Comparative perspectives on regional and immigrant minority

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languages in multicultural Europe

In this introductory chapter we will address the three perspectives referred to in the subtitle of this Volume: demographic, sociolinguistic and educational perspectives on the *other* languages of Europe, in terms of both regional and immigrant minority languages. Apart from these three perspectives, we will open this chapter with a discussion of the rationale of this Volume and the semantics of our field of interest. The chapter will be concluded with an outline of the contents of the Volume.

Rationale and semantics

Europe has a rich diversity of languages. This fact is usually illustrated by reference to the eleven official languages of the European Union. However, there are many more languages spoken by the inhabitants of Europe. Examples of such languages are Welsh and Basque, or Arabic and Turkish. These languages are usually referred to as 'minority languages', even when in Europe as a whole there is not one majority language, because all languages are spoken by a numerical minority.

There are many parallels between the sociocultural status of minority languages in Europe which are worth investigating. As part of the project *Which languages for Europe?* the non-governmental European Cultural Foundation (established in Amsterdam), together with Babylon (Tilburg University) and the Fryske Akademy organized a seminar to bring together experts and policy makers on regional and immigrant minority languages. This book is the outcome of that seminar, organized in Oegstgeest, the Netherlands, from 28-30 January 2000. The seminar was an occasion on which representatives from all sides of the spectrum were brought together for the first time. The aim was to reflect upon a more integrated approach to the research on minority languages and upon policy making on their behalf. The similarities and differences between the different groups as well as between the different nation-states in which they live, were brought to the fore. The spread, status and vitality of the different language

groups were systematically compared from the perspectives of demography, sociolinguistics and education.

The title of the present Volume brings of course to mind the well-known study of the Linguistic Minorities Project from the mid-eighties: *The Other Languages of England*. In that study the following explanation was given of the title: 'The other languages of England are all those languages apart from English that are ignored in public, official activities in England' (LMP 1985: xiv). We extended this title in grateful memory to this *opus magnum*. In our case the 'other' languages of Europe are all those languages apart from the eleven official languages that are ignored in public, official activities in the European Union. An important issue which remains is how to refer to the different categories of languages we are dealing with. There is no easy or final solution. In the end we have opted in this chapter for 'regional minority languages' and 'immigrant minority languages', henceforward referred to as RM and IM languages respectively.

RM and IM languages have much in common, much more than is usually thought. On their sociolinguistic, educational and political agenda's we find issues such as their actual spread, their domestic and public vitality, the processes and determinants of language maintenance versus language shift towards majority languages, the relationship between language, ethnicity and identity, and the status of minority languages in schools, in particular in the compulsory stages of primary and secondary education. Our subtitle thus refers to the three dimensions (demographic, sociolinguistic and educational perspectives) which we have brought into comparison. First of all, it is important to know about the size of the groups, vis-a-vis the total population. We are dealing with languages that have - taken together- a substantial number of mother tongue speakers. The statistics about these languages, however, are scarce, and where such statistics are available they are based upon different criteria for counting numbers of speakers (see below). In the second place, we want to find out more about the sociolinguistic status of different language groups. The way they are treated by society differs from language to language and from state to state. Some of them have obtained extended legal protection and language policies, whereas for others there are no legal arrangements at all, not even the bare recognition of their existence (as is the case for Romani in a number of states). Finally, we focus on education as the social institution which has much, in some cases most, importance for the continued existence of these languages. Whether and how these languages are taught in schools differs widely in and between the nation-states in Europe. Various bilingual or multilingual models have been developed over the past decades and applied with more or less success. Discovering the differences and similarities in educational opportunities is an important part of the exercise of confronting the different minority languages.

The origin of most RM languages as *minority* languages lies in the 19th century, when, during the processes of state-formation in Europe, they found themselves excluded from the state level, in particular from general education. These RM languages missed, so to speak, the boat and did not become the official languages of the states which were then established. Centralizing tendencies and an ideology of 'one language - one state' have threatened the continued existence of RM languages. The greatest threat to RM languages, however, is the lack of intergenerational transmission. When parents give up speaking the ancestral language to their children it becomes almost impossible to reverse the ensuing language shift. Next to parents, education can be a major factor in the maintenance and promotion of a minority language. For most RM languages some kind of educational provisions have been established as a first step in an attempt at reversing ongoing language shift. Only over the last few decades some of these RM languages have become relatively well protected in legal terms, as well as by affirmative educational policies and programmes, both at the level of various nation-states and at the level of the European Union. In practice, however, such provisions leave still much to be desired.

Over the centuries there have always been speakers of IM languages in Europe, but they have only recently emerged as community languages spoken on a wide scale in North-Western Europe, due to intensified processes of immigration and minorization. Turkish and Arabic are good examples of so-called 'non-European' languages that are spoken and learned by millions of inhabitants of the member states of the European Union. Although IM languages are often conceived and transmitted as core values by IM language groups, they are much less protected by affirmative action and legal measures in, e.g. education. In fact, the learning and certainly the teaching of IM languages are often seen by speakers of dominant languages and by policy makers as obstacles to integration. At the European level, guidelines and directives regarding IM languages are rather scant and mostly outdated.

Despite the possibilities and challenges of comparing the status of RM and IM languages, amazingly few connections have been made in the sociolinguistic, educational and political domain. Already in the Linguistic Minorities Project, which was restricted to England and did not cover all of Britain, an observation was made which still applies to the situation today: "The Project has been struck by how little contact there still is between researchers and practitioners working in bilingual areas and school systems, even between England and Wales. Many of the newer minorities in England could benefit from the Welsh experience and expertise" (LMP 1985: 12). In our opinion little has improved over the past fifteen years, and contacts between researchers and/or policy makers working with different types of minority groups are still scarce. Integral publications which focus on both types of minority languages are rare; an exception is the work by Alladina & Edwards (1991), although both types of languages are

dealt with in two separate and unrelated volumes. Overall we see separated research paradigms and circles of researchers which have very little or no contact, although a lot can be learned mutually.

Against this background, the objective of this Volume is to compare the status of RM and IM languages in Europe from the three already mentioned perspectives. As yet, we are lacking a common referential framework for the languages under discussion. As all of these RM and IM are spoken by different language communities and not at state-wide levels, it may seem logical to refer to them as community languages, thus contrasting them with the official languages of nation-states. However, the designation 'community languages' as a title of this Volume would at least lead to surface confusion because it is already in use to refer to the official languages of the European Union. In that sense the designation 'community languages' is occupied territory. From an inventory of the different terms in use (see also throughout this Volume) we learn that there are no standardized designations. Table 1 gives a non-exhaustive overview of the nomenclature of the fields. As is clear from Table 1, the terminology used is variable and in flux. Imagine a European citizen who has never been abroad and travels to San Francisco for the first time in life, walks around downtown for a week, gets an impression of the Chinese community and food, happens to be invited for dinner by a Chinese family, and asks the host at the dinner table: "How many foreigners live in San Francisco?", in this way referring to the many Asian, Latin, and other non-Anglo Americans (s)he has seen during that week. Now, two things might happen: if the guest's English is poor, the Chinese host might leave this European reference to ethnocultural diversity unnoticed and go on with the conversation; if the guest's English is good, however, the Chinese host might interrupt the dinner and charge his guest with discrimination.

In the European public discourse on IM groups, two major characteristics emerge (see also Extra & Verhoeven, 1998): IM groups are often referred to as *foreigners* (*étrangers*, *Ausländer*) and as being in need of *integration*. First of all, it is common practice to refer to IM groups in terms of non-national residents and to their languages in terms of *non-territorial*, *non-regional*, *non-indigenous* or *non-European* languages. The call for integration is in sharp contrast with the language of exclusion. This conceptual exclusion rather than inclusion in the European public discourse derives from a restrictive interpretation of the notions of *citizenship* and *nationality*. From a historical point of view, such notions are commonly shaped by a constitutional *ius sanguinis* (law of the blood) in terms of which nationality derives from parental origins, in contrast to *ius solis* (law of the ground) in terms of which nationality derives from the country of birth. When European emigrants left their continent in the past and colonized countries abroad, they legitimized their claim to citizenship by spelling out *ius solis*

in the constitutions of these countries of settlement. Good examples of this strategy are English-dominant immigration countries like the USA, Canada, Australia, and South Africa. In establishing the constitutions of these (sub)continents, no consultation took place with native inhabitants, such as Indians, Inuit, Aboriginals, and Zulus respectively. Only in recent years have we witnessed a reversal in the discussions where these groups are concerned. Today some recognition and rights are also granted to e.g. the Inuit in Canada or the aboriginals. At home, however, Europeans predominantly upheld *ius sanguinis* in their constitutions and/or perceptions of nationality and citizenship, in spite of the growing numbers of IM groups who strive for an equal status as citizens in a new multicultural European context.

A second major characteristic of the European public discourse on IM groups is the focus on *integration*. This notion is both popular and vague, and it may actually refer to a whole spectrum of underlying concepts that vary over space and time (cf. Kruyt and Niessen 1997 for a comparative study of the notion of integration in five EU countries since the early seventies). The extremes of the spectrum range from assimilation to multiculturalism. The concept of assimilation is based on the premise that cultural differences between IM groups and established majority groups should and will disappear over time in a society which is proclaimed to be culturally homogeneous. On the other side of the spectrum, the concept of multiculturalism is based on the premise that such differences are an asset to a pluralist society which actually promotes cultural diversity in terms of new resources and opportunities. While the concept of assimilation focuses on unilateral tasks of *newcomers*, the concept of multiculturalism focuses on multilateral tasks for *all* inhabitants in demographically changing societies. In practice, established majority groups often make strong demands on IM groups for integration in terms of assimilation and are commonly very reluctant to promote or even accept the notion of cultural diversity as a determining characteristic of an increasingly multicultural environment.

It is interesting to compare the underlying assumptions of *integration* in the European public discourse on IM groups at the national level with assumptions at the level of cross-national cooperation and legislation. In the latter context, European politicians are eager to stress the importance of a proper balance between the loss and maintenance of 'national' norms and values. A prime concern in the public debate on such norms and values is cultural and linguistic diversity, mainly in terms of the national state languages and to a much lesser degree, the RM languages. In this context, national languages are referred to as core values of cultural identity. It is a paradoxical phenomenon that in the same public discourse IM languages and cultures are commonly conceived as sources of problems and deficits and as obstacles to integration, while national (and sometimes the RM) languages and cultures in an expanding EU are –regarded as sources of enrichment and as prerequisites for integration.

The public discourse on integration of IM groups in terms of assimilation vs. multiculturalism can also be noticed in the domain of education. Due to a growing influx of IM pupils, schools are faced with the challenge of adapting their curricula to this trend. The pattern of modification may be inspired by a strong and unilateral emphasis on learning (in) the language of the majority of society, given its significance for success in school and on the labour market, or by the awareness that the response to emerging multicultural school populations can not be reduced to monolingual education programming. In the former case, the focus will be on learning (in) the national language as a second language only, in the latter case on offering more languages in the school curriculum. Also in the domain of education, there is a wide conceptual gap between the discourse on RM and IM languages, as will be outlined later in this chapter.

Demographic perspectives

In this section we focus on the definition and identification of minority groups in terms of four widely but differentially used criteria, i.e. nationality, birth-country, selfcategorization (or ethnicity) and (home) language use. Derived from this overview, we will present some basic data on RM groups and IM groups in European Union countries respectively.

Definition and identification of minority groups

Collecting reliable information about the number and spread of RM and IM population groups in EU countries is no easy enterprise. What is, however, more interesting than presenting numbers or estimates of particular groups, are the *criteria* for such numbers or estimates. Throughout the EU it is common practice to present data on RM groups on the basis of (home) language and/or ethnicity and to present data on IM groups on the basis of nationality and/or country of birth. However, convergence between these criteria for the two groups appears over time, due to the increasing period of migration and minorization of immigrant groups in EU countries. Due to this increase there is strong erosion in the utilization of nationality or birth-country statistics.

Given the decreasing significance of nationality and birth-country criteria, collecting reliable information about the composition of immigrant population groups in EU countries is one of the most challenging tasks facing demographers. Complementary or alternative criteria have been suggested in various countries with a longer immigration history, and, for this reason, a

history of collecting census data on multicultural population groups. In English-dominant countries such as the USA, Canada, and Australia, census questions have been phrased in terms of self-categorization or ethnicity ('To which ethnic group do you consider yourself to belong?') and home language use. In Table 2, the four criteria mentioned are discussed in terms of their major advantages and disadvantages (see also Broeder & Extra, 1998a).

Table 2 Criteria for the definition and identification of population groups in a multicultural society (P/F/M = person/father/mother)

Criterion	Advantages	Disadvantages
Nationality (NAT) (P/F/M)	objective relatively easy to establish	(intergenerational) erosion
Birth-country (BC) (P/F/M)	objective relatively easy to establish	intergenerational erosion through births in immigra tion country BC not always indicative of ethnicit y/identit y invariable/deterministic: does not take account of dynamic s in society (in contrast to all other criteria)

Criterion	Advantages	Disadvantages
Self-categorization (SC)	touches the heart of the matter emancipatory: SC takes account of person's own conception of ethnicity/ identity	subjective by definition: also determined by language e/ethnicity of interviewer and by the spirit of times multiple SC possible historically charged, especially by World War II experiences
Home language (HL)	HL is most significant criterion of ethnicity in communication processes HL data are cornerstones of government policy in areas such as public information or education	complex criterion: who speaks what languag e to whom and when? language not always core value of ethnicit y/identit y useless in one-person house-holds

As Table 2 makes clear, there is no single royal road to a solution of the identification problem. Different criteria may complement and strengthen each other. Given the decreasing significance of nationality and birth-country criteria in the European context, the combined criterion of self-categorization and home language use is a potentially promising long-term alternative. As a result, convergence will emerge between the utilized criteria for the definition and identification of immigrant and regional population groups in increasingly multicultural societies.

Regional minority groups in EU countries

We will try to give an approximation of the distribution of the different regional minority language groups in the European Union. Of course, also here we are faced with a large diversity in the quality of the data. In some states there are fairly accurate figures because a language question has been included in the census several times, in other cases we only have rough estimates by insiders of the language group (usually language activists who want to boost the figures) or by outsiders (e.g. state officials who quite often want to diminish the number of speakers).

We will use a simple typology and distinguish between five categories of regional minority languages within the European Union. For each language we will give an estimate of the number of speakers (see also Gorter, 1996). Some figures given are adequate and recent estimates based upon census or survey research. However, many other figures are, due to the lack of other data, derived from informed estimates by experts and take the average of such subjective estimates (these are referred to as 'disputed numbers'). Also, some languages would perhaps not be included according to certain criteria, others might be split up further (e.g. for some outsiders Frisian in the Netherlands and North Frisian and Saterfrisian in Germany are considered as one language) or again others be taken together as one group (e.g. outsiders would not distinguish between Catalan in Valencia, the Balearic islands and Catalonia). Limburgian has been perceived as a dialect of Dutch until 1998 when it was recognized by the government of the Netherlands as a regional language in terms of the European Charter for Regional or Minority languages; in Belgium where the same variety is spoken the government has thus far not followed this step. The figures given are based upon Breatnach (1996), Euromosaic (1996), Istituto della Enciclopedia Italiana (1986), Siguan (1990) and Tjeerdsma (1998).

- 1 The first category concerns unique minority languages. They are defined by the fact that they are spoken in one part of only one European Union member-state. The languages in this category are the following ones:
 - France: Breton (300,000), Corsican (160,000);
 - Germany: North Frisian (8000) Saterfrisian (2000) and Sorbian (60,000);
 - Italy: Friulan (550,000), Ladin (35,000), Sardinian (1,000,000);
 - the Netherlands: Frisian (450,000);
 - Portugal: Mirandes (15,000);

- Spain: Galician (2,300,000), Aragones (30,000), Asturian (450,000);
- United Kingdom: Scottish Gaelic (67,000), Scots (1,500,000), Ulster Scots (100,000), Welsh (500,000) and Cornish (200);
- 2 The second category concerns those regional minority languages that are spoken in more than one member state of the European Union. This category may include the following languages:
 - Basque in Spain (Basque Autonomous Community 515,000, Navarre 50,000) and in France (70,000);
 - Catalan in Spain (Catalonia 4 million, Balearic Islands 428,000, Valencia 1.9 million and Aragon 48,000), in France (102,000) and Italy (20,000);
 - Occitan in Spain (4000), in France (3,500,000) and in Italy (50,000);
 - Sami in Sweden (18,000) and in Finland (3000, spread over dialects: North, Inari and Solt);
 - Low-Saxon in the Netherlands (1.8 million) and Low-German (8-10 million) in Germany;
 - Limburgian in the Netherlands (1 million) and in Belgium.
- 3 Languages which are a minority language in one member state, but the dominant official language in another, neighbouring state (the latter not necessarily a member state of the European Union). There are quite a few of them and the linguistic relationship between the minority language and the dominant language differs from case to case. Some of these languages might perhaps also be considered as examples of category 1. Multiple cases are Albanian in Italy (100,000) and Greece (80,000), Croatian in Italy (2000) and Austria (25,000), German in France (975,000), Italy (280,000), Belgium (69,000) and Denmark (20,000), Slovenian in Austria (17,000) and Italy (75,000). Single cases are Swedish (296,000) in Finland and Finnish (305,000) in Sweden, French (including Franco-Provencal) (115,000) in Italy, and Walloon in Belgium (600,000, including Champenois, Lorraine and Picard), although the latter seems difficult to categorize; it is referred to in category 2 and not 1 because its relationship to French seems so close (cf. Francoprovencal). Furthermore there is Berber (25,000) and Portugese (3600) in Spain; Dutch (80,000) in France; Danish (50,000) in Germany; Greek (11,000) in Italy; Magyar (Hungarian) (14,000), Czech (8000) and Slovak (1000) in Austria; Turkish (100,000), Macedonian (75,000), Aromanian (also called Vlach) (50,000), Pomak (from Bulgarian) (27,000) in Greece (although there is no or very little recognition of these languages by the state).

In addition there are also two special categories.

- Two languages have a special status because they are official state languages but no official working languages of the European Union. These are Luxemburgish (359,000), also spoken in France (35,000), and Irish (1.5 million have some ability, 353,000 use it everyday), also spoken in the UK (in Northern Ireland by 142,000 speakers who have some knowledge, of whom perhaps 15,000 use it regularly).
- 5 Finally there are non-territorial minority languages, which will be found in smaller or larger numbers in almost all member-states; they are Romani (see Bakker in this Volume for numbers in all European states) and Yiddish.

Our typology refers mainly to the geographic dimension of state boundaries and partially to legal status. In that sense the typology has its inherent difficulties. The distinctions may be gradual or some language groups may not fit in nicely (e.g. Slovenian, Croatian or Czech). Of course, other typologies are possible (e.g. Edwards, 1991: 215; Euromosaic, 1995). Our point is to use a typology here for the purpose of making the diversity of contexts visible.

Demographic size has some importance in order to better understand the sociolinguistic status of languages. Included in the latter are factors such as use in the family, legal status and protection by government, provisions in the media and in cultural life, development of a written standard, economic prosperity of the community, attitudes to language and level of organized activism. Demographic and sociolinguistic status are related strongly with the educational status of these languages. Educational provisions in turn influence the numerical development and social status of regional minority languages.

Immigrant minority groups in EU countries

As a consequence of socio-economically or politically determined processes of migration, the traditional patterns of language variation across Western Europe have changed considerably over the past several decades (cf. Extra & Verhoeven, 1998). The first wave of migration started in the sixties and early seventies, and it was mainly economically motivated. In the case of Mediterranean groups, migration initially involved contract workers who expected - and were expected - to stay for a limited period of time. As the period of their stay gradually became longer, this pattern of economic migration was followed by a second wave of social migration as their families joined them. Subsequently, a second generation was born in the immigrant countries, while their parents often remained uncertain or ambivalent about whether to stay or to return to the country of origin. These demographic shifts over time have also been accompanied

by shifts of designation for the groups under consideration - 'migrant workers,' 'immigrant families,' and 'ethnic minorities,' respectively.

As a result, many industrialized Western European countries have a growing number of immigrant populations which differ widely, both from a cultural and from a linguistic point of view, from the mainstream indigenous population. In spite of more stringent immigration policies in most European Union countries, the prognosis is that immigrant populations will continue to grow as a consequence of the increasing number of political refugees, the opening of the internal European borders, and political and economic developments in Central and Eastern Europe and in other regions of the world. It has been estimated that by the year 2000, about one third of the population under the age of 35 in urbanized Western Europe will have an immigration background.

Within the various EU countries, four major immigrant groups can be distinguished: people from Mediterranean EU countries, from Mediterranean non-EU countries, from former colonial countries, and political refugees (cf. Extra & Verhoeven, 1993a; 1993b). Comparative information on population figures in EU member states can be obtained from the Statistical Office of the EU in Luxembourg (EuroStat). An overall decrease of the indigenous population has been observed in all EU countries over the last decade; at the same time, there has been an increase in the immigration figures. Although free movement of migrants between EU member states is legally permitted and promoted, most immigrants in EU countries originate from non-EU countries. According to EuroStat (1996), in January 1993, the EU had a population of 368 million, 4.8% of whom (almost 18 million people) were not citizens of the country in which they lived. The increase in the non-national population since 1985 is mainly due to an influx of non-EU nationals, whose numbers rose from 9 to 12 million between 1985 and 1992. The largest absolute numbers of immigrants have been observed in France, Germany, and Great Britain.

For various reasons, however, reliable demographic information on immigrant groups in EU countries is difficult to obtain. For some groups or countries, no updated information is available or no such data have ever been collected at all. Moreover, official statistics only reflect immigrant groups with legal resident status. Another source of disparity is the different data collection systems being used, ranging from nation-wide census data to more or less representative surveys. Most importantly, however, the most widely used criteria for immigrant status - nationality and/or country of birth - have become less valid over time because of an increasing trend toward naturalization and births within the countries of residence. In addition, most residents from former colonies already have the nationality of their country of immigration.

There are large differences among EU countries as regards the size and composition of immigrant population groups. Owing to labour market mechanisms, such groups are found mainly in the northern industrialized EU countries, whereas their presence in Mediterranean countries like Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain is rather limited. Mediterranean groups immigrate mainly to France or Germany. Portuguese, Spanish, and Maghreb residents concentrate in France, whereas Italian, Greek, former Yugoslavian, and Turkish residents concentrate in Germany. The largest immigrant groups in EU countries are Turkish and Maghreb residents; the latter originate from Morocco, Algeria, or Tunisia. Table 2 gives estimates of their size in twelve EU countries in January 1994.

Table 3 Estimated numbers of inhabitants of Maghreb and Turkish origin in twelve EU countries, January 1994, based on the nationality criterion (EuroStat, 1997)

	Ма	ghreb countr	Total		
EU countries	Morocco	Algeria	Tunisia		Turkey
Belgium	145.363	10.177	6.048	161.588	88.302
Denmark	3.180	368	404	3.952	34.658
Germany	82.803	23.082	28.060	133.945	1.918.395
Greece	333	180	314	827	3.066
Spain	61.303	3.259	378	64.940	301
France	572.652	614.207	206.336	1.393.165	197.712
Italy	77.180	3.177	35.318	115.675	3.656
The Netherlands	164.567	905	2.415	167.887	202.618
Portugal	221	53	28	302	65
Finland	560	208	142	910	995
Sweden	1.533	599	1.152	3.284	23.649
Great Britain	3.000	2.000	2.000	7.000	41.000
Total	1.112.695	658.215	282.595	2.053.505	2.514.417

According to EuroStat (1997) and based on the conservative nationality criterion, in 1993 the largest Turkish and Maghreb communities could be found in Germany (almost 2 million) and France (almost 1.4 million), respectively. Within the EU, the Netherlands is in second place as the country of immigration for Turkish and Moroccan residents.

Table 4 gives an overview of population groups in the Netherlands on January 1, 1996, based on the combined birth-country criterion (birth country of person and/or mother and/or father) *versus* the nationality criterion, and derived from CBS statistics (CBS, 1997).

Table 4 Population of the Netherlands (x 1000) based on the combined birth-country criterion (BCPMF) and the nationality criterion on January 1, 1996 (CBS 1997)

Groups (x1000)	<i>BCPMF</i>	Nationality	Abs. diff.
Dutch	12,872	14,768	1,896
Turks	272	154	118
Moroccans	225	150	75
Surinamese	282	15	267
Antilleans	94	-	94
Greeks	11	5	6

Italians	32	17	15	
Former Yugoslavs	56	34	22	
Portuguese	13	9	4	
Spaniards	29	17	12	
Cape Verdians	17	2	15	
Tunisians	6	2	4	
Other groups	1,585	331	1,254	
Total	15,494	15,494	-	

Table 4 shows strong criterion effects of birth-country *versus* nationality. All immigrant minority groups are in fact strongly underrepresented in nationality-based statistics. However, the combined birth-country criterion does not solve the identification problem. The use of this criterion leads to non-identification in at least the following cases:

- an increasing group of third and further generations (cf. the Moluccan and Chinese communities in the Netherlands;
- different ethnocultural groups from the same country of origin (cf. Turks *versus* Kurds from Turkey);
- the same ethnocultural group from different countries of origin (cf. Chinese from China *versus* Vietnam);
- ethnocultural groups without territorial status (cf. Romani).

Verweij (1997) made a short *tour d'horizon* in four European Union countries (i.e., Belgium, Germany, France, Great Britain) and in the USA in order to study criteria utilized in the national population statistics of these countries. In Belgium, Germany, and France, such statistics have traditionally been based on the nationality criterion; only in Belgium has additional experience been gained with the combined birth-country criterion of persons, parents, and even grandparents. For various reasons, identification on the basis of the grandparents' birth-country is very problematic: four additional sources of evidence are needed (with multiple types of outcomes) and the chances of non-response are rather high. Verweij (1997) also discussed the experiences with the utilization of ethnic self-categorization in Great Britain and the USA, leaving the home language criterion out of consideration. Given the increasing identification problems with the combined birth-country criterion, Verweij, on the basis of Anglo-Saxon experiences, suggested including the self-categorization criterion in future Dutch population statistics as the second-best middle- and long-term alternative in those cases where the

combined birth-country criterion would not suffice. Moreover, he proposed carrying out small-scale experimental studies on the validity and social acceptance of the self-categorization criterion, given its subjective and historically charged character, respectively (see also Table 1.2), before this criterion would be introduced on a nation-wide scale.

As early as 1982, the *Australian Institute of Multicultural Affairs* recognized the above-mentioned identification problems for inhabitants of Australia and proposed including questions on birth-country (of person and parents), ethnic origin (based on self-categorization), and home language use in their censuses.

As yet, little experience has been gained in European Union countries with periodical censuses, or, if such censuses have been held, with questions on ethnicity or (home) language use. It is expected that, as a consequence of ongoing processes of immigration and minorization, European Union countries will show a development towards periodical censuses with questions on language and ethnicity. Given the decreasing significance of nationality and birth-country criteria, the combined criterion of ethnocultural self-categorization and home language use would be a potentially promising long-term alternative for obtaining basic information on the multicultural composition of societies. The added value of home language statistics is that they can offer valuable insights into the distribution and vitality of home languages across cultures and can thus raise the awareness of multilingualism. Moreover, data on home language use are indispensable tools for educational policy in the domains of both first and second language instruction.

Sociolinguistic perspectives

In this section we focus on the status of RM and IM languages in terms of declared language rights. For a valuable overview and discussion of existing policy documents on the theme of minority language rights we refer to De Varennes (1997). Here we will only deal with an important selection.

There is a growing international awareness that, irrespective of the fundamental freedoms of the individual as expressed most noteworthy in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in December 1948, minority groups have rights that should be acknowledged and accommodated as well. As a result, the recognition and protection of minorities has become a significant issue in international law. At the UN World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna in June 1993, a Declaration was adopted which confirmed

the importance of the promotion and protection of the rights of persons belonging to minorities and the contribution of such promotion and protection to the political and social stability of the State in which such persons live.

It is important to note that diversity is recognized in this declaration as a prerequisite and not as a threat to social cohesion. A complicated issue is the definition of 'minority' in legal documents. The concept has both quantitative and qualitative dimensions, based on dominated size and dominated status respectively. Dominated status may refer to, e.g. physical, social, cultural, religious, linguistic, economic or legal characteristics of minority groups. Attempts by the UN to reach an acceptable definition, however, have been largely unsuccessful (Capotorti 1979). The UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) endures as the most significant international law provision on the protection of minorities. Article 27 of the covenant states:

In these states in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with others of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own language.

Article 27 of this covenant does not contain a definition of minorities, nor does it make any provision for a body to designate them. Nevertheless, it refers to three prominent minority properties in terms of ethnicity, religion or language, and it refers to 'persons', not to 'nationals'.

While Article 27 of the 1966 UN Covenant takes a defensive perspective on minority rights ('shall not be denied'), later UN documents give evidence of more affirmative action. Article 4 of the UN Declaration of the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, adopted by the General Assembly on 18 December, 1992, contains certain modest obligations on states

to take measures to create favourable conditions to enable persons belonging to minorities to express their characteristics and to develop their culture, to provide them with adequate opportunities to learn their mother tongue or to have instruction in their mother tongue and to enable them to participate fully in the economic progress and development in their country.

Although adopted by the UN General Assembly, this document remains as yet a non-binding declaration. In contrast to the protection offered to individuals in terms of international human rights (cf. the previously cited Article 27 of the 1966 UN Covenant or Article 4 of the 1992 UN Declaration), minority groups as such appear to be largely ignored.

At the European level, language policy has largely been considered as a domain which should be developed within the national perspectives of the different EU member states. Proposals for a common EU language policy are labouriously achieved and non-committal in character (see Coulmas 1991 for a historical perspective). The most important declarations, recommendations, or directives on language policy, each of which concepts carry a different charge in the EU jargon, concern the recognition of the status (of in the order mentioned):

- national EU languages;
- · indigenous or regional minority languages;
- immigrant or 'non-territorial' minority languages.

The Treaty of Rome (1958) confers equal status on all national languages of the EU member states (with the exception of Irish and Luxembourgian) as working languages. On numerous occasions, the EU ministers of education have declared that the EU citizens' knowledge of languages should be promoted (see Baetens Beardsmore 1993). Each EU member state should promote pupils' proficiency in at least two 'foreign' languages, and at least one of these languages should be the national standard language of one of the EU states.

Promoting knowledge of regional and/or immigrant languages has been left out of consideration in these ministerial statements. At the European level many linguistic minorities have nevertheless found in the institutions of the former European Communities (EC) and the present European Union (EU) a new forum for formulating and defending their right to exist. Although the numbers of both regional and immigrant minority groups are often small within the borders of particular nation states, these numbers become much more substantial at the European level. The EC/EU institution which has shown the most affirmative action is the European Parliament.

The European Parliament accepted various resolutions in 1981, 1987 and 1994, in which the protection and promotion of regional minority languages was recommended. The first resolution led to the foundation of the European Bureau for Lesser Used Languages in 1982. Meanwhile, the Bureau has member state committees in 13 EU countries and it has recently acquired the status of Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) at the levels of the European Council and the United Nations. Another result of the European Parliament resolutions is the foundation of the

European MERCATOR Network, aimed at promoting research on the status and use of regional minority languages.

The Council of Europe, set up in 1949, is a much broader organization than the European Union, with 41 member states. Its main role today is to be "the guardian of democratic security founded on human rights, democracy and the rule of law." A bottom-up initiative from its Council for Local and Regional Authorities resulted in the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, which was opened for signature in November 1992 and came into force in March 1998. In October 2000 it has been ratified by 11 out of 41 Council of Europe member states. The Charter is aimed at the protection and the promotion of 'the historical regional or minority languages of Europe'. Article 1a of the Charter states that the concept of 'regional or minority languages' refers to languages that are

- i traditionally used within a given territory of a State by nationals of that State who form a group numerically smaller than the rest of the State's population; and
- ii different from the official language(s) of that State;
- it does not include either dialects of the official language(s) of the State or the languages of migrants.

It should be noted that the concepts of 'regional' and 'minority' languages are not specified in the Charter and that (im)migrant languages are explicitly excluded from the Charter. States are free in their choice of which regional/minority languages to include. Also the degree of protection is not prescribed; thus a state can choose for light or tight measures. The result is a rich variety of different provisions accepted by the various states. At the same time the Charter implies some sort of European standard which most likely will gradually be further developed. Enforcement of the Charter is under control of a committee of experts which every three years examines reports presented by the Parties. The Charter asks for recognition, respect, maintenance, facilitation and promotion of regional/minority languages, in particular in the domains of education, judicial authorities, administrative and public services, media, cultural activities, and socio-economic life (Articles 8-13).

As a more or less parallel activity to the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, the Council of Europe opened the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities for signature in February 1995. This treaty does not focus on language(s). It is more general in its aims and scope, and it has far less specific provisions for protection and promotion of the minorities concerned. Still it also offers a European standard to which states

have to adhere. Although in this framework no definition of 'national minorities' is given, it is clear from the document that 'non-national' immigrant groups are - again - excluded from the considerations. Articles 5 and 6 of the Framework state the following:

Article 5

- 1 The Parties undertake to promote the conditions necessary for persons belonging to national minorities to maintain and develop their culture, and to preserve the essential elements of their identity, namely their religion, language, traditions and cultural heritage.
- 2 Without prejudice to measures taken in pursuance of their general integration policy, the Parties shall refrain from policies or practices aimed at assimilation of persons belonging to national minorities against their will and shall protect these persons from any action aimed at such assimilation.

Article 6

- 1 The Parties shall encourage a spirit of tolerance and intercultural dialogue and take effective measures to promote mutual respect and understanding and co-operation among all persons living on their territory, irrespective of those persons' ethnic, cultural, linguistic or religious identity, in particular in the fields of education, culture and the media.
- 2 The Parties undertake to take appropriate measures to protect persons who may be subject to threats or acts of discrimination, hostility or violence as a result of their ethnic, cultural, linguistic or religious identity.

Ratification of this framework was more successful than in the case of the European Charter mentioned before. At the end of 2000, 29 out of 41 Council of Europe member states had ratified the framework.

It is interesting to note that The Netherlands, which were among the first four states to sign the Charter, has not yet signed the Framework Convention. In the preparations for the ratification of the Framework Convention proposal to the Parliament is to include the Frisians as well as immigrant minority groups as 'national minorities', however, only those that are part of its formal ethnic minorities policy.

A final document of the Council of Europe that should be referred to in this context, is Recommendation 1383 on Linguistic Diversification, adopted by the Council's Parliamentary Assembly on 23 September 1998. Article 5 states that

There should (...) be more variety in modern language teaching in the Council of Europe member states: this should result in the acquisition not only of English but also of other European and world languages by all European citizens, in parallel with the mastery of their own national and, where appropriate, regional language.

In Article 8i the Assembly also recommends that the Committee of Ministers invite member states

to improve the creation of regional language plans, drawn up in collaboration with elected regional representatives and local authorities, with a view to identifying existing linguistic potential and developing the teaching of the languages concerned, while taking account of the presence of non-native population groups, twinning arrangements, exchanges and the proximity of foreign countries.

While Article 5 is restricted to 'regional' languages, Article 8i recognizes for the first time the relevance of 'non-native' groups in the context of language planning.

Apart from the Council of Europe's efforts, two other initiatives on linguistic rights should be mentioned here as well. A host of institutions and non-governmental organizations signed the Universal Declaration on Linguistic Rights in Barcelona, June 1996. This declaration takes as a starting point language groups instead of states and explicitly includes both regional and immigrant languages, in contrast to the earlier mentioned European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages. Article 1.5 says:

This Declaration considers as a language group any group of persons sharing the same language which is established in the territorial space of another language community but which does not possess historical antecedents equivalent to those of that community. Examples of such groups are immigrants, refugees, deported persons and members of diasporas.

The Articles 4.1 and 4.2 deal with the issue of integration and assimilation in the following way:

- 1 This Declaration considers that persons who move to and settle in the territory of another language community have the right and the duty to maintain an attitude of integration towards this community. This term is understood to mean an additional socialization of such persons in such a way that they may preserve their original cultural characteristics while sharing with the society in which they have settled sufficient references, values and forms of behaviour to enable them to function socially without greater difficulties than those experienced by members of the host community.
- 2 This Declaration considers, on the other hand, that assimilation, a term which is understood to mean acculturation in the host society, in such a way that the original cultural characteristics are replaced by the references, values and forms of behaviour of the host society, must on no account be forced or induced and can only be the result of an entirely free decision.

Article 5 indirectly criticizes the European Charter's focus on 'regional or minority languages' by stating

This Declaration is based on the principle that the rights of all language communities are equal and independent of their legal status as official, regional or minority languages. Terms such as regional or minority languages are not used in this Declaration because, though in certain cases the recognition of regional or minority languages can facilitate the exercise of certain rights, these and other modifiers are frequently used to restrict the rights of language communities.

In line with the European Charter, the Universal Declaration defines domains of linguistic rights in terms of public administration and official bodies, education, proper names, media and new technologies, culture and the socio-economic sphere.

Another recent important European document on linguistic rights are The Oslo Recommendations Regarding the Linguistic Rights of National Minorities, drafted by the High Commissioner on National Minorities and approved by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in Oslo, February 1998. The focus of this document is on 'persons belonging to national/ethnic groups who constitute the numerical majority in one State but the numerical minority in another (usually neighbouring) State'. The document was designed in the context of many recent tensions on such groups in Central and Eastern Europe.

Its 'Explanatory Note' contains valuable sources of information on related documents in the domains of (proper) names, religion, community life, media, economic life, administrative authorities and public services, independent national institutions, judicial authorities and deprivation of liberty. In an earlier separate document, referred to as The Hague Recommendations Regarding the Education Rights of National Minorities and published in October 1996, the OSCE focuses on educational measures.

As yet, specific documents on the linguistic rights of immigrant minority groups in Europe hardly exist. The major document is the Directive of the European Communities (now European Union) on the schooling of children of 'migrant workers', published in Brussels, July 1977. Although this directive has promoted the legitimization of immigrant minority language instruction and occasionally also its legislation in some countries (see Reid & Reich, 1992; Fase, 1987), the directive was very limited in its ambitions regarding minority language teaching and is meanwhile completely outdated.

The Declaration of Oegstgeest (*Moving away from a monolingual habitus*), approved at the international conference on regional, minority and immigrant languages in multicultural Europe in January 2000, convened by the non-governmental European Cultural Foundation (established in Amsterdam) aims at reconciling the ambitions with respect to each of these types of languages in the context of the European Year of Languages (2001), organized by the Council of Europe and the European Union. The Declaration of Oegstgeest is presented in full as Appendix X to the present Volume. Both this declaration and the present volume are the outcomes of initiatives supported by the European Cultural Foundation.

As mentioned at the beginning of this section, it is important to note that in many of the quoted documents cultural pluralism or diversity is conceived as a prerequisite instead of a threat to social cohesion or integration. A plea for reconciling the concepts of diversity and cohesion has recently also been made by the Migration Policy Group (2000) in co-operation with the European Cultural Foundation, on the basis of a comprehensive survey and evaluation of available policy documents and new policy developments and orientations. Also the Migration Policy Group's report puts 'historic' and 'new' minorities in Europe in an overarching context. Both types of minorities significantly contributed and contribute to Europe's cultural, religious, linguistic and ethnic diversity.

European nation-states are reluctant to recognize and respect this diversity as part of their national and increasingly European identity. However, multicultural and multi-ethnic nation-states are a common phenomenon in Europe's distant and recent past. Abroad, diversity due to immigration and minorization, has become part of the national identity and heritage of

English-dominant countries like the USA, Canada, Australia and South Africa. Without losing sight of the enormous diversity between and within 'historic' and 'new' minorities, European nation-states should learn to appreciate and use the contributions of all of them.

Educational perspectives

In this section we discuss the *status quo* of RM and IM languages in European education respectively. Our focus is on primary and/or secondary schools as part of compulsory education and, as in the former section, on European Union countries.

Regional minority languages in education

In the European Framework Convention on National Minorities and in the European Charter on Regional or Minority Languages we find a sort of European standard. The groups covered by these treaties are RM. The Framework convention outlines some aims in a very general sense. In that way it puts a *moral standard* upon the states that become signatories. As far as education is concerned there is first of all the encouragement 'to foster knowledge of the culture, language and history of the national minorities, also among the majority' (Article 12) as well as 'the recognition of the right to learn the minority language' (Article 14). This means that all citizens have to be informed, through the school curriculum, about the minorities, and also that the members of a minority group have a right to receive at least some minimal teaching of their own language.

The Charter is much more elaborate on the use of language in education. As was explained before it offers the adhering states the opportunity of choice among different alternatives. Even if one has decided upon the goals, what languages are actually used as the *target languages* used inside the curriculum can vary from situation to situation. For the sake of exposition the complexity can be summarized as a typology with four categories: 1) no minority language teaching at all; 2) minority language as a subject, the dominant language as a medium of instruction; 3) both the minority language and the dominant language as a medium of instruction; and 4) the minority language as a medium of instruction and the dominant language as a subject. The fifth logical possibility, no teaching at all of the dominant language, does not occur.

The number of regional language groups where there is no teaching at all, is decreasing, although in many cases there is only a very small amount of teaching available, confined to

pre-primary education only, e.g. Saterfrisian in Germany. What happens most frequently is the pattern denoted in category 2, with the minority language as a subject. The categories 3 and 4 contain less language groups, and especially category 4 may, where it occurs (Basque Country, Wales), be limited to a certain level of the educational system or to certain types of schools (immersion education).

Of greatest importance are, of course, the final outcomes of the teaching of the minority language: does it lead to increased maintenance or, has it encouraged the transition to the dominant language? Very little *evaluation* studies have been done throughout Europe. In the case of transitional education, where a small amount of attention is given to the minority language (for example, one lesson per week only at primary level) this may work as stimulus for assimilation to mainstream society. In such cases the minority language is often defined as a 'learning deficit' which has to be remedied through education. In the case of a stronger provisions for minority education, learning the minority language is conceived of as an enrichment. The language is defined as worthy of preservation and promotion. The outcome of such education is a contribution to cultural pluralism. In principle, all pupils do become bilingual and biliteral. Examples are Catalan, Basque, Welsh, and Swedish (in Finland).

Immigrant minority languages in education

We examine the policies of a number of European Union countries regarding immigrant minority language instruction in both primary and secondary education (see also Broeder and Extra 1998). The cross-national terminology for this type of instruction is not consistent, as can be derived from designations like home language instruction, instruction in the native language and culture, instruction in immigrant languages, or instruction in ethnic minority languages. We will use the acronym IMLI (Immigrant Minority Language Instruction) when referring to this type of instruction in the countries under consideration. The decision to use the designation IMLI is motivated by the inclusion of a broad spectrum of potential target groups. As has been made clear in Chapter 2, the status of an immigrant minority language as the 'native' or home language can change through intergenerational processes of language shifts. Moreover, in secondary education, both minority and majority pupils are often de jure (although seldom de facto) admitted to IMLI (in the Netherlands, e.g., Turkish is a secondary school subject called 'Turkish' rather than 'home language instruction'; see also the concept of Enseignement des Langues et Cultures d'Origine versus Enseignement des Langues Vivantes in the on France).

For various reasons, the development of an educational policy regarding IMLI was, and continues to be, a complex and challenging task. In view of the multicultural composition of

many schools, this task involves the organization of multilingual rather than bilingual instruction. Experiences with, and the results of research into, an exclusively bilingual context are therefore only transferable to a limited degree. In addition, there are big differences as to the nature and extent of bilingualism of immigrant minority pupils, both within and across different language groups (see also Chapter 2). Moreover, from an intergenerational perspective, these differences tend to increase and shift in the direction of the dominant language of the immigrant country. Furthermore, given the very divergent target groups, it is no easy task to fit IMLI into the rest of the curriculum. In a number of countries, the current policy is ambivalent in the sense that, for some groups, IMLI is an addition to the curriculum, while for others, IMLI replaces a part of the curriculum. Finally, there is the question of feasibility in the case of a relatively modest demand for instruction and of relatively small or widely scattered groups.

The cross-national comparison of the countries in this chapter is based on secondary analyses of the available data and on oral or written information supplied by key informants. The focus is on three EU countries with relatively large numbers of immigrant minority groups (Germany, France, Great Britain), on two countries which partially share their language of public use (The Netherlands and Flanders/Belgium) and on one of the Scandinavian countries (Sweden). In all the countries involved in this study, there has been an increase in the number of immigrant minority pupils who speak a language at home other than or in addition to the dominant school language in primary and secondary education. The schools have responded to this home-school language mismatch by paying more attention to the learning and teaching of the national standard language as a second language. A great deal of energy and money is being spent on developing curricula, attainment targets, teaching materials, and tests for second-language education. Instruction in the immigrant minority languages stands out in stark contrast to this, as it is much more susceptible to an ideological debate about its legitimacy. While there is consensus about the necessity of investing in second-language education for immigrant minority pupils, there is a lack of such support for IMLI. Immigrant minority languages are commonly considered sources of problems and deficiencies, and they are rarely seen as sources of knowledge and enrichment. Policy makers, headmasters, and teachers of 'regular' subjects often have reservations or are negative towards IMLI. On the other hand, parents of immigrant minority pupils, IMLI teachers, and immigrant minority organizations often make a case for having immigrant minority languages in the school curriculum. These differences in top-down and bottom-up attitudes emerge in all the countries focused upon in this study.

From a historical point of view, most of the countries in this study show a similar chronological development in their argumentation for IMLI. IMLI was generally introduced into primary education with a view to family remigration. In the seventies, this argumentation was

virtually abandoned. Demographic developments showed no substantial sign of families remigrating to their former recruitment countries; instead, a process of generation building and minorization came about. This development resulted in a shift and IMLI became aimed at combatting disadvantages. IMLI had to bridge the gap between the home and school environment and to encourage school achievement in 'regular' subjects. Because such an approach tended to underappreciate ethnocultural dimensions, a number of countries began to emphasize the intrinsic importance of knowledge of immigrant minority languages from a cultural, legal, and economic perspective:

- in cultural respects, IMLI can contribute to maintaining and advancing a pluralist society;
- in legal respects, IMLI can meet the internationally recognized right to language development and language maintenance, in correspondence with the fact that many immigrant minority groups consider their own language of key value to their cultural identity;
- in economic respects, finally, immigrant minority languages and cultures can be an important pool of knowledge in a society that is increasingly internationally oriented.

The historical development of arguments for IMLI in terms of remigration, combatting deficiencies, and cultural policy is particularly evident in the Netherlands, Germany, and Belgium. In France and Great Britain, cultural policy is tied in with the respective national languages French and English to such an extent that IMLI is only tolerated in its margins. In contrast to each of these five countries, cultural-political motives have always taken pride of place in Sweden. It should, however, be stressed that cultural-political arguments for IMLI have not led to an educational policy in which the status of immigrant minority languages has been substantially advanced in any of the countries involved in this study.

The target groups of IMLI are considered disadvantaged groups in virtually all the countries in this study only Sweden has an explicit home language criterion rather than a socio-economic status or generation criterion for admission to IMLI. Actual enrolment in IMLI varies widely not only between countries (cf. the enrolment percentages in the Netherlands versus Flanders), but also between groups (cf. the enrolment percentages of Moroccan and Turkish pupils *versus* those of Southern European pupils). Variation in enrolment is determined by a combination of factors, such as the attitudes of immigrant minority parents and pupils, and indigenous majority headmasters and teachers, and the geographical distribution of immigrant minority groups (which will decide whether or not numerical criteria can be met). As yet, comparative studies on the actual causes of this differentiated picture are not available.

There are remarkable differences in status between IMLI in primary and secondary education in the countries of this study. A comparison of target groups, arguments, objectives, evaluation, enrolment restrictions, curricular status, funding, and teaching materials shows that IMLI in secondary education has gained a higher status than IMLI in primary education. In primary education, IMLI is generally not part of the 'regular' or 'national' curriculum, and, consequently, it tends to become a negotiable entity in a complex and often opaque interplay of forces by several actors, in contrast with other curricular subjects. These differences are summarized in Table 5.

 Table 5
 Status of IMLI in primary and secondary education

Immigrant Minority Language Instruction	Primary education	Secondary education	
Target groups	 de iure: mostly immigrant minority pupils from specific source countries de facto: mostly subset 	 de iure: mostly all pupils de facto: mostly subset of immigrant minority pupils 	
Arguments	mostly in terms of a struggle against deficits: • bridging home/school gap • promoting school success in other ('regular') subjects rarely multicultural policy: • promoting cultural pluralism • promoting knowledge of languages in a multicultural and globalizing society	mostly multicultural policy: promoting cultural pluralism promoting knowledge of languages	
Goals	rarely specified skills to be reached with IMLI	commonly specification of oral and written skills to be reached with IMLI	
Evaluation	rarely judgement/report figure for IMLI: 'language' in school report = national standard language	examination and report figure for IMLI: national standard language is explicitly referred to and separately evaluated in school report	
Minimal enrolment	relatively high number of pupils: specified per class, school or municipality	relatively low number of pupils: specified per class, school or municipality	
Time-table not perceived as 'regular' education: instead of other subjects or at extra-curricular hours		regular optional subject in regular free time-table space	
Funding	by national, regional or local authorities by consulates/embassies of source countries	by national, regional or local authorities	
Teaching materials	rarely originating from country of settlement, often from abroad/source country	commonly originating from country of settlement	

The higher status of IMLI in secondary education is largely due to the fact that instruction in one or more languages other than the national standard language is a traditional and regular

component of the (optional) school curriculum. *Within* secondary education, however, IMLI must compete with languages that, in their turn, have a higher status or a longer tradition. The hierarchy of languages in secondary education is schematically represented in Table 6 in six categories with descending order of status.

With regard to category 6, it should be noted that some countries provide instruction and/or exams in non-standard language varieties. In France, for instance, pupils can take part in examinations for several varieties of Arabic and Berber (see Tilmatine 1977); Dutch primary education provides instruction in Moluccan Malay (as an alternative to Indonesian), and Sweden offers Kurdish (as an alternative to Turkish).

Another remarkable fact is that in some countries (particularly France, and some German federal states), IMLI in primary education is funded by the consulates or embassies of the countries of origin concerned. In these cases, the national government does not interfere in the organization of IMLI, or in the requirements for, and the selection and employment of teachers. A paradoxical consequence of this phenomenon is that the earmarking of IMLI budgets by the above-mentioned consulates or embassies is often safeguarded. National, regional, or local governments often fail to earmark budgets, so that funds meant for IMLI are not infrequently appropriated for other educational purposes.

IMLI may be part of a largely centralized or decentralized educational policy. In the Netherlands, national responsibilities and means are gradually being transferred to the local level. In France, government policy is strongly centrally controlled. Germany has devolved governmental responsibilities chiefly to the federal states with all their mutual differences. Sweden grants far-reaching autonomy to municipal councils in dealing with tasks and means. In England, there is a mixed system of shared national and local responsibilities (cf. the ministerial guidelines for special target groups *versus* the guidelines of the local educational authorities).

In general, comparative cross-national references to experiences with IMLI in the various EU member states are rare (e.g., Reich 1991, 1994; Reid and Reich 1992; Fase 1994; Tilmatine 1997; Broeder and Extra 1997b, 1997c) or they focus on particular language groups (e.g., Tilmatine 1977; Obdeijn and De Ruiter 1998). With a view to the demographic development of these states into multicultural societies and the similarities in IMLI issues, more comparative research and cross-national policy initiatives would be desirable.

Comparative perspectives on regional and immigrant languages in education: The Netherlands as a case study

Derived from the parameters used for an outline of status differences between IMLI in primary and secondary education, we expand our comparative perspective in this section by including both regional and immigrant languages. In this context our focus is on the Netherlands, in particular on the status of Frisian vs. immigrant languages in both primary and secondary schools. Table 7 gives an outline of status differences from these comparative perspectives. There are remarkable differences between the *status quo* of Frisian and IMLI at elementary schools on the one hand and remarkable similarities between Frisian and IMLI (in particular Turkish/Arabic) at secondary schools on the other. Elementary school differences emerge in particular on the parameters of target groups, arguments, goals, minimal enrolment and time-table. The historical development of the status of Frisian at elementary schools in terms of arguments and time-table has a remarkable longitudinal parallel in the status of IMLI at elementary schools.

Contents of this Volume

The contributors to this book are a mixed group of specialists in the field of RM and IM languages. They have been asked to describe and analyse the situation of the language group(s) they were most familiar with in the context of the member state in the European Union where the language group(s) reside(s). For the RM languages the experts usually are concerned with a particular minority language in a particular region. Their counterparts, specialists with an expertise in the domain of IM languages originate from the same European Union member states but not from one specific region, because IM languages are spread over the various states and are not bound to specific regions. They treat one or more IM languages in one state. Also experts from five non-European countries where English functions as a *lingua franca* (Australia, Canada, South Africa, India and the United States) have been invited to contribute because the issue of RM and IM languages is, of course, not unique to Europe. For the purpose of crosscontinental comparison these authors were asked to share their knowledge and experience of their respective multilingual societies with the European experts along the same three dimensions. These five countries have a much longer history of immigration and minorization and have, therefore, a longer history of collecting large-scale census data on (home) language use and ethnicity. Their experiences in the domains of demography, sociolinguistics and education are useful and profitable for all of Europe.

In the final **session** of the seminar from which this book is the result, a concept version of the *Declaration of Oegstgeest* (see Appendix) was presented for discussion and for approval by

the participants. On the basis of a large number of recommendations put forward by all the experts in the seminar a basic list of 12 articles was drafted. The Declaration proposes a set of measures to improve (home) language data-gathering methods and stimulate action programmes in, e.g. education and research, thus improving the status of regional, minority and immigrant languages across Europe. The idea behind the declaration was to prepare a readable document that would be useful for decision makers in the development of further policy, whether on the regional, national or European level. The subtitle of the declaration makes its intention very clear: *Moving away from a monolingual habitus*. The final text of the declaration was unanimously adopted on 30 January 2000 in Oegstgeest. The declaration has been distributed to many politicians and decisions makers accross Europe. By including it again in this Volume we hope to reach an even wider audience.

This Volume consists of three parts, with a focus on regional minority languages in Europe, immigrant minority languages in Europe, and an outlook from abroad respectively. It was, of course, not possible to include representatives of all the regional and the immigrant minorities in Europe. The contributions come from seven of the fifteen member states of the European Union: Austria, Finland, France, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Also within these states we had again to be selective. Our overall purpose was to have one representatives of regional and immigrant minority languages and immigrant languages. We succeeded in most cases, but not in all.

We include countries with a relative longer history of immigration, some of them with a colonial past (United Kingdom, Netherlands, France) others without such past (Germany, Sweden, Finland). This circumstance has had great influence on which groups have immigrated to which countries. For Austria we have one regional minority language represented (Slovenian by Busch). The case of Austria is special because most of the older and recent immigration comes from the middle of Europe (e.g. from the Czech and Slovak republics, Hungary or Poland). The other exceptions are France and Germany where we have a chapter on Arabic (by Caubet) and on Turkish and other languages (by Gogolin and Reich), but none on one of the regional languages. In the case of the United Kingdom we include as regional languages both Welsh (Williams) and Scottish Gaelic (Robertson). They represent two contrasting cases of unique languages which did go through an interesting development over the last decades and policies for Welsh and Gaelic have been examples for other RM languages in Europe. IM languages in the United Kingdom are dealt with in a general overview (by Edwards). Finland and Sweden do contrast because Finland has a well established policy towards Swedish (chapter by Huss), but Sweden has only of recent 'discovered' its historical minorities, of which Finnish is by far the largest (by Østern). In terms of IM languages it is the other way around, because

Sweden (by Boyd) has been considered in the past by some to be model country for Northwestern Europe and Finland has experienced far less immigration (thus no chapter on IML in Finland). It is interesting to observe that whereas Spain used to be an emigration country for North-Western Europe in the sixties, it has more recently become an immigration country (in particular for Arabic speaking Moroccans) (chapter by Lopez and Mijares). Also for regional minorities Spain is an interesting case because it has experienced a rather rapid development of languages policies, among others for Basque (chapter by Cenoz). The Netherlands is an interesting case because it has a long history of immigration from the former colonies, but also more recent immigration (chapter by Van der Avoird, Broeder and Extra), as well as one well-established regional language, Frisian (chapter by Gorter, Riemersma and Ytsma). Finally, the category of diaspora languages is dealt with in an overview on Romani (by Bakker).

When we look at the first five cases with an outlook from abroad, all five countries have English as a *lingua franca*. Also English is an important official language, but in each case there are differences in its function. The way English functions may explain part of the way the minority languages groups are perceived and treated. In Australia, Canada, and the USA (California) English is undisputed the dominant language, notwithstanding the 'English Only' movement in the USA. From such a position of strength it is possible to grant rights and provisions to minority languages. In Canada and the USA even when English is spoken by an overwhelming majority it has one important competitor, respectively French and Spanish. Many other groups are present, older or recent immigrant languages and indigenous Indian languages. Edwards illustrates the difference by the struggle for recognition by the Makah tribe and the influence of the struggles surrounding French in the case of Canada. In Australia there is no 'second best' language, probably therefor only there the catchall phrase 'Languages Other Than English' could arise, all LOTES are more or less equal. Australia has the most liberal policies towards multiculturalism. In South-Africa and India the position of English is different from the former three countries, where it is the language of (former) oppression. In South Africa there are 11 main languages groups (plus other smaller groups), none of which has more than 25% mother tongue speakers. South Africa may evolve towards a situation similar to Australia, without the strong domination of English. In India English is only a *lingua franca*, and the mother tongue of a tiny minority, other language groups are much stronger. If we think of Europe as having a rich diversity of languages, we only have to remind ourselves of the 1652 languages present on the Indian continent, of which 67 are taught in education in order to realize that we in Europe may have much more in common with the rest of the world than we usually are inclined to think.

The two concluding chapters (by Yamur and Saib) deal with the languages of Turkey and Morocco. As Table X makes clear, former inhabitants of these source countries, and therefore also their children and languages, are well represented in European Union countries. Both majority and minority languages of Turkey and Morocco are spoken and more or less intergenerationally transmitted in the EU context of migration and minorization. In particular the status of Kurdish in Turkey and Berber in Morocco as minority languages shows interesting similarities and differences. The typological distance between Turkish and Kurdish on the one hand and Berber and Arabic on the other is large, while at the same time 'Berber' and 'Kurdish' are cover concepts for different subvarieties which in some cases are hardly or not mutually understandable. Moreover, Berber and Kurdish are non-codified language varieties, although Kurmanci (a major variety of Kurdish) and Tashelhit and Tarifit (two varieties of Berber) have made important steps towards a generally accepted codification.

From a historical point of view, Islam as the unifying determinant of the Ottoman empire has been ideologically substituted by language (=Turkish) since the establishment of Turkey as a republic under Kemal Atatürk. In Morocco such substitution never took place. As a result, the concept of 'one nation - one language' is much stronger imposed on the people of Turkey than on the people of Morocco. Nevertheless, both Kurdish and Berber are dominated language varieties in Turkey and Morocco respectively that have traditionally been denied access to school. As yet, in contrast to Kurdish, however, Berber is increasingly being accepted in oral and written mass media. Language policy in both Turkey and Morocco is made in the absence of any reliable recent survey data on (home)language use. Census data on (home) language use have been regularly collected in Turkey until 1985 and published until (1965). In Morocco, only in the latest 1994 census such data have been collected, but they have not been published either.

Both in Turkey and Western Europe Kurdish is spoken by a minority of the Turks. Berber is to a much lesser degree a minority language in Morocco than Kurdish in Turkey, and Berber is frequently spoken as a home language by Moroccans in Western Europe next to or instead of Arabic. Apart from Turkish and Arabic, both Kurdish and Berber are accepted as optional elementary and/or secondary school languages in a number of EU countries.

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TO BE ADDED

Table 1 Nomenclature of the field

Reference to IM groups

- non-national residents
- foreigners, étrangers, Ausländer
- (im)migrants
- new Xmen (e.g. new Dutchmen)
- ethnic/cultural/ethnocultural minorities
- linguistic minorities
- allochthones, allophones
- non-English speaking (NES) residents (in particular in the USA)
- anderstaligen (Dutch: those who speak other languages)

Reference to RM and IM languages

- community languages (cf. in Europe vs. abroad)
- anchestral/heritage languages
- national/historical/regional/indigenous minority languages vs.
- non-territorial/non-regional/non-indigenous/non-European minority lang.
- autochthonous vs. allochthonous minority languages
- lesser used/less widely used/les widely taught languages
- stateless/diaspora languages (in particular used for Romani)
- languages other than English (LOTE: common concept in Australia)

Reference to RM and IM language teaching

- community language teaching (CLT)
- mother tongue teaching (MTT)
- home language instruction (HLI)
- regional minority language instruction (RMLI) vs.
- immigrant minority language instruction (IMLI)

- 6
- enseignement des langues et cultures d'origine (ELCO: in French elementary schools)
- enseignement des langues vivantes (ELV: in French secondary schools)
- Muttersprachlicher Unterricht (MSU)
- Herkunftssprachlicher Unterricht (HSU)
- * Cf. also the Dutch concept of andersdenkenden (those who think differently) for reference to non-Christians.
- ** The concept of lesser used languages has been adopted at the European Union level, cf. the European Bureau for Lesser Used Languages (EBLUL), established in Brussels and Dublin, and speaking and acting on behalf of 'the autochthonous regional and minority' languages of the EU'.

Table 6 Hierarchy of languages in secondary education, in descending order of status (categories 1-6)

	1	2	3	4	5	6
English	+		+			
French		+	+			
German		+	+			
Danish			+			
Dutch			+			
Swedish			+			
Finnish			+		+	
Portuguese			+		+	
Spanish			+		+	
Italian			+		+	
Greek			+		+	
Basque				+		
Frisian				+		
Gaelic				+		
Arabic					+	
Turkish					+	
Berber						+
Kurdish						+

- Often compulsory subject
 Often optional subject as 'second foreign language'
 National languages of EU countries, often supported by positive action programs abroad
- 4: Regional minority languages, often supported by positive action programs in the region
 5: Immigrant minority languages, often offered to immigrant minority pupils only
 6: Rarely offered non-standardized immigrant minority languages