

**LEFT-WING TERRORISM IN THE FEDERAL
REPUBLIC OF GERMANY**

Bruce Allen Scharlau

**A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD
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UNIVERSITY OF ST. ANDREWS

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BRUCE ALLEN SCHARLAU

20 December 1991



ABSTRACT

The Federal Republic of Germany has coped with indigenous left-wing terrorism for several decades and not lost its liberal democratic character, which raises the question of why terrorists continue to attract recruits to fight the state. This case study of terrorist motivation also elucidates the concept of identification, the lasting influence of someone, some group, or some idea on others, to aid the understanding of motivation and responses to terrorism. Identification also enables the integration of three entwined levels of terrorism study- -individuals, groups and society.

Elucidation of left-wing terrorism in the Federal Republic of Germany shows that a wide variety of persons became terrorists. The important factors in becoming a terrorist were the influence of 'significant others' both in the decision to join a terrorist group, and later within the group, as well as the perception that terrorism was the only available option. The terrorist groups formed 'macronarratives' based on the group members' shared history and culture which supported their decisions to offer incentives and sanctions to group members to enable their underground existence. Not all of the groups sought to influence public policy. The Red Army Faction was mainly interested in group survival, as was the Second of June, while some of the Revolutionary Cells and **Autonomen** followed their self-interest in committing terrorist acts. Other Revolutionary Cells and **Autonomen** groups, however, sought public policy changes through terrorist acts in support of protest groups. The other groups had limited concepts of the 'public', which reflected their group direction.

The government of the Federal Republic responded to left-wing terrorism with short-term paramilitary options taking precedence over the long-term socio-economic considerations. The German government generally has perceived all left-wing terrorist groups as the same, and not given due consideration to the different terrorist organisations perceptions of the 'public'. A clearer perception of left-wing terrorism in the Federal Republic of Germany shows the usefulness of the concept of identification in the study of terrorism, and highlights the processes involved in terrorist motivation at individual, group and society levels.

DECLARATIONS

I, BRUCE ALLEN SCHARLAU, hereby certify that this thesis, which is approximately 103,000 words in length, has been written by me, that it is the record of work carried out by me and that it has not been submitted in any previous application for a higher degree.

date 19 December 1991 signature of candidate 

I was admitted as a research student under Ordinance No. 12 in October 1986 and as a candidate for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in October 1986; the higher study for which this is a record was carried out in the University of St. Andrews between 1986 and 1991.

date 19 December 1991 signature of candidate 

I hereby certify that the candidate has fulfilled the conditions of the Resolution and Regulations appropriate for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the University of St. Andrews and that the candidate is qualified to submit this thesis in application for that degree.

date 19 Dec. '91 signature of supervisor 

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DEDICATION

Formerly our home had three.

Currently it has two.

Success is due to the help of the other one.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The completion of a project of this magnitude can be accomplished only with the assistance of others, to whom I here publically give my thanks. Financial assistance came from my parents and other relatives, a grant from the University of Aberdeen, the Axel Springer Stiftung, and the Intercon Security Fellowship arranged through the Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, who also employed me, as did the Universities of Aberdeen and St. Andrews. Research assistance was given by Dr. David Th. Schiller in Stuttgart, and Dr. Alex Schmid in Leiden. Supervisory guidance was given by Prof. Paul Wilkinson and Dr. Alasdair M. Stewart, who saw my potential in the early days, and saw me through to the end. Supportive assistance was afforded by Lisa, Robin, Gamini, Tom, and a host of others, while the library staff at Aberdeen and St. Andrews University Libraries kept me supplied with materials. To all of these, and especially to Fiona, who saw me through it all, I say thank you. However, as they only helped me bring the work together, I am the one responsible for any mistakes.

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ABBREVIATIONS AND GLOSSARY

AD	Action Directe	Action Direct
APD		Antisocial Personality Disorder
APO	Ausserparlamentarische Opposition Aussteiger	Extra-Parliamentary Opposition an ex-terrorist
BGS	Bundesgrenzschutz	Federal Border Guard
BfV	Bundesamt fuer Verfassungsschutz	Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution
BKA	Bundeskriminalamt	Federal Criminal Office
BR	Brigata Rossa	Red Brigades (Italy)
BR-PCC		BR-For the Building of the Combatant Communist Party
BR-UCC		BR-United Combatant Communists federal level
EMI	Bund Bundesministerium des Innern Bundestag Bundeswehr	Federal Ministry of the Interior lower house of parliament federal army
B2J	Bewegung 2. Juni	Movement Second of June
CCC		Combatant Communist Cells (Belgium)
CDU	Christliche Demokratische Union	Christian Democratic Union
CSU	Christlich Soziale Union	Christian Social Union
DISPOL		Police Digital System Computer
ETA	Euskadi ta Askatasuna	Euskadi and Freedom (Spain)
FDP	Freie Demokratische Partei	Free Democratic Party
FRG		Federal Republic of Germany
GDR		Germany Democratic Republic
GRAPO		Anti-Fascist Commando First of October
GSG	Grenzschutzgruppe	Special Border Guard Group
IMF		International Monetary Fund
INPOL		Police Information Network
IRZU	Informationzentrum Rote Universitaet	Information Centre Red (Peoples') University
KPD	Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands Kronzeuge	German Communist Party state's evidence/grass
LfV	Laender Landesamt fuer Verfassungsschutz	state level Land Office for the Protection of the Constitution
LKA	Landeskriminalamt	Land Criminal Office
MIK	militaerisch- industriellen-komplex	military industrial complex
NATO		North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

OPEC		Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries
PFLP		Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
PIOS		Persons, Institutions, Objects, Articles (Sachen)
RAF	Rote Armee Fraktion	Red Army Faction
RZ	Revolutionaere Zellen	Revolutionary Cells
SDS	Sozialistischer Deutscher Studentenbund	Socialist German Students
SED	Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschland	Socialist Unity Party of Germany
SPD	Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands	Social Democratic Party
Stasi	Staatssicherheitsdienst	new runway at Frankfurt airport State Security Service (of the GDR)
StGB	Strafgesetzbuch	Criminal Code Book
StPO	Strafprozessordnung	Criminal Code Procedure
TREVI		Terrorism, Radicalism, Extremism, Violence, Insurgency
USA		United States of America
VSB	Verfassungsschutzbericht	interior ministry extremism report

If we see one goal clearly we may advance one step. If we contemplate all goals at once we shall not advance at all.

John le Carre' *The Russia House* (London: Hodder and Stoughton Ltd., 1989), 199.

Preface

This thesis deals with the Federal Republic of Germany which used to be colloqually named 'West Germany'. On 3 October 1990 the newly created five *Laender* (states) which formerly comprised the German Democratic Republic acceded to the Federal Republic via Article 23 of the Basic Law. Now there is no longer a 'West' and 'East Germany'. The result of these changes on the thesis are that 'West Germany' is used in the thesis to denote the old borders of the Federal Republic and 'Germany' is used with regards to the new borders of 1990.

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

Galileo:

There is already much discovered, but there is more that can still be discovered.¹

The Three Agitators:

That the shorter path is better than the long one, no one denies.

But if someone knows it

And does not point it out to us, what good is their wisdom?²

1. Thesis Aims and Goals

This thesis examines the motivation of indigenous left-wing terrorism in the western half of the Federal Republic of Germany. This state has coped with indigenous left-wing terrorism conducted by groups espousing anarchist, socialist and communist ideologies (as well as right-wing terrorism by groups espousing racist and fascist ideologies, and acts of terrorism by non-German terrorist groups) for over twenty years without losing its liberal democratic character. This provokes the question of why, if terrorists have not proven successful at subverting the state in the past, they continue to attract recruits in their fight against the state.

This search for the motivation of left-wing German terrorists elucidates a theoretical approach to the study of terrorism. The thesis introduces the concept of identification to show its usefulness in understanding the motivation of, and responses to, political terrorism. This study shows how people develop ties to individuals, groups and societies, and why these occurred in the Federal Republic amongst the leftist terrorists in the areas which they did, and what influence these had on their activities. Similarly, the concept also explains the public and government response.

The elucidation in the case study begins with an examination of left-wing terrorism in West Germany. This involves a historical and then an analytical study. The former places the events into their larger context, while the latter details the protest issues raised by the terrorists and the extent of left-wing terrorism. The historical context highlights the identifications' origins, and the analytical section shows how the terrorists employed these in their activities.

¹ Bertolt Brecht, "Leben des Galilei", in: *Die Stuecke von Bertolt Brecht in einem Band* (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1978), 491-539, 493.

² Bertolt Brecht, "Die Massnahme", in: *Die Stuecke von Bertolt Brecht in einem Band* (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1978), 255-268, 265.

Both the historical and analytical chapters serve as an introduction for the analysis, theory and examples that follow in chapters four through seven which cover individuals, groups, government measures, the media and the public. The last two (government measures, and the public and media) are seen as society's response that, along with groups and individuals, form three entwined conceptual elements of terrorism analysis, which must always be reflected in the study of terrorism.³ Chapters four to seven, which discuss individuals, group dynamics, government measures, the media and public responses, will each form a layer of the concept of identification. The result should be an understanding of how identification contributes to the motivation of, and responses to, political terrorism.

Chapter four focuses on individual processes and characteristics to uncover potential psychological motivations and socialisation processes that potentially motivate individuals towards terrorism. After discussion of the 'psychologically disturbed' and 'rational-idealist' positions, biographical and psychological characteristics are examined in light of identification to point towards the role of 'significant others' and available options in peoples' lives.

In chapter five the movement of a person from entering to leaving a terrorist group is followed to highlight group organisational differences and the limiting and supporting effects of these on members. The position of the group with regards to outsiders is also discussed, as is the role of dissension within the group. Throughout the chapter the effects of individuals identifying with the group, or with members within the group, and how the group identifies with its own ideal in opposition to other possibilities, are constant themes.

Chapters six and seven cover society's response to terrorism and how this affects terrorists' motivation. Chapter six, the dynamics of government measures towards terrorism, highlights the conflicting identifications between the terrorists and government in an examination of government counterterrorism policy. Chapter seven shows how the public, the subject over which the terrorists and the government struggle for identification and legitimacy of control, responds to terrorist overtures and government counterterrorism measures. The media is seen as an 'identification machine' that can be employed to convey measures of identification with the government or the terrorists.

³ Martha Crenshaw, "Questions to be Answered, Research to be Done, Knowledge to be Applied", in: Walter Reich (ed.), **Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theories, States of Mind** (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 247-260, 249-250.

Chapter eight brings together a summary of the case study analysis and of the theoretical concepts. It also offers practical applications for the Federal Republic, and theoretical ones for future research on identification and terrorism, because research should be cumulative, not disparate. Therefore "any and all promising information, perspectives, disciplines and methods" are used in the thesis.⁴ This is not to suggest an overgeneralisation, nor that the thesis conclusions will be applicable to all other forms of terrorism. Rather it is hoped the thesis provides a conceptual starting point for other studies of political terrorism.

2. Literature Review

Left-wing terrorism is a sub-section of the wider topic of extremism in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) that covers the far right and left as well as terrorism. Two authors in particular, Backes and Jesse, have mapped out this area of study in their joint projects of 1989. The first was a three volume set⁵ that reviews the literature on ideology, organisations, activities and extremist threat in volume one. Volume two is the authors' own contribution to the discussion with a chronological analysis of extremism in the country that concludes with an explanation and review of the constitutional state. The third volume is a reader in original extremist documents from far right, far left and terrorist organisations, which ends with biographical sketches of some extremists.

Backes and Jesse also began a yearly project on extremism and democracy⁶ that seeks to shed light on the far left, right and terrorism as a discussion forum, reference work and orientation aid. It forms annual additions to their 1989 three volume work with updates on analysis, literature reviews and documentation.

Left-wing terrorism is also a sub-section of the wider literature that examines the state security apparatus with regards to civil liberties. This type of literature was already established in the seventies with books and articles which argued that the state is conservative, and possibly on the road to fascism. They also argued that the state used the far left as an excuse to defend itself, while ignoring the far right, who are just as, if not more dangerous than the

⁴ Bowman H. Miller, "Terrorism and Language: A Text-Based Analysis of the German Case" *Terrorism* 9 (4) 1987, 373-407, 375.

⁵ Uwe Backes, Eckhard Jesse (eds.), *Politischer Extremismus in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland Band I: Literature, Band II: Analyse, Band III: Dokumentation* (Cologne: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1989).

⁶ Uwe Backes, Eckhard Jesse (eds.), *Jahrbuch Extremismus und Demokratie* (Bonn: Bouvier Verlag, 1989 IV).

left.⁷ This tradition continued into the eighties with concerns over computerisation of the security services and the resultant transparency of public life, which are also linked with how the government controls demonstrations and responds to terrorism.⁸

The literature on specifically left-wing terrorism can be broken into three broad categories: journalistic, academic and terroristic. Two authors, Aust and Becker, stand out amongst the journalists for their detailed analysis of the rise and fall of the Rote Armee Fraktion (RAF, Red Army Faction) under Baader and Meinhof in the seventies.⁹ Becker seeks to explain the events in light of the main characters and their parents' past, which she perceives as being influenced by the shadow of the Third Reich whereby the early RAF became 'Hitler's children' as they sought to provoke fascism in order to encourage dissent. Aust relates terrorist events in a study of the internal group activities, and how these were affected by government counterterrorism policies. However, both of these studies limit themselves to the seventies, and no comparable work exists for the eighties, or for the *Bewegung 2. Juni* (B2J, Second of June) or *Revolutionaerer Zellen* (RZ, Revolutionary Cells) apart from the short, broad overview of leftist terrorism offered by Kahl.¹⁰

The academic studies of left-wing terrorism are reviewed in the Backes and Jesse volumes mentioned above, so the following only discusses the more important works. In 1978 the government commissioned academic studies into West German left-wing terrorism in the country. The results were five volumes in a series entitled *Analysen zum Terrorismus* that approached the subject from the different perspectives of terrorist ideology,¹¹ individual life histories,¹² group dynamics,¹³

⁷ See Peter Brueckner, Alfred Krovoza, *Staatsfeinde: Innerstaatliche Feinderklaerung in der Bundesrepublik* (West Berlin: Verlag Klaus Wagenbach, 1972); Sebastian Cobler, *Law, Order and Politics in West Germany* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Ltd., 1978); Peter Brueckner, *Versuch, uns und anderen die Bundesrepublik zu erklaren* (West Berlin: Verlag Klaus Wagenbach, 1978, Neuausgabe, 1984).

⁸ See Rolf Goessner, Buerger kontrollieren Polizei (eds.), *Restrisiko Mensch: Volkserfassung, Staatsterrorgesetze, Widerstandsbekaemfung* (Hamburg: Instituts fuer Sozialforschung, 1987).

⁹ Jillian Becker, *Hitler's Children: The Story of the Baader-Meinhof Gang* (London: Granada Publishing Ltd., Second Edition, 1978); Stefan Aust, *The Baader-Meinhof Group: The Inside Story of a Phenomenon* (London: The Bodley Head, 1987).

¹⁰ Werner Kahl, *Vorsicht Schusswafen! Von kommunistischen Extremismus, Terrorismus, und revolutionaerer Gewalt* (Munich: Guenter Olzog Verlag, 1986).

¹¹ Iring Fetscher, Guenter Rohrmosser (eds.), *Ideologien und Strategien* (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1981).

¹² Gerhard Schmidtchen, Herbert Jaeger, Lieselotte Suellwold (eds.), *Lebenslaufanalysen* (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1981).

the relationship between violence and legitimacy,¹⁴ and that between protest and government reaction.¹⁵ Each of these brought new light to the subject in thorough studies of their particular topic, but the series as a whole suffered from the lack of a volume that brought the diverse subjects together into a conclusion. It also does not appear that the same intensity and thoroughness will continue in government supported study of terrorism in the eighties.¹⁶

A postscript of sorts to these studies can be found in the first volume of a two volume 1988 work on terrorism,¹⁷ which covers theoretical approaches to terrorism and includes a case study on the FRG. This brings together some of the diverse macro and micro levels of study found in the *Analysen* series and seeks to offer conclusions about the processes involved. However, this leftist view of terrorism which points towards an institutionalisation of terrorism ends without any prescription. The second volume of the set is perceived as a comparison study reader with case studies of the neighbouring European countries of Italy, France and the Netherlands.

English language academic treatments of left-wing terrorism in West Germany have produced short case studies in general volumes on terrorism,¹⁸ or focused on specific aspects such as intellectuals,¹⁹ literature analysis,²⁰ or government response.²¹ This thesis thus offers one of the first book length English language studies of left-wing

¹³ Wanda von Baeyer-Katte, Dieter Claessens, Hubert Feger, Friedhelm Neidhardt (eds.), *Gruppenprozesse* (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1982).

¹⁴ Ulrich Matz, Gerhard Schmidtchen (eds.), *Gewalt und Legitimität* (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1983).

¹⁵ Fritz Sack, Heinz Steinert (eds.), *Protest und Reaktion* (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1984).

¹⁶ The series *Texte zur inneren Sicherheit* is aimed towards continuing the research first conducted in the *Analysen zum Terrorismus*, but on a smaller scale. J. Kurt Klein, "Die geistigen und politisch-sozialen Ursachen des deutschen Terrorismus", in: Bundesminister des Innern (ed.), *Texte zur inneren Sicherheit: Gewalt und Terrorismus - aktueller Stand* (Bonn: Bundesministerium des Innern, 1990), 7-36, 8.

¹⁷ n.n. *Angriff auf das Herz des Staates: Soziale Entwicklung und Terrorismus* (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1988). Two volumes.

¹⁸ Raymond R. Corrado, "Ethnic and Ideological Terrorism in Western Europe", in: Michael Stohl (ed.), *The Politics of Terrorism* (New York: Marcell Dekker Inc., Second Edition, 1983), 255-326; Geoffrey Pridham, "Terrorism and the State in West Germany During the 1970s", in: Juliet Lodge (ed.), *Terrorism: A Challenge to the State* (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1981), 11-57; Eva Kolinsky, "Terrorism in West Germany", in: Juliet Lodge (ed.) *The Threat of Terrorism* (Brighton: Wheatsheaf Books Ltd., 1988), 57-88.

¹⁹ Julian Roberts, "Terrorism and German Intellectuals" *Journal of Area Studies* 3 (Spring) 1981, 21-5.

²⁰ See B.H. Miller (1987).

²¹ Kevin G. Horbatiuk, "Anti-Terrorism: The West German Approach" *Fordham International Law Approach* 3, 1980, 167-191.

terrorism in the Federal Republic of Germany that brings together the diverse components on the subject.²²

The last type of literature is that written by terrorists and former terrorists, which can be divided into operational statements and memoirs. The first category includes communiques and pamphlets describing the group and what they seek to achieve.²³ These all offer subjective perspectives of the groups and their audiences as they compete against each other. Despite their sometimes contradictory arguments, and their inaccurate 'evidence', they provide insight into their perspective.

The same holds true for the memoirs of former terrorists of the Second of June,²⁴ Revolutionary Cells,²⁵ and the Red Army Faction.²⁶ A novel written by a RAF sympathiser about the group relates the RAF experience from an insiders viewpoint.²⁷ These all portray individual experiences and explanations for what occurred.

These are the general categories of literature on West German left-wing terrorism: journalistic, academic and terroristic. The thesis draws on each of these. The thesis relies on the journalistic works as a chronological framework, but also uses press contributions to elucidate on areas the other journalists do not cover. The thesis synthesises the

²² John D. Elliot, *Terrorism in West Germany* Ph.D. Thesis, (George Washington University, 1981), is the only thesis referenced in the literature, but I was unable to locate a copy.

²³ Red Army Faction, *texte: der RAF* (West Berlin: no publisher given, ueberarbeitete und aktualisierte Ausgabe, 1983). [Originally Malmoe: Bo Cavefors, 1977]; Jean Paul Marat (ed.), *Widerstand Heisst Angriff! erklarungen, redebeitraege, flugblaetter und briefe 1977-1987* (Amsterdam: Biblitheek voor Ontspanning en Ontwikking, 1988). Second of June, *Der Blues: Gesammelte Texte der Bewegung 2. Juni* (No place/date of publication); [I was unable to obtain a copy of this.] Revolutionary Cells, *RZ: Geschichte, Kritiken, Dokumente* (Oberursel: Westdeutsches Irlandssolidaritaetskomitee (WISK) Vertrieb, no date given, but after February 1985); n.n. *Das Tapfere Schneiderlein: Organ der Unverbesserlichen* (No place/publisher, but appeared June/July 1978); n.n. *Guerilla Diffusa: In Bewegung bleiben* (Bremen: no publisher, 1981).

²⁴ Michael 'Bonmi' Baumann, *Terror or Love? The Personal Account of a West German Urban Guerrilla* (London: John Calder Publishers Ltd., 1979).

²⁵ Hans Joachim Klein, *Ruckkehr in die Menschlichkeit: Appell eines ausgestiegene Terroristen* (Reinbek: Rowohlt, 1979).

²⁶ Peter-Juergen Boock, *Abgang* (Bornheim-Merten: Lamuv Verlag, 1988) is a semi-autobiographical novel. See Peter-Juergen Boock, Heinrich Lummer, "'Die RAF war nie ein Gefahr fuer den Staat'" *Stern* 41 (39) 22-8 September 1988, 270-3. I did not obtain Klaus Juenscke, *Spaetlese: Texte zur RAF und Knast* (Frankfurt a.M.: Verlag Neue Kritik, 1988), which is reported to be a collection of interviews, letters and essays that have appeared in the press, and not a a memoir itself. See Backes, Jesse (1989 IV), 220-2.

²⁷ Christian Geissler, *kamalatta. romantisches fragment* (West Berlin: Rotbuch Verlag, 1988).

German and English language academic literature to provide a theoretical framework for the case study. Some of the framework portions are new as described in chapters four through seven in discussions on individuals, groups, government response and public and media reaction are covered. The communiques and other writings of the diverse left-wing terrorist groups are comprehensively used by including those of the Second of June, the Revolutionary Cells and the Autonomen, which have generally been ignored by academic writers,²⁸ in favour of those by the Red Army Faction. The discovery and arrest of former RAF members in the former German Democratic Republic provided more autobiographical articles by former terrorists, which added more examples for the historical and theoretical frameworks.

The resultant synthesis of these information sources produced a thesis that does two things. First, it elaborates on left-wing terrorism in the Federal Republic of Germany with the benefit of new materials. Second, the theoretical context lifts the thesis from a pure case study to one which examines general motivation processes in terrorism. This relieves the West German case study of the problem of covering the same ground as previous studies because it approaches the questions from new perspectives in light of new theoretical approaches.

3. The Study of Terrorism

Terrorism is a subjective emotional experience. What terrorises one, may not terrorise another.²⁹ Its subjectivity extends to the public's perception of terrorists' capabilities, and contributes to its perception as a world-wide menace, and its impact beyond the actual target audience of the terrorists and their victims.³⁰

Subjectivity also extends to the perpetrators with the oft repeated claim that 'one man's terrorist is another man's freedom-fighter'. This implies that terrorism has no agreed upon moral position, because the well-wishers on both sides allow the perpetrators to be either of these. This problem arises because terrorism is not derived from any particular ideology, or religion. Many ideological or religious perspectives use terrorism to support their ends.³¹

²⁸ Except for David Th. Schiller, "Germany's Other Terrorists" *Terrorism* 9 (1) 1987 (II), 87-99, which covers the RZ and Autonomen.

²⁹ Paul Wilkinson, *Terrorism and the Liberal State* (London: Macmillan Education Ltd., Second Edition, 1986), 11-2.

³⁰ Nehemin Friedland, Ariel Mehari, "The Psychological Impact of Terrorism: A Double-Edged Sword" *Political Psychology* 6 (4) 1985, 591-604, 592.

³¹ Walter Laqueur, *The Age of Terrorism* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1987), 7; Martha Crenshaw, *Terrorism and International Cooperation* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989), 5-6.

The result is that terrorism research is hindered by moral stumbling blocks over what terrorism is and is not, based on the researchers' normative assumptions over what types and forms of political violence constitute terrorism.³² This is further complicated by the question of cognitive terrorism typologies, who labels whom 'terrorists', and what type of activities fall within the heading of 'terrorism'. The two phenomena, how it is conceptualised, and the activities it includes, are connected³³ as is shown in the 'freedom-fighter' versus 'terrorist' debate.

Despite these hindrances, research on terrorism has continued unabated, with terrorism research placing terrorism in political, criminal, and various war (civil war, guerilla war and wars of infiltration) situations. Its theoretical content, as in other social science disciplines, is akin to 'current thinking' and interpretations of terrorism. To avoid the danger of generalisations within the topic which blur differences, and bring illusions of a mastery that does not exist, a basic conceptual and theoretical groundwork to form a solid framework for future analysis of terrorism is required.³⁴

There is disagreement over definitions of terrorism, and there is deficient theorising about terrorism. As the two problems are related because the breadth of the definition will determine the research and response focus,³⁵ the question is, how to resolve them and move forward in the study and research of terrorism. Should the question of definitions be resolved, or should one use what consensus there is on definitions as a position from which to build up a theory of terrorism?³⁶

³² Grant Wardlaw, *Political Terrorism: Theory, tactics, and counter-measures* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Second Edition, 1989), 4.

³³ Ronald D. Crelinsten in: Yonah Alexander, Jakov Katwan (eds.), "The International Scientific Conference on Terrorism, Berlin" *Terrorism* 3 (3/4) 1980, 179-351, 203.

³⁴ Martti Sirrala in: Alexander, Katwan (eds.) (1980), 327; Denis Szabo, Ronald D. Crelinsten, "International Political Terrorism: A Challenge for Comparative Research" *Terrorism* 3 (3/4) 1980, 341-8, 342; Alex P. Schmid, *Political Terrorism: A Research Guide to Concepts, Theories, Data Bases, and Literature* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1983), xiii, 160-1.

³⁵ *ibid.*, 168; Alex P. Schmid, "Force or Conciliation? An Overview of Some Problems Associated with Current Anti-Terrorist Response Strategies" *Violence, Aggression, and Terrorism* 2 (2) 1988, 149-78, 150.

³⁶ Alex P. Schmid, Albert J. Jongman, *Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories and Literature* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, Revised, expanded and updated edition, 1988), 3.

3.1 Definitions of Terrorism

Numerous definitions of terrorism abound³⁷ so unanimity in the usage of the term is unlikely. This leaves two options. One is unanimity amongst social scientists, who can then all pursue research with the same focal point. Another option is to leave the political definition of terrorism to the policy-makers, who are responsible for justifying responses to suspected terrorist acts.³⁸

Leaving aside the policy-makers for a moment, consensus amongst the social scientists in terrorism research is found in a 1985 questionnaire mailed out to around two hundred researchers on political terrorism. The result was that, while 81% found the provided definition partially or fully acceptable, almost two-thirds could not entirely agree with it.³⁹ The researchers then rewrote their definition with the study results in mind to arrive at this definition of terrorism:

Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi-)clandestine individual, group, or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal, or political reasons, whereby- -in contrast to assassination- -the direct targets of violence are not the main targets. The immediate human victims of violence are generally chosen randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic targets) from a target population, and serve as message generators. Threat- and violence-based communication processes between terrorist (organization), (imperiled) victims, and main targets are used to manipulate the main target of demands or a target of attention, depending on whether intimidation, coercion or propaganda is primarily sought.⁴⁰

This definition explicitly states that there are different types of terrorism, some of which are political. As this thesis restricts itself to political terrorism in general, and left-wing terrorism in the Federal Republic of Germany, the appropriate government definition should be compared to the above definition to uncover any possible differences.

The Interior Ministry annual reports on political violence in the Federal Republic, *Verfassungsschutzberichte*, state that terrorism is

the sustained battle waged for political goals, that with the help of supporters is to be carried out against life, limb and property of other people, especially through serious criminal acts, such as those named in Para 129a Art. 1 of the Criminal Code Book

³⁷ see Schmid (1983), 119-158, for 109 definitions; and Schmid, Jongman, 32-38, for 35 more definitions.

³⁸ Schmid (1983), 6; Wardlaw, xiii.

³⁹ Schmid, Jongman, 2-3.

⁴⁰ *ibid.*, 28.

(particular murder, killing, extortionate kidnapping, arson, causing explosions with explosives) or through violent acts that aid the perpetration of such criminal acts.⁴¹

The government definition refers to paragraph 129a of the Criminal Code Book which covers terrorist organisations, and lists specific activities that could be means by which individuals and groups pursue ends. Unlike the first definition, there is no interest in whether the victims are the targets to be influenced (i.e., the audience). The government is interested in what is done, not the reasons for the actions. Governments and academics appear to be interested in two different aspects of political terrorism.

3.2 Theoretical Approaches to Terrorism

The question then remains, can the first definition offered, which has at least some consensual legitimacy, be used to form the basis for a theoretical framework? The answer necessitates an examination of the existing theoretical framework.

A review of terrorism literature shows ten broad categories of theories on terrorism: terrorism as part of political violence, 'common myths/wisdom', state and regime terrorism, terrorists' own theories, psychological theories, surrogate (internal) war theories, conspiracy theories, communication and sociological theories.⁴² In order to build a framework for a general theory of terrorism, these need to be reduced to one theory that explains why and predicts when political terrorism occurs.

One way to begin this process is to work towards a theory of terrorism for a particular case, such as this thesis seeks with left-wing terrorism in the Federal Republic of Germany. In this situation, some of the above theories obviously do not apply. This is not a case of state or regime terrorism, nor do 'common myths/wisdom' of interconnected propositions apply. The conspiracy thesis, that the Soviet security services (or its obverse, the American intelligence services) are the directors of terrorism, is shown in chapter two to be inoperative. Admittedly, the East Germans partly financed the RAF and had arrangements for them to pass information to the East Germans with

⁴¹ Bundesministerium des Innern (ed.), *Verfassungsschutzbericht 1987* (Bonn: BMI, June 1988), 72. *Verfassungsschutzbericht 1989* (July 1990, 76) excludes spontaneous activity in the course of demonstrations turning violent.

⁴² Schmid (1983), chapter two.

regards to some RAF target areas, but there is no indication that the East Germans (or the Soviets via them) directed the group.⁴³

Terrorism as political violence can be reduced to its basis in psychological factors on a mass scale, and sociological theories can be seen as the setting for communication theories. Terrorists' own theories overlap with communication theories as propaganda, and surrogate (or internal) war theories because they seek to provoke internal repression to force mass participation.

This reductionism has left only psychological, communication and surrogate (or internal) war theories. Psychological theories seek the answer within the individual terrorists. Communication theories view terrorism as a form of propaganda to spread particular political messages, and war theories view terrorism as military instead of political violence. The first raises personal questions, whereas the other two raise questions about the function of terrorism. Each of these raise research questions that lead in different directions.

If one assumes that terrorism is a type of war, then questions of a military and paramilitary nature are raised in research that seeks to contain and counter terrorism with police and paramilitary measures, or expounds on terrorism's suitability as a type of warfare in special situations. If terrorism is seen as a tactic used to gain attention from official authorities by those who see no other means, then the study focuses on communication channels, sociopolitics, psychology, authority and power. The use of violence in this case does not necessarily signal the pursuit of military goals. Knowing that they cannot win militarily, terrorists can use violence and force rhetorically.⁴⁴

The psychological theories are linked to the 'terrorist personality' question, which has only produced generalisations,⁴⁵ and allows simple answers: yes, they are 'psychologically disturbed', in which case the governments can disregard the terrorists' demands, or no, as a rule they are not 'psychologically disturbed', in which case the

⁴³ "Lauschen unterm Pflaumenbaum" *Der Spiegel* 26 (24 June) 1991, 92-5.

⁴⁴ Szabo, Crelinsten, 346; Ralph E. Dowling, "Terrorism and the Media: A Rhetorical Genre" *Journal of Communication* 36 (1) 1986, 12-24, 13.

⁴⁵ Laqueur, 76-77; see also Martha Crenshaw, "The Subjective Reality of the Terrorist: Ideology and Psychological Factors in Terrorism", in: Robert O. Slater, Michael Stohl (eds.), *Current Perspectives on International Terrorism* (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1988), 12-46, 28-9.

government has to take the terrorists' positions, statements, and their implications into account.⁴⁶

The reductionism must proceed further to bring these three theories of terrorism together to form a model that explains individuals, groups, society and how they intertwine. The model needs to account for the interactions between many persons and collectives, involving psychological effects and subjective evaluations of many, in an attempt to explain the behaviour of few: why do some resort to political violence and terrorism, while others pursue other means?⁴⁷

The 'psychological' component focuses itself on individual, group and government responses in an examination of their subjective positions. The 'communication' aspect explains the sociological context of group and individual situations in society. It and the 'war' theories also explain government and society's responses to terrorism.

Therefore, it is necessary to examine theories which bring these three concepts, 'psychological', 'communication' and 'war' together in one model which involves individuals, groups and society. Two possibilities appear, one sociological and one social psychological. The sociological model is less a model and more a list of stages on the path to terrorism that begins with social protest and ends with an active terrorist group.⁴⁸

(1) There is a broad social movement.

(2) Some members of the social movement experience repressive violence in conflict with their adversaries which leads to radicalisation and public discussion of counterviolence.

(3) A lack of response from the addressed audience of the social movement leads to frustration and increased determination of the social movement, some of whom discuss tactical violence to achieve their goals.

(4) The decision of some, but not others, to tread this path needs to be uncovered in individual biographies.

(5) The nascent violence promoting group within the social movement uses models of the Tupamaros, Palestinians and others as examples of the possibilities available to them.

⁴⁶ Raymond R. Corrado, "A Critique of the Mental Disorder Perspective of Political Terrorism", *International Journal of Law and Psychiatry* 4, 1981, 293-309, 293. See also Walter Reich, "Understanding Terrorist Behavior: The Limits and Opportunities of Psychological Inquiry", in: Walter Reich (ed.), *Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theories, States of Mind* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 261-79.

⁴⁷ Wilkinson (1986), 31.

⁴⁸ See Schmid (1983), 233-4.

(6) The first acts by this violent group test the responses of the public and government as to the group's potential and freedom of action.

(7) The further development of the violent group is influenced by dynamics between the group and state reaction. Action deemed successful by the violence promoting group affirms their choice, but state prosecution isolates them in the underground.

(8) The violence promoting group is the focus for others to join them via the media.

(9) The life span of the violent group is determined by police effectiveness, and public resonance and support.

This provides a general idea of the processes involved, but does not address particulars. It addresses individuals only vaguely and does not explain how individuals become attached to groups, whose internal dynamics are also ignored. Instead the focus is on society and how it does not respond to the social movement, without any attention paid to the possibility that the group initiated the cycle. The 'psychological' component is obliquely addressed in individual biographies, while 'communication' is attended to in the idea of the group message, and with 'war' included as the government response.

The social psychological model addresses each of these particular concerns, individuals, groups, government response, and public and media reaction, as is shown in chapters four through seven. Each item is discussed generally and then with relevance to left-wing terrorism in the Federal Republic of Germany. Individual attention to these topics, as mentioned previously, is not enough, because of their symbiotic relationships. Therefore a concept that joins them together is also requisite.

3.3 The Concept of Identification

In an attempt to overcome some of these problems this thesis furthers the concept of 'identification', a term from social psychology that refers to the influence one person can exert on the behaviour of another person, group or society, or any combination thereof. Some people identify with victims of terrorism out of compassion (or the fact that they may have been victims too), while others identify with the terrorists because of the power they appear to have, or because they felt the victim was 'guilty'. Identification can be influenced by several factors with one or two key factors (class, race, nationality, or party) being the decisive ones for most people.⁴⁹

⁴⁹ *ibid.*, 195-6.

The concept of identification used here is an amalgam of theories about the source of personal and group identities, which concentrates upon the relationship between individuals, groups and society. Personal identities arise from an individual's perception of one's present self-image in relation to one's past self-image and development towards one's future self-image ideal, whereby progress towards a confident identity depends upon the continual synthesis of the past self into the present self and a path the individual's identities are determined by lifestyles, experience and the cultural and historical context.⁵⁰

The formation of individual's self-images is influenced by one's positive and negative interpretation of entities (individuals, groups, institutions), and how one resolves conflicts between the perceived 'good' found in negative role models and the 'bad' found in positive ones, whereby the determination of positive and negative entities is influenced by social relations.⁵¹ These social relationships maintain and modify individual identity, because individual identity is a continual process of reflection and adaptation to the perceived reception of oneself by others deemed significant by the person.⁵² Thus individual identity is a group identity, which is fought and strived for, and which expresses desires from which demands and actions follow.⁵³

The usefulness of identification in the study of terrorism arises out of the overlap of the focus of the two on the relationship between individuals, groups and society and how each of these influences one another. For example, within this thesis processes of identification which transfer a love of mankind to terrorism may be explained by problems with family, class or social group identifications. In West Germany in the late sixties and early seventies this could be particularly difficult because of the Nazi legacy resurfacing as former Nazis were rehabilitated and took up posts in government and society.

⁵⁰ Peter Weinreich, "Identity Exploration in Adolescence" *International Journal of Adolescent Medicine and Health* 1 (1/2) 1985, 51-71, 54-5; see also: Peter Weinreich, *Manual for Identity Exploration Using Personal Constructs* (Birmingham: SSPC Research Unit on Ethnic Relations, University of Aston, 1980).

⁵¹ Karmela Liebkind, *Minority Identity and Identification Processes: A Social Psychological Study* (Helsinki: The Finnish Society of Sciences and Letters, *Commentationes Scientiarum Socialium* no. 22, 1984), 50, 55-6.

⁵² Peter L. Berger, Thomas Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise on the Sociology of Knowledge* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Ltd., 1971), 194.

⁵³ Friedrich Hacker, *Terror: Mythos, Realitaet, Analyse* (Reinbek: Rowolht, 1975), 131; Erik H. Erikson, *Identity: Youth and Crisis* (London: Faber and Faber, 1968), 300-1.

The left-wing groups offered individuals the Third World as an alternative.⁵⁴ The protesters viewed the government as imperialists who endangered society and the Third World. In response the protesters chose to identify with the Third World revolutionary movements that offered them alternatives to the National Socialist past.

At societal level identification explains how terrorists use this concept to gain sympathy and new members from supporters, while also arousing fear in their target audiences.⁵⁵ These processes could be seen in the kidnapping of Schleyer in the seventies. The government was to be fearful of certain types of behaviour and action that would endanger people if they did not release the imprisoned terrorists. Particular government officials responsible for sentencing or apprehending terrorists, or high persons in the business world who have links with government and industry were to feel threatened that they might be the next victims. These identification messages showed terrorist supporters that the group was active and needed more members to further the struggle, while the public was to see (in the government's actions) that the terrorists were the ones who deserved and needed public support.

Terrorism, in the above context, is a communication tool used to manipulate target audiences with the threat and/or use of violence. The government, tries to counter these efforts without allowing change in the power (who governs and implements policy) and social structure (policy content and resource distribution). Each side struggles to discredit the other to receive and retain legitimacy with audiences,⁵⁶ through the use of labels to steer identification.

One implication of this labelling process for the state (and state terrorism) is public difficulty in positively identifying with bureaucracies they hold responsible for activities. Therefore, in state terrorism it is likelier that the victim and targets will gain the audiences' sympathy and support, rather than the regime or state.⁵⁷ The institutionalisation of social functions may also contribute to this as people lose their 'role-distance'. The bureaucrat has his regulations, and cannot do otherwise, or he may be seen to act out of resignation because he weighs the options and calculates the risks and benefits to national interest. Individual terrorists, on the other hand, are

⁵⁴ Schmid (1983), 199.

⁵⁵ *ibid.*, 200.

⁵⁶ Ronald D. Crelinsten, "Terrorism as Political Communication: The Relationship Between the Controller and the Controlled", in: Paul Wilkinson, Alasdair M. Stewart (eds.), *Contemporary Research on Terrorism* (Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press, 1987), 3-23, 7.

⁵⁷ Wardlaw, 7-8.

sometimes seen to act on emotion or psychosis. The situation and the structures are both determining factors.⁵⁸

In summary, Figure 1.1 (page 16) shows it is possible to construct a tentative diagram of identification and its levels of operation. Figure 1.1 shows why subjects identify with objects, be they terrorists, the general public, government supporters, or others. Where the subject is a terrorist, group or society (the social basis for sympathisers and the general public), then the matrix provides reasons for them to support the individuals, group or society. The matrix also explains why the 'average person in the street', or other category will identify with the terrorists' opponents.

All individuals, groups and societies that fill the boxes in the matrix are prone to idealisation which facilitates identification. 'Victim'(s) are polished when subjects perceive them as any individual or group of society which is the object of perjorative special treatment or attention. This may be murder, or ill treatment, as well as, in the case of society, a terrorist campaign which leaves the target individuals or groups with the feeling that they are in the same situation.

Figure 1.1 Identification

Subject	Object		
	Individual	Group	Society
Individual	with a person who may join with others and whom one follows	seek access to a group and stay with them	with an image, or against what one sees
Group	an example for others, a 'martyr'	with allies or a coalition	same as above
Society	with 'victim'	with 'victims' or group struggling for survival	with other society seen as similar, or 'victims'

All five terrorism participants: the perpetrators, the immediate victims, the wider target group (or society that is to be intimidated), the 'neutral' bystanders within society, and the international opinion that may be aware of the events⁵⁹ are thus affected by identification.

⁵⁸ H.C. Greisman, "Social Meanings of Terrorism: Reification, Violence, and Social Control" *Contemporary Crises* 1, (1977), 303-18, 303, 304, 308.

⁵⁹ Paul Wilkinson, "Foreword- -Terrorism: An International Research Agenda?", in: Paul Wilkinson, Alasdair M. Stewart (eds.), *Contemporary*

The terrorist perpetrators seem to be in a no-lose situation: identification with victims brings psychological humiliation, disorientation and intimidation- -a victory for the terrorists. Direct identification with the terrorists brings them new supporters. No 'neutral' bystanders can exist because of the polarisation of terrorist violence.⁶⁰ This applies equally to international opinion and other groups. The requirement is to understand why people identify with the reference group that they do, and what facilitates or causes a change in reaction from positive to negative.

Identification processes work at the three levels the thesis examines: individual, group and society. A person can join a group because they see themselves similar to others. The group can identify with other groups, and society can cause some people to disassociate themselves from it.

For these reasons it seems appropriate to attempt to use 'identification' as a linking concept to formulate the motivation of left-wing terrorism. While the thesis will not offer a theory of terrorism applicable to all terrorisms, a theory for West German left-wing terrorism can become a building block for other theories of terrorism, and perhaps lead to a new path that negates this apparent terrorist success with identification.

The thesis therefore examines left-wing terrorism in the Federal Republic of Germany and the applicability of identification as an overarching concept to this type of political terrorism. While the results of the case study influence the descriptive ability of the concept as a whole, they do not limit the power of the sub-concepts discussed with regards to individuals, groups, government, society and the media. Each of these also has relevance to the study of terrorism in highlighting different areas of the multifaceted phenomenon.

Before moving on to these theoretical discussions it is first necessary to found these discussions on the case study. This takes two forms. Chapter two relates an overview of the conditions in which left-wing terrorism in West Germany arose, how it developed and what groups were involved. Chapter three examines the extent of left-wing terrorism in the country and the particular areas of concerns to the terrorist groups with a discussion of the issues they have sought to raise with the public and the government.

Research on Terrorism (Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press, 1987), xi-xx, xi.

⁶⁰ Alex P. Schmid, "Terrorism and the Media: The Ethics of Publicity" *Terrorism and Political Violence* 1 (4) 1989, 539-565, 545.

CHAPTER TWO: LEFT-WING TERRORISM IN WEST GERMANY
THE HISTORY

we are worldwide, only not yet here. here we fight....¹

How should we ever find it out, if we do not first try? That the FRG is one of the last countries, in which a revolution is imaginable, means only that here every attack counts twice. Here is the brain of the monster, I think, the blows hurt him more here, than when something happens somewhere in the jungle on the other side of the world. You can already read that in what the pigs invest in searches for us...Do you think they would do that, if they were secure on the chairs they throne their fat arses on...?²

...here you defend the houses, your houses, our houses, off we go. then the bulls [pigs] come, banging on the shields, after two stones k. runs...
-and when you close the door behind you, stumbling in the dark hallway with the beams in front, then you're not in just any house, any old rubble; this house doesn't belong to the state any longer, it is a house outside of it.³

This chapter presents a historical analysis of the major events and developments in left-wing terrorism in West Germany as a basis for later analysis in the remainder of the thesis, and to highlight the sources of terrorist identifications in their activities. The chapter examines the sources of left-wing terrorism from the late sixties onwards, and the development of the Red Army Faction, the Second of June Movement, the Revolutionary Cells and **Autonomen**. This is done first for the sources of terrorism in the sixties, then the development of the terrorist groups in the seventies with a section about West German and Palestinian terrorist cooperation included. Discussion about terrorism in the eighties also includes 'Euroterrorism' developments, and the cooperation between the Red Army Faction and the East German security service. The details of individuals, group dynamics, government countermeasures, public and media reaction are discussed in later chapters.

1. Pre-Terrorism Developments

The structures of the left-wing terrorist groups in the Federal Republic of Germany arose out of the situations in which the groups were

¹ Geissler, 267. There is no capitalisation in this book.

² Boock (1988), 97.

³ Michael Wildenhain, *zum beispiel k.* (West Berlin: Rotbuch Verlag, 1983), 55. There is no capitalisation in this passage.

formed.⁴ Each group was a reflection of those it originally identified with as a social basis.

The remnants of the student movement in the late sixties and early seventies provided an original base for the Red Army Faction, while the Second of June Movement joined with the counter-culture closer to the workers.⁵ This was the result of the domination of early terrorist activity by two groups: those from mainly university and middle-class origins that recognised the need for targeted 'counterviolence' by a vanguard, and those from the lower classes.⁶

These bases in the student and protest movements of the sixties supplied the early basis for terrorist groups and provide clues why the terrorist groups felt their violence was necessary and indicate why public support did not materialise.

1.1 The Student Movement

When the student movement was at its peak in 1968/69 two-thirds of the seventeen to twenty-five year old students mistrusted the West German political party system. In July 1968 one-third of them sympathised with leftist groups. After the Warsaw Pact's march into Prague it was still 28% in December 1968. Demonstrators accounted for 36% of students in January/February 1968 and 53% in June/July 1968. Non-academic youths in the same age group taking part in demonstrations were only 5%.⁷

Similar movements were underway all around the world. Paris saw revolts in May 1968, the American student movement was only the latest of a string of events that began in the early sixties with the Free Speech movement in Berkeley, California. Japan was also undergoing similar events. Connections and identifications between these and the

⁴ Hans Josef Horchem, "Terrorismus in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1985" *Beitraege zur Konfliktforschung* 16 (1) 1986, 5-23, 7; see also Jo Groebel, Hubert Feger, "Analyse von Strukturen terroristischer Gruppierungen", in: Wanda von Baeyer-Katte, Dieter Claessens, Hubert Feger, Friedhelm Neidhardt (eds.), *Gruppenprozesse: Analysen zum Terrorismus* 3 (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1982), 393-432, 400.

⁵ Hans Josef Horchem, "Terrorism in Germany 1985", in: Paul Wilkinson, Alasdair M. Stewart (eds.), *Contemporary Research on Terrorism* (Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press, 1987), 141-168, 144; Peter Brueckner, "Politisch-psychologische Anmerkungen zur 'Roten Armee Fraktion'" *Soziologisches Jahrbuch* 43 (5) 1973, 73-100, 74.

⁶ Bernward Vesper, *Die Reise. Romanessay* (Reinbek: Rowohlt Verlag, 1983), 689.

⁷ Gerd Langguth, *Protestbewegung: Entwicklung- -Niedergang- -Renaissance. Die Neue Linke seit 1968* (Cologne: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1983), 17.

Third World liberation movements also existed. 'One, two, many Vietnams' was the slogan, and they all claimed to fight for justice and freedom.⁸

The immediate concern in West Germany, however, was local. The universities had been established in the aftermath of World War Two and not attended to since then as other priorities such as the Cold War, restoration of the country, and the economy called for more attention.⁹

A major problem with higher education in the sixties was overcrowding. In 1960 there were 291,000 students, in 1965 384,000 and in 1966 over 400,000. The government did not reform the university structures in 1966, but limited the number of students for some studies, and introduced time limits on the length of study.¹⁰

Apart from massive overcrowding which caused problems with lack of teaching facilities, there were also increasing student-staff ratios as staff were not increased. This was further encumbered by outdated elitist staff attitudes towards the students, whereby the Ordinarius professors were completely sovereign within their departments as to who was promoted, who received academic positions, and who was accepted for doctorates. Everyone was dependent upon the Ordinarius, who were beholden to no one. The staff were not ready for the general intellectual decline of the students, which presumably occurred with growing student numbers.¹¹

The students felt that in democratic states university consumers should have a say in their education, and demanded more democracy in university administration. The students objected to the bureaucratic reforms which they saw as a means of producing "functional elites and ideologically conformist experts."¹²

Few outside of the **Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands** (SPD, Social Democratic Party) sponsored student group, the **Sozialistischer**

⁸ Langguth, 19; Willibald Karl, "Students and the Youth Movement in Germany: Attempt at a Structural Comparison" *Journal of Contemporary History* 15 (1) 1970, 113-127, 113; Hans Martin Bock, *Geschichte des 'linken' Radikalismus in Deutschland: Ein Versuch* (Frankfurt a.M.: Edition Suhrkamp, 1976), 196; Hans Josef Horchem, "Fuenfzehn Jahre Terrorismus in der Bundesrepublik" *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* 31 January 1987, 3-15, 3; Fridrich Mager, Ulrich Spinnarke, *Was wollen die Studenten?* (Frankfurt a.M.: Fischer Bucherei, 1967), 30.

⁹ William David Graf, *The German Left Since 1945: Socialism and Social Democracy in the German Federal Republic*, (Cambridge: The Oleander Press, 1976), 260.

¹⁰ *ibid.*, 261; Uwe Schlicht, *Vom Burschenschafter bis zum Sponti: Studentische Opposition gestern und heute* (West Berlin: Colloquium Verlag, 1980), 69-70.

¹¹ Corrado (1983), 303-4.

¹² Schlicht, 91; Rob Burns, Wilfried van der Will, *Protest and Democracy in West Germany: Extra-Parliamentary Opposition and the Democratic Agenda* (London: The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1988), 104.

Deutscher Studentenbund (SDS, Socialist German Students),¹³ recognised these problems in the sixties. The SDS linked them with social values, and used it to justify its position that the universities could only be changed with society.

The students believed that, because the universities were part of society, they reflected society in the values they promoted. It was thus necessary to change the society whose values were reflected in the university. Furthermore, the student powerbase in the universities was the starting point for this change which would begin by the students joining with the workers, whose interests, the students theorised, overlapped with their own. The necessary ingredient, according to the students, was enlightenment of the students and workers.¹⁴

The connection between Western democracies and the Third World was obvious to the SDS and the left in the early sixties as they began discussions in 1960 on liberation movements, colonialism and anti-imperialism. Foremost in this discussion, which slowly spread into society, was the role of the West, and especially of the USA in Vietnam. The students called into question the simple East-West relationship which prevailed in the Cold War, that the USA and its allies were good, while the USSR and the Eastern Bloc were evil. The students saw the USA in Vietnam as a traitor to the democratic ideals it propounded, and guilty of war crimes and genocide. These ideas made the public uneasy, because suddenly all students were suspect: was the student a friend's son or daughter, or the person in the street?¹⁵

1.2 The Protest Movement

Whereas the student movement concerned a wide range of social issues, the protest movement was more single-issue orientated. The protest movement in the Federal Republic began with the anti-militaristic and pacifist movement against conscription and remilitarisation in the fifties, and the Easter Marches of the sixties against nuclear weapons, to end the late sixties in protest against the emergency laws in concert with the wider social critique of the student movement.

After World War Two and the founding of West Germany the pacifist-neutralists from the anti-militarist movement held the belief that peace

¹³ Unlike the Young Socialists, the SPD's youth group, the SDS was originally formed as an independent group of socialist students. Tilman Fichter, Siegward Loennendonker, *Kleine Geschichte des SDS* (West Berlin: Rotbuch Verlag, 1977), 14-5.

¹⁴ Graf, 260-2.

¹⁵ Burns, van der Will, 106; Schlicht, 59.

and its continuation should not be left to the politicians, but required extra-parliamentary pressure from below. This theme has flowed through all anti-militarist protest since then.¹⁶

The SPD's position on military and other issues changed in the late fifties as they effectively dropped any extra-parliamentary group and member, who did not support its own changes to a proper *Volkspartei* (people's party),¹⁷ which culminated in the new party programme adopted in 1959. The new programme allowed the SPD to open new doors and gain new members by overcoming religious, business and economic barriers. Beyond this the programme re-emphasized commitment to parliamentary democracy, distancing from communism, protection of individual freedoms, striving for social justice, solidarity with the powerless and the furthering of science and education.¹⁸

Those to the left of the new Social Democratic Party position had, apart from the illegal *Kommunistische Partei Deutschland* (KPD, Communist Party of Germany) which had been banned in 1956 and its cover organisations, no coherent organisation, and only a minimal consensus on programmes, leaders and mass basis.¹⁹ Therefore protest against SPD policy had to proceed in a general format outside of the party while opposition within the party occurred- -for a while- -within the SPD-affiliated Socialist German Students.

SDS opposition to SPD changes led to the SPD disowning the SDS in 1961. The SPD also disagreed with SDS collaboration with the *Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands* (SED, Socialist Unitary Party of Germany), the East German ruling communist party, the KPD and other socialist groups. The SPD was fearful these other groups would subvert the SDS, or allow the *Christliche Demokratische Union* (CDU, Christian Democratic Union) and its Bavarian sister party the *Christliche Soziale Union* (CSU, Christian Social Union) to label the SPD as communist sympathisers.²⁰

The SPD wanted to maintain its 'respectable' image and avoid any 'red' taint it might otherwise acquire, and when the 'right' faction in the SDS split away in May 1960 to form the *Sozialdemokratischer Hochschulbund* (Social Democratic Federation of Students), they were recognised by the SPD. Their position was reinforced in June when the SPD disassociated itself from the SDS by stopping its funding for them,

¹⁶ Burns, van der Will, 73.

¹⁷ *ibid.*, 90-91.

¹⁸ Susanne Miller, *Die SPD vor und nach Godesberg*, (Bonn-Bad Godesberg: Verlag Neue Gesellschaft, 1974), 37-38.

¹⁹ Graf, 224.

²⁰ *ibid.*, 258.

and in November the SPD added the incompatibility of SPD and SDS membership which left the SPD in a publicly securer position.²¹

Choosing the means of extra-parliamentary opposition necessitated a consensus on issues of concern. By 1962 the SDS was represented by 1000 persons at twenty-six universities and colleges. The issues they canvassed on then would be with them throughout the sixties and into the seventies: criticism of internal party organisation, the absence of alternative foreign and domestic policies, exposition on restoration of the pre-war hierarchy, and refutation of anti-communism and Cold War premises.²²

The overriding theme of SDS theory was revolutionary emancipation. As the group was in the minority, and as some argued, in isolation from the masses, they were limited to creating the conditions for the revolutionary situation. This was to be done through enlightenment about the current system's power and privilege, injustices, and transformation of this knowledge into a desire for change. The SDS hoped to revolutionise the public by means of provocation, sit-ins, and confrontation. The old themes of anarchism, direct action and spontaneity also returned²³ with the increased extra-parliamentary activity and self-organisation in the university cities. To achieve these SDS goals a double-strategy was formulated on the assumption that the liberal constitution of the FRG must be actively defended, because it expounds liberal rights on the road to socialism, to which it must also be actively extended.²⁴

The SDS, however, was not the only left of SPD group in the sixties. Five opposition forms developed. First, the old left Socialist League, was a forum to air socialist theory and ideas, and to critique SPD praxis outside of the SPD party. Second, the old left Union of Independent Socialists, was an undogmatic nucleus organisation to serve as the forerunner of a future party by developing theory, programme and tactics, while waiting for the conditions for socialist transition. Third, the German Peace Union and Easter March movement, was a broad-based minimal consensus organisation and platform that would use any and all available opposition groups to gain a share of power to achieve some parliamentary representation to air vital views. Fourth, the New Left around the SDS, developed anti-authoritarian and anti-capitalist theory, programme and tactics while forcing the conditions through public

²¹ *ibid.*, 230; Burns, van der Will, 103.

²² Graf, 233.

²³ *ibid.*, 278; Bock, 253, mentioned their spreading via pirate pressings of anarchist classics.

²⁴ Graf, 259-260.

awareness. Fifth, the idea to form a conspirative, closely knit party which would draw its ideology and tactics from outside the party organisation developed in the late sixties and early seventies into the terrorist organisations, which were unpopular and illegal.²⁵ Together the five strands, with the fifth coming from the breakup of the fourth in later years, contributed their support to the umbrella protest organisation of the *Ausserparlamentarische Opposition* (APO, Extra-parliamentary Opposition).

The APO was a new occurrence in the FRG as evidenced by its structure, function and methods. Whereas earlier extra-parliamentary activity was independent of other groups, or in addition to other organisations, the APO was an independent structure with internal exchanges within the organisation.²⁶

The APO's self-organisation forms and its tactics (provocative protest, 'go-ins', and 'sit-ins') had not previously been used by other institutions and parties. The self-organising format meant the APO was a collective learning process, independent of the established institutions, against which it organised on behalf of the organising persons and groups instead of as extensions of official party-politics as in the past.²⁷

The goal of the APO was grassroots mobilisation of the public through information exercises to exemplify and politicise the autonomous and solidarity ability of the affected groups. This was based upon unlimited openness of discussion and decision processes, and the belief that through self-participation they could change socialisation processes and unwind authoritarian mentality.²⁸

The growth of the APO was aided by the formation of the Grand Coalition between the SPD and the CDU/CSU in December 1966 as the SPD's desire to leave the opposition and join the government resulted in their proof to the public and their supporters that they could administer the government as a viable alternative to the Christian democratic parties. The SPD also acted in the belief that more could be achieved by working with partners on the inside, than from outside of an administration.²⁹

²⁵ *ibid.*, 236-237, 277.

²⁶ Karl A. Otto, *Vom Ostermarsch zur APO: Geschichte der ausserparlamentarischen Opposition in der Bundesrepublik 1960-70*, (Frankfurt a.M.: Campus Verlag, 1977), 23-4.

²⁷ *ibid.*, 24

²⁸ *ibid.*, 24-25.

²⁹ Wilfried Roehrich, *Die verspaetete Demokratie: Zur politischen Kultur der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, (Cologne: Eugen Diederichs Verlag, 1985), 192.

Outside of the Grand Coalition many now saw the Social Democrats as equivalent to the Christian Democratic parties and lost their belief in political change through parliamentary reforms. This led to a search for new political opposition forms.³⁰

The founding of the Grand Coalition had far reaching implications. First, it coincided with the end of the economic boom and prosperity as recession arrived, and therefore a loss of perspective and direction for the CDU/CSU government. It also became apparent that long overdue reforms were needed in education, social welfare, social planning and redistribution of social goods. Third, a relaxation in the Cold War affected CDU/CSU ideology. Coupled with this was the viewpoint of the left that the upper-classes and their parties were reverting to authoritarian measures in the form of the emergency law legislation, (discussed further below) censorship, and 'criminalisation' of non-conformist political groups. Lastly, there was a sense of disillusion with politics and apparently monolithic political parties.³¹

There were fears that the Grand Coalition would lead to the end of democratic conflict in the creation of an organised society.³² This did not occur. Instead the inner-SPD opposition about participation in a government headed by a former Nazi, Kurt Georg Kiesinger, and the APO protest movement developments, led to a turn in the development of the FRG. The SPD was presented with criticism and political alternatives from inside and outside of the party.³³

The anti-authoritarian student movement eroded the APO in their common work against the emergency laws. The trade union element shrank as the student presence grew due to the students' ideas of 'cultural revolution'. While the students brought great expectations to their work with the workers and unions, the latter did not share the students' enthusiasm for 'revolution', and the students remained isolated. It explains, to some extent, the movement's abrupt end after the passing of the emergency laws in 1968.³⁴

Part of this was also due to a clash between the New and Old Left over the New Left's strategy of 'liberated areas' within which 'dual power' bases could be created in institutions by the introduction of direct democracy as an alternative to parliament and as a modification thereof. The requirement for these changes, according to the New Left,

³⁰ Langguth, 20; Graf, 275.

³¹ *ibid.*, 275.

³² Burns, van der Will, 106.

³³ Horst Heinemann, *Theoriediskussion in der SPD: Ergebnisse und Perspektiven*, (Frankfurt a.M.: Europaeische Verlagsanstalt, 1975), 26-27.

³⁴ Burns, van der Will, 112; Bock, 230.

was that 'late capitalism' needed to be revealed to the public by provoking the system of 'latent fascism' to become 'manifest fascism'.³⁵ Once things became worse, the people would see the need to work to reform them.

'Latent fascism' was believed evidenced in the proposed emergency laws designed to implement internal controls in the event of domestic 'emergency' situations, which were drafted in 1958. These constitutional amendments required a two-thirds majority in the **Bundestag** (lower house of parliament), thus requiring SPD support to pass them. The SPD opposed the amendments in principle until the early sixties, when it formulated seven additional points to prevent excessive abuse of the emergency powers.³⁶ A Grand Coalition thus presented an opportunity to pass the legislation.

These general developments did not lead directly to terrorism, but specific incidents aggravated some underlying concerns. The first of these specific incidents was the Shah of Persia's visit to West Germany in June 1967. The shooting of Benno Ohnesorg by policeman Karl-Heinz Kurras at an anti-Shah of Persia demonstration in West Berlin on 2 June 1967 brought the anti-emergency law campaign into closer alignment with the student movement and their call for the expropriation of the Springer owned press, which they held responsible for his death. This also made the question of violence, already discussed in the movement and in the APO, a standard element of discussion.³⁷

In September 1967 Rudi Dutschke and Hans-Juergen Krahl of the Frankfurt SDS presented a joint paper in favour of urban guerillas operating against the executive power of the state to enlighten and mobilise the masses. Later these ideas bore fruit in the terrorist organisations, but in Hanover the idea of provoking 'fascist' reaction with calculated violence brought out the label of 'leftist fascism'.³⁸

In the meantime, the anti-authoritarian sentiment against the Springer press led to the expropriate-Springer campaign in the fall and winter of 1967/68, with seminars and public education programmes in many university cities. The campaign message was to fight for freedom of opinion, which was unavailable with Springer's monopoly of publishing

³⁵ Burns, van der Will, 112; Otto, 174; Bock, 245-6.

³⁶ Graf, 250.

³⁷ Burns, van der Will, 99, 110-111.

³⁸ Rudi Dutschke, "Das Sich-Verwiegen erfordert Guerilla-Mentalitaet", in: Rudi Dutschke, *Geschichte ist machbar: Texte ueber des herrschende Falsche und die Radikalitaet des Friedens* (West Berlin: Verlag Klaus Wagenbach, 1980), 89-95; Burns, van der Will, 111; Fichter, Loennendonker, 107-9.

power. The campaign was most intense in Berlin where Springer controlled seventy percent of the daily press.³⁹

Between late 1966 and mid-1968 the other major item of discussion was the issue of the West and the Third World as represented in Vietnam. There had been one anti-Vietnam demonstration of 2000 persons in February 1966 in West Berlin, and a Vietnam congress in February 1968 with German, French and Italian participation brought out 12,000 demonstrators for a march.⁴⁰

These demonstrations unnerved the public and local government, who mostly concurred with government support for American involvement in Vietnam. The public saw Vietcong and red flags, Rosa Luxemborg and Che Guevara photos as the same red flags of the enemy they were trying to keep out of West Berlin. The fact that the march went near the American forces living quarters was also considered provocative.⁴¹

The general public of the previous generation had matured in the fifties and early sixties when there was a democratic deficit in the attitudes of many of the younger generation of the time. As a result of the lack of a democratic tradition, because of its interruption by the Third Reich, this democratic deficit could be recognized by the depoliticisation of much of West German life, which resulted in their lower expectations of what democracy could offer. All of this was tempered with a strong anti-communist ideology, which was believed to be (a) the first line of defence for the new democracy, (b) a sign of positive political perspective, and (c) a convincing justification of the new democracy. It became instead a sort of 'substitute ideology'.⁴²

Therefore the counter-demonstration to show West Berlin's true orientation in support of the USA, involving right of centre student groups, trade unions and the political parties, brought out 68,000-80,000 participants. The demonstrators carried banners proclaiming: 'better dead than red', 'no money for long-haired apes', 'Dutschke - public enemy No. 1'. The forty attacks on long-haired, rimless glassed persons showed the demonstrations' 'pogrom atmosphere' which raised public emotions.⁴³

³⁹ Otto, 162-163; Heinz Schaefer, "Die BILD-Zeitung eine Ordnungsmacht im Spaetkapitalismus," in: Heinz Grossmann, Oskar Negt (eds.), *Die Auferstehung der Gewalt: Springerblockade und politische Reaktion in der Bundesrepublik* (Frankfurt a.M.: Europaeische Verlagsanstalt, 1968), 19-29, 19.

⁴⁰ Schlicht, 68-69.

⁴¹ *ibid.*

⁴² Langguth, 19-20.

⁴³ Schlicht, 69.

In this kind of atmosphere an assassination was attempted on Rudi Dutschke, a leading public figure identifiable with the APO and student movements on 11 April 1968 when he was shot by Josef Bachmann. On 3/4 April Andreas Baader, Gudrun Ensslin, and two others had firebombed two Frankfurt department stores, and on 4 April Martin Luther King Jr. was assassinated, which was reported widely around the world. These all raised the question of violence.⁴⁴

Shortly after the attack on Dutschke, 2000 persons, mainly students, gathered at the Technical University of Berlin, and later moved against the Springer press buildings as they decided Springer was responsible, and that by spontaneously blockading the building they would communicate to the public the connections between the Springer press and the attack on Dutschke. Several days later at the Easter March the SDS had 45,000 persons demonstrating against the Springer press in twenty cities. The city and nation were polarised on the issue between the young and old.⁴⁵

These were, in theory, the types of actions and situations, the emergency laws were designed to handle, and therefore perhaps added to its passing in the Bundestag. This was the first time the police were mobilised nationwide in response to internal developments, and not on a training exercise.⁴⁶

This and other factors also contributed to the end of the Easter March: (1) the Emergency Laws were passed in June 1968 by the Bundestag, which meant that the APO, mainly a protest movement mobilised against these laws, had to concede defeat despite having mobilised nearly all social strata on the issue; (2) the invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 by the Warsaw Pact countries caused bitter controversy within the organisation when the communists refused to endorse any form of condemnation; (3) the advent of Ostpolitik and detente' meant some felt the organisation was no longer necessary; (4) the minimal consensus was also gone. Ideological divisions were opened every time the question of

⁴⁴ Ulrich Chaussy, *Die drei Leben des Rudi Dutschke. Eine Biographie* (Frankfurt a.M.: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 1985), 195; Dieter Claessens, Karin de Ahna, "Das Milieu der Westberliner 'scene' und die 'Bewegung 2. Juni'", in: Wanda von Baeyer-Katte, Dieter Claesens, Hubert Feger, Friedhelm Neidhardt (eds.), *Gruppenprozesse: Analysen von Terrorismus 3* (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1982), 19-181, 86.

⁴⁵ Otto, 172; Schlicht, 72-73.

⁴⁶ Eckart Dietrich, "Notstandsuebung", in: Heinz Grossmann, Oskar Negt (eds.), *Die Auferstehung der Gewalt: Springerblockade und politische Reaktion in der Bundesrepublik*, (Frankfurt a.M.: Europaeische Verlagsanstalt, 1968), 42-75, 72.

methods of protest were discussed, and violence could not be prevented by group members.⁴⁷

The actions of the anti-authoritarian movement and the APO became more intense in the run-up to the final readings of the emergency laws in May and June 1968. The APO brought larger and larger numbers on to the streets for these demonstrations: 50,000 in Bonn, 30,000-40,000 and 60,000 in West Berlin. They felt they were a power that would force the government to contend with them. The events in May in Paris, and the Prague spring only intensified these false feelings. University buildings may have been occupied by students on twenty-five university campuses, and renamed after revolutionary heroes, but to no avail, the laws were passed.⁴⁸

The passing of the emergency laws brought resignation and a loss of direction as the trade unions and others withdrew from the APO. The non-communists withdrew from national into local and regional projects. The integrating power that was there before was lost in the coming years of 1969 and 1970.⁴⁹

This is why there is no clear direct line between left-wing West German terrorism and the protest groups of the left, despite what conservatives and others have stated. Before 1969, when the Social Democratic Party took power with the Free Democratic Party, some people went into the SPD, others into communist groups, and others became anti-communist publicists, while even fewer became terrorists. The main link is the symbolism of the 'spirit of 68'.⁵⁰

Sectarianism occurred as the New Left groups fell apart into diverse tendencies, which now campaigned separately. The unpredictability and the creativeness of the sixties was replaced with dogmatism and loyalty to the cadre organisation in pursuit of the 'correct party line'. A large number (over 100,000 members in the mid-seventies, which represents roughly 25% of the student population) of student communist parties sprang-up with the theory that the working-class could be reconstituted as a political agent and that class-warfare was to be seen both nationally and internationally.⁵¹

A reaction against this dogmatism were the *sponti* groups that followed subjective views of problems with spontaneous (hence the name) responses. The *spontis* did not follow the false ideals of the late sixties: Vietnam, Cambodia, and Cuba were not attractive, and in this

⁴⁷ Burns, van der Will, 96, 98.

⁴⁸ Schlicht, 72-75.

⁴⁹ Otto, 175-7.

⁵⁰ Pridham, 18.

⁵¹ Burns, van der Will, 115-116.

vacuum some *spontis* formed land communes, and Mescalero city indians city communes. The *spontis* sought a path between accommodation with capitalist society and the will to change things for all, while trying to avoid a loss of their perspective.⁵² They were the *Autonomen* forerunners.

2. Terrorism in the Seventies

The above discussion set the context for the following one of left-wing terrorist group development in the Federal Republic of Germany. The pre-terrorist developments brought forth the idea of provoking reactions by the government to bring 'latent fascism' to 'manifest fascism', and established the connections between Third World development and the actions of the West with the idea of demonstrations at home to affect changes in the Third World. Lastly, with the end of the APO as the last alternative to leftist opposition, there was a loss of direction in the far left.

2.1 Red Army Faction

This first section on the *Rote Armee Fraktion* (RAF, Red Army Faction) concentrates on three distinct phases of the group's development between 1968 and late 1974. Much of the detail of who, what, when and where is available elsewhere⁵³ and is not discussed here. This chapter outlines group structure, organisation, and to some extent, who was involved in the original discussions about group formation.

The first phase, the RAF's incarnation, begins with the department store bombings in April 1968 and ends with the freeing of Andreas Baader in May 1970. The second phase continued on to the arrest of most of the group members in June 1972, was the logistical organisation of the group as it acquired the requisite means to conduct a short bombing campaign. The last phase continued on until RAF member Holger Meins' death in November 1974, and represented the organised armed struggle from the prison cells via the torture committees and lawyers. Each of these three

⁵² Schlicht, 133-136; Guenter Amendt, "Vater und Erben," in: Frank Deppe (ed.), *2. Juni 1967 und die Studentenbewegung heute* (Dortmund: Weltkreis Verlag, 1977), 19-32, 29.

⁵³ Aust (1987); Becker; Mario Krebs, *Ulrike Meinhof: Ein Leben im Widerspruch* (Reinbek: Rowohlt, 1988); Sebastian Scheerer, "Deutschland: Die ausgebuergerte Linke", in: n.n., *Angriff auf das Herz des Staates: Soziale Entwicklung und Terrorismus Band I* (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1988), 193-429; n.n., *Der Baader-Meinhof-Report: Dokumente - Analysen - Zusammenhaenge* (Mainz: Hase und Koehler Verlag, 1972); Reinhard Rauball (ed.), *Die Baader-Meinhof Gruppe* (West Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1972).

phases required different group organisation and structures that forced different operational methods.

2.11 First Phase, 1968-1970

The founder members of the Baader-Meinhof-Group, which called itself the Red Army Faction, came together around the 3 April 1968 firebombings of several Frankfurt department stores, and during the trial of those participants, which ended in a prison sentence on 31 October 1968. Andreas Baader, Gudrun Ensslin, Thorwald Proll and Horst Sohnlein instigated the arson, while Horst Mahler and Otto Schily were defence lawyers, and Ulrike Meinhof was an observing reporter. The idea for the department store bombing probably came from a court case in West Berlin which ended on 22 March 1968, with the acquittal of *Kommune I* members (see Second June section) accused of inciting people to arson. Baader, Ensslin and Proll had met the accused that week and left saying they were off to play with fire in department stores.⁵⁴

Court appeals allowed the prisoners' release on 13 June 1969 and Baader and Ensslin began rehabilitation work with juvenile offenders. When the hoped for amnesty and revision of their prison sentences did not occur, they did not return to prison as ordered by the courts on 12 November 1969, and went underground abroad before later returning to Berlin. After Baader's arrest on 4 April 1970 in West Berlin the group felt they had to free him, which was done on 14 May 1970, the date when many feel the group came into existence.⁵⁵

The name of the group was reportedly in honour of the Japanese Red Army, the left-wing terrorist group from Japan. The name also suggests that the group belongs to some larger organisation, i.e. an international Marxist-Leninist one, with them as the army thereof. It is, in fact, neither part of a Marxist-Leninist group, nor is it the army of another group. The 'RAF' abbreviation also recalls the British Royal Air Force, which along with the group's identification with the Red Army, is an explicit identification with the major aggressors against the Third Reich and their parents' generation. Like the Allies in World War Two, the original Red Army Faction also wanted to crush German fascism.⁵⁶

⁵⁴ Aust (1987), 49.

⁵⁵ *ibid.*, 71-3, 84-5; Kahl, 40-2. Almost a year later the group first uses the Red Army Faction name in the 26 April 1971 issue of *Der Spiegel*.

⁵⁶ Rauball, 30; B.H. Miller (1987), 379; Risto Fried in: Alexander, Katwan (eds.) (1980), 237.

2.12 Second Phase, 1970-1972

The operational phase of the original Baader-Meinhof group was characterised by logistical and operational requirements in preparation for a bombing campaign in May 1972 shortly before the arrest of most members in June 1972.

After the group returned from the Middle East, where they received military training in an Al Fatah camp in Jordan between June and August 1970, they solved their most urgent requirements, arms and money, with armed bank robberies in West Berlin. Later some of the group went to West Germany to organise safe-houses, and other false identity requirements, such as blank passports, and similar requirements for vehicle registrations.⁵⁷

New recruits to replace arrested and dead members, as well as to swell the ranks of the group, were sought through pamphlets about the group and its goals,⁵⁸ and by forging links and contacts with other revolutionary minded groups. For example, the RAF provided money and safe-houses to help support the Second of June in the early days of its formation in 1971, and the Revolutionary Cells and the B2J shared safe-houses several years later. Some people also moved about between groups because they preferred one group over another. Other times the group leaders of the RAF, the B2J and the RZ would all meet with others.⁵⁹

Belief in the *Stadtguerilla* (urban guerilla) ability to reproduce themselves by their 'actions' of robbery, bombings and other activities which attract followers⁶⁰ in order to gain mass mobilisation, was common to the various terrorist groups in a form not unlike that espoused earlier by Dutschke. However, ideological and operational differences prevented the emergence of one terrorist organisation.

⁵⁷ Aust (1987), 89, 96, 113-5; Kahl, 127-8.

⁵⁸ The early RAF papers were these: **April 1971:** "Das Konzept Stadtguerilla", in: *texte: der RAF* (West Berlin: pirate pressing/Raubdruck, Uebersetzte und aktualisierte Ausgabe, 1983), 337-367. **October 1971:** *Ueber den bewaffneten Kampf in Westeuropa* (West Berlin: Klaus Wagenbach Verlag, 1971). **April 1972:** "Dem Volk dienen - Rote Armee Fraktion: Stadtguerilla und Klassenkampf", in: *texte: der RAF* (1983), 368-410. **November 1972:** "Die Aktion des Scharzen September in Muenchen", in: *texte: der RAF* (1983), 414-447. A full discussion of the ideology presented in these RAF (and also RZ) publications is found in Fetscher, Rohmoser (eds.) (1981).

⁵⁹ Hans Josef Horchem, "Die Innere Sicherheit der Bundesrepublik" *Beitraege zur Konfliktforschung* 6 (4) 1976, 45-62, 51; Claasens, de Ahna, 144; H.J. Klein (1979), 18, 41-2, 168-172, 206, says that he and Wilfried Boese were turned off by the RAF because they pressurised people, so they went to the RZ.

⁶⁰ Alex Schubert, "Die Stadtguerilla als revolutionaere Kampfform", in: Alex Schubert (ed.), *Stadtguerilla: Tupamaros in Uruguay - Rote Armee Fraktion in der Bundesrepublik* (West Berlin: Verlag Klaus Wagenbach, 1971), 7-26, 18.

The main theme running through the early RAF theoretical papers was the necessity to begin the revolution immediately, because if one waits for the optimum revolutionary conditions to appear it will be too late. They also add that you will wait forever, because these conditions can only arise out of the revolutionary struggle. Furthermore, it is now the responsibility of the vanguard group to set the example of showing state vulnerability to the masses by undertaking the armed struggle against the repressive state.⁶¹

The armed struggle, however, had to move beyond logistical operations to an offensive campaign. For the Red Army Faction this was a bombing campaign in May 1972, which had two aims. One was to end West German support for American involvement in Vietnam, and thus contribute to helping Third World revolutions through activity in the West. Another aim was to also avenge fallen and imprisoned comrades (see chapter three).

Baader and others envisaged a group that was linked into a world-wide framework of groups that worked towards the revolution. He saw an illegal group that could form armed commandoes (the underground hard-core) that was supplied by a large nation-wide network of safe-houses run by legal sympathisers, and which was anchored in legal political organisations. The arrest and imprisonment of members in June 1972 provided an ideal group for public focus, and this led to the setting up of the prisoner aid groups.⁶²

2.13 Third Phase, 1972-1974

This phase concentrated on the organised struggle from the prison cells as evidenced by increased Red Army Faction influence on the prisoner support groups; the organised information network between the prisoners, their lawyers and free terrorists; as well as the beginning of the hunger strike campaigns. The arrest of the majority of members in June 1972, including Baader, Ensslin, Meinhof and Raspe, pushed the concept of the organised armed struggle from the prison cells to the fore of group activities. The imprisoned leaders wanted to ensure their control of the group.

⁶¹ Red Army Faction, "Das Konzept Stadtguerilla" (1983), 356; Kollektiv RAF (1971), 43; Red Army Faction, "Das Konzept Stadtguerilla" (1983), 350-1; (1971), 13, 32-3, 57, 64; "Dem Volk Dienen: Stadtguerilla und Klassenkampf" (1983), 400-2.

⁶² Andreas Baader (assumed), "Dokumente 12" in: Bundesministerium des Innern (ed.), *Dokumentation ueber Aktivitaeten anarchistischer Gewalttaeter in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (Bonn: BMI, 1974), 65-71, 70-1; also in Alfred Klaus, *Aktivitaeten und Verhalten inhaftierter Terroristen* (Bonn: Bundesministerium des Innern, 1983), 44-5.

The first of the follow-on groups to rebuild the RAF was so nervous and careless that it was arrested virtually en masse on 4 February 1974. This encouraged others to be more careful and was always remembered by them.⁶³ Such a security service success has not been repeated.

Some of the new RAF recruits came from the **Sozialistisches Patientenkollektiv** (Socialist Patients' Collective) after some collective members were arrested between 24 and 26 June 1971. Twenty-one of the twenty-two member 'inner circle' eventually found their way to the RAF. They were the main source of the so-called 'second generation' of West German terrorists. They worked through the offices of RAF lawyers and organised committees to publicise the terrorists' situation. The terrorists' hunger and thirst strikes against 'Isolation Torture' and the deaths of prisoners all kept the justice system off balance between 1972 and 1977. That the prisoners appeared to be 'victims' provided motivation for new members who sought to free imprisoned ones.⁶⁴

At first the RAF tried to use whatever organisations were already at hand after its members were arrested. Rote Hilfe (Red Aid) was begun in 1968 in West-Berlin to help imprisoned leftists materially, ideologically, and with legal aid, and had since spread to other cities. The RAF used Red Aid to pressure the justice system because of previous RAF member contacts with the group. This lasted until 1975 when some of its militant members joined the Revolutionary Cells.⁶⁵

The Red Army Faction also exploited the **Informationszentrum Rote Volksuniversitaet** (IZRU, Information Centre Red Peoples' University) connected with the Socialist Patients' Collective, which increased its denunciations of the FRG 'justice system as a part of the new fascism' in their literature in autumn 1972, and their coverage of the 'torture' of RAF prisoners in 1973. This connection led active SPK members later

⁶³ "Der EM-Kode wurde geknackt" *Der Spiegel* 7 (11 February) 1974, 29-34; Volker Speitel, "Wir wollten alles und gleichzeitig nichts" *Der Spiegel* 31/1980, 36-49, 44.

⁶⁴ Aust (1987), 147-151; Becker, 262; Informationszentrum Rote Volksuniversitaet (IZRU), *Aus der Krankheit eine Waffe machen. Eine Agitationsschrift*, (Munich: Trikont-Verlag, 1972), 29; Wanda von Baeyer-Katte, "Das Sozialistische Patientenkollektiv in Heidelberg (SPK)" in: Wanda von Baeyer-Katte, Dieter Claessens, Hubert Feger, Friedhelm Neidhardt (eds.), *Gruppenprozesse: Analysen zum Terrorismus* 3 (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1982), 183-316, 263; Jochen Reiche, "Zur Kritik der RAF", in: Barbara Herzbruch, Klaus Wagenbach (eds.), *Jahrbuch Politik* 8 (West Berlin: Verlag Klaus Wagenbach, 1978), 16-23, 22.

⁶⁵ Klaus, 62-4.

to turn to the 'Committees against Torture' as they sought greater assistance for the 'political prisoners'.⁶⁶

The lynchpins of this activity were the RAF defence lawyers, who had been co-opted into the structure, or who willingly helped. They were central to the group's structure because their offices functioned as the heart of an information system designed in March 1973 to keep the imprisoned and free RAF members in mutual contact, to maintain the RAF as an organisation, and to maintain the political identity of the members in collective politicisation. The importance of the information system and archive can be measured in the rise of material transfers from over fifty letters and information packets between March and July 1973 between the prisoners, the committees and the other lawyers' offices, to 9000 pages of materials by the end of 1974.⁶⁷

In April 1973 other operations were underway to supplant the Red Aid and IZRU propaganda efforts with the RAF's own organisations established to propagandise the prisoners' position in the aid of the struggle. Twenty RAF defence lawyers decided that judicial means were inadequate to end the 'torture' in prisons, and regional *Komitees gegen Isolationsfolter in Gefaengnissen der BRD* (Committees against Isolation-Torture in Prisons of the FRG) were organised that month.⁶⁸

While the roughly 450 member committees were single-issue in orientation (to aid the prisoners and their struggle for freedom), the RAF wanted to involve more than just leftists in the anti-torture campaigns. The committees sought to construct a wide anti-fascist campaign over and above the anti-torture campaign with activities covering everything from handbills, money collections and petitions on one level; to demonstrations, educational seminars and gatherings with RAF lawyers and medical experts on another; all covered by national and international press conferences and documentation pieces on the 'torture' and other 'deadly measures' which they alleged transpired in West German prisons.⁶⁹

The brief of the committees was widened in September 1974, before the third RAF prisoners' hunger strike, to cover solidarity with revolutionaries of the anti-imperialist struggle and with militant

⁶⁶ *ibid.*, 65-6; Baptist Ralf Friedrich, "'Ich bitte um Vergebung'" *Der Spiegel* 34 (20 August) 1990, 52-62, 52.

⁶⁷ Klaus, 16-7; Walter Altmann, (ed.), *Gegen den Terror: Texte/Dokumente* (Stuttgart: Verlag Bonn Aktuell, 1978), 84-5; Pieter Bakker Schut (ed.), *das info: briefe von gefangenen aus der raf aus der discussion 1973-1977* (Kiel: Neuer Malik Verlag, 1987), 5; Horst Herold, "Taktische Wandlungen des Deutschen Terrorismus" *Die Polizei* 67 (12) 1976, 401-5, 403.

⁶⁸ Klaus, 67-70, 77.

⁶⁹ *ibid.*, 80-4.

attacks against imperialist counter-strategy. Part of this was due to the RAF pushing committee members also to conduct illegal activity as a means of pushing them into the "drift to the underground", which was facilitated through work in lawyers offices and contacts with the underground established by the lawyers.⁷⁰

At the international level the RAF prisoners also sought to supplant Amnesty International with an international Red Aid type of organisation to serve as the legal umbrella for the diverse guerilla groups of the world to support their imprisoned members, and to form the base the RAF lacked in the FRG to guarantee safe havens for released prisoners and members of the underground wanted by the authorities. The RAF defence lawyers only found weak international support for the International Committees for the Defence of Political Prisoners in Europe, founded in Paris on 20 January 1975, which only focused on prisoners in capitalist Europe. The 'Sektion-BRD' of the International Committees was housed in Stuttgart until the end of 1977, and functioned as a propaganda and agitation centre for RAF members with national and international responsibilities. The breadth and effectiveness of this propaganda could be measured by the disturbances around Europe after the Stammheim deaths in 1977.⁷¹

The relatives of imprisoned RAF members were also included in the group's legal activities. They were organised alongside the Committees to provide similar activities as well as spontaneous emotional reports of the prisoners' conditions, and hand in complaints to prison officials and politicians, as they sought to influence the prison conditions.⁷²

Recruitment was boosted after the death of Holger Meins in the RAF's third hunger strike (13 September 1974 to 5 February 1975) on 9 November 1974. Meins' death publicised the terrorists' cause and situation more effectively than any other previous activity. Militants felt a need to act immediately to help imprisoned members, because, in their eyes, Meins had been murdered, and others could also die if they did not assist them.⁷³ Immediately after Meins' death the Second of June attempted the abduction of Judge Guenther von Drenkmann, the president of West Berlin's highest court, on 10 November. They failed and he died in the attempt.⁷⁴

⁷⁰ *ibid.*, 84; V. Speitel, *Der Spiegel* 31/1980, 41.

⁷¹ Klaus, 87-94; Volker Speitel, "Wir wollten alles und gleichzeitig nichts" (Part 2 of 3) *Der Spiegel* 32/1980, 30-6, 32.

⁷² Klaus, 106-7.

⁷³ H.J.Klein (1979), 195; V. Speitel, *Der Spiegel* 31/1980, 41.

⁷⁴ Aust (1987), 266-7.

2.2 Second of June Movement

Although the RAF is certainly better known than the Second of June, the latter, in its earlier formations, was the first terrorist group in West Germany. The Second of June Movement was a loose group of people in West Berlin in the late sixties, who came together in the counter-cultures that formed around the student and protest movement. Some of the members had come from 'Subversive Aktion' (Subversive Action), the West German affiliate of the 'Situationists' who sought to transform society through the freedom of creative subjectivity in the revolution of everyday life.⁷⁵

Subversive Action spread their message with posted handbills in 1964-5 in Munich, Berlin, Stuttgart and Hamburg, and as individual members, joined the Sozialistischer Deutscher Studentenbund. This was an indication of the politicisation of Subversive Action's original cultural criticism.⁷⁶

One Subversive Action member, Rudi Dutschke, became a leading person in the SDS, while another, Dieter Kunzelmann, joined others to found another famous group of the late sixties, *Kommune I* (Commune One), a collective of persons who believed that political and private lives should not be separated, but continuous. The commune lifestyle was to become an example of how to break out of individual isolation, and family and pairing relationships. *Kommune I* (and later *Kommune II*), as opposed to *Wohngemeinschaften* (house or flat-sharing communities), were active groups of persons, while the others were living communities without separate political and private lives. Furthermore, when *Kommune I* was founded in late 1966, it was an exercise to show the practical possibilities of joining the 'struggles in the metropolises' with the publicising of 'liberation movements in the Third World'. *Kommune I*'s example was followed in other university cities with less notoriety than the original, which was excluded from the SDS in May 1967 after it imperiled the SDS' reputation with its 'polit-clown' activities.⁷⁷

The group achieved notoriety in April 1967 when members were arrested for an alleged bomb plot against visiting US vice-president Hubert H. Humphrey. The 'bombs' were discovered to be made of pudding and yoghurt. On 24 May 1967 the group distributed handbills that again brought them to public and judicial attention for saying bombs should bring the 'Vietnam experience' to West Berlin. They were acquitted in

⁷⁵ Claessens, de Ahna, 90.

⁷⁶ Bock, 209.

⁷⁷ Fichter, Loennendonker, 102-3; Burns, van der Will, 109; Bock, 258-259.

March 1968 shortly before Baader and Ensslin firebombed Frankfurt department stores.⁷⁸

By the time of the attempt on Dutschke in April 1968, there was also the Wieland Commune of ten to twenty people who lived off the proceeds from pirate pressings and shoplifting. Some of these members- - Michael 'Bommi' Baumann, George von Rauch and others- -formed a terrorist cell whose first activity was to plant illegal transmitters around Berlin for Humphrey's visit and a small bomb that was given to Baumann by the security service undercover agent, Peter Urbach (see chapter six). The bomb was inoperative, and the group collected it again. Similar bombs were also found at **Kommune I** during a house search, while the ones in Wieland Commune went undetected.⁷⁹

These people formed the 'Blues', a group of persons that lived between the 'high' times and 'blue' (low) times in a counter-culture parallel to normal society. These people went on to form the **Zentralrat des Umherschweifenden Haschrebellen** (Central Committee of the Roaming Hash Rebels) in early 1969, a part of the 'militant core of the Berlin sub-culture' devoted to the struggle against the modern system of post-capitalism in order to promote free decisions about relationships and lifestyles. They had no fixed abode, nor possessions, but passed through the numerous large apartments in West-Berlin, and lived in the easy going atmosphere of the the time and the 'scene' which accepted people using and sleeping where space was available.⁸⁰

Between October 1969 and April 1970, a group of about thirty persons formed the Tupamaros West-Berlin with a core of 'Blues' members, four of whom could be seen as the 'hard-core', and moved between five apartments in West-Berlin.⁸¹ Two Tupamaros West-Berlin members, Dieter Kunzelmann and Ingrid Siepmann, were trained in Jordan in an Al Fatah camp between October and November 1969. Their training was possibly arranged via the Palestinian Student's General Union in the FRG which maintained close ties with left-wing students with up to 150 left-wing students from Europe and the United States attending a special one-month training course at the 'European Camp' in Amman, Jordan run by Al-Fatah.⁸²

⁷⁸ Aust (1987), 48-9; Rainer Langhans, Fritz Teufel, **Klau mich: StPO der Kommune I** (West Berlin: Rixdorfer Verlagsanstalt, no year given), no pagination.

⁷⁹ Baumann (1979), 45-7.

⁸⁰ Claessens, de Ahna, 100, 107.

⁸¹ *ibid.*, 123. They do not provide their names.

⁸² Kahl, 36, 53; Roberta Goren, Jillian Becker (ed.), **The Soviet Union and Terrorism** (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1984), 167.

Tupamaros West-Berlin and the Hash Rebels had different viewpoints. The Tupamaros West-Berlin members had obtained military training in Palestine and pushed the Palestinian perspective over that of Vietnam and the Third World in general, while the Hash Rebels had no clear political direction, for which they received much criticism from the left.⁸³

The *Bewegung 2. Juni* (B2J, Second of June Movement) was officially created between 16 June and 8 July 1971 with about ten people in two groups coming together after release from prison to undertake violent illegal revolutionary activity.⁸⁴

In its early days the Second of June was a group of three to five sub-groups whose members were known to each other, and one of each sub-group knew a contact person with the other sub-groups. The B2J was then only interested in West-Berlin, as it was familiar ground, and wanted to anchor itself in Berlin's working class. The B2J was to be worker orientated in contrast to the elitist RAF, who had never had contact with workers.⁸⁵

To ensure that the various Second of June commando groups did not trip over each other, or endanger another sub-group who was in the same area at the time of an operation, B2J used a system of 'supervision'. 'Supervisors' would also notify the commando groups if they were to destroy clothing or other evidence, or to pass on financial requirements. 'Supervisors', however, also had the role of pushing newer sub-groups towards action.⁸⁶

The lack of a clear hierarchical structure in the Second of June was the result of several groups coming together to work with another established group. The 'supervisor' group was part of the original group that undertook violent illegal actions in the late sixties, while other groups joined with it to undertake other operations over the course of time. In 1972 the structure became more solidified as new groups sought membership with the organisation. This was the case of the group around Ilse Schwipper (nee' Bongartz) in Wolfsburg, which was believed to have been responsible for Ulrich Schmuecker's murder in June 1974.⁸⁷

⁸³ Claessens, de Ahna, 116, 121.

⁸⁴ *ibid.*, 144.

⁸⁵ *ibid.*, 155, 157; Baumann (1979), 87; Brueckner (1973), 74.

⁸⁶ Claessens, de Ahna, 153.

⁸⁷ *ibid.*, 147, 153, 160; Stefan Aust, *Kennwort Hundert Blumen: Die Verwicklung des Verfassungsschutzes in den Mordfall Ulrich Schmuecker* (Hamburg: Konkret Literatur Verlag, 1980), 234; see also Monika Held, "Fuer immer angeklagt" *Sueddeutsche Zeitung Magazine* 8 June 1990, 26-30, about the fourth trial revision. In 1991 the trial revision was withdrawn by the state prosecutor because the Berlin state security services had sabotaged the sixteen year court cases.

Schmuecker was a group member believed to have turned traitor after his arrest and release from prison.

In 1972 the Second of June was supposed to organise itself into small commando groups of three to nine persons in as many West German cities as possible, with each of these groups working independently of the others in the planning and conduct of activities. Only materials for forging documents and specialised equipment were to be centrally provided by the umbrella organisation. Instead of specialised roles within the groups, members were to be trained, as far as possible, to become generalists with experience in all matters of underground life. B2J actions were to be simple enough for others to imitate and apply so that others could continue in their spirit with simple, universal logistics in actions against the state.⁸⁸

The B2J was a group that sought to consolidate everyday political resistance against the state. The commando units were to exemplify possibilities and stimulate other similar responses with their activities, as part of the 'general resistance' which fights for its perceived rights. The best way to do this was by working together with others who had similar ideas. During the Lorenz abduction in 1975, they also realised that they could not topple the state. Thus they calculated their possibilities of action, and learned from their praxis.⁸⁹

However, the B2J, while begun in the working-class area of Berlin-Kreuzberg,⁹⁰ lost this position as it moved further into the isolation of the underground with safe-houses and training abroad.

The height of the Second of June Movement was the abduction of Peter Lorenz, the Christian Democrat candidate for the West Berlin mayorship on 27 February 1975. After obtaining maximum television publicity for their cause by virtually dictating what was broadcast, the group obtained the release of five imprisoned terrorists, and a plane to fly them to Aden, South Yemen⁹¹ (see chapter seven).

The Second of June also showed its populism and consideration in late July 1975 with two bank robberies that gained it attention by

"Verfahrenseinstellungen- -Schmuecker, radikal, ZSK" Die Rote Hilfe: Zeitung der Roten Hilfe e.V. 3, 1991, 9.

⁸⁸ Claessens, de Ahna, 156; Baumann (1979), 77, 92-3.

⁸⁹ Ronald Fritsch, Gerald Klopper, Rolf Reinders, Fritz Teufel, "The Berlin Indomitables: An Interview with...", in: *The German Guerrilla: terror, reaction, and resistance* (Sanday, Orkney: Cienfuego Press, 1981), 68-83, 72-3; Second of June, "Die Entfuehrung aus unserer Sicht", in: *'Holger, der Kampf geht weiter!': Dokumente und Beitrage zum Konzept Stadtguerilla* (Gaiganz/Ueberfranken: Politladen Verlagsgesellschaft, 1975), 279-303, 280, 284-6.

⁹⁰ Baumann (1979), 87.

⁹¹ Aust (1987), 286-8.

leaving chocolate kisses behind for the customers and employees: 'Revolutionary chocolate kisses from the urban guerillas of the Movement Second of June'. This type of 'humour' in its activities and courtroom appearances meant it came that bit closer to the public than the Red Army Faction.⁹² Nonetheless, by now it too was in the underground and in the Middle East alongside the RAF and Revolutionary Cells, as is discussed below in section 2.32.

⁹² Thomas Meyer, *Am Ende der Gewalt: Der deutsche Terrorismus - Protokoll eines Jahrzehnts* (Frankfurt a.M.: Ullstein, 1980), 142.

2.3 Revolutionary Cells

The *Revolutionaeren Zellen* (RZ, Revolutionary Cells) appeared in 1973 and highlighted both the domestic and increasingly international character of left-wing terrorism in the Federal Republic in their contacts with 'Carlos' of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-Special Command (PFLP-SC). The first section discusses domestic developments, and the second the Palestinian connections of 'Carlos' to the RZ and other German groups.

2.31 The Revolutionary Cells in Germany, 1973-1975

The Revolutionary Cells were a response to the hard, violent, vanguard approach of the Red Army Faction. Instead of using cells in the underground the Revolutionary Cells based their organisation on a group of roughly five to eight member cells. RZ members conduct 'normal' lives practicing their profession, be they students, labourers or professionals. Therefore they are sometimes referred to as *Feierabend Terroristen* (Afterhours/Freetime Terrorists), because they remain 'legal' for as long as possible. This does not necessitate safe houses, stolen vehicles, falsified documents, and the other requirements of underground existence. The end result is that the security forces have fewer places to profit from RZ mistakes. Each group relies on fewer people, and uses fewer materials for their operations, which makes the RZ potentially more dangerous than the RAF, because less is known about them.⁹³

Similarly to the Second of June, the Revolutionary Cells wanted to develop multiple centres of counter-power in society to determine the direction of the social revolution. Like the B2J the RZ also claimed that the masses--which they claimed to be a part of-- should be part of the struggle as a sort of 'popular guerilla' which responded to general trends of public sentiment. This sharply contrasted with the RAF position that only a select few could lead the masses. The simple organisation, and broader appeal of the Revolutionary Cells opened the way for many more attacks at lower levels without the difficulties of life in the underground.⁹⁴

⁹³ Claessens, de Ahna, 126-7, 129; Langguth, 197; Kahl, 109, adds that for emergencies each member had a stolen passport should they need to enter the underground to evade arrest.

⁹⁴ Langguth, 197; Horchem (1987 II), 147; Revolutionary Cells, "Fragen an die Stadtguerilla: Interview mit der Gruppe 'Revolutionaere Zellen'", in: 'Holger, der Kampf geht weiter!' *Dokumente und Beitrage zum Konzept Stadtguerilla*. Gaiganz/Oberfranken: Politladen Verlagsgesellschaft, 1975, 203-229, 209; -----, RZ: *Geschichte, Kritiken, Dokumente* (Oberursel: Westdeutsches Irlandsolidaritaetkomitee (WISK) Vertrieb, no date given, but after February 1985), 45.

The first RZ cells are thought to have been formed by members of *Schwarze Hilfe* (Black Aid), *Rote Hilfe* (Red Aid), *Anti-Imperialistischen Kampf* (Anti-Imperialist Struggle), and *Revolutionaerer Kampf* (Revolutionary Struggle). The main areas of RZ activity have been West Berlin, the Rhein-Main-Neckar area, and the Ruhr area, with lesser activity in the northwest and Hamburg.⁹⁵

However, the Revolutionary Cells were not coordinated into one large organisation with a hierarchical structure. They remained without a nerve centre to lead the cells in campaigns in the manner of the Red Army Faction. The cells acted autonomously. Some supported one issue, others another. Usually only one member had contact with another group in the organisation, and a very few people knew all of the groups. It is also possible that in the beginning there were one or two cells with each of the cell members then forming a 'resonance cell'.⁹⁶

The feminist orientated 'women of the revolutionary cells' organised themselves with a bombing on 4 March 1975 of the Federal Constitutional Court, which had restricted abortions, as a first step towards moving women from the 'private sphere' of sexual objects and child producers to the social political sphere. They believed that the private structures enabled the social ones so that emancipation in one's private life would enable emancipation in social spheres. The name *Rota Zora* was derived from 'Rota Zora and her band' which stole from the rich to give to the poor, and had the same initials as the RZ.⁹⁷

The RZ organised an irregular publication, *Revolutionaerer Zorn* (Revolutionary Anger) in 1975 to publicise the views and comments of the different cells while also providing operational tips.

2.32 The Palestinian Connection, 1973-1977

Revolutionaerer Zorn, however, did not discuss the organisation's own international aspects. It ignores that the RZ were originally divided into two different circles or branches. One as the German, or national branch, which operated only in the FRG on a legal/illegal existence. The other as the 'Europe' or 'Outside' branch of hard-core persons who dropped into the underground because of past experience.

⁹⁵ Kahl, 101, 108.

⁹⁶ H.J. Klein (1979), 49; Andreas Schmidt, "Die Revolutionaerer Zellen" *Die Polizei* 9, 1983, 287-290, 288.

⁹⁷ Rota Zora, "Widerstand ist moeglich: Die Rota Zora und ihr Selbstverstaendnis", in: Peter Hein (ed.), *Stadtguerilla: bewaffneter Kampf in der BRD und Westberlin: Ein Bibliographie* (Amsterdam: Edition ID-Archiv im IISG, 1989), 131-4, 131-2.

This group operated internationally and is associated with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-Special Command.⁹⁸

Whereas the RAF and the Second of June went first to Al Fatah before ending up with the PFLP, the Revolutionary Cells had contacts with them from the beginning. Mohammed Boudia, working for Dr. Wadi Haddad and Georges Habash's PFLP, set up contacts with leftist Germans and other Europeans.⁹⁹ Boudia also had the support of Iraq and other Arab countries.¹⁰⁰

After Boudia's murder by the Israeli Mossad in 1973, his lieutenant, Illich Ramirez Sanchez, better known as 'Carlos', took over. The 'outer circle' of groups that Carlos had contact with included the regional groups of the Basques, Bretons, Corsicans and Republicans in Ireland. The 'inner circle' of groups consisted of four left-wing terrorist groups: the Japanese Red Army (which had some members in Paris then), the RZ 'Europe' branch, the Turkish People's Liberation Army, and the Italian Red Brigades. Klein reports that also the RAF, B2J and RZ worked with the PFLP.¹⁰¹ This network around Carlos formed a logistics base of money and goods for the groups, as well as a brokerage for paid services by the Germans for the Palestinians,¹⁰² presumably in addition to the \$3000 a month reportedly paid to the RZ by the PFLP.¹⁰³

The German terrorists aided Palestinian operations in West Germany and abroad. For example, the RZ helped the Fatah backed Black September organise some of the logistics for the 5 September 1972 Olympic massacre, although most of it was done by Palestinians, some of whom lived in Germany, and one of whom worked on the Olympic building site.¹⁰⁴ The RZ also aided Carlos in attacks on Israeli targets such as

⁹⁸ See Revolutionary Cells (1985); Schiller (1987 II), 89. The PFLP abbreviation is used in the thesis, because the sources do not always specify whether the PFLP in general, or the PFLP-SC is the group involved.

⁹⁹ Colin Smith, *Carlos: Portrait of a Terrorist*. (London: Andre Deutsch Ltd., 1976), 100.

¹⁰⁰ Helena Cobban, *The Palestinian Liberation Organisation: People, Power and Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 148.

¹⁰¹ C. Smith, 100, 107-8; H.J. Klein (1979), 81, 206.

¹⁰² See the following about the fate of 75 stolen hand grenades to five locations on four continents. Kahl, 140; C. Smith, 114, 117, 141, 167-8; Ray S. Cline, Yonah Alexander, *Terrorism: The Soviet Connection*. (New York: Crane Russak and Co., Inc., 1984), 64; and Christopher Dobson, Ronald Payne, *The Carlos Complex: A Pattern of Violence*. (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1977), 51.

¹⁰³ Hans Joachim Klein, Jean Marcel Bougereau, "An Interview with Hans-Joachim Klein", in: *The West German Guerrilla: terror, reaction, and resistance*. (Sanday, Orkney: Cienfuego Press, 1981), 7-61, 44.

¹⁰⁴ H.J. Klein (1981) 44; Aust (1987), 75-6; Serge Groussard, *The Blood of Israel: The Massacre of the Israeli Athletes of the Olympics, 1972*, (New York: William Morrow and Co. Inc., 1975), 100-9.

on 13 January 1975 when two of them shot at a taxiing El Al airplane with an RPG-7 at Paris-Orly airport.¹⁰⁵ Three West German terrorists participated in an attempted PFLP commando rocket attack on a landing Israeli commercial airliner in Nairobi, Kenya on 18 January 1976,¹⁰⁶ and Carlos enlisted the help of Brigitte Kulhmann and Wilfried Boese in the PFLP hijacking of the Air France airliner to Entebbe, Uganda between 27 June and 4 July 1976.¹⁰⁷

Carlos also gained West German assistance in money raising attempts such as when Klein, and Gabriele Kroeher-Tiedemann of the RZ, along with Carlos and three Arab terrorists, took the OPEC (Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries) conference ministers at Vienna, Austria hostage on 21 December 1975. Later in April 1976 the West Germans helped in attempts to plant a plastic explosive lined suitcase on a Japanese Air Lines plane in order to destroy the plane in mid-air as part of an extortion exercise demanding five million dollars to prevent further bombs on their flights. Had the plan succeeded, the money would have gone mainly to the PFLP. A small portion would have gone to the West German groups, who were employed because of their ability to enter places where Palestinians would arouse too much suspicion.¹⁰⁸

The reciprocation for West German efforts occurred between 13 and 18 October 1977 when a PFLP commando hijacked a Lufthansa plane as part of the Schleyer episode. This was both to obtain a ransom and the release of two PFLP members from Turkey, and to add pressure to the West German government to release its terrorists. Although it went against the grain of RAF domestic actions which sought to avoid injury to non-participants, the RAF had coordinated the PFLP hijacking through its Palestinian connections. The attempt failed, and the PFLP and West German connections were reduced to training and material support.¹⁰⁹ There is more about this below in section 3.1.

¹⁰⁵ C. Smith, 185-6; Dobson and Payne (1977), 53-5.

¹⁰⁶ Kahl, 156; H.J. Klein (1979), 79, 312-4, 326-8. While two sources say the RAF was involved, William Stevenson, *90 Minutes at Entebbe* (New York: Bantam Books, Inc., 1976), 23-4, says this involved two of the people who attempted shooting at the El Al airliner in Orly in January 1976, which would involve the RZ and not the RAF. *Associated Press* 15 August 1979 says that two Germans, Brigitte Schulz and Thomas Reuter, were arrested and taken to Israel.

¹⁰⁷ H.J. Klein (1981), 18; Becker, 19-20; Goren, 4, but Becker and Goren attribute Klein, Boese and Kroeher-Tiedemann to the RAF.

¹⁰⁸ H.J. Klein (1981), 31, 44-5; (1979), 199-200. On the OPEC raid see Dobson and Payne (1977), 89-123; and C. Smith, 221-293 and various sections in H.J. Klein (1979), and (1981), 23-30.

¹⁰⁹ Kahl, 156; Hans Josef Horchem, "The German Government Response to Terrorism", in: Yonah Alexander, Richard A. Kilmarx (eds.) *Political Terrorism and Business: The Threat and Response* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1979), 245-256, 249; "Aktion Spindy" *Der Spiegel* 36 (3

Money, weapons, training and safe-havens were the major incentives for cooperation with the Palestinians for the West Germans. Despite the large amounts stolen from West German banks, and the theft and forgery of necessary documents and papers requisite to underground existence,¹¹⁰ they needed more.

2.4 The 'Second Generation', 1975-1980

This section covers the activity of the Red Army Faction in the second half of the seventies. The 'second generation' are the RAF members, who joined the group in the wake of the Committees against Torture and hunger strike activity in 1974. They became members between 1975 and 1977.

For example, former members of the Heidelberg Committee against Torture organised the 25 April 1975 storming of the Federal Republic's embassy in Stockholm, murdering two embassy officials, and then demanding the release of twenty-six prisoners, among whom were the leading RAF members in Stammheim prison. The government refused, and shortly before the Swedish government begun to storm the embassy, the terrorists accidentally set off the explosives, which killed one terrorist, wounded another who later died, and enabled the arrest of the other four. Its effect on the supporters alienated some and increased the feelings of helplessness amongst others who then joined the committees.¹¹¹

Ulrike Meinhof was found hung in her cell on 9 May 1976, and there followed large demonstrations in many West German cities and in Europe. Although she committed suicide, many believe that she was murdered in her cell, or at a minimum, believe she was driven to suicide by her prison conditions.¹¹²

Meinhof's death reverberated through the committees,¹¹³ and more extortionate kidnappings were outlined for the release of those imprisoned in Stammheim. When the coded plans for a RAF campaign were found on arrested lawyers in 1976, along with money from bank robberies,

September) 1990, 126-30, 128. See also the letter from Karl-Heinz Dellwo found on Stefan Wisniewski when he was arrested on 11 May 1978 reprinted as: "Wir wollen nun endlich raus" *Die Zeit* 23 (2 June) 1978, 3

¹¹⁰ Horchem (1979), 250, reports that by 1979 the RAF had stolen over DM 11 million from banks; Aust (1987), 113-5; and Manfred Funke (ed.), *Terrorismus: Untersuchungen zur Struktur und Strategie revolutionärer Gewaltpolitik*, (Dusseldorf: Athenaeum Verlag, 1977) lists many similar robberies of town halls in the chronology.

¹¹¹ Aust (1987), 289-92; Friedrich, *Der Spiegel* 34/1990, 53.

¹¹² Becker, 330; Kahl, 115.

¹¹³ Sigrid Sternebeck, "'Dann sind bald alle tot'" *Der Spiegel* 33 (13 August) 1990, 57-67, 62.

the plans were postponed until they went into effect with the murder of Siegfried Buback, the Federal Prosecutor General, on 7 April 1977.¹¹⁴

Three months later, on 30 July 1977, Juergen Ponto, the president of Dresdener Bank, was murdered in an attempted kidnapping in his home near Frankfurt. Pressure on the government, and more publicity, were gained when the RAF began another hunger strike on 9 August. The judicial and court system was the object of another attempted attack, when a technical fault prevented damage to the Federal Prosecutor's Office building on 25 August.¹¹⁵

The hunger strike ended on 2 September 1977. Three days later, Hanns Martin Schleyer was abducted. He was the head of the German Employers' Association, and on the board of directors for Mercedes Benz, as well as a former SS officer in the Third Reich. The RAF demanded the release of eleven prisoners- -including Baader, Ensslin, Raspe and Moeller- -as the price for his release.¹¹⁶

The government did not give in, and on 13 October the PFLP hijacked a Lufthansa plane enroute from Majorca to Frankfurt and demanded the release of the same eleven prisoners plus two others in Turkey before they would release their planeload of eighty-six passengers and five crew members. On 18 October the elite specialist border guard unit, GSG 9, stormed the plane, which had eventually landed in Mogadishu, Somalia, freeing all of the hostages unharmed, arresting one hijacker and killing the other three (see chapter seven). After hearing of the rescue Baader, Ensslin, Raspe and Moeller attempted suicide- -all but Moeller succeeding- -in their prison cells on the night of 17/18 October. Schleyer was found dead in Muellhausen, France on the 19th.¹¹⁷

Amongst the Left there was much speculation about the Stammheim deaths as to whether these were indeed suicides or murders. Only recently were these confirmed as suicides by the former terrorists Susanne Albrecht and Monika Helbing.¹¹⁸ However, even this evidence is not believed by all. Some people still believe the murder thesis.¹¹⁹

The inconclusiveness of the Stammheim deaths at the time provided speculation for various theories. If it was suicide, then the deaths

¹¹⁴ Aust (1987), 400-2; Becker, 343-5.

¹¹⁵ Aust (1987), 407-8, 412-5.

¹¹⁶ *ibid.*, 424-5, 430.

¹¹⁷ *ibid.*, 500, 505, 533-4, 541.

¹¹⁸ "Suicide Action" *Der Spiegel* 50 (10 December) 1990, 62-70, 62. For a discussion of murder and suicide theories see Christina Ensslin (sister of Gudrun) "Alle Kreter luegen...", in: Klaus Hartung (ed.), *Der Blinde Fleck: Die Linke, die RAF und der Staat* (Frankfurt a.M.: Neue Kritik, 1987), 86-97.

¹¹⁹ See "Presserklaerung" *Clash: Zeitung fuer Widerstand in Europa* 3 (April [?] 1991), 9.

were not heroic and they signalled the failure of the struggle. If it was murder, then this too was not a heroic end for the prisoners who were so totally isolated that this was easily possible. The prevention of similar acts in the future would require a rethink of the prison work organised in the past that sought to help imprisoned suspected and convicted terrorists. If it was clearly murder, then this represented a confirmation of the Left's hints and accusations of the state's neo-fascist character- -a state that would murder its opponents- -against the government, which therefore had been hiding behind its mask and comfortably going about its business as if it was a democratic state. However, the possibility of the mask being torn away could be too frightening for the Left, who would then see the state acting as it wished without any fear. Instead, it would be far better to believe the smaller horror that the prisoners did commit suicide, which would not require the Left to reconceptualise its work to change prison conditions. The thought that the state committed murder would necessitate a reconceptualisation of prison work, because this would require that the Left prevent the possibility of the state murdering future prisoners.¹²⁰

The deaths of the imprisoned RAF leaders meant that only general instructions about outside operations were communicated from imprisoned members to the underground until the eighties. This was shown by the discovery of letters from imprisoned RAF members in safe-houses, on arrested members, and amongst materials found in prison cell searches on 25 February 1981 during the 1981 hunger strike. Communication systems can only be countered by the contact ban, so it is likely that the system continued to operate sporadically.¹²¹

In the late seventies the group was mainly concerned with securing its existence in Paris until May 1979 as they worked towards building up a logistic structure of apartments and caches in Germany again, while also maintaining foreign safe-houses to serve them and Second of June members. This proceeded slowly, with setbacks of deaths and arrests balanced by new recruits.¹²²

¹²⁰ Oliver Tolmein, Detleff zum Winkel, *Nix Gerafft- -10 Jahre Deutscher Herbst und der Konservatismus der Linken* (Hamburg: Konkret Verlag, 1987), 94-6.

¹²¹ Klaus, 49; Horchem (1987 II), 144. See also the Dellwo letter in *Die Zeit* 2 June 1978, 3.

¹²² *Frankfurt Allgemeine Zeitung* 20 December 1979, 6 January 1981; Sternebeck, *Der Spiegel* 33/1990, 62-4.

The group mood altered between continued plans to free prisoners, even hiring helicopters to the astonishment of watching policemen,¹²³ and a resignative mood that even went to contemplating mass deaths in one final blow such as a suicide bombing at the annual US Army carnival in Heidelberg Castle. Another vengeance idea was to have targets affixed to trees surrounded by anti-personnel mines near Frankfurt, Stuttgart and somewhere else, with the intention of luring policemen there with reports of shooting. According to Werner Loetze this was the idea and work of Christian Klar and Monika Helbing. Due to group dissension the mines were cleared and the idea shelved because it was feared this would discredit the group's image.¹²⁴

The three level structure of the early seventies remained the same as the one designed by Baader and in use since at least 1975 to keep the original imprisoned RAF leaders in control and contact with its members on the outside. In the late seventies there were three levels. (1) The hard-core organised into groups of five to twelve persons for operations. There were forty members in 1979, half of whom were women. (2) The lawyers who acted as liason between the active members, the support groups and the imprisoned members. (3) Lastly, the support groups who organised sympathy campaigns both in the FRG and abroad. There were also the reserves for future active terrorists. There were about 150 of these in 1979, half of whom were women.¹²⁵

In spring 1980 the Second of June ceased to exist.¹²⁶ Most of its West-Berlin members were integrated in Revolutionary Cells, which may also explain the more violent tendencies of the West Berlin RZ as exhibited in knee-cappings.¹²⁷ The other Second of June members in the FRG joined the RAF.¹²⁸ However, imprisoned B2J members were already

¹²³ Hans Schueler, "Kommissar Computer in Noeten" *Die Zeit* 1 September 1978, 3; and see the Dellwo letter in *Die Zeit* 2 June 1978, 3.

¹²⁴ Peter-Juergen Boock, "'Zum Selbstmord bereit'" *Der Spiegel* 9 (23 February) 1981, 123-4; 'Suicide-Actions' is what Sternebeck mentions in: *Der Spiegel* 33/1990, 62; and is confirmed by her husband in Friedrich, *Der Spiegel* 34/1990, 55; "Aktion Spindy" *Der Spiegel* 36/1990, 128.

¹²⁵ Klaus, 45; Horchem (1979), 247.

¹²⁶ The July 1980 issue of *Radikal* was accused of advertising for the Second of June, thus assuming the group existed then. However, a West Berlin court dismissed the case by deciding the group no longer existed. *Die Welt* 16 July 1981.

¹²⁷ *Die Welt* 3 November 1986; "Neue Anschlagphase der 'Revolutionaeren Zellen' (RZ)?" *Terrorismus: Informationsdienst* 2, 1986, 5.

¹²⁸ Hans Josef Horchem, "Die 'Rote Armee Fraktion': Agitation und Aktionen ihre Sympathisanten", *Beitraege zur Konfliktforschung* 17 (3) 1987, 61-81, 61. Second of June, "Aufloesungspapier der Bewegung 2. Juni", in: Jean Paul Marat (ed.), *Widerstand Heisst Angriff! erklarungen, redebeitraege, flugblaetter und briefe, 1977-1987*

integrated into the RAF prisoner structures, and the two groups were also combining their logistic networks as evidenced by the arrests of B2J and RAF members in a Paris safe-house on 5 May 1980. Such activity had presumably been usual practice over the years since the RAF assisted the B2J with money, weapons and explosives in the first few months of its formation in the summer of 1971.¹²⁹ This may also be why the ransom money from Michael Palmer's abduction by the Second of June, between 9 and 13 November 1977 in Vienna, went to the RAF in the merger, instead of to those who went to the RZ in Berlin. While the B2J may have been independent minded to begin with, they moved closer to the RAF over time until a clear division no longer made sense.

The B2J also shared some logistic bases with the RZ, possibly because of overlapping strategic concepts and membership, as exemplified by the RZ targeting the court appointed defence lawyers of B2J defendants on 31 May 1978,¹³⁰ which could have resulted in them becoming RZ members when the others merged with the RAF.

(Amsterdam: Bibliotheek voor Ontspanning en Ontwikkeling, 1988), 51-52, 51.

¹²⁹ Klaus, 5; Claessens, de Ahna, 144.

¹³⁰ Kahl, 109-110, 148.

3. Terrorism in the Eighties and Beyond

In many ways the early eighties were a watershed for West German left-wing terrorism. New groups came to dominance and older ones receded and then rejuvenated themselves. There was also a shift of emphasis from the Middle East to Western Europe. However, before examining the individual groups it is necessary to discuss the phenomenon of 'Euroterrorism' that became associated with perceived links between West European groups in the mid-eighties. It is also necessary to discuss the role of state sponsorship in left-wing terrorism in the Federal Republic of Germany.

3.1 'Euroterrorism'

The Red Army Faction had mixed times in the early eighties. Underground members attempted the assassination of General Alexander Haig, Supreme Allied Commander of Forces in Europe for NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation), near Mons, Belgium on 25 June 1979. The next attacks were the 31 August 1981 RAF satchel bomb explosion in a car at the NATO Air Force Headquarters in Ramstein, and the attempted assassination of General Friedrich Kroesen, the Commander of the US Army in Europe, on 14 September 1981. Possibly the 1981 and the 1979 attacks should have been closer together, but the arrest of five members in Paris on 5 May 1980 and the death of two others on 25 July 1980 in a car accident may have postponed their plans. Postponement also arose through an extended visit by several Red Army Faction leaders to Briesen, East Germany for 'strategic discussions' with the East German security services between September and October 1980. At some point in 1981 or 1982 the group was also trained in the use of rocket launchers in East Germany. Such a weapon was used in the attack on Kroesen.¹ Recruitment drives, in the form of hunger strikes (two since 1977), were boosted when Sigurd Debus died in Celle on 16 April 1981. This triggered small bombings and demonstrations in the following days.

The emphasis on NATO and Western Europe in these attacks was to characterise the West German groups' operations in the eighties. The Mogadishu rescue was probably one factor in ending Middle East contacts between the RAF and the Palestinians. The Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 also contributed to a shift in focus for the terrorist groups, from

¹ Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 28 July 1980; Times 1 August 1980; The Guardian 8 November 1980; Associated Press 25 October 1980; Die Welt 1 September 1981; "Lauschen unterm Pflaumenbaum" Der Spiegel 26/1991, 95.

Palestine to Western Europe, where they sought a new revolutionary basis.²

Diverse terrorist group motivation meant the Red Army Faction could not seek allies everywhere in Western Europe as the specific circumstances differed enough to hinder the union of arguably similar revolutionary ideas. Contact with the separatist groups such as the Provisional Irish Republican Army and the Irish National Liberation Army was possible in the seventies. However, the use of the name of a dead Irish hunger striker from the 1981 hunger strike for the 1 February 1985 RAF 'Patsy O'Hara Commando' that claimed the murder of Ernst Zimmermann was not acceptable to the Irish. This probably indicates a sign of the non-cooperation between them, as they prefer to remain under themselves for fear of informers amongst foreign groups.³ Furthermore, the RAF cannot offer anything to the Provisionals which they could not do themselves.

The same is true of the Basques in Spain. No links have occurred between *Euskadi ta Askatasuna* (ETA, Euskadi and Freedom) and the RAF due to the different objectives pursued by the two groups. ETA seeks a 'full amnesty' for its imprisoned members, while the RAF seeks the liberation of its members from prison by force if necessary.⁴

Leftist European terrorist groups, however, have a common ideological framework to organise campaigns around as was apparent in the anti-nuclear and peace movements campaign of the early eighties. This brought thousands onto the streets of European capital cities, and appeared to bring the different terrorist groups together against USA and NATO targets.⁵ While it would be incorrect to state that the Soviet Union directed the peace movement, it can be stated that the communist parties furthered the peace movement as a means to spread their ideas and influence. In this way the Soviets were able to also assist their own desired end of non-deployment of the new nuclear weapons by NATO.⁶

² "Im Ziel, im Kampf", *Der Spiegel* 43 (20 October) 1986, 24-7, 24.

³ Horchem (1987 II), 141; "Hocken drin" *Der Spiegel* 25 (18 June) 1979, 32-3; "Dublin Connection", *Der Spiegel* 34 (20 August) 1979, 28-9; *Independent* 5 May 1990, 2; n.n. *Republican Resistance Calendar 1990* (Dublin [?] 1989), lists O'Hara as an INLA member, while Hans Josef Horchem, *Die verlorene Revolution: Terrorismus in Deutschland* (Herford: Busse Seewald, 1988), 170, says it was the PIRA who stated their disapproval with the use of his name for an RAF commando.

⁴ Horchem (1987 II), 152-3.

⁵ Simultaneously right-wing groups also targeted NATO as a sign of foreign influence and 'occupation'. J.F. Pilat, "Research Note: European Terrorism and the Euromissiles", *Terrorism* 7 (1) 1984, 63-70, 65, 67.

⁶ Langguth, 256-61, 276; Vittoriofranco S. Pisano, *The Dynamics of Subversion and Violence in Contemporary Italy* (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1987), 57-118.

The combination of similar types of targets across Europe and alleged terrorist meetings, created the 'Euroterrorist' notion of cooperation and agreement between the different groups at an international level. Involved in this union were the RAF, the French Action Directe (AD), and the Cellules Communistes Combattantes (CCC) of Belgium as the main members. To a lesser extent it seemed that the Revolutionary Group of International Solidarity- -Christos Kassimos, and the National Front, both in Greece, the Portuguese group, Popular Forces of April 25 (FP-25), and the Brigade Rossa (BR, Red Brigades) of Italy were also involved in the wave of Euroterrorism.⁷

These groups did not drop their own indigenous contexts and concerned themselves solely with the supranational 'Euroterrorism' aims. While the RAF may have desired to coordinate activities with the 'Euroterrorist' groups in the mid-eighties, each group still had its own private concerns and issues that were also targeted, as represented by the RAF's hunger strike in 1984/85.⁸

Despite the threat the 'Euroterrorists' posed in the beginning, they did not amount to much. The CCC were arrested in December 1985, the Portuguese groups' activities ended, while those of the Greeks abated for a while, and the BR became semi-active after splitting into two groups, a 'militant' and 'movementist' faction, with the 'militarist' majority joining the RAF and the AD against imperialism. AD and RAF cooperation continued until early 1987 when a series of arrests wound up the AD for the present.⁹

Action Direct and RAF cooperation was based on more than money and logistic aid. The two groups provided a mutual support system for each other. AD had even less of a resonance in the French population than the RAF in West Germany, and benefited from a like-minded group for ideological and material support. The RAF was in the same situation. AD also had valuable contacts with the PFLP, Italian groups, and even the Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Faction. By working together the AD and RAF

⁷ Pisano, 135; Konrad Kellen, "The New Challenge: Euroterrorism Against NATO", *TVI Journal* 5 (4) 1985, 3-6, 3-5. See also in the same issue, "A Chronology: Euroterrorist Actions 1984-April 1985", 18-22.

⁸ Kurt Rebmann, "Das Interview: Fragen an Generalbundesanwalt Rebmann" *Terrorismus: Informationsdienst* 1, 1986, 4-5, 5; Paul Wilkinson, "Support Mechanisms in International Terrorism", in: Robert O. Slater, Michael Stohl (eds.), *Current Research on International Terrorism* (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1988), 88-114, 92-3.

⁹ Kahl, 171; Alison Jamieson, *The Heart Attacked: Terrorism and Conflict in the Italian State* (London: Marion Boyars Publishers, 1989), 212; *The Guardian* 9 December 1986, 6; 23 February, 1; 10 March 1987, 8.

justified their claim to be an international anti-imperialist front in West Europe.¹⁰

A side-effect of the cooperation was that the German terrorists radicalised AD. Prior to 1984 AD murdered defensively in the course of bank robberies, and post-1984 the group did this offensively in assassinations. Simultaneously, increased AD violence led to increased isolation from its home supporters¹¹ in the same manner as the RAF.

Joint AD and RAF operations such as the 8 August 1985 bombing of the US Rhine-Main-Airbase, and possibly the murder of General Rene' Audran on 25 January 1985 also offered heightened publicity, as did the joint communique issued on 15 January 1985. Joint operations also solved AD technical problems with RAF expertise and experience. For example, the 'peoples prison' and notes in German found in an AD Orleans safe-house in 1987 implied joint cooperation in an area of no previous AD experience. Cooperation was facilitated by the personal contacts of AD member Georges Ciprani, a trained printer in Frankfurt between 1972 and 1983, and RAF member, Birgit Hogefeld, whose handwritten notes were found in the Orleans farmhouse rented by Ciprani.¹²

Prior to any Red Army Faction and Brigata Rossa cooperative arrangements like those with Action Direct, there were supportive communiques issued by the two groups. The RAF named the 'Commando Mara Cagol', responsible for the murder of Karl-Heinz Beckurts and his driver on 9 July 1986, after a dead BR member, and the Brigata Rossa issued solidarity statements after the Beckurts and Gerald von Braunmuhl (10 October 1987) murders. However, after the BR split into two 'positions' in September 1984, only the BR-PCC (BR-For the Building of the Combattant Communist Party), the international and anti-imperialist orientated so-called 'second position', praised the RAF in a communique after a robbery on 14 February 1987. The BR-UCC (BR-United Combattant Communists), the so-called 'first position', is more proletariat, class struggle orientated and does not offer support for the RAF.¹³

The addition of the Brigata Rossa to the revolutionary struggle of the RAF in August 1988 failed to materialise when twenty-one BR members

¹⁰ Michael Dartnell, "France's Action Directe: Terrorists in Search of a Revolution" *Terrorism and Political Violence* 2 (4) 1990, 457-488, 469, 471; Christopher Dobson Ronald Payne, *War without End*. (London: Sphere Books Ltd., Updated Edition, 1987), 240.

¹¹ Dartnell, 478-9.

¹² Kahl, 167; Horchem (1987 II), 153; Horchem (1988), 166-7; Wilhelm Dietel, "'Action directe' am Ende?" *Terrorismus: Informationsdienst* 3, 1987, 1-4, 2-3; Karl-Guenther Barth, "Jetzt ist Rebmann die Nummer eins" *Stern* 40 (32) 30 July-5 August 1987, 118.

¹³ Bundesministerium des Innern (ed.), *Verfassungsschutzbericht 1986* (Bonn: BMI, 1987), 138.

were arrested in Rome in September 1988. Nonetheless, the two groups issued a joint communique for the 20 September 1988 attack on Hans Tietmeyer in German and Italian, which placed him in the centre of the 'imperialistic economic politics' securing the profit and power of international capital, and saw the attack as the beginning of a combined offensive to develop the 'fighting anti-imperialist front'. This was strengthened with a later paper that praised past RAF and AD cooperation as a definite step towards European revolutionary subjectivity in the framework of attacks against imperialism. BR-PCC added to this with a statement on 1 March 1989 saying that Brigade Rossa support for the hunger strike strengthened the 'fundamental importance of the active RAF-BR unit in the fighting anti-imperialist front.'¹⁴

The suspected RAF commando operation in June 1988 in Rota, Spain, where three people were interrupted preparing a moped with explosives near the US Marine and Air Force base, can perhaps be taken as a sign of an RAF convergence of dialogue and contacts with the Anti-Fascist First of October Commando (GRAPO) in Spain. GRAPO view the RAF as lacking in a communist programme and its goals as corresponding to those of the petty bourgeoisie, but there has appeared in the recent past a strong interest in both parties to develop their ties.¹⁵

The development of cooperation between the Red Army Faction and either BR-PCC or GRAPO to the same level which existed with Action Direct would offer the same benefits to both partners. However, it may also be that the RAF is more isolated than the others at home and therefore has more to gain than the other two groups. Agreements might therefore be more difficult to negotiate than those with AD.

Nonetheless, the Red Army Faction has not stopped its search for new partners. Their communique after the Detlef Rohwedder murder on 2 April 1991 explicitly stated a desire for coordinated campaigns with common goals amongst those who find capitalism repressive and begin to

¹⁴ "Rote Armee Fraktion: Kampf ohne Chance" **Terrorismus: Informationsdienst** 12, 1989, 1-2, 1; "Gespraeche zwischen RAF und BR" **Terrorismus: Informationsdienst** 2, 1990, 4-9, 4; "Interview: Kurt Rebmann" **Terrorismus: Informationsdienst** 5, 1989, 1-3, 2; BR-PCC, "Fuer die Einheit der Revolutionaere im Kampf gegen den Imperialismus", in: *Reihe- -Texte: Italien: Dokumentation zur Zeitgeschichte 2* (Munich: Gruppe 2, 1989), 38-47, 38, 45.; Joachim Gross, "Dem Kampf einen neuen Impulse" **Stern** 42 (18) 27 April-2 May 1989, 268-9.

¹⁵ Bundesministerium des Innern (ed.), **Verfassungsschutzbericht (VSB)** 1987, 80; BMI (ed.), **VSB** 1988 (Bonn: BMI, 1989, manuscript version) 97-8. The three left behind explosives, weapons and notes in German.

act for their own ideas of organisation. They know that without partners they stand alone and that the armed struggle is lost.¹⁶

3.2 State Sponsorship of West German Terrorism

Until recently it was safe to say that there was no direct state control of the West German left-wing terrorist groups. An article in 1980 stated that there never was any evidence of direct influence by the Soviets or East Europeans on the German terrorist organisations, while a 1987 publication said the Federal Prosecutor General had no evidence in recent history of this. It did, however, caution that there was a suspicion of East German money laundering aiding the terrorists based upon their high frequency of trips to East Berlin, and mentioned the possibility of East German money to leftist groups in the Federal Republic finding its way into terrorist coffers.¹⁷

A danger of emphasis on foreign sponsored state terrorism is the assumption that if foreign supporters of domestic terrorist groups are removed, then the terrorist group will end. This ignores terrorists' local political bases. The question of state sponsorship must also be tempered by the caution of sponsors because of the potential example the supported group could set for the sponsor's own people if it is successful. Furthermore, there is the problem of control over the group, who may have its own ideas, and the potential damage revelation of the support given to the group.¹⁸

Given these caveats, it is possible to conceive of outright state control of a terrorist group, its funding of a group, and its toleration of a group operating from within its borders. Only the last two appear to have occurred with the West German left-wing terrorist groups.

Before the West German terrorist groups were organised, Ulrike Meinhof and her former husband, Klaus Rainer Rohl, were secret members of the outlawed Communist Party of Germany from 1956 to 1964, when Rohl was expelled. From 1955 until 1964, Rohl, the publisher of the left-wing magazine *konkret* was funded by monies received from the East Germans.

¹⁶ Red Army Faction, "Dokumentation: Erklahrung der RAF zur Erschiessung von Rohwedder", *Clash: Zeitung fuer Widerstand in Europa* 3 (April [?] 1991), 40-2; Hans Josef Horchem, "Der Verfall der Roten Armee Fraktion" *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* 9 November 1990, 54-61, 60.

¹⁷ Hans Josef Horchem, "Terrorism and Government Response: The German Experience" *Jerusalem Journal of International Relations* 4 (3) 1980, 43-55, 48; Dobson, Payne (1987), 133, 161.

¹⁸ Wilkinson (1986), 193-4; Richard E. Rubenstein, *Alchemists of the Revolution: Terrorism in the Modern World* (London: I.B. Tauris and Co., Ltd., 1987), 54.

After the East Germans withdrew their support in 1964, the magazine stayed alive,¹⁹ and was outside of East German influence.

Once the terrorist groups were organised the East Germans appeared to acquiesce the groups' passages through East Germany such as when the first RAF members went to Jordan in 1970, when Baumann of the Second of June went to Asia in 1972, and later when on his return journey they released him after three and a half months imprisonment in the GDR.²⁰ This allowed the West German groups to use East Berlin as a backdoor to West Berlin, and the East Bloc as a rest area where they could also contact other parties, such as when Action Direct arranged for Ingrid Barabas of the RAF to meet with the speaker of the PFLP, Bassam Abu Sharif, in an East Berlin hotel on 16 January 1985. He later offered PFLP support for the then current RAF hunger strike in a newspaper interview.²¹

Contact between West German terrorists and the *Staatssicherheitsdienst* (Stasi, Ministry for State Security) was unavoidable, because of the terrorists' travel in the Arab countries, some of whom had their security services organised and trained by East German security services. Similarly, using East Berlin's Schoenefeld airport brought them into contact, as the Stasi wanted to know who entered and left the country. Transfers through passport control were eased for the terrorists by special controls, and telephone numbers for each country, Iraq, South Yemen, Syria and Lebanon, which the West German terrorists could use when these special control procedures failed. Training of both the left and right-wing West German variety of terrorists in Palestinian camps was also done by East German, Cuban and Soviet trainers.²²

Conditions for terrorists in Eastern Europe and Yugoslavia were not always cordial. Four RAF members were detained in Yugoslavia between 28 May 1978 and 17 November. If West Germany had agreed, Yugoslavia would have exchanged the four RAF members for eight Croatians. On 21 June 1978

¹⁹ Cline, Alexander, 58; Dobson, Payne (1977), 145; Becker, 161-176; Krebs, 104-6.

²⁰ Michael 'Bonmi' Baumann, *Hi Ho: Wer nicht weggeht, kommt nicht wieder*, (Hamburg: Froehlich und Kaufmann im Hoffmann und Campe, 1987), 59-64.

²¹ Karl-Heinz Janssen, "Die Hydra des Terrorismus" *Die Zeit* 23 (2 June) 1978, 3; Horchem (1988), 167-8. See *die taz* 19 January 1985.

²² Peter-Juergen Boock, "Fuer jeden eine Nummer" *Der Spiegel* 25 (18 June) 1990, 103-5, 103-4; Horchem (1987 II), 154-6; Cline and Alexander, 67.

four Second of June members were arrested in Bulgaria and extradited to West Germany the next day.²³

At some point, however, the East Germans went beyond acquiescence of the West German terrorists' presence in their country and, with the support and approval of Erich Honecker, the General Secretary of the Socialist Unity Party and other high level officials, supplied identity papers, apartments and employment papers.²⁴

In 1977 three West German terrorists fleeing Czechoslovakia asked the East Germans for help with their problems and were given a three-day hearing in East Berlin, after which they were flown to the Middle East. Assistance for ex-members began in 1980, with Inge Viett and Henning Beer allegedly joining the others later.²⁵

The German Democratic Republic (GDR) provided housing for ex-RAF members, who in exchange travelled to the Palestinian groups in Damascus, Beirut and Iraq to maintain contact between them and the East Germans. Thus the stories of West German terrorists dropping out in the Middle East arose, while the GDR hoped the ex-RAF members could help them maintain influence with the Palestinians. The East Germans also hoped that by housing the Red Army Faction they would be left in peace by them. Any information gained by the East Germans through former and active RAF members could also be passed on to the Soviet Union, who had more direct concerns about Islamic fundamentalist developments and how these might affect its own Muslim population.²⁶

Of greater consequence, however, it is also alleged that the May 1982 paper of the RAF was outlined during one of their visits to East Germany when they held a strategy session with the Stasi. Possibly then, or earlier in 1980 or 1981 (the dates are still unclear) the RAF agreed to focus on the 'military industrial complex' as a strategic concept of targeting, and to pass any useful information to the East Germans who were also interested in this area. Therefore plans of US barracks went eastwards, and discussions were arranged between Stasi officers and RAF supporters who had been in the barracks and knew about their control

²³ "Ware gegen Ware" *Der Spiegel* 48 (27 November) 1978, 25-6; Michael Sontheimer, Otto Kallscheuer (eds.), *Einschuesse: Besichtigung eines Frontverlaufs zehn Jahre nach dem Deutschen Herbst* (West Berlin: Rotbuch Verlag, 1987), 179.

²⁴ "Oma im Altkader" *Der Spiegel* 24 (11 June) 1990, 86-9, 87; "Eine perverse Kombination" *Der Spiegel* 25 (18 June) 1990, 97-103, 97.

²⁵ "Hier bleibt jeder fuer sich" *Der Spiegel* 26 (25 June) 1990, 82-7, 85; "Die mit den Hueten" *Der Spiegel* 34 (20 August) 1990, 62-3, 63

²⁶ "Oma im Altkader" *Der Spiegel* 24/1990, 88; "Eine perverse Kombination" *Der Spiegel* 25/1990, 99; Boock, *Der Spiegel* 25/1990, 104; Horchem (1990), 55.

systems. A master key to a barracks area was offered also (but not given) to the East Germans.²⁷

The East Germans also exploited the RAF, when they kept group leaders in the country on the pretext of 'strategic discussions' in September and October 1980. They wanted to ensure that the RAF undertook no operations in the run-up to the **Bundestag** elections. East Germany thus assisted Chancellor Helmut Schmidt's re-election against his Christian Social Union opponent Franz Josef Strauss.²⁸

According to Michael Baumann, East German assistance in the West went as far as RAF safe-houses in the West occasionally being watched by Stasi agents, who could warn the members in the houses when danger arose so they could slip away in safety.²⁹ Boock maintains that, at least in his time with the RAF, 1976 to the end of 1979, the active group did not use East Germany as a safe-haven after their activities in the West.³⁰

In the eighties- -right until the Berlin Wall was opened in 1989- - the East Germans supported the RAF with occasional plane tickets, money and training. This was documented by accounts found in Stasi records, and accounts from former RAF members. It also applied to Palestinians, members of the German Communist Party and right-wing terrorists like Oddfried Hepp and Udo Albrecht. This was part of the East German's 'informal employees' network with contacts in various terrorist organisations in 1989, that included three people with the Abu Nidal Organisation, five with 'Carlos', three with the Revolutionary Cells, four with the Red Army Faction, three with the Japanese Red Army, and one with Action Direct.³¹

The East Germans, however, did not directly support the active terrorists in their attacks with agents. The self-consciousness of the Red Army Faction alone would not allow this. They are proud of their self-sufficiency in arms and money thefts, etc. Nor did the RAF see the German Democratic Republic as a proper alternative to capitalism. The common demoninator was their wish to destabilise the West, and this is possibly why the ex-RAF members could stay in the East.³²

²⁷ Red Army Faction, "Guerilla, Widerstand und Antiimperialistische Front", in: **texte: der RAF** (West Berlin: no publisher given, Ueberarbeitete und aktualisierte Ausgabe, 1983), 594-620; Helmut Voigt, "'Es ging um Schmidt/Strauss'" **Der Spiegel** 26 (24 June) 1991, 94-5; "Lauschen unterm Pflaumenbaum" **Der Spiegel** 26/1991, 95.

²⁸ Voigt, **Der Spiegel** 26/1991, 95.

²⁹ "'Eine perverse Kombination'" **Der Spiegel** 25/1990, 99.

³⁰ Boock, **Der Spiegel** 25/1990, 104-5.

³¹ "Denen trauen wir jetzt alles zu" **Der Spiegel** 14 (1 April) 1991, 22-6, 23; "Stasi-Abteilung XXII/8 und der Terrorismus" **Terrorismus: Informationsdienst** 7, 1991, 1-4, 1-2.

³² Boock, **Der Spiegel** 25/1990, 104; "Oma im Altkader" **Der Spiegel** 24/1990, 88.

The effect of these Red Army Faction members going into retirement ended dissention within the terrorist group. This unified the alleged leadership of Christian Klar, Willy Peter Stoll, Brigitta Mohnhaupt, Rolf Heissler and Knut Folkerts.³³

The East German claim to help counterterrorism was a lie, even as they helped Middle Eastern terrorists plan the 'La Belle' discotheque bombing in April 1986, and did nothing to help the Federal Criminal Office find five wanted terrorists in the East in late 1986. Instead, the five disappeared again. The East Germans probably knew where these five and three other ex-terrorists were, because each ex-RAF member had a phone number to contact their Stasi controller in emergencies, and the Stasi kept an eye on each of the former terrorists.³⁴

Unlike when they were in the Middle East, the ex-RAF members could pass unnoticed in East Germany. There were no language problems, nor was it necessary, as in the Middle East, to arm themselves.³⁵

One theory believes the West German authorities came upon stories of ex-RAF members in the East via interviews with newly arrived East Germans. However, it is more likely that the East Germans decided the suspected former terrorists were expendable, and a former Stasi member told the Western authorities about them. This theory is supported by the introduction of terrorist wanted posters in East Germany, and explains why an East German citizen in Magdeburg could point to where Inge Viett was living in the hopes of receiving a 50,000 DM reward.³⁶

The ex-RAF members living in the GDR needed to worry about West German television which could reach most of East Germany, and carried dangerous pictures when programmes about the Red Army Faction were televised. After one such programme in 1987 Susanne Albrecht had a note put in her post box that asked: 'How can one live with such a past?' The Stasi moved Albrecht and her family (she had a husband and one daughter born in 1983) to an East Berlin suburb. Inge Viett, who lived in Dresden was moved to Madgeburg, where she worked in a heavy machinery factory organising holidays for the employees and their families, and helping the Socialist Unity Party successor, the Party for Democratic Socialism, in elections.³⁷

³³ "Hier bleibt jeder fuer sich" *Der Spiegel* 26/1990, 86; "Die mit den Hueten" *Der Spiegel* 34/1990, 63.

³⁴ "'Eine perverse Kombination'" *Der Spiegel* 25/1990, 99; "Hier bleibt jeder fuer sich" *Der Spiegel* 26/1990, 84.

³⁵ "'Eine perverse Kombination'" *Der Spiegel* 25/1990, 100.

³⁶ "Oma im Altkader" *Der Spiegel* 24/1990, 87; "'Eine perverse Kombination'" *Der Spiegel* 25/1990, 99.

³⁷ "'Eine perverse Kombination'" *Der Spiegel* 25/1990, 102; "Oma im Altkader" *Der Spiegel* 24/1990, 87.

Once in retirement, the ex-RAF members were supposed to forego violence and contact with both the active RAF in the West, and other ex-RAF members. All the arrested ex-RAF members claim to have been inactive since entering the German Democratic Republic, with Henning Beer, Ekkehard Freiherr von Seckendorff-Gudet and Sigrid Sternebeck claiming not to have left the country. The Stasi also asserted that they had watched these people since their immigration.³⁸

3.3 The Red Army Faction

The Red Army Faction resumed large scale activities in 1984 with a hunger strike, and smaller bombings building into larger ones, that lead to a joint communique with Action Direct, and then the murder of the industrialist Ernst Zimmermann on 1 February 1985. A new RAF had emerged, which used new operating patterns only previously hinted at.

The new organisational structure of the RAF reflected its audience, and the group's perceived achievements. In the eighties this was not the general public, who did not understand the groups' activities, but the mobilised group of supporters around the hard-core of the RAF and any new members these could bring to the group.³⁹

RAF membership prior to the '84/85 Offensive' was divided into four bodies; the commando level, the illegal militants, the legitimate fringe, and the prisoners. A position paper found in a safe house in July 1984 showed that the imprisoned members were no longer a dominant force in the group, although the authorities believed that before the '84/85 Offensive' began, imprisoned members were in contact with the underground to coordinate goals and operations.⁴⁰

The 'Prisoners of the RAF and the Anti-imperialist Resistance' were important to the active members, and consulted when possible before operations. The prisoners fell in status since their release from prison was no longer a key RAF concept as signalled by the change in emphasis from prisoner exchanges to the targeting of objects and persons. Better conditions for the prisoners are always sought, as reiterated in the RAF communique after Alfred Herrhausen's murder on 30 November 1989, which

³⁸ "Hier bleibt jeder fuer sich" *Der Spiegel* 26/1990, 83-5.

³⁹ Dieter Schroeder, "Terroristen ohne strategischen Plan: SZ-Gespraech mit dem Hamburger Verfassungsschuetzer Christian Lochte", in: Dieter Schroeder (ed.), *Terrorismus: Gewalt mit politischem Motiv* (Munich: Paul List Verlag, Sueddeutsche Zeitung Serie, 1986), 66-76, 69.

⁴⁰ Horchem (1987 I), 9; Kurt Rebmann, "Aktuelle Probleme der Bekaempfung von Terrorismus, politisch motivierter Gewaltskriminalitaet und Landesverrat" *Kriminologisches Bulletin* 11 (1) 1985, 5-25, 10. The Justice Minister, Hans Engelhard, neither denied nor confirmed any contact between the prisoners and the outside in 1985, *Sueddeutsche Zeitung*, 9/10 February 1985, 5.

stated that the prisoners must be brought into the discussions about the new international situation for revolutionary movements, and their need to be brought together in larger groups,⁴¹ but the prisoners were not the operational focus they once were. Their importance lay instead, in their ability to recruit new members through hunger strikes, because the hunger strikes create opportunities through demonstrations, discussions and other activities for potential new recruits to identify with RAF activities, to learn about its ideas, and meet people, who could lead potential recruits to other members as is discussed later in chapter four.

The 'Commando level', the hard-core leadership of the RAF in 1985 had about twenty persons in the underground who undertook the bombings and assassinations for the group. They were recruited from the 'legitimate fringe' in the mid-eighties.⁴²

To minimise the risk to itself the underground group was buffered from the outside world by a close legal level of about 200 persons. These persons lived a legal existence, and so their names were mostly unknown to the authorities. The group logistically supplied the commando level, conducted small armed actions, and provided reconnaissance and planning operations in preparation for larger commando level operations, while also maintaining contact with the prisoners.⁴³

In between the legal group and the underground hard-core were the thirty to forty person strong group of the 'Illegal Militanten der RAF' (Illegal Militants of the RAF), who conducted bombings as part of the RAF strategy. The group shares some logistics with the 'commando level', and some had lived in the underground.⁴⁴

After the '84/85 Offensive' the Red Army Faction organised the bombing of the US air base in Frankfurt which involved the murder of an American serviceman, Edward Pimental, to obtain his identity card to ease airbase access. His murder outraged the left more than the death and injury of the base bombing that killed two and injured twenty and forced the RAF to publish a separate statement that argued he was a legitimate target because he was an American soldier.⁴⁵

⁴¹ Horchem (1987 I), 15; n.n., *Der Koenig ist Tot, Hilgar Kopper Nachfolger: RAF Dokumentation 30.11.-6.1.90* (Hamburg: no publisher/date given), 3.

⁴² Bundesministerium des Innern (ed.), *Verfassungsschutzbericht 1985*. (Bonn: BMI, 1986), 120.

⁴³ *ibid.*, 125.

⁴⁴ Horchem (1987 I), 9; "Im Ziel, Im Kampf" *Der Spiegel* 43/1986, 24; BMI (ed.), *VSB 1985*, 124-5.

⁴⁵ Red Army Faction, "Zur Aktion gegen die Rhein-Main Air Base und die Erschiessung von Edward Pimental", in: Jean Paul Marat (ed.), *Widerstand Heisst Angriff! erklarungen, redebeitraege, flugblaetter und*

'Offensive 86' comprised coordinated RAF and AD murders on 9 July (Karl-Heinz Beckurts, a Siemens director), and 10 October (Gerald von Braunmuehl, a ministerial director at the Foreign Office), as well as sporadic bombings by the 'Illegal Militants' from July to December, which targeted military (American and West German), defence, development and political party institutions and buildings. This was the last sustained campaign of the group.

Since then, the Red Army Faction has (apart from 1987, which saw no RAF activity), performed yearly assassinations. There was a failed attempt on Dr. Hans Tietmeyer, the State Secretary of the Federal Finance Office on 20 September 1988, the murder of Alfred Herrhausen, director of the Deutsche Bank on 30 November 1989, and a failed attempt on Hans Neusel, the State Secretary of the Interior and Minister responsible for terrorism, on 27 June 1990. A planned attack in March 1990 on Ignanz Kiechle, the Federal Minister for Food, Agriculture and Forestry was broken off by the RAF.⁴⁶ Detlev Rohwedder, head of the **Treuhandanstalt**, which oversees privatisation of former East German state owned companies, was murdered on 2 April 1991, and on 13 February 1991 the RAF shot across the Rhine river at the American embassy in Bonn in connection with the Gulf war to oust Iraq from Kuwait.

The 'Illegal Militants' began operating again in December 1989 and February 1990 with attacks against banking, and German multinational energy interests, while the imprisoned RAF members have, however, made up for the lack of outside activities through hunger strikes from February to April 1989, and a solidarity strike with other West European terrorists from January to April 1990.

The RAF's attempts to include other militant groups in its fold was partially successful in propagandising its position in the prisons. The group has organised the 'Prisoners of the RAF and the Anti-Imperialist Resistance' which includes prisoners who have joined the RAF prisoners, but were not RAF members before imprisonment. These can join the ready-made support of the RAF in the prisons and carry on 'the struggle' instead of remaining isolated amongst smaller groups.

The RAF is organised into inner and outer hierarchical circles in the underground, and in the prisons whereby the non-RAF prisoners are relegated to the bottom. An example of this is the manner in which the RAF and their newsletter **Angehorigen Info** handled the non-RAF prisoners who participated in the 1989 hunger strike. Although Manfred Klein was

briefe 1977-1987 (Amsterdam: Bibliotheek voor Ontspanning en Ontwikking, 1988), 221.

⁴⁶ Horchem (1990), 59.

on hunger strike more often and longer than any of the RAF prisoners, this was downplayed in a two-line note in *Angehörigen Info*, who instead claimed that Rolf Heissler and Gabriele Rollnick were at the forefront of the hunger strike. When Klein reached his seventy-first day of the hunger strike, the *Info* mentioned this in a small note. When the RAF members reached this time period there were long articles about health, demonstrations outside prisons and other similar pieces. Obviously, some are more equal than others.⁴⁷

Possibly the RAF hoped for another Sigurd Debus, the RAF periphery prisoner in Celle who died during the 1981 hunger strike. Had someone died during the 1989 hunger strike the RAF could have then claimed the person for their own, and created another martyr. Martyrs, like Holger Meins, who died in the 1974 hunger strike, bring the RAF publicity, and more recruits in the manner discussed previously with regards to hunger strikes in general. Meins' death also acted as an impetus for some people to end legality and move on to illegal means of struggle against the system.⁴⁸

Communications from the prisoners to the outside are general in nature, allowing them to be placed in *die taz*, *Zusammen Kaempfen*, or the relatives' publication, *Angehörigen Info*, which publishes information about the prisoners in the FRG, and throughout Europe every two weeks. Such communications allow the prisoners to contact a wider audience and pass the 'struggle' from themselves to the hard-core, who will have planned assassinations in the meantime.⁴⁹

Reduced Red Army Faction activity since 'Offensive 86' is possibly due to several factors. One is the dialogue sought by the Greens in 1985 with imprisoned RAF members about reconciliation and the end of terrorism. This dialogue had several long involved phases in 1988 and 1989 and the RAF wanted to see its outcome⁵⁰ (see chapter six). Second, the prisoners gained contact with the underground group and told them to discontinue operations during the 1989 hunger strike. The prisoners once

⁴⁷ Peter-Juergen Boock, "Wir haben Schuld auf uns geladen", *Die Zeit* 16 (24 June) 1988, 11-13, 11-2; Gerhard Linner, "Die Karawane zieht weiter: Kritik an der Diskussion zum Hungerstreik", *Schwarzer Faden: Vierteljahresheft fuer Lust und Freiheit* 33 (4/1989), 7-10, 8.

⁴⁸ Kahl, 160; H.J. Klein (1981), 19-21; Meins reportedly bowed to authority, so Baader's authority fascinated him according to Becker, 245; which lends some credibility to H.J. Klein's (1979), 198, assertion of an order for someone to die in the 1974 hunger strike because of sabotaged medical treatment.

⁴⁹ *Angehörigen Info* Nr. 36, 15 March 1990; Helmut Pohl, "Brief vom Helmut Pohl", (October 1989) in: n.n. *Der Koenig ist Tot, Hilgar Kopper Nachfolger: RAF Dokumentation 30.11.-6.1.90* (Hamburg: no publisher/date given), 14-5; n.n., *Der Koenig ist Tot*, 7, 18-21.

⁵⁰ Pohl (1990).

again became the directing force behind the group, and decided the strategic concept. The possibility of the renunciation of terrorism, was deemed unthinkable, so a new direction was required. The opening up of East Germany, and unification with the Federal Republic of Germany, possibly led to a 'wait and see what happens' attitude in the run up to the arrests of former RAF members. That Neusel was targeted shortly thereafter shows that the underground might have expected these arrests. The communique from the Rohwedder murder, and confiscated papers from prisoners' cells, led the authorities to believe that the group seeks common goals with partners in a revolutionary movement with tangible results. They fear this may lead to a tactical change back to abductions in order to free imprisoned members.⁵¹

The arrests in East Germany left the RAF with the following suspected members in the underground: Sabine Callsen (29), Birgit Hogefeld (34), Andreas Klump (33), Wolfgang Grams (37), Christoph Seidler (32), Barbara (34) and Horst Ludwig Meyer (34), Karl-Heinz Gerum (37) and Corinna Kammermeier (32). The last two are believed to have entered the underground in March 1990.⁵²

This is disputed by people who knew Gerum, Kammermeier and the RAF, who claimed that, while they knew the two, they have parted ways. The same RAF document also claimed there was no hierarchy in the group, and that there are no legal, only illegal members, who have contact with other groups for discussion purposes to understand situations and processes in the left and in the resistance in general⁵³ (see chapter five).

The above list of nine suspected RAF members means there are possibly between nineteen and twenty-nine unknown people in the RAF hard-core, the traditional number of the RAF 'hard-core' members. Added to this are the twenty to fifty 'Illegal Militants', around two hundred militants of the legal RAF and about 2000 other RAF supporters.⁵⁴

⁵¹ Red Army Faction, *Clash* 3, 42; "Muss Bernhard machen" *Der Spiegel* 25 (17 June) 1991, 30-2, 31-2.

⁵² "Moegliches Ziel" *Der Spiegel* 31 (30 July) 1990, 60-2, 62.

⁵³ Red Army Faction, "Documentation: RAF about the Attack on Hafenstrasse", *Clash: Newspaper for/of Resistance in Europe* 1 (October 1990), 18.

⁵⁴ Hans-Ludwig Zachert, "Die Gefaehrdung der verfassungsmaessigen Grundordnung durch den Terrorismus in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland", in: Bundesminister des Innern (ed.), *Texte zur inneren Sicherheit: Gewalt und Terrorismus- -aktueller Stand* (Bonn: Bundesministerium des Innern, September 1990), 37-56, 46.

3.4 The Revolutionary Cells

The Revolutionary Cells in the first half of the eighties were not the same as the RZ of the seventies. The RZ in early 1982 apparently also operated with combined RZ groups in some instances, to overcome single cell manpower and other resource limitations for larger operations. Nor was there a 'Europe' or 'outside' level of the Revolutionary Cells. There was only the 'national' RZ level, and officials place the majority of the fifty to eighty cells at about five to eight members (i.e. 250 to 360 members) of the RZ in the Rhine-Main area, North-Rhine-Westphalia, and West Berlin. This number was believed to have been as high as 200 cells in the FRG until around 1983-5, when it declined. The high numbers could be due to cell collapses after a few weeks or months, the fact that some people are allowed to 'retire' from the terrorist scene,⁵⁵ and the possibility of persons being involved in multiple cells.

Carlos reappeared in the early eighties after Magdalena Kopp, a suspected RZ member, and Bruno Breguet, a Zurich student, were arrested after a shooting in Paris on 16 February 1982. The two claimed to be with the 'International Revolutionary Organisation', and two weeks later a letter with the fingerprints and signature of Illitch Ramirez Sanchez, demanded Breguet and Kopp's release because they were not acting against the French government. Despite several bombings, believed to be the work of Carlos, the two were sentenced and later released in 1985. Kopp was handed over to the Germans, who could not hold her on any charge, and later released her. She went to Damascus via East Berlin, and reportedly married Carlos.⁵⁶

The RZ of the eighties was more disdainful of life. They knee-capped individuals in West Berlin (31 May 1978, 28 October 1986 and 1 September 1987), and murdered Hans Herbert Karry on 11 May 1981 (while ostensibly attempting a knee-capping), and showed the same disregard of life in the bombing of public and private places. Rota Zora showed similar disregard of life in their campaign against Adler textiles in 1987.

The eighties Revolutionary Cells campaigns were less organised than those of the RAF, because of the autonomy within the RZ. Each cell was independent to act when and where it desired. The common direction of RZ (and *Autonomen*) cells seems only to occur when there is agreement through discussion of the issues in the alternative press, and at

⁵⁵ A. Schmidt, 288; Horchem (1987 I), 10-11; Schiller (1987 II), 96; Revolutionary Cells (1985), 48.

⁵⁶ Dobson, Payne (1987), 302-4.

congresses. Discussion of the issues is found in chapter three, so here it is only necessary to mention the general trends.

The early eighties saw the RZ active against nuclear power, NATO as part of an anti-imperialism campaign, and *Startbahn West* (new runway at Frankfurt airport). In the mid-eighties these issues widened to include the nuclear reprocessing plant at Wackersdorf, the NATO deployment of new nuclear weapons, anti-apartheid, and the Federal Republic's political asylum policy.

Most Revolutionary Cells did not operate during the RAF's '84/85 Offensive', but those which did support the offensive allegedly operated under different names. The RZ became active again in March 1985 with several bombings in support of the British miners' strike.⁵⁷

Many RZ cells were inactive during the RAF's 84/85 hunger strike because they felt the RAF did not address the proper issues. They saw the RAF moving against the wrong targets in their idea of 'NATO-imperialism'. They felt that instead of attacking NATO, the concern should be with improving the daily life of people in struggles against poverty, progressive social deterioration and exploitation.⁵⁸

The Rota Zora also supported these aims in women's issues. This included a 'successful' 1987 bombing and extortion campaign of the Adler textile company in order to force the company's re-employment of sacked women union members at their South Korean subsidiary.⁵⁹ Fortunately, this 'success' with Adler did not result in copycat campaigns. This campaign did not have public opinion and protest behind it.

RZ activities slowed down in the late eighties. This could be for several reasons. First, there was successful police activity directed against them in December 1987, from which they did not recover until later in 1988.⁶⁰ Second, some of their attacks are possibly receiving less resonance with their perceived public (see chapter seven) in connection with gene and biotechnology, computers and political asylum rights, where there is minimal public opinion and protest. These campaigns could be seen as a sign of the Revolutionary Cells and Rota Zora moving towards a vanguard position similar to the one the Red Army Faction has traditionally held.

⁵⁷ Eine Gruppe aus dem 'Traditionsverein' der Revolutionaere Zellen, 'Es ist zum Kotzen', *Radikal* 130 (1985), 21.

⁵⁸ "Das Bilanz ist schlimm", *die taz* 13 February 1985, reprinted in *Radikal* 130 (1985), 21.

⁵⁹ *Sueddeutsche Zeitung* 25 June 1987, 27; *die taz* 29 September 1987, 4; Heinrich Boge, in *The German Tribune* 1 November 1987, 5.

⁶⁰ BMI (ed.), *VS* 1989, 84.

3.5 Autonomen

Amidst the radicalisation process of the fringes of various protest activities in the mid-to-late seventies there arose a group known as the **Autonomen** (autonomous) or as the **Guerilla Diffusa** who fight "not for ideology, not for the proletariat, not for the people, but rather for a self-determined life in all areas."⁶¹ It is almost as if this group was a result of the effects of terrorism: they seek to withdraw from society and avoid public space. While others do this behind alarms and other protective measures, the **Autonomen** do so because of the effects of capitalism they see in normal society and its attitude towards them. They are an ideologically and hierarchically free alternative to the more disciplined Red Army Faction and ideological Revolutionary Cells that fight against society to maintain their own lifestyle.

The **Autonomen** are visible at demonstrations as the **Schwarze Block** (Black Bloc) because they dress mainly in black. For special occasions, they can be gathered from all around the Federal Republic through notices in the left-wing press and bookshops and cafes/pubs, which might raise up to 2000 'real activists' and 1000 'lesser activists' nationwide. Other estimates suggest there are 3000 hard-core and 6000 others. Special occasions for large scale demonstrations include visits by American presidents or vice-presidents, large protests against the nuclear recycling plant in Wackersdorf, the nuclear plant in Brockdorf, the new section of **Startbahn West**, or in support of the **Hafenstrasse** squatters in Hamburg. The **Autonomen** are believed to be responsible for around eighty per cent of all bombings in the country.⁶²

Some authors categorise the **Autonomen** as a separate sub-section of the Revolutionary Cells. Reasons for this include their similar use of the cell structure, their disdain of hierarchical structures and their 'mass perspective', believing they should employ 'direct democracy' to help social movements further along, thus staying close to the masses. This is their long-term strategy.⁶³

⁶¹ "Wir machen Rambo auf Linkes", *Der Spiegel* 46 (8 November) 1987, 17-24, 19; Langguth, 225, ascribes the name 'Guerilla Diffusa' to a borrowing of the name of splinter groups from the Italian **Brigatta Rossa** who accused the BR of using Stalinistic methods, and is similar to the autonome of the Italian and French models. In Germany the name **Guerilla Diffusa** was only used by the media and not by any group itself. "Traenengass ist der dritte Bildungsweg" *Der Spiegel* 43 (24 October) 1983, 108-26, 124. The name did appear though as the title of a brochure in July 1981 that provided tips on bombs, cells, and security and sabotage.

⁶² "Wir machen Rambo auf Linkes", *Der Spiegel* 46/1987, 11; Horchem (1987 I), 13; Kolinsky, 68.

⁶³ Langguth, 225; Schiller (1987 II), 95-6; Horchem (1987 I), 13-4; n.n. *Das Tapfere Schneiderlein*, 12.

The **Autonomen's** basis in collective action in cooperation with local groups and their potential ability to combine themselves nationally have enabled them to achieve some successes in gaining 'free space' to organise their lives after their own fashion. Collective action is based upon the principle that each person has to work for their own freedom in collective activity with others without discussions over leadership.⁶⁴

For example, in the case of the Hafenstrasse squatters in Hamburg, some success was achieved through limited bombings and arson campaigns and through demonstrations and the support of public figures in Hamburg, Hanover, Bremen, Lubeck, Marburg and West Berlin. However, the Hafenstrasse question is not yet ended. Similar campaigns over other squattings (**Hausbesetzungen**) as occurred in Frankfurt in the seventies, and West Berlin in the eighties, have also had limited success, if success can range from delayed action by the developers, and sometimes limited rental agreements.⁶⁵

The suspicion and hostility of the **Autonomen** for the state has, on the one hand, led some security authorities to view the 200 and more bombings and arson attempts of the **Autonomen** per year as basic hooliganism. Others, however, see this as leading to terrorism, instancing the biographies of the first terrorists of the late sixties and early seventies, who started with small bombings before moving on to larger terrorist activities. This view is supported by the Red Army Faction, who see the 'free space' and potential numbers of **Autonomen** as a social basis they should mobilise in line with their May 1982 paper, which states the RAF are the ones to lead the revolution, independent of, and without consideration for, other developments in the Federal Republic.⁶⁶

An integration exercise occurred in January/February 1986 during the Frankfurt 'Anti-Imperialist Front in Westeuropa' congress. **Autonomen** attended, but distanced themselves from the authoritarian

⁶⁴ Geronimo (pseudonym), **Feuer und Flamme: Zur Geschichte und Gegenwart der Autonomen. Ein Abriss** (Amsterdam: Edition ID-Archiv im IISG, 1990), 162.

⁶⁵ On Hafenstrasse see: "Beil in der Tur" **Der Spiegel** 45 (3 November) 1986, 60-8, 63; Michael Sontheimer, "'Wenn ihr uns räumt holen wir die Russen'" **Die Zeit** 26 December 1986, 9-11; "Feuer und Flamme fuer diesen Stadt" **Der Spiegel** 1 (29 December 1986) 1987, 41-4, and the communique to the Hamburg firebombings in **die taz** 2 January 1987; "Die wollen unser Leben klauen" **Der Spiegel** 3 (14 January) 1991, 77-80, 80; and see Geronimo for sympathetic histories of the various squatting movements, 127-132 (Hafenstrasse); 94-104, 132-140 (Berlin-Kreuzberg); 40-4 (Frankfurt a.M.).

⁶⁶ Schiller (1987 II), 96; Red Army Faction, "Guerilla, Widerstand und Antiimperialistische Front" (1983).

hierarchical RAF and its indoctrination attempts. The RAF reinforced the differences between itself and other groups. For example, this occurred between the congress participants and a group against Startbahn West which wanted to organise an information meeting.⁶⁷

This position was reiterated in the RAF communique after their failed attack on Neusel in July 1990, when they praised the self-determined free-space of groups like those in the Hafenstrasse. Their communique after Rohwedder's murder repeated this and also directed itself towards the workers in former East Germany. Rohwedder's murder was to be their contribution to the East's freedom from Western imperialism at both strategic and tactical levels.⁶⁸

Unlike the RZ, which appear to have slowed down in the late eighties, the **Autonomen** maintained a high level of activity, and conducted most of the terrorist attacks in the country. This is possibly because the other groups have provided an example to the **Autonomen**, who see problems and directly respond without the ideological issues and concerns of the RAF and the RZ.

4. Summary

This chapter highlighted the source of left-wing terrorists identifications. The original source was the left-wing search for viable opposition to the conservative governments which had ruled since 1949, and a desire for a change from the previous generation's linkage to the National Socialist past. Internationally the desire to support and assist Third World governments efforts towards independence, was their reaction to perceived US guilt in its betrayal of democracy in Vietnam.

These larger social concerns formed a backdrop to immediate situations amongst the Left in the late sixties. These concerned how to reach the public with their message of social criticism, and how to respond to the death of one student and the attempted assassination of another. Later a group response to a member's arrest resulted in the beginning of a major terrorist organisation. After the terrorist groups formed in the seventies they sought different identifications according to their needs and goals.

⁶⁷ Horchem (1987 I), 14; n.n. "Zur Auseinandersetzung ueber den Schutz/ Ueber die Schwierigkeit revolutionaere Politik zu machen und nich in Konkreten Situationen ein taktisches Verhaeltnis zu entwickeln", in: Jean Paul Marat (ed.), **Widerstand Heisst Angriff! erklaeungen, redebeitraege, flugblaetter und briefe 1977-1987** (Amsterdam: Bibliotheek voor Ontspanning en Ontwikklng, 1988), 269-273.

⁶⁸ Red Army Faction, "Documentation: RAF about the Attack on Neusel", **Clash: Newspaper for/of Resistance in Europe** 1 (October 1990), 37-8, 38; Red Army Faction, **Clash** 3, 40-2.

The Red Army Faction began with the above identifications, but later centred on their imprisoned members and how they could free them. After this was deemed no longer possible they changed their identification to an 'anti-imperialist West European front' which they sought to create with alliances to other European terrorist groups, and with Stasi assistance began to focus on the 'military industrial complex'. The focus on the prisoners remained, nonetheless, due to their recruitment potential amongst supporters, as is shown in chapters four and five.

The Second of June began with an identification with the workers of West Berlin and claimed to use actions easily replicated by other groups. However, the group's identification shifted to that of the RAF and its concentration on freeing prisoners. In the end the B2J realised this, and most of its members merged with the RAF, while others joined with the RZ in West Berlin.

The Revolutionary Cells began as an alternative to the RAF and B2J with their focus on militant aid to public protest groups. While the 'German' branch did this, the 'Europe' branch of the group in the seventies sought the release of imprisoned terrorists. The 'Europe' branch did not survive into the eighties, while the 'German' RZ in some areas such as gene, biotechnology and womens' issues in the Third World, may have become as elitist as the RAF in their vanguard approach to issues.

Some **Autonomen** similarly work with public protests by adding their weight to the issue. In general, though, **Autonomen** identification lies in their search for self-determination of their lifestyles.

Thus the groups appear to move towards a vanguard position ahead of the public. The RAF began there, and the B2J left the workers as it moved towards the RAF. The RZ and **Autonomen** have managed to maintain its identification with the public in some areas, while other cells have moved to vanguard positions ahead of the public.

These similarities occurred, despite the different groups' determination to maintain their separate identities in opposition to their rivals. The B2J was to be worker orientated, in opposition to the RAF, in order to maintain public ties. The RZ and **Autonomen** also sought this goal of public ties with its illegal/legal structure.

Most of these efforts to fight for the common people have failed amongst the left-wing West German terrorist groups. The RAF and B2J were driven into the underground as a means of survival and this separated them from the public. The RZ have also found underground positions for some of its members, while others, and the **Autonomen**, have been able to

maintain their illegal/legal existence. Probably this loss from the public has come through their counter-culture lifestyle away from the common people.

Each of these groups has fared differently since they began, and some of them have virtually faded away. This chapter showed that each of them also had different concerns indicated by the issues with which they have identified. These are discussed in the next chapter in more detail as are the determining factors for the selection of targets and the overall level of terrorism which this chapter outlined.

**CHAPTER THREE: LEFT-WING TERRORISM IN WEST GERMANY
AN ANALYSIS**

everyone, even the enemy, said pauli, talks of love, of learning, of work, of peace. just like us...it is not the words, it is the interests that determine the value of a word. down there the gun, every fascist can do that too, whomever, wherever we aim it at, that characterises them, not the production company, the practise, not even the courage, the shot.¹

The movement? We find ourselves in a phase of reorientation. The correct political path is not determined through the head and through theory, it is also crystalised in the practical struggle, its result. And practical struggle means armed struggle, building up an urban guerilla, the organisation of the underground!²

Because we could not reach the masses in our own country, and scorned them in principle, we consequently sought a new revolutionary subject: the impoverished and repressed of the Third World.³

This chapter's analysis of left-wing West German terrorism covers four aspects of the violence. First, the frequency of the incidents. Second, the types of incidents involved; kidnappings, bombings, murder and other incidents. Third, the themes represented by the incidents and activities of the terrorist groups. Fourth, an attempt to explain why and when particular targets are chosen.

1. The Scale of Left-wing Terrorism

Left-wing West German terrorism began in the late 1960s, as is reflected in Table 3.1 (page 74).⁴ The table shows that in the eighties there were over two and a half times more terrorist incidents than in the seventies. The rise of incidents possibly shows lower public identification with the state in the eighties than in the seventies, as more incidents caused less clamour. This is seen arguably in public satisfaction with democracy scores (average 78.4%, 1970s; average 72.5%, 1980s), and defence against subversion scores (average 44%, 1970s;

¹ Geissler, 193. There is no capitalisation in the book.

² Boock (1988), 10.

³ *ibid.*

⁴ The word 'terror' itself only appeared in the West German press sometime after 1964, and then under sole proprietorship of the Springer press. The word entered public usage after the death of Benno Ohnesorg on 2 June 1967. Bowmann H. Miller, *The Language Component of Terrorism Strategy: A Text-Based, Linguistic Case Study of Contemporary German Terrorism* Ph.D. Thesis (Georgetown University, 1983), 128, 131.

average 36.7%, 1980s), which were higher in the seventies than in the eighties.⁵

Table 3.1 Left-Wing Terrorist Offences, 1968-1989

YEAR	OFFENCES	YEAR	OFFENCES	YEAR	OFFENCES
1968	9	1976	33	1984	222
1969	48	1977	172	1985	299
1970	119	1978	58	1986	460
1971	88	1979	44	1987	242
1972	71	1980	77	1988	197
1973	70	1981	129	1989	101
1974	106	1982	184		
1975	45	1983	215		

Source: Uwe Backes, Eckhard Jesse, *Politischer Extremismus in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Band III Dokumentation* (Cologne: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1989), 132; Bundesministerium des Innern (ed.), *Verfassungsschutzbericht 1988*, (Bonn: BMI, 1989 (manuscript)), 92; 1989, 77.

It is also potentially the case that the youths who contributed to early incidents aged and became the more relaxed public in the eighties, and that the government's definition of terrorism was widened to include transport obstructions and the toppling of power pylons, after these incidents increased in frequency.⁶

A lower public identification with the state in the eighties occurred at great material cost. The Red Army Faction's 'Offensive 84/85' (December 1984 to February 1985) cost about 20 million DM for the insurance companies. The Federal Criminal Office placed damage caused by the various terrorist groups at somewhere between 200 and 250 million DM.⁷ Another estimate for the years 1967 to 1981 counts 448 attacks on

⁵ See Tables 7.1 and 7.2, pages 254, 255. The figures for September 1973 in table 7.1 and February-March 1970 in table 7.2 were left out because they differed in each table. Adding them would have unbalanced the figures for the respective periods. When added the figures became 71.3% 'satisfied with democracy', and 39.2% for 'defence against subversion'. Otherwise the 'satisfied' and 'very satisfied' were added together for a single score. Where two dates occur in the year these were averaged together. From table 7.2 'defence against subversion' was used.

⁶ Of 112 attacks on energy supply installations between January and November 1986 103 were attacks on power pylons. Rolf Goessner, "Im Schlepptzug des Sicherheitsstaates: Die Rationalisierung des Massenkontrollen", in: Rolf Goessner, *Buergen kontrollieren Polizei* (eds.), *Restrisiko Mensch: Volkserfassung, Staatsterrorgesetz, Widerstandsbekaempfung* (Hamburg: Instituts fuer Sozialforschung, 1987), 5-11, 5.

⁷ This was equal to about \$100 million when the article was written. David Th. Schiller, "The Economic Implications of Terrorism: A Case Study of the Federal Republic of Germany" *TVI-Journal* 7 (1) 1986, 37-40, 38.

property (compared to 1069 for all attacks between 1968 and 1981 in Table 3.1) at a cost of \$75 million in damage. However, these are only rough estimates of damage. The reason is that not all arson and lesser attacks are classified under terrorist attacks, and follow up costs do not always enter into police reports.⁸

Lower public identification with the state in the face of higher levels of terrorism appears to exist despite high material costs. This may indicate decreased materialist values in the population and increased post-materialist ones. Between 1978 and 1988 the proportion of men and women supporting post-materialist values rose from 16% to 25% in men and 9% to 18% in women. Post-materialists are less concerned with economic and physical security, and more concerned with self-expression, belonging, and quality of life. There is also a greater acceptance of unconventional protest amongst post-materialists. The Green Party also rose between the seventies and eighties.⁹

2. Types

However, the next question is whether this explanation holds when the incidents are increased. A comparison between Table 3.1 and 3.2 (page 76) reveals that left-wing terrorism itself is only a small fraction of all left-wing extremist offences.

Table 3.2 contains both offences committed at demonstrations- -the general public are thus potentially included- -extremist acts directed against business and state, as well as operational and logistical terrorist offences. Operational incidents are the murders and bombings, and logistical offences are those that provide the means of operations, such as the six million DM the Red Army Faction stole or extorted by the eighties. Logistical offenses also include the theft of such items as weapons and identity cards, passports, etc., which the RAF routinely stole as mentioned in chapter two. Abductions such as that of Lorenz are both logistical and operational, because they provide funds and release imprisoned group members. The cost of all goods and monies stolen or extorted by left-wing West German terrorists between 1967 and 1981

⁸ Schiller (1986), 38; Christopher Hewitt, "The Costs of Terrorism: A Cross-National Study of Six Countries" *Terrorism* 11 (3) 1988, 169-180, 171.

⁹ Statistisches Bundesamt (ed.), *Datenreport 1989: Zahlen und Fakten ueber die Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (Bonn: Bundesamt fuer politische Bildung, 1989), 152, 536. Ronald Ingelhart, "Political Action: The Impact of Values, Cognitive Level, and Social Background", in: Samuel H. Barnes, Max Kaase (eds.), *Political Action: Mass Participation in Five Western Democracies* (London: Sage Publications Ltd., 1979), 343-80, 356-7.

amounted to \$22.5 million in ransoms, \$6.2 million in robberies, and \$6.4 million in stolen goods, for a total of \$35.1 million.¹⁰

Table 3.2 Left-Wing Extremist Offences, 1982-1989*

	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989
Murder (Victims)	--	--	--	2	3	2	1	1
Explosions	68	55	47	63	60	28	11	6
Arson	310	304	172	229	395	210	144	68
Assault	212	41	65	88	155	133	83	88
Robberies	1	--	3	5	2	2	1	3
Breach of Peace/ Violence at Demonstrations	119	90	117	112	139	98	99	136
Obstruction of Transport	6	5	95	115	153	99	43	18
Malicious Damage	1071	1045	770	990	995	925	408	517
All Violent Acts	1597	1540	1269	1602	1902	1497	790	837
Violent Threats	43	7	38	74	97	100	38	40
Other Offences	249	157	216	167	240	258	127	206
Total	1889	1704	1523	1843	2239	1855	955	1083

* These figures also includes non-terrorist incidents.
See Table 3.3 for strictly terrorist offences.

Source: Eva Kolinsky. "Terrorism in West Germany." in: Juliet Lodge (ed.), *The Threat of Terrorism* (Brighton: Wheatsheaf Books Ltd.), 1988, 62. Bundesministerium des Innern (ed.), *Verfassungsschutzbericht 1986* (Bonn: BMI, 1987), 141; 1987, 83; 1988, 1989 (manuscript), 118; 1989, 89.

The seriousness of the logistical offences is possibly doubted by some of the public, which lessens identification with the state. However, this is counterpoised by the fact that these are mainly undertaken by the underground RAF. The RAF and the Revolutionary Cells were also responsible for the murders (apart from two in 1987) and large bombing and arson activities. For example, the RZ exploded eight bombs--some simultaneously--in eight different cities in 1982.¹¹

¹⁰ Hewitt (1988), 170; Kahl, 68; Horchem (1980), 51, says that between 1970 and April 1979 thirty bank robberies by terrorists netted 5.4 million DM, and that another twenty-one robberies, probably by terrorists, raised 1.6 million DM. A further 4.6 million DM was lost through possible terrorist attacks on armoured cars. Karl Guenther Barth, "Mal ein paar Tage abtauchen" *Stern* 40 (45) 29 October-4 November 1987, 250-1, 251, adds possible terrorist connections to department store cash room and money courier thefts.

¹¹ Bundesministerium des Innern (eds.), *Verfassungsschutzbericht 1982*. (Bonn: BMI, 1983), 103.

Between their beginning in 1973 and late 1984, the RZ were believed responsible for 200 arson and bomb attacks,¹² three knee-cappings over the years 1978, 1986 and 1987, and one murder in 1981.

Table 3.3 Left-Wing Terrorist Attacks by Group, 1982-1989

		RAF Illegal RZ/				Total
		RAF	Millitants	Rota Zora	Other	
Arson	1982	--	--	38 ¹	--	120 ²
	1983	--	8	12	144	164
	1984	--	5	4	92	101
	1985	--	13	3	138	154
	1986	--	5	6	244	255
	1987	--	--	17	132	149
	1988	--	6	5	116	127
	1989	--	7	2	56	65
	Explosions	1982	--	--	-- ¹	--
1983		--	5	15	31	51
1984		1	13	7	23	44
1985		1	20	15	24	60
1986		--	12	10	38	60
1987		--	--	5	23	28
1988		--	1	1	9	11
1989		--	1	2	3	6
Murder (Victims/ Attempts)		1982-84	--	--	--	--
	1985	2	--	--	--	2
	1986	3	--	--	--	3
	1987	--	--	--	2	2
	1988	1	--	--	--	1
	1989	1	--	--	--	1
Other	1982	1	--	--	--	1
	1983	--	--	--	--	0
	1984	2	--	--	--	2
	1985	5	--	--	--	5
	1986	--	--	1	--	1
	1987	--	--	1	149 ³	150
	1988	--	--	--	58	58
	1989	--	--	--	29	29
1	Explosive and arson bombings are not seperated in 1982.					
2	'Other' is not seperated from RZ in 1982.					
3	Transportation obstruction added to 'terrorism' offences.					

Source: Bundesministerium des Innern (ed.), *Verfassungsschutzberichte* 1982 (Bonn: BfM, 1983), 100, 103; 1983, 103; 1984, 110; 1986, 128; 1987, 73; 1988 (manuscript), 92; 1989, 77.

This still leaves about 80% of the incidents committed by unknown groups (Table 3.3). The increase in lesser incidents is possibly because the perpetrators usually remain free. It is suspected that they belong to the circles around the *Autonomen*.¹³

The possibility is that identification with the smaller activities of unknown groups has set an example which others follow. Some of the

¹² Rebmann (1985 I), 11.

¹³ Kolinsky, 68; Langguth, 225; "Wir machen Rambo auf Linkes" *Der Spiegel* 46/1987, 17-24.

public may see models for their own activity in low level violence, and there may also be lessened sensitivity to political violence in general, due to its continuation since the late sixties.

**Table 3.4 Left-Wing Terrorist Offences
by Group and Target, 1968-1989**

1968-1980				
	People (%)	Objects (%)	Other (%)	Total (%)
RAF	46 (44.7)	22 (21.3)	35 (34.0)	103 (100)
B2J	13 (16.9)	46 (59.7)	18 (23.4)	77 (100)
RZ/Rota Zora	5 (5.6)	85 (94.4)	-- --	90 (100)
Others	5 (4.3)	94 (81.7)	16 (13.9)	115 (100)
Total	69 (17.9)	247 (64.2)	69 (17.9)	378 (100)
1982-1989				
RAF	7 (41.2)	2 (11.8)	8 (47.1)	17 (100)
RAF Illegal Militants	--	96 (100)	--	96 (100)
RZ/Rota Zora	2 (1.4)	142 (98.6)	--	144 (100)
Others	2 (0.15)	1073 (81.8)	236 (18.0)	1311 (100)
Total	11 (0.7)	1313 (83.7)	244 (15.6)	1568 (100)
1968-1989 (Minus 1981)				
Total	80 (4.1)	1560 (80.2)	313 (16.1)	1946 (100)

Source: (1968-1980) Friedhelm Neidhardt, "Linker und rechter Terrorismus: Erscheinungsformen und Handlungspotentiale im Gruppenvergleich." in: Wanda von Baeyer-Katte, Dieter Claessens, Hubert Feger, Friedhelm Neidhardt (eds.), **Gruppenprozesse: Analysen zum Terrorismus 3** (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1982), 437-8.

Source: (1982-1989) The numbers are from Table 3.3 with people obtained from 'murder', except for the RZ kneecappings listed there under 'other'. Objects are the totals for 'arson' and 'explosions'.

Table 3.3 shows the high number of incidents perpetrated by groups without links to the RZ and RAF, and the proclivity of the RAF for attacks against persons, specifically murder, and the RZ's preference for acts against objects. The 'Illegal Militants' support role for the RAF hard-core can also be seen in the potential for them to maintain RAF activity when the hard-core is inactive. The effect of changes in the criminal code terrorism definition in 1987 is also seen.

Table 3.4 presents data compiled by different methods, because similar data was unavailable. The results show that more people were targeted in the seventies than the eighties, and that the number of objects targeted rose in the eighties. This possibly helps explain why the public identified more strongly with the state in the seventies, than in the eighties. The public did not feel as threatened in the eighties as it did in the seventies. The eighties have also not seen the abductions, hijackings and embassy sieges of the seventies, whereby the public could identify with the incident victims (see chapter seven).

Instead, the eighties have had fewer murders, but more bombings and arson attacks against 'objects'.

Table 3.5 Distribution of Targets by Category and Estimated Cost, 1967-1981

Property Ownership		Individuals	No.	Cost (millions)
Business	25%	Deaths	71	\$18.2
Government	18	Injuries	1589	\$5.1
Security Forces	13	Estimated Cost		\$23.3 million
Utilities	11			
Residential	10			
Political	9			
Vehicles	7			
Cultural, Social,				
Educational	5			
Bars, Cinemas, ect.	2			
Other	1			
Estimated Cost		\$44.2 million		

Source: Christopher Hewitt, "The Costs of Terrorism: A Cross-National Study of Six Countries" *Terrorism* 11 (3) 1988, 169-80, 173, 174.

Tables 3.3 and 3.4 provide no details as to the types of targets chosen by the different terrorist groups. Knowing the types of targets, (banks, department stores, construction firms, etc.), can provide clues as to the issues that motivate terrorist groups. However, the caveat is that targets can also be chosen because of their vulnerability and ease of access as is discussed later in the chapter. Table 3.5 exhibits the identification possibilities of motivation for, and reaction against, terrorism in the high percentage of business and political targets 'political', 'security forces', 'governmental' and residential targets, as well as the deaths and injuries.

The types of terrorist violence help explain potential public identification for the state and against terrorists, as well as for the terrorists and against the state. The terrorist violence of the seventies was new and attacked more people than was acceptable to the public. Attacks against people fell off sharply in the eighties in a shift towards attacks against objects. There was a rise in less sophisticated attacks as people identified possibilities to extend unconventional political activity. Both of these resulted in a lessened danger perception for the state as opposed to that in the seventies, and a higher identification with low level terrorism against objects.

3. Issues Raised by Terrorist Attacks

The motivating identifications differed for the terrorist group founders and their successors. Some issues have remained consistent

between them, while others changed. Some targets have also remained consistent between them, while the issues connected to the targets changed. The issues discussed are not in any order of importance.

3.1 The State

A foremost issue of left-wing terrorist activity in the Federal Republic of Germany has been the state itself. The terrorists viewed the state as their enemy, and wanted to prove their strength against it by showing its vulnerability¹⁴ in order to obtain legitimacy as objects of identification from the public. The public would join the terrorists, the Red Army Faction thought, because the state produced too many contradictions, and it could no longer buy off the public with reform promises. Thus

...in the measure that we make the correct actions and you [a prisoner support group] the correct propaganda, the guerilla will become anchored in the masses, a revolutionary process and consciousness will develop and advance. The consciousness that it is justified to act- -and possible!¹⁵

The result in the seventies was that the Second of June Movement attacked police offices (3 March 1972)¹⁶ and judges (10 November 1974), while the RAF included the bombing of police offices on 12 May 1972, and the car of a federal judge (15 May 1972) amongst the first targets in their first bombing campaign in May 1972.

The RZ targeted the State Court House in Hamm (15 May 1976), and a tax inspector's home (16 September 1976) though not for the same vanguard reasons as the RAF. The Revolutionary Cells have always stated they are part of the masses because

...in view of the reality that we see opposite us, in view of the horrible authority methods available to mankind that the powers have...and against which we have to defend ourselves...we can only finally overcome with violence, whereby 'we' naturally doesn't mean urban-guerilla groups, but naturally, as said, only [urban] guerilla [tactics] practiced by the masses.¹⁷

However, these motives were not the only identification at work in the terrorists. They also identified with their members, and sought

¹⁴ Red Army Faction, "Das Konzept Stadtguerilla" (1983), 357.

¹⁵ Red Army Faction, "Tonbandprotokoll der Erklarung der RAF auf dem Teach-in der Roten Hilfe Ffm. am 31.5.72.", in: *Bewaffneter Kampf: Texte der RAF, Auseinandersetzung und Kritik* (Graz: Verlag Rote Sonne, 1973), 181-3, 183.

¹⁶ The dates here and elsewhere in the chapter refer to the chronology.

¹⁷ Revolutionary Cells (1975), 216-7.

revenge for the deaths of fallen comrades- -the first motive of the RAF's second attack. They could not let the police and others go unscathed¹⁸ nor unanswered. Similarly, the attempted abduction that ended in the murder of Guenter von Drenkmann, by the Second of June, was because of the state's perceived responsibility for the death of an imprisoned terrorist, and as Drenkmann was a member of the 'hard core' of responsible state persons he had to realise that "whoever sows violence, will harvest violence".¹⁹

In the seventies the Red Army Faction considered the Federal Republic an independent actor. This changed in the eighties when it was perceived as subservient to the USA. This meant the state was targeted for its connections to other issues, and not in and of itself as a means to overthrow the state, but to assist in the general overthrow of imperialism in Europe and the world. For example, the communique of Detlev Rohwedder's murder (2 April 1991) stated that this was an 'instalment' against 'the imperialist beast' and 'the reactionary greater German and Western European plans to suppress and exploit people here and in the Third World.' This was a sign of the RAF's self-identification shift towards that of an anti-imperialist group, something the group always thought itself to be. However, in its early days this was not as heavily promoted as it was in the eighties.²⁰

The Revolutionary Cells in the eighties shifted their moves against the state towards support for specific protest campaigns which are examined in the following sections. The Revolutionary Cells, in this respect are like the **Autonomen**, whose low-level terrorism, sabotage, bombing and disturbances at demonstrations are used to point out ecological and social problems.²¹

3.2 Anti-Imperialism

The terrorists' self-identification as anti-imperialists means they target imperialists, whom they perceive as enemies of the Third World. The RAF sees

...the urban guerilla [as] the connection between national and international class struggle. The urban guerilla is a possibility to produce relationships

¹⁸ B.H. Miller (1983), 214-24.

¹⁹ Second of June, "Zum Attentat auf Berlins hoechster Richter: Terror oder Gegenwehr?!", in: 'Holger der Kampf geht weiter!' Beitrage zur Konzept Stadtguerilla (Gaiganz/Ueberfranken: Politladen Verlagsgesellschaft, 1975), 248-52, 251.

²⁰ B.H. Miller (1983), 232-3, 315-8; *Independent* 3 April 1991, 1.

²¹ Hans Josef Horchem, "European Terrorism: A German Perspective", *Terrorism* 1 (1982), 27-51, 27.

between imperialistic authorities in the consciousness of the people.²²

Their first target, the US Fifth Army Corp Headquarters on 11 May 1972, was to answer American bombs with Red Army Faction bombs in order to eliminate secure areas for the US.²³

In 1973 the Revolutionary Cells underscored their displeasure with US-imperialism and supported the Third World by bombing ITT (International Telephone and Telegraph) offices in West-Berlin (17 November 1973) and Nurnberg (18 November 1973) as their first official activity. These attacks were also linked with the company's involvement in the overthrow of Allende's government in Chile.²⁴

In 1976 they added US military targets because:

We understand our struggle as that of a colonised people, whose territory of the Federal German administration is given up to the US-imperialism as the main support area, and is made ready as the military and strategic headquarters for the subjugation and eradication of the European people, the people of the Middle East and during the Indochina war the people of the Far East.²⁵

The eighties saw the RAF shift from attacks on unprotected American rear areas in 1972 to the RZ view of attacks on enemy strongholds. The RAF no longer attacked weak points, because of the imperialist's problems elsewhere, but attacked it in its homeland. By showing Germany to be a centre of imperialist power it also pointed to Germany's role of servant with the real masters- -the USA (via NATO)- -being in charge.²⁶ The same targets were attacked for different reasons.

The May 1982 paper clarified the RAF's position by calling for an anti-imperialist front "within the framework of the world-wide struggle" whereby the major enemy/target is 'US-imperialism'.²⁷ These targets had been underscored in 1981 by an attack on the NATO Air Force Headquarters in Ramstein on 31 August, and by the attempted assassination of the US Army Supreme Commander in Europe, General Frederick J. Kroesen, on 14 September.

The RAF stated these attacks were a sign of the

²² Red Army Faction, "Dem Volk dienen: Stadtguerilla und Klassenkampf" (1983), 374.

²³ B.H. Miller (1983), 212.

²⁴ Revolutionary Cells (1985), 25.

²⁵ *ibid.*, 43.

²⁶ B.H. Miller (1983), 332, 341.

²⁷ Red Army Faction, "Guerilla, Widerstand und Antiimperialistische Front" (1983), 613.

...new political situation and the orientation of the whole political process in resistance against the reconstruction of the strategy of US-imperialism, with its pivot in West Europe and which the centrality of West Europe introduced a new phase of the world revolutionary process.²⁸

The RAF saw NATO as part of a US-imperialist policy for the West, to prepare for the Third World War by building up the military machine to change the military balance between socialist and imperialist Europe. In the RAF's view, the Europeans would see what it is like in the Third World under the rule of the imperialists.²⁹

It is incorrect to believe that the Red Army Faction has identified with both the Third World and its domestic public. The Third World did not interest itself in them and the RAF did not care about the West German public, because they believed the public never considered that their lifestyle was at the expense of those in the Third World.³⁰

3.21 Support for the Third World

The terrorist groups identified with what they saw as the price of imperialism. In the case of Vietnam it was

...the horrible experience of the people of the Third World that imperialism is determined to practice genocide on them, if there is nothing more to gain from them- -them as market, on a military basis, as natural resource supplier, as a supplier of cheap labour, to no longer join in...³¹

Vietnam was an identification point for West German groups even in the sixties, as discussed in chapter two. Vietnam was also the focus of handbills written by *Kommune I* members in West-Berlin after a department store was firebombed in Brussels in May 1967. The handbills and the bombing were both meant to awaken a new understanding of the Vietnam war by providing the West European public with a chance to experience the horrors of American bombings similar to those undergone by the North Vietnamese. One of the handbills stated that:

If there's a fire somewhere in the near future, if an army barracks goes up into the air, if in some stadium

²⁸ Red Army Faction, "Erklaerung vom 10.4. aus Stammheim zu den Aktionen 81", *Zusammen Kaempfen* 1 (December 1984), 3.

²⁹ Red Army Faction, "Kommando Sigurd Debus", in: Jean Paul Marat (ed.), *Widerstand Heisst Angriff! erklarungen, redebeitraege, flugblaetter und briefe 1977-1987* (Amsterdam: Bibliotheek voor Ontspanning en Ontwikkeling, 1988), 70.

³⁰ Reiche, 16-7; Peter-Juergen Boock in *Stern* 41 (39) 1988, 271.

³¹ Red Army Faction, "Die Aktion des Schwarzen September in Muenchen", in: *texte: der RAF* (West Berlin: no publisher given, ueberarbeitete und aktualisierte Ausgabe, 1983), 411- 447, 413-4.

a stand collapses, be little surprised. Just as little as when the [Americans] transgress the demarcation line, or bomb the city centre of Hanoi, or send marines marching into China. Burn, department store, burn!³²

The same firebombing, and the trial of the *Kommune I* authors, was also the inspiration for a firebombing by later members of the RAF in April 1968,³³ whose identification with Vietnam was so strong for the founder Red Army Faction members that it was a central point of the courtroom defence strategy for Baader, Ennslein, Meinhof and Raspe. On 4 May 1976 they asked a number of people to be called as witnesses to give evidence that

...the US government, by military intervention in Vietnam and Cambodia, had committed violations of international law, that West German soil had been among the places from which they operated, and that accordingly it might be a relevant legal issue to consider whether, in its own turn, 'the use of force against certain military establishments of the USA on West German territory, such as bomb attacks on US bases in Frankfurt and Heidelberg, was justified'.³⁴

By the time the 'second generation' RAF, and the Second of June were organised and operational in the Stockholm embassy and elsewhere, other concerns were paramount, and the issue of Vietnam itself was decided. However, the targets need not change, only the object of identification and the message.

Contacts between the pre-terrorist groups and Palestinians, which continued during the terrorists' early formation, led to identification with the Palestinians. The RAF founders were trained in an Al Fatah camp in Jordan in 1970 which was under the command of Hassan Salameh, who later organised the Black September attack on the Munich Olympics in 1972. In the hostage taking Salameh required the release of Baader and Meinhof along with the release of Palestinians held by the Israelis in exchange for the Israeli Olympic team.³⁵

Possibly in return, the RAF wrote a long essay about Black September and the Munich Massacre, in which the RAF praised the group and discussed its anti-imperialist, anti-fascist and international

³² Langhans, Teufel, (no pagination) Flugblatt 8, 24.5.67. The original ended with the English phrase: "burn, warehouse, burn!"

³³ Aust (1987), 49-50.

³⁴ *ibid.*, 343-4; see also: Red Army Faction, "Protokoll- -Ausschnitt Stammheim 22. Juni 1976", in: *texte: der RAF* (West Berlin: no publisher given, ueberarbeitete und aktualisierte Ausgabe, 1983), 491-5, 491. The applications for these persons to appear, and the testimony of those who came nonetheless, is provided in: *texte: der RAF*, 476-516.

³⁵ Aust (1987), 234; George Jonas, *Vengeance: A True Story* (London: Pan Books Ltd., 1985), 23.

characteristics. The RAF praised the action as an example of the periphery bringing the war to the centre of imperialism and multinational corporations.³⁶

However, West German contact with Al Fatah did not last, and they changed their affiliation to the Palestinian Front for the Liberation of Palestine. The identification did not change. Both groups were action oriented, but as Al Fatah moved away from attacks outside of Israel, the German groups identified with the PFLP who did undertake attacks outside of Israel. The PFLP could offer the Germans training, weapons, and other items in exchange for money and services rendered as in the OPEC (1975) and Entebbe (1976) attacks. The PFLP, who hijacked a Lufthansa airplane in October 1977, demanded the release of imprisoned German terrorists.

In the eighties there was less direct contact with Palestinian issues after the Palestinians were pushed out of the Lebanon by the Israelis in 1982. However, there has been the use of commando names with Palestinian connections, and an RAF position paper offered for a Middle East congress in Wiesbaden in November 1986. The paper was presented by an RAF supporter and pointed out that the Palestinians--the PFLP by name--had learned the same lessons as the anti-imperialists in Western Europe: one has to work with others to free oneself from imperialism. No one person can do this alone, and the political and military aspects need to be fought together. This applies as much to the Middle East as to the struggle in the Federal Republic and Western Europe.³⁷

The main Third World identification object in the eighties for left-wing terrorists in West Germany (apart from the RAF) was apartheid in South Africa. To the other West German groups

...South Africa means...our hope for a life on the other side of the imperialist exploitative relationship and the unrealistic behavior combines itself with the independence struggle of the black youth, women and men. That is why our actions are directed against those who are responsible for the repression, exploitation and hunger politics around the world.³⁸

RZ theory placed the issue of black South Africa into the already present anti-imperialist schematic that the West in general feels it

³⁶ Red Army Faction, "Die Aktion des Schwarzen September" (1983), 414.

³⁷ n.n. "Beitraeg zur Nahost Veranstaltung, am 16. Nov. 86 in Wiesbaden", in: Jean Paul Marat (ed.), *Widerstand Heisst Angriff! erklaerungen, redebeitraege, flugblaetter und briefe 1977-1987* (Amsterdam: Bibliotheek voor Ontspanning en Ontwikkeling, 1988), 341-8.

³⁸ Revolutionary Cells, "Solidaritaet mit dem Befreiungskampf in Suedafrika" 10.2.86, printed in: *tot oder Lebendig: Zeitung fuer Polittourismus* 3, 1986, 37.

needs South Africa to be under Western influence or control to maintain secure raw material resources. Furthermore, South Africa's role in southern Africa, like Israel's in the Middle East, is seen as that of the guardian of Western interests in an otherwise difficult area. Therefore, South Africa is supplied with the most modern weapons and is integrated into the strategy of NATO in order to secure the imperialist interests of the West.³⁹

As a part of the anti-apartheid campaign, and as a part of the larger anti-imperialism campaign, the efforts against the multinational company Shell took on a special position. Attackers against Shell could easily justify their attacks without worrying about the positions of the national resistance movements like the African National Congress. Attacking Shell was not supporting any of the resistance movements with weapons or workers brigades as was done in Central America, but was simply "fighting the supporters of counter-revolution here in the metropole" whereby such militant activity helps the blacks in South Africa through the encouragement of disinvestment from South Africa. The international character of the anti-Shell campaign, with strong movements in Holland, Denmark, and Sweden and to a lesser extent in Norway, Italy, Finland and West Germany, presented the possibility of a West European internationalism. However, this was only seen as possible through systematically widening personal clandestine contacts.⁴⁰

3.22 Finance and the 'Military Industrial Complex'

Identification with the Third World and anti-imperialism has led to its linkage with finance for the Third World as evidenced by opposition to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank meetings held in West Berlin in September 1988. There were large demonstrations against the meetings, along with rioting by left-wing extremists. Twenty-five percent of the left-wing terrorist bombings in 1988 were also connected with the event. There was also the attempted murder of Dr. Hans Tietmeyer, the government official responsible for organising the event, on 20 September 1988 by the RAF.⁴¹

The Red Army Faction saw Tietmeyer as the embodiment of international crisis management on the national, European and international levels. The RAF perceived the imperialists as responsible

³⁹ Revolutionary Cells, "Burn, Baby Burn", *tot oder Lebendig: Zeitung fuer Polittourismus* 3, 1986, 38-9, 39; "RZ 13.10.1985", *Radikal* 131, 76-77.

⁴⁰ "Shell to Hell! Diskussionspapier" *Radikal* 139 (November 1989), 4-7.

⁴¹ BMI (ed.), *VSB 1988* (manuscript), 93, 103.

for hunger and death in the Third World as they used all possible means to balance the powers of imperialism against freedom movements. The RAF argue that by fighting against imperialism around the world, imperialism could be countered, eventually eroded and broken to allow "concrete perspectives for the end of imperialist rule".⁴²

To come full circle, the eighties also saw the Red Army Faction develop its 'militarisch-industriellen-komplex' (MIK, military industrial complex) concept of attacking the strong centre of the imperialist enemy in West Europe in its political, military and industrial areas. Since then the concept has matured into the 'antiimperialist front in Western Europe' through collaborative efforts which the RAF has sought with other West European terrorist groups since 1984/85, as exemplified by its cooperation with the French terrorist group Action Direct.

In their communique for the murder of Beckurts on 9 July 1986 the RAF wrote that the MIK comprises technological monopolies that increase Third World dependence on the West as contributors of the West's economic profits and growth. American capital, according to the RAF, leads the enterprise, and together with the other core states of West Germany, France, Great Britain, Italy and Japan, the Americans are strategically internationally reorganising their research and production, while Europe also increases its cooperative efforts in political, economic and military areas.⁴³

The Belgian Combatant Communist Cells, the French Action Direct, in joint work with an Italian Red Brigades offshoot, and the RAF were all targeting similar objects such as NATO pipelines, NATO institutions and defence contractors, as well as American military installations, **Bundeswehr** (federal army) targets, defence industry sites, technology and research firms, individual politicians, state security people, and businessmen in the MIK area such as the two RAF victims, Ernst Zimmermann (1 February 1985) and Beckurts.⁴⁴ The attacks against the 'imperialist beast' and the 'reactionary greater German and Western European plans to suppress and exploit people here and in the Third World', language used in the Rohwedder communique quoted above, show that the 'anti-imperialist struggle' of the RAF continues.

⁴² Red Army Faction, "'Bekennerschreiben' der RAF zum Anschlag auf Staatssekretär Tietmeyer", in: Uwe Backes, Eckhard Jesse, (eds.), **Jahrbuch Extremismus und Demokratie 1989** (Bonn: Bourvier Verlag, 1989), 159-61.

⁴³ die taz 11 July 1986.

3.3 Technology

The technology aspect inherent in the Red Army Faction's MIK concept is also underscored by the Revolutionary Cell's and **Autonomen** activities against technological issues. The RZ campaign began against nuclear energy in the seventies, and added computers and genetic technology in the eighties.⁴⁵ A simple explanation of the RZ and **Autonomen** attacks against technology would be an identification with ecology and romantic movements. The communiqués also join up the technological issues with other ones as described below.

In the 1983 RZ discussion paper on the peace movement they pointed out that the peace movement has not been so radical as to move beyond the basis of eliminating the Pershing IIs and Tomahawk cruise missiles. The RZ state that the movement must go further and eliminate the system that brought the missiles to Europe in the first place.⁴⁶

In connection with the RZ campaign against **Startbahn West** the group targeted suppliers and builders of the new project, which they also perceived to be linked to the Hessian nuclear programme.⁴⁷

Another issue area of the RZ has been computing centres and electronics firms. The reason for distancing themselves from computer technology is because "[t]he logic of the computer is the logic of capital: it serves the exploitation and subjection, the splintering and selection, the collection and repression."⁴⁸ Computers are thus evil, because they help their users to exploit chances and circumstances which might have otherwise been neglected.

Computers and computer integrated manufacturing, according to the Revolutionary Virus Thomas Muenzer group (RZ offshoot) in Berlin, increases the influence of business and capital on research, which must always 'chase the coin' and is therefore undesirable.⁴⁹

Attacks against gene technology research by the RZ and **Rota Zora** are grounded in the belief that "these experiments bring with them the destruction of natural diversity and unforeseeable ecological problems." The extremists do not believe that these research centres are for the

⁴⁴ "Angriffsziel: NATO" **Stern** 38 (35) 22-8 August 1985, 10-4, 14; "Im Fadenkreuz der RAF" **Stern** 39 (20) 17-23 July, 1986, 10-8, 133-4, 16.

⁴⁵ Geronimo, 72-158.

⁴⁶ Horchem (1987 I), 10, discussing: Jedes Herz eine Zeitbombe: Diskussionspapier der 'Revolutionaerer Zellen' zur Zukunft der Friedensbewegung", reprinted in: Revolutionary Cells (1985), 57-60.

⁴⁷ Revolutionary Cells (1985), 61.

⁴⁸ Revolutionary Cells, "Wie der Herr so das Gescherr", **Radikal** 131, 77.

⁴⁹ Revolutionary Virus Thomas Muentzer in **Radikal** 135 (October 1988), 46-8.

benefit of the people. One Rota Zora cell that bombed a cultivation gene research centre on 18 August 1985 believed that:

A consequence of these new forms [of plants is that]... Their profitable use continues the social destruction process of the 'Green Revolution' and increases the power of the agricultural, food and chemical multinationals. They do not conquer the hunger.⁵⁰

Rota Zora also perceives danger in racist selective processes on an economic basis, attacks on women, and economic exploitation in gene and biotechnology,⁵¹ because, as discussed in chapter two, Rota Zora feel women's resistance needs to be furthered against what they see as patriarchal imperialism so that women's roles are changed both privately and socially.

The technological issues are characterised by identification with the larger issues of the Third World, anti-imperialism, feminism and ecology. Technology poses dangers to each of these, according to the terrorist groups.

3.4 Human Rights

The RZ idea of emancipation for the individual as a natural part of the emancipation of the people in the repressive state⁵² forms the basis for the Revolutionary Cells' identification with human rights. In particular this takes the form of support for political asylum seekers, and Rota Zora support of women's rights.

The Rota Zora first came to the attention of the public on 4 March 1975 when they bombed the Federal Constitutional Court building in Karlsruhe. The court had just ruled in Paragraph 218 of the Criminal Code that abortions were to be prohibited "in agreement with the 'free democratic basic order'" when the life of the mother or child was not in danger.⁵³ Rota Zora bombed the court building in order to 'protect' themselves from the court because they were against

a constitution, that illegalises women- -driving many to death- -if they do not let the mafia of doctors and

⁵⁰ Rota Zora, "Rota Zora 18.8.85", *Radikal* 131, 75.

⁵¹ Rota Zora, "'Bekennerschreiben' der Terrorgruppe 'Rota Zora' zum Sprengstoffanschlag auf das Biotechnologische Zentrum der Technischen Universitaet Braunschweig", in: Uwe Backes, Eckhard Jesse, (eds.), *Jahrbuch Extremismus und Demokratie 1989* (Bonn: Bourvier Verlag, 1989), 161-4.

⁵² Revolutionary Cells (1975), 213.

⁵³ *Sueddeutsche Zeitung* 8 August 1986; Rota Zora, "Erklaerung der Revolutionaeren Zellen zu ihrem Anschlag auf das Bundesverfassungsgericht!", in: *'Holger der Kampf geht weiter!' Beitrage zur Konzept Stadtguerilla* (Gaiganz/Ueberfranken: Politladen Verlagsgesellschaft, 1975), 242-4, 242.

judges [abuse/violate] their sexuality, the intimacy of their own bodies, [and] dictate the number of children allowed.⁵⁴

Rota Zora interest in women's treatment and role in life has continued in the eighties with attacks on marriage bureaux in 1983 that facilitated the arranged marriages of Phillipino women (about 200 bureaux each arranged about 400 marriages a year), and the Phillipine Embassy in Bonn for its complicity in the marriages. They also damaged the private vehicles of owners of the marriage bureaux companies in 1988 while these were parked outside their homes to point out that their public and private lives were inseparable. The main Lufthansa offices were bombed on 28 October 1986 by Rota Zora because of alleged airline profits from both the deportation of people who had been denied political asylum in the FRG, and because it 'shamelessly' helped to exploit the misery of women in the Third World by flying to such centres of prostitution as Bangkok and Manila. These Rota Zora bombings were pointers towards the poverty of Third World countries, the repression and exploitation of women as objects in prostitution, sex trips to Thailand and marriage bureaux.⁵⁵

Between June and September 1987 Rota Zora, and the Berlin offshoot Amazons, directed a successful 'blackmail' arson bomb campaign against the Adler textile company in Haibach. The two groups forced Adler to direct its South Korean subsidiary to rehire thirteen dismissed women union employees. Rota Zora made the same demands as the South Korean strikers: the reinstatement of the thirteen women, free workers' council elections and a wage increase of 20%.⁵⁶

Since 1986 the Revolutionary Cells have targeted political asylum issues as part of their anti-imperialist identification and support for the Third World, because they view political asylum as a reflection of the misery caused by the imperialists in their homelands, where the level of refugees reflects the level of capitalism in their home countries. The RZ seek to help open the borders of the countries that want to close them to secure their internal stability. The RZ feels it can contribute towards a reduction in the state's response towards political refugees by attacking police and social control points in order to create a free-space for political refugees beyond state control and regulation. For example, in 1986 the RZ attacked police foreign

⁵⁴ Rota Zora (1975), 242.

⁵⁵ *Sunday Times* 22 September 1983; Rota Zora, "Anschlag auf Kasseller Frauenhandler" *Radikal* 135 (October 1988), 31; Horchem (1987 I), 11.

⁵⁶ Heinrich Boge in *The German Tribune* 1 November 1987, 5; *die taz* 29 September 1987, 4; *Sueddeutsche Zeitung* 25 June 1987, 27.

registration centres in Hamburg, Hamm and Hagen and the federal registration computer in Cologne. The loss of records and applications meant that thousands of asylum seekers had to start over, and could stay longer in the Federal Republic. This was the intention of the 'Revolutionary Virus/ The Youth Organisation of the RZ', (Revolutionaere Viren/ Die Jugendorganisation der RZ) who fire bombed the Foreign Registration Offices in Berlin-Wedding.⁵⁷

The political asylum issue is connected with the most violent RZ attacks. On 28 October 1986, the Director of the Foreign Registration Office in West-Berlin, Harald Hollenberg, was knee-capped, as was the judge of the Federal Supreme Court in West Berlin, Guenter Korbmacher on 1 September 1987. Korbmacher had become more severe in political asylum cases, by having applicants prove they were persecuted for their religious and political beliefs. Threats of such persecution were not enough.⁵⁸ These two attacks account for the only attacks on persons by the RZ in the eighties, outside of the murder of Herbert Karry on 11 May 1981 in connection with **Startbahn West** in Frankfurt.

3.5 Imprisoned Terrorists

A constant identification object of terrorists has been their imprisoned comrades. The apprehension of the founder Red Army Faction members in June 1972 brought this identification to the fore with activity by prisoner support groups, hunger strikes, shootings of judiciary officials and representatives, prison escapes and hostage takings. The terrorists no longer identified with foreign groups and abstract ideas, but with their own comrades who became identification objects in their own right, (see chapter seven) as well as linkages to other identifications such as the Third World, the state and anti-imperialism as they sought to free old members and recruit new ones.

However, it can also be argued that by involving themselves with efforts to free terrorists the West German terrorists neglected their original revolutionary aims on behalf of their own country's class war and the Third World peoples.⁵⁹

⁵⁷ Revolutionary Cells, "Erklaerung der RZ zu 'politischen Aktionen' im Jahre 1986", in: Uwe Backes, Eckhard Jesse, **Politischer Extremismus in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland Band III: Dokumentation** (Cologne: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1989), 148-50; *die taz* 8 July 1987, 20; *die taz* 9 July 1987.

⁵⁸ *Sueddeutsche Zeitung* 29 October 1986, 1; *Guardian* 2 September 1987, 7.

⁵⁹ Otto Billig, "The Lawyer Terrorist and His Comrades" *Political Psychology* 6 (1) 1985, 29-46, 41.

3.51 Release of Prisoners

Identification with apprehended comrades led to dramatic terrorist activity in the seventies. The RAF began its first action with the freeing of Baader from prison in May 1970, and the Second of June could also be said to have begun similarly on 8 July 1971 when two future B2J members impersonated each other in court. The result was that the person who was to be sentenced to a prison term was able to walk out free as someone else, while the person remaining had to be let free, as he was not the sentenced person and was thus innocent of the charge.⁶⁰ The B2J also undertook many other successful prison escapes in the course of its history (see chronology).

The Second of June was also, as discussed in chapter two, the only group to secure the release of imprisoned terrorists in a hostage exchange when they abducted Peter Lorenz between February and March 1975. As the government guessed, this was only the prelude to a larger hostage exchange attempt by the terrorists, which followed on 24 April 1975 when an RAF commando occupied the West German Embassy in Stockholm, Sweden and held eleven hostages captive in exchange for the release of twenty-six prisoners in the FRG. The incident ended when the terrorists accidentally set off their explosives.

In 1977 the RAF sought to force the SPD/FDP coalition to become harsher, or give in to the terrorists. The first half of the campaign began on 30 July with the attempted kidnapping of the Chairman of the Board of the Dresdener Bank, Juergen Ponto, because he represented the international finance capital. When his abduction went wrong, he was shot.⁶¹

On 5 September the RAF kidnapped Hanns Martin Schleyer, who supposedly represented the

national economic policy (the fat businesses, coordinated action, FRG as the international model of the social peace). That means the power in the state, which the SPD as the administrative party has to consider, if they wish to remain in the administration.⁶²

The RAF believed Schleyer represented enough interested parties to force the government to release the remaining cadre in prison. However, even the coordinated Palestinian hijacking of a Lufthansa plane with similar demands for the release of RAF prisoners did not secure their

⁶⁰ Baumann (1979), 79-80, 83-4.

⁶¹ Red Army Faction, "Guerilla, Widerstand und Antimperialistische Front" (1983), 618; Aust (1987), 406-8.

⁶² Red Army Faction, "Guerilla, Widerstand und Antimperialistische Front" (1983), 618.

release by the government. After the plane was freed Baader, Ensslin, Raspe and Irmgard Moeller, were found dead, or critically wounded. Hanns Martin Schleyer was found dead on 19 October.⁶³

November 1977 saw a shift from abductions for freeing prisoners to abductions for ransoms when the Second of June kidnapped the Austrian textile industry magnate, Michael Palmers in Vienna. The group received about 4.3 million DM for his release.⁶⁴

The first hostage episode ended with the release of the imprisoned terrorists. The others resulted in dead hostages and terrorists, apart from Mogadishu, which left the hostages alive. This has not escaped the terrorists' attention. Since then they have switched the emphasis of their campaigns to reflect the fact that they no longer expect the prisoners' release, although there are police suspicions that this position may have recently changed back to a belief in the viability of hostage rescue attempts.⁶⁵

3.52 Hunger Strikes

Hunger strikes in West Germany were first used after regular protests against prison conditions proved ineffective in gaining normal prison conditions for imprisoned suspected and sentenced terrorists. They believed hunger strikes would achieve more publicity and thus add more pressure for change. This also led to the creation of the 'Committees Against Torture'. Since the suspected terrorists were first arrested they had been held in special conditions of imprisonment, separated from other prisoners. Later hunger strikes were also used to prolong trials. This failed when the courts declared the terrorists had brought their weakened conditions on themselves, and that the trials would be conducted in their absence.⁶⁶

Ostensibly the terrorists sought to be treated as 'normal' prisoners, but in effect they only drove a wedge between themselves and 'normal' prisoners according to Mahler. He also later believed it would fail as society was immoral, and therefore the moral weapon of the hunger strike would not work. Mahler, instead, felt that the imprisoned terrorists should promote methods that would unify them and 'normal'

⁶³ Aust (1987), 500, 541.

⁶⁴ Kahl, 131.

⁶⁵ Horchem (1987 I), 15; "Muss Bernhard machen" *Der Spiegel* 25/1991, 31-2.

⁶⁶ Pieter Bakker Schut, *Stammheim: Der Prozess gegen die Rote Armee Fraktion* (Kiel: Neuer Malik Verlag, 1986), 89-90, 99; Aust (1987), 243-30; Billig, 35; Horbatiuk, 178.

prisoners. Creating an elitist group such as the Red Army Faction would only cause a loss of credibility.⁶⁷

However, while the prisoners were seldom able to enlist support for their aims amongst the left, they could nonetheless gain their moral support based on their claims for improved prison conditions. The list of the special conditions imposed on suspected and convicted imprisoned terrorists was long, as is seen in those imposed on Holger Meins in March 1973. The special conditions included physical searches after each visit, no one was to be placed in the cells around, above or below his, only known delivery people could enter the prison when he was out of doors, visits could only occur in the presence of the chief security officer and an assistant, exercise was only allowed when accompanied by two guards, and a daily cell and body search was to be performed.⁶⁸ These were similar to those imposed on Siegelind Hoffman in July 1980,⁶⁹ which would imply either that the government was immovable on the issue, or that the hunger strikes were not to improve prison conditions but had another purpose. Both could also be true.

In the seventies the discussion about the prison conditions for suspected terrorists was to create opportunities for more activity by the commandos and other supporters.⁷⁰ As is shown below this was also true in the eighties, and arguably remains so in the nineties.

Discussion outside of the prisons was originally organised by prisoner support groups (see chapter two) who were interested in improved prisoner conditions. These groups sought to improve the prisoners' conditions through public pressure before, during, and after hunger strikes as well as after 'suspicious' circumstances surrounding the death of prisoners, as was the case when Meinhof committed suicide in 1976, and when Baader, Ennslin and Raspe committed suicide in 1977. The open questions surrounding these deaths have been raised to questions of belief for terrorist supporters, who believe these persons to have been murdered by the authorities.⁷¹ The result, as is shown in chapter four, is new recruits. New recruits were important as the lifeblood of groups whose members were invariably imprisoned or died. As shown above, freeing imprisoned members was difficult at best.

In January 1981 *Revolutionaerer Zorn* observed that to free prisoners one had to take on a military aspect and confront the state as equals.

⁶⁷ Billig, 35-6.

⁶⁸ Aust (1987), 245-6.

⁶⁹ Pieter Bakker Schut (ed.), *Todesschüsse, Isolationshaft, Eingriffe ins Verteidigungsrecht* (Selbstverlag, Eigendruck, Second Edition, 1985), 244-7.

⁷⁰ Klaus, 75.

⁷¹ Aust (1987), 124.

The guerillas had the problem of little experience in an area where the state would use every means at its disposal to eliminate the armed groups. This does not mean the guerillas were doomed to failure. The Lorenz abduction showed that the groups must be sure to use the "certain political constellations [in order] to stand the actual power relationships punctually on their heads".⁷²

This was a tall order, but as a means of recruitment terrorists, as discussed in chapter two and as is elaborated upon further in chapter four, had found hunger strikes a mobilising power that did 'stand the actual power relationships punctually on their heads'. Their success, however, depended upon mobilising parts of the public and media to debate the issues of prison conditions and provide the suitable canvas for continued terrorist activity.

Hunger strikes aim for an identification with the state or the striker such that it is difficult for the terrorists to lose. If the state does not accede to the hunger strikers' demands, and someone dies, then this is labelled murder. If the state steps in and force feeds people, then this is labelled an act of torture. When the force feeding cannot be employed because of the individuals' resistance, or is itself a life threatening procedure, then the state is further pilloried.⁷³

The Federal Republic's dilemma comes from (1) the obligation of the prison to maintain the bodily and spiritual health of the prisoner, (2) they must also balance this with their obligation of health care which sometimes results in forceful handling and feeding, as well as (3) the doctors' ethical and legal obligations of assistance. The prisoners, on the other hand, have their own rights of personal self-development, bodily integrity, and self-determination, which means the state and prison staff cannot intervene until the prisoners cannot express their self-determination because they are comatose. At this stage, however, medical assistance may also be life threatening because of the force feeding methods.⁷⁴

The lack of success in freeing terrorists in the seventies and the deaths of some imprisoned ones, possibly reinforced the use of hunger strikes as recruitment drives in the eighties. It may also have reflected a new organisational structure of the Red Army Faction that did not place the prisoners at the top, as discussed in chapter two. Therefore abductions were replaced by assassinations as underground

⁷² Revolutionary Cells (1985), 55.

⁷³ Mr. Beckmann (FDP) in *Verhandlungen des Deutsche Bundestages* 10. Wahlperiode, 117. Sitzung, 24 January 1985, 8643.

⁷⁴ *ibid.*, 8643-4; "Recht an den Grenze" *Der Spiegel* 3 (14 January) 1985, 71.

activities that placed the outside group's activities in focus, while the imprisoned members brought attention to themselves in long, death threatening hunger strikes. It is possible that they came to believe, as one Second of June member did, that concentrating on freeing prisoners means ignoring all the other repression in the world, and to misinterpret capitalism. Lastly, they "make themselves not only ridiculous, but invite the enemy to murder the prisoners."⁷⁵

This change was seen in the RAF's 'Offensive 84/85', which also reflected a coordination of the various RAF levels that has not been repeated. Since then there have been no coordinated bombing campaigns-- in connection with hunger strikes or otherwise.

Ostensibly the hunger strike in 1984/85 sought:

- consolidation of the prisoners from the resistance [against imperialism] and all fighting prisoners in large groups;
- the abolition of single and small group isolation and the acoustic and optical inquiry and control;
- lifting of the communications ban: visits, letters, books, free political discussions and information.⁷⁶

Actually the hunger strike was to create the proper atmosphere for more public awareness and sympathy for the RAF prisoners. First, the legal arm of the RAF organised sixty discussion evenings, solidarity meetings and demonstrations. Some family members of imprisoned RAF members and others also occupied the Bonn information office of the European Parliament on 10 January, and on 7 February 1985, after the hunger strike was over and Zimmermann murdered, RAF sympathisers occupied the Green party office in Frankfurt.⁷⁷

Second, the bombs of the 'illegal militants' and the 'hard-core' highlighted the group by example. Third, the 15 January 1985 joint statement with Action Direct was designed to show that the RAF was not alone in its ideas, but part of "a united front to combat NATO imperialism".⁷⁸ This was also signalled by support activities for the RAF hunger strike in other countries (the blockade of the Federal

⁷⁵ Ralf Reinders, "'Das Gewaltmonopol wurde durchbrochen'" *Schwarze Faden: Vierteljahresschrift fuer Lust und Freiheit* 25 (3/1987), 25-9, 29.

⁷⁶ Red Army Faction, "Erklaerung zur Zusammenlegung der Gefangenen aus der RAF", *Zusammen Kaempfen* 1 (December 1984), 5.

⁷⁷ Kahl, 151; Hans Josef Horchem, "Terrorismus in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland" *Beitraege zur Konfliktforschung* 16 (1) 1986, 5-23, 14-5.

⁷⁸ Red Army Faction, Action Directe, "Fuer die Einheit der Revolutionaere in Westeuropa", in: Paul Wilkinson, "Support Mechanisms in International Terrorism", in: Robert O. Slater, Michael Stohl (ed.), *Current Perspectives on International Terrorism* (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1988), 88-114, 106-9.

Republic's embassy in The Hague, the consulate in Amsterdam, the offices of the International Red Cross in Geneva, the bombing of the Nato communications centre in Brussels, and a Mercedes-Benz office in Barcelona). The evidence of the RAF and AD union was the assassinations of General Rene' Audran on 25 January 1985 near Paris, and of Ernst Zimmermann, the business leader of the Munich Motor and Turbine Union, a defence contractor, on 1 February 1985 near Munich. Zimmermann was the civilian equivalent to Audran in the French-German military-industrial-cooperation.⁷⁹

These public activities provided opportunities for potential new recruits to identify with RAF activities, to learn about its ideas and meet people who could lead potential recruits to the 'illegal militants' or the underground as is shown in chapter four.

The next Red Army Faction hunger strike from 1 February to 12 May 1989 was different. There was no accompanying underground campaign, and the hunger strike grew slowly, two at a time, every two weeks, until all active members were on hunger strike. This prolonged the government's problem of reaction. The hunger strikers demanded the consolidation of all forty-three RAF prisoners in one or two prisons and the release of four, whom they deemed should be released for health reasons.⁸⁰

One new factor in this hunger strike was the non-participation of ex-RAF members. Also *die taz* began with a page in a Saturday issue with addresses for RAF hunger strike support committees and articles about the anti-imperialist struggle. It later withdrew support for fear of being misused. The Green-Alternative scene saw a possible chance of power then and did not want the RAF to ruin it.⁸¹

In the end there were no deaths, and the group was not to be brought into one or two large groups, but the Social Democrat states did agree to form small groups of terrorists and 'normal' prisoners.⁸²

The hard-core and 'illegal militants' were not active during the hunger strike. Only in their communique for the attack on Dr. Alfred Herrhausen of the Deutsche Bank on 30 November 1989 did the underground

⁷⁹ Horchem (1986), 12-3, 15; David Th. Schiller, "The Police Response to Terrorism: A Critical Overview", in: Paul Wilkinson, Alasdair M. Stewart (eds.), *Contemporary Research on Terrorism* (Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press, 1987 I), 536-48, 543.

⁸⁰ "Auf der Kippe" *Der Spiegel* 9 (27 February) 1989, 109-10, 109; Gerhard Spoerl, "Mattes Echo" *Die Zeit* 10 March 1989, 7.

⁸¹ Non-participants were Angelika Speitel, Peter-Juergen Boock, Verena Becker, Stefan Wineiewski, Gabriele Tiedemann and Klaus Viehmann. "Auf der Kippe" *Der Spiegel* 9/1989, 110; Spoerl, "Mattes Echo" *Die Zeit* 10 March 1989, 7.

⁸² Gerhard Spoerl, "Ein kleiner Hoffnungsfunke" *Die Zeit* 19 May 1989, 11.

call for the 'consolidation of prisoners of the RAF and the resistance'. This was after Helmut Pohl, an imprisoned RAF member, had stated that the prisoners had not achieved what they wanted, and that the hard-core should take over. Shortly after this the 'illegal militants' came back to life with the bombing of the Bayer Plant Protection Centre in Mannheim, which was involved in gene and biotechnological research.⁸³

Presumably to highlight the RAF's international solidarity with the 'united front against anti-imperialism' they began a solidarity hunger strike with Spanish terrorists by having a group on hunger strike for one week, after which another replaced them. This began in January 1990 and ended in April with AD and the Belgian CCC joining the others on hunger strike.

After the arrests of ex-RAF members in East Germany in June 1990 there were death threats against the East German authorities with the RAF signature- -but not from the Western RAF according to the authorities. These anonymous letters originated in the East, no doubt from around the circle that organised a demonstration in East Berlin for improved RAF prison conditions, and from those who threatened bombings in Leipzig if the arrested ex-members were not set on planes bound for Syria. It thus appears that there is a sympathiser group in the East.⁸⁴

The arrest of suspected ex-RAF members in the East did not prevent the RAF from undertaking attacks, as evidenced by the unsuccessful 27 June 1990 attempt on the Interior Minister's assistant, Hans Neusel by the 'Jose' Manuel Sevillano Commando' (a Spanish GRAPO hunger striker who died after 144 days on hunger strike).⁸⁵

Past experience shows that, as mentioned earlier, the hunger strikes are not for improved prison conditions, but to offer identification objects for recruitment. The prisoners as identification objects can also be linked to other issues, when they join in solidarity hunger strikes, and when the underground members conduct simultaneous campaigns. Thus the hunger strikes are both an issue- -improved prison conditions- -and a method of forcing an identification object on the public. Here identification is more than propaganda. Propaganda emphasises absolute justness of claims,⁸⁶ whereas identification offers people individuals and groups to identify with and to become attached to.

⁸³ BMI (ed.), VSB 1989, 79, 81.

⁸⁴ "Hier bleibt jeder fuer sich allein!" *Der Spiegel* 26/1990, 87.

⁸⁵ "Moegliches Ziel" *Der Spiegel* 31/1990, 61-2.

⁸⁶ Paul Wilkinson, "Terrorism and Propaganda", in: Yonah Alexander, Richard Latter (eds.) *Terrorism and the Media: Dilemmas for Government, Journalists and the Public* (MacLean, VA: Brassey's Inc., 1990), 26-33, 29.

However, not all of the issue aims are like that of the prisoners, which use the issue to recruit new members as the Red Army Faction does. The Revolutionary Cells and **Autonomen** may desire new members and more cells, but they do not choose issues considered to attract members more than other issues.

The issues of the RAF, the 'military-industrial-complex' and 'the anti-imperialist resistance in Western Europe', are the group means to widen and anchor itself in the small social base in Germany centred around prisoner issues. It also seeks--as it did with Action Direct-- to anchor itself to another terrorist group in Europe, as discussed in chapter two.

The RZ and **Autonomen** work towards an anti-imperialist struggle to aid the Third World in their attacks on single-issues, while living in the community. In general the two groups centre on immediate protest issues such as **Startbahn West**, anti-nuclear power, and anti-apartheid. Recently, however, the RZ and **Rota Zora** have raised human rights and technological issues. It might be that neither of these have the same type of public support which their earlier campaigns had. Perhaps the groups are moving towards RAF elitism, because as the **Rota Zora** argue, their attacks against women's exploitation in the sex trade has brought these issues into the limelight.⁸⁷ This is discussed further in chapter five as part of group dynamics.

4. Operational Timing of Terrorist Attacks

The above discussion of the issues terrorist groups promote said little about the timing of their issue programmes, or why particular targets were chosen. Unfortunately as most terrorist attacks are perpetrated by unknown groups, why they chose to act when they did, remains unknown.

From what is known the activities of groups can be due to several reasons. First, they are in response to the activities of governments, business, and other interests. In the early seventies the Red Army Faction began targeting objects associated with the American involvement in Vietnam, judges and policemen associated with imprisoned and dead members, as well as the property of critics of the terrorists group's activities such as the Springer building in Hamburg. The bombs against the US Army can be explained somewhat by the activities of the US in Vietnam.⁸⁸

⁸⁷ Rota Zora (1989), 134.

⁸⁸ Aust (1987), 209.

More important for the RAF, however, have been actions associated with the prisoners. The RAF's first action was to free a prisoner, and countless similar actions associated with the prisoners and their conditions followed (Buback, Ponto, Schleyer, etc.). The hunger strikes were also designed to increase awareness and identification with the prisoners through publicity and committee work. All of these pointed towards an internal dynamic that united the group.

The Second of June murdered Guenter von Drenkmann because he resisted an attempted abduction after the death of RAF member Holger Meins in the late 1974 hunger strike. His abduction must have been planned and prepared some time previously, and the decision to do it then was moved forward with Meins' death.⁸⁹

The Revolutionary Cells and **Autonomen** activities also fall into this category. They generally occur in connection with public protests against similar institutions such as attacks against US and NATO targets when the peace movement was campaigning against the deployment of missiles in West Germany and elsewhere, or against construction and building firms connected with nuclear reprocessing plants and **Startbahn West**. The aim of the RZ activity was to support other protest issues with the pressure of their bombings, and to bring attention to these issues.⁹⁰

A second factor determining group activities is the necessity to time one part of a campaign to coordinate with another. The timing of the hunger strikes in the seventies sometimes seems to have been coordinated with outside activities so that the prisoners would be ready, if an abduction resulted in their release. For example, the third RAF hunger strike ended on 5 February, and Lorenz was abducted on 27 February. The timing of the Lorenz abduction may have been known to the RAF, but not who was to be released. The fifth hunger strike ended on 2 September, just days before Schleyer was abducted. This had put the group in the public eye,⁹¹ and the prisoners knew about the planned abduction. However, timing hunger strikes to coordinate with other events, says nothing about the timing of these 'other' events.

The Schleyer abduction may have been organised to fall on the fifth anniversary of the Munich Olympic massacre, or it may be that that was the day he was in Cologne and not at his Stuttgart home. Chance may have

⁸⁹ Second of June, "Zum Attentat auf Berlins hoechsten Richter" (1975), 251.

⁹⁰ Revolutionary Cells (1975), 208, 226-7.

⁹¹ See Tatjana Botzat, Elisabeth Kiderlein, Frank Wolff, **Ein deutscher Herbst: Zustände, Dokumente, Berichte, Kommentare** (Frankfurt. a.M.: Verlag Neue Kritik, 1978), 17-20.

allowed this to be on the fifth and not on the sixth or seventh of September. In any case it was organised without consideration of general leftist activity such as the anti-nuclear movement, which was affected by the resultant security clampdown.⁹²

Sometimes the coordination is also due to pressures outside of the group as in the case of Alfred Herrhausen's murder. It was planned sometime previously, but was put on hold by the 1989 hunger strike, which itself had been agreed upon by the prisoners as early as 1987. The prisoners told the underground to wait while they pursued talks with the Greens and others. However, the prisoners waited and anticipated the hunger strike and eventually deemed the discussions fruitless, held the hunger strike and then after its conclusion told the underground to pursue group goals with other means.⁹³

A third factor affecting group activities is the introduction of a new factor to upset pre-planned activities such as the arrest or death of members and the discovery of group plans. While the 'May 1982' paper called for precise coordination of underground, illegal militant and prisoner activities, as well as combined operations with other militant groups- -under RAF hierarchy- -arrests interrupted the flow of these for several years when the top echelon of Klar, Mohnhaupt and Schulz were arrested in late 1982 and a series of caches were also discovered. Only in early 1984 was the group ready again. Notably, however, this time the arrest of six members in July 1984 did not interrupt a major operation planned for autumn. The 84/85 campaign continued despite the arrests and the discovery of the strategy paper which outlined the offensive.

Fourth, terrorist group activities are affected by the linkage of operations to other events, whereby group activities are only relevant within the time frame of the other event. For example, the RAF attempted the murder of Hans Tietmeyer, the government organiser of the IMF and World Bank meetings in West Berlin immediately prior to these meetings in September 1988. The RZ and Autonomen activity linked to the meeting would only be relevant until the meetings ended.

The same is true with regards to the Rota Zora bombing of the Federal Constitutional Court after the Lorenz abduction, and their campaign to reinstate women employees to their former posts at a West German subsidiary in South Korea. The same reasons probably led to the Second of June's selection of Peter Lorenz as a kidnap victim several days prior to the West Berlin elections which possibly provided more

⁹² Tolmein, zum Winkel, 41, 79.

⁹³ Pohl (1990), 15.

publicity than would have otherwise been the case. His name had been in the news and made him more recognised than before hand.

Fifth, terrorist group activities are affected by the larger question of why particular targets are chosen over other ones in the same issue area: why this building firm and not that one. When the target is one of many possible ones, banks, construction firms, petrol stations, etc., the decision is presumably influenced by the target's location (is it near lights, or in the dark), accessibility (how well protected it is), and the impact of publicity or damage (high or low profile), as well as opportunity such as inside information, or seeing a limited opening.

For example, Detlef Rohwedder, who was murdered in April 1991, was not as heavily protected at home in Dusseldorf, as he was in his office during the week in Berlin--despite being warned by Hans Neusel that he was high on a list of potential RAF targets. Nonetheless, to feel unhindered at home, he only had occasional police car passes and bodyguards for official functions while in Dusseldorf. Therefore, shooting him from a lightly concealed place across the street with a rifle was not difficult. Targeting him in Berlin where he had full-time bodyguards and an armoured car, would have been more difficult.

Attacks on people presumably are also determined by these factors, as well as their functions within the targeted institution. For example, in 1981 when the Revolutionary Cells attacked Herbert Karry, the Hessian Economic Minister, he was the government minister who wanted to extend *Startbahn West*.⁹⁵ The RZ kneecappings in West Berlin were also due to the function of the individuals in connection with the political asylum of refugees (Hollenberg and Korbacher), and another (Hohla) in connection to trials against Second of June members.

Connected to this is the question of why groups attack a particular target in a particular way. Sometimes assassination is conducted with a gun, and other times with a bomb. One explanation is that the method is to express a message as the murder of von Braunmuehl in Bonn must have, because the group used the same gun that murdered Schleyer. It could have meant that the 'old' and 'new' RAF were the same, or that the murder was a revenge for Mogadishu, or a symbolic return to the question of Palestine, as Braunmuehl worked with Middle Eastern issues in the arena of European Political Cooperation.⁹⁶

⁹⁴ "'Da ist irgendwo ein Nest'" *Der Spiegel* 15 (8 April) 1991, 18-24, 18-9.

⁹⁵ *Times* 12 May 1981.

⁹⁶ *Frankfurter Rundschau* 13 October 1986; "Im Ziel, im Kampf" *Der Spiegel* 43/1986, 25-7.

Another explanation is the availability and possible influence of individuals in the group, who can bring particular talents to the group. The arrival of people with specialist skills in a group means that hitherto impossible operations are now possible. Instead of the Red Army Faction having to use less precise bombs manually triggered under the road, as they did with their attempt on Haig in 1979, the arrival of Horst Meyer (an apprentice electrician) to the group in 1984 meant they could use photo-electric cells to trigger the bombs to murder Beckurts in 1986, Herrhausen in 1989, and in their unsuccessful attempt on Neusel in 1990. There is also the possibility that they were trained in the use of photo-electric cells by the East German Stasi. While there is no direct evidence of this, the authorities suspect it.⁹⁷

This concept is also applicable to low level terrorism in the Revolutionary Cells and *Autonomen*. For example, *Radikal* 131 carried several articles about the NATO pipeline system with communiques describing its importance, how it worked, and its breadth and width in the country, while *Radikal* 139 described the dangers and methods of bombing petrol stations with reference to the anti-Shell campaign. No doubt both of these issues resulted in damage done to pipelines and petrol stations.

The final determinant will ultimately be a reflection of the group's resources, the messages it wants sent, and the problems and possibilities of different targets. Had Rohwedder been as well protected in Dusseldorf as he was in Berlin, the RAF would have possibly attempted the murder of someone else on their list, or taken more time and precautions in their attempt. Well protected targets are not impossible to reach, as was shown with Herrhausen, Schleyer and Buback.

5. Summary

The first two parts of the chapter showed why individuals might lessen their identification with the state because of possible unconventional political protest and public desensitivity to political violence. The third part related that terrorists use different issues to (a) in the case of the Red Army Faction, identify with issues designed to bring them new recruits and a wider social base at home and abroad, and (b) in the case of the Revolutionary Cells and *Autonomen* to support public protest issues in the framework of their own broader issues. These issues are discussed further in chapter seven. Lastly, some of the

⁹⁷ Horchem (1988), 157; "Moegliches Ziel" *Der Spiegel* 31/1990, 62; "Denen trauen wir jetzt alles zu" *Der Spiegel* 14 (1 April) 1991, 22-6, 22-3.

factors involved in operational timing and targeting explained that the availability of a target may have as much influence as the coordinating efforts of imprisoned and underground members of the Red Army Faction.

This concludes the general analysis of left-wing terrorism in the Federal Republic of Germany. The thesis now moves to the specific questions of individuals, groups, government response, and media and public reactions. Chapters two and three provided a general historical and analytical framework for the following chapters, which begins with a study of individual terrorist motivation amongst terrorists in general, and left-wing West German terrorists in particular.

...but honestly I see it this way. If for only one day I did just that, from morning to night, which I most dearly see fit, then on the second day or already that evening before, I would be off to life imprisonment. They talked a long while, why we do not do the dearest, and it was always out of fear, the longing for a long life.¹

...I had fear for the first time, but a totally different fear, fear of a slow death, fear of being wounded. And I thought: my mother will be sad, but that was something else and does not change anything, that I see fit to fight now.²

...and this feeling, just before [you break a shop window], that does not come from just any doubt, that is over, shot down, you know that it is right, no, that is the fear of being caught, not by any old department store theft, but rather by a totally conscious political act, by resistance against the system, that is in your bones, that you've breathed in since you were a kid, that wells from your pores, against that is resistance, against the habituation, the custom, that is the place that you leave, you break - but don't you think, that lots just let out their aggression, asks the questioner.

... perhaps, certainly everyone lets out their aggression too, but it comes from somewhere, where does it come from?³

Terrorism is a group activity that requires goals, a belief system defining the group and its surrounding environment, interactive partners, the means of hope for success, acceptable roles for the individuals, including leaders and some sort of organisational structure, along with weapons and access to targets. Individuals, the components of groups, are an important level of terrorism analysis,⁴ and are the focus of this chapter which shows how individual psychological

¹ Geissler, 42. There is no capitalisation in this book.

² Gudrun Ensslin in Vesper, 439-40; also as "Guerrilla Ausbildung", in: Susanne v. Faczensky (ed.), Frauen und Terror: Versuche, die Beteiligung von Frauen an Gewalttaten zu erklären (Reinbek: Rowohlt Verlag, 1978), 37-40, 39.

³ Wildenhain, 46-7. There is no capitalisation in this passage.

⁴ Herbert Jaeger, Lorenz Bellingger, "Studien zur Sozialisation von Terroristen", in: Herbert Jaeger, Gerhard Schmädchen, Lieselotte Sueliold, Lorenz Bellingger (eds.), Lebenslaufanalysen: Analysen zum Terrorismus 2 (Opfaden: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1981), 117-243, 118; Gerhard Schmädchen, "Terroristische Karrieren: Soziologische Analyse anhand von Fahndungsunterlagen und Prozessakten", in: Herbert Jaeger, Gerhard Schmädchen, Lieselotte Sueliold, Lorenz Bellingger (eds.), Lebenslaufanalysen: Analysen zum Terrorismus 2 (Opfaden: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1981), 13-77, 14.

and biographical processes can lead some people to terrorist group membership. Targets were discussed in chapter three, weapons in chapter two, and the group leadership and organisational structure are discussed in chapter five.

1. Individual Motivation

Study of the individual terrorist is difficult for several reasons. First, there is the fear that the study of individual terrorists and their motivation might be viewed as condoning such behaviour.⁵ Second, is the implicit rejection of terrorist demands for major changes in the political order, which simultaneously rejects their motivation.⁶ Third, is the impression of pointlessness. If all that can be done is to arrest them, then why should their motivation be examined? Lastly, is the shock that leaves people with little curiosity to understand why the terrorist act was done.⁷

Another reason for the underdevelopment of the study of individual terrorists is the reluctance of terrorists to submit themselves to study.⁸ West German terrorists, for example, pursued a strategy of non-cooperation with prison and psychiatric authorities in order to maintain their political identity.⁹ The result is study based on what some terrorists have said and written, what others have observed in their encounters, and biographical studies as the basis for social science research.

Research on individual terrorists has broadly divided into the positions of 'sane' (rational-idealists) and 'insane' (psychologically disturbed), as derivatives from the 'communication' and 'war' model pairing discussed in chapter one. The model used determines the countermeasures employed. If terrorists are mainly psychologically

⁵ Stephen Segaller, *Invisible Armies: Terrorism into the 1990s* (London: Sphere Books Ltd., Revised and Updated Edition, 1987), 77.

⁶ Jeanne N. Knutson, "Social and Psychodynamic Pressures Toward a Negative Identity: The Case of an American Revolutionary Terrorist", in: Yonah Alexander, John M. Gleason (eds.), *Behavioral and Quantitative Perspectives on Terrorism* (Oxford: Pergamon Press Ltd., 1981), 103-150, 105-6.

⁷ Konrad Kellen, "Ideology and Rebellion: Terrorism in Germany", in: Walter Reich (ed.), *Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 43-58, 48.

⁸ Segaller, 78. An exception to this is Michael Baumann's discussion with Uwe Backes for his "Biographisches Portrait: Michael ('Bonmi') Baumann", in: Uwe Backes, Eckhard Jesse (eds.), *Jahrbuch Extremismus und Demokratie 1989* (Bonn: Bouvier Verlag, 1989), 196-204.

⁹ Klaus, 11; Hans-Dieter Schwind, "Bisher veroeffentlichte Meinungen zu den 'Ursachen' des Terrorismus (Ueberblick)", in: Hans-Dieter Schwind (ed.), *Ursachen des Terrorismus in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (West Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1978), 45-59, 55.

disturbed persons, and not generally ideologically motivated persons, then the military response predominates, and if the opposite is true, then political socio-economic solutions are sought.¹⁰ The 'war' model is the answer to 'insane', and 'communication' the response to 'sane'.

This chapter examines the two models and proposes a third that uses identification as a tool to uncover individual motivation. In the end the definition of an individual's motivation to enter a movement

must [first] make provision for the individual member's perception of his aims, and must be able to relate this to his past experiences and his conduct. Second, the definition must account for the person's relationship to his movement, including the nature and degree of his commitment. Third, it must relate the individual's aims to the objectives of the movement, and must characterize the way in which membership can be a means to the achievement to the member's objectives. Last, the definition of motives must point to specific solutions which the person finds incentive to action.¹¹

The overlapping identifications of members need to be uncovered in individual group members because the incentives for collective action are perceived solutions to perceived common and shared problems. Nonetheless, each individual's motivation must be unique because of his or her individual psychology and biography.¹²

Both the 'psychologically disturbed' and 'rational-idealist' model seek to explain aggression in individual members of terrorist groups. The 'psychologically disturbed' model places its source in the individual and the 'rational-idealist' in social conditions as is shown below.

Both models begin with two types of aggression: one 'benign' or defensive, and the other 'malignant' or cruel and destructive. The first serves individual and species survival, and ends when the threat has passed. The second is lustful, without purpose, and found only in humans. The sources for these two types of aggression are man's instincts (physiological organic drives) and 'character passions'. While human instincts are poorly developed, human passions of love, tenderness, freedom, the lust for destruction, power and property are answers to 'existential needs' that are the same for all, but differ with regards to which passions dominate.¹³

Although the question of what influences ones' 'character passions' differs between the 'psychologically disturbed' and 'rational-idealist'

¹⁰ Corrado (1981), 293.

¹¹ Hans Toch, *The Social Psychology of Social Movements* (London: Methuen and Co. Ltd., 1971), 201-2.

¹² *ibid.*, 202.

¹³ Erich Fromm, *The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Ltd., 1967), 24, 26.

models, both agree that the 'character passions' are influenced by the relationship between the individual and their environment. The social group and common structure of the socio-economic conditions help mould the individual character. They influence the desires of the individual not always to act in the desired manner, and to temper desires and actions to the social norm. Thus given different conditions the individual might act differently given the same type of stimulus; e.g. they are submissive to authority and dominate their family. At best, man can be domesticated. However, this does not mean that man is innately aggressive. No support has been found for that thesis.¹⁴

The two models differ as to which passions predominate and are influential: are they personal, or do religious and ideological arguments also hold sway? In general the 'psychologically disturbed' would agree that the 'character passions' of love, power, revenge and lust for cruelty and destruction are powerful before, and while, other 'lower' physiological needs are met. This is shown through the instances of suicide because of where there is a lack of love, power, revenge and fame.¹⁵

The 'rational-idealist' model would add that religious and ideological motivation are also powerful and can contribute to destructive and cruel acts that outweigh love for one's children, parents and friends. The belief in these is such that the acts do not appear cruel and destructive to their perpetrators, and possibly this contributed to West German terrorists leaving their children (Ensslin, Meinhof, the Speitels and Siepmann), and to Susanne Albrecht's participation in the murder of the family friend Juergen Ponto in 1977.¹⁶

Foresight and imagination also widen the range of potential dangers that could be foreseen for religion and ideology which must be defended against today so that they are avoided in the future.¹⁷ This perhaps explains how feelings of anger and revenge can become generalised for the terrorist group into 'despair' of the situation and its resolution through words.¹⁸ The Red Army Faction murdered Siegfried Buback as much

¹⁴ *ibid.*, 121-3, 131, 305; apart from Fromm's review of the literature see also Paul Wilkinson, "Social Scientific Theory and Civil Violence", in: Yonah Alexander, David Carlton, Paul Wilkinson (eds.), *Terrorism: Theory and Practice* (Boulder, CO.: Westview Press, Inc., 1979), 45-72, 51-2.

¹⁵ Fromm, 30.

¹⁶ *ibid.*, 243-4; Marion Schreiber, "Wir fuehlten uns einfach staerker" *Der Spiegel* 20 (1 May) 1981, 82-108, 100; *Independent* 27 April 1991, 8.

¹⁷ Fromm, 265-6.

¹⁸ Rubenstein, 8.

for the revenge of the deaths of Holger Meins and Ulrike Meinhof, as to prevent the deaths of other prisoners.¹⁹

However, the 'rational-idealist' model would not hold with the extremes of this argument that the person's ideology, religion, foresight and imagination can combine to make the individual almost incapable of changing to rise above normal existence and almost predestines them to failure. Their main disagreement would be that by implication this means the person has no free-will or choice.²⁰

1.1 The 'Psychologically Disturbed' Model

The 'psychological disorder' model perceives the source of terrorism in Western democracies as personality disorders displayed as repression, antisocial personality disorder, narcissism, death wishes, and physiological impairments. The role of terrorism in guerilla warfare and other contexts is not discussed.²¹

The model argues that terrorists' justifications for their acts are only rationalisations for their psychological drives. They are people beyond love and affection with twisted hate and frustration. The structural and political problems discussed in the group's ideology are reduced to those of the personal problems of individual terrorists, such as exhibitionism, and hero-martyr ambitions. Where political motivations are also at work, this is perceived as the exploitation of human sickness for political purposes.²²

Most of the psychological disorders attributed to terrorists can be subsumed under the heading of personality disorders, which are inflexible and maladaptive personality traits that impair the individual's behaviour in social or occupational situations, or does so generally through their subjective distress, and are typical of the

¹⁹ Red Army Faction, "kommunique' des kommandos ulrike meinhof zur hinrichtung bubacks", in: *texte: der RAF* (West Berlin: no publisher given, ueberarbeitete und aktualisierte Ausgabe, 1983), 451-4.

²⁰ Fromm, 31-2; Wilkinson (1979), 68-9.

²¹ Corrado (1981), 294.

²² Jerrold M. Post, "Terrorist Psycho-Logic: Terrorist Behaviour as a Product of Psychological Forces", in: Walter Reich (ed.), *Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 25-40, 25; Gerald McKnight, *The Mind of the Terrorist* (London: Michael Joseph Ltd., 1974), 13-4; Ian Kent, William Nicholls, "The Psychodynamics of Terrorism" *Mental Health and Society* 4, 1977, 1-8, 7; Jillian Becker in Alexander, Katwan (eds.) (1980), 197; Ronald Grossarth-Maticek, *Revolution der Gestoerten: Motivationstrukturen, Ideologien und konflikte bei politisch engagierten Studenten* (Heidelberg: Quelle und Meyer, 1975), 93, argues that personal problems accounted for the West German student movement, because it enabled students to overcome their personal inhibitions and neuroses in a situation that was displayed as political activity.

person's long-term functioning. None of these categories, however, have sharply delineated boundaries between them, or between them and the category of 'no psychological disorder'. Nor are all persons in one category similar in the important aspects, as they may differ in ways apart from the defining features of the disorder.²³

The thesis that terrorists have an antisocial personality disorder (APD) rests on the premise that terrorists do not express guilt over their deeds. Whether this is true or not is unverifiable without clinical interview data, which are currently unavailable.²⁴ Amongst recanted West German terrorists there has been hitherto no remorse for politically motivated crimes.

The interest in the study of individual terrorists as those who suffer from an APD lies in the apparent overlap of characteristics, despite the fact that both the term 'terrorist' and 'antisocial personality disorder' are ill-defined. Overlapping terrorist and APD characteristics are considered to be their innate self-righteousness, and an attitude that others are out of step with them. This can vary from an indifference to the rights of others to an active hostility towards others not sharing their own personal code of conduct. Furthermore, both types are interested in drawing attention to themselves. Despite their actions and personalities the two can also gain sympathy from others, even from unexpected quarters.²⁵

However, other APD characteristics, such as unpredictability, do not lend themselves to terrorism, which requires a degree of selflessness, perseverance, moral responsibility and dedication to projects. None of these qualities are found in those who suffer from an APD. Additionally, terrorists, unlike APD sufferers, show an ability to learn from past mistakes.²⁶

Like APD, narcissists are believed to have similar characteristics with terrorists. Narcissism combines the need for constant admiration

²³ American Psychiatric Association, *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders* (Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association, Third Edition, 1980), 6, 305.

²⁴ Corrado (1981), 297. Others have labelled this category as sociopathic or psychopathic in the past, but both of these categories were deemed too vague and the term 'antisocial personality disorder' was introduced. D.T. Lykhen, "Psychopathic Personality", in: Raymond J. Corsini (ed.), *Concise Encyclopedia of Psychiatry* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1987), 926-7.

²⁵ H.H.A. Cooper, "Psychopath as Terrorist", *Legal Medical Quarterly* 2 (4) 1978, 253-262, 253, 255-6.

²⁶ *ibid.*, 261; Wardlaw, 172; Joseph Margolin, "Psychological Perspectives in Terrorism", in: Yonah Alexander, Seymour Maxwell Finger (eds.), *Terrorism: Interdisciplinary Perspectives* (New York: John Jay Press, 1977), 270-282, 282.

and/or attention, exhibitionist need, and lack of empathy and consideration of others from APD along with vacillating overidealisation, devaluation, and fantasies of unlimited success.²⁷ These are thought to explain terrorists' faith in their otherwise depressing struggles against powerful enemies, who can hopefully be overcome through technological innovations, death-defying activity, and in causes with world-wide companions who identify with and will avenge each other.²⁸

Like APD, narcissistic characteristics, like the inability to take criticism, the lack of success, and the need for constant attention, may be difficult to maintain in a terrorist group. Instead, terrorists need sacrifice, loyalty and perseverance.²⁹

Repression is the process of selective forgetting or denying of conflict and stress related experiences or thoughts,³⁰ and could be exhibited, for example, by those who ignore their 'leftist-fascist' tendencies in their stated aim of fighting fascism when they seek to provoke their enemies into becoming fascists.

Projection can be seen to work at the level of individuals and groups as part of their belief systems, as discussed later, and is the attribution of personal characteristics or motives onto others, or see them as the cause of one's own particular characteristic. This allows one to hold a constant world view that enables justification of one's actions. In its fullest form it is said to be a narcissistic struggle by the terrorists to heal themselves through attacks on society. These terrorists idealise themselves as embodying all that is good and project all that is evil onto society as the source of their failures.³¹

Alternatively, this could be a displacement of childhood guilt and anger directed towards parents and ersatz-parents in the form of authority, usually represented by a government. The person feels they cannot attack their parents or other groups close to them. Instead they attack either the groups the parents have taught the children are their enemies, or against persons in similar authority positions. The aim is to produce experiences in others which they themselves felt earlier in life.³²

²⁷ Corrado (1981), 298.

²⁸ Fried in Alexander, Katwan (eds.) (1980), 236.

²⁹ Corrado (1981), 300.

³⁰ D.S. Holmes, "Defense Mechanisms", in: Raymond J. Corsini (ed.), *Concise Encyclopedia of Psychiatry* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1987), 295-8, 295-6.

³¹ *ibid.*, 297; Jerrold M Post, "Notes on a Psychodynamic Theory of Terrorist Behavior", *Terrorism* 7 (3) 1984, 241-256, 248-9.

³² Kent, Nicholls, 4-5; Fried in Alexander, Katwan (eds.) (1981), 221.

The possibility of a death-wish motivating terrorists comes from their apparent willingness to die, and to use virtually any means to achieve their ends.³³ However, a physiological explanation possibly lies in the compounds that increase in the body in times of stress (both the terrorists and victims experience these), which may contribute to 'stereotyped audience agitated tissue response'.³⁴ This could lead to a search for emotionally intense stressful environments. Like other stimulants, stress needs to be increased over time to achieve the same results and the person must perform more stressful activities. However, this does not explain how terrorists would cope with the quiet times in the underground described in chapter five.³⁵

Psychological disorders, in general, do not appear to be the source of individual motivation for terrorism. Abnormal characteristics in people, in the sense of deviation from the norm, is only important and negatively evaluated when the individual exhibits them over time in recurrent patterns of behaviour. That they also appear as criminal tendencies is not a criterion of neurotic behaviour.³⁶

The 'psychological disturbed' model can gain credence in the media coverage of terrorist events when only the immediate terrorist demands are portrayed (see chapter seven). This denies, or distorts, the 'transactions' of terrorism that occur between the victims, audience, the terrorist organisation, and the full context of the political situation in which it occurs, along with the free-will of the terrorist organisation and its members to decide how to employ their strategic and tactical decisions: the when, where and how of terrorism.³⁷

³³ Abraham Kaplan, "The Psychodynamics of Terrorism", *Terrorism* 1 (3/4) 1978, 237-254, 242.

³⁴ Kent Layne Oots, Thomas C. Wiegele, "Terrorist and Victim: Psychiatric and Physiological Approaches from a Social Science Perspective" *Terrorism* 8 (1) 1985, 1-32, 7-8.

³⁵ Martha Crenshaw, "The Psychology of Political Terrorism", in: Margaret G. Herman (ed.), *Political Psychology* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Inc. Publishers, 1986), 379-413, 388.

³⁶ Wilfried Rasch, "Psychological Dimensions of Political Terrorism in the Federal Republic of Germany" *International Journal of Law and Psychiatry* 2 (1979), 79-85, 80; Elisabeth Mueller-Luckmann, "Terrorismus: Psychologischer Deskription, Motivation, Prophylaxe aus psychologischer Sicht", in: Hans-Dieter Schwind (ed.), *Ursachen des Terrorismus in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (West Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1978), 60-68, 60-1.

³⁷ Micheal Stohl, "Introduction: Myths and Realities of Political Terrorism", in: Micheal Stohl (ed.), *The Politics of Terrorism* (New York: Marcel Dekker Inc., 1979), 1-19, 5; Frederick J. Hacker, "Contagion and Attraction of Terror and Terrorism", in: Yonah Alexander, John M. Gleason, (eds.), *Behavioral and Quantitative Perspectives on Terrorism* (Oxford: Pergamon Press Ltd., 1981), 73-85, 73-4; Robert A. Friedlander, "The Psychology of Terrorism: Contemporary Views", in: Patrick J. Montana, George S. Roukis (eds.), *Managing Terrorism:*

Despite these considerations, there is no denial that the decision for an individual to join a terrorist group is subject to conscious or unconscious individual psychological motivations. This is characteristic of reflective group activity which requires the gratification of the participants to be delayed by long, meticulous planning and organisation.³⁸

1.2 The 'Rational Idealist' Model

'Rational-idealists' perceive a typology of terrorism with different goals and strategies used by various groups to achieve desired ends.³⁹ Their main premise is that rationality does not consider psychological classifications, and demands that behaviour conform with social norms, but that the actor defines it as rational. The actor is presumed to want to maximise the utility of his or her behaviour, so that if planting bombs pays more dividends in his or her plans than writing letters to politicians, then he or she will do the former. The person is thought to act on what he or she believes to be the best available knowledge at the time, which sometimes equals much less than the ideal of perfect knowledge.⁴⁰

'Rational-idealists' believe that if the study of the phenomenon of collective violence is concerned with the group and 'normal' individuals, the emphasis of study should not dwell too heavily on the activities of the possibly psychopathic minority. Only a few people become terrorists, whereas many more experience the same social circumstances and events of religion, literature, history, ideology and current events. The concern should be what makes an individual become a terrorist.⁴¹

'Rational-idealists' therefore emphasise variations in individual psychological and biographical histories combined with variations in individual susceptibility to social and political influences,⁴² along with individual free-will to bear "the burden and freedom of moral

Strategies for the Corporate Executive (London: Quorum Books, 1983), 41-54, 49.

³⁸ Crenshaw (1986), 385.

³⁹ Laqueur, 4-5; M. Stohl, P.A. Flemming, "Terrorism and Related Concepts: Typologies", in: Alex P. Schmid, Albert J. Jongmann, *Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories and Literature* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, Revised, expanded and updated edition, 1988), 39-59.

⁴⁰ Kent Layne Oots, *A Political Organization Approach to Transnational Terrorism* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, Inc., 1986), 36, 64-5.

⁴¹ Wilkinson (1979), 68; Martha Crenshaw (1988 I), 13, 28; Wardlaw, xiv.

⁴² Crenshaw (1988 I), 13.

responsibility" to the extent of deciding to break the law if that is deemed necessary.⁴³ This allows people to choose terrorism, and to decide to end it too. In this respect, the group and its members need to be examined in light of their socio-economic and political context.

1.3 Identification: An Alternative Approach

The concept of identification meets the above requirements of the 'rational-idealists'. It is a theory of individual terrorist motivation that integrates the psychological characteristics of individual terrorists noted by analysts with empirical observations. It also draws from developmental psychology, and social psychology in the subjective processes of the various individual and group belief systems.⁴⁴ The subjective belief of a person's role in a given situation is important in determining their behaviour, perhaps more so than human motives in general.⁴⁵

The concept of identification is dependent upon allegiances being gained and lost. Individuals can identify with a group. A group can identify with other groups or individuals who are held up as examples to be followed, and society can identify with particular groups or individuals and their activities.

A crucial aspect of identification is that of individual identity, which is formed through social processes. Once it is formed, social relationships maintain, modify and possibly change the person's identity. This occurs through the process of individual reflection and observation of how the person is seen and judged by others significant to the individual.⁴⁶

Individual identity, which is gained through socialisation, is a group identity because it is only through representation of an individual as part of a larger 'we' that an individual has an identity. This reflects both what one wants ideally to be, and what one thinks he or she should be. Identity is something recognised, competed and fought for, and is a belonging that expresses desires from which demands and actions follow.⁴⁷

The sharing of traits and characteristics does not automatically form collective identity feelings. Only when interests, positions, or other elements feel threatened, attacked or unjustly affected, do collective identity feelings grow. Naturally, these threats can be

⁴³ Wilkinson (1986), 20.

⁴⁴ Crenshaw (1986), 390-1; Liebkind, 15, 17.

⁴⁵ Hacker, F. (1975), 65.


⁴⁶ Berger, Luckmann, 194; Erikson, 22-3.

⁴⁷ Hacker, F. (1975), 131; Erikson, 300-1.

imagined or exaggerated. The competing loyalties of an individual's identification then determine which ones will gain ascendancy over others. Here such factors as whether one felt a belonging to a group before the threats, or only afterwards, also determines the outcome of identification. Similarly, so does the selectivity of information considered by individuals and groups.⁴⁸

A summation of how these factors lead to terrorism can be examined with an adaptation from diverse physiological and psychological disciplines. Here individuals are noted as unable to enter into the fight or flight responses in modern society because the problems and situations that bring forth these responses do not diminish, and people cannot usually leave. After repeated arousals, the individual seeks relief through aggressive actions, and also thereby removing the initial cause of frustration by achieving political goals hitherto denied.⁴⁹ (see Figure 4.1)

Figure 4.1 Model of Terrorist Contagion



Adapted from: Kent Layne Oots, Thomas Wiegele, "Terrorist and Victim: Psychiatric and Physiological Approaches from a Social Science Perspective" *Terrorism* 8 (1) 1985, 1-32, 16.

Of particular note in the model is the weight given to the role of personal contacts, which is elaborated upon later in the chapter. Personal contacts can lead to identification with political goals, individuals, and influence one's attitude to violence such that one feels aroused and frustrated enough to turn towards terrorism with others.

⁴⁸ Hacker, F. (1975), 138-140; and see chapter five.

⁴⁹ Adapted from Oots, Wiegele, 16-7.

The aggregate external variables (Z1 to Z4) represent (Z1) all the factors leading to the denial of the sought political goals, (Z2) the factors leading to personal contacts, (Z3) the factors leading to the individual developing attitudes to allow them to pursue political goals by violent means, and (Z4) the factors affecting media coverage of terrorist events.

The variables function when denial of the political goal (Y1), which was possibly influenced by personal contacts (Y2) begins to bring on frustration (Y4) in the potential terrorist. After arousal (Y5) comes the unrelieved flight or fight response, which is intensified by media presentations of terrorism (Y7) and discussions with personal contacts (Y2) which add more arousal (Y5). The media (Y7) and personal contacts (Y7) also lead the individual back to frustration (Y4) as the person sees and hears of others successfully (in their view) using terrorism, while they themselves do nothing. Frustration (Y4) and arousal (Y5) feed on one another, and attitude (Y3) enters via the person's direction (violence rejection or violence acceptance) of arousal (Y5) in response to media presentations of terrorism (Y7) and personal contacts (Y2). Attitude (Y3) and personal contacts (Y2) feed on one another and lead to the person potentially committing a terrorist act (Y6), only if the person is aroused (Y5) in a violence accepting manner. The commission of a terrorist act (Y6) by a hitherto potential terrorist enters figure 4.1 also in media presentation (Y7) of another terrorist act and it begins again. Here terrorism is both psychological, social psychological and physiological.

All of these factors are accounted for in the definition of personal motivation offered earlier. The individual's personal aims result in the fight or flight response that leads to frustration. The person's relationship to the group or movement is covered by their personal contacts, which also relate to how group membership can achieve the person's own aims and are an incentive to their actions. Throughout all of these the person acts in what they perceive as a rational manner as discussed earlier in the 'rational-idealist' model.

However, this model is not without its difficulties. Currently this is a descriptive model which can only be used to identify variables. Nor can it rank or measure the variables. Other difficulties are the aggregate factors (Z1 to Z4) and how these influence their respective variables (Y1, Y2, Y3 and Y7). Goal denial (Z1, Y1) is discussed in chapters two and three as to what group goals are and how they are expressed, while chapters six and seven discuss government and public responses to the groups. Personal contacts (Z2, Y2) are discussed later

in this chapter and in chapter five as part of group dynamics, while the role of the media (Z4, Y7) is handled in chapter seven. Attitude (Z3, Y3) is covered in the remainder of the chapter with regards to belief systems and as to why and how individuals join terrorist groups. It is also discussed in group beliefs and dynamics in chapter five.

2. Belief Systems

Belief systems affect the attitudes and identifications of individuals, groups and society. This section examines the identification aspects of belief systems on individuals. The group dynamic aspects of belief systems are discussed in chapter five.

Both chapters four and five show that different people join terrorist groups for different reasons, but that all individuals need to align their individual motives with the group's belief system. This determines their world view and provides their reasons and justifications for action. This will be a strong belief system because the person's and group's subjective beliefs are not aligned with the objective world, and must maintain the group's position and ability to function despite this misalignment.⁵⁰

The result could be a change in personal beliefs whereby individuals come to the terrorist group with 'a beating heart for the well-being of humanity' and leave with 'the rage of crazy self-conceit' because the public did not identify with them, but with the state and its institutions. The Red Army Faction's calculated actions, which sought to bring out state repression and possibly fascist activity, thus combined with their hatred of the people who went to the state's defence. Subjective aspects influenced their objective perspective of their situation.⁵¹

Perhaps this also explains how people joined the terrorist group and how an alignment of personal and group belief systems occurred. Some of the 'why' of this process is left for enlargement in section three of the chapter.

⁵⁰ Friedhelm Neidhardt, "Ueber Zufall, Eigendynamik und Institutionalisiertbarkeit absurder Prozesse", in: Heine von Alemann, Hans-Peter Thurn (eds.), *Soziologie in Weltbuergerliche Absicht: Festschrift fuer Rene Koenig* (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1981), 243-257, 253.

⁵¹ Juergen Baecker, Horst Mahler, "Zehn Thesen zur RAF", in: Barbara Herzbach, Klaus Wagenbach (eds.), *Jahrbuch Politik 8* (West Berlin: Verlag Klaus Wagenbach, 1978), 10-5, 12-3.

2.1 Solutions

Group belief systems can be attractive to individuals because they

offer individual members an illusion of a better world which they believe is probable in the future. The vision of a probable better future offers hope to act in the present, and the intolerable situation perceived in the present is made endurable by a miracle offered in the future. The miracle offered in the illusion enables the enormity of the proposed project hopefully to be worked towards even when frustration and lack of success occur.⁵² The miracle of the 'urban guerrilla' or a 'guerrilla' anchored in the masses was the perceived source of power for the original and later left-wing West German terrorist groups as discussed in chapter two.

A person does not arrive at new beliefs overnight. Rather, he or she arrive at new beliefs after a time of incongruity in his or her belief system. The individual would have begun to enter situations that their belief system could not answer. The person's unrecognised doubts and inconsistencies in their belief system grew because of continued encounters with unexplained situations, therefore adjustments and substitutions to the belief system were introduced to avoid its breakdown. After a while, the person could boast of a conversion.⁵³

For example, Hans-Joachim Klein, a Revolutionary Cell member, was taught that policemen were friends and helpers, and that women were to be looked after and treated kindly. How was he to organise his beliefs with the sight of three policemen beating a woman student? It led to a search for answers amongst the students.⁵⁴

linked to this is the possibility of individuals coming together with others who hold similar views and beliefs. The search for answers to belief system imbalances can therefore be accompanied by a possible change in behaviour before the change in beliefs has run its course. For example, Klein added newspaper reading and smoking to his behaviour to fit in with students.⁵⁵

These appeals to the individual can gain further weight with the fact that they can offer the person another reason to become involved with, or to become closer to, a group of people who can offer friendship and intimacy to replace what may have been absent at home. The group can

⁵² Toch, 30, 43-4.

⁵³ Ibid., 116-7; see also Albert Bandura, "Mechanisms of Moral

Disengagement", in: Walter Reich (ed.), "Origins of Terrorism: Psychological, Ideologies, States of Mind (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990)", 161-191, 186, 188-190 on self-deception.

⁵⁴ H.J. Klein (1981), 8-9.

⁵⁵ Ibid.,

also provide an outlet for personal emotions of anger and frustration which the group explains as being located outside of the group in society.⁵⁶ This is discussed later in section three and in chapter five.

Violence can contribute to belief change in a hard, direct manner, which polarises the solutions to problems by making the problem appear less complex and difficult than it is. The aura of violence's viability and beauty is increased by the heroic appeal of its advocates and disciples. It also carries the danger of becoming an end in itself, instead of a means to an end.⁵⁷

Violence acts as an intensifier of the belief conversion in situations where it can further disrupt and confront the old belief systems with new experiences. The meanings, for example, of old institutions such as the police and other authorities, come into confrontation with the new experiences of police action and the group's sources of legitimacy and world view. Violence, and other intensifying factors, such as initiation processes (see chapter five) speed up the conversion of the individual from one socialisation to another.⁵⁸ As mentioned above, this led to an experience that confronted Klein's belief system, and as discussed in chapter five, welds groups together.

2.2 Extremism and Death

After the belief conversion and group membership, the new beliefs serve personal psychological needs, and become central to the life of the person, such that previously important persons and institutions are devalued and dismissed. This was evidenced by some of the members leaving their children, as was mentioned earlier. Part of this is the result of individuals restructuring and reorientating their new life with the group to take account of their past experiences in light of their conversion. Now the group, its issues, and other members define the individual and who they are.⁵⁹ These form the person's new identity.

The new belief system can offer steadfastness and value that raises individual self-esteem and self-resilience so they can work with and through a group which promotes what they see as a worthy and noble cause. This can lead to very firm beliefs which cannot be compromised. Alternative views are disregarded. The lack of compromise adds to their

⁵⁶ Helm Stierlin, "Familienterrorismus und oeffentlicher Terrorismus", *Familiendynamik* 3 (1978), 170-198, 187.

⁵⁷ Hacker, F. (1975), 79.

⁵⁸ Berger, Luckmann, 164-5.

⁵⁹ Jaeger, Boellinger, 154-6; Crenshaw (1988 I), 28; Maxwell Taylor, Helen Ryan, "Fanaticism, Political Suicide and Terrorism" *Terrorism* 11 (2) 1988, 91-111, 91-2.

perceived legitimacy of action. Goals of unconditional value justify unconditional action for their achievement.⁵⁰

Sometimes the individual's trust in the group is taken to the limit when the environment is suitable to allow and support the death of a group member. Prior to hunger strikes the imprisoned members of the Red Army Faction were able to communicate between themselves, and to some extent, with those on the outside (see chapter two). The group was able to pressure members to participate, and sometimes even to cause the members to believe they must continue to the point of death. For example, Klein implied this when he suggested that an order went out for a member to die in the 1974/5 hunger strike, which Holger Meins did in 1974, as mentioned in chapter two. Similarly, the suicides in Stammheim in 1977 were planned as possible and expedient, because they would offer revenge incentives for future group activities.⁵¹

Before any deaths the Red Army Faction used propaganda to set the tone for a possible death, priming the public and reinforcing the members' beliefs in their ideology and the group's abilities. The goal is to raise the consciousness of the public by promoting themselves as objects of identification to gain new recruits. This works because the government looks poor either way during a hunger strike, whether or not someone dies or someone is force fed, as described in chapter three. In the case of the Stammheim suicides in 1977 the aim was to make the politics of the RAF believable to the public, and to create a legitimacy for further activity by showing the reaction of a fascist state which 'murdered' its enemies.⁵²

The decision to accept death for political beliefs can perhaps be better understood as one of several perceived possible alternatives options which a rational actor can utilize. When the person views their commitment to their belief system as beyond reproach and as something greater than themselves, especially if the ideology carries a developed militant sense, then perhaps suicide is the ultimate form of political expression available to them. Perhaps, as in hunger strikes, the individuals are open to collective group influences on their own individual beliefs and personalities that affect their decisions.⁵³ This is discussed further in chapter five.

⁵⁰ Eric Hoffer, *The True Believer: Thoughts on the Nature of Mass Movements* (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1951), 12, 15; Taylor, Ryan, 92-3; Kaplan, 242-3, 245-6.
⁵¹ Taylor, Ryan, 106; "Suicide Action" *Der Spiegel* 50/1990, 62.
⁵² Taylor, Ryan, 106-7; "Suicide Action" *Der Spiegel* 50/1990, 62, 65.
⁵³ Taylor, Ryan, 109.

2.3 Rationalisation and Guilt

Rationalisation of beliefs has the goal of supporting one's identity (group and individual) through tenet axiomatisation; group belief statements become articles of faith that cannot be criticised or held as false. These articles must be simple and firm enough to withstand the contradictions and uneasiness that led the members to adopt this belief system. The main articles of ideological faith for the RAF are that (1) the social reality is complete poverty and must be changed; (2) the origin of the evil lies in capitalism and its international form of imperialism which both must be destroyed; (3) all small steps of reform by the government are incorrect, because they only lead to a stabilizing of the unjust system; (4) while there is no mass basis for revolution in this country, it must first be created and guerilla actions of terrorist groups are a suitable means for this.⁶⁴

The operationalisation of these axioms (i.e., the group's actions, murder, bombings, and other acts) has necessitated that they justify themselves by avoiding responsibility, denial of the injustice they have done, and calling upon higher moral authorities. All of these forced the group to distance itself from the norms that it wanted the state to reject. This lost the group support, and it found itself increasingly isolated.⁶⁵

Identification with the group and its beliefs provides responsibility through shared belief in the authority and legitimacy of group beliefs. This relieves the members from the problems of freedom of responsibility- -making individual decisions and the possibility of poor decisions and failure- -by postponing individual liberty. Personal identity arises out of group demands as a basis for aggression in the name of defended and promoted rights.⁶⁶

The result is that while the group may collectively accept responsibility for their actions, they deny responsibility as those accountable for the ends: Buback's death, for example, was historical progress, applied to those who murdered imprisoned group members.⁶⁷

The process is not due to altered personalities, but cognitive reconstruction of violent acts as a defensive option where non-violent ones were tried, and where the hoped for ends are deemed worthy enough to countenance the violence of the moment. The appeal of morality to

⁶⁴ Neidthard (1981), 254.

⁶⁵ *ibid.*, 255.

⁶⁶ Kaplan, 248-9; Hoffer, 30-1; Hacker, F. (1975), 133, 152-3.

⁶⁷ Edward Sagarin, Robert J. Kelly, "Political Deviance and the Assumption of Responsibility" *Deviant Behavior* 7 (3) 1986, 217-242, 223; Red Army Faction, "kommunique' des kommandos ulrike meinhof zur hinrichtung bubacks" (1983).

such situations adds further weight to the social revolutionaries who seek to end harmful social practices by making their opponents appear self-interested and calling upon higher social morals,⁶⁸ such as noted in chapter three, with concern over prison conditions.

The result is not simply mindless individuals. They would not do anything without orders. Rather, responsibility is reduced with various processes, some of them being defence mechanisms discussed earlier. The processes include: responsibility to superiors, displacement of responsibility on to others for any harm they cause, and diffused responsibility in division of labour (each person is responsible for one part of the action and may not know what the others are doing), group decision-making (collective decisions), and collective action (no one person did anything, everyone did) where the individual can become lost, and not feel personally responsible. Responsibility can also be reduced when the consequences of actions are disregarded or distorted. This is especially easy when causal actions occur at a distance with remote control bombings, and hierarchical commands.⁶⁹

The sophistication and types of justification that reduce responsibility hinge on the group being able to gain some element of credibility for their claim that the government has done some wrong or injustice to which they have responded.⁷⁰

As mentioned earlier, the claims of murder against the authorities after the deaths of Meinhof and later Ensslin, Raspe and Baader, worked on the principle of guilt transfer to turn potential liabilities into assets. Repeated claims of murder were to plant seeds of doubt with the belief that there can be no smoke without fire.⁷¹

2.4 Immunisation of Beliefs

The belief system of the group must withstand influences from outside of the group, and not upset the precarious balance between group beliefs and the real world. Therefore the deaths of Red Army Faction members need to be given weight within the group's belief system, that both failures and successes lead to success in the armed struggle.

⁶⁸ Bandura, 164-5.

⁶⁹ *ibid.*, 175-7. After leaving the group, the moral responsibility returns, but not always the responsibility for criminal crimes. Friedrich, *Der Spiegel* 34/1990, 57.

⁷⁰ Maurice A.J. Tugwell, "Guilt Transfer", in: David C. Rapoport, Yonah Alexander (eds.), *The Morality of Terrorism: Religious and Secular Justifications* (Emsford, NY: Pergamon Press, Inc., 1982), 275-289, 275-6, 285.

⁷¹ *ibid.*, 281-2.

Otherwise doubts about the group would creep in and deter new members. Collective action thus becomes an end in itself.⁷²

Success for terrorists, it seems then, is not the same success the public sees. The terrorists look to the long time scale and the growth of public support, if not in reality, then in the terrorists' minds. When the terrorists do suffer a setback, this is perceived as minor by them, and in their eyes their members' who died or were arrested, have certainly failed honourably. By identifying with a sacred cause the members are sure in their convictions and actions.⁷³

To maintain their belief system, terrorists use labels to change the appearance of activities and events. Formerly reprehensible acts are now justified and even respectful⁷⁴ as noted already, with the 'execution' of Buback as a historical process in which his death helps to prevent the deaths of prisoners.

Linked to this is also dehumanisation, whereby policemen, for example, become 'pigs' or **bulle**n to use the German. Dehumanisation distances people from empathy for others, and decreases similarities as they are turned into subhumans, who are seen as only repsonding to harsh measures. Dehumanisation thus engenders justifications for punitive conduct towards others.⁷⁵

Similarly, terrorists use language to imply that their activities are the result of passive agents such as 'the bomb that was brought to explosion'. Comparisons can justify action through passive agents. For example, while the RAF 'executed' Buback, the state 'under Buback's directorship' 'murdered', 'executed', 'liquidated', and 'eliminated' group members. These and other words were chosen by the RAF to illustrate the state's immorality and guilt.⁷⁶

Belief systems therefore are not changed overnight, but with supportive conditions can change from 'a beating heart for the well-being of humanity' to 'the rage of crazy self-conceit' which condones terrorism. However, the 'supportive conditions' have not been elucidated, and this has not explained why people might move from non-terrorist to terrorist activities in West Germany.

⁷² Neidhardt (1981), 255-6.

⁷³ Jeanne N. Knutson, "The Terrorists' Dilemmas: Some Implicit Rules of the Game" *Terrorism* 4 (1980), 195-222, 208-9; Hacker, F.J. (1981), 78.

⁷⁴ Bandura, 169-170.

⁷⁵ *ibid.*, 180.

⁷⁶ *ibid.*, 170-1; B.H. Miller (1983), 208, 275-6.

3. The Individual in West German Left-Wing Terrorism

The previous sections of the chapter examined individual terrorists in general. The remainder concerns specifically left-wing terrorists in the Federal Republic of Germany in a study of the 'supportive conditions' requisite for a change in belief systems and of the 'personal contacts' discussed in Figure 4.1 (p. 113).

No one becomes a terrorist overnight. This is studied from the individual's viewpoint below, and from the group's perspective in chapter five. It appears that primary socialisation in general has not led to left-wing terrorism in the Federal Republic of Germany, but that family influences may produce dispositions that tend to facilitate the move to terrorism given key encounters with political events and individuals.⁷⁷

However, it is not possible to chart definitive personal development progression to terrorism, because of its long gradual nature. Another complication is the simultaneous multiplicity of overlapping processes involved. There is the individual, the family, peer group(s) and society. These could be viewed as a four-ring circus, and depending upon which one is focused upon those activities become clear, but the others continue out of sight or in one's peripheral vision.⁷⁸

3.1 The Psychological Question

The above variables are studied here to the exclusion of the 'psychologically disturbed' model, because that model has not proved sustainable for West German terrorism. Prof. Wilfried Rasch, who examined eleven suspected terrorists in 1975 at the request of the authorities, and with the consent of the imprisoned suspects, came to the conclusion that only one (an unnamed marginal member) was acting to draw attention to himself, and none of them could be diagnosed as 'paranoid'. He met with Baader, Meinhof, Ensslin and Raspe among the eleven. As a caveat it must be added that Rasch did not examine them under optimal conditions. The suspected terrorists would not complete a psychological test, and instead of Rasch asking them questions, it was the reverse. The suspected terrorists asked Rasch questions in an hour and a half interview.⁷⁹

⁷⁷ Klaus Wasmund, "The Political Socialisation of Terrorist Groups in West Germany", *Journal of Political and Military Sociology* 11 (2) 1983, 223-239, 223.

⁷⁸ Wolfgang Salewski, Peter Lanz, *Die neue Gewalt und wie man ihr begegnet* (Munich: Droemer-Knaur Verlag, 1978), 83-4; Stierlin, 173.

⁷⁹ Rasch, 80; Bundesgerichtshof, "Beschluss des Bundesgerichtshof vom 22. Oktober 1975", in: Wolfgang Dressen (ed.), *Politische Prozesse*

In April 1976 Dr. Wolfgang de Boor met the four survivors of the Stockholm embassy siege after the court authorities requested that he examine them. He found them uncooperative, and his results thus depended upon his interpretation of their gestures. Whenever they chose to speak, which was seldom, it was aggressively. He did not find them psychologically ill according to clinical standards, but he did think they were not that different from schizophrenics, who, like the terrorists, have their own standards of reality.⁸⁰

A 1981 study of left-wing West German terrorists found that six percent of these (out of 227 individuals) had attempted suicide before they entered the left 'scene'. Six percent of the 227 had also at one time sought psychiatric or psychotherapeutic help. This was only one percent above the five percent average of the general public who had also sought similar help.⁸¹

Another study claims that the West German terrorists suffer from psychological trauma that colours their perceptions in unreality, and motivates them to commit terrorist acts. This conclusion is based on the study of autobiographies and interviews with some of the apprehended terrorists, court statements and the behaviour of terrorists. On the other hand, it notes that many terrorists have enough links with reality to evade police efforts to locate and arrest them.⁸²

Ill health could also affect psychological problems in individual terrorists. Half of those included in the 1981 study suffered from ill health, and one third were chronically or severely ill. This was the result of life in the underground, accidents and head injuries, to which could be added numerous hunger strikes (six between January 1973 and January 1979). Their ill health resulted in poor coordination and the frustration of not being able to match their idealised image of themselves. This could be especially severe due to their active requirements in the underground.⁸³

While this is not conclusive data, there are no ideal clinical examinations, the exhaustive 1981 study found no psychological

ohne Verteidigung? (West Berlin: Verlag Klaus Wagenbach, 1976), 89-100, 95.

⁸⁰ Wolfgang de Boor, "Terrorismus: Der 'Wahn' der Gesunden", in: Hans-Dieter Schwind (ed.), Ursachen des Terrorismus in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (West Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1978), 122-153, 122, 124, 128.

⁸¹ Lieselotte Suellwold, "Stationen in der Entwicklung von Terroristen: Psychologische Aspekte biographischer Daten", in: Herbert Jaeger, Gerhard Schmidtchen, Lieselotte Suellwold, Lorenz Boellinger (eds.), Lebenslaufanalysen: Analysen zum Terrorismus 2 (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1981), 79-116, 101.

⁸² Kellen (1990), 43-4.

⁸³ Suellwold, 102.

disturbances. This supports the above thesis that the 'psychologically disturbed' model is not valid for left-wing terrorism in the Federal Republic of Germany. Psychological processes are involved, as elsewhere in political science, but the 'insane' model is not.

3.2 Data on Left-Wing West German Terrorists

Two studies provide the main basis for examination of the lives of individual left-wing West German terrorists. They are not ideal references, but are, nonetheless, something to generate ideas of what may or may not contribute to terrorist motivation.

The examination contains the subjects' social origins, their childhood experiences with regards to moving home and problems with the authorities, socialisation after leaving home, key experiences and people, available options of protest and terrorism, and desertion from the terrorist groups. In each of these sections the concept of identification aids understanding the motivation of the individuals.

In 1981 a study was published of 250 persons who, until the end of 1978, had been

either sought for arrest, accused or tried because of proscribed actions against paragraph 129a StGB [Criminal Code Book], or (according to the contents of the convictions that were against them) were convicted if paragraph 129a StGB had been in force.⁸⁴

Of the 250 persons studied, twenty-three were right-wing and the other 227 left-wing terrorists. 175 were men, and seventy-five women.⁸⁵

This is not the best social scientific data gathering, making it appear that judicial and social scientific definitions of terrorism are equal. Nor does this data always provide comparisons with the population at large or any other type of control group. The study also exhibits the problem of uneven data compilation by the judicial authorities so similar data is not always available for each person.⁸⁶ The absence of a similar study based on a social science definition of terrorism forces the use of the study, which does offer a comparison of persons considered terrorists by the state.

A less thorough study published in 1977 compared 350 terrorists active between 1966 and 1976 in eighteen different urban terrorist groups. The West German groups were the Red Army Faction and the Second

⁸⁴ Schmidtchen, 19. Between 1971 and 1980 209 people were sentenced for left-wing terrorist activities according to Die Welt 11 August 1981. Thus the 227 from the study is inflated with suspects and supporters.

⁸⁵ *ibid.*, 77.

⁸⁶ Schmidtchen, 18; Post (1990), 28-9; Reinhard Kreissl, "Die Studien zum Terrorismus", *Kritische Justiz* 16 (1983), 311-324, 314.

of June Movement. Although, the authors did not state their definition of terrorism for the study,⁸⁷ it is used as a comparison to the West German findings of 1981. No comparative study is available for left-wing terrorists after 1978. However, various other sources have provided data for occasional comparisons.

The 227 left-wing terrorists in the 1981 study were convicted of "membership in a criminal terrorist organisation" (73%), "supporting a criminal terrorist organisation" (34%), and "forming a criminal terrorist organisation" (26%). As each person, on average, was accused of five criminal charges (the leaders six), they were also accused and convicted of murder (33%), causing explosions (32%), abduction (16%) and other acts. There were seventy-five Red Army Faction members, forty-nine Second of June members, eight in the Revolutionary Cells, and sixty-nine members of other groups. Twenty-six could not be documented as belonging to a group.⁸⁸

3.3 Social Origins

One's social origins, where one lives and what one's parents do, can explain which social influences may or may not have been present.⁸⁹ Parentage determines one's primary socialisation into the world, because one's 'significant others', those who influence one's primary socialisation, cannot be chosen, and one has no influence over how they present the world. Parents and others present the world to the child depending upon their own location in the social structure and their own individual idiosyncrasies.⁹⁰

The individual will identify and internalise this world presented to him or her through 'significant others' by taking up their attitudes and roles to reflect back their own interpretation of their parents and other significant persons' image. Some doubt about the world, and its legitimacy about why things are the way they are, as presented and explained to them by their significant others, may set in later, but by and large this world is accepted.⁹¹

⁸⁷ Charles A. Russell, Bowman H. Miller, "Profile of a Terrorist", *Terrorism* 1 (1) 1977, 17-34, 18-9.

⁸⁸ Schmidtchen, 19, 62, 77.

⁸⁹ *ibid.*, 22.

⁹⁰ Berger, Luckmann, 150-1.

⁹¹ *ibid.*, 151-2, 155-6.

Table 4.1 Demographic Profile of the Fathers of Left-wing Terrorists, 1978

Last Profession of Father	Left-wing Terrorist	Drop Outs (Aussteiger)	Population over forty
<u>Self-employed</u>			
small	7%	11%	6%
middle	4	8	2
large	4	x	x
<u>Employees</u>			
Low level	6		14
Qualified	14	11 ¹	16
Managerial	9	11	5
<u>Civil Servants</u>			
Low/Middle	5	x	4
Senior	6		2
Executive	14	16 ²	2
<u>Workers</u>			
Unskilled	3	27 ³	8
Trained	5		13
Specialist	11		14
<u>Independent Farmers</u>			
	2		3
<u>Professionals</u>			
	10	14	1
Other/not employed	0	2 ⁴	10
Executives⁵	47	49	12
x equals less than 0.5%			
¹ includes low and qualified employees.			
² includes senior and executive civil servants.			
³ includes all workers.			
⁴ includes farmers.			
⁵ all bold numbers.			
Note: 30% of the data on fathers is unavailable.			

Source: Gerhard Schmidtchen, "Terroristische Karrieren: Soziologische Analyse anhand von Fahndungsunterlagen und Prozessakten", in: Herbert Jaeger, Gerhard Schmidtchen, Lieselotte Suellwold, Lorenz Boellinger (eds.), *Lebenslaufanalysen: Analysen zum Terrorismus 2* (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1981), 13-77, 22; Karin de Ahna, "Wege zum Aussteig- -Foerdernde und hemmende Bedingungen", in: Wanda von Baeyer-Katte, Dieter Claessens, Hubert Feger, Friedhelm Neidhardt (eds.), *Gruppenprozesse: Analysen zum Terrorismus 3* (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1982), 477-525, 482.

Comparison between the 1978 left-wing terrorists and a 1979 study of social demographic trends in the Federal Republic shows that 47% of the terrorists' fathers held jobs of higher social status (i.e., they were self-employed, high level officials and employees) whereas only 12% of the 1979 study were of the same level.⁹² Similar findings from the 350

⁹² Schmidtchen, 22, 30% of the data for the terrorists was unavailable. Baader's father was an historian/archivist, Ensslin's an evangelical pastor, Meinhof's a museum director, Klar's a grammar school headmaster, Albrecht's a lawyer, and Raspe's a businessman. Salewski, Lanz, 132-4; Aust (1987), 116; Backes, Jesse, (1989 III), 276, 287, 297, 305, for the short biographies of these people and Mohnhaupt, Baumann, Klein and Tiedemann. Other biographical data is found in Robin Smith,

urban terrorists shows that two-thirds of them were from higher social status families⁹³ (see Table 4.1).

Parentage of higher social status for the subject group can mean two things. First, that this is a source of higher demands on oneself and one's environment, such that a leading position in society and one's profession is expected in the future. Second, that these were parents in the era of the economic miracle who believed it was acceptable to spoil children with bribes to compensate for lack of attention after the poverty phase of West German rebuilding was over.⁹⁴

These factors made it hard for the parents to understand the subculture that emerged in the sixties. The parents had worked hard to gain their material and physical security in the fifties, and were surprised when their children developed totally different priorities. The social criticism of the youths contrasted so sharply with the position of the parents, that political communication between the two was probably broken and could lead to the forced departure from the parental home when one identified completely with the new political ideas.⁹⁵

Table 4.2 Sex and Age of Left-wing Terrorists, 1978

	Total	RAF	B2J/RZ	Other
Male	67%	66%	61%	67%
Female	33	34	39	33
	100	100	100	100
Born 1945 or earlier	34	46	18	22
1946 to 1950	34	36	39	30
1951 to 1955	39	15	41	35
1956 or later	3	3	2	3
	100	100	100	100

Source: Gerhard Schmidtchen, "Terroristische Karrieren: Soziologische Analyse anhand von Fahndungsunterlagen und Prozessakten", in: Herbert Jaeger, Gerhard Schmidtchen, Lieselotte Suellwold, Lorenz Boellinger (eds.), *Lebenslaufanalysen: Analysen zum Terrorismus 2* (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1981), 13-77, 23, 24.

The children generally had a negative identification with their fathers that resulted in poor contacts and few common interests. The parents possibly believed that after their own, more stringent socialisation during the previous decades, it was acceptable to purchase their childrens' affection with bribes. Due to the parents' need to

"Daughters of the Gun" *Observer Magazine* 11 December 1977, 34-7, and *Das Parlament* 5 November, 24 December 1977.

⁹³ Russell, Miller, 23.

⁹⁴ Schmidtchen, 21.

⁹⁵ *ibid.*, 20-2.

rebuild and maintain their material well-being, this was perhaps also linked to their sense of identity. There was also a lack of grandparents who possibly died in the war, or were elsewhere, which meant they and the parents were both unavailable to look after the children and pass on their socialisation potential.⁹⁶

These children were unable to discuss things about the world with their parents, and when there was discussion, it was not discussion - give and take - so much as dogmatic responses by the parents. This potentially hindered the reduction of aggression in the children.⁹⁷

The full effects of post-war socialisation were also influenced by the age of the person. Some were born during the Third Reich, but most of them were born afterwards. Table 4.2 shows that almost half of the Red Army Faction members during the seventies were born before 1945. This includes Baader (6 May 1943), Meinhof (7 October 1934), Ensslin (15 August 1940), Raspe (24 July 1944) and Mahler (23 January 1936), all the founding group leaders.⁹⁸ Mahler and Meinhof were born in the thirties and had memories of the war. Some of the group born before 1945 would also experience the economic difficulties of the post-war reconstruction. Perhaps this hardship also influenced the authoritarian character of the Red Army Faction. Most of the Second of June members, on the other hand, were born between 1946 and 1955. They all benefited from the 'economic miracle', which perhaps influenced their anti-authoritarian character.

Many of the left-wing terrorists of the seventies had the benefit of being born after the war, but they could not escape its legacy. German youth had no national identity to attach itself to, and no elites to look up to. All they had was a model of how not to be.⁹⁹

This possibly came partly from doubts in children who could not, or found it difficult, to identify with their parents. Instead of love being fostered between them, anger and aggression could occur, and possibly extended to the whole generation who found it difficult to identify with the 'fascist past' of the previous generation.¹⁰⁰

From the perspective of the left-wing terrorists, fascism had not been overcome in West Germany, and was growing once again in the late sixties. For example, after the war 90% of those responsible for the events in the country were promoted by the Allies to positions of wealth and power. Thus twenty years later 75% of the judges had also been

⁹⁶ *ibid.*, 21, 23; Salewski, Lanz, 68-9.

⁹⁷ Salewski, Lanz, 61, 64.

⁹⁸ Rauball (ed.), 50, 54, 67, 76.

⁹⁹ Claessens, de Ahna, 20-1.

¹⁰⁰ Schmid (1983), 199.

judges in the Third Reich. The percentages declined only because of judges dying. Business showed similar trends whereby those who helped the Nazis to power were restored to their power after the war and opponents of the regime were still ineffectual.¹⁰¹

The terrorists and other youths in the sixties felt determined not to fall into the same seemingly helpless spectators' behaviour of their parents' generation in 1933. The younger generation wondered what their parents did between 1933 and 1945. Some felt ashamed of their nationality, and felt a demand to respond better in a similar situation, which they saw in German support for the American position in Vietnam. They felt morally responsible to work towards a better world, even if it involved sacrifices in the 'necessary' violence.¹⁰²

The terrorist suspects sought by the Federal Criminal Office in 1991 include twelve Red Army Faction hard core suspects (see chapter two). Friederike Krabbe, who is believed to reside in Iraq, was born in 1950. Wolfgang Gramms, Thomas Simon and Heins Gerum were born in 1953, Volker Staub in 1954, Birgit Hogefeld, Barbara Meyer and Horst Ludwig Meyer (husband and wife) in 1956, Andrea Martina Klump in 1957, Christian Seidler in 1958, Corina Kammermeier in 1960, and Sabine Callsen in 1961.¹⁰³

Based on their date of birth it is likely that most of these suspected terrorists did not experience the same problems of their parents working and ignoring them which the first generations faced. Nor would their parents- -who were children in the Third Reich- -be associated with its legacy. Therefore, the negative identity with their parents as 'fascists' is probably inoperative with the current suspected terrorists. However, if the social strata is still largely middle and upper class- -this is unknown- -then it may still be true that the youths have increased post-materialist tendencies that reject their parents' affluence.

3.4 Discontinuity and Troubled Childhood

Secondary socialisation, the internalisation of other worlds beyond primary socialisation and the world of one's 'significant others', can sometimes cause crises when it differs too much from primary

¹⁰¹ Kellen (1990), 46.

¹⁰² die taz 5 October 1987, 19; Michael 'Bommi' Baumann, "Interview: The Mind of a German Terrorist" *Encounter* 51 (1978), 81-8, 81; Gerhard Baum, Horst Mahler, "Wir muessen raus aus den Schuetzenengraben" *Der Spiegel* 53 (31 December) 1979, 36-49, 37, 39.

¹⁰³ "Frauen in der RAF" *Terrorismus: Informationsdienst* 10, 1990, 6-7; "'Da ist irgendwo ein Nest'" *Der Spiegel* 15/1991, 22.

socialisation.¹⁰⁴ The development of an individual identity can also be made more difficult by the stresses and strains resultant from the loss of parents and broken friendships by moving home and school.

Table 4.3 Percentage Living with Both Parents

Household	Age					Population
	0-2	2-6	6-10	10-14	14+	
Both parents	87%	84%	82%	80%	76%	87%
Mother only	11	12	14	14	17	9
Father only	0	1	1	2	2	1
With Relatives	x	1	1	1	1	1
With Foster Parents	x	1	1	1	1	x
Hostel/ Boarding School	2	1	1	2	3	2
	100	100	100	100	100	100

Note: For 13-14 percent of the terrorists there was no data available for all the different ages.

Source: Gerhard Schmidtchen, "Terroristische Karrieren: Soziologische Analyse anhand von Fahndungsunterlagen und Prozessakten", in: Herbert Jaeger, Gerhard Schmidtchen, Lieselotte Suellwold, Lorenz Boellinger (eds.), *Lebenslaufanalysen: Analysen zum Terrorismus - 2* (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1981), 13-77, 66.

Earlier socialisation in the post-war era was discussed with the assumption that one lived with both parents. This was not always the case. Baader and Raspe grew up with their mothers and aunts, while Fritz Teufel (Second of June) and Mahler, after his father's death, were raised by their mothers. Klein's mother died shortly after his birth so he grew up with his father. Astrid Proll (and her brother) had divorced parents. Meinhof was raised by her mother and then later by a foster mother. Amongst the founder terrorists, only Ensslin was raised by both parents.¹⁰⁵ The loss of one, or both parents, however, was more a problem with the older terrorists. As Table 4.3 shows, most terrorists in the group grew up with both parents.

Table 4.4 (page 133) shows that over half of the generation born up to 1955 suffered the loss of one or both parents through death or divorce. Compared to a similar population sample, less than ten percent would have lost their father over the same time period.¹⁰⁶ Only the terrorists born after 1956 had divorced parents. This distorts the impression of Table 4.3 that most terrorists had both parents. The weight of Table 4.4 is increased by Table 4.2 which shows only three percent of all terrorists in the study where born in 1956 or later.

¹⁰⁴ Berger, Luckmann, 158, 161.

¹⁰⁵ Schreiber, *Der Spiegel* 20/1981, 92; Backes, Jesse (1989 III), 276-8, 287-9, 303-4, 305-6.

¹⁰⁶ Schmidtchen, 29.

Table 4.4
Decisive Biographical Occurances in Left-wing Terrorists, 1978

	Total%	Year of Birth			
		1945 or earlier	1946 to 1950	1951 to 1955	1956 or later
Orphan	5	13	3	0	0
Death of father	15	19	14	12	0
Death of mother	6	4	9	6	0
Death of a parent	26	36	26	18	0
Divorce of parents	10	9	5	17	17
	63	81	57	53	17

Source: Gerhard Schmidtchen, "Terroristische Karrieren: Soziologische Analyse anhand von Fahndungsunterlagen und Prozessakten", in: Herbert Jaeger, Gerhard Schmidtchen, Lieselotte Suellwold, Lorenz Boellinger (eds.), *Lebenslaufanalysen: Analysen zum Terrorismus 2* (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1981), 13-77, 66.

The implications are that over half of the left-wing terrorists in the seventies lived without both parents, with an even higher percentage of the founder terrorists affected by this problem of only one immediate 'significant other' for role model identifications. Where both parents are dead, this 'significant other' may not necessarily be a 'father' and 'mother', but two aunts, as occurred with Baader.

A possible speculation would be that not knowing one's parents' involvement- -and not personally knowing them- -would make the negative identification of 'fascist Germany' easier. Therefore the founder terrorists could be more easily moved to act against the state. Furthermore, it could be speculated from this data that the followers- -mainly from whole families- -were not moved by the negative identification of the continued 'fascist state', but by the identification with imprisoned persons that were held by the 'imperialist state' as discussed in chapters two and three.

The influence of the loss of one or both parents on problems with education and other experiences is highlighted in Table 4.5 (page 134), which shows that educational discontinuity is more influential. Generally, the conflicts in society at home and in schools and universities, and encounters with the court and police systems, were found to go with discontinuity problems of moving home, school and training.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁷ *ibid.*, 37, 66.

Table 4.5
Biographical Occurrences and Discontinuity and Conflict
Problems Among Left-wing Terrorists, 1978

Discontinuity Level	Number of Biographical Occurrences ¹					
	Total ²	0	1	2	3-4	5+
Three and more	19%	19%	17%	8%	24%	45%
Two	22	21	12	30	26	28
One	23	20	29	22	32	18
None	36	40	42	40	18	9
	100	100	100	100	100	100
Authority Conflicts						
Two or more	38%	31%	32%	40%	59%	82%
One	26	25	32	38	15	--
None	36	44	36	22	26	18
	100	100	100	100	100	100

¹ Biographical occurrences are not living with both parents after fourteen, death of one or both parents, divorce of parents, undesired leaving of one or both parents and similar problems.

² Total occurrences of moving home, school or training.

Source: Gerhard Schmidtchen, "Terroristische Karrieren: Soziologische Analyse anhand von Fahndungsunterlagen und Prozessakten", in: Herbert Jaeger, Gerhard Schmidtchen, Lieselotte Suellwold, Lorenz Boellinger (eds.), *Lebenslaufanalysen: Analysen zum Terrorismus 2* (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1981), 13-77, 34-6.

Another factor in the socialisation of West German left-wing terrorists is the protestant religion. While the religious beliefs of fifty percent of the terrorists are not available, 56% of those recorded were protestant, 19% catholic, and 25% other or none. This compares to a sample of 5000 youths showing 47% protestant, 41% catholic and 12% other or none. The influence of protestantism is increased when the faith of the parents is considered. 68% of the terrorists or their parents were protestant, 26% catholic, and 6% other or none. The comparison sample shows figures of 49% protestant, 46% catholic and 5% other or none.¹⁰⁸

The influence of the protestant faith, apart from its theological component, emerges in secularism through its stress on the autonomy of individual conviction, which adds weight to the legitimacy of one's actions.¹⁰⁹ This leads to searches for ideas and groups which are worthy of identification.

Problems arise, however, when the individual's belief adds the new identification to their verbal mission, but the progress of the group fails. The danger is that the options are then limited to only resignation or violence.¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁸ *ibid.*, 31.

¹⁰⁹ *ibid.*, 31-2.

¹¹⁰ *ibid.*, 32.

There are possibly two different types of families that the terrorists in the seventies came from. One is where the parents worked their way up to high social status through diligence, hard work and self-restraint. They had little time to offer their children any practical insights and guidance. In an attempt to compensate for this lack of attention, the parents gave the children material gifts, the same things the parents were working hard to provide for themselves. The parents wanted to instill in their children similar values of hard work, obedience to authority and the control of impulses and deterred gratification.¹¹¹

A second type of family would be one with well-educated parents that provided their children with liberal ideas of freedom, equality and possibly socialism. This was done in a permissive atmosphere without enough self-restraint taught. These children had a hard landing in the real world after leaving home because they lacked enough orientation to manage successfully.¹¹² This leads to the argument that children of leftist parents did not learn to accept their emotional-erotic impulses and fantasies as part of themselves, but rather viewed these as from outside of themselves.¹¹³

This is simplified, but does represent the group that emerged from the immediate post-war hardship, and the later group that emerged from the 'economic miracle'. These two types are also continuously found in any state, and would thus supply more youths that might prove susceptible to terrorist ideas.

The suspected terrorists of the eighties did not appear to move around different areas, and all but one changed schools at least once before moving on to further study and/or training. Unfortunately there is little information offered about the family life: Birgit Hogefeld is one of three children, and Thomas Simon is the son of a tool and die maker with one brother.¹¹⁴

An important time and phase in the process of socialisation for individuals is that of adolescence, when a person questions the lifestyles available, the commitments that could be made, and who they might become. The trying and testing of possible identities is not so much the search for a permanent identity, but an accelerated phase of

¹¹¹ Herbert A. Kampf, "On the Appeals of Extremism to the Youths of Affluent Democratic Societies" *Terrorism* 4 (1980) 161-93, 168.

¹¹² *ibid.*, 169.

¹¹³ Grossarth-Maticek, 20.

¹¹⁴ Horchem (1988), 155-9; Lukas Lessing, "Schwarzwald Faktion" *Wiener* 11 November 1986, 58-74; Hans Oberlaender, "Die Taeter" *Stern Extra: Terrorismus- -Das Attentat: Mord an Alfred Herrhausen* 4 December 1989, 51-3, 52.

questioning about oneself and the world around one. This phase will only be successful, however, if the individual can resynthesise earlier identifications and formulate aspirations within their potential capability, which are shaped by their own experiences and the cultural situation of the time.¹¹⁵

Problems in the process could arise if the adolescent does not have a direction in which they eventually want to develop their identity, or if they develop a brittle rigidity towards new situations reflecting their vulnerable identity. Added problems arise when the person overreaches his or her aspirations, and cannot achieve the skills required for his or her intended identity. This engenders low self-esteem.¹¹⁶

Identity exploration is normal in adolescence and at other times when a reconsideration of life goals and priorities occurs such as in the case of graduation from school and university, marriage, childbirth, divorce or job loss. The decision taken is affected by one's current level of satisfaction, the perceived need to make a decision and social expectations of parents, peers, teachers and employers.¹¹⁷ Therefore the life at home will influence socialisation and identifications, but only so long as one lives at home or remains connected to the parental home.

3.5 Socialisation Away from Home

The move away from home enables one to leave the influence of parents behind, and, given that one is not dependent upon them for financial reasons, become independent individuals. Of the ninety-five left-wing terrorists who attended some form of higher education (university or polytechnic), 41% lived in a commune, 44% rented a room (38% alone and 6% with others), while 18% lived with their parents and 4% with relatives. A comparative academic sample shows only 5% living in communes, and 29% renting a room (24% alone and 5% with others), with the largest percentage, 28%, having their own apartment, while 33% lived with their parents. None of the terrorists had their own apartment.¹¹⁸

Almost half (ninety-five) of the terrorists in the 1981 study attended higher education. A sample of 5000 persons between fifteen and thirty-five shows that while only 19% of the 5000 attended higher education, 47% of the 227 left-wing terrorists did.¹¹⁹

¹¹⁵ Weinreich (1985) , 53-5.

¹¹⁶ *ibid.*, 54.

¹¹⁷ Harold D. Grotevant, "Toward a Process Model of Identity Formation" *Journal of Adolescent Research* 2 (3) 1987, 203-22, 209.

¹¹⁸ Schmidtchen, 29, 44, 77. Data on 32% of the terrorists is unavailable, and there were multiple responses totaled 154%.

¹¹⁹ *ibid.*, 25.

In the eighties, of the suspected terrorists mentioned earlier, four had finished their *Abitur* (higher school leaving certificate), one did not, and two others completed lower school leaving certificates. Of the five who attended university, four left without a degree. Three others received apprenticeships, which two completed. One person had no training, and did not complete her school leaving certificate.¹²⁰

Many of the terrorists lived in collectives. 57% lived in communes and 36% in collectives (see Table 4.7, page 143). This type of living provided solidarity and a chance to practice theories in alternative lifestyles, and form new identifications in unique living arrangements.¹²¹ Generally the members are politically oriented to the left, and recruit new members from a relatively homogeneous group of the same orientation as the present commune members.¹²²

Sigrid Sternebeck, a later Red Army Faction member, felt that the traditional family lifestyle (father works and mother raises the children) was not enough, and founded a commune with five other adults and two children, as well as founding a childrens' centre with other parents.¹²³ Susanne Albrecht was dissatisfied at home and left there to move into a collective in St. Pauli saying she had had enough of the caviar lifestyle.¹²⁴

Apart from the chance to put theory into practice, membership in collective living arrangements allows the members, both youths and older ones, a chance to feel accepted and a chance to prolong the necessary search for an acceptable lifestyle. Young people who were not adequately socialised before can now catch up in socialisation. The commune can become an emotional substitute for the family and the individual can gain from what now could be seen as a complete family. The collective lifestyle provided a safe haven for the person to experiment and to develop.¹²⁵

One of the new experiences available was drugs, which seems to have been used by about the same amount of people in the terrorist groups as was normal in the counter-culture of the sixties. The use of drugs amongst the terrorists also increased with the number of problems and conflicts that occurred in the family and with the level of incidents involving conflicts with authorities. One interpretation of this is that drug consumption was an expression of non-conformity with the current

¹²⁰ Horchem (1988), 155-9.

¹²¹ Schmidtchen, 28-9, 44.

¹²² Suellwold, 82-3.

¹²³ Sternebeck, *Der Spiegel* 33/1990, 57.

¹²⁴ "Oma im Altkader", *Der Spiegel* 24/1990, 89.

¹²⁵ Suellwold, 85-6

roles and norms and offered a possibility of breaking these by accepting the social stigma associated with drug consumption in a heroic manner with others in group activity.¹²⁶

Drugs also offered the raising of feelings and personal value in a 'setting' contrasting reality outside the group that eventually leads to increased 'binding' on the source of the need fulfillment. In an underground group such dependence could cause problems for dependant persons who were concerned about where the next fix would come from.¹²⁷ Nonetheless, it was possible for Peter-Juergen Boock daily to take between four and eight ampules of heroin, morphine, cocaine, and other drugs from at least 1977 until May 1978 when he was held until November 1978 by the Yugoslav authorities, who rehabilitated him.¹²⁸

Table 4.6
Job Employment of Left-wing Terrorists, 1978

Employment	Left-wing Terrorists	Population Sample*
Full employment	35%	48%
Part-time	14	4
Irregular	18	0
Unemployed	10	1
Education/training/ without a trade	23	47
	100	100

* Population sample of 5000 youths and adults between 15 and 35 years old.

Source: Gerhard Schmidtchen, "Terroristische Karrieren: Soziologische Analyse anhand von Fahndungsunterlagen und Prozessakten", in: Herbert Jaeger, Gerhard Schmidtchen, Lieselotte Suellwold, Lorenz Boellinger (eds.), *Lebenslaufanalysen: Analysen zum Terrorismus 2* (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1981), 13-77, 25.

The link between the high number of left-wing terrorists living in collectives and pursuing a new philosophy of life can be seen in their poor work habits prior to entering a terrorist organisation. Unlike their counterparts in the public, the terrorists had a much higher percentage in part-time and irregular work, and experienced discontinued job training and higher education. If one does not manage to find employment after completion of one's studies or training, then the reduced satisfaction found in part-time and irregular work can lead to a weak and potentially helpless position where the alternative

¹²⁶ Suellwold, 103; Schmidtchen, 41-2; the survey showed that 26% of the left-wing terrorists had either tried marijuana, hashish or used drugs for longer periods. However, there was no data available for 73% of the terrorists.

¹²⁷ Suellwold, 102-3.

¹²⁸ Boock, *Der Spiegel* 9/1981, 116-7.

organisations of communes and other philosophies promoting alternative social structures, which allow one's lower personal value to be raised, appear attractive.¹²⁹ They support an identification that fits the reality (see Table 4.6).

3.6 Key Experiences and Persons

The 1977 study of urban terrorists found that most were unmarried, but there were exceptions, which centred on the West German terrorists, of whom 61% were married, and 37% had a companion. Couples are not the only ones who have a 'significant other' influencing their life. People can identify with many different persons. However, the left-wing terrorists were found to be influenced by a politically homogenous group. They were without political pluralism in their discussions. The influence of the peer groups and communes shows itself here.¹³⁰

Through contact with new people in a collective the person could also widen their individual emotional contacts, while people who wanted to influence others, could also find outlets in communes and group life. Both could fulfil personal needs with social rewards in group activity. Possibly too, the person entered the commune through contact with their partner who was already a member, and thus provided contact with the political group. Not all contacts with political groups and collective living arrangements were initially due to the group's ideology or outlook.¹³¹ The goals of the group were important to the individual only to the extent to which the group goals allowed fulfilment of individual goals. Group membership can itself be the goal, and not the goals available to groups.¹³²

For example, the influence of couples is seen in that of Ensslin and Baader, Mahler and Monika Berberich, Ingrid 'Ina' Siepmann and Dieter Kunzlemann, Petra Schelm and Manfred Grashof. Friendships between Ensslin and Ingrid Schubert, and Meinhof and Irene Goergens had the same result of bringing someone into the group.¹³³ The strength of the bond between Baader and Ensslin was so strong that she even visited him in prison in April 1970 before he was freed by the group in May.¹³⁴

The effects of the idols, the people identified with, can be to foster a protective, admiring, or affective attitude in the identifying person. If the idol is more educated, then it is possible that the other

¹²⁹ Schmidtchen, 24-6.

¹³⁰ Russell, Miller, 23; Schmidtchen, 45-6.

¹³¹ Schmidtchen, 86-7; Knutson (1980), 207.

¹³² Jaeger, Boellinger, 152-3.

¹³³ Schreiber, *Der Spiegel* 20/1981, 90.

¹³⁴ Aust (1987), 84.

person feels less experienced and inferior in the company of someone who better expresses themselves.¹³⁵

A survey of the top four influential people amongst left-wing terrorists showed 57% were members of the same group, 23% were influential due to their idol and emotional status, while others, accounting for 9% each, were influential because of their career, sexual desires or something else. No data was available for the other 23%.¹³⁶

Whereas key people and personal influences exert more of an immediate effect on people, key experiences may not always be immediately seen as such. Key events do not always cause decisive impulses, but can lead individuals already predisposed through socialisation towards a particular path. In the closed homogeneity of a group, the choice of alternatives is already somewhat foreclosed and some options therefore appear more valuable than others.¹³⁷

Key experiences can also be long term in nature, where continued exposure to an influence has a lasting effect on a person's attitudes. This was the case with Angelika Speitel (and presumably others) who worked in Klaus Croissant's Stuttgart office. The daily reading of prisoners' mail to Croissant became too much for her and she wanted to do more than office work so the Stammheim prisoners "could walk in the woods". Via a middle-man she made her first contact with the underground in 1976 when she met Peter-Juergen Boock.¹³⁸

Sigrid Sternebeck wanted to work against the unfairness of the ten year sentence against Werner Hoppe in July 1972. He had been sentenced for three attempted murders in a 1971 shootout with policemen, although only one spent cartridge was found from Hoppe's gun. This led Sternebeck to work with the prisoner support group Red Aid.¹³⁹

One suspected illegal militant member of the Red Army Faction wrote in 1988 that the emotions of working together in the militant scene of anti-nuclear power, defending squats and other protests can be that they are not focused enough, because one has not yet become a subject of the revolution and removed divisions between goals and means. This is what he says the Red Army Faction hunger strikes are to show by example, and is what those outside of prison seek to achieve. However, when the goal is unclear, the means are also unclear. This is where discussion with

¹³⁵ Wasmund, 230.

¹³⁶ Schmidtchen, 70.

¹³⁷ Wasmund, 231.

¹³⁸ Angelika Speitel, "Ein ungeliebtes Leben", *Stern* 39 (30) 17-23 July 1986, 134-8, 138.

¹³⁹ Sternebeck, *Der Spiegel* 33/1990, 57-8. Petra Schelm died in this shootout.

others can give direction to one's own experience which in the end can motivate people.¹⁴⁰

The subjective value of these examples is difficult to calculate, but it is thought that individual political experiences and world and state political events gain value once the person joins a group and the person then needs to assimilate the group values by interpreting one's problems and conflicts in light of group ideology and beliefs. Before this the person has possibly joined the group, less because of its political orientation, than because of personal relationships and requirements.¹⁴¹ In retrospect the particular political events or socio-political experiences gain new meaning for individuals.

These are the types of conditions that can lead to transformations of individuals' subjective reality, whereby the person 'switches worlds'. In doing so the person, in effect, goes through a second primary socialisation process, with the original primary one deconstructed and another erected in its place.¹⁴²

To be successful, the world switching exercise must include both social conditions to provide new significant others to establish effective identifications and provide dependency for the individual. It must also include conceptual conditions to provide a framework for the new order of the reality that displaces the old one.¹⁴³

While it is perhaps difficult to determine when particular events and experiences gain explanatory influence in an individual's life, it may be possible to examine the lives of left-wing terrorists to see what types of lifestyle they led shortly before joining terrorist organisations.

The influence of communes and collective lifestyles on the terrorists is seen in Table 4.7 (page 141). Named examples show that when one person entered other acquaintances usually followed. Susanne Albrecht shared a three-room apartment with Silke Maier-Witt and Sigrid Sternebeck, while Adelheid Schulz lived with Guenter Sonnenberg, Knut Folkerts and her boyfriend, Christian Klar, whom she met when she worked as a maid in the Klar household. Brigitte Mohnhaupt, along with Rolf Heissler and Ralf Reinders, lived together and formed 'Tupamaros Munich'. Friederike and her sister Hanna Krabbe also lived together in a Frankfurt collective.¹⁴⁴

¹⁴⁰ Norbert Hofmeier, "Erklaerung von Norbert" *Radikal* 136 part 2 (late 1988, no date given), 84-8, 84-5.

¹⁴¹ Jaeger, Boellinger, 154-6.

¹⁴² Berger, Luckmann, 176-7.

¹⁴³ *ibid.*, 177-8.

¹⁴⁴ Schreiber, *Der Spiegel* 20/1981, 92-4; "Wie wird man Terrorist" *Stern* 11 May 1978, 56-72, 62.

Table 4.7 (page 143) shows that, in general, the number of conflicts and problems a person has with authorities and the roles and norms of society increases with the individual's isolation and involvement in a counter-culture lifestyle. However, it cannot be said that one causes the other, only that the two appear to coincide. Although the figures only represent 76% of the individuals, the isolation of members amongst people who think, speak and collectively live together is clear. Also evident are the poor interpersonal relationships of some members who change employment, friends and lovers. The framework for the people to switch worlds appears.

In the case of Volker and Angelika Speitel (husband and wife) and Willy Peter Stoll, it was a case of living together between 1970 and 1973, with all eventually quitting their jobs and picking up- -as many others did at the time- -light drugs, and identifying with the leftovers of the student movement *Kommune I*, Teufel and Langhans and the feeling of repression. They had fewer commitments than ever before, and the repression came from the daily duties, which they were not capable of due to laziness. This also made decisions for them.¹⁴⁵

¹⁴⁵ V. Speitel, *Der Spiegel* 31/1980, 36-7.

Table 4.7
Noticable Behaviour Amongst Left-wing Terrorists, 1978

	Terrorists Total	Number of role and norm conflicts with parents and authorities			
		0	1	2	3+
Live in commune	57%	55%	56%	62%	45%
Live in collective	36	21	44	34	43
Only contact with specific groups	65	57	60	72	75
Aggressive towards authorities	47	32	44	53	53
Stereotyped ideological speech	27	25	22	23	33
Increasing isolation	23	23	16	28	33
Strong change of influence person	11	5	8	13	18
Giving up of earlier hobbies and interests	10	5	4	17	15
Quickly changing career goals	10	7	6	11	15
Strong mood swings	9	9	2	6	23
Poor common feelings towards people with whom relationship exists	8	5	4	11	15
Planless hanging/roaming about	8	2	2	11	18
Unclear thinking	7	5	2	11	10
Feeling of living in a false world	7	7	4	6	15
Seeing the light experience	5	0	0	6	15
	331	258	274	364	416

Note: Data was only available for 76% of the 227 left-wing terrorists.

Source: Gerhard Schmidtchen, "Terroristische Karrieren: Soziologische Analyse anhand von Fahndungsunterlagen und Prozessakten", in: Herbert Jaeger, Gerhard Schmidtchen, Lieselotte Suellwold, Lorenz Boellinger (eds.), *Lebenslaufanalysen: Analysen zum Terrorismus 2* (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1981), 13-77, 47.

Table 4.7 says nothing about types of group affiliation outside of living arrangements. Affiliations to other groups and associations, even political parties, also tell what types of contacts and ideas a person is exposed to. Theoretically, any of these groups of people could have also entered religious sects, drugs or the alternative scene. The difference that brought the follow-on groups to the successive terrorist groups was the connection with the prisoner support groups.¹⁴⁶

Table 4.8 (page 144) highlights the isolated circle of groups and people which did not force the individuals to confront ideas and thoughts different from their own. The identifications shown in chapter three appear here with a sizable number of womens' group members and even more belonging to prisoner help groups that would bring attention to the problems and ideas of 'political prisoners'.

¹⁴⁶ Schreiber, *Der Spiegel* 20/1981, 94.

Table 4.8
Group Affiliations of Individuals
Prior to Entering Left-wing Terrorist Groups, 1978

	All			
	Terrorists	RAF	B2J/RZ	Other
Prisoner aid organisations	27%	20%	29%	39%
New Left	10	9	14	14
Student organisations	8	9	10	7
Independent communist or social revolutionary groups	7	5	8	3
Communes	6	9	2	6
Independent protest groups/movements	4	8	4	0
Women's groups	3	0	12	3
Anarchist groups	3	1	0	0
Armed service resistance organisations	2	1	2	1
Youth groups	2	3	4	1
Parties	2	4	0	1
Other	4	3	8	3
No answer	48	51	49	43
Total	126	123	142	121

Source: Gerhard Schmidtchen, "Terroristische Karrieren: Soziologische Analyse anhand von Fahndungsunterlagen und Prozessakten", in: Herbert Jaeger, Gerhard Schmidtchen, Lieselotte Suellwold, Lorenz Boellinger (eds.), *Lebenslaufanalysen: Analysen zum Terrorismus 2* (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1981), 13-77, 71.

The prisoner help groups enabled contact to be established between people outside of prison and the prisoners, and became a continued source of new members by providing contact with the terrorist groups, and reasons to join the struggle in the form of revenge and aid to the terrorists. The office workers of the defence lawyers saw the letters from the imprisoned terrorists and could be manipulated by the defence lawyers, who also organised the prisoner support committees (see chapters two and five).

As in the case of Sigrid Sternebeck the position of the prisoners built up pressure on the people to do something. In the case of those who held onto the legal scene after the death of Meins in 1974, as Sternebeck did, this was even more difficult after Meinhof's death in 1976. As she told herself: "How long do you still want to wait- -if it goes further, then they are all soon dead".¹⁴⁷

The identification of the people in these pre-terrorist and terrorist circles could be intensified in confrontation with police and other authorities in support of the ideas of one's group, as a large percentage were. They also exhibit a high level of participation in unlawful demonstrations, with more participating in these than lawful ones (see Table 4.9, page 145).

¹⁴⁷ Sternebeck, *Der Spiegel* 33/1990, 62.

These episodes could show and prove one's membership, and help the group gain effect and influence in the public arena. These activities also provide the group with an identity of what they stand for, and do or do not accept.¹⁴⁸

Table 4.9
Participation in Demonstrations
and Squatting by Left-wing Terrorists, 1978

	Terrorists Total	Population Sample
Participation in illegal demonstrations	32%	4%
Participation in legal demonstrations	25	23
Participation in squats (Hausbesetzungen)	17	1
Confrontation with the police as an adult	63	8*

* Experienced police measures in a demonstration

Source: Gerhard Schmidtchen, "Terroristische Karrieren: Soziologische Analyse anhand von Fahndungsunterlagen und Prozessakten", in: Herbert Jaeger, Gerhard Schmidtchen, Lieselotte Suellwold, Lorenz Boellinger (eds.), *Lebenslaufanalysen: Analysen zum Terrorismus 2* (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1981), 13-77, 47.

It is also possible, however, that their collective street demonstrations will be seen as not enough. For example, Sternebeck interpreted the clearing of the Eckhoffstrasse squat by Hamburg city police in May 1973 as a sign of how strong the city was and how unable the protesters' method was to solve problems. The result was impotent anger, and a search for political activity that eventually led her to the Committees against Torture and Political Prisoners in 1974.¹⁴⁹

The objective results the individuals achieve or not, are not as important as how they subjectively interpret the performance and record between what they feel capable of and what they feel they have achieved. Usually a person lowers their subjective ability levels after a failure. However, someone who perceives themselves as having raised ability levels, and has unsuccessful conflictual experiences, generally raises their expectations and goals even higher. They intensely hold onto their beliefs in high flying success. Terrorists who continually fail are similar.¹⁵⁰

Perhaps this explains the move from protest to violent demonstrations to low-level (arson and small bombings) and then high-level (large bombs, assassinations, abductions) terrorism. Their message did not have an effect at one level, so another one was sought.

¹⁴⁸ Schmidtchen, 47-8.

¹⁴⁹ Sternebeck, *Der Spiegel* 33/1990, 59.

¹⁵⁰ Suellwold, 89-90.

A person's perceived level of ability can also be raised by others who think a person must be able because of their intelligent presentation and ability. This raises the expectation level of others, and to avoid disgrace, one tries to live up to these, especially when the same person is looked up to as a leader.¹⁵¹

There is not much information known about the presently suspected terrorists. What is available shows that they all worked in the surrounding Red Army Faction legal network before entering the underground. Some had been arrested during their legal work, and several were involved in the squatting movement and RAF prisoner work.¹⁵²

The personal contacts of suspected RAF members in the eighties were important. Three of the suspected terrorists were born in Wiesbaden (Andrea Klump, Birgit Hogefeld, and Wolfgang Grams), and entered the RAF scene in the mid-seventies. Hogefeld and Grams later entered the underground together in early 1984 after living together for some time. Klump was a friend of Grams who entered the underground in mid-1984. Together these three form the so-called 'Rhein-Main-Gruppe' (Rhine-Main-Group) of the RAF.¹⁵³

The 'Stuttgarter-Gruppe' (Stuttgart Group) is believed to be centred on Barbara Meyer (nee' Metzger) and her husband Horst Ludwig Meyer. She is from Stuttgart and he later moved there from nearby Schwenningen to run a newsagent shop with her in Stuttgart. Both were active in RAF prisoner work in the early 1980s and entered the underground together in summer 1984 along with Thomas Simon. Simon had lived with the Meyers in a collective in 1981. Before entering the underground Barbara Meyer lived with Sabine Callsen from Hannover in Frankfurt a.M. in late 1983. Callsen entered the RAF underground in September 1984.¹⁵⁴

Many of these people can be expected to have participated in illegal demonstrations and confrontations with authorities through their RAF activities before entering the underground. Some were arrested prior to entering the underground (Simon, Seidler, and Grams). Unfortunately, it is not known exactly why the people decided the underground was the next logical option.¹⁵⁵ A possible reason for so many entering in 1984 was that the group was building up to a campaign and needed more members, especially after the arrest of six members in July 1984, as mentioned in chapter three.

¹⁵¹ *ibid.*, 91.

¹⁵² Horchem (1988), 155-9.

¹⁵³ Oberlaender, *Stern Extra* 4 December 1989, 52.

¹⁵⁴ Horchem (1988), 158-9.

¹⁵⁵ *ibid.*; Lessing, *Wiener* 11 November 1986, 61.

3.7 Available Options

The end of the 'world switching' exercise may be uncharted for the individual and the group they have joined. Ideally there should always be the option of exit for those who do not want to enter terrorism. They should be able to disappear back into society without any attached labels in order to take up subjectively acceptable alternatives.¹⁵⁶

On the individual level, the person must feel comfortable in their identity. If not, then they will continue to change and adapt to find one they are comfortable with. When they have been unable to acquire their first option, especially the identity with positive overtones, then negative ones become potentially viable. Positive and negative refer to the person's viewpoint which may, or may not, coincide with society's perspective.¹⁵⁷

The direction and options available to the person are dependent upon and influenced by the social structure and the culture in which the person finds him or herself. An influence on the person entering this stage of terrorism would be a desire to end the indecision and frustration they may have been experiencing with unacceptable roles and identities, by making a clear decision to do something decisive both in action and commitment. Peers and contacts may influence the individual's decision, especially when they are all homogenous in orientation. To this could be added outside pressures such as a police record, or the potential for arrest (see chapter five). The identity the person chooses will also be one that allows personal as well as political (these may also come later) needs to be met, and may follow a severe disappointment of expectations¹⁵⁸ which was mentioned earlier as a time for identity exploration.

Chapter two stated that Baader and Ensslin went to Frankfurt in 1968 after meeting two people acquitted of incitement to arson, while Meinhof decided to join in the escape of Baader to signify her resolve for the revolutionary ideas of the group. She was also seeking to overcome her isolation since moving to West Berlin after her divorce by maintaining contact with Baader and Ensslin who had recently moved to Berlin and sought her assistance in finding accommodation. Mahler also helped in this. Meinhof was also having difficulty in believing in the continued

¹⁵⁶ Neidhardt (1981), 246-7.

¹⁵⁷ Knutson (1981), 112.

¹⁵⁸ *ibid.*, 113, 115, 122. This is the thesis developed from a neo-marxist perspective in Micheal Horn, *Sozialpsychologie der Terrorismus* (Frankfurt a.M.: Campus Verlag, 1982), which sees the 'career' option of terrorism at the end of a series of closed options.

possibilities of legal extra-parliamentary opposition in West Germany.¹⁵⁹

Sternebeck felt the death of Meinhof was too much, and sought contact with the underground, which did not pose any problems because it seemed to be her only possibility to help the prisoners, and she did not have many contacts holding her to the legal world.¹⁶⁰

Most importantly, the person must see this path as the most viable option available to him or her at the time. They must (a) see this as a positive choice to become actively committed to the identity of a group member, (b) where they will gain personal (and possibly political) benefits from group membership, and (c) see this as the most viable option available even though this means taking on the state.¹⁶¹ The person will also be aware, even if only in an abstract manner, that they will be expected to commit murder if they come into particular situations where weapons will be used¹⁶² (see chapter five).

For example, as Sternebeck mentions above, the group offered her more options than society, to which she only had severed most links. The shift of contacts from society at large to the counter-culture and the group also underscores the perception of the group as the person's most viable option at the time when other paths have been narrowed or closed.

Later, as mentioned, the person will be able to incorporate his or her earlier identities and experiences into a perspective placing this new identity as the culminating point of their life. This provides continuity and explains their behaviour to them and provides a belief system that makes their behaviour acceptable to them.

The conditions and ideas that prevailed in the fifties and sixties were quite different from the rules and norms of the eighties which determined the available alternatives with which individuals and groups could assert their independence from parents.¹⁶³ The concerns of the students of the sixties about peace and war served to widen political consciousness in general and to increase awareness about the environment as one effect. It also continued in the belief that peace and its

¹⁵⁹ Krebs, 202-8, 210-2.

¹⁶⁰ Sternebeck, *Der Spiegel* 33/1990, 62.

¹⁶¹ Knutson (1981), 143; Wilkinson (1986), 94.

¹⁶² Peter-Juergen Boock, Peter Schneider, *Ratte-tot...Ein Briefwechsel* (Darmstadt: Sammlung Luchterhand, 1985), 111-2.

¹⁶³ Sibylle Huebner-Funk, "Growing up with Nazism and NATO: A Comparative Generational Approach to the Formation of Political Consciousness in the Federal Republic of Germany" *International Sociology* 1 (4) 1986, 381-396, 392.

continuation should not be left to the politicians, but required extra-parliamentary pressure from below, as mentioned in chapter two.

These later youths had the history and examples of violent demonstrations and of terrorist attempts to influence government in West Germany. These could either be positive or negative identifications depending upon the individual's biographical and psychological experience. They also have available the experiences and success of the Green party to show that reform rather than revolution is possible, as mentioned in chapter three. However, personal dynamics and activities, which in turn are influenced by social and political cultures and events, influence opportunities and limit available personal identities. Where extended political struggles occur, some individuals will adopt these identities for their own.¹⁶⁴

3.8 Desertion and Leaving the Group

One perspective of someone leaving a terrorist group (an *Aussteiger*) is that of an unsuccessful socialisation experience for the individual, where the asymmetry between their objective and subjective realities becomes too great.¹⁶⁵ In chapter five other viewpoints on desertion and exit from West German terrorist groups are discussed from that of the group and decision-making process. Here the focus is on the individual.

The discrepancies between the individual's objective and subjective worlds can occur because of the conflicting reports of 'significant others' as the person is socialised into the group. Possibly the person only recently arrived and still had some contact with the outside. Alternatively, the person's primary socialisation still maintained such a hold that subsequent secondary socialisation into the group was never successfully completed.¹⁶⁶

This is less so when the person joined the group with high expectations of achievement because they came from political or socially motivated groups (21 *Aussteiger* came from prisoner or Red Cell groups), or when they joined out of a desire for justice in changes in the state (8 *Aussteiger*), or simply to be more effective in political work they had begun in the legal sphere which they saw as limited (12 *Aussteiger*). They confused their subjective expectations with objective reality.¹⁶⁷

¹⁶⁴ Knutson (1981), 144.

¹⁶⁵ Berger, Luckmann, 183.

¹⁶⁶ *ibid.*, 187, 191-2.

¹⁶⁷ Karin de Ahna, "Wege zum Aussteig: Foerdende und hemmende Bedingungen", in Wanda von Baeyer-Katte, Dieter Claessens, Hubert Feger, Friedhelm Neidhardt (eds.), *Gruppenprozesse: Analysen zum Terrorismus Band 3* (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1982), 477-525, 488-9.

When the person joined because it was a 'slip' into illegality after the dynamics of low-level terrorism led them to the group, then half of the *Aussteiger* felt less bound to the group and decided to leave. This affected mostly the Second of June members. Othertimes, where couples entered, if one left, the other generally left shortly thereafter.¹⁶⁸

These problems are increased by potential discrepancies the person experiences after they join the group. The personal worth and solidarity that was once there can evaporate in the demands of the group's activities and organisation. The person who wanted to give him or herself to the higher cause of the ideology of the group, cannot do so because of the lack of manoeuverability within the group's hierarchy.¹⁶⁹

The 1981 study showed fifty-eight left-wing terrorists deserting the various groups because of the means used (11%), the means and the goals (8%), the goals (2%) and personal grounds (4%). However, the reasons for 75% of them leaving are unknown.¹⁷⁰

A comparison of the *Aussteiger* with overall membership social origins shown in Table 4.1 (page 128) shows that as many of them came from executive families as the others. One difference, however, is that they held a larger percentage of workers and the self-employed amongst them, than the average of the terrorists.

This perhaps explains the large percentage of experts amongst the *Aussteiger*. As discussed in chapter five, these are experts in the planning and organisation of operational equipment required for terrorist activities. Of those who left the groups, 49% were experts, 18% supporters, 17% executors who carried out the actions, and 16% leaders. These figures show a possible explanation for experts leaving the groups because they are possibly not drawn as far into the group. They therefore have no orientation and conviction with regards to the overall group goals, which conflict with their own political ideas and goals. They are able to leave the group by maintaining their own identity through its orientation towards the political ideas and concepts of groups outside of the terrorist organisations, of which they feel they are members.¹⁷¹

This is, nonetheless, a difficult process because of doubts about the 'rightness' of the exit, and guilt over betrayal of the group.¹⁷² Perhaps the distancing of oneself from immediate contact with others in the group and the lengthy spells of isolation in one's prison cell aids

¹⁶⁸ *ibid.*, 490.

¹⁶⁹ Wasmund, 236.

¹⁷⁰ Schmidtchen, 56, 77.

¹⁷¹ *ibid.*, 56, 74.

¹⁷² Wasmund, 237.

this process, for 60% of those who have left the group before 1979 did so while in prison. Only 17% did so after leaving prison, and 23% before their arrest.¹⁷³

Imprisonment and separation from the group does not necessarily lessen the fear of group vengeance. In one of the early hunger strikes one woman had her name added to the medical 'danger' list of hunger strikers, even though she was not on hunger strike. This allowed her to appear to be a member, when in fact she was not. She possibly feared retribution after her expected release from prison, in the same manner of Ulrich Schmucker's murder.¹⁷⁴

However, other prisoners are further radicalised because of the group socialisation and propaganda over prison conditions that are associated with 'isolation torture', 'destruction', 'brainwashing', and 'special treatment'. These can increase the person's belief in the group's labelling of the 'system' and its objectives. If someone is exchanged for a hostage, then their time in prison acquires special meaning as a furthering to their actions in the group.¹⁷⁵

Most of the terrorists who left the groups were usually the first or an only child, and were possibly unfamiliar with, and unable to cope with the stresses and strains of the large family life in the underground, unlike children from larger families. Furthermore, they seemed unsure of themselves, showing a tendency to retreat and avoid conflict despite good communication skills.¹⁷⁶

4. Summary

The first section showed that the concept of identification could provide a viable model to explain individual motivation by combining aspects of the 'psychologically disturbed' and 'rational-idealist' models. The belief systems section highlighted how apparently untenable ideas could appeal to individuals and groups, as well as how these could be supported through the terrorist group environment. The remainder of the chapter elaborated on the influence of personal contacts in left-wing terrorism in the Federal Republic of Germany.

The left-wing West German terrorists were mainly from whole families of higher social standing, and with incomplete university educations. The incompleteness of their education and training, coupled with possible conflicts with their parents and authorities led to a search

¹⁷³ Schmidtchen, 56; Jaeger, Boellinger, 172-3.

¹⁷⁴ Melvin J. Lasky, "Ulrike Meinhof and the Baader-Meinhof Gang" *Encounter* 6, 1975, 9-23, 10.

¹⁷⁵ Jaeger, Boellinger, 172.

¹⁷⁶ Schmidtchen, 58-60.

for a new identity which contrasted with that expressed by the society of their parents, and was accompanied by a strong belief in the ideology of their group that justified and legitimised their actions for them.

The current RAF members, from what is known, seem to have less university education than previous group formations. However, this is compensated by more technical knowledge within the group. These members seem to come from pre-underground cliques that enter the underground together, hinting that individuals find 'significant others' in the sub-culture and stay with them out of affection or admiration. They also find enough other personal benefits in group membership to continue with the group as their only option available to continue with their chosen beliefs. Although less is known about the RZ and **Autonomen**, these conditions appear also to hold true for their members.

No particular type of person emerges, because there have been a mixture of types of people that have entered the known groups. However, as this examination is based on incomplete data this cannot be considered a conclusive statement. A fresh study undertaken in the manner of the one published in 1981 may reveal a different picture.

Now that the individual's motivation to opt for terrorism has been discussed, it is imperative to follow this through to their group membership to uncover which costs and benefits the person is subject to. Chapter five follows the individual through the group to examine the group dynamic aspects of terrorist motivation.

CHAPTER FIVE: TERRORIST GROUP DYNAMICS

I would rather not be alone, he thought as he went over the bridge. When it comes down to it, one is often alone. But decisive is whether one can know together, and that there is someone with whom one can know together. The more the better.¹

first we are collective there, said feder, where the individual in the group finds no safe haven to gain their [individual] life, no one sees any more terrain. none. simply does not want any. otherwise it does not work, because you have experienced this, the adoption of your life without the group does not work.²

if it goes properly, said marie, the faults of the individual are also the faults of everyone, and everyone learns from it, in that they seek the provisions of the faults in the collective. our collectivity means, to break so often and so long between us, that abject scheme of payment and guilt, this psychology of power, until we are people, stronger than the pack [fascist forces], collective.³

Oh, you know, there must be lots that is in the interest of everyone [in the group], which nonetheless does not happen. The group is no island, there are power struggles and intrigues, strange coalitions, outsiders, all forms and positions, that you can imagine. With the interests of everyone, that is hard. It is really not much different from outside. Often it is in the greater interest of everyone that peace reigns in the gang.⁴

This chapter follows the path of the individual member from entry to exit in a terrorist group in an examination of the different processes encountered. These processes are dependent upon the type of terrorist organisation, and the group belief systems. Both of these are discussed before the individual's path through the group.

1. Theoretical Types of Terrorist Organisations

The behaviour and actions of the new recruit towards a terrorist organisation are determined by the specific hierarchy and structure of the group, which in turn are dependent upon the aims and goals of the group. The possibility of a group's goals changing means that the group can move from one model type to another as its situation and membership change over time.

¹ Christof Wackernagel, Nadja. *Erzaehlungen und Fragmente* (Reinbek: Rowohlt, 1988), 32.

² Geissler, 273. There is no capitalisation in this book.

³ *ibid.*, 436.

⁴ Boock (1988), 95.

Three theoretical approaches are available in the literature on terrorism: 'instrumental', 'organisational' and 'expressive'. The first two approaches originate in the rational-actor and political organisation literature, while the third is from psychology.

The 'instrumental' and 'organisational' models assume terrorist organisations are similar to other political organisations, except that they rely on violence to influence policy. Like political organisations, terrorist groups need to solve the same problems of recruitment, funding, competition and providing members selective incentives.⁵

Like other political organisations, the terrorist organisation's demands, if granted, would result in collective public goods in the form of government, business and other policy changes with costs and benefits to other segments of society. For example, terrorist groups produce a climate of fear amongst the elite, and ensures the employment of security consultants. The attainment of collective public goods does not rule out group peripheral activity (such as bank robberies) that may not lead directly to their goal attainment. Terrorist group activities could also be a mixture of legal and illegal methods in an effort to maximise utility of their resources.⁶

People join terrorist groups in the belief that membership benefits outweigh membership costs. The value of the public good may be more important in the 'instrumental' model because the members perceive their own benefits in acting for the resultant collective public goods.⁷

The selective incentives, monetary and social, that are available to members may be more decisive in the 'organisational' model. The assumption in both cases is that the actor behaves rationally given his or her best available knowledge at the time.⁸

Group size limits the type and availability of members' selective incentives. Large groups are thought to provide incentives or coercion (positive inducements or negative sanctions) separate from the public goods to generate members to help supply these. Small groups may be able to avoid these methods, because of the larger individual share of the public goods potentially supplied by the group. On the other hand, because of the greater face-to-face contact within the group, small groups can also employ peer pressure and moral persuasion to better

⁵ Kent Layne Oots, "Organizational Perspectives on the Formation and Disintegration of Terrorist Groups" *Terrorism* 12 (3) 1989, 139-152, 139.

⁶ *ibid.*, 140; Oots (1986), 38, 45.

⁷ Martha Crenshaw, "The Logic of Terrorism: Terrorist Behavior as a Product of Strategic Choice", in: Walter Reich (ed.), *Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990 I), 7-24, 8-9.

⁸ Oots (1986), 18, 64-5.

advantage than larger groups. These small group benefits and side effects lead to their use as decision-making bodies for larger groups.⁹

The 'instrumental' approach views terrorism as a deliberate strategic choice based on collective group values, and institutionalised decision-making procedures that calculate the consequences of their action and inaction, whereby terrorist means are related to the ends and resources. Terrorism is a decision taken by political actors to achieve changes in the political and social conditions of a country or region, as a response to external conditions such as government response and public perceptions in an attempt to produce change in the political position of the government. The goals of the group may be agreed upon, but disunity between factions may exist over the best path to them, whereby some may extol short-term goals in publicity and recognition available through terrorism over the longer processes of other political protest means. Increased costs of terrorism will decrease its likelihood, and it will have failed when the group does not reach its stated political goals.¹⁰

The decision to use terrorism would be based, as mentioned, on the assumption of perfect knowledge. However, miscalculations and wrong decisions could occur due to the group's limited amount of outgroup contacts, as well as other psychological and physical restraints it may have. This could be the outcome of a learning experience: having tried all other perceived options, terrorism is the last one available. Additional factors could be: lack of majority support; its members may be unable to mobilise larger numbers; the perception that time is against them; and eagerness and impatience.¹¹ All of these could contribute to a group deciding to use terrorism to try to improve its ability to influence political change.

The 'organisational' approach examines internal group dynamics to explain the use of terrorism by groups. Terrorism is the result of the group's determination to survive by offering members incentives and rewards which, while they may not always bring the group's goals closer to achievement, do serve to maintain group loyalty and cohesion. Outside pressures on the group change the members incentives, group actions are therefore erratic and not always related to stated goals and ideological values. In this case increased terrorism costs only strengthen group

⁹ *ibid.*, 48-9.

¹⁰ Crenshaw (1990 I), 8; Martha Crenshaw, "Theories of Terrorism: Instrumental and Organizational Approaches", in: David C. Rapaport (ed.), *Inside Terrorist Organizations* (London: Frank Cass and Co., Ltd., 1988 II), 13-31, 13-5, 27.

¹¹ Crenshaw (1990 I), 10-2.

cohesion, instead of lessening activity, but rewards may create incentives for some members to leave. Disintegration of the group leads to the end of terrorism, as achievement of the long-term ends could threaten their survival.¹²

The 'expressive' approach to terrorist groups views terrorism as the result of frustration of other means in an attempt to draw attention to the act of terrorism. Long-term goals are not the prime consideration so much as the inherent satisfaction of the terrorist act itself.¹³

Unlike the 'organisational' model that wants to maintain group survival, the ecstatic element of the terrorist act becomes almost a religious experience whose repetition is considered a primary motivation in the 'expressive' model. When this ecstatic element dominates, then terrorism is not a strategy to right wrongs, but specific violence motivated mostly by the experience of the terrorist act.¹⁴

This refines terrorism to its essence as a 'spectacle' which mediates human relationships through their representation, instead of through their actual experience. Spectacles are politically institutionalised events where power actors appear as separate depersonalised untouchables. The public audience experiences ecstasy by seeing feared and admired secret desires played out by these political actors.¹⁵

Expressive terrorism turn 'normal' events into 'spectacles' by twisting the event into something different. This could be the result of the politicised street theatre of the late sixties that occurred in West Germany as an accompaniment to the protest movement. After it ended the terrorist groups sought to continue this tradition of festival with the world turned upside down. An example of this is the pudding attack prepared for US vice-president Hubert H. Humphrey's visit to West Berlin by *Kommune I* in 1967. This was blown into a bomb attempt by the press and resulted in the arrest of commune members.¹⁶

Attempts to apply the above three approaches to the left-wing West German terrorist groups yield a mixed result. The 'instrumental' pattern is more in line with nationalist and separatist groups such as the Provisional Irish Republican Army and the Palestine Liberation

¹² Crenshaw (1988 II), 27; Crenshaw (1990 I), 13; Post (1990), 38.

¹³ Martha Crenshaw, "An Organizational Approach to the Analysis of Political Terrorism", *Orbis* 29 (3) 1985, 465-489, 470.

¹⁴ Wardlaw, 54.

¹⁵ Aida Hozic, "The Inverted World of Spectacles: Social and Political Responses to Terrorism", in : John Orr, Dragan Klaić (eds.), *Terrorism and Modern Drama* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1990), 64-81, 66-7.

¹⁶ *ibid.*, 67, 71-2.

Organisation.¹⁷ However, an argument could also be made that this is how some of the Revolutionary Cells and Autonomen cells operate. They have a political objective of hindering and stopping construction of a nuclear processing plant, for example (as well as others described in chapter three), and then do so outside of the remit of other political organisations. The decision, admittedly, is not that of the legal groups, but one made by some members of the involved organisations. After the goal is achieved the cell ends. For this reason, and the RZ idea of being for and of the masses, the idea of an RZ cell striving to maintain itself with membership incentives only applies to possibly the 'Europe' RZ of the seventies.

On the other hand, the 'organisational' model does apply to the Red Army Faction. After Baader and Ensslin were released during their court appeal they stayed together, and then freed Baader, after he was arrested again, to maintain the group. The same applies in the nineties when the group writes that it needs to have the armed group support the prisoners on hunger strike.¹⁸ This is reminiscent of the '84/85 Offensive' which sought to raise membership levels.

The 'organisational' model also applies to the Second of June, which merged with the Red Army Faction, and became a cell of the Revolutionary Cells in West Berlin to survive. Thus the group's operational capacity continued under different banners.

Some RZ and Autonomen cells are perhaps also primarily 'expressive'. This would be the case when the activity was designed to turn events into 'spectacles' as discussed earlier, and when the group was more interested in the activity than any political results they might achieve. Examples here might be stopping military trains with NATO supplies, and other official vehicles, as well as incitement and provocation at demonstrations with molotov cocktails.

Extrapolation from the three models of group motivation leads to one suggestion that national-separatist groups are more 'rational' for using terrorism, than those which use terrorism in affluent liberal-democracies. The latter are seen as having "more of a psychopathological grain".¹⁹ This would mean the proper response to the 'instrumental' model is the 'communication' model, while the 'organisational' and 'expressive' ones should be countered with the 'war' model. As mentioned above these responses would be non-productive and, in the case of the 'organisational' model solidify the otherwise potentially self-

¹⁷ Crenshaw (1988 II), 15; Within the PLO the 'rejection front' would be organisational however.

¹⁸ "Da ist irgendwo ein Nest" *Der Spiegel* 15/1991, 20.

¹⁹ Ariel Merari in Alexander, Katwan (eds.) (1980), 281.

destructive group. The countermeasure difficulties (discussed further in chapter six) highlight the overlap in each of the three group models, which are pure ideal-types rarely found in practice. Their purpose is to guide discussion and theory as is done further below.

2. Group Beliefs

In chapter four belief systems were shown to support the individual's new identification with the group and its members by offering solutions, preparing them for extremism and death, rationalising away their guilt, and immunising their beliefs from outside influences. There the emphasis was on how the beliefs affected individuals. Here the focus is on the effect of beliefs on the group.

Group beliefs are thought to offer some explanation for terrorist group activity because these feed, support, justify and help bring new recruits to the groups.²⁰ As chapter four showed, the group beliefs may not be what brought the individual initially into contact with the group, but assimilation of group beliefs binds the person closer.

The main belief that holds the group together is the members' common dream of goal attainment, which is shown below to be a dream or fantasy. The desired solution mobilises history and organisations for the group to overcome its current problems- -otherwise it would not be in the underground- -to continue until their self-defined goals are reached.²¹

The processes described in chapter four should leave the belief system strong enough for the group to move from "the intolerable present to the promised future"²² and outline behaviour patterns to cover all contingencies they might encounter. Like ideologically motivated elite soldiers, terrorist group members will be motivated to protect and promote their ideological position, and not to compromise their position by a 'cutting of losses' with regards to ideologically defined enemies. An extreme and absolute conflict requires extreme responses.²³

The left-wing West German terrorist groups also gain the benefits of small size, as mentioned above, and those of primary groups where members' face-to-face contacts create and meet the primary and social norms, needs and ideals of the individual group members. When group beliefs reinforce these motivational factors they form a 'we' which the individuals will not want to disappoint. Together the ideological and

²⁰ Wilkinson (1988), 95-6.

²¹ J. Bower Bell, "Revolutionary Dynamics: The Inherent Inefficiency of the Underworld" *Terrorism and Political Violence* 2 (2) 1990, 193-211, 195, 196.

²² *ibid.*

²³ Elliot P. Chodoff, "Ideology and Primary Groups" *Armed Forces and Society* 9 (4) 1983, 569-93, 578, 581.

primary group factors are enhanced by symbols, literature, group education and associations that portray the members as part of one whole of brothers, sisters, and comrades.²⁴ For terrorist groups the combining of these go hand-in-hand as is shown below.

By definition a group comprises people who see themselves as separate from others, who also recognises this difference.²⁵ Terrorist groups have few contacts with others, and the challenge and rejection of the group's views appears to reinforce the validity of their beliefs. The group then identifies itself as a vanguard elite as it loses outgroup contacts with increased rejections, and it is believed that intra-group contacts increase to compensate for the loss of inter-group contact.²⁶

The terrorist group acceptance or rejection of others, and of others accepting or rejecting the terrorist group, is the process of social comparison where the group judges itself against others. In individuals the comparisons occur in reality, but group comparisons occur more in fantasy.²⁷ The isolation of the group increases this tendency, and it becomes more 'surrealistic' to serve as a mechanism to escape reality, rather than as a guide to action.²⁸

Group beliefs based in fantasy can arise from their subjective interpretations of the political and social world through the filters of past political, social, economic and cultural (i.e., history, tradition, literature, and religion) experiences and memories. These beliefs, encouraged by the group to be inflexible and closed to change, as discussed in chapter four, aid the group members as cognitive and motivational factors. They want something to hold onto through their turbulent situation, and they want something to further solidarity and cohesion, not something that questions their position.²⁹

The belief system and fantasy of the group's position can be supported with multiple categorisations for their enemies and the causation of events such as individuals, the group, competitors, political parties, the public and media. No one cause is enough of an explanation,³⁰ because extremists of the left (and the right) are

²⁴ *ibid.*, 582-3, 586-7.

²⁵ Rupert Brown, *Group Processes: Dynamics within and Between Groups* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1988), 2-3.

²⁶ Claessens, de Ahna, 19-181, 113.

²⁷ Brown, 59, 66.

²⁸ Crenshaw (1989), 16.

²⁹ Crenshaw (1988 I), 12-3.

³⁰ *ibid.*, 14.

interested in sociopolitical affairs and integrate their knowledge into their beliefs.³¹

The belief system and fantasy of the group can also be supported by a structured place in history with a 'macronarrative' that links the past with the future through the group. The macronarrative explains past, present and future events to provide a comprehensive interpretation of events and the group categorisation system.³²

This occurred when the Red Army Faction tried to identify its revolutionary past in the student movement,³³ and later when it sought the working class as its revolutionary subject, as well as when the group claimed the tradition of resistance against the Third Reich, because they were involved in the anti-imperialist struggle against fascism.³⁴ The early terrorists of the RAF and Second of June did not see fascism overcome after the end of the Third Reich, and did not want to look on helplessly as their parents had. They wanted to do something.³⁵

The left viewed the Federal Republic as tied to its worst historical aspects. Its development was not derived from the ideal of public democratic revolution and anti-fascist resistance, but rather chained to the concepts of restoration and preservation of reactionary power politics. The terrorists saw themselves as the undivided vanguard who acted, unlike the rest of the left who only talked.³⁶

The Third World identification of the terrorist groups allowed not only evidence of the inhumanity of Western democracies, and a substitute for the lack of repression for Western revolutionary intellectuals. It also lifted the groups above their own individual doubts to a position where their struggle was objective and on a global scale. This increased its psychological importance for them.³⁷

³¹ James Sidanius, "Cognitive Functioning and Sociopolitical Ideology Revisited" *Political Psychology* 6 (4) 1985, 637-661, 638-9, 657.

³² Crenshaw (1988 I), 20-1.

³³ Red Army Faction, "Das Konzept Stadtguerilla" (1983), 349.

³⁴ Red Army Faction, "Dem Volke dienen: Stadtguerilla und Klassenkampf" (1983), 389-390.

³⁵ Baumann (1978), 81; Horst Mahler, "Terrorism in West Germany: Interview with Horst Mahler" *Socialist Review* 39 (May/June) 1978, 118-123, 119.

³⁶ Reiche, 17; Hans Adamo, "Vorgebliche und tatsaechliche Ursachen des Terrorismus" *Blaetter fuer deutsche und internationale Politik* 12, 1977, 1436-1448, 1442.

³⁷ Bernd Guggenberger, "Kulturkritik und Guerilla-Mythos: Die Dritte Welt als Identifikationsobjekt" *Beitraege zur Konfliktforschung* 3 (4) 1975, 91-108, 103.

The power of these fantasies and macronarratives is shown in an oral history study of former female Italian terrorists. The ideas and images dealing with interpretations of resistance to fascism were seen

...as overwhelmingly clandestine work and armed struggle; heroic stories of revolutionaries in other countries and other times; the legend of the hero or heroine who leaves home to help the oppressed against the oppressors....³⁸

These thoughts sustained them against everything. It does not explain why these women turned to terrorism, but does show how they persisted in their venture when its impossibility of success became increasingly evident. As the reality loomed larger, so did the shared mythical imaginary world. As the people could not create the future they wanted, they could nonetheless form "a common imaginary world to sustain their choice of action."³⁹ That this occurs also in West German terrorist groups does not seem impossible.

This assumption is supported by the above examples of how the West German groups place themselves into large macronarratives where they are the heroes overcoming the evil forces of imperialism in a long struggle as part of the psychological process of projection: the group sees external causes for their difficulties. The individual is idealised and all of the undesirable personal aspects are projected outwards to evil institutions. To a lesser extent people outside of the group are also seen as evil.⁴⁰ The members identify positively with people and negatively with institutions.

The good inside and the evil outside increases group cohesiveness towards group objectives in its competition with other groups. This also applies to the ingroup's positive attitudes towards other ingroup members. Outside groups, their members and ingroup scapegoats, are viewed negatively.⁴¹

The examination of belief systems in chapter four highlighted mechanisms used by the groups to distance themselves from their activities against the outgroup and 'traitors' within the group. The

³⁸ Luisa Parserini, "Mythbiography in Oral History", in: Raphael Samuel, Paul Thompson (eds.), *The Myths We Live By* (London: Routledge, 1990), 49-60, 54.

³⁹ *ibid.*, 55.

⁴⁰ Schmidtchen, 55; J. M. Post, "Hostilite', Conformite', Fraternite': The Group Dynamics of Terrorist Behaviour", *International Journal of Group Psychotherapy* 31 (2) 1986, 211-224, 220; J. M. Post, "Group and Organisational Dynamics of Political Terrorism: Implications for Counterterrorist Policy", in: Paul Wilkinson, Alasdair M. Stewart (eds.), *Contemporary Research on Terrorism* (Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press, 1987), 307-317, 310-2.

⁴¹ Brown, 194, 200-1.

addition of fantasy to their belief system caused relative deprivation because their social comparisons were inaccurate subjective positions that resulted in a discrepancy between their perceived expectations and their capabilities.⁴²

The Red Army Faction think they are fighting against their defined deprivation, when in fact they are not deprived. They see their defined enemies of imperialism and fascism winning against them in maintaining/gaining support of the population thereby reducing them to a long struggle. In reality the group never stood a chance in gaining popular support, because they have been competing against non-equals on non-equal terms (the group fantasy) from the beginning.

Group behaviour is also dependent upon who the group compares itself to in terms of relative deprivation.⁴³ The deprivation experienced by the group when it compares itself to other terrorist groups, differs from that deprivation experienced through comparisons to the state.

This also has implications for identification processes. Just as relative deprivation depends upon who the group compares itself to, identification depends upon which loyalty and identification process is in operation.⁴⁴ A group member could identify with individuals who once helped him and to whom he felt loyalty to help free from prison (Boock), or the person could feel that while they believed in socialism, the terrorists' manner of achieving socialism was incorrect (Klein). Both of these are just as valid as someone identifying with a prisoner who died and felt they needed to add their contribution to help ensure the other imprisoned terrorists were freed before others died (Speitel and Klein).⁴⁵ At the group level, as chapter three showed, the terrorists use different identifications to (a) identify with issues that bring new recruits and a wider base (the RAF), and (b) support public protest issues in the framework of their own broader issues (the RZ and Autonomen). The key to identification and relative deprivation, is the subject of the group's (person's, society's) focused attention.

The group can rationalise its cause by such means to better deploy its resources to achieve maximum effectiveness. Some clues as to what these will be in the formation of identity, both individual and collective, are (1) an awareness of what can be gained or lost; (2) the expected return from one's actions; and (3) the formation of a

⁴² *ibid.*, 188.

⁴³ *ibid.*, 188-9.

⁴⁴ *ibid.*, 245.

⁴⁵ Boock, *Die Zeit* 24 June 1988, 11; H.J. Klein (1979), 187, 195, 198, 201; V. Speitel, *Der Spiegel* 31/1980, 41.

collective identity as the basis for future interpretations of members' individual identities.⁴⁶

The time used for analytical thought by the group is thus devoted to their subjective reality, their ideology, and the ultimate goals. The implications, such as the violence used by them, are less of a concern. In this way the group uses discussions and self-criticism as a form of 'faith ritual' to assure persistence of belief,⁴⁷ which helps maintain group survival.

3. Paths into the West German Terrorist Organisations

Chapter four showed that no particular type of person became a left-wing West German terrorist, but that they did experience somewhat similar types of socialisation that might lead the person to join a terrorist organisation. The next section builds on the results of chapter four and the models presented earlier in this chapter to show what the person experiences as a member of a terrorist organisation. This section is based on the West German groups, but appears to be applicable to other groups such as the Brigata Rossa.⁴⁸

People have to want to join a terrorist organisation because of some personal incentive or be coerced to join. If the person could benefit from what the group offered without joining- -being a free-rider- -they would not join. Their behaviour is thus potentially predictable, as is discussed below.⁴⁹

Chapter four examined the chronological process of joining terrorist groups as a series of overlapping arenas that included key experiences and people, a breaking away from traditional social structures, and a commitment to a small social circle where eventually the number of options for the group is potentially narrowed down to terrorism. This process can be broken into segments.

First, a disassociation phase which begins when the individual questions social and emotional ties. Then these ties are loosened before the phase ends with a total negation of one's previous existence as a form of internal and external liberation. The second phase is membership in counter-culture groups which form a substitute for the social and emotional ties left behind. The counter-culture includes groups ranging from those only wanting an alternative existence, to those wanting to actively fight against society, and the person can move from unpolitical

⁴⁶ Richard Weiner, "Collective Identity Formation and Social Movements", *Psychology and Social Theory* 3, 1982, 13-23, 14.


⁴⁷ Bell, 197.

⁴⁸ See Jamieson, 103-6, 266-8.

⁴⁹ Oots (1989), 143, 149-50.

to political groups. The person's commitment to ideas can also intensify and move from violence rejection to violence accepting positions. He or she can move from the vision of a new society, to a smaller group that is totally committed to the new society, to a violent vanguard that strives for the new society. Moving from one to the next group is progression from larger to ever smaller groups.⁵⁰ However, as chapter four showed, the move in any stage can be as much because of a personal identification as commitment to ideas.

Figure 5.1
Practical and Theoretical Groups Around the 'Hard-Core'



Source: Dieter Claessens, Karin de Ahna, "Das Milieu der Westberliner 'Scene' und die 'Bewegung 2. Juni'" in: Wanda von Baeyer-Katte, Dieter Claessens, Hubert Feger, Friedhelm Neidhardt (eds.), *Gruppenprozesse: Analysen zum Terrorismus 3* (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1982), 19-181, 58.

⁵⁰ Wasmund, 226-7, 229; Rubenstein, 91.

Once the person is in a violence promoting group there is another round of phases before one enters the 'hard-core' of the underground. Figure 5.1 shows two paths through groups to the 'hard-core', one theoretical and the other practical. Both must be completed.

The theoretical groups are: (1) 'pure' theorists, who work in the abstract; (2) 'engaged' theoreticians, who work towards specific protest issues; (3) people who understand the protesters' position; (4) 'weapons permissive' persons, (5) people who wish them well but do nothing to support them; (6) passive supporters of the active supporters; (7) active supporters of the hard-core; and (8) the 'hard-core'.

The practical groups are: (1) the 'total reservoir' of school, higher education, work, family and social circles who can be moved into the first stage, (2) social 'acquaintances', and through that, (3) the closed circle of other pubs, apartments and then, (4) new acquaintances made in the closed circle, to (5) the 'entrance room' of the terrorist scene where one meets people who can pass individuals on to (6) the supportive sub-terrorist group, before finally obtaining (7) membership in the 'terrorist group' which will mean something different for each organisation.⁵¹

There are no fixed boundaries in these groups with secret doors from one group to the next. Nor is the above a diagram of a specific group organisation. Rather it is an heuristic device applicable to all terrorist organisations.

How fast someone moves from the outer to the inner circles depends upon the person's own perception of the situation and how the group perceives the person's role and function in the group: Will the person be more useful as a legal or as an illegal member of the group?⁵²

Exactly where one ends up within these categories depends upon what the group needs, and what one can offer. One needs to be able to offer the terrorist group something, be it special skills like explosives, or criminal experience.⁵³ The four roles are: (1) operations personnel, where either individuals or groups perform operations; (2) experts in ideology and propaganda, organisation and processing of materials for mobility and cover in the underground, or for the planning and organisation of operations equipment (explosives, weapons, logistics, etc.); (3) leadership roles, amassing the groups and organising their

⁵¹ Claessens, de Ahna, 57.

⁵² H.J. Klein (1979), 49, says it was the RZ's decision that he be in the 'Europe' and not the national RZ group.

⁵³ Konrad Kellen, "Terrorists- -What are They Like? How some Terrorists Describe Their World and Actions" in: **Terrorism and Beyond: An International Conference on Terrorism and Low-Level Conflict** (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corp., R-2714-DOE/DOJ/DOS/RC, 1982), 125-173, 151.

links with the legals (lawyers, supporters and prisoners), planning and leading operations; (4) legal supporters who supply items and materials for the underground.⁵⁴

Almost everybody falls into category one as operations personnel, because in the German groups everybody takes part in operations. This included Baader, Ensslin, Meinhof and others in the first generation, as it does the Meyers in the current one.⁵⁵

The experts could be divided into those like Meinhof and Mahler who wrote the Red Army Faction's early position papers, and others like Boock who was a technical expert. According to Boock there were few technicians in the RAF so they tended to be active in many roles in the group.⁵⁶ In the current group Horst Meyer is possibly the technical expert, as he was trained as an electrician.

Red Army Faction leadership roles have been filled by Baader and Ensslin, Haag and Mayer, Mohnhaupt, Klar and Schulz, and Barbara and Horst Meyer over the years.⁵⁷ The legal supporters have included some of the lawyers, and others like Volker and Angelika Speitel, who also later moved into the underground. The names of those who fill these last roles today are unknown.

In the Revolutionary Cells the functions of group members differed between the national and international division in the seventies. Klein, for example, as a member of the international division, participated in the OPEC raid because of his military training, which was then at a premium in the RZ, and because his participation guaranteed a remuneration for the RZ from the PFLP.⁵⁸

The national group in the seventies may have been similar to the RZ in the eighties, where it seems the group of people involved in each cell was smaller and led to the sharing of expert information- -and maybe experts- -but this is speculation. This was the likely result of each cell not being necessarily self-sufficient in all skills. A case in point was the use of a particular type of clock in RZ bombings.⁵⁹ Other similar types were not substituted, only the one particular model was used. This leads to the hypotheses that either a recipe for bombs went around the cells which was strictly adhered to- -the cooks not knowing how to substitute items- -or the bombs were all made by the same cell.

⁵⁴ Schmidtchen, 49.

⁵⁵ Kahl, 46-7, 163.

⁵⁶ See Fetscher, Rohrmosser (eds.) (1981); Boock, *Der Spiegel* 9/1981, 117.

⁵⁷ Kahl, 46-7, 112-3, 163.

⁵⁸ H.J. Klein (1979), 53, 73.

⁵⁹ Gerd Elendt, Lisa Trunk, "'Die Luft ist raus'" *Stern* 42 (19) 3-10 May 1989, 236, 240, 236.

Replacement of members arrested or killed in the Red Army Faction is not a problem. In 1984 the authorities arrested seven of the twenty to twenty-five hard-core RAF members, and still the '84/85 Offensive' went ahead. This appears normal as the group remains active and maintains fifteen to twenty members in the hard-core, despite the arrest of seventy-eight hard-core members since the group's founding.⁶⁰

The media, and some security officials, see the new RAF recruits coming from squatters, anti-nuclear groups, and others associated with the **Autonomen**. They believe that these groups, with their violent fringes, act as a 'pressure cooker' as the person moves from these groups to the RAF, which can offer more militancy in the long run than the other groups.⁶¹

This viewpoint overlooks that the **Autonomen** are against hierarchy and group indoctrination, which are found in the RAF, and that any **Autonomen** members who joined the RAF were already members of RAF legal support groups⁶² (see chapter two).

The usual route to RAF hard-core membership begins with visits to RAF members' trials, membership in one of the committees seeking improvement of prison conditions, personal contact through prison visits or other persons such as lawyers, and participation at public demonstrations, seminars and other events. On top of this is added a key experience such as participation in occupying offices, or some other demonstration.⁶³

A key experience is sometimes not necessarily one particular event, but long-term exposure to events, such as Christof Wackernagel's attendance at the Stammheim trials of Baader and others while working for the lawyer Klaus Croissant. During this job Wackernagel's belief system shifted to a position that the government system could only be changed through violence, and he joined the RAF in 1977.⁶⁴

All of the suspected Red Army Faction members in the 1986 campaign were all active for at least three years in the legal arms of the RAF before becoming hard-core members, and had joined the underground in

⁶⁰ Gerhard Boeden, "Die RAF und ihr Nachwuchs", **Terrorismus: Informationsdienst** 7, 1987, 1-4, 1. The ten people arrested in the German Democratic Republic in 1990 were all hard-core members, and had all 'retired' from active membership.

⁶¹ *ibid.*, 2, Boeden uses the word **Durchlaufhitzer**; Friedrich Zimmermann in *Die Welt* 25 October 1986.

⁶² Horchem (1987 I), 13-4.

⁶³ Boeden **Terrorismus: Informationsdienst** 7/1987, 2.

⁶⁴ Frank Nicolaus, "Theater um einen Freigaenger" **Stern** 39 (35) 21-7 August 1986, 152.

1984 or 1985.⁶⁵ Then only the names of nine suspects were known. At the time of writing (autumn 1991), as mentioned in chapter four, there are still only eleven suspects.

The example of RAF supporters from the Federal Republic, Switzerland, Holland, and Denmark, who occupied European Community offices in Brussels during the 1989 RAF hunger strike shows how the group can offer a chance for "non-militant" persons to participate in action instead of discussion. The participants were also offered closer identification with RAF and Action Direct hunger strikers by their own imprisonment and hunger strike in Brussels after their arrest.⁶⁶

This was not a new method of radicalising members. Susanne Albrecht was arrested along with twenty-four others for occupying the Hamburg offices of Amnesty International to protest about Red Army Faction prisoners' conditions in October 1974. Along with her were also five other later hard-core members: Karl-Heinz Dellwo, Lutz Taufer, Guenter Sonnenberg, Christian Klar and Knut Folkerts.⁶⁷

In the eighties special cases occurred in the RAF whereby some people do not seem to have remained long in the legal RAF groups before they entered the underground. These cases were where the individual knew the terrorists and others in the scene for many years, and that they did not need to prove their commitment in protest demonstrations like the ones described above, and thereby avoided the unnecessary risks of being noticed by the authorities.⁶⁸ An example of this is Sabine Callsen, who became an RAF supporter in 1981, lived with Barbara Ernst (arrested in July 1984) in 1983 and entered the underground in September 1984. Ernst had attracted police notice since she was arrested in January 1978 after pouring acid in a subway ticket machine which subsequently exploded and killed her companion, and in 1983 when she belonged to a group seeking to stop US munitions trains between Bremerhaven and southern Germany. The assumption is that Callsen, who helped in the local Hamburg elections in 1982, and the national ones in 1983, was radicalised by Ernst as they lived together.⁶⁹

Presumably, after initial contact is established the new recruit is politicised by the RAF members through propagandistic use of the prison

⁶⁵ Horchem (1988), 156-9; "Im Fadenkreuz der RAF" Stern 39 (30) 1986, 14-5.

⁶⁶ Zusammen Kaempfen, Dokumentation zur Besetzung der EG-Kommission waehrend des Hungerstreiks. Bruessel 11.5.89 (No place/publisher/date of publication), 5-6.

⁶⁷ Salewski, Lanz, 134.

⁶⁸ Boeden, Terrorismus: Informationsdienst 7/1987, 2-4.

⁶⁹ Horchem (1988), 156-7; Hans Schueler, "Ein Schuss durch die Decke" Die Zeit 13 July 1984, 5.

conditions, the court trials and other means to recruit the new person after asserting that the person is not an undercover agent, but 'clean' and acceptable to the group.⁷⁰ This might explain how people unknown to the authorities in connection with the RAF or other terrorist groups reach the underground. The other possibility is the continued use of 'middlemen' who could pass a cleared person on to the RAF, as Angelika Speitel was in the seventies.⁷¹

Personal contacts are used by the Revolutionary Cells to obtain new members. Here the difference is that the person rarely gives up their 'normal' existence as a student, labourer, or whatever their profession may be. These people will also be able to participate in legal political activity and enjoy a social life.⁷²

Personal contacts between the underground and legal individuals also enable such occasional supporters to offer their aid to the underground in single operations. This can be in the form of safe-houses and other logistical problems common in the seventies, with their legal existence and a few days of illegal activity hindering the authorities' knowledge of who belongs to terrorist groups.⁷³

Similarly, as the Revolutionary Cells are not always a collective in the same way as the RAF underground is, they also have a less dynamic structure than that outlined here. They may all know each other in the cell, some may even be from the same commune or collective apartment, but unlike the RAF, after the action--be it a bombing or otherwise--they are once again alone until the cell meets again. They have fewer outlets to discuss their feelings about activities, and have to cope with this alone.⁷⁴

Angelika Speitel also noted this feeling of isolation as a member of the Red Army Faction as she maintained safe-houses for the group, and was thus not always in contact with others. She wanted to participate more, but had inhibitions about it. Eventually, however, as she could not talk to just anybody in the street, she spoke with a cook. When the group found out "all hell broke loose".⁷⁵

⁷⁰ Boeden, *Terrorismus: Informationsdienst* 7/1987, 2-3; Wasmund, 232.

⁷¹ A. Speitel, "Ein ungeliebtes Leben" *Stern* 39 (30) 1986, 138.

⁷² Wasmund, 232; H.J. Klein (1979), 172; "Der erste Besuch ist entscheidend" *Der Spiegel* 34 (21 August) 1978, 44.

⁷³ Aust (1987), 113; Barth, "Mal ein paar Tage abtauchen" *Stern* 40 (45) 1987, 250.

⁷⁴ Geissler, 277.

⁷⁵ A. Speitel, *Stern* 39/1986, 138.

3.1. Group Benefits and Entering Processes

Group membership brings psychological consequences with it as a result of different behaviour patterns than when one is an isolated individual. This follows from the different identity concepts that individuals have of themselves: personal identity and social identity that is acquired in a group. The social identity stems from personal acquaintances and acceptance of group attributes and norms as part of group membership.⁷⁶

Group membership is reciprocal.⁷⁷ The person loses their contacts with family and friends, which may have already been left behind along the way towards acquisition of a new belief system, as discussed in chapter four. This is a cost of group membership. The group needs security and the person's abilities in exchange for the solidarity and other benefits it offers the individual.

Prior to group membership the person forms an impression of the group based on the image of the group presented by the media. This is when the first positive or negative identifications with the group form. If the media image is desirable, then individuals could see their social status being raised by group membership.⁷⁸

The Second of June forerunner, *Kommune I*, was always interested in press reaction to their activities, and played to it by planning their actions based on what the press reactions would be to them. This idea still held weight with Baumann after he left the B2J in 1972. He felt that as the groups were built up by the media, they always feared a lack of attention from them⁷⁹ (see chapter seven).

The individual's internalisation of the group's identity brings any status or prestige associated with group membership to the new member. Thus Klein could speak of having good feelings about the new group he was a member of when he joined up with people in the left after a broken home and problems in his first job.⁸⁰

This also means internalisation of the group macronarrative of its history, roles and reputation in society. Internalisation of the group macronarrative is influenced by group structure. In the Red Army Faction it begins as the individual enters the group's legal arm and identifies with group aims and activity. If the person moves into the 'illegal militants' he or she needs to also internalise the new factor of criminality and potential illegal existence, which is assured if they

⁷⁶ Brown, 5, 6.

⁷⁷ *ibid.*, 20.

⁷⁸ Crenshaw (1985), 478.

⁷⁹ Baumann (1978), 83; Baumann (1979), 28.

⁸⁰ Brown, 20; H.J. Klein (1979), 113.

move into the hard-core membership. Through these stages the macronarrative intensifies and solidifies around and within the individual.

Membership in the Revolutionary Cells and *Autonomen* is different. They too have their macronarratives that are begun with entrance into the pre-terrorist circles in the alternative scene. In the seventies membership in the RZ may have involved contact with others already in the group, who could pass on their experience and aid in the internalisation of the macronarrative.

The eighties, however, experienced spontaneously formed RZ and *Autonomen* cells, which did not have the benefits of prior history and membership. For these the comments of the post-1984 version of the magazine *radikal*, which left Germany to establish itself beyond the reach of the German security services, must apply. *radikal* said the experience of organising the publication in illegality was not only a break with others, but also a development in which one learns and reflects on the meaning and consequences of each step. The RZ and *Autonomen* cells are similar in that, while they can attach themselves to the macronarrative of 'resistance against the state', they also form their own cells' separate macronarrative together with other members.⁸¹

The social status associated with the group may also reside in the eyes of people other than the new recruit. Volker Speitel, who entered the Red Army Faction via the Committees organised around Klaus Croissant's Stuttgart office, said that the group recruited people on the principle that 'only in illegality and the armed struggle is life possible', and that whoever entered the underground was correct. The move from legal to illegal activities was a status rise in the eyes of those left behind as well as in the eyes of those seeking to help the cause beyond the level of handbills and Red Aid, to that of weapons.⁸²

The move from legal to illegal means of struggle against society constitutes another reason for group membership. This could be seen especially after such events as the death of Ohnesorg, the attempt on Dutschke, or the death of Holger Meins. With Ohnesorg and Dutschke, according to Baumann, it was as if the police were going to get you, no matter what you do, so now you need to fight back.⁸³ For Speitel and Klein, as mentioned, the death of Meins signalled that all of the Red

⁸¹ ID-Archiv im IISG (eds.) *radikal 1984-1989. Ein Interview* (Amsterdam: ID-Archiv im IISG, 1989), 30; and see Weiner, 14-5, about collective experiences.

⁸² V. Speitel, *Der Spiegel* 31/1980, 37-9.

⁸³ Crenshaw (1985), 474-5; Baumann (1979), 41.

Aid committee work had been in vain, because a prisoner had died despite their work to help the prisoners. All that remained was illegality.

Others could be enticed by the monetary incentives of group membership that provided an income. In left-wing West German terrorism this was not an incentive for the founding members, but did become an issue for some in the 'Blues' to remain in the bank robbery scene instead of joining the Second of June.⁸⁴

Money could also be used to bring people into the group, who would later have other incentives and sanctions to remain in the group. The RAF used this method in its early days to obtain the help of 'experts': a mechanic to change locks and fittings, and the body and engine numbers of stolen vehicles; and a metal worker to build and modify items for the group. The mechanic later voluntarily became a full member, but the metal worker needed to be coerced to remain in the group.⁸⁵

This is an example of how the group could coerce cooperation through fear of the group and of the authorities. The group could also, as discussed later, use the threat of expulsion to maintain order in the group. Fear thus recruited members and kept them in order.⁸⁶

With this in mind, 'chance' can play a role in recruitment if the person is like the auto mechanic or metal worker above, who is on the sidelines and is presented with an opportunity which is taken without thinking through the possible consequences. Those consequences are shown again in the next example.

The work in Croissant's office in the seventies was divided between those involved with legal propaganda work and those with the illegal work maintaining contact between the illegals, the committee members, lawyers' offices, and the prisoners. After someone was attracted to the group, then there was always the possibility to pull the person into the underground through fear of the authorities, or through contact with the illegals. At special times, such as just after Croissant left for France to seek asylum before arrest by the authorities, the group in the offices became infected with eagerness for the underground. They were ripe for picking by the illegals, who could play on their fears of arrest and excitement for the underground with the argument that it was better to go into the underground than to be arrested. This was the argument used by Baptist Ralf Friedrich, who went into the underground

⁸⁴ Crenshaw (1985), 478-9; Kellen (1982), 153; Baumann (1979), 104, does not name these people.

⁸⁵ Aust (1987), 106-8, 112, 188-9.

⁸⁶ Wasmund, 243; Wilkinson (1986), 95, 100-2.

after Schleyer's death because he had seen Mueller, Newerla and Speitel arrested and wanted to avoid that fate.⁸⁷

The reason for entering the underground presumably influences individual initiation processes, which also serve different functions: (1) the symbolic function of marking the passage and change in identity for the group and individual; (2) its role as an apprenticeship to the newcomer as an introduction to the new skills required as an effective group member; (3) as a means of gaining the newcomer's loyalty, something that is normally associated with favourable treatment. However, terrorist groups perhaps demand dangerous and illegal experiences.⁸⁸

There are several possible forms of initiation in terrorist groups. The simplest is an explanation to the newcomer of how they fit into the group: what is expected of them, and what they can expect from the group. This includes information about the security arrangements they now have to adhere to for their own, as well as the group's, safety and freedom. The newcomer must understand this reciprocal aspect.⁸⁹

A possible example of initiation is the 26 March 1984 Red Army Faction bank robbery in Wurzburg. The authorities believe the group had around one million DM then, which leads them to believe the robbery was a test of their abilities after a rest period, and to provide newcomers with a chance to prove themselves in advance of a later offensive. The money was useful, but not the sole reason for the robbery.⁹⁰

Although Susanne Albrecht was affiliated with the RAF by June 1977, she had only done courier services and worked with the committees. It is thought that her assistance with the groups' entrance to the Ponto household, because of his status as a godfather to one of the Albrecht children, was a trial for her entrance to the hard-core group.⁹¹

In the extreme initiation could be the murder of a 'traitor' by a group seeking membership with another group, as is believed to have occurred with the group around Ilse Schwipper (nee' Bongartz), who wanted to enter the Second of June Movement. In return for membership the Schwipper group is believed to have offered to murder Ulrich Schmuecker to show their value to the Second of June. Schmuecker was believed to be working for the Federal Office for the Protection of the

⁸⁷ V. Speitel, *Der Spiegel* 31/1980, 39; V. Speitel, *Der Spiegel* 33/1980, 31-3; Friedrich, "Ich bitte um Vergebung" *Der Spiegel* 34/1990, 53.

⁸⁸ Brown, 23-4; Wasmund, 233.

⁸⁹ "Der erste Besuch ist entscheidend" *Der Spiegel* 34/1978, 44.

⁹⁰ David Th. Schiller, "Current Terrorist Activities in Germany" *TVI-Journal* 5 (3) 1985, 14-7, 14-5.

⁹¹ "Oma im Altkader" *Der Spiegel* 24/1990, 88.

Constitution at the time. The Second of June was able to have something done which it thought too hot to handle itself, while the newcomers had a chance to prove themselves.⁹²

One way of viewing initiation is as a means of bonding the group together. This is based on the belief that a group is only constituted when everyone perceives their fates to be linked together in order to achieve a common group goal.⁹³ In this sense, now that the new recruit has committed an illegal act and is in the underground, he or she relies upon the group for protection and assistance to survive. The other members are in similar positions--their fates are linked to the group and to each other. Hence the use of fear within the group to maintain order and control. A new recruit's irrevocable action ensured their loyalty to the group, because they could no longer return to the old system, and binds the group together.⁹⁴ The murder of Schmuecker also made others fear reprisals if anyone else left the group to betray them.

Cognitive dissonance suggests how seemingly disproportionate membership costs can be carried by the new member. In the process of joining a group

...people's awareness that they have undergone the unpleasant experience to gain entry to the group is inconsistent with their subsequent discovery that there are things about the group which are not as they had anticipated...[T]his perception of inconsistency (or dissonance) is psychologically uncomfortable and...people will look for ways to reduce it. Since the initiation may be too vivid or painful to repress easily, one avenue to reduce dissonance is to enhance one's evaluation of the group....⁹⁵

Thereby the initiation process raises the individual's estimation of the status of group membership by increasing the newcomer's internalisation of the group identity.

The initiation is theoretically also important for the group because it moves the group from a newly unstructured 'fused' group to one that is 'structured'. The members' pledge (implicit or explicit) bonds the group together in mediated reciprocity, whereby this forms a terror that allows the group to act upon itself as a defence against the fear of the enemy. This 'pledged group' seeks only to survive and may--depending upon its situation--develop into an 'organised group' with concrete objectives. Where no initiation, or 'pledge' exists, there is no common

⁹² Claessens, de Ahna, 160.

⁹³ Brown, 28, 30.

⁹⁴ Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Ltd., 1967), 67, 73.

⁹⁵ Brown, 25.

long term objectives for the group. In this concept the 'pledge' allows violence, internal terrorism within the group, to keep the group together in the manner that killed Schmuecker.⁹⁶

3.2. Group Hierarchy

Newcomers find the group's activities balanced between task related (instrumental) and socio-emotional (expressive) behaviour. In the course of achieving instrumental goals the means to the end may divide the group into factions, and the expressive behaviour will release some of the tensions between factions.⁹⁷ Sometimes in terrorist groups where weapons are available this can lead to persons drawing weapons on one another before the situation is defused. This is the result of waiting for the activity, which gives the group its meaning, and always being with the same people in the same places. In this situation tensions can build up between people. The result can be two members from different groups drawing guns on each other as happened when Baader argued with George von Rauch that the Second of June should be subordinated to the Red Army Faction. Baumann defused the situation when he dropped a wine bottle.⁹⁸

The group hierarchy and leadership structure determines the person's roles in the group. As the group situation changes, through changed internal and external forces, some of the norms also change. The hierarchical structures are part of the group's achievement of instrumental tasks as a means towards the ends. The hierarchy delineates tasks and avoids the overload of any one person, and provides order in the group, allowing expectations of one's behaviour, and as part of the formation of personal and group identities.⁹⁹

As the situation (or the group's perception of the situation) changes, the hierarchy changes. The arrest of the RAF founder members meant the erection of the first 'info' network. Its collapse shifted the weight to the couriers and lawyers, while the leaders' suicide in 1977 moved authority back to the underground. Later problems in the underground meant a recognition of the usefulness of the illegal/legal members in the establishment of the 'illegal Militants' described in chapter two.

⁹⁶ Jean-Paul Sartre, *Critique of Dialectical Reason* (London: NLB, 1976), 419, 430, 467.

⁹⁷ Brown, 33-4. These are not to be confused with 'instrumental' and 'expressive' group models.

⁹⁸ Baumann (1978), 86.

⁹⁹ Brown, 47-8, 55.

As mentioned earlier, a person's status within a group is determined by their contribution towards the achievement of the group's goals. Apart from their particular speciality, this is also based on the level of terrorist means (illegal activity) and goals (political change) they represent.¹⁰⁰ In a group that falls under the organisational approach, the value of emotional behaviour may also be influential as this helps maintain group survival.

The leader representing terrorist means and goals is the initiator of ideas and actions, and carries the consensual prestige granted by the group. This person, who may have introduced these elements to the organisation, is granted this status by the group who come to expect a certain kind of behaviour that allows predictability and expectations of competence within the group. If these aspirations are disappointed, then it is likely that a different leader will be chosen. Therefore, it is also possible that the leadership could remain with one person for instrumental activities, and transfer to another person for emotional ones, or for different instrumental activities.¹⁰¹

Allegedly, Baader and Ensslin complemented one another in a symbiotic relationship similar to the instrumental and emotional leadership described here. Where Baader was action-oriented, abrupt and loud, Ensslin translated what he expressed on an intellectual level. She was the head and he was the heart.¹⁰²

The addition of new members and different environments tends to change the leadership.¹⁰³ New recruits are generally less ideologically inclined,¹⁰⁴ as highlighted already with Klein and Speitel, who joined less because of group ideology, but more for the purpose of improving the prisoners' conditions.

In a terrorist organisation the size of the Red Army Faction, with fifteen to twenty members in the underground, the implications of the above are a group of people with leadership roles, whereas the Revolutionary Cells, with small cells, will have a leadership of only one or two persons. The Second of June would have had more than the RZ but fewer than the RAF. Over time, as membership changed due to the arrest and death of members, a larger leadership would imply more stability of group concepts and strategy compared to a small leadership

¹⁰⁰ Groebel, Feger, 409.

¹⁰¹ Brown, 54.

¹⁰² Aust (1987), 92-3; Krebs, 201.

¹⁰³ Brown, 56-7.

¹⁰⁴ Crenshaw (1988 I), 19.

which could be unstable if only one or two persons were central to the group structure of contacts.¹⁰⁵

A possible danger with a strong, stable leadership is over dependence of the cadre upon the leadership for guidance. This is the picture painted by Speitel of the RAF after the initial founders were arrested in June 1972, and the first follow on group, the '4.2.' was arrested on 4 February 1974 without having undertaken any activities. The group was nervous about making mistakes and were arrested while they waited to begin activities. Other RAF followers all held this as an example of failure not to be repeated and organised themselves more effectively.¹⁰⁶ After the deaths of the original leadership in 1977 this leadership dependence weakened.

In the seventies the leadership of the Red Army Faction, with its information system, maintained its role as organisers and provided a continuity of concepts and strategy that could become entrenched due to the identification possibilities they offered to others in the group, and via the media, to potential new recruits. After the deaths of the original leadership its dominance of concepts and strategy continued in the vast amounts of literature left behind, and the general dearth of materials from their successors, which include only collected statements and pamphlets from them and their supporters.¹⁰⁷

Another important factor in the stability and leadership of a terrorist organisation is the amount of protection afforded the leaders: can they be contacted by the cadre, or can they only be reached through intermediaries? This raises the problem of how the group reconciles its security with that of its control. It needs to be able to establish means of intra-personal contact in order to act, while also keeping the group secure from outside forces. The broader the organisation and the knowledge of identities among them, the more efficient are the communications and control. However, this is also more insecure.¹⁰⁸

Security concerns are intensified by elitist vanguard groups like the Red Army Faction which lend them increased feelings of privilege. Nor are the RAF as cooperative with other groups because of their fear of betrayal and pursuit by the authorities. Added to the privileged status is the status of martyrdom for dead members. The result can be behaviour and attitudes that change from one day to the next, with

¹⁰⁵ Groebel, Feger, 410.

¹⁰⁶ *ibid.*, 411; V. Speitel, *Der Spiegel* 31/1980, 44.

¹⁰⁷ Groebel, Feger, 412; see Marat (ed.).

¹⁰⁸ J.K. Zawodny, "Internal Organizational Problems and the Source of Tension in Terrorist Movements as Catalysts of Violence" *Terrorism* 1 (3/4) 1978, 277-285, 278-280.

feelings of resignation and irrational aggression against fellow members, as well as mistakes.¹⁰⁹

Insecurity can lead to group activity if the security of the group is breached. If, due to a possible informer or 'traitor', they fear the arrest of the whole group, they could pre-emptively act in one last blow since they have nothing to lose. If they decide the danger is not the arrest of the whole group, they could murder the informer. The important point is that the group may feel it is necessary to act now instead of later when they feel better prepared.¹¹⁰

Table 5.1: Clique Indices of the RAF, 1970-1977

Year	Total N	Total number of cliques	Expected avg. clique size*	Maximum clique size	Minimum clique size	Percent of persons in small cliques	Large clique percent of the total N
1970	21	5	4.2	11	2	19%	52%
1971	42	10	4.2	11	2	47	26
1972	47	8	5.8	11	2	23	17
1973	48	9	5.3	11	2	16	18
1974	50	6	8.3	16	2	16	12
1975	61	9	6.7	13	2	16	14
1976	60	13	4.6	17	2	60	21
1977	80	19	4.2	15	2	68	23

Year	Distribution of the Cliques by Size															
	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17
1970	2	2								1						
1971	3	2	2	1	1					1						
1972	1	3				1	1		1	1						
1973	2		1	2	1		1			1						
1974	2		1						1						2	
1975	3		2						1	1		1				
1976	6	1	1	1	2	1										1
1977	5	6	3	3					1							

* The number obtained when total n is divided by the total number of cliques.

Source: Jo Groebel, Hubert Feger, "Analyse von Strukturen terroristischer Gruppierungen", in: Wanda von Baeyer-Katte, Dieter Claessens, Hubert Feger, Friedhelm Neidhardt (eds.), *Gruppenprozesse: Analysen zum Terrorismus* 3 (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1982), 393-432, 424.

In the early RAF (pre-1977) and the B2J the founding members who provided the concepts and strategies, were accessible to all the members, although they also used intermediaries on occasion to reach

¹⁰⁹ Vesper, 689.

¹¹⁰ Zawodny, 280.

other people. The founders offered the possibility of motivating identification with others, who could join the armed struggle and fight 'side by side' with the leaders.¹¹¹ Later membership motivation was identification with the same leaders to improve their prison conditions, or to help free them.

Earlier the initiation of the Wolfsburg group with the murder of Schmuecker into the Second of June was mentioned. This highlights evidence of sub-groups or cliques within the overall group. The new clique will remain linked closer together than with the other members, and in an analysis of the terrorist groups these cliques can be measured for size and proportion of the group that it covers over time.¹¹²

Table 5.2: Clique Indices of the B2J, 1970-1976

Year	Total N	Total number of cliques	Expected avg. clique size*	Maximum clique size	Minimum clique size	Percent of persons in small cliques	Large clique percent of the total N
1971	13	1	13	13	13	0%	100%
1972	24	7	3.4	7	2	16	29
1973	26	5	5.2	6	4	0	19
1974	34	7	4.8	7	2	11	20
1975	37	9	4.1	11	2	32	24
1976	40	11	3.6	6	2	60	27

Year	Distribution of the Cliques by Size												
	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	
1971													1
1972	2	3	1			1							
1973			1	2	2								
1974	2		1	1		3							
1975	3	2	1	2									
1976	3	2	3	2	1								

* The number obtained when total n is divided by the total number of cliques.

Source: Jo Groebel, Hubert Feger, "Analyse von Strukturen terroristischer Gruppierungen", in: Wanda von Baeyer-Katte, Dieter Claessens, Hubert Feger, Friedhelm Neidhardt (eds.), **Gruppenprozesse: Analysen zum Terrorismus** Band 3 (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1982), 393-432, 424.

An examination of the cliques in the RAF and the B2J showed that the B2J had larger cliques to begin with than the RAF and that because of its equal contacts with everyone, the B2J was more stable in the beginning than the RAF which had a central clique holding the structure

¹¹¹ Groebel, Feger, 418.

¹¹² *ibid.*, 419.

together making it liable to control problems with loss of members (see Tables 5.1 and 5.2).

The large (over half of the group's membership) cliques that occurred in the founder terrorist groups did not last. The interaction of group activity and public reaction, both in the media and from the state authorities, caused the cliques to break down into numerous smaller ones with only up to ten percent of the members included.¹¹³

The close contact at the beginning with everyone in contact gave way with the growth of the group and public reaction to more indirect contacts between members.¹¹⁴ This made leadership control over the group more difficult, and increased the distance between them and the cadre.

Tables 5.1 and 5.2 do not relate the quality of the contacts between the people involved. Some will be person to person, while others will be only through intermediaries or letters. Even amongst the legals the groups want to maintain some secrecy between the different sections of legals. Thus if one section is arrested, they can only betray part of the organisational structure.¹¹⁵

The growth of the number of cliques also points to the factionalisation within the groups. While everyone may have worked towards a common goal along an agreed path in the beginning, it is possible to speculate that the rise of cliques also signalled a diversity of views about the proper path in later years. This would not have been as important in the Second of June, where sub-groups could enter and leave, but of significance in the Red Army Faction where exit from the group was more difficult in the seventies, as discussed further below. A further speculation would be that the rise in number of cliques supports the thesis that if 'organisational' model groups are left alone, they self-destruct due to a build-up of internal pressures.

3.3. Group Orientation: The Organisational Approach

Earlier the organisational approach to the terrorism of the Red Army Faction, and the Second of June, was seen as a contributory explanation to left-wing terrorism in the Federal Republic. A lack of information about the internal dynamics of the RZ and *Autonomen* precludes discussion about 'instrumental' and 'expressive' model groups. The 'organisational' model views the terrorist organisation as a political organisation whose first goal is survival. The leadership of the group base their actions and decisions upon the perceived social conditions as filtered through

¹¹³ *ibid.*, 425.

¹¹⁴ *ibid.*, 425, 426.

¹¹⁵ Boock (1988), 75.

the belief systems of the collective group body. The variables of beliefs, ideology, social conditions, individual motivation, internal and external group influences, are integrated into the one approach. The crucial factor is the leadership's perception of available resources, opportunities, threats and possible reactions.

The survival of the group as the determining goal of the group places entrepreneurship as

an essential ingredient; the leaders who establish an organization must skillfully create and manipulate incentives to attract members. The founders must have an exceptional commitment to the group's purposes and an exaggerated sense of the group's likely efficacy.¹¹⁷

The three stages of task-accomplishment (orientation, evaluation and control) may therefore not be absolutely objectively determined as leaders manipulate the incentives to reach desirable decisions. These stages, however, determine the necessary sub-tasks of the terrorist organisation leadership to maintain the group. 'Orientation' involves acquainting the group with information and points the members towards the task. 'Evaluation' is the assessment of the different ideas as the group moves towards a decision. 'Control' refers to the way people seek to influence decisions via control of the group members, and is discussed under desertion from the group.¹¹⁸

Orientation highlights ideas that legitimise violence by the group. The leadership provide the 'moral dispensation' for the violent acts the members undertake. They promote ideas in a previously identified direction, which was determined by the members' acceptance of the group belief system discussed earlier.¹¹⁹

The leaders of the organisation, who have their own reputation and personal ambitions linked with the group, seek to influence the group orientation. They seek to maintain group cohesion and organisation survival because their own lives and those of the members are dependent on a minimum level of group cooperation and survival due to the limited options for the course of their actions. To maintain this state of affairs the leaders need to provide rewards and incentives for members of both an instrumental and an emotional nature, as described earlier. The rewards and incentives will reflect short, medium and long term

¹¹⁶ Crenshaw (1985), 472-3.

¹¹⁷ Crenshaw (1988 II), 21.

¹¹⁸ Brown, 34.

¹¹⁹ Zawodny, 284; Crenshaw (1988 I), 12; Crenshaw (1988 II), 21.

goals, but will not always relate to the overall proclaimed group goals as some will pertain to the members' rewards and incentives.¹²⁰

The rewards and incentives the leadership can offer the members are similar to the ones afforded new members: (1) opportunities for action; (2) need to belong; (3) desire for social status; (4) material rewards, and (5) the 'chance' or 'accidental' factor which is sometimes also forced upon a person by other group members. Once inside the group these forces are used by the leadership to exert different pressures on the members to maintain the organisation's survival and viability to retain and maintain their controls over the group.

Previously the changed incentives offered an auto mechanic and metal worker in the Red Army Faction were mentioned, as was the role of Albrecht in the murder of Ponto in 1977. She did not initially want to participate in this attempt to force the release of the prisoners in Stammheim (Baader, Ensslin, Raspe and others), so the group worked on her feelings by saying she did not have a political identity, and-- despite what she said-- did not really want the prisoners' freedom. Over time in the small group without any free space to withdraw in, and the general lack of strength required to withstand such pressures, the result was like brainwashing. Albrecht was not threatened, but she was not left alone, and could not leave the safe-house alone. After the murder of Ponto she was convulsed with crying for days, and in normal conditions would have entered a hospital.¹²¹

The Second of June member Bernd Haussmann was trained in the Palestinian Front for the Liberation of Palestine for a massacre at Ben-Gurion airport in Israel in May 1976. He was not told that his suitcase was fixed to explode upon opening for customs inspection in Israel. One woman died and others were wounded. Haussmann's girlfriend, Brigitta Kuhlmann, a Revolutionary Cells member, was told the Israelis murdered him, and that she could exact revenge if she participated in the hijacking of an Air France plane to Entebbe. She accepted.¹²²

The role of women in terrorist groups also affects their functioning. In general women have filled support roles like running safe-houses and reconnaissance trips, because an all-women household attracts less attention than all male one, and women can pose as wives, sisters or girlfriends to gain access to places men cannot. However, in West Germany womens' roles were operational too. They took part in one third of the bombings, bank robberies and other activities up to 1977.

¹²⁰ Crenshaw (1985), 473-4.

¹²¹ Boock, *Der Spiegel* 25/1990, 105.

¹²² Stevenson, 54-5.

Despite this, there were no womens' cliques in the Red Army Faction or Second of June,¹²³ but it is assumed that in any mixed group of women and men there inevitably exists a conscious or unconscious competition for women within the groups, and while these feelings may be suppressed, they nonetheless affect relationships.¹²⁴

Sometimes too the emotional involvement of men and women in the group can also lead to the collective good of the group being endangered for the individual emotional values of one person for another. Hence, Baader was freed in 1970 because of Ensslin's attachment to him, and she disguised herself to visit him in prison before his rescue.¹²⁵

Also as vividly exemplified in fiction, someone will move to protect a member, a loved one, despite the fact that by doing so, they possibly endanger others in the group. The individual remembers the other individual and forgets the group. The group and the individual may not want this, but have to cope with the possibility.¹²⁶ On the other hand, Angelika Speitel, speaking of the mid-seventies in the RAF, said that there may be an attraction between members, but no love. Hate was the requisite feeling for group survival.¹²⁷

Sexual interest along homosexual lines could also pose problems if there is only one homosexual in the group, and there is no outlet for their needs and desires. The danger is that the person will seek this release outside the group, and thus endanger group security.¹²⁸

Terrorist groups were organised because they preferred action over theory, and this continues to be a reward and incentive available to leaders. But, the group does not always act. It must also husband its resources to make their use decisive. The group leaders need to balance these two needs: they need to preserve the organisation itself and use its available resources to greatest effect, while also meeting the members' demand for action. Participation in the limited actions that do occur thus becomes a reward for some and an incentive for future possibilities for others. This is perhaps why Sternebeck felt relieved from the fear of discovery while waiting for her first Red Army Faction active service once she entered the underground. Waiting produced fear of discovery to which action was the antidote.¹²⁹

The balance between action and group preservation has other implications for the nature of terrorist activity. Terrorism as part of

¹²³ Russell, Miller, 21-2; Groebel, Feger, 423.

¹²⁴ Zawodny, 280.

¹²⁵ Aust (1987), 84.

¹²⁶ Geissler, 212-3.

¹²⁷ A. Speitel, *Stern* 30/1986, 135.

¹²⁸ Boock (1988), 43.

¹²⁹ Crenshaw (1985), 476; Sternebeck, *Der Spiegel* 33/1990, 62.

a social revolution, which is what the groups in West Germany seek, is a slow, long-term strategy necessitating much planning and preparation, with supposedly up to eighty percent of the time spent meeting logistical requirements.¹³⁰ Between the RAF freeing of Baader in 1970 and their first bombing campaign, two years elapsed in which they organised logistic requirements needed for life in the underground. Then, after practising their bomb-making skills and having prepared safe-houses and getaways, the RAF began their campaign in May 1972.

The logistical and other activities can relieve stress and strain, while also functioning as a cohesive for the group. This occurs in several ways. The individual in the group has passed through whatever initiation procedure was required for membership, which may have involved illegal activity. Now the group acts as a defender of the individual against the authorities with each member defending the others: the group needs the individual and the individual needs the group. Each feel their personal and group identity threatened and join together against the external threat.¹³¹

The group is now a collective weapon to be used against the courts, government and security forces.¹³² The individual is not 'guilty', the group is, and a stronger group-identity replaces the weaker personal-identity.¹³³

Social status of members once in the group is also a means of balancing group tensions with rewards and incentives. Status and position may be granted or taken away from members, depending upon their behaviour and compliance with group norms and goals. The group can be divided into those who can, and those who cannot take part in group discussions. Under Christian Klar's leadership in the RAF only those who were participating in an action had a voice in discussions. All others had to keep quiet.¹³⁴

Additionally, if the person is not trusted by the group, but is nonetheless needed, they can isolate the person within the group as was done with Boock. Sternebeck, who voiced dissension, and whose actions were 'unclear' in a critical situation, was asked to keep within the apartment for weeks to minimise any risk.¹³⁵

¹³⁰ H.J. Klein (1981), 47.

¹³¹ Post (1986), 218.

¹³² Guenther Wagenlehner, "Motivation for Political Terrorism in Germany", in: Marius Livingstone (ed.), *International Terrorism in the Contemporary World* (London: Greenwood Press, 1978), 195-203, 196.

¹³³ Wasmund, 233-4.

¹³⁴ Crenshaw (1985), 478; A. Speitel, *Stern* 30/1986, 135.

¹³⁵ Boock, *Der Spiegel* 9/1981, 114, 118; Sternebeck, *Der Spiegel* 33/1990, 64.

The individual's membership in the group is the last means of control for the leadership, and as a last resort this could be denied an individual.¹³⁶ To remain in the group dissension is possibly therefore muted on occasion.¹³⁷ If the person speaks out too much against the group, they risk separation from group activity, and could become- -like Boock and Sternebeck- -prisoners within the group. This is discussed later in more detail in connection with dissent and conformity in terrorist organisations.

Sometimes too, the illegals ask for something to be done by the legals, who do not know to what end they do it. Although the legals may need to know something more for their long term motivation, they are only told what they need to know to fulfill their task in order to ensure security. The same occurs in the illegal commando groups.¹³⁸ However, the illegals can also manipulate the legals and push them into illegality and underground work.

After orientation is established the group needs to evaluate and decide upon specific issues. In terrorist groups, as in other insulated groups, several processes are simultaneously under way during decision-making. First, a 'shift to risk', or 'shift to extremity' process occurs as members move from the 'neutral' point of members' individual choices towards the individually favoured position. The degree of the extremity of the decisions depends upon the group's original position. The more extreme the original position, the more extreme will be the shift in position.¹³⁹

The phenomenon of the 'shift to extremity/risk' occurs most noticeably when a group is forming its position and establishing formalised procedures. Novel situations, where the group has no prior experience, may also induce the effect.¹⁴⁰

The 'shift to risk' in the Red Army Faction could explain group decisions as in these examples. When the RAF began with the freeing of Baader in April 1970 it was ahead of itself by not having prepared the groundwork for its concepts, structure and logistics. Baader's arrest upset their plans, and the group jumped ahead to the phase of armed struggle without having thought through all of the consequences. After the group returned from the Middle East they did not, as originally planned, opt for the legal/illegal life and contact with community

¹³⁶ Crenshaw (1985), 477.

¹³⁷ Post (1990), 34; and the opening chapter quotes.

¹³⁸ Boock (1988), 84-5.

¹³⁹ Brown, 143-5.

¹⁴⁰ *ibid.*, 145-6.

groups, but upon Baader's insistence, went totally into the underground.¹⁴¹ There were no half-way points, only extremes.

When the group took the Stockholm embassy personnel hostage they murdered a hostage before stating their demands to possibly highlight their solid position about the release of imprisoned group members in exchange for the release of the hostages. This could also provide a motivation for the suicides in Stammheim after the rescue of the Lufthansa passengers in Mogadishu, because now there was no possibility of their release, and they wanted to show their highest identification with the group ideology. The group had no interest in indecisive measures. There was only success or failure, with nothing in between.

A possible example of the 'shift to extremity' working away from the other RAF extreme--attacks against people--occurred after the Schleyer affair and the Stammheim suicides. Allegedly Klar wanted to kidnap an officer and his family and murder them. This bloodbath, however, was turned down by other members, because it was too far away from the perceived RAF identity held by the members.¹⁴²

There are three possible explanations for the 'shift to extremity/risk'. Firstly, as decisions are voiced in the group people discover that their position is further away from the group values than others' positions. The people are comparing themselves to others and find their personal identity is not matching up with their group identity, and then shift their position accordingly to be in a more preferred one.¹⁴³

Secondly, decisions in groups are not equally balanced between pros and cons, but rather there is a tendency towards one or the other position. In the course of the discussion over the decision people receive new information to increase their tendency towards the general direction. Known evidence in this case is supported by additional evidence to shift their opinion further in the agreed direction.¹⁴⁴

Lastly, in an argument similar to the first, it is believed that when ingroup norms are supported or called for more heavily than usual over outgroup norms, then more extreme positions that are prototypical of the group are preferred. This again raises the notion that novel situations are occasions for the 'shift to extremity', as this is when the ingroup will be most identifiable against the outgroup. All three of

¹⁴¹ Krebs, 210-8, 220.

¹⁴² "Die mit den Hueten" Der Spiegel 34/1990, 63.

¹⁴³ Brown, 148-9.

¹⁴⁴ *ibid.*, 150-1.

these explanations are likely to be at work to differing degrees in the 'shift to extremity' process.¹⁴⁵

The second process at work next to the 'shift to extremity' is that of 'groupthink', a mode of thinking engaged in when people are deeply involved in a cohesive ingroup, and when their "strivings for unanimity override their motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses of action."¹⁴⁶ Six features of groupthink can lead to 'bad' decisions: (1) a very cohesive decision-making body, (2) insulation from outside information, whereby experts are not utilised, and there is a selective bias against factual information from outside sources that do not support initial policy preferences, (3) decision-makers not searching systematically through alternative policy options, (4) time pressure pushes the group to reach a decision urgently, (5) a group dominated by a distinctive leader, and (6) little attention is paid to how policies could be sabotaged or hindered by accidents. The result is a loss of independent critical thinking supplanted by 'groupthink' promoting irrational, dehumanising activity directed towards outgroups.¹⁴⁷

These 'groupthink' conditions lead to symptoms of 'groupthink' which manifest themselves in eight ways in terrorist groups: (1) an illusion of invulnerability leading to over optimism and risk-taking; (2) key assumptions are dismissed in collective rationalisation; (3) the morality of the group is assumed; (4) the enemy is perceived as evil (which eliminates negotiation), and incompetent (which justifies risky ventures); (5) key beliefs are upheld in the face of individual members's challenges to these beliefs; (6) differing views are not expressed in the perceived group consensus; (7) the group believes there is an unanimity of position; (8) members withhold information to maintain the illusion of the group's positions on its decisions.¹⁴⁸

The symptoms are intertwined and affect one another: if the group believes its members are unanimous in agreement, then challenges to decisions will not occur, or will be dismissed, and people will withhold their voices and information supporting differing positions.

On some occasions these all apply to the Red Army Faction, at others times they do not. For example, after the Stammheim suicides in 1977 the leaders prepared retributive acts involving the deaths of many policemen with mined target areas. However, when the leaders discussed these plans with the other group members the leadership was dissuaded because this

¹⁴⁵ *ibid.*, 154, 157.

¹⁴⁶ Irving L. Janis, *Victims of Groupthink* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1972), 9.

¹⁴⁷ *ibid.*, 10, 13.

¹⁴⁸ *ibid.*, 197-8.

might reflect badly on the public image of the group. The leaders had perhaps due to the 'groupthink' symptoms listed above, and discounted any possible opposition in the group. The leadership had planted the mines, and now had to retract them.¹⁴⁹

The retraction of 'groupthink' here meant the terrorists did not act. On another occasion, if the information is correct, then group consensus did not take account of how an individual member might sabotage activity he was strongly against because it did not have anything to do with the goal of releasing imprisoned group members. Boock says that he sabotaged the rocket launcher that was to be fired at the Federal Prosecutor's building in Karlsruhe in August 1977.¹⁵⁰

3.4. Leaving the Group

After the new recruit has been with the organisation for some time the question arises of how the person copes with the apparent failure of the group to attract the masses to their cause. There are several responses enabling groups to maintain their cohesion in the face of failure. The 'cognitive dissonance' theory discussed earlier argues that because people voluntarily (in their view) paid a high entry price to join the group, then this must mean that group membership is valuable to them, even if the group does badly, and they will increase their identification with the group for this reason because they feel personally responsible through their voluntary actions.¹⁵¹

Personal responsibility, however, does not completely explain group cohesion in the face of failure, because groups also tend to attribute external or situational causes to their problems, and thus push their failures onto the actions of outside groups. Continuing with this justification process groups also see their opponents' failures as part of their nature, and their opponents' successes due to luck, whereas the group's own successes will be due to their skills and character.¹⁵²

Should the members of a terrorist group not be satisfied with their membership, or the group want to bolster its own self-image, there are several avenues open to them to relieve their discomfort. This can be accomplished with the defence mechanisms discussed in chapter four and the fantasy building possibilities discussed earlier. (1) The person can leave the group physically or psychologically through denial of group membership: they are not criminals, but resistance fighters. (2) They can restrict comparisons between themselves and other groups to make

¹⁴⁹ "Die mit den Hueten" *Der Spiegel* 34/1990, 63.

¹⁵⁰ Aust (1987), 415.

¹⁵¹ Brown, 204.

¹⁵² *ibid.*, 235-6.

ingroup outcomes favourable, such as comparing similars instead of dissimilars. For example, they could compare themselves to left-wing oriented terror organisations, instead of to different ethnic/religious based terrorist groups: compare the RAF to Action Direct, *Brigata Rossa*, instead of the RAF to the Provisional Irish Republican Army and the Basques. (3) The person or group can sidestep the main dimensional comparison, invent new dimensions, or change their values, whereby the group twists the meanings of words to promote favourable outcomes so that, as mentioned in chapter two, in the name 'Red Army Faction': 'Red' highlights their supposed Marxist-Leninist credentials, and the 'Army' implies larger numbers. (4) Promote the image of instability and illegitimacy in the status and power relationship in the state so the terrorists perceive a chance to raise their status and identity level from low or negative levels to higher ones. The status quo power, on the other hand, now feels forced to defend their position, which may be seen as a "fragile superiority".¹⁵³

However, these processes do not end group membership, and may not relieve discomfort for everyone. The result could be a group of dissenters in the terrorist organisation.

Dissenters in a group can disagree with the majority for a number of reasons, but their options are limited. They can 'exit' from the group, or 'voice' their opinions. The extent to which they choose to 'voice' their opinions and exercise the threat of 'exit' from the group depends upon their 'loyalty' to the group.

'Exit' and 'voice' are allegedly not available in terrorist groups where the former is considered treason and the latter as mutiny.¹⁵⁴ However, examples in this chapter have shown these two conditions do not exist in the left-wing terrorist groups in the Federal Republic of Germany. People have left the groups, and others have raised their voices in dissension.

When the dissenters in the terrorist organisation are unsatisfied with the direction, methods or practices in the group they can make protests in the group to change these. As discussed earlier, the increased costs of membership increased the value of membership according to cognitive dissonance. This implies that people do not want to leave, once they have joined a terrorist group, and would thus prefer to remain 'loyal' and dissent from within, than to 'exit' the group.¹⁵⁵

¹⁵³ *ibid.*, 250-2.

¹⁵⁴ Albert O. Hirschman, *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), 121.

¹⁵⁵ see also *ibid.*, 41-2, 87-9.

The effectiveness of any dissension within a terrorist group is influenced by the conditions within and outside the group. The voicing of dissent is generally seen as more serious than leaving the group because the cohesion and solidarity of the group are seen as paramount concerns due to security considerations, and because of their psychological significance for group morale. Where groups are formed on the premise of action over theory and discussion, as terrorist groups are, then dissension is liable to be interpreted as being directed at the leadership for not being representative of the organisation. To this end, the leadership relies on their past record, and on their interpretation of group ideology to legitimise their direction and leadership.¹⁵⁶ Ideology can also guide the group in reducing dissension, for example, by arguing that innocent lives will not be lost in a department store bombing because the people who shop there are capitalists, and capitalists are never innocent.¹⁵⁷

Other considerations about dissension within the group are its size and the ability of the group to recruit new members, should others leave. The more dependent the group is on these members, the more likely it is to adopt the dissenters' suggestions.¹⁵⁸

As already discussed, new members can also change the group because they are usually less ideologically inclined and more action oriented. The struggle may become the goal - not the future society strived for.¹⁵⁹ For the RAF and the B2J the imprisoned members and how to liberate them became the primary concern over the 'anti-imperialist struggle' as exemplified by the groups' exploitation of the prisoners' conditions to recruit new members.

To mitigate these problems the leadership can use rewards and incentives to maintain group cohesiveness and membership loyalty. Additionally, there are the options of merger with smaller groups (the B2J merged with the RAF), and the use of extreme discontent to increase motivation to change the group from inside when the option of leaving the group seems undesirable.¹⁶⁰

This defence mechanism of regression can also be the aim of fostering 'loyalty' in the group so that dissension is used to the group's benefit.¹⁶¹ The lack of apprehended members providing state's evidence, and the existence of a prisoners' arm of the Red Army Faction

¹⁵⁶ Crenshaw (1985), 484.

¹⁵⁷ Post (1990), 34.

¹⁵⁸ Hirschman, 41.

¹⁵⁹ Crenshaw (1988 I), 19.

¹⁶⁰ Crenshaw (1985), 485-6.

¹⁶¹ Hirschman, 88.

might be taken to confirm this. However, this could also be a sign of the group's control over its members.

Where 'exit' from the group is possible, several alternatives may be available. These depend upon whether there are other terrorist organisations available from which the person(s) can continue their activities, or where no other groups are available. The other possibilities are surrender to the authorities, and leave terrorism while in prison or afterwards.

The option of working back towards as normal a life as possible, is also available, but difficult. Hans-Joachim Klein, Peter-Juergen Boock, Michael Baumann, Astrid Proll, and others have tried this route. Klein is the only one who has not been apprehended since he left terrorism in 1977 (see the chronology). This path carries the risks of pursuit from the authorities, as well as from former members. Even those who are apprehended can still have fears of speaking out. For example, when Boock was arrested in 1981 he hinted at things, which only later in 1990 did he elaborate on, after the arrest of former members in the German Democratic Republic.¹⁶²

A variation of this option is exit from terrorism altogether with the aid of the group as occurred in the Red Army Faction. In the late seventies the group was torn with dissension to such an extent that the leadership had to find a way to mitigate the situation if the group was to survive and function properly as its leadership desired. The dissenters' risk to the group needed to be minimised, but was not discussed in great detail with them. Some possibilities were letting them disappear into the Third World- -Angola, Mozambique or Portuguese colonies were mentioned. In 1980 everything suddenly moved quickly: the dissenters received new Federal Republic of Germany passports and money for travel and moving expenses to travel from Paris to Prague by train in groups of two. Only there did they find out they were to move to East Germany, which solved any potential language problems. Sternebeck and Friedrich went on ahead to East Berlin's Schoenefeld airport where they found everything ready for their immigration as West German citizens to East Germany. The pairs had 'legends' of their past constructed before this, as apparently the East Germans they saw did not know their past. Several days later they met East Germans who did know their past. Only in 1986 did Sternebeck, allegedly find out that their 'contact' person who helped them settle in worked for the Stasi.¹⁶³

¹⁶² Compare Boock, *Der Spiegel* 9/1981, 110-25 and *Der Spiegel* 25/1990, 103-5.

¹⁶³ Sternebeck, *Der Spiegel* 33/1990, 64-6.

Leaving one terrorist organisation for another depends upon whether there is an alternative group, in which case a change of allegiance is the necessary requirement. If no alternative group exists, then one needs to find like-minded persons to form one. In West Germany it was possible in the early days to choose between three organisations, and some even (Hans-Joachim Klein, and Wilfried 'Bonni' Boese) experienced one (RAF) before opting for another (RZ), before discovering that (in Klein's case) neither was any better than the other, and opting out altogether.¹⁶⁴ There has also been the possibility, as mentioned in chapter four with Friederike Krabbe, of leaving the West German terrorist scene and entering that of the Palestinian groups, as some are believed to have done.

If one group is preferred over another by members of one group who are dissatisfied with it, they may cause it to collapse and end by moving to the other group thus ending the competition between them.¹⁶⁵ As described in chapter two, this is what the Second of June did when it split into an RZ group and others joined with the RAF.

The other possible method of leaving the group is after arrest during imprisonment, where support, while easier to acquire, nonetheless still leaves exit from the group a difficult process. This is more common than the other methods, and includes the option of turning state evidence against one's former group members. This latter remains a rare option exercised by few.¹⁶⁶

The RAF for its part has much power within the prison and can restrict contact (in the past at least) between members and those questioning the group and its actions. Without the group in prison the collectivity is gone, and the individual is potentially alone without any guarantee that others will contact him or her. This is the fear of prisoners in the event of all prisoners being housed in the same prison should the group ever receive their demand of prisoner consolidation. This might mean that those who want to leave the group while in prison will be unable to do so when surrounded by other group members.¹⁶⁷

The loss of members, who have left the terrorist groups, does not seem to have noticeably harmed them. Some former members have provided state's evidence against members, but the groups have continued to

¹⁶⁴ Crenshaw (1985), 483; see H.J. Klein (1979).

¹⁶⁵ Oots (1989), 148.

¹⁶⁶ Karl-Heinz Ruehland, Gerhard Mueller, Hans-Joachim Dellwo, Volker Speitel, Juergen Bodeux, *die taz* 24 October 1986. More recently Werner Loetze and Susanne Albrecht have also turned state's evidence under the supergrass legislation due to expire in 1992. *Independent* 11 February, 8, 26 April 1991, 14.

¹⁶⁷ Spoerl, "Mattes Echo" *Die Zeit* 10 March 1989, 7.

function. However, the dissenters have also forged pathways out of terrorism and provided identification objects in themselves as examples for others to follow. This has led to others leaving the group. As mentioned in chapter four, this usually occurred after arrest in the seventies, and based on events discussed in chapter six, appears to have been also true in the eighties.

The decision to leave a terrorist group is not easily taken. It involves the loss of one's group identity without the possible immediate replacement of another to give the person new meaning and identity.¹⁶⁸ Therefore, the psychological effort to give up the group that one was with through good and bad is immense and leaves guilt feelings, despite belief in the rightness of this, with the person who gives up their group identity through a lengthy process of detachment from the group.¹⁶⁹

This is where the government can find people willing to collaborate with the police and judicial system. In the past these have been minor persons in the group who were not wholly in the group. They were more outsiders, and less identified with the group.¹⁷⁰ This presumably means that they suffered less stress and strain in providing evidence against the other group members.

If this government action is successful, then eventually the group could be defeated. It could be physically destroyed, or made inoperative through pre-emptive action. Alternatively, the government could raise the costs and risks of terrorist activity so that the group ceases to act, and possibly decides that other forms of political behaviour are more expedient than terrorism.¹⁷¹

Depending upon the terrorist organisation's behaviour, it is also possible that their actions caused a backlash against them. The result could then be that people leave the group and supporters and new recruits do not replace them. This could also occur because, as described earlier, group members' needs are not met.¹⁷²

4. Summary

The left-wing terrorist groups have the characteristics of the 'instrumental' (the Revolutionary Cells and *Autonomen*), 'operational' (the Red Army Faction and Second of June Movement), and 'expressive' (Revolutionary Cells and *Autonomen*) models. Given that the Revolutionary

¹⁶⁸ Post (1986), 216.

¹⁶⁹ Wasmund, 237.

¹⁷⁰ *ibid.*

¹⁷¹ Oots (1989), 140-1.

¹⁷² *ibid.*

Cells and ~~Autonomen~~ belong to two models there is a need for more study into categorisation of these models to see if one of them is a miscalculation.

However, if there are 'instrumental' Revolutionary and ~~Autonomen~~ cells, then these should disappear as soon as their goals are achieved. As they seek long-term social revolution, this could be a long wait.

The 'expressive' groups, if they do exist, will only end when the members are arrested or move into other organisations. Until then they could cause problems for the authorities if they become more violent.

The 'operational' model Red Army Faction, in theory should self-destruct if it were left alone. This option, however, would be too dangerous given the group's resources and experience.

Additionally, the chapter showed that left-wing West German terrorist motivation also springs from within the group, which can employ its own incentives and sanctions to maintain group viability and operational activity. Terrorist motivation does not stop once the person enters the group, but continues while the person is in the group, and, to some extent, after he or she has left the group.

The possibilities available to employ these models in counterterrorism operations are discussed in the next chapter. It also discusses past counterterrorism policy in West Germany.

CHAPTER SIX:

THE DYNAMICS OF COUNTERTERRORISM

Commentator: ...what is domestically, politically and policewise necessary, must also have a constitutional basis. It makes no sense to first make laws only when a particular situation arises. On the contrary, laws must be made to prevent the occurrence of a particular situation. In this situation the parties must recognise their common duty and quickly pass the security legislation.¹

All those persons [whom he met] have been identified unequivocally as chance encounters rather than planned contacts. However, I will not be persuaded that Miss Blum was also a chance encounter...the fact that she apparently let him leave without saying good-bye and quite obviously showed him a way out of the apartment building that must have been overlooked by our strict surveillance... Of course, we could not keep the entire area...under complete surveillance... In my opinion the best thing would be to let her run around freely so she can make a mistake, and probably the trail will lead to his present quarters....²

I mention that only, because Jutta had been sought for two years as an 'anarchist'. Do you think that is why I'm suspected? Naturally my name and my address are in her notebooks... If it was the other way around, when **she** was the teacher and had lived with an anarchist, that would certainly incriminate her. But a man, says the mathematics teacher, the Office for the Protection of the Constitution, lets him have his own opinion.³

The last two chapters established models of how individuals are drawn to terrorist groups, and how the groups function. This chapter integrates the models with the concept of identification to highlight its contribution to understanding terrorists' motivation due to government responses to political terrorism in West Germany.

The chapter begins with government counterterrorism policy assumptions, overall policy balance, the resources provided for policy implementation, the policy strengths and limitations, and a concluding discussion of the dynamics of the terrorists and the government measures. The chapter shows a conflict of values between those held by the terrorists and the government, which exhibits itself in the dynamics

¹ Peter Schneider, *Messer im Kopf. Drehbuch* (West Berlin: Rotbuch Verlag, 1979), 16.

² Heinrich Boell, *The Lost Honour of Katharina Blum. Or: How violence develops and where it can lead* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1978), 63.

³ Peter Schneider, *...schon bist du ein Verfassungsfeind* (West Berlin: Rotbuch Verlag, 1976), 19-20, original emphasis.

of the relationship between the terrorists and the criminal justice and penal system.

1. Assumptions of Counterterrorism Policy

This chapter ties together the models presented earlier in the thesis. Chapter one presented two models of terrorism that suggested paramilitary and police responses to the 'war' model, and socio-political responses to the 'communication' model. Chapter three showed that the Red Army Faction mainly sought recruitment to its ranks and the Revolutionary Cells and *Autonomen* supported protest movements. Chapter five showed these respectfully as the 'organisational' and 'instrumental' models, with some RZ and *Autonomen* cells as examples of the 'expressive' model.

The appropriate counterterrorism measures differ for each model. The 'instrumental' model decreases terrorism with raised costs in either the 'war' or 'communication' arenas depending upon the legitimacy of the issue. The 'war' response to the 'organisational' model was deemed inappropriate as it would increase group cohesion, thus 'communication' may have more success if a path can be arranged that allows non-violent group survival. Responses to the 'expressive' model would be those that raise its cost as in the 'instrumental' model, but no success can be guaranteed as its motivation is psychologically determined.

In chapter four the suggested response to the 'psychologically disturbed' model was the 'war' model. The 'rational-idealist' model was to be countered with the 'communication' model because of terrorism's use as a strategy decided upon by rational actors. The rest of chapter four showed that left-wing terrorists were not 'psychologically disturbed', but identified with their belief system and acted accordingly. No single model is the proper response in all cases, and it is possible that several types of terrorism occur simultaneously- each necessitating different responses.

The 'identification' model combines the 'war' and 'communication' models whereby the 'war' and 'communication' models are short and long-term options. Optimally, the 'war' model represents the tactical short-term options, while 'communication' coordinates long-term counterterrorism policy to reduce terrorism in all areas and avoids the danger of overdependence on the 'war' model as the sole option available to the neglect of coordinated long-term planning.

Assumptions about the source of terrorism influence the responses. The wrong response can increase terrorism, or reduce it at the expense of democracy. The correct response, on the other hand, may not guarantee

an end to terrorism either, only its reduced frequency. In democratic states responses are guided by the state's identification with legal principles that guarantee democracy, which limits counterterrorism response options.

Democratic governments should be able to respond to sociopolitical changes in its citizenship and adopt legitimate reforms. Given that the government is effective, this is the best method of avoiding political violence. This long-term 'communication' aspect of the model needs to balance, on the one hand, legitimate adaptations with calls for others that would provoke, on the other hand, both violent responses from groups who see their positions threatened, and those reforms that would appear to be granted under duress and blackmail of the government. Beyond this is the danger that some reforms might lead to expectations of greater reforms than the government can reasonably maintain.⁴

Balancing these demands requires a clear internal security policy with clear objectives, the foremost of which must be the rule of law that guarantees both equal rights and treatment under the law, and equal protection of rights. The government's political will to undertake these goals must also be evident. Vacillation will undermine public confidence in the government and the value of the law, and open exploitable positions for the terrorists to further harm the government's position. Overreaction lends credence to the terrorists' claim that the government is not democratic.⁵ The 'communication' models seeks to relieve any tension that would lead to terrorism and to reduce support for such means.

Government 'war' model short-term responses must be morally justifiable to the public, and not violate its own principles and standards. The danger of this situation is clear when it comes to justifying 'grave danger', a potentially 'slippery' term, which becomes doubtful when less dangerous opponents are met in a similar vein on the grounds that if left unchecked, they will become a greater danger.⁶

Equal rights for all entails the same court and prison conditions for terrorists as other criminals. Motivation plays no role. Special status can lead to terrorist enclaves which continue their organisations within prison. It can also lead to resentment from other criminals.⁷

The government must seek to both apprehend the 'hard-core' and to dry out the surrounding sympathetic group by using legal measures to apprehend people, while also being an enlightened preventative state

⁴ Wilkinson (1986), 119-22.

⁵ *ibid.*, 123, 127-8.

⁶ Bandura, 166.

⁷ Wilkinson (1986), 131-2.

which views the justification of law as protecting and preserving general values. The government can counter terrorism as ordinary serious crime and not admit to its expressive character by placing it in a special role, but rather stress normal criminal code barriers.⁸

The government must counter the problem that without arrests the legal system runs dry (how often has the 'hard-core' been dried up already?) with clear statements about government objectives, policies and problems in counterterrorism to help maintain public support. This avoids the problem that the more specialised the laws are made, the more difficult it becomes to continue saying that these are just ordinary criminals. However, the state has to remain within its legal limits, and tie itself to rules that the terrorists do not. All of these require the government to have formed clear objectives about its policy with regards to the general nature of the society lived in, police powers, civil rights and the rule of law.⁹

The 'identification' model of counterterrorism fields the 'communication' model as the long-term counterterrorism options, and the 'war' model as the short-term antiterrorism options. The former is preventative and the later reactive. While the 'communication' aspects admit the political motives of terrorism, and seek to reduce these, the 'war' model denies them as an example of equality before the law, and pursues terrorists as normal criminals.

2. The Counterterrorism Policy Options in West Germany

This section outlines the Federal Republic of Germany's decisions in counterterrorism policy. Alternatives to these decisions are offered later in section four.

The Federal Republic of Germany did not immediately understand the necessity of both the 'communication' and 'war' models of counterterrorism and began with 'war' responses. In both the abduction and murder of the West German ambassador to Guatemala, Graf Karl von Spreti, in April 1970, and of the Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympics in September 1972, the government recognised the need for international cooperation. On the other hand, they were also prepared to resolve the situations with ransom payments and the release of imprisoned suspects including Baader and Meinhof.¹⁰ Beyond this the

⁸ Friedrich Dencker, "Kronzeuge, terroristische Vereinigung und rechtsstaatliche Strafgesetzgebung" *Kritische Justiz* 20 (1) 1987, 36-53, 37-8.

⁹ Dencker, 38, 44; Wilkinson (1986), 127; Wardlaw, 68.

¹⁰ Jonas, 23; Willy Brandt, "Erschuetterung ueber den Mord an Botschafter Graf von Spreti" *Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung* 46 (7 April) 1970, 437-8, 437. Hereafter the

government also wanted to end "conflict in or between other states being conducted with unlawful or violent means on the soil of the Federal Republic". Therefore the state would work with the separate German states to do everything possible, while also realising that there is no absolute security against extortionate violence.¹¹

After the arrests of the first Red Army Faction leaders in 1972 it understood the ability of the 'communication' model to undercut sympathy for the suspected terrorist prisoners. The government realised it needed to counter the terrorist propaganda definition of the justice system, and thirst and hunger strikes with explanations about how the terrorist suspects' health and well-being were being secured- -sometimes against their will- -to counter any suicide attempts by the suspects. The government did not pursue or imprison people because of their political beliefs or convictions. People were imprisoned, the government stated, who were suspected by legal judges of crimes such as murder, attempted murder, arson, and to whom arrest warrants were issued or court sentences applied.¹²

The elements of counterterrorism policy were also known by the government. The state had to defend itself against its enemies while not leaving the floor of the law. Nor could it capitulate to terror. This meant that the state's enemies included whoever worked with murderers. Whoever hid, supported or rallied them was also guilty.¹³

By the time of the Second of June's abduction of Peter Lorenz in February 1975, these pledges of support for the democratic state, and knowledge of the terrorists' goals and methods were forgotten. Then the government first used adaptable legislation which could always justify its position. It hoped the release of five suspected and convicted terrorists would not set a precedent for further hostage incidents,¹⁴ without providing for adequate measures if it did. The government justified the terrorists' release with Paragraph 34 (Justified Emergency) of the Criminal Code which provides for the balancing of

periodical is referred to as *Bulletin*. Walter Scheel, "Bemuehungen der Bundesregierung zur Freilassung von Botschafter Graf Spreti", *Bulletin* 54 (21 April) 1970, 501-3, 501; Willy Brandt, "Wirksame Sicherheitsmassnahmen gegen den Terrorismus" *Bulletin* 124 (13 September) 1972, 1537-8.

¹¹ Willy Brandt, "Internationale Massnahmen gegen Terror und Gewalt" *Bulletin* 153 (3 November) 1972, 1817-8, 1817.

¹² Werner Maihofer, "Erklaerung der Bundesregierung zur Inneren Sicherheit" *Bulletin* 137 (15 November) 1974, 1373-6, 1373-5.

¹³ Ernst Benda and Klaus Shuetz in: "Trauerkundgebung in Berlin fuer den Praesidenten des Berliner Kammergerichts" *Bulletin* 142 (23 November) 1974, 1421-4, 1422-3.

¹⁴ Klaus Boelling, "Kein Freibrief fuer Terroristen" *Bulletin* 28 (4 March) 1975, 284.

public interests when the danger of life, limb and freedom and honour or other goods can be relieved through actions that endanger these to a lesser extent.¹⁵

The Red Army Faction's takeover of the German embassy in Stockholm in April 1975 showed that the terrorists' saw a precedent in the Lorenz abduction. The Chancellor sought to explain that the position in Stockholm was different because this time the known terrorists' location allowed police measures to save the hostages. Furthermore, imprisoned persons who were to be released included twenty-six persons, some of whom were accused of violent crimes. These persons would no doubt have returned to the Federal Republic if released. He also reaffirmed the belief that there are no patent recipes for security- -police methods alone do not suffice- -other means are also required to protect the state. "Whoever wants to reliably protect the legal state, must be inwardly prepared to also go to the borders of what is allowed and necessary by the legal state."¹⁶ He knew how far he could personally proceed, and would feel comfortable working at these outer legal limits.

However, the terrorists resolved the situation when they accidentally set off their explosives. If they had not, perhaps the government's hard-line would have been more evident. The events of 1977 might therefore have been different. This inconclusive episode- -from the terrorists' viewpoint- -meant that next time the stakes needed to be raised. The government's position was underscored by their refusal to release prisoners in the course of the Entebbe hijacking.¹⁷

The middle of 1977 showed a clear government understanding of counterterrorism and antiterrorism policy problems. The murder of Siegfried Buback in April 1977 brought the government realisation that successful early apprehension of terrorist group members may prevent larger terrorist incidents, but was forcing the terrorists in the underground on to the defensive and to be less cautious and more brutal in their operations. Furthermore, terrorists who are firm in their beliefs against the liberal democratic state, and risk their lives in activities against it, may not be deterred by judicial sentences, but nonetheless must be arrested and sentenced.¹⁸

¹⁵ Federal Ministry of Justice, "Verantwortung aller Demokraten fuer den Rechtsstaat" Bulletin 30 (6 March) 1975, 299-300, 300.

¹⁶ Helmut Schmidt, "Erklaerung der Bundesregierung zum Terroranschlag auf die Deutsche Botschaft in Stockholm" Bulletin 5 (29 April) 1975, 517-20.

¹⁷ Klaus Boelling, "Zur Befreiung der Geiseln aus der Gewalt der Terroristen" Bulletin 80 (6 July) 1976, 754.

¹⁸ Werner Maihofer, "Erklaerung der Bundesregierung vor dem Deutschen Bundestag" Bulletin 27 (18 March) 1977, 241-5, 242; Helmut

Counterterrorism policy needs to include the judicial, legislative and police measures, wholehearted moral support of the people in their posts, and questioning of those who say the real danger of terrorism comes not from those labelled 'terrorists' by the state, but from the authorities who protect the constitution, as well as the moral isolation of those who sympathise and call for violence. They must understand that there is no right of resistance to the constitution, democratic majority and the laws passed under the constitution. Everyone has a right to express their political position within this framework.¹⁹

The basic framework of what is allowed is found in the constitution, the Basic Law, which in Article 9 grants freedom of association, unless it is to break criminal laws, to conduct unconstitutional activity, or the concept of international understanding. Article 18 allows the basic rights of those who combat the free democratic basic order to be forfeited by the Federal Constitutional Court. Under Article 21 this court can also prohibit, when asked to do so by the government party, political parties who seek to abolish the free democratic basic order.²⁰ However, the terrorist groups were not political parties, against which neither the criminal code prohibiting criminal organisations applied,²¹ and Article 19 of the Basic Law stipulates that when basic rights are restricted that it must be done in a general manner and not solely in an individual case,²² which would have happened if this was done with suspected terrorists.

The government also understood the dangers of overreaction in momentary bitterness translated into legislative actionism, and that the duties of the democratic state were to check the effectiveness of measures and ensure that they meet new challenges. They also argued against special processes for terrorists. Every available legal measure would be used to concentrate and speed through the court cases, but terrorists' rights remain equal to others. The overall aim of their

Schmidt, "Staatsakt in Karlsruhe" *Bulletin* 35 (14 April) 1977, 321-6, 322-3.

¹⁹ Hans-Jochen Vogel in: "Staatsakt in Karlsruhe" *Bulletin* 35/1977, 326; Helmut Schmidt, "Erklaerung der Bundesregierung zur inneren Sicherheit und Terrorismusbekaempfung" *Bulletin* 40 (22 April) 1977, 361-6, 364.

²⁰ *Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany* (Bonn: Press and Information Office of the Federal Government, 1986), 16, 21, 23; Gordon Smith, *Democracy in Western Germany: Parties and Politics in the Federal Republic* (Aldershot: Gower Publishing Co., Ltd., Third Edition, 1986), 206-7.

²¹ Kevin G. Horbatiuk, "Anti-Terrorism: The West German Approach" *Fordham International Law Approach* 3, 1980, 167-91, 177.

²² *Basic Law*, 21.

policy must be to foster identification with the free democratic state, which can only occur when it is protected and defended.²³

The murder of Hanns Martin Schleyer's driver and bodyguards in the course of his abduction by the Red Army Faction called for the government's allegiance to its previous policy statements about the relationship between terrorism and the liberal democratic state. The government initially viewed this as a provocation that required a hard response and a cool head. Anyone who sought to excuse or lessen the serious danger of the situation, isolated themselves from the others who identified with the rule of law and social order of the state.²⁴

On 6 September the government decided- -in consultation with the opposition parties- -to follow three simultaneous aims as policy orientation guides. These were to free Schleyer alive, to apprehend and to try the abductors, and to maintain the state's freedom of action, which included non-release of the prisoners, and not to endanger domestic and foreign confidence in the state. Only when one of these goals forced a decision between it and another, would a decision over the prevalence of one over the other be taken.²⁵ These goals were not communicated to the public and the Schleyer family, who did not realise the conflict between the first and third goals. The conflict between not releasing the prisoners and the rescue of Schleyer alive would only be resolved if the authorities could locate and free him.²⁶ Realisation of these goals was facilitated through a news embargo on the events²⁷ (see chapter seven). These made public identification with Schleyer more difficult and eased an identification with the government because little information was available about the hostage's condition, and more was known about the government efforts.

Paragraph 34 (Justified Emergency) of the Criminal Code was used this time to justify the government's 'contact ban' on suspected and convicted terrorists to prevent them passing and receiving information about the events via their lawyers and to inhibit the release of the

²³ Schmidt, *Bulletin* 40/1977, 363, 365-6.

²⁴ Helmut Schmidt, "Erschuetterung und Empoerung ueber den Mordanschlag in Koeln und die Entfuehrung von Dr. Schleyer" *Bulletin* 84 (7 September) 1977, 789-90.

²⁵ Press and Information Office of the Federal Government, *Dokumentation zu den Ereignissen und Entscheidungen im Zusammenhang mit der Entfuehrung von Hanns Martin Schleyer und der Lufthansa Maschine 'Landshut'* (Bonn: Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, 1977), 17-9. Hereafter referred to as *Schleyer Dokumentation*.

²⁶ Thomas Wittke, *Terrorismusbekaempfung als rationale politische Entscheidung: Die Fallstudie Bundesrepublik* (Frankfurt a.M.: Peter Lang, 1983), 216.

²⁷ "'Die Deutschen sind irrsinnig geworden'" *Der Spiegel* 36 (31 August) 1987, 106-11, 108.

imprisoned persons in exchange for Schleyer and the Lufthansa passengers. Nor could there be any guarantee that freed convicted and suspected terrorists would not return to the Federal Republic, such as the five who were freed in exchange for Lorenz. The lesser good was sacrificed for the threatened greater good according to the values laid out in the constitution.²⁸

The 1982 change of government from a Social Democrat and Free Democrat coalition to one between the Christian Union, Christian Socialists and Free Democrats, did not change the counterterrorism policy assumptions. The new government believed that the arrest of terrorists would not end terrorism because their 'fanaticism' was a constant danger and their hatred of the state and society blinded them to the 'real relationships' in the country, while their personal overconfidence could lead to serious attacks. The new government was also committed to confronting terrorism with all means available to the liberal democratic states, both alone and as joint efforts between states because of its international character. Nor would the new government accept legitimate 'resistance' against the state. This could arguably be allowed in dictatorships, where individual freedoms were curtailed, but not in liberal democracies,²⁹ therefore it is necessary to reduce the number who support and aid the terrorists in the Federal Republic, or who support their aims. A peaceful world can only be based on human rights and social justice.³⁰

The government identified with the rule of law, equal rights, and the liberal democratic state. All things which the terrorists sought to eliminate in their identification with anti-imperialism and the end of the Federal Republic. The government's main counterterrorism assumption was that they needed to reinforce and widen public identification with itself. They were slow in understanding the long-term implications of counterterrorism policy, and sometimes wavered in the heat of the terrorist incident, such as in the Lorenz incident when they freed the prisoners, and in the Schleyer incident when they imposed the contact ban and other measures discussed later in section four. At other times,

²⁸ Schleyer Dokumentation (materialien) 9, 49-55; (materialien) 4-6, for the crimes attributed to the people involved.

²⁹ Friedrich Zimmermann, "Erfolg und Chancen bei der Verbrechensbekaempfung" *Bulletin* 117 (23 November) 1982, 1063-4, 1063; ----, "Trauerfeier in Muenchen" *Bulletin* 16 (8 February) 1985, 130-1, 131; -----, "Sicherung des Rechtsstaats vor Gewalt und Kriminalitaet" *Bulletin* 99 (20 September) 1985, 877-9, 879.

³⁰ Hans-Dietrich Genscher, "Abschied von Gerold von Braunmuehl" *Bulletin* 125 (17 October) 1986, 1052-4, 1053-4; -----, "Opfer des Terrorismus im Auswaertigen Amt" *Bulletin* 103 (14 October) 1987, 884-5, 885.

the government did arrive at an understanding of the dilemmas of counterterrorism in between the extreme incidents when they spoke of using more than police measures.

3. The Resourcing of Policy Implementation

The value of the government's counterterrorism policy assumptions could only be realised if these were adequately resourced and implemented with the desired results. In this section the counterterrorism resources in the Federal Republic of Germany are examined. This is followed with a discussion of policy implementation. Both sections are sub-divided into two different areas: counterterrorist measures taken before terrorist incidents to deter and prevent them, and antiterrorist measures taken as reactions to specific incidents.³¹ Despite the overlap with this categorisation- -police used to collect and analyse data, while also being the first response to incidents- -it provides a useful framework for analysis of responses to terrorism. Counterterrorism measures are passive (or proactive), and in place prior to an incident, while antiterrorist ones are active (or reactive), and occur after an incident.

3.1 Counterterrorism Resources

None of the measures functions without money provided to the various state institutions with counter (and anti) terrorism responsibilities. Given the West German state's assumption that one needs to dry up support for political violence against the state this requires money for more than internal security. This necessitates monies for solving problems in social conditions, the education system, and housing at both the federal and regional (*Laender*) level, the later of which has a more direct everyday responsibility. The government must also clearly explain its position on defence, nuclear energy, and other issues which cause public concern, and form the basis for the terrorist activity described in chapter three. These general measures will not prevent terrorist sympathisers from possibly becoming terrorists, but should reduce the number of people who become potential sympathisers.

Table 6.1 (page 205) shows that government spending has remained fairly constant over the years, and that the major change over time has been the result of accounting changes, which highlight the large proportion of the budget devoted to social services. Otherwise spending on the armed forces has become 5.4% of the budget, down from its height

³¹ Eric Morris, Alan Hoe, *Terrorism: Threat and Response* (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1987), 126.

of 13.8% in the early sixties, and spending on public security, which includes the Federal Border Guard, federal police and fire services, public prosecutors, disaster aid and the federal intelligence services, has only fluctuated within a one percent spread. This would not appear to have warranted a label of excessive spending by the government.

Table 6.1 Budget Expenditure per Area, 1961-1987¹
(in million DM)

Year	Total A	Armed Forces	% of A	Public ² Security	% of A	Educa- tion	% of A	Social Security	% of A
1961	95,275	13,175	13.8	3707	3.9	8196	8.6	22,151	23.2
1965	140,581	18,899	13.4	5313	3.8	14,283	10.2	31,302	22.3
1967	155,944	21,024	13.5	5946	3.8	16,316	10.5	34,968	22.4
1968	159,190	17,514	11.0	6298	4.0	17,458	11.0	35,910	22.6
1969	174,723	19,886	11.4	6996	4.0	20,304	11.6	37,249	21.3
1970	196,330	19,831	9.7	7889	4.0	24,784	12.6	40,355	20.6
1971	225,182	21,840	9.9	9285	4.1	31,287	13.9	45,242	20.1
1972	251,271	24,843	9.8	10,338	4.1	35,651	14.2	50,326	20.0
1973	277,665	27,342	9.7	11,813	4.3	40,427	14.6	52,123	18.8
1974a	316,504	30,734	6.9	13,957	4.4	47,281	14.9	61,970	19.6
1974b	448,250	30,734	6.3	13,903	3.1	49,351	11.0	189,073	42.2
1975	511,710	32,357	6.2	15,253	3.0	53,830	10.5	232,719	45.5
1976	542,047	33,662	6.0	16,038	3.0	54,921	10.1	249,378	46.0
1977	576,293	34,336	5.9	17,364	3.0	57,411	10.0	267,431	46.4
1978	622,259	36,667	5.7	18,678	3.0	61,327	9.9	283,530	45.6
1979	671,251	38,582	5.7	20,313	3.0	66,294	9.9	299,704	44.6
1980	722,866	40,938	5.7	22,225	3.1	73,008	10.1	319,880	44.3
1981	791,199	44,200	5.6	23,526	3.0	76,546	9.7	368,095	46.5
1982	828,482	46,019	5.6	24,151	2.9	77,583	9.4	389,649	47.0
1983	849,178	48,465	5.7	24,864	2.9	78,061	9.2	397,404	46.8
1984	876,812	49,542	5.7	25,425	2.9	77,572	8.8	412,978	47.1
1985	907,266	50,849	5.6	26,465	2.9	80,765	8.9	425,957	46.9
1986	941,902	52,049	5.5	27,634	2.9	83,523	8.9	443,501	47.1
1987	978,851	52,997	5.4	29,120	3.0	86,520	8.8	464,648	47.5

a/b old and new accounting methods
¹ The percentages are part of the total budget for the year.
The prices are not constant.
² includes federal border guard, federal police and fire services, public prosecutors, disaster aid and federal intelligence services.

Source: Statistisches Bundesamt, *Statistische Jahrbuch fuer die Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1983* (Wiesbaden: W. Kohlhammer, 1983), 412; 1990 (1990), 443.

Indeed, the suspicion that terrorism became a public concern that suddenly demanded the government find previously unavailable money to handle 'the problem', as it did with public education in the sixties,³² is not borne out by the figures in Table 6.1, because the difference

³² Heinz Schwarz, "Die Herausforderung des Terrorismus: Sicherheit nach innen und Freiheitsrechte" *Die Politische Meinung* 20 (158) 1975, 9-20, 15.

between projected and actual costs for the security services amounted to an additional 0.6% of the gross domestic product (\$2,696.7 million) between 1970 and 1981. Instead it is possible to argue that these increases were due to population growth and programme expenditure.³³

Table 6.2 Personnel in Federal Public Service, 1964-1988

Year	Total	Armed ¹ Forces	Public ² Security	Legal Aid	Social Security
1950	62,400	-----	200	200	100
1960	211,400	85,500	17,600	1200	1000
1964	255,036	195,417	4177	1492	752
1969	280,444	168,005	4568	1636	721
1970	305,100	171,300	21,500	1700	700
1970	284,988	171,317	4710	1661	721
1971	290,203	175,400	5109	1688	739
1972	295,567	178,473	5417	1786	786
1973	300,743				
1974	296,253	177,447	5878	1813	818
1975	322,000	177,500	26,700	1900	800
1975	297,572	177,450	6199	1939	824
1976	299,028	175,602	6580	1964	821
1977	311,687				
1978	323,830	178,935	28,394	2149	906
1979	327,457	180,425	29,426	2194	1044
1980	306,200	172,200	28,800	2000	1000
1980	326,141	179,004	29,426	2117	1173
x1970	1.04	1.01	1.34	1.18	1.43
x1970	1.14	1.04	6.39	1.24	1.63
1981	328,414	179,397	30,094	2062	1214
1982	328,661	180,060	30,107	2065	1179
1983	315,600	172,100	28,800	1800	1100
1984					
1985	312,800	171,900	27,700	1800	1100
1986	311,800	171,100	27,400	1800	1100
1987	313,100	171,300	27,200	1800	1200
1988	312,300	169,100	27,700	1900	1300
x1980	0.98	0.98	0.96	0.95	1.30
x1980	0.96	0.94	0.94	0.89	1.11
¹ Does not include border guard and armed units. ² See Table 6.1.					

NOTE: The bold figures are rounded off to exclude those on vacation by a considerable degree as is seen when they are compared to the other figures for contemporary years that were originally published.

Source: Statistisches Bundesamt, Statistisches Jahrbuch fuer die Bundesrepublik Deutschland volumes 1965-1990 (Wiesbaden: W. Kohlhammer, 1965), 453; 1971, 406; 1972, 411; 1973, 424; 1974, 411; 1975, 412; 1976, 419; 1977, 405; 1978, 422; 1979, 421; 1980, 416; 1981, 429; 1982, 433; 1983, 431; 1984, 440; 1990, 459.

³³ Hewitt (1988), 175.

Computers, armoured cars and bullet-proof windows do not apprehend and protect people from terrorists without people to analyse the situations, and make recommendations concerning improvements. Spending figures do not seem out of the ordinary for the category of public security, but perhaps the figures for personnel in public security are different.

Table 6.2 shows several points. One is that the bold figures highlight a rise in personnel which peaks between 1975 and 1980, after which they decline in all areas except social security. These retrospectively rounded off figures published by the Federal Statistical Office since 1983 highlight large increases in public security between 1970 and 1975, after which its growth slows in 1980 and then falls. The non-bold figures, those published contemporaneously by the Federal Statistical Office, show a much slower growth rate for public security between 1970 and 1975, the formative years of West German terrorism.

Table 6.3
Personnel in the Security Apparatus, 1960-1980

Year	BGS ¹	1970 BKA ²	1970	BfV ³	1970 BGS/	1970 Public	1970 Percent-				
	=100	=100	=100	=100	BKA/	Employ-	age of				
	I	II	III	IV	BfV(IV)	ees (V)	IV in V				
1960	17,530	82	419	35	523	48	18427	78	211,397	69	8.7
1965	20,338	95	548	45	920	85	21796	92	286,771	94	7.6
1968	19,101	89	578	48	998	92	20677	87	296,016	97	7.0
1969	20,673	97	933	77	1016	93	22622	96	300,749	99	7.5
1970	21,370	100	1211	100	1088	100	23669	100	305,096	100	7.8
1971	22,129	104	1529	126	1186	109	24844	105	312,592	102	7.9
1972	22,557	106	1876	155	1259	116	25692	109	317,957	104	8.1
1973	23,309	109	2062	170	1459	134	26830	113	319,263	105	8.4
1974	23,841	112	2212	183	1559	143	27612	117	319,995	105	8.6
1975	24,544	115	2237	185	1585	146	28366	120	321,959	106	8.8
1976	24,849	116	2424	200	1623	149	28901	122	319,672	105	9.0
1977	25,650	120	2545	210	(1660)	153	29855	126	314,173	103	9.5
1978	26,215	123	3122	258	(1700)	156	31037	131	315,173	103	9.8
1979	25,869	121	3189	263	(1740)	160	30798	130	316,256	104	9.7
1980	26,305	123	3339	276	(1780)	164	31424	133	316,229	104	9.9

¹ Calculated figures for all positions in BGS
² Planned and actual figures
³ Published figures only until 1976, afterwards progressed ones

Source: Heiner Busch, Albrect Funk, Udo Kauss, Wolf-Dieter Narr, Falco Werkentin, *Die Polizei in der Bundesrepublik* (Frankfurt a.M.: Campus Verlag, 1985), 79.

The large discrepancy between the bold and non-bold figures in Table 6.2 for public security is probably due to the inclusion of the Federal Border Guard in the revised figures, which probably explains the sudden upsurge in public security personnel between 1975 and 1978. This also explains the change in statistical format that occurred and caused the

holes in the table. A view of Table 6.3 shows that although the figures differ for total public personnel, the rises are similar in volume. Table 6.3 also explains that between 1975 and 1978 the percentage of people in public security only moved from 8.8% to 9.8% which is consistent with the thesis that other unaccounted personnel were not included in Table 6.2 before 1978.

Table 6.4 Laender Personnel in Public Service, 1964-1988

Year	Total	Public Security	Legal Aid	Educa- tion	Social Security
1950	722,200	94,000	69,000	204,000	46,000
1960	949,600	118,000	91,800	295,800	55,700
1964	977,071	122,788	96,556	279,309	46,488
1969	1,111,285	135,650	88,403	345,383	44,990
1970	1,209,900	144,500	104,900	487,100	46,200
1970	1,154,193	144,468	104,884	491,129	46,226
1971	1,213,347	147,630	106,397	533,359	48,026
1972	1,269,771	156,072	113,973	569,698	48,319
1973	1,383,753				
1974	1,376,293	168,572	113,973	615,022	50,343
1975	1,440,200	175,600	115,900	635,100	49,500
1975	1,403,291	175,567	115,933	458,192	49,514
1976	1,494,284	185,715	115,320	478,986	49,641
1977	1,439,102				
1978	1,680,380	199,674	127,611	594,970	58,351
1979	1,741,082	207,222	133,454	618,401	60,911
1980	1,567,900	204,500	123,500	713,000	51,100
1980	1,666,074	209,797	136,484	622,352	60,540
x1970	1.30	1.42	1.18	1.46	1.11
x1970	1.44	1.45	1.36	1.16	1.31
1981	1,658,987	214,100	140,600	630,700	59,150
1982	1,668,611	215,456	143,061	646,712	59,699
1983	1,586,500	212,000	131,600	718,700	51,700
1984					
1985	1,571,700	211,800	135,400	694,800	52,000
1986	1,559,800	211,700	136,500	681,400	49,600
1987	1,548,300	211,600	138,500	669,900	49,600
1988	1,538,100	211,500	139,700	659,700	49,500
x1980	0.98	1.03	1.13	0.93	0.97
x1980	0.92	1.01	1.02	1.06	0.81

NOTE: The bold figures are rounded off to exclude those on vacation by a considerable degree as is seen when they are compared to the other figures for contemporary years that were originally published.

Source: Statistisches Bundesamt, Statistisches Jahrbuch fuer die Bundesrepublik Deutschland volumes 1965-1990 (Wiesbaden: W. Kohlhammer, 1965), 453; 1971, 406; 1972, 411; 1973, 424; 1974, 411; 1975, 412; 1976, 419; 1977, 405; 1978, 422; 1979, 421; 1980, 416; 1981, 429; 1982, 433; 1983, 431; 1984, 440; 1990, 459.

Table 6.2 also shows that the total personnel in federal public service has risen since 1964 with a cutbacks in 1974 and 1980, with apparent reorganisational exercises at regional and federal levels, because these are also mirrored in Table 6.4. Table 6.1 shows these were not due to budget reductions. However, while all the other sectors lost personnel, public security did not. It only suffered a personnel freeze in 1980.

Table 6.3 shows mixed growth in the security services with responsibility for counterterrorism. The number of employees with the already large **Bundesgrenzschutz** (BGS, Federal Border Guards) did not grow much between 1960 and 1970, whereas those of the **Bundesamt fuer Verfassungsschutz** (BfV, Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution) more than doubled, and those of the **Bundeskriminalamt** (BKA, Federal Criminal Office) almost tripled during this time. By 1974 the growth rate of the BKA had almost doubled, while the BfV grew by virtually half. In 1980 the BKA was nearly three times its 1970 size, while the BfV slowed its growth, only growing a bit more than half.

Table 6.4 shows the same discrepancies exhibited in Table 6.2. One notable exception, however, is that while all of the categories in Table 6.2, except for social security, peaked and then fell back in the eighties, those in Table 6.4 peaked between 1980 and 1983 before all but legal aid began to fall. Some of these also exhibited growth in the eighties so that their percentage of total **Laender** (Federal Republic states) public service personnel grew. Thus the growth of the security services highlighted by Table 6.3 continued into the eighties.

The increase in personnel in public security areas is only effective in improving the quality of public security for the citizens if these people have strong motivation, good morale and are provided with requisite materials to undertake their duties. An identification with them must also be conveyed and built up in the public to avoid their alienation and loss of confidence.

Positions in public security became more attractive in the seventies with wage increases and an open door to any of the career paths in the police. Changes in the mid-seventies that enabled those with an **Abitur** (higher school leaving certificate) to apply directly to the newly established police college meant they could move directly into the higher police levels. Those with lower school leaving certificates (**Real-**, **Volks-**, and **Hauptschule**) could also move into the higher police echelons when a quota for **Abitur** students was imposed. Nonetheless, there has been a general rise in school qualifications for new recruits since the seventies. This has ensured a gap between everyday policemen

and the police hierarchy that lead the force, and also appears as a gap between the qualified technically able and the large mass of employees. Moves to widen the training of recruits and personnel during their careers have not necessarily led to individual flexibility, but rather to a flexible institution.³⁴

Changes introduced since the mid-seventies have also led to a lessening of direct police experience with the social problems and a reliance on technically transmitted information. This has led to an information flood as discussed below. The increased information availability is obtained at the loss of the direct experience and shortened police personnel horizons, which has left the police with fewer personal contacts to the public. Now the police cannot always identify with the public, whom they only meet directly through calls for help. This in turn makes it harder for the public to identify with them.³⁵

The working conditions for the police are not always optimal and many hours of overtime accrue, without the possibility of leave in lieu. For example, the Bonn police spent 496,558 hours in 1985 protecting people and buildings, and then saw this figure rise to 615,109 hours in 1986. The large increase was due to a change in Red Army Faction targets. Once they had moved from top people like Schleyer and Buback, to the second and third rank people like Beckurts and von Braunmuehl, the Bonn police had to suddenly change from protecting seven individuals in 1985 to protecting up to 132 people and 267 buildings. The result is over 7000 days leave, which never will be taken.³⁶

The provision of modern resources for personnel in the security services is highlighted in the example of computer information networks that grew rapidly from 1972 onwards. Previous to the introduction of the central computer system, INPOL (Police Information System) at the **Bundeskriminalamt** each of the regional police forces had computerised their files with different computer systems. The goal of the new system was an on-line service available to all police officers. Eventually this system became available to the eleven **Laenderkriminalaemter** (LKAs, Land Criminal Offices), customs officials and the Passport Control Authority of the **Bundesgrenzschutz**. However, this did not immediately end the use of different systems by the **Laender** and **Bund** (federal level), as the

³⁴ Heiner Busch, Albrecht Funk, Udo Kauss, Wolf-Dieter Narr, Falco Werkentin, *Die Polizei in der Bundesrepublik* (Frankfurt a.M.: Campus Verlag, 1985), 151-2, 168-9.

³⁵ *ibid.*, 429-30.

³⁶ Joachim Zimmermann, "Bonn als Zielscheibe des Terrorismus" *Terrorismus: Informationsdienst* 10, 1987, 1-3, 2.

regulations allowed the two levels to achieve the goals with different systems. These then required compatibility modifications.³⁷

Despite the formal division of the executive and the intelligence gathering arms of the police that separate the *Bundeskriminalamt* from the *Bundesamt fuer Verfassungsschutz*, both enjoyed direct access to each others' computer systems, INPOL and NADIS until 1979. Afterwards they interfaced each other's computer systems via telex machines.³⁸

However, information held in INPOL could only pass from the centre outwards to the regional offices. Access to the information on other LKA computers could only be obtained by another LKA if the central computer also had the information on its files. This cost both time and money. Hence, the *Laender* interior ministers decided between 1975 and 1978 to develop a new system, DISPOL, that would overcome this problem.³⁹ The results of the developments of INPOL, DISPOL and their connections to other computer systems is that any policeman, or other authorised person has instant access to countless files and search systems to enable quick and efficient access to information.

Fears of the abuse of this system that brings together information that would normally be difficult, or impossible, to combine without computer assistance, hinders public identification with public security officials.⁴⁰ These fears are also raised by the powers available to the public security personnel which can be used in combination with the available computer information. For example, whereas previously the authorities could only establish identity control points at border crossings, new legislation allows these where terrorist acts have been, or are considered to be, a threat, as occurred at the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank meeting in West Berlin in September 1988.⁴¹ Added to this are the fears associated with computer readable identity cards.⁴²

Although the West German security services apprehended most Red Army Faction members in June 1972, shortly after their first bombing campaign in May, the first major changes to the criminal and court procedure codes began in 1974 after the discovery of the extent to which these

³⁷ Busch et. al., 119, 121; Dieter Kuester, "Das INPOL-System: Zielsetzung und Ausbaustand 1982" *Kriminalistik* 1, 1983, 18-20, 41-3, 19.

³⁸ Busche et. al., 217-9.

³⁹ *ibid.*, 125.

⁴⁰ Jochen Boelsche, "Das Strahlnetz stuelpt sich ueber uns", in: Jochen Boelsche (ed.), *Der Weg in den Ueberwachungsstaat* Reinbek: Rowohlt Verlag, 1979, 13-107, 14.

⁴¹ Juergen Blume, Werner Mathias, "Schwerste Aufgabe nach den Krieg'" *Stern* 41 (39) 22-8 September 1988, 262-3, 262.

⁴² See Rolf Goessner and Buerger kontrollieren die Polizei (eds.).

first suspected terrorists pushed the state's legal limits to their outer edge. The rejuvenatory factor of terrorists--the identification of recruits with imprisoned suspected and convicted terrorists--meant that the apprehension and conviction of terrorists was only one part of countering terrorism. A thorough counterterrorism policy was required.

The laws designed to counter terrorism in West Germany were mostly written between December 1974 and October 1978, with several repealed in 1981 and more added in the late eighties.⁴³ The legislation that was introduced to counter terrorism can be found in four areas: (1) legal procedures and defence rights for persons suspected of terrorism; (2) legislation defining what constitutes terrorism and the state's monopoly of force; (3) increased powers for the surveillance of suspects and the police and intelligence apparatus, and; (4) legislation over weapons ownership and usage.⁴⁴

These four areas cut across fundamental political differences between the major West German political parties, which could only agree that the liberal democracy should not be an unarmed society with passive loyalty to the nation, but have 'active democrats' as the cornerstone of counterterrorism. They also agreed that individual citizens' rights, a criterion of liberal democracy, needed to be balanced by the need for further security measures.⁴⁵

Otherwise, the Christian Democrats and the Christian Social Union considered themselves to have a special competence with law and order matters, one of their traditional concerns. The CDU/CSU often pushed a conservative view that argued terrorism derived directly from the events of 1968 and 'leftism' in general, whereby any form of social criticism challenged the established social norms and thus encouraged terrorists. The SPD, on the other hand, was less inclined towards such simplistic positions on terrorism due to the complexities of leftist ideology, and the fact that they did not want to alienate their supporters who ranged from moderate to radical left.⁴⁶ The FDP and Greens are discussed under

⁴³ Uwe Berlit, Horst Dreier, "Die legislative Auseinandersetzung mit dem Terrorismus", in: Fritz Sack, Heinz Steinert (eds.), *Protest und Reaktion: Analysen zum Terrorismus 4/2* (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1984), 227-318, 229, Helmut Kerscher, "Der Rechtsstaat setzt sich zur wehr", in: Dieter Schroeder (ed.), *Terrorismus: Gewalt mit politischem Motiv* (Munich: Paul List Verlag, Sueddeutsche Zeitung Serie, 1986), 77-87, 86-7; Horbatiuk, 167-191. Earlier counterterrorism legislation introduced on 16 December 1971, Article 316c StGB, covered attacks on aviation, and perpetrators thereof anywhere, and Articles 239a and 239b covered ransom and coercion. This article also contains translations of many other StGB and StPO articles.

⁴⁴ Kolinsky, 82, 83-4, 85.

⁴⁵ Pridham, 46.

⁴⁶ *ibid.*, 39.

policy implementation, as are the SPD and CDU/CSU with regards to specific policy options.

The legislation was designed for the apprehension of suspected terrorists before they committed crimes, and for quick and speedy trials afterwards. This necessitated the expansion of state prosecutor's powers and of the police's rights of search and apprehension.⁴⁷ The pressure for success, coupled with the added difficulties of counterterrorism, showed the borders of the legal limits more forcefully than previously had been the case for the executive and judicial institutions.⁴⁸ These are discussed more fully in the next section on antiterrorist resources.

Legislative measures are mentioned here briefly because preventative and reactive measures overlap. There are grey areas between them, especially when measures designed to be used reactively are used preventatively as mentioned in the case of the IMF meetings in 1988 when Federal Prosecutor General Rebmann used Para 111 Criminal Court Procedure Code in connection with 129a Criminal Code to establish control points before, instead of after, suspected terrorist incidents.⁴⁹

Public trust in the security services is a delicate affair developed through media presentation of incidents and government policy, as well as general political education of the democratic political system (see also chapter seven). Part of the general political education is undertaken through the *Bundeszentrale fuer politische Bildung* (Federal Office for Political Education) created in 1974 to promote political understanding, democratic consciousness and public participation in the political process. It is independent of the political parties and falls under the organisational responsibility of the Interior Ministry.⁵⁰ The office organises conferences, seminars and provides free publications for interested persons.

The effectiveness of counterterrorism policy resources does not rest solely with the provision of material resources, but also in the intangibles of conventions and legislation to reduce the attractiveness of terrorism and aid in the apprehension of suspects in other countries. For example, the need to overcome difficulties in radio communications between the police forces of different countries, and the regulations and suspicions about foreign policemen on home territory contributed to

⁴⁷ Berlitz, Dreier, 232.

⁴⁸ Heinz Giehring, "Die Reaktion des Gesetzgebers auf den Terrorismus", in: *Jugend und Terrorismus: Ein Hearing des Bundesjugendkuratoriums* (Munich: Juventa Verlag, 1979), 61-83, 61-2.

⁴⁹ Blume, Maithes, *Stern* 41/1988, 262.

⁵⁰ "Erlass ueber die Bundeszentrale fuer politische Bildung" in *Das Parlament* 9 August 1980, 14.

turn a multinational effort to apprehend extortionists operating in Europe into a farce. Had the regulations restricting the operation of foreign policemen in different countries not been overcome and the effort a success, this may have led to more serious problems in future cooperation, because suspicions would have been proven justified.⁵¹

While the FRG efforts of cooperation outside the West, where group efforts may conflict with its own interests, have not been as beneficial as some would like, its cooperation within the West has been substantial.⁵² One problem with international cooperation is its tendency to mirror the domestic policy of 'no concessions' discussed earlier in the counterterrorism assumptions. In foreign policy this has extended to the 'self-help' of the Mogadishu rescue.⁵³

Perhaps its strongest bilateral cooperation efforts have been with France. The 1963 Franco-German Treaty of Friendship, provided a convivial context for discussions about terrorism when it became a problem in the seventies. The two states added to this with the February 1977 agreement on joint customs and police posts. The February 1985 efforts initiated by the two Interior Ministers to improve cooperative police and intelligence efforts, with immediate information exchanges, bloomed in April 1987 with an agreement over constant contact between German and French officials who would aid the exchange of internal security, legal, and investigative procedure information through their particular expertise when in the neighbouring country. Ideally this will lead to similar cooperative efforts with other European states.⁵⁴

The lack of a general international agreement on terrorism makes it more difficult to counter. Agreements that specifically list the extraditable crimes have proved unworkable in the past, and new ones which list crimes not covered by the treaty are in use. Fortunately, terrorism is less often considered as an excludable political crime so progress is being made. The best way forward, however, is a harmonising

⁵¹ Sepp Ebelseder, "Katastrophenalarm beim 'Party-Service'" *Stern* 43 (9) 22-8 February 1990, 214-5, 214.

⁵² Busch et.al., 216, 231, 309.

⁵³ Martha Crenshaw, "Introduction: Reflections on the Effects of Terrorism", in: Martha Crenshaw (ed.), *Terrorism, Legitimacy, and Power: The Consequences of Political Violence* (Middletown, Conn: Wesleyan University Press, 1983), 1-37, 13.

⁵⁴ Malcolm Anderson, *Policing the World: INTERPOL and the Politics of International Police Co-operation* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 136, 156; *Sueddeutsche Zeitung* 6 February 1985, 1; *Die Welt* 9 April 1987; "Zusammenarbeit" *Terrorismus: Informationsdienst* 6, 1987, 5.

of criminal legal systems so that involvement in the activities of terrorist organisations is a crime in all states.⁵⁵

Another main area of furthering international cooperation is that of practical measures such as the prevention of terrorist acts. This can be furthered by forming a European databank network similar to the German intelligence services system which would list the files of information in their national databanks. This avoids the national legislation problems about the transfer of data on individuals and its end use. At a minimum, such a system would speed up the transfer of information. A similar information exchange already exists between the TREVI members, as they exchange information about terrorist organisations, suspects, stolen weapons and explosives with possible terrorist connections. They have further agreed to conduct evaluations of terrorist threats to Europe and report these through the secure TREVI communications network.⁵⁶

TREVI was organised as a loose inter-governmental structure at the suggestion of the British Foreign Minister James Callaghan in 1975, and forms an important part of the European Political Cooperation process at the ministerial and official level of the European Communities. The United States and Canada are observer members.⁵⁷

The removal of borders within the European Community by 31 December 1992 means that cooperative efforts are required sooner rather than later. The Schengen Agreement designed to remove borders in 1990 between the Federal Republic, France and the Benelux countries signed on 14 June 1985 has highlighted the difficulties involved. This area was widened to include Poland due to the removal of visa restrictions for Poles entering the Federal Republic after 8 April 1991. Spain and Portugal also signed the agreement in June 1991. The implications of this are heightened further when it is noted that between 1971 and 1982 border crossing in West Germany rose from 687 to 880 million and currently stand at over 900 million a year. Between 1971 and 1982 the number detained at borders rose from 41,096 to 89,200, and those arrested from

⁵⁵ Kurt Rebmann, "Probleme und Moeglichkeiten der Bekaempfung des internationalen Terrorismus" *Neue Juristische Wochenschrift* 30, 1985 (II), 1735-8, 1737-8.

⁵⁶ *ibid.*, 1738; "TREVI", *Terrorismus: Informationsdienst* 1, 1987, 4; "TREVI", *Terrorismus: Informationsdienst* 6, 1987, 4.

⁵⁷ Named after the fountain in Rome, and as the abbreviation of Terrorism, Radicalism, Extremism, Violence, International, Anderson, 3; Friedrich Zimmermann, "Europaeische Zusammenarbeit bei der Bekaempfung des Terrorismus" *Bulletin* 2 (5 January) 1983, 10-11, 10.

7,265 to 14,073. However, these difficulties have also hindered the treaty's enactment, which the members hoped would be in late 1991.⁵⁸

An extension of the European Community's outer borders requires enhanced security in less secure border countries like Greece and Portugal through such speculative measures as employing multiple national police forces at border crossings, i.e. German border guards in Greece and Portugal. Another option is pursuit over borders by police authorities, even if only to observe. Lastly, there could also be Euro-wide searches for terrorists to reduce their safe-havens.⁵⁹

However, international cooperation can, at best, only reduce terrorism. It cannot be eradicated. Cooperation can be maximised with common rules of behaviour, rewards to shift the perspective of states from short-term (release of hostages, or remove threat of reprisals) to the long-term security benefits via raised international prestige and economic rewards, and penalties for non-cooperation which range from political, economic, and diplomatic levels to the extreme example of military reprisals such as the USA raid on Libya in April 1986.⁶⁰

3.2 Antiterrorist Resources

After the experience of centralised police forces in the Third Reich the new republic separated the executive and investigative tasks of the police forces and gave the main responsibility for police powers to the regional *Laender*, while the federal level could be called for assistance when requested. The BKA and regional police forces have the powers of arrest, while the intelligence services of the BfV, its regional offices and the Federal Intelligence Service have no powers of arrest. The intelligence services therefore work with liason members from the BKA and LKAs.⁶¹

The *Bundeskriminalamt* was created in 1951, but until 1970 remained mainly a letter box institution, where officials were only involved with filing information. Although the BKA could be called in by the regional

⁵⁸ *ibid.*, 25; Busche et. al., 297; Anderson, 25; "Interview: Eckhardt Wertebach" *Terrorismus: Informationsdienst* 7, 1991, 4-5, 5; *Independent* 9 April 1991, 26 June 1991.

⁵⁹ "Interview: Kurt Rebmann" *Terrorismus: Informationsdienst* 5, 1989, 1-3, 2-3.

⁶⁰ Crenshaw (1989), 38, 44-6, 59.

⁶¹ Busch et. al., 107-8; Juergen Thomanek, "Police and Public Order in the Federal Republic of Germany", in: John Roach, Juergen Thomanek (eds.), *Police and Public Order in Europe* (London: Croom Helm, 1985), 143-184, 150-1; Diethelm Damm, "Die Praktiken des Verfassungsschutzes", in: Peter Brueckner, Diethelm Damm, Juergen Seifert, *1984 schon heute, oder wer hat Angst vorm Verfassungsschutz?* (Frankfurt a.M.: Verlag Neue Kritik, 1977), 7-106, 12.

Landkriminalaemter to take over difficult cases, this occurred only five times prior to 1970.⁶²

The computerisation of the BKA in 1972 was organised by Dr. Horst Herold, who became president of the BKA on 1 September 1971. Computerisation did not occur sooner because the previous president, Paul Dickopf, did not see the institution as a leader for new technology and systems in criminology, and disliked computers. This led to regional LKAs computerising their files and offices on their own,⁶³ which remained after national computerisation and necessitated interconnections between the different systems. Some of the alternative systems required birthdates to locate files, and others not. Some could enquire about stolen vehicles, others not.⁶⁴

Legislation later widened BKA responsibility from information storage to investigative responsibilities. In 1969 the BKA received new regulations to enable it to direct people to assist the *Laender*, and when the Baader-Meinhof group was at its climax in 1971/2, the BKA was directed by the Federal Interior Minister to handle all politically motivated acts against 'constitutional institutions'.⁶⁵

The lack of success in apprehending the early Red Army Faction created pressure for BKA powers to direct special commissions in the *Laender*. After success in June 1972 this was quickly changed back to the other system, and the BKA had to request to have automatic control over the *Laender* firmly established. Legislation in 1973 charged the BKA with responsibility for investigation into terrorism, international weapons trade, drugs and counterfeit money.⁶⁶

Bundeskriminalamt authority was further entrenched in 1975 after the Lorenz abduction when the Federal Interior Minister instituted 'cooperative federalism' with the BKA storing and compiling all information on terrorism, and the *Laender* committing themselves to follow the requests and suggestions of the BKA. As the Bundeskriminalamt has no searching capacity with officers in the field apart from BKA and LKA cooperative targeted searches for individual terrorists, the regional police forces have sole responsibility for these measures,⁶⁷ and so the BKA must rely on the LKA work.

⁶² Busch, et. al., 83, 84.

⁶³ Boelsche, 17; Armand Mergen, *Die BKA Story* (Munich: F.A. Herbig Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1987), 175-6.

⁶⁴ Karl-Heinz Krumm, "Terrorbekaempfung und Foederalismus", in: *Extremismus- -Terrorismus- -Kriminalitaet* (Bonn: Bundeszentrale fuer politische Bildung, 1978), 80-3, 81.

⁶⁵ Mergen, 80-1.

⁶⁶ *ibid.*; Busch, et.al., 84.

⁶⁷ Krumm, 81-2.

Beneath the BKA and LKAs are regional uniformed and criminal police units which comprise the majority of police persons. About a hundred years ago, there was one policeman for every 1500 citizens. In 1971 it was one to 466 and in 1987 one policeperson for every 361 citizens.⁶⁸

The **Bundesamt fuer Verfassungsschutz** is the internal intelligence gathering and analysis institution of the country, which examines the threats posed to government stability and security by domestic and foreign enemies operating in the Federal Republic. In essence this comes down to their watching and analysing unconstitutional behaviour within the country, whereby the BfV determines what is and what is not unconstitutional behaviour.⁶⁹

The powers and scope of the BfV and the regional **Landesämter fuer Verfassungsschutz** (LfV, State Offices for the Protection of the Constitution) grew considerably when the **Radikalenerlass** (Radical Decree) was introduced by the Social Democratic government on 28 January 1972. This required the BfV to screen personnel for civil service posts, which includes education, post office and railroad employees, as well as local, regional and state government positions.

The Radical Decree was first introduced in SPD controlled Hamburg and then widened nationally, because both the **Bund** and **Laender** can set loyalty standards, and without wide agreement between them, each could have different ones. The Social Democrats instituted this to erect a strong demarcation line between itself and communist parties to avoid the label of communist sympathisers. This was also imperative with the widening of the SPD's **Ostpolitik**.⁷⁰

The **Radikalenerlass** did not introduce any new principles regarding civil service employment, and was even based on the 1957 civil service law. The new concept introduced--to avoid blanket exclusion based on

⁶⁸ Die Gruenen im Bundestag, "Zehn Jahre danach--Offene Fragen und politische Lehren aus den 'Deutschen Herbst': Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die Grosse Anfrage der Gruenen", in: Die Gruenen im Bundestag (eds.), **Ende der Bleierne Zeit? Versuch eines Dialogs zwischen Gesellschaft und RAF** (Bonn: Die Gruenen, Bundesgeschäftesstelle, 1989), 65-123, 82.

⁶⁹ Damm, 18; n.n., "Act Regulating the Cooperation of the Federal Government and the Laender in Matters Relating to the Protection of the Constitution", quoted in: Carl-Christoph Schweitzer (ed.), **Politics and Government of the Federal Republic of Germany: Basic Documents** (Leamington Spa: Berg Publications Ltd., 1984), 183-4. In the former East German territory, that has been divided into five new **Laender**, it is expected that five new LfVs will be organised with 150 to 200 personnel each, roughly half of whom will be from the West, "Werber aus dem Westen" **Der Spiegel** 37 (10 September) 1990, 26.

⁷⁰ n.n. **Deutsche Geschichte 1962-1983: Band 2** (Frankfurt a.M.: Fischer, 1985), 94; G. Smith, 223; page 224 contains a translation of the decree.

membership of 'hostile' organisations- -individual consideration of each case, which required an enlarged security service to compile the numerous individual dossiers. Foreign press attention was captured when the word *Berufsverbot* (job exclusion) became attached to the decree, because of the government's monopoly on training, development and employment in certain areas. If disqualified, where was the person to find work?⁷¹

Under the Basic Law the armed forces can only play a role in counterterrorism policy if the matter should become so serious as to cause "a state of defence or a state of tension" (Article 87a Basic Law) during which time the *Bundeswehr* carry out traffic control, building protection duties or support the *Bundesgrenzschutz*. Beneath this threshold the BGS and other regional paramilitary organisations play a more active antiterrorism role.

Between the two garrisoned federal paramilitary organisations, the BGS is more concerned with antiterrorism policy. The 18,000 *Bereitschaftspolizei* (standby police) participate in regular police duties for use in situations such as subway station and building raids, for combing areas of land, and for protection duties.⁷²

The *Bundesgrenzschutz* has many roles in counterterrorism policies. The 20,000 BGS members, in addition to border protection, also supervise the frontier traffic with its Passport Control Authority.⁷³

The BGS was originally empowered to act only on the national borders. Nonetheless, sections were used as supportive police units at the request of interior police departments to help control demonstrations. Additionally, units were stationed around Bonn to help protect the capital and the government. These practices were legalised with the BGS laws passed on 18 August 1972, and added to them in the form of disaster aid, seaborne operations, and other functions included in other legal directives, such as those covering immigration, firearms and the protection of airports and German embassies abroad.⁷⁴

The most famous subunit of the BGS, *Grenzschutzgruppe* (GSG, Border Protection Group) 9, was called into creation on 26 September 1972 by the Federal Minister of the Interior to carry out specific police missions that require, either covertly or overtly, the use of immediate force against criminals and terrorist organisations. This was a direct

⁷¹ G. Smith, 223-5; *Deutsche Geschichte 1962-1983: Band 2*, 94-5.

⁷² Busch, et. al., 101-2; Thomaneck, 154; J. Blum, "The Protection of Persons and Installations at Risk: The German Way" *Police Studies* 1, 1978, 53-61, 57.

⁷³ Thomaneck, 160; Rolf Tophoven, *GSG 9: German Response to Terrorism* (Coblenz: Bernard and Graefe Verlag, 1984), 13.

⁷⁴ Tophoven, 13-4; Busch, et.al., 100-1; Blum, 58.

response to the Munich Massacre on 5 September 1972. The unit originally had 188 members, but later grew to 200.⁷⁵

GSG 9 is employed on federal territory when a state interior minister requests their assistance through the federal interior minister. Due to the 'machoism' or 'ego' of the states in the past, they have not requested the GSG 9's assistance. Hence, GSG 9 only saw its first operation in Mogadishu, a place outwith federal territory.⁷⁶

At the regional level each state has its own units similar, but not equivalent in training and experience, to the GSG 9, which were also established in 1972. These are the mobile, special intervention, and marksman units.⁷⁷

These special elite units are police units, and after secondment the members return to regular police duties (or the Border Guard in the case of GSG 9) with their home units. Therefore training is from the police background, and when called to action these units first contain the situation, save lives, and then apprehend offenders.⁷⁸

The direction of the police and intelligence units comes from two sources in reaction to terrorist incidents. One is the council organised around the chancellor, and the other is the immediate response system organised after the Schleyer abduction.

In the Lorenz and Schleyer kidnappings, and during the Stockholm siege, Chancellor Schmidt headed political councils which included both coalition and opposition members. These were formed to ease the exchange of information and its evaluation, as well as to provide a forum for the voicing of opinions and ideas. A standard of unanimous decisions was formed. Not in order to distribute the responsibility, that always remained with the Federal Government, but rather it was considered self-evident that when the life of an individual was at stake, the government and opposition leaders should gather to discuss and consider alternatives- -independent of their political persuasion and position.⁷⁹

These were extraordinary councils which disrupted the regular channels of communication and hierarchy in the security services, so a new crisis coordination office was organised by the Interior Ministry. Similar ones were also established in the *Laender*. The office was

⁷⁵ Tophoven, 10-1, 18-25.

⁷⁶ *ibid.*, 11, 13, 92-3. Previous to this the group had sent units abroad for security purposes at sporting events, and to advise the Dutch during South Moluccan attacks.

⁷⁷ *ibid.*, 11-3; Blum, 57.

⁷⁸ Schiller (1987 I), 539-540.

⁷⁹ *Schleyer Dokumentation*, 20, (materialien) 37, 86; Helmut Schmidt, "Erklaerung des Bundeskanzlers zur Inneren Sicherheit am 5. Maerz 1975" *Bulletin* 31 (7 March) 1975, 301-2.

created after an Interior Ministers' Conference decision in Dusseldorf on 29 August 1978, which decided that the nation needed a coordination office to offer first response in any type of crisis situation ranging from terrorist incidents and abductions to natural and man-made disasters. The coordination committee office acts as an information clearing house to support political decision-makers.⁸⁰

Criminal and court procedure code changes were previously described as affecting both preventative and reactive counterterrorism measures. Such changes reduced the accused's rights, which had previously produced long terrorist trials. In the mid-seventies it was argued both that the terrorists and their defence lawyers were unnecessarily drawing out trials, and that they were using the system to its full advantage, because the court system favoured the accused. The authorities wanted to introduce legislation to aid the executive and judicial branches where they saw their manouverability restricted by legal limit, but yet balance this 'reactive crisis management' with the minimum necessary measures to counter the proportional danger of terrorism at the time. Overreaction was to be avoided.⁸¹

The first changes introduced to cope with terrorism were aimed at the management of affairs between defence lawyers and defendants, and the maintainance of courtroom order. The justice system was concerned that courtroom order be maintained to ensure that the rule of law was not placed in question by people seeking to make court and justice procedures difficult, if not impossible,⁸² or that they would be able to turn the court proceedings into a propaganda forum. This only worked if the court could first identify the political content in order to eliminate it. This was made more difficult by the establishment of motives for the crimes being tried, and by terrorists' non-cooperation policy,⁸³ as discussed in chapter four, whereby they physically resisted

⁸⁰ H.J. Gebauer, "Aufgaben und Gliederung im Fuehrungsstab des Bundnisministers des Innern" *Die Polizei* 1, 1982, 13-20, 13-6. See also H.J. Gebauer, "Fuehrungsstaebe oberster Bundes- und Landesbehoerden mit Sicherheitsaufgaben" *Die Polizei* 12, 1979, 385-389.

⁸¹ Giehring, 62-3; Gerhard Mauz, "Es ist nicht immer Haarmann, der kommt...", in: Wolfgang Dressen (ed.), *Politische Prozesse ohne Verteidigung?* (West Berlin: Verlag Klaus Wagenbach, 1976), 7-11, 8; Detlef Krause, "The Reform of the Criminal Procedure Law in the Federal Republic of Germany" *Judicial Review* December 1979, 202-223, 207; Joerg Berkemann, "Die Bindung des Rechtsstaates", in: *Extremismus- - Terrorismus- -Kriminalitaet* (Bonn: Bundeszentrale fuer politische Bildung, 1978), 71-6, 74.

⁸² Kerscher, 86; Hans-Jochen Vogel in: Herman Vinke, Gabriele Witt (eds.), *Die Anti-Terror-Debatten im Parlament: Protokolle 1974-1978* (Reinbek: Rowohlt Verlag, 1978), 26.

⁸³ Otto Horn, "Vorschlaege des Richterbundes", in: *Extremismus- - Terrorismus- -Kriminalitaet* (Bonn: Bundeszentrale fuer politische

everything the prison and court staff wanted to do as a means of maintaining their 'political identity'.

The courts had a foretaste of this during the Socialist Patients' Collective trials (see chapter two) several years before the 1975 case against Baader, Ensslin, Meinhof and Raspe. The SPK trials had public bench choruses that called out: 'special judge Gohl cooks the Nazi Kohl!'⁸⁴ The accused would be more dragged than brought in, sometimes hitting out around them, while calling out obscene abuse at the judges, and their own lawyers. The courts, however, could only fine people up to DM1000, and sentence them for up to three days in prison. On 1 January 1975 the fine was doubled and a prison sentence could be as long as one week. This was still not deemed sufficient.⁸⁵

Ever since Meinhof was arrested in June 1972 with a note from Ensslin (who had been arrested several weeks previously) on her person, the suspicion of defence lawyers' collusion with terrorists has always been present.⁸⁶ Previous attempts to exclude defence lawyers had been found unconstitutional, so new legislation was required. New laws were passed on 20 December 1974, which limited three defence lawyers for each accused person, and excluded the combined defence of several persons in collaborative court defence. Later additions to excluding defence lawyers also occurred in legislation passed on 18 August 1976 and 14 April 1978.⁸⁷

When these court procedure codes were combined with Para 129a *Strafgesetzbuch* (StGB, Criminal Code Book)⁸⁸ (supporting, recruiting for or member of a terrorist organisation), then accuseds' rights could be further restricted. This also affected the defence strategy whereby judges could view correspondence between the defendant and the defence

Bildung, 1978), 85-7, 85; Hans Buchheim, "Der linksradikale Terrorismus: Voraussetzungen zu seiner Ueberwindung" *Die politische Meinung* 22 (170) 1977, 7-18, 16-7; Hans Schueler, "Finale in der Festung Stammheim" *Die Zeit* 16 May 1975, 3.

⁸⁴ Kohl means cabbage in German and Kohle is criminal argot for money.

⁸⁵ Erich Schwinge, "Terroristen und ihre Verteidiger: Blick auf den Baader-Meinhof-Prozess" *Politische Meinung* 30 (158) 1975, 35-49, 41.

⁸⁶ see Wolfgang Dressen (ed.), *Politische Prozesse ohne Verteidigung?* (West Berlin: Verlag Klaus Wagenbach, 1976); Schut (1986), and Walter Althammer (ed.), *Gegen den Terror: Texte/Dokumente* (Stuttgart: Verlag Bonn Aktuell, 1978).

⁸⁷ Kerscher, 86.

⁸⁸ The legal codes cited are found in: Dr. Heinrich Schoenfelder (ed.), *Deutsche Gesetze, Sammlung des Zivil-, Straf-, und Verfahrensrechts*. 14.-16. Auflage. Stand: 10 Oktober 1987 (Munich: CH Beck'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung 1988) and reference will only be made to the code.

lawyer in some cases, and according to some sources, the public prosecutor can also view these and other confiscated materials.⁸⁹

During the Schleyer abduction the possibility of information passing between imprisoned persons and their lawyers was seen to engender the possible loss of "life, limb and liberty of a person". Therefore, the government and opposition parties argued for legislation to prevent contact between suspected and convicted persons under 129a StGB. This included contact between themselves and their defence lawyers. The Laender justice ministers decide when to implement this, and if prisoners in several Laender are involved, then the decision rests with the Federal Justice Minister.⁹⁰

Defendants accused of Para 129a StGB may have their court case carried out in their absence if the defendant "intentionally and through his own fault placed himself in a condition which suspends his ability to participate in the trial",⁹¹ such as through a hunger strike. The proceedings themselves may only be interrupted for up to thirty days. Conversely Para 231a *Strafprozessordnung* (StPO, Criminal Code Procedure) also means that the accused can also take part whenever they desire, which itself causes delays, when the accused is informed of what transpired in their absence (Para 231a Art. 2 StPO).⁹²

Court procedure and criminal codes operate in tandem in the courtroom. They also, however, influence apprehension through their definitions of what is illegal.

Legislative changes to the definitions of crimes, and the creation of new crimes with new criminal codes, first occurred on 22 April 1976 with the passage of Para 88a StGB, which sought to inhibit the spread of terrorism by controlling the manner of communication about violence.

⁸⁹ Berlit, Dreier, 236-7; Iring Fetscher, *Terrorismus und Reaktion* (Cologne: Europaeische Verlagsgesellschaft, Second Edition, 1978), 83-4.

⁹⁰ Herbert Weber in: Vinke, Witt, 275-6, 278; Horbatiuk, 183; see also Federal Ministry of Justice, "Contact Ban Between Prisoners and the Outside World- -Information about the Law to Fight Terrorism", in: National Criminal Justice Reference Service, *International Summaries: A Collection of Selected Translations in Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice Volume 3* (Washington DC: US Department of Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, April 1979), 147-153, 149.

⁹¹ Horbatiuk, 179.

⁹² Krause, 215-6.

⁹³ Kerscher, 86; Sebastian Cobler, "Das 'Gesetz zum Schutz des Gemeinschaftsfriedens'- -oder wie man Buecher verbrennt ohne sich die Finger schmutzig zu machen", in: Ulrich Sonnemann (ed.), *Der misshandelte Rechtsstaat in Erfahrung und Urteil bundesdeutscher Schriftsteller, Rechtsanwaelte und Richter* (Cologne: Kiepenheuer und Witsch, 1977), 94-102, 94-5.

These changes in early 1976, along with the creation of a new offence under Para 129a StGB on 18 August 1976, brought an 'advancement of criminal zones' whereby previously unpunishable offences were made illegal in an effort to apprehend potential pre-terrorists before they became terrorists. This included Para 88a and 130a StGB which cover communication about violence, and Para 129a and 138 StGB, which deal with terrorist organisations and the non-notification of crimes.⁹⁴

The discussions about these paragraphs centre on one's perception of terrorist recruitment, and what is or is not terrorism. If terrorism is perceived as the final stage on the path of political violence, then the imprisonment of violence accepting persons before they become terrorists is considered important. When one sees terrorism as a form of violence which puts the liberal democratic state in question, then other forms of violence which do not question it, call for a different response.⁹⁵

Para 129 StGB, which prohibits criminal organisations, was first used to arrest and charge the original terrorists, and furthered the government's case that the terrorists were criminals. The new 129a, which prohibits terrorist organisations, compromised the argument that terrorists were ordinary criminals, because of the other special regulations and powers the code enables.⁹⁶

Worth special notice in Para 129a StGB is the lack of definitions: What is 'support' or 'recruitment' to a terrorist organisation, and what is an 'organisation'? There is a large amount of semantic play in the law which allows the authorities manoeuvrability. More interestingly, 129a does not have to be proven to arrest someone. Suspicion by the prosecuting authorities is enough.⁹⁷

In 1986 Para 129a StGB was modified, in light of perceived terrorist recruitment, to include more people than those normally considered 'terrorists'. These new people could feel endangered enough now to enter the underground, instead of remaining in society, because the new Para 129a StGB amendments placed the persons in a special category in which they had previously not been included.⁹⁸

⁹⁴ Kerschler, 86; Berlitz, Dreier, 232.

⁹⁵ Erwin Brunner, Karl-Heinz Janssen, Joachim Riedl, Michael Sontheimer, "Wunderwaffe Kronzeuge" *Die Zeit* 21 November 1986, 17-22, 22; *die taz* 5 December 1986, 3; see also the Federal Interior Minister, Friedrich Zimmermann, in *Die Welt* 25 October 1986, 6.

⁹⁶ Berlitz, Dreier, 267-8.

⁹⁷ *ibid.*, 233. For a more detailed discussion of how this legislation can be used, especially in connection with the security services, communication and computer systems, see Rolf Goessner, *Buerger kontrollieren die Polizei* (eds.).

⁹⁸ Christian Lochte in *die taz* 5 December 1986.

The widening of 129a also widens the concept of terrorism to now include formerly less serious crimes, thereby losing some of its political weight. Furthermore, it is also not proven that toppling of power pylons- -the main target of the modification- -is the work of organisations. If it is individuals, how can a code designed for groups be applied? These changes compromised legal principles.⁹⁹

New criminal court procedure codes passed on 13 April 1978 widened the number of codes that were enabled by Para 129a StGB.¹⁰⁰ In cases of Para 129a StGB the public prosecutor and their appointed assistants now had the right, in addition to judges, to allow the police to search apartments and other rooms in buildings where it is suspected terrorists or items connected with them are to be found (Para 103 StPO). They could also erect control points on streets and in squares for the purpose of checking and holding individuals to establish their identities (and hold their vehicles and belongings), if it is suspected a crime under Para 129a (or 250 Art. 1 Nr. 1) StGB was committed in the 'area', an undefined term. (Para 103, 108, 111b, 111c, StPO) The person may additionally be held incommunicado if it is suspected that their normally allowed notification of either a relative or confidante would endanger the investigation. (Para 163b StPO)

Physical resources are available in the form of security services and other institutions to counter terrorism. These are also supported with the requisite powers to undertake their duties.

Based on the assumptions in the second section it appears that the West Germans reacted well to terrorism. They have provided institutions with funds, personnel and powers to respond within the organised counterterrorism assumptions. The next section views whether these assumptions and resources were usefully implemented.

⁹⁹ Dencker, 45.

¹⁰⁰ Vinke, Witt (eds.), 312-3.

4. Strengths and Limitations of Counterterrorism Policies

Previously the chapter highlighted ample resources for the West German government's counterterrorism policies based on assumptions which mirrored general assumptions on the subject. The government appeared to understand that the 'communication' model worked best if it was supported by the 'war' model, and that both were necessary.

This section examines how these resources and assumptions were implemented. For if policies were only half-heartedly implemented then the expected actual return of the policies would differ. Similarly, if implementation overlooked aspects which affected policy effectiveness.

As in the section on resources the following one is divided into counter and antiterrorism aspects. Each of these focuses on how policy implementation succeeded or failed, and its effects on terrorist motivation and public identification with the government.

4.1 Counterterrorism Policy Implementation

West German counterterrorism policy assumed that terrorism could be reduced through the reduction of its sources and causes by increasing the tolerance of different viewpoints in the state, i.e. the promotion of democratic ideas. The aim of this was to reduce the support base in which the terrorists move and recruit new members. Thus government counterterrorism policy examined efforts towards preventing and deterring terrorist activity, as well as efforts of removing people from the terrorist scene of their own will.

The promotion of democratic tolerance can occur in the education system- although it must be realistic and not engender idealistic expectations. It can also be done through public participation in political parties and interest groups, as well as the manner in which the government explains its policies and decisions.

The government's role in all of these must be to promote democratic non-violent means and goals. Where the initiative is not from the government, as is the case with the rise of the Greens, the government could not hinder the growth of new allies in the sense that, while the government may not agree with the policies of the group, it does support its democratic principles, and its ability to draw others away from violence.

The overall effectiveness of these West German policies is arguably not as successful as desired, given chapter three's opening discussion about the rise of terrorist incidents and lower satisfaction with democracy (see also Table 7.1, page 254). This implies less general public identification with the government.

Apart from trying to convince people of the benefits of democracy, the German government also needs to deter people from entering terrorist organisations. However, as mentioned, the government realised the futility of trying to dissuade people from terrorism, who would risk their lives pursuing their goals. In this case legislation is not counter-, but antiterrorism when it becomes aimed at the apprehension and conviction of suspected terrorists. This is discussed later.

On the government side, the success of efforts to dissuade people from entering or forming a terrorist organisation depends upon proper institutional coordination, legislation that provides them with requisite powers to fulfil their roles, and incentives for these to be fulfilled.

From the earliest days of terrorism West German federal and state institutional cooperation was a problem in the area of preventative surveillance and other intelligence operations designed to oversee the operations of the left-wing terrorist groups.

The group of people in and around **Kommune I**, (part of the nucleus of the Second of June), and the people around Mahler, Baader and Ensslin, who formed the Red Army Faction, were under surveillance by the West Berlin **Landesamt fuer Verfassungsschutz** since the summer of 1967 via the undercover agent Peter Urbach. He was involved in the 'pudding attack' preparations on US vice-president Hubert H. Humphrey that year, and supplied the molotov cocktails that burned out the Springer press vehicles after the attempted murder of Rudi Dutschke in 1968. Later in early April 1970 he met up with Baader, Ensslin and Mahler to help the group find weapons to begin their armed struggle. During one of these unsuccessful trips Baader was arrested.¹

However, as arrest warrants had been issued for Baader and Ensslin earlier in March, the question is raised as to why only Baader was arrested at this time, and not also Ensslin and the others, although Urbach knew where they were to be found. Apparently he arranged for notice of Baader's vehicle to be passed on to the authorities.²

In 1987 the Green party asked the government whether an early release for Baader and Ensslin after serving one third of their sentence for arson in 1969 might not have ended their career before it began. The government said they did not know the grounds for the state of Hesse's refusal of an early release, but added that the two did not need to enter the underground, because the continuation of their prison sentence

¹ Aust (1987), 33, 47,56, 80-3.

² Scheerer, 318-9; n.n., *Der Baader-Meinhof-Report*, 25-8.

did not hang over them. They were to remain free.³ This would imply that had Baader and Ensslin returned to court, they would have been placed on probation and continued their youth group project in Frankfurt. As they did not return, arrest warrants were later issued for their arrest as standard practice.

The above case is not the only time undercover agents were near the group. Eight years later, in June 1978, an attempt to insert undercover agents into the Red Army Faction was made by the Lower Saxony Landesamt fuer Verfassungsschutz, who were assisted by explosive experts from GSG 9. The plan was to blow a hole in the wall of Celle prison and fake the escape of two criminals who were to help a lesser RAF member, Sigurd Debus, back to the group and thus gain their entry into the group. They were unable, however, to enter the terrorist scene with the contacts they had previously built-up, and the attempt failed.⁴

Apart from the police services not being informed about the true nature of the escape attempt from Celle prison by the Lower Saxony intelligence service, other institutions were also not informed, which probably should have been. For example, the Interior Minister of Lower Saxony, Ruetger Gross, only knew of plans to insert someone into the terrorist scene, but not the details of how, where and when. After the state elections with the resultant Christian Democrat majority, the new Interior Minister, Egbert Mochlinghoff, was only partially informed of the plans with the assurance that the Federal Interior Minister, Maihofer, and Bundeskriminalamt President, Boeden, knew and approved. Chancellor Schmidt also said he was uninformed.⁵

Both examples, Urbach and the 'Celle Hole' show that preventative counterterrorism policies needed better coordination. Had Urbach's information been passed on to the police, Baader and Ensslin could have been arrested sooner, and the group around Mahler dispersed. Had the 'Celle Hole' been thought through properly, the authorities would have realised that criminals could not be moved into the terrorist scene without a working knowledge of the RAF, its ideology and knowledge about explosives which they reportedly used in the attempted escape.⁶

When institutional coordination is better, there is still no guarantee that they can overcome differences of opinion between ministerial directors. For example, Adelheid Schulz and Christian Klar were not arrested until November 1982. Had Interior Minister Baum

³ Die Gruenen im Bundestag, "Zehn Jahre danach", 100.

⁴ Stefan Aust, **Mauss: Ein deutscher Agent** (Munich: Knauer, 1989), 226.

⁵ *ibid.*, 229-30, 238.

⁶ Robert Leicht, "Die Staatsbombe" *Die Zeit* 2 May 1986, 1.

desired, Klar and Schulz could have been arrested in 1980 when they were observed for an extended time by BKA officers. Against the wishes of the Federal Prosecutor General, Kurt Rebmann and BKA President, Horst Herold, who both wished them arrested, Baum decided to wait and see to where they would lead them. Needless to say, no one else appeared before the authorities lost the trail.⁷

Even worse, Klar, Schulz and Willy Peter Stoll could have been arrested in 1978, but eight BKA officers did not believe their eyes when the three terrorists joined them in a heliport restaurant for one and a half hours. This episode cost Gerhard Boeden, then head of the terrorism unit at the **Bundeskriminalamt**, his job.⁸ Since then, however, he has risen up the ranks again to become the head of the **Bundesamt fuer Verfassungsschutz**.

The authorities' security services also appear to have difficulties in understanding what the terrorists wrote. The BKA may have decoded the maps and details of the texts found when Klar, Mohnhaupt and Schulz were arrested in 1982, and found further RAF caches,⁹ but on two other occasions they were unable to read into the text the meanings of RAF offensive plans.

Twice the police have received detailed strategy papers for planned terrorist operations: preceding the 1977 murders, and again prior to the '84/85 Offensive'. This should have prepared the police with suitable responses to the terrorist operations which followed. Zimmermann's name, and papers relating to European Political Cooperation, which connected to von Braunmuehl's post at the Foreign Ministry, were found along with nineteen others, and accompanying press clippings and other materials on them, and 1000 other people.¹⁰

The security services cannot necessarily predict who out of a list of names will be chosen as the target. Chapter three explained how the final target is determined by various factors, which can include determination to reach a particular target, regardless of how well it is protected. However, the authorities should have preparations in place for different contingencies, be they abductions, assassinations or bombing campaigns. None of these were in place prior to the Schleyer abduction. This is discussed more closely in the section on antiterrorist policy implementation.

⁷ **Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung** 13 November 1982.

⁸ Hans Schueler, "Kommissar Computer in Noeten", **Die Zeit** 1 September 1978, 3; **Guardian** 23 October 1978

⁹ Zimmermann, **Bulletin** 117/1982, 1063.

¹⁰ Schiller (1986), 39; **Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung** 13 October 1986.

Preparations, on the other hand, can only be made when target risks are properly assessed. And when this is done, they only work if the person wants to be protected. For example, Hans Tietmeyer's name had turned up after an arrest in August 1986 and he was placed in security bracket three: 'A danger is not to be ruled out'.¹¹ As he was not a parliamentary state secretary the police of North-Rhein Westphalia covered his security. Grade three also ruled out bodyguards for him, and he felt he could save the state money by not ordering an armoured car. When he was designated organiser of the 1988 IMF meeting in West Berlin nothing changed, despite the rise of his image in association with the conference. The July 1988 security review left him at grade three, and a police car drove occasionally by the front door. Therefore the authorities would not notice several people lying in wait in the bushes fifty metres from his front door with branches trimmed for a good shot, and a car near-by for a quick getaway. Forty minutes before the attack in September 1988 someone looked around, and noticed nothing. Fortunately for Tietmeyer the gun jammed.¹²

As discussed in chapter three, Detlef Rohwedder desired a freer lifestyle while at home on weekends in Dusseldorf and dismissed bodyguards except for when he attended functions. Again police only passed by occasionally.

Had the authorities followed 'Concept 106' established by the 'Working Group Criminal Police' in August 1986, these attacks might have been avoided. The group had noted the Red Army Faction's main target groups of the 'military industrial complex', as discussed in chapter three. Defence of these people can only be done with the cooperation of the economic and security sectors, whereby in some cases private individuals are employed to observe suspected endangered persons. The main observation focus being early morning and after work activity in the neighbourhood. Commuting routes need to be covered and continuously checked, and security needs to continue on the weekends. Photographs from the air should be periodically compared to uncover any new or moved objects, and to notice any paths and observation posts that appear.¹³ Had these been employed the attacks might have been dropped or, admittedly, taken another form.

'Concept 106' has so far only proved itself on paper. Its major hindrance is a manpower shortage. For example, in Dusseldorf there are

¹¹ Security bracket one: 'An attack is to be expected', and two: 'An attack is not to be ruled out'.

¹² Rudolf Moeller, Gerd Ellendt, "Gefährdet, aber nicht geschützt" *Stern* 41 (41) 3-12 October 1988, 225-6.

¹³ *ibid.*, 226.

120 people who should fall into the programme, which would require 200 security personnel. Only twenty-seven are available. The programme is also hindered by lack of training and police dismissal of suspicions voiced by bodyguards. Both Herrhausen's bodyguards and those of Rohwedder's neighbor, a Thyssen manager, reported suspicious people in the area, only to be told that the police did not have the time to chase down bodyguards' observations.¹⁴

Part of the problem with West German bureaucratic institutions is that the majority of the BKA, BfV, and other government personnel (in and out of the security services) are trained as lawyers and think in an analytical, if not always original manner, concentrating on how to present the case in the courtroom to gain convictions, instead of how to capture the terrorists in the first place.¹⁵ Perhaps it is a sign of bureaucracies in general that once patterns and efforts are institutionalised, they tend to become impervious to external change. The money, time and effort involved in first organising the programmes remains the justification for lack of change in a changing environment.¹⁶

As a result, between the early seventies and 1978 some 350¹⁷ terrorists were apprehended, of whom only sixty were hard-core terrorists. Twenty had been arrested abroad by foreign police,¹⁸ thirty were arrested because of terrorists' own mistakes and an alert public. Only eight hard-core terrorists had been apprehended due solely to the sophisticated technological police efforts. It seems the police need to increase their fieldwork and conventional investigative efforts.¹⁹ Since 1978 the police efforts have not been much better.²⁰ Apart from the

¹⁴ "Da ist irgendwo ein Nest" *Der Spiegel* 15/1991, 24; David Th. Schiller, "Die Schutzmaenner" *Visier* 5, 1990, 6-15, 14.

¹⁵ Schiller (1987 I), 545; -----, "West Germany Coping with Terrorism: The Evolution of a Police Organization" *TVI-Journal* 6 (2) 1985 (II), 28-32, 31.

¹⁶ Szabo, Crelinsten, (1980), 342.

¹⁷ This figure refers only to arrests. *Die Welt* 11 August 1981 states that 209 people were sentenced between 1971 and 1980 for activities involving left-wing terrorism, and chapter four referred to 227 suspected and arrested people.

¹⁸ *The Guardian* 25 October 1978 refers to forty arrests since September 1977 with most of these being made abroad, while those in the Federal Republic occurred because of public tip offs.

¹⁹ *ibid.*; Schiller (1985 II), 31; Anderson, 88.

²⁰ Between 1977 and 1980 340 people were arrested on suspicion of terrorist activities with most of them set free. Twenty-nine were suspects or sentenced to prison. Five further terrorist were killed at the time of arrest or died in accidents, and six others turned themselves in according to the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* 6 January 1981. By late 1984 forty left-wing terrorists (and a further seven awaiting or under trial) had been sentenced since mid-1977. Rebmann (1985 I), 9.

arrest of Rolf Heissler in 1979, no terrorists have been caught due to police search efforts. Instead, every arrest was because of the terrorists' mistakes²¹ (car accidents,²² using the wrong passport,²³ shooting weapons inside buildings),²⁴ being recognised by the public²⁵ and turning themselves in.²⁶

This success, or lack of success, affects politicians' and bureaucrats' conceptions of what measures need to be modified and adjusted to improve counterterrorism. The measures concerned are also influenced by party political concepts of the liberal democratic state and the sources and motivation of terrorism, which are clearly evident in the discussions about the changes to Para 129a StGB (supporting, recruiting for, or a member of a terrorist organisation) and the *Kronzeuge* (states' evidence) in 1986.

The *Kronzeuge* legislation was designed to allow the Federal Prosecutor General to offer reduced sentences to persons charged with 129a StGB or associated crimes if the person explained the crimes beyond their own participation, or helped apprehend other participants. The person could also be offered a reduced sentence if he or she explains crimes in which the person did not participate.²⁷

New changes to Para 129a StGB were to widen the list of acts to be denoted as 'terrorist' and to increase the minimum length of sentence for people, who advertise for terrorist groups, or are members or leaders of terrorist organisations.²⁸

The prelude to the widening of 129a and the *Kronzeuge* discussions occurred on 7 February 1985, the day of the burial of Ernst Zimmermann who was murdered by the RAF on 1 February, and the day the *Bundestag* voted on two motions about 129a StGB. The Greens proposed its repeal,

²¹ Schiller (1987 I), 542.

²² Plambeck and Beer in July 1980.

²³ The passports of Andreas and Maria Risch were stolen from Luxembourg and that of A. Risch was found on Rolf Clemens Wagner at his arrest in Zurich in November 1979, which alerted the authorities to look for terrorists when that of M. Risch was used. Siegeling Hoffmann used it in Paris six months later, and this led to the arrest of her and four others in May 1980. *Frankfurter Rundschau* 8 May 1980.

²⁴ In July 1984 a gun fired a bullet into the apartment below which alerted its occupants to phone the police about suspicious people above them. Six suspected RAF members were arrested. Hans Schueler, "Ein Schuss durch die Decke" *Die Zeit* 13 July 1984, 5.

²⁵ Eva Sibylle Haule-Frimpong in August 1986, Ingrid Barabas in July 1985. *Süddeutsche Zeitung* 4 August 1986, *Frankfurter Rundschau* 5 July 1985.

²⁶ Rudolf Raabe in June 1980, and Guenther Maria Rausch in October 1983.

²⁷ Dencker, 40.

²⁸ *ibid.*, 39.

while the Social Democratic Party desired that advertising for a terrorist group be withdrawn from the code.²⁹

The SPD believed that terrorist sympathisers should not experience the hardest reaction of the state, because this might encourage solidarity and support with the terrorist scene. The CDU/CSU argued against the motion with the suggestion that present terrorist attacks were only possible because of massive terrorist advertising for members and sympathisers over the last year. Furthermore, because gaining sympathisers was a goal of terrorist organisations, an increase in sympathisers leads to an increase in terrorist campaigns.³⁰

The Greens argued that because the normal rules and laws of liberal democracy were not designed for 'fair weather democracy', but for its security in special situations, terrorism can be overcome with normal rules. If the regular rules were adjusted to handle special situations, these changes would affect other legal areas. For example, the state prosecutor can call witnesses or accused individuals for questioning (by force if necessary), which affects individuals' usual rights to lawyers and leaves individuals facing charges of complicity or experiencing protective custody if they do not cooperate. Similarly, the availability of special protection cells for suspected and sentenced terrorists has now made these the disciplinary cells for normal prisoners.³¹

However, none of the other parties agreed with the Greens. The FDP questioned the Greens on how they imagined murders such as Zimmermann's occurred. Was it due to a single 'crazy' that shot someone because of an overconfident need to move the world, or would the person not have been motivated without sympathisers such as the Greens who tell others that the criminal codes should be changed, which would lengthen court cases. The FDP also wondered whether the Greens stood for peace or change in society and what ends they had in mind for society, if they accepted violence as a means to achieving those ends, and if undermining the legal system was a part of this.³²

The CDU/CSU concurred with these questions and saw the Greens as uninterested in counterterrorism because they trivialised it to a dangerous degree if they succeeded in having 129a StGB withdrawn along with other measures. Combined, these would end the inner security of the

²⁹ *Süddeutsche Zeitung* 9/10 February 1985, 5.

³⁰ Mr. Bachmaier (SPD), Mr. Saurin (CDU/CSU) in *Verhandlungen des Deutschen Bundestages* 10. Wahlperiode, 120. Sitzung, 7 February 1985, 8929, 8930-1.

³¹ Ms. Nickels (Greens) in *ibid.*, 8933-4.

³² Mr. Kleinert (FDP) in *ibid.*, 8934-5.

country and count the life, health and property of the citizens as acceptable costs. Nor did the SPD support the measure.³³

These arguments turned on the point of the source and motivation of terrorism, but were not as intensive as those on 5 December 1986 in the **Bundestag** when the government coalition of CDU/CSU/FDP sought to widen 129a StGB, reintroduce 130a StGB, and to change the traffic laws to allow the intelligence and police services on-line access to the computerised vehicle registration files. The government had only shortly beforehand withdrawn its bill for the **Kronzeuge** so that the different government factions could come to an agreement over bill modifications.³⁴

After the RAF murders of Beckurts in July and von Braunmuehl in October 1986, the government had discussed various new counterterrorism measures, even if, as in the case of the **Kronzeuge**, the party had voted against it in 1975 when the SPD had introduced a similar bill. In 1975 the **Kronzeuge** was deemed ineffective if terrorist group leaders could offer up their members to the authorities, and claim the worst crimes for themselves. Thus the 'grassed' members would have little or no sentences, while the leaders who became the **Kronezeuge** received no sentence. There was also the problem of truthfulness amongst the 'grasses'. In 1986 the acceptance of the **Kronzeuge** was argued to be due to an effort to try every possible countermeasure, as well as the need to be seen to do something, even if it is known to be an unworkable measure. This role reversal for the FDP, who had in the past called for a review of antiterrorism laws and called for the preservation of liberal democratic principles in antiterrorism legislation, caused division within its ranks, as some members voted against and others abstained in the vote for the measures.³⁵

The CDU/CSU introduced the new antiterrorism legislation because they believed that when liberal democracies are not content with existing legislation, then they must consider other possibilities to achieve terrorist apprehensions. They believed that someone who joins a group that murders people deserves a tougher sentence than someone who steals handbags. Similarly attacks against energy and transport installations should not be trivialised, but deserve hard sentences as

³³ Mr. Saurin (CDU/CSU) in *ibid.*, 8931; Mr. Bachmaier (SPD) in *ibid.*, 8930.

³⁴ *Suddeutsche Zeitung* 26 November 1986; *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* 6 December 1986.

³⁵ *die taz* 24 October 1986, 3; "Verbrennung vorm Dom" *Der Spiegel* 44/1986, 132-5, 132, 135; "Sie haben uns den Todesengel geschickt" *Der Spiegel* 45 (3 November) 1986, 19-23, 21; *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* 6 December 1986.

terrorist activities.³⁶ The CDU/CSU also rejected the argument that this increased the number of terrorists, because "people do not become terrorists through laws, but through terrorist behaviour."³⁷

All of these were positive measures compared to the opposition, argued the CDU/CSU, who claimed the Greens wanted to withdraw all terrorism legislation, end barracked police units and the intelligence services. Twenty percent of the Green members, according to the CDU/CSU, also had terrorist connections and they served as the ammunition of terrorists and other state enemies. The SPD, responsible for saving lives at Mogadishu, also wanted to introduce a *Kronzeuge* in 1975, but in 1986 was seen by the press as against terrorism laws. The SPD failed to rise to the democratic unity required of all democratic parties--the Greens do not count here--in the fight against terrorism, according to the CDU/CSU.³⁸

Some FDP members argued that one cannot continuously ask the executive to do its utmost with the given materials to counter terrorism without also responding to executive requests to provide them with better instruments to conduct their work. Additionally, the criminal code changes to 129a StGB are not the goal, but rather the criminal court procedure possibilities this allowed. The same occurred when the SPD first introduced 129a to allow criminal court procedure possibilities, and not to offer new criminal code penalties for what was already regulated by other codes.³⁹

Other FDP members, however, disagreed with the party majority and argued against the changes because legislators cannot allow themselves to be perceived to be running behind reality, as if the death of von Braunmuehl was the determining motivation for legislative changes, and the criminal energy of the terrorists determined the legal system changes. Furthermore, while they agreed with the Federal Interior Minister's proposition that one's actions, not the legislation, makes one a terrorist, they added that legislators decide which label to apply to which action.⁴⁰

The SPD was against the government's planned changes because they were perceived as widening the label of terrorist beyond the people who should be labelled as such. The SPD viewed everything the changes would cover as already included in existing legislation, and widening 129a

³⁶ Mr. Eylmann (CDU/CSU) in *Verhandlungen des Deutschen Bundestages* 10. Wahlperiode, 254. Sitzung, 5 December 1986, 19789-90.

³⁷ Mr. F. Zimmermann (CSU) in *ibid.*, 19799.

³⁸ Dr. Stark (CDU/CSU) in *ibid.*, 19802-3.

³⁹ Mr. Kleinert (FDP) in *ibid.*, 19794-6.

⁴⁰ Dr. Hirsch (FDP) in *ibid.*, 19803.

StGB may only push terrorist sympathisers closer to the terrorists. Furthermore, they perceived these changes as legislative actionism that will impress the terrorists as little as the extended criminal punishments will deter the terrorists and their supporters. The driving force behind the changes are thus the need to be seen to do something because the government does not have the terrorist apprehensions that the SPD/FDP coalition had in the seventies.⁴¹

The Greens argued that instead of being 'laws for the fighting of terrorism' they were really 'laws for the criminalisation and repression of the anti-atom movement' which would maintain the government's nuclear programmes and construction of the nuclear reprocessing plant at Wackersdorf. The 'law for the changes to the traffic law' was actually the 'law to observe the citizen' because it brings the transparent citizen closer to reality with moving pictures of vehicles without the need to ask the owners' and drivers' permission.⁴²

These laws were passed, but the *Kronzeuge* was not, and the government felt it was still a viable alternative that must not be overlooked. In 1986, when it was reintroduced, they had only arrested one terrorist, Eva Sybille Haule-Frimpong on 2 August 1986, in the previous three years. The government hoped this would allow them to appear busy.⁴³

It was hoped the *Kronzeuge* legislation would break down the silence surrounding the hard-core Red Army Faction, which since 1985, has not left behind many fingerprints, letters or any other evidence which leads the authorities to individuals. Hence, the introduction of a law that would enable the circle to 'grass' on their colleagues, with the hoped for resulting loss of security and confidence therein.⁴⁴

The counterarguments of money to murderers still remained, as did that of the lack of evidence that terrorists at large desired to end their underground existence and rejoin society. In 1986 the government had invited twenty experts to offer their opinions on the matter. Only three experts were in favour of the law: Kurt Rebmann, the Federal Prosecutor General; and Heinrich Boge, the *Bundeskriminalamt* president; and Helmut Tromeler, the president of the Bavarian *Landeskriminalamt*. Everyone else was against the law because it would solidify the

⁴¹ Dr. de With (SPD) in *ibid.*, 19792-3.

⁴² Mr. Mann (Green) in *ibid.*, 19797.

⁴³ *die taz* 16 October 1986; Wolfgang Schaeuble, "Es ist riskant, bringt wenig, aber es beruhigt" *Stern* 39 (45) 30 October-5 November 1986, 252-5, 252.

⁴⁴ *Independent* 11 February 1991, 8.

terrorist groups and not, as Interior Minister Friedrich Zimmermann argued, put more pressure on the groups.⁴⁵

Even the FDP, part of the government, was divided over the issue. Some members doubted its usefulness, whether it fulfilled liberal democratic principles, if it only applied to specific groups such as terrorists but not other criminals, and whether or not there should be minimum sentences.⁴⁶

The Greens simply questioned what would happen with conflicting statements, as commonly occurred in Italy, and would happen with changed statements in the course of court cases. The SPD argued that the *Kronzeuge* would not contribute to counterterrorism because it was designed to satisfy emotions.⁴⁷

In 1988 the Kohl government was finally able to pass *Kronzeuge* legislation, which came into effect in June 1989, expires on 31 December 1992, and requires a minimum three year sentence for murder.⁴⁸

The *Kronzeugenregelung* was first used in the case of Werner Loetze, sentenced on 31 January 1991 to twelve years imprisonment, instead of two life sentences.⁴⁹ The severe sentence he received is believed to deter active terrorists from coming forward with evidence. Therefore the prosecutors (who wanted a sentence of nine years) and the defence lawyers will appeal the sentence.⁵⁰ His sentence has not, however, deterred other ex-RAF members arrested in summer 1990 from becoming *Kronzeugen*. Some of these people⁵¹ are allegedly accusing each other in full cooperation with the authorities, while others remain silent.⁵²

Since its introduction the *Kronzeuge* legislation has not led to the self-destruction of the Red Army Faction, and not hindered murders by the group. However, it has brought new light into the working of the group in the seventies and early eighties. While this process of historical explanation aids the correct ordering of past events, it can

⁴⁵ Brunner et. al., *Sueddeutsche Zeitung* 9/10 February 1985, 5; *Die Zeit* 21 November 1986, 17; *die taz* 24 October 1986.

⁴⁶ *die taz* 16 October 1986; *Sueddeutsche Zeitung* 23 October 1986.

⁴⁷ *Sueddeutsche Zeitung* 23 October 1986, 25 October 1986.

⁴⁸ "Ohne Helm" *Der Spiegel* 21/1988, 25-6; "Oma im Altkader" *Der Spiegel* 24/1990, 86.

⁴⁹ On 19 December 1986 life sentences were raised from fifteen to twenty years. *Das Parlament* 10 January 1987.

⁵⁰ *Independent* 11 February 1991, 8.

⁵¹ Susanne Albrecht received twelve years and Henning Beer six and a half as *Kronzeugen*. Silke Maier-Witt is also mentioned as a possible *Kronzeuge*.

⁵² Inge Vielt, Sigrid Sternebeck and Monika Helbing; "Die mit den Hueten", *Der Spiegel* 34/1990, 62.

only prevent future activity of the group, if this knowledge is gainfully employed.⁵³

Monetary reward efforts are not successful either. Counterterrorism policy cooperation between the BfV and the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) offering monetary rewards of up to one million Swiss Francs for information leading to the the arrest of terrorists, were begun in February 1987. The failure of this plan could have been seen in similar reward failures since 1980 when a group of industrial and banking firms put up a reward of 400,000 DM, and after the Beckurts murder in July 1986, Siemens and other firms put up a total of three million DM reward for information leading to the arrest of terrorists. Neither the Kronzeuge or rewards reach the targeted people. The ones who would really help break the RAF and the RZ are the ones who pulled the triggers and planted the bombs, not the ones who supply the logistics.⁵⁴

Both of these only reinforce the terrorists' ideology. The terrorist can say: look at the capitalist system, it has deteriorated so far that it now shows its true face by offering us money to help save itself. How 'typically capitalist' this is! The hard-core terrorists reject the rewards because they believe in their higher moral position, and believe themselves justified in their actions. Rewards can only reinforce these beliefs.⁵⁵ Such attempts by the government to discourage the groups loses sight of the group's organisational reasons for existence discussed in chapter five. If the group exists to give the members identity, then they can ill-afford to betray it. Perhaps this is why only those who have left the group and found other viable identities that allow their non-violent opposition to the government have taken up the Kronzeuge offer.

The Bundesamt fuer Verfassungsschutz began a project in 1986 for terrorists wanting to drop-out, and allegedly organised the retirement of seven terrorists' through the terrorists' lawyer or a trusted person. While the BfV will normally contact other offices seeking to apprehend terrorists (to find which warrants are in force against the individual, and how much flexibility they have with the arresting authorities), the BfV is not always required to contact them. This is a grey area which they use to reduce terrorism, their main concern.⁵⁶

⁵³ See Alexander von Stahl, "'Es gibt keine glatte Loesung'" Der Spiegel 51 (17 December) 1990, 34-8, 38.

⁵⁴ Brunner et. al., Die Zeit 21 November 1986, 18; "Schnapp und greiff" Der Speigel 52 (21 December) 1987, 44-8, 45-8.

⁵⁵ Christian Lochte, "Abtruennig um des Geldes willen?" Die Zeit 8 July 1986, 8; Brunner, et.al., Die Zeit 21 November 1986, 18.

⁵⁶ Gerhard Boeden, "Auf saubere Fuesse stellen: Interview mit Verfassungsschutz-Praesident Boeden", Der Spiegel 12 (21 March) 1988,

Possibly this was another side of an anonymous letter sent in September 1986 to about forty people in the Federal Republic, who, the letter alleged, had contact with people in the terrorist scene, and might be willing to offer information leading to the arrest and conviction of suspected terrorists in exchange for up to one million DM and a new identity and freedom from prosecution. The letter offered no clues as to its author, but freedom from prosecution can only be offered by the state. Some of the letter's recipients considered this to be a way around the *Kronzeuge* legislation also under discussion then, and, in any case, could be used to elicit feelings of being under observation and sow distrust amongst the scene.⁵⁷

The *Kronzeuge* and reward schemes only open doors out of terrorist scenes for those who provide something in return for the money and a new life elsewhere under a new identity. For those who refuse these schemes, other paths out of the scene are few.

In an effort to begin the reconciliation process between the Red Army Faction and society, the Green parliamentarians Antje Vollmer and Christa Nickels had a poor start when they sent a letter to five imprisoned RAF members during the group's hunger strike in 1984/5.⁵⁸ After initial criticism about their approach which broke with the party position, their second public letter in the autumn of 1985 received a response and led to quiet discussions which grew and included more people in 1987 and 1988.⁵⁹

However, these attempts to break the RAF's isolation by meeting others also depend upon government approval at both the federal and state level. Individual government ministers are also divided on the

22-5; Gerhard Boeden, "Aussteiger aus terroristischen Gruppierungen - Probleme und Moeglichkeiten einer Hilfe durch den Verfassungsschutz", in: Uwe Backes, Eckhard Jesse (eds.), *Jarhbuch Extremismus und Demokraite 1989* (Bonn: Bouvier Verlag, 1989), 165-173; the programme gained more publicity with an October 1987 interview between the BfV and the Frankfurt city magazine *Pflasterstrand*, Hans Josef Horchem, "The Lost Revolution of West Germany's Terrorists" *Terrorism and Political Violence* 1 (3) 1989, 353-360, 359-360.

⁵⁷ "Kronzeugen-Suche", in: Goessner, *Buerger kontrollieren Polizei* (eds.), *Restrisiko Mensch: Volkserfassung, Staatsterrorgesetze, Widerstandsbekaempfung* (Hamburg: Instituts fuer Sozialforschung, 1987), 68-9.

⁵⁸ n.n. "Gruene: Mut und Leichtsinn" *Der Spiegel* 12 (18 March) 1985, 133-4. The letter was addressed to Christian Klar, Brigitte Mohnhaupt, Adelheid Schulz, Siegelind Hoffmann and to Elard Biskamp for his information, and is reprinted in *Sueddeutsche Zeitung* 8 March 1985, 8; and *Der Spiegel* 13 (25 March) 1985, 66.

⁵⁹ n.n. "Zur Terrorismus-Diskussion" *Gruenes Bulletin* March/April 1985, 6-8, 7; Janssen, *Die Zeit* 16 May 1986, 17-8; "Gruene Nachhilfe" *Der Spiegel* 12 (21 March) 1988, 21-2, 21; "Mythos und Bauchnabel" *Der Spiegel* 33 (15 August) 1988, 54-6, 56.

issue. The Federal Prosecutor General, Rebmann, and Federal Interior Minister, Zimmermann, were against the idea, while Federal Justice Minister Engelhard thought it worth an attempt.⁶⁰

Discussions between active RAF prisoners and some Green members are also parallel to Green discussions with ex-RAF prisoners who seek reconciliation with society and have voiced the possibility of amnesties and pardons. These political positions argue that one cannot ignore these prisoners who believe that the RAF and the militant left lost because they did not win, and the kind of power necessary for them to win is not in sight, nor does anyone know how to achieve a victory. They also argue that they cannot remain in prison until they are very old. Their alternative is possibly death in a senseless hunger strike⁶¹ as this gives their life meaning if no other exit is possible.

Arguments against amnesties came from the position that not fighting to the end equaled capitulation. However, if no fight is in progress because the RAF is already defeated, amnesty is possible. It only requires the acceptance that one phase is over, and another has begun.⁶²

These measures would show that the state does not assume 'once a terrorist, always a terrorist', with a fight to the bitter end. Rather, they argue that if society contributed, even in a small way, to terrorism, then it should also aid rehabilitation and provide a way out for those who want to stop.⁶³

The goal was a campaign of small steps; pardons and early release on parole after serving half of the sentence, or fifteen years where life sentences were sought. All measures used with 'normal' prisoners. These were discussed and sought by the Green initiative in 1987.⁶⁴

The question of amnesty and pardon came to the fore again in 1988 when Angelika Speitel and Peter-Juergen Boock requested pardons from the Federal President, Richard von Weizsaecker. Weizsaecker was already

⁶⁰ "Mythos und Bauchnabel" *Der Spiegel* 33/1988, 56; Antje Vollmer, "Die einfachen Weltansichten aufbrechen" *Der Spiegel* 5 (30 January) 1989, 34-44, 34.

⁶¹ Gert Schneider "Was Sie schon immer von der RAF wissen wollten, aber sich nie zu fragen getraut haben", in: Peter-Juergen Boock, Peter Schneider, *Ratte-tot...Ein Briefwechsel* (Darmstadt: Sammlung Luchterhand, 1985), 134-6, 134-5.

⁶² Christoph Wackernagel, "Die Mythen Knacken", in: Peter-Juergen Boock, Peter Schneider, *Ratte-tot...Ein Briefwechsel* (Darmstadt: Sammlung Luchterhand, 1985), 131-4, 132.

⁶³ Sternsdorff, *Der Spiegel* 43/1987, 85, 88.

⁶⁴ "Grüne Nachhilfe" *Der Spiegel* 12/1988, 21; Johannes Eisenberg, "Bis ins nächste Jahrtausend? Argumente fuer eine Entspannungspolitik zwischen Staat und RAF", in: Michael Sontheimer, Otto Kallscheuer (eds.), *Einschuesse: Besichtigung eines Frontverlaufs Zehn Jahre nach dem Deutschen Herbst* (West Berlin: Rotbuch Verlag, 1987), 140-152, 144.

known to be in favour of pardons, because he sees each person and situation as unique and deserving of society's attention and help.⁶⁵

Speitel was pardoned on 8 March 1989 and a release date was set for 30 June 1990, having served twelve years of her sentence, to be followed by a five year parole. Boock was refused as he had not yet served enough of his sentence. The Federal President's decision kept to the pattern of allowing pardons between nine and fourteen years of life sentences.⁶⁶

Opponents of pardons feel that only tough measures work against terrorism, and that they should only be offered pardons if they are willing to provide evidence against others. Friedrich Zimmermann, the Federal Interior Minister, thought that by considering pardoning former terrorists, Weizsaecker was endangering his reputation, and that of the Federal Republic, for the danger he might cause. The RAF attempt on Tietmeyer in September 1988 enforced this position, which did not, as some feared, sabotage the pardoning process. These positions contribute to the problems of people distancing themselves from the RAF, for then they are attacked from both sides: the group wants to know why, and the authorities want evidence of their sincerity.⁶⁷

Paths of resocialisation must be kept open for terrorists. Chapter five highlighted how their belief systems provide an alternative reality. The government and the public, as well as reform minded former terrorists, must do their best to reduce the group boundaries of the society that tighten cohesion within groups and widen gaps between them. For example, the government must not condemn, as some people do, any groups that also support such aims as reducing US military presence in Europe as sympathisers of terrorist groups, because terrorists also strive for this goal.⁶⁸ This amounts to guilt by association and reinforces group boundaries.

One way of doing this is to acknowledge that it is necessary to fight more than the symptoms of the problem as a *Bundeskriminalamt* study published in 1977 found.⁶⁹ While reform will not solve all the problems of terrorism, government acknowledgement of legitimate problems and of the difference between the ends and means of terrorism, then the perceived legitimacy of terrorism may be reduced.⁷⁰

⁶⁵ "Neue Einsicht" *Der Spiegel* 35 (29 August) 1988, 34-5, 34.

⁶⁶ "Sie hat ihre Tat aufrichtig bereut" *Der Spiegel* 11 (13 March) 1989, 8-10, 8-9.

⁶⁷ "Gruene Nachhilfe", *Der Spiegel* 12/1988, 21; "Neue Einsicht", *Der Spiegel* 35/1988 35; "Weizsaecker muss allein entscheiden" *Der Spiegel* 39 (26 September) 1988, 16-21, 17-8.

⁶⁸ Crenshaw (1983), 22; Kellen (1990), 51.

⁶⁹ "Wie wird man Terrorist?" *Stern* 11 May 1978, 65.

⁷⁰ Crenshaw (1983), 32.

Ideological groups can be destroyed by allowing a radical place for social dissension within society. Thus pre-terrorists can remain radicals instead of entering the underground, and ex-terrorists can return. All they must do is renounce violence and serve the sentences for their crimes. Not all terrorists can be eliminated, so they must be co-opted to non-violence and benefit society. If this option is not available terrorists stay terrorists, either in prison or in hiding.⁷¹ Only some resocialise and benefit society.

This provides an alternative organisation to that of the 'organisational' model terrorist groups so that exit from one to join the other is possible. It also provides a platform alternative to the 'instrumental' model. Some 'expressionist' model types may also be coopted for non-violent 'spectacles'.

However, West German counterterrorism policy has not always assisted or even accepted such a place in society. As mentioned, there is not always a tolerance for different viewpoints, and there can be a tendency to label all who seek similar goals as alike, despite the use of democratic means by some. This can alienate them and force their identification with others against the state.

4.2 Antiterrorism Policy Implementation

These are the measures employed in response to specific terrorist incidents. On one hand, they could also be considered as the available options after failure of counterterrorism policy, while on the other hand, they are also a continuation of wider counterterrorism policy because all counterterrorism policy must be based on efficient antiterrorism policies.⁷² These also include measures designed to assist the security services and the judiciary in their work.

The death of a hostage in a Munich bank robbery in 1971 highlighted the need for effective hostage rescue capabilities when a hostage taker was shot for the first time in post-war Germany.⁷³ However, it was not until after the Munich Olympics Massacre in 1972 that efforts were taken to create an effective antiterrorist force at the state and federal levels, as mentioned earlier.

Since then the authorities have done well when they can find the terrorists and have an actual response situation. However, the Lorenz

⁷¹ Franco Ferracuti, "Ideology and Repentance: Terrorism in Italy", in: Walter Reich (ed.), *Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 59-64, 62, 64.

⁷² Morris, Hoe, 126, 133.

⁷³ Thomas Osterkorn, "Darf der Staat toeten?" *Stern* 42 (32) 10-6 August 1989, 28-30, 29.

and Schleyer episodes show that when a specific location for the terrorists is unknown and when a long-term response is required, then the responses are less effective. This was also true in the eighties and nineties where the level of arrests has fallen.

The sort of problems experienced during the Lorenz abduction led to the BKA terrorism unit which was supposed to compile and store all information on terrorism, with the Laender binding themselves to this decision. The BKA also introduced new computer programmes like PIOS (persons, institutions, objects, articles) to bring together diverse data from different files in new data combinations and, hopefully, answers to questions.⁷⁴

The Lorenz abduction was characterised by bad communication, coordination and demarcation of responsibility problems between the West-Berlin administration and the police units as well as within and between the police units. For example, they wasted efforts to establish Lorenz's fingerprints in the telephone box he used to call the police after his release and neglected to check the mileage on the van used in the kidnapping. The police also missed an opportunity to follow or capture involved terrorists or their accomplices, by not observing the apartment of a woman who was to receive money from the terrorists. Perhaps the single action which speaks volumes on the police infrastructure at the time was the ability of three men successfully to rob a bank of 45,000 DM in West-Berlin on the day after Lorenz's release, when 4000 policemen were on duty.⁷⁵

However, the implemented changes did not help the authorities in 1977 when their capabilities and organisational structures were tested for coordination and effectiveness. The Hoecherl-Report found that they did not perform effectively, and sought to uncover why a 'hot clue' that was reported on 9 September, which could have led to Schleyer's location, was left hanging in the system. The information flood mentioned earlier which the police information system produced and by which the security authorities oriented themselves, became a tidal wave that produced 1200 telex messages in the first six days of the abduction, and 24,000 in one month, more than occurred in all of 1976.⁷⁶

The Hoecherl report, which examined the authorities' efforts and activities for 1977, stated, when published in June 1978, that the authorities did not heed the warnings evident early in 1977 and failed

⁷⁴ Krumm, 81; Busch et.al., 136-7, Boelsche, 27.

⁷⁵ Dietrich Stohmann, "Keine Stadt der Angst" Die Zeit 7 March 1975, 3-4, 4; Joachim Narowski, "Ein Schlag ins Wasser" Die Zeit 14 March 1975, 2; ----, "Klagen nach dem Wasser-Schlag" Die Zeit 28 March 1975, 2.

⁷⁶ Werner Maihofer and Dr. Wernitz in Das Parlament 25 March 1978.

to organise their efforts accordingly. The authorities, Interior Minister Werner Maihofer, and BKA President Horst Herold, should have had enough indications at the beginning of 1977, when Buback and Ponto were murdered, as well as from the papers found on Haag and Meyer in November 1976, to introduce new legislation, organisational measures, and operational procedures to counter the terrorism that followed.⁷⁷ For example, the *Bundeskriminalamt*, which held competence in the affair, should have been prepared for this eventuality at both *Bund* and *Laender* levels. Instead they organised themselves as the events unfolded.⁷⁸

Instead, what followed was that decision-making bodies had unclear jurisdiction, operational procedures for handling clues were changed three times within forty-eight hours, and the lower police levels did not know the investigation goals, let alone the abilities of the computer programmes available at the higher levels. These were the conditions that allowed a clue about the whereabouts of Schleyer to be neglected for two weeks, by which time the RAF and Schleyer had left the apartment.⁷⁹

Added to these problems were also more familiar ones such as differing practices, and loyalty orientations of the different institutions to their state instead of the federal levels. It was part of the problem of the *Laender* worrying that the federal institutions directing the investigation wanted federal competence under the guise of clear guidelines. This resulted in orders from above being carried out slowly under the impression that they were superfluous, wrong, or did not have adequate personnel.⁸⁰

Hoecherl suggested that closer ties between the federal and state levels be introduced, along with more decentralisation for regional investigations coupled with more precise strategic leadership from the BKA of investigation and evaluation at the federal level, as well as the introduction of similar police computer programmes that produce the same results with the same procedures and in the same format which all police personnel understand. Furthermore, all tried and trusted leadership and communications structures should not be changed, and unusual ones should not be established above or next to these. These structures should be tested with exercises.⁸¹

⁷⁷ Carl-Christian Kaiser, "Verwirrung und Versaeumung" *Die Zeit* 9 June 1978, 7.

⁷⁸ Alfred Dregger in *Das Parlament* 25 March 1978.

⁷⁹ *ibid.*

⁸⁰ Krumm, 80, 83.

⁸¹ Kaiser, *Die Zeit* 9 June 1978, 7; "Hoecherl-Untersuchung (Auszug)" *Das Parlament* 8 July 1978.

Similar problems, which Hoecherl sought to overcome, showed themselves again in 1979 in the 'Loreley' exercise designed to recreate another Schleyer episode to test departmental coordination between local and federal institutions and units. Unfortunately similar mistakes occurred in this exercise as occurred during the Schleyer abduction. The system was unable to cope with the large amounts of information which needed to be processed: 300 reports a day, or 30,000 during the whole of the Schleyer episode. As in 1977, vital information could be lying at the bottom of large stacks of reports. In 1980 the same type of exercise was run and this time it went as planned, literally. Everything was coordinated in the scenario outline, which was followed, right down to the terrorists' surrender.⁸²

Preprogrammed exercises, like the one above, are the result of everyone trying to make themselves and their colleagues look good while showing that they consider the worst case scenario as surmountable. As the terrorists become more experienced, moving forward with new practices, the police need to do the same. The terrorists read the same books as the police and orientate themselves accordingly.⁸³

The authorities are only as effective as the public in that--due to their reliance upon the public to be their eyes and ears--they rely upon information being passed on to them. If the public do not understand why something like information registration with the authorities is needed, it will not be done. Public identification must be fostered via openness by the authorities as to why information is necessary and how it will be used, and why it will not lead to Orwellian ends.

On the other hand, the authorities need to know how to collect and collate the information they demand. They should also be innovative and adapt to unscripted simulations of abductions and other crises. This demands police identification with original thought and not standardised approaches dictated by their available technical means. Form of thought should not be constrained by the function of analytical instruments.

The important and potentially dangerous aspect of the Lorenz and Schleyer cases is that the authorities and leadership wanted results during the abductions which pressured the police to produce these. Although Chancellor Schmidt said one needed to go to the legal limits, both cases show that he was prepared to stretch, and arguably breach, those same limits in the interest of obtaining results in the form of

⁸² Schiller (1985 II), 31; Schiller (1987 I), 544-5.

⁸³ Schiller (1985 II), 31. See also the list of 177 titles obtained by imprisoned suspected and convicted terrorists in Klaus, 32-5.

arrested suspects. This was the opposite of the general portrayal of the hard government position owing to Chancellor Schmidt's 'passion for reason' based on his democratic beliefs.⁸⁴

The desire to arrest suspects after the release of Lorenz resulted in eighty-three searched houses and apartments, confiscated chemicals, radio transmitters and automobile registration plates, and the arrest of 175 people, who were all later released, while 4000 automobiles were stopped and checked. According to those who had their homes searched, this meant devastation of government supported hostels, the use of tear gas in closed rooms and broken windows, doors and goods. Those arrested reportedly had no food for hours, no contact with their lawyers, and the police accused of these acts would not provide their badge numbers.⁸⁵

The aim of all of these searches ordered by the public prosecutor was to deprive the Second of June manoeuvrable space and to search for clues in the scene. Nonetheless, it is still questionable whether these necessitated the form they took.⁸⁶ The activities were fruitless, in this form. Perhaps they could have been effective in another form and manner. The police function best with the public behind them, and these activities did not further public identification with them.

Several years after the Schleyer abduction Schmidt told an interviewer that he could now thank the German lawyers for not checking the constitutional basis for everything the government undertook. This characterised the division between his words and actions which proclaimed an emergency to capture murderers and hostage-takers. To this end he gathered all powers to himself and justified everything with Paragraph 34 (Justified Emergency) of the Criminal Code.⁸⁷

In practice this meant control points, where instead of police checking vehicle registration documents, which is allowed, they checked over the vehicle and passengers. They also checked through whole apartment buildings. Neither of these activities had constitutional underpinnings.⁸⁸

Similarly the authorities had wire taps on all telephone kiosks in Cologne, and via the Swiss, to the **Bundeskriminalamt** on that of Denis Payot, the lawyer who acted as go-between for the Red Army Faction and the government. They also tapped the phones of suspected doctor and lawyer sympathisers- -they had once helped or defended a terrorist, and

⁸⁴ Wittke, 221.

⁸⁵ Nawrocki, *Die Zeit* 14 March 1975, 2.

⁸⁶ Nawrocki, *Die Zeit* 28 March 1975, 2.

⁸⁷ "'Die Deutschen sind irrsinnig geworden'" *Der Spiegel* 36/1987, 106-8.

⁸⁸ *ibid.*, 111.

the government thought they might be terrorist couriers. There was, however, no evidence that this was the case.⁸⁹

The wiretapping of Payot in Switzerland was also illegal as the Federal Intelligence Agency can only operate in order to assess the danger of possible attacks against the Federal Republic. Such an attack from Switzerland was doubtful.⁹⁰

None of these examples held the two basic principles of proportionality and the rule of law. Proportionality was broken when the government decided to assume that all persons between the ages of twenty and thirty-five could be guilty when they decided to check all identification papers of these persons at all border-crossings and all vehicles in some areas against the INPOL police computer records. The principle of the rule of law was violated when policemen required more than just the vehicle papers from drivers when they were inspected. This procedure was not incorporated in law until February 1978. Additionally the BKA sought to obtain a copy of car purchase papers during the Schleyer kidnapping, which again was without legal basis.⁹¹

The *Kontaktsperrgesetz* (contact ban) passed on 29 September 1977 was against the wishes of the Federal Constitutional Court because it also forbade defence lawyer visits. The court agreed to the legislation, nonetheless, because the law would have lost its effectiveness if exceptions were allowed.⁹² When it was passed, this legalised--on a firmer basis than Para 34--the practice of the previous three weeks.⁹³

Para 34 of the Criminal Code was the government's justification for its activities and avoided the regulated constitutional framework of the Emergency Laws passed in 1968. The Emergency Laws were designed to limit and regulate the government in such conditions, but in 1977 these were avoided and one conclusion could be that they moved towards a dictatorship.⁹⁴

However, this conclusion confuses the official legal reason and the legal motivation of the contact ban. The legal reason was to break contact between accused and convicted terrorists, while the legal motivation was a lengthened abduction to gain time for successful searches and investigations. No parliamentarians knew this fact, which was restricted to the executive. Although the ban did not break contact between the terrorists and the outside world--some justice ministers

⁸⁹ *ibid.*

⁹⁰ "'Haben wir Fehler gemacht?'" *Der Spiegel* 37 (7 September) 1987, 47-58, 43.

⁹¹ Wittke, 227.

⁹² *ibid.*, 252.

⁹³ "'Haben wir Fehler gemacht?'" *Der Spiegel* 37/1987, 46, 50.

⁹⁴ *ibid.*, 50.

ignored the order because they deemed it illegal- -its lack of success in gaining time must be questioned for suitability.⁹⁵

The parliamentarians were told by the SPD that the contact ban was necessary to break contact between the outside world and suspected and convicted terrorists to preserve life, limb and public security. This was supported with the legal argument that 34 StGB was not enough, because some Laender had dismissed it as illegal, so that a proper legal code was required. Support for the bill also showed solidarity with the government who had CDU/CSU support before the bill's formal presentation to the Bundestag.⁹⁶

Both of the arguments also produced responses. One was that if there was already a SPD and CDU/CSU Grand Coalition for the bill, then public opposition to the bill needed representation in the Bundestag by dissatisfied SPD members. This did not affect FDP members. Other SPD and FDP members were dissatisfied because the new bill would imply the contact ban could occur again, while 34 StGB use implied a return to the status quo. Other FDP and SPD opposition centred on the loss of liberal democratic values with the contact ban and felt that radical opposition was necessary now to prevent greater losses in the future, while a small group of SPD members believed that it was not necessary to separate suspected and convicted terrorists from their lawyers. Another group of FDP members was concerned about the question of innocents and access to lawyers for people suspected of terrorism as highlighted by the case of Nora Poensgen, who was arrested shortly after the Ponto murder as a suspected terrorist. She was innocent, but would have had great difficulty in proving this under the contact ban.⁹⁷

In the end, party political arguments gained support for the contact ban as SPD/FDP members were told that this was the lesser of evils compared with other CDU/CSU suggestions aimed towards strengthening the executive. These included the use of the Federal Constitutional Court as the court of first instance for terrorist cases, which would shorten cases because appeals would be excluded if the cases began at the top. They also suggested the prohibition of public congregations that endangered public security in order to prevent such incidents before they occurred when evidence of such possibly existed. Individual CDU/CSU members' suggestions included the introduction of the crime of state defamation, reintroduction of the death penalty, and shortened court cases for terrorist offences.⁹⁸

⁹⁵ Wittke, 203-7, 208-9.

⁹⁶ *ibid.*, 173, 177.

⁹⁷ *ibid.*, 172-3, 186-7; Botzat et. al., 151-7.

⁹⁸ Wittke, 191-2.

Both the Lorenz and Schleyer episodes were seen by the government as situations demanding police responses instead of balanced short and long-term police and political responses. The short-term police response needed to be tempered by the long-term political response.

At the time of the Schleyer abduction, Chancellor Schmidt and the rest of the crisis committee--with two exceptions--all denied any ideological or political motives in the Red Army Faction activities, and held such thoughts to be held only by sympathisers. Only Horst Herold, the BKA president, and the Interior Minister, Werner Maihofer, believed the terrorists sought to bomb their way into society's political attention. Herold even respected the highly intelligent and moral terrorists, and saw the proper response as being the removal of the ground from which such ideas sprang.⁹⁹

Arguably, because it broke a precedent, a case could be made that Federal Prosecutor General Rebmann overstepped himself by asking, and receiving permission from, the Federal Constitutional Court to erect mobile control points wherever and whenever necessary during the IMF meeting in Berlin in September 1988. As a result all persons travelling into the city between 18 and 45, who did not at first appear unsuspecting, were checked under 111 StPO. Normally this code can only be used after terrorist incidents.¹⁰⁰

Earlier this chapter explained that the authorities reduced accuseds' rights and increased police manoeuvrability against terrorism. The two of these work together in terrorism with criminal codes providing justification for court procedure codes and vice versa. The government's dilemma in framing legislation in these areas, as mentioned earlier, is balancing apprehension and speedy trials without framing special categories of legislation, which they arguably have with Para 129a StGB, as mentioned earlier. This means strengthening legislation where necessary and discarding or rewriting useless legislation. This was not always done as is shown below.

Between January 1971 and November 1980 279 (left and right wing) persons suspected of committing and supporting those who committed terrorist crimes were arrested. Only in 24% of the cases were the full limits of court sentences required. (34.4% in juvenile cases.) Fines reached their limit 12% of the time. Crimes with sentences up to two

⁹⁹ "Die Deutschen sind irrsinnig geworden" *Der Spiegel* 36/1987, 107-8; "Haben wir Fehler gemacht?" *Der Spiegel* 37/1987, 55-6.

¹⁰⁰ Blume, Maithes, *Stern* 41/1988, 262.

years were less often sentenced to probation than similar non-terrorist cases.¹⁰¹

The introduction of new criminal codes were also not always necessary. While Paragraph 129a StGB was often used after its introduction, Para 88a StGB was only used five times, four of them in connection with other codes, but only once solely. Para 130a StGB was never used.¹⁰²

Court procedure codes that sought to shorten court cases did have the desired effect. While the longest allowable interruption of main court proceedings went from ten to thirty days, the actual number of court days declined from thirteen to ten at the state level, and from thirty to twenty-two at the higher state court level.¹⁰³

Of the 279 cases, 67% were sentenced to imprisonment, 11% to a fine, 10% to a juvenile sentence, and 11% acquitted.¹⁰⁴ This indicates, as stated, that the legislation in general is fine tuned to the needs of the country in counterterrorism.

Since then, however, the effectiveness of Para 129a StGB is perhaps questionable. Between 1980 and 1987 2131 cases of 129a were investigated, of which five percent came to court. Of this 5%, only thirty resulted in successful convictions. That is a 1.4% success rate from the 2131 cases.¹⁰⁵

129a is, nonetheless, deemed useful because of its ability to enable other activities such as control points, building searches, restrictions of defence lawyers' rights, and telephone tapping. This is what places terrorism into a special category. One result is that many things which are possibly not terrorism receive the terrorism label, such as a womens' rights group that organised an archive on gene technology. Likewise a twenty-three year old female doctor's assistant became a 'terrorist' for spraying 'war on the palaces' on a subway wall, and was sentenced to one year imprisonment for supporting a terrorist group.¹⁰⁶

Para 129a StGB allows the articles to be used in perhaps unusual circumstances. While it was normal to use Par 88a StGB against publications, as when it was used against early RAF publications like the *Ueber den bewaffneten Kampf in Westeuropa* in October 1971, or against Baumann's autobiography in 1975, it was rescinded in 1981. This necessitated the use of Para 129a StGB to supress a book of prison

¹⁰¹ Bundesministerium des Justiz, "Ausreichende Stratvorschriften zur Bekaempfung des Terrorismus" Bulletin 77 (11 August) 1982, 692.

¹⁰² *ibid.*

¹⁰³ *ibid.*

¹⁰⁴ *ibid.*

¹⁰⁵ Elendt, Trunk, *Stern* 42 (19) 1989, 236.

¹⁰⁶ *ibid.*, 240.

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letters by former RAF members, because the introduction states that the current RAF prisoners are behind the book. Thus the Federal Prosecutor General viewed the book as an advertisement for the RAF. As when the Baumann book was banned, this one was to be published in a cooperative effort by publishers who felt the book contributed to the discussions of the helplessness of terrorism.¹⁰⁷

Given this use of 129a StGB, and the fact that 130a StGB was never used, the usefulness of its reintroduction in 1988 must be questioned. Perhaps a less direct purpose was fulfilled by these new, or revised legal codes directed against terrorism. The parliamentarian and public officials could be seen to respond to public concern about terrorism. They were seen to be acting, and not sitting idly by watching on the sidelines.¹⁰⁸

5. Summary

This chapter has shown that identification can usefully combine the 'communication' and 'war' models into a coherent long and short-term counterterrorism concept. Furthermore, both of these aspects need to be addressed for an effective counterterrorism policy to develop.

The Federal Republic did not realise this when it first experienced terrorism, but did understand this later. However, it also wavered in its dedication to both long and short-term counterterrorism policy in the heat of some terrorist incidents, such as during the Lorenz and Schleyer abductions. Similarly, there were also problems in the late eighties due to terrorist incidents without terrorist arrests, when the government felt under pressure to be seen to be doing something about terrorism. This was the government acting more on 'war' than 'communication' assumptions.

Resource provision for counter and antiterrorism policy has been adequately provided for in the Federal Republic of Germany both materially in the form of funds and equipment, as well as legislatively with criminal and court procedure codes to provide operational legitimacy. These later were sometimes seen to be overextended beyond their requisite levels. For example, the creation of 129a StGB erected a 'special category' that justified security force activity beyond what was necessary if it only resulted in five per cent of all 129a cases coming to court. The widening of 129a in the eighties caused more

¹⁰⁷ n.n., *Deutsche Geschichte 1962-1983*, 122; Brueckner, Krovoza, 24; Cobler (1977), 94-5; Hanno Kiechert "Toerische Zensur" *Die Zeit* 23 October 1987, 81; see also *die taz* 10 December 1986.

¹⁰⁸ Berlit, Dreier, 247.

problems than it solved, because of the consequent rise in the terrorism figures due to the inclusion of hitherto non-terrorist offences.

The possibility of exit from terrorism was shown to be possible in this chapter (and the two previous ones). The government has enabled various routes back to society, some of which aid the government, and others which do not. Here the choice lies with the individual as to which is chosen. Whether or not this forms an adequate release passage from terrorism back to a 'radical' non-violent space in society is difficult to determine, but can be judged to meet some need as expressed by the larger number of ex-terrorists who did not participate in the 1989 hunger strike than was the case in previous years, as mentioned in chapter three.

The government and terrorist relationship, however, also depends upon the public, who can support either side. The position of the public is influenced by both the government and the terrorists, as well as the media and their portayal of the situation. These roles of the media and the public are discussed next.



CHAPTER SEVEN: TERRORISM, PUBLIC OPINION AND THE MEDIA

Katharina on the front page. Huge photo huge type.

KATHARINA BLUM
OUTLAW'S SWEETHEART
REFUSES INFORMATION
ON MALE VISITORS

...
On the back page he saw that the *News* had transformed his statement that Katharina was intelligent, cool, and levelheaded into 'ice-cold and calculating', and his general observations on crime now read that she was 'entirely capable of committing a crime'.¹

The same picture can often be seen on multiple screens, but there is no short circuit because of that. My objection: These are all reproductions, while here the reproduction of reality and the reality itself coincide...Can they handle that?²

Then the claim to be part of a world-wide struggle, and that without noticeable anchoring in one's own country. The international claim also contradicts that we...carry out propagandistic inbreeding... Our statements are always directed towards the same circle of people, and are also only read by them. It's true the statements are often grammatically so composed that they can barely be understood. Thus we run the possibility of confirming the belief of being only a group of elitist middle-class kids.³

The relationship between terrorist organisations, the public and the media is different for each organisational model discussed in chapter five. Each model type identifies with a different subject and thus envisages its relationship to the media and the public accordingly. The 'instrumental' model aims to achieve political goals and wants to gain public support to assist this aim. 'Organisational' model groups are mainly interested in self-survival and thus seek recruitment of the minimum necessary for replacement of lost members. The self-interest of the 'expressive' model types neglects the public.

Public perception of the terrorist organisations' pursuit of these diverse aims is mediated to them through the media, who also pursue their own goals, as was mentioned in chapter four. These goals may aid or hinder the terrorists' goals, and may also be influenced by the government.

Discussion of the media and public is broken into four sections. The first concerns public opinion about terrorism, and the second the media

¹ Boell, 31-2.

² Christof Wackernagel, *Bilder einer Ausstellung. Erzaehlungen* (Reinbek: Rowohlt, 1986), 26.

³ Boock (1988), 125.

and terrorism relationship. Both of these concern mainly theoretical issues as a prelude to the third section that discusses both the public and the media in relationship to the three models mentioned above and the different terrorist organisations in the Federal Republic of Germany. The fourth section concludes the chapter with a discussion of options available to the government.

1. The Public Response to Terrorism

Regardless of whether the 'war' or 'communication' model is used, terrorists need to gain legitimacy with the public to achieve their aims. They require public identification with them as opposed to the government.

This did not happen in the Federal Republic. At times there were pockets of support for the terrorists, but never enough to endanger the government. The reasons for this are discussed in the third section.

Table 7.1 Satisfaction with Democracy, 1973-1990

	Sept. 1973	Oct- Nov. 1976	Apr- May 1977	Oct- Nov. 1977	May- June 1978	Oct- Nov. 1978	Apr. 1979	Oct. 1979	Oct. 1980	Oct. 1981
Very satisfied	5%	13%	11%	9%	9%	9%	10%	12%	9%	11%
Fairly satisfied	39	66	67	69	67	68	70	68	64	59
Not very satisfied	44	16	16	16	16	15	13	12	17	18
Not at all satisfied	11	3	2	2	3	2	2	2	4	5
No reply	1	2	4	4	5	6	5	6	6	7
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N=	1957	1007	1005	999	996	1006	1003	1005	1008	962
	Mar- Apr. 1982	Oct. 1982	Mar- Apr. 1983	Oct. 1983	Mar- Apr. 1984	Oct- Nov. 1984	Mar- Apr. 1985	Oct- Nov. 1985	Mar- Apr. 1986	Oct- Nov. 1986
Very satisfied	12%	8%	12%	7%	12%	11%	13%	10%	11%	12%
Fairly satisfied	56	59	59	59	59	62	60	59	69	59
Not very satisfied	21	22	18	21	19	21	19	22	15	22
Not at all satisfied	7	4	4	3	3	5	5	4	2	4
No reply	4	7	7	10	7	1	3	5	3	3
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N=	1328	1012	1049	1058	992	1053	1007	1028	987	1084
	Mar- Apr. 1987	Oct- Nov. 1987	Mar- Apr. 1988	Oct- Nov. 1988	Mar- Apr. 1989	Oct- Nov. 1989	Mar- Apr. 1990	Oct- Nov. 1990	East FRG 1990	E/W Avg. 1990
Very satisfied	10%	6%	13%	13%	10%	13%	15%	19%	5%	16%
Fairly satisfied	65	62	64	66	65	65	66	62	44	59
Not very satisfied	19	25	18	18	15	17	15	13	34	17
Not at all satisfied	2	4	2	4	4	3	2	2	14	5
No reply	4	3	3	2	3	2	2	4	3	3
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N=	994	957	1008	1051	1024	1202	1000	1000	1000	2000

Source: Commission of the European Communities. Euro-barometre, Public Opinion in the European Community: Trends 1974-1990 (March 1991), 20-1.

A glance at Table 7.1 shows that widespread dissatisfaction with democracy never appeared. As mentioned in chapter three, the average of those satisfied with democracy was comparable between the seventies (71.3%) and the eighties (72.5%). However, given that the 1973 figures skew the average, without other seventies figures to balance them out, their deletion raises the seventies average to 78.4%. The figures for 1973 reflect public concern over the *Berufsverbot* discussed in chapter six as a means for the Social Democratic Party to separate themselves from the communists in line with their *Ostpolitik*.

Table 7.2 Basic Attitudes Towards Society, 1970-1990

	Feb- Mar. 1970	Oct- Nov. 1976	Apr- May 1977	Oct- Nov. 1977	May- June 1978	Oct- Nov. 1978	Apr. 1979	Oct. 1979	Apr. 1980	Oct. 1980	
Revolutionary											
Action	2%	2%	2%	2%	1%	2%	2%	3%	4%	4%	
Reform	70	52	43	41	41	43	52	50	47	46	
Defence Against											
Subversion	20	39	48	50	50	49	39	38	37	43	
No reply	8	7	7	7	8	11	7	9	12	7	
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	
N=	2021	1007	1005	999	996	1006	1003	1005	1009	1008	
	Apr. 1981	Oct. 1981	Mar- Apr. 1982	Oct. 1982	Mar- Apr. 1983	Oct. 1983	Mar- Apr. 1984	Oct. 1984	Mar- Apr. 1985	Oct- Nov. 1985	Mar- Apr. 1986
Revolutionary											
Action	3%	4%	4%	3%	2%	3%	2%	3%	2%	3%	3%
Reform	41	49	44	45	49	48	48	58	56	51	52
Defence Against											
Subversion	43	36	39	38	42	39	35	32	32	36	37
No reply	13	11	13	14	7	10	15	7	10	10	8
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N=	1004	962	1328	1012	1049	1058	992	1053	1007	1028	987
	Oct- Nov. 1986	Mar- Apr. 1987	Oct- Nov. 1987	Mar- Apr. 1988	Oct- Nov. 1988	Mar- Apr. 1989	Oct- Nov. 1989	Mar- Apr. 1990	Oct- Nov. 1990	East FRG 1990	E/W Avg. 1990
Revolutionary											
Action	2%	2%	2%	2%	2%	1%	2%	2%	1%	3%	2%
Reform	51	52	57	59	57	63	53	55	58	79	62
Defence Against											
Subversion	39	38	33	34	31	29	40	39	34	14	30
No reply	8	8	8	5	10	7	5	4	7	4	6
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N=	1084	994	957	1008	1051	1024	1000	1000	1000	1000	2000

Source: Commission of the European Community. *Euro-barometre, Public Opinion in the European Community: Trends 1974-1990* (March 1991), 35-6.

Nor, as Table 7.2 shows, was there ever large support for revolutionary action. Instead there was more heightened concern for

'defence against subversion' in the seventies (39.2%) than in the eighties (36.7%) as mentioned in chapter three. Similar to Table 7.1, the lack of other data in the early years before the rise of terrorism skews the figures. Deleting the figure for 1970 raises the seventies average to 44%.

Table 7.2 also shows that the left-wing terrorist caused a public backlash. If the 'defence against subversion' figures are interpreted as public reaction to terrorism, then the 1977 figures show half the population against them, when they were at their peak. In 1970, before any deaths, the groups were still up against twenty percent of the public. The fact that seventy percent of the public wanted some reform possibly explains the amount of sympathy with which the groups began.⁴

Together both tables show the general public did not identify with the terrorists. On the other hand, the tables do not show a reciprocal identification with the government. The seventies saw the need for defence against subversion, while the eighties exhibited a need for reform. Both of these were supported by a belief in democracy.

Both tables also exhibit some potential support for terrorists amongst the small percentage that believe revolutionary action is necessary, and who do not support democracy. These people could potentially be mobilised in some circumstances.

Both tables also show in their figures from former East Germany that there is a possible group of sympathisers for the various terrorist groups in the dissatisfaction with democracy and who are eager for reform. The reduction of these figures in the coming years would be a sign that the government is handling the concerns of these potential terrorist supporters in an appropriate manner.

This small dissatisfied group is the basis for the ill-defined group of people labelled as terrorist sympathisers. When public concern about sympathisers was possibly at its height in 1977 a *Spiegel* magazine series concluded that sympathisers were those held to be such, and that the word had become a political tool.⁵ This ignores those who state a willingness to assist the terrorists. These two groups are not necessarily identical, but indicates the extent of public support and belief of support for terrorists.

A March 1971 survey showed that 16 to 29 year olds were the most supportive, with 25% of them, and 18% of the 30 to 44 year olds, viewing the RAF as political fighters. On average 51% of the public saw them as

⁴ Christopher Hewitt, "Terrorism and Public Opinion: A Five Country Comparison" *Terrorism and Political Violence* 2 (2) 1990, 145-170, 157-8.

⁵ "Mord beginnt beim boesen Wort" *Der Spiegel* 41/1977, 28-47, 30.

criminals, and 68% would not provide group members pursued by the police with shelter for the night. Of the 16 to 29 year old category, however, 10% would provide shelter, as would 7% of the 30 to 44 year olds.⁶

In May 1977, after Baader, Ensslin and Raspe were convicted in Stammheim, 60% of the population felt they had received a fair trial, while 10% thought their defence had been hindered, and 30% were undecided one way or the other. Again the 16 to 29 and the 30 to 44 year old groups were more inclined to support the terrorists' viewpoint. 14% of the 16 to 29 year olds, and 10% of the 30 to 44 year olds felt the group was hindered in its defence.⁷

The public in November 1977 perceived sympathisers as those who sheltered terrorists (95%) at one end, and as those who did not support the death penalty (18%) at the other. A few months earlier, 67% of the public had supported the reintroduction of the death penalty. The public also viewed sympathiser activities to be helping to ease the prison conditions of terrorists (67%), agreeing with the terrorists' criticisms of society (36%), and believing the terrorists act out of desperation (56%).⁸

When people were asked if sympathisers could be categorised by profession, 57% disagreed. The 43% who agreed this was possible suspected mainly students (38%) and lawyers (32%). Beneath these came communists (23%), university professors (18%), writers (12%), and right-wing persons and former Nazis at 10%.⁹

A summation of these figures would generally be a person under thirty, who was critical of the current political system, and worked towards an alternative system. Whether the person supported evolutionary, or revolutionary means towards this end was apparently not always a determining factor for the public.

This position is supported by a random questioning of 1800 people over eighteen years old in the Federal Republic in late August and early September 1978, which found the public's reactions to terrorism were not along a simple left-right continuum. For example, while 57% of the sample was 'very high/high' interested in terrorism (28% 'medium' and 15% 'low'), only 22% could name three or more terrorists. While 36% could name one or two terrorists, 42% could not even name one terrorist.

⁶ Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann (ed.), *The Germans: Public Opinion Polls, 1967-1980* (London: Greenwood Press, 1981), 163.

⁷ *ibid.*, 164.

⁸ *ibid.*, 166; Pridham, 42.

⁹ *ibid.*

There is a large difference between interest in the issue of terrorism and the public's actual knowledge of the subject.¹⁰

This is a sign of the paradox of terrorism that it seeks publicity while trying to keep its organisational structure secret. The group may have publicity, but its members are only suspected names until their arrest. After the arrests come courtroom trials with more publicity,¹¹ and more terrorist incidents by other group members. However, this may be true of the RAF, but does not apply to the RZ, which is shown below in section three to only seek publicity for its causes, and not itself.

2. Terrorism and the Media

The last example and Figure 4.1 (page 115) in chapter four both highlight the influence of the media on individuals and groups in terrorism. The publicity of the media—favourable or not—has created a symbiotic relationship between it and terrorism whereby the two are possibly inseparably entwined.¹² The media provides a medium for the terrorists' message, and coverage contributes to motivation for the individuals and groups.

Some forms of terrorism cater particularly to the media because they are "pseudo-events", planned or incited events for the primary purpose of immediate reporting to wider audiences. This is in the manner of New Left activities (like the 'pudding bomb' in chapter two) in the late sixties and early seventies when New Left splinter groups turned to terrorism to attract the mass media to break out of their isolation and engender mass mobilisation.¹³

Terrorist publicity campaigns have four main propaganda aims: (1) to convey the 'propaganda of the deed' with 'pseudo-events' and spread fear through the target group; (2) mobilise wider support for their cause both at home and abroad by emphasising the righteousness of their cause and its inevitable victory; (3) delegitimising the government and

¹⁰ Gerhard Unholzer, "Zielgruppenhandbuch fuer die Oeffentlichkeitsarbeit gegen Terrorismus: Einstellungen der Bevoelkerungen zum Terrorismusproblem", in: Bundesministerium des Innern (eds.), *Auseinandersetzung mit dem Terrorismus: Moeglichkeiten der politischen Bildungsarbeit* (Bonn: Bundesministerium des Innern, October 1981), 19-38, 19-22.

¹¹ John Orr, "Terrorism as Social Drama and Dramatic Form", in: John Orr, Dragan Klaic' (eds.), *Terrorism and Modern Drama* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1990, 48-63, 49, 51-2.

¹² Abraham H. Miller, "Terrorism, the Media, and the Law: A Discussion of the Issues", in: Abraham H. Miller (ed.), *Terrorism, the Media, the Law* (Dobbs Ferry, NY: Transnational Publishers Inc., 1982), 13-50, 13.

¹³ Hozic, 64-81, 79, mentions as a counter example, the small coverage of the abduction of aid workers in the Third World; Schmid (1989), 541-3; Wilkinson (1986), 79-80.

security forces' counterterrorism measures with their portrayal as a tyrannical and counterproductive overreaction; (4) mobilise their supporters to incite more acts, boost recruitment and raise funds.¹⁴

An examination of media coverage about terrorism shows that the type of terrorism determines the intensity of the coverage such that terrorists can determine how the public is to be reached. Journalists and politicians create non-violent 'pseudo-events' to the same end.¹⁵

Terrorism, as a method of propaganda for group publicity, has been deemed successful in making people aware of the group. Sometimes this is not only just publicity about the group's means, but also about their cause. This has not, however, legitimised the cause of the terrorist organisations. The media has also implied mental instability amongst terrorists and their leaders, which has led to the implication that one cannot negotiate with 'crazies'.¹⁶

Nonetheless, terrorists believe in the 'propaganda by the deed' and courtroom coverage of trials by the established press was spread publicity further and more effectively than their own pamphlets. To this end they seek useful supporters in the media who will either consciously or subconsciously further the terrorists' ideas.¹⁷

Where terrorist groups can gain little or no publicity in their home country, by undertaking actions in foreign countries they can obtain international publicity with the foreign media. When the media cannot, or will not, come to the terrorists, they can travel to the media centres. The live broadcasts of the Munich Olympic Massacre in 1972 ensured that while millions had not previously heard of the Palestinian cause, they would know about it afterwards.¹⁸ However, since the public has not rushed to join the terrorist groups, it seems that the exposure of the public to terrorists' ideas does not convert them.¹⁹

The media contribute to the terrorist uses of publicity with their own six ways of terrorist motivation. First, on the one hand, the mass media can teach people models of action and experience from elsewhere,

¹⁴ Wilkinson (1990), 30-1.

¹⁵ Gabriel Weimann, Hans-Bernd Brossius, "Die Attraktiviteat von Gewalt: Ueber welche internationalen Terroranschlaege berichten die Medien?" *Publizistik* 34 (3) 1989, 329-39, 334, 335, 338.

¹⁶ John L. Martin, "The Media's Role in International Terrorism" *Terrorism* 8 (2) 1985, 127-46, 134; George Gerbner, "Symbolic Functions of Violence and Terror", in: Yonah Alexander, Richard Latter (eds.), *Terrorism and the Media: Dilemmas for Government, Journalists and the Public* (McLean, VA: Brassey's Inc., 1990), 93-9, 95-6.

¹⁷ Wilkinson (1990), 31; Alex P. Schmid, Janny de Graaf, *Violence as Communication: Insurgent Terrorism and the Western News Media* (London: Sage Publications, 1982), 12, 14.

¹⁸ Wilkinson (1986), 60; Schmid, de Graaf, 30-1.

¹⁹ Nathan Leites in Alexander, Katwan (eds.) (1980), 268.

indicate goals and stimulate aspirations. On the other hand, television arouses people, but does not provide a release for this arousal, and leaves them feeling impotent.²⁰

Contagion, the transfer of ideas from one place or person to another, contributed to the first bombs planted on 2 April 1968 after Ensslin and Baader talked to Langhans and Teufel of *Kommune I* the week after their acquittal in court for incitement to arson as mentioned in chapter two. Media coverage of US activities in Vietnam added both to their feeling that they had to do something about Vietnam because they wanted to avoid the mistakes of their parents' generation, and combined these feelings with ideas from the court case in their own arson attempt.²¹

Second, the media reduce complex political structures and events to the actions of individuals and institutions. This leaves the impression that if individual people are removed, or eliminated, then the problems are solved.²² The public and government thus present the mirror image of the terrorists' belief systems as they dehumanise the terrorists as angry monsters, whose actions have no political significance and present images of the 'good' establishment and 'evil' terrorists. The terrorists lose their human features along with their contact to the social base. Choosing somewhere between the two is thus either backsliding or treachery.²³

Third, for people with hungry egos, the media provide publicity and visibility. People can be known and named by the media. Perhaps this is why Christian Klar left his fingerprints everywhere for the authorities to find and report.²⁴

Fourth, the media can incite people, wittingly or not, to terrorist acts. The attempted murder of Rudi Dutschke by Josef Bachmann falls into this category. When Bachmann was arrested he had newspaper clippings of the right-wing *Deutsche National Zeitung* from 22 March 1968 that said: "Stop Dutschke now! Otherwise there will be a civil war."²⁵

The first item above, contagion, was also apparently at work in Bachmann's assassination attempt on Dutschke. On 4 April 1968 Martin Luther King Jr. was assassinated in Memphis, Tennessee, over a week after the *Deutsche National Zeitung* article. Now, arguably, Bachmann had an idea of how to stop Dutschke, but had television, with its emotive

²⁰ Schmid, de Graaf, 137-8.

²¹ Aust (1987), 48-9.

²² Schmid, de Graaf, 138-9.

²³ Orr, 53; Hozic, 73, and see the opening chapter quote from Boell.

²⁴ Schmid, de Graaf, 139; "'Da ist irgendwo ein Nest'" *Der Spiegel* 15/1991, 22.

²⁵ Aust (1987), 52.

images of King's assassination, not been available, it is unlikely that newspaper accounts would have been as effective at motivating Bachmann.²⁶ Television may have provided an example of how an action could be conducted.

Fifth, the media can motivate terrorists, because news must be new, which contributes to the escalation of violence in terrorism. The worse the incident is, the better it is as news, so terrorism, which remains unpredictable also excites interest.²⁷

Six, the media want good pictures, and the terrorists want publicity, so the arrangements are sometimes made for the media to be on hand when the terrorist events occur.²⁸ It appears that they feed on each other.

The conclusion here should not be that media coverage of terrorism causes more terrorism. That has not been proven, but nevertheless remains an assumption. Rather, it should be thought that the media contributes to terrorism by reinforcing already present personal contacts.²⁹ These are the effects seen previously in Figure 4.1 (page 115). One's personal contacts can influence one's goals, attitude, arousal, frustration and ultimately one's motivation towards terrorism if one is already inclined towards violence. The media can increase these arousals and reinforce one's identifications with these other factors.

The violence of terrorism polarises everyone concerned: the direct witnesses, the victims, and those who learn about it through the media. Those who share some characteristics with the victim usually identify with them, while those who share characteristics with the perpetrators generally identify with them. Sometimes there is an ambiguity of identification: the person disapproves of the means, but identifies with the terrorists' aims. The terrorists are in an apparent no-lose situation. Identifying with the victims brings psychological humiliation, disorientation, and intimidation- -a victory for the terrorists. A direct identification with the terrorists is also a victory bringing them new supporters. The terrorists see no middle

²⁶ Schmid, de Graaf, 128.

²⁷ *ibid.*, 140; J. Bower Bell in: Yonah Alexander, Seymour Maxwell Finger, "Terrorism and the Media" *Terrorism* 2 (1/2) 1979, 55-137, 90-1.

²⁸ Schmid, de Graaf, 140.

²⁹ Robert Picard, "News Coverage as the Contagion of Terrorism: Dangerous Charges Backed by Dubious Science", in: Yonah Alexander, Richard Latter (eds.), *Terrorism and the Media: Dilemmas for Government, Journalists and the Public* (McLean, VA: Brassey's Inc., 1990), 100-110, 101, 104-5.

ground of innocent bystanders. They assume the public will make the right decision if the middle ground is withdrawn.³⁰

The shrinking of the world through high-speed telecommunication links enables long-distance identification to exist whereby the personal knowledge of the imitator is unnecessary. This generally leads to more intense identifications because the lack of personal verification of the desirability and value of the identification object is unavailable. This long distance identification process was employed by the first West German terrorists, who took up the revolutionary struggles of Vietnam and the Palestinians, which they identified with as being on behalf of oppressed people suffering from injustice.³¹

Objects of identification closer to home were felt by the German youth to be tainted with their nation's and parents' past. Therefore they chose to take up distant, remote identifications. German youths in the sixties questioned what their parents' generation did in the Third Reich and did not want to be accused of similar behaviour in a similar situation, which the youths perceived with regards to German support for American involvement in Vietnam.³² Allied to the youths feeling of wanting to react better than their parents was a perception that Germany did not overcome fascism in the forties,³³ but that Germany sought to restore and preserve reactionary power politics.³⁴

This displeasure with the German youths' nationality and past meant that identification with the Third World provided evidence of the Western democracies' inhumanity, and also lifted the protest (and later terrorist) groups' own doubts to a position where their struggle was the objective on a global scale.³⁵ These causes came to them via the public media, and the underground and alternative press,³⁶ which also no doubt supplied them, to some extent, with the methods of terrorism.

Identification also passes from the terrorist to the audiences via the mass media as "identification machines". Print media, which addresses the reader's intellectual understanding, are less suited to this. Television, colourful moving pictures with accompanying sound, on the other hand, is highly suited to bypassing the viewers' consciousness.³⁷

³⁰ Schmid (1989), 545; Leites in Alexander, Katwan (eds.) (1980), 269.

³¹ Schmid, de Graaf, 46; Schmid (1989), 543.

³² Baumann (1978), 81; Mahler in *Der Spiegel* 53/1979, 37, 39.

³³ Mahler (1978), 119.

³⁴ Adamo, 1442.

³⁵ Guggenberger, 103.

³⁶ Schmid, de Graaf, 46.

³⁷ *ibid.*, 54.

Nonetheless, 'identification machines' work in both directions. Even as the terrorists attacked functions and not individuals the death of these people brings about a media inquiry and breath of life into who these people were and what they did. A murdered functionary, like Buback, becomes a husband with children and a pet dog, and the state acquires a human face. The terrorists, on the other hand, in a case of role reversal with the death of a member, do not mention the life of their former comrades, such as Beer and Plambeck, beyond their dedication to the 'cause'.³⁸

3. Terrorism, Public Opinion and the Media

This section examines each of the organisational models in relationship to its characteristics and approaches to the public and the media. For each model type the relevant terrorist organisation is discussed (Revolutionary Cells as 'instrumental', Red Army Faction as 'organisational', and the *Autonomen* as 'expressive') with regard to what they expected of the public, how they viewed them, and why they did not receive public support, but the government did. The aims and expectations of the terrorists about the media are also discussed.

3.1 The Instrumental Model

Chapter five stated that the 'instrumental' model applied to groups using terrorism as a strategic option to further political goals, and that this coincided, to some extent, with the activities and statements of the Revolutionary Cells. The RZ use terrorism to affect increased public pressures for change on the government or other targeted bodies. RZ activities use the public as the object of their actions, the public do not use the RZ as their object to increase pressure on the targeted bodies.³⁹ The 'public' for the group may be an exclusive one when aims are limited to particular causes chosen by the group.

The Revolutionary Cells argue that they are part of the masses and want to help them help themselves. However, as the group began as afterhours activity by people in other political organisations and did not undertake large activities and publish pamphlets, the public could not identify with the RZ itself, but with the goals of the other groups the members belonged to, such as anti-imperialism, support for prisoners

³⁸ Hozic, 74.

³⁹ Iring Fetscher, Herfried Munckler, Hannelore Ludwig, "Ideologien der Terroristen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland", in: Iring Fetscher, Guenter Rohrmoser (eds.), *Ideologien und Strategien: Analysen des Terrorismus Band I* (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1981), 15-271, 161.

and other activities. At that time the group was orientated towards discussion amongst people.⁴⁰

The group began with a security consciousness that overrode other considerations and influenced its public presentation. It was concerned that the media and authorities had as little information as possible to turn against the RZ members, and there were other campaigns and organisations already publicising their issue areas. The lack of arrests or other names in connection with the group also assured that any publicity about the group led nowhere. As the group perceived itself as a part of other groups,⁴¹ they did not want to overly publicise themselves to the detriment of their political aims.

The publication of their own annual magazine, *Revolutionaerer Zorn*, from 1975 to 1981, however, directed itself towards those leftists who fought against the political system, because one either fought against, or was part of the capitalist system. The magazine sought to further discussion about the theories and practicalities of such fighting.⁴² These were not directed at the general public, but at those who already approved of violence in general, but had not previously considered low-level terrorism. Identification with the group was then only open to the far left who had access to RZ letters of responsibility in the alternative press as only larger RZ bombings and the murder of Karry in 1981 attracted general press attention.

Given the increase of Revolutionary Cell incidents in the early eighties, it would seem that the group reached new members and received public identification with some of their public audience. Others may have identified with the RZ, but not used their label and thus fallen under 'other' in government classification. This would show further identification success on behalf of the public as discussed in chapter three.

Nonetheless, the Revolutionary Cells have not received widespread direct public support, although there may be support for their goals evident in other, non-violent citizen initiatives that deal with similar issues such as South Africa, and nuclear power. The rise to power of the Green party to membership in *Laender* coalition governments with Social Democrats has, no doubt, also reduced their public support in more recent years.

The Revolutionary Cells are perhaps an unusual example of the 'instrumental' model as they do not seek publicity for themselves, but

⁴⁰ Revolutionary Cells, (1975), 208, 226-7.

⁴¹ *ibid.*, 226-7, 229.

⁴² Revolutionary Cells, (1985), 24, 41.

for their chosen causes that are highlighted by their attacks discussed in chapter three. While the group seeks publicity for its causes amongst the general public, its recruitment efforts are directed towards far left readers of the alternative press. This follows the aim of focusing public pressure while remaining behind the scenes as members of the legal groups, who also conduct 'afterhours' activity. This 'instrumental' nature of the RZ, however, is questionable with those cells that pursue issues without widespread public support as discussed in chapter three.

3.2 The Organisational Model

The 'organisational' model views terrorism as the result of internal group dynamics, with the group seeking to maintain cohesion and survival through members' incentives. Ideological goals may be secondary to group survival, as their achievement may end the group. The Red Army Faction may have sought to be an 'instrumental' group, but became 'organisational' as its emphasis shifted to obtain the release of their imprisoned members. Therefore the public is important only to the extent that it can help facilitate group survival, and whether the group survives or not, is only to be found through the practice of trial and error. The 'primacy of praxis' would show if interested third parties, the audience, came to the group's support.⁴³ This occurs in publicity about the group to aid recruitment, and highlight ideological issue areas of group activity. As with the Revolutionary Cells the 'public' may equal the far left and not the general public.

The Red Army Faction stated after they freed Baader that it was not directing itself towards the intellectual left, but rather towards the youths in juvenile centres, poor families and factory workers. These people would understand the need to free prisoners because they themselves were prisoners. They would understand that a 'Red Army' was theirs and support it with more groups who would follow their example.⁴⁴ However, as discussed in chapter two, the group contradicted these aims with the freeing of Baader before the logistical apparatus for the group was organised, and without a clear idea of how they were to achieve their aims from the underground.

These were not insurmountable problems for the RAF, who saw their isolation from the public not as a sign of rejection, but the state

⁴³ Fetscher et. al., 43-6.

⁴⁴ Ulrike Meinhof, "Natuerlich kann geschossen werden" *Der Spiegel* 25 (15 June) 1970, 74-5; Red Army Faction, "Die Rote Armee aufbauen", in: Reinhold Rauball (ed.), *Die Baader-Meinhof-Gruppe* (West Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1973), 83-6.

using unbelievable amounts of energy to separate the group from the masses. That the public was not waiting to join the group was only a sign that the concept of the armed struggle would arise in the collective class struggle when people were not demoralised but acted.⁴⁵ Partly this is due to the "trail of the politics of the RAF", whereby many people change their position towards the state because of state measures against the group. Now people began to realise the state was an imperialist repression machine against the people.⁴⁶

The 'identification machines' of the media were enacted by the second phase of left-wing West German terrorism after the Red Army Faction founders were arrested and imprisoned. Through the help of their lawyers imprisoned RAF members were able to portray themselves as isolated and held in poor conditions in order to gain the support and sympathy of further young and idealistic people. By 'terrorizing' themselves through hunger strikes the terrorists could use public reaction for recruitment.⁴⁷

The RAF founders took this even further on 18 October 1977 when they used 'pseudo-terrorism', with themselves as victims, to imply that the government was guilty of murder when they committed suicide after hearing about the Mogadishu rescue. The result was that many believed the state to be guilty, and the press was filled with speculation about their deaths.⁴⁸

RAF group activities were less identifiable for the public. While the bombings of 1972 may have been clearly interpreted by the public, the murders of 1977 were less so. The murders in the eighties were even more difficult to explain and justify to the RAF's far left audience as confirmed by the discussion that arose after the murder of Pimental in 1985, as mentioned in chapter two, and their search for new allies in their development of a West European anti-imperialist front between them and other groups.⁴⁹

None of these measures by the group brought greater public identification with them. Their activities have been less understood by the public as only those who developed a personal connection to the group were recruited, as discussed in chapter five. They do not appear to recruit others without this direct contact to either a member or

⁴⁵ Red Army Faction, "Dem Volk dienen: Stadtguerilla und Klassenkampf" (1983), 401-2.

⁴⁶ Original emphasis, Red Army Faction, "'Wir werden in den Durststreik treten'" *Der Spiegel* 4 (20 January) 1975, 52-7, 55.

⁴⁷ Hozic, 47.

⁴⁸ *ibid.*, 49-50.

⁴⁹ Red Army Faction, "Guerilla, Widerstand und Antiimperialistische Front" (1983), 608.

someone who attends trials, and protests for the group. Thus the group dynamics play a more integral part, than the issues the group canvases for, and the public remains excluded.

This group dynamic aspect makes the RAF an ideal-type 'organisational' group. Internal conditions drive the group, not their ideological goals. Their ideology can be used to justify their continued existence, but has the problem that it is not understood outside of their target audience. These are the people the group concerns itself with, not the general public. Within their recruitment field prisoner conditions play a more important role than underground group activities, which appear to show the group's ability.⁵⁰ The lack of sustained campaigns since 1986 leads to this conclusion.

3.3 The Expressive Model

The 'expressive' model places the emphasis of terrorism on the act itself as the motivating factor. Long-term goals apart from the repetition of terrorist acts are not considered in this model which places a high regard on the 'spectacle' of terrorism. Some *Autonomen* cells are arguably of this variety and less inclined towards the 'instrumental' model described above. As the focus of the group is inward on the 'spectacle' of terrorism, the group does not concern itself with the general public, only like-minded others.

The *Autonomen* argue that their activities must be clearly understood by the public as resistance against the political system, to preserve the security of those who undertake these acts, which are to be part of already identifiable campaigns around the issue. Together this shows that resistance is possible, and some of the public who identify with the strength of the state because they see no strength in the masses, will identify with and imitate these resisters.⁵¹ This mirrors the Revolutionary Cell arguments above.

However, the *Autonomen* also hold the notion that their call to resistance happens once, and they are not responsible if people ignore the signs of their fighting. They do not care about people's opinions, because all activity is done for themselves.⁵²

Autonomen activities are responses to what they see in their daily lives. They do not want to relinquish their lifestyle to become workers,

⁵⁰ See Dowling, 16-7, on how insiders (supporters) and outsiders (public) receive messages from terrorist groups.

⁵¹ n.n. *Das Tapfere Schneiderlein*, 11-2.

⁵² n.n. *Guerilla Diffusa*, 12-3, 30.

but rather develop themselves. To this end they seek means for the expression of personal radicalism in public movements.⁵³

The **Autonomen** argue that the public has difficulty identifying with terrorists because they only represent idols to resistance fighters and devils to others. The **Autonomen** see themselves, unlike the terrorists, because they use means- -fantasy and energy- -available to everyone. **Autonomen** do not seek to use methods available to underground terrorists like the RAF to conduct sophisticated attacks like light beam triggered bombs, but seek to use their imagination and enthusiasm to conceive of ways and means of turning events into 'spectacles' with the limited means at everyone's disposal. However, because the media present their activities out of context, they appear as mysterious, which hinders their identification building impact.⁵⁴ This is minimised though, as the **Autonomen** target audience is not the general public, but the far left, who they want to join their resistance against the 'system'.

The **Autonomen** exemplify the 'expressive' model in their disregard for the public as they undertake resistance to develop their own lives as they see fit. Ideally they see this personal radicalism developed within public movements, but if not, then they believe others will understand their resistance to the system and join them. The public is superfluous to the scheme because the whole emphasis is on personal development.

4. Terrorism, the Media and the Government

The media is not monolithic, and different people will expend various efforts to obtain desired news, which may be presented in diverse quantities with attention to increasing their ratings over their competitors'. Terrorism attracts news media attention because it (a) arouses public alarm with its ruthlessness and unpredictability, (b) could happen to anyone, which provides dramatic excitement as audiences generally identify with the victims, and (c) is critically important for governments when it signals dissension, highlights security problems, and creates political crisis.⁵⁵

The media can also end rumours and counter erroneous and potentially harmful information, especially during on-going incidents such as hijackings and other hostage-taking acts. At other times, however, the media cause deaths in these incidents because they do not hold back information, as was partially the case with Captain Juergen Schumann of

⁵³ *ibid.*, 64-5.

⁵⁴ *ibid.*, 64.

⁵⁵ A.H. Miller, 27; Martin, 142; Schmid, (1989), 552-3.

the 1977 hijacked Lufthansa plane, 'Landshut'. He was murdered because the terrorists heard over the radio that he had smuggled out information to the authorities, and for taking too long--due to Yemeni soldiers around the plane--in returning from checking the landing gear after an emergency landing.⁵⁶

Although all acts that are the same should have the same label, the media usually use the definitions of violence that are passed on to them from their information sources--mainly the government with regard to terrorism. This does not deny that in other cases the news media have more information than the authorities, as is the case when they obtain interviews with suspected terrorists. The police, in some of these cases, have an information superiority over the media, who have editorial deadlines. The government can therefore preselect and offensively present their information to the media, which may be doubly handicapped. The media can become source dependent upon the government sources and wittingly, or unwittingly, disseminate government opinion. This can lead to news about terrorism that has no basis in reality, while other terrorist acts are never heard about, both of which distort public perceptions of terrorism.⁵⁷

One example is the alleged theft of fifty-three mustard gas canisters from an army depot by the Red Army Faction that was reported in the press. Later the theft of the gas canisters was linked by the **Bundeskriminalamt** with a supposed gas attack on the **Bundestag**. Several months later the canisters were 'found', and their 'loss' attributed to inaccurate inventories.⁵⁸ The original report about the gas canisters has been included by authors who did not see the later corrections.⁵⁹

Alternatively the government can suppress information from terrorist groups to enable it to create favourable conditions for policy implementation. In Stuttgart, press reports stated that the Red Army Faction planned to bomb the city centre on 2 June 1972. Before then a BKA authenticated RAF statement sent to several newspaper editors claimed this was a false report planted, most likely, by the police. The government suppressed the communique, and the result was a beleaguered Stuttgart on 2 June with thousands of police checking roads, vehicles and 'suspicious persons'. The government had created conditions favourable to the introduction of rewards, which, they felt, could only

⁵⁶ A.H. Miller, 25-6, 29; Aust (1987), 521-2.

⁵⁷ A.H. Miller, 17-8; Schmid, de Graaf, 64-5, 93.

⁵⁸ Cobler (1978), 45-7, contains this example and others concerning false reports of terrorist activities and their actual explanations.

⁵⁹ see how Robert H. Kuppermann uses these canisters in: Alexander, Finger (1979), 60; and Wilkinson (1986), 149.

be used if the public were confronted with spectacular events. If not, the rewards were believed to only add psychological weight to the terrorists. This was decided, however, in January 1972, i.e. before the May 1972 bombing campaign.⁶⁰ Events of terrorist nature have also been conducted by the government and attributed to terrorist groups, as was discussed with regard to the 'Celle Hole' in chapter six.

Two more examples show how the media and government relationship works at opposite ends of the spectrum between unfettered and restrained media coverage in on-going terrorist incidents. For West Germany the two ends were the Lorenz abduction in February/March 1975, where terrorists virtually dictated broadcast policy to the government,⁶¹ and the Schleyer abduction coupled with the Lufthansa hijacking in September/October 1977 when the government requested, and mostly received, a news embargo on the events. This news embargo went further than anything else in a peacetime democracy.⁶²

Some results of the Peter Lorenz abduction can be seen in its coverage in the Springer press publications. Between 28 February and 6 March (from the day after the kidnapping to the day after Lorenz's release) the quality paper *Die Welt* used 42.8% of their political reportage space for the abduction, while the mass circulation *Bild* used 72.51% of its political reportage space for the abduction. Comparatively, the *Stuttgarter Zeitung* used 31.7% and the *Frankfurter Rundschau* used 38.68%.⁶³

The Springer press writers used various writing techniques to communicate with their readers that they too were in danger from the terrorists. A 'diffusion' process was engaged to intimate that the terrorists were part of a larger network of intellectuals and others indirectly responsible for the abduction. Furthermore, by using various 'intimacy building' techniques such as 'concretism' (to provide the impression that the readers have all of the information), 'offers of identification' (which idealises the victims and brings them closer to the reader), and 'psychologising' (to reduce the terrorists' motives to purely private and psychological ones), the writers made the public feel endangered. All of these techniques were also employed to a lesser extent in the other newspapers.⁶⁴

⁶⁰ Cobler (1978), 169.

⁶¹ Melvin J. Lasky, "Ulrike Meinhof and the Baader-Meinhof Group" *Encounter* 6, 1975, 9-23, 15-6.

⁶² Schmid, de Graaf, 154.

⁶³ *ibid.*, 79-80.

⁶⁴ *ibid.*, 80.

Combining this biased press coverage with large quantity press and other media coverage must have left the reader with the impression that the terrorists had 'carried the attack into the heart of the state' and distorted the reality of the event. While the media no doubt condemned the abduction, their large scale reporting of the event made the affair of one family an affair of the nation and forced the public to take sides and identify with one participant or the other. People could identify with the seemingly powerful terrorists, the impotent victim, or the equally impotent government that had decided the life of one individual was more important than law and order. Thus the 'information machine' was used by the terrorists to turn the violence against one into the violence against millions.⁶⁵

After the murder of Hanns Martin Schleyer's bodyguards and driver and his subsequent abduction on 5 September 1977 a news embargo was introduced three days later that lasted forty-five days, with most of the 139 terrorist communications to thirty-seven media sources not reaching the public. The terrorists were unable to build up a wave of public sympathy and compassion to force the government to release the imprisoned terrorists in exchange for Schleyer and the airline passengers.⁶⁶

The government news embargo covered 121 dailies in West Germany, and fewer than twelve ignored the government request. The government and the media were somehow able to contain the normally existent competitive pressures. Additionally, the government press office monitored the German office communications of twenty foreign news agencies, seventy radio and seven television programmes, German dailies, foreign dailies and other magazines. If the government deemed something harmful it asked for the item to be blocked, issued a denial or a statement. This negated or placed the news in a different light and influenced the news before it reached the public. This also extended to foreign news agencies such as the BBC, who held back on reporting the GSG 9 flight to Mogadishu.⁶⁷

Not everything was suppressed by the West German government. It allowed useful information through to the public. This included coded messages to the terrorists from the government, and later after an intermediary was introduced (the Swiss lawyer, Denis Payot) the government announced when communications were received and sent to the Red Army Faction. The content of these was not disclosed. The government also encouraged the reporting of ministers' moves to Algeria, Libya,

⁶⁵ *ibid.*, 81, 152-3.

⁶⁶ *ibid.*, 49, 154, 156.

⁶⁷ *ibid.*, 155.

South Yeman, Iraq and Vietnam, which had been chosen by Baader and others as possible safe-havens for their exchange. These movements were used to win time for the investigation. However, the government was silent on the crisis management committee, and about the investigation for the abductors' location.⁶⁸

The news embargo was to ensure the government's ability to keep their investigation secret because the terrorists had threatened Schleyer's death if it was not stopped, and feared they could not keep it secret if the media uncovered its continuation. The government also wanted to keep its strategy and tactics secret from the terrorists, and to prevent the media from being used by the terrorists for propaganda purposes.⁶⁹

However, the government news embargo was not completely successful, because some foreign media received terrorist communiques (French and Dutch) which in turn were used by the German media.⁷⁰ Also the 19 September issue of *Der Spiegel* carried a story of the crisis committee that said they would not release the prisoners, but sought to gain time through negotiations with the terrorists. Later an attempt by Schleyer's family to pay a \$15 million ransom for his release was ruined when the time and place of the exchange became publicly known through the media.⁷¹

All the West German press could do was to comment on the information the government provided, and on the RAF communiques that were printed in the foreign press. Thus, to some extent, the news embargo did not work and the terrorists received publicity.⁷²

The news embargo went against the basic feelings of journalists and their editors, who felt that while this is perhaps alright in exceptional circumstances, but should not become the norm. In this case, forty-five days was also too long. Amongst the public, 70-80% supported the news embargo.⁷³

While the terrorists did not direct when and what was broadcast, as in the Lorenz abduction, there were frequent programme changes. For example, the funerals of Schleyer's guards must have had an effect similar to what would have occurred without the embargo.⁷⁴ The same must

⁶⁸ *ibid.*, 155-6.

⁶⁹ *ibid.*, 156.

⁷⁰ *ibid.*

⁷¹ Gitta M. Bauer in Alexander, Finger (eds.) (1979), 134-5.

⁷² Tolmein, zum Winkel, 39, 71-2; One side effect of the news embargo is that it provided the impetus to found *die tageszeitung (die taz)* in 1978. See *die taz* 5 October 1987, 20.

⁷³ Bauer in Alexander, Finger (eds.) (1979), 135-6; Schmid, de Graaf, 156.

⁷⁴ *ibid.*, 157.

have been true for Schleyer's own funeral which was broadcast, except that this one contrasted that given for Baader, Ensslin and Raspe.

The government also allowed a two part programme on anarchism and Bakunism that idealised and glorified them, as well as portrayed them as opponents of the October revolution. Later anarchism and Bakunism, according to the programme, resulted in state bureaucratic socialism, and became the spiritual father of 'anarcho-terrorism' that affected Germany. This could be said to affect the public by pointing the finger towards Marxists as the origins of terrorism.⁷⁵

The government had one large benefit in the news embargo- -it obviated the need to explain why it was not going to release the imprisoned terrorists for the hostages. They could portray an image of negotiation towards an exchange to the public, even though the other decision had already been made one day after Schleyer's abduction. The goal of maintaining a strong state image at home and abroad was the hidden agenda behind the publicity of protecting Schleyer's life.⁷⁶

Had the rescue at Mogadishu been unsuccessful, the government would have had a high price to pay for the lack of public understanding that would have been evident. This would have been different if the public had been continuously informed during the news embargo.⁷⁷

That the news embargo had been a method of crisis management aimed at reducing public sympathy, and compassion to provide a free hand for government action in the kidnapping and hijacking, would be the cynical explanation.⁷⁸ On the other hand, the government could not reduce all of the identification possibilities to a choice between the terrorists, and the victims. In mid-September 60% did not want the government to grant the terrorists' demands (22% did). After the hijacking in October the public was evenly divided: 42% for, and 42% against supplying the terrorists' demands. This could be partially attributed to the fact that in the first case there was one life at stake in exchange for ten freed terrorists. In the second case there were eighty-seven more lives added, whom the public could identify with as holiday-makers.⁷⁹

The implication of this is that, had the Mogadishu rescue operation gone wrong, then the public would have seen the government as defeated with regards to terrorism, despite the government's firmness against the terrorists' demands. In September 1977 48% of the public had thought the government had acted resolutely and deliberately, and 27% had thought

⁷⁵ Adamo, 1447.

⁷⁶ Botzat et. al., 61.

⁷⁷ Schmid, de Graaf, 157.

⁷⁸ Botzat et al, 65.

⁷⁹ Pridham, 43.

not. A month later, 50% had thought the government been 'resolute and well-considered', 35% not so, and 15% were undecided.⁸⁰

The West German news embargo's mixed results, and its inappropriateness where emphasis is placed on knowing what has been decided on the public's behalf, raises the question of other options. At the extreme end there is censorship of all terrorist incidents. In some cases this could lead to increased terrorist incidents when government supporters think they can attack suspected left-wing terrorists and their supporters without any fear of exposure or criticism by the media. Furthermore, the possibility of rumours that are worse than overheated news coverage is also possible,⁸¹ possibly damaging government credibility and thus aiding the terrorists.

In between news embargos and censorship from above and unfettered coverage, are other possibilities. Codes of practice for the media have been suggested, but also have problems when each incident is considered unique and makes generalised rules inadequate. Additionally, each news organisation, radio and television stations and the press, are also unique. To force them all into one mould would be difficult and possibly futile.⁸²

Delayed reporting has other difficulties. For example, media and government credibility is on the line when lots of people already know what has happened, such as when buildings are cleared in bomb scares, and other incidents. Lies by the authorities and the media could be remembered, so it is necessary to avoid lies, in order that the public trust the media and the government next time. One suggested way out of this dilemma is for the media to not become part of the story, and to stay away from these problems.⁸³

Another option, moving towards censorship, is that of banning television and radio interviews with terrorists and other proscribed organisations as a means of reducing propaganda outlets.⁸⁴ However, this is less of an option in the Federal Republic where such interviews are few and rare, than in the United Kingdom where they have been more frequent due to the availability of elected parliamentary representatives and Provisional Irish Republican Army spokesmen available for comment after terrorist incidents, who could speak about the 'armed struggle'.

⁸⁰ *ibid.*; Noelle-Neumann (ed.), 165.

⁸¹ Schmid, de Graaf, 150, 157; Schmid (1989), 560.

⁸² Charles L. Bennet in: Michael T. McEwan, Stephen Sloan, "Terrorism: Police and Media Problems" *Terrorism* 2 (1/2) 1979, 1-54, 4-5.

⁸³ Jim Campbell in McEwan, Sloan (eds.) (1979), 33-5.

⁸⁴ Wilkinson (1990), 32-3.

Interviews with terrorists can be dubious sources that may include inaccuracies, lies and exaggerations, and could be unwitting 'identification machines' for the terrorists. The terrorists use of their own language to define reality and to challenge the existing order in confrontation with public morality, may lead some viewers to ponder why the terrorists believe what they do, and to seek explanations.⁸⁵

On the other hand, however, it must be remembered that terrorists are not intellectual supermen that appeal to everyone. Their messages are often confused, and they should be confronted with common sense, instead of being allowed to live in their isolated underground ghettos. The words the terrorists utter are less dear than the lives they take with their 'propaganda by the deed', and they should be able to send their messages without the cost of life. It could be argued that the public fear the pictures of the victims, not those of the terrorists.⁸⁶

In combination with terrorist access to the media would have to be sound government arguments based on the truth that compared democratic realities with terrorist realities, and democratic ideals with terrorist ideals as a means of confronting the terrorists' tendency to compare their ideals with democratic reality. Part of this could be done in the form of countering terrorist pamphlets in a serious manner with properly refuted arguments.⁸⁷ These counter-arguments would reduce the effect of the terrorists' messages to their own members and supporters and provide increased familiarity with the terrorists' perspectives and its pitfalls, because its mystery would be reduced.

Other possibilities are self-restraint and voluntary guidelines for the different media.⁸⁸ This would be part of consistent coverage of terrorism so the public can become aware of the problem and yet keep it in perspective with other events. This avoids the two extremes of articles about fear and terror on the one hand, and nothing in between the appearance of these extreme articles about terrorism on the other.⁸⁹ A benefit of this for the authorities would be a higher public recognition of wanted terrorists, especially if the government had its way, with televised videos of different terrorists in different disguises, i.e. with beard, without beard, long hair, short hair, etc.⁹⁰ It also respects the media's role of informing the public by enabling them to form opinions according to their own desires on one newspaper's,

⁸⁵ Schmid, de Graaf, 14, 16, 25.

⁸⁶ *ibid.*, 170.

⁸⁷ Schmid (1988), 173-4.

⁸⁸ Wilkinson (1986), 177.

⁸⁹ David Anable in Alexander, Finger (eds.) (1979) 133.

⁹⁰ Schaeuble, *Stern* 39 (45) 1986, 255.

or radio or television programme's subjectivity over another, and recognises readers' preferences for entertainment value and information.⁹¹

5. Summary

Given coverage of terrorism, the public is concerned about its effects. The general public is not inclined to join the terrorists, although parts of the far left might join one of the groups. This is partly because the general public is ignored by the terrorists- -only the 'instrumental' group sought to reach them indirectly through their contacts in other movements. The 'instrumental' groups only sought direct contact to the far left through the alternative press. The 'organisational' type was interested in recruitment through personal contacts and raising general publicity as to its capabilities in the general press. The 'expressive' organisations had self-interest in personal development expressed through public movements.

As only the 'instrumental' type Revolutionary Cells wanted to raise issues in the general media with the general public as part of the movements they support it would appear that coverage of these issues may reduce their perception of a need for terrorism to help further some of the issues raised by protest movements. As they did not argue that terrorism would raise the issues, but would add to the pressure, it is necessary to separate the means of protest from the ends in informed media coverage, which in turn, depends upon the issue, and its legitimacy.

For the 'organisational' type Red Army Faction media coverage aids recruitment, so its reduction may reduce recruitment. However, this can only effectively end when the 'identification machine' of perceived injustice is reduced. This can be achieved by genuinely improved circumstances that bring about personal contacts to the terrorists and their lawyers- -prison conditions- -and also through better discussion of the relationship between the state and the terrorists.

The 'expressive' type groups of possibly some Autonomen cells are not interested in the general media and rely upon the alternative press to spread their ideas of resistance. Their concern for themselves means that they might end their use of terrorism when they feel no need to fight the state, because they can freely develop themselves. A radical free space discussed in chapter six may aid this, as might the use of government articles inserted, either anonymously or with the government organisation's name, in the alternative press to open more discussion

⁹¹ Rabe in Alexander, Finger (eds.) (1979), 70.

about terrorism and the goals of the groups. This is also applicable to the other two organisation types.

This concludes the analysis of the different factors in the motivation of left-wing terrorism in the Federal Republic of Germany and the concept of identification. Individuals, groups, government response, and media and public reaction have been studied with respect to both of these issues, and towards the general theories in each chapter. It now remains to bring these separate findings together for joint discussion over the theoretical and case study findings.

CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSION

The Three Agitators:

No, a good question is followed by a better answer. We see that the extreme is already demanded of you; but still more is demanded of you....¹

The Little Monk:

And you don't think, that the truth, when it is the truth, will prevail, even without us?

Galileo:

No, no, no. Only so much truth is accepted as we accomplish; the victory of reason can only be the victory of the reasonable ones.²

This chapter brings together the concepts discussed throughout the thesis with three different purposes. First, it offers a summary of the concept of identification with relevance to the Federal Republic of Germany. Second, it draws conclusions from the findings on left-wing terrorism in the Federal Republic as to its origins, causes, decline, and how these were affected by individuals, groups, government and the media. Third, it offers practical applications in policy options for the Federal Republic based on these findings. Fourth, it points towards future theoretical applications of identification in the general study of terrorism.

1. Theoretical Summary

The thesis examined how the concept of identification contributes to understanding the motivation of, and responses to political terrorism as a means of integrating the numerous levels of terrorism study shown in Figure 1.1 (page 16). The three by three matrix (individual, group and society on both axes, one as object the other as subject) was covered in different areas of the thesis. Chapter four showed that individuals could meet and be influenced by 'significant others', whom they could follow and/or cause to seek access to as group members, as well as rebel against one image and fight for another. Meinhof was attracted to Ensslin, who represented a group Meinhof wanted to become a part of as a means of working against the developing image of 'latent fascist' Germany as she strove for a different state.

Chapter five highlighted how groups could identify with individuals whom they portrayed as martyrs, and how they sought examples in other similar groups. The Red Army Faction made its dead members into martyrs

¹ Bertolt Brecht, "Die Massnahme" (1978), 257.

² Bertolt Brecht, "Leben des Galilei" (1978), 519.

and identified with other groups like the Palestinians as they sought to destroy the Federal Republic of Germany.

Chapters six and seven showed how society could identify with individual 'victims', and groups that struggled against terrorism (or for freedom) as well as with other societies perceived as similar to themselves or seen to be 'victims'. West German society could identify with individual 'victims' such as Schleyer or Lorenz, as well as with the government officials who struggled against terrorism (or a hijacked plane of holiday makers), and with the USA as it seemingly fought against protesters at home and abroad who were against its involvement in Vietnam and opposed America's role in NATO. The German public understood- -in their view- -that America was their democratic champion, despite what the far left claimed.

Chapter four presented identification as an approach that combined the diverse motivation factors seen in Figure 4.1 (page 115). In particular the ability of belief systems and of personal contacts to limit individual perceptions of available options in the choice of goals and what could be done when these were denied.

Chapter five on group dynamics detailed how the limiting of personal contacts could amplify group belief systems on individuals by enlisting history and fantasy to support the terrorist group in their roles. The chapter also presented three organisational models of terrorist groups. The 'instrumental' model viewed terrorism as a deliberate strategic choice based on collective group values which identified with changes in the political and social context. The achievement of these changes should lead to the end of terrorism by the group. The 'organisation' model viewed terrorism as the result of group identification with survival through incentives and rewards offered to the members. Disagreement over the allocation of these and the best path for the group should lead to its self-destruction if it is left alone. The 'expressive' model viewed terrorism as the result of group identification with self-interest, possibly as the result of frustration in other means. They appear to join public issue protesters only as a means to their ends of terrorism. These cells will only end after the arrest of the members, or when they find other fulfilling activities.

Chapter six showed how the identification model used the 'war' model (paramilitary and police responses) in the short-term, and the 'communication' model (socio-political responses) in the long-term. Optimally, the 'war' model represents tactical short-term options, while 'communication' coordinates long-term counterterrorism policy to reduce terrorism in all areas and avoids overdependence on the 'war' model as

the sole option available to the neglect of coordinated long-term planning. Throughout this the government also needs to maintain its identification with liberal democracy and the rule of law as a means of maintaining public identification with them.

These aspects of identification showed how people developed ties to individuals, groups and societies, and why these occurred in the Federal Republic of Germany amongst the left-wing terrorists in the areas which they did. Identification explained the effects of different group identifications whereby the 'instrumental' model looked for outward change, the 'organisational' model for survival, and the 'expressive' model for self-interest. The potential for these groups was seen to be reflected in how they viewed the public and potential recruitment. Only the 'instrumental' groups sought recruitment amongst the general public, but then only in their non-terrorist group activities. Identification also showed that while the government and the terrorists fought for the 'public's' identification, the government did not understand this in the limited concept of the public which the terrorists used. Therefore, the government overreacted in some instances when they felt particularly threatened, and did not maintain their identification with liberal democracy as rigorously as they should have.

2. Conclusion of Findings

This section re-examines the motivation of left-wing terrorism in the Federal Republic of Germany from the differing perspectives of the individual, group, government and media, with regard to its origins, rise and decline. In contrast to the theoretical aspects of the summary, this section concentrates upon the case study.

2.1 Individuals

Society, in the form of the extra-parliamentary opposition and the alternative culture in the sixties, contributed a perceived need to find alternatives to the present liberal democratic system. Many youths of the time wanted to avoid the mistakes of their parents' generation and its acceptance of the fascist government under the National Socialists. It also encouraged a search for more extreme and provocative protest methods to reach the public with their message of alternatives, which were more a list of undesirable aspects of the present system. The combined influences of society and other individuals led these first members to join with others to form terrorist groups.

However, the youths were not all the same. Those who became left-wing terrorists in West Germany came from diverse backgrounds as was

shown in chapter four. Some were from families without one or both parents, others from whole ones. Also, their parents' employment situations differed. Some had attended university, and others not.

Some common characteristics do stand out. Almost half (47%) of the terrorists suspected, arrested or convicted by 1978 had fathers whose last profession could be considered as an executive one, compared to an average population sample of 12%. Furthermore, the left-wing terrorists of that period were also more likely (21%) to come from a home without one or both parents, than the average population sample (11%). Prior to entering the terrorist group pre-terrorists were more likely (65%) than the average population (52%) to be unemployed, in higher education, to have part-time or irregular work. At this time pre-terrorists were also more involved (137% [multiple responses]) than the average population (36%) in demonstrations, squattings and police confrontations.

Beyond these comparisons to the general public, there were other common characteristics that the terrorists of the seventies exhibited. Most (97%) were born before 1956, and 63% were either orphans, or had experienced the death or divorce of one or both parents. These also provided the foundations for later problems as seen in their likelihood (64%) to have suffered from moving home, school etc., and likelihood (64%) to have had encounters with police and juvenile authorities as a youth. The more problems occurred in the one area, the more likely it was that they also occurred in the other two areas. These factors also influenced the person's later lifestyle to varying degrees.

These high percentage figures for the left-wing terrorists do not hide the fact that there was a sizeable proportion who did not exhibit these problems. There were terrorists who came from complete families, who only moved schools when they went up the educational ladder, who completed university and were in full time employment, or at university. The answer, therefore, as to the biographical source of terrorist motivation lies in other areas of life than those discussed above.

The more significant areas for the terrorists were where individuals influence one another in their decisions of acceptable options for work, enjoyment and lifestyle. For example, 98% were married or had a partner when entering the terrorist group, 57% idolised someone in the group, and 23% felt influenced by someone because of their idol or emotional status. There is presumably a large degree of overlap between partners and influential people, so one person brings their partner into the group, who is then influenced further by the original person who joined.

The factor of key experiences also influenced individuals' decisions, both in the moves towards politically orientated groups, and

as the person assimilated their past life within the framework of the group's belief system. The counter-culture formed one large generally homogenous circle within which the pre-terrorists lived and their own and their partner's experiences moved them towards others with similar ideas. The combination of key experiences and 'significant others' is the likely explanation for why people move towards the counter-culture, pre-terrorist and later terrorist groups.

Once they were in the counter-culture individuals were also influenced by the group dynamics of the pre-terrorist group as it developed into a terrorist group. After the fragmentation of the extra-parliamentary opposition in 1968 when the Emergency Laws were passed by parliament, collections of people without leaders gathered to discuss their options and opportunities. In this atmosphere of group formation a process of leadership selection and initiation of members for possible roles within the groups occurred. Individuals were challenged to meet these group demands, which they wanted to join or lead. These would also support the ideas of provocative protest to spread the message, as well as theft and militant action to prove one's daring.

The West German government influenced individuals with their idealisation of liberal democracy, while they simultaneously re-instated and restored former National Socialists to positions of power in the Federal Republic, and supported and encouraged Third World dictatorships such as the Shah of Iran, and supported American involvement in Vietnam. Individuals were directly motivated against the government through their experiences as demonstrators. The individuals viewed themselves as peacefully protesting, while the government, in the form of the police, used repression to end their protests. Other individuals were influenced by agents provocateurs such as Urbach, who supplied protesters like Baumann with molotov cocktails and bombs, where none might have previously been available. These added to the influence of key experiences and 'significant others' described above.

The media influenced individual's interpretations of world events according to the media perspective. The media could spread messages from protest leaders to wider audiences, or bring news of events that demanded a response, such as how a student was killed by a policeman, or a student leader shot. After a protest event, demonstration or bombing, the media also represented public responses to the event, which would determine its effectiveness and possible need for adaptation in future protests.

Once the pre-terrorist groups moved to the active RAF the individuals' motivation changed group members and others, who,

nonetheless, were motivated towards group membership. West German society now had two focal points of concern about terrorists. The general public worried about the danger they posed, while the New Left, some of whom supported the group, were concerned with how society responded to the group and treated its suspected members.

Individuals concerned with supporting the group could, at first, decide between group membership themselves, forming their own group, or supporting the supporters. The deciding factors in these decisions were key experiences and 'significant others', as described above and in chapter four. Sternebeck was enraged by a court decision over one terrorist, and further motivated by the death of Meinhof. Supporters of the RAF could work through the prisoner support groups, as the prisoners' position became a concern, and offer the opportunity for advancement to the lawyers' offices and the underground group. Others, who disagreed with the RAF's methods, went on to found their own groups, the Second of June and Revolutionary Cells. Klein and Boese objected to RAF group practices and later left to work in the RZ, while Baader's efforts to co-opt B2J members into the RAF failed.

Individuals in the terrorist group now had new motivations to remain members, and society now noticed group activity. Apart from the small group of the New Left, who wanted to support the group, society rejected them. This left the group as the only option for the person, unless they accepted the option of prison. The group protected the individual and the person protected the group by not speaking out to the authorities if arrested. This maintained the group and the person's 'political identity'.

Inside the RAF individuals found offers for their services to the group, and sanctions for unacceptable behaviour. The group's direction influenced the members' positions in the group according to their abilities, who they knew, and their commitment to the cause. As the person moved from outside support with demonstrations to legal support in the committees, and possibly later, in the defence lawyers' offices, until potential membership in the underground, the person was influenced by group manipulation (not being told the whole story that Meins was possibly told to die on hunger strike), intimidation (because if the person did not continue to help the group, he would regret his decision), and incentives (like money and working with those who started the 'struggle'). Group security had its costs and benefits.

Government actions affected individuals' perception of their options once the group was formed. If the person had been identified as a terrorist suspect, then the group offered security and the government

imprisonment. This could only bind the person closer to the group, who now had a stronger hold on the person, unless the government offered the possibility of prison sentence remission in exchange for states' evidence. This has proven of little attraction for most West German terrorists. The move away from the group by individuals has generally (60%) only occurred after the person's arrest. These have also been overly represented by 'experts' (49%) and only 16% of those leaving could be classed as groups' leaders.

The government also affected individuals' perception of terrorist groups through its counterterrorism and antiterrorism activities. Fair and equitable treatment of suspected persons promotes the rule of law, while unfair and harsh treatment promotes protest activity and the search for alternatives. In West Germany the portrayal of unfair and harsh treatment of the terrorist suspects brought people into the prisoner support groups, and this eventually extended the terrorist groups, who took advantage of the peoples' fear of arrest to bring legal members into the underground.

After terrorist groups formed, the media continued, as before, to influence individual perceptions of the world, and, now had another 'story' to inform the public about. The media could inform about the groups' activities, its beliefs and members, as well as about government and public concern and action against terrorist activity. The media coverage of the left-wing groups excited some like Boock to help free imprisoned members Baader and Ensslin, who had once assisted him. Other people also identified with the position of the imprisoned members, whose position was conveyed to the media, and this assisted the formation of the 'committees against torture'. For group members themselves, the media confirmed their suspicions about the government and society, which reinforced their beliefs about their activities.

When the terrorist group begins to decline, as the Second of June has, and which the RAF arguably did in the late seventies and has done again since the late eighties, individual members experience new motivational pressures. The far left of society could intimate that now, more than ever, the group needs new members and support. Others could also imply that the group is worthless and that another group deserves their membership. A person's choice will again be determined by their 'significant others' and key experiences.

Those signals from society that do reach individual members could move them to leave the group because its activities have not fulfilled expectations. They could also lead the person to believe that now is the time to change groups, if the person believes in the viability of

terrorist activities, and as one group is on the decline, they need only to join another group. This occurred with the Second of June members, who are believed to have moved to the RAF and the West Berlin RZ.

Group decline will affect the incentives and sanctions offered and imposed on individual members. The terrorist group may offer higher inducements to retain an individual, rather than have them leave the group. It is also possible, that the group might, as the RAF did with its members who moved to the German Democratic Republic, allow those who want to leave to do so, in the belief that this will enable the group to end the decline with renewed activities.

Similar to when the group formed, government actions in its decline affect individual perceptions of their options. These may encourage or discourage individuals' exit from a group in decline, and may similarly affect individuals contemplating membership.

Government treatment of defeated terrorist groups may be potentially more important than how it treated them when the group was active. Here the experiences of people like Angelika Speitel, who was pardoned, and Boock who left the RAF, are important as examples of possibilities to others. Similarly, the court sentences for the ex-RAF members arrested in East Germany will possibly influence others to leave or join the RAF or other terrorist groups. Sentences perceived as harsh will not encourage others to leave the groups, and those contemplating support may be encouraged to be more active in their support. For this reason the continuation of the RAF is not inconceivable.

The media portrayal of these events and situations may encourage some to aid the declining group, while others will be drawn to other groups according to their own beliefs about group organisation. Some may feel more inclined towards the less rigorously organised RZ or the Autonomen instead of the RAF.

2.2 Groups

The first terrorist groups, the RAF and the B2J, were motivated by society to form in the late sixties through incentives similar to those offered individuals searching for left-wing alternatives then, as well as others particular to groups. The fragmentation of the New Left after 1968 encouraged group formation, as did the particular attraction of some individuals to others, who would follow them. This was instrumental in the freeing of Baader and the beginning of the RAF. The B2J, on the other hand, formed because of the attraction of two smaller groups for one another.

Pre-terrorist group groups also motivated members as discussed above, while leaders' and members' abilities were explored. More importantly, the terrorist group beliefs were also formed into 'macronarratives' to offer solutions to their problems, prepare them for the dangerous group activities, rationalise their guilt and immunise their beliefs from outside influences. At this stage the 'macronarrative' formation was gathered from sources in the literature and experiences of the other groups upon whom the German groups modelled themselves (Tupamaros and Palestinians), as well as from their own history (anti-fascist resistance) and experiences (youth work).

Throughout this process of 'macronarrative' formulation (discussed in chapter five) the group rejected and excluded various other groups and means of action as unworthy and inappropriate. Discussion was inappropriate, action was appropriate, and groups that supported discussion- -the political parties- -were unworthy. This concept of the primacy of action led to many small bombings in the late sixties, like the one planned and assisted by Urbach with *Kommune I* which did not work, and the one planted by Baader, Ensslin and others in 1968.

The formation of one terrorist group did not hinder the formation of others, which established competition between themselves. Despite the declaration of differing aims, this competition was friendly enough to provide one another aid and assistance when the new groups were formed. The RAF helped the B2J, who also shared logistics with the RZ.

The government's contribution to group formation was similar to its motivation for individuals. The activities of groups with illegal aims were the subject of police scrutiny and to avoid this the groups had to remain clandestine until logistically and operationally ready to confront the authorities. The apprehension of members prior to this caused turmoil within the groups, when no obvious leader was available to replace arrested ones. This contributed to the RAF's formation after Baader's arrest in 1970, because Ensslin would not continue without him, and Mahler could not replace him.

The media provided coverage of the group's aims and government activities, which were part of the groups' justification. The media also provided models of terrorist groups and liberation movements to be supported and emulated.

After the groups were formed, and society in general rejected them, this encouraged further activity to exhibit their commitment and necessity for more activity to exhibit the connection between themselves, their enemies, and their goals. Simultaneously this required that the groups reformulate their organisations according to whom or

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what they perceived as their social base. The original legal/illegal concept of the RAF and B2J were found unworkable. Instead the RAF had three sections (underground, legal base and prisoners) until the mid-eighties when it added the illegal militants. The B2J used underground and legal supporters as their prisoners were integrated into the RAF prison system. Only the RZ was able to use the illegal/legal organisation, apart from its underground 'Europe' network in the seventies. These organisational structures also reflected their far left audiences, which became smaller over time. The only audience to have arguably grown is that of the Autonomen who accounted for most of the terrorist incidents in the eighties.

Terrorist group formation added to the 'macronarrative' with more justifications based on members' collective experiences. Deaths and arrests of members were worked into the 'macronarrative' as the result of government and police activity which demanded group reaction. As time progressed the 'macronarrative' moved further towards a position of 'fantasy' based on the group's subjective interpretation of their situation. Their fantasy supported them in their activities. For example, this allowed the interpretation of the deaths of Meinhof, Baader and others as murders, instead of suicides. Similarly, they could also believe that they were in a position to endanger the liberal democracy of the Federal Republic of Germany.

Terrorist group support for one another over the years has assisted their motivation. This also applies to Palestinian and West European groups support and assistance for the West German groups. After one foreign group's assistance ended another was immediately sought to maintain sources of supply and safe-havens. When one group, the B2J, was deemed unnecessary it merged to continue the terrorist 'struggle' with a revitalised RAF and RZ West Berlin cell.

The government's contribution to the rise of the terrorist groups lay in how its counter- and antiterrorism policies forced professionalism on the terrorist groups. The high number of group member arrests and deaths in the early days of the RAF and B2J forced the groups to adopt tighter control and increase their professionalism to maintain themselves. The terrorists' success with these measures lies in the fact that the government does not know who was personally involved in many of the left-wing terrorist incidents undertaken by the groups. Group professionalism and control have also, to some extent, influenced the groups' operational targets and methods such that these have become deadlier. The RAF, for example, does not undertake abductions, but assassinations. However, this does not excuse the RAF, who, if they

believed the benefits outweighed the costs, could probably mount an abduction.

The government also affected group membership and areas of activity for the RZ and Autonomen on local and regional issues when it was perceived as being unresponsive to issues in the regions. For example, the Hafenstrasse squatters in Hamburg, the runway in Frankfurt and nuclear power plants, highlight this motivational aspect.

Media influence on the groups has been linked to their recruitment. Media coverage for the RAF was most effective during hunger strikes when it might encourage new people to join the committees, and during abductions when it could add to the pressure of release prisoners. This was also determined by who the hostage was, as exemplified in the difference between public reaction to Schleyer and the Lufthansa passengers. More people thought the passengers should be exchanged for the prisoners, than thought Schleyer should be exchanged. Contrastingly, the RZ and Autonomen do not seek publicity beyond that for their cause and how people can also use similar political violence to support other issues.

Terrorist group decline can be seen in low recruitment amongst its perceived audience. The RAF countered this problem in the late seventies with a merger of most of the B2J members, and through the removal of dissenting members to East Germany. Simultaneously, the group also sought out new audiences with its realignment towards the 'anti-imperialist front in Western Europe', which became fully operational in the mid-eighties with Action Direct cooperation. The end of this cooperation between the two groups with AD arrests in 1986/87 resulted in a renewed RAF decline exhibited by no campaigns, but only single operations.

The 'Europe' branch of the RZ declined and ended sometime in the late seventies, while the 'national' branch continued. RZ activities have declined in the late eighties, but it is unknown what has occurred in the slow period of potential decline in the RZ since late 1987.

The groups are influenced in their decline by the government to the extent that it encourages or discourages group dissolution and decline. Increased pressures on a declining group may only encourage continuation as the group offers the best safe-haven to its members. This is possibly one result of the Kronzeuge on active RAF and RZ members, because no active members have accepted the offer. It could also be that the widening of 129a StGB has added members to the RZ and RAF because these people feel threatened by the possibility that they now fall under the

shadow of 129a. However, these are only speculations without evidence to support or disprove them.

The government can also encourage decline through efforts aimed towards open discussion in society about terrorism and reconciliation. Discussions with imprisoned members by parliamentarians, as has occurred with the RAF and Greens, may assist the end of the group, because its isolation is broken. Similarly the media may facilitate or hinder the end of the group through its coverage of the affairs. Sympathetic coverage may encourage others to open discussions with legal supporters and thus curtail membership. Negative reportage of the issues may hinder the decline because it could reinforce stereotyped responses that terrorists are inhuman and that talking to them is fruitless.

2.3 Government

The government facilitates the organisation of terrorist groups when it ignores (or is perceived to ignore) legitimate public grievances and concerns. The New Left perceived this when it protested against the Emergency Legislation in 1968, and when it protested against the visit of the Shah of Iran in 1967. The responses to that demonstration, which included the killing of a student, added to the far left's perception that the government's reaction was unfair and harsh to their demonstrations. Later the RZ formed in protest of government support for authoritarian Third World countries, and because of perceived harsh and unfair treatment of RAF prisoners.

Individuals influenced government actions and contributed to the formation of terrorist groups for several reasons. First, individuals implement government decisions as the policeman who shot Ohnesorg, and as the prison official who ordered the prison conditions for Meins and others. Second, individuals are the ones imprisoned as the object of government decisions and who can thus elicit public support.

Groups influenced government contributions towards terrorist group formation when they encouraged the perception that the extra-parliamentary opposition was against the public interest, and that they should support the government. However, this was only a general condition. There are always groups for and against the government.

The sheer size and compartmentalisation of the government bureaucracies allows that some will not know what the others are doing, and they may work at cross purposes. This possibly explains the presence of undercover agents in the New Left scene in the late sixties and early seventies who could facilitate the pre-terrorist groups' acquisition of bombs, molotov cocktails and the pursuit of weapons.

The government assisted the rise of the terrorist groups and their formation when it discounted the arguments of unfair and harsh treatment of terrorist prisoners without giving them due consideration and adequate counter-arguments. The continuation of these arguments led to increased terrorist supporters when the prisoner support groups were taken over by the RAF.

This mistake was repeated in several forms when the government did not completely refute the suspicions about the deaths of Meinhof and others while in prison. Had these prison conditions been adequately handled, then there may not have been as much continued support for the terrorist groups, because the 'macronarrative' would not have been as fuelled as it was by the prison conditions and deaths of these members.

The government also facilitated terrorism because it has handled all terrorist groups in a single uniform manner, as if they were all enroute to RAF membership, instead of acknowledging the different aims and methods of the groups. The widening categories of people considered to be suspected terrorists, also possibly contributed to terrorism.

The decline of the terrorist groups is encouraged by the government when it withdraws the social base from the groups. The government has not yet done this, although it has moved towards this position in the late eighties through discussions via Green party members with the RAF. However, the RZ and **Autonomen** still feel they have unheeded concerns to which their actions are responses.

The government has facilitated the end of individual terrorists' careers through treatment of each as individuals. The government belief in the ability of its supergrass legislation to aid the decline of terrorism has ignored the situation in the groups which excludes the possibilities of any 'traitors' to the group because of the personal relationships which have been established between them. This was probably also a sign that the government does not discriminate between different types of terrorist groups, but rather sees them all as more similar rather than dissimilar.

2.4 Media

In general, the media in the Federal Republic of Germany did what they always do. They presented world and national events that it considered newsworthy. It also encouraged a simplified version of the world in its concentration on individuals as responsible for events, and its presentation of terrorist group models from other parts of the world. Through the media's connections to the government they also presented the government viewpoint of protest groups and of the

potential dangers these posed for society. Some papers were also affected in their competition to sensationalise events.

In West Germany, in the late sixties and early seventies these factors affected nascent terrorist groups on some occasions- -along with the other items discussed above- -to encourage a small group to believe that terrorism was an available and useful option to achieve their ends.

That the media facilitated these events is not necessarily their fault. Sensationalisation may have contributed more than other factors to some incidents such as Bachmann's attempted murder of Dutschke, but because many (47%) of the 1970's terrorists took some form of higher education, it can be assumed that they were not the readers of sensationalist publications. Therefore, it is more likely that the media only reinforced underlying beliefs with current examples.

The rise of terrorism was facilitated by the same aspects as above, whereby the coverage encouraged some to join the groups because they represented goals which they deemed as worthy. Public identification with the terrorist 'victims' has also differed between the seventies and eighties, due to the media's ability to engage 'identification machines'. The seventies experienced more terrorist activities where the public could see themselves in the 'victims', such as when Lorenz was abducted, or when the holiday-makers were hijacked. The eighties did not witness abductions, but assassinations, where 'identification' could only occur after the event. Nor were there, apart from Debus in 1981, any terrorist deaths from hunger strikes which the terrorists could transform into martyrs in order to aid recruitment. Current terrorist events are on a smaller scale with less coverage than before. Today's coverage is also reduced because of the lack of the individual victims and perpetrators, such as Meinhof, of the seventies, who elicited more public support. There are no such people for the media to draw upon today. Reduced RAF activity also means less coverage of it, and it is difficult for the media to cover the activities of unknown groups like the *Autonomen*.

2.5 Conclusion

The origins, rise and decline of left-wing terrorism in the Federal Republic have been due to entwined factors at the individual, group, government, media and social levels. The mixture of these factors has varied over time to produce different results and activities by the different groups. This is partially due to a constant learning process by the individuals, groups, government, media and public.

3. Practical Applications

The concept of identification and the above findings offer several counterterrorism policy options. Given that prevention is the best cure, the first measure is to develop strong public identification with the Federal Republic's liberal democratic system to ensure that it adequately responds to legitimate grievances. Furthermore, as liberal democracies require robust opposition and government parties, a full spectrum of political parties should be encouraged in order to suit different political identifications. The purpose of this is to ensure radical spaces within society that can absorb those who feel that the traditional parties are not suitable and desire the pursuit of alternative policies. If such parties are non-existent, then people may feel it necessary to form their own, and not benefit from open discussion with others if they are in the underground.

Radical spaces will not absorb everyone with radical ideas, so adequate intelligence is required from security services both at home and abroad. Part of their work should also be countering the arguments of terrorist group statements anonymously in the alternative press. Nothing prevents the security services drafting counterarguments that promote non-violent alternatives to those policies promoted by terrorist groups. It is unlikely that all of these would be printed by the magazines, as that decision ultimately rests with the editors, but assuming that some of them would be, then there is the possibility that it may deter some from moving to terrorist violence.

Identification proposed that terrorist groups could be categorised into 'instrumental', 'organisational' and 'expressive' type groups. In reality it is unlikely that any of these will be one or the other. For example, the RAF began with statements saying it was an 'instrumental' type group, but its operations started as 'organisational' when it freed Baader. The murder of Schleyer after Baader and the others committed suicide was for no group purposes other than vengeance, and could therefore be classed as 'expressive'. Nonetheless, in general the RAF has been predominantly 'organisational', the RZ and *Autonomen* 'instrumental' and some *Autonomen* cells possibly 'expressive'.

The options for responses to 'instrumental' terrorist organisations depend upon their desired social-political aims, and legitimacy. Legitimate grievances should have been dealt with before they reach the stage of terrorism, but if they do, then they should be handled appropriately. However, when these are legitimate and some groups follow the democratic system, while others use terrorist means, the government should deal with the two groups separately. Governments need to

discriminate between the means used to achieve ends. If the government treats all of those who strive for the same ends as terrorists, even when some use legal democratic means, then the government may alienate the legal ones, who might then identify more closely with the terrorists. The government needs to raise the cost for terrorists without alienating legal protesters.

For example, the government should not have widened the criminal code for terrorism to include those who topple power pylons, as West Germany did in 1988 (see chapter six). This only increased the number of terrorist incidents to be investigated, and possibly moved the police effort beyond terrorist groups. There is no indication that pylon toppling is conducted by 'organisations', which is what Para 129a seeks to counter. Instead the government should have used more analytical and preventative protection duties amongst the police and security forces, such as irregular patrols of the pylons. The changes in the criminal code may have deterred some, but not others, for the authorities still need to apprehend people before they can be prosecuted. This raised the costs, only for those who were apprehended, and may encourage implicated persons to become an 'operational' model group.

The options for responses to 'operational' terrorist groups hinge upon the internal dynamics of the terrorist group and their source of recruitment. The stated aims of these groups do not necessarily relate to their main goal of group survival. Therefore, their source of supply needs to be shut down, and if possible the active group broken up through internal dissension. The main point the government needs to avoid, if possible, is to raise the cost of membership because this increases group cohesion. It may keep some of the public away, but will not encourage members to leave.

Internal dissension in 'organisational' groups would be facilitated through the existence of the radical alternatives mentioned earlier, because it allows for those who enter the terrorist group to leave and pursue their ends with non-violent means and thus not lose their principle identification. This move is easier and less costly than one which required their total loss of a radical identification, which may not occur, and therefore means the person continues with terrorism.

Such a radical place may also aid the usefulness of 'supergrass' policies aimed towards active terrorists turning on their fellow members, because it would mean they are not rejecting their ideals and goals, only their methods. The currently wanted West German terrorists did not have this type of situation before they joined the Red Army Faction, and therefore cannot easily shift their identifications in this

way. They are wedded to an organisation, not an idea, and that is why they do not respond to the 'supergrass' offers. The former RAF members from East Germany, on the other hand, have already broken with the group, and thus are not betraying themselves.

Internal dissension within the 'organisational' group may also be fermented if its object of identification is lost, which in the case of the Red Army Faction would also mean their loss of recruitment. As the imprisoned members of the RAF are the active group's source of recruitment (see chapter five) their renunciation of terrorism would mean the loss of focus for the active group, who would then have to either declare themselves as having lost their 'revolution' or begin a reorientation phase to maintain group survival. This may lead to dissension and the loss of some group members.

Renunciation of terrorism by imprisoned terrorists can only be achieved if they are confronted by other ideas and new situations which force a rethink of their belief systems. Some people can achieve this on their own if they have access to books, periodicals and other media, and are not confronted daily by other members of the group. Other people need to have alternative support systems available to them that are not controlled by other imprisoned terrorist group members. The members need to be trusted as individuals and not stereotyped as all being untrustworthy. The process of identification changes requires a stable trusting environment and if one is to change from terrorist to non-terrorist, support facilities in the form of trusting people and information must be there at a supply equal or greater to that available in their fellow terrorist prisoners.

This process could be facilitated by the grouping together of imprisoned terrorists into two or three large groups within the Federal Republic's prison system. This would confront the different generations of RAF terrorists with different people who have not previously met, and bring together possible confrontations of beliefs about the group. The added security costs could be met in part by the closing down of multiple high security prisons around the country as the terrorists are concentrated into two or three large groups.

The danger to avoid in this project would be the possibility that these larger groups were able to hold themselves together more effectively, because they mutually support their group identification, and thus negate any potential individuals moving away from terrorism. To counter this the prisoner groups must be exposed to outside ideas and people, possibly through the mixture of these prisoners with others, or through an influx of visitors beyond the usual scope of relatives and

friends to include politicians, journalists and others in discussions similar to those begun by the Greens in the late eighties (see chapter six). The seclusion of the large terrorist group to themselves, without access for those who desire it to other support systems described above, would only lead to the increased cohesion of the group.

The aim of this confrontation between imprisoned terrorists and the outside world is the internal group dissent sought in the underground active members, whereby the members undergo a world-switching exercise similar to that which they experienced while becoming a terrorist. Over time this should lead to the rehabilitation of terrorists to non-terrorists, who can then offer their ideas and talents to society. Therefore, throughout the process they need to have access to other people and resources to facilitate an identification transfer from the RAF to a new group. Once again the existence of a radical space in society facilitates these measures.

The 'expressive' model can be countered with raised participation costs, i.e. arrests. However, the rise of 'other' terrorist attacks in the statistics (see chapter three) would suggest this has not been a deterrent. Like 'instrumental' model responses, the government needs to differentiate between those who seek legitimate ends and those who use illegal means, because the existence of a radical group or space within society may also channel some motivation to create non-violent 'spectacles' in the manner of the sixties protests, because of some of this type of terrorism is possibly due to individual motivation for the act itself within the framework of public protest.

Each of these three terrorist model groups differs sufficiently to deserve specific government responses atuned to that model type. This demands government flexibility in its counterterrorism responses. A final example highlights this. If, as has been suggested, the Red Army Faction returns to abductions, then these would need to be dealt with differently from those conducted by an 'instrumental' or 'expressive' model group. Each group has a different concept of 'public' as discussed in chapter seven. Therein lies the key to the government response.

If the RAF abducts someone in a bid to increase its funds and to free members, then the government needs to remember the group's aim of survival and its select audience. This means the general public will identify with the government and assist them. The government would not need to repeat the drastic measures used during the Schleyer abduction to subdue the media and check everyone within a specific age band (see chapters six and seven). Instead the government should seek a response that would divide the group. This would ideally be a split between the

prisoners and the active members, or any subdivisions within the active and prisoner groups. This necessitates communication between the government and the terrorists, either directly or through an intermediary to conduct negotiations, but not concessions, which should be refused. As in the Schleyer case, the government should pursue the three goals of safe return of the hostage, pursuit of the terrorists, and the retention of the state's freedom of action and not endanger domestic and foreign confidence in the state.

The 'instrumental' model would necessitate only a few changes in government response to an abduction. One is to reconcile government reaction to a wider audience which the terrorists aim towards. The larger the terrorists' audience in this model, the more the possibility exists that an intermediary from the cause may be able to assist the government to defuse the situation in negotiations with the terrorists.

In the unlikely event that an 'expressive' model group acquired the resources to undertake an abduction, it should be responded to in the same manner and methods as an 'instrumental' one. The only exception would be that as it is done in self-interest by the group with the context of public protest, the government would need to be sensitive to the protest group aims.

In the end it must be remembered that a diverse political spectrum is the sign of a healthy liberal democracy, and that if the security services were able to apprehend all potential terrorists before they act, then it is possibly no longer a liberal democracy. Given this limitation, complete freedom from terrorism is impossible.

4. Theoretical Applications

One of the aims of this thesis was to contribute to research that would further basic conceptual and theoretical groundwork in the study of terrorism. Identification showed that, although it added new models to the study of terrorism, it can be used to orientate different types of terrorism, and explain terrorist motivation, public and government responses, and its continuation.

The basic conceptual and analytical groundwork in this thesis opens several paths for the future study of terrorism with the concept of identification. One is to apply the concept to right-wing terrorism as a test of its applicability there. More challenging, however, would be to use the concept to study its applicability to state sponsored terrorism and test the usefulness of the 'instrumental', 'organisational' and 'expressive' models in a different context.

Although it could be argued that all state governments desire to remain in power (the 'organisational' model), it is also possible that some are willing to pursue their goals out of office (the 'instrumental' model), while other rulers are only interested in personal power (the 'expressive' model). It may be that these are single party states, liberal democracies and dictatorships. Identification would suggest that most cases of state sponsored terrorism fall into the 'organisational' model, but that the case of Israeli use of their own contacts with terrorist groups to hunt down the organisers of the Munich Olympic abduction of their athletes, may be an exception to this.

The concept of identification, with its emphasis on the influential forces on individuals, groups and society, can aid the study of terrorism in its understanding of motivation and responses to political terrorism. This thesis exemplified the concept's usefulness in its application to left-wing terrorism, and its theoretical usefulness in other areas of terrorism. Hopefully this small step will lead others to further good questions with better answers as more is demanded of those researchers who follow.

CHRONOLOGY OF MAJOR EVENTS

- 2 June 1967: The student Benno Ohnesorg was shot at an anti-Shah of Iran demonstration in West Berlin.
- 2/3 April 1968 (RAF): The Schneider and Kaufhof department stores in Frankfurt were firebombed by Andreas Baader, Gudrun Ensslin, Thorwald Proll and Horst Soehnlein.
- 11 April 1968: (Easter Week) Josef Bachmann attempted the assassination of Rudi Dutschke in West Berlin.
- 13 June 1969 (RAF): Baader, Ensslin, Proll and Soehnlein were released temporarily from prison.
- 4 April 1970 (RAF): Baader was arrested in West Berlin.
- 14 May 1970 (RAF): Baader was freed from prison by Ingrid Schubert, Irene Goergens, and Ulrike Meinhof. An institute employee, Georg Linke, was shot and wounded.
- 8 June 1970 (RAF): Horst Mahler, Hans-Juergen Becker, Brigitte Asdonk, Manfred Grashof, Wolfgang Thoms, Petra Schelm and Heinrich Jansen left for an Al Fatah camp in Jordan via Beirut and Damascus.
- 21 June 1970 (RAF): Baader, Ensslin and Meinhof followed the others to Jordan where everyone stayed until August.
- 8 October 1970 (RAF): Horst Mahler, Brigitte Asdonk, Monika Berberich and Ingrid Schubert were arrested in West Berlin.
- June 1971 (RAF): Rolf Pohle and other RAF members stole 75 US M26 handgrenades from the US-Army base Niseau near Kaiserslautern. Some sources say the grenades were taken from Weilerbach in the Pfalz.
- 8 July 1971 (B2J): Georg von Rauch escaped from prison with the help of Michael Baumann and Thomas Weisbecker, and the Second of June was formed afterwards.
- 15 July 1971 (RAF): Petra Schelm was shot and killed in Hamburg and Werner Hoppe was arrested.
- 22 October 1971 (RAF): The policeman Norbert Schmid was shot and killed in Hamburg. Margit Schiller was arrested.
- 4 December 1971 (B2J): Georg von Rauch was shot and killed in Berlin.
- 22 December 1971 (RAF): Five people robbed a bank in Kaiserslautern of more than 130,000 DM, and wounded the policeman Herbert Schoner.
- 2 February 1972 (B2J): Irwin Beelitz died when the British Yacht Club in Berlin-Gatow was bombed.
- 2 March 1972 (B2J): Thomas Weisbecker was shot and killed in Augsburg, and his companion, Carmen Roll, arrested.
- 2 March 1972 (RAF): Manfred Grashof and Wolfgang Grundmann were arrested in Hamburg after a shootout in which the policeman Hans Eckardt was wounded. He died on 22 March from the wounds.
- 3 March 1972 (B2J): State security offices in West Berlin were bombed.

- 7 May 1972 (B2J): **Ulrich Schmucker**, **Inge Vielt**, **Wolfgang Knupe** and **Harold Sommerfeld** were arrested in Bad Neuenahr.
- 11 May 1972 (RAF): The headquarters of the Fifth US-Army Corps in Frankfurt were bombed by the 'Commando Petra Schelm'. Colonel **Paul A. Bloomquist** died and thirteen others were wounded.
- 12 May 1972 (RAF): The central police offices in Augsburg and Munich were bombed by the 'Commando Thomas Weisbecker'.
- 15 May 1972 (RAF): The wife of Federal Judge **Wolfgang Buddenberg** was wounded by the 'Commando Manfred Grashof', who planted a bomb to explode when the car started.
- 19 May 1972 (RAF): The Hamburg Springer-Press building was bombed by the 'Commando Second of June'. 17 people were injured.
- 24 May 1972 (RAF): The headquarters of the US-Army in Europe in Heidelberg was bombed by the 'Commando Fifteenth of July'. The soldiers, **Clyde R. Bonner**, **Ronald A. Woodward** and **Charles L. Peck**, died.
- 1 June 1972 (RAF): **Baader**, **Holger Meins** and **Jan-Carl Raspe** were arrested in Frankfurt.
- 7 June 1972 (RAF): **Gudrun Ensslin** was arrested in Hamburg.
- 9 June 1972 (RAF): **Brigitte Mohnhaupt** and **Bernhard Braun** were arrested in West Berlin.
- 15 June 1972 (RAF): **Ulrike Meinhof** and **Gerhard Mueller** were arrested in Hanover.
- 9 July 1972 (RAF): **Klaus Juenschke** and **Inngard Moeller** were arrested in Offenbach.
- 14 July 1972 (RAF): The lawyer **Joerg Lang** was arrested.
- 5 September 1972: The Palestinian group, 'Black September', murdered members of the Israeli Olympic team and abducted the others, who died in the failed police attempt, as did five terrorists and one policeman.
- 17 January 1973 (RAF): The RAF began their first hunger strike.
- 16 February 1973 (RAF): The hunger strike ended.
- 8 May 1973 (RAF): The second RAF hunger strike began.
- 20 June 1973 (B2J): **Inge Vielt** escaped from the women's prison in Berlin-Moabit.
- 29 July 1973 (RAF): The second RAF hunger strike ended.
- 12 November 1973 (B2J): **Till Meyer** escaped from Castrop-Rauxel prison.
- 17 November 1973 (RZ): The SEL/ITT building in West Berlin was bombed.
- 18 November 1973 (RZ): The SEL/ITT building in Nurnberg was bombed.
- 4 June 1974 (B2J): **Ulrich Schmucker** was assassinated in West Berlin as a suspected 'traitor'.

12 June 1974 (RZ): The Chilian consulate in West Berlin was bombed.

13 September 1974 (RAF): The RAF began their third hunger strike.

4 October 1974 (RAF): The home of the Hamburg Senator for Justice, Ulrich Klug, was bombed.

30 October 1974 (RAF): Members of the 'Committee against Torture of Political Prisoners' occupied the office of Amnesty International in Hamburg.

9 November 1974 (RAF): Holger Meins died in hunger strike, and fifty demonstrations broke out after his death.

10 November 1974 (B2J): Guenter von Drenkmann, the president of West Berlin's highest court, was murdered in his home in an attempted kidnapping.

13 January 1975 (RZ): Two persons (Johannes Weinriech and Willy Boese?) attempted to shoot at a taxiing El Al airplane at Paris Orly with an RPG-7, but missed and hit a parked Yugoslav DC-9 and wounded a French policeman.

5 February 1975 (RAF): The third RAF hunger strike ended.

27 February 1975 (B2J): Peter Lorenz, the CDU candidate for the Mayor of West Berlin, was kidnapped three days before the elections.

3 March 1975 (B2J): While Horst Mahler refused to be released as part of the ransom arrangements for Lorenz, Gabriel Kroecher-Tiedmann, Rolf Pohle, Rolf Heissler, Ingrid Siepmann and Verena Becker, joined Pastor Heinrich Albertz, a former Mayor of West Berlin, in Frankfurt, and were flown to Aden.

4 March 1975 (B2J): Lorenz was released in West Berlin.

4 March 1975: Rote Zora bombed the Federal Constitutional Court building in Karlsruhe.

25 April 1975 (RAF): The West German embassy in Stockholm, Sweden was stormed by the 'Holger Meins Commando' and hostages taken. Two hostages, Lt-Col. Baron Andreas von Mirbach and Dr. Heinz Hillegart, were murdered, and an accidental explosion of the terrorists' bombs killed one terrorist, Ulrich Wessel, and enabled the arrest of the others, Siegfried Hausner, Hanna-Elise Krabbe, Karl-Heinz Dellwo, Lutz Taufer and Bernhard-Maria Roessner.

30 April 1975 (B2J): Ronald Fritsch, Gerald Kloepper, Hendrik Reinders and Paul Reverman, were arrested.

9 May 1975 (B2J): The policeman, Walter Pauli, was murdered during a vehicle check in Cologne by suspected B2J members, Werner Sauber who also died in the shooting, Karl-Heinz Roth who was wounded, and Roland Otto was also arrested.

21 May 1975 (RAF): The trial against Baader, Ensslin, Meinhof and Raspe began in Stuttgart-Stammheim.

6 June 1975 (B2J): Till Meyer was wounded and arrested in a shootout in West Berlin.

- 25 June 1975 (RAF): **Katharina Hammerschmidt** died in prison from a breast tumor. The court decided in 1977 that she died of the doctor's negligence.
- 20 August 1975 (RZ): A letter bomb sent to the president of the Jewish Community in Berlin, **Galinsky**, was defused.
- 9 September 1975 (B2J): **Ralf Reinders**, **Inge Viett** and **Julianne Plambeck** were arrested.
- 13 September 1975 (B2J): **Fritz Teufel** and **Gabriele Friderike Rollnick** were arrested in West Berlin.
- 16 October 1975 (RAF): The daughter of the Hamburg Senator for Justice, **Dr. Klug**, was murdered. A threatening letter with the RAF signature is sent to him informing him the next bullet is for him.
- 21 December 1975 (RZ): **Hans-Joachim Klein** and **Gabriele Kroecher-Tiedemann** participated in the abduction of the OPEC ministers at their conference in Vienna with **Illich Ramirez Sanchez**, 'Carlos'.
- 18 January 1976 (RAF): In Kenya **Brigitte Schulz**, **Thomas Reuter**, and three others attempted to fire at an El AL plane with a SAM-7.
- 9 May 1976 (RAF): **Ulrike Meinhof** was found hung in her Stammheim prison cell. Demonstrations and thirty small bombings followed.
- 25 May 1976 (B2J): **Bernd Hausmann** died in the Tel Aviv airport after his suitcase bomb was detonated.
- 1 June 1976 (RZ): The headquarters of the Fifth US. Army Corp in Frankfurt was bombed. Sixteen people were seriously wounded.
- 27 June 1976 (RZ): **Wilfried Boese**, and **Brigitte Kuhlmann**, participated in the hijacking of an Air France plane to Entebbe, Uganda.
- 4 July 1976 (RZ): Israeli commandos freed the hijacked Air France plane in Entebbe. **Boese** and **Kuhlmann** died in the shootout.
- 7 July 1976 (B2J): **Inge Viett**, **Gabriele Rollnik**, **Julianne Plambeck** and **Monika Berberich** escaped from the Lehrterstrasse Women's Prison in West-Berlin.
- 16 September 1976 (RZ): The Cologne home of tax inspector **Kaussen** was bombed.
- 30 November 1976 (RAF): The lawyers **Siegfreid Haag** and **Roland Meyer** were arrested in Butzbach. Amongst the papers found on them was money from a 15 November bank robbery in Hamburg.
- 1 December 1976 (RZ): The Rhein-Main Officers' Club of the US-Air Force Base in Frankfurt was bombed.
- 13 December 1976 (B2J): **Waltraud Boock** was arrested in Vienna after a bank robbery chase in which about 500,000 DM was stolen.
- 18 December 1976 (RZ): The buildings of the US Army in Bad Hersfeld were firebombed.
- 4 January 1977 (RZ): US Army petrol tanks near Lahn-Giessen/Roedgen were bombed.

- 5 January 1977 (RAF): **Christian Klar** wounded a Swiss customs official in a shootout at the Swiss-German border in Basel/Lorrach.
- 8 February 1977 (RAF): **Brigitte Mohnhaupt** was released from prison in Cologne-Bruehl.
- 16 February 1977 (RZ): 'Commando Siegfried Hausner' bombed the car of the Dusseldorf public defence lawyer **Heinz Peters**, who was defending suspects of the Stockholm embassy siege.
- 29 March 1977 (RAF): The RAF began a fourth hunger strike.
- 7 April 1977 (RAF): **Siegfried Buback**, the West German Federal Prosecutor General, was assassinated in Karlsruhe by the 'Commando Ulrike Meinhof'. His driver, **Wolfgang Goebel**, and the Prosecutor's Office employee, **Georg Wurster**, were also murdered.
- 28 April 1977 (RAF): **Baader**, **Ensslin**, and **Raspe** were sentenced to lifetime imprisonment (sixteen years) by the Stuttgart court.
- 30 April 1977 (RAF): The RAF's fourth hunger strike ended.
- 3 May 1977 (RAF): **Guenther Sonnenberg** and **Verena Becker** were arrested in Singen.
- 3 May 1977 (RAF): **Johannes Thimme** and **Uwe Folkerts** were arrested in Karlsruhe.
- 11 May 1977 (RZ): The cars of a West-Berlin judge and state prosecutor were bombed as revenge for sentencing two homeless asylum candidates.
- 30 July 1977 (RAF): **Juergen Ponto**, the President of the Dresdener Bank, was murdered in his home near Frankfurt.
- 9 August 1977 (RAF): The fifth RAF hunger strike began.
- 25 August 1977 (RAF): A multiple-tube rocket launcher was found in an apartment facing the Federal Prosecutor's Office building in Karlsruhe.
- 30 August 1977 (RAF): The associate lawyer of **Klaus Croissant**, **Armin Newerla**, was arrested in Stuttgart. **Arndt Mueller**, from the same office, was arrested a month later.
- 31 August 1977 (RAF): **Hans-Joachim Dellwo** was arrested in Croissant's Stuttgart office.
- 2 September 1977 (RAF): The fifth RAF hunger strike ended.
- 5 September 1977 (RAF): The head of the German Industrial Association, and a member of the Mercedes-Benz board of directors, **Hanns-Martin Schleyer**, was kidnapped in Cologne by the 'Siegfried Hausner Commando'. His driver, **Heinz Marcisz**, and three accompanying police bodyguards, **Reinhold Braendle**, **Helmut Ulmer** and **Roland Pieler**, were murdered.
- 22 September 1977 (RAF): **Knut Folkerts** was arrested after a shootout in Utrecht, Holland.
- 30 September 1977 (RAF): **Klaus Croissant** was arrested in Paris and extradited to the FRG on 16 November.

- 13 October 1977 (RAF): The Lufthansa airliner, 'Landshut', enroute from Palma de Majorca to Frankfurt was hijacked by the PFLP to Mogadishu, Somalia via Rome and Athens by the 'Martyr Halimeh Commando'.
- 17 October 1977 (RAF): The 'Landshut' Lufthansa captian, Juergen Schuman, was murdered by the hijackers.
- 18 October 1977(RAF): The 'Landshut' was freed by the GSG 9. Later the government announced the deaths of Baader, Ensslin and Raspe, and the attempted suicide of Irmgard Moeller in Stammheim. German businesses across Europe were bombed and burned by RAF supporters.
- 19 October 1977 (RAF): The body of Hanns-Martin Schleyer was found in the boot of a car in Mulhouse, France.
- 9-13 November 1977 (B2J): The Austrian textile manufacturer, Michael Palmers in Vienna was abducted and ransomed for about 4.3 million DM.
- 10 November 1977 (RAF): Christoph Wackernagel and Gert Schneider were arrested in Amsterdam, Holland, after a shootout with the police.
- 12 November 1977 (RAF): Ingrid Schubert was found hung in her Munich-Stadelheim prison cell. Demonstrations and bombings followed the announcement of her death.
- 20 December 1977 (RAF): Christian Mueller and Gabriele Kroecher-Tiedemann were arrested on the French-Swiss border north of Bern after a shootout with the police.
- 6 February 1978 (RAF): The security services blow a hole in the wall of Celle prison in an attempt to introduce undercover agents into the RAF.
- 10 March 1978 (RAF): The sixth RAF hunger strike began.
- 20 April 1978 (RAF): The RAF hunger strike ends.
- 27 May 1978 (B2J): Till Meyer and Andreas Vogel were freed by two alleged female B2J members from Berlin-Moabit prison.
- 28 May 1978 (RAF): Peter-Juergen Boock, Siegelinde Hofmann, Rolf Clemans Wagner and Brigitte Mohnhaupt were arrested in Zagreb, Yugoslavia.
- 31 May 1978 (RAF): Two West-Berlin public defense lawyers representing suspects in the Lorenz/von Drenkmann cases were attacked: one, Hohla, was knee-capped, and the other found, and defused, a bomb in his car.
- 23 June 1978 (RZ): The Heidelberg university student, Herman Feiling, was arrested after a bomb he was making prematurely exploded.
- 21 June 1978 (B2J): Till Meyer, Gabriele Rollnick, Gudrun Stuermer and Angelika Goder were arrested in Sonnenstrand, Bulgaria, and extradited the next day to West Germany.
- 6 September 1978 (RAF): Willy Peter Stoll was shot and killed by a policeman in Dusseldorf.
- 15 September 1978 (RAF): Astrid Proll was arrested at an auto repair station in London, and returned to the FRG on 23 June 1979.
- 24 September 1978 (RAF): Angelika Speitel (wife of Volker Speitel) and Michael Peter Knoll were arrested in Dortmund after a shootout. Knoll died on 7 October due to the wounds.

17 November 1978 (RAF): Peter-Juergen Boock, Siegelinde Hofmann, Rolf Clemens Wagner and Brigitte Mohnhaupt were declared undesirables and set free in the country of their choice. The FRG had not agreed to extradite eight Yugoslaves in return.

20 April 1979 (RAF): The seventh RAF hunger strike began.

4 May 1979 (RAF): Elisabeth von Dyck was shot and killed in Nurnberg by a policeman waiting in her apartment.

25 June 1979 (RAF): Members of the RAF unsuccessfully attempted to assassinate the Supreme Commander of NATO forces in Europe, General Alexander Haig, with a bomb under a bridge in Mons, near Brussels.

26 July 1979 (RAF): The RAF hunger strike ended.

2 September 1979 (RZ): The Delta factories in Worms were firebombed.

19 November 1979 (RAF): Rolf Clemens Wagner was arrested in Zurich, Switzerland after an armed bankrobbery.

Spring 1980 (RAF/B2J/RZ): The remaining members of the B2J merged with the RAF. Some in West Berlin, however, become cells in the RZ.

5 May 1980 (RAF): Sieglinde Hofmann of the RAF, and the following B2J members, Ingrid Barabas, Regina Nicolai, Carola Magg, and Karin Kamp-Muennichov were arrested in a Paris apartment.

25 July 1980 (RAF): Julianne Plambeck and Wolfgang Beer died in an auto accident near Stuttgart.

22 January 1981 (RAF): Peter-Juergen Boock was arrested in Hamburg.

2 February 1981 (RAF): The eighth RAF hunger strike began.

10 February 1981 (B2J): Michael 'Bonmi' Baumann was arrested in London.

8 April 1981 (RAF): RAF sympathisers exploded a bomb in the Cologne Neumarkt underground station wounding seven.

16 April 1981 (RAF): Sigurd Debus died in the hunger strike in Hamburg. There were demonstrations and small bombings in the following days.

18 April 1981 (RAF): The eighth RAF hunger strike ended.

11 May 1981 (RAF): The Hessen Minister of Finance, Hans Herbert Karry was murdered.

31 August 1981 (RAF): The NATO Air Force headquarters in Ramstein was bombed.

14 September 1981 (RAF): The 'Commando Gudrun Ensslin' unsuccessfully attempted the assassination of the Commander of the US-Army in Europe, General Friedrich J. Kroesen, with an RPG.

16 February 1982 (RZ): Magdalena Kopp and the Swiss Bruno Breguet were arrested in Paris.

11 November 1982 (RAF): Brigitte Mohnhaupt and Adelheid Schulz were arrested in Neusenstamm.

16 November 1982 (RAF): Christian Klar was arrested in Sachsenwald.

25 October 1983 (RZ): The Bundeswehr school for military intelligence at Bad Ems was bombed.

July 1984 (RAF): In the first week of the month, Christa Eckes, Helmut Pohl, Ingrid Jakobmeister, Stefan Frey, Barbara Ernst and Volker-Wilhelm Straub were arrested in Frankfurt.

4 December 1984 (RAF): The RAF began their ninth hunger strike.

18 December 1984 (RAF): An attempt to bomb the NATO school in Oberammergau failed due to the timer setting.

20 January 1985 (RAF): Johannes Thimme died after a premature bomb explosion in Stuttgart-Vaihingen. His companion, Claudia Margarete Wannersdorfer, was wounded and arrested.

25 January 1985: The AD 'Commando Elisabeth von Dyck' assassinated General Rene' Audran, the director of the French Ministry of Defence's Export, Weapons and Armaments Cooperation Society, near Paris.

1 February 1985 (RAF): The 'Commando Patrick O'Hara' assassinated Ernst Zimmermann, the director of the Munich Motor Turbine Union (MTU), a defence contractor, near Munich.

2 February 1985 (RAF): The ninth RAF hunger strike ended. During the hunger strike the 'Illegal Militants' of the RAF had carried out fifteen bombings and twenty-three firebombings of targets in support of the hunger strike. Half of these were against targets of military nature.

8 March 1985 (RZ): The IG Mining offices in Bochum and the Coal Employer in Essen and Hamburg shipping office were bombed.

8 April 1985 (RAF): The 'Illegal Militant Fighting Unit Johannes Thimme' bombed the International Society for the Study of Ships in Hamburg. One bomb exploded, and the other was defused.

8 April 1985 (RAF): The 'Illegal Militant Fighting Unit Ulrike Meinhof' bombed the NATO pipeline near Ippingen.

28 April 1985 (RZ): The Hoechst chemical plant in Cologne and the Deutsche Bank in Dusseldorf was bombed.

5 May 1985 (RZ): The Central Committee of the All Metal Employers Union was bombed.

30 May 1985 (RZ): The NATO pipeline near Frankfurt was bombed.

3 July 1985 (RAF): Ingrid Barabas and Mariela Schmenger were arrested in Offenbach.

7 August 1985 (RAF): Members of the 'Commando George Jackson' murdered the American soldier Edward Pimental to obtain his identity card.

8 August 1985 (RAF): The 'Commando George Jackson' exploded a car bomb at the US air base in Frankfurt. Two people were killed and another twenty wounded.

18 August 1985: Rota Zora bombed the Max Plank Institute for plant gene technology in Cologne-Vogelsang.

- 6 September 1985 (RAF): Illegal militants bombed three mobile 'Hawk' anti-aircraft rocket radar stations at the US base in Freisen-Reitscheid.
- 27 September 1985 (RAF): Karl-Friedrich Grosser was arrested in Ludwigsberg.
- 7 October 1985 (RZ): The showrooms of a Mercedes Benz dealership in Cologne were bombed.
- 7 October 1985 (RZ): The Botanical Institute of the University of Cologne were bombed.
- 19 December 1985 (RZ): A production and warehouse building of Brueggemann and Brand was firebombed.
- 10 February 1986(RZ): The Bonn offices of the South Africa Foundation were bombed.
- 9 July 1986 (RAF): A bomb planted on a roadside tree in Munich-Strasslach by the 'Commando Mara Cagol' killed the Siemens director, Professor Karl-Heinz Beckurts, and his driver, Eckhard Groppler.
- 24 July 1986 (RAF): The 'Illegal Militants Fighting Unit Sheban Atlauf' bombed the Fraunhof Institute for Laser Technology in Aachen.
- 25 July 1986 (RAF): Illegal militants bombed Dornier Aerospace in Immenstaad. The guard was warned before the bomb exploded.
- 2 August 1986 (RAF): Eva Sibylle Haule-Frimpong, Luitgard Hornstein and Christian Kluth were arrested in Ruesselheim.
- 11 August 1986 (RAF): Illegal militants exploded three bombs at the Federal Border Guard station in Heimerzheim.
- 13 August 1986 (RAF): The American electronics firm of Westinghouse in Wuppertal was bombed by the 'Illegal Militants Fighting Unit 13.8.86.'.
- 13/14 August 1986 (RAF): Suspected members of the RAF illegal militants, Norbert Hofmeir, Barbara Perau, and Thomas Thoene were arrested in Duisberg.
- 8 September 1986 (RAF): The Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution in Cologne was bombed by the 'Illegal Militants Fighting Unit Christos Tsoutasouvis'. One man was wounded.
- 16 September 1986 (RAF): The 'Illegal Militants Fighting Unit Anna Maria Ludmann' bombed the Munich Arabella building complex. The offices of Panavia Aircraft, and the military control agency, NATO MRCA Management Agency (NAMMA) were the targets.
- 10 October 1986 (RAF): Gerald von Braummuehl, a Ministerial Director in the Foreign Office, was murdered in Bonn-Ippendorf by the 'Commando Ingrid Schubert'.
- 28 October 1986 (RZ): The main offices of Lufthansa in Cologne were bombed, and the director of the Foreign Registration Office in West Berlin, Harald Hollenberg, was knee-capped.
- 16 November 1986 (RAF): The IBM research centre in Heidelberg was bombed by the 'Illegal Militants Fighting Unit Hind Alameh'.

- 17 November 1986: The AD murdered **Georges Besse**, the General Director of the state-owned Renault automobile manufacturer, in Paris-Montparnasse.
- 19 December 1986 (RAF): The 'Illegal Militants Fighting Unit Rolando Olalia' bombed the German Society for Economic Development office in Cologne-Muengersdorf. The society was bombed by the RZ on 11 March 1984.
- 21 December 1986 (RAF): The 'Illegal Militants Fighting Unit Mustafa Actas' bombed the educational building of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation in Bad Munstereifel.
- 21 June 1987: Rota Zora attempted to bomb the main offices of the Adler textile company in Haibach, but the explosives were too damp to explode.
- 7 July 1987): The Revolutionaeren Viren- -the youth organisation of the RZ, announced itself with the firebombing of the Foreign Registration Offices in Berlin-Wedding.
- 7 July 1987: An unknown group exploded a bomb on 'Canada Day' at the Lahr base where Canadian Forces Europe have their headquarters.
- 1 September 1987 (RZ): Judge **Guenter Korbacher**, of the Federal Supreme Court was knee-capped.
- 1 November 1987 (RZ): Fifteen lorries of a foodstore chain in Wesel were destroyed in protest of their South African trade.
- 2 November 1987: Two policemen, **Thorsten Schwalm**, and **Klaus Eichenhofer**, were shot by someone at a Startbahn West demonstration.
- 18 December 1987 (RZ): **Gabriele Tiedemann** (now divorced from **Norbert Kroecher**) was extradited from Switzerland to the Federal Republic.
- 17 June 1988 (RAF): Two men and one woman were interrupted in Cadiz, Spain when preparing a bomb on a moped that explodes prematurely. Later the police found hand grenades and notes in German in a bag left behind when the three escaped unharmed in a shootout.
- 20 September 1988 (RAF): State Secretary **Dr. Hans Tietmeyer** of the Federal Finance Ministry escaped an RAF assassination by the 'Commando Khaled Aker' when the gun jammed.
- 1 February 1989 (RAF): Tenth RAF hunger strike began.
- 11 May 1989 (RAF): The tenth RAF hunger strike ended.
- 30 November 1989 (RAF): 'Commando Wolfgang Beer' murdered **Alfred Herrhausen**, the director of the Deutsche Bank.
- 7 December 1989 (RAF): **Ute Hladki** and **Frank Holger Bodo Deikle** were arrested in Husem.
- 10 December 1989 (RAF): The 'Illegal Militant Fighting Unit Sheban Atlouf/Conny Wissman' attempted to bomb the Bayer AG Plant Research Centre in Mannheim near Dusseldorf, but the bomb was defused.
- 21 January-6 April 1990 (RAF): 'Prisoners of the RAF and Resistance' began solidarity hunger strikes with three Spanish prisoners of the GRAPO and PCE(r) terrorist groups, who sought imprisonment in the same Spanish prison. The RAF and other Resistance prisoners were each on hunger strike for one week after which others took their place.

6 June 1990 (RAF): **Susanne Albrecht** was arrested in East Berlin, where she has lived since 1980 under the name of 'Ingrid Jaeger'. She was married and had one daughter.

13 June 1990 (RAF): **Inge Viett** was arrested in Magdeburg, where she worked in the Karl Liebknecht steel conglomerate.

14 June 1990 (RAF): **Werner Loetze**, **Ekkehard Freiherr von Seckendorff**, and **Monika Helbing** were arrested in Frankfurt an der Oder. **Christine Duemlein's** arrest warrant had expired.

15 June 1990 (RAF): **Sabine Elke Callsen** was arrested in Leipzig.

15 June 1990 (RAF): **Sigrid Sternbeck** and **Baptist Ralf Friedrich** were arrested in the GDR.

18 June 1990 (RAF): **Henning Beer** was arrested in the GDR.

19 June 1990 (RAF): **Silke Maier-Witt** was arrested in the GDR.

27 June 1990 (RAF): The RAF 'Jose Sevillano Commando' unsuccessfully attempted to murder the State Secretary of the Interior Ministry, **Hans Neusel**, on his way to work in Bonn.

13 February 1991 (RAF): RAF members shot at the US embassy in Bonn from across the Rhine in protest of the allies attack on Iraq.

3 March 1991 (RAF): The RAF announced that they cancelled a planned attack on **Ignanz Kiechele**, the Federal Minister for Food, Agriculture and Forestry.

2 April 1991 (RAF): The RAF assassinated **Detlev Rohwedder**, head of the government agency overseeing the privatisation of East German state owned firms in Dusseldorf.

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Zusammen Kaempfen (No place of publication given.)