


Poland in the World
Challenges,
Achievements,
Threats

Stefan Batory Foundation
Warsaw 2003



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Poland in the World Challenges, Achievements, Threats


Discussion

on Polish foreign policy

with the participation

of the Minister of Foreign Affairs,

Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz



Stefan Batory Foundation

ul. Sapieżyńska 10a

00-215 Warsaw

tel. |48-22| 5360200

fax |48-22| 5360220

batory@batory.org.pl

www.batory.org.pl

Editors:

Piotr Kosiewski, Paweł Krzeczunowicz

Translation:

Marcin Łakomski

Proof-reading:

Jarosław Król

Art director of

the Stefan Batory Foundation's publications:

Marta Kusztra

Graphic design

and type-setting:

Michał Poloński

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Introduction

Polish foreign policy has attracted a great deal of interest from the international community. It is claimed that the world press has not paid so much attention to Poland since the 1980s, the Solidarity movement and the Round Table discussions.

Reactions to Polish policy have varied. Many publications have expressed surprise at the emergence of an important new player on the international scene. Some views have been positive, such as *The Wall Street Journal's*, which referred to Poland as a global player. Other publications in the European press were less favourable, more ironic and aggressive. One way or the other, all these positive and negative comments, both serious and tongue-in-cheek, suggest that Polish foreign policy has moved up considerably. The question now is whether this is only the result of extraordinary international conditions and coincidences, or rather a permanent reinforcement of the position of Poland, its importance and influence in international relations. Another question is how this change will affect the most important areas of national security, internal stability and widely understood opportunities of further growth.

The current interest in Polish policy derives from the decisions of the Polish government in the face of the Iraq crisis which caused deep rifts in the transatlantic community and in Europe. Poland gave strong backing to the policy of the US administration. The visits of the Polish President, Prime Minister, and Foreign Minister to Washington D.C. and President George W. Bush's visit to Poland marked on-going rapprochement between Poland and the USA. This trend was

substantiated when the Polish Prime Minister signed the letter of eight European leaders and, subsequently, when Poland decided to send troops to participate in the military intervention in Iraq and to supervise one of the zones in post-war Iraq through significant military presence. These choices gave rise to tensions in relations with our closest European allies. Time will tell whether this portends serious and far-reaching problems or only temporary strains. Nonetheless, the successful closing of the accession negotiations and the support of a vast majority of Poles for EU accession were a great success on the European plane.

To conclude this brief outline of the major directions of the Polish foreign policy, I want to point to significant achievements in regional policy, including the policy towards our eastern neighbours. Poland is an acclaimed proponent of many initiatives and a beacon of stability in the region. Our position is clear, our priorities well defined. Poland has done a great deal to cushion the shock that may take place in our relations with the eastern neighbours when Poland's eastern border becomes the external border of the European Union. In response to the changing situation, the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs has proposed a new eastern policy for the future enlarged Union and made it clear that Poland wants to participate actively and constructively in the development and implementation of the future foreign policy of the European Union. Importantly enough, thanks to its good relations with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Polish NGO sector contributed to the debate preceding the drafting of the Polish proposal of the EU's eastern policy.

These issues delineate the main aspects of the Polish foreign policy and thus inform and direct our debate.

Aleksander Smolar

Keynote Address

Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz

There can be no doubt that the position of Poland in international relations has grown stronger, although we are all aware of the risks intrinsic in our new role. The main factors which have brought about the present state of affairs include our position on the Iraq issue. Equally important are the conclusion of the accession negotiations, the signing of the treaty, and the outcome of the referendum, as well as how this was brought about. The last moments of the accession negotiations impressed many observers. We showed that Poland can stand by well-reasoned truths, not only its own truths but those shared by the majority, if not all acceding countries. Naturally, the present state of affairs is due not only to the events of the past months, but also to other initiatives of ours, including those on the future Eastern policy of the European Union or the future of the United Nations.

Without a doubt, one of the key factors of our success is the determination we have shown over the past several years in attaining the main goals of the foreign policy. I owe a thank you to all those who have made a contribution, primarily successive Cabinets and Ministers of Foreign Affairs. This determination is unique in Polish politics and is unaffected by diverging views recently articulated for the first time so sharply, mainly concerning European integration and our involvement in the Iraq conflict.

It can be said that we have achieved the goals set by Poland in the early 1990s. We are a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, we will soon

join the European Union, we have good, even very good relations with our neighbours. We play an important role in various initiatives of regional co-operation. We have recently put forth proposals on global issues. Moreover, I believe that our timing and choice of issues have been most appropriate. Does this mean that we have exhausted the tasks of our diplomacy? Certainly not. We should clarify the goals for today and for the future in public discussions in various forums, not only official ones. While many of our efforts are crowned with success, there are still threats ahead, including in the areas we have identified as our priorities.

We have looked to NATO membership as the guardian of our security. Today we feel safer, though conventional threats are more of theoretical than of real nature. Does this mean that we are really safe? No – new threats have emerged or become apparent: international terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). We hope that Senator Richard Lugar's warning will not come true; a year ago he pointed to potential threats arising from availability of WMDs to terrorist organisations. Given their modus operandi and their aspiration to strike the Western world, if they were to lay their hands on WMDs, the implications could be most terrifying. Consequently, all measures taken to prevent this scenario are of paramount importance for us.

With regard to NATO, our efforts follow the decisions of the 2002 Prague Summit. On the one hand, it was decided to enlarge NATO, a move we had promoted for years. On the other hand, it was decided to modernise NATO, especially its defence capability. Several months ago doubts were still being raised about the political will of the member states necessary to achieve the second goal. George Robertson himself on a number of occasions expressed his disappointment with lack of progress in discussions and lack of decisions. However, I am more optimistic now after the June NATO Council meeting in Madrid. I sense a readiness to take specific actions in national armies, in national defence and security strategies, actions conducive to the goal set for NATO.

Certainly, the enlargement of NATO is a challenge in itself. The new members need to converge with NATO and shoulder their responsibilities. I hope the process will be smooth. At the same time we realise that NATO, like any community

of the Western world, is not free from tensions, conflicts and divergent opinions, especially regarding the Iraq issue. This poses a threat to the reliable guarantee offered by the NATO security mechanism. It also suggests that, clearly, there are different positions on the principles of international law and the principles of use of force. There are also clear differences in protecting egoistic interests. The Iraq dispute demonstrated how easy it is to disrupt transatlantic solidarity. The course of action at the UN Security Council was disappointing. I believe that each permanent member of the Security Council can be said to have made mistakes in late 2002 and early 2003. Meanwhile, some concepts of protecting the US security interests proposed in America can undermine the coherence and the traditional mechanisms of NATO. According to such concepts, unconventional threats should be addressed by way of forming ad hoc coalitions of countries ready to oppose the given threat. This implies a selective approach to NATO. NATO is now often referred to as a toolbox; those instruments that are most useful and best fit the circumstances are to be used. There is certainly a logic to this line of reasoning but it is destructive to the crucial issue of upholding NATO's traditional capacities and credibility as a defence alliance.

A warning signal was sent when Turkey faced trouble asking for guarantees in the case of a potential threat during military operations in Iraq. We remember how the mechanism of the alliance's positive response to a request of an ally failed. This was worrying. Yet we need to realise that a lesson was learnt. When Poland asked the alliance for assistance in our involvement in Iraq, the decision was made swiftly and unanimously. And so we are safer: on the one hand, our security is strewn with new threats, on the other hand, it is in our interest that NATO should modernise while preserving its credibility.

The Iraq issue is also related to other tensions and conflicts in transatlantic relations, ones not directly involving security issues. A debate is underway on both sides of the Atlantic on the policy towards the partners across the ocean. There are – to put it simply – two types of European positions. Some Europeans, while noticing problems in transatlantic relations, speak in favour of close cooperation; others, in many different ways, argue for the need of Europe's identity, self-sufficiency, or autonomy, which more or less explicitly points to a situa-

tion of rivalry or competition. From our point of view, this situation is very distressing. The questions we addressed three years ago are being asked all over again. It was here, at the Stefan Batory Foundation, that we had a debate on Poland between Europe and the United States.¹ Should we make a choice or not? What kind of choice, in what context and under what conditions? We now have to revisit these questions again.

Some concepts put forth across the Atlantic are unacceptable. They suggest that the importance of Europe is diminishing and that Europe is only one of many world partners to US interests. Such a position could cripple Euro-American co-operation. For fundamental reasons, we are interested in fostering this co-operation and make sure it is acknowledged. We have consistently taken this position vis-à-vis our European and American partners, taking advantage of favourable developments, such as improving relations between Poland and the USA. Without prejudice to all earlier achievements, our mutual relations have enjoyed a particularly beneficial climate in the past several months. This was recognised by certain events and actions, initially of formal nature, such as the special status of President Aleksander Kwaśniewski's visit to Washington D.C. in July 2002. They have gained genuine political currency when President George W. Bush arrived in Kraków and delivered a significant speech where the US President extended a friendly hand to Europe. It is no secret that we wanted those words to be spoken and had talked to our US partners about them. We know that today's relations between the USA and Poland also owe much to the decision to purchase US aircraft for the Polish air force, difficult but successful off-set negotiations, and the prospect of the USA's growing economic investment in Poland. All this helps to build and strengthen Polish-American relations and to stabilise top-level co-operation.

The discussion on transatlantic relation continues; it is difficult to anticipate its outcome. However, from experience and participation in many debates, I can tell that after the NATO-EU summit several months ago, after discussions in the

1 *Polska między Europą a Stanami Zjednoczonymi*, a debate featuring Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz, Jerzy Marek Nowakowski, Janusz Reiter, Jan Maria Rokita and Aleksander Smolar, 17 May 2001, see www.batory.org.pl/debaty or excerpts in *Tygodnik Powszechny*, 26 August 2001.

North-Atlantic Council, and after the EU-USA summit we may speak of a will to foster co-operation. Certainly, some issues remain controversial, such as the International Criminal Court, environmental protection, etc. Sometimes US foreign policy on issues of vital importance is unacceptable to Europe, when the US exerts pressure on European countries, including small countries acceding the European Union, to force them to go against the grain of the EU's common position. Yet, I think we should see things in the right context and look for points of co-operation and common interests even in areas of difference and divide. In my opinion, shared interests prevail over differences. We must not allow the emotions of politicians or their irritation, be it well under control, to create a new, but in the end virtual reality.

As for the European Union, we have reasons to feel glad though dark clouds gather on the horizon. I believe that the most important issue ahead is the preparation, execution, and outcome of the Inter-Governmental Conference to adopt the Constitutional Treaty. We have raised our objections concerning several important proposals presented by France on behalf of the European Convention in Thessaloniki. I want to mention only one divergence from the Nice compromise: the voting system. This is crucial from our perspective. Let me remind you that the system was developed with great effort in anticipation of EU enlargement: the goal was to create a decision-making system for the new Union. On the eve of enlargement, we are told that the adopted solution was wrong. We are told that the new system may operate for a few years after enlargement but then should be abolished. Arguments are offered to support the quest for a simpler voting mechanism. To my mind, these arguments are artificial: I can see no qualitative difference between the two systems in terms of complexity. It is proposed that the weight of one factor affecting the number of votes allocated to each country, that is the population, be increased; it is not mentioned that this factor plays a key role in the structure of the European Parliament where it truly belongs.

We cannot accept this proposal, also because Poland has no room for manoeuvre on this point, and we say so frankly to our European partners. In my opinion, foreign policy can be developed to attain various goals and to protect one's interest, but it must never make the fundamental mistake of forgetting

the partner, his situation, the limits of his flexibility, borders he can't cross. Moreover, I think that the new solution was in fact forced through at the Convention; by initiative of Danuta Hübner, in May 2003 eight and then eighteen countries of the Convention opposed the proposal put forth by Valéry Giscard d'Estaing. Yet, the proposal found its way into the draft Treaty; the explanation was that the Treaty took so much effort to draft that the deletion of a single provision would send us back to square one.

I want to stress it once again: we have no room for manoeuvre. Poland is joining the European Union on terms and conditions set in Nice. Before the accession referendum many of those who promoted Poland's accession pointed to the Nice success and said that it guaranteed our strong position in the European Council. If the agreement were to be changed, Poland would definitely need a referendum on the Constitutional Treaty. Let me remind you that after great efforts we only managed to mobilise 58 percent of Poles to answer the simple question: Do you want Poland to join the European Union or not? I don't think a referendum on the European Constitution could be successful. If the referendum fails, we will have to open ratification procedures in Parliament. The ratification of the European Constitution will probably take place next year, before the Parliamentary election. Ratification of this Treaty would be tantamount to accepting a weaker position for Poland in the EU than that approved by Poles in the accession referendum. I don't think this Parliament can muster a majority of two-thirds to pass such decisions; the next Parliament will make it equally difficult if not impossible. Hence, maintaining the Nice agreement is a precondition for adopting the European Constitution. We are trying to draw the attention of our European partners to this issue, one they probably missed, or perhaps underestimated hoping for space for further negotiations or pressure to be exerted to achieve concessions. This situation determines the difficulty intrinsic in our participation in the Inter-Governmental Conference. Even now it is argued as follows: if you raise your objections, we'll raise ours, since everyone has something to complain about. This will be a politically sensitive moment and Poland may be depicted as a country missing the logic of integration of the European Community and causing its disruption.

A brief comment on other areas of European integration. New concepts of fundamental importance are being proposed today in the European Union. The Greek Presidency cannot be overestimated. It brings more than the draft Treaty. The Thessaloniki meeting opened a debate on Mr Javier Solana's proposal of a European security strategy. It also made crucial decisions on the West Balkans. It adopted the final European position on illegal migration. It was during the Greek Presidency that a position on combating terrorism and a declaration on weapons of mass destruction were adopted. A discussion on "wider Europe" was initiated, the Mediterranean dialogue was deepened, new initiatives of co-operation with the Arab world were proposed.

We are taking part in all these efforts. What's more, we have achievements at least in some areas. Some have fundamental importance from the point of view of direct interest of the country, especially foreign policy: the neighbourhood policy, in this case the Eastern Dimension of the Union; the Balkans; the Middle East; the Mediterranean. These issues are our priorities. In the months to come we will approach completion of concepts to be proposed. This is a major task for our diplomacy.

I have been trying to outline the core issues and to show that great efforts are still ahead so we will have to be active in diplomacy. I want to briefly mention some other areas of improvement and success, though many questions remain open. Take the issue of our relations with Russia. From the initiatives of Władysław Bartoszewski, to the visit of Vladimir Putin to Poland, to the meeting of Putin and Kwaśniewski on 28 June this year: the political climate between our countries has improved. This is of key importance. Meanwhile, we have not so much failed – that would be an overstatement – but made little progress in co-operation in many areas, in particular economic co-operation. I think there was no failure: last year we cut the foreign trade deficit by a quarter. Our exports grew 27 percent in 2002 while imports from Russia fell by several percent, improving our trade balance. Yet this remains Poland's greatest trade deficit with any single foreign partner. Trade grew only due to increasing efforts by Polish manufacturers and Polish exporters. Although President Putin said in Poznań last year that the issue should not be a matter of concern to the Polish government only and that the Russian

government must help to improve the situation, we have not seen any major efforts of the Russian government to change the status quo. I could enumerate many similar examples but I will limit myself to this brief outline.

My last comment. Last year at a Stefan Batory Foundation seminar on social diplomacy we talked about the activity and the role of non-governmental organisations and the efforts made by Poland abroad.² I am proud to say that we have put some of the ideas discussed at the seminar in practice. The NGO Consultative Council at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is in place; once again I want to thank them for their co-operation. Let me quote one example. A great part of the Polish non-paper on the Eastern Dimension of the common European policy³ presented recently by the Polish government was drafted based on proposals tabled by the Polish NGOs. Theirs were valuable, creative proposals, far removed from the studies and ideas typically put forward and adopted in the European Union. This public diplomacy should continue. There is space for it not only in the East. It would be crucial for Polish NGOs to support the actions of the Polish state in Iraq, especially in the zone we will soon be responsible for. Our troops and the civilian personnel supporting our military contingent are going to Iraq in early July after a reconnaissance mission. Obviously, there are many open questions in Iraq, not only issues of stability and security. This opens a new area of co-operation.

I said in the beginning that our initiatives also cover global issues. This affects the perception of Poland. Last year we put forth proposals for the future of the United Nations. At first they attracted little attention. However, after recent tensions in the UN, the Polish proposals have aroused much greater interest. The position of some countries has evolved. Russia has moved from indifference to genuine interest. The USA has confirmed its interest. We have consulted with several countries; at least two-thirds of them are ready to second our proposals. We are now drafting a memorandum to be sent to Mr Kofi Anan in the coming

² *Social Diplomacy. The Case of Poland. International Activity of Polish NGO's and Their Dialogue with Government*, ed. Grażyna Czubek, Warsaw 2002.

³ *Non-paper with Polish Proposals Concerning Policy Towards New Eastern Neighbours after EU Enlargement*, www.msz.gov.pl.

weeks. It will report on the consultation process and call for more attention to be paid to these issues at the forthcoming session of the UN General Assembly. I believe that such involvement addresses global interests, including the interests of Poland, and is evidence that our policy is not unilateral, confined to a single orientation or bound to a single strategic partner; it is not a policy of subservience or dependence. As we make these efforts, we believe that the interests of our country fit into broad international interests.

Once again, I realise the risks involved. Not everyone is happy with the developments around Poland and in Poland. Yet I know, especially in the context of Iraq, that if the worst-case scenario came true, we could suffer serious political consequences of the situation. Nonetheless, we are involved in the Iraq issue not as an adventurer. We've made a conscious choice. We've made a decision, though it was very difficult. The President, Prime Minister, Defence Minister and myself discussed it for hours before coming to a conclusion. This was not political adventurism, though we always realised that the situation may not necessarily develop in line with our expectations, with the interests of the Iraqi people, and with our own interests.

Discussion

Jan Krzysztof Bielecki

Minister Cimoszewicz has presented the situation in very circumspect terms. I think that we are at a very interesting point in history: the role of international institutions is being redefined. NATO and the UN are good examples. As has often been pointed out, a group of about fifty democratic countries seems to be emerging, all guided by the rule of promoting democracy and opposing any alliances with the enemies of democracy. This is, of course, a far-reaching strategy. I mention it to make clear that there are no easy choices and that a stable constellation is unlikely to evolve soon. Some say that a spontaneous order will emerge out of the crises ahead. The international context is very complex as the global institutional order is changing.

We have heard that Poland wants to participate in this process. Questions must be asked about the effectiveness, skill, reliability and integrity of our foreign policy in the changing world. How can we find our way as a country whose policy is not totally autonomous, and how can we propose and implement new solutions? I have some doubts about the effectiveness of our policy. First, I think that we have too many priorities. For a medium-sized, moderately wealthy country, we have quite a long list of priorities which we resort to depending on the actual discussion. We want to participate in the Central European Initiative, the Vyshehrad Group, the EU-Balkans Initiative. We want to develop the Riga Initiative and be actively involved in the Baltic Council. Not to mention the member-

ship of institutions and organisations we forget to pay fees to. After all, we cannot make a sufficient financial contribution to all these initiatives and play a role that would afford us with our own micro-policy. The Central European Initiative, a gigantic organisation of 18 countries, has a budget of 2 million dollars paid up by the Italians. You can't pursue a policy just by subscribing to an organisation. You can only pursue a policy if you have a clear vision and the means to bring it about. This seems simple enough. But we don't have the necessary resources. This doesn't mean that the institutions should be done away with, but we don't have to belong to each and every one of them.

I am also concerned about the language of politics in Poland. Other countries speak a positive language in discussions about the first draft of the European Constitution. They say, we're very happy because the draft is in line with our *raison d'état*, and we want to support specific solutions in continued work on the Constitution. Meanwhile, Poland – perhaps under the impression of its Copenhagen success – is determined to convince its own citizens and the EU politicians that frightening Europe with ever-growing Polish problems is an effective tool of policy making, especially in difficult times. I think it is not a good method. Moreover, the policy of the state is coupled with individual initiatives of Polish politicians. Many of them keep arguing against EU accession and treat Europe as a scarecrow to garner domestic support. In these difficult times we speak a language of confrontation, a language which undermines the goals of different initiatives. I agree with Mr Cimoszewicz in that no one will vote in the referendum on the future Constitution of the EU since we are being told again and again that everyone is against, that Europe is a source of threats, that we have no room for manoeuvre. Of course, I realise that the situation is difficult, but having won so much support for our membership and participation in further European integration we should all look to use language that supports the magical term “consensus” and, wherever possible, emphasise benefits rather than threats, speak a language of opportunities and not losses.

Speaking about the effectiveness of our policies, both domestic and foreign, we must not forget co-ordination. The European Union is a big exercise in co-ordination. This is a great challenge for Poland. I don't want to revisit the prob-

lems we had in preparing an agricultural subsidies system, but it is a case in point which illustrates our weaknesses. We have to rework the operating models of the institutions responsible for European affairs and their mutual interrelations. In those countries where co-ordination mechanisms are effective, they report directly to the Prime Minister (with the exception of Germany). There should be one centre of command in order to pursue policies effectively.

In summary, I think that our goals should be very clear and specific in these difficult times; we can't just rely on values. We also need to bear in mind what language we speak and whether we are capable of attaining our goals. Otherwise we will be a paper tiger sending troops by train because there is no plane to get them there.

Tadeusz Mazowiecki

I agree that the process of attaining the goals we set out for ourselves in the early 1990s is now approaching completion. But, new problems arise. We, Poles, thought that NATO membership would give us a guarantee of security. Some even thought that we didn't need to keep an army any more. Suddenly NATO found itself in a new situation and faced new problems. Its future role remains unknown. We are joining the European Union when it is experiencing a special change; it is a European Union that has problems with itself and with its recent principal ally, the United States.

Let me repeat, the process of achieving goals is almost complete, but our situation has changed. The change was probably triggered by the tragic events in New York and Washington DC. The terrorist attacks made it clear that the mightiest superpower could be assailed. Then we faced other new problems. Unfortunately, as an observer and participant of public debates in Poland, I remain unaware of the mechanisms used to make key decisions in Poland. Little is known of the very difficult debates of the Government and the President concerning key Iraq decisions mentioned by Minister Cimoszewicz. The general public had the impression that the decisions were made automatically. I criticised it publicly and I still believe that the decisions were automatic while the present situation requires at least a moment of reflection.

New concepts proposed in the US for NATO have been mentioned. But the issue is really about unilateralism and the impact of this stance on US politics today. How do we develop and continue good relations between Poland and the USA despite unilateralism, so as not to be just a tool in the tool-box? Aren't we just that now? Some of our partners point the finger since they share this concern. I am not a supporter of the decision for Poland to run the occupation zone in Iraq. But you can't discuss this issue publicly at all. Everyone is ecstatic about it, any moment now we will set up the Colonial League! I said that in an interview for *Gazeta Wyborcza*¹ but it seems that the Polish media are bowing to a kind of political correctness, so the decision cannot be criticised.

I realise that the USA are and will remain a superpower with the casting vote. But I repeat, even a superpower has to know how to be a partner. The Minister said that Polish-US relations have improved. I'm afraid we are deluded. One President pats the other President on the back... What difference does it make? How has Poland benefited from these fantastic relations? I ask this question but at the same time I note positive Polish diplomatic initiatives. We need a consensus about our foreign policy. But I have many doubts.

You asked, "What if we fail?" Everything suggests that guerrilla warfare is about to be unleashed in Iraq. What if the US take another step in pre-emptive warfare? Do we have a consistent position? Can we say "no"? These are my fundamental questions. Please don't think that I'm an enemy of the USA, I just don't want my country to be yet another satellite of the USA.

I agree that dropping the Nice compromise is very bad. It suggests that agreements can be challenged by an advisory body. The Convention is not a legislative body of the Union but it can present the EU and its member states with a *fait accompli* by reshuffling their relative weight. I think that the Nice compromise was very well balanced. Giving the population criterion such great weight ignores the fact that the EU has to look at two aspects. One is the EU's states and structures; the other – its people and citizens. The draft Constitution upsets the balance.

¹ *Bez mandatu nie jedźmy* [interview with Tadeusz Mazowiecki by Jarosław Kurski], *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 9 May 2003, p. 20.

I agree with Jan Krzysztof Bielecki: we should speak a positive language rather than keep complaining. Yet, if the EU citizens remain unconvinced about the advantages of the draft now that the document should bring them closer to the institutions and mechanisms of the community, we can't hope for a success of the Convention.

Let me reiterate: I think that we should be active in many ways but we must think things over. We must bear in mind that our domestic situation is our biggest weakness and that it hurts our international position. Only countries with well-structured and developing domestic conditions matter in foreign policy; this is not what Poland can offer. Therefore, I'm afraid that our importance is illusory, a bubble inflated by our special transatlantic relations.

Dariusz Rosati

First, Poland has had clearly set foreign policy goals over the past ten years, and has achieved those goals. This is unique in Polish history as different orientations always clashed in the history of our diplomacy. The achievement of the strategic foreign policy goals has recently been coupled with a sound strengthening of the international position of Poland. This was helped by the accession to the Euro-Atlantic structures, the way the accession proceeded, as well as recent foreign policy decisions. The final stage of EU accession negotiations, especially the negotiations in Copenhagen, though irritating to some EU partners and envied by some Central European partners, placed Poland in a position of a country able to defend its interests. Earlier in the negotiations, Poland was believed to be unnecessarily stubborn in standing by its position. The final outcome proved that we were right.

Second, particularly good and special transatlantic relations with the United States have already been mentioned several times today. The strategic decision to take part in the military intervention in Iraq together with the United States and Great Britain advanced Poland to the group of countries which pursue their own policy and which matter on the international scene. It could be ironically or half-jokingly said that never before have two hundred troops created a global superpower. Though we are not a superpower, we're a country which counts more today than it did two or three years ago.

Third, in the long run, the international position of a country depends on its internal economic and spiritual power. I am convinced that the turbulence we are now going through at home is only temporary.

Fourth, when applying for NATO accession, Poland wanted to join a NATO on the terms and conditions of the 1970s and 1980s. This was our goal. At the end of the day, we joined an organisation that is evolving. We are not really sure whether NATO can guarantee our security the way it did twenty or thirty years ago. Here, Polish foreign policy faces important tasks. We should try to support a direction of NATO's evolution which would guarantee permanent transatlantic bonds and the presence of the USA in Europe as well as an adequate level of the allies' commitments to all countries. Recent problems regarding security guarantees for Turkey suggest that this direction of the evolution is not yet certain.

Fifth, I have a feeling that all intellectual and diplomatic resources have been channelled to ensure a positive outcome of the negotiations and the best possible conditions of accession. This was fully successful and must be appreciated. Yet both the debate prior to the [accession] referendum and the debate today lack a broader vision of Europe and don't aim at developing a Polish position on the Europe we are heading to or the European Union of the 21st century. I must say that I am unhappy with impromptu declarations favouring one option or another in the discussions in the Convention. We tend to speak in favour of some constitutional or institutional system of the EU without the slightest reference to the long-term interests of Poland. For instance, I believe that a strong federal Europe is in the interests of Poland. I can think of at least three reasons for this option. Bear in mind that Poland is poorer than most EU Member States and we should strive for more solidarity between the member states as this would provide us with greater economic benefits of EU membership. Federation, unlike confederation, always implies more responsibility, including economic responsibility, for members. The same applies to security. Poland lies on the periphery of the European Union. East of our border is an area as yet not fully stabilised, both politically and economically. We should be interested in close co-operation in the EU under the umbrella of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. This co-operation is easier and more effective in a strong union of countries rather than

in a loose confederation. Finally, Poland is a large country. With the existing decision-making system we have a bigger say in a federation than in a loose union of countries where the interests of each member are better protected as the countries retain more sovereignty in their decisions. I don't want to elaborate on this, it is only one example pointing to lack of an in-depth debate.

Once an EU member state, we will face new issues which we are intellectually and politically unprepared to tackle. One issue is that of transatlantic relations. We don't want to have to choose between Mum or Dad; we want NATO to remain what it was over the past decades. Yet there are different opinions in the European Union. I wish we could handle the issue in a manner distanced from day-to-day political events (such as the Iraq war), acknowledging these relations as a community of values, a cultural community we all share. We should take a similar approach to the relations with the east, our contribution to the European Union. We have to reflect on how to develop the Eastern Dimension, especially with partners such as Russia, Ukraine or Belarus.

One last point. Poland's European debate, crowned with a successful referendum result, revealed deep rifts in society, different viewpoints on our presence in Europe and whether the presence is indeed required. There is a host of reasons for this divide, including our historical legacy. But there is still another legacy, that of Jagiellonian Poland. Our foreign policy was oriented to the east for 600 years. Poland was absent from great European politics. Now we have to adapt to the new situation. We have to mitigate our distrust of Europe, of the French, of Germans, of Spaniards. On the other hand, we have to take a reasonable approach to our relations with the east, and to identify all potential benefits and threats of those relations.

In conclusion, two comments on Mr Mazowiecki's intervention. I agree that Poland should not be a satellite. However, I have never thought of Polish government policy as supporting everything and anything proposed by the USA; this is not the case. I think that our attitude to the USA and its policy was based on the position that it is in the best interests of Poland and the Polish *raison d'état* to support the USA. We were not the only country to buy US aircraft! We know that without the support of President Clinton, Poland would have joined NATO two or three years later. I remember the doubts raised by EU partners

concerning our NATO membership. The USA has played a most positive role in helping Polish interests time and time again over the past decade. A cost and benefit analysis of these relations implies that they are good for Poland.

Tadeusz Mazowiecki

But my doubts are about the situation today!

Dariusz Rosati

Our presence in Iraq can lead to doubts. I think there was no good explanation whether and how Poland will benefit politically (and economically) by supporting the allies' intervention in Iraq and participating in the management programme. The course of events was so fast that apparently there was little time for reflection. I think it would be good for the Polish political scene to discuss views of Poland's presence in Iraq. As has been said, it is but a small step from grandeur to ridicule.

Aleksander Smolar

I want to ask several questions about the relations between Poland and the USA and the relations within Europe. Mr Rosati mentioned the frequently used (and abused) terms Dad and Mum standing for the USA and the European Union. Polish foreign policy has been saying for ten years now that there is no *embarras de choix*. But yes, there is! There is a choice to be made between a part of Europe and the United States. We would rather not have to choose but we are making the choice. In addition, US policy towards Europe is evolving. How are we to evaluate Polish foreign policy in this context?

The USA have supported European integration for decades. Now Washington is signalling its changing position. I will quote one statement. At a Brookings Institute conference in April 2003, Richard Hass, a former senior officer at the Department of State, asked about US policy towards Europe, said: "Desegregation". I am not saying that it is the official policy of the US administration. Yet, this statement comes from the moderate wing of the administration rather than the neoconservatives who are much more aggressive about Europe.

The common values and interests of Europe and the United States remain key. However, areas of competition and divergent interests are equally important. I have a question about these. There is no doubt that we benefit from our relations with the USA. One could even say that we have used them consciously or unconsciously in European politics in order to strengthen our position. Even the growing importance of the Weimar Triangle in the policies of Germany and France seems to be a consequence of our present position in the transatlantic alliance. But the question that should be addressed before we engage in a cost and benefit analysis of the policy pursued thus far is: What is the role of Poland in the European policy of the United States?

Another question is about the dramatic asymmetry between day-to-day mundane issues we will have to face in the early years of our EU membership and the apparent ease of relations with the USA which are much simpler. Paradoxically, we may psychologically distance ourselves from Europe as we become a full member of the EU. The language of Polish politics, mentioned by Jan Krzysztof Bielecki, may favour this process.

Minister Cimoszewicz mentioned the risk that Polish policy may be sidelined. We may have no choice as a consequence of our own position and approach to the EU, and cause serious problems in Europe.

Bear in mind that the change of the voting system proposed by the Convention is not only an issue for Poland. I'm not in favour of discarding the Nice formula. Yet it is all part of a global shakeout that is to make the Union more effective. The relative number of votes granted to Germany leads to a significant weakening of the position of Spain, as well as France, the UK and Italy. What, therefore, of our possibly more positive approach to the proposals of the Convention, and what of our room for manoeuvre in other areas of the EU's internal relations?

Jerzy Jedlicki

I share Mr Mazowiecki's doubts and worries, especially about Iraq. I'm afraid the question will soon be asked in Poland: What are we doing in Iraq? The question is already being asked in the USA! I don't accept the argument that since we have contributed symbolically to the war, we have to contribute less symbolical-

ly to the occupation of Iraq. Moreover, no weapons of mass destruction have been found in Iraq, which undermines the original rationale for our presence there. We now say that we have helped our Iraqi friends to get rid of a tyrant ruler. Correct me if I'm wrong, but I don't think we were asked for help. After the expedition of the Polish Legion to San Domingo, this is the second time the Polish army is an occupant. Let's call a spade a spade. We are occupants of a people unhappy to welcome strangers who want to regulate their internal political affairs. This could have been expected before the decision was made. Look at the news and you will see where we will soon be when Polish troops in Iraq have to open fire on Shiite demonstrations, Saddam's guerrillas, or civilians. Is the Polish government morally and politically ready to face such events?

Maciej Łętowski

I want to ask you, Mr Minister, about the determination of the Government concerning the Nice compromise. You are speaking war. This is a deliberate choice of a dramatic crisis, a conflict with twenty-four partners. We are alone in our position but we are deeply convinced that we are right. I share this opinion. It is worth our while to go to war about Nice; but since the Polish Foreign Minister speaks war, I want to ask whether it is only a spectacular declaration, a move to raise the stakes in a diplomatic bid before we accept a compromise, for instance the Presidency in the 2½ year Council of Ministers? This is how wars in the EU usually end: first you say "no" and "under no circumstances", only to get a lucrative proposal. But the price of the compromise must be high. What if Polish diplomacy accepts an unsatisfactory compromise?

Another comment on Iraq. I support the decisions of the Polish government. I think we will have to open fire on any groups attacking Polish troops: there is no other way. The problem is, is the Polish general public convinced that the decision was right? We are among the most pro-US societies in Europe but most Poles condemned the Iraq expedition. The Government said that no one was in favour of war. Of course, no one wants war, but there was no serious dialogue with the general public, no attempt to convince the public about the decision. If we open fire, Poles who have not been convinced will turn their backs on this most appropriate policy.

Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz

Let me first address the question asked by Jan Krzysztof Bielecki. I think that we are effective; our present position proves that we are. But how do you measure effectiveness in day-to-day politics? You always need some distance, some perspective from which to look at issues involved. Naturally, some initiatives fail, others are a success. I am aware that some initiatives fall through. The reasons for failure are often other than lack of skill or commitment. Objective factors prevail. For instance, difficulties in developing more favourable economic co-operation with Russia are due to Poland's weaker position. We have no trump cards which would encourage the Russian Government to support economic co-operation with Poland. We have presented twenty-nine Polish proposals about Kaliningrad and only one was approved (not that it has been implemented). We have to bear these limitations in mind.

I agree that mechanisms of regional co-operation have proliferated. They arose at different times. Questions are often asked: How are they different? How to define their goals? How are we to differentiate between the roles of the OSCE and of the Council of Europe? How does the Central European Initiative stand out among other forums of co-operation? Apparently, it is easier to establish organisations than to change them, control them, and close them down once they have accomplished their mission. This year we are presiding the Central European Initiative, trying to redefine its goals and simplify its structure.

Concerning the issue of co-ordinating European policies, I think that it is of secondary relevance who is the co-ordinator, the Prime Minister's Office or the Foreign Ministry. Both solutions have worked successfully. What is more important, and as yet undecided, is the model of co-ordination. Two positions compete within the Government. Some support the formation of a strong, extensive monitoring and co-ordinating centre while others believe that we should strengthen European affairs structures in all the ministries and agencies involved. I personally think that European affairs should remain a responsibility of Government administration. We cannot invent a mechanism that would take over the responsibility of the Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of the Environment, etc. But we must devise solutions ensuring effective monitoring and co-ordination.

It is too early to judge these issues. I believe that the Government should make these important decisions as soon as possible since we have little time before 1 May 2004. We have to try out organisational solutions now in order to avoid paying a high price for wrong decisions in the future.

I agree with Tadeusz Mazowiecki that domestic politics have or may have some impact on the external position of the country. Especially if Poland were to become a politically unstable country ruled by fractions pursuing irresponsible policies at home and abroad. Today, our situation at home arouses some concerns, but these do not affect our international position. It is little consolation, yet few countries in today's Europe have avoided serious internal problems in government, effective governance, economic decisions, public finances, and social affairs. Yet, unlike Dariusz Rosati, I am not content to optimistically conclude that we shall overcome these temporary turbulences. The problem is more profound, but I do not want to elaborate now. I think it is simplistic to attribute weaknesses and pathologies only to the political class now in power. This is a serious affliction of the entire political class. Unless we discuss it openly, there will be no panacea, only measures used to hit individuals rather than resolve actual problems.

Many speakers have discussed the Iraq issue for good reasons. Theoretically, we cannot rule out the possibility that the course of events will follow a worst case scenario. What can we conclude as a result? I believe that we have to maximise the probability of the best case scenario and minimise the likelihood of an adverse course of events while we realise that some factors are beyond our control. This is why we are taking many initiatives. It was no coincidence that before the troops were sent, I visited Teheran to present our intentions to the Iran government (and the leaders of Iranian Shiites), to outline our plans of developing relations with the population and the religious leaders of our sector, and to reassure them that we will respect the sacred sites of the Shiites and give safe access to Shiite pilgrims. We are talking to all interested parties about our presence in Iraq.

I understand that we are in dispute. I also understand the emotional undertones; but we are not going to Iraq as an occupant, this is not our intention. Even if the UN Security Council resolution uses the term "occupant forces", it is used

in the sense of international law and the Geneva Conventions. Moreover, we realised the possible reaction in Poland to the Polish troops being called occupiers. We acted to make sure that Resolution 1483 only uses the term with regard to US and British troops. And, to reiterate, only in the sense of international law since the term “occupant forces” implies a status and authority to temporarily administer the relevant country. There is no pejorative meaning, so typical of political and colloquial use.

We will soon see how we are welcomed by the Iraqi people; we will make best efforts to ensure their understanding. We are doing our best to prepare our troops. We are talking to all stakeholders in the sector. We are trying to minimise the probability of conflict. Of course, it cannot be ruled out completely. I realise that anti-Americanism is one of the reasons for the dramatic events in Iraq. But I have no illusions! What is happening in Iraq has nothing to do with the Iraqi people fighting against an occupant; it is the BAAS party and people close to Saddam Hussein’s regime trying to seize control. Bear in mind that whatever their views, many are fighting out of a sense of helplessness and lack of subsistence. Hence the idea to pay out wages to the Iraqi soldiers. Hence the idea to reconstruct the Iraqi military under the control of the allies. Bear in mind that thousands of people recently in power in Iraq have been removed from power forever. They have no reason to cheer, quite the opposite.

We will see whether foreign instigators of the resistance in Iraq come to light in the future. It is clear what the best case scenario for Iraq implies for many countries in the region. Many are happy that Saddam has been overthrown but are concerned that a relatively democratic country ruled by law will soon be their close neighbour. This will be a challenge to the regimes of these countries. It is one aspect of the complexity of the situation.

Jerzy Jedlicki said with irony that we have not been asked to come up with fraternal assistance. We are not offering fraternal assistance and I believe that there is no reason to feel embarrassed or ashamed. We have helped to dismantle one of the most vicious regimes of the last decades. Why should we feel ashamed? Because the regime can no more murder tens of thousands of people? Is this why we should feel remorseful? We understand that the decision to

intervene was controversial from the standpoint of international law, but we had two goals which we clearly communicated to the general public. We were convinced that Iraq did not fulfil its international obligations, including the elimination of weapons of mass destruction. Today you can say that it was a mistake since there were no weapons of mass destruction. I call for intellectual integrity: don't jump to conclusions. Time will tell.

I know that the situation today is uncomfortable because weapons of mass destruction seemed easy to find, which did not happen. But I think there are no reasons to believe that the weapons were destroyed. What's more, it is more probable that weapons, especially chemical weapons, were hidden in Iraq or taken abroad than that they were destroyed. Why were UN inspectors being misled, kept away from certain locations and finally thrown out of Iraq four years ago? Iraq had no weapons of mass destruction and threw out the inspectors? Why should Iraq destroy the weapons once it removed all witnesses and was at no risk of disclosure? Why should it destroy the weapons just before the military intervention? If it did destroy the weapons before the intervention, it could have produced evidence and avoided the likely military attack. Let me repeat: it is too early to draw definitive conclusions.

Another goal we had was to improve transatlantic relations. When Europe strongly opposed US politics and European allies refused to co-operate and some even warned that they would block a UN Security Council resolution under all circumstances, it was in the best interests of Poland and the transatlantic community to demonstrate to the USA that they have partners and should not turn their back on Europe. We were not the only ones to take this position. If you count the NATO members and accession countries, most of them backed the USA.

Am I ready morally and politically for such difficult situations? Let me repeat: myself, my colleagues and other Polish politicians are making best efforts to ensure most positive developments. Our troops will have detailed instructions, will only use arms in self-defence, in extreme situations. Recent events suggest that many incidents involving US troops (and in one case British troops) were due to mistakes made by soldiers. Lessons must be learned. I am not saying that we are more cautious but we have extensive experience including peace-keeping operations in difficult conditions. I hope there will be no dramatic events.

A question was asked about the Government's commitment to defend the Nice agreement. We are fully committed! I think that our European partners have pushed us into a corner. It was a mistake and we have to be open about it rather than play games. I disagree with Jan Krzysztof Bielecki who talked about the language we speak in negotiations with the European Union. It is not the case that others speak in a positive way while we go for confrontation. We appreciate the success of the Convention. We have publicly said that more was achieved than generally expected. But this does not mean that we can't raise objections. By the way, the tactic of speaking in a positive fashion nearly caused a problem. Several days before the Thessaloniki meeting Foreign Ministers met in Luxembourg and agreed to adopt a formula defining the Constitutional Treaty drafted by the Convention as a "good basis for the Intergovernmental Conference." Yet in the conference, since most countries praised the advantages of the draft, the Dutch Foreign Minister was prompted to propose a changed formula whereby the draft would be a good basis for the European Constitution rather than the Conference. Had the proposal been accepted, we and others would find it difficult to discuss the draft. I believe in open discussion and argumentation about potential limits. If we are talking to a responsible partner who also cares about the successful outcome, they will understand our situation. To summarise, we are fully committed to this issue.

We are also raising other objections, including the preamble to the Constitution. We will try to convince others about our arguments but we are not indifferent to others' argumentation. I do not want to describe the details of our negotiations but during the recent visit of Cardinal Angelo Sodano I felt that the Church was aware that our proposal was not bound to succeed. At the same time, the Catholic Church takes note of at least two other provisions of the draft Constitution important to churches and denominations. And another proposal we are making: the President of the Commission should be elected by the Parliament from among two candidates proposed by the European Council. We think this would give the European Parliament a more serious status. Meanwhile, the draft Treaty preserves the existing system: the European Council elects one candidate approved by the Parliament.

Concerning other comments: Mr Smolar said that the change of the voting system applies to Poland as well as other countries which apparently accept the change. We will see at the Intergovernmental Conference. It is for each country to decide: if they are happy about the change, it is up to them. Let me repeat: we neither want to, nor are we able to accept this solution.

We can imagine future areas of dispute in the European Union. To follow up on Mr Rosati's intervention: What should the future Europe be like? You were right to say that it should be based on solidarity. The principle should hold. Yet even today EU discussions on the future of some community policies, such as the structural policy, abound in views contradicting the solidarity principle. It is proposed that it be "renationalised". What does it mean for us? If this line of thinking is pursued, a divide would open between the well-developed countries of "old" EU and the newly acceding countries which are hoping for a positive effect of the structural policy. If you translate this clear rift in opinions into the two voting systems, the Nice system and the one proposed in the European Constitution, the implications of the change become clear. Is it in line with the philosophy of European solidarity? We believe that the Nice compromise is closer to the principles of the EU, including the solidarity principle.

Mr Smolar said that there is an objective choice between the USA and Europe, or at least its part. In addition, with the evolution of US interests, the relative importance of Europe is diminishing. I believe that shared interests are of fundamental importance in various areas, especially security as today's threats loom equally over both America and Europe. There are also many global problems of development, environment, poverty which cannot be resolved effectively without co-operation between Europe and America.

Naturally, there are differences of opinion, but I don't think that the divide is growing wider. We shouldn't overestimate the difference in defence capacity, although it is quite real. Today and even more so in the future, politicians who want to measure the effectiveness of US policy in the world with its military capacity realise that it is not sufficient. The military capacity impressively won the war in Iraq, but it is not enough. To follow up with effective actions, the measures adopted have to be truly international. I believe that Iraq will be a lesson to those

who thought that the USA can do everything unilaterally. It is an argument in the debate about unilateralism vs. multilateralism, although the debate is very complex. To promote responsible multilateralism, we have to ensure effective and efficient mechanisms, structures and organisations which support multilateral decisions. As long as everyone says that the UN should play a leading role but refrain from actions supporting the UN, we are only talking. Nothing will ever change if international organisations are doomed to be ineffective due to their internal mechanisms, constellations of interests, lack of political will, etc. In this context, the action of the UN Security Council in the case of Iraq is discouraging as it undermines the impact of such mechanisms as the UN. Fortunately, a lesson was learned, as demonstrated in the adoption of Resolution 1483.

Biographical Notes

Jan Krzysztof Bielecki (born 1951) – economist and politician. MA from Gdańsk University, Assistant Professor with the Maritime Transport Economics Department of Gdańsk University. Worked with the Steel and Machinery Ministry Training Centre. Solidarity activist from the early 1980s. President of the Sopot-based consulting company Doradca (consultant for multinational financial corporations) from 1985. First President of the Junior Chamber of Poland in 1989-1990. Co-founder of the Liberal Democratic Congress (KLD). Member of the Freedom Union (UW) since 1994. MP in 1989-1993. Polish Prime Minister from January to December 1991. Minister for Integration in 1992-1993. At present represents Poland at the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. He has published in *Die Welt*, *Gazeta Bankowa*, *Gazeta Wyborcza*, *Rzeczpospolita*, *The Wall Street Journal*.

Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz (born 1950) – politician, lawyer, PhD in Law. MA from the Department of Law and Administration of Warsaw University. Researcher with Warsaw University in 1972-1978. Fulbright fellow in 1980-1981. Farmer since 1985. Member of the Students Union ZSP/SZSP in 1968-1975, member of the Polish United Workers' Party PZPR in 1971-1990. Member of the Social Democratic party SLD since 1999. MP since 1989. Member of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe in 1992-1996, Chairman of the Constitutional Commission in 1995-1996. Deputy Speaker of the Polish Sejm in 1995-1996. Deputy

Prime Minister and Minister of Justice in 1993-1995. Prime Minister in 1996-1997. Polish Foreign Minister since 2001.

Jerzy Jedlicki (born 1930) – historian, Professor of History, Chair of the History of Intelligentsia Faculty at the Institute of History, Polish Academy of Sciences. He researches social history and the history of ideas in Poland against the European context. He has published, among others, *Jakiej cywilizacji Polacy potrzebują* (1988, 2002; English edition *A Suburb of Europe: Nineteenth-century Polish Approaches to Western Civilization*, 1999), *Źle urodzeni czyli o doświadczeniu historycznym* (1993), *Świat zwyrodniały: lęki i wyroki krytyków nowoczesności* (2000). He has published essays, articles and reviews in *Gazeta Wyborcza*, *Polityka*, *Przegląd Powszechny*, *Tygodnik Powszechny*.

Maciej Łętowski (born 1949) – essayist. Deputy Editor-in-Chief of the Catholic weekly *Ład* in 1981-1995, later its Editor-in-Chief. In 1995-2002 Secretary and later Director of Radio Polonia, Polish Radio's external service. Member of the Supervisory Board of the Polish Press Agency (PAP) in 1998-2002. At present he writes essays for the radio (Polskie Radio S.A., Tok FM) and newspapers (*Tygodnik Solidarność*, *Życie Warszawy*). He lectures at the Faculty of Journalism of the Catholic University of Lublin and the Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński University of Warsaw. He has published, among others, *Ruch i Koło Poselskie "Znak" 1957-1976* (1998).

Tadeusz Mazowiecki (born 1927) – politician, essayist, founder and long-time Editor-in-Chief of the monthly *Więź*. In 1980 he organised and chaired the Committee of Experts supporting the strikers at the Gdańsk Shipyard. Editor-in-Chief of *Tygodnik Solidarność*. Arrested under martial law. Polish Prime Minister in 1989-1990, President of the party Democratic Union (UD) in 1991-1994 and of the party Freedom Union (UW) until 1995. MP in 1991-2001. Special Rapporteur of the UN Human Rights Commission on human rights violations in the former Yugoslavia in 1992-1995. He has published, among others, *Powrót do najprostszych pytań* (1986), *Ludzie Lasek* (ed. and preface 1987, 2000), *Druga twarz Europy* (1990), *Kredowe koła i dwa inne eseje* (1997).

Dariusz Rosati (born 1946) – Professor of Economics. MA from the Warsaw School of Economics. Consultant with Citibank, New York in 1978-1979. Founder and Director of the Institute of Global Economy, Warsaw School of Economics, in 1985-1986 and 1987-1988. Member of the Committee of Economic Advisors to the Prime Minister in November 1988 – June 1989. Expert with the World Bank, UN WIDER, ILO and the European Commission in 1988-1991. Head of the Central and Eastern European Countries Section, European Economic Commission, UN, Geneva in 1991-1995. Polish Foreign Minister in December 1995 – October 1997. At present he is a member of the Monetary Policy Council. He has published over 200 studies and essays in Polish, English, French, Russian, and Hungarian, including 4 books.

Aleksander Smolar (born 1940) – essayist, political scientist. MA in Sociology and Economics from Warsaw University. Political émigré in Italy, the UK and France in 1971-1989. In 1974 he founded the political quarterly *Aneks* and was its Editor-in-Chief until 1990. Political Advisor to Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki in 1989-1990; Foreign Policy Advisor to Prime Minister Hanna Suchocka in 1992-1993. President of the Stefan Batory Foundation since 1990. Researcher with CNRS, France. Member of the Political Council of the party Freedom Union (UW). He has published, among others, *Władza i przywileje* (1984), *Le rôle des groupes d'opposition la veille de la démocratisation en Pologne et en Hongrie* (eds. with Peter Kende, 1989), *La Grande Secousse. L'Europe de l'Est 1989-1990* (eds. with Peter Kende, 1991), *Globalization, Power and Democracy* (eds. with Mark Plattner, 2000).

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