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Tolerance and Cultural Diversity Discourses in Hungary



The research leading to these results has been conducted under the auspices of the research project ACCEPT PLURALISM: Tolerance, Pluralism and Social Cohesion: Responding to the Challenges of the 21st Century in Europe. The project runs between 2010-2013 and has received funding from the European Commission's Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013), under Grant Agreement 243837.

ABOUT THE PROJECT

The **ACCEPT PLURALISM** project investigates whether European societies have become more or less tolerant during the past 20 years. In particular, the project aims to clarify: (a) how is tolerance defined conceptually, (b) how it is codified in norms, institutional arrangements, public policies and social practices, (c) how tolerance can be measured (whose tolerance, who is tolerated, and what if degrees of tolerance vary with reference to different minority groups). The ACCEPT PLURALISM consortium conducts original empirical research on key issues in school life and in politics that thematise different understandings and practices of tolerance. The Consortium is formed by 18 partner institutions covering 15 EU countries. The project is hosted by the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies and co-ordinated by Prof. Anna Triandafyllidou. <http://www.accept-pluralism.eu>.

ABOUT THE PAPER

Policy Research Reports are occasional studies that provide support or background information for wider research projects. They include reviews of scientific literature, state of the art reports, and country studies. They are works in progress and offer practical combinations of academic and policy writing. This paper was authored under the auspices of the University of Bristol's Centre for the Study of Ethnicity and Citizenship, with the project's Work Package 1, focusing on the Overview of National Discourses on Tolerance and Cultural Diversity. Within the ACCEPT PLURALISM project, it has been published by the European University Institute, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Following the dramatic electoral changes in Hungary in 2010 that witnessed the strengthening of the centre- and far right parties and the demise of the left, an important shift in public discourses on tolerance and acceptance has occurred. The ‘Nation’ now occupies a central role in the governing Fidesz’s vision of legislative and constitutional reform for Hungary. Through its discourse and policies, Fidesz implicitly and explicitly identifies who belongs, and who, by extension does not belong, to the ‘Nation’. Ethnic Hungarians living outside of Hungary in the neighboring countries are included in Fidesz’s conception of the ‘Hungarian Nation’ (reflected most prominently in the extension of dual citizenship to them). Hungary’s Roma minority, on the other hand, features increasingly prominently (particularly in far-right but also centre-right discourse) as the primary ‘Other’ against which the ‘Nation’ is constituted. Whilst the boundaries of national inclusion extended beyond the political borders of the country, the boundaries of national difference were constructed within those same political borders. This was an ethnic (or ethnicised) vision of the nation: it included transborder Hungarians but excluded Roma.

These recent developments reflect only the latest chapter in Hungary’s political history of national inclusion and exclusion. Indeed, the discourses circulating now enjoy political legitimacy in large part due to their resonance with earlier iterations of Hungarians nationalism. The ‘Nation’ has figured prominently in Hungarian political and social life over the last century and a half to describe and explain all sorts of social and economic phenomena.

In order to better understand in the impact of this most recent resurgence in Hungarian nationalism on discourses and practices of tolerance, we explain in our report how the question of Hungary’s internal minorities (and the Roma in particular) has taken a backseat to the question of the transborder Hungarians. The result is that in certain respect the search for solutions to the Roma problem in Hungary is still in its infancy. For years, Hungary’s policies toward its minorities were driven, at least in part, by concern for (and a preoccupation with) the transborder Hungarians: Hungary used its domestic policies in an attempt to set an example for the neighboring countries to adopt in their treatment of the transborder Hungarians. The policies thus devised for Hungary’s minorities and the Roma in particular did not always correspond to the needs or demands of these minorities. Legislative changes in education, the welfare system, and economic structures have often had the effect of further marginalizing the Roma. This continued socio-economic marginalization of the Roma has been further exacerbated by racialised understandings of difference (particularly evident vis-à-vis the Roma) that preclude possibilities for socio-cultural integration and/or accommodation. The major tolerance issues in Hungary today are overwhelmingly related to the situation of the Roma.

The History of Toleration and Exclusion in Hungary: The Roma, National Minorities, and Immigrants

Social scientific research shows that the Roma are the primary target of the most intense prejudice and racism in Hungary. The extreme right have recently turned their attention to the Roma not with the aim of ameliorating tensions but rather aggravating them by scapegoating the Roma. This has had the effect of legitimating the continued radicalization of more mainstream discourses on the Roma. Anti-Roma prejudices can and also should be understood more generally as a ‘cultural code’ shared to

varying degrees in all political discourse and indeed more generally at a societal level as well, regardless of ideological orientation. The Roma thus are understood across the political responsible as being connected to or indeed at the root of a wide variety of social, political, and economic problems in Hungary.

Immigrants in Hungary, although very small in number, are also typically viewed with a combination of fear and distrust. The largest group of immigrants to Hungary are Hungarians from the neighboring countries. Despite the fact that in political discourse these Hungarians constitute an important part of the national 'self', in and through the practices of immigration they have been constituted as, somewhat ironically, a national 'other'. Other immigrant groups in contrast have been less visible simply due to their small numbers. But when these groups do appear in the media, they too are often presented as either threatening (e.g. the Chinese mafia) or at the very least exotic.

The report elaborates on these two main types of groups: indigenous groups and immigrants. Indigenous groups include the country's national minorities, Jews and the Roma; immigrant groups include the transborder Hungarian immigrants and other (mostly non-European) immigrants. Individually and collectively these various groups constitute only a small portion of the Hungarian population. About 4% of the population belong to one of the officially recognized 12 national minority groups, though these numbers have been declining in recent years. At the same time the Roma minority has at least doubled over the last forty years to an estimated 400,000-800,000 at present. The national minorities and Roma enjoy official legal recognition. The Jewish population, estimated at around 80,000-200,000, is not afforded official recognition as a minority group. The proportion of immigrants in Hungary is even lower and one of the lowest in Europe, at about 2% of the population, with about two-thirds of these immigrants being ethnic Hungarians from the neighboring countries.

The 1993 Minorities Law signalled a 'multicultural turn' in Hungary's relations with its minorities. The Law officially recognized (and institutionally accommodated) cultural and ethnic difference. The cultural autonomy the law afforded to Hungary's minorities, however, was in large part symbolic for most of the national minority groups given their relatively small numbers and their strong assimilation tendencies. As for the Roma, the law contributed little to resolving the harsh social, cultural and economic problems they experienced. Jewish activists for their part did not seek official recognition and therefore Jews were not named in the law. Nor did the law address immigrant groups, although another 1993 law, "The Act on Hungarian Citizenship", decreed restrictive paths to naturalization (with some benefits for ethnic Hungarians).

The most pressing issues surrounding tolerance in Hungary concern the Roma. Rates of Roma unemployment were above 75% in 2005; their poverty rate is five-ten times higher than that of the majority population, doubling over the last ten years; and neighborhood and school segregation further exacerbate their marginalization. Discrimination against the Roma has been increasing in spheres of employment, healthcare, and law enforcement. Life expectancy for the Roma is seven years below the national average.

Roma political mobilisation and activism has been unable to reverse these trends. Roma minority self-governments and political parties were formed after the 1993 law, but without significant power. The 'Roma issue' unquestionably remains the most serious diversity challenge facing Hungary today.

Other minorities in Hungary are not viewed as a challenge to the hegemony of the Hungarian nation. They therefore do not present similar problems related to toleration. In contrast, anti-Semitism has been (and continues to be) an essential and formative element of Hungarian national

self-understandings, with ‘the Jew’ having fill the role of ‘internal other’ for centuries. “The Jewish question” has always been a crucial question in Hungary and continues to be connected to broader issues of tolerance. About 10% of the population hold radical anti-Semitic views (still well below rates for those views expressed in relation to the Roma).Immigrant groups are also viewed with distrust (despite their low numbers), but again not to the same degree as the Roma.

The Roma minority therefore suffers from the greatest intolerance: 50-80% of the population (including those holding views from both sides of the political spectrum) display negative attitudes towards the Roma. These negative tendencies have been exacerbated in recent years by the rise of the radical right. . The exclusion of the Roma is deeply embedded both in institutional and everyday practices. Studies on discrimination against the Roma in the labor market, schools, law enforcement, and state welfare point to the failure of policy at both macro and micro levels. Many experts argue that an ethnicized Roma underclass has taken shape in recent years in Hungary. These experts acknowledge the importance of anti-discrimination and minority rights legislation in dealing with this problem, but at the same time they argue that the problems facing the Roma minority also should be addressed through the policies of social inclusion.

Concluding remarks

Although rarely successful, Hungarian elites have made some significant efforts over the past three decades to adopt minority and human rights frameworks laid out by the European Union and other international organisations. Further changes have been brought about since Hungary’s formal accession to the European Union in 2004, contributing to the rise of a policy discourse on toleration/acceptance. These changes have also importantly been accompanied by the new availability of financial resources, part of which have reached the targeted minorities and contributed to the improvement of certain aspects of their lives (e.g., a slight decline in school segregation in some districts, and the improved treatment of immigrants and refugees). But while the EU has undoubtedly produced successes in these and other regards, the accession process has also somewhat paradoxically provided new opportunity structures for nationalists and right-wing radical groups to pursue discourses and policies of intolerance towards ethnic and religious groups. This is what is occurring now with the Roma in Hungary. The Roma will therefore be the main focus of our further research into issues of tolerance and acceptance in Hungary.

KEYWORDS

Tolerance, Nationalism, Racism, Segregation, Discrimination, Immigration, Hungary, Roma, Transborder Hungarians

DEFINITIONS

The 1993 Law on National and Ethnic minorities: a law granting cultural autonomy to thirteen national and ethnic minorities (the Roma being the only ‘ethnic minority’) allowing them to form self-governments at the local and national levels to deal with cultural matters in order to nurture and maintain their distinctive identities.

“Gypsy criminality”: a term used by the police in their record keeping during the communist years. The term was discredited following the regime change but has recently enjoyed renewed circulation with the recent rise of the radical right.

Dual citizenship Law: a law (2010) aimed at transborder Hungarians to make it easier for them to claim Hungarian citizenship.

Status Law: package of entitlements for transborder Hungarians which included measures to promote Hungarian culture in the neighboring countries and the legal right for transborder Hungarians to work in Hungary.

Transborder Hungarians: ethnic Hungarians living in the countries bordering Hungary. According to nationalist discourse they never ceased being members of the Hungarian nation.

1. INTRODUCTION

The 2010 Hungarian Parliamentary elections made it onto the front page of many international newspapers. Although most papers reported on the electoral success of the radical right-wing political party, Jobbik, at the same time another, arguably more important, development had occurred in Hungarian electoral politics that led to the restructuring of the entire Hungarian political landscape. The previously governing Hungarian Socialist Party was unseated (capturing only a couple more percentage points of the vote than Jobbik), while the Fidesz-KDNP coalition (the centre-right Hungarian Civic Union-Christian Democratic People's Party,¹ hereinafter simply 'Fidesz') received enough votes to secure a two-thirds majority in parliament, making it possible for them to pass legislation (or even change the constitution) without support from the opposition. The new government made it clear that they saw their victory as a "*two-thirds revolution*"² reflecting the will of the "*Hungarian nation*". Thus, as the new Prime Minister Viktor Orbán declared, Fidesz formed a "Government of National Causes" which would not shy away from using its constitutional majority "to demolish taboos". They intended to push their own legislation through parliament and to rewrite the Hungarian Constitution to reflect "the moral system of the new Framework for National Cooperation"³.

The 'nation' played a central role in Fidesz's vision of legislative and constitutional reform for Hungary. Through its national discourse and policies, Fidesz implicitly and explicitly identified who belonged, and who, by extension did not, to the nation. Ethnic Hungarians living outside of Hungary in the neighboring countries were included (and not only symbolically) in Fidesz's conception of the 'Hungarian Nation'. This was reflected in the institution of dual citizenship for transborder Hungarians, one of the first laws passed by the new parliament. The new law removed residency requirements for those speaking Hungarian and claiming Hungarian ancestry. In effect, this meant that the 2.5 million ethnic Hungarians in the neighbouring countries were now eligible for Hungarian citizenship. In his 'one-hundred day' speech Orbán made it clear that these transborder Hungarians were now 'reunited' with the 'Nation'.⁴

At the same time, boundaries of exclusion from the 'Nation' were also being redrawn at the level of discourse and in some cases policies as well. The Roma minority, which had featured prominently in the 2010 elections as the primary 'Other' against which the 'Nation' was constructed, clearly did not fit in Fidesz's conception of the 'Nation'. A series of laws were passed that directly or indirectly targeted the Roma 'problem': tougher measures on petty crime were introduced; school behaviour of children deemed violent was to be more strictly punished; it again became possible to fail students, thus forcing them to repeat the school year even if they were only in the first grade; and actions seen as 'welfare delinquencies' were criminalized. Although none of these changes named the Roma explicitly (to the

1 The KDNP is a small party that would not have obtained enough votes in 2010 to enter parliament without the support of Fidesz. The last time the KDNP won seats on its own was in 1994. After the party fell apart in 1997, many of the party's MPs joined the Fidesz fraction in the parliament. Former KDNP members joined Fidesz lists in 1998 in elections that saw Fidesz ultimately form a government. KDNP subsequently reformed and the two parties formed an official alliance in 2005, a year before the 2006 parliamentary elections (in which they lost out to the Socialists).

2 Prime Minister Orbán, evaluating the first 100 days of his government's work, in a speech at the 'Professzorok Batthyány Köre' on September 4, 2010.

3 *Ibid.*

4 Prime Minister Orbán on September 4, 2010.

contrary, Fidesz repeatedly invoked an anti-discrimination discourse citing ‘dignity for all’⁵) it is clear that the Roma were disproportionately affected by these measures.

Orbán thus clearly demarcated the boundaries of the ‘Nation’. Transborder Hungarians were referred to as ‘co-nationals’ (*nemzettársak*) or ‘Hungarian people’ (*magyar emberek*), and Roma were ‘our fellow citizens’ (*állampolgárok*) or ‘our compatriots’ (*polgártársak*). Other ‘markers’ also conveyed and constructed difference: ‘Gypsy ethnic origin’ (*cigányszármazás*), ‘skin colour’ (*bőrszín*), ‘citizens belonging to the Roma minority’ (*Roma kisebbséghez tartozó állampolgárok*) were often used in relation to criminality, social welfare delinquencies, or school violence.⁶ Government officials emphasized the fact that they had to take action against such crimes in order to protect Hungarians, whose interests had been neglected by the previous government. The irony of this situation is that while the boundaries of national inclusion were extended beyond the political borders of the country, the boundaries of national difference were constructed within those same political boundaries. This was an ethnic (or ethnicised) vision of the nation: it included transborder Hungarians but excluded Roma.

These inclusionary and exclusionary discourses were diluted versions of similar discourses preferred and proffered by the right-wing party Jobbik. Indeed, the governing party, Fidesz, operated in a symbiotic if ultimately silent relationship with Jobbik. When it suited them, Fidesz, could draw clear boundaries to distinguish them and Jobbik, identifying in the process what was unacceptable and what was not. On other occasions, Jobbik became the unofficial spokesperson for Fidesz, saying explicitly what Fidesz dare not say even implicitly, thus blurring the lines between politically correct and stigmatizing discourses

The dramatic electoral changes taking place in the spring of 2010 reflect only the latest chapter in Hungary’s political history of national inclusion and exclusion. Indeed, the discourses circulating now enjoy political legitimacy in large part due to their lineage through previous generations of Hungarian politics. The status of Hungarians living in the neighboring countries has been a perennial topic of public debate on the nation on and off for the last century. All post-communist governments of varying political stripes have made the transborder Hungarian question central to their political agenda. The question of Hungary’s internal minorities has taken a backseat to the question of the transborder Hungarians. In many ways, Hungary’s policies on internal minorities can even be said to have been driven by the political elite’s preoccupation with the transborder Hungarians: Hungary has used its domestic policies to set the example for minority politics which the neighbouring countries have been meant to follow in their treatment of Hungarians. But the policies they have devised for Hungary’s minorities in general and the Roma in particular have provided administrative structures that do not always meet their needs. Legislative changes that were introduced in education, the welfare system, and economic structures have had the effect of further marginalizing the Roma. The key difference now with the rise of Fidesz has been the party’s ability to implement policies unencumbered by political opposition.

Our report on tolerance will focus its attention on these two groups: the transborder Hungarians and the Roma. We will sketch out the position of other groups in Hungary in both historical and demographic context, but our main focus will be on these two groups that have also received historically the main focus in Hungarian political, cultural, and social life.

5 See for example the ‘one-hundred day’ speech of Orbán on September 2, 2010 (<http://www.fidesz.hu/index.php?Cikk=152748>), or his parliamentary address on ‘Roma criminality’, September 13, 2010 (<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0x3bjN7wUcK>).

6 Ibid.; see also some of Orbán’s declarations during the electoral campaign: (http://www.nol.hu/belfold/Orban_viktor_ciganybunozes_nincs_ciganybunozok_vannak).

2. NATIONAL IDENTITY AND STATE FORMATION IN HUNGARY

The ‘Nation’ has figured prominently in Hungarian political and social life over the last century and a half as an all-encompassing framework to explain all sorts of social and economic phenomena. The ‘nation’ has even overshadowed to a certain extent traditional left-right political cleavages in various east European contexts (Fox and Vermeersch, 2010; Palonen, 2009). In order to better appreciate this resurgence of the ‘Nation’ in Hungarian political and public thought, as well as its effects on the public’s perceptions of what ‘being Hungarian’ means, we will look at, first, how Hungarian national identity has been historically constituted, and, second, changing popular understanding of Hungarian national identity. In both cases our interest is in how both political and public space has been ‘nationalized’ and the implications of these developments for both inclusion and exclusion.

2.1. Understandings of the ‘Nation’ in Hungary

Political debates on questions related to definitions of the ‘Hungarian nation’ began in Hungary in the 19th century and have continued with varying degrees of intensity and with periodically shifting ‘Other-figures’ to the present day. The debates wavered between ethno-cultural and civic-political conceptions of Hungarian nationhood. These competing conceptions were applied differently to Hungary’s changing landscape of minority politics. Until 1918 the minority question concerned those non-ethnic Hungarians living within the borders of the Hungarian portion of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. After World War I and the loss of territory it entailed, the situation of the Hungarian minorities living in the newly constituted or transformed neighbouring countries became the main national minority issue. Then as now, the relationship between internal (non-Hungarian) and external (Hungarian) minorities was viewed as two sides of the same coin: how can Hungary adequately address the issue of its internal minorities without harming the interests of ethnic Hungarians living outside the national borders.

Different solutions to this problem have been proposed at different historical junctures. Following Hungary’s political reconfiguration at the conclusion of WWI, the ruling classes “perceived the main danger as the threat to the existence of what remained of the state of Hungary”, overshadowing their concerns for the Hungarian minority abroad (Kis, 2002a, p. 234). During the years of the Cold War stability “Hungarian statehood – even if not independence – seemed fairly secure. Thus, the anxiety for the Hungarians outside of Hungary, for their capacity to resist oppression and forced assimilation, became the main preoccupation of the new populists” (Kis, 2002a, p. 234). This distinction led to different policy strategies and outcomes: while the ruling classes sought out alliances in the interwar period to help bolster Hungarian statehood and regain the lost territories, by the 1960s and 1970s, when the Hungarian minorities of the neighboring countries were ‘rediscovered’ and their existence raised political questions for Hungary, the new populists had to depart from the old nationalism and form alliances with western powers embracing the discourse of human rights and minority rights.

Things changed again following the collapse of communism when Europe emerged as a key political actor, “offer[ing] a set of international standards, including provisions on minority rights, in terms of which conflict resolution could be sought” (Kis, 2002a, p. 236). This new generation of Hungarian nationalists thus had to ‘learn’ this new rights-discourse if they wanted to be accepted in European politics. The ensuing debate has

“reveal[ed] a deeper disagreement between the nationalist and non-nationalist understandings of the policy of minority rights. For non-nationalists, the commitment for such a policy is a matter of principle, a consequence of their more general commitment to freedom, equality, and individual dignity. Nationalists, on the other hand, adopt the rights-discourse as a matter of tactical accommodation to a status quo, not as a framework for principled settlement” (Kis, 2002a, p. 238).

Nationalists thus, argues Kis, fail both the universalization test (anti-Semitism and indifference for the plight of the Roma are common in these groups) and the human-rights test (they treat individual human rights with neglect and contempt).

2.1.1. Hungarian national identity and some of its external “Others”

Hungary has defined itself not only vis-à-vis internal minorities (the Roma) and external neighbours, but also vis-à-vis Europe. After World War II, when leading public figures were expected to legitimize the “sovietization” of Hungary and the neighbouring countries (Bariska & Pallai, 2005), there was little room for open debate on questions of national identity. In this new context, the ‘reactionary forces of the ancien regime constituted the ‘internal Other’; at the same time the “people of the East” became part of the ‘self’ in a new homogeneous and homogenising version of Eastern Europe,. This was an attempt to ideologically and historically justify the geo-political division of Europe, a political reality that emerged after Yalta. Similarities among the nations of Eastern-Europe were frequently stressed, and common roots in their history, literature, and culture were highlighted by literary critics, musicologists, ethnographers, and historians.

These state-driven, top-down identity construction programs ultimately contributed to the appearance of a counter-debate, led by historians, about the characteristics of Hungarian national identity and Hungary’s position in Europe. Starting in the 1960s a new generation of Hungarian historians began to reframe the “Europe debate”, many of them with the aim of differentiating Hungary and its neighboring countries – “Central Europe” – from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, thus repositioning the region on the mental and geographical map of the continent (Pach, 1963, 1968; Berend – Ranki, 1968, 1969; Szucs, 1981; Berend 1982, 1985; Hanak, 1988). Beginning in the early 1970s, more and more academics argued that a sharp line cut through Eastern Europe where the western parts of this region – especially Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary – were more developed and thus more similar to Western Europe. However, it was not until the early 1980s that a Hungarian historian, Jenő Szűcs, openly claimed that Europe was divided into three parts – the West, the East, and the in-between region of Central-Eastern-Europe. He argued that each of these three regions had a different path of development (Szűcs, 1981).

By the 1980s this debate evolved into a more general dispute about the existence and essence of a “Central” Europe, with well known intellectuals from all around Europe chiming in (Milan Kundera, Czesław Miłosz, Eugène Ionesco, Danilo Kis, György Konrad, Timothy Garton Ash and others). This debate centred on the degree to which a shared Central-European culture and mentality could be said to exist. These debates carried into the 1990s, trickling down ever more into public consciousness and public opinion, leading ultimately to the rediscovery of the Hungarians that lived as minorities in the neighbouring countries. Csepeli (1989) argues that at the start of late 1970s Hungarian national identity began a process of reinventing itself. Part of this can be explained by an emergence in a

“world-wide demand for a reformulation of national identity”, but the more particular reasons were the worsening condition of Hungarians living outside Hungary: “consequently, beginning in the second half of the 1970s, an outwardly directed aspect of the national question emerged in Hungary” – argues Csepeli (1989). In surveys conducted in the 1980s a significant number of Hungary’s population (57%) said that “there were countries in Hungary’s vicinity which discriminate against Hungarians who live there” and they thought that the Hungarian state should support and help these groups of Hungarians living outside of Hungary. However, it was only a minority of the respondents which said that, if it became necessary, Hungary should not avoid clashes with its neighbours (23%), while an even smaller proportion (7%) thought that there was nothing objectionable “to the Hungarian government’s extortion of its neighbours through the limitation of domestic minority group’s rights.” (1989)

This shift in focus by the early 1990s led to the re-emergence of some of the neighbouring states and nationalities as Hungary’s dominant ‘external Others’, thus undoing completely any notion of ‘relatedness’ among ‘the people of the East’ that had been constructed and legitimated during Communism.

2.2. Attitude surveys on Hungarian national identity

Surveys from recent decades reveal ambiguity over popular understandings of Hungarianness. Research from the 1980s showed that political vacillation between ethno-cultural and civic-political understandings of nationhood was reflected in popular confusion over Hungarian national identity (Csepeli, 1989). On the one hand, the communist state promoted a civic-political understanding of identity where all individuals, irrespective of their background, were equal citizens. On the other hand, in its everyday practices the same state placed pressure on minority groups to assimilate into a ‘homogenous nation’. This was further complicated by the fact that the majority population resisted the assimilation of certain minority groups, especially that of the Roma. Attempts at ‘integration’ were thus viewed as imposed cultural and lifestyle practices that were deemed desirable for the Roma by members of the majority society (e.g., the forced washing and haircutting campaigns to ‘civilize’ the Roma in the 1960s, as described by Stewart, 1989; Bernath and Polyak, 2001).

National identity is understood in Hungary as elsewhere as an ascribed identity, one that it is given at birth (and therefore one that is not achieved). The assimilation of the Roma was thus inconceivable simply because the Roma were ascribed “a separate minority identity which took into account primarily origin and outward appearance. That made it impossible, even in theory, for a change in ‘national’ character to occur” (Csepeli, 1989; Hann, 1990).

In the 1990s there was a greater ambivalence in relation to these civic-political and ethno-cultural understandings of national identity. On the one hand, human rights, tolerance, and rational discourse were seen as dominant components of the national character; on the other hand, ethnocentrism and intolerance towards foreigners were part of the same national identity. These latter components were remnants of the long history of the ‘culture-nation’ rhetoric of Hungary and could be best understood by using Habermas’ concept of ‘welfare chauvinism’: people living in developed welfare states were aware of the set of privileges they benefited from, and, fearing the loss of those privileges, they developed feelings of ethnocentrism and intolerance towards foreigners (Csepeli, 1997; Csepeli et al., 1999).

More recently culture-nation conceptions of Hungarianness have been resurgent. This is manifest in the lately declining negative attitudes towards foreigners (xenophobia) and the increasing prejudice, rejection, and negative attitudes towards internal minorities (mainly the Roma). This is accompanied

by claims of cultural supremacy and the rejection of ‘difference’. These trends have been attributed to alarmist discourses about the ‘shrinking of the nation’ (*nemzetfogyás*) which anticipate a rapid aging of Hungary’s population. Against this backdrop, foreigners are increasingly expected to undergo complete assimilation. This was made easier (at least in theory; see below) by the fact that the largest group of immigrants in Hungary are ethnic Hungarians from neighboring countries. These groups speak Hungarian as mother tongue and share more or less the same cultural codes; as such they are not perceived as threatening the ‘Nation’. In contrast, assimilation of internal minorities and especially the Roma is viewed as much more problematic: a separate ethnicised and sometimes racialized identity is ascribed to the group, based mainly on origin and outward appearance, which makes assimilation unimaginable.

Nationalism and ethnocentrism has been consistently high among Hungary’s population since the 1990s (Csepeli et al., 2004; Örkény, 2006). During this same time significant changes have occurred not so much in the degree of nationalism but in its content and in the socio-economic background of those who support it. In the mid 1990s, the demographic profile of nationalists was older and low social status; ten years later this demographic profile dissipated and only value preferences correlate with nationalist attitudes (Csepeli et al., 2004). At the same time, ethno-cultural understandings of the nation have enjoyed a political revival. This has contributed to a slight decrease in xenophobia and rejection of foreigners but also a significant increase in prejudice and intolerance against internal minority groups, namely the Roma.

3. CULTURAL DIVERSITY CHALLENGES DURING THE LAST 30 YEARS

In this section we identify minority groups in Hungary and account for their ‘difference’. We summarize the most important demographic features of these groups and briefly outline their histories with a focus on questions of toleration and/or exclusion. We also explore how well ‘toleration’ captures the circumstances of these groups in the larger political and social contexts in which they are embedded. Whilst we provide a general overview of all major minority groups in Hungary, our focus in this report will be on the Roma (as our ‘indigenous’ minority) and transborder Hungarians (as our ‘immigrant’ group).

The most significant tolerance issues in Hungary today are related to the situation of the Roma. Their ‘otherness’ has been constructed differently from other groups for a variety of complex historical and social reasons. At present, Roma are the target of the most intense xenophobia, prejudice, and racism in Hungary. Historically, it was Jews who were seen as the primary internal other against which the national ‘self’ was understood; now it’s the Roma who fill this role. This is due in part to the rise of the extreme right who have turned new (and negative) attention on the Roma, further legitimating the radicalization of more mainstream discourses in the process. But the extreme right is both cause and consequence of this: anti-Roma prejudices can and also should be viewed more generally as a ‘cultural code’ shared to varying degrees and with different interpretation in all political discourse and indeed at a societal level more generally as well. In different ways, a wide range of political processes contribute to the ethnicization of Hungary’s social, political, and economic problems by making a scapegoat of the Roma.

Immigrants in Hungary, although comparatively small in number, are also typically viewed as a fearful ‘other’. This is even the case, somewhat paradoxically, when the ‘other’ in certain contexts (namely nationalist political discourse) simultaneously constitutes part of the national ‘self’. Thus ethnic Hungarians arriving in large numbers primarily as labour migrants from the neighboring countries since the early 1990s have suffered the humiliations and degradations (often ethnicised) of labour migrants elsewhere in the world, in spite of their nominally shared ethnicity. Other immigrant groups in contrast have basically remained more invisible due to their small numbers. But when these other immigrant groups do appear in the media, they too are often presented as either threatening (e.g. the Chinese mafia) or at the very least exotic.

3.1. Main minority groups in Hungary

We will discuss both indigenous groups and immigrant groups in Hungary.

The *indigenous groups* include:

- National minorities: Germans, Slovaks, Croats, Serbs, Slovenes, Ukrainians, Ruthenians, Greek, Armenians, Poles, Bulgarians, Romanians
- Religious minority: Jews
- Ethnic minority: Roma

The *immigrants* include:

- Ethnic Hungarian immigrants from the neighboring countries
- Other (mostly non-European) immigrants

3.1.1. Indigenous groups –demographic picture

Changes in the number of the biggest national and ethnic minority groups, 1949-2001⁷:

| Year | German | Slovak | Serb | Croat | Slovene | Romanian | Roma |
|---------------------------------------|-----------------|----------------|--------|---------------|---------|----------|-----------------|
| 1949 | 22 455 | 25 988 | 5 185 | 20 123 | 4 473 | 14 713 | |
| 1960 | 50 765 | 30 690 | 4 583 | 33 014 | | 10 502 | |
| 1970 | 35 594 | 21 176 | 12 235 | 14 609 | 4 205 | 8 640 | 325 000 |
| 1980 | 31 231 | 16 054 | | 20 030 | | 7 139 | 380 000 |
| 1990 | 30 824 | 10 459 | 2 905 | 13 570 | 1 930 | 10 740 | 142 683 |
| 2001 | 62 233 | 17 692 | 3 816 | 15 620 | 3 040 | 7 995 | 190 046 |
| Sociological estimations ¹ | 200 000-220 000 | 100 000-110 00 | 5 000 | 80 000-90 000 | 5 000 | 25 000 | 400 000-800 000 |

7 The data are from the national census.

According to the 2001 census, about 4% of Hungary's population belong to a national minority group. The Roma minority population has at least doubled over the last forty years from an estimated 200 000 (1967) to 400 000-800 000 (2008). Censuses in Hungary notoriously undercount Roma who are reluctant to self-identify as Roma for fear of persecution.

National minorities

Hungary is home to a number of officially recognized national minorities that together make up about 8-12% of the population including both the Roma and the national minority groups. Most officially recognized minorities in Hungary are the result of the post World War I efforts to fashion (ethnically homogenous) nation states out of previously multi-national empires in the region. Whilst minorities constituted nearly half of the population of the Hungarian half of the Habsburg Monarchy, the post war I truncated version of Hungary (with two-thirds less territory and half the population) largely achieved its aims of national homogeneity, thus accounting for the modest figures for national minorities that we see echoed generations later in contemporary Hungary. After World War II, the expatriation of a large part of the German minority and the population exchange of ethnic Slovaks in Hungary for ethnic Hungarians in Czechoslovakia, as well as the assimilationist politics of the communist regime resulted in even further population decrease of national minorities in Hungary.

A. Germans/Swabs

Germans have lived in Hungary since the 17th century when came as settlers. More waves arrived throughout the centuries to follow. At the end of World War I, 500 000 Germans lived in Hungary. After WWII, in the name of collective guilt, thousands of Germans were either deported to the Soviet Union for forced labor (35 000-60 000) or expatriated back to Germany. During this period, in total about 185 000 Germans were deprived of their citizenship and of property and had to leave the country for Germany. About 230 000 Germans remained in Hungary.

During the communist regime, the cultural activities of the German minority were very limited. In this politically (and ethnically) constrained environment, however, the Alliance of Germans was established and officially recognised (1955), thus providing the German intelligencia with an opportunity to develop certain literary and fine art activities as well as to engage in research projects on the history, linguistic and ethnographic characteristics of the German minority in Hungary. From the early 1980s, the Alliance established its first bilingual primary schools. These schools were popular with German families, including those who had otherwise been on the path to assimilation. This contributed to a revival of German culture in Hungary, which included the fostering of cultural and economic links with various organizations in Western Germany. Today, the German minority (benefitting from the 1993 Minorities Law) is very active and enjoys a vibrant cultural life in villages and towns where there are significant numbers of ethnic Germans.

B. Slovaks

As in case of the Germans, Slovaks also settled in the historic territory of Hungary in the middle ages to fill various gaps in the labour market. And like the Germans, Hungary's Slovak population was

also subjected to population transfers following the conclusion of World War II. At this time nearly half a million Slovaks lived in Hungary and a million Hungarians lived in Slovakia. The population exchange affected a much smaller proportion (but nevertheless very significant) of the two groups: 76,000 Hungarians move to Hungary from Slovakia, and 60,000 Slovaks moved from Hungary to Slovakia. Today, there are still villages and towns in Hungary where half of the population declares themselves Slovak. In these places there are minority self-governments which organize local cultural life. Like the Germans, the Slovaks have also been beneficiaries of the 1993 Law on Minorities. Slovaks thus have been bouncing back from the post World War II population transfers with Czechoslovakia which had attempted (unsuccessfully) to tidy up a messy national minority picture.

C. Other national minorities: Greeks/Bulgarians/Croats/Serbs/Slovenes/ Ruthenians/ Ukrainians/Poles/Armenians/Romanians

The number of ‘other national minorities’ in Hungary (including Greeks, Bulgarians, Croats, Serbs, Ruthenians, Ukrainians, Poles, Armenians, and Romanians) totals altogether around 40,000 (with nearly three-quarters of those being either Croatian, Romanian, or Ukrainian).

Hungary’s Law on Minorities granted all of these groups a degree of cultural autonomy that has contributed to their revival (though this especially true for the biggest of these groups, the Germans and Slovaks). This cultural autonomy, however, is in large part symbolic. Given the relatively small number of these groups together with the degree of their assimilation, none are viewed as a challenge to the hegemony of the Hungarian nation or as groups that present problems related to toleration today.

D. Jews⁸

The Jewish population is estimated to be around 80 000 – 200 000 in today’s Hungary. At the beginning of the 19th century this population was rather small, consisting of mainly wealthy families living in urban areas. From the 1830s onwards, new migrants (mostly from poor rural backgrounds and Yiddish speaking) started to arrive from Galicia and Russia. By the turn of the century Jews made up 4% of Hungary’s population. The liberal and open political atmosphere of the time, however, contributed to a significant degree of assimilation among these Jews. The political emancipation of Jews took place in 1867 and in 1895 the Jewish religion was given the same legal status as other religions, thus effectively legalizing mixed marriages between Jews and Christians. Hungarian Jews turned increasingly to Hungarian culture and Hungarian even became the language of religious practices. The Jewish population, especially in towns, mixed with the rest of the population. Inter-marriage and conversion provided further paths of assimilation. These trends continued relatively unabated until 1882 and the ‘Tiszaeszlár trial’ in which members of a Jewish community were accused of killing a Christian girl for her blood to drink at Pesach. Whilst the accusations were ultimately dropped, the trial signaled a new era in the rise of anti-Semitism in Hungary.

A new era in anti-Semitism began following the end of World War I. The political shock owing to the loss of territories and population led to the dominance of an irredentist political ideology that went hand-in-hand with (and indeed fueled) the rise of anti-Semitism. In 1920 the Hungarian government

8 Jews are neither a national, ethnic nor a religious minority from an official point of view; rather Jewish is (officially) a religious denomination on the one hand, and a cultural community (unofficially, sociologically) on the other hand.

passed the first ‘*numerus clauses*’ law, placing caps on the number of Jews who could be admitted to university. Further laws followed culminating in the late 1930s with severe restrictions placed on the Jews’ basic rights of citizenship. With the outbreak of World War II, Jews were moved to ghettos before they were eventually deported with the German occupation in 1944. In the span of a couple of months about 600 000 people (70% of Hungary’s Jewish population at the time, most of them from the countryside) were deported to the death camps and killed. The majority of the Budapest Jews (in the ghettos), however, survived.

After the end of the war a segment of the surviving Jewish population left the country for the US and Israel. Many of those who stayed behind in Hungary joined the Communist Party. Jews also participated in the 1956 revolution, but because Rákosi, the previous dictator, was well-known for his Jewish origins, whose Jewish origin was well-known, anti-Semitism rose as a result during the revolutionary period. The revolution was oppressed and thirty years of soft communism followed (the Kádár-regime, 1956-1989). But this soft communism was not soft for national or religious minorities, who by the 1960s were being subjected to policies of assimilation and religious persecution. The National Church Office controlled all churches and let them function only under surveillance. Practicing one’s religion was risky and demanded lots of personal devotion. The majority of Budapest Jews were already strongly assimilated before the war and this tendency continued in the Kádár era.

The regime change in 1989/1990 brought about a Jewish revival. Zionist organizations, cultural and civil organizations, and Jewish educational institutions were all established and many Jews, especially the younger generations, discovered a new interest in their previously lost and forgotten cultural and religious traditions. Second and third generation Jews, often from mixed marriages, began to organize themselves. Today, there is a vivid Jewish cultural life in Budapest. Despite some debate on the matter, most Jewish leaders did not make demands for official recognition in the 1993 Minorities Law. During this same time, however, anti-Semitism has also been on the rise. Surveys reveal that about 10% of the population hold radical anti-Semitic views (radical being defined for those respondents scoring high on all dimensions: negative opinion on Jews, negative emotions attached to these opinions, and negative behaviors towards Jews) (Kovács, 2005). (Notably, however, these rates of radical anti-Semitism are still below those views expressed in relation to the Roma.) Political anti-Semitism has recently surged ahead where it has been finding renewed expression amongst the next generation of radical right extremist groups.

Over the years anti-Semitism has been an essential and formative element of Hungarian national self-understandings, with the Jew filling the role of ‘internal other’ for centuries. Two hundred years of Jewish assimilation in Hungary, sometimes interpreted as a success story, sometimes as a failure, has now seem to arrive at a new phase. The Jews as a group will not be studied in detail, though references to the group as well as the phenomenon of anti-Semitism will be made when relevant, given the fact that the Jewish question has always been a crucial question in Hungary and continues to be clearly connected to broader issues of tolerance.

The Roma

A. History of toleration and exclusion

Today, the ‘Roma question’ is the most serious diversity challenge facing Hungary. One of the reasons the Roma question is distinctive is because the state always treated them as a distinct group, developing specific

policies exclusively targeting the Roma. These policies were also consistently assimilatory, with the aim of eliminating ‘differences/otherness’ of the Roma (Liégeois, 1983). The 1993 Minorities Law signaled a new ‘multicultural turn’ in Hungary’s relations with its minorities. The Law officially recognized cultural and ethnic difference, but it did little to resolve the ‘Roma problem’. The recognition and emancipation of the Roma as a minority group did not and could not lead to sustained ethnic political mobilization or the fight for reversing the assimilatory trends of the past. Cultural difference continues to operate as a disadvantage rather than a source of pride. Prejudiced discourses have indeed become even more dominant and discrimination and segregation of the Roma is arguably greater now than during the communist regime.

The Gypsy/Roma population first arrived in Hungary during the 15th century. Another important wave of Gypsy/Roma migration, this time from Romania, occurred following the Turkish occupation of Hungary in the 16th century. In the 18th century, the Empress Maria Theresa, followed later by her son Joseph II, introduced a series of policies intended to sedentarize this otherwise nomadic Gypsy/Roma population. This was partly successful, although at a cost to the majority communities who relied on the Gypsy/Roma itinerant tradesmen for local goods and services. Part of the Gypsy/Roma population, was, however, settled (mainly by force) in villages where they could fill the niche of some missing trades (Gypsies/Roma thus became blacksmiths, brick makers, etc.). These new Gypsy/Roma communities were located on the edges of villages where they were unable to enjoy the basic amenities of village life. Linguistic assimilation gradually began around this time and by the 19th century the sedentarized communities had all lost their original languages.

From the beginning of the 19th century new waves of Gypsy/Roma migration began from Romania. These Roma became known as the Vlach Gypsies and spoke the Romany language. They were tradesmen, who, similar to their predecessors in Hungary, still travelled around the country selling goods and providing services. Another important group arriving from the east were the ‘Beas’ Gypsies who were not nomadic but instead settled in villages in the south of Hungary. They mainly worked with wood and spoke an archaic Romanian dialect.

According to the 1910 census, 0,6% of the population of 18 million was Gypsy/Roma. From the beginning of the 20th century, the living conditions for many Gypsy/Roma communities began to deteriorate as the demand for traditional trades waned. During WWII, the Roma were persecuted and ultimately deported, with tens of thousands murdered (on debates over figures, see Bársony and Daróczi, 2005; Karsai, 1992; Purcsi, 2004).

The Roma population in Hungary was politically emancipated at the end of WWII with the onset of communism. This emancipation, however, consistent with the communist ideology at the time, promoted the assimilation of all sub-national groups; it did not, therefore, translate into the recognition of the Roma as a cultural/ethnic/linguistic group. New policies were instituted in 1961 that amounted to forced assimilation. The Roma were viewed as a socially disadvantaged group with distinct cultural traits. Their social integration was to be achieved by suppressing all signs of cultural difference, which, in communist parlance, included somewhat vaguely the ‘Roma way of life’. The Roma were categorized into three groups: integrated Roma, Roma on the path to integration, and non-integrated Roma (a system of classification that still operates today). Integration was interpreted as acceptance of and adoption to the ‘Hungarian way of life’ and norms (Mezey, 1986; Kemény, 2005).

The communists thus regarded and dealt with the ‘Roma question’ as a social problem. At the same time the Roma were viewed as a reserve of manpower to fulfill the regime’s industrial ambitions. Due to this (and alongside more generic communist goals of full employment), the majority of the Roma were

indeed employed as unskilled workers in these communist years. The state also had plans to resettle the majority of Roma who continued to live at the edges of towns and villages. This resettlement program, which began in the 1960s, however, resulted in numerous local conflicts. By the 1980s, though, most of these old colonies had disappeared, with their populations dispersed. This ultimately led to the next problem: the increasing concentration of Roma in poor urban areas and the emergence of new urban ghettos. The relatively high employment rates of Roma during the communist years ensured that rates of absolute poverty remained relatively low. The social distance separating the Roma from the majority population, however, did not decrease during this period. Nonetheless, linguistic assimilation continued to take place: in 1971, 71% of the Roma claimed Hungarian as their mother-tongue; this figure has more recently increased to 90% (Kemény, Janky and Lengyel, 2004; Kemény, 2005).

It was claimed during Communism that the Roma were fully tolerated and accepted into society. In reality, however, the Roma experienced very real and specific problems in housing, healthcare, education, and employment that were systematically ignored by a ‘colour blind’ state committed to a policy of assimilation. These policies did not eradicate difference, but cemented the marginal position of the Roma. The possibility for discussing these issues in public, and the need for a shift in approach, emerged only with the political and socio-economic restructuring of Hungary in the late 1980s. By then, because of the long standing inequalities they had endured, the Roma were the most vulnerable and also therefore the most affected population by the changes brought about during the transition to a market economy.

With the regime change in 1989/1990 one million jobs were lost as a consequence of the economic transition and the restructuring of major industries. Unskilled manpower was made largely redundant resulting in the long-term unemployment of large numbers of Roma. The transition thus led to mass unemployment among the Roma: while in 1989, 67% of the Roma were still employed, by 2003 this number had dropped to 21% (Janky 2004) and 23% in 2005 (Kertesi, 2005). Since the changes, a second and now a third generation have grown up without ever entering the labor market. The poverty rate is five-ten times higher for Roma than it is for the majority population, and it has doubled in the last ten years. (It is important to note, however, that 60% of households living in deep poverty are not Roma [Ladányi–Szelényi, 2002; Spéder, 2002]).

Neighbourhood and school segregation further exacerbates this marginalization of Roma. Discriminatory practices against them in employment, healthcare, and law enforcement have worsened, and segregation in schools and places of residence have also increased. The extent of Roma isolation in some of the poorest areas of Hungary has been so great that so-called “Roma Villages” have come into being without access to public transport or public services. Nearly three quarters of the Roma live in segregated areas (Kemény, 2005), with most of them trapped in the most deprived and unemployment stricken areas of the country. Steady rates of school segregation also contribute to the low educational level of the Roma population (Kertesi and Kézdi, 2009). Despite policy measures aimed at curbing segregation, the situation is not improving. Life expectancy for Roma is seven years below the national average (Kemény and Janky, 2003, 2004).

B. Political representation and mobilization

The most important political institution guaranteeing political representation for minorities is the self-government system, created by the 1993 Minorities Law. In 1994 there were 477 local Roma self-

governments; by 2006, the number had increased to 1100. There are several Roma political parties representing different interests and political views in local self-government, but none have won representation at the national level. Roma politicians lack a significant power base in Hungary, not because they are not politically united (as some critics claim), but because the political system, like Hungarian society at large, continues to discriminate against Roma. In 2006 and 2010, only four candidates of Roma origin were elected as MPs of different mainstream parties. Critics say, however, that the political representation of the Roma minority is still inadequate because the self-government system was tailored to meet the needs first of the national minorities and only then the Roma.⁹ The minority self-government system was designed to provide minorities with a degree of cultural autonomy, which is what national minorities were demanding. For the Roma, however, the greatest challenge they face is not whether they can nurture their cultural heritage or develop their particular ethnic identity, but rather whether and how they can integrate into the majority society, becoming equal, tolerated, non-discriminated members with the same opportunities as others in society. The minority self-government system is therefore more of symbolic importance than any real politically practical consequence.

C. Toleration/exclusion today

No other group suffers from lower rates of acceptance and tolerance than the Roma. In spite of a few blips in the early 2000s, “it is noticeable that attitudes towards the Roma remain essentially negative and, in comparison with other ethnic groups, the rejection of the Roma is at a very high level” (Enyedi, Fábíán and Sik, 2005). Since then, increasingly open and hostile political discourse directed at the Roma has translated in part to declining rates of acceptance (Láttele, 2008).

Attitudes towards ethnic/national/migrant groups in Hungary (scale of 100: 1 - the least accepted; 100 - the most accepted)¹⁰

| | 1995 | 2002 | 2006 | 2007 | 2009 |
|---------------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Roma | 25 | 32 | 29 | 25 | 24 |
| Chinese | 41 | 37 | 35 | 32 | 34 |
| Arabs | 35 | 36 | 36 | 33 | 36 |
| Serbs | 32 | 38 | - | 38 | 37 |
| Romanians | 32 | 36 | 46 | 38 | 37 |
| Blacks | 40 | - | 44 | 41 | 42 |
| Jews | 57 | 52 | 50 | 50 | 44 |
| Germans/Swabs | 55 | 57 | 55 | 56 | 60 |

9 Research has been done on the issue of the legitimacy and effectiveness of minority self-governments (Csefkó 1999, Kállai 2003)

10 Research conducted by András Kovács. Data collection by Median: <http://www.median.hu/object.ad137cad-29f5-4fd8-8a3a-b28531f9d8d7.ivy>

‘Non-acceptance’ is constructed by well-known stereotypes such as: ‘They do not want to integrate’, ‘They do not deserve to be helped’, ‘They are thieves because it is in their blood’, etc.

Anti-Roma attitude scale

| | Number of respondents | Agreed among the those who responded |
|--|-----------------------|--------------------------------------|
| Roma are mature enough to make decisions concerning their life | 959 | 38 |
| Roma should be given more assistance than the non-Roma | 973 | 15 |
| The country should provide the opportunity to Roma to study in their mother tongue | 976 | 66 |
| All problems of Roma would resolve if they finally started to work | 976 | 90 |
| The Roma should completely be separated from the rest of the society since they are incapable to cohabitate. | 976 | 34 |
| Roma should not hide their origin | 937 | 80 |
| The Roma should be taught to live in the same way as the Hungarians | 979 | 79 |
| It is good that there are still bars/discos where Roma are prohibited to enter | 926 | 49 |
| The increase of the number of the Roma population | 943 | 73 |
| Everyone has the right to take their children to schools where there are no Roma children | 956 | 60 |
| Roma have criminality in their blood | 947 | 67 |

Source: Fábíán-Sik 1996, 2006

The intensity of these stereotypes has also grown over time: more negative stereotypes are shared by a higher proportion of the population now than twenty years ago.

Rate of those who agree with the following statements on Roma (%) (Source: Median)

| | 1992 | 2001 | 2009 |
|--|------|------|------|
| There are respectable Roma but most of them are not | 88 | 89 | 82 |
| Roma do not make any efforts to integrate into the society | - | 75 | 79 |
| Roma should be forced to live as the rest of the society | 67 | 76 | 79 |
| Roma do not deserve assistance | 49 | 58 | 61 |
| Roma have criminality in their blood | - | - | 58 |
| Roma should be separated from the rest of the society | 25 | 29 | 36 |
| Roma cannot integrate because of discrimination | - | 34 | 33 |
| The Hungarian government should do more for Roma | 19 | 23 | 23 |

The negative tendencies characterizing this picture of intolerance can partly be explained by the rise of the radical right in the last several years. However, as the data indicate, the non-acceptance of Roma is more widespread than this: along different dimensions 50-80% of the population display negative attitudes towards the Roma. Moreover, surveys also reveal that prejudiced attitudes are held from people on both sides of the political spectrum.

The recent rise of Jobbik as part of a more general shift to a increasingly radical and racist political discourse emerged following the ‘legitimacy crisis’ political scandal of 2006 (precipitated by the leaking of the prime minister admitting to lying in the build up to the elections earlier that year). This culminated with a series of on again, off again riots orchestrated and attended by an assortment of radical right groupings. Jobbik, although not the main organizer, benefited from this backlash and witnessed an increase in its support. Their first big electoral victory came in 2009 when they sent three MPs to the European Parliament. Their next big success came in the Hungarian 2010 elections when they came in third, only slightly behind the previously governing socialists. The Magyar Gárda (Hungarian Guard), which established itself in 2007 as a ‘cultural NGO’, also has links to Jobbik. Its main activities involve organizing uniformed marches through villages and towns with large Roma populations. The association was outlawed in 2008 but still continues to operate.


This is all evidence of a general shift to a more radical political discourse (frequently echoed in the media). Jobbik has put the Roma back on the political and public agenda with their talk about ‘Gypsy criminality’, ‘parasites of the society’, and so forth. These and similar themes have found their way into the mainstream media, reproducing and in a sense legitimating them in the process.

3.1.2. Immigration trends

The proportion of immigrants in Hungary is one of the lowest in Europe (less than 2%, with the majority being ethnic Hungarians from the neighboring countries). These numbers are nevertheless on the rise (with non-EU nationals now making up 35-40% of all immigrants) (Kováts, 2010).

The first important wave of migration to Hungary started in the late 1980s still during the communist years across the tightly controlled borders of Romania. Most of these immigrants were ethnic Hungarians fleeing economic hardships and political persecution in Ceaușescu’s Romania. The early 1990s witnessed a second upsurge in ethnic Hungarian migration from Romania in response to continued economic stagnation but also following the outbreak of ethnic tensions in Romania (Sik, 1990, 1996). The third wave of migration took place during the Yugoslav war, with ethnic Hungarians accompanied by many other nationalities from the former republics of the dissolving Yugoslavia. (Most of them, however, continued on to other EU countries).

The number of naturalized citizens between 1990 and 2005 can be seen in the graph below. The 1992 spike presumably reflects the upsurge in migration from Romania following the ethnic violence there (see Kováts, 2005).



Given that the question of migration in general and transborder Hungarian migration in particular had been politically taboo in the communist years, it is not surprising there was a corresponding void in the area of migration policy. The 1993 Law on Minorities did not address immigrants, only national minority groups. Another 1993 law, however, “The Act on Hungarian Citizenship”, was the first law to address immigration matters. The law decreed fairly restrictive paths to naturalization (with some benefits for ethnic Hungarians).

Because of the ambiguities surrounding the problems of immigration, civic participation of immigrants was not a relevant issue in contemporary Hungary, and so its direct legal regulation has been practically non-existent. Currently, NGOs are tasked with matters of immigrant and refugee inclusion (Sik and Tóth, 2000; Tóth, 2004). This hands off approach to immigrant incorporation is evidenced by Hungary’s failure to sign the European Council’s Convention on the role of foreign nationalities in local politics (ETS. 144). Since their participation was not forbidden, however, migrants have in some cases participated in local elections (Sik and Zakariás, 2005; p. 16). One of the main reasons the state has not concentrated its efforts on immigrant integration is because it has been assumed that most migrants are ethnic Hungarians from the neighboring countries, for whom questions of integration are viewed as unproblematic. Research on the topic has nevertheless shown a sharp discrepancy between the political elite’s discourses on national unity and the discriminatory practices experienced by migrants on the ground (Fox, 2007; Pulay, 2006; Feischmidt, 2005).

A marked shift in policy towards immigration occurred in 2002 when the then Fidesz government introduced its ‘Status Law’, a package of entitlements for transborder Hungarians which included the legal right to work in Hungary for three months per calendar year. Although the law did little to

facilitate immigration and settlement for ethnic Hungarians, it did open the door to legalized labour migration (which had previously been mostly undocumented). A far more significant breakthrough in immigration issues, however, came in 2007, when Romania joined the EU and Hungary decided to open up its employment market to workforce coming from Romania. Against all expectations and forecasts, studies show that these administrative changes did not lead to mass migration to Hungary (Hárs, 2003; Örkény, 2003a, 2003b; Feischmidt and Zakariás 2006; Sik and Simonovits, 2003). Within the above context, the new Dual Citizenship Law passed by the Fidesz government in May 2010 can be perceived as more of a symbolic gesture than a law with immediate practical implications for the Hungarian economy (at least not in the case of ethnic Hungarians that live in countries that already joined the European Union.)

3.1.3. Attitudes towards immigrants

Attitude surveys (Dencsó and Sik, n.d.) show that general levels of xenophobia are very high in Hungary (only Greece, Portugal and Estonia exhibit higher levels), despite low levels of immigration.

The rate of those refusing to receive the different ethnic groups arriving to Hungary (%) June 2006 and February 2007 (Source: TARKI 2006, 2007)

| | June 2006 | February 2007 |
|--|-----------|---------------|
| Ethnic Hungarians from the neighboring countries | 4 | 4 |
| Arabs | 82 | 87 |
| Chinese | 79 | 81 |
| Russians | 75 | 80 |
| Romanians | 71 | 77 |
| Pirez (a non-existent group) | 59 | 68 |

According to another survey (TARKI 2009) 71% of the Hungarian population supports issuing residence permits to ethnic Hungarians, whereas only 15-19% support residency for other immigrants (Arabs, Israeli, Africans, Ukrainians, Serbs, Chinese, Roma from neighboring countries).

It is worth pointing out that the acceptance of ethnic Hungarians today at the expense of other immigrant groups was very different in the early 1990s. Survey data have shown that more than half of the ethnic Hungarian coming to Hungary felt that the receiving society was unfriendly towards them (Sik, 1990). The most common complaints were verbal insults and occasional discrimination (Fox, 2007; Pulay, 2006; Feischmidt, 2005). These findings are in sharp contrast with survey data on attitudes toward co-ethnic Hungarians. More ethnographic research has shown that ethnic Hungarian migrants have been frequently blamed for the worsening labor market situation: 'they take our jobs'. In the early and mid-1990s only 25% of the Hungarians agreed that 'they should unconditionally be admitted into the country'. Research on attitudes toward foreigners shows that Hungarians in Hungary consistently regard Transylvanian Hungarians favorably and Romanians unfavorably (Fábián, 1998; pp. 158-60; Tóth and Turai, 2003 pp. 112, 115-16). Such findings, however, do not account for the way in which category membership shifts in sending and receiving contexts. It is not enough to say that Hungarians

in Hungarian like Transylvanian Hungarians and dislike Romanians. Hungarians in Hungary like Transylvanian Hungarians as long as they stay in Transylvania. The moment Transylvanian Hungarians cross the border as migrant workers they become ‘Romanian’ in the eyes of their hosts (Tóth and Turai, 2003, pp. 108-10, 125).

The root of tolerance towards ethnic Hungarians comes from the traditional understanding of national identity and nationhood which claims ethnic/cultural kinship among all Hungarians who are scattered in different states of the Carpathian basin. Despite this political discourse, the ethnic Hungarians were perceived as ‘others’ when they started to come and live side by side with their co-nationals in Hungary.

4. DEFINITIONS OF TOLERANCE AND ACCEPTANCE/ACCOMMODATION IN HUNGARY

The concept of ‘tolerance’ as such is not explicitly defined or used in Hungary’s legislative frameworks. However, from an analytical point of view, it can be said that in Hungary different aspects of the notion can be captured by the term “liberal tolerance” (ACCEPT, 2009).¹¹ Thus the constitution codifies and guarantees freedom of speech, media, and religion, the right to respect and dignity; equal treatment before the law; the right to equal education; and the protection of children and ethnic minorities. Many of the laws and policies that have been implemented in Hungary over the past two decades have contributed to the development of a framework of “egalitarian tolerance”¹². These laws and initiatives have collectively aimed to create “institutional arrangements and public policies that fight negative stereotyping, promote positive inclusive identities and re-organize the public space in ways that accommodate diversity” (ACCEPT, 2009). While in principle these frameworks of ‘tolerance’ were developed in order to address the problems of all groups and individuals living in Hungary, in practice questions of ‘toleration’ most often came into focus in relation to the Roma and their integration into mainstream society. Thus, throughout this section of the report we will focus on the Roma. We will discuss how values of accommodation are understood and articulated in Hungary and how these values are codified into laws and policies. We will also consider how tolerance is reflected in institutional and everyday practices.

4.1. Values of the Hungarian regime of accommodation: legislative and policy frameworks

By the late 1990s, two main and divergent approaches had taken shape to accommodate Roma in mainstream society: the first approach focused on legislative solutions whilst the second concentrated on educational and welfare policies. The two approaches saw the root of the ‘Roma problem’ very differently and offered remedies that were therefore based on different assumptions of the cause of the problem. But as many experts have pointed out, the legislative and socio-economic solutions need not be seen as mutually exclusive, but rather as complementary (Szalai, 2000).

11 Liberal tolerance was defined in the ACCEPT Project Grant Agreement, Annex I – “Description of work” (p. 7) as follows: “not interfering with practices or forms of life of a person even if one disapproves of them”.

12 ACCEPT Project Grant Agreement, Annex I – “Description of work” (p. 7)

4.1.1. *Legislative frameworks*

It was suggested by lawyers, NGOs, and human rights activists who pursued legislative solutions for the Roma that the problems they experienced existed because intolerance and informal discriminatory practices against them were deeply embedded in Hungarian society. As a result, the Roma, both as individuals but also as members of a minority group, had little or no protection under the law. Two parallel legislative frameworks were thereby developed, both of which attempted to codify norms of respect and recognition into Hungarian law:

a) Minority rights approach: This approach resulted in the Minorities Law of 1993, which was conceived, drafted, and implemented to protect the cultural rights of all ethnic and national minorities living in Hungary. The law explicitly named thirteen indigenous minority groups to benefit from the law by being given the right to form local and national minority self-governments. Minority self-governments in turn could administer their own cultural institutions as well as offer their opinions on bills concerning minorities, including sending them back to parliament in cases where there were objections of a substantive nature. The law was modified in 2005 to create electoral lists, meaning that only those who registered as a member of a minority group before an election were able to vote for their respective minority self-government. This was welcomed by minorities given earlier perceived abuses of the system where non minorities were able to vote for minority representatives, resulting in minority self-governments without any minority members. Despite these modifications and improvements, the law has remained very controversial in Hungary. Many of its critics claim that the law is burdened by an inherent contradiction: while it protects cultures of numerically small and assimilated national minority groups, the less assimilated, numerically larger minority Roma are the least protected. Legislative efforts in this regard have thus been aimed primarily at addressing the needs of Hungary's national minorities, not the Roma. This is due in part to the Hungarian state's desire to use the law to showcase its progressive minority treatment to the neighbouring countries and the EU and its institutions. The hope was that the Hungarians in the neighbouring countries would eventually benefit through the implementation of copycat laws in their own countries.

b) Human rights approach: This approach resulted in the *Equal Treatment and Equal Opportunities Law* of 2003, more commonly referred to as the 'anti-discrimination law'. It was designed to sanction established discriminatory practices in everyday life (e.g. workplace, housing) and institutions (e.g. education, police, healthcare). This approach, by its very nature, focused on individuals, and claimed that all people, irrespective of their ethnic, racial, religious, sexual differences should be given equal opportunities and be treated with equal respect before the law. Since the law was passed, several human rights NGOs have successfully brought cases against schools, hospitals, and companies that discriminated against the Roma (data on such cases can be found in the archives of the Roma Press Agency and the Equal Treatment Authority¹³). During this same time period, the media became more cautious and nuanced in its reporting on Roma matters and avoided routinely linking the Roma with criminality. However, as pointed out in the introductory chapters, some of these gains have recently been lost: "Roma criminality" has once again become a catchphrase both in the media and political discourse.¹⁴

13 http://www.rroma.hu/gss_rroma/alpha?do=3&pg=79&m132_act=1&st=4 and <http://www.egyenlobanasmod.hu/>

14 E.g. Amnesty International Report 2010 – Hungary, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,,,HUN,,4c03a82487,0.html>

These successful cases were thus both few in number and often only of symbolic importance: the law failed to bring about significant improvement in the lives of the Roma. Discrimination against the Roma in state institutions, the labor market, and everyday interactions is still widespread; some analysts even claim that in the past few years the tendency has been toward a worsening of the situation (see for example studies by Havas-Liskó, 2006 and Kertesi-Kézdi, 2009 on increase in school segregation). And even at the time the legislation was passed critics argued that its basic framework, although important, did and could not adequately remedy the situation of the Roma in Hungary since their problems were not caused by discriminatory legislation but by informal and non-codified discriminatory practices which laws in themselves cannot eradicate (Stewart 2002). Lately, though, others have begun to argue that more recent legislation does at least implicitly discriminate against the Roma, or at the very least has discriminatory consequences for the Roma (Szira 2010).

4.1.2. Policy frameworks

Many researchers have argued that an ethnicized (Roma) underclass (e.g. Szelenyi and Ladanyi, 2001, 2002) has been taking shape in recent years and have thus urged the state to speed up its efforts for the ‘inclusion’ of this group. Proponents of this perspective acknowledge the importance of anti-discrimination and minority rights legislation, but at the same time argue that the problems facing the Roma minority have to be addressed not only through the ‘politics of recognition’ but also through the implementation of various measures and policies of social inclusion. Some social policy experts (e.g. Ferge, 2000, 2002) support the idea of universal social rights, claiming that without a universal system of such rights, the chance for increasing social inequalities is much higher. On the other hand, there have been sociologists (Szalai, 1992, 2005; Ladányi, 2009) who have been fiercely critical of the existing system for supporting not only the needy but the more privileged classes as well. Moreover, research on social policies shows that consecutive Hungarian governments have often promoted policies that benefit the middle and upper-middle classes while simultaneously contributing to the emergence of an ‘aid industry’ which socially excludes the poor (Ferge, 2000, 2003; Ferge, Tausz and Darvas 2002; Szalai, 2005). Data show that the lack of well-targeted social policies correlate with inequalities, poverty, and increasing social exclusion.

Besides debates over how comprehensive a system of social inclusion should be (whom to include, how, and for how long), there is also considerable confusion among policy makers, the general public, and politicians concerning whether color-blind or color-conscious approaches are preferable. In theory, social integration policies are (or ought to be) color-blind; they target the poor regardless of their skin color or cultural background. Many people belonging to the Roma minority are poor, and since the poor are targeted, they would automatically benefit from these policies. At the same time, successive governments in Hungary have liked to remind everyone of the efforts they have made to facilitate the integration of the Roma. This has meant that certain policy measures and the budgets attached to them were specifically labeled ‘Roma integration policies’ without the benefit of clear goals or budgetary allocations (as the State Audit Office wrote in its report in 2008). Therefore, it has never been entirely clear how much money has actually been spent on the Roma, or how many of them have actually benefited from these funds.

At the time pre-accession EU funds became available to promote integration in the labor market and educational institutions, policy making took a different tack. A clear requirement of these funds was that they had to explicitly target the Roma (thereby endorsing a color-conscious approach). This

approach was also carried over to the post-accession period when the National Development Plans required recipients of public money to specify how their programs would specifically affect the Roma. The state funded ‘Szechenyi Plan for small and medium sized enterprises, for example, was a color conscious economic policy that targeted the Roma to address EU directives regarding equality in labor markets. The plan offered financial incentives for businesses that employed Roma in disadvantaged regions of Hungary and gave financial support to small and medium size businesses that were started and run by Roma. An analysis of the program once in place, however, suggested that a significant portion of the plan’s budget was spent on non-Roma businesses that employed Roma only for the shortest period required, and only in low paying, marginal positions.

It is important to highlight, though, that a color conscious approach has not been adopted wholesale in Hungarian policy making. To the contrary: certain integration measures continue to be formulated as color-blind. One of the most crucial issues in this regard is school segregation. The most important steps that have been taken to reverse the processes that have led to segregation have all used social and not ethnic terminology to define the target group (their preferred terminology is the ‘socially disadvantaged’). The system today is thus a mixed one, containing both color-conscious and color-blind elements.

Twenty years of ‘state efforts’ to integrate the Roma have therefore not achieved the expected results as increasing poverty, inequality, and segregation tendencies reveal. Until pre-accession funds became available, successive governments developed more holistic integration strategies that attempted to simultaneously address all policy areas (labor market, education, housing, health care, social assistance) in a collective effort to foster integration. Later, when EU funds became available, new programs were developed specifically targeting the Roma. Nevertheless, it has been argued that the Roma have benefitted less from these projects than the majority society (Kadét-Varró 2010). At the same time, there is continued social and political opposition to a number of integration and desegregation strategies and policies (e.g. school desegregation is typically hindered by resistance from local populations). This also contributes to the socio-economic degradation of the Roma in Hungary.

4.2. (In)Tolerance as institutional and everyday practice: the Roma

The complex processes that have contributed to the ongoing exclusion of the Roma are so deeply embedded both in institutional and everyday practices that it is almost impossible to disentangle them and discuss them individually. Most studies that describe labor market discrimination (Kertesi, 2005; Ladanyi and Szelenyi, 2001, 2002), school discrimination (Kertesi and Kézdi, 2009), law enforcement discrimination (Helsinki 2008), and discrimination in the social security system (Ferge, 2000, 2003; Ferge, Tausz and Darvas 2002; Szalai 1992, 2005) emphasize that the reasons for the failure of these policies are to be found at both macro and micro levels, and that institutional and individual discriminatory practices are strongly intertwined. Although there are many studies of these issues, two by Julia Szalai (1992, 2005) particularly exemplify the (in)tolerance of the present structures, demonstrating why the social security system is ill-suited to help Roma families in breaking the poverty cycle.

Szalai (1992) argues that the long-term impoverishment of the unemployed, pensioners, families with young children, and the Roma after 1989 was not the inevitable consequence of the transition from a planned to a market economy, but rather resulted from the ways in which the social security system was structured and organized during communism and immediately thereafter. In 1990 this system suddenly lost 27-28% of its operating budget since two deficit running departments (the health

care system and the pharmaceutical industry) were included in its budget. As a consequence, a conflict of interest arose between the long-term and the temporarily poor, while the two big ‘players’ (the healthcare system and the drug industry) succeeded in representing their interests against the interests of the ‘small and powerless consumers’ of the social security system. A second major change occurred also during the early 1990s: The social security system was decentralized and many of its functions were given over to local self-governments, where minority self-governments were thus put in charge of many issues related to ‘Roma poverty’. New funds to tackle these issues, however, were not allocated to these minority self-governments; the allocation of social aid remained the responsibility of municipalities. These contradictions provided few opportunities to redress problems of social exclusion. Szalai (2005) also shows through interviews with key social security stakeholders how many policies were subject to different local interpretations. Thus even well intentioned policies not infrequently resulted in practices that were discriminatory and even racist, with the Roma, the long-term unemployed, and families with many children benefitting little if at all. These bureaucrats were always able to find some law or policy to support their exclusionary decisions. Szalai (2005) concluded her study by placing the burden of responsibility for these abuses not only on the state bureaucrats directly involved, but more widely on society as a whole for the overly broad scope of this power.

5. CONCLUDING REMARKS

An overview of the history of Hungarian nation building and of the policy and legislative frameworks that resulted from different approaches of the state to this issue has highlighted several important points. First, it is clear that ethnic/cultural and civic/political interpretations of nationhood in Hungary have existed concomitantly throughout the past 150 years of state building, and political elites have alternated between both to define the nation and formulate policies to protect or assimilate minorities.

Second, Hungarian political elites in the past three decades have made significant efforts to adopt minority and human rights frameworks laid out by the European Union and other international organisations. These obstacles to nationalism were strong enough so that even the radical and extremist political forces attempted to conform to them.

Third, accession to the European Union has brought about many significant changes in Hungarian legislation and has been accompanied by the availability of new financial resources, part of which have reached the targeted minorities. This has led, on the one hand, to the rise of a policy discourse of toleration/acceptance and, on the other hand, to the improvement of certain aspects of the life of these minorities and immigrants (e.g. lessening of segregation in some school districts at least, and improved treatment of immigrants and refugees). But while EU has undoubtedly produced successes in these and other regards, Hungary at the same time has experienced an alarming rise in the activities and popularity of the radical right. These tendencies paint a rather bleak picture of intolerance towards the Roma.

The question of the Roma is the most pressing question of tolerance in Hungary today. As such, it will be the primary (if not at times exclusive) focus of our research. Immigration to Hungary has

not generated the same sort of problems with respect to tolerance that the Roma experience. This is in part because of the small scale of immigration to Hungary but also because the majority of these immigrants are ethnic Hungarians from the neighboring countries. Immigration thus does not present the same sorts of diversity challenges that the Roma question presents. We will thus devote our energies to concentrating on the Roma question in the hopes of arriving at a more nuanced understanding of its various complexities and dimensions of the problem.

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