



Tim Barth, PhD, NASA Engineering and Safety Center Kennedy Space Center, Florida



- Ground Crews and Space Vehicle Safety
- Flight/Ground System Interfaces
- Ground Systems
- Summary







Ground Crew Functions

a) Design, Manufacturing, Assembly, Acquisition Systems

b) Vehicle and Payload Processing **Operations**

f) Maintenance, Repair, and/or Refurbishment

c) Integrated Vehicle and/or **Payload Processing Operations**

e) Landing and Recovery

- Integrated Logistics
- Design, Manufacture, Maintenance, Repair of Ground Support Equipment, Facilities, Tools, etc.
- **Ground & Flight Crew Training Systems**
- Planning and Scheduling Systems
- Safety & Mission Assurance

d) Launch and Mission Control

Enabling (Supporting) Functions

Why are Ground Crew Factors Important?

- Space transportation systems involve many ground and flight systems. A concurrent engineering, "system of systems" development approach is required to optimize life-cycle performance.
 - Apollo and Shuttle lessons learned
- Exploration systems must be safe, sustainable, and affordable
 - NASA safety stakeholders: public, flight crews, workforce (including ground crews), and high-value capital assets (including spacecraft)
 - Majority of life-cycle cost is historically in operations, including ground crew operations




People are the critical elements of the system of Exploration systems: flight crews, ground crews, and surface crews

Constellation Human System Integration Challenges

- Design and development phases requirements, standards, guidelines, design reviews.
 - Flight systems
 - Vehicles, payloads
 - Flight/ground system interfaces
 - Umbilicals, mechanical and electrical connectors, flex hoses
 - Ground systems
 - Ground support equipment, ground crew training systems, launch and mission control workstations, facility systems, personnel protective equipment (PPE), ground crew work instruction systems, line replaceable unit (LRU) repair/refurbishment workstations, and more.
- Operations and maintenance phases
 - Changing workforce
 - Mixed fleet: Shuttle phase-out and Constellation phase-in

Human Errors in Ground Processing

Human errors occur in the design, development, operation, and maintenance of any system



resistant

A poorly designed (vulnerable) system enables humans to make errors

A well designed (robust or resistant) system enables humans to avoid errors



Example:
Space Shuttle Auxiliary Power Unit

"<u>Complex systems</u> sometimes fail in complex ways. Sometimes you have to work pretty hard to pin down those complex failure mechanisms. But if you can do that, you will have done the <u>system</u> a great service."

Admiral Harold Gehman, Chair of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board


Flight System Example

STS-93 JULY 23, 1999

- Five seconds after lift-off, one of two redundant main engine controllers on two of the three engines shut down due to power fluctuation (later found to be due to wire arcing). The redundant controllers on those two engines -center and right main engines -functioned normally allowing them to fully support Columbia's climb to orbit
- Orbit attained was 7 miles short due to premature main engine cutoff an instant before the scheduled cutoff; eventually traced to a hydrogen leak in the No. 3 main engine nozzle



Flight System Example



- Investigation of wire arcing on shuttle launch found to be result of collateral damage.
- Human error issues include: maintenance workplace, standardized visual inspection & practices

An orbiter has more than 300 miles of wires such as these shown in the cable tray inside Columbia's payload bay. A wire damaged by abrasion from the head of a screw was found during electrical wiring inspections in Columbia's payload bay following STS-93, when a damaged wire caused a short circuit in two separate main engine controllers on launch.

System Risk Management

- Ground processing errors that compromise vehicle safety
 - Design risks vs. maintenance risks
 - Assumption of "perfect" human reliability
- Visible vs. invisible risks
 - Over-reliance on small numbers of "big" events, lack of lower level data
 - Over-reactive vs. proactive

"accident scenarios...are...often a combination of the precipitant technical failure and the handling of the technical failure by the flight crew."

International Air Transport Association Safety Report (2003)

Flight/Ground System Interface Examples


Quick Disconnects (QDs), Fluid and Electrical Umbilicals:

- Flexhose connections inside the spacecraft introduce risk of collateral damage, additional work content

- Human error potential (QD mismates)

Spacecraft Handling Mechanisms





Ground System Example #1

Self-Contained Atmosphere Protective Ensemble (SCAPE) Suit HSI Challenges:

- Dexterity/agility/flexibility
- Weight/bulkiness
- Heat stress/fatigue
- Negative pressure relief valve
- Electrostatic discharge
- Sizing/suit dimensions
- Visibility
- Communication










Ground System Example #2

		APPROVED			
DATE: 04-16-1997	TIME: 1258		JC V80-9	5963	
			REVISION	s c	HANGE: 2
10-19		OK To I	nstall:	Qw	N
[3-19]					CSR-242
	Install (1) V070-395968-003 carrier panel (F/N 10) by using attaching hardware from Table (Ref Figure). Install threaded fasteners per MA0101-501. Torque screws to 20 to 30 in-lbs				
	PN V070-3959	66-003 CMID:			
	TW 20 to \$0 in	n-lbs Cal No	Due	Date	4
			Not Perfor	med	
			т	Qw	_ N
10-20					
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10-20		OK To la	nstall:	Qw	N CSR-242
	V070-398888-0 screws from Ta Perform corros 08-AA-23-XX b Install captive	0-395974-005 cam 118 flow restrictor (ble (Ref Figure), in potection for a y using MB0120-0 asteners per MA0 Torque -4 captive I	rier panel (F/N (F/N 15) by tig screws only pe 83 TYPE II se 101-308. Insta	15) and (1) htening capt or MA0608-3 alant.	CSR-242 We bolts and 01 code asteners per
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	V070-398888-0 screwe from Ta Perform cores 08-AA-23-XX b Install captive : MA0101-301. T screws to 20-30 PN V070-3959 PN V070-3968	0-395974-005 can 118 flow restrictor (ble (Ref Figure), ion protection for ; y using MB0120-0 asteners per MA0 Forque -4 captive l in-lbs. 74-005 CMID: 88-018 CMID:	rier panei (F/N 15) by tig screws only pe i83 TYPE II se 101-308, instabolis to 20 to 3	15) and (1) htening capt or MA0608-31 alant . Ill threaded to 30 in-lbs T	CSR-242 We bolts and 01 code asteners per orque -3

NON-HAZARDOUS 10-21 APPROVED Work Instruction Systems: many HSI challenges associated with transition from centralized production & paper-based delivery to decentralized production & electronic delivery

- Requirement tracking
- Embedded reference information, photos, videos, drawings, training
- Automated deviations and updates
- Interfaces to other systems: scheduling, logistics, problem & mishap reporting





Summary

- Proactive consideration of ground crew factors enhances the designs of space vehicles and vehicle safety by:
 - Reducing the risk of undetected ground crew errors and collateral damage that compromise vehicle reliability and flight safety
 - Ensuring compatibility of specific vehicle to ground system interfaces
 - Optimizing ground systems
- During ground processing and launch operations, public safety, flight crew safety, ground crew safety, and the safety of high-value spacecraft are inter-related
- For extended Exploration missions, surface crews perform functions that merge traditional flight and ground operations