

and 'Provincializing Europe,'" forthcoming, *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East*, 26:3.

12. Ziya Gökalp, "Toward Western Civilization" in *Turkish Nationalism and Western Civilization: Selected Essays of Ziya Gökalp*, ed. and translated by Niyazi Berkes (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959) [1923], 279. Except where otherwise noted, all citations from Gökalp refer to this volume. The dates in brackets refer to the original publication date in Turkish, "Garba Doğru," *Türkçülüğün Esasları* (Ankara: Varlık, 1963 [1923], 46).

13. See Taha Parla, *The Social and Political Thought of Ziya Gökalp, 1876-1924* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1985) and Kemal Karpat, "Ziya Gökalp'in Korporatifçilik, Millet-Milliyetçilik ve Çağdaş Medeniyet Kavramları Üzerine Bazı Düşünceler," in *Cumhuriyet'e Devreden Düşünce Mirası: Tanzimat ve Meşrutiyet'in Birikimi* (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2001), 328-34.

14. "Modern Family and National Culture," [1917] 253.

15. "Culture and Refinement," [1923], 282.

16. For elaboration on Gökalp's meaning, see Davison, *Secularism and Revivalism*, Chapter 3.

17. "The Rise of Nations," [1917], 134; "Modern Family," 248; "What is Turkism?" [1917], 288.

18. "The Methods of Cultural Sociology," [1917], 180.

19. "Modern Family," 250-51.

20. "Three Currents of Thought," [1913], 76.

21. "Tradition and Formalism" [1913], 95.

22. "Towards the People," [1923], 260.

23. For discussion of the modernist content of Gökalp's vision as well as important literature in this regard, see Davison, *Secularism and Revivalism*, Chapter 3.

24. "Revolutionism," 267.

25. "The Turkish Programme-Language," [1923], 293.

Chapter 4

From Culture of Politics to Politics of Culture: Reflections on Turkish Modernity

Hasan Bülent Kahraman

Introduction

A perusal of modern Turkish literature beginning from the first novel published in the year 1872 rather surprisingly demonstrates that an issue referred to as the "crisis of civilization" is a constantly debated topic. The debate most likely derives from the fact that there has been a lack of consensus on the roots of the concept of the word, "civilization." The Ottomans traditionally used a word they had borrowed from the Arabic, *medeniyet*,¹ but the meaning of this word remained nebulous. *Medeniyet* expresses a broad spectrum that includes the entire culture, tradition and customs produced in a certain social environment. The borrowed word was parochial in nature and its meaning quite different from the new concept of *civilization* taken from the West, a word that has a significant "implementation" history which I dealt with in another article.² Even this significant unfolding was a remark of an ongoing change because the original meaning of the word civilization was diametrically opposite of that of culture and excluded all local connotations.

This clash of the old and new is a common issue in all societies undergoing a (radical) modernization process. The Turkish example eventually led to an interesting solution proposed by an influential thinker of the Young Turk and Kemalist eras, Ziya Gökalp. He proposed the use of the Arabic word *hars* to refer to the local social elements and differentiated it from the earlier concept of *medeniyet*, arguing that the former more closely eluded to *civilization* whereas the latter refers to *culture*.³ The extension of this debate was inevitable because, beginning with the *Tanzimat* (Reformation) period, Turkey—then the Ottoman Empire—was undergoing vast transformations at all levels—social, political and cultural. The call for such a continuous transformation was defined as *modernization*; in Turkish this became *medenilesmek* (to be (come) modernized) or *as-*

rilemek (to be contemporary). Whichever word was preferred, the source of the concept of civilization lay in the West and envisioned a huge transformation of the prevailing social norms.

The generations that succeeded the *Tanzimat* period, namely, the *Mesrutiyet* (Constitutional), and *Cumhuriyet* (Republic), did not compromise on the transformations and supported the same model with an ever increasing intensity of will to change. The state and members of the political elite did not refrain from clashing with any opposing groups among the masses and this resulted in the creation of specific models of both modernity and republic. In any case, the long history of *total change* was inspired by the French Revolution in a strict *Jacobin* methodology disregarding the habits and the practice, more specifically, the *culture*, of the society.

The introduction of new ideas taking hold with a new set of ways of living resulted in elites, read intellectuals, ferociously attacking the existing *social* structure rather than the *political*.⁴ In other words the track of transformation in Turkey was not from the political or economical to the social but from the social to the political. In this sense, the entire history of modernity in Turkey may be qualified as a cultural transformation having impacts and ramifications at all levels, including that of direct interventions on everyday life. The relevant literature refers to this as *authoritarian modernity*.⁵ This transition has two interconnected and significant corollaries.

The first is that the early *Tanzimat*, even though it is consistently "accused" of starting all these troublesome set of transformations, did *not* ask for a radical change in the social life. On the contrary, it constantly looked for ways to reconcile the cultural norms with the past. The *Gulhane Hatt-i Humayunu* (*Rose Chamber Rescript*) talks about "the entire renovation and reformation of the ancient procedures (*usul-u atikayi butun butun tagyir ve tecdid*). This is a rather forgotten or vastly ignored issue which defines the early epistemological limits of the "will" that created the Reformation Period as well as showing the scope of what is meant by the "reformation." However, approximately fifty years later, the course of the approach took a radical turn and, with the penetration of positivist ideas into the intellectual circles in the era of the Young Turks, intellectuals deliberately set upon a campaign against the existing structure and its roots at all levels. The new Republic in the following period and its constitutive ideology, *Kemalism*, also claimed that the "new" could only be sustained if all existing structures were entirely demolished. In return, the political transformation in/of Turkey up until very recent times has been in fact a modernization via cultural transformation based on the demolishing of the whole "past." I describe this as the transition from the *culture of politics* to *politics of culture* and in this chapter I will try to show the basic aspects of the difference between the two concepts.

Secondly, a furious debate continues among the students of Turkish politics regarding the nature and the meaning of modernization. While one camp argues that it is a process of *rupture*, the second group supports the idea that, with all due information about the radicalism of the "reforms," especially those of the *Kemalist* era, the process sustains a certain *continuity* with the past. The latter

not only emphasizes the clear connection between *Kemalists* and the Young Turks, a movement from which the prominent names of the latter arose, but, as I will argue in this chapter, that it is possible to find an epistemological perpetuation on three levels. These are the *state, society, and individual* levels that intervened in the different political periods and—despite all divergent interests and ambitions—there existed a deep stream linking one movement to the other. The basic aim of this chapter is to focus on and explain this aspect, with specific emphasis on a significant fact; that is, not only is there a continuity between *Kemalism* and its predecessors, but that even the developments in Turkey that are generally classified as belonging to the "post-Kemalist period" are also contiguous elements.

The Culture of Politics and why it is not the Politics of Culture: Turkey and the Politics-Culture Clash

The Early Movement

As a country with a "short" history of "modernization," Turkey for many reasons is a significant example of a country in which politics and culture clash. The main reason for this is not that politics has always been intent on dominating the cultural field, but rather it is the fact that culture developed out of the structure and peculiarities of politics in the modernization process. In other words, the political culture in Turkey depends to a large extent on the twists of modernization. To understand this, one has to delve into the idiosyncrasies of the Turkish modernization; this might be analyzed on the basis of two important concepts: the state on the political side and the positivism constructing both the political and the cultural. Leaving the brief analysis of positivism to the next section I will first start with the natural relationship between politics and culture in Turkey.

Turkish modernity started with the early attempts of the Young Ottomans. As analyzed in the seminal book by *Serif Mardin*, this period saw an attempt to inject the basic ideas of the French Enlightenment into the institutions of the Ottoman Empire.⁶ Even though the fundamental aim was to convince the Sultan to accede to the establishment of a parliament and transform the Empire into a parliamentary monarchy, the intervention comprised more than this. Accompanying the "innocent" idea of a parliamentary system were also early political notions of "rights." The Ottoman Empire of the period put into the Islamic (*seri*), and to a certain degree "customary" (*orfi*), notions of right⁷ but what was being suggested by the Young Ottomans extended far beyond this. It was inclusive of the preliminary conception of a relatively solid *secularism* in the sense that it included, as *Mardin* has shown, the attachment to *reason*.⁸ This was a transition from a sacred or heavenly explanation of the material world towards a materialistic conceptualization. I propose this as the principal definition of *secularism*.

The second issue raised by the Young Ottomans along the same line was the birth of the concept of both the public and the private spheres in the context of *public opinion*.⁹ Both the birth of the public press and the publication of daily papers combined to trigger this intervention. Accordingly, both the "invention" and the "discovery" of the novel and its publication in daily papers as serials also contributed to this development, as well as the construction, of the "reader."¹⁰

The third point that emanates from the Young Ottoman period is the birth of the *intellectual* both in accordance with the state and set against it. This kind of intellectual in its new form was completely different from the traditional *ulema*.¹¹ Whereas *ulema* was on the whole part and parcel of the Islamic law and social system, and in that context in connection with the state, the new group of intellectuals was intent on change, which meant the introduction of a new mind set and clash with the existing state.¹²

The fourth issue developed in this period was the creation of early notions of two political concepts: *vatan* (literally, "the country," but more attached to the French word *la patrie*)¹³ and *millet* (nation). Young Ottomans were mostly a group of men of letters and their source of inspiration was dominantly the French literature of the day and especially the Romantics. Namik Kemal was a devotee of Victor Hugo as the "poet of *vatan* and *millet*."¹⁴

These four elements make the Young Ottomans era one that I call the period of *transfer of knowledge* (system), where knowledge stands for the West. Nevertheless, "West" here especially emphasizes two things: technology and politics. In this period the idea of culture is limited to the notion and practice of politics, but it was also a period in which traditional values and customs were highly respected. *The defenders of these ideas did not demand that people drastically alter their way of living*. There was an apparent transformation but it was a more natural and spontaneous type. This is obvious once again in Namik Kemal's writings and basic arguments.¹⁵ As the prominent figure of the period, Kemal was a fervent supporter of a new set of mind and political structure but this did not bar him from defending the idea that those entities present and effective in Western culture also already existing in Islamic culture. Accordingly, Kemal did not refrain from writing a treatise against French historian and thinker Ernest Renan, whom he believed to have repudiated and belittled Islam.¹⁶

As Kemal saw it, the potentials of Islam were now being hampered by a detrimental ignorance and inefficiency, and Islam was no longer being practiced and enjoyed as it had previously in the high days of the Ottoman Empire. Stressing the traditional "progressive" methodology of the classical Islamic model, Kemal proposed a return to the practices of the golden days, *asr-i saadet*, meaning that one should do what the fathers had done before.¹⁷

The significance of this period can be summarized in a few points: i) the period envisioned the formation a new society; ii); there was a call for a new understanding of politics within the context of (natural) rights and secular vision; and iii) this period enabled the birth of new classes who would reshape the society and the state. These three issues created a common ground that may be termed early modernization. Nevertheless, these issues also delineated the short-

comings of Turkish modernity. From this perspective, the most important of the shortcomings is that the call for the implementation of the "rights" did not foresee the sharp separation of the state and the society. On the contrary, the main aim of the Young Ottomans was the salvation of the (pro-Islamic) state. The way to achieve this was found in the new "system," but with the condition that the society should be loyal to the state and should never forget that it was the state that provided opportunities for salvation and happiness.¹⁸

Second, as mentioned above, in the course of the reform—although at some point the state may conflict with the intellectuals—it did not refrain from forming a coalition with them. Though sometimes problematic, this coalition also made the intellectuals, if not fully obedient, loyal to the state. This cohabitation would in time evolve into a situation that I define with a term borrowed from Gramsci, *the historical bloc*, a situation in which the army and bureaucracy are joined together. Here it should also be noted that the aim of "new" or the "modern" state was to create a rational bureaucracy, and insofar as it succeeded in that, this very new *cluster* became a non-separable part of the state. Relative to the formation of this structure and its outcome, I refer to the period and process as the *culture of politics*.

Second period: Birth of a New Culture of Politics

As far as the culture of politics is concerned, the era of the Young Turks differs in many aspects from its antecedent period.¹⁹ First of all, this period introduced to both political and social life a number of issues and concepts that up to then were completely alien to the interested circles and the society, in general.²⁰ The important contributing element to this development was the "long-life" of the period. It was so long that in itself it can be separated into different periods. When Abdulhamit II banned the Ottoman Parliament upon his reign in the year 1876, a struggle for "freedom" started in different circles and these proponents came later to be known as the Young Ottomans. As Abdulhamit's sultanate lasted for 33 years, generations changed and the history of the Young Turks can be pulled back to the year 1889 when *Ahmet Rıza* decided not to return from Paris, where he had traveled for the centennial celebrations of the French Revolution, and joined the Positivist circles.²¹

The second period had a beginning date but it is not easy to determine its closing date. It was at the Second Congress of the Committee for Union and Progress that the role of the army was accepted as necessary and indispensable for a revolution.²² This (pre)condition set the stage for the army to be regarded as the omnipotent internal constitutive of modern Turkish politics.²³ More than that, the army has been considered as the key modernizing force in Turkey, a path-setter.²⁴ This occurred before the Second Congress started to be publicized, intellectualized and theorized in the writings of Ahmed Rıza. In the year 1907 he penned a pamphlet called *Vazife ve Mesuliyet: Asker* (Duty and Responsibility: Soldier).²⁵ Here, he not only set forth an elitist theory of military and complained of the secondary role given to it by civilians, but also called for a new mission for the army. Henceforth, the military should no longer accept the role

of "conqueror," but should work to protect the existence of the Empire. To defend the new responsibility, Rıza reminded the reader of the functions of the army in the revolutions in the Ottoman Empire.²⁶

Rıza came to this conclusion, not only because of the military power of the army, but by drawing on another very significant question that emerged mutually and in concert with the modernization process in Turkey, that is "how might the country be saved?" This question in return has two implications. The first, one which can be understood through different experiences analyzed by the school of political transformation,²⁷ is the importance attributed to technology transfer. Rıza argued for the need for new military methodologies to enhance the power of the army, making it once again as strong as it was in the past. With a radical decision very similar to that of Rıza's, and as a first step, the Sultan Mahmud II (1808–1839) transformed the structure of the army by demolishing the traditional Janissary Hearths. The modernization of the army continued during the reigns of all succeeding sultans and demarcated a significant history.²⁸

Second, modernization in the context of army involved more than simply a transfer of war techniques and arms. Military modernization represented the implementation of a new world-view, namely the positivism, in the society. For that reason, it was not only the military school students who were being exposed to the materialistic explanation of the world in the context of pure mathematics and related scientific knowledge, but medical and engineering schools were also made branches of the military academy and doctors and engineers were graduated as members of the army.²⁹ It is not surprising that, as will be seen, the most ardent positivist ideas emanated from the medical school as well as the core of the political organization which will be transformed into CUP first formed there.³⁰

The generation of young military school students born around the year 1880 were introduced to these new and revolutionary ideas and the critical role—to be played by the army during their schooling. Eventually they all graduated from the War Academy around the year of 1908 when the Second Constitutional Period (*İkinci Mesrutiyet*) was proclaimed. In the military schools they were educated according to "scientific" principals in both secular and positivist senses and they thus became crucial supporters and defenders of "enlightenment" principals.³¹ In that capacity they remained emphatically and persistently attached to the idea that the army should play the leading role in both the salvation and the reshaping of the country. Then, both direct and indirect, military interventions turned out to be a "natural" outcome of this belief, making the armed forces the key element of modern Turkish politics.

These two periods jointly spanning 1889–1908, one determining the ideology and the other the practicality of the politics, have yet another supporting buttress, that is, the birth of *enlightened professionals*. These were especially the young teachers and administrative bureaucrats graduated from the School of Administration (*Mekteb-i Mülkiye*) as governors (*Vali, Kaymakam*), together with a cluster in lower ranks like post officers and other civil servants.³² Among this group the role of military originated doctors and engineers still need further studies.

The last subgroup in this category is made up of the lawyers who graduated from the law schools, got exposed to new ideas in Istanbul, returned to their hometowns and held key places to motivate the people as renowned and powerful members of the local bourgeoisie.³³ These were already well equipped with the idea of westernization/modernization and intent on disseminating the same ideology in deep Anatolia. The existence and role of the local press, the enlarging possibilities of communication, were also supporting factors for this young generation. This provincial group was also in contact with the local bourgeoisie whose children were sent to western style schools in Istanbul. On the whole, the 1908 revolution was not a matter of overnight intervention but of a process long prepared by the contribution of different ingredients whose effects had had a long influence; this process continues to remain active even today, as this socio-cultural structure was later inherited by the Kemalist movement and period.³⁴

This composition brings forth and better describes the essential essence of what I have called above as *the Historical Bloc*. I, in passing, have defined it as the coalition of the military, bureaucracy and the state. To that, the intellectuals/literati should now be added. However, provincial bourgeoisie (*esraf*) can also be adjoined to this grid in a crucial way. This network first backed the 1908 Revolution and its political organization CUP (*Community for Union and Progress*), rather than Kemalism and its political organization the Republican Peoples Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Fırkası/Partisi*) which can be taken as the extension of the former.³⁵ Nevertheless, one should observe that this network also served to form parties like the *Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası* (Progressive Republican Party) and *Demokrat Parti* (Democrat Party), which sprung out of a spontaneous and real political opposition or *Serbest Fırka* (Free Party),³⁶ which had started as a counterfeit opposing political organization under the control and authority of the regime.

The only difference was the importance and the role attributed to mobs and masses, the people (*halk*), as a social and political actor. Whereas hard-liners like CUP and RPP had called for *populism*³⁷ from the beginning, despite the fact they continued with uncompromising elitist policies, the other parties showed more respect for the mobs and masses, especially on ideological matters, without disregarding the importance and function of the elites. Other than that, the political priorities of the political organizations were similar to each other. Cultural ideology, namely positivism, was the common tie that merged all these groups and it needs a further look as it is still the most important ideology, open and hidden, in Turkey.

The Mother of All: Positivism

Positivism has played a significant historical role in the formation of Turkish modernity in that it has never fully been grasped as a philosophical concept, but rather used as a tool to transform society through the political intervention from above.³⁸ In this sense, the history of positivism should be analyzed mainly as a policy-making instrument. However, this should not diminish its meaning as a

belief in the material world nor imply that positivist assumption in Turkey envisions a kind of materialistic relativism that opens itself to different interpretations of matter. Positivism is, rather, geared toward a strong belief in the existing materialistic norms. Comte suggested that classical metaphysics and epistemology should be replaced by "scientific methodology."³⁹ The main task should be the rationalization of all social relations through *positive politics*. What is needed is the construction of *social physics* and *sociology* that will support positive politics. It can be broken down three main components.

The first is that in the configuration of Comte's philosophy, the role of the intellectual as scientist leads to a more important role than the structure itself. The scientist has two important tasks: first is the explanation of the laws of the nature even if it is being ontologically proved and analyzed through observation and experimentation and second, when the scientist not satisfied with this, he should demarcate the future consequences of the laws of the nature. In other words he should be a prognostic as well. This very notion of *scientist as a prognostic* is the main agent in Comte's theory giving it its social tone.

Second, scientists using the power of the diagnostic, that is as "the knowing subject," should arrange and organize social matters according to the laws of both science and rationality following scientific truth and reality. The main achievement of this task and process would be the creation of a *positive society* in the context of the other critical component of this philosophy, namely the concept of evolution. Comte argued that societies could evolve in a manner similar to the evolution of the nature. The last crucial issue in the political aspect of this philosophy is the role of the intellectual, even though this role has been shaded by the scientist.⁴⁰ Inheriting the knowledge provided by the scientist, the intellectual would motivate and even force the society to transform itself, as he is also thought to be diagnostic in nature.

Ottoman intellectuals of the Young Turks era adhered to this ideology at various levels. First of all, Ottoman intellectual history has a materialistic background that goes all the way back to Tanzimat period (1839–1856). As has been analyzed by Hanioglu in his groundbreaking article, this generation inherited the German tradition of *Vulgarmaterialismus* and the biologism of the period.⁴¹ However, the politicization of materialism took precedence in the following generation, for when the Ottomans tried to find a way out of their troubles they found themselves facing positivism with all its characteristics, both philosophical and political, a movement that was already on the scene at that time. The Ottomans were not interested in the epistemological side of the question; rather, they relied on the political issues. The "right" and the role supplied by positivism to the intelligentsia proved an indispensable opportunity for the Ottomans, for it made it possible to intervene in society to reshape it with the belief that all societies have the same innate characteristics and, if the scientific way is followed, they can all end up being similar. It was also the provision of positivism—one declared by Comte himself—that these conditions could also lead to the eventual union of societies.

By drawing especially on the knowledge of *evolution*, Ottoman intellectuals moved with the strong belief that all societies share the same basic qualifications

and if those societies followed the tenets of Positivism, these qualities would lead them eventually to achieve an ultimate developed state.⁴² Ottoman intellectuals regarded the West as an earlier development of this process and took them as proof of the preconditions set by positivism. They maintained that the Ottoman Empire would also achieve the same development if it could be "socially engineered" on the basis of scientific knowledge. This would necessitate first the effacement of the "uniqueness" and the historicity of any society, here the Turkish, and second, relying on the positivist utopia. Westernization became both the reality and the metaphor of rational transformation under the leadership of intellectuals, despite the fact that they were totally ignorant of the internal Orientalization that this process includes.⁴³ The intellectuals of the period—like those later seen in Russian modernization—referred to themselves as *populist*, but they did this while concealing the condition that populism puts the intellectual on a higher hierarchical level, thus implicitly meaning that the people are in need of a redeemer, that is, the intellectual/scientist himself. These same intellectuals were also influenced by the "mass theories" of Gustave Le Bon who maintained that the masses were incapable of developing themselves.⁴⁴

As Özlem⁴⁵ argues, this approach brings with it a priori consequences: a) the state always has priority and must be reinforced in such a way that it will be the main motivating force in the transformation of the society; b) representation of different groups in the nation is important, but only in the sense that such representation serves to support the entity of the state and is in accordance with the ideals of the ruling elite; c) the progress of the nation should follow the development of the state and should also follow the priorities set by the state and the ruling elite; d) rationalism in both social and political matters should also apply to the bureaucracy, a body that should obey the state and the ruling elite. However, another aspect that should be added to this approach is the nationalism of the period. Turkism, as it has been called, was in a total harmony with positivism, especially in terms of its dimension of populism.

These principals set the agenda for the long history of the Young Turks. After assuming power indirectly in 1908, and directly in 1913 with a military coup,⁴⁶ this group never shifted away from these principals. On the contrary, they organized cultural circles to further develop these ideas. The *Turkish Hearths (Türk Ocakları)* became the center for shaping these ideas, mostly on a nationalist positivist base.⁴⁷ The culture developed in this institute through poets like Yahya Kemal and especially a handful of thinkers, Ziya Gökalp being the prominent and leading ideologist, all were struggling for the practice of these principals.⁴⁸

With its positivist roots, Kemalism is a part of this debate; however, it is also an eclectic and sui generis ideology, as will be analyzed below. The abiding characteristic of Kemalism is that it is a *cultural ideology disguised in politics*. Its dual character as being both *radical* and *conservative* leads to another debate as whether it is a rupture or continuity in the history of modernity. This debate emanates from a certain historiographical and methodological conflict. I will

now first focus very briefly on this question and then turn to the analysis of Kemalism as a constitutive of politics of culture.

Is Kemalism a Break or Continuity?

According to one group—its adherers—Kemalism ushered in a completely new and unprecedented period in Turkish history. They hold that it is a unified project shaped in the mind and realized by the strong will of Kemal Atatürk himself. The supporters argue that the components of this movement, that is the reforms carried forward in the course of Westernization, served to detach the society radically from the past. Conversely, critical approaches argue that the Kemalist movement was a prolongation of the long history of Westernization that started during the Tanzimat period. Moreover, they would continue correctly, most of the reforms implemented by the Kemalist cadres—former army officers and a handful of young intellectuals—had been ideologically shaped by the Westernizing branch of the Young Turks headed by Abdullah Cevdet and his journal *İctihad*. The further proof of this thesis is a text published by Kılıçzade Hakkı that lists the reforms necessary for the westernization of a country.⁴⁹

Given its stance, this debate cannot cast a light on the basic parameters of the politics of culture reigning in Turkey, for the “originality” of Kemalism needs a further and deep analysis into the relative historical, methodological and epistemological issues. Due to constraints of space, I will merely attempt here to touch upon a few issues that have contributed to the transformation of the political perception in Turkey. We should start with the basic argument that the notion of break and continuity both appear in a dualistic way in Kemalism.

Secularism versus Religion

Starting with secularism, it is best to say that, since its very birth, Kemalism has been a devotee of a radical rationalism with a fierce denial of anything intuitional. In that sense it is attached to the idea of *universal reason* and is uncompromisingly modernist.⁵⁰ Kemalism in this context might also be described as part of the tradition of *enlightened despotism*.⁵¹ For Kemalists, secularism means an unquestioned devotion to the materialistic explanation of matter, as well as the separation of the state from the religious affairs. The scientism of the nineteenth century, which was one of the constitutive movements of modernization and of the early secularization processes in Turkey, appears once again in the rhetoric of Kemalism but now with an overwhelming predominance. Gaining Jacobin content and meaning, secularism was now transformed into *laicism*, taking the post French Revolution practice (as well as the French model of Enlightenment) as its model.⁵² This radical attempt would naturally erode the notion of tradition. The demolition of the Caliphate and the annulling of the Ottoman Empire were expected consequences because Kemalism, since its very beginning, considered and constructed Islam as its *constitutive outside* and in this sense reflects a radical difference from the earlier practices.⁵³

Islam has always been a crucial issue in the history of modernization. It was not only “revolutionaries” of the first generation like Namik Kemal who sought

conciliation of Islam with modernity, but those with even much more radical names like Ahmet Rıza, who also attributed a certain importance to Islam. Rıza in the later periods of his “revolutionary” life attributed a significant and special importance both to Islam and tradition by referring to Comte. He clearly takes a position against the separation of state and religion from each other, saying that in an Islamic state the king obeys the laws and the advice of the intellectuals, in the same line with Young Ottomans.⁵⁴ This convoluted mind system is also true for Abdullah Cevdet, a fierce Westerner. He also shifted back and forth when Islam is the subject matter.⁵⁵

The significant novelty of Kemalism appears when it totally discredits all these presumptions and situates itself as a completely new system. It removes Islam from the public space, completely limiting it to conscience and personal/private practice and space and never refers to it as part of administrative processes. Neither does it take an initiative to reconcile Islam with worldly affairs. In that sense Kemalism attributes a kind of religiosity to the importance of science and rationalism, reminding us of the *positive religion* conceptualization of Comte.⁵⁶ Tradition was another adverse issue for Kemalism. In its great ambition for the total modernization of the society it aimed to entirely eliminate traditions and traditional value systems. Kemalism is an unceasing endeavor aimed at replacing Islamic values with individual/personal ones.

These interventions have a deeper impact at another level, namely the sphere of politics. Nineteenth century Turkish modernization clung to the traditional meaning of politics. It systematically refrained from using politics as an instrument to transform the structure of the things. When secularism entered the intellectual arena as a thought system to be used for the dissection of the matter and for the construction of a new relation among the things it would necessarily correspond to the conceptualization of the politics as a solid and materialistic value to give new meanings to social issues. When based on a secularist rationale, politics encompasses the basic tool for the “explanation” of social issues, as well as a new “science” capable of “rehabilitating” the society. Unless secularist principals were fulfilled, it was impossible as a matter of fact to intervene in the political realm in this sense. Also it was not possible to reshape the state if it were a heavenly issue. In that regard Kemalist secularism may be seen as a radical move in the history by way of positivism.

Citizen: Old or New

The second realm in which Kemalism appears as a new phenomenon is the introduction of the new notion of citizenship.⁵⁷ Even though in the relevant literature Kemalism has been criticized as not having fulfilled the necessities of citizenship on a more social and democratic level and on the contrary saw citizens as subjects who should obey the rules of the state, the implementation of the Civil Code might be taken as a turning point in modern politics.⁵⁸ The Civil Code above all shifts the ground on which the subject and the state meet towards contractualism. With the Civil Code, the citizen becomes a social entity on the

basis of rights. Perhaps not as understood in the full liberal sense, but still in line with the basic principal of the contractual model state—as demarcated by Sadik Rifat Pasa of the Tanzimat period—the existence of the citizen is protected, *habeas corpus*, and rights are the domain of the citizen, rather than existing for the good of the state.

This is an important point because it critically dismantles the concept of “rights” as understood by the first and second generations. Tanzimat thinkers conceived of “rights” only in terms of a “natural right” with an Islamic rationale. To Namik Kemal, the Quran qualifies the human being as a virtuous creature, so the state should approach him thusly.⁵⁹ This was a clear contradiction with modernity, for in modern thinking, “rights” are extremely material in nature and represent an “invented” concept. Kemalism, for the first time in Turkish history, brought a secular understanding of citizenship and by making it a political actor introduced the notion of political reasoning. With these tenets Kemalism attributed a Kantian meaning⁶⁰ to the citizen, arguing that the enlightened individual should break away from the tutelage that imprisons him, be it Islam or tradition. In order to understand the implications of this, one should remember the ideas and the poetry of Tevfik Fikret, a prominent poet of the Young Turks period who had resisted Abdulhamid and a positivist/materialist who contributed to the journal of *Servet-i Funun* (The Treasure of Sciences). He was a sheer materialist defining himself as a poet whose, conscience, ideas and reasoning are free. Later Atatürk reminded teachers that the new regime expects them to train students who have free reasoning and conscience.

The New Notion of Progress

The third issue with which Kemalism might be evaluated as a “break” is the idea of progress. In classical Islamic thought, as I explained above in passing, progress/change always meant a backward move in history. The point of departure, in a sense, the starting point of the history, is the *asr-i saadet* (happy era) in which the prophet was alive and governing. The purpose of history, and that of governments, should be the emulation of his governance, as well as the return to those rules and that period. Should there be any changes that would become evident through public outcry; the government should again retreat to those former days and rules.

Kemalism was the first time in Turkey’s modern history that this model was bypassed, as it not only erased the reminders of the past with its attack on Islam and traditional values but because it also introduced concepts of futurism and utopia. For Kemalism, the progress would be in the future, in other words in the transcendentalism of modernism itself. When Kemalism introduced the task of catching up with modern civilization, it was referring to the utopic futurism of modernism.⁶¹ In that sense Kemalism defined itself as a perpetual forward motion having Hegelian notes of historicity. Nevertheless, at this point it is necessary to discuss the concept of *idealism* that is implicit in the Kemalist understanding of time, as this also has an impact on secularism and, in doing so, I will refer to Ülken.

Ülken argues that Young Turks confronted the problem of *being open* to the society in expressing its shortcomings. But this openness should have relied on two preconditions: one, it should have been based on scientific arguments and the second, it should not disturb it.⁶² The crucial argument is that, according to Ülken, this approach should have also been carrying a *conservative* point of view, while still being uncompromising in its reformist nature. The concept of *social positivism* developed by Gökalp is the key solution found to this problem, for his basic argument was that his ideas were based on *science*. Despite this claim, this “science” is more like the ancient *fikh* or *kelam* of the Islamic political and social culture. Continuing, Ülken argues that positivism never assumes matter to be the substance of its theory of knowledge. On the contrary, the basic elements are always impressionistic. In this sense, sociological accounts became “matters of conscience.” Essentially, what Gökalp has called “the sociological positivism” is easily transformed into *sociological idealism*.⁶³ Gökalp found a link between the methodology of Gökalp and the policies of CUP. In that context he argues that materialism is more “violent,” whereas idealism appears rather personal. “The best way to impose his [Gökalp’s] ideas on the masses as a “true belief” (*iman*) was to replace the absolute order of *fikh* with the “scientific” idealism of sociology.”⁶⁴ This quotation and the argument not only concerns the ideological background of CUP but also, by way of influence of Gökalp, the basic epistemology of Kemalism that claims that scienticism works more like a religious belief system.

These three elements at first glance match Kemalism in terms of a theory of break. But in a further analysis they have their internal shortcomings, which in turn reinforce the continuity thesis in accordance with the basic argument of this chapter that is the culture of politics in the modern period has followed a continuum, even if at various moments it appears in different guises, and Kemalism is not immune to this principal, despite the fact that it has at some points certain peculiarities.

The Shortcomings of Kemalism and the Continuity Thesis

It is in a sense much easier to show the shortcomings of Kemalism that links it to a past from which it ambitiously wants to detach itself. Continuing on the same issues as explained above, it may be argued that Kemalism i) has a problematic relation with secularism; ii) it has not been successful in the construction of civil rights in the context of citizenship but rather it has once again created a transcendental state and asked the citizen to accept it as obeying subjects; and iii) even in terms of the idea of futurism and utopism, Kemalism has constructed itself as a kind of *asr-i saadet* and in that sense annulled its modernist epistemology. In the next section of the chapter I will reflect further on these issues.

Secularism

The issue of the Kemalist tenet of secularism still remains the most debated topic today in Turkey. In the post-1980 period this principle became the subject

of a heated debate regarding the veiling/headscarf issue. As political Islam began to erupt in the 1990s, the critics of Kemalism roared that Kemalism in fact lacks a "real" secularist opening. The core of this argument was based on three important points. The first one is that Kemalism, rather than separating the sacred and the profane from each other, meticulously strove to put religion and the religious under the control of the state.⁶⁵ The General Directorate of Religious Affairs is a government office and it is attached to the Ministry of State.⁶⁶ This gives the state the opportunity of managing religious affairs by excluding any possible intervention from the society.

Secondly, limiting the sacred to the private space and excluding it from public secularism again worked in favor of the controlling elite. Thirdly, the state's intervention in religious matters ends up (or starts with) the selection of the Sunni sect of Islam as the "official" one. Other religious groups and sects are completely ignored. Especially Alevites, who encompass a large group of about ten million members and who are also fervent supporters of Kemalism, are unhappy with this situation, arguing that the teaching of religion in the school system is in violation of their existence.

Citizenship

In the relevant literature covering the criticism of Kemalism in the context of citizenship, the main argument is that Kemalism has not been able to create the Kantian notion of citizen emancipated from his tutelage. It is not, as has been argued by the prominent ideologists of early Republican era, a notion of citizenship based on culture but it is definitely a racist one⁶⁷ and is an extension of the "Turkist" nationalism that has started in the post-1908 era.⁶⁸ On the contrary, Kemalism, even though it has attempted to "construct" enlightened citizens, has been inadequate in achieving this goal. The main cause for this insufficiency has been the transcendentalism of the state. Instead of creating the liberal conditions necessary for the formation of the emancipated citizen by way of minimizing the state, Kemalism has reinforced the state both ideologically and practically.

Ideologically, the state delineates the limits of the society and the citizen. In this sense the citizen is obliged to obey the state. This is clear at two points: the first one is the notion of "authority" that penetrated public opinion in the early republican era. Mahmut Esat Bozkurt, long time Ministry of Justice in Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's cabinets and one of the prominent ideologist of the era, argues that Kemalism is a "democracy with the ingredient it needs: authority. Kemalism is an authoritarian democracy."⁶⁹ This is also true when the corporatist structure of Kemalism is analyzed. Kemalism, which rejects the existence of classes in the society while resting on Gökalp's corporatist interpretation of Durkheim, fervently advocates policies of solidarity and a transcendental state.⁷⁰

On the practical level, statism, which appears primarily in the economic sphere, is one of the six tenets of Kemalism. Although in the 1930s—due to the reason explained above—it was rather difficult to espouse a more democratic society, Kemalism used statism to form a new class, namely the bourgeoisie, a class that would support the reforms as they were introduced, in a "from the top" methodology.⁷¹ Certain Kemalist institutions of the 1930s, like the *Halk Evleri*

(Peoples' Houses), similar to their German and Soviet inspired counterparts, also represented ideological institutions controlled by the party-state-leader unification for the dissemination of this ideology.⁷²

Feminist circles have also criticized Kemalist notions of citizenship. The wide literature argues that even though the rights to elect and be elected were bequeathed to women as early as 1933—many years before several Western countries—the steps taken have never been adequate to the task of obliterating discrimination against women. Quite the reverse, in the Kemalist era, as well as in subsequent periods, the discrimination of the women has been a major political issue on the social agenda.⁷³

An analysis of the textbooks used in the secondary education system in the Kemalist period clearly demonstrates that women are situated in the domestic sphere in the form of "housewives."⁷⁴ This is a contradiction that extends to the general situation of citizens, as it is usually argued that the citizen has certain rights in an abstract sense, rights that he, however, is not permitted to use. This is what I call the *paradox of modernity*. The extent of this paradox is obvious when the two famous statements by Gökalp are set diametrically opposite to what Atatürk asked from the teachers with reference to Tevfik Fikret as mentioned above. Gökalp argued that one should close his eyes and do his work and emphasized that there are no rights, there is only duty.

Kemalism as an Official Ideology

The third constraint of Kemalism as a modernist ideology is that it has in time become an official ideology, having an end in itself. Notwithstanding the fundamental and internal arguments it assumed and produced in the early Kemalist period, it gradually metamorphosed into an ideology that disavowed its epistemological opening. In another place I have argued that an idea in its epistemological period is emancipatory, whereas an ideology is strict and exclusionary.⁷⁵ By the 1930s Kemalism was facing this problem and ended up promoting itself as the ideology that would found and protect the state. The totalitarian system of the 1930s reinforced this understanding, and during the Second World War years it gained overtly fascist tendencies. In the writings of Recep Peker, long time secretary general of RPP, this point is emphasized with a reference to the notion of "leader."⁷⁶ Due to the corporatist elements it possesses and as an outcome of the statism it has adopted, Kemalism has been presented as the hegemonic rhetoric of the state set against social openings.⁷⁷ Colliding with the periphery, the center or the Historical Bloc used Kemalism as the basic ideological instrument to align and re-align the social movements. In other words, new attempts at social developments have been hindered in the name of Kemalism. In that sense, the ideology of all military coups has been Kemalism.⁷⁸ This makes Kemalism an ideology continuously referring itself to the extent that the tasks of all military coups have been to reestablish Kemalism as the main hegemonic discourse. From that stance, the period of the 1930s, when Kemal Atatürk was alive and leading, are considered the glorified days to which the society is called to return.

Post-Kemalist Period: The Question of Continuity, 1950–1980

Turkey's general elections in the year 1950 resulted in changes that were almost thrilling in impact. The Kemalist party, RPP, lost its majority in the parliament and an opposition movement that had started in 1946 under the name of *Demokrat Parti* (Democrat Party) assumed power. The result was not only political⁷⁹ for it also engendered a debate on the conditions that had triggered this spectacular shift. Among the many topics discussed, the most important was that of the contradiction between the *center* and the *periphery* as proposed by Mardin. In his essay he argued that modern politics in Turkey is composed of a dualistic character.⁸⁰ Those who started the process of modernization with the Tanzimat can be referred to as the central forces, namely the state and the political elite.

The second is a rather vague concept, the periphery, that is in general what is usually referred as *the people* and, in its larger sense, includes the provincial social forces. It is redundant to say that there had been friction or tension between these two actors. Whereas the center relies on transformation theories and social engineering utopias, disregarding the culture developed in the society (more concretely, the ideological tenets of Kemalism summarized in this chapter), the periphery is attached to traditional values, Islamic values and Islamic practice more than anything else. This really represents the dividing point between the two different groups. The center, especially so in the Kemalist era, has systematically tried to obliterate Islam, as has been explained above and, in fact, the early movements of the DP really involves such pro-Islamic symbols like reciting the call to prayer in Arabic but not in Turkish, a rule previously set by Kemalist cadres.

Besides the center-periphery clash, another core factor that has determined the demise of Kemalism in the post-World War II era was the economic management. Kemalism, especially in the 1930s following the Great Depression, returned to a rigid statism as the basic economic policy.⁸¹ Parallel to the spirit of the 1930s that witnessed the birth of totalitarian regimes, Kemalism, which also found itself in the course of trying to engage in "nation building" from the position of extremely deprived conditions, decided not to rely on capitalist principals. Kemalist nationalization was bulky and was in accordance with the political statism explained above.⁸² Despite this, during the 1930s a liberal wing even existed among the Kemalist cadres. Celal Bayar, who would later become the third president of Turkey as the chairman of DP, favored liberal economic policies. Naturally enough, DP also supported liberalism to the extent that it did not completely ignore statist principals. For these cadres liberalism meant the birth and reinforcement of a class of entrepreneurs or private sector and this new model would later be referred to as a mixed economy.

To judge whether the post-Kemalist era brought a break in the existing normative structure very much depends on the analysis of the economic models. It is rather difficult to qualify this period as a break because, even though there is a clear backlash as far as Kemalist principals are concerned, statism was still perpetuated by the new groups. The main reason for this is the role of the bourgeoisie in Turkey. Beginning with the Young Turks era in Turkey the leading elite had long been in search of a new bourgeoisie to support modernization.⁸³

Due to its social structure Ottoman society did not permit the formation of a bourgeoisie as it had happened in the West. It was during the Young Turks period of economic policies that the bourgeoisie first became visible on the historical scene in its modern sense.⁸⁴ This was due to the transfer of the sources from the state to another group of elites in the course of industrialization.⁸⁵ The same model continued in the Kemalist period, but especially so in the post-1950 era. Politics in Turkey never ceased to be perceived as the control and the transfer of state resources. The 1950–1960 and post-1965 period also accepted the same model, which eventually meant the existence of statism.

The connection with statism also had another meaning. Social development in the country even after 1950 was in an upward direction. The early 1950s saw a large injection of American aid through the Marshall Plan and the resulting huge investments and industrial progress catalyzed very rapid change in Turkey.⁸⁶ Urban migration of the large masses was in accordance with this development. Soon the rural areas, which until then had been stifled under extreme conditions of poverty, found themselves connected to the urban regions and towns.⁸⁷

This is still a continuing social fact. The newcomers brought with them a massive demand for modernization. The social modernization of these groups forced the governments to support them with perpetual growth policies. This tradition of support that had started in the 1950 persisted in the 1960s without interruption.⁸⁸ The "nasty" politics of *populism* forced the governments to continue with the statist policies, making the state the primary investing agent. In a country in which majority of the population lives by agriculture and in the villages, the state also became the primary supporter of the rural sector, assisted with the help of the base price policies and unending compromises.

Not only economic statism, but political statism as well became a major determining factor in the formation of the political culture in the post Kemalist period. During the years spanning 1950–1973 all of Turkey's governments leaned to the right. They defined themselves as conservatives. Conservatism actually meant rigid opposition and even struggle against even lenient left openings and, for a very long period of time, even moderate leftist arguments were also seen as *communist propaganda*. This "leftist" opposition primarily consisted of mostly liberal demands, but the DP in the 1950–1960 period strictly refrained from taking any steps toward a relatively liberal policy. On the contrary, politically speaking, towards the end of its years in power the DP became, in gradually increasing ways, more and more conservative and anti-democratic.

As is usually claimed in the literature this model radically changed with the 1961 Constitution. The 1960 military intervention, however, was an attempt to rehabilitate the Historical Bloc and restore the center that had lost power in 1950.⁸⁹ Therefore, a Constitutional Convention was convened to prepare a new constitution. Those charged with this responsibility under the control of the National Unification Committee, were a coalition of army, intellectuals and bureaucrats.⁹⁰ To put an end to the arguments, it would be fair to declare that the 1961 Constitution actually opened the way for some liberalism in the political

realm. Despite this, the main spirit of the constitution clearly relies on statist principals, with no compromise, and it positions statism, especially that at the economic level, as a governmental aim, even though the constitution is infused by a notion of autonomy, the single liberal concept to be found in the document.

This general stance toward statism was also backed in many ways by the post-1960 governments. The coalition governments of the post coup period were strictly statist. In addition to that, the major governing party which was an extension of DP, namely the Justice Party (*Adalet Partisi*), complained about the liberal spirit of the constitution during its governing years 1965–1971. Second, the Justice Party also voiced opposition to the autonomy granted to universities and especially the judiciary supervision of the executive. Adhering to the principals of the Cold War era, JP governments also reflected strong opposition against liberal principals, once again arguing that they were leftist, or even communist, ideas.⁹¹ The conservatism of these governments was also demonstrated to their implementation of the nationalist principals.⁹² Since 1908, nationalism in Turkey has clouded internal relations with the state and mostly represent the praising of the state over that of the society. In other words the nationalism espoused by conservative governments was actually justification of the transcendentalism of the state. This reasoning in Turkey ends up with a *raison d'état* that is the complete negation of the society and on this ground there is never a clash of interest between the army and the conservative in Turkey.

The military intervention of 1971 is a strong proof of this. In the aftermath of the "coup by memorandum," the parliament (with the support of the JP in a tacit coalition with the military) enacted major revisions to the 1961 Constitution and the changes encompassed a good deal of what JP governments had been demanding for years.⁹³ The aim was to "bolster the state" against the roaring post-1968 leftist shift in Turkey and the social demands raised by the developing and growing working class in concurrence with the youth and backed by the RPP, which had taken a serious shift in the year 1965. The Kemalist party of the founding ideology started defining itself as a party politically situated on the left of center. However the "left" here did not include any disavowal of statist policies and ideology.⁹⁴

On the contrary this was the new disguise and period of statism. It affirmed statism as being a part and parcel of leftist politics and policies and this argument continued all way through the rest of the 1970s up until the 1980s. Despite some revisions, it even remains a valid argument today for the same groups. This means the 1970s were the towering years of statism in both nationalist and leftist versions. The 1980s began with the last and most severe military coup, an event that exploded with the apparent claim of the restoration of both statism and Kemalism. The Advisory Convention prepared a new constitution, a document that clearly separated politics from society and bequeathed society as once again the domain of the state; the goal of the constitution was to restore the basic political culture that is *politics excluding the society*. This was to be one of the most sweeping evidences of the continuity thesis in modern politics.

By Way of Conclusion: The Last Trial, Post-1980 Period

If one is to speak about a break in Turkish politics it would probably lead to an observation of the 1980s. Although there are interesting determinations in the literature that the "new deal" period in Turkey in the post-1983 period also showed a consistency with the previous eras, this period can be analyzed under the effect of two clashing forces. On the one hand, the government—under the influence of the neo-liberal politics—continued at another level with both the nationalist and conservative undertones within the influence of the New Right. Neo-liberal policies enabled the Motherland Party (*Anavatan Partisi*) governments to openly and avidly criticize statism at all levels, both politically and economically, with the argument that we should now enter a period of economic liberalism unchained from the constraints of statism.⁹⁵ The bureaucracy was also challenged in this period with the argument that modernization of this institution had never before been achieved. In other words, there was a search for the "real," meaning Weberian, rationalization of the bureaucracy based on the merit system with a strong emphasis on the de-centralization of the government.⁹⁶ This would lead the state to minimize itself in accordance with the liberal policies.

Despite these arguments and policies, MP governments continued with the existing non-liberal structure as far as the politics of culture is concerned. The MP made no step to change the 1981 Constitution, which foresaw an authoritarian regime.⁹⁷ Another condition reflecting the MP's involvements in the continuity of the traditional political culture is again seen in its objective in creating a new privileged group of capitalists using state resources and other potentials. This attempt culminated when a great reaction gathered against the MP governments on the basis of corruption.⁹⁸ Not only did the MP lose power to the Social Democratic Populist Party in the 1989 elections, largely due to this reason, but a number of its ministers—even later the prime minister—were sent to the Supreme Court for reasons related to corruption and abuse of power. This was a good indicator showing that even the liberal movements of varying intensities are attached to statism in Turkey.

The post-1980 period can also be analyzed as a period in which the break theories period reside. It is especially in this period that a certain search started for liberal concepts, not only in the forms proposed by the governments or parties but also in the forms of new cleavages in search of a civil society. The cry-word "Civil Society" became the magical concept of the 1990s and 2000.⁹⁹ Although this concept started in the 1980s, it evolved in the following decades mainly due to the impact of the first wave of globalization.¹⁰⁰ The movements, which had taken off in democracies that were searching for ways to implement or preserve cultural values in the society, also had an effect on Turkey. Especially the notion and practice of citizenship opened a debate with large outcries from various ethnic and gender groups.

The second vital factor in this unfolding was the demands raised by religious groups that demanded to practice their religion in the public realm. Veil-

ing was the crux of this debate and it still is. The arguments of these groups tacitly put the Kemalist tenets into debate. Gender groups mainly began criticizing the understanding of citizenship; ethnic groups were questioning the nationalism principal; and in religious spheres the debate was unfolding around secularism. In general, as the importance and functionality of NGOs developed in Turkey, their existence first and foremost questioned the transcendentalism of the state. Finally the rise to power of the Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*) as a political organization with an Islamic background is the pinnacle of this process, in which there has been a transition to a new culture, not in the form of a break but once that has been gradual and consistent.¹⁰¹

The question appears now if the move of the JDP should be assumed to be a break in the history of modernization of Turkey, with its significant model of modernization led by the state and political elites. What has been argued in this chapter can be summarized into two specific remarks: the first is that the "intervention" of grassroots politics in Turkey has a long precedence and has been exercised since the early Free Party period of the 1930s. In that sense the present situation does not reflect a move that is specifically original. Second, the originality would appear if the JDP or any other political power radically dares to change the state-society configuration in Turkey. This would mean the transformation of the existing culture-politics alignment as well. Since 2002, under the pressure of the European Union, Turkey has undergone a remarkable change toward a "better liberalism" and this could be the start of a new process. Turkey now has the potential for such a change, namely to pass out of its long standing politics of culture to a culture of politics. But the most crucial potential is Turkey's recalling the time it lost in its long history of modernization.

Notes

1. For a lengthy analysis of the concept and how it was conceived by the Ottomans see Tuncer Baykara, *Osmanlılarda Medeniyet Kavramı (Concept of Civilization in the Ottomans)*. (İzmir: Akademi, 1993).

2. Hasan Bülent Kahraman, "The Cultural and Historical Foundation of Turkish Citizenship: Modernity as Westernization," in E. Fuat Keyman and A. İcduygu, ed., *Citizenship in a Global World: European Questions and Turkish Experiences*. (London: Routledge, 2005), 70–86.

3. Ziya Gökalp, *Hars ve Medeniyet*. (Ankara: Diyarbakır'ı Tanıtma ve Turizm Derneği Yayınları, 1964).

4. This point is stressed despite all endeavor of the first generation of Ottoman reformers beginning with the Young Turks. At least it should be remembered that even Young Turks differentiated between the political and the social and comprehended the political as a part and parcel of the social. The following generations went further and refrained from touching the political issues in their literary works whereas the social structure was under furious criticism.

5. The case of Turkey is analyzed in this context in Touraj Atabaki and E.J.Zurcher, *Men of Order: Authoritarian Modernity under Atatürk and Rıza Şah*. (London: I.B. Tauris, 2004).

6. Şerif Mardin, *Genesis of the Young Ottoman Thought*. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964).

7. *Ibid.*, 86–94.

8. *Ibid.* 98.

9. *Ibid.*, 252–275. A certain discussion of this condition as it appears in the novel as an epistemological question is in Jale Parla, *Babalar ve Oğullar: Tanzimat Romanının Epistemolojik Temelleri (Fathers and Sons: The Epistemological Origins of the Tanzimat Novel)*. (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1990).

10. For a general history of reading see Alberto Manguel, *A History of Reading*. (London: Harper Collins, 1996). For a more specific notion of reading that has developed in the West in the sense it is used above see Reinhard Wittmann, "Was There a Reading Revolution at the End of the Eighteenth Century?" in Guglielmo Cavallo and Roger Chartier, ed. by, *A History of Reading in the West*, translated by Lydia G. Cochrane. (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1999).

11. The history and political analysis of the birth of Turkish intellectuals still is lacking but in parts it can be found in Mardin, *Genesis*. Another very controversial and polemical thesis is Yalcın Küçük, *Aydın Üzerine Tezler (Thesis on Intellectuals)*. V volumes. (İstanbul: Tekin Yayınevi, 1984).

12. To follow the changing position of *ulema* in the bureaucratic sense see Carter Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform in the Ottoman Empire*. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980).

13. For the advent and development of the concept of *vatan* see Bernard Lewis, *Political Language of Islam*. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988).

14. The best analysis of the political ideas of Kemal is in Mardin, *Genesis*, 283–336. For his literary ideas see A. H. Tanpınar, *19. Asır Türk Edebiyatı Tarihi (History of 19th Century Turkish Literature)*. (İstanbul: Çağlayan Kitabevi, 1967). 321–430. Also, A. Tanpınar, *Namik Kemal Antolojisi (A Namik Kemal Anthology)*. (İstanbul: Muallim Ahmet Halit Kitap Evi, 1942). However his political ideas still are in need of further analysis.

15. The first volume of the collection of Kemal's basic articles has recently been transliterated. Namık Kemal, *Osmanlı Modernleşmesinin Meseleleri. Butun Makaleleri I (The Problems of the Ottoman Modernization)*. Ed. N.Y. Aydoğdu, I. Kara. (İstanbul: Dergah Publications, 2005).

16. Namık Kemal, *Renan Mudafaanamesi (İslamiyet ve Maarif) (Renan Defense: Islam and Education)*. (Ankara: Milli Kültür Yayınları, 1962). (For an analysis of his ideas on this particular case see Berkes, who translates the name of the book as *Renan Refutation*. Niyazi Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*. (London: Hurst & Company, 1998). 262–63.

17. *Asrı-ı saadet*, which literally means "the times of happiness," is an Islamic concept which demarcates the age in which the Prophet was alive and ruling. In the classical Islamic epistemology the notion of "progress," as has been the case for the Ottomans, was meant to imitate the practices of the Prophet's days. That means going back in the history in order to create a forward progress. I will touch on this later.

18. This argument does not counter Sadık Rifat Pasha, who claimed that it is the state for the people and not that the people for the state. His statement continued to be an idea pertaining to the realm of the rights and would not demolish the limits set by the state. See, Kahraman, "The Cultural."

19. The difference between the groups and generations of the Young Ottomans is analyzed by Mardin. As a late study see, Şerif Mardin, "Yeni Osmanlı Düşüncesi," in *Cumhuriyete Devreden Düşünce Mirası: Tanzimat ve Meşrutiyet'in Birikimi (The Heritage Inherited by the Republic: The Accumulation Tanzimat and Meşrutiyet)*, ed. by M.O.Alkan. (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2001), 42–53.

20. The political ideas of the period are analyzed at length in Şerif Mardin, *Jön Türklerin Siyasi Fikirleri 1895–1908 (The Political Ideas of Young Turks)*. (Ankara: Türkiye İş Bankası Yayınları, 1964).

21. Rıza sent a group of letters (*layiha*) to Sultan Abdulhamid, joined the positivist circles in Paris, and contributed to *La Revue Occidentale*. He had been educated in his youth at the agricultural school in France, Grignole and, according to Professor Mardin, he was under the influence of d'Holbach, the Enlightenment period philosopher. However, as he himself explains, he was exposed to positivist ideas in Istanbul in the year 1887 in a book written by Dr. Robinet about Comte. He also attended courses delivered by Pierre Lafitte who was then the head of the French positivist circle. At that time positivism was not that strange to the Ottoman mind as Comte, the founding father of the movement, had in that year penned a letter to mighty Mustafa Resit Paşa. Rıza soon launched a journal called *Mesveret* (Consultancy). Until the end, 1908, he ambitiously stayed loyal to his journal and principals, defying the all other attempts to dissuade him. The first period is significantly marked by these events. As will be discussed more in the following section, the idiosyncrasy of the period is the penetration of the positivist ideas, ideals and ideology into Turkey as a policy making tool, as well as a formative and seminal social element. This very momentous matter determines the politico-social dimension of the period that would evolve into 1920s, 1930s, and even today, as will be seen. The best source for Rıza, primarily, is Sukru Hanioglu, *Bir Siyasal Örgüt Olarak "Osmanlı İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti" ve "Jon Turkluk" Cilt 1 (1889-1902) (Ottoman Committee for Union and Progress and Young Turkism as a Political Organization Volume 1 (1889-1902))*. (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1986) and also Şerif Mardin, *Jön Türklerin Siyasi Fikirleri*, 123–67.

22. The history of this period can be followed through the seminal book by Sukru Hanioglu, *Preparations for a Revolution*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).

23. This period's interrelation with military is analyzed with an extensively detailed approach in M. Naim Turfan, *Rise of the Young Turks: Politics, the Military and Ottoman Collapse*. (London; New York: I. B. Tauris, 2000).

24. A great deal of importance has been attributed to the army in the modernization of the Ottoman Empire by those scholars who might be attached to the modernization school. The best example is still Bernard Lewis, *Emergence of Modern Turkey*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, second edition, 1968), especially 75–129.

25. Ahmed Rıza, *Vazife ve Mesuliyet: Asker*. Cairo, 1323 (1907). In Mardin's book this year appears as 1906. Şerif Mardin, *Jön Türklerin Siyasi Fikirleri 1895–1908*. (Ankara: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 1964) 127.

26. Şerif Mardin, *Jön Türklerin*, 127, 157.

27. Among others especially Barrington Moore and his follower Theda Skocpol should be mentioned.

28. Lewis also gives very valuable information about the intellectual origins of Mahmud II's attempt. Bernard Lewis, *Emergence*, 80–82.

29. *Ibid.*, 83–86.

30. Lewis traces the impact of the West on the Ottoman Empire on this course and clearly shows the connection between the two cultures by way of teaching in the military academies drawing the attention to the books acquired among which *Grande Encyclopedie* is particularly important. Bernard Lewis, *Ibid.*, 59.

31. It is interesting that Kemal Atatürk himself started his education in his district school, *mahalle mektebi* where the education principals were traditional, namely Islamic. Teaching and the teachings of the Koran were the main elements of the education. He then transferred to first a civil primary school and then to a military school. One important element here is that according to his biography even in that time, in Selonica, a province of the Ottoman Empire, a kind of binary educational system was available for the Muslim society, both religious and civil. This shows that civil education was already a part of social life, but its nature was still ambiguous. However, from Atatürk's biography it is evident that he was sent to the traditional school due to the wishes of his mother, but left the school after being beaten by a teacher, an event that haunted him with a remarkable feeling throughout his life. This shows that the society had not yet completely accepted the new ideas, even in a city like Selonica known for its liberal character. Another event that runs through the memories of Atatürk's sister, *Makbule Atadan*, was that he did not want her to go to school. He was already a prominent general in the army and even offered bribes by transferring the houses he owned to her name to dissuade her from her eagerness for being schooled. This is also another proof of the character of the social transformations of the period, as even Atatürk, who would in a decade be a forerunner of social rights for women, could not curtail himself from behaving traditionally. Though later he even asked Makbule Hanım to be a member of the new opposition party, The Free Party, she remained semi-illiterate throughout her life. For Atatürk's biography see, Andrew Mango, *Ataturk*. (London: John Murray, 1999). The insight for such "strange" attitudes of Atatürk is analyzed in his psychoanalytical analysis by Vamik D. Volkan and Norman Itzkowitz, *The Immortal Atatürk: A Psychobiography*. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984). For Selonica see Mark Mazower, *Salonica, City of Ghosts: Christians, Muslims and Jews, 1430–1950* (New York: Harper and Collins, 2004); for Makbule Atadan's memories see *Ağabeyim Mustafa Kemal. Makbule Atadan anlatıyor (My elder brother Mustafa Kemal: Makbule Atadan recounts)* yazan, Semsî Belli. (Ankara: Ayyıldız Matbaası, 1959).

32. The period of Abdulhamid II is crucial on these grounds. First and foremost, during his long reigning years there was a tremendous change in what might be called infrastructural levels, like the enlargement of the railway projects, the development of the notion of local administrations and municipalities, the commencement of new school systems, the enhancing of the postal structure. The birth of the new class of officials and civil servants as explained above is an outcome of this progress. For a discussion of the Abdulhamid II period see İlber Ortaylı, *İmparatorlugun En Uzun Yuzyili (The Longest Century of the Empire)*. (Istanbul: Hil Yayınları, 1983).

33. Although there has not yet been sufficient research on this subject, the Turkish novel reflects important observations on the role of the lawyers and doctors. In all novels taking the political turns as the key matter the male protagonist is a member of this group. See Tarik Bugra, *Yagmur Beklerken*. (Istanbul: Otuk Yayinevi, 1981).

34. For this arguments see Erik Jan Zürcher, "Kemalist Düşüncenin Osmanlı Kaynakları" (Ottoman Resources of the Kemalist Thought), in *Kemalizm*, haz. A. İnşel. (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2001), 44-55.

35. For an analysis of the Republican Peoples' Party from this point of view and in the context of modernization see Hasan Bülent Kahraman, "The Making and The Crisis of Turkish Social Democracy: Roots, Discourses and Strategies," Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Bilkent University, 1999.

36. The word "free" has a number of different meanings in Turkish. One is "free" and the other one is "liberal." The name of the party can easily be translated as Liberal Party. However, the word liberal is a purely political term in Turkish and at the time it was launched, although its program was established on relatively liberal ideas, the intention in naming it was not.

37. For an analysis of populism in the early republican era see M. Asım Karaömerlioğlu, "Tek Parti Döneminde Halkçılık," in *Kemalizm*. Ibid. A lengthy analysis from a political perspective can be found in Hasan Bülent Kahraman, "The Roots," Ibid; see also Hasan Bülent Kahraman, *Yeni Bir Sosyal Demokrasi İçin. (For a New Social Democracy)* (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi Yayınları, 1993).

38. See, Murtaza Korlaelci, "Pozitivist Düşüncenin İthali" (The Import of Positivist Thought,) in *Tanzimat ve Mesrutiyetin Birikimi*, op. cit., 214-22.

39. Gertrud Lenzer, "August Comte and Modern Positivism," in *August Comte and Positivism: Essential Writings*, edited with an introduction by Gertrud Lenzer. (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1975), xlvii-lxiii.

40. Andrew Wernick, *Auguste Comte and the Religion of Humanity: The Post-theistic Program of French Social Theory*. (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

41. Şükrü Hanioglu, "Blueprints for a Future Society: Late Ottoman Materialists on Science, Religion and Art," in Elisabeth Özdalga, ed., *Late Ottoman Society: The Intellectual Legacy*. (London and New York: Routledge Curzon, 2005), 28-116.

42. The Darwinist approaches have also played an important role in the formation of all these ideas; see Hanioglu, Ibid., and Hanioglu, *Bir Siyasal Örgüt*, (A Political Organization), 604-13.

43. For the concept of "internalized Orientalism" see Hasan Bülent Kahraman, "İçselleştirilmiş, Açık ve Kapalı Oryantalizm ve Kemalizm" (*Internalized, Manifest and Latent Orientalism and Kemalizm*), *Doğu Batı*, September 2002.

44. For the elitist dimension of Young Turks see Serif Mardin, *Jon Türklerin*, 152-58 and Şükrü Hanioglu, *Bir Siyasal Örgüt* (A Political Organization) 613-619.

45. Doğan Özlem, "Türkiye'de Pozitivism ve Siyaset" (Positivism and Politics in Turkey), *Modernleşme ve Batıcılık. (Modernization and Westernization)* Ed. U. Kocabaşoğlu. (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2002), 452-65.

46. The history of this period is analyzed in extensive detail in M. Şükrü Hanioglu, *Young Turks in Opposition*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).

47. The most important analysis for the Turkish Hearths remains that of Füsün Ustel, *İmparatorluktan Ulus-Devlete Türk Milliyetçiliği: Türk Ocakları, 1912-1931 (Turkish Nationalism From Empire to Nation-State: Turkish Hearths, 1912-1931)*. (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1997). See also, İbrahim Karac, *Türk Ocakları, (1912-1931)*. (Ankara: Türk Yurdu Yayınları, 1992); Hüseyin Tuncer, Yucel Hacıoğlu, Ragıp Memişoğlu, *Türk Ocakları Tarihi: Açıklamalı Kronoloji*. (Ankara: Türk Ocakları Genel Merkezi, 1998); Ersal Aytakin, *Türk Ocakları ve Siyaset*. (Ankara: Berikan, 2004).

48. Successively the art produced in this period was an inseparable part of the general culture which followed these political ideals. Here it should be noted that this introverted understanding of the social and political transformation ended up with two distinctive peculiarities: i) the corporatist and communitarian ideas of Ziya Gökalp that denied all class differences and assumed the whole society to be unified in the Durkheimian spirit and ii) the proto/quasi fascism of the *Etat Thiers* of France through the poetry of Yahya Kemal who based all his ideas concerning the "invention" of the history, geography and the language of the Turks on the ideas of Maurice Barres and George Sorell. It is this culture inherited by the following Kemalist period that needs a closer look, especially from the perspective of the absence of democratic principals. See Hasan Bülent Kahraman, *Yahya Kemal Rimbaud'yu Okudu mu? Erken Türk Modernizması Üstüne Bir Deneme (Did Yahya Kemal Read Rimbaud? An Essay on the Early Turkish Modernism)*. (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 1997).

49. The best analysis of Abdullah Cevdet is in Hanioglu: M. Şükrü Hanioglu, *Bir Siyasal Düşünür Olarak Dr. Abdullah Cevdet ve Dönemi (Dr. Abdullah Cevdet: A Political Thinker and his Period)*. (İstanbul: Üçdal Neşriyat, 1981).

50. A lengthy analysis of Kemalizm with attachment to the "break" thesis can be found in Niyazi Berkes, *The Development*, 479-505. However in the same book there is a section devoted to the former developments. Berkes, Ibid., 411-30.

51. The literature about the relation between Enlightenment and Kemalizm nearly totally ignores the concept of enlightened despotism. See John G. Gagliardo, *Enlightened Despotism*. (New York: Crowell, 1967); Stuart Andrews, *Enlightened Despotism*. (London: Longmans, 1967); Roger Wines, *Enlightened Despotism; reform or reaction?* (Boston: Heath, 1967). For a more theoretical analysis of the philosophical roots see Leonard Krieger, *An Essay on the Theory of Enlightened Despotism*. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975). For the possibility or observing the similarities between two different but alike paths of modernization on this ground see James F. Brennan, *Enlightened Despotism in Russia: The Reign of Elisabeth, 1741-1762*. (New York: P.Lang, 1987).

52. Berkes discusses this point. N. Berkes, *The Development*, 479-80.

53. Bobby Sayyid, *A Fundamental Fear: Eurocentrism and the emergence of Islamism*. (London; New York: Zed Books, 1997).

54. Serif Mardin, 148-49.

55. Şükrü Hanioglu, *Dr. Abdullah Cevdet ve Dönemi*.

56. Note that Comte even named his book in which he explained his political ideas as the *cathechism*. Auguste Comte, *Cathechism of the Positive Religion*. Translated by Richard Congreve, Third ed., rev. and corr. (Clifton, N.J.: A.M. Kelley, 1973).

57. For a discussion of the Kemalist concept of citizenship in Turkey, see Ayşe Kadioglu, "Can We Envision Turkish Citizenship as Non-Membership?" in E. F. Keyman and A. İçduygu, *Citizenship*, 105-23; Nalan Soyarik, "Legal and Constitutional Foundations of Turkish Citizenship: Changes and Continuities," in E. F. Keyman and A. İçduygu, Ibid., 124-44, Hasan Bülent Kahraman, "The Cultural," E.F. Keyman and A. İçduygu, Ibid., 70-86.

58. Niyazi Berkes, *The Development*. 467-472.

59. Şerif Mardin, *The Genesis*.

60. Immanuel Kant, "What is Enlightenment?" In *Kant's Political Writings*, edited with an introduction and notes by Hans Reiss; translated by H.B. Nisbet. Second edition, Cambridge [England]; (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
61. Utopia is one of the most crucial concepts of early twentieth century Western modernism, especially in arts. For a general discussion see *Imaginary Communities* [electronic resource]: Phillip E. Wegner, *Utopia, the Nation, and the Spatial Histories of Modernity*. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002).
62. Hilmi Ziya Ülken, *Ziya Gökalp* (Istanbul: Kanaat Kitabevi, 1939), 12.
63. *Ibid.*, 13. Italics are mine.
64. *Ibid.* Italic added.
65. Andrew Davison argues that secularism can be seen in conjecture with Ziya Gökalp's ideas that have a corporatist base. Andrew Davison, *Secularism and Revivalism in Turkey: A Hermeneutic Reconsideration*. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998).
66. İstar B. Gözaydın, "Türkiye Hukukunun Batılılaşması (The Westernization of the Law in Turkey)" in *Modernleşme ve Batıcılık*, haz. Uygur Kocabaşoğlu. (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2002), 286-298.
67. Ahmet Yıldız, *Ne Mutlu Türküm Diyebilene: Türk Ulusal Kimliğinin Etno-Seküler Sınırları (1919-1938) (Happy is the One Who Says "I am a Turk": The Ethno-secular Limits of Turkish Citizenship)* (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2001).
68. Günay Gökse Özdoğan, *Turan'dan Bozkurt'a: Tek Parti Döneminde Türkçülük, 1931-1946 (From "Turan" to "Bozkurt": Turkism in the Single-Party Era)*, trans. from English by İsmail Kaplan. (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2001).
69. Mahmut Esat Bozkurt, "Mahmut Esat Bozkurt Ders Notları," (*Mahmut Esat Bozkurt Course Notes*), in *1933 Yılında İstanbul Üniversitesinde Başlayan İlk İnkılap Tarihi Ders Notları (The History of Reforms Course Notes First Commenced in İstanbul University in 1933)*, ed. Oktay Aslanapa. (Istanbul: Türk Dünyası Araştırmaları Vakfı, 1997), 73.
70. The best analysis of Gökalp's ideas in the context of solidarism and corporatism can be found in Taha Parla, *The Social and Political Thought of Ziya Gökalp 1876-1924*. (Leiden: E.J.Brill, 1985).
71. This point might also be taken as an extension of the corporatist structural aspects of the state. See Taha Parla and Andrew Davison, *Corporatist Ideology in Kemalist Turkey: Progress or Order?* (Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 2004).
72. Sefa Simscek, *Bir İdeolojik Seferberlik Deneyimi: Halkevleri 1932-1951 (An Experience of Ideological Mobilization)* (Istanbul: Boğaziçi Üniversitesi, 2002).
73. Yesim Arat, "The Project of Modernity and Women in Turkey," in Sibel Bozdoğan and Resat Kasaba, ed., *Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey*. (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997).
74. Zehra Arat, "Educating the Daughters of the Republic," in Zehra Arat, ed., *Deconstructing Images of the Turkish Woman*. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998).
75. Hasan Bülent Kahraman, *Yeni Bir Sosyal Demokrasi İçin (For a New Social Democracy)*. (Ankara: İmge Yayınevi, 1993).
76. Recep Peker, "Recep Peker' in Ders Notları," in *1933 Yılında İstanbul*. 252-54. See also, *inter alia*, Cemil Kocak, "Tek Parti Yönetimi, Kemalizm ve Seflik Sistemi: Ebedi Sef/Milli Sef" (Single Parti Ruling, Kemalism and System of Leadership: Eternal Leader/National Leader," in *Kemalizm*, ed. A. Inel. (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2001): 119-38.

77. Nur Betül Çelik, "Kemalizm: Hegemonik Bir Söylem" (Kemalism: A Hegemonic Discourse), in *Kemalizm*; 75-92. Mesut Yegen, "Kemalizm ve Hegemonya?" (Kemalism and Hegemony) in *Kemalizm*. *Ibid.*; 56-74.
78. To see the discussion of different military coups in this context see, Nursen Mazici, "27 Mayıs Kemalizmin Restorasyonu mu?" (Is May 27 a restoration of Kemalism?), in *Kemalizm*; 555-70 and respectively, Yüksel Taskin, "12 Eylül Ataturkçuluğu ya da bir Kemalist Restorasyon Tesebbüsü olarak 12 Eylül" ("Ataturkism of September 12 or September 12 as a Kemalist restoration intervention), in *Kemalizm*; 570-84.
79. For the history of the Democrat Party see Cem Eroglu, *Demokrat Parti (Democrat Party)*. (Ankara: İmge Yayınevi, 1989).
80. Şerif Mardin, "Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?" *Deada-lus*, Winter 1973; 169-90.
81. Bilsay Kuruç, *Mustafa Kemal Döneminde Ekonomi (Economy in the Mustafa Kemal Era)*. (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1987).
82. Çağlar Keyder, *State and Class in Turkey: A Study in Capitalist Development*. (London: New York: Verso, 1987).
83. Çağlar Keyder, *State*.
84. Reşat Kasaba, *The Ottoman Empire and the World Economy: The Nineteenth Century*. (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1988).
85. J.M. Wagstaff, *The Role of the Government in the Industrialisation of Turkey, 1938-1980*. (London: Centre of Near & Middle Eastern Studies, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, 1989).
86. Stefanos Yerasimos, *Az gelişmişlik sürecinde Türkiye, V. 3 (Turkey in the Process of Underdevelopment)*. (Istanbul: 1974).
87. An interesting analysis of this question in the late 1970s in the context of urbanization can be found in Tansu Senyapılı, *Bütünleşmemiş Kentli Nüfus Sorunu (The problem of the unassimilated urban population)*. (Ankara: ODTU, 1978).
88. A brief history of this condition is surveyed in Tim Jacoby, *Social Power and the Turkish State*. (London: Frank Cass, 2004), 93-126.
89. Nursen Mazici, "27 Mayıs," in *Kemalizm*.
90. Walter Weiker, *The Turkish Revolution, 1960-1961: Aspects of Military Politics*. (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1980).
91. Tanel Demirel, *Adalet Partisi: İdeoloji ve Politika (Justice Party: Ideology and Policy)*. (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2004).
92. The "genealogy" of these parties is analyzed in Umit Cizre Sakallıoğlu, "Liberalism, Democracy and the Turkish Center-Right: The Identity Crisis of the True Path Party," in Sylvia Kedouris, ed., *Turkey: Identity, Democracy, Politics*. (London: Frank Cass, 1996), 142-61.
93. An analysis and discussion could be found in Kemal Karpat, "Military Interventions: Army-Civilian Relations in Turkey Before and After 1980," M. Heper and A. Evin, ed., *State, Democracy and the Military: Turkey in the 1980s*. (New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1988), 137-58.
94. Hasan Bülent Kahraman, "Social Democracy," 167-214.
95. For a discussion of the early history of MP see Ustun Erguder, "The Motherland Party 1983-1989" in Metin Heper, Jacob M. Landau, ed., *Political Parties and Democracy in Turkey*. (London: I.B. Tauris, 1991).

96. Ersin Kalaycioglu, "Decentralization of Government," Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin, ed., *Politics in the Third Turkish Republic*. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), 87-102.

97. The history of the constitution making, especially in the post-1983 period in Turkey, is analyzed in Ergun Ozbudun, "The Politics of Constitution Making," in *Contemporary Turkish Politics: Challenges to Democratic Consolidation*. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000), 49-72.

98. The demise of MP is analyzed in Ersin Kalaycioglu, "The Motherland Party: The Challenge of Institutionalization in a Charismatic Leader Party," in M. Heper and B. Rubin, ed., *Political Parties in Turkey*. (London: Frank Cass, 2002), 41-61.

99. Fuat Keyman and A. İçduygu, "Globalization, Civil Society and Citizenship in Turkey," *Citizenship Studies*, 7: 2, 2003.

100. The impact of globalization on Turkey especially at the "grassroots" level is best analyzed in Fuat Keyman, "Cultural Globalization and Turkey," in *Many Globalizations*. Peter Berger (ed.), (Oxford University Press, 2002).

101. Ziya Öniş and E. Fuat Keyman, "Turkey at the Polls: A New Path Emerges," in *Journal of Democracy* (April 2003), Vol. 14, No.2, 95-107.

Chapter 5

The Public Sphere and the Question of Identity in Turkey

Feyzi Baban

During the tumultuous year of the Young Turk revolution in 1908, Jak Samanon, a Jewish subject of the Ottoman Empire, enthusiastically commits himself to the ideas of freedom, equality, and justice. His commitment to the emerging regime with the constitution at its center leads him to believe that there will no longer be Jewish, Muslim, Christian subjects but one people subject to the same laws and having the same rights.¹ It seemed that the quiet and isolated Jewish quarters of Istanbul no longer satisfied his sense of belonging and he began to give passionate speeches to his family and neighbours about the importance of moving out of the ghetto mentality and integrating with the rest of society as equal citizens.² Jak Samanon's passionate plea was not met, however, with a warm welcome by the Jewish community of Istanbul. For centuries, the Jewish community, like other religious communities of the Empire, enjoyed autonomy in its internal affairs and found little reason to mix with the rest of the Ottoman society. The Ottoman social system was organized around autonomy and strict segregation of religious communities; as a result Jewish, Christian, and Muslim communities were able to live side by side without involving in each other's business. However, Jack Samanon sensed that the ancient order was coming to an end while a new society was emerging in which religious, ethnic and cultural differences should not segregate individuals into isolated communities but allow them to become equal members of society. Full of passion about the coming age and no longer desiring to be confined within the physical and cultural boundaries of the Jewish quarter, Jak Samanon broke away from the community in which he grew up and became a dedicated activist of the new revolutionary era.³

We fast forward in time. It is 1938, fifteen years after the declaration of the Turkish Republic. Committed to create a modern society out of the ancient social order of the Ottoman Empire, the new Republic adopts a universal citizenship regime in which all members are declared equal and entitled same rights and obligations. Gone is the way of organizing individuals into the separate and segregated communities in the Empire. Menahem Adato, citizen of the Turkish Republic, sits around the dinner table with his wife and their two sons. Mr. Adato tells his family that from then on they are no longer Jews, but will be-