Rejecting Spam during SMTP Sessions

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Abstract—This paper analyzes a spam rejection scheme at Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) sessions. This scheme utilizes a layer-3 e-mail pre-classification technique to estimate e-mail classes before an SMTP session ends. We study the spam rejection scheme using discrete-time Markov chain analysis and analyze the performance of the proposed scheme under different e-mail traffic loads and service capacities. The proposed scheme reduces the e-mail volume to be queued and processed by e-mail servers. This reduces non-sparse e-mail queueing delay and loss, and protects e-mail servers from being overloaded by spam traffic.

I. INTRODUCTION

Current spam control systems are post-acceptance systems [1]. E-mails are first received and buffered in a common queue before spam detection is performed. An e-mail class is only known after the Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) [2] session ends. During heavy spam traffic, the non-sparse e-mail delivery could be delayed and lost. Spam is best stopped before it is being received by the receiving e-mail server (also known as mail transfer agent, MTA) [3]. Spam detection during SMTP sessions is impossible without passing e-mail class hints (within the e-mail) or without a fast e-mail class estimation.

A fast and accurate e-mail class estimation on MTAs is possible by pre-classifying e-mails at layer 3 (the packet level) [4]. This paper analyzes a spam rejection scheme during SMTP sessions to reduce the number of e-mails received for delivery by MTAs and hence, non-sparse queueing delay and loss probability. We model and estimate the performance of our proposed scheme at the receiving MTA using discrete-time Markov chain analysis. Our results show that the non-sparse queueing delay and loss probability can be reduced due to the reduction in the number of e-mails to be processed by an MTA.

This paper is structured as follows. We discuss related works in Section II. Section III describes the spam rejection scheme. We model the proposed scheme in Section IV and analyze its performance in Section V. We conclude and state directions for future works in Section VI.

II. RELATED WORKS

Techniques to prioritize e-mail servicing on MTAs have been proposed in [1], [5]. Prioritizing e-mail servicing gives better non-sparse delay and loss probability even under heavy e-mail loading and high spam prior [5]. Such techniques deal with e-mails after they are received for queuing. Our proposed scheme deals with e-mails before they are received for queuing. A similar e-mail proxy technique that throttles attempted spam connections has been proposed in [6] using a proxy server due to the need for layer-7 spam detection. The authors' recent work showed that spam can be pre-classified at layer 3 anywhere in the network without the need to reassemble email messages [4]. By pre-classifying and tagging e-mail packets at intermediate nodes, a fast e-mail class estimation can be performed by the receiving MTAs. The layer-3 e-mail classification detects spam with 2% false positive (fp) and 27% false negative (fn) [4].

Spam control on outbound e-mail traffic can effectively control spam [7], especially when illegal zombie-relayed spam probability is high [8]. A zombie detection technique has been proposed in [9] by heuristically analyzing spam transfer and rejection behaviors from MTA logs. In our proposed spam rejection scheme, the failure in sending an e-mail, including failed spam deliveries to valid e-mail addresses are also negatively acknowledged and logged by sending MTAs. This provides easier log analysis compared to [9] since users with high e-mail rejection statistics are most likely relaying spam and not false positive senders.

III. PROPOSED SPAM REJECTION SCHEME DURING SMTP SESSIONS

Fig. 1 shows an example of an SMTP session between two MTAs. Lines with S are those sent by the sender MTA, whereas lines with R are those sent by the receiving MTA. On line 05, the envelope address MAIL FROM used to forward the e-mail does not have to be the same as the address FROM on line 11, which specifies the author's e-mail address. The fields To and carbon copy (Cc) specify the e-mail recipients. The Date field specifies the date and time of the e-mail. As specified in RFC2822 [10], all header fields as well as e-mail body are free text input, which need not to be valid and can be easily forged.

Layer-3 pre-classification allows e-mail class estimation before an SMTP session ends, i.e., before an e-mail is accepted for queuing (line 2.1 in Fig. 1). The receiving MTA can issue a temporary failure notice (tempfail) [2] to deny e-mail receipt before the session ends. With this scheme, when a server's resources are low or the traffic loading is higher than the service capacity, a server could reject spam e-mails and deny an e-mail transfer at its SMPT session.

Fig. 2 illustrates the proposed spam rejection scheme during SMTP sessions. Current statistics show that more than two-thirds of the e-mail traffic over the Internet are spam e-mails [8]. For inbound spam control, spam transfers can be
denied without the need for queuing. This reduces the amount of e-mails to be processed by an MTA.

More than 45% of spam are relayed by zombie systems [8]. Spam rejection during SMTP sessions enables outbound spam control during relaying through legitimate MTAs. Similar to spam rejection at receiving MTAs, relaying MTAs can reject spam transfers at their SMTP sessions. Since rejection is at the SMTP session (layer 7), the delivery failure notice is issued to the sending MTA and can be used to detect zombie systems [9].

IV. MODELING THE PROPOSED SPAM REJECTION SCHEME

Fig. 3 shows the model of the proposed spam rejection scheme. E-mail packets are first reassembled (by module B) to form complete e-mails. During reassembly, e-mail classes can be estimated without significant delays when e-mail packets have been pre-classified and tagged with packet scores [4]. We define $p_a$ as the probability that an e-mail is accepted during an SMTP session and queued in queue $W$. We also define $p_d$ as the probability that an e-mail is dropped during an SMTP session. Then, e-mails are queued before being processed by a layer-7 spam detector $C$ with a service probability $c$. Then, $C$ decides whether to forward an e-mail to the recipient's mailbox or to a junk e-mail folder.

The e-mail arrival can be measured by the e-mail inter-arrival time, which follows the exponential distribution [11]. The delay to detect spam can be measured by its service time, which is not sensitive to e-mail size and could be modeled using exponential distribution [1]. Define $t_a$ as the minimum e-mail inter-arrival time and $t_c$ as the minimum service time. Choosing a time step $\tau = \min(t_a, t_c)$ ensures that an $M/M/1/B$ Markov chain model [12] can be used to model the queue. The e-mail arrival probability can be defined as $\alpha = \tau/t_a$, where $t_a$ is the average e-mail inter-arrival time. Similarly, the service probability can be defined as $c = \tau/t_c$, where $t_c$ is the average e-mail service time.

Due to the retransmission policy, a compliant MTA will attempt retransmission. We assume that spammers' own MTAs (not zombie systems) do not attempt retransmissions under the assumption that the recipients' addresses are invalid [1]. We also assume that senders' histories are maintained by the receiving MTA to accept e-mails after $k_{max}$ retransmission attempts. Given $p_a$ as the spam prior and $p_d$ as the probability that spam is sent by a zombie, $p_a$ and $p_d$ are defined as

$$ p_a = \alpha(1 - p_s) + \alpha p_s (f_p + p_c t_a) \quad (1) $$

$$ p_d = \alpha(1 - p_s) f_p (k_{max} - 1) + \alpha p_s (1 + p_c (k_{max} - 1)) \quad (2) $$

where $t_a = 1 - f_p$ is the true negative. Note that retransmission increases $p_a$ by only one attempt since attempts $1 \leq k < k_{max}$ are rejected.

An $M/M/1/B$ queue $W$ of size $B$ with the arrival probability $p_a$ and service probability $c$ can be analyzed using Markov chain analysis [12]. Assuming that an e-mail cannot arrive and be served in the same step time, the queue can be described by the state transition matrix

$$ P = \begin{bmatrix}
1 - p_a & b & 0 & \cdots & 0 & 0 \\
0 & f & 0 & \cdots & 0 & 0 \\
0 & 0 & f & b & \cdots & 0 \\
0 & 0 & 0 & \cdots & p_a d & 1 - b
\end{bmatrix} \quad (3) $$

where $b = 1 - p_a$, $d = 1 - c$, and $f = p_a c + b d$. The equilibrium distribution vector $w$ [12] can be expressed as

$$ w = \begin{bmatrix} w_0 & w_1 & \cdots & w_{B-1} & w_B \end{bmatrix}^T \quad (4) $$

where $w_i$ is the probability that queue $W$ contains $i$ e-mails. At steady-state, solving $Pw = w$ and $\sum_{i=0}^{B} w_i = 1$ [12] gives

$$ w_i = \frac{(1 - \rho d)^2 d^i}{1 + \rho (c - \rho B d^B)} \quad \text{for} \quad 0 \leq i \leq B. \quad (5) $$

where $\rho = p_a/(bc)$. 

![Fig. 3. The model of the proposed spam rejection during SMTP sessions. Suspected spam e-mails are dropped to reduce the amount of e-mails to be processed by an MTA.](image-url)
We are interested in two performance metrics, the non-spam queueing delay and loss probability. The average queue throughput, $T$, is defined as the probability that an e-mail be served [12] and is defined as

$$ T = c(1 - w_0) \tag{6} $$

From [12], the average queue occupancy $Q$ is given by

$$ Q = \sum_{i=0}^{B} i w_i \tag{7} $$

From Little’s result [12], the average queueing delay $D_s$ is given by

$$ D_s = \frac{Q}{T} = \frac{\sum_{i=0}^{B} i w_i}{c(1 - w_0)} \tag{8} $$

A non-spam e-mail is lost when the queue is full, or when a non-spam e-mail arrives and the queue is not served in a single time step (i.e., $t_c \geq \tau$). For the spam rejection scheme, the non-spam loss probability can be estimated as

$$ L_s = \frac{a(1 - p_s)}{p_0} w_B p_a d \tag{9} $$

We analyzed typical single-queue scheme at receiving MTAs in our recent work on prioritized e-mail servicing [5]. The single-queue scheme does not support spam rejection during SMTP sessions. The queue performance metrics can be obtained using M/M/1/B queue model with input probability $a$ and service probability $c$. From [5], the non-spam queueing delay of the current scheme, $D$, is defined as

$$ D = \frac{\sum_{i=0}^{B} i s_i}{c(1 - s_0)} \tag{10} $$

where $s_i$ is the probability that the common queue contains $i$ e-mails. The non-spam loss probability of the current scheme, $L$, is defined as

$$ L = s_B ad(1 - p_s) \tag{11} $$

V. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS

This section analyzes the performance of our proposed spam rejection scheme. For all figures in this section, horizontal axes represent the arrival to service ratio $0 \leq a/c \leq 2$, where $a/c > 1$ and $a/c \leq 1$ illustrate an under-provisioned and an over-provisioned MTA, respectively. An under-provisioned MTA could not process all incoming e-mails. The horizontal axes are for non-spam delay or loss probability for $B = 50$, $\tau = 0.1$, and $k_{max} = 2$. Dashed lines represent the current (without SMTP rejection) and solid lines represent the proposed scheme.

A. Effect of $p_s$

Fig. 4 shows the performance of the proposed spam rejection scheme when $0.3 \leq p_s \leq 0.7$, $f_p = 0.02$, $f_n = 0.27$, and $p_2 = 0.45$. Fig. 4(a) shows that the queuing delays decrease with increasing $p_s$, where $D_s < D$ for all $a/c$ values. The non-spam loss probabilities show similar trend to the non-spam delay, as shown in Fig. 4(b). Both $L_s$ and $L$ decrease as $p_s$ increases with $L_s < L$ for all $a/c$ values. Since $p_s$ directly affects $p_n$, we can conclude that higher $p_s$ results in higher reduction in spam to be processed, and hence, lower non-spam queueing delay and loss probability.

B. Effect of $f_p$

According to Equation (2), the input to the queue in our proposed spam rejection scheme, $p_n$, is not influenced by the changes in $f_p$ and hence, $D_s$ and $L_s$.

C. Effect of $f_n$

Fig. 5 shows the effect of $f_n$ on the non-spam queueing delays and loss probabilities when $p_s = 0.5$, $f_p = 0.02$, $0 \leq f_n \leq 0.5$, and $p_2 = 0.45$. Fig. 5(a) shows that the queuing delays increase as $f_n$ increases with $D_s < D$ for all $a/c$ values. Similar trend is observed for the non-spam loss probabilities, where increases in $f_n$ increase $L_s$ and $L$ ($L_s < L$ for all $a/c$ values). False negative, $f_n$, affects the input probability to the queues, $p_n$. Increases in $f_n$ increase the input probability to the queue and result in increases in $D_s$ and $L_s$.

D. Effect of $p_s$

One of the main issues of spam rejection during SMTP sessions is zombie-relayed spam e-mails. Fig. 6 shows the effect of $p_s$ on $D_s$ and $L_s$ when $p_2 = 0.5$, $f_p = 0.02$, $f_n = 0.5$, and $0 \leq p_s \leq 0.9$. Fig. 6(a) shows that $D_s$ and $D$ increase as $p_s$ increases, where $D_s < D$ for all $a/c$ values. Similarly, Fig. 6(b) shows $L_s$ and $L$ ($L_s < L$ for all $a/c$ values). Since $p_s$ affects $p_n$, increases in $p_s$ result in increases in $D_s$ and $L_s$. From our analysis, we observed that the value of $p_s \leq 90\%$ gives better performance than the current scheme.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK

We proposed and evaluated a spam rejection scheme during SMTP sessions. We analyzed the performance and cost of the proposed scheme. We found that the proposed spam rejection scheme exhibits better non-spam delay and non-spam loss probability than the single-queue scheme without SMTP rejection. The proposed scheme protects MTAs from being overloaded by huge incoming spam traffic.

This work can be further extended to proposing a scheme to detect and reduce the zombie problem and illegal spam relaying. It can also be extended to spam throttling beyond MTAs by utilizing the layer-3 e-mail classification technique and developing a hardware architecture for e-mail class estimation.

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