

DUTCH NATIONALISM AND THE QUESTION OF FOREIGNERS IN THE
NETHERLANDS

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Submitted to the Graduate School of Arts and Social Sciences
in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts

Sabancı University
February 2007

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To the memory of my deceased grandfather Kasım IŞIK

ABSTRACT

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M.A. in European Studies Programme, Thesis, 2007

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Key Words: public preferences, public opinion polls, xenophobia, immigration policy,
extreme right-wing parties, civic nationalism, pillar system.

It is argued in classical political science that policy outputs are fed by public preferences (inputs). It is also argued that these inputs more resonate in Western democracies. For that reason, policy outputs in democratic countries are expected to reflect public preferences. At this point, it is important to know how to measure and how to reach these preferences and clear result of this process is public opinion polls. In that sense, it is discussed that in spite of the fact that the credibility of public opinion polls is a bit controversial, they still measure and reflect public preferences. In this context, according to the eurobarometer survey results, although Dutch people are as xenophobic as European average, these xenophobic sentiments that constitute public inputs do not turn into policy outputs in the Netherlands. Therefore, in

the Dutch case, policy outputs and public inputs differ from each other. Indeed, integrative immigration policy and weaker extreme right party tradition are clear proof of this situation in the country. However, why classical input-output correlation does not work in the Netherlands? According to the findings of this study, civic nationalism and the pillar system prevent public inputs in transforming into policy outputs.

ÖZET

HOLLANDA MİLLİYETÇİLİĞİ VE HOLLANDA'DA YABANCILAR SORUNU

Gökhan ÜZÜM

Avrupa Çalışmaları Yüksek Lisans Programı, Tez, 2007

Tez Danışmanı: Yrd. Doç. Dr. E. Burak Arıkan

Anahtar Sözcükler: kamu tercihleri, kamu yoklamaları, yabancı düşmanlığı, göçmen politikası, aşırı sağ partiler, yurttaş milliyetçiliği, sütun sistemi.

Klasik siyaset biliminde politika çıktılarının kamu tercihleriyle (girdi) beslendiği iddia edilir. Bu girdilerin Batı demokrasilerinde daha çok yankı buldukları da belirtilir. Bu nedenle, demokratik ülkelerdeki politika çıktılarının kamu tercihlerini yansıtmaları beklenir. Bu noktada, bu tercihlerin nasıl ölçüleceğini ve bunlara nasıl ulaşacağını bilmek önem arz etmektedir ve bu sürecin doğal bir sonucu kamuoyu yoklamalarıdır. Bu anlamda, kamuoyu yoklamalarının güvenilirliği her ne kadar biraz tartışmalı da olsa, bu yoklamaların hala belirli bir kamu tercihinin yansıttığı savunulur. Bu bağlamda, eurobarometer anket sonuçlarına göre her ne kadar Hollanda toplumu Avrupa ortalaması kadar yabancı düşmanı çıksa da, birer kamu girdisi anlamına gelen bu yabancı düşmanı duygular Hollanda'da politika çıktılarına

dönüşmemekteler. Bu nedenle, Hollanda örneğinde politika çıktıları ve kamu girdileri birbirlerinden farklılık gösterebiliyor. Gerçekten de, entegrasyoncu göçmen politikası ve güçsüz aşırı sağ parti geleneği ülkedeki bu durumun açık bir kanıtıdır. Fakat, neden klasik girdi-çıkıtı korelasyonu Hollanda'da gerçekleşmiyor? Bu çalışmanın bulgularına göre, yurttaşlık milliyetçiliği (civic nationalism) ve sütun sistemi (pillar system) kamu girdilerinin politika çıktılarına dönüşümünü engelliyor.

Acknowledgements

First of all, I would like to thank my supervisors Asst. Prof. Dr. E. Burak Arıkan. Managing this study became really easier with his gentle guidance, encouraging searching questions, and the occasional nudge. I must also thank Asst. Prof. Dr. Ayşe Betül Çelik and Assoc. Prof. Dr. Bahri Yılmaz. Their valuable comments and critics guided me in true way as well.

I would also thank my grandmother Dİlfırız Işık, my father Yusuf Üzüm, my mother Rahime Üzüm, my younger brother Tugay Üzüm, my roommate Dođukan Aras, my uncle Şeref Çeküç, my aunt Tırkan Çeküç and lastly my work fellow Melis Özdeđirmenci. This study could not have been completed without their invaluable helps.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
Introduction	1
Chapter One: Immigrants in the Netherlands and the Dutch Immigration Policy	10
Chapter Two: Extreme Right-Wing Parties in the Dutch Politics	20
1) Explaining Extreme Right	20
2) Extreme Right-Wing Parties in the Netherlands	23
Chapter Three: The Dutch Nationalism	35
1) Types of Nationalism	35
1.1) What is Nationalism?	35
1.2) Ethnic and Civic Nationalism	39
1.3) Liberal Nationalism	45
2) The Formation of Dutch Nationalism	50
Chapter Four: Political Structure in the Netherlands: The Pillar System	58
Chapter Five: A Dutch Exceptionalism?	74
1) The Reasons of Integrative Immigration Policy	75
1) The Reasons of Weak Extreme Right	78
Conclusion	84
Bibliography	86

Introduction

The Netherlands has long been a country of different religious groups. Indeed, Catholic and Protestant segmentation of society has been clear for years and years. On the other hand, thanks to the immigrants and guest workers, ethnic differences also became one of the distinguishing features of the Netherlands in the middle of the twentieth century. Moreover, not only ethnic differences but also religious diversities, especially with the introduction of Islam into the country, have increased after this immigration influx. Nevertheless, it has been relatively successful in harboring many different cultures inside the country. Indeed, in comparison to their counterparts, for a long time immigrants in the Netherlands enjoyed liberal rights granted to them and lived freely in the country.

On the other hand, during the 2002 Dutch national election campaign, politician Pim Fortuyn who is famous with his anti-Islamic discourse was murdered by an animal rights activist on the ground that he was seen as a growing danger who would affect liberal tendency towards immigrants in society. Worse than this, in 2004, when director Theo Van Gogh, a well-known critic of Islam, made his movie “Submission” in which he filmed Qur'anic verses painted on women's naked bodies and dealt with violence against women in Islamic societies, he was shot to death by a Moroccan Dutch citizen in Amsterdam. Later on, we all witnessed the retaliation bombing of Muslim schools in the country. Furthermore, in 2005, Law on the Integration of Newcomers was approved by Parliament. The new law brings certain requirements for those who apply for permanent residence in the Netherlands. In that sense, once their applications are

accepted they are required to have basic knowledge of Dutch language, institutions, history or culture before their arrival to the Netherlands. Similar requirements are also assigned to those who stay in the country for a long time but have little knowledge of the Dutch or the Netherlands as newcomers.

In that sense, the aforementioned developments that occurred in the 2000s seem to interrupt the cohabitation appearance in the Netherlands and all these developments sparked a debacle on the content of foreigners around xenophobia in the country. Indeed, eurobarometer¹ survey results show that the Netherlands is quite xenophobic as much as its counterparts. Accordingly, sometimes very close to European average and sometimes more than the average rate, Dutch people think that there are too many foreigners living in the Netherlands.

In this context, when Dutch were asked by eurobarometer surveys that how they evaluated the number of foreign people living in their country, % 44 of them in 1991², % 49 of them in 1992³, % 47 of them in 1994⁴ and % 40 of them in 1997⁵ thought that there were too many of them. In that sense, while the EU average of these four years was % 47,25 the average rate of Dutch response thinking that there were too many foreigners living in the Netherlands was % 45 in that years.

If survey results are examined in detail, two important indicators are seen. One is that Dutch people are very sensitive on crime and the other is that they made foreigners

¹ The reason in using eurobarometer surveys here is the belief that they harbor certain stability in the survey results due to the fact that they are held every year and two times in a year in Europe. The prestige of eurobarometer among the academics, for sure, can be counted as another reason.

² Eurobarometer Spring, 1991 table 38.

³ Eurobarometer Spring 37, 1992 figure 5.1.

⁴ Eurobarometer Autumn 42, 1994, figure 9.9.

⁵ Eurobarometer Autumn 48, 1997, figure 6.2.

identified with crime. That means that the more foreigners in the country live, the more crime and insecurity in the Netherlands will occur. In other words, presence of foreigners means insecurity for them. Therefore, more than the average, they see crime as a priority issue that should be discussed at the EU level. In addition, they oppose the idea of common market in the European Union (the EU henceforth) so that it will increase immigration and foreign population in the country. The followings are the summary of the reports:

% 57 of Dutch in 1986⁶, % 52 of them in 1997⁷ and % 38 of them in 2004⁸ believe that the action that the EU should follow in priority is fighting against crime. In that sense, while the EU average of these three years thinking that fighting against crime should be priority issue in the EU level was % 44, Dutch average rate was % 49. The reason behind this can be found in survey results. In this context, while % 26 of the EU average thought that crime was the most important issue facing the EU at that moment in 2004, this rate was % 47 in the Netherlands.⁹

The fear of crime of Dutch people was very clear when they opposed Single Market. Accordingly, while the EU average was % 30, % 29 of Dutch people were afraid of Single Market because of the belief that it would open borders to immigration. In addition, while the EU average was % 26, % 33 of Dutch people believed that Single Market would also open borders to crime.¹⁰ In this context, % 59 of them thought that the EU enlargement with ten new states in 2004 would cause an increase in

⁶ Eurobarometer Spring 1986, table 42.

⁷ Eurobarometer Autumn 48, 1997, p.67.

⁸ Eurobarometer Autumn 62, 2004, p.33.

⁹ Eurobarometer 61 Spring, 2004, figure 3.1b.

¹⁰ Eurobarometer Autumn 38, 1992, figure 3.6. and p.59.

international organized crime in the country.¹¹ In that sense, while the EU average rate was % 44, according to % 45 of Dutch, the presence of foreign people was a cause of insecurity in their country.¹² For that fear, % 98 of them thought that fighting against crime should be the criteria for joining the EU.¹³

Considerable numbers of Dutch people think negatively about foreigners. Accordingly, there are too many of them living in their country. At this point, according to Hans-Georg Betz, to blame immigrants for growing crime rates is a clear xenophobic sentiment.¹⁴ In that sense, since Dutch people make foreigners identified with crime, they are still xenophobic. In other words, since they think that all foreigners will be somehow engaged in crime, Dutch people reactively oppose the existence of foreigners in the country. In this context for example, they were afraid of Single Market simply because they thought that it would open borders to crime. Similarly, they are still doubt about the European enlargement on the ground that it will increase immigrant population and so crime in the country.

On the other hand, responsiveness of a political system to the preferences of its citizens is one of the central discussions in the political science. Accordingly, those democracies with participant political culture and competitive political party system are expected to respond people's preferences. Commonly, public preferences, inputs, are transformed into government policies, outputs. In that sense, state policies are the clear expression of citizens' preferences. That is to say, if society changes, policies also

¹¹ Eurobarometer Autumn 62, 2004, p.143.

¹² "Attitudes towards minority groups in the European Union", A special analysis of the Eurobarometer 2000 opinion poll on behalf of the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia, Technical Report, Vienna, March 2001, p.15.

¹³ Eurobarometer Autumn 50, 1998, p.87.

¹⁴ Betz, Hans-Georg. *Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe*. Macmillan, 1994, p.119.

change. But, non-democratic states are expected to be less responsive to these preferences.¹⁵

However, the way that how preferences could be measured is a controversial issue. Nevertheless, the rapid growth of public opinion polls since the 1930s seems to fill this gap. Indeed, it is suggested that public opinion polls reflect at least the potential preferences of public.¹⁶ In that sense, back to the central discussion in political science, are public opinions, preferences, responded by politicians and do they shape policy-making then?

According to some, public opinions have a strong impact on policy-making. The others, on the other hand, do not believe that public opinion affect policy-making at all. According to the first thought, political system is responsive to public opinion simply because politicians derive at least some benefit from implementing policies that reflect the wishes of citizens. Indeed, since state managers and politicians are aware that they are rewarded or punished for their previous policy outcomes by voters, they perceive the responsiveness to the preferences of their citizens to be in their interests to minimize the distance between the rulers and the ruled. In that sense, public opinions are the significant factor in explaining different policy outcomes.¹⁷

On the other hand, public opinions polls provide information available to political actors about public preferences. At this point, John G. Geer claims that “well-informed politicians behave differently than their less well-informed counterparts even when their

¹⁵ See Easton, David. *The Political System: An Inquiry into the State of Political Science*. Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1953. and Dahl, Robert. *Who Governs? : Democracy and Power in the American City*. Yale University Press, 1961.

¹⁶ Gallup, George and Rae, Saul. *Pulse of Democracy*. New York: Simon and Shuster, 1940, p.266.

¹⁷ Jacobs, Lawrence R. and Shapiro, Robert Y. *Politicians Don't Pander: Political Manipulation and the Loss of Democratic Responsiveness*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000, Chapter 1.

motivations are the same.”¹⁸ In that sense, information facilitates responsiveness simply because they give politicians the capacity to make rational judgments about where the public stands.

However, the second thought claims that the first thought still lacks the possibility that politicians can shape or influence public opinions as well. Indeed, while the public opinion can be measured through polls, most expressed opinions in these polls are subject to change through manipulation by business, the mass media or even government elites. Besides, “public opinion surveys present only a rough idea of what people generally think because the results are highly sensitive to a number of factors...Polls may even create the impression of public opinion on questions in which none actually exists.”¹⁹ So, the credibility of public opinion polls is controversial. In addition, policy-makers may have their own policy preferences that may come into conflict with public preferences. Therefore, politicians and policy-makers might be non-responsive to public preferences.²⁰

It might be true that public opinion polls are subject to change and manipulation or include survey questions which actually do not exist in reality. On the other hand, the aforementioned eurobarometer opinion polls are held by the European Commission to monitor the evolution of public opinion in Member States in the EU. Therefore, eurobarometer surveys help the preparation of texts and the evaluation of the EU’s work. All in all, they help the decision-making in the EU.²¹ In that sense, eurobarometer

¹⁸ Geer, John G. *From Tea Leaves to Opinion Polls: A Theory of Democratic Leadership*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1996, p.2.

¹⁹ Domhoff, G. William. *Who Rules America? Power and Politics in the Year 2000*. Mountain View, CA: Mayfield Publishing Co., 1998, p.172.

²⁰ Jacobs and Shapiro, op.cit., p.19.

²¹ http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/index_en.htm

polls seem to be far from domestic political maneuvers and manipulation. Besides, their questions include certain topics that might exist in the future. For example, they ask about immigrants and foreigners on the ground that the EU decided to enlarge in the future. In that sense, topics in eurobarometer polls exist in reality. For that reason, this study assumes that eurobarometer public opinion polls display certain preferences and opinions of people in the EU in general and in the Netherlands in particular.

At this point, building from Easton, these preferences are input for government outputs. To respond these inputs, on the other hand, depends on the initiative of policy-makers. Nonetheless, building from Easton once again, democratic countries are expected to be more responsive to public preferences for policy outputs. In that sense, this study also assumes that public opinions in the democratic Netherlands display inputs for policy outputs.

On the other hand, those who have negative feelings about ethnic minorities are assumed to favor and prefer restrictive immigration policy.²² In this context, xenophobic sentiments of Dutch people are expected to be “input” for government’s “output”. However, what is seen in the Dutch case is that domestic preferences, inputs, do not feed policy outputs. Indeed, the study will show that although Dutch people are as xenophobic as European average, immigration policy of the country is still integrative. That means that xenophobic “inputs” of the Dutch do not turn into policy “output” favoring restrictive immigration policy. Therefore, the question is why these inputs are not transformed into outputs?

Furthermore, domestic preferences in the Netherlands do not feed political actors in the Dutch politics, either. In that sense, if public opinion polls represent the potential preferences of public and if considerable number of Dutch people harbor xenophobic

²² Citrin, Jack. et.al. *Public Opinion toward Immigration Reform: The Role of Economic Motivations*. Journal of Politics, Vol. 59, No. 3, 1997, pp. 872-875.

sentiments in eurobarometer opinion polls and if Klaus von Beyme is right on the ground that the main breeding ground of extreme right parties is xenophobia²³; extreme right-wing parties in the Netherlands are also expected to be influential in Dutch politics. However, what the study shows is that the country still has weaker extreme right parties. In that sense, the question is why Dutch extreme right parties are weaker contrary to expectations?

On this ground, the study shows that although Dutch people seem as xenophobic as European average, this situation does not dramatically affect the policies that are directly related with foreigners. In that sense, I claim that although Dutch people are xenophobic, the country has still integrative immigration policy and has weak extreme right parties simply because civic nationalism that defines nation on a shared citizenship base and the pillar system that allows certain autonomies to diverse cultural groups in their private sphere in the Netherlands block certain extremisms in the country.

In this context, in the first chapter immigration policy of the Netherlands will be summarized to be able to evaluate input-output correlation in the country. However, socio-economic reason of immigration will not be analyzed in that part. The real question is where the country stands on the issues of immigration policy. In the following chapter, Dutch extreme right parties in the political spectrum will be dwelled upon to understand the affects of xenophobic sentiments in politics. But, it is worth to note that socio-economic background of extreme right voting will not be explained. At this point, in spite of xenophobia in the Netherlands, it will be seen that the country has still integrative immigration policy and weaker extreme right party tradition. But how can this situation be explained? According to the findings, civic nationalism and the

²³ See Von Beyme, Klaus (ed.). *Right-wing Extremism in Western Europe*. London: Frank Cass, 1988.

pillar system very endemic to the Dutch society are two main reasons of this situation. Thus, third chapter will explain Dutch nation-building process and theoretically discuss the emergence of Dutch nationalism. The fourth chapter then will historically discuss the reasons and consequences of pillar system in the country. In this context, in the last chapter, the reasons of integrative immigration policy and of weak extreme right in spite of xenophobia in the country will be discussed.

Chapter I

Immigrants in the Netherlands and the Dutch Immigration Policy

There are certain concepts in explaining the integration of immigrants into the host country population. Accordingly, *assimilation* implies the absorption of all immigrants into the host society. Their own culture disappears in favor of host country culture and so they no longer identify themselves with their descendants. On the other hand, *adaptation* demands the efforts of immigrants to adopt norms and values of the host society. Although a successful integration requires mutual interaction between the population of the host country and immigrants, adaptation turns a blind eye to this fact and puts the greatest burden on immigrants' shoulder. Very lastly, *integration* aims to bring different ethnic and cultural groups into the host society with equal opportunities. In that sense, instead of absorption into the majority culture, diverse cultures and traditions are also developed in integration process.²⁴

In that sense, there are also certain types of integration: socio-cultural, political and legal and structural integration. Socio-cultural integration means that interpersonal contacts between different ethnic groups are developed as long as they accept and

²⁴ Junger-Tas, Josine. *Ethnic Minorities, Social Integration and Crime*. European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research, Vol. 9, No.1, 2001, p.8.

tolerate their diverse customs, traditions and lifestyles. Political and legal integration, on the other hand, is shaped around introducing fundamental civil rights such as freedom of religion, granting political rights such as voting or facilitating naturalization procedures in favor of ethnic minorities and immigrants. Besides, structural integration means that access of immigrants to social and economic institutions like housing, education and labor market should be improved to provide equal participation in the society.²⁵

On the other hand, thanks to the guest workers and international immigration influx since 1960, Netherlands had been transformed into a country harboring diverse ethnic and cultural communities inside. At first, immigration to this country was characterized by colonial connections. People from the former colonies of the Kingdom began to migrate to the Netherlands in the early 1950s. In that period, approximately, thirteen thousand of Moluccans and three hundred thousand of Indonesians came into the country. In the 1970s, people from Surinam and the Netherlands Antilles constituted the last migration population from the former colonies. On the other hand, in the 1960s, the country also recruited guest workers especially from Turkey and Morocco. After first generation immigrants, on the other hand, family re-unification increased the number of immigrants in the country. Today, approximately twenty per cent of the whole population has non-Dutch origin in the Netherlands.

Furthermore, the official policy in the 1970s was characterized by the belief that immigrant workers would stay temporarily simply because contracts between firms and workers or between workers and their country of origin emphasized temporal residence. Therefore, for a long time, the Netherlands did not develop an integration policy precisely because immigrants and especially guest workers were expected to return to

²⁵ Ibid., pp.9-11.

their home countries. However, once it was realized by the government that they intended to reside permanently, the country developed certain immigration policies.

In that sense, it is possible to examine the Dutch immigration (integration) policy on three stages. At the first stage, in the late 1970s and in the early 1980s, the Netherlands implemented socio-cultural integration theme and introduced “Minority Policy” (Minorities Memorandum). The main idea behind the Minority Policy was to foster ethnic minorities’ incorporation into the majority. In this context, the Policy developed cultural rights of immigrants, combated discrimination against them, and supported ethnic organizations and institutions since they nurture ethnic identities. At this point, for the sake of decreasing the cultural difficulties of immigrants for example, they were educated in their native language as part of the orientation courses.²⁶ Besides, tolerance for cultural and religious differences became one of the characteristics of Minority Policy. Indeed, thanks to the pillarization but also to the Minority Policy, immigrants and newcomers could organize themselves along their ethnic or religious lines. Indeed, mosques, Islamic and Hindu schools or broadcasting corporations funded by municipalities or the government became very salient in Dutch life. Municipalities and government, on the other hand, provided certain funds for social and cultural activities of ethnic minorities. Indeed, European counterparts envy Dutch ethnic minority organizations because of their sizable subsidy and easy access opportunities.²⁷

At the second stage, the country developed political and legal integration. Accordingly, naturalization process was facilitated and dual-citizenship had been introduced at this period. In addition, since 1985, those who have legally resided in the

²⁶ Ireland, Patrick. *Becoming Europe: Immigration, Integration, and the Welfare State*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2004, p. 118.

²⁷ See Doornik, Jeroen. *The institutionalization of Turkish Islam in Germany and the Netherlands: A comparison*. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, Vol. 18, No. 1, 1995.

Netherlands for five years could both vote and become candidate in local and municipal elections.²⁸

In the 1990s, structural integration had risen. In that sense, the phrase “minority” was replaced by “integration” and the new “Integration Policy” based more on equal citizenship principal was introduced. Accordingly, the main aim now was to provide equal participation of immigrants in the socio-economic sphere like labor market, education or housing. For that aim, certain integration courses such as Dutch language were held by the government.²⁹

However, in the late 1990s and in the early 2000s, the integration policy of country was criticized on the ground that it began to emphasize more Dutch norms and values.³⁰ Indeed, in 1998, Law on the Integration of Newcomers (*Wet Inburgering Nieuwkomers*) was introduced by Dutch government. The Bill aimed to provide pre-arrival integration of newcomers. Those who apply for permanent residence through family re-unification for instance, are required to have basic knowledge of Dutch language, culture, history and institutions before their arrival to the Netherlands. In that sense, they have to pass a related test held in Dutch embassies and consulates in the world. On 22 March 2005, the Bill was approved by the Parliament. However, the

²⁸ Böcker, Anita. *The impact of host-society institutions on the integration of Turkish immigrants in Germany and the Netherlands*. Paper presented at the workshop on integration of immigrants from Turkey in Austria, Germany and the Netherlands, Boğaziçi University, Istanbul, February 27-28, 2004, p.9.
http://www.ces.boun.edu.tr/papers/feb/anta_bocker.pdf

²⁹ Engbersen, Godfried. *Spheres of Integration: Towards a Differentiated and Reflexive Ethnic Minority Policy*, in R. Sackmann, B. Peters and T. Faist (eds.), *Identity and Integration: Migrants in Western Europe*. Aldershot/Burlington: Ashgate, 2003, p. 63.

³⁰ Penninx, Rinus., Garcés-Mascareñas, Blanca. and Scholten, Peter. *Policymaking Related to Immigration and Integration: A Review of the Literature of the Dutch Case*. p.5.
http://www.imiscoe.org/workingpapers/documents/country_report_netherlands.pdf.

implementation date of it was postponed.³¹ According to this law, all newcomers allowed to reside permanently in the Netherlands should prove their proficiency in Dutch. Otherwise, they are required to follow nearly 600 hours Dutch language courses in which they will also learn Dutch institutions, norms, values, history and geography. After the courses, newcomers are examined. In these exams, it is possible to see a video displaying a gay marriage or to read a question whether to sunbathe topless on the Dutch beaches is ok or not. Although citizens from the EU countries and from the European Economic Area are exempt from these courses and exams, its final aim is still to provide early participation of newcomers especially from the Middle East into the Dutch society. Accordingly, once they increase their competence they become socially and professionally independent and are able to participate in society.³²

In 1999, in addition to the obligatory integration courses of newcomers, the government introduced a similar integration schedule for those who stay in the country for a long time but have little knowledge of the Dutch as newcomers. They can purchase the course themselves from the private providers. The government, on the other hand, will provide credit and compensation for costs of the courses providing that participants pass their exams within the specified time. The time limitation for newcomers is three and a half years and it is five years for the others.³³ If the examinee

³¹ Marinelli, Vera. *Current Immigration Debates in Europe. A Publication of the European Migration Dialogue: The Netherlands*. The Migration Policy Group, Brussels/Utrecht, September 2005, p. 6.
http://www.migpolgroup.com/multiattachments/3009/DocumentName/EMD_Netherlands_2005.pdf

³² Doomernik, Jeroen. *The Effectiveness of Integration Policies towards Immigrants and their Descendants in France, Germany and the Netherlands*. ILO, International Migration Papers 27, Geneve, 1998, p.65.

³³ Marinelli, op.cit., p. 10.

fails the exam, he or she is imposed certain administrative fines by the municipalities. In addition, their benefits might be cutted or residence permit might be terminated.³⁴

On this ground, in order to evaluate the integration policy of the Netherlands a parliamentary inquiry committee, known as the Blok Committee, was set up in 2002. In 2004, the committee submitted its report to the parliament and concluded that many immigrants have been successfully integrated into the Dutch society. Nevertheless, it also explained that measures against illegal immigration have increased and a more emphasis on Dutch norms and values has been introduced especially after 2002. Accordingly, since immigrants were firstly required to learn Dutch culture and language, ethnic language and culture courses for ethnic pupils in primary schools were cancelled. Turkish or Arabic teachers were dismissed. However, the committee added that they could still learn the language and culture of their country of origin in secondary schools. Indeed, one of the highest aims of the government is to achieve equal opportunities for all. Accordingly, combating educational disadvantages take a crucial place in the Dutch integration policy. In that sense, in secondary education, immigrants have opportunity to study their own language. Many Turkish or Moroccan immigrants' children, for instance, learn Turkish or Arabic in their schools. However, in primary education, they are required to learn Dutch.³⁵ In addition, as cited in the report, the Ministry of Education supports the development of related teaching materials for Arabic and Turkish and directly allocates the funds given to these schools. According to the Ministry, pupils in primary schools are expected to learn the language of the country they live. Nonetheless, in the secondary schools, they are expected to develop their

³⁴ Smith, Nicola. *Pass this test, Dutch tell immigrants*. The Sunday Times, June 18, 2006.
<http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,2089-2230733,00.html>

³⁵ Leeman, Yvonne. and Pels, Trees. *Citizenship Education in the Dutch Multiethnic Context*. European Education, Vol. 38, No. 2, 2006, p. 66.

language skills other than Dutch such as Turkish and Arabic to incorporate into an ethnically plural society they live in.³⁶ Moreover, the report explained that the government reached an agreement with Small and Medium Sized Entrepreneurs on the introduction of new jobs for ethnic minorities. They were also warned to employ ethnic women in their companies. Similarly, social participation of immigrant women should also be promoted by the municipalities.³⁷

On the other hand, in the 1990s, concerning the labor market, it was clear that immigrants remained behind the local people. Indeed, unemployment rate was approximately three times higher than that of indigenous Dutch persons. In order to remedy this problem, policy makers introduced certain courses which provided learning of Dutch and appropriate labor skills for immigrants. In this way, individuals were expected to ensure their integration into the society. Municipalities, on the other hand, were the primary institutions in leading these integration courses.

Besides, according to the Dutch integration policy, certain quotas should be allocated between ethnic groups in public jobs provided by municipalities and government and in private sector jobs provided by employers.³⁸ Indeed, since 1987, the number of immigrant employees in the public sector is tried to be increased by the government. On the other hand, in 1992, an enacted law, Youth Employment Guarantee Law, made work available for those who were under 21 and have been unemployed for

³⁶ Extra, Guus. and Yağmur, Kutlay. *Immigrant Minority Languages at Home and at School :A Case Study of the Netherlands*. European Education, Vol. 38, No. 2, 2006, pp.55-7.

³⁷ The Blok Committee, 2004.

³⁸ See Doornik, Jeroen. *Integration Policies towards Immigrants and their Descendants in the Netherlands*, in F. Heckmann and D. Schnapper (eds), *The Integration of Immigrants in European Societies: National Differences and Trends of Convergence*. Stuttgart: Lucius & Lucius, 2003.

six months.³⁹ In addition, following an act enacted by the government in 1993, medium sized employers were obliged to send a yearly report to the Labor Authority stating the number of ethnic minorities among their personnel. Besides, they should explain their measures to hire more ethnic minorities.⁴⁰

In that sense, in comparison to its counterparts, the Netherlands has more liberal immigration policy. Indeed, officially, France does not recognize any ethnic differences among its citizens or not allow for any cultural, say religious, dress such as large Christian crosses, Jewish skullcaps or Islamic headscarves in schools for example.⁴¹ In contrast, there are certain state sponsored ethnic and religious organizations varied from schools to broadcasting corporations in the Netherlands. Children of different ethnic groups in this country, for example, learn their native language in public schools. In that sense, concerning immigrants and ethnic groups, one could argue that unlike France, the Netherlands implies an integrative policy rather than an assimilative policy.

In addition, non-EU nationals in Germany do not have the right to vote at all. However, they can vote at the local elections in the Netherlands. Although they are highly encouraged to be employed in public sector in the Dutch case, the similar jobs are barred to foreigners in Germany. Although the number of Turks in Germany is nearly eight times higher than in the Netherlands, only %20 of the Turkish immigrants hold German citizenship. However, this rate is 70% in the Netherlands.⁴² Accordingly, after five years of legal residence, a non-Dutch citizen can obtain Dutch citizenship

³⁹ Doornik (1998), op.cit., p.62.

⁴⁰ Ibid., p.64.

⁴¹ See Calvès, Gwénaële. *Color-Blindness at a Crossroads in Contemporary France*, in Herrick Chapman and Laura L. Frader (eds), *Race in France: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on the Politics of Difference*. New York: Berghahn Books, 2004.

⁴² Böcker, op.cit., p. 2.

without renouncing his/her foreign nationality. Besides, the children of immigrants born in the Netherlands gain automatic Dutch citizenship.⁴³

In this context, since ethnic nationalism and assimilation traditions perceive nation as a culturally homogeneous community, they are reluctant to the expression of cultural or religious identities in public life. Indeed, this was very clear when France banned the religious symbols at schools or some federal states in Germany prepared legislation to forbid the headscarf for civil servants.⁴⁴ However, according to Sawitri Saharso, the tradition of civic nationalism and pillar system in the Netherlands “allows for relatively great recognition of cultural difference and grants religious identities much visibility in public life. Religious symbols, irrespective of which religion they symbolize, therefore find easy acceptance in Dutch public life.”⁴⁵

Among the others, the Netherlands is one of the European countries that hosts certain amount of immigrant in its territory. In that sense, after the government realized that immigrants would stay permanently, the country developed immigration policies. Accordingly, the Netherlands granted cultural rights to the immigrants in the late 1970s and in the early 1980s. Moreover, the government granted political and civil rights to them in the middle of 1980s. Besides, accesses of immigrants to labor market, education or housing have been improved in the 1990s. However, in the late 1990s and in the early 2000s, the integration policy of the country was criticized so that it emphasized more Dutch norms and values. Nonetheless, its integrative structures are still dominant.

⁴³ Ibid., p. 3.

⁴⁴ *German state backs headscarf ban*
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3591043.stm>

⁴⁵ Saharso, Sawitri. *Headscarves: A Comparison of Public Thought and Public Policy in Germany and the Netherlands*, p.18.
<http://www.essex.ac.uk/ECPR/events/generalconference/budapest/papers/4/8/saharso.pdf>

Indeed, many immigrants' children can learn their country of origin language in secondary schools. On the other hand, government and municipalities fund social and cultural activities of ethnic minorities. Job opportunities for immigrants in public and private sectors are developed. In addition, in comparison to their counterparts, immigrants in the Netherlands enjoy certain rights in the country. Indeed, while France does not recognize any cultural differences among its citizens, immigrants in the Netherlands can freely access their ethnic and religious organizations. Besides, unlike in Germany, they can vote and be candidate at the local elections. More than this, gaining a Dutch citizenship is relatively easier in this country than in Germany. All in all, the country still prefers integration rather than assimilation or adaptation.

On the contrary of input-output correlation in theory, it was seen in this chapter that xenophobic sentiments of Dutch people cannot shape the immigration policy of the country in favor of assimilation. On the other hand, do xenophobic sentiments of Dutch people strengthen the position of extreme right-wing parties in the Netherlands? Where do these parties stand in Dutch politics? The following chapter will be focusing on this issue.

Chapter II

Extreme Right-Wing Parties in the Dutch Politics

1) Explaining Extreme Right

The core ideology of extreme right is based on the notion of restrictive citizenship and homogeneous community “that only long-standing citizens are full members of civil society and that a society’s benefits should only accrue to them.”⁴⁶ In that sense, they oppose individual and social equality, they reject the social integration of marginalized groups and they appeal to xenophobia.⁴⁷ Indeed, according to Klaus von Beyme, the main breeding-ground of extreme right parties is xenophobia.⁴⁸ In other

⁴⁶ Betz, Hans-Georg. *The Growing Threat of the Radical Right*, in Peter H. Merkl and Leonard Weinberg (eds.), *Right-Wing Extremism in the Twenty-First Century*. London: Frank Cass, 2003, p.77.

⁴⁷ Betz (1994), op.cit., p.4. The Oxford English Dictionary defines xenophobia as “a morbid fear of foreigners or foreign countries”. In that sense, foreign things like foreign customs and foreign culture are the main factors of fear. This reflects a situation of aversion to foreigners or strangers.

⁴⁸ See von Beyme, op.cit.

words, only nationals should benefit the state-provided goods such as housing, jobs and social payments.⁴⁹ In this sense, it demands the exclusion of unemployed foreigners and foreigners charged with committing a crime and the stop of all transfer payments to asylum-seekers and refugees under the slogan of “the own people first”.

Besides, extreme right has a special focus on Islam. Accordingly, the growing numbers of Muslim immigrants are seen as the main challenge and threat to Western culture simply because the Islamic order is not compatible with the Western values such as human rights, democracy and the equality of woman.⁵⁰ Therefore, extreme right aims to protect national identity from hostile cultures and values.

On the other hand, extreme right-wing parties count certain issues precondition for the survival of the indigenous society. Accordingly, these issues are respectively immigration, fear of crime, social and economic insecurity because of increased crime and unemployment and drugs trafficking.⁵¹ Indeed, according to Wouter van der Brug et. al., “negative attitudes towards immigrants have a stronger effect on preferences for anti-immigrant parties than on preference for other parties.”⁵² and according to Betz, xenophobic sentiments are clear when indigenous people of Europe blame immigrants for growing crime rates.⁵³ Thus, extreme right issues are clearly laid on foreigners and xenophobia.

⁴⁹ Hainsworth, Paul. *Introduction: the extreme right*, in Paul Hainsworth (ed.), *The Politics of the Extreme Right: From the margins to the mainstream*. Pinter, 2000, p.10.

⁵⁰ Betz (2003), op.cit., p.84.

⁵¹ Betz (1994), op.cit., p.67.

⁵² Van der Brug, Wouter., Fennema, Meindert. and Tillie, Jean. *Anti-immigrant parties in Europe: Ideological or protest vote?*. European Journal of Political Research, Vol. 37, No.1, 2000, p.77.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, p.119.

In addition, foreigners are blamed for all problems of society ranging from unemployment and crime, to declining standards in health and in education. In this context, according to Paul Hainsworth, the opposition of extreme right to immigration and immigrants is “inspired by ethnocentric⁵⁴, xenophobic, exclusionary and often out-right racist representations of the nation.”⁵⁵

Some extreme nationalists may prefer to vote for center-right political parties instead of extreme right-wing parties. Nevertheless, only extreme right-wing parties in the Netherlands will be discussed precisely because they minces no words while the center-right parties are more cautious in their policies.⁵⁶ For example, while it is more likely that an extreme right-wing party uses a xenophobic discourse in its election campaign, a center right party may not chose the similar slogans of the extreme right-wing. That is to say while those who vote for extreme right-wing parties are counted as extreme or ultra nationalist, it is too hard, if not impossible, to pick up extreme nationalist votes in a center-right party turnouts precisely because the latter party does not use an explicit xenophobic or nationalist discourse. So, in comparison to mainstream right-wing parties, studying extreme right parties give clearer results in showing the xenophobic and illiberal base in a certain country. However, it is also clear that extreme right-wing turnouts do not show whole illiberal or xenophobic picture in

⁵⁴ Ethnocentrism refers to the situation in which the positive characteristics of in-group and the negative characteristics of out-groups are predominantly selected. In this way, it contributes to the maintenance of a positive identity. Besides, ethnocentrism shows a positive attitude toward in-group but a negative attitude toward out-groups. In this sense, it harbors positive prejudices and superiority about one's own social groups and negative prejudices about other ethnic groups. See Billiet, Jaak., Eisinga, Rob. and Scheepers, Peer. *Ethnocentrism in the Low Countries: a comparative perspective*. New Community, Vol. 22, No. 3, 1996, p.402

⁵⁵ Hainsworth, op.cit., p.10.

⁵⁶ Betz (2003), op.cit., p.89.

the country. Nevertheless, for the aforementioned reasons, extreme right-wing parties in the Netherlands will be historically discussed below.

2) Extreme Right-Wing Parties in the Netherlands

Although it lost its southern part to the Belgium in 1830, this did not cause a revenge movement in the Netherlands and so aspiration for the Greater Netherlands was not the case in Dutch politics. Nonetheless, especially after the immigration influx, extreme right parties also arose in the Dutch politics.

The *Nationaal Socialistische Beweging* (National Socialist Movement, NSB) was founded in December 1931. The party adopted nationalist socialism and formed an armed militia. At that time it had nearly 50,000 members. However, the NSB could not exceed 4 percent of the total votes in the 1937 general elections. But, after the Nazi occupation, the party began to play an important role in the Dutch politics and became only legal political party of the Netherlands. However, the party program did not include certain typical National Socialist features like racism and anti-Semitism. Nevertheless, after the war, most of the members of the NSB were imprisoned and any future para-fascist movement was forbidden by the constitution.⁵⁷

In the post-war era, *Nationaal Europese Social Beweging* (National European Social Movement, the NESB) had been founded in 1953 under the leadership of ex-Dutch Nazis. However, it was outlawed by the Supreme Court in 1955.⁵⁸ For that reason, after the fascism and Nazism experience of Europe, it was too hard for people to display their extreme right opinions in the post-war period. Thus, it was only 1970s that

⁵⁷ Ignazi, Piero. *Extreme Right Parties in Western Europe*. Oxford University Press, 2003, p.162.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p.163.

extreme rightists could come back to the Dutch politics. So, the *Nederlandse Volks-Unie* (Dutch People's Union, NVU) was founded in March 1971 and immediately radicalized. Accordingly, the constituent principal of the NVU was to found a Great Dutch State and unify all the Flemish-speaking people in it after expelling all ethnically diverse groups. Therefore, Ignazi labels the NVU as an ethnocentric nationalist party. Indeed, the party chairman, Glimmerveen, invoked and fostered violence against immigrants. However, the extremism did not resonate among the Dutch people and the party only took 0.4 per cent of all votes of the 1977 elections.⁵⁹

Later on, a group of people from NVU left the party due to it was too radicalized and founded a moderate but still extremist *Nationale Centrumpartij* (National Center Party, NCP) in December 1979. However, after their first party meeting in February 1980, some younger party members raided a church in Amsterdam simply because some illegal foreigners were taking shelter against expulsion there. Then, this caused a huge protest in Dutch society and so NCP had to dissolve itself. Nonetheless, some of the NCP members founded the *Centrumpartij* (Center Party, CP) in the following days.

Although it was splitted from the NVU, unlike the NVU, the CP's constituent principal was not extremist nationalism but preservation of Dutch culture. Nevertheless, its primary policy was shaped around the immigration topic. Accordingly, the other problems such as unemployment or corruption of cultural identity were the pure results of immigration and immigrants. So, illegal immigrants must be expelled and the legal ones must be forced to integrate into the Dutch society. In that sense, it is clear that the CP also followed ethnocentric policies. The party won 1 seat of 150 in the 1982 the parliamentary elections. This seat was taken by party leader, Hans Janmaat. However, its best result was 1984 European elections and reached 2.5 % of all votes in the

⁵⁹ Ibid., p.164.

Netherlands. Nevertheless, domestic tensions and competition for party leadership led to a split: *Centrumdemocraten* (Centre Democrats, CD) and *Centrumpartij '86* (Center Party '86, CP'86).⁶⁰

The CD was founded in November 1984 and soon Janmaat joined the party and became the party leader. Like the CP, the CD also constituted its policies around the immigration issue which it describes as foreign occupation. Indeed, the leader of the CD, Janmaat, stated that :

[E]ndless [the parliamentary] debates indicate one of the weak spots of democracy. For it seems to me impossible to reach solutions when ideas are opposed to each other. These oppositions are reinforced by ideas and values of the *multicultural society* which do not increase but undermine the strength of our political system (italics added).⁶¹

In addition, during an interview published in an independent weekly newsmagazine, he expressed tolerance as a personal and ethnic characteristic that Dutch have and the others lack: “Netherlands has always been a tolerant country. The foreigners who come here have no tolerance.”⁶² Therefore, the CD was only party capable of reconstituting *Dutch* culture and defending *Dutch* interest, norms and values.

Indeed, the CD ideologically followed the ethnocentric nationalist tradition of the CP. In other words, the party program and the ideology of the CD heavily focused on the immigration issue. In this sense, the party policies fluctuated between assimilation and repatriation. This was very clear at the 2nd chapter of 1989 party program:

⁶⁰ Ibid., p.165.

⁶¹ Quoted in Ignazi, op.cit., p.166.

⁶² De Groene Amsterdammer, 7 October 1992.

“Foreigners and minorities either adjust to the Dutch ways and customs or leave the country.”⁶³ Other clear statements of ethnocentric tradition were as follows:

- stop discrimination against the Dutch;
- place asylum seekers in labor camps;
- stop the destruction of Dutch culture;
- control the movement of travelers at the border;
- the Netherlands is not an immigration country.⁶⁴

The CP, on the other hand, was soon convicted of electoral fraud and so bankrupted. Few days later, the *Centrumpartij* '86 (Center Party'86, CP'86) was established in May 1986. Therefore, two parties, CD and CP'86, began to compete on the legacy of the CP in the Dutch politics. Later on, the CD, taken by Janmaat, won a seat in the Second Chamber⁶⁵ in 1989. One year later, the CD won 11 and CP'86 won 4 seats at the municipal elections⁶⁶. In 1991, the CD perpetuated its success in comparison

⁶³ Quoted in Mudde, Cas. and Van Holsteyn, Joop J.M. *The Netherlands: explaining the limited success of the extreme right*, in Paul Hainsworth (ed.), *The Politics of the Extreme Right: From the margins to the mainstream*. Pinter, 2000, p. 150.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p.151.

⁶⁵ It is the States General that represents the people of the Netherlands. It consists of a Lower House or Second Chamber (*Tweede Kamer*) and an Upper House or First Chamber (*Eerste Kamer*). While the former is composed of one hundred and fifty members the latter is composed of seventy-five members. The members of both Houses are renewed in every four year. In this sense, the members of the Lower House are directly elected by Dutch nationals. However, the members of the Upper House are indirectly elected by Dutch people. Accordingly, its members are elected by the members of the provincial councils. Upper House cannot propose or amend laws but only reject them. The cabinet can be dismissed by the States General after a vote of no confidence. See *The Constitution of the Kingdom of the Netherlands (2002)*. article 50-5.

⁶⁶ The Netherlands is divided into twelve provinces, Friesland, Groningen, Drenthe, Overijssel, Flevoland, Gelderland, Utrecht, North Holland, South Holland, Zeeland, North Brabant and Limburg, and all provinces are divided into municipalities, 458 in total in January 2006. The provinces and municipalities are respectively headed by provincial and municipal councils and the members of both councils are directly elected

to CP'86 and won 3 seats at the provincial elections of North Holland, South Holland and Utrecht. In 1994, the CD increased its seats to 77 and the CP'86 increased to 8 at the municipal elections. On the other hand, while the CP'86 only took 0.4 per cent of all votes, the CD took 2.5 per cent and so gained three seats at the 1994 general elections.

Nevertheless, the 1990s was the beginning of the end for both parties. Accordingly, first Janmaat and the CD but later the CP'86 were convicted for provocation to racial hatred in 1994 and 1995 because of their "own people first" policies. As a result, both parties and Janmaat were fined to violate the Constitution regulation which delegitimizes racial hatred. More than this, the CP'86 was banned and dissolved by the Amsterdam court in 1998 simply because the court found that the policies of the CP'86 exceeded the boundaries of democratic rule of law.⁶⁷ On the other hand, after 1998 general elections, the CD lost its all seats and so disappeared from the parliament. Thereafter, Janmaat left the party leadership and the CD could not submit a list of candidates on 15 May 2002 and 22 November 2006 general elections. Nonetheless, the CD still manages to survive.

In the 2000s, most famous politician in the Netherlands was Pim Fortuyn. Livable Netherlands (*Leefbaar Nederland, the LN*), on the other hand, was the stepping stone for his political career. The LN was founded on 21 March 1999. The party was the national continuation of two local parties, *Leefbaar Hilversum* and *Leefbaar Utrecht*. The LN was actually an anti-establishment party of the left. However, once Pim Fortuyn, an ex-member of Labor Party (*Partij van de Arbeid, the PvdA*) became the party leader on 25 November 2001, the party did slide to the right. Thereafter, when

with proportional representation by Dutch nationals reside in that province or municipality. The duration of these councils are four years. See *The Constitution of the Kingdom of the Netherlands (2002)*. article 123-36.

⁶⁷ Mudde and Van Holsteyn, op.cit., pp.144-49.

Fortuyn stated in an interview on 9 February 2002 that “Islam was a backward culture, that no new asylum seekers would be allowed”, and that “if necessary to protect freedom of speech, the first article of the Constitution should be repealed”⁶⁸ he caused a bombshell in the Dutch politics and next day he was dismissed from the leadership of LN. However, when a LN type local party *Leefbaar Rotterdam*, lead by Fortuyn, won 17 of 45 seats with 35 per cent of votes in municipal council, Fortuyn decided to participate to the general elections with his own List Fortuyn.⁶⁹

In this context, the List Pim Fortuyn (*Lijst Pim Fortuyn, the LPF*) was created by Pim Fortuyn in February 2002 and immediately got strong among the other parties. According to the election polls, for example, the LPF was expected to win considerable seats in the parliaments. However, on 6 May 2002, he was shot to death by an animal rights activist, Volkert van der Graaf. He said: “I confess to the shooting. He was an ever growing danger who would affect many people in society. I saw it as a danger. I hoped that I could solve it myself.”⁷⁰ This caused a stunning effect in the Dutch politics simply because since William of Orange was killed in Delft in 1584, there was no other assassination of a political leader in the Netherlands. Therefore, thousands of people immediately crowded into the streets and did shout and riot. Just nine days after his assassination, on the other hand, the LPF became the second party in the general elections of May 15. It gained 26 seats of 150 with 17 per cent of votes and so

⁶⁸ Van Holsteyn, Joop J.M. and Irwin, Galen A. *Never a dull moment: Pim Fortuyn and the Dutch Parliamentary Election of 2002*. West European Politics, Vol. 26, No. 2, 2003 p.46. The first article of the Dutch Constitution states that “[a]ll persons in the Netherlands shall be treated equally in equal circumstances. Discrimination on the grounds of religion, belief, political opinion, race or sex or on any other grounds whatsoever shall not be permitted”.

⁶⁹ Van Holsteyn and Irwin, op.cit., p.46.

⁷⁰ Quoted in Ambrose Evans-Pritchard and Joan Clements, *Fortuyn killed 'to protect Muslims'*. London Daily Telegraph, 28/03/2003.

participated to the coalition government with four ministers. However, after his death, the fights between the party members especially for the party leadership had weakened the LPF. Moreover, the conflict between vice-prime minister Eduard Bomhoff and minister of Economic Affairs Herman Heinsbroek, two LPF ministers in the Cabinet, immediately signaled the coalition partners Liberal Party and the Christian-Democratic Appeal to resign.⁷¹ In this sense, Premier Balkenende asked the Queen for his resignation on October 16, 2002. New election was held in 22 January 2003 and the LPF lost 18 seats. The new coalitional government was formed without the LPF on 27 May 2003.⁷² Currently, the LPF is out of the parliament after it lost its all seats in the general elections held on 22 November 2006.⁷³

Extreme right-wing parties combine hierarchical party structure with charismatic leadership and a populist discourse. They employ anti-establishment messages together with scapegoating of immigrants.⁷⁴ In this context, Fortuyn predicated his election campaign on two issues: to restructure the public sector and to restrict the policy on asylum seekers.⁷⁵ In that sense, during his campaign, he linked the issues such as crime,

⁷¹ Van Holsteyn and Irwin, op.cit., p.58.

⁷² Ghillebaert, Christian-Pierre. *Miscasting Politicians in the Netherlands. What remains of the fellowship of Pim Fortuyn after a brief ruling time?*. p.1.
<http://www.essex.ac.uk/ecpr/events/jointsessions/paperarchive/uppsala/ws6/GHILLEBAERT.pdf>

⁷³ In 2006 elections, another political party with a xenophobic leader entered into the parliament. *Partij voor de Vrijheid* (The Party for Freedom, the PvdV) lead by Geert Wilders won 9 seats in the parliament with 5.9 % of all votes. However, since the PvdV is a very fresh event, academic discussions about the party and Geert Wilders are still lacked. Therefore, at least at the moment, the results of 2006 elections cannot be discussed here in detail.

⁷⁴ Zaslove, Andrej. *The Dark Side of European Politics: Unmasking the Radical Right*. European Integration, Vol. 26, No. 1, 2004, p.61.

⁷⁵ Van Holsteyn and Irwin, op.cit., p.45.

poor public services or insecurity to immigration.⁷⁶ However, it is hard to label him as racist. Indeed, according to Ghillebaert, Fortuyn was not an ethnic nationalist. He gave for instance no hint of anti-Semitism. In addition, party program of the LPF prioritized the keeping of Frisian cultural good. However, his Islamophobia was quite clear: “since the collapse of German Nazism, the world has not known any ideology as cruel and imperialistic as that of Islam.”⁷⁷

On the other hand, as Pennings and Keman explained, in the case of immigrants, far from liberal nationalism, the LPF asked foreigners to adapt Dutch culture instead of their social and cultural integration into the society. However, it did not express and display any tough anti-immigration stances or strict law order against immigrants. It only criticized the fragmentation of society. Therefore, according to them, the LPF cannot be classified as an extreme right-wing party like *Freiheitliche Partei Österreich* (Austrian Freedom Party, the FPÖ) or *Front National* (National Front, the FN). Instead, it resembles other center right-wing Christian Democrat parties in Europe.⁷⁸ Indeed,

⁷⁶ Bruff, Ian. *The Netherlands, the Challenge of Lijst Pim Fortuyn, and the Third Way*. Politics, Vol. 23, No. 3, 2003, p. 158.

⁷⁷ Ghillebaert, op.cit., p. 20.

⁷⁸ Pennings, Paul. and Keman, Hans. *The Dutch parliamentary Elections in 2002 and 2003: The Rise and Decline of the Fortuyn Movement*. Acta Politica, Vol. 38, No. 1, 2003, p.62. Broadly speaking, Christian Democracy can be described as liberal insofar as it emphasizes human rights, as conservative insofar as it emphasizes law and order and rejects communism and lastly as socialist insofar as it emphasizes welfare state and prioritizes alleviation of poverty. However, in contrast to liberalism, conservatism and socialism respectively, Christian Democracy emphasizes that since the individual is part of a community he/she has duties towards it; unlike conservatism, it is open to change; and lastly it is open to market economy but not to class struggle. See Roberts, Geoffrey K. and Hogwood, Patricia. *European Politics Today*. Manchester University Press, 1997. Indeed, the LPF was liberal while it prioritized the keeping of Frisian cultural good but illiberal while it asked foreigners to adapt Dutch culture. Moreover, the party was conservative while it criticized the fragmentation of society but non-conservative while it aimed to restructure the public sector. Lastly, the party was quite close to socialism while it intended to restore health care system in the country. See below.

while many scholars call the CD as an extreme right party, they call the LPF as an anti-establishment party.⁷⁹

In that sense, according to Ian Bruff, the popularity of the LPF stems from its anti-establishment stance rather than its xenophobic outlook.⁸⁰ Indeed, Fortuyn's election campaign was based on the rejection of coalitional government of the past eight years. Therefore, in his book, *The Mess of Eight Purple Years (De puinhopen van acht jaar Paars)*, he heavily criticized the governmental policies of the time. As Van Holsteyn and Irwin explained, voters' evaluation of the governmental economic performance was positive in 2002. But, although the government was quite successful in economic policies, without mentioning these successes, Fortuyn only spoke of the problems that the coalition created. Among the others, policies on education, health care system, asylum seekers and minorities were the mess that the government created. Accordingly, insecurity in the streets, insufficient number of teachers in the schools or the long waiting lists in hospitals were by-products of government policies. Nonetheless, during his campaign, Fortuyn recommended that these problems could only be solved by small-scale community organizations. For instance, a small hospital or a small school could be managed by their own personnel and do not need even any managers.⁸¹ Therefore, according to Van Holsteyn and Irwin, those who were dissatisfied with the governmental performance were the most susceptible to the Fortuyn's campaign. Thus,

⁷⁹ See for example Huib Pellikaan, Rob Honig and Frank Busing. *The left-right scale as a political orientation for voters of party positions: The Dutch Case.*

http://www.eur.nl/fsw/english/research/nig/docs/doc_nig05_paper_pellikaan-honig-busing.pdf

⁸⁰ Bruff, op.cit., p.156.

⁸¹ Lucardie, Paul. and Voerman, Gerrit. *From Challenger to Government Partner Without a Party: the List Pim Fortuyn.* p.3.

<http://www.essex.ac.uk/ECPR/events/generalconference/marburg/papers/24/2/Lucardie.pdf>.

political and social dissatisfaction with the government policies at the time of the election was an important factor in the LPF's electoral success.⁸² In other words, protest votes were the determinant of 2002 elections.

In addition, Fortuyn's assassination positively contributed to the LPF's votes in the elections.⁸³ Indeed, as Bruff stated, Fortuyn's murder changed the voters' preferences and enabled the LPF to capture 12 per cent more votes than the expected one.⁸⁴

On the other hand, proportional representation was another factor favored the LPF's success. As Andeweg and Irwin stated Netherlands is "one of the most proportional systems in the world."⁸⁵ Accordingly, the whole Netherlands constitutes a single electorate and those candidates who takes approximately 0.67 % of votes (about 60,000 votes) are elected. In addition, approximately 10 out of 20 parties in the elections win seat in the parliament but, up to now, no party have won the majority of the votes in the history of Dutch politics. Therefore, this proportionality makes it easier for political parties to enter into the Dutch parliament.⁸⁶ In other words, to see an extreme right party in the parliament is strongly possible under the Dutch proportional representation.

In short, since the LPF did not follow clear racist, any tough anti-immigration stances or strict law policies against foreigners, it seems hard to classify it as an extreme right-wing party. In that sense, the success of the LPF can be found in its anti-

⁸² Van Holsteyn and Irwin, op.cit., p.59-60.

⁸³ Ibid., p.58.

⁸⁴ Bruff, op.cit., 159.

⁸⁵ Andeweg, R.B. and Irwin, G.A. *Governance and politics of the Netherlands*. Houndmills: Palgrave MacMillan, 2002, p.78.

⁸⁶ Lijphart, Arend. *Electoral Systems and Party Systems*. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1994, p. 22.

establishment rather than its “xenophobic” stance. Indeed, those who were dissatisfied with the policies of the coalition government of the period were the most susceptible to the LPF’s campaign. Fortuyn’s assassination, on the other hand, positively contributed to the LPF’s votes. Last but not least, proportional representation system also favored the LPF.

Since there is no aspiration for the Greater Netherlands, the Dutch extreme right parties formed their policy around the issue of immigration and immigrants. Roughly, other problems such as unemployment or corruption of cultural identity were the clear results of foreigners. So, immigration to the Netherlands must be stopped, illegal immigrants must be expelled and the legal ones must be forced to adapt to the Dutch society. Nevertheless, extreme right parties in the Netherlands have always had limited success in Dutch politics. Up to the foundation of LPF, their vote potentials in the general elections fluctuated between 1 and 3 per cent.⁸⁷ In academic discussions, on the other hand, the LPF is still seen as right wing party rather than extreme right-wing one. In that sense, without too much emphasis on xenophobic policies, its anti-establishment stance during the electoral campaign was the main reason behind the success of the LPF.

Up to now, it was seen that although considerable numbers of Dutch people are xenophobic in public opinion survey results, the country has still integrative immigration policy and has weak extreme right party tradition. In other words, regarding immigration policy, xenophobic sentiments of public, input, do not shape

⁸⁷ However, the situation for extreme right was quite different in other European countries hosting considerable immigrants population like the Netherlands. For example, while *Freiheitliche Partei Österreich* (Austrian Freedom Party, the FPÖ) in Austria received 27% of the votes in the 1999 parliamentary election, during the 2002 presidential elections, *Front National* (National Front, the FN) in France received nearly 18% of all votes. *Vlaams Blok* (Flemish Bloc, the VB), on the other hand, won nearly 15% of all votes in 2004 European Parliament election. The party also gained approximately 12% in 2003 election for Belgian Chamber of Representatives.

policy outputs and regarding extreme right, xenophobia does not feed extreme right-wing parties in the Netherlands. But how can this situation be explained? What are the reasons and consequences of it? According to the findings, civic definition of nation on a shared citizenship notion and the pillarization of society in the Netherlands are two main determinants of the aforementioned situation. The following two chapters will be discussing these topics.

Chapter III

The Dutch Nationalism

1) Types of Nationalism

1.1) What is Nationalism?

People in different groups have different aims and interests. However, sometimes these people might not know their aims and so the social group that they are member of does not make sense for them. In this context, ideology tells its believers their common interests and it shows how to reach them.⁸⁸

As an ideology, nationalism is a modern discourse. British rebellion against monarchy in the seventeenth century, New World's struggles against Iberian

⁸⁸ Ergil, Dođu. *İdeoloji ve Milliyetçilik*. Ankara, Turhan Kitabevi, 1983, pp.24-6.

colonialism in eighteenth century, the French revolution of 1789, the German reaction to German disunity and to French revolution are counted as the origins of nationalism.⁸⁹

In that sense, the most famous argument of nationalism is to organize the nation under a nation-state. But to define “nationalism” is not a simple task. As Andrew Vincent truly points out, “there is no one nationalist doctrine – there are rather nationalisms”⁹⁰ or in Ignatieff’s words, nationalism “is not one thing in many disguises, but many things in many disguises.”⁹¹ So, there are different connotations for nationalism. According to Ernest Gellner, for instance, nationalism is “a principle which holds that the political and national unit should be congruent.”⁹² For Haas, on the other side, it is “a belief held by a group of people that they ought to constitute a nation, or that they already are one.”⁹³ One common meaning is loyalty to the state. The other is having an independent state for its own nation. Accordingly, nationalism demands that people of the world who are divided into nations should be granted self-determination right. This right either requires “self-governing entities within existing states” or “stand-alone nation states.”⁹⁴

⁸⁹ Calhoun, Craig. *Nationalism and Ethnicity*. Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 19, 1993, p.212.

⁹⁰ Vincent, Andrew. *Modern Political Ideologies*. 2nd edition, Oxford: Blackwell, 1995, p.241.

⁹¹ Ignatieff, Michael. *Blood & Belonging: Journeys Into the New Nationalism*. London: BBC Books and Chatto & Windus, 1993, p.9.

⁹² Gellner, Ernest. *Nations and Nationalism*. Ithica, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983, p.1.

⁹³ Haas, Ernst. *What is Nationalism and Why Should We Study It?*. International Organization, Vol.40, No.3, 1986. p.727.

⁹⁴ Bowden, Brett. *Nationalism and Cosmopolitanism: Irreconcilable Differences or Possible Bedfellows?*. National Identities, Vol. 5, No. 3, 2003, p.239.

Therefore, since nationalism demands a political community, it needs certain boundaries that pre-modern ethnicity does not. Indeed, regarding the self-determination rights, nationalism is an attempt to demarcate political communities and to provide legitimate rule in referencing to “the people” of a country. Ethnic identities, on the other hand, do not claim “national” autonomy but rather recognition inside and outside the state boundaries.⁹⁵ Nationalism also requires internal homogeneity throughout a certain nation rather than a sub-cultural distinction. So, ethnicity and cultural traditions are essential ingredients of nationalism in so far they constitute historical memory or habitus.⁹⁶

On the other hand, in nationalism, national identities trump other group or personal identities such as family or ethnicity and individuals are directly linked to the nation. Nonetheless, many ethnic identities stem from kinship or family membership.⁹⁷ In this context, regarding the cultural ideal, nationalism explains that although individuals can have many different identities, moral worth is realized only through belonging to a nation. For example, according to Ignatieff, “[a]s a moral ideal, nationalism is an ethic of heroic sacrifice, justifying the use of violence in the defence of one’s nation against enemies, internal or external.”⁹⁸ Similarly, for Bowden, “it requires that one must be willing put the nation first – to die in defence of the nation if need be.”⁹⁹

⁹⁵ Calhoun, op.cit., p.211.

⁹⁶ Ibid., p.222.

⁹⁷ Ibid., p.229.

⁹⁸ Ignatieff, op.cit., p.3.

⁹⁹ Bowden, op.cit., p.239.

On this ground, individuals owe their loyalty to the nation over any other sub-group to realize and maintain this moral worth. But unfortunately, this logic brings a blind adherence: “my country, right or wrong”. Clearly, this is the extreme form of nationalism that caused the darkest ages of humanity. However, civic or liberal nationalism in which the membership of the nation is based on the equal rights of citizenship are counted as an alternative to this extreme form. Accordingly, an adherence to a nation must not be at the expense of the others.¹⁰⁰

In this context, one of the claims of nationalism is the national superiority. Accordingly, it asserts that one’s culture, ethnic group or history are superior to neighboring nations simply because when the nation is idealized as the highest moral platform then the external nations are subordinated, are not trusted and pose a possible threat.¹⁰¹ However, Halliday’s question shows the potential danger: “Yet what if the lies of one movement conflict with the lies of another? Are they equally valid?”¹⁰²

Thus, in general, nationalism commonly is an idea based on nation-state, self-determination, national identity, territorial autonomy, sovereignty or national superiority. In this context, nationalism defines the territorial boundaries that would be controlled by the nation and it defines the criteria for the membership of a nation.¹⁰³

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., p.240.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., p.239.

¹⁰² Halliday, Fred. *The Perils of Community: Reason and Unreason in Nationalist Ideology*. Nations and Nationalism, Vol.6, No.2, 2000, p.167.

¹⁰³ Barrington, Lowell W. ‘Nation’ and ‘Nationalism’: *The Misuse of Key Concepts in Political Science*, Political Science and Politics, Vol 30, No.4, 1997, p.714.

1.2) Ethnic and Civic Nationalism

The definition of nation is pathological simply because while any definition legitimates certain claims, it at the same time delegitimizes others.¹⁰⁴ On this ground, German and French understanding of nation might be helpful in clarifying this statement. According to Rogers Brubaker, German and France models are two ideal-typical models of citizenship in Europe. In Germany, the notion of “nation” (blood) preceded the notion of “state” (soil). However, in France, the picture was the other way round. Accordingly, a German nation had already existed in ethnic terms. So, the unification of Germany in 1871 did not create Germans but a German nation founded a state. However before 1871, they were governed by different states such as Austria, Prussia or Russia. Therefore, if a person carried a German blood he could then claim to be German regardless of his residence. France, on the other hand, was a state before it was a nation. It was the transformation of dynastic state into people’s state that created French nation. Accordingly, peasants had been turned into Frenchmen by the state roughly in nineteenth century.¹⁰⁵ In other words, types of nationalism in these countries are determined by whether the national identity feeling emerged before or after the foundation of a nation-state. National feeling in France has occurred after the establishment of French nation-state. So, it is an example of civic nationalism. However, national feeling in Germany preceded the establishment of the German nation-state. So, the foundation of German state was an ethnocultural development

¹⁰⁴ Calhoun, op.cit., p.215.

¹⁰⁵ McCrone, David and Kiely, Richard. *Nationalism and Citizenship*. Sociology, Vol. 34, No. 1, 2000, p.27.

rather than a political one.¹⁰⁶ French society is politically bound and they define national membership politically through formal citizenship methods. On the other side, German society is ethnically bound and national membership is defined according to blood ties.¹⁰⁷

Therefore, the definition of nation in more civic ties might delegitimize an ethnic definition of nation and vice versa. In addition, this situation in long term caused different policies in these countries:

The state-centred assimilationist understanding of nationhood in France is embodied and expressed in an expansive definition of citizenship, one that automatically transforms second-generation immigrants into citizens, assimilating them – legally – to other French men and women. The ethnocultural, differentialist understanding of nationhood in Germany is embodied and expressed in a definition of citizenship that is remarkably open to ethnic German immigrants from Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, but remarkably closed to non-German immigrants.¹⁰⁸

In parallel with this, Ernst Renan emphasizes the civility of the nation once again. Accordingly, in 1882, Renan demanded the return of Alsace to France in accordance with the free choice of the province's population regardless of their language or blood precisely because in the German Romantic tradition the nation was an organic community. However, Renan stated that the nation is a voluntary community, a daily plebiscite: “[m]an is the slave neither of his race, his language, nor his religion; neither of the courses of the rivers, nor the mountain ranges. One great aggregate of men, of sound spirit and warm heart, creates a moral conscience that is called a nation.”¹⁰⁹ So,

¹⁰⁶ Brubaker, Rogers. *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany*. Harvard University Press, 1992, p.1.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, p.23.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, p.3.

¹⁰⁹ Zimmer, Oliver. *A Contested Nation: History, Memory and Nationalism in Switzerland, 1761-1891*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, p.9.

Renan distinguished “those nations (such as France) that are the result of the free choices of their members from those (such as Germany) whose identity and cohesion are given to their members independently of any voluntary will.”¹¹⁰

In that sense, ethnic nationalism¹¹¹ defines the nation on the base of blood or ethnicity. Therefore, it is quite exclusionary. So, while civic nationalism sees the nation as a voluntary association and a daily plebiscite, ethnic nationalism sees it as a community of fate. In this sense, civic nationalism is identified with liberalism but ethnic nationalism is identified with authoritarian regimes and historically became dominant in Central and Eastern Europe.¹¹² However, French and American nationalisms are traditionally regarded as civic nationalism. These societies fought for the sovereignty of the people. So, community membership is defined in political terms and civic virtues became more important than common culture or even ethnicity. Territorial boundaries were the only means of exclusion. Therefore, anybody having the civic virtues can become French or American citizen.

On the other hand, although civic nationalists have an antipathy to bureaucratic state just like ethnic nationalists have, their *raison d'être* is a bit different. Their ideal is a citizenship community that lives under the common laws irrespective of their cultures. So they have conflict with any existing state preventing these ideals. However, since the world population is divided into states they have to work within these particular political units. In that sense, their aim is to secure this state to realize their ideals. But,

¹¹⁰ Calhoun, op.cit., p.221.

¹¹¹ In academy, ethnic and civic nationalism are also called respectively as cultural and Eastern or political and Western nationalism. However, it is preferred to use ethnic and civic nationalism terminology in this study.

¹¹² Auer, Stefan. *Two Types of Nationalism in Europe?*. Russian and Euro-Asian Bulletin, Vol.7 No.12 December 1997.

what is paradoxical here is that civic nationalists may be forced to adopt ethnic-historical identities to mobilize people in favor of their ideals and in the end their policies can be ethnicized. Nonetheless, their ideals are modernist since they defend a representative state that will enable equal participation to all citizens.¹¹³ Unlike civic nationalists, for ethnic nationalists, nation is primordial and natural.¹¹⁴ Therefore, it is

¹¹³ Hutchinson, John. *The Dynamics of Cultural Nationalism*. Allen and Unwin, London, 1987, p.12.

¹¹⁴ The definition of nation is controversial. In that sense there are three main approaches in defining the concept of nation. According to modernists approach, nation has been emerged due to certain historical developments. For instance, in Gellner's analysis, nation depends on industrial society, state formation and cultural transformations such as the creation of "high cultures" in relation with folk culture. Accordingly, agrarian society was culturally diverse and fragmented into small sub-communities which lived in their own specific idiom. Peasants did not need to communicate with the high cultured elites. However, modern industrial and urban society necessitated mass literacy and certain social mobility that could only be achieved by state led national educational system. This, in turn, required a common vernacular. Therefore, the political doctrine of nationalism was born simply because of the need for cultural homogenization and for transformation of low culture into high culture. So, he is clear that nation and nationalism are not the result of prior ethnicity but of modernity. Furthermore, according to Hobsbawm, nation is invented through the invented traditions such as the standard national language, public ceremonies or monuments and states, political, economic or technological conditions are somehow functional in construction a nation. In addition, according to Anderson, nation is an imagined community simply because the member of the nation will never know or even meet their nationals. For him, print technology and capitalism had played a major role in community imagination. Accordingly, nationalism depended heavily on the integration of distinctive dialects into new common languages and print technology and capitalism facilitated this process as providing a new fixity and a stable grammar to the language. On the other hand, according to primordialist approach, the roots of the nation are very old and nations have always been in existence. People are bound their nationals not only because of practical necessities but also because of their primordial ties such as kinship, blood or customs. So, there is continuity between ancient and modern concept of nation. Ethno-symbolist approach, on this ground, is a midway in between modernist and primordial approach. It is a midway because Anthony Smith, like primordialists, has explained that the roots of nationalism have lied in pre-modern ethnicity but like modernists he also accepted that nations are somehow constructed. However, this is not an arbitrary invention. Nations take their powers from the myths, traditions or symbols of ethnic life and once these myths, symbols or values are formed they then tend to change very slowly. See Gellner, Ernest. *Nations and Nationalism*. Ithica, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983. Hobsbawm, Eric J. *Nations and Nationalism Since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality*. Cambridge University Press, 1992. Anderson, Benedict. *Imagined Communities*, Verso, London, 1991. Geertz, Clifford. *The Integrative*

organic and a passion rooted in nature and history rather than mere political units and so nation should be cherished by the members of it. Nevertheless, they respect the division within the nation such as sexual, religious or regional one since this differentiation enables for national creativity. However, to consolidate this creativity ethnic nationalists seek a moral regeneration by re-uniting the different aspects of the nation in between traditional and modern, agriculture and industry, science and religion.¹¹⁵

The politics of two nationalisms also differ from each other. The basic objective of civic nationalists is the achievement of a representative national state. This is vital because only a representative state could guarantee certain citizenship rights to its members. So, they mobilize people against the existing state that is perceived as neither representative nor egalitarian. However, ethnic nationalists emphasize the importance of culture rather than the state simply because “[t]he glory of a country comes not from its political power but from the culture of its people...”¹¹⁶ Therefore, ethnic nationalists aim to consolidate and re-create their particular national civilization. According to them, although it is possible to construct a state from above, it is not in the case of civilization simply because it is a spontaneous social order and can only be aroused from the bottom. Accordingly, the established decentralized cultural societies, associations or journals provide complimentary love of community to their members by teaching them their

Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in the New States in Clifford Geertz (ed.), *Old Societies and New States: The Quest for Modernity in Asia and Africa*. Free Press, New York, 1963. Berghe, Pierre Van Den. *Race and Ethnicity: A Sociobiological Perspective*. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, Vol. 1, No: 4, 1978. Connor, Walker. *A Nation is a Nation, is a State, is an Ethnic Group, is a...*, *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, Vol.1, No. 4, 1978. Smith, Anthony D. *'Ethno-symbolism' and the Study of Nationalism*, in A. Smith, *Myths and Memories of the Nation*. Oxford University Press, 1999.

¹¹⁵ Hutchinson, op.cit., p.12-4.

¹¹⁶ Hutchinson, John. and Smith, Anthony D. *Nationalism; Oxford Readers*. Oxford University Press, 1994, p.124.

common splendor and suffering. For that aim, they engage in rituals and cultural celebrations but reject foreign practices. Nonetheless, they are not totally hostile to independent statehood in practice precisely because they need state tools to provide cultural autonomy.¹¹⁷

At this point, according to Hans Kohn, once a nation state is founded there occurs two types of nationalism: either civic or ethnic. While the former is more rational the latter is more mystical. On the other hand, the socio-political development of a society determines whether this society will be civic or ethnic nationalist.¹¹⁸ Accordingly, civic nationalism has first arisen in the Western Europe and the USA. These were the communities where a developed culture and a sophisticated urban middle-class molded with Renaissance existed. Therefore, the only thing they aimed during the emergence of nationalism was to transform the existing state into people's state. In other words, nationalism gained a constitutional form in these societies and became more rationalist and pluralist. However, when nationalism arose in the East, namely Central and Eastern Europe and Asia, it turned into a reactive nationalism and conflicted with the existing state model. But, unlike in the West, their intention was not to transform it into a people's state "(...)but to redraw the political boundaries in conformity with ethnographic demands."¹¹⁹ Here, the vast majority of the population was agrarian dominated by an aristocracy and intelligentsia, so there was no such a secular middle class in these communities. Moreover, nationalists in the East were aware of their backward social and political culture in comparison to the West and unable to identify a community within the concrete territory. Thus, they created an imaginary nation based

¹¹⁷ Hutchinson, op.cit., p.16-7.

¹¹⁸ Kohn, Hans. *The Idea of Nationalism*. Macmillan, New York, 1944, pp.3-4.

¹¹⁹ Ibid., p.330.

on historical memories and culture. So, unlike civic definition of nationalism in the West, they claimed ethnic, mystic and organic link between peasant, land and community. Thus, nationalism in the East became more emotional and authoritarian. In that sense, while ethnic nationalism in the East regarded the myths of the past without too many connections with the present, civic nationalism in the West struggled with present without too much emphasizing the past.¹²⁰

1.3) Liberal Nationalism

Postwar liberal philosophers opposed nationalism simply because they feared that using the state in favor of a certain ethnic or national project would cause brutal conflict. In 1970s, for example, neo-Kantian approach stated that state should remain neutral and must not be used in favor of certain religious, ethnic or cultural agendas. This doctrine of state neutrality derives from the liberal idea in which individuals from different religious, ethnic and cultural groups could live peacefully together, under a political institution that they see as legitimate.¹²¹ However, in time, liberals came to realize that political institutions cannot be separated from culture as in the case of religion. So they concluded that neither the nation nor political institutions can be totally culturally neutral, but what is important is to protect plurality of the society.¹²²

¹²⁰ Ibid., pp.329-30.

¹²¹ See Rawls, John. *A Theory of Justice*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971 and Dworkin, Ronald. *Liberalism*, in Stuart Hampshire (ed.), *Public and Private Morality*. Cambridge University Press, 1978.

¹²² Kymlicka, Will. *Multicultural Citizenship: a Liberal Theory of Minority Rights*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995, pp.111-5, Kymlicka, Will. *Politics in the Vernacular: Nationalism, Multiculturalism, and Citizenship*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001, p.24, and Tamir, Yael. *Liberal Nationalism*. Princeton University Press, 1993, pp.148-9.

In this context, Yael Tamir argues that it is possible to alleviate some of the problems of culturally or ethnically diverse societies. For that aim, for instance, “public sphere in which a nation’s culture is expressed (nationality) from the political institutions in which all citizens participate (citizenship)” must be distinguished from each other. So, according to her, although we cannot provide each nation their own state, to prevent the alienation of minorities we can still guarantee them a public sphere in which national culture of minorities is expressed.¹²³ Because, if culture is something that holds a nation together and keeps it distinct from others, then the existence of a nation as a separate unit depends on the presence of a public sphere in which the national culture is expressed.¹²⁴

It is for these reasons that intellectuals have developed liberal nationalism. Mainly, liberal nationalism has two claims: (a) nationalism is functionally vital for the viability of liberal democracy simply because it is necessary for social integration; and (b) certain forms of nationalism are compatible with liberal democratic norms.¹²⁵ Accordingly, a liberal democratic society can provide social integration democratically as long as its citizens are unified by a shared nationality and national culture. On this ground, this integration must be nationalist integration.¹²⁶ But on the other hand, individual rights are the main core of liberal nationalism. So, to liberal nationalists, all

¹²³ Tamir, op.cit., p.150.

¹²⁴ Ibid., pp.8-9.

¹²⁵ Abizadeh, Arash. *Liberal nationalist versus postnational social integration: on the nation’s ethno-cultural particularity and ‘concreteness’*. Nations and Nationalism, Vol. 10, No. 3, 2004, p.231.

¹²⁶ Ibid., p.232.

nations should enjoy equal rights simply because “national rights rest on the value that individuals attach to their membership in a nation.”¹²⁷

Hence, liberal nationalism is a composite of liberalism and nationalism and it combines personal autonomy with communal belonging and sees them as complementary rather than conflicting.¹²⁸ In other words, it derives from two schools of thoughts. From liberalism, firstly, it commits to personal autonomy and individual rights which mean in the end the right of individuals to choose their national identity; and from nationalism, secondly, it appreciates the importance of communal membership in human life which means the right to attach to the national culture of individual choice.¹²⁹ Accordingly, individuals are social animals and the membership of a society is a constitutive element of personal identity¹³⁰ and society is necessary to provide individuals self-development, self-expression, and satisfaction.¹³¹

Therefore, liberals celebrate the plurality of thoughts, desires and beliefs. Regarding the personal identity, nationalists explain that the only way in which individuals can realize themselves is their identification with a certain nation. Since nationalists perceive societies as natural organs, “the social whole is therefore seen as prior to, more important, and greater than all its parts.” Nevertheless, for liberals, individual diversity is the main core of the organic view of society.¹³² So, Tamir reaches

¹²⁷ Tamir, op.cit., p.9.

¹²⁸ Ibid., p.14.

¹²⁹ Ibid., p.35.

¹³⁰ Ibid., p.19.

¹³¹ loc.cit

¹³² Ibid., p.17.

the conclusion that “liberals need not reject the importance of cultural contextualization, whereas nationalists need not ignore the importance of personal freedom.”¹³³

In addition, individuals will only be able to exercise their right to make cultural choices as long as the plurality of cultures is protected.¹³⁴ Cultural plurality is important simply because individuals “are like artists and writers who pick up elements of one another’s style, or even borrow plots, not for the sake of imitation but in order to strengthen their own work.”¹³⁵ At this point, the right to culture means to allow individuals to choose the culture they would like to live within. So, liberal nationalism acknowledges that culture and membership are communal features. In other words, they are fully enjoyed only together with others who made similar choices. Thus, the right to culture necessitates the right to a public sphere in which individuals can share a common language, folk or memory.¹³⁶

On the other hand, according to Tamir, cultural affiliations should be respected. For example, if a company employs Muslim or Jews workers, it should assure other foods than pork at the company’s restaurant. But it does not have to assure Japanese food for those workers who love it.¹³⁷ Thus, the right to culture is not ultimate and the freedom of one culture ends at where the freedom of other culture begins.¹³⁸

In addition, she also argues that individuals have some obligations to the state, supposed that state is just, to which they belong. On this ground, “individuals assume

¹³³ Ibid., p.18.

¹³⁴ Ibid., p.30.

¹³⁵ Ibid., p.32.

¹³⁶ Ibid., p.8.

¹³⁷ Ibid., p.41.

¹³⁸ Ibid., p.37.

such obligations because they see the state as their state, its laws as their laws, and its government as their government.”¹³⁹

In short, the entire aim of liberal nationalism, says Tamir, is to assure minorities an opportunity to live together with the majority and to protect their cultural, religious, and linguistic identities.¹⁴⁰

Liberal nationalism thus celebrates the particularity of culture together with the universality of human rights, the social and cultural embeddedness of individuals together with their personal autonomy. In this sense it differs radically from organic interpretations of nationalism, which assume that the identity of individuals is totally constituted by their national membership...¹⁴¹

Hence, if all nation-states were homogeneous then liberal nationalism would pose no problems simply because the society would have a homogeneous culture and there would be no need to respect other cultures. However most of the states are culturally or ethnically diverse and the advancement of a certain nation to the detriment of other nations renders harsh implications for members of minority groups. Therefore, liberal nationalism entails a certain degree of tolerance, open-mindedness, and common sense.¹⁴² So, according to liberal nationalism, nationalism can be more pluralistic and less ethnocentric.¹⁴³ In other words, individuals can make national choices. It means that

¹³⁹ Ibid., p.135.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid., p.76.

¹⁴¹ Ibid., p.79.

¹⁴² Ibid., pp.10-1.

¹⁴³ Ibid., p.94.

‘I would like to be French’ is meaningful and different from the statement ‘I am French’ or ‘I feel French’.¹⁴⁴

2) The Formation of Dutch Nationalism

On the aforementioned theoretical ground, it is worth to explain theoretically that how and under which conditions the Dutch nationalism occurred. In that sense, in order to find the nationalist bases in a certain country, one needs to study the history of that nation due to the fact that history accommodates very clear clues about that country. For instance, the reasons of ethnic nationalism in the pre-war Germany could not have been understood without studying early German history. In that sense, as it has been discussed before, the history of this country shows that a common German identity had arisen before the modern state penetration. In other words, prior to state apparatus, there have been already a national consciousness and this was one of the most important reasons for the fact that why a stronger nationalism had found a chance to live in Germany. On this ground, the same mentality should be followed: the history of the Netherlands can provide very important clues on Dutch nationalism. Thus, this part will discuss the creation process of a Dutch identity and will theoretically evaluate the consequences of it.

The current territory that is today called as “The Netherlands” was inhabited by Germanic and Celtic tribes, i.e. Frisians, Saxons, and Franks, and later became one of the provinces of Roman Empire till the 5th century. After the dissolution of Roman Empire, on the other hand, the country consisted of various countships, duchies and dioceses belonging to the Holy Roman Empire. However, under Habsburg rule, these

¹⁴⁴ Ibid., p.26.

separate feudal entities of the territory had been united into one state by Charles V in the 16th century. Nevertheless, there was uneasiness for the religious restrictions and absolutist ruling of Charles V's son, King Philip of Spain at that time. Indeed, after the spread of Christian reformation especially to the Western Europe, many people in the Netherlands immediately adopted Christian Protestantism simply because they were under the suppress of Roman Catholic Habsburgs. So, they willingly embraced a new Christian sect protesting Roman Catholicism. However, this situation eventually increased Habsburgs' religious suppress on Protestants. On the other hand, there were still quite considerable Catholics settling especially at the southern part of the country. Naturally, in comparison to Protestants, these Catholics were not abused by Habsburgs' religious suppress. In other words, Catholics did not complain about the Habsburg yoke as much as Protestants did. Therefore, there was not only a religious but also political clash between these two communities. Nevertheless, the aforementioned Habsburg yoke caused a revolt under Prince William of Orange started in 1568 and ended in 1648 with the Peace of Westphalia. With this treaty, Spain recognized the Netherlands as an independent state under the name of the Republic of the United Provinces. Accordingly, the new state had consisted of seven sovereign provinces of Utrecht, Groningen, Gelderland, Zeeland, Friesland, Overijssel and Holland.¹⁴⁵

In that sense, the religion was the primary cleavage in Dutch history. It was the Protestant subjects' revolt against the Catholic Spanish King that created the Dutch Republic. Calvinism, on the other hand, became a dominant sect very early in the Dutch Protestantism. So, the political elites of the new Republic were mainly Calvinist. Although other religious groups such as Protestant dissenters, Roman Catholics or Jews

¹⁴⁵ See Blom, J. C. H. and Lamberts, E. *History of the Low Countries*. Berghahn Books, Oxford, 1999, pp. 55-221.

had freedom of conscience, they did not have the same public rights in comparison to Calvinist citizens. For example, one had to be member of the Calvinist Church in order to be employed as a teacher or a civil servant. In addition, a Catholic province had been governed by a Calvinist *Staten-Generaal*. For that reason, the new state was not legitimate enough among Catholics or Protestant dissenters. So their orientation to the Dutch Republic was low and a Dutch conscious and identity was very limited at the period of Republic of the United Provinces.¹⁴⁶

At the same time, The Republic of the United Provinces had a decentralized structure. In terms of their decisions, cities and localities were autonomous. Apart from religious matters, Dutch Reformed Church¹⁴⁷ also ruled in education, poverty relief or marriage. But other religious groups such as Lutherans, Catholics or Jews were discriminated and not allowed to be employed in government. In that sense, they were second-class citizens. Therefore, southerners with their high Roman Catholic population, for example, did not have any emotional attachments towards the state just because it was associated with Protestantism.

In this context, it is clear that especially non-Protestant communities in the Netherlands have not felt Dutch or think nationally in the 19th century, yet. The official discrimination against these people, on the other hand, was the main reason behind this non-allegiance. Nonetheless, Napoleonic invasions and modernization process started in the 19th century have changed people's approach to the concept of nation in the Netherlands.

¹⁴⁶ Knippenberg, Hans. *Dutch nation-building: a struggle against the water?*. Geo-Journal, Vol. 43, No.1, 1997, pp. 29-30.

¹⁴⁷ Dutch Reformed Church is a historical Protestant denomination based on the doctrines of John Calvin. Historically, the foundation of the Reformed Church goes back to the Dutch Revolt. Accordingly, the declaration of religious independence from Rome followed the declaration of political independence from Spain.

In that sense, the French arrival to the Netherlands in 1795 ended the old federal Republic and after the foundation of the Batavian Republic¹⁴⁸ in the same year, the Netherlands became a French style centralized nation-state. In other words, after their withdrawal in 1813, French left behind the basis of a centralized state structure in the Netherlands. That meant that the all citizens, Calvinist, Catholics and the others, got the same rights derived from the idea of sovereignty of the people.¹⁴⁹ Therefore, the new Kingdom of the Netherlands was founded on equal citizenship principle in 1815. Eventually, the aforementioned legal discrimination of these groups had been officially ended by the new centralized state. This situation, on the other hand, necessitated the re-definition of the nation based on an equal citizenry. Therefore, this was the clear introduction of civic nationalism into the country.

Indeed, according to Kohn, the Netherlands, apart from Great Britain, France, United States, and Switzerland was one of the countries that civic nationalism had first arisen in it. That meant that, after the foundation of Kingdom of the Netherlands, Dutch nation became a voluntary association and a citizens community with equal rights and duties. In this context, irrespective of their religious or ethnic backgrounds, every people in the Netherlands could freely join the Dutch nation providing that they submit their allegiance to the newly founded state. In this sense, membership for the nation was not fixed on the ground of religion or ethnicity. On the contrary, after the foundation of

¹⁴⁸ After the French Revolution, the Netherlands was occupied by French revolutionary forces in 1795 and the Batavian Republic which made the country a vassal state of France had been founded. In 1806, Napoleon declared his brother Louis Bonaparte as the king of the Kingdom of Holland , a new title of the Netherlands and just four years later it was annexed by France. Following the collapse of French Empire, the Kingdom of the Netherlands consisting of Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg was formed in 1815. However, first Belgium in 1830 and then Luxembourg in 1890 left the Kingdom and gained their independence.

¹⁴⁹ Knippenberg (1997), *op.cit.*, p.30.

the Kingdom of the Netherlands, people in this country, from then on, were a community of citizens held together by common principles.¹⁵⁰

Nonetheless, legal discrimination of non-Protestant religious groups had been officially ended and “nation” was re-defined by more civic terms by the Kingdom of the Netherlands simply because the aim of new Kingdom was to create an undivided Christian nation. Accordingly, it would marginalize religious differences by moving them from public sphere to the private sphere. The ban of the reading of Bible in schools was a good example for this policy. By this way, the Kingdom intended to consolidate the unity of the people of the Netherlands.¹⁵¹ So, for example, two ministries responsible for religious affairs, a Ministry for Protestant worship and a Ministry for Roman Catholic worship, had been introduced in 1815. The main motive was still to control religious groups and to facilitate the creation of undivided, general Christian nation. However, as Knippenberg stated, “State efforts to keep the religious diversity out of the public sphere had an inverted impact. The result was a stronger self-consciousness of Orthodox-Protestants and Roman Catholics...”¹⁵² Accordingly, the undivided Christian nation understanding contrarily strengthened the consciousness of religious difference in Dutch society. The more religious groups were marginalized the more religious conscious they became. In other words, it was the same state encouraging territorial integration on the one hand and stimulating religious division on

¹⁵⁰ Cited in Janmaat, Jan Germen. *Popular conceptions of nationhood in old and new European member states: Partial support for the ethnic-civic Framework*. Ethnic and Racial Studies Vol. 29 No. 1, 2006, pp.52-3

¹⁵¹ Postma, Roelien. *The Nation-State and Cultural Diversity in the Netherlands*. pp.1-3, http://www.emz-berlin.de/projekte_e/pj50_pdf/netherlands.pdf

¹⁵² Knippenberg (1997), op.cit., p.35.

the other hand. But, as it was noted above, this was not a result of purposive policy. The real aim was to provide Dutch unity.¹⁵³

Prior to the 19th century, there was not a clear-cut Dutch consciousness. On the contrary, in comparison to non-Protestant communities, the Dutch state, the Republic of the United Provinces, favored Protestant communities. However, spread of the French Revolution principles by Napoleonic invasions inverted the picture in the Netherlands. Accordingly, the impact of French invasion on Dutch policy was the foundation of the Kingdom of the Netherlands based on equal citizens community. The main motive behind this policy was to provide Dutch unity. Nonetheless, French invasions introduced common principles that would hold people together in the society. As a result, people in the Netherlands began to attach their allegiances to the Dutch state and to the Dutch “nation”.

In this context, as it was noted before, state formation precedes nation-building in the civic nationalism. However, in ethnic nationalism, a nation already exists and this ethnic nation struggles for the formation of a new state as in the case of Habsburg or Ottoman Empire.¹⁵⁴ In other words, while “ethnicization of the polity” occurs in the civic nationalism, “the politicization of ethnicity” occurs in the ethnic nationalism.¹⁵⁵

In that sense, since the formation of Dutch state preceded the Dutch nation-building, civic nationalism was dominant in the Netherlands. Indeed, nation-building process only started after the Dutch state had been formed at the end of the 17th century.

¹⁵³ Ibid., p.34. Also see Knippenberg, Hans. *State formation and Nation-building in the Netherlands and the Soviet Union: a historical comparison*. Geo-Journal, Vol. 40, No. 3, 1996, pp. 249-262.

¹⁵⁴ Kohn, op.cit., p.329.

¹⁵⁵ Grillo, R.D. *Introduction*, in: Grillo, R.D. (ed.), *Nation and State in Europe*. London: Academic Press 1980, p.7.

Accordingly, before the foundation of Dutch state, the unifying force of the Calvinist Church and cultural domination of the province of Holland were dominant, but a Dutch consciousness was too limited. However, after the foundation of the Dutch states, first the Republic of the United Provinces and then the Kingdom of the Netherlands, cultural homogenization and what Karl Deutsch calls “social mobilization”¹⁵⁶ of the Dutch people have started and up to now, the development of a common national culture and the replacement of the Calvinist Church by the Dutch state as the strongest unifying force have occurred.

At the same time, since it recognizes people’s right to choose their nationals and accepts those who come from different subcultures but unite under the same citizenship roof, civic nationalism is liberal. However, as it was touched upon before, irrespective of individual free will, membership of a specific community in ethnic nationalism is described by birth. Thus, it is seen as illiberal.¹⁵⁷ In this sense, since the Kingdom of the Netherlands was founded on equal citizenship principle and accepted those who come from different subcultures, the country seems once again liberal.

According to Renze Portengen, in comparison to neighboring countries, there is no strict language or ethnic demarcation in the Netherlands. Rather, it is more concrete to speak of Protestant and Catholic areas.¹⁵⁸ Historically, this demarcation goes back to the spread of Calvinism in the country in the 16th century and became a symbol during the Dutch revolt against the Catholic Spain in Eighty Years War started in 1568. In this context, religious demarcation of the Netherlands strongly affected social, cultural and

¹⁵⁶ See Deutsch, Karl. *Nationalism and social communication: An inquiry into the foundations of nationality*. Cambridge, MIT Press, 1966.

¹⁵⁷ Brown, David. *Are there good and bad nationalisms?*. Nations and Nationalism, Vol.5, No.2, 1999, pp.288-9.

¹⁵⁸ Portengen, Renze. *The Netherlands: A Pillarised Nation*, in Hagendoorn, L. et al. (eds), *European Nations and Nationalism*. Ashgate, 2000, p.142.

political life in that country. Indeed, the Dutch nationalism is a clear by product of this demarcation. Since Catholicism was identified with Holy Roman Empire and Habsburg dynasty, after their independence, Republic of the United Provinces would be very pleased to have loyal Protestant subjects. Therefore, there was an official discrimination of the Catholics in the new Republic. As a result, Catholics were those who had the lowest “Dutch” feelings. However, when the Kingdom of the Netherlands was founded on the principle of sovereignty of the people in the 19th century, it adopted all religions with equal rights policy. According to this idea, the Kingdom marginalized religious differences by moving them from public sphere to the private sphere. The intention was to create an undivided Christian nation. In the end, a Dutch identity among the Protestant and Catholic communities had arisen. Theoretically, since the formation of Dutch state preceded the Dutch nation-building, it is more concrete to find civic nationalist ties in that country. In addition, due to the fact that the plurality of the subcultures is respected and protected through certain autonomies of the pillar systems, liberal nationalist sentiments are also clear.

Chapter IV

Political Structure in the Netherlands: The Pillar System

The Netherlands is a typical plural society¹⁵⁹ with its clear-cut subcultural segments. However, social segmentation causes certain cleavages in plural societies. Indeed, in the Netherlands, the aforementioned Catholic and Protestant cleavages on the religious discrimination and on the Protestant definition of citizenship during the Republic of United Provinces were grand cleavages between these two communities. Therefore, according to Lijphart, the Dutch invented consociational democracy simply because they had to learn to live together with acute differences. In this context, consociational democracy and elites try to neutralize the destabilizing effect of social segmentation through compromise. In other words, the role of social elites and their agreement and co-operation are needed for a stable democracy.¹⁶⁰

¹⁵⁹ Plural society here is used in the meaning of a situation in which more than one cultural groups live in the same territory but at the same time maintain their separate cultural identities. <http://www.geographic.org/glossary.html>

¹⁶⁰ Lijphart, Arend. *Democracy in Plural Societies; A Comparative Exploration*. Yale University Press, 1977 pp. 25-47.

Indeed, when Arend Lijphart introduced his famous consociational democracy concept in the late sixties his aim was to explain political stability in plural societies. In that sense, the elite behavior was the starting point in his analysis of plural societies. Accordingly, Lijphart says that “[b]oth the explanatory and predictive power of the consociational model can be improved (...)by identifying the conditions that are conducive to overarching elite cooperation and stable nonelite support.”¹⁶¹ Thanks to “overarching cooperation at the elite level with the deliberate aim of counteracting disintegrative tendencies in the system” the Netherlands besides Switzerland, Austria and Belgium succeeded consociational democracy that provided “a self-negating prediction or prophecy.”¹⁶²

In this context, since the elites of socially fragmented bodies of society such as confessional party leaders realized the dangers endemic to religious and social cleavages, they preferred to compromise in favor of the masses. Lijphart names this situation as a politics of accommodation at the elite level. Accordingly, cooperation within the government was one of the most influential ways in providing political stability in the socially fragmented Netherlands. At this point, a current and a good example of cooperation in Dutch society is proportional representation system simply because it favors minority rather than majority and thus opens the doors for coalitional governments. This is very critical because it provides high legitimacy of the rules and decisions emerged from these cooperation and coalitions. Therefore, coalition

¹⁶¹ Lijphart (1977), op.cit., p.54.

¹⁶² Lijphart, Arend. *Typologies of Democratic Systems*. Comparative Political Studies, Vol.1, No.1, 1968, p.21.

governments are the most important means of consociational democracy.¹⁶³ In that sense, since it was necessary for the continuous presence of religious and social groups in the country, proportional representation had been introduced in 1917. As a result, Dutch coalition politics had emerged. This emergence is very important precisely because “the formation of governments is not only about the question of which parties will join, but it also involves *negotiations* on policies” (italics added). In other words, the compulsory outcomes of these negotiations are compromise and consensus.¹⁶⁴

Nevertheless, it is hard to claim that this system is perfect. For example, the involvement of too many segments of society into the policy-making process generally results with convoluted compromises and causes *gedogen* (‘to tolerate’). It means that “the law is strict, so as to satisfy opponents of a particular practise, but it is not always applied, so as to satisfy its proponents.” In other words, while the state has certain regulations and rules, it officially tolerates people to deviate from these rules. For instance, the law forbids abortion except in emergency but it is tolerated for the first twenty-four weeks in practice; or the law does not allow the selling of drugs but the selling of soft drugs in coffee shops are officially tolerated.¹⁶⁵ In this context, toleration is an inevitable consequence of the consociational democracy.¹⁶⁶

¹⁶³ Timmermans, Arco. and Andeweg, Rudy B. *The Netherlands: Still the Politics of Accommodation?*, in Wolfgang C. Müller and Kaare Strom (eds.), *Coalition Governments in Western Europe*. Oxford University Press, 2003, p. 391.

¹⁶⁴ Inclusive coalitions and proportionality in political life can really decrease the degree of cleavages. Therefore, according to Lijphart, consociational democracies have four main characteristics: grand coalition, proportional representation, mutual veto, and segmental autonomy (pillarization). See Lijphart (1977), *op.cit.*, pp. 25-47.

¹⁶⁵ Andeweg, Rudy B. *From Dutch Disease to Dutch Model? Consensus Government in Practise*. Parliamentary Affairs, Vol. 53, No. 4, 2000, pp.703-4.

¹⁶⁶ Moderate nationalism is another favorable factor of consociational democracies. Indeed, since plural societies are consisted of heterogeneous cultures, they preferred cooperation and consensus to neutralize ongoing and possible social cleavages and so to

On this ground, the Netherlands is a good example of consociational democracy in the world history precisely because although it had deep social divisions inside, the Dutch succeeded to neutralize the destabilizing effects of them. Therefore, Lijphart's model of consociational democracy had explained the political stability in a deeply fragmented society. Accordingly, the severe clashes among the religious groups and social classes made political leaders notice that there was no way other than cooperation to maintain peace.¹⁶⁷ Thus, stability is provided simply because the elites of the pillars, the fragmented subcultures, pragmatically cooperated and so reached certain compromises. So, the leaders of the social segments and the cooperation among them are vital in consociational democracy.¹⁶⁸

In that sense, it is possible to originate Lijphart's consociational democracy to Dutch pillar system.¹⁶⁹ The term is used to stress the religious segmentation of the

live in peace together. On this ground, elites of the society do not follow policies that a certain homogenous culture is emphasized precisely because such a policy may damage the cooperation between different cultures. Therefore, a moderate nationalism is typical characteristic of consociational democracies. See Lijphart (1968), op.cit., pp.25-30. and Matthijs Bogaards. *The favourable factors for consociational democracy: A review.* European Journal of Political Research, Vol. 33, No. 4, pp. 475-96, 1998.

¹⁶⁷ Andeweg (2000), op.cit., p.698. Some historians traced compromise tradition back to the Dutch Republic. Accordingly, since The Seven Provinces had to unite to win the war against the Habsburgs they pragmatically cooperated and compromised with the intention of maintaining their provinces' freedoms and privileges. See Kickert, Walter J. M. *Beneath Consensual Corporatism: Traditions of Governance in the Netherlands.* Public Administration, Vol.81, No.1, 2003, p.137.

¹⁶⁸ See Lijphart, Arend. *The Politics of Accommodation; Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands.* 2nd edition, California University Press, 1975.

¹⁶⁹ For some historians, pillarization in the Netherlands had been invented by political scientist in 1960s but existed long before the 20th century. Accordingly, Lijphart put his model on the parliamentary democracy system. However, in the pre-democratic times, from 1650 onwards, Dutch society had been already subdivided into subcultural namely confessional groups that performed political and socio-cultural activities within their own ideological circles or organizations. In this context, pillarization in the Netherlands had started in between 1500 and 1650 at the time two main churches, Catholic and Calvinist, historically originated. See Kickert, op.cit., p.136.

country. In this context, regarding the Catholic/Protestant cleavage in the Netherlands, the pillar system had emerged due to the need for consensus-building in social and political life. For that aim, in political system, a lot of autonomies in labor relations, education or religious activities were given to each *zuil* (pillar) and so the pillar system maintained the politics of accommodation in Dutch society. In this context, according to many scholars, Dutch society performed the pillar system's most developed form between 1910s and 1960s. At this period, many people lived big part of their lives within one of the three pillars: Roman Catholic, Calvinist (Protestant) or secular (socialists or liberals).¹⁷⁰ However, as it will be seen below, this system began to lose its importance after the 1960's especially because of dechristianization and the rise of welfare state. Nonetheless, it is still a model especially for the integration of immigrants into Dutch society.¹⁷¹

Historically, religious line organizations of Dutch society had weakened the class struggle from the late 19th century precisely because they united different people from different social classes. These religious line organizations were typical political interest groups and called *verzuiling* (pillarization). In addition, *verzuiling* heavily consisted of compliance with elite control and confessional solidarity. Accordingly, it is a system in which the major religious sects are vertically organized and so each citizen can find his/her position in accordance with his/her sect in these voluntary organizations. Catholic/Protestant youth organizations, trade unions, universities, media, sports clubs, homes for the elderly and hospitals can be counted as an example. Therefore, people are

¹⁷⁰ Bryant, Christopher G. A. *Depillarisation in the Netherlands*. British Journal of Sociology, Vol.32, No.1, 1981, p.56.

¹⁷¹ Berting, Jan. *Democracy in the Netherlands*, in Christopher G. A. Bryant and Edmund Mokrzycki (eds.), *Democracy, Civil Society and Pluralism, In Comparative Perspective: Poland, Great Britain and the Netherlands*. Ifis Publisher: Warszawa, 1995, p.357.

secluded according to their pillar and have little relations with members of other pillars in this system. In that sense, Catholics and Calvinists had strong pillars while liberals and socialists had not. Indeed, H. L. Wesseling defines *verzuijing* as the religious segmentation of Dutch society.¹⁷² Therefore, the core of pillar system is the existence of different religious groups, namely Catholics and Protestants, in the Dutch society. In other words, socialist or liberal pillars have been included into the system much later. For example, in an economic daily life, people might prefer to shop in the markets whose owners share the same sect with them. However, liberals and socialists have recently engaged in “neutral” organizations just like in the case of neutral (state) universities.¹⁷³

Education is the most dominant part of the pillar system. Accordingly, after the foundation of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the public schools gained a modern character and forbade any religious dogmatism precisely because the education policy of the new Kingdom was to create undivided, general Christian nation. Nevertheless, Orthodox-Protestants complained about the public schools so that it was not religious enough. Furthermore, for Roman Catholics, public schools were still too Protestant in nature since they forbade the reading of Bible in schools, for example. Therefore, they both struggled for founding their free denominational schools. Under these conditions, the international revolutionary atmosphere of 1848 pressured King William II to sign a liberal and a modern constitution in 1848. With this constitution, freedom of education and of religion had been declared. In other words, Protestants and Catholics were then able to found their confessional private schools. However, since confessional private schools did not get any State aid in comparison to public schools, Protestants and

¹⁷² Wesseling, H.L. *Post-Imperial Holland*. Journal of Contemporary History, Vol.15, No:1, 1980, p.126.

¹⁷³ Berting, op.cit., p.357.

Catholics still struggled for financial rights of confessional private education. In the end, this right had also been declared with 1917 Pacification.¹⁷⁴

Pillarization system, therefore, is somehow the acceptance of hierarchical body of the pillars such as the obedience of the majority of people to the directives of pillars' leaders. As Jan Berting stated, "the major orientation of the population in political matters has been described as being one that is characterized by compliance to the wishes of the leaders and to the system's rules."¹⁷⁵ Nevertheless, the hierarchy in the pillars is not an undemocratic tie but is there to protect the weak. D'Iribarne says that the hierarchy in large organizations exists in all societies he analyzed except in the Netherlands. In the Dutch case, the tasks of these echelons are to listen and guide the workers, for example. If a worker makes mistakes in executing his task he is not blamed but his superior supervisor is blamed since he neglects to teach or supervise the worker.¹⁷⁶

There are certain ways to eliminate the cultural minorities and differences in a society. Accordingly, minorities can be suppressed and assimilated or cultural differences are marginalized and institutionalized by the state. In that sense, diversities

¹⁷⁴ The core denominations of the Netherlands are Roman Catholics, orthodox Calvinists and liberal Protestants. However, at the beginning of the century, Liberals and then Socialists opposed their confessional school system financed by state subsidies and supported a neutral education system. But, article 192 of constitution came after the 1917 Pacification stated that "education – not only public education – is an object of continuous concern of the central government, and both private education that met the conditions of law, and public education should be financed on an equal basis". So, it was the victory of Catholics and Protestants since their schools still would be financed by the state as "neutral" schools. In other words, state subsidies for confessional schools became a constitutional right. See Zijdeveld., Anton C. *Pillarization and Pluralism*, in Christopher G. A. Bryant and Edmund Mokrzycki (eds.), *Democracy, Civil Society and Pluralism, In Comparative Perspective: Poland, Great Britain and the Netherlands*. Ifis Publisher: Warszawa, 1995, p.381. Also see Knippenberg (1997), op.cit., pp.35-6.

¹⁷⁵ Berting, op.cit., pp.363-4.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid., pp.364.

are moved to the private sphere. The latter is the case in the Netherlands. As it was mentioned above, at first, the Republic of the United Provinces emphasized the Christian Protestantism and then the Kingdom of the Netherlands intended to create an undivided Christian nation. That meant that the Dutch government tried to eliminate the other religious groups from the public sphere in the 18th and 19th century. As a result, these differences have increasingly been institutionalized. At this period, the country was divided into three religious groups and so pillars: Orthodox Protestants¹⁷⁷, the Liberal Protestants (including atheists/socialists) and Roman Catholics. Since they concentrate in different regions these religious groups were segregated from each other. Besides, because of this segregation, there were minimal contacts between the members of the three pillars. On the other hand, social control on the private life is provided by the pillarized organizations dealing with politics, media, education, unions, leisure-time activities and healthcare. By this way, internal communication in the pillars was improved while the individual contacts between the members of the other pillars were minimized. So, consciousness of religious and cultural differences were high and it was only the elites of the pillars making compromise on a national level to be able to cooperate precisely because they were national institutions and they could change their members' orientations. Consequently, the pillarization had marginalized the cultural and

¹⁷⁷ When the liberal Calvinist wanted to open the church for all Christians, many orthodox Calvinists thought that the Church was too liberal and so decided to split off from the Dutch Reformed Church. In the end, they founded The Reformed Churches in the Netherlands (Gereformeerde Kerken in Nederland) in 1892 and immediately became a separate pillar. From then on, they were the orthodox Protestant while the Dutch Reformed Church was liberal Protestant. Parts of its pillars were the Anti-Revolutionaire Partij which was articulated into the Christian Democratic Appeal and Vrije Universiteit.

religious differences and so provided a relative peace in favor of the minorities in the Dutch society.¹⁷⁸

Indeed, pillarization had a special meaning for Catholic minorities. Accordingly, the Dutch revolt against the Spain was also a Protestant revolt against Roman Catholicism. The economic base of the country, namely Holland, was strongly opposed to the Roman Catholic Church. Moreover, till 19th century, the only officially acknowledged church was the Dutch Reformed Church and after the separation of Belgium and the Netherlands in 1830, Dutch Catholics became a typical minority. On the other hand, the orthodox Calvinists were not pleased with the Reformed Church since the latter is too “modernist” and “liberal”.

At this point, it was the pillar system that created a living space for these Catholics and Calvinists (or neo-Calvinist as generally called):

Through their own schools, universities, media, unions, sports and leisure clubs, and above all their own political parties (the Roman Catholic People’s Party and the Anti-Revolutionary Party), and through a clerically supervised endogamy and demographic policy, Dutch Catholics and Neo-Calvinists were forged into coherent, visible, demographically significant and increasingly powerful segments of Dutch society and culture. Pillarization, in other words, was the main road to Catholic and Neo-Calvinist (“gereformeerde”) emancipation.¹⁷⁹

However, it does not mean that there are three different Dutch nations. Rather, only one Dutch nation was built. Accordingly, while pillarization had integrated Protestants and Catholics in their own pillar, it at the same time integrated them in the national community. Men were not only Catholic or Protestant but a Dutch Catholic and a Dutch Protestant. Again, education played a very critical role in this process. Although education in confessional schools was different from the public schools,

¹⁷⁸ Postma, op.cit., p.9.

¹⁷⁹ Zijderfeld, op.cit., p.383.

standard Dutch language, Dutch geography or Dutch history were still frames of reference.¹⁸⁰

Nevertheless, after the World War II, the pillar system began to be questioned. Accordingly, at the post-war period, the aim was renewal rather than recovery and for that aim, the old type of *verzuiling* had to disappear and a new society based on equality and liberty should be constructed. Therefore, in the 1960s, accepting the pillars' control unquestioningly were no more the case for many Dutch people. The demands for liberalization and democratization were grand challenges in this process.¹⁸¹ In other words, during the reconstruction period of the Netherlands, The Dutch believed that a physical and a material reconstruction was not enough but a socio-cultural and a moral one were also needed simply because the pillars had lost most of their influence during the German occupation. At this point, it was questioned whether the pillar system would maintain its function and value on a post-war society in which all economic and social forces were needed to be pulled together to re-build the society. Under these conditions, the Dutch nation was called to break the confinements of their pillars by certain ideological groups. However, only a little group of Catholics and Protestants abandoned their confinements and joined either Socialist or the Liberal Parties. Nonetheless, in the

¹⁸⁰ Knippenberg (1997), op.cit., p.37. At this point, it is worth to mention that second religion of the Netherlands is now Islam. So, it is quite possible that Islam will join into the pillar system of the country and Muslim minority may follow the same route for their emancipation within the Dutch society. However, there are also certain factors that prevent the establishment of a Muslim pillarization. First of all, there is a huge ethnic difference among the Muslims (Moroccans, Turks, Surinamese or Moluccans) and second, there is also a huge difference within the denominations of Islam. Nevertheless, since the state subsidies for confessional schools are constitutional rights thanks to the 1917 Pacification, Islamic schools also have a right to ask for it. In this sense, there are already certain Islamic primary schools fully subsidized by the state. But of course, they teach Dutch curricula in Dutch language. In addition, Islamic radio, Islamic television corporation and the Islamic Council of the Netherlands are ties for an Islamic pillarization. But, the aforementioned problems of the Muslims in the Netherlands are barrier in front of this process. See Zijderveld., op.cit., p.383.

¹⁸¹ Bryant, op.cit., p.71.

1950s, the Netherlands was still a pillarized country. However, two main factors have interrupted the pillar system. First, the post-war harmony created between employers, workers and politicians began to be questioned by workers in the 1960s. Accordingly, concerning the devastating conditions of post-war period, this harmony kept wages relatively low but provided high level of employment. Nevertheless, the Dutch workers who were paid lesser than the other workers in the surrounding countries demanded better working conditions and higher wages at the beginning of the 1960s. Second, a new generation who did not witness the two World wars and the Great Depression had arisen. They grew up in better conditions than their families had. For instance, they were educated better, gained an international outlook due to the newly presented television and the increasing geographical mobility. These new middle-class students in universities felt uncomfortable about the authoritarian confinements of the pillar system. In short, the huge economic and social inequalities of post-war society had to be thrown away. “The post-war society should be a society of social justice and of social security for which the state would be the major guarantor, although in close cooperation with societal organizations and the market.”¹⁸²

In addition, thanks to their autonomy vis-à-vis the state the pillarized organizations had executed the so-called social welfare tasks in the pre-war period. The pillarized organizations such as schools, housing corporations or hospitals strongly operated charity campaigns during the war. However, when the welfare state project had been introduced roughly in 1960, all balances in the pillar system have changed in favor of the state simply because a state rather than the pillar organizations penetrating all parts of the social and economic life had been projected. In other words, after the construction of the Dutch welfare state in the 1950s and 1960s, the government rapidly

¹⁸² Zijderveld, op.cit., p.384-7.

began to penetrate all parts of the daily life. Accordingly, this process resulted with the loss of autonomy to the detriment of pillarized institutions precisely because it was the time of top-down government planning then. At first, the juridical system in social security law had been introduced and then government engagement into certain social policy sectors such as health, housing, education and welfare had been provided by center planning.¹⁸³ For that reason, one must take this turning point in the Dutch history into account to understand the transformation of the pillar system in the Netherlands in the 1960s. Accordingly, although they still kept their *de jure* autonomies, the pillarized organizations began to lose their prior *de facto* autonomies vis-à-vis the state. They were now heavily dependent on state subsidies and were subject to state regulations and bureaucracy. At the same time, increasing class consciousness in the 1960s got the Dutch workers in the welfare state organized under the professional organizations. In this way, they have not directed their orientation to their pillars any more but to the state and certain bureaucrats precisely because “it was from them that they could expect the defence of their rights and interests and, it was from them that they could receive power and influence.” So, the pillarized organizations became more dependent on state and bureaucrats as long as welfare state workers got professionalized.¹⁸⁴

Nonetheless, a strong central government control was still a new concept for the Dutch people precisely because for centuries central state had not existed or remained relatively small in the Netherlands. Indeed, according to Catholic and Protestant communities, state interference to societal affairs should be limited. Therefore, Catholics introduced subsidiarity principle. That means that “higher instance cannot take over a task that a lower instance can fulfil.” In other words, the state that is a higher

¹⁸³ Kickert, op.cit., p.121.

¹⁸⁴ Zijderfeld, op.cit., p.388.

instance can only interfere if the lower instance, say autonomous pillarized parts, fails to fulfil their tasks. Individual responsibility to God, on the other hand, is a core idea at the Protestant thinking and so unlike Catholic churches there is no such hierarchical body in Protestant churches. On this ground, Protestants introduced the idea of sovereignty in their own circles. Accordingly, living community, school, family, church or companies are counted as circles and people should be sovereign in their own circles. That is to say there should not be any state interference.¹⁸⁵ Nevertheless, as Walter Kickert stated “Dutch ‘pillarized’ society governed itself through political, social, economic and cultural institutions”, but after the growth of central and welfare state in the post-war period, the pillarized system had been challenged.¹⁸⁶

In this context, since the 1960s, the Netherlands is in the depillarization process in terms of the worldview of its citizens. However, its organizational pillarization still continues. Indeed, there are still Roman-Catholic and Protestant broadcasting corporations, hospitals or universities. Besides, the state financed Muslim or neutral schools continue to be opened while the Christian employers’ organization, Protestant workers’ union, Christian Democratic Center Party or a socialist broadcasting corporation still keep their existence. From this perspective, the Dutch society looks less depillarized. Nevertheless, the majority of Dutch citizens no longer adhere to religious doctrines and norms and are not members of a church. So, the ideological contents of the pillarized organizations became very vague. In other words, there are no clear cut distinguishing ideological values and norms of a, say, Catholic University any more. However, there is no direct connection in between depillarization and

¹⁸⁵ Kickert, *op.cit.*, pp.128-9. It is worth to note that Protestant thinking on state interference went further than in Catholicism. In this sense, Protestants kept distance towards Catholic state-corporatism.

¹⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, p.122.

dechristianization. Accordingly, Catholic priest or Protestant ministers supervised the pillarized organizations before the 1960s but their churches did not totally engage into the pillars they supported. Therefore, rapid secularization and dechristianization after the 1960s did not automatically interrupt the pillar system. As Anton C. Zijderveld stated, “people may well leave the church but can at the same time maintain all sorts of religious notions which they are willing to share with pillarized organizations, as long as their values and norms remain vague, general and thus ‘modern’.” Thus, although there is an ideological depillarization process in the Netherlands after the 1960s, it is still a pillarized society in terms of organizations. In that sense, secularization and dechristianization does not directly mean depillarization.¹⁸⁷

In addition, despite there are no grand coalitions including all major parties anymore, Dutch coalitional governments still include several parties. In this context, The Netherlands still maintains consociational democracy in its political life.¹⁸⁸ Indeed, although depillarization and political antagonism between parties has increased since the 1960s, according to Lijphart, the politics of accommodation is still determinant in the Netherlands.¹⁸⁹

The pillar system and consociational democracy model were both the results of the societal fragmentation in the Netherlands. Consociational democracy was born to explain the reasons of stable democracy in the plural societies. Accordingly, the elites of socially fragmented bodies of society felt themselves forced to cooperate in order to cohabitate in peace. The proportional representation and coalitional governments in the

¹⁸⁷ Zijderveld, op.cit., pp.389-91.

¹⁸⁸ Kickert, op.cit., p.136.

¹⁸⁹ See Lijphart, Arend. *Consociational or Adversarial Democracy in the Netherlands*, in Hans Daalder and Galen A. Irwin (eds), *Politics in the Netherlands: How Much Change?*. London: Cass, 1989.

Dutch political life were clear results of this cooperation. Concerning Catholics and Protestants but later Socialist and the Liberals cleavage, the pillar system, on the other hand, had emerged to provide unity and peace in the Dutch society. Accordingly, diversities of these groups were moved from public to the private sphere by the state and they were allowed to act in their own circles. Thus, consociational democracy and the pillar system in Dutch history respectively made consensus rather than conflict and toleration rather than antagonism determinant both in political and in social life of the Netherlands:

The Dutch experience of pillarization may in that case be more than a curious configuration of a specific national past. It may function as a kind of model for societies that try to combine pluralism and democracy within a cultural context that is based upon and maybe even in the grip of many tensions and conflicts, yet in the end remains always geared towards consensus and cooperation. Not because of some sort of liberal open-mindedness and longing for an easy-going harmony, but because there is no other way to survive collectively.¹⁹⁰

According to Knippenberg, the pillarization of Dutch society can be considered as a reaction to the unitary nation-building process of the Netherlands.¹⁹¹ Indeed, when the religious groups were marginalized from the public sphere, Protestant and Catholic self-consciousness in their own communities had been strengthened. So, these confessional communities asked to the state for more autonomy. For that reason, two grand religious groups, Protestants and Catholics, especially struggled for education freedom. They were also opposing the new Dutch state penetrating all social and political area of the Dutch people. So, with the beginning of the second half of the 19th century, first the confessional groups but later the political groups, Socialist and Liberals, of the Netherlands gained their autonomy toward the State. As it was mentioned before, since the Dutch society was socially fragmented and so the clash among the religious groups

¹⁹⁰ Zijderveld, op.cit., pp.393-4.

¹⁹¹ See Knippenberg (1996), op.cit., pp. 249-262.

and social classes were so severe, political and religious leaders saw no way other than cooperation to maintain peace in the Dutch society. Therefore, they preferred cooperation. Lijphart names this policy as consociational democracy. In this context, cooperation was compulsory in the Netherlands to cohabitate with different subcultures. This situation, in turn, created a liberal culture that enabled respect and toleration toward different groups in the Netherlands. In other words, it is also possible to find liberal nationalist ties in the Dutch society. Accordingly, nationalism in this country seems more pluralistic and less ethnocentric precisely because the subcultures are respected and the plurality of these cultures is protected especially through given autonomies. This, in the end, provides minorities an opportunity to live together with the majority.

Chapter V

A Dutch Exceptionalism?

It was discussed in the last two chapters that thanks to the Napoleonic French invasion of the Netherlands after the French Revolution, the new Kingdom of the Netherlands had been founded on equal citizenship principal just after the French withdrawal. In that sense, civic rather than ethnic nationalism became salient in the Dutch society. On the other hand, it was also discussed that thanks to the pillarization of the society, a liberal tradition towards different cultures also became evident in the Netherlands.

At this point, although Dutch population is quite xenophobic in public opinion polls, what is found is that it is this liberal and civic nationalist tendency that shaped the immigration policy of the country on more integrative rather than on assimilative bases. Besides, it was also found that it is this liberal and civic nationalist tradition that weakened the extreme right in the country.

1) The Reasons of Integrative Immigration Policy

As it was noted above, the main distinguishing feature of consociational democracy was cooperation rather than conflict and a good example of cooperation in Dutch society was proportional representation system that opened the doors for coalitional governments. Therefore, coalition governments are current means of consociational democracy. In that sense, according to Paul Pennings, thanks to the consociational democracy derived from pillarization, political parties in the Netherlands have to compromise rather than to simply respond their voter priorities. In other words, cabinet parties must overcome their differences to provide cooperation in coalition governments. Consequently, discourse of political parties during elections may change when they enter into the coalition government.¹⁹² Indeed, although anti-Islamic discourse of the LPF was clear during elections, this did not negatively affect, say, immigration policy of the country when the LPF became coalition partner.

On the other hand, voluntary associations of free citizens set up to pursue a common goal and interest is generally called civic community. In that sense, civic community building in the Netherlands accelerated in the twentieth century. Accordingly, thanks to the pillarization and the Dutch state support, each confessional group gained the possibility to form voluntary associations of their own denomination. Catholic and Protestant trade unions, universities, media, sports clubs or hospitals can be counted as an example here. Furthermore, civic community building also began to be applied to the ethnic minorities in the Netherlands. As a result, an integrative immigration policy had emerged in the country. In this context, the maintenance of

¹⁹² Pennings, Paul. *Parties, Voters and Policy Priorities in the Netherlands, 1971-2002*. Party Politics, Vol. 11, No. 1, 2005, p.29 and p.37.

ethnic cultures was not only tolerated but also promoted by the Dutch state. The state also subsidized ethnic organizations.

According to Paul Statham and Ruud Koopmans, on the other hand, due to the fact that Christian and Protestant confessional groups had their own state-sponsored autonomous organizations in education, health, or media, "...such rights could not be denied to the new cultural and religious minorities."¹⁹³ Nevertheless, these were not done for a democratic impulse. The real intention was to provide living in peace with different cultures. Indeed, according to Meindert Fennema and Jean Tillie, "[t]he development of ethnic communities was at least partly an unintended result of political opportunity structures (*pillarization*) and government policies that prevailed in [t]he Netherlands..."¹⁹⁴ (italics added).

Besides, it was emphasized that thanks to the pillarization and consociational democracy, proportional representation system that favors the representation of minority groups became salient in Dutch politics. Therefore, according to David C. Earnest, states with proportional representation system are expected to enfranchise resident aliens. In this context, this system "...may create electoral incentives for parties to enfranchise societal groups who may favor one party or another."¹⁹⁵ Indeed, all mainstream political parties supported the 1985 bill to enfranchise foreigners at the local elections and thus the Netherlands is today one of the few countries where resident

¹⁹³ Statham, Paul. and Koopmans, Ruud. *Problems of Cohesion? Multiculturalism and Migrants' Claims-Making for Group Demands in Britain and the Netherlands*. European Political Communication Working Paper Series, Issue 7/04, p. 7.

¹⁹⁴ Fennema, Meindert. and Tillie, Jean. *Civic Community, Political Participation and Political Trust of Ethnic Groups*. Connections, Vol. 24, No. 1, 2001, p. 37.

¹⁹⁵ Earnest, David C. *Political Incorporation and Historical Institutionalism: A Comparison of the Netherlands, Germany and Belgium*, p. 10.
http://www.odu.edu/~dearnest/pdfs/earnest_isa_2005_final.pdf

aliens have a right to vote at the local elections. In addition, they are also proportionally represented in the local councils.¹⁹⁶

On the other hand, incorporation of foreigners into Dutch society is also shaped by the civic nationalist tradition in the country. As it was mentioned before, Dutch nation became a voluntary association and a citizens community with equal rights and duties in nineteenth century. In that sense, according to Earnest, “[t]he Netherlands’ decision to enfranchise resident aliens is particularly illustrative of this shared conception of Dutch citizenship.”¹⁹⁷

In addition, as Paul Statham and Ruud Koopmans explained, civic definition of nation has made gaining access to formal civic rights relatively easy for migrants.¹⁹⁸ Indeed, after five years of legal residence, a non-Dutch citizen can obtain Dutch citizenship without renouncing his/her foreign nationality.

In this context, it is clear that the integrative immigration policy of the Netherlands had been shaped by the pillar system and civic nationalist tradition in the country. In other words, it is this pillarization and civic nationalism that forced political parties to cooperate and overcome their differences in favor of foreigners, that granted state subsidies to ethnic and religious voluntary associations, that enfranchised resident aliens or that facilitated gaining access to formal civic rights.

¹⁹⁶ Ibid., p.16.

¹⁹⁷ Ibid., p.14.

¹⁹⁸ Statham and Koopmans, op.cit., p. 5.

2) The Reasons of Weak Extreme Right

According to the literature, two main conditions determine the extreme right votes. One is the protest votes and the other is xenophobia.¹⁹⁹ The former condition states that a large resentment against the living conditions, political system, politicians or parties orient voters to vote for another party which is less responsible for the resentment. In other words, once people's confidence with the system decreases, their votes for extreme right is more likely to increase.²⁰⁰ In this sense, when the protest votes are oriented to the extreme right party, it increases its turnouts.

However, if public opinion polls are examined it is seen that the Dutch are relatively more satisfied with their life than the other countries in Europe.²⁰¹ Indeed, eurobarometer surveys show that the great part of the Dutch people are satisfied with their life and feel no non-confidence about the future. That is to say protest votes theory is not so strong in the Dutch case. Nonetheless, as it was discussed above, protest votes were indeed the determining factor in the LPF's electoral success.

Besides, the second condition states that the main breeding-ground of extreme right parties is xenophobia.²⁰² So, following this statement, one can argue that extreme right in the Netherlands had limited success simply because xenophobic sentiments in the country had limited spread. However, as it was discussed above, substantial part of

¹⁹⁹ See Betz (1994), *op.cit.*

²⁰⁰ Ignazi, *op.cit.*, p.171.

²⁰¹ See Eurobarometer surveys 1985 Spring, 1997 Spring, 1998 Autumn and 2001 Spring.

²⁰² See von Beyme, *op.cit.*, 1988.

the Dutch society gives xenophobic answers to the survey questions. But then why extreme right parties are weak in the Netherlands?

According to Mudde and Van Holsteyn, the answer of this question can be found in internal factors. Since the extreme right parties in the Netherlands are all badly organized, lacking large member networks and cadres and are always plagued by scandals, they have limited success in the Dutch political life.²⁰³

However, according to some scholars, the real reason stems from Dutch history. Accordingly, political and socio-cultural life shaped by pillarization and civic nationalist tradition does not allow extremisms in the society. In this context, according to Paul Lucardie, one should look at the history of the Netherlands to explain the relative failure of extreme right-wing parties in this country. In that sense, since the Dutch nation derives from civic rather than ethnic nationalism, ethnic nationalist discourse had difficulty in finding supporters among the Dutch people. In that sense, absence of a nationalist tradition in the country is one of the reasons for the failure of them. In this context, since civic nationalism defines the nation as a voluntary association, it is more likely in a civic nationalist society to tolerate different ethnic groups and immigrants. However, since ethnic nationalism defines the nation on the base of blood, “we” and “they” dichotomy is clearer than civic nationalism. In that sense, foreign cultures are perceived as pitfall to the detriment of common blood. That means that it is more likely in an ethnic nationalist society to contribute xenophobia.²⁰⁴

²⁰³ Mudde and van Holsteyn, op.cit., p.162.

²⁰⁴ Greenfeld, Liah. and Chirot, Daniel. *Nationalism and aggression*. Theory and Society, Vol. 23, No. 1., 1994, pp.86-7.

Indeed, according to Piero Ignazi, “[t]he more ethnic nationalist... people are, the more they vote extreme right.”²⁰⁵

On the other hand, as it was explained before, due to the fact that religious differences among the people in the Netherlands were so vigorous, they pragmatically developed the system of pillarization to naturalize these differences and to leave in peace in the country. In that sense, certain autonomies were given to each pillar to perpetuate their cultural presence in peace. In other words, tolerance to different cultures which is essential for the perpetuation of Dutch society became salient in the country. Indeed, thanks to the pillarization, each confessional group was able to form voluntary associations of their own denomination in the Netherlands. Although the real intention was to provide living in peace with different cultures, this in the end caused a tolerance and liberal tendency towards different cultures in the country. For that reason, any attempt to harm this tolerance faces with an aggressive response simply because it is perceived as a threat against the presence of society. In that sense, according to Lucardie, a repressive sanction against extreme right parties by Dutch institutions and people is another reason for the failure of these parties.²⁰⁶ At this point, Ignazi agrees with Lucardie: “...probably in no other country has the counter-mobilization against the extreme right proved so vigorous as in the Netherlands, both on the streets and inside the institutions.”²⁰⁷

²⁰⁵ Ignazi, op.cit., p. 171.

²⁰⁶ Lucardie, Paul. *The Netherlands: The Extremist Center Parties*, in Hans-Georg Betz and Stefan Immerfall, *The New Politics of the Right: Neo-Populist Parties and Movements in Established Democracies*. St. Martin's Press, New York, 1998, p.122. Also see Lucardie, Paul. *Right-Wing Extremism in the Netherlands: Why it is still a marginal phenomenon*. p. 8.
<http://dnpp.eldoc.ub.rug.nl/FILES/root/publicatieLucardie/right-wing/rightextrem00.pdf>

²⁰⁷ Ignazi, op.cit., p. 172.

Indeed, many Dutch people perceive extreme right parties as a threat to Dutch liberalism and struggle to eliminate them.²⁰⁸ They put their pressures on the leaders and members or on the voters of the parties. As a tactic of isolation, for example, they do not involve or engage the representatives of extreme right parties in a debate. Indeed, especially during election campaigns, Dutch media in general does not include their representatives in the screens or in the columns. Other ways of struggle are disturbing extreme right party meetings, holding counter-demonstrations, or even engaging physical violence against objects such as party posters. By this way, supporters of these parties are discouraged to become a party member or to join a party meeting. Indeed, although many party members pay their dues, they are almost totally inactive in party politics precisely because of fear of societal pressure.²⁰⁹

Dutch institutions also took a prominent role in the struggle against the extreme-right. In that sense, various administrative measures are used to block these parties. As Van Holsteyn explained, "...the requirements for obtaining signatures in order to obtain access to the ballot were changed to make participation by the extreme-right parties more difficult."²¹⁰ Dutch courts, on the other hand, carefully scrutinize extreme right

²⁰⁸ At this point, although it was stated that the LPF was not a classical extreme right party, one must remember that the murderer of Pim Fortuyn explained that he murdered him simply because he perceived him as a growing danger who would affect liberal tendency towards immigrants in society.

²⁰⁹ Van Holsteyn, Joop J.M. *Neither Threat Nor Challenge: Right-wing extremism in the Netherlands*. pp.15-6.
<http://www.extremismus.com/forschung/english/english.html>

²¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 17.

parties' or persons' comments or discourses, and if necessary, they do not avoid punishing them.²¹¹

It has been seen that xenophobia and protest votes theory in determining extreme right votes does not fully work in the Dutch case. In this context, although it might be true that certain internal factors such as bad party organizations and low cadres somehow weaken extreme right in the country, it is clear that the main reason of the failure of extreme right in the Netherlands stems once again from the pillar system and civic nationalist tradition. Accordingly, since the country comes from a civic nationalist tradition, ethnic nationalist discourse of these parties had difficulty in finding supporters among the Dutch people. Besides, thanks to the pillar system, tolerance to different cultures which is essential to live in peace among these diversities in the country became salient in the Dutch society. Therefore, any attempt to harm this tolerance faces with an aggressive response by Dutch institutions or people.

In that sense, although the Netherlands harbors integrative immigration policy and has weak extreme right, the considerable numbers of population are as xenophobic as European average in the public opinion polls. However, since the pillar system and civic nationalist tradition shape immigration policy and extreme right in the country, this xenophobia does not turn into, say, assimilation in the immigration policy or it does not

²¹¹ Since the preferences of majority directly become policy outcomes in the direct democracy, domestic blockages can be neutralized through direct democracy means like referenda. In that sense, there is no constitution, courts, or even public that might prevent the majority. From this perspective, when domestic blockages are neutralized, it is possible to see xenophobic sentiments of Dutch people more clearly. Indeed, among the others, xenophobia was one of the reasons of Dutch no vote against the European constitution in 2005 referenda. In that sense, the main motives were the fear of losing Dutch identity and of losing jobs to foreigners. See René Cuperus, *Why the Dutch Voted No: An anatomy of the new Euroscepticism in Old Europe*, Progressive Politics, Vol. 4, No. 2, 2005, p. 95-6.

contribute to the extreme right votes in the elections. In other words, the pillar system and civic nationalist tradition blocks certain extremisms in the country.

Conclusion

It is argued in classical political science that policy outputs are fed by public preferences (inputs). It is also argued that these inputs more resonate in Western democracies. For that reason, policy outputs in democratic countries are expected to reflect public preferences. At this point, it is important to know how to measure and how to reach these preferences and clear result of this process is public opinion polls. In that sense, it is discussed that in spite of the fact that the credibility of public opinion polls is a bit controversial, they still measure and reflect public preferences. In this context, according to the eurobarometer survey results, although Dutch people are as xenophobic as European average, these xenophobic sentiments that constitute public inputs do not turn into policy outputs in the Netherlands. Therefore, in the Dutch case, policy outputs and public inputs differ from each other.

Indeed, integrative immigration policy and weaker extreme right party tradition are clear proof of this situation in the country. In this context, it was found that the Netherlands still preferred integration rather than assimilation and extreme right parties were not capable to make any significant impact on elections.

However, why classical input-output correlation does not work in the Netherlands? According to the findings of this study, civic nationalism and the pillar system prevent public inputs in transforming into policy outputs. In that sense, sociological and historical backgrounds of the country have been examined and it was seen that civic nationalism and the pillar system were two by products of religious demarcation in the Netherlands. In this context, what were the premises of the creation

of Dutch nationalism? Accordingly, thanks to French invasion and spread of French Revolution principles like popular sovereignty, historical Catholic-Protestant cleavage forced the country to adopt civic nationalism which would provide undivided Christian nation on the ground of shared citizenship concept. Confessional segmentation of the country, pillarization, on the other hand, enabled the creation of liberal tendency towards different cultures in the Netherlands.

Nonetheless, although the Netherlands have long succeeded to cohabitate in peace, it is still possible to find certain xenophobic sentiments in the country. Indeed, according to public opinion polls, Dutch people are as xenophobic as European average. In that sense, if the democratic political system is a means to transform the public inputs into policy outputs and if xenophobia really feeds extreme right, it is expected that restrictive immigration policy and strong extreme right parties resonate in the Netherlands. However, what the study shows is that although considerable numbers of Dutch people are xenophobic, the country has still integrative immigration policy and has weak extreme right parties precisely because civic definition of nation and the pillarization of society block certain extremisms in the country.

Indeed, the study showed that since the immigration policy was shaped by the pillar system and civic nationalist tradition and since they also affected extreme right politics in the country, Dutch xenophobia did not dramatically transform integrative immigration policy into a restrictive policy or it did not contribute to extreme right votes. In that sense, the pillarization of society and the definition of nation on more civic terms blocked certain extremisms in the country.

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