Fashioning an Entrepreneurial Creative Cultural Self

Dr. Terry Flew

Media and Communication
Creative Industries Faculty,
Queensland University of Technology,
Brisbane, Australia


Cultural Studies and Contemporary Modes of Knowledge Production

I want to begin today’s paper by considering a recent academic ‘blockbuster’ tour of Australia by U.S. academic Richard Florida, Professor of Regional Economic Development at Carnegie Mellon University and author of *The Rise of the Creative Class* (Florida 2002) to Melbourne, Sydney and Brisbane. What interested me was not so much Florida’s arguments, which I have discussed elsewhere (Flew 2003, 2004a, 2004b), but rather who brought him to Australia and why, and how this compares to previous academic blockbuster tours. Florida was brought to Australia, not by
university or an academic association, but rather as part of the 2004 Melbourne Fashion Festival, sponsored by L’Oréal, and his tour was also supported by The Hornery Institute, a non-profit think-tank supported by Delfin Lend Lease to advise on community development and urban planning.

Florida’s tour presented an interesting contrast to other visits to Australia that were associated with cultural studies, such as Stuart Hall’s 1983 visit, or that of Jean Baudrillard in 1994. In the case of Hall, his 1983 ‘Rethinking Marxism’ presentations were supported by the Communist Party of Australia, as a part of its activities to commemorate the 100\textsuperscript{th} anniversary of the death of Karl Marx. Jean Baudrillard’s 1994 visit to Australia, another academic blockbuster event, occurred under the auspices of the Institute of Modern Art in Brisbane and the Power Institute for Fine Arts at the University of Sydney, and was accompanied by a photographic exhibition. If we contrast these three academic tours, we note interesting contrasts in terms of sponsors, presentation sites, the intellectual linkages which these presentations were principally formed around, and the intended audience for these presentations.

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<td><strong>Event sponsors</strong></td>
<td>Communist Party of Australia</td>
<td>Power Institute for Fine Arts; Institute of Modern Art</td>
<td>L’Oréal Melbourne Fashion Festival; Hornery Institute</td>
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<td><strong>Presentation sites</strong></td>
<td>Tom Mann Theatre, Australian Metal Workers’ Union Building, Surry Hills</td>
<td>University of Sydney; Griffith University</td>
<td>Sofitel Hotel, Melbourne; Wharf Theatre, Sydney; Kelvin Grove Urban Village, Brisbane</td>
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<td><strong>Intellectual linkages</strong></td>
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<td>Fashion design, urban planning; business management</td>
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One way of reading this trajectory is, of course, to identify it with the de-politicisation of cultural studies, in the face of a decline of the traditional left, intellectual fashion (‘from Marxism to postmodernism to the market’), and a progressive commercialisation of the university more generally. This presupposition of once-radical academic disciplines having their critical teeth pulled in the face of ascendant neo-liberalism has been made, most vocally by Thomas Frank (2000). It features prominently in critiques of creative industries developments in Australia, such as that of Rossiter, who denounces creative industries as being driven by “‘market populism’ … defined by a delirious faith in entrepreneurial culture and the capacity for new ICTs … to unction as a policy and electoral panacea’ (Rossiter 2004: 26).

In this paper, however, I wish to consider such developments in light of three issues: (1) emergent knowledge production frameworks, and how cultural studies is positioned in relation to them; (2) the relationship of cultural studies academics to developments in creative industries fields, most notably the rise of cultural enterprise; and (3) the question of how conceptual frameworks are related to empirical developments in creative labour markets.

Ien Ang (2004) has recently posed the question of whether the research questions and methodologies of cultural studies are best understood as being within Mode 1 or Mode 2 knowledge production frameworks. Arguing that there has been a growing attention to questions of ‘culture’ in contemporary global capitalism as well as
international relations, Ang has proposed that the historical orientation of cultural studies towards engagement with current issues, and a form of ‘applied humanities’ with real purchase outside of the university environment, draws attention to ‘the very pragmatic conditions in which our production of knowledge is organised in contemporary society, and the place of our kind of work within it’ (Ang 2004: 478). Ang’s understanding of cultural studies as more of a filed of application than as an academic discipline leads to a discussion of the Mode 1/Mode 2 frameworks of contemporary knowledge production proposed by Michael Gibbons and his collaborators in relation to the social production of knowledge in science and technology-related fields (Gibbons et. al. 1994; Nowotny et. al. 2001).

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<td>Conditions of knowledge</td>
<td>Grounded within rules and practices of an academic discipline</td>
<td>Grounded in context of application and expectations of external clients</td>
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<td>Conditions of knowledge</td>
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<td>Multiple stakeholders, both within and outside the academy</td>
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<td>Purpose of knowledge</td>
<td>Advancement of disciplinary knowledge</td>
<td>Solving of practical problems as they arise in social context</td>
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<td>Mode of knowledge</td>
<td>Individuals or discipline-based groups</td>
<td>Trans-disciplinary, project-based teams</td>
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<td>Where knowledge is</td>
<td>Traditional sites: universities and research centres</td>
<td>Multiple sites: universities, corporations, government agencies, ‘think</td>
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<td>Quality control</td>
<td>Internal mechanisms (e.g. academic peer review)</td>
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To the best of my knowledge, Ang is the only leading academic to have evaluated the relevance of this framework to cultural studies, although it is very widely discussed in other fields, such as education, health and, of course, the natural sciences (e.g. Heath
Critics argue that the Mode 1/mode 2 dichotomy implicit assumes that knowledge which was ‘socially valued’ by external stakeholders from industry and government is inherently ‘good’, and that the absence of disciplinary-based criteria for the valorisation of knowledge ran the risk of collapsing academic research into the realm of special interest-driven consultancy research. Ang’s reading of these debates, and their relevance to cultural studies, is a very astute one. An important consequence of the rise of Mode 2 knowledge production, for Ang, is that ‘knowledge production has become much more widely distributed, taking place in many more types of social settings, and involving many different types of individuals and organizations’ (Ang 2004: 479). One result of the demand that universities become more ‘relevant’ to the external environment, which comes not only from governments and industry but also from students, is that insofar as they succeed in this, universities undercut their own claims to have a monopoly on knowledge production (the Mode 1 framework). This is because ‘to the extent that universities continue to provide quality graduates, they undermine their monopoly as knowledge producers’ (Ang 2004: 479). Ang also recognises the particular significance of this discourse in the Australian context, as a progressive (and politically bi-partisan) tilting of research funding towards initiatives that involve industry partners, such as Australian Research Council Linkage grants, has increasingly imbricated academic researchers in the humanities and creative arts into a Mode 2 knowledge production framework, where social use-value, connection to industry partners, and national benefit criteria are paramount.

This distancing of the traditional concerns of cultural studies from emergent forms of cultural practice seems to be most apparent in debates about creativity and the
creative industries. Culture has made a belated appearance in the Australian Government’s National Research Priorities under the theme of ‘Promoting an innovation culture and economy’. The Australian Research Council has twinned culture and creativity to innovation and economic development, proposing that ‘Promoting an innovation culture and economy requires research with a focus on developing and fostering human talent, societal and cultural values favourable to creativity and innovation, and structures and processes for encouraging and managing innovation’ (ARC 2004). There are significant problems with this twinning of creativity and innovation that are reflective of the science-based paradigm through which the National Research Priorities have been constructed. Madden (2004) has pointed out that the currently fashionable understanding of creativity as involving invention and new ideas has neglected the understanding, that has a long history in the arts, as understanding creativity as involving the adaptation of a received tradition. To take an obvious example, the staging of a Shakespearean play can be creative without it involving the writing of a new dramatic work. The invention-cognition approach to creativity, based around novelty and new ideas, can also lose sight, as Negus and Pickering (2004) point out, of the extent to which they can be effectively communicated to an audience, and therefore the extent to which creative ideas resonate with the emotions of those receiving them, as well as shared cultural and other experiences.

The absence of cultural studies researchers from creativity debates – although not those concerned with affect and the emotions – can be noted. For many in cultural studies, adaptation to such discourses are seen as, at best, a pragmatic response undertaken reluctantly in politically uncongenial times, and, at worst, as a new form
of false consciousness, whose core terms – creativity, the new economy, knowledge industries, consumption – are all intellectually suspect (see e.g. Miller 2004). At the same time, what is also striking is the extent to which developments in these creative sectors have themselves an increasingly attenuated relationship to the academy. In her discussion of the new generation of cultural workers associated with networking initiatives such as the London Cultural Entrepreneurs Club, Angela McRobbie notes that:

> These ‘second wavers’ are redescribing culture and creativity as we know them … We cultural studies academics might teach these young people in the relatively fixed space of the seminar room, but once they enter the world of work, our encounters with ‘incubators’ and others are increasingly estranged and contingent (McRobbie 2002: 528).

At an empirical level, the growing significance of cultural entrepreneurship can be seen in a recent European Union survey of employment in the cultural sector by the consultants MKW. Recognising the difficulty in establishing a shared definition of the ‘cultural industries’ or the ‘creative industries’ within the European Union, they nonetheless found that employment growth rates in cultural occupations were four times the EU average (4.8 per cent growth between 1995-1999, compared to overall employment growth in the EU of 1.2 per cent), and that people working in cultural occupations were almost three times as likely to be self-employed as the EU average (40.4 per cent compared to 14.4 per cent for the EU as a whole) (MKW 2001: 84-86). The EU study also indicates that workers in cultural occupations are twice as likely to have a tertiary qualification as those in
other sectors, and that higher degree qualifications are particularly pronounced among self-employed cultural workers (MKW 2001: 87-88). As MKW observe, it is this element of cultural entrepreneurship which gives it interest and resonance beyond the specific domain of cultural policy:

It is precisely this in-between position of the ‘new worker’/‘new entrepreneur’, between capital and labour, that is particularly interesting for labour market researchers, cultural studies analysts and politicians, because new socio-political relationships beyond the welfare state are reflected in it. The categories of the full-time-job society – here the worker, there the employer – no longer apply; the (cultural) worker is suddenly also a (cultural) entrepreneur (without capital) (MKW 2001: 40).

No comparable Australian or New Zealand studies exist at this stage, although some suggestive data exists. The New Zealand Institute for Economic Research (NZIER) estimated the number of people employed in the creative industries at 49,000, or 3.6 per cent of the workforce in 2000/01 (NZIER 2003), while the Creative Industries Research and Applications Centre (CIRAC) has estimated the number of people employed in the creative industries at 225,000 in 2001, or 4.2 per cent of the workforce (Cunningham et. al. 2003). Neither of these studies differentiated between wage-earners and the self-employed, or between those working for large corporations as compared to SME (small-to-medium enterprise) employment. Add data on self-employment in Australia
Cultural Enterprise: Understandings and Misunderstandings

In their manifesto for cultural entrepreneurship, *The Independents: Britain’s New Cultural Entrepreneurs* (Leadbeater and Oakley 1999), Charles Leadbeater and Kate Oakley established two points that are important to bear in mind in considering this phenomenon. The first is models of creative production are inherently collaborative, networked and team-based. While the constitution of the creative teams shifts and changes across projects – as part of what Jeremy Rifkin (2000) has elsewhere termed the ‘Hollywood organisational model’ – cultural entrepreneurship in this model is understood as an inherently collaborative activity. This is consistent with what economist Richard Caves (2000) has termed the *motley crew* principle of creative industries production, whereby creative teams with a diverse range of skill and expectations about the final product, need to be co-ordinated in a finite and time-constrained production cycle. Second, Leadbeater and Oakley make much of cultural entrepreneurs constituting a ‘missing middle’ between the large publicly-funded arts and cultural organisations the large, and increasingly global, media and entertainment corporations that dominate the distribution of cultural and creative products and services, and the myriad micro-businesses, sole traders, intermittent creative workers, volunteers and unemployed people found across all of the creative industries sectors (c.f. Cunningham 2004). In this respect, their activities are a central part of the emergent *network enterprise* form, and across large organizations and the SME/micro-business sector, that operates between and across the public and private sectors, in a distinctive manner to both the hierarchical corporate or bureaucratic organisational form and the disconnected and disembodied nature of pure market transactions (Davis and Scase 2001; Thompson 2003; Barney 2004).
In this respect, then, the relationship between this form of cultural enterprise and the concept of the ‘entrepreneur’ may prove to be an obstacle to better understanding this phenomenon. Perhaps the most widely held image of what an entrepreneur looks like is Donald Trump. The image of Trump as entrepreneur, carefully cultivated through the reality TV program *The Apprentice*, is that of the powerful and completely autonomous individual, able to turn his business acumen to any new market opportunity that might emerge. Writing in the early 1990s, when Australian images of entrepreneurship were shaped by failed local tycoons such as Alan Bond and Christopher Skase, Tom O’Regan (1993) identified the fatal flaw in the ‘entrepreneurial game plan’ as it was applied to Australian commercial television. O’Regan observed that, unlike the established media moguls such as Rupert Murdoch and Kerry Packer, who made their fortunes in the media by having intimate knowledge of the subtle nuances of media businesses, the new entrepreneurs possessed highly generalised forms of knowledge that lacked domain specificity. As a result, they were caught high and dry when economic circumstances changed in the Australian television industry, since they approached the sector solely from the point of view of its balance sheet assets, and misunderstood the complexities of creative processes and market relations in the sector. While O’Regan applied this analysis to Australian television in the early 1990, its intellectual antecedents can be found in the dissident economic traditions associated with Thorstein Veblen and John Maynard Keynes, who drew a distinction between enterprise that was grounded in local knowledge and industry-specific practice, which is seen as genuinely generating new wealth, and profit-making that arose from asset trading and speculation, which was seen as predatory and ultimately destructive (c.f. Stilwell 2002).
O’Regan’s critique of ‘entrepreneurial television’ in Australia recalls Henry Mintzberg’s more recent jeremiad against Masters of Business Administration (MBA) programs. He argues that MBA programs teach business management in ways that are too theoretical and genericised in their content, and too disconnected from the ‘real world’ of business (as opposed to the stylised facts of business case studies), to generate useful applications of knowledge on the part of their graduates when they come to work in companies (Mintzberg 2004). Importantly, and perhaps in contrast to O’Regan’s critique, Mintzberg emphasises that while MBA program increasingly have courses on entrepreneurship, they typically do not teach entrepreneurs – defined here as people who start new businesses – and in many respects their approach to management education is antithetical to entrepreneurial styles of managing, and more akin to traditional hierarchical and bureaucratic modes:

"It might be said then, that the entrepreneur practices a traditional style of managing; as the boss who knows the business deeply and gets involved in everything … Many … are attracted to industries too new or fragmented to generate the numbers required for fancy calculation. So they need the courage to act without the data, and an MBA education hardly encourages that … Entrepreneurship, then, is largely an act of faith, requiring the imagination of the artist more than the calculation of the technocrat (Mintzberg 2004: 134).

Entrepreneurship, then, can be grounded in local knowledge, domain-specific experience, and a passion for achievement in particular fields in ways that are conducive to new wealth creation, or it can be associated with asset-stripping and
speculative paper-shuffling that are ultimately destructive of viable industries. It can also be something undertaken by the enthusiast, the person with few tangible assets but many big ideas, or it can constitute a form of genericised knowledge that becomes a trendy adjunct to the corporate MBA. A third approach, which has perhaps been the dominant one in cultural studies, is to treat the concept as essentially an ideological smokescreen, as part of the obsfucatory discourses of neo-liberalism, disguising the largely unchanged nature of exploitative capital-labour relations. In this light, concepts such as cultural entrepreneurship and, indeed, the whole notion of a ‘new economy’ driven by ideas and intangible assets, are seen little more than ideological camouflage or ‘cheerleading’ for the global copyright industries. As James Donald summarises this line of argument, the so-called ‘new economy’ is simply ‘the old wolf of capitalism in designer clothing’ (Donald 2004: 255). For Ned Rossiter, to take one example, ‘the Creative Industries project is a reactionary model insofar as it reinforces the status quo of labour relations within a neo-liberal paradigm’ (Rossiter 2004: 29).

Such a critique is a very familiar one, defending the fort of a cultural studies informed by Marxist political economy, with its dominant language of exclusion and exploitation, with familiar barbs directed at those projecting any alternative understandings (‘’reactionary’, ‘status quo’, ‘neo-liberal’). My point is that the empirical trends that we observe may require some reconsidering of our constitutive models of economy and society, and that, insofar as cultural studies works with an analysis of the dynamics of capitalist market economies which trails off the slipstream of Marxist political economy, it largely misses these trends. In establishing the centrality of the capital-labour relationship based upon exploitation of one class by
another, or upon the exclusion of disenfranchised groups from the capital-labour relationship, Marxist political economy has also always required the associated assumption that the concentration and centralisation of capital will witness the demise of small businesses and the self-employed. It is a debate that has been around since Eduard Bernstein’s critique of the platform of the German Social Democratic Party at the beginning of the 20th century, and history has continued to establish how problematic the ‘class polarisation’ thesis has been.

My sense is that the trend towards networked models of business organisation, and the rise of self-employment and sub-contracting in its various forms - dependent contractors, independent contractors or consultants, flexi-hire workers or mediated service providers (Burton-Jones 2000) - has intensified in the early 21st century, and that those engaged in the creative industries are at the epicentre of such changes. The continuing attachment of cultural studies to Marxist political economy, where categories of enterprise and entrepreneurship remain illegitimate, since new wealth is derived either from the exploitation of labour by capital in the sphere of production, or from the exploitation by producers of consumers in the sphere of consumption (‘buying cheap and selling dear’). The generation of new wealth from new ideas, or from new ways of organising existing activities (e.g. entrepreneurship in arts management (Rentschler 2000), or university governance (Marginson and Considine 2000)), continues to be incommensurable with a Marxist-inspired cultural studies cosmology.¹ By contrast, McRobbie’s critical empirical account of the London creative industries workforce is alert to such trend, and draws attention to:
the sheer incommensurability of working patterns in the creative network with existing official, governmental and social science paradigms ... there is as yet no category for the curator/project manager/artist/website designer who is transparently multi-skilled and ever willing to pick up new forms of expertise, who is also constantly finding new niches for work and thus inventing new jobs for him/herself (e.g. incubator/creative agent), who is highly mobile moving from one job or project to the next, and in the process also moving from one geographical site to the next (McRobbie 2002: 387).

If the discovery of creative enterprise and cultural entrepreneurship is anything other than the redefining of the self-employed as ‘entrepreneurs’ and corporations as ‘enterprises’, along the lines of what Don Watson (2004) has termed weasel words – the unemployed become ‘job seekers’, customers become ‘clients’ – then here is a need to locate the activity in the broader context of how creative industries emerge, develop and grow. One well-known feature of these sectors is their ‘hour-glass’ shape, whereby the relationship between a very large number of content creators and an almost infinite number of prospective consumers is funnelled through a small, highly concentrated and vertically integrated set of content distributors (Hesmondhalgh 2002; Cunningham 2004). If terms such as cultural enterprise and cultural entrepreneurship have meaning, I would propose, it lies in the action that can be taken at both ends of the ‘funnel’, in brokering relations between content creators and distributors on the one hand, and the large-scale distribution network and consumers on the other. In my own work, I have drawn attention to the empirical possibility of disintermediation in the creative industries value chain, where content creators have the scope to bypass the distributional ‘middle’, and reach prospective
clients more directly through digitally networked technologies such as the Internet (Flew 2004: 94-95). In doing so, there is no naïve assumption that the distributional ‘middle’ (be it media corporations, service providers, political parties, or whatever) simply disappears in the face of new opportunities to directly connect content creators and consumers through the Internet. Rather, it locates cultural entrepreneurship at two critical interstitial points in the creative industries value chain, in the capacity on the one hand to aggregate content creators as a loosely collective form of agency able to deal with large-scale distributors (e.g. the case of independent music labels for example), or the ability to achieve new forms of audience/user aggregation – perhaps in ways that supercede the producer/consumer dichotomy (e.g. the social organisation of game players as co-creators of in-game content (Banks 2003; Flew and Humphreys 2004).\(^2\)

**Nicholas Garnham: Creative Industries as ‘Service Capitalism’**

I wish to briefly consider the critique of creative industries arguments developed in a recent essay by Nicholas Garnham (Garnham 2004). Garnham develops a political economy analysis that critically interrogates the twin propositions that, on the one hand, the media or ‘content’ industry sectors are increasingly central to the dynamism of contemporary capitalist economies, and, on the other, that these sectors have become ‘precursors for the whole economy’ in the transition from an industrial to an information-base, knowledge or creative economy (Garnham 2004: 95). Garnham argues that this debate is in part driven by concerns about whether a Keynesian/Marxist economic growth model, which emphasises the relationship between material inputs and outputs as the cornerstones of growth, remains the most appropriate, or whether these have been superseded by a model first developed by the
Australian economist Joseph Schumpeter in the 1930s, where it is innovation and entrepreneurship that underpins the cyclical dynamism of capitalist economies.

Garnham rejects what he terms ‘media-centric’ analyses of the information society, arguing that the rise of the content or creative industries is interpretable within the parameters of theories of the capitalist business cycle. Not surprisingly, he critiques claims that the information, copyright or creative industries constitute the central growth sectors of contemporary capitalism, and their models of enterprise development, work organisation etc. are new ‘axial principles’ that should govern policy development. Rather, Garnham argues that while the recent emphasis placed upon creativity in contemporary policy discourse stems from ‘new economy’ dynamics’ such as the innovation premium, returns to human capital in high-wage economies, and the growing importance of service (or human-to-human, rather than human-to-machine) industries, this should not be read as dealing with ‘creativity in the artistic or cultural sense’ (Garnham 2004: 98). Garnham’s critique revolves around two arguments. First, he argues that the bulk of growth in the ICT sector has been in business-to-business (B2B) transactions, and not the business-to-consumer (B2C) area, meaning that the transformative dimensions of the ‘new economy’ upon broader social relations are frequently overstated. Second, Garnham argues that ‘most of what is now the information economy/society is in fact the service economy/society revisited’ (Garnham 2004: 98). Garnham therefore stresses the degree to which empirical observations about the transfer of work from the manufacturing industries to other sectors (cultural, service, or knowledge-related), and associated transformations in the work process, need to distinguish between what he describes as ‘high level scientific research and development, the varied skill levels
needed for differential applications of technology, and the embedded “touchy/feely”
skills involved in much managerial and service work’ (Garnham 2004: 102).

I would argue that Garnham’s critique draws us towards two threshold questions. The
first concerns the nature of wealth creation in contemporary capitalist economies.

Garnham is right, I believe, to draw attention to two economic fundamentals. One is
the consequences of Engel’s Law in terms of consumer demand and consumption,
whereby as consumer incomes rise, the proportion of income spent on goods and
(particularly) services that enhance life, rather than simply sustain it, increase. The
second is the associated move of low-value-added manufacturing from the advanced
capitalist economies to lower-wage economies such as China, which can combine
application of the most advanced production technologies with abundant supplies of
low-cost labour (Nolan 2004). What remains unanswered – and, I believe,
unanswerable in terms of Garnham’s Marxist-inspired political economy – is whether
the prosperity of the so-called ‘digitally-empowered (Western) citizen-consumer’
therefore rests upon the exploitation of manufacturing workers in low-wage
economies, or whether it arises from new forms of wealth creation in the expanded
spectrum of industries that include services, knowledge-based industries and the
creative industries, which occupy both an increasing percentage of those employed
and a growing proportion of consumer expenditure in these economies. As should be
apparent, my proposition is that new wealth is being created in these sectors, and that
it derives from innovation and entrepreneurship in both the services and creative
industries. A political economy which fails to theoretically grapple with the
implications of such empirical trends runs the risk of becoming a new version of 18th
century Physiocratic thinking, where it was believed that all wealth must derive from
the land, and which was so effectively critiqued by Adam Smith in *The Wealth of Nations*. The problem now is that ‘the hand’ has replaced ‘the land’, and a ‘New Physiocracy’ is emerging that rejects *in toto* the possibility of new wealth being generated from the innovative reapplication of existing physical resources, in response to both new ideas and changing consumer expectations.

**James Donald: Avoiding the ‘Black Hole’ of Creativity**

James Donald’s contribution to creative industries debates (Donald 2004), which takes the form of a personal epistolary to a paper of mine on creativity, the “new humanism” and cultural studies (Flew 2004), is prepared to at least partly concede that the traditional orthodoxies of Marxist-inspired cultural studies possess real problems in the contemporary educational, cultural and economic environment, which is a useful contrast to the denunciatory literature discussed earlier. Rather than engage in a familiar leftist mode of heresy-hunting, Donald positions the creative industries debate in the longstanding opposition between liberal and vocational education, or what, following Friedrich Schiller, her terms the ‘Philosophy Heads’ and the ‘Bread Scholars’ (or ‘Bread Heads’), and sees the debate as a welcome attempt to try and overcome such paralysing dualisms in a context of mass higher education and changing expectations from the university sector from governments, its students, and other stakeholders which include industry, but also the students’ parents, and that much interpellated figure ‘the taxpayer’. As Donald observes:

> In Australia … undergraduate participation in tertiary education has exploded from 33,000 people just 50 years ago to over 600,000 today. There is no way
that such an increase in scale and demographic reach … is comparable with the imposition of Bildung or any of its variants and revenants as the sole ideal for Humanities education. Even if it were desirable, there are simply too many students, bringing with them too diverse a variety of experiences and often mutually exclusive aspirations, for it to be possible – whatever you think about the ethics of the attempt (Donald 2004: 242).

Donald’s analysis of these debates opens up three questions which, in my view, are of the utmost importance. First, and perhaps most notoriously, Donald questions the concept of creativity, remaining to be convinced that it is anything other than a ‘conceptual black hole’ and an ‘absurd and self-defeating’ concept, the pursuit of which in any meaningful educational sense will lead to a ‘programme in Narcissism Studies’ (Donald 2004: 236). Second, Donald asks the question of whether a critical perspective remains pertinent to a cultural studies education oriented towards creative industries, or whether ‘critique [is] to outmoded to be redeemable … [and] has Cultural Studies become a subsidiary of the Business School?’ (Donald 2004: 239). Put differently, has the concept of creative industries introduced new research paradigms for cultural studies, or is it ‘only [to] be concerned with producing graduates mature enough, autonomous enough, and well enough rounded to fit easily into the slots awaiting them in the new economy?’ (Donald 2004: 243). Finally, Donald raises the related question of the purpose of higher education in such a context, and his concern that any form of education which aims for an ‘alignment’ to external trends misses the wider purpose of higher education, which is to ‘teach students to think’, and demonstrate not simply competency or even creativity, but also a capacity for reflexivity (Donald 2004: 245).
Donald’s critical overview raises questions that are relevant both to research agendas and to issues of pedagogy and educational practice. My comments will focus upon the former, although they have clear connections to the latter. As my earlier comments indicate, I do not think that creativity is a conceptual black hole, just as this paper rejects the claim that discussions of enterprise and entrepreneurship are ideological smokescreens. I have instead proposed that their renewed centrality emerges from socio-economic trends as well as policy discourses that are emerging independently of dominant modes of thinking in cultural studies, but which cultural studies as a field both can and must respond to. I would propose, as an opening gambit, three areas in which a renewed focus upon creativity is not simply a ‘substitute for critique’ (Donald 2004: 241), but actually opens up new vistas for the contemporary development of cultural studies as a significant player in new modes of knowledge production based around the applied humanities, rather than a sidelines critic and periodic debunker.

The first, and most obvious, is the relationship between creativity and intellectual property (IP). The rise of creativity discourses and their articulation to ‘new economy’ dynamics points to a clear need for cultural studies to better understand the nature of intellectual property, its contradictions, and its politics (Flew 2004b). The important trends of recent times have been: the growing significance of IP as a source of corporate wealth; the globalisation of intellectual property regime (IPRs) through the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS) agreement and numerous bilateral free trade agreements (such as the Australia-US Free Trade Agreement (AUSFTA)); the rapid dissemination of low-cost reproduction technologies, and attempts to ‘block’ these technologies through digital rights management (DRM)
regimes; and the centrality of copyrighted works to global popular culture, as discussed by Rosemary Coombe:

The extension of proprietary rights to cultural forms has created immense new fields of potential economic value, engendered new industries, and raised a host of legal and ethical quandaries … the texts protected by intellectual property signify: they are cultural forms that assume local meaning in the life worlds of those who incorporate them into their daily lives. Circulating widely in contemporary public spheres, they provide symbolic resources for the construction of identity and community, subaltern appropriations, parodic interventions, and counter-hegemonic narratives (Coombe 1998: 6-7).

Second, the relationship between creativity and geography is looming as an exciting research field. The literature on creative industries, creative cities and the creative class has posed quite sharply the question of the conditions that are most conducive to cultural development and associated economic trends in cities and regions. Policy-makers, architects, urban designers and planners and many others are pondering this question, as economic globalisation increases, rather than decreases, the significance of non-tangible factors in locational advantage. Moreover, while the temporal dimensions of creativity have been widely discussed in academic literature (art history, film history, literary history etc.), the spatial dimensions of creativity have received comparatively less attention. At the same time, as Oakley (2004) has recently argued, there is a danger of creative industries discourses as applied in the policy domain generating ‘cookie-cutter’ approaches to cultural development strategies, which she describes in the UK context in the following terms:
[There] is the sense that these [creative industries] are sectors that can be replicated and developed pretty much anywhere, without regards for the specifics of place … we currently seem hellbent on trying to replicate a single creative industries model across the country. It appears everywhere needs a university, some incubators and a ‘creative hub’, with or without a café, galleries and fancy shops (Oakley 2004: 72-73).

The need to understand the relationship between geography and creativity becomes particularly sharp when we recognise the tendency of creative industries to cluster in a small number of global cities, and the question of how ‘middle tier’ cities, or regional centres, can develop a distinctive cultural economy. What works for Sydney or Melbourne will present different challenges for Brisbane, Adelaide and Perth. Moreover, are these discussions even relevant to the development of Rockingham, Noosa, Byron Bay or Dubbo? There are many examples here of a research agenda that both generates new ways of thinking about how to live in communities, and new possibilities for effective forms of institutional and social action, to take Donald’s two criteria for a socially useful knowledge paradigm (Donald 2004: 241).

Finally, there is considerable opportunity to explore the relationship between creativity and organisations. The management theorist Jeremy Rifkin has emphasised the Hollywood film industry as the exemplar of ‘networked capitalism’ because he identifies its working model of team-based production, loose strategic alliances between large and small enterprises, and its restless search for new ideas as being what will be required by all corporate and governmental organisations to adapt to 21st
century global capitalism. Similarly, Scott Lash (2003) has wondered whether we are moving from a social world dominated by organisations and institutions to one where what he terms ‘disorganisations’ are prevailing. Lash argues that while the decline in the power of organisations is associated with a rise in individualism, disorganisation is not synonymous with individualism, but rather points to ‘a rise in certain forms of sociation that are non-organisational, indeed non-institutional … disorganisations are not the absence of sociation, but particular forms of sociation’ (Lash 2003: 39). While these accounts are somewhat speculative, they do point to the likelihood that what we term enterprise or entrepreneurship will occur as much within organisations as outside of them. Indeed, this inside/outside dichotomy between individuals and institutions may no longer be the relevant distinction, as organisations themselves evolve into looser, more networked forms.

Bibliography


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1 Rossiter argues that the Creative Industries model is ‘reactionary’ in its failure to deal with the role of unions. I would suggest this is an odd inversion of an important issue, and that the problem lies, not in the failure of academics to adequately promote the role of unions to a largely non-unionised workforce, but rather in the failure of the relevant unions to establish their relevance to this emergent workforce.

2 I would argue that it is at this point that Rossiter’s focus upon IPRs becomes interesting. Recognition of the politics of IPRs requires a prior recognition of the extent to which the creative industries value chain is increasingly driven by the ideas generation activities of relatively autonomous creative labour.