Schooling and 'disorderly' objects:
doing discourse analysis using Foucault

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But here is an example of another possible orientation. In analysing a painting, one can reconstitute the latent discourse of the painter; one can try to recapture the murmur of his intentions which are not transcribed into words, but into lines, surfaces, and colours; one can try to uncover the implicit philosophy that is supposed to form his view of the world… [or] … try to show that it is a discursive practice that is embodied in techniques and effects. In this sense, the painting is not a pure vision that must then be transcribed into the materiality of space; not is it a naked gesture whose silent and eternally empty meanings must be freed from subsequent interpretations. It is shot through… with the positivity of a knowledge (savoir). It seems to me that one might also carry out an analysis of the same type on political knowledge.

Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, p.214.

Act I: Pedagogical systems of formation

This paper is derived from the work I am doing through my doctoral study, which aims to interrogate the construction of otherness and differential treatment of children presenting with problematic behaviour in schools (Graham, 2006; Graham & Slee, 2005; Graham, 2005). It does not contribute to arguments that debate the "truth" of ADHD or claim that "behaviour disorderedness" is purely a social construct. Instead, I take the position that it is not necessary to engage in 'a battle "on behalf" of the truth' by debating 'the philosophical presuppositions that may lie within' that truth nor the 'epistemological foundations that may legitimate it' (Foucault, 1972, p.205). Indeed, Foucault maintains that to 'tackle the ideological function of a science in order to reveal and modify it', one should 'question it as a discursive formation' (1972, p.205), which involves mapping the system by which particular objects are formed and the 'types of enunciations' implicated (Foucault, 1972, p.205). This is taken to mean that instead of engaging in a battle of truth and fiction with the human sciences as to the existence of ADHD or "behaviour disorderedness", the objective is to consider not whether ADHD/behaviour disorder is *true* but how its objects *might become formed*; that is, how is this particular difference articulated and brought to attention and what might be the 'effects in the real' (Foucault, 1980a, p.237).

Scene I: Mapping Systems of Formation

When engaging with Foucault's metaphor of a discursive/technological grid, Scheurich (1997) discusses the construction and recognition of a problematic group occurring within what he describes as a 'grid of social regularities' (Scheurich, 1997, pp.98, 107). Importantly, Scheurich describes this grid as 'both epistemological and ontological; [for] it constitutes both who the problem group is and how the group is seen or known as a problem'

(Scheurich, 1997, p.107). Of interest in this paper is *how* particular children come be described as a problem within the schooling context. Following Scheurich's suggestion of epistemological actions, I investigate pedagogical discourses or discursive practices as enunciations (Foucault, 1972) that determine *whom* a problem group is (Scheurich, 1997).

This is consistent with Foucault's suggestion to tackle truth by questioning it as discursive formation, using discourse analysis to interrogate the productive power of psychopathologising pedagogical discourse and how this may implicate schooling as 'a system of formation' (Foucault, 1972, p.205) of certain truth-objects. In order to facilitate an investigation of pedagogical discourses that construct recognisable (Butler, 1997a) "disordered" objects through statements that define the behaviourally problematic school child, this paper focuses on the deployment of what might be called a discursive analytic; a methodological plan to approach the analysis of pedagogical discourses through the location of enunciations or statements that function with constitutive effects (Foucault, 1972).

Act II: Orientation

Scene I: The Statement.

Foucault privileges the "statement" extracted from 'the simple inscription of what is said' (Deleuze, 1988, p.15). He describes the statement, not as a linguistic unit like the sentence, but as 'a function' (Foucault, 1972, p.98). The statement as "function" can be theorised as a discursive junction-box in which words and things intersect and become invested with particular relations of power, resulting in an interpellative event (Althusser, 1971; Butler, 1990) in which one can 'recognize and isolate an act of formulation' (Foucault, 1972, p.93). According to Foucault, the statement is a 'special mode of existence' (Foucault, 1972, p.100) which enables 'groups of signs to exist, and enables rules or forms to become manifest' (Foucault, 1972, p.99). Thus, in theorising the tactics related to the production of psychiatric "truth" and the development of a power/knowledge specific to the human sciences, Foucault (1972) looks,

> to describe statements, to describe the enunciative function of which they are the bearers, to analyse the conditions in which this function operates, to cover the different domains that this function presupposes and the way in which those domains are articulated (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982, p.56; Foucault, 1972, p.86, 87).

In doing so, Foucault finds that 'psychiatric discourse finds a way of limiting its domain, of defining what it is talking about, of giving it the status of an object – and therefore of making it manifest, nameable, and describable' (Foucault, 1972, p.46). He maintains that the construction of categories and description of disorders (such as the evolving descriptions within the *DSM-IV-TR*) serves to provide the human sciences with a locatable object of scrutiny (Foucault, 1975b). Of interest here is how the statement functions not to define 'objects, fully formed and armed, that the discourse of psychopathology has then merely to list, classify, name,' (Foucault, 1972, p.47) but instead how the statement, as a function of certain discursive dividing practices, 'enables [the object] to appear… to be placed in a field of exteriority' (Foucault, 1972, p.50).

Scene II: Recognising particular objects of discourse

Correspondingly Butler declares that, '[o]ne "exists" not only by virtue of being recognized, but, in a prior sense, by being *recognizable* (original emphasis, Butler, 1997a, p.5). It would be reasonable to argue that statements within pedagogical discourse that speak to poor regulation, impulse or attentional control are the means by which "disordered" discursive objects (Deleuze, 1988) become articulated and made manifest in a form that is "recognizable" (Butler, 1997a). In this way, pedagogical use of behavioural descriptors synonymous with ADHD diagnostic criteria, such as the discussion of attentional or regulatory capabilities, effectively speaks into existence the "behaviourally disordered" schoolchild as a *recognizable* (Butler, 1997a) 'object of discourse' (Foucault, 1972, p.50).

Thus borrowing from Foucault, I interpret the statement as an articulation that functions with constitutive effects. In discussing Foucault's interest in the statement, Deleuze points to the constitutive properties intrinsic to a statement by imparting that a 'statement has a "discursive object" which does not derive in any sense from a particular state of things, but stems from the statement itself' (Deleuze, 1988, p.8). To briefly illustrate I have extracted a statement from the "Swayneville State School Supportive Environment Management Plan" (*Swayneville SS Management Plan*, 1995). This is a school behaviour management policy posted on the Education Queensland website as an example of one school's approach to student discipline. Under "Code of Behaviour" the school lists the category "*Courtesy*". The first point outlined is:

> All people are expected to:
>
> 1.   Think before they speak [i]

In keeping with my project, the question becomes: how does this statement *function*?

Scene III: Tracing the positivity of a knowledge [ii]

The constitutive object in this case is a person who speaks only after clearly thinking of what it is they want to say; the considered, thoughtful subject. Correlatively, an opposition is formed. The antithesis of the thinking, considered, *reasoned* subject is always the unconsidered, poorly-regulated, *unreasonable* subject, for a 'statement always defines itself by establishing a specific link with *something else* that lies on the same level as itself... almost inevitably, it is something foreign, something outside' (original emphasis, Deleuze, 1988, p.11). In locating this statement and identifying its "function" or constitutive properties, it is also possible to isolate the workings or "positivity" (Foucault, 1972, p.214) of a particular power/knowledge – the mantra of "self-regulation" which marks the psychological project to construct the self-governing individual (Popkewitz, 2001).

Interestingly, and despite differences in psychological and medical conceptualisations of Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder, literature from both psychology and medicine revolve around discussions of ADHD as a deficit, not so much in attention but in the locus of executive control (Barkley, 1998; Wallace, 1999); that is, a perceived lack of ability to

control attention or impulse (Atkinson & Shute, 1999; Holmes, 2004; Whalen & Henker, 1998). In this way, I read ADHD as a medical/psychological construct that privileges the ability to self-regulate. This is evident in ADHD diagnostic questionnaires, such as the Connor's Parent/Teacher Rating Scales, where questions relating to calling out in class, remaining seated or in line are common. In privileging such self-regulatory abilities, which in young children is an impossible ideal, medical and psychological discourse sets up a simple bifurcation in childhood behaviour that can be and is being appropriated for disciplinary ends.

It matters little why the Swayneville State School behaviour management policy made such a statement, for 'there is no point in distinguishing between the different types of intentionality' (Deleuze, 1988, p.8). Whilst there are probably a number of explanations as to why thinking before speaking is expected, I am interested only in the *function* the statement performs. Neither does it matter in what context a statement is born, particularly in terms of the analysis of archival records. Entextualisation results in the representation of the child through a case-file, a 'decontextualised text-artifact' (Mehan, 1996, p.359), which objectifies the child and their alleged actions in clinical terms. This is highly problematic for, as Foucault maintains, this "case" is 'no longer a monument for future memory, but a document for future use' (Foucault, 1977, p.191). The significance of this, particularly in light of the Queensland Government's intention to establish a central database that tracks not only student academic history but behavioural "history" as well, is profound (Wardill, 2004). If the discourses teachers use to describe child behaviour are indeed constitutive of 'disorderly' objects, then the development of such a database could have devastating effects for children who come to be described in these ways, further implicating schooling practices in spiralling ADHD diagnostic rates (Davis, Beer, Gligora, & Thorn, 2001; Mackey & Kopras, 2001).

Thus if statements are 'the words, phrases and propositions which revolve round different focal points of power… set in play by a particular problem' (Deleuze, 1988, p.17), for my research project I locate "statements" as *things said* within the discourses used to describe problematic behaviour in schools that *function* with constitutive effects to speak into existence the "behaviourally disordered" schoolchild as a recognizable (Butler, 1993) 'object of discourse' (Foucault, 1972, p.50). Therefore, looking to 'ADHD' and 'behaviour disorderedness' in schools as a discursive formation, and thereby the 'behaviourally disordered' child as a discursive truth-object, entails the location of a particular family of statements and the development of an analytic to examine the words and phrases coagulating around pedagogical descriptions of "disruptive", "disordered" or "disturbed" behaviour in schools. In "doing" discourse analysis this way, I will attempt to map the system through which these particular truth-objects are formed and the 'types of enunciations' implicated (Foucault, 1972, p.205); to call attention to the dangers inherent to the ways in which problematic child behaviour is described in schools.

Act III: "Doing" discourse analysis using Foucault

To interrogate pedagogical discourses relating to child behaviour as 'practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak' (Foucault, 1972, p.54), I analyse three

texts. The principle text is a statement describing problematic child behaviour in school. Of concern is how this particular statement functions – *what does it do and with what effects?* In examining the function of this statement, my analysis will be informed by the examination of two other texts. Each demonstrate techniques in the production of meaning; specifically how the use of performative language and intertextual reference contribute to and enhance the constitutive properties of discourse. The aim is to 'try to grasp subjection in its material instance as a constitution of subjects' (Foucault, 1980b, p.97) through the interrogation of discursive practices that objectify and subjugate the individual. Objectification acts as a locating device, a mechanism of visibility (Deleuze, 1992; Ewald, 1992) that formulates how a 'group is seen or known as a problem' (Scheurich, 1997, p. 98). Once constituted as an object of a particular sort, individuals can be dispersed into disciplinary spaces (Graham, 2006) in that 'grid of social regularity' (Scheurich, 1997) and from there, become subject to particular discourses and practices that Butler argues results in, 'the "on-going" subjugation that is the very operation of interpellation, that (continually repeated) action of discourse by which subjects are formed in subjugation' (Butler, 1997b, pp.358-359). Through this process, individuals not only come to occupy *spaces* at different points in the social hierarchy but, through their continual subjugation, come to know and accept their *place* as natural (Graham, 2005).

In the context of this paper then, discourse analysis is read as a exercise in explicating statements that function to place a discursive frame around a particular position; that is, statements which coagulate and form rhetorical constructions that present a particular reading of social texts. The intention is to demonstrate how such statements, in eliding other readings (Derrida, 1967), come to present a particular view of the world and prepare the ground for the 'practices that derive from them, in the social relations that they form, or, through those relations, modify' (Foucault, 1972). Following Foucault, I interpret statements as things said that privilege particular ways of seeing and codify certain practices. The regularity of statements both in general form and dispersion come to represent a discursive field, or a 'family of statements' (Deleuze, 1988, p.11) that in betraying a 'positivity of knowledge' (Foucault, 1972, p.214) can be (re)traced and linked to a constituting field of power-knowledge. The effect of statements privileging the psychological notion of self-regularity and self-government is to 'speak into existence' an irregular, ungoverned object – the "behaviourally disordered" child with concomitant referrals to behaviour management programs, guidance officers, paediatricians or psychiatrists.

Act IV: Turning to literary vs literal versions of truth

My principal text in this analysis is a statement describing an incident that occurred in a school involving problematic behaviour. Of concern is how this particular statement functions – *what does it do?* In examining the function of this statement, my analysis will be informed by the preliminary examination of two other texts that each demonstrate techniques in the production of meaning, specifically focusing on the *performative properties of language* and the *role of intertextuality*.

Scene I: The effects of the performative

When I refer to the performative I refer to the literary use of the notion of performativity, 'to pose questions about how to think about the constitutive force of language, the nature of discursive events and literature as an act' (Culler, 2000, p.503). In other words, the performative properties of words tell a story by evoking imagery, "performing" actions 'rather than merely reporting them' (Culler, 2000, p.504). To demonstrate the performative in language, I draw on Wilfred Owens and the poem, <u>Dulce Et Decorum Est</u>.

> Gas! Gas! Quick, boys!--An ecstasy of **fumbling**,
> Fitting the **clumsy** helmets just in time;
> But someone still was **yelling** out and **stumbling**
> And **flound'ring** like a man in fire and lime ...
> Dim, through the misty panes and thick green light,
> As under a green sea, I saw him **drowning**.

(Owen, 1963)

In the above stanza, Owens uses words like fumbling, clumsy, yelling, stumbling, flound'ring and drowning. These words convey a sense of urgency and movement, confusion and horror. Owens, a war poet killed in action during WWI, managed to convey the conditions faced by soldiers at a time when political reports were heavily censored. Although this was written some 90 years ago, the language *transports* via the imagery conjured by emotive words that "perform" by conveying action and drama.

Whilst poststructural accounts of meaning in language assert the death of the author (Barthes, 1977) because the potential for multiple reader interpretation/s has been established (Humes & Bryce, 2003), this does not mean that meaning is completely up for grabs. This *would* be relativism and, if this were really the case, why would *post*-theorists bother writing or saying anything at all? Instead, poststructural arguments discount the sovereignty of the author and destabilise the treasured relationship between signifier and signified (Peters, 2004; Trifonas, 2000), claiming that the signified is not some stable construct but comes into being through an interpretative process negotiated by and through the 'cultural politics of the sign' (Trifonas, 2000, p.275). The precariousness of signification does not mean that if I say "The cat is on the mat" that my addressee can intuit that a giraffe is in a spaceship. Language is a system of signification that on the whole works very well. As Thomas (1997) puts it:

> If we are to understand what "pipe" means, the word must refer only to that class of objects normally thought of as pipes; it must not also refer to dogs, vacuum cleaners, and trees. And if "pipe" does happen to be inconvenient enough to refer, as my dictionary tells me it does, to a musical wind instrument, to a tube, or to the note of a bird, I can be confident that the context – sentence, paragraph, or longer passage – will finish the job and furnish the right meaning. (Thomas, 1997, p.79)

Obviously, the words I say govern to a great extent what my addressee will understand of the exchange, however whilst I (the author) 'made subject and subjected through discourse,… can act with intent' (Saltmarsh & Youdell, 2004, p.357), the interpretative

power of the reader means that I 'cannot ensure or secure the constitutive force of [my] discursive practices' (Saltmarsh & Youdell, 2004, p.357). I *can* influence the process of interpretation through various techniques though, and in doing so, convey my meaning more forcefully. For example, I can say "The cat is *sitting* on the mat" and thus my addressee will now know that the cat is not lying but sitting on the mat. This may also convey through the use of the performative "sitting" that the cat is alive and not lying on the mat in a state of rigor mortis. It would be unusual for a dead cat to be found sitting up. Here we are determining one aspect of what the statement "The cat is *sitting* on the mat" does and the effect of the use of performative language upon meaning and interpretation. The use of the performative is one way I can influence meaning. Another is intertextual reference and it is to a discussion of this technique that I now turn.

Scene II: The use of intertextuality

Whilst we now know that the cat is sitting on the mat and not lying in state, we still don't know very much. We don't know whose cat it is, nor what colour it is, whether it is old or young, whether it spends all day on the mat and hence, whether it is a lazy cat or one just stopping for a moment before returning to decimate native wildlife. In art such as literature, creativity and novelty are important. Endless narrative setting the scene and explaining the lives of characters can be boring and it takes time. Intertextuality is an inventive technique that calls up other texts to help the interpretive process. To demonstrate what intertextuality can *do*, I draw on Kenneth Slessor's <u>Wild Grapes</u> and contrast this with Shakespeare's <u>Othello</u>.

> Eating their flesh, half-savage with black fur.
> Acid and gipsy-sweet, I thought of her,
> Isabella, the dead girl, who has lingered on
> Defiantly when all have gone away,
> In an old orchard where swallows never stir.
>
> Isabella grapes, outlaws of a strange bough,
> That in their harsh sweetness remind me somehow
> Of dark hair swinging and silver pins,
> A girl half-fierce, half-melting, as these grapes,
> **Kissed here ––– or killed here ––– but who remembers now?**

> (Kenneth Slessor)

We can interpret from the above that the girl Isabella is dead. We don't know how she died, although the word 'killed' suggests she did not die of natural causes. We cannot be certain though. However, the final line could be a reference to Othello's final soliloquy after he murders his wife, Desdemona.

> **I kissed thee ere I killed thee.** No way but this, Killing myself, to die upon a kiss.

> (Othello, Act V, Scene II, line 359-60, William Shakespeare).

The point of an intertextual reference is to bring another text/story into the field of investigation to inform and enhance the reading of the current text. In this case, the reference to Othello's statement provides the reader with another interpretation (certainly not a definitive one for who knows whether Slessor intended such a connection) and another way of looking at the story of <u>Wild Grapes</u>. Interestingly, other words such as gipsy, outlaws, black, fur and half-savage stand out *more* after one makes the intertextual connection between the poem and Shakespeare's tale of a disapproved bi-racial marriage between Desdemona and Othello who, amongst frequent other animal metaphors, is referred to as an 'old black ram' by Iago (Shakespeare, 1983, 1:1). In short, through the use of intertextual reference the story of <u>Othello</u> could be used to inform readings of Slessor's <u>Wild Grapes</u>.

Scene III: Examining the effects of pedagogical discourse through discourse analysis

As mentioned previously, the analyses of the two previous texts were done to inform the analysis of a principle text. This "text" is a statement made by a teacher to support the referral of a primary school student to a behaviour management program called RAP or "Reflecting About Problems". The author wrote:

> In short, "Randall"[1] punched 5 boys in the face for absolutely no reason. This is possibly the 5th time this term he has violently attacked children in the playground.

> "Randall", 2002.

The question here is: how does this statement function? What does it *do*? As with <u>Dulce Et Decorum Est</u>, this statement demonstrates the use of performative language. Let us look at the statement differently by isolating the performative and question what that does.

> In short, "Randall" **punched** 5 boys in the face for absolutely no reason. This is possibly the 5th time this term he has **violently attacked** children in the playground.

> "Randall", 2002.

Here I have isolated the words "punched", "violently" and "attacked". These words mean both nothing and anything. We do not know what *really* happened because we were not there and are left to rely on the author's account. Significantly, Randall does not get to provide his account which suggests that his view of events is unimportant or, because the teacher informs us that Randall acted for 'absolutely no reason', that Randall's account has been discounted. In any case, and here we return to poststructural caution in the analysis of language/meaning, *we do not know what the author interprets as "punching", what s/he regards as "violent" or what in his/her eyes constitutes an "attack".* I am not attempting to uncover the 'truth' of what happened in the playground, as impossible as that is. Of concern here is how this statement functions – *what does it <u>do</u>?*

The statement constitutes "Randall" as a mindless, violent attacker. The act is described in highly emotive language with the use of "punched", "violently" and "attacked", words

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[1] A pseudonym.

that *perform* in that they evoke images that increase the effect of the statement. Consider this statement using less powerful words:

> In short, "Randall" hit 5 boys in the face for absolutely no reason. This is possibly the 5th time this term he has behaved like this towards other children in the playground.

Interestingly, the impact of the statement has changed considerably with a simple substitution of less emotive words. However, the use of performative language is not the only technique used in the production of meaning in this statement. Let us consider what else the statement does.

Description of the five other boys, their reaction, and what may have led to the event is strangely lacking. Whether the incident involved five boys in a group or five boys at random is not explained. Nor is there any attempt to establish the timing of the incident; i.e. whether there was one incident in that day or five separate incidents throughout the course of the day. On one hand there is an absence of context but then, on the other, there is the establishment of a *another kind of context altogether* which is brought to bear through the iteration of the second half of the statement. Again, I am not seeking the 'truth' of what happened through an establishment of context, as 'context explains nothing' (Deleuze, 1988, p.11), instead here I query the *function* of this absence for discourse analysis consistent with a Foucauldian notion of discourse does not seek to reveal the true meaning by what is said or not said (Foucault, 1972). Instead, when "doing" discourse analysis within a Foucauldian framework, one looks to statements not so much for what they say but what they *do*; that is, one questions what the constitutive or political effects of saying this instead of that might be? It is the effects derived from 'hidden elements' constituted by 'the unsaid' (Foucault, 1972, p.124) that I find interesting, how this statement functions because of the way it is written; the effects of the noisy claims made in concert with glowering silences. In this instance, the silence or 'lack' (Foucault, 1972, p.124) surrounding causality and provocation, *functions to efface other actors or actions from the scene* and effectively *invalidates any possible reasonable provocation for the actions reported* in the incident. The second part of the statement,

> This is possibly the 5th time this term he has violently attacked children in the playground.
>
> "Randall", 2002.

…is extraneous to the reported incident and one might wonder why it is there at all? I will argue that it functions in two ways: (1) to counteract the statement preceding it; and oddly enough, (2) to support the statement preceding it.

This may seem somewhat paradoxical. How can (and why would) one part of a statement work both for and against another? To respond to this paradox, we must return to the first half of the statement:

> In short, "Randall" punched 5 boys in the face for absolutely no reason.
>
> "Randall", 2002.

Apart from using performative language to describe the actions of the Grade 3 child in question, this statement imposes an interpretive paradigm that posits "absolutely no reason" for the child's actions. The effect of this is to dramatically increase the seriousness of the action described. To have "punched" another child is serious. To have done so for "absolutely no reason" is suggestive of malevolence, psychopathology, a state of *unreason*. However, and here is the problem, to suggest that a child has punched another for <u>absolutely no reason</u> is to introduce the problem of the 'motiveless act' (Foucault, 1975a, p.123) and the dilemma of how to punish 'crimes without reason' (Foucault, 1975a, p.118) for, as Foucault points out, 'the exercise of punitive power requires a rationality of the act to be punished' (Foucault, 1975a, p.116).

> The criminal subject's reason is the condition of the application of the law. The law cannot be applied if the subject is not rational… But exercise of the right to punish says: I can punish only if I understand why he committed the act, how he committed the act, that is to say, if I can enter into the analyzable intelligibility of the act in question… we inevitably find ourselves in a situation in which the exercise of punitive power can no longer justify itself, since we find no intrinsic intelligibility of the act through which the exercise of punitive power connects up with the crime. (Foucault, 1975a, p.116-117)

The assertion that the child acted for/with "absolutely no reason" throws the awkward alliance between medical and psychological conceptualisations of childhood "behaviour disorderedness" into clear relief. The medical model of ADHD/behaviour disorderedness posits neurobiological reasons for disorderly behaviour 'with medical practitioners having the primary role in interventions' (Atkinson & Shute, 1999, p.124). This is to the apparent detriment of an army of psychological practitioners keen to remain involved, prompting tactics like the avoidance of words 'such as "symptoms" and "diagnosis" [which] automatically give precedence to a medical model of ADHD' (Atkinson & Shute, 1999, p.123).

Whilst I am favour of neither, the fundamental difference between medical and psychological models lies in their respective theorisation of agency, reason and control with an effect towards perceptions of responsibility and culpability. The medical model appears to accept the "behaviourally disordered" child as having little or no control over their actions. The psychological model, on the other hand, is dependent for its very existence on the paradoxical assertion of the child's ability to exert or learn self-control. Difficult behaviour is interpreted as misdirected behaviour or seen as behaviour that is gaining a pay-off which can be fixed by re-arranging the terms (Atkinson & Shute, 1999). On the side of the medical model, there is the assertion of a lack in the faculty to control, which results in a view of the child as not entirely responsible for their actions. On the other side, psychological concepts rely on *reason*, and this constitutes the shaky epistemological base upon which psychological interventions (behaviour management/modification) rest. I say *shaky* because if, as Atkinson & Shute concur, 'the generally accepted premise is that the medical model is the appropriate one' (Atkinson & Shute, 1999, p.124) and ADHD and other disruptive behaviour "disorders" are behavioural reflections of neurobiological anomalies affecting a child's ability to self-regulate, then where does that leave behaviour modification techniques that require self-regulatory abilities?

In the schooling context, however, behaviour intervention techniques informed by the psychological model prevail over medical conceptualisations of behaviour "disorderedness" and it's more conservative estimate of the agentive capabilities of the child, however, it must be stated that the medical model is just as problematic because of the increasing recourse to psycho-pharmaceutical control (Mackey & Kopras, 2001). Psychological conceptualisations may find more fertile ground within the schooling arena because, as Usher & Edwards maintain, 'the very rationale of the educational process and the role of the educator is founded on modernity's self-motivated, self-directing, rational subject, capable of exercising individual agency' (Usher & Edwards, 1994, p.2),. Or perhaps because, much like psychiatry provided the courts with an indictable subject/object (Foucault, 1975a), psychology provides the disciplinary institution of the school with a *punishable* subject/object. At this point, we might return to the statement that sparked this discussion:

> This is possibly the 5th time this term he has violently attacked children in the playground.

> "Randall", 2002.

After considering this statement briefly, I questioned why is it there at all? As has been discussed, the assertion in the preceding statement that "Randall" acted for 'absolutely no reason' raises the question: how can he then be referred to a behaviour management program that is grounded in and dependent on the child's ability to self-regulate? Probably without even knowing it, the author of this statement has placed the validity of the referral itself into jeopardy. However, in keeping with my project, I refrain from asking why the author wrote this and what their intentions may have been and instead pose what is arguably a more important question; what does this statement do and how? Through the use of intertextuality, the second half of this statement functions to construct a "history" of psychopathological behaviour. In doing so, this statement works to support the 'truth' of the first, cementing the depiction of "Randall" as not only a violent attacker but also a *habitual* violent attacker; constituting him as an object of psychopathology but one that exhibits a 'certain habitual way of behaving' (Foucault, 1975a, p.124).

In his College de France lectures, Foucault discussed the case of Henriette Cornier whose 'motiveless act' confounded the justice system until the crime and indictment against her was rearticulated to question, not her interest in the act, but her resemblance to the act itself (Foucault, 1975a). Foucault maintains that the service psychiatry provides to the courts is to provide a historical account of the subject's conduct in order to reflect the act's imputability to the subject; where, when faced with the 'crime without reason' (Foucault, 1975a, p.118) upon which occurrence the jurisdiction of the courts might stall, psychiatry provides the courts with a 'moral requalification of the subject' (Foucault, 1975a, p.127) that substitutes a moral history of conduct through which the subject's actions can be interpreted and thus, judged.

> You can see how, for the problem of the act's reason and intelligibility, the indictment substitutes something else: the subject's resemblance to her act, or even the act's imputability to the subject. Since the subject so resembles her act,

> then the act really is hers and we have the right to punish the subject when we
> come to judge the act. (Foucault, 1975a, p.124)

Returning to my current analysis, the effect of the second statement is that the prior events conjured characterise and condemn "Randall"; no longer does this statement function as an incident report, it has become an indictment of character and conduct. Hence, the second statement supports the 'truth' of the first, in that the child is "unreasonable" but counteracts the assertion that the child is not responsible (or punishable) for his actions – because the child so resembles his actions and his actions are imputable to evidence of his prior conduct. Once written these words constitute an archive, a history, and the child quickly becomes a *case* constituted by the statements within his case file which, 'no longer a monument for future memory, but a document for future use' (Foucault, 1977, p.191), comes to provide the rationale for "professional" intervention (Slee, 1994, 1995; Thomas & Glenny, 2000). The intertextual moment in the second half of the statement directs the reader towards the student's case-file which can be used to support the veracity of the first statement (despite its obvious flaws) *and* the student's referral to the "Reflecting About Problems" behaviour management withdrawal program.

However, psychological discourses that speak to self-regulation and reason disseminate universalising theories of cognition and development that exclude through 'systems of recognition, divisions, and distinctions that construct reason and "the reasonable person" (Popkewitz, 2001, p.336). Similarly, the constitutive effects of psychopathologising pedagogical discourse imbued with the positivity of psychological power-knowledge works to speak into existence the "behaviourally disordered" child as a recognisable object of scrutiny. The dominance and dispersion of such statements privilege a particular constituting field of power-knowledge which acts to legitimise and bring into operation the practices that derive from such statements,[iii] whilst disguising the exclusionary logic of such practices by rearticulating the conditions of exclusion. This occurs through the establishment of a causal link within the recalcitrant, uncooperative "unreasoned" child who "chooses" to make the wrong choices (Graham, 2005).

I stated earlier that my objective is not to consider whether ADHD/behaviour disorder is *true* but how its objects *might become formed*; that is, how this particular difference is articulated and brought to attention and what might be the 'effects in the real' (Foucault, 1980a, p.237). In considering "ADHD/behaviour disorderedness" as a discursive formation and schooling as a system of formation of disorderly objects, it makes sense to deploy some form of discourse analysis in order to map the system by which these particular truth-objects are formed and the 'types of enunciations' implicated (Foucault, 1972, p.205). Having had difficulty finding coherent descriptions of how to do discourse analysis using Foucault, I have chosen to develop what might be called a discursive analytic. This is a methodological plan that looks to locate statements that function with constitutive effects in which one can 'recognise and isolate an act of formulation' (Foucault, 1972, p.93). I have attempted to describe these statements and the 'enunciative function of which they are the bearers' (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982, p.56) by indicating how things said within pedagogical discourse may call into being a recognizable object of discourse (Butler, 1997a). The operation of such discursive dividing practices in schooling enables not just that object to

appear and be placed in a field of exteriority (Foucault, 1972) but prepares the ground for the exclusionary practices that derive from them.   The 'method' I have drawn upon in this paper is certainly not one I have developed to discipline those who choose to do discourse analysis using Foucault but to aid my overall project in calling attention to the dangers inherent to the ways in which problematic child behaviour is described in schools.

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[i] Swayneville State School Supportive Environment Management Plan, 1995, p. 8.

[ii] Here I refer to the earlier citation of Foucault's description of 'another possible orientation' (p.213) in The Archaeology of Knowledge (Foucault, 1972)

[iii] Here I am referring to, for example, referrals to behaviour management programs, guidance officers, paediatricians or psychiatrists, suspension, alternative-site placement or school exclusion