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European Security and Defence Policy in the Light of the Transatlantic Relationship

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June 2005

Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank the German Marshall Fund of the United States for its generous support for this publication. The author also thanks all those who contributed to this study through their valuable comments and remarks. The author would like to say a special thanks to Jan Váška. All errors of fact or interpretation lie with the author.

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Not all is achievable with military instruments, yet nothing is achievable without them.

Raymond Aron

1. INTRODUCTION

The 'European defence' idea is as old as the project of European integration itself.¹ Following a number of long-winded adventures the European defence project took shape of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) in 1998 which has been becoming a still more important component of the EU's Common Foreign and Security (CFSP). This intergovernmental initiative representing a new dimension of European integration² is surely a milestone on the integration journey on which ESDP is as important as the single market or the monetary union.³ In relation to the ESDP (and the whole CFSP) EU member states have decided to extend – though on the intergovernmental level – the scope of the Union's action to areas which had previously been under exclusive control by nation states, in spite of a similar military and political cooperation within the framework of the North Atlantic Alliance for over fifty years. ESDP can be said to be a part of European political integration while coming in reaction to the end of the Cold War and the subsequent hot wars on the European continent throughout the 1990s, wars that Europe was unable to face with adequate reaction.

In spite of its large population and great economic power (the EU is the largest economic superpower in the world and the most populous entity in the West) Europe remains a 'political dwarf', as claimed by Nicole Gnesotto.⁴ So far, Europe has not been able to look after its own security and take up responsibility for what is happening on the European continent, to say nothing of the world.

ESDP could thus be described as an effort at the emancipation of Europe so as to leave behind Europe's legacy of the Cold War and start intervening in military conflicts and crises on the continent or even beyond, in areas under the aegis of Europeans such as in Africa, with the new joint military instruments made operable only through cooperative effort (such as armed forces specialisation). ESDP is to allow the Union to undertake military operations without first US and, later on, also the NATO assistance: so far, the ESDP has been linked and complementary to NATO, as part of a larger package of 'burden sharing'.⁵ These operations shall be undertaken by the European Union in line with its values, such as the promotion of human rights, democracy, political and cultural pluralism, and peace and prosperity on the European continent and in the world. They shall be carried out according to the Union's principles which

¹ Lefebvre, M.: Les perspectives de la défense européenne. In: Montbrial, T. (ed.): Ramses 2004, IFRI-Dunod, Paris 2003, p. 88.

² Editorial in: Mezinárodní politika, No. 3, 2000, p. 3.

³ Brimmer, E.: Conclusion. In: Brimmer, E. (ed.): The EU's Search for a Strategic Role. Center for Transatlantic Relations, The Johns Hopkins Un., Washington 2002, p. 159.

⁴ Gnesotto, N.: Introduction. In: Gnesotto, N. (ed.): EU Security and Defence Policy: First Five Years. Institute for Security Studies, Paris 2004, p. 35.

⁵ Layne, C.: Death Knell for Nato? Policy Analysis, Cato Institute, Washington 2001, p. 5.

include the emphasis on international law, multilateralism, co-operation and assistance. Last but not least, ESDP is also geared towards stimulating European governments to pay more attention to their own defence – and increase their defence spending – to end their security dependence on the United States.

The ESDP has had a brief but dynamic past record⁶ with a number of achievements. Even though the thoughts of an autonomous European defence were considered utopian during the Cold War era and found resonance in only some, predominantly French, political circles, the end of the Cold War transformed them into a necessary reality.

ESDP itself has evolved from the previous European Security and Defence Identity – the ‘NATO’s European pillar’ – and has been accepted by all EU Member States in the end, chiefly due to the fact that it was Great Britain who co-sponsored the effort along with France after Tony Blair became the UK Prime Minister. Great Britain’s own perception of its role in ESDP is that of a driving force. The USA has declared its support to the ESDP project to a certain extent and under certain conditions. ESDP is provided for in the primary law of the European Union and has its own institutions, along with its slowly developing Rapid Reaction Force and Battle Groups. First military operations in the Balkans and Congo have been undertaken under the ESDP leadership and EU flag even though all of them relied on NATO military and planning capacities, except for the Congo operation. ESDP has gained wide support from the general public across EU states with people preferring ESDP rather than NATO and reliance on the US.⁷

And yet, despite all these indisputable achievements the ESDP is still tied by substantial constrictions, symptomatic more or less for the whole CFSP or European political integration in general. To a large extent, the implementation of ESDP targets is a compromise struck among the EU Member States and is hostage to the unity of their positions on foreign policy and security issues which is very hard to achieve, especially in issues that are on top of the national foreign policy list. Each of the EU states has projected its national foreign policy and security preferences into the implementation of ESDP goals and each of these EU states has had a different perception of the need for autonomous European defence and European political emancipation or the role of NATO and the USA in European security. Last but not least, the ESDP project has been discredited by the ongoing unwillingness by EU Member States to spend (even slightly) more on defence because of their strained budgets having to bear up the welfare state burden. On the one hand, Europe wishes to take on some more responsibility for its defence and become a heavier global actor, on the other hand, however, Europeans are not willing to spend enough money on that goal (in fact, of all the EU countries, only Great Britain,

⁶ Gnesotto (ed.), 2004, p. 11.

France and to a lesser extent Germany have armies that could be used in modern operations). In general, many ESDP and CFSP aspects are dealt with on the theoretical level, ‘on the paper’, but the execution falls behind the plan, due to a number of reasons.

The ESDP project is not carried out in a vacuum even though that might sometimes seem to be the case. It seeks to react to the transformation of the security milieu after the Cold War.⁸ New, ‘asymmetric’ or ‘non-state’ threats have emerged upon the disappearance of the communist threat. Terrorism now represents the primary threat for the West, as the September 11 2001 attacks and other later attacks in Madrid and London confirmed. Along with these changes, the understanding of security and security policy have also been transformed into much more complex notions, including a broad range of both military and non-military instruments. This has had a crucial impact on the security and defence policies of European states as new threats have been defined, helped to legitimise the very existence of ESDP (the EU as a civilian - and future military – power aspiring to become a universal security structure), and somewhat challenged, in the long term, the so far unswerving position of NATO as an exclusively military organization.⁹ These changes in the security milieu have met with even more avid response on the other side of the Atlantic: the US security policy has been adapted and rationalized, though in a different way and through different methods of first choice than in Europe. The very definition of threats, however, is the same for Europe and the USA.

These ESDP developments have been closely linked to the development of transatlantic relationship and the transatlantic security link. The transatlantic link was the axis of Western security throughout the Cold War era, largely retaining this role in the post-Cold War context as the community of values and fundamental interests still means that Europe and North America need each other as allies. A debate has started, however, on a substantial transformation of the transatlantic relationship in relation to the building of a political union and CFSP (and ESDP) as well as in the context of a changed US foreign and security policy after September 11, 2001 which has brought unilateralism and non-reliance on Europe and NATO and, eventually, caused a rupture in the West over Iraq. The two sides of the Atlantic are said to be moving away from each other.¹⁰ The USA has become less interested in Europe and it is in this respect that Americans welcome the European efforts to take over from them the responsibility for Europe’s own security. At the same time, Washington – along with some European capitals – is concerned about the EU being overambitious in terms of the common EU’s foreign and defence policy by

⁷ Eurobarometer 62, Autumn 2004, www.europa.eu.int.

⁸ Cameron, F.: *The Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union CFSP*. Sheffield University Press, Sheffield 1999, p. 69.

⁹ Van Ham, P.: *Security and Culture, or why NATO Won’t Last*. In: *Security Dialogue*, No. 4, 2001.

¹⁰ Layne, 2001, p. 9.

seeking to establish ESDP as a defence union, making the EU the world's leader and a global power. The potential (and still more or less theoretical) translation of these ambitions into reality might dramatically change or damage, depending on the point of view, the transatlantic relationship and the position of NATO, dominated by Americans.¹¹ It might also threaten the US interests and the dominance of the USA in the world.

This paper seeks to analyse the current and future effect ESDP might have on the transatlantic relationship while trying to find out what form of ESDP might disrupt the transatlantic partnership in the future and what form would, on the contrary, be beneficial. This paper aims to prove that ESDP is perfectly compatible with the transforming transatlantic relations, providing specific conditions are met, which will be specified in the below text. This claim is not made because of the fact that the currently minimalist ESDP is not in conflict with the transatlantic relations and the role of NATO today as this might change over time, depending on further ESDP developments. This assumption is rather made on the basis of a successful ESDP being able to bridge the present 'mental gap' between Europe and the USA stemming from their different military potentials and their willingness to use military force.

The paper will also aim at proving that the existence and development of ESDP are inescapable – though problematic – because the very transatlantic relation must become more balanced to benefit all stakeholders and maintain the transatlantic link for the future since the importance of this relation is unquestionable for the whole Western community. The primary focus of the future transatlantic relations in security and defence shall be on the EU-US relationship whose goal should not be to become absolutely conflict-free at any costs. The focus shall therefore shift from NATO, even though, from the practical point of view, NATO might seem indispensable today. We do not dispute NATO's role in a mutual defence relation. As an organisation though, NATO has been losing its political *raison d'être* from the long-term perspective, we believe, because of the ongoing political integration of the EU and the recently changing security milieu and due to the transformation of US foreign and security policy.

The paper builds on a top-down critical analysis method. First of all, we focus on general issues such as the changing security environment and the post-Cold War developments in the security policy of Europe and the United States. A case study comparing the European Security Strategy with the US National Security Strategy is used to illustrate this. This case study is followed by an assessment of post-Cold War transatlantic relations, along with an outline of the ESDP developments so far, follows, tracking the progress both on paper and in practice,

¹¹ Khol, R.: Introduction. In: Khol, R. (ed.): ESDP: Národní perspektivy. ÚMV, Praha 2002, p. 9.

focusing on the key aspects of ESDP. Another section of the paper deals with European defence industry which is a marginal topic in respect of ESDP but plays an important role in the broader security context of our paper. These introductory – rather descriptive – chapters serve as a backdrop to some more specific issues such as the positions of key nations on ESDP. We will focus on Great Britain, France, Germany and the USA. These actors' attitudes towards ESDP are absolutely crucial for this paper: the analysis of these common and divergent positions will allow us to predict future ESDP developments and their impact on transatlantic relations as it is states, in the first place, that determines the nature of ESDP and the transatlantic relation. This analysis takes account of the long-term and continuous positions of these states represented by their governments. Where appropriate, however, some attention is also given to other actors, such as opposition parties etc. And, finally, the concluding synthesis seeks to answer the question asked at the beginning: How and under what conditions will ESDP influence transatlantic relations?

Before starting with the analysis, we shall turn to the state-of-the-art debate on this topic. Since ESDP and post-Cold War transatlantic relations are extremely topical and fast evolving issues, there is quite little consensus among experts on these themes. There is practically no disagreement among the authors about the fact that some European defence policy is definitely needed today to remove the burden from the US shoulders and that a transatlantic defence alliance must be retained. Little consensus, however, is found in what the defence policy should look like and whether it should go hand in hand with an overall political emancipation of Europe or rather with the effort to make the EU a global player acting independently from or even contrary to the USA. There is a whole range of views on, for example, the future of NATO: some authors, in minority now, argue that NATO is irreplaceable, being the only effective embodiment of the transatlantic defence relations which is seriously threatened by an extensively evolving ESDP. Other experts perceive NATO as an obsolete 'Cold War relic'¹² which is not to today's security reality and lags behind the transforming transatlantic relations and the changing US security policy. (Security is a complex notion: it is necessary to combine and complement military and non-military instruments as well as internal and external security policies.) These authors see the Union or the ESDP, operating with a wider range of instruments than NATO, as the only chance to carry out a European security policy in the context of recent developments. There is no consensus among authors on what the security and defence relations between Europe and the USA should be like in the future: similar to today's relations, i.e. security interdependence even though Europe is rather dependent on the US in this model; or different,

¹² Layne, 2001, p. 9.

with Europe and the USA becoming equal and independent partners who may ‘quarrel’ from time to time, after all. A note must be made here that the views of these experts are often out of sync with the views of politicians and administrations of their respective countries. Yet, there are clear exceptions to this: French authors unanimously pushing for ‘European solutions’ and authors from the ‘New Europe’ countries – including from the Czech Republic – clinging to the current status of NATO because, being ‘orthodox Atlanticists’, they see NATO as the corner stone of security of their countries which have only recently joined NATO and have still been influenced by their deeply troubled past.¹³ Despite some distrust by US administrations of ESDP, there are many American authors who rather welcome ESDP and its further progress, including the development of a ‘new, balanced transatlantic partnership’¹⁴. This is either because they recognise European ambitions as legitimate, or because of the need to ‘disregard’ Europe as such, in the spirit of the new Republican ‘isolationism’. In general, ‘non-believers’ in ESDP and a possible equality in the EU-US relationship pointing out the need for NATO retaining its current role, are ‘closer to the practice’, perceiving NATO as indispensable at this moment in time and in practical terms. On the contrary, ESDP supporters who believe that an equal security partnership between the EU and the USA is the only feasible one for the future are closer to academia and theoretical thinking.

Little has been written on the very topic of ESDP effects on the wider transatlantic relations. Given the complexity of the issue examined, we had to rely on a synthesis of a broad spectrum of publications on (current and future) transatlantic relations in general and ESDP in particular, along with the individual positions of states on security and defence. We also studied publications analysing the theoretical aspects of security policy and the current trends. As things move very quickly in this area, we had to follow the press and news servers as well. A number of publicly available sources were relied on, too, such as EU summit communiqués etc.

We have taken four publications as the main reference documents for the analysis of facts, definitions and views. Two of them – one by a French and the other by a Czech author – deal with the ESDP development and main features (Dumoulin, Mathieu, Sarlet, 2003)¹⁵ or the positions of key countries on ESDP (Khol, 2002),¹⁶ both being quite detailed. The other two publications are written by American authors, one by a US thin-tank CSIS¹⁷ focussing on the past and present developments in the transatlantic relations (Balis, Serfaty, 2004)¹⁸ and the other by a

¹³ Bugajski, J., Teleki, I.: Washington’s New European Allies: Durable or Conditional Partners? The Washington Quarterly, No. 2, 2005.

¹⁴ Layne, 2001, p. 11.

¹⁵ Dumoulin, A., Mathieu, R., Sarlet, G.: La PESD. Bruylant, Brussels 2003.

¹⁶ Khol, R. (ed): ESDP: Národní perspektivy. ÚMV, Praha 2002.

¹⁷ Center for Strategic and International Studies.

¹⁸ Balis, C., Serfaty, S. (eds.): Visions of America and Europe. CSIS, Washington 2004.

Johns Hopkins University team, dealing with the way how the ESDP effects the transatlantic relations (Brimmer, 2002).¹⁹ The last-mentioned volume was the major source of information for us in terms of our assessment of the future ESDP scenarios and the likely impact on the transatlantic relations. Publications stressing the importance of building an autonomous European defence (Andréani, Bertram, Grant, 2001; Layne, 2001),²⁰ pointing out to the weakening political role of NATO (Van Ham, 2000),²¹ and the need for a balanced transatlantic relationship (Brimmer, 2002; Sweiss, 2003)²² were of crucial guidance to us as well. On the other hand, we had to stand in critical opposition to some Czech authors, namely to Jiří Schneider and Michael Žantovský²³ representing a thought community insisting on the indispensability of NATO as the single framework for transatlantic relations. As much as ESDP is concerned, we also had to somewhat relativise the Robert Kagan's famous *Power and Weakness*.²⁴

Let us conclude this introductory section with the definitions of several key notions used throughout our paper. By the frequently used term '*Europe*' we mean a political area of Western Europe embracing EU Member State and candidate countries and the European NATO members. For the purposes of this text, the *transatlantic relationship* is reduced to security and defence cooperation (we refer to a *transatlantic link*), in spite of the need to take the political dimension (i.e. the politically balanced relationship between the EU and the USA) into account as well. *Security and defence policy* shall mean a policy providing for the security of a given entity. Nowadays, however, this is not limited to the defence of a state territory by force only and to the reliance on armed forces and intelligence but it increasingly covers out-of-area military or other operations²⁵ or international cooperation, in line with respective foreign policies. When speaking about *European defence* or the *European Union security and defence policy* (the EU being composed of nation states with their own defence policies), we refer to the latter security policy category only, i.e. to operations abroad.²⁶ The *European security and defence policy* (ESDP) is understood very specifically, as an EU project or policy implemented after 1998 only, despite occasionally dealing with the future models of ESDP as well.

¹⁹Brimmer, E. (ed.): The EU's Search for Strategic Role. Center for Transatlantic Relations. Johns Hopkins University, Washington 2002.

²⁰ Andréani, G., Bertram, C., Grant, C.: Europe's Military Revolution. Centre for European Reform, London 2001; Layne, C.: Death Knell for NATO? CATO Institute Policy Analysis, Washington 2001.

²¹ Van Ham, P.: Europe's Common Defense Policy: Implications for Transatlantic Relationship. In: Security Dialogue, No. 2, 2000.

²² Schweiss, C.: Sharing Hegemony: Future of Transatlantic Security. In: Cooperation and Conflict, No. 3, 2003.

²³ Schneider, J., Žantovský, M.: NATO and the Greater Middle East: A Mission to Renew NATO. Pass Policy Paper No. 1, Prague 2003. Schneider, J.: Budoucnost transatlantických vztahů z pohledu České republiky. In: Mezinárodní politika, No. 4, 2005.

²⁴ Kagan, R.: Power and Weakness. Policy Review, No. 113, 2002.

²⁵ Cameron, 1999.

2. CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SECURITY CULTURE OF EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES

2.1. Changing understanding of security and security policy after the Cold War

This paper deals with the post-Cold War period which has brought about a fundamental change in the security milieu and, sooner or later, the reactions by members of the Western community. The vacuum created by the sudden disappearance of the dominant threat from the Communist camp has been filled by ‘asymmetric threats’ posed by non-state actors who did operate prior to the end of the Cold War but were not paid much attention to and were only recognised by the tragic attacks of September 11, 2001. The transformed security environment has necessitated modifications in the strategic thinking of both Americans and Europeans.

Traditionally, security thinking distinguished between external security (reactions to threats from abroad) and internal security (reactions to threats coming from within). A distinction used to be also made between *hard security* (reaction to a military threat by a state by using military instruments) and *soft security* (reaction to internal and cross-border threats by non-state entities by using both military – *hard power*²⁷ – but also non-military – *soft power* – instruments).²⁸ Because of the presence and nature of the new, asymmetric threats it is not tenable to treat these as separate categories since they are intertwined: all security threats must be approached in a complex way today.²⁹ In other words, post-Cold War security is a complex issue covering even those areas that had previously not been included in the security category.³⁰

2.2. Comparing the European security strategy and the US National Security Strategy

The European Security Strategy and the United States National Security Strategy provide the best illustration of the new European and American perception of threats and the adequate answers to these threats.

The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (NSS) was drafted in 2002. In spite of the NSS being a standard document produced by every US administration, the NSS of the Bush administration, drafted after the 9/11 attacks, holds a privileged position as it is considered to be an embodiment of a long-term US foreign and security policy after the Cold

²⁶ Krahmann, E.: Conceptualizing Security Governance. In: Cooperation and Conflict, No. 1, 2003.

²⁷ Fatič, A.: Conventional and Unconventional – Hard and Soft Security: The Distinction. South-East Europe Review, No.3, 2002, pp. 93-98.

²⁸ Joseph Nye defines the combination of *soft power* and *hard power* methods as a ‘carrot and stick’ method. (Nye, J.: The Paradox of American Power. Oxford Un. Press, Oxford 2003, p. 10).

²⁹ Van Ham, 2001, p. 396.

War. NSS has identified three major threats: terrorism, regional conflicts and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.³¹

The European Security Strategy (ESS), subtitled as ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World,’ was drafted to serve as a long-term strategic conception of the EU Member States (not only) for the purposes of CFSP. The ESS was endorsed at the December 2003 summit in Brussels. The ESS identifies the same threats as the NSS but adds another two: failed states and organised crime.³² The ESS is certainly document providing a fair reflection of today’s security reality. The strategy, however, is a hurried document – it is not clear how the ESS is going to be implemented as it is a joint strategy of twenty five states.³³ But this aspect should be left aside for the moment.

Europe and the USA agree, in principle, on the definition of threats. They are, however, at times in disagreement over the way of facing them. Europe is generally in favour of an ‘effective multilateralism’³⁴ building on the primary role of international organisations (the UN in particular) which provides more space for Europe to exert its influence.³⁵ This method is built on an assumption that diplomatic instruments must be used to muster support for the use of force (and possible military solutions) from as many states as possible to make this use of force legitimate and to ensure that this solution complies with international law. Europe also argues that, besides force, prevention through humanitarian and economic aid as well as through wider co-operation (*soft power*) can be effective in fighting terrorism where no negotiation is possible.

The United States, on the contrary, generally favour *preventive* or *pre-emptive actions* taken without any previous diplomatic negotiations and recourse to international law.³⁶ This strategy grows from a conviction that the absolute national sovereignty concept in the UN Charter is an antiquated notion and that immediate interventions are necessary to safeguard human rights and democracy even at the price of an armed conflict. (This strategy is undoubtedly built on the high-level US armed forces allowing for fast and precise actions without substantial harm to civilian populations.) Moreover, the traditional US Cold War doctrine of deterrence is not effective in

³⁰ Cf. the concept of ‘securitization’ – Waever, O.: *Securitization and Desecuritization*. In: Lipschutz, R. (ed.): *On Security*. Columbia University Press, New York 1995.

³¹ Weiss, T.: *Evropská bezpečnostní strategie ve světle Národní bezpečnostní strategie USA*. In: *Integrace*, 27/9/2004. European Security Strategy, 2003, s.3-4; National Security Strategy of the USA, 2002, part III, IV,V

³² Ibid.

³³ Grevi, G.: *No Strategy Without Politics*. Ideas Factory – European Policy Centre, Brussels, 2004.

³⁴ Weiss, 2004. *European Security Strategy*, 2002, s. 9.

³⁵ Multilateralism is an idea once promoted by the United States (by presidents Wilson and Roosevelt) as an alternative to the European Concert that lead the world into two world wars.

³⁶ Weiss, 2004. *Pre-emptive war* is what happens when a state targets an enemy that represents an imminent threat of attack. *The Six-Day War* was a pre-emptive war.

Preventive war is what happens when a state targets an enemy *before* they can become an imminent threat of attack. The attack on *Pearl Harbor* was a preventive war.

fighting terrorism.³⁷ We must note that European countries do not reject the pre-emptive action doctrine as such but they understand it in the spirit of the ‘Annan Doctrin’ of humanitarian intervention,³⁸ i.e. as a military intervention by the international community in order to prevent a humanitarian disaster or a massive violation of human rights, such as in Kosovo in 1999. It is clear, however, that the war in Iraq, for example, has gone beyond this concept of humanitarian intervention: Iraq was not a failed-state type of a threat as defined under the ESS – and failed states are to be assisted, on top of that. Instead, it was an implementation by the USA of a *regime change* doctrine³⁹ which does not see the threat in failed states that have to be assisted but rather in the *rogue states* whose regimes need to be overthrown by military force.

The US National Security Strategy is based on the notion that internal and external or hard and soft security are both part of a larger whole and that the USA, with its military capacities, would be ‘better off’ in exporting the effort to safeguard its internal – or soft – security (e.g. the fight against terrorism) abroad. This means that an internal/soft security threat is reacted to by using hard security/power instruments.⁴⁰ Europe, on the other hand, makes a distinction between external security (through national defence or NATO and/or ESDP) and internal security (the fight against terrorism using intelligence within national borders or EU-level coordination such as in the spheres of police cooperation or an anti-terrorist coordinator).

The USA has a wealth of both hard power/security and soft security instruments, Europe (or the EU) has a wide range of purely soft power instruments: Europe enjoys much more trust in the world due to the weight of a joint position of many countries and the ‘power of an example’,⁴¹ it has a much greater potential to negotiate and much greater potential to help and cooperate. What is positive about the transatlantic link is the mutual inspiration in this respect – in communicating with their US ally, European states realise the need for more hard power while the USA recognise the many benefits of soft power thanks to Europe.⁴² It is therefore quite paradoxical that Europe used to be the greatest power in terms of hard security while the USA exerted most of its influence as a soft power.

³⁷ Föhrenbach, G.: Security Through Engagement: The Worldview Underlying ESDP. In: Brimmer (ed.), 2002, p.15.

³⁸ A concept promoted by Bernard Kouchner, the chief of the Médecins Sans Frontières, in the 1980s.

³⁹ Courmont, B.: Washington et le monde. In: Boniface, P. (ed.): L’Année stratégique 2004. IRIS, Paris 2003.

⁴⁰ Shapiro, J., Suzan, B.: The French Experience of Counter-terrorism. In: Survival, No. 1, 2003, pp. 79-80.

⁴¹ Nye, 2003, p. 9.

3. TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS AFTER COLD WAR

3.1. New reality for an ‘Old Relationship’

The transatlantic relations have been going through a time of significant change caused by the above-mentioned transformation of the strategic milieu after the Cold War and the 9/11 attacks. It is necessary to note that pessimism is currently prevailing in terms of the future of the Atlantic alliance, mainly due to the Iraq crisis.⁴³ More and more voices point out that the two sides of the Atlantic are moving apart from one another and that common values no longer have much weight in a world of increasingly divergent interests and growing disagreements. All of this goes hand in hand with increased anti-Americanism in Europe and anti-Europeanism in the USA.⁴⁴

On the other hand, we may assume that the alliance from the Cold War era would endure the new threats and challenges and that the Western community of values has not ceased to exist but has begun transforming into a ‘more conflicting community,’ a community which is, nevertheless, driven by the will to actively deal with and overcome the conflicts. Extensive trade between the two Atlantic coasts, the largest flow of goods and investments in the world⁴⁵ prove the tight bond. (The trade exchange exceeds USD 500 billion, creating some six million jobs on both sides of the Atlantic.)⁴⁶

According to Richard Holbrook, the United States was a ‘European power’ throughout the Cold War era.⁴⁷ Back in 1990, the then US President George Bush claimed that: ‘We are not in Europe for the sake of the Europeans – we are in Europe for our own sake.’⁴⁸ With the end of the Cold War, however, the unifying threat of Communism has disappeared and, for many authors, the world has shifted from the bipolar to a multipolar model, by the virtue of which the reason for US ‘hegemony’ over Europe has disappeared. One thing must be highlighted, however: the current condition of the transatlantic security relation is largely a legacy of the Cold War. Europe has not been able to cast away this legacy and the and so has Europe’s ‘security dependence’ on the USA persisted. Western Europe got used to not being engaged in its own security during the Cold War and the reactions to the end of the Cold War era were by no means

⁴² Otte, M.: ESDP and Multilateral Security Organizations. In: Brimmer (ed.), 2002, p. 53.

⁴³ Solana, J.: Foreword. In: Brimmer (ed.), 2002, p. VII.

⁴⁴ Transatlantic Trends 2004. German Marshall Fund, Washington 2004.

⁴⁵ Up to now, American investment in the Netherlands has been higher than the US investment in China. Similarly, the French investment in Texas is greater than the French investment in the whole of China (Němec, P.: Atlantická obchodní válka? Vážme slova. Hospodářské noviny, 26/4/2005.

⁴⁶ Solana, 2002, p. VII.

⁴⁷ Föhrenbach, 2002, p. 12.

⁴⁸ Penksa, S., Warren, M.: EU Security Cooperation and Transatlantic Relationship. In: Cooperation and Conflict, No. 3, 2003, p. 267.

adequate. At the same time, and quite paradoxically, this European ‘dependency’ on the USA deepens the transatlantic divergences caused by the fact that Europe relies less on military power in dealing with conflicts and tends to criticise US solutions based on force. Some authors go as far as to speak of a new ‘European appeasement’.⁴⁹ American political scientist Robert Kagan described this quite aptly in his famous essay *Power and Weakness*⁵⁰ by claiming that ‘the USA come from Mars and Europe from Venus’ – whereas it was exactly the other way round before World War II. This process runs parallel with similar developments in the ‘European public opinion’⁵¹ which has – since the 1980s – been generally strongly anti-war and even anti-American or at least has not largely approved of the current US role in the world, trusting more to Europe which, however, is hardly breathing down America’s neck in terms of political clout and global role.⁵²

NATO, born as an alliance to defend the West against the Soviet block, is the major security glue in the transatlantic relations which has less and less practical use, however, after the Cold War and whose future is not quite clear.⁵³ Both Europeans and Americans continued to speak about the necessary reform of the alliance after the Cold War in order to modify NATO to be able to operate outside Europe and the North Atlantic region. Some substantial reform steps were taken at the 1999 Washington summit where a new strategic concept was endorsed. On the 2002 Prague summit NATO Rapid Reaction Forces were created, and, finally, at the 2004 Istanbul summit out-of-area operations were officially promoted on the basis of the NATO-headed operation in Afghanistan. As much as there is no doubt about the actual irreplaceability of NATO’s operational and planning capacities, the political meaning of this organisation has become a moot point. More and more voices can be heard about NATO being an obsolete political structure out of all current and future reality of the EU-US relations.⁵⁴ Given their recent foreign and security policy unilateralism, Americans are not increasing NATO’s political prestige either: on the one hand, they declare NATO to be indispensable (and any autonomous European defence policy redundant). On the other hand, their recent political conduct has revealed that they do not need NATO at all.

⁴⁹ Serfaty, S: Anti-Europeanism in America and Anti-Americanism in Europe. In: Balis, Serfaty (eds.), 2004, p. 6.

⁵⁰ Kagan, 2002.

⁵¹ The term ‘European public opinion’ is a highly problematic one. Some authors, such as Dominique Reynié, point out that it is especially in relation to the war in Iraq and the US role in the world that such a phenomenon does exist.

⁵² Eurobarometr 62, Autumn 2004.

⁵³ Layne, 2001.

⁵⁴ Van Ham, 2001.

3.2. Post 9/11 transatlantic relations

The terrorist attacks at New York and Washington on 11 September 2001 have surely brought a similarly important impetus for change in the transatlantic relations as the end of the Cold War. The 9/11 attacks also brought an unprecedented confirmation of the existence of new, asymmetric threats in the post-Cold War world.

September 11 was a milestone for the involvement of Europeans in the defence of the West. European states expressed enormous solidarity with their attacked US ally, promising their extensive engagement in the war against terrorism. And they were serious.⁵⁵ European NATO members decided to evoke Article 5 of the Washington Treaty for the first time and many of them – Great Britain, France and Germany, in particular – were actively involved in the operations against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan as well as in the post-war ISAF administration of Afghanistan. Nevertheless, the generally cold reactions by the USA to this European solidarity and engagement and the clear choice of unilateralism by the Bush administration have been disappointing for a number of European politicians, especially those from France and Germany. In their eyes, this has confirmed the interpretation of the USA as no longer considering the partnership with Europe to be crucial.⁵⁶ Nevertheless, the major crisis of the ‘transatlantic trust’ which has probably been more serious and grave than all the previous ones, including the Suez crisis or France’s abandoning of NATO military structures, came with the war in Iraq. The transatlantic rupture during the ‘Iraq crisis’ between January and March 2003 was enormous indeed. It was also extremely confusing for many countries, such as the post-communist states. The Iraq crisis split Europe into two camps, showing what a utopia the oft declared European unity in foreign and security policy is and how divergent the views and ambitions of European countries are in relation to Europe’s position vis-à-vis the USA the optimum response to the security threats of the world today. In a sense, the post-Cold War transatlantic rift was, sooner or later, inevitable.⁵⁷ Diverse interests have appeared after the joint threat disappeared and different perceptions of the world on the two sides of the Atlantic have become apparent.

3.3. Changing US foreign and security policy

The war in Iraq played such a crucial role in the transatlantic relations not least for the fact that it was largely a proof of major changes in the US foreign and security policy after 9/11.

⁵⁵ Parmantier, G.: Diverging Visions. In: Balis, Serfaty (eds.), 2004, p. 116.

⁵⁶ Ibid, p. 118.

⁵⁷ Khol, R.: Spojené státy americké: Nová etapa a nová administrativa. In: Khol (ed.), 2002, p. 74.

The foreign and security policy pursued by the Bush administration is, in many a respect, a continuation of the policy implemented by the previous administration and could be understood within the context of new U.S foreign policy developments in the post-Cold War environment. Yet, it has been the administration of President George Bush jr. that has reinforced and accelerated this trend in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, putting foreign and security policy at the top of the US domestic policy agenda and making it – as the ‘War on Terror’ – a clear priority of President Bush’s first term in office. Some authors go as far as to speak of Bush’s ‘revolution in foreign policy.’⁵⁸ What are the major features of this ‘revolution’ whose main pillars can be found in the above mentioned National Security Strategy of 2002 but whose practical manifestation has gone beyond this document, a ‘revolution’ often labelled as ‘neoconservative’ as the so called neoconservatives, holding key positions in the Bush administration, are the carriers of this change? First of all, it is an attempt to break out of the post-war order logic, namely challenge the role of international law and the UN while beginning to face global challenges effectively.⁵⁹ President Bush’s statement in a conference only a few days after the 9/11 attacks that ‘there are no rules’ in today’s world is a fitting summary of the change in the US post-September foreign and security policy that was to come.⁶⁰

In spite of talking about the foreign policy of a Republican administration – and throughout the US history, Republican administrations inclined to realism in foreign policy – a key, if not the dominant, feature of this administration’s foreign policy is idealism, even though the protection of America’s interests surely is not sidelined. Without any hyperbole we may talk about trying to ‘save the world’ under the aegis of the USA. This idealism, drawing heavily upon the work of Israeli author Nathan Sharansky,⁶¹ is based upon a belief that once dictatorships are removed from the world and replaced by democracies, permanent peace and prosperity will be guaranteed. These goals are to be striven for with great vehemence (*zero sum game*) and use various tools which may not always be generally acceptable, such as pre-emptive war principle and regime change, by and large in the spirit of ‘the end justifies the means’. Even though the neocon – and largely black-and-white – visions are not something that would appeal to the pluralistic Europeans, it is chiefly the means used by the neoconservative foreign policy-makers that raise most doubt across the Atlantic.⁶² There is a general consensus in the Western community over the rightness of the principle of humanitarian intervention, such as the one in Kosovo, and looser interpretations would find some support for this principle in international law. What is not,

⁵⁸ Daalder, I., Lindsay, J.: *America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy*. Brookings Institution Press, Washington 2003.

⁵⁹ Hurrell, A.: *There Are No Rules*. In: *International Relations*, No.2, 2002.

⁶⁰ *Ibid*, p. 186.

⁶¹ *The Odd Couple*. *Economist*, 3/2/2005.

however, a matter of consensus, is the unilateralist tendency of this foreign policy. According to French security expert François Heisbourg,⁶³ it is this unilateralism that may bring the end of the West because it is a sign of contempt of – namely European – allies and of a ‘hegemonic temptation’ of the single global superpower of today.⁶⁴ The unilateralism of the Bush administration and the war on terror marks, in actual fact, a return to the Cold War logic of the presence of a permanent enemy. Only Europe is not really counted on according to this logic.

The lesser US interest in Europe is manifested not only through a gradual pull-out of the US troops from Europe but also through the unwillingness to perceive Europe as a whole while trying to pick the ‘right ones’ from the continent, those who are willing to join the USA (New Europe) and the ‘wrong ones’ who do not share the US visions (Old Europe). This differentiation presupposes the creation of the ‘coalitions of the willing’ made of those world countries that are willing to join in and contribute to the achievement of some US objective, following the ‘coalition does not define the mission but the mission defines the coalition’ logic.⁶⁵ This, however, is against the basic principles not only of the EU’s CFSP but also of NATO itself.

It is quite obvious that the current American foreign policy is not just a matter of the Bush administration and that the development is, to a certain extent, irreversible and the next US administration will not be willing and able to abandon this course.⁶⁶ On the other hand, there can be and probably already is a shift in the style of behaviour to and in communication with Europe. This was manifest throughout George W. Bush’s February visit to Europe during which the US President made a significant gesture of recognition of the European Union and the EU institutions: he did not visit the capitals of the large European states but came to the European Council summit in Brussels and visited the seat of the European Commission. Not even this ‘reconciliation’ visit did, however, help to overcome mutual disputes which are aplenty these days, from the divergent views on the Iran nuclear programme and the cancellation of embargo on arms export to China, to the disputes over the International Crime Tribunal or the Kyoto protocol, to the disagreements in the World Trade Organisation. It appears, though, that the desire to overcome the discord is still prevailing on both sides of the Atlantic.⁶⁷ The Iraq crisis seems to be forgotten now and common values and the ensuing long-term interests of the West are getting prevalence again even though the USA and Europe have still more disagreement over

⁶² Courmont, 2003.

⁶³ Heisbourg, F.: *La fin de l’Occident*. Odile Jacob, Paris 2005.

⁶⁴ The former French Foreign Minister Hubert Védrine even talks of a ‘hyperpower’: Védrine, H.: *Face à l’hyperpuissance*. Fayard, Paris 2003.

⁶⁵ The terms ‘New Europe’ and ‘Old Europe’ as well as the ‘coalition of the willing’ principle have been introduced by the US State Secretary Donald Rumsfeld.

⁶⁶ Courmont, 2003.

⁶⁷ Král, D.: *Bushovo evropské turné*. Policy Brief, Institut pro evropskou politiku EUROPEUM, February 2005.

how to enforce and protect these. The European Security Strategy is a good case in point, identifying more or less the same threats as the US National Security Strategy and giving the USA a privileged position of a partner in managing these threats, in spite of the ways of facing these threats being different on the two sides of the Atlantic.

We may thus conclude this chapter with an optimistic claim that the transatlantic community is a ‘conflicting community’ after the end of the Cold War but it is a community after all.

4. EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY (ESDP): DEVELOPMENTS AND KEY FEATURES

4.1. Pre-ESDP developments

The European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) as we know and analyse is today was preceded by a relatively long development starting back in the 1950s. European integration evolved over the Cold War era, one of the main objectives being to cordon off Communism from Western Europe. It was politically impossible to distinguish between NATO, the European Communities and parallel security structures in Western Europe which were linked to the North-Atlantic Alliance during the Cold War era. These parallel structures included, in particular, the West European Union and a failed project of the European Defence Community – the ‘Pleven Plan’ – geared towards the remilitarization of West Germany within the framework of a supranational organisation and common military structures which might, with some license, be labelled as a ‘European army’. The European Defence Community project was not implemented in the end because of the rejection of the plan by the French National Assembly in 1954, due to the major influence the French Communist Party at that time. The other European security structure, the West European Union (WEU), however, did overcome the twists and turns of history. Originally, a defence alliance was established back in 1948 by France, Great Britain and other countries to safeguard them against Germany (the Brussels Pact, the alliance’s founding treaty, expired in 2002). This Western Union Defence Organisation was transformed into a West European Alliance in 1955 as the Federal Republic of Germany was remilitarised and joined NATO (WEU was under the military control of NATO during the Cold War).⁶⁸ The sixties and seventies saw attempts at the deepening of political integration of EC Member States which was, from the very beginning, understood as the reason behind establishing the EC, though through economics.⁶⁹ The ‘Fouchet Plan’ (1961) was another attempt at this direction, inspired by the ideas of French President De Gaulle on the political and security emancipation of France and the whole Europe from the two superpowers of the Cold War, superpowers that were often – and even more so during the *détente* period – overlooking Western Europe in their negotiations.⁷⁰ The Fouchet Plan resembles the current CFSP in many respects, namely in foreign and security policy cooperation between the Member States of the European Communities. But this plan had to be brushed off since it might threaten the spirit de corps of the Western bloc in the Cold War

⁶⁸ Fidler, J., Mareš, P.: Dějiny NATO. Paseka, Praha 1997.

⁶⁹ This view is supported by the Treaty of Rome preamble identifying the aim of integration: an ever closer union.

⁷⁰ Cameron, 1999.

context. A plan presented by Commissioner Etienne Davignon (1970) was much less ambitious and led, in the end, to the establishment of the European Political Cooperation – a fairly limited mechanism of EU Member State foreign policy coordination.⁷¹

It was only at the end of the Cold War that this situation changed. The transformation of the security environment, described above, and the slowly weakening interest of the USA in Europe put a new burden on Europe's shoulders: Europe was to become responsible for itself if nothing else. The early 1990s saw the revival of the WEU which was to turn into a purely European security structure operating parallel to NATO. On the basis of this initiative by France and Germany, joint international units such as Eurocorps, Eurofor, and Euromarfor, were established with three states dominating this effort: France, Germany and Spain. In 1992, the WEU member states defined new tasks of this organisation – the 'Petersberg Tasks', focused on humanitarian operations, conflict-resolution or peacemaking, and peacekeeping.

The revitalisation of WEU was, nevertheless, overshadowed by another event: the establishment of the European Union by the Treaty of Maastricht, a major step forward in Europe's political integration, and the creation of the Union's Common Foreign and Security (CFSP). CFSP, however, turned out to be a 'still-born baby' soon after its birth because the EU states were unable to find a consensus vis-à-vis the boiling conflict in the former Yugoslavia over the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia.⁷² The EU inability due to its political fragmentation and actual military capacities to prevent or manage the civil war in the Balkans made the USA intervene once again in the 'European backyard.' The Bosnian lesson was a 'cold shower' for, and a reason for great self-reflection in, the EU.⁷³

The 1997 Amsterdam summit saw the EU incorporating the WEU whose founding treaty was to expire in five years, adopting the above Petersberg tasks, and creating the post of an EU High Representative for CFSP (and the Secretary General of the Council of the EU at the same time), a post taken by former NATO Secretary General Javier Solana two years after that.

In the meantime, a European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) concept has been created on the basis of WEU, integrated into the EU in 1999 after the Amsterdam Treaty became effective. The ESDI project, endorsed already at the 1994 NATO summit in Brussels and fully supported by the Clinton administration encouraging Europe to take over the responsibility for itself, was to become a 'European NATO pillar' of a sort. The ESDI was a cherished project of France, which was seeking rapprochement with NATO and considered returning into NATO military structures at that time. The ESDI project counted on the formation of European

⁷¹ Cameron, 1999.

⁷² Gnesotto, N.: *La puissance et l'Europe*. Presses de Sciences Po, Paris 1998, pp. 9-14.

⁷³ Otte, 2002, p. 41.

Combined Joint Task Force under the operational and planning command of NATO headquarters in Europe (SHAPE).⁷⁴

4.2. Birth and Development of ESDP

Things have started developing in a different direction, though. A ‘pro-European turn’⁷⁵ of the British foreign policy in relation to Labour Party leader Tony Blair becoming the UK Prime Minister brought about yet another initiative which has, in the end, proven more viable: an autonomous European Security and Defence Policy, outlined at the October 1998 EU summit in Portsäich and defined at the Franco-British summit in Saint-Malo in December 1998.⁷⁶ A common defence policy was born, along with NATO-independent joint forces deployable for the implementation of the Petersberg tasks under the UN mandate. This Franco-British initiative stemmed from the political positions of the two main actors, i.e. UK Prime Minister Blair and French President Chirac, which will be discussed later in this paper, and also from the fact that France and Great Britain have been the only EU countries with truly operable military capacities to execute modern missions.

The Kosovo War, i.e. the NATO intervention under the US command, was another rude awakening for EU Member States who appeared to be unable to tackle problems in their ‘near abroad’. The Kosovo lesson brought a more specific ESDP and the Saint-Malo agreement.⁷⁷ The EU adopted a European Headline Goal at the 1999 Helsinki summit, following discussions at the 1999 Cologne summit.⁷⁸ According to this European Headline Goal, (almost all) EU countries were to earmark by 2003 between 50,000 and 60,000 troops deployable within sixty days in the radius of action of 6,000 kilometres for one year. This EU Rapid Reaction Force was to implement the Petersberg tasks.⁷⁹ A year later, at the Nice summit ending the EU’s Intergovernmental Conference, ESDP was incorporated into the EU primary law and EU political and military institutions under the European Council were established.⁸⁰ These were similar to COREPER, i.e. included permanent representatives of EU Member States. It is unclear, however, what their specific competencies are with respect to the EU Council and its

⁷⁴ Dumoulin, Mathieu, Sarlet, 2003, p. 26.

⁷⁵ Khol, R.: Velká Británie – v srdci Evropy a v čele evropské obrany? In: Khol (ed.), 2002, p.18.

⁷⁶ Franco-British Summit: Declaration on European Defence, 4/12/1998.

⁷⁷ Dumoulin, Mathieu, Sarlet, 2003.

⁷⁸ Presidency Conclusions, European Council, 10-11 December, 1999.

⁷⁹ Van Ham, 2000.

⁸⁰ A ‘civilization shock’ metaphor is sometimes used in relation to ESDP and the EU military institutions: the EU as a civilian organisation is also becoming a military organisation.

formations as there are some overlaps between them. The same actually applies to the High Representative for CFSP and SHAPE. The following institutions are referred to:

- Political and Security Committee (consists of permanent representatives of EU Member States – often juniors compared to COREPER or NATO; deals predominantly with the political aspects of ESDP – monitoring crisis areas; provides for early warning and political leadership of ESDP operations; prepares documents for General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) meetings)
- Military Committee (the EU's highest military body composed of members of the General Staff of EU Member States – usually the same ones as in NATO; provides other EU bodies with military information needed for military operations)
- EU Military Staff (under the Military Committee, deals with practical ESDP operational issues)
- EU Satellite Centre and EU Situation Centre

The High Representative for CFSP (and the General Secretary of the EU Council), currently in the person of Javier Solana, is the coordinator of many ESDP aspects. It is necessary to note that many of the ESDP and CFSP achievements so far are generally ascribed to Solana's personal credit. (He has been the hottest candidate for the future EU Foreign Minister post - see below).

The European Constitutional Treaty means a great leap forward for ESDP, providing the constitutional treaty (or a future similar treaty) is finally ratified, of course, or the relevant provisions from the treaty are introduced into practice without the ratification of the constitutional treaty. According to the constitution, ESDP shall get the most visible reinforcement from all CFSP components (a special ESDP working group was v established in the Convention on the Future of Europe preparing the draft constitutional treaty; the working group was chaired by the then French Commissioner Michel Barnier).

The Constitution introduces a new legal option of a 'permanent structured (or enhanced) co-operation' in defence which the existing treaties did not allow for.⁸¹ This idea was initially opposed by Great Britain who has threatened to veto the draft if structured co-operation was not to be open to all states interested in participating and meeting specific criteria, to prevent the establishment of an exclusive 'hard core' made of some countries⁸². The constitution has also

⁸¹ Article I-41 (6) of the Draft Treaty Establishing the Constitution for Europe.

⁸² The criteria are set out in Protocol 23 to the constitutional treaty. The protocol states that Member States will have to proceed more intensively to develop their defence capacities through the development of their national contributions and in the activity of the European Defence Agency. They will have to become interoperable and achieve the 2010 Headline Goal (formation of Battle Groups). These are relatively undemanding conditions so the

made a step forward in making a commitment to mutual defence in case of a military attack on a Member State (mutual defence clause) or to civil and military assistance in case of a terrorist attack or a natural disaster (solidarity clause).⁸³ A reference is made to Article 51 of the UN Charter providing for regional defence alliances. This mutual defence commitment, however, is quite problematic for neutral EU Member States some of which have an opt-out from defence co-operation as well as for some other EU countries which are also NATO members and are concerned about the potential collision with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty.⁸⁴ On the other hand, the European Union has been an entity made of politically interlinked states, so mutual assistance in case of an attack is quite commonplace and would presumably be provided even without an explicit mutual defence clause, irrespective of the fact that such a clause was included in the Western Union Brussels Pact effective between 1948 and 2002, i.e. outside NATO. The draft European Constitutional Treaty also extends the ESDP goals beyond the earlier mentioned Petersberg tasks: according to the constitution and the international law, the EU can carry out disarmament and anti-terrorist operations in and provide military advice to third countries.

ESDP can be more successful with a newly established post of an EU Foreign Minister, a post merging the powers of the External Relations Commissioner and the High Representative for CFSP in order to make the CSFP more coherent.⁸⁵ The newly proposed flexibility in operation financing can make ESDP operations more effective: operations shall be financed not only from the Member States contributions proportionate to their GDP, as the is case today, but also from a Start Up Fund administered by the EU Foreign Minister and financed from Member States' advance payments to be used in the time of operation.

The constitution, however, does not envisage decisions being made on ESDP on behalf of the entire EU or the states participating in a structured co-operation by a qualified majority because the two major ESDP actors, Great Britain and France, insist on the intergovernmental principle and unanimity in decision-making.

Finally, ESDP has been provided an official and theoretical base not only in the Constitution but also in the 2003 European Security Strategy the implementation and practical impact on ESDP of which, however, is up for debate.

possibility of a state not being able to comply with them and being automatically excluded from structured co-operation is very small.

⁸³ Articles I-41 (7) and I-43 of the Draft Treaty Establishing the Constitution for Europe.

⁸⁴ The constitution includes, at the same time, a guarantee for respecting national defence policies and NATO commitments (Král, D., Pítrová, L., Šlosarčík, I.: *Smlouva zakládající ústavu pro Evropu – komentář*. Institut pro evropskou politiku EUROPEUM, Praha 2004, p. 68).

⁸⁵ The establishment of the post of a Foreign Minister could be understood, as many commentators have it, as a de facto reply to the famous objection by US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in the 1970s that there is no single telephone number in Europe to call from Washington.

4.3. There is no ESDP without NATO...

The formal (or theoretical) and institutional shape of ESDP is quite advanced. But let us look at the implementation of the ESDP project in practice. The practical realisation of ESDP was a long-time hostage to the ambiguous relationship between ESDP and NATO.⁸⁶ Given the fact that the EU has not had its own planning capacities, EU operations were to rely on NATO capacities. This principle was first proposed at the 1996 NATO summit in Berlin. That is why this 1996 agreement between NATO and the WEU was later called a 'Berlin+ arrangement'. In order for EU states to use the SHAPE military and planning capacities⁸⁷ for their own operations outside NATO, an agreement had to be made.⁸⁸ This agreement was being blocked for a long time by Turkey, a NATO member without the membership of the EU who did not want to open up the way for EU countries to NATO capacities. (Another reason for Turkey to block this deal was the Turkish-Greek controversy over Cyprus and the planned accession of the Greek part of Cyprus to the EU). Nevertheless, the agreement was reached in December 2002 with the view of planned operations under the EU flag. The EU Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia and Herzegovina starting in January 2003 was the first EU operation abroad, even though it was not a true ESDP (military) operation.⁸⁹ It was only in March 2003, in operation Concordia in Macedonia (FYROM) that the Berlin+ arrangement was made the full use of. The EU forces took over the activities of three previous NATO operations: Allied Harmony, Essential Harvest, and Amber Fox. On December 2, 2004, EU units took over the NATO Althea operation in Bosnia (SFOR) and deployed 7,000 troops there (EUFOR).⁹⁰ The use of the Berlin+ arrangement meant that only flags got actually changed in both of these operations: the planning, command and manning remained the same. The operations have remained under the command of the NATO Deputy-SACEUR, British general John Reith.⁹¹

As soon as neither NATO units (KFOR) nor the UN and OSCE administration are needed in Kosovo and the status of the province is sorted out, the whole Former Yugoslavia will be under the aegis of the EU which will thus repay its old debt of failing to intervene during the war in Yugoslavia. The EU role in the Balkans is further reinforced by the prospect of EU

⁸⁶ Dumoulin, Mathieu, Sarlet, 2003, p. 356.

⁸⁷ For example, the AWACS surveillance planes play a major role in ESDP operations.

⁸⁸ Dumoulin, Mathieu, Sarlet, 2003, p. 362.

⁸⁹ With a view to further EU police missions, several states (France, Italy, Spain and the Netherlands) agreed last year, during the Dutch presidency, that new European paramilitary police units modelled on the French Gendarmerie or Italian Carabinieri be established.

⁹⁰ Řiháčková, V.: EU dnes přebírá od NATO misi v Bosně a Hercegovině. Integrace – kalendárium, 2/12/2004.

⁹¹ Tertrais, B.: Basic Concepts of European Defense Policy. In: Brimmer (ed.), 2002, p. 178.

membership for all former Yugoslavian republics. Slovenia has already joined the EU and Croatia should be soon invited to start accession negotiations.⁹²

Africa is the second area of ESDP focus. And it is Africa that is very likely to become the region of most ESDP activities: the USA and NATO are not really interested in intervening in Africa and the EU countries still have close ties with African countries since the colonial times.⁹³ In June 2003, two EU states, France and Great Britain, sent their troops (1,500 soldiers) under the UN Security Council mandate to the Democratic Republic of Congo in operation Artemis. This operation was not carried out according to the Berlin+ arrangement but according to the lead nation principle. This principle determines that an operation under the EU flag agreed by the entire Union is carried out by one or more states using their national capacities and units. Sadly though, it is only Great Britain and France that are actually capable of such missions in the EU.⁹⁴

4.4. From Rapid Reaction Force to Battle Groups

In spite of the first real operations under the EU flag but with the units previously earmarked for NATO, the achievement of the 1999 European Headline Goal (EHG) formulated in Helsinki was still far from reality. In 2003, the European Council declared the EHG achieved since 50,000-60,000 troops were really earmarked for the Rapid Reaction Force. (The force, however, was not operable, largely due to the lack of means for unit transport which should be dealt with by introducing the new Airbus A400M carrier between 2008 and 2010 as planned).⁹⁵ The striving for compatibility between the EU Rapid Reaction Force and the NATO Response Force (endorsed at the Prague NATO summit in November 2002) made the whole matter even more challenging.

The Helsinki European Headline Goal (EHG), achieved on paper but not satisfactorily met in practice, was replaced by a Headline Goal 2010, approved by the European Council in June 2004.⁹⁶ The practical problems of forming the Rapid Reaction Force are to be solved through a speedy formation of Battle Groups or 'tactical groups', finally approved by EU Defence Ministers in November 2004⁹⁷. (This idea was supported by the way the Franco-British operation Artemis in Congo was carried out in June 2003). The total of 13 battle groups shall

⁹² Otte, 2002, p. 41.

⁹³ Pachta, L.: Role EU při prevenci a řešení konfliktů v Africe. In: Mezinárodní politika, No. 11, 2002.

⁹⁴ Khol (ed.), 2002.

⁹⁵ A European Capabilities Action Plan was adopted at the 2001 Laeken summit to ensure faster equipment of the Rapid Reaction Force. (Dumoulin, Mahieu, Sarlet, 2003, pp. 175-176).

⁹⁶ Presidency Conclusions, European Council, 17 – 18 June, 2004.

⁹⁷ The idea of creating small, highly operable units was debated at the Franco-British summit in Le Touquet (2/2003) where the Iraq crisis overshadowed other issues. Barnier, M.: Actors and Witnesses. In: Gnesotto (ed.), 2004, p.169.

consist of 1,500 combat soldiers and three companies from three EU states. The Battle Groups shall be deployable within 15 days in the area of conflict up to 4,000 kilometres from Brussels and shall be sustainable for 30 days (extendable to 120 with rotation). The Battle Groups shall become fully operable in 2007, with the exception of one to be operable in 2005 already.⁹⁸

A special, autonomous EU planning cell shall be created at SHAPE.⁹⁹ This reflects the ambitions of some EU Member States, lead by France, to cut European defence completely off NATO and establish a 'European Defence Union' in an avant-garde group of states. This EU planning cell was proposed at a 'chocolate creams summit' in Brussels in April 2003 which brought together the opponents of the Iraq war and advocates of strong European defence (France, Germany, Belgium, and Luxemburg – the so called Gang of Four).¹⁰⁰ The establishment of the planning unit was approved, in spite of the opposition by the USA – and objections by Great Britain – at the 'Naples Conclave,' a meeting of EU Foreign Ministers in Naples in November 2003. It was more or less a symbolic act though. The cell, located at Tervuren, on the outskirts of Brussels, is at its infancy with its current 40 staff and it does not look like developing extensively any time soon without a close link to SHAPE, as Great Britain expects, to say nothing of planning autonomous operations (jointly with the EU Military Staff) without any NATO help.

4.5. Main stumbling block: defence spending

The above documents a relatively fast and dynamic development of ESDP¹⁰¹ – hardly five years did pass between the first ESDP ideas and the first operations. In many respects, however, ESDP is a typical European initiative: the centre of gravity is on paper and not on the ground – just like the establishment of the post of an EU Foreign Minister is a response to the issue of CFSP coherence à la EU which does not really solve the problem. The success of ESDP is restricted by the divergent goals and ambitions of individual EU Member States, namely the big ones (see below) and, more importantly, the actual military capacities of Europeans.¹⁰² The EU can, according to the 2002 agreement, rely on NATO planning capacities but the armament and equipment of EU states is lagging behind on all accounts, mainly in comparison with the USA.

The low spending on defence is Europe's major problem in this respect. It is not the ESDP contributions by Member States (operations are paid by EU members in proportion to

⁹⁸ Schmitt, B.: European Capabilities – How Many Divisions? In: Gnesotto (ed.), 2004, p. 98.

⁹⁹ Ibid, pp. 99-100.

¹⁰⁰ Let us mention other initiatives presented at this 'chocolate creams summit': a Franco-German brigade modelled on the Eurocorps (up to 7,000 men) and the establishment of a European Security and Defence College. (Dumoulin, A.: Europe Occidentale. In: Boniface, P. (ed.): L'Année stratégique 2004, IRIS, Paris 2003, p. 86).

¹⁰¹ Gnesotto, 2004, p. 11.

¹⁰² Ibid, p. 11.

their GDP with the possibility of absence from an operation) but the generally low national defence budgets of the EU countries that make it difficult. According to the Financial Times,¹⁰³ the European members of NATO spent USD 221 billion in 2003 (1.9% of their GDP), compared with the US spending of USD 405 billion (3.7% of their GDP). The EU countries spending most on defence, i.e. France and Britain, increase their defence budgets each year by 3-4% on average whereas the USA do so by 15%. There is a clear gap between the ambitions (autonomous European defence and military readiness of Europe) and the willingness to pursue these goals through higher defence spending which would necessarily have to shake up the European welfare state model.

4.6. European defence industry

Europe can boast of more achievements in defence industry. In spite of the largely economic reasons for this development¹⁰⁴ politics plays also an important role: European corporations are not, with some exceptions, in the hands of the state but it is crucial for the general political and military prestige of Europe that these corporations succeed in developing new, technologically advanced weapons systems.

European corporations such as EADS,¹⁰⁵ Thales or BAE Systems have already started giving jitters to their US competitors who got used to their monopoly in defence industry.¹⁰⁶ European corporations have started to implement grandiose projects such as the A400M carrier, the Eurofighter jet or the combat helicopter Tiger. Technologically, these projects are as good as the American ones though the acquisition costs are still higher. European companies have already started winning contracts from the Pentagon which is also an incentive since the EU states' defence budgets are still relatively low. The question is what effect the advised but still unconfirmed abandoning of the embargo for EU arms exports to China will have on European defence industry. On the one hand, Chinese demand may stimulate European supply. On the other hand, European corporations might be seriously harmed if Washington reacted by imposing sanctions on Europe, keeping Europeans off the US market.

Europe is also relatively successful in developing modern technologies with no immediate but potential future military use and definite importance for Europe's prestige in the world. The

¹⁰³ Dombey, D.: Europe must spend more on defence. Financial Times, 3/3/2005.

¹⁰⁴ Maulny, J.-P.: L'industrie d'armement, acteur et bénéficiaire de l'Europe de la défense ? In: La revue internationale et stratégique, No. 48, 2002/2003.

¹⁰⁵ European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company, a new corporation established after a merger of the French Aerospatiale Matra, German Daimler-Chrysler and Spanish Construcciones Aeronáuticas in 2000.

¹⁰⁶ Airbus, the current major competitor to the US Boeing, is a great European achievement even though in civil aviation. The new A380 is a major success, in particular.

finalisation of the preparatory works for the Galileo satellite navigation system competing with the US GPS or the European Space Agency (ESA) exploratory initiatives can be mentioned in this respect.

Europe has also made some progress in the coordination in armaments and military research, knowing that one state is too little in this respect.¹⁰⁷ Following many previous initiatives¹⁰⁸ aimed at enhancing cooperation in this area, a European armaments, research and military capacities agency (European Defence Agency) was established. The agency is provided for in the European constitutional treaty but, following a Council Decision, it has already been in full operation since July 2004, headed by Brit Nick Witney. The agency's mission is to promote the enhancement of EU Member States' military capacities (a commitment made, among others, in the constitutional treaty), coordinate military research, and monitor the fulfilment of Member States' obligations. The overall aim is to rationalise through co-operation the increase of military capacities of EU states and prevent duplicities.

¹⁰⁷ Keohane, D.: Europe's new defence agency. Centre for European Reform - Policy Brief, June 2004.

¹⁰⁸ Western European Armaments Group – 1992, Letter of Intent – 1998, Organisme Conjoint de Coopération en Matière d'Armement (OCCAR) – 1998 or approved liberalisation of trade in military material in the single market.

5. KEY ACTORS' PERCEPTION OF ESDP

The various and often contradictory visions of actors, i.e. countries involved, have to be taken into account when studying the ESDP project. It is only the differentiation between these views on ESDP that allows us to get a better understanding of both the real and potential impact of ESDP on the transatlantic relationship. Some more pro-European and 'EU-ambitious' states perceive ESDP as a baseline for the construction of a European identity¹⁰⁹ and a way to secure a global role for the EU. Other states, seen as 'Atlanticist', understand ESDP (with the rather minimalist objectives) as a value added to NATO, and not as a replacement of the Alliance as known today.

The following chapter will deal mainly with the positions and views of the big EU states and major ESDP actors: Great Britain, France and Germany. European integration did replace the 'European concert', giving small states a voice much stronger than their size and real weight would suggest, which is a good example of the 'overrepresentation' of small states in EU institutions. And yet, we can say that the real EU foreign and security legitimacy and potential comes from large states with their own, well-respected global engagements and operable armies. There would be no ESDP if the big EU states did not find agreement among themselves.¹¹⁰ We shall also turn to the position of the United States, a key country in terms of ESDP and the transatlantic relationship, and also to Russia and small EU states, particularly the post-communist ones.

5.1. Great Britain – from 'Splendid Isolation' to 'Lead Nation' role

Great Britain plays a key role in the ESDP project. Britain's political weight in the world, its position vis-à-vis the USA, and its military capacities are indispensable for ESDP. Great Britain is also a country that has been able to adapt its military force to new challenges and has been approaching the USA with its technologies and operability of its force deployable anywhere in the world most of all the other NATO states.¹¹¹ At the same time, Great Britain was a country blocking any further, namely political integration of the EU for a considerable time, opposing European defence parallel with NATO. For a long time, Great Britain gave preference to its

¹⁰⁹ Chilton, P.: La défense européenne, condition nécessaire à la formation d'une identité européenne ? In: La revue internationale et stratégique, č. 48, 2002/2003.

¹¹⁰ This is illustrated aptly by the EU initiative in relation to the Iran nuclear programme from November 2003, promote by Foreign Ministers of the three largest EU countries.

¹¹¹ British strategy and armed forces were adapted on the basis of their *Strategic Defence Review* in 1998. Khol, R.: Velká Británie...In: Khol (ed.), 2002, p. 17.

‘special relationship’ with the USA before Europe in the area of foreign and security activities. (Nicole Gnesotto wrote that ‘For Britain, the United States is what Europe is for France.’).¹¹²

A major change came with UK’s new Prime Minister Tony Blair who won the election in 1997. The Blair government made a U-turn in Britain’s EU policy¹¹³ and was quite open about its attempts to ‘put Britain in the heart of Europe’.¹¹⁴ Lead by Tony Blair, Great Britain has been actively involved in the European integration process, chiefly on the intergovernmental level though. Along with France, Britain has become the main initiator and the driving force of ESDP. Some authors claim that Blair is using ESDP as a trump card even towards the USA, to show that Britain is not that dependent on the USA. (Similarly, the Brits are playing the US card against Europe). ESDP is also a tool used in trying to influence Washington.¹¹⁵ Blair’s Britain is taking a position of an intermediary in the transatlantic relation, using it exquisitely for its own purposes as well, though one might doubt Britain’s real influence on decision-making in Washington.

Great Britain has adopted a very pragmatic approach towards ESDP. The country is aware of the need for Europeans to assume responsibility for their own security and the security of their neighbourhood. But it has refused to make ESDP highly ambitious. It has strictly adhered to a minimalist vision of ESDP, one designed to accomplish only the Petersberg tasks without disturbing and duplicating the role of NATO where the Brits play the most important role after the USA and which is still considered irreplaceable by the UK. Britain is convinced that the ESDP should not aim at a total independence from NATO but that the ‘EU should be a smart client of NATO’s military services.’¹¹⁶ The Brits are also insisting on ESDP being open to all EU states. Britain opposes the EU defence hard core or avant-garde vision, reiterating the need for openness of structured co-operation in defence for other states that would like to join.¹¹⁷ The UK Labour politicians believe that ESDP will ultimately be better with the Brits in rather than out and that Britain must not absentee from this project because it might then ‘degenerate’ into something harmful for the transatlantic security relation.¹¹⁸ And the British role in ESDP should not be minimal but that of a leader, given Britain’s weight and military capacities.¹¹⁹ What might threaten this prospect is perhaps only a change on the domestic political scene because the conservative opposition is not in favour of ESDP at all and often refers to ESDP – incorrectly and in a populist fashion – as to a ‘European army’.

¹¹² Gnesotto, 1998, p. 96.

¹¹³ Some continuity with the unrealized plans of Prime Minister John Major might be observed here though.

¹¹⁴ Dumoulin, Mathieu, Sarlet, 2003, p. 36.

¹¹⁵ Dumoulin, Mathieu, Sarlet, 2003, p. 38; Schweiss, 2003, p. 230.

¹¹⁶ Khol, R.: *Velká Británie...* In: Khol (ed.), 2002, p. 21.

¹¹⁷ Ibid, p. 20.

¹¹⁸ Grant, C.: *EU Defence Takes a Step Forward*. Centre for European Reform – Policy Brief, December 2003.

¹¹⁹ Dumoulin, Mathieu, Sarlet, 2003, p. 41.

5.2. France – driving force hard to control

France is the main designer and mover of ESDP.¹²⁰ The country has a very specific motivation for this though. The French Fifth Republic has always understood European integration - perceived in France as a 'French child'¹²¹ - as an opportunity to advance their own interests ('an extended arm of France'). And since France is rather in favour of intergovernmental integration,¹²² CFSP, along with its most recent top-up, ESDP, is completely in line with the French interests. That is why the political scene (democratic parties) is so united on ESDP issues.

For France, ESDP is much more than just meeting the Petersberg tasks. The French vision of ESDP envisages autonomous European defence¹²³ and security emancipation vis-à-vis the USA and NATO the military structures of which France left in 1960s. In France's view, NATO is an antiquated instrument of US security dominance.¹²⁴ Instead of relying on NATO, Europe should seek complete defence autonomy to meet the criteria of a global power, in line with the 'Europe puissance' concept.¹²⁵ France's core assumption is that Europe has its legitimate interests, resting on universally valid values, which might differ from the US interests,¹²⁶ and Europe should be able to support these interests with adequate political power and military force. The basic premise of France is that the EU is a more universal security structure than NATO: it has a wide range of instruments available, from humanitarian aid and assistance to cooperation and diplomacy to military force, all perfectly in line with the modern understanding of comprehensive security. That is why, France believes, the EU has a chance of a greater success than the USA in, e.g. fighting terrorism where pure military power does not help much.¹²⁷

France is therefore pushing for a fully autonomous ESDP, independent of NATO, i.e. with its own planning capacities, an ESDP relying on international organisations, especially the UN. At the same time, France is a great believer in enhanced co-operation among those EU states that wish to go further in European defence than others. This hard core or avant-garde concept is an expression of their 'European security and defence union'.¹²⁸ The above mentioned 'chocolate creams summit' of France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg in April 2003 in

¹²⁰ Andréani, G.: L'Europe de la défense : y a-t-il encore une ambition française ? In: Politique étrangère, No. 4, 2002.

¹²¹ Defarges, P.M.: La France et l'Europe: l'inévitable débat. In: Politique étrangère, No. 4, 2002.

¹²² Eichler, J.: Francie – důraz na mezivládní rámce CFSP a ESDP. In: Khol (ed.), 2002.

¹²³ European defence (défense européenne) is frequently used in French discourse when referring to ESDP.

¹²⁴ Parmentier, 2004, p. 125.

¹²⁵ Dumoulin, Mathieu, Sarlet, 2003, p. 64.

¹²⁶ Parmentier, 2004, p. 127.

¹²⁷ Eichler, 2002, pp. 37-38.

¹²⁸ Dumoulin, 2003, p. 87.

Brussels was a prime example of this approach. France stipulates that ESDP must remain a project for EU members only. ESDP is a clear manifestation of EU political integration, in the eyes of France, which satisfies the Greeks but displeases the non-EU members of NATO, especially Turkey. But France, with its military potential comparable to that of Great Britain, is not really willing to bring its defence spending up which underscores its ambitious ESDP visions.

In many respects, the French ambitions are founded. What is problematic though is the quite blunt assertion of these ambitions which does not win them much trust with most of EU countries, to say nothing of the USA. The French ESDP ambitions are understood as France's attempt to reclaim its former position of a great power and advance its interests in Europe and in the world.

5.3. Germany – civilian power with military ambitions

All of the post-war policy of the Federal Republic of Germany has had a definite European dimension. European integration has been a chance for Germany to get out of the grips of World War II and, given the lack of a global outreach of West Germany's foreign policy, Europe has been on top of the German foreign policy agenda. Along with France, Germany was the main driving force of European integration, including political integration. In its foreign and security policy, Germany has always preferred civilian instruments, multilateralism and coordination of its efforts with other states, except for a unilateralist push for the recognition of the independence of Slovenia and Croatia in 1991.¹²⁹

The German government under Gerhard Schröder has therefore been in favour of ESDP.¹³⁰ In spite of Germany being a great champion and active member of NATO which has allowed for the remilitarisation and, in a sense, also the rehabilitation of Germany and despite Germany preferring strategic partnership with the USA for a long time, the ESDP, built on a broader and multilateral security concept, has some appeal to Germany. (Germany would even welcome if the ESDP issues were decided by qualified majority which is opposed by Great Britain and France.) The German government perceives ESDP as a chance to increase the political and military weight of Germany in foreign policy which has not been possible so far because of Germany's internal restraints. Germany's government is also seeking a permanent chair in the Security Council.¹³¹ The German efforts at the country's military emancipation translated into Germany's intensive involvement in KFOR in Kosovo (the first deployment of

¹²⁹ Dumoulin, Mathieu, Sarlet, 2003, p. 45.

¹³⁰ Ibid, p. 50.

¹³¹ A 'new German interventionism' is sometimes referred to in this context (Dumoulin, Mathieu, Sarlet, 2003, p. 44).

German forces abroad after WWII) or in the ISAF force in Afghanistan where Germany has got the lead nation position. Within the context of European integration, Germany is slowly shifting from the traditional role of communitarism and small states champion to the role of a European power on the par with France and Great Britain. ESDP, on the other hand, exerts a great pressure on the reform of the German Bundeswehr and the enhancement of German armed forces in general, as well as on the defence budget, of course. Germany, despite its ambition to be the key component of ESDP, might end up being dominated by France and Great Britain because of its actual military capacities and relatively low defence spending - Germany spends only 1.14% of its GDP on defence, compared with France's 2.18% and Britain's 2.58%.¹³²

The 'anti-American sting' of the 2002 election campaign added yet another dimension to German foreign and security policy.¹³³ In line with the pacifist and anti-American public opinion in Germany, the government puts less emphasis now on NATO and the alliance with the USA while promoting more the need for European defence emancipation. The current German government is very close to the French one in this respect. Chancellor Schröder had a very surprising speech at a Munich security conference in February 2005 where he spoke of his belief that NATO was not the organisation for the transatlantic security partnership of the future.¹³⁴ Instead, the Chancellor proposed a direct dialogue between the EU and the USA. The opposition CDU/CSU does not appear to share this vision though. Yet, it is probable that, given the current public opinion in Germany, the next German government where CDU/CSU will be represented will not change this direction taken by Schröder and Fischer, a direction of exclusive promotion of ESDP at the expense of NATO and of the emancipation of Europe from the USA.

5.4. United States of America – ambiguous enthusiasm

The United States has been a supporter of European integration from the very beginning.¹³⁵ Political and economic co-operation of West European countries, bringing peaceful relations and economic prosperity while halting the spread of communism, was beneficial for US interests during the Cold War. At the same time, the USA had a huge political influence over Western Europe, trying to control the process of European integration, which was relatively easy during the Cold War, given the circumstances. European political integration, accelerated towards

¹³² Boniface, P.(ed.): *L'Année stratégique* 2005. IRIS, Paris 2004.

¹³³ Handl, V.: Německo – politický závazek s dlouhodobým plněním. In: Khol (ed.), 2002, p. 50.

¹³⁴ The German Chancellor nevertheless mentioned something that has had some resonance in academia for quite some time and has generally been accepted. The full text of the speech can be found on www.securityconference.de.

¹³⁵ Hamilton, D.: American Views of European Security and Defense Policy. In: Brimmer (ed.), 2002, p. 147.

the end of the Cold War, however has not won a full US support, as documented by the permanent US promotion of Turkey's membership in the EU.

As the US interest in Europe started fading towards the end of the Cold War, the United States welcomed European initiatives aimed at assuming more responsibility for European security and at lessening the need for any future US intervention on the continent as in the case of wars in former Yugoslavia. The USA has thus become an active supporter of the European Security and Defence Identity in NATO which was to become a 'European NATO pillar', allowing for greater burden sharing among allies.¹³⁶

The US position on ESDP itself, however could best be termed as 'ambiguous enthusiasm'.¹³⁷ On the one hand, the US has still been quite happy with Europeans trying to gain more military autonomy and end their security dependence on the USA, which (namely in terms of the US units in Europe) is quite costly for the United States and still harder to defend domestically. On the other hand, Clinton's administration - and there is some continuity here even in the Bush administration though the latter is less interested in Europe, just like the mostly Republican Congress - was clearly worried that ESDP might, over time, torpedo NATO. The surprising pro-European turn in Britain's policy certainly played a role here.¹³⁸ This worry was reflected in the formulation of three conditions under which the USA has been willing to accept ESDP. These three conditions specified by the Clinton administration in December 1998 and known as 'three D' included *no decoupling*, *no discrimination* and *no duplication*.¹³⁹ This means that the USA has been against ESDP disturbing the transatlantic relation (*no decoupling*), against ESDP being an exclusively EU project closed to European NATO members, Turkey in particular (*no discrimination*), and against unnecessary duplication of the existing or developed NATO military and planning capacities (*no duplication*). These conditions have more or less been supported by some EU Member States, including Great Britain.¹⁴⁰ The 'no duplication' requirement is, at the same time, a safeguard for a US 'supervision' of ESDP: Europeans should not seek to be completely independent of the USA and NATO in terms of planning and intelligence.¹⁴¹ We must point out that Europeans are not even capable of this at the moment - that is why the agreement on the EU's access to NATO capacities was necessary for the past and present ESDP operations in Europe.

¹³⁶ Tertrais, B.: ESDP and Global Security Challenges. In: Brimmer (ed.), 2002, p. 117.

¹³⁷ Van Ham, 2000, p. 221.

¹³⁸ Layne, 2001.

¹³⁹ Khol, R.: Spojené státy americké... In: Khol (ed.), 2002, p. 67.

¹⁴⁰ Hamilton, 2002, p. 147.

¹⁴¹ Americans still dominate in the key domains of effective defence policy - the so called C3I: Command, Control, Communication and Intelligence.

We may say that ESDP as such, i.e. an initiative within the framework of NATO and with fairly limited goals (the Petersberg tasks and interventions where neither the USA nor NATO chose to intervene), is acceptable for the USA. This, however, cannot be said about some, mostly French but increasingly also German, ESDP-linked ambitions. These ambitions, seeking to make the EU a global power equal to the United States and defending Europe's interests even in defiance of the USA, or to transform the EU into an arena of competition with the US defence industry, surely are not in line with American interests.¹⁴² Americans often speak of their worries about the future of NATO in this respect but that is not quite frank.¹⁴³ The approach of the current US administration, taking NATO as an 'obedient reservoir' of potential US allies for this or that operation, devalues NATO as an organisation and alliance in the eyes of Europeans, at the least.¹⁴⁴ Americans are not so much worried about the fate of NATO with respect to ESDP and the European autonomisation aspirations, but rather about their dominance over Europe.

The US approach to ESDP is, to a certain extent, based on the following logic: Europe and the USA are to work together through NATO and Europeans are capable of less in this co-operation. Given their great burdens and low defence budgets, can they possibly handle the ESDP project as well?¹⁴⁵ This more-than-justified US doubt is, at the same time, a self-comforting assurance that the US political and military superiority cannot be questioned by Europe because the EU is simply unable to implement its visions and cannot even agree on these visions as it is not united. It is only logical that the US government of the day seeks to continue providing Europeans access to NATO military and planning capacities to keep them dependent on the USA in this respect while trampling down, in a way, the germs of European unity in foreign and security policy, just as Donald Rumsfeld did by talking of an Old and New Europe.

5.5. Remaining 'old' Member States – mismatch of ambitions and capabilities

The ESDP project is meeting with more or less agreement from other EU Member States. Most of them, however, are not able to contribute because of their insufficient military capacities, in spite of their quite big ambitions (e.g. Italy).¹⁴⁶ Denmark is not taking part in ESDP and has had an opt-out since Maastricht and 'neutral states' (if one can speak of neutrality these days) have had quite understandable objections, especially if ESDP developed into a classic mutual defence; these countries must be excluded from the camp of clear supporters of ESDP.

¹⁴² Khol, R.: *Spojené státy...* In: Khol (ed.), 2002, p. 69.

¹⁴³ Hamilton, 2002, p. 147.

¹⁴⁴ Schneider, Žantovský, 2003, p. 2.

¹⁴⁵ Andréani, Bertram, Grant, 2001, p. 7.

¹⁴⁶ Khol, R.: *Itálie – politické ambice větší nežli možnosti.* In: Khol (ed.), 2002.

Most states, however, do welcome ESDP as a platform for carrying out the Petersberg tasks under the UN mandate (e.g. Sweden), or they accept this in the least (e.g. Ireland).¹⁴⁷

5.6. 'New Europe' – from Atlanticism to Europeanisation?

New Member States recruited from post-communist countries have quite specific approaches to ESDP. Being more or less 'Atlanticist', they take the transatlantic relationship and NATO in particular as the cornerstone of their security.¹⁴⁸ They also have warmer feelings towards the United States than the old Member States because they are thankful to the USA for dismantling communism in Europe. But that does not mean that these states, labelled as 'New Europe' by the US Defence Secretary, would not support the ESDP project – as long as priority is given to NATO operations. Until recently, states of New Europe made and wanted to make no political distinction between EU, NATO or ESDP as they saw no discrepancy there because they were willing to join the Western 'Euro-Atlantic' structures.¹⁴⁹ The Iraq crisis may be said to have questioned their a priori non-conflicting approach: they were made to 'choose' and almost all of them chose the side of the USA and their allies. The slight departure from Atlanticism and the incremental 'Europeanisation' of the foreign and security policy of post-communist countries which have joined or will join the EU are, nevertheless, inevitable in the future, says Janusz Bugajski of the US Center for Strategic and International studies (CSIS).¹⁵⁰

5.7. Russia – opportunistic and unpredictable partner

It is worth to mention the position of the Russian Federation on ESDP as well. The Russian approach to European integration is quite inconsistent. Russia is aware of the benefits the co-operation with Europe brings but has always perceived EU enlargement as a threat. At the same time, Russia is a master at exploiting the fact that EU Member States have very different views on the country and that there is no common EU policy on Russia. That is why Russia has started driving a wedge between EU Member States and has differentiated between these states, namely between the new and the old members.¹⁵¹ The Russian government has had a quite positive view of ESDP. It has perceived ESDP as a European security structure which has taken up, in Russia's eyes, many of the activities of OSCE, initiated de facto by Moscow. Russia has

¹⁴⁷ Dumoulin, Mathieu, Sarlet, 2003, p. 54.

¹⁴⁸ Schneider, 2005.

¹⁴⁹ Král, D., Pachta, L.: Česká republika a irácká krize. EUROPEUM, Praha 2005, p. 5.

¹⁵⁰ Bugajski, Teleki, 2005.

seen ESDP as an initiative which may do practically no harm to Russian interests and might, in a certain context, weaken NATO which has quite suited Russia for a long time.¹⁵² The multilateralist approach and the emphasis on the UN in ESDP are also very much in line with Russia's interests. Under Vladimir Putin, Russia has several times expressed its wish to get directly involved in ESDP but that has more or less been rejected by most EU states, especially the new members. To a certain extent, the Russian interest in ESDP is conditional on Russian-US relations that had until recently been more than good (and have remained so, to some extent, thanks to the war on terror, although the US criticism of Russian domestic issues has been growing). In any case, Russia has clearly preferred its involvement in NATO which has included Russia's voice through the mechanism of the NATO-Russia Council before ESDP.¹⁵³

¹⁵¹ Král, D.: Enlarging EU Foreign Policy: Role of the New Members States and Candidate Countries. EUROPEUM, Praha 2005.

¹⁵² Soukup, O., Votápek, V.: Rusko – pozitivnější přístup, nebo zmatení pojmů? In: Khol (ed.), 2002, p. 86.

6. SYNTHESIS: EFFECTS OF ESDP ON TRANSATLANTIC RELATION

After we have dealt with transatlantic relations in the security domain, with the development and main features of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and the positions of key ESDP actors let us now turn to the assessment of the actual and possible impact of ESDP on transatlantic relations.

6.1. ESDP acceptable for all

We may start by claiming that the existence of ESDP has long been seen as inevitable, a *fait accompli* which means that the current ESDP, based on co-operation and complementarity with NATO does not principally harm the transatlantic relation.¹⁵⁴ The ESDP project has developed very fast and proved relatively high viability: it is now accepted by almost all EU states, including the three largest ones, as well as by the USA. First ESDP operations have successfully been carried out and ESDP as such has without major harms survived even the Iraq crisis.

The general acceptability of the current ESDP is based on several preconditions. Through ESDP, Europe has been repaying its debts by taking up more responsibility for itself and its immediate neighbourhood at a time when it has been enjoying relative peace and security, unlike the United States.¹⁵⁵ Nevertheless, the EU's possibilities to replace NATO completely in the issues of European defence and security and take over the US role of the loudest voice and actor of Western community are still quite limited. This helps, on the other hand, to inhibit any possible negative approaches to ESDP.

Also, ESDP is acceptable because it is an absolutely logical step in political integration: ESDP is closely linked with and includes the values of EU states and therefore plays a certain role in building the European identity without a state-like community being created from the EU.¹⁵⁶ In other words, the achievement of ESDP objectives is a chance for EU states to implement their foreign and defence policy in line with their values and principles, helping the rest of the world as well. Many politicians understand such global involvement of the EU not as a possibility or option but as a duty. They believe that the Union has more than enough legitimacy to do so as a unified position of all 25 or more Member States is needed (which has some weight in itself) and enough means. In terms of hard power, the European Union cannot equal the United States but in soft power the EU, thanks to the diversity of the EU's and its Member

¹⁵³ Forsberg, T.: Russia's Role in the ESDP. In: Brimmer (ed.), 2002, p. 92.

¹⁵⁴ Andréani, Betram, Grant, 2001.

¹⁵⁵ Joint Declaration of European Defense Integration – Center for Strategic and International Studies, 8/2004.

States' activities and policies, has some very good instruments available – from diplomacy to political and economic co-operation to various forms of assistance and humanitarian aid (the EU is the single biggest humanitarian aid donor in the world).¹⁵⁷ Last but not least, what ultimately helps the EU is the fact that its foreign policy (if there is one indeed) or the foreign policies of the Union's Member States are more trust-worthy globally than US foreign policy, especially thanks to the general EU's emphasis on multilateralism and international law. And it is the ESDP that adds the – still limited but functional - hard power element to the wide range of European soft power tools.

As already said, it is not possible to separate internal and external security – or hard and soft security. At the same time, complementarity and combination of hard and soft power elements is important for the overall success in foreign and security policy. In this perspective, the EU appears to become a universal structure capable of reacting to all types of issues and therefore surpassing single-purpose security organisations such as NATO or OSCE.

To relativize the above description of ESDP and the Union's ESDP a CFSP developments as the only possible and 'easy' alternative of further development we must state that the concept of Europe as a global player displays a number of inherent contradictions.¹⁵⁸ Moreover, this Union's aspiration has been undermined by Europeans themselves since they are not willing to spend more on defence and to reach unity in foreign policy issues because of diverging national interests, namely those of European powers without which no European foreign and security policy can be implemented. Apparently, finding a common position on most conflicts, such as a humanitarian disaster or civil war in Africa, is not that difficult for EU states. This unity, however, will only last before an issue such as the war in Iraq appears which will split Europeans into irreconcilable camps once again. Moreover, there is no agreement in Europe on the nature of the relationship with the USA and the need for a transatlantic link in defence and security, the key concern of this paper. Some states, such as France, go clearly the 'European way.' Some, such as the new members from post-communist countries or Great Britain, prefer the emphasis on NATO and the relation with North America. The rest of the states are not willing to choose 'between Europe and America'. We profess that it will not be possible for CFSP and ESDP to develop beyond the currently very limited and restricted form of co-operation without a common position of EU states on issues such as the war in Iraq, a common perception of the role of the United States and a transatlantic link in relation to European and global security.

¹⁵⁶ Chilton, 2002.

¹⁵⁷ Parmentier, 2004, p. 131.

CFSP and ESDP largely fall within the category of European theoretical and institutional solutions with no real content,¹⁵⁹ with the lack of common interest and the will to advocate it in practice. The European Security Strategy is a good illustration of this. The creation of such a document which defines common threats and the ways of facing them surely is a step in the right direction. But is it really justified to worry about this achievement remaining just on paper because Member States are not willing to take some practical steps and measures on the basis of this strategy?¹⁶⁰

6.2. Where is the ESDP heading?

If ESDP, in its existing limited form, is acceptable for West European actors and does not really upset the transatlantic relationship, the future effect it might have on transatlantic relations will depend largely on the next steps and priority goals. It is almost impossible to guess the future developments of ESDP, just like the European integration, a project *sui generis* in itself. Yet, we may present here three scenarios of the future development of ESDP:¹⁶¹

1. 'Minimalist Option' – ESDP will continue to develop within the current framework. ESDP will continue to be an autonomous project of EU states which will not dent the role and significance of NATO (respecting the three D and shared burden principles), will have fairly limited tasks (i.e. Petersberg tasks) which will, after all, be implemented only where there is no place for NATO. This scenario reflects the wishes of the USA, Labour-led Great Britain and many other EU states, except the ones mentioned in Scenario 2.¹⁶²
2. ESDP as the main pillar of European defence – EU states will be able to achieve an autonomous European defence policy which will make NATO politically redundant as the Atlantic Alliance will continue to turn around the EU-USA axis. This scenario suits the interests of France, Germany (namely the current federal government), Belgium, Greece, and Luxembourg.¹⁶³

¹⁵⁸ Nivet, B.: La défense : problématiques et dynamiques d'un chantier européen. In: La revue internationale et stratégique, No. 48, 2002/2003, p. 100.

¹⁵⁹ Shepherd, A.: The European Union's Security and Defence Policy: A Policy without Substance. In: European Security, No. 1, 2003.

¹⁶⁰ Grevi, 2004.

¹⁶¹ This is a synthesis of six scenarios presented in Dumoulin, Mathieu, Sarlet, 2003, pp. 724-744.

¹⁶² Radek Khol calls this scenario an optimistic one - Khol (ed.), 2002, p. 69.

¹⁶³ Radek Khol calls this scenario a pessimistic one - Khol (ed.), 2002, p. 69.

3. Hard Core Defence Union – ESDP will be developing within its current limited framework (Scenario 1) but some states will be seeking more defence integration, wishing for a defence union, in an avant-garde hard core – if need be, even outside the EU structures. This scenario fits France, in particular.

We can also take into account a scenario of total ESDP failure, for whatever reasons. Nevertheless, stopping the project and returning back before 1998, making European defence a 'European pillar of NATO' is, in our view, highly improbable, given its seven years of existence and the great political will behind this project. And as we want to turn to the impact of future ESDP development on transatlantic relations, the thoughts of future non-existence of ESDP is irrelevant to us.

6.3. Future ESDP developments and transatlantic relations

Let us now consider the ways in which the further development of ESDP will influence or change the transatlantic relationships, referring to the three scenarios presented above.

A lot has been written on the ESDP - NATO relationship and its complementarity or inevitable antagonism. Yet, it seems that the ESDP-NATO relationship is only secondary here.¹⁶⁴ This is mainly because the complementarity of today's ESDP with NATO was provided for by a 2002 agreement allowing ESDP operations to use NATO planning capacities and to be carried out where the US force is not needed and where the USA itself is not willing to intervene, e.g. in the Balkans. What is crucial now is the relationship the EU is building now with the USA and NATO within the context of the developing European defence policy.¹⁶⁵

A minimalist ESDP as we know it today (Scenario 1) surely cannot be understood as a 'Trojan horse' in NATO as America's UN ambassador candidate John Bolton remarked.¹⁶⁶ The question is, however, whether the future development of ESDP, though in a limited form, will not necessarily lead to the weakening of the current role of NATO.¹⁶⁷ NATO as an organisation – and not a defence alliance that must undoubtedly be maintained and is absolutely necessary – is a legacy of the Cold War and is largely a 'service organisation' for ESDP on the European continent, with the exception of Kosovo where NATO troops are still present, because NATO's planning capacities are still irreplaceable for ESDP. NATO's role as an organisation outside

¹⁶⁴ Bono, G.: L'ambiguïté des relations OTAN/PESD : faux débat ou enjeu réel ? In: La revue internationale et stratégique, No. 48, 2002/2003, p. 137.

¹⁶⁵ Otte, 2002, p. 53.

¹⁶⁶ Layne, C.: Iraq and Beyond. In: Balis, Serfaty (eds.), 2004, p. 59.

¹⁶⁷ Van Ham, 2000, p. 224.

Europe will, however, be also problematic. The United States' reliance on NATO has been only limited and the country has perceived NATO more as a security organisation for Europeans, allowing Europeans to take part in US-lead operations (e.g. NATO units in Afghanistan or the US request for NATO to get involved in post-war Iraq). Presumably, many European states will, however, prefer operations elsewhere than in Europe and – in spite of carrying them out side by side with Americans – under the EU rather than the NATO flag, for political reasons or because of a greater prestige (brand building) - especially if NATO provides its planning capacities and if ESDP remains a project of the whole Union, most members of which are also members of NATO, and not just of an EU hard core.¹⁶⁸ Increasingly, it appears that NATO as a political organisation (and not just a mutual defence alliance) is really losing its *raison d'être*, though not in practice. It will nevertheless depend on whether the USA recognises the EU as its partner, stops discriminating all the time in favour of NATO as against ESDP and allows Europeans to use more of the Alliance's capacities¹⁶⁹ to prevent duplication¹⁷⁰ while being careful not to undermine their attempt to become independent on NATO capacities over time. For this option (basically Scenario 2) to become real, it is absolutely crucial and necessary that Americans are willing to co-operate. This co-operation between the USA and Europe might, however, be threatened by overblown (anti-American) ambitions of EU states, namely of France, and the possible formation of a 'hard core', i.e. a defence union, made up of just a few member states (Scenario 3).

The very development of the ESDP project, though related to security emancipation of Europe and weakening of the political significance of NATO, cannot harm the transatlantic relationship in the future, providing some conditions are met, because the very transatlantic relationship has undergone some changes.¹⁷¹ In saying this, we disagree with a view presented by Jiří Schneider who sees maintaining the present role of NATO (for other than just practical reasons) as the only chance for keeping up the transatlantic link and providing for European security, whereas he admits that NATO's position is threatened not only by ESDP but also by the US unilateralism and the 'coalition of the willing' principle.¹⁷² ESDP is a logical step on the way of European integration which, however, does not have much chance to really succeed without the existence of a transatlantic security relation and co-operation with the USA in planning and intelligence. Turning Europe into a military and political rival of the USA should not be the (dominant) goal of ESDP. Rather, the aim should be to make – along with some other actors – the transatlantic relationship more balanced by Europe taking up more military

¹⁶⁸ Otte, 2002, p. 50.

¹⁶⁹ Van Ham, 2000, p. 227.

¹⁷⁰ In this respect, the complementarity between NATO Response Force (NRF) and EU's Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) still seems problematic.

¹⁷¹ Andréani, Bertram, Grant, 2001, p.78.

responsibility so that the huge military capacity gap between the USA and Europe closes up a little. It is this gap that makes Europe and the USA less and less comprehensible to each other in security and defence issues (the ‘dialogue of the deaf’) where each of them is choosing different methods: soft power versus hard power.¹⁷³ And it is ESDP that might be the stimulus for Europe to put more emphasis on hard power. Let us take as a point of departure the famous thoughts of Roberta Kagan in his *Power and Weakness* in which he claims that ‘Europe is from Venus and America is from Mars’ and that this absolute gap between the mentalities of Europe and America breaks up the transatlantic relationship since each of these actors ‘speaks a different language.’ In the light of this reasoning, it might be possible to claim that it is the ESDP that may ensure that Europe is ‘less from Venus and more from Mars’. ESDP and all that is related to it, including the European Defence Agency or the building of Europe’s own planning capacities etc., is surely improving Europe’s strategic thinking and perhaps allowing for Europe and the USA to ‘speak one language’ even though the EU’s interests might vary still more from the American ones.¹⁷⁴ We can illustrate this on US defence industry: the USA and Europe are the two largest producers of weapons in the world and their products are of the best technical quality, though the USA is still ahead of Europe. The growing European competition in defence industry, which Americans are rather worried about now, may very well stimulate further research and development in defence industry and help to better equip armies because of reduced prices.¹⁷⁵

Yet, there are some aspects of ESDP that might harm the transatlantic relationship in the future. On the European side, these include an overambitious goal (of France, in fact) of transforming Europe into a great power – which is not linked with ESDP only – standing as a rival to the United States or ignoring the US legitimate right to take part in a decision-making on the security of the whole West, i.e. North America and Europe – all of this spiced up by an anti-American rhetoric of politicians and anti-American public opinion. ESDP would thus appear as the crucial factor in creating a strong defence union which might replace the transatlantic relation.¹⁷⁶ Given that such visions are unenforceable in the European Union as a whole, they would have to get implemented within the above mentioned hard core of the ‘chosen countries’ (Scenario 3) which would seriously disturb the building of a balanced EU-USA relationship (Scenario 2) as there would be two transatlantic links on the EU side: a tighter and a looser one.

In general, the transatlantic relationship will not be upset by such ESDP bearing European identities in a Europe-wide project; neither will it be harmed by such ESDP which

¹⁷² Schneider, 2003, p. 2.

¹⁷³ Serfaty, 2004, p. 17.

¹⁷⁴ Keohane, 2004.

¹⁷⁵ Grant, C.: *Transatlantic Alliances and the Revolution in Military Affairs*. In: Ashbourne, A. (ed.): *Europe’s Defence Industry – A Transatlantic Future*. Centre for European Reform, London 1999, pp. 63-69.

would only be the projection of the interests or an extended arm of the big EU states. Many might think, however, that this is utopian.

But many things to do are up to the US. Europeans do not want to give up their ESDP and CFSP and if Americans do not recognise these European ambitions or even undermine them it will not help the transatlantic relationship either.¹⁷⁷ The USA has so far been unable to genuinely recognise and accept the European defence and security ambitions (*hard power*) and the fact that the typically European methods, such as the emphasis on soft power, may bring results.

The current unilateralism and the ‘coalition of the willing’ principle used in the US foreign policy is another risk factor threatening the transatlantic relation. American unilateralism does no good to the transatlantic relationship because it arouses negative sentiments in Europe about America, both on the sides of public opinion and politicians, and because it is principally at odds with the idea of a balanced (transatlantic) partnership and dialogue. The ‘coalition of the willing’ doctrine contradicts the basic principle of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy, i.e. seeking a common position of all EU Member States. In CSFP, this principle is acceptable through the above mentioned *lead nation* mechanism: some states carry out an operation but they are supported by the remaining ones. At a time when the EU is – or is trying hard to be – a relatively politically integrated entity, a policy of driving a wedge between EU states can only harm the transatlantic relations.

If the risks outlined in the above paragraphs do get eliminated ESDP will be of a great benefit to the continuation of the transatlantic relation.

¹⁷⁶ Bono, 2002, p. 137.

¹⁷⁷ Layne, 2001, p. 8.

7. CONCLUSIONS

In spite of its short history, the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) is a successful project. At the same time, the present form of ESDP is acceptable to the vast majority of states and political actors on both sides of the Atlantic while being in line with the transforming transatlantic relation.¹⁷⁸ The acceptability of ESDP and its compliance with the transatlantic relation are based on a long-term need, expressed at both sides of the Atlantic, for Europe to end its security dependence on the USA, to take up the responsibility for what is happening in its 'spheres of influence' to use the old imperial term, and to contribute to the defence of the West.

Many of this will depend on what direction the future ESDP development will take. ESDP may stay within its current limited shape which would be welcomed by Great Britain,¹⁷⁹ the countries of 'New Europe' and the United States. According to this scenario, ESDP would remain a policy/initiative whose major feature is complementarity (burden sharing) and co-operation with NATO (confirmed by the 2002 EU-NATO agreement and based on the dependence of Europe on the military and planning capacities of NATO), that is in the form of a 'European pillar of NATO' – though one that is more autonomous than the European Security and Defence Identity before 1998.

ESDP, however, may also start evolving in the direction of a truly autonomous European defence policy independent of NATO and the USA, as more and more political actors in Europe, France and the present German government in particular, wish. And an establishment of a hard core or a defence union made up of a few avant-garde EU countries cannot be ruled out either.

It is quite clear that it is much more than just a 'division of labour' between NATO and the EU what is going on in the present ESDP. Moreover, the ESDP- NATO relationship seems only secondary today: the EU-USA must get into focus instead now.¹⁸⁰

The European Union has been going deeper in political integration while reinforcing its CFSP instruments, fully supported by European public opinion. The EU is a political entity which should also have a military dimension so as not to be incomplete. As Europe and the world in general is more and more interconnected, new security threats, such as terrorism, arms proliferation, as well as regional conflicts, have a more even impact on all EU Member states and

¹⁷⁸ Scharioth, K.: Making ESDP Strong Will Strengthen NATO and the Transatlantic Partnership. In: Brimmer (ed.), 2002, p. 165.

¹⁷⁹ Great Britain prefers such concept of ESDP where the 'EU would be a smart client of NATO's military services'. Khol, R.: Velká Británie.... In: Khol (ed.), 2002, p. 21.

¹⁸⁰ Bono, 2002, p. 137.

no single state can face them alone.¹⁸¹ The European Union also has its own security strategy and its constitution, in spite of not having been ratified so far, includes a commitment to mutual defence. From a certain perspective, it seems that the EU of the future will be a universal security structure, completely in line with the requirements for a comprehensive security policy which is needed now, including, for example, the fight against terrorism, with the use of non-military and other than force-based means. The European Union of today is described as a civilian power¹⁸² using some considerable soft power instruments, such as diplomacy, global prestige, economic power and co-operation, assistance and humanitarian aid. If EU states are able to increase their military potential to the required level the EU will have a wide range of soft and hard power instruments (as explained in Chapter 2) for its own security and for exerting its influence in the world. The global involvement of the EU is made easier by the fact that the Union's foreign and security policy (or the respective policies of EU Member States) evokes more confidence than the policy of the United States. This is both due to the legitimacy of a common approach of all Member States and due to the greater emphasis put by the EU on international law and multilateralism.

The concept of the European Union as a successful global actor, however, hides some contradictions.¹⁸³ Firstly, it is very hard to reach a common position in foreign and security policy: the unity must be achieved among all Member States, first and foremost among the big ones without which no European foreign or security initiative is legitimate and can succeed. But EU states have no common positions on a number of issues and, sadly for their foreign and security policy, these include most of the really crucial matters. EU states are not united on the approach to such key issues as the former Soviet Union, Middle East or Far East. Neither can they agree on the nature of the future transatlantic relation, the role of NATO in their security arrangements, and the direction of the European Foreign and Security Policy, including ESDP. The bust-up during the Iraq crisis was a prime example of the combination of the several levels of EU divergence: there was no unity in the positions on how to solve the situation in such a sensitive and crucial region and no common position on supporting the US ally.

The unwillingness to spend more on defence is the second major flaw in Europe's plans of a global involvement and operational defence policy – the US annual defence spending is almost twice higher than that of all the EU states together. This unwillingness discredits the European ambitions, harming the European defence industry, keeping Europe subordinate to the

¹⁸¹ Cameron, 1999, p. 71.

¹⁸² Khol, R: Úvod. In: Khol (ed.), 2002, p.9.

¹⁸³ Dumoulin, Mathieu, Sarlet, 2003, pp. 461-465.

United States and, in principle, disrupting the transatlantic relationship.¹⁸⁴ The still greater gap between the military potential of Europe and that of the USA results in a lack of balance and mutual distrust: Europe has no confidence in the US solution based on force because it cannot fully participate in implementing it while the USA has no confidence in the European peaceful solution as Americans do not take part in it. This gap in military operability between Europe and the USA was well described by Robert Kagan in his famous essay *Power and Weakness*.¹⁸⁵ In claiming that ‘Europe is from Venus and America from Mars’ – though it was the other way round before WWII – Kagan transposed this rather simplified distinction onto the level of different mentalities: it is not only the potential of using power but rather the willingness to do so.¹⁸⁶ In the light of this, European ambitions in foreign and security policy seem to be acceptable for many actors because they are quite ‘harmless’ due to these crucial structural limits. This idea is based on the fact that, due to its general ‘inaptness,’ Europe is left with nothing else then clinging to the transatlantic relation and remaining subordinate to the USA.

But let us now turn to the realms of theory and pies in the sky: let us assume that Europe will be able to overcome these limits.

Given the nature of the security environment today and the changes in the transatlantic relation as well as in American foreign and security policy we believe that there is no other way for Europe seeking to continue with its integration than to develop an autonomous defence policy and overall political and security emancipation even though that will require unity in foreign and security policy and higher defence spending.¹⁸⁷

The need for a truly autonomous European defence policy is closely linked to the quite problematic future of NATO as the main pillar so far of European defence and the embodiment of the transatlantic security relation.¹⁸⁸ Although this relation, mentioned in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty is not and should not be questioned, the political significance of NATO as an organisation has been somewhat fading in the long-term perspective.¹⁸⁹ This statement is principally opposed by die-hard ‘Atlanticists’ from post-communist countries (this paper refers to the work of Jiří Schneider and Michael Žantovský.¹⁹⁰ It is true that NATO is still irreplaceable in practice: recent ESDP operations have been dependent on NATO capacities. On the political level, nevertheless, it is still more difficult for NATO to find its *raison d’être*. NATO as a purely

¹⁸⁴ Ibid, pp. 461-465.

¹⁸⁵ Kagan, 2002.

¹⁸⁶ Simon Serfaty proposes a similar comparison - Europe lives in a Kantian world while the USA lives in a Hobbesian one. Serfaty, 2004, p. 6.

¹⁸⁷ Van Ham, P.: A European View of the US and ESDP. In: Brimmer (ed.), 2002, p. 135.

¹⁸⁸ Howorth, J.: ESDP and NATO. Wedlock or Deadlock? In: Cooperation and Conflict, No. 3, 2003, p. 252.

¹⁸⁹ Van Ham, 2000, p. 224.

¹⁹⁰ Schneider, Žantovský, 2003; Schneider, 2005.

military organization does not correspond to the current need for comprehensive security which would combine hard security with soft security and hard power with soft power. NATO's future role is rather problematic in relation to another two aspects. Besides the very development of European political integration, including ESDP, and the establishment of a direct EU-USA relationship, it is the recent development of the US foreign and security policy with its weakening of interest in Europe, unilateralism, the 'coalition of the willing' principle undermining the coherence of NATO and turning the alliance into a 'reservoir' of potential allies for these coalitions.¹⁹¹ Even though Americans, in their rhetoric, still point out the perpetual significance of NATO, their recent acts reveal that they do not need NATO as an organisation and will not rely on it any longer, as illustrated by the little appreciation by the Bush administration of the historically first evocation of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty in reaction to 9/11 attacks.¹⁹² The USA may thus be suspected of favouring NATO as an organisation only because of the dominant role they play there.¹⁹³

Given this quite unclear future of NATO, even the present, rather limited form of ESDP which is complementary to NATO, seems more and more untenable. The existing 'division of labour' between the USA, NATO and ESDP is based on the fact that Europeans themselves are capable of carrying out only operations they have capacities for and in locations the United States and their 'coalition of the willing' allies do not wish to intervene in. According to this logic, shared with the USA by European 'Atlanticists,' it is the USA and its current allies that have preference. Then comes NATO (according to the NATO first principle) and only then, when neither the USA nor NATO is willing to carry out an operation, comes the EU. First, however, comes the consideration of an ESDP in line with the 'Berlin+' logic, i.e. the use of NATO capacities. It is only then that an operation can be carried out by EU states themselves, according to the lead nation principle. In the light of the effort to establish a more balanced relationship between the USA and the EU, this logic will get problematic in future. In order for ESDP to have some meaning, the EU should not be *a priori* sidetracked but should have the possibility to carry out operations according to its own interests and not just in 'allocated' territories such as the Balkans or Africa and for humanitarian purposes only, in line with the Petersberg tasks. For this to be changed, Europe must, of course, be able to agree on its interests and specific operations while having the adequate military instruments available.

At the same time, the American (and largely also British) conditions under which ESDP is tolerated, the above mentioned '3D', must be relativised: these conditions are somewhat outdated

¹⁹¹ Schneider, 2003, p. 2.

¹⁹² We might mention here that the American NATO commitment in terms of armed forces is only 8%. Heisbourg, F.: *Quel rôle mondial pour l'Europe*. Paris Conference notes, 18/9/2003 – *Europartenaires*, p. 3.

since they were formulated in 1998, shortly after the ‘political launch’ of ESDP. The Bush administration, unlike the Clinton one, is less interested in ESDP and Europe in general. Quite paradoxically, the Bush administration is more in favour of ESDP although this is a rather ‘negative tolerance,’ supported by the weakening interest in Europe. That is why the Bush administration has formulated no new conditions which would reflect the ESDP as we know it today. We may, nevertheless, assume that these conditions set by the Clinton administration still give evidence of the main aspects of the US approach to ESDP.

The ‘no decoupling’ condition, i.e. no disturbance of the transatlantic relation, is politically achievable even in a balanced EU-USA relationship, depending largely on the US approach and tolerance of European ambitions (keeping it dependent on NATO) and whether these ambitions will be understood as harmful to the transatlantic relationship. The other two conditions are more problematic, though: an ESDP accessible for European non-EU members of NATO¹⁹⁴ (no discrimination) and no duplication. ESDP is a project of the European Union which has, so far, been a quite strongly politically integrated entity and which is entitled to have its own interests, though it cannot fully define them yet. The participation (as well as decision-making) of non-EU states in ESDP is, in principle, politically unacceptable, even though the number of non-EU members of NATO in Europe will be dropping over time. The no duplication condition is very problematic too. Eliminating duplication in military and planning capacities is more than reasonable, if just for reasons such of cost reduction etc., yet it must not be used as an excuse for blocking the development of European capacities and, in effect, maintaining Europe’s subordination.

The gradual development from the currently limited ESDP to a truly autonomous European defence policy is, in our view, absolutely legitimate.¹⁹⁵ This development, however, should not do harm to the transatlantic relation. Europe should not see a replacement for this relation – an a priori rivalry with the USA – in ESDP, nor should it question the crucial role of the USA in European security. Also, no small defence union made up of a European ‘hard core’ (as many French political actors wish) shall be created in Europe because it would split up Europe, could even be formed outside the EU framework and might deform the relationship with the USA by establishing several levels of partnership with some states having a closer, some looser relationship with the USA. This would undermine the efforts to establish a balanced EU-USA relationship. In other words, ESDP must be a project of the entire EU, and not just a projection of the interests of a few (big) states.

¹⁹³ Layne, 2001, p. 10.

¹⁹⁴ The so called Non-EU European Allies (NEEA).

¹⁹⁵ Layne, 2001, p. 11.

The United States, on the other hand, will have to recognise the EU as an entity with the right to have its own interests and security methods, such as effective multilateralism and soft power, while co-operating with this entity and not seeking to divide it by building ‘coalitions of the willing.’

The European Union of today is a civilian rather than a military power which makes the United States whose current security policy is largely based on pre-emptive wars not rely on and co-operate with Europe too much. The military dimension of the European Union, i.e. ESDP which stimulates the EU states to spend more on defence and put more emphasis on the hard power element of their security policy, can paradoxically draw the security mentalities of Europe and the United States closer together. To paraphrase Roberta Kagan, Europe would be ‘less from Venus and more from Mars’. Europe could also become a universal security structure complying with the current security policy requirements for the combination of hard and soft power.

And Europe as a global political and military power which will suddenly promote its interests in spite of the USA will not necessarily be a threat to Washington.¹⁹⁶

The transatlantic partnership today, fifteen years after the end of the Cold War and two years after the Iraq crisis, is at a crossroads. In order to remain alive in the future it has to continue to be a real partnership – a dialogue of equal partners, the EU and the USA, none of which is dependent on the other – though it has been mainly Europe who has been dependent on the USA – and who need one another without quite realising it.¹⁹⁷ Europe will presumably not acquire quite the same military power as the USA in near future so the alliance with North America is and will long remain vital for Europe. The USA is one of the world’s superpowers that does not need anyone. But the previously great strength of America, the power of example (or soft power),¹⁹⁸ is getting lost from its policy. What America needs, as Joseph Nye claims, is feedback and correction of its hegemonic temptation.¹⁹⁹ And that is why the USA needs Europe, its most faithful ally who has the same values and a similar way of thinking.

In spite of this all, some geopolitical rivalry and divergence of interests between Europe and the USA appear to be inevitable.²⁰⁰ It is a natural consequence of the disappearance of a common, unifying threat after the Cold War. Today’s threats – though equally important for Europe and America²⁰¹ - do not have this unifying effect of the old Soviet threat.²⁰²

¹⁹⁶ Layne, 2001, p. 9; Srov. Everts, S., Grant, C.: President Bush: Why You Need the Europeans? Centre for European Reform, December 2004.

¹⁹⁷ Schweiss, 2003, p. 231.

¹⁹⁸ Nye, 2003, p. 9.

¹⁹⁹ Ibid, p. 39.

²⁰⁰ Khol. R.: Spojené státy... In: Khol (ed.), 2002, p. 74.

²⁰¹ As evident from the comparison of the European Security Strategy and the US National Security Strategy (see Chapter 2.2).

²⁰² Andréani, Bertram, Grant, 2001, p. 74.

It is quite natural for Europe and America to have their own, sometimes clashing interests. What is important here is that they can find agreement. This, however, might not be always possible: internal discord is typical for democratic systems and can be found in the relations between democratic countries, too.²⁰³ What should be always present in the transatlantic partnership though is the effort on both sides to seek dialogue and consensus while realising that the variance of views and methods or even competition can be beneficial for both parties and might enrich both sides alike.

Variance is a sign of a mature, balanced relationship which must, however, be accompanied by the art of knowing how to deal with and overcome these divergences – though through concessions.²⁰⁴ And this art has not disappeared from the transatlantic community although it has not been used too much in recent years. Europe and the United States are still a community sharing the very basic interests and values, in spite of the variances in some interests and methods.

As stated in the introduction to *Europe's Military Revolution*,²⁰⁵ all those concerned with the success of European integration must wish for a further-developing ESDP and CFSP. We may add that all of those who wish to maintain the Western community in today's postmodern and globalised world²⁰⁶ must protect and 'nurture' the transatlantic relation: but not at the cost of stagnation and maintaining the status quo, i.e. implementing the European defence policy through NATO only, as seen as necessary by e.g. Jiří Schneider,²⁰⁷ but by adapting the alliance to new conditions.

What has been described so far is an ideal development which, however, need not correspond with reality. This paper presents the reality and author's ideas in mid-2005 but further developments may cast doubt over many of the presented assumptions. Yet, we believe that the ESDP project, just like the transatlantic relation, builds on a very firm base and that there are not many factors undermining this foundation. Surely, these factors do not include a change in the governments of the countries involved, even though the case of Great Britain, a country which is crucial for further ESDP development, might be different as a potential Conservative government might change Britain's position on ESDP quite substantially. Not even the failure of the European constitution which takes ESDP and the entire CFSP²⁰⁸ a huge step forward, should

²⁰³ Parmentier, 2004, pp. 121-122.

²⁰⁴ Solana, 2002, p. IX.

²⁰⁵ Andréani, Bertram, Grant, 2001, p. 7.

²⁰⁶ The paradox has it that the Western community is the main driving force of globalisation while globalisation is a potential threat to the cohesion of the Western community.

²⁰⁷ Schneider, 2005, p. 9.

²⁰⁸ E.g. by establishing a position of EU Foreign Minister.

threaten further development of the project because many of the constitution clauses can be or have been introduced into practice even without the constitution itself. What is a real risk, however, is that European integration as a whole might be discredited by the constitution (or any other similar treaty) not being ratified or a defence hard core (which the constitution includes a safeguard against) being established and potentially harming the transatlantic relationship.

No serious crisis such as the one over Iraq should threaten to damage the transatlantic relation: the Iraq crisis was very grave indeed but both the transatlantic partnership and ESDP did get over the rupture. Europe has even got 'used to' the US unilateralism, which has become a typical feature of the US foreign and security policy, and can respond with a common foreign and defence policy without disrupting the alliance with the USA.

Let us conclude this paper with a personal observation. Many authors quarrel about whether we are living in a unipolar or multipolar world at the dawn of the 21 century. There are many signs pointing rather to the unipolar order. We may try, however, to make the whole West, and not just the United States, the single world's pole.²⁰⁹

²⁰⁹ We are inspired by the thoughts of a British political scientist Martin Shaw on a single 'Western state'. Shaw, M.: *Theory of the Global State: Globality as Unfinished Revolution*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2000.

8. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: European Security and Defence Policy in the Light of the Transatlantic Relationship

European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) was launched in 1998. The project builds upon the necessity for Europeans – who have depended on the US for security and defence for much of the Cold War and post-Cold War period – to take over some of the responsibility for their own security and for the building of permanent peace in Europe ('burden sharing'). The emergence of ESDP was stimulated by three factors. (1) The end of the Cold War saw the disappearance of a unifying threat to the Western Community and a consequent decrease in the US interest in Europe. (2) A change of the security milieu with its new so-called 'asymmetric threats'; and (3) Europe's incapability to react to 'hot crises' in the Balkans in 1990s.

The ESDP project has already brought some considerable achievements. ESDP has become a part of the process of European political integration and EU primary law, having been provided with its own structures and institutions. Under ESDP, the EU is creating the Rapid Reaction Force and Battle Groups. Moreover, the EU has participated in three military operations: two of them in the Balkans (taking over previous NATO missions), with operational support from NATO (SHAPE), and one in the Democratic Republic of Congo, largely inspired and made a reality by the two ESDP 'lead nations' – France and Great Britain.

Despite these achievements, the ESDP is 'weakened' by a relatively low defence spending in European states, as compared with the USA, and by internal divisions among European states that have been unable to find a consensus on the very objectives and interests in their common foreign and security policy. This is most evident in the different concepts of the future role of ESDP where there are two competing models: a minimalist one (preferred by the UK and 'New Europe') versus an ambitious one (preferred by France and Germany).

There are three fundamental questions addressed in this study: Is ESDP necessarily at odds with the current or future form of the transatlantic relationship? What could be the future shape of ESDP? And what is the future role of NATO? This is particularly germane to the development of ESDP (and the whole Europe's political integration) and to the evolution of the transatlantic relationship, most especially in light of America's recent move toward unilateralism.

Key findings:

- ESDP is an acceptable project for all partners in the transatlantic community given the new geopolitical reality and also its present, rather limited form which makes it a complement of rather than an alternative to NATO. Nevertheless, ESDP cannot remain in the shape it has now because it is strongly linked to the process of political integration and is central to Europe's legitimate ambitions to play a more important role in the world.
- Today's EU is technically dependent on NATO; in the long term, however, the EU, through its ESDP, might become a more universal common foreign and security structure than NATO is now. Effective security policy is now seen to require the combined use of both soft and hard security and/or soft and hard power policy instruments and strategies.
- NATO's future political role is fading: NATO is 'only' a military structure; the transatlantic relationship should be founded on a balanced EU-US relationship.
- The development of an autonomous European defence policy is realistic and should not cause damage to the transatlantic relationship if the following two conditions are met:
 - a. The United States should recognise the EU as an equal partner and it should not discourage the EU from achieving military capability and operational capacity making it independent of the USA in terms of security and defence. The USA should not divide Europe by America's unilateral foreign policy and creation of 'coalitions of the willing'.
 - b. The EU should be more united and spend more on defence, but it should not seek to become a rival to the USA and aim to replace the transatlantic relation by ESDP, particularly if ESDP would give birth to a 'hard core' defence group.
- Europe and the USA might and do have different interests, views, and foreign and security methods, but still share some fundamental values, so they both face the same threats.
- Transatlantic disputes are not something to fear but they should never cast doubt on the transatlantic relationship, which is still vital for both Europe and the USA.

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