

RICE UNIVERSITY
**The Electoral Strategy of Legislative Politics:
Balancing Party and Member Reputation in
Japan and Taiwan**

by

Akitaka Matsuo


A THESIS SUBMITTED
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE

Doctor of Philosophy


APPROVED, THESIS COMMITTEE:



Mark P. Jones, Committee Chair
Joseph D. Jamail Chair in Latin
American Studies, and
Professor of Political Science




Randolph T. Stevenson
Professor of Political Science



Lanny W. Martin
Associate Professor of Political Science



Royce A. Carroll
Assistant Professor of Political Science



Steven W. Lewis
C.V. Starr Fellow in Asian Studies,
James A. Baker III Institute, and
Professor in the Practice in Humanities

Houston, Texas

April 20, 2012

To my parents, Etsuo and Fumiko Matsuo

ABSTRACT

The Electoral Strategy of Legislative Politics: Balancing Party and Member Reputation in Japan and Taiwan

by

Akitaka Matsuo

This research explores how political parties coordinate competing objectives, such as winning elections and influencing public policy with demands from their legislators whose interests lie principally in re-election and policy distribution. Electoral and legislative institutions affect the prioritizing of these goals and the appropriate strategy by which to achieve them. Utilizing two East Asian democracies, Japan and Taiwan, the thesis evaluates this argument via the econometric analysis of various aspects of legislative behavior and policy outcomes, such as committee assignments and deliberations, and intergovernmental fiscal transfers. In regard to committee activities, there exists a significant difference between governing and opposition parties in terms of the expected role of their members on legislative committees. In regard to fiscal transfers, governing parties distribute fiscal resources strategically to party strongholds.

Acknowledgments

My first thanks go to my adviser, Mark P. Jones. From the beginning of my post-graduate study at Michigan State University, he has been always supportive of me. His advice on selecting dissertation topics and mapping out the research plan was essential for carrying out this research. He was also a great mentor who has provided guidance in professional development. I would like to thank other members of my dissertation committee. Royce Carroll was always ready to read my drafts and gave me comments both theoretically and substantively insightful. I greatly owe him for considering my work in the body of political science research. Randy Stevenson and Lanny Martin revitalized my interest in legislative studies through their teaching, and also always gave me research advice full of new ideas. Steven Lewis helped me with locating my research in the historical context of the countries I studied in my dissertation.

My thanks also go to my colleagues at several graduate schools I have attended. My colleague at Kyoto University, Etsuhiro Nakamura, was the person who first introduced me to the theoretical and methodological development of the field in the US. Without him, I would not have developed and pursued a plan to study and conduct research here. Conversations with Shunta Matsumoto, Nobutaka Otobe, Fujimura Naofumi, and other colleagues at Kyoto University have inspired me since my school years in Japan.

At Rice University, I was really fortunate to be surrounded by wonderful friends and colleagues. I thank Tiffany Barnes who always took time to read my drafts

and gave thoughtful comments. Other colleagues at Rice University, especially Iliya Atanasov, Daina Chiba, Jason Eichorst, Jesse Johnson, Yoshi Kobayashi, Seonghui Lee, and Matt Loftis, provided me with an environment which was not only academically stimulating but also encouraging to the progress of my research.

I also thank a number of funding supporters which made the completion of this research plan possible. The Dissertation Improvement Grant (SES-0819527) from the National Science Foundation helped me with traveling to Japan and Taiwan, and the generous support from the Interchange Society and Taiwan Foundation of Democracy helped with spending time in Taiwan for my field research. Matsushita International Foundation supported me as I collected data on Japanese politics.

Last but not least, I thank my parents, Fumiko and Etsuo Matsuo, for their unconditional support throughout my school years. I dedicate this dissertation to my parents.

Akitaka Matsuo

Contents

Abstract	iii
Acknowledgments	iv
List of Illustrations	ix
List of Tables	x
1 Introduction	1
1.1 Context of Japanese Politics	3
1.1.1 The LDP One-Party Dominance	5
1.2 Context of Taiwanese Politics	8
1.3 Plan of the Thesis	11
2 Committee Attendance, Member Replacement and Speech in the Japanese House of Representatives	14
2.1 Introduction	15
2.2 Committee Rules and Member Activities in the Japanese House of Representatives	18
2.3 Literature and Theory	23
2.3.1 Selection of Committee Members	26
2.3.2 Members Attendance at Committee Meetings	28
2.3.3 Temporary Replacement of Committee Members	30
2.4 Data Description	32

2.5	Analysis	38
2.5.1	Committee Member Selections	39
2.5.2	Committee Attendances	42
2.5.3	Committee Member Replacements	45
2.6	Conclusion	51

3 Incentive for Pork-Barrel Spending Under Mixed-Membered System in Japan **53**

3.1	Introduction	54
3.2	The Japanese Context After Electoral Reform	57
3.3	Literature and Theory	61
3.4	Data Description	68
3.4.1	Dependent Variables	69
3.4.2	Explanatory and Control Variables	70
3.5	Results	72
3.6	Conclusion	79

4 The Effects of Party Control on Committee Assignments in the Taiwanese Legislative Yuan **85**

4.1	Introduction	86
4.2	Committee System in the Legislative Yuan	87
4.3	Literature and Theory	93
4.4	Data and Methods	95
4.4.1	Dependent Variables	96
4.4.2	Independent Variables	97

4.5	Empirical Analysis	99
4.6	Conclusion	106
5	Conclusion	108

Illustrations

2.1	Proportion of Lower House Members Who Attend Committee Meetings	21
2.2	Proportion of Lower House Members Who Make Speeches	24
2.3	Number of Speeches by Seniority	25
2.4	Prediction: Assignment to Committees	41
2.5	Prediction: Members Attendance Rates	44
2.6	Prediction: Attending Committee Meetings as Replaced Member without Speech	48
2.7	Prediction: Attending Committee Meetings as Replaced Member with Speech	50
3.1	Proportion of the LDP Votes at Local Level	61
3.2	Substantive Effects of Additional Seniority	76
4.1	Predicted Difference in The Probability for Money Committee Assignments (All Legislators)	104
4.2	Predicted Probability of Money Committee Assignments	106

Tables

1.1	Legislation in the Japanese Diet	4
2.1	Committee Powers in Japan and Western Countries	19
2.2	Number of Committee Activities Per Session	35
2.3	Average Seniority for Each Activities	36
2.4	Summary Statistics of Dependent Variables	37
2.5	Summary Statistics of Independent Variables	38
2.6	Committee Member Selection Regression	40
2.7	Binomial Regressions of Attendance for Committee Members	43
2.8	Negative Binomial Regressions for Committee Member Replacements without Speech	47
2.9	Negative Binomial Regressions for Committee Member Replacements with Speech	49
3.1	Theoretical Predictions	65
3.2	Descriptive Statistics of Variables	72
3.3	Estimates of Electoral Incentives on Fiscal Transfer (District Level)	82
3.4	Estimates of Electoral Incentives on Fiscal Transfer (Municipality Level)	83

3.5	Estimates of Electoral Incentives on Fiscal Transfer (Municipality Level, No PR Votes)	84
4.1	Maximum Number of Sessions A Member Served in a Committee . . .	90
4.2	Descriptive Statistics for Independent Variables	99
4.3	Number of Session a Member Served in Money Committees	100
4.4	Number of Session a Member Served in High Policy Committees . . .	101
4.5	Committee Assignments for Money and High Policy Committees (All Legislators)	102
4.6	Committee Assignments for Money and High Policy Committees (District Legislators Only)	105

Chapter 1

Introduction

When incumbent legislators seek reelection, they potentially have several strategies to utilize. As the seminal paper by Carey and Shugart (1995) argues, candidates can either campaign on their personal reputations or party reputations, and the efficacy of each is largely dependent on the political institutions in existence, especially electoral institutions.

In a state with an electoral system which makes a personal-vote seeking strategy more effective, incumbents want to obtain resources which can be useful to distinguish themselves from fellow members of the legislature and make appeals to their current and potential constituencies. For example, they might want to be a sponsor of a bill to help these constituencies' needs and successfully pass the bill to make such a distinguished appeal. By doing so, they can not only provide a benefit to their supporters but also demonstrate their competency. Members might also want to serve on legislative committees closely related to their electoral district's interests, which can also help them to bring pork back to their district more directly. In the last two examples, concerning committee seats and the fiscal resources of the

government, provisions of such resources are strictly limited, and incumbents are in competition with other members for procuring such resources. If the electoral benefit an incumbent gets from these resources is large, the competition might be severe and could result in a situation which no one wants. For instance, incumbents' excessive demands for fiscal distribution can lead to large deficits which have to be resolved with large-scale spending reductions unpopular to citizens. Likewise, an overflow of legislative bills introduced by legislators seeking credit-claiming opportunities might result in the incapability of the legislature to resolve urgent problems

Although there are several possible ways to avoid such tragic outcomes, this dissertation particularly focuses on the case where political parties in the legislature are expected to take responsibility for this, and examines how parties resolve these difficulties and allocate limited political resources appropriately. To explore the subject, this dissertation studies legislative activities and policy outcomes in Japan and Taiwan. As the following short descriptions of politics in these two countries illustrate, they are appropriate subjects because of the fairly strong personal vote incentives, especially under the electoral systems existing before electoral reforms, and because of the existence of dominant parties which came to control legislative processes.

1.1 Context of Japanese Politics

The time span this dissertation covers is the years from 1980 to 2005. This section provides a brief overview of Japanese politics in this period, focusing on how political institutions shaped the incentive structures of parties and their members.

Characteristics of Japanese politics are largely defined by features of two political institutions. The first is the fact that Japan is a parliamentary democracy, and the second is that the electoral systems for the House of Representatives enhance the incentives for personal vote cultivation.

In many parliamentary democracies, the legislative arena is dominated by the cabinet, and Japan is an example of such a case. Table 1.1, which provides a general overview of legislation after 1955, illustrates the point. In the entire period after the formation of the dominant Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), cabinet bills make up the largest proportion of bills discussed in the Chamber, and the success rate of legislation is much lower for member bills than for cabinet bills.

The pessimistic view of the Japanese Diet contends that it was just a rubber stamp to approve the cabinet's legislative agenda. Although this view was countered by a number of studies which have demonstrated the opposition influence in legislation (e.g. Mochizuki, 1982), it is obvious that the governing parties had been successfully passing bills on which their members shared some urgency. Under such

Table 1.1 : Legislation in the Japanese Diet

Period	Years	Proportion of Member Bills	Member Bills		Cabinet Bills	
			Number of Bills	Success Rate	Number of Bills	Success Rate
LDP Dominance I	1955-1974	9.7%	31.3	17.9%	63.9	82.3%
LDP Dominance II	1974-1986	15.5%	23.8	21.2%	34.4	80.2%
LDP Dominance III	1986-1989	10.9%	10.1	35.2%	35.6	81.6%
Divided Chamber I	1989-1993	13.2%	13.6	31.3%	30.7	91.0%
Coalition Government I	1993-1998	12.3%	17.6	26.7%	35.8	93.7%
Coalition Government II	1998-2007	16.5%	36.0	25.8%	50.9	92.4%
Divided Chamber II	2007-2009	25.5%	30.9	24.5%	26.6	83.3%

From Koga, Makihara and Okumura (2010)

conditions, opposition parties' strategies for the legislative arena are predictably different from those of the governing parties. To be more specific, as will be seen in Chapter 2, attainable goals from the legislative arena and available resources to achieve them are different between the governing and opposition parties, and therefore parties use their resources in different ways.

The second political institution that has had a large impact on Japanese politics is the electoral system. Until 1996, general elections to the House of Representatives had been held under the single non-transferable vote (SNTV) system. Carey and Shugart (1995) categorize SNTV as one of the electoral systems which enhances personal-vote seeking incentives. In this electoral system, individual candidates directly compete with their co-partisans for votes if multiple candidates from the same

party run in the same district, and voters cast a single vote for a candidate. The average district magnitude in House of Representatives elections was 3.8 under the SNTV system, meaning that if a party wanted to attain a legislative majority, it was forced to win multiple seats in the same district which pitted candidates from the same party in direct electoral competition against one another. When candidates have to compete with their co-partisans, they cannot rely on the party label to distinguish themselves from these rivals. This is the reason why personal vote incentives under SNTV are particularly strong, in one sense even stronger than those found in single member district elections.

1.1.1 The LDP One-Party Dominance

The LDP had been the governing party in Japan from 1955 to 2008, except for a short period of nine months in 1993, when an anti-LDP coalition was formed after a general election to the House of Representatives. The survival of the LDP regime was predicated on successful exploitation of these political institutions.

The LDP was formed in 1955 to counteract the reunification of the Japanese Socialist Party (JSP). The JSP split into Leftist and Rightist Socialist Parties in 1948, mainly because of differences of opinion toward the US-led pacification after WWII. After the split, both parties had increased their number of seats held in the

house in every general election. Being afraid of a socialist takeover of the government following the unification of the political left, leaders of the two largest conservative parties, the Liberal and Democratic Parties, agreed to merge in order to form a united front toward the JSP.

For some time after its formation, the LDP had a large proportion of seats in both houses of the Diet and enjoyed majority popular support in elections. However, popular support for the LDP continuously decreased over time and after the 1963 general election, the party never again garnered the majority of votes in an election for either house. In the legislature, the LDP successfully managed to maintain a majority of the House of Representatives until 1993.¹

In order to cope with the declining support and keep a majority in the chambers, the LDP exploited the political institutions described above. As to the legislative process, the LDP virtually monopolized agenda-setting power (Cox, Masuyama and McCubbins, 2000). Although opposition resistance to legislation had a substantial influence in delaying its passage, the LDP successfully passed bills crucially important to the party's policy agenda, and allowed less important bills to be terminated before being placed on the plenary agenda (Masuyama, 2003). In order to make this system work smoothly, the LDP had to make sure that its members were amenable to

¹ In some elections, they could not win the majority of seats. However, they could lure newly elected conservative members, who could not obtain the LDP endorsement, and the number of these late-joiners was enough to secure the majority.

its discipline at every stage of the legislative process. Chapter 2 shows how this motivation worked at the committee stage.

Exploiting its position as a dominant party, the LDP members could exercise significant influence on policy formation. The agreements on the party's policy agenda were formed in the Policy Affairs Research Council (PARC). Each LDP member was affiliated with a section (*bukai*) of the PARC. Members with low seniority acquired policy expertise by continuously serving on the same section for years, and could eventually become key players in that policy area (Inoguchi and Iwai, 1989). Party members from the same district usually ended up specializing in different policy areas in order to claim credit for policies related to the district, in an effort to cultivate personal votes under SNTV (McCubbins and Rosenbluth, 1995; McKean and Scheiner, 2000). As Hirano (2006) showed, fiscal transfers during the SNTV period were significantly influenced by members' efforts to bring pork to their electoral strongholds. Chapter 3 studies how the system of exchanging benefits through this selective specialization in policy area altered after the 1996 electoral reform to introduce a mixed member majoritarian system, and finds strong party influence on the allocation of particularistic spending.

The opposition parties were marginalized because of LDP dominance. The opposition parties could not exercise much influence over the government's policy decision-

making. However, members of oppositions were also under the pressure of cultivating personal votes and they tried to make the most of the limited resources. One of the resources available to opposition parties was legislative activities at the committee stage. As I have showed elsewhere, speech contents of the opposition party members in the committees of House of Representatives were altered strategically depending on the context in which members deliver speeches (Matsuo and Matsumoto, 2011). Chapter 2 also shows that the difference between opposition and government is reflected in committee assignments and participation.

1.2 Context of Taiwanese Politics

In contrast to the stable history of Japanese democracy after WWII, Taiwanese politics and political institutions were much more unstable. Taiwan is a country with a semi-presidential system with an elected president who appoints a premier to be head of the Executive Yuan. The variation in semi-presidential systems is larger than pure parliamentary or presidential systems (Shugart, 2005). Under Taiwan's current constitution, the Legislative Yuan can pass a motion of no confidence; if the motion passes the premier has to resign within ten days, but can dissolve the Legislative Yuan under the advisory of the president.

One of the most prominent characteristics of Taiwanese politics is the existence of

the Kuomintang (KMT). After retreating the government of the Republic of China (ROC) to the island of Taiwan in 1949, the KMT ruled the island under authoritarian control. Under this authoritarian control, KMT leaders, especially Chiang Ching-kuo, implemented various economic reforms and development plans. Taiwan experienced rapid economic growth and had successfully built a modern, developed economy by the end of the 1990s.

The political system of Taiwan began to democratize in the 1960s. Though the general election for the Legislative Yuan could not be held because the ROC had lost the control of the mainland, the first supplementary election to the Legislative Yuan was held in 1969 to replace members who left the chamber and to add additional members to the Legislative Yuan. These supplementary elections have been held regularly since then. Although the formation of opposition parties was prohibited, a large number of non-KMT (*Tangwai*) candidates competed in these elections and won seats.

The process of democratization made drastic progress under the presidency of Lee Teng-Hui, who became acting president for the late Chiang Ching-Kuo starting in 1988. He announced the start of constitutional reform in his inaugural address in 1990, and promised the introduction of democratic reforms within two years. As a result of several constitutional reforms, a fully democratic re-election for the

Legislative Yuan was held in 1992 and the first presidential election was held in 1996, which Lee won. The second fully democratic election for the third-term Legislative Yuan was held in 1995 and Chapter 4 of this dissertation covers the Legislative Yuan from the third to the sixth term.

In contrast to national politics, where the KMT dominated, the politics of sub-national governments was the place where local political elites were able to have significant influence. Since the 1950s, elections for local offices had been held regularly, and the KMT did not have much support from *benshengren* (Taiwan natives). In order to make up for the lack of connections, the party gradually developed a patron-client network with local factions where the party provided privileges and economic benefits in return for political support for the party (Wu, 2003). These sorts of networks between parties and local factions remained in local politics after democratization, though their strengths were getting weaker because the presence of the KMT in the economy was reduced due to the rise of the mainland economy (Wu, 2003), and the factions were seeking ties with the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) as a result of the party change in the presidency in 2000 (Mattlin, 2006).

Although such dynamics of local politics will not be the main focus of this dissertation, the research question of Chapter 4 on committee assignments in the Legislative Yuan is about the interactive effects of such local interests, measured by vote

concentration, and legislative institutions. During the period this dissertation covers, Legislative Yuan elections were contested under a mixed member system with SNTV and party-list proportional representation, and for SNTV members, personal vote seeking was predictably strong as is the case of Japan.

1.3 Plan of the Thesis

This dissertation consists of three independent chapters, each of which investigates various aspects of the overall theme of this thesis: How do parties resolve the overflow of incumbents' demands for limited resources? Chapters 2 and 4 study an important arena in the legislative process, which is legislative committees in Japan and Taiwan. In these two countries, legislative committees are fairly strong. Standing committees in each chamber have clearly defined jurisdictions, all bills have to go through committee deliberation to pass, and committees have strong bill initiation authority. These chapters look into how parties control limited resources such as committee seats and speech time.

Chapter 2 investigates the standing committees of the Japanese House of Representatives from 1980 to 2005. In particular, this chapter studies how political parties and legislators utilize committee assignment, committee attendance, and speeches in committees to accomplish competing goals such as securing members' reelection,

passing legislation and establishing the party reputation. The goals and constraints in using committee resources are different for governing and opposition parties. As the governing parties are supported by the majority of the parliament, they focus more on passing legislation, while opposition parties focus on establishing party reputation and helping electorally vulnerable members. Chapter 4 investigates the standing committees of the Taiwanese Legislative Yuan from 1995 to 2007, focusing on the electoral incentives of committee assignments. This chapter investigates how the shift from the absence to the presence of legislative institutions changes the mechanism of self-selection onto distributive committees. In particular, this chapter studies the effect of the 2001 reforms in the committee systems of the Legislative Yuan, which installed party control in committee assignments.

Chapter 3 investigates fiscal transfers to local governments, focusing on the characteristics of the Japanese electoral system introduced in 1996. This chapter sheds new light on the research agenda of the targets of particularistic spending by investigating the early period under the mixed member majoritarian system in Japan. I utilize a unique characteristic of this electoral system in which electoral support for parties and candidates are separated on the ballot and therefore can be observed independently from each other. Using fiscal data from 1997-2002, this chapter shows that the governing parties dominate this domain, funneling fiscal transfers to dis-

tricts that provide strong support for the party. Individual candidates, however, do not have sufficient control over resources to galvanize a personal vote by rewarding supporters. However, influential members of the governing parties can provide goods to their core supporters. Chapter 5 summarizes the findings from individual chapters and discusses their implications.

Chapter 2

Committee Attendance, Member Replacement and Speech in the Japanese House of Representatives

Chapter Abstract

This chapter investigates the legislative activities of members of the Japanese House of Representatives. In particular, it examines how political parties and legislators utilize committee assignment, attendance, and speeches to accomplish competing goals such as securing members' reelection, passing legislation and establishing party reputation. In order to achieve these goals, parties assign members to proper committees, pressure members to attend committees when needed, and provide opportunities to deliver legislative speeches. Facing different constraints on available resources to pursue these goals, governing and opposition parties prioritize the aforementioned goals differently. Governing parties focus more on passing legislation, while opposition parties focus on establishing party reputation and helping electorally vulnerable members through deliberations. To test this argument, I compile an original, comprehensive dataset of committee assignments and membership replacements from 1980 to 2005 in the Japanese House of Representatives, which allows an unlimited number of temporally member replacements.

2.1 Introduction

Legislative committees play numerous important roles in many parliamentary democracies, especially in countries with strong, established committee systems (Mattson and Strøm, 1995). In such countries, committees are a central part of the legislative processes. For instance, committees control the timetable for legislation and thus are able to delay the passage of critical legislations (Döring, 1995*b*). Committees can also change the content of legislation by redrafting government bills and initiating legislation. In addition, parties in the coalition utilize legislative committees to reduce the policy loss created by disagreement between coalition partners in a country with a coalition government. Deliberations at committee meetings provide coalition partners with additional time to scrutinize policy details (Martin and Vanberg, 2005). Holding committee chairs offers a chance to monitor cabinet ministers by allocating chairs to a party other than that which holds the cabinet minister (Kim and Loewenberg, 2005; Carroll and Cox, 2012).

The previous research on legislative committees in parliamentary democracies reveals the important role of committees in party politics but tends to overlook the importance of committees for individual members of legislatures. As voluminous studies of the US Congress have shown, committee appointments can be an important resource for members to achieve their goals. Under the individualistic understanding, Congressional committees are regarded as a mechanism to implement stable exchange of members' policy benefits based on their district interests (Weingast and Marshall, 1988), and members assigned to the committee closely related

to their constituents' interests are benefited in votes and campaign financing (Grier and Munger, 1991). In contrast to extensive research on the US Congress, scholars have given little attention to this issue in comparative legislative studies, except for studies on European Parliament (e.g. McElroy 2006; Yordanova 2009).

This chapter attempts to fill this gap by exploring how parties and individual members in the Japanese House of Representatives use committee appointments and committee activities to achieve legislative and electoral goals. The Japanese Diet is a legislature with well-developed committee systems in which deliberations have substantive impacts on policy outcomes. In such chambers, selections of committee members and their activities impact the legislative processes. Parties in the legislature control allocation of committee appointments in many countries, including Japan, and can strategically use appointments to achieve legislative and electoral goals.

To thoroughly explore this topic, this study focuses on one of the interesting characteristics of the committee systems in the Diet: the high number of replacements in committee memberships. In each meeting of the committees, as many as thirty percent of members are temporarily replaced and return when the meeting has concluded. Two types of replacements exist: those who attend a meeting to make a speech and those who do not. Replacements who do not deliver speeches are exclusively used to achieve legislative goals. Committee deliberations are a process for all bills to go through before they are placed in the plenary agenda. In order to conclude committee deliberation, all bills must be discussed in a certain number of committee meetings, every one of which must satisfy quorum requirements. The key to un-

derstanding frequent member replacements, especially ones without speeches, is the procedural necessity for legislation. In contrast, replacements who make speeches have more important meanings in party politics in Japan than replacements who don't.

The motivation behind the use of committee systems should differ for governing and opposition parties, because they have different priorities, such as securing members' reelection, passing legislation and establishing party reputation. Governing parties with the majority in the chamber can pass legislation as long as they can get the support of their members in legislature. Governing parties have mandates from electorates in the last election; meeting this expectation by making and implementing policies will determine their performances in the next election. Therefore, their primary goal is to pass legislations on issues on which party members can form agreements. In contrast, since opposition parties cannot block legislation when governing parties are cohesive, they focus on establishing party reputation and improving their members' reelection prospects through committee deliberations. To test hypotheses derived from this argument, I compile an original dataset of comprehensive records of the members of the House of Representatives from 1980 to 2005. The dataset includes all information about membership assignments and replacements, committee attendance and speeches.

This chapter is organized as follows. In the following section, I briefly describe the Diet rules about the committee assignments and allocation of time for speech. The third section develops the theoretical argument of the chapter. Section four introduces the data. Section five conducts empirical analysis of committee assignments

and members activities. The last section summarizes the findings.

2.2 Committee Rules and Member Activities in the Japanese House of Representatives

Compared to other parliamentary democracies, legislative committees in the Japanese House of Representatives are moderately strong. Table 2.1 shows various aspects of committee authorities in Japan compared to those of Western European countries, including the European Parliament. For a majority of the categories, standing committees in Japan are strong authorities. Discussions in committees are a crucial part of deliberations for legislation, because plenary session time is severely limited. The duration of an ordinary session is only 150 days each year; at the end of each session, all bills without final passage in both chambers are automatically terminated. Therefore, even when governing parties hold the majority in both chambers, they have to set the orders for bills to pass, allowing low priority bills to be scrapped. This limited plenary time is the reason why opposition parties can have strong influence on policy decisions and retrieve concessions from the governing parties (Mochizuki, 1982). For governing parties, this limited plenary time is an important resource to influence rank-and-file members of the party (Masuyama, 2001).

All introduced bills are referred to a committee that has jurisdiction over the content of bills. A resolution on the floor can skip the reference, although this rule is rarely used. Once a bill is referred to a committee, its board of directors set the schedule of deliberation and the total time for questions (Oyama, 2003). At the beginning of committee deliberations, proposers of a bill explain the aim

Table 2.1 : Committee Powers in Japan and Western Countries

State	Control of Own Time Table	Initiate Legislation	Redraft Government Bills	Committee Stage Before Plenary	Right to Compel Witnesses	Committee Members Removable	Influence of Committee Members on Party Positions
Japan	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Medium
Austria	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	High
Belgium	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Medium
Denmark	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	Medium
Finland	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Medium
France	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Low
Germany	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Medium
Greece	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	Low
Ireland	No	No	No	No	No	No	Low
Italy	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	High
Luxembourg	No	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Medium
Netherlands	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	High
Portugal	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	Low
Spain	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Low
Sweden	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Medium
UK	No	No	No	No	No	No	Low
EP	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	High

Sources: Taken from Mamadouh and Raunio (2003), The original data come from several chapters in Döring (1995a).

of legislation, and then committee members are allowed time for questions. After discussion of a bill has concluded, the committee takes votes and sends it to the floor.

Governing parties want to secure the majority in committees, because failure to win a majority vote makes passage of bill difficult (although it does not necessarily terminate it). The number of committee seats held by each party is automatically determined in proportion to the number of seats that each party holds in the chamber; approval by the Steering Committee is required to formally finalize it. Each party then selects members from their party to represent them in each committee. The Speaker of the House officially appoints members according to the list of members submitted by parties.¹

There are about twenty standing committees in the House of Representatives.² Each committee has a chair person and several directors. In many committees, majority parties possess the chairmanship, and director positions are allocated to parties proportionally. Members of the House of Representatives are required to hold at least one membership in standing committees; once assigned to a committee, they hold the membership throughout a session. Members who are assigned to other important posts, such as the speaker or cabinet ministers, are allowed to decline appointment to committees.

Figure 2.1 shows the proportion of members who attend at least one meeting in a session by seniority.³ Most members of the House of Representatives attend committee meetings, but the proportion gradually declines as seniority increases.


¹ For detailed description, see Oyama (2003) and Asano and Kohno (2008)

² The number of committees changes over time; currently, there are 17 committees.

³ The sample of legislators is limited only to single member district candidates.

There is a dip in the proportion of attendance for governing party members: fifth-term members under the old single nontransferable vote (SNTV) system and fourth-term members under the current mixed member majoritarian (MMM) system have relatively low attendance rates. These dips are caused by appointments of members to other offices, which exempt them from committee membership requirements.

Figure 2.1 : Proportion of Lower House Members Who Attend Committee Meetings



Since the number of seats in each committee is fixed, many members are not awarded their desired assignments. Those who are not selected to a committee, how-

ever, may have opportunities to participate in deliberations in committees. That is, they can attend the meeting and make speeches as temporary members by replacing current members. The House Rules allow parties to make any number of temporary replacements in each meeting. They in fact make a large number of replacements especially for important committees, such as the Committee on the Budget.

Sometimes current committee members want to be replaced temporarily by other members, because they are unable to attend committee meetings for various reasons. In that case, they can resign their committee post for that meeting, and their party fills the vacancy by temporarily assigning a different party member. More than a half of members must be present in order to meet the quorum requirement to hold a meeting. Governing parties have a stronger incentive to meet the quorum requirement for several reasons. Taking votes at a committee is a requirement to consider a bill on the plenary agenda; before taking vote for a bill, they must have had deliberation for a certain amount of time agreed by the board of directors. Thus, parties seeking to pass legislations must ensure that enough members attend every committee meeting.

The board of directors for each committee determines the amount of question time in each session. The House Rules stipulate that question time is allocated in proportion to the number of seats held in the chamber; in practice, however, governing parties pass a large portion of question time to opposition parties. Directors of a committee from each party decide to whom they allocate question time. Committee members who are allocated time for questions determine what to discuss. The use of this time is not strictly limited to questioning the bills; they can also deliver speeches


on related topics (Matsuo and Matsumoto, 2011). Question time is followed by the final deliberations by all parties to display opposition or approval to the bill.

Figure 2.2 shows the proportion of Diet members who make speeches in committee meetings. The proportion is much smaller than that of committee attendance in Figure 2.1. The difference between governing and opposition parties is also larger for speeches than attendances, though the difference is smaller under the new electoral system, especially for members with low seniority. Under the present electoral system, MMM, governing party members seem to be more active in making speeches. This tendency is seen in Figure 2.3 as well, which shows the number of speeches made by committee attendants. Under the former electoral system, SNTV, governing party members did not make many speeches, even if they were newly elected members. In contrast, under the MMM system, the amount of speeches made by freshmen and sophomores is much larger, although they still speak less than opposition party members.

2.3 Literature and Theory

This section develops a theoretical argument based on the partisan theory of legislative organization. As seen in the previous section, most members of the House of Representatives in Japan attend committee meetings, and a majority of them make speeches at the committee meetings. These committee memberships and allocation of speech time are under partisan control, which is established by the rules of the chamber.

Figure 2.2 : Proportion of Lower House Members Who Make Speeches






Figure 2.3 : Number of Speeches by Seniority

2.3.1 Selection of Committee Members

Political parties are instruments for members to solve collective action problems and provide public goods for members such as party label (Aldrich, 1995) or the reputation of the governing parties (Cox and McCubbins, 2007). In both arguments, political parties are the institutions that help their members' reelection through several measures. Aldrich (1995) claims that political parties are established by ambitious politicians who want to have a mechanism to achieve their goal through long-stabilized relationship, while Cox and McCubbins (2007) claim that the majority party organizes the structures of the Congress in order to steer their members' reelection goals from being damaged by members' excessive demands for policies.

Committee assignments can be seen as the tool for achieving these goals. There are multiple competing motivations for parties to appoint members to committees; the priority of these goals can vary depending on the characteristics of a committee. When a committee plays an important role in the debate of party politics, parties have an incentive to send members who are suitable for that task. Some committees are a key arena for partisan confrontation for primary political issues at that point in time. In addition, committee deliberation is a good opportunity for oversight of the government policies (Kiewiet and McCubbins, 1991; Pollack, 2003); this is particularly important for opposition parties that need to criticize governments for unresolved policy issues, as this is an effective strategy to improve their prospects in the next election. There are variations in the importance of committees and some committees draw more attention from the media and voters.⁴ For such important

⁴ Another potential role of committee deliberations for governing parties is to oversee coalition

committees, placing competent members is particularly important. This reasoning leads to the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 2.1 *Parties appoint competent members to committees that are important for partisan debates.*

In the context of the Japanese Diet, the Committee on the Budget is by far the most important committee for partisan politics, because it functions as a substitute for the plenary sessions in terms of deliberations for key legislation. The plenary bottleneck problem (Cox, 2006) is remarkably serious in the Japanese Diet, because the number of plenary meetings in one session is small. As explained previously, all bills must pass both chambers before the end of each Diet session. Except for crucially important issues discussed at the plenary sessions, deliberations for most issues are held at committee meetings. In particular, the Committee on the Budget is used as a substitute for plenary sessions, because the committee has jurisdiction over every issue related to fiscal expenditures; thus, almost all political issues can be placed on the agenda.

The second goal for parties in selecting membership of committees is to help their members get reelected. Legislators pursue several objectives, including reelection, policy and promotion (Fenno, 1978; Müller and Strøm, 1999). Among them, reelection has crucial importance, because winning an election is the prerequisite for seeking other goals. Parties can help their members to achieve reelection by assigning them to a committee related to the interests of members' constituents. Serving as

partners (e.g. Martin and Vanberg, 2005), but this is not the case in Japan.

a member of a committee closely related their supporters' interests provides members with several opportunities. First, this allows legislators to easily obtain more information about the policies that are important to their constituents. Second, committee membership allows legislators to claim credit for legislation passed in the committee. Third, committee membership gives legislators the opportunity to promote their policy positions and formally champion legislation that is important to their constituents (Mayhew, 1974).⁵ This is particularly important for opposition party members, because they have limited opportunities to advocate their policy position and influence government policies. Members of governing parties have the opportunity to provide their input on policies proposed by the government. For these reasons, parties are expected to pursue following strategies:

Hypothesis 2.2 *Parties assign members to committees that have policy jurisdiction over issues that are related to their electorates' interests.*

2.3.2 Members Attendance at Committee Meetings

Once appointed to a committee, parties expect legislators to attend committee meetings. To send a bill to the plenary agenda, it is required that a committee first votes on the bill. Therefore, parties that seek to pass or block legislation want their members to show up for meetings. In this respect, there is a significant difference between governing and opposition parties. Governing parties with the legislative majority are able to pass legislation when all members from their party attend the meeting.⁶

⁵ A previous analysis shows that the electoral pressure has a substantive impact on the legislators in pre-electoral sessions (see Fukumoto and Matsuo, 2010).

⁶ As far as committee membership is allocated proportionally to parties.

Therefore, they have stronger needs for members to attend meeting in order to avoid the roadblock for the schedule in legislation. In particular for the Japanese Diet, committee rules stipulate that a certain amount of deliberation, which usually requires several committee meetings, must take place before the committee can vote on a bill. In order to deliberate and vote on a given bill, a quorum requirement to hold a meeting must be satisfied. Thus, committee attendance is imperative for the majority party's success.⁷

In contrast, opposition parties do not have a strong incentive to make members attend committee meetings. Even when all opposition members attend committee meetings, they cannot form a majority in the committee if all governing party members are present. Furthermore, even if opposition parties successfully form a majority for the committee vote and pass a bill that they support, it is likely that the bill will not pass the plenary vote. Summarizing this discussion, the following hypothesis is made:

Hypothesis 2.3 *Governing party members are more likely to attend committee meetings than opposition members.*

There are several factors that may affect the relationship stated in Hypothesis 2.3. The first is the seniority of members. Parties try to influence their members' behavior in order to achieve the goal that they are pursuing. They can utilize the

⁷ Governing parties in Japan have successfully cartelized the legislative agenda in the sense that bills not preferred by a majority of government members are rarely on the agenda (Cox, Masuyama and McCubbins, 2000). Once government bills are introduced, governing parties are able to pass the legislation as long as time permits. Usually important bills are submitted earlier in the session to have it enough time to go through the obstacles.

resources, such as political funds and political posts under their control, as rewards and punishments. Junior members are more vulnerable to such pressures, because they need parties' help to develop their political career, while senior members are more independent from the party. The second is individual members' policy interests. Some legislators might have an incentive to be absent from meetings, because time is a precious resource for members; they have to make efficient use of it in order to achieve the goals that they pursue. Therefore, when they do not have strong interests in the issues discussed at the committee, they may be less likely to attend.

2.3.3 Temporary Replacement of Committee Members

Recall that there are two types of temporary member replacements: the first satisfies quorum requirements, while the second makes speeches for particular issues (see Table 2.2).

With regards to the former, not all parties have the same incentives to satisfy the quorum requirement. As previously discussed, opposition parties do not have an incentive to satisfy the quorum requirement, because they cannot form a majority to pass or block legislation. On the contrary, given that governing parties control the legislative agenda, they must be careful to satisfy the quorum requirements, especially during a time of heated interparty confrontation.

In addition, when contentious issues are raising intraparty conflicts, party leadership has an incentive to replace members who do not agree with their policy position with those who support the leadership's position. For example, in 2005, the governing Liberal Democratic Party replaced eight members from the Special Committee

on Postal Service Privatization when they voted on a bill to privatize the postal service.⁸ Given that young members are less likely to break with party rank, party leadership may prefer to temporarily replace older, more independent members, with younger, more disciplined members. This argument will be less applicable to committee replacement patterns by opposition parties, because opposition members votes are rarely decisive. This leads to the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 2.4 *Governing parties have a larger number of replacements than opposition parties, and the replacements are likely junior members of a party.*

The second type of temporary replacements are members who deliver speeches in a committee meeting. These replacements are based on completely different motivations from the previous category. Delivering committee speeches is a more salient activity than just attending a committee meeting; their speeches might impact the incumbent legislators' electoral performance. Since the number of committee seats is fixed, some members are not appointed to their preferred committee. This is often the case for powerful and prestigious committees such as the Committee on the Budget, which allocates fiscal resources, and the Agriculture Committee, which represents rural interests (Horiuchi and Saito, 2003), and has a strong agricultural lobby (Rosenbluth and Thies, 2010, Chapter 5).

Members can be assigned temporarily to such prestigious committees. Parties are willing to make these temporary reassignments, because they find it mutually beneficial. Even an one-time opportunity for serving on a powerful committee pro-

⁸ *Yomiuri Shinbun 06-09-2005*

vides members with an important electoral advantage, which can increase the party's chances of winning. Therefore, parties often assign temporary members who anticipate a difficult reelection. Since opposition parties do not have access to the resources of executive division, they utilize this opportunity more often.

Hypothesis 2.5 *Opposition members, especially electorally vulnerable members, are more likely to have the opportunity to deliver speeches in committee meetings as temporal members.*

2.4 Data Description

In order to test the hypotheses stated above, a comprehensive dataset of committee assignments and membership replacements from 1980 to 2005 was compiled. For this period, data at ordinary sessions for the Diet were collected, excluding special and extraordinary sessions, many of which were too short to use as reliable data sources. To collect committee activity data, all conference minutes of the House of Representatives were downloaded from the National Diet Library website⁹ and parsed using perl scripts. The records of 129th sessions were excluded from the data, since governing party membership is almost intractable due to multiple changes in coalition partners during the session.

The unit of observations in the dataset is each member by each legislative session. For the period under the current MMM system, I only include the members who ran for single-member district (SMD) races and exclude members who ran only

⁹ <http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/SENTAKU/index.htm>

for proportional representation (PR) races, because the latter members' reelections depend little on their personal efforts.¹⁰ The present MMM election allows dual candidacy on both SMD and PR races; PR candidacy is valid only following a loss in the SMD race. In total, 180 of 480 (67 percent) members are elected from PR districts, around 80 percent of members held a candidacy in SMD races. After parsing the information from conference minutes, individual members' attendances, speeches, and replacements (resignations and appointments) were counted in each session. Different variables were created for members' speeches on the day of temporal appointments. In sum, there are five variables for each committee: the number of members in attendance, the number of resignations, the number of temporary members in attendance, the number of speeches and the number of speeches given by temporary members. These data are used to construct the dependent variables used in the analysis.¹¹

Though data were collected for all standing committees, a small subset of committees was shown for the analysis. First, committees that have not been subjected to jurisdictional changes in this period were selected: Budget, Judicial, Foreign Affairs, Environment, Agriculture, and Cabinet Committees. Among them, the analysis focuses on Budget, Agriculture, Foreign Affairs, and Agriculture Committees. As described previously, the Committee on Budget is particularly important, since it is one of the fronts for partisan confrontation; the Agriculture Committee is a typical distributive committee that can easily identify which legislators have higher demand

¹⁰ Pekkanen, Nyblade and Krauss (2006) show that the LDP treat PR-only members differently from other members.

¹¹ First, committee membership is measured using the criterion described below.

for becoming a member; Judicial Committee is a committee dominated by experts; and the Foreign Affairs Committee was another front of partisan confrontation in the Cold War era, although its importance has been decreasing.

The average number of replacements in each session are shown in Table 2.2. Each item in the table is the average number of committee activities in one session. The data are separated into four subcategories depending on governing/opposition status of parties and pre/post-electoral reform period. For all subcategories, more than 10 percent of members are replaced in each committee meeting, and 20 to 30 percent are replaced in Budget Committee meetings.

Table 2.3 shows the average member seniority for each activity. Each entry is the deviation of individual member from the entire mean of committee activities.¹² The average seniority for Budget Committee attendants is much higher than that of other committee attendants. This is probably because more senior members are likely to be more competent.

The next session analyzes who is appointed to each committee and members' activities. For this purpose, permanent committee members must be identified; given the large number of replacements, however, this is difficult. To address this problem, the number of attendances and resignations are totaled for each Diet member and considered one as a permanent committee member if the total number of attendances and resignations is larger than one half of the meetings held in a session.¹³ There are four dependent variables in the analysis: permanent committee membership,

¹² In other words, the average seniority of total attendance is subtracted from each average.

¹³ Resignations indicate that she or he holds a membership but did not attend a committee meeting by being replaced with another member.

Table 2.2 : Number of Committee Activities Per Session

Committee	Type	SNTV Gov	MMD Gov	SNTV Opp	MMD Opp
Total	Attend	3420.9	5691.4	3219.4	4986.4
	Rep-Attend	344.1	772.2	337.8	781.8
	Resign	173.6	275.8	156.5	273.9
	Speech	138.3	400.3	909.7	1123.4
	Rep-Speech	7.5	44.6	98.6	185.0
Budget	Attend	632.9	729.4	473.6	613.0
	Rep-Attend	126.3	202.0	109.8	240.6
	Resign	47.1	38.3	39.1	35.1
	Speech	22.0	46.0	88.9	128.2
	Rep-Speech	4.6	19.1	34.1	70.2
Judicial	Attend	146.3	414.8	144.0	289.1
	Rep-Attend	13.3	47.9	11.6	50.7
	Resign	8.7	20.1	6.2	20.9
	Speech	8.8	34.0	53.2	82.3
	Rep-Speech	0.3	2.0	4.0	10.9
Agriculture	Attend	298.9	376.6	302.1	371.6
	Rep-Attend	20.1	51.2	24.0	37.4
	Resign	11.5	23.6	11.2	15.6
	Speech	12.0	25.6	103.0	75.3
	Rep-Speech	0.1	2.7	6.3	6.1

permanent members' committee attendance, temporary replacement without speech, and temporary replacement without speech. The summary statistics are shown in Table 2.4.

The committee data are then matched with the following variables to be used in the analysis: degree of urbanization, electoral strength, and seniority. Urbanization is measured by the proportion of electoral district population who reside in densely

Table 2.3 : Average Seniority for Each Activities

Committee	Type	SNTV Gov	MMD Gov	SNTV Opp	MMD Opp
Total	Attend	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	Rep-Attend	-1.133	-0.782	-0.474	-0.459
	Resign	1.284	0.760	0.537	0.526
	Speech	-1.258	-0.582	-0.009	-0.025
	Rep-Speech	-0.257	-0.482	0.135	-0.126
Budget	Attend	2.086	1.924	0.958	0.427
	Rep-Attend	-0.233	0.153	-0.027	-0.077
	Resign	3.068	3.231	1.012	0.591
	Speech	0.767	0.862	1.089	0.329
	Rep-Speech	0.272	0.040	0.531	0.305
Judicial	Attend	0.546	0.269	0.531	0.130
	Rep-Attend	-1.353	-0.785	-0.423	-0.422
	Resign	1.967	1.473	1.219	2.562
	Speech	-1.511	-0.647	0.361	-0.255
	Rep-Speech	0.182	-0.751	0.248	-0.215
Agriculture	Attend	-0.673	-0.401	-0.538	0.262
	Rep-Attend	-1.925	-1.164	-0.952	-0.587
	Resign	0.190	1.374	-0.219	-0.138
	Speech	-1.907	-0.918	-0.311	0.229
	Rep-Speech	-2.018	-1.182	-0.069	-0.223

Each number indicates the diversion of average seniority for each activity from average for total attend

inhabited districts; electoral strength is measured as divergence from Droop quota¹⁴ and seniority as the number of terms served as a member of the House of Represen-

¹⁴ Droop quota indicates the proportion of votes sufficient to win a seat given district magnitude. The formula is

$$\frac{v_i - q_j}{q_j} \quad \text{where} \quad q_j = \frac{1}{d_j + 1}$$

v_i is proportion of candidate i obtained in the previous election, q_j is Droop quota ratio for district j , d_j is district magnitude for district j . For more detailed discussion, see Cox and Rosenbluth (1993).

Table 2.4 : Summary Statistics of Dependent Variables

Variable	Elec. Sys	Mean	Std Dev	Min	Max
Member Selection					
Budget	SNTV	0.112	0.315	0	1
	SMD	0.118	0.322	0	1
Agriculture	SNTV	0.086	0.281	0	1
	SMD	0.089	0.285	0	1
Foreign	SNTV	0.06	0.238	0	1
	SMD	0.067	0.25	0	1
Judicial	SNTV	0.052	0.223	0	1
	SMD	0.072	0.259	0	1
Number of Attendances					
Budget	SNTV	19.5	5.636	2	33
	SMD	21.98	6.383	9	37
Agriculture	SNTV	15.2	5.581	0	29
	SMD	18.09	4.784	2	26
Foreign	SNTV	11.22	5.27	0	24
	SMD	16.01	5.371	4	28
Judicial	SNTV	11.34	5.636	0	29
	SMD	21.61	7.3	0	35
Replacements without Speech					
Budget	SNTV	0.331	0.957	0	12
	SMD	0.531	1.259	0	13
Agriculture	SNTV	0.069	0.317	0	5
	SMD	0.16	0.526	0	6
Foreign	SNTV	0.04	0.236	0	4
	SMD	0.09	0.361	0	6
Judicial	SNTV	0.041	0.263	0	6
	SMD	0.162	0.569	0	11
Replacements with Speech					
Budget	SNTV	0.097	0.363	0	5
	SMD	0.223	0.62	0	6
Agriculture	SNTV	0.013	0.143	0	4
	SMD	0.02	0.178	0	4
Foreign	SNTV	0.014	0.142	0	3
	SMD	0.019	0.167	0	4
Judicial	SNTV	0.008	0.1	0	4
	SMD	0.027	0.187	0	3

tatives. In order to capture the effects of expertise on committee activities, a dummy variable is included for lawyers in the models of the Judicial Committee; it equals one when a member has a career in the legal profession. Summary statistics for these variables are shown in Table 2.5.

Table 2.5 : Summary Statistics of Independent Variables

Variable Name	Mean	Minimum	Max	Std Dev
Urban	0.583	0.080	1.000	0.278
Margin	-0.054	-0.882	1.800	0.225
Seniority	4.516	1	20	3.318
Governing Party	0.511	0	1	
Lawyer	0.059	0	1	

2.5 Analysis

The empirical tests first explore factors that explain committee membership and attendance. The set of explanatory variables is common to both analyses: seniority, degree of urbanization, electoral strength. Since the effects of these variables are considered different between governing and opposition parties, models are estimated in which all explanatory variables interact with the governing party dummy. In order to allow for easy interpretations of coefficients, interaction terms are included with the opposition party dummy, and constructive terms are excluded.¹⁵ I separate sam-

¹⁵ Mathematically, the estimates of the models in this section are the same as those with interactions with governing party and constructive terms. The constructive term estimates and their standard errors can be calculated as linear combinations of estimates from our specification.

ples based on electoral systems, SNTV, and SMD to address potential heterogeneity issues of samples.

2.5.1 Committee Member Selections

Table 2.6 shows the results of logistic regressions in which the dependent variables are the memberships of each committee. Figure 2.4 shows the predicted probability of member assignments to each committee given party affiliation and seniority.¹⁶ Black dots correspond with predictions for governing parties; white dots, opposition parties. Squares represent members under the old electoral systems; circles, under the new electoral system.

As expected by Hypothesis 2.1, memberships in the Committee on the Budget are more likely to be held by those with higher seniority. In contrast, membership in other committees cannot be explained by seniority. For both the governing and the opposition parties, seniority has a negative impact in the case of Agricultural Committee. As Hypothesis 2.2 predicts, the committee is filled with high-demand members who are representatives of rural areas. In addition, members of the Agricultural Committee tend to be electorally weak and with lower seniority for both governing and opposition party members. As for the Judicial Committee, electoral concerns do not seem to be important in selecting committee members. The Judicial Committee is a typical non-partisan committee with little relations with district

¹⁶ The predictions implemented in R are obtained using a simulation-based method introduced in King, Tomz and Wittenberg (2000) Other prediction in the later subsections are also obtained in the same manner.


Table 2.6 : Committee Member Selection Regression

	Budget		Agriculture		Foreign		Judicial	
	SNTV	SMD	SNTV	SMD	SNTV	SMD	SNTV	SMD
Governing Party								
Urban	0.364 (0.226)	0.478 (0.382)	-1.713* (0.313)	-3.855* (0.498)	1.150* (0.281)	0.263 (0.464)	0.738* (0.340)	1.898* (0.456)
Margin	-0.174 (0.289)	0.024 (0.462)	-0.924* (0.383)	-1.722* (0.504)	1.358* (0.327)	-0.143 (0.571)	-0.759 (0.481)	2.075* (0.532)
Seniority	0.196* (0.015)	0.263* (0.027)	-0.161* (0.024)	-0.112* (0.041)	0.001 (0.023)	-0.147* (0.046)	0.021 (0.025)	-0.076 (0.039)
Lawyer							2.514* (0.208)	1.693* (0.336)
Party Dummy	-0.461 (0.247)	-0.868* (0.396)	-1.019* (0.257)	-0.142 (0.364)	0.942* (0.332)	1.516* (0.509)	0.138 (0.370)	-0.508 (0.485)
Opposition Party								
Urban	-0.008 (0.220)	0.319 (0.323)	-3.905* (0.318)	-3.394* (0.335)	1.368* (0.287)	0.853 (0.455)	-0.176 (0.335)	-0.277 (0.433)
Margin	0.218 (0.339)	-0.334 (0.356)	-0.985* (0.406)	-0.362 (0.401)	0.205 (0.430)	0.086 (0.482)	-1.688* (0.566)	-0.288 (0.497)
Seniority	0.118* (0.021)	0.082* (0.032)	-0.170* (0.029)	-0.077 (0.044)	0.128* (0.026)	0.093* (0.041)	0.017 (0.034)	-0.079 (0.057)
Lawyer							3.234* (0.187)	2.375* (0.253)
Constant	-2.742* (0.177)	-2.634* (0.280)	0.145 (0.182)	0.021 (0.244)	-4.263* (0.251)	-3.676* (0.399)	-3.824* (0.270)	-2.783* (0.364)
Observations	6360	2884	6360	2884	6360	2884	6156	2863
Log Likelihood	-2114.9	-989.7	-1697.9	-771.6	-1403.7	-695.4	-1056.8	-680.8
χ^2 : Model	2565.3	1152.2	2310.8	1038.2	2575.1	1206.0	2058.1	1109.4

Standard errors in parentheses

* indicates significance at $p < 0.05$

Figure 2.4 : Prediction: Assignment to Committees



interests.¹⁷ Although I do not present the empirical results, the same relationship exists in the case of the Health, Labour and Welfare Committee, where medical doctors are overrepresented. Overall, these findings for Agricultural Committee support the hypotheses presented in Section 2.3.

2.5.2 Committee Attendances

This section investigates committee activities by formal members of the committees previously identified. Binomial regressions with logistic link are used for the analysis of committee attendance.¹⁸ The number of Bernoulli trials are the total number of meetings for the respective committees in each session; the number of success is the number of committee attendance by the member. Estimates are shown in Table 2.7. Hypothesis 2.3 predicts that committee members from governing parties are more likely to attend committee meetings. Since models are used with interaction terms, the estimated coefficient of constructive terms cannot be interpreted by itself, especially when other variables are not normalized. As a result, the substantive impact is calculated by simulation and presented in Figure 2.5. Budget Committee members from the governing party are more likely to attend committee meetings than opposition members, especially when members have low seniority.

However, members with higher seniority are less likely to show up for committee meetings. This indicates that members attend committee meetings to show their

¹⁷ As the authors show in a different paper (Matsumoto and Matsuo, 2010), discussions in the Judicial Committee are dominated by legal professionals.

¹⁸ This specification is the same as running logistic regressions with each members attendance/absence as a unit of observation.


Table 2.7 : Binomial Regressions of Attendance for Committee Members

	Budget		Agriculture		Foreign		Judicial	
	SNTV	SMD	SNTV	SMD	SNTV	SMD	SNTV	SMD
Governing Party								
Urban	0.277*	-0.259	-0.185	-1.574*	-0.168	0.590	-0.248	1.059*
	(0.128)	(0.214)	(0.233)	(0.319)	(0.162)	(0.325)	(0.258)	(0.249)
Margin	-1.117*	-0.700*	-0.620*	0.430	-1.083*	1.477*	-0.746*	0.070
	(0.156)	(0.258)	(0.227)	(0.293)	(0.231)	(0.414)	(0.291)	(0.281)
Seniority	-0.034*	-0.112*	-0.122*	-0.238*	-0.104*	-0.088*	-0.088*	-0.116*
	(0.013)	(0.019)	(0.013)	(0.020)	(0.012)	(0.035)	(0.013)	(0.018)
Lawyer							0.578*	0.977*
							(0.138)	(0.221)
Party Dummy	-0.369*	1.009*	0.360*	0.489	0.365	-0.326	0.937*	0.107
	(0.162)	(0.258)	(0.158)	(0.250)	(0.225)	(0.378)	(0.257)	(0.273)
Opposition Party								
Urban	-0.511*	0.167	0.325	-0.136	0.177	-0.074	0.450*	-0.088
	(0.128)	(0.185)	(0.201)	(0.274)	(0.201)	(0.376)	(0.218)	(0.225)
Margin	0.634*	0.629*	0.332	-0.514	-0.307	-0.291	-1.759*	-2.404*
	(0.194)	(0.208)	(0.236)	(0.359)	(0.204)	(0.306)	(0.388)	(0.290)
Seniority	-0.044*	0.028	-0.036*	-0.117*	-0.055*	-0.075*	-0.004	-0.035
	(0.013)	(0.020)	(0.016)	(0.026)	(0.015)	(0.028)	(0.018)	(0.028)
Lawyer							0.607*	-0.491*
							(0.116)	(0.129)
Constant	2.310*	1.987*	1.731*	2.699*	1.532*	2.266*	0.905*	1.632*
	(0.116)	(0.186)	(0.097)	(0.176)	(0.180)	(0.299)	(0.163)	(0.202)
Observations	709	339	549	258	382	193	322	207
Log Likelihood	-2191.4	-873.5	-1365.6	-607.4	-892.1	-458.3	-750.0	-641.0
χ^2 : Model	6278.1	3525.3	3628.7	2087.5	1564.1	1444.8	1469.9	1939.0

Standard errors in parentheses

* indicates significance at $p < 0.05$

Figure 2.5 : Prediction: Members Attendance Rates



loyalty to their party. Members with lower seniority have larger expectation for distribution of political resources controlled by party caucuses, such as subsidies to political parties¹⁹ and assignment to important political offices (Nemoto, Krauss and Pekkanen, 2008), and tend to show greater party loyalty. There are substantial variations across committees. For the Committee on Agriculture, governing party members are less likely to attend committee meetings under the SNTV system. Most of the issues on the committee agenda are not accompanied by strong partisan divides, but all members are either agreeable or opposed to the government policy²⁰; therefore, governing parties do not have to push their member to attend the meeting.

2.5.3 Committee Member Replacements

As discussed, there are two separate categories in committee member replacements led by different motivations. Table 2.8 shows the results for member replacements who do not make speeches. The dependent variable is the number of times that a house member attends meetings of each committee in a session. Since the dependent variable is a count variable, negative binomial regressions are used to deal with the issue of over-dispersion (King, 1998).²¹ Many of governing party dummy variables

¹⁹ The Party Subsidy Law stipulates that parties with more than five Diet members are subsidized by about sixty million yen per member every year.

²⁰ The typical example is whether to liberalize the market of rice and accept imports, which was the most contentious issue in the agricultural policy in the 1980s and 1990s. Protecting the agricultural sector was important for a large number of members of the House of Representatives (Rosenbluth and Thies, 2010).

²¹ Strictly speaking, the dependent variable is not a count variable, because the variable is upwardly bounded by the number of meeting in each session. However, this does not pose a serious issue, because the maximum numbers for dependent variables are far from the bound (see Table 2.4). Addressing the over-dispersion is more important. As Table 2.8 indicates, dependent variables are over-dispersed (see the χ^2 statistics for α). I use *Stata* for estimating

are positive, which suggests that the main reason to fill absent members' vacancy is to satisfy the quorum requirements and hence evade a roadblock in committee deliberation (i.e. Hypotheses 2.4). To determine if this is the case, the predicted numbers of committee meeting attendances are plotted as a temporal member.

The prediction plots basically conform with Hypotheses 2.4: for all committees, members from governing parties have a higher predicted count of attending as temporal members, but temporal replacements are mainly observed for members with low seniority and very few senior members serve as temporal members.

The second category of temporary replacements includes those who make speeches. The suggested motivation for such replacements is to give members a credit-claiming opportunity. The estimates of models are shown in Table 2.9. The model specification is the same as in the previous analysis. For prediction, electoral strength is used as a variable to investigate the effects on the number of replacements (Figure 2.7), because electoral strength is the variable of interest in Hypothesis 2.5. The empirical distribution of the variable in order to choose the value for predictions, and the first to the third quantile of the variable is selected. The results partially support the hypothesis: for most committees under both electoral systems, opposition party members have a greater chance to deliver speech as a temporal member; in some cases, however, the differences between governing and opposition parties are not significant at the 95% confidence level.

negative binomial regression models. The model specification is an exponential link to mean parameter λ with over-dispersion parameter α .

Table 2.8 : Negative Binomial Regressions for Committee Member Replacements without Speech

	Budget		Agriculture		Foreign		Judicial	
	SNTV	SMD	SNTV	SMD	SNTV	SMD	SNTV	SMD
Governing Party								
Urban	0.143 (0.209)	0.128 (0.285)	-0.401 (0.344)	-0.796* (0.364)	0.746 (0.408)	0.049 (0.447)	0.387 (0.421)	-0.476 (0.457)
Margin	-0.268 (0.291)	-0.368 (0.366)	-0.374 (0.484)	-0.405 (0.449)	-0.845 (0.615)	-0.208 (0.577)	-1.732* (0.668)	-0.322 (0.583)
Seniority	-0.472* (0.028)	-1.010* (0.072)	-0.674* (0.060)	-0.875* (0.085)	-0.452* (0.059)	-0.932* (0.118)	-0.569* (0.066)	-0.552* (0.072)
Lawyer							0.631 (0.513)	-0.433 (0.729)
Party Dummy	1.742* (0.200)	0.995* (0.279)	0.602 (0.331)	0.930* (0.391)	0.961* (0.429)	1.388* (0.484)	0.665 (0.466)	0.311 (0.423)
Opposition Party								
Urban	0.774* (0.182)	-0.126 (0.216)	-1.641* (0.332)	-0.985* (0.330)	0.340 (0.404)	0.193 (0.411)	-0.453 (0.473)	-0.187 (0.335)
Margin	-1.566* (0.304)	-0.071 (0.248)	-0.982 (0.537)	0.385 (0.403)	0.319 (0.617)	1.125* (0.517)	-1.168 (0.791)	0.496 (0.427)
Seniority	-0.210* (0.022)	-0.523* (0.047)	-0.353* (0.047)	-0.630* (0.090)	-0.230* (0.053)	-0.484* (0.098)	-0.519* (0.087)	-0.572* (0.081)
Lawyer							1.047* (0.408)	-0.715 (0.576)
Constant	-1.311* (0.141)	0.402* (0.178)	-0.937* (0.238)	-0.038 (0.278)	-2.911* (0.314)	-1.519* (0.352)	-2.131* (0.364)	-0.379 (0.285)
$\ln(\alpha)$	1.074 (0.065)	0.458 (0.091)	0.912 (0.180)	0.332 (0.186)	1.599 (0.216)	0.373 (0.278)	1.584 (0.194)	1.155 (0.138)
α	2.926	1.581	2.489	1.394	4.949	1.452	4.876	3.174
$\chi^2: \alpha$	1173.059	503.975	86.705	76.052	78.081	31.043	110.820	206.469
Observations	5651	2545	5811	2626	5978	2691	5834	2656
Log Likelihood	-3625.2	-2066.4	-1255.0	-1014.7	-920.7	-716.4	-842.8	-1092.4
$\chi^2: \text{Model}$	1334.2	474.9	1696.1	803.8	1694.9	887.8	1370.6	750.3

Standard errors in parentheses

* indicates significance at $p < 0.05$

Figure 2.6 : Prediction: Attending Committee Meetings as Replaced Member without Speech





Table 2.9 : Negative Binomial Regressions for Committee Member Replacements with Speech

	Budget		Agriculture		Foreign		Judicial	
	SNTV	SMD	SNTV	SMD	SNTV	SMD	SNTV	SMD
Governing Party								
Urban	0.699 (0.565)	1.168* (0.580)	-0.567 (4.339)	-1.171 (2.724)	14.025 (19.514)	-11.159 (13.378)	0.765 (1.722)	6.441 (4.082)
Margin	-0.209 (0.793)	1.537* (0.670)	-7.336 (7.929)	1.928 (2.965)	4.568 (4.207)	1.301 (4.315)	1.968 (1.589)	4.804 (3.677)
Seniority	-0.029 (0.048)	-0.009 (0.048)	-0.468 (0.682)	-1.850 (1.066)	-0.015 (0.396)	-0.647 (0.903)	-0.098 (0.159)	-0.470 (0.377)
Lawyer							2.241 (1.150)	4.365* (2.003)
Party Dummy	-1.424* (0.443)	-1.569* (0.455)	-5.433 (3.239)	-0.122 (2.062)	-16.158 (19.090)	3.428 (3.700)	-1.448 (1.383)	-5.972 (3.070)
Opposition Party								
Urban	1.400* (0.191)	0.638* (0.226)	-3.874* (0.661)	-2.321* (0.627)	0.439 (0.491)	2.118* (0.851)	0.883 (0.623)	1.440* (0.621)
Margin	-0.112 (0.298)	-1.532* (0.228)	-2.352* (0.941)	-0.409 (0.745)	0.133 (0.794)	-2.831* (0.697)	-3.187* (1.150)	0.761 (0.676)
Seniority	0.018 (0.019)	0.000 (0.027)	-0.098 (0.059)	-0.170 (0.101)	0.004 (0.050)	-0.126 (0.101)	-0.109 (0.071)	-0.316* (0.101)
Lawyer							2.134* (0.380)	1.792* (0.425)
Constant	-2.822* (0.160)	-1.924* (0.200)	-1.542* (0.419)	-1.456* (0.521)	-3.891* (0.388)	-5.732* (0.796)	-5.125* (0.534)	-3.428* (0.531)
$\ln(\alpha)$	0.365 (0.188)	0.275 (0.160)	2.472 (0.326)	2.349 (0.410)	2.830 (0.302)	1.708 (0.480)	1.022 (0.813)	1.470 (0.429)
α	1.440	1.317	11.849	10.477	16.945	5.520	2.777	4.348
$\chi^2: \alpha$	63.732	102.016	52.087	34.031	60.566	18.582	5.210	17.451
Observations	5651	2545	5811	2626	5978	2691	5834	2656
Log Likelihood	-1644.1	-1303.6	-314.4	-210.0	-379.1	-196.0	-235.0	-272.5
$\chi^2: \text{Model}$	2008.2	869.0	662.3	429.0	784.1	404.8	793.4	526.2

Standard errors in parentheses

* indicates significance at $p < 0.05$

Figure 2.7 : Prediction: Attending Committee Meetings as Replaced Member with Speech



2.6 Conclusion

This chapter explored how parties in the Japanese Diet use standing committee appointments and activities to achieve their legislative and electoral goals. For important committees where parties need to advance the partisan agenda, parties send more competent members who can deliver messages more effectively. In contrast, for committees which serve members' needs for distribution, parties are likely to assign members with strong interests in a district or who are electorally vulnerable. After making the assignment, members from governing and opposition parties exhibit different patterns in attendance and committee speeches. Members from governing parties, whose primary goal in a committee deliberations is to send bills to the plenary agenda on schedule, are more likely to attend committee meetings than opposition party members. Finally, the governing and opposition parties both take advantage of their ability to assign an unlimited number of temporary committee replacements, but each utilizes this rule for different purposes. The governing parties exploit this institution to send junior members to attend committee meetings that may otherwise fall short of the quorum requirement, hence maximizing the probability of passing legislation. Opposition parties, on the other hand, use temporary member replacements to advance policy debates and provide members with the chance to give speeches, creating credit-claiming opportunities.

Committees in legislatures, which consist of a small subset of its members, can be seen from three general perspectives: (a) arena for high demanders; (b) an efficient mode to manage information; and (c) extensions of majority parties (Mattson and

Strøm, 1995). This categorization comes from the literature of the US Congress. Applying this to other countries or other entities (i.e. state government in the US) is one of the developing areas in comparative legislative studies. This research is a such attempt. It shows the different motivations to use committees for governing and opposition parties as a logical consequence of the parliamentary system. High demanders and experts are selected to relevant committees as active members as a consequence of personal vote incentives created by majoritarian electoral systems.

Chapter 3

Incentive for Pork-Barrel Spending Under Mixed-Membered System in Japan

Chapter Abstract

By examining who received the distribution of targetable goods, the literature has tried to determine whom legislators and parties represent. Some scholars argue that legislators and parties pay special attention to their core supporters, while others argue that they just seek votes with larger impacts on electoral outcomes at smaller expenses. Recent studies have shown that their strategic calculations and decisions are intervened by electoral institutions and party organizations. This chapter sheds new light on this research agenda by investigating mixed member systems in Japan, using fiscal transfer data from the parallel system in Japan to investigate the distribution of government funds. The empirical results show that the governing parties dominate this domain. They funnel fiscal transfers to districts that provide strong support for the party. Individual candidates do not have sufficient control over resources to galvanize a personal vote by rewarding supporters, but influential members of the governing parties can provide goods to their core supporters.

3.1 Introduction

In the literature of particularistic spending, scholars have attempted to determine who receives the distribution of targetable goods. Political parties who are in control of spending decisions have an incentive to use these resources for their electoral benefits. Parties want to reward their current supporters and make an effort to secure the support in future elections from current or potential supporters. Theoretical debates have focused on who will be the likely recipients of such spendings: core-supporters of parties or swing supporters (Cox and McCubbins, 1986; Dixit and Londregan, 1996). Recently, there has been renewed interest in the strength of parties, especially in elections, as a determinant of government spending (Golden and Picci, 2008; Primo and Snyder Jr., 2010). Empirical evidence has been accumulated from countries around the world such as Albania (Case, 2001), Japan (Hirano, 2011), Portugal (Veiga and Veiga, Forthcoming 2012), and Sweden (Dahlberg and Johansson, 2002) to name a few.

This chapter investigates this research question through a study of fiscal transfer from national to local governments under a mixed member system. Two specific questions are addressed. The first is how the distribution of particularistic goods works under mixed systems, where electorates have two votes. Mixed member systems are one of the most popular electoral systems.¹ In most chambers with mixed systems, the electoral system consists of two-tiers of single member districts (SMD)

¹ According to the Inter-Parliament Union website, forty four chambers in forty three countries are listed as the mixed systems. (<http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/parlinesearch.asp>, accessed on February 25, 2012.)

and proportional representation (PR).² There are two major variations of mixed-member systems: mixed-member proportional (MMP) and mixed-member majoritarian (MMM).

This study focuses on MMM systems, in which the election outcomes are determined by two separate votes. Although a number of studies have explored the determinant of particularistic spending, only a few studies explicitly take into account the characteristics of the MMM system. In MMM systems, electorates have two votes that are used independently from each other in calculating seats; therefore, electoral support for parties and candidates are separated on the ballot and therefore can be observed independently from each other. This study seeks to determine to which type of support are parties more responsive.

More broadly, this chapter investigates how parties create strategies to obtain and sustain support from their constituents. Except for the closed-list PR systems, election outcomes in any electoral systems are the functions of personal and party votes (Carey and Shugart, 1995). For instance, the national swings of party votes in the US have altered the majority parties of the Congress, although the US Congressional electoral system is considered to emphasize personal vote incentives. In contrast, even in the elections for the British House of Commons, personal traits have shown to be influential to election outcomes (Wood and Norton, 1992). In these two examples, elections are held with pure-SMD plurality rules; therefore, political actors as well as researchers can only observe the votes cast for individual candidates and must rely on this information when they make electorally motivated policy decisions. However,

² Shugart and Wattenberg (2001*b*) provide a detailed description of each country's system.

voters' evaluations of candidates can be different from that of parties. Accordingly, responses by the parties might be different as well. In other words, parties might be responding only to personal votes but not to party votes, or vice versa. By treating these two types of votes separately, this research can provide a novel insight on the parties' response to constituent support.

I investigate these questions using data of fiscal transfers in Japan during the early years after the electoral reform in 1996 from a single non-transferable vote (SNTV) system to a MMM system.³ The new electoral system provides two conditions to create a suitable environment for testing the argument. The first is the direct output of MMM system: electorates have two ballots, each of which represents personal or party votes separately. The PR-portion ballots are mostly cast for partisan motivation, while plurality ballots are the combination of partisan and candidate-oriented. The second is the significant effect of personal votes. The new electoral system is certainly more party oriented, and personal votes' aspects are less salient. However, as Scheiner (2007) argues, due to the strong tradition of SNTV, voting behaviors are still heavily influenced by personalized motivation.⁴ The combination of these two factors allows the test of how parties and members respond to these personal and partisan votes by allocating particularistic spendings.

This chapter proceeds as follows. The next section provides a brief overview of the current electoral system and recent elections of the Japanese House of Rep-

³ The new systems is also called a mixed-member plurality system (e.g. Krauss and Pekkanen, 2010), but I use the term, MMM system, which is one of two subcategories of mixed-member systems defined in Shugart and Wattenberg (2011*b*).

⁴ See also Moser and Scheiner (2004) and Scheiner (2008).

representatives. The third section presents the theoretical framework and hypothesis, followed by a description of the dataset used in this chapter. The fifth section shows the result of empirical analysis at two different levels. The last section concludes with a broader discussion about the relations between elections and particularistic goods spending.

3.2 The Japanese Context After Electoral Reform

Until its monumental fall in the 2008 general election, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in Japan had been the dominant party for more than a half century. The LDP hegemony was stable and strong during most of the period under SNTV. Numerous academic and journalistic articles have argued that the LDP created the system of clientelistic network, which helped them to maintain the dominant party status through a large flow of fiscal transfer to the national to the local governments (e.g. Hirose, 1993; Scheiner, 2006; Saito, 2006).

As Carey and Shugart (1995) argue, SNTV is one of the electoral systems that gives strong incentive to cultivate personal votes. Under SNTV, party labels are not an effective tool to procure votes, since candidates from large parties have to compete with their co-partisans. This personal vote cultivation incentive was particularly strong for the LDP members, because the LDP was the only party which had to field multiple candidates in electoral districts with an average magnitude of four in pursuit of securing the majority of the chamber. To cultivate personal votes, the LDP incumbents had to coordinate and divide votes across candidates in the same district by building a coalition of a portion of electorates (McCubbins and

Rosenbluth, 1995), acquiring policy expertise in the area different from co-partisans (Tatebayashi and McKean, 2002) and building clientelistic networks of local politicians and constituents (Scheiner, 2006). The LDP could have established a centrally controlled system of distributing benefits, but the party instead limited their role to coordinating incumbents' interests by establishing institutions to enhance stable exchanges, such as the Policy Affairs Research Council, to ensure the long-term exchange between incumbents (McCubbins and Rosenbluth, 1995).

The situation changed drastically after the electoral reform. In 1994, the Japanese Diet passed an electoral reform to repeal the SNTV system and install the parallel MMM system, which consists of 300 seats from single member districts with plurality formula and 200 proportional representation seats from 11 districts. Under the MMM electoral system in Japan, electorates have two votes which they cast for PR and SMD tiers. These two votes are counted separately and there is no compensation mechanism between two tiers. Therefore, seat-vote disproportionality created by the SMD portion is not moderated by the PR portion, which is the case for MMP systems, such as Germany and New Zealand.

The electoral system alteration has significantly reduced incentives to cultivate personal votes. Personal vote incentives under SNTV resulted mostly from the intraparty competition, which is almost non-existent under the MMM system. The MMM system has an indirect mechanism of intraparty competition through the best-loser rule. Under this rule, candidates can have dual-candidacy for both SMD and PR; their candidacy is only considered in the latter when they lose in the former. Parties can place multiple candidates at the same rank in PR, and seats are given to can-

didate with higher proportion of SMD votes to the winner of their SMDs; therefore, SMD candidates have to lose by a narrower margin than their copartisans. However, this does not give them a strong incentive to personalize their campaign strategies because SMD losers' fates are determined by their SMD competitions where no copartisans are running against.


Additional evidence of declining personal vote incentives can be found in the membership of *Koenkai*, a local support group for individual candidates. In the pre-electoral reform period, LDP candidates organized and mobilized *Koenkai*. Krauss and Pekkanen (2010) point out that the *Koenkai* membership was at its peak from the 1970s to 1990s and has been in a steady decline after the electoral reform. Since *Koenkai* is primarily an organization which delivers supports for a candidates by enhancing and sustaining personal ties between a politician and his supporters, not necessarily by utilizing particularistic benefits to their supporters (Krauss and Pekkanen, 2010, 31), the decline itself is not direct evidence of the declining pork-barrel spending. However, this implies that cultivating personal votes is a less attractive strategy for candidates.

The decline of personal vote incentives does not necessarily mean that they have disappeared from House members' electoral strategies. The proportion of *Koenkai* members among electorates in 2003 was still as high as in the 1970s (Krauss and Pekkanen, 2010). Its resilience can be attributed to historical factors and complementary institutions related to campaigning. This strategy, which was effective in the past, might be one of the few options that incumbents have under very restrictive campaign regulations.

This persistence of personal-vote seeking behavior is simply shown by the fact that there is a large difference between the votes cast for the ruling LDP in SMDs and PR. Figure 3.1 shows the proportion of LDP votes in SMDs and PR at the local level in the first two general elections for the House of Representatives after the electoral reform. The difference is the aggregated outcomes of the split ticketing; that is, electorates cast votes for different parties for SMD and PR. There are at least two possible reasons for this split ticketing: strategic voting by electorates who consider the viability of candidates in plurality election and the personal votes.⁵ Since plurality systems provide the strong incentive to vote strategically, the literature on mixed member systems has been placing the stronger emphasis on the strategic voting (e.g. Cox and Schoppa, 2002; Gschwend, 2007). In contrast, Moser and Scheiner (2004) argue that the personal-vote seeking strategy to raise votes is viable under the Japanese context. The Japan's MMM system puts stronger emphasis on the SMD portion, because a larger proportion of seats are selected from this portion; moreover, there is no linkage between the two portions to ensure proportional electoral outcomes. In addition, especially for the early post-reform period studied in this research, the prior electoral system has had residual influence on the candidates' behavior.⁶

⁵ Another possibility is the different choice sets in SMDs and PR. Voters might not have the option to vote for some parties in SMD election, if a party refrains from fielding candidates. This might be particularly problematic considering the electoral cooperation between the LDP and New Komeito since the 2000 general election ("Vote for me in SMD, but vote for Komeito in PR" campaign by LDP candidates). However, the dispersion of the SMD-PR difference is almost identical for the 1996 and 2000 elections, which implies that the difference is not the result of electoral cooperation.

⁶ See also McKean and Scheiner (2000).



Proportion of the LDP votes for municipalities in 1996 and 2000 general elections. Municipalities without an LDP candidate are excluded.

Figure 3.1 : Proportion of the LDP Votes at Local Level

It is clear that competing motivations are present under the MMM system, especially the Japanese one. This provides an excellent context to study how parties' interest in distribution of particularistic goods depends on different electoral incentives.

3.3 Literature and Theory

Who is buying what from whom? This is the question addressed in research on electoral incentives to distribute targetable goods. Political actors attempt to improve their prospects by effectively delivering the resources which they can allocate discre-

tionarily. Two influential formal models provide different answers to these question.⁷ A formal model proposed by Cox and McCubbins (1986) shows that, among three groups of electorates – core support groups, opposition groups, and swing voters – actors seek core support groups. For risk-averse actors, core supporters are a more reliable target of investments, as they have more information about this group; therefore, investment is economically efficient. In contrast, Lindbeck and Weibull (1987) model shows different results.⁸ Their model assumes that political actors want to maximize the votes through targetable goods allocation. For that purpose, their target is the vote that they can buy with smaller costs. This implies that political actors attempt to acquire votes from swing voters who do not have strong support for any actors.

These two models consider the situation in which political actors and voters are exchanging targetable benefits and votes. However, there are several weak linkages to connect allocations and votes in these arguments (Cox, 2009); These weak linkages create a renewed research attention to the topic of targetable goods allocation. The first is the lack of institutional arguments. These models assume that the electoral system is majoritarian: two parties compete with each other, and both pursue the electoral victory in a single electoral district where obtaining the majority of votes is required to secure the win. Most legislative elections create more than one winner across multiple districts with magnitude larger than one. As Cox (2009) points out, empirical works on this subject are divided into studies that support core supporter

⁷ See also Cox (2009).

⁸ See also and Dixit and Londregan (1996), who provide general model support for the swing voter model.

and swing voter theories.

These mixed findings may result from lack of consideration of institutional arrangement (Golden and Picci, 2008). Institutions change the incentive structure that determines who has the largest concern for bringing the benefit to their strongholds and who controls the decision making power for allocating targetable goods. The literature particularly focuses on two factors. The first is the electoral system, which determines to what degree individual candidates' strategies matter for electoral success. As seen in the previous section, some electoral systems create a situation where personal vote incentive is almost negligible. The most extreme case is the PR, in which candidates' efforts do not count much in determining their fates. The opposite case is single member districts in which electorates have more information on individual candidates, and this information plays a role in voters' decision-making.

The MMM system in Japan is a mixture of two systems which have opposite characteristics. The SMD tier still gives strong motivation to cultivate personal votes, although it is weaker than the SNTV system. In contrast, the PR tier does not have such effects. Although the PR tier has the "best loser" rule, this does not give additional incentive to cultivate personal votes. In their analysis of committee assignments for LDP members, Pekkanen, Nyblade and Krauss (2006) argue that legislators who earned a seat as a best-loser should get preferable allocation of distributive posts, because these legislators are electorally vulnerable. Helping them to improve their electoral prospects in the SMD election will be a rewarding strategy for the party.

Parties and individual members might have potentially conflicting incentives.

Given that the largest electoral concern for an individual member is to secure re-election, incumbents' personal efforts under SMD would help them to achieve this goal. However, the resources available in the legislature and in the government in general are limited in many aspects. For instance, in the legislature, there are limited committee seats and plenary time; therefore, time for deliberation and the number of bills considered on the floor are severely restricted (Cox, 2006). As a result, members need a coordination mechanism. In many states, political parties take charge of this coordination as intensively discussed in the literature on the US Congress.

It is obvious that the fiscal resource of the government is another example of such limited resources. In the study of US Congress, credit-claiming through pork-distribution is considered as one of the most important sources for personal vote cultivation (Mayhew, 1974). This type of mechanism has been found in studies of other countries (e.g. Stratmann and Baur, 2002; Denmark, 2000; Case, 2001). Japan is not an exception, at least before electoral reform (Hirose, 1993; Scheiner, 2005).

Given the importance of pork-barrel politics even under the MMM system, what has to be addressed is whose political supports to whom are rewarded. Table 3.1 shows the prediction used by Golden and Picci (2008). Based on the theoretical arguments of McGillivray (2004), Golden and Picci argue that electoral systems and party strengths determine the likely recipients of pork-barrel spending. The logic is that parties want to invest in marginal districts, because this is the most cost-efficient way to improve their electoral performance. When parties are strong, they are able to choose this strategy; when parties are weak, powerful deputies can alter the flow of money and bring pork to their district, even if this is not an efficient strategy for

parties as a whole. Note that safe districts receive more government funds because of the existence of powerful deputies. In other words, safe districts are used as a proxy for powerful deputies.

Table 3.1 : Theoretical Predictions

		Governing Parties	
		Strong	Weak
Electoral System	SMD	marginal districts	safe districts
	open-list PR	party strongholds	party leader bailiwicks

From Golden and Picci (2008)

There are two possible explanation why strong districts receive a large transfer. The first possibility is that, as Golden and Picci (2008) stated, powerful legislator has an influence over the fiscal transfer, and the second possibility is that, parties care about core-supporters for the party. Therefore, even when parties are strong, there is a possibility that safe districts are rewarded and there are potentially three likely recipients of the fiscal transfer under the SMD only system. The first is that the parties are in charge of the transfer and investing marginal districts, the second is that the parties are strong but investing safe district, and the third is that the individual members with a say in the distribution allocates larger transfers. In this third case, since powerful members are more likely to be strong in election as well, the outcome may not be observationally indistinguishable from the second case.

In contrast to the complexity of SMD scenarios, the closed-list PR gives a much simpler story. As shown in Table 3.1, there are two possibilities in regard to the

open-list PR systems depending on the strength of parties. Under the closed-list system, the weak party scenario is no longer relevant, because powerful members of the party would not benefit much from distributing pork to their bailiwicks. In order to get reelected, they only need to be ranked high in their party lists enough to secure their seats.

The discussion so far has focused on pure systems with only SMD or closed-list PR elections. The next issue is how these theoretical expectations are intertwined under mixed systems. Some of these scenarios are realized depending on two conditions: *strength of parties* and *relative importance of party supports*. In the literature, strength of parties has been considered one of the key factors which determine incumbents' behavior in the electoral and legislative arena (e.g. Primo and Snyder Jr., 2010; Tavits, 2009). McGillivray (2004) defines party strength as the degree to which "the voter is choosing a party with an associated package of policies or the voter is choosing an individual who will enter the bargaining process to further constituency interests" (44). When parties are strong, individual legislators' electoral performances are closely tied to the parties' reputation; therefore, legislators may not have strong incentives to put much effort into improving personal reputation. This consideration definitely has an influence on members' interests in pork barrel spending.

The second factor, the importance of party support relative to support for individual members, is particularly relevant under mixed electoral systems through the parties' emphasis on either electoral support for parties in PR districts or members in SMD districts. The importance of party support varies across states depending on several factors. The first is electoral institutions. MMP systems have a com-

pensatory mechanism that ensures the proportionality of electoral outcomes, and will enhance the parties' interests in PR votes. However, even under MMM systems without compensatory mechanism, a high proportion of PR seats will have similar effects. Since success in PR districts will determine the entire performance of parties in elections, parties care more about the election outcomes.

The second element which increases the importance of party support is the strength of correlations between PR election votes and SMD votes. That is, even when electoral institutions do not necessarily emphasize the PR portion, strong correlation between the two tiers of an electoral system will lead to stronger party concerns for votes in PR portion, as far as a party believes that voters' decision-making is based on mostly partisanship. Under such conditions, parties have reason to reward their partisan supporters.

Based on these arguments, the following hypothesis is made:

Hypothesis 3.1 (Governing Parties' Strategies)

1. *The larger the weight of the SMD portion or the more unstable partisan support for the parties, the more fiscal transfers are influenced by individual members' electoral performance.*
2. *The smaller the weight of the SMD portion or the more stable partisan support for the parties, the more the parties' bailiwicks are likely to receive larger allocation of distributive goods.*

As to individual members' influences, the predictions are simple. When individual members rely on personal votes for reelection, they have reason to put efforts in to

extract money to their district, especially to groups who exhibit strong support.

Hypothesis 3.2 (Influential Legislators' Influence) *Legislators with strong influence on intraparty decision-making can direct fiscal resources for their benefit:*

- 1. At the district level, influential members' districts are likely to receive larger allocation.*
- 2. Within each district, influential members are more likely to direct resources to their bailiwicks.*

3.4 Data Description

To test the hypotheses provided in the previous section, this research utilizes the fiscal transfer from central to municipality governments from 1997 to 2002. The Japanese House of Representatives held its first election under the new electoral system in 1996. This dataset covers the period immediately following the reform and runs until the period before the massive wave of municipal mergers in the early 2000s. The central government in Japan introduced policy measures to enhance mergers in order to improve the efficiency of local administration. As a result, the number of municipalities has declined from 3,200 in 1999 and 1,700 in 2011. A large number of mergers were held in 2004 when the financial assistance for mergers expired. Before the mergers, most electoral district boundaries overlapped with municipality borders. Few municipalities were split in multiple districts, which enable us to identify incumbent members from the municipalities. As district elections are held under the first-past-the-post system, parties field only one candidate from their

party almost without exception. For municipalities that underwent the mergers in 2004, the financial report for fiscal year 2003 were prepared under a new government, which does not distinguish spending in old municipalities. To keep the empirical analysis simple, only data before the wave of mergers are used. For both variables, the natural logarithm to the per capita expenditures is calculated.

3.4.1 Dependent Variables

The main dependent variable is the per capita total transfers to municipality governments, which combine both earmarked and non-earmarked lump-sum transfers. The former is distributed based on fiscal programs taken up by local governments. The major items in earmarked spending are public constructions projects and education spending. Both types of transfers are considered, because in the Japanese case, it is difficult to see whether some spending is an automatic transfer or arbitrary distribution with political intentions.

Per capita spending on public constructions works is used as further evidence to support the result from the main analysis, which uses total transfers. This analysis uses ordinary construction work expenditures of municipalities, which include all necessary expenditures to implement new construction projects for social capital improvement such as road, bridges, school buildings, and public parks. Among developed countries, Japan ranks high in such social capital development investments, and a large portion of spending had been implemented by the local government with the funds transferred from the central government. In the Japanese fiscal system, local governments, especially financially weak ones, rely heavily on fiscal transfer from

the central government; discretionary use of such fiscal transfer was how the dominant LDP mobilized support for the party in elections (Saito, 2006; Scheiner, 2006). Among others, construction projects in agrarian areas were one of the preferred areas for the LDP. These projects produced demand for temporary construction workers, many of whom were farmers.⁹ Ordinary construction works expenditures consist of projects taken up solely by local governments as well as those aided by the central government. The latter is the main interest of this research; however, a variable which combines both categories is used, because separate variables are not readily available.

3.4.2 Explanatory and Control Variables

There are three main explanatory variables in this research. The first two measure the strength of the support for the governing party by the percentage of votes cast in each of the two parts in the current electoral system for the Lower House in Japan. As explained, the chamber's electoral formula is a parallel plurality-PR system in which voters face two separate voting decisions for each portion. There is a significant difference in the percentages of the LDP votes between the two portions the electoral systems (Figure 3.1). As the LDP fielded almost all SMD districts in both elections in this research, there is little missing value problem caused by the unobservability of the LDP's SMD votes. To consider the possibility of curve-linearity caused by governing parties' intention to reward swing-supporters, squared terms of SMD votes are included in the model.

⁹ Full-time farming households comprise only 18 percent of farming households.

The third explanatory variable is the seniority of LDP members, measured by the number of the terms that the LDP incumbent in the district has served as a member of the Lower House. In the 1970s, the LDP established a seniority system for allocating posts in the party and government. As most of senior members are assigned to important posts such as cabinet ministers, they are more influential for pork barrel distribution. A natural log is calculated after adding one to the variable. Thus, it equals zero when the municipality does not have an incumbent member from the LDP.

Several control variables are included in the model. Municipality population, population density, and the proportion of primary industry workers are included to control for the effects of demography. The fiscal index of each municipality is also included. This index, which essentially calculates the divergence between fiscal demand and revenue, is the major determinant of non-earmarked transfers. In the fiscal system of Japan, the central government compensates for the deficits by direct transfer.

To investigate the hypotheses at different levels, the data are organized into two different units: municipalities and electoral districts for SMD seats. The unit of observation for the former is a municipality in each year from 1997 to 2002. The number of municipalities during this time period is around 3,000; each municipality has six observations. The main analysis is estimated by ordinary least square. In order to deal with the issue of unobserved heterogeneity across observation, the model is also estimated with mean subtractions for all variables. For both independent and dependent variables, I subtract its mean for each SMD electoral district in each year

from each value.¹⁰ When mean subtractions are conducted, the seniority variable must be excluded from the specification, because it is perfectly collinear with the district dummy variables. The descriptive statistics for municipality-level data are shown in Table 3.2. For the district-level data, observations are aggregated at the municipality level. The measurement of fiscal index at a district is calculated as the average across municipalities in a district weighted by municipality population.

Table 3.2 : Descriptive Statistics of Variables

Variable	Mean	S.D.	Min	Max
Dependent Variables				
Per Capita Total Transfer (logged)	5.458	0.797	2.230	8.928
Per Capita Construction Spending (logged)	4.889	0.783	1.765	8.897
Explanatory Variables				
Number of Electorates (logged)	9.125	1.164	5.081	13.064
LDP PR Vote Share	0.385	0.103	0.064	0.774
LDP SMD Vote Share	0.516	0.165	0.030	0.947
LDP Incumbents Seniority	3.974	3.510	0.000	16.000
Primary Industry Ratio	0.166	0.116	0.002	0.794
Fiscal Index	0.377	0.222	0.040	1.120

3.5 Results

Table 3.3 shows the estimation results for the district level data. The top panel shows the coefficients for variables of interest, and the bottom panel shows those

¹⁰ This provides essentially the same results as including fixed effects, but it is computationally much faster. Since there are 300 SMD districts, there are 1,800 fixed effects. Including this many fixed effects will make estimation much slower, even for OLS.

of controls. In the first model, the dependent variable is the log-transformed per-capita fiscal transfer to municipality governments. As expected by Hypothesis 1, the coefficient for the LDP vote-share for PR portion is significantly positive. This result indicates that a district that gives more support to the governing LDP through party-list votes is rewarded by higher transfer spending. In contrast, a relationship between SMD election results and fiscal transfer is not found for individual legislators. The governing party does not necessarily help the incumbent politician. That is, if an empirical investigation does not distinguish support for a candidate from support for a party, the inference might end up with a misleading conclusion that the personal vote cultivation is a leading motivation for fiscal transfer.¹¹ While the first model does not include any variable that measures members' competency, the second model includes the seniority variable. The coefficient is significantly positive: incumbent legislators with more experience are able to exercise a substantive influence on fiscal transfers to their districts.

With the same sets of independent variables used in the first and second models, the third and fourth models conduct analyses for a different dependent variable: construction spending by the municipal government. Since construction spending comes from the central government as well as the prefectural governments and taxes raised by municipal governments, the interpretation of results might be difficult. However, since the LDP has been using local construction spending as an instrument for manipulating local government (Hirose, 1993), this variable can be used an indicator of

¹¹ As a robustness check, the model is estimated with a squared term for LDP vote share to capture non-monotone relation with limited samples of districts that have LDP incumbents. The results are unchanged in terms of the sign and significance of coefficients.

the political motivated fiscal transfer. The advantage of using this variable is that this measure does not include fiscal transfers earmarked for mandatory spending such as compulsory education costs.¹²

The findings from these models are similar to those of the previous models: support for governing parties leads to the higher fiscal transfer, and strong incumbent politicians can distribute larger transfer to their district.¹³ In sum, for both indicators of total transfer and construction spending, the models provide evidence that parties reward their core supporters in SMD districts. Individual electoral performance does not have influence on fiscal transfer, but powerful members can extract fiscal resources from the national government to local governments.

In the next set of analyses, the data are further disaggregated into each municipality. The purposes of these analyses are to confirm the relationships found at the district level at a municipal level and to explore to which sub-district units influential members of governing parties are directing transfers. The core supporter model predicts that politicians invest in groups of electorates who show concrete support for them; in contrast, the swing voter hypothesis argues that they seek the cheapest votes. Dividing single member districts into smaller units allows us to distinguish these two motivations.

Table 3.4 shows the results for the municipality level analysis. I estimate two models for each dependent variable, one with a mean-differenced variable for each

¹² For instance, nine years of compulsory education is a statutory requirement for the national government, but its actual implementation is delegated to local governments. Since the proportion of younger generation varies across municipalities, per capita transfer for this budget item also varies.

¹³ In this model, the coefficient is statistically significant at the 99 percent confidence level.


district-year and one without. As for total transfer, LDP vote share is significantly positive for both models. This means that the governing LDP returns the favor from supporters with fiscal transfer, but the vote for individual members does not have such effects. This finding does not change when using the mean-differenced model, but the effect of the PR vote is much larger in this case. Since the variables are mean-differenced at the SMD district level, there may not be any straightforward interpretation for this result. However, this might be seen as additional support for the core supporter theory, since it indicates that the governing party gives larger fiscal transfer for local government even after eliminating idiosyncratic factors for each SMD district.

Since seniority is invariant in a district in a year, its effect is only estimated in a model without mean-difference transformation. I also include an interaction term between seniority and candidate votes. The effect of seniority with interaction terms is hard to grasp: The coefficient for the constitutive term is significantly positive; its interaction term is significantly negative with first order LDP candidate vote share but positive with quadratic term. The total effect of seniority is positive for most ranges. To illustrate this, the substantive change in total transfer when member seniority increases by one term is plotted in Figure 3.3(a) shows the case when members seniority increased from one to two.¹⁴ The solid line indicates the mean of first difference, while the shaded area indicates the 95 percent confidence interval. The line crosses zero at around 30 percent, and the interval is above zero when candidate vote share is over 40 percent. The effect of seniority is small near the

¹⁴ Calculated by `Zelig` (Imai, King and Lau, 2008). The number of draw for each value of dependent variable is 100,000.

average value for percentage votes won by LDP incumbents (55 percent). However, at both ends of the domain, the effect is greater. The larger difference at high values implies that legislators with more experience are able to compensate core supporters with more fiscal transfer.

Figure 3.2 : Substantive Effects of Additional Seniority



Note: Substantive effects are calculated as a change in dependent variable when seniority is increased from one to two. I use `Normal` model in `Zelig`. The left panel is the effects on total transfer to local governments and the right panel is the effects on construction spending of each municipalities.

As Table 3.4 indicates, the coefficient for constitutive term of LDP candidates' voting percentage is negative after controlling for the effect of party votes. I reestimate Models 2 and 4 in Table 3.4 after removing the PR vote variable percentage for the LDP (Table 3.5). For both dependent variables, the coefficients for the first order terms are significantly positive, and the second order term is not large enough

to change the sign of total effect in their domain. This result is the same as that of the district level analysis. If one mistakenly considers that SMD support comes from mainly personal vote – and therefore, fiscal transfer is the result of efforts made by individual legislator – then this inference may not reflect the actual reason why groups receive favorable treatment from government policies. Parties might show concern for partisan supporters even under the SMD systems; under pure SMD systems, however, support for parties and individual candidates are not distinguishable.

The analyses of construction spending exhibit similar results. As shown in the third and fourth columns in Table 3.4, first of all, the coefficients for LPD party votes in municipalities are significantly positive in both models with and without mean-differenced variables. In contrast, the LDP candidate vote share is negative. The total effect of seniority is positive for incumbent LDP members (Figure 3.3(b)).

Some of the estimated coefficients for controls are worth noting. First, the voter turnout has positive and statistically significant effects, consistent with the findings in Horiuchi and Saito (2009a). This indicates that the governing LDP rewarded electorates who participated in the voting processes regardless of the direction of their votes. This might imply turnout buying (Nichter, 2008): even though parties are not able to determine individual voting intentions, they can reward a group of electorates who cast votes if there are plenty of weak supporters who would not have voted without mobilization. Another possible explanation is perverse accountability through vote buying (Stokes, 2005): constituents have to be accountable for their support in an election. The key premise for perverse accountability in elections is that there must be some ways for parties to monitor voting behavior. Some argue

that such a mechanism did exist in Japan, especially in local areas where dense social networks make such monitoring possible (Saito, 2006, 2010). Since these two mechanisms are not distinguishable from the data, further investigation is needed in future research.

Second, the number of electorates has negative impacts on distributive spendings. Since the dependent variables are measured as a log-transformed per capita transfer, there is no intuitive way to explain how this happens. However, there are several possible reasons. The first is the homogeneity of small municipalities. As Cox (2009) argues, one of the key reasons for the core supporter hypothesis is that parties and members have less uncertainty about the behavior of core supporters than weak supporters. Small towns and villages might work as such units. The second is the representation of their interest in small government. Since any small village has a local assembly, locals' interests are more likely to be represented in local assembly (Horiuchi and Saito, 2009*b*). The finding here might provide additional support for such arguments.

Third, the ratio of primary industry workers to all workers has a strong positive effect. This fits well with the conventional wisdom of Japanese politics (Rosenbluth and Thies, 2010, Chapter 4). In order to maintain the network of local and national politicians, fiscal transfer from central to local government was used (Scheiner, 2006). This compensated for the lack of a safety net and has worked as a quasi welfare policy in Japan (Estevez-Abe, 2006). Although such networks have weakened since the electoral reform (Krauss and Pekkanen, 2010), some evidence shows this network remains strong (McKean and Scheiner, 2000).

3.6 Conclusion

This chapter examines the determinants of fiscal transfer to local government in Japan in the early period of post electoral reform of 1994. It focuses on party strategies to respond to electoral contexts and individual legislators' influences. The empirical results show following points. First, under the Japanese mixed electoral system, votes casted for the governing parties are of more importance for fiscal transfer, however, votes for individual candidates from the governing parties does not have influence on fiscal transfer. These results imply that for this period of the time, the governing parties considered party support, rather than support for individual members, crucially important for their electoral success. Second, the empirical results confirm the effect of seniority on fiscal transfer. These results imply that incumbents are able to direct larger fiscal transfer to their district as they turned more experienced, tactical politicians.

This research investigates one state with an MMM system. Most studies on mixed systems have focused on parties, their members' election strategies, and voters' behavior (Shugart and Wattenberg, 2001*a*; Ferrara, Herron and Nishikawa, 2005; Moser and Scheiner, 2004), while have focused on legislative behavior, in particular, how legislators elected from different tiers exhibit different patterns (Stratmann and Baur, 2002; Bawn and Thies, 2003). However, little attention has been paid to the policy outcomes of MMM system with a few exceptions (e.g. Thames and Edwards, 2006). The theoretical arguments and empirical investigation presented here draws on the utility of mixed motivations created by the two-tier system. Such MMM

systems in which electorates make voting decisions in two tiers provide an excellent field to disentangle parties' and individual members' strategies and influences.

Related to this point, the findings of this chapter suggests that the importance of party supports as a determinant of the governing party's policy-making. Schickler and Green (1997) demonstrate the varying stability of partisan support across countries. When party support is stable, parties have a good reason to maintain their bases by providing benefits to their supporters. Party support has long-term, stable impacts on their electoral performance. Under pure-SMD systems, support for parties and individual candidates are difficult to separate. However, the outcomes of party-based and candidate-based electoral competition are conceptually distinguishable. This calls for careful treatment of this difference to reach profound understanding of the interaction between elections and policy-making.

The last point worth mentioning in regard to the party competition in Japan is the possibility of parties moving away from any particularistic spending in recent years. The theoretical work of this chapter implicitly assumes that the total amount of resources allocated by governing parties is fixed. Parties have multiple competing goals in determining such allocation; members attempt to distribute their share of allocation to their supporters in order to secure their reelection. However, for various reasons, governing parties might reduce spending either voluntarily or reluctantly. Such reasons include demographic shifts which reduce the importance of existing political groups, changes in the electoral system, and globalization of the economy which gives little room for fiscal manipulation by the government. This chapter focuses on the early period after reform, during which the LDP had the ability of and motivation

for fiscal manipulation. This situation has changed since the early 2000s. The LDP perceived the demerit of malapportionment through electoral reform (Horiuchi and Saito, 2003); thus, the party weakened its ties with local politicians and groups of traditional core supporters of the LDP (Horiuchi and Saito, 2009*b*; Rosenbluth and Thies, 2010, Chapter 7). This change resulted in the decline of particularistic spending (Noble, 2010), leading the shift of the LDP and other Japanese parties from clientelistic to programmatic. Sometimes, being clientelistic incurs electoral costs on governing parties (Weitz-Shapiro, Forthcoming 2012); therefore, parties might have an incentive to shift their spending target to public goods. Analyzing the transitions in Japanese politics in the context of strategic shifts of parties will be a subject of future research.

Table 3.3 : Estimates of Electoral Incentives on Fiscal Transfer (District Level)

	Total Transfer		Construction	
LDP PR Vote Share	0.608*	0.560*	1.292*	1.200*
	(0.222)	(0.223)	(0.192)	(0.192)
LDP Candidate Vote Share	-0.121	-0.408	-0.141	-0.697
	(0.419)	(0.441)	(0.363)	(0.380)
(LDP Candidate Vote Share) ²	0.166	0.361	-0.264	0.114
	(0.450)	(0.459)	(0.390)	(0.396)
LDP Seniority		0.032*		0.062*
		(0.015)		(0.013)
log(Number of Electorates)	-0.335*	-0.354*	-0.104	-0.140*
	(0.066)	(0.066)	(0.057)	(0.057)
Voter Turnout	1.646*	1.652*	1.232*	1.243*
	(0.201)	(0.201)	(0.174)	(0.173)
Primary Industry	0.064*	0.064*	0.041*	0.042*
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Fiscal Index	-0.725*	-0.713*	0.030	0.054
	(0.044)	(0.045)	(0.039)	(0.039)
Intercept	7.643*	7.931*	4.352*	4.909*
	(0.892)	(0.902)	(0.774)	(0.778)
<i>N</i>	1426	1426	1426	1426
<i>R</i> ²	0.733	0.734	0.511	0.518
Residual Standard Errors	0.385	0.385	0.334	0.332

Standard errors in parentheses

* indicates significance at $p < 0.05$

Table 3.4 : Estimates of Electoral Incentives on Fiscal Transfer (Municipality Level)

Mean Differenced	Total Transfer		Construction	
	No	Yes	No	Yes
LDP PR Vote Share	0.261*	1.137*	0.547*	1.277*
	(0.031)	(0.060)	(0.064)	(0.112)
LDP Candidate Vote Share	-0.564*	-0.177*	-1.268*	-0.466*
	(0.094)	(0.041)	(0.196)	(0.076)
(LDP Candidate Vote Share) ²	0.371*	-0.079*	0.921*	0.037
	(0.106)	(0.013)	(0.219)	(0.025)
LDP Seniority	0.103*		0.175*	
	(0.019)		(0.039)	
LDP Candidate Share × LDP Seniority	-0.344*		-0.552*	
	(0.075)		(0.157)	
(LDP Candidate Vote Share) ² × LDP Seniority	0.297*		0.495*	
	(0.075)		(0.156)	
log(Number of Electorates)	-0.171*	-0.314*	-0.271*	-0.257*
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Voter Turnout	0.809*	1.826*	1.337*	1.994*
	(0.028)	(0.043)	(0.058)	(0.080)
Primary Industry	0.228*	0.383*	0.989*	0.678*
	(0.023)	(0.026)	(0.047)	(0.048)
Fiscal Index	-2.292*	-0.462*	-0.349*	0.032
	(0.017)	(0.011)	(0.035)	(0.020)
Intercept	4.980*	0.197*	2.778*	-0.023*
	(0.031)	(0.006)	(0.064)	(0.012)
<i>N</i>	17689	17689	17689	17689
<i>R</i> ²	0.893	0.814	0.522	0.452
Residual Standard Errors	0.260	0.248	0.541	0.460

Standard errors in parentheses

* indicates significance at $p < 0.05$

For mean differenced model, year-district means are subtracted from both dependent and independent variables

Table 3.5 : Estimates of Electoral Incentives on Fiscal Transfer (Municipality Level, No PR Votes)

	Total Transfer	Construction
LDP Candidate Vote Share	0.403*	0.185*
	(0.028)	(0.051)
(LDP Candidate Vote Share) ²	-0.073*	0.043
	(0.014)	(0.025)
log(Number of Electorates)	-0.321*	-0.264*
	(0.003)	(0.006)
Voter Turnout	1.957*	2.142*
	(0.043)	(0.079)
Primary Industry	0.489*	0.797*
	(0.025)	(0.047)
Intercept	0.198*	-0.023
	(0.006)	(0.012)
<i>N</i>	17689	17689
<i>R</i> ²	0.810	0.448
Residual Standard Errors	0.250	0.462

Standard errors in parentheses

* indicates significance at $p < 0.05$

Year-district means are subtracted from both dependent and independent variables

Chapter 4

The Effects of Party Control on Committee Assignments in the Taiwanese Legislative Yuan

Chapter Abstract

Some scholars of the US Congress have emphasized self-selection as a key dynamic of committee assignments, and legislative institutions have been developed to provide a stable legislative exchange. This chapter investigates how the shift from the absence to the presence of such institutions changes the mechanism of self-selection using data regarding committee assignments in the Taiwanese Legislative Yuan. Committees in the Legislative Yuan are an appropriate subject because its elections are highly personalized, so incentives for self-selection are as strong as they are in the case of the US Congress. In particular, this chapter studies the effect of the 2001 reforms in the committee systems of the Legislative Yuan, which installed party control in committee assignments. I test this argument with an original dataset regarding committee assignments from 1995-2007.

4.1 Introduction

This chapter attempts to show how the exercise of party influence affects the individual members' personal goals using the data for the committee assignments of the Legislative Yuan members from 1995 to 2007 (from the third to the sixth legislature). I specifically focus on the impact of institutional change to establish party control over committee assignments. In the early periods of the Legislative Yuan, parties did not control the committee assignments, which created a problem in that conflict between individual interests resulted in coordination failure. This chapter will investigate how the modification of the rules of committee assignment resolved this problem.

Parties in a legislature organize the legislative institutions, which will prevent members' excessive demands for limited resources, such as time in the legislature or fiscal resources, from leading to the breakdown of the exchange of benefits between members. Committee membership is one such limited resource because of the fixed number of committee members. In the study of committees in the US Congress, committee assignments have been seen as an instrument to enable stable, long-term relationships (Weingast and Marshall, 1988) and parties control it (Kiewiet and McCubbins, 1991).

As is shown in Chapter 2, even in Japan, a country with a parliamentary regime where individualistic legislative behavior is less salient than presidential regimes, the assignment of committee seats is affected by the factors linked to members' individual interests. In addition, this association is particularly strong for opposition members

because legislative behavior has more crucial importance for opposition members, as their opportunities to influence actual policy outcomes are more limited than those of the members of governing parties (Chapter 3).

Taiwan is a country with a semi-presidential regime in which the executive branch has a strong influence on the legislature. For instance, most crucial pieces of legislation are submitted by the government, and the bill success rate is much higher for government bills than for member bills (Sheng, 2003, 2006). Despite these factors that reduce the importance of the Legislative Yuan, its standing committees have played an important role in the legislative process (Batto, 2005), and it has been shown that Legislative Yuan members consider it important to get a position in the committee related to their electorates' interests and policy goals (Hsiao, 2007).

The outline of this chapter is as follows. The next section provides a brief description of the committee system of the Legislative Yuan, including the selection mechanisms before and after the reform. Subsequently, the hypothesis is presented. Section 3 introduces the data and explains the model specification, followed by a section containing the empirical analysis. The last section concludes the chapter.

4.2 Committee System in the Legislative Yuan

In contrast to the US or Japanese example, the scholarship has argued that the Legislative Yuan members do not acquire strong policy expertise (Hsiao, 2005). There are several reasons that they do not develop policy expertise (Sheng, 2000; Hsiao, 2005). The first is the absence of a seniority system in committee assignments. There was no party control over of committee seat assignments before 2002. The

Legislative Yuan members independently submitted applications for a committee seat, and if the number of applicants did not exceed the maximum number of seats, they were granted a seat on the committee they wanted.

Second because the former dictatorial party, Kuomintang (KMT), dominated the policy-making authority for years after democratization, intraparty policy-making in KMT was more important than that in the Legislative Yuan. The substance of each policy proposal was determined by the executive branch, and KMT members in the Legislative Yuan supported the party agenda. Third, before the introduction of fully democratic elections in 1992, most Legislative Yuan members were non-elected. The original members of the Yuan in 1949 comprised the non-elected part of the members, and they did not have to worry about their reelection. Though partial elections for additional members had been held since 1969, these democratically elected members had never become the majority of the chamber. For these reasons, even after instituting a fully democratic electoral system, the Legislative Yuan was not considered to be a principal decision-making body.

These points gradually changed in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Regarding the first point, the rules for committee assignments were altered in 2001, when the reform of committee system, as a part of the reform of the Legislative Yuan, was adopted in the last session of the fourth term and implemented at the start of the fifth term. The motivation behind the committee reforms was to enhance the development of members' expertise and to improve the effectiveness of bill proceedings. Under the new rule, committee assignments became partisan. In each session, which starts every half-year, committee seats are first allocated to parties, and then the parties

pick members for each committee from among their members. The introduction of party control over the committee assignments seemed to have crucial importance in the relationship between members' demands for committee seats and voting results.

Regarding the second point, the DPP presidency since 2000 and the KMT's loss of the majority in the Legislative Yuan in 2001 changed the situation (Sheng, 2003). The legislative process in the Legislative Yuan became more crucial after 2001 because the general elections of the Legislative Yuan failed to produce a majority coalition in the chamber. Regarding the third problem, through several elections, most of the former non-elected members left the chamber.

Despite the perception that the committees were not important bodies in passing legislation, membership allocations were not as random as one might expect. Table 4.1 shows the numbers and proportions of members who served on the same committees in one term. Even in the period without party control for committee assignments, more than half of the Legislative Yuan members served on the same committee in more than three sessions out of six terms in interelectoral periods before the committee reform (the third and fourth terms), and this figure became even larger after the reform (the fifth and sixth terms). After the reform, three-quarters of all members served on the same committee for more than three sessions, and two-fifths served on the same committee for all six sessions. As Hsiao (2005) shows, some parties have established seniority rule since the committee reform, while others have not. Assignments of members and chairs by the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) follows seniority rule. Other parties do not have a specific rule, but this tendency seems to extend to other parties.

Table 4.1 : Maximum Number of Sessions A Member Served in a Committee

Number of sessions served in one committee								
Term	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	Total
3	1	3	31	44	37	30	23	169
4	0	7	40	72	38	40	31	228
5	1	8	16	39	42	38	87	231
6	0	7	14	44	50	46	75	236

Number of session served in one committee								
Term	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	Total
3	0.01	0.02	0.18	0.26	0.22	0.18	0.14	1.00
4	0.00	0.03	0.18	0.32	0.17	0.18	0.14	1.00
5	0.00	0.03	0.07	0.17	0.18	0.16	0.38	1.00
6	0.00	0.03	0.06	0.19	0.21	0.19	0.32	1.00

Note: The top panel shows the count, and the bottom panel shows the proportion of each category.

When looking at legislative behavior other than committee assignments, the general patterns of Legislative Yuan members' initiation of bills are also changing. As Sheng (2003, 2006) illustrates, the legislation initiated by legislators has come to comprise an important part of legislation (Sheng, 2006, Table 2). Especially under divided governments, many important bills have been introduced as member bills by KMT members.

Electoral pressure is the primary motivation of Legislative Yuan members for affiliating with a specific committee. The system for Yuan elections before the introduction of the current system in 2008 was a mixed-member system in which a general election for the Legislative Yuan was held under a parallel single nontransferable vote (SNTV) and proportional representation (PR).

The majority of members were elected in SNTV elections in which the electoral districts were counties and cities, while a smaller number of members were elected from closed-list PR elections from the at-large national district. Take an example from the sixth term, for which the general election was held in December 2004; the total number of seats was 225, 168 were elected from SNTV districts, 41 elected through PR, and another 17 elected from aboriginal and overseas districts. Since the two portions are not compensatory, this system can be categorized as a variation of mixed-member majoritarian systems (Shugart and Wattenberg, 2001*b*). Though the size of the chamber altered in each election, the combination of SNTV and closed-list PR was used throughout the period of this study.

SNTV is known to be one of the most individualistic voting systems (Carey and Shugart, 1995). Under SNTV, candidates from the same party cannot transfer votes

cast for them, so they have to compete against each other. Since party labels do not help to distinguish candidates from their co-partisans, they have to make personal appeals to attract votes.

The legislative activity of Legislative Yuan members was influenced by the electoral system, and previous studies have shown that members elected from different tiers have different perception about their role as a representative and behave differently. In the fifth term of the Legislative Yuan, more than sixty percent of SNTV members considered gaining recognition and support from electorates as most important, while only twenty percent of PR members considered this important. In contrast, the proportion of members who thought that their primary role was to accomplish their political ideals or to support party agenda was much higher for PR members than for SNTV members (Hsiao, 2007). In addition, the electorate has different expectations about Legislative Yuan members' pork distribution depending on the strength of the connections between the members and specific geographic areas (Luor, 2008). Luor and Hsieh (2008) show that members from smaller districts, which usually require members seeking reelection to have a closer relationship with their constituents, introduce more bills related to distributive politics.

Likewise, I expect that incentives to cultivate personal votes play a key role in committee assignments for members from SNTV districts, while PR members do not have strong incentives to do so. For instance, Legislative Yuan members who are vulnerable in an election have an incentive to show themselves to be skilled legislators who can introduce policies beneficial to their districts, while members who are selected from regions with high demand for social welfare have an incentive

to have membership on committees for social policy.

4.3 Literature and Theory

Theoretical developments regarding committee assignments have mostly been made through research on the US Congress. There are three main competing theories, each of which makes particular predictions regarding the composition of congressional committees. The first theory is the distributive theory of congressional committees, which posits that committees are composed of legislators with high demand for that policy area (Weingast and Marshall, 1988). The second and third theories are the informational theory (Krehbiel, 1992) and the partisan theory (Cox and McCubbins, 2007).

The committee assignments under the distributive theory are characterized as a process of self-selection. Winning reelection is the primary goal of incumbent congressional members (Mayhew, 1974), and, to achieve this goal, they try to make the most of the available resources at their disposal. Working on a standing committee is one such resource, so they demand a seat on a committee strongly related to their district interests (Adler and Lapinski, 1997). Congressional members have developed legislative institutions to protect their benefits produced by stable exchange, and for committee seats, the property rights of incumbent members have been established (Weingast and Marshall, 1988).

This discussion of members of the Congress is pertinent to the committee membership of the Taiwanese Legislative Yuan if the focus is on the proper group of members. The dual electoral systems create different electoral incentives for the members

(Hsiao, 2007), and this affects the policy behavior of the members (Luor and Hsieh, 2008). For instance, governing party members elected in SNTV elections, especially from district with a small district magnitude, have a strong influence on distributive spending (Luor, 2000). The requests for committee assignments by Legislative Yuan members reflect such electoral incentives (Batto, 2005), so the self-selection argument is particularly applicable for committee assignments in the Legislative Yuan.

This “demand-side” theory was especially true for the period until the fourth term of the Legislative Yuan, when parties were not authorized to control their members’ requests. In that period, a few committees that were popular among distribution-oriented members garnered many applications, exceeding the maximum number of seats for these committees.

These excessive demands were detrimental to the Legislative Yuan members. Since the membership for the committees in demand was determined by lottery, members could not continuously serve on a popular committee, which discouraged the development of policy expertise among Legislative Yuan members, and legislative oversight over government decisions was ineffective. Furthermore, under this system, there was no proper means of distinguishing members with high demand from those with low demand. Since any member could apply to serve on these popular committees, members with weak demand had an incentive to request seats on these committees hoping for a stroke of luck.

In the face of these problems, the Legislative Yuan decided to introduce reform of the committee system (see Section 4.2) as a part of the Legislative Yuan reform approved at the end of the fourth term. Under the new system, which is called

the party proportionality system, committee seats are first distributed to parties in proportion to their seats in the chamber, and the parties determine the actual membership.

This reform was intended to encourage members to develop policy expertise, so it was expected to have an impact on the committee membership. One of goals of political parties is to coordinate the interests of the members, and according to Hsiao (2007), parties take members' electoral interests into consideration in the allocation of committee seats.¹ Due to such considerations by parties, we can expect the following change in committee membership from a situation without party control to one with party control over the membership:

Hypothesis 4.1 (Party Control of Committee Assignments) *The effects of electoral incentives on committee assignments are stronger when party control is established than when it is not.*

4.4 Data and Methods

In this chapter, I consider committee assignments from the third to the sixth terms of the Legislative Yuan (1995-2007). The data regarding committee assignments was collected by the author.

¹ For instance, a KMT caucus said “PR members cannot compete for their rights with SNTV members, and PR members usually do not receive a favor from the party” (Hsiao, 2007).

4.4.1 Dependent Variables

The main dependent variables are the number of times a member was assigned to a specific type of committee in a three-year period of each legislature. Since the committee members were reshuffled in each session of a half-year, each member had six opportunities to obtain a seat on committees. I counted the number of times members served as committee members. If a member served on one committee for the entire period of the legislature, the variable takes the value of six. After recording the values for all the committees, I aggregated the observation based on the types of committees they served on using the classification used in several previous articles (see Batto, 2007, 2005). There are three different types of committees: money, high policy, and other committees.

Money committees are committees of one of two types. The first type is a committee concerned with jurisdictions that require a large amount of funding to implement policies, such as the Transportation Committee, which administers public construction projects. Another type of committees includes those concerned with the distribution of spending itself. Because the chance to oversee pork-barrel projects is higher for these committees, they are popular among Legislative Yuan members (Hsiao, 2007). The committees in this category include the Finance, Economics, Transportation, and Budget and Accounts committees.

High policy committees are committees that discuss typical high policies such as the judicial or legal system (Judicial Committee) and foreign policy (Foreign Affairs Committee) or committees for the management of the Legislative Yuan (the Discipline and Rules Committees). These committees were not popular among Legislative

Yuan members, and their memberships did not reach the maximum.

4.4.2 Independent Variables

This study uses three independent variables. The first two variables are related to the characteristics of electoral districts, and the third variable is related to party control of committee membership.² I utilize two variables that are aimed to measure the type of support that an incumbent mustered in the previous election. The first variable, *district member* is a dummy variable that indicates the electoral system from which a member was elected. SNTV is a system that enhances personal vote cultivation (Carey and Shugart, 1995), so members from the SNTV portion have a stronger demand for pork. The variable takes a value of one when a member was elected from an SNTV district.

The second variable is each member's *vote concentration* in an SNTV district. Some members' votes were concentrated on one area in their district, while others spread their support over a broader area. This difference in electoral support changed the incumbents' strategy under SNTV (McCubbins and Rosenbluth, 1995; Tatebayashi and McKean, 2002). In this study, I use Mizusaki's RS-index, which measures the weighted average of deviation from the individual vote mean across sub-units in a district.³

² District characteristics are not included in this analysis, because district magnitude is too large to use a proxy for the characteristics of constituents, and sub-district level data were not available.

³ The formula is:

$$\sum_i \frac{q_j |p_{ij} - p_i|}{2p_i}$$

where q_j in indicates the proportion of votes from sub-unit j , p_i is the proportion of votes

The third independent variable, *no party control*, is a dummy variable for the committee member appointment rules. As explained in the previous section, when the number of applications for committee membership exceeded the maximum number of committee seats, memberships were awarded using a lottery during the second to fourth terms of the Legislative Yuan. After the fifth term of the Legislative Yuan, a new rule was used in which the committee seats were allocated to each party in proportion to their share of the legislative seats, and party caucuses were placed in charge of selecting members. This chapter's hypothesis argues that this change helped in the coordination of the members' interests and helped members with high demand to obtain committee seats. This *no party control* variable takes a value of one for the third and fourth terms and zero for the fifth and sixth terms. As a control, the *seniority* of a member, measured by the number of the Legislative Yuan terms a member served, is also included. Summary statistics for these independent variables are shown in 4.2.

The two dependent variables used in this analysis are count variables bounded by six. Assuming that each count is an independent Bernoulli trial, I use a binomial regression model with a logistic link. Interaction terms between *no party control* and two other independent variables are included in the analysis.

candidate i wins in the entire district, and p_{ij} is the proportion of vote i gets in sub-unit j . The range of this index is $[0,1]$, where higher value means higher vote concentration in a small area. For further explanation of this index, see Hirano (2006). Another concentration index is used in Batto (2005). If this index is used instead of RS-index, the empirical results in the following section become much stronger.

Table 4.2 : Descriptive Statistics for Independent Variables

Variable	Mean	S.D.	Min	Max	N
RS-Index	0.218	0.101	0.000	0.617	627
Seniority	1.973	1.102	1	6	864

Variable	0	1	N
District Member	237	627	864
No Party Control	467	397	864

4.5 Empirical Analysis

Tables 4.3 and 4.4 show the count and proportion for the two dependent variables, *money committees* and *high policy committees*, in each term. The top panel of each table shows the count of individual legislators' affiliations with money or high policy committees, and the bottom panels indicate the proportion of legislators in each term. As Table 4.3 indicates, the patterns of money committee affiliation changed from the no party-control to the party-control periods. In the party-control period, the number of legislators who were not affiliated with any money committees throughout the period was smaller, while a larger proportion of legislators became members of money committees at least once in the period. In addition, during the no party-control period, members who served a small number of terms, 1-4, comprise a larger proportion than in the party-control period, while the proportion of members with the maximum number of sessions increased substantially. As discussed in Section 4.3, when parties did not have control over the committee assignments, the requests

of members with low demand might block those of members with high demand.

Table 4.3 : Number of Session a Member Served in Money Committees

Session	Number of sessions served in money committees							Total
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	
3	51	23	18	15	15	24	23	169
4	61	37	34	29	35	22	10	228
5	101	21	15	19	18	20	37	231
6	113	17	15	14	19	19	39	236

Session	Number of sessions served in money committees							Total
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	
3	0.30	0.14	0.11	0.09	0.09	0.14	0.14	1.00
4	0.27	0.16	0.15	0.13	0.15	0.10	0.04	1.00
5	0.44	0.09	0.06	0.08	0.08	0.09	0.16	1.00
6	0.48	0.07	0.06	0.06	0.08	0.08	0.17	1.00

Note: The top panel shows the count, and the bottom panel shows the proportion of each category.

In contrast, Table 4.4 shows a less clear illustration of the change created by the establishment of party control. While the proportion of legislators who served on high policy committees for only one session is smaller and the number of members who served on these committees for the entire term increased, the change in size is smaller. This is also expected based on the theoretical discussion; since the demand for these committee seats does not exceed the supply, introducing party control would not change the practice of committee assignments as much. However, as the following empirical analysis shows, there was a change in high policy committee assignments after the implementation of party control.

Table 4.4 : Number of Session a Member Served in High Policy Committees

Number of sessions served in high policy committees								
Session	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	Total
3	74	34	23	10	13	5	10	169
4	122	45	22	14	6	9	10	228
5	142	26	16	10	7	8	22	231
6	142	34	13	9	9	10	19	236

Number of sessions served in high policy committees								
Session	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	Total
3	0.44	0.20	0.14	0.06	0.08	0.03	0.06	1.00
4	0.54	0.20	0.10	0.06	0.03	0.04	0.04	1.00
5	0.61	0.11	0.07	0.04	0.03	0.03	0.10	1.00
6	0.60	0.14	0.06	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.08	1.00

Note: The top panel shows the count, and the bottom panel shows the proportion of each category.

The analysis for all legislators is shown in Table 4.5. Each column shows the results for each of two dependent variables. In the model for money committees, the effect of *district member* is significantly positive, and since the coefficient for its interaction term with *no party control* is much smaller than the constitutive term, the effect of *district member*, whether or not a member was elected from an SNTV election, is positive regardless of party control. The theory anticipates that district demand will increase the chance for members to be selected as money committee members, and this result confirms the expectation.

Table 4.5 : Committee Assignments for Money and High Policy Committees (All Legislators)

	Money	High Policy
Intercept	-1.461*	-1.096*
	(0.105)	(0.102)
Seniority	0.039	0.071*
	(0.027)	(0.031)
No Party Control	0.359*	0.089
	(0.127)	(0.118)
District Member	1.043*	-0.597*
	(0.100)	(0.099)
(No Party Control)*District Member	-0.283*	-0.023
	(0.143)	(0.146)
N	864	864
AIC	4623.319	3786.118
BIC	4718.550	3881.350
$\log L$	-2291.659	-1873.059

Standard errors in parentheses


* indicates significance at $p < 0.05$

The estimated coefficient for the constitutive term of no party control is significantly positive. This is also expected; when parties do not control committee assignments, members' demand will create conflicts of interest, and this result will work in favor of members with weaker demand. However, after including an interaction term, the results change. Figure 4.1 shows the substantive effects of two main variables. The left figure shows the difference between SNTV districts and PR members. Each point indicates the mean of the predicted difference, and each line indicates a 95 percent confidence interval of difference in the predicted probability. I calculate the prediction for two separate cases: the left is the effect when party control for assignments is present, while the right is the case without party control. For both cases, the predicted difference is significantly positive, which means that SNTV members are much more likely to be assigned to money committees. However, the difference is smaller in the situation of no party control. This result implies that members with high demand (SNTV legislators) under no party control are less different from PR legislators than they are under party control.

The right figure (Figure 4.2(a)) illustrates the effect of party control for different types of members. The effect of party control is significantly positive for PR legislators, while for SNTV legislators, the difference is not distinguishable from zero. This result means that PR legislators, who do not have a strong need for pork, still request seats on money committees when party control is not present, but their demands are not given much priority in the party-based selection of committee members.

The above analyses utilize the electoral system under which members were elected as an indicator for determining the legislators' demand for a seat on a money commit-

Figure 4.1 : Predicted Difference in The Probability for Money Committee Assignments (All Legislators)



Note: The left panel is the effects of *district member* under the different conditions of party control, and the right panel is the effects of *party control* for two types of legislators. I use **Logit** model in **Zelig**.

tee. The following analysis utilizes another variable that also captures the members' demand. Table 4.6 shows the estimated coefficients for models with the RS-index. The number of observations is smaller for this model because the values for the RS-index are missing for PR members, and these observations are excluded. The basic finding is the same as in the previous analysis. The constitutive term for vote concentration is significantly positive, and *no party control* variable is almost significantly positive, while the coefficient for the interaction term is negative.

To illustrate the relations between the two main independent variables, I plot a

Table 4.6 : Committee Assignments for Money and High Policy Committees (District Legislators Only)

	Money	High Policy
Intercept	-0.836*	-0.544*
	(0.128)	(0.164)
Seniority	0.038	-0.051
	(0.031)	(0.041)
No Party Control	0.311	-0.361
	(0.159)	(0.204)
Vote Concentration	1.948*	-4.478*
	(0.447)	(0.665)
(No Party Control)*(Vote Concentration)	-1.125	2.177*
	(0.655)	(0.935)
<i>N</i>	627	627
AIC	3500.993	2439.335
BIC	3589.812	2528.154
log <i>L</i>	-1730.496	-1199.667

Standard errors in parentheses


* indicates significance at $p < 0.05$

District fixed effects are omitted.

predicted probability of gaining seats on money committees in the value range of the RS-index (Figure 4.2). Two lines indicate the cases with and without party control over committee assignments. The solid line is the prediction under party control, and the dashed line is the prediction under no party control. The shaded regions indicate 95 percent confidence intervals of prediction. For both situations, the effect of vote concentration is positive, but the slope is steeper for party-controlled cases. As expected by Hypothesis 4.1, when parties control the assignment of committee

seats, the requests of members with high demand have a better chance to be fulfilled because of the success of coordination implemented by party leaders.

Figure 4.2 : Predicted Probability of Money Committee Assignments



Note: The solid line indicates the point prediction under party-control, while the dashed line indicates the one under no party-control. The shaded regions indicate 95% confident intervals. I use Logit model in `Zelig` to obtain the prediction.

4.6 Conclusion

This chapter studied the mechanism of committee assignments in the Legislative Yuan. Given the presence of strong personal vote incentives under the SNTV sys-

tem, this chapter particularly emphasized the importance of legislative institutions that keep individual members' demands in order and prevent excessive demands for limited committee seats from resulting in tragedy of the commons. Potentially, there are multiple institutional solutions to this problem. For example, in the US Congress, the solution was to establish property rights to committee seats for incumbent members and the seniority rule. The Taiwanese Legislative Yuan adopted a different solution, which is party control over committee membership. The empirical results of this chapter show that this solution was successful: After introducing the reforms for committee assignments, committee memberships became more stable and reflected the members' electoral incentives more strongly than before.

Taiwan is a young democracy that just observed its seventh legislative election and fifth presidential election in January 2012. In the early period, many aspects of the Legislative Yuan were not institutionalized. For instance, a member could serve as a committee director for only one session in a term, which disturbed the expertise of committee membership (Hsiao, 2005), and there was no official mechanism to resolve the situation of gridlock in the case of the lack of a clear majority in the Legislative Yuan (Yang and Chen, 2004). These problems have been resolved through the development of official institutions in the Legislative Yuan. Investigating this institutional development in the context of a comparative study of legislative institutions will be my future research agenda.

Chapter 5

Conclusion

A monkey that has fallen off a tree is still a monkey, but a politician who has lost an election is a nobody.

–Banboku Ohno, The Former LDP Vice President

As this famous quote from an LDP strongman eloquently illustrates,¹ securing reelection is the most important goal for politicians. Without achieving this goal, they cannot pursue their political career in any sense. This dissertation examined how political institutions, especially electoral systems, shape incumbent politicians' reelection strategies, and how political parties coordinate such strategies. In this brief concluding chapter, I summarize the findings from each chapter then address the future research agenda.

Chapter 2 investigates how parties in the Japanese House of Representatives use standing committee appointments and activities to achieve their legislative and electoral goals, focusing on the difference between governing and opposition parties. For opposition parties, committees are an important arena for developing party reputation and their members' personal appeals for reelection. Therefore, opposition parties exhibit strong connections between parties' or members' needs and actual

¹ Many studies cite this quote including Inoguchi and Iwai (1989) and Saito (2006).

committee activities. For important committees, where parties need to advance the partisan agenda, opposition parties send more competent members who can deliver messages more effectively. In contrast, for committees which serve members' needs for distribution, opposition parties are likely to assign members with strong interests in a district or members who are electorally vulnerable. With regard to attendance, members from governing parties are more likely to attend committee meetings than opposition party members. Finally, as to the rule of unconstrained temporary replacements of committee membership, governing and opposition parties both take advantage of the rule, but each utilizes this rule for different purposes. The governing parties use it to maximize the probability of passing legislation, while opposition parties use it to advance policy debates and provide members with credit-claiming opportunities.

In another chapter, I further pursued the research topic of the mechanism of committee assignments by exploring these in the Taiwanese Legislative Yuan (Chapter 4). This chapter particularly focuses on the development of political institution and its effects. Given the presence of strong personal vote incentives under the SNTV system, this chapter particularly emphasized the importance of legislative institutions that prevent individual members' demands for limited committee seats from resulting in a tragedy of the commons. As a newly democratized legislature, many legislative institutions are not well developed and Legislative Yuan members had not had an effective coordination mechanism. The chamber finally introduced such a mechanism by enforcing party control over committee membership. The empirical results of this chapter show that this solution was successful in preventing a tragedy

of the commons: After introducing the reforms for committee assignments, committee memberships became more stable and reflected the members' electoral incentives more strongly than before.

In the second chapter on the Japanese Diet, I examined the determinants of fiscal transfers to local governments in Japan in the early period following the electoral reform of 1994 (Chapter 3). It focuses on the governing parties' strategies to respond to electoral contexts and individual legislators' influences. The empirical results show that under the current mixed-member majoritarian (MMM) system, governing parties are more responsive to party votes. This result implies that governing parties considered party support, rather than support for individual members, as crucially important for electoral success. Though little attention has been paid to the policy outcomes of the MMM system, the empirical results of this chapter demonstrate the importance and usefulness of MMM systems for studying the dynamics of parties and their members' interactions. MMM systems provide an excellent setting in which to disentangle parties' and individual members' strategies and influences.

In closing this conclusion, I would like to address three directions of my future research from this dissertation. The first is to analyze temporary membership replacements as a policy network. A particularly interesting question is whether or not the LDP intra-party factions are policy-oriented groups. In the conventional understanding, the LDP factions are considered to be groups composed of a leader and his followers in which the leader provides benefits in return for followers' contributions to the leader's intra-party power struggles. Though sometimes the differences in policy interests between factions are mentioned, that is not considered to be the key

issue distinguishing one faction from others. By comparing the density of factions' networks in each policy area, this research can provide new insights not only on the role of LDP factions, but also on intra-party competition in a party where members are highly individualistic.

The second is to address the change of legislative behaviors of Legislative Yuan members after electoral reform in 2009. The reform changed the system of district elections from SNTV to a single member district system while simultaneously cutting the number of Legislative Yuan members in half. These changes should have had an influence on the electoral incentives of members. They have just concluded the first three-year term under the new electoral system, and there is an opportunity for future research.

The last is to extend the scope of fiscal transfer analysis to the period after the fall of the LDP in 2008. After the electoral reform, some argued that party competition in House of Representatives elections had gradually been shifting from competition based on clientelistic appeals to more programmatic appeals (e.g. Noble, 2010). In addition, in the 2009 general election, the Democratic Party in Japan (DPJ) won a landslide victory, strongly backed by their policy appeals. Empirical research to check the validity of these points is much awaited. The broader implication of this research is about the long-term and short-term effects of institutional change. One interpretation of the findings of Chapter 3 in this dissertation is that, in the short-term, electoral reform had caused a shift in distributive policy decision-making from individual members to the governing party. Future research would show that the further shift in party competition also had taken place.

Bibliography

- Adler, E.Scott and John S. Lapinski. 1997. "Demand-side Theory and Congressional Committee Composition: A Constituency Characteristics Approach." *American Journal of Political Science* 41(3):895–918.
- Aldrich, John H. 1995. *Why Parties?: The Origin and Transformation of Political Parties in America*. University of Chicago Press.
- Asano, Ichiro and Hisashi Kohno, eds. 2008. *Shin Kokkai Jiten* [New Dictionary for the Japanese Diet]. Second ed. Tokyo: Yuhikaku.
- Batto, Nathan F. 2005. "Electoral Strategy, Committee Membership, and Rent Seeking in the Taiwanese Legislature, 1992–2001." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 30(1):43–62.
- Batto, Nathan F. 2007. *Meshing Motivations: Individual and Collective Action in the Taiwanese Legislature* PhD thesis University of California, San Diego.
- Bawn, Kathleen and Michael F. Thies. 2003. "A Comparative Theory of Electoral Incentives." *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 15(1):5–32.
- Carey, John M. and Matthew S. Shugart. 1995. "Incentives to Cultivate a Personal Vote: A Rank Ordering of Electoral Formulas." *Electoral studies* 14(4):417–439.
- Carroll, Royce and Gary W. Cox. 2012. "Shadowing Ministers: Monitoring Partners in Coalition Governments." *Comparative Political Studies* 45(2):220–236.
- Case, Anne. 2001. "Election Goals and Income Redistribution: Recent Evidence From Albania." *European Economic Review* 45(3):405–423.
- Cox, Gary W. 2006. The Organization of Democratic Legislatures. In *The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy*, ed. Barry Weingast and Donald Wittman. Oxford University Press pp. 141–161.

- Cox, Gary W. 2009. Swing Voters, Core Voters, and Distributive Politics. In *Political Representation*, ed. Ian Shapiro, Susan C. Stokes, Elisabeth Jean Wood and Alexander S Kirshner. Cambridge Univ Press chapter 13.
- Cox, Gary W. and Frances Rosenbluth. 1993. "The Electoral Fortunes of Legislative Factions in Japan." *American Political Science Review* 87(3):577–589.
- Cox, Gary W. and Mathew D. McCubbins. 1986. "Electoral Politics as a Redistributive Game." *Journal of Politics* 48(2):370–389.
- Cox, Gary W. and Mathew D. McCubbins. 2007. *Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House*. Cambridge Univ Press.
- Cox, Gary W., Mikitaka Masuyama and Mathew D. McCubbins. 2000. "Agenda Power in the Japanese House of Representatives." *Japanese Journal of Political Science* 1(1):1–21.
- Cox, Karen E. and Leonard J. Schoppa. 2002. "Interaction Effects in Mixed-member Electoral Systems." *Comparative Political Studies* 35(9):1027–1053.
- Dahlberg, Matz and Eva Johansson. 2002. "On the Vote-purchasing Behavior of Incumbent Governments." *American Political Science Review* 96(1):27–40.
- Denemark, David. 2000. "Partisan Pork Barrel in Parliamentary Systems: Australian Constituency-Level Grants." *Journal of Politics* 62(3):896–915.
- Dixit, Avinash and John Londregan. 1996. "The Determinants of Success of Special Interests in Redistributive Politics." *Journal of Politics* 58:1132–1155.
- Döring, Herbert. 1995a. *Parliaments and Majority Rule in Western Europe*. Palgrave Macmillan.
- Döring, Herbert. 1995b. Time as a Scarce Resource: Government Control of the Agenda. In *Parliaments and majority rule in Western Europe*, ed. Herbert Döring. Palgrave Macmillan chapter 7, pp. 223–246.
- Estevez-Abe, Margarita. 2006. *Welfare and Capitalism in Postwar Japan: Party, Bureaucracy, and Business*. Cambridge Univ Press.
- Fenno, Richard F. 1978. *Home Style: House Members in Their Districts*. Scott Foresman & Co.

- Ferrara, Federico, Erik S. Herron and Misa Nishikawa. 2005. *Mixed Electoral Systems: Contamination and Its Consequences*. Palgrave Macmillan.
- Fukumoto, Kentaro and Akitaka Matsuo. 2010. "Staggered Chambers as Laboratories: Legislative Activities in the Shadow of Election." Paper Presented at the Annual Meeting of American Political Science Association, September 2010, Washington, DC.
- Golden, Miriam and Lucio Picci. 2008. "Pork Barrel Politics in Postwar Italy, 1953-1992." *American Journal of Political Science* 52(2):32-47.
- Grier, Kevin B. and Michael C. Munger. 1991. "Committee Assignments, Constituent Preferences, and Campaign Contributions." *Economic Inquiry* 29(1):24-43.
- Gschwend, Thomas. 2007. "Ticket-splitting and Strategic Voting Under Mixed Electoral Rules: Evidence From Germany." *European Journal of Political Research* 46(1):1-23.
- Hirano, Shigeo. 2006. "Electoral Institutions, Hometowns, and Favored Minorities: Evidence from Japanese Electoral Reforms." *World Politics* 59(01):51-82.
- Hirano, Shigeo. 2011. "Do Individual Representatives Influence Government Transfers? Evidence From Japan." *The Journal of Politics* 73(4):1-14.
- Hirose, Michisada. 1993. *Subsidies and the Governing Party*. Tokyo: Asahi Shimbun.
- Horiuchi, Yusaku and Jun Saito. 2003. "Reapportionment and Redistribution: Consequences of Electoral Reform in Japan." *American Journal of Political Science* 47(4):669-682.
- Horiuchi, Yusaku and Jun Saito. 2009a. "Rain, Elections and Money: The Impact of Voter Turnout on Distributive Policy Outcomes in Japan." Unpublished Manuscript. Australia-Japan Research Centre.
- Horiuchi, Yusaku and Jun Saito. 2009b. "Removing Boundaries to Lose Connections: Electoral Consequences of Local Government Reform in Japan." Paper Presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association 67th Annual National Conference, Chicago, April.
- Hsiao, Yi-ching. 2005. "Woguo Lifa Yuan Zishen Zhidu Zhi Tantaoy [The Seniority System in the Legislative Yuan in Taiwan: Change of the Transfers Among Committees and the Convener's Seniority]." *Zhengzhi Kexue Luncong* [Taiwanese Journal of Political Science] pp. 105-134.

- Hsiao, Yi-ching. 2007. “Woguo Lifa Weiyuan Xuanze Changshe Weiyuanhui Zhi Yanjiu: Yi Di Wu Jie Lifa Weiyuan Weili [Committee Selection in the Legislative Yuan: the Fifth Term Legislative Yuan].” *Soochow Journal of Political Science* 25(3):132–182.
- Imai, Kosuke, Gary King and Olivia Lau. 2008. “Toward a Common Framework for Statistical Analysis and Development.” *Journal of Computational and Graphical Statistics* 17(4):892–913.
- Inoguchi, Takashi and Tomoaki Iwai. 1989. *Zoku Giin No Kenkyu* [Studies on Zoku Giin]. Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Shimbun Sha.
- Kiewiet, D. Roderick and Mathew D. McCubbins. 1991. *The Logic of Delegation: Congressional Parties and the Appropriations Process*. University of Chicago Press.
- Kim, Dong-Hun and Gerald Loewenberg. 2005. “The Role of Parliamentary Committees in Coalition Governments.” *Comparative Political Studies* 38(9):1104–1129.
- King, Gary. 1998. *Unifying Political Methodology: The Likelihood Theory of Statistical Inference*. Univ of Michigan Press.
- King, Gary, Michael Tomz and Jason Wittenberg. 2000. “Making the Most of Statistical Analyses: Improving Interpretation and Presentation.” *American Journal of Political Science* 44(2):347–361.
- Koga, Tsuyoshi, Yasue Makihara and Makito Okumura. 2010. “Teikoku Gikai Oyobi Kokkai No Rippou Toukei [Statistics of Legislation in the Imperial Diet and Post-War Diet].” *Refarensu* [Reference] pp. 117–155.
- Krauss, Eliss S. and Robert J. Pekkanen. 2010. *The Rise and Fall of Japan’s LDP: Political Party Organizations as Historical Institutions*. Cornell Univ Press.
- Krehbiel, Keith. 1992. *Information and Legislative Organization*. Univ of Michigan Press.
- Lindbeck, Assar and Jorgen W. Weibull. 1987. “Balanced-budget Redistribution as the Outcome of Political Competition.” *Public Choice* 52(3):273–297.
- Luor, Ching-Jyuhn. 2000. “Cai Cai Kan Shui Ba Yan Rou Dai Hui Jiale: Buzhu Kuan Liyi Zai Xian Shi Fenpei De Fenxi [Guess Who Brings Home the Bacon: The Geographic Distribution of Taiwan Provincial Grants].” *Renwen ji Shehui Kexue* [Journal of Social Sciences and Philosophy] 12(1):1–45.

- Luor, Ching-Jyuhn. 2008. "Xiao Guimo Lifa Weiyuan Xuanqu De Fenpei Zhengzhi: Xuanming Duiyu Buzhu Liyi De Qidai [*Distributive Politics in Small Districts under the SNTV System in Taiwan: The Expectation of Constituencies on Pork Barrel*]." *Taiwan Minzhu Jikan* [Taiwan Democracy Quarterly] 5(4):47–86.
- Luor, Ching-Jyuhn and Ying-Shih Hsieh. 2008. "Xuanqu Guimo Yu Lifa Weiyuan Fenpei Zhengce Ti'an De Guanlian Xing Yanjiu: Di San, Si Jie Lifa Yuan De Fenxi [*The Association of District Size and Pork Barrel Related Bills Initiated By Legislators: An Analysis on the 3rd and 4th Legislative Yuan in Taiwan*]." *Xingzheng ji Zhengce Xuebao* [Public Administration and Policy] 46:1–48.
- Mamadouh, Virginie and Tapio Raunio. 2003. "The Committee System: Powers, Appointments and Report Allocation*." *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 41(2):333–351.
- Martin, Lanny W. and Georg Vanberg. 2005. "Coalition Policymaking and Legislative Review." *American Political Science Review* 99(1):93–106.
- Masuyama, Mikitaka. 2001. "Agenda Power in the Japanese Diet: A Duration Analysis of Lawmaking" PhD thesis University of Michigan.
- Masuyama, Mikitaka. 2003. *Giakai Seido To Nihon Seiji* [Agenda Power in the Japanese Diet]. Tokyo: Bokutakusha.
- Matsumoto, Shunta and Akitaka Matsuo. 2010. "Kokkai Giin Ha Naze Iinkai De Hatsugen Suru Noka? [*Why Do MPs Speak in Committee Meetings?*]." *Senkyo Kenkyu* [Japanese Journal of Electoral Studies] 26(2):84–104.
- Matsuo, Akitaka and Shunta Matsumoto. 2011. "Partisan and Nonpartisan Incentives in Parliamentary Speeches." Paper Presented at the Annual Meeting of American Political Science Association, September 2011, Seattle, WA.
- Mattlin, Mikael. 2006. "Party opportunism among local politicians after Taiwans power transition." *East Asia* 23(1):68–85.
- Mattson, Ingver and Kaare Strøm. 1995. Parliamentary Committees. In *Parliaments and majority rule in Western Europe*, ed. Herbert Döring. Palgrave Macmillan chapter 8, pp. 249–307.
- Mayhew, David R. 1974. *Congress: the Electoral Connection*. Yale University Press.

- McCubbins, Mathew D. and Frances McCall Rosenbluth. 1995. Party Provision for Personal Politics: Dividing the Vote in Japan. In *Structure and policy in Japan and the United States*, ed. Peter F. Cowhey and Mathew D. McCubbins. New York: Cambridge University Press pp. 35–55.
- McElroy, Gail. 2006. “Committee Representation in the European Parliament.” *European Union Politics* 7(1):5–29.
- McGillivray, Fiona. 2004. *Privileging Industry: The Comparative Politics of Trade and Industrial Policy*. Princeton Univ Press.
- McKean, Margaret and Ethan Scheiner. 2000. “Japan’s New Electoral System: La Plus ça Change.” *Electoral Studies* 19(4):447–477.
- Mochizuki, Mike M. 1982. Managing and Influencing the Japanese Legislative Process: the Role of Parties and the National Diet PhD thesis Harvard University.
- Moser, Robert G. and Ethan Scheiner. 2004. “Mixed Electoral Systems and Electoral System Effects: Controlled Comparison and Cross-national Analysis.” *Electoral Studies* 23(4):575–599.
- Müller, Wolfgang C. and Kaare Strøm. 1999. *Policy, Office, Or Votes?: How Political Parties in Western Europe Make Hard Decisions*. Cambridge Univ Press.
- Nemoto, Kuniaki, Eliss S. Krauss and Robert Pekkanen. 2008. “Policy Dissension and Party Discipline: The July 2005 Vote on Postal Privatization in Japan.” *British Journal of Political Science* 38(3):499–525.
- Nichter, Simeon. 2008. “Vote Buying Or Turnout Buying? Machine Politics and the Secret Ballot.” *American Political Science Review* 102(1):19–31.
- Noble, Gregory W. 2010. “The Decline of Particularism in Japanese Politics.” *Journal of East Asian Studies* 10(2):239–273.
- Oyama, Reiko. 2003. *Kokkai Gaku Nyumon* [Introduction to the Legislative Studies in Japan]. Second ed. Tokyo: Sanseido.
- Pekkanen, Robert, Benjamin Nyblade and Eliss S. Krauss. 2006. “Electoral Incentives in Mixed-member Systems: Party, Posts, and Zombie Politicians in Japan.” *American Political Science Review* 100(2):183–193.
- Pollack, Mark A. 2003. “Delegation, Agency, and Agenda Setting in the European Community.” *International Organization* 51(1):99–134.

- Primo, David M. and James M. Snyder Jr. 2010. "Party Strength, the Personal Vote, and Government Spending." *American Journal of Political Science* 54(2):354–370.
- Rosenbluth, Frances McCall and Michael F. Thies. 2010. *Japan Transformed: Political Change and Economic Restructuring*. Princeton Univ Press.
- Saito, Jun. 2006. Pork Barrel Politics in Contemporary Japan PhD thesis Yale University.
- Saito, Jun. 2010. *Jiminto Choki Seiken No Seiji Keizaigaku* [The Political Economy of the LDP Regime]. Tokyo: Keiso Shobo.
- Scheiner, Ethan. 2005. "Pipelines of Pork." *Comparative Political Studies* 38(7):799.
- Scheiner, Ethan. 2006. *Democracy Without Competition in Japan: Opposition Failure in a One-party Dominant State*. Cambridge Univ Press.
- Scheiner, Ethan. 2007. Clientelism in Japan: the Importance and Limits of Institutional Explanations. In *Patrons, Clients, and Policies: Patterns of Democratic Accountability and Political Competition*. Cambridge Univ Press pp. 276–97.
- Scheiner, Ethan. 2008. "Does Electoral System Reform Work? Electoral System Lessons From Reforms of the 1990s." *Annual Review of Political Science* 11:161–181.
- Schickler, Eric and Donald Philip Green. 1997. "The Stability of Party Identification in Western Democracies." *Comparative Political Studies* 30(4):450–483.
- Sheng, Shing-Yuan. 2000. Lifa Weiyuan Weisheme Youzou Zai Butong De Weiyuanhui [Why Do Yuan Members Go Around Committees?]. In *Zhengzhi Zhidu* [Political Institutions], ed. Jih-wen Lin. Zhongyang Yanjiuyuan Zhongshan Renwen Shehui Kexue Yanjiusuo.
- Sheng, Shing-Yuan. 2003. "Lifa Jiguan Yu Xingzheng Jiguan Zai Lifa Guocheng Zhong De Yingxiang Li [The Influence of the Legislative Branch and the Executive Branch in the Process of Lawmaking: A Comparison of the Unified and Divided Governments]." *Taiwan Zhengzhi Xue Kan* [Taiwanese Political Science Review] 7(2):51–105.
- Sheng, Shing-Yuan. 2006. "Lifa Weiyuan De Lifa Ti'an: Di Wu Jie Lifa Yuan De Fenxi [Yuan Members Bill Proposals: An Analysis of the Fifth Term]." Working Paper, National Chengchi University.

- Shugart, Matthew S. 2005. "Semi-presidential systems: Dual executive and mixed authority patterns." *French Politics* 3(3):323–351.
- Shugart, Matthew S. and Martin P. Wattenberg. 2001a. *Mixed-member Electoral Systems: the Best of Both Worlds?* Oxford University Press.
- Shugart, Matthew Soberg and Martin P. Wattenberg. 2001b. Mixed-member Electoral Systems: A Definition and Typology. In *Mixed-member electoral systems: the best of both worlds*, ed. Matthew Soberg Shugart and Martin P. Wattenberg. Oxford University Press chapter 1, pp. 9–24.
- Stokes, Susan C. 2005. "Perverse Accountability: A Formal Model of Machine Politics With Evidence From Argentina." *American Political Science Review* 99(3):315.
- Stratmann, Thomas and Martin Baur. 2002. "Plurality Rule, Proportional Representation, and the German Bundestag: How Incentives to Pork-barrel Differ Across Electoral Systems." *American Journal of Political Science* pp. 506–514.
- Tatebayashi, Masahiko and Margaret McKean. 2002. "Vote Division and Policy Differentiation Strategies of LDP Members Under SNTV/MMD in Japan." Working Paper.
- Tavits, Margit. 2009. "The Making of Mavericks." *Comparative Political Studies* 42(6):793–814.
- Thames, Frank C. and Martin S. Edwards. 2006. "Differentiating Mixed-Member Electoral Systems." *Comparative Political Studies* 39(7):905–927.
- Veiga, Linda Gonçalves and Francisco José Veiga. Forthcoming 2012. "Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfers as Pork Barrel." *Public Choice* .
- Weingast, Barry R. and William J. Marshall. 1988. "The Industrial Organization of Congress; Or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets." *The Journal of Political Economy* 96(1):132–163.
- Weitz-Shapiro, Rebecca. Forthcoming 2012. "What Wins Votes: Why Some Politicians Opt Out of Clientelism." *American Journal of Political Science* .
- Wood, David M. and Phillip Norton. 1992. "Do Candidates Matter? Constituency-specific Vote Changes for Incumbent MPs, 1983–1987." *Political Studies* 40(2):227–238.

- Wu, Chung-li. 2003. "Local factions and the Kuomintang in Taiwan's electoral politics." *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 3(1):89–111.
- Yang, Wan-Ying and Tsai-Wei Chen. 2004. "Guohui Gaige Fengchao Xia Dangtuan Xieshang Zhidu Zhi Zhuanbian Yu Pinggu [*The Transformation and Evaluation of the Inter-Party Negotiation System after the Congressional Reforms*]." *Soochow Journal of Political Science* 19:111–50.
- Yordanova, Nikoleta. 2009. "The Rationale Behind Committee Assignment in the European Parliament: Distributive, Informational and Partisan Perspectives." *European Union Politics* 10(2):253–280.