This chapter examines an ethnographic paradox. Anti-globalization rhetoric in Greece is predominantly articulated in terms of conspiracy theory, mistrust of other cultures and strong nationalist feelings. The same rhetoric, however, reflects a strong empathy with people and nations that are imagined to be deprived of power, and communicates a global awareness of an imagined community in discontent. In other words, popular anti-globalization in Greece, despite its mistrust of multiculturalism and non-Greek cultural expressions, is paradoxically cosmopolitan with respect to its allegiance to what is perceived to be a community of the non-powerful in the world. To shed some light on this paradox, we look at Greek views of Turks and other ethnic groups as these are negotiated in the critique of globalization and cosmopolitanism. We explore how symbolic enemies (such as the Turks) and other peoples of the Middle East (e.g. the Palestinians) are approached, within the broader context of opposing Western ideological and political authority, with a certain degree of empathy, as fellow victims of the powerful and as disempowered human beings.

Our interest in shared discontent with (and within) an imagined community of unhappy peripheral – with respect to power – individuals is inspired by Herzfeld’s (1997) notion of cultural intimacy, the mutual self-recognition of shared familiarity, embarrassment and pride. We argue that anti-globalization ideas in Greece are shared with the implicit understanding that an alternative, culturally intimate audience exists, one that includes other disenfranchised peoples in South-East Europe, in the Middle East and more generally, in the world. This reference to a broader
community that resists globalization demonstrates that local anti-
globalization rhetoric in Greece is based upon a global – and, in some
respects, globalized – consciousness and imagination. It reproduces a
global awareness based on the work of local, ‘historically situated
imaginations’ (Appadurai 1996: 33), which are often articulated in daily
life in terms of resourceful, but primarily critical, arguments.

In informal contexts and everyday conversation, Western competitive
globalization is received in Greece with guardedness, scepticism and
reservation. Local commentary is disapproving in its orientation and for
the most part is expressed – like other variations of political interpretation
(Brown and Theodossopoulos 2000, 2003) – in terms of metaphors, broad
comparisons between nations, humour, sarcasm and pointed remarks.
Like globalization, multiculturalism is similarly viewed as a new,
fashionable idea imported from the West, which has entered Greek
contemporary life via the back door, mainly through EU policies and top-
down development projects (Yiakoumaki 2007). Cosmopolitanism, a
much older concept with the resonance of sophisticated urbanity – for
example, in the Ottoman plural society (Ors 2007) – is often conflated with
the multicultural orientation of the EU, and treated in local conversation
as another by-product of globalization.

In most cases, anti-globalization sentiments in Greece, including
reservation towards Western paradigms of cosmopolitanism and
multiculturalism, are expressed in local conversation as part of a more
general critique of the status quo. In particular, both recent and older
eamples of Western involvement in the non-Western world are used as
evidence of global interference, and fuel, in turn, local arguments against
interventionism on a global scale. Cases of Western involvement also
provide a handy comparative setting for evaluating and discussing
globalization more generally. They form a repository of well-known
eamples of Western wrongdoing that sets the background and tone in
local conversation. Other contemporary topics, such as 11 September and
subsequent terrorist attacks, present additional opportunities for
assessing global dissatisfaction more generally. In this broad
conversational context, the Greeks, and the citizens of other small nations,
are juxtaposed against the powerful, those who make decisions of global
consequence and shape the face of the world.

In the ethnography that follows, we explore the meaning of locally
expressed arguments of this type, in the discourse of working- and middle-
class citizens in two medium-sized Greek towns, Patras and Volos, our
field sites during previous studies in political anthropology (Brown and
Theodossopoulos 2000, 2003; Theodossopoulos 2004, 2007c; Kirtsoglou
2007). Our respondents openly criticize globalization, multiculturalism
and cosmopolitanism during informal conversations with ourselves and
other fellow citizens in the everyday contexts of social interaction – in shops, cafeterias, while travelling in buses and taxis, but also in private living rooms, kitchens and backyards. Most of them are confident and articulate amateur commentators on wider political processes, who read national newspapers, watch televised political discussions and often have university degrees and/or run private businesses. They have been aware of our interest in their views (and our role as academics working in British universities) since our engagement with them in previous fieldwork, and in many cases they suggested that we should record and take seriously their opinions about the greater political processes that surround them. The following sections demonstrate that we have indeed been attentive to their arguments.

Some Theoretical Predilections

Anti-globalization attitudes – often hastily subsumed under the label of ‘nationalism’ – represent a complex indigenous reaction to centres of power, and cannot be analysed simply as the opposite of cosmopolitan values. They rather appear to be unfolding as expressions of frustration towards a global realpolitik that creates divisions and inequalities and that is seen as a clear-cut ‘Western-inspired’ project. To paraphrase an argument that West and Sanders put forward about modernity, globalization is felt by many as a ‘fragmented, contradictory and disquieting process that produces untenable situations and unfulfilled desires’ (West and Sanders 2003: 16). Thus, globalization and what are seen as its by-products – namely multiculturalism and, to some extent, cosmopolitanism – cannot be perceived as the residual effect of ignorance, nationalism, regionalism and persistence of tradition. Globalization, however, as the nexus of power relations is not felt the same everywhere and therefore is not appreciated equally by everyone.

Following a careful, context-specific approach established by anthropological writing, we do not treat globalization as a single entity. Rather, we feel the need to acknowledge the possibility of multiple globalizations experienced differently in various parts of the world (Comaroff and Comaroff 1993; Fischer 1999: 459). In the same manner, we can talk about multiple anti-globalization attitudes fuelled by diverse kinds of mistrust of those who are seen as the agents of global political power. Trust and mistrust, here, are similarly dependent on contextual considerations, such as local interpretations of history and time contingencies. Concerned with the consequences of modernity, Giddens (1990) has spoken about trust in the sense of confidence towards (or about) the transparent operation of social institutions. Despite the
international post-Cold War emphasis on transparency, however, a number of authors point out that power does sometimes operate in ambiguous ways, which inspire the development of conspiratorial interpretations (West and Sanders 2003: 2, 12; see also, Bastian 2001; Hellinger 2003; McCarthy Brown 2003).

Our respondents in Greece provide us with very good examples of such conspiratorial interpretations. In informal conversations about international politics, they consistently challenge the idea that the Western powers are moved and mobilized by a humanitarian ethos (or by the values of tolerance and sharing). Some of them perceive cosmopolitanism as a handmaid of globalization, as yet another tool for the establishment of Western cultural and political domination. Such attitudes are not only the result of a felt and lived national history (cf. Sutton 2003; Kirtsoglou 2006, 2007). As Marcus (1999) has discussed in the context of conspiracy theories, the cold war political legacy legitimizes (to a certain extent) people’s mistrust of the sincerity of the great powers. The US is indeed seen – not just by the Greeks, but by many others, including academics – as an overtly hegemonic global empire (Stewart-Harawira 2005: 4; see also, Hardt and Negri 2000). Seen in this light, globalization feels to those who exist on the margins of power merely yet another ideology that seeks to legitimize a certain status quo that directly contradicts the ideals of modernity (Kirtsoglou 2006).

Greek arguments against globalization that uncritically encompass other concepts, such as cosmopolitanism and multiculturalism, need therefore to be examined in close relation to warm support for the idea of modernity, as has been well documented in the Greek sociocultural context (cf. Faubion 1993). As has been noted by social anthropologists, Greek subjects are infused with pro-modernity sentiments (cf. Argyrou 2002; Kirtsoglou 2007) and an idiosyncratic desire to be and to be perceived by others as cosmopolitan, tolerant, hospitable and open. The idea that Greece belongs to the West – not only in a geopolitical but also in a cultural and ideological sense – informs a great deal of modern Greek political life (Kirtsoglou 2006, 2007). It is, in fact, the disappointments and inconsistencies of modernity that have led our respondents in Greece to question the sincerity of politico-economic projects like globalization. Unilateralism, the flamboyant exhibition of military power, and the interventionist strategy of the great powers in the political arenas of various countries around the world contradict the ideals of the social contract, consensus, equality and transparency that supposedly characterize the new world order. It is in this context that our respondents speak of the Pax Americana, alluding to the Pax Romana, in order to express their reservations with regard to the democratic values of today’s international political strategies and balance. To them, globalization seems
like a move ‘back to the future’: to a new world order that – politically at least – is not new at all, but rather just another imperium.

Our analysis of Greek responses to cosmopolitanism and globalization, then, focuses on this seemingly paradoxical coexistence of openness and closure, pro- and anti-Western feelings and conflicting discourses of empathy and hostility towards various Others. The latter can be viewed as rich rhetorical strategies that situate the actor vis-à-vis wider political processes. Anti-cosmopolitanism is thus a form of discursive and practical empowerment, a critique of the cosmopolitics and a simultaneous, dynamic and decisive engagement with it (Beck and Sznaider 2006: 3, 5). In this sense, discontented cosmopolitanism is not a form of ‘cultural fundamentalism’ (Stolcke 1995), but perhaps more of an alternative form of ‘rooted cosmopolitanism’ (Appiah 1998), in so far as the concerns of local actors are indeed global and relate to the problematization of being a citizen of the world. The articulation and expression of discontent in this context constitute in effect a commentary on the workings, transparency and distribution of political power, and not a superficial manifestation of lagging modernization, nationalism, traditionalism or regionalism.

Our Greek respondents situate themselves in the globalized world, and it is from their standpoint as citizens of the world that they comment on the imbalance of power in the international status-quo. It is this particular subjectivity that inspires them to talk about and sympathize with unhappy others who share the same political predicament of powerlessness as themselves. As our ethnography will shortly demonstrate, commenting on the imbalance of power transcends national and nationalistic boundaries and appeals to the idea of a common humanity, as well as the shared positionality of the subaltern. In some ways, our respondents’ perceptions of international politics turn the concepts of globalization, cosmopolitanism and multiculturalism on their head, posing serious (and difficult to answer) questions about the legitimacy of power and the authority of the powerful to create and impose politics and also – and perhaps more importantly – ideology and history.

**Unhappy Turks and Greeks**

In Greek ethno-national classification the Turks constitute an oppositional category, the stereotypical enemy. In everyday conversation and political debate, but also in the Greek national(ist) imagination and historical consciousness, the Turks (generalized, homogenized and frequently mentioned) figure as the ‘significant Other’ for modern Greeks (Theodossopoulos 2007a). Despite these easily verifiable broad observations, attitudes towards the Turks in Greece are complex and context-specific,
more unsympathetic in public, less oppositional in private. In informal settings, most Greeks will differentiate between their critical views towards the state of Turkey (and its official representatives) and their more nuanced views about the ordinary Turkish people. While Turkey, the nation state, is viewed with suspicion (or as a potential threat), the people of Turkey, under certain circumstances and in certain conversations, are favourably compared with the Greeks themselves (Theodosopoulos 2004, 2007c; Kirtsoglou 2007).

A similar distinction in Greek attitudes towards Turks relates to the contrast between the generalized singular notion of the ‘Turk’ and the more individualized everyday Turks, who can be imagined in intimate terms. The singular, undifferentiated ‘Turk’ is negatively stereotyped (Theodosopoulos 2004; Spyrou 2007) and rationalized as culturally incompatible, despite many self-evident similarities. He – he is usually male – is a faceless, nameless Turk, a warrior or agent of the Ottoman empire, such as the caricatures that appear in Greek novels and history textbooks (Millas 2007) or the profiles of the so-called ‘Kemalists’ in contemporary Turkey drawn by Greek journalists of a radical nationalist persuasion (Tsibiridou 2007). In contrast, the more individualized Turks of Greek imagination are depicted in everyday conversation as people like oneself, men and women with familiar everyday worries and aspirations. These are referred to as ‘the Turks as people’ (oi Tourkoi san or, os anthropoi) ‘the ordinary citizens of Turkey’ (oi anthropoi tis Tourkias) or the people of Turkey (o laos tis Tourkias).

In conversations about the ills of globalization, our respondents in Patras and Volos are more likely to discuss the Turks in terms of their individualized attributes. Everyday Turks, like everyday Greeks, are (and have been in the past) betrayed by their government and politicians, exploited by profiteering business people and subjected to the ruthlessness of penetrating Western capitalism. The people of Turkey, like the people of Greece, have been misled – to some degree or another – by the promises of the West, and now share a comparably disadvantaged position in the global hierarchy. The entry of Turkey into the European Union, for example, represents such a misleading promise and is discussed in comparison to the familiar ‘European’ experience of the Greeks, who share vivid memories of the painful efforts to meet the entrance requirements and strict conditions set, from the top down, by various EU regulation committees. Notions of affinity between Greeks and Turks rely on perceptions of a shared unofficial orientalism and the conviction that, should both countries wish to ‘make any progress’, they must ‘learn to be good Europeans’ (Herzfeld 1995: 134; Kirtsoglu 2007). As a respondent has characteristically stated to us:
'We Orientals (anatolites) naively believe that the Others (alloi, i.e. Westerners) have bessa (honour) and that they keep their word, but they don’t. If and when Turkey joins the EU, the Turks will finally realize what kind of two-faced bastards the Europeans are. The same way they play with us they will play with them.’

Thus Turkey might be Greece’s ‘traditional’ enemy, but in the global context, our Greek respondents argue, Turkey is nothing more than the puppet of the Americans and the great powers in general (Kirtsgoglou 2007). Vis-à-vis the West, Turkey is imagined as powerless as Greece, always at the mercy of Western political interests and caprice. In this respect, Turkey shares the same predicament with Greece; that of being a nation state at the margins of power, always destined – as our respondents vividly describe – ‘to dance to somebody else’s tune’, ‘always in a precarious political position’, ‘another bond servant of the new world order’. As a small independent merchant in Patras pointed out, ‘The Turks want to get into Europe, like we did, they want to become “European”, but, if they could feel the sweetness (sic) of Europe (tin glyka tis Europis), they would run away now!’

More often than Europe, the United States of America and its policies – the topic of much animated conversation in Greece – bring Turks and Greeks closer together. Since the collapse of the Soviet Bloc, there has been only one empire, our respondents explain, the ‘super power’ (iperdynami). This is, of course, an idea that is not only found in lay discourse. Writers such as Held, McGrew, Goldplatt and Perraton (1999: 425) also claim that since the collapse of the Soviet Union the US has become one of the ‘world’s last imperial structures’ (see also Stewart-Harawira 2005: 4). In Greece, this conviction is strengthened by the critical manner in which US international affairs are reported by the Greek media, and further verified by official and unofficial Greek history, which provides many examples of previous Western – and, since the second World War, primarily American – interventions in Greek and Cypriot politics (cf. Sutton 2003; Kirtsgoglou 2006). It is this combination of ideas borrowed from local interpretations of history and arguments circulated in the media that led a forty-year-old school-teacher from Patras to claim:

‘We talk about our differences, the Greeks and the Turks, and we forget the global superpower. Who makes the small nations fight with each other? Who creates wars here and there? Who makes the people of the world suffer? And who benefits from this?’

The re-familiarization of the abstract Turk in this context is based on the recognition of his or her suffering – a well-recorded empathetic approach
in Greece (Dubisch 1995: 213–25). When it comes to Turkey’s position in the global political scene, such empathy can be easily documented. ‘The Turks are like us,’ our respondents often say. ‘They have to obey the Americans, otherwise their fate is as sealed as ours.’ Following this line of argumentation, the differences between the two nations are presented as having been fabricated by the Western powers, and their responsibility for their own problematic relations is subsequently underplayed (Herzfeld 1992). ‘What can the Greeks and the Turks do without the approval of the planet leader?’ a thirty-year-old engineer said with rhetorical persuasion. ‘What can the simple people do? Everything in globalization is controlled!’

In some other conversations in Greece, Turkey’s perceived closeness to the US is criticized. In some of these our respondents portray Turkish political consciousness in terms of cultural notions of trust that are intimate to both nations and foreign to North Americans and Europeans. As a thirty-eight-year-old professional in Volos explained:

‘the Turks are always trying to be America’s favourite child. They believe that their loyalty is guaranteed and should be reciprocated. They don’t understand that the American is capable of selling his own mother down the river. The American doesn’t have bessa (trustworthiness).’

The notion of bessa, akin to the concept of filotimo (love of honour: see Seremetakis 1991: 237; Dubisch 1995: 202), is believed to be a shared attribute of Greeks and Turks. Our respondents’ appeal to it attempts to establish an imaginary community of trust and warn the Turks about the untrustworthiness of the Europeans. The employment of such arguments – which represent examples of union in discontent – are always discussion-specific and appear only in comparisons of the West with the rest. Thus, in discursive contexts that focus on the Balkans and South-East Europe, it is Turkey (and other neighbours of Greece) that is cast as lacking in bessa (trustworthiness).

Selective interpretations of this kind appear in several topics of debate. A number of practices that in local-level conversation are disapproved of by our respondents become acceptable (and are considered with a degree of empathy) when discussed in relation to the wider picture of Western-related politics. Suggestive of this is the issue of the headscarf. Most Greek subjects, who readily – and perhaps hegemonically (Argyrou 2002) – embrace modernity and its various expressions, criticize their Muslim neighbours for their support for women wearing headscarves. Women covering themselves are seen by our respondents as a sign of backwardness; ‘The Turks are a hundred years behind,’ some of them argue. ‘Their women are still wearing headscarves.’ In discussions about
globalization, however, the opinions of our respondents take an unexpected turn. They now admire and defend Turkish determination to adhere to what they see as custom or tradition. ‘If they fancy wearing the scarf,’ some respondents emphatically argued, ‘who are the Europeans and the Americans to dictate to them what to do in their own country? They are right to defend their beliefs.’

Despite the proliferation of arguments that shift around culturally specific beliefs and practices, such as the example of the Muslim scarf, most of our respondents are critical of multiculturalism (in Greek, poly-politimiskotita). Many see its introduction as a recent European import intended to undermine the delicate balance of the multi-ethnic regions of Greece and Turkey. In the conversations of our respondents, for example, the Muslim Turkish-speaking minority in Greek Thrace is regularly compared to the Kurdish minority in Turkey. ‘The Americans are using Turkey to terrorize us, and the Kurds to terrorize the Turks,’ a thirty-five-year-old construction manager stated emphatically. For him and the majority of our respondents in Greece, the minorities themselves do not compose the real problem in the Greco-Turkish relationship. Friction between the two countries is instigated by ‘the Americans’ or ‘the great powers’, and minority issues provide the excuse for Western interference in the local affairs of Greece and Turkey. Foreign initiatives, such as EU-led multicultural policies, some of our respondents explain, ‘bring more trouble than they are likely to solve’. ‘Multiculturalism is a Western idea,’ a sixty-year-old accountant underlined. ‘We have lived close to the Turks for centuries. Who are they [the West] to teach us [the meaning of] multiculturalism (poly-politimiskotita)?’

The problem lies, according to several local critics of globalization, in the uncritical introduction of Western ideas into Greek everyday life. Western versions of multiculturalism or EU cosmopolitanism are introduced in a top-down manner from centres of power abroad. This observation leads some of our respondents, especially (but not exclusively) those of a socialist predisposition, to interpretations that emphasize ideological mystification. Despite the obvious connection, however, and with a few exceptions, our respondents neither quote Marx nor acknowledge his authorship directly; their views are presented as reflecting their own opinion on the nature of politics and some of them insisted that they should be taken as such. Globalization, they argued, is an ideological platform that masks unequal power relations, seeking at the same time to obliterate any possibility of resistance. It is also believed that resistance to this new imperialist status quo is eventually articulated through the richness of local culture, tradition and history, that is, the things that globalization is attempting to undermine. Despite the Marxist overtones of such an approach, it is defended – as we have already said –
by the majority of our Greek respondents and informs most of what is seen as nationalist Greek rhetoric.

In this light, one could argue that academic theories of nationalism do not always explain the full complexity of Greek perceptions on politics. Widely employed nation-building strategies and the documented Greek irredentism notwithstanding, much of what appears to be Greek nationalism at the level of local discourse today is inspired by anti-globalization attitudes. These, in turn, originate in the conviction that the new world order has broken its promises of democracy and equality for all. Globalization, in lay accounts of this type, is reified and personified – in a poetic rather than overtly theoretical manner. Culture, history and tradition acquire new rhetorical overtones as they become the means of celebrating difference and, in the arguments of some respondents, the very loci of the struggle against the invisible forces of homogenization. Hence, what connects the Greeks with the Turks (and eventually a number of other pariahs of the new world order) is a worldwide demand for equality articulated in terms of respect for cultural difference and celebrated in acts of symbolic defiance or resistance. ‘Everybody in the world, like monkeys, tries to imitate the West,’ a forty-five-year-old housewife in Patras explained, ‘[but] some peoples, like the Muslims, are resisting. The Turks [resist] more than we do; for this, I give them credit!’

Other Unhappy Others

Greece, Cyprus, Palestine – not a single American left (Ellada, Kypros, Palaistini, Amerikanos de tha meinei). (Popular banner used in anti-war demonstrations in Greece).

As with the Turks, conventional Greek nationalism treats the Muslim communities of the Middle East with suspicion and patronizing orientalism, especially with regard to Islamic rules of dress and conduct or attitudes to women, which are generally regarded in Greece as ‘backward’ and ‘repressive’. Despite the fact that our respondents confront Islamic populations near (or indeed inside) the Greek borders with reservation (and in some cases with suspicion and prejudice), Muslims elsewhere in the world, and especially in the Middle East, are portrayed in a rather favourable manner. This attitude is again more clearly apparent in discussions about globalization and worldwide manifestations of power, and represents a further example of parallel, imagined subjectivities of discontent.

The current Greek pro-Middle-Eastern feelings have a historical resonance in the politics promoted by Andreas Papandreou, especially
after the fall of the dictatorship in Greece in 1974. As has been argued elsewhere (Kirtsoglou 2007), the US was widely accused in Greece of supporting the 1967 coup and several other cold war political interventions in various countries. The socialist party of Andreas Papandreou employed in its rhetoric a popular – some say populist – anti-American stance, already familiar by that time in the political positions maintained by the Greek Communist Party and smaller leftist groups. Papandreou’s anti-Americanism was mostly rhetorical in nature, and when he found himself in a position of power he did not undermine Greece’s position in NATO and the European Union. But his anti-American statements, and his close friendship with Arafat, our respondents report, made a significant percentage of the Greek public – at least those of a leftist political predisposition – feel ‘pride’ for Greece’s (safe, and mostly rhetorical) defiance of American hegemony.

Papandreou and the socialist party remained in power throughout the 1980s and most of the 1990s, cultivating warm relationships with anti-American political leaders (not only Arafat, but also Muammar al-Gaddafi). The present Greek pro-Arab stance, however, cannot be entirely explained in terms of the post-dictatorial choices of Andreas Papandreou and the ideological advocacy of a small but always visible Greek communist minority. Until the end of the cold war, the Greek public was separated into two easily identifiable pro- and anti-West ideological orientations—represented by the division between the right wing, on the one hand, and the socialist and left-wing parties, on the other. During the 1990s, however, anti-Americanism reached almost catholic proportions in Greece, and expanded gradually across and beyond the traditional divide of left and right. The NATO interventions in Yugoslavia intensified the growing discontent of the Greek public with the role of the US in international politics (Sutton 1998; Brown and Theodossopoulos 2000, 2003), while subsequent Western involvement in predominantly Muslim countries gave new impetus to the older, cold war rhetoric on American expansionism. Without seeking to lessen the importance of lived post Second World War history, we argue that the current anti-US and anti-globalization attitudes in Greece are the result of an old narrative model that received a new and important stimulus before and after the turn of the millennium.

In this general context of disaffection with the interventionist attitudes of the West, our respondents started presenting a unity with the ‘people’ of Palestine and later Afghanistan and Iraq. The basis of this unity is feelings of political – though not entirely cultural - empathy. Thus, although Muslim culture and daily life are regarded as ‘backward’ and ‘oppressive’, the political predicament of being at the mercy of the great powers is shared and forms a solid platform for the cultivation of feelings
of sympathy and solidarity. A graffiti slogan on a wall in Volos, ‘The only solution is intifada’, led a taxi driver to comment last summer: ‘They are right. What else is left to the Arabs? What else is left to us? We should raise our heads one day and stop being governed by the Americans.’

The perceived affinity between Greeks, Cypriots and Middle Easterners is explained by our respondents entirely in the context of power, or lack of it, which in modern politics is seen as being directly connected to a nation’s general prospects and prosperity. Even when the Western nations are not blamed directly for local events, they are nevertheless perceived as not being capable of understanding the predicament of powerlessness. The following quotation highlights this view; it epitomizes the position of a forty-three-year-old Greek woman from Volos, which eloquently communicates sentiments of bonding at the margins of power:

‘It is certain that whatever happens at times in the Middle East does not politically activate (den evesthitopiei) the Westerners to the degree it mobilizes us and our Cypriot brothers. Such a degree of [political] sensitivity (evesthisia) would have been illogical for someone whose everyday security is not at stake. The way we live, our prospects and hopes make us capable of tuning to the messages that come from the troubled Middle East. In fact, we are not completely outside these developments, since centuries of history bind us with this region of the world.’

In 2006, during Condoleezza Rice’s (the US Secretary of State) short visit to Greece and Turkey, the owner of an Internet cafe in Patras commented on the latest involvement of the United States and its allies in Middle East. ‘Condoleezza’, he said, ‘is cooking another war, this time in Iran.’ He continued:

‘She will find, remember my words, all the excuses she wants. Excuses for war are made by the powerful (apo tous dynatous); take Alexander the Great or the Romans, for example. It is now the Americans… What have the people of this world done to deserve this? The Greeks, the Turks, the people of Iran… We are all victims of the powerful.’

The claim that the local and the global are interconnected and mutually constitutive (West and Sanders 2003: 9) finds its ethnographic expression in local discussions about political developments inside Greece, Greco-Turkish relations, the events in Cyprus, Palestine and Iraq. We began this section with a rather provocative slogan, often heard in various demonstrations in Athens, ‘Greece, Cyprus, Palestine – not a single American left’, which has recently been transformed into ‘Greece, Iraq, Palestine – not a single American left’. During the last three decades, the Israeli–Palestinian conflict has been compared to that in and over Cyprus,
and like the Cyprus problem is regarded as an obvious example of political injustice committed by the great powers. The recent crises in Iraq and Palestine offered new opportunities for unofficial commentary of this kind and inspired our respondents to reflect upon the position of the Arab world with familiar metaphors:

'It is as if someone comes with a bulldozer and tries to demolish your house. If you can, you will burn that bulldozer to the ground. The Americans know all this and they are doing it on purpose. They divide and rule. It is their way of reigning in the region. Their tactics keep the Israelis as hostages as well. Can Israel ever go against the US? They depend upon them.'

Globalization as an ideological platform of American imperialism represents in the collective Greek imagination a political future where all peoples’ fate is at stake and where alliances are never honourable or stable. Bin Laden and, more so, Saddam Hussein are seen by many in Greece as political products of US policy in the Middle East (Kirtsoglou 2006). The fact that the US and NATO turned against those who they themselves invested with power in the past proves to our respondents beyond any doubt that there is nothing trustworthy in the new world order. Power in the globalized world is felt as being deeply repressive, deceitful and suspicious (West and Sanders 2003). The predicament that leads many Greeks to feel a sort of political intimacy with other disenfranchised nations is that of being condemned to serve a profoundly unequal regime that hides behind ‘big and nice words’ (oraia kai megala logia), such as democracy, tolerance, multiculturalism, cosmopolitanism and freedom. A thirty-eight-year-old businessman in Volos expressed this general idea as follows:

‘The Americans care for no one. They insist on policies that seem innocent and positive on the pretext of multiculturalism, while what they are after is the creation of various thorns inside nations around the world. When the time is right for them, they light a sparkle and the fire of hatred is soon burning strong. Then they intervene to bring peace to a war they had long before prepared.’

Opinions like this fuel discontent with the use of noble ideals, such as freedom, democracy and independence, when these ideals are used to justify what our respondents see as cruel and unilateral interventions. Their sympathy for and empathy with the people of Afghanistan, Iraq and Palestine are expressions of this discontent and of the belief that in the new political order all the powerless are similar and therefore intimate. In this light, the emerging anti-globalization rhetoric is informed by deeply
‘global’ thoughts communicated by experiences of political inequality in the globalized world. As we have argued in the introduction and conclusion to this volume, anti-globalization presupposes a consciousness of global interconnections.

Seen from this perspective, discontent with globalization can be understood as a feeling that originates not from some stubborn insistence on localism, nationalism, regionalism or ‘tradition’, but one that stems from a global perception of the world as an interconnected place. In this interconnected world, the supremacy of some is understood as the predicament of others, while power is thought of in a rather holistic fashion. When our respondents speak of power, they do not refer to military or economic power only, but also, and perhaps more importantly, the power to fashion a cosmology according to one’s own interests and then hegemonically extend it to the rest of the world as the indisputable, politically correct stance.

In fewer words, our respondents speak of the power to produce history in both its discursive and practical sense. The conviction that history is written by the powerful and the victorious guides local perceptions and misconceptions, conspiracy-driven narratives and composite scenarios that explain and justify – successfully or unsuccessfully, accurately or inaccurately – international political developments. At the heart of such exegeses of historical causality lies the confidence that in world history particular characters (or nations) play the roles that are reserved for them by the most powerful protagonists of international politics. Globalization is then seen as nothing but another chapter, another device, yet another excuse to keep the world divided between powerful and powerless, agents and patients, elites and pariahs.

The Global Awareness of Greek Anti-globalism

Locally shaped perceptions of history inform almost every aspect of contemporary Greek political consciousness. The concept and role of history in this case transcend the notion of a nation-building narrative that seeks to consolidate Andersonian imagined communities. Historical events from the past are constantly reworked in the present, while the present is always evaluated in terms of past historical developments. David Sutton, in *Memories Cast in Stone* has referred to this practice as analogical thinking (1998). Analogical thinking, however, concerns not only events but also processes. Our respondents draw analogies between contexts, strategies, means and ends and ultimately between the distribution and the effects of power diachronically. It is this kind of diachronic, processual, historical, analogical thinking that leads contemporary Greeks to term our era Pax
Americana, alluding to the times of Pax Romana, when the world was politically organized in imperiums.

As has been argued elsewhere (Clogg 1992; Argyrou 2002; Kirtsoglou 2006), the Greek people have collectively (and not bloodlessly) committed themselves to the West and to the project of modernity. Their desire to ‘become modern’ and to ‘develop into Europeans’ signalled their ideological commitment to the ideals of democracy, equality, transparency, trust, openness, rationality and fairness that modernity promised to bring to the social and political world. Modernity, however, as West and Sanders argue, produces effectively ‘the very opacities of power that it claims to obviate’ (2003: 11). As we have argued in this chapter, modernity in this sense also produces disenfranchised subjectivities. Discontent with globalization (among the Greeks or others) can then be analysed in the context of a discussion about power and political subjectivity.

Our respondents speak of the power to produce discourse and to shape history. In their accounts, globalization, cosmopolitanism and multiculturalism are met with reservation at best and frequently with hostility, because they are seen as discourses created and sustained by power and as cosmologies that serve the interests of Western power and ideological authority. In the place of such concepts, most of our Greek respondents pose an alternative understanding of global connectedness, one that is based on the shared political predicament of the powerless. The awareness of global power inequalities leads local-level commentators to empathize with others perceived to be in similar positions and to form with these dispossessed others idiosyncratic and sometimes paradoxical political intimacies.

In order to ethnographically substantiate the aforementioned points, we have first discussed the example of the Turks, the Other of the Greeks par excellence, the traditional enemy so to speak, and the nation with whom modern Greeks have the longest history of military confrontations. When the Turks are discussed vis-à-vis the global political scene, they cease to become enemies, and are seen as equally peripheral and instrumental to the plans of the great powers. In turn, ‘the powerful of the West’ become further stereotyped as the agents of blame and responsibility. Especially when it comes to Greco-Turkish relations, the West and, sometimes, local politicians who are believed to be acting as its pawns are deemed responsible for the tensions and conflicts of the past. In evaluations of this kind, Greece and Turkey stand closer together in opposition to the West, and the self as commentator readily acknowledges all those intimate aspects of Greek life that the Turks can understand and Westerners cannot (Herzfeld 1997; Theodossopoulos 2007b). In this discursive context, the Greeks and the Turks become united in their mutual discontent.
When the Greeks are prepared to try to understand the Turks – for example, in terms of their more general critique of the West – they resort to the humanizing tactic of familiarizing the unfamiliar (Sutton 1998). They draw upon personal experiences with Turks, reflect upon a shared culture and common predicaments and imagine the unknown Turk as the Greek next door. The empathy that Greeks demonstrate towards Turks – transcending regional politics – extends to other peripheral actors who are perceived as sharing a similarly disempowered position. Thus, while our respondents feel culturally distinct from Palestinians, Iraqis and generally the Muslim people of the Middle East and the Arab world, they simultaneously seek to stand as their political allies. In contrast, when the majority of the Greeks consider the presence of Muslim populations in their Balkan neighbourhood, they feel threatened and at times express resentment towards these geographically closer Muslim groups. Concurrently, however, both at the level of official governmental strategy and at the level of everyday experiences, the Greeks offer their allegiance to the Palestinians and the peoples of Afghanistan and Iraq. They comment upon Middle Eastern politics as being yet another example of the unilateralism of the great powers and the desire of the great powers to intervene in local affairs in order to serve their own interests.

Situated in this ethnographic context, this chapter has explored Greek expressions of anti-globalization and local resistance to cosmopolitanism to the extent that this is connected to globalization and Western authority. The political and cultural implications of the assumption that, although citizenship can remain national in scope, certain values ought to be shared cross-culturally and transnationally (Kymlicka 2001) have some resonances here. In terms of its theorization, cosmopolitanism has been carefully distinguished from universalism (Appadurai 1996; Hannerz 1996). Local actors, however, often fail to make this distinction, not because they are ‘unreflexive’, but because they are concerned with inequality, power and marginalization (cf. Mehta 2000; Shweder 2000). As Driessen has pointed out recently, apart from the celebration of diversity, cosmopolitanism also entertains a problematic relationship with power, for ‘it is mostly embraced by political, economic and cultural elites as part of their cultural domination’ (2005: 137).

It could be argued that the sympathy of Greek actors towards the desire of some Turkish people to revive certain kinds of dress code for women is a cosmopolitan sympathy for an idea that is otherwise regarded as backward and unacceptable. Similarly, the allegiance shown to disparate groups such as the Serbs, the Palestinians, the Iraqis and the Afghans is a kind of cosmopolitan allegiance (cf. Levy and Sznaider 2005), an allegiance across cultural difference, which originates in the perception of a shared lived history of being powerless in comparison with the West. It
is this kind of idiosyncratic cosmopolitanism that we have called in the present chapter ‘political intimacy’, inspired by Herzfeld’s (1997) notion of cultural intimacy, the mutual self-recognition of shared familiarity, embarrassment and pride. In the context of political intimacy, even traditional or potential enemies are reconsidered with empathy, as fellow victims of the powerful and as dispossessed human beings like oneself.

Our respondents are thus thinking, acting and expressing discontent in an interconnected world (Geertz 1994, quoted in Kearney 1995). Their thoughts, actions and discontent, however, call for a rethinking of how this interconnection takes place and to what purpose, who such processes exclude and what kind of subaltern identities they produce (West and Sanders 2003: 11). Thinking globally and from a cosmopolitan perspective poses no particular difficulty for our Greek interlocutors, whose narratives we sought to analyse in an open-minded fashion, going beyond well-rehearsed exegeses of nationalism, regionalism and tradition. For, in the perceptions and misconceptions of our respondents we have seen their determination to imagine the vast majority of the world as sharing the same humanity, an equal vulnerability, and, as a result, similar anti-Western orientations. In circumstances like these, anti-cosmopolitanism inspires a cosmopolitan imagination of resistance to and discontent with those who – as a well-known Greek expression goes – ‘hold both the pie and the knife’, thus being capable of ‘portioning and sharing the world, just as they like’.

Notes

1. See, for example, the chapters in the volume When Greeks think about Turks (Theodossopoulos 2007a), which examine particular cases in diverse social contexts.
2. ‘Milame gia tis diafores mas, emeis kai oi Tourkoi kai xehname tin pagosmia yperdynami; pios kanei tous mikrous laous na polemane metaxy tous? Pios skaronei polemos edo kai ekei? Pios kanei tous anthropous na ypoferoun? Kai pios kerdizei apo ayto?’
3. ‘Ti mporoun na kanoun Ellines kai Tourkoi horis tin egrisi tou planitarhi? Ti mporoun na kanoun oi aploi anthropoi? Ola stin pagosmiopiisi einai elenhomena!’
4. Ama goustaroune mantila magkia tous. Poioi einai oi Europaio diladi kai o kathe Amerikanos pou tha tous pei ti thi kanoune mesa sti xora tous? Kala kanoune kai yperaspiizontai ta pisteuo tous.’
5. Olos o kosmos maimoudizei, prospathai na miasei stin Dysi; orismenoi laoi, san tous Mousoulmanous antistekonte; oi Tourkoi, perissotero apo mas; gi’ auto to logo tous paradehomai!
6. The concept of agents and patients belongs to Michael Carrithers and has much more theoretical depth than our expression allows for here.
References


