

FORMATIONS AND TRANSFORMATIONS OF LANGUAGE REGIMES:  
TURKEY, A CASE STUDY

by  
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FORMATIONS AND TRANSFORMATIONS OF LANGUAGE REGIMES:  
TURKEY, A CASE STUDY

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## ABSTRACT

### FORMATIONS AND TRANSFORMATIONS OF LANGUAGE REGIMES: TURKEY, A CASE STUDY

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Ph.D., Political Science, 2008

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There are two main aims of this dissertation: to present a legal and ideological history of the formation of the language regime in Turkey in the Republican period; and to analyze its transformation in the post-1980 era.

A language regime is defined in this dissertation as a *de jure* or *de facto* regulation of the linguistic behavior, in its content or in its status, within a space of communicative action, such as that of a nation-state or a speech group. In other words, a language regime is a system of the governance of the linguistic domain within a defined political territory by planning and employment of particular policies. Language ideologies, on the other hand, are inseparable aspects of the formulation and operation of the language regimes. Such a conception of language enables an analysis of language as a domain of social and political power.

In the first part of the dissertation, the history of the language politics in the Republican Turkey is analyzed through the concept of language regime, and the ideological repercussions pertaining to the designation and practicing of these regimes are assessed.

The second part concentrates on the changes in post-1980s, within a globalizing environment, in the broadcasting policies and the ways in which language regimes have been transformed. Controversies over two basic processes have been analyzed in this part: the commercialization of the audio-visual domain, and the developments concerning broadcasting in minority languages.

## ÖZET

### DİL REJİMLERİNİN OLUŞUMU VE DÖNÜŞÜMÜ: TÜRKİYE ÖRNEĞİ

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Anahtar Sözcükler: dil rejimleri, ideoloji, Türkiye, küreselleşme

Bu tez, iki ana amaç doğrultusunda tasarlanmıştır: Türkiye’de Cumhuriyet dönemi dil rejiminin kuruluşunun hukuki ve ideolojik bir tarihini sunmak ve bu rejimin 1980 sonrası dönemdeki dönüşümlerini incelemek.

Dil rejimi bu tezin kapsamında, belli bir iletişimsel alan içinde, ki bu alan bir ulus-devletin hüküm sürdüğü dil evreni ya da bir dil topluluğu olabilir, dilsel davranışların yasal ya da fiili olarak düzenlenmesi şeklinde tanımlanmıştır. Bir başka deyişle, dil rejimleri belirli bir siyasi alan içinde dil evreninin yönetilme biçimlerini tanımlar. Dil ideolojileri bu rejimlerin biçimlendirilmesinde, organizasyonunda ve uygulanmasında ayrılmaz unsurlar olarak ortaya çıkar. Dilin bu şekilde kavramsallaştırılması, dilin bir toplumsal ve siyasi iktidar alanı olarak incelenmesine olanak sağlar.

Tezin ilk bölümünde Cumhuriyet döneminin dil politikaları, dil rejimleri kavramı çerçevesinde değerlendirilmiştir. Türkçeyi tek geçerli dil kılan dil rejiminin ideolojik arka planı ile birlikte, bu rejimin kuruluşu ve işletilmesi sırasında türeyen söylemler de analizin kapsamı içine alınmıştır.

Tezin ikinci kısmı bu dil rejiminin 1980 sonrası dönemde ne tür itirazlarla ve meydan okumalarla karşılaştığını incelemektedir. Temel olarak odaklanılan konu yayın politikalarındaki dönüşümdür. Bu dönüşümün iki temel ayağı vardır. Birincisi, 1990’larda gelişen, özel radyo ve televizyon kanallarının ortaya çıkışı, diğer ise, azınlık dillerinde yapılacak yayınlarla ilgili olarak beliren tartışmalardır.

*to ELİF, İDA and ÇINAR...*

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My Ph.D. work began in 2001 at Sabancı University (SU). After deciding to pursue my career in political science, Ayşe Kadiođlu helped me much to make my mind in choosing SU and time has proved her right on that there was no better place in Turkey to do so. Her and Hasan Bülent Kahraman's courses were useful in closing the gaps in my political scientific background. The discussions that we made in their lectures have their marks in many pages of this thesis.

A Ph.D. thesis, I have learnt by experience, is nothing without a qualified body of thesis committee, and I had the chance to consult and receive advice from some of the best social scientists of Turkey.

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## ABBREVIATIONS

- AKP** : *Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi* (Justice and Development Party)  
**ANAP** : *Anavatan Partisi* (Motherland Party)  
**AP** : *Adalet Partisi* (Justice Party)  
**CHP** : *Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi* (Republican People's Party)  
**DİB** : *Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı* (the Presidency of Religious Affairs)  
**DGM** : *Devlet Güvenlik Mahkemesi* (State Security Court)  
**DP** : *Demokrat Parti* (Democratic Party)  
**DPT** : *Devlet Planlama Teşkiatı* (State Planning Organization)  
**DYP** : *Doğru Yol Partisi* (True Path Party)  
**ECSC** : European Coal and Steel Community  
**EU** : The European Union  
**HEP** : *Halkın Emek Partisi* (People's Labor Party)  
**İTC** : *İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti* (the Committee of Union and Progress)  
**LPP** : Language policy and planning  
**MGK** : *Milli Güvenlik Kurulu* (National Security Council)  
**MHP** : *Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi* (Nationalist Action Party)  
**PKK** : *Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan* (Kurdistan Workers' Party)  
**PSB** : Public service broadcaster  
**RTÜK** : *Radyo ve Televizyon Üst Kurulu* (Supreme Board of Radio and Television)  
**SHP** : *Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Parti* (Social Democratic People's Party)  
**TDK** : *Türk Dil Kurumu* (Turkish Language Institution)  
**TRT** : *Türkiye Radyo Televizyon Kurumu* (Turkish Radio and Television Corporation)  
**WWII** : The World War II

## **CHAPTER 1**

### **INTRODUCTION**

Kroskrity marks that various debates on language “serve to keep us aware of the status of language as a primary site of political process and of the discursive mediation of those very activities and events we recognize as political” (2000a, p. 1). A Turkish version of constant push towards such an awareness is exactly what guided this dissertation.

In the last decades, public sphere in Turkey has become an arena where language fighters are chanting and hunting. Language has always been a hot issue to talk and write on, even before the Republican period. For more than a century, the cultured circles experienced confrontations about language. Major disputes have emerged between supporters of Arabic vs. Latin orthography, elite vs. simple language, moderate or living vs. pure Turkish, “progressive-nationalist” vs. “conservative-nationalist” styles, etc.

However, contemporary debates have developed to become significantly different.

For the majority of the participants of the debates, the main concern today is the alleged decline of Turkish. The fear, to be exact, of losing the language that has long been accepted as the “flag” of the national culture has been provoked with increasing use of English in various domains, from education to public communication and consumer culture. The phenomenon of the “corruption” of Turkish by “unconscious” and “careless” users has been equally effective. However, for a smaller number of citizens, mostly Kurds, the issue has been rather about being able to speak, use or learn their mother language. The fire was not fed only by those who were simply debating in

public, but many legal regulations and laws concerning various aspects of language use have been made, ranging from the banning of shop names in non-Turkish languages to the granting limited rights for learning or broadcasting in Kurdish.

In summary, there are concerns about both the status and the corpus of the claimed languages. Status problems, for Turkish, have been interpreted as the language is losing ground to English and Kurdish in many aspects of cultural and social life, which were supposed to be conducted in Turkish. For the Kurdish side, the issue of status is rather a political motive and the agenda is quite different.

Problems of corpus for Turkish is also with the intrusion of English words and idioms into the language itself, but also with the increasing visibility of non-standard varieties of Turkish with respect to the popularization of the mass media. As for Kurdish, its diverse varieties and the question of standardization, again, exhibit distinct characteristics.

Each of the discursive elements of these public debates has been derived from a complicated political background, of which construction was primarily performed by the Republican state. As Kroskirty proposes, recent debates on language in Turkey are considered in this study as great opportunities for the exposition of the political that is intrinsic to language.

For an authentic perspective to analyze language politics in Turkey, one concept, **language regime** is employed as the core theoretical base of this dissertation. A second one, **language ideology**, a widely debated, well-known notion, has also been utilized in order to complement the conceptual framework. This framework and its further implications are explained in the next chapter. In this introductory chapter, I will try to present the contributions that this dissertation might offer in order to understand the historical and ideological aspects of language politics in Turkey. I will also give the outline of the work.

To be specific, this thesis aims at discovering the dynamics of the relationship between language regimes and language ideologies through an analysis of the formation of the Turkish official language regime. This discovery will be enhanced with the examinations of the practical consequences of the language regime with respect to speakers of languages other than Turkish, and of its discursive consequences within the

public sphere with respect to the perception and conception of Kurdish, as a minority language.

Many studies have been published recently on the construction of the national identity in Turkey, and the way in which language was incorporated in this construction.<sup>1</sup> However, these studies are exclusively dedicated to the first decades of the Republic, as they are parts of a recently growing scholarly enterprise to enlighten the political and cultural transformations related to the new era.

In some of the studies on the establishment of the modern language politics in Turkey, the common approach has been to concentrate on instrumental aspects. Questions of how language has been used, changed, modified or reformed in order to supplement the nationalizationist/ modernizationist practices have been in the center of some researches (cf. Çolak, 2004; and Aydıngün & Aydıngün, 2004). In other researches, the nationalist nature of the Language Reform was scrutinized. Şavkay, for example, aims to present the political dimensions of the Turkish Language Reform, especially those that went beyond the mere establishment of a national language for a new nation-state. He questions the ways in which the Reform had been associated with the Kemalists' understanding of nationality (Şavkay, 2002, pp. 16-17).

There is only one study, which could be considered as a social scientific endeavor, on the language politics of the later Republican decades (Doğançay-Aktuna, 2004). Doğançay-Aktuna examines the politics of language since the *Tanzimat* era (the Ottoman reform period of 1839 to 1876), but her analyses are rather formed by conventional perspectives and ideas. In her work, she reproduces the classical themes of the Republican discourse on the issue of language reform and "its success". Most strikingly, her story of the language policy in Turkey does not reflect on any image of the minority languages.

She states that her article has a two-fold purpose: "to familiarize the reader with the most important language planning effort in Turkey, the Turkish Language Reform ... and to discuss current language problems and recent Turkish language planning attempts on Turkish." (p. 5). Whereas the article is titled *Language Planning in Turkey*:

---

<sup>1</sup> See Şavkay (2002), Sadoğlu (2003), Çolak (2004), Aytürk (2004), and Aydıngün and Aydıngün (2004).

*Yesterday and Today*, her theoretical and ideological framework apparently has no space for questioning the re-configuration of the non-Turkish linguistic situation in Turkey by the Republican state's language planning. Her approach, in fact shared by many, takes Turkish as the only legitimate and proper language in Turkey to be discussed in such a presentation. In this dissertation, I aim, *inter alia*, at explaining how this conception of language hierarchy has become so dominant that it also informs academic studies.

As it will be unfolded in the next chapters, Turkish language politics were not only about reshaping the content and the functions of Turkish language, but they were also about the governance of non-Turkish languages. So, to put it another way, the exploration here focuses not only on the constitution of a particular variety of Turkish as the standard and official language of the nation, but also emphasize how other languages and linguistic varieties are excluded, both practically and discursively, outside the legitimate domain of linguistic action in the public sphere.

What conditioned this dissertation has been the examination of the larger system of language politics, with an analysis of recent developments. Nevertheless, a historical background is also considered as a necessity.

The new Republican state acquired a more substantial legitimacy and power that were absent in the last century of the Ottoman Empire. The Republic was ruled by educated elites who had uncompromising faith in positivism for achieving development and social change. Therefore, they conceived language quite differently from the rulers of the Ottoman Empire. This is not say that linguistic matters was completely irrelevant to the culture of the Imperial Palace, but the Republican state introduced practices and narratives of language politics that were far more radical. The language had been constructed as a new category; it was nationalized along with other cultural aspects of the society. People, who were just speaking the language, were confronted with "the national language", which became a sign of loyalty, obedience, unity, and integrity. On the other side, other people who were just speaking "other languages", too, were confronted with the national language, which indexed their own tongue as a symbol of diversity, subversion, treason and betrayal.

In that sense, the language politics of the Republican period is beyond an instrumentalization of language for political ends. It is not simply repressive, either, as



it banned the use of a language while prioritizing another. There are also productive aspects of the language regime and practices in Turkey. The Republican language regime not only denied some languages, but also constructed their status as a non-language (as in the case of Kurdish). It did not only exclude the provincial dialects of the national language, but created a new “high” Turkish (in the process of the Language Reform) while the claim was to create a language that would be of Turkish essence. Last, but not the least, the Turkish language regime constructed and framed the codes of legitimate talk on language. Creation of a moral code of language and spread of it to all citizens resulted in the emergence of a civil society, which would consider Turkish language as one its essential elements. A counter consequence, however, was the emergence of a significant number of discontent citizens, who claimed their own, separate identity through their own language, while facilitating the very ideological principles that the regime produced.

Although the main proposition of the thesis will be that the official language regime of Turkish state has always been to single out Turkish as the one and only legitimate language, this is not to deny that there have been fluctuations in time in the consistency of the regime. These fluctuations has ranged from forwarding a radical version of pure Turkish in the 1930s, constructed within the framework of the *Dil Devrimi* (variously translated as Language Reform or Revolution), to shifting the focus more on the uses of traditional and elite Ottoman Turkish in the 1950s when the *Demokrat Parti* (Democratic Party, DP henceforth) was in power, and to the approval of the implementation of English in many universities as the language of instruction after 1980s. Therefore, the Republican language regime has gone through considerable changes, although the principality of Turkish has never lost power, at least for the majority of the citizens.

The Turkish official language regime has faced serious challenges by the social and cultural transformations particularly in the 1990s. There have been three concurrent and interrelated developments with respect to the sources of these challenges. First, the social structure has been transfigured through urbanization and commercialization of the cultural spheres. Second, distinctive processes inherent in globalization, such as the expansion of economical, political and cultural patterns, considerably threatened the assumed monopoly of the state in determining the cultural dynamics of the population.

And third, the rise of politics of identity brought about the empowerment of identity claims that endangered the presumed integrity of the nation and its cultural and linguistic representations of homogeneity. So, accompanying the recent debates on languages, there have occurred major social and cultural transformations.

To explore both the establishment of the domain of language politics and its ideological implications, as noted above, a core concept, language regime, and a complementary one, language ideology, will be utilized.

The literature of linguistic anthropology has recently concentrated on how particular language ideologies produce particular discourses on language and its use, and particular practices of them (Schieffelin, Woolard, & Kroskrity, 1998). This dissertation aims to explain how certain language policies and practices of linguistic manipulation guide and inform particular language ideologies. That is, it tries to examine the opposite direction of the ideology-regime link. Studies of language ideologies generally excavate ideological underpinnings of certain metalinguistic discourses and practices. Here, the object of analysis is rather the ways in which nation-state politics of language frame linguistic ideologies and how the hegemony of the official discourses of language are established over the perceptions and conceptions of languages in Turkey in general, and of Kurdish as a minority language, in particular. It is intended to present that such a domination or colonization of minds with respect to languages not only operates through a rigorous indoctrination via national and compulsory education and the control over mass communication institutions, but also through the very policies, practices and formations of legitimate and illegitimate domains of language use.

Therefore, the thesis is comprised of three different levels of analysis. The first level focuses on how the domain of language is incorporated as into a project of total political and social transformation an essential dimension. This examination investigates the Turkish modernizationist project of westernization, of which two main pillars has been nationalization and secularization, and its articulation of language as both its medium and instrument. The end result of this articulation has been the construction of a language regime that encompassed the officialization of a particular variety of Turkish in all public domains, and the discouragement and/or the legal exclusion of other varieties of Turkish and non-Turkish languages. As a part of this

analysis, a short examination of the census results will be given in order to assess to what extent the regime was successful in leveling the linguistic differences in Turkey.

The second level of analysis is based on the explanation of the changes and variations within this language regime with respect to social and cultural changes. At this stage, the transformation of the social structures and emerging of new channels of information flows are brought under inquiry, such as globalization, urbanization, and commercialization of the information networks that were once under the monopolistic control of the state.

The third level of analysis concentrates on the development of particular discourses about Kurdish. The survey at this level assesses the discursive frameworks in the public arena about the Kurdish language(s). Since Kurdish has not been controlled and cultivated under a state authority, as Turkish has been in the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the former lacks a unified, standard form. This lack of homogeneity has been frequently overemphasized by the Turkish nationalists, to the point of arguing that there is no language as Kurdish. However, for those who have been in favor of linguistic and cultural freedoms of non-Turkish speakers, the problem is about democratization and human rights, rather than about the justifications for realities of linguistics. Thus, there have developed particular frameworks of discourses on Kurdish that are distinct and competing in the public sphere.

Having presented the conceptual flow of the dissertation, the outline of the chapters and section follows below.

The next, second theoretical chapter will explore the conceptual repercussions pertaining to the concepts of language regime and language ideology. First, a brief review of the traditional research on language policy and planning is presented. Following, enriched by the theoretical contributions of Foucault and Bourdieu, the post-modern critique to the classical language policy research and the evolution of the concept of language regime are reviewed. Last, the theoretical implications (together with language ideology) and the possibilities of explanation promised by the concept are discussed.

From the third chapter on, the empirical research is presented. The chapter starts with a short history of the pre-Ottoman and Ottoman legacies of language politics. Especially the last century of the Empire is considered as important, and is detailed

accordingly, since most of the basic ideological principles of the Republican practices were formed in that period. The formation *and* the practices of modernity in the Ottoman Empire are deemed critically significant for explaining the Republican politics.

In the fourth chapter, the Republican official policies and legal regulations will be analyzed. Regulations, with actual practices, and ideological implications and outcomes, amount to the subsistence of a language regime. The formation and the development of the Republican language regime are analyzed. The main axis is formed by the chronological history of regulations that affected languages of the country, in one way or another. However, the discourses and “realities” generated are also evaluated. Through the notion of language regime, the relationship between the political and the linguistic spheres in the Turkish case will be assessed.

The fifth chapter is devoted to a survey of the changes in the linguistic populations in Turkey. Considered as a sign of the effectiveness of the language regime of the top-down modernization in Turkey, the levels of linguistic assimilation are assessed based on the data from the censuses and other relevant researches.

Chapter 6 continues the history of the language regime in Turkey, now with a specific focus on the regulations of and public debate about broadcasting. Mass media in general, and television and radio broadcasting in particular have become the field of language battles, especially since 1990s. On the one hand, private radio and TV channels have flourished. They rapidly and substantially commercialized a domain that belonged to the state before. The profound changes emerged with commercialization of audio-visual domains inevitably changed the way language has been conceived with respect to broadcasting.<sup>2</sup> Moreover, the intrusion of English was unleashed under the conditions of less-control by the state and of profit maximization.

Broadcasting in a language other than Turkish was considered a political taboo for more than half a century. This taboo has been recently challenged not only by the technological developments that enabled transnational broadcastings that render the official language policies on broadcasting mostly invalid. More importantly the Turkish governments have experienced a two-way pressure from both inside with the demands

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<sup>2</sup> Öncü (2000) discusses various aspects of commercialization in the sphere of television. Öncü’s article has been a major inspiration in the formulation of this dissertation’s case study.

of cultural and linguistic rights, claimed especially by Kurds, and from outside, particularly from the EU that mandates the implementation of a certain level of multiculturalist policies to become a member. Finally, some of the languages other than Turkish were broadcasted on Turkish Radio and Television Corporation (*Türkiye Radyo Televizyon Kurumu*, TRT henceforth) after being defined as “the traditional languages and dialects that are used by the Turkish citizens in their daily lives” instead of being titled as “the minority language”.

Since 2000, the media coverage on the issue of broadcasting in non-Turkish language has been vast. In a context of abundance of speech on language, some regularities with respect to the representations of particular language ideologies have appeared. In the last eight years, there have been reformulations and explicit manifestations of how Turkish and non-Turkish language has been conceived. Therefore, 2000s has been a valuable period for the excavation of language ideologies that have considerable effect in the public arena. Chapter 6, then, will be the part where these language ideologies are presented and analyzed.

The controversy on language in Turkey in the last two decades has been best demonstrated in the field of broadcasting. Spitulnik remarks “[t]he place of powerful institutions such as mass media ... in the construction and the maintenance of such linguistic hegemonies has been the subject of growing attention over the past decade” (Spitulnik, 1998, pp. 164-165). In this sense, this chapter might be considered as a study on the Turkish case of how mass media has become a primary field of conflicts on language politics.

The conclusion chapter will be an evaluation of the findings of the empirical research above. First, the following questions will be answered. To what extent has the theoretical framework that is constructed with the critical notions of language regime and language ideology helped us to understand the political nature of language in Turkey? What are its advantages, and what has it enabled us to uncover? Secondly, based on the categorizations of regimes by Pool and Laitin (see below) and the review of the history of the Turkish language regime, its comparative position with respect to other regimes will be explained. And finally, more theoretical questions will be discussed, such as how language regime and ideology could be related to each other and

how the case study of Turkey helped us to advance the conceptual understanding of politics of language.

## **CHAPTER 2**

### **THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: LANGUAGE REGIME**

The following chapter introduces the theoretical framework of this study. Language regime is presented here as the core concept and it is explained how the concept could be utilized to analyze the formation of and the transformation of the language politics in Turkey.

In the next section, the theoretical and empirical developments that transformed the studies of language politics are presented. After that, the notion of “language regime” is introduced and further conceptual implications that the notion offers are assessed.

#### **2.1 Theoretical Challenges to Traditional Language Planning**

It is widely accepted that language, as a social phenomenon, is political. Its political nature derives from that it is a social and historical construct, which marks cultural borders among genders, statuses and communities, and that it is a means to control or maintain the access to knowledge, hence to power. Language is also always politically contextualized because it has always been incorporated into the power play of politics.

Modernity, by substantially transforming the ways in which the political sphere is organized and operated, has changed the political nature of language (Neustupny, 2006).

Modernity, especially with its urge for scientific understanding and control, turned languages into means of direct cultural and political change and discipline. Language has become one of the essential dimensions of modern forms of power (Wright, 2004 and 2007). “The standardization and the spread of Western European vernaculars” (Wright, 2007, p. 165) were guided and accompanied by a series of parallel and consequential processes: the spread of printing and print capitalism (Anderson, 1991), the formation of the modern state institutions (Wright, 2004), the undertaking of language as an object of science and a resource for intellectual and political discourses (Crowley, 1996; Neis, 2006; and Patten, 2006). The highest level of authority and power in the modern era, the nation-state has taken the “problem of language” seriously from the very beginning and manipulated languages and language uses in the way to national identity construction (Barbour & Carmichael, 2000; and Joseph J. E., 2006). The western European nation-states transferred their experiences in language and culture administration to the colonies, as well, and created a colonial political culture in their imperial domains. As nationalism and modern-state formations are reproduced in non-European geographies, so were the corresponding politics of language.

In 1960s and 1970s, the political interest in language policy and planning (LPP) was becoming globalized. In the center of the interest were the emerging nation-states, mostly established during the rapid decolonization process in Africa and Asia. There were two main sides of these planning attempts. On the one side were the political elites of these countries who inherited the European ideological legacies of state control of the linguistic domains. The other front of language planning process was formed by the language planners from the academic circles, who were, infused with the enthusiasm of modernization theories, believed that these new political settings promised a fertile domain in which linguistic and sociolinguistic theories would be assessed and put into practice.<sup>3</sup>

Some issues were especially attractive. The choice of the official language was one of the main problems. Most decolonized polities were sociolinguistically complicated: there were the languages of the colonialists; the multilingual context of the

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<sup>3</sup> For an in-depth review of the history of language planning studies, see Blommaert (1996) and Wright (2004).



society and a set of linguistic power relations pertaining to ethnic and class distinctions. Standardization and modernization of local languages were other hotspots, since a “modern” language was expected to satisfy the needs of a “modern” nation-state and country. The urge for language modernization was exhibited best in setting up educational language policies for the now-liberated members of these nations, in order to close the “gap” in the race for modernization.<sup>4</sup>

However, theories emerging in the last quarter of the 20<sup>th</sup> century attacked fiercely on these types of Westernizationist/modernizationist missionary attempts. The critique of the modernization theories in general were derived from dual sources of deconstructivism in the western political theory and the theories of post-colonialism. The tides of this critique also influenced classical LPP theory and practice. Sue Wright, in her review of language planning studies, similarly emphasizes that the concern for the relationship between language and power relations was derived from the Critical Theory and postmodernism (2004, pp. 165-172).

The strong belief in the evolutionary progress of human societies that would bind them all, in the end, in the condition of modernity was among the pillars LPP research with modernizationist aspirations. Modernity was defined by the economical, political and cultural standards of the Western societies, of which national citizenship and modern bureaucratic formation of the state apparatus were held to be essential. Glyn Williams similarly argues that "... language planning emerged side by side with the theory of modernization which not only was closely integrated with a specific theoretical perspective - structural functionalism - but also involved a specific conception of the world. This world view involved dividing states into the modern and the traditional." (Williams, 1992, p. 124; cited in Blommaert J. , 1996).<sup>5</sup>

Criticism of conceptual categorization of “the modern” and “the traditional” has also been coupled by the critique of modernity itself. Many scholars followed the Frankfurt School’s disillusionment with modernity and the Enlightenment, especially

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<sup>4</sup> See Spolsky and Hult (2008) for a collection of empirical and theoretical essays on how educational language and language cultivation has been major issues for nation-states.

<sup>5</sup> For a further analysis of the theoretical foundations of the classical LPP studies, see Richard J. Watts (2001), especially pages 297-298.

that of Adorno and Horkheimer. Postmodern theories interrogated the institutions and technologies of modernity, and questioned to what extent modernity, as a discourse and practice, fulfilled its promise for the well-being and the development of humanity; and what it can further contribute (Wright, 2004).

Within the re-assessment of modernity, via its method and its content, none of the modern social and political formations were left out, including nationalism and language.

With respect to nationalism, a theoretical deconstruction of the modernist nationalist utopia was launched by those who successfully interpreted nationalism as an invention of modernity, rather than a transcendental historical ideal (Gellner E. , 1983; Hobsbawm E. J., 1993; Anderson, 1991; Kroskrity P. V., 2000b).

However, for the issue of language, the deconstructivist attacks proved more subversive. The strongest criticism to the understanding of language as an object be studied, categorized and planned, appeared within anthropology, especially studies of linguistic anthropology. The nature of anthropological research and theory challenges established conceptions of social dynamics. Kroskrity identifies that there has been an increasing awareness in anthropological perspective to complement the microanalysis of language with “an understanding of how such patterns might be related to political-economic macroprocesses” (2000a, p. 2). He describes how the 20<sup>th</sup> century linguistics mostly dealt with an “amputated” language, that is language removed from its social and political context and he marks the theoretical re-assessments to restore “the relevance of contextual factors” (p. 5). Kroskrity refers, for example, to Irvine where she launches a socio-cultural emphasis as she concentrates on “the cultural system of ideas about social and linguistic relationships, together with their loading of moral and political interests” (Irvine, 1989, p. 255; cited in p. 5).

A series of reconsideration has also emerged about how language has become an instrument of politics and science. Among other philosophers, Foucault “acknowledge[d] the significance for modernity of the construction of language as a separate realm in the 17th century” (Foucault M. , 2002; cited in Makoni & Pennycook, 2005, p. 145). Bauman and Briggs similarly questioned the modern establishment of language as a discrete domain, and asked “how language came into being” (2003, p. 7). Mühlhäusler joined this track with his claim that “the notion of a ‘language’ is a recent

culture-specific notion associated with the rise of European nation-states and the Enlightenment. The notion of ‘a language’ makes little sense in most traditional societies.” (Mühlhäusler, 2000, p. 358).

Similarly, Blommaert notes, language is a key ingredient of modernity and thus a rather recent construct (Blommaert, 2006, p. 512). He adds, “... but it has become the most widespread view of language both in popular and in scientific circles. Linguistics has contributed in no small degree to the cultural construction of language in general as a stable, contextless individual mental object, and language and educational policies as well as larger nation-building programs have been deeply influenced by this ideology” (ibid.).

On the front historians and sociologists, on the other hand, approaches to the linguistic dimensions of modernity, nationalism and the political. Anderson (1991) focused on this issue in relation with the emergence of nationalism and modern politics of language. He unearthed the association between nation building and language construction. Likewise, Blommaert confirmed that standardization of languages has been tied to the rise of nation-states and the concurrent project of modernity (1996). Glyn Williams (1992, p. 128) described how, as a part of that project, language has been situated within an evolutionary view of progress, which is itself a central idea of the modernist thought.

Among all, Bourdieu stands significantly distinctive in “understanding and exposing the role of language in power relations” (Wright, 2004, p. 11).

Like Foucault, Bourdieu was also interested in how modern power relations are established, and through which dynamics they are maintained or subverted. In his analysis, the notion of “symbolic power” is located at the center, defined as the power in constructing reality (1991, p. 166). He further elaborates on “reality”, where he echoes Foucault’s truth regimes<sup>6</sup>: reality normalizes the social taxonomy of the social inequality (a process of legitimization of domination), naturalizes new configurations of

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<sup>6</sup> For Foucault, what is called “truth” is not independent of power: “... there are truths that correlate with modes of government. The production of truth is ‘not the production of true utterances but the establishment of domains, or ‘regimes of truth’, in which the practice of true and false can be made at once ordered and pertinent’ (Foucault M. , 1981, p. 9; quoted in Simmons, 1995, p. 44).

power relations, and it subjugates the dominated. In this sense, symbolic power imposes systems of classifications, or hierarchies. His approach has challenged those of linguists with an understanding of language as a transcendental grammatical reality. Bourdieu criticized, for example, Chomsky's theory of universal language for ignoring the economic and social conditions of language and "social laws of construction", and hence, for masking the "social genesis of language" (Bourdieu, 1991, p. 44). A categorization of language, which had become of historical importance in the science of linguistics, Saussure's *langue* vs. *parole*, could not escape Bourdieu's critique, either.<sup>7</sup> Bourdieu emphasized the political unification of "a" language in the formation of modern official languages and during the incorporation of the vernaculars into the language of the political authority. Saussure's *langue* as a category actually corresponds to official languages, according to Bourdieu.

Subsequently, Bourdieu reversed one of the classical and popular assumptions about official languages and languages of the people. According to him, it is the politics of official language that has constructed the "linguistic community" as a "group of people who use the same system of linguistic signs"; and that such a construction has been a precondition "for economic production and even for symbolic domination" (Bourdieu, 1991, p. 45).<sup>8</sup>

Bourdieu's critical approach has inspired many scholars who reviewed, not only the actual relationships of politics and language, but also theoretical orientations that have had framed studies of those relationships.

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<sup>7</sup> On *langue* and *parole*, Sanders reminds that "the former refers to the potential linguistic system which resides in the mind of all members of a speech community, and waits to be activated in *parole*, in individual utterances, or acts of speech" (2004, pp. 4-5).

<sup>8</sup> Bourdieu's relating language and economics sounds is similar to Gellner's idea of establishment of horizontal social relationships via institutions of education and relations of capitalist production (Gellner E. , 1983).

## 2.2 New Approaches to LPP Research

The new theoretical influence on “traditional language policy and language planning” (Wright, 2007, p. 164) has been more than a mere criticism. Hornberger marks that critical and postmodern theories have made their way into LPP research, “infusing new perspectives and emphases” (2006, p. 24). LPP research and practice itself has become an object theoretical attention. Hornberger points out that Cooper (1989) and Tollefson (1991) were first to critically revise LPP. Cooper has proposed a descriptive function for the field of LPP, while Tollefson has sought to “contribute to a theory of language planning that locates the field within social theory” (1991, p. 8; cited in Hornberger, 2006, p. 24).

These new perspectives led the way to the new conceptual tools, as well. New concepts prioritized some of the issues like locality, diversity, subjectification and objectification, power as a dispersed network rather than an application of domination from above, reproduction and subversion of/through power relations, etc. In these new orientations, focus shifted to explain how “language is employed to produce, maintain and change the social relations of power and to permit the domination of some people over others” (Wright, 2004, p. 167).

One of the flourishing new concepts has been “language regime”. This concept, with its underpinnings and promises for the analysis of politics of language will be discussed in the sections below. Before that, there is a need to describe the new world order within which these new conceptualizations thrived.

The new theoretical approaches were coupled with the revival and reformation of the field of LPP within the discipline of sociolinguistics. For Hornberger, this resurgence was due to two factors: “the imperious spread of English and other global languages, and reciprocally the alarming loss and endangerment of indigenous and small language communities world-wide” (2006, p. 24). There have been various forces of globalization, both from above and from below, which challenged established systems of politics of language.

## **2.3 Revival of LPP Research in Connection with Globalization**

After 1980s, conceptualized under the notion of globalization<sup>9</sup>, the new world (dis)order generated many repercussions, which subverted particular aspects of the modern political order. Not as a primary cause but as a process in effect, globalization also entailed the creation of new areas of interest for LPP scholars. Equipped by the new theoretical orientations, scholars focused on a new set of linguistic problems, which were quite different from those they dealt with within the mind-set of post-colonial nation-state building (cf. Maurais & Morris, 2004). These new studies focus on four main sites of language political challenges.

First, the dissolution of Soviet Union resulted in the rapid formation of new republics, in which now language, as a political battleground, was to be reconfigured. Second, the European Union (EU), as one of the most ambitious and controversial political projects in history, has given rise to equally controversial linguistic problems. Within this project, multiculturalism and multilingualism have been presented as political ideals, but on the other hand, they posed more questions than they aimed to answer. Third, the problematic of linguistic matters, fueled by both ethnic nationalisms and immigrant communities, have forced the long established language regimes of national politics to be reformulated. Fourth, the global storming effect of English has become the top ranking linguistic issue in almost every country. Having implications for all the previous three areas of research, the domination of English has also been critical for the futures of national or sub-national languages. In the following sections, these four new spheres of study of language politics will be explored briefly.

### **2.3.1 The Aftermath of the Break of the Soviet Union**

The fall of the Soviet Union was not only about the collapse of the communist system and a disappointment with the socialist utopia. It meant a radical change in the overall world power system, as well. To the interest of the scholars of LPP, the end of

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<sup>9</sup> For theories of globalization, see Robertson (1990) and Robinson (2007).

the Soviet era entailed re-establishment of the local politico-linguistic spheres due to the formation of new nation-states together with their attempts to form capitalist economies and liberal democratic parliamentary systems. In all these post-Soviet republics, nationalist ideologies eventually triumphed and language politics were nationalized in contrast with the “imperialistic” politics of language in the Soviet Union (Hogan-Brun, 2005b, p. 369), which was based on the precedence of Russian.<sup>10</sup>

In his work on the changes in language regimes in globalizing environments, Coulmas refers to the developments in post-Soviet republics and shows how

“... language policies were adopted to expand the communicative space of the national languages at the expense of Russian, the language of the erstwhile power holders. Language laws passed from 1989 to 1995 were explicitly anti-Russian, restricting the use of Russian in spheres of regulated communication. By means of laws of citizenship and linguistic qualifying requirements, Russian was turned from the language of power that dominated all domains of higher communication into a stigmatized ethnic language.” (2005a, p. 8).

The geography directly affected by the fall of the Soviet Union was vast. Baltic and Black Sea coasts, Caucasia, and Central Asia have hosted new republics. The new sociolinguistic situations were multi-layered and complicated with officialized languages of the majorities; minority languages; lingering hegemony of Russian, linguistically, and of Russia, politically; and the lowered instrumental value of all these varieties in the international arenas of communication and competition with respect to English.

In the three states on the Baltic shores, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, national languages have been very strong symbols for cultural authenticity and “central to the political life” (Hogan-Brun, 2005b, p. 368).<sup>11</sup> In all three Republics, the status and the prestige of the national languages are secured at the constitutional level.

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<sup>10</sup> For a historical account of the Soviet language politics, and how language became a crucial symbol in the dissolution of the USSR, see Marshall (1996). Pavlenko (2006), too, presents the situation of Russian in the territory of the former Soviet Union.

<sup>11</sup> For a comparative sociolinguistic analysis of the Baltic states, see Hogan-Brun (2005a).

In Lithuania, for example, “the Lithuanian language is one of the key elements of ethnic and cultural originality of the Lithuanian state, an inseparable part of the nation’s spiritual culture, the guarantee of national identity and survival, the language of state and individual, the language of the state and all spheres of public life.” (Smetoniene, 2003, p. 147; cited in Grumadiene, 2005).

As noted above, the Baltic states issued further laws that required the use (or the demonstration of competence to use) of the national languages in public contact. “[O]ther requirements covered the increase of teaching of the national language in all school systems, signage, and measures promoting the national languages in broadcasting, publication and public life.” (Ozolins, 2003, p. 218). Nevertheless, there have been important problems with respect to the linguistic rights of the Russian minorities. Lithuania differs from the other two Republics in that the proportion of its main ethnic population was preserved during the post-WWII migrations from the other Soviet republics that were mainly initiated by the Soviet regime. Major demographic changes have taken place since then “reducing the titular nationals to 61.3% of the population in Estonia by 1989 (down from a pre-war 88%) and to 52% in Latvia (down from 77%). Lithuanians’ proportion remained largely unchanged, at 79.6% (down from 80.6%)” (ibid.). Ozolins reports that in Estonia and Latvia, those (of whatever nationality) who were citizens in 1940 at the time of Soviet occupation and their descendants were granted citizenship, leaving over 30% of the population in Latvia and 25% in Estonia without citizenship (ibid.). While Moscow, concerned with the conditions for Russian speaking minorities, was quite agitated by the Baltic initiatives and delayed the withdrawal of its armies, the institutions of the European Union, of which the Baltic states decidedly endeavored to become members, were closely monitoring the standards of human rights, as the minority and language rights are one of the main accession criteria. In short, these countries had to find out ways out of rather challenging language political situations and work on a balanced standpoint that would simultaneously satisfy the members of the EU for accepting them to the Union, ease the worries of Russian government and soothe its possible aggression, and respond to the nationals that were demanding their cultural security and independence.

On the other hand, membership to the EU has been perceived as both an opportunity and a potential threat concerning the Baltic languages. Hogan-Brun notes



the anticipation in external strengthening Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian as official languages of the Union, accompanied with a “growing awareness of an ensuing local impact of more widely spoken languages such as English, French and German” (2005b, p. 368).

Ukraine, another independent republic of the post-Soviet period, similarly turned its attention on the empowerment of the national language and worked on the establishment of the superiority of Ukrainian over Russian.<sup>12</sup> While Ukrainian was made the official language of the Republic, Russian was downgraded to the status of a minority language (Janmaat, 1999, p. 475). However, this has posed major problems, since the Russian speaking community forms the almost half of the Ukrainian citizens (Taranenko, 2007, p. 119 and 123). The new Constitution of the Ukraine adopted in 1996 further confirmed the status of Ukrainian as the state language, as well as a number of other laws (on education, mass media, television and broadcasting, the Ukrainian Armed Forces, citizenship, etc.) and state programs which also provided for the expansion of the functions of the Ukrainian language in society” (p. 127-128). The educational language policies expanded the use of Ukrainian against Russian; however, the political demand to register Russian as the second official language of the state remains powerful (ibid.).

Belarus followed a somewhat different pattern. Although, since the 1980s, “the Belarusian language became the symbol of Belarusian independence” (Goujon, 1999, p. 661), the political leadership, even after independence, has been mostly in favor of maintaining a close relationship with Moscow and aimed at the continuation of the pro-Russian language politics. Goujon describes how Belarusian became the battleground for power between the two main factions running for the government since the independence (1999). The 1994 Constitution re-affirmed the article of the previous

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<sup>12</sup> For a sociolinguistic study on the Ukrainian language politics, see Bilaniuk (2005).

constitution, which stated that Belarusian is the official language of the state, but in 1996, a referendum approved an equal official status to Russian (p. 665).<sup>13</sup>

Kazakhstan, too, experienced a process of Russification with the establishment of Soviet Union. “The issue of the Kazakh language was among the main grievances articulated by Kazakh intellectuals in the wake of the national revival during Perestroika.” (Bissenova, 2004, p. 5). The current constitution, adopted in 1995, grants Kazakh the status of state language, but it also recognizes “Russian as the language of ‘interethnic communication’ and guarantees its ‘equal use’ in the government and media” (ibid.). In 1997, a Law on Languages was issued to support Kazakh in its use in bureaucracy and mass communications. Bissenova underlines that the politics of language has already coincided with political and social tensions among various sections of the society, especially between Kazakhs and Russians. Similar to the case in Belarus, there is a strong political opposition in Kazakhstan and an international pressure from the Russian diplomatic channels, to raise the status of Russian to the level of the second state language.

Azerbaijan became independent in 1991 and in its constitution, Article 21 notes that “the Azerbaijan language shall be the state language” (quoted in Bishop, 2006, p. 634). Speakers of minority languages constitute comparatively a smaller part of the society, with 3% Russian and 2% Armenian, hence, the language ideological debates are more focused on the issues of Azerbaijani, itself, such as its script and purification (ibid.).

Uzbekistan, the most populated country of its region, exhibits alike numbers of linguistic minorities with 14% Russian and 4% of Tajiki speakers. Uzbekistan adopted a change in script to a Latin-based orthography in 1993. As in other Central Asian Republics, language and language policies have become important dimensions of the political sphere after independence, and moving away from a Slavic script to a Latin one is in concert with the creation of an authentic linguistic and cultural identity apart from Russia and Russian:

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<sup>13</sup> For a study that analyzes the uses of both languages in public spaces in Belarus, see N. Anthony Brown (2007). For another study by Brown on another dimension of Belarusian language issues, with a more sociolinguistic emphasis on the role of language in shaping individual and collective identity, see (2005). For a study on language ideologies in Belarus, see Woolhiser (2001).

“And perhaps most significantly, Latinized Uzbek emphasized the geopolitical borders of Uzbekistan, distinguishing it from Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, which use Cyrillic script; Afghanistan, which uses Arabic script; and Tajikistan, which uses both Cyrillic and Arabic letters. (Turkmenistan also adopted a Latin alphabet but remains politically isolated because of the policies of its government.) (Montgomery, 2006, p. 291).

In the Republic of Tatarstan, de-Russification of the language, as well, has been an integral part of the Tatar nationalist ideology and identity. The Republic is similar to Ukraine in that the Tatar and Russian populations are both around 45%, as Tatars are slightly higher in number (Davis, Hammond, & Nizamova, 2000, p. 204). Since the declaration of Tatarstan’s autonomy in 1990, Wertheim reports, “government has been legislating ‘promotive’ language policies in an attempt to put Tatar on more equal footing with Russian, such that Tatar is now one of the Republic’s two official languages and Tatar language study is compulsory in primary and secondary school” (2003, p. 348). Tatarstan, despite the nationalist discourse and practices to support Tatar, experiences the hegemonic domination of Russian, as a legacy of the Soviet period. Davis, Hammond and Nizamova report that the 1989 census revealed that while more than 77% of Tatars knew Russian, only 1.1% of Russians understood Tatar (2000, p. 205). In parallel, where the state authority is less decisive, such in many aspects of public and cultural life, there is an imbalance in favor of Russian (p. 204).

The destruction of the Soviet system was also effective on what was once called “Eastern Block” countries with communist regimes. Released from the subjugation by the Soviet regime, these eastern European countries turned their faces towards capitalist/liberal westernization. Pertaining to politics of language, these new regimes found themselves facing unaccustomed problems in the face of speedy transformation.<sup>14</sup>

Studies that focus on the post-Soviet language political issues bring forward novel insights into a variety of theoretical subjects. They refer to matters such as minority and/or linguistic rights, cross-cultural analysis of language politics, discourses on diversity and integrity especially those derived from Western experiences.

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<sup>14</sup> For a historical analysis of the language politics in Hungary, with a special emphasis on the developments after the fall of communism in 1989, see Medgyes Katalin Miklósy (2000). For the post-Yugoslavian case, see Greenberg (2001)

Ozolins, for example, by examining “the specific sociolinguistic situation in the Baltic including the often unrecognised attitudes of the Russian-speaking minorities”, introduces a “critique of the minority-rights based approach of European institutions” (2003, p. 217). Hogan-Brun, similarly, “explores issues pertaining to the transferability of standards developed for established democracies in the West to the situation of democratizing countries in Central and Eastern Europe, where the demographic legacy of the Soviet past has left its imprint on the structure and outlook of society” and “considers a range of factors which need to be taken into account in Western discourses on diversity and integration, or sameness and difference, when applied to post-communist or post-imperialist contexts” (2005b, p. 367). Exemplified by both authors, the post-Soviet terrain not only raised new policy-based issues but also generated a new critical perspective that also reflects upon the Western experience and conceptions of language.

In addition to the critical analyses of the post-Soviet language politics, there has appeared another fertile ground for re-thinking the relationships among language, state, citizenship and nationality; the European Union.

### **2.3.2 The European Union**

Established at first as the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951, the European Union, by 2008, includes 27 states with two more, Croatia and Turkey, in the process of negotiations for full membership. The transnational project of the EU has been stimulating in many respects. For one, although the origins of the Union were based on post-WWII solidarity aimed at economical recovery, it promised the realization of the idea of a union of Europe. It was a dream to be emphasized from time to time since the Enlightenment to become *the* Europe, a singular entity, a unity could at last end the centuries old national and religious conflicts. Brought together, the peoples of Europe would enjoy the richness of cultural diversity and political unity simultaneously.

Mamadouh summarizes what makes the issue of language rather a complicated problematic for the EU, as follows:

“The linguistic configuration of the European Union consists of the official and national languages of the Member States, of which are also the official and working languages of the European Union, many regional languages with an official status in regional constituencies (such as Basque in the Basque Country in Spain), regional languages with no such status (such as Corsican), non-territorial languages (such as Romani) and non-territorial languages of (recent) immigrant communities (such as Turkish). (1999, p. 134).<sup>15</sup>

There are many languages in effective use within the borders of the EU. Urrutia and Lasagabaster report that the Union encompasses more than 60 autochthonous languages in its member states (2007, p. 479). By 2008, there are 23 official languages of the Union.<sup>16</sup>

The Union itself was also a fresh field of experiment for the language planners. Since every citizen of the member states has been supposed to participate in decision making processes, the language problem to realize this aim was a painstaking one. On the one hand, there is the political ideal of equality of differences, in this context, linguistically. On the other hand, there exists the difficult question of maintaining an efficient way of working of the bureaucratic units within this plethora of languages.

van Someren, in her study of language policies of the EU, states that in 2003 all translation and interpretation work of EU institutions cost about a billion Euros. She also adds that this “figure does not include the costs for language courses, office space and booths and the finances that are actually needed for more employees to cope with the current backlogs in the EU translation and interpretation divisions” (Van Someren, 2004). It is important to note that these figures belong to the year 2003, that is before ten new states joined in 2004, and two more (Bulgarian and Romania) in 2007 to add eleven more languages to already existing spectrum of official languages of the EU. The time consumed in translations is immense and the hindrance to an efficient working schedule is easily anticipated.

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<sup>15</sup> See Urrutia and Lasagabaster (2007) for the chronology of expansion of the EU’s official language list.

<sup>16</sup> The official languages of the Union are, in the alphabetical order; Bulgarian, Czech, Danish, Dutch, English Estonian, Finnish, French, German, Greek, Hungarian, Irish, Italian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Maltese, Polish, Portuguese, Romanian, Slovak, Slovene, Spanish, Swedish. (Languages of Europe, 2008).

“The principles underpinning policies in both the Council of Europe and the EU, then, are broadly complementary and clearly support multilingualism. Nonetheless, the implementation of these policies is largely left to the governments at nation-state level. It is, therefore, no surprise that European language policy is developing at different speeds and even in different directions, the inevitable gainer in such a situation being international English.” (Mar-Molinero & Stevenson, *Language Policy in a Changing Europe - Introduction*, 2006b, p. 240)

For these reasons, there has been a challenging race among the language planners to work out solution to the linguistic problems of the Union.

Mar-Molinero and Stevenson reports how, since 1991, key language questions confronting the Union are raised by a number of scholarly works (2006b, p. 241). Starting with the publication of *A Language Policy for the European Community*, edited by Florian Coulmas (1991), a debate about the language policy and practices across Europe has been opened.<sup>17</sup>

One major work on the theoretical debates inflicted by the complexities of the language politics in the EU is written by Jonathan Pool (1996). Pool discusses whether an optimal language regime that is both politically and economically correct (p. 161) is a possibility for the Union, and he concludes affirmatively.<sup>18</sup> He elaborates on various possible policies of languages regimes and analyzes them with respect to political ideals, such as equality for all languages, and to economical reasonable. Although Pool himself does not offer a single model for the Union, he proposes a consideration of different official language systems “potentially optimal” for the institutions of the EU (p. 177).

Pia Vanting Christiansen, too, elaborates on the possible futures of the language policies of the EU (2006). The author analyzes “ten future language policy scenarios, selected as representative of the spectrum of language policies available to the European

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<sup>17</sup> For a wide-range of discussions on the issue, see Mamadouh (1999), Extra & Gorter (2001), Lenaerts (2001), O’Reilly (2001) , Grin (2003), Hogan-Brun & Wolff (2003), Phillipson (2003), Baldauf & Kaplan (2005; and 2006), Ginsburgh & Weber (2005), Horspool (2006), Mar-Molinero & Stevenson (2006a), and Trenz (2007)

<sup>18</sup> In a previous study, Pool already argued that the dilemma of political fairness versus economical efficiency in determining official language policies in multilingual societies could be overcome (1991).

Parliament” (p. 23). Christiansen differentiates various levels of language use within the EU, such as daily communication, contact languages with the governing bodies the Union, translation and interpretation facilities. She debates how different domains of language use could be organized and managed, including the corresponding educational and organizational plans. The scenarios include the present situation from which English is benefitted, and other possible alternatives, some of which are more democratic and ecological, while other are more hierarchical and hegemonic. Among various possibilities, Christiansen argues in favor of the employment of a planned language (such as Esperanto) in the long term, as the lingua franca of the Union; and “thereby contributing to establishing a democratic public sphere in the EU” (p. 38).

With its repercussions to nationalism, rights (individual or communal), civil society, public sphere and reconfiguration of the political, the linguistic issues in the EU have been and, as it seems, will continue to be attracting much interest.

### **2.3.3 Minority Groups vs. the Nation-state**

In traditional LPP practice, multilingual social settings, which were to be found in every nation-state, were found disruptive. They were the outward signs of multi-ethnic populations, therefore, in conflict with the project of modernization. Laitin summarizes the extent of the debate within the classical approach to LPP:

“Ethnic heterogeneity is often portrayed as a powerful source of democratic instability, regional assertiveness, and civil war. In his classic essay on primordial conflict, Geertz (1973) sees it as a source of chronic tension in the postcolonial states after World War II. Dahl (1971) sees it as a serious constraint to the success of democracy. Rabushka and Shepsle (1972) model ethnic heterogeneity such that it leads in equilibrium to the breakdown of democratic regimes. Connor (1994) equates ethnic heterogeneity with higher probability for civil war. But not all studies link heterogeneity with unhappy outcomes. Lijphart (1977) for one showed the possibility for democracy (of the nonmajoritarian sort) under conditions of cultural pluralism” (2000, p. 142).

The rise of the notion of minority rights has been another field that challenged the LPP researchers. While the focus in the traditional LPP studies was on the formation and the maintenance of the nation-state and its language policies, post-1980s were the

times when the axes of the debates shifted. The emphases, since then, have been on the linguistic policies that would be produced to ensure the survival and the rights of the languages of minorities. Various new terminologies were developed, such as linguistic rights, linguistic human rights, linguistic discrimination, and linguicide or linguistic genocide. Many scholars wrote extensively on how language politics of nation-states and colonial powers ended up with the destruction of languages of minorities, either in power or in number (see Atkins, 1978; Phillipson & Skutnabb-Kangas, 1994; Hamel, 1997; Skutnabb-Kangas, 2000; and Masenko, 2005). A parallel issue that concerns the backlash of locally dominant national languages against the hegemony of English in the globalization process is also a crucial debate, as will be discussed below.

Contrary to the expectations towards the dissolution of nationalism in the post/late-modern world<sup>19</sup>, there is an apparent process of re-nationalization in the already established nation-states and a rise of ethnic nationalism by the sub-national minorities who seek autonomy or independence. Pleading for language rights or linguistic survival has been one of the pillars of these ethnic/national struggles.

Besides the demands from existing minorities, new minorities are incessantly formed across world-geography due to the increased flow of individuals. The dislocation and relocation of masses due to civil wars, military occupations or oppression, poverty or streams of labor force doubles the linguistic challenges that countries and LPP researches face. As Heinrich concurs, “[c]hanging language regimes exert pressure on national languages. Their ideological assessment is affected because a growing number of new (foreign) speakers and their ‘deviant’ language behavior serve as evidence as well as a source of change” (2005, p. 228).

A remarkable point concerning the issues of minority language is that the very logic of the politics of language that nation-states have been employing now turned back onto themselves. That is, nation-states have built their own systems of language policies on the premise that every nation, as the political expression of a unique culture, represents itself exclusively with its unique language, its vital marker for identity.

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<sup>19</sup> Hobsbawm, for example, argues that, historically speaking, nationalisms becoming more and more insignificant (1993, p. 225). It should be reminded that his argument was originally written down 1989 and published in 1990, as Hobsbawm reminds in his preface to the Turkish translation.



Hence, the nation-states have been assumed to uphold the right to pursue the development and practice of the language of the proclaimed nation (Barbour & Carmichael, 2000). However, the rising waves of nationalisms of ethnicities turned linguistic minorities of the nation-states into new nations, or they reclaimed their “abused” right to become one). The political actors of these nationalisms raised a similar demand, like that of the nation-state: the political independence or autonomy of the distinct linguistic/cultural community.

Coupled with the rise of equality and freedom of choice as basic values, at least in theory, the road to the recognition of the languages of autochthonous and immigrant minorities was drawn. Coulmas concludes that

“[t]hus, ironically, in combination with progressing democratization, monolingual language regimes have become instrumental in their own undoing. All Western countries ... are faced with increasing linguistic pluralism in urban centres and, calls for deregulation notwithstanding, feel compelled to introduce more language regulations targeted especially at immigrant communities” (2005a, p. 12).

#### **2.3.4 English as the global lingua franca**

Besides the pressure from below by the minorities, nation-state language policies are also under threat from above by the overwhelming effects of English, which has developed to be the worldwide *lingua franca*, not only in the capitalist consumer universe, but also in academics, international communication and organizations. English seems disempowering national languages, even in homeland domains such as the language of the university education. On the other hand, intrusion of English hinders the instrumental functions of both national and minority languages. They are rendered to be less effective in increasingly interconnected universe of institutions and processes. Coulmas comments:

“[M]arketization, democratization and deregulation favor languages of scale and undermine the instrumental utility of local languages. Push factors, such as government sanctioned foreign language education, and pull factors, such as tourism, cross-border communication, Internet trade and international migration advance the expansion of English. More generally,

bigger languages expand at the expense of smaller ones. Diminishing linguistic diversity worldwide is the result” (2005a, p. 12).

Many researches and arguments are produced concerning the global diffusion of English (see Pennycook A. , 1994; Siedlhofer, 2001; Brutt-Griffler, 2002; Crystal, 2003; and House, 2003). A concept used to explain the hegemonic power of English has been “linguistic imperialism” (Phillipson R. , 1992). Chimombo summarizes the debate:

“This imperialism is most clearly confirmed in the fact that 80 percent of the information stored in the world's electronic retrieval systems is in English, with the vast majority of people communicating in English through the Internet (Crystal 1997:360). Far from being a "neutral" international language, culturally and politically, English is asserting and maintaining its dominance by ‘...the establishment and continuous reconstitution of structural and cultural inequalities between English and other languages’ (Phillipson 1992:47; cf. Pennycook 1994:12). The dominance of English is thus leading, if not to linguistic genocide, at least to ‘linguistic curtailment’ (Pennycook 1994:14)” (1999, pp. 222-223).

Surely, the constitution of structural and cultural inequality with respect to globalization is not confined to linguistic sphere; there is also political inequality at stake where the non-Western subjecthood has to express itself in the conceptual framework of the West. According to Griffiths, technological imperialism that works through transnational communication and media networks implicate two further problems:

“First, ... the flow of information is still largely one-way and [is] determined by the economic control of the large Western international publishing houses and media distributors; and secondly, ... when the postcolonial world wants to employ the resources and technology of the metropolitan world to speak, it had better learn to do so in voices and accents (for these read formats and structures) which people in the West want to hear” (1997, p. 131; cited in Chimombo, 1999, p. 223).

Again ironically, opposition to globalization at the international level is also organized in English. The Internet and English are not merely the medium of global domination; they are also the connection that enables a global resistance (Coulmas, 2005a, p. 13).

Resentment of local nationalisms operates in language politics, as well, in addition to the reactions against the dynamics of economic and political globalization. The idea of protection of national languages serves two advantages for nationalism: it both enables the fabrication of defensive language policies against the perceived attack of English, such as limiting the use of the latter in certain sites such as shop and company names; and it re-confirms the rigidity of the national language policies against minority demands.

In summary, latest studies on language politics have focused on recently generated areas of research and are equipped with new theoretical directions. New concepts have been crafted to unearth the disguised relationships of language and politics as they are revealed by emerging problematics. One of these new concepts, “language regime” is considered most effective for the framework of this dissertation.<sup>20</sup> Below are the theoretical introduction of the concept, its implications for the association between language politics and power relations and a final debate on how it can help to illuminate our understanding of the dynamics of language politics in Turkey.

#### 2.4 A History of the Concept of “Language Regime”

In fact, the notion has already been used for some decades, however with a restricted scope. The political tensions concerning what language should be used in the services of schools, municipalities or governments of some states with multilingual populations were already on the rise in late 1960s and 1970s. Scholars, who were interested in language status problems in administration and education systems of

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<sup>20</sup> Other relevant new concepts are **linguistic culture** (see Schiffman, 1998 and 2006), **linguistic landscape** (see Landry & Bourhis, 1997; Hicks, 2002; Ben-Rafael, Shohamy, Amara, & Trumper-Hecht, 2004; Shohamy, 2006; Gorter, 2006; Backhaus, 2007; and Shohamy & Durk Gorter, 2009), **language/linguistic ecology** (see Mühlhäusler, 1996 and 2000; Maffi, 2000 and 2001; and Pennycook, 2004) and **language ideology** (see Silverstein, 1979; Joseph & Taylor, 1990; Woolard, 1992; Woolard & Schieffelin, 1994; Schieffelin, Woolard, & Kroskrity, 1998; Blommaert J., 1999 and 2006; and Kroskrity, 2000a).

multilingual social settings, used the notion of language regime to describe policies of official language. Main debates were about the ways to implement monolingual or bilingual language regimes in bureaucratic services and/or schools. Such studies focused on two major geographical areas where language regime debates were similarly assessed: Canada with her francophone state, Quebec (see Pharand, 1968; Rowat, 1968; Smiley, 1978; and Esman, 1982) and Belgium with her problems of regionalism between Flanders and Wallonia (see Stephenson, 1972; Dunn, 1974; Geiger, 1980; and Halls, 1983).

These earliest uses of the notion of “language regime” should be evaluated within the theoretical framework of traditional LPP research and action. The concern in those studies was rather about maintaining the national unity than it was about cultural diversity. Both in Quebec and in the regions of conflict in Belgium, there were localities with populations in majority and who spoke languages other than the official language of the federal state. In the ideological climate of the world-wide decolonization process where political legitimacy of local majorities were celebrated, the main thrust of policies regarding language regimes was to preserve the status quo of the overarching political structure. In order to maintain the integrity of the polities, some of the linguistic minorities have been granted with rights to a certain extent. However, on the other hand, the policy makers were cautious about that any compromise in favor of linguistic rights would not trigger struggles of independence by the local majorities.

In the literature up to the 1990s, a clear definition of what a language regime is had not been offered. It was rather used in line with the concept of political regimes, in the ideological atmosphere of Cold War, where macro nation-state politics were classified as regimes: liberal/capitalist/democratic or totalitarian/socialist/communist. A regime was, then, taken to be the totality of basic premises according to which a government administered the political unit.

In 1991, Jonathan Pool offers the first clear definition for a “language regime”. Pool’s aim is to work out a proposal for a model to overcome the efficiency-fairness dilemma that arises in governance of multilingual societies. The peak point of that dilemma is about determining the official language(s) of a polity and Pool exclusively focuses on that problem. Pool, therefore, first defines what he called as the “official

language problem”: “a set of language policy choices that have particular consequences and that are subject to particular normative criteria” (1991, p. 497).

In addition to fairness and efficiency, there are a large number of norms inhabited by various solutions to the official language problem. Pool gives an account of these norms:

... *authenticity* (favoring indigenous languages), *uniformity* (favoring only one language), *diversity* (favoring multiple languages), *distinctiveness* (favoring languages unique to the community), *universality* (favoring languages known by outsiders), *stability* (favoring existing language rights and statuses), *radicality* (using language policy to liberate oppressed groups), *definitiveness* (avoiding linguistic options), *liberty* (noncoercion), *modernization* (favoring languages with developed lexicons and literatures), *populism* (favoring mass over elite languages), *prestige* (recognizing already-high-status languages), *antibossism* (discouraging powerful linguistic intermediaries), and *tolerability* (avoiding policies that would induce emigration or secession)... (my emphases, 1991, p. 497).

Based on these normative premises, states and institutions determine their language regimes. Pool identifies a language regime as “a rule [that is] producing a language policy” (1991, p. 499). He emphasizes the functions (in mathematical terms, as well) of a regime; of which inputs would be linguistic facts, such as the numbers and the size of language groups, and output to be a language policy that would ensure both justice and efficiency (ibid.). He proposes ten possible models and compares them with respect to their power in efficiency and political fairness.

Pool later develops his definition, in another article in 1996. The writer, here too, is primarily interested in the politics of official languages, this time for the European Union. He identifies two possibilities of linguistic regimes for the Union:

“The prevailing conditions in the EU create a clear choice between two families of language regimes. One family satisfies the professed norm of equal language treatment by making either none or all of the groups' languages official. The other family, by making only the largest languages official, systematizes the common EU practice of sacrificing language equality for cost reduction.” (Pool, 1996, p. 159)

Similar to his work in 1991, Pool compares alternative regimes. Here, he extends his discussion of language regimes and defines two dimensions of them: (a) “a set of

official languages” and (b) “a set of rules governing their use” (1996, p. 164). With such a description, he aims at to disable any reductionism regarding a language regime. He warns that:

“[T]he official languages of an institution do not completely define its language regime. Two institutions with different official languages must have different language regimes, but two institutions with the same official languages need not have the same language regime. Nor do the rules governing the use of official languages completely define a language regime. For example, two institutions that both require all official communication to take place in a single official language still have different language regimes if their official languages differ. Likewise, if either the official languages or the rules change, the language regime changes. (Pool, 1996, p. 164).<sup>21</sup>

Pool develops the span of a language regime, on the one hand, with the composition of official languages and their respective consequences on the linguistic communities, and, on the other hand, with the variety of rules with which the chosen languages are managed. The management is, basically, about the way the institutions the official languages employed are run, such as those of education, bureaucracy, or other offices of the state.

Pool’s approach is institution-centered and clearly functionalist. He is more interested in the ways in which language regimes are utilized and how they (should) function. A language regime, accordingly, is presented as a possible project of a government, or of a governing body such the European Union, shaped by its political motives and morality. In this sense, Pool understands a language regime as a governmental practice, a matter of choice and political vision. Pool’s early attempt of defining what language regime is, therefore, limited in its power of explanation with respect to the power relations that generate those language regimes and that the latter transform.

Pool emphasizes that it is a characteristic feature of the macro social and political establishments to develop some sort of a language regime. He notes that for a polity,

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<sup>21</sup> It should be noted that Pool’s argument was basically on the discussion of the language regimes in the EU, so he was writing specifically about multilingual official language environments. It is for this reason that he accentuated on “a set of official languages” rather than one official language.

indifference to religious or racial diversities, for example, is a possibility. However, it has to choose and use language(s) (1991, p. 496), and the choice is inevitably political in its nature, regarding the institution's authority over related social networks of power. Florian Coulmas, a scholar who has utilized the concept of language regime with wider implications, joins Pool at this point: "Some states limit their attention to instrumental aspects, while others also take an interest in esthetic and symbolic functions of language. However, all states have a language regime, which finds expression in the allocation of various statuses to the languages used within their territories" (1998, p. 66). Coulmas's position will be analyzed in detail below, but before that another functional definition, by David D. Laitin, will be examined, as it stands closer to that of Pool in terms of its empirical methodology and its focus on officialdom.

In his article dated 2000 where he utilizes the notion of "language regime", Laitin discusses the ways in which language communities could be indexed. His distinction is based on the number of languages in a political territory, which are either officialized or crucial for social or economical mobility. In line with his aim, he distinguishes two forms of language regimes: (a) rationalized language regimes and (b) multilingual regimes (2000, p. 151).

For the first type of language regimes, Laitin derives the notion of rationalization from Max Weber's *Economy and Society* (1968) and redefines it for his purpose.

"Rationalization, the authoritative imposition of a *single* language for educational and administrative communications, is a concept borrowed from Max Weber (1968), who used the term to refer to modern state practices of standardization and bureaucratization. A common currency, a common legal system, and a unified tax code are all examples of rationalization, as would be a common administrative language." (my emphasis; Laitin, 2000, p. 151).

The second type of language regimes, multilingualism, is identified with respect to the states that are not able to pursue a single-language policy, for one reason or another (*ibid.*).

Laitin further categorizes each type of language regimes with reference to how they were achieved. He identifies three ways for realizing rationalized language regimes.

Firstly, rationalization through the recognition of a *lingua franca* occurs “when there is a language spoken widely and understood practically universally within the boundaries of a state, but this language is not associated as the mother tongue of a significant language-group living within that state” (ibid.). His examples are Swahili in Tanzania, Bahasa in Indonesia, and English in the U.S.

Secondly, rationalization through the recognition of the language of a majority group takes place when “a dominant language group [has and practices] the power to impose its standard on a wider society” as happened in France for French, in China for Han Chinese and in Japan for Kyotsugo Japanese (ibid).

And thirdly, rationalization through the recognition of the language of a minority group is the last type of outcome as in “the rationalization of Spanish by Mestizos in South America, Halle Selassie's policy to impose Amharic on Ethiopia, and Afrikaner attempts to make Afrikaans the rationalized language of South Africa” (ibid).

Concerning multilingual regimes, Laitin defines two distinguished sets.

Firstly, “multilingual regimes with individual multilingual repertoires” involve the development of different language repertoires that are required by distinct functional domains. These different domains might include “official regional affairs ... economic exchange in large businesses ... for official business with the central state ... for local services such as hospitals and primary schools” (ibid.). Laitin's frequently referred and quoted model of multilingual regime is derived from Indian case:

“In India there is a well-established (but not formally recognized)  $3 \pm 1$  language regime. Here, Indians with aspirations for a wide range of mobility opportunities must know Hindi (the language of much popular culture and some state documents), English (the language of the higher civil service and big business), and the state language (used for most state services and education). This is a three-language formula. For those who live in a state where Hindi or English is the state language, only two (3-1) languages are necessary for one's repertoire. For those who are minorities within states where Hindi and English are not state languages, and seek minority rights, their people need to know four (3+1) languages – English, Hindi, the state language, and their minority language” (Laitin, 2000, pp. 151-152).

His second type of multilingualism is achieved through pillarization. In this regime, there is no necessity for individuals, even if they pursue social or mobility, to be multilingual. However, the political organization itself is multilingual: “Each region



under pillarization has equal rights to write laws, to impart education, and to administer society in its own language. There is no necessity for a citizen living in one pillar to learn the language spoken in regions of the other pillars, but there is a minimal level of bilingualism for those who develop a specialty in all-pillar governance” (2000, p. 153). Laitin’s examples for this category are Switzerland and Belgium.

Laitin’s work is policy oriented and, as described above, it aims to create a model with empirical indices and well-defined categories. He is not interested in the political dimension, if not in consequences, of the establishment of rationalized or multilingual language regimes. Hence political processes involved in making a *lingua franca* or minority language the only official one, for example, or of what reconfiguration of power relations such rationalization or multilingualism results in have not been taken into consideration in his work.<sup>22</sup>

Like Jonathan Pool, Laitin gives clear definitions of language regimes and explains their various implementations. The works of both authors are confined mostly to politics and the way states organize the use of language(s) at the official level. Their common approach is institution-centered and they hardly attempt to discover relations of symbolic power that any language regime generates. Their theoretical preferences stems from their interest to build up practical solutions for linguistic conflicts at the official level.

The study of politics of language closely depends on how “political” is defined. In the classical sense, politics is relevant to sphere of action of governments, states and other actors associated with governance. This particular definition of “politics” narrows the conceptual universe of the notion with a bias towards institutional configurations. Within this conceptual framework, a study of language politics and language regimes would be focused, fundamentally, on the actions, practices or programs of the governmental bodies.

However, there is another approach in political philosophy, which associates politics with broader relations of power. Accordingly, in this approach, politics as a

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<sup>22</sup> In relation to that, Safran refers to Laitin as “a proponent of the ‘rational-choice’ thesis” (Safran, 2004, p. 2)

noun turns into an adjective as “the political”, marking a state of affairs. Mouffe elaborates:

“The political designates the potential antagonisms inherent in human relations and can manifest itself in many different social relations. Politics, for its part, indicates the ensemble of discourses, institutions and practices which aim at establishing an order; at organising human coexistence, in a context that is always conflictual because of the presence of the political.” (1993, p. 8; quoted in McAuley, 2003, p. 4).

Here, politics is considered intrinsic to human social relations, which involve intersecting arrays of discourses and practices of power. Such an expanded understanding of “the political” takes the concept beyond organized competition for access to institutions of power, as in party politics, or beyond the practices of domination exerted by macro bodies of governance.

Such an opening of the concept of the political also transforms the way language politics is understood. To consider the issue of language in society as an issue of dynamic power regimes rather than a problematic of institutional politics also empowers the attempt to understand and explain language in society.

The next sub-section reviews Florian Coulmas’s works, in which his perspective on language regimes is closer to the notion of “the political” than “politics”.

## **2.5 Language Regime as Symbolic Domination**

Coulmas, who, in his works, deals with the transformation of language regimes and the widespread effects of due language policies, reminds us first, that his understanding of the language regime is centered on administered language (2005a, p. 3).

Unadministered language, Coulmas identifies, is oral and acquired spontaneously. Administered language, on the other hand, is literal and formed consciously through various institutional domains such as, he exemplifies, “schooling, literacy education, terminology creation, and other measures of corpus planning” (Coulmas, 2005a, p. 3). Spoken, unadministered language has a higher capability for adaptation to changes in

communication requirements. Coulmas, borrowing the notion of an invisible hand guiding the fashion of this adaptation from Keller (1994), contrasts language administration as the visible hand, which takes various forms of manipulating language use (ibid.).

What seems to be missing in this categorization by Coulmas is the fact that orality is not completely free of social conventions or linguistic morality in a given community. His emphasis on the administration of written languages seems like he suggests that unwritten languages are not subject to social or political control. Florian Coulmas kindly replied my questions on the issue and further deliberated on the issue:

“Regarding language regimes, you should distinguish two things, (1) the administration of languages and (2) language as an object of administration/regulation. A language regime that regulates language use in a community can refer to both spoken and written language. For instance, only certain languages are admissible in national parliaments or other official bodies in speech and in writing. Limitations are placed on the display of a written language in public places, or on its use in speech. This refers to the fact that a given language can or cannot be used in a certain context. (personal communication with Florian Coulmas, April 2008).

Here Coulmas distinguishes between language regime and administered language:

“On the other hand, the notion of administered language refers to the way it is used, that is, the traditional domains of corpus planning: spelling, grammar, phonetic standardization, lexicon, terminology. These activities are typically bound to a language that has a written form. The use of unwritten languages can be proscribed or permitted, but it is very difficult if not impossible to administer them in the sense of standardization, systematic lexical development, phonetic normization, etc. Thus “language administration” can be concerned with written and unwritten languages, as the case may be, but “administered languages” are typically languages that do have a written form.” (ibid.).

In this sense, Coulmas differentiates between the general regulations on various uses of language and the particular administration of the language itself, which concentrates on the language itself, in other words, on its corpus planning.<sup>23</sup>

Indeed, verbal hygiene, as a concept made popular by Cameron (1995), is but one illustration of that how speakers of a language “routinely make value judgments” and “active[ly] attempt to improve or ‘clean up’ language” (Cameron, 2006, p. 407). Apart from individually conscious manipulations, spoken language is also bounded by social regulations such as registers, politeness, age related speech, sub-cultural domains of alternative language uses, etc. There are strictly administered speech acts, too. In some cases oral language, or unadministered language, is interfered by the political administration from above. Typical examples would be banning of the speaking of mother tongues of minorities, as was the case with Kurdish in the first decades and the post-1980s of Turkey.<sup>24</sup> Therefore, the administration of a language, the planning of its written and spoken forms, vocabulary or other inherent characteristics is only one of the elements of language regime practices. Language regimes encompass a wider space of intervention and regulation.

For Coulmas it is critical to underline that we can talk about language regimes since languages are artifacts, rather than natural structures. His approach to language, in this regard, is similar to that of Bourdieu’s, whose ideas on the subject have been presented in the previous section. However, the constructedness of language, Coulmas concludes, is by no means clear in the public mind:

“[r]ather, the notion of a language regime tends to evoke suspicion if not resistance because language is so often talked about as a natural system, where ‘natural’ is understood by some, notably the adherents of Noam Chomsky’s conception of biolinguistics, in the strict sense of the natural

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<sup>23</sup> The classification for language planning as corpus and status planning was first introduced by Kloss (1969). “This dichotomy has set the trend in language planning studies for the past 25 years” (Daoust, 1998). Recently, language planning has been widely accepted to comprise another dimension as well, acquisition planning (Cooper, 1989). On language planning, also see Haugen (1966; and 1983).

<sup>24</sup> Another example would be the banning of certain words to be used in broadcasting by the Turkish Radio and Television (TRT) in 1984. Further details will be given in the following chapter.

sciences, while others just mean objects that have come into existence without deliberate planning” (2005a, p. 4).

For highlighting how such a naturalist approach is widely accepted, Coulmas presents, as an example, the common opposition against the language reforms (ibid.) which has important implications for the Turkish case, as well. One of the favorite counter arguments against reforms of language is that the latter disturbs the natural development of a language. This perspective is very typical of conservative stance against modernist/rational social intervention. Coulmas, however, notifies that since every linguistic system is an artifact “the notion ‘natural development’ must be called into question” (2005a, p. 4).

Having preliminaries laid down, Coulmas defines a language regime “as a set of constraints on individual language choices [consisting of] habits, legal provisions, and ideologies” (2005a, p. 7). Coulmas, elsewhere, discusses the various complicated ways in which these three dimensions of language, habit, legal provisions and ideology interact. Below, the repercussions of these three elements of language regimes are discussed.

Ideally, legal provisions reflect habits and they are supported by ideologies, but this is not always the case. Sometimes, inconsistencies appear, generating pressure for adjustment. For instance, habitual functional domain allocations of languages may change in ways that diverge from current legal provisions, ideologies or market forces. Language of the education in many developing and post-colonial countries is a popular site of language debate, and a good example of such a divergence. Is higher education a domain that is exclusive to the national language, or is there a place for English as well?

Another example concerns the status of minority languages. Although individual speakers may be able to and may want to use language X in a courtroom, they may not be permitted to do so because the rules of procedure determine that language Y must be used. In this connection, clear criteria for distinguishing X from Y are particularly important (Coulmas, 1998, p. 7).

The use of language or linguistic choices does not naturally just occur nor are they under complete control of human intentions. People and communities have linguistic habits as more or less regulated practices of linguistic behavior. Some uses fit more in a

situation rather than others. They seem to be tailored for some circumstances, and in most cases, speakers or writers find themselves employing a particular variety of language without even noticing it. Not strictly bound by rules, habits mostly determine the way language is exercised. Coulmas offers the notion of inertia for the habitual implications of language regimes (2005b, p. 187). Establishment of a linguistic regime creates a potential for inertia that, in advance, ensures the regime's prevalence. A regime produces or transforms peculiar linguistic subjects, who would act within its boundaries. The expansion of the effect of the regime within the linguistic domain, in time and in space, enforces and generates habitual dynamics. Coulmas notes that language regimes are "supported by habit and inertia" in many cases (ibid.).

The concept of "ideology of language" is recently proved a valuable source for the construction of another theoretical framework. The notion is variably used as language ideology, linguistic ideology or ideology of language.

Irvine, in her definition of the concept, emphasizes its structural context; "the cultural system of ideas about social and linguistic relationships, together with their loading of moral and political interests" (1989, p. 255). Silverstein, on the other hand, emphasizes the agency dimension, and defines the language ideology as "any [set] of beliefs about language articulated by the users as a rationalization or justification of perceived language structure and use" (1979, p. 193). Although mostly used in social anthropological research, the notion is also useful in explaining the ideological aspects regarding language regimes. In this sense, Coulmas's stress on ideology is significant, since language regimes exhibit complex relationship with linguistic ideologies. This relationship will be elaborated below.

Habits of language use and ideological formations related to language regimes mostly correlate with a set of legal terms. Every language regime not only generates habitual uses or is backed by ideologies of language, but is also secured by the force of authority. The designations of use of official languages, the laws that may allow or forbid specified uses of various languages, and encouragement or punishment of the use of a particular variety of language are all within the domain of legal arrangements. Within the contemporary politics system, legality is constructed and maintained by states.

### 2.5.1 States and Language Regimes

Pool has noted, as cited above, that every polity has to establish some sort of language regime. For Coulmas, the leading role in establishing language regimes is played by states. He highlights the instrumental factor for a state to found language regimes and notes, “the state has an interest in establishing a language regime and is widely believed to have the right to do so, if only by virtue of the fact that the state communicates with its citizens by means of languages of its choice. State interest in language is basically instrumental” (1998, p. 67). With various degrees of importance, a language regime would work for a state in terms of providing it with a medium of communication for its efficient operation, setting up a working connection between the subjects and the governing bodies, and ascertaining horizontal or vertical relations for a particular economical system, etc. It is not only that states claimed the right to build language regimes, but also typically, it is believed that they *should* do so. Especially under the command of nationalism, state is assumed to be the main guardian of all that is deemed to national, and therefore, of the language as well. Popular demand for the protection and the management of language by the state or by authorized institutions is not a rarity in today’s linguistic politics.

Coulmas enhances his argument that language is under social and political control in modern societies, emphasizing that

“... the idea that language is and, ought to be, subject to regulation by the powers to be is so deeply ingrained in all literate cultures that it will not be abandoned easily. Orthographic standards, reference dictionaries, mother tongue, second and foreign language curricula, standardised tests, publication, rules of procedure, provisions for the recognition of speech forms as languages and legitimate forms of expression, official status ascriptions on international, national, regional, and local levels are all measures predicated on the fundamental idea that language is not to be left to speakers’ choices or unchecked market forces, but controlled by a regime which, presumably, serves the common good” (2004, p. 5).

Other than the instrumental functions of language regimes, Coulmas also identifies a symbolic function (2005a, p. 11) that corresponds to the representational relations of a language. Closely related with the ideological and political settings, a

language or one of its varieties might symbolize an ethnic or national identity, religiosity, or a status- or a class-bound social position.

The symbolic nature of language within the politics of nationalism is widely debated (see Barbour & Carmichael, 2000), and will be frequently elaborated as the discussion of this thesis evolves.

With respect to symbolization of religiosity, Arabic would be a good example. Arabic is regarded in the Islamic world as sacred as *Allah* communicated with his last prophet and the book of the last religion was revealed in Arabic (see Suleiman, 2003).

Exemplifying how a language is symbolized as a marker of social status, Amara shows how Hebrew, in contrast to the sacredness of Arabic, “symbolizes the desire and aspiration to associate oneself with the modern outside world” for Palestinians in Israel (2002, p. 62).

Consequently, as states have instrumental motives for establishing language regimes, they also operate symbolic functions. A nation-state usually aims to benefit from the legitimacy produced by the claim of being the political representative of culturally and linguistically unified subjects. To that end, such a state would labor for the foundation of linguistic spaces and domains in which the symbolic power of the language would be generated. In this sense, language ideologies and symbolic functions of language are knitted together.

At this point, it would be meaningful to turn back to Bourdieu again. His idea of symbolic power and symbolic domination is directly related to the language ideologies and regimes.

Following Bourdieu’s debate on official language, it is arguable that the most modernist language politics single out the official language as the only legitimate one, and turns a tongue into the formal communicative medium. This monistic perspective establishes the official language as the representative of the political unit.

What takes place at this point is the constitution of a unified linguistic market, which is dominated by the official language. It is at this very moment, the language regime gains another momentum, beyond its instrumental function. Via language regimes, not only rules, but also norms regulating linguistic practices and the ideologies of language are constructed. Domination of the linguistic market by the official language, with all the support, encouragement and enforcement of the state power,



inevitably transfigures existing linguistic relationships. Bourdieu describes this process of structural change as integration into a single linguistic community, which is a product of the political domination that is endlessly reproduced by institutions capable of imposing universal recognition of the dominant language (Bourdieu, 1991, p. 46).

Bourdieu's analysis embraces the historical dimension, as well. According to him, in the absence of "objectification" in writing, "languages" only exist in the practical state, in the form of linguistic habitus.<sup>25</sup> Concerning the European modernization, until the French Revolution, linguistic unification went hand in hand with the empowerment of the monarchical state: "the popular and purely oral uses of all the regional dialects [were] degenerated into *patois*" (original emphasis, Bourdieu, 1991, p. 46).<sup>26</sup>

French Revolution stamped its mark, with respect to our subject, with its enthusiasm for creating a new man, and a new language. Bourdieu identifies the political conflicts as the consequences of "struggle for symbolic power, in which what was at stake was the formation and re-formation of mental structures" (p. 48). War on language was an essential aspect of this struggle, and the state was the main site for reification of this symbolic power.

It is worth to elaborate on how the modern state happens to be foremost agent in determining language regimes. Blommaert emphasizes the centrality of state in organizing "a particular space in which it can establish a regime of language perceived as 'national' and with particular forms of stratification in value attribution to linguistic varieties and forms of usage (2005a, p. 219). He explains that "the state is one of the main organisers of possible sociolinguistic contrasts within a particular space: it allows others to create differences between their norms and those that are valid nationally (e.g. those that are transmitted through the education system)" (ibid.).

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<sup>25</sup> McLuhan, similarly, observes a strong relationship between the development of modern politics and the domination of the written language over orality or of text over performance (2001).

<sup>26</sup> In this sense it is import to note that becoming a minority language, or a non-standard variety, then, is a process of political disempowerment. Bourdieu defines the process as "social devaluation" (1991, p. 47). Similarly, there is no minority, *per se*, but the dispossession of power. It is not only that minorities lack power, but, more importantly, their lack of power results in their statuses as minorities.

According to Blommaert, state's fundamental role in the formation of language regimes derives from the very qualities that define it as the political body of the modern governance. It is the state which has the capacity to assemble and administrate a infrastructure "for the reproduction of a particular regime of language: an education system, media and culture industries - each time a selective mechanism which includes some forms of language and excludes others" (pp. 219-220).

What he explains at this point has important implications for the strength of the notion of language regime as a meaningful theoretical framework for this dissertation. For Blommaert, the state's capacity corresponds to its power to apply substantial control over "access to symbolic resources and access to spaces of interpretation and value attribution" (p. 220). The state has the coercive instruments that enable it to practice such a widespread effect on the social sphere it rules: the legal system and the law enforcement system. Blommaert concludes, "[s]o the state is often a determining force in the sociolinguistic landscape, in contrast to other centering institutions whose effect can best be described as dominant" (ibid.). The case is more so in Turkey, since the state has assigned itself the very responsibility to build a modern nation with its culture and language, and therefore it has been the foremost actor in the establishment and the maintenance of the language regime.

### **2.5.2 Language Regimes, Policies and Planning**

States perform their effective roles in the formation and preservation of linguistic regimes through employment of language policies and planning, therefore, a brief look at the ideas on their links would be useful.

In his analysis of the relationship between language regimes and language policies, Coulmas focuses on how the function of a language policy affects a language regime:

"The goal of a language policy is to perpetuate, establish or undo a language regime. Some examples of language regimes are the European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages, China's recognition of 55 minority languages, Switzerland's territorialization of its official languages, Ireland's designation of Irish as its national and first official language, and

Quebec's 1977 Charter of the French Language which stipulates that all laws must be printed, published, adopted and approved in both French and English" (2005b, p. 186).

For Coulmas, language policies function on language regimes. Pool presents a contrasting version of the relationship between language regimes and policies. He argues that language regimes produce language policies by taking into account linguistic facts of a community (1991, p. 449). Hence, for Pool, language policies are sub-functions or sub-programs of language regimes and are dependent on them. On the other hand, Coulmas assigns a more autonomous position, or priority of effect, to language policies.

Coulmas incorporates "language planning" in his conceptualization of language regimes, as well. He marks language planning as the implementation plan of language policy that aims to change the language regime (2005b, p. 186). With the example of language planning of East Timor, he argues that:

"Specific language-planning measures fall into two categories illustrated by the two articles of the East Timorese constitution ... status planning and corpus planning corresponding, respectively, to macro- and micro-sociolinguistics. While Article 1 declares Tetum and Portuguese official languages thus determining their status, Article 2 which calls for Tetum and other languages to be developed is concerned with not the status but the state of languages, their corpus. For a language policy to be effective it needs status planning and corpus planning since both are interrelated. Tetum will not be able to serve the functions of an official language unless it is developed. A third category, acquisition planning, is sometimes considered separately in addition to the other two (e.g. Cooper, 1989, p. 33)" (Coulmas, 2005b, p. 186).

In summary, in Coulmas's theorization, (a) a language regime is a general framework within which linguistic activity in a society is organized, (b) a language policy is a program that shapes a language regime and (c) language planning is a sub-agendum to install language policies.

Although Coulmas has informed the theoretical interpretation of the notion of language regime for this dissertation in a fundamental way, it is considered that Pool's approach to the relationship between LPP and language regimes is more plausible than that of Coulmas'.

Hence, language policies and planning is described, in this work, to be produced and performed within the boundaries of the ideological/practical framework that is defined by the language regime. Once a language regime has been set, it has to be implemented by means of employment of certain language policies – concerning the extent of the use official language(s) in educational institutions, in courts, in economical transactions, etc. Language planning also stems from the premises of the language regime, in that, a regime determines status planning, and a regime almost always implies the ways in which a language would be developed by corpus planning. Similarly, acquisition planning, that refers to the ways in which speaker would obtain certain linguistic skills, is usually inhabited by the practical implications of a regime of language.

Language regimes act on the linguistic realm through policies and planning of language. They are operated within particular sites of communicative, where they become realized. The next section deals with varieties of these sites and their relevance to the establishment and working of a language regime.

### **2.5.3 Sites of Language Regimes**

One important idea in the literature of language regimes is that language regimes are not always explicit. According to Coulmas, a language regime consists of

“... both of explicit, even legally binding components and implicit, habitual elements. [...] Many countries have, by custom or statute, a national language thus establishing the foundation of a national language regime that is typically subject to a variety of modifications and restrictions of international and intranational provenance. Only some aspects of a country’s language regime find expression in decrees and statutes. To a large extent, a language regime consists of practices, often unchallenged, which have evolved over time without much deliberate planning” (Coulmas, 2003, pp. 246-247; quoted by Katsuragi, 2005, p. 45).

In his inspiring work on the language policies and linguistic cultures, Harold Schiffman attempts to typologize language policies. His conceptualization of the notion of language policy is close to Coulmas’s use of the notion of language regime, and there Schiffman similarly emphasizes the dual forms of language policies. He distinguishes

“overt (explicit, formalized, de jure, codified, manifest) policies and covert (implicit, informal, unstated, de facto, grass-roots, latent) aspects of the policy” (1998, p. 13).

Unearthing the distinction of *de jure* and *de facto* language regimes enables us to articulate the ways in which language regimes, as assigned from above by legal texts, are either constructed, maintained or subverted and how the social configurations of power relations reflect onto linguistic issues. This approach keeps us in a safe distance from focusing merely on the dimension of the state and from state-centeredness in language-in-society research. It, therefore, facilitates a more complete representation with the inclusion of agents and structures of language use into the analysis.

However, such an emphasis should not obscure the inequality of power between language regimes and users of the language within that regime. Blommaert (2005b) highlights one final decisive effect of the states in the social formation of language:

“The state can contribute a materiality to its role as a centering institution in a way hard to match by others. The state has the capacity to provide an infrastructure for the reproduction of a particular regime of language: an education system, media, culture production - each time a selective mechanism which includes some forms of language and excludes others. The state, in other words, has the capacity to exert substantial control over the two dynamics of access ... to forms and access to spaces [domains] of interpretation. The state has coercive instruments usually exclusive to the state: the legal system and the law enforcement system. So the state is often a determining force in the sociolinguistic landscape, in contrast to other centering institutions whose effect can best be described as dominant.” (p. 397)

The infrastructure that state acts upon for the reproduction and the consolidation of a language regime is comprised of various sites where language regimes are realized. Actually, the language regimes function in all the domains that the state authority is exercised.

Public offices, where a state gets in touch with its citizens, are significant sites of the language regime practices. In state institutions, there are languages that could be legitimately used, while others are ignored or directly forbidden. Application to those offices has to be in the official language, and citizens are expected to master the language, at least, at a level of basic communication with the state administrative centers.

The core language of a regime is also critical for political mobilization. In most of the countries, either candidates for offices are required, directly, to have the skills to communicate in the official language, or indirectly, to have degrees of certain levels of education, which itself mostly ensures the mastery of the language.

Educational system is one of the most important sites within which a language regime operates and governs. The schools, and especially those at the elementary level, work as the reproduction centers of a language regime. It is in the schools where the children are forged into the linguistic system as the citizens of the political community and members of the cultural unity. The officially recognized form of a language is transmitted to those whose linguistic activities are ordered, and who consequently become the subjects of the linguistic regimes.

In most modern states, the language of education is exclusively the official language. As unitary ideologies of nationalism still sweep across the world, children with mother languages different from the official one are not allowed to speak it. Apart from formal valuation function, that is the valuation or the legitimization of one language over others, the schools also operate to facilitate standardization of the language. Different varieties, accents or dialects of the education language are leveled at the school. "The identity of language" is constructed in the educational institutions (Coulmas, 2004).

Jurisdiction is another sphere of action for language regimes. The working language of the judicial system, similarly, is almost always the official language, although those, who are not able to communicate in the prescribed tongue, are provided with interpreters, in general. Nevertheless, equality before justice, then, is mediated through interpretation for those who are not able to speak or write the language of the court.

Organization of the public sphere, if not its direct control, is another business for which a state is held responsible. The management of public spaces involves the designation of the information flow, and this opens up a vast area of action, from public signs to media industry. Anthony Brown quotes Shohamy about the workings of language regime on the public level:

“Yet aside from mere dissemination of information, the choice of language(s) on public signs accords a degree of ethnolinguistic prestige and/or status that serves a powerful symbolic function. Shohamy (2006, pp. 110-111) contends that individuals in authority, i.e. governments, municipalities, NGOs, global and smaller companies, intentionally convey symbolic messages through signage about ‘the importance, power, significance and relevance of certain languages or the irrelevance of others.’ In doing so, Shohamy claims that public space becomes ‘a most relevant arena to serve as a mechanism for creating de facto language policy,’ and in some instances, ‘for influencing and creating de facto language realities’ (ibid.)” (Brown, *Status Language Planning in Belarus: An Examination of Written Discourse In Public Spaces*, 2007, p. 282).

One last, but not the least, site that is worth to mention is the language of mass media. Benedict Anderson’s arguments on print capitalism and its relation to the formation of nationalism (1991) facilitated detailed inquiries of the relationship between languages and ideologies in the modern age. In most polities, where modernity has been a project rather than a process, and where capitalism has not preceded the formation of the modern state institutions and ideologies, the political control on mass media has been firmer. That is why, a solid enforcement on mass media is generated by the language regimes that are established and governed by states, rather than civil society. Concerning the intentions of this dissertation, the dynamics of the relationship between language regimes and the commoditization of newspapers, radios, televisions and other forms of information technologies are crucial and they will be explored in detail in the following chapters.

## **2.6 Language Regimes and the Theoretical Framework of the Dissertation**

This last and concluding section summarizes the theoretical debate on the notion of language regime, and defines it in order to describe the theoretical structure of this dissertation.

The Oxford English Dictionary defines a “regime”, with respect to social relations, as the following:

“**1. (a)** the act of governing; government, rule. **(b)** A particular form or kind of government; a prevailing system **2. (a)** A manner, method, or system of rule or government; a system or institution having widespread influence or prevalence. **(b)** The set of conditions under which a system occurs or is maintained” (2002).

Accordingly, three basic dimensions of a social or political regime can be delineated: its form (of governance), its manner (method or system concerning its operation), and the extent of its effect or prevalence. A regime also involves a dimension of institutionality with which its dominance is sustained. Although the Oxford definition does not refer to matters of agency, it would be appropriate to consider that regimes are comprised of unequally positioned subjects, and this inequality derives from the unequal distribution of power within the framework of the regime itself. Inequality entails asymmetrical access to institutional or procedural resources, which in turn makes some of the members of the domain more powerful in decision-making processes or more effective in the reproduction of the regime.

Two scholars who have produced major works on language regimes, Jonathan Pool and David D. Laitin have centered their arguments by defining a regime through the ways in which official languages are chosen and operated. In this dissertation, the notion will be expanded far beyond that. Inspired by the Foucauldian understanding of “power”, a regime will be reconceptualized as a general framework in which language and its use is organized, and that generates and generated by particular power relations and ideologies of language.

So therefore, a language regime could be defined through two steps.

Firstly, a language regime is the regulation (purposeful or not, *de jure* or *de facto*) of linguistic activity, both in content and status, within a defined space of communicative action. This space could be either the universe of a speech group of a particular language, or an interactional linguistic multiplicity. This scope of a language regime could encompass political or social formation of the administration of a



language or a particular variety, along with the formation of an elite culture<sup>27</sup>, to be a symbolic demarcation of social stratification, ethnic or national inclusion or exclusion, etc. Borrowing Coulmas' reflection, a regime consists of habits, legal provisions and ideologies of language (2005a, p. 7).

Secondly, to further refine the definition for the purposes of this study and elaborate on the political dimension of a language regime, the notion corresponds to the governance of the linguistic domain within a defined political territory, through the employment of particular policies or planning. Such demarcation of the space of linguistic activity inevitably brings the state forward as the primary actor of determining and maintaining language regimes. Reconfiguring the discussion of state's role in language regimes above, the state leads the scene of language regime and its interest in this establishment is both instrumental and symbolic. It is instrumental in the sense that an organization of the use of a language or a variety of a language is inevitable for a modern-state to be utilized in its operations of internal bureaucracy, or its communication with its citizens or subjects, be it defined clearly in constitutional texts or not. The state's interest is also associated with the symbolic functions of a language regime, within which the national language is assumed to represent the uniqueness, authenticity, unity and cultural wealth of a nation, as defined within the ideology of nationalism and the practices of nation-states. Symbolic implications of a language regime are not confined to the function of representation. A regime also acts actively on the very construction of the political body called nation.

An essential point to be underlined is that the language regimes are founded and maintained within a social matrix of unequal distribution of power. Coulmas reflects on the issue:

“As any other regime, a language regime is the result of rival interests and reflects inequalities in social strength and power... Language regimes are a means of social control and the ability to make language-related

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<sup>27</sup> Perry re-introduces the concept of linguistic elite closure and describes it as “a system where language policy perpetuates the privileged status of an elite class, commonly by way of enshrining a minority language as the de facto or de jure official language of the state” (2003, pp. 7-8). Perry's definition echoes Laitin's third type of rationalized language regimes (with a single official language), that is rationalization through the recognition of the language of a minority group (see above).

choices on the policy level and on that of language planning are distributed quite unevenly” (2005b, pp. 186-187).

In other words, language regimes are derivative functions of power relations – that is, a particular configuration of power relation produces a relevant language regime within which established power inequalities are maintained in and through the sociolinguistic realm. In addition, they may also reinforce new power relations and transfigure the existing sociolinguistic relations by integrating hitherto unconnected communities of different languages and imposing among them a linguistic hierarchy. This has been especially observed in the processes of nation-state building.

The state’s predominance appears at this moment, once again. State’s efficiency is reflected by its power as, what Blommaert calls, a “centering institution”. Blommaert boldly emphasizes the determinant power of state over frames of reference. Although, he advances, there will be other centers to overrule the state’s authority, the state nevertheless in many cases appears the very institution that establishes itself as the main force defining relations among alternative centers and between itself and others (2005a, p. 220).

The power of the state is enabled through its institutional network, which could be assessed as the sites of language regimes. These sites are where the language regime is reified and the unequal distribution of power in controlling the linguistic activity is reproduced, as pointed out above. An interesting point on how institutions function with respect to language regimes is about the way they take part in the emergence and diffusion of particular language ideologies.

Debra Spitulnik, who has studied the language ideologies in the public broadcasting organization of the Zambian state, maintains that language ideologies are not only visible in the metalinguistic discourse, i.e., language about language, but are also “embodied in a very fundamental and implicit sense within the everyday practices of institutions” (Spitulnik, 1998, p. 163). She proposes that “the structural grounding of language ideologies in institutional practice is best understood as a process of *language valuation* and *evaluation* which occurs through specific kinds of semiotic processes” (sic., *ibid.*). She introduces the concepts of language valuation and language evaluation, borrowing from Saussure’s concept of relational value and Voloshinov’s concept of

social evaluation. She defines language valuation and language evaluation as “processes through which different social values and referents come to be associated with languages, forms of speaking and styles of speaking” (p. 164).

Spitulnik’s emphasis on how these semiotic processes masks the contingencies of values of languages, and the power relations and interests underlying them, is the key to understand the very nature of dynamics of the association between language regimes and ideologies.

The notion of language ideology has been explored both theoretically and in terms of various case studies in recent years. A general agreement seems to have been formed on that language ideologies operate as bridges linking the micro-cosmos of a language – the way it is perceived, formed and used – with its macro-cosmos – the social structures of the community that speaks it. (Kroskrity P. V., 2000b; Paffey, 2007). Such a connection enables us to associate language regimes and ideologies, between which a dialectical relationship emerges. On this relationship, Milani reminds that:

“... ideologies are not merely abstract systems of ideas, values, and beliefs existing in people’s minds, but materialize in texts and discourses produced by “real historical actors” (Blommaert, 1999, p. 7), and ultimately feed into actual policies and practices, thereby having a real impact on people’s lives.” (Milani, 2008, p. 31).

Language regimes are formed by those agents who have particular ideologies of language in their minds. The establishment of a language regime is framed by the way the linguistic universe is conceived by those actors, as well their practical limits in political power struggles.

In turn, language regimes, once they start consolidating, construct new ideologies of languages or empower those that are already dominant. Therefore, while presenting how language regimes are founded and how they are conducted, it is an analytical necessity to reconstruct the ideological background, as well.

Remembering Spitulnik’s stress on language valuations, once again, it could be assessed that a language regime’s symbolic domination effects on the definitions of a language, the way linguistic varieties are (de)valued, classifications of and hierarchy among languages, norms and legitimacies pertaining them, sites of usage, and qualities

of usage.<sup>28</sup> In that way, linguistic aspects of symbolic capital for social mobilization is constrained and ordered by the valid language regime, and some subjects of that regime are, thus, rendered more advantageous over others.

Language regimes have the power to simultaneously objectify and subjectify. They, on the one hand, produce or incite the productions of language as an object of the political action and regulation. The incorporation of vernaculars into the political sphere is the initial phase of formations of both language ideology and language regimes. The emergence of modern institutions of the state and the widespread integration of the masses into the economic and political realm created language as an object of desire over and through which power is pursued. Language regimes, on the other hand, create linguistic subjects, or docile linguistic bodies, to borrow Foucault's term (Foucault M. , 1979), especially through mandatory educational facilities. Disciplining or colonizing minds is not only confined to issues of language and its use, but the ideological background of a language regime is also introduced, through discursive domination and the practices "educate" the speaker on language use.

In general, the process of subjectification proceeds mainly by making these "subjects" dispossessed of their means of creating meanings and make them dependent on the bombardment of meaning produced and imposed by discourses of language ideologies.<sup>29</sup> So they are both subjugated by the regime that informs language ideologies (i.e., they are made the subjects of authority that orders language), and also they are turned into the subjects or the agents of the regime that serves as the pragmatic resource for language ideologies. In that way, the ideologies of language are embodied, practiced and transmitted by speakers. Here, the productive aspect of power is materialized besides its repressive effect.

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<sup>28</sup> The emergence of linguistics, the scientific study of language, has a very exciting history, especially when this history is reviewed through its associations with language ideologies and regimes. Nonetheless, those aspects of the issue are considered well beyond the scope of this dissertation and therefore framed out. For the rise of linguistics, see Crowley (1996).

<sup>29</sup> For a study, which employed the notion of "docile bodies" within the context of language politics, see Pennycook (2002).

Within the framework of modern nation-states, this subjectification evolves towards cultural homogenization. The nation-building processes almost always conceived nation “a linguistic identity, on the assumption of one language determining one nation determining one state” (Ozolins, 1996, p. 191). Homogenization usually involves the construction of a standard, manageable and national linguistic culture among citizen subjects and assimilation or exclusion of divergences.

The problem of subjectification is interesting from another aspect, as well. First, as Kroskrity identifies, the notion of regime “invokes the display of political domination in all its many forms, including what Gramsci distinguished as the coercive force of the state and the hegemonic influence of the state-endorsed culture of civil-society” (2000a, p. 3). The distinction between political society (the state) and civil society by Gramsci;

“...correlates with distinct mechanisms of control – coercive and hegemonic apparatuses respectively. According to some interpreters of Gramsci, the state – in both its narrow sense (as government) and its more general sense (as the source of state-endorsed culture) – employs these different mechanisms in an attempt to control citizens through both forceful domination of the state and consent-organizing “leadership” of its hegemonic culture.” (Kroskrity P. V., 2000a, pp. 33, n. 1).

The state appears acts for the consolidation of its power. The concern here is the production of consent. Various processes of subjectification, which the state organizes and sustains, generate subjugated subjects, not only consent to the authority of the state, but also actively labor to reproduce it.

Apart from symbolic functions, language regimes materially classify and stratify linguistic varieties. Some are recognized as official, others ornamental (such as provincial vernaculars or accents) and mostly tolerable, while some are denied, banned, degraded, or even denied being a proper language. This last aspect of language regimes is particularly relevant to linguistic minorities. Coulmas underlines the historical background of minority formation and states that

“[s]ince the establishment of society-wide language regimes and compulsory education in the nineteenth century, many such groups have been forced to accept restrictions on the use of their languages in state-controlled domains, such as education, government, and law.” (1998, p. 68).

Actually, this is what constitutes language groups as linguistic minorities. Hence, linguistic minority is a category generated by political action, not a transcendental state of being. This is important to underline to uncover the historico-political foundations of macro sociolinguistic relations.

To conclude; the concept of language regime allows us to reconsider the power relations within a particular context of language politics. Language regime demarcates both the macro linguistic situation and the ways in which that linguistic situation was formed, transformed and reformed. It enables shifting the focus of analysis of language politics from the notion of language as a mere instrument for the achievement of political goals, mostly those of nationalism, to the notion of “language as power”. Taking language as power means to start with the postulation that language is more a social fact than a grammatical structure. Kroskrity asserts that ‘regimes of language’, “promised to integrate two often segregated domains: politics (without language) and language (without politics)” (2000a, p. 3).

This analytical approach facilitates a wider inquiry to investigate the processes of producing truth regimes about languages, ordering hierarchies of language varieties and of those who are speaking them, reconfiguring power relations pertaining to language, and the institutions and practices that generate, maintain or subvert a linguistic regime.

Besides, the changes of language policies or ideologies are, argued here, better explained through the changes within the framework defined by language regimes. In particular, the issue of change in established language regimes is associated with the various dimension of an overall process, called globalization. Coulmas summarizes the kinetics of language regime changes in globalizing environments:

“Since the French Revolution, language regimes in many parts of the world have been predicated on the nation state which appropriated one of the languages spoken within its borders as its national language. In recent decades, the privileged position of national languages has been challenged by ideas of democracy and equality as well as a proliferating discourse of non-discrimination, on one hand, and the force of global English, on the other. Rudimentary contours of an international language regime are becoming apparent which places restrictions on national language regimes and is likely, as the effects of globalization reach ever more areas of society and culture, to grow in importance. International standards are evolving, and

as a consequence national language regimes will gradually cease to be understood as the inviolable sovereign right of the state alone. Proscribing the use of minority languages will gradually become more difficult.” (2004, p. 5)

The crucial position of the state as a “centering institution”, as offered by Blommaert, in discursive frames of reference and at the practical level was reviewed above. The next step to his contribution, incorporating Coulmas, would be to discuss in what ways states’ centering power over language regimes is undermined through the global attack of English, and the sub-national discontents’ claims of ethnic language. In that way, it would be possible to build a referential framework to understand the modes of change of language regimes in globalizing environments.

As presented in this introduction chapter, it is a primary concern for this dissertation to answer why there has been so much conflict about language in Turkey, and what the social and political backgrounds of such a controversy have been. One of the basic assumptions regarding this question is that Turkish politics has always been intrinsically linked with issues of language. However, it seems that the main track of the debates pertaining to this link has shifted frequently in a way to be explained in detail in the next chapter.

Language regime is assessed as a notion with theoretical details reviewed above, as the most promising one to understand the dynamics of relationship between language and politics. Throughout the text, the term is used variably as “language regime”, “regime of language” and “linguistic regime”, as the recent literature on the problematic did. With its implications, the idea of language regime is assumed to enable us to articulate a better analysis of the politics of language in Turkey. That is, to conceptualize the history of Turkish language politics through the notion of regime allows us to ask questions about how the linguistic universe in Turkey has been established; how it was maintained; what aspects of linguistic activities were administered; to what extent it achieved its goals or failed, and how recent challenges to the Turkish language regime.

What is intended here is more than finding out in which language regime category that the case of Turkey would fit in. Pool’s and Laitin’s categories are, for sure, useful but are principally devised for the authors’ propositions of a fair and efficient official

language systems. Although Turkey's installation of the official language policies will be elaborated in detail in the next chapter, and a concluding assessment of Turkish language regime with respect to Pool's and Laitin's categories will be given in the last part, this thesis will focus more on the symbolic aspects of the regime.



## **CHAPTER 3**

### **THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF LANGUAGE IDEOLOGIES IN TURKEY**

#### **3.1 Introduction**

For an appropriate presentation of the language regime in Turkey, and to enlighten the politico-historical background of controversies pertaining to it, the next two chapters will present and assess the history and the current situation of the language regime in Turkey.

In this chapter, as the Turkish political tradition and, therefore, the linguistic ideologies intrinsic to it had been informed by the political developments occurred during the last decades of the Ottoman Empire, a summary of the Ottoman past of language politics will be presented as an introduction

After that, the next chapter will present the history of language politics and ideologies, the debates over various aspects of language and legal regulations that, in one way or another, have affected the use and the status of Turkish and other languages of Turkey. The ideological background of linguistic nationalism, the linguistic map of Turkey, which has considerably changed, and the legal history the construction of the Turkish language regime will be displayed in detail. While reviewing the language political history, the theoretical possibilities offered by the concept of language regime will also be included in the analysis, as well.

Although, it is just noted that there is a continuum regarding the political sphere between the Ottoman Empire and the Republican era, the periodization of the history of

language politics is based on the republican break in this dissertation.<sup>30</sup> There are two basic reasons for that.

First, the republican elites were much keener on their associated projects of modernization, secularization and nationalization, as it will be displayed below in detail. Therefore, they did not experience the hesitations of the *Tanzimat* or *İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti* (the Committee of Union and Progress, İTC henceforth) leaders. Surely, the rapid transformation of the cultural realm was as much related to the mindsets of the politicians as it was bound to the international and internal political circumstances. The republicans had ruled after a successful war against occupation and had different climate of legitimacy, both inside and outside the country. The Independence War and the Lausanne Treaty created distinct political conditions that were quite dissimilar to that of the Ottoman Empire of the post-World War I international context. Both the new state and its urge for a total modernization was legitimate, therefore the way they employed linguistic policies was radically different.

The analytical separation of the Ottoman and Republic periods is also justified by the theoretical implications of the notion of “language regime”. The following section will reveal that, regarding the political conditions of the post-*Tanzimat* era, the political elites were unable to build a consistent and powerful language regime within the empire. From a viewpoint of agency, neither their political and military power nor their ideological standpoints were adequate for the establishment of a persistent regime. On the other hand, the structural conditions of both the Ottoman state and the society were non-resistant to a successful and solid modernization of the political institutions whereas such a modernization is essential for the construction of modern language regimes.

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<sup>30</sup> The idea of a political continuity is at odds with the official Republican paradigm of Turkish history. While the Republican nationalist history thesis holds that the declaration of the Republic in 1923 has been a breakthrough in Turkish history, many historians observe that the ideologies and practices of the revolutionary Republican decades were already in the process of formation since the *Tanzimat* era. For a historical periodization that is different from that of the official thesis, see Zürcher (2003, pp. 1-6).

## 3.2 Before the Republic

### 3.2.1 Pre-Ottoman regimes of Turkish language

This chapter is not intended to be a complete history of Turkish language. Rather, it is confined to the aspects of politics that incorporated the Turkish language. Nevertheless, different constructions of the pre-Ottoman past of the Turkish language have been frequently visited within the contemporary discourses on language. This period has been a center of attraction for the many republican interpreters of the history of Turkish. The main argument is that the Ottoman era was a “dark age” for the language, and it was the messianic revolution of the Republic that has saved it for good.<sup>31</sup> Turning back to the antique resources of Turkish had been considered as a true nationalist attitude for the salvation of the language. On the other hand, the opponents of such an interpretation, mostly conservatives, also have been attracted to the period, since it was in this period that Turkish language displayed its greatness as the language of a great nation. To understand the language ideologies that are at work in the last century, then, a synopsis of pre-Ottoman period is required.

The first written forms of Turkic languages were unearthed in the 19<sup>th</sup> century. They were stone inscriptions and were found in one of the valleys of the Orhon River, in Mongolia. Many historians of the Turkic languages maintain that they are an indication of a well-developed language (Özkırımlı A. , 2002, p. 50). Nomadic life style of Turkic tribes both enabled the dispersion of their language to a vast geography and also caused grammatical and vocabulary exchanges with neighboring cultures. There have been other relics, inscriptions and manuscripts, few in number, in what is now Mongolia and China. This period is known as the first one in the history of the written varieties of Turkic languages: pre-Islamic East Old Turkic period (Johanson, 2006, p. 162).

As the Turkish clans advanced more to the West, they came across militarily weak but culturally strong civilizations. Iran, as it was between the geography of birth of

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<sup>31</sup> Behar (1992) explains how the denial of Ottoman and Islamic past was reflected in the Republican historiography.

Islam and the Turks coming from the Central Asia, was more influential in the reformation of the Seljuk and Ottoman linguistic cultures (Belge, 2005, pp. 369-370). According to Johanson, these times correspond to the second period comprises the early times of assimilation to Islam, and lasted until the early modern period of 16<sup>th</sup> century (2006, p. 162).

Kemal Karpat notes that it was in this second period that Turkish went under strong Arabic and Persian influences and, ironically, when two major works that many accept as the monumental works of the linguistic heritage of Turkish, were produced (Karpat K. H., 2004, p. 441). Both were written in Kashgar (in today's China).

The first one was *Divan-ü lûgat at-Turk* (Compendium of Turkic Dialects), written by Mahmud al-Kashgari, around 1072 and 1074. The book was a dictionary, but also a catalogue of the main Turkish groups and dialects of the eleventh century. Karpat emphasizes that:

“Kashgarlı argued that the name “Turk” was given by God and that it was a religious duty to learn Turkish, which was in his view as good if not a better language than Arabic and Persian; he mentioned *hadises* (later proved not authentic) in which the Prophet and the Caliph Umar (634–644) were made to praise the Turks.” (2004, p. 441)

Mahmud tried to reverse the pressure of Arabic on the Turkish language. Mahmud also commented favorably on the purity of language. Intrusion of Persian and other languages was considered a flaw in the clarity and the correctness of the language (cited in Karal, 1978, p. 24).

*Kutadgu Bilig* (published in English as “Wisdom of Royal Glory”) was written by Yusuf of Balasagun (Yusuf Has Hacib) and was dedicated to Buğra Khan of the Karakhanid dynasty (999–1212), in 1170 (Paksoy, 2002, p. 479). Karpat reminds that the book was “a didactic poem of over 6,000 couplets which seems to have enjoyed great popularity in its time” (Karpat K. H., 2004, p. 441).

Karpat's comments on these works are interesting:

These works, along with others of lesser impact, express a profound attachment to the Turkish language and were intended to make the Turks known to the Arabs but also to preserve and propagate their language as the vehicle for the Turks' ethnic-linguistic identity within the framework of Islam. Both works can be read today by someone possessing the old

vocabulary and a good knowledge of phonetic changes... One may argue that the *Divan-ü Lügat-it Türk* and *Kutadgu-Bilik* were created, as some Turkish secularist-nationalists claim, in order to defend the Turkish language against the Arab rulers who used Islam as a vehicle for the assimilation of other peoples. Actually the reverse was the case. These works reflect the fact that Turkish flourished under Islam” (2004, p. 441).

Karpat associated this thrive of Turkish language and the ethnic attachment to it to the characteristics of the Islamic conception of *umma*. He argues that as long as communities with languages other than Arabic accepted the political supremacy of the Islamic communal bond over ethnic and national loyalties, they did not experience any pressure on using their languages. He underlines that:

“For a Muslim, membership in the *umma* superseded, without undermining or destroying, membership in a linguistic ethnic group, as the loyalties required for the two memberships were not in conflict—at least not until the introduction of Western type nationalism which gave priority to ethnicity and language and made them the basis of political organization” (Karpat K. H., 2004, pp. 441-2).

As Karpat himself registers, this perspective is quite contrary to the republican version of the history of Turkish language. It is widely accepted that the retreat of Turkish is best exemplified in the Empire of Seljuks, where Persian was accepted as the official language. In literature too, Persian was dominant in the cultural circles of the Empire. Besides, there existed the unrivalled hegemony of Arabic as the language of the religion and science. Belge and Karal finds the situation of Persian and Arabic in the Turco-Islamic domains similar to that of Latin for the educated European elites in the Middle Ages (Karal, 1978, p. 23; Belge, 2005, p. 370).

After a while came another triumphant moment for the “glorious history” of Turkish. Karamanoğlu Mehmed Bey, in 1277, declared Turkish to be the language of officialdom and public speech. Karal, in his review of the Turkish language problem in the Ottoman Empire, observes the linguistic with respect to “national unity”. In his/story, for Mehmed Bey and the coming Ottomans basic political concern was to establish *the* cultural and national unity in their principalities and across Anatolia (Karal, 1978, pp. 23-27). Murat Belge (2005, pp. 38-39) warns that the declaration of Turkish as the language of state in 1277 should be analyzed free of today’s nationalist

aspirations. He comments that during that time Arabic and Persian was the lingua franca of the “civilization” in Anatolia and the declaration means to facing backwards to the Central Asian origins of the Seljuks in the face of an overwhelming cultural hegemony of the Anatolian landscape, which threatened Seljuks’ dominance.

After the Seljuks, the Anatolian principalities of Turkic origins continued to speak Turkish heavily influenced by Arabic and Persian, as Ottomans did. However, the conquest of Constantinople marks the rite of passage into the imperial age for the Ottomans, and language had its share. Belge comments that this should not be a determined language policy, but that language developed in a new way under the general settings of the new situation. (2005, p. 370)

### **3.2.2 Ottoman politics of language**

Unlike the Seljuks, the Ottomans did not designate a specific official language. There were many non-Turkic communities whose linguistic affinity to Turkish strengthened the process of consolidation and growth of the Ottoman state (Karpas K. H., 2004, p. 446). Karpas adds that, although Greeks and Armenians had the chance to develop their languages without any impediment,<sup>32</sup> the affinity of most of the non-Turkic peoples to Turkish with its being “the preferred language for everyday communication, particularly in cities and towns and mixed villages, because it was the language of the ruler and of the administration” (2004, p. 449)”. Bernard Lewis, similarly, comments on the issue that Islam and Turkish language were pass cards to higher social statuses and political power for Kurds, Arabs, Albanians, Greeks and Slavic people (1980, p. 163).<sup>33</sup>

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<sup>32</sup> Karpas associates the much-celebrated “tolerance” of the Ottomans with the very logic of being an empire. “However, as innumerable ethnic and religious groups came under its authority, the Ottoman state attempted to accommodate them ethnically, religiously, and culturally on an equal basis by stretching to the maximum the religious tolerance and permissiveness of Islam” (Karpas K. H., 2004, p. 450).

<sup>33</sup> For another account of the linguistic and ethnic transformation of the Anatolian peoples during and after the Seljuks and Ottomans’ rule, see Meeker (2001, pp. 89-98)

Karal, indicates that, despite that there was no official language policy and the increasing use of Arabic and Persian in the court business, *Enderun*, the special school for recruiting bureaucrats to the palace, taught exclusively in Turkish during the reign of the Mehmet II. He also notes that in *Acemi Oğlanlar Okulu* (preparatory school for *Enderun*), *Mehterhane* (the Janissary Band), *Tophane* (artillery school) and *Tersane* (shipyard) Turkish was the language of education. Mehmet also issued his own *Kanunname* (book of codes) in Turkish, simple in its style and short in sentences, for the possible purpose of understandability for a large audience (Karal, 1978, p. 33). Nevertheless, taking into account that Mehmet II enabled a freedom of Greek by taking the Patriarchate under his imperial protection and that he did not hesitate to communicate with his Rum subjects in Greek (Karal, 1978, p. 34), it could be concluded that he was pragmatic more than doctrinal in his dealings with language. In parallel, Karal cites Köprülü where he notes that Greek had long become the diplomatic language between the Anatolian principalities of Turks and the Byzantine Empire and the Ottoman bureaucracy palace used it until the end of the 16<sup>th</sup> century (ibid.).

Although Karal celebrates the reign of Mehmet II for its preference of Turkish in many domains, he adds that the introduction of words from other languages gained momentum too (Karal, 1978, p. 36). This note is in parallel to what Belge remarks, that becoming an empire out of a small and local principality entailed a totally different language regime (2005, p. 370). The change in the political vision and structures had their effect on language use in contexts like diplomacy, navy building, titles of social stratification, etc.

The influence of Islam and Arabic increased in the first half of the 16<sup>th</sup> century, as a result of the expansion of the Empire's dominion over Egypt, when the dynasty acquired the Caliphate, and to Hejaz was joined with the holy cities of Medina and Mecca (Karpas K. H., 2004, p. 447).

Karpas summarizes the linguistic history of Turkish for the rest of the 16<sup>th</sup> century Ottoman Empire:

“A separation of the court and especially literary language from the vernacular began and was accelerated during the sixteenth century, in part due to the sophistication of the Ottoman cultural, social, and artistic life. The social division between the vast ruling order composed of bureaucrats,

poets, the religious establishment, merchants, and other community leaders on the one hand, and the masses on the other, deepened so that two worlds were created, each one having its own Turkish language, the one sophisticated and complex, the other homely and simple. The lack of an educational system prevented the dissemination of high class Turkish among the masses. The emerging court literature adopted not only Arabic and Persian words but also a large variety of ingenious though often artificial constructions” (2004, p. 448).

After the 16<sup>th</sup> century, the third period of history of written Turkish according to Johanson (2006, p. 162), what is known as the Ottoman language began to form. It was a result of a liberal policy that allowed the introduction of Arabic and Persian vocabulary, which was based on the base of Turkish grammar. Belge also argues that Ottoman language was the language of the written texts and daily speech should have been constructed with more Turkish vocabulary (2005, p. 370). As an example of pre-modern empires, the Ottoman State did not feel obliged to build an intense communication with its subject, and a well-known discrepancy between the language of the educated elites and that of commoners was established the Ottoman domains that was rapidly forming into an empire from a local principality.

However, Belge warns the reader again against the nationalist interpretation of history. He argues in opposition of the idea that the “corrupt” elites of the Ottomans found it unproblematic to “pollute” the Turkish language, while the Turkish lay people remained loyal to their national essence and refused the intrusion of foreign languages. Belge states that the linguistic gap was formed in the Ottomans mainly because of the educational opportunities of the elites and the subjects (2005, p. 371). The classical political culture of the Ottomans involved the refusal of any intermediary aristocratic strata between the state and the society, and was very sensitive in protecting the hegemonic dominance of the palace over its subjects of various ethnic and religious origins. Belge, too, notes that this was particularly an important aspect of the Ottoman politics (2005, p. 219). In that sense, Ottoman state elites were also sensitive to the



protection of the elite language or its degradation. The language of the palace and its annexes also exerted a symbolic power of the political sphere over the social.<sup>34</sup>

By the 18th century, the social stratification in terms of cultural capital and political power was at its peak. Karpat associates the cleavage between the “high” language, of the upper classes, and the “low” language, the vernacular, with the increase in the numbers of the elites, such as bureaucrats, scribes (20,000 in Istanbul in the 18<sup>th</sup> century), religious men, merchants, artisans and others (2004, p. 449). Karpat reviews the general linguistic situation of the time:

“The basic educational system – *medreses* – placed the emphasis on religious learning, which required a knowledge of Arabic, while it was *de rigueur* for any self-respecting poet and intellectual to know Persian as well. The social dichotomy between the ruling order and the masses and the lack of a political ideology based on linguistic unity prevented the emergence of an educational system designed to disseminate the rulers’ language, thus delaying the emergence of a uniform Turkish national language” (2004, pp. 449-50).

For Karpat, the profound change in the structure of the Ottoman State brought about the need for a more complex vocabulary for the expression of the new context. The enlargement of the society’s elite classes and the structural changes that are experienced by the Ottoman State inevitably changed the linguistic ideologies:

“Thus the vernacular and the language of the upper classes diverged still more sharply, until the words “Turk” and “Turkish” came to refer exclusively to the coarse, primitive, rural folk of Anatolia and Rumelia, and the society was clearly divided into the elites (*has*) and the commoners (*am* or *havas*, the latter meaning one who lives with the five senses)” (2004, pp. 450-1).

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<sup>34</sup> Belge gives an interesting detail of the Ottoman linguistic history. He notes that even those children who knew Turkish were not included into *devşirme* system (recruitment of young boys, mostly non-Muslims, for the service of the Palace). It is known that levied boys were subjected to a total identity transformation and they got devoid of their linguistic and cultural backgrounds. Belge thinks that this linguistic practice was a part of the preference of mentally virgin young ones, children of non-elite families and those who had no craftsmanship, who had not seen the Capital before. (2005, p. 180).

Karpat draws the attention to a paradox concerning the political power and concern for language:

“The early states of Uighur and of Chagatay, each of which lasted about two centuries, perished as political entities at the hands of nomadic conquering groups. Yet these states displayed a keen linguistic consciousness and tried to retain their Turkish language. The Ottoman state, far richer and more sophisticated than its predecessors, achieved both stability and continuity, lasting from 1286 to 1918, but it gradually lost its ethnic-national character and its linguistic consciousness until the revival in the second half of the nineteenth century. Nonetheless, the Turkish language survived and developed, chiefly as the consequence of the historical accident of its being the language of the administration rather than as the result of a consciously devised state policy or the political consciousness of the population. There was no forum or association charged with the study and diffusion of Turkish” (Karpat K. H., 2004, p. 450).

Karpat’s remarks are important, as the main argument of the republican historians of Turkish language was that it was the affinity of the Turkish speakers with their language that prevented its demise, despite the irresponsible and ungrateful rulers.

### **3.2.2.1 Printing in the Ottoman Empire**

One of the novelties that radically changed the way language has been treated in the Ottoman Empire has been the coming of the printing house. It was printing and the possibilities that it enabled which basically determined the way language has been debated one century after it was first used for printing Turkish books under the control of the Palace.

A short history of printing would enlighten the ways in which its introduction into the linguistic universe of the Empire and the formation of modern paradigms of governance coincided.

Although the printing house has been considered to be established first by İbrahim Müteferrika in the Empire, the non-Muslim minorities were in the business of printing much before him. The first printing house was opened by Jews in Istanbul in 1495, and later in Salonika and then another one in Istanbul (Berkes, 2007, pp. 58-59; The Encyclopaedia of Islam, p. 799). Berkes comments that the main motive behind this

quick adaptation of printing was religion for the Jewish community and that it generated religious debates in large sections of the religious community (ibid.). Another basis for this would be the close relationship of Jews in various European countries who were acquainted with printing. It had been only a few years since thousands of Jews were forced to migrate out of Europe, especially from Spain to the Ottoman Empire.

Armenians opened their own printing house in Istanbul in 1567. The first book printed was on the Armenian Alphabet. The first book in Turkish language printed in this house was titled “This is a book containing what is necessary for our Christian life” (The Encyclopedia of Islam, p. 799). Similarly, religion seems to be the primary incentive for Armenians, too. In 1710, the Ottoman government banned books causing religious conflicts within the Orthodox and Catholic communities and closed the house (Berkes, 2007, p. 62). Orthodox Greeks, too, opened a printing house in Istanbul in 1627 (The Encyclopedia of Islam, p. 800).

Although there were printings in the Arabic Alphabet in Europe and these were traded in the Empire, there were no houses exclusively devoted to printing in Turkish with Arabic alphabet until Müteferrika in the 18 century.

İbrahim Müteferrika collaborated with Mehmet Said Paşa for establishing the printing house. Berkes remarks that he had most possibly been acquainted with printing before his conversion in Hungary (Berkes, 2007, p. 57). He prepared a report, *Wasilat al-tiba'a*, where he stated the need for printing and presented it to the *şeyhülislam* and the *padişah*, Ahmet III. The necessary *fetva* and *ferman* were issued and the house was established in 1727. They were allowed to print on all subjects but the religious issues. Lack of sufficient paper interrupted the printing business and due to the diplomatic mission he was assigned in 1742, the house halted. In the same century, another printing house was established by the French Embassy to print in Turkish in 1787 (The Encyclopedia of Islam, p. 801).

There are some points to be discussed after this short summary of the start of printing.

The first one is the crucial period of encountering the European superiority. In 1699, the Ottoman Empire was forced to withdraw from a land by a treaty (Karlowitz) for the first time and the decline had become more apparent. In Europe, there was an accumulating transformation of the political, governmental and military structures. An

immense advance in natural sciences and geography was taking place. In this situation, the non-Muslim minorities and the converted multi-lingual individuals serving the Empire were the main agents of transference of the technological and scientific novelties of the West, as the Ottoman state seems to be reluctant to take action in the face of these changes. Printing is a good example for this situation.

On the other hand, as the Ottoman state decided to send envoys and establish embassies in European states towards the end of the 17<sup>th</sup> century, long after the Europeans did so in various cities of the Empire. The educated diplomats and bureaucrats who visited those countries and made observation became the sources of reforms back at home. Yirmisekiz Mehmet Çelebi was in Paris in 1720. He was sent there to see the European civilization, to observe and to bring back information. His son Mehmet Said Paşa, worked with İbrahim Müteferrika contributing with his experience of Europe and sympathy for change.

As the European modernity had been diffusing into the Ottoman government and upper classes, the heads of the state and the religion had to be convinced for adopting new advancements. İbrahim Müteferrika wrote a memorandum to be presented to the *padişah*, first asking the question, “Why do Christian nations, which were so weak in the past compared to Muslim nations, begin to dominate so many lands in modern times and even defeat once the victorious Ottoman armies?”. He was asking Muslims to awaken from the slumber of headlessness and he added, “let them be informed about the conditions of their enemies. Let them act with foresight and become intimately acquainted with the new European methods, organization, strategy, tactics and warfare.” He was asking geography to be learnt. He also wrote that Ottomans have to learn from the Russians whose Tsar had brought experts skilled in these sciences and reformed their armies (Kinross, 1977). İbrahim Müteferrika, had printed the maps of the Marmara Sea in 1719 and the Black Sea in 1724, and presented them to grand vizier, Damat İbrahim Paşa, before the establishment of the printing house. Damat İbrahim Paşa was quick to perceive how press could be used for military purposes. He was influential on *padişah* and *şeyhülislam* who did not hesitate to grant the authorization (Shaw & Shaw, 1976, pp. 236-237). Müteferrika, later, printed another book to advise to the Sultan titled “*Usul ul-Hikam fi Nizam al-Umam*”, which is described by Shaw and Shaw as a kind of “Mirror for Princes” (Shaw & Shaw, 1976, p. 237).

Berkes rejects a common idea that postulates that *ulema* opposed strongly to the business of printing (2007, p. 58). He observes no apparent religious resistance against printing and that there is no historical evidence of a declaration of that "printing is against *Sharia*". Similarly, Berkes finds no opposition against printing during the revolts of *Patrona Halil*. Since religious matters were left out of the allowed subjects for printing, the alleged opposition from the scribes is also seen as ineffective by Berkes (p. 59). Shaw and Shaw connects the two themes and argue that agreeing the printing except religious subjects, *Şeyhülislam* preserved for the scribes the most lucrative source of income and soothed their opposition (1976, p. 235).

However, the Palace did not release the business of printing completely free. İbrahim Müteferrika seems to be alert to the religious sensitivity and avoided any incidence to cause *ulema*'s disturbance. He, for example, is said not to be able to print his own *Risale-i İslamiye*, his autobiography of his conversion (İslâm Ansiklopedisi, p. 899). *Şeyhülislam* was assigned for proof reading everything printed (The Encyclopedia of Islam, p. 800). The new institution, moreover, was integrated into the traditional guild system. The owner of the printing house had to pay a kind of tax per book published. The prices were decided by the government. Running the business of printing needed to be obtained through the *malikâne* system from the State. Berkes recognizes this integration, hence the lack of autonomy as the main reason of underdevelopment of printing in the following years (Berkes, 2007, p. 59). Until the launch of mass media, printing business remained a monopoly of the state.

All in all, Berkes thinks that the general resistance against printing among the Ottoman elites mainly had political, rather than religious concerns. He notes that observing the intensified religious turmoil among the non-Muslim minorities of the Empire cultivated by the expanding possibilities enabled by printing, the religious elites were reluctant in releasing printing free to avoid similar conflicts within the Muslim community (2007, p. 63).

There were 17 works printed in total, in 23 volumes and 13,200 editions during Müteferrika's period. These included linguistic books and dictionaries, history books and the ones on geography, military and natural sciences. Until Selim III, at the end of the 18<sup>th</sup> century, only the following books were printed: the reprint of *Kitab-i Lügat-i Vankuli*, which was also the first book printed in the Müteferrika's printing house of and

all of its editions were sold out; the histories of *Şakir-Subhi* and *İzzi*; three books on military subjects, and a book on the Arabic language (The Encyclopedia of Islam, p. 801).

The printed books were expensive, although not as much as the hand-written ones. Berkes notes too that there was no pressure from the market for cheap and a large number of books (2007, p. 65).

For the conclusion on the introduction of printing in the Ottoman Empire, there some points to be highlighted.

Printing did not only brought a new technology, but also introduced and spread new themes that were unknown to the Empire, like geography and natural sciences. There were books by Katip Çelebi, Copernic and Tycho Brahe. The increasing interest in geography could be related to the growing concerns for the precision and territory. As the new way of diplomacy necessitated being cognizant of the borders of the lands of the states, and as the populations within the territories became factors more than simple tax-givers, the numbers, statistics and records became the tools of governing. However, in the case of Ottoman Empire, the products of printing seem to address only to a narrow circle of intelligentsia. The lack of interest in large number of cheap books could be related to the non-existence of a significant literate population, the religious content of education and the state control over the Islamic cultural domain of the Empire.

Yet, another important point is the growing interest on language, and the printing of dictionaries. A good amount of Islamic thought had been based on the interpretation of Quran and *hadiths* of Mohammed. The absence of a standardized dictionary and set rules of linguistic interaction could be regarded as one the reasons for this. Similarly, with a standard Arabic-Turkish dictionary, the translation of Arabic history books gains more importance in reading the cultural hesitation of the Ottoman Empire against the European predominance on the horizon.

The last point to be underlined is the gradual diffusion of modernity with its paradigm, practices and institutions into the Ottoman Empire. The recognition of decline, the idea of reform and adaptation of European techniques and strategies seems to be intertwined with the attempts to recover by searching for what had been done wrong and for the solution in the Islamic past. The times of the start of printing coincides with the start of the paradoxical modernization of the Ottoman Empire.

### 3.2.2.2 Ottoman Modernization and Language Policies in the 19th century

Peter Burke, too, underlines that it was after the 18<sup>th</sup> century that Turkish became a concern for many institutions of the Ottoman state (2004, p. 154). However, major transformation of the relationship between languages and political ideologies occurred in the 19<sup>th</sup> century. Modernization's impact along with an attempt to transform the Ottoman state into a modern one and with the nationalization movements resulted in that the imperial language became problematic. As Belge approves this problematization is common in many nation-state building processes (2005, p. 371).

Karpat evaluates the evolution of Turkish language in the 19<sup>th</sup> century and notes that it had been conditioned by three major developments:

(1) "the introduction of a series of reforms, largely under the political and economic impact of the West", (2) "the emergence of Ottomanism as the denominator for a common national identity", and (3) "the introduction of a government-supported European type of educational system designed chiefly to train personnel for government services." (2004, pp. 451-452).

The 19<sup>th</sup> century endeavors for the formation of a modern state bureaucracy, the reorganization of the military forces, introduction of Western institutions of education such as academies of engineering, military and medicine were insufficient to save the Empire but were decisive in the building of Turkish modern politics. New institutions brought with them new statuses and new ideologies.

On the one hand, new bureaucrats of the state became involved more and more in the politics of language, either by state enterprises of publishing daily newspapers or by expanding the communication networks, such as postage or telegram services. Political modernization was substantiating itself while its practices compelled engagement in the rethinking of the problem of language. A more easily printable script and a simpler lexicon were becoming increasingly essential, as the "high" Ottoman language appeared to be unfit for relations of social and political modernity. Besides, the Ottoman alphabet was hard to come to terms with by large sections of the population, for not only it was complicated or alien to the nation as Kemalist cadres cursed, but also more than that, for educational facilities were poor. Therefore, literacy was low, especially among the

Muslim populations and this was not promising in the context of modernizing Ottoman politics.

On the other hand, there were new groups emerging who were engaged also in politics: recently growing intellectuals for whom the first concern was to “reach the public”. It was a passionate debate in literary circles, for example, to what extent the language should be simplified in order to get in touch with the people. The idea behind such a reflection was obviously to include masses in to the political mobilization.<sup>35</sup>

One specific challenge for the existing understanding of Turkish was that there were particular sources of formation of a new vocabulary of political, military and scientific terminology, borrowed both from Arabic and Persian, and from European languages. Mostly all version of a term was used simultaneously, as Karpat exemplifies “*doktor, tabib, hekim*”. The conscious choice of the word depended on the political position one took. Multiplication of the varieties of language transforms the language use into a choice. Such multiplication could be a result of many developments, among which are the transfiguration of the political (modernization) or class structures (development of capitalism), the introduction of a new media of communication (newspapers) to enforce a different assessment of the language, or the introduction of the new domains of knowledge (natural or social sciences). Consequently, preferring one variety of a language over another is related to many factors, such as class position, political ideology, cultural and education background.<sup>36</sup>

There were some important developments following the first decades of the 19<sup>th</sup> century that would allow us trace the links between the Ottoman bureaucratic modernization, formation of a public sphere and language policies.

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<sup>35</sup> See for detailed analyses of the debates and developments concerning language during the last century of Ottoman Empire, Levend (1972), Sadoğlu (2003), Karal (1978), G. Lewis (2004), Heyd (2001), Yücel (1982), Bosworth (1965a; 1965b), and İmer (1998).

<sup>36</sup> Geoffrey Lewis quotes some interesting comments of how the preferences of words reflected the positions of class and status in the Republican Turkish. Most known examples would be how the vocabulary shifts from *aşevi* to *lokanta*, and then to *restoran*, or from *ayakyolu*, to *abtesane*, and then to *hela* and to *tuvalet* or *lavabo*, as the speakers situates herself or himself within higher positions on the ladder of social hierarchy (2004, p. 169).



On November 1, 1831, the first newspaper of the Ottoman Empire was launched: *Takvim-i Vekayi*. It was the official gazette, and its language policy represented the multilingual linguistic situation in the Empire. Although Turkish had its primacy, the gazette was also sold with copies in Greek, Armenian, Arabic and Persian (Sadođlu, 2003, p. 82).

On July 31, 1840, an English man, William Churchill took necessary permissions to publish a daily which was titled *Ceride-i Havadis*. The Ottoman State supported its publication. In the petition for permission, he stated that the language of the newspaper would be a plain Turkish, free from Arabic and Persian borrowings, in order that everybody could easily read (ibid.).<sup>37</sup>

Twenty years later came the first private newspaper independent (from both the Palace's support and influence). On October 21, 1860, Agâh Efendi and Şinasi started *Tercüman-ı Ahval*. It was, then, the first time that press as business appeared with commercial worries about sales. The newspaper was a keen supported of the simplification of the language, in order to reach the maximum of the reader audience. Şinasi left the publication and launched his own on June 27, 1862: *Tasvir-i Efkar*. Şinasi continued on his articles there with a simpler and cleared Turkish, and his advocating of such a language use. *Tercüman-ı Ahval* was closed down in 1866 (p. 83).

On the other hand, the State was publishing local official gazettes too. After the enactment of 1864 *Vilayet Nizamnamesi* (Regulation on the administration of provinces), there appeared 15 local gazettes, primarily using Turkish, but also the most used local language as the second one.<sup>38</sup> Their number increased to 22 in 1876, when the first Constitution was declared.

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<sup>37</sup> After Churchill died, his son ended the publication of the newspaper and issued a new, this time titled *Ruzname-i Ceride-i Havadis*.

<sup>38</sup> The newspapers were: *Duna* (in Tuna), *Aydın* (in İzmir), *Bosna* (in Turkish and Sewrbian), *Diyarbakır* (in Kurdish?), *Envâr-ı Şarkiye* (in Erzurum), *Furat* (in Halep), *Basra* (in Turkish and Arabic), *Edirne* (In Turkish and Greek), *Girid* (in Crete), *Hüdavendigâr* (in Bursa, in Turkish and Armenian), *Kastamonu*, *Konya*, *Selanik*, *Trabzon*, and *Zevra* (in Bagdat) (Sadođlu, 2003, pp. 85-86).

Another private daily *Muhbir* started to publish by Ali Suavi in 1867. Ali Suavi explained on the first day of its publication about the language to be used in the newspaper: “The newspaper will deliver everything that is considered to be provided to the readers in the daily spoken language of Istanbul”. Later, he emphasized that this did not mean that the newspaper would use *kaba Türkçe* (crude Turkish) (Sadoğlu, 2003, p. 85).

In 1869, an important reform regarding the educational system was initiated: *Maarif-i Umumiye Nizamnamesi* (Regulation for public education). The elementary level of education was planned to be mandatory for all subjects and it was declared to be in Turkish. After the secondary school level, *Rüştiye*, the communities were allowed to teach in their own languages (Sadoğlu, 2003, p. 75). The idea was on target for the cultural and educational integration of all the citizens of the Empire, nevertheless, this one, like other attempts of modernization, was proved ineffective.<sup>39</sup>

The *Tanzimat* period witnessed several attempts to simplify the written form of the Ottoman language, as well. Increasing use of the print both necessitated and facilitated the use of a more easily printed script, called *matbu* (literally means printed), in which the characters were placed with spaces between them compared to the continuous flow of the brush in handwriting (Ortaylı, 2001, pp. 127-129).

Before *Tanzimat*, a great calligrapher, Mustafa Râkım Efendi (also known as Hattat Râkım Efendi) offered a more uncomplicated script simpler in the first years of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, but faced strong opposition. However, the Sultan of the times, Mahmut II, himself a calligrapher as well, supported him and the script widely used for some time (Mardin, 1998, p. 294; Sadoğlu, 2003, p. 67).

Şerif Mardin notes that simpler alphabet prepared by the two main *Tanzimat* statesmen, Fuad Paşa and Cevdet Paşa was used to increase the rates of reading among the students of elementary schools (1998, p. 294).

In many regulations up to 1876, Turkish was taken for granted as the language of official business, without any formal assertion. The first declaration of Turkish as the official language of the state came in 1876, in the first Constitution, *Kanun-u Esâsî*. The

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<sup>39</sup> For a detailed explanation on the reasons of the failure of the Regulation, see Ortaylı (2001, pp. 188-190)

declaration of the constitutional monarchy came with an overarching legal text that would bind all the laws. Besides other regulations of the state functions, the text also enforces, in its Article 18, that “in order to work in state services, the Ottoman subjects have to know Turkish, which is the official language of the state.”<sup>40</sup> Such order is interesting in that it words the rule as based on the given assumption that Turkish is the official language. However, there is no article before the 18<sup>th</sup>, which enlists the language of the state. Moreover, the Article 18 does not distinguish the knowledge of writing, reading or speaking Turkish.

The 1876 Constitution also decreed that speeches in the parliament would be made in Turkish, in Article 57. Article 68, on the other hand, decided that, in the elections to be made after four years, members of the parliament would have be able to read Turkish, and also to write it *as far as possible*.<sup>41</sup>,

The Law of Municipalities of 1877 similarly required those who would be elected to the municipal councils to be able to speak Turkish.

Although short lived, the parliament seems to host some hot debates on the issue of language. For example, Kushner quotes from *Times*, dated April 9, 1877, that there erupted strong arguments in the parliament on language. A Greek deputy, who spoke on the rights of other languages, was silenced by Ahmet Vefik Paşa, who argued against that Turkish has a priority before others (Kushner, 1977, pp. 117, n. 15).

*Tanzimat* period is also known as the time when the bureaucratic network overcame the long established center of power, the Palace. The advisory councils, ministries, and the formation of a bureaucratic structure shifted the focus of authority from the Palace to *Bab-ı Âli*. The peak of this shift was the declaration of the Constitution and the opening of the *Meclis-i Mebusan*, the Parliament. However, Abdülhamit II ruled out both the Constitution and the Parliament in one and a half year, in 1878, shifted balance of power back to the Palace, once again. For the next 30 years,

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<sup>40</sup> “*Tebaa-i Osmaniye'nin, hizmet-i devlette istihdam olunmak için devletin lisan-i resmisi olan Türkçeyi bilmeleri şarttır.*” (Kili & Gözübüyük, 2000, p. 44).

<sup>41</sup> “*Dört seneden sonra icra olunacak intihaplarda mebus olmak için Türkçe okumak ve mümkün mertebe yazmak dahi şart olacaktır.*” (Kili & Gözübüyük, 2000, p. 50).

Abdülhamit II tried to re-establish the authority of the Ottoman State and utilized the title of Caliphate, to unify the Muslim peoples of the Empire.<sup>42</sup>

The ineffective policies of language continued under Abdülhamit II's reign. A special council was established to be exclusively deal with the problem of language reform (*Islah-ı Lisani*). In 1894, as Levend states, Necip Asım proposed and the *Bab-ı Âli* accepted to ask the teachers and the officers in the provinces to collect pure Turkish words, which are lesser known. However, after two months it turned out to be that there was no response from anyone (Levend, 1972, p. 147). Levend cites Abdülhamit's and his bureaucrats' letters where they mentioned about the proceedings of the council; however, he also notes that there were no concrete results.

In the same year, Abdülhamit attempted to re-enforce the 1869 Regulation, which was noted above, and ordered that all local and foreign schools would teach Turkish as a compulsory course.<sup>43</sup> The order also required that the ministry officials would be present in the language examinations and stipulated closing down the schools of which students were unable to pass. This order turned out to be yet another failure.

On the other hand, the educational institutions of the ethno-religious communities where the education was in the communities' mother languages mounted rapidly. In 1897, Sadoğlu reports, non-Muslim communities had 6739 primary schools, 5982 secondary schools and 687 high schools (2003, p. 74)

1880s had been the decade of the emerging opposition of Turkish nationalism from *Jön Türkler* (Young Turks).

Sadoğlu marks an interesting phase of political action during Abdülhamit II's reign. He notes that, around 1880s, the censorship on the press considerably increased and that any direct reference to daily political issues would mean trouble for the writers. In following, he argues that the growing number of articles on language, culture, history

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<sup>42</sup> Zürcher convincingly argues that the reign of Abdülhamit II was not a time of retreat from modernization, on the contrary, the elements of continuity predominates the signs of withdrawal (2003, pp. 76-90). For an interesting study on the ideological formations of the Abdülhamit's period, see Deringil (2002).

<sup>43</sup> Avram Galanti, too, narrates that Christian schools were required to teach Turkish to its students (1928, pp. 64-65).

and literature, in time, turned out to be the camouflage for political opposition (Sadoğlu, 2003, p. 117). In fact, Sadoğlu bases his case on Şerif Mardin's argument.

Mardin states that in a political environment where Turkism was not favored by the State, linguistics turned out to be a channel for conducting Turkist politics (2001, p. 114). This is an interesting point in that a similar environment and a similar masking of political opposition were reproduced in many sections of the republican history. Relevant details will be given in the next section; however, it is worth to underline here how the science of language appeared as a position of authority and how it has been intrinsically political.

Sadoğlu comments that there was a success during the *Tanzimat* period, in a quite limited way, in closing the gap between the spoken and written varieties of Turkish. Nevertheless, he goes on, there was no advance in the formation of a common language among the subjects of the Empire, despite all the attempts to build an Ottoman identity of citizenship. There was an increasing linguistic homogenization only at the level of literate intellectuals (Sadoğlu, 2003, pp. 62-76). This linguistic unification among the intellectuals, notwithstanding different approaches regarding the norms of language use, can be attributed to an expanding use of the print, to the formation of circles of politics and literature autonomous from the Palace and an intensifying circulation of books, newspaper articles and pamphlets.

The lack of linguistic integration of the wider population of the Ottoman subjects, on the other hand, had a multi-dimensional background.

Firstly, there was no solid official politics of language. Although many political elites of the time were aware of the fact that the new institutions and the new politics of citizenship required a standardized common language, principally in order to enable the communication between the state and its citizens, there was hardly an infrastructural organization aimed at that. The educational system was still fractured in line with the ethno-religious boundaries, to which the missionary schools were added. All these various institutions grounded their courses on different languages, and the state schools, which prioritized Ottoman Turkish, were far from being a part of widespread national education.

The military duties were skipped by most of the non-Muslim male subjects by the payment of a special tax, so the military institutions were the places to learn the state language only for the Muslim men whose mother language was not Turkish.

The general two-fold development of *Tanzimat*, modernization attempts on the one side, and the persistence of conservative institutions and discourses on the other, was reflected on the language regime, as well. Institutions of justice, where in modern states, have been one of the main contact sites of the states and the civil society. However, in the Ottoman *Tanzimat*, like the educational system, each *millet* had their own judiciary organization, and beside that, there was the modernized court system in parallel to them.

It could be concluded that there was not any consistent and effective language regime within the Ottoman Empire in the 19<sup>th</sup> century. There were attempts like prioritizing Turkish in particular domains such as in education, or the declaration of Turkish as the official language in 1876. Nevertheless, the inability of the State to centralize and efficiently operate in the 19<sup>th</sup> century ruled out possibilities of the establishment of any particular language regime.

This absence, by no means, should be interpreted as that the 19<sup>th</sup> century was insignificant in the issue language. On the contrary, this absence is strongly related to the fact that the linguistic ideologies were in the process of formation. These are the very ideologies of Turkish, with its repercussions to other related languages and varieties, which would inform the language ideologies of the Republican era.

The notion of official language is one basic cause, among others, that triggers the politicization of language. The preference of one language or another exceeds mere linguistic facts, but is more associated with the ideological frameworks. Before the above-mentioned institutions of modernization such as the newspapers or the secular primary schools were established properly, the ideologies pertaining to them were at work. The political elites and intellectuals of the 19<sup>th</sup> century in the Ottoman Empire quickly understood how language was a source of power and legitimization. The problem with the organization of a full-frame language regime was resulted from undecided political struggles, those that were both internal and external to the Empire. Young Turks ended the term of an absolutist sultan, Abdülhamit II, after 30 years of

rule, in 1908 (Kansu, 2001), however, they were unable to produce a resolution for the internal and international political conflicts.

There is yet no agreement on the limits of Turkish nationalism – in terms of ideology or practice – of the Young Turks and İTC (Kushner, 1977; and Arai, 2000). Among Akçura's three ways of political inclinations of the time, Turkism, Islamism and Ottomanism, as he himself proposed in 1904, nationalism of Turkishness was confirmed to be more effective (Akçura Y. , 1976). With the influence of the studies of Turkology by the European orientalist, the association between the Turkish nation and a genuine Turkish language became securer. Following the failure of Ottomanism during the *Tanzimat* and the first constitutional period first *Meşrutiyet*, Young Turks were much more suspicious of the non-Muslim and non-Turkish populations of the Empire. Turkish nationalist policies were put into effect, coupled with attempts to create a Turkish bourgeoisie and industrialization, resulted in escalating Turkification of education and economic affairs.

Multilingualism was still a reality of the İTC period. According to a study, there were 730 newspapers being published in the Ottoman Empire in 1909.<sup>44</sup> The classification of the main languages used by these newspapers is shown in the Table 1 below.

Although there were attempts to linguistically Turkify the cultural, educational, economic and political spheres, similar to those of the *Tanzimat* period, the İTC leaders had much to negotiate with the non-Turkish minorities and the imperial powers that assigned themselves the mission of protection of the minorities. Still it is not possible to observe the formation of structured language regime, nor the political power in order to create one.

Yet, nationalism was becoming more influential among the civil actors. It was during the İTC power when the foundations of many Republican institutions of civil society, which would subjectify the citizens as the ideological satellites of the state, were laid.

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<sup>44</sup> A number of other minor languages are excluded from the above list. Numbers are given by Koloğlu (1979, p. 100).

Language of the newspapers	Count
Turkish	308
Greek	109
Arabic	67
Armenian	43
Turkish/Arabic	41
French	36
Turkish/French	24
Jewish (Ladino)	20
Turkish/Greek	16
Turkish/Armenian	5
Persian/Turkish	3
Italian	2
Persian/Arabic	1
(Other mixed-language newspapers)	36

**Table 1** - Numbers of newspapers according their language in 1909

*Türk Derneği* (Turkish Association) was one of them. The Association's concentration was on the formation of a common language among the population of the Empire. Their manifesto started with an emphasis on the linguistic diversity.<sup>45</sup> Sadoğlu rightly interprets the approach of the Association as a demand for status planning (2003, p. 131), and explains that they also asked for a reform of the language itself regarding the grammar, script, syntax, spelling and purification from foreign elements.

Most of the influential nationalists also appeared in this period, such as Yusuf Akçura and Ziya Gökalp. They were both members of the ruling elite in the İTC, but also they carved the foundations of the nationalist discourse of the Republican era, of which analysis would not be complete without referring to the works of them both.<sup>46</sup>

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<sup>45</sup> See Üstel (1997, pp. 37-40) for the complete text of the manifesto.

<sup>46</sup> For extensive information and essential analyses of the sources of Turkish nationalism, see Kushner (1977) and Heyd (2001).



## **CHAPTER 4**

### **REPUBLICAN REGIME OF LANGUAGE**

This chapter presents the history of legal arrangements with respect to language policy during the republican period in Turkey. To that purpose, the legal history of Turkey is reviewed and major official linguistic regulations are introduced. The review is not limited to the laws that are decreed by the parliament. Other relevant regulations, rulings, directive or rules that have been agreed and/or practiced are also included. Such commandments include the decisions of municipalities and public or educational institutions that in one way or another regulate the use of language in areas such as speaking, publication, broadcasting, use in meetings or propaganda, etc.

Surely, the establishment of an official language regime is not merely confined to the use of Turkish, which has been the official language of the state since the declaration of Republic on October 29, 1923. Such a survey inevitably includes what is excluded, besides what is ordered, as well. In this sense, the regulations are evaluated also in terms of how languages of Turkey other than Turkish were treated.

The minority language policies of the Republic of Turkey have been based on the Lausanne Treaty. On the one side, there are the languages of the officially recognized non-Muslim minorities of Armenians, Greeks and Jews. As they are bestowed with special statuses in the Treaty, their rights of language use are guaranteed by an international treaty.

On the other side, there are major demographic or sociological minorities of which languages include varieties of Kurdish, Arabic, Laz, and Circassian. As it will be

exhibited below, there are no direct references to any of these languages in any Turkish law.<sup>47</sup> A general official attitude with respect to other languages has been to abstain even to name them, until very recently. It seems like the main motive for such a refrain to mention them in any official document or discourse has been to avoid any sort of legitimacy that might arise. Although some of the authorities were unable to maintain such a discreet position in a consistent way, a pattern might be observed on the side of the state, which registers to the attitude of discursive negation while in practice taking measures against these languages, or the minorities speaking them. Therefore, with respect to the linguistic regime in Turkey, the discourse of negation conflicts with the practice of elimination.

As summarized above in the language policies of the Ottoman Empire, Turkish became the official language for the first time in 1876 constitution. However, the political interest in the Turkish language and in its purity and simplification were much more effective than the direct practices of its hegemonization. The rising political value of the Turkish language in the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century in the Ottoman Empire is indeed a significant symbol of the emergence of practices and institutions of modernity, and the ideology of nationalism. The linguistic variety of the common people, which had been until lately downgraded by the admirers of the cultural and political high-language of Ottoman as primitive, unintelligible and crude, was then becoming a focus of linguistic, political and cultural interest.<sup>48</sup>

The debates on reforming Ottoman alphabet, on the simplification of the language to make it accessible for the layperson, and on the status of Turkish/Ottoman with respect to its official use had been almost a century old when the Republic came to grips with the language problem. What the republicans inherited were Turkish as the state

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<sup>47</sup> One exception is the proscription of Kurdish publications, by the Council of Ministers on January 25, 1967. Details are presented below, in this section.

<sup>48</sup> Mardin refuses the classical and sharp distinction between the Ottoman of the palace and the folkloric Turkish vernacular and argues for that “a common substratum of ‘Turkishness’ was maintained across the varieties of linguistic code” (2002, p. 116). For the depreciation of folk Turkish by the elites see Heyd (2001, p. 10), Ahmad (1993, p. 78) and Lewis (1961, pp. 1-2).

language, which had been highly vernacularized, and a legacy of heated discussions on the Romanization of the alphabet.<sup>49</sup>

As stated above, the Republic was much keener on the total modernization of the state and the social relations. The Grand National Assembly of Turkey was established in Ankara on April 23, 1920, during the war against the occupation of Greek forces. In a very short time, Ankara proved to be a real rival against the Istanbul government, which had long lost its legitimacy and credibility. There were many signs of, not only resistance against occupation, but also of preparation for the foundation of a new political unit.

Language was yet to be the issue with a high level of priority. The alliances were made in order to gather forces as wide as possible for a military defense, from the tribes of Ottoman Kurdistan to the guerilla forces of the Northern Anatolia (Zürcher, 2003, pp. 147-160). Although many members of the Assembly considered themselves as Turkish nationalists, the urgency of resisting occupation seems to prevent to emphasize the “Turkishness” of the new polity. The transformation of the political discourse from Islamic-patriotism to secular-Turkism only gradually evolved (Göktürk, 2002).

Therefore, the new constitution of 1921, *Teşkilatı Esasiye Kanunu*, has no single reference to notions like Turk, or Turkish, and neither in any way to a process of Turkification. (Kili & Gözübüyük, 2000, pp. 95-108). In parallel, there was no mention on the official language. The language used in the parliament was Turkish in practice, and, maybe because of that, it is understandable that a debate on assigning an official language and stating it clearly in the Constitution would not be one of the main concerns. The Constitution basically regulated the operation of the Ankara government and the territory it claimed its authority.

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<sup>49</sup> Mardin, in his same work noted above, loads a relatively autonomous characteristic to the vernacularization process with respect to the formation of the institutions of modern state and education, and of modern ideologies. He discusses against the Andersonian conception of linguistic vernacularization and suggests a challenging perspective for the cases of the Ottoman Empire and Turkey (2002). Also, see Mardin (1995).

#### **4.1 Lausanne Treaty and the Population Exchange of 1922-1923**

With a victory against the Greek army in the second half of 1922, the Ankara government was recognized as the legitimate representative of what was left of the Ottoman Empire and was called to take part in the peace negotiations in Lausanne. After hard times during the meetings, which were interrupted twice, the Treaty was signed with the delegates of related countries on July 24, 1923. The Treaty is mostly treated as the constitutive document of the new state of Turkey, which was acknowledged as a genuine member of the international community, with the Treaty. In addition, it was with this treaty that the new state had to face the challenge to articulate a politically admissible discourse on its minorities and their cultural expressions. Against all pressure to register Kurds as an officially recognized minority (Özkan, 2001), alongside with the Armenians, Greeks and Jews, the Turkish side resisted, and succeeded. On the other hand, the treaty enforced to guarantee linguistic rights of every Turkish citizen.

The relevant articles of the Treaty were extensive defining social and cultural freedoms. Below are the articles that were pointing out linguistic issue.

Article 38 ensured the equality of citizens without any discrimination, including language. The first clause of the Article read:

“The Turkish Government undertakes to assure full and complete protection of life and liberty to all inhabitants of Turkey without distinction of birth, nationality, language, race or religion.”

Article 39 was specifically on freedoms of language use, and again, they were to be granted to every citizen:

“No restrictions shall be imposed on the free use by any Turkish national of any language in private intercourse, in commerce, religion, in the press, or in publications of any kind or at public meetings... Notwithstanding the existence of the official language, adequate facilities shall be given to Turkish nationals of non-Turkish speech for the oral use of their own language before the Courts”.

Article 41 regulated the educational rights of non-Muslim minorities and their right to educate their children in their own mother language:

“As regards public instruction, the Turkish Government will grant in those towns and districts, where a considerable proportion of non-Moslem nationals are resident, adequate facilities for ensuring that in the primary schools the instruction shall be given to the children of such Turkish nationals through the medium of their own language. This provision will not prevent the Turkish Government from making the teaching of the Turkish language obligatory in the said schools.”

Lausanne Treaty still triggers much debate, especially when the linguistic rights of the Muslim minorities, who were not particularly entitled to distinct rights, are at stake. Many supporters of such rights argue, rightfully, that the Turkish State violates its citizens' rights that were granted by the Treaty's Article 38 and 39.<sup>50</sup> As it will be presented below, the Republican period has been a time of misery for any minority in Turkey in terms of rights and freedoms.

The Treaty did not only define the minorities and the rights of citizens. In the same conference, before the final text of Treaty was formed, in January 1923, the Greek and Turkish governments agreed on a population exchange, which would affect more than one and half million people in both countries.<sup>51</sup> The exchange involved the “Greek Orthodox” people in Turkey except those residing in Istanbul, Bozcaada and Gökçeada, and the “Muslims” of Greece except those in West Thrace.

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<sup>50</sup> For similar arguments, see Oran (2004). Also there are others who argue that there are no minorities in Turkey other than Armenians, Greeks and Jews, as defined by the Lausanne Treaty. For a case that is empower by legal, historical and sociological theses in which ethnic groups in Turkey are acknowledged but are considered as minorities in legal terms, see Özkan (2001). For a perspective of a similar vein that exclusively bases its argument on international law, see Terzioğlu (2007). The latter two are the social scientific reproductions of the official discourse, which has been painstakingly constructed within the Republican period, in order to illegitimize and criminalize any claim of minority rights.

<sup>51</sup> The issue only recently attracted attention of the Turkish social sciences. For different accounts of the 1923 Population Exchange see Aktar (2000c), Arı (1995), Pekin and Turan (2002), Pekin (2005), Yıldırım (2006), Gökaçtı (2003), Zengin-Aghatabay (2007), Erdal (2006), Hirschon (2005a) and (2005b), (Küçük Asya Araştırmaları Merkezi, 2002) and Belli (2004).

Mass migrations, in fact, started almost a century ago in the Ottoman Empire. The nationalist uprisings in Balkans, the Russian oppression on the Muslims, massacres against the Armenians and their deportation, Balkan Wars in 1913-1914 and the World War I caused hundreds of thousands to be relocated. As for the 1923 exchange, it could be considered a final blow decided by an agreement of the two states to clean the remaining subversions of religious heterogeneity. Aktar reminds that the percentage of minority population in Greece fell from 20% in 1920 down to 6% in 1930s (2000c, p. 26). Similarly Keyder states “Before the World War I, one was non-Muslim in every five (20%) who were living within the territories of today’s Turkey, the ratio fell well down to one in twenty (5%) after the [Independence] War” (2001, p. 112). By 1923, the land was more than 95 % Muslim, only two large Muslim linguistic group were left, Turks and Kurds, and some other small groups, Greek-, Armenian- and Syriac-speaking Christians, Spanish speaking Jews, and Circassian-, Laz- and Arabic-speaking Muslims.

The exchange not only leveled the religious diversity in both countries, but also brought up the reconfiguration of the linguistic landscape. However, the language composition of the migrants was much more complex.

There were two linguistic groups of Muslims, who migrated from Greece. Those who were deported from Aegean Islands and the southern mainland of the country mostly spoke Greek as their mother language. On the other hand, those who came from Ionnina and its environs (the northwestern regions of Greece) were speaking Turkish. There were also two linguistic groups among the Greeks, who that had to leave their lands in Anatolia. The mother language of their majority was Greek, and most spoke Turkish, as well. There was also the Orthodox Christian community of Karaman who spoke Turkish as their mother language and who wrote it in Greek alphabet. The community expected to be excluded from the Exchange, nevertheless, they ended up

among the deported, being officially considered as Greeks speaking Turkish (Okutan, 2004, pp. 228-229).<sup>52</sup>

By 1923, the land was more than 95 % Muslim, only two large Muslim linguistic groups were left, Turkish and Kurdish, and some other small groups, Greek, Armenian, Syrian-speaking Christians, Jews speaking a variety of Spanish, and Circassian, Laz and Arabic speaking Muslims (Zürcher, 1997: 172).

#### **4.2 Republican Thrust to Radical Nationalization - 1923 Amendments in the Constitution**

The period, especially until the death of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in 1938, is distinguished with its intensity of reforms and uncompromising state authority. It was in this period when the radical project of total modernization and secularization through nationalization was operated by the new political elites. Language at that time became an indispensable dimension of modernization, homogenization and nationalization. It is possible to read the political trails of the Republican period by following the politics of language. At the very starting moment of the Republic, the formation of a national language regime was set out.

With the proclamation of the Republic on October 29, 1923, the Grand Assembly agreed on amendments in some of the articles of the 1921 Constitution. Article 2 was renewed as “The religion of the State of Turkey is Islam, and its official language is Turkish. The capital is Ankara.” Article 2 was changed twice until the 1961 Constitution came into force. The first change was with the Law no. 1222 decreed on

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<sup>52</sup> The religious emphasis in the population exchange is worth to note. The people to be migrated were categorized according to their religions, not their national identities: Muslims vs. Orthodox Greeks. After a century of nationalist consolidation in both countries, it might appear as if the ethnic identities have overcome religious identifications. However, it was not the case then, especially for most of the Greek speaking Muslims. A similar story to that of the Karaman Orthodox community belongs to the Gagauz Turks of Moldavia. They were too speaking a variety of Turkish, they defined themselves as Turks and asked to be admitted to Turkey within the scope of the exchange agreement. They were, too, refused by the Turkish government (Gözler, 2001).

April 10, 1928, when the part stating the religion of state as Islam was deleted and the article was made into “The official language of the State of Turkey is Turkish and its capital is Ankara.” The second change was with the Law no. 3115 decreed on February 5, 1937 when the six principles of Kemalism were added, leaving sentence on the official language intact (Kili & Gözübüyük, 2000, p. 120).

The language regime was not limited to status planning. An early Republican sign of language purification was a statement in the 1923 program of the fourth government. The program ruled that books for the education of the people were to be written, in the language of the people (Kantarcıoğlu, 1998). The Ministry of Education was keen on the Turkification of the linguistic landscape and one of the main targets was minority schools. The Ministry obliged all minority schools to give at least five hours of Turkish courses a week. The courses would be taught by the teachers assigned by the Ministry, but their fees would be paid by the school administrations (Hür, 2005).

### **4.3 1924 Constitution**

In 1924, a new constitution was initiated. The official language of the state was, again, clearly stated as a part of the Article 2: “The official language of the State of Turkey is Turkish.” (Kili & Gözübüyük, 2000, pp. 120-121). In addition, the Constitution regulates the criteria to be elected as a member of the parliament. Similar to that of 1876 Constitution, Article 12 instructs that the candidates were to be literate in Turkish (Kili & Gözübüyük, 2000, p. 122).

Mesut Yeğen argues that Article 12 practically leaves the Kurds outside the parliament. He states that although there has always been Kurds in the Grand National Assembly, they were admitted in so far as they leave their Kurdish identities behind (1999, p. 120). It is true that multiculturalism has not been favoured by the Republican politics; however, the article could be also assessed as an inevitable regulation with respect to the official language, which was set in the same text. Yeğen maintains that Kurds were excluded not because they were Kurds but they were not Turks. Nevertheless, Article 12 seems to be the byproduct of the formation of a nation-state, a



polity based on a society defined as a nation. Therefore, the terms of eligibility ruled by this Article are more about the consolidation of the Turkish nation-state than it is a special arrangement for the exclusion of Kurds.

The 1924 Constitution is the first grand text to mark the ethnicization of the political membership to the state, as well. A Republican legacy emerged in 1924 and in Article 88, a Turk was defined as any citizen, without any exception of religion and race (Kili & Gözübüyük, 2000, p. 138). A particular ethnic category was generalized as the name of those who bore the title of a citizen of the Republic of Turkey. Although, the formulation seems like a political or civic version of nationalism that is defined via citizenship, in fact it has obscured the assimilationist affinity of the State. On the one hand, all the citizens are legally Turks; on the other hand, Turkish-speaking Muslims have always been considered “more” Turkish than the others have. Since such a framing of national identity was inscribed into the Constitution, any demand of right or claim of difference of identity was opposed by the elites. The argument was legitimized by the most authoritative legal text: no diversity in terms of identity (apart from the three official minorities) was admitted, therefore, any claim of it would not only be politically irrelevant but also a violation of the Constitution. As for the latter, it was considered so, really.<sup>53</sup>

#### **4.4 *Takrir-i Sükun* period and Authoritarianism**

The main target of ethnic and linguistic homogenization of the society would apparently be Kurds. Zürcher reminds that, although not officially declared, there were incidents of prohibiting Kurdish use in public spaces (2003, p. 170). Combined with the feeling of alienation with the abolishment of the caliphate in 1924, the promises given during the independence struggle but not realized, and the Republican path emerging

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<sup>53</sup> For Soner Çagaptay’s review of this tension between Turkish citizenship and Turkish nationality, see his *Islam, Secularism, and Nationalism in Modern Turkey: Who is a Turk?* (2006), especially pp. 14-15.

ahead alarmed some of the Kurdish nationalists and religious leaders. In the first months of 1925, what is now known as the Sheikh Said's rebellion erupted.

Besides military actions taken, the government of İsmet İnönü passed *Takrir-i Sükûn Kanunu* (the Law on the Maintenance of Order), on March 4, 1925. Zürcher emphasizes that “[t]his empowered the government for two years to ban by administrative measure any organization or publication it considered might cause disturbance to law and order.” (2003, p. 171). The rebellion also registered Islamism and Kurdish nationalism as the two major threats to the republican regime. It also built up the distrust to Kurds on the republican elites. The Congress of *Türk Ocakları* (the Turkish Hearth Movement) in 1926 hosted heated debates on a widespread ban on the use of Kurdish (Hür, 2005).<sup>54</sup>

*Takrir-i Sükûn Kanunu*, which was expanded later for several times, enabled the new regime to work in a opposition free environment and the reforms to transform the society accelerated afterwards.

One major reform was to re-adjust the educational system. *Tevhid-i Tedrisat Kanunu* (the Law on the Unification of Education) of 1924 unified the all the educational institutions under the authority of the Ministry of Education. This meant the closure of religious schools and the elimination of the last Islamic educational sites. Such a change was furthering the linguistic Turkification of the society by outlawing any establishment where the education could be made in languages other than Turkish. Within a couple of generations, the educational reform would create a smooth linguistically Turkish surface.

The formation of the language regime did not only involve the restructuring the linguistic space, but also the very vocabulary to be used. In 1925, the Ministry of Education issued a proclamation on “Currents Trying to Undermine Turkish Unity” that “banned the use of the terms describing minority communities and the areas they inhabited, such as Kurd, Laz, Çerkez, Kurdistan and Lazistan” (Zürcher, 2001, p. 210).

The nationalization project aimed at the destruction of the “enemies of the state” not only by sheer violence but also at the discursive level. This discursive attack could be assessed as typical of a language regime: constructing categorical irrelevancies and

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<sup>54</sup> See below for further details on the Congress.

political disempowerment of alternative narratives on language. Such political determination of the language-society relationship from above creates a wounded discursive universe in the sense that those concepts or names, which were once corresponding to particular social facts, now corresponds to a linguistically empty space. The erasure of the languages other than Turkish at the discursive level, such as excluding them from the class of “language”, turns them into illegitimate members of the domain of language.

The republican regime was impatient to rule out unwanted social realities, like Kurdishness or Islamic sects. And, where it was unable to erase them immediately, it simply erased them from the language. On the one hand, the state seems to have overpowered its hand against any claim for minorities, to the point that any reference to Kurds, for example, would be considered as an attempt to create minorities out of a united nation. However, the unintended consequence of that kind of domination would be that the claim of the very existence of the terminologically forbidden realities would be a solid resistance to the hegemony. The discursive ban, on the other hand, might fool one as if the reality has vanished, and social or linguistic homogenization might fail in reality, although it would seem as a success in rhetoric. These arguments will be re-assessed below as later developments on the way to the formation of the Turkish language regime are introduced.

#### **4.5 Eastern Reform Plan**

The new State continued, after the population exchange with Greece, to re-design the demographic formation of the country in 1925, with the *Şark Islahat Planı* (Eastern Reform Plan). The program was prepared by a number of appointed ministers, including Cemil Bey, the Minister of Home Affairs, and Mahmut Esat Bey, the Minister of Justice. The committee was formed in order to review the current situation in those provinces where “*irtica hadisesi*” (the incident of reactionism) took place and asses necessary safety measures to be taken. On September 24, the Assembly received the report, which contained a reformation of the administrative partition of the country,

proposals of relocating influential families of Kurdish tribes in other parts of the country and the settlement of “Turkish” immigrants to the Kurdish lands. The report was the first of its kind. The Kurdish region was particularly important, and also dangerous, therefore it deserves special treatment. Similar reports would be produced in the next decades.<sup>55</sup> The 1925 plan exhibits one of the boldest expressions of the intention of Kurdish assimilation.

The main idea about the problematic population in the region is that those, who were indeed Turks, were in danger of assimilation to Kurdishness. The ideology of the report reverses the direction of absorption and the case is now a matter of protection of the Turkish population from degeneration. Hence are the phrases like “those who are in fact Turk but are about to be defeated to Kurdishness” (Article 13) and “those who were originally Turks but about to get assimilated into Kurdishness” (Article 14). There is no denial of Kurds or Arabs of the region. In fact, although there was yet no sign of hostility against Turkishness on the side of Kurds, the report itself reformulates the issue as a potential danger to Turks, as it was commanded that Turks who were to be settled should be protected against Kurdish rebels.

The linguistic aspects of the Report are inherent to the assimilationist policies that were proposed. Article 13 defines the provinces where the Turks were about to captured by Kurdishness, and decrees that those who spoke in a language other than Turkish in those provinces would be punished. The forbidden zones were governmental offices, schools, markets and bazaars. Such a restriction goes well beyond the imposition of the official language in the official institutions, and leaves only the household where language would be free of control of the “order of the state”.

Article 14 of the Report introduces another, special plan for the regions where the population mostly speaks Arabic. In places like Siirt, Mardin and Savur, new branches of *Türk Ocakları* and new schools would be opened. The emphasis was on the schools for girls, that should be “perfectly built” and attendance should be ensured.

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<sup>55</sup> For other reports and files prepared by official authorities, governments, political parties or civil associations, see Akçura (2008)

In the Article 16, Kurds located around the west bank of *Fırat* (Euphrates) rives would be prevented to speak Kurdish, no matter what. Here, too, schools for girls would be opened and it would be ensured that especially women would speak Turkish.

#### 4.6 Civil society at work

*Türk Ocakları* and *Halkevleri* were the organizations, which were active at the civil level, but they were encouraged and controlled by the government. Theirs was a missionary work, to deliver the revolution down to the people. At times, they became more enthusiastic about the rate of Turkification of the non-Turkish elements of the society. There were demands from the civil society to legalize the speaking Turkish in public spaces as mandatory. The speakers of the 1926 congress of *Türk Ocakları* severely criticized those who were speaking languages other than Turkish and they demanded the government to punish those who insist on that. Şakir Turgut Bey, a representative from the province of Çal, called for the legal punishment of those who were not speaking Turkish (Okutan, 2004, p. 181).

The father of the nation was actively encouraging the enthusiasm of *Türk Ocakları*. It was in a speech in Adana branch of *Türk Ocağı*, that Mustafa Kemal directly addressed the issue of nationhood and language:

“Language is one the most evident characteristics of nationality. Those who say that they belong to the Turkish nation ought to speak, first and after all, in Turkish. If anyone who does not speak Turkish would claim his membership to the Turkish culture and community, it would be wrong to believe him.”<sup>56</sup>

In the same speech, he assigns the mission to the movements, and strengthens his argument with a narrative that haunted the minorities throughout the republican period: the possibility of cooperation of “others within us” against the Turkish nation:

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<sup>56</sup> “*Milliyetin çok açık vasıflarından biri dildir. Türk milletindenim diyen insanlar, her şeyden evvel ve mutlaka Türkçe konuşmalıdır. Türkçe konuşmayan bir insan Türk harsına, camiasına mensubiyetini iddia ederse buna inanmak doğru olmaz*” (Kocatürk, 1984, p. 182; quoted in Yıldız A. , 2001, p. 202).

“Nevertheless, in Adana there are more than 20 thousand citizens who do not speak Turkish. If *Türk Ocağı* would tolerate this fact, if youth and all the political, social Turkish institutions would remain senseless before this situation, this situation which has went on for one hundred years could last hundreds years more. What would be its consequence? In any time of catastrophe, these people would join others to act against us”<sup>57</sup>

This is just one of many examples of how Mustafa Kemal was determined to integrate social forces into the total transformation of the society, and his charisma and the legitimacy he held as a victorious savior was indeed effective on the audience.

The 1927 congress of the organization was also overwhelmed with the debates on the perceived insufficiency of speaking Turkish. A delegate from Mardin, mainly an Arab and Kurdish city, stated that they had difficulties in “persuading Kurds to speak Turkish”. Therefore, the organization decided to have a closer interest in the Kurdish region and its mission was set as “to help the physical and intellectual development of the Turkish youth, in the regions other than the east of Anatolia, and to realize the national ideal by imposing Turkish culture and language in the eastern regions” (Yeğen, 1999, pp. 177-178). There was, according to the members of *Türk Ocakları*, a problem to be dealt with in one particular part of the country, the eastern region, and the solution offered was the imposition of the Turkish culture.

The demands for legal regulations were responded in the National Assembly. In 1938, Manisa deputy Sabri Toprak proposed in the Assembly to prepare a law in order to enforce speaking Turkish in legal terms and to punish disobedience (Okutan, 2004, p. 194). The proposal contained harsh measures. According to the draft of the law, the Turkish citizens were forbidden to speak any language other than Turkish, apart from their households. Any violation of this rule would be penalized with from one to seven days in prison and a fine ranging from 10 to 100 *kuruş*. In addition to that, those punished would not be able to work as doctors, teachers or journalists and their diplomas would be confiscated. The informers would get their shares from the money

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<sup>57</sup> “Halbuki Adana’da Türkçe konuşmayan 20 binden fazla vatandaş vardır. Eğer Türk Ocağı buna müsamaha gösterirse, gençler ve siyasi, içtimai bütün Türk kuruluşları bu durum karşısında duygusuz kalırlarsa, en aşağı yüzyıldan beri devam edegelen bu durum daha yüzlerce yıl devam edebilir. Bunun neticesi ne olur? Herhangi bir felaket günümüzde bu insanlar, başka dille konuşan insanlarla el ele vererek aleyhimize hareket edebilirler” (Önder, 1998, p. 8).

collected. And, any Turkish citizen who did not know how to speak Turkish language would learn it in one year (Sadođlu, 2003, p. 286).

Although the proposal was refused, Okutan points out that in Konya, İzmir and Niđde, municipal fines were issued to those who were “caught” speaking a language other than Turkish (2004, p. 194).

One infamous practice in order to hegemonize Turkish in the public places, which was spread via the cooperation between the state and the civic institutions, was the campaign, *Vatandaş Türkçe Konuş!* (Citizen, Speak Turkish!). In January 1928, the Student Union of Istanbul University’s Faculty of Law decided to start a campaign, and it was followed by the transportation companies that hanged various banners containing relevant messages. Ahmet Yıldız reminds that the campaign commenced rapidly but its pace was slowed down in April the same year (2001, pp. 286-290). Nevertheless, the campaign has become the symbol of the mobilization of civil forces in order to join the nationalization process. It was also could be considered as the reification of xenophobia, as a result of the internalization of the nationalist discourse. Although the campaign faded away within months, it paved the way for civic reactions against speakers of other languages, which frequently reached at the point of physical attacks.

The campaigns and the pressure to speak Turkish affected all linguistic minorities, but it was among the Jews that passionate supporters of Turkification emerged. One of them was Moiz Kohen, and he finally changed his name for Munis Tekin Alp, a very interesting selection of names.<sup>58</sup> He was an active member of the İTC. He frequently addressed the Jewish community and tried to convince them to act, speak and think as the way new Republic demanded from all its subjects. Inspired from the Old Testament, he published a book titled as “*Evamir-i Aşere*” (Ten Commandments), in which he advised Jews to change their language of religion and schools to Turkish, and to speak Turkish all the time. Avram Galanti, was another champion of the Turkish revolution, and he wrote a book to support the campaign: *Vatandaş Türkçe Konuş!* (Hür, 2005).<sup>59</sup>

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<sup>58</sup> *Munis* in Turkish means obedient, subdued or friendly, while *Tekin* and *Alp* are old Turkic names from the Central Asian times. The selection clearly declares Kohen’s subjection to, indeed internalization of Turkishness.

<sup>59</sup> On the other hand, before, Avram Galanti had been an opponent of the script reform and published a book titled *Arab Harfleri Terakkimize Mani Deđildir* (1927).

However, the fever of some Jewish intellectuals was not always appreciated by nationalists. Orhan Seyfi Orhon accused the speakers of non-Turkish and asked them to be excluded:

“You fake citizen, who speaks French in Maçka, German in Ayaspaşa, Italian in *Degüstasyon*, English in *Beyker*, Spanish in *Maksim*! Never speak Turkish! ... So that we could recognize you from your word, if we can't from your look!”<sup>60</sup>

Cevat Rıfat Atilhan, known with his racist declarations similarly asked Jews to stay away from the Turkish language: “Jews' speaking Turkish is a harassment of our beautiful Turkish and our sweet accent”.<sup>61</sup> The times were difficult for all the Jews around the world. Coupled with the heat of nationalist revolution in Turkey, the anti-Semitic feelings were set free. Racism has been a frequent stop within the Turkish nationalism.

#### 4.7 Governmental bodies takes action about Language Usage

*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi* (Republican People's Party, CHP henceforth) was the party of Kemalist revolutionaries and the period until the multi-party regime was accepted in 1945 is known as the one-party regime. Not an exception in the 1930s when the European and Soviet politics were becoming increasingly totalitarian, CHP was the basic political force that was to realize the project of modernization. In time, the Party's principles became the official ideology of the Republic. In 1927, the Statute of the Party expressed that the unity of language was one of the strongest bonds among the citizens. It was more than an expression of dedication to the nationalist attitude. Since the

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<sup>60</sup> “*Maçka'da Fransızca, Ayaspaşa'da Almanca, Degüstasyon'da İtalyanca, Beyker'de İngilizce, Maksim'de İspanyolca konuşan sahte vatandaş; sakın Türkçe konuşma!... Bir gün gelip de seni özünden, yüzünden tanıyamasak bile, bari sözünden tanıyalım!*” (Orhon, 1940; quoted in Okutan, 2004).

<sup>61</sup> “*Yahudilerin Türkçe konuşması, dünya kadar güzel Türkçemize ve tatlı şivemize bir tecavüzdür*” (Hür, 2005)



discourses of the Party conditioned most of the political language of the time, the insistence on the use of Turkish and the banning others became more legitimate.

In 1931, the Party renewed its program, and limitations for party membership became tighter. Article 7 defines the criteria for membership:

“Any Turkish citizen can join CHP, on the condition that he has been speaking Turkish and accepted the Turkish culture and all the ideals of the Party”<sup>62</sup>

The striking issue in the statement is that the candidates were expected to “have been speaking Turkish” rather than only to know Turkish. With this condition, the party practically excludes those who had other languages as their mother tongues or those who were not assimilated into Turkish speaking, and hence, secures a full-Turkish body of dedicated activists. Combined with the condition to become a deputy, the political realm had been considerably closed for non-Turkish minorities.

The non-Muslim minorities were now far fewer in number compared to the Ottoman period, but they were still the others of the Turkish nationalism. They were frequently referred as to be the potential traitor within the nation. The result was harassment of their rights and conditions both from the State and from the nationalists of the civil society.<sup>63</sup> Although the Greek communities of Bozcaada (Tenedos) and Gökçeada (İmroz, or İmbroz) were excluded from the 1923 Population Exchange, and that they were granted rights to educate their children in Greek, in 1927 these rights were ruled out. With the article 14 of Law no. 1151, titled “*Bozcaada ve İmroz Kazalarının Mahalli İdareleri Hakkında Kanun*” (Law on the Local Governments of the Provinces of Bozcaada and İmroz), they were no longer entitled to the public service of

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<sup>62</sup> “*Cumhuriyet Halk Fırkası’na ... her Türk vatandaşı, Türkçe konuşmakta bulunmuş, Türk kültürünü ve fırkanın bütün umdelerini benimsemiş ise, girebilir.*” (Tunçay, 1999, p. 452).

<sup>63</sup> For historical accounts of the relations with non-Muslim minorities in the Republican period see Oran (2004), Okutan (2004), Aktar (2000f), Levi (1996), Bali (1999; and 2001), and Demir and Akar (1994).

Greek education. They had to pay for in order to hire a private teacher to teach their own language, and the content of the course had to be authorized by the Government.<sup>64</sup>

The municipalities were far from autonomous local councils, but were more operating as local branches of the only party. They were, too, active, in the construction of an all-Turkish language regime, especially with the measures they imposed upon public spaces.

In 1929, the Municipality of Istanbul banned street peddlers to call their customers in any language other than Turkish.<sup>65</sup> In 1932, in Dörtyol, local administration announced with town criers that those who would speak a non-Turkish language in common places would be persecuted and severely punished.<sup>66</sup> In 1933, the Municipality of Izmir decreed a similar regulation and in 1938, the Municipality of Istanbul decided to re-enact on the old rule, which proved vain, and re-forbid any languages other than Turkish in trade, including the sellers and the customers (Sadoğlu, 2003, p. 286).

The municipal acts were not confined to the western provinces. Kurds and Arabs were also targeted. In 1939, the Municipality of Mardin announced that speaking Turkish was mandatory, and that even the villagers who did know Turkish would be communicated in Turkish, and assigned a 5 *kuruş* fine for any violation.<sup>67</sup>

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<sup>64</sup> These schools would be opened again in 1951, after the relations with Greece calmed down. However, on July 29, 1964, the Ministry of Education, once more, decided to close down the schools, with the Ordinance no. 2690 and two months later the assets and properties were transferred to the local municipalities (Oran, 2004, p. 109).

<sup>65</sup> May 19, 1929, *İkdam*, quoted in Sadoğlu (2003, p. 286)

<sup>66</sup> September 23, 1932, *Son Posta*, quoted in Sadoğlu (ibid.)

<sup>67</sup> For an account of the ban, see Öztürkatalay (1995, p. 312; quoted in Dündar C. , 2004).

## 4.8 Religion and Language

Although secularization is usually declared as one of the pillars of the republican revolution, religion and religious institutions were deemed allies as far as they were under control of the government. It was the case for the language regime, as well. The language of religious worship was becoming a problem for the Kemalist elites, and they wanted to get rid of every sign of the *ancien régime*. However, the resistance was substantial, since there were many who considered the Arabic language as sacred and as essential as it was the language of the Quran.

In five years, the language of the communal religious services shifted from Arabic to Turkish. The first step was to deliver *hutbe* in Turkish on February 3, 1928 in Istanbul. A few years later, in the Yerebatan Mosque, the first Turkish Quran was read on January 22, 1932. In the same year, *Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı* (the Presidency of Religious Affairs, DİB henceforth) notified the Istanbul Mufti office that in a few months, *ezan* and *kamet* would be recited in Turkish. And, in the next month, on February 7, its practice first began in Istanbul, then spread to other cities.

Not everyone was happy about the linguistic change in religious matters. In 1933, in Bursa, there were protests against the change; reactionaries attempted an insurgency, which was suppressed in a short time. Atatürk, after the protest, stated, “It must be assured that the national language and national identity of the Turkish nation will be the essence and dominate in the entire life.” (Ertop, 1963, p. 86).

Turkish language regime was proposed to have an over-arching domination in every sphere of life of the new men and women of the Republic. The religious domain was not spared. As the republican regime aimed at the construction of the Turkish national identity to replace all other “minor” identifications with ethnicities, cultures and religions, it accordingly worked for the elimination of linguistic expressions of such identities. Arabic was such a significant symbol of the old life, that its mere existence was perceived to be potential threat to the revolution. İTC was already tested with the 1909 rebellions in Istanbul, of which suppression was managed by intervention of the supporters of the new Constitutional regime in the army, including Mustafa Kemal. Insurgencies of 1909 were denounced as a sign of the danger of Islamicist politics.

Added to that was 1925 Sheikh Said's rebellion and the republican government had no tolerance for any indication of politic of religion, apart from its own.

The Turkish *ezan* has been a much-appreciated marker of the revolutionary spirit of the republican elites by the supporters of Kemalism. The withdrawal of religious practices in Turkish was one of the first performances of *Demokrat Parti* (Democratic Party, DP henceforth) in 1950.

#### 4.9 The New Script, the New Language

A major step in the formation of the Turkish language regime was the change of the script, from Arabic to Latin, in 1928. After months of discussions in the commissions, which were set for laying out the possibilities of an alphabet change, and heated debates in daily newspapers, in August 1928, Mustafa Kemal announced the new alphabet. At the dinner, organized in the honor of *Gazi*, he introduced the new script as:

“Our harmonious, rich language would express itself with the new Turkish letters. You have to save yourself from those signs, which are *unintelligible*, that we cannot understand and that held our mind in iron cages for centuries; you have to understand that.” (my emphasis).<sup>68</sup>

So what was at stake was not only the coming of new, authentic alphabet with which Turkish would have the opportunity to express itself in a better way, but also “those incomprehensible signs” were got rid of. The law was prepared in a few months and on November 1, *Türk Harflerinin Kabul ve Tatbiki Hakkında Kanun* (the Law for the Adoption and Application of the New Turkish Letters, no. 1353), was issued in the parliament.

The law mandated that the new script would be used in all the paperwork of economic and social institutions and associations with the first day of 1929. In all the printed and painted writings, the new letters would be employed. The very display of

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<sup>68</sup> “*Bizim ahenktar, zengin lisanımız yeni Türk harfleriyle kendini gösterecektir. Asırlardan beri kafalarımızı demir çerçeve içinde bulundurarak, anlaşılamayan ve anlayamadığımız işaretlerden kendimizi kurtarmak, bunu anlamak mecburiyetindediniz*” (my emphasis, (my emphasis, Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Demeçleri II, 1997, p. 272).

the language was being changed and it was a total change of the image of the language. The symbolic shift also exemplified that the new Turkey was facing towards modernity and turned it back on the old, non-modern, traditional East. Therefore, the change of the script was an important sign of a new dimension of nationalization, which was set by the Kemalist elites as the “language revolution”. This symbolic characteristic of the figurative change of the language was of primary significance in the construction of the categorical division of old vs. new. The “new” regime already established a new system of politics with the declaration of the Republic, without a sultan and a Caliph for whom the War of Independence was in fact pursued.

The new script stood for the evidence of this change from the old to the new. Nevertheless, the employment of the new alphabet created a rupture of the written culture. Within a few months, the literate people of the old times were made illiterate (which was around ten percent), and written cultural wealth of the Empire, with all its historical documents and literature, was rendered inaccessible for the new generations (Ahmad, 1993, p. 80).

One strong argument for the change was that the old Arabic script was difficult to learn. Many proponents of the alphabet reform have pointed the low rates of literacy in the imperial times. The Arabic script was not as easy to learn as the new script, true, since it was properly representing all the voices of the Turkish language. A student has to learn the patterns of words to recognize the meaning (Lewis G. , 2004). However, the reason of the low rates of literacy could be the lack of an organized public education system, rather than the difficulties in learning the Arabic script.<sup>69</sup>

The claim that the new alphabet makes easier to learn reading and writing was to put to test. Right after the announcement of the new alphabet an educational mobilization was organized. *Millet Mektepleri* (Nation’s Schools) were established in order to teach the new script to the illiterate and those who knew the old script. It was the first republican national mobilization, when every citizen between the ages of 16 and 40 were obliged either to attend the schools or to enter an examination to be

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<sup>69</sup> For extensive analyses of the Alphabet Reform, see Yorulmaz (1995), Ertem (1991), and Şimşir (1992). These works cover debates on the alphabet that took place in the 19<sup>th</sup> century Ottoman Empire, as well.

exempted. Attendance was mandatory and it was to be observed by the special commissions.

The duration for the courses was four months for the illiterate and two months for the literates of the old alphabet. In these schools, according to Sami N. Özerdim, 2.546.051 people received their certificates for their success until 1936, when the Schools were closed (cited in Sadoğlu, 2003, p. 230).<sup>70</sup>

The language was not only figuratively transformed but also in terms of its corpus. The second phase of the formation of the new language is known as the “Language Revolution”, which started with the establishment of the *Türk Dili Tetkik Cemiyeti* (the Society for the Study of the Turkish Language) on July 12, 1932. Mustafa Kemal initiated the efforts for the Society and the first thing to do was to organize an international scientific congress of Turkish language in the same year. The congresses were organized again in 1934, 1936 and 15 more until 1982. The meetings in the one-party period were more about constructing the scientific infrastructure for the claim of authenticity of the Turkish language. Such justification was deemed especially important as the language ideology of the Kemalists dictated the equation of the nation and the language. As it could be scientifically proved that Turkish has been a language of civilization and culture throughout the history, so could be the legitimization of the Turkish nation.

Later on the name of the institution was changed to *Türk Dil Kurumu* (Turkish Language Institution, TDK henceforth). Language purification became the foremost mission of TDK. The foreign words were to be eliminated from the language. The problem of substituting the foreign words would be resolved by either the collection of “pure Turkish” vocabulary from all over the country, or they would be derived from authentic Turkic languages. Compiled words were published in books and the agglutinative character of Turkish language was made use of for devising many of the new terms. *Öztürkçe* was the term coined with new version of Turkish language, which the new Republic would build.

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<sup>70</sup> An alternative number is a little more than 1.3 million (see İnan, 1979; and Albayrak, 1994)

However, there were always criticisms, especially after the 1950s, that the attempts at purification was an unscientific intervention to the language, that most of the new word did not comply with the rules of Turkish, and that purification was a mistake in the first place.<sup>71</sup>

A significant moment regarding TDK was the invention of *Güneş-Dil Teorisi* (Sun-Language Theory) in 1935. The theory mainly argued, in line with *Türk Tarih Tezi* (the Turkish History Thesis),<sup>72</sup> Turkish was at the source of all human languages. Zürcher explains the theory as it claimed that:

“... languages derived originally from one primeval language, spoken in Central Asia, that Turkish was closest of all languages to this origin and that all languages had developed from the primeval language through Turkish” (2003, p. 190).<sup>73</sup>

With Atatürk’s encouragement, the theory became the official theory of language. It was widely supported in the Third Language Congress in 1936. It was claimed that the European linguistics was not able to solve the problem of “glottogony” (the emergence of the first human language) since they had ignored Turkish. It was announced to be a challenge to the existing linguistic theories.

Led by Atatürk, most of those interested in the Language Revolution, be them linguists or not, were trying to explain how virtually every word of the known

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<sup>71</sup> See below for details.

<sup>72</sup> For an analysis of *Türk Tarih Tezi*, see Behar (1992).

<sup>73</sup> Harold Schiffman reminds that such a theory was not unique to the Turkish case:

“... the idea that one’s own language is the ‘original’ language of all the world’s languages was also a feature of Soviet language policy, when N. K. Marr’s theories were dominant. Marr was a Georgian championed by Stalin, and Marr had a theory about ‘Japhetic’ languages (which Georgian was the archetype of) being the original family. This fit the Soviet policy idea that all languages would eventually be given up (as relics of bourgeois nationalism) and people would adopt a universal language, derived from Japhetic, and resembling Russian.” (personal communication, April 2008).

For an analysis of Marrist language policy, see Schiffman (2008).

languages were “nationalized”, through games of etymology.<sup>74</sup> After the First Language Congress, Turkish had been claimed to be the mother of the Indo-European language family, now it became to be the mother of the languages of high civilizations, such as Sumerian and Hittite (Ertop, 1963, pp. 72-78). The Theory became a compulsory course at the Language and History-Geography Faculty of the Ankara University by the orders of Atatürk. After Atatürk’s death, *Güneş-Dil Teorisi* lost its master and faded away.

There have been various comments on the emergence of the theory. Zürcher, for example, maintains that the theory was supported as a reaction to the attempts of new word inventions, which were getting out of hand (2003, p. 190).<sup>75</sup> Zürcher’s utilitarian proposal should be taken into account; however, there is more in the Theory. The members of TDK and Atatürk seem to be amazed by what the Theory offers. There could hardly be any other scientific hypothesis to confirm the antiquity of the Turkish nation. Being the mother of languages could become another source of national pride, a feeling that Atatürk believed to be missing in the hearths of the members of the nation. On the other hand, the Theory itself shows the conceptual horizons of the Turkish nationalism.

A frequently missing point in the reviews of the Theory is its contribution in the formation of the discourse, in which it is claimed that Kurdish is in fact a distorted variety of Turkish. Since Turkish to various extents reside in the roots of every language, this would be more so when Kurdish is the issue. The narrative effects of the claim would quickly transform as to declare that Kurds are in fact Turks, one of the basic *clichés* of the republican period. In post-1980 decades, the story would become an absurdity to claim that Kurds are mountain Turks and they were named after the sounds they made while walking on snow.

In conclusion, the alphabet and language reforms of the first republican decades were the products of “a massive linguistic engineering”, to borrow Ayşe Öncü’s statement (2000, p. 299). Öncü also emphasizes that this enterprise attempted to

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<sup>74</sup> For an amusing account of *Güneş-Dil Teorisi*, based on the proceedings of TDK commissions, see “Türk Dehasının Ürünü Muhteşem Bir Teori!”, *Birikim* (2), June 1989, (pp. 56-61).

<sup>75</sup> Also see Zürcher (1989).



generate an empty and homogenous universe that is “liberated” from its “old” and “traditional” connections, a cultural *tabula rasa*, on which the biography of the new national identity could be written (ibid.).

#### 4.10 The Army and Language

The first modernization attempts aimed at the Ottoman army, and since then, the military forces have always been an important element of the issues of modern political power. The mounting efficiency of the Janissaries had already signaled the failure of the state’s power over the provinces and the outcome, *inter alia*, was the emergence of a new class of aristocracy, *âyan*. To reinforce the central authority of the Ottoman palace, Selim III and Mahmut II labored for the construction of a new military system (Karpas K. H., 2006). The new military schools, since the end of the 18<sup>th</sup> century, were first to educate its students with European methods and in European languages.

Within the scope of instrumental rationality employed in the new army, language played an important role. Needs for standard and rapid communication among the different units of the army produced some pragmatic solutions. There are a substantial number of documents in the army archives, which contained telegrams in Ottoman language, but with Latin letters. The transliteration was done according to the spelling of the French Language. It was easier and quicker to print these messages, and the letter system complied with the machines that were imported from European countries. Later, in 1910s, Enver Paşa devised an easily printable script to be used in the military correspondences (Şimşir, 1992; Lewis G. , 2004, p. 45).

As a rite of passage for young male citizens, the Turkish Army, besides other things, has always been conceived as a school. The army played an important role in the spread of literacy, as well. Webster states that more than ten percent of the literate population – which makes a total number of 350.000 men – learnt to read Turkish during their military service (1939, p. 223). Those who were taught Turkish were advised to teach it to their fellows back in their villages.

The role of the army in teaching Turkish is still valid, especially for the Kurdish boys who have not been registered to elementary schools before. It also recently plays one of the leading roles in keeping the issue of Turkish on the public agenda, by various campaigns and declaration.<sup>76</sup>

So apart from its role as a modernizing agent, the Turkish army was also an important part of the production process that generated new subjects of the new political regime. These new subjects would be the individual bearers of new qualities of the national identity, devoted to progress and contributing to the expansion of the Turkish language regime.

#### **4.11 Economy in Turkish**

The Turkification of the linguistic universe involved the sphere of economics, as well. The rising of Turkish nationalism already resulted in the attempts to create a national bourgeoisie in the İTC power. Çağlar Keyder notes that the new nationalism encouraged the employment and entrepreneurship of Muslims in various sectors of the economy. Keyder reminds that the language regulations of May 1915 forbid the displays of French, English (and later on, German) signboards on the street and required the use of Turkish in every commercial correspondence and official accounting transactions (2001, p. 90). Certainly, the regulation also aimed at controlling and manipulating the economic realm, which was becoming more bound to the international economical system through the increasing integration of the Ottoman Empire with the global network.

A similar law was enacted in the first years of the Republic, too. On April 10, 1926, the Parliament passed the law, which made the use of Turkish compulsory in all companies in their transactions, contracts, accounting and communication. The corporations with foreign investments would also use Turkish with their relations with Turks and in their official connections. (Aktar, 2000b, p. 117).

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<sup>76</sup> The army's involvement in the language debate in 2000s will be presented in detail in the next chapter.

Recalling the municipal regulations mentioned above, the municipalities were also entitled to control the language of public signs. The Law no. 5237, *Belediye Gelirleri Kanunu* (the Law on the Municipal Assets) commanded that the signboards to be displayed to publicize the name and slogans of shops and companies would be in Turkish. The law was in effect until the 1980s, but there are no signs of its enforcement in that period. Lately, the municipalities are compelling the workplaces and companies to be named in Turkish. The recent attempts to re-enforce the linguistic regime in local economics will be dealt in the next sections.

#### **4.12 Modernization, Citizenship and Language**

Turkish language had not only been considered as one of the new pillars of the Turkish modernization. Education of the new Turkish was also deemed to be a strong instrument in establishment and consolidation of the republican regime. New generations of the Turkish nation would learn to be proud of and advance their Turkishness, and teaching Turkish could be a significant facilitator for this pedagogical process.

The republican cadres exhibited considerable effort to reform the educational system for it to conform the needs and aims of the massive transformation. *Tevhid-i Tedrisat Kanunu* (the Law on the Unification of Education), decreed on March 3, 1924, aimed at the unification of all educational institutions under the authority of the Ministry of Education. The law closed down *medreses*, the Islamic educational organizations, and totally secularized the educational system (Zürcher, 2003, p. 197).

The education, as it was the case in other nation-states, was seen as the primary medium for ideological indoctrination of the new generations. The construction of the standard national language and the transmission of the knowledge pertaining to it was a vital dimension of the generation of the "new Turk". In 1930, the Ordinance for the Teachers of Secondary and High Schools requested the educators to take every chance to engage in the "republican education" and registered that Turkish courses were

extremely important in this sense (Akyüz, 1985, p. 324; quoted in Karakuş, 2006, p. 65).

Similarly, in 1935 program of the Ministry of Culture on the curriculum of the elementary schools, the emphasis was, once more, on the courses of Turkish. The overall aim of the new program was stated to be “educating Turkish children as Turkish citizens equipped with national ideals, as active and loyal individual members of the society”. Turkish courses, in following, were marked to be the fields of the development and nourishment of the national sentiments (Karakuş, 2006, p. 69).

As noted above, speaking Turkish was registered as a condition for an adequate state of citizenship. According to the *Türk Tarihinin Ana Hatlarına Methal* (Introduction to the Outlines of Turkish History), one of the masterpieces of the Turkish History Thesis;

“over time the Turks had ‘crossed with other races’; however the Turkish language had preserved their memories, cultural characteristics and everything else that made them a nation, including the Turks’ most cherished possession, the Turkish intellect. Since the Turkish language had preserved the nation, one had to speak it to prove that one was of ethnic Turkish descent and was eligible for membership in the Turkish nation.” (Çağaptay, Reconfiguring the Turkish Nations in the 1930s, 2002, p. 70)

With the campaigns like *Vatandaş Türkçe Konuş!*, and regular addresses to the society in which the relationship between the Turkish language and the Turkish nation, the discourse on citizenship was becoming increasingly ethnicist, despite the formal definition of Turkishness was based on the political bond of the individuals with the state. “This ethnicist definition of the nation through language put non-Turkish speakers in a precarious position.” (Çağaptay, Reconfiguring the Turkish Nations in the 1930s, 2002, p. 70). The aim of the language regime was not only to establish standardization among the speakers of varieties of Turkish or to reconfigure the image and the content of the Turkish language. The purpose of the republican language was also the creation of a nation-wide linguistic homogeneity and eradication of linguistic differences. Languages were assumed as essential elements for the definition and legitimacy of nations, therefore to ensure the creation of the new nation, the linguistic enterprise, similarly, was assumed as a necessity.

#### 4.13 Expansion of the Republican Regime of language

In June 1934, the Law of Surnames, no. 2525, required every citizen to take a surname. A regulation regarding the Law was later published in December, the same year, and the regulation clearly stated how the law would be operated.<sup>77</sup> The foremost relevant issue was that the surname would be chosen from the Turkish language (the Article 5).

The governors of the cities and towns were appointed as the officials in responsible of the execution of the Law, and they were commanded to resolve any conflicts. This has resulted in some odd applications, especially in Kurdish regions. There are many Kurdish families, who were given the surnames, such as *Türk* and *Öztürk*. The problem of naming has been a trouble, until recently, for many who were refused because of that the names they chose for their newborns were not Turkish or that they contained non-Turkish letters. The ban was based on the Law of Public Registration, dated 1972, which required that only Turkish names could be given to the newborns, and it was recently changed in 2003 in line with reforms to conform the EU standards. However, the condition of using letters that are in the Turkish alphabet is still valid. Therefore, many Kurds now can name their children with words from the Kurdish vocabulary but they cannot write them properly.<sup>78</sup> Names like *Xezal*, *Bawer*, *Berwar*, *Berxo*, *Cigerxwin*, *Ciwan*, and *Welat* are transliterated with the Turkish alphabet.

The same year means a lot for many Kurds, for another reason. On June 14, *İskan Kanunu* (the Law on Settlement, no. 2510), was decreed. It was in fact legalizing the *Şark Islahat Raporu* of 1925.<sup>79</sup> The law categorized the society in three groups: (1)

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<sup>77</sup> The Law and the Regulation are interesting in their use of “pure Turkish” and recently produced words, such as *günlemeç* instead of *tarih*.

<sup>78</sup> “İsim Yasağı Ayıbına Son”, *Radikal*, September 23 (2003).

<sup>79</sup> The Turkish text of the Law is in Okutan (2004, pp. 316-330). The Law was replaced by the new Law on Settlement in 2006. The last version of the Law n. 2510 is accessible at <http://www.mevzuat.adalet.gov.tr/html/554.html> (retrieved on July 30, 2008). In the new law of 2006, no. 5543 does not refer to speaking Turkish but, still, “being of Turkish descent *and* associated with the Turkish culture” is still the basic category to classify the migrants.

those who speak Turkish and belong to the ethnic groups of Turks, (2) those who are ethnically Turks but who do not speak Turkish, and (3) those who are neither Turks nor speak Turkish.<sup>80</sup> The purpose was to de-intensify the Kurdish population and arranged their re-settlement in regions where Turks are in majority, and the settlement of Turkish immigrants into the Kurdish regions. The law was about the reorganization of the whole population according to their cultures and their tendencies to become proper citizens. Many Kurdish families, especially those who were influential in their neighborhoods were dispersed in non-Kurdish provinces; their re-groupings were prevented. Even the Kurdish tribes who clearly stated before that they would ally with the Republic were forced to migrate.

A clear assumption of the Law was that speaking Turkish was a solid evidence of belonging to the Turkish culture. There were those who belonged to the Turkish “race”, but they, according to the subtext of the Law, eventually lost their identities. The famous republican thesis, which claimed that Kurds were indeed originally Turks but they were assimilated, had its formal and discursive roots in the legal documents of the time.

The elimination of linguistic alternatives was spread out to the names of settlements. Although the names of more than 800 villages and towns with Greek, Armenian or Kurdish names were already changed to Turkish between 1934 and 1936 (Hür, 2005), it was properly stated in a legal text in *İl İdaresi Kanunu* (the Law on the Administration of Provinces) which was enacted on June 10, 1949. The law read,

“Village names which are not Turkish and which should be changed are to be brought before the provincial council and changed by the interior minister within the shortest possible time. (Article 2, Clause D/2).

After 1959, a total number of 12 thousand villages and towns were made Turkish, among which is the illustrious change of *Dersim* to *Tunceli*.

Entessar informs that after the suppression of the Dersim Rebellion in 1938, the last Kurdish insurgency until that of PKK (*Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan* in Kurdish, Kurdistan Workers' Party) in the late 1970s, the terms, Kurd and Kurdistan were

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<sup>80</sup> The only directly referred ethnic group was the gypsies, whose settlements and immigrations were subjected to strict conditions.

forbidden and references to them were removed in the Turkish history books (1992, p. 84 and 87). Indeed, the name of an ethnic groups was erased from the official discourse, although everyone knew that there were people called Kurds, the authorities never made the name public until Turgut Özal, in mid-1980s, who announced that he was half-Kurdish and frequently talked about possible resolutions of the Kurdish problem (Yıldız K. , 2005, p. 17). Many writers and politicians were arrested and sentenced for, among others, claiming that there are Kurds in the country, on the basis that they served the tendencies to divide the country by attempting to show that as if there is a separate nation within the Republic of Turkey or that they sought “to destroy or weaken nationalist feeling” (ibid., p. 50).

#### **4.14 After the One-Party Rule**

Turkey was inclined to stay close to the Nazis in the WWII, and signed a treaty of friendship with Germany almost simultaneously with the invasion of the Soviet Union by the Nazi forces (Zürcher, 2003, p. 204). However, when it was becoming clear that the Allied Countries were about to triumph with the coming defeat of the Germans, the Turkish government declared war on Germany in 1945 (ibid., p. 205), in order to remain on the winners' side.

The establishment of the United Nations, the worldwide condemnation of one-party rules and totalitarian regimes; and the internal pressure in Turkey for change were among the reasons for changing the political regime to a multi-party system (ibid., pp. 206-215). The first election with an opposition party was made in 1946, and DP came to power in 1950 with a considerable support from the citizens. The founder party of the Republic apparently lost the support of the nation, which the party pursued to transform and to modernize.

The DP period, until 1960 when they were taken out of office by the coup d'état of May 27, was a significant time for the language regime in the country as well. On the one hand, the Turkification of non-Turkish elements never slowed down, especially against the non-Muslim minorities. The notorious riots took place in Istanbul on

September 6 and 7, 1955 aimed at the houses and shops of Greek and Armenian minorities, and a new wave of emigration of them took place (Güven, 2006).

On the other hand, as Blau notes, the DP period and the time until the 1971 was a renaissance in terms of the creation of a Kurdish intelligentsia (Blau, 1992, p. 54). Now that there were many Kurds in greater cities while preserving their provincial bonds with those who remained, they had more opportunities for access to educational and cultural facilities. It might be assessed that this climate of relative freedom laid the bases of the creation of a Kurdish politics that would become evident in the 1960s and 1970s.<sup>81</sup>

With respect to language policies, the results of the approach to the international pole led by the USA became evident, and English turned out to be the language of the new era. In 1955, the first *Anadolu Lisesi* (Anatolian High School) was opened. These were the public schools in which the students learnt English in the preparatory classes for one year, and most of the courses were conducted in English (Kırkgöz, 2007, p. 175). And, the first university to use English as the language of education, *Ortadoğu Teknik Üniversitesi* (Middle Eastern Technical University) was open in 1956, in cooperation with the US government.

As noted above, the opposition of DP against radical reforms of the one-party governments was clear and they acted on the language policies in parallel with their ideologies. The Arabic *ezan* was restored; the name of the Constitution was made *Teşkilatı Esasiye Kanunu* again, as many of the state offices regained their pre-republican titles.

As the DP period set free the conservative, liberal and leftist challenges against the republican policies, it was also the time when a substantial opposition against the republican language revolution made itself visible. Some writers, among which were Halide Edip Adıvar, İsmail Habib Sevük, Burhan Apaydın, Zahir Güvemli, Nihat Sami Banarlı and Nurettin Ergin, strongly resisted the works of TDK, claiming that the unscientific practices of the Institution was undermining the integrity of the Turkish

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<sup>81</sup> A reproduction of this politicization, now at a higher level, took place in 1970s, when many Kurds migrated to European countries as they accepted immigrant workers and in 1980s, when many Kurdish politicians were forced to leave the country due to persecutions and torture after the coup d'état of September 12.



language, therefore of the Turkish culture. One of the favorite demeaning etiquettes they coined with the purification efforts was *uydurmacılık* (making-up).<sup>82</sup> What they were propagating was *yaşayan Türkçe* (living Turkish), the Turkish language which was alive among its speakers and which connects the present with the culture and wisdom of the past.<sup>83</sup> The linguistic clash was between *Öztürkçe* and *yaşayan Türkçe*.

The critics were no less nationalist or less amazed with the qualities of Turkish language; however, the way they considered the Turkish language was not puristic and they viewed society and language within a more conservative paradigm. For them language and culture were not objects of direct political action, an approach which solidly stands against the republican positivism. They were convinced that the standardization of the language is necessary, especially in its rules of grammar and punctuation, rather than its vocabulary. Moreover, they frequently demanded that this was to be a business of linguists and other language specialists, not of some politically biased people, and they asked for the foundation of a language academy, like that of France, instead of TDK.<sup>84</sup>

This confrontation about the ways to treat language, on the other hand, was a conflict of power among elites. The republican political regime transformed the existing hierarchies of social status.<sup>85</sup> The new order excluded some of the important figures of military, politics, literature and some local notables. The new script and the efforts to create a purely Turkified language, in a very short time disqualified a large number of men of letters as the representatives of the old regime. They and their works were no longer appreciated and respected. The invention of new politics, which prioritized centralization, nationalization, positivist intervention to social relations, and a cultural

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<sup>82</sup> See Peyami Safa's *Osmanlıca, Türkçe, Uydurmaca* (1970) for a critique of purification efforts.

<sup>83</sup> Who those speakers were and which section, class or status of the society was meant was almost never clearly noted. The obscurity of the linguistic variations among the citizens of Turkey in the writings of these writers opposing the republican language policies was yet another evidence that they shared the republican notion of a nation, which is indifferently united without distinction in culture and language.

<sup>84</sup> For a representation of anti-reform faction, see Banarlı (1999).

<sup>85</sup> For an extensive analysis of the new Turkish political elite, see (Frey, 1965).

policy that oriented to rapid Westernization modified the way prestige was defined. Many of those who were socially dislocated, even those who were within the Kemalist elite circles in the one-party period,<sup>86</sup> found a relatively free space to express their discontent in the 1950s and later on. As the language regime of the Republic became one of the foremost representatives of the new order, once again, the field of language became a battlefield of political ideologies. The way political confrontations were relegated to debates on language was a long established tradition in Turkish politics, since the Abdülhamit II's reign.<sup>87</sup>

#### 4.15 Between Two Military Interventions

The policies of DP were deemed dangerous by a considerable fraction of the Army and most of the politicians in the CHP. On May 27, 1960, the Army reclaimed the power and refreshed the tradition of military intervention to the political system, which was first practiced in the İTC period (Ahmad, 1993, pp. 121-147; Zürcher, Turkey: A Modern History, 2003, pp. 141-144).

The constitution of 1961, on the one hand, ensured many liberal rights and paved the way for the rapid politicization of the 1960s and 1970s. On the other hand, it also guaranteed the authority of *Milli Güvenlik Kurulu* (National Security Council, MGK henceforth) over the political realm.

The 1961 Constitution was not consistent in its description of the State, as it was phrased as *Türkiye Devleti* (the State of Turkey) in some articles and as *Türk Devleti* (the Turkish State) in others. The Article 2, titles as “The Unity of the State, the Official Language, and The Capital” clearly defined Turkish as the official language, as did the 1924 Constitution (Kili & Gözübüyük, 2000, p. 175). Article 9 protects the regime and outlaws any change about that the State is a republic, however has not set any mentioned about that the official language is not subject to change. (p. 176).

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<sup>86</sup> Fuad Köprülü was one of them. See Turan and Özel (2003, p. 126-131) for a critical account of his changing sided on the issue of language reform.

<sup>87</sup> See above for the period and Şerif Mardin's comments on the issue.

The Constitution secured the fundamental rights and the Article 12 stated, “Everyone is equal before the law, without any consideration of language, race, gender, political thought, philosophical belief, religion and sect.” (p. 177).

It also reiterated the definition of Turkishness. The Article 54 read, “Everyone, who is related to the Turkish State with the bond of citizenship, is a Turk.” (p. 188).

The linguistic restriction about candidacy for the parliament is kept intact and the Article 68 stated, “Those who are not literate in Turkish ... cannot be elected.” (p. 193).

The DP policies made it clear, according to those who prepared the Constitution, that the protection of the republican benefits should be clearly asserted in this master legal document. The Revolution Laws or the republican reforms were protected by the Article 153, in which the Law on the Approval and the Application of Turkish Letters (no. 1353) is included (p. 227).

Further rationalizations concerning the Turkish language regime followed in 1960s. The Law on Turkish Citizenship, no. 403 and passed on February 11, 1964 regulated the conditions for admittance to citizenship or its removal. Speaking and understanding Turkish, at least to be able to know how to express him or herself in Turkish, was among the criteria for acceptance. The Directorates of National Education were assigned for the documentation of the applicants’ skills in Turkish.

The 1960 coup was led by the idea of restoration of the republican order and the language regime was an essential part of it. The dark times for TDK, of which funds were reduced and studies of purification, harshly criticized by those who were close to DP were about to end after 1960. They regained their prestige before the new government. However, the response from the opponents of the Language Reform came quickly. In 1961, *Türk Kültürünü Araştırma Enstitüsü* (Institute for Research on Turkish Culture) and published volumes titled *Türk Dili İçin*. The volumes compiled articles written by the advocates of *yaşayan Türkçe*. An important figure among them was Faruk K. Timurtaş, a linguist and a scholar of literature, especially emphasized the unscientific base that fed the production of new words.<sup>88</sup>

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<sup>88</sup> For a compilation of Timurtaş’s articles, see Timurtaş (1996). A masterpiece, which analyzes and criticizes the development of the Language Reform, is Geoffrey Lewis’s *Turkish Language Reform: A Catastrophic Success*. For the Turkish edition, see Lewis (2004).

In 1966, a Regulation on Censorship was issued by the Council of Ministers. The Regulation orders the how the communication would be controlled under conditions of war and martial law. It commanded that Turkish would be used in any communication within the country. The urge to control the information flow, apparently aimed at Kurdish, since after 1950s, there are hardly non-Muslim communities in considerable numbers left. According to 1965 census the total proportion of Greek, Armenian and Hebrew speakers in the country was no more than 0.65 percent. On the other hand, the ratio of those who declared that they spoke Kurdish as their first or second language is more than 8.5 percent.<sup>89</sup> The Regulation of Censorship also limited the languages to be used in international communication: only those languages that were approved by the Supreme Military Command or the Commandership of Martial Law.

The limitations on the use of Kurdish language made a peak when the Council of Ministers completely banned importation of any publication, records, and the like, that were produced in Kurdish (Yılmaz & Doğaner, 2007, p. 63). The ban doubtless intended to disconnect the international relationships conducted in Kurdish, whereas the main rationale behind the decisions was that those publications provoked a part of the society, they aimed at increasing the “feeling of Kurdishness” and at the unity and the integrity of the country (pp. 54-64).

*Posta Tüzüğü* (the Regulation on Postal Services), dated 1973, criminalized the use of languages other than Turkish or letters other than that of the Turkish alphabet, in writing the addresses. The Regulation was based on the Law on Postal Services, where there was no rule concerning language use.

The rising politicization, including the development of Kurdish and socialist politics and student movements resulted in an increasing interest in the Kurdish regions. In accord with socialist interpretation, the problem was mostly assessed as one of underdevelopment and the State was accused for ignoring a significant portion of the society. The most significant protests were *Doğu Mitingleri* (Eastern Marches), which were supported by *Türkiye İşçi Partisi* (Worker Party of Turkey), the first socialist party in the Turkish parliament. The marches started in 1967 and eleven of them were

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<sup>89</sup> The real number of Kurdish speakers should be higher than the one obtained in the census. See Appendix 2 for a detailed analysis of the results of Republican censuses with respect to linguistic minorities.

organized until 1969.<sup>90</sup> The narrative of the protests started with emphasis on *doğululuk*, (being from the Eastern regions), not on Kurdishness. The speakers were calling for more economic investments and more attention of the government to the region. The organizers were cautious not to present the events as a Kurdish insurgence, but a civic and democratic protest of citizens who demanded equality between the citizens and the regions of Turkey. The use of the Kurdish language was avoided in speeches or banner in the first marches but as the protests drew more populated masses Kurdish become frequently visible. The prosecutors investigated the events, and the organizers were sued for “regionalism”.<sup>91</sup> The marches would become a major subject of numerous cases against the socialist and Kurdish politician in the trials after 1971.

Another military intervention came on March 12, 1971. The Army sent a memorandum to the government, which consequentially ended in the resignation of the latter and the formation of another one under the control of the military forces. Extensive arrests and prosecutions took place in order to prevent the further advance of radical movements (Ahmad, 1993, pp. 148-180; Zürcher, Turkey: A Modern History, 2003, pp. 258-263). The 1961 Constitution was deemed as far too liberal for the Turkish society, and a clause was added to the Article 11 on September 20, 1971:

“None of the rights and freedoms stated in this Constitution can be used to abolish human rights and freedoms, or the indivisible unity of the Turkish State with its country and nation, or the Republic, of which qualities are stated in the Constitution, according to distinctions based on language, race, class, religion or sect.” (my translation, Kili & Gözübüyük, 2000, p. 176).

As the politics of 1960s was marked with the mounting of the socialist ideology and Kurdish movements, the 1971 amendment aimed at the further protection of the regime by criminalization of political ideas, which pursued the establishment of a socialist state based on the power of the working class, or the propagation of an autonomous or independent Kurdistan.

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<sup>90</sup> From the project I worked on in 1998 for Kumru Toktamış, as a part of her PhD. thesis research.

<sup>91</sup> “Doğu Mitingi Düzenleyenler Adliye’de”, *Milliyet*, September 10 (1967); “Doğu Mitingi”, *Ant*, September 12 (1967); “Doğu Mitingi Komite Başkanı Tutuklandı”, *Akşam*, September 27 (1967).

*Nüfus Kanunu* (the Law on Public Registration, no. 1587, enacted in 1972), as noted above, regulated the way children are named. The Article 16 stated that the newborns could not be given names, which were “in contradiction of our national culture”.<sup>92</sup> Such a phrasing of the law provided the Public Registration Offices a flexible sphere of action in their refusing any “inappropriate” names, such as Kurdish ones.

#### **4.16 1980 Coup and Afterwards**

The effects of the 1980 military intervention were more widespread. It totally reconfigured the political realm (Ahmad, 1993, pp. 181-213; Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, 2003, pp. 278-284). Similarly, the language regime was redefined in many aspects.

The 1982 Constitution was less focused on rights but more on duties, limitations and prohibitions, compared to the 1960 Constitution.<sup>93</sup> It is still in effect, with considerable amendments made especially after 2001, when the governments were keen on legal adjustments to comply with the EU norms in order to start negotiations for full membership to the Union.

Below are the constitutional regulations with respect to the Turkish language regime.

Similar to the previous Constitutions, the first articles define primary attributes of the State. The first three articles are as follows:

Article 1 – The State of Turkey is a Republic.

Article 2 - The Republic of Turkey is a democratic, secular and social state governed by the rule of law; bearing in mind the concepts of public peace, national solidarity and justice; respecting human rights; loyal to the nationalism of Atatürk, and based on the fundamental tenets set forth in the Preamble.

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<sup>92</sup> Law 1587 was changed in July 2003; annulled and replaced with a new one in 2006.

<sup>93</sup> For a comparative analysis of the 1960 Constitution, see Tanör (2000)

Article 3 - The Turkish state, with its territory and nation, is an indivisible entity. Its language is Turkish. Its flag, the form of which is prescribed by the relevant law, is composed of a white crescent and star on a red background. Its national anthem is the “Independence March”. Its capital is Ankara.

Article 4 takes under protection the first three articles and rules out any changes or any proposals to change them.

The interesting aspect concerning the official language is that in the 1982 Constitution, it is rather fuzzily phrased.<sup>94</sup> Although the Section 3, under which the Article 3 is placed, is titled as “The Unity, the Official Language, the Flag, the National Anthem and the Capital of the State, the Article 3 reads as “the language of the State is Turkish”. It neither clearly states that Turkish is the official language or it is the language of the state. This vagueness is, in fact, an essential characteristic of Turkish legal texts, in particular in the constitutions and penal codes. The urge to take under control of the political and social spheres means that there is the need of defining every minute detail of such control and its conditions. Since the legislators have been unable to define the totality of the societal relations, of which they aim to take control, the results are the vague statements and phraseology. This, on the other hand, offers the executors of the laws a flexible field of interpretation, as it has done in the issue of naming children with names “in conformity with our national culture”, as noted above. Various other examples regarding this elasticity will be presented below.

An infamous pattern, introduced to the Turkish justice system by the 1982 Constitution, is the phrase of “*kanunla yasaklanmış diller*” (languages forbidden by law). The languages that are forbidden by law were made clearer in 1983 with the Law no. 2932, of which details will be given below. The Constitution, however, before defining which ones are the forbidden languages, brought limitations to the freedoms of expression and publication. It outlawed the expression and spread of ideas (the Article

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<sup>94</sup> There were always debates on the poor language use in the 1982 Constitution. The discussions heated particularly during the assembly elections of the President in 2007. Many argued that in the Constitution, the sufficient number of Assmebly attendees for an election of the presiden was badly phrased. For a similar argument see “367 kararıyla Anayasanın omurgası kırıldı”, *Yeni Şafak* (June 27, 2007).

26/3) and any publication (Article 28/2) in forbidden languages. Both clauses were annulled in October 2001 in line with the EU regulations.

The Constitution also limited the education of languages of the Turkish citizens and with the Article 42, it is prohibited to teach and study any language, other than Turkish, as a mother tongue. The Article implies that the education in and of other languages are ordered by law, however, none of them could be taught as the mother language of the students, except that the rights granted by international treaties, such as the Lausanne Treaty are recognized.<sup>95</sup>

The issue of mother language has been a very problematic one, for the legislators of the 1980 coup, who were actually the chief generals in charge. There remained only the Kurdish minority of which language could be problem. The socialist movements were subdued but the Kurdish movement was promising more trouble to the coup leaders. Since the Kurds were spread in four countries and their regions are particularly important for the Middle Eastern political order and the global energy supplies, any possibility of a revival of Kurdish resistance could easily become an international problem. Besides, after 60 years of assimilation policies, there were still a considerable number of Turkish citizens, who would identify themselves as a Kurds. Moreover, the Kurdish population was no more restricted to the southeastern regions of the country; there were many Kurdish communities in the outskirts of greater metropolitan areas. The most apparent element of distinction of Kurdishness was the Kurdish language. The Turkish language regime pursued the linguistic assimilation of minorities, however, the educational facilities in Kurdish regions were not widespread hence many Kurds were spared of assimilation. Now, via the widened opportunities of education and the possibilities of ethnic politicization would help Kurds to rediscover their linguistic origins.<sup>96</sup>

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<sup>95</sup> The Article 42 is still in effect, despite the changes in other minor legislations, which permitted private courses to teach Kurdish. As it will be explained in detail below, the courses, however, were considered to be teaching one of the “different languages and dialects that are used by the Turkish citizens in their daily lives”, but not teaching a mother language other than Turkish.

<sup>96</sup> For an analysis of Kurds in Turkey, see Martin van Bruinessen (1995a; and 1995b).



Therefore, the language of Kurds was a critical, and there were some methods devised to erase the public expressions of Kurdishness. A historical moment regarding that end was the preparation of relevant laws.

One of the legal regulations associated with the problem of mother languages was *Yabancı Dil Eğitimi ve Öğretimi Kanunu* (the Law on Foreign Language Education and Teaching), dated September 14, 1983 and numbered 2923). The law formulated in an interesting way the outlawing of teaching mother languages other than Turkish. Article 2/a stated that “the mother languages of the Turkish citizens cannot be taught in any language other than Turkish”. Here there is no denial of that there are other mother languages, but the restriction comes from that they have to be taught, if it ever happens, in Turkish.<sup>97</sup> It is hard to imagine how it could be to teach a Kurdish or an Armenian child to teach their mother language in Turkish. If the mother language is Kurdish or Armenian, then it is reasonable to assume that the child has hardly learnt any Turkish until her age of education. Therefore, it practically becomes impossible to teach her Kurdish or Armenian with a language that she has almost no knowledge of.

In July 2003, the title of the Law was changed as *Yabancı Dil Eğitimi ve Öğretimi ile Türk Vatandaşlarının Farklı Dil ve Lehçelerinin Öğrenilmesi Hakkında Kanun* (the Law on Foreign Language Education and Teaching, and on Learning Different Languages and Dialects Used Traditionally by Turkish Citizens in their Daily Lives), which is still in effect. Its second article was amended as follows:

“No language other than Turkish can be taught in educational institutions and in schools to the Turkish citizens as their mother language. However, private courses can be opened for learning different languages and dialects used traditionally by Turkish citizens in their daily lives”<sup>98</sup>

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<sup>97</sup> As in other regulations, in this Law too, it is stated that the rights granted by international treaties are preserved.

<sup>98</sup> “Eğitim ve öğretim kurumlarında, Türk vatandaşlarına Türkçeden başka hiçbir dil, ana dilleri olarak okutulamaz ve öğretilemez. Ancak, Türk vatandaşlarının günlük yaşamlarında geleneksel olarak kullandıkları farklı dil ve lehçelerin öğrenilmesi için ... özel kurslar açılabilir; bu kurslarda ve diğer dil kurslarında aynı maksatla dil dersleri oluşturulabilir.”

It is worth to note that the Law made to comply with the Constitution's Article 42, hence preserving the prevention of mother language education. Although reviewed in detail below, it should be underlined here that the native languages other than Turkish were conceptualized, still after 2001, as tongues that are used in daily lives, as if they were not mother languages but invented during adolescence.

Only five day later, on October 19, 1983, after long debates on its formulation, *Türkçeden Başka Dillerde Yapılacak Yayınlar Hakkında Kanun* (the Law on Publications and Broadcasts in Languages Other than Turkish, no. 2932), was accepted and enacted as of October 22.<sup>99</sup> Now the society faced another assessment concerning mother languages.

The Law stated, in its Article 1, that it was a regulation of the languages that were prohibited in order to protect the indivisible unity of the State with its country and nation, the national sovereignty, the Republic, the national security, and the public order. The Law's rationale, then, considered that any expression and publication of ideas in the forbidden languages might pose a threat to these precious elements of the republican political order.

The second article defined those languages that were forbidden, in a spectacular phrasing, though:

“It is prohibited to express, publicize and broadcast ideas in languages other than the first official languages of the states that are recognized by the Turkish State”<sup>100</sup>

The Article directly targeted Kurdish. The idiom “the first official languages of the states that were recognized by the Turkish State” was in particular reflects the doubts about the Iraqi situation at the time, when Kurdish was the minor official language. The phraseology was bended in a way to avoid the straight reference to

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<sup>99</sup> The full text of the law has been presented in the Appendix 1. The story of the formulation of the Law is documented in MGK assemblages (see *Milli Güvenlik Konseyi Tutanak Dergisi*, vol. 11 (1983).

<sup>100</sup> “*Türk Devleti tarafından tanınmış bulunan devletlerin birinci resmi dilleri dışında herhangi bir dille düşüncelerin açıklanması, yayılması ve yayınlanması yasaktır*”

Kurdish.<sup>101</sup> This is reasonable considering the sensitivity of the 1980 generals against any expressions that would imply that there are a separate people called Kurds in Turkey.<sup>102</sup>

However, the Law was not only about forbidding languages, but also about linguistic facts. In the Article 3, Turkish was declared as the mother language of Turkish citizens. The Law and this Article were used the basis of other legal regulations that prevented the teaching and using of language other than Turkish.

It is worth to review and asses the regulations concerning the mother language together. We are faced with three different conceptions:

The Constitution – dated 1982 – asserts, “No language other than Turkish may be studied and taught to the Turkish citizens as their mother languages.”

The Law on Foreign Language Education and Teaching – no. 2923, dated October 14, 1983 – states, “The mother languages of the Turkish citizens may not be taught in a language other than Turkish.”

The Law on Publications and Broadcasts in Languages Other than Turkish – no. 2932, dated September 19, 1983 – states, “The mother language of Turkish citizens is Turkish. It is forbidden to ... engage in any activity to use or disseminate languages other than Turkish as the mother language.”

This body of legal texts on mother languages has been quite confusing. The confusion is, in the first place, caused by the contradictory ideas on whether there are mother languages in Turkey other than Turkish or not. It is hard to resolve it from the phrasing in the Constitution; the Law no. 2923 is affirmative but limits its teaching with

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<sup>101</sup> A similar clause was in *Evlendirme Yönetmeliği* (Regulation on Civil Marriages), enacted on November 7, 1985. It was stated that registrars of marriage agreement could use interpreters if the brides and grooms had no knowledge of Turkish. The condition is that the language must be one of the first official languages of the states that were recognized by the Turkish State. The last amendment of the Regulation was in 2006, and the clause remained.

<sup>102</sup> An interesting incidence related to this Law occurred in 1987. Mehdi Zana, who was the mayor of Diyarbakır until he was arrested after the coup, refused to testify in Turkish, in order to protest the Law, and spoke Kurdish. Baskın Oran reports that the event was recorded as Zana spoke in an *unintelligible* language (2004, p. 108).

the obligation of using Turkish; and the Law no. 2932 is negative since it states that Turkish is the mother language of all citizens in Turkey.

The logic behind this law, as well as other prohibitions on the mother languages, is significant since it plainly represents the way the State positions itself against its subjects. The idea that the mother language of all Turkish citizens, who are Turks anyway, according to the Constitution, is Turkish goes beyond the top-down transformation of the society and its total control. It aims at the construction of a discursive domain through which the reality would be altered. Recalling the concept of symbolic power, introduced by Bourdieu and defined as a power of constructing reality, then the Law no. 2932 should be one of the foremost expressions of the urge of the Turkish state for symbolic power. Similarly, following Foucault, the Law runs a regime of truth and its implications are far more than it is simply not true. The legislators of the 1980 coup certainly knew that there were people with mother languages other than Turkish. What they intended, apparently, is to shift the discursive realm of legitimacy. For eight years until its annulment, the Law formed the basis of rejecting any claims of language rights.<sup>103</sup>

To continue with the military legislation; *Siyasi Partiler Kanunu* (the Law on Political Parties no. 2820, dated April 22, 1983) have further restriction on the use of languages in political activities.

The Law prohibits the use any language other than Turkish by the political parties, with the Article 81, under the section heading “Prevention of Creation of Minorities”:

“Article 81: Political parties;

a) cannot put forward that minorities based on national, religious, confessional, racial, or *language differences* exist in the Republic of Turkey.

b) cannot advocate the goal of destroying national unity or be engaged in activities to this end; by means of protecting, developing, or *disseminating language or cultures other than the Turkish language and culture* and thus create minorities in the Republic of Turkey.

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<sup>103</sup> The Law no. 2932 was annulled in 1991, with the introduction of the Law on Struggle against Terrorism, no. 3713.

c) cannot use a language other than Turkish in writing and printing party statutes or programs, at congresses, indoors or outside; at demonstrations, and in propaganda; cannot use or distribute placards, pictures, phonograph records, voice and visual tapes, brochures and statements written in *a language other than Turkish*; cannot remain indifferent to these actions and acts committed by others. However, it is possible to translate party statutes and programs into foreign languages other than those forbidden by law.” (my emphasis)<sup>104</sup>

The Law on Political Parties, likewise, became the basis of many cases against Kurdish parties and Kurdish politicians. Considering that there have been many Kurds in the southeast region that speak no other language, the Article also prevents any political contact with the potential electors there in their own language.

The title of the section that the Article 81 is placed under is important, as well: Prevention of creation of minorities. The discursive move here is similar to that of the Law no. 2932, that it is assumed there are no minorities anyway, and that the usage of any other language might facilitate their emergence. The protection of cultures and languages and their spread has been exclusively granted to Turkish. The narratives of these laws bend onto themselves, creating a discursive loop within which the chances of the generation of alternative discourses are insignificant.

The coup also reconfigured the way civil society was organized. The Law on Associations, no. 2908 was accepted on October 10, 1983. The linguistic regime also acted on the languages that are used in the activities of associations or societies, and the Article 6 forbid the use “languages forbidden by the law” in their documents, transactions, correspondences, congresses, publications and public banners, and in their formal or private meetings. Similarly, the Law further aimed at the prevention of any political activity that would be operated under associations, which has not been a rarity in Turkish political history.

With the efforts for harmonization with the EU in 2003, Law no. 2908 was altered, as well. After the amendment, the only linguistic regulation for the associations

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<sup>104</sup> Although the notion of “languages that are forbidden by law” is eliminated in the respective articles in the Constitution, the phrase is not altered in the Law on Political Parties. Baskin Oran argues that the Law is yet another violation of the rights that were granted to all citizens by the Lausanne Treaty (2004, p. 86).

has been the obligation of using Turkish in their correspondence with the State offices.<sup>105</sup>

#### 4.17 A different Turkish for Broadcasting

TRT was strictly bound to the political orientation of the government after 1980. The ANAP (*Anavatan Partisi*, Motherland Party) government came to power in 1983 and it was led by Turgut Özal. Liberal in economics and conservative in ideology, the ANAP government did not hesitate to consider TRT as its backyard, as were many public institutions (Cankaya, p. 235). In March 1984, Tunca Toskay was assigned as the General Manager of TRT. His period has been remembered by its biased and partisan broadcasting policies, the massive employment of people known as *ülküçü*<sup>106</sup> and frauds to be unearthed later on (Kejanlıoğlu, 1989, p. 179; cited in Cankaya, 2003, p. 230).

On January 10, 1985, the administration of TRT published a notice and banned the use 205 words in radio and television programs of the. The reason stated was that the words were conflicting with the structure and functions of Turkish, and that they could not achieve the level of the standard Turkish (Cankaya, 2003, p. 230).

Among the forbidden words were *anı, bellek, öykü, söylev, söyleşi, ulus* and *uluslararası*. The words offered to substitute these ones were of Ottoman origins. The list was prepared by Ahmet Bican Ercilasun and Hamza Zülfikar (ibid., p. 235). Ercilasun later became the president of the TDK, which lost its institutional autonomy after the coup and the 1982 Constitution assigned its new status as a state institution

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<sup>105</sup> Law on 2908 was totally annulled in 2004, and replaced by the new Law on Associations, no. 5253. The clause concerning the use of Turkish in official correspondence with the State remained the same.

<sup>106</sup> *ülküçü*: supporter or member of MHP (*Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi*, Nationalist Action Party). MHP has been known as the far right, nationalist party, since it was established in the 1960. Its members were active in the street violence acts before 1980. As all the political parties were banned after 1980 coup, conservatives, nationalists and supporters of liberal economics were allies in ANAP. For a historical analysis of MHP and Turkish far right, see Ağaoğulları (1990), Bora (1998) and Can (2002).

under the direct control of the prime minister's office. It was a turning point for the republican history of institutional linguistic and language policy studies. Ever since the change of TDK status, there have been severe criticisms against it.<sup>107</sup>

The attempt to re-form the vocabulary was not confined to radio and television. Other official institutions followed TRT. One month later, in February 1985, the General Manager of the police forces, Saffet Arıkan Bedük announced a notice which asked to avoid using words that are “incompatible” with the norm of Turkish (*zorlama kelimeler*) in all written and aired correspondences and on the Police Radio (*Polis Radyosu*). The target was apparently the “pure Turkish” words that were introduced by TDK.

The implications of such efforts to rule out some words and ordering the use of others are remarkable. The reaction against the purification of Turkish was not new, as noted above. In fact, the effort to prioritize the use of older words after 1980 was yet another phase of the political conflict between the republicans and conservatives<sup>108</sup>, which was operated over language. Between 1960 and 1980, too, the language was the political playground of the parties in power. In the times when Süleyman Demirel, the head of AP, was the prime minister, the institutions of the state were pushed towards the use of less *Öztürkçe* and more *yaşayan Türkçe*. The situation was reversed when CHP came in power.<sup>109</sup> The choice of words in speech or in texts was a sign of the ideological tendencies of the speaker or writer. That political cleavage over language

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<sup>107</sup> *Dil Derneği* was founded after the change, and gathered many devotees of the pre-1980 TDK. The Association, since then, relentlessly called for the foundation of an autonomous language institution. For criticisms against the new TDK, see Turan and Özel (2007), and Püsküllüoğlu, Özen, and Özel (1986).

<sup>108</sup> Hasan Bülent Kahraman argues that the notion of conservative does not suit well in the Turkish case. For him, those who were denounced as reactionaries or conservatives were in fact who took the steps for the modernization and historical progress. He defines a historical swing of political power between the forces of status quo and centralization, and change and democratization, since the *Tanzimat* period. He maintains that DP, AP (*Adalet Partisi*, Justice Party), ANAP, and AKP (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*, Justice and Development Party) turned out to be the sides of this political clash which acted more effectively on democratization, economic development and social modernization (lecture notes).

<sup>109</sup> See Brendemoen (1990) and Belge (1983) on the reflections of political ideologies on language use, after 1950s.

use would slowly diminish over time in the 1990s. For example, writers from the leftist politics seem to leave their hesitations about using “old language” behind.<sup>110</sup> Additionally, recent comparisons between daily newspapers, which previously reflected their political differences also through their choices of old or new vocabulary, show that in the post-1980 period the disparity in using words of Turkish origin is decreasing.<sup>111</sup>

Now a conservative nationalists coalition was in power after 1983. The leaders of the military junta were quite disturbed with the way Turgut Özal performed state businesses and his economically liberal approach, however, their contempt for any sign of leftist or socialist discourse was common. The banning of some words in TRT broadcasts was an expression of this alliance, since, in the blacklist, there were also words such as *özgürlük* (freedom) and *devrim* (revolution), which became the slogans of leftist, socialist and Kurdish groups before 1980. The 1980s military politics was primarily oriented to the destruction of the left and Kurdish movements, of which only the latter would revive in a short time.

#### 4.18 1990s: Insurgence of Linguistic Diversity

The 1990s were marked with many developments that radically changed the language political universe.

Presumably, the most important aspect of the last decade of the 20<sup>th</sup> century was the rise of the Kurdish resistance. The Kurdish problem became an object of international interest as, where, on the one hand, there were armed clashes and attacks – a low-density war to use a popular term – on the other hand, there were serious

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<sup>110</sup> The content of the language that is used by the writers from the circle of *Birikim*, a socialist monthly, like Tanıl Bora and Ömer Laçiner, might be regarded as an example case. They employ many words and terms that would be assessed in the 1960s as the language of a nostalgia for the Ottoman culture.

<sup>111</sup> İmer discovered only a minor difference of two percent in her comparison of *Cumhuriyet*, a republican newspaper and *Tercüman*, a conservative daily. This low rate also points to the decrease in the political significance of Ottoman or *Öztürkçe* vocabulary (1998, p. 121).



violations of and desperate demands for human rights.<sup>112</sup> In 1991, HEP (*Halkın Emek Partisi*, People’s Labour Party) allied with SHP (*Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Parti*, Social Democratic People’s Party) for the elections and for the first time in the republican history, a Kurdish party sent deputies in the National Assembly. However, they were not welcomed, especially after they attempted in the assembly to take the oath in Kurdish (Zürcher, 2003, p. 319). It was such a radical act: voicing Kurdish, a language that has been long denied, and that has been banned even longer, in the highest court of Turkish politics. That was a severe challenge to the language regime, both in practice and in theory. The assumed linguistic unity of the nation was torn apart, shown that it was unreal. The deputies heavily paid for it, and they were arrested within the premises of the Assembly in 1994 and they were sentenced due to “their support to the terrorist organization”.

Although the deputies of HEP were punished, Kurdish was already becoming increasingly visible. In spite of various ways of legal and illegal prosecutions and oppression, publications and music records in Kurdish were becoming a part of Kurds’ daily lives.<sup>113</sup> In 1991, when Süleyman Demirel’s DYP (*Doğru Yol Partisi*, True Path Party) made a coalition with SHP to establish the government, declared that they “recognized the Kurdish reality” (Düzgören, 1994, p. 124). Until then, it was a problem of terrorism, anarchy, underdevelopment, unemployment, *eşkiyalık* (banditry) etc., but never a problem concerned with Kurdishness. Turgut Özal, the president then, was frequently referring to the Kurdish problem, as well. After a very long time, Kurdishness was voiced aloud, as a political issue. The difficulty was that there were no solid steps taken to solve it.

Although the Armed Forces never compromised about granting cultural and linguistic rights to Kurds, in 1991, the government led by Özal succeeded in adding in the new Law on Struggle against Terrorism a clause that would annul the Law 2932.

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<sup>112</sup> For a historical account and political analysis of the Kurdish issue, see Kirişçi and Winrow (1997)

<sup>113</sup> Because of the pressures, many cassettes in Kurdish were circulated as pirated copies. Gökhan Maraş, the Minister of Culture in 1991, declared that Kurdish is not an official language (of any state?), but a dialect, a tongue, therefore they will not issue banderoles for Kurdish music records (Düzgören, 1994, p. 101).

The latter had stated that the mother language of all Turkish citizens was Turkish, and in practice, it turned out to be a total forbiddance of Kurdish. There were no Kurds, and Kurdish was not a mother language of no one. Anyone who dared to sing or write in Kurdish was immediately persecuted and mostly sentenced for the reason that they were “aiding the terrorist organization” or “attempting to divide the country by claiming that some part of the population is culturally and linguistically different.”<sup>114</sup> Despite MGK, the abolition of the law and granting freedom to speaking Kurdish was widely supported. Even the architect of the Law no. 2932, ex-general Kenan Evren, who was retired in 1991, stated that people should be able to speak, publish and produce records in Kurdish as other can do so in English, Arabic or in Italian.<sup>115</sup> However, the authorities were worried about that this freedom could be misused. In the end, the Law on Struggle against Terrorism, numbered 3713 was accepted on April 12, 1991.<sup>116</sup> Even though, the unusual official statement on the mother languages was no longer valid, Kurdish was still a sign of possible trouble in the eyes of the prosecutors and police forces. What was effective in the matters of justice was the interpretation of the laws

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<sup>114</sup> See Düzgören (1994) for numerous cases against using Kurdish. Zürcher reminds that İbrahim Tatlıses was also “prosecuted for ‘separatist propaganda’ when he declared that he regretted not being able to sing a folk song in his native Kurdish” (2003, p. 316).

<sup>115</sup> “Hatayı düzelttik”, *Cumhuriyet*, January 27 (1991).

<sup>116</sup> The international context should also be taken into account. In 1990, the allied forces led by the USA attacked Iraq in order to counter the latter’s attempt to invade Kuwait. Following the eviction of Iraqi army from Kuwait, in 1991, Iraq’s Kurds rebelled again, briefly capturing Kirkuk. “They were driven back into the mountains, but the ‘coalition’ allies who had defeated Iraq sent a small force which stayed there for four months and deterred the Iraqi army from pursuing the Kurds into an enclave designated as a ‘safe haven’. Iraq’s air force was warned not to fly north of 36° North, and American, British and French aircraft, based at Incirlik in Turkey policed this ‘no-fly zone’.” (Boyd, 1998). Turkey, with Özal, established close relationships with the Kurdish leaders of Barzani and Talabani. It was a widely accepted idea at the time that Iraq would soon be divided and the Kurds would be the masters of the lands on which they were majority. What was questioned was the role of Turkey in this process. On the other hand, the European Union and the European Parliament was constantly asking Turkey to recognize the rights of Kurds, and to end violations of human rights (Yıldız K. , 2005).

according to the political context and agenda, as it has already become a tradition in Turkey.

The expansion of the audio-visual universe with the emergence of private radio and television broadcasts kept alive the debates on the rights of Kurdish. The broadcastings that began illegally were put into order with *Radyo ve Televizyonların Kuruluş ve Yayınlar Hakkında Kanun* (the Law on the Establishment and Broadcasting of Radios and Televisions, no. 3984) was prepared and accepted on April 13, 1994. Despite all the confrontations at the political level on the possibility of withdraw the restrictions of the use of Kurdish on broadcasts, the law strictly limited the language of programs with Turkish. Turkish to be used had to have some specific qualities:

“using a moderate Turkish, as a speech language without distorting its characteristics and rules; to support development and empowerment of the language, which is one of the primary elements of national unity and integrity, as a contemporary language of education and science” (Article 4/t, Law no. 3984)<sup>117</sup>

The emphases on the use of Turkish in a linguistic style, which is “not excessive” and close to the daily speech, were, similarly, were placed in the clause as a precaution of using *Öztürkçe*. Such an attitude is a delicate expression of the populist vein in the political discourse of right-wing politics in Turkey.

In the Article 4/t, an exception was made for teaching and delivering news in foreign languages that “contribute to the production of the universal and scientific values”.<sup>118</sup> Such wording is of yet another vague definition to keep the possible demands of linguistic rights in broadcasting out of the framework of legitimacy. The classification of languages within the linguistic ideology of the official discourse, as mentioned above, considered sub-national native languages as inappropriate for satisfying the demands of modern and universal needs.

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<sup>117</sup> “*Türkçe’yi aşırılığa kaçmadan, özellikleri ve kuralları bozulmadan konuşma dili olarak kullanmak; milli birlik ve bütünlüğün temel unsurlarından biri olarak çağdaş eğitim ve bilim dili halinde gelişmesini ve zenginleşmesini sağlamak...*”

<sup>118</sup> The detailed history and an analysis of the politics of language in the area of broadcasting, therefore, any development concerning the regulations of the language use in radios and televisions will be presented in next chapter.

#### 4.19 The EU Relations: Love and Hate

The last decade of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, for Turkey, was an episode of legal and structural re-organization in order to become a full member of the European Union. In 1987, Turkey officially applied for membership to the European Community of the time. After two and a half year, the Community refused the application, basing its refusal on economic and political conditions of the country and its international problems with Greece and on the issue of Cyprus. The Community, however, stated its anticipation of keeping on the cooperation with Turkey.<sup>119</sup> In 1995, Turkey became a participant of the customs union. In 1993, The Copenhagen European Council had already decided on a number of political criteria, widely known as the Copenhagen criteria, for accession to full membership in order to form a guideline for candidates. In 1999, the Helsinki European Council of December 1999 granted the status of candidate country to Turkey. Until 2005, when accession negotiations with Turkey were opened, the EU demanded Turkey to adopt some serious structural changes in economics, and political, cultural and human rights. The Union closely observed the progress, and published annual reports.

1999 was also the year when the leader of PKK, Abdullah Öcalan was captured in Kenya, trialed and sentenced to death after his trial. “Öcalan had already declared during his stay in Rome that PKK would seek a peaceful solution to the conflict. This line was now reaffirmed by PKK leadership, which declared that it continued to regard ‘Apo’ as its leader, but also that the cease-fire declared in August 1998 would remain in force.” (Zürcher, 2003, p. 321). The end of armed clashes no doubt released an important pressure of the government to focus on democratization with substantial legal amendments.

After 1999, there have been many changes, regarding the language regime, although the pace of structural transformation has considerably varied. Despite the difficulties in practice, which were mostly originated the traditional attitudes of the state

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<sup>119</sup> For a wide selection of articles on the history and the political implications of the EU-Turkey relations, see Çarkoğlu and Rubin, (2003), and LaGro and Jørgensen (2007).

official against minorities, in just a few years, the linguistic regime of the Republic and the post-1980 order was significantly transformed.

Besides legal arrangements, the interpretations of the existing laws were in line with the democratic rights in some cases.

An example is from DGM (*Devlet Güvenlik Mahkemesi*, State Security Courts) in 2000. The Court, for the first time in its history asked for a Kurdish interpreter for a suspect who did not know Turkish. The Court demanded the interpreted from the Istanbul Kurdish Institute, of which members were tried for separatism.<sup>120</sup>

Another example is that in March the same year, a judgment was passed by the Supreme Court of Appeal on confirming the freedom of individuals to give any name of their children. The case was about a father who demanded to change his daughter's name to *Mızgin*, by which the girl was known. Although the local court refused the demand twice, the final decision of the Supreme Court was different and final, and formed a peer for similar cases.<sup>121</sup>

In 2001, on March 19, the National Program of Turkey for the Harmonisation of the European Union *Acquis Communautaire* was adopted by the Council of Ministers. In the Program, the issue of language was stated, as well, with some reservations:

“The official language and the formal education language of the Republic of Turkey are Turkish. This, however, does not prohibit the free usage of different languages, dialects and tongues by Turkish citizens in their daily lives. This freedom may not be abused for the purposes of separatism and division.”

It was the declaration of what was obvious, as the penal code already criminalized separatism. However, it was a clear statement, which accepted that there were languages other than Turkish in Turkey.

On the other hand, the way the State conceptualized these languages was remarkably interesting. There was no reference to mother languages, but to languages, tongues and dialects that were spoken by Turkish citizens in their daily lives. This pattern would become a popular one to be repeated in a number of new legal texts. The

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<sup>120</sup> “DGM'de ilk defa Kürtçe tercüman”, *Sabah*, January 16 (2000).

<sup>121</sup> “Kürtçe İsme İzin”, *Hürriyet*, March 5 (2000).

State was cautious about the language issue, as the European Union was becoming increasingly sensitive on language rights in its member countries, and for the candidates, as well. The acceptance of that there are different mother languages would bring forward a conflict with the EU standards and the traditional politics of language against the minority languages. Turkey, until now, has noted reservations in the application of the agreements of the United Nations and the EU on cultural and linguistic rights, or has not ever signed them.

Baskın Oran marks that a common reservation of the Turkish State in her participation in international agreements usually brings forward the Lausanne Treaty. Oran reports that a typical reservation looked as the following:

“The Republic of Turkey reserves her right to apply the Article xxx, according to the provisions and the verdicts of the 1923 Lausanne Treaty, the Constitution of the Republic of Turkey, and their appendixes.” (Oran, 2004, p. 49).

This kind of a reservation basically aims at the refusal of recognizing any minority other than those of the Lausanne Treaty.

One critical moment towards the change of the language regime was the enactment of The Law Amending Several Articles of the Constitution (No. 4709) on October 3, 2001. It covered 35 articles, two of which aimed at removing restrictions on the use of different languages and dialects. According to Article 9 of the Law, the clause, which read, “no language prohibited by law shall be used in the expression and dissemination of thought” is deleted from Article 26 of the Constitution. In the same vein, the Article 10 of the Law deleted the second paragraph of Article 28 of the Constitution, which read, “Publications shall not be made in any language prohibited by law”. However, Article 42 of the Constitution, which reads, “No language other than Turkish shall be taught as a mother tongue to Turkish citizens at any institutions of training and at education” remains intact today.

After 2001, there have been numerous attempts to expand the use of Kurdish, beside other minority languages. The efforts to use other languages, such as Circassian or Laz, in publication and music records remained limited due to their speakers potentials of social impact. Mostly the Circassian or Laz minorities have been organized

in non-governmental organizations, as association or foundations, and their political influence are quite restricted.

On the other hand, Kurdish population is highly politicized and they have been able to organize in political parties. Linguistic rights have long become an important aspect of the Kurdish politics and developed in addition to the official denial and exclusion of the Kurdish language (Yıldız K., 2005).

On one side of the attempts to push for the legal limits on the use of Kurdish were the civic groups. Right after the elimination of the notion of “languages forbidden by law”, a widespread movement started and the participants demanded education opportunities in Kurdish. Between October 2001 and January 2002, some university students began a campaign for optional Kurdish courses in the university curriculums.

The way the students formulated their demands echoed well-known themes on the right and legitimacy of using mother language in education. In Dokuz Eylül University, İzmir, the Student Initiative for Kurdish Education and Schooling organized a debate on the issue. The spokesperson of the Initiative declared, “Our mother language is the condition of our very existence.” and told that they would resist against any oppression of the movement.<sup>122</sup>

The attempt was reacted with a very strong opposition by the university administrators and the movement was widely considered as one of the plans of PKK to transform itself as a civil movement.<sup>123</sup> The students were both prosecuted by the university administrations<sup>124</sup> and more than 1,000 people who plead were detained throughout Turkey.<sup>125</sup>

In 2004, *Eğitim-Sen*, the labor union of workers in the educational sectors with a member number of more than 150,000, was similarly sued for defending the right of education in mother languages (Hür, 2005). The request for prosecution was ordered by the Governorship of Ankara. Although the local court refused the request and decided

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<sup>122</sup> “Öğrenciler anadilde ısrarlı”, *Evrensel*, November 28 (2002).

<sup>123</sup> “Rektörler 'Kürtçe'ye kızgın”, *Radikal*, November 11 (2001).

<sup>124</sup> “İsteyenin bir yüzü...”, *Radikal*, January 11 (2002).

<sup>125</sup> “‘Kürtçe eğitim’ dedi, tutuklandı”, *Milliyet*, January 11 (2002).

that there is no need further investigation, the Supreme Court ruled, with unanimity of all its 45 members, that the statements in the Union's statute that defend the right of education in mother language should be considered within the framework of separatism.<sup>126</sup>

The Supreme Court, in its reasoned decision stated that the freedom of education and schooling does not rule out the Constitution's verdicts, which commands that the Republic of Turkey is an indivisible unity with country and nation:

“As a natural consequence of this unity, the Constitution rules that [the State's] language is Turkish. As another consequence of this attribute, the Article 42 decreed that no language other than Turkish could be taught in education as a mother language... This is to dictate the unity of nation and the uniqueness of nation in public life and therefore the national culture is authoritative in public life... The final verdict, to follow the relevant clauses of the Constitution, is that the language of education is Turkish in Turkey... Individuals are free to use their mother languages as they wish except the domain where Turkish is mandatory. Likewise, learning and broadcasting in different languages are accepted as a democratic right and those rights been regulated and protected by law... However, education in mother languages is a different concept and necessitates the use of languages other than the official language in every levels of schooling. Education in different mother languages would eventually stand for the appearance of an unknown number of mother languages in the *public sphere in a state* [sic.]. This is by no means compatible in the Republic of Turkey with the unitary nature of the state and the Constitution. Because not conceiving different languages and dialects as only cultural elements, and to pursue their introduction into educational system under the title of “different mother languages” are against the Constitution, as noted above. It would also reproduce social conflicts in the public sphere. (my translation)<sup>127</sup>

The rationale of the decision is significant in that it is a clear statement of the language ideology and language regime of the State, at least as it is interpreted by its highest body of justice.

According to the Court, the unity of the State and, in parallel, the national culture and its unity are the foremost Constitutional values. The mother languages of citizens,

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<sup>126</sup> “Yargıtay'a göre 'anadil'ler böler!”, *Radikal*, May 26 (2005).

<sup>127</sup> “Eğitim-Sen için gerekçeler”, *Radikal*, July 30 (2005). For the full text of the decision see Appendix 4.



however, are not considered parts of the national culture; therefore, they cannot be asked to be parts of the public life in general and in education, in particular.

The Turkish linguistic regime does not handle every language with equal treatment. As seen in the decision of the Court, the emphasis is exclusively on the problem of teaching a mother language, rather than teaching any language other than Turkish. There is no reference to the universities who deliver education in English, for example. The conclusion is that the language regime particularly aims at the native languages of its citizens, of which uses in public domains are considered to run against the unity of the Republic. The unity of State and its national culture, then, is maintained by exclusively its official language. It is the official language, not the language that is shared among the citizens, which ensures the unity. That is, it is the State that ensures the unity of the nation by imposing the regulations of the official language in particular domains. The Court already conceives of the diversity of mother languages in the country as a source of social conflict, which would not be transmitted into the public sphere via educational system. The linguistic diversity is itself a source of conflict, not the way they are articulated into the political discourses according to the Court.

The State is sure about that there is a linguistic diversity, which is a potential threat against the unity of the nation, of which unity is being guaranteed only by the practices of the State itself. The decision, and the rationale behind it, is a solid evidence of how the state is self-conscious of its critical tutelary function in ensuring the very existence of society, and how it is ambitious to keep it that way.

As the argumentation is logically set in this way, any demand for linguistic rights would be a violation of the very unchangeable qualities of the Republic. However, the laws allow teaching of other languages in private courses, including the “dialects that are used by Turkish citizens in their daily lives”. The justification behind that is retained by a selective definition of public sphere. In the Court’s decision on *Eğitim-Sen*’s case, the public sphere refers to the services that are granted to the citizens. And that public sphere is based on the condition of a firm unity of the national culture.

In July 20005, the congress of *Eğitim-Sen* decided to eliminate the clauses in its program that caused prosecution in order to avoid a possible verdict of closure. The

president of the Union stated that they would be going to apply to the European Court of Human Rights.<sup>128</sup>

In March 2002, another regulation in line with efforts of harmonization with the EU was decreed. The Law no. 4748, titled *Çeşitli Kanunlarda Değişiklik Yapılmasına İlişkin Kanun* (the Law Amending Various Laws) followed the Law no. 4709 and deleted the clause from the Article 16/5 of the *Basın Kanunu* (the Law on Press, no. 5680), which banned to the use “languages forbidden by law”.<sup>129</sup>

A package of major amendments in the existing laws was issued in the summer of 2002. On August 3, the Law Amending Various Laws, no. 4771, was accepted:

“This law contained two articles enabling broadcasting in non-official languages and allowing private courses to be opened for the teaching of non-official languages, which are referred in the law as “*the different languages and dialects used traditionally by Turkish citizens in their daily lives*”.” (Eraydın-Virtanen, 2003b, p. 35).

The elements of broadcasting will be analyzed in the next chapters, but the issue of private courses for teaching “traditional languages” needs further emphasis. As usual, there were reservations regarding the operation of these laws.

“Such courses cannot be against the fundamental principles of the Turkish Republic enshrined in the Constitution and the indivisible integrity of the state with its territory and nation. The procedures and principles related to the opening and regulation of these courses shall be undertaken through a regulation to be issued by the Ministry of National Education.” (translation in Eraydın-Virtanen, 2003b, pp. 36-37).

Moreover, the interpretation of the non-Turkish languages as “languages traditionally used by Turkish citizens in their daily lives” was in accord with the Constitution’s established clause in the Article 42, which forbids the teaching of any language other than Turkish as the mother tongue. Therefore, the formulation non-Turkish language teaching was as a private course, nothing to do with the public

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<sup>128</sup> “Eğitim-Sen tüzükten 'anadil'i çıkardı”, *Radikal*, July 4 (2005).

<sup>129</sup> In 2004, the Law on Press was completely renewed.

services of the State. People had to pay for, if they wanted, to become literate in their mother languages.<sup>130</sup>

The State was definitely not encouraging the spread of languages other than Turkish with this regulation. The Ministry of Education set the rules for the operation of these private courses with *Türk Vatandaşlarının Günlük Yaşamlarında Geleneksel Olarak Kullandıkları Farklı Dil ve Lehçelerin Öğrenilmesi Hakkında Yönetmelik* (The By-law on the Learning of Languages and Dialects Used Traditionally by Turkish Citizens in Their Daily Lives) in September 2002. Eraydın-Virtanen describes the regulation:

“It was drafted on the legal basis of Law No. 625, which regulates the opening, and functioning of Private Education Courses. The regulation consisted of 5 sections and 16 articles. The by-law stipulated that courses teaching non-official languages could be established and start to teach once they had fulfilled the required conditions and received the permits issued by the Ministry.

According to Article 7, the personnel appointed to these courses had to be Turkish citizens and fulfil the qualifications required by Law No. 625. The personnel should not have been convicted of crimes committed against the State in the past.

Article 8 allowed Turkish citizens with at least a primary –level education to register on the courses. Persons under 18 years of age could be registered with the permission of parents or legal guardians.

According to Article 10, the course syllabus had to be approved by the Ministry and the list of trainees was to be submitted to the Director of National Education. The article also stipulated that the course syllabus should only cover the learning of non-official languages. Those attending these courses would have to obey the dress code of the Ministry of Education.” (2003b, pp. 37-38)

The State wanted to keep away those who were convicted for their links with PKK for the courses. The authorities were worried about that they would seem conforming the demands of PKK because any demands of cultural and linguistic rights were already assessed as “the political tactics of the terrorist organization” by the very same authorities. Now they were obliged to open some space to able to start

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<sup>130</sup> The final version of the Law no. 2923 was formed by the 23rd Article of the Law no.4963, agreed on July 30, 2003. For the final statement on mother languages and teaching non-Turkish languages, see above.

negotiations with the EU, of which evaluation would take place in December 2002.<sup>131</sup> That was the reason why Turkey, in 2001 and 2002, witnessed the most comprehensive legal reforms for a very long time.

However, the application of the law was not easy. First courses could be opened with after one year of the installment of the by-law. Many obstacles were forwarded against those who applied for opening course. Among the excuses for not granting approval were the sizes of the doors<sup>132</sup>, the missing fire exits<sup>133</sup> and the name of the course<sup>134</sup>. The last case was especially interesting. A retired teacher in Şanlıurfa applied in December 2002 for opening a Kurdish course, which he named *Urfa Kürt Dili ve Lehçeleri Öğretim Merkezi*. In six months, he was unable to start the courses since his application was refused for its name, which contained the word *Kürt*. The inspectors of the Ministry of Education declared that the approval would mean that they accept Kurdish as a language. The local directorate of National Education offered the name *Özel Urfa Mahalli Lehçe Dil Kursu*, but it was refused the applicant.<sup>135</sup> The persistence of the language ideology that resists against the recognition of Kurdish as a language proper is perfectly exemplified in this case. Especially with respect to the officials who are in the end of practice line, the refusal became a natural reflex.

There was great interest in the courses and they were opened with great celebrations in Şanlıurfa, Diyarbakır, Batman and Van. However, the fire went out quickly. In less than two years, the Kurdish course in Batman was closed down. The manager of the course stated that the number of the students had remained below their capacities and they had had hard times in financing the institution. Until its closure, the

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<sup>131</sup> There were attempts to organize Kurdish courses before but they were refused. One case was in 1997, when *Kürt Kültür ve Araştırma Vakfı* (The Kurdish Foundation of Research and Culture, *Kürt-Kav*), the first organization with the word Kurd in its name was approved but rejected its demand to open courses for teaching Kurdish (“Kürtçe kursuna izin yok”, *Zaman*, April 28 (1997)).

<sup>132</sup> “Kürtçe dil kursu ‘kapı’ya takıldı”, *Hürriyet*, October 13 (2003).

<sup>133</sup> “Kürtçe kursa merdiven engeli”, *Radikal*, November 11 (2003).

<sup>134</sup> “Kürtçe kursuna Kürtçe engeli”, *Hürriyet*, June 6 (2003).

<sup>135</sup> “Kürtçe kursun ismine itiraz”, *Radikal*, June 9 (2003). The name of the course, in the end, was accepted as it was applied for.

course awarded certificates to about 450 students.<sup>136</sup> The reaction of the mainstream dailies was particularly remarkable; many of them announced the news in their headlines and comments expressed various sentiments ranging from relief – from the fear of troubles that these freedoms could be misused, to teasing – the “useless” political demands of the Kurdish politicians which in turn was not even supported by Kurds.<sup>137</sup>

The Kurdish movement also gained a significant power in local politics through municipalities.

#### 4.20 Municipalities as the Guardians of the Language

In 2004, in many cities, towns and provinces of the regions with high Kurdish population, Kurdish candidates won the local elections to which they joined as independent runners. With the legal openings that were brought about with the harmonization efforts to join the EU, many of these municipalities attempted to incorporate Kurdish language in the municipal matters.

However, their enthusiasm was quickly responded and the persecutions followed one after another. Two major cases were about the mayors of Diyarbakır Metropolitan Municipality, Osman Baydemir and Sur, Diyarbakır, Abdullah Demirbaş.

Abdullah Demirbaş announced in January 2007 that the Assembly of Municipality of Sur accepted the implementation of multilingual services in languages of Kurdish, Armenian, Syriac and English.<sup>138</sup> Within two hours, the Ministry of Home Affairs assigned two inspectors for investigation. In June, the major and the members of the Assembly were discharged by the decree of the Council of State.<sup>139</sup> On February 29, 2008, Demirbaş, the members the Municipal Assembly and Osman Demirbaş, who

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<sup>136</sup> “Bir efsanenin sonu”, *Radikal*, July 19 (2005).

<sup>137</sup> “Mitingle açıldı, sessiz kapandı”, *Hürriyet*, July 19 (2005).

<sup>138</sup> “Belediye'den Kürtçe hizmet!”, *Milliyet*, January 5 (2007).

<sup>139</sup> “Yargı 'çok dilli belediye'yi fesh etti”, *Radikal*, June 15 (2007).

approved the decision as the Metropolitan Mayor were accused of and sued for misconduct and violation of the revolution law – the law on the Turkish letters.<sup>140</sup>

The two mayors were once more in March. Baydemir was accused of publishing a compilation of Turkish and Kurdish stories, and Demirbaş for publishing a brochure on organ donation in both languages.<sup>141</sup>

In the same month, Baydemir was acquitted for allowing Kurdish banners about the services of the municipality and for sending to the Governor of Şanlıurfa an invitation in which there was Kurdish writings. The public prosecutor asked for 10 years and 6 months of prison service for the violation of the law “on the Approval and the Application of Turkish Letters” and misconduct of duties.<sup>142</sup>

The Municipality of Yenişehir, Diyarbakır, in order to protest the judicial pressure on using Kurdish, prepared posters on March 8, Women’s Day, in Chinese. Deputy Mayor Şefik Türk stated that there were already five cases and three investigations against the mayor, Fırat Anlı.<sup>143</sup>

In February 2007, the Municipal Assembly of Suruç, Şanlıurfa, agreed on 32 new street names, of which 11 were Kurdish names. However, the Governor of the town refused the Kurdish names for that they were in Kurdish and that they could result in separatism and discrimination.<sup>144</sup>

Next to demands for changes in the freedoms and rights of using languages other than Turkish, there were worries about the way Turkish is losing its supremacy. A widespread reaction came, yet again, from the municipalities, which pursued the re-establishment of the domination of Turkish, at least in the visual landscape.

Indeed MHP, who was already quite disturbed to be a part of the government who abolished the death penalty – including that of Abdullah Öcalan – and passed some other regulations concerning language rights, proposed a bill “to make changes in the

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<sup>140</sup> BİA Medya Gözlem Raporu (2007).

<sup>141</sup> BİA Medya Gözlem Raporu - Ocak-Şubat-Mart (2008)

<sup>142</sup> (ibid.).

<sup>143</sup> (ibid.)

<sup>144</sup> “Kürtçe sokak isimlerine veto”, *Milliyet*, February 26 (2007).

*Belediye Gelirler Kanunu* (the Municipality Revenue Law) in order to ban the use of foreign words in advertisements (sales, jobs, etc.) and signboards and to impose more taxes on those businesses that use foreign names” (Doğançay-Aktuna, 2004, p. 20). Doğançay-Aktuna reminds that a similar law was in effect until the 1980s liberal policies of economics of Turgut Özal (ibid.).

MHP’s bill was not accepted but many municipalities agreed on either making it obligatory to use Turkish on signboards and shop and business names, or to encourage such practices. Many of the municipal administrations also decreed that the non-Turkish names of the streets and public places would be changed with Turkish ones. Some of the decisions also included regulations on the style of Turkish, as the Municipality of Çanakkale, of which mayor is from CHP, required *Öztürkçe* words.<sup>145</sup> A remarkable stress is, on the other hand, on the use of the letters of the Turkish alphabet.

In 2007, *Marmara ve Boğazları Belediyeler Birliği* (The Union of Municipalities in Marmara and Straits) accepted a proposal, which recommended its members to use the correct forms of the language in official correspondences. The proposal also included an invitation to encourage and take necessary measures for the use of Turkish in licencing new workplaces and their names.<sup>146</sup> The municipal action has been a part of the general rise of mobilization based on “saving Turkish”.<sup>147</sup>

The widespread interest in the protection of Turkish and its further support was echoed in the major institutions of the State, as well.

One of the first measures taken was about the installment of an article in the new Penal Code, no. 5237, which was decreed on September 26, 2004, which ordered the punishments in case of violations of the Law on the Approval and Application of Turkish Letters, no. 1353, of 1928. The Penal Codes’ Article 222 stated that any violation of the Law no 1353 would result in prison sentences from two to six months. This clause in fact was a response to the increasing complaints about the increasing use

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<sup>145</sup> The list of those municipalities that required or advised the use of Turkish in various domains is added as Appendix 5.

<sup>146</sup> Marmara ve Boğazları Belediyeler Birliği, 2007 Yılı Meclis 1. Olağan Toplantısı Karar Özetleri, retrieved July 11, 2007 from <http://www.marmara.gov.tr>.

<sup>147</sup> A general assessment of the post–1980 language debates will be presented below, in the following sections.

of non-Turkish elements in language, including the letters of Q, X, and W. The protests were usually targeted the widespread use of English in mass media and various sectors of economics, but it was also a precaution against the uses of Kurdish. The Kurdish alphabet also used non-Turkish letters.

Actually after the Supreme Court declared that giving Kurdish names to children should not be considered as crime, there have been some applicants who wanted to change their own names to those which contained non-Turkish letters. A case, already before the new Penal Code passed, was of the former president of the Istanbul branch of *İnsan Hakları Derneği* (Human Rights Association), Eren Keskin. She, with a friend applied for changing their names as *Xezal* and *Xece*, but their applications were refused for the reason that the proposed names involved the letter X that is not in the Turkish alphabet.<sup>148</sup>

In the first AKP government period (2002-2007), a new investigation commission for Turkish language was established in TBMM.<sup>149</sup> After interviewing many authors and scholars working on the subject, the commission prepared its report. However, the 2007 general elections were closing, so the report proved vain, without even being discussed in the Assembly. After the elections, the interest was not extinguished and the new Assembly formed another investigation commission, with a rather long name: *Türkçe'deki Bozulma ve Yabancılaşmanın Araştırılması, Türkçe'nin Korunması ve Geliştirilmesi için Alınması Gereken Önlemlerin Belirlenmesi Amacıyla Kurulan Meclis Araştırması Komisyonu* (the Parliamentary Investigation Commission for Researching Corruption and Alienation of Turkish Language and for Assessing the Measures to Protect and Develop Turkish). The final report was published in June 2008. The report reviewed many aspects of the popular complaints on the problems of with Turkish, such as the expanding usage of slang and foreign words, non-standard uses in speech and

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<sup>148</sup> “Kürtçe isim davası”, *Sabah*, November 19 (2003)

<sup>149</sup> There have been attempts to pass a law in the Assembly in order to define the official protection of the language in 1997 (“Türkçe’ye ‘yasal’ koruma, *Sabah*, January 2 (1997). The effort caused heated debates in the newspapers and in the political circles, but nothing came out. In 2000, DPT (*Devlet Planlama Teşkiatı*, State Planning Organization) produced a report on Turkish language as a part of the eighth Five-Year Development Plan (*Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı*, 2000). The report was presented to the authorities to be considered and acted upon, but, yet again, no action seems to be taken.



writing, inefficiencies in teaching Turkish, and education in foreign languages. The report was concluded that the national consciousness of language was missing and what the government must accomplish was to figure out a national language program.<sup>150</sup>

The Turkish Armed Forces was involved in the wave of complaint for the corruption of Turkish, as well. The Army published a booklet in 2007 on Turkish for the use of its personnel. The aim of the book was described as to help the members of the Armed Forces to develop their communicational skills by using “*doğru ve güzel Türkçe*” (correct and beautiful Turkish) (Erenoğlu & Otçu, 2007).

The book was a part of a larger interest of the Army to the issue of language. In September 2007, the Army published four posters. They were made public on the internet site of the Armed Forces, and were prepared for the Turkish Language Festival on September 26. The two of them are presented below:



**Figure 1** – The posters prepared by the Turkish Armed Forces in September 2007.

<sup>150</sup> “TBMM’de ‘Milli dil politikası’ önerisi”, *NTVMSNBC*, June 25 (2008).

The emphases were on the antiquity of the language and its wealth. Messages were so selected as to rouse feeling of pride of Turkish. However, the posters suffer from a routine irony, which is quite frequent in the publications of those who complain about the poor usages of the language: poor usage of the language. The poster on the left has problems with its expression. Regarding the mistakes in many elements of the complaint tradition, the very instrumentalization of the language for political ends could be assessed as the reason. The title by *Radikal* for the news of the posters, which read, “*Asker Türkçeyi de Koruyor*” is quite right in the sense that it is evident that the Army assigned itself another mission of protecting the language.<sup>151</sup>

The Chief of the Staff, Yaşar Büyükanıt, too, frequently stresses the importance of Turkish. In many of his speeches, and especially when he addressed the students of the Military Academies, he reiterated the well-known discursive elements of the relationship between the nation’s well-being and that of the language. In one of his addresses he stated

“Language is one of the fundamentals that define a nation, and when the language is damaged, the structure of the nation will follow. And, in that case, the country would eventually lose its identity. You have to pay a special attention to your expressions, in your speeches or writings, in order to prevent the pollution of our language. This is your national mission. Never forget that.” (my translation; Büyükanıt, 2006)

On the one hand, the head of the Military Forces carries on the mission of protecting the nation and the state, therefore language, as it comes as a vital dimension of nationhood. The dominant linguistic ideology, which prioritizes the decisive function of language on the bonds and the medium of nationality, inevitably makes Turkish as a subject matter in the Army’s agenda. On the other hand, the emphasis on Turkish reaches beyond the correct and beautiful usage of the language. It also is an emphasis on the rise of ethnic languages and the political claims based on these languages. It is at the same time an emphasis on the linguistic consequences of globalization and the increasing influences of foreign cultures on the Turkish nationals.

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<sup>151</sup> “Asker Türkçeyi de koruyor”, *Radikal*, September 26 (2007).

The poster publications of the Army were repeated in June 2008. This time there was only one design, with the letters Q, X and W crossed over and a large red letters read “*Önce Türkçe*” (Turkish first) with the subtext “*Tabelalarda, ilanlarda, reklamlarda*” (On the signboards, banners and advertisements). The poster was hung in all the premises of the Military Forces. In addition, the General Staff took steps to Turkify some of the words used in the Army. The substitutions were *kuşluk* for brunch, *ayakkabı bakım yeri* for *lostra*, *hızlı yiyecek satış noktası* for fast food, *yemek listesi* for *menü* and *lokanta* for restaurant.<sup>152</sup> Despite the fact that *lokanta* is not more Turkish than restaurant or that *lostra* has been used for such a long time that it is for sure, no one will ever call the workshop *ayakkabı bakım yeri*, the act has a symbolic meaning. The idea of cleansing the pollution of the language is such a strong drive that it usually creates more contamination that it cleans. The control of the language from above and assuming a social change following linguistic modifications is a tradition of the modern Turkish politics. The Army, in which the symbols are of extreme importance, accomplishes its own mission in the protection of the language against the relentless attacks to it.

The judicial perceptiveness is still very strong on the official language. Below are two cases of penalizations for attempting to use Kurdish in official correspondence, in 2008.

On February 6, Mehdi Tanrıkulu, a Kurdish publisher, was sentenced to five months of imprisonment. His offense as announced by the Court was violating the Law No. 1353 on the Adoption and Application of the New Turkish Letters, as he delivered a petition in Kurdish to the Diyarbakır Attorney Generalship of the Republic”<sup>153</sup>.

On March 4, 2008, Mahmut Alınak, a former member of the Parliament and the former chairman of DTP (*Demokratik Toplum Partisi*, Democratic Society Party), was sentenced to serve six months for he sent a letter in Kurdish to report on the problems of Kars. He was convicted for violation of the Article 81 of the Law on Political Parties.<sup>154</sup>

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<sup>152</sup> “Genelkurmay’dan ‘Önce Türkçe’ afişi”, *Hürriyet*, June 19 (2008).

<sup>153</sup> “Kürtçe’ dilekçeye hapis cezası”, *NTVMSNBC*, (2008)

<sup>154</sup> “Alınak’a Kürtçe dilekçeden 6 ay hapis”, *Hürriyet*, March 4 (2008)

Such incidents, that concern language and become a public issue seem to increase in number in the next years, as there are no signs of resolution in any of the issues, neither in the increasing ubiquity of non-standard, or “low” varieties of Turkish, nor in the rapid “invasion” of Turkish by English, nor in the discontent caused by violation of linguistic rights. Before advancing towards the discussion of the most recent developments especially on the issue of public broadcasting in minority languages, there will be short break to this account of Turkish language regime.

In this chapter, the history of the formation of the language regime in Turkey has been presented. The mounting debates on almost every aspect of language are already solid evidences that, at least at the ideological level, the unification of Turkish nation through a standard, “high” language has not been that successful. The next chapter is an assessment of the success of the regime in terms of leveling linguistic differences in Turkey.

## CHAPTER 5

### THE HISTORICAL LINGUISTIC MAP OF TURKEY

In the previous chapter, a long legal history of the Turkish language has been presented. The laws and regulations certainly point out how the language ideology of the official institutions and the authorities in charge were reified in order to establish a corresponding language regime. However, the history of official arrangement alone does not define the ways in which language regimes are practiced. Although a macro field study was not considered as a research method for this dissertation, where the major subject matter is the construction and the maintenance of the linguistic regime, a presentation of the history of the linguistic map of Turkey is necessary.

On the other hand, the sources of data for such information are rather poor for the country. The State was uncompromisingly headed for a linguistic homogenization, with all the laws decreed and campaigns organized, which in turn is an evidence of a multi-linguistic situation in Turkey. The citizens who were born into a non-Turkish linguistic environment in the families and household have been considerable in number. It was therefore the State aimed at the leveling of the linguistic diversity in favor of Turkish. However, it was not an easy task to work on the statistical information on these numbers. How many people in fact were speaking Turkish as a mother language? How was the homogenization process working? And, how was the linguistic shift effective between generations of non-Turkish speakers? As far as known, the only way the State devised was the censuses, of which history has been given below. For a very long, in fact until the 1990s the ethnic and linguistic diversity of the population was a taboo subject to be studied in the academia. Auto censoring has been quite powerful in the Turkish universities in order to avoid dealing with “sensitive issues” such as cultural

diversity of the society, which was outlawed by the Constitution.<sup>155</sup> Rare exhibitions of bravery were immediately punished by the political regime, as it was the case for İsmail Beşikçi, who served many years in prison for the reason that his studies on the Kurdish population encouraged separatism.

After the 1990s, the existence of ethnic differences within the assumed solidness of Turkish nation was slowly appreciated. The decade was also one of armed struggle against the separatist Kurdish groups, which in turn made the development relatively a difficult one. However, it is possible to say that there are more studies on the ethnographic configuration of the country recently, bearing in mind that the self-controlling mechanisms are still commanding in some of the universities.

The following section, presents the information available on the quantifiable data of the linguistic ecology in Turkey. After the presentation, an overall analysis on the extent the established language regime was effective will be given.

The first republican census was in 1927. Second census was conducted in 1935, and in every five years, a new one was organized. In 1990, the government decided to conduct the censuses in every ten year, in the years with the number “0” in the end. After the 1990 census, in 1997 the population data was renewed in accordance with the updating of electors’ lists. In 2000, the last census was conducted and the concluding results were announced in 2002.

The most quoted study on the linguistic minorities of which data were obtained by the censuses belongs to Fuat Dündar (1999). Dündar compiled the relevant numbers of the censuses between 1927 and 1965, and explained them with respect to the way the questions were formulated. He included in the work his analyses of the repercussions of counting the minorities of Turkey and he presented the speeches and declarations by the authorities on the significance and political implications of the censuses.

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<sup>155</sup> Scalbert-Yücel and Ray reminds that 1960s was a decade of exception when “a progressive social scientists’ stand emerge ... strongly interested in searching for the causes of inequality and its solutions” (2006). Martin van Bruinessen notes that “in the course of the decade, many of them came to adopt Marxism in one form or another as a framework for explanation’ (van Bruinessen, Ağa, Şeyh, Devlet, 2003, p. 4; quoted in Scalbert-Yücel & Ray, 2006).

Until 1985, there were questions concerning the mother and second languages of the population, but the results with regard to language data acquired in the 1970, 1975, 1980 and 1985 censuses were not made public (Dündar F. , 1999, p. 65). The figure are shown in Appendix 2.

Dündar explains the ways in which the questions on language were formulated. In the censuses of 1927 and 1935, the mother language was defined as “the language spoken among family members”. In 1940, it was “the language spoken in the household”. In 1955, the mother language was described as “the tongue conventionally [*mutad olarak*] spoken in the household, within the family”. In the following censuses, it was defined as “the language of the household and within the family” (Dündar F. , 1999, p. 67).

The second language, on the other, was another information that was researched. The question on the second language was first asked to the respondent in 1935. In 1935 and 1945, the second language was formulated as “the language the respondent knows to speak other than her mother language”. In the next three subsequent censuses, the question was asked as “the language best spoken other than the mother language” (Dündar F. , 1999, p. 68). The point of asking the second language was to find out the possible influences of cultures to each other (Aybar & Aykut, 1937, p. 89; quoted in Dündar F. , 1999, p. 68).

An interesting detail with the question of the second language asked in 1950 was that it was filled by the census officer as Turkish, if the mother language was reported to be Turkish (*ibid*). This certainly excludes the speakers of other languages who were linguistically assimilated as a result of schooling, forced or voluntary migration, etc. It is reasonable to think that there have been many Kurdish families who were speaking Turkish at a time in the household for various reasons, but retained Kurdish as their second language.

The numbers obtained from the censuses are quite problematic for other reasons, as well. Mete Tunçay states that there are inconsistencies in numbers of ethnic communities with respect to respective languages and religions:

“In the last census of 1965, in which questions related to language and religion were asked, there were around ten thousand people who answered that they spoke Jewish, but the number of the Jews was around 40.000.

48.000 Greek speakers but 80.000 Greek-Orthodox, and 33.000 speakers of Armenian but around 70.000 people associated with the Gregorian Church.” (my translation; Tunçay, 1983, p. 1563).

One of the main reasons for the unreliability of the data is that the respondents might have refrained from exposing themselves before a state with an unpleasant history of minorities. Fuat Dündar reminds, for example, the declaration of the Jews in 1927 that they would report their mother languages as Turkish (1999, p. 49). Authorities promised that there would not be any counter practices, and called everyone to testify correctly. However, it should be considered as more than a coincidence that the campaign *Vatandaş Türkçe Konuş!* was started right after the census results were announced. In the following censuses, the policies and incidents the minorities such as relocations of Kurds, *Trakya Olayları* in 1934<sup>156</sup>, *Varlık Vergisi* (Wealth Tax) of 1942<sup>157</sup>, September 6-7 incidents in 1955, and the deportation of Greeks in 1964<sup>158</sup>, must have affected the way respondents answered questions about their ethnicities. Eraydın-Virtanen agrees to the idea that the data concerning non-Turkish languages are rather unreliable (2003b, p. 24). Therefore, the numbers should be treated carefully.

The inconsistencies are seen also in the lists and the categorizations of the minority languages. The lists of languages in the censuses are presented below, in Table 2.

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<sup>156</sup> See Aktar (2000a), Levi (1996, pp. 100-130) and Bali (1999, pp. 243-265).

<sup>157</sup> See Aktar (2000d) and (2000e), Levi (1996, pp. 140-145), and Bali (1999, pp. 424-495)

<sup>158</sup> See Demir and Akar (1994).



	1927	1935	1945	1950	1955	1960	1965
<b>Abaza</b> ( <i>Abazaca</i> )		+	+	+	+	+	+
<b>Albanian</b> ( <i>Arnavutça</i> )	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
<b>Arabic</b> ( <i>Arapça</i> )	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
<b>Armenian</b> ( <i>Ermenice</i> )	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
<b>Bosnian</b> ( <i>Boşnakça</i> )		+	+	+	+	+	+
<b>Bulgarian</b> ( <i>Bulgarca</i> )	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
<b>Circassian</b> ( <i>Çerkesçe</i> )	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
<b>Coptic</b> ( <i>Kiptice</i> )		+	+				
<b>Croatian</b> ( <i>Hırvatça</i> )		+	+	+	+	+	+
<b>Czech language</b> ( <i>Çekçe</i> )			+		+		+
<b>English</b> ( <i>İngilizce</i> )	+	+	+		+	+	+
<b>Flemmish</b> ( <i>Flamanca</i> )		+	+	+			+
<b>French</b> ( <i>Fransızca</i> )	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
<b>Georgian</b> ( <i>Gürcüce</i> )		+	+	+	+	+	+
<b>German</b> ( <i>Almanca</i> )		+	+	+	+	+	+
<b>Greek</b> ( <i>Rumca</i> )	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
<b>Hungarian</b> ( <i>Macarca</i> )		+	+				
<b>Italian</b> ( <i>İtalyanca</i> )	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
<b>Jewish</b> ( <i>Yahudice</i> )	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
<i>Kırdaşça</i>				+			+
<b>Kirmanji</b> ( <i>Kırmanca</i> )				+			+
<b>Kurdish</b> ( <i>Kürtçe</i> )	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
<b>Laz</b> ( <i>Lazca</i> )		+	+	+	+	+	+
<b>Persian</b> ( <i>Acemce</i> )	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
<b>Polish</b> ( <i>Lehçe</i> )		+	+	+	+	+	+
<b>Pomak</b> ( <i>Pomakça</i> )		+	+	+	+	+	+
<b>Portuguese</b> ( <i>Portekizce</i> )						+	
<b>Romenian</b> ( <i>Rumence</i> )		+	+	+	+		+
<b>Russian</b> ( <i>Rusça</i> )		+	+	+	+	+	+
<b>Serbian</b> ( <i>Sırpça</i> )		+	+	+	+	+	+
<b>Spanish</b> ( <i>İspanyolca</i> )		+	+			+	+
<b>Swedish</b> ( <i>İsveççe</i> )		+	+	+			+
<b>Tatar</b> ( <i>Tatarca</i> )	+	+	+				
<b>Zazaki</b> ( <i>Zazaca</i> )				+			+

**Table 2** – List of languages in the censuses.<sup>159</sup>

<sup>159</sup> The 1940 population census was conducted based on sampling method with the quotient of 2.5 percent; therefore, it is not included in the table. The data is from Dündar (1999, p. 71).

With respect to the numbers of languages that were available in question forms, there were 14 designated languages to be asked in the 1927 census, 31 in 1935 and 1945, 28 in 1950, and 25 in 1955, 1960 and 1965 (Dündar F. , 1999, pp. 69-70).

In 1927, 1935, 1945 and 1955, the languages were listed alphabetically without further classification.

In 1950, these categories were made up: 1-Turkish, 2-Local Languages and 3-Foreign Languages. The local languages involved all those spoken by all Muslim and non-Muslim minorities.

In 1960 and 1965, the languages were categorized under seven groups: 1-Turkish, 2-Islamic minority languages 3-Other minority languages, 4-Anglo-saxon languages, 5-Latin Languages, 6-Slavic Languages and 7-Others (ibid.). Table 3, below, shows the detailed categorization.

<b>Language Group</b>	<b>Languages</b>
<b>1. Turkish</b>	
<b>2. Islamic minority languages</b>	Abaza, <i>Acemce</i> (Persian or Farsi), Arabic, Albanian, Bosnian, Circassian, Georgian, <i>Kırdaşça</i> , <i>Kırmanca</i> , Kurdish, Laz, Pomak, Zazakî
<b>3 Other minorities</b>	Armenian, Greek, Jewish
<b>4. Anglo-Saxon languages</b>	German, Flemish, English
<b>5. Latin languages</b>	French, Spanish, Italian
<b>6. Slavic languages</b>	Bulgarian, Czech, Croatian, Swedish, Polish, Romanian, Russian, Serbian
<b>7. Others</b>	

**Table 3** – The categorization of languages in the 1965 census

The language categorization, as seen in the list, is both inconsistent and problematic. Ali İhsan Aksamaz registers that there have been more languages than listed spoken within Islamic minorities and he gives a long list of them (2007).

The most controversial classification is that of Kurdish. Kurdish was evaluated in three groups in the 1950 census (*Kırdaşça, Kürtçe-Kırmanca, Zazaca*) and in four groups in 1960 (*Kırdaşça, Kürtçe, Kırmanca, Zazaca*). However, in the question regarding the second language, the grouping was given up and only Kurdish was offered as a choice. Dündar assesses the variable categorization as an invention and a result of the urge of the official discourse to break up Kurdishness in pieces and to present its population as a segregated diversity, which, therefore, should not be evaluated as a unique and uniform ethnicity (1999, p. 70 and 106).

Zazakî is another important issue. Recently, there are members of the Zaza community, who claim that they are ethnically distinct and that the languages of Zazaki and Kurmanji Kurdish are separate languages.<sup>160</sup> Zazaki was included in the language list only in 1950 and 1965.<sup>161</sup> In 1965, 150,644 respondents told that they spoke Zazakî. *Kırmanca* counts as only 45 in the same census, and *Kırdaşça* as 42. These strange numbers indicate the misguided formulation of the language list.

There is a widespread disagreement on the linguistic varieties of Kurdish. The Encyclopedia of Language and Linguistics describes Kurdish as being spoken in three main variants:

“Northern Kurdish, comprising Kurmanji in the west and dialects spoken from Armenia to Kazakhstan; Central Kurdish, spoken in northeastern Iraq (called *Sorani*) and adjacent areas in Iran (called *Kordi* or *Mokri*), as well as in Iranian Kurdistan (called *Senne’i*); and Southern Kurdish, spoken in Kermanshah province in western Iran (including *Lakki* and *Lori* of Posht-e Kuh).” Skjærvø (2006, p. 265).

According to Eyyüp Demir, among others, Kurdish has four main dialects (2005).

Kurmanji (*Kurmanca, Kurmançi* or *Kurmanci*), of which speakers forms the largest Kurdish groups in Turkey), has four significant regional accents that are spoken in Turkey: *Hakkari*, around the province of Hakkari; *Botanî*, around Botan, *Aşitayî* and *Beyazîdî*, around the provinces of Ağrı and Doğubeyazıt.

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<sup>160</sup> See İremet (1996) and Selcan (1994).

<sup>161</sup> The numbers of Zaza speakers were added to the Kurdish population data in table in Appendix 2.

Soranî, also called southern Kurdish, is spoken around Soran region. Kerkuk, Erbil, Süleymaniya and Haneqîn in Irak, and Mahabad and Senandaj (Sine) in Iran are where Soranî speakers mostly reside. Soranî is also known as *Baba Kurdî* or *Sitêmani*.

Goranî is a dialect of Kurdish mainly spoken in a limited area around southern Iranian and Iraçî Kurdistan. Demir notes that many tribes switched to Soranî from Goranî in the province of Kermanshah. Two widely used accents are Hewremanî (around Halepçe, Mervan and Pawe) and Lekî.

Lastly, Zazakî, also known as *Dumilî*, *Dimilî*, *Kirdki* or *Zazaca*, is spoken around Tunceli, Bingöl and in some provinces of Elazığ and Diyarbakır. Goranî and Zazakî are closely related in linguistic terms. *Kırmançki* or *Kırmanca*, as it is asked in the 1965 census, is known as Northern Zazakî.

It is worth to underline that the names of these dialects are subject to change from one region to another, and different linguistic communities define their and others' varieties in different terms. Religion is also an important classifier in naming others, since the Kurdish population is divided into two major Islamic sects: Alevi and Sunni.

Such a diversity of varieties of Kurdish and the disagreement on their classification, without any doubt, is a consequence of a lack of a central political power that would utilize Kurdish as the language of a polity. The political pressures on Kurds, and therefore their language, inevitably ended in the absence of reliable linguistic studies on Kurdish. The categorizations of the Kurdish varieties are rarely more than derivations from ethnographic guesses and personal experiences and observations about a population that is highly mobile, both socially and geographically.

Concerning the official reaction to Kurdish and its variants in Turkey, there are chiefly two distinct attitudes. One of them, as noted above, is denial: Kurdish has never been an authentic language. It is either a distorted form of Turkish or Persian, or just a tribal tongue that does not deserve to be classified as a proper language. It is worth to note that the emphasis on the distortedness which can be considered as a result of the republican understanding that holds that Kurds are inferior to Turks.

After the 1980 coup d'état, an old story revived about the Turkishness of Kurds. In the universities, studies that "prove" the Turkish origins of Kurds and their publications came one after another. Book titles included "*Doğu Anadolu'nun Türklüğü*" (Eröz, 1982), "*Türkistanlı Bir Türk Boyu: Kürtler*" (Taneri, 1983), "*İki Türk*

*Boyu: Zaza ve Kurmancılar*” (Başbuğ, 1984), “*Kürt Türklerinin Gerçeği*” (Giritli, 1989), and “*Doğu Anadolu Osmanlıcası: Etimolojik Sözlük Denemesi*” (Gülensoy, 1986).

A consequential approach is that Kurdish is not a modern or sufficient language to produce culture. Bedrettin Dalan, former mayor of Istanbul and the present head of the board of trustees of Yeditepe University, Istanbul, stated in an interview for *Zaman*, a daily newspaper, that Kurdish is no language:

“Kurdish has no more than 600 words. They introduce the Persian they speak as Kurdish. There is no such language... [in response to Yaşar Kemal who declared that there are 100,000 words in Kurdish] ... forget the one hundred thousand words, forget even fifty-thousand, write me a novel with thirty thousand words. I will undertake the publication and the distribution of the book. If any thirty people read and understand the book, I will apologize from you before everyone.”<sup>162</sup>

Not surprisingly, Dalan’s claims sparked off widespread debates on the adequacy of Kurdish.

The second attitude towards Kurdish has been the overemphasis on the dialectical diversity of the language. This approach is, certainly in close relationship with the first one above. This was best exemplified in the choice of languages for broadcasting in 2004.

When the State felt obliged to start broadcasting in minority languages in 2004, in line with the EU harmonization programs, five “languages that are spoken by Turkish citizens in their daily lives” were designated: Arabic, Bosnian and Circassian, Kurmanji and Zazaki. At the time, TRT asked statistical information about the linguistic minorities from *Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü* (State Institute of Statistics, DİE henceforth), and the data that was sent to TRT as a response was the results of the census of 1965. TRT declared that the design of language allocation was based on scientific evidence.<sup>163</sup>

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<sup>162</sup> “30 bin kelimelelik bir Kürtçe roman yaz bastırması benden”, *Zaman*, May 18 (2003)

<sup>163</sup> “Lehçelerde nüfus savaşı”, *Yeni Şafak*, October 25 (2004). The newspaper headline is in line with the tradition of underestimation of the minority languages in Turkey.

It seems like the ratio of population who spoke other than Turkish according to the data of censuses remains more or less the same, between 12 and 15 percent. Latest researches conclude similar numbers.

Koç, Hancıoğlu, & Çavlin (2008) in their research compiled the various studies on minority populations based on ethnic identity or language and came up with the following numbers, in the Table 4.

<b>Language/Ethnic group</b>	<b>1935</b>	<b>1965</b>	<b>1990</b>	<b>1992</b>	<b>1993</b>	<b>1998</b>	<b>2003</b>
Turks	89.2	90.1	-	85.8	82.7	83.2	82.6
Kurds	9.2	7.6	12.6	12.4	13.0	14.4	14.5
Arabs	1.0	1.2	-	1.4	1.7	1.9	1.9
Other	0.6	1.1	-	0.4	2.6	0.5	1.0

**Table 4** – Percent distribution of language/ethnic groups in Turkey

Another frequently referred research is a worldwide project of linguistic data called *Ethnologue*. Detailed information on the project and their information on the current situation of the languages of Turkey are presented as Appendix 3. The figures of *Ethnologue* are also compiled from various resources, and they display another example of the linguistic diversity in Turkey. According to *Ethnologue*, the largest linguistic minorities in Turkey are the speakers of Kurdish, Dimli (Zazaki), Arabic, Bulgarian and Adgyhe (Circassian), in order.

The relative increase in the ratios of minority languages with respect to the overall population is makes the success of the language regime in Turkey questionable. Why, despite all the legal regulations, has the target of a linguistically homogenous society not been accomplished?

Before proposing answers to this question, some remarks are needed.

To begin with, the language regime seems to achieve the eradication of the minor linguistic groups. Göksel notes that “[f]or most of the languages with less than 30,000 speakers, the population is over 50 years of age.” (2006, p. 160). The background story without doubt is based on the forced or voluntary migrations of the Greek, Armenian and Jewish communities out of the country. Therefore, the language regime seemed to work in accord with the general minority policies or the political regime that aimed at

the cultural homogenization of the nation. However, it seems like it only worked on the non-Muslim elements of the society. The two major linguistic groups that remained, Kurds and Arabs are Muslim, although there are denominational differences.

There are two main reasons behind the failed leveling of linguistic differences.

First, although the Turkish modernization project assumably prioritized the withdrawal of the religion into the private spheres and its exclusion from the public and political domains, there is enough evidence to accept that religion has been a major instrument of the nation building process. As presented above in the discussion of the Population Exchange of 1923, religion has always been seen as an absolute dimension of the Turkish national identity. Even though the republican constitutions maintained that the association to the State of Turkey through the bond of citizenship defines Turkishness, it was clear that the non-Muslim were not considered as Turks.

Second, the regional differences in educational and economic opportunities have been considerably high. From the very first years of the Republic, the schooling rates were relatively low in the regions, where most of the Kurdish population resided. Enrolment for the primary schools in 1930s was at the lowest percentage in the eastern and southeastern regions with respect to national figures; between 7.3 and 18.5 percentage, respectively. Similarly, those provinces produced with the lowest ratios in the country of the adults becoming literate in *Millet Mektepleri* between the years 1928 and 1935 the percentage of 2.4 and 5.8, respectively (Webster, 1939, p. 222). McDowall reports that by 1925 “only 215 of 4875 schools in Turkey were located in Kurdistan, providing education for 8400 pupils out of Turkey’s 382.000 enrolled” (McDowall, 1997, p. 192).

The figures above prove that the relative lack of institutions of modernity, such as educational network, is an inheritance of the Ottoman Empire to the new Republic. The nomadic and patriarchal culture of most of the Kurdish population at the time was also a reason. While there were many Kurds who were not settled and pursuing a pastoral-nomadism, a considerable number of them have been located in rather small residential areas such as minor villages, where the land is arable, a rarity in mountainous sections of the region. On the other, patriarchal ideologies, as in the other sections of the country, keeps girls away from schools and many of them are married in their early adolescence. It should be emphasized here that patriarchal exclusion of girls from

schooling is by no means a property of the Kurdish population but has been experienced by many girls in the society, by and large.

However, the republican political of integration could not eliminate the regional and gender differences after several decades of assimilation efforts.

In 1945, the census results were also reflecting the relationship between the mother language and literacy. At that year, the findings were that 11 percent of the Arabic speaking population was literate in Turkish (Dündar F. , 1999, p. 79), while the figures for Kurdish speakers are 9.8 percent for men and 0.9 for women (p. 106).

In 1950, only 8.6 percent of the Kurdish speaking population (covering all three defined groups of Kurmancji, *Kırdaşça* and Zazaki speakers) is literate in Turkish, where the rates of schooling among girls is one fourth of the boys' (p. 108).

One of the latest researches<sup>164</sup> found out that most of those who are at the bottom of the income distribution are Kurds. In accord, the income distribution in these two regions is remarkably different from other regions. In the Eastern Anatolia, 32.9 percent of the population is in the poorest section of income, out of five sections. The second section included almost half of the eastern citizens: 44.3 percent. The figures show that the citizens who live in the Southeastern Anatolia are more unfortunate, where 44.73 percent of the population is in the poorest section and 39,1 of them are in the second section, which in total makes up the almost 85 percent of all the southeastern region.

The same research concluded that the residents of the eastern and southeastern regions still have the lowest levels of schooling. They have the highest rates of illiteracy with 14.53 and 22.81, respectively. Only 5.67 of the Eastern Anatolian population could access university education and 4.59 of the Southeastern population. All figures are lower than the average of the country.

Therefore, the persistency of linguistic characteristics in the Kurdish and Arabic population is more related with the exclusion of their regions from the nation-wide education systems and the way schooling was conceived among the population rather than their ethno-political resistance. It is true that recently, especially the Kurdish population experienced a high level of politicization and the ethnic claim has risen considerably. Many members of the younger generation among the Kurds are interested

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<sup>164</sup> “Biz Kimiz? – 2”, *Milliyet*, March 20 (2007).



in learning Kurdish, even though they have not learnt it from their parents in their childhoods.

At this point, the presentation of the Turkish history of language regime is concluded. In this chapter, three major parts of this history were given. First, the Ottoman heritage of the language policies and the Turkish language was summarized. Secondly, a legal chronicle of the various milestones of the establishment of the Turkish language regime was displayed in detail. Lastly, a short outline of the linguistic map of the country was laid out with figures from censuses and researches.

The next chapter is devoted to a case study, of which analysis, it is expected, will explicate the dynamics of the transformation of the language regime and the way it was subverted.

## **CHAPTER 6**

### **CHANGING LANGUAGE REGIMES**

The language regime in Turkey faced important challenges in the post-1980 era. In the previous chapters, it has been presented how language was articulated into the comprehensive modernization project of the Republic. One of the pillars of this project was to eliminate any possibilities of cultural diversity and to build a Turkish nation with a homogenous culture. Language has been conceived as a vital dimension of this cultural transformation. Through various legal regulations and practices, the attempt has been to ensure the status of Turkish language both as the officially recognized and legitimized medium of communication and as the expression of the projected cultural unity. However, as noted in the last section of the previous chapter where census results concerning the languages spoken in Turkey have been evaluated, there have been also significant failures in the linguistic assimilation process, especially among the citizens of Kurdish origins.

After the 1980 coup d'état, Turkey has experienced three basic transformations concerning the political and cultural domains. First, Turkey has become more integrated into the global economic movements and the idea of a protected and territorial economy has considerably changed. Second, related to the inclusion of Turkey into the globalizing economy, the domains, over which the state claimed exclusive authority before, rapidly have become commercialized. The state's monopoly of the control and instrumentalization of the cultural spheres has ended; the due result has been the change in the ideological functions of these domains that shifted from guiding and assisting the overall cultural transformation of the nation towards the exploitation of those very domains with the primary motivation of profit maximization. And third, the official

discourse of the “unity of the state with its nation” has been undermined by the politicization of the Kurdish identity and due armed insurgencies.

These major changes in the political, economical and social conditions, all-Turkish language regime has had to confront many challenges, both from above with the pressure of English, and from below with the increasing demands for rights of minority languages, especially of Kurdish. Legal re-arrangements in the areas such as broadcasting were among the adjustments of the language regime to settle down these chief challenges.

To explain the dynamics of the changes in the regime of languages, the following chapter will concentrate on a representative case study: the controversies that have focused on the problem of radio and television broadcasting in Kurdish.

In the sections below, the theoretical implications of broadcasting with respect to the construction, maintenance and the subversion of language regimes, and the Turkish story of broadcasting regarding its relationship with languages will be reviewed in an interwoven fashion.

## **6.1 Broadcasting as a Major Domain of a Language Regime**

The choice of “Kurdish broadcasting” as the case study is generated by the overall problematic of the dissertation. As it is intended to present and explain the ways in which Turkish language regime has been contradicted by local and global developments, it is assumed as reasonable to explore the challenges in an area such as broadcasting, in which these contradictions are most evident. As it will be laid out in detail below, various domains of broadcasting have always been critical spaces of action for the Turkish language regime.

National identities are mostly considered as the constructs of modernity, of which specific institutions, ideologies and processes have constituted their very existence.<sup>165</sup> The cultural integration of masses, which had previously defined themselves through traditional local distinctions of language and religion, became a possibility only during the modern age. Self-imagination of individuals as the members of a transcendental national community means sharing common cultural and political values. Language has been one of the primary dimensions of this development of identification of the self with the larger group. Several developments of modernity proved to be decisive in facilitating the formation of shared standard languages, which substituted the religious *lingua franca* of the elites and other local varieties.

The formation of the modern states, bureaucratic centralization of political power and the practices of citizenship created official languages, which linguistically linked up the subjects with the body politic. Printing and mounting literacy, the ubiquity of text based on the circulation of information, and the establishment of nation-wide educational systems spread the official version of the language among the population within the territory. The result was the valuation of the official languages, their extensive use and devaluation of the excluded linguistic varieties, which turned into *patois*, dialects and accents in comparison to the authorized version.

As it is the case with any identity, national identity can only prove persistent in time with a persistent process of reproduction. Citizens' renegotiation of their identities is therefore important to be kept within the limits of the national ethos. This is enabled by the profound power networks of the nation-state of which legitimacy is based on the consent of those who consider themselves as part of a nation. In this sense, the nation-

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<sup>165</sup> The debates on whether nationalism is an exclusively modern phenomenon or not, and whether the nation is imagined or real, have been distinctively favorite subjects among historians and social scientists. For an illustrative discussion on the issue, by two proponents of different views on the subject, Ernest Gellner and Anthony D. Smith, see what is widely known as the Warwick Debates (Gellner & Smith, 1996). For an intensive introduction on the theories of nationalism see Steger (2000) and for comprehensive reviews of these theories see Anthony D. Smith (1998) and Özkırmılı (2000). The view subscribed to in this thesis, it is assumed to be clear by now, stands close to what is commonly labeled as "the modernist perspective" which holds that nationalism, and therefore national identity have only become possible to emerge and operate within the conditions of modernity.

states paid particular attention to reproduce the cultural vitality and dynamics of the national language. The technological novelties of 20<sup>th</sup> century, radio and television have been regarded as fresh forces to be utilized in this reproduction process.

Edensor, while being persuaded by Benedict Anderson's idea of nation as an imagined community and acknowledging the historical importance of print, criticizes Anderson for his overemphasis on the textual reproduction of the nation as it "effaces the spatial, material and embodied production of identities" (Edensor, 2002, p. 7). For Edensor, Anderson's concentration on text induces a reductive view of culture. He argues that other means of cultural reproduction, such as popular music, theatre, festivals, architectural spaces of congregation, and other embodied habits and performances are as effective. Referring to Barker, Edensor underlines that there is hardly any medium with widespread influence as television, which addresses one in his/her living room as part of a nation and situates him/her "in the rhythms of a national calendar" (Barker, 1999, pp. 5-6; cited in Edensor, 2002, p. 7).

Especially in Europe, public service broadcasters (PSBs, henceforth) took the lead in using the opportunities that are produced by the new channels of information flow. Van den Bulck and Van Poecke emphasize the role played by the PSBs: "Virtually all public service broadcasters (PSBs) in modern industrialized countries have contributed substantially to the creation of the ... 'imagined community'" (1996, p. 164). It should be noted that PSBs, rather than actually creating it, has contributed to the consolidation of the sense of the national communities, which appeared much before the coming of the relevant technology. However, it is important to highlight their roles in creating an audio-visual universe through which the national identity has been reproduced. Language, then, once more plays the vital role in the formation of these domains and it achieves a magnified strength in defining the boundaries of communities. The new function of language is now added to its previous utilizations in the formation of the national identity through education, official uses and the creation of textual/national domains.

These audio-spaces also reinforce the power relations pertaining to the uses of varieties of the languages. Official languages' hegemonic positions with respect to other dialects or languages have been intensified. In connection, the prestige that has been attached to the official language about its production and support of social relations of

modernity similarly aggregated. The reification of the invention of the national language, hence, is furthered through the operations of the audio-visual space, which prioritizes that language. Moreover, the legitimacy of the national universe, with its political and social organization becomes more plausible. The sense of “us”, and its implications, of partaking within the same communicational context, therefore, is similarly, empowered. Scannell, for example, refers to the British PSBs in the same line. She underlines that the British state defined the radio broadcasting as a public and national service, of which ultimate target was to create a homogenous time and space that would bind masses into a nation (Scannell, 1990, p. 14; quoted in Ahiska, 2005, p. 3173).

Spitulnik associates the power of the mass media with their high visibility and their inherent publicizing functions. She states, “mass media are a particularly volatile domain for ... battles over representation” (1998, p. 165). Besides, she marks the indexical factor in mass media’s using a particular variety of language with respect to the linguistic power relations:

“As mass media build the communicative space of the nation-state, all of a nation’s language, dialects and language varieties and the speech communities associated with them are *automatically* drawn into relations with one other... In semiotic terms, what this means is that there is an indexical component of the use of a language or a speech variety, which extends beyond the indexing of a social group associated with the code: the code chosen indexes the code not chosen.” (sic., Spitulnik, 1998, pp. 165-166).

The linguistic multiplicities within political territories have been re-ordered with the becoming of the nation-state. In general, one particular variety, mostly that of the elite classes, groups or the culture that had played a more decisive role in the nation-building process, has been sorted as the prime medium of communication. Other varieties and languages have been relatedly excluded from the public sphere.<sup>166</sup>

Spitulnik introduces the notion of “language valuation” in this process of language choice and draws attention the language ideological dimensions that are

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<sup>166</sup> See Chapter 2 for the discussion of the theoretical implications of (Bourdieu’s) symbolic power generated by the political unification of one variety of a language and the comparative devaluations of the others.

inherent to it, as it has been already noted above. The ways the languages of the national community are treated and the linguistic hierarchy that has been reproduced by mass media is critical in understanding how the linguistic ideology of nation-state is running. For Spitulnik “broadcasting must be seen as both a *source* and a *result* of language evaluations” (sic., 1998, p. 175) as broadcasting “gives a fixity and legitimacy to certain language valuations” (p. 182). It is not only that the evaluation of languages is made through their use, and non-use of others thereof, in mass media. In addition, social valuation of the communities speaking those languages is also classified.

The states’ power in organizing the linguistic control and discipline, as a productive power to categorize and subjectify in Foucauldian terms, is evident in the ownership and through the functions of the broadcasting institutions. PSBs were designed to

“serve the audiences and social institutions within the national territory, center-peripheral in form of organization, expected to protect national language and culture and (however implicitly) to represent the national interest. As an aspect of their national character, broadcasting institutions were usually monopolistic or quasi-monopolistic in their form of control” (McQuail, Rosario de, & Tapper, 1992, p. 9; cited in Van den Bulck & Van Poecke, 1996, p. 164).

The instrumental political rationality of the nation-state takes every opportunity to enforce its justification as the sole center of political power, and so was the case with radio and television. Both were made nationwide educational devices “contributing to the development of a national identity and culture, which carried a threefold responsibility; education (to support the national education system), information (to create political consciousness), and entertainment (to articulate a national culture)” (Desaulniers, 1985; cited in Van den Bulck & Van Poecke, 1996, p. 164). The pedagogical function assigned to radio and television, especially of public broadcasting agencies, undertook the business of transmission of the “proper” language to the whole nation that would be “educated, emancipated, and liberated from their backwardness, their vulgar pleasures, and, indeed, their linguistic poverty” (Van den Bulck & Van Poecke, 1996, p. 164)”

### **6.1.1 Broadcasting and Language in the Republican Turkey**

Although an apparent political project of Turkish nationalism could not be located before the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century (Heper, 2007, p. 4), the ideological contestations during its development had been quite dense. Language debate, as it has been a virtually universal phenomenon for all nationalisms, has also been one of the primary subjects of the intellectuals of Turkish nationalism. The nationalist writers and activists, who were extremely influential during the birth of Turkism, were in favor of a simplified language that would help to connect the elites and the folk. Having in mind Benedict Anderson's theory of the formation of nations as modern national "imagined communities" (Anderson, 1991); the primary source for the insistence on a simplified, easy-to-understand language should be assigned to the development of a public sphere with an increasing number of newspapers, journals, books and their readers and writers. The republican founders further rejected the Ottoman legacy of multiculturalism, in favor of a hegemonic Turkification of the population. Consequently, the demands for simplification turned into the attempts to create a purely Turkish language. The grammatical and lexical purification was accompanied by the change of the alphabet to Latin, from the Ottoman Arabic script that was deemed as alien to the Turkish language with its phonology and as an obstacle with its Eastern and Islamic references against the development of the new, modern Turkish national culture.

The republican Turkish state, on the one hand, aimed at establishing a state of mind that was found necessary for a new and secular re-start with the reforms, like the new calendar, besides others. On the other hand, it had a strong belief that general and national education in "new Turkish" would enhance "the possibility of shaping, molding and steering the society into the ranks of western European nations" (Öncü, 2000, p. 299) and eliminating two major "others", Islamicist politics and Kurdish nationalism.

Apart from assumed purity, the ambitious intervention in language institutionalized "new Turkish" as opposed to what had been called "old Turkish". Various practices of the State offices, works of republican men of letters, and especially the state radio were effective in the generalization of this new variant. As Öncü remarks (ibid.), in a very short period, what has been labeled as Ottoman Turkish turned out to



be a property of “old people”. The *ancien regime*, an object of total rejection by the republican modernization, hence, gained another representative among others: the old language, which symbolized traditionalism and conservatism. In an era when using the “new language” was an appropriate marker of being modern, the use of the “old” version was deemed as a resistance to the secular/nationalist symbolic system, which had been under construction.<sup>167</sup>

Radio, and later on, television has been considered instrumentally as efficient ways of consolidating the monolingual cultural universe. Radio broadcasts were indeed more effective since their reception did not require literacy, and they could reach far beyond where the textual and institutional materials of linguistic uniformity could access. Radio was especially an important novelty in an illiterate society that was ruled with an enthusiasm for political and cultural transformation. Establishment of a state-driven and controlled public sphere is crucial in the massive project of teaching the “new” Turkish.<sup>168</sup>

Until 1938, when the Ankara Radio was officially launched, the radio has been mostly broadcasting music. The folk songs that were collected from all over the country were processed in the radio and many Kurdish and Armenian songs were sung with Turkish lyrics. Ahıska identifies this process as the disembodiment of the songs off their time and space, which were actually their constituents (2005, p. 140). The disembodiment of local cultures was accompanied by their re-embodiment as Turkish cultural expressions. What was decisive in this transformation was, unsurprisingly, the language of Turkish. In that way, Turkish language was not only imposed upon those

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<sup>167</sup> A memory from an iconic name from the first Republican generations, Muazzez İlmiye Çığ, supports Öncü’s comment. Çığ recalls an incident when she was at the Faculty of Language, History and Geography (Dil Tarih Coğrafya Fakültesi, of Ankara University) in mid-1930s. “Hasan Âli Yücel was an inspector at the time, and he was by coincidence at the university. I was studying in a room, alone. Old Turkish was on the blackboard; we knew it and used it for it was easy to take notes. He came over and checked my work; he saw that I was writing in the old Turkish. He got furious, and asked, “How old are you? How come you use this old writing?” I said, very frightened, “Since it is quicker, sir...” (my translation, Rıza & Sakızlı, 2005, p. 129).

<sup>168</sup> Meltem Ahıska’s work “*Radyonun Sihirli Kapısı*” (2005), with its emphasis on the ways of production of social power in the first decades of the Republic, is an important source in this field.

who do not speak it, it simultaneously produces new realities: new Turkish songs, as part of the Turkish folk culture. This aspect of language as power is already assessed by Bourdieu, where he emphasized the symbolic power of language, one that constructs realities (see Chapter 2 for the discussion).

After 1938, verbal programs increased in number, due to the advancement of technology in the premises of the studios in Ankara. Ahıska explains the change as that the “singing box” has turned into a “speaking box” (p. 210). As speeches were more frequently aired, the functional value of the language similarly arose. The general manager of the Ankara Radio, Vedat Nedim Tör explained that the aim of the programs was to give the most beautiful examples of Turkish, in both pronunciation and in *inşad* (aesthetics of reading and speaking) (ibid.).

Equally, in the same line, İsmail Hakkı Baltacıoğlu, a professor of pedagogy and a deputy of Afyon in 1945, declared in a discussion in the National Assembly on radio broadcasts that:

“The purpose of the radio is that the beauty of our sound, of Turkish, the beauty of our feelings are presented by the State, and to nationalize each of them.” (cited in Ahıska, 2005, p. 337).

It is clear in these quotations the authorities’ belief in the power of radio as a mediator between a society to be educated, and a state as the educator.

In time, however, the projected cultural progress of the masses could not be realized. Class and regional inequalities in accessing to opportunities of education and cultural products, reconstructed the critical role of the language in various social stratifications, now for the “new” Turkish. Once again, mass culture and the universe of the elites were distinguished by different accents and uses of the language, this time with respect to the indexical reference point of officialized, standard Turkish. Here is relevant another point that Öncü observes for this development. She comments that the strict distinction between the “high” and “low” versions of Turkish language represents itself in two ways in a country where the majority of the population is semi-literate: This distinction, on the one hand lays on the cultural fault lines between different social strata. On the other hand, it also functions as a critical mechanism that enables the construction and the maintenance of a culture of officialism, which dissociates the State

from the rest of the society (Öncü, 2000, p. 300). Öncü underlines the complicated ways in which different uses of the language, vocabulary choices and accentual variations have become intrinsic to power relations in Turkey.

Right at this stage Öncü also warns the reader against a misunderstanding: the boundaries between “old” and “new” or “high” and “low” Turkishes are not fixed but are rather quite dynamic, that these categories are constantly remade with respect to time and context within which the conflicts in the political sphere are transformed. She continues; “at the core of this process is the national state itself which simultaneously defines and monitors the canons of “*düzgün, güzel Türkçe*” (correct and beautiful Turkish) through a complex maze of institutions and practices” (ibid.).

Turkish Radio Television (TRT) has had a special position within these institutions that monitor the “correct and beautiful” Turkish.<sup>169</sup> The language used by TRT has mostly been both the “new” and the “high” Turkish, although governments attempted to alter the limits of language employed from time to time. TRT spoke through carefully written texts of Turkish, as it had the self-assigned mission of the construction of the voice of national unity, addressing to the nation, in the name of the nation.<sup>170</sup> TRT has had another mission of transferring modernity to uneducated masses, hence its “correct and beautiful Turkish” has always been at the core of this transmission as the carrier of modernity itself.<sup>171</sup> According to Öncü, the rare exceptions were the speech styles of peasant Turks, cleansed of strong accents, and utilized in a number of entertainment or instructive programs. Those excluded were the diversity of speech styles that were under development at the outskirts of metropolitan cities, and

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<sup>169</sup> TRT was established as an autonomous public broadcasting company, with the Law no. 359, right after 1961 Constitution was prepared, and reconfigured the public audio-visual service. However, after the 1971 military memorandum, the institution's autonomy was overruled, once again, with a change in its law.

<sup>170</sup> “Using a comprehensible, correct, clean and beautiful Turkish” in the TRT programs was a condition ruled by the TRT Law of the 1980 coup, in its Article 5 that regulated the “General Principles of Broadcasting”.

<sup>171</sup> A former TRT employee, Aysel Aziz clearly underlines this aspect of education: “Television was not considered as an apparatus of entertainment but as a mass-medium for delivering news, education and culture. This issue was a reflection of the dominant mentality of the manager and producers of the time” (Aziz, 1999, p. 28)

local languages other than Turkish (p. 302-303). The state was painstakingly selective in deciding what could be heard by the nation.

As it was stated in the previous chapter on the formation and the maintenance of Turkish language regime, TRT has been a battleground for competing political ideologies. The governments considered the Institution as a base to be conquered and each imposed their understanding of Turkish. The battle between *Öztürkçe* and *yaşayan Türkçe*, was not fought over the basic premises of the language regime, which basically legitimized Turkish over other languages of Turkey. It was more a war of different cultural and political networks. What they could not agree on was the legitimate variety of Turkish in general and the vocabulary in particular. This conflict was reflected on the linguistic policies of TRT as to prioritize “new” or “old” language under the rule of different governments. A similar intervention to broadcasting language policy was the 1985 regulation on banned words (see above).

In the 1990s, language politics of the audio-visual domain would get incomparably complicated.

## 6.2 Changing Nature of Broadcasting

Second of the reasons for the choice of “the language policies in broadcasting” as the primary case study of this thesis is that the issue emerges as a reflection of global patterns in the Turkish locality. In connection with the worldwide ubiquity of the strain on the national language regimes generated by English and the minority languages, themes of English and Kurdish in Turkey turn out to be local cases of a global problematic. There are global and local transformations at stake, such as the globalization of capitalist economics of consumption, decolonization, forced or voluntary labor migrations, and transnational mass media, etc., that makes the language issue more complicated to be resolved in traditional frameworks of the national linguistic regimes (Safran, 2004, p. 13).

The nation-states’ public broadcasting policies that favored the official languages and their dominant status has been fractured by two simultaneous processes: (a)

commodification and commercialization of culture with respect to post-fordist economics (Van den Bulck & Van Poecke, 1996, p. 176), and (b) by the empowerment of the minorities who were long denied, assimilated or excluded by the nationalist politics. This section reviews the first of these developments that effected the changes in language regimes in broadcasting: the commercialization of mass media institutions. The next section (Section 6.3) deals with the rising ideological climate within which broadcasting in minority languages has become legitimate.

### **6.2.1 Post-Fordist Economics of Broadcasting**

Van den Bulck & Van Poecke (1996) elaborates on the formation of a post-fordist postmodern culture where languages lose their criticality in the representation/demarcation of clearly defined identities. This modification is reflected in the changing language policies of the PSBs. They argue that PSBs have been affected by a process of informalization, which points out the shift from a rigid categorization and valuation of language varieties to a more flexible positioning with respect to linguistic variations. They maintain that the increasing flexibility of broadcasting language policies in accommodating minority languages or varieties of the official language is a result of the flexible nature of the post-fordist economics of culture.

In relation to their assessment of the PSBs with respect to the transformation of modernity, Van den Bulck & Van Poecke state “[t]he original setup of the PSBs fitted the modernist organization of the society... both the nation-building project and the paternalistic ethos can be seen as elements of the sharp boundary maintenance and framing of visible pedagogy, or socialization.” (1996, p. 175). While the previous mission of the public service broadcasts was to educate and “to give the population what they need”, as the first director-general of BBC, Lord Reith stated (*ibid.*), the new trend is to present what is likely to be shaped by the entertainment market. “As a result, the national character of the public service broadcasting is threatened.” (Van den Bulck & Van Poecke, 1996, p. 176). Recently, the audience is assumed to be getting what they want.

With the possibilities brought about by the information technologies that enable global broadcasting, the framework, within which the radio and television channels have been operated, has exceeded national boundaries. Broadcasting increasingly became a subdivision of the global economy, which has facilitated the international trading of audio-visual commodities.

The expansion of the commodification is not confined to geographical diffusion of the global capital into the economical territories of nation-states, which had been long protected. Within post-modern capitalism, which has been also conceptualized as the post-fordist economy (see Harvey, 1997), there appeared the commodification of new spheres, previously out of the production relations. With respect to the further commercialization, audio-visual entertainment and delivery of information became vast fields to be exploited for profit.

### **6.2.2 The Privatization of the Audio-Visual Universe in Turkey**

The year 1980 may be assigned as a turning point in Turkey in many aspects, from politics to culture, as the coup d'état and due policies of the military government transformed the way the political and the social spheres were organized. Two important consequences of the post-1980 period were the expansion of the civil society and its transformation of its relationship with the political sphere<sup>172</sup>, and the capitalization of domains that were previously regarded as the domains of the State.

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<sup>172</sup> For a concise history of the civil society movements in Turkey, see Yerasimos (2001).

The explosion of the number of audio-visual mass media corporations and of their due effect had been another critical consequence of the post-80s social reconstruction.<sup>173</sup> In the first years of 1990s, broadcasting of private television and radio channels began. After a short period of their prohibition and a succeeding popular protest, the broadcasts were decriminalized and regulated by law. This was an official end to the monopoly of the State on one of the significant sites of cultural production.<sup>174</sup> This process is associated with the integration of the Turkish economy to the global markets of consumerism. The integration has been accompanied by rapidly penetrating patterns of cultural commodities. Relatedly, the perception of broadcasting has radically changed. In the times of the monopoly of TRT broadcasting was conceived as a public service (and mission), but with the privatization of the domains of radio and television this was substituted by an understanding of broadcasting as a consumer-oriented commodity. Accordingly, the audience, once-conceived as the recipients, hence the objects of modernizing projects and as the mass of citizens to be educated, were substituted by an audience who are now became subjects through the culture of consumption. With the remote controls in their hands, now the consumers could be in charge of their preferences of what to watch and what to listen.

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<sup>173</sup> As of February, 2007, the following figures have been found with respect to channels licensed by RTÜK: 22 national TV channels, 36 national radio channels, 16 regional TV channels, 100 regional radio channels, 215 local TV channels, and 958 local radio channels (data compiled from RTÜK's web site at <http://www.rtuk.org.tr> on February 6, 2007).

With respect to the reception of broadcasts, in Turkey, there are 54 channels accessed via Kablo TV by Turksat, which has 1.187.960 subscribers in 21 cities (information compiled on February 6, 2007 from <http://www.turksat.com.tr>). There are 140 channels on broadcast via Digiturk, a major digital satellite network, with over one million subscribers (compiled on February 6, 2007 from <http://www.digiturk.com.tr>). Besides, there were more than 6 million households in Turkey, who could access to satellite broadcasts with hundreds of channels from all around the world in 2006 (*Hürriyet*, May 30, 2006). As of September 2007, more than 50 percent of the accesses to TV broadcasts were through satellite receivers. ("Televizyon uydudan izleniyor", *Birgün*, September 12 (2007)).

<sup>174</sup> Surely, this expansion did not mean an end to the *attempts* of the State to control the cultural. As it will be explored below, through several institutions and regulations, the State still resists and it is still persistent on its authority over social discipline.

Besides their wide-ranged social and cultural outcomes, the multiplication of mass media has also changed the way the language issue is assessed. Parallel to the geometric increase in the effects of mass media in socialization, language became more central in battles of ideologies and conflicts of political-cultural identities.

The regulation of private channels was legalized on April 13, 1994 by *Radyo ve Televizyonların Kuruluş ve Yayınlar Hakkında Kanun* (the Law on the Establishment and Broadcasting of Radio and Televisions). The law also decreed on the foundation of an overarching institution called RTÜK (*Radyo ve Televizyon Üst Kurulu*, Supreme Board of Radio and Television). The broadcasting language was set exclusively as Turkish, with a solid emphasis on that broadcasts would facilitate its development.<sup>175</sup> However, the rule was not to become the reality.

Television became more and more effective on the use of language, after the State lost its control over the linguistic geography of the audio-visual sphere. Television broadcasting, by producing and presenting the seductive forms of visuality, became increasingly influential on cultural socialization in Turkey, where functional literacy is relatively rather low (Öncü, 2000, p. 300).<sup>176</sup> The rate of possession of a TV set is more than 97 percent in the country, where newspaper and book sales are comparatively low (Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü, 2005).

As television intruded into a greater part of daily life, so grew the debates that focused on the relationship between language and the way broadcasting is practiced. This multi-dimensional debate has participants from both official departments and the civil society. On the one hand, there are public institutions of which policies are directly determined by the government, such as RTÜK, which has sanctioned for many times the “wrong” uses of Turkish language on television and radio. Besides TDK is still considered as an authority, and the representatives of the institutions frequently

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<sup>175</sup> See above for the Article and a review of the regulation.

<sup>176</sup> A definition of functional literacy explains the concept as “the literacy that would enable the individual to acquire the necessary information and abilities for success in all activities of life, in other words habit of reading” (my translation, Yılmaz B. , 1993, p. 25). According to a research that Öncü refers on the subject, in 1991, the 67.6 percent of the adult population in Turkey never reads a newspaper. The ratio rises up to 79.7 percent among women. The same research states that the corresponding data for Europe is around 14 percent, on the average (2000, p. 315).



publicize their evaluations on the issue. On the other hand, there are contestants from the civil society, like *Dil Derneği* (the Language Association), *Türkçemizi Canlandırma Derneği* (*Türkcan*, the Association for the Revival of Our Turkish), university student clubs, internet communities like *Türkçe Sevdalıları*<sup>177</sup>, writers and columnists<sup>178</sup>. This wide-ranging foundation of sensitivity on Turkish invariably maintains that the “irresponsible media” is guilty for the corruption of Turkish. Before delving into the details of the discourse of this sensitivity, two additional dimensions of the “threat” to Turkish should be briefly noted.

The only factor that challenged the presumed hegemonic status of Turkish was not the local developments. Besides, compared to the TRT period, English has been occupying increasingly and aggressively a larger space in the audio-visual universe, as it did in other realms of daily life. Within the integration process with the global economy, the cultural products of Anglo-Saxon origins have become more frequently encountered, and English appears to be the main medium of this diffusion (Büyükkantarcıoğlu, 2004, p. 40). English has become more visible by means of music, movies and TV series with Turkish subtitles, original commercials of global companies, or channels broadcasting in English via the satellite or cable networks. However, more to its increasing visibility, English is also getting more room in the areas, which have been conventionally expected to be Turkish. There is a considerable density of English use in names of channels and TV programs, and the language used in especially entertainment productions. Büyükkantarcıoğlu similarly underlines;

A sudden increase in the number of private TV channels and radio stations meant an end to the monopoly of the state-run TRT (Turkish Radio Television), which had exerted a highly controlled broadcasting policy over the country.... Commercials both on TV and in popular magazines presented new lifestyles and products with a generous use of English words

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<sup>177</sup> The internet address of the groups is <http://www.turkcesevdalilari.com>. On the World Wide Web, there are tens of similar sites dedicated to the defense of Turkish language. Most of them have their own forums where registered members can communicate on daily issues.

<sup>178</sup> See Kongar (2003) and Hepçilingirler (1998) for the compilations of their daily articles on the issue.

and brand names in order to convince people that using the advertised item meant sophistication and modern life.” (2004, p. 44).

The knowledge of English has become a more significant and displayable parameter of contemporary cultural/symbolic capital and its exhibition an ordinary business. With respect to that, the mounting weight of English over the geography of Turkish language is considered as an indicator of cultural occupation, and that it has been targeted as a major issue of nationalist/reactionist politics. A feeling of cultural nightmare strikes back; in the first Republican decades Islamic or eastern effects on language were officially renounced as they were believed to be contaminating the “pure Turkish” culture. A similar feeling recently peaks, this time because of English. The intensifying global hegemony of English now influences Turkey. In this process, national language is conceived as vital for the resistance against globalization or imperialism. The developments which bring English to the forefront in daily life, education, information technologies, and international relations are coupled with the alarming idea that “the foreign forces that are at work for destroying Turkey”, which is a politico-ideological inheritance of the demise of Ottoman Empire and a popular discourse of Turkish nationalism. The consequence is that the defense of the national language is constructed as a very critical means of political struggle against the linguistic and cultural imperialism of the West.<sup>179</sup> This type of linguistic response in

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<sup>179</sup> Oktay Sinanoğlu is an iconic example of those who wage war for the “defense” of Turkish. His countrywide university seminars, titled with the slogans of “*Sağ Sol yok! Önce bağımsızlık!*” (Neither Left nor Right! Independence First!) and “*Türkçe giderse Türkiye gider!*” (If Turkish is lost, Turkey will be lost!), has drawn many admirers among the students. His book, a collection of his articles on the subject, is titled “Bye-Bye Türkçe” and has been frequently referred as the flag of this defense (Sinanoğlu, 2000). There are many internet sites for supporting his “cause”, that are often organizing campaigns related to Turkish and hosting discussion forums (<http://www.sinanoglu.net/>, which was very active until the last couple of months and <http://www.byebeturkce.com/>, to name two of them). Discussions are not only on Turkish. Unsurprisingly, there are also heated debates on Armenian issue, terror and “treason of Turkish intellectuals” like Orhan Pamuk, as they are usual stops of Turkish nationalism recently. In passing, it should be noted that there is an astonishingly high number of grammatical and other linguistic errors in both Sinanoğlu’s books and the mentioned web sites.

opposition to globalization is also very common in other nationalisms<sup>180</sup>. English seems not to be threatening only the status of Turkish, but also its corpus. It is one of the main reasons held responsible for linguistic weakening, via the corruption of Turkish.

Recently, there is a widespread and escalating critique of how Turkish language is being polluted, corrupted or corroded, and usually this criticism aims at private television broadcasts. The concealed nostalgia for the “Turkish that was once beautifully and correctly used” does not refer to any specific moment or situation of an uncorrupted Turkish language, but only to the discursive and imaginary construct of “the” Turkish language. The assumed “golden age” sometimes recalls the times when TRT was the only audio-visual provider in the country. Beyond being a source of news and entertainment, the State’s television also bore a constructive and instructive mission, and the Turkish language was both the medium and the subject of this education. One of the favorite subjects of the authors of Turkish is the great contrast that appears when one compares the hygienic Turkish of the TRT and today’s private channels’ poor and “unruly” Turkish filled slang and words with foreign origins.

### **6.2.3 “Corruption of the Turkish Language”**

The following sub-section reviews the approaches to the issue of the effects of commercial broadcasting on the deterioration of Turkish language. The theme does not seem directly related to the subject of the subversion of language regimes in broadcasting via the increasing employment of minority languages. Nevertheless, what connects the two is that they are both part and parcel of the overall process of changing language regimes in the context of globalization (Coulmas, 2007).

There are qualitative differences between current grievances related to the corrosion of Turkish and the pre-1980 debates of language that were based mainly on “new and old” Turkish. Use of “new” or “old” Turkish was considered as a significant

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<sup>180</sup> For exemplary studies on the impact of English to the linguistic and political regimes in other countries, see Papapavlou (2001) for Cyprus and Lai and Byram (2003) for Hong Kong. For detailed works on English in Turkey see Demircan (1988) and (2006), Köksoy (2000), Büyükkantarcıoğlu (2004), and Doğançay-Aktuna and Kızıltepe (2005).

marker of ideological tendencies in the previous period. Lately, the focus of debates on Turkish shifted to the issue of erosion of the language.

Those authors who emphasize negative developments concerning the Turkish language label this tendency with notions such as corruption, pollution, contamination, wrong usage, or bad Turkish, etc. These critiques sometimes end up in warnings against the total destruction of the language. “Murdering Turkish” (Kongar, 2003, p. 13) and “slaughtering Turkish”<sup>181</sup> are common expressions in these kinds of texts. There two main objections associated with the degeneration of the language: disorderly use of Turkish, and the use of words of foreign, mostly of English, origins. Rarely, to the second objection is added the use “old” words (Hepçilingirler, 1998, pp. 34-36), as a reemerging sensitivity.

A special report was prepared by TDK for RTÜK in 2000. It was titled *Radyo ve Televizyonda Türkçe Kullanımı* (Usage of Turkish on Radio and Television). It was a well-worked compilation of criticisms of bad usage of the language on television.<sup>182</sup> The report evaluated a complete two-month monitoring of particular radio and television channels in 1999 and identified misuses were classified in detailed. In the classification, there are subtitles like grammatical, lexicological, and pronunciation “errors”. For every problem remarked, there are numerous examples from the observed programs and their correct forms are indicated, as well.

Among the motives for preparing such a report, there is an apparent continuation of the perception that television broadcasting has an educational mission. At least the report exhibits that the idea is still preserved by TDK and RTÜK. In the introduction section, it is commented that “most of the broadcasting, with respect to their content, purpose and qualities, result in the corruption of Turkish, instead of maturing the linguistic skills of the public, increasing their cultural level and motivate their

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<sup>181</sup> Fatih Karaca, the general manager of RTÜK of the time (“Türkçedeki yozlaşma tartışıldı”, *NTVMSNBC*, September 24 (2004)).

<sup>182</sup> (RTÜK, 2000). Again, in passing, the internet link on RTÜK’s web site to the file was wrongly typed as “Radyo ve TV’de Türkçe’nin Kullanımı”, with the mistaken use of apostrophe after the name of the language. This is yet another example of a careless use of Turkish by those who are apparently the most worried ones about the corruption of Turkish.

affectation for the language” (RTÜK, 2000). There are also conflicting statements. For instance, on the one hand it is stated that “there has been an intensifying wrong and arbitrary public use of language” and after a few paragraphs, it is noted that “there is an increasing public awareness of language”.<sup>183</sup> Institutions of education are especially emphasized for their failure in forming a consciousness of language.

An important observation of the report is that most of the language mistakes are made in live programs. Not very surprising indeed, especially when the growing demand and supply of live coverage are considered. Particularly in news reporting, real time and on-the-spot-coverage induce a sense of reality. Drawing the full attention of the audience to the television, live broadcasts also contribute to the public image of a news channel for its punctuality, reliability, quality reporting and its technological competency.<sup>184</sup> In the world of television, parallel to the technological advances, the growing affinity for “breaking news” and the dramatization of narrated realities facilitate high ratings. From that respect, increasing rates of daily or spontaneous talk on television is closely related to the changing dynamics of television culture and technologies. They also make it much possible for the reporter, who has to talk without a pre-written text and has to do that quickly, to divert from the assumedly standardized version of the language use.

Another process that triggered the increasing audibility of colloquial Turkish, or to enlarge the category, of non-standard varieties of the language, is the commercial production of television entertainment.

Colloquial language has been heard more and more as the consumer culture absorbed the customs and the language of the masses, or the “lower classes”. Ayşe Öncü notes in her article that cultural banalities, undisclosed in various ways by commercial broadcasting, have had a more subversive effect on language than the global flows or words of foreign origins (2000).

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<sup>183</sup> In fact, the conflict resides not on the observation but on the reality itself. As shown before, it is not rare that even the keenest critiques of “bad Turkish” make errors in their language use.

<sup>184</sup> CNN Turk’s slogan, “*İlk bilen siz olun!*”, an equivalent of CNN’s “Be first to know!”, is an example to such a tendency.

Öncü analyses Kemal Sunal movies, as the case study in this respect. She remarks that commercial television channels' hunger for "light" entertainment has oriented the broadcasts to take the common denominator of general tastes into consideration (2000, p. 304). After being banned from the state television for its "cheap art", Kemal Sunal movies has been one of the favorites of private channels in order to satisfy such hunger. In those movies, the hero is the "man of the people" with his plainness, modesty, simplicity, frankness, naïve honesty. The movies forefront a well-known conflict: the communal values of an ordinary man as opposed to the materialist individualism of the "bad guy". This ordinariness is mostly signified by Kemal Sunal's simple language. "He understands everything literally, seemingly unaware of the double meanings of language and blurts out what comes into his mind, again seemingly oblivious of social conventions" (Öncü, 2000, pp. 305-306). His answers in street slang in most of the talks in "beautiful and correct Turkish", is one of the basic elements of comedy in these movies.<sup>185</sup>

Besides the themes and the humor in Sunal's movies, they have become mostly desired commodities that increase ratings of commercial televisions. The abundance of the employment of daily language and "low" versions of speech does not demand intense mental activity and are easily understood by the uneducated or less educated. Similarly, Öncü attributes the political significance of the movies to their low-languages, or with her own words, to the "opening of the cultural world of immigrant/low-income metropolitan life, grounded in syncretic speech styles (neither "modern" new Turkish nor "traditional" peasant) to nationwide audiences." (2000, p. 306).

However, such nationwide interest in these movies has not been celebrated by linguistic authorities. RTÜK, in its report mentioned above, reacts against the "rude" versions of colloquial language: "It is observed in Turkish movies and TV series that

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<sup>185</sup> Such a controversy has been frequently referred in the history of Turkish literature. The traditional shadow theater, Karagöz and Hacivat, is a good example in which this gap in language use is represented with irony (see Bosworth, 1965a, p. 62; Dilaçar, 1962, p. 18; and Lewis G. , 2004, p. 25). For how the play was used as an ideological apparatus, delivering revolutionary messages, after the Republic was established, see Erdoğan (1998), where he presents a comprehensible account of how popular elements were utilized for ideological purposes.

there has used a lot of rude words, which are inappropriate considering the social manners. The extreme use of such words disturbs and *disgusts* the audience.” (my emphasis, RTÜK, 2000). The wording of the feeling on the speeches with slang or cursing as “disgusting” should be considered as a good example of how class or cultural conflicts are also psychologically translated. Indeed, the result of this disturbance is “beeping” of such talks by the broadcasting channels against any chance of being warned the by Council.

Although political subversion of Kemal Sunal movies has subdued in time, such language power play between colloquial and “correct” Turkish has continued to be a basic element used in other entertainment programs and TV series, especially produced for the semi-literate audiences. RTÜK’s report reflects the discontent with “wrong Turkish” by that most of the language errors exemplified in the report are taken from such TV productions.

The audio-visual spread of “low language” has also drawn attention from the critiques that lay emphasis on cultural change, though mostly in an elitist tone. Emre Kongar, for example, comments on a letter from one of his readers who criticizes calling all the automobiles as taxis: “[this] is a reflection of the provincial culture... our televisions are becoming more provincialized” (2003, p. 27).<sup>186</sup>

In another example of this reaction comes from Ersin Salman. Salman, in his speech titled *Dil Kirlenmesi ve Medya* (Language Pollution and Mass Media) explicitly blames the *varoş* (suburb) culture:

“Another socio-political element of the language pollution could be the suffocation of, not only the urban daily life, but also the culture of the city, by the suburbs. We can conclude that masses, paralyzed with cultural poverty, as well as economically, speed up the language pollution. We have to leave worries of populism aside here. The effects of many of our people

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<sup>186</sup> The original text is as follows: “*Köy kültürünün bir yansıması olarak ... televizyonlarımız köylüleşiyor.*” The emphasis on provincial, village culture and on the negative implications on provincialization is important to note. Typically urbanization and urban culture has usually been celebrated by the modernizationist elites against the provincial uneducatedness and non-modernity. This is true despite the early Republican discourse of the prioritization of the village folk as the natural and the cultural core of the nation. However, Parla notifies that the “populism” of the one-party era should not be confused with German idealization of the “*volk*” or Russian “peasant” (1995).

who learnt Turkish later on are not confined to the deterioration of the language as a means of daily communication. An indirect reason of language pollution is the concentration of the mass media on these sections of the society as customers.” (Salman, 1999, p. 312).

Salman seems to leave the worries of populism aside really for good. Without disclosing the target population, he certainly has Kurds in his mind, when he stresses because of the outskirts of urban areas and not having Turkish as a mother language, but as a second language are considered. Quite unhappy to get in touch with the “masses”, Salman evidently suffers from a long-established “provincial” invasion of the “urban”.

This anxiety of provincialization (*köylüleşmek*) is apparently induced by parallel processes of a new wave of urbanization in the 1990s and its overwhelming effect on the republican elite’s urban culture on the one hand, and the commoditization of low-classes’ culture and language, on the other hand.<sup>187</sup> The reaction to the increasing impact of the “low Turkish” might also be interpreted as an attempt to contextualize the shattering of the elite culture’s assumed priority and superiority.

The increasing visibility of different linguistic variations within the cultural sphere is mostly codified as a “cultural decline” or a “diversion of the road to the civilization”. The picture becomes more complex when the reaction against the globalizing cultural patterns, especially via the spread of English is considered. It would be a plausible argument to underline that Turkey’s elite culture is currently experiencing an identity crisis in opposition to (or between) local plebianism and global cultural dynamics. It is observable that the way to soothe the anxiety initiated by this depression in general passes through a particular reactionism shielded by nationalism.

The RTÜK’s report contains a special sub-section titled *Yabancı Kelimelere Özenme* (Imitation of Using Foreign Words). Almost without exception, “the foreign language” is English. In fact, arguments such as “the fashion” to use English words or “imitation” of English are very common.

Beside such complaints, there is one particular perspective, which might be evaluated as contradictory to them: to assess the infusion of English into Turkish through conspiracy theories which seek an intentional plan and its perpetrators. The

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<sup>187</sup> For a research on recent waves of migrations to urban areas and due political implications, see Kurban (et.al.) (2006)



report states: “Foreign words are *injected* into the language by mass media in a very short time like an *invasion*, and the result is the corruption of the language rather than enrichment.” (my emphasis, RTÜK, 2000). The very terminology, which includes concepts like invasion, is yet another verification of the idea that culture in general and language in particular is a battlefield.

The charge of *özenmek* (imitation by affection) should be elaborated more. The idiom has, by and large, negative connotations in Turkish. It evokes imitation, flightiness or volatileness, and reminds the futile search of those who are always unable to fix their dispositions. Therefore, it is mostly coupled with being seized by the trends. When the context of our subject is taken into consideration, *özenmek* refers to the positions that are cursed by the republican ideology such as alienation, loss of identity or unconsciousness. On the one hand, the children of the Westernizationist and modernizationist Republic are expected not to imitate the West. On the other hand it is frequently questioned whether to head for the West has been a good idea in the first place. The schizophrenic association of the Turkish elite culture with the West is disclosed once again and exemplified by the debates on English and Turkish. This is remarkably so, if it is taken into account that the calls to protect Turkish language from “foreign invasion” do not evolve into a kind of societal reaction or overarching legal regulations. The fear for the identity cannot transcend the discursive level.<sup>188</sup>

As mentioned earlier, due to increased number of institutions of education teaching in English, English names used in enterprise names, trademarks, commercial slogans, and even in daily conversations, the pressure of foreign language felt in a wider social and cultural sphere. How this process is defined, is closely related to the Turkey’s political culture.

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<sup>188</sup> In relation, education in foreign language is another theme of heated debate. There is a plethora of refusals of using foreign languages as the medium of education. Yet, those educational institutions, which teach in foreign languages, are the most popular ones and desired most in the general entrance examinations. This is true, despite the fact that many private and demand expensive tuitions. There are some local municipal regulations, which mostly discourage using words and letters from other languages in shops’ signboards and commercial names. An analysis about the municipal regulations has already been presented above. See Appendix xxx for a list of the municipalities who decided to act on the widespread use of foreign languages.

For example, *Reklam Yaraticıları Derneği* (an association of creative writers from the advertisement industry) organized a campaign in 2005 with the slogan “*Dilinizden utanmayın!*” (Do not be ashamed of your language!). This campaign was announced by advertisements in various newspapers, and it was introduced with the following commentary: “Turkish is one of the world’s most rooted, richest, and most beautiful languages. Do not pollute it with foreign words. Use Turkish!”<sup>189</sup> In the text, the “natural” relationship narrated, between “the pollution of language” and “the destruction of culture” is a proof of how the notion of “our national language” has been internalized by at least urban middle and upper classes. The direct relationship between preserving the language’s uniqueness and sovereignty or independence is evident in the arguments of the writers like Emre Kongar or Oktay Sinanoğlu.

The approach defined as “complaint tradition” by James and Lesley Milroy (1999), is frequently employed by those who are considered as authorities in language matters in their critiques of the daily language usages of the masses. The problem is never dealt with as merely a matter of language, but also as a reflection of macro social circumstances. Mostly shining with intense elitism, as Öncü mentioned and defined above, the critiques involve a bemoaning for the threats against “the Turkish”. The basic attitude in the arguments of these critics, the “missionaries” of Turkish, is that mistaken usages of Turkish is held to be crimes against the language, and consequently as crimes against society.

To summarize the attitude of the complaint tradition, to note the conclusive declaration of a congress, organized in 2005 in Ankara, would be useful. The congress was titled “*Türkçem, Dilim Dilim...*” and the following was argued in its final statement:

“Language pollution is like blood pollution: it harms the nation’s culture as the blood pollution harms the body. Based on this truth, it can be

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<sup>189</sup> Detailed info can be found at <http://www.ryd.org.tr/template.asp?id=10> (retrieved on July 28, 2008). The split of the discourse and the practice is present in this campaign, too. Although the campaign is a propaganda of Turkish, some of its supporters named their companies as *Marketing Türkiye*, *Mediacat*, *Radyo Foreks*, *Trendsetter*. English words in these names imply that, “being not ashamed by the language” stays only in discourse level.

concluded that, the most effective way to eliminate a cultural community is to damage its language...

Language pollution leads to the pollution of ideas, which in turn leads to the pollution of identity. What we experience in the national context recently is closely related to the weakening of our languages.

In order to keep our national identity alive ... Turkish should be used appropriately in all walks of life. Science should be in Turkish...

For Turkish, and therefore our nation, to live forever ... the principal condition is that ... education should be in Turkish. (Aslan, 2005, pp. 287-288).

It is obvious that in a text like this, in which references to biology and body are plenty, an organic definition of nation is constructed. This construction clearly excludes and disregards linguistic differences in order to enforce an imagined cultural unity. This imagination, which is narrated as the truth, is a reflection of the State's construction of the discourse of national unity.

In the text, in which the relationship between national culture and language is defined as vital rather than important, mass media is singled out as one of the main responsible fields of action for the dangerous course:

“Main function of mass media instruments is to contribute to the cultural development by educating the public. In this respect, one of their important responsibilities is to support the education of mother language. Nevertheless, the opposite is what is happening today.

In our country, especially in the last years we observe that a high amount of language pollution is taking place in the mass media. Pollution in language has been accelerated as private radio and television channels became available.

It is clear that in the process of polluting and corrupting our Turkish, computers, and consequential mass usage of internet has a great impact...

Regarding all these, mass media instruments should be sensitive and conscious about the correct and beautiful usage of our Turkish...” (Aslan, 2005, p. 287)

This conclusive declaration follows the course of a mentality that maintains that the mass media must have ideological missions. It is evident that the authors of the statement are quite worried about the disappearance of this mission; however, they seem to neglect questioning the economical and political background of the current situation.

Mass media is considered apart from consumption economies and its corporate institutions, and addressed as such.

The invitation made by the declaration could be described as a call for “awakening”, or “returning back to the essence”; for being conscious about “the right and beautiful usage” of Turkish of “all of us”.

In this understanding of the nation as an organic unity, as exemplified with the emphasis on the “education of mother language”, the truth that there are mother languages other than Turkish in Turkey is obscured. Thus, Turkish is considered as not only an important but also the vital “condition” of national culture. Turkish is taken as granted as the universal constant in the linguistic universe of the country. Both the substance of the nation and the main source underneath is Turkified. The discourse of Turkification is correspondingly a warning to those who use foreign words:

“There is a truth that must be recognized; what lies beneath the affection for using foreign words, observed in some intellectuals, scientists and politicians, is the corruption of the identity – based on the diversion from one’s own culture and the underestimation of one’s own values” (Aslan, 2005, p. 288).

The text, which argues that the corruption of language is a reflection of the corruption of identity (and therefore of the essence, as well), is yet another evidence of how language is taken as a domain of identity politics, as Öncü underlines (2000, p. 288), rather than mere system of signs and meanings.

The statement, furthermore, locates two frequently pronounced sources of the pollution of language, one an external one, and the other an internal one. Using the “incorrect usages of the language” as a base, it targets at the “affection for foreign languages”. In this way, the text reproduces the cliché of “external and internal enemies”, and yet with its cultural proof. In parallel, those who are using the language in a wrong way or with borrowed words and idioms from foreign languages are blamed for a wide spectrum of guilt, from ignorance (Kayış, 2000), to indulgence and alienation (Sezgin, 2004, p. 105).

The notion of “pollution” is significant in anthropological terms. It contains both the denial of cleanliness, purity, refinement, or being sterile, and it distinguishes the inside from the outside, the healthy from the sick, the local from the foreign, the

original or authentic from the hybrid. The translation of a linguistic process as “pollution” should be perceived as the ideological outcomes of the modernist paradigms and practices, within which language is constructed and processed as the definition of the boundaries of the national culture and the national identity. Accordingly, in the background of the discourse of language pollution, it is likely to discover the ideological processes of the republican and nationalist discourses, which enables the production of the terminology of pollution.

To summarize, the objections about the corruption of Turkish are concentrated on the anxiety of that the national identity is becoming indistinct due to the weakening of the mother language. Worth to note once more, those who are involved in language debates mostly refer to Turkish as the sole mother language in Turkey. This is more than a slip of the tongue but the result of the selective nationalist way of seeing.

As if, not all the problems of the “high”, standard Turkish concerning its corpus and status were enough, the minority languages have joined English and the colloquial, slang and rude varieties of the language in “troubling” the Turkish language.

### **6.3 Broadcasting and Minority Languages**

It is reviewed above how public broadcasting activates more efficient channels of ideological indoctrination that further empower the state and how it is established as another apparatus of ideological hegemony. However, an official broadcasting policy is applied over a territory, which almost always contains more than one linguistic community. The problem of establishment, or consolidation, of a broadcasting language regime in multilingual conditions is further complicated by possible histories of colonization.

The advancements in the technology of airing and of reception broadcasts have seemingly worked against the nation-state, its discourses and practices. Hobsbawm sees broadcasting as both a threat and an opportunity for the minority languages:

“The first development is basically the effect of film and television and, above all, the small portable radio. It means that spoken vernacular languages are no longer only face-to-face, domestic, or restricted idioms.

Illiterates are, therefore, directly within the reach of the wider world and wider culture. (1996, pp. 1073-4)

He acknowledges the expansion of the audio-visual action beyond immediate relationships as a result of the spread of broadcasting, and how it fits well with the purposes of the modern forms of power. He underlines the improved possibility of linguistic assimilation of a tongue, minor in power, that could be triggered by its confrontation with some bigger language. On the other hand, Hobsbawm considers that broadcasting could also be an instrument of resistance.

“This may also mean that small languages and dialects can survive more easily, insofar as even a modest population is enough to justify a local radio program. Minority languages, thus, can be cheaply provided for.” (p. 1074)

Similarly, Eisenlohr sees the dual face of the effects of broadcasting on minority languages. He is, too, attentive to that language shift away from less powerful languages is conditioned by the radio and television broadcasting in dominant languages:

“Pessimistic perspectives on the relationship between the reproduction of linguistic diversity and electronic mass mediation have even culminated in assessments such as those describing the impact of electronic media on the maintenance of lesser-used languages as "cultural nerve gas". Activists have expressed similar views: A production coordinator of the Canadian Inuit Broadcasting Corporation likens the effects of mainstream television to those of a neutron bomb.” (Eisenlohr, 2004, p. 23)

However, he reminds, that in recent works on minority language broadcasting it is stressed that electronic mediation is helpful in the maintenance and renewal of such languages:

“A central concern of the use of lesser-used languages in electronic mediation is not only encouraging language maintenance and revitalization by providing speakers with opportunities to hear and maintain skills in the language, but also is achieving a transformation of ideological valuations of the language so that the lesser-used language is viewed as part of the contemporary world and as relevant for the future of a particular group” (Eisenlohr, 2004, p. 24).

Before presenting the details on the subversion of the republican only-Turkish regime of language by the political claims of the minorities over their linguistic cultural

expressions, a brief review of the various cases in other countries would enable us to contextualize the local developments in Turkey.

### **6.3.1 International cases of the relationship between language and broadcasting**

Every broadcasting policy prioritizes some languages or one of them over others. The time allocation of different languages in the radio or television programs is almost never free of the language ideologies that are in effect in a particular linguistic regime. In this short review section, examples from major areas of linguistic conflicts of the world are presented.

In post-colonial settings, in Africa for example, the language policy of broadcasting is an intricate issue as the states have to deal with both the colonial languages such as English, French and Flemish and also with the languages of native populations. There is a push for the recognition of local languages in mass media whether they are official minorities or not. The demand from below coincides with the global demand of international communications thru English and the traditional usages of colonial languages as a “neutral” unifying element to keep away the debates on the inequalities concerning the treatment of local languages, thus local communities.<sup>190</sup>

In Algeria for example, where the linguistic regime excluded minority languages for a long time, recently there is an increasing articulation of “other tongues” into the public space, thanks to the possibilities enabled by technology:

“As for the audiovisual media in Berber, the ENTV began to diffuse two daily news bulletins in Tamazight by the end of 1991. At present, there is a daily 15 minute news bulletin. A TV channel completely devoted to Berber language and culture has been on the drawing board for quite some time. Since 2001, a Berber satellite TV station called Berbère Télévision, based in Paris, has been broadcasting programmes entirely in Tamazight. Such a crucial space has been enhanced in recent years by a proliferation of Internet sites and e-mail networks” (Benrabah, 2005, p. 459).

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<sup>190</sup> See Kamwangamalu (2001), Louw (2004) and Giliomee (2004) for studies on the situation of Afrikaans with respect to English in South Africa and Namibia. For an analysis on the relationship between English and local languages, see Kamwendo and Mooko (2006).

In Spain, where the ethnic politics of Basque and Catalan identities have a long history as opposed to the centralized hegemony of Castilian, the autonomous regions already implemented their own language-protection policies. The Catalan regional government, for example, enacted *Llei de Política Lingüística* in 1998 (Atkinson & Kelly-Holmes, 2006, p. 242). With respect to broadcasting, the situation is also explicitly favoring Catalan:

“However, in the case of the media such legislation tends to focus on outlets owned or licensed by the Catalan government. The private media, i.e. the bulk of the sector, have been left largely to their own devices. Catalan does have a strong presence in the broadcast media in Catalonia but in the case of television this is mainly due to the presence of two public channels which broadcast entirely in Catalan (TV3 and Canal 33), and as far as radio is concerned the station with the highest audience figures is the Catalan-medium *Catalunya Ràdio*” (ibid.)

The republican tradition of France has been resisting for a long time against the demands for cultural rights for minorities. An iconic law, which aimed at the protection of French against foreign linguistic invasion, of English in particular, was issued in 1994. The second article of the regulation, known as the Toubon Law, ruled that:

“The use of French shall be mandatory for the designation, offer, presentation, instructions for use, and description of the scope and conditions of a warranty of goods, products and services, as well as bills and receipts. The same provisions apply to any written, spoken, radio and television advertisement. The provisions of the present article shall not apply to the names of typical products and specialities of foreign origin known to the general public” (Wise, 2006, pp. 206-207).

Television and radio broadcasting are, with the enactment of the Toubon Law, are linguistically protected in favor of French.

In the post-Soviet Republics, which became a major area of research in language politics recently, new linguistic regimes are being built after the declarations of independence. Here, the situation is similar to that of post-colonial contexts. Each new independent republic officialized their own national language. As reviewed in the Chapter 2, Russian, which has long been established as the language of politics, culture and education in the Soviet era, was demoted in most of the new states, despite the fact that there are considerable numbers of Russian and other minorities.



In Latvia, for example, the complicated picture of linguistic situation is also reflected in the political domain and is evident in the broadcasting policies. The Latvian Radio and Television Law, issued in 1995, restricted the use of languages other than Latvian in commercial broadcasts to a maximum of 25 percent of broadcasting time: However, in 2003, the process of EU membership resulted in a renewed conception of freedom and rights in the field of broadcasting:

“The Latvian Constitutional Court ruled that the law violated freedom of speech and struck down these clauses in the law aimed at restricting broadcasts in Russian by a 5–2 vote. The chief judge remarked ‘It is clearly a violation of freedom of speech and freedom of information and would not hold up under international law’” (Schmid, Zepa, & Snipe, 2004, p. 244)

What Latvia experiences is quite similar to the adventure of minority language broadcasting in Turkey, as it will be presented below. In Turkey, too, the objective of EU membership necessitated considerable legal re-arrangements, which would not be realized otherwise.

There are also cases, which are similar to the traditional devaluation of Kurdish in Turkey. Ironically, an exemplary case is from China’s problem with the Uyghur minority. It is ironic in the sense that, Uyghurs and the political controversies on their situations are a significant subject matter of the Turkist groups in Turkey. The attitude against Uyghur language in China is comparable to the attitude against Kurdish in Turkey. Dwyer explains:

“The official promotion of Chinese stems from the assumption that Uyghur is not as useful as Chinese (the latter being a “quality” language). Uyghur is seen as backward. The central government’s push to “Develop the West” should begin, in the view of one official in the Xinjiang Chinese standardized testing HSK office, “with a change in the language of instruction”. Furthermore, during an interview on the western channel of the Chinese Central Television (CCTV), “the CPC [Party] secretary of the Xinjiang UAR, Wang Lequan, state[d] that minority languages in Xinjiang contain only limited amounts of information, and cannot express some more advanced knowledge” (Dwyer, 2005, p. 37)

The Communist Party of China attempts to legitimize the exclusion of Uyghur as a part of the Chinese language regime by framing the issue within modernity.<sup>191</sup> The discursive byproduct of the framework of modernity with respect to the issue of language is the creation of a hierarchy of languages, within which the Chinese is located on top, and unsurprisingly, the Uyghur language is way down below. Surely, the similarity between Turkey and China in cases of Kurdish and Uyghur is more related to the modernist and positivist ideologies that have been very much in the constitution of the political cultures of these two countries. In both countries, the state is far from only operating with a regulative function, but more importantly, it has assigned itself a mission of modernization of the “non-modern” society. The ideology of modernizationism conditions the ways in which the communal identity, its language and their relationship with other “subversive” sub-national identities and languages are conceptualized. The *vaulational* function of broadcasting institutions, as introduced with referring to Spitulnik above, necessitates discursive processes of legitimization of the ways in which official and other languages are dealt with, which are in turn conditioned by the modernist categorizations of languages.

The prioritization of the official form of a language through broadcasting is a common development in other countries as well. The Japan Broadcasting Corporation (NHK) has a specific role in the domination of the “proper” forms of Japanese:

“...the most influential organization in spreading the spoken form was NHK through radio and, later, television. NHK is a public broadcasting organization but not a state organ; it places considerable importance on its role as a modeler of correct language, issuing pronunciation dictionaries and other language-related publications and from time to time conducting surveys on aspects of language. The advent of national broadcasting in the 1920s presented a fortuitous opportunity to model the recently adopted standard in spoken form for listeners throughout Japan” (Gottlieb, 2005, p. 9).

However, the relationship of broadcasting and languages are not always that of assimilation or ethnicization. The European Union stands for an ambitious project of the

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<sup>191</sup> Such a perspective was exemplified, as noted above in the fifth chapter, by Bedrettin Dalan when he declared that Kurdish could hardly be named as a language as it lacks certain linguistics standards.

expanding rights of non-official languages. The Union is sensitive in favor of the civic participation and to the circulation of information in languages of the members.

“[T]he 1985 ADONNINO Report drew up specific proposals for creating a European identity of citizens of the Member States. The majority of these proposals have been realized. One proposal related to the creation of a ‘European audiovisual area’, and specifically a multilingual European television channel, with the aim of informing the citizens about European issues” (Magyar, 2006, p. 20).

Surely, there are many complaints about the huge bureaucratic structure of the European Union, and about how its policy of language equality constitutes a heavy burden on the efficient working of the offices, as noted in the second chapter. However, at least formally, the Union has legalized many regulations in order to prevent the extinction of minority languages in the face of their dominance by the official languages, and also in order to refrain from facilitating a hierarchy among the languages of its member states.

### **6.3.2 Broadcasting in Minority Languages in Turkey**

For the last two decades, Turkey has experienced further challenges to the language regimes. The influx of English in various domains and “suffocating” pressure generated by the “incorrect” form of speaking and writing of Turkish already triggered a reaction of anxiety in losing the integrity and the prestige of the language. By the 1990s, the rising Kurdish movements, which have had repercussions beyond the armed war that PKK waged against Turkey, emerged as another “trouble” for the assumed hegemony of Turkish. Although the commercialization and privatization of the mass media created a potential for enhancements in broadcasting in minority language, the laws were not in favor of such an opening. However, the context has had an international dimension: the process of membership to the European Union, which compelled Turkey to reconsider its policies concerning her minorities and their cultural rights. The state, in spite of its reluctance, opened a limited space for the minority languages within the broadcasting system. Since 2002, when Turkey had to make compulsory changes in its laws in accord with aimed progress in the EU negotiations

for membership, the use of languages other than Turkish in broadcasts has become another major point of conflict. This section presents a detailed analysis of the emergence of broadcasting in minority languages in Turkey by a presentation of the history of relevant legal regulations, accompanied with the debates it generated in the public arena.

Legalism has habitually saved the authorities of the Turkish state from dealing with emerging social and political problems. The logic of the laws and interpretations of legal texts have always served against the demands from below. This is the case with the issue of minorities in Turkey, as well. Although there are more cultural and linguistic varieties in Turkey, only three of them have been recognized as minorities. According to the Lausanne Treaty of 1923, which has always been considered as the founding contract of the Republic of Turkey, Jews, Orthodox Greeks and Armenians are considered as minorities bestowed with various rights. The history of minorities, official or not, in the republican era has been one of misery, and in turn, the post-1980s have witnessed a hard time for the governments of Turkey for their treatment to the non-Turks. Kurds have been a special constituent of these minorities both for their considerable confrontation to the policies of nationalization and for what their discontent has resulted within the last 30 years. After PKK has launched its attacks against Turkey in 1984, the issues related to Kurdishness were assembled under the title, “Kurdish problem”. The growing global concern for the rights of minorities also brought Kurds under focus as an international issue. The way that Turkish official ideology has devised to deal with the demands of Kurds and the international concern, has been to present these demands as legally irrelevant. Kurds were not among the officially recognized minorities. Although it has regularly failed to fulfill the rights of non-Muslim official minorities as was laid in the Lausanne Treaty, Turkey has stuck to the Treaty firmly in order not to expand the rights for other minorities. Turkey, with very same motives, has consented only partially with some of the basic treaties of the European Union (with which Turkey is within the negotiation period for full membership), Council of Europe (of which Turkey is a member) and the United Nations (of which Turkey is a founding member), and has disagreed to participate at all with some others.

However, there have been disagreements with Turkey's official position with respect to her denial of non-official minorities based on the 1923 Treaty. The opponents argue that Turkey in fact violates the Treaty as it had already assigned many of the civic rights to every citizen that are asked for by other minorities. Article 39 of the Lausanne Treaty entitles all the citizens of the Republic of Turkey with rights to use their languages in every sphere, except official transactions (while the law courts had to provide translators if needed). Accordingly, Baskin Oran, for example, maintains that the impediments on the use of, Kurdish for example, in press, meetings, and broadcasting are violations of the Treaty (Oran, 2004).

Questions concerning minorities took precedence among other issues especially as the "low-density war" in the southeast of the country has evolved after 1984. The mindset of the Kemalist ideology, which presupposed an indivisible unity and the integrity of the Turkish nation with its state and its country, has been experiencing a distressing confrontation since then, with the reality that there *are* indeed linguistic and cultural differences within the population. The Kurdish movement has been accused of being divisive, if not as terrorism, and as a betrayal by the State and Turkish nationalist groups. It was on the other hand celebrated by its supporters as a struggle of cultural and national rights. The movement with all its different components, as most ethnic/national movements did, established the Kurdish language as one of the most significant political battlefields.

Until the 1990s, Kurdish language had been reacted by paradoxical positions of the Turkish State and the nationalist intellectuals. On the one hand, its existence was denied all together in parallel the denial of the Kurds "as a nation". On the other hand, there had been various attempts to absorb Kurdish into Turkish with respect to its linguistic origins. In the end, with the unexpected developments – unexpected in terms of its pace and decision-makers, of the legal reforms aimed at European Union (EU) membership, Kurdish has been officially considered as one of the "different languages and dialects used traditionally by Turkish citizens in their daily lives". The repercussions of the invention of a new linguistic category such as this one have been discussed above, in Chapter 4. The avoidance of using the words such as Kurds and Kurdish in legal texts is a byproduct of a tradition of court discourse. For decades, many people have been sentenced for "claiming that there is a separate Kurdish minority" or

for “their intentions to create minorities within the unity of the Turkish nation”. Any reference to Kurdishness has been, therefore, punished immediately.<sup>192</sup>

The linguistic diversity within Kurdish, on the other hand was an aspect that empowered the official discourse on Kurdishness. Within the nationalist discourse, which equaled a language with a nation, Kurdish language defines the Kurdish nation. Hence, as noted above, the dialectical diversity in Kurdish has been exploited to the point of claiming that there is no language as Kurdish at all. In 1999, a small crisis emerged in the National Assembly, when it was discovered that some deputies declared that they knew Kurdish as a foreign language in the forms they filled in for the Assembly documentation. The crisis was resolved by the statement of the President of the Assembly that they would not allow deputies to register Kurdish as a foreign language, because Kurdish was a dialect, not a language.<sup>193</sup>

After the delivery of the leader of PKK, Abdullah Öcalan to Turkey by the US forces in 1999, he was trialed and sentenced to death. For a few years during and after the trial, his demands from Turkey for the resolution of the Kurdish issue became considerably moderate. Previously seeking national Kurdish independence with a socialist revolution and then a federative political structure with an autonomous Kurdish region, Öcalan now put forward demands concerning cultural rights, such as freedoms in using Kurdish language, in education in Kurdish. Broadcasting in Kurdish in radios and televisions were among those cultural rights. However, the Turkish political reaction was to reject any ideas of the expansion of freedoms with respect to Kurdishness, on the base that these were the outcomes of the new strategies of PKK. The organization was claimed to shift the battleground from the armed struggle of the guerrillas in the mountains to the legal spheres of political and cultural rights. The calls

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<sup>192</sup> See, three exemplary decisions of the Supreme Court that ruled for the banning of three political parties: *Özgürlük ve Demokrasi Partisi* (ÖZDEP, Freedom and Democracy Party) in 1993 with Decree No: 1993/2; *Sosyalist Türkiye Partisi* (STP, Socialist Turkey Party) in 1993 with Decree No: 1993/3 and *Demokrasi Partisi* (DEP, Democracy Party) in 1993 with Decree No: 1994/2. All three parties were found guilty, among others, for violating the relevant clauses of the Political Parties Law (see above) that prohibits propagandizing the existence of other peoples and nations in Turkey, other than Turks. (Retrieved on November 10, 2007 from <http://www.anayasa.gov.tr>).

<sup>193</sup> “Akbulut: Kürtçe dil değil, şive”, *Hürriyet*, August 10 (1999)

for cultural rights were deliberately squeezed into the category of “terrorist organization’s demands”. They were thus illegitimized and pushed out of discussion.

The changes in the strategies of PKK coincided with the new developments in the relationship between the EU and Turkey. After 1999, when the European Council accepted Turkey as a candidate to membership, the Turkish governments issued various sets of legal adjustments in order to match up with the EU regulations. The EU has been severely criticizing Turkey for its violations of human rights and the suppression of cultural rights of its minorities. Therefore, the EU has usually been assessed in Turkey with respect to the former’s involvement into the Kurdish issue.

The major theme of the discourse, which was developed against the demands of education and broadcasting in Kurdish, is that granting these rights would endanger the unity and the integrity of the nation, or the country.

In 1999, Enis Öksüz, a minister from MHP opposed the idea that Kurds should be granted their linguistic rights:

“A nation has only one official language. There is no nation with two official languages. In the definition of unitary states, there is space for only one language. The people, who we call as Kurds, are our own people. Our own people, in every sense; our brothers... We shall resolve our issues with our brothers, in the family. If we have any problem, we shall settle down to discuss it. Therefore, it is our family matter. It is wrong to search a solution with other people abroad. You shall put aside history, sociological phenomena, cultural facts, and pump tribalization instead of nationalization. Then you shall declare that there are problems among the people. These are wrong dealings.” (my translation, “MHP’de Kürtçe Sıkıntısı”, *Evensel*, December 15 (1999)).

As a typical statement of the nationalist conceptualization of identity and language, Öksüz’s declaration indicates some of the basic elements of the official anxiety. The apparent paternalism in the speech is evident in the patronizing discourse of Turkish nationalists against Kurds. The notion of brotherhood mostly requires to the obedience of the younger brother. The organic definition of the nation relatedly compares the community of citizens to a family, of which father – the state – has the word to say. A pattern of reference to the Kurdish social organization as tribalism is clear in the statement, as well. The state already signaled that it would attempt to

respond the demands of cultural rights without ever altering the main tenets of its discourse against Kurds.

Another MHP deputy, of Bitlis in the Kurdish region, made the case clearer:

“There is no language as Kurdish, among the languages of the world. What counts as important for us is the integrity. Anyone can use whatever mother language he has, but asking for a Kurdish television shows Kurds as if they are a minority. I do not think it is right to broadcast in Kurdish. In anyway, the people of the region do not need anything like that.” (my translation, “Kürtçe televizyon hakkında siyasilerin yorumları”, *Zaman*, November 16 (2000))

Towards the end of 2000, the debates on possible regulations to be enacted with respect to the harmonization program with the EU fused intense debates. The EU demanded TV broadcasts in local languages to be allowed, in the Document for Partnership (Katılım Ortaklığı Belgesi). The adjustment program that the EU offered has been accordingly reacted by many as an intrusion to home affairs or as “the well-known games played by the external enemies”.

The General Staff also declared their own unapproving ideas on the issue. The conceptualization of the demands of cultural rights by this most powerful institution of the state clearly has conditioned other discourses on such themes:

“They are trying to create a political separatist movement based on ethnic nationalism. Slogans of ethnic identity, education and broadcasting in mother language, and the empowerment of local governments are the themes utilized by PKK for persuasion in the activities of political separatism. A new technique of struggles has to be developed against the new strategies of PKK’s attempt to legitimize its politics.” (my translation, “Kürtçe TV PKK oyunu”, *Hürriyet*, December 8 (2000).

The Army, as always, evaluated the issue within its framework of struggle against terrorism, rather than with respect to rights and freedoms. The profound refusal of the Army of any demands concerning the minority rights is in fact discursively based on the notion of “national security” and “the mission of the military forces to protect the political regime and the national unity”.

There were representatives from the other end, who were positive on issue, as well, especially among the deputies from the Kurdish regions. They were mostly the



members of the political parties such as ANAP and, FP (*Fazilet Partisi* of the time, which would split into two as SP, *Saadet Partisi* and AKP, *Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi* in 2002). Many of them favored a controlled freedom of broadcasting in Kurdish, and stated that use of the mother language is one of the basic human rights. Salih Yıldırım, for example, the deputy from Şırnak of southeast Turkey with a highly Kurdish population, underlined that,

“In the region, more than 75 percent of the people can access to Kurdish television channels with satellite antennas. The state should broadcast in Kurdish in order to reverse the influences of the terrorist organization’s [PKK’s] propaganda through broadcasting. In addition, the refusal of Kurdish as a language is not right. There is a Kurdish that every Kurd can understand. Moreover, there are many people in the region who do not know Turkish.” (my translation, “Kürtçe televizyon hakkında siyasilere yorumları”, *Zaman*, November 16 (2000))

It was true that there were many Kurdish channels, which could be accessed by satellite technologies. They were aired from Northern Iraq, from Yerevan, Armenia and from Europe.<sup>194</sup>

The Kurdish diaspora in Europe has been particularly engaged in the Kurdish movement in Turkey. MED TV, for example, was launched in 1995. Turkey fought a relentless struggle against MED TV and asked many times to close it down from the countries, where the channel was operated.<sup>195</sup> Recently, a similar crisis has emerged because of Roj TV, a television channel that is run by PKK and broadcasts from Europe via satellite (Romano, 2006, pp. 153-159).

While the debates concentrated on the issue of whether the state could broadcast in Kurdish, Eser Karakaş, a scholar, reminded that the EU was not asking for positive actions on minority language rights:

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<sup>194</sup> In connection, Hassanpour reports that Iran and Iraq have allowed state broadcasting, both radio (since the 1950s) and television (since the 1970s), in Kurdish: “This policy aimed at neutralising foreign and clandestine broadcasting targeted at the Kurds” (1995).

<sup>195</sup> See Hassanpour for an in-depth analysis of the contribution of MED TV as a language academy for the Kurdish language and for the history of protests against it by Turkey (1995).

“What is being debated is the broadcasting in Kurdish by the state. Why should a state get involved in such a business? The state has to refrain from intervening to those who want to make Kurdish broadcasting. The states have a distinction between positive and negative action. The European Union is not asking for a positive action. It does not say to do something. It just says not to do some things. The EU never tells the Turkish state to broadcast in Kurdish.” (my translation, “Eser Karakaş ile röportaj”, *Zaman*, November 19 (2000)).

Karakaş’s remarks are important in that it discloses the way the relationship between the state and society has been formulated. The state’s impulse to govern the society ended up controlling and disciplining every field of action. Consequently, if it was such a need then it was the state that would do it.

Among these debates, RTÜK became more sensitive to the use of Kurdish in radio broadcasting. In 2001, many radio stations were either warned or closed for periods up to one year for broadcasting Kurdish songs.<sup>196</sup> For example, charging with the violation of the Article 4/t of the Law 3984 by playing Kurdish songs, RTÜK stopped the broadcasting of *Batman FM* for 90 days and *Radyo Ses* of Mersin for one week.<sup>197</sup> Before 2002, the Law No. 3984 aroused further legal controversies. There are reports that although the legal consultants of the RTÜK declared that there is no legal impediment against playing Kurdish music, the Institution held it tight and gave warnings to the local radio and TV channels who broadcasted music in Kurdish. A similar legal assessment was made by Council of State, which decreed, in a case of a local TV program in which there were some Kurdish interviews that the short interviews in Kurdish do not violate the principle of broadcasting in Turkish, as the studio language was Turkish.<sup>198</sup>

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<sup>196</sup> The following information of RTÜK decisions have been compiled from the web site of the Council, located at <http://www.rtuk.gov.tr> and from the annual reports of BİA (*Bağımsız İletişim Ağı*, a news network for monitoring and covering media freedom and independent journalism), published at <http://www.bianet.org>.

<sup>197</sup> Article 4/t regulated the broadcasting languages and allowed the use of Turkish and those languages that “contribute to the formation of scientific and cultural works of universal value”. See above for a detailed discussion on the Law.

<sup>198</sup> “Kürtçe Esnekliği”, *Zaman*, December 4 (2000). RTÜK has also intervened in the usages of Turkish. For an analysis of RTÜK decisions and penalties concerning the “improper” uses of Turkey, see Balçık (2006, pp. 114-115).

The first major “democracy package” within the framework of harmonization program was decreed in 2001 (the Law no. 4709, of which details were given above). The law eliminated the clauses in the Constitution, which banned the usages of “languages that were forbidden by law”. This modification was conceived by many opponents as a freedom to Kurdish, or as a misleading step of the state for soothing the EU’s and Kurds’ demands for cultural rights by others.

The legal arrangements concerning the use of languages in broadcasting came in 2002. The Law Amending Various Laws, no. 4771, was issued on August 3, 2002, Its Article 8, allowed broadcasting in non-official languages by adding the following clause to the Law 3984:

“Furthermore, there may be broadcasts in the different languages and dialects used traditionally by Turkish citizens in their daily lives. Such broadcasts should not contradict the fundamental principles of the Turkish Republic enshrined in the Constitution and the indivisible integrity of the state with its territory and nation. The principles and procedures for these broadcasts and the supervision of these broadcasts shall be determined through a regulation to be issued by the Supreme Board.” (translation in Eraydın-Virtanen, 2003b, p. 36):

By this change, for the first time and although accompanied with cliché warnings, the fact that there are different languages used by the citizens of the Republic of Turkey was formally acknowledged. From then on, the definition “different languages and dialects used traditionally by Turkish citizens in their daily lives” was going to be used in many regulations. The law enacted in September 2002, which regulated the private courses for teaching minority languages, was also titled using the same expression: “*Türk Vatandaşlarının Günlük Yaşamlarında Geleneksel Olarak Kullandıkları Farklı Dil ve Lehçelerin Öğrenilmesi Hakkında Yönetmelik*” (The By-law on the Learning of Languages and Dialects Used Traditionally by Turkish Citizens in Their Daily Lives). The laws concerning the minority languages were evident derivatives of the confusion – one that has been productively exploited by the state – of simultaneously refusing Kurdish as a language, and trying to forbid or regulate its usage.

The Supreme Board completed its works in an atmosphere of dense contestations, and launched the regulation mentioned in the Law no. 4771, and it published in the official gazette on December 18, 2002. According to “*Radyo ve Televizyon Yayınlarının*

*Dili Hakkında Yönetmelik*” (the Regulation on the Language of Radio and Television Broadcasts), TRT was entitled as the only authorized institution to broadcast in non-Turkish languages. The programs could include news, culture and music. However, they would be made exclusively for adults and no broadcasts in order to teach these languages and dialects were allowed.

The time allocations of the broadcasting and other regulations were also stated:

“The duration of radio broadcasts in these languages and dialects shall not exceed 45 minutes per day and a total 4 hours per week. TV broadcasts shall not exceed 30 minutes per day and a total of 2 hours per week. TV broadcasts shall be accompanied by Turkish subtitles, which will fully correspond, to the broadcast in terms of timing and the content. As regards radio broadcasts, a Turkish translation will be broadcasted after the program.” (translation in Eraydın-Virtanen, 2003b, p. 38)

Within several months, as a part of the sixth harmonization program, which was issued on July 15, 2003 as the Law no. 4928, the exclusive permission given to TRT for the broadcasts in other languages was expanded and the private channels were allowed, as well.

In January 2004, the regulation on broadcasts in different languages was finalized with the by-law no. 25357, titled “*Türk Vatandaşlarının Günlük Yaşamlarında Geleneksel Olarak Kullandıkları Farklı Dil ve Lehçelerde Yapılacak Radyo ve Televizyon Yayınları Hakkında Yönetmelik*” (the Regulation on the Radio and Television Broadcasts in the Languages and Dialects Used Traditionally by Turkish Citizens in their Daily Lives).<sup>199</sup> Regulation, which was allowing very limited rights, specified the following principles in the fifth article:

“The radio and television broadcasts in the languages and dialects used traditionally by Turkish citizens in their daily lives are subject to permission of the Supreme Board.

With these language and dialects, broadcasts can only be towards adults, and on music, news and for introduction of the traditional culture.

No broadcasts are allowed for teaching of these language and dialects.

Institutions that are licensed as public and private are allowed to broadcast in these languages and dialects; in radios for five hours a week,

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<sup>199</sup> The regulation’s full-text in Turkish is in the Appendix 6.

not to exceed 60 minutes a day, and for television, for four hours a week, not to exceed 45 minutes a day.

The television stations are responsible for the one-to-one subtitling or broadcasting of the same programs with Turkish translation immediately afterwards; and radio stations are responsible for broadcasting of the same programs with Turkish translation immediately afterwards.” (my translation)

Considering the corresponding rights of minority language broadcasting in other countries, the limitations are quite unsatisfactory. However, the Turkish case should be evaluated within its specific history of total banning of minority languages.

One of the most striking concerns of the regulation was its preventing the teaching of languages and dialects, and programming for children. The idea behind that is to preclude the transmission of a language other than Turkish to the younger generations. In this sense, the state has been determined to keep those languages as folkloric themes and as “traditional” tongues, which would never achieve the status of a well-established language. The state has apparently avoided from such an image of officially supporting the non-Turkish languages, or their unification and standardization. This would be a critical rupture in the integrity of the discourse on the unity of the Turkish nation and the priority of Turkish language pertaining to it. While there are already four channels that are broadcasting in Kurdish (Kurdish Human Rights Project, 2005) that are available in Turkey via satellite receivers, this regulation should be assessed as the persistence of the state in controlling the cultural domain.

Predictably, the bureaucratic process of application and permission for obtaining a license for broadcasting in languages other than Turkish was so complicated that as of 2005, none of the 11 private stations that applied was approved.<sup>200</sup> In March 2006, RTÜK granted permission to *Medya FM*, a radio station in Şanlıurfa, and *Gün TV* and *Söz TV*, television channels in Diyarbakır.<sup>201</sup> In March 2007, *Çağrı FM*, an Islamic radio station in Diyarbakır, too, was licensed for broadcasting in Kurmanji, and Zazaki.<sup>202</sup>

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<sup>200</sup> “Kürtçe yayına eksik evrak engeli”, *NTVMSNBC*, November 24 (2005).

<sup>201</sup> “RTÜK’ten farklı dilde yayına izin”, *NTVMSNBC*, March 26 (2006).

<sup>202</sup> “Yerelde Kürtçe yayın çeşitleniyor”, *Evrensel*, June 12 (2007).

In June 2006, RTÜK expanded the time limits for music and movies, with the restriction of subtitles. The decision took the broadcasting of these programs as “cultural demands” and ruled that their broadcasting would not count for the 45 minute-a-day limit.<sup>203</sup>

However, TRT started broadcasting in non-Turkish languages before, in June 2004. Although TRT was authorized by RTÜK as the public station to broadcast, there were serious hesitations within the institution for starting the broadcasts. Their major excuse was the article in the Law of the TRT, which required the use of “easily understandable, clear and beautiful Turkish”. With the encouragement of the AKP government, on June 2004 towards the resolution of the problems, the first non-Turkish language was heard on public television.

Before detailing these broadcasts, it is important to mention that there have been already broadcasts in languages other than Turkish in public and private channels. The titles of the laws and regulations concerning our subject matter might sound as if there has been no broadcasting other than Turkish; however, this is not true.

It has been a long time that all sorts of programs are broadcasted in foreign languages in radios and TV channels. Especially English has virtually become the language of the international cultural products like hit songs, video clips, movies and TV series. TV programs are sometimes broadcasted with Turkish subtitles. CNBC-e, the commercial channel of the workday, in other times broadcasts movies and TV series in their original languages, and has its own audience with the knowledge of English enough to follow the programs, who does not want to compromise the originality of the shooting in favor of a possibly impoverishing Turkish dubbing.

Apart from Turkish channels, the cable and satellite networks allow to watch virtually every TV channel in any language. The cable network, operated by the recently privatized Türk Telekom includes most known English-language news networks like BBC and CNN, and also other French, German, and Azeri channels. Satellite receivers enable access to hundreds of channels from all over the world.

The controversy is not about broadcasting in non-Turkish languages in general, but it was specifically about broadcasting in the minority languages *of* Turkey. A legal

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<sup>203</sup> “Kürtçe yayında kültürel devrim”, *Radikal*, June 11 (2006).

excuse of the “difficulty” of broadcasting in local/native/Muslim minority languages was declared by the general manager of RTÜK:

“The law considers English, French, Italian, German, and the like, as the languages that contribute to the universal science and culture. Kurdish is *considered out of this framework* [in the law]” (my emphasis, my translation, “Dilde kapsama alanı!”, *Zaman*, October 6 (2001)).

Languages of the west, in this narrative, are representing the advanced and “universal” culture and science, whereas the languages of Turkey, except Turkish of course, are deemed as divisive, backward, and not contributing to the universal science and culture. Surely, there is a cleavage between the political reasons of banning Kurdish and the discursive excuses presented in case of need.

The delicacy of the issue is a product of the ways in which the issue of minorities, other than the recognized non-Muslim communities, was dealt with. The peculiar ways of wording and practicing of minority language broadcasting should be assessed as the results of the stress of re-formulating the language regime. This stress guided the state for the formulation of an interesting classification of languages. As it was mentioned above, a similarly interesting invention was devised in 1983 when the Law no. 2932 banned the languages other than the first official languages of the states that were recognized by Turkey.

TRT broadcasting in minority languages included half-an-hour programs, titled as “*Kültürel Zenginliğimiz*” (Our Cultural Wealth) in the weekdays. The time allocation was arranged to broadcast in Bosnian on Mondays, Arabic on Tuesdays, Kurmanji on Wednesdays, Circassian on Thursdays and Zazaki on Fridays. The programs were broadcasted on TRT Radio 1 at 6.10 AM, and on TRT3 television at 10.30 AM with subtitles.

The administrators at TRT did not bother to contact with the authorities of these languages, as no authority of these languages were considered to exist. To avoid any relationship with a possible representation of the speakers of these communities, as representable cultural units, TRT attempted to manage broadcasts by its own resources and in its own peculiar style. The state apparently had no intention to give away its urge to govern the cultural domain. It was important for the authorities, with a tradition of

discursive emphasis on the power and capability of the state, not to be seen as it had to accept the demands of Kurds and the EU. The broadcasts were indeed presented as the courtesy of a great state.

On the opposite side, most of the speakers of these languages considered the broadcasts as linguistically poor and as a maneuver to escape the enforcements of the EU. The official broadcasting in minority languages, despite all its limitations has a symbolic meaning and power to re-constitute the discursive field of language politics. A closer look at results of the wave-effect that this symbolic change has triggered would be enlightening.

The very names of the programs, *Kültürel Zenginliğimiz*, resonates what Spitulnik defines as “the culturalization of ethnicity” (1998, p. 167). Starting with the definition of minority languages as “traditional languages and dialects that are used in the daily life”, the culturalization or folklorization of ethnicities excludes any political representation, which is in line with the republican tradition. Spitulnik describes the process as the diffusion of the political dimension (ibid.). A similar reaction came from the Kurdish Institute, of Istanbul, of which deputy executive criticized the broadcasts as the state aimed at to present Kurdish, therefore Kurds, as an ordinary cultural element.

Easily recognized is the insistence of the state in not assigning a status of language to Kurdish. While the dialectal varieties in Arabic, Bosnian or Circassian have been overlooked, those of Kurdish were underlined. Kurdish was split into two of its main dialects. Linguistic realities aside, the state’s position here is important. The state aims to maintain its symbolic power in registering its own linguistic categorization. Categorization of Circassian and Arabic as “language”s contrasts with classifying Kurdish out and presenting, instead, two “distinct dialects”. Being engaged in the business of broadcasting in “traditional languages and dialects” the state has to make a categorization. In this one, the established discourse on the way of existence of Kurdish was reproduced. The state decides, and it is willing to determine, which tongue is a language, or dialect and which one is not. This is a solid evidence of the centrality of the state as an institution of power in creating categorical realities, as discussed with reference to Blommaert (2005a), in chapter of theoretical framework.

Ece Temelkuran defines the situation as “the normalization of Kurdish” (2004). The culturalization of Kurdish ethnicity is accompanied by the division of the language



division into two categories. In this way, Kurdishness is de-politicized via fragmentation and presented as a traditional/ethnographic color. The state hence continues to use its political power to exclude Kurds and Kurdishness out of the political domain.

This “cultural expression of the nation’s wealth” was responded by widespread curiosity. Although they were very early in the morning, the first broadcasts were watched in crowded coffee houses and the clubs of the associations of various ethnic communities.

Kurdish communities mostly considered the broadcasts as an important step, however found it quite unsatisfactory in time and in quality. Especially the language quality was found to be quite poor. The criticisms aimed at the non-usage of appropriate letters of Q, X and W in the subtitles, frequent uses of Turkish and Arabic words, and not mentioning about Kurds or Kurdishness in neither of the broadcasts in Kurmanji and Zazaki.<sup>204</sup>

Other language groups, on the other hand, reacted in various ways. The most striking comment came from Bosnian speakers. Many members of *Bosna Sancak Kültür ve Yardımlaşma Derneği* (the Bosna Sancak Association of Culture and Solidarity) stated that they evaluate the broadcasts as unnecessary. *Bosna-Hersek Dostları Vakfı* (the Foundation of the Friends of Bosnia-Herzegovina) declared, “We did not demand such a broadcast. We sadly observe that there are those who are after tearing Turkey apart and colonize each of its part, and that they are using us for their own games”. The president of the Foundation made a written statement and rejected the minority status: “We are part of the Turkish nation, in belief and culture. We support with all our hearths the spirit and the understanding of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s ‘*Ne Mutlu Türküm diyene*’”. Other organizations of the Bosnian and Balkan communities signed the statement, as well.<sup>205</sup>

Circassian communities welcomed the broadcasts. However, they were too uncomfortable to be evaluated in the same framework with the Kurdish movement.

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<sup>204</sup> “Devlet Kırmancı konuştu”, *Radikal*, June 10 (2004).

<sup>205</sup> “Boşnaklar sitemkâr”, *Radikal*, June 8 (2004).

Muhittin Ünal, the president of *Kafkas Dernekleri Federasyonu* (the Federation of Caucasian Associations) stated

“Our demand is merely cultural. It is questioned whether our demands for education and broadcasting in Circassian would pose a threat to the unitarian regime of Turkey. Our demands are associated by others with the Kurdish movement. Circassians have no purposes. Our citizens with Caucasian origins did everything for the unity of our country. Our intention is to prevent the Circassians to forget their languages; they have already lost many of their cultural values.” (my translation, “Bugün Arapça yarın Kürtçe”, *Akşam*, June 8 (2004)).

Speakers of Arabic are also reported that they did not enjoy the broadcasts.

“Citizens of Arab origins reacted against the broadcasts in mother languages, like some of the Bosnian associations. Arabs, living in Adana, stated that they could not understand the broadcast as its dialect was different. Citizens told that those with Arab origins had no demand of broadcasting in mother languages and considered them as “separatism”. Arabs said that only the older generations spoke Arabic among each other and that many of the younger ones do not know Arabic.” (my translation, “Araplar da lehçeyi beğenmedi”, *Akşam*, June 9 (2004)).

In the same piece of news, only Arabs of Mardin were reported to welcome the broadcasts and that they were already watching Arabic stations of Syria, Iraq and Iran.<sup>206</sup>

On the side of the government, there was an apparent relaxation of getting rid of a heavy burden. However, MHP was quite angry about the developments. Devlet Bahçeli, the leader of the party, stated that the decision of broadcasting in Kurdish was in line with the determination of PKK to become legalized. He added that a Kurdish language is being created with the support of the state.<sup>207</sup> The main opposition party, CHP reacted in a different point of view. Its leader, Deniz Baykal told, “What has to be done is to leave this business to its owners. It is important to overcome the dogmas. However, it is

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<sup>206</sup> There was also protest against that there was no broadcasting in Laz. Ethnologist İsmail Bucaklışı stated that Laz people would feel like being discriminated (“İlk yayın Boşnaklar için”, *Birgün*, June 9 (2004)). The objection of Laz speakers brought the way the languages of the broadcasts are chosen.

<sup>207</sup> “Devlet Kırmancı konuştu”, *Radikal*, June 10 (2004).

not right to maintain this school show. The state cannot spend its money for the needs of any ethnic group”<sup>208</sup>

It is easy to understand the reactions concerning the time of the broadcasts or their linguistic quality. However, it is worth to comment on the sensitivity of the associations and foundations, of which organization was based on an ethnic identity, on being a minority.

One of the most remarkable points has been the strict refusal of a status of minority. Although in none of the official narratives induced by the law “minorities” are referred to, especially the representatives of the Bosnian associations seemingly felt it necessary to underline that they are first-class citizens in Turkey. Their statements, ironically, discloses the discursive implications of the notion of minority in Turkey.

The minorities of Turkey have a two basically different history. On the one hand, there have been officially recognized non-Muslim minorities. Being a minority, in the official discourse and in general public opinion meant to be a non-Muslim. This was also an ideological inheritance of the Ottoman Empire, of which political traditions recognized the non-Muslims as different and employed specific policies in their governance while considering Sunni Muslims as the “first class” subjects (Mahçupyan, 1998-1999). The republican popular culture, too, labeled them as others, or foreigners. However, in the republican decades, non-Muslims have been further excluded and many considered them as ungrateful traitors within us. This difference from the Ottoman period was derived from the widespread belief that the Empire was destroyed by the western imperialists with the help of non-Muslims and their “poisonous nationalisms”.

The construction of the Turkish national identity, typically, comprised the construction of the “other”, both of the outside and of the inside. What the Bosnian associations testified was indeed true; minorities are considered as second-class citizens in Turkey. And this consideration is so powerful that it conditions the narratives of the linguistic minorities in Turkey in a way that they, in the end, refrain from demanding the protection and support of their mother languages.

The non-Muslim minorities were on the agenda between 1960s and 1980s with respect to the mounting Greek nationalism in Cyprus, and the terror attacks of ASALA

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<sup>208</sup> “Baykal: Anadilde yayın devlet eliyle olmamalı”, *Radikal*, June 9 (2004).

(the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia). The Kurdish movement, which was on the rise in the 1970s, accompanied the resentment against non-Muslim in the revival of the notion of “minorities as traitors”. Kurdish problem was different in that religion, this time, was not the borderline between “us” and “them”. Being a minority or an ethnic group, or expressing cultural difference, throughout the 1980s and 1990s, was held equal to separatism and treason.

Both ways of minority existence, either as officially recognized non-Muslims or as denied Muslims, and the official discourse and practice against them enhanced the idea of that being a minority is not, and could not, be particularly a good situation in Turkey. This idea has been consequentially internalized even by the citizens with distinctively different cultural origins. At this point, it is worth to remind that it is a frequently declared notion by both Kurdish and Turkish politicians that Kurds could not be considered as a minority in this country, since they are the among the constitutive building blocks of the Republic (Aydın, 2005).

Political and cultural existence in Turkey is conceived to be possible and legitimate in so far as one stands close to the discursive center. As different cultural communities speaks the tone of the state on the issue of *Kültürel Zenginliklerimiz*, the weight of the state in the formation of the civil society becomes more evident.

To conclude; this chapter presented a historical overview of the changes in broadcasting language policies in Turkey in the 1990s and later. The presentation has been supplemented with an analysis of language ideological fluctuations across the society. The dynamics that brought about the radical transformation in the domain of radio and TV broadcasting have been effective on the debates on language at different levels. Changes in the social structures of Turkey (i.e. urbanization and commercialization, etc.) and in the availability of technological novelties that enables the transcendence of audio-visual national boundaries (via satellite and digital networks) led the emergence of major challenges to the established language regime. Moreover, politicization of ethnic and cultural differences within the context of compelling international relations such as the negotiations for membership to the EU introduced serious threats to the assumed unity and homogeneity of the linguistic topography of the society. Three appeared major fields of language debates with respect to broadcasting

issues: the “corruption” of Turkish by misusages, the intrusion of English and the status-related problems of the language with respect to the minority languages.

Practical consequences of these complicated processes have been less intricate, at least for the time being. With respect to the mounting criticisms of distortion of the linguistic essence of Turkish and the “invasion” of English structure, there are only some minor attempts from RTÜK – that are minor in comparison to the intensity of critiques. As reviewed above RTÜK has inconsistently warned or punished, from time to time, stations that were assessed to be using language in a pejorative way. Although there have been several attempts in the parliament to regulate the protection of Turkish, there is no

With regard to broadcastings in minority languages, there have been regulations that granted very limited freedoms for the use of languages of the non-official minorities. Besides, using those freedoms necessitates a very difficult and time-consuming bureaucratic application and approval processes.

However, ideological consequences of those changes have been much more complex. In the first place, the state has apparently lost its hegemonic position in the matters of language use in the audio-visual media. Despite some attempts for linguistic control through RTÜK, the central authority of the state seems no longer as effective in determining the variety of Turkish to be transmitted in broadcasts as it was before the commercialization of radio and television. On the other hand, an extensive circle of critiques that severely disapprove of what they consider as “linguistic corruption” has emerged. As noted above, criticisms on this problem are not reflected on the actual “malpractice” of language. There are not any evident developments in television or radio broadcastings with respect to their language use, except the beep over slang thanks to the fear of punishment by RTÜK. Similar to the fact that changes in broadcasting regimes of minority languages have been more subversive for the established language policies, the ideological confrontations on the issue have also been more acute. It could be assessed from the explorations of this chapter that the ideological consequences have emerged in two ways.

On the one hand, the developments concerning Turkey’s implementation of legal regulations in compliance with the EU membership caused the discourses on the rights and freedoms of language use to be formulated and to be expressed. For a long time,

there have been ideas of human and cultural rights, but they were rendered illegitimate within the hegemonic language regime. The EU process succeeded what civil and political enterprises in Turkey could not, and as a result, there emerged a multiplicity of the discursive multiplicity on the issue. On the other hand, this multiplicity and calls for a more liberal linguistic regime triggered nationalist sensitivities, as well. There has already been a mounting resentment against the Kurdish political demands and the international pressure concerning the denial of these demands. What could be evaluated as the republican lobby has also found the opportunity to consolidate their own discourses against any concession in favor of cultural difference. It is not that cultural difference is altogether denied, but the nationalist ideology denies any attempt to divert the Turkified representations of these differences. As exemplified with quotations from MHP deputies, this perspective usually acknowledges that there are Kurds, for example, and they speak a different language or dialect or tongue. However it refuses that the reality of linguistic difference is a sufficient condition for changing the regime of language, hence of citizenship. The patrimonial political tradition of the Republic strictly holds that the only legitimate way of political existence is Turkishness, or at least, not non-Turkishness. Such political demands are quickly drawn into a discursive context of independence and separation of the country, a context within which the nationalist ideology has better equipped for confrontations especially during the times when PKK intensifies its attacks. The emphasis on national independence also attracted support from so-called leftist politics that shifts the context of the problematic, this time, to the problematic of imperialism – a field that is much enhanced especially following the US invasion of Iraq.

In short, although forces that push for changes in Turkish language regime provided a discursive space within which demands that are insubordinate to the hegemonic republican/nationalist could be expressed. However, against the ideological and institutional power of the latter, these demands proved ineffective, yet, to bring about substantial changes in the politics of language in Turkey.

## CHAPTER 7

### CONCLUSION

The present chapter concludes the dissertation. As noted in the introductory chapter, this study has been designed in order to accomplish several objects. One major objective has been the explanation the current public debates on language. Such a discovery necessitates both a historical reading of “language” in modern Turkey, and also an evaluation of the recent social, cultural and political transformation that set the “infrastructure” of these debates. It has been assessed that the notion of language regime would enable the best theoretical framework for this enterprise. The concept of language regime has been introduced in Chapter 2. Before, the notion was used by Pool and Laitin but their usages involved in their formulation particular limitations for a comprehensive political analysis. I sought to enhance the concept with particular approaches that have been developed by the literature on language ideology; Foucault’s notion of power as a regime and Bourdieu’s symbolic domination; with Blommaert’s assertion of state’s centrality in the formation and dissemination of linguistic orders, and Coulmas’s focus on the changes in language policies in globalizing environments. It presumed that the furnished framework facilitated a wealthy analysis of both the history of Turkish language politics and their recent transformation.

The analysis articulated in this dissertation, therefore, poses an important challenge to the mainstream ideology of language in Turkey. The conventional understanding of language presupposes that (Turkish) language is an objective reality that has its own existence and power, independent of its social and political context. Situated within the context of nationalist politics, language is often taken as a primary field over which national pride and loyalty are demonstrated. However, as the thesis concludes, it is not only that a particular language regime has been *the* resource of the

generalization of such an understanding, but also that the very concept of “Turkish language” itself is a political and historical construction. This construction process involves the singularization and officialization of one particular linguistic variety (a choice that is conditioned socially and politically), a vigorous effort for the standardization of that variety, dissemination of the standard variety through domains such as education and mass communication. Conceptualized as a regime, language policies have been employed in order to secure the exclusiveness of the official language. These policies have deliberately excluded other varieties, tongues and languages as illegitimate ways of communication or expression of cultural identity.

What this thesis challenges is not only the public opinion about language, but also some particular manifestations in the social scientific world. As noted in the introductory chapter, the republican language ideology haunts many social scientists who write on Turkey. They either recall Turkish when they are discussing the language-planning situation in Turkey, without even referencing to Kurdish, which has been recently at the focal point of language planning. Even in critical studies, which try to uncover the political foundations of Republican language politics, an instrumental paradigm is dominant. Turkish is taken for granted, and analyses concentrate on the nationalist political impulses that instrumentalize language. However, as it was mentioned before and will be reviewed again in the present chapter, failing to spot the productive aspects of power inevitably brings about an uncompleted representation of the relationship between language and politics. In this sense, this thesis attempted to construe a more inclusive investigation that not only pays attention to how language has been constructed as a primary field of modernist and nationalist governmentality, but also to how exclusions and disseminations of the linguistic ideology through the linguistic regime has generated linguistic subjectivities.

In this conclusion chapter, I will first refer back to the theoretical chapter to explicate in what ways the employment of the framework of language regime has been effective in the analysis of politics of language in Turkey. Secondly, I will introduce some of the theoretical openings that are provoked by the implications of the theoretical framework that is based on the notion of language regime, and the questions developed in relation, with regard to the exploration of the Turkish language regimes.



To begin with, Pool's and Laitin's conceptions of a language regime provided formal classifications with which Turkish language regime could be reviewed.

As the thesis has been formulated mainly as a history of ideologies, Pool's account of various norms that are involved in the construction of language regimes (1991, p. 497), discussed in Chapter 2, could be employed to further reveal the ideational basics of the Turkey's language regime. Actually, deriving from the research presented in the chapters above, linguistic regime in Turkey inhabits some of these norms, simultaneously.

Turkey's regime of language, in the first place, could be identified with its emphasis on *distinctiveness* by favoring a language that is unique to the political community, the Turkish nation. The authentic language of the national culture was deemed representative of the uniqueness of the nation itself. The feature of linguistic authenticity was also further developed with the Language Revolution when the purification of Turkish and elimination of what was considered as non-Turkish elements from the language were the primary aims.

The language regime in Turkey is also found to be *uniformist*, by favoring only one single language. Turkish had been designated as the only official language since the first Ottoman Constitution of 1876. In that sense, the regime favored *stability* with respect to the privileged status of Turkish language, but not with respect to the freedoms enjoyed by the speakers of non-Turkish languages before the declaration of the Republic. The Republican policies of language have also been deliberately organized against the linguistic freedoms of non-Turkish speakers. Therefore, the Turkish language regime, until very recently, has also been *definitivist* in the way that it always excluded different linguistic options. The operators of the regime never stepped back from their determinacy of exclusion any language other than Turkish from the spheres of formal communication.

*Radicality* could be assessed as another characteristics of the language regime in Turkey, at least within the discourse of the Republican ideology. Radicality refers to "using language policies to liberate oppressed groups" (Pool, 1991, p. 497). The official Republican thesis, especially through the speeches by Atatürk, frequently pointed out to the desire of freedom within the Turkish "essence". A fight had been fought for independence prior to the establishment of the Republic. Now, another fight, this time

to liberate the minds of Turks should be fought by liberating the language from the tutelage of other languages. (Turan & Özel, 2007, p. 81). The definitive designation of Turkish as the sole medium of communication within the Republic has usually been associated with the overall struggle of ensuring the legitimacy of both the nation and its language.<sup>209</sup>

*Populism* is another norm valid mostly within the discourses of Turkish language regime. The complicatedness of the issue of populism comes from the divergence of the discursive and pragmatic elements of the Turkish nationalism, on the whole. A very frequently encountered theme of the Turkish nationalist ideology has been the celebration of the popular culture and other relevant elements that ensure the uniqueness of the nation, such as language. The birth of Turkist movement could be associated with the development of a national language and literature, especially by the intellectuals of the turn of the 20<sup>th</sup> century (see Şavkay, 2002). However, populist approaches have not completely concealed the elitism that is intrinsic to Turkish modernization. The governance of the society has been framed, around the turn of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, by the top-down modernization. Language has been, as shown above, a primary instrument of this modernizationist mission. This link connects to another norm that has been in effect in the construction and the consolidation of the regime of language in Turkey.

Another norm effective in the establishment of the Turkish language regime has been *modernizationism*.<sup>210</sup> As a reflection of the project of total modernization, the Republican language regime, on the one hand, endeavored for the development of the Turkish language in its capabilities of expressing “the modern culture”, and satisfying the latter’s communicational needs. The labor to produce Turkish equivalents of technical and intellectual terminologies, which was provided by Arabic, Persian and French languages before, was immense. On the other hand, the modernizationist aspect

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<sup>209</sup> Radicality has been also assigned to Kurds, especially, as Kurdish political elites have always considered Kurdish language as the groups’ primary cultural element, however, except for the development in Iraqi Kurdistan, it is hard to speak of a language regime operated by Kurds in Turkey.

<sup>210</sup> See Ayhan Akman (2004). Ayhan Akman introduces the notion of modernizationist nationalism with respect to the Turkish case in his article where he assesses the conventional categories of nationalism.

of the Turkish language regime is also reproduced in the negation of minority languages, but mainly of Kurdish. Kurdish has been consistently charged with a lack of unity and incapability to satisfy the needs of the modern world. Kurdish has usually been categorized as the language of the mountain folk or as a tribal tongue, of which varieties would be unable to form a standard medium for modern communication. The contrasted counter-fact has been, unsurprisingly, Turkish which is considered as a developed, legitimate and standard language of the Turkish nation.

With respect to Pool's account of norms in language regimes, what the Turkish case has not inhabited are *diversity* (favoring multiple languages), *liberty* (non-coercion), and *tolerability* (avoiding policies that would induce emigration or secession).

And, with respect to Laitin's distinction between rationalized (single-official language regime) and multilingual regimes, that has been discussed in Chapter 2, Turkey would be classified as to have a rationalized regime of language. Rationalization, in the way Laitin appropriates the concept from Weber, refers to both centralization and standardization of the sphere of communicative action. Among various settings in which rationalized language regimes are organized, Turkey falls into the second category defined by Laitin, which appears when "a dominant language group [has and practices] the power to impose its standard on a wider society" (Laitin, 2000, p. 151).

Although norms and typologies have been introduced into the conception of language regime, the literature on the subject, as revealed in Chapter 2, lacks the ideological dimension. This lack has been complemented with contributions from anthropologists that work on the formation and transformation of language ideologies. A language ideology has been defined as a consistent set of ideas, assumptions and beliefs on the nature of language and on the relationship of language with culture, identity and representation. Language ideologies have been identified to be effective in the structuration of linguistic dispositions of a political system, as well as of daily sociolinguistic interaction and inter-communal relations. The articulation of the notion of language ideology into the theoretical framework founded on the concept of language regimes has evidently empowered the analyses of the case studies in this dissertation. Language ideology has enabled the assessment of the ideational forces that had been in

effect in the formation of the language regime in Turkey. It has enabled a comprehensive evaluation of the ideas pertaining to language that have been generated and disseminated by the regime, as well.

Below are some specific implications of the theoretical framework that is based on the notion of language regime, and the questions developed in relation, with regard to the exploration of the Turkish language policies.

Safran comments on the political nature of language and states that competition for language:

“is not only an interethnic rivalry but also a conflict between elites and masses, religion and secularism, and ‘official’ and de facto languages. Languages are not only tools of nation-building but also means of political control. That is why ethnic minorities use language – for example, the demand for bilingualism – as a political strategy – as “a form of protest against political domination.” (2004, p. 4)

Recent concentration on minorities and their cultural and linguistic rights might deceive an observer. The claim for language, in order to protect, defend or propagate it, might have been considered as a “natural” reaction of linguistically subordinated communities.

However, the social scientific explanation has to uncover the historical and ideological background of language politics. And, such a search takes one back to the formation of nation-states, as constitutive institutions. Almost all nation-states have produced their own language regimes based on a common nationalist language ideology. This particular language ideology holds that language is the primary source and expression of the genuine communal culture, of which representation has been accomplished by the nation-state. Therefore, it has been the nation-state that employed nationalist language policies based on the prioritization of one standard national language. It has been the nation-state that disseminated a particular understanding of language and a particular way of its politicization. The link between language and ethnic/national identity and culture has been formulated and practiced by the nationalism of the nation-state. Moreover, it has been the nation-state that produced the social and political category of “minority” in the course of a series of discursive and practical ventures. The territorialization of the modern governance rendered some of the

population as the majority of which culture has been celebrated and refined by the nation-state, while leaving other segments as the minorities of which cultures and languages have been excluded, denied or terminated.

Sue Wright has relevantly commented as follows:

“For example, those engaged in the revitalization of minority languages believe that they can only do so by replicating nation building policy and planning processes. For example, languages become ‘endangered’ because they are not used in political institutions, commercial circles or education, and speakers appear to assign little value to them if they are only used as the media of civil society and domestic life.” (Wright, 2007, p. 247)

So, rather than a natural, instinctive urge to claim language in order to protect identity or distinctiveness, language politics of resisting subaltern communities emulate the language ideology developed and spread by nation-states. In Chapter 2, Blommaert’s insistence of the centrality of nation-states in the construction of language regimes was introduced. The analysis of the Turkish case, it is presumed, has been a substantiation of that the state is the crucial leading agent in the creation of both the status of minority and the ideology within which the political claims of ethnic/linguistic minority identity are generated.

The Turkish case, as it has been analyzed above within the conceptual framework of language regime, is a solid evidence of how the state has introduced the issue of language as a political domain. As the Turkish state instrumentalized language within every aspect of its modernization project, the notion of language became a politically loaded social phenomenon. Citizenship, national loyalty, national unity, cultural homogeneity and integrity have been defined also by the employment of, or the will to employ, the officialized variety of Turkish. Accordingly, any diversion from this enforced linguistic practice and ideology has been evaluated as treason, or disloyalty at best, the sacred notions of unity and integrity. Such a powerful construction of the legitimate domains of language politics rendered alternative discourses not only illegitimate but also irrelevant.

Paradoxically, the Turkish state not only produced the regime of language as one of its techniques of governmentality, but also it produced a fertile discursive domain for the generation of the subversion of its own linguistic regime. The major linguistic

problematic in front of the Turkish state seems to be Kurdish language. Now, the politics of Kurdish identity demands linguistic and cultural rights on the very basis that Turkish language has been politicized: the authentic expression of an authentic cultural community.

Eriksen narrates that a similar situation is experienced in France:

“Why do the survival and revival of the Breton language seem so important to many Bretons? It would be simplistic to say, as an explanation, that their language forms an important part of their cultural identity. After all, language shift has been widespread in Brittany (and elsewhere) for centuries. The militancy concerning language can therefore be seen as an anti-French political strategy. Since the French state chose the French language as the foremost symbol of its nationalism, the most efficient and visible kind of resistance against that nationalism may be a rejection of that language. For many years, it was illegal to speak Breton in public. Many Bretons are still bilingual and switch situationally between the languages. By using Breton in public contexts, Bretons signal that they do not acquiesce in French domination. A notion of cultural roots alone would not have been enough.” (Eriksen, 1993, p. 110).

In this sense, language has been formulated and presented as a political issue with the rise of Turkish nationalism, and it became the instrument of nation-state domination in Turkey. Now, in reverse, it becomes the instrument of ethnic resistance against this domination.

However, resistance is not the only response that dominated linguistic groups produced against domination. As presented above in the case of the Bosnians’ associations’ rejection of a minority status, some could be so much dominated that they might even reject an opportunity to express their linguistic existence.

This is the other facet of the productive aspect of power regimes in general and language regimes in particular. Language regimes are not only repressive – as they dominate and subordinate the uses of non-official and non-standard languages, but they are also productive, in the sense that they fabricate subjectivities of language politics either by internalization of the hegemonic discourse (as the Bosnians representatives did) or by resistance (as Kurdish movement did). Foucault’s conceptualization of power as productive, rather than being merely repressive is evidently helpful in this case to elucidate the complexity of the issue.

These are the assessments of the ideological panorama on the issue of language politics that have been revealed by the transformation of the Turkish language regime. As it has been reviewed throughout the thesis, the construction of a language regime in Turkey prioritized Turkish, as the language of the “only” legitimate state of being. The linguistic others were explicitly invited to the process self-assimilation into Turkishness (as Jews became the target of campaigns like *Vatandaş Türkçe Konuş!*) or they were totally excluded or denied of existence (as Kurds were).

The foundational indication of assimilation was speaking Turkish, an almost inevitable consequence of the very definition of language ideology of Turkish nationalism. As shown above, such a conception of language as the authentic representation of the authentic cultural identity is intrinsic to the modern nature of nationalism itself. One could shift one’s language and, hence, one’s identity.

The symbolic power that the official language regime generated by prioritizing Turkish also created linguistic categories; it also indexed a hierarchy of languages. In the research above, several cases of these categorizations have been presented, such as the classifications of languages in pre-1965 censuses or of the “traditional” languages to be broadcasted from TRT. This is clearly a verification of Bourdieu’s argument with respect to symbolic domination that the latter constructs realities (1991). Symbolic domination over and through language has constructed linguistic realities.

The historical overview of the language regime in Turkey in this study, which endeavored to present its story thoroughly up to the present day, is also considered as a contribution to the ongoing debate on the transformation of language regimes due to globalization. Coulmas has been the foremost scholar who worked on diverse responses that national language regimes generated as they encountered various challenges during the process of globalization (see 2005a; and 2007). A multiplicity of different case studies will undeniably add up to a wider understanding of globalization and its effects on national politics in general, and on language politics in particular.

There are several dimensions of the post-1980 subversion of the language regime in Turkey. The challenges were fundamentally posed by the intrusion of English via globalization, the rapid commercialization of the domains that were once deemed as service sectors of the state – with the mission of modernization – and the growth of

ethnic politics. Similar cases in other language regimes have been exemplified as much as possible.

However, the Turkish state is having hard times in responding the challenges posed by a much more vibrant cultural universe. The commoditization of culture, on the one hand, invaded the field of action of which the state was once the main agent. The global circulations of images, sounds and other resources of cultural capital as commodities have threatened the nation-states' assumed cultural governance. In this sense, the nation-state of Turkey experiences a reflection of global tendencies in which national language regimes have encountered substantial challenges.

Nevertheless, the crisis of the Turkish language regime is a sign that the power of the state could not secure full cultural homogeneity. An interesting outcome of the analysis of the language ideologies in Turkey reveals that almost everyone is quite interested in the protection of the language, many support its widespread use in new technologies and education, and however, it is hard to observe a material evidence of reification of this narrative. The most passionate militants of Turkish speak or write rather poorly, companies with English names see no problem to participate in the organization of a campaign to encourage the use of Turkish in every space. Or, the rates of applications to the schools with education in English are high enough to compel one to interrogate the problematic of how a widespread discourse on the protection of Turkish is rather poorly manifested in action. So, there is a clearly visible discrepancy between the discourse on language and the practice of language. With a preliminary consideration, it could be evaluated that this inconsistency is not far from the general mode of modernization in Turkey. The positivist paradigm of the Kemalist elites projected that the changes in the outfits, vocabulary, calendars or surnames would bring about the creation of a new man. But, even for the leaders of the Kemalist revolution, it was hard to get over the traditional ways of being. With respect to the issue of language, it is well known that many important figures of the one-party period were taking their personal notes in the old script, while propagandizing the use of the new, Latin alphabet.<sup>211</sup> Therefore, the discrepancy mentioned above is not a problem of those who

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<sup>211</sup> İsmet İnönü was a major example of such a political leader. His dairies have been written with the Ottoman script (Demirel, 2001). It would certainly be an interesting study to investigate how the elites of the Republic managed – or manipulated



are “not modern enough”. The very nature of Turkish modernization has similar problems. And, surely, this is not a unique problem for Turkey. In almost all late-modernizing countries, the schizophrenic rupture between the modern as an object of desire and the modern as a threat to the self (of the nation), created wounded consciousnesses (Shayegan, 2002).

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– this divergence between their own daily, private lives and their political discourses or actions.

## APPENDIX 1

### THE LAW ON PUBLICIZING IDEAS IN LANGUAGES OTHER THAN TURKISH

#### Türkçeden Başka Dillerde Yapılacak Yayınlar Hakkında Kanun

**Kanun Numarası:** 2932

**Kabul Tarihi:** 19/10/1983

**Yayımlandığı Resmi Gazete:** Tarih: 22/10/1983 Sayı: 18199 Sayfa: 27

**Yayımlandığı Düstur:** Tertip: 5 Cilt: 22 Sayfa: 810

**Durumu:** Külliyyatın yayımlanmasından sonra 12/4/1991 tarih ve 3713 sayılı Kanununun 23 üncü maddesi ile yürürlükten kaldırılmıştır.

#### **Amaç ve Kapsam:**

##### **Madde 1:**

Bu kanun; Devletin ülkesi ve milletiyle bölünmez bütünlüğünün, milli egemenliğinin, Cumhuriyetin, milli güvenliğin, kamu düzeninin korunması amacıyla düşüncelerin açıklanması ve yayılmasında yasaklanan dillere ilişkin esas ve usulleri düzenler.

#### **Düşüncelerin açıklanması ve yayılmasında kullanılmayacak diller**

##### **Madde 2:**

Türk Devleti tarafından tanınmış bulunan devletlerin birinci resmi dilleri dışında herhangi bir dille düşüncelerin açıklanması, yayılması ve yayınlanması yasaktır.

Türkiye Devletinin taraf olduğu milletlerarası andlaşma hükümleriyle eğitim, öğretim, bilimsel araştırma ve kamu kurum ve kuruluşlarının yayınlarına ilişkin mevzuat hükümleri saklıdır.

## **Türk vatandaşlarının anadili**

### **Madde 3:**

Türk Vatandaşlarının anadili Türkçedir.

a) Türkçeden başka dillerin anadili olarak kullanılmasına ve yayılmasına yönelik her türlü faaliyette bulunulması,

b) Toplantı ve gösteri yürüyüşlerinde, mahallin en büyük mülki amirinden izin alınmadıkça bu Kanunla yasaklanmamış olsa bile Türkçeden başka bir dille yazılmış afiş, pankart, döviz, levha ve benzerlerinin taşınması, plak, ses ve görüntü bantları ve diğer anlatım araç ve gereçleriyle yayım yapılması,

Yasaktır.

## **Ceza hükümleri**

### **Madde 4:**

a) 2nci madde ile 3üncü maddenin (b) bendinde belirtilen yasaklara aykırı harekette bulunanlar hakkında, fiilleri başka bir suç oluştursa bile ayrıca altı aydan iki yıla kadar hapis ve yüzbin liradan aşağı olmamak üzere ağır para cezası hükmolünür.

b) 3üncü maddenin (a) bendi ile yasaklanan hususlarda her ne surette olursa olsun faaliyette bulunanlar hakkında, fiilleri başka bir suç oluştursa bile ayrıca bir yıldan üç yıla kadar hapis ve yüzbin liradan aşağı olmamak üzere ağır para cezası hükmolünür.

Mahkemece yapılacak kovuşturma sonunda, mahkumiyet hükmüyle beraber her nevi elle yapılmış veya yazılmış veya basılmış kağıt ve eserler, plaklar, ses ve görüntü bantları, afiş ve pankartlar ile diğer anlatım araç ve gereçlerinin müsaderesine de hükmolünür.

Bu Kanun kapsamına giren yayın araç ve gereçlerinin kaçırılmasını, değiştirilmesini, ziyana uğramasını ve tahribini önlemek için tahkikatın her aşamasında gerekli görülen tedbirler alınır.

## **Toplatma kararı**

### **Madde 5:**

Bu kanundaki yasaklara aykırı olan her nevi elle yapılmış veya yazılmış veya basılmış kağıt ve eserler, plaklar, ses ve görüntü bantları, afiş ve pankartlar ile diğer anlatım araç ve gereçleri sulh ceza hakiminin kararıyla, gecikmesinde sakınca bulunan

hallerde mahallin en büyük mülki amiri tarafından verilecek kararlar toplattırılır. Toplatma kararını veren mülki amir bu kararı yirmidört saat içinde mahallin sulh ceza hakimine bildirir. Hakim, en geç üç gün içinde kararın onaylanıp onaylanmaması hakkında karar verir. Onaylanmama halinde, mülki amirin kararı hükümsüz kalır. Mahkemece verilen toplatmaya ilişkin kararlar o yer Cumhuriyet savcılığı tarafından diğer yerlerdeki Cumhuriyet savcılıklarına en seri vasıta ile bildirilir.

### **Muhakeme usulü**

#### **Madde 6:**

Bu kanunda yazılı suçları işleyenler hakkında soruşturma ve kovuşturmalar yer ve zaman kayıtlarına bakılmaksızın 3005 sayılı Meşhut Suçlara Muhakeme Usulü Kanunu hükümlerine göre yapılır.

### **Yürürlük**

#### **Madde 7:**

Bu kanun yayımı tarihinde yürürlüğe girer.

### **Yürütme**

#### **Madde 8:**

Bu kanun hükümlerini Bakanlar Kurulu yürütür.

## **APPENDIX 2**

### **MINORITY LANGUAGES IN CENSUSES OF TURKEY**

The figures in the following table are compiled from Eraydın-Virtanen (2003b), Tunçay (1983), and Dündar (1999). The table starts on the next page.

		1927	1935	1945	1950	1955	1960	1965
<b>Abaza</b>	1 <sup>st</sup> tongue		10,099	8,602	17,200	13,655	4,689	4,563
	2 <sup>nd</sup> language		2,108	1,265	-	1,489	8,018	7,836
	per 1000		0.75	0.53	0.82	0.63	0.46	0.40
<b>Albanian</b>	1 <sup>st</sup> tongue	21,774	14,496	14,165	16,079	10,893	12,000	12,832
	2 <sup>nd</sup> language		26,161	17,701	-	25,898	37,144	40,688
	per 1000	1.69	2.52	1.69	0.77	1.52	1.78	1.70
<b>Arabic</b>	1 <sup>st</sup> tongue	134,273	153,687	247,294	269,038	300,583	347,690	365,340
	2 <sup>nd</sup> language		34,028	60,061		95,612	134,962	169,724
	per 1000	9.85	11.62	16.35	12.84	15.34	17.39	16.99
<b>Armenian</b>	1 <sup>st</sup> tongue	67,745	57,599	47,728	52,776	56,235	52,756	33,094
	2 <sup>nd</sup> language		9,782	12,354	9,322	6,084	19,444	22,260
	per 1000	4.97	4.17	3.18	2.96	2.59	2.60	1.76
<b>Bosnian</b>	1 <sup>st</sup> tongue		24,615	10,900	24,013	11,844	14,570	17,627
	2 <sup>nd</sup> language		13,526	9,599		12,669	37,526	39,589
	per 1000		2.36	1.09	1.14	1.01	1.87	1.82

continues on the next page...

		1927	1935	1945	1950	1955	1960	1965
<b>Circassian</b>	1 <sup>st</sup> tongue	95,901	91,972	66,691	75,837	77,611	63,137	58,339
	2 <sup>nd</sup> language		14,703	9,779		22,861	65,061	48,621
	per 1000	7.04	6.60	4.07	3.62	4.17	4.62	3.40
<b>Georgian</b>	1 <sup>st</sup> tongue		57,325	40,076	72,604	51,983	32,944	34,330
	2 <sup>nd</sup> language		16,255	9,337		24,720	54,941	44,934
	per 1000		4.56	2.63	3.47	3.19	3.16	2.52
<b>Greek</b>	1 <sup>st</sup> tongue	119,822	108,725	88,680	89,472	79,691	65,139	48,096
	2 <sup>nd</sup> language		67,547	64,736	55,280	58,990	82,830	78,941
	per 1000	8.80	10.90	8.16	6.91	6.91	5.32	4.05
<b>Hebrew</b>	1 <sup>st</sup> tongue	68,900	42,607	51,019	35,786	33,010	19,399	9,981
	2 <sup>nd</sup> language		3,578	2,800	3,770	4,107	4,375	3,510
	per 1000	5.06	2.86	2.86	1.89	1.54	0.86	0.43
<b>Kurdish*</b>	1 <sup>st</sup> tongue	1,184,446	1,480,246	1,476,562	1,854,569	1,679,265	1,847,674	2,370,233
	2 <sup>nd</sup> language		114,456	117,130	215,352	263,020	469,458	447,080
	per 1000	86.90	98.69	84.82	98.82	80.71	83.49	89.75

\* Kurdish was evaluated in 3 groups in the 1950 census (*Kirdaşça, Kürtçe-Kirmanca, Zazaca*) and 4 in 1960 (*Kirdaşça, Kürtçe, Kirmanca, Zazaca*)

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		1927	1935	1945	1950	1955	1960	1965
<b>Laz</b>	1 <sup>st</sup> tongue		63,523	39,323	70,423	30,566	21,703	26,007
	2 <sup>nd</sup> language		5,061	4,956		19,144	38,275	55,158
	per 1000		4.23	2.36	3.36	2.07	2.16	2.59
<b>Pomak</b>	1 <sup>st</sup> tongue		32,661	10,287	36,612	16,163	24,098	23,138
	2 <sup>nd</sup> language		8,380	5,594		22,816	28,602	34,234
	per 1000		2.48	0.85	1.74	1.62	1.90	1.83
<b>Romani (Gypsy)</b>	1 <sup>st</sup> tongue		7,855	4,463				
	2 <sup>nd</sup> language		-	193				
	per 1000		0.58	0.28				
<b>Tatar</b>	1 <sup>st</sup> tongue		15,615	10,047				
	2 <sup>nd</sup> language		4,106	2,255				
	per 1000		1.22	0.65				
<b>Non-Turkish Speakers</b>	per 1000		1.22	0.65				
	percentage		153.54 %15.3	129.52 %12.9	138.34 %13.8	121.3 %12.1	125.61 %12.5	127.24 %12.7



### APPENDIX 3

#### LINGUISTIC DATA ON TURKEY IN THE *ETHNOLOGUE*

In the table below, the languages spoken in Turkey are exhibited, as they were presented by Ethnologue (Ethnologue Report for Turkey, 2005). Ethnologue is a US-based institution and conducts a worldwide study of linguistics data, for every country and linguistic group, of which results are published the on its web site at [www.ethnologue.com](http://www.ethnologue.com), and in printed format, as well (Gordon, 2005). Ethnologue states that the data is updated in every four years. Although the report quotes studies of linguistics for some of the presented data, the information should be considered with attention. For Kurdish and Turkish below, comparative numbers are presented.

Language	Information		Population *
	Alternate names	Dialects	
<i>Abaza</i>	Abazin, Tapanta, Abazintsy, Ahuwa	Tapanta, Ashkaraua (Ashkar), Bezshagh	10,000 (1995)
<i>Abkhaz</i>	Abxazo	Bzyb, Abzhui, Samurzakan	4,000 (1980)
<i>Adyghe</i>	Adygey, Circassian, Cherkes		277,900 (2000)
<i>Albanian</i>			15,000 (1980)
<i>Arabic</i>	Syro-Mesopotamian Vernacular Arabic		400,000 (1992)
<i>Armenian</i>	Haieren, Somkhuri, Ermenice, Armjanski	Eastern Armenian	40,000 (1980)
<i>Azerbaijani, South</i>	Azeri	Kars	530,000
<i>Bulgarian</i>	Pomak	Pomak	300,000 (2001)
<i>Crimean Turkish</i>	Crimean Tatar	Northern Crimean (Crimean Nogai, Steppe Crimean), Central Crimean, Southern Crimean	unknown

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<b>Dimli</b>	Southern Zaza, Dimli, Dimili, Zazaki, Zazaki	Sivereki, Kori, Hazzu (Hazo), Motki (Moti), Dumbuli (Dumbeli)	1,500,000 – 2,500,000 (1998)
<b>Gagauz</b>	Balkan Gagauz Turkish, Balkan Turkic	Gajol, Gerlovo Turks, Karamanli, Kyzylbash, Surguch, Tozluk Turks, Yuruk (Yoruk, Konyar)	327,000 (1993)
<b>Georgian</b>	Kartuli, Gruzin	Imerxev	40,000 (1980)
<b>Greek</b>			4,000 (1993)
<b>Gypsy</b>	Middle Eastern Romani, Tsigene, Gypsy, Domari [Kiptice in 1935 and 1945 censuses]	Karachi, Beludji, Marashi	28,461 (2000)
<b>Hértevin</b>		Hértevin Proper (Arton), Umraya, Jinet	1,000 (1999)
<b>Kabardian</b>			550,000
<b>Kazakh</b>			600 (1982)
<b>Kirmanjki</b>	Northern Zaza, Alevica, Dimilki, Dersimki, So-Bê, Zonê Ma	Tunceli, Varto. Closest to Dimli (Zazaki)	140,000
<b>Kumyk</b>	Kumuk, Kumuklar, Kumyki	Khasav-Yurt, Buinak, Khaidak	A few villages
<b>Kurdish, Northern</b>	Kurmanji, Kurmancî, Kirmancî, Kermancî, Kurdi, Kurdî	Boti (Botani), Marashi, Ashiti, Bayezidi, Hekari, Shemdinani	3,950,000 (1980)
<b>Ladino</b>	Dzhudezmo, Judeo Spanish, Sefardi, Judezmo, Hakitia, Haketia, Spanyol		8,000 (1976)
<b>Laz</b>	Lazuri, Laze, Chan, Chanzan, Zan, Chanuri		30,000 (1980)
<b>Osetin</b>	Ossete	Digor, Tagaur, Kurtat, Allagir, Tual, Iron	Unknown
<b>Pontic</b>		Arlija (Erli)	4,535 (1965)
<b>Romani</b>	Arlija		25,000
<b>Serbian</b>	Bosnian		20,000 (1980)
<b>Syriac</b>			extinct
<b>Tatar</b>			Unknown
<b>Turkish</b>	Türkçe, Türkisch, Anatolian	Danubian, Eskisehir, Razgrad, Dinler, Rumelian, Karamanli, Edirne, Gaziantep, Urfa	46,278,000 (1987)***

*continues on the next page...*

<b><i>Turkmen</i></b>	Trukhmen		925 (1982)
<b><i>Turoyo</i></b>	Süryani, Suryoyo, Syryoyo, Turani	Midyat, Midin, Kfarze, `Iwardo, Anhil, Raite	3,000 (1994)
<b><i>Ubykh</i></b>		Ubyx, Pekhi, Oubykh	extinct
<b><i>Uyghur</i></b>	Uighur, Uygur, Uigur		500(1981)
<b><i>Uzbek, Southern</i></b>			1,981 (1982)

\* The numbers do not describe the ethnic group.

\*\* The number is apparently very low. In other two studies, in which the 1965 census results were re-formulated according to the demographic data (such as birth-rates and migration), the number of the Kurdish speakers are estimated to be 7,224,402 (Özsoy & Koç, 1992, p. 113; quoted in Dündar F. , 1999, p. 116) and 7,046,025 (Mutlu, 1995, p. 49; quoted in Kirişçi & Winrow, 1997, p. 123). A research, made in 2007 by a private research company KONDA for the daily newspaper *Milliyet*, found out that for 11.97% of the population, Kurdish (Kurmanji and Zazaki) is the mother language. This percentage corresponds to 8,735,000 according to the population of Turkey in 2007, which is 72,9750,000 (“Biz Kimiz?”, *Milliyet*, March 22 (2007)).

\*\*\* In the research by KONDA in 2007, the number of the population who has Turkish as the mother language is estimated to be 84.54%, which corresponds to a number of 61.693.065 (ibid.).

## APPENDIX 4

### SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN THE CASE AGAINST *EĞİTİM-SEN*

The following text is a part of reasoned decision of the Supreme Court in the case against *Eğitim-Sen*, which was persecuted in 2005 for defending the right of education in mother languages. The quoted parts are Section G on the controversy and Section H on rationale.<sup>212</sup>

Yargıtay Hukuk Genel Kurulu'nun Eğitim-Sen'in kapatılma davasına ilişkin, 2005/9-320-355 sayılı gerekçeli kararının, Uyuşmazlık ve Gerekçe bölümlerinin tam metni:

#### **G-UYUŞMAZLIK:**

Davalı Eğitim ve Biiim Emekçileri Sendikası Tüzüğü'nün "**Sendikann Amaçları**" başlıklı. 2. maddesinin (b) bendinde; "**Toplumun bütün bireylerinin temel insan haklan ve özgürlükleri doğrultusunda demokratik, laik, bilimsel ve parasız eğitim görmesini, bireylerin anadillerinde öğrenim görmesini ve kültürlerini geliştirmesini savunur**" denilmiştir ve davalı sendika yukarıda gerekçede yer verildiği üzere yapılan uyarılara karşın, Tüzüğü'nde yer alan bu ifadenin Anayasa ve yasalara bir aykırılık teşkil etmediğini, uluslararası sözleşmelerin konuya ilişkin değerlendirmelerine uygun olduğunu, bu nedenle tüzüklerinde değişiklik yapmayacaklarını bildirmiştir.

Görüldüğü üzere yerel mahkeme ile Özel Daire arasındaki uyuşmazlık, sendika tüzüğü'nün (sendikaların amaçları) bölümünde yer alan, "**...bireylerin anadillerinde öğrenim görmesini savunur**" ibaresinin kanuna, Cumhuriyetin temel niteliği ve demokratik esaslar unsuruna aykırılık oluşturup oluşturmadığı noktalarında toplanmaktadır.

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<sup>212</sup> “Yargıtay'ın Eğitim Sen Gerekçeli Kararı”, *Bianet* (2005)

## H-GEREKÇE:

### a)Anayasa Açısından İrdeleme:

Türkiye Cumhuriyeti, tek yapılı yani üniter bir devlettir. Bu husus Anayasa'nın 3.maddesinde açıkça "**Türkiye Devleti, ülkesi ve milletiyle bölünmez bir bütündür**" denilmek suretiyle ifadesini bulmuş ve bu niteliğin doğal bir sonucu olarak da maddede dilinin Türkçe olduğuna yer verilmiştir. Yine bu niteliğin bir başka sonucu olarak 42.maddenin son fıkrasında, Türk vatandaşlarına eğitim ve öğretim kurumlarında Türkçe'den başka hiçbir dilin anadil olarak okutulamayacağı ve öğretilmeyeceği bir Anayasa kuralı olarak öngörülmüştür.

Bir başka deyişle milletin bütünlüğü, kamusal yaşamda milletin tekliği demektir ve bu nedenle kamusal yaşamda ulusal kültür geçerlidir ve hukukun koruması altındadır. Özel yaşamda ise herkes ait olduğunu hissettiği kültürü yaşayabilir (Bülent Tanör-Necmi Yüzbaşıoğlu, 1982 Anayasasına göre Türk Anayasa Hukuku, Yapı Kredi Yayınları, İstanbul, 2001, sn: 106).

Devletin tekliği, üniter oluşu Anayasa'nın 4.maddesine göre değiştirilemez ve değiştirilmesi teklif; dahi edilemez.

Anayasa'nın 66. maddesinde ise "**Türk Devletine vatandaşlık bağı ile bağlı olan herkes Türktür**" denilmiştir.

Devletin ülkesi ve milletiyle bölünmez bütünlüğü kuralı sadece kanun koyucuyu değil, bütün kurumlan ve vatandaşları da bağlayan, onlar açısından da sonuç doğuran bir ilkedir.

42.maddenin 4.fıkrası ise, açıkça "**Eğitim ve öğretim hürriyetinin Anayasaya sadakat borcunu ortadan kaldırmayacağını**" öngörmektedir.

Bütün bunlardan çıkan kesin sonuç, Türkiye Cumhuriyetinde öğrenimin Türkçe ile yapılacağı hususudur.

Ana dil en yalın tanımıyla, bireylerin yakın çevreleriyle ilk etkileşimini sağladığı dili ifade eder.

Kişi ana dilini çevresinde öğrenir ve Türkçe'nin kullanımının zorunlu olduğu alanlar dışında bu dili istediği gibi kullanır.

Nitekim toplumda kullanılan farklı dil ve lehçelerin öğrenilmesi bu dil ve lehçelerde yayın yapılabilmesi demokratik bir hak olarak kabul edilmiş ve bu amaç yapılan yasal düzenlemeler hayata geçirilmiştir.

Bu düşüncenin sonucu ve somutlaştırılması olarak da, 2923 sayılı Yabancı Dil Eğitim ve Öğrenimi İle Türk Vatandaşlarının Farklı Dil ve Lehçelerinin Öğrenilmesi Hakkında Kanun ile Türk vatandaşlarının günlük yaşamlarında geleneksel olarak kullandıkları farklı dil ve lehçelerin öğrenilmesine olanak sağlanmış, esasları düzenlenmiş, bu yöndeki hak ve özgürlüklerin uygulanmasına yer verilmiştir.

Buna paralel bir düzenleme olarak 3984 sayılı Radyo ve Televizyonların Kuruluşu ve Yayınları Hakkında Kanun ile de Türk vatandaşlarının günlük yaşamlarında geleneksel olarak kullandıkları farklı dil ve lehçelerde yayın yapılabilmesi olanaklı hale getirilmiştir.

Ancak, ana dilde öğrenim ise çok farklı bir kavramdır ve ilk öğretimden itibaren tüm eğitim ve öğretimin devletin resmi dili dışında, farklı dillerde de eğitim ve öğretimde kullanılmasını gerektirir. Bir başka deyişle ana dilde öğrenim haklarının hayata geçmesi, bir devlette sayısı belirsiz ana dilin kamusal alana taşınması demektir.

Bu da üniter bir devlet olan, ülkesi ve milletiyle bölünmez bir bütün olan, dili Türkçe olan Türkiye Cumhuriyetinin Anayasası ile bağdaşmaz. Anayasamız gereği Türkiye Cumhuriyetinde **"Türkçe'den başka hiçbir dil, eğitim ve öğretim kurumlarında Türk vatandaşlarına ana dilleri olarak okutulamaz ve öğretilmez"**.

Çünkü farklı dil ve lehçeleri sadece bir kültür ögesi görmek yerine, bu öğelerin **"farklı ana diller"** adı altında eğitim ve öğretim alanına sokmayı amaçlamak, yukarıda da belirtildiği gibi Anayasaya aykırılık oluşturması yanında, toplumsal çelişkileri, eğitim, öğretim, bilimsel ve kamusal alanda da artırmaya neden olacaktır.

Türkçe eğitim almak, ülkenin kamusal alanlarına, aldığı bu eğitim ve öğretim doğrultusunda katılacak yurttaşlar için bir hak, Türk dilinde eğitim ve öğretim yaptırmakta, yurttaşlarını hiçbir ayırım gözetmeksizin yurttaşlık statüsüyle kendisine bağlamış Türkiye Cumhuriyetinin, yurttaşlarına sunduğu bir hizmet, bir görevdir. Ana dilde öğrenimin hayata geçmesi demek, bir devlette sayısı belirsiz ana dilin kamusal alanda boy göstererek bireyler aracılığıyla kamusal alana taşınması demek olacaktır ki, bu da, yukarıda da belirtildiği üzere ulusal bütünlüğünü, ülkesi ve milletiyle bölünmezliğe ve diline bağlayan Cumhuriyetin üniter yapısı ile bağdaşmaz.

Bu durumda davalı sendikanın, bireylerin ana dillerinde öğrenim görmesini savunması açıkça Anayasaya aykırıdır.

### **b)Kamu Görevlileri Sendikaları Kanunu Açısından İrdeleme:**

Anayasanın yukarıya da aynen alınan 51.maddesi, Sendika kurma hakkını düzenlemiş ve bu hakkın hangi nedenlerle sınırlanabildiğini de göstermiştir.

4688 sayılı Kamu Görevlileri Sendikalar Kanunu'nun; 3/f maddesi Sendikayı, **"kamu görevlilerinin ortak ekonomik, sosyal ve mesleki hak ve menfaatlerini korumak ve geliştirmek için oluşturdukları tüzel kişiliğe sahip kuruluşlardır"** şeklinde tanımlanmıştır.

Görüldüğü üzere bu Kanun ile kamu görevlilerinin ortak ekonomik, sosyal ve mesleki hak ve çıkarlarının korunması ve geliştirilmesi amaçlanmıştır ve uluslararası sözleşmelerde de anlamını bulan örgütlenme özgürlüğünün somut bir göstergesidir, şeklindedir. Ancak bu örgütlenme Özgürlüğü, hiçbir zaman fertlerin Anayasada ifadesini bulan Cumhuriyetin temel niteliklerine ve demokratik esaslara aykırı faaliyette bulunmalarına olanak vermez.

Üzerinde durulması gereken husus bu amaca ulaşmada kullanılan yöntem ve araçların amaçları gerçekleştirmekte gerekli ve yeterli bulunup bulunmadığı, demokratik esaslar karşısında ölçülü bir yaklaşımın benimsenip benimsenmediğidir. Bu yön sadece anılan tüzel kişilik için değil, tüm toplumsal kesitler için de siyasal, ekonomik ve en önemlisi toplumsal uzlaşma ve ortak gelecek için benzeri anlamları ifade etmelidir.

4688 sayılı Kamu Görevlileri Sendikaları Kanunu'nun kuruluş işlemlerini düzenleyen 6. maddesi uyarınca sendika tüzüğüne içerdiği bilgilerin kanuna aykırılığının tespit edilmesi halinde, ilgili valilik eksikliklerin tamamlanmasını istemekte, tamamlanmadığı takdirde ise, mahkemece, kanuna aykırılığın veya eksikliğin giderilmesi için bir süre verilmekte, verilen süre sonunda tüzük ve belgeler kanuna uygun hale getirilmemişse, sendika veya konfederasyonun kapatılmasına karar verilmektedir.

Madde hükmü ile, sendika tüzüğüne, kamu çalışanlarının sosyal, ekonomik ve kültürel menfaatlerini sağlamaya uygun nitelikteki unsurlardan oluşması

amaçlanmaktadır. Bir ölçüde, sendika hakkının kapsamı belirlenmekte, sendika hakkı adı altında sınırsız bir örgütlenme hakkının ve yararlanmanın söz konusu olamayacağı ifade edilmeye çalışılmaktadır.

Davalı Sendikanın Tüzüğü'nün 2/b maddesindeki "**bireylerin ana dillerinde öğrenim görmesini...savunur**" şeklinde belirtilen amacını; düşüncenin ifade edilmesinden başka bir şey değildir, şeklinde savunulmasını, geçerli kabul etmek mümkün değildir. Çünkü dernek, vakıf, sendika, siyasi parti vb. kurumların örgütlenmelerine ilişkin esasları, özel olarak bu konulan düzenleyen Anayasal ve yasal hükümlerin dışına çıkarıp, genel bir düşünce ve örgütlenme özgürlüğü kapsamında ele almak, bu, kuruluşların tabi tutulduğu özel yasaların varlık sebebini ve amacını ortadan kaldırmak veya görmezden gelmek olur ki, bu da genel hukuk mantığına aykırıdır. Hukuk mantığı ve ilgili yasalarla kurulması ve korunması amaçlanan hukuk düzeni, böyle bir yorumu kabule olanak vermez.

4688 sayılı Kamu Görevlileri Sendikaları Kanunu'nun 7/b maddesinde, sendikaların tüzüklerinde amaçlarının yer alacağı, 20.maddesinde ise sendika ve konfederasyonların yönetim ve işleyişlerinin Anayasada belirtilen Cumhuriyetin niteliklerine ve demokratik esaslara aykırı olamayacağı, kurala bağlanmıştır.

Davalı Sendika, tüzüğü'nün "**Sendika amaçları**" başlıklı 2.maddesinin (b) bendinde:

"Toplumun bütün bireylerinin, temel insan hakları ve özgürlükleri doğrultusunda demokratik, laik, bilimsel ve parasız eğitim görmesini, **bireylerin anadillerinde öğrenim görmesini** ve kültürlerini geliştirmesini savunur."

Amacına yer vermiştir.

Bu amacı, yukarıda belirtilen, Anayasanın 51, 4688 sayılı Kanunun 3/f, 7/b ve 2G.maddeleri ile bağdaştırmak mümkün değildir. Çünkü bir sendika, Anayasanın kamu görevlileri sendikası için öngörüp çizdiği sınırlar çerçevesinde faaliyette bulunmak zorundadır ve faaliyette bulunurken de, Anayasanın öngördüğü ve buna dayalı olarak çıkartılan Kanunun da belirlediği ilkelere kesinlikle uyması gerekir.

Davalı sendikanın bireylerin anadilde öğrenim görmesini amaçlaması, bu bakımdan da Kamu Görevlileri Sendikaları Kanunu'na ve Anayasaya aykırıdır.



**c)Anayasamn 90/son Maddesi ile İnsan Haklan Avrupa Sözleşmesinin 10 ve 11.Maddeleri Açısından İrdeleme:**

Kapatma davasının konusu olan tüzük kuralını ulusa! ve uluslararası hukuk çerçevesinde değerlendirmeden önce Anayasanın 90/son maddesi ile oluşan durum üzerinde durmak, bu düzenlemenin anlamını ortaya koymak gerekir.

Son fıkraya eklenen cümlede aynen;

"Usulüne göre yürürlüğe konulmuş temel hak ve özgürlüklere ilişkin milletlerarası andlaşmalarla kanunların aynı konuda farklı hükümler içermesi nedeniyle çıkabilecek uyuşmazlıklarda milletlerarası andlaşma hükümleri esas alınır."

Denmektedir.

Bu düzenleme, ulusal hukuk ile uluslararası sözleşmeler arasında oluşabilecek çatışma sorununa çözüm getirmeyi amaçlamıştır.

90. madde uyarınca uluslararası andlaşmaların anayasaya aykırılığı iddia edilemeyeceği için bu andlaşmaların Anayasa ile birlikte yorumlanması gerekecektir.

Anayasanın 25. maddesi ile düşünce ve kanaat hürriyeti, 26.maddesi ile düşüncüyü açıklama ve yayma hürriyeti, 51. maddesi ile sendika kurma hakkı düzenlenmiştir. İnsan Haklan Avrupa Sözleşmesinin ifade özgürlüğünü düzenleyen 10., Örgütlenme özgürlüğünü düzenleyen 11. maddeleri, Kamu Hizmetinde Örgütlenme Hakkının Korunması ve İstihdam Koşullarının Belirlenmesi Yöntemlerine İlişkin Sözleşme, Sendika Özgürlüğüne ve Örgütlenme Hakkının Korunmasına İlişkin Sözleşme, Örgütlenme ve Toplu Pazarlık Hakkına İlişkin Sözleşmeler de dikkate alındığında, bu sözleşmeler ve diğer mevzuat iç hukukumuzda bütünleşmiş belgeler niteliği ile yargı yerlerini de bağlayan onaylanmış uluslararası sözleşme niteliğindedir.

Belirtilen metinlerde, ifade ve örgütlenme özgürlüklerinin önündeki yasal ya da yönetsel engeller açılmaya, kapsamı genişletilmeye çalışırken, bir kısım sınırlamalara da yer verildiği görülmektedir.

Davalı Sendika tüzüğünde yer alan ibarenin, ifade ve örgütlenme özgürlüğü kapsamında hukuksal koruma bulup bulamayacağı sorununa gelince;

Anayasanın 26.maddesi ile, **"Bu hürriyetlerin kullanılması, milli güvenlik, kamu düzeni, kamu güvenliği, Cumhuriyetin temel nitelikleri Devletin ülkesi ve milleti ile bölünmez bütünlüğünün korunması, suçların önlenmesi, suçluların cezalandırılması, Devlet sırrı olarak usulünce belirtilmiş bilgilerin açıklanmaması, başkalarının şöhret veya haklarının, özel ve aile hayatlarının yahut kanunun öngördüğü meslek sırlarının korunması veya yargılama görevinin gereğine uygun olarak yerine getirilmesi..."** amaçlarıyla **"düşünceyi açıklama ve yayma"** özgürlüğünün sınırlanabileceği, Anayasanın 51.maddesi ile sendika kurma hakkının, **"...ancak, milli güvenlik, kamu düzeni, suç işlenmesinin önlenmesi, genel sağlık ve genel ahlak ile başkalarının hak ve özgürlüklerinin korunması sebebiyle ve kanunla..."** sınırlanabileceği, İnsan Hakları Avrupa Sözleşmesinin 10. maddesinde ifade özgürlüğünün **"...ulusal güvenliğin, toprak bütünlüğünün veya kamu güvenliğinin korunması, asayişsizliğin veya suç işlenmesinin önlenmesi, sağlığın veya ahlakın, başkalarının ün ve haklarının korunması, gizli kalması gereken haberlerin yayılmasına engel olunması veya yargı gücünün otorite ve tarafsızlığının sağlanması için kanunla öngörülen bazı formalite/ere, şartlara, sınırlamalara ve yaptırımlara..."** bağlanabileceği, benzeri nedenler ile Sözleşmenin 11. maddesinde tanımını bulan örgütlenme ve toplantı özgürlüğüne engeller konulabileceği, Sendika Özgürlüğüne ve Örgütlenme Hakkının Korunmasına İlişkin Sözleşmenin 8. maddesinde belirtildiği üzere, **"Çalışanlar ve işverenlerle bunlara ait örgütler bu sözleşme ile kendilerine tanınmış olan hakları kullanmada, diğer kişiler veya örgütlenmiş topluluklar gibi, yasalara uymak zorunda..."** olduklarına dikkat çekilmektedir. Ulusal hukuka bakıldığında sınırlamalara ilişkin düzenlemenin Sözleşmenin 10 ve 11. maddelerinin göz önüne alınarak yapıldığı görülmektedir.

İnsan Hakları Avrupa Sözleşmesinin 10 ve 11. maddeleri, görüldüğü üzere güvenceye alınan haklar yanında sınırlama nedenlerine de yer vermiştir. Belirtilen sınırlama nedenleri yanında diğer önemli bir yön, sınırlamanın **"yasa ile"** getirilmiş olması ve özellikle de **"demokratik toplumlarda zorunlu önlemler"** niteliği taşımasıdır. Bu koşul, sınırlamaların istisna oluşuyla yakından ilgilidir. Sendika hakkına getirilen yasak ve sınırlamaların iç hukuk düzenlemeleriyle temel hak ve özgürlüklere

ilişkin uluslararası andlaşmalara uygun bulunup bulunmadığı, iç hukuk düzenlemelerinin bu andlaşmalarla uyumlu olup olmadığının belirlenmesi gerekir.

Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin, daha önce belirtilen tek yapılı (üniter) devlet anlayışına uygun olarak Anayasanın 3 ve 42. maddelerinde ifadesini bulan, ülke sınırları içerisinde eğitim ve öğretim alanında anadil birliğinin sürdürülmesi yönündeki ulusal istencini işlevsiz kılmaya yönelik bir sendika! amacın, üyelerinin çalışma hayatına yönelik olumlu bir katkıyı ifade edemeyeceği ve yürürlükte bulunan Anayasal ve yasal sisteme aykırı olduğu belirgindir.

Bu nedenle tüzükte yer verilen Anayasa ve ilgili yasaya uyarlılık göstermeyen amaç bendinde belirtilen değişikliğin yapılmasının, ifade ve örgütlenme özgürlüğü alanında demokratik bir eksiklik yaratmayacağı açıktır. Bu açıdan sendika hakkı bu sınırlı nedenle kısıtlanabilir ve sınırlamanın demokratik toplum düzeni için zorunlu bir önlem niteliği taşıdığı kabulü gerekir. Bu bakımdan davalı Sendikanın anadilde öğrenim savunmasının Anayasa'nın 90/son maddesi ile İnsan Hakları Avrupa Sözleşmesinin 10 ve 11. maddesine dayandırılması da olanaksızdır

#### **d) İrdemelerden Ulaşılan Sonuç:**

Anayasamızın 51. maddesi ile 4688 sayılı Kanununun 20 ve 37.maddeleri davalı Sendikaya yapılan müdahalelerin yasal dayanaklarıdır. Bu yasaların koruduğu alan ise Cumhuriyetin temel niteliklerine ilişkin Anayasanın 3 ve 42/son cümlesindeki kurallardır.

Eş söyleyişle; ana dilde öğrenim görmeyi savunmak Anayasamızın 3 ve 42/6. madde!eri ile belirtilen hükümlere aykırı bulunduğu, taraf olduğumuz uluslararası temel hak ve özgürlüklere ilişkin sözleşmelerle uyumlu iç hukuk düzenlemeleri ve kurallarıyla çatıştığı, demokratik bir toplumda, (üniter devlet yapısını bozmayı amaçlamanın yaptırımının) zorunlu önlemler niteliğinde bulunduğu gözetildiğinde, yukarıda belirtilen nedenler ve Hukuk Genel Kurulu'nca da benimsenen Özel Daire bozma kararına uyulmak gerekirken önceki kararda direnilmesi usul ve yasaya aykırıdır. Bu nedenle direnme kararı bozulmalıdır.

**SONUÇ:** Davacının temyiz itirazlarının kabulü ile, direnme kararının yukarıda açıklanan ve Özel Daire bozma kararında gösterilen nedenlerden dolayı H.U.M.K'nun 429.maddesi gereğince **BOZULMASINA**, 25.5.2005 gününde bozmada oybirliği, sebebinde oyçokluğuyla karar verildi.

## APPENDIX 5

### MUNICIPAL ACTS TO PROTECT TURKISH LANGUAGE

Below is table that lists the municipalities as of June 2008, which either recommended the use of Turkish language and letters of the Turkish alphabet in signboards, shop names or the names of public spaces such as streets, squares, etc., or decreed decisions which ruled that the use of Turkish and Turkish letters in the defined areas is mandatory. The types of the municipal decrees are noted with “+” respectively. Where the regulation compells the use of Turkish, the municipalities refuse issuing new lincenses or cancel existing ones.

Municipality	Recommendation	Obligation	Year
19 Mayıs / Samsun*			2008
Afyon	+		1995
Akçay / Edremit - Balıkesir		+	2007
Alaşehir / Manisa*			2006
Amasya		+	2006
Aydın		+	2006
Bala / Ankara		+	2007
Balıkesir	+		2006
Beldibi / Antalya	+		2006
Beldibi / Muğla		+	2006
Beykoz / İstanbul		+	2006
Beypazarı		+	2002
Bitez / Bodrum		+	**
Bodrum		+	2007
Bolu		+	2004
Boyabat / Sinop	+		1995
Bozüyük / Bilecik		+	2007
Bulancak / Giresun*			2006

*continues on the next page...*

Burdur	+		2003
Cumapazarı / Aydın*			2006
Çanakkale		+	2005
Çankaya / Ankara	+		2008
Çıldır / Ardahan*			2007
Çorlu	+		2007
Demirci / Manisa		+	2006
Denizli		+	2006
Dereli / Giresun		+	2007
Emiralem*			2007
Erbaa / Tokat	+		1999
Ermenek	+		2003
Erzincan		+	2006
Eskişehir Metropolitan		+	2003
Espiye / Giresun	+		2007
Fethiye		+	2004
Gazi / Samsun*			2008
Giresun	+		2007
Gönen / Balıkesir	+		1996
Gümüşler / Denizli		+	2006
Hisarcık / Kütahya		+	2003
Ilgaz İlçesi / Çankırı		+	2005
İlgın*			2006
İkizdere / Rize	+		2007
İnegöl*			2007
Kahramanmaraş*			2006
Karabük		+	2006
Karaman		+	1994
Karayılan / Hatay	+		1996
Karşıyaka / İzmir		+	2007
Kavak / Samsun*			2008
Kayseri Metropolitan	+		1996
Keçiören / Ankara	+		1997
Keşap / Giresun*			2007

*continues on the next page...*

Kırşehir	+		1996
Kocasinan / Kayseri	+		1999
Konya Metropolitan	+		1995
Malatya		+	2003
Mamak / Ankara*			2008
Manisa	+		2007
Meram / Konya		+	2007
Milas*			2003
Niksar / Tokat	+		1997
Nilüfer / Bursa		+	2002
Odunpazarı / Eskişehir		+	2007
Ölüdeniz / Muğla	+		2006
Piraziz / Giresun	+		2006
Reşadiye / Tokat	+		2006
Seyhan / Adana		+	2008
Sivas ***			2007
Sungurlu / Çorum*			2008
Tarsus / Mersin		+	2007
Taşova / Amasya*			2003
Tokat	+		2006
Turgutlu / Manisa		+	1995
Uşak	+		2006
Yalova	+		2001
Yeşil Dumlupınar / Çankırı		+	2005
Yozgat		+	2007
<b>Total: 78 municipalities</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>33</b>	

\* No information on the content of the regulation was available. The names of these municipalities are taken from the list of the municipalities that were awarded by TDK. The list is retrieved on July 24, 2008 from [www.tdk.gov.tr](http://www.tdk.gov.tr).

\*\* There are news of the implementation of the Municipality of Bitez the rules concerning the use of Turkish,<sup>213</sup> however, the date of the relevant regulation was unavailable.

\*\*\* Extra tax is assigned for signboards in non-Turkish languages.

<sup>213</sup> “Bitez’de tabelalar değişiyor”, *Kent TV*, May 02 (2007)

## APPENDIX 6

### REGULATION ON BROADCASTING IN NON-TURKISH LANGUAGES

#### **Türk Vatandaşlarının Günlük Yaşamlarında Geleneksel Olarak Kullandıkları Farklı Dil ve Lehçelerde Yapılacak Radyo ve Televizyon Yayımları Hakkında Yönetmelik**

**Yönetmelik Numarası:** 25357

**Yayımlandığı Resmi Gazete:** 25/01/2004

#### **BİRİNCİ BÖLÜM**

##### **Amaç, Dayanak, Tanımlar**

##### **Amaç**

**Madde 1** - Bu Yönetmeliğin amacı, kamu ve özel radyo ve televizyon kuruluşlarının radyo ve televizyon yayınlarının Türkçe yapılması esası yanında Türk vatandaşlarının günlük yaşamlarında geleneksel olarak kullandıkları farklı dil ve lehçelerde de yayın yapabilmelerine ilişkin usul ve esasları düzenlemektir.

##### **Dayanak**

**Madde 2** - Bu Yönetmelik, 3984 sayılı Radyo ve Televizyonların Kuruluş ve Yayınları Hakkında Kanununun 4928 sayılı Kanunla değişik 4 üncü maddesine ve Avrupa Sınır Ötesi Televizyon Sözleşmesinde öngörülen hükümlere dayanılarak hazırlanmıştır.

##### **Tanımlar**

**Madde 3** - Bu Yönetmelikte geçen;

- a) Üst Kurul: Radyo ve Televizyon Üst Kurulunu,
- b) Kanun: 3984 sayılı Radyo ve Televizyonların Kuruluş ve Yayınları Hakkında Kanunu,
- c) İletişim Ortamı: Radyo ve televizyon programlarının üretildiği merkez çıkışındaki sinyali herhangi bir teknik kullanarak tek veya birden fazla radyo ve



televizyon yayını bir arada olarak radyo, televizyon alıcıları ve/veya veri dağıtım merkezlerine ileten her nevi ortamı,

d) Tematik Kanal: Haber, belgesel, spor, müzik ve benzeri türlerde olmak üzere yalnızca belli bir konuda yayın yapan kanalı,

e) Ulusal Yayın: Bütün ülkeye yapılan radyo, televizyon ve veri yayını,

f) Bölgesel Yayın: Birbirine komşu en az üç il ve en çok bir coğrafi bölge alanının asgari yüzde yetmişine yapılan radyo, televizyon yayını,

g) Yerel Yayın: Mülki taksimat itibarıyla en az bir ilçe (merkez ilçe dahil) veya bir ilin alanının en az yüzde yetmişine yapılan radyo, televizyon ve veri yayını,

h) Yeniden İletim: Yetkili yayın kuruluşu tarafından kullanılan teknik araç ne olursa olsun, halkın izlemesi amacıyla yayınlanan radyo ve televizyon program hizmetlerinin değişiklik yapılmaksızın bütününe veya bir bölümünün alınması ve aynı anda veya teknik nedenlerle bağlı olarak daha sonra iletilmesini,

i) Haber: Kamuoyunun bilgi edinme ihtiyacını karşılamak amacıyla ve nesnel bir bakış açısıyla izleyici ve dinleyicilere iletilen güncel, toplumsal, siyasal, kültürel, ekonomik olay, konu ve gelişmeleri,

j) Haber Programları: Kamuoyunun bilgi edinme ihtiyacını karşılamak amacıyla olay, konu ve gelişmeleri ayrıntılarıyla ele alan ve değerlendiren; olağandışı durumlar dışında belirli yayın gün ve saatinde ve genellikle belirli bir süreyle sınırlı olarak, düzenli biçimde izleyici ya da dinleyicilere sunulan program türünü,

k) Haber Bülteni: Kamuoyunun bilgi edinme ihtiyacını karşılamak amacıyla, güncel, toplumsal, siyasal, kültürel, ekonomik olay, konu ve gelişmelerin, basın ve yayın meslek ilkeleri uyarınca, doğruluk ve çabukluk ilkesine uygun olarak izlenip, derlenerek, izleyici veya dinleyicilere, olağandışı durumlar hariç düzenli olarak, belirli saatlerde sunulduğu program türünü,

l) Kültür Programları: Toplumun düşünce ve hayat şekline konu teşkil eden ve nesilden nesle aktarılan inanç, bilgi ve uygulamaların korunması, geliştirilmesi, yayılması ve zenginleştirilmesi amacıyla milli kültür politikasının ilkeleri doğrultusunda hazırlanan programları,

m) Müzik Programları: Kültürel zenginliğin bir parçası olan her türlü sözlü ve/veya sözsüz müzik eserlerinin icra edildiği programları,

- n) Yayın Planı: Kanun ve bu Yönetmelik uyarınca, yayıncının, yayınların gün, saat ve sürelerini belirtmek üzere hazırlayacağı yayın düzenini,
- o) Yıllık Yayın Dönemi: Her yılın 01 Ocak günü Türkiye saatiyle 00.00'da başlayıp 31 Aralık günü saat 24.00'de sona eren zaman dilimini,
- p) Aylık Yayın Dönemi: Her ayın birinci günü Türkiye saatiyle 00.00'da başlayıp son günü saat 24.00'de sona eren zaman dilimini,
- r) Yayın Günü: Türkiye saatiyle 00.00'dan başlayan 24 saatlik zaman dilimini,
- s) Yayın Saati: Yayın yapılacak saatleri ve münferit programların yayınlanma saatlerini,
- t) Alt Yazı: Program kaydı veya yayın esnasında, çoğunlukla ekranın alt bölümüne yerleştirilen, sabit ve/veya hareketli olarak verilen yazılı bilgileri ifade eder.

## İKİNCİ BÖLÜM

### Yayımların Dili, Yayın Esasları, Başvuru

#### Yayımların dili

**Madde 4** - Yayınların Türkçe yapılması esastır. Yayınlarda Türkçe'nin özellikleri ve kuralları bozulmadan konuşma dili olarak kullanılması, çağdaş kültür, eğitim ve bilim dili olarak gelişmesi sağlanmalıdır. Münhasıran Türkçe'den başka bir dil ve lehçede yayın yapılamaz. Ancak, bu yönetmelik çerçevesinde Türk vatandaşlarının günlük yaşamlarında geleneksel olarak kullandıkları farklı dil ve lehçelerde de yayın yapılabilir.

Türk vatandaşlarının günlük yaşamlarında geleneksel olarak kullandıkları farklı dil ve lehçelerde yayın esasları

**Madde 5** - Kamu ve özel ulusal radyo ve televizyon kuruluşlarınca Türk vatandaşlarının günlük yaşamlarında geleneksel olarak kullandıkları farklı dil ve lehçelerde de bu Yönetmelik hükümleri doğrultusunda Üst Kurul'dan izin almak suretiyle yayın yapılabilir.

Bu dil ve lehçelerde sadece yetişkinler için haber, müzik ve geleneksel kültürün tanıtımına yönelik yayınlar yapılabilir.

Bu dil ve lehçelerin öğretilmesine yönelik yayın yapılamaz.

Kamu ve özel ulusal yayın lisansı sahibi radyo ve televizyon kuruluşları, bu dil ve lehçelerdeki yeniden iletim konusu yayınları da dahil olmak üzere; radyo kuruluşları günde 60 dakikayı aşmamak üzere haftada toplam beş saat, televizyon kuruluşları ise günde 45 dakikayı aşmamak üzere haftada toplam dört saat yayın yapabilirler.

Bu dil ve lehçelerde yeniden iletim konusu yayınlar dahil, televizyon yayını yapan kuruluşlar bu yayınlarını içerik ve süre açısından bire bir olmak kaydıyla, Türkçe alt yazıyla vermekle veya hemen akabinde Türkçe tercümesini yayınlamakla, radyo yayını yapan kuruluşlar ise programın yayınlanmasını takiben Türkçe tercümesini yayınlamakla yükümlüdürler.

### **Başvuru**

**Madde 6** - Kamu ve özel radyo ve televizyon kuruluşları;

a) Yayın yapmak istedikleri, dil ve/veya lehçeyi, bu dil ve lehçede yayınlanacak program türlerini, bu programların, günlük yayın akışı içindeki yerleşimini, aylık ve yıllık yayın planlarını belirleyen, kuruluşun yönetim kurulu kararı,

b) Münhasıran bu yayınlarla ilgili denetleme kurulu, sorumlu müdür, haber biriminde çalışanlar ve spikerlerin 3984 sayılı Kanun ve Yönetmeliklerde aranılan vasıfları taşıdıklarına dair belge,

c) Taahhütnamenin kuruluşun tüzel kişiliğini temsile yetkili kişi tarafından noter huzurunda imzalanmış örneği ile,

Üst Kurula başvururlar.

Başvurudan sonra meydana gelen değişiklikler de Üst Kurul'a bildirilir ve onayı alınır.

## **ÜÇÜNCÜ BÖLÜM**

### **Değerlendirme, İzin, Yükümlülükler**

#### **Değerlendirme, izin**

**Madde 7** - Üst Kurul, Türk vatandaşlarının günlük yaşamlarında geleneksel olarak kullandıkları farklı dil ve lehçelerde yayın yapmak isteyen kamu ve özel yayın kuruluşlarının başvurularındaki bilgi ve belgeleri inceler ve bu yönetmelik hükümlerini yerine getiren kuruluşlara yayın izni verir.

Türkçe yayın yapan yayın kuruluşlarının, günlük, aylık ve yıllık yayın planları göz önüne alındığında süreklilik arz etmeyen münferit müzik eserlerinin yayınları ve sinema filmlerine yer verilmesi bu izin kapsamı dışında değerlendirilir.

Yayın kuruluşlarının başvurusunun Üst Kurulca reddi kararlarına karşı yargı yolu açıktır.

### **Yükümlülükler**

**Madde 8** - Türkçe'den başka bir dilde de yayın yapmak üzere Üst Kuruldan izin alan yayın kuruluşları yayınlarını; hukukun üstünlüğüne, Anayasanın genel ilkelerine, temel hak ve özgürlüklere, milli güvenliğe, genel ahlaka, Cumhuriyetin Anayasada belirtilen temel niteliklerine, Devletin ülkesi ve milletiyle bölünmez bütünlüğüne, 3984 sayılı Kanun ve bu Kanuna dayanılarak çıkartılan yönetmeliklerle düzenlenen esas ve ilkelere, Üst Kurulun öngördüğü yükümlülüklerle izin şartları ve taahhütlerine uygun olarak kamu hizmeti anlayışı çerçevesinde yapmakla yükümlüdürler.

Yayın kuruluşları farklı dil ve lehçelerde yaptıkları yayın süresince stüdyo düzeni, mevcut logo, ses efekti ve tanıtıcı ses işaretleri dışında simgelere yer vermemekle yükümlüdürler. Gerekli takdirde, sadece Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin simgesi niteliğindeki görüntü ve işaretler kullanılabilir.

## **DÖRDÜNCÜ BÖLÜM**

### **Müeyyideler**

### **Müeyyideler**

**Madde 9** - Kanundaki esaslara, yayın ilkelerine ve Üst Kurulca öngörülen yükümlülüklerle aykırı yayın yapan yayın kuruluşları 3984 sayılı Kanunun 33 üncü maddesi hükmü uyarınca cezalandırılır.

Üst Kurulun izni olmadan Türkçe'den başka bir dil ve lehçede yayın yapan yayın kuruluşlarına 3984 sayılı Kanunun Ek-2 maddesi hükmü uyarınca izinsiz yayın müeyyidesi uygulanır.

Üst Kurul'ca yayın kuruluşlarına uygulanacak müeyyidelere karşı yargı yolu açıktır.

## **BEŞİNCİ BÖLÜM**

### **Çeşitli Hükümler**

**Madde 10** — Bu Yönetmelikte hüküm bulunmayan hallerde 3984 sayılı Radyo ve Televizyonların Kuruluş ve Yayınları Hakkındaki Kanuna dayanılarak çıkartılan yönetmeliklerin ilgili hükümleri uygulanır.

**Madde 11** — 18/12/2002 tarihli ve 24967 sayılı Resmî Gazetede yayımlanan Radyo ve Televizyon Yayınlarının Dili Hakkında Yönetmelik yürürlükten kaldırılmıştır.

**Geçici Madde 1** — Türk vatandaşlarının günlük yaşamlarında geleneksel olarak kullandıkları farklı dil ve lehçelerin izleyici-dinleyici profili belirleninceye kadar bu dil ve lehçelerdeki yayın sadece kamu ve özel ulusal yayın kuruluşları tarafından yapılır.

Üst Kurul ülke çapındaki talepler yanında, gerekli araştırmalar yaptırarak izleyici-dinleyici profilini çıkarır.

## **ALTINCI BÖLÜM**

### **Yürürlük ve Yürütme**

#### **Yürürlük**

**Madde 12** — Bu Yönetmelik, yayımı tarihinde yürürlüğe girer.

#### **Yürütme**

**Madde 13** — Bu Yönetmelik hükümlerini Radyo ve Televizyon Üst Kurulu yürütür.

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