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The Development of a 'Normative Battleground' between the EU and Russia from 2004 to 2014

MA Thesis

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Abstract

This thesis will chart the development of a “normative battleground” between the European Union and Russia within Ukraine. This “normative battleground” stems from the clashing securitising projects both the EU and Russia are implementing within Ukraine in order to shape the development of the country according to their own interests. The EU and Russia are widely believed to carry out securitising projects from within different international relations spheres. For this thesis, these are the EU’s “postmodern”/“Kantian” security project, which is incompatible with the Russian “modern”/“Hobbesian” security project. These security projects are manifesting themselves in the norms each side is promoting, and this is where the clash is particularly visible, this is the “normative battleground”. This thesis seeks to provide a holistic conceptualisation of the term “normative battleground” within the framework of Buzan’s English School Triad and to tie its development with the contrasting securitising projects being implemented within Ukraine.

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Introducing the ‘Normative Battleground’

When analysing the interactions of the European Union (EU) and the Russian Federation (Russia), some have resorted to analogies centred around the different dimensions the two inhabit. German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, is reported to have once complained Russian President, Vladimir Putin, was “living in another world.”¹ Political scientist, Ivan Krastev, claimed that Russia “previously a Pluto in the Western solar system, has spun out of its orbit, powered by the determination to find its own system.”² Political correspondent, Brian Whitmore, during a panel discussion accused the Russian and more Western leaning participants of “inhabiting parallel universes.”³ The different spheres the two powers occupy are clashing as they attempt to implement world views based upon these spheres within one country, Ukraine.

The EU and Russia have been promoting norms they wish to frame Ukraine’s societal development within, so as to shape their neighbourhoods through those norms, and to secure influence in your neighbourhood in this way is a key way of guaranteeing security. These ‘securitising projects’, as they will be named, are the subject of analysis for this research. The norms promoted by both the EU and Russia to frame Ukraine’s development stem directly from their corresponding securitising projects. The securitising projects of the EU and Russia, in turn, stem from the diverging ‘spheres’ each inhabits. These can broadly be classified, and this thesis will attribute a ‘modern’ framework for analysing Russia’s securitising project, and a ‘postmodern’ framework through which to analyse the EU’s.

The EU is an example of enacting a ‘postmodern’ approach to securitising, for example, by spreading liberal norms, such as the pooling of sovereignty, democracy promotion, strengthening of neighbouring states and interference beyond its borders. Whereas Russia is an example of a more traditional ‘modern’ approach to norm promotion, focusing on promoting norms such as respect for state sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference, within its neighbourhood. These different approaches derive, at least in part, from each power’s recent history. The EU can be seen as forming in response to the “catastrophic rivalries” of nation states and nationalism in the early 20th century. Whereas, the Russian securitising project within Ukraine has largely been shaped by the disintegration of the Soviet Union and expanding EU influence. As Krastev has written “European nightmares are rooted in the experience of the 1930s. Russia’s nightmares are shaped by its existence in the 1980s and 1990s.”⁴ This normative clash was inevitable.

¹Tony Paterson, “Ukraine crisis: Angry Merkel questions whether Putin is ‘in touch with reality’ 3rd March 2014, [<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/ukraine/10673235/Ukraine-crisis-Angry-Angela-Merkel-questions-whether-Putin-is-in-touch-with-reality.html>] <accessed 4th July 2017>

² Ivan Krastev, “Russia and the Post-Cold-War European Order”, March 2008, [<https://www.diplomaatia.ee/en/article/russia-and-the-post-cold-war-european-order/>] <accessed August 12th 2017>

³ Brian Whitmore, “Europe, Russia, and Quantum Mechanics”, 29th May 2017, [<https://www.rferl.org/a/europe-russia-and-quantum-mechanics/28516968.html>] <accessed 19th June 2017>

⁴ Krastev, “Russia and the Post-Cold War European Order”,

Ukraine has become the subject of these normative projects due to multiple factors, but primarily because Ukraine sits geographically at the border between the EU and Russia and therefore is significant to both in terms of security and stability. For the EU, Ukraine is a key neighbouring partner state and holds a centre position in the EU's eastern norm promoting. For Russia, Ukraine is something to lose, and as Ukraine's first president, Leonid Kravchuck said, Russia understands that without Ukraine, "it would not be able to take its place in the wider arena of Europe" and create a powerful structure in order to counterbalance the west.⁵ This desire to be the dominant power shaping the development of Ukraine has added to the development of the "normative battleground".

As political scientist, Kadri Liik, has pointed out, that "Russia is a 'challenge' to the West has become conventional wisdom" but what is missing is clarity about the nature of the challenge.⁶ It is important to grasp a deeper understanding of what Russia is standing for and why. Liik's argument, that the current standoff between the West and Russia is not over domestic models but is actually over the fundamental understanding of the international order, has framed this research. However, this thesis seeks to demonstrate that the disparity over this understanding of the international order, can be seen through the norms which are promoted, which then in turn also clash, creating the "normative battleground". Furthermore Rilka Dragneva and Kataryna Wolczuk used the term "normative battleground" in 2012 to describe the situation in Ukraine as resulting from the competing EU's Association Agreements and Russia's Eurasian Customs Union.⁷ The example they drew upon was largely economic, and this thesis seeks to take the term in another direction and apply it to the norms being promoted as part of the securitising projects, thereby building a fuller conceptualisation for the term. This research aims to take the realist connotations of a "battleground", together with the "idealist" understanding of norm promotion and weave these together into one conceptual framework: a 'normative battleground'.

This thesis will argue that a 'normative battleground' has developed between the EU and Russia within Ukraine, and contends that this battleground stems from the conflicting securitising projects being projected into Ukraine; the 'modern' and the 'postmodern'. The questions shaping this research seek to uncover how the 'normative battleground' has developed and secondly, to what extent can it be tied to the contrasting securitising projects of the EU and Russia. The theoretical framework for this research has employed Barry Buzan's 'Triad', which provides a tripartite analytical framework based on different interpretations of international relations (IR).⁸

⁵ Robert Coalson, 'For Putin, Ukraine is too Important to 'Lose'', 25th February, 2014 [<https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-russia-too-important-to-lose/25276457.html>] <accessed 4th July 2017>

⁶ Kadri Liik, "What does Russia want?", 26th May 2017, [http://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_what_does_russia_want_7297] <accessed 29th May 2017>

⁷ Rilka Dragneva and Kataryna Wolczuk, "Russia, the Eurasian Customs Union and the EU: Cooperation, Stagnation or Rivalry?" Chatham House Briefing Paper, Russia and Eurasia Programme, August 2012, p. 1

⁸ Buzan, Barry, *From International to World Society? English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalisation*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004

This framework allows the thesis to combine the distinct securitising projects under one holistic approach. It will use process tracing as the methodology, and makes use of a wide range of sources to build an understanding of the development of the ‘normative battleground’ through events and over time. The tracing of the ‘normative battleground’ is across three critical junctures in Ukraine; 2004, 2009, and 2014.

As the ‘battleground’ develops over time, it will also become clear that the ties become more nuanced and so to do the style of promotion and the norms themselves. In part, the norms become ways of legitimising and promoting the securitising outlooks, rather than legitimising the norms themselves. Through this research it is possible to distinguish three distinct aspects of the ‘normative battleground’. These three aspects stem from the Russian reaction to EU norms, and include their opposition to the norms being promoted by the EU within Ukraine, attempts to counter those norms, and lastly, a complete manipulation of their interpretation. These three aspects throughout the development are what build this “normative battleground”.

1: Constructing the ‘Normative Battleground’

1.1: Norms

Before conceptualizing ‘normative battleground’ it is important to explain both why norms are important in IR, and why they have a role in governing international society. ‘Normative’ is an ambiguous term and one which can be defined rather broadly. Therefore, a norm here is defined, in the simplest sense possible, as a “standard of appropriate behaviour”⁹. Ian Manners defines international norms as “shorthand for what passes as ‘normal’” in IR, and accordingly, normative power should be understood as the ability to shape or change what passes for normal.¹⁰ Foreign policies are constructed and conducted in a world of international and national norms which help define the goals and purposes of these states. While norms do not establish clear policy options for an actor, they can offer a general vision and direction, provide motivations, and be seen as providing ‘road maps’ for foreign policy action.¹¹ Furthermore, it is important to note that while norms do not necessarily identify behaviour, they do allow us to identify notions of what behaviour ought to be.¹²

An important distinction is the one between terms such as ‘norms’, ‘rules’, ‘values’ and ‘principles’. These terms are scattered throughout IR literature and yet clear distinctions are not often given. For this thesis it will be important to identify norms and norm promotion over rules and values. Yet Barry Buzan explains that “all [terms] are linked by the idea that their existence should shape expectations about the behaviour of members of a social group”, and queries whether norms and rules are just shaded variations of the same thing.¹³ Stephen Krasner wrote that “principles are beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude. Norms are standards of behaviour defined in terms of rights and obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for actions.” However, Buzan points out that Krasner’s distinctions between norms and rules seem to hinge on formality; both aim to regulate behaviour and both are authoritative, and therefore it is fundamentally unclear how these two concepts can be disentangled.¹⁴ The unavoidable entanglements among Krasner’s definitions explain why these terms are so often grouped together, and therefore hard to separate.

⁹ Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change” in *International Organisation*, Vol. 52, No. 4, 1998, pp. 887-917, p. 891

¹⁰ Scott Nicholas Romaniuk, “Not So Wide: Reconsidering the Normative Power of the EU in European Foreign Policy” in *Romanian Journal of European Affairs*, Vol. 10, No. 2. 2010, p. 56

¹¹ Annika Bjorkddahl, “Norms in International Relations: Some Conceptual and Methodological Reflections” in *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 15, No. 1, 2002, pp 9-23, p. 22

¹² Bjorkddahl, “Norms in International Relations”, p. 20

¹³ Buzan, *From International to World Society*, p. 163

¹⁴ Buzan, *From International to World Society*, p. 164

To declare that norms matter within IR is no longer a controversial statement. Annika Björkdahl argued that scholars are now concerned more with how, when and why norms emanate and evolve.¹⁵ Even Hans Morgenthau, the father of realism, defined power as “a psychological relation between those who exercise it and those over whom it is exercised ... [which] gives the former control over certain actions of the latter through the impact which the former exert on the latter’s minds”¹⁶ In doing so, Morgenthau was addressing the notion of power outside of material power, that is, the importance of power over ideas within international society. In this sense, norms can contribute to a state’s power and influence, and that physical power can be less valuable than psychological or normative power. In addition, H.E. Carr wrote that “political action must be based on a coordination of morality and power.” Realism fails, in Carr’s analysis, precisely because it excludes essential features of politics like “emotional appeal to a political goal and grounds for moral judgement.”¹⁷ Therefore, importantly for this concept, the presence of norms and their impact on international society is no longer seriously disputed.

1.1.1: The EU as a ‘Normative Power’

In 2002, Ian Manners famously labelled the EU as a “normative power”.¹⁸ This label reframed our ideas of the EU, and realised the EU’s normative influence in world politics. For Manners, the EU transcended traditional Westphalian norms and has evolved into a hybrid of supranational and international form of governance.¹⁹ In highlighting this further, the former President of the European Commission, Jose Manuel Barroso, famously argued that the EU is “one of the most important, if not the most important, normative power in the world.”²⁰

The identity of the EU is closely tied to the norms it promotes, and for Manners, the label ‘normative power’ is applicable because of “the degree to which national interest and international relations, with their emphases on security and order, are cultivated into discourses regarding justice and human-centric concerns.”²¹ Manners wrote how the EU is constructed, not only on a normative basis, but that this predisposes it to act in a normative way in international society.²² The EU’s “normative power” means it has the power to construct the interests and identities of its neighbours using norms that “shape external identities through non-coercive means separate from economic, military or even civilian power”.²³ The EU is not simply being

¹⁵ Bjorkddahl, “Norms in International Relations”, p. 9

¹⁶ Tatiana Romanova, “Russian Challenge to the EU’s Normative Power: Change and Continuity” in *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol 63, No. 3, pp 371-390, 2016, p. 373

¹⁷ Finnemore & Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics”, p. 899

¹⁸ Ian Manners, “Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?” in *JCMS*, Vol. 40, No. 2, 2002, p. 235

¹⁹ Manners, “Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms”, p. 240

²⁰ Romanova, “Russian Challenge to the EU’s Normative Power”, p. 371

²¹ Ian Manners, Normative Power Europe: The International Role of the EU, Panel 1D, 31st May, 2001, ‘The European Union between International and World Society’, Biennial Conference, Wisconsin. p.8

²² Manners, “The EU and the English School”, p. 9

²³ Romaniuk, “Not So Wide, Europe”, p. 56

altruistic with its norm promotion, as it is also a method of securitising. The *European Neighbourhood Policy* and the *Eastern Partnership* form a core aspect of the EU's external norm promotion and the EU is "unequivocal about the aim of these policies: to establish stability and prosperity on its periphery, and as a result foster sustainable security in its broadest sense."²⁴ The EU challenges traditional notions of statehood by viewing boundaries as more porous, and of security "which precipitated a 'multi layered conception of political and security space going well beyond the borders of Europe.'"²⁵

1.1.2: Russia as a 'Normative Power'?

Russia, as described by Tatiana Romanova, is probably the best illustration of the unease with which the EU's normative power is met. Russia also sees norm promotion by the EU as "empty talk" and as an "instrument for manipulation and promotion of geopolitical objectives".²⁶ However, Russian foreign policy has steadily been given more prominence to norms, demonstrating Russia's increasing use. While Russia has not always been an obvious norm promoter, it is possible to trace the growing prominence given to its normative role in Russia's foreign policy through the Foreign Policy Concept documents from 2000 to 2016. The 2000 Russian Foreign Policy Concept (FPC)²⁷, for example, does not emphasise Russia's normative role, and yet by the 2008 FPC refers to how "global competition is acquiring a civilisational dimension", and talks of "competition between different value systems"²⁸ In the 2013 FPC, this idea progressed beyond "competition", stating how "various values and models of development based on the universal principles of democracy and market economy start to clash"²⁹. The 2013 document specifically referred to the increased use of "soft power" to "exert political pressure on sovereign states, interfere in their internal affairs, destabilize their political situation, manipulate public opinion". Russia in 2013 positions itself as playing a unique role as a "counterbalance in international affairs," and this idea can be seen in the alternative norms Russia promotes. The 2016 document further emphasizes how Russia's foreign policy is aimed at creating international stability based on "generally accepted norms of international law and principles of equal rights, mutual respect and noninterference in domestic affairs of State, so as to ensure solid and equal

²⁴ Derek Averre, "Competing Rationalities: Russia, the EU and the 'Shared Neighbourhood'" in *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 61, No. 10, December 2009, p. 1694

²⁵ Elena Korosteleva, "The Eastern Partnership Initiative: A New Opportunity for Neighbours?" in *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics*, Vol 27, No.1, 2011, p. 4

²⁶ Romanova, "Russian Challenge to the EU's Normative Power", p. 375

²⁷ The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, June, 2000, [<https://fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/doctrine/econcept.html>] <accessed January 10th 2017>

²⁸ The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, January, 2008, [<http://en.kremlin.ru/supplement/4116>] <accessed January 10th 2017>

²⁹ Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, 18th February, 2013, [http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/official_documents/-/asset_publisher/CptlCk6B6BZ9/content/id/122186] <accessed January 10th 2017>

security for each and every member of the global community.”³⁰ The growing importance Russia attaches to norm promotion as part of their foreign policy can lead us to, while maybe not classify Russia as a ‘normative power’, still acknowledge that Russia is promoting norms. For Russia, the desire to promote norms and to shape the neighbourhood, particularly Ukraine, forms part of their securitising project. The norms Russia seeks to promote are to counter the growing influence of EU norms and to preserve Ukraine as a key state within their ‘sphere of influence’.

1.2: Legitimacy and Norms

As the previous section confirmed the importance of norms in IR and helped to classify what type of ‘normative powers’ the EU and Russia are, it is important to next address the question of legitimacy of norm promotion. It is necessary to address in order to assess what gives certain norms legitimacy over others within the international system and whether some norms are inherently more legitimate than others. This is important for conceptualisation of the ‘normative battleground’ as it is attempting to analyse a clash between two sets of norms, both perceived by the promoters to be legitimate. Steven Dixon has explained that the advancement of a norm is synonymous with the acquisition of legitimacy.³¹ Therefore, in order for a norm to be successful, it needs to be presented as legitimate, and legitimacy can thus be considered the “language and currency of norms”. For Ian Clark however, “legitimacy is a process by which norms emerge and are adhered to, not an inherent property.”³² For Clark, legitimacy can be envisaged as a “contested political process, drawing upon both [existing] norms and material power.” Meaning, it is not the norm itself that necessarily has legitimacy, but the process through which the norm is ‘normalised’ is what gives it legitimacy. Dixon claims that the ‘norm entrepreneurs’ use existing moral and legal normative context, alongside material power, in order to legitimize a new norm.³³ States care about legitimisation in international society as it can be essential to the perceptions of domestic legitimacy held by a state’s citizens. States can be seen to comply with international norms to demonstrate that they have adapted to, and can adapt to, the social environment; that they ‘belong’.³⁴ For Finnemore and Sikkink, by definition, “there are no bad norms from the vantage point of those who promote the norm”³⁵ and thus, bad norms are not normal. Overall, states need to legitimize their norms in order for them to be successful, and these norms can help legitimize a state's behaviour. As Ann Florini explains, it doesn’t matter how a norm arises, it must take on an aura of legitimacy before it can be considered a norm.³⁶

³⁰ Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, 1st December, 2016
[http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/official_documents/-/asset_publisher/CptlCk6B6BZ29/content/id/2542248] <accessed January 10th 2017>

³¹ Steven Dixon, “Humanitarian Intervention: A Novel Constructivist Analysis of Norms and Behaviour” in *Journal of Politics & International Studies*, Vol. 9, Summer 2013, p. 139

³² Clark, Ian, *International Legitimacy and World Society*, Oxford Scholarship Online, 2007, p. 15

³³ Dixon, “Humanitarian Intervention”, p. 143

³⁴ Finnemore and Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics”, p. 903

³⁵ Manners, ‘The International role of the EU’, p. 10

³⁶ Manners, ‘The International role of the EU’, p. 10

For the EU and Russia, both perceive their norms to be legitimate for promotion with Ukraine, and this is a formative aspect in the development of the ‘normative battleground’.

1.2.1: The EU and Russia: Legitimising the norms

The EU gains legitimacy for the norms they promote through their *sui generis* nature. As Nathalie Tocci explained, “what the EU is has been considered as the principal explanation for what it does beyond its borders.”³⁷ The EU sees the norms it promotes as legitimate as they are the same norms they adhere to internally. These norms have their roots in European treaties, for example, the 2007 *Treaty on European Union* lays out the general provisions of the EU’s external action and specific provisions on the common and foreign security policy. It states that “the Union’s action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles which have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law.”³⁸ Therefore, the EU finds legitimacy for the norms they promote as they, in their own words, inspired its own creation.

Russia also seeks to confirm and demonstrate the legitimacy of the norms it promotes. In the 2005 address to the Federal Assembly, Putin stressed that Russian norms stem from the same place as EU norms. However Putin stated that Russia had to “find our own path in order to build a democratic, free and just society and state,”³⁹ making clear that while the Russian ‘path’ is different, it is equally legitimate. During the same speech Putin calls Russia “a major European power” and goes on to tie Russia to ‘European’ values. For Putin, “European culture, the ideals of freedom, human rights, justice and democracy have for many centuries been our society’s determining values.” These norms appear in part to mirror closely EU norms, yet Putin adds, “the democratic road we have chosen is independent in nature, a road along which we move ahead, all the while taking into account our own specific internal circumstances”. Here this demonstrates that Putin is seeking to both, provide legitimacy for Russian promoted norms in Europe, while also, making clear these norms are specific to Russia. Furthermore, Putin binds neighbouring countries, such as Ukraine, to Russia “through a common history... language ... and great culture”, implying that Russia could potentially have more legitimacy than other foreign policy actors to promote Russian norms within Ukraine. Putin is making clear that the EU does not have a monopoly on legitimate norms within the neighbourhood, and that Russian

³⁷ Nathalie Tocci, ed, ‘Who is a Normative Foreign Policy Actor?: The European Union and its Global Partners’, Center for European Policy Studies, 2008, p. 2

³⁸ The Treaty on the European Union, Article 21, 13th December, 2007 [<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:12012M/TXT&from=EN>] <accessed 21st July 2017>

³⁹ ‘Annual Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation’, 25th April, 2005 [<http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/22931>] <accessed 26th July 2017>

norms stem from the same roots as the EU norms. This can be seen as laying the foundation for the subsequent ‘normative battleground’ as both the EU and Russia have claimed legitimacy in their norm promotion, and both seek to promote these norms within Ukraine.

1.3: Securitising Projects

As has been established the EU and Russia, are norm promoters, and this thesis will argue that these actions form part of their securitising projects within Ukraine. Therefore, it is important to fully explain what these securitising projects are, and how they are formed. This thesis will argue that the norms being promoted by the EU and Russia stem from the distinct type of powers they are. Russia and the EU are promoting norms which originate from their different securitising projects, and the competing securitising projects can be framed within the ‘modern’ and ‘postmodern’ foreign policy outlooks. However, it is important to note that the EU and Russian securitising projects do not always cleanly fall into these categories, as they would not cleanly fall into any. Yet, as Robert Cooper has explained, “thinking about foreign affairs, like any other kind of thinking, requires a conceptual map which, as maps do, simplifies the landscape and focuses on the main features.”⁴⁰ This helps justify why it is helpful to see the securitising projects within this framework.

1.3.1: A ‘Modern’ Outlook on Security

The ‘modern’ state can be described as sitting in the “classical, traditional” state system, and is often traced back to the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, which guaranteed each nation-state sovereignty over its own affairs. In the Westphalian age, foreign policy was characterized by states as the main actors, and there was a clear distinction between foreign and domestic politics.⁴¹ For Robert Cooper, ‘modern’ states “retain the monopoly of force and may be prepared to use it against each other”⁴². Important characteristics of the ‘modern’ order are the primacy of state sovereignty, and the refusal of external influence in ones’ domestic and foreign affairs. Cooper argued that “it is not that, in the modern order, might is right so much as that right is not particularly relevant; might and *raison d’état* are the things that matter.” This was an international order that was based on hegemony, on spheres of influence, on balance, and one where external borders could be changed using force. This is why behaving as a ‘modern’ power in today’s international system can be seen to be reverting to ‘rougher’ methods of a previous era: force, pre-emptive attack, and deception, principles that are characteristic of the “nineteenth

⁴⁰ Cooper, Robert, *The Post-Modern State and the World Order*, London: Demons, 1996, p. 8

⁴¹ Rokas, Grajauskas, and Laurynas Kasčiūnas. "Modern versus Postmodern Actor of International Relations: Explaining EU-Russia Negotiations on the New Partnership Agreement." *Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review* 22 (2009): 80-98 p. 83

⁴² Cooper, *The Post Modern State*, p. 19

century world of every state for itself.”⁴³ Grajauskas and Kasčiūnas have argued that ‘modern’ states have been epitomised by concepts such as nationalism, the nation-state and sovereignty.

The concept of sovereignty and the separation of domestic and foreign affairs are priorities for Russian politics today.⁴⁴ Moscow operates within the great power school of IR, which assumes the inevitability of conflict, the supremacy of hard power, and the cynicism of others motives.⁴⁵ Russia’s world view, particularly the view of the European order as “a mixture of nostalgia for the time of the ‘concert of Europe’”⁴⁶ where balance of power was key, is a fundamentally ‘modern’ concept. This desire for a ‘concert’ has been labelled by Sten Rynning as a dangerous pursuit that could “herald the type of unrestrained or flexible balance of power politics that presaged the great wars of the twentieth century,”⁴⁷ with the implication of Russia holding an outlook stemming from the previous era. Russia would argue that within the international system, “the best basis for [world] order would be for the great powers mutually to respect their spheres of influence and domestic political differences.”⁴⁸ For Russia, the concepts epitomised by ‘modernism’ are keenly promoted, such as respect for the nation-state and sovereignty.

1.3.2: A ‘Postmodern’ Outlook on Security

‘Postmodernism’ as an intellectual movement came into existence after World War Two, as Western societies became increasingly disillusioned by the brutality of the two World Wars.⁴⁹ A ‘postmodern’ system can be characterised as one seeking to establish a post-Westphalian order, where a state’s sovereignty is constrained through legal developments beyond the national state.⁵⁰ In this post-Westphalian order, foreign policy can transcend states, and the state-centric idea of IR. Postmodernism accepts a wide spectre of foreign policy actors in addition to nation-states, such as non-governmental, international and supranational organisations. A ‘postmodern’ actor uses cooperation instead of force to build security, and prefers soft power to any form of hard power. The concept of sovereignty and the principals of non-interference have been superseded by that of cooperation and the pooling of power. Furthermore, as ‘postmodern’ powers place more focus on immaterial aspects of power, such as norms, the projection of norms can become as important as any other form of national interest. The characteristics of a

⁴³ Grajauskas and Kasčiūnas, “Modern versus Postmodern”, p. 83

⁴⁴ Boris Mezhyuev, “Modern Russia and Postmodern Europe”, 2nd March, 2008, [http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/n_10362] <accessed 27th July 2017>

⁴⁵ Stephen Kotkin, “Russia’s Perpetual Geopolitics”, May/June 2016, [<https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukraine/2016-04-18/russias-perpetual-geopolitics>] <accessed May 16th 2017>

⁴⁶ Krastev, “Russia and the Post-Cold War European Order”,

⁴⁷ Sten Rynning, “The false promise of continental concert: Russia, the West and the necessary balance of power” in *International Affairs*, Vol, 91, No. 3, 2015, 539-552 p. 552

⁴⁸ Niall Ferguson, “The Russia Question”, December 2016, [<http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/12/23/the-russian-question-putin-trump-bush-obama-kissinger/>] <accessed March 17th 2017>

⁴⁹ “Grajauskas and Kasčiūnas, “Modern versus Postmodern”, p. 82

⁵⁰ Grajauskas and Kasčiūnas, “Modern versus Postmodern”, p. 84

'postmodern' world can be identified as the breaking down of the distinction between domestic and foreign affairs, mutual interference, the rejection of force, the growing irrelevance of borders and security based on concepts such as transparency, openness and interdependence.⁵¹ For Robert Cooper, the EU is the most developed example of a 'postmodern' system. The EU, Cooper claims, represents security through transparency, and transparency through interdependence.⁵² If 'modern' Europe was known to have been born with the Treaty of Westphalia, then 'postmodern' Europe derived from two treaties: *The Treaty of Rome* which was an attempt at moving beyond the nation state and the *Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe* (CFE Treaty) which aimed at restricting a build-up of military power. Ivan Krastev has also attributed a 'postmodern' outlook to the EU, arguing that it relies on mutual interference and security based on transparency and openness.⁵³ The EU, as a 'postmodern' power, successfully blurs the distinction between foreign and domestic politics, enacts voluntary mutual intrusiveness and demonstrates a complete repudiation of the use of force in settling disputes.⁵⁴ Furthermore, the EU has a desire to protect individuals, not solely to resolve security issues of states, which is an important aspect of a 'postmodern' outlook.⁵⁵

⁵¹ Cooper, *The Post-Modern State*, pp. 22-30

⁵² Cooper, *The Post-Modern State*, p. 30

⁵³ Mezhyuev, "Modern Russia and Postmodern Europe",

⁵⁴ Grajauskas and Kasčiūnas, "Modern versus Postmodern", p. 84

⁵⁵ Cooper, *The Post-Modern State*, p. 43

2: The Theoretical Framework: Introducing Barry Buzan

As has been discussed, there are seen to be two separate, competing outlooks needing to be analysed within a theoretical framework that allows for these different outlooks. The EU and Russia are enacting securitising projects from different understandings of IR, from different ‘spheres’ of IR. Contemporary IR has previously been labelled a “mixed bag of unrelated approaches which are usually not in dialogue”⁵⁶. This highlights a core problem within IR: that theories do not allow for competing or different approaches to be applied concurrently. Adrian Gallagher wrote “IR is said to be detached from the complexities of a 21st century globalized world that demands students understand interconnected processes at the sub-national and international level.”⁵⁷ Barry Buzan has attempted to overcome this criticism by developing an analytical framework based on three differing interpretations of IR: Hobbesian power politics, Grotian ideas of shared interests and incentives, and Kantian values and norms.⁵⁸ Buzan, as part of the ‘English school’, rejects the view that paradigms in IR are incommensurable, and aimed to provide a tripartite framework for analysing IR. Buzan’s framework provides an opportunity to combine aspects of IR theory in order to provide a more holistic and thorough approach. Therefore Buzan’s approach can be seen as one providing a more effective framework as, as Andrew Linklater wrote, “there is more to international relations than the realist suggests but less than the cosmopolitan desires.”⁵⁹

2.1: Buzan’s “Three Spheres”

This thesis will apply the approach advanced by Barry Buzan, who argues that the overarching idea of the English School is to synthesize different theories and concepts in order to provide a fuller understanding of the society of states. The basic aim is to understand and interpret the composition and dynamics of the social structure of international politics.⁶⁰ In doing so, Buzan casts international theory into the “English School triad” of three spheres that operate simultaneously. These are called:

- International System
- International Society
- World Society

⁵⁶ Robert W. Murray, “Introduction” in *System, Society & the World: Exploring the English School of International Relations* ed. Robert W. Murray, Bristol: e-International Relations, April 2013, p. 10

⁵⁷ Adrian Gallagher, “Look inside International Relations: she’s alright she’s alright” An overview of the English School’s engagement with human rights” in *System, Society & the World: Exploring the English School of International Relations* ed. Robert W. Murray, Bristol: e-International Relations, April 2013, p.34

⁵⁸ Buzan, *From International to World Society*,

⁵⁹ Gallagher, “Look inside International Relations”, p. 36

⁶⁰ Buzan, *From International to World Society*, p. 3

The first sphere is the ‘international system’ which takes a Hobbesian/Machiavellian understanding of power politics amongst states and broadly parallels the realism and neorealism theory.⁶¹ This sphere holds that states are engaged in an escalating struggle for power, just as “gladiators in an arena”.⁶² The ‘international system’ considers the principal actors to be states, acting in their own self-interest.

The second sphere is ‘international society’, which stems from Grotian ideas of Rationalism and puts the institutionalization of shared interest and identity amongst states, and shared norms, rules and institutions at the centre.⁶³ Contrary to Hobbes, Grotius believed that states are not engaged in a simple power struggle, “like gladiators in an arena”, but are limited in their conflicts by common rules and institutions. However, this sphere still asserts that states are the principal actors in international politics. Hedley Bull and Adam Watson in 1984 wrote the classic definition for ‘international society’; “a group of states which not merely form a system, in the sense that the behaviour of each is a necessary factor in the calculations of the others, but also have established by dialogue and consent common rules and institutions for the conduct of their relations and recognise their common interest in maintaining these arrangements.”⁶⁴ This sphere combines both the more material aspects of IR, with sharing a common identity, such as norms, beliefs, governance and even securitising methods. “International society” is often labelled the ‘via media’ between the other two spheres.

While ‘international society’ and the ‘international system’ are both focused upon states, the final sphere of the triad, ‘world society’, builds upon the ideas of Kant and the theory of Revolutionism. World society relates to shared values and identities; it takes individuals, non-state organisations, and ultimately the global population as a whole, as the focus of global societal identities, and the ‘world society’ transcends state systems.⁶⁵

The foundations of Russian securitising projects can largely be seen to fit within Buzan’s ‘international system’ framework, the Hobbesian based sphere. Strobe Talbott wrote how “to understand Russia, think back instead to the 17th century English philosopher Thomas Hobbes, who thought that the natural human condition is a “war of all against all”; that the security of a people depends on a strong, even authoritarian, state; and that successful states are those that strike the “posture of Gladiators”⁶⁶ For Talbott, Russia’s insistence on treating its neighbours as fitting within a “sphere of privileged interests” only further highlights the ties between Russia’s foreign outlook and a Hobbesian outlook. The core aspects of the ‘modern’ outlook attributed to

⁶¹ Buzan, *From International to World Society*, p. 7

⁶² Maria Ileana Stanescu, “The English School of International Relations: A “Middle Way” Between Realism and Idealism”, Valahia University Press, 2011, [<http://www.diacronia.ro/ro/indexing/details/A20433/pdf>] <accessed 26th July 2017> p. 1

⁶³ Buzan, *From International to World Society*, p. xvii

⁶⁴ Barry Buzan, “The English School: An Underexploited Resource in IR” in *Review of International Studies*, Vol 27, No. 3, July 2001, pp. 471-488, abstract

⁶⁵ Murray, Introduction, p. 9

⁶⁶ Strobe Talbott, “Dangerous Leviathans: Russia’s Bad Philosophy”, 20th April, 2009, [<https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/dangerous-leviathans-russias-bad-philosophy/>] <accessed 2nd August 2017>

Russia, also fit largely within this ‘international system’ sphere; the primacy of state sovereignty, hegemony and balance, cynicism of others motives, being distrusting of the EU, and the primacy of the nation-state as a principal actor.

The EU can be seen to fit largely within the Kantian ‘world society’ sphere. Kant has even been described as the “secular patron saint of today’s Europe.”⁶⁷ In Kant’s writings he foresaw a ‘*Perpetual Peace*’ based on democratic rule and a federation of like-minded states. Robert Kagan has declared that the EU “is entering a post-historical paradise of peace and relative prosperity, the realization of Kants’ “*Perpetual Peace*”,⁶⁸ further demonstrating the notion that the EU is largely a realisation of Buzan’s ‘world society’. Furthermore, ‘world society’ emphasises the individual over the state, and this wish to protect individuals, over the wish to resolve the security problems of nation states, “is a part of the post-modern ethos,”⁶⁹ and is one shared by the EU.

For this thesis, it was necessary to frame the analysis in a theory that allowed for the interaction of different political systems. One of the key advantages to the triad is its “middle-approach” to IR as it provides for different systems to operate and engage, for example, states such as Russia, and non-states, like the EU. For Barry Buzan, “the English school’s triad of spheres exactly captures the simultaneous existence of state and non-state systems operating alongside and through each other, without finding this conceptually problematic.”⁷⁰ Buzan explained that the English School offered “an escape from the Westphalian straightjacket”⁷¹ by providing the framework for differentiation and comparisons among different types of international society.

The theoretical framework of the English School triad, specifically the ‘international system’ and ‘world society’ spheres, will be applied to the securitizing projects of Russia and the EU. As this thesis is analysing competing outlooks on IR, it therefore requires a theory that will allow for this type of pluralist approach. The English School triad allows for different theoretical systems to be applied simultaneously and believes that this works to form “a complete and interlinked picture of the IR universe”.⁷² A distinctive feature of the English School is that it allows for multiple spheres and this is what generates its theoretical pluralism.⁷³ Richard Little has added that the English School manages to transcend the ‘inter-paradigm debate’ which argues that realist, liberal and Marxist approaches to IR theory are incommensurable. For clarity, academics like to see things in isolation, but in reality, differing systems exist simultaneously, for example, Hobbesian and Kantian systems can exist together within one larger system. The

⁶⁷ Talbott, “Dangerous Leviathans”,

⁶⁸ Robert Kagan, “Power and Weakness” in *A Different Kind of Power?*, ed. Thomas Diez, New York: The International Debate Education Association, 2014 p. 77

⁶⁹ Cooper, *The Post-Modern State*, p, 43

⁷⁰ Buzan, *From International to World Society*, p. 23

⁷¹ Buzan, *From International to World Society*, p. 4

⁷² Buzan, *From International to World Society*, p. 9

⁷³ Buzan, *From International to World Society*, p. 10

English School triad allows us to achieve a more nuanced understanding of the multifaceted international system.

Crucially, the English School triad is able to focus on individuals, norms, and values alongside realism, and does so without rejecting the primacy or necessity of the state in global affairs,⁷⁴ demonstrating how it is also applicable to Russia. Buzan also elaborated on ‘world society’ and called it “the idea of shared norms and values at the individual level but transcending the state.”⁷⁵ This can be applied to the EU as they seek to promote norms beyond the borders of the EU, and the idea behind the EU itself is one which transcends state boundaries. This thesis will chart the interaction, and subsequent clash of these securitising methods, and the English School approach allows for these distinct spheres to “blur into each other at the boundaries.”⁷⁶

However, a core criticism of this theoretical framework is whether the English School is really a theory at all. The question of what counts as a theory is controversial. Dave C. Copeland wrote how the English School is less a theory, than a vague approach to thinking about and conceptualizing world politics.⁷⁷ In the American tradition, a theory should contain and explain, or at least be able to generate, a testable hypothesis of a causal nature.⁷⁸ Robert W. Murray has argued that all legitimate theories must stand up to testing in order for them to be taken seriously.⁷⁹ While the English School does not do this, it does however organize a field systematically, structure questions and establish coherently a set of interrelated concepts. This approach is far more suited to this research as there is no such hypothesis, and the research requires a framework that would allow for interrelated concepts.

As Barry Buzan argues, if the English School is presented, not as a normative theory, but as a theory about norms, then there is potential to close this gap. Buzan goes on to add that “English School thinking has as much of a claim to theory as Alexander Wendt’s attempt to pose constructivism as a social theory of international politics.”⁸⁰ The English School provides benchmarks for the evaluation of significant change within international orders, it sets out a taxonomy that enables us to make clear comparisons across time and space, and can provide some predictions and explanations of outcome. Furthermore, the English School provides a solid

⁷⁴ Robert W. Murray, “Introduction” in *System, Society & the World: Exploring the English School of International Relations* ed. Robert W. Murray, Bristol: e-International Relations: April 2013, p. 10

⁷⁵ Cornelia Navari, “World Society and English School Methods” in *System, Society & the World: Exploring the English School of International Relations* ed. Robert W. Murray, Bristol: e-International Relations, April 2013, p. 16

⁷⁶ Barry Buzan, “The English School: An Underexploited Resource in IR” in *Review of International Studies*, Vol 27, No. 3, July 2001, pp. 471-488, p. 476

⁷⁷ Dale C. Copeland, “A Realist Critique of the English School” in *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 29, No. 3, 2009, pp. 427-441, p. 427

⁷⁸ Buzan, *From International to World Society*, p. 24

⁷⁹ Robert W. Murray, “The Need for an English School Research Program” in *System, Society & the World: Exploring the English School of International Relations* ed. Robert W. Murray, Bristol: e-International Relations, April 2013, p. 69

⁸⁰ Buzan, *From International to World Society*, p. 25

theoretical framework that provides scholars with a coherent set of tools with which to analyse IR, and allows for exploration of interactions between seemingly contradictory pre-existing theories.

This issue is said to be compounded by the School's adherents lack of desire in operating according to a set of defined methodological rules.⁸¹ This forms part of the problem when testing the school as a theory 'in the social science tradition' as it lacks a concern with methods and a clear framework, in order to determine whether an English School approach was being used. Murray has claimed the English School lacks a coherent theoretical lens, and Buzan agrees that there is a lack of clarity setting out exactly what is entailed in the theoretical pluralism that underpins the theory.⁸² While Buzan accepts that it is necessary for the theory to develop one, this criticism has also been painted as a strength. Richard Little claims that there are in fact three distinct ways to consider the theory.⁸³ Firstly; "as a set of ideas found in the minds of statesmen, secondly; as a set of ideas found in the minds of political scientists,; thirdly. as a set of externally imposed concepts that define the material and social structures of the international system. This methodological openness could work to open up the possibilities of the English School. For this research, this lack of clearly defined methodological rules worked in its favour, allowing this research to take on a broad process tracing approach in order to trace the development of the 'normative battleground'.

⁸¹ Murray, "The Need for an English School Research Program", p. 69

⁸² Buzan, *From International to World Society*, p. 22

⁸³ Murray, "The Need for an English School Research Program", p. 67

3: Conceptualisation of the “Normative Battleground”

3.1: The Norms promoted through the EU and Russia’s ‘Securitising Projects’

For the EU, its norm promotion in the eastern neighbourhood, and specifically Ukraine, constitutes an extension of its internal project.⁸⁴ This project is based primarily on EU norms and values which are placed at the forefront of its policy concerns, and largely shape all of what the EU is and does. The EU’s normative agenda, according to Ian Manners, centres around five core norms, which are peace, liberty, democracy, rule of law and human rights.⁸⁵ While also containing four ‘minor norms’ of social solidarity, anti-discrimination, sustainable development and good governance. These norms can be characterised as being largely ‘postmodern’ in the sense that they are also promoting the individual ahead of the state, demonstrated by the emphasis on human rights and democracy promotion. Furthermore, these norms fit into the ‘world society’, Kantian sphere of Buzan’s ‘triad’, in that Kant foresaw a peaceful society based on democratic rule, one which the EU is promoting norms, such as democracy, in order to achieve.

Russia is promoting the more ‘modern’ norms as their core norms. Russia claims to privilege sovereignty, regime stability, non-interference in internal affairs of states, alongside a gradual evolution of governance, as a means of managing its unstable environment.”⁸⁶ These Russian norms can be classified as ‘modern’ as the focus on state sovereignty can be traced back to the Treaty of Westphalia discussed earlier, which defined the ‘modern’ system. In addition, the non-interference in the internal affairs of states would imply that nation-states are the legitimate actors in international affairs, not supranational organisations which could require some level of interference. These norms can stand in almost direct contrast to the ‘postmodern’ norms being promoted by the EU. For example, the norm of regime stability as the EU’s focus on developing good governance as a norm could be seen as undermining Russia’s promotion of regime stability.

Interestingly, both powers claim to adhere to the United Nations (UN) backed norms in the international arena. These norms consist of such as respect for sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of states and the peaceful settlement of disputes.⁸⁷ The EU has consistently pursued and applied these principles, whilst also acting as a ‘postmodern’ power, despite on the surface these norms appearing to adhere to a more ‘modern’ outlook. Richard Sakwa has explained that the UN norms such as “the respect for sovereignty, and territorial integrity, non-interference in internal affairs of states, indivisibility of security, human rights and freedoms, are

⁸⁴ Derek Averre, “Competing Rationalities”, p. 1693

⁸⁵ Romanova, “Russian Challenge to the EU’s Normative Power”, p. 373

⁸⁶ Derek Averre, “Competing Rationalities”, p. 1696

⁸⁷ ‘Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy, 11th December, 2008, [https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/reports/104630.pdf] <accessed 27th July 2017>

in line with ‘Russia’s definition of a great power’”.⁸⁸ Russia is promoting these norms, not merely due to their status as UN backed norms, but also because they allow Russia to gain a sense of international legitimacy, and to rebuild their status. In Russia’s eyes, the UN is a legitimate international actor, and the EU is not. Russia is using these norms, as UN backed norms, in order to legitimise its use of ‘modern’ norms in the twenty first century.

3.2: Methods of Norm Promotion

3.2.1: EU Norm Promotion

The EU has a carefully crafted method for promoting norms, as an established normative foreign policy actor, and is experienced with the use of soft power, particularly political conditionality. Political conditionality is said to be “at the heart of the EU’s promotion of its political organisation, norms, rules and regulations beyond its territory, known as “Europeanisation.”⁸⁹ This principle of political conditionality is a fundamental aspect of the EU’s norm promotion within its neighbouring states.

The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), conceived in 2003, implemented in 2004, has been seen as the overarching policy for norm promotion in the EU’s eastern and southern neighbourhoods. The objective of the ENP was to ensure stability, security and well-being within neighbouring countries.⁹⁰ The ENP was established as an alternative to EU membership but would allow the EU to “employ its political and economic weight by turning to either coercive or negative, i.e. punishment, such as sanctions, or positive, i.e. rewards such as more favourable trade relations, conditionality.”⁹¹ Norm promotion was to form a core aspect of the ENP and in order to meet the goals of the ENP there would be jointly agreed Action Plans based on a commitment to shared norms and values. “Most of the ENP Action Plans established with the Eastern Neighbours underlined the need for a reinforcement of democratic institutions, including new electoral laws, reform of the judiciary and ratification of international Human Rights covenants, among others.”⁹²

By 2008 the ENP was widely perceived to need a reboot and a new initiative was established within the ENP framework: the Eastern Partnership (EaP). Ukraine was one of six partner

⁸⁸ Maria Raquel Freire, “Russian Foreign Policy and the Shaping of a ‘Greater Europe’” in *Security in Shared Neighbourhoods*, eds, Remi Piet and Licinia Simao, Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2016, p. 35

⁸⁹ Alena Vysotskaya Guedes Vieira, ‘The Many Patterns of Europeanisation: European Union Relations with Russia, Ukraine and Belarus’ in *The European Union Neighbourhood: Challenges and Opportunities*, ed. Teresa Cierco, Surrey: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2013, p. 57

⁹⁰ ‘Beyond Enlargement: Commission shifts European Neighbourhood Policy into higher gear’, 12th May 2004, [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-04-632_en.htm] <accessed 26th July 2017>

⁹¹ Alena Vysotskaya Guedes Vieira, ‘The Many Patterns of Europeanisation’, p. 59

⁹² Licinia Simao, ‘Coming of Age: Dilemmas for the European Union’s Foreign Policy in the Wider Europe’ in *The European Union Neighbourhood: Challenges and Opportunities*, ed. Teresa Cierco, Surrey: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2013, p. 104

countries included in this new partnership. Since its implementation in 2009, the Eastern Partnership (EaP) has represented the eastern dimension of the ENP and is based on instilling EU norms in neighbouring countries, such as, liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law.⁹³ The framework of the EaP “promoted specific thematic ‘policy platforms’ on democracy, good governance and stability, economic integration, energy security and contacts between people.”⁹⁴ The reforms to instil these norms would be agreed through Association Agreements (AA) of the EaP and they have been labelled as the EU’s main instrument bringing the partner countries “closer to EU norms and standards.”⁹⁵

In addition, in 2011, Catherine Ashton, the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Stefan Fule, the EU Commissioner for Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy, re-launched the ENP with a renewed focus on engagement with its neighbours. Part of this revitalised proposal was the ‘more for more’ principle which offers ‘more funds for more reforms’ within the EU neighbourhood.⁹⁶ In short, financial incentives for adopting more EU promoted norms. A European Commission memo published in 2013 laid out how the EU reviewed the ENP in 2010-2011 and put a strong focus on promoting deep and sustainable democracy.⁹⁷ The memo also discussed the EU’s ‘more for more’ principle through which the EU will develop stronger partnerships with neighbours who make ‘more’ progress with reforms.

3.2.2. Russian norm promotion

The Russian approach to norm promotion is less structured than the EU approach and Russia has leant about the high stakes of normative influence in the region from encountering the EU’s “normative power”⁹⁸. As a result, Russia has developed an “alternative normative concept” to challenge the universality of the concept the EU is promoting.⁹⁹ Russia does not want Ukraine to fall under the EU liberal security order based on the norms the EU promotes. Therefore, Russia seeks to counter the EU norms being promoted within the neighbourhood. Makarychev has also promoted this idea and has labelled Russia as more of a “norm-exploiter” than a “norm producer”.¹⁰⁰ Tatiana Romanova has discussed how Russia when addressing, specifically, the norm of human rights being promoted by the EU in its neighbourhood, has “moved from a

⁹³ The Eastern Partnership, [https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/neighbourhood/eastern-partnership_en] <accessed 10th February, 2017>

⁹⁴ Alena Vysotskaya Guedes Vieira, ‘The Many Patterns of Europeanisation’, p. 62

⁹⁵ Rikard Jozwiak, ‘Explainer: What Exactly Is An EU Association Agreement?’ 20th November, 2013, [<https://www.rferl.org/a/eu-association-agreement-explained/25174247.html>] <accessed 26th June 2017>

⁹⁶ ‘A new and ambitious European Neighbourhood Policy’ 25th May, 2011, [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-11-643_en.htm] <accessed 9th July 2017>

⁹⁷ ‘European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) – Fact Sheet’, 19th March, 2013, [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-236_en.htm] <accessed 26th July 2017>

⁹⁸ Dragneva and Wolczuk, “Russia, the Eurasian Customs Union and the EU: Cooperation, Stagnation or Rivalry?” p. 13

⁹⁹ Romanova, “Russian Challenge to the EU’s Normative Power”, p. 372

¹⁰⁰ Andrey Makarychev, “Russia and its “New Security Architecture”, CEPS Working Document, No.310/February 2009, p.7

defensive to an offensive strategy”.¹⁰¹ This implies a change in norm promotion over time, meaning there are two forms of promotion we can identify. Russia promotes norms both in defence of EU norms, and offensively to actively counter EU norms.

Russia can be seen to be promoting norms defensively, in reaction to the EU norms it seeks to counter. This is done largely through criticising EU norms and EU norm implementation, and promoting alternatives. Some of the Russian criticism of the normative interference of the EU in Ukraine in 2004 was not an explicit promotion of a Russian norm, yet in directly opposing and criticising the norms the EU was promoting, this was a way of undercutting EU norms and thereby, in a sense, promoting the opposing norm. For example, in complaining that the EU was undermining Ukrainian sovereignty with interference during the 2004 ‘Orange Revolution’, Russia was advocating to respect the sovereignty of states, a core ‘modern’ Russian norm.

Russian norms promoted also sought to counterbalance the growing influence and presence of the EU and its norms, particularly within its neighbourhood and security.¹⁰² For example, in 2008, Russian President Medvedev suggested the current European security architecture was inadequate and proposed a new system.¹⁰³ Medvedev suggested that a key issue was that European security continued to be “overly ideologised”, which as Samuel Layton states, refers to the “conflation of normative and democracy related arguments relating to security”, and the view from Russia that security decisions should not be based on evaluations of a country’s level of democracy. In this respect, “Russia sought to reframe security principles in the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian space away from such Western notions of democracy and ideology” In sum, Russia was attempting to reframe European security away from any form of norm promotion or compliance. Even though the proposal wasn’t adopted, this is still an example of action taken by Russia to counter what it viewed as EU dominance over norm promotion.

One way Russia tried to counter the perceived monopoly on EU norms, and therefore to be able to promote its own norms, was to ensure the EU couldn’t claim the monopoly on legitimate norms being promoted. In this sense, Russian norm promotion became almost assertive. During a 2007 speech in Munich, Putin spoke of how Russia is “constantly being taught about democracy. But for some reason those who teach us do not want to learn themselves.”¹⁰⁴

Putin also added that “we are seeing a greater and greater disdain for the basic principles of international law,” implying that Russia is a legitimate power who upholds and respects these basic principles. As Tatiana Romanova has discussed, from this stage, in 2007, there was a notion of competition over norms and values and there was a clear understanding by Russia that

¹⁰¹ Romanova, “Russian Challenge to the EU’s Normative Power”, p. 386

¹⁰² Freire, ‘Russian Foreign Policy and the Shaping of a ‘Greater Europe’, p. 39

¹⁰³ Samuel Layton, “Reframing European Security: Russia’s proposal for a new European Security Architecture” in *International Relations*, Vol. 28, No. 1, 2014, p. 28

¹⁰⁴ ‘Speech and the Following Discussion at the Munich Conference on Security Policy’, 10th February, 2007, [<http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/24034>] <accessed 29th July 2017>

it needed to critique the EU and have its own alternative concept to promote.¹⁰⁵ This approach of norm promotion fits with the Russian goal of rebuilding its ‘great power’ position in international society as critiquing EU norms is not enough, but promoting alternative, legitimate norms would be the way.

3.3: The Formation of the “Normative Battleground”

This entire chapter has been laying the foundations for the conceptualisation of the ‘normative battleground’ that will be analysed as developing between the EU and Russia in Ukraine. The ‘normative battleground’ stems from the conflicting securitising projects promoted by the EU and Russia, classified earlier as ‘modern’ and ‘postmodern’, and these securitising projects can be seen through the norms each power chooses to promote. These ‘modern’ and ‘postmodern’ outlooks can be framed with Buzan’s ‘triad’ allowing for a Hobbesian and Kantian interpretation of these norm promoting projects. For example, Russia, coming from a ‘modern’/Hobbesian approach to securitising, seeks to promote respect sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference within Ukraine as their view of what is legitimate in the international arena. Whereas the EU, seeking to promote a ‘postmodern’/Kantian approach to securitising, is promoting norms such as mutual interference, democracy promotion, and pooling sovereignty.

It is clear that these norms cannot be promoted within the same space at the same time, and yet this is what occurs in Ukraine between 2004 and 2014. The ‘normative battleground’ which the following empirical sections seeks to outline and develop, stems from these opposing securitising projects promoting incompatible norms within Ukraine.

¹⁰⁵ Romanova, “Russian Challenge to the EU’s Normative Power”, p. 386

4: Reviewing the ‘Modern’ and ‘Postmodern’ Debate

This thesis will frame the securitising projects of the EU and Russia into ‘postmodern’ and ‘modern’ categories respectively. However, this is the subject of much academic debate, with regards to what extent these terms are wholly appropriate, and even, necessary, as Andrew Wilson has pointed out. Wilson claims that some have said western Europe has become more ‘postmodern’, “whatever that meant.”¹⁰⁶ In countering the classification of this thesis, Robert Cooper has argued that Russia cannot be classified as a ‘modern’ power. Cooper made the point that Russia’s behaviour is not entirely ‘modern’, claiming that “there are also postmodern elements in Russia trying to get out”.¹⁰⁷ Cooper draws on the example of the acceptance of OSCE observers in Chechnya by Russia, and their acceptance of the CFE Treaty. However, while Cooper was correct in 1996, at the time of writing, Russia chose to suspend its participation in the CFE Treaty in 2007.¹⁰⁸ As the CFE Treaty encouraged openness and transparency, Russia’s withdrawal can indeed be seen as reverting to a more ‘modern’ stance. Furthermore, academic, Andrew Wilson discussed how Dmitri Trenin, Head of the Moscow Carnegie Centre, has inverted Cooper’s perspective of the 21st century international system as being ‘postmodern’, and claimed that there are members of the EU, such as the United Kingdom and France, that still “possess elements of both”, meaning elements of both hard power ability from the 19th century, and soft power ability from the 21st.¹⁰⁹ Europe, argues Trenin, is not located within a 21st century world, as Cooper has asserted, and instead argues that there are still aspects of the more ‘modern’ world within Europe.

On the other side of the discussion, Richard Sakwa has argued that while Putin is deeply committed to a “new realism”, it has “rejected much of the zero-sum logic of traditional views of international politics”.¹¹⁰ This implies that Russia is not adhering to the traditional ‘modern’ outlook which has the zero-sum mentality at its foundations. Sakwa has further argued that the EU’s normative agenda is “vitiated by the geopolitical aspirations of the new Atlanticism to extend its zone of influence to the east.”¹¹¹ Implying that the EU also hosts some aspects of ‘modern’ behaviour in its foreign policy outlook. A more nuanced understanding of the ‘modern’ and ‘postmodern’ debate has been given by Andrew Wilson who has argued that the EU is actually “a mixture of postmodern factors and old nation state traditions,”¹¹² and that Russia “also mixes up the traditional and the postmodern, but in a different way.” This thesis

¹⁰⁶ Wilson, Andrew, *Ukraine Crisis: What it means for the West*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014, p. 4

¹⁰⁷ Cooper, *The Post-Modern State*, p. 33

¹⁰⁸ ‘Russia quits arms pact as estrangement with NATO grows’, 2015, [<https://www.ft.com/content/f6c814a6-c750-11e4-9e34-00144feab7de>] <accessed 23rd June, 2017>

¹⁰⁹ Wilson, *Ukraine Crisis: What it means for the West*, p. 5

¹¹⁰ Richard Sakwa, “Vladimir Putin and Russian Foreign Policy towards the West: Towards a New Realism”, in *Russia and Europe in the twenty first century - an uneasy partnership*, eds. Jackie Gower and Graham Timmins, London: Anthem Press, 2007, p. 7

¹¹¹ Derek Averre, “The Ukraine Conflict: Russia’s Challenge to European Security Governance” in *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 68, No. 4, 2016, pp. 699-725, p. 701

¹¹² Wilson, *Ukraine Crisis: What it means for the West*, p. 5

acknowledges this debate, but this research seeks to draw upon the ‘modern’ and ‘postmodern’ aspects of the securitising projects, not claiming that the securitising projects solely and entirely sit within the outlooks, and acknowledges that in reality the situation is largely more complicated than this. The ‘modern’ and ‘postmodern’ framework is applied to help provide an outline to understand the EU and Russia’s securitising outlooks.

5: Methodology

The aim of this research has been to provide a full conceptualisation for, and trace the development of, a ‘normative battleground’ occurring between the EU and Russia within Ukraine. To trace the development of a ‘normative battleground’ this thesis will analyse three critical junctures during a ten-year period in Ukraine, looking at 2004, 2009 and 2014. In order to trace this development, this thesis will apply process tracing as its methodology.

This research can be broken down into two research questions:

Research Question 1: To what extent can the different securitising outlooks be seen to shape the norms promoted by the EU and Russia?

Research Question 2: How have the corresponding norms lead to the development of a ‘normative battleground’ between the EU and Russia?

This thesis will be using process tracing as its methodology. Process tracing has been defined as “the analysis of evidence of processes, sequences and conjunctures of events within a case for the purposes of either developing or testing hypotheses about causal mechanisms that might actually explain the case.”¹¹³ Through this method we are able to identify the intervening causal process or causal mechanism between an independent variable and the dependent variable. Without applying process tracing to a chain of events to uncover the causal mechanisms, it would merely be a narrative, and without applying the events it would merely be a theoretical study. Process tracing is a way of braiding together factors and events with mechanisms.¹¹⁴ Process tracing also allows for an in-depth study of a case,¹¹⁵ which in the case of this thesis, is the development of a ‘normative battleground’ within Ukraine.

There are three types of process tracing it is possible to employ: theory-testing, theory-building and explaining-outcome.¹¹⁶ This thesis will use the explaining-outcome type of process tracing as this type produces a result that is only applicable to the one relevant case being investigated, and cannot be generalised and applied to other cases. The conceptualisation and application of the “normative battleground” will be specific to the events in Ukraine during the 2004-2014 period.

¹¹³ Andrew Bennett and Jeffrey T. Checkel, “Process Tracing: from philosophical roots to best practices”, in Andrew Bennett and Jeffrey T. Checkel, eds, *Process Tracing: from Metaphor to Analytic Tool*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014, p. 7

¹¹⁴ David Waldner, “Process Tracing and Causal Mechanisms”, in *The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Social Science*, ed. Harold Kincaid, Oxford Handbooks Online, August 2012

¹¹⁵ Melanie Punton and Katharina Welle, “Applying Process Tracing in Five Steps”, *CDI Practice Paper Annex*, Institute of Development Studies, 2015

¹¹⁶ Punton and Welle, ‘Applying Process Tracing in Five Steps’,

For a successful process tracing, it must include several factors. It must include the effect which is under investigation; in this case, that is the development of the 'normative battleground'. It must include a hypothesised cause; in this case is the two conflicting securitising projects stemming from the diverging 'modern' and 'postmodern' security outlooks. Also there must be processes or events that link the hypothesised cause with the effect; in this case the norms that are being promoted and leading to the 'normative battleground' that stem from the conflicting securitising projects. With process tracing, the focus is not merely on what happened, but how something happened. That means with this research, using process tracing will enable us to identify how the 'normative battleground' has developed, not merely that it indeed has. This thesis will use a combination of sources to build the empirical research. As process tracing takes a holistic approach to explaining outcomes, and brings together events, with factors and mechanisms, a wide variety of sources is necessary. This thesis will use a combination of speeches, interviews, foreign policy documents, policy papers, statements and newspaper articles in order to build this complete image of the events.

Ukraine was selected as a case study through which to analyse the development of the 'normative battleground' as it is a key neighbouring state for both the EU and Russia. For EU member states such as Poland, keeping Ukraine out of Russia's orbit through active EU norm promotion was the only way of protecting the EU's, and Poland's, borders.¹¹⁷ Ukraine is significant to the EU for many reasons, such as energy security, the need for Ukraine as a neighbour to have political stability, and for overall EU security. An unstable Ukraine could pose a significant security threat for the EU and its member states. Therefore, Ukraine remains a core part of the EU's norm promotion to ensure security in the region, part of its 'postmodern' securitising project. In addition, for Russian President Putin personally, "Ukraine lies east of the line that marks the extent of Western civilisation in Europe."¹¹⁸ Much has been written about the Russian desire to reclaim great power status within the international arena and Russia recognises that "Ukraine is the key to its plans."¹¹⁹ In this respect, it is possible to point to Ukraine as being important to Russia in maintaining their international prestige, and developing its international image as a 'great power', therefore marking Ukraine as an important place to prevent overt EU influence. Ukraine can be classified as being vital for the stability of the European continent as a whole, and a country over which influence is challenged.

The critical junctures that have been selected as key points to analyse the development of the 'normative battleground' are 2004, 2009 and 2014. These dates have been selected as, through the conceptualisation of the 'battleground', it became clear that Russian norm promotion was largely reacting to EU normative promotion in Ukraine, and the EU attempts at securitising within a 'postmodern' outlook within Ukraine. Therefore, the critical junctures chosen

¹¹⁷ Olga Shumylo-Tapiola, 'Why Does Ukraine Matter to the EU?', 16th April, 2013, [<http://carnegieeurope.eu/2013/04/16/why-does-ukraine-matter-to-eu-pub-51522>] <accessed 26th July 2017>

¹¹⁸ Dmitri Trenin, 'Ukraine is not the only battlefield between Russia and the West', 21st March, 2014 [<http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategieurope/55049>] <accessed 26th March 2017>

¹¹⁹ John Ewadin Mroz and Oleksandr Pavliuk, 'Ukraine: Europe's Linchpin' in *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 75, No.3, June 1996, p. 52

correspond to key events and developments in EU norm promotion that Russia reacted to. These are:

2004: The European Neighbourhood Policy and the 'Orange Revolution' in Ukraine

2009: The implementation of the Eastern Partnership

2014: The height of the fallout over the non-signature of the Association Agreement in 2013

6: Tracing the Development of the “Normative Battleground”

This study will begin in 2004, a critical juncture for Russia-EU relations with regards to Ukraine. This empirical research will span 10 years, beginning with the ‘Orange Revolution’ in 2004, and culminating with Euromaidan protests in 2014. The aim is to trace the development of a ‘normative battleground’ between the EU and Russia during this period, and to analyse how the securitising projects being implemented have shaped the norms being promoted. This analysis will begin with a brief description of events at this time to lay the groundwork, an analysis of the securitising projects framing the norms that are projected, and the subsequent development of the ‘normative battleground’.

6.1: 2004: The Dawn of the “Normative Battleground”

The main factor shaping EU-Russian relations towards the end of 2004, was the ‘Orange Revolution’ in Ukraine. This powerful civic movement began on 22nd November and “set a major new landmark in the post-communist history of eastern Europe, a seismic shift westward in the geopolitics of the region.”¹²⁰ The ‘Orange Revolution’ was a series of protests against the 2004 Ukrainian presidential election results. One candidate, Viktor Yanukovich, was strongly supported by outgoing President Kuchma and Russian President Putin. In opposition, stood the western leaning Viktor Yushchenko, who ran on an anti-corruption platform. The election was marred in fraud and irregularities after Yanukovich declared victory, and this led to two weeks of mass protests which brought the country to the brink of civil war. The mood of the revolution can be summed up with the lyrics of the 2004 winning Ukrainian Eurovision entry, “no falsifications, no lies, no machinations. Yes Yushchenko! Yes Yushchenko! This is our president!”¹²¹ In December, the Supreme Court of Ukraine declared the election invalid and subsequently Yushchenko defeated Yanukovich and was inaugurated in January 2005. The Orange Revolution is this thesis’ starting point as during this time it became clear that the EU was actively seeking to instil EU norms within Ukraine as a way of extending EU security into the neighbourhood. Furthermore, Russia’s involvement in the election campaign highlighted their desire to counter the EU’s influence, and to keep Ukraine within a Russian sphere of influence.

6.1.1: The EU’s Securitising Project in 2004

For the EU, the key securitising project being projected into Ukraine was the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). The recent ‘big bang’ enlargement meant the EU borders had shifted east and moved the EU geographically closer to Ukraine. The objective of the ENP was

¹²⁰ Adrian Karatnycky, ‘Ukraine’s Orange Revolution’, March 2005, [<https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2005-03-01/ukraines-orange-revolution>] <accessed 17th August 2017>

¹²¹ ‘What will Terry Wogan think?’ 19th May 2005, [<https://www.theguardian.com/music/2005/may/19/ukraine.bbc>] <accessed 12th July 2017>

to ensure stability, security and well-being within the neighbouring countries,¹²² and to prevent the emergence of new ‘dividing lines’ within Europe by allowing EU neighbours to “share everything with the Union but institutions.”¹²³ The *European Neighbourhood Strategy* explained that the ENP was necessary to help realise the objectives of the *European Security Strategy* released in 2003.¹²⁴ This paper had been the EU’s first security strategy, “*A Secure Europe in a Better World*,” and the document laid out the key threats faced by the EU and its strategic objectives in order to defend its security and promote its values; two concepts it appears are inextricably linked. For example, one of the key strategic objectives was “Building Security in our Neighbourhood” which argued “the best protection for our security is a world of well-governed democratic states”¹²⁵. In order to meet the goals of the ENP there would be jointly agreed Action Plans based on a commitment to shared norms and values. The EU deems the spread of good governance, the support of social and political reform, countering corruption and abuse of power, establishing the rule of law and protecting human rights are “the best means of strengthening the international order.”

This securitising measure forms part of the EU’s “postmodern” identity, demonstrated further by factors such as the growing irrelevance of borders, security based on cooperation and openness, interference within domestic affairs, contained within the ENP. The norms that formed a core part of this securitising project are the promotion of interdependence, with sovereignty no longer being absolute and democracy promotion. Buzan’s “world society” sphere, of a Kantian ‘perpetual peace’ from the cooperation of a group of likeminded states, based on the spread of democracy, can encompass the EU’s securitising project here. The norms the EU are promoting are also norms from the internal EU project, so demonstrating the breaking down of domestic and foreign policy borders.

6.1.2: Russia’s Securitising Project in 2004

The period between 2003 and 2005 saw a “decoupling” of Russia’s Foreign Policy from the West, and a move towards pursuing its own self-interest, a move which had “major implications for Russian security and defence policy.”¹²⁶ During the 2004 Annual Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, Putin spoke of how for the first time in a long time, Russia was economically and politically stable, which had had a beneficial effect on Russia’s

¹²² ‘Beyond Enlargement: Commission shifts European Neighbourhood Policy into higher gear’, 12th May 2004, [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-04-632_en.htm] <accessed March 27th 2017>

¹²³ ‘Wider Europe – Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours “Sharing everything with the Union but institutions”’ 9th October 2003, [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_COR-03-94_en.htm] <accessed 17th June, 2017>

¹²⁴ European Neighbourhood Policy Strategy Paper, 12th May 2004, [https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/2004_communication_from_the_commission_-_european_neighbourhood_policy_-_strategy_paper.pdf] <accessed 17th June, 2017>

¹²⁵ ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World’, European Security Strategy, 12th December 2003, Brussels, [<https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf>] <accessed 3rd August, 2017> p. 10

¹²⁶ Trenin, Dmitri. “Russia’s Threat Perception and Strategic Posture” November, 2007, [<http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=829>] <accessed 13th June, 2017> p. 1

international position.¹²⁷ In analysing the factors of Russia's securitising project within Ukraine at this stage, it is not as simple to identify as the EU's securitising project. The last *National Security Concept* had been published in 2000, and much had changed since this point. However, there are certain aspects that were still relevant. For example, the concept stated that "internationally, threats to Russian national security are manifested in attempts by other states to counteract its strengthening as one of the centres of influence in a multipolar world, to hinder realization of its national interests and to weaken its positions in Europe."¹²⁸ Therefore, Russia was seeking to counter any attempts at lessening its influence in Europe, and in this case, particularly in Ukraine. This is further demonstrated with a speech by Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, in 2004 where he declared that the situation on the territory of the former USSR provided an example of "the new threats and challenges which require a new level of understanding, trust and respect for the legitimate interests of each other,"¹²⁹ and demonstrated the strongly held belief that Ukraine sits in Russia's sphere of "vital interests" when he said the territory of the former USSR is a "a sphere of vital interests prompted by its entire history." Lavrov also defined what was meant by "vital interests" saying "we are talking about respect of the legitimate concerns of each other about the issues of security." Therefore, it can be established that Ukraine staying within Russia's sphere of influence is a matter of security for the Russian state. In a second speech, Lavrov explained that "Russia, as nobody else, has done a great deal for these countries to become truly independent and sovereign."¹³⁰

This Russian desire to maintain Ukraine's independence and sovereignty can be interpreted here as keeping Ukraine independent from the EU's influence, a direct security threat. In doing so, Russia promoted norms stemming from this securitising project, in order to counter the implementation of EU norms within Ukraine. Norms such as, natural progression of political systems, rather than the EU implementation of democracy, respect for absolute sovereignty, non-interference. These norms stem from Russia's 'modern' interpretation of international society, and can be traced back to Buzan's 'international system' sphere, with its emphasis on sovereignty, balance, and spheres of influence. These norms form part of Russia's international outlook, and almost diametrically oppose EU promoted norms, this here is forming the development of the 'normative battleground'.

¹²⁷ 'Annual Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation' May 26th, 2004, [<http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/22494>] <accessed 24th July 2017>

¹²⁸ 'National Security Concept of the Russian Federation' 10th January, 2000, [http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/official_documents/-/asset_publisher/CptlCk6B6BZ29/content/id/589768] <accessed 25th July 2017>

¹²⁹ 'Article by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, 'A different Russia: A challenge or new opportunities for partnership?' 1st April, 2004, [http://www.mid.ru/en/press_service/minister_speeches/-/asset_publisher/7OvQR5KJWVmR/content/id/479404] <accessed 24th July 2017>

¹³⁰ 'Transcript of the Interview Granted by Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov to the German Newspaper *Handelblatt*' 28th December 2004, [http://www.mid.ru/en/press_service/minister_speeches/-/asset_publisher/7OvQR5KJWVmR/content/id/452054] <accessed 26th July 2017>

6.1.3: The ‘Normative Battleground’

Sovereignty or Interference?

The EU promotes the pooling of sovereignty amongst member states and neighbouring states, such as Ukraine, for the security of the Union. The president of the European Commission, Romano Prodi, speaking in April 2004 from the Tretyakov Gallery in Moscow, when discussing the *European Security and Defence Policy*, explained that “in these areas, the Member States of the Union have chosen to pool some of their sovereignty to deal with common problems more effectively and face up to our growing global responsibilities.”¹³¹ Furthermore, Prodi added, this “sovereignty pooling” has moved beyond the Union’s borders as a securitising measure. For Prodi growing interdependence has meant that the issues of security within the EU “no longer stop at borders.” In a separate speech in April 2004, Prodi spoke of the future of the EU and said “one option is to continue to put our trust in a system of international relations based on the balance of power and rely on the sovereignty and national interests of individual nation-states,” and yet that would be like “tackling the challenges of the 21st Century with the instruments and policies of the 19th.”¹³² An approach based on these “modern” policies would be contrary to the very nature of the EU as a union based upon “dialogue, solidarity, multilateralism and an ethical dimension to politics.” Here, the EU is making clear their stance on the importance of pooling sovereignty for security, and how using a ‘19th century approach’, as a byword for a ‘modern’ approach, is in direct opposition to the EU approach.

This ‘postmodern’ stance on sovereignty is demonstrated during the ‘Orange Revolution’. The EU clearly stated that they played a decisive role in the development of events. With direct reference to the Orange Revolution, Dr. Benita Ferrero-Waldner, the Commissioner for External Relations and ENP in April 2005, while acknowledging the pivotal role of the Ukrainian people in the revolution, went on to add that “we practitioners of international politics know that major changes in the political cosmos are invariably due to a coincidence of factors. In this case, an important factor was the European Union and its new initiative, the European Neighbourhood Policy.”¹³³ Ferrero-Waldner stated that “I believe that the EU’s Neighbourhood Policy played a significant role in the outcome of the Orange Revolution.” For Ferrero-Waldner, the EU contributed to the events in Ukraine, not by merely being an attractive ‘club’, as that would imply the EU’s role was purely passive, but with active involvement. The EU made clear to Ukraine that they would only offer a supportive partnership and a closer relationship “if Ukraine shared our fundamental values, and that Ukraine needed to demonstrate its commitment to

¹³¹ Romano Prodi, ‘Russia and the European Union: enduring ties, widening horizons’, 23rd April 2004, [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-04-198_en.htm] <accessed 26th July 2017>

¹³² Romano Prodi, ‘The Role of the EU in a changing world’, 14th April, 2004, [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-04-176_en.htm] <accessed 26th July 2017>

¹³³ Dr. Benita Ferrero-Waldner, ‘The EU and Ukraine – what lies beyond the horizon?’, 26th April, 2005, [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-05-257_en.htm] <accessed 26th July 2017>

democratic principles and respect for the rule of law. This is an example of the EU using its influence to enact change and encourage reform within Ukraine, an example of the EU's stance on pooling sovereignty and encouragement of interference within domestic affairs.

In direct contrast, for Russia sovereignty is seen as a privileged norm and Russia vocally rejected the EU's 'interference' within Ukraine. Lavrov stressed the importance of not meddling in the internal affairs of Ukraine and "to allow the Ukrainians to solve this problem themselves."¹³⁴ In an interview in November 2004 discussing the situation in Ukraine, Lavrov was asked to what extent the EU influenced the ongoing situation. Lavrov responded "everybody should avoid any incitement and take up firmly the position that Russia has held from the very beginning and which is that the Ukrainian people alone, on the basis of their laws, have the right to decide their future."¹³⁵ Here Lavrov was openly criticising interference within Ukraine from external influences, quite likely directed in part at the EU. Lavrov was asked if there remained any differences between Moscow and the West as to how to resolve the crisis in Ukraine and Lavrov responded "We are convinced that Ukraine alone will be able to select its foreign policy priorities and, based on the exercise of its sovereign rights, develop its international relations."¹³⁶ Russia claimed that Ukrainian has a sovereign right to make its own decisions, and therefore Russia is promoting sovereignty within Ukraine.

However, in reality, Russia's interpretation of 'sovereignty' is far more complex than it would first appear. Prioritising sovereignty as a 'modern' power would imply a lack of interference within a neighbouring country's internal affairs, however this was not the case. Putin visited Ukraine twice during the election campaign to back Mr Yanukovich, who was standing for deepening ties with Russia, in direct contrast to Mr Yushchenko who presented himself as a pro-Western reformer.¹³⁷ The EU criticised Putin for "interfering in the discredited Ukrainian poll,"¹³⁸ almost entirely mimicking Russian criticism of EU interference within Ukraine. The EU Commission president, Jose Manuel Barroso, registered annoyance with Russia's role in Ukraine during this period. Barroso accused Russia of sending advisers to aid Yanukovich's campaign, and that stated that Putin repeatedly praised Yanukovich.

Academic, Ruth Deyermond, has written on the concept of sovereignty within Russian foreign policy and claims Russia has a dual approach to state sovereignty. Deyermond explains how

¹³⁴ Transcript of the Interview Granted by Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov to the German Newspaper Handelblatt, 28th December, 2004, [http://www.mid.ru/en/press_service/minister_speeches/-/asset_publisher/7OvQR5KJWVmR/content/id/452054] <accessed 6th June 2017>

¹³⁵ Transcript of the Interview Granted by Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov to the German Newspaper Handelblatt, 28th December, 2004, [http://www.mid.ru/en/press_service/minister_speeches/-/asset_publisher/7OvQR5KJWVmR/content/id/452054] <accessed 6th June 2017>

¹³⁶ Transcript of remarks and replies to media questions by Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov Following Russia-NATO Council Session, 9th December, 2004, [http://www.mid.ru/en/press_service/minister_speeches/-/asset_publisher/7OvQR5KJWVmR/content/id/453350] <accessed 26th May 2017>

¹³⁷ 'Huge protests over a 'stolen' election' 23rd November, 2004, [<http://www.economist.com/node/3422101?zid=309&ah=80dcf288b8561b012f603b9fd9577f0e>] <accessed 5th August 2017>

¹³⁸ Ewen MacAskill and Nick Paton Walsh, 'EU anger at Putin's role in election', 25th November, 2004, [<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/nov/25/russia.eu>] <accessed 30th July 2017>

Russia has a Westphalian model of sovereignty for outside the former Soviet region, and a separate post-Soviet model for inside it.¹³⁹ As a ‘post-Soviet’ state, Ukraine would fall under a different interpretation of state sovereignty to other states. It appears that for Ukraine, the issue of sovereignty is closely tied with Russian sovereignty, that is, protecting Russian and Russia’s neighbourhood from EU interference. Furthermore, Deyermond points out that the shifts in Russia’s interpretations of sovereignty can be traced to the development of the liberal order with its rejection of the primacy of state sovereignty over the rights of the individual, the responsibility of the state to the individual and the responsibility of an international community of states to the individual, even, if necessary, without that states’ consent. This concept of sovereignty can be closely tied to the ‘postmodern’ outlook and ‘world society’ sphere that the EU interprets sovereignty from within, with the emphasis on the rights of the individual over the state. It is partly this challenge to the primacy of the state’s sovereignty that Russia is clashing with the EU. The Russian worldview rests on the Westphalian concept of sovereignty, that is the sovereignty of the state, not with the individual.

Democracy or Regime Stability?

The EU’s stance on sovereignty, as placing emphasis on the rights of the individual over the state, can also be seen in their approach to democracy and democracy promotion. As part of the EU’s securitising measures, they were actively promoting democracy and democratic reforms in Ukraine in 2004. Prodi, speaking in April, said how “we have already accomplished a lot in fostering democratic principles through development assistance, which has helped bolster peace and security internationally.”¹⁴⁰ The EU’s role in democracy promotion is described as “second to none” in Ukraine. Furthermore, Prodi spoke of how the EU is the “first example of a democracy that goes beyond national borders.” A core aim of the ENP was democracy promotion within the neighbouring countries, and Janez Potočnik, member of the European Commission, made clear that the 2004 Ukrainian presidential elections would need to comply with democratic standards for the EU-Ukraine relationship to progress.¹⁴¹

This support for democratic reform and active democracy promotion can be seen in the EU’s actions during the Orange Revolution. Following the claims of illegitimate interference and fraud in the 2004 presidential elections, the EU refused to accept the election results, as this undermined the democratic process. Benita Ferrero-Waldner, of the European Commission, said that “in the light of reports of serious and systematic irregularities from the OSCE election observation mission, it is clear that the official published results do not reflect the will of the

¹³⁹ Ruth Deyermond, “The Uses of Sovereignty in Twenty-first Century Russian Foreign Policy” in *Europe-Asia Studies*, 68:6, 2016, p. 957

¹⁴⁰ Romano Prodi, ‘Dialogue and shared values’, 25th May, 2004, [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-04-264_en.htm] <accessed 28th July 2017>

¹⁴¹ Janez Potočnik, ‘Ukraine-EU Relations: Prospects for the Future’, 18th May, 2004, [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-04-255_en.htm] <accessed 26th May 2017>

Ukrainian voters. The EU cannot therefore accept the election results.”¹⁴² Ferrero-Waldner added that the Ukrainian parliament had voted overwhelmingly on the same position, providing further legitimacy in rejecting the results. Furthermore, the EU supported the protestors of the Orange Revolution. The European Parliament adopted a resolution saying “it strongly condemns” the conditions under which the elections took place and “expressed its solidarity with the Ukrainian people” who were demonstrating in the streets.¹⁴³ Here this demonstrates the EU’s preference for democracy, and their insistence on legitimate democratic procedures. The support for the protestors also highlights the EU’s support for the rights of the people against the state if democratic rights are not adhered to. This is an example of the EU demonstrating an overwhelming desire for a legitimate democracy over short term stability within Ukraine.

In contrast, Russia prioritised regime stability within Ukraine over the rights of the protestors to protest the election fraud. While Russia did make reference to the importance of respecting the will of the people and the importance of the democratic process, Lavrov placed a greater emphasis on decisions being taken “on the basis on their laws and Constitution”¹⁴⁴ Putin, when asked about the situation within Ukraine, said “one of the parties cannot be cornered by means of unconstitutional activities. Otherwise other people in the region can say ‘Why don’t we act against the constitution?’”¹⁴⁵ Here Russia is demonstrating its preference for law and order within the Ukrainian constitution, in short, regime stability.

Russia insisted however to respect the democratic process of Ukraine and Lavrov claimed that Russia had no “bets” in the presidential campaign.¹⁴⁶ Lavrov claimed that Russia would respect any choice made by the Ukrainian people, and that any speculations of Russian election interference were based solely on a meeting held between Ukrainian President Kuchma, and Putin, which, as Lavrov claimed, were merely meeting to discuss the Russia-Ukrainian partnership. This would on the surface support the claim that Russia promotes non-interference in the domestic affairs of other states as a norm. However, this is directly opposed to claims made at the time. Russia was accused of attempts to “thwart” the western leaning candidate, Yushchenko, through a variety of, somewhat unpleasant, means.¹⁴⁷ Therefore, demonstrating a clear lack of regard for the EU backed democratic process, despite claims to the contrary.

¹⁴² Dr. Benita Ferrero-Waldner, ‘Situation in Ukraine’, 1st December, 2004 [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-04-506_en.htm] <accessed 17th July 2017>

¹⁴³ ‘The European Parliament’s support for the ‘Orange Revolution’ in Ukraine is a step towards an ambitious Wider Europe – Neighbourhood policy’ [<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+IM-PRESS+20050819FCS00984+0+DOC+PDF+VO//EN&language=EN>] <accessed 25th February 2017>

¹⁴⁴ Transcript of Replies to Russian Media Questions by Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Sergey Lavrov, 30th November, 2004, [http://www.mid.ru/en/press_service/minister_speeches/-/asset_publisher/7OvQR5KJWVmR/content/id/454254] <accessed 26th August 2017>

¹⁴⁵ Jonathan Steele, ‘Putin still bitter over orange revolution’, 6th September, 2005, [<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2005/sep/06/russia.jonathansteele>] <accessed 13th July 2017>

¹⁴⁶ Transcript of the Interview Granted by Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov to the German Newspaper Handelsblatt, 28th December, 2004, [http://www.mid.ru/en/press_service/minister_speeches/-/asset_publisher/7OvQR5KJWVmR/content/id/452054] <accessed 26th July 2017>

¹⁴⁷ ‘The Challenger’, 9th December, 2004, [<http://www.economist.com/node/3471877>] <accessed 25th January 2017>

Overall, the events of the Orange Revolution brought to the fore the beginnings of this normative clash, and lay the foundations for further conflicting norm promotion. Russia promoted the norm of regime stability over the need for a legitimate democracy. While the EU promoted the norm of interference, over Russia's demands to respect sovereignty. The opposing 'spheres' of 'international society' and 'world society' can frame these different approaches as the Russian 'international society' supports sovereignty and regime stability, and the EU's 'world society' sphere is promoting democracy and interference. In this section it also becomes clear that the 'normative battleground' is centred around Russia rejecting the EU norms being imposed in Ukraine. Russia is promoting alternative norms to reject these norms, stemming from its 'modern' outlook and securitising project.

On issues such as sovereignty, and democracy promotion, these issues cannot yet be fully classified as a 'battleground'. The issue of sovereignty with regards to Russian norm promotion is a complex one, that grows more complex across the ten-year time span of this research. Russia is adamant that Ukrainian sovereignty be respected, and yet also demonstrates a clear disregard for its own norm. Therefore, it is possible to interpret Russia's promotion of sovereignty within Ukraine as, in reality, not a norm to defend Ukraine's sovereignty, but that of Russia's own.

6.2: 2009: Counter Attacks on the 'Normative Battleground'

The year 2009 forms the midway point of this empirical research, and is an important point of development for the 'normative battleground' as this year saw the introduction of the EU's Eastern Partnership (EaP). This EaP has formed a key part of the EU's securitising project within Ukraine since this point. Alongside the EaP, the year 2009 also brought the ratification of the EU's Lisbon Treaty, which is relevant here as it gave the EU a more cohesive foreign and security policy, as well as supporting the EU's aim of greater influence on the world stage.¹⁴⁸ Catherine Ashton was appointed as the first High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to take charge of this more directed foreign policy. The year 2009 is also important as it was the year following the events of the Russian-Georgian War in 2008, which drastically altered the dynamic of EU-Russian relations. At the 2008 NATO summit in Bucharest, Ukraine and Georgia made NATO membership bids in opposition to Russia's wishes, and when Russia made retaliatory measures, war broke out in August 2008.¹⁴⁹ Russia's intentions in the international arena were becoming clearer during this period, and at the same NATO summit, Putin gave a speech where he stated that Ukraine was an artificial country and that the greater part of the lands of Ukraine historically belonged to Russia.¹⁵⁰ This year was

¹⁴⁸ 'Q&A: The Lisbon Treaty', 17th January, 2011, [<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/6901353.stm>] <accessed 30th July 2017>

¹⁴⁹ Fiona Hill and Steven Pifer, 'Putin's Russia Goes Rogue', 23rd January, 2014, [<https://www.brookings.edu/research/putins-russia-goes-rogue/>] <accessed 12th July 2017>

¹⁵⁰ Ben Judah, 'Putin's Coup', 19th October, 2014, [http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/10/vladimir-putins-coup-112025_Page3.html#.WaQGn5MjHBI] <accessed 28th July 2017>

also an important halfway point to assess as events, for example, the gas dispute between Russia and Ukraine in 2009, were bringing the situation in Ukraine to the forefront of discussions in Europe. This was a period of more focused and heightened foreign policy outlooks for both the EU and Russia.

6.2.1: The EU's Securitising Project

For the EU, 2009 brought the implementation of the EaP, a key platform for norm promotion within the EU's neighbouring states to the east. The EaP was partly conceived to encourage the partner countries to adopt EU norms such as values of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law.¹⁵¹ The framework of the EaP promoted "policy platforms" on democracy, good governance and stability, economic integration, energy security and contacts between people.¹⁵² While the EaP went further than norm promotion, in that it encouraged other alignment between the EU and Ukraine, such as economic, it can be pointed to as EU norm promotion. In the words of Stefan Füle, who was the Commissioner for Enlargement and the ENP, the EaP is equipped to "support democratic and market-orientated reforms in partner countries, consolidate their statehood and bring them closer to the EU."¹⁵³ In sum, the EaP would promote the normative alignment of Ukraine with the EU, particularly with norms such as democracy, human rights, and fundamental freedoms. The EaP was to form a core part of the EU's securitising measures and be an active policy through which to promote EU norms.

6.2.2: Russia's Securitising Project

The Russian securitisation project in Ukraine in 2009 can be framed as being largely reactionary. At this stage, Russia was still reeling following the war with Georgia the previous year. In 2009, Russia was not only objecting to the actions of the EU, but also to perceived NATO interference, in their immediate neighbourhood. Furthermore, due to the timing of the announcement of the EaP initiative coinciding with loud criticism of Russia over their actions in Georgia, alongside the lack of an invitation to be a partner state, Russia perceived the EaP as being directed against them. The final document of the extraordinary European Council held in September linked the EU's condemnation of Russian actions in Georgia, along with its decision to move ahead with the EaP.¹⁵⁴

The Russian governments perspective on the ENP in the previous years had been fairly muted in comparison to how the EaP was perceived. Lavrov, on multiple occasions, condemned the

¹⁵¹ The Eastern Partnership, [https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/neighbourhood/eastern-partnership_en] <accessed 10th February, 2017>

¹⁵² Alena Vysotskaya Guedes Vieira, 'The Many Patterns of Europeanisation', p. 62

¹⁵³ Korosteleva, "A New Opportunity for Neighbours?", p. 3

¹⁵⁴ Susan Stewart, 'Russia and the Eastern Partnership, Loud Criticism, Quiet Interest in Cooperation', German Institute for International and Security Affairs, 2009, p. 1

establishment of the EaP and equated it to the establishment of an “EU zone of interest in Eastern Europe.”¹⁵⁵ Russia was seeing the EaP through zero-sum, traditional, ‘modern’ eyes, and equating the EU’s actions with creating a ‘sphere of influence’. This led to Russia defensively promoting norms in order to maintain their sphere of influence including Ukraine.

During this Russia began to see the EU as an increasingly important actor within the post-Soviet space. This led to Russia seeing the EU as a competitor and Russia saw the EaP as a threat to Russia’s security within the neighbourhood. Russia saw the EU’s actions in Ukraine as a deliberate attempt at excluding Russia, not providing further cooperation, and thereby, not respecting Russia as a legitimate international actor. In Russia’s *2020 Security Strategy* brought in in 2009, it is discussed how the international system has transitioned from “opposing blocs to principles of multivector diplomacy”¹⁵⁶ which means Russia was going to defend their right as a legitimate actor in the international system and to reinforce its influence. At this stage, within Ukraine, this would have meant countering the EaP and the norms it was seeking to promote. For example, this would have involved a keen defence of the principals of the Westphalian world, which Lavrov complained, had “become a fashionable object of criticism in certain circles.” An article written by Lavrov highlights the key norms that Russia was promoting at this stage. The article, titled “Containing Russia: back to the future?”¹⁵⁷ explained that Russia was promoting “the maintenance of international stability” and “natural evolution of international relations towards freedom and democracy”. These can be taken as almost direct criticism of the EU and their norm promotion within Ukraine, particularly their promotion of democracy and the instability this had previously caused.

Overall, the securitising projects in 2009 are actually both reacting to a sense of threat. For the EU, the EaP was partly formed in response to Poland’s concerns about the eastern neighbourhood. For Russia, they felt they were witnessing an attempt to belittle their role in their perceived ‘sphere of influence’. Russia was promoting norms at this stage to counter the EU’s norm promotion, which they saw forming a key part of this threat. These securitising projects can be tied in with their foreign policy outlooks. For example, the EU’s plans to spread its norms beyond its borders, for closer cooperation with Ukraine, and for higher levels of ‘interference’, are all part of the “postmodern” outlook on security. Whereas Russia is viewing the EU’s actions in Ukraine through a zero-sum 19th century mind-set where the actions of the EU are diminishing Russia’s influence. Therefore, Russia attempted to counter the EU’s norms of democracy promotion and deepening cooperation, in order to maintain influence in their neighbourhood. For Russia, this is achieved by promoting sovereignty and the natural evolution of political systems.

¹⁵⁵ Stefan Meister and Marie-Lena May, ‘The EU’s Eastern Partnership – a Misunderstood Offer of Cooperation’ in *DGAP standpunkt*, No. 7, September 2009

¹⁵⁶ Russia’s National Security Strategy to 2020’, approved 12th May 2009, [<http://rustrans.wikidot.com/russia-s-national-security-strategy-to-2020>] <accessed 26th July 2017>

¹⁵⁷ Article by Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov ‘Containing Russia: back to the future?’, 15th August, 2007, [http://www.mid.ru/en/web/guest/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/365592] <accessed 5th June 2017>

6.2.3: The ‘Normative Battleground’

This 2009 juncture sees a departure from the earlier categorisation of the EU as promoting sovereignty pooling, and the belief that Russia was advocating for absolute sovereignty to be upheld in Ukraine. Poland, as an EU member state, sought to create an eastern dimension for the EU, that included Ukraine, even before their 2004 admittance. This desire was motivated by the idea that Poland’s sovereignty could only be guaranteed if Ukraine’s sovereignty was also protected from Russia.¹⁵⁸ This would frame the development of the EaP as a way of ensuring Ukraine’s sovereignty, despite also being a way for the EU to, in Russia’s eyes, interfere and undermine Ukrainian sovereignty. The EU was seen in 2009 as a protector and enforcer of sovereignty in the neighbourhood, despite promoting deep integration as part of the EaP, and sovereignty not actively being promoted as a norm in the area. This would imply that the EU member states did not believe that Russia would uphold the norm of sovereignty, and relied on the EU to ensure that it did.

In spite of this, Russia viewed the EaP as an affront to the concept of sovereignty, and one which denied any possibility of “free and information choice for European integration by post-Soviet states.”¹⁵⁹ In March 2009 speaking at the Brussels Forum, Lavrov stated that “we are accused of trying to intimidate or pressure others. What is the Eastern Partnership? Is it not a case of intimidating and pressuring others”, and asked is this “threats, blackmail or democracy at work?” For Russia, they believed that the EU and west had diluted this concept of sovereignty, and that Russia’s current aim was to position itself as the champion of the autonomy of sovereign states.¹⁶⁰ Even though the EaP, as discussed, was partly designed in order to provide assurances of sovereignty to states such as Ukraine, Russia perceived the actions of the EU as a direct assault on the concept. In 2008 Prime Minister Medvedev, just prior to becoming President, wrote how ‘sovereignty’ and ‘Europeanisation’ were “two competing bureaucratic strategies of managing globalisation”¹⁶¹ Here this highlights the extent to which Russia did not see Europe as being in any sense a promoter of sovereignty. Russia was seen as reinforcing sovereignty, while the EU worked to promote “ambiguity” along its periphery. Furthermore, as Derek Averre has claimed, Putin has rejected liberal interdependence in favour of “illiberal sovereign statism” to guarantee power and influence in the international system.¹⁶²

Russia saw the EaP as potentially dangerous to its own sovereignty, and that the allegiance of Ukraine with the EU would diminish Russia’s power and influence in the neighbourhood.

¹⁵⁸ Meister and May, ‘A Misunderstood Offer of Cooperation’, p. 1

¹⁵⁹ Transcript of Remarks and Response to Questions by Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov at Brussels Forum 2009, 21st March, 2009, [http://www.mid.ru/en/web/guest/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/300388] <accessed 25th June 2017>

¹⁶⁰ Richard Sakwa, ‘New Cold War’ or twenty years’ crisis?’ in *International Affairs*, 84:2 (2008), pp. 241-267, p. 245

¹⁶¹ Averre, “Competing Rationalities”, p. 1696

¹⁶² Derek Averre, ‘The Ukraine Conflict’, p. 718

Russia, with its 'modern' securitising outlook, set itself up as a protector of the norm of sovereignty, in response to the EU's perceived 'postmodern' stance, which is in favour of pooling sovereignty. However, in this case there begins to be a blurring of the lines between 'modern' and 'postmodern' norms. Russia was claiming to be the guarantor of state sovereignty, despite its recent actions in Georgia and despite the foundations of the EaP as seeking to protect neighbouring states sovereignty. Russia was using the norm of sovereignty to distinguish itself from the norms promoted by the EU, and to undermine the legitimacy of the EU norms, despite not showing any evidence of their intent to promote the norm in their neighbourhood in any meaningful sense.

The EU's EaP included an aspect of encouraging 'good governance' and the EU was actively seeking in 2009 to promote democracy within Ukraine. Russia, along with the EU, claimed to support democracy, yet in contrast to the EU, did not claim to promote democracy and instead privileged regime stability as a norm. However, earlier in 2006, the concept of 'sovereign democracy' was developed within Russia and this can be analysed within the 'normative battleground' framework. This is relevant to Russian norm promotion within Ukraine as Nicu Popescu wrote how despite at first the concept of 'sovereign democracy' being a domestic concept, it also became about "extending this 'sovereignty' to neighbours".¹⁶³ Popescu explained that while the concept was deliberately vague and therefore difficult to accurately grasp, it can be understood as 'non-interference from the West'. Therefore, this concept is meant as a counterexample to Ukraine. Secondly, Popescu argues that the idea behind 'sovereign democracy' is democracy distinct from western democracy, that Russia has its own values which are democratic, but are unique to Russia. Here, the point is that Russia was promoting a form of democracy separate from the western understanding of the norm. Ivan Krastev supports this theory and wrote how "Russia will not fight democracy, Russia will fight for democracy - its kind of democracy."¹⁶⁴ This demonstrates how Russia was seeking to counter the EU's form of democracy promotion within the neighbourhood

Overall, the development of the 'normative battleground' in 2009 becomes slightly more complicated. Russia was also promoting norms that on the surface, mirror EU promoted norms. Russian was claiming to support development of democracy, but a distinct form of democracy. Furthermore, at this stage the EU is pointed to as a guarantor of sovereignty, despite this being a well promoted Russian norm, and despite the EU promoting norms such as interference. The 'normative battleground' here can be summarised as developing through Russia seeking to counter EU promoted norms, not merely oppose as in 2004. This can be seen through the alternative concept of 'sovereign democracy' to counter the EU's promotion of democracy. Russia was seeking to normatively be the west's equal, yet did not want to adhere to the liberal backed securitising norms the EU was promoting. Russia also sought to promote norms that

¹⁶³ Nicu Popescu, 'Russia's Soft Power Ambitions' CEPS Policy Brief, No. 115, October 2006, p. 2.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid.

could lead to the reimagining of itself as a ‘great power’. This helps explain why Russia was seeking to promote norms, not just to counter EU norms, but to provide a normative alternative, solidifying itself as an equally legitimate power.

6.3: 2014: The Culmination of the ‘Normative Battleground’

By 2014 it was clear that President Putin saw the EU as a threat to Russia’s ‘sphere of influence’ in the east, particularly with Ukraine. This perceived threat had been building since the 2004 Orange Revolution and led to Russia successfully pressuring Ukraine into deferring signing the Association Agreement (AA) with the EU in November 2013.¹⁶⁵ This perceived “threat” stemmed from the way the AA could pull Ukraine out of Russia’s orbit. The AA and Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area Agreements (DCFTA’s) were also seen as incompatible with Putin’s plan to expand Russia’s Customs Union with Belarus and Kazakhstan and create a “Eurasian Union,” to counter the EU project. Furthermore, Putin saw the Eurasian Union as a buffer against “civilizational” ideas and values from Europe and the West. This threat was that, if the AA was signed Ukraine would become more European and, implicitly, less “Eurasian.” The failure of Ukrainian president, Yanukovich, to sign the EU AA led to the protest movement in Kiev that became known as Euromaidan. The protests erupted in November 2013 and culminated in 2014. The AA, had been seen by the Ukrainians protesting in Maidan Square as not only, “an opportunity to rebuild, through free trade accords, their shattered economy, but to defend their country’s fragile standards on democracy, human rights, and freedom of press”,¹⁶⁶ key norms that were being promoted by the EU at that time.

6.3.1: The EU’s Securitising Project

For the EU, the AA formed part of the EaP introduced in 2009, and it formed a core part of their securitising project at this time. The AA was aimed at fostering and achieving peace, security and stability on the European continent. It sought to underpin Ukraine’s development and included a deep political association between Ukraine and the EU. These agreements also included economic integration and DCFTAs, but this research will focus on the political association aspect with the norm promotion. The agreements largely contained a reform agenda through which Ukraine could align itself with the EU by approximating EU norms.¹⁶⁷ The AA focused on support for core reforms, such as encouraging good governance, equal rights, cooperation, education, cultural cooperation, social development, and increased people-to-people contacts between EU and Ukrainian citizens. The AA foresaw the intensification of cooperation

¹⁶⁵ Hill and Pifer, ‘Putin’s Russia Goes Rogue’, 23rd January, 2014, [<https://www.brookings.edu/research/putins-russia-goes-rogue/>] <accessed 29th April 2017>

¹⁶⁶ Askold Krushelnicky, ‘The Fight for Maidan’, 13th December, 2013, [<http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/12/13/the-fight-for-the-maidan/>] <accessed 27th March 2017>

¹⁶⁷ ‘The EU-Ukraine Association Agreement and Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area: What’s it all about?’, [http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/delegations/ukraine/documents/virtual_library/vademecum_en.pdf] <accessed 26th August 2017>

between the EU and Ukraine, even to the extent of a gradual convergence in the areas of mutual cooperation on defence and security.¹⁶⁸ The norms the EU was promoting in Ukraine at this time can largely fit within the EU's 'postmodern' outlook, as pooling sovereignty for security and democracy promotion played a core part.

6.3.2: Russia's Securitising Project

Russia's securitising project in 2014 was based on a more "modern" interpretation of international society, and once again, is not as clearly laid out as the EU securitising project. But it is largely possible to frame the securitising project as aiming to keep Ukraine within a Russian 'sphere of influence', a "modern" concept. While Russia did not seek to recreate the Soviet Union, there was a desire to keep Ukraine from 'Europeanising', as well as a desire for deference from neighbouring states.¹⁶⁹ Ukraine's decision to shelve the AA with the EU taken by Yanukovich can be pointed to as a direct example of Russia's securitising project within Ukraine. The Polish Foreign Minister, Radoslaw Sikorski, spoke of how he was aware that prior to Yanukovich meeting with Putin, he had wanted to sign the AA, but that in November 2013, "something happened".¹⁷⁰ The Ukrainian Prime Minister, Mykola Azarov, disclosed that the Ukrainian U-turn on the AA was due to Putin demanding a say in, and a delay to, the signing of the agreement.¹⁷¹ These statements here can provide evidence that the Russian securitising project at this time was to apply pressure on Ukraine in order to keep Ukraine within their sphere of influence - a factor deemed crucial for maintaining Russian security. This was also to be achieved by countering EU influence within Ukraine through their norm promotion, and through this chapter it becomes clear that Russia used aggressively promoted norms to counter EU norms, and promoted norms to manipulate the application and interpretation of EU norms, in order to prevent Ukraine leaving their sphere of influence.

These two different styles of securitising within Ukraine can be tied to the different worldviews of the EU and Russia. The EU, with its emphasis on expansion through cooperation, domestic interference, democracy and human rights emphasis can be laid within the 'postmodern' outlook for security. In contrast, the Russian 'modern' approach is applying pressure, looking to protect a sphere of influence, promoting concepts such as sovereignty, non-interference and regime stability. Interestingly enough, the EU argued that in comparison to Russia's Custom's Union, the AA proposed by the "the EU provides explicit legal and political guarantees of sovereignty,

¹⁶⁸ EU-Ukraine Association Agreement, "Guide to the Association Agreement", EEAS, [http://www.eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/images/top_stories/140912_eu-ukraine-associatin-agreement-quick_guide.pdf] <accessed 20th June 2017>

¹⁶⁹ Fiona Hill and Steven Pifer, 'No More Mr. Nice Putin', 6th February, 2014, [<https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/no-more-mr-nice-putin/>] <accessed 26th July 2017>

¹⁷⁰ Ben Judah, 'Putin's Coup', 19th October, 2014, [http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/10/vladimir-putins-coup-112025_Page3.html#.WaqGn5MjHBI] <accessed 27th March 2017>

¹⁷¹ Oksana Grytsenko and Ian Traynor, 'Ukraine U-turn on Europe pact was agreed with Vladimir Putin', 26th November, 2013, [<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/26/ukraine-u-turn-eu-pact-putin>] <accessed 26th July 2017>

independence and territorial integrity of the Ukrainian state.”¹⁷² Whereas, in joining the Russian Custom’s Union “Ukraine would lose its sovereign power to decide for itself on its future trade and economic policy,” in essence losing sovereignty to Russia, the largest Customs Union member. This is interesting as these norms, sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity, are largely “modern” Russian norms.

6.3.3: The ‘Normative Battleground’

Territorial Integrity or Territorial Integrity?

The norm of territorial integrity is a widely held international norm, not just a Russian promoted norm, and is promoted outside of the “modern” outlook. Under the United Nations charter, it clearly stated “all members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.”¹⁷³ In addition, both the EU and Russia comply with the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 where “Western and Communist bloc leaders pledged to respect the inviolability of borders.”¹⁷⁴ Adherence to this norm has also been pledged by Russia and the EU through these international agreements: for the EU, “respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law.”¹⁷⁵ and for Russia, in the 2009 National Security Strategy, perceived “the United Nations as a central element of a stable system of international relations”.¹⁷⁶ This should leave no doubt of the EU’s and Russia’s commitment, on the surface, to upholding this norm, and yet this is a norm through which this “battleground” has developed.

A key example from 2014 are the events of February 2014, when Ukrainian officials claimed the Crimean peninsula was being occupied by Russian troops, and accused Moscow of ‘orchestrating a military invasion and occupation’.¹⁷⁷ The new Ukrainian interior minister, Arsen Avakov decried the events as being in “violation of all international treaties and norms” and that it was “a direct provocation aimed at armed bloodshed on the territory of a sovereign state.” By March, the peninsula had been annexed following a referendum held on 16th March. This section will discuss how the different securitising projects led to a different application of the norm of territorial integrity which developed into a “normative battleground”.

¹⁷² The EU-Ukraine Association Agreement and Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area: What's it all about?, [http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/delegations/ukraine/documents/virtual_library/vademecum_en.pdf] <accessed 26th August 2017>

¹⁷³ Charter of the United Nations, Chapter 1, Article 2, [<http://legal.un.org/reperory/art2.shtml>] <accessed 26th July 2017>

¹⁷⁴ Judy Dempsey, ‘Europe and the End of Ukraine’s Territorial Integrity, 19th February, 2015, [<http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategieurope/59118>] <accessed 26th July 2017>

¹⁷⁵ The Treaty on the European Union, Article 21, 13th December, 2007 [<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:12012M/TXT&from=EN>] <accessed 21st July 2017>

¹⁷⁶ Russia’s National Security Strategy to 2020, approved 12th May, 2009, [<http://rustrans.wikidot.com/russia-s-national-security-strategy-to-2020>] <accessed 26th July 2017>

¹⁷⁷ Shaun Walker, Harriet Salem and Ewen MacAskill, ‘Russian ‘invasion’ of Crimea fuels fear of Ukraine conflict’, 1st March, 2014, [<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/28/russia-crimea-white-house>] <accessed 6th July 2017>

Throughout Europe and the West, it was widely believed that “international law was violated” with the annexation of Ukraine’s territory.¹⁷⁸ In November, the Council of Europe adopted a resolution to find a solution to the crisis based on “respect for Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity.”¹⁷⁹ Catherine Ashton, the EU’s top diplomat, stated her goal at crisis talks in Minsk “was to ensure the former Soviet republic can safeguard its territorial integrity.”¹⁸⁰ President of the European Commission, Barroso, in a speech reminded that the Helsinki Final Act “established territorial integrity as central to the European security order.”¹⁸¹ The annexation of Crimea by Russia, Barroso denounced as a “blunt challenge to international law and order.” Since March 2014, “the EU has progressively imposed restrictive measures in response to the illegal annexation of Crimea and deliberate destabilisation of Ukraine.¹⁸²” These actions show the EU clearly calling for the territorial integrity of Ukraine to be respected.

In contrast, for Russia, the annexation of Crimea means the restoration of Russian territorial integrity. Russia’s use of the word “reunification” implies that Russia’s territorial integrity was not respected before, this is not a violation but a correction of previous wrongdoings - Russia’s territorial integrity was previously not respected. In the State Duma address following the annexation, Putin spoke of how of how Crimean residents spoke out “in favour of reuniting with Russia”¹⁸³ and how Crimea has “returned to its homeland.” The decision to transfer Crimea to Ukraine “was made in clear violation of the constitutional norms that were in place even then.” This action is not an attack on territorial integrity, but righting a previously violated norm. The original violation was against Russia’s own territorial integrity, Putin makes clear he believed “it was only when Crimea ended up as part of a different country that Russia realised that it was not simply robbed, it was plundered.” For Putin, reunification means protecting territorial integrity and righting the wrong, clear in his words: “In the hearts and minds of people, Crimea has always been and remains an inseparable part of Russia.”¹⁸⁴ For Putin, there was no violation of any norms in ‘reunifying’ Crimea with Russia. The promotion of territorial integrity by Russia contained a different interpretation and application of the norm.

¹⁷⁸ Gwendolyn Sasse, ‘Revisiting the 2014 Annexation of Crimea’, 15th March, 2017, [<http://carnegieeuropa.eu/2017/03/15/revisiting-2014-annexation-of-crimea-pub-68423>] <accessed 15th June 2017>

¹⁷⁹ ‘Concil Conclusions on Ukraine’ Foreign Affairs Council meeting, 17th November, 2014, [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/145789.pdf] <accessed 26th July 2017>

¹⁸⁰ ‘EU’s Ashton says wants Ukraine to safeguard territorial integrity’, 26th August, 2014, [<http://www.reuters.com/article/ukraine-crisis-ashton-mission-idUSL5N0QW2PA20140826>] <accessed 6th July 2017>

¹⁸¹ José Manuel Durão Barroso, ‘Working together for a united Ukraine in a united continent’, 12th September, 2014, [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-14-598_en.htm] <accessed 26th July 2017>

¹⁸² ‘EU restrictive measures in response to the crisis in Ukraine’, 16th March, 2017, [https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage_en/8322/EU%20restrictive%20measures%20in%20response%20to%20the%20crisis%20in%20Ukraine] <accessed 26th July 2017>

¹⁸³ ‘Address by President of the Russian Federation’, 18th March, 2014, [<http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20603>] <accessed 26th July 2017>

¹⁸⁴ Shaun Walker, ‘Putin condemns western hypocrisy as he confirms annexation of Crimea’, 18th March, 2014, [<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/18/crimea-putin-condemns-western-hypocrisy-annexation>] <accessed 4th July 2017>

This difference in interpretation of the “territorial integrity” norm is a fundamental aspect of the “normative battleground” at this stage, and can be tied to the differing securitising projects of the EU and Russia. For the EU, it is objecting to the annexation as a violation of a sovereign state, Barroso spoke of how “nobody recognised the annexation of Crimea.”¹⁸⁵ Making such territorial claims on other states territory is reminiscent of the ‘modern’ securitising project, a Hobbesian state of world order rather than a Kantian. Where annexation implies undercutting a country’s territorial integrity, reunifying implies restoring a country’s territorial integrity. Russia is still respecting the norm of territorial integrity in their eyes, but in an opposing way to the EU’s interpretation.

Russia previously had promoted the norm of territorial integrity, but does not see the case is the same with Crimea. This type of action was labelled earlier by Putin himself as an anachronism. In 2005, following a meeting with EU leaders, Putin angrily chastised the Baltic states for, “clinging to historic grievances over Soviet domination.”¹⁸⁶ Putin stated he hoped Latvia and Estonia would not make “idiotic” territorial demands” and that in Europe in the 21st century, when one country is making territorial claims against another, “this is complete nonsense – soft boiled boots! (a Russian idiom for an absurdity.)”¹⁸⁷ Here Putin is making the point that territorial claims on other sovereign nations are no longer part of a 21st century foreign policy, insinuating that to make such claims, would be a return to a 19th century outlook. One which it is possible to attach to a “modern” outlook.

Overall, Russia is using a widely held international norm, territorial integrity, a norm which Russia themselves has consistently promoted, to justify a violation of international norms with the annexation of Crimea. By annexing a neighbouring country’s territory “Putin overturned in a single stroke the assumptions on which the post-Cold War European order had rested.”¹⁸⁸ Russia not strictly adhering to the norms it espouses, demonstrating that the norms can shift to suit the securitising agenda.

Democracy or Democracy?

In order to provide some semblance of legitimacy for the annexation of Crimea from Ukraine, Russia sought a referendum, an established and accepted form of direct democracy. For the EU

¹⁸⁵ ‘Russia is more isolated’, says EC chief Jose Manuel Barroso’, 21st March, 2014, [<http://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-europe-26692597/russia-is-more-isolated-says-ec-chief-jose-manuel-barroso>] <accessed 9th July 2017>

¹⁸⁶ Steven Lee Myers, ‘Putin’s sour mood darkens Russia-EU accord’, 11th May, 2005, [<http://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/11/world/europe/putins-sour-mood-darkens-russiaeu-accord.html>] <accessed 11th March 2017>

¹⁸⁷ Steven Lee Myers, ‘Putin’s sour mood darkens Russia-EU accord’, 11th May, 2005, [<http://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/11/world/europe/putins-sour-mood-darkens-russiaeu-accord.html>] <accessed 11th March 2017>

¹⁸⁸ Daniel Treisman, ‘Why Putin Took Crimea’, May/June 2006, [<https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukraine/2016-04-18/why-putin-took-crimea>] <accessed 6th August 2017>

and the EaP, democracy promotion and good governance formed a fundamental pillar of the norm promotion. Russia used this norm of democracy to legitimise their actions in Ukraine and to undermine the actions of the EU and the Ukrainian opposition, this led to the development of a “normative battleground” over whose interpretation of democracy held more legitimacy within Ukraine.

In the eyes of the EU, “the ‘so-called referendum’ was ‘illegal under the constitution of Ukraine and under international law,’”¹⁸⁹ declared Catherine Ashton. This was in stark contrast to Russia who organised the referendum. Following the annexation, Putin declared “a referendum was held in Crimea on March 16 in full compliance with democratic procedures and international norms.” Russia claimed that more than 82% of the electorate took part in the vote. Over 96% of them spoke out in favour of reuniting with Russia. Putin declared, “these numbers speak for themselves.”¹⁹⁰ Even if the figure of 96% in favour was proved accurate, the EU would not have backed the referendum as it was, in their eyes, illegal. In a declaration by the EU’s High Representative on Crimea, it stated “the EU does not recognise and continues to condemn this act of violation of international law. The illegal annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol by the Russian Federation is also a direct challenge to international security, with grave implications for the international legal order.”¹⁹¹ This here demonstrates a conflicting application and interpretation of democratic measures. For the EU, the referendum violated international law and therefore could not be valid, despite advocating for democracy promotion within Ukraine. Russia used the referendum, and the claim that it was in full compliance with democratic measures and international norms, to use this EU promoted norm to legitimise the previous violation through the annexation of Crimea.

In November 2014, pro-Russian separatists held elections in both the Donetsk and Lugansk People’s Republics, which Kiev and the EU refused to recognise. These elections were held in order to give the breakaway regions some form of legitimacy through democratic means. The election commission chief of the Donetsk People’s Republic, Roman Lyagin, claimed that “these elections are important because they will give legitimacy to our power and give us more distance from Kiev.”¹⁹² Russia stated that they would recognise the election results, and this backing sparked criticism from Europe. Russia said it would recognise the polls as “a way of granting the separatists electoral legitimacy.”¹⁹³ This is a further example of a different application of the

¹⁸⁹ ‘Ukraine crisis: EU ponders Russia sanctions over Crimea vote’, 17th March, 2014, [<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26607466>] <accessed 27th March 2017>

¹⁹⁰ ‘Address by President of the Russian Federation’, 18th March, 2014, [<http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20603>] <accessed 20th January 2017>

¹⁹¹ ‘Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the EU on Crimea’, 16th March, 2015, [<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/03/16-declaration-high-representative-crimea/>] <accessed 28th April 2017>

¹⁹² ‘Pro-Russia separatists hold leadership elections in two Ukraine enclaves’, 2nd November, 2014, [<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/nov/02/russia-elections-ukraine-donetsk-lugansk>] <accessed 26th July 2017>

¹⁹³ ‘Why are Ukraine separatist elections controversial?’, 1st November, 2014, [<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-29831028>] <accessed 25th July 2017>

norm democracy. Russia is advocating for a norm usually promoted by the EU in order to legitimise norm violations, such as of the territorial integrity of Ukraine. This is part of the “battleground” and there is a disagreement over which is the legitimate holder of the norm of democracy. For Russia, they don’t see the EU as having the monopoly on the interpretation of democracy.

This “normative battleground” can also be addressed from the opposite side, with Russia criticising the EU’s backing of ‘democracy’ within Ukraine. In October 2014 there were fresh national parliamentary elections due to take place in Kiev that were backed by the EU but rejected by Russia. The EU welcomed the holding of these elections which they believed “marked an important step in Ukraine’s aspirations to consolidate its democratic development in line with its international commitments.”¹⁹⁴ These new elections would ensure much needed political and economic reforms, those which the EU sought through its AA, and EaP initiative. However, according to Russia these new elections to be held in Ukraine were the result of a violent coup. Ukraine, according to President Putin, had had an “unconstitutional coup” by protesters in Kiev, expelling the democratically elected government.¹⁹⁵ Putin added that President Yanukovich was Ukraine’s legitimate leader and had been deposed an “an armed seizure of power”. Hence, these new elections are illegitimate as they are the result of an undemocratic action. Russia continued to criticise EU in order to support their position as a legitimate democracy promoter. In countering the EU’s position on the Crimean referendum, Russia “call foul” over a key member states own referendum. Following the September 2014 Scottish independence referendum, Russia declared it “did not meet international standards.”¹⁹⁶ This was a core criticism levelled at Russia over the Crimean referendum.

This leads us to the crux of the clash between the EU and Russia leading to the “normative battleground”; which claim to democracy has legitimacy within Ukraine? Both the EU and Russia are claiming to promote democracy yet both desire vastly different outcomes from this democracy promotion within Ukraine. The EU claims to represent the legitimate form of democracy. Federica Mogherini’s first newspaper interview as successor to Catherine Ashton “denounced the elections in the Donetsk and Lugansk regions of eastern Ukraine as illegal and illegitimate and praised President Petro Poroshenko for his full commitment to the Minsk accords.”¹⁹⁷ The EU went on to claim that they are promoting the only legitimate elections, stating that “these so-called “elections” are in breach of the letter and the spirit of the Minsk protocol. ... all sides should work towards early local elections in these parts of the Donetsk and

¹⁹⁴ ‘Council conclusions on Ukraine: Foreign Affairs Council meeting’, 17th November, 2014, [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/145789.pdf] <accessed 26th May 2017>

¹⁹⁵ Nate Rawlings, ‘Putin calls Ukraine Uprising ‘Unconstitutional’’, 4th March, 2014, [<http://time.com/12161/vladimir-putin-ukraine-russia-crimea/>] <accessed 17th July 2017>

¹⁹⁶ Luke Harding, ‘Russia cries foul over Scottish independence vote’, 19th September, 2014, [<https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2014/sep/19/russia-calls-foul-scottish-referendum>] <accessed 10th March 2017>

¹⁹⁷ Ian Traynor, ‘Ukraine rebel elections illegitimate, says new EU foreign policy chief’, 3rd November, 2014, [<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/nov/03/ukraine-rebel-elections-illegal-eu-mogherini>] <accessed 19th May 2017>

Luhansk regions in accordance with Ukrainian law, as foreseen in the Minsk Protocol, as the only legal and legitimate means of renewing the democratic mandate of the local authorities.”¹⁹⁸ Whereas for Russia, the referendum and elections held in eastern Ukraine were to provide the actions with international legitimacy. Russia has made clear during the previous 10 years that the EU does not have the monopoly on legitimate norms to be promoted within Ukraine.

Overall, the EU was, and is, vocal about the importance of developing democracy within Ukraine. This is a core goal of the EaP and the AA, and democracy promotion is a consistent EU promoted norm within Ukraine. Russia sought to use democracy as an internationally recognised norm to justify actions the actions, such as annexing Crimea, within Ukraine. Russia here was using a ‘postmodern’ norm, democracy, in order to justify ‘modern’ securitising behaviour.

Sovereignty or Sovereignty?

The Russian promoted norm of respecting sovereignty and non-interference in other countries domestic affairs forms part of the “normative battleground” that has developed within Ukraine. Russia accused the EU of interfering in Ukraine and therefore undermining Ukrainian sovereignty. While the EU accused Russia of applying political and economic pressure on Ukraine to keep it from being able to make sovereign decisions. This here is adding to the development of the “normative battleground”.

The Maidan protests in Ukraine that began in 2013 were sparked by the non-signing of the EU’s AA agreement with Ukraine. As has been well established throughout this research, Russia deems EU interference with Ukraine as an infringement on its sovereignty. However, with the AA the situation becomes more complex. Sergei Glazyez, an adviser to President Putin said “the political and social cost of EU integration could also be high, and allowed for the possibility of separatist movements springing up in the Russian-speaking east and south of Ukraine. He suggested that if Ukraine signed the agreement, Russia would consider the bilateral treaty that delineates the country’s’ borders to be void.”¹⁹⁹ Here demonstrating that Russia would not respect Ukraine’s sovereignty. Glazyez added, “legally, signing this agreement about association with EU, the Ukrainian government violates the treaty on strategic partnership and friendship with Russia ... when this happened, he said, Russia could no longer guarantee Ukraine’s status as a state and could possibly intervene if pro-Russian regions of the country appealed directly to Moscow.” This here is a direct threat against Ukraine’s sovereignty if they moved towards closer integration with the EU. This can also be interpreted as Russian interference in an attempt to counter the EU’s interference.

¹⁹⁸ ‘Council conclusions on Ukraine: Foreign Affairs Council meeting’, 17th November, 2014, [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/145789.pdf] <accessed 26th May 2017>

¹⁹⁹ Shaun Walker, ‘Ukraine’s EU trade deal with be catastrophic, says Russia’, 22nd September, 2013, [<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/22/ukraine-european-union-trade-russia>] <accessed 4th July 2017>

The Maidan protests in Kiev formed another aspect of this “normative battleground” developing over the concept of sovereignty. For Russia, seeing EU officials encouraging the Maidan protestors was an assault on Ukraine’s sovereignty. The EU’s Catherine Ashton was welcomed at the protests and gave them a message of encouragement saying “I was among you on Maidan in the evening and was impressed by the determination of Ukrainians demonstrating for the European perspective of their country.”²⁰⁰ Lavrov in turn accused the EU of “stirring up the situation”,²⁰¹ adding that several members of European governments rushed to Maidan uninvited and took part in anti-government demonstrations, describing this action as “indecent.” Lavrov added that they had received information that much of the protests were being stimulated from abroad, which would have been seen in Russia as a high level of EU interference within Ukrainian society. Lavrov further condemned the violence of the protestors as being “a complete violation of European standards of behaviour.”

The Russian outlook on Ukrainian sovereignty is one that has been widely debated. Timothy Snyder discussed an event when the Russian Ambassador to France, Alexander Orlov, reportedly claimed the state of Ukraine did not exist.²⁰² According to Snyder, Orlov declared “Russians and Ukrainians are one nation. It’s like the Bretons and the Normans in France. You can’t separate them.”²⁰³ The connotations of this statement for Ukrainian sovereignty are clear, that from the Russian mind-set, Ukraine is not a fully separate state from Russia. The Ambassador was also not merely expressing a privately held opinion, Putin had previously made such a remark. When speaking with western journalists Putin made a similar claim: that Russians and Ukrainians are “one nation”. Therefore, there is no such thing as illegitimate Russian ‘intervention’ within Ukraine, as Russia has the legitimate right to do so. Following from this, it is the EU’s interference in Ukraine that is illegitimate, and Russia is unable to undermine Ukrainian sovereignty, the EU is therefore responsible for violating sovereignty as it acknowledges Ukraine as an independent state.

Overall, 2014 provided the clearest demonstration of the ‘normative battleground’. Here there were clear examples of Russia, somewhat aggressively, countering EU norm promotion within Ukraine. Furthermore, there were examples of Russia taking EU promoted norms and providing an alternative interpretation. An interpretation that directly opposed the stance the EU was taking on the norm at that time in Ukraine, for example, the ‘battleground’ over the norm of territorial integrity. This shows how in 2014, the ‘normative battleground’ was not merely composed of conflicting norms, but of an understanding of how that norm should be interpreted and applied.

²⁰⁰ Catherine Ashton, ‘Message by EU High Representative Catherine Ashton to Maidan protestors’, 11th December, 2013, [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-13-1060_en.htm] <accessed 29th July 2017>

²⁰¹ ‘Russia’s Sergei Lavrov: Ukraine getting ‘out of control’, 21st January, 2014, [<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-25823091>] <accessed 18th August 2017>

²⁰² Timothy Snyder, ‘Ukraine: Putin’s Denial’, 13th December, 2013, [<http://www.nybooks.com/daily/2013/12/13/ukraine-putins-denial/>] <accessed 26th July 2017>

²⁰³ Timothy Snyder, ‘Ukraine: Putin’s Denial’, 13th December, 2013, [<http://www.nybooks.com/daily/2013/12/13/ukraine-putins-denial/>] <accessed 26th July 2017>

This also brings in the concept of legitimacy, as in Russia's opinion, the EU does not have the monopoly on the legitimate norms to be promoted within Ukraine.

The development of the 'normative battleground' at this stage can still be tied in with Buzan's spheres, despite the norms not necessarily stemming directly from the 'spheres'. Even though the norms did not stem directly from the spheres, the interpretation and application of the norms did. For Russia, the use of territorial integrity was more closely tied to regaining power and influence, than to the norm itself. The use of norms in this context is more closely related to power and security, than to the norms themselves. For the EU the spreading of norms is about creating a neighbourhood that mirrors the EU, but for Russia it is about power, influence and stability, here it is possible to identify Buzan's 'international society' and 'world society' spheres within the actions of the EU and Russia.

Conclusion

This thesis sought to trace the development of a ‘normative battleground’ within Ukraine between the EU and Russia from 2004 to 2014, with the norms being promoted stemming from the opposing securitising projects being implemented by both parties within Ukraine. The initial aim was to frame these norms within the ‘modern’ and ‘postmodern’ securitising projects, and while this was largely possible, the reality was much more nuanced. Russia did not merely promote norms stemming from a ‘modern’ securitising outlook, and the EU did not only promote norms stemming from a ‘postmodern’ outlook. 2004 saw the beginnings of the ‘normative battleground’ following, and during, the events of the ‘Orange Revolution’. Overall, Russia was largely backing ‘modern’ norms, such as non-interference and regime stability, where the EU was backing ‘postmodern’ norms such as interference and democracy promotion. During this juncture it became clear that the ‘normative battleground’ in 2004 was centred around Russia rejecting the EU norms being promoted in Ukraine. Russia was promoting alternative norms in order to reject the EU backed norms, stemming from its ‘modern’ outlook and securitising project.

In 2009, the process of development of the ‘normative battleground’ altered slightly and became slightly more nuanced. The EU was actively promoting norms from their ‘postmodern’ outlook in order to shape the development of Ukraine. Whereas, Russia was not only criticising EU norm promotion, but also promoted norms that on the surface mirrored those of the EU, for example, the concept of ‘sovereign democracy’. The ‘normative battleground’ here can be summarised as developing through Russia seeking to counter EU promoted norms, not merely oppose as in 2004. Russia was seeking to normatively be the west’s equal, yet did not want to adhere to the liberal backed securitising norms the EU was promoting. 2014 provided the greatest demonstration of the ‘normative battleground’ between the EU and Russia within Ukraine. Within this section there were examples of the EU and Russia, not only promoting clashing norms, but also having wildly different interpretations and applications of the same norm. In 2014 Russia was taking EU backed norms and applying them selectively, adding to the development of the ‘normative battleground’. An example is the application of the norm, territorial integrity, which led to very different applications of the EU and Russia. It is these interpretations that can be tied, once more, to the securitising projects. In that, Russia was behaving as a 19th century ‘modern’ power, when annexing Crimea. The EU’s incomprehension at this act further underlined the different ‘worlds’ the EU and Russia belong to.

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