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Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional Design

Rachel E. Barkow*

So-called independent agencies are created for a reason, and often that reason is a concern with agency capture. Agency designers hope that a more insulated agency will better protect the general public interest against interest group pressure. But the conventional approach to independent agencies in administrative law largely ignores why agencies are insulated. Instead, discussions about independent agencies in administrative law have focused on three features that have defined independent agencies: heads who are removable for cause by the President, an exemption from having to submit regulations to the President’s Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs for cost–benefit analysis, and a multimember structure.

But these traditional characteristics of an independent agency are not the only, or necessarily even the most effective, ways in which insulation from interest groups and partisan pressure can be achieved. In fact, under modern conditions of political oversight, other design elements and mechanisms are often just as important if the goal is to create an agency that is best suited to achieve a long-term public-interest mission free from capture. This is particularly true of agencies tasked with protecting the general public in the face of one-sided and intense political pressure. This kind of lopsided pressure can be seen in a range of areas, from criminal justice to consumer protection.

The goal of this Article is to move the conversation about insulation beyond the traditional hallmarks of independence and identify overlooked elements of agency design, deemed “equalizing factors,” that are particularly well-suited to addressing the problem of capture in the context of asymmetrical political pressure. The Article identifies five such equalizing factors that have received little or no attention in the legal literature on independent agencies but that are critically important for insulation against one-sided interest group dominance. The Article then compares the effectiveness of traditional and equalizing factors in the context of consumer protection.

* Professor of Law and Faculty Director, Center on the Administration of Criminal Law, NYU School of Law. Thanks to Nick Bagley, Anthony Barkow, Jacob Gersen, Daniel Ho, Mike Livermore, Rick Pildes, Cristina Rodriguez, and the participants in the Furman Workshop at NYU and the Yale Law Women Workshop for their helpful comments and conversations. Thomas Bennett, Kirti Datla, David Edwards, Jonathan Grossman, David Lin, and Darryl Stein provided exemplary research assistance. I acknowledge with gratitude the financial support of the Filomen D’Agostino and Max E. Greenberg Faculty Research Fund at NYU.
protection, an area with the kind of one-sided interest group pressure that is a breeding ground for capture. The Article explores the relationship between the institutional design of the Consumer Product Safety Commission and its effectiveness and uses those lessons to analyze the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection, the most significant new federal agency created in decades. This analysis of consumer protection regulatory agencies showcases both the continuing danger of capture and the critical importance of institutional design in policing it.

Introduction

According to the existing legal literature and case law, the defining hallmark of an independent agency is that it is headed by someone who cannot be removed at will by the President but instead can be removed only for good cause. This one design feature has spawned countless law review articles about the meaning of separation of powers, the nature of the unitary executive, and the constitutional pedigree of the New Deal and the explosion of agencies with this attribute. The Supreme Court and lower courts have considered the removal question at length, with the latest chapter coming last Term when the Court held that it was unconstitutional for Congress to place “dual for-cause limitations on the removal” of members of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) by vesting the removal power in the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), whose members


themselves cannot be removed by the President except for cause. The Court divided five to four and produced more than 100 pages on the subject.

The obsessive focus on removal as the touchstone of independence is curious because insulation from the President is often not the dominant reason why policy makers seek to create independent agencies in the first place. Rather, the goal of insulation is frequently to allow an agency to protect the diffuse interest of the general public or a vulnerable segment of the public that, because of collective action problems or resource limitations, is often outgunned in the political process by well-financed and politically influential special interests. The insulated agency, its designers hope, will better resist short-term partisan pressures and instead place more emphasis on empirical facts that will serve the public interest in the long term. Put another way, the creation of an independent agency is often motivated by a concern with agency capture.

What the conventional discussion of administrative law and agency design has overlooked is that the traditional metrics for an independent agency are not the only, or necessarily even the most effective, ways in which insulation from interest groups and partisan pressure can be achieved. In fact, under modern conditions of political oversight, other design elements and mechanisms are often just as important to an agency’s ability to achieve its long-term mission relatively free from capture. This is particularly true of agencies tasked with protecting the interests of politically powerless groups, including the dispersed general public, where the political pressure to rule for more powerful, organized interests will be intense and one-sided.

The goal of this Article is to move the conversation about insulation beyond the traditional independent agency structure of a multimember commission with for-cause removal protection and address overlooked elements of agency design that are particularly well-suited to addressing the problem of capture when interest groups line up on one side of an issue. This kind of lopsided pressure can be seen in a range of areas, from criminal justice to consumer protection.

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4. Id. at 3146.
6. See Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory State, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 1260, 1285 (2006) (“[More recent explanations of agency capture] look to how agencies cooperate with interest groups in order to procure needed information, political support, and guidance; the more one-sided that information, support, and guidance, the more likely that agencies will act favorably toward the dominant interest group.”). This Article focuses on the question of one-sided interest group pressure. If there are powerful interests on different sides of an issue (for example, labor versus management or competing industry groups fighting over antitrust policy), different design strategies may come into play.
banking agencies to guard against lending abuses8 to the Minerals Management Service’s lack of oversight of offshore drilling that led to the British Petroleum disaster9—make clear that addressing capture remains an urgent need. The brightest prospect for doing so lies in intelligent agency design that moves beyond the simple focus on presidential removal decisions and other traditional features of agency independence.

The Article begins in Part I by identifying the main reasons why policy makers seek to create independent agencies in the first place, highlighting that a concern with agency capture and lopsided partisan and interest group pressure has been a driving force. Part II then explores the traditional factors associated with independent agencies. Removal protection for agency heads is the touchstone, but independent agencies are also typically characterized by their multimember structure and the fact that, unlike executive agencies, they do not have to submit cost–benefit analyses of proposed rules for review by the President’s Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs. Part II explains the relationship between these traditional characteristics and the goal of limiting capture and one-sided political pressure. Part III then goes beyond the conventional mechanisms to address additional design features that have largely gone under the radar of administrative law scholarship. These features are an agency’s funding source; qualifications for appointment and post-employment restrictions for agency officials; the agency’s relationship with other federal agencies; the agency’s relationship with state-level actors; and various political tools, including the agency’s ability to generate politically powerful information, its ability to recruit political benefactors, and the potential for public advocates to become part of the agency structure. Part III argues that these factors, deemed “equalizing factors,” are more robust checks against agency capture under asymmetrical political conditions than the use of traditional factors alone.

To illustrate the limits of the traditional factors and the promise of the equalizing factors, Part IV focuses on consumer-protection agencies, where capture is a significant threat because the public interest is pitted against one-sided powerful interest group pressure. The creation this year of the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection (CFPB)—the most important federal agency created in decades and one charged with the Herculean task of regulating the financial services industry to protect consumers—provides an ideal case study for considering the importance of institutional design. The structure of the CFPB was the subject of heated debate in Congress, and its ultimate success or failure will likely depend on whether the agency is, in

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fact, sufficiently insulated against industry pressure. In addition, the CFPB follows in the footsteps of the Consumer Products Safety Commission (CPSC), an agency that provides vivid proof of the limits of the traditional hallmarks of agency independence. Part IV thus considers how agency design affected the CPSC’s function, and how it will likely influence the work of the CFPB. This Article thus provides one of the first in-depth studies of the new CFPB. Part V concludes.

I. Why Insulation

“From the perspective of institutional design,” as Jacob Gersen recently noted, “the optimal bureaucratic structure depends on the ends to be achieved.” This is a critical point to keep in mind in thinking about independent agencies and their design, as one cannot begin to think about what makes an agency independent without thinking about what the agency is supposed to be independent of.

The main aim in creating an independent agency is to immunize it, to some extent, from political pressure. But that, in turn, raises the question of why political pressure would be bad. After all, one person’s political pressure is another person’s democratic accountability. What policy makers who seek insulation want to avoid are particular pitfalls of politicization, such as pressures that prioritize narrow short-term interests at the expense of long-term public welfare. This Part explores the different goals of insulation and the particular political shortcomings it seeks to avoid.

A. Expertise and Nonpartisan Decision Making

The classic explanation for agency independence is the need for expert decision making. New Deal architect and administrative law scholar James

10. Gersen, supra note 1, at 334.
11. See Marshall J. Breger & Gary J. Edles, Established by Practice: The Theory and Operation of Independent Federal Agencies, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 1111, 1113 (2000) (“They are ‘independent’ of the political will exemplified by the executive branch, yet they are also multimember organizations, a fact that tends toward accommodation of diverse or extreme views through the compromise inherent in the process of collegial decisionmaking.”); Neal Devins & David E. Lewis, Not-So Independent Agencies: Party Polarization and the Limits of Institutional Design, 88 B.U. L. REV. 459, 463 (2008) (“Independent agencies are preferred to executive agencies because long commissioner tenure, staggered terms, and political insulation are intended to facilitate a nonpolitical environment where regulatory experts can apply their knowledge to complex policy problems.”); Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2311, 2376–77 (2006) (“These institutions were conceived as means to limit the sphere over which partisan political power could exert control.”); Paul R. Verkuil, The Purposes and Limits of Independent Agencies, 1988 DUKE L.J. 257, 259–60 (noting that the characteristics of independent agencies are “designed to isolate those decisionmakers from politics”).
12. See, e.g., Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 625 (1935) (“Thus, the language of the act, the legislative reports, and the general purposes of the legislation as reflected by the debates, all combine to demonstrate the congressional intent to create a body of experts . . . .”); Bressman & Thompson, supra note 1, at 612 (“Independence was traditionally justified, particularly during the New Deal era, as promoting expertise.”); Devins & Lewis, supra note 11, at 463
Landis succinctly put it as follows: “With the rise of regulation, the need for expertness became dominant.”13 The idea is that an agency could be created that would be insulated from short-term political pressures so that it could adopt public policies based on expertise that would yield better public policy over the long term.14 Thus, the New Dealers hoped to create apolitical agencies that would be guided by information and not politics. Of course, it is impossible to remove politics and political judgments from agencies, particularly given the discretionary authority afforded to them. But it is possible to make politics relatively less pronounced and expertise relatively more of a basis for decision making.15

Related to the goal of expertise is a desire to insulate agency decisions from the sort of political horse-trading that is anathema to impartial decision making.16 In this sense, expertise and nonpartisanship can be seen as two sides of the same coin. The Progressive reformers who pushed for additional independent agencies in the early part of the 20th century wanted both to eliminate partisan politics and to replace it with nonpartisan expertise.17 “The Progressives had an abiding faith in regulation, expertness, and the capacity of American government to make rational decisions provided experts

14. Bressman & Thompson, supra note 1, at 613–14; Gersen, supra note 1, at 348.
15. See, e.g., Devins & Lewis, supra note 11, at 491 (“[P]olitical polarization strengthens the institutional design of independent agencies—both with respect to the willingness of opposition-party commissioners to check the President and the willingness of the opposition party in the Senate to use the confirmation power to push for commissioners who will not simply rubberstamp the President’s decisions.”); Anne Joseph O’Connell, Political Cycles of Rulemaking: An Empirical Portrait of the Modern Administrative State, 94 VA. L. REV. 889, 953–54 (2008) (finding that executive agencies typically engage in more regulatory activity in the final quarter of a president’s administration than do independent agencies). A recent empirical study of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), for example, found that partisanship accounts for roughly 75% of the FCC’s nonunanimous decisions. See David E. Lewis, The Adverse Consequences of the Politics of Agency Design for Presidential Management in the United States: The Relative Durability of Insulated Agencies, 34 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 377 (2004) (finding that agencies insulated from presidential control are more durable than other agencies); Daniel E. Ho, Congressional Agency Control: The Impact of Statutory Partisan Requirements on Regulation 35 (Feb. 12, 2007) (unpublished manuscript), http://dho.stanford.edu/research/partisan.pdf (concluding partisan balance requirements for independent agency commissioners have “the largest and most robust explanatory power over votes compared to presidential affiliation”).
16. See ROBERT E. CUSHMAN, THE INDEPENDENT REGULATORY COMMISSIONS 189–90 (1972) (discussing the debates surrounding the creation of the FTC that emphasized the need to establish an independent body as a means of correcting the partisan and pressure-controlled management of the antitrust laws by the Department of Justice); see also Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at 625 (explaining that it was “essential that the [FTC] should not be open to the suspicion of partisan direction”).
in the administrative agencies could remain free from partisan political considerations.”

But nonpartisanship can also be seen as a separate justification that aims for balanced decision making whether or not it is driven by technical expertise. Indeed, one can see the desire for unbiased decision making as a separate, central concern in the development of independent agencies. Robert Cushman points out in his seminal work on the creation of the first modern independent agency, the Interstate Commerce Commission in 1887, that the impetus behind it was a desire to avoid “one-sided partisan control.” The Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC) creation in 1914 was similarly prompted by a desire to avoid “partisan and pressure-controlled” antitrust enforcement. The Banking Act of 1935, which established the modern structure of the Federal Reserve, aimed to give the agency more insulation so that it would serve the “general public interest” and not “special interests.”

**B. Insulation from Capture**

To achieve either expert or nonpartisan decision making, one must avoid undue industry influence, or “capture.” Unfortunately, as Richard

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20. See Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at 624 (explaining that the FTC was to be “non-partisan” and “from the very nature of its duties, act with entire impartiality”); CUSHMAN, supra note 16, at 61 (noting that the independence of the Interstate Commerce Commission “if it meant anything, appears to have meant bipartisanship, as a guarantee of impartiality” and pointing out that “independence of one-sided partisan control was a matter of great moment”).


Stewart has observed, “[i]t has become widely accepted, not only by public interest lawyers, but by academic critics, legislators, judges, and even by some agency members, that the comparative overrepresentation of regulated or client interests in the process of agency decision results in a persistent policy bias in favor of these interests.”

This bias operates for a few central reasons. First, regulated industries are well-financed and well-organized, especially when compared to the general public and public interest groups. Industry groups are thus better positioned to monitor agencies closely and to challenge any and all agency decisions that will negatively affect them. All else being equal, agencies would prefer not to become mired in legal challenges, so they may seek to work with, rather than against, these organized interests. Although there are some important and influential groups that seek to represent the public interest, these interest groups do not have the funding or resources of industries. Thus, they often cannot monitor and challenge all the potentially negative rules and orders from an agency or marshal the same resources as industry representatives when they do bring a challenge.

Second, agency capture is further exacerbated by the fact that industry groups are also well positioned to contribute to political campaigns and to lobby, which in turn gives them influence with the agency’s legislative overseers on the relevant oversight committees. For example, Arthur Levitt, the


25. Bagley & Revesz, supra note 6, at 1284–85.


27. See Scott R. Furlong & Cornelius M. Kerwin, Interest Group Participation in Rule Making: A Decade of Change, 15 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 353, 361 (2005) (finding that businesses are participating twice as much as public interest groups); Seidenfeld, supra note 26, at 464 (“A regulated entity frequently is a large corporation with resources to appeal agency decisions at every level.”).

chair of the SEC from 1993–2001, describes the SEC during his tenure as being constantly threatened with budget cuts by the SEC’s congressional overseers if it pursued aggressive regulations.\footnote{29}

Third, capture operates because of the revolving-door phenomenon: the heads of agencies often anticipate entering or returning to employment with the regulated industry once their government service terminates.\footnote{30} As a result, they do not want to make enemies within the industry by regulating with what the industry will view as a heavy hand.

A fourth factor that helps give regulated entities disproportionate influence over agencies is their information advantage. For an agency to regulate an industry effectively, it needs to know how the industry works and what it is capable of doing. But that information is often in the exclusive control of the regulated entity.\footnote{31}

These dynamics can be seen operating across a range of agencies.\footnote{32} Even if an agency has a promising beginning of “vigorous and independent regulation,” it “often becomes closely identified with and dependent upon the industry it is charged with regulating.”\footnote{33} To be sure, it is sometimes hard to identify when an agency decision is the product of undue interest group pressure as opposed to an exercise of the agency’s independent judgment.\footnote{34} But the difficulty in assessing \textit{ex post} whether a decision is the result of capture is all the more reason why policy makers often hope \textit{ex ante} to create structural checks on capture by designing the agency to better protect it from one-sided political pressure.

Politics cannot be removed from agency decision making, so of course one can never hope to avoid all hints of capture. But as with expertise, the question is whether one can achieve \textit{some} insulation from interest group

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\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\item 29. See \textsc{Arthur Levitt with Paula Dwyer}, \textit{Take on the Street} 132–33 (2002) (describing an incident in which the SEC’s attempt to institute auditor-independence rules resulted in a threatened cut in funding).
\item 30. \textsc{Kay Lehman Schlozman & John T. Tierny}, \textsc{Organized Interests and American Democracy} 342 (1986).
\item 31. Seidenfeld, supra note 26, at 464; Stewart, supra note 23, at 1713–14.
\item 34. \textsc{Protecting the Public Interest: Understanding the Threat of Agency Capture: Hearing Before the S. Subcomm. on Admin. Oversight and the Courts}, 111th Cong. 5–6 (2010) (statement of Nicholas Bagley, Assistant Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School).
\end{thebibliography}
The goal of many independent agency designers has been to create this extra buffer against interest group pressures that might harm relatively weaker political interests, including the collective public interest of the general electorate or a vulnerable subgroup.

C. Stability

A related goal of agency independence is to insulate the agency from future political changes in either Congress or the presidency. This can be done either to cement in place current congressional policy preferences or to allow the agency to make an initial policy decision that is not subject to wide fluctuations over time.

Stability has been a driving motivator since the creation of the earliest independent agencies. When the FTC was created, for instance, the Senate Committee Report emphasized the need “for an administrative board ... which would have precedents and traditions and a continuous policy and would be free from the effect of such changing incumbency.” The Federal Reserve was also created with stability in mind—to insulate monetary policy from the changing whims of presidents who serve four-year terms. After initially creating a Board of Governors to serve ten-year terms, Congress extended term lengths to fourteen years in 1935. The need for long-term stability in monetary policy explains why not just the Fed, but most financial regulatory agencies were designed with independence as the framework.

35. See Cristina M. Rodriguez, Constraint Through Delegation: The Case of Executive Control Over Immigration Policy, 59 Duke L.J. 1787, 1826 (2010) (“[T]hough complete insulation from political control may be unattainable ... the structure of an independent agency at least enables tensions between political actors to keep politically motivated decisionmaking at bay.”).

36. Rui J. P. de Figueiredo, Jr., Electoral Competition, Political Uncertainty, and Policy Insulation, 96 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 321, 331 (2002) (observing that groups that are electorally weak are more likely to insulate their preferred policies by designing independent agencies).

37. Bressman & Thompson, supra note 1, at 613–14; Gersen, supra note 1, at 347–48.

38. See Lewis, supra note 15, at 381 (noting that when political groups “worry about losing power, they remove agencies from political control by fixed terms for appointees, party balancing requirements, independence, specific statutes and other means”); id. at 400 (“In insulated agencies the impact of changing administrations is muted so that policies have less variance and the variance occurs around an ideal point set by the enacting Congress or the current Congress.”); Matthew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 Va. L. Rev. 431, 444 (1989) (arguing that enacting coalitions can mirror ex ante agreements and stack the deck to limit undesirable policy drift while allowing policy changes that would be acceptable).

39. 51 Cong. Rec. 10,376 (1914).


41. Id. at 466 n.39.

42. See Gersen, supra note 1, at 348 (noting that the need for long-term stability explains central bank independence in the United States and elsewhere); Marc Quintyn & Michael W. Taylor, Regulatory and Supervisory Independence and Financial Stability 10 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 02/46, 2002), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=879439 (arguing that financial stability requires regulatory and supervisory independence in the same way that monetary stability requires central bank independence); see also Bressman & Thompson, supra note 1, at
Stability is related to the goal of preventing capture because it aims to keep an agency free from unwanted political forces even as the enacting coalition fades from power. It is insufficient to insulate an agency from one-sided interest group pressures only as long as the designers stay in power. A policy maker concerned with the agency’s long-term success must create insulating measures that will work even as the presidency and Congress undergo shifts in party leadership.

**D. Less Presidential Control, More Congressional Power**

The creation of the first independent agencies appears not to have been motivated by a desire to decrease executive control or to buttress legislative power, but subsequent agencies have been established with these interests in mind. David Epstein and Sharyn O’Halloran examined the agencies created between 1947 and 1990 and found that Congress used independent agencies more often during periods of divided government than unified government, a result consistent with the idea that Congress uses independent agencies at least in part to keep power away from a President of the opposite party.

Although historically this has not always been the driving force in agency creation, much of the criticism of “independent agencies” has focused on the question of what these agencies mean to the presidential/congressional relationship. Scholars concerned with maintaining the power of the unitary executive have made much of the fact that independent agencies shift power from the President to Congress. Justices who endorse a formal view of the separation of powers have similarly honed in on this aspect of independent agencies. A recent opinion by Justice Scalia captures this concern. He noted

607–08 (supporting the assertion that financial agencies are among the most prominent independent agencies by highlighting numerous examples).

43. See Cushman, supra note 16, at 19, 60–61 (discussing the formation of the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), the first independent regulatory commission, and noting the limited debate at the time about the relationship between Congress and the ICC and the absence of any discussion of presidential responsibility for the Commission); Breger & Edles, supra note 1, at 1116 & n.12 (noting that the Commission’s independence developed years after its formation due to executive supervision).


46. See Devins & Lewis, supra note 11, at 464 (“When members of Congress fear the administrative influence of the current President on policies post-enactment, they are more likely to create independent commissions to implement their policies.”); Lewis, supra note 15, at 383 (“If the president’s influence is diminished but Congress’s is not, insulated agencies will produce policy outputs systematically closer to the ideal of the congressional median than other agencies.”).

47. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the Laws, 104 Yale L.J. 541, 582–83 (1994) (arguing that without presidential control, independent agencies are subject only to congressional oversight).
“independent agencies are sheltered not from politics but from the President, and it has often been observed that their freedom from presidential oversight (and protection) has simply been replaced by increased subservience to congressional direction.”

Importantly, as Part II will discuss in greater detail, insulating agencies from presidential oversight may also protect them from capture because interest groups can exert pressure on the President to rein in agencies. But focusing solely on presidential authority over agencies is an incomplete inquiry if the goal is to reduce capture and one-sided political pressure because it will ultimately do little to protect agencies if interest groups use congressional pressure or the pressure of other agencies to achieve the same ends.

II. The Traditional Lodestars of Independence

Given the varied goals of insulation, different design elements may be better suited for some goals and not others. This Part considers three design features traditionally associated with independent agencies: the President’s ability to remove an agency head only for cause, which has been the defining feature of an independent agency; freedom from oversight by the President’s Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs; and a multimember design that is the structural setup of most agencies with heads removable only for cause. This Part takes a fresh look at these design features with a particular question in mind: how well do they address the problem of capture and one-sided political pressure.

This is not, of course, intended to be an exhaustive list of mechanisms that have been associated with the insulation of agencies from industry dominance, whether exercised directly on the agency or through political benefactors. There are, in particular, three notable means of insulating agencies against capture that will not be covered here but that have received substantial attention in the literature. First, this Part will not address the use of substantive legal standards to constrain the power of interest groups. Obviously, if Congress itself takes a position on what must be done in clear terms, no amount of interest group pressure can override that substantive standard unless the statute is repealed or supplemented. But analyzing substantive limits is field specific, so it is not possible to speak of substantive boundaries in general terms of institutional design. Second, and relatedly, judicial review may help to police the original substantive framework of the statute, so it, too, can be a line of defense against capture to the extent that the original standard itself has those aims. Because the relationship between judicial review for adherence to statutory standards and industry capture has been covered at length in the literature, I will not rehash it here.

49. See Merrill, supra note 33, at 1043 (noting that federal judges began to police the administrative state for instances of agency capture in the 1960s).
Third, procedural mechanisms may help equalize the playing field by, for example, giving the public notice of agency policy changes and standing to challenge agencies’ decisions in court. While these mechanisms can help protect the public, that is not always the case. In fact, just the opposite may occur because parties with more resources are often in the best position to take advantage of procedural mechanisms, as Part IV explains in the context of the Consumer Products Safety Act and the history of procedural elements that were designed to help consumers but ended up benefitting the industry instead.

All three of those mechanisms are important, but because they have been discussed at length elsewhere in the legal and political science literature with a particular focus on their relationship to capture, this Part will not re-hash what we already know about these features. Instead, this Part looks to the traditional hallmarks of independence through the lens of capture avoidance, an emphasis that is often lacking in the discussion of these design features.

A. For-Cause Versus At-Will Removal Provisions

Whether an agency head should be removable at will or serve a term of years and be removable only for cause before his or her term expires is, as noted, the insulation design feature that is most often used to demarcate an agency as “independent.”50 If this is the definition of independence, independent regulatory agencies abound across a wide range of policy fields. They include, for example, the FTC,51 the Consumer Product Safety Commission,52 the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission,53 and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.54 The heads of these agencies can be removed only for good cause, which typically means “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.”55 Though the issue has not been decided by the Supreme Court, most commentators agree that it is not good cause for removal if an agency performs a lawful regulatory agency action that the President disagrees with as a matter of policy.56 If this view is correct, the

50. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
55. Id. This limitation on Presidential removal power has been upheld by the Supreme Court. See Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 627–32 (1935) (distinguishing officers of quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial agencies from executive officers who are removable at will by the President). However, the Court has never defined these terms. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 729 (1986) (“These terms are very broad and, as interpreted by Congress, could sustain removal . . . for any number of actual or perceived transgressions . . . .”).
56. See, e.g., Peter M. Shane, Independent Policymaking and Presidential Power: A Constitutional Analysis, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 596, 609 (1989) (asserting that the President can only remove officers for failing to comply with the law). For the alternate view, see Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 2, at 110–11 (arguing that because the Supreme Court has not defined “good
President cannot control independent regulatory agency policy making with the threat of removal.57

Empirical studies on when Congress opts for good-cause provisions support the view that this design feature seems largely aimed at stopping presidential pressure in particular and not necessarily at preventing interest group or partisan influence in general. The independent model of for-cause removal is typically selected during divided government when Congress is controlled by a different party than the presidency.58 Thus, Congress is interested in making sure that the minority party in the legislature does not exert greater influence over the agency through presidential power.59 When Congress and the presidency are controlled by the same party, Congress is more likely to delegate authority to an executive agency whose head is removable at will by the President.60

But this does not mean that current party politics is the only explanation for removal restrictions. Even if Congress is controlled by the same party as the current President, it may prefer a for-cause removal provision if the need for stability in policy is relatively great. This concern, for instance, was the driving force behind the removal of the Secretary of Treasury and the Comptroller General from the Federal Reserve Board in 1935.61 Similarly, Congress may agree with the current President’s policies but worry that the

57. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 410–11 (1989) (“[L]imitation on the President’s removal power . . . is specifically crafted to prevent the President from exercising ‘coercive influence’ over independent agencies.”); DAVID E. LEWIS, PRESIDENTS AND THE POLITICS OF AGENCY DESIGN 47 (2003) (“Political appointees who serve for fixed terms are insulated from presidential control since they cannot be removed without cause.”); Levinson & Pildes, supra note 11, at 2376–77 (“These institutions were conceived as means to limit the sphere over which partisan political power could exert control.”); Thomas O. Sargentich, The Emphasis on the Presidency in U.S. Public Law: An Essay Critiquing Presidential Administration, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 8 (2007) (suggesting that possibility of termination is an ex ante deterrent to executive agency heads’ willingness to negotiate strongly with the White House).


59. See Levinson & Pildes, supra note 11, at 2358 (“When Congress confronts a President who disagrees with its policy objectives, in other words, it directs its delegations to the executive branch actors most insulated from presidential control, and perhaps also most susceptible to congressional control.”).

60. David Epstein & Sharyn O’Halloran, Divided Government and the Design of Administrative Procedures: A Formal Model and Empirical Test, 58 J. POL. 373, 391 (1996) (“[U]nder unified government Congress is more inclined to increase the president’s discretionary authority, and the president will certainly not be averse to accepting it.”).

61. During hearings, the banking lobby argued that because Congress was concentrating “greater power than ever before” in the Federal Reserve Board, it should enjoy “absolute independence” from political considerations through elimination of the Secretary of the Treasury and the Comptroller of the Currency positions on the Board. Banking Act of 1935: Hearings Before the H. Comm. on Banking and Currency, 74th Cong. 514–15 (1935) (statement of D.J. Needham, Gen. Counsel, American Bankers Association).
short-term preferences of future administrations could undermine the long-
term goals of law. 62

The President, too, may support the creation of an independent agency
in the name of stability and of helping the agency to avoid future partisan
pressure from the opposite party. 63 For example, as part of his economic
recovery plan, President Obama proposed a Consumer Financial Protection
Agency (CFPA) as an independent regulatory agency with broad authority
over consumer financial services and lending statutes. 64

A concern with long-term stability helps explain why most financial
agencies, including the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 65
and the SEC, 66 have heads removable only for cause. Though the President
and these agencies share a common long-term goal of economic growth,
achieving that goal often requires politically unpopular actions in the short
term. 67

Giving agency officials tenure for a term of years can also foster
expertise, as agency heads gain wisdom from their experience on the job. 68
The terms must be sufficiently long to allow agency heads to gain the rele-
vant experience. And in the case of multimember agencies, the terms of the
members must be staggered so that institutional expertise can accumulate
without gaps. 69

Removal protections can also help serve the goal of reducing capture.
To the extent powerful groups operate to influence the President, they can

62. See Bressman & Thompson, supra note 1, at 613–14 (“When continuity was an end unto
itself, as was the case with monetary policy, agency independence was a means.”); Devins & Lewis,
supra note 11, at 463 (“Members of Congress worry not only about the current President but also
about the impact of future Presidents on agency policy and implementation.”).

63. See Devins & Lewis, supra note 11, at 468 (noting that Congress and the President can
“lock in” a set of policies by creating independent regulatory agencies with sympathetic
appointees); see also Bressman & Thompson, supra note 1, at 636 (“The President may have
trouble resisting the short-term pressures in deference to other interests and thus may seek an
independent regulator for fortitude.”); Verkuil, supra note 11, at 965 n.116 (pointing out President
Carter’s rejection of a proposal that would have shifted responsibility for nuclear power safety away
from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and to the Department of Energy).

64. U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM: A NEW FOUNDATION 58
(2009), http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/regs/FinalReport_web.pdf (recommending that the
CFPA “be structured to promote its independence and accountability”); see also Jackie Calmes &
Sewell Chan, Obama Pressing for Protections Against Lenders, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2010, at B1
(describing President Obama’s efforts to persuade Congress to create the CFPA as an independent
agency).


66. Though there is no explicit removal provision that governs the SEC, the Supreme Court
recently accepted the argument that its commissioners are subject to removal only for “inefficiency,
130 S. Ct. 3138, 3148, 3154 (2010).

67. Bressman & Thompson, supra note 1, at 603.

68. See S. REP. NO. 63-597, at 10–11 (1914) (noting that the seven-year terms of FTC
commissioners would “give them an opportunity to acquire the expertness in dealing with these
special questions concerning industry that comes from experience”).

69. Id. at 11.
also influence agencies by virtue of the President’s threat to remove agency
officials if they do not serve those interests. A removal restriction undoub-
tedly gives an agency head greater confidence to challenge presidential
pressure.

But one must be careful not to overstate the functional difference
between at-will and for-cause removal and thus the effect of removal
protections on capture. For starters, even at-will agency heads have greater
protection than their formal status suggests because, as Paul Verkuil puts it,
“removal is a doomsday machine” that is politically costly for presidents.70
On the flipside, just because agency officials have for-cause job protection
does not mean they are immune from political pressure. Presidents seem to
be able to remove them without litigating the question of good cause because
officials typically voluntarily accept a presidential request for their resigna-
tion or otherwise fail to challenge their removal.71 Even without a
presidential request to leave, the average presidential appointee is likely to
leave his or her position after about two years, giving the President authority
to fill the vacancy.72

More fundamentally, agency officials with for-cause protection who are
members of the same party as the President typically want to fall in line with
the President’s agenda. This could be for substantive policy reasons. Reed
Hundt, a former chairman of the FCC, explained that “naturally I, and any
agency head, preferred the White House to approve of my agenda. Few are
successful in any endeavor without learning the value of partnership.”73 Or,
as discussed in greater detail below, it could be for their own career
advancement.74 Regardless of the reason, presidential acceptance is likely to
matter to agency heads even without the threat of removal hanging over
them.

This is not to say that removal restrictions do not matter. Rather, it
emphasizes the need to look beyond removal if the goal is to create the
strongest barrier possible against capture.

B. Oversight by the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs

Threats of removal are not the only way presidents control agency
heads. Presidents also aim to steer agency policy through the Office of

70. Paul R. Verkuil, Jawboning Administrative Agencies: Ex Parte Contacts by the White
House, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 943, 957 (1980); see also CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 2, at 413–14
(noting that the removal of U.S. attorneys by President George W. Bush was politically costly);
Pierce, supra note 2, at 607–10 (describing the political costs to removing at-will agency officials).

71. Breger & Edles, supra note 1, at 1149–50; Pierce, supra note 2, at 604–05; Verkuil, supra
note 70, at 955.

72. Anne Joseph O’Connell, Vacant Offices: Delays in Staffing Top Agency Positions, 82 S.
CAL. L. REV. 913, 919 n.23 (2009).

73. REED E. HUNDT, YOU SAY YOU WANT A REVOLUTION: A STORY OF INFORMATION AGE
POLITICS 130 (2000).

74. See infra subpart III(B).
Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) in the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). One of OIRA’s main functions is to coordinate administration policy across agencies, so if OIRA discovers an outlier position, it will inevitably seek to pressure the agency to fall in line with the larger administration position. Another key OIRA function involves its review of proposed regulations. Every president since Ronald Reagan has used OIRA to require agencies under OIRA’s jurisdiction to justify their proposed regulations using cost–benefit analysis. OIRA also requires all agencies (executive and independent) to submit an agenda of all regulations they have under development or review. Finally, in addition to OIRA’s oversight of regulations, it also reviews legislation and congressional testimony proposed by covered agencies. Presidential appointees control OMB and OIRA, so channeling regulations through OIRA is an effective way for the President to monitor their compliance with his or her overall agenda and to pressure the agency to make changes if necessary.

Empirical evidence confirms OIRA’s influence on agency policy. A recent Government Accountability Office (GAO) report, for example, found that OIRA review prompted significant or material changes to eight of twelve agency rules being considered.

A key question of agency design is thus whether the agency must submit regulations for OIRA review. It is an open constitutional question whether the President could require traditional independent agencies (defined for these purposes as an agency whose head is removable for cause) to submit cost–benefit analyses of proposed regulations to OIRA for review, or if

75. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-205, FEDERAL RULEMAKING: IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED TO MONITORING AND EVALUATION OF RULES DEVELOPMENT AS WELL AS TO THE TRANSPARENCY OF OMB REGULATORY REVIEWS 8 (2009) (hereinafter GAO OMB STUDY) (noting that OMB is responsible for making sure that “decisions made by one agency do not conflict with the policies or actions taken or planned by another agency”).


77. See Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 4 (“For purposes of this subsection, the term ‘agency’ or ‘agencies’ shall also include those considered to be independent regulatory agencies . . . . Each agency shall prepare an agenda of all regulations under development or review, at a time and in a manner specified by the Administrator of OIRA.”).

78. Breger & Edles, supra note 1, at 1151.

79. See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2338 (2001) (“[I]t is difficult to identify instances of [Executive Office of the President] intervention in agency action that deviated markedly from the policy orientation of the President.”).

80. GAO OMB STUDY, supra note 75, at 30. An earlier study by the General Accounting Office determined that OIRA significantly impacted twenty-four of the eighty-five rules studied “by suggesting changes that revised the scope, impact, or costs and benefits of the rules, returning the rules for reconsideration by the agency, or, in one case, requesting that the agency withdraw the rule from review.” U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-03-929, RULEMAKING: OMB’S ROLE IN REVIEWS OF AGENCIES’ DRAFT RULES AND THE TRANSPARENCY OF THOSE REVIEWS 5 (2003).
Congress has the power to prevent such review.81 But ever since OIRA started engaging in extensive oversight of agency regulations, presidents have avoided this constitutional confrontation by making the political choice to exempt independent agencies that are defined in the Paperwork Reduction Act from having to submit a cost–benefit analysis of their rules to OIRA.82

Thus, right now the key marker of whether an agency must submit cost–benefit studies of proposed rules to OIRA is whether the agency is listed in the Paperwork Reduction Act as an independent agency. Notably, not all agencies with heads who are removable for cause are exempt from OIRA review under this definition. For example, the head of the Social Security Administration (SSA) is removable for cause,83 and the Act creating the SSA states that it shall be “an independent agency in the executive branch.”84 But the SSA is not among the agencies listed in the Paperwork Reduction Act.85 The SSA, in turn, has complied with executive orders on regulatory review.

81. See, e.g., Memorandum from the Dep’t of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel to David Stockman, Dir., Office of Mgmt. and Budget 7–8 (Feb. 12, 1981), reprinted in Role of OMB in Regulation: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 97th Cong. 158 (1981) (claiming that an attempt by Congress to prevent a cost–benefit analysis requirement would be met with skepticism by the Supreme Court); Robert W. Hahn & Cass R. Sunstein, A New Executive Order for Improving Federal Regulations? Deeper and Wider Cost–Benefit Analysis, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1489, 1534–35 (2002) (contrasting the narrow and broad views of independent agency autonomy, including the possibility of cost–benefit analysis); Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 2, at 112 (stating that the issue of presidential authority over independent agencies does not yet have precise contours); Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 29–32 (1995) (“The legal question . . . [of] whether the President has any legal authority to supervise [independent agencies] . . . has not been answered.”); Peter Shane, Independent Policymaking and Presidential Power: A Constitutional Analysis, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 596, 611 (1989) (arguing that the Constitution allows for textual arguments supporting both a narrow and a broad view of independent agency autonomy from the President); Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 596 (1984) (stating that the text of the Constitution makes it difficult to describe the administrative state’s position with respect to the three branches of government “in purely legal or theoretical terms”); Memorandum from Richard L. Revesz & Michael A. Livermore, Inst. for Policy Integrity, N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law to Office of Info. & Regulatory Affairs 5 (Feb. 13, 2009), available at http://www.reginfo.gov/public/jsp/EO/fedRegReview/ReveszLivermore.pdf (“While there are plausible legal arguments that the President may have the authority to require cost–benefit analysis, this question is far from settled.”).


84. Id. § 901.

85. 44 U.S.C. § 3502(5) (2006). Though the Act’s definition of “independent regulatory agencies” includes a catchall for “any other similar agency designated by statute as a Federal independent regulatory agency or commission,” id., there appears to be no court decision interpreting this definition to include the SSA.
including the appointment of a regulatory policy officer when President George W. Bush’s executive order required it.86

In thinking about whether Congress should list an agency among the independent regulatory agencies in the Paperwork Reduction Act to exempt it from OIRA review, it is important to return to the goals of insulation.87 Obviously, if the goal of insulation is to limit presidential control, OIRA review should be avoided.

If the goal of insulation is to enable decisions to be made on expert information, the analysis is more complicated because OIRA review can cut both ways. On the one hand, OIRA review helps the President coordinate policies across the Executive Branch, which can rationalize government decision making overall and include the input of other expert agencies that are dealing with the same topic.88 In addition, requiring an agency to submit a cost–benefit analysis of a proposed regulation to OIRA can have potentially positive disciplining effects because OIRA brings a fresh set of eyes to the issue and expertise at economic analysis.89 Cass Sunstein and Richard Pildes, for example, believe “strong policy reasons favor including the


87. Note that if one’s goals were different—say, increasing democratic accountability—the analysis may change. For example, because some argue that the President represents a national constituency, subjecting agency rules to OIRA review may increase democratic accountability. See Kagan, supra note 79, at 2335 (arguing that the President’s national constituency causes him to consider the interests of the general public rather than parochial interests). But see Evan J. Criddle, Fiduciary Administration: Rethinking Popular Representation in Agency Rulemaking, 88 TEXAS L. REV. 441, 457–63 (2010) (arguing that voters do not select presidents based on policy platforms, administrative procedures obscure Presidential control and decrease accountability, and agencies receive conflicting advice from White House officials rather than national perspectives); Jide Nzelibe, The Fable of the Nationalist President and the Parochial Congress, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1217, 1248 (2006) (comparing the incentives of Congress and the President and arguing that “in many circumstances, the president has an incentive to exhibit a parochial preference in his policies that exceeds that of the median member of Congress”). But the point of the Article is to think about these design elements as they relate to the specific end goals of insulation, which by their nature cut against increased accountability.

88. Bagley & Revesz, supra note 6, at 1264; see also Rodriguez, supra note 35, at 1837 (pointing out in the context of immigration that “some White House scrutiny and coordination may well be warranted, given both the political nature of the agency’s mandate and the sprawl of the immigration bureaucracy across the executive branch”).

89. See Steven Croley, White House Review of Agency Rulemaking: An Empirical Investigation, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 821, 873 (2003) (“White House review appears to be at least partially technocratic and at any rate not ad hoc.”); Strauss, supra note 81, at 591–94 (pointing out that better policy can result from getting the President’s broader perspective on policy).
independents within some degree of presidential authority."\textsuperscript{90} They argue that OIRA review can “diminish some of the characteristic pathologies of modern regulation—myopia, interest group pressure, draconian responses to sensationalist anecdotes, poor priority setting, and simple confusion.”\textsuperscript{91} Although there is some delay with OIRA review, in recent years the process has been relatively expeditious, taking roughly a month of additional time.\textsuperscript{92}

On the other hand, the agency has subject-matter expertise that can get lost in OIRA review. For example, Thomas McGarity points out that OIRA lacks the technical expertise necessary to adequately review many agency actions.\textsuperscript{93} The relationship between expertise and OIRA is thus a complicated one.\textsuperscript{94}

If the goal of insulation is to further nonpartisan decision making that is not captured by a particular interest and to encourage stability, the case for OIRA review weakens. Consider first the relationship between OIRA review and a desire to insulate an agency from biased decision making, particularly bias in favor of a politically powerful regulated entity. Some have argued as a matter of theory that presidential oversight via OIRA review is needed to curb the capture of independent agencies.\textsuperscript{95} But Nicholas Bagley and

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{90} Pildes & Sunstein, supra note 81, at 28.
\item \textsuperscript{91} Id. at 4. The concern about excessive costs of regulation motivated a 2002 proposal by the Center for Regulatory Effectiveness to impose OIRA review on independent agencies. CTR. FOR REGULATORY EFFECTIVENESS, A BLUEPRINT FOR THE OMB REVIEW OF INDEPENDENT AGENCY REGULATIONS I (2002).
\item \textsuperscript{92} See OIRA’s Role in the Obama Administration Examined, OMB WATCH (June 16, 2009), http://www.ombwatch.org/node/10115 (quoting OIRA associate administrator Michael Fitzpatrick as describing the pace of review as “expeditious” and stating that the average length of review for most regulations was twenty-eight days, while for economically significant regulations it was thirty-two days).
\item \textsuperscript{94} Bagley & Revesz, supra note 6, at 1312–13 (noting the complexity of determining when centralized review in OIRA makes sense).
\item \textsuperscript{95} See, e.g., BERNSTEIN, supra note 18, at 291–97 (arguing that independent agencies “have proved to be more susceptible to private pressures, to manipulation for private purposes, and to administrative and public apathy than other types of governmental organizations”); Christopher C. DeMuth & Douglas H. Ginsburg, White House Review of Agency Rulemaking, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1075, 1080–81 (1986) (assuming that the fact that “regulation tends to favor narrow, well-organized groups at the expense of the general public” means that OIRA review is needed to check against the failings of regulation); Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 2, at 96 (“[A]n independent agency is highly likely to fall victim to factional capture.”); John O. McGinnis, Presidential Review as Constitutional Restoration, 51 DUKE L.J. 901, 905, 913 n.45 (2001) (suggesting that OIRA review is even more justified for independent regulatory agencies than executive agencies because “at the margin independent agencies are even more likely to be dominated by special interests than are agencies whose heads are not insulated from presidential removal” and offering his view that “the pressure for special interest regulation is greater than for special interest deregulation”); Cass R. Sunstein,
Richard Revesz have persuasively shown that “the assumption that agencies will be routinely plagued by regulatory capture, but that OIRA will never be, is not very plausible.”

On the contrary, OIRA review is likely to add to the problem of capture by industry. As Bagley and Revesz effectively demonstrate, agencies are more likely to underregulate than overregulate because industry groups are far more likely than public interest groups to have the organization and resources to capture agencies. Yet OIRA is poorly positioned to check the problem of underregulation. Just the opposite, OIRA itself is prone to be captured by the very same industry forces because “the President will be particularly attentive to those groups that can provide him with the resources, support, or votes to win elections or promote his political agenda.” And because the OIRA review process is less transparent than the agency process, it is that much easier for industry groups to influence OIRA without being checked. This is not just a matter of theory; empirical evidence confirms OIRA’s strong deregulatory bias and sympathy for industry views. Thus, Bagley and Revesz conclude that “solidifying the President’s already substantial control over the administrative state may have the perverse result of amplifying the power of those groups that are in a position to exert undue influence on the President while doing nothing to minimize industry group influence at the administrative level.”

This is all the more likely when the agency at issue has been set up to be relatively insulated from interest group pressures. That is because any insulation of the agency will be lost if interest groups can achieve their desired policies once the agency’s rules reach the level of presidential review.

Thus, for agencies charged with regulating in an area where there is no powerful interest in favor of regulation to counterbalance the deregulatory forces that line up on one side—the problem this Article seeks to address—OIRA review is likely to exacerbate agency bias, not neutralize it. And

96. Bagley & Revesz, supra note 6, at 1306, 1308.
97. Id. at 1287–90 (using theory and empirical evidence to refute the claim that agencies will be captured by public interest groups seeking more regulation).
98. Id. at 1305; see also id. at 1306 (pointing out that industry groups will have the same incentives to bid for regulatory outputs at OIRA as they do at other agencies).
99. Id. at 1309–10.
100. See, e.g., id. at 1306–07 (citing Erik D. Olsen, The Quiet Shift of Power: Office of Management & Budget Supervision of Environmental Protection Agency Rulemaking Under Executive Order 12,291, 4 VA. J. NAT. RESOURCE L. 43, 56–57 (1984)) (summarizing empirical evidence that “OIRA was a ‘conduit’ for industry views”).
101. Id. at 1312; see also Verkuil, supra note 70, at 950–51 (“Powerful private lobbies, increasingly frustrated in obtaining preferential access to administrators, can be expected to use White House political advisors to achieve equivalent clout.”).
102. OIRA may well be needed in other circumstances where the risks of overregulation are present, as Bagley and Revesz concede as well. Bagley & Revesz, supra note 6, at 1283.
although many urge OIRA to take a more aggressive role in policing agency inaction—thus theoretically serving as an additional check on an agency that is not regulating enough to protect the public interest—policing agency inaction will always be more difficult than supervising agencies’ affirmative acts. For example, even after OIRA committed itself to making greater use of prompt letters “to a regulator, that a rulemaking be initiated or completed, that information relevant to a regulatory program be disclosed to the public, or that a piece of research or analysis relevant to rulemaking be conducted,” very few were actually sent.

More fundamentally, OIRA will rarely pay much heed to interest groups that are unorganized and lack power in the political process. These groups are unlikely to have the resources to participate actively in the OIRA process. Even when they do, OIRA may opt to intervene in areas where more powerful groups take an interest to help the President get reelected.

And of course, a president with a deregulatory, pro-business agenda is hardly likely to use OIRA to prompt more regulations. While a president with that ideological outlook is likely to influence independent agencies as well through his or her appointments and other means, the independent agency will nevertheless be relatively more insulated from industry pressure, so keeping its decisions away from OIRA will, on net, produce less of a deregulatory bias.

In the same vein, OIRA review undermines the goal of stability because the more susceptible an agency is to presidential oversight, the more likely the agency’s policies will shift as new administrations take power. Dramatic shifts hinder business planning and create legal uncertainty, thus leading to greater destabilization.

103. See, e.g., Hahn & Sunstein, supra note 81, at 1521–24 (praising OIRA’s use of prompt letters to encourage agency action); Revesz & Livermore, supra note 81, at 1–3 (encouraging OIRA to take advantage of opportunities to review agency inaction).


106. Bagley & Revesz, supra note 6, at 1277–78 (noting that fourteen prompt letters were sent between 2001 and 2006).

107. See id. at 1306–07 (discussing empirical studies showing a relative lack of public interest participation in the OIRA review process).

108. Strauss, supra note 81, at 664–65; see also McGarity, supra note 93, at 288 (“White House political operatives promised to intervene in an ongoing OSHA rulemaking in exchange for a large contribution from the textile industry to the Committee to Re-elect the President.”). This concern initially caused a legal debate as to whether OIRA review was constitutional even as applied to executive agencies. David J. Barron, From Takeover to Merger: Reforming Administrative Law in an Age of Agency Politicization, 76 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1095, 1110 (2008).

109. See infra note 123.
Having said all this, it is important to reiterate that even if a president is restricted from removing agency officials and cannot exercise review through OIRA, he or she will undoubtedly still exercise informal pressures that may be just as powerful. For example, even though agencies are not required to submit to OIRA regulatory review, some do on a voluntary basis to stay in the President’s good graces and ensure access to resources such as coordination with other agencies, office space, and legal services.\textsuperscript{110} Elena Kagan has similarly observed that presidents achieve influence through personal ties, sanctions, and institutional incentives.\textsuperscript{111}

One recent study found that during the Bush I and Clinton Administrations, nineteen White House offices (including OIRA) were involved in EPA rulemaking to some degree.\textsuperscript{112} Vice President Cheney exercised considerable influence on agency decisions by contacting lower-ranked agency officials directly.\textsuperscript{113} Some believe these informal contacts further the White House’s agenda even more than OIRA review.\textsuperscript{114} Thus, any attempt at curbing presidential influence must seek to address these more subtle mechanisms of influence.

C. Single Agency Head Versus Multimember Commission

It is often remarked that independent agencies are characterized not only by their statutory for-cause removal protections but also by the fact that they are typically multimember bodies.\textsuperscript{115} Thus, another traditional question of agency design is whether to opt for a single agency head or to have a commission or board structure with a number of voting members.

This question of institutional design is a bedrock inquiry that is reflected in the Constitution. The unitary executive model of Article II was selected for efficiency and accountability.\textsuperscript{116} But a single head also means less deliberation and debate. A multimember agency, in contrast, “tends toward accommodation of diverse or extreme views through the compromise

\textsuperscript{110} Strauss, supra note 81, at 593–94, 663.
\textsuperscript{111} Kagan, supra note 79, at 2376.
\textsuperscript{114} Pierce, supra note 2, at 600 (“Largely invisible ad hoc White House jawboning is now, and always has been, far more important in its impact on agency policy decisions.”).
\textsuperscript{115} Bressman & Thompson, supra note 1, at 610. In Free Enter. Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., the Supreme Court assumed that SEC commissioners are removable for cause, even in the absence of a statutory for-cause removal restriction, and that was likely due in part to the multimember structure of the agency and the fixed terms for its commissioners. 139 S. Ct. 3138, 3153 (2010).
\textsuperscript{116} See THE FEDERALIST NO. 74, at 447 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (noting that “the sense of responsibility is always strongest in proportion as it is undivided”); Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 2, at 93 (“The framers believed that unitariness advanced the interests of coordination, accountability, and efficiency in the execution of the laws.”).
inherent in the process of collegial decision making.” And having only one person at the apex can also mean that the agency is more easily captured.

Presidents may have relatively less direct influence over multimember agencies, if only because these agencies have members who serve staggered terms, meaning that presidents typically cannot appoint a full slate of officers immediately upon taking office.

It is important, however, not to understated the President’s power over independent multimember commissions. Dating to the presidency of Warren G. Harding, presidents have been able to obtain majorities for their party on independent commissions within thirteen to fourteen months after taking office from a prior president of a different party. Recently, the process has slowed, with Presidents Clinton and George W. Bush taking an average of twenty months to obtain a majority for their respective parties. Once the President has a majority of members of his or her party, the commissions fall in line with the President’s priorities and positions.

The President’s influence can occur even more quickly than noted because he or she often has the power to demote the chair of independent commissions and appoint a new one. The chair in many cases has significant authority over the agency’s budget and personnel decisions, and often has a large influence over the agency’s day-to-day decision making as

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117. Breger & Edles, supra note 11, at 1113.
118. Cushman, supra note 16, at 153 (“It seem[s] easier to protect a board from political control than to protect a single appointed official.”).
119. Bressman & Thompson, supra note 1, at 610.
120. See Devins & Lewis, supra note 11, at 468–69 (finding that it takes presidents on average nine or ten months after taking office to obtain majorities on commissions).
121. Id. at 470. New presidents who are of the same party as the previous president obtain a majority for their party much more quickly, within one to two months. Id.
122. Id. at 472. It takes a bit longer (about one more month) for presidents to appoint absolute majorities of commissioners (for example, appointing three out of five commissioners, regardless of party), but this is less relevant because party polarization means that once a president has a majority of party votes, the agency tends to follow the President’s lead. Id. at 469–73, 492.
123. For a more detailed model of how elected officials change the policies of multimember agencies depending on the sequence and timing of open seats on the agency, see Susan K. Snyder & Barry R. Weingast, The American System of Shared Powers: The President, Congress, and the NLRB, 16 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 269 (2000). That independent agencies ultimately fall in line with presidential priorities because of party loyalty shows the wisdom of Daryl Levinson and Rick Pildes’s plea to administrative law scholars to spend more time focusing on party affiliation rather than formal structural separation of powers. Levinson & Pildes, supra note 11, at 2364.
124. See Verkuil, supra note 70, at 955 & n.75 (noting that the President appoints the chairman of the FTC, FCC, SEC, and National Labor Relations Board (NLRB)). Typically, when the President demotes a chair, the chair opts to resign and not serve the remainder of his or her term, thus giving the President a new appointment as well. Daniel E. Ho, Measuring Agency Preferences: Experts, Voting, and the Power of Chairs, 59 DePaul L. Rev. 333, 338 (2010). The President does not have the power to select the chair of all independent agencies. The chair of the Federal Reserve Board, for instance, has a fixed tenure of four years. 12 U.S.C. § 242 (2006).
In many agencies, the chair has the right to appoint staff directly and is the public voice of the agency. These powers allow the chair to exercise significant control over the agency’s agenda.

In the case of multimember agencies, another design question of import is whether the members should be relatively balanced among political parties. Most independent commissions can have no more than a bare majority of the members from the same political party. For example, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) has a five-member board, and its authorizing statute provides that no more than three members may be of the same political party. The FTC is also governed by a five-member body, and its authorizing statute similarly insists that no more than three of its commissioners can be members of the same political party. The National Credit Union Administration (NCUA) follows this same model:


I should make it clear that in the management of the Commission’s day-to-day affairs, there are no collegial decisions. Management of the Commission, save for the appointment of top policy making positions and policy decisions having to do with the allocation of major resources, is placed squarely on the Chairman. In my experience, matters having to do with the management of the Commission’s staff are not the subject of debate among the Commissioners.

DAVID M. WELBORN, GOVERNANCE OF FEDERAL REGULATORY AGENCIES 31 (1977) (quoting Miles W. Kirkpatrick, Dinner Address, 40 ANTITRUST L.J. 332 (1971)). With respect to the allocation of funds among various projects, however, the commission as a whole generally decides. See WELBORN, supra, at 22 (“In the Civil Aeronautics Board, Federal Power Commission, Federal Trade Commission, and Securities and Exchange Commission, authority is reserved to revise or approve budget estimates and to allocate appropriated funds among ‘major programs and purposes.’ In the Interstate Commerce Commission, budget authority is phrased somewhat differently but to the same effect.”); Breger & Edles, supra note 1, at 1173–74 (“Many statutes affirmatively accord the agency as a whole the right to approve the annual budget . . . . [T]he chairman’s unitary authority often does not extend beyond the preparation or drafting of budget documents . . . .”); see also, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 41 (2006) (reserving the right of the FTC to approve the agency’s budget).

126. Breger & Edles, supra note 1, at 1173 n.317 (describing the differences in the hiring power of the chairman at various agencies, and noting that FCC Chairman Reed Hundt hired 200 staff members during his four years in office).

127. Ho, supra note 124, at 360.


129. Breger & Edles, supra note 1, at 1139.


the three members of its board, only two may be members of the same
party.132

There are, however, some multimember bodies that lack a
bipartisanship requirement, including the National Labor Relations Board
and the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission.133 The Federal
reserve Board of Governors also lacks a requirement that it be politically
balanced.134 Even in those independent agencies that have less formal
requirements on the balance of members, there exists political pressure for
continuity in patterns of membership.135

Appointees who are of the opposite party as the President who appoints
them tend to be “ideological partisans committed to the agenda of the oppo-
sition party.”136 And appointees who are of the same party as the President
who appoints them are likely to be equally committed to the President’s party
and therefore his or her agenda. Thus, these agencies ultimately shift as
presidential power shifts. While one might think this divergence undercuts
the goals of having independent agencies, there are reasons to believe that
having a mix of ideologies at agencies facilitates some of the aims of
insulation.

In particular, a partisan balance requirement can help achieve two goals
of insulation: it can avoid extremely partisan decisions and help facilitate
more stable agency policy. As a wealth of empirical research demonstrates,
a group composed solely of ideologically like-minded people tends toward
extreme decision making.137 Liberals and conservatives alike become more
liberal and conservative, respectively, when they deliberate only with like-

133. Breger & Edles, supra note 1, at 1139. The original proposal for the CFPA lacked a
requirement of partisan balance. Consumer Financial Protection Agency Act of 2009, H.R. 3126,
111th Cong. § 112 (2009).
134. 12 U.S.C. § 241 (2006). The legislation creating the Board of Governors does state,
however, that, in “selecting the members of the Board, not more than one of whom shall be selected
from any one Federal Reserve district, the President shall have due regard to a fair representation of
the financial, agricultural, industrial, and commercial interests, and geographical divisions of the
country.” Id.
(describing pressure on President Johnson to maintain balance between consumer- and industry-
136. Devins & Lewis, supra note 11, at 461.
137. See, e.g., David Schkade et al., What Happened on Deliberation Day?, 95 CALIF. L. REV.
915, 917 (2007) (discussing the results of an experiment that shows that liberals and conservatives
become more liberal and conservative, respectively, as a result of deliberation amongst like-minded
people); Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110 YALE L.J. 71,
74 (2000) [hereinafter Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble] (“In brief, group polarization means that
members of a deliberating group predictably move toward a more extreme point in the direction
indicated by the members’ predeliberation tendencies.”); Cass R. Sunstein et al., Ideological Voting
(discussing data that shows that unified groups of three Democrat-appointed or Republican-
appointed judges are far more likely to vote in a “liberal” or “conservative” manner, respectively,
than Democrat-appointed or Republican-appointed judges who are part of a divided bench).
minded people. Thus, as Cass Sunstein has observed, “[a]n independent agency that is all Democratic, or all Republican, might polarize toward an extreme position, likely more extreme than that of the median Democrat or Republican, and possibly more extreme than that of any member standing alone.”

This kind of polarization could mean wide fluctuations in policy as presidential administrations change. Thus, the designers of the ICC—which became the template for later independent agencies—insisted on partisan balance (with not more than three of the five members permitted to come from the same political party) based on a desire to create “impartiality, or at least neutrality.” Indeed, Robert Cushman notes that this neutrality “was looked upon as more important than expertness.”

Put another way, a commission of five members all of the same party would be even more polarized than one in which a bare majority is of the same party.

A multimember commission that is politically balanced is beneficial for another reason. As noted above, one of the concerns with agencies that regulate powerful, wealthy industries is that those industries tend to dominate the agency’s agenda because they have greater resources to monitor what the agency is doing. But, when an agency is composed of members of different parties, it has a built-in monitoring system for interests on both sides because that type of body is more likely to produce a dissent if the agency goes too far in one direction. That dissent, in turn, serves as a “fire alarm” that alerts Congress and the public at large that the agency’s decision might merit closer scrutiny.

138. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble, supra note 137, at 103.

139. One might wonder why the Federal Reserve Board of Governors lacks a partisan balance requirement if it is so central to stability. But the Board of Governors seems to be checked by other measures. First, the members serve long terms of fourteen years, thereby increasing stability. In addition, they have perhaps the most powerful agency positions in the country because of their authority to set monetary policy. Monetary policy cannot fluctuate in an extreme manner as administrations change because of the deleterious effect it would have on the economy. It is therefore unsurprising that even without a requirement that the Board be politically balanced it is one of the most stable agencies in government and the most independent.

140. See Cushman, supra note 16, at 188 (“A controlling force moving legislative leaders to create the independent Federal Trade Commission was the model of the Interstate Commerce Commission.”).

141. Id. at 63.

142. Id.

143. A recent empirical study of the FCC, for example, found that partisanship accounts for roughly 75% of the FCC’s nonunanimous decisions. Ho, supra note 15, at 35.

III. The Equalizing Insulators

While the traditional hallmarks of agency independence serve important insulating functions, they have shortcomings. In particular, these metrics do not offer much help to an agency that must protect politically disadvantaged groups, including the general public, against powerful interests that may capture the agency. To be sure, not having the traditional hallmarks of independence can make things worse for these agencies because anything that increases their political accountability necessarily increases the ability of powerful political forces to control them. Thus, presidential oversight in the form of at-will removal power or OIRA review of regulations can limit an agency’s ability to protect a politically weak and unorganized group. But while these features may be necessary for independence, they are insufficient if the goal is to create a buffer against one-sided interest group pressure and capture.

This Part therefore turns to design features that have been largely ignored in the cases and legal literature on independent agencies, but that can be effective tools in the battle against agency capture and can help even the political playing field. Because these features can be helpful to agencies charged with protecting a diffuse public interest against one-sided interest group pressure, the Article refers to them as “equalizing” insulators. They include the agency’s funding source; restrictions on agency personnel both in terms of initial hiring requirements and limits on subsequent employment; the rulemaking and enforcement relationships between the agency and other agencies, including state agencies; and political tools to make the agency’s public interest mission more salient.

A. Agency Funding Sources

If you want to locate power in Washington (and just about any place else), you must follow the money. This holds true for agency authority as well. Agencies cannot survive without resources, so the source of their funding is a critical, though largely overlooked, key to their power. If legal scholarship has ignored most of these features, political scientists have recognized the value of some of them, such as funding and appointments. But even this literature has ignored some key elements, such as the role of state law enforcement and the power of information generation.

145. While legal scholarship has ignored most of these features, political scientists have recognized the value of some of them, such as funding and appointments. But even this literature has ignored some key elements, such as the role of state law enforcement and the power of information generation.


147. See STEINZOR & SHAPIRO, supra note 93, at 65 (pointing out that four regulatory agencies—the Consumer Product Safety Commission, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, and the National Highway Transportation and Safety Administration—have not received significant budget increases, adjusted for inflation, since 1980); Daniel P. Carpenter, Adaptive Signal Processing, Hierarchy, and Budgetary Control in Federal Regulation, 90 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 283, 284, 298 (1996) (studying the FCC and FDA and finding that elected officials exercise authority over agencies through the budget’s signaling effects rather than resource constraints).
agencies must rely on OMB for budget requests, the President has a huge lever of power over the agency, whether or not the head of the agency is removable at will. Similarly, if Congress provides the agency’s funding at its discretion, partisan considerations will certainly play a role in the agency’s decision making.

To be sure, the power of the purse is one of the key ways in which democratic accountability is served. But if the purpose of insulation is to curb political pressures in favor of powerful regulated interests, then to some extent accountability has to be sacrificed or tempered. And giving agencies greater control over their funding is a way to do so while still allowing political actors to oversee an agency’s substantive agenda.

One way to limit political control through budgetary oversight is to allow agencies to submit budget proposals directly to Congress without having to go through OMB and thus the President. Alternatively, Congress can allow agencies to submit their budget requests concurrently to OMB and Congress, which eliminates the President’s ability to change agency policy before Congress sees the agency’s original proposal. These mechanisms bypass one political pressure point—the President—but still allow political influence to operate through Congress’s budgetary control. Thus, if the goal of insulating an agency is simply to shift presidential authority to Congress, this mechanism effectively does so. But if the goals of

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149. See RICHARD F. FENNO, JR., THE POWER OF THE PURSE: APPROPRIATIONS POLITICS IN CONGRESS 291 (1966) (“Once the [Appropriations] Committee’s ability to hurt it is recognized, the most obvious way for the agency to ensure a favorable kind of relationship with the Committee is simply to do . . . what the Committee tells it to do.”); Randall L. Calvert et al., A Theory of Political Control and Agency Discretion, 33 AM. J. POL. SCI. 588, 605 (1989) (noting that Congress’s budgeting power may contain aspects of both active and latent control); Weingast & Moran, supra note 28, at 792 (“The statistical evidence implies that the FTC is remarkably sensitive to changes . . . in its budget.”); B. Dan Wood & Richard W. Waterman, The Dynamics of Political Control of the Bureaucracy, 85 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 801, 822 (1991) (“The EPA’s hazardous waste enforcement program illustrates the importance of . . . budgeting to political control.”); Bruce Yandle, Regulators, Legislators and Budget Manipulation, 56 PUB. CHOICE 167, 178 (1988) (“[B]udget manipulation is the most effective sanction available to Congress.”).

150. See J. Gregory Sidak, The President’s Power of the Purse, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1162, 1164 (“The most plausible purpose of the appropriations clause is to encourage efficiency in the production of public goods by the federal government and to impose fiscal accountability on both Congress and the President.”); Kate Stith, Congress’ Power of the Purse, 97 YALE L.J. 1343, 1356 (1988) (“All funds belonging to the United States . . . are public monies, subject to public control and accountability.”).

151. Breger & Edles, supra note 1, at 1152; see also Verkuil, supra note 70, at 963 (observing that Congress has the authority to withdraw agencies from OMB jurisdiction).

152. See Lewis, supra note 15, at 389 & n.41 (noting that the Commodity Futures Trading Commission and Federal Aviation Administration submit budget requests to OMB and Congress contemporaneously).
independence include shielding the agency from partisan pressure and creating a more stable policy making space that does not change as majorities change in the House and Senate, then this method falls short. Interest groups can put pressure on members of Congress to exercise control over an agency through the budget, which Congress has done. The CPSC, despite its ability to submit its budget directly to Congress and OMB at the same time, has gone decades without a budget increase.\footnote{Steinzor & Shapiro, supra note 93, at 65; see also Gen. Accounting Office, GAO/HRD-87-47, Consumer Product Safety Commission: Administrative Structure Could Benefit from Change 4 (1987) [hereinafter GAO, Administrative Structure] (noting that although the CPSC is authorized to submit its original budget requests to Congress at the same time they go to OMB, “this ‘has not kept the President or OMB from making changes’“).}

A more powerful alternative is to provide agencies with an independent funding source, such as by requiring regulated interests to pay mandatory fees to the agency. For example, the Federal Reserve is authorized to levy assessments against member banks to fund its operating budget.\footnote{12 U.S.C. § 243 (2006).} So, too, is the Office of Thrift Supervision,\footnote{Id.} the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency,\footnote{Id. § 1467(a).} and the PCAOB.\footnote{Id. § 482.} With independent funding, the agency is insulated from Congress as well as the President.\footnote{See Joel Seligman, Self-Funding for the Securities and Exchange Commission, 28 Nova L. Rev. 233, 256 (2004) (“An independent budgetary process would be more effective in adjusting the size of the SEC staff to the Agency’s regulatory needs during the good times, which ironically are when the SEC is more vulnerable to a lack of budgetary support.”); Yandle, supra note 149, at 178 (arguing that Congress can sanction agencies by manipulating budgets). But see Lewis, supra note 15, at 390 n.42 (noting that being outside the normal budget process might make the agency ultimately more vulnerable to termination if Congress views the agency costs as greater than termination costs).}

Providing independent funding is not, by itself, a guarantee of independence. In the case of banking regulators, it has had the opposite effect because of the ability of the regulated industries to opt out of one agency’s jurisdiction and switch to another’s.\footnote{Ramirez, supra note 146, at 534 (“When a regulated industry has the ability to choose their regulator, a giant channel towards capture is opened.”).} Stark illustrations of this dynamic come from the experience of the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC). The OTS has jurisdiction over national thrifts\footnote{12 U.S.C. § 1464 (2006).} and the OCC has jurisdiction over national banks.\footnote{Id. § 481.} States regulate state thrifts and banks. But banks and thrifts have a great deal of flexibility in determining whom they wish to be chartered by,
and it has little effect on their business plans. As a result, financial entities can shop around for the regulator they prefer. This has created an unhealthy (from the public’s perspective) competition between the OTS and OCC to attract regulated entities to charter with them to gain their operating fees. How have these agencies competed for the “business” of the regulated entities? They agreed to use their regulatory authority to preempt state consumer protection laws that would otherwise govern the activities of banks and thrifts.

Thus, the lesson with respect to funding independence—as it is with all elements of agency design—is that no one particular feature can be viewed in isolation. It is critical to assess the overall structure of the agency. This is true for all of the goals of insulation, but particularly important if the goal is insulation from partisan and interest group pressures. Any cracks in the agency structure will be exploited by these powerful interests, so attention must be paid to every design feature.

B. Employment Restrictions

Although the traditional focus on the relationship between personnel and independence has focused on how agency officials are removed, the requirements for appointment are just as critical to an agency’s ability to serve the goals of independence—indeed, arguably more so. Especially in recent decades, individuals selected to head agencies are picked based on ideological agreement with the President, not expertise. Given the modern vetting


164. See Regulator Shopping, supra note 162, at A34 (noting the regulatory “race to the bottom” resulting from firms searching for the “loosest rules and laxest regulators”).

165. See Bruce Ackerman, The New Separation of Powers, 113 HARV. L. REV. 633, 700 (2000) (observing that the “overriding criteria in making these appointments will be loyalty to the president and her program”); Barron, supra note 108, at 1096 (“Agencies are now to an unprecedented extent governed by a thick cadre of political appointees” who “have been chosen either for having close ties to the President or for making strong prior commitments to his regulatory vision.”); Breger &
process and party partisanship that produces extreme party loyalty, presidents typically can predict with great accuracy how an appointee will decide issues of importance to the Administration. As a result, tenure protection becomes less important because the need for removal never arises unless the vetting process fails or the appointee goes through a fundamental shift in position. That shift is all the more unlikely because defying the President and the party would diminish or destroy the possibility of future appointments and influence.

Even if appointees in charge of an agency are not focused on their future within the government, they may be thinking about their prospects in the private sector when their terms at agencies expire. Because the most likely private-sector job on the horizon would be with the very industry the agency regulates, an agency head’s independence may be compromised. Put another way, a concern with post-agency employment may make these officials reluctant to impose regulations that an industry views as too aggressive or obtrusive. It may dim an official’s job prospects or make that job more difficult if the official has to live with the rules upon leaving the agency.

The effect of the revolving door is often cited as one of the reasons why the SEC failed to adequately protect consumers by addressing pressing problems in the trading industry. For example, although late trading and market timing were widespread and well known, the SEC did not act to regulate the practices and stepped in only after the New York Attorney General (AG) brought an enforcement action under state law. Similarly, it was the New York AG who led the fight to stop investment bankers from influencing

Edles, supra note 1, at 1140 & n.147 (citing a Senate Government Operations Committee report that found partisan politics driving the appointment process to an “alarming” extent and expertise and competence coming in as “only secondary considerations”); Devins & Lewis, supra note 11, at 481–83 (pointing out that beginning with President Reagan, “ideological loyalty has become a hallmark of presidential appointments”).

166. See Devins & Lewis, supra note 11, at 461 (“[P]arty identity is an especially good proxy for commissioner ideology.”); Kagan, supra note 79, at 2277 (explaining how President Reagan “staff[ed] the agencies with officials remarkable for their personal loyalty and ideological commitment” who would adhere to the President’s “policy agenda even in the face of competing bureaucratic pressures”).

167. See Pierce, supra note 2, at 603 (noting that Executive Branch officials are typically selected because of “agreement with the President on policy issues related to their areas of responsibility, long-time loyalty to the President’s political party, and/or personal loyalty to the President,” and therefore “Presidents rarely need to resort to explicit or implicit threats to remove an officer to persuade the officer to act in accordance with the President’s policy preferences”).


the reports of firm analysts.\footnote{171} Experts on SEC practice have noted that the SEC did not initially address these problems because of a prevailing view among SEC officials that given the “rapidly revolving door between the SEC and private legal practice . . . , unless an issue has become high profile, it is best not to rock the boat.”\footnote{172} The SEC became overpopulated with members who “identified with the market participants they were ostensibly regulating.”\footnote{173} These pressures may have led the agency to adopt an overly lax view of its enforcement and regulatory functions.\footnote{174}

What can be done about these pressures? First consider the problem of partisan appointments.\footnote{175} One way to create greater independence is to specify qualifications for appointees so that the pool of potential candidates from which the President picks is more limited and he or she cannot select solely on the basis of partisan leanings. For example, because food and drug regulation is a highly technical subject, presidents are more limited in whom they select to head the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) as a practical matter because they are looking for scientific expertise as well as party affiliation.\footnote{176} As a result, the FDA is relatively more independent than other executive agencies, with its heads often advocating for drug regulation regardless of the position of their appointing president.\footnote{177}

Although most statutes fail to specify qualifications for appointees, there are exceptions.\footnote{178} For instance, at least two members of the three-member Surface Transportation Board must have a professional background in

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\begin{itemize}
\item \footnote{171}{Id.}
\item \footnote{172}{Id.}
\item \footnote{175}{Barron, \textit{supra} note 108, at 1133 (proposing that a way to limit the politicization of agencies through appointments is to cabin the number of political appointees at agencies). This would create a relatively greater role for civil servants who are often well positioned to blow the whistle on agency actions that harm the public interest in favor of a powerful interest, but that might not come to the public’s attention in the absence of an agency insider pointing them out.}
\item \footnote{176}{C. Frederick Beckner, III, Note, \textit{The FDA’s War on Drugs}, 82 GEO. L.J. 529, 542 (1993).}
\item \footnote{177}{\textit{See id.} (“As a result [of the need for FDA Commissioners to have scientific expertise], FDA policy remains the policy dictated by Congress when it passed the 1962 Kefauver-Harris Amendment.”). This is not to say, of course, that the FDA does not suffer from capture problems. \textit{See, e.g.,} Merrill Goozner, \textit{Conflicts of Interest in the Drug Industry’s Relationship with the Government}, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 737, 738–42 (2006) (describing capture problems at the FDA); Gardiner Harris, \textit{Regulation Redefined: The F.D.A. Shifts Focus; at F.D.A., Strong Drug Ties and Less Monitoring}, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2004, at A1 (reporting the widespread view that resource shifting has resulted in inadequate methods for uncovering the dangers of approved drugs).}
\item \footnote{178}{Breger & Edles, \textit{supra} note 1, at 1139. For a detailed examination of expertise and experience requirements for politically appointed positions, see Anne Joseph O’Connell, \textit{Qualifications of Agency Leaders}, at 11–14 (2010) (unpublished manuscript) (draft on file with author).}
\end{itemize}
The PCAOB consists of five members, two of whom must be certified public accountants. The members of the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board must be “respected experts in the field of nuclear safety.” The Consumer Product Safety Act (CPSA) provides that a person cannot hold the office of Commissioner if he or she is “in the employ of, or holding any official relation to, any person engaged in selling or manufacturing consumer products” or owns “stock or bonds of substantial value in a person so engaged” or “is in any other manner pecuniarily interested in such a person.” In addition, CPSC Commissioners are also barred from “engag[ing] in any other business, vocation, or employment.”

Requiring appointees to possess certain qualifications can help limit partisan decision making, and it also facilitates expert decision making because individuals are hired not with an eye toward having them become experts on the job but with the idea that they will join the agency with the relevant skill set. For this to work, the agency must present itself as an attractive place for an expert to work. This may be possible either by the agency’s independence qua independence or by making commissioner compensation competitive with that of the industry from which the expert is drawn.

Even if appointees are selected for particular qualifications, there is still a question of whether post-agency-employment incentives will influence their decision making while at the agency. This revolving-door problem has been noticed by many good government scholars, and the standard solution is to place meaningful limits on the ability of agency heads and other high-level officials to work for regulated industries in positions that would involve dealings with the agency after their service with the agency comes to an end. Many agency officials are subject to such limits to create greater insulation from partisan bias. For example, the legislation creating the PCAOB charges it with

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183. Id.
184. See HENRY J. FRIENDLY, THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 153–54 (1962) (noting that experts would be unlikely to be attracted to an agency if their decisions were constantly second-guessed by politicians and their assistants). But see Miller, supra note 19, at 80–81 (questioning the theory that independent agencies offer greater challenge and responsibility).
185. See Bressman & Thompson, supra note 1, at 613 & n.64 (noting that PCAOB members are paid more than SEC commissioners).
establish[ing] ethics rules and standards of conduct for Board members and staff, including a bar on practice before the Board (and the [SEC], with respect to Board-related matters) of 1 year for former members of the Board, and appropriate periods (not to exceed 1 year) for former staff of the Board.  

The Federal Board of Governors also imposes post-employment restrictions on its members, making them “ineligible during the time they are in office and for two years thereafter to hold any office, position, or employment in any member bank.” 189  Members of the Board of the Farm Credit Administration are also ineligible to work for “any institution of the Farm Credit System” while they are in office and for two years thereafter. 190

Post-employment restrictions are not without costs, of course.  To the extent the restrictions are too onerous, it might be difficult to attract people with the relevant expertise to join the agency in the first place if they are concerned that they will be foreclosing too many job prospects in the future.  Some attention must therefore be paid to the field of employment to be sure that a restriction will not unduly impede one’s ability to land a job after government service.  In most cases, barring an individual from taking a position that would require him or her to appear before or interact directly with the agency where he or she previously worked should not be too burdensome.  And to the extent it is, it might be possible to increase the salary during government service, as was done with the PCAOB, to counterbalance the disincentives that might be created by post-government job restrictions.  

Even with this kind of attention to circumstance, appointment and post-employment restrictions are no panacea.  Even when the list of appointees is narrowed by expertise, the President is likely to find individuals who share his or her vision for the agency. 191  And post-employment restrictions for a year or two after leaving government service might temper officials’ incentives not to anger the industry in which they might work, but they will hardly eliminate them.  That said, every little bit helps when it comes to protecting against capture.  Moreover, enacting these kinds of limits might help to express a commitment to independence and thereby help to influence the culture of the agency.

C. The Role of Other Agencies in Setting Regulatory Policy

The typical discussion of agency independence considers the relationship between the federal agency and its government overseers: the

189. 12 U.S.C. § 242 (2006).  This restriction does “not apply to a member who has served the full term for which he was appointed.”  Id.
190.  Id. § 2242(a).
191.  See Barron, supra note 108, at 1135 (arguing that it is difficult to meaningfully constrain the President with employment restrictions because qualified individuals representing different ideological views typically can be found within any profession).

President and Congress. But agencies can face pressure and receive support from other governmental actors. In particular, agencies can share substantive regulatory responsibilities with other federal agencies and with state governmental entities, and these shared responsibilities can either foster or frustrate the goals of insulation.

1. Regulation by Other Federal Agencies.—One of the first decisions for political designers is how much responsibility to give a single agency as opposed to splitting functions among agencies. Expertise concerns may dictate giving one actor the ability to balance a variety of complementary or competing concerns, or those same concerns might suggest splitting functions among specialists.

From the perspective of avoiding capture, it may be helpful to have agencies with broad jurisdictions to make them more likely to resist pressure from any one interest group. However, a key danger to avoid is giving a single agency conflicting responsibilities that require the agency to further the goals of industry at the same time that it is responsible for a general public-interest mission. In that scenario, there is a significant risk that industry pressure and a focus on short-term economic concerns that are easily monitored will trump the long-term effects on the public that are harder to assess. Eric Biber has demonstrated, for example, how these competing pressures pushed the Forest Service to prioritize timber production at the expense of the agency’s other mission of conservation. J.R. DeShazo and Jody Freeman observe a similar dynamic at licensing agencies, such as the Atomic Energy Commission, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, and the Army Corps of Engineers, where economic development trumped environmental concerns. Indeed, it was precisely this conflict of missions that ultimately led Congress to decouple the development and safety mis-


194. See Bagley, supra note 34, at 8 (“Because the agency must prioritize one task at the expense of the other, industry group pressure can easily cement an agency’s preference for the task that favors industry.”); Eric Biber, Too Many Things to Do: How to Deal with the Dysfunctions of Multiple-Goal Agencies, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 7 (2009) (“[A]gents will have systematic incentives to privilege certain goals over others—specifically, to privilege goals that are easily measured over conflicting goals that are difficult to measure.”).

195. See Biber, supra note 194, at 17–30 (arguing that the Service’s historic charge to produce timber, the relative ease with which this goal could be measured, and pressure from outside groups led to the adoption of an incentive structure that favored timber production to the detriment of the Service’s conflicting conservation-based goals).

196. See J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, Public Agencies as Lobbyists, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 2217, 2220 (2005) (noting the reluctance of the stated agencies to comply with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the Clean Water Act (CWA), and the Endangered Species Act (ESA), among other environmental laws, when first passed in the 1960s and 1970s).
sions of the Atomic Energy Commission and place each within separate agencies, the former going to the Department of Energy and the latter residing with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.\textsuperscript{197}

Even if a single agency does not have competing internal goals, conflict can emerge from the agency’s relationship with a separate agency that is looking out for a different interest.\textsuperscript{198} To assess the effect of relationships between agencies in terms of capture, it is necessary to distinguish the different types of agencies, in terms of institutional design, that might be sharing authority.

Consider first the dynamics if the shared authority is between an agency that has been designed to be an insulated agency along the lines discussed in this Article and an executive agency with a head that answers to the President. If the executive agency has the authority to veto or dictate the insulated agency’s policies,\textsuperscript{199} the other design features of the insulated agency are meaningless because the insulated agency answers to a political entity that shares none of its insulating features.

If the relationship between the two agencies is less hierarchical, and the insulated agency and executive agency must consult one another\textsuperscript{200} or monitor each other’s proceedings to avoid conflicting policies\textsuperscript{201} without a clear line of authority that will break a tie, the insulated agency may still find that its power is diminished. This is because the executive agency can sound fire alarms to interested groups early in the insulated agency’s regulatory decision-making process that allow interest groups to mobilize and attempt to block the insulated agency’s actions (through congressional overrides or court challenges).\textsuperscript{202} Of course, interest groups could do this even in the absence of executive agency consultation requirements, but if a statute requires an insulated agency to contact an executive agency early in its decision-making process—which is often the case when consultation requirements are imposed—that gives the interest group that much more advance notice to mount its attack. To be sure, a monitoring role can facilitate decision making

\textsuperscript{197} Biber, supra note 194, at 33.

\textsuperscript{198} For a thorough discussion of the various interagency relationships Congress has prescribed, see generally, Cornelius P. Cotter & J. Malcolm Smith, Administrative Responsibility: Congressional Prescription of Interagency Relationships, 10 W. Pol. Q. 765 (1957).

\textsuperscript{199} Eric Biber refers to this model as “‘agency as regulator’ of another agency.” Biber, supra note 194, at 6. An example is the Secretary of Energy’s ability to “propose rules, regulations, and statements of policy” in areas that fall under the jurisdiction of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), a traditional independent agency located within the Department of Energy. Department of Energy Reorganization Act of 1977, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7171, 7173(a) (2006). FERC must act upon the proposals within the Secretary’s time limits. Id. § 7173(b).


\textsuperscript{201} J.R. DeShazo and Jody Freeman refer to this model as “agencies as lobbyists.” DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 196, at 2217.

\textsuperscript{202} See Jacob E. Gersen, Overlapping and Underlapping Jurisdiction in Administrative Law, 2006 Sup. Ct. Rev. 201, 214 (“[U]sing multiple agents may also provide for monitoring and reporting of agent behavior by competing agents themselves.”).
in the public interest if the monitor is more responsive to the public interest than the monitored agency that has been captured. But the effects are likely to cut against the public interest if a politically sensitive agency is charged with monitoring one with equalizing insulators that help promote the public interest.

Similarly, whether multiple agencies limit or buttress the power of the President depends on what the single agency alternative looks like. If power would otherwise reside in an insulated agency alone, the President gains power when an executive agency takes on a partnership role. But if power would otherwise reside in an executive agency, Congress may prefer to inject multiple agencies into the decision-making process to limit presidential control. David Epstein and Sharyn O’Halloran have found that “Congress does play agencies off against each other more under divided government, despite the reductions in efficiency and centralized control that this might entail.” By increasing the costs of coordination for the President, Congress may be able to insulate certain policy decisions from presidential control.

Now consider the effects if the agencies sharing rulemaking authority are both independent in the traditional sense, but one of them has been insulated using some or all of the equalizing mechanisms discussed in this Article and the other has not. If the traditionally independent agency has veto authority over the insulated agency, it will undermine those insulating mechanisms. The effect may not be as pronounced as when an executive agency has veto power, but it will nevertheless undercut the insulated agency’s ability to resist partisan pressure and create less stable policies because, as noted above, traditionally independent agencies are more prone to shift policies with changes in presidential administrations than agencies that have the additional protection of equalizing factors.

A consultation or veto requirement that gives either executive or traditionally independent agencies more power over an insulated agency with equalizing factors may, however, serve a different goal of insulation, namely expertise. Consultation may bring more experts into the process and improve decision making by presenting competing viewpoints.

203. See Iver P. Cooper, The FDA, the BATF, and Liquor Labeling: A Case Study of Interagency Jurisdictional Conflict, 34 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 370, 375–76 (1979) (describing the Food and Drug Administration’s initiative to regulate alcohol ingredient labeling after the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms proved unwilling to regulate the industry); DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 196, at 2221–22 (discussing the role of fish and wildlife agencies as monitors of FERC).

204. DAVID EPSTEIN & SHARYN O’HALLORAN, DELEGATING POWERS 159–60 (1999). Epstein and O’Halloran found specifically that the number of agencies per unit of delegated discretion was 58.89 under divided government and 29.55 under unified government.

If authority is shared between two or more agencies that have been designed to be maximally insulated, the effect is harder to predict. On the one hand, shared responsibility may create a healthy competition between the two agencies, and it will be harder to capture two agencies instead of one. On the other hand, shared authority may undercut the goals of both agencies. Because these agencies may be charged with serving somewhat different politically vulnerable populations, they may undermine each other by engaging in costly and time-consuming turf battles.

Thus, an assessment of the effect of an interagency relationship on insulation will depend on which of the sometimes competing goals of insulation the policy makers are seeking to further and on the particular structures and design features of the respective agencies.

2. Regulation by States.—Federal agencies may share regulatory authority not only with each other, but with states. For purposes of this section, the question is what role state law should play in regulation to foster the goals of insulation. (The role of states as enforcers of federal law is taken up in the next section.) Thus, the question is really one of preemption. When should an insulated agency’s interpretation of federal law be the exclusive regulatory regime and when should it co-exist with state law? The question of when agencies should preempt state law is obviously a compli-

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206. See O’Connell, supra note 205, at 1677 (“Competition may encourage redundant entities to work harder and more creatively, generating a race to the top in performance; competition may also motivate one entity to correct mistakes made by another entity.”); see also Andrew B. Whitford, Adapting Agencies: Competition, Imitation, and Punishment in the Design of Bureaucratic Performance, in POLITICS, POLICY, AND ORGANIZATIONS 160, 164 (George A. Krause & Kenneth J. Meier eds., 2003) (“Agencies will respond to comparison, competition, and information revelation because of the real world implications of failure.”); Gersen, supra note 202, at 213 (“The threat of jurisdictional loss is a sanction for the failure to produce desirable informational expertise.”); Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s Most Dangerous Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2324–25 (2006) (describing the benefits of competition).

207. See O’Connell, supra note 205, at 1677 (arguing that it is difficult for any one interest group to capture a multiagency process and that the interest group cooperation that might make capture possible is costly for the groups).

208. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Competition Versus Consolidation: The Significance of Organizational Structure in Financial and Securities Regulation, 50 BUS. LAW. 447, 460–66 (1995) (chronicling some costs associated with the interagency conflict over jurisdiction between two traditionally independent agencies, the SEC and the Commodities Futures Trading Commission); Pildes, supra note 157, at 93 (noting that Congress created the PCAOB as a unit within and under the control of the SEC because of a concern that creating a new agency with overlapping jurisdiction with the SEC would “spawn jurisdictional battles, create redundant regulation, or make it hard to ensure regulatory coherence”); Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 192, at 71 (“The transaction costs of strong coordination, the differing internal incentives of each agency, the loss of autonomy, and other collective action challenges often overwhelm ambitions towards coordination.”); cf. Whitford, supra note 206, at 164 (observing that information revealed by competition may help interest groups and partisan overseers).
icated topic that goes beyond the scope of this Article. But it is important to flag the relationship between state law and the goals of insulated agencies, particularly the aim of reducing capture.

If the concern is that a federal agency will be captured by one-sided industry interests at the expense of the general public, there is value in making federal regulations a floor and allowing states to enact laws that are even more protective of the public. This is true even if the federal agency is an insulated one, because no amount of insulation will ever be foolproof. As a result, having states regulate might provide a critical check against the dangerous combination of a captured agency and federal preemption. An example of this phenomenon is the aggressive preemption of state predatory lending and consumer protection laws by the OCC and the OTS. After preempts state laws, the OCC and OTS subsequently largely ignored federal consumer protection laws. Thus, the federal government stepped in at the behest of industry to prevent states from taking action against lending abuses, which, in turn, contributed to the economic crisis. If states had been permitted to play a greater role, some of the damage would have been mitigated.

To be sure, the value of state law as a check against capture must be weighed against the need for uniformity in an area. But in engaging in that calculus, it is important to note that states might be more sensitive to the


210. Buzbee, supra note 209, at 1597–98 (arguing that pervasive forms of regulatory failure—including “interest group distortions of the regulatory process, agency self-interest, information limitations, and inertia”—argue in favor of federal floor preemption).


212. See Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 163, at 90–95 (criticizing the banking agencies’ lack of interest in consumer protection and focus on bank profitability).


214. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff & Catherine M. Sharkey, Backdoor Federalization, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1353, 1354 (2006) (noting that a desire for nationwide uniformity and the benefits that flow from uniformity may explain Supreme Court cases preemption state regulation).
public interest, either because of ballot initiatives that give consumers a more
direct voice or because some states are particularly harmed by an industry
interest (for example, by pollution) and so stand in a good position to vindicate a more general public interest.

Thus, in all these scenarios, if the goal is insulation from partisan
pressures to protect interest group dominance, it is critically important to pay
attention to the relationship with other agencies.

D. The Role of Other Agencies as Enforcers

Another important question of agency design is whether the agency will
have exclusive enforcement power under its authorizing statute or whether
other actors will also be permitted to enforce the statute. That is, even if a
single agency has the sole power to set the governing regulations for the in-
dustry under a statute, it is still possible to have multiple agencies with the
authority to enforce those rules or the underlying statute itself. As with
shared rulemaking authority, shared enforcement responsibility can help
achieve some of the goals of agency independence and hinder others, and
again it depends critically on which agencies are sharing authority and the
nature of that relationship.

1. Federal Enforcers.—We start again with the relationship between
agencies that were designed to be insulated from partisan pressures and other
federal agencies. Most agencies, including independent agencies, have
substantial civil litigation authority outside of Supreme Court practice.215
Thus, if the insulated agency’s enforcement authority is merely shared with
another agency, but the other agency does not have the ability to veto the
insulated agency’s enforcement decisions, this structure does not formally
undercut the insulated agency’s authority to bring actions to protect the bene-

215. Devins & Lewis, supra note 11, at 488; Neal Devins, Unitariness and Independence:
Some agencies, such as the Federal Communications Commission and Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, have authority under the Hobbs Act to intervene in any proceeding, including one
before the Supreme Court, that involves the question of whether one of its orders should be
enjoined. 28 U.S.C. § 2348 (2006). This authority is significant because, if the agency must be
represented by the Solicitor General in the Supreme Court, the Administration can put forth its own
views on policy instead of the views of the agency. See, e.g., Bressman & Thompson, supra note 1,
at 645 (“The Solicitor General sometimes has taken positions on securities cases that diverge from
the SEC view.”).

151, 195 (2010) (arguing that federal regulators like the SEC do not have sufficient resources to fill
regulatory gaps on their own); Michael A. Perino, Fraud and Federalism: Preempting Private State
enforcement of certain types of securities regulation by state and federal agencies).
because an interest group must incur greater costs to capture several agencies instead of just one. If anything, one would think that the agency that is not insulated from pressure will be unlikely to bring an enforcement action where the insulated agency has not because the uninsulated agency is more likely to side with the regulated industry.

But enforcement overlap can have potential costs in terms of the zeal of the insulated agency’s enforcement agenda. Unless the insulated agency is given primary responsibility, there is the risk that it will not be as active because it is of the view that the other agency will take the lead or pick up any slack. When only one agency has responsibility for enforcement, it is more likely to be diligent in pursuing that task because it knows it will be accountable for any failures. It is all too easy for agencies to point fingers at each other with no one ultimately held accountable. Indeed, that scenario is eerily similar to the lead-up to the recent financial crisis, with each overlapping regulatory agency essentially casting blame on others. To remedy this risk and achieve a check on capture, the insulated agency should be designated as the primary enforcer to ensure greater accountability and to increase the incentives for the responsible agency to take action.

A designated primary law enforcer also serves the expertise function of insulation because enforcement actions have a policy-making component. It is impossible to bring actions against every law violator, so ultimately agencies need to prioritize. In addition, if regulatory standards are vague or uncertain, the decision of whether to bring an enforcement action in the face of an ambiguity also involves a substantive policy judgment. To the extent that these questions arise, there is the same risk of inconsistent standards discussed above. Having a designated enforcer addresses this problem because the agency with primary enforcement authority can be vested with the power to intervene in actions by other agencies that it views as inconsistent with the statute’s objectives.

2. State Enforcers.—As with shared regulatory authority, shared enforcement authority can also exist with state actors, typically the state AG. Allowing state AGs to bring enforcement actions can be a very effective check against capture. These are elected posts in most states, and although state AGs can and do become beholden to powerful interests, they

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217. Gersen, supra note 1, at 352.

218. See O’Connell, supra note 205, at 1680 (arguing that redundancy may actually decrease reliability).


often win elections by appealing to broad consumer interests and bringing suits against fraudulent practices.\textsuperscript{221} In addition, the fifty state AGs will undoubtedly represent different parties, so even if an administration is in power that is partial to business interests, there is likely an AG of the opposite party who is more sympathetic to consumer claims.\textsuperscript{222} For example, during the 1980s when the federal government leaned heavily toward deregulation, state enforcement surged.\textsuperscript{223}

There are numerous examples of state-initiated enforcement actions filling a void left by federal enforcers. These include Eliot Spitzer’s more aggressive enforcement of securities violations as compared to the SEC,\textsuperscript{224} as well as a host of multistate consumer protection efforts, ranging from suits against the tobacco industry to prescription drug marketing programs.\textsuperscript{225} More recently, states joined forces to pursue fraud charges against various subprime lenders, including Household, Ameriquest, and Countrywide.\textsuperscript{226} State AGs would have pursued fraudulent lending practices even further, but the federal regulators preempted them from going after lenders who affiliated with national banks and thrifts.\textsuperscript{227} Although the federal financial agencies did not shift their stance on mortgage abuses in light of these state suits, in some other cases federal enforcers have followed the states and changed their own views of an issue.\textsuperscript{228} And although many examples of states filling federal voids involve state AGs suing under state law, the incentives and effects are the same when state AGs bring actions under federal law.

\textsuperscript{221}. See Colin Provost, \textit{State Attorneys General, Entrepreneurship, and Consumer Protection in the New Federalism}, 33 PUBLIUS 37, 38 (2003) (“[S]tate attorneys general have strong incentives to build up their record of political accomplishments by helping consumers and pursuing high levels of enforcement.”).

\textsuperscript{222}. Id. at 51 (observing that AGs from more liberal states join more consumer protection actions than those from more conservative states).


\textsuperscript{224}. See Barkow, \textit{supra} note 174, at 10 (describing Spitzer’s aggressive use of the Martin Act in order to regulate companies with the SEC joining in shortly after).

\textsuperscript{225}. Lemos, \textit{supra} note 220, at 21.


\textsuperscript{227}. Robert Berner & Brian Grown, \textit{They Warned Us About the Mortgage Crisis}, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, Oct. 9, 2008, \textit{available at} http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/08_42/b4104036827981.htm; Milgram & Barkow, \textit{supra} note 213; Wilmarth, \textit{supra} note 211.

\textsuperscript{228}. Barkow, \textit{supra} note 174, at 10–11 (chronicling how the SEC joined the efforts of former New York AG Eliot Spitzer to reform in-house mutual fund brokerage practices); Lemos, \textit{supra} note 220, at 25 (noting that the FTC changed its policy on restitution in light of state actions seeking monetary remedies); Milgram & Barkow, \textit{supra} note 213 (noting that the House version and Senator Dodd’s proposed version of a consumer financial protection bill “recognize[d] the important role that states” played).
State AGs can also serve a valuable equalizing function by bringing enforcement actions when a federal agency shares the state’s outlook on regulation but lacks the resources to police all infractions.\textsuperscript{229} When Congress vests shared enforcement responsibility with state AGs, it often remarks on the increased resources AGs bring.\textsuperscript{230} Federal regulators often recognize this as well. Former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan has acknowledged that federal regulators need the resources of state AGs to effectively police the lending industry for abuses.\textsuperscript{231} The FTC also has a long, if not consistent, history of working together with states to address consumer fraud.\textsuperscript{232}

Critically, state AG enforcement checks against a particular federal failing: underenforcement, not overenforcement, of the law. If one is concerned with agency capture by powerful interests, that is precisely the threat to be avoided. Thus if the goal of insulation is about something else—say, congressional aggrandizement—then the relationship between state AGs and federal agencies might yield a different conclusion. Similarly, if one is more concerned with other values, such as uniformity or stability in policy, again the calculus might be different.

But if the concern is capture, then AG involvement makes sense. A multiple enforcer model with an insulated agency and state AGs is likely to be more effective than a multiple enforcer model involving only federal agencies because the federal agencies are all likely to ultimately fall in line with the President’s priorities, and those priorities will frequently be dictated by powerful political interest groups.

E. Political Tools

Agencies are political creatures; even if one Congress sets up an agency in a way that maximizes its insulation from political pressures, another Congress may disagree and pass legislation that undermines it. That is the nature of our governmental structure, and this Article does not attempt to do the impossible by taking the politics out of agency design or operation. On the contrary, to help an agency charged with protecting relatively powerless

\textsuperscript{229} See, e.g., Hearing on H.R. 4040 Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Prot. of the H. Comm. of Energy and Commerce, 110th Cong. (2007) (testimony of Rachel Weintraub, Director, Product Safety, Consumer Federation of America) (“[State AG enforcement] will be a critical tool that will help buttress the CPSC’s limited enforcement capabilities, help consumers to obtain redress for harms they have suffered, and deter wrongful conduct.”); Robert M. Langer, \textit{Point: State Attorneys General Should Have Broad Powers to Enforce a Federal Telemarketing Law}, 5 \textit{ANTITRUST} 36, 36 (1991) (“The sheer number of actions the FTC can bring in any year is insignificant compared to the nature and scope of the consumer protection problems plaguing consumers and honest businesses in the United States.”).

\textsuperscript{230} Lemos, \textit{supra} note 220, at 12 n.67 (providing examples).


\textsuperscript{232} \textit{Consumer Credit Hearing}, \textit{supra} note 226, at 7–8 (statement of James E. Tierney, Director, National State Att’y Gen. Program, Columbia Law School).
interests requires one to be particularly attentive to the political environment in which it operates and to give the agency tools that help it negotiate that landscape as effectively as possible.

Although much of this is situational, this subpart discusses some general principles that can fortify agencies against lopsided partisan pressures in the agencies’ efforts to achieve long-term public interest goals.

1. Information.—One of the most powerful weapons policy makers can give agencies is the ability to generate and disseminate information that is politically powerful. If an agency is charged with resisting short-term partisan pressures in the name of long-term public interest, then assuming the agency is faithfully pursuing that task, large numbers of voters stand to gain if the agency is allowed to operate without undue influence from elected officials that may be more focused on special interests. This mass of voters may lack political power, however, for two main reasons. First, is the classic collective action problem. The general public lacks the organization to fight for its own benefit. Second, the public may have no idea that there is even an issue worth fighting for because it lacks the resources to monitor agencies and government operations and therefore loses out to the organized interests that constantly keep tabs on government action to steer government policy in the direction the interest groups prefer.

Giving the agency the power to generate and disseminate information that can sway votes can go a long way toward addressing both of these issues. Most obviously, the power to provide information can remedy the public’s information disadvantage vis-à-vis industry. The agency must make the public aware of pending issues so that industry is not the only one who knows about them. That is not enough, however. The key is to give the agency the authority to study and publicize data that will be of interest to the public and help energize the public to overcome collective action problems and rally behind the agency. The precise content of that information is going to be subject-matter specific. For example, achieving long-term criminal justice policies that benefit the public requires data about recidivism, the effectiveness of incarceration and rehabilitative programs, and, critically, the costs of different policies. In the area of consumer-protection policy, identifying dangerous products and services is a key means of generating

233. OLSON, supra note 5, at 11–22.
234. See Golden, supra note 26, at 257 (“[B]usiness groups—whether they are corporations or trade associations—utilize much more sophisticated monitoring techniques than the smaller advocacy groups do.”).
235. Cf. Christopher S. Elmendorf, Representation Reinforcement Through Advisory Commissions: The Case of Election Law, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1366, 1388 (2005) (noting that legislatures often accede to districting commission recommendations and positing that “the prospect of public outcry seems to be an important part of the story”).
236. See Barkow, supra note 7, at 806–12 (discussing importance of fiscal costs in helping agencies influence sentencing policy).
public support for regulations that industry may oppose. The point here is not to identify all the salient information that can help agencies in different areas. Rather, the aim is to highlight how important information is to an agency’s mission, above and beyond the information agencies need to regulate effectively. Agencies also need to be able to obtain and broadcast information that matters in political debates over the agency’s policy decisions. Once key information gets highlighted in the popular press, the mass of voters may take sufficient interest in how it is handled that they will register their approval or disapproval at the ballot box.

The question for agency design, then, is how to imbed information generation and dissemination into an agency’s structure. One way is to create a research arm in the agency to produce reports and studies and ensure that it is adequately funded. If getting information from industry is likely to be a problem, the agency can be given subpoena or inspection power so that it has access to the materials it needs to study an issue.

Another structural feature that promotes information dissemination is to give the agency the authority to provide testimony at oversight hearings and in public without having to obtain preclearance from political actors who may censor the agency’s positions. Unless Congress specifies otherwise, the default rule for agencies is that they must preclear testimony and written responses to congressional inquiries with the OMB. To avoid the possibility that interest groups will pressure the OMB to keep the lid on testimony damaging to their interests, it would be preferable to allow agencies to speak directly to Congress without having to seek approval in advance.

2. Political Benefactors.—Another crucial weapon for an agency facing an army of powerful interest groups on one side of an issue is to have a powerful political ally on the side of the agency. Now, one might think this is impossible because the very situation hypothesized is one in which all the interest groups are favoring one side of an issue. But political power comes from sources other than interest groups. There may be particular legislators who care about the issue and the public’s interest and have electoral security because of their positions in other areas. Or, if the agency presents politically saleable information, a policy entrepreneur might take up the cause of public crusader in the hopes of winning enough votes as a consumer cham-

237. See Elmendorf, supra note 235, at 1412–13 (stating that it is important to give agencies the capacity to communicate reform proposals with an adequate budget and research capabilities).


239. See Barkow, supra note 7, at 800–04 (noting the importance of political ties to the success of sentencing commissions); Heather K. Gerken, The Double-Edged Sword of Independence: Inoculating Electoral Reform Commissions Against Everyday Politics, 6 Election L.J. 184, 192 (2007) (“[T]he empirical work on independence suggests that the reform commissions that have proved most successful in persuading the public to back a reform proposal have been able to harness the skills of those elites in the service of reform.”).
pion or sensible reformer. In addition, the head of the agency may himself or herself have a base of authority because of prior public service or outreach.

The question becomes how to hardwire these connections into the very design of an agency, instead of relying on the fortuity that these links will emerge because of the particular actors involved.

Although this is a difficult task, a few avenues are promising and relate to some of the equalizing measures already discussed. One possibility is to require the agency head to have policy making experience in the subject matter. A specific requirement of policy making experience—as opposed to advocacy or field work—should increase the number of candidates with congressional experience, which in turn might give the agency head greater political capital. This is no guarantee, of course, because political capital often fades with electoral turnover. But it may prove helpful in at least some circumstances.

Second, it is important for agencies to give politicians information that can help them mobilize voter support. Agencies should obtain information about what proposals are politically viable by sounding out interested groups and using pilot projects to test public reaction. For example, Heather Gerken notes that the United Kingdom’s Electoral Commission succeeded in part because it “use[d] pilot projects and opinion research to test the political waters before committing to a particular reform proposal.” Similarly, the Minnesota Sentencing Commission succeeded in getting its reform agenda passed in large measure because it sought feedback from interest groups.

And all of the most successful sentencing commissions have used fiscal impact statements to achieve reforms because legislators are able to support proposals that they can tout as money savers.

A third option is to give designated legislators a sense of ownership in the agency’s mission so that they are more likely to support it. States have done this by making legislators voting or ex officio members of

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240. The experience of Mike Pertschuk at the FTC is an illustration of the limits. Pertschuk was a high-level staffer on Capitol Hill who went on to head the FTC. But by the time Pertschuk assumed the helm of the agency, the composition in Congress changed and the leading consumer advocates who could provide him with political assistance had left office.


242. See Barkow, supra note 7, at 773–77 (describing how the Minnesota Sentencing Commission’s effectiveness can be traced to its appreciation of the fact “that it would have to satisfy the interest groups concerned with criminal justice”); Richard S. Frase, Sentencing Guidelines in Minnesota, Other States, and the Federal Courts: A Twenty-Year Retrospective, 12 Fed. Sent’g Rep. 69, 76 (1999) (“[T]he Minnesota Guidelines allow sentencing policy to be significantly influenced by each of the major actors and stakeholders: the legislature, the [Sentencing] Commission, trial and appellate courts, the prosecution and defense, crime victims and community groups, probation officers, and prison officials.”).

243. See Barkow, supra note 7, at 804–12 (explaining how sentencing commissions have been most successful influencing legislatures when they have focused on resource impact statements); Rachel E. Barkow, Federalism and the Politics of Sentencing, 105 Colum. L. Rev. 1276, 1285–90 (2005) (describing the influence of cost considerations on criminal justice reforms).
commissions. Separation of powers limitations may eliminate this option at the federal level, so admittedly less effective alternatives must be sought. There is a natural link between members of Congress who serve on oversight committees and agencies, but unfortunately these relationships are tainted because committees themselves are often captured by special interests. Thus, if the goal is to insulate the agency from partisan pressures, committee oversight hardly fits the bill.

But one can mitigate those concerns somewhat by placing the agency within the jurisdiction of an oversight committee that is more likely to favor a broad public interest than industry interests. For example, in the House, placing a consumer financial protection agency under the jurisdiction of the Banking Committee will yield different results than placing oversight responsibilities with the Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade and Consumer Protection. The latter is far more likely to be attuned to consumer interests than the former. Again, this protection will only go so far because all members of Congress will be concerned with powerful groups that can marshal money and votes. But the goal of design is to put the agency in as favorable a position as possible given the political environment in which all agencies must operate.

A fourth option is to enlist other agencies that have been fulfilling their public service mission to play a greater role in the target agency’s process. As noted above, one must be careful with this approach not to give an agency that is itself captured by interests too much oversight over an insulated agency. But as J.R. DeShazo and Jody Freeman effectively demonstrate, “interagency lobbying” can in some cases “give voice to a set of interests that might balance or neutralize the influence of private—and usually well-financed and industry-dominated—groups.”

3. Public Advocates.—Another way to get political support for an agency’s position is to build within the agency’s structure a formal position of public advocate who is charged with representing the public’s interest before the agency. Two examples of this model show both the potential pitfalls and promise of this avenue of agency design.

The Federal Reserve Board of Directors provides an illustration of the shortcomings of this model when the selection of the representative is too tied up with industry interests and the advocate lacks sufficient focus on the general public interest. Class B and Class C directors on the Board are

244. Barkow, supra note 7, at 800–04 (describing the benefits of having legislators on sentencing commissions).


246. DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 196, at 2231.
charged with representing the public. In practice, however, these directors have been more representative of industry, for several reasons. First, the legislation stating that they should represent “consumers” also states that they should be selected with “consideration to the interests of agriculture, commerce, industry, services, [and] labor.”

Second, and more importantly, banks play a major role in the selection process. Class B directors are elected by the same banks that elect Class A directors. Class C directors are appointed by the Board of Governors. As a result, the Class B and Class C directors generally have strong ties to regulated industries as opposed to consumers.

Third, regardless of affiliation, it is unlikely that the Class B and Class C directors are able to conduct sufficient oversight over state-member banks. Given the significant responsibilities that each of these directors appears to have apart from their position at the Fed, it is unlikely that any of them have sufficient time, staff, or energy for supplemental oversight that is sufficient to protect consumers.

There are, then, at least two larger lessons to draw from the experience of public advocates at the Federal Reserve. First, the selection process for a consumer representative or public advocate is critically important. Because anyone is a consumer or member of the public—even high-powered financiers—it is important to have processes and selection criteria that target people who have a greater interest in consumer and public welfare than in any particular industry in which they participate. The selection, moreover, should not be made by the industry being regulated. Second, no consumer or public interest representative can succeed without sufficient resources to look for agency transgressions. Representing the public cannot be a part-time job. It is a full-time task that requires sufficient staffing and funding to allow public advocates to properly monitor agency actions and to challenge those actions where appropriate.

A more successful deployment of the public advocate model is found in the many states that have created public-utility consumer advocates to give

248. Id.
249. Id. § 304.
250. Id. § 305.
251. For example, in Boston, the Class B representatives are affiliated with The Kraft Group, MassMutual Life Insurance Company, and BJ’s Wholesale Club. Officers and Directors, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF BOSTON (2010), http://www.bos.frb.org/about/officers.htm#directors. Class C directors generally appear little different from their Class B counterparts. Generally, the positions are filled with Presidents and CEOs of small- and medium-sized companies. One former Class C director of the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, and the then-chair, was concurrently the chairman of Madison Dearborn Partners—which specialized in management buyout and special equity investing—and managed over $10 billion of committed capital and portfolio investments. See Jeff Bailey, Q & A: Madison Dearborn Partners Chairman John A. Canning, Jr., CHICAGOMAG.COM (Apr. 2010), http://www.chicagomag.com/Chicago-Magazine/April-2010/Q-and-A-Madison-Dearborn-Partners-chairman-John-A-Canning-Jr/.
consumers a greater role in the ratemaking processes of state utilities. In some jurisdictions, such as Arizona, this consumer representative is directly appointed by the governor. In other jurisdictions, such as the District of Columbia, there is an independent agency with a head appointed by the mayor and confirmed by the city council. Other states have a special division within the AG’s office charged with representing consumers in ratemaking proceedings.

Studies have found that participation by a consumer advocate leads to lower utility rates, which suggests that these advocates can make a difference in substantive agency policy. The most consumer-friendly outcomes occur when the advocate is an independent entity in the bureaucracy.

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As many equalizing insulators as possible should be employed if the goal is guarding against capture in an environment of lopsided interest group pressures. These features are critical supplements to the traditional design characteristics associated with independent agencies. Indeed, if designers fail to pay attention to these equalizing features, an agency will hardly deserve the appellation “independent” at all.

IV. Case Studies in Insulation Against Capture

The best way to illustrate the limits of the traditional hallmarks of independence and the importance of equalizing insulators is to describe a real-world agency facing precisely the kind of uphill one-sided political battle that insulation is supposed to help fight. This Part considers a prototypical example of asymmetrical interest group pressure opposing the general public interest: consumer protection. Subpart A discusses the doomed effort to create a robust protector of the public interest in the CPSC by using the traditional features of independence, and mostly ignoring

255. See, e.g., What the Office of Consumer Advocate Does for Pennsylvania Utility Consumers, PA. OFF. CONSUMER ADVOC. (2010), http://www.oca.state.pa.us/information_links/brochure.htm (describing the role of the Office of Consumer Advocate, within the AG’s office, for representing consumers in policy making decisions and legal proceedings).
256. See, e.g., Stephen Littlechild, Stipulated Settlements, the Consumer Advocate and Utility Regulation in Florida, 35 J. REG. ECON. 96, 97 n.1 (2009) (highlighting a quantitative study that demonstrated lower rates in environments with consumer advocates); Robert N. Mayer et al., Consumer Representation and Local Telephone Rates, 23 J. CONSUMER AFF. 267, 279–80 (1989) (finding rates for basic telephone service higher where a member of a public utility commission or of the AG’s office represents consumers instead of a consumer advocate).
257. See Mayer et al., supra note 256, at 281 (“Consumer advocates ought to be pursuing . . . the establishment of an independent consumer counsel as a means of holding down rates for flat-rate residential service.”).
equalizing insulators. Subpart B then turns to the most recently created agency charged with protecting consumer interests: the CFPB. Subpart B analyzes the CFPB in light of the experience of the CPSC and what we know about agency design in an environment of one-sided interest group dominance.

A. The Consumer Products Safety Commission

Agencies charged with protecting consumers have a difficult task because the industries they are charged with regulating are typically far more powerful and well financed than the consumers whose interests they are charged with protecting.258 Though select public interest advocacy groups,259 such as Public Citizen, have had some success representing consumer interests, they are no match for the resources and political clout of the industries that oppose consumer protection laws.260 As a result, consumer protection agencies tend to be less likely to worry about satisfying consumer groups than the more powerful regulated industries. This, in turn, creates the ideal breeding ground for agency capture and one-sided political pressure.261

The experience of the CPSC provides a prime illustration of how even a structurally independent agency by traditional measures, with just a few equalizing insulators, can be captured. The CPSC was created in 1972 to “protect the public against unreasonable risks of injury associated with consumer products.”262 At the time it was established, the CPSC was charged

258. See Raj Date, Cambridge Winter, Regulator Unbound: Solving an Old Problem at a New Regulatory Agency 2–3 (2009), available at http://www.cambridgewinter.org/Cambridge_Winter/Archives/Entries/2009/7/2_REGULATOR_UNBOUND_files/regulator%20unbound%20070209.pdf (discussing the tendency of agencies to align with the powerful firms they regulate and arguing that the influence these firms have on their regulators should come as no surprise).

259. As Peter Schuck notes, public interest organizations can be defined as those that “purport[] to represent very broad, diffuse, noncommercial interests which traditionally have received little explicit or direct representation in the processes by which agencies, courts, and legislatures make public policy.” Peter H. Schuck, Public Interest Groups and the Policy Process, 37 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 132, 133 (1977).

260. See Peter M. Shane, Madison’s Nightmare: How Executive Power Threatens American Democracy 162 (2009) (“[T]he parties with adequate resources and organization to make themselves effectively heard within the administrative process are far more likely to be antiregulatory voices of big business than even well-known public interest groups such as the Sierra Club or the Natural Resources Defense Council.”); Jason Webb Yackee & Susan Webb Yackee, A Bias Toward Business?: Assessing Interest Group Influence on U.S. Bureaucracy, 68 J. OF POL. 128, 129 (2006) (“[B]usiness interests enjoy disproportionate influence over rulemaking outputs despite the supposedly equalizing effects of notice and comment procedures.”).


with enforcing statutes that were previously administered by other agencies and was vested with broad new powers as well.263 Its jurisdiction covered an estimated ten thousand consumer products and more than a million sellers and producers.264 The CPSC was authorized to research and investigate the safety of consumer products, test consumer products, develop testing methods and devices, and train others in product safety research, investigation, and testing.265 Congress gave the CPSC the power to promulgate safety standards266 or ban products if a safety standard would be infeasible.267 Its enabling legislation also gave the CPSC the power to seek judicial orders of seizure and condemnation for “imminently hazardous” products,268 as well as orders mandating public notification of hazards, recalls, repairs, reimbursements, or replacements.269 With this range of powers and given the breadth of its jurisdiction, the CPSC was heralded at its inception as the “most powerful Federal regulatory agency ever created.”270

When the agency was initially proposed, there was a debate about whether it should be an executive agency or a traditional independent commission. President Nixon originally proposed housing the new consumer agency within the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.271 Consumer groups and their proponents in Congress, however, worried that placing the agency under executive control would undercut consumer interests because they doubted President Nixon’s commitment to protecting consumers at the expense of powerful business interests.272 The consumer advocates won this particular battle, and the CPSC “generally parallels” the structure of other traditional independent regulatory agencies.273 There are five commissioners who are appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate who serve staggered, seven-year terms.274 The President chooses the Chairman from the commissioners with the advice and

266. Standards can be for performance or labeling and must be “reasonably necessary to prevent or reduce an unreasonable risk of injury.” 15 U.S.C. § 2056(a).
267. Id. § 2057.
268. Id. § 2061(a).
269. Id. § 2064.
272. Devins & Lewis, supra note 11, at 465; Moe, supra note 271, at 290–91.
consent of the Senate. The commissioners can be removed only “for neglect of duty or malfeasance in office but for no other cause.” There is no requirement of partisan balance among the Commission, but the President is required to consider candidates who possess a “background and expertise in areas related to consumer products and protection of the public from risks to safety.” The CPSC is defined as an independent regulatory agency in the Paperwork Reduction Act, which exempts it from OIRA review of its regulations but not from the regulatory planning process. Congress also gave the agency independent litigation authority. Thus, the CPSC checks all the boxes of traditional independent design and includes the additional insulating factor of having the President select on the basis of expertise in the area.

Despite these indicators of independence, the CPSC has fallen far short of its statutory mandate. The major reason is that the CPSC has been chronically underfunded and understaffed. From the outset, the agency was subject to prescribed budget ceilings, a statutory framework that differed from other federal agencies that have had the authority to seek all necessary sums for their operation. And the CPSC’s budget decreased over time. The CPSC budget, adjusted for inflation, decreased 60% from 1975 to 1990 and staffing decreased by 41%. The budget shortfall affected every aspect of the agency’s operation—limiting its investigations, reducing its ability to gather and disseminate data, and requiring it to close offices. As a result, the CPSC has been no match for the industry participants it is charged with regulating.

Product manufacturers have used their resource advantage on all fronts, including by capitalizing on various procedural rules in the CPSA that were aimed at protecting consumers. Section 7 of the CPSA created what was known as the offeror process, which required the CPSC to solicit and utilize

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275. Id. § 2053(a).
280. Adler, supra note 263, at 82 n.123.
281. Schwartz, supra note 264, at 44.
284. Adler, supra note 263, at 75–76.
people from outside the agency to draft its safety standards.286 The CPSC would put out a notice in the Federal Register describing the need for some standard and inviting people to propose or offer to develop a standard.287 After the offeror submitted its proposal, the CPSC could adopt or revise it and then seek comments on the resulting standard. In theory, offerors could be consumer groups, standard-setting organizations, other agencies, or industry groups. In reality, the process was dominated by industry.288 Because submitting a proposal was resource intensive, consumer groups and standards organizations found the process too burdensome; the process was “affordable only to industry groups with an economic stake in the outcome.”289 Industry representatives did not just dominate the drafting stage, they often controlled the outcomes. Industry representatives brought successful challenges to most of the CPSC’s rules in court.290 Ultimately, Congress viewed the offeror process as a failure and abolished it.291

Section 10 of the CPSA, which was designed to give consumers a greater say with the agency, suffered a similar fate. Section 10 established a process whereby interested persons could petition the agency to issue rules, and the CPSC would have to respond to those requests with a statement of reasons within 120 days and face de novo judicial review.292 This framework was enacted with the intent to allow the public to “overturn bureaucratic inertia.”293 In fact, however, the process itself impeded the agency from fulfilling its mandate because the CPSC was overrun with petitions, including many from industry participants who had economic incentives to get the agency to pass particular standards.294 Section 10’s 120-day deadline and requirement of judicial review were therefore also ultimately revoked in 1981.295

These consumer protection mechanisms thus fell far short of their goals, and a more robust equalizing mechanism that could have helped the agency never got off the ground. The bipartisan study group that recommended the creation of the CPSC also endorsed the creation of a Consumer Safety Advocate who would be appointed by the President and would be charged with representing consumers in the CPSC’s decision-making process to

286. Id. at 59.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Id. at 63–64.
290. Id. at 66.
291. Id. at 71.
294. Schwartz, supra note 264, at 52–53 (noting the CPSC commitment to review each petition led to a backlog that prevented the CPSC from meeting the 120-day deadline).
“defend consumer safety against exploitation, excess, or neglect.”296 But Congress rejected the suggestion, thus eliminating a possible avenue for generating more political support for the agency’s efforts.297 To be sure, the consumer advocate would have faced a difficult task in trying to generate support for this under-resourced agency. But having a permanent position in the agency looking out for consumer interests might have at least raised the public profile of the agency, thus paving the way for some politicians to take up the mantle of rejuvenating the agency.

The CPSC faced another obstacle in achieving its mission: Congress restricted its ability to disclose information to the public. Under section 6(b) of the CPSA, “before the Commission can release any information from which the public can readily ascertain the identity of a manufacturer, the agency must submit the information to the manufacturer.”298 The manufacturer then has thirty days to comment on the information, at which point the CPSC is required to take reasonable steps to ensure the information is accurate and releasing it to the public would further the purposes of the CPSA.299 No other agency responsible for regulating health and safety operates under similar restrictions.300 The CPSC is further barred from releasing reports about substantial product hazards that manufacturers file with it under section 15(b) of the Act.301 These information distribution restrictions apply whether the CPSC seeks to release the information on its own initiative or in response to a FOIA request.302 Thus, the CPSC operates at a significant disadvantage because it is unable to use the power of this information in its efforts to win public support and equalize the political-power imbalance that so heavily favors industry.

Another shortcoming of the original CPSA was that it preempted state product-safety requirements. States were forbidden from establishing or continuing requirements “unless such requirements [were] identical to the requirements of the Federal standard.”303 The statute allowed states to apply for exemptions if the state proposed a requirement imposing “a higher level of performance than the Federal standard,” but a state could do so only if there were “compelling local conditions” and if doing so would not “unduly

297. Scalia & Goodman, supra note 273, at 951–52 (“[T]he elimination of the consumer-advocate proposal of the original NCPS bill is highly significant, since it was specifically designed to insure that these ‘extra-agency’ initiatives would be taken for the benefit of the consumer.”).
298. Adler, supra note 263, at 107–08.
299. Id. at 108.
300. Id. at 107.
301. Id. at 110.
302. Id. at 108–10.
burden interstate commerce.”\textsuperscript{304} These two provisions were “probably inherently contradictory”; only one state applied for an exemption and none were granted.\textsuperscript{305} Critically, along with hampering the development of state product-safety standards, states were not authorized to enforce the CPSA.\textsuperscript{306} Taken together, these provisions allowed dangerous products to remain on the market long after state AGs had identified them.\textsuperscript{307} Even after a product recall or ban on a product, the understaffed and underfunded CPSC could not effectively monitor implementation to ensure the product was no longer available to consumers.\textsuperscript{308}

Congress sought to address some of these shortcomings with the Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act of 2008 (CPSIA),\textsuperscript{309} which allows for a more cooperative relationship between the CPSC and state AGs. The CPSIA of 2008 left the preemption provisions in place but significantly changed the relationship between the CPSC and the state AGs when it comes to enforcement. State AGs still cannot seek civil penalties, but they can now bring actions to enjoin the sale of products that violate CPSC regulations after providing CPSC with thirty days notice.\textsuperscript{310} They can also bring actions to protect their citizens from “substantial product hazard[s]” after notifying the Commission of a determination that immediate action is necessary.\textsuperscript{311} With this reform, the CPSC now treats state AGs as “partners,” according to

\textsuperscript{304} Id.
\textsuperscript{306} Consumer Product Safety Act, § 29(a), 86 Stat. at 1230 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 2078). The CPSC was authorized only to accept assistance from the states in the form of data collection, investigation, and educational programs if the state authority was already engaged in those activities and compensated in advance. States could also be commissioned as CPSC officers to aid in investigations and inspections. \textit{Id.}; \textit{see also} Widman, supra note 261, at 18 (explaining that prior to the Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act of 2008, only the CPSC could define whether a product was a “substantial product hazard”); Victor E. Schwartz & Christopher E. Appel, \textit{The Plaintiffs’ Bar’s Covert Effort To Expand State Attorney General Federal Enforcement Power, LEGAL BACKGROUNDER} (Wash. Legal Found., Wash., D.C.), July 10, 2009, at 3 n.7, \textit{available at} http://www.wlf.org/Upload/legalstudies/legalbackgrounder/071009Schwartz_LB.pdf (noting that state AGs did not previously bring actions for injunctive relief under the CPSA and that “if they had clear authority to do so, it would [have been] unnecessary” for Congress to pass the Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act of 2008 giving AGs that power).
\textsuperscript{308} \textit{See id.} at 8–9 (describing finding Magnetix toys on Illinois shelves more than fourteen months after the initial recall).
current CPSC Chairman Inez Tenenbaum. Because it is so recent, it remains to be seen how this one equalizing change will address the CPSC’s historical shortcomings.

What we do know is that the experience of the CPSC before the 2008 legislative changes provides a cautionary tale both of the limits of the traditional markers of independence and of how even well-intended provisions can cut against the ultimate success of a statute. The CPSC on paper looks like a textbook independent agency, yet is widely regarded as one of the least politically independent and influential agencies in government. In its first five years, the CPSC issued only one safety standard—for swimming pool slides—and only seven safety standards after ten years. At many points, Congress and the President intervened in the agency’s operation to block or weaken pending regulations. The OMB considered recommending that President Carter abolish the CPSC and ultimately did advise President Reagan to do so, though Congress refused. Procedural rights aimed at benefitting consumers and creating better policy became hijacked by well-financed and well-organized industry representatives. Thus, “[v]irtually every authorization hearing and appropriation hearing” for the CPSC has included a debate over proposed structural changes to the CPSC. Proposed structural changes, however, have focused largely on the traditional design elements of independence, such as moving from five commissioners to a single administrator or placing the CPSC within an executive branch agency. As discussed above, these changes are unlikely to do much to improve the fate of the CPSC. More promising is the CPSIA’s inclusion of state AGs as enforcement partners. But even that is only one step toward

313. See Adler, supra note 263, at 70–71 (describing many of the criticisms of the agency).
314. Id. at 70.
315. Schwartz, supra note 264, 61 & n.206.
316. Adler, supra note 263, at 89.
317. Id. at 74 n.82.
318. Id. at 83 n.126.
319. A 1987 GAO study examined whether a single administrator rather than five commissioners should head the CPSC, as was the case with seven of the eight other health and safety agencies. It noted that commissioners tended to vote with the Chairman and a single administrator would save money and regulate more efficiently. GAO, ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE, supra note 153, at 5. All former CPSC chairpersons recommended a change to a single-administrator structure. Id. at 6.
320. GAO, ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE, supra note 153, at 7–9; Adler, supra note 263, 42 n.63.
321. The recognition that CPSC’s dependence on the Department of Justice and its own small staff was rendering it ineffective was a major impetus for the CPSIA of 2008. The mere fact that the States have this authority gives a local hammer to the CPSC that they do not have right now. Right now, what we have to do is rely on the Justice Department or we have to rely on CPSC employees to turn around and try to enforce those out in the various States . . . . It is hurting enforcement.
equalizing the enormous power imbalance between dispersed consumer interests and the highly organized, fully funded lobbying of products manufacturers.

B. The Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection

Despite its shortcomings, the CPSC was the inspiration for the recent creation of an agency charged with regulating financial products to protect consumer interests.322 Professor Elizabeth Warren advocated for the creation of such an agency in 2007, and the financial meltdown that followed provided the political impetus to turn the idea into reality. In 2010, Congress created the CFPB, an agency tasked with making sure that “consumers are provided with timely and understandable information to make responsible decisions about financial transactions” and with protecting consumers “from unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts and practices.”323

The institutional framework for the CFPB was a hotly contested issue from the beginning. And because capture was an obvious concern, many of the issues discussed in Parts II and III were expressly debated as industry groups fought to avoid powerful equalizing measures.

A foundational issue involved whether a new agency responsible for consumer protection should be created or whether an existing agency could be given new authority. The Obama Administration initially proposed the creation of a freestanding commission whose members would have removal protection,324 and consumer advocates embraced this model as well.325 Consumer groups wanted a new agency to protect consumer interests because the existing banking regulators with consumer protection responsibilities largely had ignored those interests and focused instead on their duties

322. See Elizabeth Warren, Unsafe at Any Rate, DEMOCRACY, Summer 2007, at 8, 16 (proposing a “Financial Product Safety Commission” modeled on the CPSC).
324. See, e.g., Creating a Consumer Financial Protection Agency: A Cornerstone of America’s New Economic Foundation: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 14 (2009) (statement of Michael S. Barr, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Financial Institutions) (“We just experienced what it is like to have massive failure in a system in which bank supervisors do safety and soundness and also do consumer protection.”); The Proposed Consumer Financial Protection Agency: Implications for Consumers and the FTC: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade and Consumer Prot., 111th Cong. 6 (2009) (statement of Michael S. Barr, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Financial Institutions) (“A new agency with a focused mission, comprehensive jurisdiction, and broad authorities is also the only way to ensure consumers and providers high and consistent standards and a level playing field across the whole marketplace without regard to the form of a product—or the type of its provider.”).
325. See, e.g., CFPA One-Pager: Support Strong Protection for Consumers, AMERICANS FOR FIN. REFORM (Jan. 11, 2009), http://ourfinancialsecurity.org/2009/01/cfpa-one-pager/ (“AFR supports creating a stand-alone CFPA that eliminates the conflicts of interest inherent in the existing banking agencies and brings a stronger and streamlined focus on consumer protections.”).
to ensure the safety and soundness of financial institutions. But the financial services sector vehemently opposed the establishment of any new agency. In their view, consumer protection could not be divorced from safety and soundness concerns, thus they proposed giving consumer protection responsibilities to an existing banking regulator. Opposition to a new agency by these powerful interests (which included the Mortgage Bankers Association and the CEOs of at least six major financial firms), plus the resistance of congressional Republicans and the current Chairman of the FDIC, ultimately pushed the Administration to give up on a free-standing agency to get the legislation passed in the Senate.

After debating whether to place the agency within Treasury or the Federal Reserve, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act established the CFPB within the Federal Reserve System. The risk with this structure is that “historical inertia” within the Fed on con-

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326. See John C. Coffee, Jr. & Hillary A. Sale, Redesigning the SEC: Does the Treasury Have a Better Idea?, 95 VA. L. REV. 707, 724 (2009) (“It approaches the self-evident to note that a conflict exists between the consumer protection role of a universal regulator and its role as a ‘prudential’ regulatory intent on protecting the safety and soundness of the financial institution.”); Christopher L. Peterson, Federalism and Predatory Lending: Unmasking the Deregulatory Agenda, 78 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 73 (2005) (“[T]he primary mission and long-standing cultural focus of federal depository institution regulators has been monitoring the safety and soundness of their institutions, rather than consumer protection.”).  


328. Some existing regulators also entered the debate, with a commissioner of the FTC arguing that the FTC should be given new financial oversight responsibilities because it already had the infrastructure and experience to address consumer issues. J. Thomas Rosch, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Managing Irrationality: Some Observations on Behavioral Economics and the Creation of the Consumer Financial Protection Agency, Remarks Before the Conference on the Regulation of Consumer Financial Products (Jan. 6, 2010), available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/rosch/100106financial-products.pdf.  


331. Sewell Chan, Dodd Proposes Giving Fed the Task of Consumer Protection, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2010, at B2 (“A[d]vocates, mindful of fierce Republican opposition to a stand-alone agency, have said that they are less concerned about where the entity is housed than the scope of its authority and the independence of its leadership and budget.”).  


sumer issues might plague the new division.334 But it really depends on how integrated the CFPB will be within the overall Fed culture. The CFPB will be headed by a single director who serves a five-year term and is removable by the President only for cause,335 so he or she will have formal independence from the Fed’s hierarchy.

But, as Part II explained, it is not just the agency’s place in an organization hierarchy that matters. Indeed, for precisely that reason, other aspects of the agency attracted controversy. Debate also revolved around whether the new entity would have independent rulemaking authority or if it would merely be an enforcement body that policed rules enacted by existing banking regulators. Consumer advocates insisted on independent rulemaking authority,336 with industry groups vehemently opposed.337 The U.S. Chamber of Commerce started a campaign to “Stop the CFPA” and released a counterproposal that explicitly reserved rulemaking authority for federal banking regulators, who would collectively sit on a “Consumer Financial Protection Council.”338

The final legislation struck a compromise between these two views. The CFPB has independent and exclusive rulemaking authority under the statute for federal consumer financial law and is to be treated as the sole agency interpreting the Act for purposes of judicial deference.339 The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve has no approval or review authority.340 But the CFPB must consult prudential regulators during the rulemaking process and publish any applicable objections those prudential regulators may have.341

Most critically, all CFPB regulations are subject to review by the Financial Stability Oversight Council, which may reject any regulation on safety and soundness concerns with a two-thirds vote.342 This Financial Stability Oversight Council is similar to the council proposed by the

334. Biber, supra note 194, at 17.
335. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 1011(c).
336. See Shahien Nasiripour, Fight for the CFPA is ‘A Dispute Between Families and Banks,’ SAYS ELIZABETH WARREN, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 3, 2010), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/03/03/fight-for-the-cfpa-is-a-d_n_483707.html (listing independent rulemaking authority as one of four crucial aspects that should be included in the new agency).
337. See Jim Kuhnenn, Talks on Bank Rules Zero in on Consumer Protection, MEMPHIS DAILY NEWS (Mar. 3, 2010), http://www.memphisdailynews.com/editorial/Article.aspx?id=48263 ("Business and banking groups also were cool to the idea of a consumer financial protection agency . . . that had independent rule writing power.").
340. Id. § 1012(c)(3).
341. Id. §§ 1022(b)(2)(B)-(C).
342. Id. § 1023(c)(3)(A).
Chamber of Commerce.\footnote{Compare Mullins, supra note 338, at A4 (describing the Chamber of Commerce’s proposal for a council of federal banking regulators and representatives from state banking and consumer regulators), with Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 1011(b)(1), (4) (including a substantially similar group of regulators on the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC)), and id. § 1023 (providing procedures for FSOC review and veto of CFPB regulations).} The voting members consist of the Secretary of the Treasury, the Chairman of the Board of Governors, the Comptroller of the Currency, the Director of the CFPB, the Chairman of the SEC, the Chairperson of the FDIC, the Chairperson of the CFTC, the Director of the Federal Housing Finance Agency, the Chairman of the NCUA, and an independent member who has insurance expertise and who is appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate.\footnote{Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 1111(b).} Most of its members have a long history of favoring the industries they are charged with regulating, making the threat of veto a real one. One analysis of the Council (that included all of its members except the chair of the NCUA) found that it would have vetoed an attempt by the CFPB to regulate nontraditional mortgages.\footnote{Raj Date, Cambridge Winter, Losing the Last War 7 (2010), available at http://cambridgewinter.org/Cambridge_Winter/Archives/Entries/2010/3/21_LOSING_THE_LAST_WAR_files/cfpa%20veto%20032110_1.pdf.} In addition, even if the Council does not have sufficient votes to veto the CFPB, any single member of this Council may stay the CFPB’s regulations for up to ninety days.\footnote{Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 1023(c)(1).} Thus, the CFPB’s design includes precisely the kind of involvement by other agencies that can undermine the CFPB’s own structural protections.

Another hotly contested issue involved preemption and the relationship of the CFPB to state AGs. The financial services industry fought hard to ensure that state consumer laws would remain preempted under any new legislation or agency framework.\footnote{See Banking Industry Perspectives on the Obama Administration’s Regulatory Reform Proposals: Hearing Before the H. Comm. of Fin. Servs., 111th Cong. 58 (2009) (statement of Edward L. Yingling, President, American Bankers Association) (noting the costs associated with the failure to maintain national standards).} They argued that uniformity of regulatory laws is critical because the alternative, patchwork system would not function effectively and would impose enormous compliance costs.\footnote{Id. at 13.} They further alleged that innovation in financial products would decline without preemption because products would have to be tested in each state, thus raising costs.\footnote{Testimony of Edward L. Yingling On Behalf of the American Bankers Association Before the Sen. Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 13 (2009); see also Suzanne Kapner & Tom Braithwaite, US Consumer Protection Proposals Attacked, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2010 (quoting, among others, John Dugan, the Comptroller of the Currency).}

The Treasury Department and some consumer advocates pushed instead for floor preemption that would allow states to enact more consumer-friendly
regulations adjusted to local conditions.\textsuperscript{350} Consumer advocates touted the states as laboratories of regulatory experimentation and argued that states could check the possible capture of a federal agency by industry.\textsuperscript{351}

Congress largely agreed with the consumer groups, preempting state law only to the extent it is “inconsistent” with the Dodd-Frank Act. And the Act clarifies that a state law is not inconsistent if it provides consumers with greater protection than the federal law.\textsuperscript{352} Thus, the law goes some distance to avoid the kind of preemption by the OCC and OTS that precipitated the current fiscal crisis.\textsuperscript{353}

Legislators took up the related question of who should have the power to enforce consumer-protection regulations promulgated by the CFPB. State AGs urged Congress to permit them to bring enforcement actions,\textsuperscript{354} and in its initial white paper, the Department of the Treasury also supported concurrent enforcement “subject to appropriate arrangements with prudential supervisors.”\textsuperscript{355} It further supported the idea that the consumer agency should help to coordinate information sharing between the states.\textsuperscript{356} Despite resistance from industry, Congress did ultimately pass legislation that allows state AGs to enforce CFPB regulations.\textsuperscript{357} States must provide the CFPB with notice before bringing any action (unless it is an emergency)\textsuperscript{358} and the CFPB retains the right to intervene in any state-initiated action, so the federal agency will be well positioned to ensure that its views are known to the court if it disagrees with the AG’s position in the case.\textsuperscript{359}

The CFPB has primary enforcement responsibility vis-à-vis other federal agencies that may be authorized to bring federal consumer finance actions.\textsuperscript{360} Other federal agencies can recommend that the CFPB bring an

\textsuperscript{350} U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, supra note 64, at 61; Hearing on Consumer Financial Protections in Financial Services: Past Problems, Future Solutions Before the Sen. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 25 (2009) (statement of Patricia A. McCoy, University of Connecticut School of Law) (“A federal floor would preserve the states’ ability to protect their citizens.”).

\textsuperscript{351} Id.

\textsuperscript{352} Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 1041(a)(2).

\textsuperscript{353} Robert Berner & Brian Grown, They Warned Us About the Mortgage Crisis, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Oct. 9, 2008), http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/08_42/b4104036827981.htm.


\textsuperscript{355} U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, supra note 64, at 61.

\textsuperscript{356} Id.

\textsuperscript{357} See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 1042(a)(1).

\textsuperscript{358} Id. § 1042(b)(1).

\textsuperscript{359} Id. § 1042(b)(2). The CFPB can also remove the action to federal court and has a right to appeal to the same extent as if it were a party. Id.

\textsuperscript{360} Id. §§ 1024(d)(1), 1025(c)(1), 1026(d)(1).
enforcement action, and if the CFPB opts not to initiate an enforcement proceeding after 120 days, the requesting agency may bring such a proceeding on its own.\footnote{361} The Act thus has safeguards if the CFPB itself is lax in enforcing its own regulations.

The Act employs other equalizing insulators as well. Proponents of the agency successfully obtained an independent source of funding for it apart from the usual budget approval process. Senator Dodd pushed this through because he wanted to insulate the agency from the political pressures that go along with budgetary oversight.\footnote{362} The CFPB’s funding is to be provided by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve in an “amount determined by the Director to be reasonably necessary to carry out the authorities of the CFPB under Federal consumer financial law” but marked at between ten and twelve percent of the total operating budget of the Federal Reserve.\footnote{363} As industry fees fund the Federal Reserve, they in turn fund the CFPB. But the CFPB’s jurisdiction is not optional, so the CFPB need not make any effort to attract fee-paying entities. The CFPB’s access to this guaranteed funding stream gives it a critical advantage that the CPSC lacked.

In addition, the Act gives the CFPB and its director some tools to generate political support. The Director and CFPB officers need not get testimony or legislative recommendations preapproved by the Board of Governors or any other agency.\footnote{364} Thus, the agency has a direct pipeline to Congress, voters, and the media to express concern over issues.

The CFPB also has the capacity to generate information that may ultimately prove helpful in the political debate. The Act creates a specific unit in the CFPB responsible for researching, among other things, consumer financial products that pose risks to consumers, and for increasing “consumer awareness and understanding of costs, risks, and benefits” of financial products and services.\footnote{365} To assist the CFPB in monitoring for risks to consumers, the Act gives it authority to gather information from examination reports provided to prudential regulators and to require regulated firms to respond to CFPB requests for additional information.\footnote{366} Although the CFPB must keep proprietary and customer identification information confidential, it is authorized to make public information in an aggregate form.\footnote{367} This function can help the CFPB flag industry abuses and garner public support

\begin{itemize}
\item \footnote{361. Id. § 1025(c).}
\item \footnote{362. Robert G. Kaiser, The CFPA: How a Crusade to Protect Consumers Lost Its Steam, WASH. POST, Jan. 31, 2010, at G01.}
\item \footnote{363. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 1017(a). The total cap on the budget slowly increases from 10% in FY 2011, to 11% in FY 2012, to the permanent rate of 12% beginning in FY 2013. Id. § 1017(a)(2)(A).}
\item \footnote{364. Id. § 1012 (c)(4).}
\item \footnote{365. Id. § 1013(b)(1).}
\item \footnote{366. Id. § 1022(c)(4)(B).}
\item \footnote{367. Id. § 1022(c)(3)(B).}
\end{itemize}
for regulation if it is otherwise facing resistance from the Council, Congress, or the President.

The CFPB also possesses independent civil litigation authority, so it can bring its own actions in federal court without having to go through the Department of Justice. 368 In addition, the CFPB has jurisdiction to represent itself before the Supreme Court and need not cede control over an appeal to the Solicitor General. 369

The Act seemingly seeks to address consumer interests in other ways, though some of these methods seem structurally unlikely to influence a Director who is otherwise more concerned with banking interests. The prime example of this is the Act’s creation of a Consumer Advisory Board to “advise and consult with the Bureau” on consumer finance laws and emerging consumer financial products, services, and trends. 370 The Director appoints the members of the Board and is charged with selecting individuals with expertise in consumer protection, community development, fair lending, and service to underserved communities. 371 Six members of this body must be selected from recommendations of the regional Federal Reserve Bank Presidents, but the Act does not specify the total number of members. This body is to meet at least twice a year, 372 but it holds no legal authority over the Director, so it is entirely up to the Director as to how much weight to place on recommendations from this body. 373 This Board is thus a poor substitute for a vigorous, full-time public advocate.

It remains to be seen how this mix of traditional and equalizing insulators will play out for the CFPB. The CFPB is a relatively insulated body compared to most agencies, but a critical exception is the check on its regulations possessed by the Financial Stability Oversight Council. The Council’s veto threat appears to be the greatest limit on the agency’s independence.

But whether the CFPB succeeds or fails, it is promising that so much attention was paid to equalizing insulators in the debate over the agency’s creation. It appears that the CFPB’s designers learned some important lessons from the CPSC. Unlike the bulk of legal scholarship that continues to obsess over removal as the touchstone of independence, the CFPB’s proponents viewed removal as nothing more than a starting point for insulation. They recognized that much more needs to be done for an agency to further the public interest when all the strong interest groups line up against that mission.

368. Id. § 1054(b).
369. Id. § 1054(e).
370. Id. § 1014(a).
371. Id. § 1014(b).
372. Id. § 1014(c).
373. See id. § 1014(a) (requiring the Board to “advise and consult with” the CFPB but lacking any indication that the Director must adopt the Board’s recommendations).
V. Conclusion

The goal of this Article has been to think about agency independence from the perspective of what independence is trying to accomplish: specifically, the goal of deflecting one-sided interest group pressure to further the public interest. If the goal of insulation is to obtain long-term rational policy decisions that benefit the public at large and do not reflexively yield to interest group demands, more sophisticated agency design mechanisms should be considered than those typically associated with independent agencies. Removal, OIRA review, and the multimember commission structure are not irrelevant to capture, but they are hardly enough to insulate an agency from asymmetrical political pressures.

Of course, no agency can be completely immunized from such pressure even with a sharp focus on all the possible equalizing factors. Agencies will remain political bodies regardless of their design. But even if a complete barrier against politics is not possible (or desirable), buffers can be put in place to reduce unwarranted political pressure that can harm the public interest.

This Article aimed to identify a list of general factors to consider in designing agencies, but it is not possible to create a one-size-fits-all template for all the substantive areas covered by agency oversight. Future research will need to assess the strengths and tradeoffs associated with particular design features in the context of specific regulatory contexts. What works for criminal law may not work for consumer regulation, and each substantive area might require design modifications not discussed here. And certainly what is practically possible will depend on the political environment.

But hopefully the discussion in this Article of previously underappreciated equalizing features will draw more attention to them as possible solutions to problems of political imbalance that cut against the public interest. Unlike removal restrictions, these are not features that spark core constitutional debates about the separation of powers. But they are mechanisms that matter in the real world of agency design, and if the goal in creating agencies is to promote good government, they deserve far more attention than they have received.

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374. For a persuasive call to administrative law scholars to closely examine the design and internal functioning of agency processes, see Philip J. Weiser, Institutional Design, FCC Reform, and the Hidden Side of the Administrative State, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 675, 721 (2009) (arguing that institutional “processes—as well as the culture and structure of the agencies themselves—must be critically examined and debated by the academy and policy makers just like the substantive decisions that result from those processes”).

375. For example, in designing prosecutors’ offices, some thought should be given to internal separation within the agency. Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons from Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869, 888–93 (2009).