

## High-life, Low-life and Common-life: The Role of Affections and Love in Citizenship

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*Hiç, hiçbir şey bilmiyorlar  
Bilmek istemiyorlar  
Siyasibend*

### *Introduction*

More than just what nation states or supranational political bodies such as the EU may claim and stand for in regard to citizenship, citizenship is evidently a political practice, and hence, not a being but becoming — in the way people identify themselves and one another, use political rights, and ask new rights and deny some decisions made by politicians and states on their behalf. Not surprisingly, citizenship politics has become central in influencing public debates, social and political change, and international relations, the way social movements are being formed, even our own personal lives and how they fit into the political community. This has been associated with the increased mobility of people across the world.

The increased and intensified flow of people on a global scale has brought together otherwise unrelated individuals and communities with different cultural structures and practices in previously constructed common social spaces such as nation-states or, as in the case of the EU, a supranational regional polity. This has created several issues among which the challenge to construct a new citizenship structure accommodative of diversity within already constructed social spaces occupies a primary position. This involves not only making people of such social spaces develop certain attitudes and gain knowledge of how other people in other cultures attach meaning to their social actions but also imaginatively create a new mood of citizenship enabling individuals to undertake their social, political and economic roles as active citizens. No doubt, the latter is a cultural condition for social coherence to the benefit of both the polity as a whole and citizens as particular individuals. What is socially needed, among other things, is a culturally constructed novel frame of mind of belongingness to a political community that can provide citizens with an assured belief in and affection for an expanding multicultural citizenship context. This must, of course, be part of both the ongoing processes of structural reconfiguration of citizenship systems, which aim at eliminating discriminator)<sup>7</sup> politico-legal regulations as well as the transformation of social practices, which are disposed to the exclusion of the «others» present in the flesh but not yet included communally.

To put it differently, the inflow of people with different cultural backgrounds into existing political communities has not only resulted in growing cultural diversity but also created a *practical question* in regard to how the «newcomers» and the «natives» can be affectionately connected with one another and with the new diversified polity as a whole. This paper attempts to elaborate on the significant role of emotions in general and love in particular in the process of «fusion» of differences within the common life of citizens.

In what follows, we emphasize that citizens are not only legal agents who have the rights to obtain and exercise political power but also moral agents whose sense of life derive from their attachments and engagements with the pursuits and relationships that they regard morally right. Citizenship provides a context for a meaningful life by which individuals choose and pursue moral precepts. Morality, which is an indispensable part of citizenship, makes life worth living. Only morally motivated individuals can see a meaning in their lives. Individuals, who feel attached to one another, construct symbols in social interaction for expressing meaningful, if not rational, causality in their relationships. In other words, symbols by providing meaningful signs for social relationships render life purposeful and intentional. For those who enter a «foreign» citizenship context as new «citizens» as well as for those native minorities who are perceived as «different», this creates an ontological problem. Unless they share in the symbolic system of the new context, they shall not find any significant purpose in their life. Thus the question is: how can they recognize the moral connotations of the new citizenship?

We begin with the observation that political, social and cultural practices of a particular citizenship while enabling the recognized members of the community to interact on the basis of a shared and valued set of meanings, they exclude the presents such as immigrants by enclosing the interaction in the public sphere only for the signs and symbols of the former. This is, in fact, the closure of communication among the citizens with respect to a particular moral system. In this sense, as a particular life-world, actual existing citizenships need to confront the problem of fusing the moral beings of the unknown presents into the daily lives of the established presents and make them feel attached to the political community and see that the recognized citizens acknowledge the moral freedom of newcomers. We argue that in so far as this impediment is not overcome, the affective disconnectedness among the so-called «legal» or «technical» citizens shall persist and result in the denial of the moral freedom of *all* citizens. Needless to say, only those whose moral freedom is respected can respect the moral order of citizenship. This means that if newcomers see their interactions with the established citizens as an affectionate relationship; if they are granted the confidence to accomplish several goals that, they think, are intrinsically adding up to the common life of their political community; if they believe that there is value in living in the new community; if they see beauty and reason in their new communal rituals, festivities, national and religious holidays, works of art and science, heroes and heroines etc, they shall feel responsible as citizens and actively participate in the doings of citizenship. In the absence of such a sense of life they are more likely to be driven into estrangement and distancing from moral responsibility for the citizenship. The problem here is not their lack of moral values but the absence of affection with any shared morality. This is to say that citizenship is built on and expanded on the basis of affective connection between

people. In other words, citizenship is invested in the political community by value affections to it.

*A model of ideal citizenship: Citizen as a member of a moral community*

The concept of citizenship understood commonly as legal membership of a state has become a problematic notion in political discussions. The way the notion of citizenship is a conceptualized change with the emphases being put on different aspects of political, social, cultural and economic conditions. Once certain aspects of these conditions are prioritized at the expense of others, the evolving concepts generate a range of different views of citizenship. These views can be separated from one another mainly according to how they consider the major components of citizenship. Among the principal views the ones that focus on such components as «citizenship as identity», «citizenship as affective connections», «citizenship as system of rights», and «citizenship as self-government\*» as well as «political and civic participation\*» are relevant to our present inquiry (Aristotle 1976: 258-311, 1992:162-173; Kant 1930, 1997: 13, 20; Locke, 1993: 164; Marshall, 1950; Parsons 1959; Rousseau, 1988: 93). These views of citizenship, however they differ from one another, are also interrelated because all of them aim to understand, describe, and explain what defines one as a citizen; who is a citizen; and what forms of citizenship at different levels can enrich our perception of problematic discussions and interpretations of citizenship. In that sense, they are as much theoretical inquiries as being political quests for practical projects for rejuvenating citizenship in the midst of diversity. Surely, among the major political philosophers of citizenship, Aristotle was the first one, who influenced much of the understanding and practice of citizen and citizenship not only in his own times but also since then. For the sake of brevity, our discussion on the necessary conditions for an ideal model of citizenship rests primarily on his accounts.

Aristotle defined citizenship as active membership of a political community, which involves affective connections among participants with reference to specific qualities i.e. virtue and values such as equality and justice and capacities of «friendship» presupposing that association (Aristotle 1976: 273-274 and 286-311 and 1992: 176-82). Friendship-like connections make it possible for people to carry out citizenship functions not only for forming citizenship as a historical political entity but also for bringing into being some type of commonly shared practical knowledge of citizenship constructed in a particular space and time (Giddens, 1984:2). In other words, the citizen can be characterized with the exclusive quality or virtues of friendship for making political community and political functions in constitutive of practices of citizenship. In this conception, citizens are largely defined by their relationship with political community and having affective connection to it. In this sense, it is not incorrect to suggest that Aristotle formed his understanding of ideal-form of citizenship through reasoning from the precondition of affective connections among a group of people and concluded it in terms of the same precondition (Aristotle 1976: 274).

The Aristotelian precondition for ideal-form of citizenship implicitly posits a difficult relation between citizens and their political community because it draws attention to a complicated

question, that is, there is no citizen without citizenship and vice versa (Aristotle 1992:183). Yet these two are also different for the apparent reason that they have their own self-determining existence. So the question turns out to be what quality each side must encompass in order to have, as Giddens puts it, a duality of the two (Giddens, 1984). When we combine the issue of duality with the Aristotelian precondition for ideal-form of citizenship, identifying the emotionally minimum necessary condition for the constitution of citizenship by citizens gains an utmost significance. To begin with, we must admit that political communities exist prior to citizens; and this always presupposes a form of affective bond among citizens who are born into it. In this structural relationship, agency of citizens, i.e., their capacity to reproduce as well as transform citizenship, requires an ongoing social construction of affective connections among citizens. Citizens in turn can achieve the latter if their citizenship as a socio-cultural milieu not only appears to them as a system of rights, responsibilities and freedoms but also a social space of common life.

To talk about a society is to talk about people who do reproduce, cultivate and transform political, social, cultural and economic relations that are necessary for reproducing and sustaining their common life. In this set up, in becoming aware of one's own self qua citizen, one must feel included in the common life of political community and its institutions (Aristotle 1992: 183-185). This is to say that citizenship and its institutions, first and foremost, must provide citizens with a feeling of solidarity. Having such a feeling, citizens as social-cultural agents, actively involve in socially practiced morals and rules. Much of characteristics of their sense of being in terms of justice, respect, perception of the good and rights are results of engagement with the moral order of citizenship. Thus, the moral order does not only identify a set of exclusive qualities of «virtue» cementing citizens but also appear to be a practical necessity of active citizenship.

Aristotle sees relationships in a political community as actions toward one another because people are political by their nature and valuable because of division of labor, which is necessary for the production of their material and social life. There are different sorts of citizens in a political community each of whom must provide some «good» for the rest. What one citizen provides for others must be no more valuable than what they receive— otherwise; as we shall see in the next section, they'll lose their moral responsibilities and get alienated from their citizenship (Aristotle, 1992:104-105). In this context, Aristotle considers political community an affiliated and mutually beneficial network of interdependent people who as citizens share what is requisite for forming and sustaining a common life. A common life can be sustained in a variety of ways, including bond created or sustained by reciprocity, care, liking, mores, politics or economic exchange—or some combinations of these. Language, symbols, and artifacts characteristically mediate these bonds as what we may call «enablers» (Wittgenstein 1953:88-92). It is thus important to note that barring the fusion of certain symbols of some citizens into the common life of citizens by framing them as «foreign» is to disable those people in their capacity as citizens. This may lead such people to develop a sense of distrust and a feeling of being humiliated and discriminated, and thereby being less prone to devote themselves to the goals and common problems and issues of their political community.

With the emphasis on the functions and the role of citizenship, Aristotle recognizes the necessity of mutual devotion in the service of a good life, for the sake of attaining a perfect and self-sufficing existence (Aristotle, 1992:176-183). He thus underlines the significance of

moral agency of citizens as a virtue in itself, which can bestow them with moral duties, responsibilities, and commitment to the common life from within their self-determining existence (Aristotle 1976: 91-110). The virtue of moral agency derives from its social inclination toward sustaining the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness among citizens. Citizens whose moral agency is recognized support and strengthen the sense of belonging to the political community. In doing so, they help develop a social milieu in which the concrete experience of being politically enabled becomes practical knowledge. As a matter of fact, citizens cannot wish for the good of their community unless there is such practical knowledge on their part. Here we notice again the central role of affections because without having widespread sense of reciprocity and solidarity among citizens, they can neither practice their moral agency nor gain the experiential confidence in being enabled by their citizenship.

In short, to conclude this part, we can suggest that the legal bond of citizenship acquires a practical existence as long as there is mutual trust among citizens (Cooper 1999 356-377). This is to say that being a citizen is to trust one another and also in relation to the others that come towards or within it. In this context, trust is more essential than any other emotion in a political community of citizens. The spontaneous emergence of expectation of good from others indicates the intermediation of a political community at work through the actions of citizens. The quality of relations within a political community can be assessed by the existence of felt interdependence on the part of citizens. It is this felt interdependence and not the formal institutions of citizenship that keep alive a kind of solidarity by which citizens become aware of the power and obligation to act for each other.

*Citizenship as it actually exists: belonging to a nation*

As it actually exists, contemporary citizenship is closely linked to the territorial-state and its claim to represent the common interests of its inhabitants. One of the claims that the territorial state makes in regard to the common interest is the national interest. Either explicitly or implicitly most of the territorial states identify the people belonging to its regulatory power structure as the «nation» that allegedly shares a common faith, if not a past, present or future. Although the states' «national» sovereignty has recently been circumscribed by the nascent multilayered global governance regimes, the nation state is still the most dominant form of territoriality (Oncu-Ko^an, 2001: 45-46)). Not surprisingly, among the «common» citizens, too, seeing citizenship as the political form of the nation is still pervasive in all parts of the world. This is why in the life-world of various contemporary citizenships people consider the state the protector of their rights based on the idea of the separation of nationals from non-nationals by certain exclusive rights. As a result, citizens driven by various forms of nationalist ideologies expect to see that their state fulfils some functions to preserve the unity (sometimes «purity») of the nation (Breuilly 1982: 393; Balibar, 1991, 1995: 45 and Lefort 1986: 191). First of all, they always have an unambiguous and exclusivist demand for the formal definition of who the citizen is (Yuvai-Davis, 1997). In practical terms this means that they want to be assured about the formal definition of the citizenship and demand from their

state to be sensitive to the boundaries of the separation between «them» and «the others». Needless to say, this demand is an integral part of the socially and historically constructed ideology of citizenship, and hence may differ in its peculiarities from one context to another.

Nevertheless, almost all «nationally» constructed citizenships rests on some form of nationalist discourse that allows its followers to make sense of their commonality, and thereby enable them to fix their «being» with reference to the transcendental category of the nation. This not only legitimizes the monopolization of power within the territoriality by the state but also gives people an existential comfort and social security. Sartre calls such deceptive existential illusions bad faith. Bad faith is a practice by virtue of which one comes to know oneself yet at the same time hides it from oneself. As Sartre precisely puts it, bad faith is «a double activity in the heart of unity.» (Sartre, 1998: 53) Seen from this light, bad faith appears to be a practice of distraction (Sartre, 1998: 54). Those who practice bad faith distract their consciousness from their experiences of «what they are» (e.g. being human) to show themselves «what they are not» (e.g. a Turk, a German, an American etc.). They do this not scornfully but in full concurrence with themselves. Anything that disturbs bad faith such as the incorporation of some «outsiders» into the formal citizenship may create an existential dissonance, which can be resolved by heightening the ideological «purity», i.e. strengthening the belief in the deception. If one fails in doing so, this may lead to a feeling of insecurity. It is at such moments the so-called nationals may be inclined to disregard the extension of formal definition of citizenship to newcomers and reduce it to an «elite» identity by which they make the new condition compatible with their «nationalist» ideology. Thus, one can hear or read in various media in the life-world: «They are just guest workers». «They are not one of us but immigrants». «He is not one of us because his parents are foreigners». In other words, while the composition of the citizens socially and culturally being expanded as a result of formal inclusion of non-nationals, the socio-psychological drives of the established citizens may reinforce the idea of citizenship as belonging to a nation.

Sometimes such socio-psychological reactions may reach the level of abhorrence. Surely, such feelings of disgust are much more uncommon than the banal nationalism that allows people to express their felt superiority to non-nationals in «civil» manners. The following quotations from some web pages can show how strong and «un-civil» the nationalist bias and reaction can be in creating the denial of the changing composition and meaning of citizenship.<sup>2</sup> With an apology to our readers we cite the following extreme messages in order to emphasize what we want to draw attention to:

*... is a turk and germans call the dirty turks, "Kun Kun".*

*But among the foreigners in germany, these dirty turks are called "doner kebabs". We never call them turks.*

*Turk women are mostly prostitutes. They sit in the prostitute houses called Pasha heims. We never call them turk prostitutes. We call them "doner kebab prostitutes".*

*Turk women are "kun kun prostitutes". Turk women are "doner kebab prostitutes".*

*Hey Deutschland, make yourself free from these doner kebab prostitutes.*

The quotation is full with cultural connotations. Turks are «kun kuns» and «doner kebaps»; and they sit in «pasha heims». Of course, the claim is that none of this is part of the German society and culture. Thus it is possible to cry out: «Hey Deutschland» clean «yourself» from these foreigners! The interesting thing to notice in the message is the call to the nation for the preservation of the purity of the nation. It is as if one is asked to scrub the «germs» from his/her body in order to protect his/her health.

The person who expresses these views divides the life-world into two halves, those who are loved and those who are abhorred. In another message the «doner kebaps» are asked not only to be moved out from «Deutschland» but also from «Europe» as a whole - without of course defining the boundaries of Europe. The message written by another person who did not indicate his ethnic identity reads as follows:

*There are too many "doner kebab" turks in Germany, Germans should get rid of them and send them back to their turkey. Muslim Turkey has no place in the EU & they are not welcomed here.*

*I work with the Germans and respect them greatly. But I have no respect for the doner kebabs and their "doner kebab prostitutes".*

*I also support the Germans when they call the turks kun kun. Muslim Turkey out of Europe.*

Here we read that the «author» works with «Germans» and «respect them greatly». This shows that the person is a respectful citizen. He is a moral «person». He is also a well functioning member of his community, as he participates in the economy as a productive person. Yet the same moral person loses his human senses and without giving any particular reason other than «doner kebab» call out to his fellow «European» friends to move «Turks» out of «Europe». It is not difficult to see that the latter is a demand for a radical change in the citizenship policy of the German state. This political demand shows us that citizenship as belonging to a nation is a strong practical knowledge in the middle of the «civilized Europe», which is getting ready to unite millions of citizens of 25 nation-states as European citizens. This is a serious issue because the abhorrence against the «other» legitimated by the belief in citizenship as belonging to a nation triggers the abhorrence on the part of the «other». As the following message reveals, a «doner kebab» in response to the above quoted message claims that:

*Germans don't hate Turks and Muslims, they hate anybody not German. A lot of British friends (emphasis is added) of mine told me straight," .., Germans are bloody ....!! Why you want to live around those Nazi pigs?" I told them I am addicted to ... and that Germany, despite the fact that they are ... have the best.... in Europe. ...*

*Miss Germany 2004 is half Persian and half Muslim. I bet the Germans are using her as some kind of "Hey you Muslim guys, I'm gonna parade around your best women ... Kind of a sick mind game that only a German can think of.»*

The message indicates clearly that those whose moral beings are denied not only put the accent on the feeling of disgust about the so-called nationals but also seem to somewhat enjoy humiliating and insulting them. The message makes the degrading claim that the so-called Europeans cannot make a unified community of individuals. Thus, the only reason why one stays in Europe is the benefits it offers. We can almost hear this person saying: «There is no such thing as respect and love in this «sick minded» community. This society offers «me» the «best» in terms of such and such; and in so far as I keep getting it there is a reason for me to stay. I am here for my personal good and I do not care the rest.» But isn't it true to think that this individual is also saying: «I am not a moral person.»

Definitely, lack of affections and feelings of friendship and love leads to a hierarchical ordering of individuals according to ethnicity, nationality and race. The following messages are indicative of this hierarchical ordering of citizens:

*Indians should go back to India. These people are rat eaters. They have no connection with Germans. Did you all know that Indians are low life people?*

*The real part of history is that, Germans are Aryan people who have migrated (@ 3000 yrs BC) from the INDUS valley to Europe. Similarly around 75% of Indians are Aryans. That's why these people have some kind of similarity (emphasis is added). For thousand of years Aryans have conquered the world, so they are proud of themselves. But sometimes it has led to some of these people becoming egoist and not accepting others to be equal.*

It is just one step from abhorrence to feeling superior to those being abhorred. This is not surprising because all forms of «hate» relationships rest on the superior-inferior type of inequality between the parties to the relationship. In this sense, once hatred is fed into the life world, then the condition of equality, one of the indispensable pillars of citizenship, is annihilated in practice. The absence of practical equality in opposition to legal or technical equality among the citizens results in one groups' claim over the possession of the state or political authority in exclusion of other groups. Once citizens are divided by any privilege such as nationals in opposition to non-nationals, they shall divide themselves into superiors and inferiors and either be terrified of or hate each other. All this shall take them to the search for establishing an authoritarian government to «manage their affairs». Returning to the message «Muslim Turks out of Europe,» the pressing question thus becomes: Who is going to make this? What must be done politically so that some groups from the political community are forcefully or rather violently removed? But more importantly, how is such an act going to be morally legitimated? Here the point is to see that the yearning for an oppressive ruling on the part of the privileged nationals ensuing from the feeling of superiority feeds the mood of revulsion on all sides of the social interaction. In other words, *all* citizens regardless of their identities lose their «moral» characters.



A perceived inequality at the expense of some *collective persons* within the community of citizens is to isolate some individuals based on a reference to dissimilarity. This is because equality, among others, refers to a group of different individuals as if they share at least one thing in common. To say, for example, that men and women are equal is to say that they are both human. In this sense, inequality creates the social condition that different groups of people are not perceived to be able to share a similarity. Yet if people are not similar in at least one trait how come they live a common life as citizens? That is why there must be a constant determination for struggle against inequality in increasingly diversified citizenship contexts. The need is thus to subvert any claim to privilege and superiority, whether this be ideational or material, in order for constructing a citizenship as political community that can help individuals feel morally responsible and free.

In the construction of citizenship as belonging to a nation - i.e. the dominant form of citizenship as it actually exists - the so-called nationals are granted the symbolic capacity to deny and alienate those signified as non-nationals. In this context non-nationals usually face the challenge to come to terms with the alleged superiority of nationals and cope with the social and personal troubles of being inferior by suppressing their true feelings. They usually choose to play the role of inferior while indicating all forms of distrust to their superiors. For example they choose to not to socialize with nationals or establish their enclaves within the society of nationals. This is usually associated with the confusion in regard to their choice of inhabitation: «Why are we here? How can we heal this pain and doubt?» Utilitarian explanations are usually of help for them because they always want to be reimbursed for their perceived loss of pride and equality. Thus, they claim that they just benefit from nationals to the best of their power. Over time they become skilled at rationalizing their choice of being inferior citizens with reference to being choiceless. The feeling of being foreigners is reinforced and transferred to the next generations through socialization within the enclaves.

In contrast, in the Aristotelian ideal construction of citizenship as belonging to a moral community, differences among nationals and non-nationals lose any symbolic reference to superiority/inferiority. Here citizens are uniformly disposed to accept, respect and care for everyone's being, as they are rendered equal. Equality is not only a part of the legal system, though. Equality is felt in the actions and interactions, as citizens believe that they share a set of similar traits such as respect, solidarity, mutual devotion and compassion. Their life-world is not segregated into isolated social and cultural universes. Different social and cultural forms of life are mixed up within the life-world of citizenship. There is not any enclave seen as a safe haven or a place to go to experience cultural differences. Differences is everywhere in such a way that they are not being noticed but lived. Citizens as equal yet also different individuals discover their differences and enjoy living the riches of their society. They learn to think and create new values by trusting and caring «the others». They come to love «the others».

*Love as a practice of citizenship as belonging to a moral community*

Mevlana Celaleddin Rumi, a thirteenth century Anatolian philosopher, poet and the founder of the Mevlevi sect, has many insights to offer for love as a basis for reconstructing citizenship as belonging to a moral community. He says: «Reason is powerless in the expression of Love. Love alone is capable of revealing the truth of Love and being a Lover.»<sup>13</sup> This means that if we want to really know whether a lover is indeed in love we must also be able to fall in love. To see the reality of love we need to experience love. According to Gibbs (2000: 160-164), love is to lose the sense of making calculations, as love does not grow out of the expectation of gain. As he puts it, «unlike strategic action, [love] cannot calculate how to PENETRATE, how to influence the other person» (Gibbs, 2000: 162). Love is to encounter the life as it comes to the individual. It can even be said that love is to lose the sense of self and eventually become a selfless individual. As again Gibbs (2000:162) states, «loving your neighbor is acting without control and without knowledges. Here we must emphasize that the absence of knowledge in the action of the lover is a precondition of love. In other words, love grows out of not knowing. But how come does one become a person without knowledge? If we recall the Sartrean concept of bad faith, we can suggest that one loses his/her knowledge by denying his/her deceptions, that is, his/her transcendental truths. By rejecting the truths of his/her deception he/she can reach the truth of love, i.e. being «knowledgeless», so to speak. This is also to say that lover is the mirror opposite of the human being who is driven to act towards the other only from his/ her deceptive transcendental knowledge. As Mevlana may put it in one of his verses, lovers must stop acting like «intellectuals» who, as part of their social identity, have to keep still and defend their «rational» positions at all expenses:

*The intellectual is always showing off, the lover is always getting lost  
The intellectual runs away, afraid of drowning  
The whole business of love is to drown in the sea.*

The metaphor sea here refers to the other. Thus love is to drown in the other. Love is to die in the other while the other dies in the self. Lovers help each other to kill their «selves» and reach a state of freedom in their love. That is why Mevlana thinks that lovers become coffins for each other:

*The coffin seems a jail, yet it means freedom. Which seed fell  
in the earth that did not grow there? Why do you doubt the  
fate of human seed? What bucket came not filled from out the  
cistern?*

Love is to open the individual up for possibilities and see the life as a place for the human being to experience freely, and without any precondition create and grow. In short, love helps

us overcome our self-deception or bad faith. Those who are practicing bad faith can never become critical of their transcendental truths. They cannot change their behavior because they cannot forget what they come to believe as the true knowledge of life. They are not practical but always theoretical. They are heartless, so to speak. They cannot love anything or anybody even though they may claim that they love their nation, for instance. They are, in the words of Nietzsche, condemned to live and die as «slaves».

Nietzsche, similar to Sartre, departs from the presumption that freedom is nothingness. He conceives resentment as the opposite of freedom. From these two opposing conditions he derives two opposing systems of morality. The first, which he refers to as the slave morality, divides the world into two realms with respect to the notions of «good» and «evil,» which are taken as transcendences- good being the truth and «us,» "friends,» "comrades» and evil being falsehood and «others,» "enemies,» "foes.» This follows from the fact that the slave morality «from the outset says No to what is «outside,» what is different,» what is «not itself» and this No is its creative deed.» In order to make one be able to say No to «others,» this morality bestows fixity of being on oneself. The slave morality, if we want to use Sartre's expressions, gives the self «an unbroken continuity of existence in itself.» It is this foundationalism inherent in the slave morality that puts it in sharp contrast with the second type of morality, that is, the noble morality.

*The noble morality ^develops from a triumphant affirmation of itself.» As Nietzsche depicts, individuals of the noble morality do not «establish their happiness artificially, by examining their enemies, or to persuade themselves, deceive themselves, that they [are] happy.» (Nietzsche 1992:474) In this sense, the noble morality does not need a fixed hostile external world, an ultimate reality, to which one may approach from a fixed mode of «good» being. The noble is capable of forgetting his/ her knowledge and acquire new knowledge. Because this become his/ her basic principle his/ her morality emerges from nothingness to end up attaining in nothingness without fear — to reach the assertion that «we no longer have anything left to fear in man. "(Nietzsche 1992: 479) Thus, for individuals of the noble morality what is «outside,» "what is different,» "what is not itself» can only provide an opportunity for getting new knowledge about diversity and richness of human existence. In this sense the noble individual «desires his enemy for himself as his mark of distinctions (Nietzsche 1992: 475)*

These two forms of morality can also be conceived of as two different forms of regulation of encounters between the self and the other. In this regard, the slave morality denies that there exists outside of it another truth, with the same reliability, and another and equal morality capable of heeding the requirements of good life on an equal footing. For the slave morality the «other» is completely and only an objective position of «what evil is.» As such, it says 'No' to the other, and bars the other from giving a reply that may alter its position from within his/ her «consciousness» which, as a matter of fact, does not need the other to reflect on its own morality. In other words, the slave morality closes the communication internally within the self and externally between the self and the other. It remains deaf to its own irony in the first place and, secondly, the irony of humanity as revealed by the opposition between the self and the other. Thus, the slave morality lacks the capacity to move beyond bad faith, beyond its

objectivisation of itself and of the other. In brief, the slave morality can do without the other as positing, as responding, as constructing, and as active honorable «stranger». That is why to some extent it essentializes itself as good and the others as evil. That is why it cannot move beyond the «self» and love the other.

The noble morality offers an entirely different regulation of encounters between the self and the other. The primary difference resides in the fact that the noble morality does not assume an ultimate reality because doing so is to close down the world for oneself, to remove the possibility of freedom as nothingness- something a noble cannot endure. The noble rushes forward to difference, looks for diverse perspectives and values, listen to various replies to his/her questions, just because he/she seeks out self-affirmation that requires an endless exploration of life. In this sense, the noble morality opens up the communication both as a form of life [i.e. morality] and as a form of knowing [i.e. epistemology]. We suggest that the noble morality allows people to really fall in love, as it requires the self to drown in the other, and be killed by the other. In brief, the noble morality let the self move in life, change and be changed. The noble or the lover as a citizen neither runs away when there are newcomers around nor laments that condition and woefully desires to remove such «low-life» strangers from his/her ostensible «high life». Instead he enjoys the «common life» that he/she shares with his/her fellow citizens.

#### *Some concluding remarks*

What we have argued up to this point leads us to conclude that citizenship is an encounter in and through which individuals learn to share a common life. Citizenship as practical knowledge in opposition to being a politico-legal system relies on cultural signs and moral codes, which provide individuals with a meaningful life. Unless individuals gain such a sense of life, they become alienated from social and moral responsibilities of citizenship. Actually existing citizenships can indeed be seen as moral orders situated in their particular political formations. As such they are systems of moral enclosure, which claim to represent the best form of life for their citizens and the common interests of them. Socialization and social interaction within the morally closed universe of citizenship make citizens ignorant and insensitive to other possible moral orders. As long as others with a different moral conditioning enter their life world, they may not have any particular reason to be interested in the value of the morality of others (unless, of course, they are «political philosophers»!). On the contrary, any faint or banal interest that may develop, say through watching sports or artistic events, is an occasion for them to prove themselves how good they really are. Things, of course, may radically change if those others become the next-door neighbors. Now, they are asked to share a common life with all its possibilities and difficulties. Thus the question is very straightforward: Are they ready to share their common life with them? Or are they going to see them as «low-life» people and treat them as their subordinates? As we have emphasized, the likelihood that they resist sharing their conditions of life is very high. So we are not facing here only a theoretical question. Indeed we are looking to the common individuals living as neighbors but divided by feelings of superiority/inferiority. In other words, we are looking at citizenship as a practice.

We need to find a practical answer to a practical question. We must be somewhat pragmatist. As pragmatists may suggest, we have to find out a solution to overcome «foundationalism» and «essentialism» in the everyday life knowledge and actions of citizens. We argue that any search for a solution to this *impasse* requires conceiving citizenship as an affective and emotional relationship among citizens. Once we understand the significance of emotions, we can see that love as a strong emotion may help overcome the division within the citizenship along the axes of high-life/low life and facilitate the emergence of a shared sense of common life.

Love is anti-foundationalist and hence anti-essentialist. Unlike essentialism, love does not assign fixity of being both to the self and the other. Love makes one accept that he/she does not know anything about the other. Love, if you will, erases all deceptive knowledge one may have about the other, and thus preparing the self for «wanting to know» the other. By doing so, love breaks the unbreakable belief in the superiority of one's own self and, say, his/her culture, ethnicity, nation, gender, etc. For the lover, the next-door stranger is an occasion for forgetting what he/she deceptively think he/she is. The other is a mirror to him/her showing what one has been assuming to be. Love helps us to be, as in one of the American TV shows, a «new me» in a double sense. First, we become more aware of what values we do cherish and even want to die for. In this first sense, we come to know what is central for us to be able to call ourselves as human beings. Second, we can understand that we could be completely different yet have missed that chance because we were unaware of other forms of imaging a good life. This does not mean that we may want to live like the others now appearing to us as our mirrors. Although this may be a possibility, there is much more than this in our discovery of the others. We can gain the practical knowledge that there are endless possibilities of imaging for forming a good life. Needless to say, one such possibility is of imagining living with the strange neighbor. So again, what is the practical solution? We must have the courage to say to our youth and ourselves: «We really do not know who these strange neighbors are». We believe, Nietzsche wanted us to understand this simple possibility and by writing always aimed to empower us so that we could, one day, undermine the will to power of slaves.

#### NOTES

- 1 Nothing, they know nothing  
They don't want to know
- 2 All of the messages cited here are taken from the webpage:  
[http://www.expatca.com/source/forum\\_thread.asp?chamel icr=2&thread id=22990](http://www.expatca.com/source/forum_thread.asp?chamel icr=2&thread id=22990)
- 3 Mevlana's verses cited here are all taken from Schimmel (1991).

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