

Credit and liquidity risk of banks in stress conditions

Analyses from a macro perspective

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Credit and liquidity risk of banks in stress conditions

Analyses from a macro perspective

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Contents

1	Introduction	1
1.1	Context	1
1.2	Research questions	3
1.3	Research approach	4
1.4	Outline	6
1.4.1	Bank behaviour during the crisis	6
1.4.2	Macro stress-testing	7
1.4.3	Policy responses	8
 Part I: Bank behaviour during the crisis		
2	When liquidity risk becomes a systemic issue: Empirical evidence of bank behaviour	9
2.1	Introduction	9
2.1.1	Dimensions of liquidity risk	9
2.1.2	Modelling bank behaviour	10
2.1.3	Contribution to the literature	10
2.2	Data and trends	11
2.2.1	Data	11
2.2.2	Trends	13
2.3	Empirical measures	15
2.3.1	Instruments used to react	15
2.3.2	Size of reactions	17
2.3.3	Dependence of reactions	19
2.3.4	Herding: aggregate number of reactions	20
2.3.5	Herding: number of reactions by instrument	21
2.3.6	Robustness	22
2.4	Conclusions	24
	Appendix 2.1	26
	Appendix 2.2	29
	Appendix 2.3	30

3	Banks' responses to funding liquidity shocks:	
	Lending adjustment, liquidity hoarding and fire sales	31
3.1	Introduction	31
3.2	Model	33
3.3	Data and stylized facts	36
3.4	Results	39
	3.4.1 Response of lending	39
	3.4.2 Liquidity hoarding	42
	3.4.3 Fire sales	45
3.5	Robustness	48
3.6	Conclusions	50
	Appendix 3.1	52

Part II: Macro stress-testing

4	Macro stress-testing methods	53
4.1	Introduction	53
4.2	Micro stress-testing	54
4.3	Bottom-up macro stress-testing	55
4.4	Bottom-up stress-testing in the crisis: three approaches	56
4.5	Top-down macro stress-testing	57
	4.5.1 Modelling the macro-micro link	58
	4.5.2 Integrated models	59
4.6	Considerations on the use of stress-tests	60
4.7	Conclusions	61
5	Modelling scenario analysis and macro stress-testing	63
5.1	Introduction	63
5.2	Scenario building	64
5.3	Credit risk	66
	5.3.1 Model	66
	5.3.2 Data	69
	5.3.3 Estimation results	69
5.4	Interest rate risk	71
	5.4.1 Model	71
	5.4.2 Data and estimation results	72
5.5	Simulation of scenario effects	73

5.5.1	Deterministic scenarios	73
5.5.2	Stochastic simulation of credit risk in base scenario	75
5.5.3	Stochastic simulation of credit risk in stress scenarios	78
5.5.4	Stochastic simulation of interest rate risk in stress scenarios	80
5.6	Conclusions	81
	Appendix 5.1	83
6	Liquidity Stress-Tester: A model for stress-testing banks' liquidity risk	85
6.1	Introduction	85
6.2	Literature	86
6.3	Model	88
6.3.1	Framework	88
6.3.2	Data	91
6.3.3	First round effects	92
6.3.4	Banks' response to scenario (mitigating actions)	93
6.3.5	Second round effects	95
6.3.6	Impact different scenario rounds	98
6.3.7	Influence of alternative distributional assumptions	100
6.3.8	Parameter sensitivity	100
6.4	Results	102
6.4.1	Banking crisis scenario	102
6.4.2	Credit crisis scenario	103
6.4.3	Impact scenario length and market conditions	105
6.4.4	Back-test	106
6.5	Conclusions	107
	Appendix 6.1	109
	Appendix 6.2	110
	Appendix 6.3	111
7	Liquidity Stress-Tester: Do Basel III and unconventional monetary policy work?	113
7.1	Introduction	113
7.1.1	Context	113
7.1.2	Contribution	114
7.2	Model	116
7.2.1	Framework	116
7.2.2	Data	118
7.2.3	Initial liquidity ratios	119

7.2.4	First round effects	120
7.2.5	Mitigating actions by banks	121
7.2.6	Second round effects	123
7.2.7	Central bank reaction function	125
7.2.8	Parameter sensitivity	126
7.3	Results	128
7.3.1	Credit crisis scenario	129
7.3.2	Wholesale and retail bank scenarios	130
7.3.3	The impact on credit supply	131
7.3.4	The influence of central bank interventions	132
7.3.5	Effects of adjusting to the new liquidity regulation	135
7.4	Conclusions	136
	Appendix 7.1	138
	Appendix 7.2	141

Part III: Policy responses

8	Crisis measures and limiting possible distortions	143
8.1	Introduction	143
8.2	Crisis measures to address market failure	144
8.3	Proper design of support policies essential but complicated	146
8.4	Market conditions	147
8.4.1	Impact on level playing field financial sector	147
8.4.2	Distortionary effects on markets and business models	149
8.4.3	Cross-border effects	151
8.5	External effects, negative impact on confidence	152
8.5.1	Investor confidence in supported institutions	152
8.5.2	Confidence in the creditworthiness of governments	153
8.5.3	Risks for the central bank	154
8.6	Longer-term distortions	155
8.6.1	Moral hazard among management	155
8.6.2	Moral hazard among investors	156
8.6.3	Moral hazard from deposit insurance	157
8.6.4	Moral hazard from extremely low interest rates	157
8.7	Policy instruments to limit distortions	158
8.7.1	Market-compatible conditions	158
8.7.2	International harmonisation	158

8.7.3	The importance of providing clarity	159
8.7.4	Relation between government and management	159
8.7.5	Involvement of the private sector	159
8.7.6	Temporary nature of support and exit	160
8.7.7	Prudential supervision	161
8.8	Conclusions	161

9 Macro-effects of higher capital and liquidity requirements for banks:

	Empirical evidence for the Netherlands	163
9.1	Introduction	163
9.2	New regulatory standards	164
9.3	Channels of effects during the transitional phase	166
9.3.1	Direct consequences	166
9.3.2	Effect on lending via interest rate channel	166
9.3.3	Effect on credit supply via bank capital channel	167
9.3.4	Influence on risk behaviour of banks	168
9.3.5	Broader effects of liquidity requirements	168
9.3.6	Impact on financial markets	169
9.4	Effects during the transitional phase: model outcomes for the Netherlands	169
9.4.1	Scenarios	170
9.4.2	Satellite models	170
9.4.3	Simulation outcomes	173
9.4.4	Simulations using macro-econometric model	175
9.4.5	Time series analysis using a VAR model	176
9.4.6	International perspective	178
9.5	Effects in a new steady state with higher buffers	180
9.5.1	Higher buffer requirements: costs and benefits	180
9.5.2	More stable economic development	184
9.6	Conclusions	185
	Appendix 9.1	186
	Appendix 9.2	187

10 Summary and conclusions **189**

10.1	Introduction	189
10.2	Bank behaviour	190
10.3	Macro stress-testing models	191
10.4	Policy responses to the crisis	193

References	195
Samenvatting (Summary in Dutch)	209

List of Figures

2.1	Development of balance sheet items	13
2.2	Size: average relative change balance sheet adjustment	18
2.3	Size: median relative change balance sheet adjustment	18
2.4	Correlation of item changes across banks	19
2.5	Number of banks, extreme balance sheet adjustments	21
2.6	Number of banks, direction balance sheet adjustments	21
2.7	Number of extreme balance sheet adjustments	22
2.8	Direction of balance sheet adjustments	22
2.9	Factor analysis	23
3.1	Stylized bank balance sheet: Possible asset side responses	32
3.2	Development of model variables	38
3.3	Adjustment of lending, sample of 17 banks	41
3.4	Liquidity hoarding	44
3.5	Fire sales, sample of 17 banks	46
3.6	Fire sales and solvency, sample of 17 banks	47
3.7	Credit default swap spreads Dutch banks	50
4.1	Dimensions of stress-testing	62
5.1	Stress-testing framework	65
5.2	Outcomes deterministic scenarios	74
5.3	Robustness checks AR and VAR models	77
5.4	Outcomes stochastic scenarios	80
6.1	Flow chart of Liquidity Stress-Tester	89
6.2	Systemic effects through contagion channels	91
6.3	Frequency distributions of risk aversion indicators	96
6.4	Relationships between model parameters	97

6.5	Distribution of buffers after scenario rounds	99
6.6	Bank-testing the scenario outcomes	107
7.1	Model framework	116
7.2	Effect asset purchases central bank	126
7.3	Impact on credit supply	132
7.4	Central bank interventions, mitigating influence	134
7.5	Impact of exit from extended central bank operations	134
7.6	Influence of stronger liquidity profiles	136
8.1	Market shares Dutch deposit market	148
8.2	Money market rate and trading volume (euro area)	151
8.3	Stock prices supported vs. non-supported financial institutions, worldwide	153
8.4	CDS premium supported vs. non-supported financial institutions, worldwide	153
8.5	Dependence between banks and governments	154
9.1	Effects of new supervisory standards	166
9.2	Balance sheet adjustments, percentage point higher TCE/RWA ratio	174
9.3	Impact on loan spread of rising liquidity ratio, percentage point higher TCE/RWA ratio .	175
9.4	Real GDP impact increase TCE / RWA ratio, structural model	176
9.5	Real GDP impact increase liquidity ratio, structural model	176
9.6	Real GDP impact increase TCE / RWA ratio, VAR model	178
9.7	Probability of systemic crisis at various buffer levels	182
9.8	Solvency and liquidity of Dutch banks in historical perspective, 1990-2009	184

List of Tables

2.1	Pecking order of balance sheet adjustments	17
3.1	Summary statistics	37
5.1	Estimation result of regression of default rate (equation 5.1)	70
5.2	Estimation result of regression of LLP (equations 5.5 - 7.7)	71
5.3	Estimation result of regression of Net Interest Income (equation 5.8)	73
6.1	Correlation between changes of buffer and balance sheet items	94
6.2	Parameter sensitivity	101
6.3	Outcomes scenario simulations	105
6.4	Parameter sensitivity credit crisis scenario	106
7.1	Parameter sensitivity	127
7.2	Outcomes at different reaction triggers	128
7.3	Outcomes scenario runs	129
8.1	Government support to banks and central banks' balance sheet	144
8.2	Policy measures during the crisis	146
8.3	Distortions and mitigating instruments	147
8.4	Composition collateral pledged at Eurosystem	155
9.1	Scenarios	170
9.2	Estimation outcomes satellite model for balance sheet adjustments	172
9.3	Estimation outcomes satellite model for loan spread	173
9.4	Equity of banks versus other enterprises in the Netherlands, 2000-2008	183