Border control cooperation in the European Union:
The Schengen visa policy in practice

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Abstract

This research project investigates the governing of Europe's external border. It analyses how the common Schengen short-stay visa policy has been applied in practice by member states in the period from 2005 to 2010. So far, little systematic theoretical and empirical research has been carried out on the implementation of Schengen. The contributions of the thesis are two-fold. Firstly, it makes available a comprehensive and easily accessible database on the visa requirements, issuing-practices and consular representation of EU states in all third countries. It enables researchers to map out and compare how restrictively the visa policy is implemented by different member states and across sending countries. Secondly, the project provides three separate papers that in different ways make use of the database to explore and explain the varying openness of Europe's border and dynamics of cooperation among member states. The three papers are tied together by a framework conceptualising Schengen as a border regime with two key dimensions: restrictiveness and integration.

The first paper asks to what extent, and why, Europe's border is more open to visitors of some nationalities rather than others. The second paper investigates to what extent, and why, EU states cooperate on sharing consular facilities in the visa-issuing process. The third paper examines to what extent, and why, Schengen participation has a restrictive impact on the visa-issuing practices of member countries. The analyses test existing theories and develop new concepts and models. The three papers engage with rationalist and constructivist theories and seek to assess their relative explanatory power. In doing so, the project makes use of different quantitative comparative approaches. It employs regression analysis, social network analytical tools and quasi-experimental design. Overall, the thesis concludes that Schengen is characterized by extensive cooperation and restrictive practices towards especially visitors from poor, Muslim-majority and refugee-producing countries.

…I may be utterly convinced of the truth of a statement; certain of the evidence of my perceptions; overwhelmed by the intensity of my experience; every doubt may seem to me absurd. But does this afford the slightest reason for science to accept my statement? (Popper 2002: 24f)

Hostility to one people intruding into another's territory is an almost universal phenomenon. Individuals and temporary residents may be tolerated, even welcomed, but the arrival of large numbers of people, with a sense of identity and solidarity, is usually regarded as a threat. Frontiers have been established and clearly marked in order to prevent such intrusions; they have always had the general purpose of controlling or preventing the movement of people. (Anderson 1996: 149)

States' ability to "embrace" their own subjects and to make distinctions between nationals and non-nationals, and to track the movements of persons in order to sustain the boundary between these two groups (whether at the border or not), has depended to a considerable extent on the creation of documents that make the relevant differences knowable and thus enforceable. (Torpey 2000a: 2)

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Preface

In contemporary Europe, internal borders have been physically dismantled across most of the continent and common rules put in place to regulate the entry of visitors. This regional free travel area is usually referred to as the Schengen cooperation. It has generated considerable public debate. Supporters of the policy see it as a key symbol of the unification and stabilisation of the continent following the Second World War and the fall of the Berlin Wall. Critics stress that common border policies infringe on state sovereignty and endanger national identity.

That border cooperation should be controversial is not surprising. The development of passports, visas and the guarding of territorial frontiers play a central role in processes of state formation. These practices help to establish who is present within a polity and determine their status as citizens, residents or temporary visitors. Border control is thus important to the on-going construction and policing of national identity and state sovereignty. Hence, understanding how new border policies are carried out is relevant to grasping the character of a political community and identifying potential trajectories for future developments.

Starting off from this assumption, this study seeks to improve our knowledge of how the Schengen cooperation is in practice being implemented by European public authorities. I focus on the external border, specifically the application of short-stay entry visa rules, and seek to explore and explain patterns of restrictiveness and dynamics of cooperation characterizing the common policy. This is done via quantitative methods, making use of a new comprehensive database developed for the project detailing visa requirements, visa-issuing practices and consular representation abroad in the period from 2005 to 2010. The project consists of three separate but linked papers. The database and background material for the individual analyses are available at www.mogenshobolth.dk/evd.

The first paper focuses on restrictiveness. It explores the question why the openness of the external border varies for different nationalities. Borders differ in

their permeability; they are neither open nor closed but selectively crossable for varying groups of persons. Nationals of Chile, for example, can travel freely to Europe whereas Peruvian citizens need a visa. Russian visa applications are seldom refused while Egyptian entry requests often are. How can we make sense of these differences? I develop and test a security theoretical explanation of variation stressing migration fears and a rival interest group account focusing on business lobbying. The conclusion, based on linear regression analysis, is that the former holds the most explanatory purchase. The main driver of variation in openness is concerns over migration from poor, refugee-producing and Muslim-majority countries.

The second paper concentrates on cooperation patterns. Visa applications are inspected abroad, and the Schengen rules enable the members to make use of each other's consular facilities for doing so. I analyse how and to what extent the participating states in practice enter into cooperative agreements. Using descriptive statistics and social network analytical tools, I show that collaboration is extensive and structured in territorial clusters. The Nordic countries, for example, cooperate internally but in general not with Southern European states. I advance and develop the concept of 'regional imagined communities' to explain the pattern. It highlights the importance of shared identities founded in similarities in language, culture and state-building trajectory as a basis for the development of cooperation on border control.

The third paper investigates restrictiveness and cooperation in combination. It explores how, if at all, Schengen participation has an impact on the openness of domestic borders. Is Europe's frontier more closed to visitors from the outside as a result of EU-integration, or is cooperation in this field without significant effects? I approach this question using institutional theory. I set out a rational choice explanation highlighting that liberal states have little incentive to cooperate with restrictive partners. This I contrast with a sociological institutional model emphasising restrictive norms and informal mechanisms ensuring their diffusion and uptake. I test these two arguments empirically through a quasi-experimental

study of the enlargement of Schengen with the Central and Eastern European countries. I show that integration had a marked restrictive impact on domestic visa-issuing practices lending support to sociological institutionalism.

Existing research conceptualize Schengen as a border regime with both supranational and intergovernmental governance and varying degrees of openness towards outsiders. Drawing the three papers together, I develop this framework further to advance our understanding of the dynamics and patterns within this mixed regime. What nationals are allowed easy entry and which are not? Do member states coordinate and adhere to the common rules when carrying out the Union's visa policy? The model I set up distinguishes between, on the one hand, civic and ethnic forms of entry selectivity and, on the other hand, conflictual and cooperative implementation practices. Based on the findings of the three papers, I argue that the European border regime is characterized by extensive cooperation and displays evidence of an ethnic mode of regulating access. Taken together this reflects what I term a 'communitarian Europe'.

Acknowledgements

This project gradually took shape during my stay at the London School of Economics and Political Science from 2009 to 2012. Through many twists and turns, discussions, frustrations with statistics, uncompleted drafts and messy notes trying to pin-down the precise research questions it slowly found its form. In this process it is impossible to thank enough my wife Rikke Wagner for academic discussions, helpful comments on earlier drafts, encouragements and unending patience with me and faith in the project. I must also thank Eiko Thielemann and Jennifer Jackson-Preece for their support and indispensable supervision through the years. Thanks are due as well to my PhD colleagues at the European Institute and the convenors of our research seminars – Bob Hancké, Sara Hagemann, Jonathan White, Simon Glendinning and Helen Wallace – for many interesting and stimulating exchanges of views. Discussions in the reading group of the LSE Migration Studies Unit have improved my understanding of the challenges, dilemmas, and possibilities raised by global mobility.

Part of the introduction is forthcoming in the Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies and has previously been published as an LSE Migration Studies Unit working paper. Various earlier drafts of paper one have been presented at conferences at the University of Salford, the University of Bath, King's College London and the University of Warwick. Paper two has been presented at the University of Oxford, and won the First Prize in the doctoral paper competition organized by LSE's 'Europe in Question' Discussion Paper Series. It was subsequently published as working paper in this series. Different versions of paper three have been presented at conferences organized by the Political Studies Association, the European Political Science Association, the Columbia University's Council of European Studies and the European University Institute in Florence. Additionally, paper one and three were presented at the LSE European Institute's lunch time seminar series.

The project has benefitted greatly from the feedback received at these events. I would particularly like to thank Sarah Leonard and Christian Kaunert for

INTRODUCTION

Border control cooperation in the European Union

1. Research theme

The borders of Europe used to be governed by a wide variety of national legal rules and practices (Anderson 1996; Anderson et al. 2000). In the mid-1990s, for example, a citizen of Bolivia could freely embark on a trip to Germany, Sweden or Spain, but had to apply for a visa beforehand when travelling to Belgium, France or Denmark (OJEU 1996). If the visit involved several countries, he or she would likely have had to obtain several entry permits and have the papers checked at the territorial border of each member state. Today, in marked contrast, uniform rules and procedures regulate the entry of foreign visitors to Europe, and internal frontiers have been physically dismantled across most of the continent (Lavenex 2010). This new regional free travel area is usually referred to as the 'Schengen' cooperation.

The transformation of the borders of Europe has generated considerable public debate. Criticism of cooperation is particularly strong on the opposite ends of the political spectrum. Left-wing parties, non-governmental pro-migration and refugee rights organizations often label it 'Fortress Europe'. Schengen, from this perspective, is about the undermining of civil liberties, the proliferation of new forms and sites of police checks, denying asylum-seekers access, and the institutionalisation of discrimination and racism towards outsiders (Bigo 1998: 155-7). Right-wing parties, in contrast, often refer to the cooperation as a form of 'sieve Europe'. This frame highlights the eroding effects of EU-integration on borders for national identity and sovereignty, and the loss of control caused by the dismantling of national frontiers (Bigo 1998: 153-5). Supporters of the project, mainly centre-parties and European institutions, present cooperation as a symbol of political unification and stabilisation of Europe and a practical means to

advance intra-European trade and mobility (COM 2010b; Kunz and Leinonen 2007).

The establishment of common policies in the area of policing and border control – justice and home affairs – thus raises fundamental and interesting questions on the character and direction of the European integration process. The political contestation surrounding the cooperation mirrors the importance attributed to the subject in academic studies of borders and state-making. Establishing and exercising control over the 'coming and going' of persons play a central role in the formation of nation-states (Salter 2003; Torpey 2000a, 2000b, 2003). Passports, visas and document inspections are necessary, in practice, to acquire knowledge on who is present on a territory and establish who belongs and who does not. These mundane actions of classification and sorting of individuals are central to the on-going enactment of citizenship, national identity and state sovereignty (Anderson 2000: 15).

Practices of control both reflect and shape ideas about the character of polities (Anderson 2000: 16). The way border control is set up and carried out is moulded by interests and identities at a given time, but can also set a path which makes different later changes and actions more or less likely (Hall and Taylor 1996; Thelen 2004). The form, scope and depth of the implementation of the new European common border policy are thus important to study. Grasping the structure put in place help to understand contemporary state formation processes in Europe and potential future trajectories.

Existing political science research has first and foremost provided a set of analyses of why cooperation was initially established (Bigo 2000; Guiraudon 2003; Monar 2001; Munster 2009; Niemann 2008; Ruben 2008; Stetter 2000). It has specified main drivers leading to the agreement to coordinate policies. The dynamics identified are manifold ranging from spill-over effects from the establishment of the single market, over strategic behaviour of state officials and

rational attempts to solve complex collective action problems, to evolutionary struggles between different cultures of control.

Turning to the implementation of Schengen, systematic and in-depth studies are largely absent. We thus know surprisingly little about how European border control cooperation works in practice. Existing analyses have established theoretical typologies of border regimes using contemporary events and trends to illustrate features of the arguments (Berg and Ehin 2006; Grabbe 2000; Mau 2006; Zielonka 2001). A key focus of empirical conjecturing has been Eastern Europe and the implications of the enlargement of the European Union. The main conclusion of these studies is that the picture is mixed: the new border regime is neither supranational nor national and frontiers neither open nor closed (See also Mau 2010; Mau et al. 2012; Mau et al. 2008). Legislative rules, for example, are negotiated at the European level but the implementation is left to the member states. Nationals of Indonesia need to obtain a visa to travel to Europe whereas Malaysian citizens do not. Visa applications from Russia are seldom refused whereas entry requests lodged in Algeria often are. European borders are, thus, selective in who they seek to allow in and try to exclude, and are governed using a combination of supranational and intergovernmental elements.

The main aim of this thesis is to advance and deepen our understanding of what characterizes this complex and multifaceted border regime. I seek to map out different patterns of restrictiveness, identify dynamics of cooperation, and explain why they occur. I do so through a quantitative comparative analysis of the implementation of the Schengen cooperation by the member states. Focusing on the external border I trace, specifically, how the common visa policy is in practice applied and enforced. Visas are a crucial component of the border regime. The most extensive control of travellers takes place at diplomatic representations during the visa application process (Bigo and Guild 2005). For the majority of persons in the world, the borders of Europe are first encountered when they apply for an entry permit at consulates abroad (Guild 2003; cf. Zolberg 2003).

The two key dimensions at the centre of the analysis are, following the existing literature, *openness* and *governance*. Why do visitors of some nationalities face stringent controls and others not? In what ways, if at all, do member states coordinate the execution of the visa policy? Are national borders more closed to visitors from the outside as a result of EU cooperation, and why?

By bringing to light and analysing trends in how European visa policy has been put into practice, I primarily seek to contribute to the public and academic debate, as set out above, on the characteristics of the European border regime. The analysis is, however, also of relevance for other bodies of literature. It advances our understanding of how visas are used in the context of asylum policy (Collinson 1996; Gammeltoft-Hansen 2011; Ryan 2010). A key concern within refugee studies is that visa requirements impair the ability of refugees to access protection in destination states. Yet to what extent visa rules are actually enforced in conflict countries has not been studied in detail. Additionally, policing and border control is a largely absent issue area in EU implementation research (Ette and Faist 2007; Toshkov 2010; Toshkov et al. 2010; Treib 2008). The study provides rare quantitative insight into how a common policy is applied in practice. Existing large-N studies almost always focus solely on the extent to which member states transpose directives legally and trends in infringement proceedings launched by the European Commission (Hartlapp and Falkner 2009; Mastenbroek 2005). The project thus advances our knowledge of key questions within this literature on reasons for similarities and differences in how shared policies are actually applied in practice.

2. Research questions

The thesis seeks to answer the following overarching question:

How, if at all, has the common European visa policy been implemented by the Schengen member states, and why?

The focus of the project is on the implementation and not the design and legislative enactment of Schengen rules. I do not, in other words, seek to uncover how integration came about but how it was subsequently put into practice. By implementation I understand the processes occurring in between a decision is made and the realisation of its end results (Bardach 1977; Hill and Hupe 2002: 2; Pressman and Wildavsky 1979). It is important to study what takes place in this stage of the policy cycle (May and Wildavsky 1978) because the way in which new legislation is realised cannot simply be read off the act. Manifold dynamics and processes take place in this phase significantly shaping and altering practices and outcomes.

In the thesis I explore the main research question through three separate analyses. The specific questions investigated are:

1. *How, if at all, does the openness of Schengen member states' external borders to visitors of different nationalities vary, and why?*

2. *How, if at all, does Schengen member states cooperate in the implementation of the common visa policy, and why?*

3. *How, if at all, does participation in the common visa policy affect the openness of Schengen member states' external borders, and why?*

The first question highlights border restrictiveness, openness and permeability. How restrictive or lenient are the member states in issuing entry permits? What theoretical models are best suited for explaining when they are more or less strict? The second question emphasises governance. In what ways do the member states cooperate in the execution of the visa policy? Are there any strong patterns in their mutual interaction and, if so, what explains this? The third question, finally, combines restrictiveness and governance. Is there an impact of participation in EU-cooperation on restrictiveness? Are the member states' borders towards third

countries more closed or open as a result of European integration than they would otherwise likely be?

The three analyses thus differ in the choice of variables. The first takes as the dependent variable restrictiveness; the second governance dynamics. Neither focuses on a particular explanatory factor but seek to test and evaluate the purchase of a set of theories and variables. The third has restrictiveness as the dependent variable and specifically focus on EU-integration as the main independent variable of interest.

3. Analytical framework

Existing research offers a range of theoretical conceptualisations of borders and border control. Balibar (2001, 2004), Salter (2005) and Walters (2002, 2004, 2006) have in different ways tried to develop post-structural approaches. They highlight post-colonial relations, genealogical analysis of practices of power and rites of passages. These studies provide overall social theories improving our understanding of the symbolic meaning of borders. As frameworks for studying the practical implementation of the Schengen cooperation they are, however, less useful. For this purpose a mid-range theorisation is more suited. Rudolph (2003) has developed a classical realist perspective within international relations theory. This approach is too state-centric as a general analytics. It rules out a priori that polities can change. This is a problematic starting-point as such potential transformations are at the centre of interest in European border cooperation. A final perspective views borders as institutions and regimes (Anderson 1996; Berg and Ehin 2006; Zielonka 2001). This approach has specified a set of key operational dimensions of borders and border control, and is open to alterations in underlying nation-state political structures. I thus adopt this perspective and develop it further.

3.1 Conceptualising border cooperation as a regime

Zielonka (2001) and Berg and Ehin (2006; Koslowski 1998) view European border cooperation as a regime. The term captures governance activities in an

environment that is as a starting-point characterized neither by international anarchy nor hierarchical relations with a central government (Czempiel and Rosenau 1992). But beyond this, how should a regime precisely be understood? Zielonka (2001) does not explicitly define the concept while Berg and Ehin (2006) refer to a border regime as "a system of control, regulating behaviour at the borders". They do not, however, discuss this formulation further leaving it unclear what is meant by for example system.

In regime theory the characteristics of regimes are debated (Kratochwil and Ruggie 1986). Phenomena such as regimes, institutions and organizations are difficult to pin down and the terminology is often criticised for being unclear (Haggard and Simmons 1987; Strange 1982). I here follow Young's (1982, 1989) conceptualisation as set out in Breckinridge (1997: 174):

> Oran Young makes a distinction between organizations and institutions (of which regimes are a subset): organizations are 'material entities possessing physical locations (or seats), offices, personnel, equipment, and budgets … generally possess[ing] legal personality' (Young, 1989, p. 32), whereas institutions are 'social practices consisting of easily recognized roles coupled with clusters of rules or conventions governing relations among the occupants of these roles' (Young, 1989, p. 32). Furthermore, international institutions can be broken down into two subsets: international orders and international regimes. The former are broad structures governing a wide variety of activities of most or all actors in international society, such as the international economic order, and the latter are more specific structures governing 'well-defined activities, resources, or geographical areas of only some actors' (Young, 1989, p. 13).

I find Young's definition particularly helpful because it clearly distinguishes between organisations and institutions, and further sub-divide the latter into orders and regimes. An order could for example be international law as a global set of rules, roles and codes of conduct. Debates on legality and treaty codifications are carried out by almost all participants in global politics and are not confined to specific subjects. The scope of regimes is more limited – geographically or functionally. Examples include cooperation on the extradition of criminals or the Council of Europe system for the mutual recognition of civil law acts such as

marriage certificates. Organisations are concrete entities, for example a ministry of justice or the national border police, whose officials take on and shape roles, rules and codes of conduct defined by orders and regimes when carrying out tasks and interacting with partners.

EU integration in the area of borders and border control can be usefully conceptualized as a regime. It prescribes the roles of the border police and consular services abroad in controlling the movement of temporary travellers. Roles are also defined for foreign citizens as for example applicants for a visa and short-stay visitors. The regime sets out rules regulating the interaction of the participants. It structures in what ways consulates can and should cooperate in assessing requests for entry permits. Rules might also specify in what ways different actors are entitled and obliged to supervise and monitor how others perform their roles. The Schengen border regime is characterized by a focus on the regulation of trips of a limited duration. The main aim is not to govern for example labour migration or the entry of refugees. However, a key concern within the regime might be to screen people in order to establish that visitors do not in reality intend to work or stay permanently.

There are different views in the literature on how the practices of organisations and individuals – their actions and behaviour – relates to regimes. For instance, is the actual issuing of entry permits or exchange of information internal or external to a border regime? One position is to view behaviour as exogenous (Keohane 1984; Krasner 1982). Regimes are thereby turned into explanatory or intervening variables. Is, say, the global environmental regime capable of solving collective action problems and produce different outcomes than we would otherwise expect? Another view is that practices are intrinsic (Kratochwil and Ruggie 1986; Puchala and Hopkins 1982). Regimes are here not used as variables but as concepts which capture integration in its entirety. I adopt the latter view. This does not mean that it is not possible to query in what ways practices alter as rules and roles are redefined. The approach adopted here only entails that such questions are not

asked as a matter of the effects of a regime, but as an investigation of the consequences of different changes within a regime.

This understanding of a regime has moderately constructivist (Adler 1997) underpinnings. Throughout the project I adopt an eclectic approach (Almond 1989) making use of both rationalist and constructivist theories and models. This introduces tensions at the meta-theoretical level, but it has the benefit of capturing interesting and important dimensions of European border cooperation. The aim is not a grand synthesis but rather fruitful dialogue across perspectives. In doing so, I contribute to a wider literature which seeks to advance and test the explanatory potential of contrasting interest and identity or discourse oriented approaches (Garry and Tilley 2009; Hooghe and Marks 2005), realism and constructivism (Adler 1997; Finnemore and Sikkink 2001; Schimmelfennig 2001) as well as rational choice and sociological institutionalism (Hall and Taylor 1996; Jupille et al. 2003; Thielemann 2001).

Having set out the general framework, I now turn to the two key dimensions characterising the European regime in the area of borders and border control.

3.2 The existing model of the European border regime

Two variables are at the centre of Zielonka's (2001) and Berg and Ehin's (2006) analyses of the European border regime. These are degree of openness and mode of governance.[1] The first refers to the permeability of the border. How easy or difficult is it to enter the territory? The latter concerns the allocation of competences between the national and the European level. To what extent are rules adopted and implemented by European agencies or by national authorities? Using these two dimensions Zielonka set up four ideal-typical border regimes:

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[1] Berg and Ehin (2006: 55), additionally, highlight the "functions attributed to the border". Is border control primarily about the regulation of persons and goods, the protection of cultural ideas or the surveillance of military threats? The focus of this project is solely on the movement of people and I therefore do not consider variation in function further.

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                              Open
                               ↑
   Liberal                     |          Imperial
   internationalism            |          neo-medievalism
                               |
                               |
                               |
   Intergovernmental    ←──────┼──────→   Communitarian
                               |
                               |
                               |
   Parochial                   |          Westphalian
   nationalism                 ↓          superstatism
                             Closed
```

Figure 1: Zielonka's ideal-typical border regimes (copied from Zielonka 2001: 516, figure 1). By communitarian Zielonka means the community method of decision-making in the EU usually seen as the most intensive form of integration.

Starting from the bottom left, 'parochial nationalism' refers to situations where borders are difficult to cross and governed exclusively by nation-states.[2] Although perhaps rare today, the type fits with the tightly policed borders of European countries in the first half of the 20[th] century after the onset of the First World War (Anderson 1996). Under 'liberal internationalism' borders are still nationally controlled but are now generally open. An example of this could be the period from the late 19[th] century until the beginning of the 20[th] (Martin 2008). In this period states did not patrol borders tightly, although lack of economic means and the cost of travel meant that the freedom to move in practice was limited to the few except in the form of permanent migration to e.g. the United States. Turning to the right-side of the model, 'Westphalian superstatism' captures the combination of closed borders and supranational governance. By contrast, 'imperial neo-medievalism' characterises supranational regimes with permeable borders. An example of the Westphalian super-state trajectory could be the gradual unification of Germany in the 19[th] century. The imperial neo-medieval

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[2] The term parochial would seem to indicate a normative distancing from this type by Zielonka, although he does not expand on this.

form has not been seen before, but resembles Europe before the formal establishment of the Westphalian state-system in the middle of the 17th century (Wæver 2000; Watson 1992).

Zielonka argues that imperial neo-medievalism is what currently characterises Europe and that it is likely to continue to do so. The reasons for this are manifold. Closed borders do not work in addressing crime and migration. There is also an expansionary push for liberalization by domestic interest groups, such as transnational firms, as well as from wider processes of globalization. Additionally, the enlargement project continually questions the location of Europe's border and hence prevents the creation of hard boundaries. Zielonka's analysis is, nevertheless, nuanced and he notes that we are likely to see considerable variation. In some cases borders might be relatively closed. His key claim is that as long as these differences persist we cannot talk of a European super-state as this would entail clear-cut boundaries identical across all fields. Berg and Ehin (2006) arrive at a similar conclusion. The current regime is a mixture of supranational and intergovernmental, and the borders are neither fully open nor entirely closed.

This overall positioning of the European border regime finds support in the broader literature. On the governance dimension, cooperation on justice and home affairs generally features both supranational and intergovernmental elements (Lavenex 2009, 2010; Wallace 2010). On the openness dimension, it is well established that European borders – and contemporary frontiers in general – are restrictive to varying degrees (Mau 2010; Mau et al. 2012). Indeed, the majority of academic analyses discussing 'Fortress Europe' in the last twenty years criticise the metaphor for being misplaced and unable to account for the selectivity of borders or simply equate a Fortress with focused surveillance and control of particular types of travellers (Bauman 1998; Bigo 1998; Geddes 2003; van Houtum and Pijpers 2007).

The general finding that the European border regime is neither open nor closed and neither national nor supranational is important and interesting in a wider perspective. What Zielonka's model highlights is that this is only one possible form of governing borders, and we have seen very different regimes historically. Different future paths are therefore, at least in principle, available for Europe.

Notwithstanding the merits of the model, it has a set of limitations. The *first* is a lack of consistency. How precisely is the supranational end of the governance axis defined? In his description of the closed version of a communitarian regime as a super-state, Zielonka equates supranational with a full transfer of decision-making and implementation powers to the European level. Yet the open version is described as neo-medieval, a concept he has previously defined as being about "overlapping authorities, divided sovereignty, diversified institutional arrangements and multiple identities" (Zielonka 2001: 509). This is very different from a Westphalian mode of governance writ large. Yet there is not only a lack of clarity in his use of the governance axis but also in relation to the openness dimension. He finds that Europe resembles a 'maze' rather than a 'Fortress' where "the inside/outside will be blurred" (Zielonka 2001: 518). As a metaphor the maze hardly suggests openness but rather a complex terrain where some find access and others not. It would therefore have been more convincing if Zielonka had placed the neo-medieval type on the mid-point on the horizontal and vertical axis. Following this point further, we can also speculate if the proper supranational regimes are not simply mirror instances of the national. That is, could we not see parochial nationalism or liberal internationalism as potential trajectories for a future European super-state?

The *second* limitation is that the model does not help us to further understand what characterises a mixed regime. It does not aid us in identifying, for example, if and in what ways there might be systematic differences in the permeability of the border for different nationalities and groups. Neither does it allow us to capture more specifically what governance dynamics are at play in the mid-point of the model. The identification of Europe as a neo-medieval regime is thus

important but only a first step. If indeed this mixed regime form is likely to persist for some time a more nuanced conceptualisation of it is called for. Probing dynamics in greater detail could also provide us with insights into the likelihood of future transformations towards the other ideal-typical border regimes.

Could a case be made that a shift away from the mixed regime has in fact already taken place? In recent years, migration policies have turned very restrictive in many member states. Rules have been tightened especially in the areas of asylum (Hatton 2004, 2009; Thielemann 2006) and family unification (Goodman 2011). Schengen cooperation has also been challenged. France, for example, in 2011 moved to reinstate internal checks at its Italian borders and Denmark announced the introduction of permanent 'customs control' at its borders (Nielsen 2012; Wind 2012). These events might suggest that rather than a neo-medieval Europe the current regime is one of parochial nationalism. While important to highlight fluctuations such a conclusion would seem unwarranted. Migration control may have been intensified but we have hardly seen a shift to closed borders. Schengen is also still in operation and the strong political controversies surrounding the French and Danish interventions testifies to the widespread commitment to the free travel area. Rather than abandoning the neo-medieval model, these events underline the importance of understanding and capturing dynamics within mixed border regimes.

All in all, Zielonka's model helpfully captures the contemporary European border regime as a mixed type of governance with varying forms and degrees of openness. This neo-medieval regime should, however, be re-positioned at the centre of the model. The outer-points on the supranational side of the graph could instead be renamed 'liberal superstatism and 'parochial superstatism'. Additionally, it would be appropriate to re-label the right-side of the governance axis as 'supranational' rather than 'communitarian'. The latter term is potentially misleading as it also refers to a holist conceptualisation of society and individuals in political theory which indicate that borders ought to be relatively closed

(Walzer 1983). Having made these initial alterations, we can now begin to conceptualize in more detail dynamics and patterns within mixed border regimes.

3.3 A revised model of the border regime

In what ways can we build on the existing conceptualisation to construct a model that better identifies variation within the current European border regime? Let us as a starting-point clarify the analytical scope. As depicted in figure two, I zoom in on the centre of Zielonka's model seeking to capture the mixed border regime of today:

Figure 2: Visualising the scope of the revised model

The aim is to provide a conceptual scheme which captures the different possible dynamics within this regime type. Doing so should enhance our understanding of how it actually operates. The focus of the project is on implementation, and I therefore set up the model with this in mind. It is, however, not necessarily limited to this stage in the policy cycle and could be applied to the decision-making phase as well.

Starting with the governance dimension, we are in the middle of the graph because decision-making is supranational but implementation national. On the one

hand, the common rules are agreed upon by member states using qualified majority voting and co-decision by the European Parliament. On the other hand, the main responsibility and resources for applying and enforcing these are vested in domestic public authorities. This so-called 'indirect implementation' mode (Egeberg and Trondal 2009) can be pulled in either the intergovernmental or supranational direction. Flexible rules allowing for considerable domestic discretion might push the regime towards the national end. The establishment of common European agencies, such as Frontex, capable of deploying officers at territorial borders moves the system in the supra-national direction. Allowing EU-delegations to issue visas in certain countries and cities abroad would have the same effect.

To capture variation on the governance axis, I distinguish between conflictual and cooperative practices (Blanton 2006; Copeland 2000; Goldstein 1992). Cooperation occurs when member states coordinate actions as well as when they provide and accept assistance from each other. It is evidenced, for example, in the extensive consular collaboration between the Schengen countries for issuing visas. To illustrate, Denmark depends heavily on French embassies in a number of African countries for handling entry requests. Poland, reversely, cooperates to a lesser extent relying almost exclusively on its own consulates. Practices turn to the conflicting end when the member states start to in different ways avoid or challenge the spirit if not the letter of the common EU-rules. This occurs when, for example, the Schengen countries regularly issue otherwise 'extraordinary' national visas or they very frequently reintroduce internal border control. Conflict and cooperation is thus here a matter of different forms and degrees of interaction.

Turning to the openness dimension, we are currently in the middle of the axis because EU borders vary considerably in their restrictiveness towards different nationalities and groups of travellers. In order to probe this variation further, I make a distinction between civic and ethnic border regimes (cf. Bartolini 2005: 32-34; Brubaker 1992; Joppke 2005). The aim is to trace different types of selectivity.

I borrow the distinction between ethnic and civic from Brubaker's (1992) classical study of migration and nationhood in the context of German and French citizenship traditions. Here he analyses two contrasting perspectives on political boundaries and membership which play a formative role in modern Europe. In Germany Brubaker finds an ethnic ideal which he characterises as pre-political. It stresses ascriptive criteria for inclusion such as "cultural, linguistic, or racial" (Brubaker 1992: 1). Where a person resides or holds formal citizenship is secondary. So too are the actions and political aspirations of individuals. What matters are the ethno-cultural ties, as illustrated by Germany's historical tradition for preferential treatment of ethnic German immigrants (Brubaker 1992: 3). Brubaker contrast this with a French civic ideal which is distinctly political. At the centre is "the belief, which France took over from the Roman tradition, that the state can turn strangers into citizens" (Brubaker 1992: 8). This community is bounded by universalistic ideals of law, liberty and political representation. Anyone born on the territory, irrespective of socio-cultural background or ancestry, can claim membership provided they are willing to take up and identify with the common political principles. This is summed up in a pointed remark by a French revolutionary that "'the only foreigners in France are the bad citizens'" (Tallien quoted in Brubaker 1992: 7).

Brubaker is aware that this contrast is ideal-typical and risks over-simplification. Later studies have questioned the relevance of the dichotomy. Joppke (2005, 2007), for example, argues that as liberal norms have spread after the Second World War Western countries increasingly resemble each other in their approach to citizenship and migration (cf. Cornelius and Tsuda 2004). Yet the distinction still holds purchase and can be usefully applied beyond the nation-state context. If we look at the heated debate on the preamble to the European constitutional treaty we find restatements of civic and ethnic ideals. For some it was important to include references to the Christian heritage of Europe while others adamantly opposed such cultural-religious formulations (Foret and Riva 2010).

I use the terms civic and ethnic in a related but different context from Brubaker's. I shift the analytical perspective away from the nation-state and to the mixed European regime. Moreover, the focus is not on citizenship and permanent migration but on border control and temporary access. Employed in this way, we can stipulate the following key traits of civic versus ethnic border regimes.

An ethnic border regime affords privileged access to nationals of foreign states depending on the degree to which they share the majority culture of the receiving country. States with the same language and religion, for example, are treated preferentially. Travellers from countries that are predominantly Christian or secular are preferred to visitors from Muslim-majority states. Where linguistic ties bind sending and receiving states together this too should count in favour of easy entry. In ethnic regimes selectivity thus tends to follow certain ascriptive features.

A civic border regime by contrast is one in which the political characteristics of foreign states have a significant influence on the openness of the border. Liberal democratic ideals oblige states to maintain friendly relations with other republics around the world by welcoming visits of their citizens. All else being equal, nationals of democratic states therefore enjoy easier access than citizens of autocracies. Civic selectivity also entails a commitment to afford protection to asylum-seekers (Benhabib 2004). Universal ideals imply that persons whose lives are in danger because of political activities or persecuted on the grounds of their race or ethnicity should be offered sanctuary. An ethnic border regime could also provide protection for some refugees but again it would be likely to flow from commonalities in ethno-cultural criteria (cf. Walzer 1983).

Civic and ethnic selectivity is a matter of degree. There is not a specific cut-off point where a border regime becomes either one or the other. To take a couple of examples, a civic European regime would be open towards democratic India and closed towards autocratic Belarus. In an ethnic regime practices would be the opposite. Where foreign states are both democratic and ethnically similar, as in the United States and Canada, both forms of selectivity entails openness. Where

sending countries are both culturally different and autocratic, such as in China and Saudi Arabia, civic and ethnic regimes alike would have closed borders.

Combining the revised openness and governance dimensions we get the following detailed picture of the mid-point of the general model:

Figure 3: A revised border regime typology

The revised model captures four different sub-types at play in the middle of Zielonka's framework. All of them are thus characterized by varying degrees of openness and a mixed mode of governance. Where relations are conflictual, the main distinction is between a civic "Europe of national republics" and an ethnic "Europe of cultural nation-states". Reversely, when cooperation is extensive the outer points are "cosmopolitan Europe" and "communitarian Europe". In setting up the model as a coordinate grid it is important to note that the different end-points on the axes are not each other's logical opposites. If a regime is not civic this does not necessarily mean that it is ethnic. Rather, barring evidence to suggest otherwise it is simply in the middle of the graph. Similarly, if states do not cooperate this need not entail that relations are characterized by conflict. And the absence of conflict does not mean that there is cooperation.

Within the border regime we might find different clusters of states. For example, some Schengen countries might approximate the civic ideal and others the ethnic. The extent of coordination can also vary. Cooperation might be a more pervasive feature of the practices in some participating countries than in others. If this is the case, the revised model can be used to map out and contrast the different clusters within the regime.

Summing up, the theoretical basis of the project is regime theory. Drawing on earlier studies, I understand Schengen as a border regime and focus analytically on the dimensions of openness and governance. The key finding of existing research is that integration is best characterized as multi-facetted: it combines supranational and national elements and the borders vary in their openness. Moving on from here, I shift the analytical focus to better capture variation within this regime. On the openness dimensions I distinguish between civic and ethnic forms of selectivity. Governance is conceptualized as a question of conflictual versus cooperative practices. Juxtaposing these two revised scales, I identify four main types within the mixed border regime.

The analytical framework ties the different papers of the thesis together. The individual analyses focus on different aspects of the regime and I draw on and discuss additional theory relevant for the question at hand. The first paper tracks variation in the openness of the external border. It explores the importance of factors such as wealth, democracy, the number of asylum-seekers and religion on visa-issuing practices. In this way it provides material for assessing the civic or ethnic character of the regime. The second paper explores to what extent member states rely on each other's consulates in the visa-issuing process. The third examines the impact of EU-integration on domestic control practices. It theorises and tests how and why we should expect adaptation to or circumvention of the common rules and norms. These two papers enable us to assess levels of cooperation and conflict. The conclusion brings the threads together and positions Schengen in the revised regime typology.

4. Research design

The overall methodological approach of the project is quantitative and comparative (Agresti and Finlay 1997; Lijphart 1971). The analyses are based on comprehensive empirics detailing the border control practices of each member state in all third countries abroad.

The main strength of this strategy is breadth and generalizability. With a large amount of observations it is possible to arrive at stronger conclusions on the extent to which different trends are likely to hold for the border regime as such. It allows for systematic tests of theoretically generated hypotheses and an assessment of the relative explanatory purchase of different perspectives. A large-N analysis is in this way well-suited to identify overall clusters and characteristics of the entire structure of cooperation as well as advancing theoretical debates. Each paper makes use of a different method to analyse large datasets. The first employs linear regression, the second social network analysis and the third quasi-experimental design. These different techniques are appropriate to examine different aspects of the regime. The regression analysis provides a broad overview of practices and assessment of the importance of different explanatory factors. The social network analysis captures both the density and patterns of interaction between member states. The quasi-experiment is particularly useful for measuring changes before and after participation in Schengen.

The key weakness of quantitative approaches is the lack of depth. In order to cover a large number of cases it is necessary to focus on a few simple variables. Closer analyses are likely to reveal measurement errors and validity problems. The focus on overall patterns also entails a particular approach to identifying causes and dynamics. It is difficult to study the different causal pathways through which outcomes and explanatory variables are connected. The emphasis is instead on the relative effects of different factors, rather than on detailed inspection of the channels through which they are likely to impact (Hancké 2009). The latter are stipulated and discussed theoretically but only tested indirectly by identifying correlations between explanatory variables and outcomes. Additionally, it is

difficult to identify if multiple pathways might lead to the same outcome and pin-point factors which might be either necessary or sufficient for different events to occur (Ragin 2000).

These limitations of quantitative strategies highlight the utility of dialogue between research projects adopting different methodologies.[3] Existing studies of the European border regime have mainly analysed policy documents, in particular those detailing the setup of new technologies of visa-processing as well as visa legislation (Bigo and Guild 2005; Huysmans 2006; Munster 2009), and drawn on secondary sources in explorative discussions of implementation practices in particular border areas (Berg and Ehin 2006; Zielonka 2001). In addition, interviews have been carried out with government officials in France (Bigo and Guild 2005), visa applicants in Bulgaria (Jileva 2002) and cross-border commuters between Poland and the Ukraine (Pijpers and van der Velde 2007). The European Commission has also commissioned and produced descriptive accounts of the overall operation of the visa policy in each of the member states and practices in specific sending countries (COM 2011b). This material provides detailed insights into the ways through which new modes of regulating movement has been developed. I make use of these secondary sources to hypothesise on causal pathways and dynamics and as a way to further substantiate statistical findings.

There are no existing databases detailing the operation of the European border cooperation.[4] Some studies do nevertheless provide empirics which could indirectly be used to do so. Neumayer (2006) has compiled a global dataset of visa requirements. Whyte (2008) and Mau (2010) employ the so-called Henley

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[3] Lieberman (2005) advocates the use of 'mixed methods', i.e. the combination of quantitative and qualitative approaches in a single study. Although an attractive strategy it is in practice seldom feasible to pursue fundamentally contrasting research strategies in a single project. The same nuanced result and triangulation of findings is achieved through dialogue and cross-referencing of studies using different approaches.

[4] Existing datasets relating to migration have mainly been developed to map the scale of the phenomena. How many migrants live in a country? What is their nationality? How many move from one state to another? A range of source have been used to do so, including population registers, permits, surveys and population censuses (Gamlen 2010). Fewer comparative datasets, in contrast, capture variation in state policy (IMPALA 2011).

index over international travel restrictions. Similar to Neumayer's dataset, this index measures how many countries a citizen of a given state can travel to without needing a visa. These information sources are, however, not well-suited for analysing the European case as travel visa requirements are almost fully harmonized in Europe today. Hence, they do not contain any variation between member states. Nor are they able to differentiate between third countries on the visa list. The restrictiveness of the border varies between visa list countries. It can be significantly more difficult or easy to obtain a visa depending on the nationality of the traveller.[5] Finally, these existing sources do not includes data on cooperative and conflictual governance dynamics.

For the purposes of this project I have thus put together a new dataset, the European Visa Database, containing comprehensive information on the visitor visa requirements, consular coverage abroad and issuing practices of European Union (Schengen) states. These variables captures key aspects of border regimes: whether a visa is required in order to travel, where applications can be lodged, the extent of cooperation, and how restrictively visa rules are enforced. Data on these elements have hitherto been available from governments and EU institutions, but in a scattered and not easily accessible form. The database compiles and systematizes the public data making it much easier to use. Apart from supporting the thesis, it should as well reduce barriers for future comparative research into the border regime. It allows for quantitative studies as well as provides a way for qualitative projects to position their cases in the wider universe of the border regime.

The database is accessible online.[6] It is possible to search for information on particular years, sending and receiving countries. The data can be viewed on the screen as a table, visualized on a world map and downloaded in excel format for further processing. All three papers are based on the database, and use it to answer

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[5] The Henley index, additionally, was put together by a private organization and the method it used in compiling it is not transparent (For a longer discussion see Whyte 2008).
[6] The database can be accessed via www.mogenshobolth.dk/evd.

the specific research question of interest. In the next two sections I describe how I constructed and use the database.

4.1 The construction of the database

The database collects and makes easily available a wide range of information on the European border regime. The primary empirical basis of the dataset is secondary legislation and information exchanged between European Union (EU) member states in relation to the development and operation of the EU's common visa policy. The time-period covered is 2005 to 2010 (six years in total) though for visa lists the information goes back to 2001. Some data on issuing practices is available for 2002, 2003 and 2004 but it does not cover all member states and is less standardised (Council 2003a, 2003b, 2004a, 2005).

The unit of analysis is pairs of receiving and sending countries in different years. A data point is, for example, France (receiving country) in Algeria (sending country) in 2005. All in all, the database for the period from 2005 to 2010 contains 35.640 measurement points.

On the receiving country side the dataset first and foremost contains information on the members of EU's common visa policy (the Schengen area). From 2005 to 2007 the circle of participants included 13 EU-states and 2 non EU-states (Norway and Iceland). From 2008 to 2010 nine additional EU-states joined up (i.e. all the new member states except Bulgaria, Romania and Cyprus).[7] There is also data on the new member states' visa-issuing practice in the years before they fully joined Schengen. The database, furthermore, contains information on the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US).

The database covers all sending countries. In the case of Germany, for example, the database contains information on the mobility barrier faced by all non-German nationals. For each receiving state there is information on 198 potential sending countries. The list of world countries is based on European visa legislation.

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[7] The new member states joined late December 2007. In the database they are coded as being members from 2008 and onwards.

The data sources are as follows. I measured the receiving countries' visa requirements using legislative acts and background government papers setting out changes in the rules (OJEU 2001, 2003, 2006, 2009a, 2010a, 2010b; Siskin 2004, 2005, 2006, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011; TSO 2006a, 2006b, 2009; UKBA 2007). Information on visa-issuing practices were taken from government overviews detailing the number of visas applied for, issued and refused at different consulates abroad or for different nationalities (COM 2011a; Council 2006b, 2007b, 2007c, 2007d, 2008b, 2009, 2010b; DOS 2011a, 2011b; UKBA 2008, 2009a, 2009b). The extent of consular services abroad, finally, was measured using a set of tables on diplomatic representation in third countries put together by the Council's General Secretariat (Council 2002, 2004, 2005, 2006a, 2007a, 2008a, 2010a). This information describes both where the member states have their own consular representation for the purposes of visa-issuing and the locations in which they are represented by another member state. Norway, for example, handles visa applications on behalf of Sweden in several sending countries.

The database thus primarily relies on administrative data collected and published by public authorities. This influences data validity in different ways. Firstly, the figures depend on the methods and concepts used by national agencies, and the resources they allocate to the task. These choices and potential shifts in procedures are not immediately apparent. Some of the differences in the statistics might thus reflect variation in techniques of data collection and not control practices as such. Secondly, the purpose with which the data is made available might give governments an incentive to manipulate the figures. For example, US visa refusal rate data is linked to discussions about granting a country a visa-waiver. This could give authorities a reason to misreport particularly low or high rates, if wider foreign policy interests are at stake. In the Schengen setting, visa figures are used to foster transparency in implementation practices. Member states might thus be tempted to distort figures to prevent criticism from their peers. These issues highlight the importance of analysing the data critically and triangulating findings based on the database with other studies.

The coding was generally done in two steps. I first converted raw tables contained in PDF files (about 100 pages each) to excel using a software tool developed by the company ABBYY. Second, using ASP.NET computer scripts I then imported the excel files to a database (cf. Høyland et al. 2009). All raw-files and computer scripts are available on the web-site. I checked the accuracy of the conversion process by comparing selected parts of the content of the original data with the final version in the database. The reliability of the database is high. There is full transparency of the coding, and other researchers should arrive at near identical results if they repeated the data generation process.

The coding process is detailed in the thesis' appendix one (the database construction codebook) as well as in the background files on the website.

4.2 Using the database

I use the database to investigate the character of the European border regime. How open is the border in practice and what dynamics of governance are at play? What nationalities face no visa requirements, and why? In what sending countries do we see a lenient enforcement of the rules, and what factors can account for this? Are there differences between the member states? Is religion and level of democracy relevant factors in accounting for the openness of the borders? Does the regime mostly resemble a civic or ethnic ideal-type? How extensive is the consular cooperation among the member state? Do we see that participation in Schengen is able to alter domestic visa-issuing practices? Is the mode of implementation primarily conflictual, cooperative or neither? To probe these questions the database contains four main variables. These are set out and discussed in detail below.

Visa requirements

This part of the database provides a set of tools for identifying variation in visa requirements. It lists information on particular sending and receiving countries and shows trends over time. Whether or not a visa requirement is in force is an

important starting-point when assessing and explaining the openness of Europe's borders.

Visa-issuing practices

This section contains statistics on the number of visas applied for, issued and refused. This data enables an estimation of travel flows and an investigation of variation in the restrictiveness of visa-issuing practices. It is for example possible to explore data on Algerians seeking to visit France.

The restrictiveness of a receiving country's visa issuing practice is estimated in existing research using the visa refusal rate or its mirror image, the recognition rate (Guild 2010; Mau 2010). The refusal rate is calculated as the number of refusals divided by the total number of visa decisions (refused plus issued). The key idea behind this measure is that it provides an approximation of how strictly the issuing criteria are enforced when applications are processed. The larger the share refused the fewer persons is deemed to fall within the scope of what constitutes a legitimate traveller. The higher the share of rejections the more restrictive the rules are enforced. This indicator resembles the use of recognition rates to compare asylum systems (Neumayer 2005). The refusal rate captures important variation in the enforcement of visa rules which is otherwise simply ignored. There are, however, a set of challenges with the measure.

Firstly, in many cases it is difficult to hand in an application. For example, in conflict countries it might be associated with considerable dangers to travel to a consulate.[8] Embassies can also outright refuse to accept applications from persons with certain types of passports and only allow holders of diplomatic passports to lodge requests. In some sending countries purpose limitations might be in place: applications are only allowed for visits concerning for example family or business.

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[8] There might also be limitations of internal mobility and international travel in some countries (e.g. through exit visas).

Secondly, the visa fee, documentary requirements and the strain of the process as such also deter some from applying. Self-selection dynamics are a general methodological problem. It refers to systematic differences between those who choose to undertake an action and those who do not (Nakosteen and Zimmer 1980). The citizens who attempt to travel are in many situations unlikely to be representative of the population at large. Refusal rates thus might give a good picture of the ability of applicants to move, but the assessment does not necessarily hold for all nationals.[9] The size of the self-selection bias is likely to vary with the refusal rate. That is, if there is a high rejection rate the incentive to apply is lower, and the expected benefits of travel must therefore be larger before a visit is attempted. In this way refusal rates have a 'deterrence' effect. A rejection rate of, for example, 50% not only means that a high proportion of visitors are denied access but also that many are discouraged from applying in the first place. The number of applications would thus be systematically lower than the demand for visas making the refusal rate a conservative estimate.[10]

The pre-screening and self-selection dynamics introduce a potential bias in the estimate. In some sending countries the refusal rate might be low but the mobility barrier in practice high, if receiving states have directed particular attention towards preventing people from applying in the first place. This means that caution should be exercised when comparing refusal rates across countries.

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[9] Self-selection dynamics has been particularly debated in migration studies in the context of earning assessments (Barham and Boucher 1998). Is migration to the economic benefit of those who decide to move? What is the impact of movement on the sending country? A key problem in answering these questions is self-selection. One way to do this would be to compare the income of those who left with those who stayed behind. But this seems clearly problematic, as it would appear likely that the two groups differ significantly: the migrants might, for example, have more educational resources than the others. A straightforward comparison would get the estimate somewhat wrong as the two groups are not comparable. The self-selection issue is particularly problematic as migration data are in general only available at a highly aggregated level (Gamlen 2010). Residence statistics and census data, for example, usually only operate in broad categories not allowing for detailed controls of socio-economic differences.

[10] The deterrence effect of refusal rates might not take a linear form. It could also be an effect which works in steps and intervals (approximating an exponential function). In the 0-10% refusal rate band, for example, people find that they have a fair chance of getting a visa. In the span between 10% and 40% the costs begin to appear much larger as it becomes a clear possibility that the application is refused. Finally, above 40% the effect increases drastically as the chance of getting a visa now appears dim.

Thirdly, the raw visa data contains information on the visa-issuing practice of the member states' consulates abroad. The statistics thus capture the practice of, for example, the French consulate in Morocco. This involves a set of further challenges. Applications are submitted to the consulates by persons residing in the country regardless of their citizenship. Thus, all visa requests are not necessarily made by nationals of the country where the consulate is located. The global amount of migrants is low, and in most countries migrants only constitute a relatively small share of the population (UN 2009). In general, it can therefore be assumed that applications are made by nationals. But in a few countries – for example in many Golf states – the share of migrants is high. Applications can also under some circumstances be submitted by citizens of nearby states. If, for example, a European country is not represented in a third country it can refer travellers to the consular services in neighbouring states. In areas where consular coverage is scarce the application pool to a consulate might therefore also contain requests from nationals of other states. Consequently, some caution must be exercised when interpreting the statistical figures from a few of the consulates. It is, however, possible to clearly identify the cases and include a check for them in the analysis. Broader analyses of all third countries are hence not likely to be affected by the problem.

Fourthly, the comparability of the permit could be a source of bias (cf. Gamlen 2010: 10). The Schengen visa permits are similar in the way that they provide access to the entire European territory to conduct a visit of a maximum period of three months. This makes them as such comparable. They might, however, vary in their precise format. Some visas are only valid for a brief period. Others allow for multiple entries over several years.

The refusal rate, all in all, provides a reasonable estimate of the restrictiveness. But it is likely to contain a bias. The stability of the measure could be further assessed and potentially improved by cross-checking the results with future studies using other methodologies. The Mobility Barriers Index described in more detail below tries to at least partly address these problems.

Consular services: access and cooperation

The database also identifies variation in consular representation. It provides overviews of where the receiving states have diplomatic representation for visa-issuing purposes. What Schengen countries are represented where? Are there some sending countries where it is not even possible to hand in visa applications? This section also gives information on the consular cooperation between European Union Schengen states. Member states are not represented in all third countries. Germany, France and Italy are present in the majority of foreign states. The consular services of the remaining member states are much less comprehensive. They rely to a large extent on mutual cooperative agreements. I use the data to calculate how many cooperative agreements a member state has entered into, where and with whom.

The Mobility Barriers Index

In several situations a sole focus on either visa requirements, visa issuing practices or consular services are likely to be problematic. For example, a conclusion on the effect of an independent variable (such as religion) on mobility barriers might be biased if it is only based on the subset of countries facing a visa requirement and ignore those without. Similarly, as we have seen an exclusive focus on the restrictivity of refusal rates could give a biased picture because it ignores cases where absence of consular representation makes it very difficult to hand in visa applications.

To take this into account when assessing restrictiveness, I have constructed an index over mobility barriers. It is an ordinal scale with four categories. A score of 0 indicates that there are no barriers to the mobility from a sending country to a receiving country in a given year. 1 means that there are low barriers; 2 medium; and 3 high.

The index was set up stepwise. I started by coding all cases where no visa requirement was in force as instances of no barriers (score 0). For the remainder of cases I started by looking at the visa refusal rate. If the figure was below 5%

(corresponding approximately to the first inter-quartile of the total dataset) I assigned a score of 1 to the case (low barrier). If the figure was between 5% and 20% (second and third inter-quartiles) I assigned the value 2 (medium barrier). Finally, where the figure was above 20% (the fourth inter-quartile) I coded a 3 (high barrier). In the cases characterized by no access to consular services I assigned a score of 2 (medium barrier). Hence, in this way the index addresses the problem which lack of consular representation can create in the data, as identified above.

I then turned to the problem that the refusal rate does not measure the ways in which receiving countries are able to prevent applications from being lodged in the first place. To take this into account I inspected visa application figures and developed a model of the expected amount of applications for a given pair of receiving and sending country considering their population sizes and the travel distance between them. This model was then used to reassess the cases assigned a score of 1 and 2. If the number of received applications was considerably lower than expected (20% of the estimate) I moved the case one up, e.g. from score 2 to 3. This approach is not without problems. Even very low application figures could in principle be a result of a low demand for travel and not barriers put in place by receiving states. Nevertheless, it is a clear improvement of leaving the issue unaddressed. In particular, introducing the penalty score provides a better estimate for conflict-ridden countries such as Iraq where most receiving states accept few applications.

All in all, the database provides comprehensive comparative empirics on the implementation of the Schengen rules by European public authorities. Additionally, it provides information on two selected outsiders (the United Kingdom and the United States). Each of the papers makes use of different segments of the dataset to answer their specific research questions.

Limitations of the database

The database is a well-suited tool for answering the research questions raised in the thesis as well as exploring other related questions framed at the country-level. There are, however, limitations which are important to bear in mind. The dataset only contains aggregate information on visa policy and practice and it is therefore not possible to investigate individual-level factors. Variation in, for example, socio-economic characteristics in a group of applicants cannot be identified. Similarly, the database is unable to pin-point differences between categories of applicants. For example, as business travellers are registered together with family visitors and tourists it is not possible to assess to what extent they are treated differently. Another limitation of the database is that it currently only covers the period from 2005 to 2010. This means that it is not possible to trace, for example, if there is a contemporary trend for mobility barriers to increase or decrease in Europe and the US.

5. Plan of the thesis

The thesis is structured as three independent papers. The *introduction* here has presented the shared theme, research questions, analytical framework and dataset informing each of them. To avoid overlap, I do not set out these elements in detail again in the individual analyses.

Paper *one* focuses on the restrictiveness and selectivity of the border regime. It is a theory testing paper. I start by adapting two existing different approaches – interest group and constructivist security theory – to the case of border control and visas, and devise a set of hypotheses for evaluating the models. The paper then presents comprehensive empirics on differences in the openness of Europe's external border to visitors of different nationalities, and uses linear regression models to test the explanatory purchase of the two models.

Paper *two* maps out patterns of cooperation within the common policy. Here the overall analytical strategy is more explorative and less tied up with the testing of specific hypotheses. I identify the extent to which the members draw on each

other's consular facilities for issuing visas abroad and use network analytical tools to ascertain if there are any clusters of states involved in particularly intensive interaction. Having set out the main empirical trends, I develop and assess the strength and weakness of different rationalist and constructivist explanations of the empirical trends.

Paper *three* discusses cooperation and restrictiveness together. The overall logic of this analysis is to focus on the importance of a key factor, namely participation in the common border regime, and assess its impact on the openness of domestic borders to visitors from outside the European Union. Drawing on rational choice and sociological institutionalism I develop two rival models of the likely effect of EU-integration in this field. The potential impacts are probed empirically using data from the Eastern enlargement. I set up a quasi-experimental study where I analyse trends in visa-issuing by the new member states before and after the expansion of the free travel area, and contrast these with practices in the old and partial Schengen members as well as the UK and the US.

The *conclusion* summarises the main contributions of each paper, and discusses the findings in the context of the overall theoretical framework. I position the border regime on the revised openness and governance dimensions and evaluate what overall type it is. In doing so I also assess the stability of the regime, and set out different scenarios for how it could evolve depending on future decisions of policymakers. I end by highlighting avenues and questions for further research.

PAPER ONE

Wanted and unwanted travellers: explaining variation in the openness of the European Union's external border

Abstract

Security theory plays a central role in contemporary analyses of European migration control. So far, however, the framework has not been subjected to systematic, comparative empirical testing nor has the strength of potential alternative explanations been assessed. In addition, the explanatory purchase of the approach has recently been put into question as authors have pin-pointed events seemingly at odds with theoretical expectations. This paper seeks to advance the debate through a large-N analysis of variation in the openness of Europe's external border to short-term visitors. Drawing on a comprehensive dataset detailing the visa requirements, issuing practices and consular services of EU destination states it conducts a test of the security explanation contrasted with an alternative interest group perspective. I show that business interests have a liberalizing impact on the European visa regime. Yet variation in the barriers to mobility imposed by EU states remains first and foremost explainable by a fear of immigration. Against recent critics this paper thus argues that security theory continues to provide the most convincing account of variation in the restrictiveness of border control practices in Europe.

Keywords

1. Introduction

From the 1980s and onwards European cooperation in the field of immigration policy has expanded considerably (Geddes 2003: 126). Spurred mainly by the wider initiative of establishing a single market, integration has in particular moved forward in the area of border control (Monar 2001). In order to facilitate the free movement of goods and persons within Europe checks at internal frontiers have now been all but dismantled and the member states instead share a single external border (Bertozzi 2008).

The gradual development of a common European border has generated considerable academic debate (Anderson 2000; Bigo and Guild 2005; Grabbe 2000; Lavenex 2001; Ruben 2008). One of the key questions explored is the restrictiveness of the new policy. Are we witnessing the construction of a 'Fortress Europe'? How can we account for the ease with which some groups of persons can access European territory and the considerable barriers others face? Why has the entry rules been liberalized at EU's eastern borders whereas tight policing remain in place towards the Southern Mediterranean countries? Answering such questions is important. Border policies have a considerable impact on bilateral trade and travel (Neumayer 2010, 2011). Tight restrictions could also engender feelings of exclusions and in this way impair relations across borders. They can, furthermore, severely hamper the ability of refugees to access the protection regimes of destination states (Collinson 1996; Hatton 2004; Lavenex 2001). Identifying the causes and drivers of restrictiveness allows us to better explain when tight control is likely to be in place and thereby suggest potential pathways towards liberalization.

The aim of this paper is to contribute to this research strand focused on understanding variation in the openness of Europe's border. Specifically, I seek to map out how open the external border is to short-term visitors of different nationalities and test two alternative explanations of the variation in restrictiveness we observe. I do so through a large-N quantitative analysis of

trends in European visa-issuing practices from 2005 to 2010, relying on an original dataset based on public government data (Hobolth forthcoming).

The empirical focus of the analysis is short-stay visas. These form a key part of the external border policy (Bigo and Guild 2005; Brochmann 1999a: 307). For the majority of the world's population the borders of Europe are first encountered at consulates abroad during the visa application process (Guild 2001, 2003). In this pre-screening significantly more people are refused entry to the EU compared to the number of people turned away once they reach the territorial border (Council 2010b; Eurostat 2010b).

The existing literature has found that EU's policy is best characterized as a filter: the openness of the border varies for different groups (Apap and Carrera 2004; Bigo and Guild 2005; Huysmans 2000, 2006; Melis 2001; van Houtum and Pijpers 2007). In order to account for the pattern of exclusion and inclusion researchers have mainly turned to constructivist security theory (Bigo 2000; Buzan et al. 1998; Wæver 1997). This approach suggests that the mobility barriers different groups of travellers face follow the extent to which they are cast as threats and dangers in European public discourses legitimizing exceptional control measures (Karyotis 2007; Karyotis and Patrikios 2010). Visitors from for example refugee-producing countries face a restrictive border regime paralleling the current construction of asylum-seekers as threats to welfare states and national identities in Europe (Huysmans 2000).

The extent to which EU border practices do indeed align with these expectations has not, however, been systematically tested. Existing research primarily consists of single or small-N country case studies and explorative analyses of different policy initiatives and wider developments without an explicit methodological basis (Bigo and Guild 2005; Boswell 2007; Brochmann 1999b; Ette and Faist 2007; Guiraudon 2003; Karyotis 2007; Neal 2009; Wolff 2008). While this body of analyses has generated considerable insights the wider applicability of the

findings are thus unclear, and in some studies lack of transparency makes it difficult to identify the grounds for and limits of the conclusions.

In addition to these methodological limitations recent research has questioned the explanatory purchase of security theory. Analysing the establishment of the EU's border agency – Frontex – Neal (1995: 333) shows that its final mandate was very limited testifying to a "failure" to securitize migration in Europe. Studying the response to recent terrorist attacks Boswell (2007: 606), in a similar vein, disputes the level of securitization of border and migration control. Rather to the contrary, she argues, "European governments had an obvious interest in keeping open mobility for the purposes of business, tourism and study" (2007: 600). This too raises doubt about the ability of security approaches to account for variation in the restrictiveness of European border control.

This paper seeks to move forward the explanatory discussion. Theoretically, I clarify and set out the security approach taking into account recent criticisms. The current debate highlights the need for a better understanding of how threat constructions link up with administrative control practices. It also points to the need for researchers to consider alternative explanations, and I therefore also set out a model focusing on business interests as a key driver of the European border policy. Empirically, I test the relative strength of these two theories drawing on comprehensive visa-issuing information. This data allows us to conduct new and broader comparisons of the restrictiveness of European border control.

The key finding of the paper is that there is both a liberalizing and restricting logic at play in the common border regime with the latter stronger than the former. The openness of Europe's border varies with the extent to which travellers are from country groups generally cast as threats in European public discourses – namely poor, Muslim-majority and refugee-producing states. To some extent, however, strong commercial interests in tourism and bilateral trade are able to at least partially override these fears and result in somewhat less restrictive practices. There is thus evidence of business constraints at play in the border policy. All in

all, the analysis supports a continued focus on migration fears when studying European border control, but also suggests a need to incorporate additional factors in the model.

The paper is structured as follows. In the next and second section I introduce and discuss two different theoretical models explaining variation in border restrictiveness and derive a set of testable hypotheses. The third section presents the research design. The following parts contain the empirical analysis. Finally, I conclude.

2. Theorizing border policy

In this section I develop two models aimed at explaining variation in the openness of Europe's external border to short-term visitors. The first account I set out is based on interest group theory (Facchini et al. 2011; Freeman 1995, 2006; Somerville and Goodman 2010; cf. Wilson 1980).[11] This approach is widely used to study Western migration policies and I therefore start here. The main prediction I derive is that the level of restrictiveness will follow the strength of business interests in more open borders. Moving on from this I develop a model based on constructivist security theory (Bigo and Guild 2005; Buzan et al. 1998; Huysmans 2006; Munster 2009). The expectation from this perspective is that the variation in openness will vary with the extent to which different groups and nationalities are cast as threats in European public discourses.

Interest group theory

The primary advocate of an interest-group focused approach to migration studies is Freeman (1992, 1994, 1995, 1998, 2006). He argues, following Wilson (1980: 366-372), that we can explain state policy by investigating what distribution of costs and benefits it entails. If a policy has both concentrated costs and benefits it

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[11] Freeman (1995: 883) originally presented his approach as a "political economy model". I follow Cornelius and Rosenblum (2005: 106) in referring to it as an interest group perspective because this label somewhat better captures the analytical focus and liberal-expansionist orientation of the theory.

is likely to be structured by proper *interest group politics*.[12] Because both proponents and opponents of the policy are clearly defined they will organize and struggle over the direction of policy. In situations where costs as well as benefits are diffuse *majoritarian politics* will take place. Policy will in this case be settled by the initiative which can command the most substantial popular support. If society at large gains yet costs are borne by well-defined groups *entrepreneurial politics* should explain outcomes. Because opposition is likely to be highly organized changes will only come about if persons in key positions become preoccupied with the case and try to push an agenda of change. *Client politics*, finally, should take place if a policy has concentrated benefits for a set of clearly defined groups and diffuse costs. The majority bearing the costs are unlikely to organize in opposition and the benefiting groups will therefore drive and set policy.

Freeman (1995: 886) first applied this theory to labour migration and argued that it was a case of client politics. A few well-organized interest groups set policy in a closed setting cooperating with the responsible officials. The concentrated benefits of a liberal policy mainly fall upon employers whereas the costs are born by the population at large (1995: 885).[13] There is no well-defined constituency which have an incentive to form and lobby for restrictive counter-measures. Labour-intensive firms, for example, have strong motivations to advocate for access of low-skill migrants to fill vacant positions and keep wages down. Any downward pressure on salaries and potential capacity pressure on public services such as health care and education are, by contrast, borne by a diffuse wider majority.[14]

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[12] Please note that I refer to the whole approach as interest group politics though this is also a specific sub-type in the original model.

[13] Conceptualizing migration using the language of cost-benefit is not unproblematic. It might reinforce a presentation of migration as a negative 'problem' (a cost).

[14] Expanding on and criticizing this model Money (1999) argues that costs are not necessarily diffuse as migrants tend to cluster in particular areas and cities. Specific local politicians and officials thus experience the impact of mobility and will organize and lobby for national policies. Their ability to do so is, in turn, determined by the extent to which their constituencies are crucial for the outcome of domestic elections. This model would appear particular well-suited for states using first past the post electoral systems. The vast majority of European states, however, use variants of proportional representation where individual constituencies matter less.

As with labour migration, travel restrictions can be seen as a case of client politics (Freeman 2006: 235).[15] Concentrated interests – such as the tourism sector – benefit from liberal rules. The costs of open access are diffuse. They are, additionally, unclear and indirect in the form of potentially increased levels of irregular migration and protection seekers arriving at the border. Hence, it would seem likely that policy is set in a closed arena involving key lobbying interests.

The model thus appears to be overall applicable to the case of border policy. There is, however, also a challenge in applying it. This follows from, as emphasised in the previous section, that a basic feature of contemporary visa regimes is that they distribute access unevenly for different nationalities. The openness differs between sending countries. How can this dynamic element be taken into account?

Freeman briefly discussed a somewhat similar challenge in the case of labour migration: The theory did not as such seem able to explain that restrictiveness varied over time. He therefore argued that the interest of the electorate could play a more substantial role during recessions as politicians would find it necessary to respond to public concerns about job security by limiting immigration. Although intuitively plausible this argument has a set of problems. It cannot account for variation in a state's openness to applicants from different sending countries. Furthermore, it significantly limits the explanatory scope of the model. It implies that client politics operate under strong constraints. When the economy is booming voters do not care about entries giving businesses free room to decide. This, however, is not the case during recessions. The salience of migration is thereby turned into the key variable of interest.

An alternative way of allowing for diverse outcomes is to dispense with the assumption that border and migration policy is always best characterized as client politics. This is the route I follow. Freeman would have pursued this approach if he had argued that businesses lose interest in importing workers during economic

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[15] Freeman (2006: 235f) discusses in some detail how travel visas can also be seen as a case of majoritarian and entrepreneurial politics.

downturns. This implies that labour migration ceases to be client politics. Instead, it shifts to a majoritarian mode as potential benefits are now also diffuse. Policy will then be set following the preference of the electorate in general.

The key question is thus under what conditions it is likely that we will observe client politics. Let us start by looking at each main pro-access actor in turn. One of the major beneficiaries of a liberal travel visa policy is the tourism industry. From their perspective visitors from abroad are a source of potential income. The tourism sector thus has a direct interest in lobbying authorities in order to ensure easy passage for international travellers. But their motivation to do so is likely to be considerably higher for third countries which are major suppliers of tourists. A case in point is Denmark. Here, the hotel and tourism organizations have participated in working groups negotiating the Danish policy. One of their main aims has been to liberalize rules for current and potential emerging markets such as China (MFII 2010). Hence, when a third country is a major potential source of tourism commercial interests will lobby and we will see client politics rather than majoritarian. This yields hypotheses 1:

H_1: The higher the tourism expenditure of a sending state, the lower the barrier to mobility imposed by the receiving country

Firms trading and operating across borders are likewise highly interested in securing easy arrivals. Their business is disrupted by cumbersome entry formalities making travel more difficult for customers, partners and employees abroad. Swedish transnational companies, for example, have successfully lobbied for the establishment of fast-track procedures at consulates in China (EMM 2011a). Their business activities were disrupted by visa rules making it complicated for local workers to travel to headquarters in Sweden. Such dynamics suggests that the more trade there is with a third country the more companies would seem likely to organize and work for an open access policy, so again we will have a case of client politics. From this I derive hypotheses 2:

H$_2$: The higher the level of trade between a sending state and the receiving country, the lower the barrier to mobility imposed by the receiving country

In addition to the tourism industry and businesses, migrant communities would also seem likely to lobby for access for friends, contacts and relatives from home (Wong 2006; cf. Bermeo & Leblang 2009). Ethnic minority groups not only lobby on issues such as non-discrimination and better work-place conditions in their new country of residence but also advocate easier entry for nationals from their former home state. Hypothesis 3 is thus:

H$_3$: The higher the number of migrants from a sending state residing in the receiving country, the lower the barrier to mobility imposed by the receiving country

These three hypotheses assumes that the preference of the electorate gravitate towards restriction. That is, in the absence of client politics the policy line will be restrictive. This starting-point appears overall plausible. Visitors might overstay their visas or work without permit leading to potential job losses for native workers and a downward pressure on wages and work conditions. The assumption nevertheless is contestable. In several cases the majority preference might not necessarily be for a high level of control. For example, when it comes to arrivals from New Zealand and the United States a liberal stance could be a 'win-win'. There is little risk of irregular migration from these countries as their level of development is high, and there is therefore no particular reason for the majority to be sceptical of the access of visitors per default. In the empirical analysis I return to this question and discuss potential ways in which this aspect can be taken into account.

All in all, from an interest group perspective we would expect that travel visa policy shifts in a liberal direction as tourism, bilateral trade and migrant communities gain weight and client politics becomes dominant. To the extent we

observe such outcomes it strengthens the explanatory purchase of the theoretical model. I now turn to the security approach.

Security theory

Constructivist security theory is widely used to analyse European migration policy (Anderson et al. 2000; Bigo 2000; Heisler and Layton-Henry 1993; Huysmans 2000; Karyotis and Patrikios 2010). There are two main approaches: the Copenhagen and the Paris school. Both start from the assumption that security threats are not objectively given but constructed by political actors (Howarth 2000). To what extent, for example, traffic accidents, climate change or terrorism comes to be viewed as security problems is not mainly a function of their inherent traits but rather of political contestation.

The Copenhagen School studies the process by which a person, group or event becomes securitized in public discourses (Buzan et al. 1998; Wæver 1997). Securitization is defined as the escalation of an issue above 'normal politics' to the status of an existential threat requiring urgent response. If it is not addressed immediately it will be too late. If this move is successfully made it becomes possible to enact and pursue policies, such as emergency laws, which would otherwise be unacceptable in liberal states. The Paris School analyses the struggle over the definition of threats between security agencies (Bigo 2000; cf. Allison and Zelikow 1999). Public political statements are viewed as of less importance. In order to understand why particular threats emerge and with what effects we should focus at the bureaucratic level. The main actors of interests are for example police, customs and intelligence services acting and competing in a field of security professionals.

Neither the Copenhagen nor the Paris School argues that security politics must lead to particular policy outcomes. Whereas the client politics mode in the interest group account is linked with liberal results a similar expectation of restrictive practices does not flow from security politics. If a group of travellers is not constructed as a danger this is simply a case of lacking or failed securitization. A

politician did not have the necessary standing to get a development accepted as threatening or he or she did not even articulate the issue in these terms; one bureaucratic agency lost out to another over what risk should be given attention. Boswell (2007: 591-594) thus somewhat misrepresents security theory when she stipulates that it argues that the preference of politicians and officials is to securitize issues. The Copenhagen School is not based on the assumption that policymakers have a built-in preference for securitization. The Paris School would suggest that some agencies have an interest in emphasising the importance of particular types of threats to improve their own position but that other agencies would struggle against this. Hence, Boswell's key finding that terrorism was not strongly linked with migration after 9/11 in Europe is not as such at odds with security theory.

Boswell's criticism nevertheless hints at a limitation of current security theory. Its relative strength is difficult to assess because a wide range of trends and outcomes are in line with it. The approach has been developed as a general interpretative framework rather than a classical causal explanatory theory. It has roots in post-structuralism and its proponents are often somewhat sceptical of the extent to which social science should aim at assessing causality (Campbell 1998; Hansen 2006). In addition, the main focus of the theory has been to understand how events and issues come to be established as security problems. Less theoretical and empirical attention has been given to empirically assessing the effects of such constructions. To the extent it is covered in the framework, it is indirectly as an indicator of successful securitization.

It is, however, possible to take security theory in an explanatory direction by reinterpreting it in line with mainstream constructivism (Finnemore and Sikkink 2001; cf. Bourbeau 2011). Here, the emphasis is on evaluating the strength of the models based on ideational factors relative to other theories. One way of doing so is to focus on the relationship between public discursive threat constructions, policies and administrative practices. Discourses constrain and enable officials to pursue different types of policies. Restrictive migration control practices are thus

explained as the outcome of a successful securitization of particular groups of foreigners and types of mobility as a threat to the survival of Western states and nations.

Set up in this way the security model thus expects a tight link between public threat constructions and visa practices. The more a particular nationality or group of countries aligns with what is cast as dangerous the higher the level of restriction we should observe. In contemporary Europe, then, what are the major patterns of threat constructions in the field of migration and mobility?

Bigo and Guild repeatedly refers to poverty (2005: 234, 236, 241-footnote 20, 245, 254, 258). The fear of the outsider is to a wide extent a fear of the poor. Impoverished third country nationals, they argue, are presented as a danger to the upkeep of welfare states by increasing demand for social services. From this follows that citizens of affluent countries should have easier access to Europe than nationals of poor states. Hypothesis 4 is thus:

H_4: The higher the income level of a sending state, the lower the barrier to mobility imposed by the receiving country

Alongside poverty Bigo and Guild also state that war-ridden, unstable and refugee-producing countries in conflict are constructed as risks (2005: 236, 241-footnote 20). Several authors link the fear of asylum seekers with visa policy (Bø 1998: 201f; Brochmann 1999a: 307f; Huysmans 2000: 763; Ucarer 2001: 295f). Brochmann, for example, mention the Bosnian war as a case where "a fear of being the preferred target for war refugees turned into a 'domino effect' of visa conditions in the receiving countries throughout Europe" (1999a: 307). The recent 'Arab Spring' has provoked restatements of similar concerns in Europe of being overrun by asylum-seekers (DMO 2011). This construction of asylum seekers as a threat yields hypothesis 5:

H_5: The lower the number of asylum applications from nationals of a sending state, the lower the barrier to mobility imposed by the receiving country

Guild (2009: 184) further identifies religion and ethnicity as important. The reference to religiosity parallels the wider intense and frequently hostile Western debate about Islam (cf. Salehyan 2009). Neither East-Asians nor persons from South America are cast as threats. It is foremost a question of a European fear of Muslims. Hypothesis 6 is thus:

H_6: If the majority of the population in a sending state is not Muslim, the barrier to mobility imposed by the receiving country is lower

Taken together we would thus expect travellers from third countries which are poor, Muslim and a source of refugees to be interpreted within a threat frame and hence often denied access. To the extent these three hypotheses find support in the data security theory would seem to provide a convincing explanation of European visa practices.

In sum, the interest group and security theories provide different explanations of the pattern of European visa restrictiveness. They put emphasis on different factors as the key drivers of policy. In the next sections I present the research design and data I use to test the hypotheses.

3. Research design

I investigate the hypotheses via a large-N cross-sectional quantitative analysis. The statistical method drawn upon is linear regression modelling (Agresti and Finlay 1997: 382-437). PASW Statistics 18 (SPSS) was used to compute the statistics. This approach is well-suited for my purposes because a wide dataset allows for a comprehensive assessment of the strength of the theories. It would be more difficult to generalise any findings on the explanatory purchase of the models if only a set of cases was analysed. The drawback is that the precise causal mechanisms involved are only studied with reference to their observable

implications on control practices. In the following I describe the dataset and the coding of the different variables before I go on in the next sections to present and discuss the results of the empirical analysis. Further information, including the robustness tests and detailed statistical read-outs, are available from the database website.

The data source for the analysis is a new European Visa Database (Hobolth forthcoming).[16] Existing datasets only cover visa requirements and thereby leaves out potentially substantial variation in practices. The majority of countries in the world are on the EU's visa list, but as we shall see in the descriptive analysis there are very considerable differences in how restrictively the rules are enforced.

The visa dataset contains information on the visa requirements, issuing-practices and consular representation abroad of EU states across all sending countries. It thus provides the necessary information on the dependent variable, i.e. the restrictiveness of European border policy for visitors of different nationalities. The raw data source is official government overviews published by the Council of the European Union and the European Commission.

The unit of analysis is pairs of receiving (European Union) and sending (third country) states per year.[17] For each country-year pair I assess the restrictiveness of the travel policy and code the values on the independent variables. The time period I focus on is 2005 to 2010. This is the main period in which systematic data is available on the dependent variable. The receiving states covered in the analysis are the participants in the common visa policy. This includes all EU-states except the United Kingdom and Ireland as well as the non-EU states Norway, Iceland and Switzerland.[18]

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[16] The information in the database can be explored via www.mogenshobolth.dk/evd.

[17] The aggregation of the data to state-level means a loss of within-country regional variation. In some countries, India for example, the visa-issuing practice can vary considerable depending on precisely where in the country the consulate is located. In order to study this variation it would be necessary to account for differences in, for example, income-level within countries by using variables measured at the regional level.

[18] Switzerland signed up in 2008. The 2004 and 2007 enlargement countries had to comply with EU's visa list from their time of accession but were allowed to maintain independent visa-issuing

The list of sending states is based on the states and territories specified in EU's common visa policy (OJEU 2001). In the analysed time-period Serbia and Montenegro split into two separate states and Kosovo seceded from Serbia. I have handled this by re-coding the data from the earlier years. Hence, I consistently use separate entries for "Serbia", "Montenegro" and "Kosovo". In total the number of observations included in the analysis is 20.884, but due to missing data on the independent variables the N is lower in the actual models (approximately 6.000 to 14.000).

The main models include all cases in a single regression using dummy variables for each year and receiving state. To further test the stability of the results I have also conducted separate quantitative tests for each receiving state.

For methodological reasons the income, trade, tourism and asylum variables are transformed using a natural log. This is necessary because they are skewed to the right, and a log transformation is thus a good option for 'pulling in' outliers and ensuring that the variable complies with the requirement of a normal distribution (Agresti and Finlay 1997: 561). This recoding, however, also makes theoretical sense. It accounts for the very likely difference in relative effects. If, for example, a poor country becomes 10% more affluent this is likely to make a very substantial difference on living conditions. A rich country increasing its wealth by a similar factor is unlikely to experience the same degree of change.

Dependent variable

The dependent variable is the Mobility Barriers Index contained in the visa dataset. This indicator aims to capture the extent to which policy barriers are put into place to prevent the movement of nationals of a given sending state to a receiving country. It is a four point scale ranging from 0 (no barriers) to 3 (high barriers). A score of 0 is assigned if no visa requirement is in place. 1 is set for the

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criteria pending full participation in the internal free movement area. Cyprus, Romania and Bulgaria remain partially outside whereas the remaining new member states became full participants in late 2007. The dataset includes information on the new member states from their time of EU-membership and thus not only from the date they fully joined Schengen.

low range of visa refusal rates (0-5%), 2 for the medium range (5-20%) and 3 for the high range (above 20%).[19] This follows the low, medium and high inter-quartile ranges in the dataset. The groups are thus coded in a manner similar to, for example, how income clusters and country development levels are measured.

The index combines information on visa requirements with issuing practices. An alternative to this would be to focus solely on for example refusal rates. Doing so, however, introduces a potential bias in the result. The conclusions on the effect of a particular variable might be skewed if the group of countries not even facing a visa requirement is not taken into account.

Using the index, additionally, takes into account a set of scenarios. These are particular relevant for better assessing the restrictiveness in the case of asylum origin countries. Firstly, in some sending states a receiving country might not even have consular representation for visa-issuing purposes. In order to lodge a visa application it is, thus, in principle necessary to travel to a neighbouring state. Here, the index assigns a score of 2. Secondly, in some cases the member states might refuse altogether to receive request for e.g. tourist visas or require applicants to possess certain types of passports. These forms of barriers are not well picked up by solely looking at refusal rates. The rejection rate might be low but this is in fact due to the strong mechanisms sometimes put in place prior to applications entering the system. The index tries to take this into account by re-assessing the scores based on application figures. If these are very low compared with population size and travel distance the index is moved one up. For example, a score of 2 is converted into a 3.[20]

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[19] The visa refusal rate is calculated as the number of refused visas as a share of the total number of visa decisions (refused and issued).

[20] I measured whether or not the application numbers were very low using a model based on travel distance and the population size of the sending and the receiving country. Application figures are highly structured and with just these variables a considerable amount of variation in the data could be accounted for. This model estimate was then used to assess whether a score in a given country was very low (below 20% of the expected).

The disadvantage of the indicator is that it reduces the amount of variation on the dependent variable. I therefore also check the results using the visa refusal rate as an alternative indicator.

Independent variables

Tourism: I measure tourism using World Bank statistics on the total tourism expenditure of a country (WB 2010a). The data is collected as part of the "World Development Indicators" series. This variable captures how many resources the citizens of a country use abroad on accommodation, transport, leisure etc. This would seem potentially somewhat difficult to measure, but the variable should at least get the relative ranking of the countries right. It should thus give a fairly robust indication of how attractive a state is relative to others as a potential source of income for the domestic tourism industry.

Bilateral trade: I code the amount of trade between the European states and third countries using mainly information from the International Monetary Fund coded by the Correlates of War project (Barbieri and Keshk 2012; Barbieri et al. 2009). The data was downloaded per year and country for all products and services and covers both import and export. These measures are used in international trade negotiations warranting for their general accuracy.

Migrant communities: I assess the number of migrants from a sending country residing in a receiving state using the Global Bilateral Migration Database developed by the World Bank (WB 2012). The data aims to capture the number of foreign-born persons residing in a state drawing on census and population registers. I use the latest information provided for the year 2000. Due to the many and diverse data sources measurement problems might exist in certain cases calling for some caution in interpreting the results.

Income: I quantify income using annual World Bank statistics on the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita adjusted for differences in purchasing power (PPP) measured in constant 2005 international dollars (WB 2010a). This measure

should thus allow for good cross-country comparison because differences in country size (per capita), exchange rates (constant international dollars) and purchasing power (PPP) has been accounted for. The data was downloaded from the World Bank's statistical database (the "World Development Indicators" series).

Muslim and non-Muslim countries: To what extent a country has a Muslim majority is coded using data from the CIA's World Factbook and the US Department of State's 2009 report on International Religious Freedom (CIA 2010; DOS 2010). The latter was used to cross-check and fill-in the data from the factbook. In general, the variable is thus measured using official census data. For several countries the reliability of census data is questionable, particularly when it comes to sensitive issues such as religion. There are also likely to be cross-national variation in the ways religious beliefs are surveyed. I first coded the percentage of the country's total population which is Muslim (0-100). I subsequently recoded this into a dichotomous variable (51-100 Muslim majority, 0-50 not Muslim majority). There is a small group of countries (Burkina Faso, Eritrea, Nigeria, Guinea-Bissau, Kazakhstan and Bosnia and Herzegovina) slightly below the cut-off mark. Of these particularly Nigeria and Bosnia and Herzegovina are interesting since they are often associated with Muslims in European public debate. To ensure consistency of the analysis these are, however, not coded as Muslim. Chad, by contrast, is the only country slightly above the cut-off mark.

The number of asylum applications: I measured the size of asylum flows using UNHCR statistics on the number and nationality of first instance asylum applications (UNHCR 2010). Because of the considerable controversy surrounding the question of refugees and asylum these data might contain several problems caused by, for example, differences in reporting by the states. It is, however, the best global source available.

Control variables

Other factors alongside those already discussed and explicitly theorized could influence state decision-making on border openness. These elements should be controlled for to reduce the risk of omitted variable bias. That is, the findings might be spurious as key factors are left out of the model. I therefore include a range of control variables: geographical distance, colonial ties, level of democracy and population size of sending state. Starting with distance, this might be a factor in different ways. A liberal practice towards neighbour countries might be part of a foreign policy strategy of ensuring peaceful regional relations. Colonial ties might, in a similar way, influence policy as states might give preferential treatment to former subject countries. Level of democracy could also be relevant. Just like democracies do not tend to engage in war with each other, they might tend to give easy access to citizens of fellow liberal states. Finally, the larger the country in terms of population the greater – other things being equal – might be the risk of illegal asylum and the potential for trade and tourism.

In addition to these variables concerned with differences between sending countries, I also include a set of factors controlling for variation between receiving states. These are the size of the tourism industry in receiving states, the level of extra-European trade in receiving states and the vote-share of far-right parties. Including these in the analysis ensures that potential key differences between European states are picked up.

The data sources for these variables are set out in annex one. Here there is also summary statistics on all the variables. The following section contains the results of the empirical analysis. If nothing else is indicated in footnotes to individual tables the source is the dataset. I start out with a descriptive overview of the EU's visa regime and then proceed to discuss and test the strengths and weaknesses of the theoretical models.

4. An overview of the European visa regime

The figures on the following pages provide a comprehensive summary of key features of the European visa regime as of 2010. Table 1 contains visa application statistics, refusal rates and information on consular services per receiving EU country. Table 2 sets out similar statistics for 169 sending foreign countries outside the EU (and the European Economic Area – EEA). In 2007 and 2008 the composition of the Schengen area changed considerably as ten new states joined. I therefore focus on 2010 and provide the overview for the entire, enlarged free travel area. Map 1 illustrates the variation in refusal rates detailed in table 2. Table 4 in the annex contains information on trends in applications and refusal rates from 2005 to 2010. The overall picture is identical for the different years although the average refusal rate has decreased very slightly from 15% in 2005 to 13% in 2010.

Table 1

2010 visa statistics per receiving country

Receiving country	Population (1000s)	Short-stay visas				Visa refusal rate		Consular coverage			Mobility Barrier
		Applied for	Issued	Refused	Issued per 1000 inhb.	Global	Average	Independent	Cooperation	None	
Northern Europe											
Denmark	5.550	78.886	71.406	6.538	12,9	8%	14%	31	49	49	1,6
Finland	5.365	1.016.582	1.003.987	12.595	187,1	1%	21%	29	40	60	1,5
Iceland	320	562	549	13	1,7	2%	2%	1	64	64	1,5
Norway	4.883	131.100	119.692	11.408	24,5	9%	24%	45	34	50	1,6
Sweden	9.380	200.546	177.160	14.929	18,9	8%	14%	34	50	45	1,5
Western Europe											
Austria	8.394	271.787	260.525	11.262	31,0	4%	9%	37	63	29	1,5
Belgium	10.712	201.048	162.860	38.188	15,2	19%	21%	47	54	28	1,6
France	62.787	2.038.327	1.854.219	184.108	29,5	9%	8%	96	6	27	1,4
Germany	82.302	1.785.415	1.659.410	126.005	20,2	7%	14%	85	18	26	1,6
Luxembourg	507	6.933	6.735	198	13,3	3%	6%	3	96	30	1,6
Netherlands	16.613	369.558	338.878	24.338	20,4	7%	14%	57	38	34	1,5
Switzerland	7.664	374.429	362.021	12.408	47,2	3%	4%	54	0	75	1,4
Eastern Europe											
Czech Republic	10.493	538.915	512.599	26.316	48,9	5%	17%	44	0	85	1,6
Estonia	1.341	120.467	116.631	3.836	87,0	3%	13%	8	39	82	1,6
Hungary	9.984	248.177	237.571	9.010	23,8	4%	14%	33	25	71	1,6
Latvia	2.252	138.498	134.988	3.510	59,9	3%	12%	10	31	88	1,5
Lithuania	3.324	275.153	271.468	3.455	81,7	1%	13%	12	13	104	1,5
Poland	38.277	687.976	668.616	19.360	17,5	3%	16%	44	0	85	1,7
Slovakia	5.462	57.260	55.470	1.790	10,2	3%	14%	22	0	107	1,5
Southern Europe											
Greece	11.359	611.127	589.314	18.754	51,9	3%	14%	36	59	34	1,5
Italy	60.551	1.322.392	1.266.004	56.388	20,9	4%	10%	67	33	29	1,5
Malta	417	40.401	37.226	3.175	89,3	8%	16%	8	47	74	1,5
Portugal	10.676	116.435	103.113	8.563	9,7	8%	13%	29	69	31	1,5
Slovenia	2.030	49.302	47.664	1.638	23,5	3%	5%	10	72	47	1,5
Spain	46.077	1.121.131	971.838	65.232	21,1	6%	13%	64	39	26	1,5
Total	**416.720**	**11.802.407**	**11.029.944**	**663.017**	**26,5**	**6%**	**13%**	**906**	**939**	**1380**	**1,5**

Source: European Visa Database, see research design section

Table 2

2010 visa statistics per sending country

Sending country	Population (1000s)	Short-stay visas				Visa refusal rate		Consular coverage			Mobility Barrier
		Applied for	Issued	Refused	Issued per 1000 inhb.	Global	Average	Independent	Cooperation	None	
Africa											
Algeria	35.468	296.963	209.277	78.179	5,9	27%	27%	16	5	4	2,7
Angola	19.082	52.012	46.463	5.193	2,4	10%	17%	8	9	8	2,2
Benin	8.850	12.637	9.825	2.808	1,1	22%	25%	5	11	9	2,5
Botswana	2.007	2.559	2.485	74	1,2	3%	4%	2	14	9	1,7
Burkina Faso	16.469	17.809	15.702	1.881	1,0	11%	19%	5	12	8	2,1
Burundi	8.383	2.582	2.018	564	0,2	22%	12%	2	8	15	2,4
Cameroon	19.599	40.471	33.058	7.325	1,7	18%	34%	7	9	9	2,5
Cape Verde	496	15.007	12.301	2.455	24,8	17%	20%	3	7	15	2,0
Central African Republic	4.401	4.693	3.940	753	0,9	16%	16%	1	11	13	2,0
Chad	11.227	7.791	7.339	452	0,7	6%	6%	1	10	14	2,0
Comoros	735	5.008	3.090	1.918	4,2	38%	38%	1	9	15	2,4
Congo	4.043	19.011	16.296	2.715	4,0	14%	21%	3	8	14	2,1
Congo (Dem. Rep. Of)	65.966	24.813	14.021	10.453	0,2	43%	41%	10	6	9	2,5
Côte d'Ivoire	19.738	42.848	36.235	6.378	1,8	15%	24%	7	9	9	2,4
Djibouti	889	4.167	3.637	530	4,1	13%	13%	1	10	14	2,0
Egypt	81.121	131.777	118.263	11.555	1,5	9%	14%	23	2	0	2,2
Equatorial Guinea	700	11.198	10.032	326	14,3	3%	4%	2	10	13	1,6
Eritrea	5.254	2.810	2.391	416	0,5	15%	16%	3	15	7	2,2
Ethiopia	82.950	14.581	11.821	2.646	0,1	18%	23%	15	6	4	2,6
Gabon	1.505	18.945	17.464	1.451	11,6	8%	8%	3	7	15	2,0
Gambia	1.728	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	0	25	2,0
Ghana	24.392	22.940	16.406	6.452	0,7	28%	30%	8	12	5	2,8
Guinea	9.982	19.334	15.820	3.580	1,6	18%	36%	3	5	17	2,2
Guinea-Bissau	1.515	4.235	3.409	1.170	2,3	26%	24%	3	9	13	2,3
Kenya	40.513	27.509	23.666	3.677	0,6	13%	16%	18	6	1	2,2
Lesotho	2.171	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	0	25	2,0
Liberia	3.994	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	0	25	2,0
Libya	6.355	58.083	54.119	3.242	8,5	6%	7%	14	6	5	1,9
Madagascar	20.714	27.407	25.350	2.057	1,2	8%	7%	4	14	7	2,0

Table 2 (visa statistics per sending country, continued...)

| Sending country | Population (1000s) | Short-stay visas | | | | Visa refusal rate | | Consular coverage | | | Mobility Barrier |
		Applied for	Issued	Refused	Issued per 1000 inhb.	Global	Average	Independent	Cooperation	None	
Malawi	14.901	1.573	1.482	91	0,1	6%	5%	2	14	9	1,8
Mali	15.370	19.648	14.074	5.403	0,9	28%	34%	6	8	11	2,6
Mauritania	3.460	13.309	11.860	836	3,4	7%	12%	3	8	14	2,1
Mauritius	1.299	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0,0
Morocco	31.951	332.044	288.961	36.937	9,0	11%	22%	16	6	3	2,4
Mozambique	23.391	9.228	8.895	196	0,4	2%	3%	9	9	7	2,0
Namibia	2.283	8.750	8.564	141	3,8	2%	2%	4	13	8	1,6
Niger	15.512	7.940	7.533	391	0,5	5%	6%	2	10	13	2,0
Nigeria	158.423	76.832	51.700	22.579	0,3	30%	37%	17	6	2	2,7
Rwanda	10.624	4.464	3.254	1.125	0,3	26%	20%	3	12	10	2,3
Sao Tome and Principe	165	2.516	2.330	96	14,1	4%	4%	1	10	14	2,0
Senegal	12.434	69.925	51.984	16.445	4,2	24%	35%	10	9	6	2,7
Seychelles	87	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0,0
Sierra Leone	5.868	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	0	25	2,0
Somalia	9.331	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	0	25	2,0
South Africa	50.133	169.789	167.417	1.926	3,3	1%	2%	18	6	1	1,4
Sudan	43.552	11.666	9.785	1.625	0,2	14%	12%	8	11	6	2,1
Swaziland	1.186	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	0	25	2,0
Tanzania	44.841	10.315	9.657	591	0,2	6%	6%	10	9	6	2,0
Togo	6.028	11.361	10.546	815	1,7	7%	10%	2	8	15	2,0
Tunisia	10.481	111.222	98.349	12.764	9,4	11%	24%	16	7	2	2,4
Uganda	33.425	8.995	7.755	1.216	0,2	14%	13%	6	11	8	2,0
Zambia	13.089	3.708	3.294	106	0,3	3%	3%	7	10	8	1,7
Zimbabwe	12.571	5.057	4.962	87	0,4	2%	2%	9	8	8	1,8
Middle East											
Armenia	3.092	33.085	29.332	3.753	9,5	11%	12%	6	15	4	2,0
Azerbaijan	9.188	37.698	35.753	1.944	3,9	5%	6%	11	13	1	1,7
Bahrain	1.262	14.674	14.487	187	11,5	1%	1%	3	14	8	1,3
Georgia	4.352	59.298	50.347	8.937	11,6	15%	17%	11	11	3	2,2
Iran	73.974	176.386	151.383	23.103	2,0	13%	17%	19	6	0	2,4
Iraq	31.672	18.936	17.869	873	0,6	5%	9%	8	4	13	2,0

Table 2 (visa statistics per sending country, continued...)

Sending country	Population (1000s)	Short-stay visas				Visa refusal rate		Consular coverage			Mobility Barrier
		Applied for	Issued	Refused	Issued per 1000 inhb.	Global	Average	Independent	Cooperation	None	
Israel	7.418	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0,0
Jordan	6.187	38.186	33.746	2.761	5,5	8%	10%	14	9	2	1,9
Kuwait	2.737	82.160	80.570	1.330	29,4	2%	2%	13	10	2	1,1
Lebanon	4.228	71.058	66.380	4.087	15,7	6%	7%	13	10	2	1,7
Oman	2.782	14.705	14.509	136	5,2	1%	1%	6	5	14	1,6
Palestinian Authority	4.039	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	0	25	2,0
Qatar	1.759	40.032	39.321	400	22,4	1%	4%	9	10	6	1,4
Saudi Arabia	27.448	174.619	168.734	4.633	6,1	3%	6%	18	6	1	1,7
Syria	20.411	47.590	37.850	8.168	1,9	18%	22%	17	7	1	2,5
Turkey	72.752	599.359	558.781	36.922	7,7	6%	10%	23	2	0	2,0
United Arab Emirates	7.512	162.160	153.693	7.611	20,5	5%	8%	16	7	2	1,7
Yemen	24.053	7.901	7.082	622	0,3	8%	13%	6	10	9	2,1
Europe											
Albania	3.204	90.612	73.863	13.626	23,1	16%	19%	15	8	2	2,2
Andorra	85	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0,0
Belarus	9.595	500.976	496.358	4.473	51,7	1%	2%	11	12	2	1,2
Bosnia and Herzegovina	3.760	100.782	94.924	5.763	25,2	6%	4%	16	8	1	1,7
Croatia	4.403	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0,0
Macedonia	2.061	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0,0
Holy see	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0,0
Kosovo	1.837	72.866	62.927	9.910	34,3	14%	21%	9	2	14	2,2
Liechtenstein	37	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0,0
Moldova	3.573	51.816	45.641	5.917	12,8	11%	13%	7	11	7	2,0
Monaco	35	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0,0
Montenegro	631	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0,0
San Marino	32	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0,0
Serbia	8.019	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0,0
Ukraine	45.448	984.142	941.885	37.347	20,7	4%	4%	22	2	1	1,6
Central Asia											
Kazakhstan	16.026	100.100	96.363	3.611	6,0	4%	9%	17	7	1	1,4
Kyrgyzstan	5.334	5.768	5.075	693	1,0	12%	12%	1	13	11	2,0

<div align="center">Table 2 (visa statistics per sending country, continued...)</div>

| Sending country	Population (1000s)	Short-stay visas				Visa refusal rate		Consular coverage			Mobility Barrier
		Applied for	Issued	Refused	Issued per 1000 inhb.	Global	Average	Independent	Cooperation	None	
Russia	142.958	4.245.774	4.143.558	56.433	29,0	1%	2%	24	1	0	1,0
Tajikistan	6.879	2.630	2.511	119	0,4	5%	5%	1	13	11	2,0
Turkmenistan	5.042	4.594	4.452	142	0,9	3%	3%	3	12	10	2,0
Uzbekistan	27.445	18.727	17.074	1.653	0,6	9%	9%	8	16	1	2,0
East & Southeast Asia											
Brunei Darussalam	399	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0,0
Cambodia	14.138	4.458	3.941	517	0,3	12%	12%	2	12	11	2,0
China (PR)	1.341.335	843.115	796.726	39.569	0,6	5%	6%	25	0	0	1,8
Hong Kong S.A.R.	7.053	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0,0
Indonesia	239.871	97.862	94.201	2.681	0,4	3%	4%	17	7	1	1,6
Japan	126.536	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0,0
Korea (North)	24.346	576	436	76	0,0	15%	33%	4	10	11	1,9
Korea (South)	48.184	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0,0
Laos	6.201	3.385	3.335	50	0,5	1%	4%	2	9	14	1,8
Macao S.A.R.	544	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0,0
Malaysia	28.401	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0,0
Mongolia	2.756	7.225	6.370	855	2,3	12%	17%	3	13	9	2,0
Myanmar	47.963	2.743	2.612	131	0,1	5%	5%	3	12	10	2,1
Papua New Guinea	6.858	790	790	0	0,1	0%	0%	1	13	11	1,4
Philippines	93.261	77.333	70.259	6.442	0,8	8%	11%	12	9	4	2,0
Singapore	5.086	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0,0
Taiwan	23.114	197.675	197.271	383	8,5	0%	1%	14	0	11	1,5
Thailand	69.122	169.867	158.079	11.114	2,3	7%	7%	19	5	1	1,7
Timor-Leste	1.124	510	258	2	0,2	1%	1%	1	4	20	1,8
Vietnam	87.848	50.399	45.784	4.085	0,5	8%	9%	17	6	2	2,1
South Asia											
Afghanistan	31.412	6.098	4.607	1.429	0,1	24%	10%	8	4	13	2,2
Bangladesh	148.692	14.010	11.021	2.926	0,1	21%	30%	8	11	6	2,3
Bhutan	726	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	0	25	2,0
India	1.224.614	449.590	420.023	28.878	0,3	6%	12%	21	4	0	2,2
Maldives	316	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	0	25	2,0

Table 2 (visa statistics per sending country, continued...)

Sending country	Population (1000s)	Short-stay visas				Visa refusal rate		Consular coverage			Mobility Barrier
		Applied for	Issued	Refused	Issued per 1000 inhb.	Global	Average	Independent	Cooperation	None	
Nepal	29.959	9.095	7.979	1.099	0,3	12%	15%	5	12	8	2,0
Pakistan	173.593	52.339	37.416	14.581	0,2	28%	37%	17	7	1	2,9
Sri Lanka	20.860	18.380	13.441	4.917	0,6	27%	24%	7	14	4	2,6
Australia - Oceania											
Australia	22.268	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0,0
Fiji	861	1.886	1.859	27	2,2	1%	1%	1	13	11	1,4
Kiribati	100	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	0	25	2,0
Marshall Islands	54	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	0	25	2,0
Micronesia	111	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	0	25	2,0
Nauru	10	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	0	25	2,0
New Zealand	4.368	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0,0
Northern Marianas	61	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	0	25	2,0
Palau	20	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	0	25	2,0
Solomon Islands	538	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	0	25	2,0
Tonga	104	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	0	25	2,0
Tuvalu	10	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	0	25	2,0
Vanuatu	240	338	337	1	1,4	0%	0%	1	10	14	1,6
Western Samoa	183	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	0	25	2,0
Central America and Caribbean											
Antigua and Barbuda	89	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0,0
Bahamas	343	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0,0
Barbados	273	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0,0
Belize	312	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	0	25	2,0
Costa Rica	4.659	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0,0
Cuba	11.258	30.637	27.308	2.527	2,4	8%	13%	16	8	1	1,9
Dominica	68	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	0	25	2,0
Dominican Republic	9.927	25.793	18.356	6.934	1,8	27%	27%	6	14	5	2,6
El Salvador	6.193	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0,0
Grenada	104	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	0	25	2,0
Guatemala	14.389	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0,0
Haiti	9.993	6.756	5.045	1.711	0,5	25%	17%	3	12	10	2,5

Table 2 (visa statistics per sending country, continued...)

		Short-stay visas				Visa refusal rate		Consular coverage			
Sending country	**Population (1000s)**	**Applied for**	**Issued**	**Refused**	**Issued per 1000 inhb.**	**Global**	**Average**	**Independent**	**Cooperation**	**None**	**Mobility Barrier**
Honduras	7.601	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0,0
Jamaica	2.741	3.582	3.394	154	1,2	4%	12%	4	7	14	1,8
Nicaragua	5.788	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0,0
Panama	3.517	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0,0
Saint Kitts and Nevis	52	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0,0
Saint Lucia	174	1.365	1.350	15	7,8	1%	1%	1	11	13	1,5
Saint Vincent and Gren.	109	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	0	25	2,0
Trinidad and Tobago	1.341	6.093	5.984	79	4,5	1%	1%	4	12	9	1,5
North America											
Canada	34.017	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0,0
Mexico	113.423	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0,0
United States of America	310.384	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0,0
South America											
Argentina	40.412	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0,0
Bolivia	9.930	9.097	6.807	2.124	0,7	24%	15%	6	12	7	2,3
Brazil	194.946	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0,0
Chile	17.114	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0,0
Colombia	46.295	97.859	85.153	10.936	1,8	11%	14%	13	9	3	2,1
Ecuador	14.465	27.657	21.763	5.700	1,5	21%	14%	5	7	13	2,1
Guyana	754	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	0	25	2,0
Paraguay	6.455	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0,0
Peru	29.077	46.155	40.144	5.349	1,4	12%	14%	14	9	2	2,0
Suriname	525	17.573	16.597	951	31,6	5%	3%	2	14	9	2,0
Uruguay	3.369	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0,0
Venezuela	28.980	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0,0
Total	**6.374.240**	**11.802.407**	**11.029.944**	**663.017**	**1,7**	**6%**	**13%**	**906**	**939**	**1380**	**1,5**

Source: European Visa Database, see research design section

Map 1: Variation in visa refusal rates per sending country (own rendering based on the data used for this paper)

Turning to table 1 we see, firstly, that there are differences between the receiving states in terms of the number of applications they process. A significant part of this variation can be attributed to country size: France, Germany, Italy, Spain and Poland alone receive 7 out of the 12 million visa applications submitted at Schengen consulates. This aspect is taken into account in the column with the number of visas issued per 1000 inhabitants. On average, a Schengen member issue 27 travel visas per thousand citizens. Finland, Estonia, Lithuania and Malta are significantly above this level. This is mainly due to applications from Russia and – in the case of Malta – from Libya. At the lower end we find Iceland which issues a very small number of visas.

The table contains two measurements of refusal rates. The 'global' column calculates the refusal rates as the share of visas refused out of the total number of visa decisions. The 'average' column computes it as the mean of the refusal rate of each sending country. The global measure is in general significantly lower because it is influenced by key outlier countries, first and foremost Russia, where member states have a lenient practice. EU-states in general receive a vast amount of visa applications at their Russian consulates and these are seldom turned down. This causes the global figure to come out at a low level. The average measure, in contrast, is per sending state and is therefore not sensitive to variation in application numbers. It therefore gives a better impression of the overall restrictiveness from the perspective of individual sending states (cf. Neumayer 2005). Focusing on this measure, we see that the EU mean is 13%. Iceland, Luxembourg, Switzerland, Slovenia appear to be somewhat below this trend. Finland, Norway and Belgium appear somewhat above it. However, there is substantial variation within each receiving state depending on the origin of the visa applications.

The consular coverage columns give an overview of the diplomatic representation of the member states abroad. In how many sending countries do they have independent representation, make use of another Schengen state or are not represented at all? France, for example, operates own consulates in 96 countries,

is represented by another Schengen member in 6 and does not have a presence in 27. In general, the larger EU-states have an extensive network of own visa-issuing facilities. The smaller members have fewer independent diplomatic representations but make extensive use of cooperative agreements (see paper two).

The last column in table 1 contains the average mobility barrier score for each EU-state. This measure takes into account the consular cooperation and cases of non-representation. When these aspects are taken into account the average restrictiveness of the EU-states is largely similar at about a 1.5 level; midway between a low and medium mobility barrier.

Moving on to table 2 and map 1 they indicate, first and foremost, that there are major differences between sending states in terms of visa applications, refusal rates, consular coverage and the overall mobility barrier. In 2010 refusal rates ranged from 0% (Papua New Guinea) to 43% (Democratic Republic of Congo). Applications ranged from 338 (Vanuatu) to 4.2 million (Russia). In China all member states had independent diplomatic representation; in Somalia and Sierra Leona no consulates were open for receiving visa applications. Two receiving states had visa facilities in Cambodia with 13 other Schengen members relying on these and 11 without any representation at all in this state.

All in all, the descriptive statistics highlights the manifold variation within the visa regime. In particular, there appears to be very substantial differences between sending states. Compared to this, the variation across receiving countries looks to be fairly small and mainly concern the amount of visa applications received and not the restrictiveness as such. In the next section I test the two theoretical models set out above and assess to what extent they are able to account for the variation in the restrictiveness of the EU's external border.

5. Explaining variation in openness

In this section I attempt to explain the variation in the openness of Europe's external borders to short-term visitors. The first part of the analysis tests the two theoretical explanations. The second part discusses the robustness of the results.

Testing the theories

To what extent are the models able to explain variation in the restrictiveness of destination states? As set out in the previous section I use the mobility barriers index to assess the level of openness. Nationals of countries such as Canada, Chile and Japan face few if any policy barriers to their mobility. They do not need a visa to travel to Europe yielding a score of 0 on the index. At the other end of the spectrum we find countries such as Afghanistan, Algeria and Iraq. Citizens of these states require a visa to travel to Europe and the rules are very tightly enforced resulting in a high barrier (score 3). Nationals of Oman, Seychelles and Indonesia need a visa but applications are seldom refused. They hence face a low barrier. In between we find states such as Vietnam, India and Peru where travel is restricted through a visa requirement and the rules neither tightly nor lightly enforced (score 2). Can we account for some of this variation using the security and interest group theories? Do they allow us to make a better assessment of the likely mobility barriers in place than merely looking at the average tendencies in the data?

Table 3 below presents the main results of the multivariate regression analyses. I have taken into account possible clustering tendencies in the data by including each year and receiving state as a control variable (e.g. Belgium yes/no). This helps to ensure that the assumption of independent observations can be upheld ("homoscedasticity"). If this was not possible the results would be very uncertain (Agresti and Finlay 1997: 534). I have tested each theoretical model using a separate regression and run a combined test including all variables. The key results are as follows:

Table 3

Testing the theories

	Regression 1		Regression 2		Regression 3	
Constant	2,45 **		4,57 **		5,34 **	
Tourism expenditure (mio., current US $) (ln)	-0,15 (-0,40) **				0,03 (0,08) **	
Bilateral trade (mio., current US $) (ln)	-0,03 (-0,12) **				-0,06 (-0,25) **	
Migrant community (ln)	0,08 -0,36 **				0,03 (0,12) **	
Income (GDP/capita, PPP, int 2005 $) (ln)			-0,36 (-0,46) **		-0,31 (-0,46) **	
Muslim-majority country (yes/no)			0,43 (0,21) **		0,23 (0,14) **	
Asylum applications in total (ln)			0,02 (0,06) **		0,03 (0,10) **	
Extra-EU trade as share of GDP					0,01 (0,09)	
Tourism receipts as share of GDP					-0,03 (-0,10)	
Far right vote share					- - -	
Colonial ties					0,14 (0,03) **	
Democracy score (Freedom House)					0,10 (0,20) **	
Distance from sending to receiving country					-0,15 (-0,13) **	
Population size of sending country					-0,03 (-0,08) **	
Observations	7.850		15.098		6.917	
R^2	17%		33%		42%	

SOURCE: The European Visa Database and other datasets. See the research design section of the paper.

NOTES: Information on the year and receiving country fixed effects are not reported in the table. The base is the year 2009 and the receiving country Germany. Standardized beta coefficients are in parenthesis.

** Statistically significant at 0.01% level. * statistical significant at 0.05% level

Starting with regression 1 this is the test of the interest group model. We can see that two of the key variables – tourism expenditures and bilateral trade levels – have a significant effect on the openness of the border in the expected direction. The higher the tourism expenditure of the nationals of a sending state the less restrictive the mobility barrier. A similar pattern is picked-up by the regression in the case of trade. The effect of the variables is non-linear. For example, initial shifts away from lower levels of trade have a much more considerable impact than moves from a high to an even higher amount of trade.

The size of the diaspora from a third country is significant but not in the direction expected by interest group theory (not supporting H_3). The larger the diaspora in a member state the higher the refusal rate. Thus, minority communities would not seem able to lobby for a lower refusal rate for visitors from their former home state. This result is puzzling from the interest group perspective. It suggests that

the diaspora variable to a wider extent works as a part of a security explanation. A large diaspora could make it easier for visitors with the same nationality to overstay their visa thus triggering a fear of irregular migration.

Overall, the data thus lends support to H_1 and H_2 and not H_3. The impact of tourism and trade is substantial. Let us first look at tourism. In 2005, for example, Russian nationals spent approximately 18.305 million current US dollars on tourism. This makes it a major tourism market. The model predicts a resulting reduced mobility barrier by about 1,4 points. As the scale runs from 0 to 3 this is a large effect. The impact of bilateral trade is also substantial but smaller. Import and export between Germany and Russia totalled about 40.098 million current US dollars the same year making it a top five trading partner. Here, the model predicts a reduced barrier of approximately 0,3 points. This difference in the size of the effects makes sense from the interest group perspective. Tourism involves one distinct set of actors with a strong incentive to lobby on the issue as it is their core activity. Businesses involved in cross-border transactions are in general, in contrast, somewhat more diverse. Hence, we should expect the tourism sector to be more organized and active on the issue compared with general business associations and large firms as such. The Russian migrant community in Germany is at about 0,98 million increasing the mobility barrier by 1,1 points. Taking the three effects together the interest group model estimates a low to medium policy barrier to mobility in the case of Russia (a score slightly below 2). This tails with what we observed in the year in question, but throughout the period scores were in general somewhat lower.

To take another example let us look at Lebanon. Tourism was in 2005 at 3.565 million estimated to reduce the barrier by 1,2 points. Trade was at 643 million translating into a reduction of 0,2 point. The Lebanese migrant community in Germany is at about 52.000 increasing the barrier by 0,9 points. Lebanon is thus estimated to face a medium barrier (score 2) – similar to what we observed in the period.

The model is, however, more often off the mark than correct in its estimations. It is near impossible for it to predict the absence of a visa requirement. To reach this level requires very large values on the tourism and trade scores not actually observed in the time-period. At the top-end the model rarely predicts a high mobility barrier because it is very sensitive to small initial increases in the amount of tourism. It thus often arrives at the prediction of a medium mobility barrier. This is a fine prediction but often not much of an improvement from simply looking at the average tendencies in the data. All in all, the model is able to account for 17% of the variation in the dataset.

Moving on to the security explanation, we see that income has a statistically significant and sizable negative impact on mobility barriers. The richer the sending country the lower the impediments to mobility set up by the receiving state (supporting H_4). Muslim majority countries face a barrier substantially above average controlling for other factors (supporting H_5). The amount of asylum application from a third country also has a statistically significant effect (supporting H_6). As the flow of refugees from a sending state increase the restrictiveness picks up. Thus, the three key observable implications of the security model are evidenced in the data.

What are the substantial implications of the model? To probe this let us again look at a set of cases. Brunei, Singapore, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates are all very high-income countries with a GDP per capita in 2005 of between 44.000 to 49.000 international dollars (Germany in the same year had a GDP per capita of about 32.000). They are not source countries of refugees and this hence does not affect the openness of the border. An income level this large is estimated to reduce the mobility barrier with about 3,9 points yielding the model to predict visa-free access. Kuwait and the Emirates, however, are also Muslim-majority countries. This is estimated to increase the barrier by 0,4 points putting the countries into the low barrier category. These estimations are also what we see in practice. Brunei and Singapore enjoy visa-free travel to Europe whereas nationals

of Kuwait and the Emirates need a visa to travel but face a relatively lenient enforcement of the rules.

In general, a GDP/capita of above 10.000 qualifies a state as having a high income level. 31 sending countries reached this threshold in 2005. Of these 15 faced a visa requirement. Eight of them had a Muslim-majority and this factor is picked up by the model as the key reason for the increased barrier to mobility they face. The high income level should lead us to expect an open border but because of their religious make-up visitors are still somewhat interpreted within a framework of threats and dangers. Most of the remaining seven cases fall at the lower end of the high-income group. The security model here captures the mobility barrier correctly solely by looking at their lower wealth. Only two cases are not estimated well by the model. These are Equatorial Guinea and Mauritius. Here, the interest group theory has a better prediction. As small countries of limited interest as tourism markets and no strong trading ties it predicts a medium barrier (a score of 2), which is also what was observed in 2005. The security model puts the two cases in the low barrier category (score 1).

Let us now turn to the variable on asylum seekers. In 2005 the UNHCR registered that Afghan nationals lodged about 13.000 asylum applications around the world. This is estimated to increase the mobility barrier by about 0,2 points. As a poor Muslim-majority country the model in total predicts that the policy barrier to mobility in the case of Afghanistan should be high. This is borne out by the data. In the same year citizens of Rwanda and Togo lodged a largely similar amount of asylum applications. As non-Muslim countries the model estimates a medium barrier. In practice, however, the restrictiveness was at a high level. Here we thus see that the different threat constructions at the centre of the security theory – poverty, refugees and Muslims – might interact with each other in different ways. Amongst poorer countries religious make-up and refugee outflows, either separate

or in combination, might be equal ways of reaching the outcome of a high mobility barrier.[21]

The effect of asylum applications quickly reaches its maximum effect in the model. At 1.000 applications the effect is at 0,1. It then climbs very slowly. In the case of Myanmar, at 55.774 the largest origin country of asylum seekers in 2005, the effect is at 0,2. Theoretically, this suggests a somewhat different securitization dynamics in the cases of refugees and poverty. The latter impacts the mobility barrier gradually. The former has more of an either-or impact. Even a relatively small amount of protection seekers substantially increases the mobility barriers, but this effect then remains relatively constant regardless of further shifts to even higher asylum application numbers.

All in all, the security model provides a good account of key patterns in the data. It is able to account for 33% of the variation in the dataset. It thus fits considerably better with the data than the interest group perspective. There are substantial differences left unaccounted for suggesting space for improvement and the relevance of potential alternative accounts. The model detects, as discussed, key differences in the policy barrier to mobility in place against the group of high income countries. It is also able to pin-point some variation amongst poorer countries but here with somewhat less success.

The third regression combines all the variables in a single analysis and includes all the control variables. Here we see that all variables are again statistically significant. The direction of their effect is unchanged but for tourism expenditure. It thus does not appear to be a stable predictor. The liberalizing dynamic now mainly seems to result from trading interests, somewhat puzzlingly compared to what we should expect theoretically. This model has a better overall fit with the data being able to explain 42% of the variation in the dataset. Yet the strength of the full regression is not that higher than the security model alone. Hence, the

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[21] Multiple pathways to similar results are not easily picked up by a general regression model, suggesting that for example that a Qualitative Comparative Analysis could produce interesting results (Ragin 2000).

simple securitization perspective might be preferable. The increased complexity resulting from the additional variables does not yield a major improvement of explanatory purchase.

The change in the direction of the effect of the tourism variable points to a potential problem of multicollinearity in the data. Income levels, tourism and trade are somewhat correlated with each other. As the relative wealth of a country increases, there is a tendency for trading levels to increase and the state becoming a more attractive tourism market. Especially tourism and income has a tendency to follow each other. This creates a challenge of causal over-determinism. To some extent we observe that the mobility barriers decrease as a sending country becomes a more attractive tourism market. As such this supports the interest group thesis. However, as increases in tourism are correlated with increased wealth the reduced barrier can also be in line with the security perspective. This model interprets the trend as evidence of a gradually weaker framing of these new arrivals within a discourse of threat to European welfare states.

To further probe this question I assessed the effect of the variables considering countries in different income groups separately. Within each country cluster the tourism, income and trade variables are to a less extent mutually correlated. Doing so reveals a similar liberalizing effect of tourism and trade especially among higher income countries. The impact is less clear in the other country groups. This is not simply a reflection of lower income countries being irrelevant. The group covers states such as Indonesia, Philippines, India and Ukraine which are important tourism markets and trading partners. The data thus suggests that client politics operate under significant constraints and is mainly able to exercise an impact when migration fears are of a somewhat smaller concern.

Finally, when we look at the control variables level of democracy has a significant and sizable impact. Higher levels of democracies are associated with lower mobility barriers. We also see that distance, population size and colonial ties matter. The further away the larger the country the more liberal the visa regime.

Previous colonies are not treated preferentially but on the contrary face more restrictive border control than others.

Turning to the control variables testing for differences between the destination states, the model finds that the size of domestic tourism and export sectors are not significant. The far right vote share variable could not be estimated. There is, in general, limited variation in mobility barriers between the receiving countries and the variable is unable to make sense of the few cases where we observe notable differences. To illustrate, Belgium and Italy have respectively the most restrictive and liberal visa-issuing practice within Schengen. Yet in both the far right has an overall similar vote share of about 10%. This is not to rule out per se that far right politics have an influence. But if so, it would require different research strategies to identify such as quantitative analysis over time or comparative case studies.

To sum up, the empirical analysis evidences that European visa practices are influenced in a liberal direction by tourism and business interests lobbying for easy access. This, however, looks to be counterbalanced by fears of asylum claims and immigration from poor, Muslim countries which often outweigh commercial interests and generate restrictive practices. Both the interest group and the security theory have explanatory purchase, but securitization of migration seems to be a more powerful logic than business interests. Finally, other factors also play a role especially the level of democracy of a sending country.

Robustness checks

I have used a set of alternative models to check the stability of the results. First of all, I have run separate regression analysis for each destination country. This should help identify if the results are driven by a particular subset of cases. It also provides an indication of whether the significance, effect magnitude and overall explanatory purchase of the theoretical models are very different between destination countries. Doing so did not reveal uncertainty about the overall tendencies discussed above. We do see variance between member states in the

size of the effect of the variables but the main results of the analysis appears stable.

Additionally, I have run separate analyses using visa requirement, visa refusal rate and numbers of visas issued as the dependent variable. Such an analysis could reveal potential problems with the coding of the mobility barriers index. The results were again largely similar. That is, the findings provided good support for the security model and some evidence in favour of the interest group perspective. Using the index captured a stronger effect of the asylum variable. This suggests the importance of taking 'deterrence' mechanisms into considerations. Looking solely at visa refusal rates, for example, Somalia drops out from the analysis because the member states do not have any consular representation in the state for visa-issuing purposes.

Finally, I compared the findings of the simply Ordinary Least Square (OLS) analysis with a more complex Generalized Linear Regression Model (GLM). Doing so should reveal if results are heavily tied up with the choice of statistical method. Again, the results were largely identical.

These checks thus give reason to expect that the analysis has captured key patterns, and are not the result of problematic variables or tendencies in the data causing estimation problems.

6. Conclusion

In this paper I have explored similarities and differences in the openness of the EU's external border to visitors of different nationalities. The analysis was based on a new migration control database covering visa requirements, access to consular visa services and information on the short-term visas applied for, issued and refused in the period from 2005 to 2010.

I showed that the variation in the barriers to mobility put in place by receiving countries can best be explained by security theory. The model derived from

interest group theory did, however, also have some purchase. There is thus both a liberalizing and a restrictive dynamic at work in the border regime. Assessing the relative explanatory power of these two theories I argued that although business lobbying is evidenced, the main patterns in the data primarily support a security-centred explanation of European migration control practices. Especially travellers from poor, Muslim and asylum producing countries seem to be refused access to European territory.

Security explanations have been predominant in the field of European migration control studies generating valuable research. Yet with a predominance of explorative and conceptual case studies the empirical basis and methodological underpinnings of the approach have been somewhat uncertain. The extent to which the theory can account for variation in the restrictiveness of border practices has not been systematically assessed. Nor has the strength of alternative accounts been tested. The recent attempt by some scholars to critically challenge this paradigm is thus a welcome call for nuance and further empirical analysis. However, the findings of this paper underlines the importance of a continued focus on the restrictive security logics of European policy, while keeping in mind that liberalizing dynamics are also operating.

Additional analysis could probe the precise causal mechanisms at work, and explore further the robustness and wider applicability of the conclusions. It could be interesting, for example, to examine through qualitative studies how precisely public threat constructions impact on the control practices on the ground. The seemingly minor role of business lobbying could also be probed in more detail. The comparative perspective provided in this paper offers a good background for selecting cases for in-depth study. It could also be worthwhile to theorize further how levels of democracy influences border regimes. One could imagine, for example, that it forms part of self-other constructions of liberal states (cf. Wendt 1999) influencing their perception of foreign travellers.

The database deployed for this article also open up other avenues of research. The visa information could be used to probe the effect of Schengen membership by analysing how the visa-issuing practice of new and old EU member states altered when the free travel area expanded (see paper three). The dataset also contains information on the non-Schengen members the United Kingdom and the United States providing an opportunity for a wider comparative perspective on migration control in contemporary Europe.

Mogens Hobolth

Annex

Table 4

Summary statistics

Variable	N	Mean	Median	Minimum	Maximum	Std. Deviation
Mobility Barriers Index	18.650	1,6	2,0	0,0	3,0	0,9
Tourism expenditure (mio., current US $) (ln)	16.326	6,0	5,9	-0,7	11,7	2,2
Bilateral trade (mio., current US $) (ln)	10.358	2,7	2,9	-2,3	11,5	3,3
Migrant community (ln)	19.695	3,4	3,6	-2,3	14,5	3,9
Income (GDP/capita, PPP, int 2005 $) (ln)	17.948	8,4	8,4	5,2	11,3	1,2
Muslim-majority country (yes/no)	20.171	0,3	0,0	0,0	1,0	0,5
Asylum applications in total (ln)	17.493	6,1	6,6	-2,3	12,0	2,9
Extra-EU trade as share of GDP	15.439	5,4	5,0	1,0	34,0	4,9
Tourism receipts as share of GDP	20.171	3,4	2,0	1,0	15,0	2,6
Far right vote share	20.171	7,0	6,0	0,0	30,0	6,4
Colonial ties	20.171	0,0	0,0	No	Yes	0,1
Democracy score (Freedom House)	19.492	3,7	3,5	1,0	7,0	1,9
Distance from sending to receiving country	20.171	8,7	8,8	1,3	9,9	0,7
Population size of sending country	19.814	8,4	8,8	-2,3	14,1	2,4

SOURCE: The European Visa Database and other datasets. See the research design section of the paper.

The control variables were put together in the following way:

Geographical distance was computed mathematically as the distance between the capitals of the sending and the receiving country in kilometres using the Haversine formula and the latitude and longitude of the cities. The precise procedure followed is detailed in the database codebook.

Colonial ties was coded by checking whether or not a sending country was a colony of a receiving state using information from Oxford's Dictionary of World History and Dictionary of Contemporary World History (Oxford 2010a, 2010b). I initially coded the duration in years of the colonial period and subsequently recoded this variable into a binary measure (colony of receiving state yes/no).

The level of democracy was measured using the Freedom House Index (FH 2012). The index measures freedom in a country on two separate dimensions: political

rights and civil liberties. The former includes, for example, the right to vote and the latter freedom of speech. The scale runs from 1 (highest degree of freedom) to 7 (lowest degree of freedom). In the analysis I use the average score of a sending country across both dimensions.

The population size of sending states was measured using figures from the United Nation's population division (UN 2011). In a few cases data was missing and I had to rely on other sources and estimation procedures. These are detailed in the database codebook.

The size of the tourism industry in receiving states was assessed via the World Bank data used also to calculate the tourism potential of sending countries. This data is thus described further in the main text. To estimate the size of the industry I used the data on receipts (in current USD) and divided this by the GDP of the countries. Doing so should identify the overall share of the economic activity in the receiving states originating from tourism in the different years.

The level of extra-European trade in receiving states was measured using the global bilateral trade dataset already described in the research design section. For each receiving state and year I isolated the export to outside the EU/EEA area (in current USD) and, as in measuring the tourism sector, divided this by the GDP of the country. This variable should thus capture the extent to which the overall economy relies on exports to outside of the EU.

The vote-share of far-right parties in the receiving states was calculated drawing on the Parliament and Government Composition Database (ParlGov 2012). This dataset includes comprehensive information on the vote share of different parties for all the receiving states in the analysed time period. In the dataset there is a classification of party families including a group called 'right-wing'. I took this as a starting-point and cross-checked the coding drawing on general research into the far right (Norris 2005; Spanje 2011). This revealed some potential problematic groupings and I thus recoded a set of cases, such the Freedom Party in Austria, as

belonging to the family of right-wing parties. The precise transformations are detailed on the database website. After having done so I imported the data on these parties vote share in elections relevant for the investigated time period. For each country I computed a combined score. That is, if more than one party was categorised as right-wing I calculated a total vote share of all the far right parties.

Mogens Hobolth

PAPER TWO

European visa cooperation: interest politics and regional imagined communities

Abstract

Since the early 1990s the European Union has struggled to increase integration in the sovereignty sensitive areas of justice and home affairs and foreign policy. The aim of this paper is to enhance our understanding of what patterns of cooperation have been established between the member states, and why. I do so by analysing the case of short-stay visa policy. Visas are a corner stone of EU's border control and moreover an instrument of diplomacy. As a field where harmonization is in general considerable it is an 'extreme case' well-suited for drawing out empirical patterns and developing theoretical concepts.

The paper is based on a network analytical approach and a new dataset of all the EU/Schengen countries' mutual consular visa assistance agreements from 2005 to 2010. I show that cooperation is intensive and that the member states mainly share sovereignty in four regional clusters – a Nordic, Benelux, Southern European and emerging Central Eastern. France and Germany are at the centre of the network. Analysing rival rationalist and constructivist explanations, I find that the latter provides the most convincing account of the patterns in the data. I put forward a new concept of 'regional imagined communities' which explains cooperation by the existence of shared identities owing to regional commonalities in language and state-building histories. The term improves our understanding of European integration in visa policy, and could hold wider potential for explaining dynamics of collaboration in other sovereignty sensitive policy areas.

1. Introduction

From the beginning of the 1990s and onwards the European Union has established still closer cooperation in the controversial areas of justice and home affairs and foreign policy (Howorth 2001; Lavenex and Wallace 2005).

Yet because of the sovereignty-sensitive character of the policy fields integration has in both cases stopped short of full supranational and hierarchical governance (Lavenex 2009: 256f). Cooperation has instead primarily been marked by "intensive transgovernmentalism" (Lavenex 2010; Wallace 2010: 93; Wallace and Giegerich 2010: 210).[22] This term captures the existence of substantial and dense collaboration strongly dominated by the member states. The supranational institutions, such as the European Commission, Parliament and the Court of Justice, only play a minor role (Wallace 2010: 92f).[23] Pin-pointing the overall importance of state governments existing research has, however, not investigated in detail the constraints and structures in their mutual interaction.[24] In this paper I aim to contribute to the existing literature by investigating what patterns of cooperation have been established between the member states in a particular sovereignty sensitive policy area, and why.

The case I study is European consular cooperation abroad in visa matters. Visas grant or deny individuals legal access to state territories (Guild 2009: 118f). Establishing and enforcing visa restrictions are matters of diplomacy and foreign relations, as well as central instruments in relation to internal security and the control of illegal migration (Martenczuk 2009). It is thus a case on both interior and foreign policy cooperation. Visas are, additionally, an example of a

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[22] Wallace (2010) classifies intensive transgovernmentalism as one policy-making mode alongside four other used in the EU: the classical community method, the EU regulatory mode, the EU distributional mode and policy coordination. Tömmel (2009) operates with four types of European governance: hierarchical, negotiation, competition and cooperation. In her framework intensive transgovernmentalism could be seen as a hybrid of negotiation and cooperation.

[23] Transgovernmentalism can also be defined as a situation where actors from diverse ministries and levels of government cooperate directly with their counterparts in other European states without explicit national coordination and control from for example foreign ministries (Bigo 2000; Lavenex 2009: 258; Mérand et al. 2010).

[24] An exception to this trend has been the general observation that cooperation is limited by the need for a converging interest of all members and that as a result political agreements reached tends to reflect the lowest common denominator (Lavenex 2009: 266).

sovereignty-sensitive policy area where the member states have established especially strong cooperation (Lavenex and Ucarer 2002: 6).[25] It is thereby an 'extreme case' (Flyvbjerg 1991: 150) and as such able to bring out empirical patterns otherwise not easily identifiable. In that way it provides a good basis for theoretical development (George and Bennett 2005: 75).

Based on a new, comprehensive and original dataset of consular visa cooperation agreements and a network analytical method I advance two empirical arguments and one theoretical:

Firstly, the EU-states cooperate intensively abroad in visa matters. Outside Europe, the average Schengen member has independent visa-issuing consular representation in about 50 countries, relies on cooperative agreements in 50 and is not represented in 70 states.

Secondly, the structure of the cooperation largely follows regional clusters within Europe. The Nordic countries, Benelux, Southern Europe and to some extent also the new Central and Eastern member states all cooperate internally. France and Germany tie the clusters together as the centre of the network. Thus, the Schengen states mainly cooperate in the visa entry control process within tight regional circles.

Thirdly, while both realism (Waltz 1979) and liberal intergovernmentalism (Moravcsik 1993) are able to explain important parts of the empirical pattern, constructivism (Jepperson et al. 1996) on the whole goes furthest in accounting for the network structure. In particular, I put forward a concept of 'regional imagined communities' (cf. Anderson 1991) as a central factor in explaining the cooperation. This notion, I suggest, could have a wider analytical potential as a tool for understanding integration in other sovereignty-sensitive areas.

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[25] Lavenex (2010: 462) characterizes asylum and visa policy as the areas of justice and home affairs where the member states has gone the furthest in transferring "comprehensive competences" to the EU. These two areas "are gradually moving towards more supranational structures" although there is still not a "single official 'common policy'" (Lavenex 2009: 255).

The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. I start out by presenting the case and existing research on visa cooperation abroad. Then the data and methods used are presented. I subsequently conduct the empirical analysis and discuss three theoretical explanations of the patterns of cooperation identified. Finally, I conclude and set out the wider implications of the findings.

2. EU visa policy cooperation

Today, with the dismantling of almost all internal borders in Europe considerable political and administrative resources are invested in attempts to strengthen and harmonise the control of the EU's external border (Thielemann and Sasse 2005). Short-stay visas are a centre-piece of these efforts (Bigo and Guild 2005). For the nationals of the approximately 130 countries currently on EU's common visa list the first and main check of their eligibility to enter the EU occurs at consulates abroad during the application procedure (Guild 2003). Visas thus aim to ensure that travellers are pre-screened before they arrive at the territorial border.

Visa requirements also play a role in diplomatic relations (Martenczuk 2009; Stringer 2004). Travel restrictions can be imposed on some third countries and not others as part of a differentiation between allies and adversaries. They are used as a 'carrot' and 'stick' and can be imposed or lifted as a concession to another partner or to signal a bi-lateral worsening or improvement of relations. As part of the EU enlargement process, for example, visa restrictions have been gradually liberalized for most of the countries in the Balkans (Trauner 2009: 75-77).

The EU has attempted to encourage different forms of administrative cooperation in the visa-issuing process to ensure a uniform application of the shared visa legislation. The European Commission has promoted the idea of joint application processing centres (see for example COM 2007b). The common rules also encourage local consular officials to meet and exchange data. Finally, a member state can make a bilateral agreement transferring fully or partly the visa-issuing process in a specific country or city to another Schengen member represented at the location (OJEU 2000, 2009b). These options for cooperation abroad have been

partially analysed both within the justice and home affairs and the foreign policy literature.

The justice and home affairs literature has in general shown considerable interest in visas and consular cooperation abroad (cf. Bigo and Guild 2005; Guild 2003; Pijpers and van der Velde 2007). It has, however, mainly focused on the overall legal framework and policy documents. Systematic empirical studies of the practice of consular visa cooperation have not been carried out within this literature.

Foreign policy analysts have largely focused on the creation of institutional structures of cooperation in Brussels, or on changes in the central offices of national foreign ministries as a result of EU integration (Carlsnaes et al. 2004). A few authors have also devoted some attention to European diplomatic and consular networks abroad.

Rijks and Whitman (2010: 39-41) analyse overall aspects of European diplomatic cooperation. They note that this concept is somewhat vague and propose a distinction between sharing "facilities" (buildings, support staff) and "capabilities" (diplomatic tasks, consular services). They state that the sharing of facilities and capabilities have not yet been much of a success. The attempts to construct joint visa application centres have not gained particular momentum.

Fernandez (2006) uses an Europeanization framework to analyse local consular cooperation and investigate how and to what extent the member states regularly meet and exchange information. Based primarily on an analysis of EU evaluation reports and policy documents she concludes that results have been "mixed" (Fernández 2006: 16f). On the one hand there has been an incorporation of EU rules and norms in local practices. But, on the other hand, resistance and lack of convergence remains due to the sensitivity of the area.

In sum, the member states have over the years harmonized overall approaches in the area of visas, a policy central to both foreign relations and internal security and migration control. Both the justice and home affairs and the foreign policy literature have taken an interest in the consular cooperation abroad in visa matters. The few analyses conducted so far indicates, however, that at this administrative level cooperation remains more limited. In the next section I set out the data and methods I utilize to contribute to our existing knowledge of European consular cooperation abroad in visa matters.

3. Data and methods

I measure the structure and extent of cooperation abroad using a new dataset covering the bilateral visa representation agreements entered into by the member states. I do not investigate meetings and exchange of data between officials in third countries ('local consular cooperation') or the establishment of joint embassy compounds ('shared visa application centres').

The rules governing the bilateral agreements are set out in the common visa code (OJEU 2009b).[26] The specific form of cooperation can vary within a given bilateral agreement. There can, for example, be rules on costs-distribution and consultation for certain categories of applicants. I only measure the overall existence of agreements. This entails that the indicator might capture somewhat different forms of bilateral cooperation. For my purposes, however, what matters is less the precise nature of the agreement but whether or not some form of collaboration takes place.

The data source for the analysis of the representation agreements is the overviews produced by the Council's General Secretariat until April 2010 ("Annex 18"

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[26] The 2009 visa code replaced, with minor changes, the previous regulations about bilateral agreements specified in the so-called Common Consular Instructions (CCI). This document laid out the rules and norms for the entire visa issuing process (Council 2004). The main difference between the old and the new regulations were the introduction of somewhat more detailed and explicit requirements about how the agreements should be legally formulated.

tables).[27] These were based on notifications by the member states of the cities abroad in which they had independent representation or relied on a visa-issuing agreement.

I have coded six versions of the consolidated overviews at yearly intervals starting in October 2004 and ending in April 2010 (Council 2004, 2005, 2006a, 2007a, 2008a, 2010a). The amount of cooperation changes throughout a given year. I used the consolidated version closest to January as an indicator of the approximate setup for the year in question. For example, the consolidated version from November 2005 is used as the best possible indicator of the cooperative setup throughout the whole of 2006.

For the different years the dataset covers all members of the Schengen cooperation, and all third countries abroad. One of the major events in the period was the enlargement of the Schengen area from 15 member states to 24 in late 2007. The dataset contains three measurements before the enlargement of Schengen and three afterwards. In 2008 Switzerland also joined bringing the total membership up to 25.[28]

The core of the dataset is two tables. The first contains a list of all the member states' own visa-issuing representations abroad per country, city and year. The raw data contains footnotes about the extent of consular services – if for example visas are solely issued to diplomatic personnel. I have only used a simple coding of whether or not a country has a visa facility at the location. For all six years this yields 9.472 observations. The second table contains a list of each cooperative agreement between two member states per city, country and year. The total count

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[27] According to article 53(a) of the new visa code the member state must now inform the Commission of the existence of bilateral agreements, which is then obliged to publish the overview of agreements (COM 2010a; OJEU 2009b).

[28] I use the following member state acronyms: AT: Austria, BE: Belgium, DE: Germany, DK: Denmark, EL: Greece, ES: Spain, FI: Finland, FR: France, IS: Iceland, IT: Italy, LU: Luxembourg, NL: Netherlands, NO: Norway, PT: Portugal, SE: Sweden, HU: Hungary, LV: Latvia, MT: Malta, SI: Slovenia, EE: Estonia, LT: Lithuania, PL: Poland, CZ: Czech Republic, SK: Slovakia, SZ: Switzerland.

of agreements is 6.852. If a cooperation agreement ended during a year, I included it if it lasted for more than half of the year in question.

The main method I utilize to investigate the data is network analysis (Scott 2000; Wasserman and Faust 1994). This technique is especially well-suited for identifying and clarifying the structure of relationship between actors by modelling their mutual contact. The analytical unit in network analysis is pairs of actors – for example two countries and the amount of contact between them. For the purpose of the network analysis I thus recoded the data into bilateral pairs of member states. For each year I measured the total number of agreements between them. This measure is directional (Wasserman and Faust 1994: 273). There are not necessarily a symmetric number of agreements between two actors. In 2010, for example, Sweden relied on Norwegian consular services in 17 cities abroad; Norway was represented by Sweden in 14 locations.

I conduct the empirical analysis over time highlighting changes and continuities in the cooperation. Although the analysed period is relatively short – six years – an analysis over time is mandated because of the considerable shift in membership in the middle of the period with the enlargement of the Schengen area.

The two main network analytical tools are sociometrices and graphs (Scott 2000: 8-16). Sociometrices are tables detailing the relationships between the actors. Network graphs give an overview of the content of the tables by displaying the actors (nodes) and their interaction (relations) in such a way that the actors with the highest amount of mutual contact are clustered together. I mainly use network graphs in the analysis. I constructed the graphs using the visualization software ORA developed by the Center for Computational Analysis of Social and Organizational Systems at the Carnegie Mellon University (Casos 2010). The positioning of the different actors on the graphs is in general stable, but the location of a node can vary slightly if the data is open for varying mathematical solutions. Sociometrices setting out the detailed content of the dataset are included in annex one to the paper.

A key consideration in the construction of the graphs is to what extent all relations between actors should be modelled or only significant or strong ties. I have chosen to operate with a threshold as this makes it possible to better identify trends in the data. As cut-off point I consistently use the mean number of agreements between any two member states in the different years. The threshold for inclusion is thereby in practice nine (2005-2009) or eight (2010) agreements.

The use of the mean guarantees the reliability of the analysis. It also ensures that only dense network links are included in the analysis. As the Schengen members on average have about 50 mutual cooperative agreements a relation encompassing eight or nine relations is a major tie. Yet a case could also be made for a lower threshold of inclusion. The median points in the dataset in the different years are four (2005-2009) and three (2010). This tells us that minor bilateral relations are common in the network. Following the mean does not fully take this into account. I assessed the practical impact of the choice of cut-off point by constructing network graphs using different settings. This robustness test is described further in the empirical analysis. The overall conclusion is that the pattern is stable.[29]

In the next sections I present the results of the main analysis.

4. The extent of the European consular cooperation in visa policy

Table 1 presents an overview of the extent of the European consular cooperation in the area of visa policy at the beginning of 2010:

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[29] The dataset, robustness tests and the statistical read-outs are available on the database website.

Table 1

European consular representation in third countries in visa matters

Member state	Independent	Cooperative	Both	None
Europe / Schengen average	51	49	2	66
Austria	50	80	6	33
Belgium	64	72	3	30
Czech Republic	66	0	0	103
Denmark	39	65	4	61
Estonia	10	56	3	100
Finland	46	52	1	70
France	125	12	2	30
Germany	116	24	1	28
Greece	57	74	5	33
Hungary	46	27	5	91
Iceland	0	90	1	78
Italy	102	35	0	32
Latvia	14	34	2	119
Lithuania	21	16	0	132
Luxembourg	4	129	3	33
Malta	11	70	3	85
Netherlands	80	54	3	32
Norway	44	58	6	61
Poland	63	1	0	105
Portugal	50	85	1	33
Slovakia	37	0	0	132
Slovenia	16	88	5	60
Spain	96	45	0	28
Sweden	46	62	3	58
Switzerland	77	0	0	92

SOURCE: 2010 data from annex 18 of the Common Consular Instructions (Council 2010b). The dataset covers 169 third countries outside the Schengen area.

Table one shows that the Schengen states in general strongly rely on cooperative arrangements. On average, the European states have independent representation in 51 third countries, relies on their partners in 49, both forms in 2 and do not have a consular presence at all in 67 states. Cooperative representation is thus almost as common as having independent visa issuing facilities in a third country. There are, however, considerable differences between the member states. France, Germany and Italy are independently represented in over 100 countries. Iceland and Luxembourg have almost no visa-representations. The vast majority of the EU-states have independent representation in visa matters in 40 to 60 third countries.

In the next section I investigate in closer detail the precise structure and development of the cooperation in the analysed period.

5. The structure of the consular cooperation

This section discusses the results of the network analysis focusing on the main tenets of the consular network before and after the enlargement of the Schengen area in December 2007. Figure one to three below shows the structure of the cooperation in the period from late 2004 until the Schengen enlargement:

Figure 1

Consular cooperation 2005

NOTES: Data from 2004.10.11. Relations with a weight below 8.7 (the mean number cities abroad covered by an agreement between two member states) excluded. These are viewed as insignificant. The arrows show the direction of the relationship. Finland is not included because none of its relations has a weight above the cut-off point. Size of the Schengen area: 15 member states.

Figure 2

Consular cooperation 2006

NOTES: Data from 07.11.2005. Links with a weight below 8.9 excluded as insignificant (see explanatory comments to figure 1). Size of the Schengen area: 15 member states.

Figure 3

Consular cooperation 2007

NOTES: Data from 16.10.2006. Links with a weight below 8.7 excluded as insignificant (see explanatory comments to figure 1). Size of the Schengen area: 15 member states.

Figure 1, for 2005, shows France at the centre of the network. All the other member states rely on France to represent them in a significant number of locations abroad (above 8). Germany is also highly central but not to the same extent. This is primarily because Italy and the Nordic countries – except for Norway – solely interact with France. Thus, only 11 countries rely on Germany's consulates for representation abroad.

Italy is somewhat isolated in the network as it only cooperates with France, and the other member states do not in general rely on its otherwise extensive consular services. Finland is excluded altogether from the picture because it only has a marginal number of ties with the other member states.

The remaining member states cluster in three sub-groups. There is, firstly, a *Nordic* group consisting of Denmark, Iceland, Norway and Sweden. Iceland relies on all the other Scandinavian countries. Denmark cooperates with Norway and Sweden. Norway and Sweden, finally, do not cooperate with each other and thus occupy opposite ends of the Nordic sub-group. The Scandinavian countries are primarily connected to the rest of the network through France. The second grouping is the *Benelux* countries. The Netherlands is the primary actor in this group with Luxembourg and Belgium relying on its representations. The *Southern European* cluster is slightly more complex. At the centre of it is Spain, which Greece and Portugal rely on. Austria also belongs to this group because of its ties with Spain. Italy, as noted, is not a part of the Southern group.

In 2006, as shown in figure 2, Finland entered the network connected to Germany and Netherlands. It did not join the Nordic group perhaps testifying to its peculiar relation to the other Scandinavian countries. Italy established ties with Germany.

Figure 3 illustrates that in 2007 Finland began to cooperate with Sweden moving it towards the Nordic group. It also, however, had relations with the Netherlands. This pulled the Netherlands somewhat away from the other Benelux countries.

The centrality of Germany, finally, increased as Sweden established a connection with it.

In sum, in the years prior to the enlargement of Schengen the consular cooperation between the member states occurred in a stable and recurrent structure. France was at the centre of the network. Germany similarly occupied a key role, but was less central because it did not cooperate with most of the Nordic countries. Italy had a somewhat secluded role only linked with France and partially Germany. The Nordic countries – but Finland – cooperated in a distinct sub-group as did the Benelux countries. The Southern European countries, and Austria, finally clustered together. The pattern of cooperation thus largely followed regional geographical groupings in Europe.

Figure four to six shows the structure of the consular network after the Schengen enlargement.

Figure 4

Consular cooperation 2008

NOTES: Data from 17.12.2007. Links with a weight below 8.8 excluded as insignificant (see explanatory comments to figure 1). Hungary and Latvia are not shown because none of their relations had a weight above the cut-off point. Estonia, Lithuania, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Poland were not part of any cooperative agreements at all. Size of the Schengen area: 24 member states.

Figure 5

Consular cooperation 2009

NOTES: Data from 01.12.2008. Links with a weight below 8.4 excluded as insignificant (see explanatory comments to figure 1). Poland is not shown because none of its relations had a weight above the cut-off point. The Czech Republic and Slovakia were not part of any cooperative agreements at all. Size of the Schengen area: 24 member states.

**Figure 6**

Consular cooperation 2010

NOTES: Data from 04.30.2010. Links with a weight below 7.5 excluded as insignificant (see explanatory comments to figure 1). Poland and Switzerland are not shown because none of their relations had a weight above the cut-off point. The Czech Republic and Slovakia were not part of any cooperative agreements at all. Size of the Schengen area: 25 states.

The post-enlargement figures in general show a process of change from 2008 to 2010, and the added complexity of the network resulting from the larger membership.

Initially, as illustrated in figure 4, the Schengen enlargement only entailed changes in the Southern cluster of the network. Malta established ties with Italy and Austria; Slovenia with Austria, Portugal, Italy and Germany. Compared with the Nordic and the Benelux groups the Southern cluster thus became more diverse and less clearly structured. The remaining new members did not enter into agreements.

A year later, in 2009, the Southern European network gained a clearer structure. In general, it was connected to the rest of Europe through Germany and France. Slovenia, however, also had direct ties with the Netherlands. Additionally, the Baltic States and Hungary entered the network. But in contrast with the Nordic and the Benelux states the Baltic States did not establish a sub-group. Estonia established ties with Finland and Germany, Lithuania with Hungary, and Latvia with Hungary and Germany. In the Nordic cluster, Norway and Sweden started to cooperate. Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia were still not a part. The new members of the network mainly established ties with Germany moving the centre away from France.

The data for 2010, finally, shows several changes. The main trend was the establishment of Hungary as the centre of a new *Central-Eastern* cluster covering Slovenia, Lithuania and Latvia but not Estonia. Estonia is only indirectly connected to the cluster through a new link with Slovenia, but it also initiated a new relation with Spain. Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia did not participate in the network at all. The Netherlands appeared to be gradually becoming a minor Northern centre in its own right. Spain, finally, became more clearly positioned as the main actor in the Southern cluster.

In sum, the network of consular cooperation in visa matters shows considerable continuity before and after the Eastern enlargement of Schengen but also new tendencies. The Nordic and the Benelux clusters remain intact, and the Southern seems to have been strengthened by the addition of Malta, Slovenia and Italy. Two main other post-Enlargement changes are the emergent creation of a Central-Eastern cluster, and a shift in the centre of the network towards Germany.

How robust are the overall empirical findings to the use of different cut-off points in constructing the graphs? To examine this I ran a series of tests plotting first the network without a threshold and then gradually moved upwards until all bilateral links were excluded. In doing so, I also explored to what extent the use of the median instead of the mean altered the picture significantly. The robustness test revealed that the regional pattern in the data is very stable with two exceptions. First, the Benelux cluster is somewhat sensitive to the threshold. At low levels the grouping becomes integrated into the centre or Southern part of the network. This is especially the case after the enlargement of Schengen. A reverse dynamic is also at play, however. The Benelux cluster is one of the last groups to disappear as the threshold is increased. Second, at low cut-off points an emerging Eastern cluster is visible already in 2008. The test also shows that conclusions about individual member states can be uncertain. For example, whether or not a Schengen country is deemed to be a part of the network in a given year sometimes depend on the cut-off point. Similarly, findings on specific cooperative links can be sensitive. Still, all in all the main trends in the data are solid.

In the next section I discuss different possible explanations of the pattern of cooperation.

6. Explaining the extent and pattern of cooperation

There is a wide range of theories of European integration (Rosamond 2000). Three of the main contemporary approaches are realism (Hill 1998; Hoffmann 1966; Howorth 2001; Waltz 1979), liberal intergovernmentalism (Moravcsik 1993; Moravcsik and Nicolaïdes 1999) and constructivism (Bretherton and Vogler

2006; Buzan et al. 1998; Neumann 2002). In the following sections I use these three theories to develop a set of explanations of the visa cooperation abroad, and discuss the strengths and weaknesses of the accounts.

A realist explanation

Realism is a key theory of international relations (Legro and Moravcsik 1999: 5), and is often used in studies of especially European foreign policy (Hill 1998; Howorth 2001). It is a rich and varied approach.[30] My analytical starting-point is neo-realism and its picture of world politics as an international anarchy populated by sovereign states (Keohane 1986: 7; Waltz 1979: 7). The interest of the state is in this account defined as survival (Waltz 1979). Concerned first and foremost with securing their own continued existence the states will attempt to balance each other so that no actor becomes powerful enough to conquer the others. What determines policy is solely the overall distribution of material capabilities in the system of states – not ideologies, historical ties or domestic politics. International relations are hence highly competitive and mistrustful. Consequently, neo-realism is sceptical about the possibility of cooperation in global politics. This is especially the case for the larger and more powerful states, which are the analytical focus of the theory (Keohane 1986).

Applied to EU visa policy, this line of explanation directs our attention towards the structure and extent of cooperation between the major member states. These are France and Germany and, albeit to a lesser extent, Italy, Spain and Poland. The first two form the centre of the network with a range of smaller countries relying on their consular representations. This is in line with realist expectations. It is more difficult to explain why Germany makes use of some French consulates, but this might still be seen as a relatively insignificant level of cooperation. Poland does not cooperate at all, again supporting the realist account. Spain is a local centre of the Southern cluster though it also relies on Italian, French and German facilities. The latter is difficult to explain but could reflect that Spain is a less powerful state. The same would hold for Italy and its increased dependence

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[30] For a critical discussion of different lines of argument within realism see Legro and Moravcsik (1999).

on France and Germany. Finally, it might be an anomaly that the smaller EU-states cooperate intensively with each other, but then again they are not overall significant in international relations.

Neorealism thus offers a fairly convincing explanation of the position of the major states. It is not, however, concerned with minor states and therefore does not provide an account of their cooperation. Yet most EU countries are small and they are responsible for a substantial amount of the visas issued. Hence to understand European visa cooperation these member states' practices should also be explained.

If we shift the focus to classical realism (Rose 1998; Rynning 2011) smaller states reappear as relevant objects of analysis. Moreover, the geopolitics of territory, population flows and frontiers become important (Ashley 1987; Rudolph 2003; Wæver 1992a: 172). States have a reasonably fixed location and their interests are therefore to a large extent driven by which countries they find themselves bordering. Thus, organised crime or social upheaval in a neighbour country is a security concern for a state as it could threaten the stability of the border area. This territorial dimension was largely absent in the neorealist model with its structuralist focus on global power relations (Buzan and Wæver 2003: 11).[31]

The classical, geopolitical realist explanation directs our attention to the EU states which share territorial borders with third countries. This shifts the focus to the Southern and Eastern clusters. The former have strong interests in trade and migration control towards Northern Africa. The latter shares similar concerns in relation to Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova. Yet, common interests do not equal a preference for cooperation. On the contrary, where concerns run high a realist account predicts that states would opt to retain independent policy-making capabilities. This is precisely what a closer look at the data suggests. Though Southern Europe cooperates intensively they do not collaborate when it comes to

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[31] Mouritzen (1997: 80) argues that geographical location is entirely absent from the neo-realist model because it was originally based on an analogy to the micro-economic concept of a market, an idea which does not involve territory.

their immediate North African and Middle-Eastern neighbours. Here they have independent consular representation in visa matters. The same is the case for the Eastern cluster with regards to their bordering states. Where national interests are at stake we thus, as expected, find that the states have chosen to retain their capacity to conduct independent migration control. Classical geopolitical realism can therefore explain the visa strategy of small and larger EU members located in the territorial periphery of the union towards their neighbours. Other patterns of cooperation and non-cooperation fall outside the scope of this account.

This somewhat narrow focus is itself a limitation of the explanation. What is more troubling is that movement and trade are not as tied to geographical proximity as they might have been once. Today, transport is easy facilitating flows of money and persons across large distances (Neumann and Gstöhl 2006: 13). The cooperation between EU member-states in relation to remote third countries thus needs to be accounted for. A realist reply to this criticism could be that the substantial amount of collaboration within the regional clusters concerns third countries of little relevance to state interests. But this is not the case. Within the Southern and Eastern groups states rely on each other's consulates in immigration sending countries like Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, and Iran and a key trade partner such as India. This questions the classical realist account.

Realism, in sum, is able to explain some of the central dynamics in the structure and extent of cooperation. Specifically, it provides an account of the position of the main players. Yet the key pattern in the data – regional clusters – is not adequately accounted for.

Liberal intergovernmentalism
Liberal intergovernmentalism is a central approach in European studies mainly developed by Moravcsik (1993, 2003). The theory models EU-politics as a two-level game (cf. Putnam 1988). In a first round of domestic politics – primarily involving economic interest groups – the preference of a member state towards a given issue is formed. In a second stage at the EU-level the state then negotiates

rationally with the other EU-members to achieve an outcome as close as possible to this interest. The international bargaining process occurs in a dense net of institutional rules and norms where the member states can make credible commitments and link diverse issues to enable more players to be accommodated (cf. Keohane 1984).

A member state thus settles on its visa policy preference in the national stage of the game. Should the overall approach be liberal or restrictive? Key actors are economic interest groups – major companies, trade organizations and the tourism industry. Because of their interest in easy travel for tourists and business partners we would expect them to lobby for a liberal policy: extensive consular representation abroad and generous visa issuing practices. National politicians seeking re-election can also play a role at this level, Moravcsik emphasises (1993: 483f). When migration is a highly salient issue governments could have an interest in a restrictive policy. Thus for example in countries with strong anti-immigration parties protecting the borders could be central to appeasing popular concerns and winning votes.

In the subsequent European stage of the game the government then identifies and aligns with other member states with a similar policy preference. Countries with a liberal approach to migration control would be expected to cooperate with other liberal players. The restrictive states should similarly collaborate with each other.

The Southern cluster in the network lends some support to this explanation. In especially Greece, Malta, Spain and Portugal tourism constitute a considerable part of the domestic economies (WB 2010b). Tourism is also significant, though to a lesser extent, in Austria. Although intra-European visits are likely to be a major part of this, especially the larger Southern countries attract guests from all over the world. It would therefore seem likely that the tourism industry here is able to lobby the government and work for a liberal visa policy. These member states would thereby end up pursuing a similar liberal interest. This in turn can explain why they cooperate with each other at the European level.

Yet tourism is not a major industry in the other member states and this factor therefore cannot account for the other clusters. What about bilateral trading interests? Extra-European trade constitute a considerable (above 15%, 2009 figures) share of the GDP of Belgium, the Netherlands, Hungary, Slovenia, Slovakia, Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia (Eurostat 2010a, 2011). Thus, in these countries companies and trade organisations would seem likely to have a particularly strong interest in an open access policy. We should therefore expect them to push their governments in this direction. A common domestic interest in liberal visa policy could explain the significant cooperation between these states. It cannot, however, account for why there are two distinct clusters – Benelux and the Eastern group – and not just one large cluster. But the Central and Eastern members have only recently joined the common visa policy. If this trade-based liberal account is correct we should thus expect cross-cluster relations to develop in the coming years. There remains the Nordic group. These countries do not have a similarly high level of external trade. Hence it makes sense that they do not form a part of the others clusters. But in the absence of a strong external trade interest it is difficult to explain why they should cooperate intensively with each other.

To what extent can national partisan politics supplement this explanation and account for especially Nordic alignment? Radical right-wing parties are particularly strong electorally in Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway and France (Lubbers et al. 2002: 357; Rydgren 2008: 737f). From the perspective of domestic electoral politics it is thus understandable that Denmark and Norway would cooperate. Their reliance on restrictive France is to be expected as well. The recent collaboration between Norway and the Netherlands equally makes sense. It is, however, difficult to see why Norway and Denmark would align with liberal Sweden. Instead, we should expect to see cooperation with Austria, while Sweden should rely on pro-migration Spain. National partisanship thus can provide some explanation of Nordic cooperation, but face significant counter evidence.

Summing up, liberal intergovernmentalism offers a convincing account of the Southern cluster and to some extent also the Eastern and Benelux groups. It is less able to explain Nordic cooperation. Nor does it account for the role of Germany and France as network centres.

A constructivist approach

Constructivism is the major alternative to realist and liberal approaches within international relations and European foreign affairs studies (cf. Smith 2001). The general starting-point is the meta-theoretical claim that the world does not have meaning independently of the language we use to describe it (Campbell 1998: 4). From this follows that we should be analytically interested in and study the ways in which different discourses and practices give significance to and allows us to interpret actions and events (Larsen 1999: 453; cf. Neumann 2002). Instead of merely assuming that state interests are objectively given we should focus on how construction of identities shapes the formation of interests (Ringmar 1996; Weldes 1996).

The analytical ambition of constructivist approaches varies. Hansen (2006; for a discussion see Wendt 1998) argues for the "impossibility of causality" and pleads for a sole focus on the "constitutive" effects of discourses and practices. We can thus investigate how shared constructions make events and actions meaningful, but we cannot attribute a causal role to ideas (cf. Neumann 1994). Wæver (1998) pleads for a focus on "negative predictions" emphasising that discourse analysis should not be used in attempts to explain what will happen but only to map out the field of actions that would *not* be meaningful and hence are unlikely to occur. Jepperson, Katzenstein and Wendt (see also Finnemore and Sikkink 1998;) argue that "ideational" factors can and should be included in causal analysis alongside "material". Thus, for any given political situation we can investigate the independent and relative causal importance of shared beliefs in bringing about the outcome. I follow this latter causal, explanatory approach. I view discourses and practices as constitutive of shared identities. These identities, in turn, can be

included as an ideational variable in causal analysis and used to explain events and actions.

The focal point for constructivist analyses of identity and international policy was initially the nation-state (Berger 1996; Campbell 1998; Katzenstein 1996; Larsen 1999; Wæver 1998; Weldes 1996). But what, from a constructivist perspective, is a nation? According to Anderson's (1991) now classical argument the nation is an "imagined community". In a complex historical analysis Anderson shows how a common linguistic space, the nation, was created through the development of new forms of mass-communication and state administrative practices and came to be experienced by its members as a community. Despite the impossibility of ever meeting more than a fraction of one's compatriots, citizens feel a sense of commonality. We thus, Anderson emphasises, distinguish members from non-members and are often willing to make heavy sacrifices for a community that is seen as a sovereign political entity. Another way of putting this is that national belonging is part of our identity and shapes in crucial ways how we act and interact.

As Neumann (1994: 58) points out, however, not only nations but also regions can be seen as imagined communities. This suggests that we can push this line of argument beyond the nation state (cf. Bellamy 2004: 31f; Held 1998: 19) and apply it to policy cooperation at a regional level. In all likelihood, regions are imagined as less thick (Walzer 1994) communities than the nation. Still, they could exhibit similar features. To illustrate, let us take the case of the Nordic regional cluster.

The Nordic region is characterized by strong linguistic similarities (Wæver 1992b: 95). The Swedish, Danish and Norwegian languages are very alike, and there is a widespread assumption in the populations that it is easy to understand each other. Finnish and Icelandic differ markedly but Swedish and Danish respectively are common second languages in these two countries. Moreover, universalistic welfare states developed in all of the countries in the same period with similar

administrative practices and technologies (Miles 2010: 186). Analyses of general societal discourses show that the Nordic countries do indeed share a perception of each other as coming from stable, small, rule-of-law welfare states (Hansen and Wæver 2001). That is, they recognize in each other a certain commonality as a basis for trust. In this way the Nordic region resembles Anderson's national imagined community, although it is arguably thinner and does not entail as strong ideas about sovereignty or patriotism.

The Nordic case suggests that the patterns of visa cooperation can be explained as a result of 'regional imagined communities'. Shared perceptions of likeness in terms of especially language and state structures generate trust which facilitates collaboration on sensitive issues. Within the regions the member states can meaningfully share and transfer sovereignty over decisions concerning which persons should be allowed or denied entry to their territory. But can this account be generalized beyond Scandinavia or do we need another approach to understand the remaining patterns?

Let us look at the other groupings in the network one by one. The Benelux cluster – which is strong and persistent – is characterized by linguistic diversity (Vanhoonacker 2003: 14). But this language diversity is a shared feature and cut across state boundaries. The Netherlands and Belgium also share a colonial past and all three countries have a long history of state-building in the light of vulnerability to European warfare.

The Southern group has important similarities but many differences as well (Featherstone and Kazamias 2001: 3f; Heywood and McLaren 2010: 170f). There are strong commonalities between the Spanish, Portuguese and Italian languages. But the linguistic differences to Greece and Austria are considerable. The state-building trajectories of Spain and Portugal are again quite similar with an early colonial expansion, a strong Catholic church and a recent history of fascism. Greece, Italy and Slovenia exhibits some like features. But Malta and Austria are the odd ones out.

The Eastern cluster displays substantial linguistic diversity, but also shares a recent history of Communism, peaceful revolution and EU-accession central to the state-building of these countries (Hamilton 1999: 136; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005: 2). All in all, the explanatory model has some purchase for the other clusters, but also limitations. It seems very likely that some forms of regional imagined communities do exist which facilitates cooperation, but that these are less tightly knit than the Nordic group.

What about France and Germany? Their consular facilities are made available to and used by almost all other EU-countries. The two states do not rely on the services of others. As centres of the network the region to which they belong is therefore Europe as such (cf. Wæver 2001: 39f). In the case of France this is understandable given its recent past as colonial world power which formed the making of the French nation-state. In its own understanding France is still a global actor with a civilizing mission. Only now this role is played out through a European Union shaped in the image of and revolving around France (Wæver 1998). In Germany the nation-state was fundamentally reconfigured after the Second World War. Its administration was rebuilt and discourses of German identity underwent significant changes. Only as a peaceful part of Europe could Germany redeem itself after the atrocities of the gas chambers. Offering assistance to smaller EU members can be seen as way of enacting this role of an institutionally embedded friendly regional power (Katzenstein 1997; Wæver 1998). The European Union from its earliest days has been created around an idea of a French-German centre (Cole 2010). Bureaucratic structures both within the EU and in individual member states are to large extent influenced by the traditions of these two core countries. French and German are leading administrative and diplomatic languages in the EU spoken widely in most member states, especially by officials. Taken together, this explains why so many smaller member-states avail themselves of the consulates of France and Germany.

The 'regional imagined communities' concept thus offers a very convincing explanation of Nordic cooperation and the role of EU core countries. It finds

support in the remaining patterns as well. The latter, however, suggest that the account demands more commonality in language and nation-state history than can be observed.

Constructivist arguments are not solely about identity. A different strand focuses on norms (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). This prompts us to ask if the network structure could be the result not of imagined communities but of a looser set of institutionally embedded practices. It might be that for some reason the member states got in the habit of cooperating mainly with their neighbours and that this has gradually evolved into standard operating procedures and norms of appropriateness (Allison and Zelikow 1999; March and Olsen 1989). But this raises the question of what triggered the pattern of cooperation in the first place. The answer could be a common policy preference. As we saw in the previous sections shared interests can account for important parts of the findings. But in that case policy interests would seem to do the analytical work leaving little role for standard operating procedures. Only if norms and preferences begin to diverge and we see continued cooperation would the norms-based constructivism have purchase. The data period, however, makes it difficult to trace such potential shifts.

Another trigger could be regional imagined communities. If state officials share a sense of belonging with their counterparts in neighbour countries this could spur cooperation which would then gradually become a standard of good practice. At first, this would again seem to make the norms-argument redundant as the common identity now drives the explanation. But in the cases where the imagined community looks rather too thin to account for all cooperation, as in the case of Southern Europe for example, the norms argument could carry important weight. Some commonalities in language and history prompt initial cooperation which then becomes institutionalized. In this way the two different constructivist accounts supplement each other.

Regional patterns of cooperation have also been identified as a component of the legislative decision-making process of the European Union, and identity-driven factors have been put forward as important in explaining these (Elgström et al. 2001; Kaeding and Selck 2005; Mattila and Lane 2001; Naurin 2008). This could, on the one hand, suggest that visa collaboration is an 'isomorphism' (DiMaggio and Powell 1983) from more well-established practices. If member-states cooperate regionally in one area this could inspire the same behaviour in other fields. With some administrative practices established broadening the cooperation would be comparatively easy. On the other hand, the presence of regional cooperation across a diverse range of issues and arenas suggests that some form of imagined community is at play. Again, if countries see their neighbours as more like themselves than other member-states and hence more trustworthy this would account for why these norms of appropriateness arise in the first place.

In sum, the concept of regional imagined communities provides a good account of the structures in the network. Especially if combined with a norms-based constructivism it provides the most extensive explanation of the patterns.

7. Conclusion

In this paper I have investigated the structure and extent of the consular cooperation in visa matters among the Schengen-members in the period from 2005 to 2010. The aim was to further our understanding of intensive transgovernmentalism – the main type of policy-making in the area of interior and foreign affairs. I did this by investigating what patterns of cooperation has been established between the member states in this selected sovereignty sensitive policy area, and why. To carry out the analysis I utilized a new dataset of consular visa representation agreements, and a network analytical approach to investigate the patterns in the data.

I showed, firstly, that the member states strongly rely on cooperative arrangements. To a large extent they use each other's consular services abroad in the visa-issuing process. The average Schengen member is independently

represented in approximately 50 countries, via a cooperative agreement in 50 and not represented at all in 70.

The network analysis showed, secondly, that cooperation throughout the period was structured in distinct clusters: a Nordic, Benelux, Southern-European and an emergent Central-Eastern. France and Germany were at the centre of the network. There were few ties across the clusters. Northern and Southern Europe, in particular, did hardly cooperate at all.

Drawing on three main theories within European and international studies I discussed what could explain this pattern of cooperation. I focused on assessing the merits of realist, liberal intergovernmentalist and constructivist perspectives.

Realism emphasises the difficulties of cooperation in inter-state affairs. This provided an explanation of the position of the larger member states. Realist theory could also account for why smaller border-states are independently represented in neighbouring third countries. But the overall regional patterns remained puzzling.

The liberal intergovernmentalist account focused on the national formation of preferences about migration control, and predicted that the member states would cooperate with others sharing a similar liberal or restrictive approach. This argument found particular support in relation to the Southern cluster where the importance of tourism constitutes a likely significant common interest. The liberal account also found some support in the rest of the patterns, but faced important counter-trends.

The constructivist argument explained cooperation as rendered feasible by the existence of shared identities owing to regional commonalities in language and state-building histories. These constructions make it possible for the member states to trust and cooperate with each other. I proposed the term 'regional imagined communities' to capture and explain the geographical clusters of cooperation. This concept was particularly well-suited to account for Nordic

collaboration and the central role of Germany and France. It could also go some way in explaining the remaining relations. But here the commonalities were weaker. This suggested the need for a supplementary norms-based constructivism working in conjunction with thin imagined communities.

The case of visa policy was selected as an example of EU-integration spanning interior and foreign policy. As an area where the member states have established particularly widespread cooperation it is an 'extreme case'. It enables us to identify patterns and dynamics which are likely to be at play in other sovereignty sensitive areas, albeit in more inchoate and therefore less easily observable form. The case of visa cooperation suggests that ideational factors such as regional imagined communities are important in facilitating cooperation, but that common interests are of some relevance as well. Further studies of, for example, judicial and diplomatic collaboration could throw additional light on the relative explanatory potential of preferences and identities in explaining patterns of interaction between the member states. This could also help to establish the extent to which regional groupings characterize the intensive transgovernmentalism of foreign policy and justice and home and affairs cooperation.

Annex 1: Socio-metrical overviews

Sociometric 1. Consular visa representation agreements in 2005

	AT	BE	DE	ES	FR	IT	NL	PT	LU	DK	FI	NO	SE	EL	IS
AT		5	25	14	32	1	2	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
BE	1		14	5	23	1	29	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
DE	0	1		1	16	1	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
ES	0	2	14		40	1	1	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
FR	0	0	5	1		1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
IT	0	1	8	2	18		1	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
NL	0	8	14	5	23	1		1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
PT	1	0	19	26	44	1	1		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
LU	1	76	14	5	23	1	32	1		0	0	0	0	0	0
DK	2	0	5	0	10	0	4	0	0		4	10	12	0	0
FI	1	2	1	0	0	0	2	0	0	5		2	6	0	0
NO	0	1	10	0	13	2	9	1	0	8	4		4	0	0
SE	2	1	7	4	13	5	7	1	0	4	4	5		0	0
EL	2	2	10	17	38	7	2	7	0	0	0	0	0		0
IS	0	0	3	0	17	1	4	0	0	51	6	16	10	0	

SOURCE: The General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union, Council (2004). Data from 2004.10.11.

NOTES: Reading the table from the rows it can be identified which partners a member state relies on. Germany, for example, (DE) used France's (FR) consular services in 16 locations abroad. Similarly, Sweden relied on Netherlands in 7 cities. Starting from the columns it can be found which partners relies on a member states. The column with Sweden (SE) shows, e.g., that IT, DK, FI, NO and IS use Swedish consular services in varying degrees. Please note that member states not participating in any agreements at all are not shown.

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Sociometric 2. Consular visa representation agreements in 2006

	AT	BE	DE	ES	FI	FR	IT	NL	PT	LU	DK	NO	SE	EL	IS
AT		5	27	14	1	32	1	2	6	0	0	0	0	0	0
BE	1		16	5	0	24	1	28	1	1	0	0	0	0	0
DE	0	1		1	0	17	1	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	0
ES	0	2	15		0	40	2	1	3	0	1	0	0	0	0
FI	2	1	9	4		0	2	13	2	0	5	2	6	0	0
FR	0	0	5	1	0		1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
IT	0	1	9	2	0	18		1	1	0	0	0	1	0	0
NL	0	10	15	5	0	23	1		1	1	0	0	0	0	0
PT	1	0	19	26	0	50	1	1		0	0	0	0	0	0
LU	1	81	16	5	0	24	1	31	1		0	0	0	0	0
DK	2	0	6	0	4	10	0	5	0	0		10	12	0	0
NO	0	1	11	0	4	14	2	9	1	0	8		4	0	0
SE	2	1	7	4	5	13	5	7	1	0	4	5		0	0
EL	2	3	12	17	0	39	8	2	7	0	0	0	1		0
IS	0	0	4	0	6	17	1	4	0	0	57	17	11	0	

SOURCE: The General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union, Council (2005). Data from 2005.11.07.
NOTES: See sociometric 1.

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Sociometric 3. Consular visa representation agreements in 2007

	AT	BE	DE	ES	FI	FR	IT	NL	PT	LU	DK	NO	SE	EL	IS
AT		6	27	14	1	30	1	3	6	0	0	0	0	0	0
BE	1		16	5	0	25	1	28	1	1	0	0	0	0	0
DE	0	1		1	0	17	1	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0
ES	0	1	13		0	42	2	2	3	0	1	0	0	0	0
FI	2	1	11	4		0	2	13	2	0	5	4	10	0	0
FR	0	0	5	1	0		1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
IT	0	2	9	2	0	19		1	1	0	0	0	1	0	0
NL	0	10	16	5	0	23	1		1	1	0	0	1	0	0
PT	1	0	17	26	0	51	1	2		0	0	0	0	0	0
LU	1	81	17	5	0	24	1	30	1		0	0	0	0	0
DK	2	0	6	0	4	11	0	5	0	0		10	13	0	0
NO	0	1	10	0	3	11	2	8	1	0	9		8	0	0
SE	1	1	9	4	4	12	5	7	1	0	4	6		1	0
EL	1	2	11	17	0	39	8	2	7	0	0	0	1		0
IS	0	0	4	0	5	17	1	4	0	0	55	18	12	0	

SOURCE: The General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union, Council (2006). Data from 2006.10.16.
NOTES: See sociometric 1.

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Sociometric 4. Consular visa representation agreements in 2008

	AT	BE	DE	ES	FI	FR	HU	IT	NL	PT	SI	LU	DK	NO	SE	EL	IS	LV	MT
AT		5	28	14	1	28	1	1	3	6	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
BE	1		16	6	0	25	0	1	27	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
DE	0	1		1	0	18	0	1	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
ES	0	1	11		0	41	0	2	2	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
FI	2	1	11	4		0	0	2	13	2	0	0	6	4	10	0	0	0	0
FR	0	1	5	2	0		0	2	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
HU	4	0	0	0	0	0		0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
IT	0	2	9	2	0	19	0		1	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
NL	0	9	15	5	0	23	0	1		1	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
PT	1	1	17	27	0	44	0	3	2		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
SI	17	3	11	0	0	0	6	11	0	11		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
LU	1	69	15	5	0	24	0	1	31	1	0		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
DK	2	0	13	0	4	11	0	0	5	0	0	0		10	15	0	0	0	0
NO	0	1	10	0	4	11	0	2	8	1	0	0	10		8	0	0	0	0
SE	1	1	8	4	5	12	0	6	7	1	0	0	5	5		1	0	0	0
EL	1	2	11	17	0	38	0	7	2	7	0	0	0	0	1		0	0	0
IS	0	0	4	0	5	17	0	1	4	0	0	0	48	18	11	0		0	0
LV	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0
MT	29	0	0	0	0	0	0	47	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	

SOURCE: The General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union, Council (2007). Data from 2007.12.17.
NOTES: See sociometric 1.

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Sociometric 5. Consular visa representation agreements in 2009

	AT	BE	DE	ES	FI	FR	HU	IT	NL	PT	SI	LU	DK	NO	SE	EE	LV	EL	LT	IS	MT	PL
AT		5	28	14	1	28	1	1	3	6	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
BE	1		16	6	0	25	0	1	27	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
DE	0	1		1	0	18	0	1	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
ES	0	1	10		0	35	0	2	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
FI	2	1	13	4		0	0	2	13	2	0	0	5	4	9	2	0	0	0	0	0	0
FR	0	2	5	2	0		0	2	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
HU	4	0	0	0	0	0		0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	1	0	0	0
IT	0	2	9	2	0	19	0		1	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
NL	0	9	15	5	0	23	0	1		1	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
PT	1	2	17	27	0	43	0	3	2		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
SI	17	3	11	0	0	8	6	12	12	11		0	3	0	0	0	5	0	0	0	0	4
LU	1	69	14	5	0	24	0	1	31	1	1		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
DK	2	0	14	0	3	10	1	0	5	0	1	0		19	19	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
NO	0	1	10	0	4	11	0	2	8	1	0	0	13		17	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
SE	1	1	9	4	4	10	1	5	7	1	0	0	11	14		0	1	0	0	0	0	0
EE	0	0	15	0	11	0	6	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0		3	0	0	0	0	0
LV	0	0	14	0	0	1	15	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0	0	0	0	0
EL	1	2	10	17	0	37	0	7	2	7	0	0	0	0	1	0	0		0	0	0	0
LT	0	0	0	0	0	0	10	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0	0	0
IS	0	0	4	0	5	16	0	1	4	0	0	0	39	22	18	0	0	0	0		0	0
MT	27	0	0	10	0	0	0	51	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0
PL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	

SOURCE: The General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union, Council (2008). Data from 2008.12.01.

NOTES: See sociometric 1.

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Sociometric 6. Consular visa representation agreements in 2010

	AT	BE	DE	ES	FI	FR	HU	IT	NL	PT	SI	SZ	LU	DK	LT	NO	SE	EE	LV	EL	IS	MT	PL
AT	■	5	27	14	1	28	2	1	3	6	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
BE	1	■	15	7	0	28	0	1	22	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
DE	0	1	■	1	0	18	0	1	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
ES	0	1	10	■	0	30	0	2	2	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
FI	1	1	13	4	■	0	2	2	13	2	0	0	0	4	0	4	8	2	0	0	0	0	0
FR	0	2	5	3	0	■	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
HU	4	2	12	0	3	0	■	0	4	0	1	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	0
IT	0	2	9	2	0	19	0	■	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
NL	0	9	14	5	1	24	1	1	■	1	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0
PT	0	2	16	26	0	42	0	3	2	■	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
SI	17	3	12	10	0	13	8	11	11	8	■	0	0	3	0	0	0	1	5	0	0	0	4
SZ	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	■	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
LU	1	69	14	5	0	25	1	1	31	1	1	0	■	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
DK	1	0	14	0	3	12	1	0	4	0	1	0	0	■	1	20	16	0	0	0	0	0	0
LT	4	0	0	0	0	0	10	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	■	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
NO	0	1	10	0	4	11	1	2	8	1	0	0	0	13	1	■	14	0	0	0	0	0	0
SE	0	1	9	4	4	10	1	5	6	1	0	0	0	11	0	17	■	0	1	0	0	0	0
EE	2	0	15	14	11	0	7	0	3	0	1	0	0	0	2	0	0	■	4	0	0	0	0
LV	0	0	16	0	0	1	14	0	7	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	■	0	0	0	0
EL	1	2	10	17	0	34	1	7	2	7	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	■	0	0	0
IS	0	0	4	0	4	16	0	1	4	0	0	0	0	40	0	22	16	0	0	0	■	0	0
MT	26	0	0	10	0	0	0	47	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	■	0
PL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	■

SOURCE: The General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union, Council (2010b). Data from 2010.04.30.

NOTES: See sociometric 1.

Mogens Hobolth

PAPER THREE

Europeanization of domestic border control policies: the case of short-stay visas

Abstract

Over the past decades Europe has gradually developed an internal free travel area (Schengen). This has generated considerable controversy. One criticism is that it leads to an aggregation of migration fears among member states and thereby results in more closed borders for visitors from the outside. Though this argument is frequently voiced in the literature, its precise theoretical and empirical basis has not undergone much scrutiny. The aim of this paper is to further theorise and test the claim of a restrictive impact.

Drawing on institutional theory I develop two rival accounts of the effect of EU-integration in the area of borders. The rational choice view stresses preference divergence, zero-sum interactions and an asymmetric control situation. The 'logic of consequentiality' suggests no impact of integration. The sociological model, in contrast, emphasises restrictive role expectations within Schengen and strong diffusion mechanisms. The 'logic of appropriateness' is one of tight control. I test these two rival models through a quasi-experimental Europeanization study of visa policy and the 2007 expansion of the Schengen area. I show that enlargement had a marked restrictive effect on the visa-issuing practices of the new member countries. These changes were significantly different from what we saw in the same period among the old and partial Schengen states as well as the UK and the US. Hence, the data primarily supports the sociological model and questions the purchase of the rational choice account. This finding lends support to the argument that Schengen has a restrictive domestic impact.

Key words

Institutional theory, quasi-experiment, Schengen, visas, Europeanization

1. Introduction

In today's Europe internal border controls have largely been dismantled (Bertozzi 2008).[32] As a result, people can in principle travel freely between most European countries.[33] The states instead share a single external border and have adopted common rules and norms for its control. This free travel area is usually referred to as the Schengen cooperation.

The consequences of the Schengen system for the ability of third country nationals to enter Europe are a topic of concern in the academic literature. Integration is generally expected to have a marked restrictive impact on the openness of the external border (Bigo and Guild 2005; Meloni 2005; Munster 2009; Neumayer 2006; Pijpers and van der Velde 2007). Different reasons are offered in support of this claim.

One argument is that EU-integration creates a restrictive 'race to the bottom' (Carrera et al. 2011).[34] Yet how this race should work tends to be unclear. In the wider EU literature the expression refers to a process of competitive de-regulation (Kvist 2004). For example, as it becomes easier for companies to move abroad this creates a pressure to lower domestic taxes and lessen workplace rules. Countries will thus undercut each other to attract capital creating a downward spiral of de-regulation. In the context of Schengen a restrictive race to the bottom, if it is to make sense, must be a quite different spiral of re-regulation. The member states start to take into account the migration fears and security concerns of each other leading to an aggregation and pooling of entry requirements. This entails higher levels of state control and more comprehensive restrictive rules and practices. More importantly, race to the bottom evokes rational choice: the logic

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[32] All EU-states except the United Kingdom and Ireland take part in the border cooperation. Iceland, Norway and Switzerland also participate even though they are not members of the EU. Denmark is associated on special terms due to its opt-out of all other supra-national justice and home affairs policies. Liechtenstein has requested membership but negotiations have so far not progressed far.

[33] Whether or not internal movement has become 'free' is contested in the literature. Some analysts argue that with the Schengen cooperation the old, systematic internal border control has merely been replaced with new forms and sites of control, for example inspection of passports at hotels and spot-checks at train stations (Crowley 2001; Atger 2008).

[34] For an analysis and criticism of the race to the bottom argument in the context of EU asylum policy see Thielemann and El-Enany (2011).

of deregulation is an outcome of altered incentives for rational actors. Yet in the case of Schengen, it is not immediately clear why it should be in the interest of states to pay heed to the restrictive preferences of their partners.

Another case for a restrictive impact advanced in the literature is that the Schengen system is based on 'mutual recognition' (Meloni 2009). This too is meant to capture the idea of a pooling and aggregation of entry requirements. But again the terminology is unhelpful. In EU-studies mutual recognition describes a system by which states agree to respect the legality of the decisions of each other irrespective of differences in the domestic rules through which these come about (Lavenex 2007). Mutual recognition in this respect thus implies that if Germany issues an entry visa, France should recognize the validity of the permit even if French consulates would have denied a similar application. This idea is very different from that of pooling and combining rules which entails that Germany should not have issued the visa if it went against the preferences of France.

Other accounts are developed within critical security theory (Bigo 2002; Guiraudon 2003; Munster 2009; Huysmans 2006). From this perspective, EU-integration is argued to trigger restrictiveness in two different ways. The first is venue-shopping. National officials interested in pursuing a restrictive line can turn to the EU and via this arena escape the constraints of domestic institutions and actors (courts, NGO's) pushing for liberal practices (Guiraudon 2003). The second is through information technologies. The establishment of databases, in particular, have created a 'stock exchange of fears' spreading discourses and articulations of threats across member states (Bigo 2002). Both of these arguments suggest interesting lines of inquiry but are not without problems. Why is it, precisely, that domestic officials should always be interested in pursuing a restrictive approach? If for example important trading interests are at stake other priorities could be paramount. Is it reasonable to expect that the introduction of new databases almost automatically have a practical impact? Changing established practices and mainstreaming the use of new technology are often difficult and meet with considerable resistance.

Furthermore, the impact of EU-integration on the openness of domestic borders has not as yet been subjected to systematic empirical testing. Various studies have substantiated the idea of a restrictive effect by referring to the establishment of the EU's common visa list (Neumayer 2005; Bigo and Guild 2005; Meloni 2009). They have noted that the list expanded considerably during the negotiations. This argument, however, overlooks that the member states had very different starting-points. By the mid-1990s, for example, the Swedish visa list contained approximately 110 countries whereas the French had about 150 (OJEU 1996). The final EU-list of about 130 countries therefore meant restriction of the former but a liberalization of the latter. It is thus not apparent what the overall impact of the harmonisation of visa requirements was and which dynamics characterized the process. In addition, changes in the visa list tell us little about the impact on domestic practices. EU-legislation in general suffers from considerable implementation gaps (Falkner et al. 2005; Mastenbroek 2003; Toshkov et al. 2010). In the case of Schengen, moreover, common rules leave considerable discretion to national public authorities (Berg and Ehin 2006).

The aim of this paper is to advance existing research by theorising and empirically examining the effect of the Schengen cooperation on the openness of Europe's borders to international visitors. I focus on a key element of the common border policy: the shared rules for issuing visas (Council 2008a; OJEU 2009; Meloni 2009). The question I ask is to what extent, if at all, participation in Schengen has had an impact on national control practices, and if so, in what direction and why. Using rational choice (Shepsle and Weingast 1987) and sociological institutionalism (March and Olsen 2008) I develop two rival accounts of the likely effects of EU-integration.

Drawing on rational choice institutionalism I argue that Schengen implementation is characterized by an 'asymmetric control situation'. A liberal state can pursue a lenient application of the common rules unilaterally. It does not need the cooperation of partner states for doing so. In contrast, restrictive states are dependent on the partners to achieve effective control. Otherwise, persons can

simply enter through one of the other states. Yet achieving this cooperation is likely to be difficult as the states are engaged in a zero-sum game. There are only costs and no gains for the liberal state to adapt. Cooperative practices could nevertheless emerge if strong sanctions, side-payments or tit-for-tat interactions are possible. Yet none of these are central to Schengen. The 'logic of consequentiality' thus suggests that integration has no impact on domestic visa-issuing practices.

Following sociological institutionalism I develop an alternative explanation of the impact of EU-integration. I identify clearly defined norms and role expectations within the Schengen regime pointing in the direction of restrictive practices. Furthermore, I argue that there are well-developed and comprehensive mechanisms in place for ensuring the diffusion and uptake of such norms by potentially recalcitrant domestic actors. Information exchange, informal evaluations and local consular cooperation create transparency and enable the naming and shaming of deviating interpretations of the common rules. There is little room for escaping predominant role expectations. The 'logic of appropriateness' is one of tight control and hence Schengen participation should have a marked restrictive effect on member states.

I test these two alternative models using a quasi-experimental (Meyers 1995; Shadish, Cook & Campbell 2002) Europeanization study (Radaelli 2003). The idea behind this research design is to assess the causal effect of EU-integration by contrasting developments in a group which experienced a change with a set which did not. To do this I draw on data from the Eastern enlargement of the Schengen area. In December 2007 nine new EU member states joined Schengen and became full participants in the EU's visa regime. Prior to this they followed the same visa list and issued visas of the same format. But they were free to use different, and perhaps more liberal, criteria for issuing visas as their permits only gave access to national territory. When they became full members internal border control was lifted, and they had to shift to the common issuing rules as their visas became valid for travel to the entire Schengen area.

The expansion of the free travel zone makes for a natural experiment. The effect of cooperation can be studied by examining how the new member states' practices potentially altered after the expansion. This shift can then be compared with trends among old and partial members of the visa regime as well as the non-members United Kingdom and the United States. If changes took place among new members, and not in the other groups, this supports the argument that there is an impact of EU integration which cannot be reduced to the effect of other factors.

Using this research design I show that the visa-issuing practice of the new member states shifted in a restrictive direction following their full Schengen membership. This trend is markedly different from what we in general observed among the old and partial members as well as the UK and the US. Hence, the empirics strongly suggest that the restrictive change in the new member states was not due to external events such as the global financial crisis. Rather, it was brought about by Schengen participation. The data thus supports the sociological institutionalist model.

The paper is structured as follows. In the next and second section I discuss and set out two models of the impact of integration. The third and fourth parts present the research design and data. In the fifth section I conduct the empirical analysis. Finally, I conclude.

2. Theorizing the impact of EU integration on border control

How can we understand the potential effects of European integration on the openness of domestic borders for international visitors? In this section I set out two different models drawing on institutional theory (Hall and Taylor 1996). The first is based on rational choice institutionalism (Garrett and Tsebelis 1996; North and Weingast 1989; Shepsle and Weingast 1987) and the second follows sociological institutionalism (Checkel 2001; DiMaggio and Powell 1983; March and Olsen 2008). Both perspectives take as their starting-point that institutions have an important effect on behaviour but differ in their understanding of what an institution is and how it works.

The paper investigates government decisions on the relative openness of external borders. I focus on situations where a visa obligation is in place. This might be the case for varying reasons. A permit could be required to prevent irregular migration. It could also reflect a foreign policy dispute between a sending and receiving country (Stringer 2004). In the context of regional integration, a visa might be required owing to the wishes of partner states. The new EU countries, for example, mainly started to demand a visa of their Eastern neighbours during the accession period as this was a condition for securing full membership of the Union (Lavenex and Ucarer 2004). The decision for governments to make, then, is how strictly a travel permit requirement should be enforced. How restrictive or liberal a visa-issuing practice is to be pursued? The following sections develop two models seeking to account for how, if at all, state implementation practices could alter as a result of European integration.

2.1 Rational choice institutionalism

In its approach to institutions, the rational choice perspective emphasises formal rules and enforcement procedures, and tend to assume that actors arrive at the scene with predefined interests (Tsebelis and Garrett 2000). The preferences of players are given, but their favoured strategies and actions will alter depending on the incentive structure provided by the institutional setup (Scharpf 1997). Actors follow a 'logic of consequentiality' (March and Olsen 2008) rationally weighing different courses of action choosing the one that will maximize their expected net benefits (Elster 1989).

In the following I assume that Schengen participants differ in their preferred visa practices. This is a reasonable position to take given the heterogeneity of the EU. There are differences for example in the extent to which domestic labour markets rely on irregular workers (Triandafyllidou 2010). Likewise, international tourism is a major source of revenue and jobs for some countries but not for others (WB 2010b). Highlighting preference divergence is especially warranted in the case of the Central and Eastern European enlargement. The new member-states are, in general, transit rather than destination countries for migrants (Anderson 2000;

Triandafyllidou and Gropas 2007: 14). In addition, their economies are often heavily tied up with cross-border trade and travel with neighbours outside the Union (Maroukis et al. 2011). This gives them a more liberal position than their counterparts in Western Europe.

Focusing on the enlargement case, Poland, for example, might like to provide easy access for travellers from the Ukraine coming to trade or visit family. It could also be interested in facilitating travel from Turkey as a major emerging market. Germany takes the opposite view fearing in both cases irregular migration. In the absence of integration, the two states are free to pursue their preferred strategies unilaterally. However, sharing a free travel area alter things considerably. Poland can still follow a lenient visa-issuing practice. It is not dependent on the cooperation of Germany for doing so but can simply instruct its consulates to permit entry in the widest possible set of cases. Germany, by contrast, comes to rely on the cooperation of Poland if it wishes to implement a restrictive policy. Unilateral action will lack effectiveness as applicants can simply enter through Poland instead. Schengen implementation is thus characterized by what I term an 'asymmetric control situation'.

From a rational choice perspective, this asymmetry will be difficult to overcome. Germany and Poland are engaged in a zero-sum game (cf. Scharpf 1997: 73). If they fail to cooperate they will not arrive at a sup-optimal outcome to what they could otherwise achieve. Rather to the contrary: there are only costs and no gains for Poland in cooperating with Germany in implementing a restrictive policy. Germany thus faces considerable problems in securing the cooperation of Poland.

In such situations rational choice institutionalism points to the importance of strong enforcement mechanisms in the form of coercion or financial sanctions. The former is not an option within European integration. The monopoly of violence rests with the member states. Oversight combined with heavy fines is, however, in principle possible. The European Court of Justice can impose economic penalties for failure to comply with European legislation (Tallberg

2002). Poland might thus adjust its visa-issuing practices for fear that Germany would turn to the Commission and prompt it to launch an infringement proceeding culminating in financial sanctions.

This scenario is not, however, probable. The common visa rules are broadly formulated and seldom strictly bind the member states to pursue a particular practice (Meloni 2005, 2009). In order to establish the travel intentions of visitors, and whether they are likely to return to their country of origin, the Schengen rules obliges participating states to collect information on applicants. Yet it is not specified precisely what this entails. A restrictive member country might demand comprehensive financial statements, extensive records over family ties as well as substantial bank deposits from potential sponsors of the visitor. It could also require applicants to travel to the consulate to attend a personal interview. A liberal state, in contrast, might only request a photocopy of a credit card, documentation of hotel reservation and a brief note setting out the purpose of the visit. There is thus ample room with the common rules for pursuing a liberal line without engaging in illegal practices which would risk an infringement proceeding.

Another route to cooperation in zero-sum games is through side-payments (Moravcsik 2003). Realising Poland's lack of interest in cooperating, Germany might instead offer compensation outweighing the losses incurred. It could thus set up a financial scheme involving periodic inspections at Polish consulates coupled with payments subject to satisfactory performance. Prior to the enlargement of the Schengen area the old member states helped fund the build-up of border control structures in the acceding countries (Grabbe 2000). Yet these transfers were not linked to performance post-enlargement. They reduced transactions costs of control but did not presumably alter state preferences. Poland's interest in facilitating easy access for travellers from the Ukraine is arguably unchanged. A performance linked compensation scheme could of course be established in the future. It would have to not merely reimburse Poland for the administrative costs of extra control but also make up generously for the reduction

in for example trade revenue arising from stricter border practices. Since such a scheme is not presently in operation side-payments is not a mechanism through which we could expect implementation behaviour to change.

Finally, cooperation could arise through tit-for-tat interactions (Axelrod 1984). Member states might differ in where they prefer more or less intensive control. If liberal and restrictive preferences are fairly equally distributed among participants, then reciprocal dynamics could arise leading to cooperation. States might be willing to give in on their ideal positions on some cases in return for similar concessions from partners in other situations. The main problem with this argument is that tit-for-tat interactions are unlikely to work when, as in the case of Schengen, many actors are involved (cf. Scharpf 1997). With a large number of participants it becomes difficult to target sanctions against the offender increasing the likelihood of defection. Even if this problem could be overcome, the conditions for tit-for-tat to work are not present in the Eastern enlargement. The new member states, as noted above, must be expected to take a more liberal position on most cases than the old. There are thus few situations where they would need the cooperation of their counterparts.

Summing up, rational choice institutionalism helps us identify a fundamentally asymmetric control situation within Schengen. A restrictive state needs the cooperation of all the other participants to effectively implement its preferred policy whereas a liberal does not. In turn, the zero-sum character of the situation makes it difficult to achieve cooperation. The three main routes are through oversight combined with sanctions, side-payments and tit-for-tat interactions. These mechanisms are not strong in the case of Schengen and the Eastern enlargement. The expectation from the rational choice perspective is thus that integration will not impact on domestic visa-issuing practices of the new Schengen participants:

> H_1: Schengen membership will not have an effect on the visa-issuing practices of the new member states

2.2 Sociological institutionalism

Sociological institutionalism offers a different picture of the characteristics of institutions and in what ways they affect behaviour. From this perspective institutions include not only formal rules but also informal norms, roles and standard operating procedures (Checkel 2001; DiMaggio and Powell 1983). Actors are guided by a 'logic of appropriateness' doing what they perceive to be expected or proper conduct for persons in their position (March and Olsen 2008). Means-ends calculations are thus replaced by role taking. This does not mean that officials are dupes with no space for choosing among different courses of action. Roles can be variously performed depending on the understanding of a particular situation. But choices are bounded by considerations of what is appropriate behaviour. To understand the potential consequences of Schengen participation on domestic visa practices it is thus important to explore the role expectations embedded in the border regime, and how these are dispersed to and taken up by new members.

Let us begin by identifying the role expectations as these are set out in key Schengen documents. The founding 1985 Schengen Convention introduces an obligation to coordinate visa policies and practices. Here we find a commitment by the states to "harmonize" and "approximate" their visa policies and adjust "procedures for the issue of visas and admission to their territories, taking into account the need to ensure the protection of the entire territory …against illegal immigration and activities which could jeopardise security" (OJEU 2000: 14f, article 7 and 20). Control should thus be uniform and respect the interest of the other participants. Moving on to the 1990 Schengen Implementing Agreement we here, additionally, find the principle of 'compensatory measures'. The member states commit themselves to increase checks at the external frontier in order to outweigh the implied loss of control by the physical dismantling of internal borders.

These general norms are given further weight in an extensive document setting out shared administrative guidelines on issuing visas – the 'Common Consular

Instructions' (Council 2004; OJEU 2000). The manual, the first version of which was put together in 1993, spells out the practical procedures to be followed when handling visa applications. How should the consular section be organized? What supporting documents might be asked for? To what embassy should applications be lodged? It also articulates a commitment to mutual consultation between the partners on the issuing of visas, and explicates the process to be followed by the actors involved. The rules clarify that only in exceptional cases may an alternative national visa ('VTL') be issued if a partner state objects to allowing a person entry (Council 2004: 41). Overall, the document sets out that the "purpose of examining applications is to detect those applicants who are seeking to immigrate to the Member States and set themselves up there, using grounds such as tourism, business, study, work or family visits as a pretext. Therefore, it is necessary to be particularly vigilant when dealing with 'risk categories', unemployed persons, those with no regular income, etc." (Council 2004: 24).[35]

The institutional set up is thus characterized by clearly defined roles. The member states should prevent irregular access and stays, and in doing so take into consideration the interest of all the participating EU executives. What constitutes appropriate and acceptable control behaviour is set out in general and specified carefully through non-binding administrative guidelines. Restrictiveness is evident in the detailed procedures and in the expectation that the control of the external border should compensate for security losses triggered by the dismantling of internal checks.

Still, even if the Schengen norms are clear a practical impact is not to be taken for granted. The key actors – consular officials, ministerial civil servants and border guards – are embedded in other institutional settings with pre-existing norms and rules. Many of the new member states have close if complex ties with their Eastern neighbours reflecting their common past within the communist bloc. After

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[35] In 2010, following the entry into force of new European visa legislation, the consular instructions were replaced with a new visa handbook negotiated by the Commission under comitology (COM 2010a). In contrast with the old instructions, the handbook also highlights obligations to respect fundamental rights and the need to balance internal security with facilitation of travel.

1989, when these states were substantially reconfigured, the fought for national sovereignty became an important regulative ideal (Wæver 1997: 281-305). Though eager to join the EU, sensitivity about supranational encroachment was widespread. In this light, we might expect a symbolic adaptation to Schengen in the form of 'window-dressing' (March and Olsen 1984: 738). A strong effort is made to appear in line with the rules, but in practice old procedures are still followed. Such a finding would tally with other enlargement studies. New EU directives are swiftly and formally transposed into the national legal order of these states (Sedelmeier 2011) but more rarely implemented on the ground. In terms of compliance, the new member countries are generally a 'world of dead letters' (Falkner and Treib 2008).

Yet the extent to which window-dressing is a feasible strategy depends on the institutional framework. Could there be strong mechanisms in place to ensure that the Schengen rules are diffused and taken up by new actors? Is it possible to merely present a picture of adaptation to the common visa-issuing rules without substantially altering practices? Three key mechanisms make it difficult to merely window-dress Schengen compliance:

First, the case management process is governed by detailed procedures for sharing information on unwanted travellers. These rules are underpinned by IT-systems making the data transfers possible in practice (Bigo 2000; Broeders 2007). The Schengen Information System (SIS) lists persons not to be admitted to the common territory, and the Schengen Consultation Network (VISION) allows for the exchange of case files. The SIS database must be accessed during the inspection of visa applications. Through the consultation network a member state can request to see entry requests received by partners for specific nationalities or types of travellers. It can object to the issuing of a Schengen visa where it deems necessary. This network is extensively used. In 2011, for example, Switzerland

"performed background checks on 286472 people in response to consultation" (FOM 2012: 15).[36]

Second, the member states conduct regular evaluations. This practice was instituted in the late 1990s and is currently carried out within the remit of the Council visa working party (OJEU 2000: 138). In 2011-2, to take an example, the Hungarian representations in Istanbul and Cairo were inspected. Practices at Czech, Polish, Slovakian and Icelandic facilities were also checked (COM 2012a). The evaluations make use of questionnaires and visits at the consulates and a draft report is drawn up and circulated (COM 2012a).

Third, Schengen allows for and mandates the member states to set up local consular cooperation between officials working on the ground in the different cities abroad (Fernández 2006). This can involve regular meetings with exchanges of best practices, information on visas applied for, issued and refused and lists of travellers considered trusted. The common consular instruction, for example, notes that persons established as trustworthy through this local cooperation can be subjected to less intensive control (Council 2004: 24).

Taken together, these three mechanisms render the practices and positions of the partners visible. They ensure a high degree of internal transparency in the visa-issuing process. This makes it difficult to window-dress. Deviating behaviour is not easily hidden and can be brought to light and 'named and shamed'. Importantly, this is not a matter of coercion or financial sanctions. The extensive information merely makes it very challenging to circumvent Schengen unnoticed and ensures that members are continually taken to account for their practical interpretation of the common rules. There are thus few options for escaping the role expectations embedded in the regime. Sociological institutionalism would therefore lead us to expect a restrictive impact of participation on domestic border control in Central and Eastern Europe:

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[36] Alongside these databases a new Visa Information System (VIS) is also gradually being taken into use.

H_2: Schengen membership will have a restrictive effect on the visa-issuing practices of the new member states

In the next section I set out the research design I use to test the two rival hypotheses and assess the relative explanatory purchase of the theoretical models.

3. Research design

In this section I set out the research design I use to assess the extent to which EU-integration has caused changes in domestic visa policies. I start out by discussing general methodological issues involved in Europeanization studies and then proceed to outline the quasi-experimental strategy adopted in the paper.

Methodological issues in Europeanization research

Europeanization is a recent and expanding research agenda in EU studies (Exadaktylos & Radaelli 2009: 508). There is some debate as to what the notion Europeanization more specifically refers to (Radaelli 2003; Börzel & Risse 2003; for a critical overview see Olsen 2002). In the following I understand the concept as denoting "[…] the effects of European integration on domestic polity, politics and policy" (Radaelli & Pasquir 2006: 36; cf. Hix & Goetz 2000: 2f).[37] I focus on changes in state policy and administrative practice which are brought about by participation in EU cooperation.

Europeanization studies usually consists of careful process-tracings of the causal mechanisms through which EU institutions affect national policy and practice (Ette & Faist 2007b; Grabbe 2003; Featherstone & Kazamias 2001; Radaelli & Pasquir 2006: 40; Exadaktylos & Radaelli 2009: 526). The most common research design is a close analysis of one or two single countries (Haverland 2006b: 66; Ette & Faist 2007b; Cantero 2011; cf. Geddes 2003; cf. Vink & Graziano 2006: 3; Caporaso 2006: 27). This approach allows for an in-depth assessment and identification of causal mechanisms at play.

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[37] A set of authors see Europeanization as the interplay between the European and domestic level. They thus investigate not only the top-down 'download' of policies but also the previous bottom-up 'upload' (Börzel 2002). The reason for this is the likely linkage between the two processes.

A key criticism of this approach is that it is likely to bias the analytical results. Researchers tend to assume from the outset that integration is a main cause of change, and thereby run the risk of ignoring other and potentially more important explanations. The suggested remedy to this problem is to include 'control-cases' in the analysis, that is countries not participating in EU cooperation (Levi-Faur 2004; Haverland 2006a; cf. Hix & Goetz 2000). Levi-Faur's (2004) analysis of the liberalization of the telecoms and electricity industry in Europe is an example of such a strategy. His article is based on a comparative research design in which the developments in the EU member countries are contrasted with a group of other Western and Latin American states. The conclusion he arrives at is that the liberalization process is also significantly driven by broader global processes and would likely have occurred even in the absence of European cooperation (Levi-Faur 2004: 4).

Schengen enlargement as a quasi-experiment

In this paper I carry out a quasi-experimental analysis (Meyers 1995; Shadish, Cook & Campbell 2002; Lijphart 1971: 683f; cf. Haverland 2006b: 63).[38] Shadish, Cook and Campbell (2002: 12) define an experiment as a "study in which an intervention is deliberately introduced to observe its effects". This can take place in a laboratory or in the field. In social and political science there are often significant practical and ethical barriers to this kind of research and a quasi-experiment can therefore be a good alternative. In the quasi-experiment the researcher lacks the same degree of control over the factor of interest and instead makes use of a 'naturally' occurring development such as a shift in government policy.

The simplest, basic quasi-experimental design involves the study of one group with a measurement conducted before and after the intervention occurs (Meyers 1995: 154). The difference between the two values is then taken to be the result of the policy change. A weakness of this approach is that it is not possible to rule out that other events in the same time-period influenced the outcome. For this reason

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[38] Meyers (1995) notes that this approach is most often labeled as quasi-experimental in the discipline of psychology whereas the term natural experiment is more often used in economics.

most studies also assess events in another similar group which did not experience the same intervention (Meyers 1995: 155ff). If the same development did not take place here, the intervention is very likely to be the cause of the change. As it is very difficult to find perfect control cases, it is important to consider alternative plausible explanations (Shadish, Cook & Campbell 2002: 14).

The 2007 Schengen enlargement provides the material for a quasi-experiment. It allows us to study the effect of EU-cooperation by measuring visa-issuing practices before and after. Any shifts among the new member states can then be compared with the visa practice of the old as well as countries not part of the free travel area.[39] The two-step Schengen membership procedure for the new participants is set out below in table 1.

Table 1

The two-step Schengen membership process

Date	EU/Schengen membership	Change in visa policy
1 May 2004	Ten new member states join the EU; internal border controls remain in place.	Visa lists harmonized. The new members must replace their national lists of which foreign citizens need to possess a visa to enter their territory with the common EU list. Their visa formats must also be aligned with the European standard.
21 December 2007	Nine of the new member states join the Schengen area; internal border controls (land, sea) lifted. Airport checks dismantled 30 March 2008.	Visa issuing requirements harmonized. The new members must now use the same criteria as the other Schengen participants, e.g. they begin to charge similar fees and where required exchange information on visa requests.

SOURCE: COM 2007

How should the quasi-experiment be set up? One analytical strategy could be to investigate potential changes from the year before full Schengen membership to

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[39] The use of the differential speed of integration resembles Haverland's (2006a: 142) suggestion to use the opt-outs and opt-ins of integration to measure the relative effects of EU-cooperation.

the next. To do so however could generate both false negatives (identifying no effect when there is an impact) and false positives (finding an impact when there actually is not one). A false negative could arise for two different reasons. The first relates to issues of anticipated implementation. The new members could have adapted their practice some time before formally acceding. If this was the case, we would see little change from 2007 to 2008 erroneously lending support to the hypothesis that EU-integration has no effect. Although it is important to take this into consideration, it should be noted that the new member states have consistently delayed the adoption of the Schengen rules as long as possible mainly to avoid adverse consequences for travel and trade with their Eastern neighbours (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier 2004: 672; cf. Lavenex & Ucarer 2004: 431). A false negative could also arise if after joining implementation is delayed or prolonged further. It would not seem unreasonable to expect that at the point of accession new member states had not yet fully altered their standard operating procedures. Adjusting to Schengen could thus carry into the next couple of years. Again, if we looked only at the shift from 2007 to 2008 we would significantly underestimate the impact of Schengen membership. Turning to the risk of false positives, such a scenario could arise if – to impress and assure their partners – the new member states intensified control immediately after accession but then reverted to old practices afterwards. A significant restrictive alteration from 2007 and 2008 would thus lead us to conclude in favour of the hypothesis of an impact ignoring that this was a very temporary change. To avoid these problems I analyse domestic visa-issuing practices in the three years before (2005-2007) and after (2008-2010) membership. This should provide the basis for a more robust conclusion.

A false positive could also be found if we identified a shift but this was driven by other factors than Schengen membership. An external shock, such as the global financial crisis, could very well impact the domestic visa-issuing practices in a restrictive direction. All states become more concerned with protecting their labour markets against irregular workers. The onset of a major armed conflict abroad could have a similar effect. The sudden increase in the number of

protection seekers may trigger many countries to tighten practices. For this reason it is particularly important to have the control cases in the analysis. If a restrictive alteration in the practice of the new member states is mirrored in the old, partial or non-members then we cannot be sure that the change is due to EU integration. We are faced with either an instance of multiple causal pathways or a shift triggered solely by external events. Reversely, if visa practices alter only in the new member-states we can be fairly confident that this is caused by Schengen participation.

4. Data

The data source for the analysis is the European Visa Database (Hobolth forthcoming). In the period before (2005-2007) and after (2008-2010) the Schengen enlargement the EU collected visa-issuing statistics from both the existing and new participants in the common policy. This information makes it possible to identify potential changes in the number of visas applied for, issued and rejected as well as refusal rates. For the same period, the database contains information on travel entry permits issued by the partial Schengen members (Cyprus, Romania and Bulgaria) and the UK and the US. The documents issued by the latter two are similar visas for temporary trips for purposes of business, tourism or family visits of a short duration. They are thus very comparable to the Schengen visas. There are differences, however. These relate to the application fee and, potentially, periods of validity. This should not cause concerns in this context as the analysis centres on changes in relative rather than absolute restrictiveness.

The dependent variable of the analysis is the change in visa refusal rates from 2005-7 to 2008-10. Refusal rates are calculated in the database as the number of refusals divided by the number of visa decisions (issued plus refused). A complication arises from the so-called VTL visas. These are visas that a country can issue if it does not consider the EU-criteria to be met, but wishes to allow partial entry. VTL permits only give legal access to the territory of the issuing member state. I have included these in the calculation as issued visas. A member

state, which makes considerable use of this option, would otherwise appear more restrictive in its practice than it is. National visas are also interesting as an indication of strain in the cooperation. Rising numbers of issued VTL visas indicate, potentially, an unwillingness to pay heed to the interests of partner countries. I therefore also discuss these in the robustness section.

In the descriptive tables I have calculated the mean refusal rate for a member state by averaging the value for each visa-list sending country. An alternative approach would be to sum up the total number of issued and refused visas and then use this aggregate figure to arrive at a refusal rate. With this method the figure is in general lower. The reason is that most member states receive a very high amount of applications from a few key countries which often also enjoy a privileged low refusal rate. This causes the overall refusal rate to shift downwards. Using an average of the countries' score instead provides a better assessment because it is less influenced by outlier partners (cf. Neumayer 2005: 50f).[40]

5. Empirical analysis: The domestic impact of EU border control cooperation

Did Schengen participation have an impact on the new member states' visa-issuing practices? Can we find support for either the rational choice or sociological institutional hypotheses? The empirical analysis proceeds in two stages. I start by describing trends in the visa-issuing practices of the receiving states. The findings suggested by this analysis are then tested statistically. Table 2 below provides a comprehensive overview of the number of short-stay visas applied for and average refusal rates in the period from 2005 to 2010:

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[40] The dataset, robustness tests and the statistical read-outs are available on the database website.

Mogens Hobolth

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Table 2

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Receiving country	Short-stay visas applied for						Average visa refusal rate					
	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
New Schengen	2.963.515	3.168.590	2.966.821	2.092.227	1.986.887	2.156.149	9%	9%	10%	14%	14%	14%
Czech Republic	447.920	556.488	579.932	557.277	452.040	538.915	10%	11%	13%	17%	16%	17%
Estonia	97.027	119.570	103.938	99.261	95.063	120.467	15%	10%	7%	18%	13%	13%
Hungary	584.070	528.638	451.128	324.768	283.166	248.177	9%	9%	9%	15%	14%	14%
Latvia	119.691	148.658	161.253	138.929	123.413	138.498	5%	4%	7%	15%	17%	12%
Lithuania	316.766	406.586	392.477	245.714	238.925	275.153	2%	2%	5%	9%	12%	13%
Malta	M	13.893	13.720	31.181	30.529	40.401	M	13%	9%	14%	16%	16%
Poland	1.186.370	1.176.919	1.087.091	512.268	591.604	687.976	11%	9%	10%	13%	14%	16%
Slovakia	114.676	133.285	95.285	79.831	64.982	57.260	5%	9%	7%	7%	11%	14%
Slovenia	96.995	84.553	81.997	102.998	107.165	49.302	10%	10%	8%	10%	7%	5%
Old Schengen	6.844.984	7.951.248	8.331.968	8.578.322	7.956.824	9.271.829	15%	15%	15%	15%	13%	14%
Austria	343.111	329.449	M	M	293.148	271.787	7%	8%	M	M	9%	9%
Belgium	156.861	169.624	199.717	196.776	182.816	201.048	20%	22%	21%	23%	21%	21%
Denmark	70.505	70.573	80.407	76.645	76.118	78.886	14%	15%	13%	22%	12%	14%
Finland	422.461	569.802	708.094	801.391	790.963	1.016.582	16%	17%	17%	16%	21%	21%
France	2.002.319	1.981.876	1.975.985	1.916.205	1.733.434	2.038.327	15%	17%	16%	10%	10%	8%
Germany	1.788.889	1.851.068	1.867.426	1.886.459	1.600.108	1.785.415	17%	18%	16%	14%	15%	14%
Greece	M	602.085	672.270	749.020	709.000	611.127	M	19%	16%	14%	13%	14%
Iceland	M	M	366	460	448	562	M	M	2%	13%	7%	2%
Italy	775.345	924.547	1.128.056	1.231.741	1.098.412	1.322.392	9%	7%	7%	9%	9%	10%
Luxembourg	2.751	3.618	4.919	4.734	4.684	6.933	9%	7%	9%	3%	5%	6%
Netherlands	341.763	362.120	392.461	358.985	326.459	369.558	14%	17%	16%	17%	13%	14%
Norway	M	M	110.487	112.166	M	131.100	M	M	16%	13%	M	24%
Portugal	74.750	88.449	106.940	116.033	109.986	116.435	20%	15%	22%	18%	17%	13%
Spain	689.148	802.585	872.650	903.618	840.872	1.121.131	15%	14%	14%	15%	14%	13%
Sweden	177.081	195.452	212.190	224.089	190.376	200.546	17%	17%	17%	14%	12%	14%
Partial Schengen	159.005	149.684	1.047.987	1.131.460	872.119	832.253	9%	7%	13%	9%	10%	9%
Bulgaria	M	M	621.655	656.995	590.104	598.388	M	M	14%	11%	11%	12%
Cyprus	159.005	149.684	206.873	236.039	109.880	53.259	9%	7%	8%	12%	12%	8%
Romania	M	M	219.459	238.426	172.135	180.606	M	M	14%	6%	7%	6%
Non-Schengen	1.562.171	6.958.988	7.183.050	7.212.350	4.993.471	5.558.832	14%	25%	24%	25%	28%	28%
United Kingdom	1.562.171	1.728.920	1.329.215	1.481.920	M	M	14%	15%	14%	15%	M	M
United States	M	5.230.068	5.853.835	5.730.430	4.993.471	5.558.832	M	29%	28%	29%	28%	28%

NOTES: M = Missing data

SOURCE: See data section

Let us begin by looking at the group of new member states. Prior to joining Schengen (2005 to 2007) they received about 3 million visa applications in total each year. Poland as by far the largest state also got the lion's share of entry requests, more than one million per year. Hungary and the Czech Republic between them handled another million. The remaining applications were spread out among the smaller of the new member states, i.e. the Baltic countries,

Slovakia and Slovenia. Malta as a tiny state received less than 15.000 applications annually. The average visa refusal rate was at 9-10% with most countries approximating this figure quite closely. The Czech Republic, Estonia and Malta were in some years rather above this figure. Latvia and Lithuania, in contrast, were in general significantly more liberal with refusal rates around 5%. Slovakia was also in the lower end.

The data does not suggest any consistent pattern of anticipated implementation. In some of the new member states there was an increase in the number of applications, for others a decline or no change. The refusal rate of the Czech Republic gradually increased from 2005 to 2007 whereas in Estonia we saw an opposite trend. With regards to the remaining countries alterations were minor and in varying directions.

After these countries joined Schengen we see a set of changes. The total number of annually received applications dropped with about one million. This was mainly due to a major decrease in entry requests at the Polish consulates. There was also a decline in Hungary, Lithuania and Slovakia. Figures for Czech Republic and Estonia were largely stable while the picture is mixed for Latvia and Slovenia. Malta deviated by a marked upward shift in the number of visa applications after membership. Why did applications numbers drop so significantly? If anything, we might have expected an increase. With Schengen membership the permits issued by the new member states in some ways became more attractive to obtain as they now allowed for visits to the entire free travel area. Two explanations of the decrease would seem plausible. First, visitors travelling to both for example Poland and Germany would previously have had to submit two applications. With Schengen they only need to apply for a single entry permit. This might explain a part of the fall in application figures. Second, the drop could be a result of a 'deterrence' effect of Schengen. In the expectation that procedures had now been tightened many potential travellers might give up applying.

The average visa refusal rate increased markedly from 9-10% to 14% annually after Schengen accession. The data thus suggest a stable upward shift in restrictiveness. This trend is found in nearly all the new member countries. In Hungary, for example, the refusal rate jumped from 9% in 2005 to 2007 to 14-15% in 2008 to 2010.

Three states deviate from this overall pattern. The Estonian figures are difficult to interpret with shifts both up and down. This is a case which underlines the importance of looking beyond the accession year. From 2007 to 2008 the refusal rate increased very notably but it then dropped again. It looks like an instance of initial adaptation followed by a reversion to earlier practices. The Slovakian case offers a reverse image. In the first year after joining there was no change but then refusal rates increased. This could be an instance of delayed implementation. In Slovenia, finally, we see a rather surprising liberalisation. A part of the explanation could be that Serbia, Macedonia and Montenegro were removed from the common visa list in 2010. As these are neighbouring countries of Slovenia the change had a particularly noticeable influence here. But a closer look at the data suggests that this cannot alone account for the declining refusal rate.

Overall, the descriptive statistics for the new member states thus show a substantial decline in visa applications and a considerable upward shift in refusal rates. Are there reasons to believe that these two trends are linked, and if so, how? Could the heightened refusal rates be explained by the reduction in the number of visas applied for? This might be the case if the decrease in entry requests was mainly triggered by many travellers no longer needing to submit multiple applications. If we assume that persons visiting several member states are predominantly wealthy tourists or business travellers, then previous research indicate (see paper one) that these applications are generally less prone to be refused. Hence, when the number of entry requests submitted by this group drops then, other things being equal, the share of 'wanted travellers' in the application pool is reduced. This could cause the refusal rate to shift upward.

On the other hand, if the fall in application numbers is mainly due to deterrence then this does not explain the rise in refusal rates. If anything, self-exclusion would be strongest for family visitors and poorer travellers who might be unable to pay increased fees. With fewer of these persons applying we could even expect the refusal rate to fall. In that case, the increase in rejection rates that we see is an even stronger sign of a restrictive shift in practices. It is difficult on the basis of aggregated statistics to determine which of these arguments carry more weight. We can, however, make some qualified assessments. Take Poland and Hungary. They account for most of the drop in applications. Here the fall is so marked (in the former from a million to a half and in the latter from about a half to a quarter of a million) that the change can hardly be accounted for solely by visitors to multiple destinations who now only need one visa. On the contrary, it would seem plausible that a significant deterrence effect is operating.

To sum up, the empirics suggest that Schengen participation had a marked restrictive effect on the new member states. This questions hypothesis one and the rational choice explanation, and lend support to hypotheses two and the sociological institutionalist account. Yet before we can draw such a conclusion we need to investigate patterns in the control cases.

The control cases
Beginning with the old Schengen states, we see a general increase in the number of applications received annually from 2005 to 2010. The average refusal rate is stable at around 15% albeit with a slight fall. As discussed in more detail below there are differences in the trends over time among these countries. In some cases refusal rates change little whereas in others we see a shift in liberal or restrictive directions.

For the partial Schengen members it is difficult to identify a particular trend due to missing data for Bulgaria and Romania in 2005 and 2006. Still, application numbers do look fairly stable for these two countries in the remaining years. In the case of Cyprus there is a marked reduction in applications. Refusal rates

change somewhat in different directions. For the non-Schengen states, the UK and the US, we also lack data for a few years. Nevertheless, the empirics indicate that the number of visas applied for and refusal rates were stable.

Having set out the major trends, let us look in detail at developments in refusal rates among the control group countries and contrast these with the new member states:


Figure 1: Changes in average visa refusal rates from 2005-7 to 2008-10. The change is calculated as a mean of the different observations per year.

Figure 1 shows shifts in average refusal rates from the period 2005-2007 to 2008-2010 comparing the new member states with the control groups. Among the old member states we see varying tendencies. In some cases – France, Germany, Greece, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and Sweden – the refusal rate drops. By contrast in other countries – Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Italy there is an increase. In the case of Denmark and Norway the tendency is quite sensitive to outlier observations characterized by very low application numbers. The restrictive shift in the case of Iceland comes down to an apparent change in practice at its one and only visa-issuing consulate in China. These cases thus do not provide a robust indication of a restrictive tendency. If they are removed, we are left only with fairly minor restrictive changes in Italy, Austria and Finland. The predominant tendency among the old

members is thus one of stability tending towards a slight liberalization. Turning to the partial and non-Schengen states we see substantial liberalisations in Bulgaria and Romania, a restrictive shift in Cyprus and no changes in the UK and the US.

Hence, while there was a restrictive shift among the new members this was not paralleled in the control groups. The descriptive analysis therefore strongly suggests an effect of Schengen participation pushing for less open borders.

Statistical tests

To further assess whether a restrictive effect is indeed at work I ran a series of statistical tests comparing mean changes in refusal rates. To maximise the numbers of observations, and hence increase the validity of the analysis, I investigated country dyads. For example, Czech visa practices in Turkey constitute one case in the dataset. This yields a much larger set of data-points than in the aggregate picture provided in the descriptive analysis. I first used an ANOVA analysis. The results are reported in the table below.

Table 3

Dependent Variable	(I) rcGrp	(J) rcGrp	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval	
						Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Change in visa refusal rate (before and after Schengen enlargement)	New Schengen	Old Schengen	6,88	0,68	0,00	5,08	8,69
		Partial Schengen	8,11	1,04	0,00	5,36	10,87
		Non Schengen	5,80	0,86	0,00	3,52	8,09
	Old Schengen	New Schengen	-6,88	0,68	0,00	-8,69	-5,08
		Partial Schengen	1,23	0,86	0,90	-1,03	3,49
		Non Schengen	-1,08	0,63	0,51	-2,74	0,58
	Partial Schengen	New Schengen	-8,11	1,04	0,00	-10,87	-5,36
		Old Schengen	-1,23	0,86	0,90	-3,49	1,03
		Non Schengen	-2,31	1,01	0,13	-4,97	0,35
	Non Schengen	New Schengen	-5,80	0,86	0,00	-8,09	-3,52
		Old Schengen	1,08	0,63	0,51	-0,58	2,74
		Partial Schengen	2,31	1,01	0,13	-0,35	4,97

ANOVA test: Multiple Comparisons (Bonferroni)

NOTES: The average visa refusal rate before (2005-2007) and after (2008-2010) is calculated as an average of each observation per sending country). N=1938 (New Schengen: 191, old Schengen: 1.398, partial Schengen: 116, non-Schengen: 233). Levene test of homogeneity of variances 6,4 (significance 0,00). See discussion in main text.
SOURCE: See data section

Table 3 corroborates the conclusion of the descriptive analysis. The restrictive change among the new Schengen member states is statistically significantly different from all the other groups and of considerable magnitude. The liberal trend in the group of old Schengen states, however, is not statistically significant. The ANOVA analysis compares average changes in refusal rates *between* the different groups. To do so, it makes the statistical assumption that the variance *within* each group is roughly similar. A closer look reveals that this assumption does not hold because the variation among the partial Schengen members is very high compared with the rest. If we exclude this group the problem disappears without changing the substantive results.

Still, the adjusted ANOVA test remains sensitive to variation in the number of observations among groups. To enhance the robustness of the analysis I therefore also conduct a chi square test. For this I converted the visa refusal rate change into

an ordinal variable of either restrictive change, no change or liberal change. This reduces the amount of variation but limits sensitivity to group size. The results of the tests are listed in table 4 below:

Table 4

Crosstabulation of receiving country groups and changes in refusal rates

			Change in refusal rate			Total
			None	Liberal	Restrictive	
Country Group	New Schengen	Count	16	29	146	191
		% within group	8%	15%	76%	100%
		Adjusted Residual	-1,4	-11,5	13,0	
	Old Schengen	Count	164	849	385	1398
		% within group	12%	61%	28%	100%
		Adjusted Residual	,8	8,7	-9,7	
	Partial Schengen	Count	13	66	37	116
		% within group	11%	57%	32%	100%
		Adjusted Residual	-,1	,5	-,5	
	Non Schengen	Count	27	114	92	233
		% within group	12%	49%	39%	100%
		Adjusted Residual	,1	-1,9	1,9	
Total		Count	220	1058	660	1938
		% within group	11%	55%	34%	100%

NOTES: Pearson chi-square 187,5 (0,00 significance level)

SOURCE: See data section

The significance test is shown by the adjusted residuals which take into account varying group sizes. They are normally distributed and values below -2 and above 2 indicate significant difference. We thus here see, as in the ANOVA test, a significant and sizable restrictive trend among the new member states. In this test the liberalization tendency in the old Schengen states is also significant.

Robustness checks

The overall robustness of the analysis is increased by the use of multiple inferential and descriptive statistical methods. I have furthermore probed the stability of the patterns in the data by conducting additional tests excluding different groups of potentially deviating cases and analysing alternative measures.

The first issue I tried to explore was the influence of possible outlier sending countries where the empirics indicate that only a few persons tried to apply. I ran the statistical tests excluding, respectively, third countries in which fewer than 50,

100, 500 and 1.000 applications were received. This did not affect results. As noted above, however, doing so has an impact on a few of the old Schengen states, in particular Denmark. I also ran the analysis excluding cases where the shift in refusal rate was very large (+/- 25 percentage points) to ensure that such outlier cases did not distort the findings. Again, the results did not alter.

The second aspect I tried to take into account was potential validity problems with the refusal rate indicator. There are some changes in EU's visa list towards the end of the period and US and UK visa lists also differ. This variation is not picked up by the refusal rate. I therefore also ran the test using the Mobility Barriers Index in the database, which combines information on refusal rates, visa requirements and consular services in a single restrictiveness score. Using this indicator I still found the same pattern in the data. I also explored the potential link between shifts in application numbers and refusal rates by testing separately for the sending countries where there was a decrease in the visas applied for versus those where there was an increase. The findings were the same.

As another alternative to looking at refusal rates I explored how the use of VTL visas has developed over the years. A vast and systematic use of national visas would indicate that states do not take into consideration the interests of their partners. It could also be a way for the new member states to side-step the constraints of Schengen. After joining Schengen, however, they did not start to issue VTL visas to any major degree. In the period 2008-10 these visas have made up less than 2% of the total number of short-stay visas issued by the new members. The only exception to this is Slovenia in 2009. Looking at all Schengen states there is a stable pattern with a similar but perhaps slightly more frequent use of VTL visas by the old member states. After enlargement France began to issue a very high amount of national VTL visas. They justify this publicly with reference to a lack of necessary information exchange on the part of the other states (EMM 2011b: 58).

In sum, the different robustness checks do not challenge the overall pattern identified. They revealed some uncertainty in the estimated change for especially Denmark and France in the time-period. The checks had no impact on the figures from the new member states. The findings are thus very robust.

6. Conclusion

The dismantling of internal frontiers throughout most of Europe has been accompanied by intensive efforts to harmonize and coordinate external migration control policies. This development has been met with some concern in the academic literature. Although movement might have become free on the inside, this could have led to a considerable reduction in the ability of outsiders to enter into Europe.

In this paper I have sought to contribute to the debate by theorising and testing to what extent, if at all, the shift to shared EU visa-issuing rules has had an effect at the national level and if so in what direction, and why. Based on rational choice and sociological institutionalism I set out two rival accounts of the likely impact of cooperation. The rational choice model identified an asymmetric control situation. Liberal countries like the new member states could pursue their preferred lenient policy without needing to coordinate with partner countries. By contrast, restrictive states were dependent on the other participants in the common policy to achieve effective control. Without cooperation, a traveller might simply enter via a partner state. To ensure collaboration, the rational choice model suggested three mechanisms: oversight and sanctions, side-payments and tit-for-tat interactions. I argued that none of these are characteristic of Schengen, and especially not in the case of the Central and Eastern enlargement. The 'logic of consequentiality' thus point towards no impact of integration.

Following sociological institutionalism, I devised a different account of Schengen and the consequences of participation. This approach stressed the presence and diffusion of norms in the regime. I found clearly specified role expectations pointing in a restrictive direction by, in particular, obliging each participant to pay

heed to the security and migration fears of the partners. Furthermore, I found that strong albeit largely informal and non-coercive mechanisms were in place to ensure their dispersion and uptake. IT-systems, evaluations and local consular cooperation created transparency among member states on practices. It enabled the naming and shaming of interpretations deviating from restrictive norms. This made it very difficult to escape the Schengen role expectations by engaging in window-dressing. The 'logic of appropriateness' was therefore one of adaptation to norms of intensive control, suggesting that Schengen participation should have a restrictive effect on domestic practices.

I tested the two theoretical models and their predictions using a quasi-experimental Europeanization framework based on data from the 2007 Schengen enlargement. I compared the new member states' visa-issuing practice in the period before and after the enlargement to assess whether or not their practices remained the same, turned more liberal or restrictive and contrasted these with different control groups. I showed that the visa-issuing practice of almost all the new members became more restrictive following Schengen accession. Their refusal rates increased markedly. This shift was not mirrored in the old and partial member states or the UK and the US. The quasi-experimental study thus shows that EU-cooperation in the case of the Central and Eastern enlargement had a restrictive impact on domestic control practices. All in all, the data thus supports the sociological institutionalist account of the effect of Schengen on domestic practices and questions the explanatory purchase of the rational choice model.

Having established the existence of an overall restrictive effect of Schengen, subsequent research could explore variation across sending countries. For example, the new member states' visa-issuing practices in general turned more restrictive in Turkey than in India. Could this perhaps be explained by differences in domestic interests or the degree of embeddedness of prior norms? Or might these factors interplay with variation in the 'misfit' (Börzel and Risse 2003; Duina 1997; for a critical discussion see Mastenbroek and Kaeding 2006) between the

practice of the new and old member states in the two sending countries before enlargement?

Further studies could also probe the wider applicability of the findings. The 2007 Schengen expansion is similar to the Southern enlargement in that the joining states are generally more liberal than the existing members. It would strengthen the conclusions of the analysis if we found a similar pattern in this case. The expansion of the free travel area to include the Scandinavian countries, in contrast, appears rather different. Here, it seems likely that old and new members shared a fairly restrictive profile. This could give rise to different theorisations. From a rational choice perspective, issues concerning zero-sums games become less important. But other collective action problems could arise leading to sup-optimal outcomes (Olson 1965). The sociological institutionalist model would still expect increased restrictiveness as states exchange migration fears and increase control at the external borders but this shift would probably be of a lesser magnitude. Additionally, the focus of the paper has been on the expansion of Schengen rather than its initial establishment (See e.g. Guiraudon 2003). The dynamics of regime creation might be rather different than those operating later on. Subsequent research could also examine in what ways increased involvement of the European Commission and Parliament in setting Schengen rules might affect policies and practices. Finally, in a wider perspective Europe could be compared with free travel areas around the world. In doing so, it would be important to establish preference compositions and pin-point formal rules, informal norms and various diffusion and enforcement mechanisms characterising these institutions.

CONCLUSION

The Schengen visa policy in practice

1. Borders and border control in the European Union

Border control, policing and the administration of justice is today an important part of the European integration process. Internal frontiers are physically dismantled across most of the continent, and common rules and norms are in place to govern external borders and coordinate police and judicial collaboration. The establishment of this so-called Schengen area has spurred considerable public controversy. Critics stress the loss of state sovereignty and national identity associated with transferring and sharing competences in the area of justice and home affairs. Proponents point to the cooperation as a major symbol of the peaceful unification and stabilization of Europe after the Second World War and the withering away of the Iron Curtain. Integration in this policy field thus raise with particular strength questions about the future trajectory of Europe, and how cooperation might transform the individual nation-states.

So far, the predominant focus of political science research in this field has been to understand how EU-integration came about. Considerably less attention has been paid to investigating the practical application of the common rules and norms by the member states. From the outset, the aim of this research project has been to advance our understanding of this side of the integration process. I have focused on borders and border control. The overall question explored has been how the common European visa policy has been implemented by the Schengen member states, and why. Visas are one of the central instruments used in the management of the external border.

Theoretically, I drew on existing research conceptualizing Schengen as a border regime with two central dimensions: mode of governance and degree of openness. These studies characterised Schengen as a mixed model. It is governed through

both supranational and national elements and the borders are neither open nor closed. In order to better understand what this composite regime form entails I set up a revised analytical framework. On the governance dimension I introduced a distinction between cooperative and conflictual implementation practices. On the openness side, I distinguished between civic and ethnic selectivity.

Turning to the empirics, one of the initial choices of the project was to attempt a broad quantitative comparative analysis rather than in-depth studies of a set of cases. In this way, the aim was to be able to identify and explain general trends in the cooperation. The existing studies that do probe the implementation primarily focus on a few countries, and I therefore also found that there might be particular value in trying to capture overall features and interaction dynamics. Pursuing this research strategy entailed setting up a new database. Current datasets in the area of borders and migration control do not cover the application of the Schengen rules. That is, existing empirics measure whether a visa requirement is in place but not how these rules are enforced. Quantitative EU implementation studies emphasise framework legislation (directives) and infringement proceedings. Neither of these has played a central role in Schengen. To carry out the project I thus put together and made publicly available a database with comprehensive information on European visa requirements, issuing practices and consular services.

The border regime framework and the database form the basis for each of the three papers in the thesis. They explore different aspects of the cooperation and therefore also eclectically incorporate and develop methods and theories specific to the research question at hand.

2. Findings of the individual papers

Paper *one* investigated to what extent, and why, the openness of the European Union's external border varies for visitors of different nationalities. It thus primarily thematised the openness dimension of the border regime. Drawing on

existing research I developed two different theoretical models explaining differences in restrictiveness, and derived a set of testable hypotheses.

I started with interest group theory, which is widely used in migration studies, and reworked the framework to be able to account for the case of short-stay visas. The overall argument was that border control is characterized by client and majoritarian politics. In the case of major trading partners and tourism markets, for instance, businesses are likely to organise and lobby for liberal policies as they benefit from open borders. The costs of openness – for example strained public services – are, in contrast, diffuse and borne by the public in general. Trade and tourism interests, however, vary considerably between sending countries. Hence, as these diminish the mode of politics shift in a majoritarian direction. When there are no concentrated interests lobbying and setting policy practices should instead to follow the generally restrictive preferences of the electoral majority.

As an alternative to this account, I developed a model based on constructivist security theory. The main focus of this approach has hitherto been to understand the political process by which different events and issues, such as terrorism and migration, becomes established as security threats. Moving beyond this, I took the existence of a widespread securitization of migration and refugees as a given and instead sought to investigate to what extent this dynamic is able to account for differences in border enforcement levels. I argued that threat constructions in the period examined centred on persons from Muslim-majority, refugee-producing and poor countries. Hence, to the extent the model holds a purchase on explaining border practices we should expect that travellers from such countries face strictly enforced visa requirements while others would enjoy easier access.

I then tested empirically the hypotheses derived from the two models. I started out by presenting comprehensive data on the European border regime establishing that restrictiveness does vary significantly. While there are some differences in the practices of the Schengen states the main variation is between different third countries. What matters most is the nationality of the applicant rather than what

member state he or she seeks to enter. Using linear regression analysis I found that the security perspective has the largest explanatory purchase, although the interest group approach is also able to account for trends in the data. I arrived at this conclusion by testing the effect of bilateral trade, the size of migrant communities, tourism, income levels, religious make-up and asylum flows. In addition, I assessed the effect of a set of control variables – mainly levels of democracy, population size and travel distance. The analysis showed that bilateral trade and tourism have an impact on border openness as suggested by interest group theory. Yet the strongest predictors revolve around income, religion and the size of asylum outflows from sending countries as we would expect from a securitization perspective. Other things being equal, borders are more closed towards travellers from poor, Muslim-majority and refugee-producing countries. I also found that higher levels of democracy were correlated with more open borders.

The main contribution of this paper is the advancement of the theoretical debate in the literature on the drivers and dynamics in European border control. Though security accounts of European borders have often been put forth in the literature, no systematic large-N testing has been carried out and recent research has questioned the relevance of the perspective. The explanatory models and the descriptive statistics also provide a much-needed comprehensive account of how the openness of the external border varies for different nationalities. In particular, where securitization theory has primarily aimed at understanding processes of threat constructions, I developed the theory in an explanatory direction. I offered a revised model which allows us to test predictions and assess the impact of different securitizations on state practices.

Paper *two* explored to what extent, and why, the Schengen member states coordinate the execution of the common visa policy. This paper thus focuses on the governance dimension of the border regime. Here I adopted a more explorative strategy mapping out empirical trends and then discussing theoretical ways in which the patterns identified could be accounted for.

The empirical focus of the paper was consular cooperation abroad in visa matters. The Schengen rules enable the member states to make use of each other's consulates in the visa-issuing process. Instead of establishing diplomatic representation in a third country, a Schengen state can try to form a cooperative agreement with another member state already present there. The focus of the paper was on such agreements. To what extent do the member states in practice enter into them? Are there any trends in the choice of partner countries? Drawing on descriptive statistics and network analytical tools I showed that cooperation is extensive and clustered regionally. On average, a Schengen state has independent representation in 50 states, relies on cooperative agreements in another 50 and is not present at all in the remaining 70. France and Germany are at the centre of the network with most Schengen states relying on their consular services. Around them form the following clusters: A Nordic, a Benelux, a Southern and an emerging Eastern European network.

To account for these patterns of cooperation I engaged with classical European and international relations theories. A realist perspective was able to account for the centrality of the large member states – France and Germany. It struggled, however, to explain the regional clusters. Liberal intergovernmentalism predicted collaboration along lines of shared policy preferences. This could account for the Southern cluster in particular, where the tourism industry is particularly strong pushing for liberal implementation practices. Other clusters were more puzzling. Based on an analysis of domestic preferences, for example, Denmark and Sweden should not cooperate as tightly as they do. I finally presented and discussed a constructivist explanation. I developed a concept of 'regional imagined communities' to be able to explain the clusters of cooperation. Regional identification based on commonalities in language and state-building trajectory would be likely to create trust and facilitate cooperation. This perspective, I argued, was particularly well-suited to explain the Nordic and the Benelux clusters, as well as the centrality of France and Germany. It also had some purchase, albeit more limited, with regards to the Southern and Eastern groupings.

On balance, I found that the constructivist perspective was best able to account for the cooperation patterns.

The contribution of this paper was three-fold. I showed that European states cooperate considerable in the visa entry control process. Furthermore, I mapped out how their interaction is structured in geographical clusters. Finally, I developed the concept of regional imagined communities to account for the collaboration. This concept, I suggested, could be of wider use in analysing other areas of justice and home affairs and foreign policy.

Paper *three*, finally, investigated to what extent, and why, participation in Schengen has a restrictive impact on the openness of domestic borders to visitors from outside of the European Union. In this paper I thus thematised both the restrictiveness and governance dimensions of the border regime.

I adopted an institutionalist approach to develop two competing models of the potential effect of Schengen participation. The first was based on rational choice institutionalism. I took as the starting-point that state preferences differ. Some incline towards a liberal enforcement of visa-issuing rules and others seek a more restrictive application. In this case, I argued that the EU free travel is characterized by an asymmetric control situation. A liberal country can pursue its preferred policy unilaterally. In contrast, a restrictive state needs the cooperation of all its partners. Otherwise, control efforts are not effective as travellers can simply enter through another member state. Achieving collaboration, however, is difficult as the situation is a zero-sum game. A liberal state has no benefits and only costs from cooperating. This problem could be overcome through oversight and sanctions, side-payments or tit-for-tat interactions. None of these mechanisms, I argued, are in place in Schengen. Hence, the 'logic of consequentiality' would lead us to expect that the domestic control practices of new member states do not alter as a result of Schengen participation.

Having set out this analysis, I then turned to sociological institutionalism. Here a quite different picture emerged. This perspective emphasises informal norms and role expectations. These I showed to be restrictive stressing in particular mutual consultation, respect for the migration fears of partner countries and a general obligation to increase control at external borders to compensate for the dismantling of internal checks. Furthermore, strong mechanisms – in the form of evaluations and inspections, local consular cooperation and common databases – were found to be in place to ensure the diffusion and uptake of these roles and control norms. That in turn makes it difficult for a member state to avoid adaptation through mere window-dressing. The 'logic of appropriateness' thus suggests that joining Schengen should have a restrictive impact on new EU-countries' visa-issuing practices.

I then moved to test these opposing arguments empirically. I did so by setting up a quasi-experimental study using data on the Eastern enlargement of the Schengen area. This case enables a study of how, if at all, the visa-issuing practices of the new member states changed before and after they joined the free travel zone, and contrast this with developments among the old and partial Schengen states as well as the UK and the US. I showed that the visa-issuing practices of the new member states, in general, turned considerably more restrictive after they joined. In the same period, the practices of the existing participants were stable or tended towards a slight liberalization. Among the partial Schengen states the picture was somewhat mixed while practices in the non-Schengen states were largely unchanged. The data thus evidence a restrictive effect of EU-integration indicating the existence of considerable cooperation between states. This supports the sociological institutionalist account and questions the purchase of the rational choice model.

The contributions of this paper are two rival models of the potential consequences of Schengen participation, as well as an empirical test hereof. In existing research there has been considerable conjecturing on the restrictiveness of cooperation, yet

few studies have offered clear and precise theoretical modelling and systematic empirical assessment of actual impacts of EU-integration.

The key strengths of the three papers are the comprehensive empirical picture of the European border regime on both the openness and governance dimensions, and the advancement of theoretical models and concepts to account for the trends we observe. The analytical tools build on existing research and can be applied to other cases of border control and free travel areas, as well as different policy fields. The main weakness is that empirical breadth invariably comes at the expense of depth in the form of detailed and context rich analysis of precise causal pathways.

Taken together, what overall picture of the European border regime emerges from these findings? In the next section I discuss the position of the regime in the analytical framework and map out potential future trajectories.

3. Mapping the European border regime

To briefly recall, the theoretical frame developed in the introduction zooms in on the current mixed border regime in Europe. Seeking to capture the specific dynamics of governance and selective openness it distinguishes between, on the one hand, conflictual and cooperative integration and, on the other hand, civic and ethnic patterns of restrictiveness. Figure 1 below presents the model and situates contemporary Europe within it based on the findings of the project:

Civic

Europe of national
republics

Cosmopolitan
Europe

Conflict ← — — — — — — → Cooperation

Europe of cultural
nation-states

Communitarian
Europe

Ethnic

Figure 1: Positioning the European border regime in the regime typology

As highlighted in the graph, the current regime is mainly characterized by ethnic selectivity (paper one). Applicants from Muslim-majority countries encounter more tightly controlled borders than others. Such religious bias pushes the regime in an ethnic direction. We did see, however, that other things being equal citizens of democratic states were somewhat more readily welcomed. This countervails the ethno-centric tendencies moving the regime upwards towards the civic end. Yet civicness was challenged by the finding that nationals of refugee-producing countries appear to face particularly restrictive enforcement of visa rules. This does not square with a civic commitment to rights and freedoms and the protection of refugees. Weighing the different aspects is challenging and requires careful interpretation. There is no automatic way of aggregating scores. On balance though, my assessment is that we are firmly on the ethnic side of the scale.

Moving to the governance axis, a high degree of cooperation is evidenced in the extensive consular network (paper two) and the considerable restrictive effects of Schengen participation on domestic border practices (paper three). Consular cooperation was widespread and expanded over time. Moreover, there was clear

indication of pooling and aggregation of migration fears. There was little to suggest that the new member states, despite rather more liberal previous practices, sought to avoid or circumvent predominant restrictive norms. Still, after Schengen enlargement France began to issue a high number of otherwise exceptional national (VTL). This could suggest some strains in the management of the external border.

All in all, I thus characterize the regime as 'communitarian Europe'. Cooperation is extensive and ethnic selectivity a key pattern.

While the analytical framework is helpful in mapping out and characterising the Schengen cooperation there are significant elements that are not captured. This concerns the economic aspects of selectivity. We saw in paper one that wealth and trading ties are important predictors of variation in openness. This highlights that market- and/or class-based logics are also involved. This is hardly surprising given the overall economic impetus and aim of European integration. What is perhaps puzzling is that especially trading ties do not play a stronger role. The general expansionary and liberalising drive of the market has not captured the Schengen border regime in a major way. Even though it has been incorporated into the broader EU institutional framework with its powerful internal market at the centre, the regime so far continues to follow a different path of security and identity.

The conclusion that economic interests play a lesser role than shared norms and migration fears in the European border regime has important theoretical implications. It highlights that rationalist models have problems fully accounting for the dynamics of governance and variation in the openness of the external frontier. Though these theories did in general have some purchase in the three analyses, constructivist models were on the whole better able to explain the empirical trends.

Still, market drivers are present. Should this lead us to revise the analytical framework and introduce a new economic axis? A multi-dimensional setup would capture more variation but would also be more complex to work with. I have opted for parsimony providing a simple tool to map and discuss the border regime. Subsequent research could develop the model further, perhaps drawing on the database and different visualisation technologies to identify patterns across a plurality of dimensions. Here more traditional security concerns, such as international terrorism or border disputes, could also be included.

4. Further perspectives

The positioning of the regime as 'communitarian Europe' is not irreversible. In what ways might the regime develop in the future? Contemporary politics points in different directions. Over the last years there has been a steady liberalisation of border rules towards the Balkan countries. This has occurred as an intimate part of the enlargement process in which these states are encouraged to move towards compliance with the Copenhagen criteria of EU-membership including democratic governance. Here we thus see a civic logic at work. The recent period has also, however, been characterized by a gradual easing of visa rules towards countries such as Russia and the Ukraine in a time where these states can hardly be said to have developed steadily in a democratic direction. This suggests a different and considerably more ethnic and/or market oriented mechanism at work. The Balkan visa waiver has also come under strong pressure with France and Germany leading a coalition of states that call for the reintroduction of the permit requirement. With the liberalisation of travel the number of asylum-seekers from the region has increased in many EU states leading to strong domestic critique.

The 'Arab spring' movement in the Middle-East is also an interesting case. The initial response by for example France to the popular uprisings was to call for increased patrolling and the reinstatement of national border control. Rather than welcoming potential democratic transformations, European leaders seemed primarily concerned with the likely influx of asylum-seekers. This confirms the

picture of Europe as ethno-centric rather than civic, but also showed additional more conflictual dynamics in the management of the common borders. This event thus in many ways played out in the bottom-left part of the figure ('Europe of cultural nation-states'). To what extent the revolts will in fact lead to democratic outcomes is as yet uncertain. If this turns out to be the case, the subsequent reaction of the EU will be highly interesting to watch. The European Commission works for mobility partnerships and an overall liberalisation of movement towards the Mediterranean neighbours. Should this succeed it would push the regime in a civic direction and situate it in the upper-right quadrant. Still, given the current regime and the immediate restrictive response this would not seem particularly likely. More generally, the Commission and the European Parliament has in recent years gained a more prominent role in the policy-making process. It will also be interesting to observe to what extent this will affect the application of Schengen rules and norms on the ground.

If economic recession continues in Europe this could also influence the border regime, significantly reinforcing market and class oriented logics in it. Opposite trends would here seem likely. On the one hand, entry rules could for example be liberalised in relation to Saudi Arabia and China in order to attract tourists thus overriding both ethnic and civic selectivity. The Commission has recently published a report highlighting the negative impact of travel restrictions on tourism and suggested reforms of visa policy and practice to facilitate economic growth (COM 2012b). On the other hand, we could see increased restrictiveness driven by a call to protect jobs for domestic workers against undocumented migrant labour. In Greece, fervent criticism of irregular migration was part of recent elections, and organisations such as Human Rights Watch (2012) has brought attention to a rise in discrimination in the wake of the economic crisis.

Yet at present the border regime resembles a communitarian Europe. This prompts wider reflection on the character and legitimacy of the EU-project. In academic research, some scholars (Duchêne 1972; Manners 2002; Orbie 2006) have described Europe as a civilian or normative power. It is based on democracy

and human rights and seeks to export such liberal norms through trade, aid, and the good example. In this argument, cooperation and liberalism are usually expected to go hand in hand. Yet as shown here this need not be so. In the case of Schengen high levels of cooperation focus on ensuring restrictiveness and do not follow a civic mode of selectivity. The tension between the ideals of liberal norms and ethno-centric or non-civic border practices might challenge the effective promotion of universal rights. On the other hand, to what extent a different, liberal and more civic-oriented border policy would find public support across Europe is an open question.

The analytical framework is thus of relevance both for academic researchers and policy-makers. It enables an analytical assessment and normative discussion of future developments. Moreover, the model highlights paths and trajectories available for the European border regime and underlines the importance and potential implications of different political decisions.

5. Questions for future research

The border regime framework, the visa database and the individual papers opens up new questions for future research.

The project has identified patterns of cooperation and restrictiveness, and tested the explanatory purchase of different theories. The focus has been on relative effects and correlations and it would thus be interesting to know more about the specific causal pathways. How precisely do wider threat constructions impact on border practices? In what ways do shared regional identities inform decisions to cooperate and what, if anything, does cooperation entail for reinforcement and reimagining of communities? It could also be interesting to test further through interview and ethnographic studies the mechanisms of dispersion and uptake of Schengen role expectations and norms. The investigation of these questions calls for in-depth case-studies. These could be selected on the basis of the comprehensive empirical picture provided by the database.

Related to this, our understanding of the impact of participation in Schengen could be solidified and deepened by investigating other expansions of the cooperation: the Nordic and the Southern as well as the recent joining of Switzerland. The Eastern enlargement was a very significant event in EU cooperation but might well differ from previous expansions of the Schengen area. Studying the accession of the Nordic countries would also enable us to investigate effects of the existence of prior regional cooperation and identification. These countries had formed a Nordic Passport Union before joining Schengen.

In-depth studies of individual countries would furthermore enable us to advance our understanding of how the Schengen cooperation is shaped by and potentially transforms state formation trajectories in Europe. Are there differences in the ways in which the common rules and norms has been incorporated in domestic administrative structures? Do we see systematic divergence in the consequences between for example the centralized state of France and regionalized Italy, post-communist Poland and welfare-state Sweden?

The positioning of the European border regime as communitarian could also be further assessed in future research. The ethnic dimension might be probed by examining, for example, to what extent descendants of European migrants in a sending country are treated preferentially. Do they enjoy easier access compared with applicants who hold similar citizenship but without the same claim of ancestry? On the civic dimension, subsequent studies could analyse the treatment of applicants undertaking trips for civil society organisations such as human rights activists. Are visits of this kind specially facilitated or as difficult or easy as seeking to travel for other purposes? Studying these dynamics would require individual-level data and might call for comparative case studies. Undertaking this research would in different ways triangulate and might qualify the overall communitarian classification arrived at in the project.

On a similar note, it could be interesting to explore in more detail to what extent openness and selectivity varies among member states. I characterised Schengen as

a whole as ethnic yet there might be interesting variation within the regime. On the conflict-cooperation axis I found distinct clusters of countries interacting more tightly with each other. Perhaps similar groupings could be identified on the civic-ethnic dimension? The political characteristics of foreign states might account better for variation in the openness of the border of some Schengen states rather than others. Likewise, differences in cultural similarity could be of more importance for explaining implementation practices in particular member states. If such differences within the regime were found on types of openness, would it also follow territorial clusters as on the governance axis or could we see other dynamics at play?

Our understanding of the Schengen regime could also be improved through a wider comparative perspective. It would be interesting to investigate further how different practices are in Schengen-Europe compared with the United States and the United Kingdom. Moreover, studies could also explore whether other regional free travel areas, for example in Africa and South America, exhibit the same characteristics as the European. Is there also here an apparent trade-off between open internal borders and more closed external frontiers? This could tell us to what extent the patterns and logics identified are unique to the EU and could also potentially point to different ways of organizing border cooperation.

Future research could as well probe how the regime is experienced, perceived and negotiated by different travellers. Using the dataset we can identify cases of high and low enforcement levels, and ask how this influence the attractiveness of Europe and affect its 'soft power' abroad. These questions can be approached both on an ethnographic basis but also pursuing quantitative strategies. If openness is reduced, does this influence the amount of cross-border travel and trade? Do increased efforts of visa control actually reduce levels of illegal immigration? Is there an effect of tightened visa rules on inflows of forced migrants?

The comprehensive empirics on the restrictiveness of the regime, finally, play into the considerable normative political theorizing on migration and open borders.

How, if at all, are different forms of travel barriers justifiable? To what extent is it reasonable and fair to ease internal mobility at the expense of the access for outsiders?

Investigating these sets of questions would enhance our appreciation of contemporary border policy and practices, European integration and the movement of persons.

APPENDIX

Database construction codebook

1. Introduction

This codebook describes in detail how the European Visa Database (EVD) was constructed.[41] The purpose is to provide full transparency of the coding process and thereby ensure a high reliability of the dataset. It is structured as follows. The next and second part sets out how the basic tables in the database on countries, cities, travel distances and population sizes were put together. The third, fourth and fifth describes the coding of the three dimensions of visa policies: requirements, issuing practice and consular services. The sixth part explains how the final combined data-table on visa requirements, visa issuing practices and consular representation, including the mobility barriers index, was devised. The seventh present a set of equations used and the final eighth part contains a technical diagram of the database structure.

All raw data, coding schemes as well as the database itself are available as a downloadable file from the EVD website. In this way, it is possible to inspect precisely how the dataset was compiled and organized in order to verify, repeat or modify the process. On a technical note, the downloadable file contains the ASP.NET computer scripts, SQL syntaxes, original and processed data as well as the database (MSSQL mdf file). This file also contains, where applicable, links to the raw data sources. To replicate the coding process a Microsoft SQL Server and Microsoft Internet Information Service running ASP.NET is required. The latter is available on most Windows computers whereas the former is specialized software which needs to be purchased separately. To repeat the conversion of pdf documents to excel it is also necessary to acquire software for doing so. For the project I used ABBYY's PDF Transformer 3.0.

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[41] The database can be accessed via www.mogenshobolth.dk/evd.

In general, the time period covered by the database is 2005 to 2010. However, as data availability varies for the three dimensions (visa requirements, issuing practices and consular services) and receiving countries the years covered can in practice differ. The table below details the years included per receiving state and analytical dimension. For each year data is available for all relevant sending countries. The database is expanded with additional years and receiving countries as new data becomes available.

Receiving country	Visa requirements	Visa issuing practice	Consular representation
Austria	2001-2010	2005-2010 [1]	2004-2010
Belgium	2001-2010	2005-2010	2004-2010
Bulgaria	2007-2010	2006-2010	2006-2010 [2]
Cyprus	2004-2010	2005-2010	2005-2010 [2]
Czech Republic	2004-2010	2005-2010	2005-2010 [3]
Denmark	2001-2010	2005-2010	2004-2010
Estonia	2004-2010	2005-2010	2005-2010 [3]
Finland	2001-2010	2005-2010	2004-2010
France	2001-2010	2005-2010	2004-2010
Germany	2001-2010	2005-2010	2004-2010
Greece	2001-2010	2005-2010	2004-2010
Hungary	2004-2010	2005-2010	2005-2010 [3]
Iceland	2001-2010	2005-2010	2004-2010
Italy	2001-2010	2005-2010	2004-2010
Latvia	2004-2010	2005-2010	2005-2010 [3]
Lithuania	2004-2010	2005-2010	2005-2010 [3]
Luxembourg	2001-2010	2005-2010	2004-2010
Malta	2004-2010	2006-2010	2005-2010 [3]
Netherlands	2001-2010	2005-2010	2004-2010
Norway	2001-2010	2005-2010 [4]	2004-2010
Poland	2004-2010	2005-2010	2005-2010 [3]
Portugal	2001-2010	2005-2010	2004-2010
Romania	2007-2010	2006-2010	2006-2010 [2]
Slovakia	2004-2010	2005-2010	2005-2010 [3]
Slovenia	2004-2010	2005-2010	2005-2010 [3]
Spain	2001-2010	2005-2010	2004-2010

Receiving country	Visa requirements	Visa issuing practice	Consular representation
Sweden	2001-2010	2005-2010	2004-2010
Switzerland	2009-2010	2009-2010	2008-2010
United Kingdom	2003-2010	2001-2008	2001-2008 [2]
United States	2001-2010	2006-2010	No data

[1] Information on visas refused missing for 2007 and 2008

[2] Information on consular representation is available via the data on cities where visas were issued

[3] Information on consular representation in 2006 and 2007 is available via the data on cities where visas were issued

[4] Information on visas refused missing for 2009

As illustrated in the table, the database fully covers the period from 2005 to 2010 on all three dimensions in all receiving countries with a few exceptions. For some states, such as Austria, data on refused visas is missing for certain years. For the UK empirics on issuing practices is lacking for 2009 and 2010, but here information is available already from 2001. It is also important to note, that there is no data on consular services for the US. I expand in more detail below on the missing data where relevant.

2. Basic tables

The database stores information on regions, countries and cities in the world as well as data on travel distances and population sizes. This data is referenced in the other tables containing the information on visa requirements, issuing-practices and consular representation.

2.1 World regions

The table structure is as follows:

Column name	Data type	Comments
regionID	Int	-
regionName	nvarchar(250)	-

The list of world regions is based on the CIA World Factbook 2012. I downloaded a background data file containing an XML file listing all countries in the world grouped into regions. I copied this information into an excel file, and subsequently imported the list of regions into the database using a country import script. The database thus contains a list of 11 regions: Africa, Central Asia, East Asia, South Asia, Europe, Middle East, North America, Central America, South America, Oceania and Antarctica. This classification of regions can of course be contested. For example, is Egypt part of Africa or the Middle East? Does Mexico belong in Central or North America? For some research purposes it could also be relevant to consider for example Sub-Saharan or Northern Europe as separate regions, and indeed in the second paper of the thesis I pursue such a sub-regional approach within a European context. The database does not preclude a re-coding along these lines.

2.2 Countries

The country table is structured as follows:

Column name	Data type	Comments
countryID	Int	-
countryName	nvarchar(250)	-
countryCode	varchar(2)	-
regionID	Int	Foreign key (FK) reference to the regions table

The list of countries in the world is based on the European visa list (Council Regulation 539/2001). I copied all the entries from annex 1 (nationals requiring a visa) and from annex 2 (nationals not requiring a visa) to an excel file. For abbreviations of the country names I downloaded a table with standard country codes from the International Organisation for Standardization (ISO) and added it to the import excel file.

The visa regulation makes a distinction between "States", "Special administrative regions of the People's Republic of China" and "Entities and territorial authorities

that are not recognised as states by at least one member state". I included all entries as countries.

Doing so yields a list of 167 countries. To this I then added Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland as countries associated with the European Union. Finally, I added the current 27 states member states of the European Union. The final list of countries thus contains 198 data points covering almost all political entities in the world. After the excel file was put together I copied the data from excel to the database using the country import script.

In the main time period under consideration in this project the political landscape in the Balkans changed. Serbia and Montenegro split up in 2006, and in 2008 Kosovo declared itself an independent state separate from Serbia. The database contains separate entries for "Serbia", "Montenegro" and "Kosovo". There are different ways of handling such secessions. One approach is to backdate the data so that earlier information as much as possible reflects the current political landscape. For example, because Kosovo has now become independent the visa practice in Pristina should be retrospectively removed from the data on Serbia and grouped under Kosovo. This might seem a reasonable strategy when shorter time periods are investigated as is the case in the database currently. However, in a longer time-scale the approach becomes problematic as it creates pseudo political entities not reflecting the legal-political landscape in which decision-makers acted at the time. Consequently, the validity of the inferences drawn is reduced.

In order to ensure that the database can at a later stage be expanded with additional years I have thus chosen a different approach which do not involve back-dating. Earlier entries in the database for Serbia simply include the visa-issuing practices occurring at consulates in what are now the states of Montenegro and Kosovo up until 2005 and 2007 respectively. Consequently, no data is available for these two new states prior to their establishment. If, however, for particular research purposes it is relevant to backdate the data can easily be re-coded.

After importing the information into the database I made a set of changes to the country list. The country codes for Bolivia, Myanmar, Congo (Democratic Republic of), Djibouti, Iran, Laos, Micronesia, Korea (North), Russia, Sao Tome and Principe, Suriname, Syria, Tanzania, Comoros, Vietnam, Bahamas, Macedonia, Holy See, Korea (South), United States, Venezuela, Palestinian Authority, Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan were added manually. This was necessary because the automated script failed due to differences in the naming of the countries between the EU and the ISO organization. Kosovo does not figure on the ISO list. Here I used the country code KV.

The regional coding of Burma, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Congo (Democratic Republic of), Djibouti, Gambia, Micronesia, Korea (North), São Tomé and Príncipe, Suriname, Comoros, Vanuatu, Palestinian Authority, Bahamas, Brunei Darussalam, Macedonia, Holy See, El Salvador, Korea (South), United States of America, Hong Kong SAR and Macao SAR were done manually as again the automated process failed due to differences in country names. The information on Vanuatu was looked up manually on the CIA World Factbook website as the country was not listed in the downloadable dataset. Note also that Palestinian Authority is listed as the West Bank in the CIA raw data. Croatia was recoded as part of Europe since the CIA data erroneously grouped it under Africa.

Finally, to correct spelling errors and for presentation purposes I adjusted the country names "Burma/Myanmar" to "Burma", "Djijbouti" to Djibouti", "North Korea" to "Korea (North)", "Surinam" to "Suriname", "The Comoros" to "Comoros", "Bahamy" to "Bahamas", "Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia" to "Macedonia", "Salvador to "El Salvador", "South Korea" to "Korea (South)" and "The Democratic Republic of Congo" to "Congo (Democratic Republic of)".

2.3 Cities

The city information is contained in two tables. The first stores the basic information on each location (name, geographical location). The second links the

cities with the different countries in the database, and includes a coding of whether a city is the capital of the country. The structure of the tables is as follows:

Column name	Data type	Comments
cityID	Int	-
cityName	nvarchar(250)	-
Lat	decimal(18, 7)	Location of city (latitude)
Lng	decimal(18, 7)	Location of city (longitude)

Column name	Data type	Comments
countryCityID	Int	Primary key
cityID	Int	FK reference to the cities table
countryID	Int	FK reference to countries table
capital	Tinyint	-

The list of cities in the world is based on a 2012 list of embassies and other forms of European consular representation and an overview of EU-Schengen visa-issuing practices in 2011. The former contains lists of cities outside the Schengen area; the latter also includes data on cities inside the EU, EEA or Schengen area where visas are issued. Both documents were put together by the EU Commission based on information from the member states. The raw data on representation sets out countries and cities in the world and specifies what diplomatic services if any the different Schengen member states offer. The information on issuing-practices details the number of visas issued abroad in different cities. Both documents are described in more detail in the sections on issuing-practices and consular representation. Here I only detail how I used the data to code cities.

As a first step in the import process I converted the tables in the original pdf files to excel. After having done so I inspected the converted data for apparent errors. In the process I also made a few adjustments to the information in order to ensure the consistency in structure necessary for the automated import to succeed. These minor alterations are documented in the excel files.

In the second step I put together a conversion table to take into account that the naming of countries and cities vary. For example, in the database there is an entry for "Russia" but in the raw data on consular representation the name "Russian Federation" is used. I put the table together by stopping the import whenever I could not look up a country in the database. I then identified what name it was coded under. I followed a similar strategy for putting together a list of alternative city names. For the import I used four sheets: primary consular representation, secondary representation (e.g. honorary consuls), visa-issuing data for full Schengen countries and visa-issuing data for partial Schengen countries. After coding the first sheet I double-checked that the entries from remaining data were indeed new cities and not duplicates with a slightly varying spelling of the city name.

After this step was completed city information for 16 countries were still missing. For these states there was no representation or visa-issuing data from the EU-Schengen area. The specific countries are: Bahamas, Bhutan, Dominica, Kiribati, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, Palau, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Tonga and Tuvalu. Here I manually added the city listed as capital of the country in the CIA World Factbook.[42] Furthermore, I deleted the entries for Hong Kong and Macao created under the entry of China as they also figure under their separate country entries. I also renamed 'Antigua' to Saint John's to correctly register the capital of Antigua and Barbuda.

Having put together the list of cities I then turned to the coding of capitals. In the Commission representation data the capital is the first city listed under a given country. I thus made use of this ordering in the coding and flagged the first imported city as the capital. As this data does not cover all countries I manually had to code the capital in some cases, in particular for the EU states themselves. Using the Factbook I coded the following cities as capitals: Vienna, Brussels, Amsterdam, Athens, Barcelona, Bern, Berlin, Budapest, Copenhagen, Helsinki,

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[42] The Factbook defines the capital as the seat of the government.

Hong Kong, Ljubljana, Luxemburg, Macao, Madrid, Oslo, Paris, Prague, Reykjavik, Riga, Rome, Stockholm, Tallinn, Vilnius, Warsaw, Lisbon and Valetta.[43] After having done so I recoded all remaining cases as not capitals.

I then inspected the dataset to check whether or not all the imported city names were unique. In doing so, I discovered an entry for Valencia in Spain and Valencia in Venezuela. I therefore renamed the former to 'Valencia (Spain)' to minimize further the risk of later coding errors.

The information on latitude and longitude of the cities was inputted using Google Maps accessed programmatically via a geo-coding web-service. I set up a computer script querying the Google servers for location data based on the country and city names stored in the database. A number of records could not be geo-coded in this way. For some of these the problem was variation in the naming of countries and cities. The code-file details the instances where I temporarily renamed a city or a country in order to make the correct data request. In three cases – Kuwait City, Funafuti and Majuro – I could not fetch the coordinates automatically. I thus inputted information on these through a manual look-up via the Google Maps webpage. Location data can be revised as errors and other issues are identified, and it should therefore be noted that future lookups could return somewhat different coordinates if Google has identified and corrected data errors. I checked the accuracy of the coding by randomly selecting 10 entries (capital cities) from the database and comparing the coding with the coordinates found via another data source, Wikipedia's mapping service.

Having set up the basic table, containing 368 cities, I then added new entries manually as need arose during the import process. All cities manually added are listed in the excel import files.

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[43] Juba is now the capital of South Sudan after this became an independent country mid-late 2011. As my data currently stops at 2010 Juba is grouped under Sudan and not coded as a capital. This required manual recoding.

2.4 Distances

The distance table structure is as follows:

Column name	Data type	Comments
distanceID	Int	-
rcID	Int	Receiving country, reference countries table (FK)
scID	Int	Sending country, reference countries table (FK)
DistanceKm	Int	

Travel distance is a key variable when understanding global travel flows and variation in visa application numbers. I use it, specifically, in the calculation of the mobility barriers index as detailed below. I calculated the travel distance between sending and receiving countries as the distance (in kilometres) between capital cities using the Haversine formula. This equation can be used to approximate the distance between a given set of coordinates. I relied on a pre-coded implementation of it as a database script, adjusting the radius of the earth to 6.378 to fetch the results in kilometres. I thus set up an automated script parsing the coordinates of all potential sending and receiving countries for getting the distance, and inserted the result into the distance table. The result yielded a total of 39.006 rows, of which only a subset is of immediate relevance as the database does not contain information on the mobility barriers of all potential receiving countries in the world. I checked the accuracy of the coding by cross-checking the calculation in the database for ten sending countries listed for France with the distance found via the Google Earth application.

2.5 Population size

The population table structure is as follows:

Column name	Data type	Comments
populationSizeID	Int	-
countryID	Int	Reference to countries table (foreign key)
dYear	Int	
populationSize	Int	Measured in 1000s

As with travel distance, population size is a key indicator for understanding trends and variations in visa figures. The measure is used in the construction of the mobility barriers index. To code population size I draw on the United Nation's 2010 revision of world population figures. This dataset contains information on almost all countries included in the dataset. Data is only missing for Taiwan and Kosovo. For Taiwan I instead used the size and annual growth estimate of the population in the CIA Factbook for 2010, and backdated this to earlier years assuming that growth-rates were constant in the time-period. For Kosovo I made use of the alternative population dataset provided by the World Bank. In coding the figures for Serbia, Montenegro and Kosovo I took into account that the latter two were not sovereign states in the entire time-period. The country section above explains the strategy followed. All transformations are detailed in the data files.

In total, I imported population data for countries for the period from 2000 to 2010 equal to 2164 observations (11 per country). For Kosovo there is three entries and for Montenegro five. I checked the accuracy of the import by randomly comparing five imported values with the information in the original dataset.

3. Visa requirements
Visa requirements are stored in a table with the following structure:

Column name	Data type	Comments
visaReqID	Int	-
rcID	Int	Receiving country. FK reference to countries table
scID	Int	Sending country. FK reference to countries table
dYear	Int	
shortStayVisaRequired	Tinyint	

The table contains information on whether a receiving country in a given year required the nationals of a sending country to obtain a visa before embarking on a short trip. The database does not yet contain information on transit visa requirements but these can be added later on.

I view nationals of a sending country as ordinary citizens without a special or diplomatic passport. This is a reasonable assumption where most travellers are concerned. There are, however, exceptions. Particular visa rules for diplomats are not covered by the database. For a few countries there is visa free access for all but holders of specific types of identity documents. Here I code no visa obligation for the state as such even though some categories of travellers still require a permit to travel. In recent years, sending states have in some cases lifted the permit requirement provided that foreign nationals hold a biometric passport. In these instances, I code the visa requirement as having been lifted for the country. Furthermore, if a visa obligation was instituted or lifted during a year, the classification follows the status the country had for the main part of the year. These coding choices slightly reduce the validity of the visa requirement measure. Ideally, the different exceptions should be explored in-depth to ascertain their precise impact and then re-coded accordingly. This, however, falls outside the scope of the research project.

The following sections describe the construction of the data for the different receiving countries.

3.1 European Union (Schengen)

The information on the permit requirements of the Schengen states is based on the 2001 common EU visa list and subsequent revisions. In 2006 Bahamas, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Mauritius and Seychelles were removed from the list pending the conclusion of a visa waiver agreement with these states. The agreements eventually reached were thus also found and consulted. All the documents were located by searches on the EUR-Lex website. I looked up the law from 2001, and used the links from there to find subsequent acts altering the visa list. The references and source documents are stored together with the database files.

To ensure consistency, I coded the visa requirement per individual Schengen receiving state for all potential sending countries – including members of the EU. As there are no travel permit obligations in force amongst EU states (including the European Economic Area), I also had to compile a list of membership status for each of the sending states. This was done using a European Commission overview of the EU and a summary of the EEA agreement by the European Free Trade Association. For example, from the perspective of Germany up until Bulgaria and Romania joined the EU their visa free status originated from the common visa list. Afterwards, it flowed from their status as EU member countries.

I coded the time-period from the establishment of the EU's common visa list in 2001 to 2010. The new member states (from the 2004 and 2007 enlargement) are coded as receiving countries from the year of their EU-membership. As above, information for Montenegro is coded from 2006 and onwards; for Kosovo from 2008 and onwards.

All in all, for this group of receiving states the database contains 49.993 entries. It is important to note, however, that the visa lists are identical for these states. Hence, the only variation is over time as the common list is expanded and contracted. Future revisions could, however, introduce variation also between the receiving states by including earlier years. Additionally, rules on short-stay visa

requirements for diplomats are not fully harmonized nor are the regulations on transit visas. Hence, introducing these would also introduce further variation in the dataset.

3.2 United Kingdom

The visa requirements of the United Kingdom are not defined in legislative acts. They are set administratively by the Home Office with a notification of Parliament. Currently, the categories of persons requiring a visa to visit the UK for a short stay (defined as a period of up to 6 months), are set out in 'Appendix 1' to the Immigration Rules. Nationalities not listed in this annex can in general visit the UK without having to obtain a visa beforehand.

It is somewhat more difficult to track changes in the UK visa list as these cannot be looked up via databases over acts of Parliament. I constructed the data entries using the following procedure. As a first step I coded the country list in the current (October 2012) appendix 1. The list was inspected for different exceptions and qualifications following the rules set out above. The entry for the "The territories formerly comprising the socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia" was split into Kosovo and Montenegro (Serbia was already on the list). Finally, I added Palestinian Authority to the list as it falls under the general category of "Persons who hold non-national documents". This I double-checked with the Home Office webpage.

Having put together this basic list I then tracked the changes to the appendix using the 'Statements of changes in Immigration rules' published from 2003 and onwards on the UKBA website. I went through each of the documents from 2003 to 2011 searching for visa, and then downloaded and inspected those that made a change to the list of visa nationals. Using this procedure I identified changes with regards to Lesotho, Swaziland, Bolivia, Taiwan, South Africa, Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia and Malawi in the time period. These were then entered into the excel sheet. In the final step I imported the information to the database, assuming that for all other countries than those identified on the list no visa requirement was in

force. The total amount of observations on the United Kingdom for 2003 to 2011 is 1.765.

3.3 United States

As a main rule, the United States requires that all persons who seek to visit obtain a 'non-immigrant' visa before embarking on their trip. This requirement, however, has since the late 1980s been lifted for a limited group of countries through the 'Visa Waiver Program'. Whether or not a country is included in the program is an administrative decision based on guidelines set by Congress. After the 9/11 terrorist attacks the visa exemptions was criticised for endangering the security of the United States. As a response, the rules were tightened and visa-waiver nationals now need to be authorised prior to the travel through the so-called ESTA system. To obtain the permit it is necessary to pay a fee, fill out a form, submit passport information and consent to the US authorities using the information. ESTA raises the question of whether the US has de facto re-introduced a visa obligation for all. I have not coded this to be the case because of the short time and ease with which it is possible to go through the ESTA screening. However, it is debatable to what extent the ESTA barrier is much different from – for example – the relatively lenient visa procedures encountered by many in for example Taiwan.

I constructed the visa list for the United States by starting out with the current list of countries participating in the waiver program. After having done so, I searched through the US Federal Register for departmental notifications on changes in the program. The precise documents found and the search criteria used are listed in the source files. I identified the following changes to the program in the time-period investigated: Argentina was removed from the list in 2002, Uruguay removed 2003, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Republic of Korea, Slovak Republic and Malta added in 2008, and finally, Greece added in 2010.

Additionally, the visa requirement was also lifted for a limited set of countries through other legislative means in the time-period. Canadian citizens are generally able to travel freely to the US. A similar option is open for nationals of Micronesia and the Marshall Islands. These countries are hence also coded as having visa-free access to the United States.

This final list was then imported into the database. As the time-period covered for the US data is identical to the EU/Schengen area, the total number of data points is 2.155.

4. Visa-issuing practices

The database contains three tables on short-stay visa-issuing practices for respectively the Schengen group, the UK and the US. A short-stay is here usually defined as a trip for no more than three (Schengen, US) or six months (UK). A permit may be issued allowing only for a shorter stay, for example a week's conference attendance. It can also be valid for multiple entries and thereby enable the holder to conduct several small visits over a longer time period.

In the following sections I describe how I coded the data for the individual receiving countries.

4.1 European Union (Schengen)

The table structure is as follows:

Column name	Data type	Comments
visaPracticeEuID	Int	-
rcID	Int	Receiving country. FK reference to countries table
scCityID	Int	Location of consulate. FK reference to cities table
dYear	Int	
shortStayAppliedFor	Int	Calculated
shortStayIssued	Int	Calculated
shortStayRefused	Int	Calculated
shortStayRefusalRate	Decimal(5,2)	Calculated
issuedA_All	Int	A = Airport transit visa
issuedA_Mev	Int	Mev = valid for multiple entries. 2010 and onwards
issuedB	Int	B = Transit visa
issuedC_All	Int	C = Short-stay visa
issuedC_Mev	Int	Data only available for 2010 and onwards
issuedD	Int	D = National long-stay visa
issuedDC	Int	D + C = National long-stay also valid as C visa
issuedVTL	Int	VTL = National short-stay visa
issuedADS	Int	ADS = Chinese tourist group visa
issuedABC	Int	
issuedABCDDCVTL	Int	
appliedC	Int	
appliedABC	Int	
notIssuedA	Int	
notIssuedB	Int	
notIssuedC	Int	
notIssuedABC	Int	

The information on EU visa issuing practices is based on detailed tables setting out the number of visas applied for, issued, and not issued at the member states' consulates. These overviews were put together by the General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union up to and including 2009. In subsequent years, due to the entry into force of new visa legislation, the collection and publication of the data has been taken over by the European Commission. The visa-issuing statistics are supplied per embassy.

The information was compiled in four steps. In step *one* I converted the raw pdf files to excel. This was only necessary for the Council data. The Commission made the figures available from the outset in excel. I then went through the processed data fixing errors in the conversion and standardising the layout. The precise changes I made to the files are set out in the source files. Step *two* was the actual import of the information in the excel sheets to the database. This was done using a computer script. During this process I added new cities to the database as necessary. In step *three* I compared the sum-totals for each year and visa column with the similar totals in the raw data, and tracked down and corrected any errors there might have been in the import. This check was primarily done per receiving country and for the Schengen area as such. I checked whether the data had been coded correctly under the different sending countries and cities by randomly looking up a limited set of data entries. As part of this step I also inspected the data from the member states for apparent major errors and problems. This revealed that 2009 figures for Norway deviated greatly with earlier and later years. I hence excluded these.

In step *four* I estimated the short-stay visas applied for, issued and refused by the EU states. Here I made use of the columns detailing the total number of 'ABC' visas applied for, issued and not issued. 'A' and 'B' are visas for transit and 'C' for short stays. In general, the member states have supplied data on these variables consistently across the years. Austria, however, did not report information in 2007 and 2008. In a set of cases data on the visas not issued were left blank. In general, I interpreted this as missing data. However, when the number of visas applied for and issued was the same I assumed that the column was left blank because no visas were refused that year. In most cases a zero would have been entered in the field but in some cases this was apparently not done.

The precise equations used to calculate the visas applied for, issued, refused and the refusal rate are listed in section 7. The main ideas behind them are as follows:

Firstly, by refused I understand both formal rejections and informal advice or delays resulting in the withdrawal of an application. Often a visa application results in a formal refusal. In other instances an applicant is encouraged to withdraw his or her request before this stage is reached. For example, some consular officials might encourage persons to withdraw 'for their own sake' so that a formal refusal is not entered into government databases. Delaying tactics might also mean that the process is prolonged and that the applicant therefore gives up. In some cases, of course, a withdrawal might be entirely voluntary and not related to state practice. For example, a conference is cancelled well in advance and a visa is therefore no longer necessary. Yet it is fair to assume that the latter form of withdrawal is comparatively rare especially as applicants have already paid a not insubstantial visa handling fee.

To what extent does it matter whether or not only formal rejections are included in the measure? Limited data is available on this. German statistics for 2003 suggests that formal rejections frequently are not made, whereas UK figures for 2006 to 2008 points in a different direction. It is likely that there is considerable variation in practices. Including informal withdrawals in the refusal rate is important to avoid significantly underestimating restrictiveness in certain cases. Reversely, with this strategy there is some risk of overestimating the refusal rate if it should be common that applicants withdraw freely. Yet of the two scenarios the latter is the least probable.

Secondly, in the calculations I include data on national 'VTL' visas. A VTL visa is a permit valid for transit or a short stay to one or more of the member states but not the entire Schengen area. It can be issued, for example, when a receiving state deems that an applicant does not meet all entry criteria but still wishes to issue a visa for humanitarian or political reasons. It is also issued when there is disagreement or insufficient clarity between the member states on what travel documents they recognize as valid.

VTL visas are not issued very often. In most cases, whether or not they are taken into account in the calculation of the refusal rate makes little substantial difference. Since the enlargement of the Schengen area in December 2007 the use of VTL visas has, however, increased. This is mainly due to a change in practice by France. In a French [government report](#) the new approach is justified with reference to the lack of information provided by Central and Eastern European member states on the travel documents they recognize. Apart from this, VTLs visas primarily matter in Macedonia and Iraq where several EU countries issue them frequently. It is to avoid overestimating the refusal rate in these cases that I include VTL visas in the calculations.

Thirdly, transit visas (A, B) figure in the estimate. In principle they should be excluded since they do not allow for a short stay. This is not possible however. The statistical material for 2005 to 2010 contains information about the number of transit visas issued but does not state how many were applied for and refused. Recent 2011 statistics include additional information making it possible to calculate transit and short stay refusal rates separately for this year. Doing so reveals that only in a very limited set of cases is the refusal rate substantially influenced by the transit visas. When these permits are excluded the refusal rate tends to increase. Hence having them in the calculation is thus not generally a problem but it does mean that in a few a cases the refusal rate is underestimated.

All in all, the database contains 14.717 observations for the period 2005 to 2010. For 13.941 of these it was possible to calculate the number of short-stay visa applications received. Information was adequate to calculate the refusal rate for 13.367 cases.

4.2 United Kingdom

The data from the United Kingdom is stored in a table structured as follows:

Column name	Data type	Comments
visaPracticeID	Int	-
rcID	Int	Receiving country. FK reference to countries table
scCityID	Int	Location of consulate. FK reference to cities table
dYear	Int	
shortStayAppliedFor	Int	Calculated
shortStayIssued	Int	Calculated
shortStayRefused	Int	Calculated
shortStayRefusalRate	Decimal(5,2)	Calculated
visitReceived	Int	Only for 2001 to 2004
visitIssued	Int	Only for 2001 to 2004
visitRefused	Int	Only for 2001 to 2004
visitFamilyReceived	Int	Only for 2004 to 2008
visitFamilyIssued	Int	Only for 2004 to 2008
visitFamilyRefused	Int	Only for 2004 to 2008
visitFamilyWithdrawn	Int	Only for 2006 to 2008
visitFamilyLapsed	Int	Only for 2006 to 2008
visitFamilyDecided	Int	Only for 2006 to 2008
visitOtherReceived	Int	Only for 2005 to 2008
visitOtherIssued	Int	Only for 2005 to 2008
visitOtherRefused	Int	Only for 2005 to 2008
visitOtherWithdrawn	Int	Only for 2006 to 2008
visitOtherLapsed	Int	Only for 2006 to 2008
visitOtherDecided	Int	Only for 2006 to 2008
transitReceived	Int	Only for 2005 to 2008
transitIssued	Int	Only for 2005 to 2008
transitRefused	Int	Only for 2005 to 2008
transitWithdrawn	Int	Only for 2006 to 2008
transitLapsed	Int	Only for 2006 to 2008
transitDecided	Int	Only for 2006 to 2008

The data for the United Kingdom is based on the ‘entry clearance statistics’ which were published by the Home Office and is now accessible via the national archives. There is data for the period 2001 to 2008. Unfortunately the data does not follow the calendar year, as is the case for the EU statistics, but the British government's financial year (1 April - 31 March). The data from 2001 to 2005

was published by the UK Visas agency. The 2006, 2007 and 2008 information was made available by the UK Border Agency. The raw data is grouped per consulate ('diplomatic post').

I imported the data in a series of steps. First, I isolated the information on visas related to short-stays and converted these tables to excel format. I then inspected the files and cleaned up the data, for example removing superfluous header lines. The precise changes are detailed in the source files. For 2001, 2002 and 2003 the data contained information on 'visit' visa applications received, issued and refused. From 2004 and onwards the files also list how many applications concerned family visits; from 2005 there is data on transit visas. The data for 2006, 2007 and 2008 maintained the basic structure from 2005 but now also added data on how many applications were withdrawn, lapsed and decided upon by the different diplomatic posts.

Second, I imported the visa practice data using a computer script. I did this for each year in turn and compared the sum totals in the database with the raw data. For 2006, 2007 and 2008 minor deviations (usually 5 or 10) started to appear. These were seemingly due to the fact that the original data was now rounded in 5s. I also inspected the data for any apparent major deviating trends that might reflect coding errors. This did not reveal any apparent problems.

After having imported the data I calculated the totals for the short stay visas applied for, issued, refused and the refusal rate. For the period 2001 to 2004 this was straightforward. For 2005 and onwards, when applications became divided into family and other visits, I used a sum of the two and calculated the refusal rate accordingly. For 2006 and onwards I also included withdrawn or lapsed in the estimation. This was done to improve comparability with the EU statistics.

In total, the database contains 1.210 observations on the UK case. The number of visas applied for is available from all observations. Refusal rates are missing from

14 cases because the number of visas issued and refused at the diplomatic posts was zero.

4.3 United States

The table on US visa-issuing practices is structured as follows:

Column name	Data type	Comments
visaPracticeUsID	Int	Primary key (unique identifier)
rcID	Int	Receiving country. FK reference to countries table
scID	Int	Sending country. FK reference to countries table
dYear	Int	
shortStayAppliedFor	Int	Calculated based on issued and refusal rate
shortStayIssued	Int	
shortStayRefused	Int	Calculated based on issued and refusal rate
shortStayRefusalRate	Decimal	In percentage (%)
typeB1issued	Int	B1
typeB2issued	Int	B2
typeB1comb2issued	Int	B1,2
typeB1comb2BCCissued	Int	B1,2/BCC
typeB1comb2BCVissued	Int	B1,2/BCV

I constructed the US data entries using an overview over visa refusal rates and a detailed background table setting out the number of visas issued per nationality. The time period covered is 2006 to 2011. The data relates to 'B' visas issued for visits for business or pleasure. This is by far the most widely used visa for temporary entry to the US. It can be issued either solely for business (B-1) or pleasure (B-2) or as valid for both purposes (B-1,2).

There is raw data on visas issued for earlier years but here data on refusal rates are missing. The US data differ from the UK and EU figures in important ways. It is, firstly, grouped per nationality. Hence, the data relates to all citizens of a given country regardless of where they submitted their application. The data, secondly, follows the US fiscal year which runs from 1 October to 30 September. For

example, fiscal year 2006 runs from 1 October 2005 to 30 September 2006. Thus the data for a given year also includes information on some of the previous months.

As the US figures only include information on the refusal rate and the visas issued it is necessary to calculate the applications received and refused manually. In the Department of State's explanatory note to the overview of refusal rates it is clarified that the calculation is based on the number of decisions made and only include final refusals. I reversed this equation to identify the number of visas applied for and refused. For mathematical reasons, this approach cannot be used in cases where the refusal rate is 100. This is a very limited problem as such a high refusal rate is only reported in three cases: Micronesia 2006 and 2009 as well as Andorra 2010. Here the applications received and refused are unknown. Please note that since the US statistics apparently do not include withdrawn applications the number of visas applied for might be higher than calculated. Likewise, the US refusal rate could be somewhat underestimated in comparison with the UK and Schengen.

I coded the data in two main steps. I started out by converting the pdf files with refusal rates to Excel format to be able to import the data. The information on visas issued was already in Excel format.

In coding the data I made the following choices. For Hong Kong I used the refusal rate information for 'Hong Kong SAR' and not the separate figure for 'Hong Kong BNO HK passport'. Data on visas issued and refusal rates for unknown, no nationality or laissez-passer was ignored. Throughout the period I coded 'Serbia and Montenegro' under Serbia. For 2008 to 2010 this meant that the otherwise separate entries for 'Serbia and Montenegro' and 'Serbia' were merged into one. The data for 2006 included statistics on visas for Serbia without a corresponding record on refusal rates. I hence ignored this and only used the statistics on 'Serbia and Montenegro' in this year. The only missing cases are Montenegro for 2006 and 2007.

In relation to Mexico, importantly, the data is not valid. This is because a separate type of permit is widely used, the Border Crossing Card (BCC or BCV). The visa refusal rate published by the US does not include these, at least not for 2006-2009. This means that the estimate in the database does not reflect the actual number of permit applications and decisions for this country. The refusal rate is of course also of limited value.

After having thus inspected the data and clarified these issues I imported the data using a computer script designed for the purpose. I fetched and added the refusal rate and issued visas for each year and sending country. Then I calculated the number of visas applied for and refused based on the imported statistics. Afterwards, I randomly checked a set of the refusal rate figures. I also controlled that the sum total of visas issued in the database equals the sum in the original data. This control only revealed a deviation of 2 visas issued for 2006 relating to the excluded case of 'Serbia'.

In total the dataset includes 1.180 US entries (including two missing cases).

5. Consular representation

The information on consular services for visa-issuing purposes are stored in a single table structured as follows:

Column name	Data type	Comments
visaReprID	Int	-
rcID	Int	Receiving country. FK reference to countries table
scCityID	Int	Sending city. FK reference to countries_cities table
dYear	Int	
reprByRcID	Int	State representing the receiving country. FK reference to countries table
ExtSerPro	Tinyint	External Service Provider involved (outsourcing)

The database contains data on the diplomatic representation of the Schengen states. It includes information on their use of cooperative agreements between them. For example, Denmark might process and issue visa applications on behalf of Norway in several sending countries.

5.1 European Union (Schengen)

I coded the diplomatic representation of the Schengen states drawing on overviews put together by the Council General Secretariat in different years (annex 18 tables to the Common Consular Instructions). With the recent entry into force of the European visa code the task of compiling the annex was transferred to the Commission, and hence data for 2011 and onwards are based on Commission overviews (annex 28 to the EC visa code Handbook). These files detail the cities where the member states have independent consular representation for visa-issuing purposes, and where they rely on cooperative agreements with Schengen partner states. The pattern of diplomatic representation alters during years. I coded a consolidated version of the annex published in a given year as indicative of the representation pattern, but also made note of the precise date of the data so that it is possible to re-group otherwise where relevant. For example, in paper two I make use of a slightly different year coding.

The coding was done in two steps. First, I converted the raw pdf data to excel and inspected the data for immediate conversion errors. Having done so, I went through detailed footnotes in the originals providing additional comments on individual cases. For example, a note might indicate that a representation agreement only last for a specific time period or that a consulate is currently not accepting visa applications. When an embassy was noted to be in practice closed or not accepting applications I registered this and did not import it as a case of visa representation. I removed notices on representation agreements if they lasted less than half of the year in question. When the Commission took over responsibility of the annex they also started to collect information on the cities where applications are processed in cooperation with a private company ('external service provider'). I decided to also code this, as the outsourcing of the visa

process might be interesting for other researchers to explore. The list now also indicates cities where a member state does not have consular representation as such but the private firm has an office. I did not code these cases as instances of representation to ensure consistency with earlier years.

In the second step I imported the information to the database making use of the automated computer script. In total, this process yielded 25.917 data instances of either independent or cooperative consular representation abroad. Of these, 6644 also contain a coding of the use of private firms.[44]

5.2 United Kingdom

Information on the UK case is not contained in the overviews produced by the Commission and the Council. Data on the consular services of the United Kingdom are thus indirectly coded via the information on the visas issued. As this data is supplied by consulate it provides information on the diplomatic posts where the UK handles visa applications. And, reversely, it indicates where the UK is not represented for visa-issuing purposes.

5.3 United States

Information on US consular services is missing from the database. These cannot be inferred from the visa practice data as this is grouped per nationality and do not state in what country or city the applications were lodged.

6. Visa policy and practice: Mobility Barriers Index

The database contains a main mobility barriers table drawing together the information from the sub-tables on visa requirements, issuing practices and consular representation data for the different receiving countries. The content of this table is shown as default on the database website. The structure of this table is as follows:

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[44] External service providers, the data indicates, is only used in 354 cases. They are, however, often involved in major sending countries such as Russia, Turkey, India and China.

Column name	Data type	Comments
evdID	Int	Primary key (unique identifier)
rcID	Int	Receiving country. FK reference to countries table
scID	Int	Sending country. FK reference to countries table
dYear	Int	
rcSchMember	Tinyint	
visaRequirement	Tinyint	
rcReprType	Int	
rcReprOthers	Int	
rcReprByRcID	Int	Representing state. FK reference to countries table
visaAppliedFor	Int	
visaIssued	Int	
visaRefused	Int	
visaRefusalRate	Decimal	In percentage (%)
mobBarIndex	Int	Mobility Barriers Index

The analytical unit in the table is country-pairs in different years. It measures the mobility barrier of a receiving state towards a sending country in a given year. The table was put together in a series of step. I started out by adding the basic information countries and years. For the period 2005 to 2010 this yields 35.340 observations. I then added on the information on visa requirements, issuing practice, consular representation and the mobility barrier index. After having done so, I corrected the table for missing data entries. For example, I made sure that the records accurately reflected that there is no data for the UK for 2009 and 2010. As a final step I coded cooperating countries as having the same refusal rate and mobility barrier. Excluding the missing cases the table contains 32.714 cases. The next sections describe in further detail the different variables contained in the table and how they were computed.

Starting with the diplomatic representation, the "rcReprType" variable measures whether a receiving country has an embassy in a sending state, relies on a cooperative agreement or is not present at all in the location. If a state relied on both (for example had an own embassy in one city and cooperated in another) I

coded it as being independently represented. The "rcReprOthers" variables measure whether or not the receiving country represents partners in the sending state. Finally, the "rcReprByRcID" variable is used to identify what member state a receiving country is represented by. For the US I simply coded information on these dimensions as missing. I coded the UK as represented in states where it had processed visas. Reversely, I assumed that it had no representation in the countries were it did not process visas. I followed a similar logic for the countries only partially participating in Schengen.

On the visa statistics, I aggregated the consular data to the country level where necessary. For example, I calculated the total number of visas applied for, issued and refused at all French consulates in China. These sums were then inserted in the table. Note that I also use these sums to calculate the refusal rate. That is, the refusal rate is not an average of the practice at the individual consulates in a state but for the sending country measured as a single unit.

If a member state was represented by another, I coded the number of visas applied for, issued and refused as missing but copied over the refusal rate from the representing state. I thus assume that when countries share embassies their mobility barrier is the same. In the (few) situations where a receiving country was represented by more than one partner state in a sending country I selected one of them randomly.

Moving on to the Mobility Barriers Index, the overall idea behind this indicator is to provide a single restrictiveness score for a country-pair in a year taking into account both visa requirements, issuing practices and consular representation. I set up the indicator as a four point scale ranging from no mobility barriers to low, medium and high.

The index was constructed using the following rules. Firstly, if no visa requirement is in force I code the mobility barrier as none. Although the control at the territorial border is a hurdle to movement, it is here assumed to have a very

limited impact compared with the obligation to obtain a visa before even embarking on the trip.

Secondly, if a visa requirement is in force I use the refusal rate to group a case as either one of a low, medium or high barrier. To do so, I first inspected the interquartile ranges in the dataset and used these as a starting-point for the classification. Here I only considered applications lodged in a visa-list country (EU, UK) or by nationals on a visa-list (US). The first range of observations in the dataset (0-25%) covers refusal rates from 0 to 4, the second and third (25-75%) 5 to 21 and the fourth (75-100%) captures rates from 22 and above. I then decided to deviate a little from the interquartile ranges and use a more easily communicable range. I thus coded a refusal rate of below 5 as low, between 5 and 20 as medium and above 20 as high. These values thus approximate but do not strictly follow the interquartile ranges.

Thirdly, when receiving countries cooperated in a sending state by sharing consulates I coded them as having the same mobility barrier.

Fourthly, if a receiving state was not represented at all in a sending country I coded the barrier as medium. It might be argued that this score should be higher. Why not code the impossibility of lodging a visa application as a high mobility barrier? I decided not to go this route as in several cases the absence of an embassy or consulate need not be a major obstacle to travel as applications can be forwarded and processed in a nearby state, and here issued leniently. Hence, the medium score is a compromise between this consideration and rival cases (such as Somalia, Sierra Leone) where the absence of a consulate could well be interpreted as a high barrier.

A key feature, finally, of the index is that it tries to take into account the many options receiving states have for preventing applications from being lodged in the first place. It does so by comparing the actual number of visas applied for with a model estimate. If the application figures are very low, below 20% of estimated, it

adds a penalty score to the index. For example, a score of "1" (low barrier) is lifted to "2" (medium). The model is simple so as to not bias later analytical result and ensure the transparency of the indicator. It only uses the population sizes of the receiving and sending countries, as well as the travel distance, to estimate application numbers. Adding on for example income (GDP per capita) to the model would undoubtedly increase explanatory purchase. But it would at the same time risk biasing later analytical results investigating how wealth influences mobility barriers. I ran the model as an ordinary linear regression analysis predicting the number of visas applied for based on the predictors. All the variables were transformed using the natural log to better approximate a normal distribution. This worked well for all variables but the size of the receiving countries. The distribution of this variable was not optimal. The regression only seeks to predict the amount of applications received for countries facing a visa requirement. The key results of the model are as follows:

Table 1

Estimating the number of visas applied for

Main model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients			95,0% Confidence Interval for B	
	B	Std. Error	Beta	t	Sig.	Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Constant	5,60	0,23		23,89	0,00	5,14	6,06
Population size (sending country) (ln)	0,47	0,01	0,44	41,58	0,00	0,45	0,49
Population size (receiving country) (ln)	0,78	0,01	0,59	52,87	0,00	0,75	0,81
Travel distance (ln)	-1,23	0,03	-0,51	-47,55	0,00	-1,28	-1,18

Notes: r square = 37%, n = 6.806

As shown in the table, the model has a good overall explanatory purchase (37%). All the predictors are significant at the 0,01 level. Let us look at a couple of examples. The regression predicts that Austria (population size 8,2 million) should receive about 3.600 applications from Albania (3,1 million) with a travel distance of approximately 800 kilometres. In practice, Austria received on average 3.800 applications annually. A contrasting case is Germany in Iraq in 2005. Here

the model predicts about 11.000 visa requests annually yet only 1.100 was received this year. In general, the regression identifies cases of few applications across most sending countries. The instances with very low figures concentrate, however, in a set of countries such as Algeria, Zimbabwe, Pakistan, Nigeria, Iraq and Afghanistan.

I checked the stability of the coefficients, significance levels and model explanatory purchase (r^2) by running the same model separately for all available combinations of receiving countries and years. For some states (Iceland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Slovenia) the number of observations per year was too low to carry out such an analysis. In total, I ran 123 separate regressions checking for changes in significance levels and shifts in the direction of the coefficients. Doing so identified, first and foremost, that the Portuguese application figures are not captured by the indicators. They are not significant and the effect of sending country population size even drops slightly below zero. In the case of Slovakia size was not significant in any years. For the remainder, there were four years where population size dropped out as insignificant and seven where distance did the same. Thus, in terms of significance levels and the direction of effects the predictors are very stable. Turning to the explanatory purchase of the model we do see some variation. In most cases the r^2 is between 30 and 50%. The model is particularly strong in the case of the US ($r^2 = 66\%$). At the bottom end we find Spain, the UK and the Netherlands ($r^2 = 18\text{-}23\%$).

The overall size of the coefficients did not, at least apparently, vary. However, as the variables are measured on a logarithmic scale small changes can have a major impact. Minor alterations matter a lot for small countries but less so for larger ones.

Still, a relatively strong and transparent model I used it to identify the cases where the model estimate is much higher than the applications actually received. I assigned a penalty score when the number of visa application received was below 20% of the estimated. This should ensure that the ability of destination states to

prevent applications from being lodged is adequately captured. Where to draw the line is of course debatable.

A closer look at the cases where the index score was adjusted reveals a set of interesting patterns. Firstly, two main sending countries where the barrier index is moved upward are Burma and North Korea. Other key cases are Zimbabwe, Afghanistan and Tunisia. The first two suggests that the model also captures cases where it might be debatable to what extent the barrier is due to policies and practices of the receiving or sending countries. In these two states exit is tightly controlled by the sending state governments. In terms of receiving countries, the adjustment affects the observations from Romania and Poland far more than for other states. This implies that these states make more use of the options for preventing applications being lodged in the first place than other receiving states. It could also reflect that the shared model is not well adapted to these cases. That is, the coefficients are not so well-suited to capture the dynamics of these cases.

7. Equations

7.1 European Union (Schengen)

$(1)\ applied\ for\ =\ ABC\ visas\ applied\ for\ +\ VTL\ visas\ issued$

$(2)\ issued\ =\ ABC\ visas\ issued\ +\ VTL\ visas\ issued$

$(3)\ refused\ =\ ABC\ visas\ not\ issued$

$(4)\ refusal\ rate$
$$=\frac{ABC\ visas\ not\ issued}{ABC\ visas\ not\ issued\ +\ ABC\ visas\ issued\ +\ VTL\ visas\ issued}$$

7.2 United Kingdom

$$(5)\ refusal\ rate = \frac{refused + withdrawn + lapsed}{issued + refused + withdrawn + lapsed}$$

Note 1: Calculation is based on 'visit' visas (2001-2004) and family plus other (2005-2008)

Note 2: Data on withdrawn and lapsed only available from 2006 and onwards.

7.3 United States

$$(6)\ refusal\ rate = \frac{refused - overcome}{issued + refused - overcome}$$

$$(7)\ Applications\ refused = \frac{issued}{1 - \frac{refusal\ rate}{100}}$$

$$(8)\ Applications\ received = issued + refused$$

Mogens Hobolth

8. Database diagram

The diagram below is a technical overview of the structure of the database (referred to as an 'E-R' diagram). This version mainly shows the data-columns that are used to cross-reference the content in one table with another. For example, the figure highlights that the table 'visaPractice_EU' is linked with the countries table (for identifying the receiving country) and the table over cities in different countries (for identifying the location of the diplomatic post).

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