Discursive Shifts in Ethno-Nationalist Politics:
On Politicisation and Mediatisation of the 'Refugee Crisis' in Poland

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Abstract

This paper analyses politicisation and mediatisation of immigration in Poland in the context of recent European 'Refugee Crisis'. Although largely absent from Polish political discourse after 1989, anti-refugee and anti-immigration rhetoric has recently become extremely politically potent in Poland. The analysis shows that, soon taken over by other political groups, the new anti-immigration discourses have been enacted in Poland's public sphere by the right-wing populist party PiS (Law & Justice). Its discourse in offline and online media has drawn on discursive patterns incl. Islamophobia, Euro-scepticism or anti-internationalism as well as historical patterns and templates of discrimination such as anti-Semitism.

1. Introduction

While in many European countries anti-immigration stance has long been at the core of political and public agendas (see e.g. Krzyżanowski & Wodak 2009; Ruzza 2009; Wodak 2015; Rydgren & van der Meiden 2016), Poland has long been a very notable exception of a country where immigration-related topics have not been politicised while rarely, if at all, being put into the focus of wider public incl. mass media discourse (see, inter alia, Krzyżanowski 2014).

However, as this paper critically shows, the second half of 2015 brought a very significant change to the Polish political discourse. This change was characterised by a very rapid move from practically the lack of any immigration-related debates to a strong and forceful anti-immigrant rhetoric reliant on discrimination or even outright hate towards migrants and in particular asylum seekers arriving in Europe. As the analysis below highlights, such a significant shift in Polish political and the wider public discourse has been a matter of a pronounced political strategy. The latter has been undertaken by the Polish PiS (Law & Justice) party – by now Poland's only government party – who since the early Fall of 2015 has been using the ongoing

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European 'Refugee Crisis'[2] as the main point of reference for building its anti-immigration stance and as a reason to incite discourses of hateful othering of immigrants and refugees.

As is shown below, PiS skilfully deployed various channels of political communication – incl. via online/social media – to politicise as well as simultaneously mediate radical anti-immigration and anti-refugee rhetoric which the party enacted in an orchestrated move to introduce the anti-immigration politics in Poland. In doing so, PiS soon also 'championed' the hateful as well as Islamophobic stance in Poland which, however, was soon taken over by other Polish populist or even some of the mainstream political movements (Pędziwiatr 2016).

The main focus of the study is hence in observing the actual 'moment' of when immigration was politicised by PiS in Poland as well as in showing that this process has to an important degree run along crucial paths of (especially top-down) mediatisation of politics. The analysis below focuses therefore on the key elements of PiS' both online and offline political communication strategy as well as on the discourse thereby constructed and recontextualised across different modalities and in different media. The study argues that by relating discourses subsequently enacted across different modes and forms of mediation and self-mediation of the politics of PiS, one can trace the process of how different ideas and imaginaries were incepted into Polish public discourse as well as effectively recontextualised over time in different loci of the Polish public sphere. The main aim of the analysis below is therefore to scrutinise the *discursive shifts* associated with politicisation and mediatisation of immigration by PiS, in the context of the European 'Refugee Crisis'.

The analysis conducted below looks at the culminating stage of the Polish national campaign prior to the national-parliamentary elections that would eventually take place on October 25th, 2015, and would put PiS back into power (after a decade as the main Poland's opposition party). The period of investigation of the study (see below) also coincides with the phase when the EU-wide response towards the then gradually peaking 'Refugee Crisis' in Europe was being debated (see Triandafyllidou this Special Issue). At that time, the EU member states' national quotas of refugees were being negotiated with the key milestones of the refugee-related policy debated across EU national arenas. In the Polish case, the national quotas were negotiated and put under debate by the then outgoing liberal government let by PO (Civic Platform, in power 2007-15) which accused of its allegedly liberal approach to immigration would come under extremely strong attacks by the then main opposition party i.e. PiS.

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[2] Despite its by now widespread presence in public and academic discourse, the notion of 'Refugee Crisis' is approached critically in this article. It is viewed as an ideologically charged notion developed in media & political discourse, also as a recontextualisation of earlier (negativised) descriptions of large-scale developments related to immigration and asylum-seeking (e.g. in the context of wars in former Yugoslavia in early 1990s, etc.). The notion is therefore used in parentheses throughout the paper.

As the paper shows, from various forms of *discursive shifts* (Krzyżanowski 2013a, 2018) that can be identified in contemporary mediated and mediatised politics (see below), it is particularly vital to speak here of the so-called *strategic enactment* as the observed process of politicisation in/via discourse. As is shown, such enactment is a polyphonic discursive process of the discursively-formed imaginaries [3] being purposefully created and strategically spread as part of orchestrated political strategy. While analysing the aforementioned discursive shift, the paper shows that exactly because of the simultaneity of its politicisation as well as mediatisation, anti-refugee and wider anti-immigration rhetoric has very quickly become extremely politically potent and socially widespread in Poland despite the fact of being based on largely imagined fears (NB: Poland still has low figures of asylum applications and approvals compared to other EU countries, see below).

2. Discursive Change, Discursive Shifts, Politicisation and Mediatisation

This paper departs from the critical-analytic notion of *discursive change* (Fairclough 1992) i.e. "a significant shift in the social functioning of language, a shift reflected in the salience of language in the major social changes' (ibid.: 6). Drawing on the notion above, the paper proposes to treat *discursive change* as a macro-level concept that denotes global or transnational, macro-level dynamic framing of public discourse. The main challenge of analysing discursive change is the fact that, within specific spatio-temporal loci, there are traditionally various forms of discursive change present, often in a state of competition for the primate of hegemonic framing of public discourse. At present one can observe the ongoing (and indeed interchangeable) prominence of discursive changes that constitute the key frames or resources for the wider, macro-level imaginaries of socio-political, cultural and politico-economic relations. These are related to, inter alia, neoliberalism and economisation of social relations, insecurity and threat, frames pertaining to 'super-diversity' and public (incl. political & media) discourses of practices of othering, or to changes related to ideological politicisation (see below) and related political radicalisation (see Krzyżanowski 2016).

Since discursive change is, however, positioned at the macro-level of framing of public discourse, a need exists to propose concepts allowing for mezzo- and micro-level operationalisation and analysis of public discourse. As means of doing so, this paper argues for the notion of *discursive shift* (see also Krzyżanowski 2013a) that denotes local, micro-level appropriation of discursive changes. Such appropriations are actor-specific responses towards social, political and economic macro-level transformations (ibid.).

As is shown in the analyses provided below, a discursive shift may, on the one hand, denote dynamics whereby a certain (to large extent) empty space in the public

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[3] From the variety of available conceptions of social imaginaries (see e.g. Taylor 2004), this study follows a 'top-down' conceptualization which sees them as "sets of cultural elements common to a given social group (or groups) that shape the 'lived experience' and help reproduce social relations" (Sum and Jessop 2013: 439).

discourse (e.g. the discourse about immigration and diversity that was largely inexistent in post-1989 Poland and until mid/late 2015) is being filled with radically new patterns of talking about specific topics and issues (e.g. racist and discriminatory anti-immigration discourses that started to dominate the debate since mid-September 2015). Such a type of discursive is called *strategic enactment* as it encompasses a strategy of de facto introducing and enacting new patterns of debating certain issues (in our case immigration and refugees) yet, to be sure, while still often drawing extensively on recontextualisation of discursive patterns from spatially and temporally different discourses.

But, on the other hand, a discursive shift may – and probably most commonly is – also realised in a different form of *strategic gradation/perpetuation.* The latter encompasses the process whereby the previously existent discourses on certain issues/topics undergo gradual change towards new forms, yet with the strategic aim to perpetuate previous discursive forms under the guise of new forms and formats of expression. The analyses of, for example, discourses about the European 'Refugee Crisis' in countries such Sweden (see Krzyżanowski 2018 – this Special Issue) point to such tendency whereby previous discourses about immigration undergoes a gradual but effectively a significant discursive shift towards the currently dominating discourse of legitimising tightened immigration and refugee control.

It is argued here that the notion of discursive shift allows viewing how/when public and political discourses change and become politicised as well as often simultaneously mediatised. Indeed, the often-highlighted negative aspects of politicisation – esp. the issue of ideologisation or outright dogmatisation of public debates (see introduction to this Special Issue) – are particularly relevant with regard to immigration, which, as is widely known, is in the vast majority of cases politicised in a highly negative and ideologised manner incl. on the back of economisation and securitisation-driven discourses (see, inter alia, Buonfino 2004; Watson 2009; Bourbeau 2013).

On the other hand, in the context of mediatisation of politics – understood here as a process whereby politics becomes increasingly dependent on the media and profoundly changes the course and logic of practices in line with media-driven institutional and public demands (see, inter alia, Bennett & Entman 1999; Mazzoleni & Schulz 1999; Strömbäck & Esser 2014) – a closer look is necessary with regard to communicative practices that allow for the quicker recontextualisation as well as, as a result, social reception and accommodation of political ideologies and views. Such is the case below as a token of many right-wing and especially RWP parties and movements which spread the strongly ideologised messages about immigration under the guise of interactivity and familiarity of using social/online media (see also Calhoun 2016; Krzyżanowski & Tucker 2017). They thereby create the image of dialogue with citizens and other strands of the public sphere as well as forge artificial polyphony of voices which effectively serves sustaining populist visions and ideologies.

3. Discursive Traditions of Talking about 'the Other' in Poland

Poland can probably be most aptly described as a country of emigration rather than immigration. It is therefore not surprising that Polish emigration – rather than immigration into Poland – has often come to dominate and occupy Polish public imagination. The same has usually applied to Polish media as well as journalism with Polish newsmakers until recently often blatantly mistaking emigration and immigration and playing down the importance or 'newsworthiness' of immigration-related topics (see esp. Krzyżanowski 2014).

As several studies show, the discourse about immigration into Poland often did not increase on a par with the gradual increase in immigration into the country post-1989 (Iglicka 2001; Weinar 2006). However, it still underwent a gradual negativisation known from other, esp. Western-European countries. While still in early 1990s, Polish media showed largely pro-immigration stance by presenting immigrants as those contributing to the modernization and internationalisation of Poland, by late 1990s the mood has gradually changed. The change was marked by the ascent of anti-immigrant views starting from arguments about 'costs' or no obvious benefits of immigration up to those related to needs of stricter laws and 'controlling' of immigration (see esp. Grzymała-Kazłowska & Okólski 2003). Studies on Polish media representations of immigration also show that while, in fact, until recently clearly standing out from other European countries in terms of the volume of immigration-related discourses, Poland followed some negative qualitative patterns in media representation. These included, inter alia, 'victimisation' of migrants (Bennett et al. 2013), non-agentic representation (Koss-Goryszewska 2010) or the almost solely economic perception of migrant motivations to migrate to Poland (Grzymała-Kazłowska 2007).

The gradually ever more negative approach to immigrants in Polish public discourse – coined with increasingly negative though in most cases hardly experience based public perceptions of immigration (Grzymała-Kazłowska & Okólski 2003) – must be viewed within the context of a larger trend of what Starnawski (2003) has aptly viewed as ongoing solidification of "anti-pluralist" stance in the Polish post-1989 public sphere. As several studies show (see e.g. Galasińska & Galasiński 2010; Krzyżanowska 2010, 2012), Polish post-1989 public arena is ridden by lack of pluralism of voices and is often outright dominated by social animosity, hate as well as deep-seated, politicised ideological struggles. This has been the case in a wide range of issues including, rights ethnic and national minorities (see esp. Gołębiowska 2009; Jasińska-Kania & Łodziński 2009). In fact, the negative discourse on minorities has often been projected onto the key cases of Polish anti-immigration discourse to date (e.g. in relation to Ukrainian migrants; see Grzymała-Kazłowska & Okólski 2003; see also Vermeersch 2007, Iglicka & Weinar 2008).

At the same time, Polish still widespread and indeed historical minority-related anti-Semitism (see, inter alia, Michlic 2007; Judt 2010) remains one of the most powerful historical templates for Poland's contemporary patterns of 'othering' (see analysis

below). Studies have shown, for example, that anti-Semitic like scapegoating political and discursive patterns are not only historical but are indeed widespread in contemporary Poland (Bilewicz and Krzemiński 2010) while anti-Semitic forms of expression penetrate into different variants of hate speech including against ethnic and national minorities such as Roma, Ukrainians or Muslims (Bilewicz et. al. 2014). or into the Polish widespread homophobic discourse (Ostolski 2007; Krzyżanowska 2010). It is hence hardly surprising that anti-Semitic like patterns of discrimination (e.g. those related to, inter alia, biological inferiority of migrants/refugees, see below) are also projected onto the most recent anti-immigrant and anti-refugee discourses which thus clearly become similar to other European right-wing populist groups widely drawing on anti-Semitic repertoire of arguments (see Wodak 2017).

4. Exploring the Context

4.1. Poland: Immigration & Refugees

After 1989 – and especially in the later periods of the post-communist transition – immigration into Poland has been very limited. It mainly boiled down to migrants from neighbouring countries – most notably, Ukraine and Belorussia – i.e. groups that also have a long history of presence in Poland as national minorities. At present, there are less than 220k foreign citizens officially residing in Poland, which in total has ca. 38.5 million inhabitants (hence the registered foreigners constitute only ca. 0.5% of the population). This data already takes into account a significant increase of foreign population in Poland (by over 35k foreigners), mainly as a result of influx of Ukrainian citizens who received various forms of official residence in Poland throughout 2015 (the last year with full available data; see European Migration Network 2016). Third-country (i.e. non-EU) nationals constitute the bulk of foreigners residing in Poland (key nationalities incl. Ukraine, Belorussia, Russia and Vietnam) followed by EU nationals from such countries such as Italy or Germany (ibid.).

During the European 'Refugee Crisis', Polish national quota was initially set up at 2.6k refugees while eventually reaching 7k. While indeed very low in a cross-EU comparison, this number to large extent corresponds with Polish actual statistics on refugees and asylum seekers in recent years. Altogether only 12325 applications for refugee status were submitted in Poland in 2015 while only 637 (i.e. ca. 5%) of those resulted in a decision on refugee status recognition incl. 348 along the rules of Geneva Convention refugee protection (UDSC 2016a). Interestingly, Russians (6556 in total) constituted the main national group of applicants for protection status in Poland in 2015, followed by citizens of Ukraine (764), Tajikistan (498) and Georgia (348). This shows that, as such, the refugee status was sought in Poland mainly by citizens of the East European neighbouring countries. However, as far as the actual granting of the refugee status, the national groups numerous elsewhere in the EU in the context of the 'Refugee Crisis' were also leading in the category of recipients of Geneva protection status in Poland. Among the aforementioned (and only) 348 persons who received refugee status in Poland in 2015, the main group were the citizens of Syria (203) followed by refugees from Iraq (24), Russians (21) as well as

by stateless refugees (20) and citizens of Egypt (15) and Belorussia (14) (see UDSC 2016b).

4.3. Polish 'PiS' (Law and Justice) Party

As a political (right-wing populist and nationalist) party, PiS was officially formed as a in 2001. In 2005, after success in national parliamentary elections, it formed a coalition government under Jarosław Kaczyński together with two other (radical left and right) Polish populist parties. Soon after PiS' success in national-parliamentary elections, the presidential vote held in Poland in October 2005 also turned out in party's favour with Lech Kaczyński (Jarosław's twin) becoming the country's president. However, despite holding several posts of power, PiS government soon collapsed. In 2007, the party lost in snap parliamentary elections to its arch-rivals i.e. Donald Tusk's liberal Civic Platform (*Platforma Obywatelska*, PO). From then until 2015, PiS remained Poland's main opposition party despite various attempts to regain power in both parliamentary and presidential elections.

The first sign of PiS' likely return to power came with the Polish presidential elections in May 2015 won by PiS candidate Andrzej Duda. In the aftermath of his win, PiS fierce campaign – including on the issues of refugees and 'Refugee Crisis' analysed below – continued until late October 2015 when PiS won the national parliamentary elections with 37.5% of voter support and overall majority in the Polish parliament. Soon afterwards, the first ever PiS-only government was formed in November 2015.

PiS' current tenure in power – clearly under 'backseat' control of Jarosław Kaczyński who as PiS chairman effectively controls both the President and the Government – have so far proved to be, mildly speaking, very controversial. It has resulted in many domestic political conflicts including, most notably, PiS' attempts to first take over control over and later eradicate Poland's Constitutional Tribunal or to radicalise many liberal (incl. abortion) laws and take over the national public media. Many of those actions also brought a very radical change of Polish previously successful EU and international as well as defence policy by, inter alia, highlighting PiS' long-established Eurosceptic and, inter alia, anti-German sentiments and voicing these via many confrontational, isolationist and often outright xenophobic views.

5. PiS & Politicisation/Mediatisation of European 'Refugee Crisis': Analysis

5.1. Design of the Study & Empirical Data

The aforementioned process of *strategic enactment* of anti-immigration and anti-refugee discourse by PiS in polish politics and the wider public sphere is followed here by means of tracking stages/contexts of the process of discursive recontextualisation – in the form originally introduced by Basil Bernstein (1990) and recently elaborated by Krzyżanowski (2016). Bernstein (1990: 193) distinguished between: (a) three stages of recontextualisation – i.e. production, recontextualisation

and reproduction and (b) three corresponding contexts of recontextualisation: the primary one (the 'source' context of production of discourse), the secondary one (the 'target' context of reproduction of discourse) and the recontextualising context (the context encompassing the process, so to speak, in between 'source' production and 'target' reproduction; the context through which the relocation and reordering of discourse takes place). Allowing for its aims which target the moment of enactment and further diffusion of anti-immigration and anti-refugee discourse, the analysis will mainly focus on the first two areas i.e. production and recontextualisation as well as on the related primary and recontextualising contexts.

While following the paths of recontextualisation highlighted above, the analysis will rely on categories of critical discourse studies of right-wing populism and anti-immigration rhetoric (Krzyżanowski 2012, 2013b; Wodak 2015). The analysis will to large extent follow a multilevel pattern (see Krzyżanowski 2010) that distinguishes between entry-level (thematic, content-oriented) and in-depth (strategy-oriented, esp. argumentative) analysis. Within the former, the focus will be mainly on discourse topics which "conceptually, summarize the text, and specify its most important information" (van Dijk 1991: 113). The in-depth analysis, on the other hand, will focus on key patterns of argumentation. It will therefore rely on the category of *topoi* (or argumentation schemes/headings; Krzyżanowski 2010) especially in the forms known from public and political anti-immigration discourse and as art of wider sets of discursive strategies (Reisigl & Wodak 2001).

At first, the analysis of topics encompasses close reading of each of the texts forming a respective discourse (incl. speeches, tweets, etc.). The reading results in production of general list of themes for each of the texts and, in a cumulative manner, for the entire discourse thus forming an overall map of its contents. The thematic analysis eventually also serves as the basis for later, argumentation-oriented (i.e. *topos*) analysis. There, the aim is to identify the key argumentative frames in the analysed discourse as those which structured key arguments and expressions. The analysis thereby points to how the key themes (topics) were deployed in formation of different arguments. For example, the construction of the central argument headed by the '*topos of threat*' (encompassing the argument against threats/dangers of immigration) will rely on various topics incl. those related to uncontrolled/mismanaged migration, great numbers of migrants, etc. as supporting the argument.

The analysis conducted in this study covers the period of one month between September 15th and October 15th, 2015. The following data will be analysed in the said period:

- Parliamentary speech by J. Kaczyński on 'Refugee Crisis' & immigration in Polish Sejm (16/10; within debate on Polish response to the 'Refugee Crisis')
- PiS website (www.pis.org.pl) report/summary from the speech above (16/10)
- Tweets from PiS' official Twitter profile (@pisorgpl) in the period 15/09 - 15/10

- Additional web material e.g. short web commentaries 'Glos Polski' (The Polish Voice) by A. Macierewicz (PiS) posted on radical nationalist-catholic www.radiomaryja.pl (esp. on 24/09)
- Speech/statement on immigration/refugees by J. Kaczyński at Pre-Election rally in Maków Mazowiecki (12/10)

The analysis focuses mainly on the 'production' locus of the PiS official own party discourse and its strategic spread across different modes and channels of the party's self-mediation. In fact, PiS Twitter discourse serves here as the main source for identification and selection of key stages (or moments) of politicisation of immigration/refugees by PiS throughout the period of investigation. As far as the activity on PiS official Twitter profile is concerned, this helped identify the 'peak' moments when debates on immigration and the relevant discourse were intensified (see Figure 1).

Figure 1: Twitter Discourse on Immigration/Refugees @pisorgpl, 15/09-15/10/2015

The intention below is to follow the key qualitative features of PiS discourses produced within three key identified peak moments (Figure 1) and in relation to relevant events taking place at the time. The analysis hence focuses on: September 16th, 2015 (Jarosław Kaczyński's speech on immigration and 'Refugee Crisis' in the Polish parliament), September 23rd-24th, 2015 (online video post on immigration/refugees by Antoni Macierewicz of PiS) and October 12th, 2015 (Kaczyński's speech at electoral rally in Maków Mazowiecki).

5.2. Analysis of the Primary Context

Approached here as the key moment in creating Polish post-1989 public discourse about immigration and refugees and as its source (or primary) context, Jarosław Kaczyński's speech on immigration and 'Refugee Crisis' was delivered in the Polish parliament on September 16th, 2015. The speech was an intervention in the Polish lower chamber of parliament (Sejm), during a debate preceding Polish decision on taking part in EU programme for refugees incoming into Europe (Poland eventually supported the programme yet in a very limited way and while accepting very low refugee quota). The speech was relatively short: 1282 during 12:08 minutes.

Looking at the results of the entry-level analysis of the speech, its key topics have included:

a) Government declarations/inability to act on immigration (and related need for government decisions taken 'under external/foreign pressure')
b) Migrants coming in great numbers to Poland and Europe and taking over control
c) Examples of countries with unsolved migration problems (esp. Sweden, France, Italy)

d) Different types of migration & different approaches as practiced in different countries
e) Germany as the key responsible for economic migration into Europe and problems across the EU
f) Polish emigration historically & recently
g) EU pressures & reality 'on the ground'

The topics above are generally framed within the wider theme of criticising the government and its actions. However, as the list suggests, the enactment of the anti-immigration discourse, draws extensively on further arguments known from both Poland (especially PiS own discourse) as well as accommodated internationally. In the first case, the importance of themes related to Germany (theme 'e') or to government actions under external/foreign influence ('a') draws extensively on PiS' widely known anti-German arguments which in this case is accommodated within a discourse on European immigration and refugees. These themes are further augmented by topics pertaining to EU (e.g. 'g') which also describe Polish then government as, as if, acting under external pressures and not in the interests of Poland. Elsewhere, the typical discourses about 'different types of immigration' ('d') – widely known from other countries and especially European right-wing populist discourses (Krzyżanowski & Wodak 2009) – are recontextualised while showing that the speech is a combination of both traditional 'local' and recontextualised (or even 'borrowed') global frames.

A closer look at the in-depth features of the speech points in particular to the extensive use of the '*topos of threat*' traditionally deployed in right-wing populist, ethno-nationalist discourses on immigration (Reisigl & Wodak 2001). As Example 1 illustrates, the said *topos* introduces framing in terms of security and allows arguing that the (here, still non-nominalised) immigration/refugees will have immense negative influence on several spheres of polish public reality.

> Example 1[4]:
> JK: In reality, the high house, one question is important: does the government have the right to - acting under foreign, external pressure and with no explicit agreement of the nation - to take decisions that can have negative influence on our lives, on our everyday reality, on our public life, on our public sphere, on our de-facto sphere of freedom and lastly, what has been brought up before, on our security (p. 1)

Moving on, the speaker eventually moves to nominate 'foreigners' as the object of his speech (see Example 2). He also explicitly points to the 'dangers' of immigration mainly by arguing about migrants and refugees' unwillingness to obey local 'rules' of social cohesion. On concluding his argument, Kaczyński also claims that foreigners –

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[4] All translations of examples from Polish into English are mine. Original versions of examples available from the author upon request. Full speech in original available at:
http://sejm.gov.pl/Sejm7.nsf/wypowiedz.xsp?posiedzenie=100&dzien=1&wyp=7&view=1, last accessed 26-01-2017

as he generically calls them – eventually become 'aggressive' and 'violent' while attempting to 'impose' their customs on the local population

>Example 2:
>JK: It is not about taking in some number of foreigners, irrespective of what sort of foreigners those are. It is about the danger that one will start a process that will more or less look like this: first the number of foreigners suddenly increases, then they do not obey - do not want to obey, they declare they do not want to obey - our customs…
>(Voice from the floor: What are you talking about?)
>JK: … and then or even simultaneously they impose their sensitivity and their claims in the public space in different spheres of life, and they do so in a very aggressive and violent way (p. 1)

In order to support his earlier claims especially on the dangers of immigration, the speaker moves on to introduce a classic argumentation structure i.e. a *topos of example* which allows him to depict his ideas with (largely untrue) examples. The latter mainly boil down to referring to a number of European countries where, as Kaczyński argues, lack of control of immigration and refugees has led to social disorder and unrest. He first provides example of Sweden where, he argues, Sharia law governs entire city districts and any symbols of Christianity (such as the cross on the Swedish flag) are abandoned (see Example 3).

>Example 3:
>JK: If somebody says all of this is not true then have a look around Europe, let's take Sweden. There are 45 zones there governed by Sharia law, there is no control of the state
>(Rep. Jerzy Fedorowicz: I was in Sweden recently)
>JK: There are fears of hanging out Swedish flag at schools, since there is a custom like that over there, because there is a cross on the flag. (p. 1)

Kaczyński continues his Islamophobic tirade – marked, again, by several Islamophobic incl. Sharia-related claims – while providing further examples of how the spread of Islam – according to him esp. by the incoming migrants – has endangered Christianity and wider European society. He claims that Muslim-related problems are practically universal across Europe (see Example 4) and argues that countries such as Italy, France, UK and Germany have not been able to avoid the alleged Islam-related social tensions.

>Example 4:
>JK: Or what is going on in Italy? Churches have been taken over and are often treated as toilets. What is going on in France? Non-stop arguments, Sharia introduced, even patrols which check if Sharia is observed. Same in London or even in the toughest in this case Germany, all of this is taking place. So do you all want that all of this becomes reality in Poland, that we stop feeling at home in our own country? Is that what you want? (p. 2)

After apparently exhausting his Islamophobic examples, Kaczyński eventually moves to the arguments built on the *topos of difference* which follows from the 'migrant ≠ migrant' claims marked already at the level of topics (see 'd' above). As the speaker argues, namely, 'economic migrants' should be clearly divided from war refugees (see Example 5). He does so in order to be able to re-introduce a classic PiS anti-German argumentation and by eventually claiming that, as such, economic migration into Europe has been caused by politics of Germany. This, according to the speaker, now also creates the problem whereby 'real' (refugees) and 'bogus' (economic) migrants cannot be told apart. By introducing such difference-based distinction, Kaczyński creates the image that he wants to 'help the refugees', yet, while, protecting the security of Polish people.

> Example 5:
> JK: At the same time, if we look at the problem, that has been raised here, we have to divide firmly between refugees, who really are fleeing the war, from economic migrants. We have to differentiate between them. And who created the whole magnet here, the magnet of inducing all economic migrants? Germany. And its their problem. Orban was right here, it is their problem, not ours. (Applause) We can help the refugees but, let me repeat, in a way that is safe and secure for the Polish people (p. 2)

5.3. Analysis of the (Main) Recontextualising Context

As the first example of a context that effectively recontextualises as well as mediates several of the arguments introduced in the primary context above, the analysis focuses on an online video post by Antoni Macierewicz, a known catholic-nationalist activist and Deputy Chairman of PiS (and, as of late 2015, also Polish Minster of Defence). The post in question was one of the series of regular Macierewicz videos entitled 'The Voice from Poland' ('*Glos z Polski*'). The video is 7:08 minutes in total was placed on 24/09/2015 on the Youtube channel of *Radio Maryja / TV Trwam* i.e. a known radical, conservative-catholic media conglomerate and a long-term supporter of PiS[5].

The thematic (entry-level) analysis reveals that the video published just over a week after Kaczyński's initial parliamentary speech, draws on the same general framing of the government critique. In fact, Macierewicz starts his statement by claiming that, while many EU governments were able to defend their national interests in face of 'Refugee Crisis' and related EU-wide response, Polish (liberal) government clearly failed to do so. This was the case, as the speaker claims, because Polish was not really a 'national' government and certainly not the one acting in Poles' interest. Following Kaczyński's aforementioned framing, Macierewicz claims that Polish government, when accepting EU decisions in relation to the European 'Refugee Crisis', acted in the interest of the German (alleged) hegemonic rule in the EU. Those

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[5] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_FqFXvqsa6Aa

topics which are recontextualised from Kaczyński's primary discourse (see above), are furthered by a number of further ones, incl.:

- Poland should help refugees but mainly financially, and proportionally to Poland's wealth
- Refugees should receive help in the points of departure, not of arrival
- 'Refugee Crisis' is a problem caused by the UN, Turkey & Ms. Merkel (Germany) – not by Poland
- Refugee routes through Europe are pre-planned and strategic

The arguments developed on the basis of the aforementioned topics to large extent also follow the earlier schemes of argumentation (see Example 6). Among them, there is the *topos of threat* which is deployed by Macierewicz to argue that Poland is set to be 'flooded' by migrants who allegedly are openly against the Polish culture (which in a national grandeur-like tone – not unusual for PiS – is even called 'Polish civilisation').

> Example 6:
> The consequences of voting against the nation's will and against the agreed position of the Visegrad countries and in favour of the position of Germany – because that is the real hegemonic power of the EU – are almost inconceivable as far as the future of Poland is concerned. This is vital in the context of flooding, of potential flooding, of Poland by people who openly say that they will be combating Polish civilisation and culture and also the European security.

> *Figure 2: Map Capture from 'Glos z Polski' (The Voice from Poland) Video, 24/09/2015, Source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_FqFXvqsa6A*

> *Figure 3: Map Close-Up from 'Glos z Polski' (The Voice from Poland) Video, 24/09/2015, Source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_FqFXvqsa6A*

In fact, this argument is deepened further in the video (see Example 7), when Macierewicz openly refers to Kaczyński's speech in the parliament and thus legitimises his own claims.

> Example 7:
> This was discussed in his excellent intervention by the Prime Minister Jarosław Kaczyński when he presented last week the PiS position. He said PiS will never agree to the fact that immigrants are flooding our country.

The (overtly) established recontextualisation chain allows using further arguments in which Macierewicz – under the guise of Christian-driven compassion and humanitarianism – argues that helping refugees must not mean welcoming them to Poland but should resort to a 'financial support' for refugees who should receive it

either in refugee camps or even in their points of departure i.e. countries which they effectively fled (see Example 8).

> Example 8:
> Lets help them, for example, financially, for example by sharing with other countries of the EU, according to our financial means and our wealth, sums of money that will be paid on so that in refugee camps or ideally in their own places of living they could lIve with dignity so that they would not have to flee. That is the right position.

The *topos of finance/economy* allows the speaker to quickly turn towards another set of arguments that allegedly explore the ontology of the 'Refugee Crisis'. These, as can be expected, are identified by Macierewicz in politics of either international actors (especially the UN) but also of Germany.

The re-introduction of the anti-German argument and yet another instalment of government critique (note labelling of Polish then Prime Minster Ewa Kopacz as a 'representative', see Example 7) leads, however, to a series of further claims including those that many refugees take routes that strategically lead to or through Poland (see Example 9). This, as Macierewicz claims, is the proof that refugees are not fleeing the war or seeking help but that they in fact undertake an organised invasion.

> Example 9:
> It is one of the curiosities, because it points to the mechanism which goes beyond the financial issues and maybe has political underpinnings, that two days before the scandalous voting of representative Kopacz who agreed to the German dictate, maps were presented that they (MK: refugees) should not be going through Austria but through Poland, not though Hungary or through Croatia but through Poland and from here to Germany and that thus a new route has been opened that should lead the refugee wave through Poland. This map was distributed in refugee camps to encourage them to go towards Poland. Mrs Kopacz is to blame for this.

The issue of 'maps' – which, in a military-like fashion also implies invasion – helsp deepening the argument that the 'Refugee Crisis' is, to large extent, a purposeful activity that is targeting Poland. It thus allows the speaker to link several of his claims (anti-Government, anti-Germany, etc.) under the overall 'threat' topos and to do it with evidence of maps that he eventually presents (see Figures 2 and 3).

5.4. Analysis of the (Further) Recontextualising Context/s

As a brief example of the further recontextualising discourse (and context), it is worth looking at a statement made by Kaczyński himself on 12/10 during a pre-election rally in Maków Mazowiecki (ca. 80 km north of Warsaw). There, during a speech that embraced many topics, Kaczyński mentioned the issue of refugees and immigration

when discussing, as usually, the allegedly numerous failures of the government (see Example 10).

Example 10:
That information about getting 100 thousand Muslims into Poland is that true? Well the Minister of Health should respond to that because all of this is related to various dangers in that area. We already have symptoms of very serious diseases, not seen in Europe for long: cholera on the Greek islands, dysentery in Vienna, various parasites and protozoans which are not dangerous in those people's organisms but can be dangerous here. I do not mean to discriminate but all this needs to be checked.

However, as the brief example shows, the anti-government framing is yet again just an excuse to eventually introduce harsh anti-immigration arguments under the *topos of threat*. Unlike previously, however, the threat is not portrayed by Kaczyński as the one related to culture, religion etc., but is instead viewed in terms of diseases and of the alleged biological difference of immigrants. The former and the latter enable Kaczyński to rest his statement on a number of implied claims. For example, the mere chain of nominalisations mentioned in the statement – such as 'Muslims' (line 1), 'parasites and protozoans' (line 4-5) and 'those people's organisms' (line 5) – implies that all of these are somehow related. this creates the image of biological difference and inferiority of refugees/migrants while, in fact, invoking deprecatory biologising metaphors and metonymies (Reisigl & Wodak 2001) incl. such as parasites, etc. These, to be sure, also constitute a very obvious recontextualisation of historical discourses of hate known e.g. from Polish and other European anti-Semitic discourses of the 1930s while also being merged with the contemporary PiS anti-immigration and anti-refugee discourses analysed above.

5.5. Recontextualisation and the Ambivalent Role of the PiS Twitter Discourse

As it is vital in the process of mediating and effectively mediatising PiS political discourse on 'Refugee Crisis' and immigration, a brief look should be taken on the rather ambivalent role of PiS Twitter discourse. While the latter was generally used in the top-down political communication mode mentioned above, it clearly served two different functions.

On the one hand (see Figure 4), Twitter was used to very plainly spread the themes and arguments expressed and developed in other contexts. Such was especially the case during Kaczyński's speech of 16/09 analysed above (in the 'primary' context) when Tweets were deployed almost solely to communicate the key ideas of Kaczyński's parliamentary intervention. Twitter was used here in a very non-interactive way (note lack of any retweets in relevant column) with a very plain remit to spread– end effectively recontextualise – the key aspects of Kaczyński's message. This was achieved mainly by means of short quotes of catchy statements (which were, however, thus taken out of context of their production). As the month-long analysis of PiS Twitter reveals, such was almost overwhelmingly the function of PiS

social media in the period of investigation – i.e. to live-Tweet during speeches and media appearances of key PiS members, yet not to allow for any debate or exchange of even related views.

Figure 4: PiS Tweets on immigration and refugees (@pisorgpl, 16/09/2015)

On the other hand, however, isolated instances showed that Twitter was also sporadically used by PiS to not only communicate the contents of speeches/interventions/debates as/when they happened but also to significantly change the tone of the communicated views, in most cases post-factually. Such was the case with, e.g. the short statement by Kaczyński above (see 5.4.) which, soon after it was delivered (on 12/09) met with widespread outcry of media and various politicians against using – and in fact recontextualising – such historically laden language of racism, discrimination and hate. Interestingly, the statement above, which was not live-Tweeted about instantly, did not have any mediated presence until two days later, when, on 14/09, just one Tweet related to the statement was posted (see Example 11).

> Example 11:
> Jarosław Kaczyński pointed to the fact that warnings against epidemiological dangers caused by immigrants have been included in Polish government documents (@pisorgpl, 14/09/2015)

As the example shows, the Tweet is used to largely misinterpret what Kaczyński effectively said about (Muslim) refugees in Maków Mazowiecki (see above). Its aim is to mitigate Kaczyński's ideas that became widely criticised immediately after his speech. Interestingly, even in such a short statement, PiS automatically turns towards the anti-government framing which, as shown above, is otherwise omnipresent and default in the analysed PiS discourse on immigration.

5. (Brief) Conclusions

As has been shown above, a very significant discursive shift has occurred in Polish political discourse which, although until recently escaping anti-immigration rhetoric, can now, mainly due to PiS politics & rhetoric, be characterised as strongly anti-immigrant, Islamophobic and at times even racist. The analysis above shows that the accommodation of debates about the 'Refugee Crisis' in Europe in 2015 has been central in the process of politicisation of immigration in Poland whereby heated political debates gave rise to discriminatory opinions about immigrants and especially asylum seekers and refugees. The former and the latter, as has been shown, have largely been framed in the analysed texts as a 'threat' to Polish culture, religion and nationhood while constructing immigrants as profoundly different from the Polish 'native' population. Such a marking of difference spanned a wide range of arguments: starting from cultural/religious incompatibility and ending in radical and blatantly racist statements on biological inferiority that recontextualised elements of Polish historical anti-Semitic arguments.

Thus, although largely missing from Polish political debates before mid-2015, immigration has now, as has been shown, entered the public discourse and has become strongly politicised in Poland, mainly as a token of right-wing populism and political opportunism. This process was, as highlighted above, systematically and strategically driven by the right wing populist PiS. It resulted in what was defined above as the *strategic enactment* variant of discursive shift in which discourses were not only introduced in to the public domain but also further recontextualised and thereby disseminated and perpetuated. As the analysis shows, starting from the primary through the further recontextualising contexts, many arguments were systematically repeated and often further particularised – e.g. by means of quasi-facts and untrue examples – in order to sustain their rhetorical efficiency and political potency.

As the analysis also indicates, the strategic nature of discursive construction of immigration by PiS in Poland has ran parallel to online mediated practices whose aim was to support politicisation as a strategy. In line with the considerations presented above, the mediatisation of politics is a very crucial factor when looking at politicisation of immigration analysed in this paper. As the analysis of PiS political discourse shows, political and especially politicisation strategies are increasingly conceived of in a way which assumes crucial role for their 'vehicle' mediated practices. The latter, as has been shown, are deployed to reinforce and disseminate political argumentation incl. by means of creating polyphonic political discourse that suggests that the expressed opinions are not solitary but part of a wider, and widely shared, sets of views. The role of social/online media is also to, if need be, modify political communication's message/tone in situations of political controversy or whenever strategic and discursive boundary testing reaches as well as overstretches the limits of accepted political language on immigration.

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
Figures

Figure 1: Twitter Discourse on Immigration/Refugees @pisorgpl, 15/09-15/10/2015

Figure 2: Map Capture from 'Glos z Polski' (The Voice from Poland) Video,
24/09/2015, Source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_FqFXvqsa6A


Figure 3: Map Close-Up from 'Glos z Polski' (The Voice from Poland) Video,
24/09/2015, Source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_FqFXvqsa6A

Date	Account name	Retweet from Acc	Tweet
16/09/15	pisorgpl		Jarosław Kaczyński w Sejmie o przyjęciu imigrantów: PiS uważa, że rząd nie ma prawa do podejmowania takiej decyzji.
			Jarosław Kaczyński: Nie chodzi o przyjęcie tej czy innej liczby cudzoziemców. Chodzi o cały proces, do którego dojdzie.
			Jarosław Kaczyński: W Szwecji są strefy, gdzie obowiązuje szariat i nie ma kontroli państwa.
			Jarosław Kaczyński: Czy chcecie Państwo, żeby to pojawiło się także w Polsce? Żebyśmy przestali być gospodarzami we własnym kraju?
			Jarosław Kaczyński: Około 1 miliard ludzi cierpi z powodu głodu. Ich wszystkich przyjmą lepiej rozwinięte kraje?
			Jarosław Kaczyński: Jesteśmy za tym, żeby pomagać. Ale metodą bezpieczną, finansową.
			Jarosław Kaczyński: Weźmy na siebie część odpowiedzialności finansowej, zgodnie z naszym poziomem PKB.
			Jarosław Kaczyński: Imigracja ekonomiczna to nie nasz problem. To problem Niemiec.
			Jarosław Kaczyński: Podnosi się argument emigracji Polaków. Ale czy Polacy emigrując narzucali swoje reguły tam, gdzie się pojawiali? Nie.
			Jarosław Kaczyński: Jest podnoszony argument - UE nam płaci. Ale za co nam płaci? Za możliwości regulacyjne.
			Jarosław Kaczyński: Mamy prawo bronić się przed akcją dyfamacyjną prowadzoną przeciw Polsce.

Figure 4: PiS Tweets on immigration and refugees (@pisorgpl, 16/09/2015)