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Jaap Dronkers and maarten Vink

Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and
Organization (METEOR), Maastricht University - Research Center
for Education and Labour Market

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Explaining immigrant citizenship status

First and second generation immigrants in fifteen European states

Jaap Dronkers

Research Centre for Education and the Labour Market

Maastricht University

Email: j.dronkers@maastrichtuniversity.nl

Maarten Peter Vink

Department of Political Science

Maastricht University

Email: m.vink@maastrichtuniversity.nl

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Abstract

Citizenship acquisition is often seen as a crucial step in the process of integrating immigrants in host societies. This paper analyzes the question why some immigrants are more likely to have acquired destination country citizenship across European states than others and tests legal-formal, socioeconomic, cultural and micro-level explanations. We use a pooled dataset of first and second generation immigrants resident in 15 European states and apply a logistic multilevel analysis to measure country of origin effects, destination country effects, as well as the effects of individual level characteristics. Our analysis shows that second generation and first generation immigrants who arrived more than 20 years ago, immigrants with one parent born in the destination country, retired workers and persons speaking the host country language at home, are more likely to become a citizen of their country of residence. Second generation Muslim immigrants are less likely to have host country citizenship than comparable non-Muslim immigrants of the second generation. Immigrants from former colonies or from poor or political instable countries are more likely to become a citizen of their country of residence. Immigrants are also more likely to have acquired citizenship in destination countries with a low net migration rate and with citizenship laws that make citizenship accessible in comparative perspective.

INTRODUCTION

Citizenship acquisition is often seen as a crucial step in the process of integrating immigrants in host societies. Whereas increasingly more precise comparative information is available about the differences in citizenship policies across European states, we know relatively little about the systematic effects of these differences. Do more inclusive citizenship policies indeed lead to higher rates of citizenship acquisition among immigrant groups?

This paper investigates the citizenship status of immigrants and analyzes the question why some immigrants are more likely to have citizenship of their country of residence than others. Twenty-five years ago observers still noted that ‘the social science literature on the naturalization process is weak and few statistically valid generalizations can be made about the effect of specific cultural, economic, political or familial variables on naturalization’ (DeSipio 1987, p. 402). Today, when reviewing the existing literature on the naturalization of immigrants, it quickly becomes evident that the literature has progressed significantly, but mostly within the context of North America.

In this paper we focus on the European context and use a pooled dataset on first and second generation immigrants resident in 15 European countries. We test a series of hypotheses derived from the social science literature on immigrant naturalization. Whereas many of these hypotheses have been previously tested in quantitative studies, most –if not all– of these studies have focused on the US and sometimes Canadian context (see e.g. North 1987, Yang 1994, Jones-Correa 2001, Mazzolari 2007, and Chiswick and Miller 2008 on the US; Mata 1999, and DeVoretz and Pivnenko 2004 on Canada; Bloemraad 2002 on Canada and the US). European studies are also mostly single case studies and often focused more on the *effects* of naturalization (see e.g. Bevelander and Veenman 2006 on both the causes and the socioeconomic consequences of naturalization in the Netherlands; Steinhardt 2008 on the economic impact of naturalization in Germany). Other studies have described the available national statistics on citizenship acquisition (see e.g. Clark et al 2006; Waldrauch 2006). We know of no *comparative analysis explaining* immigrant naturalization across European countries. Our study is thus important in terms of exploring a phenomenon that has been understudied in the European context –where immigrant naturalization arguably has a different dynamic than in classic settler states such as Australia, Canada and the US. Moreover, by applying a logistic multilevel analysis to measure country of origin effects, destination country effects, as well as the effects of individual level characteristics, we use a comparative research design that is better suited to analyzing the importance of macro-level factors related to the countries of residence. These factors can simply not be tested in single country studies.

A brief word on terminology. We use the term ‘destination country’ in order to indicate the country of residence of first and second generation immigration and the ‘origin country’ to refer to either the country of birth (of the first generation) or the country of birth of their parents (of the second generation). ‘Destination’ refers here to the direction of the migration process. We are well aware that, in particular, when referring to second generation ‘immigrants’ these terms are misleading in the sense that these persons were born in the country of their residence and that neither ‘destination’ nor ‘origin’ country can strictly speaking be used, simply because these persons are not immigrants at all. In this paper we are interested in capturing the dynamics of legal integration of both the first generation and their immediate offspring.

THEORY AND HYPOTHESES

Virtually all empirical research on the question of what explains immigrant naturalization applies what DeVoretz (2008: 682) terms an ‘ad hoc approach’: a collection of a wide-ranging number of explanations, formulated at both individual and country level, in the absence of a formal model that motivates immigration citizenship acquisition. DeVoretz (2008: 692) is right to note that such an approach carries the danger of providing a ‘weak rationale and ambiguous arguments on the direction of the effects of the [...] variables’. Yet, as said in the introduction, most of these variables have been developed and tested in a North American context and their application to a European context is a novelty. We present here a first large-scale comparative and explanatory analysis of immigrant citizenship acquisition in the European context. Therefore, rather than testing a possibly more cohesive, but restricted model, we favor an eclectic model in order to take on board as many as possible of the variables that have been tested in the relevant literature.

We now discuss the existing literature and the hypotheses that we will test in the empirical part of the paper, categorizing them into three groups: macro-level explanations that focus on the destination country and on the origin country and micro-level explanations that focus on the individual characteristics of the immigrants. Within these three groups of explanations we focus on legal-formal, socioeconomic, cultural and resource perspectives (cf. Bloemraad, 2002 for a related, but somewhat different typology of explanations). For each of the hypotheses we indicate between brackets at which level they are formulated: destination country, origin country or individual.

Legal-formal perspective: institutional conditions

The first group of explanations can be summarized under the heading ‘national citizenship laws matter’. Citizenship laws vary greatly between countries and thus may well explain differences in terms of naturalization rates between similar immigrant groups. Typically we see important differences between ‘immigration countries’ such as Canada and the US, where both birth at the territory still gives automatic access to citizenship to the second generation and naturalization is seen as a natural part of the integration process that follows immigration, and most European countries where citizenship acquisition has for a long time been dominated by descent-based transmission from one generation to the other and therefore was never very accessible to immigrants, in comparison to countries such as Canada and the US (see e.g. Brubaker, 1992; Bauböck et al, 2006; Howard 2009; Janoski 2010; Vink and De Groot 2010).

Aspects of citizenship laws that influence the ‘accessibility’ of citizenship are *ius soli* birthright, residence requirements, dual citizenship toleration, language and integration requirements, fees, and administrative discretion. One might hypothesize, as many politicians in destination countries do, who either aim to facilitate or restrict access to citizenship for immigrants, that citizenship laws have an important influence on the citizenship acquisition by immigrants (H1). For second generation immigrants, what matters in particular would be the presence of regulations that imply the automatic or facilitated access to citizenship for second generation immigrants (H2).

H1: Immigrants are more likely to have destination country citizenship in countries with a citizenship law that makes citizenship relatively easily accessible. (destination country)

*H2: Second generation immigrants are more likely to have destination country citizenship in countries where birth in a country provides automatic or highly facilitated access to citizenship ('ius soli effect'). (individual*destination country)*

An important caveat to these hypotheses is that, in the European context for example, it is a well-known phenomenon that even in those countries, such as Austria, where the material conditions for access to citizenship are high, naturalization rates may also be comparatively high. This phenomenon may be driven by strong demand for destination country citizenship, or specific demographic background of the target population, but also by the fact that even if conditions are high, accessible procedures may facilitate access in general. North American scholars have previously also underlined the importance of administrative procedures (North, 1987) as well as institutional environments (Bloemraad, 2002). Particularly Bloemraad's (2002) convincing comparative analysis of the Canadian and US context, where citizenship laws are broadly similar but naturalization rates differ sharply between similar groups of immigrants, makes us careful not to raise too high expectations about the effects of differences between citizenship laws. Having said this, that is no reason not to measure the effect of legal differences, but rather to make sure that alternative explanations are included in the model. Given that the in-depth research into broader institutional environments *a la* Bloemraad goes beyond the scope of our empirical analysis we do not include a separate hypothesis that captures these important dynamics.

Moving from destination country to sending country, scholars have noted that also the citizenship laws in countries of origin matters, in particular with regard to the toleration of dual citizenship (Jones-Correa, 2001; Chiswick and Miller, 2008). Whereas in some countries the voluntary acquisition of another citizenship leads either to the automatic loss or may cause the withdrawal of citizenship of origin, in others such provisions on loss of citizenship do not exist, or are restricted to naturalized citizens only. In order to maintain links with their emigrant community, also with a view to income from remittances, many countries, particularly in Latin America, have abolished such loss provisions. We expect dual citizenship toleration in sending countries to have a positive effect on immigrant citizenship acquisition in destination countries (H3).

H3: Immigrants from countries that accept dual citizenship are more likely to have destination country citizenship than immigrants from those countries that do not accept dual citizenship. (origin country)

Moving to the individual level, given that the institutional context in migration receiving countries generally favors long-term immigrants over short-term immigrants, with regard to citizenship acquisition, one may also expect that the longer immigrants reside in a destination country the higher the likelihood that they will acquire the citizenship of that country. Given that for second generation often additional, facilitated ways exist to acquire citizenship, we hypothesize that this residence effect holds in particular for first generation immigrants (H4).

H4: First generation immigrants who reside longer in a destination country are more likely to have the citizenship of that country than those whose residence in the destination country is shorter. (individual)

Given that the institutional context in all European countries favors descent-based transmission of citizenship over other ways of acquiring citizenship, we also hypothesize that immigrants of whom one parent is born in the country (and thus, presumably, is more likely to be a citizen of that country) are also more likely to be a citizen of that country (H5).

H5: Immigrants of whom one parent was born in the destination country are more likely to have destination country citizenship than those of whom both parents were born abroad ('mixed parentage effect'). (individual)

The same can be said for immigrants who are married to a citizen of the destination country: this often provides a ground for facilitated naturalisation. As our data only provides information about marital status, but not about whether or not that is with a citizen of the destination country, we hypothesize a general positive effect of marital status (H6). That is also in line with earlier findings from Yang (1994: 470), who found that immigrants in the US who were ever married were 18 percent more likely to become citizens than those who were never married. Finally, Yang (1994: 472) also observes gender bias and finds that women are more likely to naturalize. He argues that naturalization helps women to free themselves from repressive marriages or occupations: citizenship provides autonomy (H7).

H6: Immigrants who are married are more likely to have destination country citizenship than those who are not married. (individual)

H7: Male immigrants are less likely to have destination country citizenship than female immigrants. (individual)

Socioeconomic perspective: push and pull factors

While formal-legal explanations undoubtedly have an intuitive plausibility, in the sense that the legal framework ultimately determines whether an individual may have access to citizenship, or not, there are good reasons to look beyond mere institutional conditions. Acquiring destination country citizenship is a deliberate choice for first generation immigrants and also for second generation immigrants often is not an automatic fact, certainly not in Europe where most countries still do not have birthright citizenship for persons born at the territory of a country (*ius soli*). Scholars have argued that the perceptions of immigrants of the costs, benefits and meaning of naturalization are conditioned by the larger socioeconomic environment around them (Yang, 1994: 456). These perceptions may be expected to be influenced both by the socioeconomic context of the sending country as well of that of the destination country. From an economic perspective one may expect push and pull factors to have a significant impact of the decision by immigrants to naturalize or not and these would in general be summarized as follows: the less attractive it is to return to the country of origin and the more attractive it is to stay in the country of destination, the more likely it is that an immigrant will naturalize. In order to test this general push-pull hypothesis, we break it down into four empirically measurable expectations.

With regard to push factors, we look at the economic and political situation in origin countries. Following Jasso and Rosenzweig (1986, 303) we expect that immigrants from high-GNP countries of origin are significantly less likely to naturalize than those from countries with a low GNP per capita (H8). The rationale behind this hypothesis is that citizenship confers not only political rights, but mostly also a secure residence status and diplomatic protection, and for immigrants from less developed countries the comparative benefits of citizenship of a European state will be far greater than for those from more developed states. We hypothesize along similar lines that immigrants from politically less stable countries are more motivated to acquire the citizenship of their country of residence (H9).

H8: Immigrants from less developed countries are more likely to have destination country citizenship than immigrants from more developed countries. (origin country)

H9: Immigrants from politically unstable countries are more likely to have destination country citizenship than immigrants from politically stable countries. (origin country)

With regard to pull factors, our argumentation partly follows the same line of reasoning. With regard to GDP per capita, we hypothesize that immigrants are more likely to aspire citizenship of a rich European country, than that of a less rich European country (H10).

H10: Immigrants are more likely to have destination country citizenship in countries with a high GDP per capita. (destination country)

Given that all European countries included in our analysis are stable democracies, we do not hypothesize that political stability makes a difference. Rather, with regard to pull factors, one may expect –somewhat in contrast with the previous hypothesis– that the attractiveness of the citizenship of a destination country may be a function of net migration rates. The hypothesis would be that the citizenship of a country with comparatively high immigration becomes comparatively less attractive (H11). There are two arguments, one positive and one negative, behind this hypothesis. The positive argument is that in a country with high immigration, immigrants may already have sufficient networks in which they can function well without having to integrate fully in the host society (Yang 1994: 456). The negative argument would be that in a country with high immigration –certainly in the European context where immigration is not as strongly embedded within the national self-perception as in the North American context– immigrants may experience antagonistic sentiments from the native population, rather than encouragement to become a full member of the new host society.

H11: Immigrants are more likely to have destination country citizenship in countries with a low net migration rate. (destination country)

Cultural perspective: attitudes towards citizenship

A third strand of explanations highlights the importance of culture, rather than economy (see Bernard, 1936 for an early work). These explanations focus on the cultural similarity between the destination country and country of origin, which in turn reduces the difficulty of immigrants to integrate and ‘fosters their cultural adaptation to the host society’ (Yang 1994: 458). Colonial relations in particular may be expected to enhance such cultural similarity, in terms of use of the same language, sharing a common history and, sometimes, similar traditions. There is of course a wide variety of postcolonial constellations and in such cases as India and the UK, or Cape Verde and Portugal, the expectation of cultural similarity may be more realistic than in other cases of postcolonial relations. We also included countries, which have belonged to the same political identity, like Austria, Hungary and the Czech republic, or Norway and Sweden. Yet, overall we expect these historical ties to have a positive influence. We thus hypothesize that being from a former colony will increase the likelihood of citizenship acquisition in the destination country (H12).

H12: Immigrants from former colonies or former parts of the same political identity are more likely to have destination country citizenship than immigrants from other countries. (origin country)

One variable that has been noticeably absent in the literature on the naturalization of immigrants, as far as we can see, is religion. Yet at least within the specific context of European host societies, the religious background of immigrants is nowadays a hot potato. With regard to access to citizenship, in a country such as The Netherlands, citizenship tests include questions about gay marriage, state-church relations etcetera that at least raise the suggestion of being a litmus test for immigrants with a specific religious background. ‘Applicants for naturalisation even need to *feel Dutch*’ (Van Oers, 2009: 128). This arguably may raise the bar for immigrants with a specific religious background and it is clear that in these cases, such as the Netherland, when discussing religious background of immigrants Islam is the main issue. We may thus expect this to have a negative effect on citizenship acquisition rates (H13).

H13: Muslim immigrants are less likely to have destination country citizenship than non-Muslim immigrants. (individual)

Furthermore, although one might perhaps expect that Muslim identity might lose force over immigrant generations, and thus its potentially problematic effect on citizenship acquisition, the theory of segmented assimilation expresses a more pessimistic view on the integration of, particularly, the second generation (Portes and Zhou 1993; cf. Thomson and Crul 2007). Faced with racial and ethnic discrimination and lower than expected employment success, one might expect in particular the *Muslim* second generation to be less integrated, and thus also to be less likely to have the citizenship of their country of residence (H14).

H14: Second generation Muslim immigrants are less likely to have destination country citizenship than non-Muslim second generation immigrants. (individual)

Resource perspective: skills

Finally, individual characteristics, such as language competence, education and employment can influence citizenship acquisition by shaping both the motivations for naturalization and by affecting the ability to do so. With regard to language, Rosenzweig (1986: 305) observes that for the US ‘coming from a country in which English is an official language facilitates naturalization, for which knowledge of the English language is a requirement.’ Yang (1994: 468) confirms these findings. Furthermore, with regard to education, immigrants –like anyone else– have to invest in their education and those with higher education will thus have invested more. They will therefore be more strongly motivated to make use of the employment opportunities they have based on their education and, with a view to returns from employment, be more inclined to do so in the destination country than in the origin country. Investing in education is also a sign that they are committed integrating in society. Finally, successful economic adaptation to the host society, for example by way of employment, increases immigrants’ commitment (Yang 1994: 455). We thus hypothesize that speaking the language of the country of destination (H15), higher education (H16) and employment (H17) all have a positive effect on citizenship acquisition.

H15: Immigrants who speak the language of their country of destination at home are more likely to have the citizenship of that country. (individual)

H16: Higher educated immigrants are more likely to have the citizenship of their country of residence than those with few years of education. (individual)

H17: Employed immigrants are more likely to have the citizenship of their country of residence than unemployed immigrants. (individual)

DATA AND MEASUREMENT

We use the second and third wave of the European Social Survey for our analysis.¹ The data are assembled in the years 2004-2005 for the second and 2006-2007 for the third wave (Jowell and the Central Coordinating Team, 2005; Jowell and the Central Coordinating Team, 2007). From the 24 countries included in the European Social Survey we selected only those 15 countries which have been stable democracies and independent states for a few decennia: Austria, Belgium, Germany, Denmark, Finland, Spain, France, United Kingdom, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal and Sweden (see Table 1).² We do so because we are interested in integration processes over a long period of time in a stable, democratic setting. In order to enhance comparability with studies on immigration and naturalization in the US and Canada, we aim to exclude as much as possible the influence of changing borders and state formation (but see discussion below on definition of immigrant status and effects of changing borders during the 20th century, even if one selects only the stable democracies and independent states).

The pooled ESS dataset of the remaining 16 European countries contains 6.465 immigrants. We classify respondents as immigrants if at least one of the parents of the respondent was born outside the survey country, or if they and at least one of the parents were born outside the survey country. The respondents who were born outside the survey country but whose parents were born in the survey country are classified as natives. We do not expect them to be different from natives in the destination country. All other respondents are classified as natives and are excluded from the analyses. If both parents were born in the same country, this country is categorized as the country of origin. If the parents were born in different countries we use the country that matches the language spoken at home. In all other cases the country of birth of the mother is used (see Fleischmann & Dronkers, 2007 for a similar approach). For first generation immigrants, i.e. those respondents who are themselves born outside the survey country, their country of birth is used as country of origin.

The question of the definition of immigrant status is contested in the social sciences (see Fleischmann & Dronkers, 2007, for an extensive discussion). A problem with the use of country of birth or having immigrant parents for the measurement of immigrant status are the changing national boundaries in Europe during the full 20th century and the start of the 21st century. Due to changes in political frontiers after 1918 (the restructuring of central and eastern Europe, including Turkey) and 1945 (the annexation by Poland of some formerly German territory) and due to the subsequent displacement of large populations, an unknown number of 'indigenous' persons are measured as being born outside their country. For example, think of German respondents or their parents who are born in Königsberg (East Prussia, now Russia) and now living in Germany, One can argue that by failing to make the distinction between genuine migrants and border changes, we overestimate the number of better-integrated immigrants. At the same time, this potential defect highlights a conceptual problem in defining an immigrant: for how many generations must an East Prussian family live in Germany before he/she is no longer considered outlandish (see Kossert, 2008)? This

¹ The first wave of the European Social Survey is not usable for our purposes, because it does not include information on the countries of origin of second generation immigrants.

² We exclude Italy because it is not included in the second and third wave of the ESS.

issue also extends to the large number of ‘visible minority’ natives, whose grandparents migrated from former colonies to Europe. The grandchildren of these immigrants are not included in this analysis, because their parents are born in the European country of destination where the respondent is also born.

Another problem of using the ESS for comparative analyses of immigrants is the selectivity of the migrants in the ESS sample. As the ESS is not specifically designed to include immigrants, and because participation requires language proficiency, the immigrants that are in the sample need to speak the language of the destination country³ and be willing to participate in a survey, so they most probably have a legal status in the country of destination. This selectivity of established immigrants in the ESS might be undesirable, but at this moment the ESS data are the best available for a comparative European analysis with comparable and relevant dependent and independent variables. We should keep in mind, however, that if significant and substantial effects are found for these legal, more well-established immigrants, the effects are probably even larger with the illegal immigrants that are not included in the survey.

The *dependent variable* of our analysis is destination country citizenship. Respondents of the European Social Survey are asked whether they have the citizenship of the country where the survey is carried out. Unfortunately they are not asked in which year they have acquired that citizenship (e.g. after how many years of residence) and they are also not asked how they have acquired it (e.g. whether automatically by birth or by naturalization). Those data would allow us to measure the effects of changing citizenship policies in destination countries. Respondents are also not asked whether they have another citizenship (e.g. of their or their parents’ country of origin). Hence we do not know the percentage of immigrants with two or more citizenships in destination countries. Table 1 provides the percentages of first and second generation immigrants per destination country that are a citizen of that country. The second column provides the total number of first and second generation immigrants surveyed in each country of destination.

[Table 1 around here]

Table 2 shows descriptive information about the *independent variables*, which we use in this analysis.⁴ All the included *individual variables* and their coding are self-evident and directly derived from the European Social Survey. However, the educational level of the immigrants was originally measured on the seven point scale of ISCED-97, but unfortunately the measurement of education in the United Kingdom forces us to reduce this to a four dichotomous variables, by collapsing the categories of less than primary and primary education to one dummy, by joining the upper secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary to one dummy and by joining first stage of tertiary education and second stage of tertiary education to the variable tertiary education. The fourth dummy is lower secondary education.⁵

³ The survey was only conducted in the official languages of the countries of destination.

⁴ Instead of using the complete-case analysis in which respondents with any missing values are completely removed from the analysis (Jones, 1999), we decided to rely on the missing dummy variable method as proposed by Cohen and Cohen (1983). If for a respondent one of the individual characteristics was not available, we imputed the mean of the people from the same immigrant status, country of origin, educational level and immigrant generation. For educational level the country of origin mean is used. If there was no available reference category, the mean of the immigrants in the country of destination was imputed. For all imputations a missing dummy was created who was also used in the analyses of perceived discrimination. If this dummy is significant, this means the imputation should better not have occurred. Because of the average small number of imputations we do not think this to be a problem.

⁵ We have used the same procedure as Fleischmann & Dronkers, 2007.

With regard to the religious background of respondents we used dummies that indicate the religious group the respondent says he or she belongs to. In this analysis we only use the dummy variable adherent to Muslim religion. We also use the number of years since the first generation immigrant has arrived in the destination country. We collapsed the categories recently and less than 6 years into one. The other categories are given by the ESS questionnaire. Finally we use one indicator for whether the respondent is currently living together with a partner (either married or cohabiting).

[Table 2 around here]

With regard to the *macro-characteristics of destination countries* we have collected the policy indicators of the level of legal openness of these societies (*ius soli*; MIPEX), and socio-economic characteristics of the country of destination (GDP, openness of the labourmarket; net migration rate). All countries which have a form of *ius soli* (citizenship is given to everybody born in that country) for second as for the third generation (the so-called double *ius soli*) are coded 1, the other countries are coded zero. This is problematic because some countries like Belgium, the Netherlands and Spain have a very easy access for second generation immigrants, formally not equal to a *ius soli*, but in practice not far from that. Therefore we coded these countries as *ius soli*. We did not code Luxembourg and Germany as *ius soli* countries, because they introduced that option too recently to affect our respondents. The Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) is a measurement of the different policies towards the integration of migrants for 28 states among which 25 EU-member states. It uses over a hundred policy indicators in six areas of shaping citizenship for immigrants (Niessen, Huddleston and Citron, 2007). Higher scores represent better migrant integration policies on a scale from 0 to 100. We use only the subscale for ‘access to nationality’.

The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita is an indicator of the economic wealth of the destination country (Data are from 2005; OECD, 2007). The net-migration rate of a destination country is the difference between the immigration and emigration in a country per 1000 persons in the population per year. The mean net migration rate of 2007 is used (CIA World Fact Book, 2007).

With regard to the *macro-characteristics of origin countries* the first indicator is an economic characteristic, which might indicate the importance of the economic motives for immigration. The Human Development Index (HDI) is a composite measure for the development level of a country. Its three components are a long and healthy life, knowledge and a decent standard of living. Data of the Human Development report 2007/2008 are used. We recode this index in such a way that a high score means a higher developmental level. The second indicator is a political characteristic, which might indicate the importance of political motives for immigration. We use Kaufmann’s indicator of political stability, which assesses the probability that the government in function will be overthrown in the near future by unconstitutional or violent means (Kaufmann et al., 2006). Data from 2006 are used. Using seven to eleven components, the indicator ranges from -2.5 to + 2.5 due to a standardization procedure. Higher scores indicate more political stability. The third indicator is a historical characteristic, which might indicate a more easy access to the citizenship of the country of destination. If the country of origin was a former colony or territory of the country of destination, this might promote citizenship in the latter.⁶

⁶ These are, in the first place, countries that have been or still are colonies (for instance India for the UK, the Spanish-speaking countries of Latin America for Spain, and Brazil for Portugal). But in the case of Austria,

For the variable ‘dual citizenship’ we use data on whether the citizenship of countries of origin is lost automatically upon voluntary acquisition of another citizenship. We use an extensive and yearly updated list used by the Dutch Ministry of Justice of provisions in all UN member states. We use the list from October 2001 as reference date (Ministerie van Justitie 2001). This is a somewhat arbitrary choice, given that these provisions sometimes change over time. However, given that the ESS data do not provide the year of acquisition of destination country citizenship, we chose to use a reference date at least a few years before the data collection of the second ESS wave. Before 2001 it is more difficult to obtain extensive and reliable data. Where citizenship is lost automatically we code this as 0 and where citizenship is not lost automatically, but can be renounced after acquiring another citizenship, or where it cannot be lost at all, we code this as 1.

Finally, our *method of analysis* needs to take into account the nested structure of our data as respondents are nested in communities and communities are nested in countries of destination as well as countries of origin. For this reason we use multilevel analysis. As the two levels of country of origin and country of destination are not hierarchically nested, we use a cross-classified model that makes it possible for respondents to be nested both in countries of origin as well as in countries of destination (Van Tubergen, Maas & Flap, 2004). Given the dichotomous nature of our dependent variables (respondents either do or do not have destination country citizenship) we apply logistic multilevel analysis.

RESULTS

Our first model is a so-called empty model, in which we do not explain any of the variance in citizenship of immigrants yet (Table 4). We can see that the majority of the non-individual level variance is at the level of destination country and not at the origin country. This means that there are more differences in citizenship acquisition by immigrants between destination countries than between origin countries. However, this is partly spurious. As soon as we control for the individual characteristics in model 2, there is also substantial variation at the origin level. This means that the individual characteristics of the immigrants are related with their country of origin in such a way that they ‘neutralize’ variation between the countries of origin. An explanation might be that the characteristics of the immigrants from less developed origin countries are more positive (for instance are younger and arrived more recently) than the characteristics of immigrants from more developed origin countries (who are older and live already longer in the destination countries). In this example the negative effect of the individual characteristics (age; year in destination) neutralizes the positive effect of the macro-characteristic Development index.

[Table 3 around here]

Our second step first step is to build a model by adding all macro characteristics of the origin and the destination country to the empty model. We include the macro-characteristics one by one and single, and so the first column of Table 3 shows the significant and non-significant parameters of these macro-features and between parentheses how much the fit of the model improves.⁷ The results show that these macro-characteristics seem to be significantly related

Germany, the UK and Sweden they also included those countries that were a part of their former territories (for example Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and the former Yugoslavia for Austria; Norway for Sweden).

⁷ A negative number indicates an improvement of the model by the inclusion of the characteristic.

with the likelihood of obtaining the citizenship of the country of destination. One has to remember that the significance of these coefficients might be spurious, because these results do not take into account the individual characteristics of the immigrants.

The third column of Table 3 shows the coefficients of these single features, but now controlled for individual characteristics of the immigrants. This control for individual characteristics hardly changes the significance of the macro-features: all remain significant after inclusion of the effect of individual characteristics. However, one has to keep in mind that these results might be spurious because these macro-characteristics are strongly correlated (see Tables A4a and A4b of the Appendix)

[Table 4 around here]

Model 2 of Table 4 shows the coefficients of the individual characteristics. Given the strong decrease of the loglikelihood individual characteristics are far more important for the explanation of citizenship of immigrants than the macro-features. Speaking a minority language at home decreases the likelihood of citizenship of destination, while being a first generation immigrant who stays already longer than 20 years or a second generation immigrant, the offspring of a marriage between an immigrant and a native, and an older second generation immigrant increases the likelihood of citizenship of destination significantly. Socio-economic position, educational level and individual religion do not influence this likelihood significantly. The hypothesized interactions between some individual characteristics are not significant.

We add in model 3 the significant macro-characteristics of origin country all together. The effects of all macro-characteristics of the origins countries remain significant, while dual citizenship remains insignificant.⁸ Each of these characteristics has its own effect, which cannot be explained by its relation with the other macro-features. The predicting force of these characteristics of the origin countries is quite powerful because they explain about half of the variance and as a consequence strongly improve the fit of our model, indicated by a strong decrease of the loglikelihood.

We add in model 4 the significant characteristics of country of destination. The *interaction between second-generation and ius soli* is no longer significant and the same holds for GDP per capita. Net migration rate and access to nationality remain significant and thus have their own effect, which cannot be explained by its relation with the other macro-features. Ius soli and GDP per capita have no such independent effect. The predicting force of these characteristics of the destination countries is quite poor because they explain hardly any variance and as a consequence improves hardly the fit of our model, indicated by a small decrease of the loglikelihood.

Model 5 contains all individual characteristics and the significant macro features of both origin and destination together. All the three macro-features of the origin countries and the two macro-variables of the destination remain significant. The direction of the parameters of the macro-variables hardly changed compared with those of models 3 and 4, which shows that the strong correlations between the macro-features do not bias our results.

⁸ Yang (1994: 458) also expects a positive effect of dual citizenship policies in countries of origin, but his analysis shows a negative relation (pp. 473-474). This contrast seems to be explained by the fact that Yang coded the dummy variable dual citizenship based on data from the second half of the 1950s when the number of countries accepting dual citizenship was much lower in the early 1990s than it is today. In his analysis almost all countries were coded as being intolerant on dual citizenship (see also his Table 1).

[Table 5 around here]

CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION

Does citizenship policy matter? The results of our analysis show that it does. Immigrants indeed are more likely to have the citizenship of a destination country with a citizenship law that makes citizenship relatively accessible, in comparison with other countries. The importance of citizenship policy should however be qualified. First, with regard to citizenship laws in origin countries, where we hypothesized an effect of dual citizenship policies, we found no significant effect. Second, more importantly, with regard to the relative explanatory power of the different variables that we tested, it is clear that legal-formal explanations that focus on institutional conditions provide the weakest explanation. The same goes for net migration rates in destination countries, which have a significant, but empirically weak negative effect on citizenship acquisition rates.

Of greater empirical importance are three variables related to the cultural and socioeconomic conditions in the countries of origin. Immigrants from former colonies or from poor or political instable countries are more likely to become a citizen of their country of residence. These findings indicate that it matters much more where an immigrant comes from, than where her or she is going.

Yet the largest variation in terms of whether first and second generation immigrants have the citizenship of their country of residence is explained by individual factors. From a democratic perspective that finding may be seen as encouraging in the sense that it matters less where you come from, or where you are, but rather who and what you are. We find that second generation and first generation immigrants who arrived more than 20 years ago, immigrants with one parent born in the destination country, retired workers and persons speaking the host country language at home, are more likely to be a citizen of their country of residence. We find no significant effects for education and employment. With regard to cultural factors, although we find no significant effect of adherence to Islam for the first generation, but we do find that in particular for second generation immigrants Muslims are less likely to have host country citizenship than comparable non-Muslims immigrants. The latter, somewhat pessimistic finding offers support for what in the literature is called the phenomenon of segmented assimilation and which draws attention to the social stratification factors that makes some immigrant groups susceptible to downward mobility (Portes and Zhou 1993; Zhou 1997).

We end with a few important caveats.

First, with regard to the scope of this analysis, it needs to be stressed that we only look at immigrant citizenship status in European destination countries. This can be seen both as a plus and as a minus of our analysis. On the plus side, whereas by far most empirical work in this area has been done on immigrant status in traditional immigrant societies, in particular the US, in this paper we take a large set of hypotheses from the existing literature and test those in the European setting. This allows us to compare similarities and differences in terms of immigrant citizenship acquisition between these different contexts. Yet it also means, on the down side, that our findings are specific for exactly that European context.

Second, with regard to the data that we use, whereas most existing work so far has been done based on census data, again particularly in the North American context (but see also Steinhardt 2008 on the German context and Evans 1988 on Australia), we use survey data in this paper (compare also Bevelander and Veenman 2006 for an analysis of survey data from the Netherlands). One clear downside of our survey approach is that we cannot do a cohort approach, which would be possible had we used census data. Our data do not indicate, for example, the year of arrival in destination countries of first generation immigrants. In more general terms our analysis provides a weak measurement of the time-dimension of immigration. Our dataset takes stock of the existing population in the recent years and thus covers all kind of immigrants, and their offspring, who have migrated into European countries over the full 20th century. In some cases, the term ‘migrant’ would not even apply because people in fact did not cross borders, but rather the other way around: as a result of state-formation and boundary redrawing people suddenly find themselves being part of a different country and migrate (for instance from East Prussia to Germany), although their nationality remained the same. Those kinds of people, although a minority, are also part of our immigrant population, because they had to settle again in a new and sometimes hostile environment (see Kossert, 2008). At the same time, this may be seen as a strength of our analysis, given that whereas much existing research on immigrant integration in European countries tends to focus on problematic immigrants groups (see e.g. Ersanilli and Koopmans 2010 on Turks in France, Germany and the Netherlands) our analysis provides a much more comprehensive picture of the whole range of immigration.

Third, with regard to the causal direction assumed in the equations of our regression model, we realize that we should be careful not to exclude the possibility that in some cases the causal direction may be reverse. After all, some individual characteristics might be the consequences of certain immigrant policies (high educated immigrants might be the consequence of an immigration policy which allows only high educated immigrants to enter legally a destination country). If one controls in such a case the effect of this policy-indicator for individual characteristics (as we do in this analysis), one assumes the wrong causal direction. This can lead to flawed parameters for that policy-indicator, and mostly its effect will be underestimated. However, table 3 does not suggest that the parameters of characteristics of the destination countries are flawed, because they hardly changed after controlling for the individual characteristics.

Thus more empirical work needs to be done, but our analysis already clearly reveals that the acquisition of citizenship by immigrants in Europe is not primarily driven by legal characteristics, but in the first place by social, economic and historical features of individuals and countries.

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Table 1: Percentages immigrants with destination country citizenship
(Number of immigrants per destination country included in pooled ESS dataset)

Country	%	N
France	82,9	691
Sweden	82,4	704
Netherlands	82,1	274
United Kingdom	79,6	603
Austria	79,5	351
Denmark	77,9	299
Germany	74	758
Belgium	71,7	590
Ireland	68,4	152
Norway	64,7	312
Greece	64,6	367
Finland	58,6	58
Portugal	51,5	231
Spain	37,2	301
Luxembourg	36,5	784
Total / Average	68,7	6475

Source: unweighted data of the second and third wave of the European Social Survey

Table 2: Descriptive statistics

	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
Individual characteristics of respondent				
Citizen destination country	0.00	1.00	0.69	0.46
Minority language	0.00	1.00	0.22	0.41
Parents with mixed marriage	0.00	1.00	0.37	0.48
Second generation	0.00	1.00	0.47	0.50
Arrived 0-5 years ago in destination country	0.00	1.00	0.10	0.30
Arrived 6-10 years ago in destination country	0.00	1.00	0.08	0.27
Arrived 10-20 years ago in destination country	0.00	1.00	0.13	0.34
Arrived > 20 years ago in destination country	0.00	1.00	0.21	0.41
Age respondent/10	1.30	9.70	4.29	1.74
Female	0.00	1.00	0.52	0.50
Married or cohabitating	0.00	1.00	0.59	0.49
Only primary education	0.00	1.00	0.18	0.38
Lower secondary education	0.00	1.00	0.22	0.42
Higher secondary education	0.00	1.00	0.34	0.47
Tertiary education	0.00	1.00	0.26	0.44
Unemployed	0.00	1.00	0.07	0.26
Retired	0.00	1.00	0.15	0.36
Housework	0.00	1.00	0.10	0.30
Student	0.00	1.00	0.11	0.31
Occupational status	0.00	1.00	0.24	0.43
Islam	0.00	1.00	0.10	0.31
Origin macro-characteristics				
Origin former colony or territory	0.00	1.00	0.25	0.43
Human Development Index origin	0.47	0.97	0.84	0.13
Kaufmann index political stability origin	-2.91	1.92	0.18	0.82
Dual citizenship	0.00	1.00	0.54	0.50
Destination macro-characteristics				
Net migration rate	0.28	8.64	2.64	2.39
GDP per capita/1000	21.80	80.80	41.60	15.59
Ius soli	0.00	1.00	0.44	0.50
MIPEX Access to nationality destination	22	71	50.01	15.51

Source: unweighted data of the second and third wave of the European Social Survey

Table 3: The parameters of single macro-characteristics as determinants of destination country citizenship, without (model 1) and with control (model 2) for individual characteristics of immigrants (change in -2loglikelihood)

	Without control for individual characteristics (model 1)		With control for individual characteristics (model 2)	
	Coefficient	Change loglikelihood	Coefficient	Change loglikelihood
Origin macro-characteristics				
Origin former colony or territory	0.60**	-55	0.46**	-242
Human Development Index	-0.30	-8	-0.17	+10
Kaufmann index political stability	0.12*	-21	0.49**	-414
Dual citizenship	-0.14	+2	0.23	+70
Destination macro-characteristics				
Net migration rate	-0.17**	-82	-0.18**	-297
GDP per capita	-0.02**	-44	-0.02**	(-422)
Second generation	2.28**	-3191	-0.07	+70
Ius soli	-0.05		0.09	
Ius soli * second generation	0.70**		0.54**	
MIPEX Access to nationality	0.01**	+21	0.02**	+79

Source: unweighted data of the second and third wave of the European Social Survey

* Significant at 0.05 level. ** Significant at 0.01 level.

Table 4: Logistic multilevel analyses of determinants of destination country citizenship: unstandardized coefficients (and standard errors).

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Individual characteristics					
Minority language		-0.43** (0.09)	-0.47** (0.09)	-0.46** (0.10)	-0.49** (0.10)
Mixed parentage (one parent born in destination country)		1.89** (0.15)	1.98** (0.15)	1.91** (0.15)	1.98** (0.15)
Age/10		0.02 (0.04)	0.03 (0.04)	0.02 (0.04)	0.03 (0.04)
Age /10* second generation		0.32** (0.07)	0.31** (0.07)	0.29** (0.07)	0.28** (0.07)
Second generation		0.06 (0.31)	0.16 (0.31)	0.15 (0.32)	0.34 (0.31)
Arrived 0-5 years ago in destination country		-2.35** (0.15)	-2.55** (0.16)	-2.46** (0.16)	-2.63** (0.16)
Arrived 6-10 years ago in destination country		-1.35** (0.14)	-1.53** (0.14)	-1.48** (0.15)	-1.61** (0.15)
Arrived 10-20 years ago in destination country		-0.57** (0.12)	-0.63** (0.12)	-0.64** (0.12)	-0.67** (0.12)
Arrived > 20 years ago (ref.)					
Gender (female)		0.03 (0.12)	0.04 (0.12)	0.02 (0.12)	0.03 (0.12)
Marital status: married or cohabitating		-0.11 (0.12)	-0.13 (0.12)	-0.13 (0.12)	-0.15 (0.12)
Female*Marital status		0.04 (0.15)	0.08 (0.16)	0.06 (0.16)	0.09 (0.16)
Only primary education		-0.07 (0.13)	-0.12 (0.13)	-0.09 (0.13)	-0.13 (0.13)
Lower secondary education		-0.09 (0.12)	-0.13 (0.12)	-0.09 (0.12)	-0.12 (0.12)
Higher secondary education		0.02 (0.10)	0.02 (0.10)	0.07 (0.10)	0.07 (0.10)
Tertiary education (ref.)					
No work (ref.)					
Unemployed		0.08 (0.11)	0.07 (0.15)	0.12 (0.15)	0.10 (0.15)
Retired		0.32* (0.16)	0.37** (0.16)	0.39** (0.16)	0.42** (0.16)
Housework		0.05 (0.13)	0.03 (0.13)	0.11 (0.13)	0.09 (0.14)
Student		0.25 (0.14)	0.29 (0.15)	0.30 (0.15)	0.33 (0.15)
Occupational status		0.12 (0.09)	0.12 (0.09)	0.12 (0.09)	0.13 (0.09)
Islam		0.24 (0.15)	0.25 (0.16)	0.25 (0.16)	0.26 (0.16)
Islam * Second generation		-0.30 (0.28)	-0.53* (0.29)	-0.46 (0.29)	-0.68** (0.30)
Origin macro-characteristics					
Former colony or territory			0.49** (0.17)		0.37** (0.17)
Human Development Index origin			-0.57* (0.28)		-0.61** (0.29)
Kaufmann index political stability origin			0.52** (0.09)		0.53** (0.09)
Dual citizenship			0.19 (0.17)		
Destination macro-characteristics					
Net migration rate				-0.17** (0.06)	-0.15** (0.03)
GDP per capita/1000				0.00 (0.01)	
MIPEX Access to nationality *10				0.12** (0.01)	0.12** (0.04)
Ius soli				-0.15 (0.18)	
Ius soli * Second generation				0.28 (0.22)	
Constant	0.67** (0.06)	0.76** (0.12)	0.57** (0.27)	0.51 (0.42)	0.47 (0.36)
Destination variance	0.86** (0.11)	0.76** (0.13)	0.77** (0.13)	0.73** (0.13)	0.72** (0.13)
Origin variance	0.02 (0.05)	0.40** (0.13)	0.23** (0.10)	0.43** (0.13)	0.25** (0.10)
-2loglikelihood	7295	1381	632	1317	530

$N_{immigrants}=6475$; $N_{origin} = 156$; $N_{destination}= 15$;

Source: unweighted data of the second and third wave of the European Social Survey

* Significant at 0.05 level ** Significant at 0.01 level.

Table 5. Summary of hypotheses and outcome of analysis

Destination country

H1: Immigrants are more likely to have destination country citizenship in countries with a citizenship law that makes citizenship relatively easily accessible. **ACCEPTED**

H2: Second generation immigrants are more likely to have destination country citizenship in countries where birth in a country provides automatic or highly facilitated access to citizenship ('ius soli effect'). **REJECTED**

H10: Immigrants are more likely to have destination country citizenship in countries with a high GDP per capita. **REJECTED**

H11: Immigrants are more likely to have destination country citizenship in countries with a low net migration rate. **ACCEPTED**

Origin country

H3: Immigrants from countries that accept dual citizenship are more likely to have destination country citizenship than immigrants from those countries that do not accept dual citizenship. **REJECTED**

H8: Immigrants from less developed countries are more likely to have destination country citizenship than immigrants from more developed countries. **ACCEPTED**

H9: Immigrants from politically unstable countries are more likely to have destination country citizenship than immigrants from politically stable countries. **ACCEPTED**

H12: Immigrants from former colonies are more likely to have destination country citizenship than immigrants from other countries. **ACCEPTED**

Individual

H4: First generation immigrants who reside longer in a destination country are more likely to have the citizenship of that country than those whose residence in the destination country is shorter. **ACCEPTED**

H5: Immigrants of whom one parent was born in the destination country are more likely to have destination country citizenship than those of whom both parents were born abroad ('mixed parentage effect'). **ACCEPTED**

H6: Immigrants who are married are more likely to have destination country citizenship than those who are not married. **REJECTED**

H7: Male immigrants are less likely to have destination country citizenship than female immigrants. **REJECTED**

H13: Muslim immigrants are less likely to have destination country citizenship than non-Muslim immigrants. **REJECTED**

H14: Second generation Muslim immigrants are less likely to have destination country citizenship than non-Muslim second generation immigrants. **ACCEPTED**

H15: Immigrants who speak the language of their country of destination at home are more likely to have the citizenship of that country. **ACCEPTED**

H16: Higher educated immigrants are more likely to have the citizenship of their country of residence than those with few years of education. **REJECTED**

H17: Employed immigrants are more likely to have the citizenship of their country of residence than unemployed immigrants. **REJECTED**

Appendix

Table A1: the number of cases of immigrants from various origin and destination countries

	AUT	BEL	GER	DEN	SPA	FIN	FRA	UK	GRE	IRE	LUX	NET	NOR	POR	SWE
Algeria		7			6		109			1	1	1			
Angola			1								1			64	
Argentina					18		1								
Australia			1	1			1	12	1	3		1			
Austria		2	38	3			2				4	3	2		7
Belgium	1		2	1	1		23	7	1		77	17	2		
Bosnia & Herzegovina	22	1	6	6					4		7	4	9		16
Bulgaria	2		1	2	2			1	17		1			2	
Brazil	1	1	2		5				1		3	1	2	44	1
Congo		24	3				6	1				1	2		1
Croatia	17		5				3	2			2	1	1	7	
Cyprus								4	7						1
Czech Republic	34	2	46				2	1	1		1	2			2
Czechoslovakia			12	1									1		3
Denmark	2	1	2					1		1	3		41		29
Egypt	2		1	2			3	2	9		1	1			1
Estonia			2	1				1					1		
Finland				9	1		1	2					12		211
France	4	115	13	3	13			6	2	1	117	2	6	6	4
Germany	71.	23	2	64	2		25	31	2	6	102	57	18		68
Greece	2	9	9				4	1			1	1	2	3	
Hungary	28	7	17	2			1				2	3	1	4	
India	2	2	3		1		1	68	2		2	1	2	7	4
Indonesia		1		3								43			
Iran	1	1	7	5	1	2		1				1	5		22
Iraq	2	2	2	11			1	2	1			3	11		22
Ireland	1		1	2	2			119	2		1		2		1
Italy	29	96	37	4	5		111	10		1	94	8	1		3
Jamaica				1				35							
Lithuania	1		2		2			1			1	2			2
Morocco		68	8	2	38		65			1	1	9			1
Netherlands	4	76	8	2	2		2	5		2	33		7		6
Norway		2		23							2				52
Pakistan		4	2	4	3			47	3				6		
Philippines	2		3	5	3			7	1	2	5	3	7		1
Poland	11	9	140	12	2		31	19	4	1	9	6	12	1	32
Portugal		1	5	1	19		51	4			221	1			2
Romania	17	3	26		22		3	1	4		2	3		5	2
Former USSR *	1	5	137	4	8	29	8	2	51	2	5	5	8		5
Serbia & Montenegro	14		4	2			4						1		7
Slovakia	5		4		1		3					1			
Spain	2	16	7				62	10		3	8	3	1	8	1
Sri Lanka			1	5			1	15		2		1			3
Sweden	2	2		23		15		2				1	43		
Switzerland	8		6	3			11	6			4	1	3		6
Tunisia		6		2			37				2	1	1		
Turkey	29	25	108	12			6		148		1	17	7		18
Ukraine	2	1	20		6	1	3		3		3		2	14	
United Kingdom	51	11.	8	9	4		8		6	110	5	5	28	1	20
United States	1	4	15	12	2	3	6	27	3	7	4	2	30		9
Former Yugoslavia	7	2	9	4	1						29	1			22
Spanish Speaking Caribbean & South America		1	1		21		2	2			3	1	1	4	28
Remaining Northern Europe				12				1					2		3
Remaining Western Asia		1	2	5	3		1	3	6			1	1		20
Eastern Africa		5	1	4			8	23		1	4		8		11
Remaining South-East Asia		1		2			5	7				2		1	3
Western Africa		8	3		6		29	7	1	1	11	1	1	47	2
Remaining Southern Europe	8		1				1	8		1			1		1
Remaining		2	1	3	1							5	1		1

Southern Asia														
Dutch Speaking Caribbean							1					14		
Eastern Asia	3	1	2		2		1	7		1	6	1		13
Middle Africa		7			1		6				3			6
Remaining Eastern Europe	2		4	2	4	6		2	83		2			14
English Speaking Caribbean & South America							1	7						
Remaining Northern Africa			1			2	2	1				1		1
Remaining Northern America				10					2					
Australia and New Zealand								7					1	2
Southern Africa			2									3		18
French Speaking Caribbean		1					11							
Remaining Western Europe	1	4					3	4						

Source: unweighted data of the second and third wave of the European Social Survey; *Former USSR Excluding Belarus, Ukraine and the Baltic states. We merge only in these appendix tables those countries into regions which had less than 10 cases. The nineteen regions of origin we use are derived from the United Nations classification of geographical regions (United Nations Statistical Office).

Table A2: total number of immigrants per country or region of origin and percentage of those immigrants who have the nationality of the country of destination.

Origin countries	Number of immigrants	% citizenship in destination country
Angola	68	64,7%
Austria	62	77,4%
Bosnia Herzegovina	71	57,7%
Belgium	132	60,6%
Bulgaria	28	39,3%
Brazil	61	34,4%
Congo	38	78,9%
Switzerland	48	66,7%
Serbia Montenegro	36	69,4%
Cyprus	12	83,3%
Czech Republic	91	93,4%
Germany	471	80,3%
Denmark	83	73,5%
Algeria	126	81,7%
Egypt	22	81,8%
Spain	138	80,4%
Finland	236	81,4%
France	292	65,1%
UK	221	67,0%
Greece	33	54,5%
Croatia	38	78,9%
Hungary	65	92,3%
Indonesia	47	100,0%
Ireland	127	85,8%
India	95	78,9%
Iraq	57	56,1%
Iran	46	69,6%
Italy	401	64,8%
Jamaica	36	91,7%
Sri Lanka	28	89,3%
Lithuania	11	81,8%
Morocco	193	67,4%
Netherlands	148	58,8%
Norway	79	75,9%
Philippines	39	69,2%
Pakistan	69	78,3%
Poland	289	82,4%
Portugal	305	22,6%
Rumania	88	52,3%
Former USSR	270	78,5%
Sweden	88	78,4%
Slovakia	14	78,6%
Tunisia	49	87,8%
Turkey	371	71,4%
Ukraine	55	40,0%

USA	125	68,8%
Czechoslovakia	17	94,1%
Former Yugoslavia	75	53,3%
Spanish Caribbean	171	51,5%
North Europe	18	66,7%
West Asia	80	78,8%
East Africa	78	76,9%
Southeast Asia	21	76,2%
West Africa	145	54,5%
South Europe	21	81,0%
South Asia	14	35,7%
Dutch Caribbean & South America	35	100,0%
East Asia	90	71,1%
Middle Africa	23	60,9%
East Europe	148	36,1%
English Caribbean	8	100,0%
North Africa	8	62,5%
North America	30	83,3%
Australia, New Zealand & Pacific	29	55,2%
Southern Africa	42	88,1%
French Caribbean & South America	12	91,7%
West Europe	8	62,5%
Total	6475	68,7%

Source: unweighted data of the second and third wave of the European Social Survey. We merge only in these appendix tables those countries into regions which had less than 10 cases. The nineteen regions of origin we use are derived from the United Nations classification of geographical regions (United Nations Statistical Office).

Table A3: Percentage immigrants with citizenship of destination-country for the largest immigrants groups and the destination countries with the largest number of immigrants

Country of origin	Country of destination					
	Belgium	Germany	France	United Kingdom	Luxembourg	Sweden
Algeria	57		88		0	
Belgium		0	96	86	47	
Finland			0	0		84
France	75	92		83	50	50
Germany	87		92	84	69	94
Ireland		0		88	0	0
Italy	54	41	95	90	47	33
Morocco	79	63	71		0	100
Netherlands	66	63	50	60	55	50
Poland	67	94	97	58	44	78
Portugal	0	40	61	50	8	100
Spain	81	86	90	60	63	71
Former USSR *	100	91	100	50	0	100
Turkey	80	38	67		0	72
United Kingdom	64	50	75		0	65
United States	75	80	67	37	50	89
Spanish Speaking Caribbean & South America	100	0	83	100	33	86
Western Africa	63	0	63	67	36	100
Remaining Eastern Europe	60	70	86	100	0	92

Source: unweighted data of the second and third wave of the European Social Survey; empty cells have no observation. We merge only in these appendix tables those countries into regions which had less than 10 cases. The nineteen regions of origin we use are derived from the United Nations classification of geographical regions (United Nations Statistical Office).

Table A4a: correlations between macro-characteristics (origin country)

	Former colony	HDI	Kaufmann political stability
Former colony	1		
HDI	0.18	1	
Kaufmann political stability	0.00	0.54	1
Dual citizenship	-0.05	-0.13	-0.04

Table A4b: correlations between macro-characteristics (destination country)

	Net migration rate	Access to nationality	Ius soli
Net migration rate	1		
Access to nationality	-0.03	1	
Ius soli	-0.04	0.61	1
gdp	0.72	-0.13	-0.33