MULTICULTURALISM AND
DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY

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This essay examines the question of justice in democratic constitutional states from the standpoint of a theory of deliberative democracy. Its aim is to show that the validity of a conception of justice and the legitimacy of political institutions and public policies based upon it can be best defended on the basis of a normative theory of deliberative democracy. This theory, I shall argue, is superior to the two main normative models of justification that appeal to the ideal of neutrality (Rawls, Larmore, Nagel) or to the ideal of perfectionism (Raz, Galston).

JUSTICE IN MULTICULTURAL SOCIETIES

The problem of justice and legitimacy has become particularly acute in societies characterised by the fact of pluralism. Pluralism refers to the existence of a variety of competing and often antagonistic and irreconcilable conceptions of the good life held by individuals and groups in contemporary western societies. These competing conceptions of the good life have both an individual and a collective dimension, since they may refer to personal or to collective conceptions of the good, or be a partial combination of the two.

Although pluralism is not a uniquely modern phenomenon, it has assumed greater political salience in societies composed by a number of distinct cultural groups claiming recognition of their unique collective identities (or their collective conceptions of the good). The type of recognition claimed by cultural groups, based on their ethnic, religious, gender or linguistic identity, is a claim pertaining to their collective sense of identity and their collective conception of the good. It therefore differs from the standard claim about recognition of individual identity, which liberal theory from Mill to Rawls has attempted to incorporate, more or less successfully, in its normative framework of justification. The emergence and increasing salience of multicultural groups claiming recognition of their collective identities represents, therefore, a challenge to the standard liberal model of justification. In what follows, I want to examine briefly three responses to this challenge: the first is centred on the value of neutrality, the second on the value of autonomy and/or diversity, the third on the value of dialogue or deliberation.

NEUTRALITY

Rawls is the most well-known advocate of the model of neutrality, along with Larmore and Nagel. Given the fact of reasonable pluralism, the aim is to find a basis of agreement that is neutral with respect to competing conceptions of the good life, whether individual or collective. This aim is achieved by the creation of an overlapping consensus among the variety of (reasonable) comprehensive doctrines, whether moral, religious or philosophical, embodying different conceptions of the good. The strength of this model lies in the acknowledgment of the fact of pluralism, seen as both inevitable and ineliminable, and in the effort to find a basis of agreement that is least controversial, since it is restricted to constitutional essentials and basic
questions of justice and does not appeal to contestable comprehensive conceptions of the good. This is what Rawls calls the "method of avoidance". The weakness of this model lies in the strong distinction between public and non-public aspects of identity and the difficulty of defining a non-contestable notion of the "reasonable". The model assumes that individuals, in order to achieve an overlapping consensus on constitutional essentials, are able to set aside their personal or non-public conception of the good from the public conception of justice or common good. For many individuals whose personal conception of the good is inextricably tied to the collective conception of the good of their group, this separation of private and public aspects of their identity is difficult to achieve. In effect, the individuals most likely to achieve and support an overlapping consensus are those for whom the separation of public and private aspects of identity is least troublesome, namely, liberal individuals\textsuperscript{2}. Liberal individuals have, as it were, a divisible conception of the self. But Rawls’s theory aims to embrace non-liberal as well as liberal individuals, and there is some doubt as to whether his theory can successfully accommodate the former. Moreover, the very notion of what is "reasonable" (reasonable doctrine, reasonable conception of the good, reasonable agreement) remains controversial, since its meaning varies in accordance with the different conceptions of the good (or reasonable comprehensive doctrines) held by various individuals and groups living in contemporary multicultural societies. Reasonableness thus remains a contested and contestable notion.

\textbf{PERFECTIONISM}

Faced with these shortcomings of the neutrality model, some political thinkers have opted for a different model of justification, one based on perfectionist ideals, such as autonomy or diversity. They start by acknowledging the controversial, that is, non-neutral character of liberal principles of justice and of the conception of the self that underlies them, and go on to defend liberal principles by arguing for their superiority with respect to available alternatives. By doing this, they engage on the terrain set by the communitarian critics of liberalism (MacIntyre, Sandel, Taylor, Walzer), because they eschew appeals to neutrality and defend liberalism as embodying a superior or normatively preferable conception of the good life. This strategy has been advocated, among others, by Joseph Raz, William Galston and Will Kymlicka\textsuperscript{3}. Joseph Raz, for example, has argued that a liberal state should protect and foster all those forms of life that encourage autonomy. He believes that autonomy is a precondition of human well-being, since the value of an individual’s life is enhanced if it is freely chosen from a range of available options. He also thinks that membership in a community is conducive to human well-being, because it determines the horizon of one’s opportunities and helps to shape one’s identity. He defends value-pluralism on the grounds that many different and incompatible ways of life are good for their members. Traditional communities which do not put a high value on freedom of choice may still be valid sources of identity for their members, and should therefore be respected and tolerated, provided that they do not oppress their members and allow them the option of exit. The liberal state is to be particularly valued because it makes available the conditions for the free pursuit of, and participation in, all those forms of life that are capable of being good for their participants. By securing certain rights to individuals and groups, the liberal state makes available a range of valuable options that will permit every person to pursue his or her conception of the good, and thus secures the
condition for human well-being. A similar argument has been put forward by Kymlicka in his liberal defence of group rights, which stresses the value of cultural membership and a secure cultural context for individual well-being. Other authors, such as Galston, have advocated the superiority of liberal principles by an appeal to the value of diversity, rather than autonomy. The liberal state accommodates diversity better than its rivals, since in its public principles, institutions, and practices it affords maximum feasible space for the flourishing of individual and group differences, constrained only by the requirements of liberal social unity. What is common to these defences of liberal principles and institutions is a rejection of the model of neutrality in favour of a perfectionist model based on the values of autonomy and/or diversity. The strength of this perfectionist model of justification is that it engages in a substantive debate with the critics of liberalism and argues for the superiority of the liberal conception of the good vis-à-vis its possible competitors. In doing so, it exemplifies what may be called a “method of engagement” which sidesteps some of the difficulties of Rawls’s “method of avoidance”. It may indeed be a more straightforward way of defending liberal principles, since it disclaims any appeal to neutrality and enters self-consciously into a debate about the good. The weakness of this model, on the other hand, partly stems from its strength: it may allow for greater debate about competing conceptions of the good life in the public-political domain, and will avoid claiming a spurious neutrality, but it will ultimately favour those individuals and groups whose conceptions of the good or well-being are predisposed toward the value of autonomy and/or diversity. The perfectionist model may be a more straightforward way of defending liberal principles and institutions, but is no less controversial or contestable than the model of neutrality. The aim of inclusiveness, of being able to accommodate the largest feasible range of competing and irreconcilable conceptions of the good, seems, in the end, unattainable on either model. But is this aim actually attainable? In what follows I will defend the model of deliberation or dialogue on the grounds that it is more inclusive than either the model of neutrality or that of perfectionism, but it is worth pointing out that such inclusiveness is a matter of degree. No model can achieve complete inclusiveness. Liberalism, as Taylor has put it, is also a “fighting creed”. The inevitable fact of exclusion of even the most expansive or accommodating forms of liberalism, such as that of Taylor, is what Donald Moon calls "the tragedy of liberalism". The aim of complete inclusiveness is unattainable. There will always be tragic conflicts and tragic choices. But this should not stop us in our search for models of greater inclusiveness that will lessen the scope for tragic conflicts. The deliberative or dialogic model may provide for a greater degree of inclusion, or so I shall argue, than either the neutral or the perfectionist models.

**DELIBERATION**

There are several lines of entry to the dialogic or deliberative model of justification. I shall describe briefly those put forward by Charles Taylor, Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, Joshua Cohen, Jürgen Habermas, and James Fishkin.

Taylor argues in favour of a dialogic model of justification based on the recognition of the uniqueness of collective identities. He calls this model the "politics of difference" to distinguish it from the standard liberal model which he terms the "politics of equal dignity". He characterizes their difference as
follows: "With the politics of equal dignity, what is established is meant to be universally the same, an identical basket of rights and immunities; with the politics of difference, what we are asked to recognize is the unique identity of this individual or group, their distinctness from everyone else. The idea is that it is precisely this distinctness that has been ignored, glossed over, assimilated to a dominant or majority identity". Thus, while the politics of equal dignity "fought for forms of nondiscrimination that were quite 'blind' to the ways in which citizens differ, the politics of difference often redefines nondiscrimination as requiring that we make these distinctions the basis of differential treatment". The example Taylor cites in defence of the politics of difference is that of the French speaking community of Quebec. They should be granted special rights and immunities so as to be able to preserve their unique collective identity, and to maintain their cherished cultural distinctness from the majority of English speaking Canada. Taylor’s model of the politics of recognition is neither neutral nor perfectionist: it rests on the presumption of equal worth, namely, that "all human cultures that have animated whole societies over some considerable stretch of time have something important to say to all human beings". It is dialogic, insofar as it promotes cross-cultural exchange among different groups and collectivities. The aim of such an exchange is to enlarge our understanding of other cultures, so that we and they may learn something from the dialogic encounter. The aim, in other words, is to achieve a "fusion of horizons", to use Gadamer’s well-known formulation.

A similar stress on dialogue and deliberation characterizes the position of Gutmann and Thompson. They argue that controversial moral issues should not be excluded from public debate, but become subject of collective deliberation. A liberal state, they maintain, "must permit greater moral disagreement about policy and greater moral agreement on how to disagree about policy". The only constraints they advocate are procedural in character: "Principles of accommodation [resting on the idea of mutual respect] govern the conduct of the moral disagreement on issues that should reach the political agenda". In a subsequent article, Gutmann provides a more articulated defence of the model of deliberative democracy. She notes that deliberation "may sometimes increase moral conflict in politics by opening up forums for argument that were previously closed ... Deliberation encourages people with conflicting perspectives to understand each other’s point of view, to minimize their moral disagreements, and to search for common ground, but it begins by opening politics up to a range of reasonable disagreement that is restricted by less deliberative politics". The advantage of deliberative politics over other models of justification (neutralist or perfectionist) is that "in the absence of forums for deliberation mutual respect for reasonable differences is unlikely to be forthcoming and common ground is likely to be overlooked or devalued even by reasonable people since reason by itself, or reasoning by ourselves, rarely points us toward the conflicting perspectives of other reasonable people".

An even stronger defence of deliberative democracy as the best institutional mechanism for the adjudication of conflicting moral and political perspectives is provided by Joshua Cohen. By deliberative democracy he means an association "whose affairs are governed by the public deliberation of its members" and where political debate "is organized around alternative conceptions of the public good". Such an association requires a broad and manifest equality among citizens and provides a basis for self-respect and the development of a sense of justice. Thus, when properly conducted, "democratic politics involves public deliberation focused on the common good, requires some form of manifest equality among citizens, and
shapes the identity and interests of citizens in ways that contribute to the formation of a public conception of common good. The idea is not to suppress difference, but to allow differences about competing conceptions of the public good to be debated in common deliberative fora that ensure the greatest degree of fairness to all participants. To this end Cohen sketches an ideal deliberative procedure that captures the notion of justification through public argument among equal citizens, and serves in turn as a model for deliberative institutions. We should seek, he says, "to mirror a system of ideal deliberation in social and political institutions." He stresses the fact that "the ideal deliberative procedure is meant to provide a model for institutions to mirror ... and not to characterize an initial situation [such as the Original Position] in which the terms of association themselves are chosen." Cohen's model of deliberative democracy is strongly normative in character and is partly indebted to Habermas's discourse theory of democracy. The relevance of such a normative theory of deliberative democracy for our present purposes is that it articulates the conditions under which a fair debate among competing collective identities and conflicting conceptions of the good can be conducted. The outcomes of debates carried out under conditions of deliberative fairness are democratically legitimate, since they are "the object of a free and reasoned agreement among equals." Cohen's theory of deliberative democracy embodies, as all normative theories tend to do, an ideal model of fair deliberative procedures, but its explicit aim is to explore ways in which to institutionalize such an ideal, so as to make our social and political institutions more open to free public deliberation. It is not an ideal thought-experiment, but an attempt to work out the fairest conditions for the adjudication of conflicting moral perspectives on the common good. Finally, the ideal of deliberative democracy is not a perfectionist doctrine, since it does not depend on a particular view of the good life (say, the life of active citizenship). Rather, "it is organised around a view of political justification -that justification proceeds through free deliberation among equal citizens- and not a conception of the proper conduct of life."

The most sophisticated theoretical account of a deliberative model of democracy is provided by Jürgen Habermas. Like Cohen, Habermas offers a characterization of an ideal deliberative procedure whose normative validity rests on the following criteria: (1) Processes of deliberation must take the form of an exchange of information and arguments backed by reasons; (2) Deliberations are inclusive and public: no one may be excluded in principle and all those affected have a right to take part; (3) Deliberations are free of any external or internal coercion that could detract from the equality of the participants; (4) Deliberations aim at rationally motivated agreement and can in principle be continued indefinitely or resumed at any time. Political deliberations, however, must be brought to a close by majority vote given the institutional pressures to reach a decision. Since it is internally connected to a practice of deliberation, majority rule justifies the presumption that the decision adopted may be considered acceptable until further notice, namely, until the minority convinces the majority of the correctness of its own views; (5) Political deliberations extend to all those matters that can be regulated in the equal interest of all, including matters, such as the unequal distribution of resources, that affect the equal and effective exercise of the right to participation in the political process; (6) Political deliberations, lastly, must also include the interpretation of needs, the articulation of collective identities, and the transformation of pre-political attitudes and preferences. In this respect, political deliberations must extend across the broad spectrum of moral, ethical and pragmatic discourses, as well as leaving a space for bargaining and fair compromises among conflicting and non-generalisable interests that
take place in non-deliberative institutional settings (a prime example would be corporatist forms of interests intermediation).

In contrast to Cohen, however, Habermas does not think that such an ideal deliberative procedure could be applied to society as a whole or to the entirety of its institutions. Rather, he conceives the ideal deliberative procedure as "the core structure in a separate, constitutionally organised political system", not as a model for all social institutions, not even for all government institutions. The reason for this is that if, as he puts it, "deliberative politics is supposed to be inflated into a structure shaping the totality of society, then the discursive mode of sociation expected in the legal system would have to expand into a self-organisation of society and penetrate the latter's complexity as a whole". This is an impossible task, since "democratic procedure must be embedded in contexts it cannot itself regulate". For this reason, Habermas advocates a two-track model of deliberative politics, according to which deliberative procedures operating in the formal decision-making domains of legislative and judicial activity are supplemented by informal processes of opinion-formation taking place in the public sphere. Deliberative procedures in formal decision-making domains shape the processes of collective will-formation with a view to the cooperative solution of practical questions, while informal opinion-formation processes are geared to the identification, articulation and thematization of problems emerging from lifeworld experience. Thus, while the public of parliamentary bodies is "structured predominantly as a context of justification", the general public of citizens located in the associational networks of civil society is structured primarily as a "context of discovery" made possible by a procedurally unregulated public sphere. The division of labour between these two domains (formal institutions of deliberation and decision-making which are procedurally regulated vs. informal processes of opinion-formation which are procedurally unregulated) is a fruitful one, insofar as "democratically constituted ... will-formation depends on the supply of informal public opinions that, ideally, develop in structures of an unsubverted political public sphere. The informal public sphere must, for its part, enjoy the support of a societal basis in which equal rights of citizenship have become socially effective". The two-track model of deliberative politics put forward by Habermas depends, in this respect, on the successful interplay between "democratically institutionalised will-formation" and "informal opinion-formation". The latter, operating in a procedurally unregulated fashion, is an essential complement to the former. As Habermas shows in a closely argued excursus, the alleged neutrality of the ideal deliberative procedure can be vindicated only if the formally regulated procedures of parliaments and courts are supplemented by the informal communications, debates and discussions taking place in the numerous public spheres of civil society.

The last contribution to a theory of deliberative democracy I want briefly to advert to is that of James Fishkin. Fishkin's contribution focuses on the kinds of institutions required for the ideal of deliberative democracy to be realised in large-scale and technologically advanced societies. Such institutions must embody both political equality and deliberation. In his book Democracy and Deliberation (1991) and, more at length, in The Voice of the People (1995), he defends an institutional design based on the model of the deliberative opinion poll, but also alludes to other institutional designs that embody both political equality and deliberation, such as the proposal of Philippe Schmitter and Claus Offe to give every citizen a "representation voucher" and Bruce Ackerman's notion of a "constitutional moment". His institutional proposal centred
around the deliberative opinion poll embodies political equality, since everyone has an equal chance of being represented in the national sample of participants, and deliberation, since a selected group of citizens is immersed for an extended period of time (say, one or two weeks) in intensive, face-to-face debate. The advantage of a deliberative opinion poll over non-deliberative or «instant» forms of polling is that it enables a representative sample of citizens to acquire an adequate level of information on a given issue, to listen to the contrasting opinions and perspectives of experts, and to test their own views and opinions through a process of common debate and discussion. Only after such an extended period of deliberation are the members of the sample «polled», that is, asked to give their considered judgment on a given issue. The results of a deliberative poll provide, in this respect, "a statistical model of what the electorate would think if, hypothetically, all voters had the same opportunities that are offered to the sample in the deliberative opinion poll". Most importantly, the results of such a poll have a prescriptive, and not merely a predictive, force: "Its results have prescriptive force because they are the voice of the people under special conditions where the people have had a chance to think about the issues and hence should have a voice worth listening to". The topics under discussion in a deliberative opinion poll may vary: Fishkin suggests that deliberative opinion polls may be used to assess candidates in the American presidential primaries, but their more general purpose is to enable a selected but representative sample of people to evaluate and debate any issue that might be of public concern, such as welfare reform or the criminal justice system or voting-rights legislation or campaign-finance reform, to name but a few.

The point of deliberative opinion polls is to allow people to engage in a reasoned debate and to find some common ground on disputed moral, political or ethical questions. By operating in a framework characterized by political equality, participation and non-tyranny, Fishkin writes, "a collective process [of deliberation] occurs in which the group has a reasonable chance to form its collective, considered judgments - to give its public voice, if you will, to the topic in question. Arguments on rival positions get an extended hearing, and each side has a chance to answer the other. The same information is available to all. People are present and engaged by the process. They do not merely listen. They also participate, in a context which is small enough that each can credibly believe that his or her individual voice counts. And they discuss the issues in an atmosphere of mutual respect, attempting to find common ground".

The theories of deliberative democracy put forward by James Fishkin, Jürgen Habermas, Joshua Cohen and Amy Gutmann, together with Taylor’s dialogic model of recognition, should be seen as providing the broad outlines of a model of normative justification, with its associated proposals for institutional reform, that is more inclusive than the two alternatives I have examined at the beginning of my paper, based on the values of neutrality or perfectionism. Whether the emphasis is on the recognition of collective identities (Taylor), the adjudication of moral conflict (Gutmann), public reasoning on the common good (Cohen), formal and informal modes of collective opinion- and will-formation (Habermas), or the evaluation of issues of public concern (Fishkin), they all stress the importance of dialogue and deliberation for a more inclusive and just form of liberal society.
NOTES


2. For a forceful reminder that liberal principles of justice are rationally acceptable, that is, justifiable in a strong normative sense only to liberal individuals, see BARRY, Brian: "How Not to Defend Liberal Institutions" in DOUGLASS, R.B.; MARA, G.M.; RICHARDSON, H.S. (eds.): *Liberalism and the Good*. New York, Routledge, 1990, p. 44-58, at p. 44: "I want to ask what arguments are available to persuade people who are not liberals ... that they ought nevertheless to subscribe to liberal institutions. I will examine four such arguments ... and conclude that they are either limited in scope or dependent on dubious factual premises. The implication to be drawn is the rather depressing one that the only people who can be relied on to defend liberal institutions are liberals".


4. A strong defence of the superiority of liberal views of the good and of a specific set of liberal virtues (such as tolerance, self-control, openness to change) is advanced by MACEDO, Stephen: *Liberal Virtues*. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1990. It brilliantly exemplifies what I call a method of engagement, but suffers from a self-declared partiality towards liberal principles and institutions. In fact, it goes as far as to claim that: "Liberalism holds out the promise, or the threat, of making all the world like California", p. 278.


7. For an important statement about the importance of political inclusion, and the need to combine it in some form with the requirement of rational agreement, see O'NEILL, Shane: "Political Legitimacy in Pluralist States: Reconciling the Demands of Inclusivity and Agreement", ms., 1997.


10. Ibid., p. 66.


12. Ibid., p. 126.


16. Ibid., p. 20.
17. Ibid., p. 22.
18. Ibid., p. 22.
21. Ibid., p. 305, emphasis mine.
22. Ibid., p. 305.
24. Ibid., p. 308.
25. Ibid., p. 308.
28. Ibid., p. 4. Fishkin argues that deliberative opinion polls may, in some respect, be considered as giant focus groups. They differ from conventional focus groups in being statistically representative of the entire population and in allowing a much greater degree of deliberation on the part of the participants. See ibid., p. 105, footnote 7.
29. Ibid., p. 4.
31. Research for this article was supported by an ESRC research award for a project on "Liberalism, Community and Citizenship" (R000222206).