



University of Bradford eThesis

This thesis is hosted in [Bradford Scholars](#) – The University of Bradford Open Access repository. Visit the repository for full metadata or to contact the repository team



© University of Bradford. This work is licenced for reuse under a [Creative Commons Licence](#).

RESPONDING TO CHILDREN AFFECTED BY ARMED CONFLICT

A CASE STUDY OF SAVE THE CHILDREN FUND (1919-1999)

Patricia SELLICK

submitted for the degree
of Doctor of Philosophy

Department of Peace Studies

University of Bradford

2001

Abstract

Patricia SELLICK:

RESPONDING TO CHILDREN AFFECTED BY ARMED CONFLICT

A CASE STUDY OF SAVE THE CHILDREN FUND (1919-1999)

Key words: children, human rights, international non-governmental organization, pacifism, Save the Children Fund, universalism, utilitarianism, war, youth.

Save the Children Fund (SCF) was at its foundation in 1919 a value-driven organization. The values, or guiding principles, of the founding generation are the lens through which I look at the history of SCF, and the associated histories of war and peace, human rights and NGO-state relations. These guiding principles are identified as universalism, utilitarianism and optimistic pacifism. They can be understood as a paradigm to which the social community which made up the founding generation of SCF gave their assent.

The first chapter locates the founding generation within the political culture of the anti-war movement. Succeeding chapters detail the metamorphosis of SCF from a contentious social movement into a respectable national organization. As soon as the organization adopted a national rather than a universal orientation, the coordinates of all its guiding principles shifted. In particular the optimistic pacifism of the founding generation was replaced by pessimistic defencism. It was not until after the Cold War that SCF began to realign itself with its original guiding principles.

The three guiding principles are found to be of continuing relevance. Universalism has been reasserted as a positive creed leading SCF to seize political opportunities to reach out to children from all sides. The organization has adopted a utilitarian perspective that affirms the dynamic role of young people in generating their own futures. Lastly, the primacy attached to peace by war-affected people has underlined SCF's urgent mission to uphold an optimistic belief in the possibility of peace.

Contents

| | | |
|----------------------------|---|------|
| Dedication | | v |
| Acknowledgements | | vi |
| Abbreviations and Acronyms | | vii |
| Figure 1. | | viii |
| Introduction | | 1 |
| Chapter 1 | The founding generation | 12 |
| Chapter 2 | Within the lifetime of Eglantyne Jebb (1919-1928) | 39 |
| Chapter 3 | An organization in retreat from idealism (1929-1939) | 61 |
| Chapter 4 | The Second World War and the National Point of View (1939-1945) | 88 |
| Chapter 5 | The early Cold War (1945-1959) | 114 |
| Chapter 6 | Decolonization: the gap widens between relief and development (1960-1975) | 143 |
| Chapter 7 | Rolling back the darkness (1976-1989) | 176 |

| | | |
|--------------|---|-----|
| Chapter 8 | After the Cold War: the continuing relevance of organizational values (1990-1999) | 216 |
| Conclusion | | 268 |
| Appendix | | 283 |
| Bibliography | | 284 |

For my grandmother

Acknowledgements

I was fortunate to be the holder of the Vera Steele Studentship in Peace Research within the Department of Peace Studies. I was also very fortunate to have Andrew Rigby as my supervisor. This thesis would not have taken the shape it has without the benefit of his principled vision and candour, or been completed without his generous encouragement. Nick Lewer has given his insight and assistance in the final stages.

This thesis has its origins in my involvement with young people in Palestine, Afghanistan, Tajikistan and the UK through work with Quaker Peace and Service, Minority Rights Group, SCF and Asylum Welcome. I am grateful to these young people for their example of energy, resilience, and courage.


Susan Sneddon, SCF Archivist, brought the history of SCF alive for me during my visits to the archives. Mary Hawkins and Frances Moore were particularly helpful in their discussions with me of their part in that history. Staff of the Refugee Studies Centre Documentation Centre and the Bodleian Library could be relied upon to find additional sources. Tom Buchanan generously gave of his time to read and comment upon the thesis. Penny Maddrell and Dennis Bailey were helpful proof-readers.

Thanks also to my parents, Jill, Laura, Eric and Kwame.

Abbreviations and Acronyms

| | |
|--------|---|
| ARA | American Relief Administration |
| COBSRA | Council of British Societies for Relief Abroad |
| DEC | Disaster Emergencies Committee |
| GPS | Global Programme Strategy |
| ICRC | International Committee of the Red Cross |
| INTRAC | International NGO Training and Research Centre, Oxford |
| IUCW | International Union of Child Welfare |
| LUCW | Lebanese Union of Child Welfare |
| NMWM | No More War Movement |
| OAU | Organization of African Unity |
| OSCE | Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe |
| SCF | Save the Children Fund (UK) |
| TASIF | Tajikistan Social Investment Fund |
| UISE | Union Internationale de Secours aux Enfants |
| UNHCR | United Nations High Commission for Refugees |
| UNICEF | United Nations Children's Fund |
| UNRRA | United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration |
| UNWRA | United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East |
| WILPF | Women's International League for Peace and Freedom |
| WHO | World Health Organization |

THE QUESTION OF THE HOUR.



Specially drawn for THE RECORD by DAVID LOW, the world-famed political caricaturist.

From *The Record of the Save the Children Fund*, Vol.1 No.18, August 1921, 283.

Figure 1.

It is our intention to enter into the domain of war and to labour there
till in the course of generations we have extinguished it.¹

Introduction

In 1919 two sisters, Dorothy Buxton and Eglantyne Jebb, founded Save the Children Fund (SCF). The aim of the organization was ‘to attack the vast mass of child suffering which exists in the world today as a result of war and economic distress’.² In the year that the Versailles Peace Treaty was signed, SCF made grants to nine different European countries. The following year it made its first grant to refugees in Constantinople and to famine relief in China. In 1921 as civil war wreaked havoc with the Russian economy, it launched its appeal for Russian famine relief, and committed itself to feed 250,000 children.

Eglantyne Jebb realized at this stage that SCF could not continue to conduct a series of large relief actions. What was needed was ‘a co-operative effort of the nations to safeguard their own children on constructive rather than charitable lines’.³ By 1923 SCF had published a draft Declaration of the Rights of the Child. In 1924 delegates of the newly formed *Union Internationale de Secours aux Enfants* [International Union of Save the Children] successfully persuaded individual heads of state, as well as the Assembly of the League of Nations, to adopt it.

¹ Schreiner, O. 1978. *Woman and Labour*, London: Virago, 178. First published in 1911, this was a dramatic appeal for the participation of women in all forms of activity. This quotation is taken from the chapter on ‘Woman and War’.

² Advertisement appearing in the Save the Children journal, *The Record*, Vols 1-3, 1920-1922.

From these beginnings the history of SCF has remained indelibly linked with the history of war and peace, human rights, and NGO-state relations.

At its foundation SCF was a value-driven organization. The values, or guiding principles, of the two sisters and their associates are the lens through which I look at the history of SCF, and the associated histories of war and peace, human rights and NGO-state relations. I have identified these guiding principles as universalism, utilitarianism, and optimistic pacificism. They can be understood as a 'paradigm' or a set of related concepts to which the social community which made up the founding generation of SCF gave their assent.⁴

Universalism is the guiding principle most often associated with SCF. The Declaration of the Rights of the Child was intended to safeguard all children 'beyond and above all considerations of race, nationality or creed'.⁵ This universalism was reflected in the importance attached by SCF's founders to the organization's secular approach and its evolution into an international union.

However, for Eglantyne Jebb saving children was not only an end in itself, it was also a means to safeguard the future happiness of the greatest number. It is crucial to hold on to this utilitarian aspect of her thought, because it counterbalances the Christian humanitarian emphasis on the vulnerability of the individual child which has underlined the position of

³ SCF Archives reference SC/SF/17, 24 January 1923.

⁴ Kuhn, T.S. 1970. *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, Chicago: University of Chicago, 174-210.

⁵ From the preamble of the Declaration of the Rights of the Child adopted by the International Union of Save the Children in Geneva, 17 May 1923.

children as victims of war. In Eglantyne Jebb's view all children were potential adults and actors in a social world. In a biography Dorothy Buxton described the utilitarian perspective her sister had of work with children.

The care of the famine stricken children is a world responsibility, in that the whole world stands to lose if the children of any nation are allowed to grow up degenerate and demoralised through hunger, and the whole world stands to gain if they grow up strong and healthy, able and willing to work for the good of their fellow men.⁶

Lastly, the founders of SCF were optimistic that the suffering they had witnessed in the aftermath of the First World War need never be repeated. They believed as idealists in the possibility of a positive and lasting peace. How far they were also realist, believing that certain circumstances required defensive war, is unclear. Eglantyne Jebb was certainly scathing in her dismissal of what she called the 'impossibility argument' put forward by the pessimistic realists who disputed the possibility of eliminating war and distress.

Clearly there is no inherent impossibility in saving the children of the world. It is only impossible if we make it so by our refusal to attempt it.⁷

This constellation of beliefs, values and techniques of persuasion adopted by the founding generation of SCF was mapped out in the many writings of the two sisters, as well as the early activity of SCF. However, after the death of Eglantyne Jebb in 1928 SCF was subject

⁶ Buxton, D. and Fuller, E. 1931. *The White Flame: The Story of Save the Children Fund*, London: Longmans, Green and Co., 34.

to competing beliefs, values and techniques of persuasion. This case study of SCF is a historical enquiry into the rhetorical and ideological underpinnings of succeeding generations.⁸

The first chapter locates the founding generation within the political culture of the anti-war movement, and details the emergence of the three guiding principles. The anti-war movement brought together people of very different inspirations and orientations. It included pacifists, who believed that war was the ultimate evil. It included pacifists, who believed in the possibility of just war and in the possibility of lasting positive peace. It also included defencists who rejected aggression but denied the possibility of lasting positive peace.⁹ The greatest number of SCF supporters could be described as pacifists of a religious, humanitarian or socialist inspiration. They could have either an internationalist or patriotic orientation.

Chapter 2 describes the extraordinary speed and scale of the founders' translation into action of the three principles of universalism, utilitarianism and optimistic pacificism. During the period up to the death of Eglantyne Jebb in 1928, SCF provided assistance to children not only in the defeated nations of Europe but also in the Russian Civil War. Much of this action was contentious in that it fundamentally challenged the government policy of the day. However, SCF made direct and repeated appeals to people in power,

⁷ Jebb, E., 'Impossible', *The World's Children*, Vol.7 No.10, July 1927, 142.

⁸ 'Objectivity in historical and moral enquiry can be found not by denying our perspectives or locations but rather by interrogating their epistemic consequences.' Mohanty, S.P. 1997. *Literary Theory and the Claims of History: Postmodernism, Objectivity, Multicultural Politics*, Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 234.

ranging from Lord Robert Cecil, the Minister responsible for the blockade, to the Pope, in order to win acceptance at the highest level for their claims. It made unprecedented use of the media, creating opportunities for itself to frame the issues of war and economic distress in a way which won support for its work. Above all it tapped the emotional energy of people disturbed by the suffering of children and offered them a way of converting a passive response into action.

The following chapters chart to what extent SCF upheld these guiding principles throughout the rest of the century. Chapter 3 describes how Eglantyne Jebb's successors had to identify the appropriate role for SCF in response to outbreaks of war in China, Abyssinia and Spain. In the 1930s, they also had to cope with a worsening economic situation and the fall of SCF's income to its lowest figure ever: just over £20,000. While Eglantyne Jebb had nurtured an ambitious vision of a life-saving movement for children the world over, her successors struggled with a popular demand for aid that was often parochial and party political. During the economic recession of the 1930s, SCF's supporters in Britain were keen that charity should begin at home amongst economically deprived children in Britain. At the outbreak of the civil war in Spain, the divisions on the left and the right of domestic politics governed the delivery of humanitarian assistance. While both these efforts were driven by sympathy for the needs of particular children, neither of these aid efforts reflected the universalist vision of SCF's founder.

⁹ See the typology adopted by Ceadel, M. 1989. *Thinking about Peace and War*, Oxford: Oxford University Press. He identifies two further types which I do not find present in the founding generation of SCF: crusaders and militarists.

Chapter 4 covers the period from 1939 to 1945 when Britain was at war with Germany. However, I deal here too with the response of SCF to refugees from Germany prior to the declaration of war. As Ruth Fry, a contemporary Quaker relief worker, pointed out war was ‘only the active stage of a state of mind which is but too often found in peace-time’.¹⁰ With the exception of the Inter-Aid Committee for Children from Germany, where SCF was represented by Dorothy Buxton and worked in partnership with the Quakers, SCF during this period was patriotic, rather than international, in its orientation. The original utilitarian vision of young people as a radical lever to transform the world, was reduced to a vision of youth related to ‘the purposive life of the nation’.¹¹ During this period SCF shed its pacifist identity and became a respectable part of the British war effort. In 1942 it was the more radical founder members of Oxfam who challenged Winston Churchill’s policy of total war and comprehensive sanctions upon the civilian populations of German-controlled Europe.

After the First World War, non-governmental organizations took the initiative and raised the funds to provide relief in the defeated countries of Europe. By contrast, after the Second World War SCF drew up plans in cooperation with government and implemented them alongside the military. This had significant consequences for SCF’s organizational identity. It acquiesced in the government policy of distinguishing between political refugees, internally displaced people and the indigenous population, and abandoned the

¹⁰ Fry, R. 1926. *A Quaker Adventure: The Story of Nine Years of Relief and Reconstruction*, London: Nisbet, xvii.

¹¹ ‘Warphans’, *The World’s Children*, Vol.22 No.3, Autumn 1942, 61.

universalist principle of providing relief to those in greatest need. Cold War political barriers, born of a pessimistic defensiveness, also prevented this generation from putting into practice the universalist principles of SCF's founders. This chapter coincides with the withdrawal of SCF from Yugoslavia and Hungary after thirty years of continuous work, and relates how during the Korean and Vietnamese wars, SCF worked alongside UN and US troops on the anti-communist side only. Paradoxically, this was also the period when the Declaration of the Rights of the Child, with its universalist principles, was adopted by the UN General Assembly. In 1959 children's rights provided an issue on which most UN members, from both East and West, could agree.

Chapter 6 is pivotal for it is at this point, fifty years after the foundation of SCF, that the institutional memory of the organization was at its weakest. The organization had now outlived all of its founders, its income was rising to levels comparable with the heyday of 1922 as it benefited from the increased affluence of the 1960s, and new people joined its ranks. By the late 1970s, there was a very large proportion of ex-military staff in the overseas division of SCF. They had a reserve of logistical experience which was useful in meeting the immediate material needs following natural and human disasters. However, it could be said that SCF's capacity to mount a relief operation, conducted with near-military precision, delayed recognition of the need for a political response. This is most clearly illustrated by the gap that SCF had allowed to open between its relief and development work. During the period of decolonization SCF adopted distinct peacetime and wartime approaches. In countries where the transition to independence was not accompanied by armed conflict, it encouraged the development of local organizations. In countries where

the transition to independence was marked by armed conflict, SCF responded with rapid relief. These two approaches reflected a dualist understanding of peace and war contrary to the continuum described earlier by Ruth Fry. An analysis of SCF's relief operation during the Nigerian Civil War illustrates the political shortcomings of this dualist approach, and links it to the organization's departure from the three guiding principles of universalism, utilitarianism and optimistic pacificism.

In the absence of an institutional memory reaching further back into the past, the Nigerian Civil War became a reference point for a whole generation of people involved with relief and development. SCF's long-term travelling companions, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the Quakers and Oxfam were present, but so too were the future founders of *Médecins sans Frontières* and journalists from the print and television media. Many of the people coming to the apex of their careers in relief and development at the end of the century were first confronted by the implications of armed conflict during the Nigerian Civil War. At this critical juncture, a number of factors combined to push SCF further from its original founding principles. The habit of unquestioning deference to the position taken by the British government first adopted during the Cold War meant that it made no independent assessment of the conflict and failed to develop a value-driven response. Although donations from the public to SCF were at an all-time high, the organization had little influence over the motivations behind the donations. Public opinion was formed by media with which SCF had few links. These media emphasized the universal vulnerability of children, but at the expense of the utilitarian view of the child. The powerful techniques of persuasion open to television obscured the way in which

children were being manipulated by the protagonists of the conflict. While the Biafran child succeeded in capturing the imagination of the British public as a starving child, it did not appear as a child belonging to a larger family or community or as a child with a role to play in the Africa of the future. This image was entirely at odds with Eglantyne Jebb's utilitarian perspective.

In Chapter 7 I deliberately seek out signs of the survival of the guiding principles. By 1981 annual income exceeded £10 million and by the end of the decade it had reached over £50 million.¹² From the wide range of different programmes financed during these years of prosperity I focus upon the example of Lebanon for within SCF's programme in Lebanon the guiding principles began to regain ascendancy. The Lebanese war was a precursor of the protracted social conflict which would characterize much of the post-Cold War world. SCF in Lebanon, under the direction of Frances Moore, adopted a positive interpretation of universalism reaching out across political, social, and economic divides, rather than the narrower definition of political neutrality. At the same time the identification of the family as the locus of change signalled the need for a cross-cultural understanding of children's rights rather than externally imposed set of rights. In Lebanon SCF broke with its historical association with the young child only and began to accompany that young child into its teenage years. The orientation of SCF in Lebanon was optimistic in terms of the potential of the child and of the immediate community the child belonged to. However, the work was limited to preparing the child and community to cope better with the consequences of war, rather than preparing for positive peace.

In the final chapter I argue that if this reorientation were carried further, it would lead to a rediscovery of the three guiding principles. Cross-cultural understanding of children's rights is vital to confer universal legitimacy on those rights. A utilitarian perspective reveals that the conditions of young people are the most critical indicator of the success of conflict mitigation, for it is young people who are the generation of and creators of the future. The primacy of peace as the goal of young people living with armed conflict requires that international agencies adopt an optimistic perspective with regard to the possibility of peace. I discuss the role of SCF in Afghanistan and Tajikistan in greater depth in order to test whether a reinstatement of the guiding principles would be of relevance today.

I conclude that the guiding principles have an abiding relevance for the practitioner. The values that drove the founding generation of SCF were utopian, however the moral example they left of their engagement in and with the world provides the key to understanding the power of the early movement. The very ambivalence of Eglantyne Jebb's commitment to the guiding principles led to acute tensions but also a creative pragmatism. This creative pragmatism should not be mistaken for lack of principle. She clearly identified her most powerful opponents as the supporters of the National Point of View and her international point of view is still contentious today. There are 'certain fundamental duties which we owe to mankind, and which, when they appear to clash (it is

¹² 1980-1981: £14,480,650; 1989-1990: £52,196,368.

always in appearance only) with our duties to our national states, should, nevertheless, take precedence'.¹³

And yet the organization she founded is not nowadays perceived as contentious. If it is in contentious social action that the power of social movements lies, at what cost has this transformation from nascent social movement of 'eccentrics' to respectable organization taken place?

¹³ Jebb, E., 'The World Policy of the Save the Children Fund', in Fuller, E. 1928. *The International Handbook of Child Care and Protection*, London: Longmans, Green and Co. Ltd and the Weardale Press, 564.

Chapter 1

THE FOUNDING GENERATION

The entry of Britain into war on 4 August 1914 brought questions of war and peace into every home. The consequent upheaval to civilian life, and in particular the introduction of mass conscription in 1916, forced people in Britain to rethink their attitudes and actions. Priorities became more acute, and fields of action widened as women, as well as men, found themselves in new wartime roles. Out of this heightened sense of principle and potential for action SCF was born.

The publication of 'Notes from the Foreign Press': a contentious political act

SCF bound people together in sustained collective action on behalf of children. This collective action grew out of a contentious political act that fundamentally challenged the British government. In early 1915 Dorothy Buxton began translating extracts from foreign newspapers and publishing them under the title 'Notes from the Foreign Press' in the *Cambridge Magazine*. She included newspaper articles from allied, neutral and enemy countries, and presented the injustices of war in a way that implicated all their governments. The radical appeal of the publication was made greater by her own links with people in the British government.

Together with her husband, Charles Roden Buxton MP,¹ in 1915 Dorothy Buxton visited David Lloyd George, then Chancellor of the Exchequer, to persuade him to allow her to import enemy newspapers. She received a special licence from the Board of Trade for the purchase of twenty-five enemy newspapers. These enemy newspapers included three from Hungary and the rest from Germany and Austria. Articles of a mainly military interest were excluded, but the articles selected did deal with the aims and causes of the war, peace discussions, reprisals, treatment of prisoners, atrocities, neutrality questions, and the idea of the League of Nations. Among reports of the impact of the war on social conditions, were descriptions of starvation among children of Vienna, sent in by Dr Frédéric Ferrière, Vice-President of the ICRC.

Mosa Anderson² worked first as a Russian language translator with Dorothy Buxton, and then moved to Manchester when 'Notes from the Foreign Press' was taken over by the *Manchester Guardian*. She stressed the significance of Dorothy Buxton's initiative:

England was indeed blockaded against the truth. The credit of having broken that blockade and shown that a common humanity bound all the nations together and

¹ Charles Roden Buxton (1875-1942). In 1914 he founded the Union of Democratic Control, which affirmed the need for open diplomacy and condemned the making of secret treaties, with Ramsay MacDonald, Charles Trevelyan and E.D. Morel. In the same year he left the Liberal Party and joined the Independent Labour Party. 'For [Dorothy Buxton], humanitarian questions took precedence of politics while for Charlie it was the other way about.' See biography by his sister: de Bunsen, V. 1948. *Charles Roden Buxton: A Memoir*, London: George Allen and Unwin, 159.

² Mosa Anderson (n.d.-1978) was a member of SCF Council from 1933 to 1967. She organized relief in Poland in 1946.

that the same aims, whether noble or selfish, were to be found in every land, belongs to Dorothy Frances Buxton.³

Dorothy Buxton's work was not unique: Mary Sheepshanks⁴ has been credited with a similar achievement as editor of *Ius Suffragii*.⁵ Throughout the war she consistently published as much news as possible from the two opposed sides to present the human face of the 'enemy' to all women readers whatever their nationality.

We appeal earnestly to readers in neutral countries to furnish news and articles, especially news of women's doing in Germany and Austria, and if the paper reaches our German and Austrian subscribers, we appeal to them not to attribute the dearth of news from their countries to anything but its true cause, the impossibility of obtaining news.⁶

Where Dorothy Buxton's initiative differed from *Ius Suffragii* was that she had succeeded in pitching her information at a politically powerful audience. 'Notes from the Foreign Press' was regularly read by members of government, and Dorothy Buxton and the rest of the editorial team had strong personal connections with people in power.

³ Quoted in Wilson, F.M. 1967. *Rebel Daughter of a Country House: A Life of Eglantyne Jebb, Founder of the Save the Children Fund*, London: George Allen and Unwin, 169.

⁴ Mary Sheepshanks (1872-1958), suffragist and pacifist. See Oldfield, S. 1984. *Spinsters of this Parish: The Life and Times of F.M. Mayor and Mary Sheepshanks*, London: Virago.

⁵ *Ius Suffragii* [The Law of Suffrage], monthly paper of the International Women's Suffrage Alliance.

⁶ *Ius Suffragii*, 1 October 1914, quoted in Oldfield 1984, 185.

The Fight the Famine Council

After the conclusion of the Armistice, Dorothy Buxton and others were concerned that the war, while no longer being fought by military means, was still being waged by economic means. They determined to continue her information campaign but this time through the channel of the Fight the Famine Council. The Fight the Famine Council was formed in January 1919 with Lord Parmoor,⁷ a former Conservative MP and champion of the League of Nations, as its chairman, and Dorothy Buxton as secretary.⁸ She shared the secretarial duties of the Council with her older sister, Eglantyne Jebb.

The Council resolved upon the following objectives:⁹

1. That the Council assures the Government of its cordial support in any humane measures they may propose, for the purpose of relieving distress in the famine districts of Europe, including such continuation of food control in this country as the needs of Europe may require.
2. That the Council is of opinion that it is desirable to relax the Blockade, with a view to the restoration of normal industrial channels as a means to the supply of food and other commodities, not only on the ground of humanity, but to prevent the dangers of continuing unrest.

⁷ Lord Parmoor (1842-1941). See his autobiography: Cripps, C.A. 1936. *A Retrospect: Looking back on a Life of more than Eighty Years*, London: William Heinemann.

⁸ Mary Sheepshanks succeeded Dorothy Buxton as secretary to the Fight the Famine Council in August 1919.

⁹ *The Famine in Europe: The Facts and Suggested Remedies, Being a Report of the International Economic Conference Called by the Fight the Famine Council and Held at Caxton Hall, Westminster, London, on the 4th, 5th, and 6th of November 1919*, London: Swarthmore Press, 1920.

3. That in urgent cases the necessity for immediate relief should be recognised, whether or not the peoples concerned are in a position to make payment.
4. That a principal object of the Council is to collect and supply information, in order that public opinion may be informed, so far as possible, of the true conditions, and may be encouraged in every way to support necessary measures of relief.

Early on in the debates of the Council it became clear that there were two distinct tasks in hand: the immediate relief of the famine-stricken areas, and the longer term task of laying the foundation for a new Europe.

SCF has often been known simply as 'The Fund'. It was formed on 19 April 1919 to raise funds to be passed on to agencies already working in the famine-stricken areas. The first appeal was made at a public meeting in the Royal Albert Hall in London. This meeting was timed to coincide with the Peace Conference in Paris.¹⁰ After speeches about conditions in Vienna, Robert Smillie, President of the Miners' Federation of Great Britain,¹¹ moved a resolution:

This meeting urges the necessity of pressing forward every measure of effective relief to meet the appalling conditions of the famine districts, and especially to stay the mortality among the children.¹²

¹⁰ Neither Soviet Russia nor Germany were represented at the Paris Peace Conference.

¹¹ Robert Smillie (1857-1940). See Smillie, R. 1924. *My Life for Labour*, London: Mills and Boon.

¹² Freeman, K. 1965. *If Any Man Build: The History of Save the Children Fund*, London: Hodder and Stoughton, 21.

With a dramatic sense of urgency, Dorothy Buxton held up a tin of condensed milk, and made her case: ‘there is more practical morality in this tin than in all the creeds’.¹³

SCF and its parent organization, the Fight the Famine Council, were organizations with a definite purpose related to a particular moment in history. The Fight the Famine Council was a magnet for a range of people who wanted to air their objections to the terms of the peace treaty that closed the First World War and promote their vision of a future European order. SCF tapped into the emotional energy of those people who wanted to make an immediate practical difference to the lives of children suffering the consequences of war.

Lord Parmoor recalls three international conferences of the Fight the Famine Council in the period from 1919 to 1921. They won the support of university professors such as Gilbert Murray, writers such as John Masefield, Olive Schreiner and Jerome K. Jerome, economists such as William Beveridge and John Maynard Keynes,¹⁴ and advocates of women’s role in peace-making such as Maude Royden¹⁵ and Emily Balch.¹⁶ The latter was determined to discuss not only the famine in Europe, but also the necessity of avoiding future war. In her report on the condition of the milk supply in Europe, she stated:

¹³ This is one of the most frequently quoted episodes associated with the founding of the organization. See for example Freeman K. 1965, 21.

¹⁴ John Maynard Keynes (1883-1946), adviser to the Treasury during the First World War. He was so appalled by the onerous war reparations imposed on Germany at the Paris Peace Conference that he resigned from his position as a representative of the British government.

¹⁵ Maude Royden (1876-1956), Congregational Minister and pioneer advocate of the ordination of women in the Church of England.

¹⁶ Emily Greene Balch (1867-1961) was Professor of Politics at Wellesley College, USA, until she was dismissed because of her opposition to US entry into the First World War. She helped Jane Addams found the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom and acted as secretary from 1919 to 1922. In 1946 she was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize.

To the query as to the cause of the deplorable situation no one answered 'War'. No one thought that necessary, and the answers relate to the different specific effects of war, including the blockade and the compulsory delivery of milch cattle as required by the Peace Treaty.¹⁷

As well as inviting British and other allied participants, the Fight the Famine Council broke new ground by requesting permission from the government to invite former enemy delegates to speak at its First International Economic Conference. This attracted criticism from the press.

A year later, the Fight the Famine Council retreated from questions of war and peace and the decision was taken to concentrate on the investigation of economic conditions. Lord Parmoor wrote that 'meetings and propaganda work on foreign policy were being undertaken largely by the Trade Unions and concentration was necessary'.¹⁸ By 1922 there had been another shift in alliances. The third and last conference was jointly promoted with the Peace Society¹⁹ and its title was changed to the 'Third International Conference on Economic Recovery and World Peace'. According to Lord Parmoor this 'enabled a programme to be formulated emphasizing the essential concordance between economic

¹⁷ Quoted in *The Famine in Europe: The Facts and Suggested Remedies, Being a Report of the International Economic Conference called by the Fight the Famine Council and held at Caxton Hall, Westminster, London, on the 4th, 5th and 6th of November, 1919*, London: Swarthmore Press, 1920, 71.

¹⁸ Cripps 1936, 162.

¹⁹ The Peace Society was founded in 1816 as the Society for the Promotion of Permanent and Universal Peace. It lost influence in 1914 because of its failure to condemn war, but is still in nominal existence. See Ceadel, M. 1996. *The Origins of War Prevention: the British Peace Movement and International Relations (1730-1854)*, Oxford: Clarendon Press; Ceadel, M. 1980. *Pacifism in Britain (1914-1945): The Defining of a Faith*, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

and moral questions'.²⁰ Both the Peace Society and the Fight the Famine Council then became moribund.

Save the Children Fund: a nascent social movement

SCF by contrast grew from strength to strength. The power of this nascent social movement lay in the networks and symbols of the political culture of the anti-war movement, the emotional energy of individuals disturbed by child suffering, and the organizational vision of Eglantyne Jebb.

There were at least three groups of people within the anti-war movement who came together in collective action in support of SCF. They differed in their inspiration and orientation. Some were people who located the causes of war in the human conscience and were concerned with spiritual and moral conversion. Others were moved to protest against the war on political grounds. The third group had experience of patriotic humanitarian action. To say they were all anti-war is to camouflage their eclectic range of ideas about peace and war. The credit must go to Dorothy Buxton for galvanizing these people into action, but it was the energizing role and vision of Eglantyne Jebb, that persuaded these groups to come together, with other individuals troubled by child suffering, in sustained collective action. She ensured that SCF was both value-driven and able to seize political opportunities. In order to understand how she did this, I examine more closely the collection of people she bound together, and the leadership roles of the two sisters.

²⁰ Cripps 1936, 162.

In their quest to understand the phenomenon of the war in Europe, some people located the cause of war in the human conscience. The horrors of the 1914-1918 war served to underline their belief in the need for personal transformation. Both the Fight the Famine Council and SCF were to find support among Protestants and Catholics, Jews, and Quakers, as well as the more newly formed movements of the Theosophists,²¹ the Baha'i,²² the Spiritualists²³ and the Rationalists²⁴. For those pacifist or pacifist members of the anti-war movement who located the cause of war as internal to human beings, experience of war quickened their conviction of the necessity and efficacy of an appeal to the consciences of others to reject war.

Christians who held this view were disappointed not only with the role of the governments prosecuting the war, but also with the established church. Both members of the Church of England and Nonconformists felt uneasy with the moral leadership of the church and the support of institutional religion for the war. Lord Parmoor remained within the Church of England during the war but compared the isolation in which he found himself with the position of earlier Christians such as Sir Thomas More, Erasmus and Dean Colet. On 20 October 1914 he wrote in his diary:

²¹ Dr Armstrong Smith (1867-1953) theosophist, visited Budapest in 1919 and reported on the situation to the Theosophical Society. Dr Smith then became SCF Continental Organiser, supervising the work all over Europe. Later, as Overseas delegate, he travelled across Australia and New Zealand. He founded the Padlock Society, against idle gossip, which regularly advertised for pledges in SCF's journal *The World's Children*.

²² Lady Sara Blomfield (n.d.-1939) was a member of the SCF Council and one of the leaders of the British Baha'i movement.

²³ Arthur Conan Doyle (1859-1930) was a convert to Spiritualism. As well as being the creator of Sherlock Holmes, he served as a physician in the Boer War and wrote a pamphlet, *The War in South Africa*, in 1902. He is cited amongst early supporters of SCF in Fuller, E. 1950. *The Right of the Child: A Chapter in Social History*, London: Victor Gollancz, 51.

²⁴ Gilbert Murray (1866-1957), Greek scholar and Chairman of the League of Nations Union (1923-38), was instrumental both in the foundation of SCF and later in the foundation of Oxfam.

Each day the weakening influence of Christianity becomes more clear. Its real failure is that national animosities have been aroused, and that religious communities, instead of preaching Christ's Gospel of World Peace and Goodwill, do often encourage a war spirit as popular in the country to which they belong. It is in this way that Christian Churches and communities lose their real power, and become weakly opportunist.²⁵

On the same day he wrote how he was optimistic that contact between German and English soldiers would be a source of peace. This faith in the positive nature of international encounters was to be a cornerstone of SCF.

... I think that the best chance of a just peace, ie just to our enemy as well as to ourselves, comes from the army. The soldiers can and do report the action of brave adversaries, and both German and English do their best to relieve misery in attending to the wounded on the other side.²⁶

In his autobiography he attributed his political beliefs to the influence of his grandmother who was brought up a Quaker. 'I learned through her much of the rule of conduct which subsequently influenced my life.'²⁷

²⁵ Cripps 1936, 110.

²⁶ Cripps 1936, 110. The benevolent attitudes of soldiers who actually met the enemy contrasted with the public who had no contact with the enemy. 'After the First [World War] there was a degree of loathing of the enemy countries, or the ex-enemy countries, which extended to every man, woman and child.' Save the Children Oral History, Interview with David Buxton, 22 June 1993.

²⁷ Cripps 1936, 6.

Two other key figures in the early life of SCF actually took the decision to leave the Church of England and become members of the Religious Society of Friends (Quakers). Dorothy Buxton and her husband Charles Roden Buxton joined the Quakers in 1917. However, even within the Society of Friends there were divisions as to how, in conscience, Quakers should respond to the war. Some served in the armed forces; some engaged in humanitarian activity; others were absolute in their conscientious objection to the war and went to prison for their beliefs.²⁸

The network of Quakers who chose to engage in humanitarian activity had the greatest impact on SCF. Members of the Friends Ambulance Unit (FAU) gave humanitarian service to wounded soldiers as a practical expression of the Friends' peace testimony. As representatives of the Society of Friends Emergency and War Victims Relief Committee, Dr Hilda Clark and Edith Pye helped women and children war victims in France, setting up emergency maternity hospitals inside the French war zone itself. Immediately after the war it was often the Quakers who were the first on the ground in the famine-stricken areas. The Emergency and War Victims Relief Committee was the conduit for grants totalling more than £250,000 from SCF²⁹ and Dr Hilda Clark acted as an experienced mentor for the new organization.³⁰

As well as those who objected to the war on religious grounds, within the anti-war movement there were also those who objected to the First World War on political grounds.

²⁸ Ceadel 1980, 41-42.

²⁹ Breen, R., *Rebuilding a Ruined World: Save the Children's beginnings in Vienna, 1919*, SCF Archive Paper No.7, October 1995, 9.

Liberals protested against mass conscription and the power wielded by the state.³¹

Socialists promoted war resistance as a response to what they saw as a capitalist war. There is a particularly strong current of socialist pacifism running through the early days of SCF.³² Dr Hector Munro,³³ Bradford GP and Independent Labour Party candidate, persuaded Robert Smillie, President of the Miners' Federation of Great Britain to make the opening appeal. The Miners' Federation then made a donation of £10,000.³⁴

Combined with these liberal or socialist values was a growing sense of internationalism.

Liberal supporters of the League of Nations had strong associations with SCF. These included Gilbert Murray, future President of the League of Nations Union.³⁵ The pacificism of these liberal internationalists contrasted with the pacifist socialist internationalists, as is clearly shown in this letter from Gilbert Murray written to Eglantyne Jebb when she was secretary of the Fight the Famine Council.

Would you be so kind as to let me know what signatures you have got before you print my name as signing the Blockade Memorial. Certain complications have

³⁰ Clark, H., 'Notes on Principles of Relief Work', *Bulletin of the Save the Children Fund: Central Union (Union Internationale de Secours aux Enfants)*, Vol.1 No.17, 30 June 1920.

³¹ 'The severity of the punishment inflicted by successive terms of imprisonment is in sinister contrast with the national appeal for a higher standard of right and justice, and negatives any claim we may make to maintain the supreme test of Civil Liberty, vis., the determination to give full protection to an unpopular minority at a time of national excitement.' Cripps 1936, 121.

³² It is hard to distinguish between socialist pacifists and pacifists. Ceadel suggests that 'the distinction lay, in effect, in differing conceptions of socialism. In contrast with the materialistic philosophy of the war-resister, who saw the socialist cause in terms of a struggle for social and economic power, the socialist pacifist believed that a socialist brotherhood would necessitate change in individual moral values. It was at this more fundamental level that war was incompatible with socialist values.' Many socialist pacifists were Christian rather than political in their inspiration. See Ceadel 1980, 47-49.

³³ Dr Hector Munro (1869-1949), opposed the war and set up a private ambulance service in Belgium ferrying wounded soldiers from the front to field hospitals. He was SCF representative in Hungary and Austria.

³⁴ This was later increased to a total donation of £30,000 to SCF.

turned out concerning the League of Nations, in regard to which, as you know, I occupy a semi-official position. I do not want to take a line on the blockade which would seem to place me in what is called the extreme pacifist group. I can express my opinion privately, but members of the Union have a right to object to the chairman taking a very strong line in public on controversial politics.

If I have to withdraw my name from the Memorial I will write a separate letter to the press protesting again the blockade in my own language, so that even at the worst I shall not entirely leave you in the lurch.³⁶

The 'extreme' pacifist group was most strongly represented by some of the women who gave SCF their support. Members of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) had not only encouraged the free circulation of information between women during the war, but also tried to meet directly with women from allied, neutral and enemy countries. In the midst of the war they had staged a Women's Peace Congress at The Hague where a few women from allied countries met with women from Germany and Austria on the neutral territory of the Netherlands.³⁷ The first message to be delivered at the Albert Hall meeting of the Fight the Famine Council was from Jane Addams³⁸ sent on behalf of the second Women's Peace Congress taking place in Paris.

³⁵ Established November 1918, see Birn, D.S.L. 1981. *The League of Nations Union*, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

³⁶ Letter to Eglantyne Jebb, Secretary of the Fight the Famine Council, SCF Archives reference SC/EJ.238, 15 June 1919.

³⁷ Winston Churchill at the Admiralty 'closed' the North Sea to British shipping for the whole period of the 1915 Women's Peace Congress to prevent any British women from attending. Oldfield 1984, 192.

³⁸ Jane Addams (1860-1935), founded Hull House in Chicago, where she worked to secure social justice in housing, factory inspection, female suffrage, and the cause of pacifism. She was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1931.

Mary Sheepshanks, former editor of *Ius Suffragii*, served as secretary to the Fight the Famine Council after Dorothy Buxton. She had kept faith with internationalism throughout the First World War. In her signed editorial for *Ius Suffragii* of October 1914 she wrote:

What is the boasted patriotism which started and supports the European war? First of all, pride. Each Great Power has encouraged national pride at the expense of humanity; each big nation feeds its children on pride in its fancied superiority in intelligence, culture, freedom or tradition. To assert and spread this superiority by force becomes a national ideal...³⁹

Both Dorothy Buxton and Mary Sheepshanks came from a different tradition within the anti-war movement from the majority of women associated with the founding of SCF who were proud patriots. The pre-war movement for women's suffrage had been split between the internationalists and the patriots.⁴⁰ The latter considered the war to be just and were keen to apply their skills to the national war effort. A number who gained wartime experience of relief work later formed a cadre of trained workers for SCF. I describe them as patriotic humanitarians.⁴¹ The most prominent among them were members of the Scottish Women's Hospitals for Foreign Service.

³⁹ Oldfield 1984, 181.

⁴⁰ This tension has attracted a great deal of scholarly interest, see for example Vellacott, J. 1988. 'Women, Peace and Internationalism, 1914-1920s: 'Finding New Words and Creating New Methods' ', in Chatfield, C. and van den Dungen, P., eds, 1988. *Peace Movements and Political Cultures*, Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 106-124.

⁴¹ These patriotic humanitarians had more in common with people who held defencist or pacifist beliefs and had seen active military service, than with pacifist humanitarians like Dr Hector Munro.

At the outbreak of war Dr Elsie Inglis proposed to the Federated Suffrage Societies of Scotland 'to equip a hospital... staffed entirely by women – if not required at home, to be sent abroad'.⁴² She received their support. The British War Office saw differently, and refused the women's offer of service. Dr Inglis therefore contacted the Foreign Offices of the other allies. By the end of the war there were fourteen fully equipped field hospitals staffed by women of the Scottish Women's Hospitals for Foreign Service. The Scottish Women, who included women from the rest of Britain and the Dominions, served alongside almost every allied army or Red Cross except the British. They formed a cadre of women with valuable medical skills, practised in the logistics of relief, and inured to all discomfort and danger. It was amongst the Serbs that much of their finest work was done. In 1915, when the Serbs were under attack from both the Austro-Germans and the Bulgarians, and allied support was unforthcoming, some of the Scottish Women accompanied the Serbian army in their retreat to Albania and others stayed behind the lines to be taken prisoner-of-war. A number of the women died in Serbia, primarily of typhoid, and memorials were raised to them by the Serbs.⁴³

The women who worked in Serbia during the war exemplify the professional paths open to the relief workers who were later to act as partners with SCF. Francesca Wilson, who worked with Serbs both in Serbia and in refugee camps in Corsica and Tunisia, moved

⁴² Record of Committee meeting of 12 August in Krippner, M. 1980. *The Quality of Mercy: Women at War, Serbia 1915-1918*, London: David and Charles, 29.

⁴³ In the 1980s there was still a fountain dedicated to Dr Elsie Inglis in Mladenovac and a small street named after Lady Paget in Belgrade (Krippner 1980, 92 and 160). The respect between the Scottish Women and the Serbian people was apparently mutual: 'They are a phenomenal people – hardy, tough, and enduring and, when ill, trusting and uncomplaining. They are ideal patients.' (Krippner 1980, 55).

from one theatre of war to another.⁴⁴ Others worked only in one country, and developed a deep local knowledge and enduring attachment to a particular people. Dr Katherine MacPhail worked for 35 years in Serbia. She established the Anglo-Yugoslav Children's Hospital at Kamenica which was then supported by SCF. In recognition of her work she was elected an honorary citizen of Sremska Kamenica and a life president of the Yugoslavian Red Cross.⁴⁵

A third path is represented by women who gained field experience, and then returned to Britain to become policy makers within SCF. Prior to the First World War Nina Boyle was an outspoken supporter of women's suffrage. During the war she went to work with destitute children in Serbia. Following the war she approached SCF for funds for the Uzice orphanage in Serbia and eventually returned to Britain and became a long-serving member of SCF Council.⁴⁶

Biographies reveal that many of the people associated with the foundation of SCF were tied together by family or marriage or church membership, and had common interests through their political, academic, or humanitarian careers. Some already had institutional links through organizations such as the Quakers, the Independent Labour Party, the League of Nations Union, the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom and the Scottish Women's Hospitals for Foreign Service. These social solidarities gave additional impetus to the new movement.

⁴⁴ Wilson, F.M. 1920. *Portraits and Sketches of Serbia*, London: Swarthmore Press. Francesca Wilson later worked in France, Austria, Russia, Spain and Germany. She wrote her own memoirs: — 1944. *In the Margins of Chaos: Recollections of Relief Work in and between Three Wars*, London: John Murray, as well as a biography of Eglantyne Jebb: — 1967 (see note 3).

The leadership of two sisters

The spotlight is now turned to the values and actions of the two sisters who led the movement. The two sisters possessed in differing degrees several of the characteristics already identified among SCF's earliest supporters. They both wrote explicitly about their quest for spiritual and moral conversion. They were individualistic and internationalist in their outlook, and they had the somewhat contradictory experience of patriotic humanitarian action. When they founded SCF they could draw upon a pool of people with similar values and practical skills to give SCF support. Dorothy Buxton was, in her son's words, 'politically minded, and somewhat fanatical', whereas Eglantyne Jebb was 'charismatic'.⁴⁷ It was Eglantyne Jebb who had the organizational vision to turn those loosely knit social solidarities into a contentious social movement.

Dorothy Buxton was someone who felt compelled to shoulder all the problems of the world. She was an idealist in all senses, including someone out of touch with the reality that the majority take for granted. She made her quest for personal and social transformation a public one. She left the Church of England to become a Quaker, and she withdrew her support for the Liberal Party in favour of the Independent Labour Party. Her long life (1881-1963) is a catalogue of initiatives borne of a strong sense of injustice. She took every opportunity to get her views into print, including on such controversial subjects

⁴⁵ '1919-1969 Yugoslavia', *The World's Children*, Vol.49 No.2, Summer 1969, 29-31.

⁴⁶ Nina Boyle (1865-1943). See obituary in *The World's Children*, Vol.23 No.3, Summer 1943, 34.

⁴⁷ Save the Children Oral History, Interview with David Buxton, 22 June 1993.

as her support for Bolshevism.⁴⁸ Her most lasting and unpopular cause was the welfare of Germans. In the First World War (and again in the Second World War) she fought for the welfare of German internees within the UK. The papers connected with Dorothy Buxton which survive in the SCF archives,⁴⁹ and the memories of people who knew her well,⁵⁰ give the impression of someone who could not be contained by an organization and did her best work freelance. The initiative she took with 'Notes from the Foreign Press' was exceptional in that she succeeded both in wielding influence and in persuading an effective team to gather round her and put her ideas into practice.

Three days after Dorothy Buxton had made the dramatic gesture at the Albert Hall of holding up the tin of milk, the Fight the Famine Council took the decision to separate the two committees of SCF and the Fight the Famine Council and allow the Council to 'develop on lines of international reconciliation' and 'leave relief work' to SCF.⁵¹

As the first Honorary Secretary of SCF Dorothy Buxton was indefatigable in her letter-writing campaigns in the pages of *The Manchester Guardian*. For example, after Lord Robert Cecil had taken the chair at a meeting of the Supreme Economic Council in May, which approved the plan to ensure a close blockade on Germany, she wrote:

Two months ago you exhorted your country men to play a noble part in the rescue of nations. You spoke of a new era of 'international confidence and cooperation',

⁴⁸ Buxton, D. 1928. *The Challenge of Bolshevism: A New Social Ideal*, London: George Allen and Unwin.

⁴⁹ SCF Archives reference SC/DB.

⁵⁰ See obituary by Mosa Anderson in *The World's Children*, Vol.43 No.2, June 1963, 45, and Save the Children Oral History, Interview with David Buxton, 22 June 1993.

and now you are supporting a policy expressive of national egoism and hatred and a destructive purpose more far-reaching than history has ever recorded or in our wildest imagining we have ever conceived.⁵²

Notes in the Buxton family papers suggest that Dorothy also drafted letters published in the *Manchester Guardian* on 27 June 1919 headed 'Labour and the Treaty',⁵³ on 2 July headed 'Philanthropy and the Blockade',⁵⁴ and on 4 July headed 'The Treaty and the Blockade' from representatives of the peace movement.⁵⁵ These letters demonstrate the wide contacts she had across the anti-war movement, both with pacifists as well as pacifists. Despite having made the plea for practical help, Dorothy Buxton was above all a campaigner for international reconciliation rather than an organizer of relief work. Within months she retired from the position of Honorary Secretary of SCF in order to dedicate herself to the economic aspects of war and responding to enquiries as to the effects of the famine.

⁵¹ Minute recorded at the committee meeting of the Fight the Famine Council (22 May 1919) *The Record* Vol.3 No.1.

⁵² 'Economic Situation of Germany. Open letter to Lord Robert Cecil sent by Mrs C.R. Buxton', *The Manchester Guardian*, 12 June 1919.

⁵³ Signed by Robert Smillie, Robert William, C.T. Cramp, J. Bromley, George Lansbury.

⁵⁴ Signed by Lord Parmoor, Noel Buxton, Kate Courtney of Penwith, Barbara Ayrton Gould, Evelyn Sharp.

⁵⁵ Edward Backhouse, Hon. Secretary, Peace Committee of the Society of Friends; Annie Besant, President, National Home Rule League (India); Oliver Dryer, General Secretary, Fellowship of Reconciliation; Barbara Ayrton Gould, Hon. Secretary, Women's International League; Carl Heath, Secretary, National Peace Council; Albert Inkpen, Secretary, British Socialist Party; B.N. Langdon Davies, Secretary, National Council for Civil Liberties; Margaret Llewelyn Davies; J.M. McTavish; E.D. Morel, Secretary, Union of Democratic Control; George Peverett, Secretary, National Adult School Union; Marion Phillips, Secretary, Standing Joint Committee of Industrial Women's Organizations; Philip Snowden, Chairman, Independent Labour Party; James Fowler Shone, Hon. Secretary, League for World Friendship; Walter Walsh, Free Religious Movement.

Eglantyne Jebb and the foundation myth of SCF

Within the next two years the political position of SCF was so defined that it is doubtful whether someone like Dorothy Buxton could have remained the spokeswoman for the organization.

The policy of the Save the Children Fund, now as always is to abstain most carefully from all political questions. Our relief work during the past two years has not been intended as a vote of confidence in any of the governments of the territories where we have operated [...] We do not, we can not, ask the hungry child what views its parents have on the political and economic questions of the day...⁵⁶

The secretaryship of SCF had passed to her older sister, Eglantyne Jebb. It is around the life of Eglantyne Jebb (1876-1928) that the myth of the foundation of SCF has been woven. Tom Buchanan has argued that organizations tend to develop an abbreviated account of when and why they were created. This then is adopted by the mass membership in myth form. The myth furnishes a benchmark definition of guiding principles that transcend formal constitutions and policy documents. Internal debates about future direction can then take the form, ‘what would Eglantyne Jebb have done in these circumstances?’. Such myths tend to emphasize the extraordinary personality and vision of the founder. In the case of Eglantyne Jebb, she was endowed with wisdom enough to see

⁵⁶ *The Record*, Vol.2 No.2, 1 October 1921, 21. From an article on ‘Politics and Charity’ published at the height of the Russian Famine when sections of the British press were challenging SCF’s work.

what now appears obvious, but which no one else had stated so clearly.⁵⁷ Her early death and aesthetic appearance reinforced the impression of saintly otherworldliness.⁵⁸

The first significant date in the abbreviated history of SCF is 15 May 1919. On this day Eglantyne Jebb appeared at Mansion House on a summons relating to the publication of a leaflet. The leaflet showed a picture of two starving children and demanded the lifting of the blockade, in the name of the Fight the Famine Council. Her technical offence was that the name of the author and the printer were not included on the leaflet and that it had not been submitted to the censors. Eglantyne Jebb's defence was conciliatory. According to the Daily Herald report:

Miss Eglantine Jebb [sic] expressed regret that the 'Fight the Famine Council' had been associated with this affair, as the bishops and others mentioned had not given their sanction. She also regretted having involved the Labour Press, but she had not broken the law.⁵⁹

Eglantyne Jebb was fined £5 without costs. A month later she retold the story as she wanted it remembered for posterity. This version revealed her sense of individual mission and was also an appeal for others to join her in a powerful social movement. She described herself as drawing inspiration from the self-sacrifice of the heroine Edith Cavell, who as a British nurse living in Belgium had tended friend and foe alike in 1914 and 1915. Edith

⁵⁷ 'A large part of the general public in Britain at that times [sic] was almost, by present day standards, almost inconceivably hostile to the very idea of helping enemy people, even if they were children.' Save the Children Oral History, Interview with David Buxton, 22 June 1993.

Cavell was executed by the Germans for helping Belgian and allied fugitives to escape capture. Her body was returned to Britain in 1919.⁶⁰

While the prosecution was taking place inside the Mansion House, Edith Cavell's funeral was taking place outside. Her message rang in my mind. Can we not accept it? Let us have 'no hatred nor bitterness towards anyone', and carry this teaching into practical effect by rescuing the perishing children and thus associate the memory of an heroic saver of life with a movement which we might make into the greatest life-saving movement the world has ever seen.⁶¹

For some of the people associated with the early days of SCF, it was a minor channel for their energies, a temporary diversion to provide immediate relief to children who shared responsibility for neither the horrors of war nor the injustices of the peace. Some of these people channelled their major efforts into intergovernmental organizations such as the League of Nations. Others worked through non-governmental organizations such as the League of Nations Union, and the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom. However, Eglantyne Jebb was single-minded in her determination to put children first. Her definition of SCF as a single-issue organization was a strategic choice: she saw children as having an urgent claim upon the rest of humanity and set out to make SCF the most effective instrument for saving children from suffering, wherever they might be.

⁵⁸ Personal correspondence with Tom Buchanan, Rewley House, Oxford. See also Schein, E.H. 1997. *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, San Francisco: Jossey Bass, 20.

⁵⁹ *Daily Herald*, 16 May 1919.

⁶⁰ Edith Cavell (1865-1914). A nurse from Norfolk, she became matron of the Berkendael Institute in Brussels in 1907. Her body was returned from Belgium for burial in 1919. Her last words were reported by the chaplain to be 'patriotism is not enough, that one must love all men and hate none', see Felstead, S.T. 1940?. *Edith Cavell: The Crime that Shook the World*, London: George Newnes Ltd, 185.

Where she derived this conviction from is hard to say. Her life preceding her involvement with SCF was a series of short-lived endeavours curtailed by frail health.⁶² Although, like many of her contemporaries she was engaged in a spiritual and moral quest, and found much she admired in the beliefs of the Baha'i,⁶³ her Christian faith was deep and unshakeable. Her humanitarianism was religiously inspired. She was at ease making appeals as a Christian to other Christians, and found solace in writing religious poetry. As a Christian she put loyalty to humanity above loyalty to church or state, but despite this nonconformist attitude she remained a member of the Church of England. In a sermon preached in St Peter's, Geneva, on Sunday 10 August 1924 she declared:

Again, this suffering is unnecessary. It is not the result of some great natural cataclysm, it was never the intention of God: it is the will of the wicked world which has decreed that refugee children should perish of hunger and disease, that orphans should be cast adrift upon the world, that parents should suffer the excruciating torment of watching their children ruined before their eyes, while lacking all possible means of saving them. But, believe me, there is no child which has died or has lost its health or its character through the privations inflicted upon it but God will demand the life of that child at our hands.⁶⁴

⁶¹ Jebb, E. 'Rescue the Perishing', Publication unknown, SCF Archives reference SC/DB, 21 May 1919.

⁶² After studying history at Lady Margaret Hall, Oxford University, Eglantyne Jebb trained as a teacher at Stockwell College, but taught for just one year. She also took part in a survey of social conditions in Cambridge.

⁶³ See citation of Baha'ullah in Buxton D., ed., 1929. *Save the Child! A posthumous essay*, London: Weardale Press, 29.

⁶⁴ 'The Claims of the Children', *The World's Children*, Vol.9 No.8, May 1929, 143.

While Eglantyne Jebb believed in a vengeful God she was not a fatalist: humanity had been given free will, and the creation of a world without suffering depended on the use to which this gift was put. Her optimism that humanity would be successful in bringing about a world without suffering, like her universalism, derived both from her religious faith and her confidence in science. She did not demarcate the world of facts from the world of values. To her mind they were mutually reinforcing. In common with many of her contemporaries in social reform movements, Eglantyne Jebb believed that the people of the twentieth century, unlike their predecessors, had been blessed with the power to find scientific solutions to their problems.⁶⁵

All through the ages we should trace a path of blood and tears where multitudes of our fellow-men had been consigned to unthinkable miseries. Does it mean nothing to us that now, at last, we have it in our power to bring these miseries to an end? Now, at last, in our age we can purify ourselves from a criminal complicity with disease, degradation, and death; now, at last, we can open the gates of life to toiling millions.⁶⁶

In the view of Eglantyne Jebb every child, whatever its race, creed, or politics, had a special claim upon the rest of humanity. This reflected the symbolic importance of God made man in the form of a vulnerable child in Christianity. The first emblem of SCF was one of the Andrea della Robbia plaques which decorated the hospital for abandoned

⁶⁵ Weindling, P. 1994. 'From Sentiment to Science: Children's Relief Organizations and the Problem of Malnutrition in Inter-War Europe', in *Disasters: The Journal of Disaster Studies and Management*, Vol.18 No.3, September 1994, 203-212.

⁶⁶ Buxton 1929, viii.

children in Florence. Her universalism was not only inspired by her religious convictions; she also drew on the arguments of contemporary science. In an article entitled 'International Responsibility for Child Welfare' Eglantyne Jebb wrote:

The distinguishing characteristic of the thought of the present age is the increased recognition of the unity of mankind. Science has demonstrated that all forms of life are connected.⁶⁷

The overriding importance of universalism to Eglantyne Jebb is reflected in the way she developed the organization of SCF. She was above all a seeker after humanitarian collaboration. Whereas the writings of other people engaged in international relief work revealed a passion and curiosity aroused by the diversity within humanity,⁶⁸ Eglantyne Jebb, the strategist and organizer, stressed its unity.

At the same time as stressing its unity, she believed humanity had the power to change the world over time. Children were not mere defenceless victims but also a new generation and powerful agents of this change. Her utilitarian understanding of children as the generation and hence creators of the future was summed up in the cartoon specially drawn for *The Record* by David Low.⁶⁹

⁶⁷ *The World's Children*, Vol.8 No.1, October 1927, 4.

⁶⁸ Francesca Wilson narrated her own experience of relief work as an adventure or a voyage of discovery rather than a period of service, see Wilson 1944.

⁶⁹ 'The Question of the Hour', *The Record of the Save the Children Fund*, Vol.1 No.18, 1 August 1921, 283.

Eglantyne Jebb has been identified as a pacifist and her writing after the First World War reflects a religious and utilitarian pacifism: war was incompatible with her Christian faith and its results could never justify its use. However, she also had experienced patriotic humanitarianism which reflected a more pacifist stance. During her visit to the Balkans on behalf of the Macedonian Relief Fund in 1913 she had defended the right of small nations to take up arms to fight their oppressors.⁷⁰ Like others in the anti-war movement, she saw no contradiction in working for peace in close cooperation with people who had engaged in active military service and held pacifist or defencist views.⁷¹ Eglantyne Jebb made herself an advocate of the child first and foremost, and second an advocate of peace. According to her nephew she would not have wanted to be asked to define her ideas about peace and war. 'She saw too many sides to problems ... she would not have liked to commit herself either to any political party or to any definite statement about pacifism.'⁷²

If Eglantyne Jebb's views were characterized by ambivalence, this was because she embraced both one principle and another. She also intended to reach out to as many possible supporters as possible. There were bound to be tensions between the values she espoused and between the people she reached out to. These tensions were made more acute by the depth of her engagement in and with the world. It is these tensions between competing values and interest groups which are at the heart of the history of SCF which is told in later chapters.

⁷⁰ Personal communication Rodney Breen, SCF Archivist 1991-1999, 26 April 1999.

⁷¹ See the founding brothers of *Service Civil International*, of which International Voluntary Service for Peace was the British branch. 'It is symbolic of this comprehensiveness and inclusiveness that Pierre Ceresole, the consistent and 'absolute' pacifist, and his brother Ernest, the Colonel in the Swiss Army, should have been sincere collaborators in building up the movement.' Best E. and Pike B., eds, 1948. *International Voluntary Service for Peace 1920-1946: A History of Work in Many Countries for the Benefit of Distressed Communities and for the Reconciliation of the Peoples*, London: George Allen and Unwin, 133.

This history begins in the next chapter with Eglantyne Jebb's endeavour to make the world a better place for children. During her lifetime she combined universalism with a utilitarian eye to the future, and underpinned them with an indomitably optimistic pacificism. All three guiding principles were necessary to refute the objections of sceptics. In her posthumous essay *Save the Child!* she cited the example of Johann Pestalozzi,⁷³ who had faced opposition when he opened a home for eighty children in 1798 following war in Switzerland.

Thus there are always two classes of people who are prepared to take sides against the humanitarian view of a Pestalozzi: there are those who do not believe that the children are worth saving, and those who do not believe that they can be saved.⁷⁴

In her view children were worth saving on two counts: in themselves and as the key to the future, and she was convinced her generation had, for the first time in the history of humanity, the power to save them.

⁷² Save the Children Oral History, Interview with David Buxton, 22 June 1993.

⁷³ Johann Heinrich Pestalozzi (1746-1827), Swiss pioneer of mass education.

⁷⁴ Buxton 1929, 5.

Chapter 2

WITHIN THE LIFETIME OF EGLANTYNE JEBB (1919-1928)

When SCF was launched, a great many sympathizers and supporters thought the attempt to raise money would be a fiasco. They were proved wrong.¹ There are several events of near mythical proportions related to early fundraising which continue to inspire SCF volunteers. The story of the barrels of clothes set afloat off the Pitcairn Islands and destined for SCF is retold many times in the SCF journal.² So too, is the story of Eglantyne Jebb's audience with the Pope.

The International Point of View

In 1919 Eglantyne Jebb went over the heads of the Protestant bishops of her own national church, to appeal to the Pope. War cut across the loyalties and solidarity of his flock, and therefore placed the Pope, as leader of the universalistic religion of Roman Catholicism, in a difficult position. The humanitarian initiatives Benedict XV took during the First World War are little known. His work on behalf of prisoners has been compared with the work of

¹ Save the Children Oral History, Interview with David Buxton, 22 June 1993.

² 'One day in September 1921, a message from the postmaster at Cristobal in the Canal Zone was received at the Fund's London headquarters. It read as follows: "The S.S. East Wind arriving from the South Seas has discharged two boxes and five barrels at this port, the master of the ship advising me that he took them aboard at Pitcairn Island, after having been signalled by the natives to stop. The address, to Lord Weardale, of the Save the Children Fund, in London, England, would indicate that they are of a purely charitable nature." Another ship, the SS Loch Katrine, brought the two boxes and five barrels to London and later a letter came explaining this mysterious gift from the South Seas.

"I read your appeal" – wrote the church treasurer, Mr McCoy – "and the vote to have a collection for the suffering children was unanimous. We have the clothing ready and God will open a way to get it to you. You will find many varieties for when we barter for clothing with passing ships we take anything we can get... but

the ICRC,³ and in a move close in spirit to the work of SCF he appealed in October 1916 to the US government for food assistance for the children of Belgium.⁴ Eglantyne Jebb judged that an appeal to Pope Benedict on behalf of all the children in Europe would not fall on deaf ears, and she was right. The Pope issued an encyclical asking for collections for the relief of children in Europe, whatever their religion, in all churches on Holy Innocents Day, 28 December 1919. The encyclical was repeated the following year. The Archbishop of Canterbury followed the Pope's example, and this has become a celebrated example of joint action in both Catholic and Protestant, and Greek Orthodox Churches. The Papal recognition did much to turn SCF into an international organization with international funding.

These two stories reveal contrasting elements of Eglantyne Jebb's vision of SCF as an organization. She made few pronouncements about her vision of government or society, but her writings have left a detailed blueprint for SCF. She saw it as a movement with local centres, as far flung as the Pitcairn Islands, and an international centre which would provide leadership not only to all its supporters, but also to heads of state. She saw SCF as continuing a tradition of humanitarian neutrality begun by the international work of individuals such as Johann Pestalozzi and organizations such as the ICRC. Reports from Austria by Frédéric Ferrière, Vice President of the ICRC, were vital influences upon the founders of SCF. Eglantyne Jebb was also a close friend of Suzanne Ferrière, Frédéric

we feel ready to share it with our brethren for whom Christ died, who are really destitute and more needy than ourselves." ' *The World's Children*, Vol.39 No.1, Spring 1959, 16.

³ Decree published in *L'Osservatore Romano* of 23 December 1914, providing for 'spiritual and material assistance to prisoners', see Pollard, J.F. 1999. *The Unknown Pope: Benedict XV (1914-1922) and the Pursuit of Peace*, London: Geoffrey Chapman, 113.

Ferrière's niece, and the two women maintained a correspondence fired with enthusiasm for the task of helping children across the political divide.

It was with the patronage of the ICRC that, less than a year after the foundation of SCF, the *Union Internationale de Secours aux Enfants* (UISE) was created on 5 January 1920. The new union was launched in Geneva in the Salle de l'Athénée which had been the site for the creation of the ICRC over fifty years before.⁵ All the funds raised in response to the appeal by the Pope were then channelled through the international body of UISE to demonstrate that they were not destined for children of any particular nationality.

It was still not clear at this stage whether SCF and UISE would have a long term role, or whether they would, like the Fight the Famine Council, be wound up after meeting a temporary need. Eglantyne Jebb's correspondence with Suzanne Ferrière demonstrates that she was thinking strategically about the development of an organization with a long-term future. A strong centre, independent of local agencies, would have the capacity to 'promote and extend the movement and keep it on the right lines'.⁶ She became more and more insistent on the importance of UISE over and above the national organizations as time went by. She deplored what she called the 'National Point of View'. In 1926 in an article on 'The Future of the Save the Children Fund' she wrote:

⁴ The Vatican was involved in a number of operations aimed at providing foodstuffs for populations in or behind the war zones. A few examples are Lithuania; Montenegro in both 1916 and 1917; Poland in 1916; Russian refugees in 1916; and Syria and Lebanon from 1916 to 1922. See Pollard 1999, 115.

⁵ Moorehead, C. 1998. *Dunant's Dream: War, Switzerland, and the History of the Red Cross*, London: Harper Collins, 281.

⁶ SCF Archives reference SC/SF/20, 15 October 1923.

This point of view appears based upon the conviction that foreign work is only possible at times of great crisis, but that in between the crises there is a great deal of work which may usefully be carried out in the national field...

My personal conclusion is therefore that it would be better to sacrifice any other branch of our work rather than our continuous international relief and that if it is impossible to maintain this, it might be better now to liquidate our work. It may also be pointed out that were the opinions of those who hold the national point of view to prevail, the quickest and best way to carry them into effect would no doubt be to liquidate and to let a new society be started upon quite different lines.

Eglantyne Jebb recognized that not all the partner organizations with which SCF worked would share this strong sense of internationalism, and recommended that UISE adopt stricter rules of affiliation.

... in spite of the immediate gains to be derived from allying ourselves with societies inspired by a spirit of narrow nationalism, we should make no concessions or compromises but insist on admitting only those to the movement who genuinely share its principles of universal fraternity and of mutual help.⁷

A national organization could not reflect the principles of universalism and utilitarianism which Eglantyne Jebb believed were key to the salvation of the world's children. She was

not alone in this conviction, and a number of the colleagues who outlived her continued to promote these principles. Both her sister, Dorothy Buxton, and Edward Fuller, the editor of *The World's Children*, were to have a much longer involvement with SCF. They cited the words of Eglantyne Jebb when the governments of the member organizations once again went to war, arguing that only if UISE were maintained would the international movement be sustained.

Eglantyne Jebb demonstrated an extraordinary capacity in her first year with SCF to put into practice one of her own axioms. 'We must write out our belief in deeds before we can communicate this belief to others.'⁸ Grants were made to nine countries. However, she devoted as much time to securing her strategic vision of the future role of SCF as part of an international voluntary organization working on behalf of children worldwide, as she did to immediate relief work.

Work in the defeated countries of Europe

With the funds raised through the Fight the Famine Council and the Pope's appeal, SCF had the means to respond to reports coming from Vienna. Whereas during the war, reports had been accessible only in such publications as 'Notes from the Foreign Press', after the war both the government and the popular press received their own reports of conditions in the city. Whether conditions in Vienna were reported in the measured tones of the Dispatch

⁷ Jebb, E. *Memo on the Policy of the SCF*, Geneva, 9 July 1928, SCF Archives reference SC/EJ.277. There is an undated comment pencilled in the margin of this document: 'but this [shared fraternal bonds] can't yet be found Balkan states eg?'

⁸ Jebb, E. *Memorandum on Relief Policy*, SCF Archives reference SC/EJ.282.

from the British Director of Relief to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs⁹ or in the emotional tones of *The Daily News*,¹⁰ it was clear that there was widespread suffering. However, who should be helped first and how, was a more contentious issue.

In *Rebuilding a Ruined World: Save the Children's beginnings in Vienna, 1919* Rodney Breen demonstrates how the early experiences of SCF in Austria continued to have a powerful effect on the way in which SCF worked around the world in the 1990s, and on the characteristics which set SCF apart from other organizations working in similar fields.¹¹ Unlike other charities, SCF did not discriminate between particular classes or national or religious groups. The guiding principle of universalism meant that children should be aided according to the extent of their needs. The second guiding principle of utilitarianism meant that this aid should also be given with an eye to the future. In Austria, SCF adopted the habit of working with the existing community and institutions rather than creating new ones.

However, these experiences were gained within a particular political context. So many of SCF's activities have been coded as welfare, that their political significance has been neglected.¹² In the summer of 1919 the socialists assumed control over the administration of Vienna, and continued in power until February 1934. This municipal government was

⁹ Goode, Sir W. 1920. *Economic Conditions in Central Europe, Presented to Parliament by Command of his Majesty*. SCF Archives reference SC/EJ.242.

¹⁰ *The Daily News*, 10 May 1920.

¹¹ Breen, SCF Archive Paper No.7, October 1995.

¹² Atina Grossman identifies this difficulty in terms of constructing notions of citizenship for women in the inter-war years. Grossman, Atina 1998. 'Social Experiments' in Gruber, H. and Graves P., eds, 1998. *Women*

the prime partner for SCF. It moved quickly to invest more public resources in the expansion of clinics, family assistance programmes, and aid to children, as well as public sanitation. In the summer of 1920 Dr Julius Tandler became city councillor for welfare.¹³ He held the view that health and welfare were the right of every citizen. This meant a shift from reliance on private charitable organizations, to what Francesca Wilson has described as ‘the best thought-out and organised single system in the world; a system in which children were looked after from the moment of their conception, right through youth’.¹⁴

The innovations of the Vienna municipality positioned Austria in the vanguard of socialist experimentation in Europe, and its very success worried the U.S. and British governments. Tandler’s highly interventionist policies for child welfare brought socialist ideas into every home. He thus antagonized both the Church and the Christian Socialist party on the domestic front. Oral histories from working class families demonstrate that individuals also resented unasked-for interference in their lives.¹⁵ As a partner with the municipality, SCF was implicated in these conflicts, both international and domestic.

SCF’s universalist decision to assist those in greatest need placed it alongside the socialists within this political context. At the same time, the Quakers decided to discriminate against children in working-class families in favour of children in middle-class families.

and Socialism, Socialism and Women: Europe between the Two World Wars, Oxford: Berghahn Books, 51-56.

¹³ Dr Tandler was imprisoned in February 1934, and upon his release went to China where he died.

¹⁴ Wilson 1944, 138.

¹⁵ Gruber, H. 1998. ‘The “New Woman”’: Realities and Illusions of Gender Equality in Red Vienna’ in Gruber and Graves 1998, 56-95 (p. 67).

The future of the state seems to depend on both intellectual and manual workers being maintained in a state of efficiency [...] It seems to us better to secure a minimum of subsistence for this class rather than choose first the poorest as the recipients of our help.¹⁶

This concern for ensuring social stability was also evident in the Commonwealth Fund, founded in October 1918, in sponsoring feeding programmes for the children of the intellectual classes in Warsaw, Budapest and Vienna.¹⁷

However, SCF's work was not only designed to meet the immediate physical needs of children. It also had the utilitarian aim of preparing them for adulthood. One of its most enduring undertakings was support for training schools for teenagers run by Julia Vajkai in Budapest. She identified a gap in provision for children between the ages of twelve, when they ceased going to school, and fourteen, when they could first be apprenticed to a trade. This work broke with the tradition of child welfare which saw children as vulnerable and dependent. It recognized that as children grew up they assumed economic and social responsibilities, and that older brothers and sisters might have young children who were dependent upon them. The schools were established with a creche for younger children. All the children were provided with one meal a day, while the elder children were taught occupations which assisted the schools to be self-supporting.¹⁸

¹⁶ Clark, H., 'Notes on Principles of Relief Work', *Bulletin of the Save the Children Fund: Central Union*, Vol.1 No.17, 30 June 1920.

¹⁷ Weindling 1994, 205.

¹⁸ It was the Theosophist Action Lodge Famine Relief Fund that first gave assistance to Madame Vajkai enabling her to establish vocational schools for children between the ages of twelve and fourteen. Dr Armstrong Smith then appealed on her behalf for aid from SCF, and the Hungarian school became one of SCF's longest running projects for young people.

In Vienna, SCF worked in partnership with a municipal government which already had a programme for the development of child welfare. In Hungary, Julia Vajkai developed schools for juvenile offenders with the Ministry of Justice. In Serbia, by contrast, no recognizable child welfare institutions existed. Here, SCF encouraged the growth of indigenous institutions. Eglantyne Jebb rejoiced in the way in which a Yugoslav government department for child welfare came into being ‘as in a sense the outcome of the war’.¹⁹ She interpreted developments in Austria, Hungary, and Serbia as a testimony of the governments’ humanitarian commitment to children, not as evidence of the spread of socialism.

Eglantyne Jebb had an optimistic faith in the capacity of every population to fulfil a double duty: to its own children and to those abroad. She attributed this capacity as much to the Austrian, Hungarian or Serbian population as to the British. In this spirit of reciprocity, Julia Vajkai was invited from Hungary to Britain to make a study of juvenile employment published under the title *Through Hungarian Eyes* in 1928.

As Rodney Breen points out, there is a tailpiece to the story which confirmed Eglantyne Jebb’s faith.²⁰ In 1926 the General Strike collapsed after a week but the miners maintained strike action. When the British miners and their families were facing great hardship, help came from the City Council of Vienna. Just as the miners had sent help to Vienna’s

¹⁹ SCF Archives reference SC/EJ.240.

²⁰ It serves as confirmation for her faith only if the inspiration behind the gift was humanitarian and not if it was intended as a socialist gesture of solidarity with others in their struggle for social and economic power.

children when they were in need, the City Council voted a grant of £1,000 to provide milk for the children of striking miners in South Wales.²¹

The public had sympathy for Austria, and even stronger sympathy for Serbia.²² As an organization that depended on publicly raised funds, this could mean that SCF priorities were decided by where the public wanted to send their money. Germany, where there was evidently great need, had the lowest level of public sympathy. This posed SCF with a dilemma. SCF made its first grant to Germany on 14 June 1919. Its representative in Germany was the practised campaigner and relief worker Emily Hobhouse.²³ She drew SCF's attention to the condition of children in Leipzig. The records of the meeting of the SCF Committee of Enquiry into the needs of Germany held on 9 July 1920 demonstrate a keen awareness among the members present of the discrepancy between the level of public sympathy and the level of need. The Secretary to the German Embassy had put the case for aid to Germany at meetings of the SCF Council, and on the basis of need Dorothy Buxton argued that SCF ought to increase the aid it was giving to Germany. However, support for Germany remained unpopular. In 1923 it prompted the resignation of one SCF Council member.²⁴

²¹ Similar stories of mutual help survive in the annals of International Voluntary Service for Peace – see Best and Pike 1948.

²² SCF Archives reference SC/EJ.242.

²³ Emily Hobhouse (1860-1926) is best known for her work during the Boer War in South Africa. In 1919 she had begun her own initiative for children in Austria. For a few months she was appointed SCF representative for Austria and Germany. Together with Dr Schwytzer from Switzerland she reported to SCF on conditions in Leipzig in September 1919. See Fry, R. 1929. *Emily Hobhouse: A Memoir*, London: Jonathan Cape, 278.

²⁴ Sir William Grey Wilson tendered his resignation at the SCF Council Meeting, 6 July 1923. SCF Archives reference M1/2 C.264.

The Russian Famine

By then SCF had become involved in another political arena which would prove even more contentious with the British public: Bolshevik Russia. The political struggle between left and right which had been a subtext in the relief work in Red Vienna, made headlines with the response of SCF to the Russian Famine. This response provides clear historical lessons about the politicization of aid. It also demonstrated the logistical requirements of delivering large-scale relief. According to Hugo Slim, the prototype in the history of the twentieth century's relief operations was the SCF response to the Russian Famine.²⁵

The Russian Famine of 1921-22 was not simply a natural disaster, it was enmeshed with the politics of war. In the summer of 1921 there was a drought in the Volga region, and the harvests failed. This in itself was not unusual. Orlando Figes cites harvest failures in 1891-1892, 1906 and 1911, and goes on to explain how, since they were accustomed to harvest failures, the peasants had always maintained large emergency stocks of grain, often in communal barns. During the civil war, peasants had seen their usual reserves requisitioned by the Bolsheviks, and begun to grow only enough for their subsistence needs. When the harvest failed in 1920 they had no reserves. By the spring of 1921 Figes estimated that a quarter of the peasantry in Soviet Russia was starving.²⁶ Internationally Russia was subject to isolation, if not hostility.

²⁵ Slim, H. 1994. 'Children and Childhood in Emergency Practice 1919-1994' (editorial), A Special Issue to Mark the 75th Anniversary of Save the Children (UK), *Disasters: The Journal of Disaster Studies and Management*, Vol.18. No.3, September 1994, 189-191 (p. 189).

By early 1921 reports were reaching SCF of the extent of the famine. Voldemar Wehrlin, a delegate of the ICRC and of UISE to Russia, had been granted permission to enter the country and was engaged in the distribution of SCF food in Moscow. SCF's General Secretary, Lewis Golden, had been born in Russia and still had family there.²⁷ He exerted personal pressure to bring the impending catastrophe to the agenda of the committee. Devising an appropriate response to these reports was a test of Eglantyne Jebb's political acumen. She sought to deliver aid in accordance with her principle of universalism and demonstrate impartiality, but as the correspondence between Eglantyne Jebb and her friend and colleague, Suzanne Ferrière, reveals, she had to outmanoeuvre public opinion. She was particularly concerned that if SCF were to channel funds through the Quakers, as it had done in Vienna, it would be interpreted as a measure of support for the Bolsheviks:

However, erroneously, the Quakers have acquired in this country a reputation for Bolshevik sympathies, & it is also widely supposed that even when they really wish to [~~crossed out: be impartial~~] do every thing we wanted, they would be very easily misled & that the supplies would not reach the children in their entirety.

Feeling runs very high over here in regard to the relief of Bolshevik children – almost higher than in the case of German children. On our Committee I think the majority are anti-Bolshevik, a small minority oppose them, & some, including Lord

²⁶ See Figes, O. 1996. *A People's Tragedy: The Russian Revolution 1891-1924*, London: Jonathan Cape, 773-783.

²⁷ Lewis Bernard Golden (1878-1954), General Secretary SCF 1919-37; member, Executive Committee, UISE; member, Hungarian Order of the Red Cross. Born in Saratov, Russia, Lewis Golden was educated in Bath, Bonn and Moscow; General Manager, Anglo-Russian Trading Company; correspondent of the *Daily Mail*, Petrograd 1917-18; member of Anglo-Russian Commission (1917-18); on the staff of the Ministry of Information, London, 1918; and general secretary to Lady Muriel Paget's Mission to Czechoslovakia, 1919.

Weardale first & foremost, are genuinely neutral, as they ought to be, & quite impartial in the matter.²⁸

Eglantyne Jebb made Suzanne Ferrière her ally in cutting through the objections of the committee. She persuaded Suzanne Ferrière that the grant for relief should be made to the Geneva-based UISE, and that UISE should then arrange for its administration by the Quakers 'which also is in no doubt the best way'. This way the committee would not be faced with a proposal to make a grant to the Quakers.²⁹

In the summer of 1921 the Patriarch of Moscow launched an appeal to the West. In response, the joint committee of the ICRC and the League of Red Cross Societies summoned all interested parties to a meeting in Geneva on 15 August. An International Committee for Russian Relief was set up to coordinate the activities of the various relief organizations. Dr Fridtjof Nansen was invited to be its High Commissioner. The most severely hit province in Russia was Saratov. One bank of the Volga was allocated to UISE, the other to the American Relief Administration (ARA).³⁰ By the summer of 1922, when its activities were at their height, ARA was feeding ten million people every day. SCF was feeding 250,000 children. One year later the famine relief operation in Russia was wound up.

²⁸ SCF Archives reference SC/SF/3, 11 May 1921.

²⁹ Quaker reports of how they were perceived give a different picture, 'A description of us [Quaker workers] in a Russian official letter as "psychologically incapable of espionage", shows a perceptive, if a humorous, understanding of our position.' Fry 1926, 166.

³⁰ The ARA was founded as a result of war relief work in Belgium. It changed status from being a governmental to a voluntary organisation because of Hoover's agreement in July 1919 to food aid for the White Russian armies. Military medical and nursing personnel staffed the ARA. At the same time Hoover found an outlet for US wheat surpluses, establishing that solutions to the problems of famine should be coordinated with those of the economics of agriculture. See Weindling, P. 1994, 203-212.

The ARA had Congressional funding and access to US grain surpluses. SCF achieved an extraordinary level of funding for an organization that relied on public donations. Its success was due to its innovative use of advertising. Through her association with 'Notes from the Foreign Press' Eglantyne Jebb had already seen the power of the press to change public attitudes. SCF became the first voluntary organization to harness the press for an advertising campaign. Eglantyne Jebb hired a professional publicist and from March 1920 SCF began placing full-page advertisements. The advertisements for contributions towards the alleviation of suffering in first Austria and then Russia made appeals to the potential donor's patriotism and Christian conscience, as well as their selfish desire for self-preservation.

The whole world is threatened

Disease and pestilence will spread – the winds will carry it over Continents and the millions of deaths will mount steadily upwards.

Stop it in the name of heaven! Give in the name of Christianity! Crush out the spectre of disease and famine as you would crush a venomous reptile under your heel.

Christians – Britons must give the help that is essential and urgent. Fail not – for you too are in peril if the Terror is allowed to spread.³¹

The journal of SCF (dubbed by the *Glasgow Bulletin* 'the most melancholy magazine in existence') was a forum for popular debate on current issues ranging from eugenics to

esperanto. It also served as a platform for appeals from Eglantyne Jebb to her supporters, whom she knew to be overwhelmingly British and Christian:

Some day, maybe long after we have passed away, these babes who we were enabled to snatch from the jaws of death will be citizens, but they will never forget that when they had only grass, clay, and the bark of trees with which to stay hunger overwhelming and death bringing, British men and women came to them with open arms, fed them and helped them, washed them and clothed them, not for the sake of reward, or concession, or repayment of loans, or political hopes, but because the Master said 'Feed my Lambs'.³²

Many of the first generation of supporters associated with SCF fit comfortably beneath the banner of 'patriotic pacifism'.³³ They struggled inwardly to reconcile a Christian abhorrence of war and a liberal respect for individual conscience with an ingrained patriotism. One way in which they reconciled these values with action was to engage in humanitarian activity. They would fulfil the special destiny of the peace movement in Britain by preaching peace to other nations and providing less fortunate people with relief.

Advertisements in the press for funds for the victims of the Russian Famine stressed that SCF was not only helping children in the Bolshevik-controlled areas but also White

³¹ SCF Appeal for victims of the Russian Famine, *The Daily News*, 4 August 1921.

³² *The Record of the Save the Children Fund*, Vol.2 No.21, October 1921, 21.

³³ Cooper, S.E. 1991. *Patriotic Pacifism: Waging War on War in Europe 1815-1914*, Oxford: Oxford University Press. See also Ceadel 1996, 136.

Russian refugee children.³⁴ In *The Record*, with its readership of SCF supporters, there were articles to show that their efforts were being met half way, and that the Russians were also endeavouring to help themselves. Cartoons from *Pravda* were reproduced showing the efforts on the part of Russians to help their suffering brethren in the Volga provinces: sharing a loaf of bread, giving a free day's labour, etc.

Some sections of the British population were in sympathy with the Russian famine victims.

The Record cited support from a mass meeting of Coventry unemployed.

We do this, in spite of the fact that many of us are suffering privation and anxiety, knowing that in the famine area of Russia they are absolutely without the necessaries of life, and believing that such assistance will help Russia again to enter the markets of the world and, by reciprocal trade, contribute to the restoration of industry which should give us employment.³⁵

Others took up the anti-Bolshevik cause. The *Sunday Express* and the *Daily Express* attacked the accuracy of Dr Fridtjof Nansen's statements as High Commissioner of the International Committee for Russian Relief, and then the administration of SCF. To counter such adverse publicity, and to be certain its own message got across to the public, SCF commissioned a film showing in intimate detail the conditions of child life and death in the famine zone. *Russian Famine* was shown at ten places in the London area and in

³⁴ *The Daily News*, 25 August 1921.

³⁵ *The Record*, 15 June 1922.

sixteen other towns in England and Wales. In the early days of documentary film, pictures of mass graves still had the power to shock.³⁶

Having raised funds on an unprecedented scale, SCF became engaged in the practical delivery of large-scale relief. All SCF's previous work had involved handing over funds to other organizations. In Russia its own staff arranged for the delivery of the aid.³⁷ Some of SCF's operational staff had previous military experience. SCF's administrator in Saratov was a former Royal Marine, Laurence Webster. Others had worked with the Quakers or the Scottish Women's Hospitals for Foreign Service.

Between 1921-1923 SCF went into action in Russia on a scale not matched until the emergencies in Biafra and Ethiopia in the 1970s. Some of the models of practice relating to scientific targeting and relief centres persisted from the Russian to the Ethiopian famine. However, the significance of this classic prototype of relief lies not only in its practical arrangements but also in its politics. Eglantyne Jebb's correspondence reveals that she was well aware that relief given by the Soviet government could be used as a means of pacifying the population; relief given by the churches as a means of proselytizing; and relief from international agencies as a means of furthering strategic aims. She thought she was pursuing her own agenda of humanitarian neutrality, however she had misjudged Lord Weardale. The attitude of SCF's own chairman was far from neutral, and he considered

³⁶ *The Russian Famine* had its first public showing on 19 January 1922. SCF commissioned a second film about the refugee crisis in Greece, *Tragedy of the Near East*, in 1923.

³⁷ One SCF staff member died of typhoid and one committed suicide.

that SCF-sponsored relief would forward his own anti-Bolshevik strategic aims:

The true way to fight Bolshevism is by a policy of friendly approach to the people of Russia as a whole, and by tendering material assistance in the shape of urgent necessities ... as an evidence of our friendly intentions to Russia so soon as by its own initiatives to establish a form of government free from the impossible vices of Bolshevism ...³⁸

That such contradictory attitudes existed at the heart of the organization demonstrate the difficulty of identifying the aims and objectives behind the activities undertaken in SCF's name.

The Declaration of the Rights of the Child

In order to clarify SCF's mission a public statement of principle was needed. The Declaration of the Rights of the Child, drafted in 1922 and commonly known as the Declaration of Geneva, was to become the organizational credo. The myth of the writing of the Declaration is that Eglantyne Jebb climbed to the summit of Mont Salève above Geneva, and, rather like Moses receiving the Commandments, there in the silence was

³⁸ In the same letter Lord Parmoor wrote: 'The Jewish riff-raff in Russia, and indeed all over the world are the real instigators for the whole Bolshevist movement'. Quoted in Breen R., *Saving Enemy Children: Save the Children's relief work during the Russian Famine, 1921-23*, SCF Archive Paper No.4., n.d.

inspired to write the rights of the child. The actual genesis of the Declaration is unclear and definitely more prosaic.³⁹ However, a letter from Eglantyne Jebb does state that:

My idea is that the axioms should be general and fundamental and such as to command universal assent: they are in the nature of principles. They should be sound, indisputable, and universally valid.⁴⁰

After a year of discussion of a French language version by UISE and an English version by SCF, the form of words that was finally made public was decided upon on 17 May 1923:

This Declaration is included as an appendix.

The Declaration embodied Eglantyne Jebb's aim to place the child 'above all considerations of race, nationality, or creed'. It was adopted by the League of Nations with remarkable speed. UISE was able to exert such effective influence because it was able to frame the issue and help define the decision makers' interests in an area in which there were no existing policies.⁴¹ Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald and Charles Roden Buxton MP both helped the Declaration get a sympathetic hearing before the Assembly of the League of Nations, and it was adopted on 26 September 1924.

Although from its earliest days SCF had friends within government, Eglantyne Jebb frequently insisted that its work was apolitical. She had a political goal to depoliticize work

³⁹ Breen R., *Claiming Rights for Children: The Drafting of the Declaration of the Rights of the Child (1922)*, SCF Archive Paper No.1, November 1994.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 2.

on behalf of children. However, her very success in attracting funds for SCF made it harder for the organization to maintain a course independent of politics.

But now when it attracts millions of pounds and affects millions of people, it is harder for it to escape from the friendship of politicians – a friendship which is often more dangerous than their enmity. For relief has become to them a coveted weapon. The promise of relief may extort political concessions, the threat of its withdrawal prevent actions distasteful to the wealthier power.⁴²

Only in Russia had SCF itself become operational, elsewhere it had passed its funds through other agencies. It chose agencies whose ideas were compatible with its own, for example the Theosophical Society in Hungary and the Haverfield Fund for Serbian Children.⁴³ Some of the smaller societies protested that the success of SCF in raising public funds was jeopardizing their own fund-raising efforts. The representatives of the two small agencies cited here later became representatives of SCF. Both the relationships between NGOs, and the relationships between NGO and state, were affected by economies of scale. Whoever held the purse strings could buy influence and attract personnel by offering them a wider scope for action.

⁴¹ See the discussion of policy innovation and selection, Adler, E. and Haas, P.M. 1992. 'Epistemic Communities, World Order and the Creation of a Reflective Research Program' in *International Organization*, Vol.46 No.1, Winter 1992, 367-390 (p. 381).

⁴² *The Record*, Vol.3 No.4, July 1923, 158.

⁴³ 'Miss Boyle [Nina Boyle, later member of SCF Council] explained that hitherto they had drawn a large proportion of their funds from Yorkshire. On their last visit to that county, they found that the SCF had practically absorbed public attention, and people who had formerly subscribed to the Haverfield Fund were now giving to the SCF, and saying that doubtless the SCF would allocate to the Haverfield Fund.' The Hon. Evelina Haverfield's Fund for Serbian Children: Interview with Miss Nina Boyle, English Representative, 8 April 1921?, SCF Archives reference SC/EJ.230.

Thanks to the practical work of these pre-existing organizations and to the innovatory work of SCF in bringing relief issues to public attention, both the public and politicians became more familiar with issues of child suffering caused by war and economic distress. In future there would be less scope for SCF to exercise its techniques of persuasion, since potential supporters would have their own agenda and be predisposed to support activities underpinned by an ideology implicitly aligned with their own. More important in the future would be the effect upon SCF of the mainstream of public opinion.

The first decade in the history of SCF was marked by burgeoning activity and geographical expansion. Its overwhelming ethos was of internationalism and pacificism. Its co-founders, Dorothy Buxton and Eglantyne Jebb, were as much associated with the promotion of international peace as the promotion of child welfare. In the pages of *The Record* and *The World's Children* the evils associated with war were discussed, including authoritarianism, lack of freedom of speech and information, economic abuse, and the social cost of rearmament. SCF was a home for 'eccentrics' who through their beliefs and deeds challenged any authoritarianism of the state. It was on the cohesion of this social community that the future of the organization would depend. However, this social community was to disintegrate, primarily because of the rift that Eglantyne Jebb had most feared between supporters of her blueprint for an international organization and supporters of what she called 'the National Point of View'.

Just over a decade after her death, at the outbreak of the Second World War, the supporters of SCF were to regroup, in just the way that Eglantyne Jebb had deplored, as a national society for child welfare at home. Eighty years on it is often assumed that SCF grew out of the political culture of social reform. However, the lives of the people active in the organization and the language of their publications and correspondence, suggest that the initial impulse behind the activities of SCF was part of the contemporary debates about war and peace. A competing set of beliefs, values and techniques of persuasion were to predominate in the second generation.

Chapter 3

AN ORGANIZATION IN RETREAT FROM IDEALISM (1929-1939)

The aerial bombardment of Abyssinia in 1935 caused not only death and displacement but also widespread revulsion.¹ A cartoon by David Low, reproduced in *The World's Children* from *The Evening Standard*, showed a village scene of conical thatched huts and children playing between them under the caption 'barbarism' and the same scene with the village now a smoking ruin under the caption 'civilisation'.² It seemed that the faith in science of Eglantyne Jebb, as well as so many others of her generation, had been misplaced. Scientific progress had given human beings weapons of mass destruction and the possibility of an even greater abuse of power.

Two years later, at a time when the British government maintained a policy of non-intervention in the civil war in Spain, and there was popular demand for aid to the Republican side, German planes bombed Guernica. The pain and suffering caused by aerial bombardment had now been brought even closer to home and public opinion rallied round the cause of the four thousand Basque refugee children brought to Britain by the Basque Children's Committee in June 1937.³ SCF joined other British agencies in taking care of them.

¹ Italy invaded Abyssinia in 1935. It was then annexed as Italian East Africa from 1936-1941 until the return of Haile Selassie from exile. SCF provided assistance to refugees from Abyssinia in Kenya, British Somaliland and the Sudan. See SCF Council meeting minutes September 1935. SCF Archives reference M1/8 C.2065.

Events in Abyssinia and Spain were all heavy blows to the confidence of those people who had believed that international disputes could be solved without recourse to war. In the face of renewed violent conflict, the deployment of new forms of weapons, and the attendant suffering, those attitudes to peace and war which had appeared enlightened and practical in the aftermath of the First World War proved difficult to sustain. During the decade following the First World War it had been believed by many that there would be no future justification for war. In the 1930s, by contrast, the rise of fascism was convincing proof for many self-declared pacifists of the necessity of taking up arms. This shift divided the anti-war movement from which SCF had drawn much of its early support.⁴

This chapter looks first at the disintegration of the anti-war movement during the 1930s, then identifies changes in the dominant attitudes of the particular group of people associated with SCF. I argue that the idealistic set of beliefs and values which guided the first generation had to compete against a set of beliefs and values characterized by pessimistic realism among this second generation. In the 1930s SCF prepared to abandon its optimistic pacificism and become acquiescent in a violent world. SCF's commitment to universalism, and its utilitarian understanding of children as a radical lever for the transformation of the world, were no longer translated into action. This had an impact not only upon the nature of its work with children, but also upon SCF's relationships with government and other voluntary organizations. How this erosion of principle came about will be revealed by an examination of the response made by SCF to the civil war in Spain. The Spanish Civil War has been chosen for a number of reasons. Firstly, it was the focus

² *The World's Children* November 1935, 23.

³ See below.

for the redefinition of many individual attitudes to war and peace. Secondly, it demonstrated the overriding popularity of a partisan rather than a universalist discourse. Thirdly, it resulted in a new array of international NGOs.

The disintegration of the anti-war movement

The anti-war movement was cohesive as long as war was perceived as the ultimate evil. The rise of fascism presented another worst possible outcome. As Fenner Brockway described in his autobiography:

The war forced on me a dilemma. I was in all my nature opposed to war. I could never see myself killing anyone and had never held a weapon in my hands. But I saw that Hitler and Nazism had been mainly responsible for bringing the war and I could not contemplate their victory.⁵

Other pacifists, whether their inspiration was religious, socialist or humanitarian, persisted in their belief that war was the greatest evil. Although Eglantyne Jebb had never declared herself a pacifist, her example was an inspiration to them. In 1934 she was held up as an icon of pacifism to the readers of the newsletter of the No More War Movement (NMWM).

⁴ See Ceadel 1980.

⁵ Brockway, F. 1977. *Towards Tomorrow: The Autobiography of Fenner Brockway*, London: Hart-Davis, MacGibbon, 136.

If any members of our “No More War” movement feel in need of fresh inspiration, of a new armoury of argument and fact as well as of poignant appeal, let them turn to Eglantyne Jebb ... The ‘Thou shalt not’s of the Old Testament clearly included the words ‘Thou shalt not kill’ but Eglantyne Jebb saw with Jesus that righteousness and peace could not be won by negative creeds. The everlasting ‘Yea’ of the two commandments was needed before the heart of humanity could be won. And to the question ‘who is my neighbour?’ Eglantyne Jebb gave the answer, and in the Declaration of Geneva endorsed by the Fifth Assembly of the League of Nations, 1924, sent it sounding through 49 states or nations: ‘Every suffering child’.⁶

The author of the article, Katharine Bruce-Glasier, was both a member of the predominantly socialist NMWM and the SCF Nurseries Committee.⁷ She chose to single out Eglantyne Jebb’s religiously inspired conviction of the oneness of humanity to reaffirm the socialist belief in the brotherhood of man and the immorality of violence against fellow men. For her the religious, socialist and humanitarian arguments for pacifism reinforced one another.

The pacifists in the anti-war movement had committed themselves to pursue all other means to resolve conflict and justified the use of arms only as a last resort. Many of them

⁶ Bruce-Glasier, K., March 1934, ‘Eglantyne Jebb: Sister of all the World’, *No More War*, Organ of the Midlands Council of the No More War Movement, Birmingham. The NMWM was set up February 1921 and claimed 3000 members by 1927. It was wound up in February 1937 and merged with the Peace Pledge Union.

⁷ Katharine Bruce-Glasier (c.1868-1950) was involved in the setting up of nursery schools in the 1930s and in the campaign to provide milk in schools. She was also one of the pioneers of the Independent Labour Party. See obituary in *The World’s Children*, July 1950, 243.

were supporters of the League of Nations. One alternative to the use of armed force available to the League of Nations was the use of economic sanctions. Under Article 16 of the League of Nations Covenant any Member of the League which resorted to war

shall *ipso facto* be deemed to have committed an act of war against all other Members of the League, which hereby undertake immediately to subject it to the severance of all trade or financial relations, the prohibition of all intercourse between their nationals and the nationals of the Covenant-breaking state, and the prevention of all financial, commercial or personal intercourse between the nationals of the Covenant-breaking state and the nationals of any other state, whether a Member of the League or not.

On 5 October 1935 Italy invaded Abyssinia and two days later on 7 October 1935 the League of Nations Committee of Six found Italy guilty of violating Article 12. Embargoes were put in place first of arms, then loans and credits, then imports, and finally a limited range of exports. Hufbauer judges that the sanctions were an outright failure, making no contribution to the policy result.⁸

However, from the perspective of many working within SCF sanctions were anathema as a viable alternative to violence. They had witnessed in Austria, Germany and then in Russia, the limited impact of sanctions upon government, and the devastating impact of sanctions upon civilians, especially children. Opposition to sanctions was a defining characteristic of

the founding generation of SCF, and to argue in their support would mean the crossing of a line. During the Second World War many SCF supporters would cross that line. It was the example of the First World War generation that SCF would choose to cite in order to strengthen their argument against the comprehensive economic sanctions that were increasingly applied in the post-Cold War period.⁹

In 1919 Dorothy Buxton and the founders of the Fight the Famine Council protested that the victorious states were continuing to wage war, if not by military means then by economic means. They had argued that economic relations could themselves embody the evils of war. In the 1930s these same people were faced with a world at peace in which people lived in poverty and continued to undergo the suffering they associated with the victims of war. The Depression had at least two effects upon the anti-war movement. Some members were so appalled by the dehumanizing effects of poverty that they argued that war and the incidental denial of pacifism could be justified to combat the permanent violence embodied in capitalism. This strand, together with the staunch pacifists such as Dorothy Buxton, still maintained an internationalist orientation. The second strand had a defencist response to the prevailing economic insecurity. They argued for the protection of national economic interests and rearmament, and had a nationalist orientation.

⁸ Hufbauer, G.C. 1990. *Economic Sanctions Reconsidered*, Washington: Institute for International Economics. For details of sanctions by the UK and League of Nations against Italy over Abyssinia, see Vol.2, *Supplemental Case Histories*, 33-40.

⁹ Save the Children Fund's Evidence to the House of Commons International Development Committee's Inquiry on the Future of Sanctions, April 1999. In the post-Cold War period SCF was working in a growing number of countries under some form of sanctions regime, including Afghanistan, Burundi, Cuba, Northern Iraq, Myanmar, and Sudan.

Pessimistic realism within SCF

Within the political and economic context of the 1930s the expansion of SCF work slowed down. In Europe, areas where SCF had had the opportunity to work with government cooperation in the 1920s, now found themselves under more hostile regimes. In *The World's Children* of April 1934 Mosa Anderson made a new appeal for Austria.

The municipality of Vienna has been suppressed. The Mayor of Vienna, Herr Sietz, together with hundreds of others, is in prison simply on the ground of his municipal activities. Thousands of others are in prison for their participation or alleged connivance in the activities of the Socialist armed forces. Dismissals on political grounds are taking place in thousands.¹⁰

In Russia Stalin had closed off all access to outside agencies. It is hard to imagine children in Russia going through a greater ordeal than that of the 1920s, but when famine struck again in 1933, no international agency was able to secure permission to enter, either to witness the horror or provide relief.

The economic context meant that SCF struggled with dwindling resources. Whereas its income for the financial year 1920-21 had been £554,938, in 1931-32 it was at its lowest point of £20,802, and SCF felt compelled to use its scarce resources to assist children in Britain. Already in 1920 SCF had made its first grants for use for children in Britain. In

¹⁰ 'Austria in Need Again: A New Call to Save the Children', *The World's Children*, Vol.14 No.7, April 1934, 101.

1933 SCF published *Unemployment and the Child: 'An Enquiry'*.¹¹ It extended its network of nurseries, which were designed to improve the health and well-being of the children and relieve the mothers, in the areas worst hit by unemployment such as South Wales and the North East.¹²

Eglantyne Jebb had not foreseen a cautious future constrained by external circumstances for the organization. Until her death the work of SCF had always outstripped expectations. In 1919 SCF had been set up to provide relief to children affected by armed conflict in Europe, and it was anticipated that the organization's work could last as little as a few months. In the first decade of its life it became clear that the organization would have a longer life: relief in Austria, Germany and Serbia, had been succeeded by work in Russia and resettlement programmes for the refugees of Turkey and Greece. This work was all stamped with the hallmark of Eglantyne Jebb; not only were new refugee settlements given her name,¹³ the organization developed according to her ambitious international vision. This vision was not merely European but global. The first grants to Africa and Latin America were made in 1923,¹⁴ and later the same year SCF sent relief to survivors of an earthquake in Tokyo. Before she died plans were put in place for work in China and a Conference on the African Child. The year after her death, the first grant was made to sub-Saharan Africa¹⁵ and the Conference was held in 1931.¹⁶

¹¹ *Unemployment and the Child: 'An Enquiry'*, SCF, 1933.

¹² These 'open-air' nurseries – keeping children in the open air was believed at the time to combat tuberculosis – where nourishing food was provided, had immediate benefits for children and their mothers. Breen, R., *The Preschool Child: Save the Children and Preschool Education*, SCF Archive Paper No.6, 1995.

¹³ The village of 'Xheba' (Jebba) was erected in Albania for refugees of Albanian origin from Smyrna [Izmir], Turkey, c.1926

¹⁴ £560 for an orphanage in Cairo and £150 for relief in Chile.

¹⁵ Relief to Ruanda-Urundi, 1929.

While Eglantyne Jebb was alive the policy of the new Fund was clearly mapped in published statements. Fewer statements of policy were published in the 1930s. After her death, close colleagues of her generation continued to serve within the organization. Edward Fuller, Editor of *The Record of the Save the Children Fund*, and later of *The World's Children* from 1920-1958, maintained a global interest not only in child welfare but also in issues of peace and war. For example, at the time of the World Disarmament Conference, *The World's Children* published several commentaries including an open letter on children and war, from John Galsworthy.¹⁷ Lewis Golden served as General Secretary of SCF until 1937. Her sister, Dorothy Buxton, also remained active in the cause of refugees. It cannot be said that there was no continuity, but at the same time it is evident that after 1928 the organization was influenced by a new generation.¹⁸

This second generation was not only the heir to the policy laid down by Eglantyne Jebb; it was also immersed in the debates of the day. They were subject to the influence of new constellations of beliefs, values, and techniques of persuasion. This chapter suggests that, by the time it was faced with the outbreak of the Second World War, SCF was an organization in retreat from idealism. The second generation had found that they could not

¹⁶ Sharp, E. 1931. *The African Child: An Account of the International Conference on African Children Geneva*, London: Longmans, Green and Co.

¹⁷ 'By war we mortgage the future, not only in those ways now so alarmingly patent to us in the trough of economic despond, but in a way far more subtle and deadly, by the partial destruction and widespread blighting of children who are the crop we have sown for the morrow and in great part shall never reap.' 'Mortgaging the Future: An Open Letter on Children and War', *The World's Children*, Vol.12 No.5, February 1932, 70.

¹⁸ Very quickly after her death Eglantyne Jebb herself became an icon, which may have contributed to the distance placed between her generation and the next. She was one of eight subjects, including Josephine Butler, Florence Nightingale and Harriet Beecher Stowe, chosen by Dr Alice Salomon for her book *Heroische Frauen* [Heroic Women], Zürich: Verlag für Recht und Gesellschaft, 1936.

apply the guiding principles of universalism, utilitarianism and optimism to the circumstances of the 1930s. They reneged on SCF's original commitment to international reconciliation and the optimistic belief in the possibility of war prevention, and became a national society for child welfare at home and relief in Europe.

There was no root and branch change of membership within the organization. Instead individuals with different affiliations came to have greater or lesser influence over the organization. Gradually the people of the first generation whose path to SCF had been from the anti-war movement were replaced. This founder generation had witnessed the economic dislocation of Europe following the First World War and the particular suffering caused to children. They had then put the evidence before governments, churches, trades unions and the media in support of the humanitarian argument for pacifism. In 1919 it had seemed to a broad church of people that a simple utilitarian calculation of the unhappiness and destruction caused by war would invariably show these to outweigh its benefits.

Alternative means for solving disputes also seemed near at hand. At an interstate level the founders of SCF were instrumental in the establishment of the League of Nations. On an individual level they had faith in the possibility of reconciling nationalism with internationalism, and believed that 'national distinctions can become bonds instead of barriers'.¹⁹

The conviction that war was the ultimate evil, and the optimism that it was within humanity's means to eradicate war, had both gone by the time SCF entered the Second World War. Twenty years on it was a very different organization from the committee of

outspoken individuals that had come together in 1919. Its very purpose had changed. The founder members had been as much involved in efforts for international reconciliation as in relief work, and in its early years SCF still reflected the twin interests of its founders. In the period under discussion in this chapter, the avowedly political interests of its founders in active war prevention were set aside and the Fund became more exclusively involved in relief work.

The first and second generations of SCF also had different characteristics. The founders were not only interested in ridding the world of violent conflict, they were also concerned with personal transformation. The early journals of SCF testify to their quests for spiritual and moral conversion. This convergence of personal and social transformation begins to disappear from the journals of this later period. In Chapter 1 it was also shown that the early members of SCF held individualistic, anti-government and internationalist outlooks. By contrast, by the outbreak of the Second World War SCF was ready to prove itself a loyal partner of the UK government. The single quality which persisted from the first generation to the second generation was that of patriotic humanitarianism. However, the first generation of SCF workers had often expressed their patriotism through individual humanitarian adventures. By contrast, SCF workers cared for refugees from Abyssinia after having secured the assent of the Foreign Office, and took part in the delivery of aid to Spain in coordination with UISE and the ICRC.

¹⁹ Jebb, E., 'The World Policy of the Save the Children Fund', in Fuller 1928, 563.

The Civil War in Spain

Lewis Golden had been General Secretary of SCF since 1919. During this period he was most worried by what Eglantyne Jebb had called the triumph of the 'National Point of View'.

The chief difficulty in obtaining the support of a large number of influential people, already necessarily taken up with other interests, is the international aspect of the work. Anything international is not popular in England at the present time, owing to the problems of unemployment, heavy taxation, etc. and general swing of public opinion towards national rather than international interests.²⁰

Lewis Golden faced a challenge to the principle of universalism on two counts during the last years of his tenure. First the recession in Britain led to a deepening of the attitude that British children living in want had first call upon the Fund. Eglantyne Jebb had lived to see the income of SCF rise to its peak in response to the Russian Famine and also begin to fall. She insisted that even in times of scarce funds innovations could be made on a small scale. In this spirit SCF responded to refugees from Greece and Turkey. However, by the 1930s the economic situation had worsened and the income of SCF fell to its lowest level ever. As poverty struck more children in the UK, SCF tilted its resources so that a greater proportion was spent on its work at home.

²⁰ Golden, L.B., *Memorandum on the Basis of Appeal, Money Raising, Publicity and Publications*, Geneva, SCF Archives reference SC/EJ.282, 28 May 1929.

The second challenge to the principle of universalism came from the Spanish Civil War. The Spanish Civil War generated an upsurge of interest in international events among people in Britain. Popular sympathy was predominantly with the Republican side, and the popular demand for aid to be sent to Spain was inextricably bound up with the campaign for a Republican victory against the Nationalists.²¹

Until the Spanish Civil War it is possible to see SCF as the most significant heir to a tradition of humanitarian neutrality dating back to the efforts of Johann Pestalozzi in 1798, and to the foundation of the Red Cross in the mid-nineteenth century. Much of the tradition had been built upon the efforts of highly placed individuals with contacts with heads of state. SCF pioneered fundraising at a more popular level, using the national media and petitioning churches, trades unions, schools, clubs etc. SCF's activity may have helped pave the way for the British response to the Spanish Civil War. Fundraising and the organization of relief were taken out of the hands of the established aid agencies, and relief became an activity open to all. At the same time as relief became more popular and populist the principle of humanitarian neutrality was jettisoned. As was shown in the preceding chapter, in the face of accusations of partiality, SCF had always insisted upon the non-political nature of its appeals, arguing in the tradition of humanitarian neutrality for aid for 'enemy children' of Germany and Austria, or for children in Bolshevik Russia.

²¹ The British Institute of Public Opinion first polled on Spain in January 1937, and the response to the question of whether Franco's junta should be regarded as the legal government of Spain revealed only 14 per cent in favour and 86 per cent opposed. Buchanan, T. 1997. *Britain and the Spanish Civil War*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 23.

During the Spanish Civil War the widespread readiness of the British public to give material support was harnessed as an extension of politics.²²

The General Secretary of SCF found himself confronted with a novel dilemma. An international issue had succeeded in capturing the imagination of a large number of influential people, but the universalist principles of SCF were not consistent with the popular enthusiasm for one side of the conflict. SCF was not alone among the established relief organizations in being unable to meet the demand for aid to Spain. The League of Nations was not strong enough to make a humanitarian intervention in its own right. The ICRC and the Quakers, like SCF, insisted on the principle of humanitarian neutrality, and would not send aid exclusively to one side. Other organizations already in existence with wartime experience were committed to provide relief to particular groups of people, such as the Armenian refugees. Of the cadre of people with experience of relief work, some of them joined the ranks of those individuals who volunteered to join relief efforts in Spain.

However, on the whole the demand for aid was met by a raft of new organizations.

Francesca Wilson was in an interesting position to comment upon the different actors amongst the organizations. She came from a Quaker family and knew their relief work well, however, she was never part of their guiding committees. She had gained experience of humanitarian relief work during the First World War, first in France and then with Serb refugees. During the Russian Famine she worked alongside both Quaker and SCF teams. With the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War she took unpaid leave from her teaching post

²² ' Party politics offered little hope for influencing the British government to change its policy, and the option of joining the International Brigades could only appeal to a few, but fundraising and the organization

in London to work in Spain. She was impressed by the educational goals of the Republican side, and wanted to be part of their efforts to raise literacy levels and provide workers' schools and libraries. In her memoirs she gives a glimpse of the contrast between the enthusiasm of the Republican supporters and the reticence of the neutral agencies. She recalls the opening of a farm colony for boys at Crevillente:

The delegate from the Provincial Board for education in Alicante said that we represented the real England, the England of John Stuart Mill, the England that had taught the world liberty. But the Quakers, who had come out to inspect the relief work in Spain and whose visit happened to synchronize with our opening, gravely reminded the audience that Friends represented nothing except peace and good will, and that their mission was to save children without regard for race or creed, or political colour. They were working on the other side too, they said, in fact wherever there was need.²³

The Quakers' conception of impartiality was different from that of SCF. They obviously did not share SCF's non-denominational character, and had a religious objective in preventing Spain from becoming an entirely secular state.²⁴ However, another critical distinction between the two organizations was the division of labour between relief and international reconciliation. Unlike SCF, the Quakers made no such division. Although

of relief was open to all and could make a material difference.' Buchanan 1997, 93.

²³ Wilson 1944, 196.

²⁴ Buchanan 1997, 117.

they were not allowed to operate in Nationalist Spain, part way through the conflict they sought an interview with Franco.²⁵

SCF studiously avoided becoming involved in the politics of the conflict, insisting on the impartiality of work with children. The importance to SCF of its conception of impartiality is stressed in this article by Lord Noel-Buxton:

This impartiality in the cause of the Child has lastly triumphed again, in the midst of the war in Spain... We do not know and we do not enquire what are the political views of the parents of the children we help, any more than we are concerned as to their religious faith...The children have no responsibility for the acts or the attitude of their parents. Our common humanity demands that we must make the utmost effort to aid them in their desperate need and so to demonstrate once again the universal brotherhood of mankind.²⁶

Since it was dedicated to the assistance of all children whatever the political views of their parents, SCF could not accept donations which were tied to one side of the war or the other. This principle had to be applied to all donations whatever their size. The Council minutes record the decision to return a cheque for £5 for Spanish children, since it was accompanied by a letter stating that the donor was strongly opposed to helping the children

²⁵ Friends Service Council papers, Spain committee minutes, 16 February 1938.

²⁶ Lord Noel-Buxton, President of the Save the Children Fund, ‘“Neutrality of the Save the Children Fund”, From an Article in *The British Weekly*’, in *The World’s Children* Vol.17 No.4 January 1937, 61.

of insurgents. In this case the donor was directed to an organization which was helping on the Government side only.²⁷

The funds which SCF did raise in Britain were passed to UISE in Geneva. UISE then supervised the provision of relief in Spain. Together with the ICRC, UISE succeeded in facilitating the transfer of children from territory held by one side to territory controlled by the other. For this kind of task cooperation with the ICRC was essential as it was the only body in Spain recognized by both sides.²⁸ This action was consistent with Eglantyne Jebb's vision of an international voluntary organization where the central machinery of the international union was more important than the local machinery of the national organization. She had also always been in favour of close cooperation with the ICRC.

Despite the fine principles behind SCF's position, and the international organization of its operation, SCF's response to the Spanish Civil War does not stand up well to scrutiny. The overall impression of SCF in its early years is of an organization defining its own path and influencing others rather than being influenced by them. A detailed examination of SCF decision-making during the Spanish Civil War suggests that the organization became constrained by other more vocal and action-oriented organizations on the British scene. It lost the initiative and found its resources were drawn into activities defined by others. This was in part a measure of SCF's success in establishing itself as the agency for children with a recognized expertise. There was a tacit expectation that SCF would make itself responsible for activities for Spanish children, freeing other actors for other engagements.

²⁷ Meeting of SCF Council, Thursday 17 December 1936, SCF Archive reference M1/8 C.2333.

Two umbrella committees emerged to provide assistance to the Nationalist and the Republican sides of the conflict. SCF could be an influential member of neither, because the *raison d'être* of each committee was to promote one side, a goal which it was known SCF did not share. Although SCF had little influence over other members, they could have some influence over SCF. Not only did they hold the purse strings for funds for Spain from the British public, but they could also put pressure upon SCF to fulfil its role as the acknowledged expert agency for children.

In late 1936 a committee was formed by the Infanta Beatrice, cousin of the exiled Spanish King Alfonso XIII, known as the General Relief Fund for the Distressed Women and Children of Spain with the avowed aim of raising funds for assisting both sides. When the Council considered the question of cooperation, a number of members felt that as the Infanta's Committee was made up of people whose sympathies were known to be to the 'right', SCF might lose prestige if it identified itself with this Committee.²⁹ Popular sympathy was with the Republicans.

Dedicated to the support of the Republican side was the better known National Joint Committee for Spanish Relief.³⁰ The leading light of this Committee was the Duchess of Atholl. As a Conservative MP and a prolific writer she was influential in her own right. Her husband was also Scottish President of SCF.

²⁸ Meeting of SCF Council, Thursday 29 October 1936. The General Secretary reported on the successful transfer of one thousand children. SCF Archives reference M1/8 C.2302.

²⁹ Meeting of SCF Council, Thursday 17 December 1936, SCF Archives reference M1/8 C.2333.

³⁰ Formed in November 1936 in response to a visit to Spain by a cross-party group of MPs.

SCF joined the two committees but participated wholeheartedly in neither. The ‘political’ character of the National Joint Committee alarmed both the Quakers and SCF, so much so that they forced it to agree to a statement of impartiality being read out before all of its public meetings.³¹ Since the formation of UISE in the Salle de l’Athénée in Geneva, SCF had aspired to the tradition of humanitarian neutrality pioneered by the ICRC. However, SCF never had the special status of the ICRC and so could not hold itself aloof from all other relief agencies. With the creation of a raft of new organizations to provide relief to Spain, it found itself one among many. Its special mission for children and record of twenty years’ work gave it some clout, but it joined the two umbrella agencies to share in information, funding and logistical support. By doing so SCF found itself in a position of interdependency with agencies whose principles it did not wholly share.

The case of the evacuation of the Basque children illustrates this. In May 1937 the dramatic evacuation of four thousand children from the Basque country to Britain absorbed much of the energy and funds of the Joint Committee. In her Penguin Special, *Searchlight on Spain*, the Duchess of Atholl portrayed the evacuation as a rescue mission.³² She described how agencies such as SCF rallied round, and how the children were made very welcome. The records of SCF show a different picture: one of an organization split over fundamental policy.

³¹ Save the Children Council minutes, 17 June 1937, SCF Archives reference M1/9.

³² Atholl, K. 1938. *Searchlight on Spain*, London: Penguin, 199.

Lewis Golden had been with the Fund since its inception. After eighteen and a half years of service, the General Secretary was driven to resign because of his opposition to the Council policy on Spain. It is stated in the minutes of the Council meeting that he considered the policy ‘wrong and almost criminal as regards the Basque children’.³³ The minutes also record his disappointment that the ideas of new members of the Council were not aligned with his.³⁴

There is evidence to show that from his visits to Spain the General Secretary found that there was no actual lack of food, except milk, and judged that it was difficult to appeal for relief work except on political grounds.³⁵ As someone who had witnessed SCF’s work during the Russian Famine and shared Eglantyne Jebb’s interest in the condition of children worldwide, he may also have been frustrated with the SCF response towards Spain on another score. This well-reported European conflict had provoked a rush of popular support. While a welcome change from the preoccupation with domestic affairs, it also diverted attention from children in need elsewhere.³⁶

As for the almost ‘criminal’ nature of the evacuation, Lewis Golden was concerned that the evacuation was a political stunt, performed at a cost to the physical, moral and mental health of the children.³⁷ The Council agreed with him that the evacuation of the children

³³ Save the Children Council minutes, 15 July 1937, SCF Archives reference M1/9.

³⁴ ‘During the past two or three years he had received no support from quarters in the Council from which he should have had it. On the contrary he had nothing but niggling criticism. After 18.5 years new people came into the Fund with new ideas.’ Save the Children Council meeting, minutes 15 July 1937, SCF Archives reference M1/9.

³⁵ Save the Children Council meeting, minutes 18 March 1937, SCF Archives reference M1/9.

³⁶ There is no record of discussion in the Council minutes of this period of follow-up to any non-European work

³⁷ Buchanan 1997, 110.

from Spain to Britain should never have happened. They had advised the Foreign Office that the children should remain in Spain, and if they could not be moved to safe areas in their own country, that they should be evacuated to neighbouring France. However, they were also in agreement that once the children had arrived in Britain they could not refuse their help.

In an attempt to separate the future care of the children from the politics of the National Joint Committee, a Basque Children's Committee was set up. Although the two committees shared much the same membership, this measure succeeded in involving the Catholic Church and the Labour movement, who had both refrained from joining the National Joint Committee, and attracting a wider spectrum of humanitarian support. The Catholic Church had been hostile to the evacuation of the children to Britain because it anticipated that the initiative would be a dangerously open-ended financial responsibility.³⁸ The Catholics did however eventually provide hospitality for the 1200 children of their own faith.

The Basque Children's Committee faced many problems: typhoid broke out in the camp, the children proved difficult to manage and a number escaped from the camp near Southampton. However, these short-term problems were slight in comparison with the longer-term problems of the children's repatriation.

When Bilbao fell to the Nationalists on 19 June 1937 the new authorities were determined to arrange for the children's return. Many of the children's families had fled in the face of

the rebel advance and were difficult to trace. The children quickly became political pawns with some members of the Basque Children's Committee, such as the Catholic Church, pressing for their speedy repatriation, and others holding out for their continued stay in Britain. By the summer of 1938 it was clear that there was a core of some 1800 children whose parents were separated, could not be traced, or were not in a position to look after them. At the end of the civil war one thousand children still remained in Britain. At the outbreak of the Second World War the British government immediately intensified the pressure on the committee for repatriation. However, in 1945, 410 were still living in Britain.³⁹

The testimonies of some of those who have spent most of their lives in Britain emphasize how far the children themselves and their families were unprepared for the consequences of the evacuation.

They weren't sending you abroad for a long period, according to what we thought, what everybody thought at the time, it was a question of days or months. I don't think our families thought otherwise. I'm quite sure that if they felt that we were going to be abroad, never mind where, for years, no one would have come out. To us it was like going on a holiday.⁴⁰

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Buchanan 1997, 115.

⁴⁰ From the testimony of José María Villegas in Marshall, O. 1991. *Ship of Hope*, London: Ethnic Communities Oral History Project, 6.

Just as no one had predicted that the holiday would turn into a lifetime, no one predicted the problems that would prevent the children receiving continuity of care. Eduardo Martínez was aged six when he came to Britain. He was separated from his elder sister when the refugees were divided into accommodation for boys and girls and into sections according to the political beliefs of their parents: Communist, Anarchist, Nationalist, Socialist. Over the next three years he was moved five times. He spent two months in the tented accommodation near Southampton, then was moved for two weeks to a transit camp in army sheds, then spent two months at a colony near Maidenhead, then went to Belfast to live with a family. The host couple separated and Eduardo returned to a colony in the London area where he lived until he was old enough to find work and make a home of his own.⁴¹

SCF had argued that if the children were to be evacuated they should be evacuated to safe areas as close as possible to their homes. The majority of children evacuated from Spain were in fact evacuated to neighbouring France.⁴² Here too UISE gave support, including through the organization *Service Civil International* (SCI). The concern registered by the Council that SCI was known as a 'pacifist' organization is an indicator of the shift in attitudes towards peace and war that had taken place within the organization.

The involvement with Spanish evacuees was an opportunity for SCF to learn several lessons. The most important lesson related to older children and challenged the conception of the apolitical and dependent child. The older evacuees had confounded the image of

⁴¹ Marshall O. 1991, 9.

⁴² A minority were evacuated to as far away as Mexico and the USSR. Marshall O.1991.

children as passive victims of war by asserting their national culture, making their political views clear and sending a clear message to the organization that they were not only victims of war but also potential protagonists. An SCI staff member at Château de Soisy, Soisy sur Seine, where 50 children aged 3-16 were looked after said:

The children's experiences had not left them unscathed. They all had decided political views; they seemed to have a vivid idea of what the Civil War was about, and a downright way of showing their allegiance.⁴³

They had been a reminder that all children were potential adults and actors who belonged to a particular social world. Eglantyne Jebb had understood this and emphasized the utilitarian principle that saving children was not only an end in itself but also a means to a better future for the community to which they belonged. Within this framework of understanding it would have been seen that the Basque children could not be removed from Bilbao without undermining their utilitarian and social role. A number of the children never returned, and those who did return no longer had a continuous history of contact with their families and neighbours, or their language and culture.

Another practical lesson related to younger children: before laying plans for the evacuation of children in the Second World War SCF now knew it had to solve the problem of tracing very young children who could not identify themselves.⁴⁴

⁴³ Best and Pike 1948, 70.

⁴⁴ 'We would like to mention here a suggestion made to us by a member of the Executive of the Save the Children International Union, namely the need for a mark of identification for each child. This suggestion is made as the result of actual experience following the evacuation of Spanish children to other countries, where

Overall it was felt that the cost to the Basque children of separating them from their families had been underestimated. As Lewis Golden had originally recommended, SCF concluded from its experience that all other avenues of protection should have been explored before the option of evacuation. When children's lives are under direct threat it is difficult to argue the case against evacuation, and in later chapters it will be seen that SCF assisted in a number of other operations to remove children from the areas of greatest risk. However, evacuation could be interpreted as a sign that international agencies consider a situation to be irretrievable. This was contrary to Eglantyne Jebb's message of optimism and faith that a peaceful future was within the next generation's grasp. With accumulated experience, SCF began to question the wisdom of evacuation to safeguard children. Reference was made to the experience of the Basque children when in 1992 UNICEF drew up guidelines to encourage agencies to reconsider before putting into effect plans to evacuate children from former Yugoslavia.⁴⁵

In its response to the Spanish Civil War SCF had struggled to maintain its principle of universalism, and eventually succumbed to popular pressure to extend greater support to children from just one side of the conflict. It had neglected the utilitarian and social role of children by dividing them from their families, and sent a pessimistic message to all involved by supporting evacuation.

in many cases, especially with young children, it was extremely difficult to trace the parents.' Translation, Save the Children International Union, *Protection of Children in Time of Armed Conflict, Résumé of the discussion at the General Council*, SCF Archives reference M14/13 and M14/14, June 1939.

These are harsh conclusions. It could be argued that twenty years into its lifetime, the organization was faced with the consequences of its success in defining itself as the authoritative children's agency and that it had been railroaded into taking care of the Basque refugees because it could not be seen to neglect what was perceived as a children's issue. It is on record that the children had been brought to Britain against SCF's recommendation.⁴⁶ The Spanish Civil War was a significant milestone in the trend towards an increase in the number of voluntary agencies involved in the delivery of aid. In future part of SCF's effort would be aimed at persuading these other agencies to adopt what SCF defined as good practice in relation to children affected by war, primarily for the sake of the children and incidentally to spare SCF involvement in misguided operations.

It is noteworthy that in its response to the aerial bombardment of Abyssinia and Spain, SCF fulfilled public expectations by taking special measures for the protection of children. SCF worked with the Foreign Office to provide food to refugees from Abyssinia, and it responded to calls from other agencies to help in the reception of the Basque refugees. At the same time it began working in close coordination with the government to prepare for the protection of British children during the Second World War. None of these acts was

⁴⁵ Ressler, E.M. December 1992. *Evacuation of Children from Conflict Areas: Considerations and Guidelines*, Geneva: UNHCR and UNICEF. See also Bonnerjea, L. 1994. *Family Tracing: A Good Practice Guide*, Development Manual 3, London: Save the Children.

⁴⁶ Minutes of Special meeting of Council to discuss proposed evacuation of children from Bilbao, Monday 10 May 1937, SCF Archives reference M1/9.

controversial. This in itself was a departure from the early history of SCF, when it had consistently taken action that was out of line with public opinion and government policy.

Chapter 4

THE SECOND WORLD WAR AND THE NATIONAL POINT OF VIEW

(1939-1945)

The Second World War forced the people associated with SCF to choose between two competing sets of beliefs and values. Immediately after the First World War the people that founded SCF had been internationalist in their orientation, and drawn their inspiration from religious, socialist and humanitarian sources. During the 1930s, the organization was in thrall to people who adhered to a pessimistic defencist view of the world. It was also constrained by economic resources. Throughout this period *The World's Children* remained under the editorial control of Edward Fuller. The articles he chose to publish reveal the rising ascendancy of the nationalist persuasion among supporters of SCF as they witnessed the effects of armed conflict round the globe.

During the war between Japan and China, the Bishop of Hong Kong and South China wrote for *The World's Children* about the work of the nationalist leader, Madame Chiang Kai-Shek. SCF was supporting this work through a grant to the United Aid to China Fund.

Madame Chiang Kai-Shek's orphanages point a moral which I shall never forget. It is not enough to save the life of a child. What sort of life are you saving it for... The grand thing about Madame Chiang Kai-Shek's orphanages is that they are directly related to the purposive life of the nation, and the problems of adolescence

emphasise this both in the very intelligent co-educational system and in the very strong sense of purpose for life which permeates her work.

Like Eglantyne Jebb, the Bishop identified the utilitarian value of work with children, and in particular work with adolescents, but he was worried by the way in which this value could be corrupted and power over the next generation abused.

You must allow me to say that my own personal view is that if you have no religious purpose, the danger of a form of national idolatry, which Germany knows too well, is always there. I am myself a strong believer therefore in religious orphanages rather than national ones...

He goes on to admit the ascendancy of pessimistic realism over optimism in his own beliefs.

On the other hand, Madame Chiang Kai-Shek's system has many other great advantages, and I am confident that it would not have been possible to do on a religious basis what she has done on a national basis.¹

Among the people who refused to be intimidated by the evidence of nationalist success, was Dorothy Buxton. Although she was an inveterate individualist, up until 1939 she was able to translate her political beliefs into action through SCF. During the Second World War the organization failed her. It failed her because it withdrew its support for

universalism and for her pacifistic optimism. Instead it narrowed its vision of children to a utilitarian view related to the 'purposive life of the nation'.

This chapter begins by examining the work Dorothy Buxton sustained within SCF until the outbreak of the war. During the 1930s she was involved with SCF's work on behalf of refugees from Germany. More than any other strand of SCF's work at the time, this activity was consistent with the founding principles. However, it was unpopular with the government, and meant pushing for change in government policy. The chapter then charts the way in which the government and SCF found a more comfortable relationship. This developed out of the less contentious work SCF had been doing on the protection of children in time of war, as well as its network of nurseries. By the end of the war, SCF had been co-opted into the national war effort. So much so that when Churchill adopted his policy of total war, SCF made no protest against the imposition of comprehensive sanctions on the civilian population of occupied Europe, despite being urged to do so by Dorothy Buxton. It was left to the Peace Pledge Union, the Oxford Famine Relief Committee and other groups to protest against this violation of the universal rights of children.

Contentious work on behalf of refugees from Germany

Since its inception, SCF had stood up for German children, one of the most unpopular of causes with the British public. While SCF was under pressure during the 1930s in Britain and in Spain to make its aid parochial and party political, the work of the Inter-Aid

¹ 'Warphans', *The World's Children*, Vol.22 No.3, Autumn 1942, 61.

Committee for Refugee Children from Germany remained consistent with the guiding principle of universalism. However, the Inter-Aid Committee was working within a context where the principle of universalism was to meet its most persistent challenge: indifference to the predicament of refugees.

Although the case of the Basque children in Britain has become part of the romance of the Civil War, Tom Buchanan argues that the acceptance of these refugees must be kept in perspective. He explains the fact that their arrival was treated as such a remarkable event as due, in part, to the unwillingness of British governments since the First World War to accept refugees – especially those without private means. In comparison, by October 1937, France had taken 70,000 Spanish refugees, and by the end of the war this had risen to some 440,000.² Although the refugees were indebted to the government for political and legal protection, the financial cost of receiving refugees in Britain had been borne primarily by non-governmental organizations.³

Since the First World War the League of Nations had begun to develop arrangements for the protection of refugees. Claudena Skran has outlined how the inter-war years saw the establishment of a 'refugee regime'. She describes how long before the formation of the International Refugee Organization (after the Second World War) a group of countries were developing a set of arrangements to govern the way in which they dealt with

² Buchanan 1997, 116.

³ 'In the post-War crisis, the whole financial responsibility was borne for some time in this way before Governments stepped in. It is fair to say that the greater part of material assistance has been provided by private organizations, some of them set up ad hoc, but some with more general functions of which refugee work is only one.' Hope Simpson, J. 1939. *The Refugee Problem: Report of a Survey*, London: Oxford University Press, 172.

refugees.⁴ SCF was influential in the shaping of this regime, and contributed to the raising of the level of protection offered to refugees. It recognized that as nation states took over more and more civil functions, twentieth century refugees would suffer greater marginalization.⁵ For example, SCF advocated the creation of a travel document for refugees. The Nansen passport was introduced in 5 July 1922 for Russian refugees and for Armenian refugees in 1924 to facilitate their travel, and this was then extended on an ad hoc basis to other refugee groups.

The refugee regime of the inter-war years was underpinned by the two principles of humanitarianism and state sovereignty. However, there was a tension between these two principles which still confuses refugee politics.⁶ The tension was brought into the open when the rise of Nazism led to an increase in the numbers of people leaving Germany, prompting the resignation of James McDonald, the High Commissioner for Refugees from Germany. He felt strongly that his office should tackle the violations of humanitarian standards by states and concluded his letter of resignation with a plea that state sovereignty be set aside in favour of humanitarian imperatives:

When domestic policies threaten the demoralization and exile of hundreds of thousands of human beings considerations of diplomatic correctness must yield to those of common humanity. I should be recreant if I did not call attention to the actual situation, and plead that world opinion, acting through the League and its

⁴ Skran, C.M. 1995. *Refugees in Inter-War Europe: The Emergence of a Regime*, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

⁵ Joly, D. 1992. *Refugees: Asylum in Europe?* London: Minority Rights Publications, 5.

⁶ See for example Korn, D.A. 1998. *Exodus within Borders: An Introduction to the Crisis of Internal Displacement*, Washington D.C: Brookings Institution Press.

Member States and other countries move to avert the existing and impending tragedies.⁷

McDonald's stand was consistent with the policy of SCF laid out by Eglantyne Jebb in *The International Handbook of Child Care and Protection*.

We need to remember that we are human beings first and the members of a particular nation afterwards... There are certain fundamental duties which we owe to mankind, and which, when they appear to clash (it is always in appearance only) with our duties to our National State, should nevertheless take precedence ... The Save the Children Fund, therefore, takes up its stand upon the conviction that we have duties to our fellow-men generally, and not only to our fellow-nationals, and that these duties are categorical...⁸

Those who adhered to the principle of state sovereignty could only offer refugees protection, and could not deal with the root causes of the refugee flight. Through the mid-1930s a kernel of SCF supporters still attempted to deal with root causes, and to understand and undo the processes which led to persecution and war. Dorothy Buxton was one of them. When the SCF had dwindling resources and was under pressure to give aid to children in Britain, she had continued to appeal for relief for Germany. The appeal recognized the straitened circumstances of British households.

⁷ Letter of resignation of James G. McDonald as High Commissioner for Refugees from Germany, October 1933. The League chose to appoint a successor who would be prepared to subordinate humanitarian principles to state sovereignty. Quoted in Skran 1995, 235.

⁸ Jebb, E., 'The World Policy of the Save the Children Fund' in Fuller 1928, 564.

An urgent appeal is more than justified despite the need in this country. Although the statistics are incomplete the percentage of people unemployed or working on very short time (often only eight hours a week) is greater by far in Germany than in England, and the only unemployment pay available in Germany is a government dole worth 5/- to 6/- a week for a whole family.⁹

Together with her husband Charles Roden Buxton she had visited Germany in 1921 and stayed with a Ruhr miner's family to experience at first hand the difficulties of their daily life. After the rise of Hitler her contact with Germans was with refugees. She had become more and more isolated in her work, but had the same principled objections to the established refugee regime as the McDonald school.

In 1938, SCF published a report calling attention to the dire conditions facing Russian refugees in France.¹⁰ In response to the economic recession many governments had adopted legislation prohibiting the employment of foreigners. It was not only becoming harder for refugees to travel, find shelter and earn a living within Europe; the US was also closing its doors. The US Immigration Acts of 1921 and 1924 established a quota system designed to limit the total immigration to the US and to favour immigrants born in northern and western Europe. This quota system proved inflexible even in the event of the 1938 *Anschluss* and an increase in refugees from the Sudetenland and Austria, and the events of *Kristallnacht* in November of the same year. Even the entrance of 20,000 German refugee

⁹ British Appeal for Relief in Germany, SCF Archives reference SC/DB.13.

¹⁰ Save the Children Fund 1935. *Report on Russians, Armenians, German and Saar Refugees in France.*

children outside the existing quotas for 1939 and 1940 was ruled out. 'One of the principal arguments made by the restrictionists was that special treatment for refugee children would divert needed attention from poor children already in the US.'¹¹ This was what Eglantyne Jebb had deplored as the 'National Point of View' of child welfare.

The extent to which anti-Semitism permeated the British government and British public was a measure of the widespread and deep-seated reluctance to accept the tenets of universalism. The work of the Inter-Aid Committee was exceptional. It is important to note how limited its success was, because otherwise mention of its existence can serve to cover up the fact that anti-Semitism was not merely a German, but a Europe-wide phenomenon.¹²

The British government had initially responded to the *Anschluss* by requiring visas for Austrians, however, public pressure forced it to adopt a more favourable policy, and in April 1938 the Home Office did ask the major British voluntary organizations to form a committee on refugees.¹³ Overall it must be said that the British government led the efforts to block the escape of Jews from Germany, both before and during the war. For example, in 1941 when ten thousand Jews were deported from Vichy France to Poland, the British government denied entry to all Jews, including children, from unoccupied France.¹⁴

¹¹ The Wagners-Rogers bill, discussed in Skran 1995, 219.

¹² Wasserstein, B. 1999. *Britain and the Jews of Europe*, London: Leicester University Press. See also comments by Lord Parmoor, Chairman of SCF, about 'the Jewish riff-raff of Russia': Breen, SCF Archive Paper No.4, n.d.

¹³ Skran 1995, 221.

¹⁴ 'On 8 December 1942 Otto Schiff, Chairman of Jewish Refugee Committees, reported to the Aliens Committee of the Board of Deputies of British Jews that "it had not been possible to bring one child here."' Wasserstein 1999, 104.

The movement to save German children fell far short of ‘the greatest life-saving movement that the world has ever seen’ envisaged by Eglantyne Jebb.¹⁵ However insignificant in its effects, it was interesting in the history of SCF on several counts. Firstly it vindicated the insistence of Eglantyne Jebb on the non-denominational and non-political character of SCF. The Inter-Aid Committee for Children from Germany was formed on 24 March 1936 by the Jewish Refugee Committee and the Society of Friends (Germany Emergency Committee) which were dealing respectively with Jewish refugees and non-Aryan Christian refugees. It placed itself under the aegis of the SCF, using the Fund’s address and financial auditor, in order ‘to emphasize its non-denominational and non-political character’.¹⁶ Secondly it adopted the language of children’s rights established by Eglantyne Jebb.

It very early became evident that the problem of the ‘non-Aryan’ children in Germany is on so vast a scale that no voluntary organisation can do more than touch the fringes [...] Yet it was felt that, however small the help given, it could keep hope alive in the persecuted minority in Germany and demonstrate, however modestly, faith in the rights of childhood.¹⁷

Thirdly, it set the precedent of explicitly identifying children for assistance not on the basis of their economic or physical needs, but on the basis of their moral and mental health.¹⁸

¹⁵ Jebb, E. ‘Rescue the Perishing’, Publication unknown, SCF Archives reference SC/DB, 21 May 1919.

¹⁶ The First Annual Report of the Inter-Aid Committee for Children from Germany 27 April 1936-31 August 1937, SCF Archives reference M14/23.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ The experience of children during the Second World War has been the starting point for debate on the psychological effects of war upon children. See for example Cairns, E. 1996. *Children and Political Violence*, Oxford: Blackwell, 28-69.

Poverty, being as widespread among the displaced 'non-Aryan' population, could not by itself constitute a claim for help; selection must be made among those children whose mental and moral equilibrium is threatened by the conditions under which they live.¹⁹

The following case history of an eleven-year-old girl gives some idea of the circumstances of the children. It also shows how the appeal relied upon the hospitality of individual families and the willingness of individuals not only to give money to SCF but also to open up their homes.

The father is 'Aryan' and the wife Jewish. They have divorced because the presence of a Jewish wife is a serious handicap to a man's career. The mother has received permission to work in England as an artist. The child was left in Germany because the mother's position in England was so precarious. The child had no relatives in Germany with whom she could live, since her father's parents would not receive her, owing to her Jewish blood. At school she suffered greatly because she was not allowed to join the Hitler Youth, but she tried to identify herself with the Nazi ideals, hanging out the Nazi flag on holidays and talking violent anti-Semitism. Yet she was never allowed to forget her Jewish blood. She is receiving free hospitality from an English family and attending day-school.²⁰

¹⁹ The First Annual Report of the Inter-Aid Committee, SCF Archives reference M14/23.

The Inter-Aid Committee demonstrated again the close links between the Quakers and SCF. The internationalism of the founders of SCF was given practical expression in the Quaker methodology of individuals providing hospitality to others suffering persecution. For the Quakers there was no separation of the personal from the professional, in other words an individual Quaker would be expected to act according to his or her conscience as much as according to the policy of a Quaker committee. It is possible to speak of a movement, however minor, on behalf of German children, at a time when other SCF activities did not achieve the same momentum. This may be attributed to the vital core of personal commitment to which SCF lent its institutional support.

War prevention or war preparation

The Quakers differed from SCF in that they made no division of labour between international reconciliation and relief. This division of labour had come about when the Fight the Famine Council was still in existence. The Fight the Famine Council had been *dedicated to international reconciliation, and SCF to relief. In the 1930s as war appeared more likely, SCF now had no parent organization to undertake war prevention. However, it did still have supporters who had participated in the early meetings of the Fight the Famine Council and embodied the concerns of both organizations.*

²⁰ One of several 'typical histories' cited in The First Annual Report of the Inter-Aid Committee for Children from Germany 27 April 1936 - 31 August 1937, SCF Archives reference M14/23.

Dorothy Buxton is described by her husband's biographer, Victoria de Bunsen, as concerning herself less with politics and more and more with humanitarian issues.²¹ However, in the year that the Nuremberg Laws were proclaimed and the numbers of people leaving Germany again increased she undertook to meet with Hermann Göring²² and protest against Nazi atrocities. It was through the friends that SCF had in government, that Dorothy Buxton was able to gain access to Göring. Countess Wilamowitz Moellendorff had worked with Eglantyne Jebb following the First World War and had been instrumental in the foundation of *Rädda Barnen* (Swedish Save the Children). Her sister was married to Göring. Dorothy Buxton learned that the Countess had since engaged in lecture tours supporting her brother-in-law's politics, nevertheless the old friendship served its purpose and she was granted an interview. This was an individual initiative sanctioned neither by SCF nor by her husband, Charles Roden Buxton MP.²³ Dorothy Buxton shared with her sister Eglantyne Jebb a characteristic determination to do whatever was within her power:

There seemed so little that one insignificant individual could possibly do against the horrors of the concentration camps! A personal interview with Göring however might conceivably produce some effect and it was therefore out of the question for me to forgo it [...] At least my remarks went home to the extent that he became very angry and excited; the dignified mien was dropped and he gesticulated

²¹ Bunsen, de 1948, 159.

²² Hermann Göring (1893-1946), was President of the Reichstag from 1932, joined the Nazi government in 1933, founded the Gestapo and set up the concentration camps.

²³ Charles Roden Buxton did himself make three visits to Germany in 1939. He went with a Quaker concern. On 23 September 1939 he resigned from his position as Parliamentary Adviser to the Labour Party in order to be able to speak out freely in favour of a negotiated peace. Bunsen, de 1948, 68.

furiously, waving his arms over his head. I soon felt that my mission was hopeless.

Failure once more – as so often (and since)!²⁴

Dorothy Buxton belonged to the tradition of pacifists that believed that ‘We must have truck with dictators, either on the battle field or round the conference table – and I choose the conference table’.²⁵ When war broke out she continued to find ways of giving expression to her own undiminished internationalism by providing assistance to German internees in Britain.

Eglantyne Jebb had always insisted that the strength of the movement must lie in the international organization, not in individual initiatives or even national societies. How well did her blueprint for an international voluntary organization withstand the test of the years leading up to the Second World War? During the inter-war years SCF had built up a formal union of organizations across Europe as well as a network of informal contacts and friends. Prior to the outbreak of war, the rise of the Nazis had already had a direct effect upon members of UISE.

One of the Union’s most successful projects on behalf of young people had been led by Madame Vajkai in Hungary. Following the *Anschluss* and the introduction of Nazi laws in Austria, the SCF Council received a letter from Madame Vajkai stating how her work in neighbouring Hungary had been affected.

²⁴ Quoted in Bunsen, de 157.

²⁵ Hudson, J. *Peace News*, 26 March 1938, 1.

The General Secretary read extracts from a confidential letter received from Madame Vajkai, describing the serious situation in which she found herself and her work owing to the new law proposed in Hungary regarding persons of Jewish origin engaged in educational and executive work.²⁶

A German child welfare organization had also been part of the Union. However, following an enquiry by UISE regarding Jewish children in Germany, the *Deutsche Zentrale* resigned from UISE. There were rumours that the German organization then approached the Scandinavian sister organizations of SCF to set up a new and separate association, but this came to nothing.²⁷

At the outbreak of war UISE took steps to safeguard its own neutrality. The British president, Hubert Watson, resigned, and a management committee was composed of members of the Executive belonging to neutral countries.²⁸

As the outbreak of war drew nearer, there is no evidence that SCF put its efforts into war prevention, instead discussions of the Council were dominated by pessimistic realism. Given that war was bound to come, then how best could children be protected from its worst consequences? In 1939 the Council dedicated most of its time to the proposal for Zones of Immunity for children. The proposal had originated with the SCF's Chairman, Hubert Watson. He gathered support from UISE. A joint commission of the ICRC and

²⁶ Save the Children Council meeting, 9 January 1939, SCF Archives reference M1/9.

²⁷ SCF Archives reference M1/10, 20 July 1939.

²⁸ Minutes of the 14th Meeting of the Executive Committee of Save the Children Fund, 3 October 1939, SCF Archives reference M1/10.

UISE was then formed to bring the question before governments. The draft 'Convention for the Protection of Children in the Event of Armed Conflict' was modelled on the International Red Cross Convention. It provided for food, clothing and supplies to be sent from other countries for the benefit of children residing at the outbreak or during the period of hostilities in the territories of States engaged in armed conflict. It also provided for places of safety to be established for the exclusive protection of children.²⁹

Both UISE and the ICRC had discussed the question of whether the protection of children should be included in that for the civilian population in general or dealt with separately. The Council of UISE agreed that protection for children would be much more easily accomplished than general protection for the civil population. They therefore considered that it would be in the interests of the children to make them the object of a special Convention and consequently to devise a distinctive protective sign for them.

Both the German and the British governments took a different view from that of UISE. On 12 July 1939 *The Manchester Guardian* published an extract from correspondence with the German Embassy.

My view is that it would be advisable to solve the question of the protection of children within the scope of the general problem of the protection of the Civil Population. The introduction of a special protection for a specific portion of the

²⁹ *The World's Children*, March 1939, 76-77.

Civil Population involved the risk that the protection of the remainder of the Civil Population might be regarded as of less importance.³⁰

Correspondence between representatives of SCF and the German Embassy continued until as late as 2 September. When negotiations over the draft convention finally broke down, their failure was blamed by the British press upon the Germans. *The Times* reported that the German Government had refused to consider a proposal to humanize the war:

The German answer, which is reported to have been given after the German Red Cross had consulted its Government in the hope of securing such a guarantee, was: 'We are unable to sign such an agreement. Germany cannot reveal in advance what will or will not be her objectives. War to-day is total warfare.'³¹

Part and parcel of the discussion of the 'International Convention for the Protection of Children in the event of Armed Conflict' were discussions of national plans for the protection of children. UISE advised each of the national societies which made up its members to get in touch with their national Ministry of Defence. SCF found itself participating in the national plans for the defence and education of Britain's children.

The work that SCF engaged in on behalf of the Ministry of Defence demonstrated the significance of the second of Eglantyne Jebb's guiding principles, utilitarianism. In time of war, children were embraced as part of the nation, and their welfare was seen as critical to

³⁰ Weizacker to Morgan, 21 August 1939, Berlin. SCF Archives reference M14/13 and M14/14.

³¹ *The Times*, 29 November 1939.

the national spirit. In the first month of the war Edward Fuller, Editor of *The World's Children*, met with Miss Greaves, Inspector of the Board of Education, to discuss War Emergency Nursery Schools.³²

Miss Greaves was alive to the ill effects on children of the sort of gossip which is going on all through the country between neighbours, which has the effect of intensifying the terror of the times for small children and in this way of disintegrating the national spirit. Nursery schools would remove the children from this influence to no small extent.

The founders of SCF had been concerned that war preparation fostered a war mentality amongst the population and represented a step towards totalitarianism. This liberal strand was not present in SCF in the 1940s. By contrast, SCF almost became an arm of the government, helping to maintain order and discipline within home and school. The direct contribution that SCF was making to the national war effort was recognized by Save the Children USA. Save the Children USA supported the work of SCF in running residential nurseries for young children in order to free more women to work in the munitions factories.

One of the great needs in England today in the way of cooperation, is residential nurseries for the children of the war workers. Two hundred thousand additional women have just been called to work in munitions factories. 25% of them have children. Under the present ruling of the government, all children from 2 to 5 years

³² SCF Archives reference SC/EF/i/10, 16 September 1939.

of age remain the responsibility of their mothers, no matter what the mothers are doing. This responsibility has made it necessary to study the problem as a welfare situation ...[The contribution of the residential nurseries] to this work is peculiarly constructive, because we not only make it possible to start the children out without the neurotic shell-shock of the war, but we also release more women to war industries, which increases the manpower in the battle line.³³

At the same time as responding to the immediate wartime needs, one of the most striking characteristics of SCF's wartime work in Britain is how forward-looking it was. It resembled development work as much as emergency work. Even before the outbreak of war, UISE had determined that the war should not divert its members from their long-term goals.

The second extremely important point is that all work for the protection of children in time of armed conflict, and notably the plans for camps, should be undertaken with the idea that they may be useful in time of peace. This principle would avoid expense for what would otherwise be only temporary work and would assist the various countries to develop their permanent work for the welfare of children.³⁴

The work of SCF during the Second World War can be interpreted in a number of ways. Clearly there was a retreat from universalism, however there was also a new emphasis upon the contribution to be made by children within national society. There were echoes of

³³ Allen, H.J. *Britain under Bombs*, SCF Archives reference SC/EF/i.

the utilitarian principle of Eglantyne Jebb and her vision of children belonging to the social world. She would, however, have been disappointed that the emphasis was upon children belonging to the nation at the expense both of their ties to humanity and of the more immediate ties that are necessary to children's well-being. Mass evacuation plans separated children from their families and homes at the same time as introducing them to other parts of the nation.³⁵

Total war

When in August 1940 Winston Churchill declared his policy of total war on Germany, it was the antithesis of all that SCF had ever striven for. However, SCF had already taken on the role of loyal supporter of the national war effort. Confronted with the terrible consequences for children in German-controlled areas of the total war policy, SCF did not deviate from this loyal role. This chapter concludes by examining the response of the Council to the policy of total war in order to discover the distance SCF had removed itself from its first principles, its past record, and its oldest and closest allies.

As part of the policy of total war, Winston Churchill had laid out his intention to maintain and enforce a strict blockade not only of Germany but of its ally Italy, France and other countries that had fallen under German control.³⁶ All goods traded with the enemy were

³⁴ Save the Children International Union, *Protection of Children in Time of Armed Conflict*, résumé of the discussion at the General Council, June 1939. SCF Archives reference M14/13 and M14/14.

³⁵ Padley, R. and Cole, M., eds, 1940. *Evacuation Survey: A Report to the Fabian Society*, London: George Routledge and Sons, and Maas 1963. 'Young Adult Adjustment of Twenty Wartime Residential Nursery Children', *Child Welfare*, February 1963.

³⁶ Speech in House of Commons, 20 August 1940. Quoted in Black, M. 1992. *A Cause for our Times. Oxfam: The First Fifty Years*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2.

declared contraband as were all goods destined for the relief of friendly countries under enemy occupation. For German-controlled areas which relied on food imports, such as the Greek islands, this amounted to a virtual sentence to death by starvation.³⁷ At a meeting of the Council of SCF on 24 April 1941 the situation in Greece was on the agenda. The following minute was made;

The situation in Greece has made it impossible to continue sending allocations to Salonika for the work of M. Tsiomis, from whom there was no recent news. All allocations for Greece had therefore been cancelled.³⁸

There was no record of any initiative on the part of the Council either to investigate other channels for sending allocations to Greece or to monitor the situation in Greece. By the autumn of 1941 news of famine in Greece began to reach London. The most prominent figures lobbying the government to lift its blockade were people who were closely associated with the first generation of SCF. It is perplexing that throughout the period from 1941 to 1944 they were not able to spur the Council to action. By its inaction, the Council can be seen to have supported the government's policy of total war, with its terrible implications not only for the civilian populations under the control of Germany, but also for future generations.³⁹

³⁷ The British government argued that according to the 1907 Hague Conventions it was the responsibility of the occupying power to feed those people under its authority, or to allow them to feed themselves from their own resources.

³⁸ SCF Archives reference M1/10, 24 April 1941.

³⁹ The harmful effects of the short-lived famine in the winter of 1944-1945 in the Netherlands upon a previously well-nourished population have attracted much medical interest. See Jeffrey, S. 'The High Price of Hunger', *The Medical Post*, 7 November 1995, www.mentalhealth.com/mag1/p5m-sc01.html

The previous chapter showed how the pacifist beliefs popular immediately after the First World War held little sway over supporters of SCF by 1939. This may explain why the 'Food Relief Campaign' set up by the Peace Pledge Union had little impact upon SCF. Its Chairman, Vera Brittain, lamented that a campaign by pacifists could easily be dismissed as the work of 'fanatics, soft-heads, and sentimental idealists'.⁴⁰ However, it was harder for SCF to ignore the voices of two of its most significant early supporters, Gilbert Murray and Lord Robert Cecil. The latter had been one of the first patrons of the SCF and a friend and admirer of Eglantyne Jebb. As Minister for the Blockade in 1919 he had been responsible in some people's view for maintaining the conditions of scarcity in central Europe and was lobbied hard by the founders of SCF, who won him to their cause. By the end of 1941 both Gilbert Murray and Lord Robert Cecil had decided to lend their weight to the Peace Pledge Union campaign on behalf of the famine-stricken Greeks. SCF still hesitated. Ex-President Herbert Hoover, founder of the ARA and SCF's partner in Saratov province during the Russian Famine, also appealed to Winston Churchill to lift the blockade.⁴¹ So did the Quaker Edith Pye, SCF's mentor in Vienna. These were all people who could have been expected to carry influence with the Council because of their long historical associations with SCF.

On 29 May 1942 the creation of a national Famine Relief Committee was publicly announced, with Bishop Bell as chairman. Edith Pye led the nationwide campaign. The Famine Relief Committee's aims were to obtain accurate information about food conditions in German-controlled or invaded countries and to promote schemes for sending

⁴⁰ Black 1992, 9.

food, vitamins and medical aid into such countries. The Committee also opened a Famine Relief Fund to pay for such relief as soon as permission was obtained to use it. The Committee recorded at its second meeting of 24 March 1943 that its objects were ‘the relief (to the extent that the law for the time being permits) of famine and sickness arising as a result of war’.⁴²

These aims were remarkably similar to those of the Fight the Famine Council, combining information, advocacy, and relief. History seemed to be repeating itself, and yet at this juncture the SCF Council took a very different decision from its forebears. It cannot be said that the Council members were ignorant of the circumstances of children living in Europe. SCF was in possession of as much, if not more, information than the members of the Fight the Famine Council. It was already collecting material for a survey of the effect of war on children in occupied areas.⁴³ Through the formal and informal network of the international union, SCF was able to gather information about the situation of children in occupied countries. Madame Vajkai remained in Hungary throughout the war and extended her work to include Polish refugees whose homes were in Russian-occupied Poland.⁴⁴ In 1942 M. Thélin reported on his journey in unoccupied France. He particularly took up the issue of young foreigners aged between 15 and 18. Jews in that age group could not benefit

⁴¹ Herbert Hoover’s Commission for Polish Relief had already delivered supplies through the blockade in 1939 with British consent.

⁴² Oxford Committee for Famine Relief, *Minute Book*, 1942. This is a small lined exercise book now kept in the Bodleian Library, Oxford. See also Black 1992.

⁴³ Save the Children Fund Post War Committee. *Children in Bondage: A Survey of Child Life in the Occupied Countries of Europe and in Finland*, London: Longmans.

⁴⁴ Vajkai, R. 1940. *XIVe Rapport concernant les enfants réfugiés polonais*, Union Internationale de Secours aux Enfants, Budapest, 21 September 1940.

as children from release from internment camps, instead they were enrolled in ‘ “workers battalions” where the conditions may prove fatal owing to their debilitated health’.⁴⁵

There was nothing in these reports which led the Council to believe that circumstances were about to improve.

This survey incorporates information which was available up to June 1942. It may become out of date, even before it is published, but unhappily only by an exacerbation of the deprivations and sufferings here shown to exist in a degree which has probably never been surpassed, and seldom paralleled, on the long Via Dolorosa of the human race.⁴⁶

The feasibility of delivering aid to children suffering from malnutrition was also not in question. In German-occupied France, the American Friends Service Council were feeding 100,000 seriously malnourished children with no evidence that food was being commandeered by the Germans.⁴⁷

While other organizations made public appeals, SCF remained silent. In January 1944, the Council received a sharp letter from Dorothy Buxton. In her inimitable style she returned to first principles.

⁴⁵ Th  lin, *Summary of M. Th  lin's Report on his journey in Unoccupied France, May 18/30, 1942*, Save the Children International Union, Geneva, SCF Archives reference M14/13 and M14/14.

⁴⁶ Save the Children Fund Post War Committee, 1943, 9.

⁴⁷ In November 1942 the supplies to this scheme were cut off by the British government.

She hoped the Council would consider very seriously whether the Fund was still justified, in view of present conditions, in drawing a hard and fast line round the sphere of the SCF to avoid touching on what might be considered as a political matter – i.e. pleading for even the slightest relaxation of the blockade. She felt it was possible that the destruction of child life would have already taken place on such a vast scale if one waited until after the war to take part in relief work that neither the surviving individual nor the nations concerned would ever recover; and that if the SCF was to remain worthy of its name it should take part in the movement for an immediate scheme of relief in Belgium and elsewhere.⁴⁸

The response of the General Secretary reveals a man without a sense of urgency. He recalled that a year ago SCF had arranged a joint deputation with the National Union of Teachers to the Foreign Office.⁴⁹ The response of Victoria de Bunsen was more surprising given her participation in the radical early days of SCF. She tempered her support for a resolution calling for the government to relax its blockade with a warning against jeopardizing the post-war participation of SCF in the work of the Council of British Societies for Relief Abroad (COBSRA). COBSRA had been formed under government auspices to undertake the task of coordinating all British voluntary efforts.

It was Edward Fuller, another member of the first generation of SCF, who made the comparison with the position twenty-five years earlier, and the work of the Fight the Famine Council. He reminded them that SCF's principal function was 'to raise funds and

⁴⁸ SCF Archives reference M1/11 C.2867, 20 January 1944.

to administer relief to the children'.⁵⁰ However, the closest that the Council eventually got to an admission that it had failed to act in accordance with its principal function was in its recognition that other organizations may have stepped in to act where it had failed to do so.

One of the organizations that stepped into the breach was the Oxford Famine Committee, later to be known as Oxfam. The Quaker roots of Oxfam are more often recognized than those of SCF, but it could be said that SCF drew on the experiences of the First World War generation of Quakers, while Oxfam drew on the experiences of the Second World War generation of Quakers.⁵¹ Both the Quakers and the newly founded Oxford Famine Committee were to remain close partners in relief with SCF, but following the failure of SCF to oppose the policy of total war, there was a public perception of a difference in respectability between the two organizations.

Although SCF generally worked with a wide variety of groups and strove to include representatives of all faiths and parties among its supporters, never before had it been quite so respectable. Before the war, Save the Children had always had a slightly eccentric tone; after the war it was definitely part of the establishment.⁵²

During the Second World War SCF distanced itself from its founding principles.

According to Gilbert Murray, 'the rules of total war are not easily distinguishable from

⁴⁹ Joint deputation of SCF and NUT to approach the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs on the question of the possibility of organizing transport and asylum for Jewish and other children from Nazi-occupied Europe.

⁵⁰ SCF Archives reference M1/11 C.2867, 20 January 1944.

⁵¹ The influence of the Quakers and in particular the FAU lasted long into Oxfam's development. See Chapter 5, and Black 1992, 81.

⁵² Breen, SCF Archive Paper No.1, April 1995.

those of Hell.’⁵³ The fact that the SCF Council remained unmoved showed how far the organization had come. It was in retreat from universalism: the survival needs of German children, and children living in occupied Europe, did not spur the Council to action. It was in retreat too from the utilitarian concern with the next generation, and the kind of society that the survivors of the war in Europe would build. Above all it had succumbed to the impossibility argument, and abandoned Eglantyne Jebb’s optimistic belief that there was ‘no inherent impossibility in saving the children of the world’. Instead of a global vision, the Council fixed its attention upon the UK where, with substantial funding from the United States, SCF did much to ensure that British children were protected from the worst effects of the war. This national work did prove a useful foundation for pre-school education in post-war British society. But whatever the quality of SCF’s work in the UK, it could no longer be described as part of the optimistic international vision laid down by Eglantyne Jebb.

After the war SCF sent its first relief teams into Europe, in association with COBSRA. It had emerged from the Second World War as a national society which acted as a child welfare organization at home and a relief organization abroad. When it did seek to revitalize its work with other child welfare organizations, particularly in Eastern Europe, it found that the new political divides between East and West acted as a barrier to international cooperation. These political divisions and their impact upon international humanitarian efforts on behalf of children are the subject of the next chapter.

⁵³ Murray, G., 1943. ‘The Turn of the Tide’, *The Contemporary Review*, Vol.164, September 1943, 129-134.

Chapter 5

THE EARLY COLD WAR (1945-1959)

Two competing perspectives were vying for the attention of the British public and politicians in 1945. The first focussed on the end of armed conflict and was post-war. The second focussed on the hardening divisions between East and West and was Cold War. These two perspectives had contrary influences over SCF. The post-war perspective allowed for a reawakening of the original spirit of SCF and a rediscovery of the guiding principles of universalism, utilitarianism and optimistic pacificism. The Cold War perspective encouraged renewed challenges to the validity of these guiding principles. This competition can be most clearly seen in Europe where attempts to work according to the three guiding principles were distorted at every level by the ideological divide between East and West. It proved impossible to practise universalism in a bipolar world, and this period saw the end of thirty years of SCF work in the Eastern European countries of Yugoslavia and Hungary. While it could be said that the utilitarian role of children as the generation and hence creators of the future was an integral part of both the ideological rhetoric of East and West, the structural nature of that future was contested. Lastly, there was no place for optimistic pacificism in a landscape of 'negative peace'.

The outcome of the competition between the post-war perspective and the Cold War perspective was not immediately evident. However, in retrospect it can be seen that a pattern was set in Europe which was then imitated in Korea and Vietnam. In each case

SCF workers worked in the zone of influence of the US and its allies only, and had to follow in the wake of the military and set up programmes under military authority. In a world dominated by the Cold War and the threat of nuclear conflict, SCF was restricted to work on one side of the Iron Curtain only.

In this chapter I look first at the impetus for the revival of the guiding principles of the founding generation, and in particular the durability of the organizational blueprint for SCF laid down by Eglantyne Jebb. The crowning evidence for this is the acceptance of the Declaration of the Rights of the Child by the UN in 1959. Next, I consider the response of SCF to the aftermath of the Second World War in Europe. Here the post-war perspective and the revival of the paradigm that guided the founding generation met with a competing Cold War perspective. By the time of the outbreak of the Korean war, the Cold War perspective was pervasive. It is noteworthy that this period also coincided with the establishment of the state of Israel and the displacement of Palestinians from Palestine, the flight of refugees from China to Hong Kong, from Hungary to Austria, and from Tibet to India. I have chosen to focus upon SCF's response to the Korean war, because by 1955 South Korea had become the largest recipient of aid from SCF and remained so until 1968.¹

The resilience of Eglantyne Jebb's blueprint for SCF

Through the Second World War SCF had found itself cut off from its partners in UISE, and insulated from the experiences of others by the difficulties of wartime travel and news

censorship. It was no longer functioning as part of an international organization with an international perspective. After the war the links with its partners were resuscitated and SCF staff began to travel among other war affected people. This international contact rekindled the original spirit of SCF. The practical work of a new generation of fieldworkers shines through from the records. In particular Bridget Stevenson in Germany² and Mary Hawkins in the Middle East and Korea³ can be seen both as successors to the pioneering generation of the inter-war years, and as remarkable precursors and mentors for the current generation of professionals who make a career of international relief and development work. In all their reports they emphasize the importance of developing opportunities for local staff to extend work on behalf of children. For example, Frau Nielsen was working with Bridget Stevenson in Uelzen before she went on to start SCF work in the refugee camps in Hamburg. She wrote with enthusiasm of the work SCF had enabled her to do.

Vor ungefähr drei Wochen habe ich mit meiner Arbeit in Hamburg begonnen. Ich möchte fast sagen, dass das Wort Arbeit nicht zutreffend ist. Es ist vielmehr eine wunderbare Aufgabe und ein schönes Gefühl seinen Mitmenschen helfen zu können. Besonders den Kindern.⁴

¹ With the exception of 1957.

² See monthly reports from Germany from 1948 to 1962 in Bridget Stevenson Papers, SCF Archives reference SC/BS/1-4.

³ See Tapes 1-3 of interviews with Mary Hawkins by Rodney Breen, 4-5 December 1997, SCF Archives.

⁴ 'About three weeks ago I began my work in Hamburg, but I must admit that "work" is scarcely the expression to use of something which brings me such a wonderful opportunity, so much happiness, and the satisfying feeling of at last trying to help people who have suffered so much and particularly the children.' SCF Archives reference SC/BS/1-4, March 1953.

SCF has been described as ‘the almoner’ of its supporters.⁵ It was a channel for individuals to provide assistance to suffering children worldwide. Without the vivid accounts of SCF personnel, whether British or German, of their daily encounters with children, and the sense that SCF was making a contribution, however minor, to the alleviation of suffering, the impetus to support SCF would dwindle. The ‘impossibility argument’ was most likely to surface when there were no practical examples to refute it. As Eglantyne Jebb had said, once the organization was able to write out its beliefs in practice, it was then able to communicate them to others.⁶

During the war the SCF Council had been isolated from international contacts and from the needs of children. During the period 1945-1959 the SCF Council was part of an organizational picture that was increasingly coloured by the experiences of its own workers in the field, and of a wider community of practitioners specializing in the study of childhood and children. These years were proof that the blueprint for the organization laid down by Eglantyne Jebb was remarkably resilient. In September 1946 UISE merged with a contemporary Belgian organization, the International Association for Child Welfare, to become the International Union for Child Welfare (IUCW).⁷ Some aspects of the new organization reflected the persistence of the ‘National Point of View’. For example, prior to the Second World War UISE had engaged in relief activities on behalf of all the national societies. After 1945 each national society allocated their resources to its own relief

⁵ Fuller, E. *Memorandum on UNICEF, with special relation to Miss Mary Gutteridge's letter of 14 August 1956*, SCF Archives reference SC/EF/ii.40.

⁶ Jebb, E. *Memorandum on Relief Policy*, SCF Archives reference SC/EJ.282.

⁷ Fuller 1950, 50. The IUCW lasted until 1986, by which time the International Save the Children Alliance (ISCA) had been formed.

activities. Jeanne-Marie Small, Deputy Secretary General of the IUCW gave the reasons for the separate relief operations.

The overriding reason was that it was felt that propaganda at home would carry greater weight if the societies said that relief was being administered by their own nationals.⁸

However, in other ways IUCW managed to retain an international perspective. Despite administrative concessions to public opinion, it developed a reputation for expertise in child welfare which transcended national boundaries.

Two aspects of good practice identified by the IUCW during this period have remained important within SCF's view of child welfare.⁹ First was an insistence on the importance of family life, and the disadvantages of institutional care. This idea arose not only from the British experience of evacuation,¹⁰ but also from research conducted by the IUCW into the experience of other war affected populations. A special round table on child welfare, which took place during the National Welfare Conference held at Shanghai in March 1947, concluded:

The Conference felt strongly that assistance and services should, where possible, be provided for needy children in their own families. The Conference was not in

⁸ 'International Cooperation', *The World's Children*, Vol.30 No.7, July 1950, 227-229.

⁹ Compare for example the response by SCF to the 1995 World Summit on Social Development in Copenhagen, *Towards a Children's Agenda: New Challenges for Social Development*, Save the Children, March 1995.

favour of the customary practice in China of caring for children mainly by placing them in institutions.

Second was the identification of the important social and economic role of children and the need to adapt educational provision for working children.

It was realised that under present economic conditions it was not possible to extend educational facilities to all children, neither was it possible for children, even where facilities available, to be able to attend school full-time. The Conference explored ways and means in the hope of providing educational opportunities for children which could be adapted to the economic and social conditions of the community.¹¹

Not only was there a growing recognition of the social and economic role of children, there was also a new set of questions around the participation of children in warfare. Children had been seen to play their own part in successful resistance movements. They were members of the Partisans in Greece, and under cover of darkness children had pushed German soldiers into canals in the Netherlands.¹² Their participation in the war effort raised disturbing questions for SCF in relation to children and war. How far were these children passive victims fulfilling adult plans, and how far were they voluntarily involved in the resistance? This attention to the agency of children was highlighted in the debates

¹⁰ See for instance, Streatfield, N. 'Unsettled Children', *The World's Children*, Vol.27 No.6, June 1947, 102-104.

¹¹ 'Child Welfare Work in China' by Lu Kuang-Mien, Special Advisor on Far Eastern Affairs to the International Refugee Organization of the United Nations at Geneva and delegate to the recent General Council of the International Union for Child Welfare at Stockholm, *The World's Children*, Vol.28 No.12, December 1948, 400.

within the SCF Council over a memorial to the children who died during the Second World War. The Bishop of London expressed his preference for a design which emphasized the heroism and spirit of the children as well as the suffering.¹³

There is evidence in this period of a new paradigm for the understanding of childhood attracting a larger following, which resonated with Eglantyne Jebb's emphasis on the utilitarian value of childhood. In 1945 childhood was increasingly constructed as part of society and culture rather than a precursor to it. Children were described not only as victims but also as social agents, who could resist, take on responsibilities for younger siblings, make a vital economic contribution to the household, and have aspirations for the future. This understanding of childhood has been identified as a phenomenon of the late twentieth century,¹⁴ however the publications of SCF reveal that the major shift in perception took place after the Second World War.

The greatest diplomatic success of the IUCW was the adoption of a revised Declaration of the Rights of the Child by the UN Assembly in 1959. It succeeded in reinstating Eglantyne Jebb's original vision, despite the opposition from governments that argued that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted in 1948 made any separate Declaration on behalf of children superfluous. It also succeeded in breaking the ideological deadlock between East and West over whether civil and political rights or social and economic rights should be accorded priority. In her detailed study of the negotiations leading up to the

¹² Green, L.H., 'The Protection of Children in Time of War', *The World's Children*, Vol.28 No.9, September 1948, 296.

¹³ SCF Archives reference M1/12 C.3052, 25 April 1946.

acceptance of the Declaration, Dominique Marshall has demonstrated that, 'children's rights provided ground on which nations otherwise unable to agree could converse.'¹⁵

Amongst the confluence of reasons for attention to be accorded to children's rights, she cited the mounting popular concern in 1950s over the fate of children given the danger of a nuclear conflict. At a time when the UN was divided by the hostilities of the Cold War, the 1959 Declaration of the Rights of the Child was a success for universalism.

The 1959 Declaration of the Rights of the Child was the most obvious evidence for the resilience of Eglantyne Jebb's ideas, and in particular universalism. The guiding principles of the founding generation are also reflected in the emphasis placed by the post-war generation of SCF workers on the development of national personnel, and the more widespread utilitarian understanding of children as social agents.

The aftermath of the Second World War in Europe

Following the First World War, SCF had been able to appeal for voluntary donations to translate its universalist values into action. In its first three years it claimed to have maintained its independence at the same time as working alongside the socialist municipality in Vienna, and in cooperation with the Bolshevik government in Russia. By contrast, in 1945 SCF could not escape the fact that all relief from Britain had been made a weapon in an ideological crusade.

¹⁴ James, A. and Prout, A., eds, 1990. *Constructing and Deconstructing Childhood: Contemporary Issues in the Sociological Study of Childhood*, London: The Falmer Press.

We will organize food immediately an area is liberated. We will build up reserves of food all over the world so that there will always be held up before the eyes of the people of Europe – I say it deliberately – the German and Austrian people, the certainty that the shattering of the Nazi power will bring to them all immediate food, freedom, and peace.¹⁶

In September 1944 Paris was liberated, followed by Greece and Belgium. Now the allies had the opportunity to fulfil Churchill's promise of immediate relief. They did provide relief to allied countries, but not to Germany. History appeared to be repeating itself. On 26 October 1945, Sir Arthur Salter, the Member for Oxford University, opened a debate in parliament on a motion with cross-party support.

That this House feels deep concern over the possibility that millions of men, women, and children in Europe may die of starvation and cold during the coming winter, with the result that disease and economic and social chaos may spread over Europe, and therefore urges His Majesty's Government to take all possible steps to prevent this disaster.¹⁷

Not satisfied with having won the war by military means, crippling economic reparations were demanded of Germany. It was Victor Gollancz, himself of Jewish origin, who argued

¹⁵ Marshall D. 1999, 'The Cold War, Canada and the United Nations Declaration of the Rights of the Child' in Donaghy, G., ed., *Canada and the Early Cold War*, Canada: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 183-212 (p. 202).

¹⁶ Speech by Winston Churchill to House of Commons, 20 August 1940, quoted in Black 1992, 2.

most convincingly against ‘putting Germany at the end of the queue’, and the ‘hideous habit of personalising abstractions – “Germany” “The Germans” – and consequently depersonalising real men and women’.¹⁸

The debate over European relief was brought to the attention of readers of *The World's Children* by Dorothy Buxton. Since she first started publishing ‘Notes from the Foreign Press’ in 1915, she had never deviated from her mission to awaken the sympathy of the British public for the economic plight of the German population. The British government had ruled that private individuals could not send food parcels to Germany. Dorothy Buxton voiced her sense of shame, that while British soldiers in Vienna were taking a voluntary cut in their rations to provide supplies for a Christmas party for the children in the British Zone, civilians were not allowed to make similar sacrifices.¹⁹

At an event reminiscent of the first meeting of the Fight the Famine Council in 1919, the Save Europe Now campaign was launched at a public meeting in the Royal Albert Hall in November 1945. Lord Noel-Buxton was on the platform in his role as president of SCF.²⁰

At last it appeared that the universalist principle which had been so important to the founding generation had been reawakened. The pages of *The World's Children* of 1945 resonate with the same arguments as the pages of *The Record* of 1920. The leader of the campaign was Victor Gollancz. The argument was succinctly put in his pamphlet *Leaving Them to Their Fate: The Ethics of Starvation*.

¹⁷ Quoted by Dorothy Buxton in ‘The Battle of the Winter’, *The World's Children*, Vol.26.No.2, February 1946, 25.

¹⁸ Gollancz, V. 1946. *Leaving Them to Their Fate: The Ethics of Starvation*, London: Victor Gollancz, 30.

¹⁹ ‘The Battle of the Winter’, *The World's Children*, Vol.26 No.2, February 1946, 25.

The plain fact is that in this last week of March, when after the long winter Spring is for the first time in the English air, we are starving the German people. And we are starving them, not deliberately in the sense that we definitely want them to die, but wilfully in the sense that we prefer their death to our own inconvenience.²¹

The Fight the Famine Council and the Save the Europe Now meetings were followed by two very different relief operations. The most significant difference is the fact that in 1919 individual humanitarian ventures led the way, and in 1945 the government coordinated the relief effort. Before discussing the impact of this upon SCF, I want to highlight one other difference concerning a shift in the understanding of the utilitarian role of children.

When Save Europe Now called a conference on 16 July 1946 on the question of German prisoners of war detained in Britain, Edward Fuller put in a plea for the early return to Germany of teacher prisoners. He claimed that, from the point of view of the children in Germany, there was an urgent and desperate need for more and younger teachers.²² The government of the day argued that Britain's own industrial needs were paramount, and justified the retention of German prisoners of war by saying that their labour was practical reparation for the devastation of the war. Victor Gollancz and Edward Fuller had a different perspective. They were concerned with the future needs of Germany, and in particular the younger generation. They were also concerned with the future needs of Europe.

²⁰ *The World's Children*, Vol.26 No.1, January 1946.

²¹ Gollancz 1946, 4.

This concern was spelled out by Phyllis Pickard in an article entitled 'Save the Children for What?'. She raised the utilitarian principle which was critical to the first generation of SCF, and argued that the safety of British children was inextricably bound up with the safety of German children. Saving German children was not only an end in itself but also a means to a better future for the whole of Europe.²³

All these people focussed their attention on German adolescents. When the Secretary General of UISE, Dr George Th  lin, first met with the Council of SCF after the war he warned of the disaster in regard to 'children and adolescents', and described the attack on the younger generation as both physical and moral. Although Eglantyne Jebb had insisted in the first clause of the Declaration of the Rights of the Child that all children must be assured of the means necessary for normal development 'materially and spiritually', the main concern of SCF prior to the Second World War had been the physical health of young children.²⁴ After 1945 reports of the situation of adolescents in Britain were frequent in the SCF journal, and international work was also extended to the upper age group. In *Germany Revisited* Victor Gollancz wrote of a troubling encounter with a young German.

²² *The World's Children*, Vol.26 No.4, August 1946, 147.

²³ 'Save the Children for What?', *The World's Children*, Vol.28 No.1, January 1948, 3.

²⁴ The word 'adolescent' does not appear in SCF publications until 1938. The disproportionate attention to younger children may have come about for pragmatic reasons: the ARA undertook to feed schoolchildren in Austria, SCF therefore provided for children under school age.

As he came in and I rose to welcome him, I suddenly felt miserable and afraid. For this was not the boy I had known – this was someone different, someone, almost from another world [...].

Victor Gollancz was not disturbed by the boy's suspected tuberculosis, but by the way in which the boy described the frightful corruption which was closing in on him from every side. 'He said that decency, humanity, honesty, honour – all were vanishing.'²⁵ How far was the moral crisis faced by young people in Germany exacerbated by the conduct of the victorious powers?

In 1919 SCF had seized the opportunity to frame the moral issues at stake in the relationship between the people of the victorious and defeated countries. In 1945 it found itself co-opted into an ideological and military crusade of Western governments against the East. Instead of going to Germany as individuals engaged in a contentious humanitarian venture as they had done in 1919, after the Second World War they went as representatives of the occupying power.²⁶ This was the most significant difference between the two relief operations. A contemporary shift in the paradigm in which childhood was understood, involving a diminished focus upon the young child as passive and vulnerable and a growing focus upon the agency of young people, heightened the uneasiness SCF workers felt with this role.

²⁵ Gollancz, V. 1947. *Germany Revisited*, London: Victor Gollancz, 16.

²⁶ 'The Germans know even better than we do that the Western allies are there because they fear the Russians – the Russians because they fear us. Why, in God's name, don't we all go, and let the fear go too?' Wilson F.M. 1947. *Aftermath: France, Germany, Austria, Yugoslavia 1945 and 1946*, Middlesex: Penguin, 67.

In November 1943 the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) had been set up. Non-governmental organizations were a subordinate group called upon to carry out UNRRA plans. British NGOs, including SCF, were organized under the umbrella of COBSRA. Once the members of COBSRA had the go-ahead from UNRRA to send teams to liberated Europe, they were then under further restrictions as to who could participate in those teams. Under British wartime regulations, individuals were no longer free to take up work when and where they chose. Permission for the release of each person had to be obtained from the Ministry of Labour through the Relief Department of the Foreign Office.

This was a far cry from the position in 1919, when NGOs had taken the initiative and found the funds to deliver relief. The new procedure was cumbersome. In addition, the military were at best ambivalent about the contribution that the civilian UNRRA teams would make to the situation in areas under their control. Francesca Wilson, who had experienced the pioneering humanitarian work of the Scottish Women's Foreign Hospital Service in Serbia and the rush of aid workers to Republican Spain, now enlisted with UNRRA. She was excited by the experiment in inter-governmental cooperation, but also wrote critically of both UNRRA preparations and the calibre of its recruits.²⁷

Francesca Wilson's comments of most enduring interest relate to the clash of interests between the military and civilians. Once in Germany she worked in several camps for displaced persons. In her account of her work in Föhrenwald Camp she shows clearly that

²⁷ Wilson 1947.

she saw her task to build peace. She did this by getting former enemies together to work on common tasks.

‘Peace will only work,’ I thought, ‘when people have practical jobs to do together. When we are in a hurry to get sandpits or seesaws made for the kindergartens or a stage for the theatres, we think only of the carpenter’s skill and not of his nationality.’²⁸

However, her approach to building peace from below starting in the camp, was at odds with the approach of the military which was driven by the logistical constraints of working with a large and depersonalized population across a wide geographical area. She described the frustrations she encountered working as a civilian alongside the military.

Next came an order that our 700 Poles must leave within five hours. The camp was to be cleared, we were told, to make way for an influx, that no one had expected, of stateless Jews. The wretched Poles had been flung about more than any other people for six years; they had just got their school and kindergarten into swing and were preparing a Sunday entertainment [...]. I said to the captain in charge of these operations: ‘I hate the army. Why don’t you go and fight someone? Why do you meddle with civilians, with peaceable human beings? They are counters to you – you think you can move mothers and babies and sick people as you move

²⁸ Ibid., 124.

companies and batteries in the war. Why don't you stick to something you understand?'²⁹

UNRRA's operation was wound down in 1947 and the Marshall Plan took effect in 1948. SCF remained in charge of the transit camp in the British zone at Uelzen. Bridget Stevenson estimated that between May 1946 and September 1947, 1.3 million people passed through the camp. SCF had an office at Uelzen transit camp until it closed on 31 January 1961.³⁰ Although far less outspoken than Francesca Wilson, Bridget Stevenson's reports demonstrate a similar unease with the way in which decisions were made regarding who would receive assistance.

The World's Children of the Spring of 1958 reported that about 12 million of the 50 million people now in Western Germany did not live there before 1945. Well over a decade after the end of the war, the monthly intake of people from East Germany was still about 12,000 to 15,000. Many thousands of eastern European refugees remained in West Germany: 80,000 Poles, 21,650 Yugoslavs, 15,000 Russians,³¹ 12,900 Hungarians³² and 11,000 Czechs.³³ Amongst this mass of people on the move SCF was only able to provide assistance to those people registered as refugees. Under the rules of the British zone transit camp it could not provide assistance to ex-enemy people or German expellees. These people, however needy, were turned away. Bridget Stevenson's monthly reports

²⁹ Ibid., 130.

³⁰ SCF Archives reference FR.2220, 9 February 1961.

³¹ This includes some refugees who came before the Second World War.

³² This figure does not include refugees following the 1956 uprising.

³³ *The World's Children*, Vol.38 No.1, Spring 1958, 11.

demonstrate the way in which the changing circumstances of people leaving the Eastern zone fitted uneasily with the category of political refugee.

I am convinced that the bulk of those who come here are not in any sense political refugees; they come here because life is too hard for them in the Russian Zone, and too much is demanded of them. Direction of labour is not peculiar to the Russian Occupying Forces; it is merely that the conditions of employment in the [Auer uranium] mines are intolerable. Similarly, those who are unemployable can no longer manage to keep their families alive under the conditions which exist in the Russian Zone.³⁴

Bridget Stevenson was in favour of opening the borders not only to people who would fit the description of political refugee, soon to be enshrined in the 1951 Geneva Convention on Refugees, but also to people who in contemporary phraseology would be known as economic refugees.³⁵ She was grateful for the fact that the Quakers worked without political distinction, on the basis of need alone, and that SCF workers were able to refer people they could not help themselves to the Quakers.³⁶ By working within the government transit camp, SCF had accepted restrictions upon its universalist founding principle.

³⁴ SCF Archives reference SC/BS, September 1948.

³⁵ SCF work in Jordan also highlighted the difficulties of distinguishing between political refugees and the indigenous population. In this case, the people who fell outside the category of political refugees would be described in contemporary phraseology as 'environmental refugees'. See discussion in the Foreign Relief Committee, 'Mrs Adams was of the opinion that the nomadic tribes in South Jordan could be considered as refugees in that they had lost their normal grazing ground and lands.' SCF Archives reference FR.2215, 9 February 1961.

In 1946 UNRRA had been forced to cease its operation in the Russian-controlled zones of Eastern Europe. At the same time UNICEF was created so that children in the East should not be cut off from assistance. This starting point was very close to the spirit of SCF which had begun by reaching out to so-called enemy children. Members of SCF could rejoice that the universalist ideas of the organization had been adopted by governments, and it was now hoped would attract more official support. There was also some confusion as to whether there was still a role left for SCF. As UNICEF grew in strength, the editor of *The World's Children* received worried letters from SCF supporters.

Miss Gutteridge asks for guidance because 'UNICEF appeals in all the places where the SCF used to get support and so the committee feels at a loss how to proceed. 'Yet' she says, 'the aim is the same'.³⁷

The editor concurred, but then went on to say that the difference between UNICEF and SCF may be briefly stated by saying that the one is official, the representative of governments, the other is voluntary, an informal expression of compassion on the part of men, women and children. The voluntary, informal character of SCF was portrayed by Edward Fuller as a strength.

UNICEF remains an official body; the SCF is utterly unofficial and while independent of government grants is free to act at the behest of its Council (through the Executive committee) to carry out the intentions of its contributors. It is their

³⁶ 'In a Transit Camp', *The World's Children*, Vol.30 No.9, September 1950, 308.

almoner among necessitous children not the means of implementing decisions which rely ultimately on the approval of governments.³⁸

Given the governmental constraints which SCF had been acting under both in the UK and in its two major fields of action: Germany and Korea, these words seem to reflect wishful thinking on Edward Fuller's part, rather than the operational reality.

Whatever their differences, both organizations were perceived in Eastern Europe as organizations inspired by the West. *The World's Children* of December 1950 used the term 'iron curtain' when it described how during the previous two years SCF had been obliged to withdraw its missions from Hungary and Yugoslavia where SCF had been working continuously for thirty years, as well as Poland. The SCF projects were handed over to national welfare authorities.³⁹

Within a Cold War perspective, the guiding principles which had led SCF to work in Hungary and Yugoslavia became open to suspicion. The suspicion centred on the question of saving children for what? The utilitarian role of children as the generation of the future was not in dispute, but the role of SCF as an international voluntary organization for children certainly was. In both Eastern and Western Europe the role of the state was expanding, and in the East it left no room for the voluntary sector. Maggie Black suggests

³⁷ Fuller, Edward, *Memorandum on UNICEF, with special relation to Miss Mary Gutteridge's letter of 14 August 1956*, SCF Archives reference SC/EF/ii.40.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ 'Chinks in the Curtain', *The World's Children*, Vol.30 No.12, December 1950, 443.

that opposition to UNICEF work in Eastern Europe came initially not so much from Eastern European countries themselves but rather from the US.

It became more and more difficult to persuade the US Congress that UNICEF's operations in Eastern European countries offered neither material nor moral assistance to the cause of Communism.⁴⁰

However, mistrust fuelled mistrust, and within the Eastern European countries UNICEF staff found it harder to go about their work of monitoring relief operations without attracting suspicion. The fact that many UNICEF staff were North American and British confirmed the perception of a Western-run organization.⁴¹ At the end of 1949, UNICEF's Hungarian operation was closed, and at the end of 1950 the Polish operation closed. At the time the Chairman of the Board of UNICEF was the Polish representative, Ludwick Rajchman. He found himself obliged to walk out of UNICEF board meetings in support of the USSR position on Nationalist China.

Although it was possible to speak of a post-war period in Western Europe, and to identify a reawakening of the original spirit of SCF as international links were revived, the overriding perspective was Cold War. Unlike in 1919, SCF was in no position to frame the moral issues at stake between the antagonists. The principle of universalism had been co-opted by both East and West as part of their competing ideological and military crusades.

⁴⁰ Black, M. 1986. *The Children and the Nations: The Story of UNICEF*, UNICEF, 59.

⁴¹ The distrust cut both ways. 'Many US citizens who served on the staff of UN relief operations in eastern Europe in the post-war years were later investigated by McCarthy tribunals, and suffered serious career and

So too had the principle of utilitarianism, as each side disputed the nature of the society that children were to be saved for. The pacificism which had been so strong among the founding generation was defined by a belief in the possibility of lasting positive peace. By contrast, in a bipolar world a more pessimistic view prevailed that only negative peace, or the absence of armed conflict between the two camps, was possible.

The war in Korea

The idea that the Second World War was not at an end, but that a conflict with ramifications worldwide was evolving between East and West was difficult to grasp. The British public and politicians were not prepared for the escalation of hostilities that led to the Korean war (1950-53), and the participation of British forces in a United States led Unified Command.⁴² Dora Russell wrote in her autobiography:

In Britain no one understood what it was all about. Amid considerable anxiety a debate was to take place in Parliament. Fenner Brockway hoped to speak. He asked me, if I could find the time, to go to the office of the New York Times in Fleet Street to look out some articles which had come from its American correspondents in South Korea.⁴³

personal harassment simply because of the geographical accident of their posting. Yet some of the local staff left behind were harassed or imprisoned for their UN association [...].’ Black 1986, 59.

⁴² See for instance Bailey, S. 1992. *The Korean Armistice*, London: MacMillan, 27; Brockway 1977, 159.

⁴³ Russell, D. 1985. *The Tamarisk Tree: Vol.3 Challenge to the Cold War*, London: Virago, 127.

These were very different circumstances from the prolonged build-up to the outbreak of armed conflict in the Second World War. It was hardly feasible under these circumstances to expect SCF as an organization to engage in war prevention. Once war was declared in Korea what then was the role of SCF? The organization had a clear mandate to alleviate the suffering of children regardless of their parents' political beliefs. The extent to which it had put this universalism into practice since its foundation had progressively diminished. Eglantyne Jebb had advocated the delivery of assistance to children in the defeated countries of Europe and Bolshevik Russia. After her death, when Spain was divided between Republicans and Nationalists, SCF kept itself informed of the situation of children on both sides of the fighting lines. During the period of Churchill's total war, SCF sought out information from occupied Europe (even though it did not act on it). There is no evidence that SCF sought out information from the Communist-dominated North Korea during the Korean war. It could be argued that in the new world of the Cold War the stakes were too high to work across political divides; however, more significant for SCF was the fact that it had acquired the habit of respectability and was used to working closely with the government. Foreign Office policy was clearly going to be focussed upon South Korea only.

Hostilities began when the North Koreans made an offensive across the 38th Parallel. Ceadel described the US counter-attack as crusading.⁴⁴ Its purpose was ideological, to unify the country and roll back communism. General MacArthur used the same term, 'the allied soldier crusading for freedom' he told the Security Council in February 1951, 'is more than a match for the Communist soldier fighting to serve neither ideal nor spiritual

purpose.⁴⁵ The war was protracted, sweeping up and down the peninsula as first General MacArthur's troops counter-attacked from the south, and then the Chinese army attacked from the north. Not until mid-1951 did the war become relatively static and the vast movements of population cease; an armistice divided Korea in July 1953. The total death toll was estimated at around three and a half million. Nine million people in the South lost their homes or possessions.⁴⁶

There is no mention in the SCF Council records of any member bringing the situation in the north to the Council's attention. Mary Hawkins, who worked for SCF in Korea from 1953, questioned the priorities SCF set for children in the south, however, she did not question the fact that SCF ignored the plight of children in the north. This pessimistic and realistic attitude to the way in which priorities for international work were set contrasted with the optimistic idealism of the founding generation. That generation had strong links with the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, and Eglantyne Jebb herself was fined for distributing a pamphlet publicizing the conditions of civilians in enemy countries.

In 1951 the Women's International Democratic Federation sent a delegation to North Korea (they were not permitted to enter South Korea) and reported back on the conditions they found.⁴⁷ According to Dora Russell, they talked with survivors who were seeking no more than holes in which to exist. Slaughter had been indiscriminate, open graves revealed

⁴⁴ Ceadel 1989, 3.

⁴⁵ Quoted in Bailey 1992, 51.

⁴⁶ Black 1992, 47-48.

bodies bound hand and foot or burned by napalm. The delegation sought to go to South Korea but this proved impossible. Their talk with American prisoners in the North brought about the SOS – Save Our Sons – movement in the USA which helped end the war.

Members of their delegation, however, suffered in some countries on their return home.

The German women went to prison.⁴⁸

In England some of the war correspondents began to be horrified at what was going on.

James Cameron, among them, lost his job on *The Picture Post*, which refused to print his report. Monica Felton lost her job as Chairman of the Stevenage new town development under the Labour government after she published the pamphlet *What I Saw in Korea*.

The first mention of Korea in the SCF Council records is of correspondence from the Prime Minister explaining that no charitable organizations were able to operate in the country, and that all assistance to the civilian population was being carried out by the Civil Assistance Command of the Eighth Army Headquarters. Any private relief operation had to be sponsored by its government, and presented to the United Nations for consideration by the Unified Command.⁴⁹ When eventually SCF did secure permission to send workers to Korea, they were not allowed to send female workers. The male Australian doctor found that he was restricted in the nature of the work he could do,⁵⁰ and the contact he could have with his South Korean assistant.⁵¹

⁴⁷ Organization set up to combat fascism in 1945 in Paris. Some WIDF members were also members of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, founded in 1915.

⁴⁸ Russell 1985, 145.

⁴⁹ SCF Archives reference M1/13, 18 January 1951.

The military and SCF were obviously mismatched, but the Council highlighted two particular differences in perspective. The first was SCF's particular focus on children. The second was that SCF was thinking of the long-term needs of Korea's children and wanted to develop a lasting project. By contrast, the military mandate was temporary and its responses were also temporary. While it aspired to retain its independent identity, SCF was dependent upon the military. Mary Hawkins described the logistical dependence of SCF upon the military, in particular the use of armed guards.⁵²

The work in Korea raised other questions that continue to resonate in relief and development projects. Post-armistice, the Council minuted that the Koreans resented the numbers of expatriates and the level of salaries paid.⁵³ Already this issue had been raised in connection with UNRRA in Europe.⁵⁴ Sidney Bailey also cites it as a problem of the UN delegation to Korea before the outbreak of war. Although SCF salaries were not at the same level as those of the UN, all expatriate workers were similarly resented.

None of these issues were raised in the promotional film *A Far Cry*. The film was a poignant statement of child suffering. It does however reflect some of the relationships between agencies: Stephen Peet, the film-maker, was himself a Quaker, the funding for the film came from the Oxford Famine Relief Committee, and the agency featured as providing practical help on the ground was SCF. *The World's Children* published reports of the film's showing by the BBC in Britain and then at private events in Australia and

⁵⁰ He had to work in existing orphanages only. SCF Archives reference M1/13 C.3597, 17 July 1952.

⁵¹ SCF Archives reference M1/13 C.3661, 16 April 1953.

⁵² Interview with Mary Hawkins, Perranuthnoe, 12 April 2000.

⁵³ SCF Archives reference M1/13 C.3698, 29 October 1953.

Canada (countries which had contributed soldiers to the Unified Command).⁵⁵ The work shown was welfarist, and featured a tuberculosis hospital, baby clinic and kindergarten, and care was taken to reassure viewers that all this work was supervised by Europeans.

A Far Cry demonstrated the persistence of the patriotic humanitarian viewpoint. Since the first full page advertisements in the press for the starving children in Austria, and the first film *The Russian Famine*, appeals to the general public had been made by portraying the children as in great need and helpless. It is interesting to notice that in the case of *A Far Cry* despite the simplicity of the appeal, there were several confusing subtexts. Firstly, there was a commentary on universalism and the difficulty of targeting assistance. Pusan had become the refuge for refugees from the north, and displaced people, however the indigenous population were also in need. One of the strongest messages of the film was that for every child helped, there was another child who had been excluded. The film was saying, we are not universalists in practice but we should be. Secondly, as well as reiterating the vulnerability of children in time of war it revealed their utilitarian role. *A Far Cry* showed how children helped other children. Adult viewers would have been chastened by the diligence with which a girl of nine carried her baby brother to the tubercular clinic. The film was also saying, we think children are helpless but they are not.

When *A Far Cry* was made Korea was the largest beneficiary of SCF funds. Although the armed conflict was over and the foreign soldiers had left the country, SCF had remained to try and alleviate the persistent suffering of children. Mary Hawkins spent ten years

⁵⁴ Wilson 1947, 78.

⁵⁵ *The World's Children*, Vol.39 No.1, Spring 1959, 10.

working for SCF in Korea. Upon her retirement from SCF she wrote about her life's work in the pages of *The World's Children*.

I have been concerned for much of my working life with refugees and displaced persons, and in particular with children in need – hungry children, sick children, deprived, homeless and lost children; victims of poverty and ignorance, but above all victims of man's inhumanity to man. The refugees are still numbered in millions and half the world is hungry and people often ask what good one organization can hope to do in the face of such immense problems.

Surely the answer must be in the words of Confucius – 'It is better to light one small candle than to curse the darkness'.⁵⁶

By 1962 questions were being asked within SCF about the justification for further aid to Korea. In June 1962 *The World's Children* published an article questioning the need for further aid. The article attributed Korea's continuing poverty to mismanagement and corruption, and could argue the case for the continuation of SCF's work there only on the grounds that SCF projects were well-managed and free from corruption.⁵⁷ Nevertheless there were examples of individual Koreans who could offer moral leadership⁵⁸ and by 1964 a plan for the 'Koreanization' of the SCF international staff had been put in place.⁵⁹

⁵⁶ 'One small candle', *The World's Children*, Vol.52 No.4, December 1972, 69.

⁵⁷ 'Poverty in Korea', *The World's Children*, Vol.42 No.2, June 1962, 33.

⁵⁸ For example, SCF was in contact with a significant number of children living without adult support thanks to its partnership with a remarkable Korean whose own childhood and youth had prepared him to assist the boys who lived on the streets. Kim was found abandoned at a railway station as a child and became a beggar boy. Later in life he became a champion boxer. He decided to use his winnings to set up a refuge for beggar boys. Each night, disguised as a beggar himself, he would go out looking for children living under bridges, in

This chapter began by considering the post-Second World War revival within SCF. Renewed international contacts rekindled something of the original spirit of the organization. However, this generation was increasingly aware of the structural violence behind child suffering. Social, economic and political structures combined to lock children into poverty and disadvantage. Whatever its universalist, utilitarian and optimistic beginnings, SCF in the period of the early Cold War was part of a landscape of negative peace. SCF workers in Germany, the Middle East and Korea chafed at the categorization of children and their entitlements according to whether they were refugees, displaced or indigenous, but could not renegotiate the rules set by UNRRA, UNWRA or the Eighth Army. SCF workers in South Korea found that the national government tolerated social conditions in which poverty was entrenched. Above all SCF was working on one side of the Cold War only.

This period also coincided with the expansion of the role of the state, not only in welfare work at home, but also in international relief. The United Nations was founded in 1945, and the specialist agencies of UNICEF (United Nations Children's Fund) in 1946, the World Health Organization (WHO) in 1948, and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugee (UNHCR) in 1951. Paradoxically, during a period when state activity was increasing, SCF was joined by a range of voluntary agencies. In the previous chapter it was

doorways, drains. The boys he persuaded to come back to the refuge were provided with shelter, food and clothing. SCF financed a teacher. It would be interesting to know the life outcomes of these boys. In 1994 SCF published a manual *Street and Working Children: A Guide to Planning* in response to the growing visibility of street children living and working in cities across the world. Many of the guidelines reflect the work of Kim, thirty years earlier. See 'Self Help Korean Style', *The World's Children*, Vol.39 No.1, Spring 1959, 21.

⁵⁹ SCF Archives reference M6/2 ORW.3026, 11 June 1964.

seen how the British policy of total war and its consequences for the people of German-controlled Europe had prompted the creation of Oxfam. In 1944 Christian Reconstruction in Europe (later renamed Christian Aid) was formed. War on Want was founded in 1951 and Voluntary Service Overseas in 1958. Unlike the British voluntary organizations set up in response to the Spanish Civil War, these agencies would be actors with staying power in the field of international relief and development. In the next chapter the contrasting actions of these voluntary organizations demonstrate the scope available to voluntary organizations within an international system based on two mutually hostile Cold War blocs. Despite its roots in contentious politics, SCF is seen to position itself at the end of the spectrum closest to government policy.

Chapter 6

DECOLONIZATION: THE GAP WIDENS BETWEEN RELIEF AND DEVELOPMENT (1960-1975)

As there are undoubtedly children who are suffering more in Asia and Africa than in Europe, we should prove the sincerity of our claim to universality by undertaking work in these continents directly we are able to raise sufficient funds for this purpose.¹

Thirty years would pass before SCF would take up Eglantyne Jebb's challenge and redirect its work towards Asia and Africa. In the intervening years SCF had been faced first with the recession of the 1930s and dwindling income, and then with the paralysing events of the Second World War. After 1945 the extraordinary concentration of refugees in Hong Kong and the outbreak of war in Korea compelled SCF to look beyond the European theatre of war and into Asia.

Between 1960 and 1975, SCF began work with children affected by a succession of wars in Vietnam, Tibet, Congo, Nigeria, Yemen, Jordan, East Pakistan, and Kurdistan. But it was the children of the newly independent states of Africa who became the focus of SCF work. By 1961 SCF was, for the first time, spending more money in Africa than in the UK;

¹ Quoted in Breen R., *Into Africa: Save the Children's Long Journey to the African Continent*, SCF Archive Paper No.2, February 1997, 3; *The World's Children*, March 1925, 90.

by 1965, expenditure on Africa exceeded that in Europe; and finally, in 1970, Africa became the leading area for SCF expenditure. This expenditure was mainly concentrated on famine relief.

There is little evidence during this period of the individualist, anti-government roots of SCF, and much of its work in Africa was done at the behest of the colonial authorities. The most expensive kind of work, food aid, necessitated fund-raising on a large scale and brought SCF into a new relationship with its paymasters among the British public and in the British government.

Within the organization there was an explicit recognition of the need to reassess the roles of its committee members and staff. Priority was given to professional skills and experience. For example, the Overseas Relief and Welfare Committee acknowledged that it would have to pay wages at least comparable with the National Health Service if it were to recruit suitable doctors. Even so, it would still not be paying the salaries doctors could get from WHO.²

This period also saw renewed efforts at coordination within the voluntary sector, independent of the government. A tentative proposal for a sub-Committee on emergencies was reported to the Overseas Relief and Welfare Committee after the earthquake in Persia.³ However, it was not until the earthquake in Skopje, Yugoslavia, that the Disaster

² SCF Archives reference M6/2 ORW.2953, 11 June 1964.

³ SCF Archives reference ORW.2652, n.d.

Emergency Committee was formed on 26 July 1963.⁴ It is noteworthy that this coordination was limited to British relief organizations. SCF's relations with the IUCW remained cool, and it was still predominantly nationalist rather than internationalist in outlook.

This then was a period of geographical expansion and organizational consolidation. Out of the range of activities worldwide, this chapter focusses upon SCF's work in Africa, because of the continent's emergence as the leading area of expenditure for SCF. It begins by looking at the background of SCF's work in Africa prior to decolonization. It then considers in detail SCF's response to the civil war in Nigeria. This choice reflects the significance of the civil war in Nigeria as a formative experience for SCF. The civil war in Nigeria was not only a turning point for SCF but also for its relationships with other organizations. Its long-term travelling companions, the Quakers, the ICRC, and Oxfam were all involved. At an intergovernmental level, not only the UN, but also the Commonwealth⁵ and Organization of African Unity (OAU),⁶ were implicated. Above all, the media took an unprecedented interest in the survival of children in the territory of Biafra.

The most significant characteristic of SCF activities during this period was an either-or approach to relief and development. This approach was symptomatic of a clear demarcation between war and peace. It was also symptomatic of a departure from the

⁴ The DEC included SCF, Oxfam, British Red Cross, Christian Aid and War on Want.

⁵ Founded in 1931. Most of the former British colonies when granted independence chose to be members of the Commonwealth.

⁶ Founded in 1963 by 32 African governments.

guiding principles of the founding generation, and in particular the principle of optimistic pacificism. Edward Fuller had distinguished between the role of UNICEF and SCF by saying:

SCF realises that the mission entrusted to it by its founder was not only to cure present suffering, but prevent so far as may be its recurrence in the future.⁷

And yet when SCF's work is juxtaposed with that of the range of intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations that were active in the tumultuous period of decolonization, it did not distinguish itself by being involved with war prevention. Instead it earned a reputation for providing rapid relief on a large scale. It also showed little political imagination about the construction of peace out of war, and neglected to address what was it saving children for. This may partly be explained by the movement of military men into the organization who brought with them habits of demarcating wartime from peacetime, and an emphasis on logistical expertise and technical solutions.

Background to SCF's work in Africa

In the years immediately after Eglantyne Jebb's death, Edward Fuller⁸ and Victoria de Bunsen⁹ held a torch for Africa. In fulfilment of her wishes, they encouraged SCF to hold

⁷ Fuller, E. *Memorandum on UNICEF, with special relation to Miss Mary Gutteridge's letter of 14 August 1956*, SCF Archives reference SC/EF/ii.40.

⁸ As editor of *The World's Children*, Edward Fuller ensured that the SCF journal consistently carried references to Africa.

⁹ Victoria de Bunsen, sister of Charles Buxton and descendant of Sir Thomas Fowell Buxton, one of the leading members of the campaign for the abolition of the slave trade.

an International Conference on the African Child in 1931 in Geneva.¹⁰ The proceedings remain a remarkable record of the thinking of the day with regard to colonialism and racism, and their impact upon the children of Africa.¹¹ Although the discourse is dated, the intentions behind the contributions would not be out of place in policy discussions within SCF much later in the century.

For example, the exploitative relationship between colonizer and colonized was criticized for its harmful consequences for children. Emil Torday, anthropologist, described how in the Belgian Congo limited access to land and the practice of forced labour led to the break-up of families as men left the home for work in the plantations, mines and cities. He challenged his countrymen in Belgium to put their house in order and 'create a new atmosphere of social justice' by developing this great dependency 'with a view to the future and not for immediate profit'.¹²

The necessity for sensitivity to different cultural practices was also emphasized. Johnstone Kenyatta (later known as Jomo Kenyatta, first President of Kenya) was one of six black African delegates present. He countered the Duchess of Atholl's characteristically precipitate approach to the problem of female circumcision, by arguing that legislation without cultural understanding was an ineffective instrument of change. He pointed out

¹⁰ Prior to the conference 1500 questionnaires were sent out to colonial administrators, missionaries, medical personnel, educationalists and business people. 358 questionnaires were returned. Breen R. SCF Archive Paper No.2, February 1997, 6.

¹¹ Sharp 1931.

¹² Sharp 1931, 46.

that the campaign against female circumcision had led ‘thousands of children to be kept out of schools by their parents, and has thus deprived them of the benefits of education’.¹³

Not only was there a continuity between the problems highlighted by SCF in the 1930s and issues which were of concern to the organization at the end of the century; there was also a remarkable continuity in the form of the solutions the organization proposed. At both stages of the organization’s history it was recognized that solutions imposed from outside were ineffective. According to Eglantyne Jebb, the best guarantee of the success of the universalist approach was the ‘arousing of native interest and native help, and thus gradually bringing into being a national movement for the care and protection of children’.¹⁴

The 1931 conference was prevented from implementing its proposals by lack of funds. However, in 1935 it was decided that the most fitting memorial to Eglantyne Jebb would be a project in Africa and the money originally collected for a monument in Geneva was reallocated to work in Ethiopia. A canteen, infant welfare centre and a playground were set up in Addis Ababa under the guidance of a British worker assisted by the Association of Ethiopian Women. The Association of Ethiopian Women deliberately excluded European women in order to build local capacity for voluntary action.¹⁵ The project was short-lived

¹³ Breen, SCF Archive Paper No.2, February 1997, 12.

¹⁴ *The World’s Children*, Vol.9 No.9, June 1929, 188; see also Breen, SCF Archive Paper No.2, February 1997, 3.

¹⁵ Lady Barton explained to the Child Protection Committee that ‘the Ethiopian Women’s Work Association was entirely composed of Abyssinian nationals and she had made this a rule when she first founded the Association. She felt that if there were European women in the Association the Ethiopian women would not bear their full part, but that if left to themselves would prove equally capable of the work, and this view had been justified by the work which the Association had done’. SCF Archives reference M14/17, 26 June 1941.

owing to the Italian occupation, nevertheless SCF continued to send aid to refugees from Ethiopia until 1941.

By this time Dr Harold Moody, founder of the League for the Advancement of Coloured People, was a member of the SCF Council.¹⁶ In April 1944 he proposed a project focussing on mothers and small children in Nigeria. A British nurse, Alice Cowper, was recruited and in July 1945 set off for Ibadan. She remained there only until October 1946 when she resigned and handed the work over to the Methodist Missionary Society. With Dr Moody taking less and less part in SCF's work the impetus for work in Africa was lost.

The pressure for work in Africa was eventually renewed from outside the organization. At the request of the colonial authorities, SCF began work in Sudan (1950), Somalia (1951) and Uganda (1959). SCF then found itself carried along by the Freedom from Hunger Campaign, launched by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations in November 1959. Part of its mandate was to fund pioneering projects to improve food production and distribution. Several SCF projects were funded by the Campaign. Amongst these projects was SCF work at Ilesha, in Western Nigeria.

The gap between relief and development

In the process of decolonization SCF can be seen to have assumed two distinct roles: relief and development. Where the decolonization process was accompanied by violent conflict, SCF became involved as a relief agency. In those former British colonies, where SCF had

ties prior to independence, and decolonization proceeded without armed conflict, SCF encouraged the development of national movements for the protection and welfare of children.

Examples of SCF's involvement as a relief agency can be found in both former French and Belgian territories. From 1954 to 1962 Algerians had waged war for independence from France. SCF drew on its continuous tradition of work with refugees to assist Algerian refugee children in Morocco (a French protectorate until 1956). By contrast the situation in Belgian Congo provoked an emergency response from SCF of a kind not seen since the Russian famine. Belgian Congo became independent in 1960, but almost immediately was pitched into civil war by the secession of the mineral-rich Katanga province. Children were among the first to suffer from the shortage of protein foods. The Congo was the place where many long-term aid workers first saw children with the greying hair and ballooning stomachs associated with kwashiorkor. The SCF Director of Overseas Relief and Welfare made this assessment of the problem:

I then examined the possibility of buying protein foods, such as beans and palm oil, from the less affected areas of the Kivu, but I soon realised that any such action would upset the existing market prices, and only serve to spread rather than solve the problem. The possibility of obtaining fish from Lake Kivu was also investigated, but, because of certain mineral properties in the water there, fish were very scarce and therefore very expensive. There were, however, plenty of fish in

¹⁶ Vaughan D.A. 1950. *Negro Victory: The Life Story of Dr Harold Moody*, London: Independent Press.

Lake Tanganyika: the near side was still under rebel control, but the far side was in Burundi territory...¹⁷

The speed with which SCF and its international sister organizations were able to respond to his cabled request was impressive.

KWASHIORKOR SITUATION KIVU DESPERATE STOP CHILDREN DYING
DAILY STOP EIGHT THOUSAND POUNDS REQUIRED PURCHASE
ESSENTIAL PROTEIN FOODS AVAILABLE BURUNDI TO COVER NEXT
FOUR VITAL MONTHS STOP REQUEST SCF PROVIDE TWO THOUSAND
POUNDS AND IUCW APPEAL UNION MEMBERS FOR BALANCE STOP
CONGOLESE GOVERNMENT PROVIDING TRANSPORTATION STOP.¹⁸

Within 24 hours Colonel Hawkins had received approval from SCF London to spend £2000. Within a week the balance of £6000 had been raised by IUCW members in Austria, Canada, France, Sweden, Denmark and Norway.

‘The Colonel’, as Colonel Hawkins was known, excelled at the delivery of aid with military speed. Since the Second World War military men had moved into positions of leadership within SCF. They stand out from the records by the use of military titles.¹⁹

¹⁷ Hawkins, J.V. ‘International Cooperation in the Congo’, *The World’s Children* Vol.45 No.4, December 1965, 95.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ It is harder to identify staff who had deliberately disassociated themselves from the military. In 1948 *The World’s Children* reported on the departure from headquarters of Mr A. Digby Holmes. He had been a member of one of the early relief teams working among refugees from the Balkans in Egypt, and then spent three years in the organization department. The journal also reported his war service: ‘During the war, as a

These military men brought with them logistical expertise and technical solutions, but little experience of direct work with children. Over the next two decades SCF was to become more and more associated in the public mind with emergency response to human and natural disasters. The role of SCF as rescue service in a disaster scenario emphasized the powerlessness of the populations involved who were perceived as victims suffering the consequences of events beyond their control.

At the same time, another dimension of SCF's work received less publicity. This was SCF's work for the long-term development of national movements for the care and protection of children, and the prevention rather than the alleviation of suffering.²⁰ It emphasized an active role for the populations of the former colonies. Decolonization meant not only the emergence of independent states but also of African government administration at a national and local level, and new relationships between these governments and society. Where would SCF, as a British non-governmental organization, situate itself in these new political constellations? As a British organization it had ties with the colonial administration, but as a non-governmental organization its natural partners were groups outside the governmental sector. This dual allegiance was reinforced by SCF's mission to ensure that both state and society assumed their responsibilities for the upbringing of children. At the point of decolonization, SCF was already present in many

member of the Pacifist Service Units, Mr. Holmes served as a 'guinea-pig' in experimental medicine and also took part in work among 'problem' families in east London.' *The World's Children*, Vol.28 No.1, January 1948, 33.

²⁰ There was concern among Council members that SCF was failing to communicate this part of its work effectively. 'Mrs Freeman said she had a recommendation she hoped the Committee would seriously consider. She had found that people had three views of the work of the Fund. That the work is limited to nurseries and 5 year olds; that the Fund exists to feed starving children; or that it exists to work in times of relief. There was a need to have an up to date view of what the fund is doing and she suggested the lead come from this Committee.' SCF Archives reference FR.2288, 11 May 1961.

former British African colonies. For example, when Uganda gained independence in 1962, SCF became the country's first approved society. In recognition of the roles of both state and society, SCF contributed to the legislation governing the regulation of homes and societies caring for children in Uganda, and ran a family casework service to provide direct assistance to children in their homes.

However, relief to famine-stricken populations in wartime and development of national movements for children in peacetime appeared to be an either-or approach. The case of Nigeria illustrates that where SCF was present in the country as a development agency it did not have the capacity either to forecast or prevent the outbreak of war. It seemed blind to the continuum between peace and war. After fifty years' experience of responding to conflict, SCF had allowed a wide gap to open between its relief and development activities.

In the aftermath of the First World War the founding generation had an eye to the future, and were mindful to close the gap between relief and development. I suggest that this gap opened as SCF departed from its three guiding principles. First, the departure from universalism allowed for invidious distinctions between refugees in obvious need of relief, and the wider population whose future depended upon the development of the country. These distinctions had particularly disturbed Bridget Stevenson in Germany. Secondly, the departure from utilitarianism allowed SCF to focus upon immediate material needs and engage in welfarist activities without regard to the structural violence endemic in society. For example, SCF workers in South Korea found that a generation after the end of war,

and the establishment of 'negative peace', they were working alongside a national government which tolerated social conditions in which poverty was entrenched, and within an international system based upon mutually hostile relations between the two Cold War blocs. Thirdly, the departure from optimistic pacificism led to a pessimistic assumption of the inevitability of armed conflict and the perpetual necessity of relief. Universalism, utilitarianism and the belief in the possibility of positive peace were all critical to work which combined immediate relief to those in greatest need with the development of a better future for all.

The period of decolonization and the instability of the newly independent states brought the question of the relationship between relief and development to the fore again. What would SCF do, if anything, to ensure that its presence in the African societies undergoing political change contributed to a greater likelihood of political conflicts being resolved without recourse to violence? This chapter reveals the very limited assessment made by the organization of the likely impact of its activity on potential conflict. It required an understanding of the factors which increase the risk of war both within as well as between states.²¹ These went beyond the incidence of disease and malnutrition, which the health project SCF set up in Ilesha, Western Nigeria was designed to address, and encompassed issues of identity, inequality, the institutional framework to allow for peaceful change, and the international availability of armaments and ammunition.

²¹ The pervasive emphasis in current literature upon the increase in the number of civil wars, as opposed to inter-state wars, is not wholly appropriate in SCF's experience. Already previous chapters have discussed interventions in civil wars in Russia (1918-1922), Spain (1936-1939) and Korea (1950-1953).

The civil war in Nigeria

Nigeria became independent in 1960. SCF was already present in the country as a development agency, and its management of the Ilesha hospital was viewed as an example of the goodwill of the former colonial power to the successor state. At first the transition to independence in this most populous state of Africa augured well. Then in 1966 a military coup brought to power a group dominated by easterners, the Ibo. A counter-coup placed General Yakubu Gowon, a young northerner, in power. Made fearful by massacres of Ibos living in the north, Ibos from all parts of Nigeria migrated to the south-east. In May 1967, Colonel Odumegwu Ojukwu, Military Governor of the Eastern Region, announced the secession of the independent Republic of Biafra.²² In July the forces of General Gowon attacked.

The newly independent state of Nigeria now risked fragmentation along regional lines. Under these circumstances where aid was targeted became of political significance. Elizabeth Stamp, Press Officer for Oxfam at the time, suggested that British agencies were singularly inept at making a political assessment in this situation for the paradoxical reason that knowledge about Nigeria was too readily available.²³ There were many people in Britain with links to Nigeria through the former colonial administration. Representatives of British financial interests as well as missionaries and forty VSO volunteers remained in the

²² During the war the name 'Biafra' was unacceptable in Nigeria, and its use still betokens in some minds partisanship to the rebel side. The use in this writing is designed for convenience, since there was such an entity, and not as any judgement of the historical events that eliminated that entity.

²³ Interview with Elizabeth Stamp, Oxford, 7 March 2000.

country after independence.²⁴ When dealing with Nigeria, Elizabeth Stamp claimed that agencies made decisions on the basis of opinions they already held or those of people they already knew, rather than seeking out new information.²⁵

The correspondence between Tim Brierly, Oxfam Field Director for West and Equatorial Africa, based in Lagos, and his head office reveals the sensitivity within Nigeria to the allocation of aid.²⁶ Oxfam differed from SCF in that it was not operational, instead it made grants to locally based organizations. Its representative for West Africa was charged with identifying recipient organizations and supporting them in the implementation of their projects. At this sensitive pre-war stage Oxfam's records show that the role of regional representative and contacts with a range of local partner organizations served as an early warning system. Seeing the signs of regional division, Oxfam attempted to respond with a programme which upheld federal structures and targeted aid according to need. Although growing antagonism to British citizens in Eastern Nigeria meant that Tim Brierly himself was unable to move freely throughout the country, it was part of his mandate to reach out to other organizations working in the parts of the country that were inaccessible to him.²⁷

By contrast the records of SCF focus exclusively on the Ilesha project, its personnel and

²⁴ Voluntary Service Overseas was founded in 1958. For its history, see Bird D. 1998. *Never the Same Again: A History of VSO*, Cambridge: Lutterworth Press.

²⁵ Anderson, M.B. 1999. *Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace – or War*, London: Lynne Rienner, 75. Anderson confirms the disadvantages of aid workers with prior involvement in a conflict situation: 'They see the present situation as inevitable. They often believe solutions can come only from outside, from external political actors.'

²⁶ In late 1966 Tim Brierly assessed that Oxfam should offer help to the Eastern Nigeria Rehabilitation Committee. He was advised by the British High Commissioner in Lagos not to put this offer in writing since 'any written offer of help might be published in the Press and cause a reaction from the North and other Regions who also have similar Commissions (though their problems are less)'. Copy to Oxfam HQ of unsent letter from T.G. Brierly to the Chairman, Eastern Nigeria Rehabilitation Committee, Oxfam Archives reference 2209, 19 November 1966.

logistics problems and data related to the health status of patients. They show no evidence of an awareness of or interest in the wider Nigerian setting. When Tim Brierly urged Oxfam headquarters to consult with SCF, Ken Bennett (Oxfam Director of Overseas Aid) found that Colonel Hawkins had given no thought to possible future needs in Biafra.²⁸

In *A Safer Future: Reducing the Human Cost of War* Ed Cairns outlines a policy for international interventions which reflects a dual awareness of immediate needs and of measures necessary for conflict prevention. 'Sometimes, seeking to reduce armed conflict may produce tough choices: for example, to target aid to an unstable country when another is poorer.'²⁹ In the Nigerian context, an assessment of the impact of aid on potential conflict of the kind advocated by Ed Cairns might have revealed that, at a time when the more prosperous Ibo population felt excluded from power, it would have been helpful to have a symbolic presence in the Ibo region of Eastern State. The security goal of promoting economic and political stability might have loomed larger than the developmental goal of alleviating poverty in the northern hinterland.³⁰

As the conflict in Nigeria unfolded SCF's work displayed two quite separate strategies: a peacetime strategy in Ilesha and a wartime strategy in Biafra. Constrained by this dualist understanding of peace and war, development and relief, SCF departed further from the founding principles of universalism, utilitarianism and optimistic pacificism.

²⁷ Anonymous warning to Tim Brierly, 'I think I should warn you that it would be most unwise for you or another to come here [Onitsha, east] There is definite anti-British feeling in the East. You might not be safe.' Oxfam Archives reference 2209, 29 May 1967.

²⁸ Ken Bennett to Michael Harris, Oxfam Archives reference 2209, 25 October 1967.

²⁹ Cairns E. 1997. *A Safer Future: Reducing the Human Cost of War*, Oxford: Oxfam Publications, 59.

Relief as a coveted weapon

The immediate cause of the Biafran secession was the claim on the part of Colonel Ojukwu that the East had received inadequate compensation to enable it to cope with more than 1.8 million refugees. From May 1967 all revenue raised in Biafra, and in particular from the oil industry in which Britain had strong interests, would be collected by the breakaway government. Colonel Ojukwu insisted that only within a sovereign state would the Ibo people be provided for and be protected from genocide. General Gowon's war aims were to rescue the Ibos from the leadership of Colonel Ojukwu and reunite them with their Nigerian brothers within a federal state. Colonel Ojukwu sought to internationalize the conflict and establish the identity of Biafra as an independent entity. The Federal government sought to resist international intervention and to localize the conflict.

The involvement of international support, whether governmental or non-governmental, was therefore a tactic of war on the part of Colonel Ojukwu. Its exclusion was part of the tactic of war on the Federal government side. With the fall of Port Harcourt on 21 May 1968, the Federal government tactic was near success. The Biafrans had lost the oilfields, access to the sea, and the airport.

The Federal Army was in effect placing the people in the secessionist territory of Biafra under siege, and part of that siege warfare meant cutting off the supply of food to the area.

³⁰ Duffield M. *Reading Development as Security: Post-Nation State Conflict and Reconstructing Normality*, draft paper presented at the conference on NGOs in a Global Future, University of Birmingham, 1999. See

Letting food through to the civilian population would have relieved the strain upon the military, and therefore was not consistent with the siege warfare. This was exactly the same tactic as that adopted by Winston Churchill with the blockade of occupied Europe. In the same way that Winston Churchill had promised that people would be fed once liberated, the Federal Army went out of its way to allow food to refugees from the Biafran held territory.

The children of Nigeria could therefore be divided into three categories with regard to access to food: those unaffected by the war in the Federal areas; those affected by the war in liberated areas; and those under siege in the secessionist state. According to its founding principles, SCF was mandated to work with all children, whatever their political situation. The need was greatest among those children in the secessionist territory, and then among the refugees from the conflict. However there were also chronically malnourished children in those areas unaffected by war.³¹ SCF faced a dilemma now in how it could reach all children in need. Adherence to the principle of universalism could be construed as political partisanship, because by the very fact of providing succour to the children in Biafra it would be undermining the Federal Army tactic. In 1940, SCF had acquiesced in the face of Winston Churchill's blockade of Europe, and made no attempt to get aid through to the embattled civilian population. What would it do on this occasion?

description of the implications of the convergence of development and security goals.

³¹ Michelle le Jossec, Health Visitor's report: 'I have now been in Nigeria for nearly a year. After three months working with the refugees in Federal-held Eastern Nigeria, I started work in Ilesha, Western Nigeria. It took a long time to re-adapt myself to a normal life of routine and at first it seemed that all was well in Western Nigeria. Unfortunately, it is not so. The needs of the children here may not be as bad or as acute as it was in July 1968 in Federal-held Eastern Nigeria, but here also, many children are dying of malnutrition and bad cases of kwashiorkor are many.' SCF Archives reference P/OS/N7, June 1969.

All international agencies were faced with the same dilemma. For some the choices were straightforward. The Churches of the Netherlands were particularly strong in their support for the besieged Biafran population because they were reminded of their own suffering during the famine winter of 1944 to 1945.

While some Dutchmen feel that the Biafran people have a right to live in freedom according to their own choice, others believe equally strongly that secession would be unwise. Where all are united is in rejecting the weapon of starvation. The Dutch have a good reason for this rejection. They have not forgotten the “hunger-winter” of 1944-1945, when their fields were flooded for military reasons, and the population was left without means of subsistence.³²

The ICRC, by contrast, attempted to uphold a position of political neutrality and to make arrangements for the delivery of aid with the agreement of both parties to the conflict. It was thwarted because the channels for the provision of food were inextricably linked with the channels to supply arms. The Biafrans objected to any attempt to establish a separate channel for relief open to Federal inspection because this would expose their arms supply routes. With hindsight it can be seen that both arms and food were critical to the Biafran prosecution of the war and therefore they were determined to keep relief as a cover for the night-time run of arms into Biafra.

³² Jenner R. *An Ecumenical Force in the Humanitarian Vanguard: Fighting Africa's Darkest Catastrophe*, Geneva: Joint Church Aid, n.d.

Following the seizure of Port Harcourt, the arms supply route into the airstrip at Uli was also the only route for relief. Under these circumstances relief could be said to prolong the war in two ways: first by enabling the population to withstand the siege for longer, and also by providing cover for the supply of arms. The Churches were the first to set aside such concerns and use the Sao Tome - Uli route for the delivery of relief. Flights were divided between the Protestant and Catholic Churches and landed at night between deliveries of arms. The ICRC delayed, hoping to negotiate permission for designated daytime relief flights from San Fernando. This was the position supported by the members of the British Disaster Emergency Committee, including SCF, but in June Oxfam broke ranks.

As far as Oxfam Director Leslie Kirkley was concerned, Oxfam had a duty to meet a 'simple humanitarian appeal'³³ and provide aid to those in greatest need. He ignored the advice of Oxfam's own Field Director, Tim Brierly, based in Lagos. Up till then Tim Brierly had been careful to ensure that a near equal amount of Oxfam aid was channelled to Biafra and to areas retaken by the Federal Army, emphasizing that help was being given to victims on both sides of the conflict.³⁴ In June 1968 Leslie Kirkley flew into Biafra on the Sao Tome - Uli run. The reaction to the Oxfam Director's visit to Biafra was predictable. 'Do-gooders we don't want' was one headline in the Nigerian press. Tim Brierly's position was made untenable and he resigned.³⁵

³³ Interview with Elizabeth Stamp, Oxford, 7 March 2000.

³⁴ Black 1992.

During this period SCF had four medical teams working with refugees in those areas of Biafran territory under Federal control. The situation was confused with the Federal Army only controlling the roads and main centres. Under such circumstances it is possible to understand how the activities of relief agencies using those roads and centres could be misconstrued as hostile by the Biafrans. There has been no full explanation for why, on 29 July 1968, an SCF vehicle should have been ambushed by Biafrans. Jonathan Ambache and Malachy Riddle died. The team leader, Dr Noel Moynihan wrote to the Director General:

What we cannot understand, of course, is why the Biafrans should have done this. They must have known that we were in the vicinity and that we had fed large numbers of their own people in the nine days we have been here – nearly 10,000 per day on average: they must have known that we were driving in white Land Rovers with Red Crosses and flying a Red Cross Pennant.³⁶

To Dr Moynihan the action was unintelligible. However, the Red Cross had declared itself politically neutral (and therefore in the eyes of the Biafran leadership against the secessionist cause) and the vehicle was using a road held by the Federal Army. Above all, the principle of humanitarian relief was itself a European import. In the next section it will be seen how this principle would be manipulated by the Biafran leadership for European

³⁵ Interview with Tim Brierly, Oxford, 7 March 2000. However critical he was of the activities of Oxfam with regard to Biafra, he returned to work with Oxfam three years later and over thirty years later was still a loyal supporter of the organization.

³⁶ Letter from Dr Moynihan to Sir Colin Thornley, SCF Director General, SCF Archives reference P/OS/N7, 30 July 1968.

audiences, but this did not mean international humanitarian missions could expect respect from Biafran rebels at the roadside.

It was not until 22 August that an SCF medical team was able to reach Biafran-held territory, flying in with the ICRC from the island of Fernando Po. The SCF team were all briefed in Geneva, and expected to follow ICRC guidelines. In the face of the Federal advance they were evacuated from Biafra in October. Individuals working for SCF in Biafran held territory were very frustrated at the ICRC order to evacuate. Sr Regan went on her own initiative to Ivory Coast (Abidjan) and then to Gabon (Libreville) in an attempt to care for the Biafran orphans who had been evacuated there. She was unsuccessful and arrived in London on 25 October 1968. Dr Wallace persistently requested to be returned to Biafra, and SCF sought ICRC backing to emphasize its refusal. He eventually accompanied Fenner Brockway's peace mission to Biafran territory.³⁷

The ban on direct assistance to Biafran territory drove a stake through the core of individual humanitarian workers' beliefs. Their personal commitment to deliver relief wherever it was necessary, whatever the political cost, eventually wrought changes in organizational policy. First the Churches,³⁸ then Oxfam and finally the ICRC and SCF began to ply the Uli route. In early September Auguste Lindt, the ICRC representative, lost patience with the deadlocked negotiations between the Federals and the Biafrans, and departed from the traditional position of the ICRC of acting only with the consent of both

³⁷ Brockway 1977, 252.

³⁸ Father Byrne of the Holy Ghost Fathers was known as 'The Green Pimpernel' for his outstanding contribution to the Biafran relief operation.

parties. Rather than wait longer for clearance for its flights from San Fernando Auguste Lindt began an airlift without Federal clearance.

In the same month France took Biafra's side and started airlifting arms into Uli via Gabon and Ivory Coast. Both the airlifts of relief and of arms were therefore increasing.

By April 1969 the ICRC was running the biggest relief operation it had ever mounted. The operation was put in jeopardy by the activities of a freelance operation led by Count von Rosen, who put together a number of light aircraft to make hedge-hopping raids against the Federal Army. On the evening of 5 June a Swedish Red Cross DC-7B was shot down by a Federal plane. By the end of the month, the Nigerian government had brought to an end the ICRC's mandate to coordinate the relief operation. ICRC was faced with a choice of continuing to fly in defiance of Nigerian policy, or suspending flights and seeking to negotiate a new agreement. Negotiations were stalled by Colonel Ojukwu's persistent rejection of a neutral land corridor or daylight flights into Uli. In this impasse, ICRC abandoned its attempt to provide relief to all and withdrew to the more conservative position of political neutrality.

The collapse of the relief effort opened the final phase of war. By January 1970 fighting in Biafra ceased.

What were SCF and other agencies saving children for?

Individual representatives of the aid agencies risked their lives, and organizations as conservative as the ICRC risked the principles which were at the core of their identity, to deliver aid to Biafra. Why did this particular conflict drive them to such extremes? The Biafran leadership recognized the universal appeal of the vulnerable child to an audience in the powerful nations, and set about building a public relations campaign which would harness this appeal for their war ends. The claim that children had a special status in themselves and must be spared from starvation was the universalist message portrayed to the media and reinforced by the agencies. In fact the protagonists of the war took a more instrumentalist view. Children became a means to secure aid, in the form of arms, food and medicine, and international solidarity. This abusive emphasis upon children by the protagonists appears to have crushed debate of the wider political and social implications of the war.

This section discusses the way in which the response of the relief agencies was manipulated by the protagonists of the war. It also points to some of the issues that were deliberately excluded from public debate. These issues are related to possible outcomes of the war, given victory to either side. They raise the utilitarian question of what the relief agencies were saving the children for.

Markpress, a Geneva-based public relations agency, has been credited with Colonel Ojukwu's success.³⁹ It primed the international media with details of the famine situation inside Biafra and facilitated journalists' visits. In June 1968 journalist Michael Leapman and photographer Ronald Burton made a visit to Biafra for *The Sun*. After reading their reports, the Oxfam Director Leslie Kirkley, contacted the editor of the paper, and a further visit was arranged, this time including Leslie Kirkley and the Biafran Peace Delegate, Sir Louise Mbanefo.

The stories in the press in the months that followed combined an emotional appeal for starving children, with a description of derring-do under such banner headlines as 'Churchmen launch plan to smuggle aid to Biafrans'.⁴⁰ On the back of this appeal for aid to be delivered to Biafran-controlled territory, SCF was able to appeal for help in assisting the population in areas now under Federal control.⁴¹ Without a detailed knowledge of where the shifting front line lay, it can be assumed the public would not always have been aware of which side the aid was destined for.

In early July the British government sent an advisory team led by Lord Hunt to assess relief needs. The Directors of SCF and the British Red Cross took part, while Oxfam was excluded. Predictably, the Biafrans refused to host the advisory team and dismissed the offer of British government relief as hypocritical. *The Daily Telegraph* reported the

³⁹ Katanga had made similar but less effective use of a public relations agency during the Congo war.

⁴⁰ *The Sun*, 22 June 1968.

⁴¹ *The Observer*, 30 June 1968. This report of the visit by SCF administrator, John Birch, mentions Enugu, Abakiliki and Nsukka, areas which had been under the control of Biafra.

Biafrans were 'to be fattened at the expense of the British public – just to be killed by arms supplied by the British government'.⁴²

The propaganda war was not only waged through the international press. The civilian population in Biafra were also subject to heavy persuasion from the Federal and Biafran military. The aid agencies found themselves joining in. The SCF team in Awgu hospital, in Federal-held Eastern Nigeria helped circulate the Federal Army messages.

The policy of the Federal Army seems to be to persuade the population in the 'liberated' areas to return to their villages, but people are scared by reports of 'genocide' and remain in the bush. The Red Cross has done much in encouraging people not to believe these rumours and to come to the feeding sessions and clinics. We have, practically speaking, followed on the advancing army's heels and as soon as an area has been captured we have delivered messages in English and Ibo language to the bush population, inviting them to come to our clinics, and we have to a great extent been successful.⁴³

For those still trapped inside Biafra, they were subject to a multitude of pressures which remain undocumented. Not only were they encouraged to come to feeding centres, but also to give up their children to orphanages or for evacuation. It remains unclear how children

⁴² *The Daily Telegraph*, 4 July 1968.

⁴³ 'Survival-Medicine in Nigeria' Gustav Weissglas and Helen Milne from the Save the Children Fund Team 1, Awgu, Nigeria and Awgu Hospital, January 1969, SCF Archives reference P/OS/N7.

were attracted to the orphanages and selected for the evacuation programmes, and there is a suspicion that this was part of a pattern of soliciting aid for unaccompanied children.⁴⁴

The Daily Mail of 15 July 1968 announced that a group of doctors and social workers were planning to fly 10,000 babies from beleaguered Biafra to Britain. The scheme was designed to take advantage of the fact that the planes were leaving empty after delivering arms and relief. SCF was clear about the detrimental effects upon the children of being uprooted. In response to an airlift of children from Vietnam in 1974 *The World's Children* published an article underlining this view:

Save the Children is in no doubt whatsoever about its attitude. Children, in the long run, are far better off looked after in their own surroundings. Uprooting and transferring them to a country which has a totally alien character, culture, and people, not to mention language, is likely to cause more emotional problems, over many years, than it cures.⁴⁵

Unlike the airlift of Vietnamese children, the airlift of babies from Biafra to Britain did not take place. Thousands of children were however airlifted from Biafra to Gabon and Ivory Coast.

⁴⁴ Interview with Eric Greitens, Refugee Studies Programme, Oxford, 9 March 2000.

⁴⁵ 'Vietnam: The Choice Facing Us', *The World's Children*, Vol.55 No.2, June 1975, 2-3. However, SCF's position on evacuation was inconsistent. It had a long and uncritical involvement with Youth Aliyah. 'Youth Aliyah's concept of child rescue and rehabilitation is today universally accepted.' *The World's Children*, Vol. 55 No.4, March 1976, 18.

Virtually absent from the press reports, the records of inter-agency meetings held in Lagos, or Biafran propaganda, is any discussion of the role of the child in relation to its family or to the wider Biafran community. This is perplexing given the way in which the conflict was portrayed by the Biafran leadership as a struggle for the survival of the Ibo people. Cultural survival is often associated with protection of children as bearers of cultural identity.⁴⁶ The Biafran propaganda and its reflection in the British press give an image only of the child as a potentially starving child.

Wynne L. Griffiths of Oxfam reports on a meeting with the Biafra Relief and Rehabilitation Organization in London 1 August 1969:

He [Father Simon Okeke] did not think the Federal attempt at starvation would succeed as money was coming in which would prevent this. (I got the impression that they [the Biafran leadership] were prepared for 'millions' to die as long as they won – what do the 'millions' think?)

The extent to which Colonel Ojukwu's war aims were shared by the Biafran people is hardly mentioned in the press or the agency reports. How far this interpretation of the war reflects a contemporary incapacity to see Africans defining their own agenda, and how far it reflects a genuine rift between the Biafran leadership and the people is open to question.

The way in which the British press ignored the interests of the recently formed OAU in

⁴⁶ See Minority Rights Group International, ed., 1997. *War: The Impact on Minority and Indigenous Children*, London: Minority Rights Group International.

supporting the Federal position and the unity of Nigeria adds weight to the former view.⁴⁷ All the heads of newly formed African states were threatened with secession. The Oxfam Press Officer remembers how the Biafran secession was hotly debated in the Kenyan press because of the tension in the country around the question of what form of government would succeed that of Jomo Kenyatta.⁴⁸ The implications of the Biafran secession for the future stability of Nigeria or the rest of the continent appear to have played no part in the debates within the relief agencies or in their own press releases.

The Biafran child had succeeded in capturing the imagination of the British public as a starving child, not as a child belonging to a larger family or community or as a child with a role to play in the Africa of the future. This image was at odds with Eglantyne Jebb's utilitarian perspective.

Constructing the peace: closing the gap between relief and development

The evidence of a rift between the Biafran leadership and the people within the secessionist territory brings to the fore the question of bad leaders in provoking and perpetuating violent conflict.⁴⁹ During the war the Biafran civilian population were sacrificed to the intransigence of Colonel Ojukwu, but after the cessation of hostilities they were treated with magnanimity by General Gowon. By many accounts he seems to have presided over

⁴⁷ Oxfam Canada were more concerned about the issue of secession than Oxfam UK, given sensibilities to the position of Quebec.

⁴⁸ Interview with Elizabeth Stamp, Oxford, 7 March 2000.

⁴⁹ Cairns 1997, 63. See also the role of 'the undefeated psychology' of Syngman Rhee in South Korea, Bailey 1992, 208.

an ‘amazingly generous’⁵⁰ end to the war. In retrospect Tim Brierly can only explain this good leadership on the part of General Gowon as a reflection of his sincere Christianity.

During their visit in July 1968 the British Relief Advisory Team had already been much impressed by the discipline and mercy shown by the Federal Army.

We were much impressed by the assistance given by the Army, in the forward areas, in emergency relief within their means. In general, we were persuaded that officials were concerned to bring the Ibos back into partnership, within the context of one Nigeria. A spirit of vindictiveness among responsible people whom we met, was notable by its absence.⁵¹

Oxfam medical teams also reported on a high degree of information sharing and cooperation with the Nigerian military.

Following this clue (of refugee children) I took a Land Rover and headed north towards the front hoping to meet either Nigerian troops or refugees before I met rebel troops. I met the Nigerians who were surprised to see me. They were very friendly and helpful and indeed had been helping cope with the refugees by digging yams in abandoned farms – most were too weak to do this themselves and showed me a houseful of orphans fed out of their own rations. Sure enough there were

⁵⁰ Yarrow, C.H.M. 1978. *Quaker Experiences in International Conciliation*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 259.

⁵¹ Hunt, J. (Lord) and Thornley, C. *Nigeria: British Relief Advisory Mission, 5-19 July 1968*, SCF Archives reference P/OS/N7.

2000+ all living 60-100 in a school class room. Kwashiorkor I estimated at 40% among the children of which half were severe so probably there 3-400 who will be dead this week unless we can do something quickly.⁵²

Reports from SCF relief workers based in Biafra after the end of the war testify to the rapid resumption of commerce and industry with the repair of the railway and pumping stations, and also credit the Federal Army with helping to lower the incidence of looting and theft.

There were apprehensions that relations between the victorious Nigerians and the defeated Ibos would be difficult. SCF decided not to involve itself with the rehabilitation of schools in liberated areas because the schools in Eastern Nigeria were looked upon as sites for Federal military government propaganda. Colonel Hawkins returned from his visit to Nigeria in April 1969 also doubtful whether any long-term project sponsored by the British would be acceptable to the Ibos, because of the British association with the Nigerian government.⁵³ In the event, SCF administered a £5 million grant-in-aid from the British government to Nigeria including building equipment for the rehabilitation of educational institutions damaged during the war.⁵⁴

The importance of optimistic pacificism as a motivating ideal to a whole society is borne out by post-war Nigeria. General Gowon appears to have believed in the possibility that the Ibo people could be welcomed back as brothers within the greater Nigerian family.

⁵² Letter from Patrick Kemmis, leader of relief/medical team operating near Iko Ekpene, 17 November 1968, Oxfam Archives reference Nigeria/Biafra Oxfam Bulletin and home-produced materials.

⁵³ Hawkins, Col. J.V., Director of Overseas Relief and Welfare, SCF Report on Visit to Nigeria 9-19 April 1969, SCF Archives reference P/OS/N7.

This faith coloured his leadership and permeated the military. With the exception of the Quakers, who worked steadily to keep channels of communication and conciliation open between the two warring parties,⁵⁵ international relief agencies had little part in constructing the peace.

The war in Nigeria did force agencies which had always insisted upon the apolitical nature of their work to recognize their political roles as providers of relief. The description of relief as 'a coveted weapon' of politicians by Eglantyne Jebb within the context of the Russian Famine in 1923 has a particular resonance.⁵⁶

After the end of the war SCF switched paymasters. While it had financed its relief operations from funds raised largely in response to media appeals, driven by the Biafran propaganda machine, immediately following the cessation of hostilities it administered a £5 million grant-in-aid from the British government to the Nigerian government. How wary was it of the consequences of the friendship of politicians and was it sufficiently politically astute to be aware of the ends to which this aid might be put? The path it trod during the Nigerian civil war suggests an organization that lacked the capacity to take the initiative. It was made aware by Oxfam of the impending crisis, and when its relief operation got underway SCF placed its staff under the umbrella of the ICRC. Throughout the war SCF was ready to collaborate in plans for relief with the British government, notwithstanding the role of the British government as the main supplier of arms to the Federals.

⁵⁴ SCF Archives reference SC/MJA/HMG 7/1.

⁵⁵ Yarrow 1978, 179-260.

During the Nigerian civil war the ICRC foundered on its principle of political neutrality and its inability to speak out on behalf of the victims of war. In protest, Bernard Kouchner, an ICRC doctor in Biafra, founded *Médecins sans Frontières*, with a mission both to provide medical assistance to the victims of war and to bear witness on their behalf.⁵⁷ This was the beginning of a trend towards revolutionary humanitarianism which would not stand on ceremony at borders or embassies. It was a trend in which SCF would have no part. The only place where it did eventually agree to support cross-border work without seeking the permission of the government was in Iraqi Kurdistan.⁵⁸ Despite its own roots among anti-government internationalists, SCF allowed the dictates of political neutrality to overrule the principle of universalism and abandoned its attempt to reach children within Biafran-held territory. It could be argued that the cessation of relief to Biafra hastened the end of the war, however, there is little evidence that SCF took the decision to abandon its attempt to reach children within Biafran-held territory on these grounds.

The second of the founders' guiding principles – utilitarianism – which emphasized the need not only to save children in themselves but for a future purpose, fared little better. When the battleground moved to the media, SCF did little to engage the public with a utilitarian understanding of children as part of a larger society, whether Biafran, Nigerian

⁵⁶ *The Record*, July 1923.

⁵⁷ Groenewold, J. and Porter E. 1997. *World in Crisis: The Politics of Survival at the End of the 20th Century*, London: Routledge.

⁵⁸ 'It had been made quite clear to the Field Director and doctor before their departure that the team should remain in Iran as in accordance with the general policy of the Fund, it never works in a country without the permission of the Government of that country nor without its invitation. The Field Director realized this but asked that, in view of the need in the area, the Committee should support him in the decision he had made'. SCF Archives reference ORW.5933, 13 February 1975.

or African. Instead it reinforced the Biafran war tactic by portraying the starving child in need of rescue by international help. Although the effects of kwashiorkor were particularly devastating for babies and young children, there was little attempt made to extend the ready public sympathy for this young age group to older generations.

As the Federal Army gained control of more and more Biafran territory, SCF's decision to provide help behind the lines meant that it could get assistance to an increasing proportion of the Biafran population. The generous terms on which General Gowon made peace also bore out the close working relations SCF sustained with the British and Nigerian governments. However, there is no evidence on record that SCF deliberately adopted a policy based on an optimistic view of Biafra's future within Federal Nigeria. From the start of the war an early warning system and measures designed to avert violent conflict were missing from its development activities in Nigeria, and as the war progressed it responded rapidly to relief needs but did little to prepare for the construction of the peace.

SCF emerged from the war confident in its role as an operational agency, capable of delivering large-scale relief. However, its capacity to assess the political context within which the relief was delivered appeared diminished. Even post-war, there is little evidence of a debate within the organization over the desirability of the convergence of security and developmental goals. As an agency with a particular mandate for children, SCF appeared to be missing the vital understanding of the dynamic role of young people in the generation of their society and the motivating power of optimism in effecting change without resort to violent conflict.

Chapter 7

ROLLING BACK THE DARKNESS (1976-1989)

SCF had emerged from the war in Nigeria confident in its role as an operational agency capable of delivering large-scale relief.¹ As television brought pictures of famine in Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Uganda, and Sudan into people's homes, SCF's income soared. By 1985, at the height of the publicity surrounding famine in Ethiopia, the Fund's income reached a level comparable to the value of its income at the time of the Russian famine of 1921. The generation of relief workers that responded to these events were expected by their supporters to roll back the darkness. They were driven by media images of famine, and popular initiatives such as Band Aid and Live Aid, not merely to influence a handful of individuals, but to feed the world.

This period also coincided with the UN Decade for Women (1975-1985) and the Nairobi Conference (1985). Through the course of the 1980s the development agenda would become less preoccupied with economic issues and refocus upon political and institutional problems, including gender issues.

¹ The 'India Diary' of Dr Hickman reflected the confident belief in the efficacy of international agencies by comparison with national agencies. 'Dr Hickman who was involved in the massive feeding programme in Nigeria following the civil war, said that in that country SCF teams had been feeding as many as three-quarters of a million children a week with high protein food, and saw their health rapidly improve. But in India, they were watching the health of the children steadily deteriorate because plans for an elaborate supplementary feeding programme remained only on paper. Large quantities of high protein food, desperately needed by the younger children, stayed stacked in Indian Red Cross warehouses.' 'India Diary' in *The World's Children*, Vol.51 No.4, December 1971, 74.

In this chapter I begin by outlining the scale and range of SCF activities from 1975-1989. I then look at the kind of leadership which was appointed to the organization to manage the growing expenditure and geographical span of programmes. Until 1985 when SCF appointed Nicholas Hinton as Director General, this leadership was made up overwhelmingly of military men. The chapter then focuses upon the Lebanon programme where one Field Director, Frances Moore, was present for sixteen years. She was given the scope to construct a multi-sectoral programme and build up a team of national staff. Over the troubled period following the outbreak of civil war in 1976, SCF developed a programme which contained within it the seeds of many of the ideas which became part of the global strategy developed by SCF in the late 1990s.

I find that these ideas are a reinterpretation of the three themes identified as the founding principles: universalism, utilitarianism and optimistic pacificism. Their implementation and propagation were to depend upon a sea change within the organization. By the 1990s the leadership of SCF would have its roots not in the military, but in the voluntary sector. International staff would be more likely to make a career of this kind of work, and greater emphasis would be placed upon the contribution made by national staff. SCF would also reflect the influence of the human rights movement and redefine its role as the champion of child rights.

The scale and range of SCF overseas activities 1975-1989

Africa remained the leading area for SCF expenditure, and within Africa emergency relief predominated. Sixty years on, this emergency relief was not dissimilar to the relief operation mounted in Russia from 1921 to 1923. The distinguishing features of this response were humanitarian neutrality, scientific targeting, feeding centres and implementation by external agencies.²

Through the 1970s refugees from Eritrea, Ethiopia, Uganda and Chad fled to one of Africa's poorest countries, Sudan. By 1980, SCF was providing relief to refugees across the Horn of Africa. In *The World's Children* the refugees' predicament was attributed to natural and political factors: severe drought and the continuing battle in the Ogaden between Somalia and Ethiopia. Confusion over the delivery of relief supplies also exacerbated the situation.³ When in the same year SCF reopened its programme in Uganda,⁴ its resources were concentrated upon tackling a famine in Karamoja in the remote North-East. By 1984, when fighting between guerrillas and army was at its height north of Kampala, SCF (together with Oxfam and UNICEF) became involved in a major rehabilitation programme in the Luwero triangle. The relief work in the Horn of Africa was at its most extensive in 1985 to 1986. Over the five years from 1983, income grew from £16 million to £108 million; SCF had become a leading actor in the 'hunger business'.⁵

² Slim, H. 1994. 'Editorial' in *Disasters: The Journal of Disaster Studies and Management*, Vol.18. No.3, September 1994, 189-191.

³ *The World's Children*, Vol.61 No.3, September 1978.

⁴ This had closed under the regime of Idi Amin. Guy Blest, Field Director, found that one of the SCF clinics was still functioning, staffed by local people – some wearing their Save the Children badges. *The World's Children*, Vol.61 No.3, September 1980, 3.

⁵ *The Hunger Business*, Channel 4, shown 12 November 2000.

During this period a number of factors combined to entrench a pathological approach to individual children. The emphasis was on the logistics of relief and the exercise of power to deliver assistance to the powerless. In order to provoke a response of shock and sympathy from the public, the media and the relief agencies portrayed children as helpless victims. For examples, pictures of children in their mother's arms were trimmed to show only the child.⁶

This approach not only portrayed children as victims, it cut them off from their social world. In its appeals for assistance for children in the Horn of Africa, SCF did little to engage the public with a utilitarian understanding of children as part of a larger society, whether defined as the family which nurtured the child, the local community or the wider African population. By contrast, the stark political situation in southern Africa obliged SCF to recognize children as inextricably bound up with societies in conflict. In southern Africa SCF worked in the front-line states. Here the main obstacle to development was clearly identified not as natural disaster, but the war caused by South Africa's relentless pursuit of its policy of regional destabilization to maintain apartheid.⁷

By the time that Princess Anne made a tour of SCF projects in Africa in 1988, this understanding of children as part of a social world had permeated *The World's Children*:

⁶ *Focus on Images*, SCF image guidelines, 1991.

⁷ *The World's Children*, Vol.68 No.1, March 1985, 2-3.

One theme linking many visits HRH The Princess Royal made during her recent African tour was the difficulties facing children in conflict: another was the determination of their communities and governments to tackle these difficulties.⁸

Three years later SCF introduced its first image guidelines. They covered all forms of communication aimed at describing or representing the work of Save the Children, internally and externally. *Focus on Images* signalled a shift away from the portrayal of the child as victim and recipient of aid. The guidelines noted that:

The vast majority of overseas staff are recruited from the countries where Save the Children works. Images of 'dominant' white project workers dispensing aid to 'passive' local people contradict Save the Children's collaborative way of working.

They also encouraged images which accurately portrayed the child as a member of a family or wider society showing resilience and coping capacities. *Focus on Images* encouraged pictures of a child with disabilities making his way towards the outstretched hands of his grandmother, rather than pictures of the same child seen in isolation with his crutches.⁹ The relationship between the media, international NGOs, and the people in the host country continues to be the subject of reappraisal.¹⁰

⁸ 'Our President's African Tour' in *The World's Children*, Vol.69 No.2, June 1988.

⁹ *Focus on Images*, 1991.

¹⁰ Research in progress, Eric Greitens, PhD candidate, Refugee Studies Centre, Oxford University.

In 1989 SCF began work in war-stricken Angola. In the same year war broke out in Liberia and two years later spread to Sierra Leone. SCF would struggle to apply lessons learned from the Horn when it responded to these conflicts.

It was not only in Africa that SCF was responding to conflict. In Asia, the Fund began new areas of work with Afghan refugees in Pakistan in 1981, and with people displaced by violence in Sri Lanka in 1983. In Central America, SCF was the first international agency to send a medical team into Nicaragua after the ending of the civil war in July 1979.¹¹

One war which SCF ignored was the inter-state conflict between Iran and Iraq. It is worth noting that, despite difficulties of access, the Swiss children's agency, *Terre des Hommes*, did succeed in developing an educational project among the Iranian child prisoners held by Iraq.¹²

With the major exception of the Iran-Iraq war, SCF demonstrated a capacity to react to human suffering and fund and staff country programmes. These proliferating country programmes then had their own momentum. As SCF responded to the immediate needs of children in emergencies it often omitted to put these needs in the context of their longer-term interests and development. SCF then found that it had to keep responding to emergency needs. Within this cycle of relief, the three founding principles were put in jeopardy.

¹¹ 'Facing a famine' in *The World's Children*, Vol.61 No.1, March 1980, 8.

¹² Brown, I. 1990. *Khomeini's Forgotten Sons: the Story of Iran's Boy Soldiers*, London: Grey Seal.

For example, where relief was delivered through channels controlled by the host government, such as in Ethiopia, SCF was unable to ensure that relief was universally available to all children in need. Where funding was dependent upon messages generated by the media, SCF did little to engage the public with a utilitarian understanding of children as part of a larger society including their immediate carers, and wider community. Lastly, the principle of optimism became distorted and self-centred. In the 1980s, SCF staff possessed an optimism about their own capacity to deliver relief, but showed little optimism about the capacity of the societies in which they were working.

During this period the range of work was so wide and the expansion happened so fast, that much necessary reappraisal is still taking place. For example, research is now being undertaken into the human rights abuses perpetrated in the Luwero triangle, Uganda, and the particular question is being asked as to why representatives of SCF, Oxfam and UNICEF working in the area did not act as effective witnesses to these abuses.¹³ Many of the events of these years were described as disasters and met with a short-term humanitarian response. Greater social and political analysis of the processes behind these disastrous events was required if agencies were to make appropriate responses within a longer-term context. This would require a leadership less committed to logistical goals and more committed to the development of policy and ideas to underpin longer-term change.

¹³ Research in progress, Patricia M. Diskett, Programme Officer, Disaster Management Centre, Cranfield University, 1999.

The leadership

Who led the organization during this expansionist period and what experience did they bring to SCF? For two decades SCF was under the leadership of a succession of men whose previous experience was either military or in the colonial service. They came to SCF, a non-governmental organization, after a lifetime of experience of government service. In 1977, for example, the Director General, Overseas Director, Administrative Director, and Supplies Officer were all former military men, as were at least six Field Directors or Administrators, the Controller of UK fund-raising, two Regional Controllers, and thirteen Area Organisers.¹⁴ Some of the women committee members also had military connections.¹⁵

The Director General during the war in Nigeria was Sir Colin Thornley (Director General from January 1965 to March 1974).¹⁶ Prior to joining SCF he had been Governor and Commander-in-Chief, British Honduras. He had seen SCF in action as a relief agency. When a hurricane and tidal wave hit the colony, endangering his and his family's life, SCF were first on the scene with emergency aid.

¹⁴ Breen, R. *Coping with Change, How Save the Children has survived over 75 years*. SCF Archive Paper No.5, 24 March 1995, 8.

¹⁵ For example, Annette Street, Chairman of the Overseas Committee, knew the Chairman of Middle East Airlines, and was able to enlist his support in allowing the SCF team and some freight to fly MEA free of charge. She ended her letter saying: 'I can recall dining with you and your wife in Beirut many years ago when my late husband was Military Advisor to King Hussein – happier days.' Letter from Annette Street to Sheikh Najeeb Alamuddine, 24 November 1976, SCF Archives reference P/OS/L3.

¹⁶ As Director General he was a member of the advisory team sent by the British government to Nigeria in July 1968.

His successor, Sir John Lapsley (Director General June 1974 to July 1975) was introduced to readers of *The World's Children* in the following way:

Sir John Lapsley retired from the Royal Air Force last October. His most recent appointment has been as Head of the British Defence Staff and Defence Attaché in Washington since 1970. In that role he was involved in selling large quantities of defence material, including the Harrier 'jump jet' to the Americans.¹⁷

The World's Children gives no indication of readers' reactions, but the wording of this announcement may be a reflection of the degree to which Cold War attitudes were entrenched among supporters of SCF.

Air Commodore William Hibbert had acted as Deputy Director General for ten years before he succeeded Sir John Lapsley as Director General (August 1975 to July 1976). He commented upon SCF involvement in Vietnam when he retired:

One lesson which stands out prominently in my recollections is the unique value to The Save the Children Fund of its consistently non-aligned and non-political stance [...] Again, in the Vietnam War, the Save the Children Fund was able to give financial help to the children in the North without prejudicing the position of its field teams on the other side of the firing line in the South.¹⁸

¹⁷ *The World's Children*, Vol.54 No.2, June 1974.

¹⁸ *The World's Children*, Vol.56 No.2, September 1976.

He was followed by John Cumber (Director General March 1976- December 1984).

Although he had had a long career in the colonial service, he had also had two years' experience with SCF as Field Director in Sudan and two years as Director of Overseas Relief and Welfare.

The greatest change came about when Nicholas Hinton was appointed in 1985. His background was neither in the military or the colonial service. He came from the voluntary sector. At the time of his appointment he was Director of the National Council for Voluntary Organizations.¹⁹ He was joining SCF at a time when both in Britain and internationally the relationship between the state and civil society was in flux. Throughout the 1980s there was uncertainty over the future of state support for UK welfare services.²⁰ Under the guise of structural adjustment there was a major setback to the construction of the state as service provider in many developing countries. By the end of the decade, state structures in socialist countries in Europe and elsewhere would be on the point of collapse.

The civil war in Lebanon

Of the proliferation of country programmes during this period I have chosen to focus upon SCF work in Lebanon, not because it was important in scale, but because it demonstrates significant qualitative changes both in the nature of war, and in the response of SCF to

¹⁹ *The World's Children*, Vol.65 No.3, September 1984.

²⁰ Nicholas Hinton reintroduced to *The World's Children* the kind of commentary on contemporary events and debate about the role of SCF, that had not been seen in the journal since Edward Fuller gave up the editorship in 1958. See for example *The World's Children*, Vol.70 No.2, June 1989.

children living with war. When appealing for funds for Lebanon in 1983, Joc Wingfield, Deputy Director Overseas Department, described the country in the following words:

Lebanon is an unusual situation in that it is neither a natural disaster that has happened, nor a war that has ended, meaning that this limbo situation is going to continue for some time.²¹

Protracted conflict, collapse of the state, ineffective international intervention, and the devastation of civilian livelihoods, became all too familiar aspects of conflict in the latter part of the twentieth century.²² In the absence of effective government in Lebanon, organized crime flourished and foreigners were targeted. Southern Lebanon had also seen the emergence of the efficient parastatal entity, Hizbollah, dedicated to its own project of 'positive peace' around which the population could rally.

These circumstances posed a challenge to the relationships between SCF and government. In Lebanon SCF would have to negotiate with diffuse centres of power, and acknowledge that internal fragmentation and cross-border interests were as important as national boundaries. The maxim that SCF would not work in a country except at the invitation of the government might still hold at the airport. However, in order to gain access to children

²¹ SCF Archives reference P/OS/L3, 11 January 1983.

²² See special issue on Complex Political Emergencies in *Third World Quarterly*, Vol.20 No.1, 1999.

and their families SCF would have to engage with brokers and rely upon those with effective local power, described in the Lebanese context as *wasta*.²³

Under these circumstances, SCF had to develop new responses to children living with war. The work in Lebanon demonstrates how, under the consistent guidance of Field Director Frances Moore and with the participation of Lebanese and Palestinian partner organizations and staff, the principles of the founding generation could be reinterpreted and could be put into practice.

First among these was universalism. Wars in the last quarter of the twentieth century were increasingly to be civil wars, intra-state rather than inter-state.²⁴ Under these circumstances SCF needed to develop ways of reaching all sectors of the child population in a divided society. The Nigerian civil war demonstrated the discordance between political neutrality and universalism. Adherence to the principle of political neutrality had led SCF to withhold assistance on an impartial basis. By contrast, universalism, as understood by the founding generation of SCF, was a positive creed inspiring them to hold out assistance to all children on an impartial basis. At a time when social divisions in Lebanon hardened along sectarian lines, SCF succeeded in maintaining and extending a non-sectarian programme accessible to children of all faiths. It also succeeded in working with both Lebanese and Palestinians. At the level of the household, this period saw the awakening of gender awareness and a renewed commitment to reach the girl child.

²³ Amin Maalouf's novel *The Rock of Tanios*, set in the early nineteenth century, is a reminder that the organization of power in this way was not only a late twentieth century phenomenon. Maalouf, A. 1995. *The Rock of Tanios*, London: Abacus.

²⁴ The Iran-Iraq war was the major catastrophic exception.

Second was the principle of utilitarianism. By the late 1970s, SCF's reputation as a rescue service in a disaster scenario was assured. While famine in the Nigerian civil war had been clearly understood as a political rather than a natural event, when in the 1980s famine struck in Ethiopia it was blamed on the failure of the rains. The populations affected were perceived as powerless victims suffering the consequences of events beyond their control. The Lebanon programme began from a different perception. It depended upon the participation of Lebanese and Palestinian partner organizations and staff, and its activities were maintained with the support and protection of the local community. Lebanese and Palestinian society contained within it not only victims, but also the agents of change.

There was also a generational dimension to the SCF Lebanon programme. Elsewhere SCF had targeted mothers and young children. By contrast, in Lebanon, as children grew up, the programme developed activities with them as young people. Another indicator of this forward-looking dimension was that education became as important to the programme as health care. Girls were particularly targeted as agents of change.

As SCF became more confident of the consequences of its approach in Lebanon, it strengthened its advocacy role. Whereas in Nigeria its operation had been dependent upon ICRC, in Lebanon SCF prided itself on an identity distinct from ICRC, UNICEF, and UNWRA, and sought to influence their programmes and particularly their impact on the lives of children.

Third was the principle of pacifistic optimism. Civil wars are particularly brutal and a grave challenge to the optimist. The very smallness of the population and geographical area of Lebanon meant that SCF staff were confronted with this brutality more directly than had been, for example, during the forced population transfers within Ethiopia. Before the term 'ethnic cleansing' had gained currency, internal borders between communities within Beirut and the surrounding mountains were being 'straightened out' by the 'elimination' of neighbourhoods and villages. Not only were children suffering maiming, killing and displacement, but also the psychological torment of trying to make sense of these events.

The development of the Lebanon programme demonstrates how SCF workers were able to preserve a degree of optimism combined with a pessimistic realism about the likely duration of the war. In response to the question of what are you saving children for, their goals were realistic. They worked with children and their communities to enable them to cope better with the consequences of war. However, the strengthening of coping strategies did not amount to a strategy for positive peace.

SCF in Lebanon: reinterpreting the founding principles

'The Lebanon programme was really mine for a long time.'²⁵

Frances Moore was SCF Field Director in Lebanon for sixteen years from 1982. When she looks back on that period she recognizes the particular freedom open to her as a Field

Director to develop the country programme. She was on the spot, analysed the needs and developed programmes in response. SCF favoured this opportunistic and flexible approach. The brief overview of activities which follows demonstrates the historical continuity of the programme in Lebanon, and the extent to which changes introduced by Frances Moore were linked into existing activities. The principles motivating these changes are then analysed in more detail in the next section.

SCF's involvement in Lebanon began in 1948, providing health care services for Palestinian refugees fleeing their homes during the first Arab-Israeli war. It was in Lebanon that Mary Hawkins had her first appointment in 1950.²⁶ In 1958 SCF began a small educational sponsorship programme to enable children from especially disadvantaged families to attend school. When civil war broke out in 1976, SCF sent a medical team led by Mary Hawkins to Lebanon. It was her task to identify a gap in the relief available to the displaced which SCF could effectively fill. In her progress report of 12 December, she wrote:

A fourth clinic is being established in a hotel next to La Siesta, called Khalde. This is one of the worst refugee settlements I have ever seen (or smelled). It has to be seen to be believed. All the occupants here are from Maslakh on the outskirts of Beirut where there was a massacre, and 40,000 inhabitants were displaced. The area was then destroyed and bulldozed. These people are Kurds. They are living in

²⁵ Interview with Frances Moore, Oxford, 11 October 2000.

²⁶ SCF HQ was in Tripoli. Mary Hawkins herself lived for two years in a tent in the camp of 4500 Palestinians near the Syrian border. There was no telephone and no transport, and so as the only nurse living

absolute squalor with blocked sewers, no water supply in the building (which means that the little girls and the women have to carry cans or buckets of water on their heads up many flights of stairs). They appear to have had very little help or distribution of relief goods compared to other centres.²⁷

By April Mary Hawkins was reporting that SCF's medical team was nearing the end of the emergency programme, but although this had helped the refugee children, the situation was a depressing one. No official plans had been drawn up for resettlement, and most of the refugees had no hope of a livelihood.²⁸

Mary Hawkins had identified long-term needs, but the SCF medical team was not in a position to meet them. Five years later, at the time of the Israeli invasion in 1982, an expatriate medical team was again sent to Lebanon, and upon its withdrawal all remaining funds were allocated through Lebanese partner organizations. The decision was taken on the following grounds:

Already there are signs of the danger of being involved in the complex political tangle that is Lebanon. The MOH [Ministry of Health] are demanding funds be put in their hands. This ministry is barely operational. The smaller organizations are very effective but are all 'political'. Discreet placement of funds with these organizations sees that the assistance reaches those who need it most and by

in the camp she was the first person to be called on in a medical emergency. Taped interview with Rodney Breen, 5 December 1997, SCF Archives.

²⁷ Mary Hawkins, Progress Report, 12 December 1976, SCF Archives reference P/OS/L3.

²⁸ Minutes of the Overseas Committee, OD 6722 Lebanon, 14 April 1977.

spreading the funds around, possible accusations of taking sides are avoided.²⁹

There was no shortage of funding or trained medical personnel among either the government or the Palestinians. However, in the administrative chaos, these funds were not immediately available, and it was decided that SCF could provide some protection for the population until the dust settled.

Frances Moore was living in the Lebanon at the time. She joined SCF, and it appears that it was her sustained commitment to the country, combined with the opportunity provided through SCF, that allowed her to address the kind of long-term developmental issues that had frustrated Mary Hawkins. She inherited a record of two distinct forms of activity: emergency medical care and an educational sponsorship programme run by a local NGO. Under her guidance the two strands were woven together, and by the time she handed over the programme it was based on multi-sectoral basic services centres designed to provide for communities' long-term needs, but also able to respond in an emergency. Most significantly the programme evolved to include no other expatriate staff, instead it was built by, and its success depended upon, Lebanese and Palestinian staff.

At the time of the Israeli invasion SCF was providing assistance to three of the Palestinian refugee camps. The clinic at Bourj al-Barajneh was reopened on Friday 12 November 1982 by HRH Princess Anne, in her capacity as President of the British and Commonwealth

²⁹ Richard Grove-Hills, Field Director, Beirut, 8 September 1982, SCF Archives reference P/OS/L3.

Save the Children Fund.³⁰ It was later developed to provide an integrated and comprehensive range of services covering health, education and social welfare.³¹

SCF also maintained its support for alternatives to institutional care. It continued to provide financial assistance as well as guidance and counselling to help extended families absorb abandoned and orphaned children. The programme was backed up by the organization of weekend and summer camps, as well as after-school clubs. In order to extend the human and material resources available to children, SCF ran nurse aide and childcare workers' training courses, and developed a school book loan scheme which aimed to give the poorest children access to the books they needed for their studies. A closer look at the way in which the above activities evolved, reveals the ideas which underpinned the programme that Frances Moore developed.

Universalism: more than a non-sectarian programme

There are many possible descriptions for the lines along which Lebanese society fractured during the civil war. The most obvious is sectarian. I therefore look first at the way in which SCF succeeded in maintaining a non-sectarian programme. Sectarian differences were entrenched in the Lebanese constitution and governed appointments of every official.³² During the war social divisions in Lebanon hardened along sectarian lines. At

³⁰ Robert Fisk reports that 'this caused a convulsion in the British embassy in Beirut who were fearful of offending Amin Gemayel's regime' and that 'David Roberts, the ambassador, arrived in the Commodore Hotel on the night of the royal visit, exploding with wrath that journalists should have even suggested the princess might have met Palestinians.' Fisk, R. 1992. *Pity the Nation: Lebanon at War*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 465.

³¹ *Lebanon, Country Report*, Save the Children Fund, April 1994, 5. SCF Archives reference P/OS/L3.

³² Government appointments were made on the basis of a ratio of 6:5 (Christians: non-Christians).

the outbreak of the war SCF had links dating back to the 1950s with the Lebanese Union of Child Welfare (LUCW). The LUCW was set up as a member of the International Union of Child Welfare, and by 1976 it was an umbrella organization for about twenty-eight Muslim and Christian member organizations. Trust both between its members and between the Union and SCF had been well established prior to the war, and withstood the strains of the war.³³

SCF in Lebanon was in a similar position to Oxfam in Nigeria at the outbreak of the civil war. It was non-operational and instead made grants to locally based organizations. Just as has been seen in the case of Oxfam practice in Nigeria, the contacts with a range of local partner organizations were able to form the basis for an early warning system, or bank of indigenous knowledge, at a time when political forces were pulling the country apart.

Ensuring that funds reached the LUCW and keeping in touch with staff and the sponsored children was the minimum that SCF could do when war broke out. However, such human ties could be very enduring.³⁴

SCF's emergency response was to send in medical teams on both sides of the sectarian conflict. Three nurses answered an appeal from a hospital on the Christian side where the organization of the children's department had collapsed as a result of the war. Meanwhile on the Muslim side, the medical team led by Mary Hawkins began work among the

³³ A visitor from the UK wrote with respect about the LUCW, its principled approach and frugal administration. See Extracts from Mr Napier Bax's 'Notes of his volunteered visit to Lebanon to convey the Sponsorship Monies to the Lebanese Union of Child Welfare and survey the needs of the children', 11 December 1975, SCF Archives reference P/OS/L3.

refugees in the hotels and beach huts. The importance of meeting people's urgent needs without delay is underlined by this comment:

We had asked everybody for help, all the big world-wide organizations. For a year they came to look at us, to survey us, to poke us, to probe us and to photograph us and they did nothing. Yet you come and then within five minutes you are actually helping us. Bless you all at the Save the Children Fund.³⁵

Two other themes in the civil war were particularly relevant to the position SCF took in the country. The first was the degree to which the Lebanese civil war was in fact a Palestinian war. The second was the contested role of the state.

Following the defeat of the Arab states in 1967 there was an influx of Palestinians into Lebanon from the northern part of the West Bank. In 1970 Palestinian organizations were expelled from Jordan. These new arrivals were a major element in the destabilization of Lebanon. The Palestinians were perceived as Muslims by the Maronite Christian population, who blamed them for upsetting the demographic balance which had historically favoured the Christians. Since the Lebanese border was the only border over which the Palestinian organizations could attack Israel, their presence in the South drew Israeli fire.

³⁴ In an interview held in October 2000, Frances Moore said that one of the staff of the LUCW was still working with SCF twenty-five years later.

³⁵ *The World's Children*, Vol.57 No.1, March 1977, 17.

SCF had first begun work in the Lebanon not with the Lebanese population but with Palestinian refugees. It was part of a regional programme of assistance to the refugees extending to both banks of the Jordan as well as the Gaza Strip. This assistance to Palestinians was implemented in parallel to a continuing programme of assistance to Jewish refugees through Youth Aliyah, and from time to time questions were raised about the distribution of aid between the two groups. In 1980 Annette Street raised the issue with the Overseas Welfare Committee:

As you know, I am concerned that the Fund appears to be giving so much aid to children in Israel and less to other children in that part of the world.³⁶

The very strength of the ties between Youth Aliyah and SCF, may have encouraged SCF to make an equivalent commitment to assist Palestinians.³⁷ This organizational commitment was reinforced by the individual loyalty of people such as Mary Hawkins who had worked alongside Palestinians in their times of most distress and had a particular respect for their cause.³⁸ In its work with Palestinians in southern Lebanon, SCF was able to refer to and draw on a reserve of trust earned by its work with Palestinians in the other places where they had sought refuge.

The other theme in the civil war which was relevant to SCF was the struggle over the nature of the state, and in particular interventionist welfare policies. The disintegration of

³⁶ Memo to DOD cc Chairman, Overseas Committee from Annette Street, 19 November 1980, SCF Archives P/OS/L3.

³⁷ In June 1982 Youth Aliyah enabled SCF representative Joc Wingfield to reach Sidon via Israel.

the central authority of the state, as well as the disintegration of the Lebanese army,³⁹ and the territorial consolidation of communities in mini-states, were evidence of more complex lines of division than sectarian interests. The brutality with which small enclaves of people, who stood in the way of this territorial consolidation, were eliminated is a measure of the degree to which ambitions were focussed upon local power. SCF had a history of working with new states to build up their child welfare. In Lebanon, if SCF were to strengthen state welfare services it would be lending authority to a heavily contested vision of the state.⁴⁰

SCF had valuable historical links with a number of non-state actors in Lebanon, most notably the LUCW and the Palestinians. However, the extent to which it developed these partnerships in Lebanese civil society and amongst the Palestinian refugee population, would be a marker of its own position in relationship to the contested Lebanese state. SCF took the position it had assumed in so many other countries: it worked with the Ministry of Health to strengthen state sector health services, and at the same time maintained its partnerships within Lebanese and Palestinian civil society.

These multiple alliances were pragmatic. In order to practise a universalism which reached out to all children, SCF negotiated with many different gatekeepers to gain access to children. Centres of power were diffuse and political neutrality meant not just working on both sides, but on all sides. The lines between military and civilian were also blurred. SCF

³⁸ In December 1997 Mary Hawkins had just received a Christmas card from Fathi Arafat, brother of Yasser Arafat and head of the Palestinian Red Crescent Hospital in Beirut, 1976. Taped interview with Rodney Breen, 5 December 1997, SCF Archives.

³⁹ Note that in the civil war of 1958 the Lebanese army did hold together under General Chehab.

⁴⁰ The role of SCF in strengthening state services in situations where the state's welfare role is contested is a recurring theme: see for example the discussion of Afghanistan during the period 1977 to 1979 in Chapter 8.

staff had to remind themselves that they were there to assist all children, whether in the company of armed men or carrying arms themselves.

Team members must realise that the camps house families in which some of the older male members are combatant and will be seen carrying guns. It is quite impossible to avoid this.⁴¹

SCF had to forge its own interpretation of universalism. This was not equivalent to bilateral aid to the sovereign state. Nor was it equivalent to assistance to non-combatants only. Instead SCF had to negotiate access to all children whatever their circumstances.

Utilitarianism

Not since the founding generation has it been so fruitful to identify features of SCF work which reflect the principle of utilitarianism. Much of the Lebanon programme described in this chapter was designed not for its intrinsic merit, but with its consequences in mind. The most significant factor was the emphasis upon national rather than international staff, and reflected an optimistic view of the capacity of the Lebanese and Palestinian people which is discussed in greater detail below.

The second factor was the generational dimension to the programme in the Lebanon. It was not confined to young children, instead it accompanied them as they grew into young people. One reason behind the emergence of these youth activities was the history of the

Palestinian programme which extended across generations. The Palestinian schoolchildren sponsored by SCF were enabled to attend school and remain in families rather than institutional care but they were 'very much poor relations'.⁴² The SCF youth activities developed to give these 'poor relations' a sense of ownership, and they developed in buildings where SCF was already running kindergartens 'on the understanding that orphans were the inner core of the committee and could invite others in.'⁴³ During the period from 1982 to 1990 the streets were dangerous, and young people needed a place out of harm's way.⁴⁴

When asked why the SCF Lebanon programme evolved to include such an important element of activities for young people, Frances Moore referred to the work of Fatah with the Palestinian youth. Until the Israeli invasion Fatah had organized activities among the Palestinian youth. When these were shut down, the young people were targeted by the occupying force. SCF then developed its youth activities to provide a safe constructive activity to protect the Palestinian young people from the occupiers.

The clubs could therefore be seen as a fusion of two visions of the up-and-coming generation. Fatah had an explicitly political goal of organizing Palestinian young people as the cultural bearers of the Palestinian nation. One reading of the goals implicit in the SCF programme was that SCF was nurturing a generation rooted in family, who valued recreation and education, and had the habit of service to the community. These two visions

⁴¹ Project document 1976, SCF Archives P/OS/L3.

⁴² Interview with Frances Moore, Oxford, 11 October 2000.

⁴³ Ibid.

were overlapping but did not coincide. For example, SCF insisted that the youth clubs were places for activities other than fighting. Frances Moore explains:

In youth clubs we would welcome fighters but they were not allowed to bring their guns. There was a very clear distinction: they came to the club to do other things.⁴⁵

She described an incident where the youth club was closed because of the entry of armed fighters. The parents went to the local committee who put pressure on the boys to allow the club to reopen. The local community not only provided protection for the club; it also became involved in taking care of some of the activities.⁴⁶

Frances Moore attributed such successes to the local staff:

If your local staff are trustworthy themselves, and known by the community, and have credibility, in the end you'll be able to win through, but we had to take it step by step.

Another possible area of diversion between Fatah and SCF, was the priority SCF attached to equal opportunities for girls and boys. High amongst SCF priorities were activities for girls. SCF staff were aware that vulnerable individuals within a family, the very young, the

⁴⁴ A similar development can be seen in the Northern Ireland programme and it would be interesting to know what communication there was between the Northern Ireland and Lebanon programmes during this period. See 'Update on Ulster', *The World's Children*, Vol.61 No.3, September 1980, 11-14.

⁴⁵ Interview with Frances Moore, Oxford, 11 October 2000. See also Chapter 8, where the importance of local ownership is observed in Tajikistan and Afghanistan.

⁴⁶ Alia Shana'a, South Lebanon Clubs/Summer Camps, Nahir El Barid, Friday Club Report, 6 February 1993, SCF Archives reference P/OS/L3.

very old, and people with disabilities, were usually looked after by the eldest daughter.⁴⁷

Youth activities for girls were designed to give these carers an opportunity to enjoy childhood and adolescence. At the same time, there was a growing recognition of the added value for the next generation of educating girls. At headquarters SCF broadened its vision of child welfare from the health sector and appointed an education adviser and a disability adviser.

The divergence in the views expressed by Mary Hawkins and Frances Moore reflected a tension critical to the organization as a whole. Mary Hawkins had seen SCF as having a special contribution to make in the medical field, where, she felt, it was possible to act independently of politics.⁴⁸ Frances Moore deliberately broadened SCF's sphere of activity in Lebanon and emphasized education, and in particular girls' education. Like Mary Hawkins, she described herself as practically rather than ideologically driven. However, the development she oversaw moved SCF closer to politically contested areas. For example, SCF in Lebanon was distancing itself from the state and to a lesser extent the male-dominated civil society and moving closer to the family. As the Lebanese analyst, Suad Joseph has said,

⁴⁷ Interview with Frances Moore, Oxford, 11 October 2000. See also Chapter 8, where this pattern is borne out in family roles observed in Tajikistan and Afghanistan.

⁴⁸ Interview with Mary Hawkins, Perranuthnoe, 12 April 2000.

Family was and remains the central social institution for most people in Lebanon.

Family became even more important with the paralysis of the state during the civil war, 1975-1990.⁴⁹

At a time when much of the women's human rights movement was pressing for changes from the state, Suad Joseph has argued that women in Lebanon, as in many Arab states, could not feel the impact of the state in their lives. They felt the impact of their communities, and in particular the men of their communities. The kind of work Suad Joseph, and other advocates of women's rights in the Middle East, have been doing to reconstruct women's human rights within the context of family, has political resonances with SCF's approach to children. After the collapse of the state in Lebanon, and the fragmentation of society, SCF had been obliged to recognize the locus of change for children as the family. In many ways social transformation within the home where culture was created and maintained, would be a far more ambitious and complex undertaking than promoting legislation for change.

The last factor in the utilitarian design of the SCF Lebanon programme was the importance of advocacy. SCF was confident that it was pioneering exemplary work in the promotion of the well-being of children in the Lebanon. Value was added to these projects if they were seen to influence others, a point which was well understood by Eglantyne Jebb. She attached great importance not only to the Declaration of the Rights of the Child but also to the IUCW as a channel for the dissemination of good practice. After her death this aspect

⁴⁹ Joseph, S. 1993a. 'Research Note: Family and Women's Human Rights', *South Asia Bulletin*, Vol.13 No.1, 148-151.

of her work was diminished. SCF had been diverted from the specific focus of child welfare, and international advocacy was limited to recommendations on health in particular on behalf of refugees in emergency situations.

Under Frances Moore's guidance, SCF in the Lebanon began to act as a local and regional advocate for improved child welfare. It did this in several practical ways. First it encouraged other agencies to borrow from models developed in SCF projects:

Frequently it can be noticed that projects started by SCF are copied either by other voluntary agencies or by UN agencies such as UNICEF. This is particularly noticeable in UNICEF's new Family Welfare programme funded by a legacy from Mrs Grelak in which the orientation and training is largely concentrated on social workers in the home, a programme similar to that involved with SCF's 1600 sponsorships.⁵⁰

It also seconded SCF staff to UNWRA. However, it was found that staff were only able to identify with UNWRA without difficulty when engaged in emergency work. The SCF priorities of child protection and the development of good practice along the orphan support model were not priorities for UNWRA. This was a period when intergovernmental organizations were also reassessing the role of NGOs.⁵¹

⁵⁰ Field Director's report to Overseas Committee, June 1985, SCF Archives reference P/OS/L3.

⁵¹ Zizzamia, A. 1987. *NGO/UNICEF Cooperation: A Historical Perspective*, UNICEF History Series, Monograph 5.

The revival of the principle of utilitarianism had far-reaching implications for SCF, all of which would overlap with the political agenda of other bodies, whether organizations engaged in nation-building, or movements for women's human rights. Ironically this coincidence of interests would push SCF to affirm its distinct identity.

Optimistic pacificism

The brutality of civil war confronts the optimist with overwhelming evidence for a pessimistic view of human nature. I argue it is under these very circumstances that optimistic pacificism cannot be jettisoned.

Optimistic pacificism as a principle can be understood in several ways. It is a pilot light in uncertain times.⁵² After the Israeli invasion the Palestinian clinics in south Lebanon had been blown up and looted. The male staff had either been killed or were in detention camps. The female staff were described in *The World's Children* as 'too demoralised to work'.⁵³ However, this description may not give due weight to the other demands on the women's time following the onslaught on the camps: demands which an international worker did not have. At this critical time, SCF nurse Diana Lacey restarted her routine work: the mother and baby clinics on Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays; ante-natal clinics on Tuesday, Thursdays and Saturdays.

⁵² In speaking of the peace movement in Britain, Martin Ceadel refers to the 'absolutist obstinacy needed in periods of adversity (when it could be no more than a pilot light).' Ceadel 1996, 23.

⁵³ 'Lebanon: a taste of normality', *The World's Children*, Vol.65 No.1, March 1984, 6-7.

In the midst of such insecurity, Diana says, the first and most important thing you can do is to try to bring back a sense of normality, a feeling that there is such a thing as what used to be everyday reality... 'They needed to see something working,' she said.⁵⁴

Diana Lacey stressed the importance of being seen in the camp every day as 'a known quantity'. Her motivation was similar to that of Mary Hawkins who thirty years earlier had deliberately moved from Tripoli to live with the Palestinians in their camp on the Syrian border.⁵⁵

Optimistic pacificism reflects not only a commitment on the part of SCF to the people living through civil war, it also reflects a particular view of the individual and of the community. In the view of the optimist, both individual and community are characterized by resilience. The staff involved in the Lebanon programme from 1975 to 1990 were optimists to this extent. However, they were not optimistic pacificists to the same degree as the founding generation of SCF. They had limited ambitions to enable children to cope better with the suffering of war. They did not have ambitions to prevent further war.⁵⁶

Optimistic pacificism was a resource which became more significant the longer the civil war endured. In 1976 André Karam, the Save the Children US Field Director in Lebanon reported that:

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ It should be said that in her inimitable pragmatic way, Mary Hawkins explained her action in terms of 'saving time and petrol'.

These are times of stress, fear, panic and uncertainty. What makes it bad is that this abnormal situation has been with us for a long time. Children ask questions to which parents cannot answer or simply do not have satisfactory replies. One such question is ‘Who is fighting whom?’ ‘When will the fighting stop?’ ‘How can we escape?’ ‘When can I go back to school?’⁵⁷

An optimistic view of the individual is borne out by the very questions asked by the child quoted above. The child was trying to make sense of the violence, did believe it would have an end, and maintained hopes of attending school.⁵⁸

Frances Moore admitted that all children suffer from pressures caused by the psychological strain of the civil war, but underlined that:

Not all children show obviously in their daily behaviour the effects of their terrible surroundings. Some are withdrawn, some aggressive, but when their family is still intact they manage amazingly well.⁵⁹

⁵⁶ Both Mary Hawkins and Frances Moore were quite clear in interview that SCF had a role in relief and development and no role in war prevention.

⁵⁷ Save the Children Federation USA, Report from Lebanon, André Karam, Director, 11 November 1976, SCF Archives reference P/OS/L3.

⁵⁸ That these kinds of optimistic questions persist is confirmed by www.savethechildren.org.uk/eyetoeye/ 2000; by interviews with child combatants in Sierra Leone by Krijn Peters and Paul Richards – see ‘Fighting with Open Eyes: Youth Combatants Talking about War in Sierra Leone’ in Bracken, P. and Petty, C., eds, 1998. *Rethinking the Trauma of War*, London: Free Association Books, 76-111; and in Afghanistan by Patricia Sellick – see Sellick P. 1998. *The Impact of Conflict on Children in Afghanistan*, Radda Barnen, Save the Children Federation Inc., Save the Children (UK), UNICEF, May 1998.

⁵⁹ *The World's Children*, Vol.68 No.1, March 1997, 2-3.

By contrast, in the aftermath of the 1982 Israeli invasion the discussion turned not around resilience but around the psychological and emotional harm done by the war. In Lebanon, as well as elsewhere, there was a growing trend to regard children who had witnessed the violence of war as war-damaged. This pessimistic view implied an irrecoverable deficit. Frances Moore remembered how one Lebanese woman tried to describe to her the limits of resilience:

It's almost as if I'm a piece of elastic and I'm being stretched, and then when the war stops I go back to where I was before, but my elasticity is not quite as strong as it was. Next time it happens I can't go back as far as I did the first time.⁶⁰

Each phase of war stretched people that much more and made them less able to cope.

During the 1980s the SCF Lebanon programme began exploring ways of creating a safe environment for the child. This meant looking beyond the child to his or her immediate carers and local community. Frances Moore uses the phrase 'the fabric of life' to describe the backdrop to each child's life. However, it did not overtly work for war prevention. In interview, both Mary Hawkins and Frances Moore have been clear that SCF had a role in relief and development and no role in working for the prevention of war.

However, they were both prepared to make the first incremental step away from direct work with the individual child. The best way, according to Frances Moore, to ensure that relief reached the child, and to ensure the child's development, was through the family. As

a UK-based agency, SCF had learned the lessons of the Second World War evacuation programme, and recognized the overriding importance of the home environment and continuous contact with parents during wartime. It then took this experience abroad and was in many ways ahead of UNICEF in finding alternatives to institutional care.

It was around this innovatory work that the partnership with the LUCW developed. While there were Christian and Muslim orphanages where the government paid for schooling, there was no safety net for providing assistance within homes. Children therefore entered an institution in order to get free education. Sponsorship by SCF enabled them to stay with their families and pay to go to school.

However, SCF was not only concerned with maintaining ties between children and their families, it was also building a new set of commitments. SCF staff demonstrated a commitment to children who were not their kith and kin, as Frances Moore said,

Our workers there put their own children into school each day and say goodbye to their families, never knowing what may happen before they get home again. Very few business organizations in Lebanon have managed to keep their staff coming into work through all the shelling, fighting and general disruption the way SCF is doing.⁶¹

⁶⁰ Interview with Frances Moore, Oxford, 11 October 2000.

⁶¹ 'The Children of Lebanon' in *The World's Children*, Vol.68 No.1, March 1987, 2-3.

This wider sense of responsibility towards children extended to the youth clubs. The youth clubs were able to function as a place where combatants left their arms at the door, not because they were neutral places run by an international organization, but because they belonged to the local community. Again, Frances Moore attributes this sense of ownership to the work of the national staff.

It is in this context that SCF has appeared critical of the UNICEF initiative to cultivate children as a zone of peace.⁶² Following similar initiatives in El Salvador and Uganda, in 1987 UNICEF organized a ceasefire to allow for the immunization of all children in Lebanon. UNICEF was able to attract international publicity and support for the immunization campaign. However, June Goodfield, researching her book *The Planned Miracle*, encountered marked anger at SCF. According to SCF, estimates from the American University in Beirut showed an immunization coverage during the four to five years prior to 1987 of between 80 and 90 per cent. The rich obtained vaccines for their children through private medicine, but the Lebanese Red Cross, the *Mouvement Social* and various other local agencies and charities had maintained a high level of immunization amongst poorer children. The competition between the mini-states set up in Lebanon during the civil war years had been played out in the field of child welfare: in Sidon, for instance, a mini-government headed by Mustapha Saad ran social programmes for Sunni Muslims, with properly established cold chains to keep vaccines refrigerated, where people could bring their children for vaccination at any time.

The real reason for their [SCF staff's] irritation was that by getting all the publicity UNICEF could undermine these ongoing efforts and erode the morale of ordinary locals who, exposed to the dangers for twenty-four hours a day, had been beavering away for years.⁶³

SCF also took issue with UNICEF's peace education programme. This programme was also inspired by the idea of children as zones of peace. From 1989 UNICEF hosted peace camps at which children from different cultural and religious backgrounds could meet and get to know each other. Young people aged 18-25 with scouting and similar experience were trained by UNICEF as camp monitors. The UNICEF annual report comments that:

UNICEF staff were surprised less by the happy intermingling of the smaller children than by the lack of mutual distrust displayed by the monitors, who proved able to discard attitudes absorbed from their elders and confirmed by a lifetime surrounded by violence.⁶⁴

It would be interesting to know whether there is any data monitoring the impact of these peace camps. Evidence from other divided societies shows that bringing children and young people together for finite periods of time after which they return to their own communities has only a superficial effect. In Northern Ireland none of the SCF playgroups or clubs included children from both sides of the denominational line, with the exception

⁶² Children as a zone of peace was an idea promoted within UNICEF by Nils Thedin, Chairman of Rädde Barnen. See Vittachi, V.T. 1993. *Between the Guns: Children as a Zone of Peace*, London: Hodder and Stoughton.

⁶³ Goodfield, J. 1991. *The Planned Miracle*, London: Scribners, 160.

of the playgroup at the waiting room for the Maze Prison. Although integration was a laudable aim, SCF did not deem it practical, and concentrated instead on providing havens from violence for children of each community. In the 1970s, Hill House, in southern England, hosted children from both communities for holidays, but this SCF programme was under review.

The benefits of integration are of doubtful value... Whereas living, playing and fighting together may soon dispel century old myths held about one side or the other, once the children return home to the rigid sectarian hatred generated all round from parents and peers, friendships are quickly eradicated. This point is now being seriously considered by the organisers of many hundred of mixed holidays organized during the last few years. Unless the children meet again the exercise is of little use...⁶⁵

In looking at SCF's contribution in Northern Ireland, Simon Clark^j begins by saying;

One expects so much simply because one wants to see, indeed one needs to see, something which gives one grounds for optimism. Ulster has never had it so good so far as the sheer amount of help in terms of money and manpower for children's welfare is concerned, and it is easy to sit back and say: 'How marvellous – we are achieving something really tangible'.⁶⁶

⁶⁴ *UNICEF Annual Report 1991*, New York: UNICEF, 1991.

⁶⁵ 'Away from it all', *The World's Children*, Vol.54, No.1, March 1974, 24.

⁶⁶ Clark, S., SCF Senior Press Officer, 'The Battle for Childhood' in *The World's Children*, Vol.56, No.1, June 1976, 17.

The UNICEF peace camps in Lebanon were tangible evidence of integration. However, their long-term benefit is dubious. Removing the children temporarily from their communities generated a relatively pristine, politics-free zone which avoided the more complex and intractable problems of their day-to-day living circumstances.⁶⁷ It answered the need of UNICEF and the donors to see something which gave grounds for optimism, but did not address the children's needs.

The model that SCF adopted in Lebanon was slightly different. Summer camps were held, and year in year out, children from Palestinian camps were taken to the Druze mountains where the local children were then invited to participate in camp activities. Frances Moore distinguishes this kind of inclusive programme from the artificial one-off activity of bussing children from different communities to a separate location. The programme she describes is opportunistic rather than contrived and its effect is built upon from year to year. She is optimistic about the potential for building integrated activities with communities but her optimism is tempered by a realistic assessment of the repetition required to cement trust.

⁶⁷ For a child's eye view of these problems, see 'eye to eye' – photographs taken by children from the Balata and Nahir El Barid refugee camps in the West Bank and Lebanon. These are included in a special website and an exhibition which was touring the UK and the Middle East in 2000, www.savethechildren.org.uk/eyetoeye/ 2000.

Lessons learned

The accelerated expansion of SCF's work in the 1980s led to a diverse range of unconnected programmes. From these programmes I have chosen to focus upon Lebanon because there are lessons to be learned which were of particular significance for the following decade. During the 1990s, SCF reassessed much of its work both to give it internal cohesion, but also to make the organization a more effective international actor.

One lesson was the experience of civil war in Lebanon. This protracted intra-state conflict with cross-border implications forced a reappraisal of the principle of universalism.

Universalism was seen to mean nothing more nor less than each and every child, whether living in East or West Beirut, a refugee camp or zone of occupation, whether combatant or non-combatant. During the civil war SCF was only able to act effectively because it could draw on existing partnerships within both Lebanese and Palestinian society. Unfortunately this is not a model that is replicable in an area where SCF does not already have contacts prior to the outbreak of conflict. However, it does demonstrate the importance of establishing contacts in areas on the verge of conflict before trust breaks down.⁶⁸

A second focus of learning which would be of critical importance to SCF in the 1990s was the relationship between the state and civil society, and SCF's own role as an international non-governmental organization. In Lebanon SCF maintained partnerships with both local NGOs and government ministries. It carved out a role for itself in the promotion of child

⁶⁸ SCF *Global Programme Strategy*, 1997. Programme priorities include 'improved pre-positioning and assessment in countries likely to be the site of future emergencies'.

welfare and distinguished itself from UN agencies and the ICRC by its goals and methodology. In its Lebanon programme it had a utilitarian regard not only to the intrinsic merit of its programmes but also to the added value of their consequences. It placed an emphasis on Lebanese and Palestinian staff as agents of social change, developed a generational dimension to its programmes with the inclusion of youth activities, and acted as an advocate and catalyst for child welfare work locally and regionally.

Lastly, the vision of SCF staff in Lebanon was optimistic in a number of ways. SCF staff served as a pilot light for both Lebanese and Palestinians through the most oppressive years of the civil war. The significance of an optimistic view of human nature can be seen in the position SCF adopted in the initial debate around individual responses to war trauma: a debate which exploded in the 1990s. It can also be seen in its long-term goal of community ownership of projects. However, this optimistic view was limited to the individual and community and was tempered by a requirement of incremental progress. This contrasted with UNICEF's initiatives under the rubric of children as a zone of peace. It should be stressed that SCF's work in the Middle East showed no evidence of the survival of the optimistic pacificism of the founding generation which believed in the settlement of disputes without recourse to war.

The repositioning which was to take place in the 1990s raised questions for the identity and integrity of SCF. Few staff would be as long-serving as either Mary Hawkins or Frances Moore, who together brought memory and cohesion to SCF's work in the Middle East.

SCF would therefore require a way of continuously inspiring new staff and instilling them with a common set of organizational values.

Chapter 8

AFTER THE COLD WAR: THE CONTINUING RELEVANCE OF ORGANIZATIONAL VALUES (1990-99)

This chapter differs from earlier chapters in that it aims to be prescriptive as well as descriptive. In the opening chapter I described the vision of the founding generation and the set of organizational values which were key to the realization of that vision. The central historical chapters analysed how these organizational values influenced later generations, and how as the century progressed, SCF's institutional memory was weakened. In this chapter I will discuss how those organizational values have continuing relevance to decision-making by SCF staff, and advocate their 'rediscovery' and reinstatement. I use the three guiding principles of universalism, utilitarianism and optimistic pacificism as a framework to view my own experience working on behalf of SCF in Afghanistan and Tajikistan.¹

In 1995, as a new member of staff with SCF, I was given less than a week's induction and then put in charge of the SCF programme in Tajikistan. Tajikistan was in the throes of civil war and SCF had been working there for just over a year. I had little access to the institutional memory of SCF, and instead brought to my work the values I had absorbed

¹ I was present in Afghanistan from March to September 1995 as the representative of the British Agencies Afghanistan Group, a consortium of ten agencies including SCF. I then returned to Afghanistan on behalf of UNICEF and the Save the Children Alliance from June 1997- September 1997 to conduct research into the

from previous employment in other agencies. I was no Bridget Stevenson or Mary Hawkins, and instead of staying for a decade, moved on within two years. The SCF Tajikistan programme has now had six programme managers in as many years.

My appointment coincided with a period when SCF was developing a global programme strategy (GPS) in an attempt to bring coherence and cohesion to its wide range of unconnected country programmes. The GPS was finalized in 1997.² It was drawn up in response to the expansion of SCF during the 1980s, and the increasing pressure from governmental donors upon SCF (as well as other NGOs) to operate within a contract culture. One reaction to this pressure was for NGOs to reaffirm their independent and voluntary identity, and focus upon the significance of organizational values.³

Although 1990 saw the close of the civil war in Lebanon, the following years were marked by an increase in the number of protracted social conflicts across the globe. Within these protracted social conflicts the codes of practice developed by the ICRC in the late nineteenth century for inter-state conflicts did not apply.⁴ For example, one field commander for anti-opposition forces in Tajikistan described how the war in Kurgan Teppe was fought by both sides 'without rules, and without wounded, only corpses'.⁵

impact of conflict on children. For the intervening period, from October 1995 to May 1997, I was the SCF programme manager in Tajikistan.

² SCF Global Programme Strategy, 1997.

³ See for example Boli, J. and Thomas, G.M., eds, 1999. *Constructing World Culture: International Non-Governmental Organizations since 1875*, Stanford: Stanford University Press; Korten, D.C. 1990. *Getting to the 21st century: Voluntary Action and the Global Agenda*, West Hartford: Kumarian Press; Uphoff, N. 1996. *Learning from Gal Oya: Possibilities for Participatory Development and Post-Newtonian Social Science*, London: IT Publications.

⁴ 1864 First Geneva Convention.

⁵ Human Rights Watch/Helsinki Watch Memorial, *Human Rights in Tajikistan In the Wake of Civil War*, New York, December 1993.

Teenage boys in northern Afghanistan explained the war to me in this way, ‘they are fighting for power and when they lose they escape by plane and poor people are killed and wounded.’⁶ Julia Groenewold of *Médecins sans Frontières* puts the argument that the deliberate slaughter of civilians was not new.

What is new, however, is the presence of humanitarian organizations on the ground. These are the international entities, notably NGOs and UN relief agencies, with no ostensible government ties. They are being given implicitly, and in some cases want to be given, a part in protecting civilians. In other words, they place themselves in one of the fundamental roles of a government: that of ensuring the collective safety of its populace.⁷

In the 1990s, Afghanistan and Tajikistan were both defined by the UN as complex political emergencies. The term was also applied to Somalia, Iraqi Kurdistan, Rwanda, Bosnia, Chechnya, Liberia and Sierra Leone.⁸ This list is not exhaustive, but in all these cases I prefer to use the term protracted social conflict.⁹ In each of these countries NGOs and UN relief agencies were present as witnesses to atrocious acts against civilians, and they have been castigated for their failure to ensure the safety of the people they worked alongside.¹⁰ In this protection role, individual representatives of NGOs and UN relief agencies were faced with tough choices between two goods, and hellish choices between two evils. SCF

⁶ Interview with boys aged 13 to 17, Mazar-i-Sharif, Afghanistan, August 1997.

⁷ Groenewold 1997, xx. The record of SCF in the Russian Civil War from 1920 to 1922, and SCF and Oxfam in northern Uganda in the 1980s, are examples that reinforce Groenewold’s argument.

⁸ See *Third World Quarterly*, Vol.20, No.1, 1999.

⁹ The term complex political emergency implies that these crises are short-lived.

¹⁰ For the human cost of this failure in Rwanda, see Gourevitch, P. 1999. *We wish to inform you that tomorrow we will be killed with our families: Stories from Rwanda*, UK: Picador.

representatives in such areas of violent conflict were often making decisions without communication with regional or international headquarters and under time constraints.

What guidance could the organization give its representatives to ensure that their decisions were informed by organizational values?

The GPS was a five-year strategy, not a detailed planning document, and was designed to be translated into a variety of more specific operational plans and procedures at every level. It made clear the parameters within which programmes must be developed in future, but then left room for local initiative and judgement. It established a number of priorities for work in emergencies which reflect some of the issues raised in earlier chapters.¹¹ For example, it was one of the strengths of SCF in Lebanon that it had a continuous history of involvement in Lebanon and the region prior to the outbreak of the civil war. The GPS recommended 'improved pre-positioning and assessment in countries likely to be the site of future emergencies'. However, when wars broke out in areas of the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, SCF felt compelled to provide assistance despite no involvement with these areas since the 1940s.

The GPS was a tool for strategic planning: none of the recommendations address the issue of how individual staff exercise their judgement to make the immediate tough and sometimes hellish choices with which they will be confronted. These questions are most

¹¹ 'Developing emergency funding strategies, including an emergency reserve fund. Improved pre-positioning and assessment in countries likely to be the site of future emergencies. Exploring new mechanisms for swift response. Improving human resource management in emergencies – e.g. through the retention of a core pool of experienced staff, additional emergency response capacity, and improved coordination mechanisms. Improving the promotion of Save the Children's approach, particularly during non-emergency periods. Bringing communications staff into the planning of emergency response and ensuring access to adequate information from the site of the emergency.' GPS, 1997.

often discussed in the form of increased risks to staff safety and security.¹² However, SCF's international staff were not only concerned to protect themselves,¹³ they were present in the area of conflict because of a special mandate to protect children. Security guidelines could not adequately help them make the choices in front of them. Caught by a moral dilemma, short of time and cut off from advice, one of the most effective ways for individuals to choose a moral response is to think of a moral example. What would X do in this situation? If individual examples provide the most effective form in which values can be encapsulated, then there must be an attempt to bind the individual moral example into the organization. To this end Hugo Slim has asked whether some form of 'organizational conscience' might be able to act in place of more rigorous deliberation.¹⁴

Is it possible that some relief agencies are cohesive enough in their inner values to make some urgent moral judgements spontaneously? Might field workers at the sharp end of a moral problem be able to claim that they are somehow acting on the conscience of the organization as a whole without requiring that the organization intellectualize the implications first?¹⁵

¹² 'Security at work' special issue of *Forced Migration Review*, Vol.4, April 1999.

¹³ Cutts, M. and Dingle, A. 1995. *Safety first. Protecting NGO employees who work in areas of conflict*, London: SCF

¹⁴ The Red Cross Code of Conduct, to which SCF is a signatory, was developed as an attempt to encourage a principled and consistent response from agencies working in conflict. However, Goodhand's observations in Sri Lanka support Slim's uneasiness about the practicality of putting such codes into operation. Goodhand, J. *Save the Children Agency Survey*, (unpublished) March 1999, Draft Notes, 19. See also the proposal for a professional body of relief workers in Relief and Rehabilitation Network 1995. *Room for Improvement: The Management and Support of Relief and Development Workers*, London: Overseas Development Institute.

¹⁵ Slim, H. 1997. *Doing the Right Thing: Relief Agencies, Moral Dilemmas and Moral Responsibility in Political Emergencies and War*, Sweden: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet.

This crucial nexus of inner values and individual actors is one of the prime justifications for my choice of case studies for the 1990s. Based on my own inside knowledge of the parameters within which programme managers were working, I make a critique of SCF's work in Afghanistan and Tajikistan and propose alternative courses of action. At the sharp end of the problem, I interpret how the fieldworker in Afghanistan and Tajikistan could be guided by the inner values I identified in the founding vision: universalism, utilitarianism and optimistic pacificism. These are the values I associate with an organizational conscience. SCF was a very minor actor in both Afghanistan and Tajikistan, however, the decisions made by its representative could be of significance.

Although we cannot know for certain what the consequences of individual and group efforts will be, because of the probabilistic and uncertain nature of the world around us, we can reasonably presume that it is possible for individuals to alter the course of events and thereby to affect outcomes.¹⁶

The SCF fieldworker is part of a value-driven organization. I will explore the ways in which his or her work is enhanced by the simultaneous interpretation of these values by policy makers at headquarters in relation to longer-term planning and international advocacy.

The two case studies offer particular and complementary insights. These insights are significant within the context of post-Cold War understanding of conflict. A dominant paradigm emerged after the Cold War in which war was located within other cultures, and

explained in terms of biological and environmental determinism. These shared causal beliefs led to a common policy enterprise which was at odds with the universalist approach of SCF. This dominant set of beliefs, values, and techniques of persuasion formed the backdrop to all SCF's work in war-torn societies in the last decade of the century. Against this backdrop I explore the particular relevance of universalism as a guiding principle for SCF work in Afghanistan. This involves probing the way in which an organization with a mission to uphold the universal rights of children was perceived within an observant Muslim society. During the period under consideration, neither of these two protracted conflicts attracted large voluntary donations of aid, and there was therefore a powerful requirement to adopt a utilitarian approach and target scarce resources. The nature of the resources available differed in the two countries. Although both Afghanistan and Tajikistan had a similar position on the periphery of the global economy, international financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and World Bank were present in Tajikistan only. I examine the relevance of utilitarianism to decision-making in the design of the Tajikistan programme. Lastly, both were situations of protracted social conflict in which, following the collapse of the state, rational actors mobilized political and economic support to protect their interests. Everyone was aligned in some way, though their leaders offered no detailed project of positive peace. This means that the two case studies pose a particular challenge to the optimist.

¹⁶ Uphoff 1996.

Civilization and barbarism

At the time of SCF's foundation, Britain was waging economic war against the defeated countries of Europe in the pursuit of national interest. In the eyes of the cartoonist David Low and the readers of the SCF journal this national interest was short-sighted greed.¹⁷

Writing in 1928 Eglantyne Jebb identified the epoch in which she lived as one of intense nationalism and compared nationalism with 'the old days of tribalism and the tribal god'.¹⁸

In 1935 David Low again published a cartoon with SCF. This time when he depicted the war in Abyssinia he ironically labelled the bombing as 'civilization' and the undisturbed village as 'barbaric'.¹⁹ David Low and Eglantyne Jebb both used the labels tribal and barbaric as a criticism of their own societies. Within the paradigm of values, beliefs and techniques of persuasion that dominated post-Cold War interpretations of conflict, these labels were routinely applied by international policy makers in the UK and the US only to other societies. The invidious consequences of this 'them and us' practice can be seen not only within government policy, but also within the policies of those minor actors that came under the influence of the dominant public discourse. These included SCF.

In his journey to the ends of the earth, Robert Kaplan began in Sierra Leone and ended in Afghanistan.²⁰ Both countries were wracked by wars producing abject suffering. Three central ideas underpinned his journey. First, cultural identity was an essential and durable, rather than context-dependent, feature of social systems. Different cultures and

¹⁷ *The Record*, Vol.1 No.18, August 1921, 283.

¹⁸ Jebb, E. 1928. 'The World Policy of the Save the Children Fund' in Fuller 1928, 564.

¹⁹ *The World's Children*, Vol.16 No.2, November 1935, 23.

²⁰ Kaplan, R. 1996. *The Ends of the Earth: A Journey at the Dawn of the 21st Century*, Random House.

civilizations were thereby prone to clash. Second, war in the post-Cold War world had changed. States had lost the monopoly of military violence, and the weapons were readily available and cheap. Third, insulation, not intervention, was the rational response of the major powers to such small, localized and essentially uncontrollable armed conflicts.²¹ The ideas that underpinned Robert Kaplan's analysis of the situation in Sierra Leone and Afghanistan leached into the public domain via the media and US government policy makers.²² They undermined the universalism enshrined in the United Nations Charter, and legitimated an abdication of responsibility on the part of the international community for the suffering that accompanies protracted conflict.²³ They were made shockingly explicit in the UK application of the Convention of the Rights of the Child to all children in the UK except refugee children.²⁴

The Afghan anthropologist, M. Nazif Shahrani, described how the conflict in his country is often analysed.²⁵

Some blame the multiethnic composition of Afghanistan's population, living in hostile mountainous terrain and enamoured of fighting and settling scores with

²¹ Richards, P. 1996. *Fighting for the Rain Forest: War, Youth and Resources in Sierra Leone*, Oxford: James Currey, xiv.

²² Kaplan's article 'The Coming Anarchy' in *Atlantic Monthly*, February 1994, was faxed by Tim Wirth, Under-Secretary at the US Department of Global Affairs, to every US embassy round the world. Richards 1996, xiv.

²³ A milder reflection of these ideas can be found within SCF 'Violence is deeply rooted in the history and culture of the Central American countries. State institutions have historically maintained control over highly unequal societies frequently through violent means; those struggling for justice have likewise resorted to violence in order to achieve their aims. The family unit has often come to reflect the inequalities in society, reproducing an authoritarian and violent atmosphere. This *culture of violence* (my italics)...' Save the Children, *Country Report: Central America*, September 1996, 13.

²⁴ SCF campaign 'Don't prejudge us', www.savethechildren.org.uk/campaigns/forgotten/index.html.

²⁵ Shahrani, M.N. 'The Future of the State and the Structure of Community Governance', in Maley, W., ed., 1998. *Fundamentalism Reborn: Afghanistan and the Taliban*, London: Hurst, 212-242.

guns – that is, a kind of absurd biological-cum-environmental deterministic solution that says ‘Afghans can’t help it, violence is in their genes’.

At a more popular level, the same ideas manifest themselves:

Since staggering up the ice-covered Karik Pass and entering the Ramgul Valley in the Afghan province of Nuristan four days earlier, we have been threatened by five savage-looking mujahadeen – armed militia – had heard of three murders, two robberies and have been warned about a notorious band of cut-throats whose lair was unavoidably on our path.²⁶

The war in Afghanistan was thus presented as a behavioural problem. Afghans were innately barbaric, and there was no common set of values uniting their human condition with those of these commentators.

Faced with civil war in Afghanistan and Tajikistan, commentators have explained the conflict both as a product of the culture of violence of Muslim Central Asia, and also as a product of the irreducible and age-old differences between ethnic groups. Vanessa Pupavac has seen similar explanations grafted onto the conflict in her own country, and has criticized the associated international programmes directed at former Yugoslavia.

²⁶ Bealby, J. 1998. ‘Journey through the Land of Light’, *Traveller* (www.travelmag.co.uk/features/feat5.htm).

Whereas in the past Western missionaries spoke of the need to civilize the natives, today's aid workers speak of the need to instil tolerance and promote peaceful conflict resolution skills and democratic values. UNESCO's Culture of Peace Programme which see the wars in El Salvador, Mozambique and former Yugoslavia as being the result of a culture of violence epitomises how such attitudes towards the Third World are expressed in today's politically correct language.²⁷

She challenged UN agencies to shift the blame for poor child health from parents and recognize the economic and political context for falling living standards.

UNICEF's programme emphasizes health and nutritional education. However, the fall in nutrition is a result of impoverishment not ignorance.

Like the people of former Yugoslavia, the people of Tajikistan had enjoyed relatively high standards of living for a long period and had no recent experience of receiving international relief and assistance. The population of Tajikistan did, however, have seventy years of experience of being the focus of Soviet policies of intervention. The Western agencies suffered by comparison.

²⁷ Pupavac, V. *Theories of Conflict and Children's Rights*. Paper presented to the Second Convention of the European Association for the Advancement of Social Sciences, on Conflict and Cooperation: University of Cyprus, Nicosia, March 19-23, 1997.

These Western activists are just like the Soviets, but at least the Soviets gave us schools and hospitals along with their ideology, these give us only their ideology.²⁸

Individuals in Tajikistan had grown up expecting to live out their lives within the predictable security of the Soviet Union. After 1992 it could be said that they had to learn new forms of behaviour to cope with insecurity.²⁹ However, they too were sceptical of international aid programmes which did not meet their needs for food, shelter, and the rehabilitation of health and education services. The trauma consultants that first appeared in aid programmes in the 1980s, and were introduced to Lebanon by Rädde Barnen (Save the Children Sweden) as early as 1983, epitomized this behaviourist approach. Even in Afghanistan, where families had proved their resilience over decades of war,³⁰ UNICEF channelled scarce resources into a trauma consultancy and individual casework.³¹ The children interviewed in Kabul reported that their greatest desire was for help in contributing as breadwinners to the family income, but the recommendations from the research were for a counselling programme. The proliferation of trauma projects framed

²⁸ Uzbek writer quoted in Akiner, S. 1997. *Central Asia: Conflict or Stability of Development?*, London: Minority Rights Group International, 292. For a critique of the socio-psychological model of conflict see also Duffield, M., *Evaluating Conflict Resolution: Context, Models and Methodology*, a discussion paper prepared for the Chr. Michelsen Institute, Bergen, Norway, May 1997.

²⁹ 'Most communities suffering famine have responded to the crisis a number of times in their history. Famine victims do not respond to stress from a position of ignorance, but from a position of knowledge. They have knowledge of both the stress processes their community suffers and the long term consequences of their individual actions.' Walker, P. 1995. 'Indigenous Knowledge and Famine Relief in the Horn of Africa' in Warren, D. and others, eds, 1995. *The Cultural Dimension of Development: Indigenous Knowledge Systems*, London: Intermediate Technology Publications, 147-154. See also Waite, M. 1997. 'The Role of the Voluntary Sector in Supporting Living Standards in Central Asia' in Falkingham, J. and others, eds, 1997. *Household Welfare in Central Asia*, London: Macmillan, 221-249. One of the most remarkable features of the colleagues I worked with in Tajikistan was the flexible way in which they adapted to new work practices.

³⁰ Ressler reports in *Children in Situation of Armed Conflict: a Guide to the Provision of Services* that virtually no unattended children are found among Afghan refugees. Ressler 1992, UNICEF, 145.

³¹ Gupta, L. 1997. *Psychosocial assessment of children exposed to war related violence in Kabul*, Kabul: UNICEF, see also Sellick, P. 1999. *The Ethics of Conducting Research with Children in Conflict-Affected Areas: Issues from Afghanistan and Tajikistan*, Paper presented to the Conference Researching on

the problem as internal to the children, without contextualizing them. Although SCF has contested the shared notions of validity underlying the trauma approach, other members of the Save the Children Alliance have not been so quick to distance themselves from this behaviourist approach.³²

Afghanistan and Tajikistan are adjacent and share many features of geography, however throughout most of the twentieth century they had very separate political histories. The state and organized civil society evolved very differently, and their populations developed contrasting expectations of international aid. To propose standardized international aid programmes, or to put the same label on both conflicts, is to neglect the context-dependent nature of culture. This context is influenced both by local interests and also by integration in the global economy, of which international aid is a part.

If SCF were to acknowledge the context-dependent nature of culture would this entail a denial of universalism? There is a significant difference between saying that people are prone to clash over cultural resources, and that different cultures are prone to clash. The very different political histories of Afghanistan and Tajikistan prior to 1989 serve to illustrate this. In Afghanistan people who continued to define themselves as Tajiks deployed their cultural resources in combination with the rest of the population to resist the

Humanitarian Assistance in Conflict Areas, 8-10 May 2000, Post War Reconstruction and Development Unit, University of York.

³² 'Inexcusable is the role played by UNICEF, which was incredibly insensitive to the needs of distressed children. In their search to justify that the western model (trauma healing) should function equally well in all settings, psychologists were sent to talk to a group of children about memories of seeing their parents killed, and provoking the children to a state of deep distress. This is morally unacceptable. Also, the children were not prepared well in advance and no provision was made to deal with the after effects of such trauma interviews.' This critique was written by a Rwandan employed by SCF-UK to assess the impact of trauma

Soviet Union. The survival, mutation and cohesion of culture of these people was in part a function of the massive displacement of the population. Within the context of oppression and resistance, flight and displacement, an Afghan identity crystallized.³³

When in Iran we prayed to God to help us set Afghanistan free. We listened to the radio, and when we heard bad news about the village we felt sad. Most of the time there was very little news. Life was better in Iran, but here we feel more free.³⁴

By contrast in Tajikistan, the Soviet Union decimated indigenous cultural resources and people who might have once defined themselves as Tajiks adopted Soviet cultural labels.

To the census agents' question, 'Who are you?', people often replied '*Alhamdulillah* ['Thank God'], I am a Muslim.' In response they were told to go to Arabia. At a second attempt, the answer might be, 'I am a Persian speaker.' 'Then go to Iran,' they were told. 'I am a Tajik': 'Then get out of Uzbekistan.' 'But Bukhara (or Samarkand) is my native town.' 'Then declare yourself an Uzbek.'³⁵

counselling among children in her home country. SCF 1996, (unpublished), 4-5. Evidence for a compelling critique of the current discourse on trauma has been gathered by SCF in Bracken 1998.

³³ Of the 500 children interviewed, those who had returned to Afghanistan from Iran and Pakistan, showed a greater pride in being Afghan than those who had never left. Sellick 1998.

³⁴ Interview with girls aged 14 to 17, Enjeel district, Herat province, August 1997.

³⁵ Jahangiri, G. 1994. 'The Premises for the Construction of a Tajik National Identity' in Djalili, M.-R. and others, eds, 1994. *Tajikistan: The Trials of Independence*, Richmond: Curzon, 14-41 (p. 35).

The attack upon Tajik cultural resources was particularly brutal and systematic in regard to gender roles and relations.³⁶

The development of the two conflicts after the demise of the Soviet Union was also very different. In Afghanistan, groups competed to show who had been the greater defender of cultural resources. In Tajikistan there was a cultural vacuum, as people repudiated the Soviet past, and had not yet invented its replacement. In contrast with Afghanistan, the violence of the conflict in Tajikistan was highly personalized. As one woman refugee from Tajikistan told me in Herat, Afghanistan:

Our war was different from the Afghans' war. We know our enemies. Here you don't see who drops bombs on you from the plane in the sky, but if I go back to Kurgan Teppe I will have to cross my enemy in the street.³⁷

So how did SCF, as a minor actor in many different areas of conflicts, put its values into practice in different cultural contexts? SCF's fundamental values as outlined in the GPS began with a commitment to the realization of children's rights. However, there was no reference in the GPS to children's rights in a cross-cultural perspective. It is worth remembering the guidance given within the early history of SCF as to how these universalist values could be put into practice across cultures. Eglantyne Jebb's original conception of the rights of the child was a set of rights arrived at within each society. Some

³⁶ Buckley, M., ed., 1997. *Post-Soviet Women: From the Baltic to Central Asia*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Massell, G.J. 1974. *The Surrogate Proletariat: Moslem Women and Revolutionary Strategies in Soviet Central Asia, 1919-1929*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

³⁷ Interview with Makhfirad, City Camp, Herat, Afghanistan, 4 August 1997.

of these early sets of rights are still extant, for example the charter of children's rights developed in India.³⁸ She understood that child rights would gain universal legitimacy only when conceived and articulated within the widest possible range of cultural traditions.³⁹ This universalist vision translates into a very different interpretation of conflict from that adopted by Robert Kaplan, and more notably Samuel Huntington.⁴⁰ Different cultures are not prone to clash, instead different actors clash over the control of cultural resources.

The next section examines SCF's intervention as a minor actor within the conflict to manipulate gender relations within Afghanistan. I argue that the decisions made within SCF reflected the influence of the dominant paradigm of cultural essentialism, led to a misinterpretation of universalism, and neglected the importance of legitimacy within Afghan society.

Universalism and the rights of girls in Afghanistan

SCF played a very minor role in the struggle for control of cultural resources in Afghanistan. Its first programme in Afghanistan began in the hamlet of Shewaki ten miles south of Kabul in 1977. The Shewaki clinic was to be part of a network of SCF-supported health clinics south of Kabul. As elsewhere, SCF aimed to enhance government services.⁴¹ The government at that time was led by Muhammad Daoud Khan. He was trying to reduce his dependence on the Soviet Union by making increasing overtures to the West and

³⁸ 'An Indian Parallel', *The World's Children*, Vol.36 No.6, 191.

³⁹ Cf. An-Na'im, A.A. 1992. *Human Rights in Cross-Cultural Perspectives: A Quest for Consensus*, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 3.

⁴⁰ Huntington, S.P. 1997. 'The Clash of Civilisations?', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol.72 No.3, 22-49.

strengthening links with Iran. If the state were able to gain substantial revenues from outside powers, it would be absolved of the need to establish systems of accountability to the people, for example through local taxation.⁴² The small contribution SCF made to the extension of government health services should be seen against this background.

In April 1978, Daoud was overthrown and killed in a coup orchestrated by the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA). The PDPA set about introducing rapid reforms of land tenure in the countryside and a mass literacy campaign aimed at girls and boys, women and men. It was only able to maintain its authority with the support of invading Soviet troops.

However short-lived SCF's programme in 1977, this experience should have left the organization with a memory of the political sensitivity of gender issues and the way in which external support could be counter-productive. It is worth remembering that at the same time SCF made the decision to close its project in Messaad in Algeria because of difficulties in gaining access to women, and reopened a project in Douera where gender relations were less strict. It was with this setback in mind that some members of the Council strongly advised against starting work in Afghanistan.⁴³ Abd Allah Ahmad An-

⁴¹ See for example contemporary work in Nigeria.

⁴² Johnson, C. 1998. 'Afghanistan: NGOs and Women in the Front-line', *Community Development Journal*, Vol.33 No.2, April 1998, 117-123 (p. 117).

⁴³ Mr Pollitzer considered that this proposed project could be one of the least successful enterprises ever embarked on by the Fund and stated that the end result was extremely speculative. From his reading of the papers, he doubted the possibility of reaching productive cooperation with the local authorities. He considered that the Fund would ultimately be faced with a situation similar to that which it had ultimately faced in Algeria. He reiterated that he must voice serious misgivings about this project. SCF Archives reference ORW.6377, 13 May 1976.

Na'im has described the struggle for control over the cultural sources and symbols of power as an internal struggle between dominant and dominated groups.

Within a society dominant groups or classes maintain perceptions and interpretations of cultural values and norms that are supportive of their own interests, proclaiming them to be the only valid view of that culture.⁴⁴

Dominated groups or classes may in their turn, hold different perceptions and interpretations. In Afghanistan in 1977 these dominated groups included non-state stakeholders such as the *Ulema* [religious leadership]. SCF witnessed the failure of Daoud's government to build a consensus which would bestow legitimacy on emerging cultural values, and the danger of outsiders being interpreted as agents of an alien culture. Despite this experience, when SCF returned to Afghanistan in 1994 it chose to make gender the main platform of its policy in Afghanistan, and to adopt a top-down approach. How did this come about?

When SCF returned to Afghanistan, it was to insert itself in a very different pattern of relations from that which existed in 1977. There was no question of assisting a national government in a project of state-led development. Instead it would either be engaging directly with civil society, or with a parastatal organization distinguished by its coercive powers and the fact that it was still actively prosecuting a war.⁴⁵

⁴⁴ An-Na'im 1992, 20.

In 1994 SCF made a strategic decision to wind down its relief work in the camps in Pakistan and begin development work inside Afghanistan. It chose Herat province on the Iranian border, away from those areas where Pakistan-based NGOs had been involved in cross-border activity and a habit of dependence had already formed. With the backing of the Governor of Herat Province, Ismail Khan, SCF moved into the education sector where it would be opening up opportunities to rural girl pupils, providing the next generation with the skills needed to rebuild their country, and encouraging independence from aid. It was hoped that the opening of schools would be interpreted as a sign of stability and lead to the return of more refugees from Pakistan and Iran.

In 1995 I found the city schools filled to overflowing. A year earlier SCF had provided the following educational statistics for the city: the number of male students was 23,347 and the number of female students 21,663. The government continued to pay teachers' salaries and to offer free schooling. Places were available to all children, Herati and non-Herati alike. However, resources were very scarce: schools operated a two-shift system and most teachers needed a second job to make ends meet. Among parents the desire for education for both boys and girls was very great. Returnees from Iran had grown used to a higher level of educational service and were particularly demanding.⁴⁶

From 1994 to 1995, SCF in Herat was building rural primary schools, and had plans to become involved in teacher training. The whole programme was developed in tandem with

⁴⁵ Goodhand, J. and Hulme, D. 1996, *NGOs and Complex Political Emergencies: Working Paper No. 1*, University of Manchester and INTRAC, 40.

⁴⁶ Sellick, P. *Emergency Preparedness in Herat: A Report prepared for the British Agencies Afghanistan Group, May 1995*, British Agencies Afghanistan Group, 1995, 13.

the Ministry of Education. It was often the case that where a primary school for boys existed, SCF built a primary school for girls. Sometimes it met with opposition to this allocation of resources. The priority on the part of SCF was a school building for girls, but on the part of the most vocal in the village was for additional school space for boys or a secondary school for boys. In such cases, SCF could rely on good relations with the Ministry. The school openings were shown on Herat TV and women teachers and girl pupils were invited.

On 6 September 1995 the Taliban entered Herat. There had been no planning within SCF for such a scenario.⁴⁷

At this critical point there was a change in personnel within SCF. The incoming Programme Manager, Angela Kearney, was the only female head of agency in Herat. As a woman, the Taliban refused to meet with her. The SCF staff had all been recruited locally, and reflected the composition of the Herat population. They were primarily urban and Tajik, and saw the Taliban as occupiers of Pashtun rural origin. The most senior member of staff left Herat and made his way to the US, leaving the new Programme Manager with no adviser. The second most senior member of staff was a young ex-mujahid who had fought for ten years with Ismail Khan, the ousted governor of Herat. SCF found itself in a very vulnerable position.

⁴⁷ The victory of the Taliban surprised most observers. 'They (the Taliban) have no intention of threatening Gen. Rashid Dostam in the north and Gen. Ismael Khan in Herat in the west – two leaders who, incidentally, have good relations with Pakistani and US intelligence.' *The Economist*, 5 January 1995. However, a failure to use the tool of scenario planning is evident in other SCF programmes, e.g. Sri Lanka: 'What is noticeably

Mandated by SCF to promote the rights of all children, the new Programme Manager was faced with a set of tough choices. She had little support from other agencies in Herat, all of whom were headed by men. Few agencies present elsewhere in Afghanistan had experienced the Taliban restrictions.⁴⁸ A delegation from SCF headquarters came to try and find a way out of the deadlocked situation in early 1996, without success.

Consequently SCF, supported by SCF-US and the International Save the Children Alliance (ISCA),⁴⁹ decided on 8 March 1996 to suspend their education and non-emergency programmes in the regions where girls or women were denied access to education, or where the employment of women had been prohibited by the regional authorities.⁵⁰

From its outset SCF had upheld universalist principles and also emphasized the particular role of girls from a utilitarian perspective.

A people's progress very largely depends upon how far their women can conserve the intellectual and spiritual gains of each successive generation by handing them on to the generation following, and the education of girls is therefore a question of great moment to the whole world.⁵¹

lacking, considering the unstable and constantly changing environment is evidence of alternative planning tools like scenario building.' Goodhand 1999 (unpublished), 20.

⁴⁸ MERLIN had a health programme in Taliban-controlled Kandahar, and had agreed that its female doctor should wear the *chadri*.

⁴⁹ ISCA resulted from cooperation between the organizations of Save the Children in Scandinavia and SC (USA) at the time of the 1976 earthquake in Guatemala.

⁵⁰ SCF argued that it was not withdrawing from Afghanistan as a whole, because it would be transferring its programme to the north, where Dostum permitted education for girls. When the Taliban eventually took control of Mazar-i-Sharif SCF then had to live with the consequences of its earlier decision in its negotiations with the Taliban.

⁵¹ Jebb, E. 1928. 'The World Policy of the Save the Children Fund' in Fuller 1928, 563.

However, the founders of SCF had also taken the view that the child population should not be penalized either for the policies of their parents or their rulers. This did not mean that SCF in its early years was uncritical of those it worked with: it had high standards for those organizations which became partners in the UISE, and non-governmental organizations which did not meet those standards were excluded from UISE.⁵² However, compromises were made with governments in order to maintain a channel of influence with those governments and a channel for assistance to children. SCF wavered from this position in the Second World War when it failed to join the campaign against sanctions upon the civilian populations of Nazi-controlled Europe. The growing use of sanctions in the 1990s, particularly against Iraq, prompted SCF to revisit the argument. It concluded that sanctions were a 'blunt instrument' imposing suffering on the poorest and most vulnerable. It pointed out that 'there is also an undercurrent perception that sanctions are mostly an imposition by the "First" world upon the "Third" '.⁵³ The uncompromising stance of SCF towards the Taliban deviated from this position.

As a protest against the gender policy of the Taliban, SCF's withdrawal from Herat was ineffective on two counts. First, SCF was a very minor actor in the lives of Afghans, and the Taliban, by contrast, were a major actor of which SCF, along with most other international agencies, was alarmingly ignorant. For SCF to assume a confrontational position was to precipitate an end to the relationship before it had even started. The Taliban already had more important conflicts on their hands, with the armed opposition. Secondly, SCF failed to take into account the political and military context of the Taliban's gender

⁵² Jebb, E., *Memo on the Policy of the SCF*, Geneva, 9 July 1928, SCF Archives reference EJ.277.

policies. Having sent their young troops to the front line to defend their policies, they were not going to change them to satisfy SCF.

Not only was control over gender roles and gender relations an indicator of who was in power, it was also a way of defining the authority with which that power was exercised. The Taliban, like their predecessors, used their gender policy to promote themselves as an Islamic authority.⁵⁴ There was a double edge to the Taliban insistence on gender discrimination. Not only was control over gender symbolic of Islamic purity, it was also symbolic of the imagined ethics of the Pashtun village as opposed to the Tajik town. This had not been an issue in Kandahar where the majority of the population were Pashtun and Sunni.⁵⁵ However, it became evident when the Taliban entered Herat where the majority of the population were Tajik and there was also a significant Shi'a minority. Overnight the Taliban became military victors in an ethnic conflict. The conquerors were not only distinguished by their dress and beards, but also by their adherence to the moral code of Pashtunwali, and use of the Pashtu rather than the Dari language.⁵⁶

SCF's action was open to interpretation as an agent of an alien culture on three grounds. It could be interpreted as anti-Taliban because SCF had worked in partnership with Ismail Khan, anti-Islamic because it was a Western agency, and anti-Pashtun because it was based

⁵³ SCF's Evidence to the House of Commons International Development Committee's Enquiry on the Future of Sanctions, April 1999.

⁵⁴ The Islamic concept of Jihad encompasses a restrictive, communitarian activity to restore peace and order, see Malik, I.H. 1998. 'Islamic Discourse on Jihad, War and Violence', *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol.21 No.4, Summer 1998, 47-78 (p.57). The Taliban rapidly gained support after an incident in October 1994 when they successfully fended off an attack on a trade convoy south of Kandahar. Their original success in establishing 'negative peace' has been underrated.

⁵⁵ An established way to overcome fragmentation among the Pashtun is to invoke Islam, and mobilize around Islamic networks, dominated by the *Ulema*, the Sunni Islamic clergy.

among the Tajik population in Herat. These were the issues for which men were dying at the front. When SCF closed the programme in Western Afghanistan and reopened a programme in the north, controlled by the Uzbek, General Dostum, the Taliban's suspicions were as good as confirmed.

The Taliban were the dominant group and proclaimed their interpretation of Islamic cultural values and norms to be the only valid view. If SCF were to show solidarity with the dominated groups, and in particular with the female students and teachers who had filled Herat's schools, it would be entering into an internal struggle. Only if it was guided by the groups it was trying to support would it be able to give effective support. If it did not listen to these groups but instead broadcast its own message, it risked doing them a disservice. The strong message coming from the population of Herat was that it was better for schools to remain open for boys only, than for all schools to be closed.⁵⁷

Afghans who opposed the Taliban restrictions on girls' education and female employment argued that if boys were educated then they could educate their sisters and be the teachers of their daughters in the future. Many Afghan parents argued that international agencies should not withdraw their support for boys' schools because if boys were not educated they would never value education for girls and there would be no future generation of teachers for either boys or girls. The continued opening of schools for boys also kept alive the question of the access of women to employment since the majority of teachers were women. The policy adopted by SCF, far from being understood as a message of solidarity,

⁵⁶ Both are official languages of Afghanistan.

was interpreted as a double blow to both boys and girls. By placing so much emphasis upon the way in which the Taliban had institutionalized gender inequity, it also detracted from the lesson learned in Lebanon that the greatest locus of change for children was the family. Long before the Taliban had prohibited attendance of girls, it had been common for girls living outside the urban centres of Herat and Kabul to be refused permission to attend school by their fathers.⁵⁸ Afghans who supported female education gave the utilitarian counsel that the best defence of the future generation of girls would be to put greater resources into schools for boys.

In Hugo Slim's discussion of the moral examples that aid workers turn to, he mentions the importance of people from within the host community.⁵⁹ There were people who shone forth as moral examples within the Afghan community, from which SCF could have taken a lead.⁶⁰ In the particular sphere of education, there were individual Afghans who had the skills to negotiate a space for education for girls and boys within a framework acceptable to the Taliban.

The *Aschiana* project in Kabul provided several daytime drop-in centres for girls and boys working on the street where they could get a meal, a wash, and attend classes. It extended its activities under Taliban control. Its success could be attributed to several reasons: first the individual example of its director, and secondly the way in which the project was

⁵⁷ At the women-only prayers held on Wednesday at a shrine in Herat, I observed that teenage girls were praying for their schools to be opened, not for the boys' schools to be closed. July 1997.

⁵⁸ Sellick 1998.

⁵⁹ Slim 1997, 5.

⁶⁰ For a comparison with the kind of leadership available in a culture dominated by Christian churches, see 'OD and Churches in Development', *Organisational Development Consultancy: Strengthening the Capacity of NGOs?*, ODC News, Issue No. 4, December 1997.

embedded in a set of values which were incontrovertible across Afghanistan. The children involved worked on the streets as rubbish collectors, shoe-cleaners and water-sellers, to gain a livelihood for themselves and their families. The project was concerned with their survival, protection from hazards, health and cleanliness. In addition, there were elementary classes.⁶¹ The international NGO, *Terre des Hommes*, was careful to be guided by the Afghan director in the nature of support it gave to *Aschiana*, for example it was the Afghan director who negotiated all agreements with the Taliban authorities.⁶²

The internal struggle over values took place at a myriad of levels. Afghan defenders of female education could influence the people closest to them without ever taking a public stand. In Zabul I visited a home school for girls run by the wife of the local Taliban commander.⁶³ She had negotiated with her husband for his support. Any publicity from an external organization would have jeopardized her negotiations.⁶⁴

The Islamic Coordination Council, an Afghan NGO, made a direct link between the stand taken by international agencies on the gender issue, and the participation of school-age boys in the war.

⁶¹ See also *Terre des Hommes*, 1996.

⁶² UNCHS (Habitat) has had similar success in resolving issues affected by Taliban gender policies, by emphasizing the local ownership of project assets. Sewing machines confiscated by the Taliban have been returned to the local community at the request of the local community. Personal communication, 1996.

⁶³ August 1997.

⁶⁴ When women choose to make public demonstrations of their objections to the Taliban gender policies, there is a place for public support. In winter 1996, women marched against the closure of public bathhouses in Herat. A number were beaten and jailed for their pains. In such a situation a message of solidarity might be the most useful contribution that an external agency could make. See for example the full page announcement by ECHO and *Médecins du Monde* in *International Herald Tribune*, 9 March 1998.

More emphasis on the gender issue will affect the rights of male [boys in schools] and will cause adverse results. In other words closing the schools will cause flow and rush of young generation to the frontlines, because the only income for them will be to go to warlords to afford the minimal living requirement of their families.⁶⁵

SCF argued that it had taken a principled stand in Afghanistan. I contend that this was a distorted version of the positive creed of universalism. Under the guise of gender equity SCF ended up pressing for equal disadvantage for both boys and girls. If SCF had combined its universalist values with a cross-cultural perspective of the kind advocated by Abd Allah Ahmad An-Na'im, and weighed up the utilitarian value of maintaining education for boys, I argue it would have made a more effective contribution to the future of the children in Afghanistan. Its decision to withdraw from Herat was particularly ill-advised given the drift towards cultural essentialism amongst international policy makers. This decision could be interpreted as confirmation that there was no common set of values uniting the people from whom SCF drew support with the people living in Afghanistan.

Utilitarianism: understanding and measuring the dynamic impact of current interventions on future generations in Tajikistan

My reappraisal of the SCF programme in neighbouring Tajikistan leads me to a similar conclusion. Decision-making was principled, but did not take into account utilitarian

⁶⁵ Islamic Coordination Council, statement to conference, 'From Rhetoric to Reality: The Role of Aid in Local Peace Building in Afghanistan', Post War Reconstruction and Development Unit, York, January 1998.

values, and the programme that resulted was only of limited short-term benefit to children. What could SCF have done in Tajikistan in order to strengthen its capacity to encourage change across generations and alleviate suffering for children in the longer term? I suggest that SCF required a stronger understanding of the processes which underpin generational change, and indicators to measure whether its interventions were effective. How SCF could acquire that understanding and what indicators it could use are the subject of this section.

SCF began its work in Tajikistan by identifying children living in female-headed households in the war-affected south as particularly vulnerable to poverty. It then developed a programme of assistance to these households which borrowed heavily in its design from SCF's work in Iraqi Kurdistan. This involved the distribution of agricultural assets and the development of a revolving loan programme. Five years later the agency was locked into the same programme with larger-scale funding, this time from the Tajikistan Social Investment Fund (TASIF), a government agency financed by the World Bank.⁶⁶

This Pilot Poverty Alleviation Project followed a development model of channelling international assistance through the national government to the poorest of the poor. This was a principled approach apparently consistent with SCF's universalism, but I question whether it was combined with either a utilitarian perspective or an optimistic belief in the

⁶⁶ Two other international agencies were also involved: Save the Children - US and the Aga Khan Foundation. The World Bank made a credit to the government of Tajikistan through the government-appointed Tajikistan Social Investment Fund (TASIF), and the three international agencies then implemented the programme.

possibility of peace. I have already referred in the context of the civil war in Nigeria to Ed Cairns' argument that aid should not necessarily be targeted to the poorest of the poor, but rather towards mitigating instability and the risks of war.

The conditions which increase the risks of war are evil in themselves which need to be remedied: gross inequality, a weak and corrupt government, and the denial of people's basic rights. When large numbers of citizens experience social, political and economic exclusion war becomes more likely.⁶⁷

Ed Cairns challenged the view of development behind the poverty alleviation project. If SCF had adopted his utilitarian view to transforming the protracted social conflict in Tajikistan rather than alleviating its worst effects, it might have focussed on the future fighters, the adolescent boys. Instead it deliberately excluded this group. If a boy aged 11 to 18 was present in a female-headed household, he was assumed to be able to make an economic contribution to the household, and it did not qualify for SCF support.

The GPS stated that one of the aims of the global programme was to 'respond to the situation of children in emergencies in ways which put their immediate needs in the context of their longer-term interests and development'. In the context of Tajikistan, SCF needed to find out whether the programme had had any impact upon the new generation of adolescent girls, who might have been aged ten when SCF first encountered them, but by the fifth year of the programme were 15 and approaching childbearing age. Were these

⁶⁷ Cairns 1997, 59. See also Macrae, J. and Zwi, A., eds, 1994. *War and Hunger: Rethinking International Responses to Complex Emergencies*, London: Zed Books in association with Save the Children Fund (UK).

girls less likely, thanks to SCF, to be forming female-headed households without the means to provide adequate nutrition to their children? This question could not be answered in isolation from an understanding of the circumstances of male adolescents. SCF did not have this understanding. It was working blindfold and risked being locked into policies which did not respond to circumstances as they evolved.

One of the questions put by a gathering of male refugees in Sakhi refugee camp, Mazar-i-Sharif, to a visiting delegation from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) was the following: 'Why should we go back to Tajikistan, if we then have to leave and go and find work in Russia?'⁶⁸ The refugees' prime concerns about returning to Tajikistan, and in particular the southern Khatlon province, were personal security and economic opportunities. They also asked questions about the position of male adolescents whose schooling had been disrupted and who were of an age to be conscripted into the army.

When the OSCE, in conjunction with UNHCR, was trying to encourage the voluntary repatriation of refugees it had therefore to provide reassurance to the men, who would take the decision for the household to return, on two counts: firstly political survival, and secondly economic survival. To provide effective reassurance would mean challenging the conflict entrepreneurs who habitually used organized violence to assert economic control.

⁶⁸ Personal Observation, Sakhi camp, Mazar-i-Sharif, Afghanistan, 20 March 1997. Sakhi camp was established by the UNHCR to house refugees from Tajikistan on 27 December 1992. This visit took place as the Tajik refugees were preparing for their fourth *Nowruz* [New Year, 21 March] outside their country. The

When wars occur 'outside' the global economy, emergency aid often remains the only major response by Western governments to these distant 'unimportant' wars, which do not immediately threaten important economic interests.⁶⁹

The inadequacy of emergency aid in providing an incentive for refugees to return to Tajikistan was recognized to a certain extent by the international community: the OSCE was present in a protection role, and, unusually, the World Bank took the decision to invest in a country still torn by military conflict.⁷⁰ How could either agency measure its effectiveness?

Measuring a contribution to peaceful change is not easy. However, amongst the indicators agreed between the World Bank and TASIF for the Pilot Poverty Alleviation Project were indicators to measure the increase or decrease in security in the project area. As a partner in the project SCF had to develop such indicators. This required a shift from an emphasis upon poverty alleviation to conflict mitigation. Quantifiable poverty alleviation indicators developed in the pilot project included the nutrition and health of children, whether they possessed shoes and their home was warm. Below is an exploration of what conflict mitigation indicators might look like.

The social fault lines important in the area where SCF was working had the following history. Before the war the province of Khatlon was divided into the provinces of Kuliab

dialogue was conducted in Russian, the head of the delegation was a woman from Denmark, and the hosts were Afghan.

⁶⁹ Cairns 1997, 47.

⁷⁰ Tajikistan was also unique in having a resident Human Rights Watch delegate.

and Kurgan Teppe. The dried-up marshes of the province of Kuliab were populated with people from the foothills in the 1930s. Kurgan Teppe had been irrigated since the 1940s and 1950s for the cultivation of cotton and other crops. The area was populated mostly as a result of Stalin's policy of forced migration, under which a significant portion of Kurgan Teppe's population was moved in from the mountains of Garm and the Pamirs, as well as Kuliab. Since one of the particular problems of Tajikistan is shortage of land suitable for cultivation, the local population of Uzbeks, Arabs⁷¹ and Tajiks did not look favourably on the arrival of the newcomers. Even where the new groups were settled in the same *kolkhoz* (collective farm), they formed their own neighbourhoods. People from Garm who were moved to the district of Vakhsh during the 1940s and 1950s hardly mixed with the other groups, marrying among themselves, preserving their local traditions and religious practices even though they worked on mixed *kolkhoz*.⁷² They prospered and their houses were marked out as multi-storey. People from Kuliab and Khodjand had long been linked economically: cotton cultivated in Kuliab was treated in Khodjand. This economic link was transformed into a political alliance in the 1970s by the investment of funds in the Kuliab region, the integration of some of the elite of the region, and by promises of autonomy for the Uzbeks of Kuliab.

During the war neighbour was pitted against neighbour in the mixed town of Kurgan Teppe, and *kholkhoz* was set against *kholkhoz*. At first the opposition based on the alliance between the people of Garm and the Pamirs was victorious and the homes of Kuliabis were burned and looted. As victory passed to the Kuliabis in October 1991 most of the villages

⁷¹ The Arab community settled in the Kabodian area during the 17th century.

⁷² Jahangiri, G. 1994. 'The Premises for the Construction of a Tajik National Identity' in Djalili 1994, 14-41.

believed to have supported the opposition were systematically looted and burned. This second round of fighting was fuelled by revenge and left households from Garm and the Pamirs suffering the worst effects of the war.

SCF provided assistance in the form of agricultural assets to all women in Bokhtar district of Khatlon province caring for children on their own, whether the father was dead or merely absent. Some fathers remained as refugees in Afghanistan, others were in prison, or had remarried and were living with a second family. The main reason why men did not return with the women and children to Tajikistan was security. The government failed to investigate and to take measures to counter discrimination and attacks by armed, pro-government civilians against returning refugees and internally displaced persons. This created an environment of fear and impunity. Circumstances in the town of Kurgan Teppe and the districts of Bokhtar and Vakhsh were especially critical.⁷³

When upon my arrival in Tajikistan I asked the SCF fieldworkers, who by then had been with the project for one year, what was the most important change they remarked on since they began their work, they mentioned improved security. One clear sign of this was that there were more men around in the villages. In the early days it was the men who had been most fearful. Women and children used to undertake the journey to town in their place.⁷⁴

Human Rights Watch confirmed that young men who had returned to their villages by May

⁷³ Human Rights Watch Report, May 1995, 3.

⁷⁴ Conway, D., *Bokhtar District Needs Assessment Report*, January 1995, 12. SCF Tajikistan archives.

1995 feared deeply for their personal safety and rarely left their homes or *kolkhoz*; this isolation made it more difficult to assess the real threats to their physical safety.⁷⁵

Evidence from the SCF project points to the possibility of mapping freedom from fear in terms of freedom of movement, and mobility as a measure of personal security. In a village where all the inhabitants shared a group identity, there could be a high degree of security within the village. Only once the villagers ventured out of the village and risked encounters with members of other groups did they fear for themselves or their possessions.⁷⁶

In Saripul village the Garmi inhabitants were harassed when they used the Kuliabi-controlled bus service to go to the provincial centre of Kurgan Teppe. They contacted an Uzbek who owned a bus and arranged with him that he would provide a service for the village. However, the Uzbek was then threatened by the Kuliabi bus company and prevented from providing the service. This situation was described to me in terms of one regional group controlling the activities of another.

Restricted mobility not only affected adults travelling to market or to work. Children too could be affected. Schools which had a catchment area of several villages, spanning different groups, were the site of bullying. Children from one village were beaten on their way to school in another village. The fear affected parents, teachers and children alike.

When children from one village were repeatedly beaten their parents made plans to build

⁷⁵ Human Rights Watch Report, May 1995, 11.

⁷⁶ Harriss, J. *Report on the Evaluation of Phase One of the Female Headed Households' Economic Activities Project, Tajikistan*, Kathmandu: SCF South Asia Regional Office, August 1995, 14. SCF Tajikistan archives.

their own school.⁷⁷ The teachers at another school were reportedly afraid of disciplining a particular group of children for fear of retributions from their parents.⁷⁸

Added to an estimate of people's mobility in their own village, and the local market town, should be an estimate of their mobility in reaching the capital. Dushanbe was the site of public offices, institutes of higher education, specialist hospitals and the airport, access to which was required by all citizens. However it could be said that Dushanbe was a microcosm of Tajikistan, with suburbs divided according to the region of origin of their inhabitants. These divisions extended to the alleys of the main markets and were being perpetuated from one generation to the next: Green Market was divided up between child barrow-pushers of different regional origins.⁷⁹

Immediately after the end of the civil war, travel within this map of local prejudices could be highly dangerous. After pro-government forces had regained control of Dushanbe individuals carrying passports showing they originated from Garm or Pamirs were summarily executed. Beginning in mid-December 1992, Popular Front soldiers and other pro-government forces stopped buses and trolley buses, stopped people on the streets, and deployed forces at Dushanbe airport in order to check individuals' documents.⁸⁰

⁷⁷ Female Headed Households Project Diary, December 1994. SCF Tajikistan archives.

⁷⁸ Female Headed Households Project Diary, Day 82. SCF Tajikistan archives.

⁷⁹ Personal observation, 1996.

⁸⁰ The Gorno-Badakhshan (Pamiri) Soviet created a commission to investigate the deaths. It gathered a list of more than 300 Pamiri deaths by making rounds in morgues, at mass graves and in private homes. Human Rights Watch Report, December 1993, 4.

Within an unstable political situation, the mobility of particular categories of people may be especially critical as an indicator of increasing or decreasing security. I want to highlight here the freedom of movement of adolescent boys and girls.⁸¹

While the personal security of returnees in the villages appeared to have improved during the life of the SCF project, young men remained particularly at risk. Reports of night-time raids on villages to round up conscripts to the government forces were present in the earliest days of the project diary, and adolescent boys continued to be at risk of forced recruitment into the government forces. In both Dushanbe and Kurgan Teppe the market was routinely sealed and adolescent boys rounded up. Buses between the two towns were also stopped by army recruiting agents. Students were meant to be exempt from military service for the duration of their studies, however students were forcibly recruited from the main street leading to Dushanbe university.⁸² In one instance a school was raided.⁸³ This resort to forced recruitment is in part explained by the breakdown of the compulsory system of pre-draft military training and conscription.⁸⁴

There were individual responses to the forced recruitment, but to my knowledge, no concerted action on the part of young people, parents or international agencies. Parents with the necessary financial means would identify the recruiting officer and pay for the freedom of their son. In 1996 the going rate seemed to be approximately \$100. Other

⁸¹ See Turner, S., *Angry Young Men in Camps: Gender, Age and Class Relations in Burundian Refugees in Tanzania*, UNHCR Working Paper No. 9. www.unhcr.ch/refworld/pub/wpapers/wpno9.htm

⁸² Personal observation, Rudaki Street, Dushanbe, November 1995.

⁸³ Interview, Russian School, Dushanbe, April 1996.

⁸⁴ Jones, E. 1985. *Red Army and Society: A Sociology of the Soviet Military*, London: Allen and Unwin, 64.

parents would approach ICRC or the OSCE who then might trace the missing young person, but could not secure his release.

The young untrained men were sent to fight in the area of Tawildara, where from August 1994, the most serious fighting between government forces and the opposition since the civil war took place. In areas of Tajikistan under the control of the opposition, young people were forcibly recruited into opposition forces.⁸⁵ In Afghanistan, Human Rights Watch estimated that in 1993, 3000 - 5000 young Tajiks were undergoing military training under Islamic Revival Party auspices in different parts of Kunduz and Takhar.⁸⁶

While there were no reports of female recruits to the government or opposition forces, adolescent girls were also vulnerable to abduction.⁸⁷ In August 1995 the SCF evaluator reported that in the worst affected villages:

People are still afraid of 'men' who arrive in the night, threatening them and sometimes taking women away. Thirty four men from this village have disappeared since the war (theoretically) finished. In other villages, however, people said that they had felt fairly safe for the last year or more. Several women, however, reported that they had married off daughters of only 15 or 16, since the war because of concerns about their security.⁸⁸

⁸⁵ Interview, Nowobod, Garm, January 1996.

⁸⁶ Human Rights Watch Report, December 1993.

Adolescent girls were also targeted in a number of hideous attacks in the Garm region. Accused of un-Islamic behaviour, three young women were taken from their homes and murdered. Other adolescent girls in the area then feared to go to school and to be seen outside their homes.⁸⁹

Human Rights Watch interviews made in Bokhtar district in December 1995 with village elders began by describing how the security of young Garmi men had improved greatly over the past year. However, the elders went on to acknowledge that most of the young men in those villages had left Tajikistan for Russia or another CIS state, in order to flee harassment and the floundering Tajik economy. The Human Rights Watch delegate concluded that the departure of the young men was a way of resolving their problems with the Kuliabis.⁹⁰ By 1997 it was an increasingly common scenario that the women and young children would return, and the man would go as a migrant labourer to Russia with the older children.⁹¹

The reasons why the older children did not stay in Tajikistan were twofold: there was a fear of conscription and rape as boys and girls became adolescents, and older children were also harder for the woman to feed. SCF's programme was helping the woman feed the remaining children, but doing nothing to prevent their eventual migration. Poverty alleviation indicators which measured the nutrition and health of children demonstrated the

⁸⁷ Carolyn Nordstrom raises the question of why it is difficult to gather information about the specific experiences of girls in war. She writes with reference to Mozambique. Nordstrom, C. 1997. *Girls and Warzones: Troubling Questions*, Uppsala: Life and Peace Institute.

⁸⁸ Harriss 1995. SCF Tajikistan archives.

⁸⁹ Interview, Nowobod, Garm, January 1996.

⁹⁰ Human Rights Watch Report, May 1996, 21.

project's success. Conflict mitigation indicators which measured the mobility of male and female adolescents might have led to a reassessment of priorities.⁹²

If SCF were to understand and promote change over generations, then it required an understanding of the processes which perpetuated social conflict. It needed an understanding of the social structures around which society in Tajikistan was organized, the sites of power to be contested, and the interests of other international actors. An analysis of society in Tajikistan based on ethnic (or regional) identities was simplistic: individuals had personal histories which complicated their allegiances. Power was located not only in fighting forces but also in the control of economic assets, protection rackets and cross-border trade.⁹³ As shown in the case of Russia,⁹⁴ international actors' interests could be promoted by confused and contradictory policies.

This kind of knowledge is commonly held by few international delegates with the possible exception of the ICRC and Human Rights Watch. Too often, international delegates are briefed on the causes of the conflict, when what they will be most concerned with are its ongoing consequences. As Jonathan Goodhand has underlined in his study of NGOs working in conflict situations:

⁹¹ See also Pilkington, H. 1997. 'For the sake of the children': Gender and Migration in the Former Soviet Union', in Buckley 1997, 119-140.

⁹² Goodhand 1999 (unpublished), 10. Goodhand observes that peace and conflict issues were not factored in to project appraisal, monitoring and evaluation of SCF work in Sri Lanka.

⁹³ There is evidence for continuity between the war economy and the earlier illegal commerce under the socialist system. Jahangiri, G. 1994. 'The Premises for the Construction of a Tajik National Identity' in Djalili 1994, 45.

Conflict entrepreneurs have a sophisticated understanding of community level dynamics and institutions and exploit this knowledge. For NGOs to compete with the claims of the conflict entrepreneurs, and build viable constituencies for peace they need far greater understanding of the terrain they operate in.⁹⁵

This expertise is even more vital when the armed conflict is not across a front line between two opposing camps.⁹⁶

One further cautionary note needs to be made in relation to the emphasis placed in this section upon the utilitarian value of analysis. The knowledge of the researchers is always partial, but brings with it a certain power. One of the flaws in the promotion of urgent action-oriented research in situations of protracted social conflict is that this can be understood to mean that the group of people encountered by the researchers are then in some way entitled to humanitarian assistance. The analysis provided by SCF in southern Tajikistan persuaded other agencies to start work in southern Tajikistan, regardless of the undocumented need elsewhere in the country. A review of the literature relating to Afghan children revealed a disproportionate amount of information relating to refugee children and a meagre amount relating to the population of children displaced within Afghanistan. This

⁹⁴ Russia has organized dialogue between both parties in Tajikistan, while providing full support to one party, the Communist old guard. Lynch, D., *Russian 'Peacekeeping' Strategies in the CIS 1992-96: The Cases of Moldova, Georgia and Tajikistan*, D.Phil. International Relations, Oxford University 1997, 233.

⁹⁵ Goodhand 1997, 6.

⁹⁶ Since the Leninabad-Kuliab alliance had regained control of the state in December 1992 the violence had become highly organized. However, these organizations did not have a formally recognized leadership and membership, nor was their sole function to engage in armed conflict.

difference has also been reflected in the scale of humanitarian assistance that has been made available to each group.⁹⁷

Optimistic pacificism in Afghanistan and Tajikistan

In my discussion of universalist values and their application to Afghanistan I have focussed upon the possible contribution SCF could make to building a local consensus around child rights and advocated the maintenance of boys' access to education. Only once military actors in Afghanistan had ceased fighting over gender relations as a cultural resource and symbol of power would girls as well as boys be able to access education. In my discussion of utilitarian values and their application to Tajikistan I have focussed upon the reasons for the creation of female-headed households and advocated the development of programmes to increase economic opportunities for men and to protect young males from recruitment. Only if the economy and people's freedom of movement were freed from the control of organized violence, would men be able to find jobs to provide for their families in Tajikistan, and maintain a tax base for essential children's services in the fields of health and education. Both conclusions point me in the direction of the overriding importance of peace to the future of children in Afghanistan and Tajikistan.

Young people living in areas of protracted social conflict have made it abundantly clear that their primary aspiration is for peace, not just negative peace, but positive peace which affords them opportunities for education, training and employment.⁹⁸

⁹⁷ Sellick 1998.

Here [in demobilization camp] we are just hanging about talking about our problems to care givers and playing football. What we need to do is get back to school and start learning something. At the very least let me learn how to make a cutlass blade so I can go and brush a farm.⁹⁹

In response, SCF staff at all levels have to reject the despised impossibility argument and be optimistic about a peaceful outcome. A pessimistic prognosis of protracted social conflict is to deny the aspirations of children in three ways. First, it denies the value of the individual child. Second, it is a denial of the potential of the up-and-coming generation to lead their country out of war. Third, it is a denial of the capacity of the international community to act in partnership with them to build a peaceful future.

The GPS aimed to put children at the centre of decisions whether to intervene and how, and identified the participation of children as a key tool in this process.¹⁰⁰ I argue that this participatory approach is essential to an optimistic view, and acknowledges the value of the individual child.

⁹⁸ The primacy of peace in terms of people's hopes and values is shown by SCF in Sri Lanka, *Listening to the Displaced*, quoted in Goodhand 1999 (unpublished).

⁹⁹ Young male ex-combatant in Sierra Leone, quoted in Peters, K. and Richards, P. 'Fighting with Open Eyes: Young Combatants in Sierra Leone', in Bracken and Petty 1998, 76-111.

¹⁰⁰ Much of the history and progress of children's participation is undocumented and unpublished. A useful inventory of child participation methods can be found in Johnson, V. and others, eds, 1998. *Stepping Forward: Children and Young People's Participation in the Development Process*, London: Intermediate Technology Publications.

It is sometimes argued that in war-affected areas there is no scope for participative research.¹⁰¹ While the security situation in conflict areas may frustrate regular extended interactions with children, delay project development, and create concern among children and adults about their continued participation, there is a growing body of evidence that children can make significant contributions to research even in situations of protracted social conflict.¹⁰² Often researchers are not bringing goods and services, but they will be communicating a set of values which can reinforce existing power relations or transform them. Participative research methods which lend authority to disempowered and disaffected members of the population can contribute to a different kind of society. The experience of wasteful, destructive conflict teaches children that some lives are worthless. Participative research methodology can offer a different lesson.¹⁰³

In an evaluation of the SCF project in southern Tajikistan,¹⁰⁴ the involvement of child evaluators enhanced the confidence of the team of children. Their involvement gave a clear message to those they interviewed, as well as SCF-UK staff, of their centrality to the project. The fieldworkers said that they had learned 'to look at the world through children's eyes' and that 'children can be helpful in finding solutions to problems'.¹⁰⁵ The head teachers had seen an example of children's participation which could be helpful to them in the development of children's representation on school community boards.

¹⁰¹ See proceedings of Conference Researching on Humanitarian Assistance in Conflict Areas, 8-10 May, 2000, Post War Reconstruction and Development Unit, University of York.

¹⁰² Coomaraswamy, Priya 'Exploring Child Participation: The Sri Lanka Experience', in Johnson and others 1998, 161-166.

¹⁰³ Care must be taken to ensure participants join in a research project on equal terms with the researcher. For example, if involvement in the research increases the workload of the child without any reward, this is sending a message that the child's involvement is of insignificant value.

¹⁰⁴ Parry-Williams, J., *Evaluation, Primarily by Children Evaluators, of the SCF (UK) Female Headed Households Project, Tajikistan*, Save the Children Fund 1998.

The centrality of children's participation to the transformation of political processes is beginning to be recognized in areas of conflict where they have become shockingly visible actors in the violent conflict.¹⁰⁶ Children in Afghanistan and Tajikistan have not yet taken centre stage in the same way as children in a number of African conflicts. However, before the genie is out of the bottle, there is scope through children's participation at all stages of project design to lay the foundation in the younger generation for a more inclusive society.

Graça Machel finds from her study on *The Impact of Armed Conflict on Children* that the views of young people are less polarized than adults, and concludes that it is therefore critical to the resolution of armed conflict that they are heard.¹⁰⁷ Article 19 has argued for greater freedom of expression for young people living with conflict, based on case studies from Sierra Leone, Uganda and South Africa.¹⁰⁸

Circumstances in Afghanistan limit the access to information and freedom of expression of young people in multiple ways. I have already discussed the exclusion of girls from school. In a society where the vast majority of the population are illiterate, the Taliban prohibition on the use of all representational media has hindered the flow of public information.¹⁰⁹ The

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., 71.

¹⁰⁶ Brett, R. and McCallin, M., *Children, the Invisible Soldiers*, Rädda Barnen (Swedish Save the Children) 1996.

¹⁰⁷ Machel, G., *The Impact of Armed Conflict on Children*, Briefing Notes on the Final Report of the Expert of the Secretary General of the United Nations A/51/306, 1996.

¹⁰⁸ Article 19, 1999. *Kid's Talk: Freedom of Expression and the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child*, London: Article 19.

¹⁰⁹ SCF-US had to redesign all their mine awareness material removing all images of living creatures, including children. July 1997.

inhospitable terrain, fragmented transport networks, and the continuing war, all limit travel and communication within Afghanistan.

The use of the media may be a creative response to the limitations upon young people's access to information and also provide them with a channel of expression, as well as communication across the country. Afghanistan is one of the few places where, in the absence of local print media, the indigenous knowledge system for coping with the consequences of war has been supported by an external actor.¹¹⁰ The BBC Pashtu and Dari service are widely listened to and broadcast not only news bulletins but also a soap opera series, *New Life New Home*, which is set within Afghanistan. SCF could encourage the development of programmes for younger listeners. These would garner the views of non-combatants and foster a greater sense of their own participation in the future of their country. The radio could also broadcast news of initiatives making positive changes in the lives of children and young people.¹¹¹ Creative use of the media could reinforce the idea that the younger generation has the potential to lead their country out of war.

The third level at which the impossibility argument has to be refuted is that of the capacity of the international community to act as partners with the next generation to build a peaceful future. SCF is part of an international community of NGOs, the ICRC, UN and governmental agencies. When the population of the war-affected area has made clear the

¹¹⁰ Warren 1995.

¹¹¹ The BBC has now taken up this proposal from Sellick 1998, and is developing children's programmes. SCF has experience of supporting children's participation in the media elsewhere, e.g. a weekly TV programme in Honduras. Save the Children *Country report: Central America*, September 1996. In Tajikistan, SCF attempted in 1996 to develop a television programme made by and for young people which would have presented views from around the country. The project failed to gain the cooperation of the state-run studios in different regions of the country and no programmes were broadcast.

primacy it attaches to peace, action on any other issue such as gender inequity, serves only to highlight the lack of commitment by the international community to the critical question of war and peace. This is especially the case in Afghanistan, where international agencies have been engaged over a prolonged period.

As Afghanistan shows, however, such states do not fail on their own, solely because of internal deficiencies. On the contrary, failed states are states whose history leaves them vulnerable to shifts in the international power configuration.¹¹²

Whether it was within the administration of Ismail Khan, or alongside the Taliban, the UN and international NGOs expanded into the space created by the lack of government in order to deliver food assistance, clean water, health, education, and agricultural inputs. These humanitarian programmes were highly visible in the country, however it was also evident to the population that the UN did not have the political will (or capacity) to resolve the country's political problems. At worst, the UN and other humanitarian agencies could be seen to be profiting from the unresolved conflict. This hostile construction of international humanitarian assistance in Afghanistan came to the fore in Mazar-i-Sharif in 1997. Looting was deliberately targeted at the UN and NGOs and was accompanied by very strong anti-Western feelings. Westerners were accused of providing materials and money to the Taliban.¹¹³ The UN was also accused of abandoning the quest for a political

¹¹² Rubin B.R., 'Women and Pipelines: Afghanistan's Proxy Wars', *International Affairs*, Vol.73, 1997, 283-296 (p. 284).

¹¹³ In Andakhoi, water cisterns built with UN assistance were explained to me as UN assistance to prepare pits for the Taliban to hold prisoners, August 1997.

solution to Afghanistan.¹¹⁴ Such looting was new to Afghanistan, even if it has been a frequent occurrence in other situations where international assistance agencies are working.¹¹⁵

Five years after the first international agencies entered Tajikistan, first world immunity had worth thin. International staff of the UN and NGOs were repeatedly taken hostage by parties excluded from negotiations with the government, and five had been killed.

Economic investment in an unregulated economy could be seen as providing further resources to fuel violent competition. Both government¹¹⁶ and other armed groups¹¹⁷ were prepared to take advantage of aid invested in local industries to produce goods destined for children.

Representatives of UN agencies and international NGOs working in Afghanistan, whose funding predominantly came from Western donor countries, were also aware of the reports that the same donor countries were providing support to the Taliban. If these reports were confirmed then a sanctions campaign could only appear hypocritical. A more cohesive policy would have involved the UN and international NGOs putting their own house in order and bringing whatever influence they had to bear on the backers of the Taliban. Such a lead had to come from headquarters.

¹¹⁴ Johnson 1998, 119.

¹¹⁵ 'Security at Work', *Forced Migration Review*, April 1999.

¹¹⁶ In 1996 SCF payments to a shoe factory for children's shoes were diverted to the manufacture of army boots.

¹¹⁷ In 1996 coal purchased by SCF for the heating of schools was diverted to an armed group.

It should be clear in the report that our primary role is not one of peace-making, nor even ‘adding pressure to the political process for achieving peace’.¹¹⁸

This comment from Rädde Barnen showed how much distance members of the International Save the Children Alliance had put between themselves and the political process. It reflected a view of the organization as disconnected from the Western societies from which it drew its support and which had a role in fuelling the conflict.

In contrast, the SCF’s report *Children at War* has a photo of two children sitting on a Kabul street, with the barrel of a gun across the foreground of the picture. The conclusion to the report printed directly over this photo reads:

To uphold them [the civil, political, social, economic and cultural rights of the child], we need the international will to find political solutions to prevent war, and more development aid for countries where people are fighting over scarce resources. And the richer countries must stop supplying the weapons which make these wars ‘against children’ possible. Unless this is achieved, future generations will continue to be destroyed.¹¹⁹

¹¹⁸ Correspondence from Tomas Hildebrand, Rädde Barnen, February 1998.

¹¹⁹ Save the Children, *Children at War*, November 1994.

By 1996 other commercial international links, besides the longstanding arms trade, were emerging and regional interests were beginning to shift. These reflected the development of their own economies by the newly independent Central Asian republics.¹²⁰

Iran was moving forward with its plans to serve as that region's major outlet for oil and gas to the international market. At the same time the stakes for Pakistan and Saudi Arabia had greatly increased. Not just trade routes, but potentially lucrative oil and gas pipelines were at stake. In the spring of 1996, press reports revealed that a partnership between the American company Unocal and the Saudi company Delta had concluded plans for multimillion-dollar oil and gas pipelines from Turkmenistan to Pakistani Baluchistan via Herat and Kandahar.

Sanctions upon Taliban-controlled Herat would be at best a 'blunt instrument' to encourage Taliban compliance with a UN Charter which they perceived as Western inspired. By mapping the international links between the Taliban and their Western backers, it is possible to identify where pressure could be applied more effectively. This involves global networks of the kind being developed by Oxfam in relation to its work on the social and environmental impact of the oil industry,¹²¹ or by Canadian Partnership for Africa in relation to the diamond trade in war-affected Sierra Leone, Liberia and

¹²⁰ See Rubin B.R., 'Women and Pipelines: Afghanistan's Proxy Wars', *International Affairs*, Vol.73, 1997, 283-296; Tarock, A., 'The Politics of the Pipeline: The Iran and Afghanistan Conflict', *Third World Quarterly*, Vol.20, 1999, 801-820.

¹²¹ *Corporate Accountability in Columbia*, Oxfam Gender and Development Links, November 2000. www.oxfam.org.uk/policy/gender/1100columbia.htm

Angola.¹²² Such work requires an optimistic view of organizational capacity and international partnerships.

Peace-building has been described by one Afghan NGO representative as ‘the honey spread on the bread’.¹²³ It sweetens a proposal and makes it more attractive to donors. If this scepticism for a term fashionable throughout the 1990s is set aside, peace-building can be recognized as ‘the strategy which most directly tries to reverse the destructive processes that accompany violence’.¹²⁴ The aim of this chapter has been to demonstrate that best practice developed in response to the combination of guiding principles: universalism, utilitarianism and optimistic pacificism, is underpinned by a belief in the possibility of peace.

Prescription for action

The tough and sometimes hellish choices faced by the worker in the situation of war, mean that ‘peace-building’ may be limited to keeping a presence, a pilot light. This pilot light is a sign of faith in the value of each individual child’s life, and the possibility of a peaceful future. To maintain it requires the absolutist obstinacy of the pacifists combined with the optimism of Eglantyne Jebb. Only International Assistance Mission have kept a pilot light burning in Afghanistan since before the Soviet invasion; all other international NGOs have come and gone. Longer-serving staff may be a source of moral examples for SCF’s many

¹²² Smillie, Ian and others, *The Heart of the Matter: Sierra Leone, Diamonds and Human Security*, Partnership Africa Canada, 2000. www.web.net/pac/ .

¹²³ January 1997.

short-term fieldworkers. However, people from within the community are more likely to be able to offer examples of how, within the specific cultural context, to build universal legitimacy for child rights. This consensus is most likely to be built around the material needs of children, and may require the maintenance of elements of a relief programme.

At the level of programme priorities, a utilitarian understanding of the factors that sustain the conflict, and indicators of social change are required. Programmes which reach across the conflict-affected area are vital to a climate of optimism, and creative ways should be found of overcoming the logistical difficulties of geography and warring divisions. Tough choices will be required between assisting the poorest of the poor and reducing the risks of conflict. The Human Rights Watch overseas delegate in Tajikistan, Guissou Jahangiri, was exemplary in her curiosity about the conflict and fearless in describing how it fed off international aid.¹²⁵

At the level of headquarters, SCF should investigate and publicize the international links that sustain protracted social conflict. It should encourage the rest of the international community to share in the responsibility for the child suffering that accompanies protracted conflict. Lastly SCF should add its weight to those international partnerships which advocate that those who benefit from the continuation of protracted social conflict, reach agreement on its termination and commence building a sustainable peace. This means reassessing SCF's relationships with its governmental donors, including the UK

¹²⁴ Ryan, S. 1990, cited in Goodhand, J. and Lewer, N., 'Sri Lanka: NGOs and Peace-Building in Complex Political Emergencies', *Third World Quarterly*, Vol.20 No.1, 1999, 69-87 (p. 85).

¹²⁵ Guissou Jahangiri's regular contributions to inter-agency meetings in Dushanbe radically changed the level of information and debate. Personal observation 1995-97.

government, the EU and the World Bank. It also means acknowledging the organized power of multinational corporations and local conflict entrepreneurs. If policy makers within SCF find that this creates uncomfortable relationships between the organization and its paymasters, then for individual moral examples of contentious action they have to look no further than the archive records of members of the *Fight the Famine Council*.

Conclusion

In 1919 Eglantyne Jebb wrote enthusiastically of SCF's plans to purchase milch cows to provide milk for the children of the city of Vienna. The SCF accounts show Cows for Vienna – £10,000.¹ Nearly eighty years later, SCF in Tajikistan was known amongst the population of the war-torn south as the organization that gave out cows.² A hasty conclusion would be that the organization had changed little over the course of the century. However, the rhetorical and ideological underpinnings of the actions of the founding generation and the SCF of the 1990s were very different. The founding generation was engaged in contentious political action: SCF purchased cows for Vienna with foreign currency at a time when the victorious allies were demanding the compulsory delivery of milch cows from the defeated countries. By contrast, SCF's programme of agricultural assistance in Tajikistan was developed in partnership with the World Bank and the government of Tajikistan to provide a safety net for children living in poverty. It did not fundamentally challenge the social and political processes which contributed to the creation of impoverished households.

I have used the paradigm of beliefs, values and techniques of persuasion shared by the founding generation of SCF as the lens through which I have looked at the organization's history to reveal its metamorphosis. In Chapter 1 I identified three guiding principles which were crucial to the actions of the generation who founded SCF in 1919. They were

¹ Breen, *SCF Archive Paper No.7, October 1995*, 14. The cows were given to farmers on the understanding that they would pay for the cows by delivering milk to the children of Vienna.

universalism, a positive creed reaching out to all children across political divides, utilitarianism, in recognition of the dynamic role of young people in generating the future, and optimistic pacificism. Unsurprisingly the ideological and rhetorical underpinnings of SCF were seen to change over the course of the century. Times change, and organizations must change with them if they are to survive. However, SCF has always defined itself as a value-based organization: a paradigmatic shift in the dominant constellation of values assented to by its supporters could undermine the very foundations of its identity. Chapter 8 showed how this was recognized by SCF (as well as other NGOs) in the 1990s when NGOs were experiencing increasing pressure from governmental donors to operate within a contract culture. This pressure forced NGOs to reaffirm their independent and voluntary identity, and focus upon the significance of organizational values.

The intervening chapters tracked how far SCF had departed from the guiding principles of the founding generation over the course of the last century. Chapter 2 described the extraordinary speed with which the founders translated the three principles into action in the defeated countries of Europe and in the Russian Civil War. This momentum was slowed by the Depression and a fall in SCF's income, but also by growing divisions within the anti-war movement from which SCF had drawn many of its early supporters. This was illustrated in Chapter 3 by SCF's response to the Spanish Civil War. By the outbreak of the Second World War SCF had shed its pacifist identity and become patriotic rather than international in its orientation. Chapters 4 and 5 portrayed SCF as the respectable partner of the British government in delivering welfare at home and relief abroad, in particular

² It was referred to by Tajiks as the 'UN for Cows' in their attempt to differentiate it from the many other international organizations that started operating in the country following the civil war. Personal observation

alongside British troops in Germany and UN troops in Korea. The succeeding period was known within SCF as the period of the junta. The overseas division was dominated by men with a military background. They developed two distinct approaches for wartime and peacetime. Chapter 6 explored how far this dualist approach was compatible with the guiding principles of the founding generation by examining SCF's role in the Nigerian Civil War. By this time the income of SCF had again reached a level comparable with the income received at the height of the Russian Famine. Chapter 7 covered the period 1975-1989 when programmes proliferated with little cohesion, however, within the work undertaken in Lebanon I discovered SCF upholding the principles of universalism and utilitarianism by reaching out to children across political divides and giving critical roles to young people as the generation of the future. Chapter 8 was a reflective analysis of my own work on behalf of SCF in Afghanistan and Tajikistan. Particularly striking was the primacy attached to peace by the people living with protracted social conflict. This period coincided with the development within SCF of the GPS and a renewed focus upon organizational values.

Two questions are now of particular relevance to this conclusion. First, how significant is it that SCF is a value-based organization? Secondly, do the values to which the founding generation gave their assent have an enduring significance over succeeding generations? The answer to the first question lies in the location of this case study of SCF within the associated historical narratives of war and peace, human rights, and NGO-state relations.

The history of war and peace produced one overriding lesson. None of the wars that SCF was involved with from 1919 until 1999 was localized. They all had international connections. They were either fought by outside powers on foreign soil, or fought with weapons (both military and humanitarian aid could be used to fuel and sustain a war) procured from outside powers. The enduring connections between the local and global economies of war made political ambitions at the end of the century to insulate Fortress Europe from the rest of the world appear out of touch with reality. The vision of SCF's founders of the ways in which humanity was globally connected was a closer reflection of reality.

The second strand of the historical narrative presented an apparent contradiction. This challenged the universal legitimacy of human rights. The founding myth of SCF is that Eglantyne Jebb conceived the Declaration of Children's Rights on Mount Geneva in a way reminiscent of Moses receiving the Ten Commandments. However, the 1923 Declaration was drafted and redrafted, and the 1959 Convention on the Rights of the Child relied upon a rare coming together of political interests during the Cold War. At the end of the century the highly publicized derogation of the rights of girls in Afghanistan, and the less well publicized derogation of the rights of refugee children in Europe, were absorbed into debates about cultural relativism. If they had been part of a public discourse dominated by universalism, they would have been seen as reminders that universal legitimacy can only be earned through the repeated conception and articulation of rights in plural settings. As

Eglantyne Jebb said ‘we must write out our belief in deeds before we can communicate this belief to others.’³

In two important respects Eglantyne Jebb’s blueprint for SCF was and still is an appropriate response to the world. Firstly, in a world where local issues have global connections she was determined to build an international, not a national, organization. Secondly, in a world where values are constructed and reconstructed in plural settings, she combined practical action with advocacy. The first two elements of the blueprint are common to many international non-governmental organizations and have enabled a plethora of NGOs to achieve consultative status with intergovernmental bodies such as the UN.

However, the third historical narrative casts a different light upon the achievements of SCF as an international organization. In some respects, the history of NGO-state relations has been one of advocacy and co-option. Chapter 2 showed how after the First World War, the NGOs led the way in encouraging the government to take on new responsibilities. Once the government had accepted a responsibility the NGO then remained to goad the government to fulfil its role:

A great deal of our work has been to make governmental action function which had lapsed for lack of outside pressure; to act, say, as the spokesmen for refugees with overburdened officials whose hands were too full to allow them to realise all that

³ Jebb, E., *Memorandum on Relief Policy*, SCF Archives reference SC/EJ.282.

was being suffered. Such work is often far harder to carry out than a smaller independent scheme, but it is also likely to be more far-reaching in its results.⁴

However, as the state extended its powers both over welfare at home and relief abroad the NGOs became contractors. Chapter 4 described how this transformation took place in the relations between the British government and SCF during the Second World War. SCF was unquestioning in its relationship with the British government and refrained from entering any other country without the permission of the national government involved until the 1990s. The circumstances in the last decade of the twentieth century demonstrate a more complex picture. In Tajikistan and Afghanistan the organizing powers of government officials were exceedingly limited and SCF found itself dealing with parastatal organizations locally. External actors included cross-border conflict entrepreneurs and multinational companies as well as national governments.

The first two historical narratives therefore describe a world where local issues have global connections and where values are constructed and reconstructed in plural settings. The third historical narrative is a reminder that power is organized in diverse ways. In such a world Eglantyne Jebb was convinced of the necessity of building not only an organization of office-holders and contracted staff, but a life-saving movement of people ready to engage in contentious social action. It is this third aspect relating to the organization of power which is most significant for this history of SCF and explains the centrality I have given to organizational values throughout this thesis. The motivating power of values is crucial to the success of a contentious social movement during its sustained interaction

⁴ Fry 1926, xxix.

with powerful opponents.⁵ Whereas an organization may or may not be value-based, the central activity of a contentious social movement is evaluative, it involves inscribing grievances in overall frames that identify an injustice, attributing the responsibility to others, and proposing a solution.⁶

This can be illustrated by a comparison between the donation of £10,000 for milch cows to Vienna in 1919 and the loan made to the Tajikistan government by the World Bank in 1997. Eglantyne Jebb had an optimistic faith in the capacity of every population to fulfil a double duty to its own children as well as to those abroad. The reciprocal donation made by the Council of Vienna in 1926 to provide the children of the striking miners in south Wales with milk appeared to confirm this faith. Eighty years later the SCF programme in Tajikistan was funded by a World Bank loan to the government of Tajikistan, which the children of Tajikistan would have to repay in twenty-five years time. In its first decade SCF was the almoner of supporters belonging to a contentious social movement that spanned Britain and Vienna. Eighty years later it was contracted to fill a very different role. However, the messages received by staff in Tajikistan were more mixed. Zainab Babaeva visited the UK to meet with other SCF staff from across the Middle East and Central Asia. One of her lasting impressions was that individuals were prepared to rattle

⁵ 'Collective action is often led by organizations, but these are sometimes beneficiaries, sometimes inciters, and at other times destroyers of popular politics. The recurring controversy about whether organizations produce movements or suppress them can be resolved only if we examine the less formal structures they draw upon – the social networks at the base of society and the connective structures that link them to one another. Sustaining a movement is the result of a delicate balance between throttling the power in movement by providing too much organization and leaving followers to spin off into the tyranny of decentralization.' Tarrow, S. 1998, *Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 201.

⁶ Tarrow 1998, 111.

collection boxes in the rain to solicit donations for SCF.⁷ Actress Amanda Burton and a photo-journalist visited Tajikistan and publicized their experiences in the UK press.⁸ These personal links created the impression of a social movement, however it was not contentious. It made no fundamental challenge to the authorities. Political power and the capacity to frame the relationship between donor and recipient was not transferred to the movement of individual SCF supporters but remained within the governmental bodies that financed the agricultural inputs in the Tajikistan programme from 1995 onwards.

The World Bank was confident that SCF would deliver a safety net for children in poverty in pilot areas of Tajikistan. After all, by the end of the century SCF had established a record of pioneering work in the field of child welfare. However, by consistently coding its achievements as welfare, both internally and externally, SCF had neglected their political significance, and distanced itself from the power that lies in contentious social movement. The organization persisted in coding its achievements as welfare despite the fact that, as Chapter 5 showed, it had become apparent to the people who worked on behalf of SCF in the 1950s that engaging in welfarist policies did not address the structural violence endemic in society.

This thesis has shown that the origins of SCF lie not only in the movement for social reform but also in the anti-war movement. ‘All wars, just or unjust, disastrous or victorious, are waged against the child’ is one of Eglantyne Jebb's more frequently quoted

⁷ Interview with Zainab Babaeva, Assistant Project Manager Bokhtar district, Tajikistan 1995.

⁸ *Global Dialogue: Staff Newsletter*, September 1998, SCF, 1.

statements in early SCF publications.⁹ The founding generation succeeded in making inroads into the way in which the issue of peace and war was thought about by people in positions of power within British society. This influence extended beyond Britain for example to the League of Nations and the Pope. At this stage in its development it drew upon several sources of power: the energy of individuals, the sense of historical purpose, and existing dense social networks.

It was Dorothy Buxton who in 1915 first contested the meanings associated with peace and war in her decision to publish accounts of the conditions in the ‘enemy’ countries. ‘Notes from the Foreign Press’ made no distinction between the suffering of children of enemy, neutral and allied countries. The articles were also concerned with the continuum between war and peace, and the consequences of actions at the time for the Europe of tomorrow. Lastly, it framed the issues in such a way as to contest government policy and construct public support for a project of lasting peace. Dorothy Buxton posed a challenge to the allied governments and all those who supported them.

But it was Eglantyne Jebb who in 1919 transformed that contentious action into a sustained collective action and articulated the beliefs which provided a value-based rationale for the supporters of SCF.

We need to remember that we are human beings first and the members of a particular nation afterwards [...] There are certain fundamental duties which we

⁹ See for example at the time of the Abyssinian crisis *The World's Children*, November 1935, 23.

owe to mankind, and which, when they appear to clash (it is always in appearance only) with our duties to our National State, should nevertheless take precedence.¹⁰

Eglantyne Jebb anticipated that her most powerful opponents would be supporters of the 'National Point of View'. An additional source of power was the founder's sense of historical destiny. Eglantyne Jebb presented herself as the torchbearer for a relay of such exemplary figures as Johann Pestalozzi and Edith Cavell, and she was convinced that she was part of the generation for whom success in eliminating the suffering caused to children by war was within their grasp. Her invitation to others to join the movement for social change was compelling. She tapped into the emotional energy of individuals disturbed by child suffering, but also exercised her own charisma.

She attracted people to her, and when recruiting for the SCF she sometimes approached some practical stranger who was engaged in his or her profession and said 'Look, come along and join our organization, and they would do so'.¹¹

The two sisters were not alone in their conviction that patriotism could be combined with internationalism. The first chapter outlined how the movement drew strength from the dense social networks between the early supporters of SCF and the convergent beliefs of the anti-war movement.

¹⁰ Jebb, E., 'The World Policy of the Save the Children Fund' in Fuller 1928, 564.

¹¹ Save the Children Oral History, Interview with David Buxton, 83, nephew of Eglantyne Jebb, by Douglas Keay in Cambridge on 22 June 1993.

Succeeding chapters showed how within a generation, the influence of the constellation of beliefs, values and techniques of persuasion which held sway over the 1920s had waned. The paradigm that governed the behaviour of the early supporters of SCF had been replaced by the 'National Point of View'. The younger generation were being brought up not as citizens of the world but as citizens of nation states. This shift in values may be most clearly seen in the narrow reinterpretation of the utilitarian role of young people. Whether it was in China, Germany or Britain, the next generation was co-opted into the purposive life of the nation. By succumbing to the 'National Point of View', SCF abandoned its contentious position. This is the point where it could be said the national organization suppressed the contentious social action, and cut itself off from international contacts which might have disturbed its newly found equilibrium. It became respectable and developed a comfortable relationship with the British government. Individuals who remained associated with SCF found other outlets for their contentious social action. For example, through the No More War Movement, and later the Oxford Committee for Famine Relief.

As soon as the organization adopted a national rather than universal orientation, the coordinates of all its guiding principles shifted. In particular the optimistic pacificism of the founding generation was replaced by pessimistic defencism. The extent of this transformation can be seen by the complete absence of SCF from the debates over disarmament and the abuse of the arms trade during the Cold War. In 1928 Eglantyne Jebb had written:

The Save the Children movement would wish to be one of those agencies which may be of service at the present day to those who are seeking to find their way back to the true path of world evolution [...] We are willing to spend a million pounds a day upon internecine destruction; when shall we be willing to spend a million pounds a day on rescuing the children who are at present left a prey to agony and despair?¹²

The values that Eglantyne Jebb upheld endured and found their expression throughout the Cold War in the movement for nuclear disarmament and the opposition to the arms trade, but they did not find their expression within SCF. It was not until after the Cold War that SCF would again deviate publicly from Foreign Office positions and question the supply of weapons from rich countries to poor countries.

The last two chapters show SCF beginning to realign itself with its original guiding principles. In Chapter 7 universalism was reasserted as a positive creed leading the organization to seize political opportunities to reach out to children from all sides. This approach was illustrated using the experience of SCF in Lebanon where it was recognized that if SCF had been politically neutral in Lebanon, it would have been paralysed. In Chapter 8 SCF began to gather evidence of the primacy attached to peace over economic development by war-affected people. This entailed a shift in emphasis from the development of children's capacity to cope with the consequences of war, towards peace-building. Although children in Afghanistan and Tajikistan were not significant protagonists in the conflict, elsewhere young people were beginning to frame the public discourse about

¹² Jebb, E., 'The World Policy of Save the Children Fund' in Fuller 1928, 568.

war and the possibility of a peaceful future in terms of their active participation.¹³ The central and highly visible role played by young people in conflicts as far apart as Palestine, and Sierra Leone, and the journeys of unaccompanied minors from war-affected parts of the world to the comparative peace of Europe¹⁴ were a powerful challenge to the prevailing understanding of childhood. These young people were obliging SCF to adopt a utilitarian perspective and affirm the dynamic role of young people in generating their own futures.

This historical case study has mapped both the neglect and the rediscovery of the guiding principles of the founding generation. Is this of only academic value or is it of use to the practitioner, the person who, in the words of Olive Schreiner, labours in the domain of war with the aim of extinguishing it?¹⁵ Writing in 1911 about the women's movement and the role women could play in ending the practice of settling differences through war, Olive Schreiner noted that:

To the men and women taking part in that mighty movement during the long centuries of the past, probably nothing was quite clear, in the majority of cases, but their own immediate move.¹⁶

Her comment is applicable to the powerful movement founded in 1919 to save children.

By the end of the century SCF had an annual expenditure of £100 million and was working

¹³ Child soldiers are the subject of much recent research, see for example Rachel Brett and Margaret McCallin 1996, *Children: The Invisible Soldiers*, Rädda Barnen.

¹⁴ The fastest growing group of unaccompanied asylum seekers in Oxfordshire is from Afghanistan. Personal observation 2001.

¹⁵ 'It is our intention to enter into the domain of war and to labour there till in the course of generations we have extinguished it.' Schreiner 1978, 178.

¹⁶ Schreiner 1978, 137.

in more than seventy countries.¹⁷ However, the question remains as to what bound the people who worked on behalf of SCF over the eighty years together? The early journals of SCF testify to personal quests for spiritual and moral conversion which overlapped with a quest for social transformation. The sense of quest disappears from the records of succeeding generations and instead these emphasize each 'immediate move'. The people associated with SCF appear vulnerable to the influence of rising constellations of beliefs, values and techniques of persuasion. If they were in fact part of a 'mighty movement' then how could SCF best harness that power in movement?

This thesis has highlighted the energizing role of individuals. The frequent citation of such long-serving staff such as Bridget Stevens, Mary Hawkins and Frances Moore, should not detract from the presence of many more short-term staff making a more immediate contribution and who were more detached from the organization. Writing about the SCF programme in Sri Lanka two years after the introduction of the GPS, Jonathan Goodhand noted that 'personalities have been critically important in the process of organisational change; either leading or skewing the organisation in different directions'.¹⁸ For SCF to harness the power of individuals behind a common purpose then it is vital that it develops its organizational memory beginning with its foundation as a value-driven organization. The identification of compelling moral examples could serve to ensure that succeeding generations of staff make decisions in accordance with the nexus of values which make up the conscience of the organization.

¹⁷ *Through Children's Eyes*, SCF Annual Report 1999/2000.

¹⁸ Goodhand, March 1999 (unpublished), 6.

The case study also points to the possibility of reinventing an organization in response to its external environment. The founders of SCF thought that it might last no longer than the Fight the Famine Council (1919-1922). They were proved wrong on this. In many other ways their work has proved far-sighted. Over the course of the last century a wide range of relief and development organizations have since emerged and adopted the value of universalism, but SCF continues to have an urgent mission to promote a utilitarian understanding of the role of young people and an optimistic belief in the possibility of peace.

Appendix 1

The Declaration of the Rights of the Child (1923)

By the present Declaration of the Rights of the Child, commonly known as the 'Declaration of Geneva', men and women of all nations, recognizing that Mankind owes to the Child the best that it has to give, declare and accept it as their duty that, beyond and above all considerations of race, nationality, or creed:

- I. THE CHILD must be given the means requisite for its normal development, both materially and spiritually.
- II. THE CHILD that is hungry must be fed; the child that is sick must be nurse; the child that is backward must be helped; the delinquent child must be reclaimed; and the orphan and the waif must be sheltered and succoured.
- III. THE CHILD must be the first to receive relief in times of distress.
- IV. THE CHILD must be in a position to earn a livelihood and must be protected against every form of exploitation.
- V. THE CHILD must be brought up in the consciousness that its talents must be devoted to the service of its fellow-men.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Published books and journals

Adler, E. and Haas, P.M., 'Epistemic Communities, World Order and the Creation of a Reflective Research Program' in *International Organization*, Vol.46 No.1, Winter 1992, 367-390

Akiner, S., *Islamic Peoples of the Soviet Union*, London: Kegan Paul International, 1987

Akiner, S., *Central Asia: Conflict or Stability of Development?*, London: Minority Rights Group International, 1997

Alston, P., ed., *The Best Interests of the Child: Reconciling Culture and Human Rights*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994

An-Na'im, A.A., *Human Rights in Cross-Cultural Perspectives: A Quest for Consensus*, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 1992

Anderson, M.B., *Do No Harm: How Aid can Support Peace - or War*, Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 1999

American Aid and Relief in Great Britain, London: The American Outpost in Great Britain, 1941

Anderson, M., *Noel Buxton: A Life*, London: George Allen and Unwin, 1952

Angell, N. and Buxton, D., *You and the Refugee: The Morals and Economics of the Problem*, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1939

Ariès, P., *Centuries of Childhood*, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1973

Article 19, *Kid's Talk: Freedom of Expression and the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child*, London: Article 19, 1999

- Atholl, K., *Searchlight on Spain*, London: Penguin Books, 1938
- Atholl, K., *Working Partnership: Being the Lives of John George 8th Duke of Atholl and his Wife Katharine Marjory Ramsay*, [n.pub., n.d.]
- Atkin, M., *The Subtlest Battle: Islam in Soviet Tajikistan*, Philadelphia: Foreign Policy Research Institute, 1989
- Bailey, S., *The Korean Armistice*, London: Macmillan, 1992
- Balogun, O., *The Tragic Years: Nigeria in Crisis 1966-1970*, Benin City, Nigeria: Ethiopian Publishing Corporation, 1973
- Bealby, J., 'Journey through the Land of Light', *Traveller*,
(www.travelmag.co.uk/features/feat5.htm)
- Best, E., and Pike, B., eds, *International Voluntary Service for Peace (1920-1946): A History of Work in Many Countries for the Benefit of Distressed Communities and for the Reconciliation of the Peoples*, London: George Allen and Unwin, 1948
- Bird, D., *Never the Same Again: A History of VSO*, Cambridge: Lutterworth Press, 1998
- Birn, D.S.L., *The League of Nations Union*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981
- Black, M., *The Children and the Nations: The Story of UNICEF*, UNICEF, 1986
- Black, M., *A Cause for our Times. Oxfam: The First Fifty Years*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992
- Black, M., *The Story of UNICEF Past and Present*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996
- Boli, J. and Thomas, G.M., eds, *Constructing World Culture: International Non-Governmental Organizations since 1875*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999

- Brand, L.A., *Palestinians in the Arab World: Institution Building and the Search for State*,
New York: Columbia University Press, 1988
- Brauman, R., 'The Médecins sans Frontières Experience' in Cahill 1993, 202-220
- Brockway, F., *Towards Tomorrow: The Autobiography of Fenner Brockway*, London:
Hart-Davis, MacGibbon, 1977
- Brown, I., *Khomeini's Forgotten Sons: the Story of Iran's Boy Soldiers*, London: Grey
Seal, 1990
- Bruce-Glasier, K., 'Eglantyne Jebb: Sister of all the World', *No More War*, Birmingham,
March 1934
- Buchanan, T., *Britain and the Spanish Civil War*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1997
- Buckley, M., ed., *Post-Soviet women: From the Baltic to Central Asia*, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1997
- Bunsen, V. de, *Charles Roden Buxton: A Memoir*, London: George Allen and Unwin, 1948
- Buxton, B., 'A Real National Movement', *The Friend*, 21 May 1999, 4-5
- Buxton, D., *The Challenge of Bolshevism: A New Social Ideal*, London: George Allen and
Unwin, 1928
- Buxton, D., ed., *Save the Child! A posthumous essay by Eglantyne Jebb*, London:
Weardale Press, 1929
- Buxton, D. and Fuller, E., *The White Flame: The Story of Save the Children Fund*,
London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1931
- Cairns, E., *Children and Political Violence*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1996

- Cairns, E., *A Safer Future: Reducing the Human Cost of War*, Oxford: Oxfam Publications, 1997
- Cahill, K.M., ed., *A Framework for Survival: Health, Human Rights and Humanitarian Assistance in Conflicts and Disasters*, New York: Basic Books, 1993
- Caufield, C., *Masters of Illusion: The World Bank and the Poverty of Nations*, London: Macmillan, 1996
- Ceadel, M., *Pacifism in Britain (1914-1945): The Defining of a Faith*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980
- Ceadel, M., *Thinking about Peace and War*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989
- Ceadel, M., *Why People Disagree About War Prevention*, Oxford: Oxford Project for Peace Studies, 1989a
- Ceadel, M., *The Origins of War Prevention: The British Peace Movement and International Relations (1730-1854)*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996
- Chatfield, C. and Van den Dungen, P., eds, *Peace Movements and Political Cultures*, Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1988
- Chatty, D. and Rabo, A., *Organising Women: Formal and Informal Women's Groups in the Middle East*, Oxford: Berg, 1997
- Cohn, I., and Goodwin-Gill, G.S., *Child Soldiers: The Role of Children in Armed Conflict: A Study for the Henry Dunant Institute, Geneva*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994
- Cooper, S.E., *Patriotic Pacifism: Waging War on War in Europe 1815-1914*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991

- Cripps, C.A., *A Retrospect: Looking back on a Life of more than Eighty Years*, London: William Heinemann, 1936
- Dacie, A., *Yugoslav Refugees in Italy: The Story of a Transit Camp*, [n.pub.], January 1945
- Disasters: The Journal of Disaster Studies and Management*, Vol.18. No.3, A Special Issue to Mark the 75th Anniversary of Save the Children (UK), September 1994
- Djalili, M.-R., Grare, F. and Akiner, S., eds, *Tajikistan: The Trials of Independence*, Richmond: Curzon, 1998
- Donaghy, G., ed., *Canada and the Early Cold War*, Canada: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 1999
- Duffield, M., *War and Famine in Africa*, Oxfam Research Paper No.5, 1991
- Duffield, M., 'Complex Emergencies and the Crisis of Developmentalism', *IDS Bulletin*, Vol.25, No.4, 1994
- Duffield, M., *Aid Policy and Post-Modern Conflict: A Critical Review*, Birmingham: University of Birmingham School of Public Policy, Occasional Paper No.10, 1998
- Eade, D., ed., *Development in States of War: Selected Articles from Development in Practice*, Oxford: Oxfam (UK and Ireland), 1996
- Emadi, H., 'The Hazaras and their Role in the Process of Political Transformation in Afghanistan' *Central Asian Survey*, Vol.16 No.3, 1997, 363-387
- Falkingham, J. and others, eds, *Household Welfare in Central Asia*, London: Macmillan, 1997

- Famine in Europe [The]: The Facts and Suggested Remedies, Being a Report of the International Economic Conference Called by the Fight the Famine Council and Held at Caxton Hall, Westminster, London, on the 4th, 5th, and 6th of November 1919.* London: Swarthmore Press, 1920
- Felstead, S.T., *Edith Cavell: The Crime that Shook the World*, London: George Newnes Limited, 1940?
- Figs, O., *A People's Tragedy: The Russian Revolution 1891-1924*, London: Jonathan Cape, 1996
- Fisk, R., *Pity the Nation: Lebanon at War*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992
- Forced Migration Review*, Special issue 'Security at work', Vol.4, April 1999
- Freeman, K., *If Any Man Build: The History of Save the Children Fund*, London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1965
- Freeman, M. and Veerman, P., eds. *The Ideologies of Children's Rights*, Dordrecht, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1992
- Fry, R., *A Quaker Adventure: The Story of Nine Years of Relief and Reconstruction*, London: Nisbet, 1926
- Fry, R., *Emily Hobhouse: A Memoir*, London: Jonathan Cape, 1929
- Fuller, E., ed., *The International Handbook of Child Care and Protection*, London: Longmans, Green and Co. and the Weardale Press, 3rd edition, 1928
- Fuller, E., *The Right of the Child: A Chapter in Social History*, London: Victor Gollancz, 1950
- Fuller, E., *She Championed Children: The Story of Eglantyne Jebb*, London: Save the Children Fund, 1956

- Gollancz, V., *Leaving Them to Their Fate: The Ethics of Starvation*, London: Victor Gollancz, 1946
- Gollancz, V., *Germany Revisited*, London: Victor Gollancz, 1947
- Goodfield, J., *The Planned Miracle*, London: Scribners, 1991
- Goodhand, J. and Hulme, D., *NGOs and Complex Political Emergencies: Working Paper No.1*, University of Manchester and INTRAC, 1996
- Goodhand, J. and Lewer N., 'Sri Lanka: NGOs and Peace-Building in Complex Political Emergencies', *Third World Quarterly*, Vol.20 No.1, 1999, 69-87
- Gourevitch, P., *We wish to inform you that tomorrow we will be killed with our families: Stories from Rwanda*, UK: Picador, 1999
- Graves, P.M., *Labour Women: Women in British Working Class Politics, 1918-1939*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994
- Groenewold, J. (MSF project coordinator), and Porter, E. (Associate editor), Médecins Sans Frontières, Doctors Without Borders, *World in Crisis: The Politics of Survival at the End of the 20th Century*, London: Routledge, 1997
- Gruber, H. and Graves, P., eds, *Women and Socialism, Socialism and Women: Europe between the Two World Wars*, Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1998
- Gupta, L., *Psychosocial assessment of children exposed to war related violence in Kabul*, Kabul: UNICEF, 1997
- Harbison, J. and Harbison, J., *A Society under Stress: Children and Young People in Northern Ireland*, Shepton Mallet: Open Books, 1980

- Harpviken, K.B., 'Transcending Traditionalism: The Emergence of Non-State Military Formations in Afghanistan', *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol.34 No.3, 1997, 271-287
- Harpviken, K.B., 'The Taliban Threat', *Third World Quarterly*, Vol.20, 1999, 861-870
- Hope Simpson, J., *Refugees: A Review of the Situation since September 1938*, London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1939
- Hope Simpson, J., *The Refugee Problem: Report of a Survey*, London: Oxford University Press, 1939
- Horder, J., ed., *Francesca Wilson: A Life of Service and Adventure*, [n.pub.], 1993
- Hoyningen-Huene, P., *Reconstructing Scientific Revolutions, Thomas S. Kuhn's Philosophy of Science*, Chicago: University of Chicago, 1993
- Hufbauer, G.C., *Economic Sanctions Reconsidered*, Washington: Institute for International Economics, 1990
- Hulme, D. and Edwards, M., *NGOs, State and Donors: Too Close for Comfort*, London: MacMillan Press in association with Save the Children, 1997
- Human Rights Watch Report, *Human Rights in Tajikistan in the Wake of Civil War*, New York: Human Rights Watch/Helsinki Watch Memorial, December 1993
- Human Rights Watch Report, *Tajikistan: Human Rights in Tajikistan on the Eve of Presidential Elections*, Vol.6 No.13, New York: Human Rights Watch, October 1994
- Human Rights Watch Report, *Tajikistan: Political Prisoners in Tajikistan*, Vol.6 No.14, New York: Human Rights Watch, October 1994

- Human Rights Watch Report, *Return to Tajikistan: Continued Regional and Ethnic Tensions*, Vol.7 No.9, New York: Human Rights Watch, May 1995
- Human Rights Watch Report, *Tajikistan: Tajik Refugees in Northern Afghanistan; Obstacles to Repatriation*, Vol.8 No.6 (D), New York: Human Rights Watch, May 1996
- Human Rights Watch Report, *Leninabad: Crackdown in the North*, Vol.10, No.2(D), New York: Human Rights Watch, April 1998
- Hunt J. and Thornley, C., *Nigeria: British Relief Advisory Mission 5 - 19 July 1968*, London
- Huntingdon, S.P., 'The Clash of Civilizations?', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol.72 No.3. 22-49, 1993
- International Organization*, Vol.46, No.1, Winter 1992
- Jahangiri, G., 'Anatomie d'une crise: le poids des tensions entre régions au Tadjikistan', *Cahiers d'études sur la méditerranée orientale et le monde turco-iranien*, No.18, July-December 1994
- James, A. and Prout, A., eds, *Constructing and Deconstructing Childhood: Contemporary Issues in the Sociological Study of Childhood*, London: The Falmer Press, 1990
- Jawad, N. and Tadjbakhsh, S., *Tajikistan: A Forgotten Civil War*, London: Minority Rights Group International, 1994
- Jebb, E., 'The World Policy of the Save the Children Fund', in Fuller 1928
- Jeffrey, S. 'The High Price of Hunger', *The Medical Post*, 7 November 1995,
www.mentalhealth.com/mag1/p5m-sc01.html

- Jenner, R., *An Ecumenical Force in the Humanitarian Vanguard: Fighting Africa's Darkest Catastrophe*, Geneva: Joint Church Aid, [n.d.]
- Johnson, C., 'Afghanistan: NGOs and Women in the Front-line', *Community Development Journal*. Vol.33 No. 2, April 1998, 117-123
- Johnson, V. and others, eds, *Stepping Forward: Children and Young People's Participation in the Development Process*, London: Intermediate Technology Publications, 1998
- Joly, D., *Refugees: Asylum in Europe?* London: Minority Rights Publications, 1992
- Jones, E., *Red Army and Society: A Sociology of the Soviet Military*, London: Allen and Unwin, 1985
- Joseph, S., 'Gender and Civil Society' in *Middle East Report*, July-August 1993, 21-26
- Joseph, S., 'Research note: Family and Women's Human Rights', in *South Asia Bulletin*, Vol. 13 No.1, 1993, 148-151
- Kaplan, R., 'The Coming Anarchy', *Atlantic Monthly*, February 1994
- Kaplan, R., *The Ends of the Earth: A Journey at the Dawn of the 21st Century*, Random House 1996
- Korn, D.A., *Exodus within Borders: An Introduction to the Crisis of Internal Displacement*, Washington D.C: Brookings Institution Press, 1998
- Korten, D.C., *Getting to the 21st Century: Voluntary Action and the Global Agenda*, West Hartford: Kumarian Press, 1990
- Krippner, M., *The Quality of Mercy: Women at War, Serbia 1915-1918*, London: David and Charles, 1980

- Kuhn, T.S., *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970
- Lebanon Monitor*, London: Refugee Council
- Maalouf, A., *The Rock of Tanios*, London: Abacus, 1995
- Maas, 'Young Adult Adjustment of Twenty Wartime Residential Nursery Children', *Child Welfare*, February 1963
- Machel, G., *The Impact of Armed Conflict on Children: Briefing Notes on the Final report of the Expert of the Secretary General of the United Nations, A/51/306*, 1996.
- Mahoney, L. and Eguren, L.E., *Unarmed Bodyguards: International Accompaniment for the Protection of Human Rights*, Connecticut: Kumarian Press, 1997
- Maley, W. ed., *Fundamentalism Reborn: Afghanistan and the Taliban*, London: Hurst, 1998
- Malik, I.H., 'Islamic Discourse on Jihad, War and Violence', *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol.21 No.4, Summer 1998, 47-78
- Marsden, P., *The Taliban: War, Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan*, London, Zed Books, 1998
- Marshall, O., *Ship of Hope*, London: Ethnic Communities Oral History Project, 1991
- Martin, R.G., *Save the Children: The Story of Eglantyne Jebb*, London: Lutterworth Press, 1969
- Massell, G.J., *The Surrogate Proletariat: Moslem Women and Revolutionary Strategies in Soviet Central Asia, 1919-1929*, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1974

Middle East Report, Twentieth Anniversary Edition, November-December 1991

Minority Rights Group International, ed., *War: The Impact on Minority and Indigenous Children*, London: Minority Rights Group International, 1997

Mohanty, S.P., *Literary Theory and the Claims of History: Postmodernism, Objectivity, Multicultural Politics*, Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1997

Moorehead, C., *Dunant's Dream: War, Switzerland, and the History of the Red Cross*, London: Harper Collins, 1998

Murray, G., 'The Turn of the Tide', *The Contemporary Review*, Vol.164, September 1943, 129-134

Murray, G., *From the League to the UN*, London (?): Oxford University Press, 1948

Nelson, C., 'Public and Private Politics: Women in the Middle Eastern World', *American Ethnologist*, Vol.1 No.3, 1974, 551-563

Noel-Buxton, 'Germany and the Hitlerite State', *The Contemporary Review*, Vol.164, July 1943, 7-12

Nordstrom, C., *Girls and Warzones: Troubling Questions*, Uppsala: Life and Peace Institute, 1997

Norton, R., 'Benedict XV and the Save the Children Fund', *The Month*, July 1995, 281-283

ODC News: Organisational Development Consultancy: Strengthening the Capacity of NGOs?, Oxford: INTRAC, December 1997

ONTRAC: The Newsletter of the International NGO Training and Research Centre, Oxford

- Oldfield, S., *Spinsters of this Parish: The Life and Times of F.M. Mayor and Mary Sheepshanks*, London: Virago, 1984
- Padley, R. and Cole, M, eds, *Evacuation Survey: A Report to the Fabian Society*, London: George Routledge and Sons, 1940
- Pollard, J.F., *The Unknown Pope: Benedict XV (1914-1922) and the Pursuit of Peace*, London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1999
- Red Cross, *£3,000,000 in Pennies: The Story of a Wartime Miracle*, London: Odhams Press, 1943
- Relief and Rehabilitation Network, *Room for Improvement: The Management and Support of Relief and Development Workers*, London: Overseas Development Institute, 1995
- Ressler, E.M., *Children in Situation of Armed Conflict: A Guide to the Provision of Services*, UNICEF, 1992
- Ressler, E.M., *Evacuation of Children from Conflict Areas: Considerations and Guidelines*, Geneva: UNHCR and UNICEF, December 1992
- Richards, P., *Fighting for the Rain Forest: War, Youth and Resources in Sierra Leone*, Oxford: James Currey, 1996
- Rigby, A., *A Life in Peace: Biography of Wilfred Wellock*, Dorset: Prism Press, 1988
- Rubin, B.R., 'Women and Pipelines: Afghanistan's Proxy Wars', *International Affairs*, Vol.73 1997, 283-296
- Russell, D., *The Tamarisk Tree: Vol.3, Challenge to the Cold War*, London: Virago, 1985
- Sahnoun, M., *Managing Conflict after the Cold War*, London: CIIR, 1995

- Said, E.W. and Mohr, J. (photographs), *After the Last Sky: Palestinian Lives*, London: Vintage, 1993
- Save the Children Fund Post War Committee, *Children in Bondage: A Survey of Child Life in the Occupied Countries of Europe and in Finland*, London: Longmans, 1943
- Salomon, A., *Heroische Frauen*, Zürich: Verlag für Recht und Gesellschaft, 1936
- Saracino, M.A., 'Woman, the Unwilling Victim of War: the Legacy of Olive Schreiner', in Chatfield and Van den Dungen, 1988
- Schein, E.H., *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1997
- Schreiner, O., *Woman and Labour*, London: Virago, 1978
- Sellick, P., *The Impact of Conflict on Children in Afghanistan*, Rädda Barnen, Save the Children Federation, Inc., Save the Children (UK), UNICEF, May 1998
- Sharp, E., *The African Child: An Account of the International Conference on African Children Geneva*, London: Longmans Green, 1931
- Skran, C.M. *Refugees in Inter-War Europe: The Emergence of a Regime*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995
- Slim, H., 'Children and Childhood in Emergency Practice 1919-1994' (editorial), A Special Issue to Mark the 75th Anniversary of Save the Children (UK), *Disasters: The Journal of Disaster Studies and Management*, Vol.18. No.3, September 1994, 189-191 (p. 189).
- Slim, H., *Doing the Right Thing: Relief Agencies, Moral Dilemmas, and Moral Responsibility in Political Emergencies and War*, Sweden: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 1997

- Slim, R.M. and Saunders, H.H., 'Managing Conflict in Divided Societies: Lessons from Tajikistan', *Negotiation Journal*, January 1996, 31-45
- Small, C., *NGO Management in Situations of Conflict*, Occasional Paper Series No.12, Oxford: INTRAC, 1996
- Smillie, I., Gbeirie, L. and Hazleka, R., *The Heart of the Matter: Sierra Leone, Diamonds and Human Security*, Partnership Africa Canada, 2000 (www.web.net/pac/)
- Smillie, R., *My Life for Labour*, London: Mills and Boon, 1924
- St Jorre, J. de, *The Nigerian Civil War*, London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1972
- Tadjbakhsh, S., 'Tajikistan: From Freedom to War', *Current History*, April 1994, 173-177
- Tarock, A., 'The Politics of the Pipeline; the Iran and Afghanistan Conflict', *Third World Quarterly*, Vol.20, 1999, 801-820
- Tarrow, S., *Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998
- Third World Quarterly*, Vol.20, 1999
- Timmins, N., *The Five Giants: A Biography of the Welfare State*, London: Harper Collins, 1995
- Turner, S., *Angry Young Men in Camps: Gender, Age and Class Relations in Burundian Refugees in Tanzania*, UNHCR Working Paper No. 9, (<http://www.unhcr.ch/refworld/pub/wpapers/wpno9.htm>)
- Turshen, M. and Twagiramariya, C., *What Women do in Wartime: Gender and Conflict in Africa*, London: Zed Books, 1998
- UNICEF Annual Report 1991*, New York: UNICEF, 1991
- UNICEF, *Situation Analysis of Afghan Children and Women January 1992*

- United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs, *Report of the DHA Mission to Afghanistan (30 March-5 May 1997)*, 1997
- UN Security Council, *Report of the Secretary General on the Situation in Tajikistan*, 3 November 1998, S/1998/1029
- Uphoff, N., *Learning from Gal Oya: Possibilities for Participatory Development and Post-Newtonian Social Science*, London: IT Publications, 1996
- Vaughan, D.A., *Negro Victory: The Life Story of Dr Harold Moody*, London: Independent Press, 1950
- Vellacott, J. 'Women, Peace and Internationalism, 1914-1920s: 'Finding New Words and Creating New Methods' ', in Chatfield and Van den Dungen 1988, 106-124.
- Vittachi, V.T., *Between the Guns: Children as a Zone of Peace*, London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1993
- Warren, D.M., Slikkerveer, L.J. and Brokensha, D., eds, *The Cultural Dimension of Development: Indigenous Knowledge Systems*, London: Intermediate Technology Publications, 1995
- Wasserstein, B., *Britain and the Jews of Europe, 1939-45*, London: Leicester University Press, 1999
- Weindling, P., 'From Sentiment to Science: Children's Relief Organizations and the Problem of Malnutrition in Inter-War Europe' in *Disasters: The Journal of Disaster Studies and Management*, Vol.18 No.3, September 1994, 203-212
- Weissman, B.M., *Herbert Hoover and Famine Relief to Soviet Russia: 1921-1923*, Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1974
- Wilson, F.M., *Portraits and Sketches of Serbia*, London: Swarthmore Press, 1920

- Wilson, F.M., *In the Margins of Chaos: Recollections of Relief Work in and between Three Wars*, London: John Murray, 1944
- Wilson, F.M., *Aftermath: France, Germany, Austria, Yugoslavia 1945 and 1946*, Middlesex: Penguin, 1947
- Wilson, F.M., *Rebel Daughter of a Country House: The Life of Eglantyne Jebb, Founder of the Save the Children Fund*, London: George Allen and Unwin, 1967
- Wiltsher, A., *Most Dangerous Women: Feminist Peace Campaigners of the Great War*, London: Pandora, 1985
- World Bank (Human Resources Division, Country Department III, Europe and Central Asia Region), *Staff Appraisal Report, Republic of Tajikistan Pilot Poverty Alleviation Project*, 18 February 1997, Washington: World Bank
- World Bank, *Post-Conflict Reconstruction: The Role of the World Bank*, Washington: World Bank, 1998
- Yarrow, C.H.M., *Quaker Experiences in International Conciliation*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978
- Zizzamia, A., *NGO/UNICEF Cooperation: A Historical Perspective*, UNICEF History Series, Monograph 5, 1987

2. Save the Children publications

- Bonnerjea, L., *Family Tracing: A Good Practice Guide*, Development Manual 3, London: SCF, 1994

- Bracken, P., and Petty, C., eds, *Rethinking the Trauma of War*, London: Free Association Books and Save the Children, 1998
- Brett, R. and McCallin, M., *Children, the Invisible Soldiers*, Rädda Barnen (Swedish Save the Children) 1996
- Bulletin of the Save the Children Fund: Central Union (Union Internationale de Secours aux Enfants)*
- Children in Bondage: A Survey of Child Life in the Occupied Countries of Europe and in Finland*, Save the Children Fund Post War Committee, London: Longmans
- Children at War*, London: SCF, November 1994
- Children's Rights: Reality or Rhetoric? The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child: the first ten years*, International Save the Children Alliance, London, 1999
- Cutts, M. and Dingle, A. *Safety First: Protecting NGO employees who work in areas of conflict*, London: SCF, 1995
- Ennew, J., *Street and Working Children: A Guide to Planning*, Development Manual 4, London: SCF, 1994
- Focus on Images*, The Save the Children Fund Image Guidelines, London: SCF, 1991
- Growing up with Conflict: Children and Development in the Occupied Territories*, London: SCF, 1992
- Macrae, J. and Zwi, A., eds, *War and Hunger: Rethinking International Responses to Complex Emergencies*, London: Zed Books in association with Save the Children Fund (UK), 1994
- XIVe Rapport concernant les enfants réfugiés polonais*, Vajkai, R., Union Internationale de Secours aux Enfants, Budapest, 21 September 1940

Record of the Save the Children Fund, The (1920-1922) Vols 1-3

Report on Russians, Armenians, German and Saar Refugees in France, London: SCF,
1935

Towards a Children's Agenda: New Challenges for Social Development, London: SCF,
March 1995

Unemployment and the Child: 'An Enquiry', London: SCF, 1933

World's Children, The, London: SCF (1922-)

www.savethechildren.org.uk/eyetoeye/ 2000

3. Unpublished material

a. Archive sources

i. SCF London archives

M1/1-14 Council of Save the Children Fund

M14/13-14 Committee for the Protection of Children in the Time of War, 1939

M14/17 Child Protection Committee, 1932-1941

M14/23 Inter-Aid Committee for Children from Germany, 1937

M6/1-8 Foreign Relief (F), Overseas Relief and Welfare (ORW), and Overseas
Committees (OD)

P/OS/A1 Afghanistan files, 1977-1995

P/A1 Afghanistan files, 1995-

P/OS/L3 Lebanon files 1951-1990

P/OS/N7 Nigeria files 1967-1975

SC/BS Special Collection Bridget Stevenson papers

SC/DB Special Collection Dorothy Buxton papers

SC/EF Special Collection Edward Fuller papers

SC/EJ Special Collection Eglantyne Jebb papers

SC/MA Special Collection Mike Aaronson papers 1970

SC/SF Special Collection Jebb, Eglantyne and Ferrière, Suzanne correspondence

Breen, R., *Claiming Rights for Children: The Drafting of the Declaration of the Rights of the Child (1922)*, Archive Paper No.1, November 1994

Breen, R., *Saving Enemy Children: Save the Children's relief work during the Russian Famine, 1921-23*, Archive Paper No.4, n.d.

Breen, R., *Coping with Change, How Save the Children has survived over 75 years*. SCF Archive Paper No.5, 24 March 1995

Breen, R., *The Preschool Child: Save the Children and Preschool Education*, SCF Archive Paper No.6, 1995

Breen, R., *Rebuilding a Ruined World: Save the Children's beginnings in Vienna, 1919*, Archive paper No.7, October 1995

Breen, R., *Into Africa: Save the Children's Long Journey to the African Continent*, Archive Paper No.2, February 1997

Breen, R., Taped Interviews with Mary Hawkins, 4-5 December 1997, Perranuthnoe *Global Programme Strategy*, 1997

Save the Children Oral History Interview with David Buxton, 83, nephew of Eglantyne Jebb, by Douglas Keay in Cambridge, 22 June 1993

Films:

The Russian Famine, 1922

Tragedy of the Near East, 1923

A Far Cry, 1959

Camp Clearance, 1961

ii. SCF Tajikistan archives

Conway, D., *Female Headed Households Project Diary November 1994 - September 1995*,
Dushanbe: SCF Tajikistan

Conway, D., *Bokhtar District Needs Assessment Report, January 1995*, Dushanbe: SCF
Tajikistan

Harriss, J., *Report on the Evaluation of Phase One of the Female Headed Households'
Economic Activities Project, Tajikistan*, Kathmandu: SCF South Asia
Regional Office, August 1995

Parry-Williams, J., *Evaluation, Primarily by Children Evaluators, of the SCF (UK) Female
Headed Households Project, Tajikistan*, 1998

Save the Children Fund (UK), *Support to Female Headed Households, Quarterly Report to
the Social Investment Fund (TASIF), August - October 1997*, Dushanbe:
SCF Tajikistan

Save the Children Fund (UK), *Support to Female Headed Households, Quarterly Report to
the Social Investment Fund (TASIF), November 1997 - January 1998*,
Dushanbe: SCF Tajikistan

Silvander, A., *Needs Assessment of Street and Working Children in Green Market and Surrounding Streets*, December - January 1996, Dushanbe: Society and Children's Rights

Thomson, M., *Gender and Generation Training Needs - Female Headed Household Programme, Tajikistan*, November 1996, London: SCF

iii. Other archive sources

Friends House Archives

Friends Service Council papers, Spain committee minutes, 16 February 1938

INTRAC Archives

Jaffer, R., *Management Implications of the Psychosocial Impact of Conflict: Report of a Workshop organised by Oxfam Afghanistan, in Dushanbe, Tajikistan 1-5 June 1994*, Lahore: Institute of Social Sciences

Oxfam Archives

Joint Church Aid (International) (1970) Press Information Service Nigeria/Biafra, Geneva

Markpress, Biafran Overseas Press Service, Geneva, 1970

Nigeria/Biafra press cuttings collection 1967-1970

Nigeria/Biafra: Oxfam bulletins and home-produced materials

Nigerian Civil War General Correspondence 1967-1970

b. Other assorted unpublished material

- Afghan Development Association (ADA), *Strengthening Peace through Sustainable Human Development: Case Study, Reconciliation between Different Ethnic Groups through Development Interventions*, 1992
- Doubleday, V., *General Report on Conditions in Herat*, March-April 1994
- Duffield, M., *Evaluating Conflict Resolution: Context, Models and Methodology*, a discussion paper prepared for the Chr. Michelsen Institute, Bergen, Norway, May 1997
- Goodhand, J., *Save the Children Agency Survey*, Draft Notes, March 1999
- Mine Clearance Planning Agency, *Report on Child Soldier Problem in Afghanistan*, 1996.
- Oxford Committee for Famine Relief Minute Book, October 1942
- Sellick, P., *An Assessment of the needs in Kandahar City and the Options for NGO Programmes*, May 1995, British Agencies Afghanistan Group, 1995
- Sellick, P., *Emergency Preparedness in Herat: A report prepared for the British Agencies Afghanistan Group*, May 1995, British Agencies Afghanistan Group, 1995
- Sellick, P., *Final report of the Shared Resource Unit Officer, March - September 1995*, British Agencies Afghanistan Group
- Sellick, P., Taped Interview with Mary Hawkins, Perranuthnoe, 12 April 2000
- Sellick, P., Taped Interview with Frances Moore, Oxford, 11 October 2000
- Terre des Hommes, *Needs Assessment of Children working in the Streets of Kabul*, 30 June 1996
- Thomas, J., *Herat, Afghanistan: Community profile and report* (contact: GPO Box 1289, Peshawar), 1993

[Copies of much of the material relating to Afghanistan are held by the British Agencies Afghanistan Group, c/o The Refugee Council.]

c. Conference papers and theses

Bradbury, M., *Aid under Fire: Redefining Relief and Development Assistance in Unstable Situations*, Wilton Park Conference Paper No.104, July 1995

Coordination of Afghan Relief (CoAR) Presentation to the Conference 'From Rhetoric to Reality: the Role of Aid in Local Peace Building in Afghanistan', York, January 1998

Duffield, M., *The Symphony of the Damned: Racial Discourse, Complex Political Emergencies, and Humanitarian Aid*, Draft Paper, University of Birmingham School of Public Policy, 1995

Duffield, M., *Reading Development as Security: Post-Nation State Conflict and Reconstructing Normality*, Draft paper presented to the Conference on NGOs in a Global Future, University of Birmingham, 11-13 January 1999

Lynch, D., *Russian 'Peacekeeping' Strategies in the CIS, 1992-96: The Cases of Moldova, Georgia and Tajikistan*, D.Phil International Relations, Oxford University, 1997

Pankhurst, D. *Issues of Justice and Reconciliation in Complex Political Emergencies*, Case Study Paper for COPE Project, Dept. of Peace Studies, Bradford University, April 1998

Pupavac, V. *Theories of Conflict and Children's Rights*. Paper presented to the Second Convention of the European Association for the Advancement of Social

Sciences, on Conflict and Cooperation, University of Cyprus, Nicosia,

March 19-23, 1997

Sellick, P., *The Ethics of Conducting Research with Children in Conflict-Affected Areas:*

Issues from Afghanistan and Tajikistan, Paper presented to the Conference

Researching on Humanitarian Assistance in Conflict Areas, Post War

Reconstruction and Development Unit, University of York, 8-10 May 2000