious implications on how civil-military cooperation is understood, and has divided opinion on whether it helps or hinders cooperation. This chapter observes that it is obvious that all groups will enter a peacekeeping operation with different expectations and constructions of the conflict<sup>57</sup>. Eide *et al* (who authored a commissioned report for the UN on integrated missions) note that categorical differences exist between different actors in a peacekeeping operation (most notably peacekeeping, development, and humanitarian actors) over the approaches to integration and benchmarks for success (Eide et al., 2005; 13). The integrated missions concept is partly designed to create one common drive for operations, and reduce the chance of further categorical differences.

While this may be the case, observers note that the integrated mission concept puts pressure on the independence of humanitarian actors in the field. Eide *et al* highlight this:

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<sup>56</sup> To serve as a brief reminder to what the integrated mission concept, it is worth revisiting the UN's 2006 definition as outlined in the *Integrated Missions Planning Process Guidelines: 'the guiding principle for the planning, design and implementation of complex UN operations in post-conflict situations, for linking the different dimensions of peace support operations (political, development, humanitarian, human rights, rule of law, social and security), and integrating the imperatives of each dimension into its strategic thinking and design'* (UN, 2006b; 3).

<sup>57</sup> It is important to remember that each group can be further divided into smaller groups (military peacekeepers for example can be separated into rank, nationality, or geographic location of deployment).

In contrast to its Cold War days, the United Nations of today does not shy away from taking a side in a peace process, for instance in favour of an internationally recognised transitional government and against the “spoilers” trying to undermine the transitional process. On the other hand, for some humanitarian actors, be they humanitarian agencies or NGOs working closely with the UN, the well-established humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality and impartiality must still be upheld.

(Eide et al., 2005; 6)

This is a significant dilemma. Gordon argues that although the DPKO understand this concept as a rational step forward in the development of peacekeeping operations, it does lead to significant problems in differentiating the responsibilities, mandate and actions of humanitarian actors and the ‘UN politico-military strategy’, which accordingly has ‘obvious implications’ for humanitarian space and independence (Gordon, 2007; 115). This is a strong critique of the concept, which argues that humanitarian actors are going to be adversely affected by the strategy of the integrated mission. The UN’s *Principles and Guidelines* also flag that integration can create difficulties for the humanitarian and development components of an operation, particularly ‘if they are perceived to be too closely linked to the political and security objectives of the peacekeeping mission’. In the worst case, this can lead to personnel and operations being placed in danger and leads the *Principles and Guidelines* to recommend that ‘appropriate dialogue, communication and contingency planning’ are carried out to ensure that such eventualities are prepared for (UN,

2008c; 54). Again this is significant, and relates to the point made above regarding the loss of consent for an operation.

However, Eide *et al* argue that the security of humanitarian space will be *further* protected through the integrated mission structure as the 'humanitarian perspective is now part of the mission itself' (Eide et al., 2005; 7). From their perspective, it is better to be influencing the operation from 'within' than from an outsider's perspective (though critics of this view could point to the fact that it is a UN commissioned study). Some observers take this a stage further. Harmer, reflecting on the targeting of humanitarian staff in countries where peacekeeping operations are deployed, argues that humanitarian agencies can no longer rely on perceptions of neutrality to safeguard them. She argues that in situations of increased vulnerability, the humanitarian agencies relationship with, and influence over, political and military agencies in integrated missions could be 'crucially important' to humanitarian operations (Harmer, 2008; 529).

There are other important issues which demonstrate the delicate state of the integrated missions concept. Campbell and Kaspersen argue that the very nature of where peacekeeping operations are deployed bring a significant number of complexities to integrated missions. In stark contrast to the 'linear planning frameworks' that the UN has been developing, post-conflict environments are 'dynamic, complex endeavours with uncertain outcomes'. This makes the UN's project of contributing to the peaceful development of a 'liberal democratic state featuring rule of law, free markets and liberal democracy' a far from simple task, where successful peacebuilding projects are

the 'surprise, not the exception' (Campbell and Kaspersen, 2008; 481). This is also dependent on whether the host state actually agrees the UN's conceptualisation of peace and development. Gowan has written extensively on how the UN faces a 'paradigmatic crisis', where their traditional conceptions of peace are challenged by states which are hosting peacekeeping operations. This is highlighted most notably in the case of Afghanistan where the national leadership, through rejecting the appointment of Lord Ashdown to the UN Assistance Mission for Afghanistan (UNAMA), showed that they preferred their own political autonomy over the benefits of an integrated UN plan (Gowan, 2008; 462-463).

Moreover, national governments with seats on the Security Council and General Assembly rarely have their own codified strategy to deal with 'failed states', making the task of forming a uniformed multi-governmental approach difficult. Doss adds to this, by noting his experiences in the field where mandates often arrived as a result of political compromise. Such compromises, he argues, can result in a mismatch between expectations and outcomes. This in turn has an immediate effect on the credibility of a mission as 'coherence and credibility go hand in hand' (Doss, 2008; 572). To underline this Doss points to mandates pertaining to the protection of civilians, which often raise expectations of the local population, yet are extremely hard to match with limited resources, thereby jeopardising the credibility of the operation. Furthermore, the UN's very own structures are characterised by, what appears to be at a field level, 'irrational constraints and barriers' (Campbell, 2008; 558). This can have a negative impact on the operations as such barriers often lead to disillusionment.

This impacts on civil-military cooperation. As well as issues of the 'humanitarian space', the impacts of what Doss terms as 'mandate expansion' for integrated missions creates the need for better coordination between peacekeepers and 'other players' - which includes UN actors, NGOs and civil society organisations. Doss argues that much of the debate about the coherence in integrated missions revolves 'around the interaction (and friction) between political-security actors and their humanitarian counterparts' (Doss, 2008; 574). Furthermore, noting the susceptibility that civil-military cooperation has to misunderstandings on mandates and motivation, Doss finds that an integrated mission concept will not - and possibly should not - change these attitudes overnight. What an integrated mission should aim to achieve, in Doss' opinion, is to use integrated approaches in order to get each actor to understand, consider, and accommodate differences (Doss, 2008; 576).

Imposing this understanding through top down approaches is, according to Doss, unworkable. Instead, he argues for a structure which enables shared recognition of others objectives (Doss, 2008; 580). Campbell and Kaspersen agree, noting that cases of successful integration are largely due to 'ad hoc initiatives, with high transaction costs, undertaken by individual staff voluntarily circumventing barriers' (Campbell and Kaspersen, 2008; 470). Thus, it is argued that there is a requirement for information to be gathered, mechanisms created at the country level, and processes fed up the chain. Instead of imposing a 'type' of integration, the UN could be a facilitator and monitor of successful initiatives (Jennings and Kaspersen, 2008b; 585) (Campbell, 2008;

566). As well as highlighting difficulty of attaching a blueprint to such interactions, this has considerable implications for training programmes. Far from having a unifying doctrine, there is every chance that military and civilian actors will continue to rely on their *ad hoc* relationship in each particular context. The *ad hoc* nature of interaction will not only require soldiers to understand the complex nature of peacebuilding tasks and organizations: it will further require them to understand the implications of their actions on the wider operation.

### ***New challenges: recognising the local population***

Further to the organisational clashes that appear between the military and humanitarian organisations in the field, the impact of the peacekeeping operations on the local population is critical to its success or failure, and is significant for the study of civil-military relations. This is a relatively new area of analysis, as up until the late 1990's, the bulk of civil-military relations literature focussed on how the military related with NGOs, UN agencies, and large international aid agencies. More recent studies have examined 'unintended consequences' of peacekeeping deployments that go far beyond the day-to-day activities outlined above. These consequences are mainly focussed on the local population and how they are affected by a large deployment. The second half of this chapter explores the challenges posed through 'unintended consequences' that arise, and links this literature to that of civil-military coordination. It does this through the assessment of the following four main areas: the impact of allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse against UN peacekeepers in the field; the expectations of the local population; cultural misunderstandings of the

host population; and economic impacts that peacekeeping operations have on the host population.

## **Sexual Exploitation and Abuse**

Allegations of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA) by UN peacekeepers (military, civilian and police) have resulted in a crisis for particular operations as well as the UN system as a whole. These allegations also put a huge strain on relations between the military and civilian population. Importantly for this thesis, the institutional reaction of the UN to allegations of SEA has had an impact on training for military peacekeepers.

High-publicity cases of SEA have tarnished the image of the UN in the past. In 1993, the UN Special Representative for the Secretary General in Cambodia, Yasushi Akashi, drew a considerable amount of criticism from different quarters because of his reaction to drunken behaviour and sexual misconduct by UN personnel. Whitworth notes that in responding to allegations, the SRSG responded by stating that 'it was natural for hot-blooded young soldiers who had endured the rigours of the field to want to have a few beers and to chase "young beautiful beings of the opposite sex"' (Whitworth, 2004; 71, Independent, 1994).

In 2001, allegations surfaced of acts of SEA committed by UN personnel (including military, civilian and police) on vulnerable members of the local population. A UNHCR investigation into the matter resulted in a leaked report, which exposed the UN organisation to some of the most damaging allegations it

has received in modern times. In response, the Secretary General's office released a policy bulletin containing special measures for protection for SEA. It opened by offering definitions of sexual exploitation and abuse:

“sexual exploitation” means any actual or attempted abuse of a position of vulnerability, differential power, or trust, for sexual purposes, including, but not limited to, profiting monetarily, socially or politically from the sexual exploitation of another. Similarly, the term “sexual abuse” means the actual or threatened physical intrusion of a sexual nature, whether by force or under unequal or coercive conditions.

(UN, 2003c; 1)

The bulletin outlined rules and regulations governing actions by UN personnel deployed in the field, and gave a zero-tolerance approach to acts of SEA. Security Council Resolutions mandating operations were also adapted to take note of SEA allegations, with mandates for operations in Sierra Leone and DRC outlined concern for allegations of sexual abuse and misconduct by UN personnel. Security Council Resolution 1265 (on the MONUC mission in DRC) offers an example of how mandates began to address the issue of SEA. In expressing ‘grave concern’ about the allegations of SEA by MONUC personnel, the Security Council mandated the Secretary General to fully investigate *all* allegations. Furthermore, it encouraged MONUC to:

conduct training for personnel targeted to ensure full compliance with its code of conduct regarding sexual misconduct, and urges troop-

contributing countries to take appropriate disciplinary and other action to ensure full accountability in cases of such misconduct involving their personnel;

(UN, 2004c)

However, allegations continued to surface in operations in the DRC, Haiti, Burundi and Liberia (SCR, 2006, 1-2). With the UN facing one of its largest emergencies since its inception, the Secretary General commissioned a much wider report into the allegations. This resulted in the publication of '*A comprehensive strategy to eliminate future sexual exploitation and abuse in United Nations peacekeeping operations*', more commonly known as the *Zeid Report*<sup>58</sup>. This examined a number of large thematic areas: how guidelines and legal jurisdiction (or the lack of jurisdiction) governs UN peacekeepers (inclusive of police, civilian and military); how the UN investigates allegations of SEA; how the UN as an organisation can prevent such acts in the future; the accountability of managers and commanders; disciplinary and financial accountability on both an individual level and institutional level; criminal accountability of perpetrators; and criminal accountability of the UN organisation.

The Zeid Report outlines a number of consequences of acts of SEA. At the top of the list is that an act of SEA 'damages the image and credibility of a peacekeeping operation and damages its impartiality in the eyes of the local population, which in turn may well impede the implementation of its mandate'

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<sup>58</sup> After the author of the report, Prince Zeid Ra'ad Zeid al-Husseini of Jordan.

(UN, 2005a; 9). This highlights the direct implications on the relations at the civilian/military interface of the operation. The Zeid Report outlined further consequences, including how such acts are against international law, that they constitute a loss of discipline within the mission, allegations foster a lack of legitimacy on the part of the operation, and create an increased risk of retaliatory violence and blackmail. Further unintended impacts relate to sexual misconduct, including the possible spread of sexually transmitted diseases, a rise in the prostitution and sex work trade, and the number of women and children left behind by UN staff and peacekeepers (Kyoama and Myrntinen, 2007; 36-37).

Significantly, the Zeid Report outlines a key factor which has important ramifications on how peacekeepers carry out their functions:

A consistent theme throughout the history of the Organization is the degree to which peacekeeping personnel have often failed to grasp the dangers confronting them, seduced by day-to-day conditions that can be viewed as benign. In other words, United Nations peacekeeping personnel have often read normalcy into a situation that is far from normal. And it is this inability on the part of many peacekeepers to discern the extent to which the society is traumatized and vulnerable that is at the root of many of the problems addressed in the present report. Peacekeeping is — and always will be — dangerous, demanding and exceptional, and no participant should assume peacekeeping to be “normal”.

(UN, 2005a; 2)

Here, the report picks up on a critical issue (and one which this thesis revisits in later chapters): that of the mindset of peacekeepers. The report outlines a number of characteristics of peacekeeping deployments which were brought to the attention of its authors, such characteristics are far from the 'normality' of day-to-day life in peacetime. Included is an erosion of the social fabric of the host population, a high number of children with little family support, high levels of poverty and lack of income-generating possibilities, and 'high incidence of sexual violence against women and children during the civil conflict coupled with discrimination against women and girls', which in the report's view, leads 'to a degree of local acceptance of violent and/or exploitative behavior against them' (UN, 2005a; 10). It is into this environment where peacekeepers arrive. According to the Report, it is the failure of a number of peacekeepers to treat this environment as *non-normal* that leads to them becoming involved in acts of SEA. Murphy observes that:

The reality of prostitution and sexual exploitation in this context is all the more disturbing as UN peacekeepers are supposed to facilitate a return to normality in a war-torn society and not to breach the trust placed in it by the local population. The UN presence is intended to protect those most vulnerable, not to exploit them.

(Murphy, 2006; 531)

Although perpetrators come from all parts of the peacekeeping community, military peacekeepers have become more synonymous with such activities. A 2008 report by Save the Children UK found that troops associated with the DPKO 'were identified as a particular source of abuse' in areas that were studied (Csáky, 2008; 8). Although the Report adds that certain operations will have a higher proportion of military peacekeepers (and this may influence figures), areas with a more mixed representation of military, civilian and police peacekeepers appeared to have higher allegations made against military peacekeepers (Csáky, 2008; 8). Murphy notes that between 1<sup>st</sup> January 2004 and 9<sup>th</sup> December 2005, 278 investigations were carried out against peacekeeping personnel (military, civilian and police), resulting in the dismissal of 16 civilians, and the repatriation of 16 members of formed police units and 122 military personnel (including six commanders) on disciplinary grounds (Murphy, 2006; 532). These figures are in addition to number of high profile cases involving peacekeepers from Italy, Denmark, Slovakia, America, Germany and Pakistan (to name a few) (Csáky, 2008; 10). Furthermore, research carried out by Kyoama and Myrntinen into the activities of battalions taking part in the UN mission in East Timor show a number of discrepancies by different nationalities within the mission. They find that while some of the nationalities (including the Australian battalion) placed limits on the number of alcoholic drinks per day for soldiers to drink, other battalions were less strict. For example, the Portuguese Battalion (PorBatt), was described by the authors to have a more 'laissez faire attitude towards the nocturnal activities of its soldiers'. Thus, PorBatt soldiers gained a certain notoriety in the area and were known to regularly visit massage parlours, be involved in bar-room brawls and

some were even known to have fathered children from the area (Kyooama and Myrntinen, 2007; 36-37).

Such substantial evidence, both anecdotal and statistically, coupled with the lack of preparedness for the unique environment of a post-conflict society, presents an important challenge for military peacekeepers. It is clear from reading the UN's literature, that the impact of SEA is felt at all levels of a peacekeeping operation. Importantly for this particular research, it erodes the delicate relations between the civilian body and military intervener. Such actions lead to the operation losing credibility, trust of the local population, and any momentum gained in pursuing any positive peace.

### **Expectations and reality of a deployed operation**

It is vital for military training for peacekeeping operations to prepare military peacekeepers to understand the reactions of the local population to certain actions, (and at times, the lack of action). Ammitzboel offers a description of the process that follows after the deployment of a peacekeeping operation. With the deployment of the mission, the population have an initial 'state of optimism'. What generally follows this is a 'general state of frustration' as time passes, as the 'livelihoods and living conditions of the local people do not improve as expected or even deteriorate' (Ammitzboell, 2007; 70). Pouligny (who has written extensively on how peace operations are perceived from the local point of view) notes how much of this could be down to the on-the-ground activities of those involved in the operation, and argues that along with the influx of the 'white all-terrain vehicles' and workers who occupy hotels and move around the

towns, are serious reservations from the local population who argue 'we don't see what they are doing' (Pouligny, 2006; 108). She finds that:

...the resulting incomprehension was expressed in exactly the same terms: they are seen 'running around everywhere in their big white cars' or 'travelling around', but basically 'They solve nothing', 'They do nothing', 'They just look around' quite often impatience also appears: 'If it's to find out about the situation, we don't need them/ there exist thousands of findings and reports. Everybody knows what's wrong in this country. Why spend more money for that?

(Pouligny, 2006; 108)

Pouligny argues that there is a critical gap between expectation and reality pertaining to the relationship between the civilian population and peacekeeping operation. In particular, she argues that relief projects and 'quick impact projects' are not met with undue support. In fact, Pouligny finds that rather than giving peacekeepers credit for these projects, 'people readily stressed that 'if they [peacekeepers] had wanted, they could have done so much more'' (Pouligny, 2006; 117). This in turn has a negative impact on those within the military who have been keen to stress the development of such projects as part of a wider civil-military endeavour. Likewise, Galtung's work on the local acceptance of the UNEF operations<sup>59</sup> in the Middle East examined the 'good deeds' of UN soldiers whilst they deployed in the region in comparison with work done by the UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA). While the good

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<sup>59</sup> United Nations Emergency Force (Middle East).

deeds undertaken by UNEF soldiers were generally well received, those done by UNRWA were received with little gratitude and 'much aggression'. This, Galtung asserts, was due to the local population judging UNRWA on 'what they did not do', whereas the population had little expectation of good deeds by UNEF troops, and were thus pleasantly surprised by any good deeds from the troops. This led Galtung to conclude that if troops were to train specifically to offer these 'good deeds', they should be careful not to draw anyone to the conclusion that they will automatically be the recipients of a good deed. If this happens 'the deed is no longer unexpected' and the peacekeeper 'may also run the risk of being evaluated in terms of leaving undone what could have been of material benefit to the local population' (Galtung, 1976b; 249).

Of importance are also the actions of the military contingents when placed under pressure in situations that, although tense, would not require a traditional military response. Pouligny outlines one such circumstance where the lack of response was seen in two totally different lights:

When a battle broke out between two rival gangs, in a lower-class area of Ca Haitien... in the north of the country, the blue-helmeted troops 'had a few rocks thrown at them, so they left. In reality they did not know how to control the situation'. For the senior officials of the mission the reaction was in accordance with instruction: both soldiers and police were supposed to avoid getting involved in that sort of event; they must simply watch to see that things did not get worse, and for that reason they

generally returned to the scene after the event. For the inhabitants of the district, it was a sign of ill will and incompetence.

(Pouligny, 2006; 111)

This is a key area for the military in its civil-military cooperation with the host population. In the UNPROFOR<sup>60</sup> mission, highlighted the importance of the actions (or inaction) of peacekeepers and the interpretations of such actions. General Sir Michael Rose argued that his unplanned crossing of a Sarajevo bridge (which was a major point of fighting) in the first 24 hours of a ceasefire successfully demonstrated confidence in the peace process<sup>61</sup> (Rose, 1999b; 77-109). However, the UNPROFOR case study also highlights the negative aspects of how actions impair local perceptions. Vaughn Kent-Payne (who commanded a UK battalion in UNPROFOR) writes of how members of his unit found disused landmines and were transporting them back to the UK for training purposes. The units' vehicles were searched by Bosnian troops who detained the UK troops, as they believed the landmines were destined for Croatian forces (who were, at the time, fighting the Bosnian Army). Kent-Payne remarked that 'whenever I denied accusations that the UN favored one side or another, the locals would trot out: 'But we know that a UN vehicle was stopped when it was carrying mines to the Croats'' (Kent-Payne, 1999; 27). Thus, in order to fully understand civil-military relations with the local population, attention must be heeded to the effects of such examples of action or inaction:

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<sup>60</sup> United Nations Protection Force (Bosnia).

<sup>61</sup> Rose also extends this reasoning to his mid-afternoon runs around the front line.

This has, to an extent, begun with the UN developing a way of quantifying the opinions of the local population in areas of peacekeeping deployments. Between 2005 and 2006, the DPKO published four public opinion surveys. In 2005, surveys for MONUC (DRC) and UNAMSIL (Sierra Leone) were published, followed by surveys for UNMIL (Liberia) and ONUB (Burundi)<sup>62</sup> in 2006. These public opinion surveys represent a development in UN policy, which at least seeks to capture the mood of the host population, and offer it as an assessment of the operation. The surveys also signify a developing set of methods to foster understanding of the host population's views<sup>63</sup>. For example, the MONUC study found that the perception of the operation was greatly varied, but results were directly related to which part of the country peacekeepers were (or were not) deployed - those in the west of the country - where MONUC's deployment was minimal - were far less favourable toward the operation than those in the north-west of the country, where the MONUC deployment was significantly higher (UNDPKO, 2005b).

### **Cultural (mis)understandings of the local population**

LaRose *et al's* report into non-traditional training for Canadian military peacekeepers identifies the serious implications for operations if peacekeepers

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<sup>62</sup> MONUC - United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies en République démocratique du Congo), UNAMSIL - United Nations Assistance Mission for Sierra Leone, UNMIL - United Nations Mission in Liberia, ONUB - United Nations Mission in Burundi.

<sup>63</sup> Surveys were either carried out by academics, with assistance from local NGOs (New York University carried out studies in UNMIL, UNAMSIL, and ONUB) or research organisations (Bureau d'Etudes, de Recherche et de Consulting International carried out the MONUC study).

possess a lack of knowledge about the culture of the host population. Firstly, they argue that such a lack of knowledge of the cultural context leads to 'misreading of individuals' and groups' intent' as well as 'a failure to recognize opportunities for concessions, agreements, cease-fires, or other steps forward in peacekeeping objectives' (LaRose-Edwards et al., 1997; 52). For the peacekeepers themselves, this lack of understanding of the local population will increase feelings of isolation and stress, and 'contribute to the perception of surrounding populations as "them," and thus possible antagonists' (LaRose-Edwards et al., 1997; 52).

Rubenstein's anthropological approach to peace operations notes that there are two main concerns that drive militaries to develop cultural awareness through increased training and education. Firstly, there is the need to decrease 'organizational-cultural misunderstandings' amongst the different components of a peacekeeping operation (such as the difficulties encountered between NGOs and the military outlined above). Secondly, is the need to increase understanding of the local cultures in which the mission is deployed. This can certainly be linked to the impact (both positive and negative) of culture on civil-military cooperation (Rubenstein, 2005; 528). Much of Rubenstein's work is directed towards emphasising the need for interveners (in this case, the military) gaining a deeper understanding of culture than the 'surface' meanings that are identified in training manuals and pre-mission briefings. Rubenstein recognises the point in basic briefings on cultural knowledge, insofar as they offer 'useful recommendations', for example, when deployed in the Middle East not to show the soles of their feet, or avoid seeing a woman without her *hijab*. However, he

argues that such briefings are seen as being akin to travelers' advice: although the information is useful on a base level, they 'provide no generative understanding that can be used to think through novel situations which interveners inevitably face' (Rubinstein, 2005; 532). This leads to the danger of cultural simplification: that interveners can lead to an 'assumption of homogeneity' for the host population, developing into a 'uniform' set of assumptions and expectations of the host population, how they will act, and how they will understand and react to the intervention. The danger of this, according to Rubenstein, is that interveners miss the 'great variation in the ways that culture is understood and enacted among people within a society' (Rubinstein, 2005; 531). Such simplification can manifest itself in a plethora of negative ways. Rubenstein argues that a simplified approach towards culture amongst Canadian forces in Somalia, which viewed all Somali teenagers as looters, led to all Somali teenagers caught stealing from the camp being treated as such. This 'looter' frame of reference had ramifications on how the youths were treated, and how 'peacekeepers thought about these Somalis' rights'. Ultimately, Rubenstein argues, this factor contributed to the torture and murder of sixteen year old Shidane Abukar Arone, who was caught breaking into the regimental compound in March 1993<sup>64</sup> (Rubinstein, 2005; 531-532).

Rubenstein also argues that although such peacekeepers may be well briefed, it does not mean that their actions will be interpreted differently by other cultures. The actions of the interveners are always 'doubly meaningful', with the intervener maintaining his/her view on the issues and actions taken, and those

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<sup>64</sup> This, according to the New York Times is one of the 'most jarring episodes in recent Canadian history' <http://www.nytimes.com/1996/02/11/world/the-killing-of-a-somali-jars-canada.html>, accessed 18<sup>th</sup> August 2009.

who receive the intervention making similar actions meaningful from 'within their own experience and cultural framework' (Rubinstein, 2005; 529). Such double meaning, in Rubenstein's view leads to a gap in understanding. Furthermore, Rubenstein argues that in order to be fully culturally aware, interveners must pay attention to the:

learned systems of meaning, transmitted through natural language and other symbol systems, having representational, directive, and affective functions, and capable of creating cultural entities and particular senses of reality.

(Rubinstein, 2005; 533)

Following this, Rubenstein suggests that interventions are based around three social constructions: legitimacy, standing and authority. Therefore, in order for peacekeeping operations to be truly effective, understanding the meaning system attached to these three areas from both the peacekeepers perspectives, as well as those who they are sent to protect, is of crucial importance (Rubinstein, 2005; 53).

Appreciating the cultural make-up of the local population has to some extent been investigated in military doctrine. The UK's CIMIC Doctrine notes that a cultural understanding of 'civil actor values, customs, ethnicity, religion, culture and ways of life' is a critical facet for the success of operations. It goes on to add that violating a local law or custom (whether unintentionally or not) will have serious implications on how the local population perceive the peacekeeping

force, and 'depending on the seriousness, a lack of cultural awareness could potentially undermine mission success' (JDDC, 2003; 3-2). This links to Duffey's work on culture discussed in Chapter one, which argues that in order to gain the consent of the local population, a better cultural understanding of the conflict - and its belligerent groups - is required. Duffey reasons that consent will be promoted if the parties 'feel understood and are made shareholders' of the peace process and that the process of making positive relations with the local population relies on the peacekeepers' understanding of the culture of the host population. Although in theory this is a positive set of assumptions, Duffey finds that in reality peacekeepers show little cultural insight, which in turn severely hampers positive community relations. The example of catastrophic failings of the UN peacekeeping operation in Somalia, where the UN failed to understand local Somali culture, is used to underline this. Duffey notes that frequently when the peacekeepers arrive in a conflict zone, they realise that 'the society has different conceptions of the conflict, different ways of managing it, and different approaches to seemingly simple everyday tasks' (Duffey, 2000b; 149-153).

Studies have examined attempts *within* militaries to recognise the significance of their own cultural impact on deployment areas. Bosman-Femke and Ait Bari's study of Dutch Muslim soldiers serving in peacekeeping operations in Muslim countries offers an insightful example of research into this area. In order to gain a full understanding of the complexities of these soldiers working in such an environment, the authors interviewed a number of Dutch soldiers 'with roots in a Muslim society' (be it children of first-generation migrant workers or asylum seekers), who had recently been deployed. The authors did this on the

understanding that 'culturally sensitive interaction and communication with the local population is essential' (Bosman et al., 2008; 695-696).

Their research raises a number of astute conclusions. Most importantly, it seeks to understand how the soldiers think about their culture, how it fits in with the military model that they work under, and also how it informs their reactions to the host population. On this last point, the authors were able to group the type of encounters that soldiers experienced. Firstly, the 'positive encounter' which outlined the positive interactions that soldiers had with the host population, particularly after the soldiers had recited verses of the Koran in order to convince members of the local population that they were not American or Russian, and were in fact 'fellow believers'. This is in contrast to the attitudes that non-Muslim Dutch soldiers received from sections of the host population, who, although not seen as being enemies in the eyes of the host population, were certainly seen as 'strangers'(Bosman et al., 2008; 696).

Not all encounters were positive though. The authors note that soldiers encountered 'loyalty issues' during operations. Here, soldiers spoke of members of the host population specifically asking for the Muslim peacekeepers to deal with issues, leading to increased pressure placed on them due to the local population seeing them as fellow 'brothers' and 'sisters'. This would result in the host population believing that they could ask more of the soldiers and that the soldiers would favour them over other groups (Bosman et al., 2008; 701). Linked to this is what the authors describe as the 'masked encounter', where soldiers attempted to conceal their Muslim identity. This

approach was more common in situations where the Muslim population of the deployment zone clearly showed antagonism towards another group, or was also overtly separated, or was disliked (Bosnia being the clear example here). Finally, the soldiers described the 'hostile encounter'. This, however, prioritized operating orders over culture. In the authors' words:

In these types of encounters, multiple identities are not ambiguous any more. The will to survive dominates; it is the only thing that matters irrespective of one's background, ethnicity or identity. The identity of a professional Dutch serviceman prevails.

(Bosman et al., 2008; 704)

Therefore, when examining culture as a key determinant of fostering positive relations with the host population, Bosman Femke and Ait Bari's work offers positive working examples of how the soldiers themselves understand culture and the impact their actions have on the host population. It also highlights the importance of the 'specific cultural dynamics' of interacting with local populations in Muslim societies. Furthermore, it has training implications as the knowledge of Muslim soldiers is being increasingly used by the Dutch military to assist in the instruction of other soldiers in cultural awareness training for peacekeeping deployments.

Linked to this study is the 2004 study undertaken by Soeters, Tanerçan, Varoğlu, and Siri into Turkish-Dutch encounters in peacekeeping operations, which compared approaches of both militaries in their relations with the host

population during peacekeeping operations, in particular the Kosovo and Afghanistan interventions (both interventions in areas with a high Muslim population).

In terms of fostering positive relations with the host population, Soeters *et al* were able to give a quality overview of the impact of a lack of cultural awareness by soldiers from northern European militaries. One such example is cited below:

This led to serious incidents, for example when the German G3 decided to transport the body of a Bosnian to Pristina on a Friday during the weekly prayer meetings. The Turkish commander, to whose sector the body was being transported, had not been informed. The first time he heard of it was when he was confronted with unrest in his area. This led to a serious argument, in the course of which the German was accused of cultural ignorance and the Turkish officer was accused of a lack of recognition of status and expertise'. (Soeters et al., 2004; 361)

As well as highlighting the negative consequences of such actions, the article highlights the positive results of effective cultural awareness by intervening forces, in particular, the cultural understanding shown by Muslim Turkish soldiers and commanders. Soeters *et al* find that the Turkish commander of ISAF from 2003-2004, General Hilmi Akyn Zorlu, instigated a number of policies for ISAF forces. Such policies 'stressed that during Ramadan nothing was to be eaten or drunk in the presence of the local population', and told soldiers that it

was not permissible to 'search women at random in the street without good reason' (Soeters et al., 2004; 366). The authors also found that Zorla's approach to the ISAF force itself, stressing it as being 'one big family', strongly related to the strength of family relationships in Turkish society. It may be difficult to quantify the importance of such policies, in comparison to the physical building of structures and facilities, but in terms of gaining a positive working environment for deployed peacekeepers, fostering of such relations is critical. The authors explain:

Traditionally, CIMIC provides 'hardware', such as civilian protection, the restoration of public utilities and the repair of roads and buildings. But it could also include appropriate social policies to win the hearts and minds of the host societies, which in turn could be significant in operational terms.

(Soeters et al., 2004; 366)

As the next chapter shows (in particular an example from the *Operation Broadsword* training exercise), this important aspect – that effective civil-military cooperation is more than the 'hardware' – is being offered in training to soldiers at an early stage.

### **Economic impacts on the host population**

Economic factors can play a role in helping or hindering relations with the host population. The ONUB mission in Burundi was criticised in certain areas for increasing inflation, creating a rise in the price of merchandise, and also a

notable price rise in the housing sector. Although it was not a major criticism of the operation, it did contribute to a sense of ambivalence from sections of the Burundian population (UNDPKO, 2006b; 23-24).

Ammitzboel notes a number of economic consequences of peacekeeping operations, including the emergence of a dual public sector syndrome where aid agencies, through mistrust of government practices and desire to use their funding, are creating a 'mirrored' public sector on reconstruction projects. She also finds that economic adjustment programmes result in low salaries being paid to government employees, as the government has to show early signs of economic growth and will cut wages to show this. These programmes can also make host governments wary of public spending projects and this results in a lack of infrastructure. Furthermore, the analysis finds that: inflation skews local markets; the price of goods go beyond what the local population can afford; a bottleneck is created in the local housing market, due to the influx of workers looking for accommodation (which also drives housing prices up); salary disparities between those working for international organisations and local salaries; and incentives for teenagers to leave their education to pursue work with the international organisations. This leads to a reconfiguration in the relationship between the peacekeepers and those who they have been sent to protect. In the case of UNMIK (the UN Mission In Kosovo), there were strong feelings that the people were actually *worse off* under UNMIK. There were also allegations of bias in recruitment towards the local Serb population. These economic dimensions are significant and if soldiers are to effectively build

positive relations with the local population, they need to be conscious of them (Ammitzboell, 2007; 76-86).

### **Negotiating the complexities of interactions with the civilian population: what not to do?**

There is no exact science to human-human interactions, particularly when one side has been through a cycle of violence, and the other is a newly arrived military contingent from another country. However, one can certainly argue that there are lines which peacekeepers should not cross, in particular the boundaries encompassed by International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law, the Geneva Conventions and elaborated in the Zeid Report. Pouligny gives suggestions of what peacekeepers should refrain from in a peacekeeping deployment:

[The peacekeeper] has to be aware that his behaviour in a foreign setting is assessed in exactly the same way as if he was in his own village or district: as a 'foreigner' not speaking a word of the local language, arriving in a big car driving at all sorts of speed, splashing and running over those who had the misfortune to be in his way, breaking all the laws of politeness and normal propriety, and beginning to flirt with his daughter and, in the worst case, rape her.

(Pouligny, 2006; 178)

Pouligny's assessment is particularly pertinent in light of the allegations that led to the Zeid Report but this is not the first time that peacekeepers have been recommended to relate the challenges of deployment to something more familiar. Brigadier Michael Harbottle, who wrote extensively about peacekeeping in Cyprus (under the UNFICYP operation), argued against increasing the use of force in the mission by stating that it would be akin to:

...turning on your host in his own house and hitting him over the head, after you have accepted his invitation to stay for the weekend and help settle an argument between him and a neighbor. The likelihood would be that you would find yourself seized by the scruff of your neck and bundled ignominiously out of the house, never to be invited again – a fate equally likely to be meted out to a UN Peacekeeping force.

(Harbottle, 1970; 7)

Calls for increased understanding also come from the UN's *Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines*, which state that operations must be aware of, and proactively manage, their impact. The Principles and Guidelines state that:

United Nations peacekeeping personnel should be careful to mitigate the possible negative consequences of the mission's presence. United Nations peacekeeping personnel must adhere to national laws, where these do not violate fundamental human rights standards, respect local

culture, and maintain the highest standards of personal and professional conduct.

(UN, 2008c; 81-82)

As outlined briefly in the previous chapter, the Principles and Guidelines also highlight that missions should be aware of possible side effects of the UN presence. It finds that:

Poor driving and vehicle accidents and lax waste management practices are just some of the negative impacts that may seriously undermine the perceived legitimacy and credibility of a mission, and erode its popular support. The size of a United Nations peacekeeping operation's human and material footprint is likely to have a direct bearing on its impact, or perceived impact, in the community.

(UN, 2008c; 81)

In particular, it asks that three impacts be kept in mind in planning. Firstly, the social impact which involves sources of friction that result from different cultural norms of mission staff and the population of the host population. Secondly, the Principles and Guidelines ask that the economic impact is understood, in particular the driving up of local house prices and accommodation, as well as the demands on local producers for staple foods and materials (which could result in shortages for the local community). The final aspect is the environmental impact, and the effects of poor waste management and levels of water usage. Overarching this is the general rule that UN personnel should be

alert to any 'potential, unforeseen or damaging consequences of their actions' and be prepared to manage such consequences (UN, 2008c; 81). This shows that the UN is beginning to understand such aspects of deployment.

To assist civil-military cooperation, it is also of critical importance to understand the local population as something considerably more positive than just the victims of violence. Pouligny argues that peacekeepers must think of the people that they encounter as 'genuine actors, rethinking their situation and expressing something about it' (Pouligny, 2006; 67). An example of how this has been incorporated into Security Council debates is in UN Security Council Resolution 1325, which reaffirmed the 'important role of women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts and in peacebuilding', stressed the importance of the equal participation and full involvement of women 'in all efforts for the maintenance of peace and security' and pushed for a much higher involvement of women in decisions pertaining to conflict resolution and prevention. Though it has taken time to filter through all chains in the UN peacekeeping hierarchy, and there exists considerable debate over the effectiveness of resolution 1325<sup>65</sup> (Willett, 2010) this thesis suggests that a baseline understanding has emerged which recognises the local population as solutions to the conflict as well as its victims.

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<sup>65</sup> The journal *International Peacekeeping* recently published a special edition outlining the impact of Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security: *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 17: 2, 2010.

## ***The desired impact of training on the enhancement of civil-military cooperation***

### **NGO-Military Relations**

Joint training between the military and civilian organisations has been outlined as a key component to improving relations between military and humanitarian organizations. Gamba, states that:

it is clear that some specialized training is needed for successful participation in peace operations... specialized training must not replace traditional military training, which should, in fact, be modified to cover the unique tasks of peace operations.

(Gamba, 1998; 10)

In 1997, the Canadian Military reflected on the need to enhance their training programmes to encounter civilian groups. In their study of non-traditional techniques of training for military forces, LaRose-Edwards *et al* argue that awareness of cultural and functional variations of other peacekeeping partners is of 'key importance' in the success of an operation. Their report recommends that:

Canadian military receive training on dealing with other military and civilian field partners, so as to increase Canadian ability to play a role in

enhancing unity of effort by all civilian-military components of a UN field operation.

(LaRose-Edwards et al., 1997; 51)

Gamba's study of the UNIDIR survey on peacekeeping training (discussed earlier in this chapter) recommends that pre-deployment training should be updated to incorporate 'more integrated civil-military peacekeeping training' (Gamba, 1998; 11). This development would, in Gamba's view, be beneficial to military peacekeepers. However, there is a shortage of training initiatives which cover joint training of civilian and military peacekeepers. This means that the training is mainly on-site once peacekeepers are deployed. This *ad hoc* nature to civil-military training for peacekeeping operations carries a serious risk of high levels of unfamiliarity and misunderstanding (Gamba, 1998; 11).

Importantly, there have been developments in training provisions. The UN's 2002 publication, *Department of Peacekeeping Operations Civil-Military Coordination Policy*, gives an enhanced focus on the level of training received by military forces. The policy advocates that training be delivered through a mix of UN and Member State initiatives. At the 'lowest level', the policy outlines the importance of the UN's own Standardised Generic Training Modules (SGTMs) in training peacekeepers<sup>66</sup> (DPKO, 2002; 5-6). The draft *Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services on the effectiveness of integrated peacekeeping training in peacekeeping operations* finds that there are areas that cross over the traditional military/civilian boundaries. In order to address such issues, the

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<sup>66</sup> The SGTMs are examined in the following chapter.

Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) suggest training in a number of key areas which involve more than one component of a peacekeeping operation:

Cross-cutting functions performed by more than one component such as DDR, Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA) and HIV/AIDS, and training and education in areas of single or dual component specialization whose cross-cutting effects bear on other components, such as the military's Rules of Engagement affecting the freedom of movement of civilian staff. (OIOS, 2007; 6)

Eide *et al's* commissioned *Report on Integrated Missions: Practical Perspectives and Recommendations* (written for the UN) argues that common training is a valuable tool 'for enabling better interoperability between conflicting organisational cultures' and offers a number of recommendations for the design of missions (Eide et al., 2005; 37). Importantly, these include the development of a common training framework and on-the-ground training facilities (Eide et al., 2005; 41). This reaffirms notions that coordination between civilian and military groups can be best formulated through training programmes and the reliance on the *ad hoc* nature of engagement is unreliable at best. However, the report finds that although the UN is taking steps in the right direction, there must be more of a 'buy in' from the whole UN community.

Linking to the issue of coordination, the UN's Inter Agency Standing Committee (IASC) recommends that the military actively seek to understand the complex network of humanitarian assistance, including local, national and international

NGOs that work with national staff and local partners. They urge the military to understand what impact they have on the local actors and parties to the conflict, arguing that military personnel must be made aware of the importance of responsiveness towards local sensitivity and ‘adherence to the actuality and perception of impartiality and independence’ whilst deployed in a peacekeeping environment (IASC, 2004; 6). Using training as a way of highlighting these dilemmas is a positive step. Both aspects here relate to a greater need to understand issues wider than the ‘traditional’ remit of military training and bring the military into the ‘grey areas’ in deployment. As the following chapter illustrates, training programmes in civil-military cooperation consider the impacts of the operation on civilian agencies, and also recommend that communication skills are used to facilitate positive relations.

There have been numerous pertinent critiques of current civil-military training techniques. The International Forum on the Challenges of Peace Operations report entitled ‘Meeting the Challenges of Peace Operations: Cooperation and Coordination’ (hereafter referred to *Challenges II*<sup>67</sup>) highlights a relevant issue in the coordination of training programmes, by suggesting that courses on civil-military cooperation are too focussed on military procedures and techniques. Consequently, too few courses are providing such training from the viewpoints of all actors involved in peacekeeping operations. *Challenges II* therefore argues for a multi-disciplinary environment where ‘military, police, and multiple civilian perspectives can be folded into the discussion’ (Project, 2005; 131). Member states and organisations which specialise in training for peacekeeping

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<sup>67</sup> Named because it is the second published report from the International Forum on the Challenges of Peace Operations (see footnote 4 for more details).

operations are recommended to create modules which 'emphasize the principles and techniques of cooperation and coordination, across organizations and disciplines' (Project, 2005; 123). This is a significant approach. Placing cooperation and coordination at the centre of such training takes peacekeeping training for the military firmly out of its 'traditional' setting, with techniques such as negotiation and cultural awareness being advocated.

The military recognition of the enhanced emphasis on cooperation is acknowledged in *Challenges II*. The report finds that the military has demonstrated interest in cooperating with civilian actors through adding a civilian aspect to training scenarios<sup>68</sup>. The report also finds that militaries have recognised the need for non-military contributions to scenarios and role-play exercises to add realism for the soldiers, and to gain a 'greater training value for the military itself'. With these ideas in mind, *Challenges II* encourages closer ties within training for operations. Underlining the argument that 'participants in peace operations shouldn't meet for the first time in the maelstrom of a peace operation', *Challenges II* recognises the need to embed a 'culture of cooperation' as a principle operational requirement. This would be done through bringing civilian knowledge into the design of training exercises for the military (Project, 2005; 124-125).

A deeper understanding of civilian roles to facilitate general relationships between the military and civilian groups is therefore vital. The UK's PSO doctrine stresses this by stating that staff at all levels should be aware of the

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<sup>68</sup> This thesis explores one such scenario at the Royal Military Training academy, Sandhurst in the following chapter.

'underlying tenets of CIMIC and the operating norms of other agencies', in order to function effectively together (JDDC, 2004; 3-6). Additionally, with regard to briefings given by the military to civilian actors, PSO doctrine spells out the importance of training to enhance the process:

Dialogue, trust, and understanding between military and civil actors is a delicate area that requires personnel trained in, and familiar with, the respective agency's agenda. Those briefing civilian agencies should have undergone additional training and should not simply be intelligence specialists delivering a standard military threat assessment. Officers briefing civil sector representatives must ensure that their information is of the highest quality and currency as the lives of IGO and NGO workers may well depend upon the data offered. In addition, the long-term credibility of the PSF [Peace Support Force] and the CIMIC staff, in particular, will depend upon the quality of these briefings, the perceived value to all concerned, and the rapport achieved.

(JDDC, 2004; 3-10)

Spence finds that in order for the transition from the military peacekeeping stage to the civilian peacebuilding phase to be successful, each actor must be aware of the other at the earliest possible stage. This involves the need for training and joint exercises between the components. Spence uses the example of work being undertaken by the Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre (JDCC) which runs a series of joint planning exercises and advocating the placement of military staff on NGO training exercises (Spence, 2002; 167-170). This is linked

to Wilkinson's assessment of PSO Doctrine, where there is a desire for a switch from 'the PSO force to the peacebuilding activities of the civilian components of the mission' (Wilkinson, 2000b; 78).

### **Military relations with the local population**

As seen above, issues of SEA have highlighted the impact of negative actions of peacekeepers on the mission, and the UN as an institution. With regard to building positive relations with the local population, and ensuring effective civil-military cooperation, it is one of the few areas which has seen a radical overhaul of training. Resolution 1820 requested the Secretary General, in cooperation with the Security Council, Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and its working group, as well as relevant states, to:

Develop and implement appropriate training programs for all peacekeeping and humanitarian personnel deployed by the United Nations in the context of missions as mandated by the Council to help them better prevent, recognise and respond to sexual violence and other forms of violence against civilians

(UN, 2008f)

Combating SEA by UN peacekeepers is a multi-faceted task, with training identified as a key component in reducing and preventing further incidents. As noted in the UN's mandate for MONUC (outlined above), training is outlined as

a pre-requisite for those embarking on the mission. Taking the case of MONUC a stage further, Dahrendorf's lessons learned study (commissioned by the DPKO) of the activities of the MONUC Office for Addressing SEA finds that training is 'the most effective preventative measure against sexual exploitation and abuse', and recommends that train the trainer programmes be set up with the support of the UN headquarters and Public Information Office (who can provide training materials and audio-visual tools) (Dahrendorf, 2006; 16). Kent also argues that that pre-deployment training must be enhanced, and that the focus should be on human rights, with issues related to gender, culture and SEA looked at from a 'rights-based approach' (Kent, 2007; 60).

Moreover, the Zeid Report recommends that intensive training be organised by the DPKO for peacekeepers arriving on missions as well as in-mission training for troops. The report places obligations on troop contributing countries to ensure that contingent commanders 'are aware of their responsibility to ensure that their contingents attend and receive such training prior to deployment' (UN, 2005a; 18). Much of this training should be aimed to convey the messages set out in the Secretary General's bulletin, as well as outlining the 'importance that the Organization attaches to the elimination of sexual exploitation and abuse' (UN, 2005a; 18). This attachment to responsibility at the level of contingent commander is critical. Dahrendorf's report finds that although training of a contingent can go so far, unless the responsibility goes up the command chain, little is achieved<sup>69</sup>:

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<sup>69</sup> OASEA - Office for Addressing Sexual Abuse and Exploitation; BOI - Board of Inquiry; FPU - Formed Police Unit.

A day after arriving in MONUC, a 120-member Formed Police Unit (FPU) was briefed by the OASEA and the SRSG on sexual exploitation and abuse. All members including senior officers attended the briefing session. That same day, and continuing for several weeks, a number of FPU members used the services of a young man to procure prostitutes. The OASEA investigation found that the Commanding Officer and his senior officers knew that members of the FPU were visiting prostitutes but had failed to implement measures that would have prevented their subordinates from engaging in such activities. The BOI concluded that nine FPU members had engaged in activities prohibited by the Code of Conduct and that the Commanding Officer had failed to exercise proper command and control. The entire FPU was withdrawn by the Police Contributing Country.

(Dahrendorf, 2006; 11)

This raises an essential issue of leadership in peacekeeping, as well as using the threat of punishment as a deterrent. Training programmes provide great value in imparting essential knowledge to military peacekeepers. However, without developments of a zero tolerance policy and a strengthening of leadership, the path to eliminating SEA will be much more precarious. It is clear though, that events in the last ten years in relation to SEA from deployed peacekeepers has critical implications on civil-military cooperation. The response to this through observed training models is explored further in the following chapter.

In his assessment of civil-military relations, Williams reinforces the need for militaries to develop training for cooperation with the civilian population. He argues that peacekeeping forces need a deeper understanding of International Human Rights standards to address abuses, from both conflicting parties and the peacekeeping mission itself. This would be greatly informed by an increase in training which specifically addresses Humanitarian Law in peacekeeping operations, as without such training, the credibility of a mission can be undermined (Williams, 1998; 73-74).

LaRose *et al* argue that more research into 'cultural behaviour patterns' is required and that this research should be incorporated into training. Briefings which utilise cultural training specialists and prepared representatives of the host population be prepared in the run up to the peacekeepers deployment, should also be employed. LaRose recommend that the Canadian military prepare a 'guide to the mission's cultural behaviour context' and distribute it to all those deploying on a mission. LaRose *et al* also recommend that a training session covering ways to interact with the local population be incorporated into each unit's pre-deployment preparation. Such training would come from nationals from the mission area or subject matter experts (LaRose-Edwards *et al.*, 1997; 52).

Linked to this, Williams notes that many of the problems that occurred in Bosnia and Somalia might have been avoided if the forces that were deployed had better prepared for the cultural challenges which they encountered in the conflict zone. This led him to conclude that peacekeeping forces 'need to be

made aware of local culture and norms of behaviour', and that there should be emphasis placed on the 'importance of collaboration with civilians, both within missions and on their fringes' (Williams, 1998; 73). Duffey expands on this by arguing that intercultural skills are 'essential tools in any third party's toolbox'. If such skills (which Duffey argues are closely related to *contact skills*) are not developed, then peacekeepers will lack an understanding of the conflict, including the 'local conceptions of the conflict and cultural means for resolving it' (Duffey, 2000b; 163). While the understanding of local cultures may encourage peacekeepers to 'build upon local resources', or employ more sensitive processes of intervention, Duffey argues, a result of a lack of such training exacerbates the potential for cultural misunderstandings and undermines relations with local populations.

The UN's *Challenges I* report finds that relevant training into cultural and religious awareness will help peacekeepers to work in the society in which they are deployed. Such training would range from the generic knowledge of the conflict, to specific knowledge of the area. It states that such training will assist in peacekeepers to avoid imposing their mindset on others. This finding may be strongly related to the calls to treat the local population as *peacebuilders* as well as the *victims* of the conflict (TCP, 2002; 239).

## **Conclusions**

This chapter adds to the literature by offering a detailed consideration of the facets of civil-military cooperation, and highlights calls for the need for further understanding of conflict resolution techniques from the academic and practitioner community. The concept of civil-military coordination has little

shared meaning amongst different military actors in a conflict zone, let alone the multitude of civilian agencies that are involved in a peacekeeping operation. This opens space for an *ad hoc* development, which by its very nature, has led to culture clashes, differences in opinions, debates about priorities, and disputes over desired ends and the means to achieve them.

However, it is clear from the existing research carried out into civil-military cooperation that positive relations are critical to the perceived success of an operation. As the chapter outlines, a critical way to improving this harmonious relationship is through joint training initiatives and mutual understanding. As an attendee at a workshop on 'Challenges to Peace Operations in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century' stated:

Nothing creates more misunderstanding, generates more emotion and results in more confusion in modern peacekeeping than the subject of civil-military relations; yet nothing, absolutely nothing, is more important to successful peacekeeping in the new millennium than the cooperation and coordination between the principal contributors to a peacekeeping mission, military and non-military.

(TCP, 2002; 145)

With regard to the issue of the local population, the chapter illustrates that this is a grey area. While the structures that govern NGOs and international humanitarian organisations offer a small clue as to the possible actions and reactions of staff, the relations with the local population are more sporadic. As

the following chapter notes, military personnel are being trained to deal with a much larger range of problems and issues than what would normally be seen in the traditional sense of civil-military cooperation.

Recent literature also picks up on the impacts, both intended and unintended, of actions by peacekeepers. Although some actions (for example, sexual exploitation and abuse) have obvious ramifications, more subtle areas are being uncovered (such as the economic impact). This thesis argues that it is vital that military peacekeepers gain a sound knowledge of the cultural make-up of the area in which they are deployed.

There is room for skills to be drawn from the conflict resolution field. As with the previous chapter on the UN, this chapter outlines the policy needs for increased training in conflict resolution. The very fact that analysis of civil-military coordination is undertaken by conflict resolution scholars, and is linked to works by Lederach (referred to at the beginning of this chapter) demonstrates that there is a further manifestation of the links between the two fields. With regard to wider debates about the role of peacekeeping as an international form of conflict resolution, the development of civil-military cooperation can have an impact at all levels. Even though it is at the very early stages of a peacebuilding process, failure to effectively understand the civilian dimension could have severe consequences for the operation.

Furthermore, an inability to consult the local population, or consult only those who have gained power through use of violence, will not have long-term

benefits for the vast majority of the local population. More worryingly, there is a danger that operations will not listen to alternative voices, under-represented groups or those whom they see as unimportant. The danger of pursuing such policies (intended or unintended) is that dominant systems in global politics, which may have led to the context for the violent conflict in the first place, may be replicated in the host country; and this is what those from the more critical studies perspective (Pugh and Richmond) argue that peace operations are doing.

In order to realise their conflict resolution potential, peace operations must understand civil-military relations as being more than a coordination policy with international NGOs. In order to move towards a cosmopolitan form of international conflict resolution, operations will have to be able to react to the needs of the local population, and also be prepared to place a great deal of effort in what Elliot describes (at the beginning of this chapter) as 'rebuilding local legitimacy and pluralist democratic practices' (Elliot, 2004; 25).

The next chapter examines how the problem areas with civil-military cooperation have been addressed through observed training programmes. It investigates how conflict resolution skills have assisted such programmes, how conflict resolution terminology is used to help soldiers understand their roles in civil-military cooperation, and how it assists them in carrying out civil-military cooperation in deployment zones. From this analysis, a picture is built reinforcing further connections between the field of conflict resolution and military forms of peacekeeping.



# **More than Fighting for Peace?**

**An examination of the role of conflict resolution in  
training programmes for military peacekeepers**

David Manus CURRAN

**Volume II of II**

## **Chapter 4.**

### **Fieldwork Investigations: Civil-military Cooperation**

In order to develop a fuller understanding of civil-military cooperation, this thesis now offers an account of experiences gained during fieldwork investigations. This adds practical examples to reinforce the previous chapter's findings: notably that civil-military cooperation is traditionally conceived as a practice of *coordination* and *understanding* between the military and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), that there now exists new forms of civil-military cooperation more aligned with ideas of conflict transformation at a local level and focussed on relationships with the civilian population, and that training informed by the field of conflict resolution can greatly enhance the abilities of military peacekeepers. This chapter therefore explores how peacekeepers are being prepared to meet these challenges and play a key role in the transformation from negative to positive peace.

Returning to the first chapter, the role of UN peacekeeping (as outlined by Hasegawa) is 'understood as a contributing factor in transforming conflict and a manifestation of the will to transform violent conflict into a peaceful situation' (Hasegawa, 2005; 27-28). In order for operations to fit into such a framework, the civil-military dimension is critical to encourage peacebuilding projects at the local level. The wide range of informative fieldwork visits, meetings, and interviews offer an analysis of the extent to which military personnel are being

trained to do this. Linking the field of conflict resolution to the traditional field of civil-military coordination further illustrates the manifestation of the links between military peacekeeping and conflict resolution. Such observations also contribute to the emerging cosmopolitan literature. Chapter six, (which looks at overall areas for discussion) uses observations from this and the following chapter, and compares them to what cosmopolitan scholars contend are the core tasks for cosmopolitan-minded militaries.

Further links between the fields of conflict resolution and military peacekeeping are outlined in this chapter (and the following chapter) through analysis of *how* training is carried out. This is primarily carried out through linking Lederach's models of elicitive and prescriptive training to military training for peacekeeping operations

### ***Lederach's training models***

Although based on experiences of mediation training sessions with civilian groups, Lederach's work on theorising a prescriptive and elicitive model of training provides a useful tool for interpreting what was observed, both in terms of teaching civil-military cooperation and other conflict resolution skills<sup>70</sup>.

In order to gain a fuller understanding of the prescriptive and elicitive forms of training, Lederach firstly distinguishes between implicit and explicit knowledge

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<sup>70</sup> For example, negotiation skills (outlined in the following chapter).

bases. When understanding conflict and conflict resolution, participants in a given setting will have either an implicit or an explicit knowledge and understanding of conflict. Lederach finds that implicit knowledge refers to accumulated knowledge of how 'conflict operates in our given milieu of origin and how it is handled in our cultural context': how we have understood conflict from our own experiences (Lederach, 1996; 44). Explicit knowledge, on the other hand, refers to a 'focussed, intentional effort to increase one's knowledge about conflict and how to handle it': where one actively seeks to gain further knowledge from a variety of sources such as studying, researching, training and focussed experience (Lederach, 1996; 44-45). Understanding these two very different forms of knowledge is essential in order to understand how training processes work. Lederach suggests that both knowledge bases are present in a training session, and that the role of the two knowledge bases will vary in relation to the training model provided.

With this in mind, Lederach finds that training for conflict resolution comes in two distinct forms. Firstly, the prescriptive model, which 'assumes that the expert knows what the participants need' (Lederach, 1996; 48-49). Thus, the trainer/expert will bring 'packages' built around his or her specialised knowledge and experience in the field of conflict resolution. In this model, the knowledge flow is predominately from trainer to receiver, with the knowledge of the trainer being a 'key resource', which is transferred to participants, who attempt to emulate it. The benefits of such an approach:

lie in its capacity to outline and permit participants to interact with an approach to conflict resolution and to understand and master the particular strategies and techniques it entails.

(Lederach, 1996; 51-52)

This interaction is useful to participants who wish to expand their knowledge of new models of conflict and conflict resolution. It also provides opportunity for 'new thinking, improving skills, and feeling more confident' about how to deal with situations of conflict (Lederach, 1996; 58). Furthermore, Lederach finds that the training benefits from the considerable experience and knowledge gained from the trainer, whose techniques can also be useful in a number of settings and provide participants with concrete set of ideas and skills.

The elicitive approach, on the other hand, is centred on the implicit knowledge of the participants. This type of training is therefore based on how participants understand conflict and its resolution. The foundation of this is:

implicit indigenous knowledge about ways of being and doing is a valued resource for creating and sustaining appropriate models of conflict resolution in a given setting.

(Lederach, 1996; 55)

Although this is different from the prescriptive approach, Lederach argues that the focus on indigenous knowledge does not exclude comparison with other models of conflict resolution. It in fact 'brackets' them, with the focus primarily

on discovering 'what people already have in place and already know about the strengths and weaknesses of their own models of conflict resolution' (Lederach, 1996; 56). It also does not blindly trust the participants' knowledge over other models, as it is designed with a degree of trust in participants to 'have the capacity and creativity to identify, name, critique, create, and recreate models that correspond to needs they experience and identify' (Lederach, 1996; 56). The role of a trainer in this scenario is more akin to a facilitator who 'brackets' his or her own experiences and techniques, in order to develop a 'participatory process of discovery' (Lederach, 1996; 56-58). Lederach therefore outlines two distinct forms of training. Each of these forms possess alternate roles for the trainer, the delivery, the focus on implicit and explicit knowledge, and the overall training model.

Significantly, it is the role and importance of culture where one can see a critical difference, and one which may be pertinent for this current discussion of training for peacekeeping operations. The prescriptive approach 'assumes a certain amount of universality', suggesting that the transfer of knowledge can take place across cultures, and that techniques are culturally neutral (Lederach, 1996; 65). Learning 'culture' in the prescriptive model is seen as something of an 'advanced stage' of development, with effective training reduced to short 'recipes', (for example, recognising cultural differences, working alongside ethnic groups and how to negotiate effectively across cultures). The prescriptive approach also offers a 'universality of technique', based on the understanding that models can be transferred into different cultural contexts (with minor adjustments), or through attempting to minimise the importance of the cultural

context (Lederach, 1996; 65). Lederach argues that this is a negative aspect, finding that what becomes universal 'may be the homogenization of people to fit into the approach' (Lederach, 1996; 68). The approach also leaves itself open to criticism that the cultural 'universality' is actually based on an underlying assumption that the trainer 'knows best', and the culture from where the trainer gained his or her knowledge has dominance over the culture to which he or she is teaching in.

The elicitive approach is very much based on the cultural setting in which it is placed, and is therefore deemed by Lederach to be less imperialistic. As the focus of this model is based on the participants' knowledge and life experiences, the cultural elements – language, heritage, and local forms of conflict resolution – will all form the base of the training. Lederach finds that the validation of these cultural elements as resources is the 'fundamental goal of the training endeavour' (Lederach, 1996; 67).

The significance of cultural specificity is important in the context of the military, and this thesis will explore this in more depth when examining military culture<sup>71</sup>. For the purposes of this chapter, it is worth bearing in mind to what extent militaries *can* be culturally sensitive to the needs of the soldiers it trains, and where such training can be informed more by the participants (soldiers) than the trainers.

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<sup>71</sup> Particularly in Chapter six.

Thus, this chapter explores both *what* is being trained in the observed exercises, and *how* the knowledge is being imparted. With regard to the question of *what* is being trained, the chapter examines what ways soldiers are being prepared for more traditional conceptions of civil-military relations. It then looks at where there are signs of more contemporary forms of civil-military cooperation, focussed on fostering relations with the host population and civil society groups. With regard to *how* soldiers are being trained, the chapter revisits Lederach's approaches and applies them to military training for peacekeeping operations, thus further adding to the links between peacekeeping and conflict resolution. This informs following chapters, which examine differences between traditional conceptions of what militaries are designed for, and the demands placed on them by increased conflict resolution skills.

### ***A note about fieldwork visits***

Civil-military cooperation is incorporated into the training exercise *Operation Broadsword*, observed at the Royal Military Training Academy Sandhurst (RMAS). In *Broadsword*, the cohort of officer cadets are deployed in a civilian environment over a 10-day period. The cohort is split into three groups and each group is rotated through three roles: deployment as soldiers in a built-up area; deployment as soldiers in areas outlying the built up area; and deployment as civilians in the built up area. Each group rotates through the

roles, with all roles played at the same time (thus at any one time, cadets will be playing civilians, soldiers in the urban area, and soldiers in the outlying area)<sup>72</sup>.

*Operation Broadsword* is based on the UK's Operation in Afghanistan<sup>73</sup>, reflecting deployment into a contemporary PSO-style environment<sup>74</sup>. The overarching scenario of *Broadsword* focuses on a deployment of a NATO force in the country of *Hampshiristan*, in support of a wide reaching peace agreement in the country. In particular, the UK forces (who are part of the NATO Force) are deployed in the *Helmand Province* and its regional capitol *Longmoor*. This province is characterised by a high degree of lawlessness, a number of different tribes, and belligerent groups. The deployment zone also contains 'spoilers' to the peace process in the form of *Banital* forces, who oppose the UK presence and have resorted to violent tactics in order to achieve their objectives<sup>75</sup>. The region is holding elections for the provincial council, which are threatening to split tribal groups in the area<sup>76</sup>.

The key task of the UK mission in *Broadsword* is to 'create a neutral and stable environment in which the [regional] elections can take place'. This role play is therefore primarily designed to use a full range of skills and techniques in order to facilitate the voting process: The traditional skills - to create a secure area for

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<sup>72</sup> In terms of the *Broadsword Exercise*, cadets are referred to as **military/soldier**, and **civilians** (unless they are training staff, in which case that shall be made explicit). When describing scenarios the term 'military' and 'civilian' will be used. When looking at lessons learned, the term 'cadet' will be used.

<sup>73</sup> The exercise is historically attached to real-life examples of UK troop deployment into civilian environments. In particular are operations in Northern Ireland and Bosnia-Herzegovina (the *Longmoor* village still contains graffiti from the different case studies).

<sup>74</sup> The development of peacekeeping doctrine is outlined on page 43.

<sup>75</sup> *Banital* forces were played by Ghurka Troops.

<sup>76</sup> The tribal groups are differentiated thus: *Pashtun* Tribes, of which there are seven different types (which are fragmented, but generally resent the extension of the *Hampshiri* Government and western control which the UK forces represent); *Hazara*; *Uzbek*; *Tajik*.

voting; and wider skills to ensure that the prospects of peace are more appealing than those of instability (Sandhurst, 2007). Throughout the role-play, cadets are asked to react to 'serials' - loosely scripted role-plays played by other cadets.

Staff from the UK's Joint CIMIC Group assesses officer cadets taking part in the CIMIC exercises at *Broadsword*. At the centre of the military base in *Longmoor* is the 'CIMIC House'<sup>77</sup>. This is the physical centre where civilians meet with the military. According to those who run the training exercise, *Broadsword* is held in high regard as the incorporation of a CIMIC House means that it is one of the few exercises which specifically run civil-military cooperation scenarios (Sandhurst, 2008a). The House is also seen by those designing the exercise as a key place to showcase an overt role for negotiation and other non-traditional skills to cadets. In discussions with staff from the Joint CIMIC Group, it was interesting to note that they believed that the CIMIC House, and civil-military cooperation in general were the 'front line' in new deployments, and provided a 'flashpoint' for the military. In terms of this particular role-play, it was noted by the trainers that the recreation of the CIMIC House was not as close as it possibly could be, but still offers the cadets 'a great deal' (Sandhurst, 2008a).

The visit to the United Nations Training School Ireland (UNTSI) coincided with their training programme on civil-military cooperation for members of the Irish Defence Forces (DF). This visit provided the opportunity to gain a flavour of how the DF were preparing their troops for civil-military cooperation. Furthermore, in

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<sup>77</sup> This house also served as an entry point to the military base, and was adjoined to meeting rooms, a communications room, as well as an area designated for intelligence gathering.

the same week of the visit, the Irish government had announced that Irish forces would be sent to Chad as part of a European peacekeeping force. As shall be demonstrated, this particular deployment was to inform parts of the civil-military relations course.

Further fieldwork contributes to this chapter, including meetings at the UN Headquarters in New York with staff working in the Department of Peacekeeping Operation's Best Practices Unit. This covered issues of civil-military cooperation and coordination, and provided the opportunity to discuss the Department of Peacekeeping Operation (DPKO) Standard Generic Training Module (SGTM) on civil-military coordination, which is used as a case study of UN training guidelines. More recently, the SGTMs have been replaced with the *Core Pre Deployment Training Materials* (CPTMs). These were released in May 2009, and have followed on from the UN's Strategic Training Needs Assessment (referred to in Chapter 2). The CPTMs will be referred to in this, and the following, chapter. Finally, fieldwork is informed by a visit to the NATO Training School in Oberammergau, Germany, and an interview with a senior trainer on the 'Peace Support Operations' module that is taught at the school. The trainer had served with NATO forces in Kosovo where he was charged with establishing contact with civilian organisations.

### ***Processes of Coordination between the military and civilian organisations***

As the previous chapter outlines, civil-military relations have traditionally been seen as a process of *coordinating* activities involving the military, NGOs, UN agencies, and civilian bodies formed from the host population. This involves debates regarding coordination, who controls the process and what effects such arrangements have. This chapter firstly examines forms of training for coordination, based on briefings and prescriptive-based training, as well as training which takes a less restrictive approach thereby allowing more interaction with participants.

To begin, it is worth stressing the *ad hoc* nature of coordination, which in many cases catches military peacekeepers by 'surprise' with the roles that they must assume. This can be illustrated through an example given by a CIMIC officer at RMAS. The officer explained that while deployed in Basra, a task for the UK CIMIC team was to convene meetings between themselves, the UK's Department for International Development (DfID), and local organisations. However, the team soon found out that there was a serious coordination problem between the major donor (DfID) and the local organisations. Although DfID had the financial backing for projects, they did not possess the local knowledge and expertise to use it – this expertise would be provided by the local organisations. However, DfID staff were located in a Basra Palace previously owned by Saddam Hussein, which was inside a UK military base. The local organisations were reluctant to use such a place for meetings (due to its historical attachments), and were also reluctant to be seen entering a UK military base. Likewise, the DfID staff were reluctant to leave the palace and travel outside of the military compound to meet with the local organisations, as

this meant that their safety could not be guaranteed. This scenario left the CIMIC team as the only body capable of meeting with both organisations in an environment that was suitable. The officer remarked that the CIMIC team often had to apologise for DfID (who would not exit the base), or the local organisations (who would not enter). This, in the soldier's view, made the 'the job of CIMIC difficult' (Sandhurst, 2008a).


This *ad hoc* approach was also referred to in an interview with a senior trainer at the NATO School. The trainer remarked that when he took up his NATO posting in Pristina (in the aftermath of the Kosovo war) a main task was to improve relations between the military and NGO community. In order to achieve this, a strategy was carried out where all international NGOs were invited to a meal every Sunday, thus giving the civilian organisations a chance to meet each other and the military informally. The trainer remarked that the 'Sunday Dinner' concept worked extremely well, and led to the civilian organisations deciding that it would be beneficial to hold a more formal meeting amongst themselves and the military after the dinner. It was also decided that if groups came to the dinner, they would have to go the meeting afterwards. The trainer argued that had the military imposed meetings on the NGO community then very little would be achieved. However, offering space for the NGO community to meet in an informal environment gave them the ownership of the process. In his view, it was this process which led the civilian organisations to be far more comfortable with the military presence in the area (NATO, 2008).

Switching to the training aspects of such coordination, the observed training institutions do offer a more regulated set of scenarios and briefing for how military peacekeepers can coordinate their work with civilian groups. Such briefings may offer guidelines, and what is expected of soldiers if a situation arises.

The UN Training School, Ireland offers a briefing which provides officers with guidelines on how to conduct CIMIC meetings, giving soldiers the chance to learn a number conflict resolution techniques. For example, the instructor stated that techniques (such as establishing ground rules, brainstorming, and voting to resolve issues) should be used in meetings. Figure 4.1 illustrates a number of rules for conducting meetings. Soldiers were asked to be aware of a great deal of issues, beyond that of the immediate security situation. The instructor further encouraged soldiers to look toward win-win scenarios, as well as communication techniques.

**Figure 4.1: CIMIC conduct of Business**

(UNTSI, 2007c)



The meetings also taught soldiers about the importance of negotiation skills in meetings.

**Figure 4.2: Golden rules for negotiators**

(UNTSI, 2007c)



As well as the briefing about the ‘nuts and bolts’ of the meeting process, the instructor was keen to point out the ‘cultural minefield’ that soldiers must negotiate during such meetings and the effect of cultural misunderstandings and different national approaches towards negotiations. The main context-specific reference came from Somalia, an example which has come through the academic text, notably Duffey’s work (Duffey, 2000b), but also resonates with the military community. Furthermore, the trainer stated that body language was important, as was the notion of hard and soft approaches to negotiations. Much of this is not too dissimilar to approaches seen in training scenarios for a non-military audience, and certainly goes some way to moving training towards non-traditional routes of conflict management to manage meetings and improve coordination efforts.

The development of civil-military coordination in UN peacekeeping training manuals are a solid illustration of the development of how civil-military cooperation is perceived, moving from strict definitions to a more ‘fluid’ state of affairs. It also shows that there can be a development of the model of training, from a rigid set of assumptions towards a model that encourages an increased degree of input from participants.

Here, it is worth examining the UN’s Strategic Generic Training Module on Civil-Military Coordination. Surrounding the development of the SGTM on civil-military cooperation was a wider debate within the UN concerning the very concept of Civil-military Coordination (CMCOORD). This is outlined in the previous chapter, where UN had to contend with competing views of the focus

of civil-military relations. At one end of the scale are the humanitarian agencies, and the other end is the DPKO, which by its very nature encompasses a stronger military viewpoint. Interviews conducted during fieldwork visits to the UN in 2007 highlighted such difficulties. It was felt that the UN's official CMCOORD policy was markedly different from the more militarised 'CIMIC' terminology used by the Troop Contributing Countries. The development of CMCOORD was partly a result of a fear of humanitarian bodies that if the term 'CIMIC' was used, then the military would end up enveloping the humanitarian agencies. Thus, CMCOORD has been the *modus operandi* for operations. However, this adoption has led some to feel that the DPKO went 'too far' with the adoption of the CMCOORD policy. While the policy has been favoured by humanitarian bodies (as it puts the military and civilian organisations on a distinctly equal footing), the troop contributing countries found it less favourable for the exact same reason. Furthermore, troop contributors did not share the CMCOORD 'optimism' that there would be a high enough degree of trust and understanding to ensure an equal share of coordination and activities (UNDPKO, 2007b).

Significantly, this example provides a clear instance of how training is influenced by policy considerations. In examining the SGTM 10 (introduction to civil-military relations) one can see that these debates have found their way into training policy, resulting in a relatively minimal role espoused for the military. The SGTM notes that in order to ensure that different components of the peacekeeping operation work together, civil-military coordination mechanisms are used to 'facilitate coordination, support, joint planning and the constant

exchange of information'(UN, 2006f; 4). The SGTM outlines six components of a peacekeeping operation, of which the 'peacekeeping force' is one <sup>78</sup>. The peacekeeping force is responsible for the establishment of a 'safe and secure environment', pointing to a limited role for military peacekeepers, very much based on filling the security vacuum (UN, 2006f; 3-4). Moreover, the training module goes on to state that the principle of exchanging information, be it through meetings, written or electronic communication or joint operation centres is at the centre of coordination (UN, 2006f; 7). Thus, the key roles for military peacekeepers within missions are to be at the centre of information exchanges and assist with the securitisation of a conflict zone. Although both are critical to the success of the operation, one could argue that they do not offer a wide range of possibilities for effective civil-military relations

The SGTM also offers advice on where and how military peacekeepers should become involved in humanitarian efforts. The tasks for military peacekeepers identified are to provide security, gather information, escort convoys, construct tents and other buildings, provide clean water supplies, and offer manpower. The module also asks that the military carry out 'confidence building measures'. These measures come in two forms. Firstly, through *civil military coordination patrols*, which specifically include in their objectives 'the gathering of information for humanitarian purposes' and establishing of good relations with the host population through 'disseminating information about the UN mission'. The second method is the organisation of cultural and social activities. For example,

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<sup>78</sup> The full list of mission components: Special Representative of the Secretary General; the Humanitarian Coordinator; the Civilian Police; the Human Rights Unit; the UN Development Fund; and the Peacekeeping Force.

the military peacekeepers organising social events, environmental clean ups, and the training of local farmers in agricultural skills (UN, 2006f; 11).

These tasks are set within a wider context that could indicate that the UN SGTM is set within restricted boundaries. This can be seen through the local and national partners, which the SGTM understands as critical to mission success. The importance of coordinating with 'official partners' is highlighted at an early stage in the training module, which states that coordination is needed among the components within a UN operation, between the UN mission and other 'international, bilateral and NGO components', and between the mission 'local Government/Administration and the parties to the conflict' (UN, 2006f; 1). Here, one can see that there is importance attached to the 'traditional' structures within a post-conflict environment. On an international level, there is reference to the international and bilateral providers as well as NGOs. On a local level, there is emphasis on the local authorities and government, as well as parties to the conflict, but no emphasis on local groups which *are not* belligerent groups, or active political groups outside of governance structures.

Thus, the SGTM offers a conservative view of the role of the military within the operation surrounded by an equally restrictive view of whom the UN peacekeeping mission should be consulting with. In terms of opening civil-military cooperation up to a genuinely wide remit of transformation, the SGTM does not achieve much more than advising the military component to stick to the relatively 'simple tasks'.

One can see significant development in the UN through the recent introduction of the *Core Pre Deployment Training Materials* (CPTM) in 2009. Whereas the SGTMs showed a conservative view of the role of civil-military cooperation, the CPTMs have broadened the role of the military in terms of coordination. They do this by making strong links between effective coordination between military and political components and the ability of the operation to fully carry out its peacebuilding functions. The CPTMs also outline current UN thinking on pursuing positive as well as negative peace, through arguing that the success of peacekeeping missions is 'measured by more than just the absence of conflict' and that the 'reestablishment and development of strong institutions and respect for the rule of law are also important conditions for success'. This is further underlined by the CPTMs' argument that the building of such institutions cannot be achieved 'through the threat, or use, of military force alone' (UN, 2009e; 48).

The CPTMs go much further than the SGTMs by offering a wide range of examples where coordination has been more than simple information gathering and sharing. The CPTM outlines projects in the DRC, Liberia and Haiti, which include the provision of security for elections, the use of combat operations in a particularly unstable area of a city in order for police judicial services to work in relative security, assistance in DDR programmes, and the joint organisation of a rubber plantation in a task (UN, 2009e; 50). Such examples widen the military role in coordination to one that is more than simple information gathering and sharing, and are more akin to strengthening the peacekeeping/peacebuilding link.

Finally, this particular module offers an exercise for participants to discuss issues of mission leadership. This is done through an organised panel discussion where speakers – ideally two or three ‘persons who have recently held various higher positions in a UN peacekeeping operation’ – present their experiences and are asked questions from participants (UN, 2009e; 66). Although this does not encompass the elicitive approach, it does offer some flexibility in the prescriptive based approach that UN training offered through the SGTMs.

### **Exercise Quick Fix – 28<sup>th</sup> November 2007**

Training in CIMIC assessment forms (see Figure 4.3) at UNTSI encouraged military peacekeepers to consider cooperation with the NGO community, and gave soldiers the opportunity to discuss the ‘grey areas’ of such cooperation. This training was based on previous experience that the Irish Defence Force had of working in Kosovo. The class was split into small groups, and were given a document outlining conditions in the village of *Rabovce*, in Kosovo. It states:

The village of RABOVCE has been identified as one where there are pressing humanitarian need [sic]. This is a mixed village of mainly Serb and Albanians and has been a flash point for the Bn [Battalion] since taking up it [sic] duties in KOSOVO in Oct 2006

You are a member of the Bn Tac CIMIC Team [Battalion Tactical Civil Military Coordination Team] serving in KOSOVO. You have been tasked

with conducting a quick village assessment of RABOVCE, to include any comments on the general situation in the village

(UNTSI, 2007e)

Using the information, soldiers were tasked to fill out a *Rapid Village Assessment* form of the village. This form covered issues including the numbers of Internally Displaced Persons (IDP's), water, sanitation, access to food, shelter, and health (the attached form offers a more comprehensive list). Although the soldiers were asked to fill out the quantitative data involved in the assessment, the trainers stated that a soldiers should pay attention to the *Action taken* and *Remarks* sections of the assessment – sections which relied heavily on the soldiers interpretation of the situation, and what they thought would be the best course of action to take.

**Figure 4.3: Rapid Village Assessment form – UNTSI Fieldwork visit**

(UNTSI, 2007e)

Municipality		Village		MORS/GRG Ref	
Agency		Name of assessor		Date	
Source of information (give as much detail as possible - give a telephone of someone in the village if possible)					
ROAD ACCESS IN SUMMER		Car	4WD	Light Truck	Heavy Truck
ROAD ACCESS IN WINTER		Car	4WD	Light Truck	Heavy Truck
CURRENT POPULATION		Persons	Abolians	Girls	Other
INTERNALY DISPLACED PERSONS (IDPs) - one record per village of former residence		Number of IDPs	from MUNICIPALITY (NAME)	from VILLAGE (NAME)	WHAT IS PREVENTING THEIR RETURN HOME? (See constraints to return box below for possible reasons)
CONSTRAINTS TO RETURN: Transport / House damaged / House occupied / Village empty / Insecurity / Fear of other ethnic groups / Access to Socio-economic needs / Healthcare / Education / Water / Electricity / etc.					
COMMUNITY LEADERS PRESENT		METS ACTIVIST	TEACHER	HEALTH WORKER	MANAGER
ASSISTANCE DISTRIBUTION		MTS	LOCK	Mayor's Office	Mosque / Church
SECONDARY DISTRIBUTION		Is this village used for secondary distribution? Y / N			
DAMAGE TO HOUSES		Total Houses in village	Category 1 (Undamaged/unfinished)	Category 2	Category 3
DAMAGE TO COMMUNITY BUILDINGS		METS WAREHOUSE	SCHOOL	METRO/SHOP/CLUB	SHELPS
CAI (0)		CAI (1)		CAI (2)	
CAI (3)		CAI (4)		CAI (5)	

EDUCATION		School functioning?	Yes / No	Number of classrooms
WATER & SANITATION		% of Households using	CURRENT STATUS	PERCEIVED WATER QUALITY
Wells		Pre-Conflict	Current	QUANTITY
Springs				Good / Bad / Adequate / Inadequate
Piped distribution				Good / Bad / Adequate / Inadequate
Electric Pumps				Good / Bad / Adequate / Inadequate
*STATUS (more than one if necessary): (Working) / (Damaged) / (Contaminated) / (Destroyed)				
HEALTH (for TYPE: # Ambulance clinic; # MTS = Mother Theresa; # = State; # = Private; for Personnel: (Doctor, Nurse, Midw. Tech.))				
TYPE (see above)		Daily Consultations	Working	Personnel (number)
Hospital		Number	Y / N	Drugs
Shelpha & Shencard (SD)		Number	Y / N	Equipment
Ambulance MTS / S / P		Number	Y / N	Water
FOOD AND COOKING		% of dairy cattle remaining	% of farms expecting to harvest this summer	Sanitation
% of families with cooking facilities:		Is there a bakery?	Y / N	Is it operational?
SOURCES OF FOOD AVAILABLE IN VILLAGE		Food item	AVAILABLE	PRICE
Humanitarian distribution		Y / N	Wheat flour	DM / Dh
Household garden / farm		Y / N	Oil	DM / Dh
Household stores		Y / N	Sugar	DM / Dh
Shop or market		Y / N	Meat	DM / Dh
Nearest village with market		Y / N	Fruit & vegetables	DM / Dh
		Y / N	Coffee	DM / Dh
ACTION TAKEN				
REMARKS				

Please return to UNHCR Phnom Penh, attn: Inter Agency Coordination Unit RVA03.DOC - GHDR - 22 June 1999

The observed smaller group analysed the best course of action to combat particular problems in the village. Observation notes offer an impression of what was discussed<sup>79</sup>:

- Ensuring safe sanitation by building a fence around an existing water well;

<sup>79</sup> UNHCR - Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees.

- Organising a meeting with the World Food Programme, community leaders and the local police chief to iron out problems with food distribution;
- Contacting UNHCR for a list of missing persons; and
- Clearing a house of unexploded ordinances.

(UNTSI, 2007e)

As well as the more traditional tasks of cordoning off an existing water-well and checking a house for unexploded ordinances, there are further tasks that require coordination with civilian agencies. Soldiers identified a need for coordination and information sharing with UN agencies, in particular the World Food Programme and UNHCR. As well as holding meetings with local authorities (a police chief), the soldiers found that local community leaders were an important part of the process. This shows awareness of the importance of including a much wider group of the host population, and not just those in positions of authority.

The groups then fed back into the main class, where soldiers spoke about the issues they encountered in their analysis of the situation. Once again, a reference to the observation notes highlights the main points of the discussion:

- Issues over who does what. It was believed that the military could not be seen to do everything so NGOs would have to be sourced for certain jobs.

- Getting a meeting with all for the food distribution was seen as the best way forward.
- Impartiality. This issue came up with the rebuilding of a house in the village. As people from one group (Serb) lived in that particular house, there would be wider implications rebuilding it and not a house belonging to another group.
- The emphasis was on representing the force commanders' mandate, the UN, the national contingent and the mandate.

(UNTSI, 2007e)

Significant points can be drawn raised from this discussion. Firstly, there was discussion over the roles and responsibilities of each of the main actors in a peacekeeping operation. Group members remarked that there had to be some kind of division of labour in how certain tasks are carried out. This showed awareness in the role and function of the NGO community, and a willingness to coordinate activity. Secondly, for the food distribution to be successful, it was argued that attention would have to be paid on meeting with *all* concerned parties. In a multi-ethnic area, such as Kosovo, this will take a great deal of coordination with local leaders who are both within the official administration, and those who are not. The issue of impartiality within a mission was also seen as important to the soldiers, and the consequences (both intended and unintended) of actions, such as rebuilding a house, were discussed at length.

Crucially, the discussions during and after *Exercise Quick Fix* at UNTSI show that military actors in a peacekeeping operation can do a great deal more than

the more traditional and relatively straightforward concepts of coordination and information sharing. Coordination of military and civilian activities is certainly a fundamental aspect of civil-military relations. However, the process of coordination does not stop with information sharing between the military and NGOs. Coordination means a great deal more: it will incorporate joint meetings, understanding both direct and indirect consequences, and incorporate civilian groups into the picture, all in order to ultimately hand over the peacebuilding of the process to civilian actors. Understanding the process as a restrictive set of actions of what peacekeepers do and what they do not do will not lead to effective civil-military relations. The process requires a considerable amount of fluidity.

### ***Military understanding the cultural nuances of NGOs***

The previous chapter outlines the cultural nuances and markedly different organisational structures that exist within a mission, and how they cause great difficulties between the military and civilian actors. Meetings conducted in the UN with DPKO officials further point to the cultural clashes which are prevalent between the military and civilian organisations. A significant perspective was offered by a DPKO official, who cited a lack of conflict resolution skills as being a key factor in difficulties endured during the start-up phases of UN missions. The official outlined the most pertinent difficulties as being between amongst professions as opposed to ethnicities or nationalities. This points once again to a recognition of institutional culture clashes at the heart of a peacekeeping operation. Crucially, it was in this particular official's view that conflict resolution skills would benefit operations. This could be because the development of such

skills could open up effective channels of communication as well as encouraging effective understandings of the conflict situation, strategies for intervention and division of responsibilities. (UNDPKO, 2007b)

Further meetings at the NATO School helped to define this complex relationship. The trainer that was interviewed explained the different working cultures and operating procedures of the international organisations that he had encountered. At the one end of the scale were the more professional organisations, which needed a great deal of coordination at the highest levels. For example, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) had little contact with NATO forces in Afghanistan, but could coordinate activities if those in the highest echelons of NATO headquarters in Brussels spoke with their counterparts at MSF headquarters. Such discussions would have an immediate impact at the field level. At the other end of the scale, were smaller organisations that had few channels of communication and were far more disorganised. The trainer also noted how militaries need to be aware of their impact on humanitarian organisations, using an example of an ICRC<sup>80</sup> worker in Afghanistan who had full access around the country before the NATO intervention, but suffered from restricted access since NATO intervened in the country (NATO, 2008).

Interviews at the NATO school also highlighted the difficulty of organisational differences, and the inability for some in the military to understand the civilian organisations. The trainer noted that the military like 'paragraphs': short, brief statements which, for example, outline 'who does what and why'. Unfortunately,

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<sup>80</sup> ICRC - International Committee of the Red Cross.

for those who work in such ways, the unorganised nature of the post-conflict environment makes this extremely difficult. It is important that this is first recognised in order for effective strategies to be developed to adapt to this behaviour, and understand the culture of the military (NATO, 2008). This is a crucial finding, and one which can be directly related to the review of the civil-military cooperation literature in the previous chapter. It can also be related to the desire shown from within the military community to use training programmes to develop decision-making frameworks for military peacekeepers (discussed in Chapter 6).

The UN CPTMs attempt to foster a better understanding of the humanitarian community, and introduce the military audience to recognise the consequences of their actions on the civilian agencies. The CPTM Unit 3 (Part 2) entitled *Working with Mission Partners* begins by acknowledging that some humanitarian organisations will feel that their principles of impartiality and neutrality will be 'jeopardized' if they are too closely associated with the military component, or the UN operation as a whole. Because of this, the CPTM states that:

When working with humanitarians it is important to recognise their independence, respect their principles and be sensitive to their approach in remaining neutral and impartial.

(UN, 2009g; 102)

The CPTM predicts that this will have an impact on the mission's activities and advises that 'Quick Impact Projects', are designed clearly with the aim of increasing consent for the mission and not 'considered to be humanitarian assistance'<sup>81</sup>. Finally, the CPTM makes clear the role of the UN peacekeeping mission, and its military components:

UN peacekeeping operations... are generally not humanitarian actors themselves although they may provide a secure and stable environment which allows other humanitarian actors to carry out activities.

(UN, 2009g; 102)

This offers a greater explanation of why the military must refrain from offering humanitarian assistance. Through giving reasons of *why* the humanitarian organisations are uncomfortable with the military presence, it provides a context for the military to work in.

### ***Relations with/expectations of the host population***

The previous chapter highlights that awareness of the relationship between the military and the local population as being a relatively new area in training for the military, and is an aspect which has received critical appraisal from both the academic community and practitioners (Pouligny, 2006). This section provides an overview of where fieldwork observations have encountered this aspect of the civil-military relationship.

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<sup>81</sup> Quick Impact Projects are outlined in Chapter 2.

The observation of the *Broadsword* exercise offers examples of how cadets are made aware (both through planned scenarios and unintentional actions) of the consequences of their actions on relations with the host population. Throughout the exercise, the CIMIC House is used by the military primarily to hold meetings with the civilian population in order to gain information, build relations, and attempt to solve problems. Throughout the observation, officer cadets were asked to carry out 'open sessions' in the CIMIC House where they, and cadets who were playing the civilian population, role-play' a session where the civilian population bring questions and concerns to the military. The military are encouraged to discuss the issues, make a note of them, and see if they can provide any solution. In the particular session that was observed, the soldier took sessions with civilians and NGO representatives. Although a small part of the general exercise, this role-play placed emphasis on the use of listening and communication skills by the officer, encouraged dialogue with the civilian population, and provided a subtle introduction of some of the more non-traditional skills needed for deployment (Sandhurst, 2007).

The CIMIC House also provided a centre-point for a planned serial, which highlighted the importance attached to relations with the host population in the exercise. It centred on two men being chased by an angry mob into the CIMIC House. The angry mob was from a different ethnic group than the two men, and had accused them both of sexually abusing women from that particular group. The task for the military was to react to this particular event and to calm relations. In this particular case, however, the military (identified in the field

noted as 'ISAF forces') were unable to stop this from happening. The observation notes explain:

In a short space of time, both men were dragged out by the angry mob and executed by a lone gunman. ISAF forces were present at the time of the shooting, and were seemingly unable to stop the executions. The gunman then fled and the crowd carried the bodies away as trophies. It was clear that the mob were from a different tribe than the two men who were executed.

(Sandhurst, 2007)

The value of this particular exercise was in the observed debrief received by the cadets. Immediately after the event, all soldiers who were staffing the CIMIC House were taken 'out of role' and asked to reflect on the events. Firstly, the trainer asked the cadets for their version of events, and how each cadet reacted. Answers from the cadets at this stage were, overall, factual and focussed on the particular part of the house which they were in, and what they did. The debrief progressed to identifying the possible perpetrators, which ethnic group they came from, and what implications this would have on the overall security situation in the area. Most importantly (in terms of fostering relations with the local population), soldiers were then asked to suggest possible responses to the situation. As well as increasing the number of patrols and instituting a possible curfew (in order to maintain the security), a number of initiatives were suggested which were intended to foster relations with the local

population in order to decrease chances of violence escalating. The fieldwork notes describe the discussion

In terms of CIMIC, the task was to engage local leaders and the civilian population to ensure that reprisal killings would not happen. The role of CIMIC here was very much to engage with the local population to ensure the security of the deployment zone. This would rely on the skills of the CIMIC officers to communicate effectively with local leaders, elders, police forces, and outside agencies. The full CIMIC operation was now just starting after the event, at a time where most people would want a rest!

(Sandhurst, 2007)

In the concluding discussion about civil-military relations, the senior trainer stated that 'CIMIC is not just painting schools, it is engaging the local population to ensure the security of the area which you are deployed in' (Sandhurst, 2007). This clear message gave the cadets a strong impression the civil-military cooperation was more than an exercise in which soldiers 'provided' for the local population (as the UN SGTM outlines), be it building schools, or delivering aid. In this debrief, cadets were strongly given the impression that civil-military cooperation is a process with a great deal more depth.

This observation outlines how civil-military relations are perceived in this particular case study, and illustrates the value of such a training exercise. Significantly, the serial helped the cadets to fully understand the implications of

such inaction on the local population, even though it appeared that they had initially failed in their task to stop the killings. Although it appears that the conclusion (the public execution of two civilians) is slightly extreme, it provided cadets with a good working example of what would happen if such situations were left to get out of control<sup>82</sup>.

In the case of the debrief, a number of points become apparent. Firstly, there is an emphasis on fostering relations with the local population. This is not only through formal channels (i.e. the local police), but also through sourcing local community leaders and elders. This approach offers a voice to those sections of the host population who may not have had access to such channels during the conflict, showing that the military can be instrumental in offering the early channels of communication to such groups. However, this is, in the military's terminology, a way of achieving *security* in a deployed zone, so it may be apparent that there is still a degree of control over who is spoken to. The emphasis on security is understandable particularly when the lives of the military personnel are at risk. Nevertheless, an over-emphasis on the security aspects may lead to a restrictive approach from the military, which may be averse to taking such risks and feel more comfortable with consulting safe groups, which may be seen as needless in highly pressurised environments. This debate over 'force protection' is examined at in Chapter six.

Secondly, the observation highlights the role of non-traditional skills in this context. One can see the importance placed on an understanding the conflict

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<sup>82</sup> As these scenarios are taken from real life situations that have been reported back from operations, the exercise maintains its reality.

and identifying the groups involved, offering an example of very basic forms of conflict mapping. There is also emphasis on ability which officer cadets have to communicate with the local population, something of critical importance when establishing effective relations. Again, if we go to Fetherston's definition of contact skills - 'the use of communication skills, methods of negotiation, facilitation, mediation, and conciliation' - we can see part of this being highlighted in the debrief (Fetherston, 1994b; 219). Thirdly, the scenario-based learning environment empowered the cadets to a certain degree, as the trainer acted more as a facilitator to the group - as opposed to a lecturer - linking directly to Lederach's work on elicitive approaches to learning.

As well as the scripted scenarios, the observation encountered one non-scripted scenario which offered a very good example of how cadets are taught to be aware of instances when military actions create unintended consequences. During the exercise a small group of soldiers were walking through the village wearing camouflage cream on their faces. The civilians in the village noticed this and immediately let it be known that they were uneasy with the use of camouflage cream by soldiers. The reasons why they showed unease was the message that it portrayed: camouflage cream indicates an escalation in force, and is used when the military are executing a 'deliberate operation'. In effect, the camouflage cream was 'war paint'. Although it later transpired that the soldiers were on a deliberate operation outside of the village (thus requiring the cream), the message was clearly made from the cadets role-playing the civilian population. This offered a valuable lesson of unintended consequences of actions (Sandhurst, 2008b).

Providing the 'umbrella' to both these scripted and unscripted serials is the context of the military being deployed in a largely civilian environment composed of a population that is sceptical of the military presence. Cadets playing the role of the civilian population are asked to be suspicious at the least, and abusive at the worst, toward the military contingent deployed in *Longmoor*. The fieldwork notes pick up on this facet of the exercise (note that the term 'ISAF' is used when describing the cadets role-playing the military):

It was interesting to note that the local population were, in general, very much opposed to the ISAF. When patrols were taking place, the civilian population 'baited' ISAF troops. The ISAF troops were to not let this get to them and still try and improve community relations, partly to ensure a positive working environment, partly to gain information and intelligence of the situation on the ground.

(Sandhurst, 2007)

The soldiers in this case, had to rely heavily on their ability to communicate with the local population, and not accidentally escalate the situation by 'snapping back' at members of the civilian population. The trainers at Sandhurst (including those who have created the *Broadsword* exercise) explain that the exercise is a culmination of UK military experiences in Northern Ireland, Bosnia, Kosovo, Sierra Leone, and Afghanistan. In the majority of these cases, UK intervention has not been welcomed by all parts of the society in which they are deployed. Again, this working environment for the cadets offers valuable lessons in

fostering positive relations with the host population, and also about the consequences of escalation. The cadets also gain an increased understanding of the impact of the military intervention, through playing the part of the civilian population. This gives the cadets the opportunity to see their role 'from the other side', and understand what impact a military intervention has on a host population. This also illustrates the benefits of using a scenario-based role-play as a form of preparing military peacekeepers.

The UNTSI CIMIC liaison briefing outlines tasks for CIMIC Liaison teams, which incorporates awareness of the local population and how relations affect the ability of a the liaison team in carrying out its duties. In notes from this particular briefing, the CIMIC 'profile' involved the following characteristics:

- Common Sense
- Credibility
- Negotiation/mediation
- Impartiality
- Authority
- Outgoing
- Looking for 'win-win' solutions
- Imaginative
- Following the commanders intent
- Available 24/7

(UNTSI, 2008)

Notable in this list is emphasis on negotiation/mediation, the need to look for 'win-win' situations, and for soldiers to possess an 'outgoing' and 'imaginative' stance. This links to a conversation held with a senior officer at UNTSI, who spoke of 'Irish Solutions to Irish Problems', which relied heavily on the soldiers' abilities to think imaginatively when looking for solutions to extraordinary problems (UNTSI, 2007a). The briefing also outlined how CIMIC teams should appear to the local population. Examples were given of groups of four or six mainly light armed or unarmed soldiers in uniform. Such examples showed the soldiers to look relaxed and approachable. The briefing offered one example that was given on how a CIMIC team *should not* look. The example was a CIMIC team from the US armed forces, who were armed and in their full battle uniform. Here the lesson was that impressions count, and if the military are to foster positive relations with the local population and civilian groups, then care must be taken.

However, Figure 4.4 (also taken from the CIMIC liaison briefing) asks that such CIMIC liaison officers are fully trained military officers. Attached notes from the briefing state that weapons training, shooting, and rules of engagement are obligatory for Liaison Officers, suggesting that they are regular soldiers with added non-traditional skills, to be used, at the least, to ensure the 'timly [sic] and accurate dissemination of information'.

**Figure 4.4: CIMIC Liaison Officer from UNTSI Briefing**

(UNTSI, 2008)

**CIMIC**

**The Liaison Officer... (1)**

- **Is appointed to conduct liaison and understands the mission.**
- **Is properly trained (basic mil skills, courses, exercises, operations).**
- **Communicates with both the Force and outside the Force.**
- **Manages information.**




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Figure 4.5 expands on this non-traditional toolbox, by further outlining the need for patience, diplomatic sensitivity, professionalism, and courtesy.

**Figure 4.5: CIMIC Liaison Officer From UNTSI Briefing**

(UNTSI, 2008)



Attached to this particular slide, the notes state:

We need a diplomatic and sensitive officer with a great patience. Some cultures and societies have different feelings about time or business. Therefore the LNO [Liaison Officer] needs to be open minded, trying to understand the situation. He must have a feeling of people and the environment in a given moment.

(UNTSI, 2008)

This is another significant indicator of the importance attached to the non-traditional skills, in particular knowledge of the cultural nuances of the host population.

The UN CPTMs recognise the importance of the host population and its institutions in the development of a peace process. In defining factors for 'success' in a peacekeeping operation, one such factor is the 'promotion of national and local ownership'. Importantly, the CPTM outlining 'Fundamental principles of UN Peacekeeping' notes that this involves reaching out to all parts of the country, and 'not just those in power or those with guns'. This offers a valuable space for alternative sources of transformation and new models of governance (UN, 2009d; 55). Following on from this, the module asks that peacekeepers consult *all* parts of the local community to decipher factors for success. While peacekeeping has often been subject to the robust critique that argues that operations only look towards the traditional sources of power, the CPTM recognises the importance of other groups.

It is important that peacekeeping personnel talk to all parts of society about what their needs are and how the mission's work can improve their lives. This means local officials, but also non-governmental organizations, different political parties, women's associations, youth and student groups. All opinions need to be heard and understood.

(UN, 2009d; 56)

The CPTM argues that the promotion of national and local ownership will be critical in the development of consent for the mission. According to the CPTM, operations which have worked with local actors on the ground have 'built a solid relationship' with them, which in turn has facilitated the handover of the

peacebuilding tasks to the host population (UN, 2009d; 56). Here again the CPTM reflects UN policy on peacebuilding mandates, and the 'bigger picture' of pursuing positive aspects of peace in its operations. This is illustrated in the CPTM through a case study of the MINUSTAH operation in Haiti, which worked alongside residents in cleaning large rubbish piles in the Bel Air Neighbourhood (the rubbish piles were being used as barricades by armed gangs). The joint ownership of the project, in the view of the CPTM, led to a building trust and consent from the local population (UN, 2009d; 56).

The CPTMs further make this point in the 'Working with mission partners' Unit, which further underlines the importance of working with all actors within the host population and not just the host government<sup>83</sup>. It states that regular dialogue must be maintained with religious leaders, women and student associations, academics, professional organisations and other parts of the civil society. As a result of this consultation, peacekeepers 'can get to understand the society in which they are working, and support them to ensure the sustainability of the peace' (UN, 2009g; 96-97). In terms of longer term peacebuilding, such partnerships are promoted as being essential for the success of the peacekeeping operation, as well as offering a significant example of how the United Nations is aiming to consult a much wider range of groups to facilitate a positive transformation from negative into positive peace. Again, this can relate to Fetherston's assertion that peacekeeping operations can play a critical role in setting a conducive atmosphere for longer term peacebuilding to take place, by 'coordination of local level resolution processes' (Fetherston, 1994b; 157).

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<sup>83</sup> Although this is qualified by the module stating that the host government is 'by far the most important non-UN actor with whom a peacekeeping mission collaborates', as it 'has the most to lose'.

## ***Sexual Exploitation and Abuse***

As the previous chapter demonstrates, UN policy attaches high value in training as one of the key ways in which to stop further outbreaks of sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA). The UN CPTMs therefore incorporate added emphasis on addressing SEA. Apart from outlining the definitions of misconduct (see Figure 4.6 below), the SEA module asks peacekeepers to understand a number of issues surrounding cases of SEA. It asks soldiers to look at three key questions:

What makes members of the host community vulnerable?

What does differential power mean in the peacekeeping context?

Why is it important that trust is not abused?

The CPTMs answer to the first question highlight the need for peacekeepers to be aware of the prevalence of a 'collapsed community' with a lack of awareness of rights and obligations amongst the population, a history of unequal power relations and a 'prevalence of gender-based violence' (UN, 2009h; 23). In relation to what differential power means, peacekeepers are pointed to an imbalance between economic, social or educational status, a dependence by one on the assistance of another to sustain living, and one being in a position of authority over the other. Such a scenario is common in a peacekeeping environment. Finally, the answers to why it is important not to abuse trust are examined. The three reasons given by the CPTM here are that it further victimises vulnerable people, it violates the human rights of victims, and it disrupts families and communities. This goes into much more depth than

previous UN training and through offering a context to the conflict zone into which peacekeepers are deployed it provides a much wider base of knowledge for the peacekeepers (UN, 2009h; 23-24).

As well as the questions noted above, the CPTM also offers a degree of participant-led learning through encouraging group work and discussions. In this case, participants are invited to discuss (in small groups) examples of SEA that occur in their home county on in peacekeeping missions. Although a small part of the overall module – which is very much based on disseminating information – this again offers participants a chance to use their implicit knowledge and gained experience to inform the training session (UN, 2009h; 3).

**Figure 4.6: Definitions of misconduct for UN peacekeepers and Military**

**Observers**

(UN, 2009h)

Definition of Misconduct for **Uniformed Personnel**  
**Members of National Contingent and Military Staff Officers**

- Misconduct means any act or omission that is a violation of United Nations standards of conduct, mission-specific rules and regulations or the obligations towards national and local laws and regulations in accordance with the status-of-forces agreement where the impact is outside the national contingent.
- Serious Misconduct is misconduct, including criminal acts, that results in, or is likely to result in serious loss, damage or injury to an individual or to a mission. Sexual exploitation and abuse constitute serious misconduct.

Reference: We are the UN Peacekeeping Personnel (lists specific instances)



Definition of Misconduct for **Uniformed Personnel**  
**UN Police and Military Observers**

- Minor misconduct: Any act, omission or negligence that is a violation of mission standard operating procedures (SOPs), directives, or any other applicable rules, regulations or administrative instructions, but which does not result in or is not likely to result in major damage or injury to an individual or the mission.
- Serious misconduct: Any act, omission or negligence, including criminal acts, that is a violation of mission standard operating procedures, directives, or any other applicable rules, regulations or administrative instructions, that results in or is likely to result in serious damage or injury to an individual or to the mission

Reference: Directives for Disciplinary Matters involving Civilian Police Officers and Military Observers (lists specific instances)



The training module then offers a number of case study examples to test peacekeepers on what they believe to be ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ in scenarios where

SEA may be taking place. For each scenario, peacekeepers are asked four questions:

- a) Has the UN personnel actually or attempted to abuse a position of vulnerability for sexual purposes?
- b) Has the UN personnel actually or attempted to abuse differential power for sexual purposes?
- c) Has the UN personnel in this scenario actually or attempted to abuse trust, for sexual purposes?
- d) Does this scenario constitute prohibited act(s)?
- e) Which uniform standards on sexual exploitation and abuse have been violated? List as many as apply<sup>84</sup>

(UN, 2009h; 46)

Peacekeepers are given seven scenarios to examine. While some scenarios are more straightforward, others may fall into slightly more grey areas. The two highlighted examples in the box below illustrate this.

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<sup>84</sup> All questions apart from 'e)' require yes/no answers.

**Box 4.1: Example questions in Conduct and Discipline Unit of UN CPTM**  
(UN, 2009h; 51-52)

**Example 3:** *Carlos, a military commander posted in the southern district, has helped set up a boys' soccer club in the town where his national contingent is deployed. Carlos enjoys the soccer games, but he particularly enjoys the access the club gives him to local adolescents. He gives presents (magazines, candy, sodas, pens) to various boys in exchange for sexual acts. He thinks there's nothing wrong with this, since the boys like the presents he gives them.*

**Example 5:** *Josie is an adolescent refugee in one of the camps. Pieter, one of the food distribution staff, who works for WFP, has offered to give her a little extra during the distribution if she will be his "special friend". She agrees willingly. Both of them agree that they should start a sexual relationship and neither one of them think that anything is wrong. Josie hopes that the relationship will be a passport to a new life in another country, and Pieter does nothing to discourage these hopes*

In the first example, it is relatively clear that the commander is in contravention of the UN's rules, however, the second example is slightly vague on the 'rights' and 'wrongs' of the case. It is imperative for all who are being trained to understand that there are many different contexts in which acts of SEA can take place. Furthermore, the answers for questions a-d in all seven examples given (including the two examples above) are 'yes'. The intention of this being that there are a number of different scenarios which may not be 'typical', but still constitute acts of SEA. All case studies and the official CPTM answers are attached as Annex 1.

The CPTM also refers to the impact that SEA has on the relationship between the peacekeepers and the local population. One of the stated 'dramatic' consequences is

The duty and care of the peacekeepers appears to be a vain statement. People talk about impunity and the failure of the UN to take responsibility for the suffering of victims of such acts.

(UN, 2009h; 33)

Finally, the CPTM also states that such acts overshadow the efforts of peacekeeping missions to 'address the very critical political issues faced by the mission'. Importantly this is a theme that runs throughout the training programme. The CPTM module on human rights in peacekeeping operations is considerably strongly worded on the importance of peacekeepers avoiding any activity which is linked to SEA. It states that 'under no circumstances can peacekeeping personnel be involved in sexual violence or exploitation of women, children or the local population in any way'. It goes on to state that the power imbalance often seen in peacekeeping environments between the peacekeepers and host population must be used 'to do good', by 'supporting dignity and equality between women and men, as the UN Charter states you should'. Linking this into the relationship with the local population, the CPTM states that the behaviour for peacekeepers can have 'far reaching impacts' on the success of operations, and the exploitation of women or children can 'call into question the legitimacy of the whole peacekeeping operation' (UN, 2009f; 11).

## ***Gender Based Violence***

Dealing with Gender Based Violence (GBV) area is relatively new in the training programmes that were studied, and there are thus few examples of the role it plays in training programmes. However, a failure of militaries to adequately be briefed or trained on the causes of GBV, and the consequences of failing to deal with it, constitute a serious breach of trust between the operation and host population.

A briefing given at the UNTSI training course was dedicated to addressing GBV in areas of deployment. As stated, this particular training course was geared towards a possible deployment in Chad, thus DF officers were briefed in instances of GBV in the context of Darfur (from where a number of refugees were coming from). The seminar was based on information from the Joint Consortium on Gender Based Violence, a collection of Irish NGOs and Government agencies, of which the DF was a member. One of the consortiums stated goals is 'promoting the adoption of a coherent and coordinated response to GBV' (JCGBV, 2009), and this briefing offered a good example of how the DF fitted into that response.

Although the lecturer delivering the briefing was clear in pointing out that there were only 'allegations' of GBV in Darfur, it was clear that he was setting a context in which the DF would be deployed into when they arrived in Chad. Furthermore, the briefing examined the case for allegations of genocide made against the Sudanese government. It explained fully what GBV was in the case

of Darfur, citing official reports which have come out of the conflict zone. This was closely linked to what international law states, particularly about genocide. The final two slides in the briefing offered a valuable case in point of what the briefing was about. The penultimate slide from the presentation is quoted below, and examines why the Sudanese Government of National Unity would allegedly use such a tactic

**Box 4.2: Slide from GBV Presentation from UNTSI CIMIC Briefing**  
(UNTSI, 2007d)

**Assessment**

- A GNU [Government of National Unity] *strategic level tactic*
  - *Terrorise communities*
  - *Family unit*
  - *Dignity and respect*
  - *Survival and access to livelihood*
  - *Women's bodies*
  
- A *valid argument in breach of Article 2 of the Genocide Convention* –
  - *“...life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part...” (Steiner, Alston, 2000; Power, 2003:57)*

The final slide follows this by examining the role of the International Community in punishing the perpetrators of such acts:

**Box 4.3: Slide from GBV Presentation from UNTSI CIMIC Briefing**  
(UNTSI, 2007d)

**Assessment – contd**

- *A strong argument that the IC [International Community] are, at least, quite reluctant to act in a timely fashion and appear unwilling to investigate the possibility of genocide in Darfur*
- *Unless the crime of genocide is vigorously challenged, there is a possibility that the crime itself becomes defunct and then only the people of Darfur suffers*
- *Using GBV to underscore genocide is a useful tool in assisting and assessing the possibility of the crime of genocide in Darfur*
- *'Does Rome burn while the IC plays the fiddle'*

This briefing is vital to establish the context for the military. In terms of establishing a 'new' level of civil-military relations, it offers the military a greater awareness of issues that traditionally would not be conceived of as security risks, or would be left to civilian actors or political organs of the UN. It is important that soldiers who are playing the part of the third party interveners are aware of such contexts, as they will be able to react in order to effectively foster positive relations.

An attached presentation given out as part of the overall briefing shows this, by examining engagement with civil society as one of the possible steps forward to effectively dealing with GBV. The slide in Figure 4.7 advises participation alongside women's groups and local networks. Such engagement is critical, as it shows women and women's organisations to not be only 'victims', but also in

a position to build peace. Like the UN CPTM, this also illustrates a coordinated policy in engaging with parts of the host population that may have been marginalised.

**Figure 4.7: Gender Based Violence Briefing from UNTSI: Working with Civil Society**


(UNTSI, 2007d)



Furthermore, as Figure 4.8 shows, a considerable amount of care is taken in ensuring that soldiers gain an understanding of where GBV has come from, and the impact it has on the conflict zone.

**Figure 4.8: Gender Based Violence Slide from UNTSI Briefing**

(UNTSI, 2007d)



As said, this is a relatively new aspect of training for civil-military cooperation (although it has been highlighted in post-operational reports and academic work for some time). The UNTSI example offers a good example of how soldiers can be briefed for deployment into an area which is characterised by such atrocities.

### ***Securitising the civil-military dimension***

The fieldwork experience also raises the question of to what extent has civil-military cooperation become an issue of *securing* the deployment for civilian-led peacebuilding initiatives. Fieldwork meetings at the NATO School indicate this. A senior trainer explained that in his view, NATO is moving away from

humanitarian assistance, and towards 'supporting humanitarian operations', unless the situation arises that there is nobody else to carry out humanitarian assistance. The trainer was also asked whether militaries are moving towards more traditional security roles. In answering, he stated that there is a growing fear amongst militaries of 'mission creep', and that since the 1990s the pendulum has swung away from the roles more akin to humanitarian assistance towards more traditional military approaches. The trainer believed that this was for two reasons. Firstly, because the military has found that it is not equipped to provide a wide range of humanitarian assistance; and secondly, because militaries have realised that they are not suitable aid providers. The trainer further remarked that there was a realisation within NATO militaries that if a military carries out large-scale humanitarian work, a dependency culture could be created. The trainer gave the example of installing a functioning water supply, which is relatively easy for the military to do, but can have an effect on the local ownership if the host population is not involved in the creation and running of such a project. Thus, for these reasons, it was felt that the military focus more on the security aspects of deployment, such as filling a security vacuum, and not the 'touchy feeley' aspects of deployment (NATO, 2008).

The *Broadsword* exercise provided the starkest illustration of the importance that is attached to the idea *securitising* the humanitarian space. Much of this exercise involved aspects of security in post-conflict environments, and the need to reduce levels of violence before any civilian peacebuilding process begins. This is possibly akin to the ideas espoused in the UK's PSO doctrine,

which states that the fundamental role of the military is to provide the security for peacebuilding work to be carried out.

There are examples of the securitisation throughout the exercise. The fostering of positive relations with the local population has a security aspect to it, and certain events observed in the exercise exemplified this. Overarching the whole role-play was the involvement of a violent spoiler group, in this case, called the *Banital* (based on the Taliban in Afghanistan). The *Banital* are based close to the village and often enter the village and carry out illegal or violent acts. On the second day of the observation in 2008, the military had to deal with a mass shooting of random civilians in a populated area. The perpetrators (*Banital*) entered the village, shot at civilians and fled. It was up to the military to cordon the area off, look for the perpetrators, and re-secure the zone (Sandhurst, 2008b).

One would argue, however, that this emphasis on securitisation is required for effective civil-military relations, as without the military provision of a negative peace there would be little chance for the positive peace aspects to flourish. However, it must be stressed that if all aspects of civil-military relations are behind a veil of security, then it will be more difficult to achieve the more radical aspects of transformation. This links strongly to how soldiers deployed into conflict zones understand their rules of engagement, and how such understandings must be balanced with the peacebuilding needs of the operation. While an outright reluctance to use force can lead to the operation suffering militarily (such as the difficulties outlined in with the Sierra Leone

operation in 2000), a high amount of force used in a peacekeeping environment has a high chance of creating difficulties for the peacebuilding aspects of an operation to flourish. This carries significant training implications.

### ***Conclusions:***

#### **How training is carried out: prescriptive and elicitive approaches**

##### *Prescriptive approaches*

Prescriptive approaches are mainly used where training modules offer 'policy' and guidelines of what is acceptable and not acceptable in terms of the expectations of the military. If a soldier (according to the UNTSI briefing) is diplomatic, looks for 'win-win' solutions and follows the commander's intent, then in the view of the Irish Defence Forces, he or she is doing the correct job. Similar can be said for UN guidelines on what constitutes acts of SEA: the UN has very clear expectations of what military peacekeepers do when deployed. These expectations are not there to be discussed: they are to be learned by soldiers, so that transgressions do not happen. These are cases where possibly a narrow form of training is used, and the role of participant input into briefings is limited.

The UN's SGTM offers the most prescriptive approach to training for military peacekeepers. The SGTM outlined in this chapter, entitled 'Civil-military Coordination' offers a clear set of assumptions and guidelines to be 'trained' to soldiers before deployment. In this case, the UN's approach of 'train the

trainers' is notably prescriptive insofar it offers very little room for participants to discuss issues of conflict and its resolution.

This chapter demonstrates, however, that there is room to manoeuvre within the prescriptive approach. The SGTMs have been replaced by the *Core Pre Deployment Training Modules* (CPTMs), which leave room for participant led discussion and learning. Each CPTM has an opportunity for participants to reflect on the issues that are identified, providing space for group work. The CPTM modules covering SEA as well as coordination of UN agencies are good examples here. Although this is not the fully elicitive approach espoused by Lederach, it offers a slightly more flexible model of a prescriptive approach. While the majority of knowledge comes from the module (and the trainer who is delivering it), there exists room for participants to reflect on it. Similarly, experience of observing the briefings in UNTSI (particularly in the briefings on CIMIC meetings and CIMIC Liaison) demonstrated that the briefings are based on a prescriptive model, with the trainers knowledge being paramount to the training process. However, it also encouraged officers to add their own experiences. A number of officers on the CIMIC course had experience of deployment in UN-led operations (particularly in Liberia and Lebanon), and were able to offer their viewpoints.

### *Elicitive approaches*

Looking at the approaches to training which may be more based on the implicit knowledge of the participants as opposed to the explicit knowledge of the trainer, the observation of the *Broadsword* exercise offered a chance for

participants (in this case, officer cadets) to inform both each other and the training session itself. This was most clearly seen in the debrief observed after the CIMIC house was stormed by locals chasing two men from another ethnic group. As stated, the value of this exercise was in the debrief, where instead of the trainer telling the cadets what was right and what was wrong, he facilitated a group discussion. This approach does to a certain extent rely on the cadets themselves to discuss their experiences of resolving, or at least managing conflict. Furthermore, discussions which followed *Exercise Quick Fix* observed in UNTSI once again point to a more elicitive approach to training. The observed session was very much based on group work, both in smaller groups (which discussed the initial topics) and the larger group which discussed the scenario, best practices and difficulties encountered with working alongside non-military groups. Thus it appears that the scenario-based training sessions which were observed (*Broadsword* and *Exercise Quick-Fix*) offer the best examples of models of for the participant-led learning, where the trainer assumes the role more of a facilitator for group discussion, and the participants use their own experiences as the 'material' for the learning process (through debriefs and group discussions). However, the observations were not 'free' from the teacher-student relationship, and the trainer did still exert a degree of control over the process. For example, in the *Broadsword* debrief at the CIMIC House, the trainer summarised to the participants (cadets) that 'CIMIC is not just painting schools, it is engaging the local population to ensure the security of the area which you are deployed in'. This does show to some extent that the trainer has some control over the process.

## **What soldiers are learning – the content of training for civil-military cooperation**

Examining the content of training, one can see how training for civil-military relations has evolved considerably, with training programmes now incorporating a much wider range of principles, ideas and issues at the heart of peacekeeping operations. One can see this most clearly in the changes seen at the UN, and the development from the SGTMs to the CPTM. The SGTMs focus on civil-military cooperation was purely based on a minimal role for the military, centred mainly around information sharing and providing security in the conflict zone. Whilst the CPTM sees these as important, they open up the role of civil-military cooperation to a much wider interpretation and expand on the roles for the military.

In terms of who the 'civilians' are in this civil-military interface, training programmes have opened themselves up to wider interaction with all parts of the host population, and not just bilateral donors, UN agencies and the host government. The CPTMs espouse the values of local and national ownership in processes, as well as asking peacekeepers not to consult only with 'those in power or those with guns'. The *Broadsword* exercise also offers a valuable contribution, as trainers advise the cadets to get out into the local community establish links, understand the conflict, and look for non-violent solutions to problems. It also gave cadets their first experience of actually being deployed amongst civilians, which is critical in their development as soldiers and peacekeepers. This role-play scenario offers the cadets a first-hand

understanding of the impacts of their work in the civilian environment. Moreover, the UNTSI briefing on tasks for liaison officers ask peacekeepers to be able to consult with a wide number of people on the ground. The skills espoused for such consultation is removed from 'traditional' military practice.

It is significant that there is development in programmes aimed to raise awareness of GBV in post-conflict environments, as well as the impacts of SEA by peacekeeping personnel. These programmes are of critical importance to civil-military cooperation as they address areas which have a huge impact on the civilian acceptance of a peacekeeping operation. These areas have been overlooked in the past, and although it took a catastrophic series of scandals to force movement on this issue, the UN, through the CPTMs, is moving in the right direction.

Although there is movement towards a wider view of civil-military cooperation, one could suggest that there is an equal swing in the other direction, towards the securitisation of space. This is an interesting debate, and may stem from the problems which were highlighted in the previous chapter of the military becoming too involved in humanitarian work. In theory the problem that this created has two possible solutions: one was for the military to understand their environment, and the implications of their actions, and the other was for the military to 'roll back' to their main role of providing security. To an extent, both are evident in this chapter. This can place the military in a difficult position, where in some interventions militaries can not or will not become involved, and in other interventions they will be asked to be more involved in humanitarian

affairs. What may be seen is the military actor in the peacekeeping environment being asked to provide security, but be aware of their surroundings and the implications of their actions. Again, elements of this approach have been demonstrated in this chapter, particularly with the CPTMs asking soldiers to differentiate between their Quick Impact Projects and the humanitarian work carried out by agencies. It could become apparent that a great deal more *ad hoc* initiatives will be incorporated. This is because it is extremely difficult for the military, or any actor in this case, to prepare effectively for every context. The best which one can hope for is that such *ad hoc* initiatives are fed back into training programmes, so that a wider range of training scenarios can be created. From the examination of the training programmes, this thesis suggests that this is happening.

Securing space in a conflict zone is a priority of the military and is accepted by cosmopolitan scholars. For example, Kaldor argues that militaries can provide 'secure areas in which alternative forms of inclusive politics can emerge' and a strong military presence is primarily in conflict zones to do this. This both links the securitisation of space to building civil-military relations and developing cosmopolitan forms of conflict resolution (Kaldor, 2001; 125).

In terms of incorporating conflict resolution skills into peacekeeping operations, a significant finding can be offered as a result of the observations. The previous chapter notes that it is the view of many in the military that civil-military coordination is the 'front line' in the interface between military and non-military skills. To a large extent, this is true. The skills that peacekeepers need to be

effective in the role of civil-military coordination/cooperation are far removed from the traditional military roles, and more akin to ideas from fields such as conflict resolution. The understanding of institutional cultures, local cultures, mapping conflicts, being able to negotiate, understand the importance of dialogue, be aware of gender dynamics all point to an increase in non-traditional skills.

On the larger picture of promoting a wider transformation of the structural causes of the conflict, the development of training programmes will have positive benefits. An increased focus on groups which do not find their voice through being a party to the conflict or being a major political party will have positive benefits for the longer term peacebuilding projects. It may not offer the radical transformation which has been put forward by critics of such interventions, as the 'system' remains under the eye of the UN, but it offers a much wider approach to the development of peacebuilding projects and the pursuit of positive aspects of peace. Thus, bringing this back to the thesis, the overall assumption of this work is that peacekeeping is a form of international conflict resolution. In avenues such as civil-military cooperation, the influence of conflict resolution skills and approaches has found a critical impact. Again, this is a notable contribution.

However, it is also worth bearing in mind that the skills that are being taught will not reach the whole of the military community. With regard to cadets at the *Broadsword* exercise, a CIMIC trainer stated that roughly one-third of cadets 'get it' straight away, one-third of cadets 'learn it' through the exercise, and one-

third of cadets 'don't get it at all' (Sandhurst, 2008a). In Chapter six, the thesis examines possible reasons behind the one-third of students not 'getting it', particularly with regard to the culture clashes apparent between traditional military conceptions and the skills needed for peacekeeping.

Returning to the research questions<sup>85</sup>, this chapter shows a development in training programmes since Fetherston's 1994 thesis. The evolution of civil-military cooperation has meant that soldiers have to develop (at the very least) communication skills, increased understanding of civilian agencies, and an understanding of the civilian characteristics in the deployment area. The chapter illustrates this, as well as the numerous ways in which this baseline understanding has been built upon. Moreover, through offering practical examples of civil-military cooperation training, this chapter how military training for peacekeeping shows evidence of conflict resolution theory and practice. Examples highlighted show how training for civil-military cooperation is giving peacekeepers the necessary skills and awareness for them to fulfil effective conflict resolution strategies, and strengthen bonds between the provision of negative and positive peace. This can be linked to cosmopolitan conceptions of peacekeeping. As the previous chapter outlined, peacekeeping operations can play a vital role in protecting alternative forms of politics which, through

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<sup>85</sup> 1) In what ways does military peacekeeping training show evidence of conflict resolution theory and practice? (*In what direction has training for military peacekeeping developed since 1994?*) 2) In light of the new roles and responsibilities placed on military peacekeepers, is there evidence that training in non-traditional military skills assists military peacekeepers adapt to the changing nature of deployment zones? 3) Does this indicate evidence of a cosmopolitan conception of peacekeeping? (*Can we find evidence - both practically and in the peacekeeping literature - of the emergence of a different type of soldier more aligned with cosmopolitan ideals?*)

violence, have been silenced. To return to Elliot's conception of cosmopolitan peacekeeping, a key function is to

Restore civil society especially in areas where it is under threat from criminal activities or various destructive forms of particularist politics, and to engage in rebuilding local legitimacy and pluralist democratic practices (Elliot, 2004; 25)

From a number of the training examples outlined above, one can observe that soldiers are being prepared for this role. This is a crucial finding, as it shows linkages between the fields of military peacekeeping and cosmopolitan theory. This will be further discussed in Chapter 6.

Looking towards the following chapter, civil-military cooperation is not the only area where conflict resolution skills have found their place in training for operations. Training programmes and exercises on a wider level incorporate similar levels of conflict resolution knowledge. The following chapter examines further fieldwork observations and offers a wider picture of where conflict resolution skills influence military training for peacekeeping operations, offering a more holistic view of the role of conflict resolution training for the military.

## **Chapter 5.**

### **Negotiation training for the British Military and United Nations**

As previously stated, this thesis examines further manifestations of links between the fields of conflict resolution and military peacekeeping, through observing training programmes for military personnel. The previous chapter notes that there is much room for positive engagement from the conflict resolution field through training in more nuanced forms of civil-military cooperation. This is backed up through observations of training in the United Nations Training School Ireland (UNTSI), and Royal Military Training Academy Sandhurst (RMAS), as well as analysis of United Nations Standard Generic Training Materials (SGTMs) and Core Pre-Deployment Training Materials (CPTMs)

This chapter adds to this analysis by surveying the role of negotiation training in the context of the UK military and the UN CPTMs. In doing so it uncovers a need to understand negotiation at the 'tactical level'. This is reinforced through a sampling of articles from the journal *International Peacekeeping*, which illustrates how the peacekeeping literature understands negotiation contexts. It charts (in the UK case) how the need for negotiation became apparent, by examining the difficulties faced by British soldiers serving in the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia Herzegovina in the early 1990's, and

offers an account of how lessons from this experience have been transferred to a strong culture of training negotiation and communication to soldiers at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst.

Using an observation of a negotiation simulation at the *Operation Broadsword*<sup>86</sup> exercise, this chapter provides an illustration of how cadets react to the stresses of negotiation, as well as making a link to the field of conflict resolution research. It then offers an analysis of the UN CPTMs, which cover issues such as negotiation, and working with diverse cultures. This chapter will thus present an informed analysis of the development of negotiation training and the role it plays in preparing soldiers for peacekeeping duties.

The chapter further provides a unique conflict resolution viewpoint in its approach to negotiation skills. It surveys negotiation literature, as well as charts where the conflict resolution field has had influence on military training for negotiation, both at the tactical level (in preparing troops themselves), as well as at a more theoretical level (in understanding the impact of negotiation on larger conflict resolution efforts).

### ***Tactical-level military negotiation in the literature: a brief synopsis***

To begin, it is important to define what type of negotiation is surveyed. This chapter offers a significant contribution by outlining the unique pressures of the

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<sup>86</sup> Chapter 4 has a full description of the exercise.

'tactical-level military negotiation'. Goodwin (whose work is intrinsic to understanding this area) offers a definition of tactical-level military negotiation, through reflecting on the changing nature of military peacekeeping in the 1990's. This provides a constructive working definition by which to chart the academic literature:

Circumstances were dictating that the military, primarily in their role as peacekeepers, were required to interact with a multiplicity of organisations and individuals on operations in order to achieve safe resolutions to volatile situations. Whilst a military force is inextricably linked with armed response, and this remains an option in most deployments, the growth of civil-military liaison work and non-confrontational encounters with warring factions to uphold a mandate of neutrality dictate an urgent requirement for any soldier to negotiate responsively and effectively.

(Goodwin, 2005; xvi)

This account highlights interactions with a multiplicity of organisations and individuals, civil-military relations and finally 'non-confrontational encounters' with warring factions. Such actions cover both intended formalities (much of which was discussed in Chapter 4), and 'flashpoints' – areas of crisis negotiation. This chapter provides a considered analysis of this critical area of 'flashpoint' negotiations.

## **General texts which offer an outline of negotiation**

The wider negotiation literature offers more generic themes which can be used to inform negotiation at the micro-level. For example, Zartman and Rubin's five attributes for a successful negotiator - flexibility, interpersonal sensitivity, inventiveness, patience, and tenacity - can be used as a benchmark to aim for when training soldiers to negotiate effectively. Some of these skills will be apparent throughout this chapter, both in the theories of negotiation and in practical examples (Zartman, 2002; 104).

It is through interest-based negotiation where the links between the negotiation literature and the tactical-level military negotiation contexts become apparent. Movius argues that this approach reflected a desire in the field to utilise negotiations to move parties to discover interests, and examine options for joint gain. This 'win-win' approach was a radical move from traditional bargaining practice and, in Movius' view, explored themes involving:

the creation and distribution of value, the importance of moving beyond positions to addressing underlying interests, the suboptimality of most outcomes, the irrationality of many negotiator assumptions, and the importance of achieving results while maintaining long-term relationships.

(Movius, 2008; 511)

Fisher Ury and Patton's *Getting To Yes* offers an approach at all levels of the conflict. The authors built on work carried out at the Harvard Negotiation Project

to develop 'principled negotiation'<sup>87</sup>, described as 'a straightforward method of negotiation that can be used under almost any circumstance' (Fisher et al., 1991; 11). It follows four key areas:

**People:** Separate the people from the problem

**Interests:** focus on interests, not positions;

**Options:** generate a variety of possibilities before deciding what to do

**Criteria:** insist that the result be based on some objective standard.

Fisher *et al* argue that in order to separate people from the problem, it is important to understand that conflict lies in 'people's heads'. They argue that:

Truth is simply one more argument – perhaps a good one, perhaps not – for dealing with the difference. The difference itself exists because it exists in their thinking. Fears, even if ill-founded, are real fears and need to be dealt with. Hopes, even if unrealistic, may cause a war. Facts, even if established, may do nothing to solve the problem.

(Fisher et al., 1991; 23)

On this basis, *principled negotiation* seeks to separate the underlying interests of each negotiating party from the overt positions taken. A close examination of underlying interests 'will reveal the existence of many more interests that are shared or compatible than ones that are opposed' (Fisher et al., 1991; 43). Following from this, the authors explore where negotiators can examine options

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<sup>87</sup> 'Principled Negotiation' will be referred to when specifically discussing Fisher *et al*'s work. Otherwise the term 'interest-based negotiation' will be used.

for mutual gain, suggesting that problems arise where ‘all available answers appear to lie along a straight line between their position and yours’. In fact, according to Fisher *et al*, there is almost certainly room for shared interests and mutual gain, ranging from developing a ‘mutually advantageous relationship’ (Fisher et al., 1991; 59), or through satisfying each sides’ interests through a ‘creative solution’. To facilitate this process, objective criteria are to be used, and the more that standards of ‘fairness, efficiency or scientific merit’ are used, the more likely that any final agreement is to be ‘wise and fair’ (Fisher et al., 1991; 86).

It is in the final part of Fisher *et al*’s analysis of *principled negotiation* where closer links emerge with military-level tactical negotiation. Firstly, is the concept of the BATNA – Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement, which is the standard against which any proposed agreement should be measured. The BATNA can be used as the yardstick for any proposals offered during the negotiation process. The authors briefly connect this principle to armed negotiation, stating that the BATNA can assist in negotiation on merits, as opposed to negotiation on physical power. Secondly is ‘negotiation jujitsu’:

when they assert their positions, do not reject them. When they attack your ideas, do not defend them. When they attack you, don’t counterattack. Break the vicious cycle by refusing to react. Instead of pushing back, sidestep their attack and deflect it against the problem. As in the Oriental martial arts of judo and jujitsu, avoid putting your strength

against theirs directly; instead, use your skill to step aside and turn their strength to your ends.

(Fisher et al., 1991; 114-115)

Fisher *et al* offer a number of skills and techniques to improve 'negotiation jujitsu', including advice of how to look for and understand the interests behind stated positions, recasting personal attacks as attacks on the problem, and inviting criticism and advice.

Finally, Fisher *et al* outline the use of 'dirty tricks' by parties to a negotiation. Such dirty tricks involve deliberate deception, phony facts, ambiguous authority, dubious intentions, and less than full disclosure. These tactics lead the authors to argue that a negotiation procedure could exist about the very rules of the negotiation itself – a meta-negotiation (Fisher et al., 1991; 135-140). 'Dirty tricks' and 'negotiation jujitsu' approaches are usually utilised during tense negotiation practice and may be more prominent in the flashpoint negotiation scenario. As this chapter demonstrates, the interest-based negotiation approach is incorporated into training at the RMAS, with Goodwin's analysis of military negotiation (outlined below) recognising dirty tricks, much more offensive approaches and the possibility of a use of physical force.

Avruch's contribution investigates the cultural element of negotiation. He argues that a focus purely on communication in negotiation makes it difficult to avoid seeing the 'human element', in particular, subjectivity, cognition, and context – all parts of the cultural makeup. Avruch argues that although culture is present

in all levels of negotiation, the closer one gets to negotiations and interlocutors, the more difficult it is to theorise. This is because the closer one gets, the less chance one has of understanding the negotiation process to be a rational decision making process based on neutral assumptions contained within a 'hermetically sealed, "black box" process' (Avruch, 2005; 40) This, as Avruch argues elsewhere, makes culture the 'lens' through which causes are refracted in the context of the negotiation arena. This has an impact on how culture is taught to negotiators, as in Avruch's view, it should not be taught as a bolt-on, variable, or 'independent causal vector' in models of negotiation (Avruch, 2000; 344). This links to Rubenstein's concerns over cultural simplification in training for military peacekeepers (outlined in the previous chapter), where he likens simplified cultural understandings to little more than 'travellers advice' (Rubinstein, 2005; 531).

A more recent development in the literature has been an examination of the motivations for negotiation, particularly if negotiation is not pursued for noble purposes. A good example of this is Aggestam's work, which investigates how 'spoilers' are involved in peace processes (linking into Fisher *et al's* work on dirty tricks of parties to a negotiation). Although this study examined negotiation contexts at a higher level than the micro-negotiation, it highlights some important issues. For example, Aggestam notes how many negotiation processes are hastily arranged with the larger powers (be it international states, funders, allies) exert pressure on belligerents. This has an impact on the negotiations themselves:


As a consequence, the most likely negotiation strategy the adversaries tend to adopt is a competitive one. The key component in competitive negotiation strategy is power... a competitive strategy emphasizes self-interests, autonomy, and strategic choice in a negotiation process and the main focus is on the advancement of one side's interests relative to those of the opponent.

(Aggestam, 2006; 29)

Although this particular article aims more strategic levels of negotiation, (the Israel/Palestine example is used extensively) it can certainly be true of a hastily arranged ceasefire negotiation or humanitarian aid delivery, following a directive or agreement made at the mission headquarters. Aggestam also notes that 'devious objectives' can characterise the approach of a number of parties to a negotiation, who may use the peace process as 'a way to achieve goals other than a peace agreement' (Aggestam, 2006; 36). Thus, in the peace operations context, parties may be able to enter into negotiations without explicitly desiring an end to hostilities. Finally, Aggestam outlines the violent context into which negotiations with spoilers are placed. The transfer of war to peace (in which the participation of military peacekeepers is noteworthy) 'entails a transition of turning warriors into peace-makers and transforming a culture of violence into one of negotiation' (Aggestam, 2006; 31). If such an environment is accompanied by violence, Aggestam argues, the transition becomes particularly troublesome, and may even be interpreted as a failure of the negotiation context.

## Utilising Lederach's Pyramid

Linking this to the conflict resolution literature, the work of Lederach provides a solid framework in which to understand negotiation contexts. A version of Lederach's peacebuilding pyramid has been amended to help understand the negotiation context. Lederach created the pyramid as a way of providing an overview of 'how an entire affected population in a setting of internal armed conflict is represented and other actors, as well as the roles they play in dealing with the situation'. A similar pyramid can be used to understand how negotiation is viewed, and possibly represented in the literature (Lederach, 1997; 37-38).



The tiers on this pyramid represent the same constituents as those on Lederach's pyramid. At tier one, is the top leadership, those who negotiate peace agreements, deployment of peacekeepers, and large-scale secession of hostility agreements. Such negotiation contexts would be found at UN

headquarters, or official negotiations (such as the Dayton Accords). Tier two would encompass a more localised version of negotiation, at the level of the Special Representative of the Secretary General or Force Commander, and those who lead the belligerent groups. Much of these negotiations will be at, for example the headquarters of a peacekeeping operation (an example would be the many negotiations which General Sir Michael Rose cited in his account of the UNPROFOR operation). Tier three outlines a larger number of negotiation contexts, under the rubric of civil-military cooperation. Such negotiation contexts (as discussed in the previous chapter) are generally organised on a local level (such as civil-military cooperation meetings) with either NGO staff, local leadership or the host population.

It is at tier four where a number of less organised negotiation situations develop and where 'tactical level military negotiation' is placed. The 'flashpoint scenario (as outlined in accounts of the Bosnia operation) is at this 'sub-level' of the matrix. Although at the lowest level of the pyramid, the conflict resolution literature sees such unorganised forms of negotiation as having a critical effect at all levels. Returning to Fetherston, her research likened military negotiation to 'conciliation', encouraging parties to make conciliatory gestures that would lead to further conflict management. The conciliation process involves 'pacification process and gentle persuasion which aims to restore severed communication'. This can be placed at a pre-negotiation stage, which decides the framework and mood for which further negotiation may take place. Thus, one could argue that it appears at the lowest level of the negotiation matrix outlined above (Fetherston, 1994b; 110-111).

The pre-negotiation stage has been referred to in earlier chapters, and is of critical importance when attempting to move from peacekeeping towards peacebuilding. Fetherston examines this in the context of Fisher and Keashly's contingency model:

Peacekeeping when operating from the rationale of a contingency model can be visualised in a two-tiered approach, with peacekeepers working in the area of operation at the micro-level facilitating settlement or facilitating a more positive atmosphere, coupled with peacekeeping, cooperating and coordinated with peacemaking and peacebuilding efforts at the macro level.

(Fetherston, 1994b; 150)

In order therefore for peacekeeping to be effective within the contingency mode, then the ability to negotiate at the lowest level in 'flashpoint' situations is paramount.

The chapter now provides a sample of key texts and journal articles from *International Peacekeeping* in the period 1997-2001, focussing on where negotiation is used in the language of peacekeeping. In order to fully understand how negotiation is conceptualised, it links to the levels of Lederach's pyramid.

## **The top level of Lederach's pyramid: top leadership**

At the top tier, Kelman analyses negotiation as interactive problem solving, arguing that when parties seek to negotiate they both acknowledge that 'there is a problem and that they can at least conceive of some outcomes that would be better than the status quo'(Kelman, 1996). It is in this rubric that the option of negotiation is presented. Kelman argues that the problem addressed in negotiation is:

...a problem in the relationship between the two parties – a relationship that has become wholly competitive and mutually destructive. Both the process of negotiation itself and the substantive focus of the negotiation are designed to restore the cooperative element in the relationship between the conflicting parties.

(Kelman, 1996; 100)

Thus, in order for negotiation to be fully successful, it ought to be directed towards 'solving the problem shared between the parties', which, in Kelman's view is to transform the relationship between them. Linking this to the work of John Burton, Kelman suggests that to transform the relationship between parties it is advisable to address fundamental human needs – in particular: security, identity, justice, autonomy and recognition. This approach provides a

solid base for conflict resolution efforts of larger scale conflict-resolution approaches<sup>88</sup> (Kelman, 1996; 102).

Through a survey of *International Peacekeeping* articles (from the period 1997-2001), the focus on the top tier can be split into four main areas. Firstly, studies cite *factors that influence international negotiations*. Such factors include the return of refugees (Albert, 1997; 6), the development of civilian police mechanisms and establishment of law and order (Call and Barnett, 1999, Cordone, 1999), the influence of resources and 'conflict goods' on negotiations (Cooper, 2001; 33), the role of women in peace negotiations (Woodhouse, 2000b; 22), or the vested interests inherent in international negotiations (Carstairs, 1997; 110). The second main area in this tier is the *creation of specific peace agreements and mission specific negotiations*. This area is concerned with particular missions (Krška, 1997, Mbadinga, 2001, Gardner, 2000), bilateral negotiations over particular conflict zones (such as the Indian/Pakistani negotiations over the Kashmir) (St. John, 1997), and negotiations behind the intervention into Bosnia Herzegovina (Williams, 1999, Bellamy, 2000). The third area of this tier encompasses *processes within the United Nations* (Gordenker, 1998; 5, Keen, 2000; 24), in particular how UN mechanisms are used to facilitate peace agreements (Adebajo and Landsberg, 2000; 181), the processes of peacekeeping (for example, the use of military force to create space for negotiation) (Otis, 1999; 31-32, Adebajo, 2000; 13-14), the development of peacebuilding mechanisms (including the need to develop democratic institutions) (Andersson, 2000; 16), and finally, the pressing need

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<sup>88</sup> Kelman's analysis looks at 'opportunities for 'politically influential representatives of conflicting parties', such as Israelis and Palestinians, or Greek and Turkish Cypriots.

for effective mandates (Bratt, 1997; 51). The fourth area of this tier is *state-to-state negotiations*. This deals with state-specific policies, such as Russia's stance against secessionist movements (Baev, 1999; 92), or South Africa's policy towards peacekeeping (Williams, 2000), or a description of state-to-state negotiation (Sidhu, 2000; 203). It also covers regional engagement in conflict resolution efforts (Malone and Wermester, 2000; 48).

### **The second level of Lederach's pyramid: middle-level leadership**

The second level of the pyramid deals with country-level negotiations and the impact of UN peacekeeping within host countries. This tier can be split into three main areas. Firstly *negotiation surrounding mission impact on the host country*. Certain studies examine the overall impact of the UN (Stanley and Holiday, 1997; 35), and partner bodies, such as the WHO (Beigbeder, 1998; 38), while others focus on the positive impacts of the mission on national-level negotiations. Louise's study highlights positive impacts of MINUGA's presence in Guatemala (Louise, 1997), as does Nachimas' 1999 study of the UNIFIL operation, which argued that UNIFIL's 'most interesting and important function' was its role in negotiation, mediation and confidence building at the national level (Nachmias, 1999; 110). However, studies also deal with the negative impacts of deployments, such as reasons behind the poor image of UNPROFOR in Croatia (Malešič, 1998; 99), as well as the catastrophic effects of using Western negotiating approaches amongst Somali elders in the UNOSOM operation (Duffey, 2000a). The second area of analysis at this level is the *implementation of peace agreements and processes*; in particular, where negotiation fits into implementation of justice and the rule of law (Mani, 1998; 6,

Mani, 1999; 13, Hartz, 1999; 29, Stanley, 1999; 131). The third main focus of study at this level explores *issues surrounding negotiation once the peacekeeping operation is deployed in country*. Strategic planning of civil-military cooperation, including a coordinated approach to 'negotiations with host authorities' fits into this area (Weiss, 1998; 50). In terms of 'mandate implementation', scholars have examined the role of negotiating parameters surrounding the use of force in operations (May and Massey, 1998, 55) (Steele, 1998; 69). Studies also analyse the relationship between country negotiations and reality on the ground. Mackinlay and Kent chart the difficulties faced by negotiators in incorporating the range of interests of parties to a negotiation, and the effects this has. They outline the 'seeds of destruction' which are sown when 'difficult' issues which were circumvented in negotiations became reality on the ground (Mackinlay and Kent, 1997, 34-35). Chandler's analysis agrees with this, and notes that many of the 'complex needs' of peacekeeping are not addressed by negotiators who focus on the 'traditional tasks' of ensuring a ceasefire (Chandler, 2001). Linked to this is Zahar's analysis which questions the motivations of militias who use a number of tactics in order to 'seek the right to represent a given community at peace negotiations' (Zahar, 2000, 124).

### **The third level of Lederach's pyramid: grassroots leadership**

It is in tiers three and four where recognition emerges for officers and soldiers at a tactical level to develop skills for negotiation. Tier three refers to the organised civil-military dimensions of an operation and organised meetings between the military and NGOs, or local leaders.

This tier can be further split into three categories: negotiation (or non-negotiation) with belligerent groups; negotiation to enhance civil-military relations (both with the NGO community and the host population); and the impact of negotiation on mission tasks once the mission is deployed. In terms of *negotiating with belligerent groups*, Mackinlay and Kent note that the traditional period of peacekeeping<sup>89</sup> was characterised by ‘well-established’ procedures of disengagement of opposing forces which involved ‘only a few negotiators who were... completely in control of their respective forces’ (Mackinlay and Kent, 1997; 36). Furthermore, Sandoz’s example of the relative success of the International Committee of the Red Cross’s negotiation with belligerent groups to evacuate refugee camps in the 1976 Lebanon conflict (Sandoz, 1997; 91) is also of note here. However, studies also look at the failure of belligerent groups to enter negotiations with an operation. MacKinlay finds the difficulty of individuals having to reconcile their humanitarian agenda with warlords who ‘disregard almost all the pressures and negotiation ploys’ of the international community (MacKinlay, 2000; 58-59). Bratt links this to the issue of gaining consent for a peacekeeping operation. The loss of consent, he argues, indicates that at least one party ‘believes that its objectives can still be achieved on the battlefield’. This leads Bratt to warn about the dangers of losing consent (Bratt, 1997; 3). *The impact of negotiations in the civil-military dimension* falls into this tier, though negotiation is mentioned more in the context of relating with key members of the host population. Hills discusses the role of NGO/Military relations in the SFOR context and the negotiation skills of Civil Affairs officers as a ‘vital link’ between military and civilian efforts (Hills, 1998; 38). Studies

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<sup>89</sup> An account of the development peacekeeping doctrine can be found on page 43.

relating to aspects of civil-military relations with the host population and local civilian leaders highlight initiatives to remove landmines (Šimunović, 1999; 137), and training programmes undertaken by political missions (in this case UNMIBH) to enhance mediation and negotiation techniques amongst the host population (Day, 2000; 165). This also incorporates study of *how negotiation (or a lack of it) has an impact on military tasks*. Doherty (Doherty, 2000; 68) warns that the lack of a negotiated settlement means how there is a move towards peace enforcement and the possibility of 'mission creep'. Wilkinson finds that negotiation and mediation efforts are military tasks within themselves which aid other diplomatic efforts to 'persuade the parties to fulfil agreements on peaceful settlements of a conflict' (Wilkinson, 2000c; 74). Although not in the bottom tier, this relates to Fetherston's assertions made above, and also illustrates the links between all levels of the pyramid.

#### **The fourth level of Lederach's pyramid: flashpoint negotiation**

The fourth tier relates the most to the aims of this chapter, and is where the work of Goodwin makes a critical impact on the field. Again, it can be broken up into three predominant themes: specific examples of 'flashpoint negotiation', the skill set demanded to participate in peacekeeping operations; the skills that peacekeepers already possess and the need to improve that skill set (including the introduction of contact skills).

Firstly, in relation to the *examples cited of flashpoint negotiation*, the literature in this case study cites two main operations which offer solid examples:

UNPROFOR<sup>90</sup> and UNIFIL<sup>91</sup>. In terms of the Bosnia operations, Newland and Waller record the skills used by UNPROFOR soldiers to gain access through roadblocks. They found that UNPROFOR and the UNHCR<sup>92</sup> 'responded to the obstruction of humanitarian relief with a combination of persistence, negotiation, threat (rarely carried out), and the non-aggressive use of UNPROFOR military assets' (Newland and Meyers, 1998; 20-21). This is linked to examples of negotiation cited by Woodhouse, who uses Colonel Bob Stewart's attempts to negotiate effectively with the host population (Woodhouse, 1999b; 35). As well as the Bosnian example, the UNIFIL operation in Lebanon offers examples of the 'flashpoint' negotiation. Murphy's contribution here is relevant. He examines official policy of the UN, which was to pursue negotiations where possible, and how this translated into action on the ground. He argues:

In attempting to diffuse potentially violent situations by using maximum restraint and negotiation, UNIFIL risked being accused of backing down and not enforcing the mandate effectively. Such solutions were preferable to becoming embroiled in the civil strife taking place in Lebanon and then being forced to withdraw.

(Murphy, 1999; 53)

In addition, Murphy notes how negotiations diffused confrontations between the UNIFIL force and local armed elements. At a tactical level, negotiation *had* to be pursued because without being able to resort to negotiating with 'de facto' forces, elements of the UNIFIL forces would have been extremely 'vulnerable'

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<sup>90</sup> United Nations Protection Force (Bosnia)

<sup>91</sup> United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

<sup>92</sup> Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

(Murphy, 1999; 51). Zahar's analysis of militias is not geographically tied down, but offers a solid example of contrasting types of militias. Such an investigation has useful insights into checkpoint negotiations:

The militias that seek the improvement of general societal conditions and which possess clear lines of command and control are expected to be the least challenging interlocutor because they have both an interest in, and the capacity to, engage the issue of civilian protection. In contrast, militias with very narrow objectives and with a loose structure are expected to be the toughest interlocutor because they lack the motivation and the capacity to improve civilians' conditions.

(Zahar, 2000; 121)

The second area of research in this tier is the *defined 'needs' for peacekeeping in terms of the skills already possessed by soldiers that are suitable for peacekeeping operations*. Leeds' research investigates aspects of cross-cultural mediation and finds the disparities in military cultures when compared with the tasks that they are asked to outline:

Professional soldiers used to share a military organizational culture associated with destroying an enemy and achieving victory. Increasingly, soldiers are involved in missions in which a win-lose scenario is inappropriate, focusing on non-coercive and facilitative activities rather than on stopping aggression. Their duties resemble police work where negotiating replaces fighting. However, PSOs may also escalate to more

'muscular' activities, as shown at various periods of successive conflicts in the Balkans since 1996.

(Leeds, 2001; 95)

From this, Leeds seeks to examine the viability of placing professional mediators (termed by Leeds as the D Mediator) into peacekeeping environments to facilitate contexts where the military needs to negotiate with civilian partners, as well as to deal with culture clashes within operations, particularly those which contain 'contingents from largely individualist societies' and 'counterparts from collectivist societies.' Leeds finds that 'D Mediators' will act as 'cultural coordinators', trained to identify and deal with 'disharmonies likely to arise when a mission contains contingents from diverse cultural backgrounds' (Leeds, 2001; 96). Linked to Leeds' investigation into national characteristics, a number of studies espouse the features of soldiers from different states. MacDonald and Murphy both advocate the capability of Irish soldiers deployed on operations. MacDonald finds that Irish peacekeepers 'enjoy a high level of acceptability' among parties in a peacekeeping environment. This is due to such characteristics which include: acknowledged neutrality; a proven record of fairness and impartiality; high standards of professionalism; and, natural friendliness. Such characteristics, in MacDonald's view, 'help to diffuse tensions and... enhance the prospects of negotiation on the ground' (MacDonald, 1997; 96). Murphy finds that the lack of heavy weaponry possessed by the Irish military, combined with more engagement in small skirmishes (as opposed to 'full scale battles'), both go some way to complementing the needs for peacekeeping operations. On this basis, a military

(such as the Irish Defence Forces) unaccustomed to offensive military operations 'can be very adept at resolving confrontations by negotiation and mediation' (Murphy, 1998; 35-36). It is not only nationalities that influence soldiers' characteristics, as job type also plays a role. Grist examines the role of the military observer in UN operations and argues that the importance of personal relationships between the observers and members of the warring sides 'should not be overlooked', as factors built from the personalities of the observers (or 'good chemistry' in the author's view) provide a foundation for trust and confidence. Grist argues that:

The work of the observer or monitor in this informal pre-negotiation process is often critical to later success or failure, and is an important, though often unstated function of such missions.

(Grist, 2001; 72)

On top of this, Grist outlines the tactical level negotiation contexts into which military peacekeepers are deployed. This is the level of negotiation most suited for level four of the Pyramid. He finds that when civilians are caught in the crossfire between belligerent groups, observers' actions are extremely important. Such an example highlights the inherent skills required for peacekeeping and observation work:

direct action by observers and monitors, speaking directly to local commanders, even during ongoing shooting, has saved civilian lives. Unarmed observers and monitors need to rely upon the skills of

investigation, negotiation, conciliation and others in order to de-escalate situations, reducing the frequency and severity of violent incidents.

(Grist, 2001; 69)

As well as studies of the natural characteristics of existing soldiers, assessments at this level seek to understand *what is needed for effective tactical-level military negotiation*. Importantly, much of this is linked to the conflict resolution field. Hills offers a comparison of military peacekeepers with gendarmerie approaches and makes the case that military peacekeepers will need to 'move between enforcing order, humanitarian relief and combat operations'<sup>93</sup>. In this light, the French gendarmerie's approach to dealing with civil disturbance through pursuing means of negotiation is used as an example of what militaries should train for (Hills, 2001; 92-93). Studies also investigate structural changes required in order for peacekeeping operations to have a higher chance of success. Wentges argues that in order for peacekeeping operations to take a further step towards determining 'contextual, strategic, operational and tactical conditionality for successful operations', a myriad of improvements need to be made at all levels of the peacekeeping chain. One set of improvements, in Wentges' view is at the tactical level, where work must be done to improve skills such as negotiation (Wentges, 1998).

Investigations to determine the needs for soldiers to become peacekeepers also examine the soldiers themselves. Johansson and Larsson's study of Swedish forces argues that in addition to good military knowledge, it is

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<sup>93</sup> Much like the 'three block operation' concept further outlined in the following chapter.

necessary for soldiers serving under the UN flag to have 'extended skills' such as 'diplomacy, negotiating and mediating' (Johansson and Larsson, 1998; 137). In a later study carried out by the same authors (a quantitative analysis of Swedish peacekeepers in Bosnia Herzegovina), they argue that a main 'stressor' for soldiers serving on a peacekeeping operation is the 'conflict between strong aggressive impulses seeking an outlet and the inability to express them'. In this light, the authors state that as well as being trained in traditional combat skills:

So-called 'civilian skills', such as conflict resolution and negotiations, cross-cultural relations, and restraint in application of force, should also be emphasized.

(Johansson and Larsson, 2001; 73)

Accordingly, Johansson and Larsson make the case for peacekeeping forces to be predominantly comprised of volunteer military forces, as opposed to professional forces. This is due to the higher likelihood of such soldiers 'possessing necessary civilian skills'. From the conflict resolution field, Woodhouse's work notes the increasing number of calls for more conflict resolution capacity for peacekeepers. In particular, Woodhouse sees the changing nature of doctrine configured to win 'hearts and minds'. Such an end requires a management of consent (through impartiality, legitimacy, mutual respect, minimum force, credibility and impartiality) as well as the promotion of 'good communication, of negotiation and mediation, and of positive approaches to community relations' through civil affairs programmes (Woodhouse, 2000b;

15). This approach to fostering support from the host population is taken up by Jakobsen, who argues that negotiation (alongside a 'wide array of consent-promoting techniques') must be employed in order to 'generate trust and cooperation' (Jakobsen, 2000). Returning to Woodhouse, his analysis of current UK PSO doctrine leads him to suggest that negotiation and mediation are relevant at every level of the operation, 'from senior commanders meeting with faction leaders to soldiers at isolated observation posts who may become involved in trying to control an incident or even arbitrate a dispute' (Woodhouse, 1999b; 33). From this, Woodhouse argues that further research from the conflict research field is required. In particular, Woodhouse advocates that experiences are compiled to help foster understanding of such 'flashpoint scenarios' such as riot control, and answer the question of 'how in practice can problem-solving, negotiation and mediation skills be used'? (Woodhouse, 1999b; 33)

Looking at the role of 'Civil affairs operations', Caddick-Adams emphasises the importance of non-traditional skills for negotiation at the tactical level. He argues that in order to foster 'regional and local factional support' a great deal of emphasis is placed on the shoulders of 'the most junior commanders'. He argues that while a potential failure can cause problems at higher levels, 'the actions of a bright junior commander or liaison officer can avert a serious crisis with careful negotiation or the massaging of a local faction commander's ego' (Caddick-Adams, 1998; 151). This leads Caddick-Adams to conclude that the where there has been success in both the UNPROFOR and IFOR/SFOR missions in Bosnia, it 'has been achieved by junior commanders' (Caddick-Adams, 1998; 151).

This 'needs analysis' leads some to develop a type of soldier suited for tactical level negotiation. Kernic sees two faces of peacekeeping, which corresponds to two different 'faces' of soldier. The first face – that of traditional peacekeeping – asks the soldiers to assume the role of a 'diplomat in uniform' who 'negotiates between conflicting parties without using force'. This must be considered against the second face – that of peace enforcement – where the more 'traditional military image' of a soldier is assumed. Here peacekeeping is primarily an 'enforcement task' (Kernic, 1999; 124). The notion of the 'diplomat in uniform' is revisited in the following chapter.

Taking this analysis as a whole, there is an even spread across the articles surveyed, with negotiation contexts observed at all levels in the pyramid from a number of viewpoints. Looking at the bottom tier (where the body of this work is aimed) studies offer *ad hoc* examples of soldiers, context and doctrine. A significant finding can be deduced here. Although there are cited examples of negotiation there is little that examines *how* negotiation is taught to soldiers in the pre-deployment phase. Thus, a gap in the literature is identified.

It is within this gap that Goodwin's work makes a valuable contribution. Much of the rationale for Goodwin's analysis of the military and negotiation comes from her conclusions that established analysis of small scale negotiations (taken from a number of different fields, including business, labour management, conflict resolution, or game-theory modelling) 'did not reflect or complement the situations within which serving personnel found themselves' (Goodwin, 2005;

xvi-xvii). Following on from this, Goodwin's main contention is that situations in which the military soldier has to negotiate differs from other forms of negotiation. For example, she argues that there will be situations where soldiers have to negotiate effectively under 'duress, physical threat, and armed intervention' (Goodwin, 2005; 3). Goodwin's analysis also provides a useful table outlining her understanding of the differences of military-based negotiation and other types of negotiation. It is presented below in table 5.2.

**Box 5.2: Goodwin's comparison of negotiation**  
 (Goodwin, 2005; 7)

<b>P R I M A R Y</b>	<b>F A C T O R</b>	<i>Importance and awareness level: [high/low/variable] Tactical-level military negotiation</i>	<i>In other negotiation contexts</i>
		<b>Factor</b>	
}	Threat moves	HIGH	LOW / VARIABLE
	Power play	HIGH	VARIABLE
	Context / Mission	HIGH	VARIABLE / HIGH
	Culture	HIGH	VARIABLE
	Communication	HIGH	HIGH
	Use of force	HIGH	LOW / NON-EXISTENT
	A time imperative	HIGH	VARIABLE
}	Interests	HIGH	HIGH
	Interplay of cooperation and competition	HIGH	LOW / VARIABLE
	Personality	LOW / VARIABLE	VARIABLE
	Preparation time	LOW	HIGH / VARIABLE
	External ratifiers	HIGH / VARIABLE	VARIABLE

Notable in this table is a considerably higher chance of 'threat moves', use of force, interplay of cooperation and competition, and a considerably lower chance of preparation time for negotiations. When compared to models of negotiation espoused by Kelman and Zartman, it becomes apparent that this type of negotiation context is substantially different. However, as outlined above, there are skills and techniques that transcend all levels of the negotiation matrix. We have seen that cultural awareness is key in the circumstances outlined in Box 5.2, as is the work done by Aggestam on the role of spoilers. Furthermore, the importance of the interest-based negotiation approach has had a significant impact. Goodwin finds that interest-based negotiation a useful base for her work on negotiation. She argues that:

Being aware of interests, be they tangible or intangible aspirations, lies at the heart of conducting a successful negotiation, and this is no different in the case of military negotiation. In fact, perception of the interests which both parties hold could lead to a more satisfactory evaluation of what is going on, particularly in a volatile or aggressive context, and allow for a more productive exchange.

(Goodwin, 2005; 46)

Goodwin's analysis of military training also notes the importance of the BATNA. When discussing the importance of the BATNA upon decision-making and behaviour in negotiation, Goodwin argues that BATNAs may prove to be 'particularly pertinent in the eventual propositions concerning military tactical level negotiation'. She adds that the BATNA may allow a greater insight into

'the effect of situational behaviour such as aggression, or an escalation of armed response, and the extent to which it might affect the negotiation itself' (Goodwin, 2005; 57).

To add to this literature survey, this chapter now surveys the recognised need from within the community of practitioners (both military and conflict resolution) for peacekeepers to understand the nuances of tactical level negotiation. The most obvious example of this is through the 'roadblock scenario'. This is explored, along with a brief history of how the humble roadblock became a driving force for those who wish to see more negotiation skills taught to military peacekeepers.

### ***The need to negotiate: the roadblock scenario***

A trainer at the United Nations Training School, Ireland provided the following anecdote. It provides an important basis for understanding how valuable the need is for military personnel to understand the importance of such skills as negotiation within the peacekeeping environment.

The trainer explained that whilst he was attending a multinational training exercise, a task was given to soldiers from three different nationalities. The soldiers were tasked to escort an aid delivery from Village A to Village B. However, between villages A and B, residents of Village C had set up a road block on the main road, as they felt that they deserved some of the aid that was destined for Village B. A small, armed militia manned the roadblock. The task

for the military contingents was to make their way through this checkpoint to Village B.

The trainer remarked that upon seeing the checkpoint, the first contingent decided to turn around and return to base; it was not in their mandate to negotiate with Village C, and they did not want the extra stresses of negotiating a further aid delivery. The approach of the second contingent was to negotiate their way through the checkpoint so that they could continue to Village B. They did this by offering a small amount of aid to the residents of Village C, in return for access along the road. They also promised another drop off of aid on their return journey. This was accepted, so they passed. The approach of the third contingent showed far less reliance on negotiation. When tasked with the roadblock scenario, the contingent was ordered to drive through it, showing no signs of stopping, as well as brandishing their weapons in order to retaliate to any signs of gunfire (UNTSS, 2007b).

This the checkpoint scenario is helpful to understand how negotiation is used in a peacekeeping context (even if one takes into account the differing national approaches of each of the three contingents). In terms of this particular case, and the three methods applied by the different contingents, there is a huge divergence between the approaches that were employed. Taking the first and third approaches, we see two approaches which may have been useful in the short-term, but ultimately negative in the long-term. In the first case, there was absolute avoidance shown, which may have saved the contingent the trouble of having to negotiate a roadblock, (which was not in their mandate). However,

this can be weighed against the fact that Village B would not receive any aid, and that the attitude towards Village C could be interpreted as showing the international presence to be weak. On the other hand, the third approach showed the international force to be highly robust, through smashing their way through the barrier. Although this has had positive results in the past (cited below in the example of UNPROFOR), it runs a high risk of alienating local opinion to the operation as well as heightening the possibilities of those operating the roadblock to escalate their levels of force to stop any future patrols.

Thus, the ideal approach in this scenario is to explore options for negotiation. In the immediate term, the result of negotiating a way through the checkpoint would be less than if no negotiations took place: for the military, less of the aid is delivered, and the inhabitants of Village C may not get as much aid as Village B. However, this outcome increases the chance of positive relations between the peacekeepers and the inhabitants of Village C. It may also prevent feelings of antagonism from Village C towards those other Villages in the area who are receiving aid.

On a wider scale, the 'roadblock scenario' has played an important role in making peacekeepers understand the importance of having to negotiate, and the serious ramifications of ineffective negotiation in the maelstrom of a peacekeeping deployment. This view is reinforced by interviews at the RMAS, which provided a brief history of the development of negotiation in the UK Military. It was explained that although the need to negotiate was clearly

identified some time ago, the formalised teaching of such a topic is a relatively new evolution in training. In the case of the UK, it was stressed that the development of teaching negotiation skills to the soldiers was a development built on the negative experiences of the UNPROFOR operation in Bosnia Herzegovina. As a senior trainer at RMAS explained, post deployment reports from UNPROFOR described how soldiers were attempting to enter into negotiation processes, without any considerable knowledge of how negotiations worked. Because of this, it emerged that negotiation training for military peacekeepers would be critical in preparing them for complex deployments such as UNPROFOR (Sandhurst, 2008c). This provides a suitable juncture to examine what difficulties were being faced by British troops in Bosnia.

### ***British Participation in UNPROFOR and the role that negotiation played***

For the UK, participation in UNPROFOR was a considerable indicator of the requirement to increase negotiation skills for military peacekeepers, and that a sizeable shift in doctrine and training was required (Curran, 2004). The UNPROFOR operation represents a watershed moment in the development of UN peacekeeping operations and the role of conflict resolution in informing the role and activities of peacekeepers.

The doctrinal significance of the UNPROFOR deployment cannot be understated. The operation provided the backdrop for UK peacekeeping doctrine *Wider Peacekeeping*, which provided guidance for soldiers and training

institutions. *Wider Peacekeeping* is a critical document when understanding the evolution of conflict resolution skills into military peacekeeping activities, (mainly due to the conditions that UK troops were operating under in the UNPROFOR mission) as it fully explored the issue of consent in peacekeeping environments and how this was influenced by acting non-violently to potentially violent situations. It argued:

For *Wider Peacekeeping* therefore, consent is confirmed as foundational to any prospect of long-term success. Lessons learned reports have highlighted the point that seeking to promote and sustain consent is the most important activity in which the tactical commander can engage. The history of peacekeeping has consistently shown that consent is the only effective vehicle for carrying peacekeeping operations forward.

(MOD, 1995; 2-6)

Negotiation skills were integrated into the doctrine to a high degree, and were outlined as one of the key techniques to achieving consent in a conflict zone<sup>94</sup>.

*Wider Peacekeeping* linked this to 'pillars' of consent - a number of principles which a mission needed to adhere to in order to foster and maintain consent. Amongst these was 'minimum use of force', which consequently pushed peacekeepers towards using non-violent forms of conflict management. *Wider Peacekeeping* states with regard to the use of force that it could become 'liable to become sources of future resentment and hostility which may inhibit control

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<sup>94</sup> The full list is: Negotiation and mediation, Liaison, Civil Affairs, Public information, Community Information, Community Relations.

and manifest in outbreaks of further violence and prolongation of the conflict' (MOD, 1995; 2-7).

The emergence of negotiation and non-use of force in *Wider Peacekeeping* was influenced primarily by the use of roadblocks as a principal impediment to the effective delivery of humanitarian aid to enclaves within Bosnia throughout the operation. Usually such roadblocks would consist of a small number of armed men blocking a road with obstacles and landmines (either anti-personnel, or anti-tank). Although it looked like a militarily small task to use force to destroy the roadblock, the UN's mandate relied on the consent of all parties to ensure the convoys would get through, thus any increase in force could mean that consent would be withdrawn to the operation (meaning the UN could effectively have become a party to the conflict: something which was opposed to by the troop contributors). Thus, soldiers were required not to use force, but negotiate their way through the roadblocks. Such scenarios were a concern to soldiers at all levels. General Sir Michael Rose (who commanded the UNPROFOR operation from 1994-1995) found that the Serbs in particular wished to retain control of humanitarian goods, because delivery of aid to any of the Muslim enclaves would work against their strategic interests. However, Rose found (to the cost of the UNPROFOR operation), that Serbian forces 'never blocked convoys in such a systematic manner that a military response from UNPROFOR became inevitable'. Instead, he argued, they played a 'cat-and-mouse' game which involved giving in to the UN when the 'pressure on them grew too much', and then becoming obstructive when the UN moved on and

concerned itself with other issues (Rose, 1999b; 361-362). Goodwin's analysis found that:

On many occasions, the main aim in stopping peacekeepers at checkpoints appeared to be to delay and hamper the military from achieving its mission. Disruption was something that the other protagonists could achieve easily, especially so when the frustration felt by the UNPROFOR personnel was noted and observed.

(Goodwin, 2005; 173)

Newland and Meyers found that convoys were continually obstructed and harassed by uncoordinated groups along the convoy route. They cite one example in particular, where in May 1992 a convoy had to negotiate its way through 90 roadblocks between Zagreb and Sarajevo, with 'many of them manned by undisciplined and drunken soldiers of indeterminate political affiliation' (Newland and Meyers, 1998; 19). The authors note that:

The parties, though unwilling to explicitly oppose humanitarian assistance, did in fact oppose it when it helped to sustain the very populations they were trying to eliminate. The tactics of obstruction were endless delays, fruitless negotiations, outright blockades and, sometimes, attacks.

(Newland and Meyers, 1998; 20-21)

Colonel Bob Stewart (who commanded the first British battalion to arrive in the country in 1992) approached such roadblocks with an attitude that negotiation as paramount. He argued:

Without a mandate to force our passage through, we would have to negotiate all the way to our destinations. It would be no good simply launching a convoy and hoping that it would be able to get through the many checkpoints to its destination. We had to create the right conditions in which to operate, which might entail a ceasefire or at least a containment of the fighting between local forces... Faced with a choice between either forcing our way through using military power or negotiating, I would obviously use the latter option unless there was no other way.

(Stewart, 1993; 61-62)

Thus, Stewart's approach was to seek out avenues to negotiate. Within this framework an extensive system of liaison officers was established to ensure that the force could maintain regular contact with local commanders. In Stewart's view, building relationships with local commanders was of high importance, and liaison teams were essential to facilitating this success. Stewart found that personal relationships were 'vital' in situations with no established order, as 'often a problem which seems impossible one moment can be solved almost instantly in a conversation' (Stewart, 1993; 319).

As the conflict went on, the idea of having to negotiate through roadblocks was tested, with commanders and contingents assuming a tougher line on roadblocks. General Sir Michael Rose argued for a 'robust' response from contingents when stopped at a checkpoint. To show what can be achieved through the threat of force, Rose used the example of a Swedish Battalion's action at a checkpoint:

Hendrikson [the Swedish Commander] had led their [the Swedish contingent] first convoy across the conflict line. At a Bosnian Serb roadblock, he was confronted by an aggressive soldier who told him he had orders not to allow him to pass. Hendrikson immediately put a loaded pistol to the soldier's head and informed him that he had just received a new set of orders. The convoy was allowed through without any further interruption.

(Rose, 1999b; 50)

Although Rose agreed with this policy, arguing that the Battalion were well respected throughout the mission, it did bring wider problems associated in refusing to negotiate at a checkpoint. Woodhouse, Fetherston and Ramsbotham note this, in their assessment of the role of conflict resolution theory and practice in the UNPROFOR operation. They found that although there was admiration for the Swedish approach, it ultimately led to three Swedish peacekeepers being taken hostage by Bosnian gunmen (although ironically they were released unharmed after negotiations) (Fetherston et al., 1994; 24). Nevertheless, Rose maintained his view that a robust posture was

needed to improve chances of success. In his view, the Serbs (who seemed to be providing the majority of roadblocks in Rose's experience) could have been obliged to offer the UNPROFOR convoys greater freedom of movement 'if national contingents had adopted a universally robust approach on the ground'. It was the lack of a unified, robust posture which Rose viewed as a stumbling point in gaining any ground with aid deliveries (Rose, 1999b; 361-362).

This debate highlighted the need for a coherent approach to training for peacekeepers, which was reinforced by post-operational assessments of the UNPROFOR deployment . Colonel Bob Stewart asserted that UN operations are 'officers' wars', in which the balance of success or failure depends on the attitude of the officers who have to establish networks in the field, and implement UN policy into practice. This is to some extent reinforced by Fetherston *et al* who argue that:

peacekeepers (military and civilian) operate at the critical interface between 'structural-political' attempts to broker mediated settlements at one set of levels (in this case reaching from Pale and Sarajevo through Belgrade and Zagreb to Moscow and Washington), and the task of monitoring or implementing them at another, including 'cultural-communal' tasks such as relief work, refugee repatriation, communal policing, reconstruction, overcoming breakdown in communication and local reconciliation. (Fetherston et al., 1994; 13)

Goodwin contends that that because of the high number of instances where negotiation was 'thrust' upon soldiers (in most cases through negotiating at roadblocks), many found that they were 'inadequately trained in negotiation skills'. Her investigation finds that the experiences gained through the UNPROFOR deployment 'indicated that individuals were either good negotiators or were not, and had little time to alter the fact for the better'. With inadequate training, soldiers had to handle negotiations which had a high chance of failing, when coupled with a pervading hostility and cultural misunderstandings. As Goodwin says, 'a great deal of damage could be done with very few words' (Goodwin, 2005; 175). With this lesson in mind, belief developed in the peacekeeping community that amongst the skills needed for conducting peacekeeping operations, 'negotiation was one of the most important duties, but one of the least practised in the pre-deployment phase' (Goodwin, 2005; 191).

It was also noted amongst the conflict resolution community that the 'roadblock scenario' was a unique case-in-point to highlight the wider issues of negotiation within peacekeeping operations. Woodhouse, Ramsbotham and Fetherston's paper that examined UNPROFOR from a conflict resolution perspective, noted the 'hard' and 'soft' power approaches needed for peacekeepers negotiating at a micro-level. Throughout 1992 and 1993, UNPROFOR soldiers required a great deal of 'skill, professionalism, judgement and restraint' in order to deal with the myriad of issues they were confronted with on a daily basis. In the authors' view, the development of 'contact skills' was essential in order for soldiers to develop their 'soft' power skills. The authors argued that:

contact skills are defined as those skills which support activities involving direct contact with armies and militias, civilian populations, humanitarian agencies, and other contingents of the peacekeeping force. They are in essence the communication skills required by the third party interveners enabling them to utilise their soft power capabilities

(Fetherston et al., 1994; 14-16)

Thus, on both sides of the military/conflict resolution divide, a growing recognition emerged that understood the need of a role for conflict resolution in micro-level military negotiation. Much of this recognition came about as a result of the difficulties which soldiers faced at checkpoint negotiation in Bosnia. This represents a significant development in links between the two fields.

Training in negotiation soon took the form of checkpoint negotiations. One such attempt to formalise training into this context was spearheaded by the Centre for Conflict Resolution, at the Department of Peace Studies, (University of Bradford). This particular exercise was based on a composite of convoy events in the Bratunac/Srebrenica area of Bosnia-Herzegovina during the Spring of 1993. A more detailed description of the scenario is presented in Box 5.3 below.

**Box 5.3: Humanitarian Aid Delivery in War-Zones – Case Study:  
Srebrenica, Bosnia Hercegovina<sup>95</sup> 1993**

(Lewer and Reynolds, 2002)

It is spring 1993. A UNHCR food convoy, which set off from Belgrade escorted by UNPROFOR soldiers, has arrived at the outskirts of Bratunac (a Bosnian Serb town) in Bosnia-Hercegovina. The convoy consists of 15 UNHCR trucks carrying 150 tons of food, medical supplies, blankets and soap. The convoy is on its way to Srebrenica (about 10 miles from Bratunac), an enclave established as a UN 'safe area' for Bosnian Muslims, which is surrounded by Serb forces

The convoy has received all necessary permissions from Bosnian Serb HQ at Pale to travel through Serb territory to Srebrenica. In order to secure these permissions, the Bosnian Muslims agreed to allow Serbs to be evacuated (by the UN) from neighbouring Tuzla. The overall situation in the country is extremely volatile, with the Serbs rapidly gaining territory with devastating effects on civilians

The convoy has had a long and difficult journey from Belgrade, with many stops. For example it was held up for a long time at Zvornik on the Serbian-Bosnian border. As it approaches Bratunac it is forced to stop yet again because of a crowd of angry Bosnian Serb civilians who are blocking the road. Positioned on the side of the road is a detachment of Serbian militia. International news reporters are present at the scene

The creators of the training exercise argued that Serbian forces hindered aid delivery in Eastern Bosnia for four main reasons:

- Passage of aid is stopped according to the orders of the highest Bosnian Serb authorities due to political or military reasons
- Passage is stopped according to orders of the highest authorities but it is presented as a will of local militias on check points

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<sup>95</sup> The authors' use of this spelling format has not been changed.

- Passage is denied by local militia commanders
- Aid passage is stopped by the local civilian population, as a sign of protest

(Lewer and Reynolds, 2002; 49)

Thus, the exercise sought to involve all four approaches in the role-play, by incorporating a multitude of different actors at a number of different levels. Over 25 different roles were defined<sup>96</sup> each with different ends, and means which to achieve them. Within the role-play were two main themes. The first level negotiated at a higher level by ‘those at the broader political and military levels’, and the second level at the micro-negotiation context of the roadblock. Within the micro-level negotiation of convoy delivery, the creators of the exercise make the point that:

UN officials in charge of these convoys must, therefore, have plenty of courage, negotiation skills, and patience in order to fulfil their task.

(Lewer and Reynolds, 2002; 49)

Therefore, in essence the roadblock ‘scenario’ was symptomatic of the UN’s involvement in the wider conflict in Bosnia. Soldiers found themselves stuck between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ power approaches towards those providing the roadblock, with no clear answer of which would be more successful. They found

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<sup>96</sup> Actors came from the following list: Local officials from Bratunac, Bosnian Serb Militia, UNHCR Convoy, UNPROFOR Escort, International Committee of the Red Cross, Medics Sans Frontiers, Oxfam, United Nations Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary General, UNHCR headquarters, UNPROFOR Headquarters, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe Headquarters, Oxfam Headquarters, Government of Bosnia Hercegovina.

themselves at the crux of the divide between the policies made in the UN Headquarters, and dealing with the practical implementation challenges of such policies. In addition, was the need for negotiation through cultural contexts, both with the humanitarian community, the militias, as well as the local population. Finally, UN peacekeepers found themselves having to deal with, and make compromises with warring factions. This, Goodwin argues, involved having to make 'some unsavoury deals' in order to maintain consent. It is because of this spectrum of issues involved and the positive impact that conflict resolution theory and practice can provide, that we see the importance in using the hugely localised scenario at the level of a roadblock on a route from Village A to Village B to effectively teach soldiers the importance of negotiation in peacekeeping environments.

Bringing this to the present day, research conducted at RMAS (through discussions with trainers and analysis of the training programme) shows that in the UK context the military roadblock is used to some extent in preparing soldiers for negotiation contexts. However, it is now seen as one of *many* contexts in which soldiers find themselves having to negotiate with civilians, NGOs, or belligerent groups of non-governmental organisations. Although the importance of the UNPROFOR experience is highlighted, militaries have developed training, adapting military peacekeepers to different contexts. It is, however, still kept as an example of negotiation, with a video of a roadblock negotiation being used to introduce officer cadets into the nuances of negotiation at RMAS (Sandhurst, 2008b).

## ***RMAS and Negotiation Training***

Negotiation training for officer cadets at RMAS is undertaken by the *Communication and Applied Behavioural Sciences Department* (where Goodwin teaches), which focuses on teaching cadets a broad range of skills and techniques centred on four thematic areas: problem solving and creative thinking; motivating and team building; communicating and influencing; and leading and managing change. It is from this range of themes that the department aims to provide future officers with the necessary base skills to become 'tactical level micro negotiators' (RMAS, 2009)

Goodwin categorises tactical level military micro-negotiators as *Type D* learners. These are defined as 'learners who are to be frequent micro negotiators in given contexts with greater personal or scenario implications for their failure/success' (Goodwin, 2005; 138). However, she finds that such learners are stifled with a very low starting knowledge of negotiation and its finer nuances (bordering on ignorance about the subject). This becomes problematic when the negotiator finds him/herself in a personal life-or-death scenario in the real world (Goodwin, 2005; 138-140). Developing negotiation training for this type of learner therefore requires a number of different approaches, in particular a mixture of classroom-based teaching, scenario based learning, and life-like simulations.

Classroom-based teaching is based around 'brainstorming sessions', where cadets are encouraged to think creatively about a particular context or situation,

and share their thoughts with other members of the class. In such sessions, elicitive approaches are followed, with Goodwin noting that suggestions are invited as well as pooling together of different ideas and responses from the learners. This leads to a 'diversity of issues and solutions' from the group, with different groups providing different outcomes. Goodwin goes on to argue that:

a learning method that is frequently overlooked is the sharing of ideas with mentors and colleagues, through general conversation or more formal interviews. This experience tends to promote higher-level skills, and the refinement of technique and approach, since improvement has no limits.

(Goodwin, 2005; 143)

Scenario-based training provides a significant part of the overall curricula, and complements the work done in the classroom. Goodwin argues that ensuring variety in the delivery of training exercises will involve the inclusion of simulation exercises, which provide a 'realistic representation of likely negotiation processes, plus the inherent external factors, which will all be pertinent to the learner' (Goodwin, 2005; 138-140). For students to effectively learn about negotiation in this framework, Goodwin argues that the context is 'vital' in order for the learner to transfer their theory into practice in a meaningful way. Furthermore in the terms of the military, attention must be paid to the rules of engagement, as well as current scenarios into which the military is likely to find itself deployed. Finally, and heeding more elicitive approaches, guided role-play ideally offers structured and constructive feedback through immediate debriefs

which utilise 'both trainer and learner response to enable a more proactive learning cycle to develop' (Goodwin, 2005; 140). Linking this to Movius's work on negotiation training, he cites systematic reviews of university and professional school curricula, which suggest that the most common single technique used to train negotiation was the use of simulations and role-play exercises. He argues that such exercises help trainees through experience, help reveal training participants' 'naïve theories of negotiation', offer opportunities to try new skills, and to 'illustrate the relevance and application of underlying principles and themes' (Movius, 2008; 515).

To supplement the theoretical approaches outlined above, this chapter now provides a fieldwork observation of a negotiation exercise at RMAS, and an examination of UN approaches to training in communication and negotiation. These will further illustrate the importance of conflict resolution skills in training programmes for military peacekeepers, particularly with regards to the significant area of tactical-level negotiation.

## ***Fieldwork observations: Negotiation in the Broadsword exercise***

The fieldwork observation at *Operation Broadsword*<sup>97</sup> provided the opportunity to witness a cadet taking part in a role-played hostage negotiation. It took place at the local mosque, where the local belligerent group (BANITAL) took three female civilians hostage. Outside of the mosque, a large crowd had gathered, angered by the fact that three civilians were taken hostage. The role of the soldiers was twofold: firstly, to stop the crowd from ‘storming’ the mosque (bringing a heightened danger of a large-scale loss of life); and secondly, to negotiate directly with the hostage takers to ensure the safe release of the hostages.

Fieldwork notes explain how the negotiation process inside the mosque worked. The observation started after the first set of negotiations failed dramatically, with one of the hostages being ‘killed’. After this happened, a new negotiator was drafted in. This change of negotiator had a positive effect. The fieldwork notes explain what happened next


He [the soldier] agreed to withdraw the forces (who moved back and ‘hid’ out of view to the hostage takers), and for this, one hostage was released. The negotiations then moved on to safe passage for the hostages. At first they [the hostage takers] demanded a bus, but were told that it was not a realistic demand. They then demanded that they had access to the edge of the village. The remaining hostage was taken

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<sup>97</sup> A more detailed description of *Operation Broadsword* can be found in Chapter 3.

as a 'human shield'. It was not until the hostage takers got to the edge of the village that she was let go. From this it was obvious that a degree of trust had emerged between hostage takers and the negotiators (Sandhurst, 2007)

Interpreting this through an amended *principled negotiation* model, Box 5.4 below shows the context of the negotiation:



Examining this process, the BATNAs for both groups are overwhelmingly violent. In fact when this scenario was discussed with Sandhurst trainers, it was remarked that such a BATNA would be employed in the operational context, as one hostage had been executed and that is usually the 'trip wire' for overwhelming force to be implemented. However, it was through understanding

each side's BATNA that brought the negotiation scenario to its ultimately non-violent conclusion. The soldiers knew the BANITAL gunman was providing a clear threat to the hostage and the BANITAL gunman knew the threat posed to himself by the military. This reciprocal understanding of the BATNA possibly led to each side exploring options for negotiation. By looking at the possible positions of the parties, there becomes scope for negotiation. The BANITAL gunman, by adopting the position of not being targeted by the military offered the safe release of one hostage in return for the military to withdraw to a safer distance. In terms of interests, there was certainly room for pursuing goals with mutual benefit. In the military's case, there was a need to save face, ensure the mandate was not harmed, resolve the dilemma in a speedy manner (particularly under the observation of a number of angered local civilians), and ensure the safety of troops. The BANITAL gunman, through needing to save face himself, and ultimately survive, offered the negotiation context a type of solution. If both were to save face, with the security of the area safeguarded in a quick manner (thus upholding part of the mandate), with the gunman surviving and still showing that the BANITAL showed a threat, then the outcome would be a rational solution: the gunman taking a hostage to the edge of the village, before giving her up and fleeing.

It is worth noting at this juncture that the observation was undertaken at a point where the negotiator had been replaced *after* the hostage taker had killed one of the hostages. In effect the first negotiator had failed his test, resulting in catastrophic failure. It was due to the flexibility of the role-play that another cadet could be brought in to 'start again' on the negotiation. Although the

observation sees the process as a success, it did begin after a failure in negotiation. In a real world scenario, this ability to start again would not be an option, and with the killing of a hostage, a chain reaction may be invoked where the military use overwhelming violence against the hostage takers – employment of the BATNA. Goodwin discusses this extensively in the case of a hostage negotiation in Sierra Leone, where an armed militia called the ‘West Side Boys’ had taken a number of UK soldiers hostage. In this particular scenario the influence of time pressures, and the growing threat of harm to the hostages led the UK military to employ violent force against the hostage takers. This, in Goodwin’s view, emphasised ‘the pervading threat of force, aggression and armed response’ in the military environment, and how such a threat is essentially an option for either negotiator (Goodwin, 2005; 203). Furthermore, Goodwin finds that

If negotiation is undertaken in such circumstances, it is necessarily a process framed by mutual awareness of the presence of this type of coercion and tension. For the parties involved the negotiation becomes a stressful and, on occasions, physically threatening, encounter, with every decision creating the potential for destructive reaction.

(Goodwin, 2005; 203)

In order to understand such a negotiation scenario in the wider context, one can look at conflict resolution approaches to the ‘prisoners’ dilemma’. The fieldwork notes suggest that his micro-negotiation context can be interpreted as a form of prisoners’ dilemma. They find that:

From a [conflict resolution] perspective, this shows the prisoners dilemma clearly, as both sides could have gone back on agreement to achieve gain for themselves at the cost of the other. However, both sides clearly trusted each other and the resolution was win-win.

(Sandhurst, 2007)

As outlined by Hopmann, the prisoners dilemma is based on a story of two bank robbers who rob a bank and bury the stolen money, with the intent to dig up the money and split the bounty (Hopmann, 1996). Before they get the chance, a local sheriff arrests them and tries to extract confessions from both prisoners (as he has no evidence to convict them). The sheriff tells the prisoners that the length of the sentence will depend not only on whether they confess, but whether the other prisoner chooses to confess or not. There options outlined are:

- 1) If neither confesses, they will be sentenced for a lesser crime;
- 2) If both confess, they will each be sentenced to five years in prison; or
- 3) If one confesses and the other does not, then the one who confesses will be given a light sentence, whereas the other will be sentenced to the maximum penalty of eight years in prison.

Box 5.5 provides a grid for the prisoners' dilemma with the potential jail sentence of Prisoner 1 is given first followed by the jail sentence of Prisoner 2

**Box 5.5: The prisoner dilemma**

(Hopmann, 1996: 73)

		Prisoner 2	
		No Confession	Confession
Prisoner 1	No Confession	- 2, -2	-8, -1
	Confession	-1, -8	-5, -5

The main crux of this dilemma, Hopmann finds, is in the relations between the top left corner (-2, -2) and bottom right (-5, -5), as the rational approach by the prisoners would both be to not confess. However, this is only a rational approach if both parties can trust each other not to confess (as doing so would mean a drastically longer sentence). This is where the tension lies, as confession can be a 'safe option'.

Linking this to the observed hostage negotiation, the situation demanded agreement between the cadet and hostage taker, possibly at the cost of something to both parties: through reaching an agreed settlement the hostage-taker was sacrificing his goals and the cadet sacrificed obtaining 'justice' (by catching the hostage-takers) in order to ensure the safety of the hostage. What led both parties to sacrifice part of their goals in order to reach an agreement was a degree of trust that the other party would not go back on their part of the agreement. Furthermore, the costs of going back on the agreement would be more costly than following it. In this case the costs would lead to an escalation of force and a high probability of injury or death. In many aspects this was an active representation of the prisoners dilemma.

Hopmann suggests that traditional bargaining theory does not suggest a 'good answer' to the prisoners dilemma, and the related tensions between 'simultaneously cooperating to seek integrative solutions and competing to win a larger share of the distributive outcome' (Hopmann, 1996; 75). Thus, he finds that more recent work on interpreting the prisoners' dilemma as a 'joint problem-solving exercise' rather than an exercise where each party aims to gain at the others expense is more fruitful. Hopmann also argues that this has longer-term benefits:

When the two parties seek to cooperate to achieve mutually beneficial solutions, this usually tends to reinforce the long-term self-interests of each of the parties as well. It does so in part because this approach prevents optimal solutions from being undermined by mistrust and conflict, as in the Prisoners' Dilemma. It also serves long-term interests because agreements that may undermine the fundamental interests of at least one of the parties are likely to be violated and eventually to dissolve (Hopmann, 1996; 75)

In their analysis of the prisoners' dilemma, Woodhouse and Ramsbotham agree. Looking at the tit-for-tat strategy, Woodhouse and Ramsbotham explain that in a scenario where this prisoners' dilemma is repeated over and over again, the greatest strategy is to mimic what the other person does. However, the process begins with cooperation. Thus, if both sides begin with cooperating, then rationally they would copy each other's behaviour: cooperating multiple

times. However, if one side does defect, then the other will change their approach from cooperation to defection for the next round. They argue:

Tit-for-tat is not a pushover. It hits back when the other defects. But, crucially, it initially cooperates (it is 'generous') and it bears no grudges (it is 'forgiving'). Its responses are also predictable and reliable (it has 'clarity of behaviour').

(Ramsbotham et al., 2005; 17)

In an extensive simulation of the prisoners' dilemma, the tit-for-tat strategy was the most successful; with both parties gaining more by cooperating than if they defected. This leads the authors to agree with the argument that 'nice guys do come first'. In terms of this particular negotiation, both sides maintained cooperation (Ramsbotham et al., 2005; 17).

In the case of the *Broadsword* observation, two conclusions can be reached about tit-for-tat. Firstly, tit-for-tat brought success in this observation. The negotiator began by offering to cooperate (moving the other soldiers away). The BANITAL member accepted this, and in turn cooperated with the negotiator (releasing one hostage). The spirit of cooperation through a tit-for-tat strategy was apparent throughout the rest of the negotiation, and the final hostage was released. The second conclusion suggests that in the larger picture, tit-for-tat was not followed. As stated, the negotiator was replaced *after* the BANITAL members had resorted to force. If tit-for-tat were to be followed, then it would be logical for the military to resort to force themselves. Thus, although tit-for-tat

works in cooperative strategies, it may not be as applicable when there is the risk of loss of life.

Thus, the Sandhurst negotiation offers an excellent example of how militaries can be trained to deal with difficult negotiation scenarios in the deployment zone, with little preparation. It also illustrates where exactly one can see interests-based negotiation being used in a 'flashpoint' scenario: a common feature of the tactical-level military negotiation. By examining the BATNA, positions and interests, it becomes clear how agreement was reached. Also, through the prisoners' dilemma, one can see how in the longer term this negotiation process may move the parties onto a more peaceful footing for future relations. Although it was a training exercise, it demonstrates the viability of conflict resolution theory and skills as tools to both inform and understand military negotiation. It further offers another example of the links between peacekeeping and conflict resolution.

### ***Approaches in the United Nations: SGTMs and CPTMs***

Negotiation training is to varying extents prevalent in current UN training. The Standard Generic Training Modules<sup>98</sup> (SGTMs) contained a section on how to negotiate, entitled *Communication and Negotiation*. This is the most obvious point of departure to examine the UN's approach to training soldiers in negotiation skills. Surrounding the negotiation context, the SGTM suggests is a wider 'communication environment':

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<sup>98</sup> The SGTMs were replaced in 2009.

The communication environment in a peacekeeping mission is much more complex than one is used to under normal circumstances. The peacekeeper will typically be communicating with somebody from another culture, without a common language, often under threatening or tense situations in a context where people are stressed and easily irritable.

(UN, 2006g; 1)

This description reflects many of the factors present in Goodwin's analysis of tactical level military negotiation. In particular, the high threat level, influence of personality, and the importance of culture. The Communication and Negotiation SGTM is therefore intended to ensure peacekeepers understand where and when they will need to use negotiation skills, and how this differs from the traditional duties in military operations. The SGTM begins by explaining that in peacekeeping operations, soldiers will be placed under situations where they will be 'interacting with another person or persons with the objective of reaching an agreement between them' (UN, 2006g; 7). It then outlines common scenarios where one would see negotiation skills being put to use. These are as outlined in Box 5.6 below:

**Box 5.6: Common scenarios where negotiation is put to use (taken from SGTM 11: Communication and Negotiation)**

(UN, 2006g; 7)

1. Negotiate freedom of movement of peacekeepers, NGO or population through area controlled by one of the parties, e.g. at a roadblock;
2. Discuss relationship/roles between peacekeepers and the parties or local authorities, e.g. patrol moving through a village;
3. Peacekeepers seek to prevent escalation or reoccurrence of conflict by parties agreeing to certain behaviour, e.g. patrol come across fighting between two villages;
4. Peacekeepers resolve disputes with or between parties or between local people, villages, communities (depending on the mandate); and
5. Peacekeepers meet among themselves, or with parties, the local authorities and/or community leaders to coordinate a specific event, e.g. a marriage or other traditional ceremony in a sensitive area, making arrangements for a vaccination campaign, coordinating the return of internally displaced persons (IDPs) or refugees or coordinating humanitarian relief distribution.

These scenarios outlined in Box 5.6 cover a wide range of purposes. One can see more procedural objectives, outlined in points 1 and 2. Point 1 links quite closely to movement through roadblocks, as well as negotiating humanitarian corridors and refugee returns (which was a recurring difficulty encountered in the UNPROFOR operation). Point 2 reflects to the civil-military aspects of a deployment, where the peacekeeping operation attempts to foster understanding of the roles, responsibilities and working relationship between the third party and host population. This is also true of point 5, which looks towards Quick Impact Projects, social events, as well as the more critical coordination tasks, such as the return of refugees. Points 3 and 4 offer a more

interesting insight into the perceived non-violent conflict resolution potential of military peacekeepers. Point 3 refers to obtaining agreement from local parties to avoid adopting the use force, effectively setting ground-rules for the intervention. Here, one could see local ceasefire arrangements, decommissioning of arms, and non-weapons zones being the main source of discussion. In terms of point 4, peacekeepers are invited to use negotiation skills to resolve disputes between parties, local people, villages and communities: effectively asking peacekeepers to use contact skills to assist negotiations between belligerent groups.

In order to achieve success in the range of negotiation scenarios, the SGTM follows a standard framework for negotiations (outlined in Box 5.7).

**Box 5.7: The structure of a negotiation (taken from SGTM 11: Communication and Negotiation)**

(UN, 2006g; 7)

The structure of Part II follows the three stages of negotiations, namely:

- 1: Introduction (start)
- 2: Substance (discussion)
- 3: Conclusion (end)

Any actual negotiation event/session will always have three stages, the introduction (start), the substantive negotiations (discussion) and the closing session (end).

Regardless whether it is an impromptu negotiation session, e.g. a dispute between two villages that you come across on a patrol (and thus have no prior warning for and no time for planning) or if this is a meeting that has been scheduled well in advance, approach the negotiation from the perspective that there is this three stages: (1) start, (2) discussion and (3) end.

In order to ensure effective negotiation, the SGTM asks peacekeepers to keep in mind three main areas. Firstly, peacekeepers understand their mandate and the role of the UN in the conflict: their own interests. In the peacekeeping context, the SGTM states 'your interests will derive from the missions mandate, the policies of your unit and the instructions you have received'. Secondly, peacekeepers understand the interests of other party/parties, and what they aim to achieve out of the negotiations. This requires a degree of preparation, as the SGTM suggests that peacekeepers study previous statements and actions, including recent changes to policy. Thirdly, peacekeepers 'understand the cultural/historical context' within which they work, and aim to avoid 'critical'

cultural mistakes. This is achieved by peacekeepers understanding what influences their interests (the mandate, policies and instructions), as well as to understand interests of the other parties to the negotiation, (the SGTM advises peacekeepers pay attention to 'identifying underlying interests, not their stated positions').

The SGTM also asks peacekeepers to understand different cultures that characterise the negotiation environment, and teaches one important aspect for all personnel to follow:

Show respect and do nothing to offend: The foundation of cross-cultural communication is respect. The golden rule is to do nothing that will offend the other culture. If you are professional, humble, friendly and respectful your chances of not offending anybody are very good... every culture has developed customs and tradition to regulate formal communications like negotiations and mediations.

(UN, 2006g; 8)

In some ways this can be linked to the interest-based negotiation approach of separating the people from the problem: taking time to understand the context of the communication and what is driving the interests of the other parties (discussed in the review of negotiation literature outlined above). It also, however, links closely to Avruch's analysis of culture in the negotiation context. As stated above, Avruch argued that culture is the 'lens' through which one sees negotiations, and needs to be treated as a critical component of any

negotiation (Avruch, 2000; 344). Seeing culture as a 'bolt-on' to a negotiation context is counterproductive; the UN's approach in the SGTM is to ensure that this does not occur.

As the previous chapter outlines, the SGTMs have been replaced by the new Core Pre-Deployment Training Materials. This new training regime has *not* incorporated a specific module on negotiation, although the new CPTMs offer an in-depth approach to training peacekeepers to work with diverse cultures in the operation.

The updated UN training materials subsumed the negotiation component of training a more broad range of principles. Thus, the CPTMs are more concerned with understanding *who* is being negotiated with, as opposed to the negotiation itself. As a result, the CPTMs offer a concerted effort to foster understandings of cultural differences between groups. This attempts to go further than traditional understandings of the obvious differences between military and civilian groups, by outlining thematic areas where differences may occur.


The closest that the CPTMs get to a specific module on negotiation is the unit entitled 'Working with Diversity'. The unit begins by stating that the peacekeeper's ability to 'maintain respectful relationships and communicate effectively' constitute key determinants as to how successful the operation will be. It adds that many of the peacekeepers' choices are influenced by 'being

aware of the diverse backgrounds and being sensitive to different ways of doing things' (UN, 2009i; 81-82). Following this, the CPTM asks that peacekeepers show a degree of reflexivity in order to increase chances of improving decision-making. Awareness of peacekeepers' own perspectives 'allows us to consider the possibility that there may be other ways of seeing a situation' (UN, 2009i; 89). Thus, from the outset, there is a concerted effort to both understand the 'other' culture(s), as well as being reflective about one's own culture.

In order to understand the impact of culture on communication, the CPTM offers a number of visual aids to explain the dynamics of culture. Figures 5.1 and 5.2 show these attempts to define the issue of culture to peacekeepers. Figure 5.1 provides various dimensions of diversity, uncovering the different layers of culture. Figure 5.2 shows an exercise given to trainees, where they are asked to write about the obvious and less obvious aspects of culture (the obvious is above the waterline and the less obvious is below the waterline).

**Figure 5.1: Dimensions of diversity**


(UN, 2009i; 83)



**Figure 5.2: Iceberg exercise**

(UN, 2009i; 89)

1. On a piece of flipchart paper, draw an outline of an iceberg with a wavy line near the top to indicate the waterline. Make sure you leave enough room to so that you can easily add words into the top and bottom of the iceberg.  
(See slide 9-11 for examples.)



Slide 9

Although relatively straightforward, these exercises introduce concepts for military peacekeepers to help them understand the complex cultural environment into which they are deploying, and also how their own cultures may affect it.

The CPTM also examines 'common differences' which may hamper effective communication during negotiations. This is a far more culturally aware method of approaching contact with the host population than the SGTMs, which offer a 'blueprint' of negotiations. The main areas of 'common difference' according to the CPTM are:

- Attitudes regarding authority and management
- Body language and gestures
- Religion
- Family and roles
- Dress Code
- Concepts of time

(UN, 2009i; 93-97)

Under each of these headings, the unit provides examples of where cultural differences lie. Like the exercises outlined above, the importance lies not in the depth of the topics. Instead the significance is in the intention to encourage military peacekeepers aware of the role of culture, and the considerable difference in cultural interpretations of regular activities. As Goodwin outlines in her assessment of the negotiation environment in Bosnia, 'a great deal of

damage could be done with very few words' (Goodwin, 2005; 175). The CPTM here illustrates the value attached to avoiding this.

As stated, the CPTMs do not contain an outright section on negotiation and mediation (unlike the SGTMs). However, discussions with DPKO officials indicate that negotiation will be within a set of Specialised Training Materials (STMs) for the military and police (Curran, 2009). Although, at the time of writing, the STMs are not publicly available, it is a positive step to understand that negotiation and mediation is still an integral part of military preparedness for peacekeeping operations. In addition, it could be argued that by focussing more on the 'human aspect' of interactions, as opposed to the 'processes' of the negotiation, that the CPTMs link to some of the key guidelines in Fisher *et al's* negotiation guide, *Getting to Yes*. One of the fundamental aspects of their *principled negotiation* process is an ability to understand the negotiating parties with: putting the people first. In Fisher *et al's* view, a working relationship based on 'trust, understanding, respect, and friendship' can make negotiations 'smoother and more efficient', and that relationships need to be based on accurate perceptions, clear communication, appropriate emotions, and a forward-looking, purposive outlook (Fisher et al., 1991; 19).

## ***Conclusions***

This chapter understands approaches to training negotiation for military peacekeepers who find themselves in the 'flashpoint' negotiation scenario. It offers an analysis of where the 'flashpoint negotiation' appears in the academic literature and practitioner experience, and uncovers four layers of negotiation

linked to Lederach's peacebuilding pyramid. Crucially, a *sub-tier* of 'tactical-level military negotiation' is uncovered. This provides a further analysis of factors influencing military peacekeepers at the lowest level, who make decisions which can affect the whole of the peacekeeping operation. Much of the research and study at this level examined *ad hoc* approaches, national characteristics, and, most importantly what skills peacekeepers *need*.

The review of existing literature establishes a context, as well as an identified set of needs for peacekeepers. The work of Goodwin and the RMAS *Broadsword Exercise* provides a solid observed example of how (to varying degrees of success) those needs are addressed. Much of Goodwin's work examines the needs of learners who end up becoming tactical level negotiators, and designing a curriculum to meet such needs. Moreover, the cadets at RMAS are given a safe environment in which to negotiate in contexts that are unfamiliar to them. This provides them with a greater ability to negotiate in difficult situations.

The UN's training modules offer a considered approach towards negotiation at the tactical level. Although it is not specifically outlined yet, it is an encouraging sign to understand that the UN is continuing to focus on negotiation and mediation for the military and police audiences, through the CPTMs. Coupled with an increasing amount of literature on working with diversity in a peacekeeping operation, there is much to look forward to in terms of UN training for tactical level military negotiation.

Linking this to the thesis questions<sup>99</sup>, the chapter further outlines a evidence of conflict resolution theory and practice in military training, and outlines a development of links since Fetherston's 1994 study on training. The literature survey of negotiation shows that, although it is relatively *ad hoc*, there is a considered attempt to understand negotiation contexts. The chapter again demonstrates that training military peacekeepers provides further evidence of conflict resolution theory and practice. This is illustrated in the shared awareness of the 'roadblock exercise' from both the military and conflict resolution community, as well as the interpretation the RMAS hostage negotiation through both the lens of Fisher *et al's* approach to principled negotiation, and solutions to the prisoners' dilemma. There is however a pertinent question remaining over tit-for-tat strategies when the use of violent force is used. If a military peacekeeper is under a restricted set of rules of engagement, or knows that through using tit-for-tat would mean more violence, then the strategy becomes considerably more difficult.

What does this particular chapter mean for the wider field of peacekeeping and conflict resolution? Peacekeepers continually find themselves in the dangerous situation of either pursuing the path of negotiation or resorting to the use of robust force. At the tactical level, there is no clear answer. Peacekeepers have resorted to either option in a number of examples. However, there is a need for

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<sup>99</sup> 1) In what ways does military peacekeeping training show evidence of conflict resolution theory and practice? (*In what direction has training for military peacekeeping developed since 1994?*) 2) In light of the new roles and responsibilities placed on military peacekeepers, is there evidence that training in non-traditional military skills assists military peacekeepers adapt to the changing nature of deployment zones? 3) Does this indicate evidence of a cosmopolitan conception of peacekeeping? (*Can we find evidence - both practically and in the peacekeeping literature - of the emergence of a different type of soldier more aligned with cosmopolitan ideals?*)

peacekeepers to add negotiation skills to their traditional toolbox of skills (inclusive of the traditional military tasks). The literature review of peacekeeping contexts offered numerous examples of where negotiation was a success, and it must still be seen as a useful alternative to deadly force. Like in civil-military cooperation, there is a developing requirement for military peacekeepers to expand their decision-making capacities, to deal with the dilemmas of when to use force, when to negotiate, when to end negotiations, and whether there is an appropriate time to employ the BATNA. The next chapter will discuss this in more detail, and outline where military practitioners and conflict resolution theorists show similar aspirations for future peacekeepers.

However the chapter raises an important note for concern. Related to the possible development in securitization of civil-military tasks, the development of more robust forms of peacekeeping may have a negative impact on the use of negotiation in peacekeeping contexts. Murphy's assessment of the qualities of Irish peacekeepers was that they have developed skills in peacekeeping because of the lack of heavy weaponry possessed by the Irish Defence forces. Therefore, one can speculate that if peacekeeping is to become more robust, there could be a real danger that 'force protection' will be the winner, instead of examining approaches for negotiation<sup>100</sup>. The finding in the previous chapter that militaries may return to 'securitisation' policies is pertinent here. This is a serious concern, particularly as much of the positive work designed to foster less violent approaches to potentially violent situations may be subservient to Rules of Engagement which place emphasis on robust use of force. It is

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<sup>100</sup> Force Protection will be examined in the following chapter.

therefore of critical importance that the 'non-traditional' aspects of PSO doctrine are highlighted, and given equal weight of importance in training programmes. Woodhouse's study of PSO doctrine, and the 'soft' aspects it incorporates offers a degree of insight here, as he highlights the critical role that conflict resolution techniques play in the doctrine as a whole.

As an aside, it is often asked whether such training is effective for peacekeeping operations. Although studies are yet to be conclusive in the military field, studies do exist in industry of the effects of increased negotiation training for personnel. Movius' analysis of negotiation training cites one of the few research studies undertaken on its impact. The study was undertaken with sixty-four graduate students at Columbia Teachers College taking a twenty-hour conflict resolution course over three weekends. Forty-two similar students who did not take the course served as a control group. Half of the participants in the group received 'multisource' feedback (from the participant, a friend, a supervisor, and a subordinate or colleague) before the course, and half after the course. Feedback was designed to 'tap' conflict-related feelings and behaviors. Movius describes the findings of the study as 'significant'. He adds

Four weeks after the first measurement, training participants reported feeling significantly fewer negative emotions in conflict situations, had a more positive view of conflict and reported a more constructive work climate after the training. Perhaps more significant, their *raters* (observers who knew the subjects well) reported that participants used

more “uniting” and “informing” behaviors in conflict situations than they had before the training.

(Movius, 2008; 523)

Moreover, the study showed that supervisors of the participants noted that more constructive outcomes to conflicts appeared when participants were involved. Although there is still much work to be done, it is again encouraging to see that such training bears fruit. It is with this in mind that this thesis strongly supports Goodwin’s claim that

When the ultimate goal is the desire to provide military practitioners with knowledge and skills in negotiation that might save lives, the impetus for pertinent training is evident.

(Goodwin, 2005; 141)

This thesis now focuses on wider discussions that arise from this chapter as well as work undertaken on civil-military relations training. Together, these two chapters on fieldwork observations both offer a solid understanding of how ‘soft’ aspects of peacekeeping operations are being trained for. In particular, the need to foster positive relations with civilian actors in a peacekeeping operation, and the need to quickly adapt to unpredictable negotiation contexts in the deployment zone. From this, the following chapter returns to the research questions, asking how exactly one sees the role of conflict resolution in military training. It further asks whether through such training we are seeing a development of the expectations of the ‘type’ of soldier which is being deployed

into post-conflict societies, and links this to cosmopolitan conceptions of military peacekeeping. An examination of future cosmopolitan compositions of military response to peacekeeping is then provided, taking into account current UN attempts and future proposals.

## Chapter 6.

### Conclusion: Reflections on cosmopolitan peacekeeping

As stated in previous chapters, this thesis examines where there exists further evolution of links between the fields of military peacekeeping and conflict resolution. This chapter brings together the project as a whole, by linking previous chapters to contemporary debates about peacekeeping operations. To serve as a reminder, the thesis is guided by the following research questions (supplementary questions are italicised):

- 1) In what ways does military peacekeeping training show evidence of conflict resolution theory and practice?
  - 1a) In what direction has training for military peacekeeping developed since 1994<sup>101</sup>?*
- 2) In light of the new roles and responsibilities placed on military peacekeepers, is there evidence that training in non-traditional military skills assists military peacekeepers adapt to the changing nature of deployment zones?
- 3) Does this indicate evidence of a cosmopolitan conception of peacekeeping?

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<sup>101</sup> This refers to Fetherston's 1994 project (entitled *Towards a theory of United Nations Peacekeeping*), examined the role of conflict resolution in training for peacekeeping.

*3a) Can we find evidence - both practically and in the peacekeeping literature - of the emergence of a different type of soldier more aligned with cosmopolitan ideals?*

After providing a summary of the thesis, this chapter investigates a number of broad conclusions that tie in the training of peacekeepers in conflict resolution skills to wider debates about the future role of peacekeeping, also paying attention to the emerging literature on cosmopolitan frameworks.

### ***The Chapters***

Chapter one sets the context for the thesis by offering a review of literature related to the links between peacekeeping and conflict resolution. After examining early attempts to conceptualise peacekeeping training (Gordenker and Weiss, 1991) (Moskos Jnr, 1976), the chapter examines Galtung's work on the role of peacekeepers, which offers an early interpretation of the role of military peacekeepers as conflict resolvers. This study highlights the difficult position which soldiers find themselves in when deployed, insofar that they require skills to facilitate closer relations with the local population, but soldiers also felt that they also needed heavier arms to deal with belligerent groups. This led Galtung to suggest that military peacekeepers are akin to 'armed police forces'. Moreover, Galtung notes that in order for peacekeeping operations to effectively make the link between negative and positive peace, the peacekeeping force is required to incorporate military skills (for peacekeeping), mediation techniques (for peacemaking) and civilian capacities to encourage a peacebuilding process (Galtung, 1976a). On a wider scale, Galtung looks at the

role of international peacekeeping in the framework of global conflict resolution. He critiques peacekeeping as an activity undertaken in the *periphery* areas, and not in the traditional centres of power. From this critique, Galtung argues that 'artificial walls' of state sovereignty need to be dismantled, and peacekeeping be used to remove both direct and structural forms of violence, with peacekeeping operations be like a 'one-way wall' permitting freedom fighters to expand liberated territory, 'but preventing the oppressors from getting in' (Galtung, 1976a). Importantly, this represents the first real attempt by conflict resolution theorists in charting the impact of peacekeeping operations on the field of conflict resolution.

Chapter 2 offers its main contribution through the development of the 'Bradford Model' of conflict resolution research. This has developed through the Centre for Conflict Resolution at the Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford. Work from within this centre links peacekeeping practice and policy to wider theoretical understandings of conflict resolution and offers a solid manifestation of links between the two fields. Key to this body of work is Fetherston's 1994 thesis on conflict resolution training for peacekeeping operations, where she advocated the incorporation of *contact skills*<sup>102</sup> into training for peacekeeping operations (Fetherston, 1994b). Linked to Fetherston's research on contact skills, early studies linked difficulties that peacekeepers were facing in operations to conflict resolution theory and practice, such as Fetherston, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse's paper examining

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<sup>102</sup> Fetherston's definition of contact skills: 'It is through the use of communication skills, methods of negotiation, facilitation, mediation, and conciliation that peacekeepers de-escalate potentially violent or manifestly violent situations and facilitate movement toward conflict resolution (Fetherston, 1994b; 219).

the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) from a conflict resolution perspective (Fetherston et al., 1994). Ramsbotham and Woodhouse offer a wide range of research which links conflict resolution research to peacekeeping operations and practice. Their book *Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution* compiles a range of articles written by practitioners and academics, which examine the existing links between the fields of peacekeeping and conflict resolution (Woodhouse and Ramsbotham, 2000).

The *Bradford model* is strengthened by PhD research carried out in the Centre for Conflict Resolution. Duffey's work on the impact of culture in peacekeeping operations advocates a wider role for culture specific training for military contingents participating in peacekeeping operations, which promotes 'indigenous conceptions of conflict and traditional methods of responding to conflict' (Duffey, 1998; 270). Hasegawa examines the role of the UN operation in Afghanistan (UNAMA) as a vehicle of empowerment and promotion of Human Security and makes the case for peacekeeping as a form of conflict resolution, arguing that peacekeeping is 'understood as a contributing factor in transforming conflict and a manifestation of the will to transform violent conflict into a peaceful situation' (Hasegawa, 2005; 27-28). Sola i Martin also looks at a particular operation (UN Mission in the Western Sahara) as an example of the wider implications for conflict resolution and uses a Foucauldian analysis of power/knowledge to assess peacekeeping operations in relation to power relations at a local and international level (Sola i Martin, 2004). Levy's thesis offers a valuable link between the practitioner and academic by examining the use of the Internet as a peacebuilding tool, offering practical examples of how

the internet has been used as a vehicle of change in the working practices of peacebuilding organisations (Levy, 2004).

The *Bradford Model* also develops a more critical approach, with Pugh suggesting that peacekeeping operations serve 'as forms of riot control directed against the unruly parts of the world to uphold the liberal peace' (Pugh, 2004; 41). Pugh's suggestions of an alternative framework include a route into more cosmopolitan assertions. He argues that future peacekeeping deployments will need to be separate from the 'state-centric control system', answerable to 'a more transparent, democratic and accountable institutional arrangement', and be based on a permanent military volunteer force 'recruited directly among individuals predisposed to cosmopolitan rather than patriotic values' (Pugh, 2004). The chapter takes this as a starting point for an analysis of cosmopolitan peacekeeping. In assessing policy changes, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse understand that cosmopolitan peacekeeping is linked to deeper reforms in the UN, the development of a rapid reaction force, and 'gender and culture aware policy and training'. From this, an assessment is made of current capacities for UN rapid reaction (Woodhouse and Ramsbotham, 2005). This chapter therefore adds a great deal to the existing literature on peacekeeping and conflict resolution, and also sets the stage for the thesis to examine civil-military cooperation, UN approaches, and the role of negotiation and other conflict resolution skills in making military peacekeepers more effective at their work.

Chapter two outlines developments in the UN since the publication of the 2000 Brahimi Report on peacekeeping operations. In doing this, the thesis offered an

up-to-date account of structural changes in the UN system, and how this has influenced the role of non-traditional training in peacekeeping operations. The UN still maintains its place as the leader in peacekeeping operations, with 101, 882 peacekeepers in the field, (86, 357 being military personnel) (DPKO, 2010), and also maintains a sense of legitimacy in the peacekeeping field, with a charter - according to Cheeseman and Elliot - which 'resounds in cosmopolitan values' (Cheeseman and Elliot, 2004; 278).

The chapter begins by noting where the Brahimi Report has had an impact on training practices for military peacekeepers. Most notably, recommendations on peacekeeping doctrine, and the use of robust force in an impartial manner, which pushed peacekeeping in a more robust direction. The Brahimi Report was also critical of the level of well equipped, well trained soldiers which the UN had at its disposal, and recommended that troop contributors, at the very least should 'have been trained and equipped according to a common standard'. Assisting these reforms would be a further drive in the UN to develop common training standards for troop contributors (UN, 2000c; 19). Much of this was informed by the disastrous performance of UN peacekeepers in Sierra Leone in the summer of 2000. On top of the need to change the structures of training in the UN system, the Brahimi Panel strongly advocated an increase in training for human rights, gender, and cultural awareness (UN, 2000c; 45-46).

Linked to this is an increased institutionalisation of peacebuilding in UN. This has been due to two main processes. Firstly, in the creation of the Peacebuilding Commission at the UN headquarters (alongside peacebuilding

missions in Burundi and Sierra Leone), which has led to peacekeepers being mandated to facilitate the change from a more militarised *peacekeeping* operation into a more civilian led *peacebuilding* operation. Secondly, through the 'integrated mission concept', which aims to develop a 'system-wide response' to crisis management and peacekeeping operations, based on shared priorities and common strategic plans. This integration process has encouraged the process of civil-military cooperation, which has in turn had an impact on the training and preparedness of military peacekeepers (UN, 2006a).

Alongside the changes in the UN, the thesis outlines the development of the UN's three cross-cutting resolutions - children and armed conflict, women and peace and security, and protection of civilians in armed conflict - with particular focus on references to training for peacekeepers. Importantly, training and preparedness is mentioned in all three thematic areas (UN, 1999e, UN, 1999f, UN, 2000f). In addition to these three cross-cutting themes, the UN has added to nearly all of its peacekeeping mandates an increased focus on training as a method to prevent sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) by peacekeepers in the field.

These thematic changes have gone hand in hand with structural changes within the UN headquarters. The 'aggressive reform' agenda set out in the DPKO since the publication of the Brahimi Report led to the splitting of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations into two separate departments: the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Support (UN, 2007b; 24). Within this new structure (and placed directly between the two new

departments) is the 'Policy, Evaluation and Training Division', of which the Integrated Training Service is a part.

The thesis finds that, significantly, the Integrated Training Service's training needs assessment uncovers a considerable need amongst military peacekeepers for further training of non-traditional skills (UN, 2008a). For example, when asked to respond to the statement 'Training on this topic is a top priority for my job', a wide range of conflict resolution techniques and approaches appear in the list<sup>103</sup>. This shows a considerable desire amongst military peacekeepers for an increase in what Fetherston outlined as 'contact skills'. Yet at the same time, the survey found that the existing training structure in the UN does not appear to meet those needs.

Leading from the training analysis, the chapter follows the introduction of two key documents, whose importance will grow in the coming years. Firstly, the Core Pre-Deployment Training Materials (CPTMs) which were introduced in 2009 to replace the Standard Generic Training Modules (SGTMs) (UN, 2009b). The second key document is the *United Nations Principles and Guidelines*, which is the nearest the UN has to doctrinal guidance to its peacekeeping operations. Importantly, the chapter outlines problematic areas in the *Principles and Guidelines*, such as the 'blurred areas' between peacekeeping, robust peacekeeping, and peace enforcement (where different rules of engagement apply), and also the need for operations to seriously consider the peacebuilding needs of the operation. As well as this, the chapter outlines where the

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<sup>103</sup> Responses include: 'conflict resolution skills', 'team building', 'cross-cultural communication skills', 'different cultural norms of mission staff and host country customs', and 'negotiation skills'.

Principles and Guidelines prescribe for an increase in communication skills for peacekeeping forces (UN, 2008c; 32).

Finally, the chapter examines how the UN is responding to current challenges and preparing itself (at a strategic level) to respond to future challenges. This comes in the form of the *New Horizons* paper, which draws together the Security Council, UN Secretariat, and Member States. Although this paper is aimed at the strategic level, it has an impact on the training of military peacekeepers in the fields of peacebuilding, the protection of civilians, and robust peacekeeping (UN, 2009a).

This chapter adds to the literature through offering an up-to-date survey of UN practices. These include an institutional co-option of peacebuilding strategies developing alongside robust approaches to military peacekeeping, backed up by mandates focused on civilian protection. With these developments in mind, it becomes apparent where the policy community recognises a need for soldiers to expand on their knowledge of conflict resolution skills, and also their understanding of 'blurred areas' when deployed. It also highlights the most recent survey of UN peacekeepers in the field - in which there was a need identified for further training in conflict resolution-related skills. On a more theoretical level, the chapter raises the question of whether the UN continues to align itself with what Rubenstein identified as 'root metaphors' - symbols that the organisation possesses to maintain its legitimacy. Rubenstein's contention is that the UN, through its actions in peacekeeping operations since the 1990s, has lost a degree of legitimacy (Rubenstein, 2005). This chapter debates this,

and argues that whilst it may not be so fully aligned with the original root metaphors that Rubenstein outlines, it possesses - through cross-cutting resolutions and commitment to peacebuilding, linked to a largely cosmopolitan charter - a degree of legitimacy not found with other organisations.

Chapter three examines civil-military cooperation, and engages with assumptions that peacekeeping operations are akin to the 'riot police' of the liberal global order (Richmond, 2005, Pugh, 2004). Whilst not being overtly optimistic about the current state of affairs, it asserts that through increased interaction with civilian agencies, the militaries studied are opening themselves up to the civilian roles in conflict resolution efforts (Sandhurst, 2008a). From the conflict resolution literature, the civil-military aspects of a deployment can play an important role and can be linked to Lederach's comprehensive approach, in which third party interveners must 'actively envision, include, respect, and promote the human and cultural resources from within a given setting' (Lederach, 1995; 213). From the cosmopolitan peacekeeping literature, Kaldor argues that effective responses to what she terms as 'new wars' have to be based on 'alliance between international organisations and local advocates of cosmopolitanism' (Kaldor, 2001; 122). Elliot makes a similar point by suggesting that that local groups need to be supported, and that their advice, proposals and recommendations need to be taken seriously (Elliot, 2004; 25). The chapter highlighted a UNIDIR study that found that in operations which were deemed as a 'success' in the eyes of the UN, the majority of respondents felt that the relationship between the military and civilian components was 'very good'.

However, in operations which struggled to find success, the vast majority of respondents felt the relationship to be inadequate (Gamba, 1998; 7).

In terms of defining civil-military cooperation, the chapter outlines the number of different policy documents and doctrines (Rollins, 2001, EU, 2002, JDDC, 2003, DPKO, 2002, IASC, 2004). The chapter is thus able to outline important difficulties in understanding what civil-military cooperation is and who has control of the process. The chapter then analyses where the civil-military relationship occurs and why coordination is sometimes necessary, if also problematic. This takes into account the desire of operations to link military, political, humanitarian, security, socio-economic and legal issues (Spence, 2002). The chapter surveys where conflicts in this relationship are noted in the academic and practitioner texts (TCP, 2002, Gamba, 1998, Byman, 2001, Slim, 1996, Pugh, 2000).

The chapter then examines the main differences which lie between military and civilian organisations. The first main area is the clash of organisational cultures, where operations have been hamstrung by 'ill informed' stereotypes of each organisation by the other (Duffey, 2000a; 149), often informed by deep rooted suspicions about the others occupation and motives (Gamba, 1998). This situation is not improved by the number of nationalities, contingents and organisations in an operation (Pouligny, 2006, Rubinstein et al., 2008). The second main area is the constant danger of the mission losing consent, heightened in the post-Brahimi context, where even the UN recognises that consent is not a constant feature of deployments. The integrated missions

concept is further considered here (Eide et al., 2005, Gordon, 2007, Jennings and Kaspersen, 2008b, Doss, 2008)

This chapter offers a significant contribution to the literature by illustrating how observers understand the impact of peacekeeping operations on the civilian population. This is of crucial importance for effective civil-military cooperation strategies. Much of the progress made in this important area has been learned by the mistakes of the past. The most notable example of this is the changes in training for peacekeeping through the very serious allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) by UN peacekeepers. Although allegations have been documented in the past, (Whitworth, 2004), the 2001 allegations challenged were of a serious enough nature to see that the UN change its training strategies, amend peacekeeping mandates, and pursue a zero level of tolerance (UN, 2003c, UN, 2004c, UN, 2005a; 9). The chapter goes on to examine local perceptions of the mission, another key determinant in the effectiveness of civil-military cooperation. Both Pouligny and Ammitzobel note the effectiveness of an operation in relation to the expectations of the civilian population in the deployment zone and notes how there exists a critical gap between expectation and reality. This is linked to the conflict resolution literature, in particular Galtung's comparison of 'good deeds' undertaken by the UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) and the UN Emergency Force (UNEF) in the Middle East (Galtung, 1976b).

The chapter further focuses on the varying degrees to which military peacekeepers understand the cultural dynamics of the local population. In its

worst manifestation, this leads to violence against civilians from peacekeepers poorly trained and prepared for the environment into which they are deployed (LaRose-Edwards et al., 1997). A great deal of research has thus been carried out examining what needs to be learned by military peacekeepers when deployed into civilian environments, and the need to develop cultural specific training for military peacekeepers (Rubinstein, 2005; 527). Duffey is of critical importance here. Her work examined the role of culture, and the substantial effect this has had on operations (Duffey, 2000b). A number of practitioners have also offered studies that have examined the benefits of cultural-specific training and cultural awareness in operations (Bosman et al., 2008, Soeters et al., 2004). Finally, we see a developing trend in the UN through the commissioning of a number of public opinion surveys of its operations (UNDPKO, 2005b, UNDPKO, 2006b, UNDPKO, 2006a).

With these two forms of civil-military cooperation in mind (military-NGO / military – civilian), the chapter examines where academic and policy communities cite training of non-traditional skills as a positive way of addressing difficulties. In terms of military-NGO relations, joint training has been advocated as a positive step to increase understanding of roles and responsibilities (Project, 2005; 121, OIOS, 2007; 6, Eide et al., 2005, JDDC, 2004; 3-10). With regard to training military peacekeepers to understand the complexities of establishing positive relations with the local population, the chapter summarises UN resolutions to deal with allegations of SEA which seeks to prevent further abuses, as well as train peacekeepers on how to ‘prevent, recognise and respond’ to sexual violence against civilians (UN, 2008f, Williams, 1998). A number of authors also

commented that in order to better address cultural awareness in conflict zones, training of non-traditional skills is essential (Williams, 1998, Duffey, 2000b, LaRose-Edwards et al., 1997, TCP, 2002).

This chapter is central to the thesis as it seeks to establish links between the practice of civil-military coordination and conflict resolution theory and skills. Theoretically, it links to both the cosmopolitan literature but also to the conflict resolution theory of pursuit of sustainable pathways to positive peace. Although there is by no means perfection in the pursuit of civil-military relations, there is room to speculate where links can be built. On a more tactical level, there is definitely critique from the conflict resolution field, as well as recommendations for the development of *contact skills* to deal effectively with both the NGO community as well as local civilians in the deployment zone.

Chapter four takes this literature on civil-military cooperation as a springboard for the first of two fieldwork chapters. This chapter used observations to examine *how* training for civil-military cooperation involves skills drawn from the non-traditional toolbox. To begin, it addressed Lederach's approach to prescriptive and elicitive forms of training, and highlighted the importance of elicitive approaches towards training for conflict resolution roles with emphasis placed on the participants' knowledge of conflict and its resolution (Lederach, 1996).

The chapter firstly examines training to enhance processes of *coordination* between military and civilian actors in the conflict zone. It first highlighted

observations at the visit to a civil-military cooperation course at UN Training School Ireland (UNTSI), where sessions were held to teach officers in the nuances of CIMIC meetings (UNTSI, 2007c). The UNTSI observation also highlighted *Exercise Quick Fix*, a small training exercise where soldiers were asked to make a village assessment based on a descriptive account of a fictitious village. This both gave the soldiers an opportunity to discuss issues of coordination, and opened the soldiers up to a form of training more akin to an elicitive approach (UNTSI, 2007e). The chapter then analyses the SGTM (which had considerably more restrictive view of civil military coordination), and CPTM, (which offer a broader range of activities related to wider peacebuilding functions) (UN, 2009d; 55, UN, 2009g; 96-97).

In terms of fostering better working relations between civilian and military organisations, interviews conducted at the UN DPKO and NATO highlighted the need for *contact skills* to be incorporated into training to help stem the organisational culture clashes that are apparent in operations (NATO, 2008). In this light, the UN's CPTM attempt to foster understanding about the impact the military actions have on humanitarian principles, and asks for sensitivity in any interactions (UN, 2009g).

Significant observations were made at the RMAS *Broadsword* Exercise in relation to training the military to foster positive relations with the local population. A number of examples were offered in the *Broadsword* observation, including the running of a 'CIMIC house', debrief sessions where cadets are taught the value of fostering positive relations with civilians, and the overall

context being shaped by a local civilian population who very much view the military with suspicion and, in some cases, hostility (Sandhurst, 2007).

The chapter further examines UN training designed to encourage peacekeepers to understand the complex dynamics of a post conflict environment (UN, 2009h). This incorporates combating SEA from peacekeepers, and addressing aspects of gender based violence (GBV) in conflict zones. In particular, it notes attempts made at UNTSI, which contains a briefing on how GBV has implications on international law, and the dynamics of the deployment zone, before examining approaches to prevent it.

Thus, the chapter notes a number of ways in which non-traditional training is being used to enhance civil military cooperation. In many ways, the skills from the conflict resolution field have been incorporated at the tactical level to enhance chances for building successful relations with the local population. Additionally, there is evidence to suggest that the 'larger picture' is being understood, where effective civil military cooperation may be more than 'fire fighting' and more akin to being a starting point towards progressive peacebuilding strategies. The chapter also outlines the importance of elicitive methods of training in terms of helping soldiers understand and reflect on their roles, and the impact that they have on the deployment zone. However, it warns about the possible emergence of a level of 'securitisation' within civil-military cooperation, as opposed to using civil-military cooperation. This may lead militaries to develop civil-military cooperation policies related to stabilisation over peacebuilding. This is an important finding as it may suggest a divergence


between militaries in their civil-military cooperation policies, whereas on one hand there is the UN policy of promoting sustainable peacebuilding, and the other is the NATO influenced idea of using civil-military cooperation techniques to promote stabilisation over a sustainable peace.

Chapter five further adds to the literature by providing an up-to-date account of negotiation training. The chapter examines how the need to negotiate in peacekeeping environments was recognised both by the military and the conflict resolution community at a similar time – the UN's deployment in Bosnia (in the UN Protection Force/UNPROFOR). UK soldiers began to see the value in negotiating ceasefire arrangements and access for humanitarian delivery, but also recognised the costs of not pursuing negotiations and using force. Much of the negotiation came at checkpoints, where small militias would often block humanitarian aid convoys for a number of hours, whilst they negotiated with UNPROFOR soldiers accompanying the delivery (Goodwin, 2005; 173). Commanders who wrote of their experience of this noted different tactics used, whether it was establishing a network of liaison officers (Stewart, 1993), or through the threat of force (Rose, 1999b). Doctrinally, there was the development of the UK's *Wider Peacekeeping* doctrine which for the first time spoke extensively of the need to negotiate and use consent promoting strategies (MOD, 1995). The chapter further notes that the growing importance of negotiation in such contexts was also recognised by the conflict resolution community, where scholars began to note the 'soft' and 'hard' power approaches required for peacekeepers negotiating at the tactical level, and the growing requirement for *contact skills* to effectively deal with the scenarios

(Fetherston et al., 1994). Conflict resolution training also began to take note of the roadblock scenario, with the Bradford Centre for Conflict Resolution running a 'roadblock exercise' based on the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Lewer and Reynolds, 2002). Thus, a manifestation of the links between the military and conflict resolution fields is identified.

In order to further define the location of such negotiation contexts, Chapter five uses Lederach's Peacebuilding Pyramid, (Lederach, 1997; 37-38). In the amended pyramid (outlined in Box 6.1 below), a new fourth layer is added: 'flashpoint negotiation'. Such negotiation contexts are unorganised, have little formality and are often undertaken at the lowest level. A typical scenario of such a 'flashpoint negotiation' would be at a roadblock. This - as the chapter explains - further reinforces Fisher and Keashly's approaches to a contingency model, with peacekeeping interventions requiring a need to control violence, and also facilitate a move towards peacebuilding (Fisher, 1993, Fisher and Keashly, 1991). Fetherston builds on this, by outlining the importance of peacekeepers in 'preparing the groundwork for later, more concerted and direct efforts' for peacebuilding efforts (Fetherston, 1994a). Being able to effectively negotiate within a 'flashpoint scenario' facilitates this.

**Box 6.1: The Amended Peacebuilding Pyramid**



With this in mind, the chapter offers a literature review of the journal *International Peacekeeping* (between 1997 and 2001 inclusive) and charts where negotiation has been examined, and how it links to the amended pyramid. Negotiation contexts are picked up at all levels in the pyramid (as would be expected). However, at the tactical level, one can see that there are a great deal of *ad hoc* initiatives and accounts, yet a gap in the literature can be identified, because very little is written about *how* negotiation is taught to military peacekeepers. The wider negotiation literature was also appraised, including Fisher *et al's* approach to interests-based negotiation found in their work *Getting to Yes* (Fisher et al., 1991).

Negotiation at the 'tactical level' takes much from Goodwin's thesis on military negotiation and the development of the 'soldier diplomat'. In this account, Goodwin argues that soldiers have to negotiate effectively under 'duress, physical threat, and armed intervention' (Goodwin, 2005). Thus Goodwin seeks

to outline the particular negotiating circumstances that military peacekeepers find themselves in, and the effects that circumstances can have on soldiers. Her work then explains the type of learners which the RMAS encounters, and how negotiation training has been adapted for this particular audience.

With this background, chapter five offers an observation of a tactical level negotiation context at the RMAS *Broadsword* Exercise. In this exercise, a soldier negotiates with an armed hostage-taker and successfully manages to free the hostage without any further bloodshed (Sandhurst, 2007). Linking this to the conflict resolution literature, the chapter examines the negotiation through Goodwin's amended principled negotiation model, and the uses the prisoner's dilemma as a larger-scale framework to place the negotiation within.

Developments in UN training were further scrutinised, in particular the SGTM entitled *Communication and Negotiation*, which is designed to ensure that military peacekeepers understand where and when they will need to use their negotiation skills, and how this differs from the traditional duties that they carry out in military operations. However, more recent developments in the UN has led to the CPTM to focus on negotiation in conjunction with other issues. However, there is a great deal of focus on the role that culture plays in the day-to-day interactions of a peacekeeping operation (UN, 2009i).

Thus, this chapter provides a significant contribution through examining negotiation at the lowest level in peacekeeping deployments, how it has been conceptualised, how conflict resolution skills have been used to enhance

tactical level negotiations and how the conflict resolution field helps to understand the role they play in a possible wider resolution process. It also provides further evidence of the links between military peacekeeping and conflict resolution, and how conflict resolution theory and practice can possibly influence military soldiers to approach potentially violent situations with a wider range of options than the traditional use of force.

### ***Towards cosmopolitan peacekeeping?***

From this study, a number of important conclusions can be made. By relating the conclusions back to the guiding questions of the research, we can see three distinct themes:

- 1) There is evidence to suggest that conflict resolution theory and practice is incorporated into training programmes for military peacekeepers. This has developed significantly since 1994.
- 2) There exists sufficient evidence to suggest that training in non-traditional military skills assists military peacekeepers in adapting to new roles and responsibilities encountered in deployment zones
- 3) There exists a strong suggestion - in both the literature and through fieldwork examples - that there is evidence of an emerging cosmopolitan conception of peacekeeping.

The rest of the chapter will be devoted to explaining these considerations.

The development of conflict resolution within training programmes for military peacekeepers can be observed at a number of levels. At the level of tactical negotiation, Chapter five illustrates the most overt use of *contact skills* by soldiers who are training for peacekeeping operations. By doing so, it highlights the significant development of negotiation training in the military. Doctrine has developed to meet the needs of negotiation training, with *Wider Peacekeeping* incorporating conflict resolution techniques into military peacekeeping and taking heed of the importance of obtaining consent from the host population. Training programmes have followed this practice, and encourage soldiers to be aware of the negotiation process, as well as the wider impacts of employing or *not* employing negotiation techniques when faced with potentially violent situations. It is also noteworthy that RMAS programmes incorporate a specialist academic (Deborah Goodwin, whose work is cited throughout this thesis) in negotiation practice, which highlights the degree to which negotiation training is intrinsic to RMAS teaching. *Operation Broadsword* also provides a solid example of other developments in training. For example, it asks soldiers to use minimum force when necessary, to understand the impacts of their posture on the host community, and to establish positive community relations as part of wider civil-military strategies. Furthermore, training at both RMAS and UNTSI are greatly informed by contemporary deployments.

From a wider perspective, Chapter two outlined how, since 2000, there has been an attempt in the UN to integrate peacebuilding into peacekeeping operations. Although the guiding principles of these processes are not without criticism, this represents a noteworthy development in UN practices. The

recently developed integrated mission concept provides the link between strategies outlined in the Security Council and operations on the ground. This is aligned to a host of civil-military cooperation strategies, which (to varying degrees) ask military peacekeepers to establish strong relations with the civilian components of the operation and with the wider civilian population in the deployment zone (outlined in Chapter three). The UNTSI observation in Chapter four significantly demonstrates the nuances of civil-military cooperation, including CIMIC meetings, assessments, and liaison with NGOs and civilian bodies. Although the need for cooperation was apparent when Fetherston's thesis was published, there was, at the time, an absence of any coherent response. The situation now, as outlined in the observations, shows that there has been a significant development in incorporating conflict resolution skills into training through civil-military cooperation.

Furthermore, structural changes within the UN point to a considerable re-organisation in their training mechanisms. With the replacement of the SGTMs by the CPTMs and the newly formed Integrated Training Unit, there is now a serious effort to support training capacities for peacekeeping deployments. This support capacity is required as UN mandates now refer to cross-cutting themes which ask deployed peacekeepers to be aware of a broad range of issues.

There are two further developments which are also of note: the development of training institutions, and the use of Internet technology to train military peacekeepers. These developments will now be explored. The development and spread of international peacekeeping training centres also marks out the

deepening of the culture and practice of training for military peacekeeping, and the international norms that guide it. Training centres, such as UNTSI, provide a valuable space for military practitioners and civilian staff to train peacekeeping personnel in non-traditional skills. The burgeoning number of centres around the globe comes under the umbrella organisation, the *International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centres* (IAPTC). Since its foundation in 1995, the IAPTC has held fifteen annual conferences and has a membership of 102 member institutions (these can be found in Annex 2). The organisation describes itself as being a forum for training personnel for discussions relating to training 'without their having to deal with national interests (and sometimes restrictions)'(IAPTC, 2009).

As part of this research, the IAPTC Annual Conference 2007 was attended at the Folke Bernadotte Academy, Stockholm. This provided the opportunity to gain an understanding of how the organisation works, and to observe how the conference acts as a facilitator for military training institutions to share ideas, best practices, and challenges. The 2007 conference was notable for a larger civilian and police attendance, reflecting the widening of IAPTC membership and the multifunctional nature of current operations (Alberoth, 2007; 5). Moreover the conference split participants into three broad groups (functional committees): military; police; and civilians. The military group recommendation was an increase in joint training mechanisms – something that has been seen in the creation of the UN CPTMs (as discussed in Chapter 3). Since the 2007 conference, the IAPTC has held two more conferences (in Sydney and Abuja), reflecting the growing trend for information sharing across national boundaries,

as well as opening up opportunities for joint training amongst nationalities and professions. Such joint training ventures have been outlined as being cosmopolitan in nature. Bergman outlines cooperation between Nordic countries (Finland, Sweden, Denmark, Norway) through the NORDCAPS model as being a framework 'in which the Nordic states' joint commitment to international peace can be furthered' (Bergman, 2004; 175). From this example, it is evident that there exists potential for the IAPTC to be aligned with cosmopolitan values. Training centres are encouraged to cooperate with each other and non-military peacekeepers (police and civilian staff), and to work to UN standards and policies, without recourse to national politics and interests.

The Internet is also playing an increasingly important role in communicating new forms of training to a wider range of military peacekeepers. As Ramsbotham *et al* state, the field of conflict resolution is being affected by the impact of Information Communication Technology (ICT) in such a way 'that traditional distinctions between national, international and local levels of activity are being eroded and the basis for a global partnership for peacebuilding is being constructed' (Ramsbotham et al., 2005; 330). This builds on work (referred to in Chapter one) carried out by the Centre for Conflict Resolution on the role of the Internet as a peacebuilding tool (Reynolds and Wessels, 2001, Levy, 2004). Alongside this research project, the Centre for Conflict Resolution has developed an e-learning course in peacekeeping and conflict resolution. Much of this is based on an existing course authored by Professor Tom Woodhouse, run through the Peace Operations Training Institute (POTI).

Here, it is important to look at the work of POTI, which started in 1995 under the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR). The organisation was created to provide self-paced training courses on different aspects of UN peacekeeping. More recently, POTI has separated from UNITAR, and updated its courses from correspondence to the e-learning platform. The organisation still maintains the UN's seal of approval for online training. This was most recently outlined in the UN's *Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations* 2010 report, which welcomed 'the free and multilingual delivery of peacekeeping distance learning through the E-learning'. The mission statement of the organisation links to the assertion from Ramsbotham *et al* about ICT eroding national and international boundaries:

The Peace Operations Training Institute is dedicated to providing globally accessible and affordable distance-learning courses on peace support, humanitarian relief, and security operations to men and women working to promote peace worldwide.

(POTI, 2010b)

The Institute has grown at an exceptional rate since beginning. In 1998, there were 1,500 students enrolled from fifty-six nations (Kidwell and Langholtz, 1998; 97). Now, POTI trains a considerably higher number, with all military, police and gendarmerie personnel from African, Latin American and Caribbean nations able to enrol free, under the ELAP (E-Learning for African Peacekeepers) and ELPLAC (E-learning for Peacekeepers from Latin America and the Caribbean) programmes. According to the Institute, since the ELAP

programme was launched in 2006, over 200,000 African peacekeepers have been enrolled (POTI, 2010a). The list of courses available for the ELAP is listed below.

**Box 6.2: Peace Operations Training Institute Available Courses (in English)**

(POTI, 2010a)

- An Introduction to the UN System: Orientation for Serving on a UN Field Mission
- Civil-Military Coordination (CIMIC)
- Commanding United Nations Peacekeeping Operations
- The Conduct of Humanitarian Relief Operations: Principles of Intervention and Management
- Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR): Principles of Intervention and Management in Peacekeeping Operations
- Ethics in Peacekeeping
- Gender Perspectives in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations
- Global Terrorism
- The History of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations During the Cold War: 1945 to 1987
- The History of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Following the Cold War: 1988 to 1996
- The History of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations from Retrenchment to Resurgence: 1997 to 2006
- International Humanitarian Law and the Law of Armed Conflict
- Logistical Support to United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: An Introduction
- Operational Logistical Support of UN Peacekeeping Missions: Intermediate Logistics Course
- Advanced Topics in United Nations Logistics: The Provision of Troops and Contingent-Owned Equipment (COE) and the Method for Reimbursement
- Mine Action: Humanitarian Impact, Technical Aspects, and Global Initiatives
- Peacekeeping and International Conflict Resolution
- Peacekeeping in Yugoslavia: Dayton-Kosovo
- Preventing Violence Against Women and Gender Inequality in Peacekeeping
- Principles for the Conduct of Peace Support Operations (PSO)
- Security Measures for United Nations Peacekeepers
- United Nations Military Observers: Methods and Techniques for Serving on UN Observer Mission
- United Nations Police: Restoring Civil Order Following Hostilities

The growth of the Peace Operations Training Institute and IAPTC are two further examples of training in non-traditional tasks for military peacekeepers being extended since the mid-1990s.

Thus there is evidence of conflict resolution theory and practice integrated into training programmes for military peacekeepers. The literature review in Chapter one forms this view from the conflict resolution standpoint, and the survey of UN policy and civil-military cooperation illustrate this from policy and practitioner perspectives. The fieldwork observations provide a unique account of where training programmes link the two fields in the training environment. This thesis therefore notes how skills drawn from the conflict resolution field assist military peacekeepers to comprehend the complex nature of peacekeeping and peacebuilding tasks. Leading from this increased understanding, training programmes provide military peacekeepers with adequate tools to respond to particular problems. Possessing both the skills to be aware of the environment and the tools to work in a non-violent manner gives military peacekeepers a higher chance of success.

In examining *how* skills are imparted to military peacekeepers, the thesis observes that there are aspects of non-traditional training which lend themselves to what Lederach termed as *elicitive* approaches, which focus on discovering 'what people already have in place and already know about the strengths and weaknesses of their own models of conflict resolution' (Lederach, 1996). Elicitive approaches are noted in training at UNTSI (in discussion groups asking soldiers for their understanding of the particular challenges in a fictitious village), debriefing sessions at *Broadsword* (after the CIMIC house had been attacked by an unruly mob), as well as being advocated by the UN's CPTMs. The impact of an elicitive approach may be hamstrung in military structures, due to the top-down nature of training and decision-making in military organisations.

However, where the 'grey areas' of peacekeeping operations are concerned, trainers see a greater value in asking soldiers and cadets to discuss issues, come to a considered opinion, and to avoid acting purely on military instinct. This is an important observation, as it suggests recognition from within the military that standard military thinking is inadequate for the problematic dimension of peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations. When discussing the development of the 'strategic corporal', it should be noted that much of the basis of the change in mindset for soldiers is toward a more elicitive approach to training, and self-aware understanding of conflict situations.

Training in the military also offers some long-term prospects for an increased indoctrination of conflict resolution skills for the military. The hierarchical structure of the military organisation allows those with operational experience to 'rise to the top' as it were. This is clearly seen in the UK military after the UNPROFOR experience, where soldiers who served in the UNPROFOR operation moved up through the ranks and were able to espouse more peacekeeping skills, such as negotiation. This was one reason outlined during the *Broadsword* observation for there being an increased acceptance of negotiation training for officer cadets (Sandhurst, 2008c). The hierarchical structures will allow this to continue, and it is through an increased knowledge of conflict resolution skills that peacekeepers will be able to benefit in the short term, but this also opens up a real possibility for change in the long term.

With regard to training and civil-military cooperation, an interesting and important debate is developing amongst those who see the activity as one of

preparing the ground for peacebuilding, and those who see CIMIC as a purely 'hearts and minds' approach, designed to secure the local environment and meet the 'commanders intent'. To take the first approach, there are examples of training programmes aligned with Stephen Ryan's assertion that military peacekeeping is essential in the early stages of the peacebuilding enterprise, and that there is a recognised need for the military to work closely with non-military components (Ryan, 2000; 40). Current UN doctrine for civil-military cooperation, which is about coordinating effective responses based on the needs of the local community and civilian representation, reflects this. Observations at UNTSI (such as *Exercise Quick Fix*) also outline where of civil-military cooperation training emphasises the role of civil-military cooperation as a role of engagement with the civilian community.

Referring to the second approach, examples exist which suggests that civil-military cooperation may be more overtly used for securitisation or even stabilisation. Aspects of the *Broadsword* exercise placed emphasis on the securitization of the village. The rationale behind establishing relations with the local community reinforced this view. Moreover, doctrine from NATO and UK suggests that there is a degree to which civil-military coordination is linked strongly into the military objectives of the operation, and not the people that the mission serves. Although not as evident in the UNTSI example and UN CPTMs, this thesis suggests that civil-military cooperation skills can be used to more political ends: more-so if that operation is not mandated by the UN, lacks impartiality in its actions, and lacks consent from the host population.

At this point, it is important to reflect on the contribution played by the more critical end of the conflict resolution spectrum. This provides a number of important critiques including highlighting unintended consequences of deployments, the inherent economic impacts of the operation, and the normative foundations of interventions and their peacebuilding legacy (Pouligny, 2006). Chapter three engaged with critiques of peacekeeping, which suggest that operations are closely linked with neo-liberal values and stabilisation projects. In order for peacekeeping operations to effectively respond to such critiques and not become the 'riot police' of an international order, developments in civil-military cooperation need to take into account the real needs of the population in the areas into which they are deployed. There are signs of this being recognised through training, where the UN CPTMs ask for continued consultation with a much wider sector of society as opposed to those who have gained power through the show of force. Though those from the critical theory background may be far more robust in their criticism of UN peacekeeping, what it represents, and the normative foundations which it is built on, does not mean that those in the policy field deem it as a critique without recommendation.

Furthermore, as a response to more critical conceptions of peacekeepers merely being the 'riot police' of a global order, an emerging body of theory suggests that military peacekeepers could assist in the emergence of pluralist offshoots of alternative power. Through linking contemporary thinking on the development of cosmopolitan forms of peacekeeping, there may emerge a form of peacekeeping synonymous with Galtung's concept of protection of freedom

fighters, as outlined in Chapter one. In his critique of peacekeeping operations, Michael Pugh concludes by offering a future policy consideration that there could exist a need for 'a permanent military volunteer force recruited directly among individuals predisposed to cosmopolitan rather than patriotic values'. This force, in Pugh's words, would be likely to be:

increasingly subtle and flexible in responding to crisis, with expert teams, similar to disaster relief specialists, providing preventive action, economic aid and civilian protection.

(Pugh, 2004; 54)

This would be achieved through releasing such forces from 'state-centric control' and making them answerable to a 'more transparent, democratic and accountable institutional arrangement' (Pugh, 2004; 54). Rubenstein, whose 'root metaphors' of the UN were discussed in Chapter two, has referred to such an institutional arrangement. He argues that peacekeeping was once seen as a 'military without weapons in the service of peace', to reinforce an image of an international community 'acting in a neutral, consensual manner to sustain a stable world economy' (Rubenstein, 2005; 356-357). Although Rubenstein now questions whether this root metaphor is still present in UN operations, it is the view of the thesis that due to cross-cutting Security Council mandates pertaining to the protection of civilians, children and armed conflict, and women and peace and security, as well as an increase in the focus on the peacebuilding functions of an operation, that the UN maintains its legitimacy, even though its 'root metaphors' are somewhat amended. This is reinforced by

Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, in their suggestion that peacekeeping, based on an emerging Responsibility to Protect norm, can be strengthened and reconfigured to meet such responsibilities.

This leads the chapter to the second broad conclusion: *There exists sufficient evidence to suggest that training in non-traditional military skills assists military peacekeepers in adapting to new roles and responsibilities encountered in deployment zones.* Even in the traditional era, the paradoxes of what soldiers had to deal with in peacekeeping operations were becoming apparent. Moskos noted that soldiers on peacekeeping duties, trained ‘in the skills of fighting and lethal weaponry’ had proved to be ‘readily available to the practices of the constabulary ethic’. However, Moskos viewed the different roles of ‘soldierly honour’ and peacekeeper to be a ‘fact of life’ for peacekeeping operations, and actually a benefit, arguing that it is because of, rather than in spite of such differences that ‘the institution building of viable peacekeeping forces has been facilitated by the standards of modern military professionalism’ (Moskos Jnr, 1976; 138). Now, it is more common for military analysts to disagree with that view. Kiszely makes a valid point when examining the differences between the traditional and modern conceptions of the military.

It was often claimed that it was relatively simple for armed forces trained in combat to adjust to what were perceived to be the lesser demands of operations other than combat, such as stability operations and counter-insurgency, but much harder, if not impossible (in a short space of time), for troops trained only for operations other than combat to become

combat-capable. True though this is, it was interpreted by some to imply that counter-insurgency required little extra training for well-trained combat troops. This was an error.

(Kiszely, 2007; 12)

Peacekeeping operations through the last decade of the twentieth century shed light on the need to create a 'new' type of soldier. An example of early changes was in the International Peace Academy Publication, the *Peacekeeper's Handbook*, which outlines the necessary skills required for effective peacekeepers. They are outlined in Box 6.3 below. What is important to know is that this list contains a lack of skills related to traditional military tasks. Although a number of these skills are currently practiced by the conflict resolution, the only skills directly equitable to skills from the traditional military tasks would be that of 'vigilance and alertness'.

**Box 6.3: List of soldier's qualities as outlined in the Peacekeepers Handbook**

(IPA, 1984; 272-278)

The handbook offers a list of the 'main credentials a peacekeeper requires'.

- a) Patience. 'A peacekeeper or a peacemaker needs to have infinite patience. Never should he expect quick results or solutions but rather he should evaluate repeatedly his achievement in the context of his aim'
- b) Restraint. 'Because of the special relationship between the third party and the parties to the dispute, any display of emotion on the part of the former can disadvantageously affect his credibility as a negotiator or pacifier'
- c) Advocacy. 'Since the third party's weapon is not a self-loading rifle but his ability without force or threats to persuade both sides to avoid violence and settle their differences by peaceful means, it is basic to his role that he cultivates an attitude and approach founded on his own personality and understanding. The advocacy that he is called upon to undertake is (1) Negotiation, (2) mediation, (3) conciliation, and sometimes (4) arbitration'
- d) Personality. 'He has to combine an approachable, understanding and tactful manner with fairness and firmness. The unapproachable and tactless are resented and often ignored, while the weak are put upon and exploited.'
- e) Persuasion and influence. 'The degree of persuasion called for is more a matter of quiet reasoning than direct pressurising, while influence should take the form of indirect suggestion rather than action manipulation.'
- f) Perspective. 'If a third party peacekeeper is to be effective and avoid making misjudgements he has to keep the conflict, his part in it, and the reactions of all concerned, in proper proportion. A clear understanding of the motivations and ethnic and cultural structures of the respective disputants is all important to the peacekeeper in the exercise of his third party role'
- g) Attitude and Approach. 'It is reasonable to demand a high level of objectivity from the members of a peacekeeping Force in their assessment, evaluation and in their reporting of actions taken by the respective sides in a dispute. Given this fundamental principle, the peacekeeper, maker and builder must strive not to pre-judge any issue or controversy but, as has already been pointed out, to consider each and every case on its merits alone, bearing in mind the antecedents and the factors affecting the reactions and motivations of those responsible for the particular case problem'
- h) Flexibility and Speed.
- i) Humour. 'Good humour makes for good working relations, because a man of good humour is accessible and approachable – a quality of considerable importance in a peacekeeper when negotiating with the respective parties to a dispute.'
- j) Vigilance and Alertness. 'The two human factors most important in a soldier's mentality make up'

Studies from conflict resolution scholars examine the positive impact that the field has on military peacekeepers in deployment zones (Fetherston et al., 1994). Woodhouse's 1998 examination of how the psychology of conflict resolution has impacted on peacekeepers argues that new types of 'routine duties' (such as mediation and arbitration) do not come naturally to conventional military personnel, and that personnel will require considerable 'shifts in traditional or conventional military culture toward a culture or psychology suitable for peacekeeping'. Woodhouse further makes the point that standard military thinking is going to be tested considerably: where instead of destroying an enemy, a soldier may have to negotiate with them, and instead of blowing a door off its hinges in a search and cordon operation, the military may have to learn to knock on it (Woodhouse, 1998; 163).

Kernic offers an important contribution to debates over the impact of peacekeeping on military postures by noting the experiences of Austrian soldiers when presented with the 'complex cultural environment' on deployment in Bosnia with the NATO IFOR operation. Through he notes that the nature of the IFOR deployment challenged soldiers' 'self-esteem as warriors', Kernic argues that a need was identified for an 'intelligent soldier'. This soldier is outlined as somebody who is not only trained to use force, but also 'use communication skills'. Kernic relates this to the deployment in Bosnia:

There was no demand for Rambo-type soldiers in Bosnia, so that some Austrian soldiers were, of course, rather disappointed. IFOR turned out to be an operation with some similar peacekeeping requirements as

previous UN missions. As such, it provided a challenge to the prevailing military warrior culture.

(Kernic, 1999; 123)

Bellamy concurs with this different mindset, noting that like those serving in national air forces or navies, who are required to undergo training to use highly technical equipment, the infantry officer needs to be equipped with similar levels of technical expertise. However, this level of technical expertise involves issues such as the 'commanders' intent', which will have to be understood to a high degree by ordinary soldiers. Bellamy suggests that soldiers will have to be adept at dealing with local parties, who, in 'may be frightened, bitter – and very cunning' (Bellamy, 1996; 196). Tillett also notes that there are fundamental differences between traditional military and peacekeeping skill sets. In his project on conflict resolution training for military peacekeepers, Tillett offers the following breakdown of the differences:

It [peacekeeping] involves the psychological change from an adversary to a pacific role; from confrontation to third party imposition. In peacekeeping there is no enemy: the object is to avoid hostilities, to improve communication between the parties, and to advance the process of reconciliation. This necessitates a full understanding of the causes of the conflict—political, military and economic—as well as the social and cultural environment. It demands a fair-minded and impartial approach while operating in an atmosphere of distrust and suspicion

among the protagonists, often under difficult and provocative circumstances.

(Tillett, 1996; 3)

Taking this into account, it appears reasonable to agree with Goodwin's suggestion that 'the modern world is witnessing a revival of the role of the soldier-diplomat in the military operational context'. This type of soldier, according to Goodwin:

Needs to possess and display a multiplicity of responses within a conflict zone, ranging from 'traditional' outright warfare (where there is a complete negation of negotiation) to a seemingly antithetical skill in the form of negotiation (where armed conflict is avoided). Such a range of response creates a complex decision-making context for the modern soldier.

(Goodwin, 2005; xvii)

This type of soldier is a product of the operational context into which militaries are being deployed. Goodwin outlines a number of characteristics (mainly found in UN mandates), which have influenced the need to develop junior soldiers into more 'rounded' soldiers. These include the 'inclusion of non-combative imperatives', new and varied Rules of Engagement, and stress on the 'the relevance and importance of negotiation, enquiry, mediation and conciliation as preferred ways to resolve disputes' (Goodwin, 2005; xvii). The result of this complex mix of characteristics is to create a 'complex decision making

environment' for the soldier. This is reflected in Kiszely's research, carried out at the UK Defence Academy. Although primarily based on counter-terrorism operations, his paper refers to the changing nature of what is termed 'stabilisation' operations, and offers an insight into what is expected from soldiers. Noting that operations are requiring junior commanders to make 'very senior decisions', the paper calls for soldiers who can

Not only cope with, but excel in, these circumstances – thus, minds that are agile, flexible, enquiring, imaginative, capable of rigorous analysis and objective critical thinking, minds that can conceptualise and innovate, minds at home with sophistication and nuance ('interpreting shades of grey'), and minds that have developed understanding, intuition, wisdom and good judgment.

(Kiszely, 2007; 15)

This is an interesting insight into the roles and responsibilities of future soldiers, who will possess a considerably high degree of decision-making capabilities and critical judgement. This complex-decision making environment informs much of Byrne's article on the development of the 'strategic corporal' in the Irish Defence Forces Review. Such a soldier is expected to have a great deal more than the traditional proficiency in fighting wars, but also be capable of providing humanitarian aid and performing a 'wide range of other activities relating to order and stability'. The study goes on to describe the attributes of the 'strategic corporal':

The strategic corporal is considered a competent, professional, technologically proficient decision-maker who is acutely aware of his actions. The constabulary role of our troops on peacekeeping missions demands a high degree of responsibility. This role requires the ability to adapt to an ever-changing environment and this environment is becoming multi-dimensional and more easily subjected to global review through media relations.

(Byrne, 2007; 101)

Byrne goes on to argue that the 'strategic corporal' will have to deal with a number of different pressures, including rapidly changing technology, an awareness of 'ethnic issues', increasing globalisation and ever changing security implications (Byrne, 2007; 96). His article examines at two different decision-making frameworks. Firstly, the 'analytical' mode (commonly used by the Defence Forces), which is based on a 'scientific, quantitative approach', dependant on a 'high level of situational certainty and accuracy'. Secondly, a participative form of decision-making, which is more reflective of the situation and allows lower-ranked officers greater involvement in decision making (Byrne, 2007; 97). This second type of decision-making is more akin to elicitive approaches espoused by Lederach. Ultimately, Byrne understands the benefit in soldiers using both approaches. Critically, he also attaches importance in understanding the benefits of autonomy that the reflective process provides.

The 'strategic corporal' further appears in the Australian Army Journal, in an article by Liddy, who defines it as:

A soldier that possesses technical mastery in the skill of arms while being aware that his judgement, decision-making, and action can all have strategic and political consequences that can affect the outcome of a given mission and the reputation of his country.

(Liddy, 2005; 140)

Although Liddy notes that officially there is no 'exact belief' as to the skills needed for the 'strategic corporal', a general view held by senior officers in the Australian Army is that he/she is highly trained in skills related to conventional warfare but supplemented with a number of specific skills which will assist them in duties in 'multidimensional operations'. These skills, as outlined by Liddy, are 'foreign language, cultural awareness, media training, negotiation techniques and conflict resolution skills' (Liddy, 2005; 145). To train the strategic corporal, Liddy finds that new training requirements will be in such areas as 'the Law of Armed Conflict, cultural awareness, and the discriminate use of force, as well as improved liaison and mediation skills'. The training impacts of the 'strategic corporal' in the Australian case has led their practitioners to recommend moving from a 'training culture' to an 'educational culture'. Liddy goes on to suggest the contrasting training requirements for the 'strategic corporal':

It has also been argued in some military circles that the constabulary role of troops on peace operations demands a range of skills that are qualitatively different from those of conventional military training. For example, on peace operations, soldiers are often confronted with

incidents that require restraint in the use of force, impartiality in action and the resolution of crisis by mediation. Developing such skills may require a new balance between training and education that transcends competency standards in favour of more educational and cognitive problem-solving skills.

(Liddy, 2005; 144)

Taking the above examples into account, there exists within militaries a significant move towards the 'soldier-diplomat', or 'strategic corporal'. In some cases, this is seen as being more than just a new type of decision making for soldiers. In Batistelli's view, 'the movement way from the professional ideal emphasizing the warrior hero toward an ideal emphasizing the soldier scholar and soldier-statesman' is a positive step in the creation toward what he terms as a 'postmodern military'<sup>104</sup> (Batistelli, 1997; 468).

In terms of developing training for the strategic-corporal or soldier-diplomat, Bellamy argues that armed forces will need to be even better trained over a longer period of time and that soldiers will 'probably be very well educated by past standards'. Interestingly (and similar to Galtung's findings in his 1976 study), he likens future military peacekeeping structures to the police, 'where individuals at the bottom of the rank structure are invested with a great deal of authority in their own right, and the sense of hierarchy is less dominant'. All of

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<sup>104</sup> The other steps being an increasing reliance on civilian employees, integration of women, increasing public acceptance of homosexuals as serving soldiers, greater independence of soldiers' spouses, and an increasing alternatives to conscientious objection and 'civilian alternatives to military service'.

this is directly impacted by training, which Bellamy argues may move militaries closer to an 'all-officer' structure (Bellamy, 1996).

Training to develop such a soldier strikes similarities with what has been observed in training programmes viewed as part of fieldwork studies. For example, Liddy's conception of training the 'strategic corporal' is reflected in the fieldwork observations:

areas such as media awareness, improved foreign-language proficiency, comparative cultural differences and educational measures to develop a soldier's basic understanding of Australia's strategic circumstances demand greater formalisation in training and education programs.

(Liddy, 2005; 145)

Notwithstanding the need to understand Australian policy concerns, the above statement reflects many of the facets of the *Broadsword* exercise, UNTSI training and UN CPTMs. Linking this to the *Broadsword* observation, Liddy suggests a 'carefully designed, scenario-based' training regime for both individuals and groups would be appropriate to offer greater room for experimentation. This is reflected in Goodwin's approaches to training the 'soldier diplomat', and her approaches to training at RMAS (outlined in Chapter five).

From this examination of the practitioner and academic literature, it can therefore be deduced that because of the demands of peacekeeping

operations, new skills are being imparted on to soldiers, which is changing their fundamental roles, responsibilities and identities. Such new identities have been christened with names 'soldier-diplomat' and 'soldier-scholar'. To follow on from this, and add further to the conflict resolution literature, the question of to what extent this is linked to conflict resolution approaches requires some discussion.

One may ask how the strategic soldier is linked to conflict resolution theory. This is a pertinent question, as much of the strategic soldier literature is based on army doctrine, publication and thought. It is also linked to such 'tactical' approaches to warfare, such as the 'three block war'<sup>105</sup>, the goals of effective decision making in complex environments, and to some extent even been linked to the counter-terrorism and stabilisation approaches seen in Afghanistan and Iraq (Kiszely, 2007).

However, the concept of the strategic soldier/soldier diplomat/strategic corporal is vital for conflict resolution purposes. If the goal of international peacekeeping operations is to search for less violent resolutions to violent conflicts, then it is imperative for soldiers to not *contribute* to cultures of violence, or at least be aware of the recriminations of their actions. The thesis outlines a development of more robust forms of peacekeeping, and recognition within UN documentation that it is a 'blurred area', which relies on the impartial nature of operations (which in itself is contested) (UN, 2008c). Therefore, a critical amount of pressure is placed on individual soldiers to understand the force that they have at their disposal, and the impacts, both short and long-term, it has.

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<sup>105</sup> Described as 'the entire spectrum of military challenges in the span of a few hours and within the space of three contiguous city blocks' (Byrne, 2007).

Woodhouse finds in his 1999 assessment of peacekeeping and conflict resolution that:

Working in conflict zones thus becomes a complex process of balancing coercive inducements with positive inducements; of supplementing military containment and humanitarian relief roles; and of promoting civic action to rebuild communities economically, politically and socially.

(Woodhouse, 1999a; 10)

This balance places a pressure on the shoulders of a military peacekeeper. Fetherston and Nordstrum's paper explored the impact of *habitus* on the abilities of third parties to effectively resolve conflicts. *Habitus* refers to ways of understanding and acting that individuals develop and learn. These forms of understanding and acting are consistent with an individuals' 'social and historical setting'. Fetherston and Nordstrum warn of the dangers of putting soldiers, trained predominantly for war, into a conflict environment, arguing that:

There is no switch inside a blue helmet that automatically turns a soldier trained for war-fighting into an individual prepared to work non-violently and with cultural sensitivity in a highly militarised environment.

(Fetherston, 1995; 21)

Because of this, military peacekeepers will arrive in a conflict zone with their own *habitus* (based on military values), which will come into conflict with the *habitus* of the host population (fostered, by and large, from living within a

conflict environment). An awareness of the limitations of one's own understanding and how it impacts on the host culture is therefore critical. Fetherston and Nordstrum suggest that failing to understand this and pursuing a warrior identity can have critical repercussions on opportunities for peacebuilding to occur.

Focussing on the complex nature of peacebuilding, Daniker finds that soldiers will have to continually be aware that the 'the final goal cannot be a tactical victory, but strategic peace' (Daniker, 1995). This resonates with the conflict resolution literature, with a number of the cited authors examining the complexities of moving from military peacekeeping toward civilian peacebuilding. Daniker's description of the 'Guardian Soldier' is slightly more optimistic than the military definitions, which we have seen above. He argues that the traditional conceptions of the 'combatant' soldier have ceased with the evolution of new conceptions of the soldier as a 'protector' who 'helps and rescues'. Daniker outlines this type of soldier:

He embodies a new type of soldier who, in analogy to the "Christian soldier" (*miles christianus*) of the late Middle Ages, might be dubbed the "Guardian Soldier" (*miles protector*). A soldier who is capable of wielding his arms valiantly and countering any use of force from any quarters, who will punish peacebreakers and restore peace, but who can intervene with the same efficiency in order to help and rescue when it is needed. A soldier who will be increasingly involved in preventative peacekeeping measures and in missions of conflict settlement. This new soldier will

gradually take the place of the old concept of a heroic warrior and sole protector of the home country, but also of the noncommittal “homo faber” of conflict.

(Daniker, 1995; 80)

Written with much optimism after the UN’s collective action against the Saddam Hussein Government in 1990 – something he describes as being a ‘watershed moment’ - Daniker argues that the ‘guardian soldier’ would be driven by two main motivations that are highly cosmopolitan in character. Firstly, a ‘conviction to act’ on behalf of new regional and global security structures, which ‘enhance stability’ and ‘promote peaceful development and prosperity’. Secondly, the soldier’s willingness to ‘participate in the defence of basic values’ (Daniker, 1995; 77). Taken together, these two aspects bring this thesis to the discussion of a possible development of a cosmopolitan soldier, and the operationalisation of cosmopolitan forms of conflict resolution. This refers to the third observation made by this chapter<sup>106</sup>.

### ***The Cosmopolitan Soldier***

Through finding links between conflict resolution skills and theory, and the field of military peacekeeping, manifested in the form of training for peacekeeping operations, this thesis has thus found a growing acceptance of the ‘soldier-diplomat’, ‘strategic corporal’ or ‘guardian soldier’. In the more traditional sense, this type of soldier shows skills in the manner of decision-making, ensuring that

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<sup>106</sup> There exists a strong suggestion - in both the literature and through fieldwork examples - that there is evidence of an emerging cosmopolitan conception of peacekeeping.

the 'mission' does not suffer as a consequence of poor decisions at the lowest level. However, as we see in Daniker's account, there is scope for the 'guardian soldier' to be a moral 'force for good'. This bears similarities to: the intuitive decision making espoused by Byrne, Liddy and Kiszely; the increased understanding of negotiation contexts, as outlined by Goodwin; and, the moral agent, as advocated by Daniker.

In order for cosmopolitan peacekeeping to be effective, operations require the integration of both 'hard' and 'soft' power roles, with the peacekeeping force being 'robust enough to use force to protect populations under the emergent 'responsibility to protect' norm', yet having 'enough conflict resolution capacity to facilitate operations across the conflict–development–peacebuilding continuum' (Curran and Woodhouse, 2007). Taking the first part of the equation, a degree of force must be used to ensure the creation of 'negative peace' – freedom from violence – and the creation of political and humanitarian space. This can be linked to the development of human security doctrine and emergent 'responsibility to protect' norm. Kaldor's analysis of 'new wars' leads her to the suggestion that the *enforcement* of cosmopolitan norms is required (Kaldor, 2001; 124-125). This is evident in the development of peacekeeping doctrine (embedded in PSO doctrine), backed up by guidelines over the impartial use of force set out in a number of UN publications, most notably the Brahimi Report. Consequently, this places demands on the intellectual capacity of the 'soldier diplomat'. In particular, through understanding the level of force to be used, how it relates to achieving the mandated tasks of the operation, and the impacts of the use (or non use) of force on the immediate environment.

The second part – the creation of positive peace – is of equal importance. Elliott argues that in addition to defending societies from violence, cosmopolitan peacekeeping missions may be expected to, where necessary:

Restore civil society especially in areas where it is under threat from criminal activities or various destructive forms of particularist politics, and to engage in rebuilding local legitimacy and pluralist democratic practices.

(Elliot, 2004; 25)

Kaldor asserts that the role of peacekeeping is to assist ‘islands of cosmopolitanism’ within civil wars. ‘Just as warring factions depend on outside support’ she argues, ‘so there needs to be a conscious strategy of building on local cosmopolitan initiatives’, as opposed to the top-down imposed peace initiatives that were seen through the 1990s (here she uses Bosnia as a case in point, where political negotiations at the highest level took precedence over local initiatives) (Kaldor, 2001; 122). Linking this to conflict resolution, which is very much based on principles of ‘addressing underlying structural or cultural asymmetries’ (Ramsbotham et al., 2005; 317), one can argue that future forms of peacekeeping can be ‘understood as a component of a broader and emancipatory theoretical framework centred on the idea of human security’ (Ramsbotham et al., 2005; 147). While at a more strategic level, such processes are in their infancy (for example, the UN’s peacebuilding commission); at the tactical level it is the responsibility of the ‘soldier-diplomat’

to address these issues. The thesis highlights the importance of incorporating a complex range of relationships, postures and initiatives into peacekeeping operations (from civil-military cooperation, to negotiation skills). As a result, a high level of decision-making is needed at the lowest level to answer (or at least begin to answer) important questions. Such questions include who to consult, what messages are sent out through consulting one group over another, and what are the cross-cultural issues and gender implications. This is not to mention the organisational clashes and coordination that is required with other civilian agencies in the field. Outlining all of this is the conflict zone itself, an area which the UN has warned its own peacekeepers not to look into as being 'normal' (UN, 2005a).

Thus, we can see the two broad outlines of cosmopolitan peacekeeping – to put the hawks back in their box, and also to let the doves out of their boxes. Cosmopolitan scholars have linked these broad roles to the 'type' of soldier envisaged for future operations, thus offering early conceptions of the 'cosmopolitan soldier'. Kaldor explains such tasks are being 'between soldiering and policing'. She states that:

Some of the tasks that international troops may be asked to perform fall within traditional ambits, for example, separating belligerents and maintaining ceasefires, controlling airspace. Others are essentially new tasks, e.g. the protection of safety zones and relief corridors. And yet others are close to traditional policing tasks – ensuring freedom of

movement, guaranteeing the safety of individuals, especially returned refugees or displaced persons, and the capture of war criminals.

(Kaldor, 2001; 125)

Elliot's definition follows a wider span than the more traditional issues of protection:

The use of coercive power to defend cosmopolitan law and cosmopolitan right must be embedded in a suite of policy responses which account for conflict prevention as well as conflict resolution... Thus a cosmopolitan mission might be expected to help defend and, where necessary, restore civil society especially in areas where it is under threat from criminal activities or various destructive forms of particularist politics, and to engage in rebuilding local legitimacy and pluralist democratic practices.

(Elliot, 2004; 25)

Thus, an emerging set of principles can be observed. As a result of existing studies on cosmopolitan peacekeeping, and cosmopolitan militaries, a list can be compiled of what would be expected from the cosmopolitan soldier:

- 1) Somewhere between soldiering and policing
- 2) Mixture of 'soft and hard' roles
- 3) Involving traditional security roles: separating belligerents, maintaining ceasefires
- 4) With doctrine aligned across the continuum of negative-positive peace

- 5) Ensuring freedom of movement
- 6) Guaranteeing return of refugees
- 7) Defend and possibly assist in the restoration of civil society
- 8) Assisting civil reconstruction
- 9) Providing an environment in which peacebuilding practices can flourish

To look at this list on a point-by point basis, Points 1 and 2 highlight the mixture of postures that are expected, with some calling it a mixture of 'soft and hard' roles, and other calling it somewhere between soldiering and policing. Numbers 3,4 and 5 are linked to the traditional 'negative peace' tasks of operations, such as a comprehensive doctrine, ensuring freedom of movement and ensuring return of refugees. Numbers 7, 8 and 9 refer to the civil military cooperation end of the spectrum with peacekeepers being asked to defend and possibly restore civil society, assist in civil reconstruction projects (through quick impact programmes), and in providing an environment for peacebuilding practices can flourish. What can also be seen through many of these is the need for conflict resolution skills and frameworks for understanding. Even the traditional security roles, such as ensuring freedom of movement, separating belligerents, and maintaining ceasefires requires some reliance on techniques from the conflict resolution field. Understanding reconstruction, civil-military cooperation, and how to provide an environment for peacebuilding to flourish all require some kind of knowledge of conflict resolution skills.

When examining the list it also becomes apparent that fieldwork experiences provide distinct similarities between what is currently being trained and what the

list offers. The policing aspect of training is not necessarily a radical diversion. *Operation Broadsword* gave soldiers training in riot control (as was seen in the large crowd outside the mosque in the negotiation scenario). Military doctrine is aimed towards using the military to provide security for peacebuilding projects to take place. The UN has noted in public opinion surveys the benefits of quick impact projects, and has linked schemes such as assisting in projects to clear rubbish piles in inner city suburbs in Haiti to wider security benefits for both the operation and host population. If the combined observations and analysis in this thesis were to be matched to the list outlined above, the results would show a convergence of cosmopolitan ethics and current training practices for military peacekeepers. This is outlined in table 6.1 (below):

**Table 6.1: Cosmopolitan ethics in observed training programmes**

Characteristic	Fieldwork Observation
1) Somewhere between soldiering and policing	<i>Soldiers' posture during Broadsword</i>
2) Mixture of 'soft and hard' roles	<i>Broadsword</i>
3) Involving traditional security roles: separating belligerents, maintaining ceasefires	<i>UN/UK doctrine</i>
4) With doctrine aligned across the continuum of negative-positive peace	<i>United Nations Principles and Guidelines/PSO</i> <i>PSO Doctrine, Robust</i>
5) Ensuring freedom of movement	<i>Peacekeeping as outlined in UN Policy</i>
6) Guaranteeing return of refugees	<i>Civil-military coordination</i>
7) Defend and possibly assist in the restoration of civil society	<i>Civil-military coordination</i>
8) Assisting civil reconstruction	<i>Civil-military coordination/Quick Impact Projects</i>
9) Providing an environment in which peacebuilding practices can flourish	<i>PSO Doctrine/UN CPTMs</i>

A cosmopolitan ethic therefore appears to be developing amongst the training programmes observed. This is of crucial importance to the thesis and to the wider conflict resolution literature, as it demonstrates that through training programmes there has been a further manifestation of the conflict resolution and military peacekeeping fields, and that cosmopolitan approaches (both

through 'hard' and 'soft' responses) have found relevance in the militarised environment of peacekeeping.

### **Barriers to operationalising cosmopolitan norms**

Although these advances are encouraging, it does not mean that militaries are now, by definition, cosmopolitan. Hurdles exist which hinder the development of this cosmopolitan soldier. This comes from a number of levels – the socialisation and psychologies of the soldiers themselves, the reluctance to institutional change, and finally, the role of the military in protecting the nation state. In order to offer a considered account of where one fully understands cosmopolitan ethics in the present day, it is important to examine the barriers which are still in place.

First, to examine the level of change required in military personnel to become peacekeepers. As outlined above, Fetherston and Nordstrum suggest that there no 'switch' exists inside a UN helmet which turns a soldier into a peacekeeper (Fetherston, 1995; 21). Much of this can be due to the 'warrior ethic' instilled into soldiers. As described by Kiszely, the warrior ethic is thus:

To be effective in combat, an army needs its members to have a self-perception of warriors as fighters; and the army as a whole needs to be imbued with the characteristic spirit, or ethos, of the fighting warrior: the desire to close with the enemy and kill him.

(Kiszely, 2007; 10)

It is this warrior ethos that is the overriding identity in the military, and any attempted change in the posture of a military from war-fighting to peacekeeping must examine this. This ethos can be explained through pledges of allegiance in national militaries. In highlighting two pledges (in this case the USA and UK), there exists a strong reference to defence of the state, or head of state.

**Box 6.4: Pledges of Allegiance**

**The US pledge of allegiance** (Army, 2010)

*I, \_\_\_\_\_, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; and that I will obey the orders of the President of the United States and the orders of the officers appointed over me, according to regulations and the Uniform Code of Military Justice. So help me God*

**United Kingdom** (MOD, 2010)

*I... swear by Almighty God that I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to Majesty Queen Elizabeth II, her heirs and successors, and that I will as in duty bound, honestly and faithfully defend Her Majesty, her heirs and successors, in person, crown and dignity against all enemies, and will observe and obey all orders of her Majesty, her heirs and successors, and of the generals and officers set over me.*

The warrior ethos forms a considerable part of the military identity. However, new challenges in deployments mean new challenges to identity. Britt notes that soldiers, (who work under this ‘warrior ethic’) have recently become subject to a ‘new’ set of identity images, including ‘peacekeeper, peacemaker, humanitarian, mediator, observer, and multinational “interactant”’. Such identities are ‘forced’ upon the soldier, who, by and large, will have joined the armed forces with the primary role of ‘defending national interests through the use of force’ at the forefront of their minds. Thus, there are psychological

ambiguities for the soldier when he or she is asked to assume such 'new' identities, although they may not be the primary role first assumed by the soldiers. Britt highlights an earlier research project that found that 36 per cent of US soldiers participating in Operation Joint Endeavour to Bosnia disagreed with the statement that the role of peacekeeper was relevant to their military training. Britt sees that this 'loose bond' is exacerbated with a lack of training practice (Britt, 1998; 119). This also concurs with Thompson and Pasto's view that '[s]oldiers can feel ambivalent about the upcoming peace support operation if warrior training clashes with the more neutral peacekeeping role' (Thompson, 2003; 224).

Such factors could offer a reason for the results of a study cited by Wisher into the skills deterioration in military peacekeepers. Wisher highlights a study undertaken by the US Army Research Institute for Behavioural and Social Sciences, which examined 27 tasks selected for training prior to US soldiers deploying in Bosnia or Hungary as part of the IFOR *Operation Joint Endeavour* deployment in Bosnia Herzegovina in 1995. A sample of soldiers was asked a number of questions about the tasks after a two-month period of not using them. The table, in full, is below.

**Table 6.2: Task Retention for US soldiers**  
(Wisher, 2003; 97)

**RANKING OF TASK RETENTION**  
(Task ranked 1 is hardest to remember.)  
%Go = percentage of soldiers predicted to perform the task at 'Go' level  
after two months of nonuse

Rank	Task	%Go
1	Extraction from Minefield	0%
2	React to Civilian on Battlefield	8%
3	React to Sniper	9%
4	Prevent Shock	18%
5	Carbon Monoxide Inhalation	28%
6	Apply Tourniquet	29%
7	React to Indirect Fire	30%
7	Winter Driving	30%
9	Vehicle Search	34%
10	Negotiation	36%
11	Rules of Engagement	42% (27%)
12	React to Media	54%
13	V Corps Convoy Mine Strike Drill	56%
14	Living in the Cold	62% (48%)
15	Identify/Detect Trip Wires	68%
17	Driving Postcheck	71% (44%)
17	Working in the Cold	71%
17	Identify/Detect Booby Traps	71%
19	Sleeping in the Cold	73%
20	Recognize/React to UXO	75%
21	Mine Detection	76%
21	Locate a Mine by Probing	76%
23	Driving Precheck	89% (62%)
24	Personal Search	90% (62%)
25	React to Mines	96% (68%)
26	Field Dressing/Pressure Dressing	98%
27	Indications of Mines/Body Traps	99% (84%)

Note: Tasks with two "Go" percentages have job aids; percentages in parentheses apply when job aids are not available.

As can be seen 'negotiation' maintains a relatively low skills retention rate with 36% of soldiers retaining the skills after two months. Thus, after two months of non-use, almost two-thirds of soldiers will forget negotiation techniques (at least in this case study). Furthermore, tasks with similar retention rates include 'rules of engagement', and 'react to the media': both characteristics of current deployments. Although the table is not too 'surprising' with regards to the tasks

that soldiers are more likely to retain (the more traditional of tasks), it is important to understand the comparative importance of negotiation skills in the military peacekeeper's mindset (Wisher, 2003; 97).

These mixed identities can further be seen in the issue of 'force protection'. This is described as a responsibility to 'safeguard' military personnel from various threats (Kretchik, 2004; 20). Kretchik examined policies regarding force protection from six militaries (UK, Poland, Norway, Sweden, Canada, Poland, USA) serving in Bosnia Herzegovina from 1995 – 2001, under the NATO banner. He found that whilst peacekeepers from five out of the six nations found that positive relations with the local population was critical for a successful mission, not one US officer interviewed found such relations essential. Much of this was due to a considerable reliance of 'force protection' by the US forces. Kretchik explains:

Observed civilian behaviour toward SFOR troop patrols was much more cooperative in certain sectors than others. Within the British, Canadian, German and Polish sectors, local people welcomed the patrols and were more than willing to engage them in conversation through interpreters. US troops were met with suspicion as late as June 2001, nearly five years after the initial arrival of American forces. Where the majority of multinational troops smiled, waved and frequented bistros for a tea or coffee in the majority of cases with a reduced protection posture, US troops secured a perimeter while one officer wearing body armour and helmet approached people with an interpreter and perhaps one or two

others. The difference in mood was striking: warm in the majority of situations where non-US troops operated and a chilly reception for the US contingent. From the testimonials of both soldier and civilian alike, force-protection posture affected civilian attitudes.

(Kretchik, 2004; 34)

This is not the only example where force protection has had an impact on the positive role that military peacekeepers can play. Gooren argues that in the Dutch military, although soldiers 'appreciated' gaining information through interaction with the civilian population, force protection 'frequently took priority over maintaining friendly relations with the local population' (Gooren, 2006; 59). This could be a symptom of the differing identities coming into conflict, where on the one hand the soldiers and structures recognise a need for effective engagement with the local population, and on the other, they are unable (through a genuine fear of attack, or a suspicion of alien environments) to let their guard down.

Studies also find that the strength of the warrior ethic has an impact on the performance of deployed military personnel on a peacekeeping mission. Franke highlights the operation in Somalia where soldiers, unable to grasp the vague mandates given to them, followed two distinct identities. Some pursued a 'humanitarian strategy', where conscious efforts were made to *not* negatively stereotype all Somali's, and an effort made by soldiers to understand Somali culture and custom. The other distinct identity followed was the 'warrior strategy', where soldiers used the behaviour of a small number of rioters as a

general stereotype for all of Somali culture, treated the whole of the population as 'potential enemies', and attempted to hide any signs of vulnerability. Franke argues that this experience (as well as other post-cold war peacekeeping endeavours) has called into question 'what it has traditionally meant to be a soldier'. As a consequence, adjustments need to be made not only in military doctrine, but also in the military's 'combat-orientated warrior identity' (Franke, 2003; 33-35). Further, LaRose Edwards *et al* find that the 'stresses and strains' of operations such as Somalia and the former Yugoslavia revealed to outsiders the 'partial inadequacy of general-purpose combat training for peacekeeping'. They found in their study that those who served in the multidimensional operations in 'failed states' were the first to identify any shortcomings (LaRose-Edwards et al., 1997).

Linked to this, Durch and England examined the trouble in assuming that all soldiers can 'shed' the baggage of their warrior ethos, and change their mindset to that of a peacekeeper, and warn that it may not be the case that all soldiers are equally as well suited to rapidly shifting roles:

One could envisage such adaptation in a thirty-four-year-old Special Forces sergeant with fifteen years of experience and special education and training in winning local support for his campaign. One has more trouble seeing it in a nineteen-year-old line infantryman with a high school education and at most a year of field experience of any sort under

his belt. In all armies, the latter types of personnel far outnumber the former.

(Durch et al., 2009; 44)

The mixed identity is not only felt at the tactical level, national military structures often show reluctance in developing their working patterns. Highlighting the impacts of mixed identities on higher levels of the military hierarchy, Hills notes the reaction to the UK's peacekeeping commitments in the immediate aftermath of the Kosovo intervention. Through her examination of the reaction in the press by senior army figures, she found that there was certainly a feeling that too much emphasis on PSO style deployments would result in UK forces becoming a 'gendarmerie', with a diminished reputation for fighting (Hills, 2001; 87). She refers to an MOD lessons learned report from the Kosovo intervention to further underline this point. It is worth outlining it in full to gain the essence of this dilemma:

While our forces need to be trained in the special skills required for peacekeeping and other lower intensity operations, this must not be at the expense of their readiness for more demanding joint, all arms warfighting operations. A serviceman trained and equipped for war may do an effective job on a peacekeeping operation, and can acquire additional special skills for this purpose, but one just trained for peacekeeping is not ready for high intensity operations.

(MOD, 2000; 6.38)

Kernic also makes a telling argument as to how certain military thinkers react to the difference in skills needed for peacekeeping operations, and the apparent 'numbing effect' this has on soldiers ability to fight and execute the 'warrior ethos'. He contends that with an increasing degree of peacekeeping experience, the Austrian military soon found that in order to be more effective, it needed to develop 'civilian skills'. However, the reaction in Austria from some officers and public commentators was that such operations - and the skills they demand - could 'undermine' combat capabilities. Hence, instead of requesting that the soldiers be better trained in the 'civilian skills', 'they demanded tougher combat training for soldiers before and during peacekeeping operations' (Kernic, 1999; 123).

This highlights the tendency of militaries to be resistant to the pressures of institutional change. Gooren, studying the Dutch military, argues that militaries are 'strongly attached to traditions; to familiar embedded practices; and to standard operational procedures that have withstood the test of time' (Gooren, 2006; 54). Similar problems are highlighted by Kiszely, who notes that there is opposition in the UK to 'moderating the warrior ethos', which is largely due to the fear that stability operations are a 'sideshow' to what the military train for (Kiszely, 2007; 21). Langille's thesis on the creation of the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre in Canada highlights the conservatism that existed in Canadian military hierarchies. In the debates leading up to the development of a training centre, Langille found that there was a considerable amount of opposition to the notion of turning a redundant military facility into a peacekeeping training centre. This was due to a military conservatism that

existed in Canada at the time, which was highly skeptical of a dedicated peacekeeping training centre, or the idea of developing particular training for peacekeeping. For example Major General Lewis Mackenzie dismissed the idea of setting up the centre, stating 'I think we're unanimous in the military that there is no special training (required) for the peacekeeping soldier' (Langille, 1999; 101).

Militaries are also tools of the nation state, and are used in whatever manner the national state structures wish to see. This brings the chapter to the third hurdle to pursuing cosmopolitan militaries. It is worth at this point to examine the UK. This also highlights how the military structures were unwilling to change their structures, even if foreign policy develops along cosmopolitan principles. Dorman has linked the UK approach to peacekeeping and stability operations to notions of cosmopolitan military forces and relates policy statements made in the early years of the Labour administration under Prime Minister Tony Blair to the reality of military doctrine and force. In terms of the policy statement, this period is characterised by what many termed as the 'Chicago Speech' – a speech on foreign policy made by Prime Minister Blair in Chicago on 24<sup>th</sup> April 1999 – in the early period of the Kosovo intervention. Declaring that 'we are all internationalists now', Prime Minister Blair argued that British Foreign Policy would be unable to 'turn our backs on conflicts and the violation of human rights within other countries'. He went on to state that:

Now our actions are guided by a more subtle blend of mutual self interest and moral purpose in defending the values we cherish. In the end values

and interests merge. If we can establish and spread the values of liberty, the rule of law, human rights and an open society then that is in our national interests too:

(Blair, 1999)

Prime Minister Blair's speech led observers to note that the UK could pursue a more internationalist agenda. Furthermore, Foreign Secretary Robin Cook argued at the time that an approach to foreign policy required an ethical dimension, which 'recognises that the national interest cannot be defined only by narrow realpolitik' (Guardian, 1997). Dorman's analysis of this period finds that although there was a cosmopolitan-minded outlook at the beginning, the difficulty of justifying 'out of area operations' forced the government to link operations with the national interest. From this, he argues that any cosmopolitan-like operations, in the UK at least, would not only have to be both 'operationally feasible and have broad international support', but must also show clear net benefits to the UK. Thus, 'national realpolitik' was able to assert its dominance (Dorman, 2004; 246).

This is reflected in UK contributions to UN peacekeeping, in comparison to UK deployments in non-UN operations. The UK's troop commitment to UN peacekeeping provides only a fraction of its total armed forces. The most recent (January 2010) UN figures (outlined in Box 6.5 below) total UK peacekeepers at 250 personnel. The total strength of the UK Regular forces (in April 2009) was 188,370, with the Army comprising of 106,500 (DASA, 2009).

The UK justifies its role in other ways. The first justification is through funding of the peacekeeping project, where it is the fourth largest contributor to the UN peacekeeping, providing 7.8% of the overall peacekeeping budget. This contribution is argued to be an adequate commitment, replacing the need for 'boots on the ground'. Secondly is the commitment the UK has to 'UN Mandated operations'. Such terminology refers to deployments in Iraq (up until the commitment ended in 2009), and Afghanistan. The current Afghani deployment has 9,500 personnel serving, covering all facets of the peacekeeping-peace enforcement-war spectrum. It can be suggested that the NATO led intervention differentiates itself from UN 'blue helmet' operations, and offers less to the cosmopolitan ethics espoused by the Labour administration, and more to the 'hard security' aspects more akin to realist politics.

**Box 6.5: UK Troop Contributions to peacekeeping operations**  
(UNDPKO, 2010c)

<b>Mission</b>	<b>Number</b>	<b>Role</b>
<b>MONUC</b> (DRC)	5	Experts on mission
<b>UNAMA</b> (Afghanistan)	1	Expert on mission
<b>UNAMI</b> (Iraq)	1	Expert on mission
<b>UNFICYP</b> (Cyprus)	241	Contingent troop
<b>UNMIS</b> (Sudan)	2	Contingent troop

**Box 6.6: Top five contributors to the UN Peacekeeping budget**  
(CIC, 2009; 163)

1.	USA	26.4%
2.	Japan	16.5%
3.	Germany	8.5%
4.	UK	7.8%
5.	France	7.4%

Through his examination of the reluctance of the military to develop along cosmopolitan lines, Dorman argues that the Strategic Defence Review of 1998 gave precedence to heavy armoured brigades, when it became more apparent that cosmopolitan-style operations – such as the UK intervention in Sierra Leone – required an ‘increased requirement for light infantry capable of rapid deployment’ (Dorman, 2004; 245). Dorman’s argument is that although the military were gaining ‘considerable experience’ in situations which required small infantry groups, trained for interventions such as Sierra Leone, the military was exceptionally keen to focus efforts on traditional war fighting.

The UK example is significant as it outlines a number of barriers towards effective cosmopolitan peacekeeping. This has an impact on how to ‘operationalise’ cosmopolitan conceptions of peacekeeping, human security, and the responsibility to protect.

## **Cosmopolitanism considered**

As illustrated with the UK as a cosmopolitan actor, much of the justification for cosmopolitan action (as outlined in the extract from Prime Minister Blair's 'Chicago Speech') was based on the UK's desire to uphold and promote cosmopolitan democracies. This certainly links in with Held's opinion of the cosmopolitan democratic project, where 'we live in a world where we must come to enjoy multiple citizenships'. From this, Held asks for the creation of a network of politically accountable bodies through the local, national, regional and international levels. The task of a cosmopolitan force, in Held's view, is to uphold these politically accountable models. However, Held makes an important qualification, arguing that such types of intervention would not be used to 'impose' a particular form of democracy (Held, 1997; 28). This is an uneasy qualification for cosmopolitans to deal with, as it does leave the theory somewhat open to accusations of it being a 'Trojan horse', used by the most powerful members of the international system to uphold favourable political regimes or instigate regime change.

Where those who study cosmopolitan forms of peacekeeping feel more comfortable is through espousing a 'moral' need and requirement for a level of outside intervention to protect civilians and uphold international law and institutions. Jones describes such moral cosmopolitanism as being the view that every person in the world is 'entitled to equal moral consideration regardless of their various memberships in states, classes, nations, religious groups, and the like' (Jones, 2005; 1). Brock furthers this viewpoint, by arguing that

Cosmopolitanism highlights the responsibilities we have to those whom we do not know, but whose lives should be of concern to us. The borders of states, and other boundaries considered to restrict the scope of justice, are irrelevant roadblocks in appreciating our responsibilities to all in the global community.

(Brock, 2009; 9)

This links to Ramsbotham and Woodhouse's concept of cosmopolitan peacekeeping, which takes the protection of civilians, and provision of negative peace as a starting point for positive peacebuilding projects.

The question that arises from the UK's example is whether the nation can be a cosmopolitan actor. Balancing the role of the nation state as an actor in world politics, with more cosmopolitan ideals (which have implications for the boundaries of the nation state) is a debate for many cosmopolitans, with a wide spectrum of theories ranging from absolute power being handed to a supranational structure, to the strengthening of cosmopolitan ideals within states. Some, such as Tan, note the importance of cosmopolitan institutions being able to accommodate the needs of state structures and patriotic ties. He finds that in order for cosmopolitan values to serve the whole of humanity, instead of rejecting patriotic partiality outright,

Cosmopolitans must accept that the challenge is to show how the impartiality of cosmopolitanism can consistently accommodate and account for the special ties between compatriots.

(Tan, 2005; 167)

The importance of the cosmopolitan project, according to Tan, is to ensure that there are institutions, rules and set practices to guide states in their pursuit of their own interests. As people opt to pursue their own concerns and interests within rules of a just international setting, Tan argues, then individuals can pursue 'particular ends and ties, including the commitment of patriotism, within the limits of a just global institutional arrangement' (Tan, 2005; 184).

Lawler takes this a stage further by advocating the state as a cosmopolitan agent in its own right. Lawler starts with the assertion that any attempt to arm and empower a cosmopolitan military would be met with a degree of resistance on the grounds of it going against traditional conceptions of the state boundary (or as Lawler calls it 'of apparently trans-historical international political realities') and the contested nature of the legitimising bodies who authorise the use of force by such a military. He also notes calls for the state to act as a force for good in itself, against manifestations of violent groupings and actions not along state lines, but along lines of 'blood and ethnicity' (Lawler, 2004; 59). Thus it is in Lawler's view that the *good state* can be an effective vehicle for moving cosmopolitan values forward. The good state is described as thus:

the good state can be defined simply as a state committed to moral purposes beyond itself, to a robust internationalism in its foreign policy. By internationalism I mean a philosophy of foreign policy constructed around an ethical obligation on the part of state actively to pursue *authentically* other-regarding values and interests.

(Lawler, 2004; 56)

This conception of the cosmopolitan state is not seen as a universally accepted step forward in the cosmopolitan project. Lawler accepts this, noting the difficulties of staunchly defending state policies based on the pursuit of the national interest. Lawler also notes that by pursuing such an argument, it 'invites the charge of naivety from realists' and being accused of being narrow-minded by cosmopolitans (Lawler, 2004; 50).

### **The cosmopolitan state?**

As we have seen with the UK example, there is enough evidence to suggest that cosmopolitan ideals have not been fully met with regard to military action, regardless of the specialised training that soldiers receive. Does this mean that all nation states do not pursue a cosmopolitan agenda? It is in the view of this thesis that room does exist for nations to espouse and act upon cosmopolitan objectives. Here, an example can be extracted from another case study: Ireland. The Irish approach to international institutions is more cosmopolitan than the UK. Service to international institutions is embedded in the Irish Constitution itself (under Article 29), which states:

1. Ireland affirms its devotion to the ideal of peace and friendly co-operation amongst nations founded on international justice and morality.
  2. Ireland affirms its adherence to the principle of the pacific settlement of international disputes by international arbitration or judicial determination.
- (Ireland, 1937; Article 29)

The Irish Department of Foreign Affairs aligns itself with peacekeeping and conflict resolution tasks. In 2007, the Department set up the Conflict Resolution Unit, to 'lead work on enhancing Ireland's engagement in conflict resolution activities internationally' (DOFA, 2010). Guiding this work, the CRU has three cross cutting themes: the promotion of human rights, working to the guidelines set out in UNSCR 1325, and the impact of climate change on conflict. This informs the three main strands of the Conflict Resolution Unit's work: peacemaking, peacebuilding, and peace process lessons sharing.

Within the peacemaking section, there is a Mediation Support Unit, which primarily collates peacemaking experiences and gathers lessons learned. The unit coordinates training for mediators, offers advice on UN standards and procedures, and has assisted in mediation projects in East Timor<sup>107</sup> and Uganda<sup>108</sup>. Furthermore, support is provided to conflict prevention, reconciliation projects, and security sector reform, alongside research into where lessons from the Northern Ireland Peace Process can be used elsewhere.

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<sup>107</sup> Where it supports the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, and works with conflict prevention projects including assistance in the establishment of an early warning system for future conflict

<sup>108</sup> Where it supported the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.

The Defence Forces (DF) objectives can be matched to the Department of Foreign Affairs. Amongst the DF 'high level goals' is a commitment to:

contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security through participation in approved UN-mandated peace support, crisis management and humanitarian relief operations.

(DOD, 2008; 6)

Noting that Ireland has been an 'active contributor' to UN mandated peacekeeping operations, the strategy states that Irish troops will participate 'where appropriate' in humanitarian and crisis management operations, subject to the 'triple-lock' – the agreement of the Irish Government, the approval of the Dáil (Parliament), and, importantly when looking at cosmopolitan conceptions, a UN mandate (DOD, 2008; 9). The strategy statement outlines how this will have an impact on serving personnel, who are required to understand the 'complex issues of cultural diversity affecting both the host nation and troops from other contributing nations', as well as balance more robust rules of engagement and national and International Human Rights Law (DOD, 2008; 13). Finally, as the box below shows, the military oath sworn by DF personnel refers to the loyalty to the constitution, and not its defence – a major difference between this and the UK and US oaths.

**Box 6.7: Irish Defence forces Oath**  
(DFHQ, 2006; 1)

*I do solemnly swear (or declare) that I will be faithful to Ireland and loyal to the Constitution and that while I am a member of the Defence Forces I will obey all lawful orders issued to me by my superior officers and that while I am a member of the Permanent Defence Forces I will not join or be a member of or subscribe to any political organisation or society or any secret society whatsoever and that, if I become a member of the Reserve Defence Forces, I will not, while I am a member of the Reserve Defence Forces, join or be a member of or subscribe to any secret society whatsoever.*

Irish UN commitments also highlight a commitment to international operations. The DF roughly maintain ten per cent of their 10,500 personnel serving on international operations (both Blue-helmet and UN mandated Operations) (UNTSI, 2007f). The list of Irish contributions to UN operations is outlined below.

**Box 6.8: Irish Contributions to UN operations**  
(UNDPKO, 2010c)

<b>Mission</b>	<b>Number</b>	<b>Role</b>
MINURCAT (Chad)	428	Contingent troop
MINURSO (Western Sahara)	3	Experts on mission
MONUC (DRC)	3	Experts on Mission
UNFICYP (Cyprus)	18	Individual police
UNIFIL (Lebanon)	8	Contingent troop
UNOCI (Cote d'Ivoire)	2	Experts on Mission
UNTSO (Middle East)	2	Experts on mission

This thesis therefore strongly advocates that it is possible for a version of cosmopolitan ethics to exist within states. Through using Ireland as a case study, it evidence that states can align defence commitments with cosmopolitan priorities – in this case, prioritising UN mandated operations for DF personnel, a

considerable commitment in the Department of Foreign Affairs to peacebuilding activities, and a constitution aligned to international institutions.

### **Operationalising cosmopolitan arrangements: the role of the UN**

Moving to a more radical end of the cosmopolitan spectrum, a need is advocated to develop standing forces free from state and national interests.

Elliot sums this up, in her work on cosmopolitan-minded militaries:

The deployment of cosmopolitan force (and forces) must be detached as much as is possible from statist and great power purposes and that it must be conducted under the authority of broadly-based international institutions such as the United Nations... Military forces that are used in support of cosmopolitan force must be qualitatively as well as materially different from traditional militaries in their identity and value structures.

(Elliot, 2004; 24)

Where can present peacekeeping arrangements fit into this? Practical considerations that have been put forward for sourcing a standing UN force. From the conflict resolution perspective, the UN is seen as the 'essential' global institutional framework for the realisation of conflict resolution goals, for its 'unique reservoir' of legitimacy, or integrative power. Furthermore, it is hoped that the UN can continue to be:

The only genuinely global institution capable of delivering authoritative endorsement of fundamental international values, and of conferring legitimacy on the most difficult international undertakings.

(Ramsbotham et al., 2005; 327)

The idea of a standing force has surfaced in a number of proposals from within the UN, from national governments (the Netherlands, Canada and Denmark), and through proposals from within parliamentary structures, such as the *United Nations Rapid Deployment Act*, proposed to the US House of Representatives in 2001 (Congress, 2001). This is not a recent occurrence as proposals for a standing peacekeeping force are as old as the UN Charter itself. Article 43 (under Chapter VII) of the Charter requests states to make available to the Security Council 'armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security' (UN, 1945). Furthermore, within the UN, there have been ambitious calls for the reform of the structures that assist peacekeeping operations. The revival of the UN's Military Staff Committee (MSC) - a 'dormant' area of the UN charter – has been proposed as a way to improve the UN's ability to launch effective peacekeeping operations. The MSC is mentioned in the UN Charter, under Chapter VII, Article 47, outlined in Box 6.9 below

**Box 6.9: Chapter VII Article 47 of the UN Charter**  
(UN, 1945)

- There shall be established a Military Staff Committee to advise and assist the Security Council on all questions relating to the Security Council's military requirements for the maintenance of international peace and security, the employment and command of forces placed at its disposal, the regulation of armaments, and possible disarmament.
- The Military Staff Committee shall consist of the Chiefs of Staff of the permanent members of the Security Council or their representatives. Any Member of the United Nations not permanently represented on the Committee shall be invited by the Committee to be associated with it when the efficient discharge of the Committee's responsibilities requires the participation of that Member in its work.
- The Military Staff Committee shall be responsible under the Security Council for the strategic direction of any armed forces placed at the disposal of the Security Council. Questions relating to the command of such forces shall be worked out subsequently.
- The Military Staff Committee, with the authorization of the Security Council and after consultation with appropriate regional agencies, may establish regional sub-committees.

In the early years of the UN, the organisation could have facilitated the creation of a standing UN force. However, political deadlock ultimately led to the UN being 'deprived' of having military capabilities. Fabian suggests the obstacles in creating such a committee and standing forces:

just as there were in 1946 no purely military perspectives on Article 43, there have been none since on preparedness for peacekeeping. Before organizing such a force and giving it a real capacity to act, governments

want assurance that it will neither be used against their own interests nor be controlled by countries threatening those interests

(Fabian, 1971; 60-61)

The lack of such assurances and certainly stopped the development of a UN standing force, with Soviet and US representatives mistrusting their adversaries and suspecting that their Cold War enemy would use any such force as a tool against their interests. Thus, no common conclusions could be reached about the overall size of such forces, size of national contributions, ratios of naval, air and land forces (Fabian, 1971; 61). This led the Security Council to entrust military forms of intervention to Member States, who would put forces under their own command and control (Childers, 1994; 173)<sup>3</sup>.

More recently, Member States made incremental steps towards a serious standby peacekeeping force system through the development of the Standard High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG). The Brigade was set up in response to a request made in the UN's 1995 *Working Group on a Multinational United Nations Stand-by Forces High Readiness Brigade* to establish a 'multinational brigade-size force at high readiness' (SHIRBRIG, 1995). The Memorandum of Understanding for SHIRBRIG outlines its main concept:

The SHIRBRIG will only be employed on a case-by-case basis in a manner safe-guarding national sovereignty considerations in peacekeeping operations mandated by the Security Council under Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations, including humanitarian

tasks. The SHIRBRIG, as an integral formation – i.e. consisting of elements from all types of arms, including manoeuvre units, medical, logistics and communications – will only be employed for deployments of up to 6 months duration, and it should not be considered for routine rotation of forces in connection with ongoing missions.

(SHIRBRIG, 1996)

The brigade became operationally available to the UN in 2000<sup>109</sup> and was involved in five UN Missions<sup>110</sup>, which were under Chapter VI of the UN Charter, to mainly assist with the establishment of headquarters and planning for missions (SHIRBRIG, 2010). Deployments were generally met with success, and the SHIRBRIG model gained credit for its work. The official lessons learned report into the brigade (published in 2009) states that SHIRBRIG had a reputation for possessing ‘a cohesive force with the highest level of peacekeeping expertise and training standards’ (CISR, 2009; 22). It was also highly regarded within the DPKO, whose lessons learned department maintained that ‘what SHIRBRIG did it did well’ (CISR, 2009; 96). In addition to the operations which it assisted in setting up, the brigade assisted in activities related to enhancing African capabilities, as well as developing a ‘Civil-military cooperation start up kit’ and a ‘Rapid Deployment/Interim Headquarters concept’(CISR, 2009; 8). However, although the operation had noted success, the impact of SHIRBRIG was limited. Many of the aspirations of setting up a

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<sup>109</sup> Sixteen nations have signed one or more SHIRBRIG Documents. They are - Argentina, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Italy, Ireland, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Spain, and Sweden. Seven other nations (Chile, Croatia, Czech Republic, Egypt, Jordan, Latvia and Senegal) are participating as observers.

<sup>110</sup> UNMEE (Ethiopia/Eritrea), UNMIS (Sudan), UNOCI (Cote d’Ivoire), UNMIL (Liberia), UNAMIS (Sudan).

standing brigade were realised in a somewhat smaller reality as SHIRBRIG staff often formed the 'nucleus' of mission headquarters. It was only in UNMEE, where the possibilities of a large rapid deployment were realized. Even when this was deployed, its strength was 1,200 – 1500 troops, and not at the brigade size of 2,000-5,000 envisaged.

It was mainly due to such limitations that the initiative was disbanded in 2009. The lessons learned report identifies SHIRBRIG's 'cumbersome decision-making process' as well as a lack of resources and political will, as important factors in making the initiative untenable (CISR, 2009; 8). Furthermore, the report states that: 'Bottom line is that the force generation did not work properly.' The SHIRBRIG model offers both positive lessons insofar as what can be achieved by like-minded states to deal with rapid deployment, but also negative lessons on how such a force can be sidelined by other needs. The lessons learned report best sums this up by stating that such an ambitious agenda like that of SHIRBRIG 'can only remain as strong as the support received from its own member-nations' (CISR, 2009; 97).

Importantly, a missed lesson from the SHIRBRIG model is that a more workable idea could be through the operationalisation of *more* radical conceptions of standing capacities. As opposed to building on state-based arrangements – such as SHIRBRIG – this thesis supports the concept of a capacity that is totally disassociated to the sovereign state. Goulding finds that a UN force based on cosmopolitan values would make it more difficult for troop contributing countries to use participation in UN operations to 'advance their national interests'. This

would be particularly relevant in smaller operations in which 'a dominant UN contingent could be the champion of cosmopolitan values' (Goulding, 2004; 112). Held also argues for a long term shift of the nation state's coercive capacity to regional and global institutions, with the ultimate aim of 'demilitarization and the transcendence of the war system' (Held, 1995; 279).

A more comprehensive concept of a UN force comes in the form of Langille's proposal for a standing force in 2002. His proposal for the creation of a UN Emergency Service – what he termed a UN '911' - which would be based on a force (including deployable elements, base support and administration) of approximately 13,200 personnel<sup>111</sup>. Langille recommends that this force can address human needs including 'protection, security, health and hope' (a whole spectrum from traditional peacekeeping to peacebuilding) (Langille, 2002; 113), would work under a robust mandate aligned with Chapter VII of the UN Charter, but also have the conflict resolution capabilities to build and maintain consent. Langille suggests that:

All ranks should be trained in contact skills such as mediation and dispute resolution to help ensure that minor conflicts are quickly contained before they risk early escalation.

(Langille, 2002; 109-111)

A more comprehensive approach, undertaken by the civilian component of the force, would address issues related to human needs as well as working to

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<sup>111</sup> The force would comprise of military (10,270 personnel), police (850 personnel) and civilian volunteers (550 personnel).

'restore hope'. Langille argues that the success of progressing to such a force will depend on the willingness of officials to recognise the 'potential contribution of conflict resolution and peace studies' (Langille, 2000; 243). However, Langille argues that the vision of the UN being a guarantor of such a force is a requirement for such development.

Codner elaborates on this idea, proposing a standing UN force 'independent of particular national or regional cultural stereotypes' (Codner, 2008; 62). The reasons for the more radical departure are more entrenched in policy considerations. Codner argues that a dilemma has emerged, where on the one hand, traditional operations are now replaced with a need for a considerably larger 'comprehensive approach', and on the other hand, is the existence of national interest: something which Codner understands:

the governments and electorates that own the more competent and combat capable of military forces may be unwilling to commit to elective operations with uncertain outcomes.

(Codner, 2008; 62)

This leaves Codner to conclude that there is room for 'serious consideration' for a combat capable force distanced from national ownership – a UN Emergency Service - recruited from ex-servicemen and women to begin with, and 'young civilians' in the future.

Codner elaborates on the development of the UN Emergency Service, arguing that in the first stage it is to be used as a preventative measure, deploying in situations where preventative diplomacy is needed (e.g. the missed opportunity to avert the genocide in Rwanda) (Codner, 2008; 61). The main thrust of the proposal is the creation of a 'Phase 1 UN Intervention Force' (UNIF I). This would be a small military force combining civilian, police and judicial capability. The tasks for the UNIF I force would include to:

- prevent violence from escalating;
- assist, monitor, and otherwise facilitate a cease-fire;
- provide the emergency framework for UN efforts to resolve the conflict and commence negotiations;
- secure a base, communications and airfield for a subsequent UN force;
- provide safe areas for persons and groups whose lives are threatened by the conflict ;
- secure humanitarian relief operations; and
- assess the situation and provide first-hand information for the Security Council so that an informed decision can be made on the utility and feasibility of further UN involvement.

This list of tasks focuses on 'hard' power aspects of securitising space for the protection of civilians and humanitarian agencies. Codner suggests that such a force would be based on the concept of the US Marine Expeditionary Unit, which numbers a total size of 2,200, though the UNIF1 force would be

considerably larger, comprising of up to 10,000 troops<sup>112</sup>. The capability of UNIF1 would be a highly trained 'specialised' infantry, whose main task would be to convey the 'diplomatic message that they genuinely represent a potential more powerful follow-on capability that could be deployed by UN sanctioned national combat forces' (Codner, 2008; 61-62). This certainly fits in with the robust end of peacekeeping operations outlined in PSO Doctrine. Codner's ideas relate to those espoused by Langille which include to provide a framework for a UN force, without the emphasis on national interest, with conflict resolution capabilities allied to the ability to defend the UN mandates and provide security to the civilian population.

A series of proposals that link the soft power aspects of Langille's with the robust framework espoused by Codner is the body of research emerging around the creation of a 'United Nations Emergency Peace Service' (UNEPS). Based at UN designated sites (including a mobile field headquarters), the force is outlined as being a 'first-in, first-out' service, designed to supplement existing UN operations as well as offering early warning and preventative capacities. With regard to personnel, Herro *et al* outline the composition of such a force:

UNEPS personnel would be individually recruited from among those who volunteer from many countries so it would not suffer the delays of ad hoc forces, the reluctance of UN members to deploy their own national units or gender, national or religious imbalance. Its personnel would be expertly trained and coherently organized to avoid the challenges of a

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<sup>112</sup> Comprising of an infantry battalion reinforced with an artillery battery, combat engineering platoon, light armored reconnaissance company, tank platoon, reconnaissance platoon, as well as other various units which would fit into particular missions.

lack of skills, equipment, cohesiveness and experience in resolving conflicts.

(Herro et al., 2009; 52)

Importantly, the UNEPS force is designed to have a considerable civilian dimension. Suthanthiraraj *et al*'s study on regional perspectives of a UNEPS force argue that although it would contain military and police contingents to 'undertake protective functions', the force will place equal emphasis on civilian non-military capacities, enabling it to 'perform certain peacebuilding as well as peacemaking functions'. Furthermore, in the UNEPS concept, civilian/military units would be created, consisting of individuals trained with 'wider professional competencies' such as social workers, health professionals, human rights lawyers and gender specialists (Suthanthiraraj et al., 2009; 15). Linking this to Ramsbotham and Woodhouse's research on cosmopolitan objectives, the desire for a civilian dimension is apparent (see Table 6.3). There is existing literature on this area of research, which deals with the wide range of roles that civilians play in conflict environments and the possible role that civilian peacekeepers can play in the future.

**Table 6.3: Woodhouse and Ramsbotham's table**

	1	2	3	4	5
<b>Theory</b>	<b>Quasi-realist</b>	<b>Pluralist</b>	<b>Solidarist</b>	<b>Cosmopolitan</b>	<b>Critical/Transformative</b>
<b>Practice</b>	Stabilization Forces	Traditional Peacekeeping	Enhanced Peace Support Operations	UN emergency Peace Services	?
<b>CR Capability</b>	Zero or low CR capacity	Limited passive CR capacity	High Military/low civilian CR capacity	High Military/High civilian CR capacity	?

### **Civilian forms of peacekeeping**

Civilian peacekeeping, as Schrich outlines, is similar to some of the more benign tasks of military peacekeeping, such as interpositioning, accompaniment, and monitoring. However, while the tools of power used by the military are the threat or use of limited force, the power in civilian peacekeeping initiatives lies with the very nature that they are *unarmed* civilians from the international community. Schrich explains:

Civilian peacekeeping works with different sources of power. Instead of weapons, civilian peacekeepers rely on nonviolent forms of power including moral authority, the power in numbers of people, the power that comes through economic and political leverage, and the power

embodied in different forms of identity, like those held by religious leaders or people with Western passports

(Schrich, 2005; 44)

Schrich outlines the potential of civilian peacekeeping to deal with a number of scenarios. These include:

- providing a human shield or moral deterrent against international or civil warfare;
- strengthening ceasefires by providing a deterrent presence and monitoring of violations;
- monitoring and reducing the likelihood of violence during elections;
- accompanying human rights activists or people who may be targeted by armed forces because of their work for peaceful social change;
- accompanying internally displaced people, refugees, communities who are threatened because of their ethnic or religious identity or their refusal to cooperate with armed groups;
- preventing terrorism by non-state actors;
- deterring violence during transitions in leadership; and/or
- preventing looting in crises or after natural disasters.

This list may look ambitious, but has roots in working examples of non-violent civilian peacekeeping taken from a wide range of organisations<sup>113</sup>. There is

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<sup>113</sup> These organisations include: Nonviolent peaceforce, Peace Brigades International, Witnesses for Peace, Christian Peacemaker teams, Servicio Internacional Para La Paz, Swedish Fellowship for Reconciliation, as well as the more traditional aid NGOs such as Oxfam, Care, the ICRC and Médecins Sans Frontières.

crossover in this list between civilian peacekeeping and military peacekeeping, through the monitoring of ceasefires, election monitoring, and protection of returning IDPs and refugees. To take one example, the organisation Non-Violent Peaceforce has been intrinsically involved with the peace process in Mindanao, a southern province in the Philippines. The organisation was invited to peace talks between the Government of the Philippines and the Moro-Islamic liberation Front (MILF), and has been able to deploy civilian peacekeepers into the conflict area, with a wide-reaching mandate (outlined in Box 6.10 below)

**Box 6.10: Non-Violent Peaceforce Strategy in Mindanao**  
(NPF, 2010)

- To enhance the scope and quality of locally based people's organizations and peace/human rights advocates.
- To reduce the incidence of violence in the vicinity of NP field sites through means of unarmed international civilian peacekeeping, thereby aiding in the maintenance of the ceasefire(s).
- To support human rights reporting mechanisms in remote conflict areas and assist/connect local and international advocacy groups that work for peace with justice by responding to people's grievances.
- To localize grassroots conflicts so that they are resolved through dialogue at the lowest level and do not snowball into larger crises.
- To provide conscious international presence by deploying international civilian peacekeepers in vulnerable areas to associate with partners from local civil society.
- To offer protective accompaniment to individuals, groups or communities wedded to non-violent solutions but exposed to threats.
- To provide neutral spaces and facilitation services to local peacemakers who attempt to resolve traditional ('rido') and non-traditional disputes carrying the potential of violence.
- To facilitate mutual sharing, learning and training on nonviolent strategies with peacemakers and authorities dealing with the peace process.
- To monitor violations of international humanitarian and human rights law, reporting them to relevant national and international agencies upon the consent of survivors.
- To interposition international civilian peacekeepers along with local peace volunteers and ceasefire monitors to boost the sanctity of buffer zones and zones of peace.

Nonviolent Peaceforce's involvement in the peace process has gained a great deal of momentum since the initial entry of the organisation in May 2007. It is now part of the International Monitoring Team (IMT), a multinational force comprised of military personnel from Malaysia, Brunei, Japan and Libya, and other civilian representation from the International Committee of the Red Cross, and a local peacebuilding organisation - Mindanao People's Caucus. The strong civilian component of the IMT allows Nonviolent Peaceforce to play a key

role in carrying out work under the Civilian Protection Component, which is tasked to 'monitor, verify and report noncompliance by the Parties to their basic undertaking to protect civilians and civilian communities' (NP, 2010; 5).

This example illustrates coordination and complementarity between military and civilian components of a peacekeeping operation, as well as a noteworthy attempt to incorporate a less militarised form of international presence to safeguard human rights and monitor issues of civilian protection. Although the results of the Mindanao case-study are yet to be seen, it can at least be argued that the IMT and its incorporation of a civilian component offers an indication of cosmopolitan forms of peacekeeping.

In addition to the practical examples in Mindanao and the development of the project from academics and practitioners, a further understanding of a possible future role of civilian peacekeeping has emerged in the policy community. In their submission to the UN's New Horizons Project (referred to in Chapter three), the Center on International Cooperation (at New York University) examined alternatives to military peacekeeping. In this study, the authors found two possible avenues for further civilian involvement in peacekeeping, arguing that the Security Council should consider deploying civilian missions in the future. The first example is through civilian observers and inspectors - standing missions or routine inspections to be deployed in areas where 'tensions take non-military forms' such as systemic human rights abuses. Examples of this are mainly in OSCE<sup>114</sup> missions and the UN's Office of the High Commissioner for

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<sup>114</sup> Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe.

Human Rights (OHCHR). The second area is through 'civilian observers with protection'. The authors found that the example of the OSCE's Kosovo Verification mission, which was backed by a US-managed 'over-the-horizon' force, was a useful case where civilian observer were able to 'provide the international community with real-time information on the situation on the ground'. Such deployments would be in conflict environments where conditions are more insecure. These two examples are important in recognising the impact of civilian peacekeeping on the 'policy community' in and around the UN Secretariat (Jones et al., 2009; 18).

### **The UN in 2010: practical considerations**

Although there are positive offshoots, the impact of policy considerations in this venture must not be downplayed, particularly current issues that are preventing the UN from being more effective in its attempts to continue with effective peacekeeping operations. It is little secret that the UN's peacekeeping architecture is overstretched. Under-Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations Alain Le Roy warned about the impact of overstretch on operations, stating in January 2009 that forces are 'spread more widely than ever before with mandates that are more complex and robust than ever' (UN, 2009n). This follows on from warnings given by his predecessor in the DPKO, Jean-Marie Guehenno, in July 2008. In numerous interviews given toward the end of his tenure, he stated that UN peacekeeping was at the 'outer limits of peacekeeping', and the UN was finding it difficult in finding troops and capacities for operations (BBC, 2008).

Gowan offers a substantial critique of current UN mechanisms to address conflict, and asserts that the UN is facing crisis in three distinct areas: a short-term crisis in deploying missions effectively; a strategic crisis in its framework for deploying new missions; and a paradigmatic crisis which underpins much of the UN's core assumptions. The short-term crisis links to fears over the UN overstretch, where the Security Council launched new operations in Timor-Leste and Darfur, heavily reinforced the UNFIL operation in Lebanon, suffered setbacks in the MONUC operation in the DRC, and failed to find an exit strategy for the Kosovo operation (UNMIK). Such commitments and setbacks have stalled the development of a 'strategic culture' within the UN, and led the organisation to a state where it is 'stumbling from short-term crisis to short-term crisis' (Gowan, 2008; 459). Gowan cites the Darfur case-study as an important example to highlight the crisis the UN faces to effectively deploy operations. The size and make up of this mission was highly ambitious, leading the UN Secretary General to consider switching personnel from other missions to the new Darfur operation, running the risk of 'cannibalizing' existing deployments. Gowan notes that somewhat ironically, the major problems did not come from the impact force generation, as the major problem was in fact deploying any soldiers at all. Much of this is due to the Sudanese government following a policy of 'obstructionism' against the force, abusing the need for consent from the host government, and demanding that the force be staffed only by African troops, even for positions where Africans were not available (Gowan, 2008; 461). Gowan argues:

Cumulatively, these problems indicate that the decisive impact of the Darfur crisis has not been to destroy the UN's peacekeeping framework as a whole, but to show how a determined government could use political demands to block its operations... Darfur has been particularly damaging for the UN because it has not fulfilled its mandate in spite of a high level of international support for its activities.

(Gowan, 2008; 461)

Finally, Gowan outlines a deeper difficulty for the UN system - a paradigmatic crisis, where some of the fundamental principles of UN peacekeeping are brought into question. The Darfur operation was not the only one which questioned the idea of consent, with other operations (Burundi, Ethiopia-Eritrea, Afghanistan) either being asked to withdraw from the country or finding themselves in opposition to the host government. Gowan notes that in more cases, leaders in Africa and Afghanistan appeared to be 'prioritizing their political autonomy over the benefits of an integrated UN plan' (Gowan, 2008; 463). From this, Gowan asserts that key assertions of UN peacebuilding strategies – based on liberal underpinnings – were being questioned by national governments, which in the UN's eyes, the organisation was helping. Most disturbingly, in Gowan's opinion, was the operation in the DRC, which has continually been beset by difficulty. One such difficulty is a government which:

...seemed less interested in finishing the transition from war to peace in 2007 than in using force against its opponents in the east of the country, dragging a wary UN along with it

(Gowan, 2008; 463)

Gowan finally notes the alarm that was raised when the government announced a US\$9.25 billion project with the Chinese government to swap mineral resources for infrastructure projects, and links this to the UN's declared principles on peacebuilding:

If these were meant to align security and economic assistance, but the model and ability to implement it was now in question, how could it carry any political credibility?

(Gowan, 2008; 464)

In addition to this crisis is the search for agreement from a potentially divisive Security Council. This is a concern for the UN, as much of its most recent literature notes the reliance on unanimity within the Security Council, in its strategic direction and production of clear and achievable mandates. Such policy considerations need to be clearly kept in mind when negotiating the complexities of strengthening UN capacities. The UN is one of the few bodies, if not the only body that carries a degree of international legitimacy. However, it is an organisation that is beset by difficulties.

Such a warning about the UN's capacity does not negate its importance to pursue a cosmopolitan agenda. There is also no end of literature which deals with forms of reform to the UN, and its mechanisms to deal with conflict. Cosmopolitan scholars link any development in the UN peacekeeping structures to the development of the UN's larger democratic structures, such as the Security Council (Held, 1995; 279, Woodhouse and Ramsbotham, 2005; 153). Others see a very clear pathway to the UN assuming control of a standing force. Childers argues that the parameters of a UN force are already clear. His case for the formation of such a force follows these arguments:

If it were to be made accountable to the General Assembly, the repository of democratic legitimacy of the United Nations, it would perhaps be an admirable goal. If access to this standing army, or even to its supplies and cargo planes and medical-evacuation units, was made available to the regional organizations functioning in Africa, in Asia, in the Middle East, in Latin America; or if representatives of the Non-Aligned Movement, the Group of 77, were somehow institutionalized within its leadership; or if the links and accountability to the humanitarian and economic development providers within the UN system and the NGOs outside it could somehow be assured – then and only then, would such a plan bode well for dealing with the root causes, economic and social, of the world's unrest.

(Childers, 1994; 173)

Linking this to a more democratised UN, Woodhouse and Ramsbotham contend that widening the representation on the Security Council is a major consideration in order to pursue a cosmopolitan peacekeeping force.

Thus, it is of critical importance that cosmopolitan peacekeeping is linked to major reforms in the UN. If reform is achieved, a cosmopolitan peacekeeping force could be a 'force for good', and not a new manifestation of the powerful creating control mechanisms to ensure that a status quo exists in the international order

### ***Conclusions***

Through investigating the role of conflict resolution in military training for peacekeeping, this chapter outlines three important conclusions:

- 1) There is evidence to suggest that conflict resolution theory and practice is incorporated into training programmes for military peacekeepers. This has developed significantly since 1994.
- 2) Training in non-traditional military skills contributes to the roles and responsibilities of military peacekeepers
- 3) There exists a strong suggestion - in both the literature and through fieldwork examples - that there is evidence of an emerging cosmopolitan conception of peacekeeping.

The chapter analyses these conclusions, and in doing so, offers a valuable contribution to the conflict resolution literature.

Importantly, this chapter has shown that there is a convergence between military practitioners, conflict resolution scholars, and cosmopolitan scholars over the future requirements for military peacekeepers. Through an analysis of the literature and training observations, this thesis suggests that if current trends continue the 'soldier diplomat' of the future will: be trained in conflict resolution techniques akin to Fetherston's *contact skills*; possess the capabilities to make considered judgements on 'blurred lines' such as rules of engagement and the complex nature of peacebuilding activity; and, be deployed in operations where protection of civilians will play a critical role. However, the missing part of the equation is exactly who that soldier will represent. In a fully cosmopolitan outlook, he or she will represent a standing UN force. In a more pragmatic outlook, the soldier diplomat will be representing a state with cosmopolitan values. This thesis suggests that although current capacities are still state-centric, there is cause for cosmopolitans to be optimistic. The operationalisation of cosmopolitan principles is not an idea which has little grounding in reality: quite the opposite. The development of peacebuilding practice in the UN, the importance attached to protection of civilians, the integration of civil-military cooperation into military practice, and the incorporation of 'soft' power roles in military training all suggest an evolution towards cosmopolitan conceptions of peacekeeping operations.

Turning to the conflict resolution literature, this chapter highlights where there have been developments in training since Fetherston's 1994 thesis, which espoused the requirement for *contact skills* in training programmes. This has

been predominantly through the observed training programmes at RMAS, UNTSI and through the UN CPTMs, as well as through the increased attention that conflict resolution scholars have paid to military peacekeeping (particularly at University of Bradford's Department of Peace Studies). Both these areas have been thoroughly surveyed throughout this thesis. The chapter also highlights two new areas of development: the spread of peacekeeping training institutions (such as UNTSI), and the increasing value of Information Communication Technology (ICT) in spreading training programmes. It is the view of this thesis that these areas will grow and will be mutually reinforcing. The expanding potential of ICT will allow further collaboration between training institutions, and this in turn will strengthen bonds between them, allowing for further dissemination of good practice. Both areas also share a common theme insofar as they provide excellent locations to develop new forms of training practice, and experiment in learning practice. It is in these spaces where ideas drawn from the conflict resolution field can have a dramatic impact. Again, this offers a cause to be optimistic, as the conflict resolution field will continue to offer new and innovative ways to understand and meet the challenges posed by contemporary peacekeeping deployments.

The following section concludes the thesis by drawing on the predominant themes of the project, as well as offering future avenues for research.



## **Future research agendas**

This thesis provides a significant contribution to the field of conflict resolution research. It determines where there are further manifestations between the fields of conflict resolution and military peacekeeping, by using examples of training theory and practice to understand how conflict resolution skills are being imparted to soldiers preparing for deployment. At the same time, the thesis demonstrates the emergence of cosmopolitan peacekeeping, with training programmes highlighting the need to understand issues pertaining to the protection of civilians and the importance of understanding the peacebuilding functions of an operation.

The research project has further achieved the aims set out in the introduction. These are explored in greater depth in the discussion chapter, but it is worth comparing the research aims to the findings presented. This is done in table 7.1:

**Table 7.1: Comparison between research aims and findings**

Research Question	Finding
In what ways does military peacekeeping training show evidence of conflict resolution theory and practice? (In what direction has training for military peacekeeping developed since 1994?)	<i>There is evidence to suggest that conflict resolution theory and practice is incorporated into training programmes for military peacekeepers. This has developed significantly since 1994</i>
In light of the new roles and responsibilities placed on military peacekeepers, is there evidence that training in non-traditional military skills assists military peacekeepers adapt to the changing nature of deployment zones?	<i>There exists sufficient evidence to suggest that training in non-traditional military skills assists military peacekeepers in adapting to new roles and responsibilities encountered in deployment zones</i>
Does this indicate evidence of a cosmopolitan conception of peacekeeping? (Can we find evidence - both practically and in the peacekeeping literature - of the emergence of a different type of soldier more aligned with cosmopolitan ideals?)	<i>There exists a strong suggestion - in both the literature and through fieldwork examples - that there is evidence of an emerging cosmopolitan conception of peacekeeping</i>

The research project further adds to the literature in two main ways. Firstly, the thesis contributes to the conflict resolution literature by surveying where conflict resolution scholars have dealt with the issue of military peacekeeping. Starting with Galtung's seminal study of Norwegian peacekeepers stationed in the Middle East in 1976, the thesis charted not only how military peacekeeping has been conceptualised, but also where academic scholarship has sought to

influence this once highly militarised activity. The thesis further adds to the literature by offering an account of the 'Bradford model' of conflict resolution research, cultivated at the Centre for Conflict Resolution at the University of Bradford. This allows the thesis to chart how the two fields have developed, and place this particular thesis within that research tradition. Through this survey, the thesis records the first steps made in the 'Bradford model' towards promoting cosmopolitan conceptions of peacekeeping and international conflict resolution (Woodhouse and Ramsbotham, 2005, Curran and Woodhouse, 2007). Although this is a new area of research, it offers a logical area in which to place this thesis.

As well as this survey, individual chapters link thematic areas to wider conceptions of conflict resolution. Civil-military cooperation has been linked to Lederach's comprehensive approach to peacebuilding, which targets all levels of the society, from the political leaders at the top, through the local leaders in the middle, down to the local grassroots and combatants at the bottom. At the 'bottom', civil-military cooperation strategies are understood as having the potential to facilitate for Conflict transformation, which aims to 'actively envision, include, respect, and promote the human and cultural resources from within a given setting' (Lederach, 1995; 213). Lederach's approaches to elicitive forms of training are also examined in the context of military training for peacekeeping operations, as the thesis charts a development in *how* peacekeepers are trained (Lederach, 1996; 56-58). Moreover, an amended version of Fisher, Ury and Patton's approach to understanding negotiation (Fisher et al., 1991) is employed as a lens to examine a negotiation scenario observed at the

*Broadsword* exercise (Goodwin, 2005), and a consideration of the *prisoners dilemma* is used to explain the importance of negotiation in longer-term peacebuilding (Hopmann, 1996, Ramsbotham et al., 2005; 17).

This thesis further contributes to the conflict resolution field through charting the development of negotiation training in the UK military, as well as the importance of understanding negotiation at the tactical level - below the more formal areas of civil-military cooperation. Accordingly, this allows the thesis to further examine the peacekeeping literature - in this case, the journal *International Peacekeeping* - to determine where negotiation experiences set at the tactical level have been discussed. From this, it was concluded that the vast number of negotiation experiences at the tactical level covered in the literature are generally of an *ad hoc* nature. Thus, the thesis adds to the literature dealing with negotiation by examining training programmes and exercises which deal specifically with this important aspect of contemporary peacekeeping deployments.

Further to the contribution to the conflict resolution field, this thesis has contributed to the emergent field of cosmopolitan conflict resolution. In the first chapter, the thesis used Woodhouse and Ramsbotham's framework. This shall be looked at again in Box 7.1:

**Box 7.1: Conflict Levels and Focal Points in the Development of Cosmopolitan Peacekeeping**

(Woodhouse and Ramsbotham, 2005; 143)

Conflict Levels and Focal Points in the Development of Peacekeeping

(1) **Global:** (Rapid Reaction Emergency Forces/Services)



**International**

SHIRBRIG (limited to Chapter 6 operations)

UN Standby Arrangements System

Sixteen extant missions (Jan 2004)



(2) **Regional:** Regional Peacekeeping Coalitions (EU, AU, NATO)

(3) **Sub-regional:** ECOMOG and other African sub-regions

(4) **National:** Lead Nations (UK in Sierra Leone; Australia in East Timor; France in Ivory Coast)



(5) **Conflict party/Conflict locale**

CIMIC and Community Liaison and Mediation Programmes:

Cross community peacebuilding and post conflict reconstruction programmes

**Key: Arrows show desired direction of capacity building and empowerment needed for the development of cosmopolitan peacekeeping**

This thesis contributes to the understanding of, and further enhances, cosmopolitan capacities at level five of this matrix. Throughout the thesis, there is a considered analysis of the military aspects of this area, In particular, how training has been configured to facilitate the expansion of civil-military cooperation strategies, the development of training with regard to increasing soldiers' ability to liaise with the host community, and the increased

understanding of peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction programmes (and the role of the military within this wider picture).

As well as contributing to research at the lower levels, this thesis contributes to the requirement for further research toward the top levels of this matrix. Through examining the new demands on peacekeepers, and how militaries are learning to cope with such new demands, this thesis (in its discussion chapter) outlines an emerging cosmopolitan ethic amongst the training regimes in the observed militaries, informing wider debates about cosmopolitan forms of peacekeeping. Firstly, at the national level, the thesis offered a brief examination of a state which has highly developed training programmes, but is presently lacking a cosmopolitan approach (the United Kingdom), and a state which, although relatively small in size and deployment, has a cosmopolitan ethic running through its military institutions (Ireland).

At the very top level, the thesis contributes to the cosmopolitan literature by offering a strong account of current UN developments, and how they link to cosmopolitan conceptions of conflict resolution. As referred to throughout this thesis, the UN is widely seen as the vehicle to move global cosmopolitan objectives forward in a legitimate manner. The thesis assessed this aspect of the UN, through an examination of Rubenstein's *root metaphors* of the UN, as a symbol of world order 'not dominated by national interests', where the 'the weak are empowered, the hungry fed, disease conquered, and conflicts settled peacefully'. According to Rubenstein, peacekeeping operations once represented a 'military without weapons in the service of peace' to reinforce an

image of an international community 'acting in a neutral, consensual manner to sustain a stable world economy' (Rubenstein, 2005; 356-357). Noting that Rubenstein now questions these root metaphors in the light of UN activities throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, the thesis argues that there *is* enough evidence to suggest that such root metaphors still exist, and in turn, the UN continues to be a legitimate vehicle for the development of cosmopolitan principles. Policies which ask military peacekeepers to be prepared use force to protect the most vulnerable civilians within a conflict zone, as well as cross cutting mandates which not only see the civilian population as vulnerable, but also as valuable peacebuilders in their own right.

It is at this juncture where this concluding chapter will examine possible areas for future research.

### **Future research agendas:**

The most obvious area for future research is to understand the impact of training on military peacekeepers. Understanding the impact of conflict resolution training of military peacekeepers will continue to be of critical importance. A number of studies from academic and policy fields have sought to add to the considerable anecdotal evidence about the effectiveness (or ineffectiveness) of peacekeepers in contributing to positive peace in a conflict zone, yet very few have been able to chart the impact of negotiation training in peacekeeping environments. A considerable study of a peacekeeping operation is thus required. Again, examples exist: Galtung's study of UNIFIL contingents in 1976 (Galtung, 1976b) offers a prime example, as does Wall and Druckman's

2003 research on mediation in operations (Wall and Druckman, 2003). Such an examination may require an extended period of time with a peacekeeping contingent.

At the time of writing, the UN is without any official standing capacity. Although the failure of the SHIRBRIG model to provide a long-standing solution to rapid deployment is disheartening, it does not mean that the debate about strengthening UN capacities is over. In fact, it leaves opportunities to discuss where the UN can feasibly develop new rapid reaction capacity. In the previous chapter, this thesis examined calls and proposals for a standing UN capacity. In assessing these options, the chapter concluded that a contributing factor to the demise of the SHIRBRIG initiative was that it was an initiative of a number of member states. In the end, according to the official lessons learned reports, it was not in the interests of enough of those states to keep the initiative alive. As a result of this, this thesis proposes that space exists for more radical solutions based on developing cosmopolitan capacities for international peacekeeping operations. Questions will remain over the long-term viability of relying on nation states to 'pull together' to create standing capacities: governments and priorities can change very quickly. Therefore, in looking toward more radical conceptions of peace, we return to Pugh's argument in the first chapter that peace support operations will be likely to be increasingly subtle and flexible in responding to crises, providing expert teams similar to disaster relief specialists, providing preventative action, economic aid and civilian protection. Importantly for cosmopolitans, Pugh contends that this may only happen if such forces are released from the 'state-centric control system', making them 'answerable to a

more transparent, democratic and accountable institutional arrangement'. Moreover, Pugh finds that such a scheme would be based on a permanent military volunteer force 'recruited directly among individuals predisposed to cosmopolitan rather than patriotic values' (Pugh, 2004; 53). This assertion is where Woodhouse and Ramsbotham take their starting point, and further reinforces existing understandings of cosmopolitan forms of conflict management (Elliot, 2004, Held, 1995, Kaldor, 2001).

How would a continuation of this research fit into this more radical conception of future peacekeeping? In outlining the training needs currently placed on soldiers in peacekeeping operations, this thesis has outlined the fundamental importance of training related to civil-military cooperation and wider peacekeeping, training of how to more effectively relate with the host civilian population, and the importance of negotiation skills for peacekeepers. Further research into how to operationalise cosmopolitan values, aligned with conflict resolution theory would be of value here.

One route to examining this is through collating the wide and varied number of training regimes which exist for military peacekeepers. Training exists at sub-national, national, sub-regional, regional, and international levels. It involves a multitude of actors from training centres, academic institutions, militaries, private contractors, and non-governmental organisations. This is also not to mention training for soldiers once they are deployed. Although this thesis has succeeded in offering a substantial examination of training for peacekeeping operations, it analyses a relatively limited number of training initiatives. There is

thus certainly scope for further research into the different forms of training offered. Importantly this should not just be a 'check list' of training institutions and courses on offer: there is much more scope than that, particularly with regard to the links with conflict resolution. This thesis found that in order for peacekeepers to comprehend the 'grey areas' of deployment, greater autonomy is needed in decision making. In turn, this impacts training programmes, with a number of them employing what Lederach termed as *elicitive* forms of training. This is an area that can be further examined in future study. It is also worth studying the cultural aspects of such training programmes. Each training institution has a different approach to how they perceive peacekeeping operations. In UNTSI, for example, trainers remarked about 'Irish solutions to Irish problems'. Using a more ethnographic approach to understanding training, in order to grasp the prevailing military cultures from the troop contributors would be of use. This leads to investigating whether certain programmes instil a 'cosmopolitan ethic' into training programmes, at the levels outlined above. Such a study may be able to uncover whether there are any discernable patterns in the development of cosmopolitan ethics in training.

Such research can further align itself with the cosmopolitan desire for a standing UN force. Through charting where cosmopolitan ethics lie in training on a much wider level, a training programme can be developed for military peacekeepers who would enter into such a standing force. This thesis has already deciphered a number of areas where there are cosmopolitan values embodied in training practice (whether this is intended or not). Furthermore, within the Centre for Conflict Resolution, a considerable amount of knowledge

and practical experience exists. This valuable resource (already made operational through the e-learning course outlined in the previous chapter) can be engaged with further to create a solid training programme for a standing UN capacity based on cosmopolitan values.

As cosmopolitan authors have stated, any attempt of a standing UN capacity should have at its heart, a commitment to aligning the peacekeeping and peacebuilding aspects of an operation, offering alternative forms of pluralistic democracy, and not offering a purely securitised peace as there is a danger of replicating existing power structures. Returning to Rubenstein's root metaphors, an ability to provide space to those groups who have been most marginalised through a period of prolonged violence is essential if the UN is to remain a legitimate enterprise for international conflict resolution. Ensuring military peacekeepers understand their role within such a framework is of crucial importance, as these peacekeepers are at the critical interface where negative peace meets positive peacebuilding projects. If peacekeepers are to act 'less like a conflict manager and more like a midwife at the birth of a new society' (Ryan, 2000; 40), then they must be trained to encounter the complex challenges that this role inevitably brings. It is therefore encouraging to chart the continued relevance of conflict resolution approaches on the field of military peacekeeping.

## Annex 1: UN CPTM On Sexual Abuse and Exploitation

**46** • Unit 4 - Part 1: Conduct and Discipline

### Questions for Scenarios

Please read the scenario/s and answer the following questions:

- a. **Has the UN personnel actually or attempted to abuse a position of vulnerability for sexual purposes?**

Yes/No

- b. **Has the UN personnel actually or attempted to abuse differential power for sexual purposes?**

Yes/No

- c. **Has the UN personnel in this scenario actually or attempted to abuse trust, for sexual purposes?**

Yes/No

- d. **Does this scenario constitute prohibited act(s)?**

Yes/No

- e. **Which uniform standards on sexual exploitation and abuse have been violated? List as many as apply.**

### Answers for Misconduct Scenarios

#### Scenarios covering prohibited acts of Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse for the various categories of United Nations personnel

The following scenarios demonstrate examples of prohibited acts under the current standards of conduct expected of all categories of UN personnel (civilian, civilian police, military observers and military members of national contingents) as set out in the UN Staff Rules and Regulations and/or the DPKO Disciplinary Directives (including the Ten Rules: Code of Personal Conduct for Blue Helmets). These acts also specifically violate standards listed in: ST/SGB/2003/13 on Special Measures for Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse; and ST/SGB/1999/13 on Observance by United Nations Forces of International Humanitarian Law. N.B. Allegations and reports of sexual harassment are covered by separate procedures described in ST/SGB/253 and ST/AI/379 (as may be amended).

The acts described below constitute misconduct and could lead to the appropriate disciplinary and administrative measures, such as summary dismissal or recommendation to repatriate. More information on determining the relevant procedures to be followed when alleged acts of misconduct occur should be obtained from the relevant Department/Agency Headquarters.

EXAMPLE OF PROHIBITED ACT	WHY IT CONSTITUTES MISCONDUCT
<p>1. Betty is a 16 year old girl living in a small village. Betty has four younger brothers and sisters. Her parents do not have very much money and find it very difficult to provide the costs for education, clothing and food for all of the children. There had even been some discussion about Betty dropping out of school to assist her mother in working at the market. However, all the problems have been solved as Betty has started a sexual relationship with Johnson, a senior UNHCR officer. He has promised to pay for her school fees and help to pay for her brothers and sisters to continue with their education. Betty's parents are very relieved that this opportunity has come and encourage Betty to maintain the relationship. It has really helped the family and now all the children can continue in school.</p>	<p>a. Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/>      b. Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/>            c. Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/>      d. Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/>            e. Sexual activity with children (persons under the age of 18) is prohibited.</p> <p>Exchange of money, employment, goods, assistance or services for sex, e.g. sex with prostitutes, is prohibited.</p> <p><b>Full Explanation:</b></p> <p>Under section 3.2 (b) of the Secretary-General's Bulletin ST/SGB/2003/13, Johnson is prohibited from sexual activity with anyone under 18, regardless of the local age of consent. This encounter also constitutes sexual exploitation as defined in section 3.2 (c) of ST/SGB/2003/13: Johnson has abused a position of differential power for sexual purposes, by exchanging money for sexual access.</p>

2. Carlos, a military commander posted in the southern district, has helped set up a boys' soccer club in the town where his national contingent is deployed. Carlos enjoys the soccer games, but he particularly enjoys the access the club gives him to local adolescents. He gives presents (magazines, candy, sodas, pens) to various boys in exchange for sexual acts. He thinks there's nothing wrong with this, since the boys like the presents he gives them.

a. Yes  No  b. Yes  No

c. Yes  No  d. Yes  No

e. Sexual activity with children (persons under the age of 18) is prohibited.

Exchange of money, employment, goods, assistance or services for sex, e.g. sex with prostitutes, is prohibited.

**Full explanation:**

Carlos' acts are in violation of the Ten Rules: Code of Personal Conduct for Blue Helmets and ST/SGB/1999/13 on Observance by UN Forces of International Humanitarian Law. He has abused a position of differential power for sexual purposes, by exchanging money and goods for sexual favours. Such acts constitute serious misconduct. In addition, Carlos is in breach of the same policy for performing sexual acts with children (anyone under 18, regardless of the local age of consent).

3. Joey is a locally-hired driver for a UN agency, who transports relief items from the warehouse to the refugee camp where the items are distributed. On one of his trips he recognized a 15-year old refugee girl walking on the side of the road and gave her a lift back to the camp. Since then, to impress her and win her over, he frequently offers to drive her wherever she is going and sometimes gives her small items from the relief packages in his truck, which he thinks she and her family could use. The last time he drove her home she asked him inside her house to meet her family. The family was pleased that she had made friends with a UN worker. Joey really likes the girl and wants to start a sexual relationship with her. He knows her family will approve.

a. Yes  No  b. Yes  No

c. Yes  No  d. Yes  No

e. Exchange of money, employment, goods, assistance or services for sex, e.g. sex with prostitutes, is prohibited.

**Full explanation:**

Under section 3.2 (b) of the Secretary-General's Bulletin ST/SGB/2003/13, Joey is prohibited from sexual activity with anyone under 18, regardless of the local age of consent. Moreover, the rules also strongly discourage sexual relationships between UN staff and beneficiaries of assistance, since they are based on inherently unequal power dynamics and undermine the credibility and integrity of the work of the UN (see section 3.2 (d) of ST/SGB/2003/13).

4. Marie is a 30-year-old refugee whose desperate circumstances have forced her into prostitution. On Saturday night she was picked up by John, a UNICEF staff member in a UN car, as he was driving back home after dinner. John took her home and paid her for sex. As prostitution is not illegal in the country where he is posted, he figured he was doing nothing wrong.

a. Yes  No  b. Yes  No

c. Yes  No  d. Yes  No

e. Exchange of money, employment, goods, assistance or services for sex, e.g. sex with prostitutes, is prohibited.

**Full explanation:**

The exchange of money for sexual services violates the standards of conduct expected of any category of UN personnel. In this case, (involving a civilian staff member) the act violates section 3.2 (c) of the Secretary-General's Bulletin ST/SGB/2003/13.

5. Josie is an adolescent refugee girl in one of the camps. Pieter, one of the food distribution staff, who works for WFP, has offered to give her a little extra during the distribution if she will be his "special friend". She agrees willingly. Both of them agree that they should start a sexual relationship and neither one of them think that anything is wrong. Josie hopes that the relationship will be a passport to a new life in another country, and Pieter does nothing to discourage these hopes.

a. Yes  No  b. Yes  No

c. Yes  No  d. Yes  No

e. Exchange of money, employment, goods, assistance or services for sex, e.g. sex with prostitutes, is prohibited.

**Full explanation:**

Pieter's relationship with Josie constitutes sexual exploitation: exchange of goods for sex or sexual favours is explicitly prohibited under section 3.2 (c) of ST/SGB/2003/13. This includes any exchange of assistance that is due to beneficiaries of assistance. Moreover (and irrespective of the local age of consent) if Josie is under 18, Pieter is in violation of section 3.2 (b) of ST/SGB/2003/13.

6. Darlene is a CIVPOL. She's always on the lookout for good business opportunities since she has to support her family back home. She's asked by another CIVPOL, Stanislas, to contribute some of her MSA towards renovating a bar in the town, in return for a cut of the bar's profits. Darlene soon finds she's getting a steady income from the bar, and gives more money to hire more staff,

a. Yes  No  b. Yes  No

c. Yes  No  d. Yes  No

e. The peacekeepers and CIVPOLs using prostitutes are exchanging money for sex, and sex with prostitutes, is prohibited.

**Full explanation:**

Darlene and Stanislas are aiding sexual

including security, and so on. She herself doesn't go to the bar, but she knows that there is a lot of prostitution going on there and that several peacekeepers and CIVPOLs use the bar often. However, she doesn't think that concerns her, since she isn't directly involved in those issues. She's just glad of the extra money.

exploitation. This violates the Ten Rules: Code of Personal Conduct for Peacekeepers. The peacekeepers and CIVPOLs who frequent the bar are engaged in sexual exploitation. For these categories of personnel, using a prostitute violates the Ten Rules: Code of Personal Conduct for Blue Helmets and the ST/SGB/1999/13 On Observance by UN Forces of International Humanitarian Law.

7. Sven is a Military Observer. He has developed a close relationship with his landlady, Amanna, who also does his cleaning. They eat meals together and talk in broken English. Amanna's family (her husband and three young children) was killed in the violence that engulfed the country five years ago, so she is very lonely and enjoys the opportunity to talk. One night Sven returns from a reception for the Force Commander who has been visiting the district where he is deployed. Sven is drunk. He has not had sex for eight months. He presses Amanna to come to his bedroom, urging her to make love with him. Amanna looks extremely embarrassed, and tries to leave the room. Sven's sure she likes him, but is just being shy. Then he changes tactics, and tells her he will have to think of leaving her house and finding a new home if she won't come to bed with him. Amanna is horrified at the prospect of losing her only source of income, so she complies with his demands. After all the violence she has seen, she has come to expect this kind of behaviour from men, but she had thought that Sven would be different. She was wrong about that.

a. Yes  No  b. Yes  No

c. Yes  No  d. Yes  No

e. Exchange of money, employment, goods, assistance or services for sex, e.g. sex with prostitutes, is prohibited.

**Full explanation:**

Sven has breached the Ten Rules: Code of Personal Conduct for Peacekeepers, by using his differential position of power to coerce Amanna into having sex with him.

Produced by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee Task Force on Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse

**Acknowledgement:** A number of the scenarios above have been adapted from materials contained in the Facilitator's Guide: *Understanding Humanitarian Aid Worker Responsibilities: Sexual Exploitation and Abuse Prevention*, produced by the Coordination Committee for the Prevention of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in Sierra Leone.

## Annex 2 - list of IAPTC member states

Country	Centre's Name
Argentina	Training Centre for Foreign Missions (CENCAMEX)
Austria	The Austrian International Operations Command/Centre for Operations Preparation or International Peace Support Command(AIPSC)
Austria	Austrian Study Centre for Peace and Conflict Resolution (ASPR)
Bolivia	Peacekeeping Centre and Consulting (PKC&C)
Bosnia-Herzegovina	Peace Support Operations Training Centre (PSOTC)
Brazil	CEPAEB
Bulgaria	Gueorgui S. Rakovski National Defence And Staff College Peacekeeping Training Centre
Canada	The Canadian Forces Centre for Excellence for Peace Support Operations
Chile	UNITAR-POCI
China	Peacekeeping Affairs Office, Ministry of National Defence
China	Peacekeeping CIVPOL Training Centre
Cote d'Ivoire	Peacekeeping School of Zambakro
Croatia	International Military Operations Training Centre (IMOC)
Czech Republic	Peacekeeping Operations Training Centre
Democratic People's Republic of Korea	PKO Dept, National Defence College
Denmark	Danish Army Logistics School
Denmark	Danish International Logistics Centre

Ecuador	Peacekeeping Operations Departments (Joint Operations)
El Salvador	Agregado de Defensa en Chile
Estonia	Estonian Peace Operations Centre
European Union	Military Staff
Fiji	Police Academy
Fiji	Peacekeeping Force Training Group
Finland	Crisis Management Centre
Finland	Finnish Defence Forces International Centre
France	Gendarmerie National International Training Centre
Germany	UN Training Centre
Germany	Fuehrungsakademie der Bundeswehr (Ge Armed Forces Command & Staff College)
Germany	Centre for Intersectional Peace Operations
Germany	Police Academy, Wertheirrmain
Greece	Hellenic Multinational PSOs Training Centre
Hungary	Defence HQ Peace Support Training Centre
Hungary	Ministry of Defence, Joint Staff, Operational Directorate, Peacekeeping and Crisis
Hungary	Zrinyi Miklos Military Academy
Indonesia	Department of Defence and Security Peacekeeping Operations
Indonesia	Indonesia Peacekeeping Centre
Ireland	UN Training School (UNTSI)
Israel	IDF Liaison and Foreign Relations Division
Italy	United Nations Staff College
Italy	Sant' Anna School of University Studies & Doctoral Research Via Carducci
Ivory Coast	Peacekeeping Training Centre
Jamaica	Jamaica Defence Force HQ
Jordan	Institute of Diplomacy
Jordan	Jordan Armed Forces Peacekeeping Academy
Kenya	Kenya Peace Support Training Centre (PSTC)
Lebanon	Lebanese Army HQ - Directorate of Training
Lithuania	Peacekeeping Training Branch/ General A. Ramanauskas Combat Training Centre
Malawi	Peacekeeping Training Centre

Malaysia	Malaysian Peacekeeping Training Centre
Malta	Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies
Mongolia	Peacekeeping Operation Office
Myanmar	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
NATO	NATO HQ, SHAPE, CIMIC Group North
Nepal	Royal Nepal Army Peacekeeping Training Centre
New Zealand	New Zealand Defence Force
Nigeria	National War College
Nigeria	Legion Centre for International Affairs (LECIA)
Northern Ireland	UN Training Advisory Team
Norway	Norwegian Armed Forces Peacekeeping Training Centre
Norway	Norwegian Institute for International Affairs
Pakistan	Peacekeeping Training Programme and School
Paraguay	Centro de Institutos Militares de Operaciones Especiales (CIMOE)
Peru	Joint Command of the Army Forces
Philippines	AFP Peacekeeping Operations Centre
Poland	National Defence University
Poland	Military Training Centre for PSOs
Portugal	National Republican Guard Practical School
Republic of Korea	The Special Warfare Training Group
Republic of Moldova	Training Centre for Peacekeeping Missions
Romania	PfP Regional Training Centre
Russia	Police Peacekeeping Training Centre
Russia	Peacekeeping Military Training Centre
Senegal	Senegal Peacekeeping Training Headquarters
Singapore	SAF Peacekeeping Office
Slovakia	UN Training Centre
South Africa	Peace Mission Training Centre (PMTC)
South Africa	Institute for Defence Policy
Spain	Coordination and International Cooperation Unit
Swaziland	Umbutto Swaziland Defence Force
Sweden	Swedish Police Peace Support Operations
Sweden	International Peacekeeping Training Centre
Switzerland	Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP)
Switzerland	Swiss Armed Forces International Command Training Centre (SWISSINT)
Thailand	Peace Operations Centre

The Netherlands	Netherlands School for Peace Operations
The Netherlands	Chief Training Education, CIMIC Group North, NATO
The Netherlands	Royal Netherlands Army
Turkey	PfP Training Centre
Ukraine	Peacekeeping Veterans Association
Ukraine	Yavoriv PSO and Security Training Centre
Ukraine	PfP Coordination Centre
United Kingdom	Operation Training Advisory Group (OPTAG)
United Nations	UNHCR
United Nations	OCHA
United States	Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI)
United States	Inter American Defence College
United States	Potomacs Strategies International
United States	JFDC- Joint Forces Staff College
United States	Centre for Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance
United States	Global Peace Operations Initiative
Uruguay	Peacekeeping National System (SINOMAP), Uruguayan Army
Uruguay	Uruguay Peacekeeping Operations School
Zambia	Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies
Zimbabwe	SADC Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre



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