A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF NYERERE’S UJAMAA: AN INVESTIGATION OF
ITS FOUNDATIONS AND VALUES

BY

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ABSTRACT

This thesis addresses the question of what Nyerere’s particular version of *Ujamaa* (socialism) is. It answers that question by focusing on themes which surround and feed into *Ujamaa*, in order to provide its conceptual account. The thesis is an account of the ideology of *Ujamaa* in both theory and practice. Thus, while the writings of Nyerere have been a primary source along with contemporary and subsequent commentators, the thesis is not about Nyerere, the person or the body of his work, but about the development and construction of the particular social, cultural, and political theory and practice. Therefore, only the elements of Nyerere’s thought which speak directly about this have been included. Data was collected from the writings of Nyerere as a primary source and supplemented with the work of other commentators in order to argue that *Ujamaa* was not just a development theory but it was also an ideology, a reconstruction of an imaginary relationship at the level of the state, which should be reinstated in order to free Tanzanians from the yoke of domination. Thus, as well as being interesting historically and conceptually, the thesis might also be relevant considering the contemporary political situation in Tanzania.
DEDICATION

To my friend the late Gisela Muench, whose love and care for me made this study possible but who did not live to see its accomplishment and to my brother, friend and intellectual companion, Rev. Prof. Laurenti Magesa, for his enduring love for me.
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Last, but by no means least, I thank my wife, Themister Michael Kafwa, our six children, Michael, Linus, Flavia, Blandina, Cornelli, and Johachi and my nieces and nephews, Cornelli, Anastazia, and Marina who, experienced numerous discomforts during my long absence from home. Writing is a solitary task and therefore I owe my family another debt of gratitude for overlooking my inattention upon my return. I thank them all for their love and understanding but most of all I thank them for their unwavering resilience in the face of trials and tribulations. It is my hope that when our young children grow up they will understand the reasons behind my long absence from home and I pray that they will learn to treasure and honour the value of the many sacrifices which made this study possible and which brought this thesis to completion. For any errors or inadequacies that remain in this work, of course, the responsibility is entirely mine.
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AD</td>
<td>Arusha Declaration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCM</td>
<td>Chama cha Mapinduzi (Revolutionary Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHADEMA</td>
<td>Chama cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CUF</td>
<td>Civic United Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESR</td>
<td>Education for Self-Reliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISA</td>
<td>Ideological State Apparatus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCCR-Mageuzi</td>
<td>-- National Convention for Reconstruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LEGCO</td>
<td>Legislative Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NASACO</td>
<td>-- National Shipping Agency Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDC</td>
<td>National Development Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEC</td>
<td>National Executive Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NU</td>
<td>-- Nyerere’s Ujamaa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCCB</td>
<td>-- Prevention and Combating of Corruption Bureau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAPs</td>
<td>-- Structural Adjustment Policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STC</td>
<td>-- State Trading Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAA</td>
<td>- Tanganyika African Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TANESCO</td>
<td>-- Tanzania Electric Supply Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TANU</td>
<td>-- Tanganyika African National Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TLP</td>
<td>-- Tanzania Labour Party</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TRC -- Tanzania Railways Corporation
TRL -- Tanzania Railways Limited
TTCL -- Tanzania Telecommunications Limited
UNUDHR -- United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights
WB -- World Bank
WWI -- World War I
WWII -- World War II
INTRODUCTION

Main Objective

The aim of this thesis is to construct Nyerere’s version of socialism, which was popularly known in Kiswahili\(^1\) as *Ujamaa*. In order to provide a conceptual construction of *Ujamaa* as Nyerere saw it, this thesis focuses on themes which surround and feed into *Ujamaa*. In particular, it focuses on what can best be described as historical and cultural themes. In the following section these themes will be outlined in the order in which they are mentioned here. First then is the historical theme. The historical theme, which constitutes the first two chapters of this thesis, involves the history of *Ujamaa*, and the events which radically changed the history of Tanzania and Africa, namely, slave trade and colonialism. The thesis begins with a history of *Ujamaa*.

Now, the history of *Ujamaa*, is usually part and parcel of the history of Tanzania and for many historians such as Kimambo and Temu (1969/1997), this history goes back centuries and involves the early settlements in the region, early contacts and settlement of Arabs, the slave trade, colonialism, independence and neo-colonialism. In considering the history of *Ujamaa* this thesis will not take that route. In addition to the lack of space, this thesis is not a historical account of *Ujamaa* and moreover, there are very good accounts of events leading to *Ujamaa* by scholars such as Judith Listowel (1965), John Hatch (1976) and William Redman Duggan (1976). Therefore, readers wishing to further their insights into the history of *Ujamaa* have plenty of material from which to choose. Owing to the above mentioned

\(^1\) Kiswahili is a Bantu language spoken in East and central Africa.
reasons, the history of *Ujamaa* as outlined here is limited to identification of key ideas, facts, figures, policies, programs and functions of *Ujamaa* from the moment of its formation to its demise. This is important because it provides a general overview of *Ujamaa* in its concrete historical manifestations and thus sets the scene for a better understanding of the contents of the thesis.

The construction of *Ujamaa* begins when the question of its origin is posed. Attempts to address it have almost always involved Nyerere. However, in some studies, such as the study by H. Glickman (1967), Nyerere is presented as if he lived, worked and thought in a vacuum but the stress that Nyerere placed on history and culture, and his preoccupation with the real socio-political and economic problems which faced Tanzania, are not considered as sources from which Nyerere derived his political thoughts or as factors which shaped Nyerere’s ideas of *Ujamaa*. Although this thesis is not about Nyerere, the person, it cannot, in its construction of *Ujamaa* as Nyerere saw it, escape the responsibility of explaining certain aspects of Nyerere the man. This is because *Ujamaa* is a product of Nyerere’s thinking, and in order to construct *Ujamaa* as Nyerere saw it, a proper understanding of Nyerere is crucial. In this thesis Nyerere is understood as a person whose political ideas in general, and his ideas of *Ujamaa*, in particular, were shaped by many sources, most notably, history, particularly, the historical events which shaped Tanzania and Africa; the cultural traditions and customs of Africans in sub-Saharan Africa, the political traditions of liberalism and communism, and by the socio-political and economic situation which prevailed in the country. It is the synthesized critical appreciation of all these sources that Nyerere brings to his *Ujamaa* vision of society. Thus, instead of presenting Nyerere as a person, who lived, worked and thought in a vacuum, the thesis presents Nyerere as a person who firmly belonged to a specific society, Tanzania --
a society whose particular history, culture, and the socio-political and economic problems, played a significant role in the formation and articulation of *Ujamaa*. Bearing in mind the different sources which shaped Nyerere’s articulation of the different components of *Ujamaa*, the thesis traces the rise of *Ujamaa* in the historical events which radically changed Africa in general and Tanzania in particular, namely the events of slave trade and colonialism. By locating *Ujamaa* in history, the thesis proposes a move from the conception of *Ujamaa* that arises out of a vacuum, to a conception of *Ujamaa* linked to concrete experiences of concrete historical events of slave trade and colonialism. In other words, what is being proposed in this thesis is that in order to construct a conceptual map of *Ujamaa*, it is helpful to know the historical conditions which motivated Nyerere’s conceptualisation of *Ujamaa*. In this way, *Ujamaa* can be understood, in part, as a result of Nyerere’s historical awareness of the circumstances which prevailed in Tanzania then.

Secondly, in order to provide a conceptual construction of *Ujamaa*, the thesis focuses also on the cultural themes. These are of two types: African cultural themes and European ones or liberal themes. In the following section these two cultures will be described in turn beginning first with the latter. Themes from European culture enter into the construction of *Ujamaa* because of the open-mindedness of Nyerere. Nyerere’s preoccupation with the history and culture of the people of Tanzania, and their socio-political and economic problems did not lead him to reject the history and culture of other far off societies. He was ready to learn from others cultures in order to broaden and perfect the African culture. He makes his point in *Freedom and Unity* (1966):

> A nation which refuses to learn from foreign cultures is nothing but a nation of idiots and lunatics. Mankind could not progress at all if we all refused to learn from each other. But to learn from
each other does not mean we should abandon our own [for] the sort of learning from which we can benefit is the kind which can help us to perfect and broaden our own culture” (Nyerere, 1966, p. 187).

The central message in this quotation is that: progress involves learning from other cultures, and that being open towards other cultures, does not mean rejection of one’s own. Indeed that is what Nyerere did with Ujamaa. In his articulation of Ujamaa Nyerere drew lessons from the European culture, which is a culture of liberalism, particularly, the liberalism of Kant. This thesis examines the liberal themes which Nyerere took from the liberal culture. In particular, it examines the principles of human equality and freedom, the principles which fed directly into Ujamaa. Issues which inform the discussion on liberal themes are based on Immanuel Kant, one of the founders of western liberalism. Although, in his writings Nyerere does not explicitly admit that the liberal principles he integrated into Ujamaa, such as equality, freedom, and democracy, came from Kant, the way those principles are spelt out in Ujamaa, clearly indicates that when Nyerere was formulating and articulating Ujamaa, he had Kant’s text in front of him.² This thesis, therefore, examines Nyerere’s interpretation of Kant, the integration of those principles in Ujamaa and the impacts it brought to bear on the articulation of Ujamaa. The issues which are examined include the equality of rights and equality of opportunities. The equality of rights include the right to dignity and respect, right to democracy, right to a just wage and their respective effects in Ujamaa. The equality of opportunity is centred on education and employment. With respect to the principle of freedom, the issues examined include: natural freedom or independence, the freedom of the will, which is the freedom for self realisation and actualisation, and influence of these freedoms on Ujamaa. In outlining these aspects, the thesis shows that as Nyerere was

² In almost all the writings of Nyerere, there is no acknowledgement of sources, for the writings are not referenced and have no bibliography, an indication that Ujamaa is articulated in a non-academic manner, and that the primary intention of Nyerere was not to write an academic treatise on Ujamaa but simply to help people understand what Ujamaa is and how to implement it.
articulating *Ujamaa* he was not thinking in a vacuum but rather he was influenced by the political philosophy of liberalism, particularly the liberalism of Immanuel Kant.

In addition to the European themes of liberalism the thesis also examines themes from the African culture so as to provide a conceptual construction of *Ujamaa* as Nyerere saw it. These enter into the construction of *Ujamaa* because the African society was central to Nyerere’s entreprise. In his earlier formulation in the article, *Ujamaa: the Basis of African Socialism* (1962), which we shall explore more in the thesis, *Ujamaa* was nothing more than the cultural principles and practices in the extended families in a traditional Africa. At a personal level, culture was to Nyerere “the essence and the spirit of any nation” (Nyerere, 1966, p. 186), and by extension, any people. He maintained that “a country which lacks its own culture is no more than a collection of people without the spirit which makes them a nation” (Ibid. p. 186). Unfortunately, during colonialism, attempts were made to make Africans believe that “[they] had no indigenous culture of [their] own; or that what [they] did have was worthless – something of which [they] should be ashamed, instead of a source of pride” (Ibid). These attempts stymied or stunted the development of African culture because as it will be shown in Chapter Two of this thesis, some Tanzanians were either ashamed or prevented by the relevant authorities to practice some of their cultural beliefs. After independence Nyerere created a new “Ministry of National Culture and Youth” (Ibid.) in order to help Tanzanians “regain [their] pride in [their] own culture” (Ibid. p. 187). In practice, that meant “[seeking] out the best of the traditions and customs of all our tribes and make them a part of our national culture” (Ibid). Nowhere is Nyerere’s belief in African culture, and attempt to make Tanzanians proud of their culture more apparent than in the formation and articulation of *Ujamaa*. In *Ujamaa*, Nyerere brings together what he considers
to be the best elements of African tradition and customs. Thus, in order to construct *Ujamaa* as Nyerere saw it, this thesis, examines what Nyerere considered to be the best elements of extended family. The thesis, therefore, examines the nature of extended families in traditional Africa and the practices which fed into *Ujamaa*, namely, participation and inclusion, sharing and co-operation, and communal ownership of major means of production. In addition, it also examines how traditional practices and principles impacted on *Ujamaa*. These are important because they provide the cultural context within which it can be understood and they help to show that *Ujamaa* was rooted in the cultural tradition of the African people.

In constructing *Ujamaa* as Nyerere saw it, the primary source is the writings of Nyerere. However, since Nyerere published extensively I will concentrate on his seminal books, namely: *Freedom and Unity* (1966)\(^3\), *Freedom and Socialism* (1967)\(^4\), *Ujamaa: Essays on Socialism* (1968)\(^5\), *Freedom and Development* (1973)\(^6\), *Man and Development* (1974),\(^7\) and *Freedom, Non Alignment and South-South Co-operation* (2011).\(^8\) A conceptual construction of *Ujamaa* from these books is not an easy task. As Green (1995), has observed, “the writings and speeches of Nyerere do not lend themselves to easy analysis, but do lend themselves to easy misreading as hopelessly self-contradictory” (p.81). The contradictions in Nyerere’s work are due to two main factors. Firstly, “*Mwalimu*’s\(^9\) thought has not been static” (*ibid.*

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\(^3\) A selection of his writings and speeches 1952-1965  
\(^4\) A selection of his writings and speeches 1965-1975  
\(^5\) A collection of articles on socialism from *Freedom and Socialism*  
\(^6\) A selection of writings and speeches 1968-1973  
\(^7\) Articles on development from *Freedom and Development*  
\(^8\) A selection from Speeches delivered from 1974-1999  
\(^9\) *Mwalimu* is a Swahili word for a teacher and remains an affectionate title for Nyerere.
Nyerere’s understanding of *Ujamaa* was not fixed instead it evolved with time and experience. His views as a young man were idealistic and utopian whereas as an adult statesman they were more pragmatic and practical. Secondly, Nyerere, “as President he had no time to write reflective over all volumes” (*ibid.* p.82). This implies that there is no single book by Nyerere that contains all of his ideas about *Ujamaa*. Rather his ideas are expressed in various articles, policy papers and in speeches written at various times, for different audiences, in diverse locations around the world and for different purposes. It is therefore not surprising that his works are sometimes contradictory and thus difficult to analyse. To overcome this challenge, the thesis carries out an elimination procedure based on consistency. For example, if an idea is reiterated several times in different speeches, this is an indication that it was central to *Ujamaa* and it will be focused upon. Conversely, the thesis shall deliberately exclude infrequent elements of the doctrine. It is envisaged that this streamlining will provide readers with a more consistent and comprehensible presentation of *Ujamaa*. In addition to consistency, the thesis also carries out a critic of Nyerere’s thought. In that respect, the thesis constructs *Ujamaa* as much as it is a critique of Nyerere’s thought.

**Main Argument**

Having described in the last section the main objective of this thesis, I will now in this section map the main argument that the thesis makes and what it does to make that argument. The main argument advanced in this thesis is that *Ujamaa* is not just a development theory, purporting to provide a guide to development in Tanzania and by extension, Africa, but *Ujamaa* is also an ideology, because it is a reconstruction of an imaginary relationship of individuals at the level of the state. This ideology, the thesis maintains, should be reinstated because Tanzania is not yet free.
In order to bring out the ideological character or elements of *Ujamaa* the thesis focuses on the two main documents which defined it: *Ujamaa: the Basis of African Socialism* (1962), and the *Arusha Declaration* (1967/1977). *Ujamaa: the Basis of African Socialism*, is a “TANU pamphlet” (Nyerere, 1968/77, p. 1), through which for the first time Nyerere argued for *Ujamaa* and in which he tried to explain what African socialism was like before colonialism. The *Arusha Declaration* is according to Kingunge Ngombale-Mwiru (1973), the party’s chief whip, “a manifesto which launched a fundamental political option of TANU [and] a declaration of principles, objectives and intentions” (p. 52), or goals “towards which TANU [was] leading the people of Tanzania and it [indicated] the direction of development” (Nyerere, 1977, p. 91). These two documents are quite revealing in this regard, since they are the documents which provide us with the ideological character of *Ujamaa*. Let me briefly describe these two documents in turns beginning first with the pamphlet. In *Ujamaa: the Basis of African Socialism* Nyerere described *Ujamaa* as “familyhood” or ‘brotherhood’. That is what he means when he writes: “‘Ujamaa’, then, or ‘Familyhood’ describes our socialism” (Nyerere, 1977, p. 12). The extended family, the basic unity of society in traditional Africa, is explained in this document, as the source of the principles and practices that Nyerere transferred to the institutions in the new nation. In this thesis, the institution of the extended family in traditional Africa is considered as a symbol or metaphor, which Nyerere uses in order to explain to the citizens of Tanzania, the new and the transformed society he envisaged for the future. In that future state “no person exploits another” (*Ibid* p. 15), “everybody is a worker” (*Ibid* p. 4), “people care for each other’s welfare” (*ibid*. p. 1), “neither capitalism nor feudalism exists” (*Ibid*. p. 15), and it is a state that “does not have two classes of people, a lower class composed of people who work for their living, and an upper class of people who live on the work of others” (*Ibid*). In addition, in that future state there is
sharing, co-operation and participation and the major means of production are held in common. There will be more to say about the ideal society in Chapter Five of this thesis; suffice only to point out here that in this thesis the extended family is considered as a metaphor that Nyerere uses to explain to the people the attitudes and practices that he wanted to be the foundation of institutions of a new state.

In the second document -- *The Arusha Declaration* -- *Ujamaa* is described in terms of liberal principles even though some African principles, such as communal ownership of property are also weaved into it. In particular *Ujamaa* is defined in terms of the principles of equality, freedom, and democracy, even though later on in a separate document, Nyerere adds, religious tolerance and secularism. With the exception of a few principles, most of the principles enunciated in the Arusha Declaration (AD) are liberal principles, or principles fundamental to western liberal democracies and in that sense, the AD is basically, a liberal document. In this thesis, liberalism, particularly, the liberalism of Kant is considered as a metaphor, which Nyerere uses in order to explain to his audience, the new and the transformed society he envisaged for the future. The ideal liberal state is one in which there is equality of all people, where citizens, as individuals, actively participate in the democratic process, where citizens live in freedom and their civil liberties are guaranteed and where development is for all. In addition to the metaphors that Nyerere uses, the thesis also examines issues related to the relationship between ideology and history, ideology and consciousness/unconsciousness, ideology and spiritual/material existence, ideology and real/unreal conditions of existence, and the relation between ideology and interpellation. In

examining these issues, which are addressed by Althusser, the French Philosopher, the thesis shows *Ujamaa* to be an ideology.

In order to argue for the reinstatement of *Ujamaa*, I will describe in this thesis the functions of *Ujamaa* as an ideology, and determine whether it has been a success or failure. In conjunction with the discussion in Chapter Seven on the effectiveness of *Ujamaa* and the discussion in Chapter Eight on the contribution of *Ujamaa*, it will be shown that it was under *Ujamaa* and not under the current neo-liberal policies that Tanzania embarked on the path to real freedom. In discussing about the functions of *Ujamaa* as an ideology, the thesis examines the contradictions which existed in society and the strategies that were used to resolve them. In particular, the discussion revolves around the social divisions along tribal, racial and religious lines and how *Ujamaa* attempted to create unity in the country. In addition, the discussion focuses on the existence of class and *Ujamaa’s* attempt to create a classless society through nationalisation of the major means of production and the creation of *Ujamaa* villages. Lastly, the discussion scrutinises the modernisation of the forces of production and of creating a new code of conduct based on education for self-reliance. The aim is to show that although *Ujamaa* did not solve all the contradictions which existed in Tanzania, Nyerere’s aim, however imperfectly achieved was to enable Tanzanians to be free not only from foreign domination but also from any other form of oppression or intimidation irrespective of the origin, creed or colour of the world-be oppressor. In discussing about the conceptual effectiveness of *Ujamaa*, the thesis looks at the synthesis between elements from traditional societies which Nyerere incorporated into *Ujamaa* and elements which Nyerere claimed that were from the liberal tradition and examines the tensions which exist. In particular, the thesis examines two major tensions in *Ujamaa*: the tension between the
freedom of the individual and the community or in this case the state, and the tension between Nyerere’s claims about socialism and other possible claims about the same. In examining these tensions the thesis suggests that although Nyerere did not succeed to resolve the tensions perfectly, in *Ujamaa* he paved the way for a synthesis whose tensions must be properly resolved for the people of Tanzania to be free. The argument for the re-installment of *Ujamaa* reaches its climax in Chapter Eight where the thesis identifies the contribution of *Ujamaa* when it was the dominant ideology and where the thesis identifies the contribution that *Ujamaa* can make today in liberating Tanzanians from the yoke of neocolonialism. So much for the main argument of this thesis, now let me in the following section explain why this thesis matters.

**Rationale of the Thesis**

Having outlined in the last section, the main argument of this thesis I will now, in this section, explain why I decided to write a thesis on *Ujamaa* and what is likely to be its contribution to scholarship and to the contemporary situation in Tanzania. I was motivated to study *Ujamaa* because of my own personal commitment to the principles of *Ujamaa* and to Christianity but, even more because of the condition of domination by foreign powers. Several studies have critically shown that Tanzania and Africa as a whole, is not yet free. A few citations will testify to this. In *Freedom, Non-Alignment and South-South Co-operation* (2011), Nyerere elaborates about this point when he says:

> No country has yet managed to shake off the colonial hold of industrialised nations over our economies...Africa, therefore, continues to have unequal dependence relationship with the developed nations – mostly former colonial powers” (Nyerere, 2011, p. 58-59).
This shows that most African countries, including Tanzania are still under the yoke of neo-colonialism. Expressing a similar observation, Joseph Stiglitz (2002), the former chief economist of the World Bank, one of the institutions which determine economic policies for Tanzania and Africa, writes:

Today these institutions have become dominant players in the world economy. Not only countries seeking their help but also seeking their ‘seal of approval’ so that they can better access international capital must follow their economic prescriptions, prescriptions which reflect their free market ideologies and theories…The result for many people has been poverty and for many countries social and political chaos (Stiglitz, 2000, p. 17).

The institutions that Stiglitz (2000) is talking about are the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). It is from these institutions that countries like Tanzania beg for financial assistance and seek the ‘seal of approval’ for policies to implement. The economic and political conditions or prescriptions attached only show that the recipient countries are not free, and therefore are always at the mercy of imperial domination. This situation of domination is also emphasized by Issa G. Shivji, one of the well known scholars in Tanzania, in his book, Where is Uhuru? Reflections on the Struggle for Democracy in Africa (2009). He writes:

The transnationals [sic], in cahoots with the states of the North, pressurize the states of the South in various ways to pass laws and create institutions regardless of whether such are democratically acceptable to their own people. It is obvious this type of globalisation is neither global neighbourhood nor global interdependence…nor, for that matter, a global village. It is nothing but total negation of the sovereignty of the state and the right of peoples to self-determination and a licence for new forms of global pillage (Shivji, 2009, p. 10-11).

The point that Shivji makes here is that the modus operandi of the transnational companies and institutions such as the WB and the IMF, denies the poor countries like Tanzania, the right to exercise their sovereignty and their right to self-determination. A people who cannot
determine their own destiny and who do not have the right to think for themselves and chart their destiny cannot be said to be free. It is this condition of lacking freedom which motivated me to study *Ujamaa*. This thesis, therefore, is not an exposition of neo-colonialism in Africa or Tanzania but an attempt to propose measures which can liberate Tanzania from the yoke of foreign domination.

The thesis does not claim to have found new ways of bringing about liberation of Tanzanians. All it says is that the path to authentic freedom does not need to be invented because it is there lying dormant in form of *Ujamaa*. What has to be done is to reinstate some of its basic policies. Many commentators such as Paul Kaiser (1996) concede that *Ujamaa* succeeded in giving Tanzania a profound experience of freedom, unity, dignity and self-respect which is different from the degradation it suffered during decades of colonial rule. The promulgation of *Ujamaa* as the official policy underlined the human dignity of all persons and the respect each individual deserves. *Ujamaa* helped to expose the conflicting ideological stances that were prevalent in the nation and it proposed ways that could facilitate the sustained economic development that Tanzania needed without at the same time jeopardising the freedom and human dignity of its people. In the words of Lionel Cliffe (1997), a well known commentator on the Tanzanian scene, *Ujamaa* “suggested a new strategy for the country’s development which would …make Tanzania’s progress depend more on her own efforts and less at the mercy of international capitalist interests” (p. 256). That is the way Tanzania would have developed without compromising its independence and the freedom of its people. However, in the 1980s onwards, Tanzania begun taking dictations from the WB and IMF – as such abandoning *Ujamaa* and the policy of self-reliance in practice – thus bending to the pressure of serving international capitalist interests, particularly multinational corporations.
This thesis is not an attempt to explain the government decision to abandon *Ujamaa* but to provide a conceptual construction of *Ujamaa* as Nyerere saw it. In other words, what I am presenting here, is not intended to be a response to the question of what *Ujamaa* is, from the point of view of ontology but how Nyerere came to have a concept of *Ujamaa* and how he constructed it. It is this conceptual construction of *Ujamaa*, which I am offering as a novel and substantial contribution to scholarship. This account fulfills the originality requirement of being awarded the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, because I have constructed *Ujamaa* in a way that no other study of *Ujamaa* has done before. My review of the major literature shows that the conceptual construction of Nyerere’s *Ujamaa* has received inadequate treatment. Although there are many studies on *Ujamaa*, I did not find any book or article that was devoted to the conceptual construction of Nyerere’s *Ujamaa*. Many studies on *Ujamaa* have focused on the evaluation of different aspects and effects of *Ujamaa* and as well as its evaluation as a whole but none maps its conceptual construction. It is for that reason that I am offering my own account of Nyerere’s construction of *Ujamaa* as a novel contribution to scholarship.

This construction of *Ujamaa* as Nyerere understood it may seem to some to be rather supportive and insufficiently ‘detached’. I am aware of this possible objection, but I cannot be any more detached than the facts will allow me. Otherwise my detachment in the name of scientific objectivity will be merely contrived and artificial. Instead of serving scientific objectivity, it will be a mockery of it. For the fact is that, I am not a ‘neutral’ observer of the *Ujamaa* scene. I was born and raised in Tanzania, of Tanzanian parents, and I am a Tanzanian citizen. I grew up in the system of *Ujamaa* and I am committed to it. On the other hand, I was raised as a Christian and was an ordained priest in the Catholic Church. Although
I left the priesthood after ten years of active ministry, I am still committed to the Christian principles. For that reason, this study cannot be as detached as it would have been if it had been written by someone uncommitted to either Christianity or Ujamaa. Yet, the study is no less objective or scientific for that. The data pertaining to Ujamaa is factual and documented. It can be checked and verified against the sources indicated or any other available to the reader. Needless to say, the interpretation and assessment of the data is mine and it is here that many of my presuppositions and biases in favour of the principles and policies of Ujamaa are most apparent. Yet, I do not think that this calls for apologies. As Sandra Harding (1999) has noted, “the ideal of objectivity as neutrality is widely regarded to have failed not only in history and the social sciences but also in philosophy and related fields such as jurisprudence” (p. 452). Part of the explanation for this is that social issues cannot be done meaningfully in a sort of a ‘vacuum’ that is irrespective of the associated social, economic and political environment. Social studies must sometimes make practical decisions and commitments; so the idea of a ‘detached’, ‘neutral’, and ‘value free’ enquiry may not particularly be helpful in that regard. Nyerere’s Ujamaa was concerned with values. It identified positive values which affirm the dignity and worth of a human person and negative values, which alienate a human person in various ways. In the sense and to the extent that one’s study allows any given elements of these values to influence or determine its orientation, one is not neutral but partial.

Chapter Outline

Having described in the last section, the rationale of this thesis, I will now, in this section, summarise the main arguments contained in each of its chapters. Together these arguments aim to show a conceptual construction of Ujamaa as Nyerere understood it and that the doctrine is still important because the conditions which it sought to counter are still very
much in existence. The structure of this thesis follows closely its main argument. In Chapter One I will outline the basic tenets of *Ujamaa*, as they are expressed in the two documents which define *Ujamaa*, namely the TANU pamphlet of 1962 and the Arusha Declaration of 1967. In particular, I examine two main ideas: the idea of socialism and the idea of self-reliance. I will describe how socialism was defined in the two documents and how the policies to build it -- such as the policy of nationalisation, *Ujamaa* villages and the leadership code -- were implemented.

Then, I will examine the basic tenets of the policy of self-reliance, and how it was implemented through such initiatives as education for self-reliance and villagisation. These tasks are carried out in order to show what *Ujamaa* was in its concrete historical manifestation, and thereby set the scene for the discussion that follows in the thesis.

The construction of *Ujamaa* begins in Chapter Two because it is in this chapter that I begin to interrogate its rise. The argument advanced in this chapter is that Nyerere’s construction of *Ujamaa* can be seen as an attempt by him to counter some of the conditions which were exacerbated by slave trade and colonialism. In particular this chapter suggests that *Ujamaa* is connected with the main historical events that radically changed the history of Tanzania and Africa. In particular, this chapter shows that the conditions which necessitated the rise of *Ujamaa* were exacerbated by the phenomena of slave trade and colonialism. To give credence to this I will briefly describe how the slave trade was carried out and its effects on the country and its people. Then, I will sketch out colonialism under the Germans and the British and its consequences on the country and its people. This chapter, therefore, sets the
thesis in its proper historical context and introduces the causes as well as conditions that necessitated the construction of *Ujamaa*.

The awareness of the conditions described in Chapter Two prompted Nyerere to look into the European and African cultures so as to extract principles for a comprehensive socio-economic and political system which would be just, contemporary and suited to rectify the specific needs of the people of Tanzania. Chapter Three, which is about the ‘Liberal Roots of *Ujamaa*’, focuses on the European culture, the culture of liberalism, and examines in particular, Nyerere’s conception of Kantian liberalism. In his reading of Kant, Nyerere picked up some of the core principles of liberalism which he thought could counter the degradation of African people, such as the principles of equality and freedom and integrated them into *Ujamaa*. This chapter, therefore, examines Nyerere’s understanding of Kant’s notion of equality and freedom, his application of the notions to *Ujamaa* and the resulting impact on the formation and articulation of *Ujamaa*, in order to show how Kantian thought influenced Nyerere’s and therefore *Ujamaa*. The focus of Chapter Four is the African Culture. Nyerere was of the conviction that in order to combat the challenges the nation was facing, the liberal principles had to be complimented by other principles that were suited to the attitudes and cultural setting of the Tanzanian people. He clearly saw that the extended families of traditional Africa did embody values, principles and practices, which, if applied more widely and systematically, then the modern state could, eradicate poverty and the other arch-enemies as well and increase harmony. The chapter describes the nature of the extended family in traditional Africa, its functions and importance, as well as the elements that were drawn from it for a wider application. Some of these included practices of participation and inclusion, sharing and co-operation and communal property ownership all of which feature prominently
in Nyerere’s *Ujamaa*. This chapter therefore, places Nyerere’s *Ujamaa* in its proper cultural context and suggests that *Ujamaa* was rooted in the extended family of traditional Africa. The two features, namely, family in traditional Africa and liberalism, both provided the foundation of what Nyerere called *Ujamaa* (socialism).

In Chapter Five, Nyerere’s claim that *Ujamaa* is an ideology is tested. To test if *Ujamaa* meets the criteria of an ideology, the meaning of ideology according to Althuser is introduced and four key elements of ideology are considered, namely, that ideology has no history, that it is a reconstruction of an imaginary relationship, and that it has a material existence and that it interpellates individuals as subjects. *Ujamaa* is thus assessed by these elements in order to show that *Ujamaa* was not only a development theory, prescribing what Tanzanians needed to do in order to develop but it was also an ideology, a doctrine and a reconstruction of an imaginary relationship of individuals at the level of the state that Nyerere thought was necessary to motivate people to move towards the desired goal of egalitarianism. The functions of *Ujamaa* as an ideology are examined in Chapter Six. Here the discussion revolves around some of the contradictions which existed in the Tanzanian society, namely, segregation along racial, religious and tribal lines; formation of classes; laziness and traditional. The chapter describes how *Ujamaa* as an ideology attempted to solve these contradictions. In particular it describes how *Ujamaa* hoped to create unity, to create a classless society, mobilise Tanzanians to work hard, and how it hoped to modernise the forces of production in Tanzania. This is done in order to suggest that Nyerere’s aim, however, imperfectly achieved, was to consolidate the independence of Tanzania and the freedom of its people.
Chapter Seven, which is about the ‘Effectiveness of Ujamaa’, attempts to determine whether Ujamaa was conceptually effective or successful in working out the tensions between communitarian strands and the individual strands and between the arguments of Nyerere about socialism and other possible counter arguments about the same. In examining these tensions, the chapter suggests that although Ujamaa was not very successful in tackling the tensions between the freedom of individual and the community, Ujamaa paved the way for a synthesis, the contradictions of which need to be resolved for Tanzania to be free. Chapter Eight considers Ujamaa holistically and identifies some of its major contributions. The chapter then considers whether -- especially in light of some similarities in current conditions and those at the time Nyerere was writing -- there are features of Ujamaa which could be employed in the current situation.
TIMELINE: JULIUS NYERERE AND UJAMAA

April, 1922: Birth of Julius Kambarage Nyerere

1934: Nyerere begins formal education

1937-1945: Nyerere pursues secondary and college education

1946-1952: Nyerere works as a teacher

1949-1952: Nyerere studies at Edinburgh University (United Kingdom).

1953: Nyerere joins a social welfare association known as Tanganyika African Union (TAA).

1954: Nyerere transforms the TAA into the political party under the name of Tanganyika African National Union (TANU).

1961: Tanganyika wins self-governance; Nyerere is its first Prime Minister on 9th December.

1962: Nyerere steps down as prime minister.

1962: (April) Nyerere publishes *Ujamaa: the Basis of African Socialism*, a TANU pamphlet in which he proposes *Ujamaa* or socialism for the first time.

1962: (September), Nyerere is elected as the first president of the Republic.

1960-1966 The state embarks on a gradual process of nationalisation of the major means of production.

1960-1966: First attempts to move away from scattered settlements to nucleated settlements.

1960-1967: The first of two stages to move away from colonial education to a more socialist oriented system of education begins.
1966: The economic development plans of the government are severely tested by lack of funds and there is widespread dissatisfaction in almost every sector of the economy in the country.

1967: (26th -29th January) The National Executive Committee (NEC) of TANU meets in Arusha, Northern Tanzania, and resolves to adopt *Ujamaa* as the official policy of the party and of the government.

1967: (5th February) the resolutions of TANU’s NEC are endorsed by the general meeting of TANU as the Arusha Declaration. This marks the official birth of *Ujamaa*.

1967: (6th February) Nyerere presents the Arusha Declaration to an audience in Dar-es-Salaam, then the capital city of Tanzania.

1967: (10th February) Nyerere explains the Arusha Declaration to diplomats stationed in Dar-es-Salaam. He supports this with further statements and speeches elaborating the policy.

1967-1980s: The government embarks on a systematic nationalisation of the major means of production.

1967-1980s: (March 1967), Nyerere publishes a policy booklet on ‘Education for Self-Reliance’, and the implementation of the policy begins.


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CHAPTER ONE:
THE BASIC TENETS OF UJAMAA

1. Introduction

The origin of *Ujamaa* -- one of the “significant landmarks in the history of Tanzania” -- is generally traced back to the formation of the Tanganyika\(^{12}\) African National Union (TANU), a “mass party” founded by Julius Kambarage Nyerere (1922-1999), on the 7\(^{th}\) July 1954 (de la Rue, 1973, p. 40; el Saadawi, 2010, p. 13). TANU asserted that Tanzanians should be free to govern themselves and to determine their own destiny as a people. To achieve this objective TANU mobilised Tanzanians to demand independence from the British Government and on the 9\(^{th}\) December 1961, Tanganyika became independent with Nyerere as its first Prime Minister (Haussler, 2009). However, Nyerere’s premiership was short lived as in January 1962, he resigned from “this position in order to concentrate on party issues and to prepare a policy for Tanganyika” (*ibid.* p. 23). The policy that Nyerere was preparing for Tanzania at this time can be identified as *Ujamaa* for two key reasons; firstly, three months after his resignation as Prime Minister, Nyerere published *Ujamaa: the Basis of African Socialism* “a TANU pamphlet” (Nyerere, 1968/77, p. 1), in which he argued for *Ujamaa* for the first time. Secondly, in 1967 *Ujamaa* became the official policy of the ruling party TANU and its government, and remained so for close to twenty-four years that Nyerere was the head of state.

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\(^{12}\) Tanganyika was a country situated on the East coast of Africa along the Indian Ocean. On 26th April, 1964 Tanganyika and the off shore islands of Zanzibar and Pemba formed a union that produced one country, Tanzania. For the sake of brevity, Tanzania is generally used throughout this thesis to designate the Mainland and the Islands as a unit even before the union except in direct quotations or where the context makes it necessary to distinguish them.
Having completed the policy of *Ujamaa*, Nyerere returned into government. On the 9th December 1962, Tanzania became a Republic, with Nyerere as its first President. Although *Ujamaa* did not become an official policy of the ruling party until the time of the Arusha Declaration in 1967, there are indications, which shall be identified later in this chapter, that Nyerere’s government began moving step-by-step towards *Ujamaa* immediately after independence. The question that is proposed for investigation in this chapter, therefore, concerns itself with the basic tenets of *Ujamaa*. For instance, what were the fundamental theories of *Ujamaa*? Whilst the basic doctrine of *Ujamaa* is spelt out in the AD, in order to understand how it appears there it is first necessary to understand how *Ujamaa* was set out in the TANU pamphlet of 1962, since this was the primary document from which the AD is derived. In the following section, therefore, these two documents will be examined in turn beginning with the pamphlet. The examination of these documents will show the basic tenets of *Ujamaa*. Moreover, this crucially sets the scene for the current thesis and evinces that it is Nyerere’s *Ujamaa* that is constructed here and not something else.

1.1. *Ujamaa* in the Pamphlet

In *Ujamaa: the Basis of African Socialism*, Nyerere argued for a specific conception of socialism. In particular, this document described *Ujamaa* in terms of attitude of familyhood or brotherhood and then proceeded to express specific socialist practices.

1.1.1. *Ujamaa*: Familyhood or Brotherhood

In the pamphlet, Nyerere depicted *Ujamaa* (his form of socialism) as “an attitude of mind …which is needed to ensure that the people care for each other’s welfare” (Nyerere, 1977, p.1). This is the attitude of “brotherhood” or “Familyhood” (*Ibid* p.12). Hence, Nyerere considered there to be a very close links between caring for one another and the attitude of
brotherhood or familyhood. In the document he suggests that care for one another can only be guaranteed if people view each other as brothers and sisters or as members of the same family. The emphasis that Nyerere (1977) places on the sense of brotherhood does not mean that socialist institutions and organisations are irrelevant, rather it implies that “without correct attitudes, institutions can be subverted from their true purpose” (p.89). Thus, although to Nyerere socialist institutions and organisations are important they cannot by themselves lead to the attainment of a true purpose of socialism, which is the well being of all people, unless the people in those institutions and organisations are infused with the spirit of brotherhood and actually care for one another. Therefore, to Nyerere “in the individual, as in the society, it is an attitude of mind which distinguishes the socialist from the non-socialist” (Ibid p.1). To Nyerere, then, it is the attitude of familyhood which is the litmus test and the condition sine qua non, for the existence of socialism.

In short, the essay on *Ujamaa: the Basis of African socialism*, offers an understanding of *Ujamaa* as ‘familyhood’ or ‘brotherhood’. This is what Nyerere means when he concludes: “‘*Ujamaa*’, then, or ‘Familyhood’ describes our socialism” (Nyerere, 1977, p.12). ‘Our’ refers to the “African-ness of the policies” (Nyerere, 1976, p. 2). This was what he intended to follow, and it implies that *Ujamaa* is a term that describes the ‘African-ness’ of the policy, that is to say the foundations of the document are to be found in African culture and traditions. It was not only this expression of African-ness that led Nyerere to believe that *Ujamaa* differed from other strands of socialism. He cites two further reasons: firstly, *Ujamaa* was “opposed to capitalism” (*ibid.* p. 12), which according to Nyerere (1977 p.12) “seeks to build a happy society on the basis of the exploitation of man by man.” Secondly, *Ujamaa* was also “opposed to doctrinaire socialism” (*ibid*), which Nyerere considered to be a
form of socialism that “seeks to build a happy society on the philosophy of inevitable conflict between man and man” (*ibid*.). Hence, for Nyerere, *Ujamaa* was opposed to scientific socialism or Marxism on the grounds that Marxism legitimises class conflicts. To conclude it can be said that in the pamphlet, Nyerere described *Ujamaa* in terms of familyhood or brotherhood and he considered this concept as being unique because it was opposed to capitalism and scientific socialism.

### 1.1.2. Practices of *Ujamaa*

Having described in the last section how *Ujamaa* was set out in the pamphlet, I will now examine some of the core brotherhood practices as identified by Nyerere. Prior to this, it is important to note, however, that almost all the practices are deliberately described in an exaggerated manner. The meaning and the implication of this for *Ujamaa* will be discussed in Chapter Five of this thesis. Here I will simply mention the four main practices without comment, the first of which is love. In the document, Nyerere claimed that:

> [An] African…does not look at one class of men as his brethren and another as his natural enemy, [that] he does not form an alliance with the ‘brethren’ for the extermination of the ‘non-brethren’ [and that] an African regards all men as his brethren – as members of his extended family” (Nyerere, 1977, pp. 11-12).

This tells us that Nyerere perceived people in African societies as caring for one another. Secondly, in the pamphlet Nyerere (1977) argues that traditional African societies were classless. For Nyerere class existed in societies that had gone through the agrarian and the industrial revolution. It was those historical events that produced the conditions that gave rise to the class system. Nyerere argues that in Africa, the situation was different in that “it did not have the benefit of the agrarian revolution or the industrial revolution” (*ibid.* p.11).
such revolutions had not occurred in Africa, Nyerere concluded that African societies were classless.

Thirdly, Nyerere maintained that “in traditional Africa everybody was a worker” (ibid. p.4), meaning that in traditional society, it was obvious to everyone in the community that “every member of society – barring only the children and the infirm – contributed his fair share of effort towards the production of its wealth” (ibid. p.5). Since everyone contributed to the wealth of the community, there were no “[loiters], or [idlers] who accept the hospitality of society as [their] ‘right’ but gives nothing in return” (ibid). Against this background Nyerere asserted that in traditional society, “loitering was an unthinkable disgrace” (Ibid).

Finally, in the pamphlet, Nyerere argues that wealth was shared in traditional Africa. No one could hoard wealth or accumulate it for the sake of gaining power and prestige. In Nyerere’s reading of the traditional society, ‘the individuals or the families within a tribe were ‘rich’ or ‘poor’ according to whether the whole tribe was rich or poor” (ibid. p. 9). In other words, the riches or the poverty of an individual or family were premised on the wealth or poverty of the whole community. If the community was rich then the individual was rich too and if the community was poor then the individual was also poor.

To summarise Nyerere’s reading of the practices in traditional Africa, it can be said that in the extended family or brotherhood, the members loved one another; they were not identified by their class since class did not exist, rather, everybody was a worker and wealth was
shared. This is how the matter stood in the TANU pamphlet that Nyerere published in 1962. In the following section I will examine how *Ujamaa* was set out in the AD, but let us first describe what it is.

### 1.2. The Arusha Declaration (AD)

First then is an account of the Arusha Declaration which was promulgated in February 1967, and its definition of *Ujamaa*. According to Nyerere, “the Arusha Declaration...is a very simple document” in a sense that “it is not a profound theory; but a way of dealing with practical problems which arose after independence” (El Saadawi, 2010, p.13) and some of the practical problems that had to be addressed included “poverty, ignorance and disease” (Nyerere, 1966, p. 139).

In terms of structure the AD is also very simple since, as Nyerere points outs out in an interview with El Saadawi (2010), it is made up of “two parts – one on socialism and another on self-reliance” (p.13). The shorter part -- that on socialism -- consists of two small sections: one on the TANU creed and the other on the policy of socialism. The longest part of the document is on self-reliance and is divided into several sub-titles. Furthermore, the two parts making up the AD are written in different styles. While the first reads like a legal document, the second by contrast reads like a speech and has all the marks of Nyerere’s oration.  

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13 Arusha is a city in Northern Tanzania. It is a popular destination for tourists visiting the Kilimanjaro, the highest mountain in Africa, the Serengeti, the world’s largest animal park, the Ngorongoro Crater, and the Olduvai Gorge, the original home of mankind and civilisation.

14 According to Lwaitama Azaveli Feza (2000), Nyerere’s speeches tended to be ‘bookish’ and ‘bombastic’. He tended to adopt “the ‘lecture’ style of deploying speaker ‘detachment’ markers like the use of exclusive ‘we’, the third person pronouns, and existential and passive constructions whenever he wished to explain to the ‘masses’ the nature of a given political crisis…” (Lwaitama, 2000, p. 304).
such as Haroub Othman (2010), have not hesitated to claim that “Nyerere was definitely the intellectual power behind the Arusha Declaration” (p.36). The authorship of the document is usually contested but according to Haroub Othman (2010), the document “was written by Nyerere himself” (p.37).

In terms of content, Nyerere described “the Arusha Declaration [as] a declaration of intent; no more than that” (Nyerere, 1977, p. 91). Thus, to Nyerere, the AD was nothing more than a statement or a pronouncement about the “goal towards which TANU [was] leading the people of Tanzania and it indicates the direction of development” (ibid.). The AD is, in other words, a proclamation about what Tanzania hoped to become and not a statement about what Tanzania was then. Haroub Othman (2010) also understands this to be the case when he writes, “neither in 1967 nor in 1985 when [Nyerere] stepped down from the presidency was Tanzania a socialist country” (p. 37). The declaration, therefore, was a vision for the future and not a description of the real situation that existed in Tanzania.

Closely related to Nyerere’s view of the AD as a declaration of intent, is Kingunge Ngombale-Mwiru's (1973) depiction of the AD as “a manifesto which launched a fundamental political option of TANU…[as] a declaration of principles, objectives and intentions couched in general terms” (p. 52). Like Nyerere, Ngombale Mwiru, the chief whip of TANU, also accepts that the AD was a mission statement; however, Ngombale–Mwiru (1973), notes that the intentions of Ujamaa were expressed in general terms, that is to say, they were vague and not specific enough. The ‘general terms’ to which Ngombale-Mwiru (1973) refers can be illustrated by at least two examples: For instance, whilst the AD decreed
that in order to “implement the policy of self-reliance, the people have to be taught the meaning self-reliance” (Nyerere, 1977, p. 33), the question of how exactly people were supposed to be taught this was not addressed. Instead, the details of education for self-reliance were subsequently spelt out in March 1967, in a policy paper entitled ‘*Education for Self-reliance*’.

Similarly, the AD emphasized rural development but failed to explain how this was to be realised. Hence the strategies for rural development were also detailed at a later date, September 1967 in a policy paper on ‘*Socialism and Rural Development*’. Most of the objectives and intentions of the AD were not, therefore, specific, a condition which made implementation of the AD resolutions far from ideal. Despite this flawed manifesto, the AD is the document which defined *Ujamaa* and which seriously raised the prospect of socialism in Tanzania. But what, then, were the basic intentions of *Ujamaa*? How was *Ujamaa* described in the AD? There were only two fundamental objectives of *Ujamaa*: to build socialism and to make the nation self-reliant. In the following section these two intentions will be examined in the order in which they are mentioned here.

### 1.2.1. The intention of building Socialism

Socialism in the AD is defined by four main principles: (i) human equality; (ii) state ownership of property; (iii) democracy; and (iv) freedom. I will briefly describe these principles here without comment as they will be the subject of discussion in Chapters Three and Five of this thesis. First then is the principle of equality. According to Nyerere (1977), the principle of equality states that “all human beings are equal” (p.13). The kind of equality Nyerere (1977) proclaims in the AD, is equality in terms of rights and opportunities. Rights
which are specifically mentioned include the right to dignity and respect, to participate at all levels of government, to freedom of expression, movement, religious belief and association, the right to life and property and the right to a just wage. In terms of opportunity, the document states the principle aim of TANU is “to see that the government gives equal opportunity to all men and women irrespective of race, religion or status” (Ibid p. 15).

The second principle concerns itself with ownership of property and is expressed in the AD as follows:

> to build and maintain socialism it is essential that all the major means of production and exchange in the nation are controlled and owned by the peasants through the machinery of their government and their co-operatives (Ibid p. 16)

Thus that state ownership of the major means of production is one of the basic tenets of *Ujamaa*.

The third principle that defined *Ujamaa* in the AD is that of democracy, described in the following terms:

> For a country to be socialist, it is essential that its government is chosen and led by the peasants and workers themselves…true socialism cannot exist without democracy also existing in the society (Ibid p. 17).

Hence, popular democracy is an essential component of socialism or *Ujamaa* in the AD.

The last principle in this order relates to the freedom or independence of Tanzania and its people. In the AD, the principle of freedom appears as a right and as one of the principle
objectives. As a right the principle states that “every citizen has the right to freedom of expression, movement, of religious belief and of association within the law” (Nyerere, 1977, p.13). But as one of the principle objectives of TANU, the principle is stated as follows: to “consolidate and maintain the independence of this country and the freedom of its people” (*Ibid* p. 14). The question of the origin of some of these principles will be discussed in detail in Chapter Three of this thesis, but for the time being it is worth noting that the AD provided a more refined version of *Ujamaa* which incorporates principles from both African socialism and western liberalism. How then was socialism to be achieved? This is the question that will be answered in the following section.

1.2.1.1. Strategies towards achieving Socialism

In order to build socialism the government embarked on the implementation of three main programmes: the nationalisation of the major means of production, the creation of *Ujamaa* villages and the establishment of the leadership code. I shall be making an assessment of these programmes later in this thesis. For now I will simply highlight the basic tenets of each, and facts and figures about their implementation. However, before describing these strategies and their implementation, I wish to draw attention to one of the chief misunderstandings that this account may cause. By identifying nationalisation, *Ujamaa* villages, and leadership code as strategies of socialism I do not wish to suggest that these programmes were irrelevant to the second intention of *Ujamaa*, one of self-reliance, on the contrary, they were strategies for self-reliance as much as they were for socialism.

Nationalisation, for instance, was a move equally towards socialism and towards self-reliance. For as we shall see in this chapter, in order to be self-reliant, it is necessary to own
the major means of production and such ownership is a pre-requisite for socialism. Hence, these programmes were interlinked because they were based on related principles. Nyerere states as much when he writes that: “The Arusha Declaration was an integrated programme of actions based on linked principles” (Nyerere, 1977, p. 93).

Thus, the AD enunciated programmes such as nationalisation and Ujamaa villages were not arbitrary but were instead linked to the aforementioned principles of Ujamaa. Therefore, while I have distinguished the programmes of Ujamaa here for reasons of clarity, they should not be separated because together they formed one coherent policy – the policy of Ujamaa. Having put forwards this precautionary note, in the following section I resume the task of describing the programme of nationalisation, which was briefly suspended above.

1.2.1.1.1. Nationalisation

Nationalisation was a programme that sought to bring the major means of production in the country under state control. Underlying this programme was the belief that “the root [cause] of exploitation of man by man is the institution of the private property” (Ngombale-Mwiru, 1973, p. 53). Private property was, therefore, considered to be the chief enemy of socialism, a stance that led Nyerere (1977) to declare in the AD that, state ownership of the means of production is the condition sine qua non for socialism. What this meant in terms of implementation was expressed by Ngombale Mwiru (1973), who stated that “all the healthy forces of the nation should be geared towards overthrowing private capital” (ibid. p.53). Mwiru uses the term ‘the healthy forces of the nation’ to refer to the state apparatus, including inter alia the police forces, the army, and the administration, which were mobilised to overthrow the institution of the private property. But, here too a note of caution is in order.
Although it is only following the AD that the government began to mobilise state apparatus for this purpose, the move away from private property slowly began shortly after independence and gathered momentum after the AD. It is against this background that commentators on *Ujamaa* such as Loxley (1973) and Biersteker (1980) make a distinction between nationalisation prior to the AD, that is from 1960-1967 and nationalisation after the AD, i.e. from 1967 to 1980s. In the following section, these two phases of nationalisation will be discussed in the order in which they are mentioned here.

First is the phase of gradualism and what was actually done. From 1960-1966 the state embarked on a step by step or gradual process of nationalisation of the major means of production. This stage involved the nationalisation of land and some banks, such as the Land Bank, the activities of which were taken over in 1963 by the Agricultural Credit Agency (ACA) which started “[lending] money to African farmers for medium and long term development” (Loxley, 1973, p.104). Also in 1963 the government established the National Housing Corporation, “to provide ‘low cost houses’” (*Ibid* p.105), and the National Insurance Corporation (NIC). This was followed in 1964 by the creation of the National Development Corporation, the “most important vehicle for initiating and implementing industrial development projects” (*ibid*). Furthermore, in 1965, the government bought sixty per cent of the shares in the Tanzanian Bank of Commerce “to ensure that profits on government banking business stayed in the government sector” (*Ibid*). In short, it can be said that the government was slowly moving towards a state controlled economy during the first phase.
Then, there followed the phase of rapid nationalisation and policy realisation. From 1967 to the 1980s, the government embarked on a systematic overthrow, in a sense of nationalising the major means of production. According to de la Rue (1973), on the 6th February, 1967, the day after its promulgation Nyerere gave a very long speech explaining the content of the AD to an audience in Dar-es-Salaam. Reporting on the events that followed the promulgation of the AD, Duggan and Civille (1976 p.92) note that on the 10th February 1967, Nyerere also addressed members of the diplomatic corps stationed in Dar-es-Salaam about the “theme of self-reliance for Tanzanian citizens.”

The next day, on the 11th February 1967, Nyerere announced the nationalisation of foreign banks, firms involved with food processing, insurance companies, and import-export and whole sale trade and assured the nation that “the government would assume controlling interest in breweries, shoe manufacturing, tobacco, container plants and eventually all sisal plantations [and]…full and fair compensation would eventually be paid” (Duggan and Civille, 1976, p. 93). For some in the business community in Tanzania the announcement was the cause of “glum uncertainty” (de la Rue, 1973, p.41), but for the ordinary people “jubilation was widespread – for a week happy parades, rallies and meetings gave Dar-es-Salaam a carnival atmosphere” (ibid.). De la Rue (1973) continues to explain that “hope and happiness not resentment and hatred, were the emotions dominating the throng” (Ibid). The prevalence of these emotions suggests that most ordinary citizens believed the programme of nationalisation offered them a better future. Meanwhile, leaders in the public sector, such as managers, the civil service and advisors began “[hammering] out details, policies and strategies for the translation of the Arusha Declaration into effective actions “(Ibid).
In general, the nationalisation programme took the following pattern: firstly, some companies were completely taken over by the government. The second category comprised companies in which the government was an equal share holder and the third category consisted of activities which were reserved exclusively for the public sector and activities requiring public sector majority ownership. For clarity these categories and processes are tabularised overleaf.
Table 1.1: The Companies that were Completely Taken Over by the Government

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COMPANY TAKEN OVER BY THE GOVERNMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Smith Mackenzie and Co. Ltd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Dalgety East Africa Ltd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. International Trading and Credit Company of Tanganyika</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Co-operative Supply Association of Tanganyika Ltd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Baumann and Co. (Tanganyika) Ltd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Twentsche Overseas Trading Company Ltd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. African Mercantile Company (Overseas) Company Ltd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Wigglesworth and Company (Africa) Ltd</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Biersteker, 1980, p. 238
Table 1.2: Companies in which the Government had a Majority Share and Private Partner

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Company Name</th>
<th>NDC</th>
<th>Foreign Partner</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Williamson Diamonds Ltd</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>Wilcroft Company-Bermuda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Portland Cement Co.Ltd</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>Cementia Hodg.Zurich and Assoc. Portland Cement Zambia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Metal Box Co. of Tanzania Ltd</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>Metal Box Company (UK)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Tanzania Publishing House</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>MacMillan and Company Ltd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>B.A.T. Tanzania Ltd</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>British American Tobacco Co.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Tanzania Breweries</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>East African Breweries Ltd (Associated with Allied Breweries, UK)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Tanganyika Packers</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>Brook Bond Liebig Group</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Nursery- Bray 1980 pp. 64-65
### Table 1.3 Economic Activities Requiring Exclusive or Majority Ownership and Activities Requiring Public Sector Majority Ownership

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Activities Reserved Exclusively for the Public Sector</th>
<th>Activities Requiring Public-Sector Majority Ownership</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Large scale processing of maize and paddy</td>
<td>Mining</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>External and wholesale trade</td>
<td>Machine tools</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Banking</td>
<td>Motor cars</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Insurance</td>
<td>Fertiliser</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Arms</td>
<td>Cement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Electricity</td>
<td>Breweries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Posts</td>
<td>Textiles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Telecommunications</td>
<td>Cigarettes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Railways</td>
<td>Shoes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Radio</td>
<td>Metal Containers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Water</td>
<td>Extracts</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Rugumamu, 1997, p. 127
In short, *Ujamaa*’s policy of nationalisation of the means of production from 1967 until its abandonment in 1985, is summed up in the following figure:

Figure 1.1 Nationalisation of the Means of Production in Tanzania (1967 – 1985)
1.2.1.1.2. Creation of *Ujamaa Villages*

Having described in the last section the basic tenets of the policy of nationalisation and its implementation I will now examine the basic convictions of the programme of *Ujamaa* villages and its implementation. The basic claims underpinning this programme were expressed in a policy paper that Nyerere published in September 1967 under the title: *Socialism and Rural Development*. In this paper he argues for a return to the pattern of settlement which prevailed in African traditional societies. He writes:

> The traditional African family lived according to the basic principles of Ujamaa. Its members ...lived together and worked together because that was how they understood life, and how they reinforced each other against the difficulties they had to contend with…” (Nyerere, 1977, p.106).

Nyerere was convinced that if by living and working together, traditional societies were able to overcome the challenges of their time – i.e. sickness, uncertainties of weather and depredation by wild animals – then, the contemporary generation of Africans could also overcome their development challenges by living together and working for the common good. In the policy paper this argument is expressed in the following terms:

> We shall achieve the goals we in this country have set ourselves if the basis of Tanzanian life consists of rural economic and social communities where people live together and work together for the good of all, and which are interlocked so that all the different communities also work together in co-operation for the common good of the nation as a whole” (*Ibid* p. 120).

What Nyerere was in effect proposing is that

> “Tanzania should move from being a nation of individual peasant producers …to a nation of Ujamaa villages where the people cooperate directly in small groups and where these small groups co-operate together for joint enterprises”(*ibid*. p.143).  


How then was this transition to be effected? What methods or approaches were employed? In order to turn Tanzania into a nation of *Ujamaa* villages three methods were used: the *selective approach*, the ‘*frontal approach*’ and the *use of force*. Let me describe these approaches beginning with the first.

The selective approach, which involved Nyerere himself in conjunction with some party leaders, was used from September 1967 to the 1970s. They embarked on the task of explaining the contents of the policy of Socialism and Rural Development and at the same time encouraged peasants in rural areas to voluntarily create *Ujamaa* villages. The government provided “schools, paramedical services, water, aid for village industries, agricultural extension services and, in some more exceptional circumstances, electric power” to those who responded immediately to the call to move into *Ujamaa* villages (Nursey-Bray, 1980, p.66). This approach, however, did not lead to the creation of many *Ujamaa* villages. It is estimated that by the late 1970s there were less than 2000 villages in the entire country and the government realised that there was no great eagerness on the part of peasants to move into *Ujamaa* villages, however, attractive and promising they were made to look. Mascarenhas (1979) has estimated that “in 1970, there were slightly less than 2,000 villages but the number had increased to over 4,000 the following year” (p.154).

The ‘*Frontal Approach*’ was the next attempt to turn Tanzania into a nation of *Ujamaa* villages. This, according to Mascarenhas (1979), was a “more comprehensive strategy in which the whole range of government and political institutions were mobilised behind the principle of *Ujamaa*” (p.151). The government sought to involve everyone in the country,
especially, everyone in TANU and other political actors towards the creation of *Ujamaa* villages. Consequently, government officials made many mistakes. As Hyden (1980), states, “the bureaucrats virtually without exception turned to an authoritarian, managerial approach” (p.106). As a result some peasants were subjected to abuse and intimidation and others were moved into locations which “were unsuitable for agriculture” (Boesen, 1979, p. 130). Owing to the mismanagement in the implementation of the programme, Nyerere cautioned that no one was justified to force people into *Ujamaa* villages.

No one can be forced into *Ujamaa* villages and no official – at any level - can go and tell members of an *Ujamaa* village what they should do together, and what they should continue to do as *Ujamaa* farmers. No official of the government or party can go to an *Ujamaa* village and tell the members what they must grow (Nyerere, 1974, p. 36-37).

Mascarenhas (1979) has estimated that by 1973, “less than a fifth of Tanzanian population lived in villages” (p.153). As such, less than 2.4 million people, out of a population of twelve million, were living in *Ujamaa* villages. Unhappy with the slow pace of resettlement a new approach was employed.

Force was the final approach used to transform Tanzania into a country of *Ujamaa* villages. In November 1973, Nyerere complained during a national radio broadcast that while the government was doing a lot, the people “had remained idle and evaded their responsibility to make a contribution to the country’s socialist development” (Hyden, 1980, p.130). He concluded the broadcast by saying that “he knew he could not turn people into socialists by force, but what his government could do was to ensure that everybody lived in a village” and this should “be done before the end of 1976” (*ibid*.). The following day the state apparatus were set in motion and the resettlements by force began. It is estimated that by “1977 two out
of three persons in Tanzania resided in villages” (Mascarenhas, 1979, p. 153). I will be assessing this programme in Chapter Six of this thesis; at this juncture I merely point out that when Ujamaa was abandoned in the mid 1980s almost all Tanzanians in the rural areas lived in Ujamaa villages.

1.2.1.1.3. The Leadership Code

In the following section I will examine the leadership code, the third measure taken to create socialism. The leadership code was a set of rules that prohibited the leaders of TANU and the government from engaging in capitalist practices. It was not an elaborate programme of action like nationalisation or the creation of Ujamaa villages that had specific documents to explain it. A few, self-explanatory prohibitions were outlined in the AD; given the brevity of the listed prohibitions, it is better to discuss them in Chapter Six of this thesis. For now, it is enough to note that the fundamental purpose of the rules was to prevent leaders from becoming involved in capitalist undertakings, which we shall also identify in the said chapter.

1.2.2. The Intention to be Self-Reliant

Having described in the last section how Ujamaa was laid out in the first part of the AD, I will now examine the second intention of the AD, that of self-reliance. The main objective of this policy was to enable Tanzanians to develop without simultaneously jeopardising their freedom and independence. In the AD, the attainment of these objectives was premised on a number of requirements which involved: Tanzanians and their own resources; a proper understanding of the place of money in development; and agriculture, hard work and intelligence. I examine each of these requirements in the order in which they are mentioned here.
1.2.2.1. Dependence on Local Manpower and Resources

First is the requirement of local people and their resources. The AD argued that for a poor country like Tanzania to develop whilst maintaining its freedom and independence it must first and foremost depend on its local people and resources. Nyerere (1977) urges this when he writes: “for our development we have to depend upon ourselves and our own resources” (p. 95). In a speech at an OAU meeting in Lagos, Nyerere (2011) paraphrases this principle when he writes:

It is we, the people of Africa, who experience, in our lives, the meaning of poverty. It is we, therefore, who can be expected to fight that poverty. Certainly, no one else will do it if we do not” (p. 37)

Hence, for Nyerere (1977), the primary responsibility for eradicating poverty lies with the common people. It is these ordinary people who must take measures to get rid of poverty. The claim that the poor have to depend on themselves and their own resources to bring about their own development does not, in Nyerere’s (1977) consideration, “imply isolationism, either politically or economically [but rather] it means that we shall depend on ourselves, not on others” (p. 99). In Ujamaa, therefore, the first requirement for development was not reliance on richer nations and their resources but dependence on the local resources and manpower. Under Ujamaa, therefore, to be self-reliant was to assume responsibility for one’s own development and ask for help only when it was absolutely necessary.

1.2.2.2. Monetary Dependence

Attention now turns to the second requirement of self-reliance, which prohibits the poor from depending on money. In the AD, Nyerere reprimanded those in the country who believed that money is the basis of development. He objected to this stance for a number of reasons: first,
Nyerere (1977) argued that “a poor man does not use money as a weapon” (p. 18). By this, he was suggesting that a poor person who chose money as his ‘weapon’ to get him out of poverty was doomed to failure because he had chosen to fight poverty with a weapon he did not have. Thus, to Nyerere, poverty must be fought with weapons to which Tanzanians could lay claim on. The ‘weapon’ to fight poverty that Tanzania had in abundance was land, which led Nyerere (1977) to state “Tanzanians can live well without depending on help from outside if they use their land properly” (p. 33). Secondly, Nyerere argued that money donated in terms of gifts, loans and private investments could not be depended upon for development because in the final analysis they would endanger the freedom and the independence of Tanzania. Issuing this warning, Nyerere (2011) writes:

[ sometime] we find ourselves being encouraged to act in a certain manner, because aid will be forthcoming only if we do so [and] at every point…we find our real freedom to make economic, social and political choices being jeopardised by our need of economic development (p. 6).

Nyerere makes the point that attached to loans and aids are conditions that often oblige the recipient to make certain political decisions that are objectionable to donors. Nyerere asserts that “independence means self-reliance [and] independence cannot be real if a nation depends upon gifts and loans from another for its development” (Nyerere, 1977, p. 23). Finally, Nyerere contended that the foundation of development would not be money. The following statement from the AD is to the point: “between money and people it is obvious that the people and their hard work are the foundation of development, and money is one of the fruits of that hard work” (ibid. p.33). Nyerere, therefore, urged Tanzanians to place money in its proper context and to bear in mind that people and their hard work were the foundations of development. Nyerere was suggesting that money resulted from hard work; it did not simply
fall from trees. Thus in the AD, and by extension, for *Ujamaa’s* self-reliance was not about dependence on money as the basis of development but rather dependence on local resources.

### 1.2.2.3. Beliefs in Agriculture, Hard Work, and Intelligence

The principle of self-reliance implied that in order to develop, Tanzania could not place too much emphasis on industries because “[Tanzania did] not have the means to establish many modern industries” (Nyerere, 1977, p. 26). In practical terms this meant that Tanzania “did not have either the necessary finances or the technical know-how” (*ibid.*). Thus, the AD identified agriculture as the basis of Tanzania’s development. This was deemed possible because “a great part of Tanzania’s land is fertile and gets sufficient rain” (*ibid.* p. 29). Because of the fertility of its land and sufficient rainfall Tanzania was considered to be a country that “[could] produce various crops for home consumption and for export” (*ibid.*).

However, in the AD Nyerere insisted that high agricultural production was only possible if two main conditions were met: hard work and intelligence (working smart). With respect to hard work, the AD instructed wage earners to “work for more than 45 hours a week” and obliged men in villages and some women in towns to stop wasting time in “gossip, dancing and drinking” (*ibid.* p.30) and get back to work. With respect to intelligence, Nyerere (1977) in the AD instructed farmers to combine hard work with intelligence. In practical terms, this meant, teaching farmers to modernise and improve their farming techniques through the employment of best agricultural practices such as the application of fertilisers, insecticides and understanding the right time for planting, weeding and harvesting. In sum, the doctrine of self-reliance expressed in the second part of the AD emphasized the use of local resources and manpower, a proper understanding of the place of money in development, agriculture, hard work and intelligence. This is how the question of self-reliance stood in the second part of the Arusha Declaration. What then was the strategy for attaining this objective of self-
reliance? The AD proposed education as the main strategy for self-reliance. In the following section this is the programme that will be examined.

1.2.1.2. Education as a Strategy for Self-Reliance

The strategy for self-reliance was spelt out in a policy booklet published by Nyerere in March 1967, under the title, ‘Education for Self-Reliance’ (ESR). In this document Nyerere argues that the education offered during colonialism and which Tanzania continued to provide was not relevant to the kind of society that existed in the country or to the aspirations of Tanzanians to build a socialist and self-reliant society. In Nyerere’s (1977) view, the kind of education that was being offered “was elitist” (p.54), it was bookish in a sense that it fostered the belief that “knowledge which is worthwhile is acquired from books or from ‘educated people’” (ibid. p.56). It was individualistic, in that it encouraged students to only care about themselves and not others; It fostered “subservient attitudes and white collar skills” (ibid. p.46); and it was “taking out of productive works some of its healthiest and strong young men and women” (ibid. p.59), just to read and contributing nothing in terms of production. In other words, the education system was training the young people just to consume and not to produce or as Nyerere put it, “they do not learn as they work, they simply learn” (ibid.).

In the policy paper, Nyerere (1977) maintained that the first objective of education in Tanzania was “to foster the social goals of living together and working together for the common good” (p.52). To encourage the young people to live and work together for their own good is, for Nyerere, a task which presupposes preparation of students “to play a dynamic and constructive part in the development of the society” (Ibid). The society in which students are supposed to play an active role and develop is not an individualistic society, but
one “in which all members share fairly in the good or bad fortunes of the group” (ibid). This means the young people were supposed to develop an egalitarian society. To attain that objective, Nyerere deemed it important to groom young people in attitudes that were necessary for community living. As Nyerere pointed out:

The education system of Tanzania must emphasize cooperative endeavour, not individual advancement...in particular, our education must counteract the temptation to intellectual arrogance; for it leads to the well educated despising those whose abilities are non-academic (ibid.).

The second objective of education was “to prepare young people for the work they will be called upon to do in the society which exists in Tanzania” (Ibid). Interpretations of the kind of society that existed in Tanzania differed but, according to Nyerere, it was a “rural society where improvement depended largely upon the efforts of the people in agriculture and in village development” (Ibid). If Tanzanian society was a rural society of farmers then it follows that the work that young people would be called upon to do after successful completion of their studies is agriculture. The second objective of education in Tanzania, therefore, was to prepare young people to become farmers.

In short, the policy paper on education for self reliance (ESR) proposed that “the education provided by Tanzania for the students of Tanzania must serve the purpose of Tanzania” (ibid. p. 74). In a more practical vein this means that:

[Education in Tanzania] must encourage the growth of the socialist values we aspire to. It must encourage the development of a proud, independent and free citizenry which relies upon itself for its own development, and which knows the advantages and the problems of co-operation (Ibid).

To meet these objectives the government took several measures: firstly, the minimum age of primary school enrolment was raised from five or six years to seven years, so that the “child
is older when he leaves school” (*ibid.* p.60), that is to say, when a person is mature and responsible enough to work in the village. Secondly, “examinations were down-graded in government and public esteem” (*ibid.* p.62), so they were no longer the only criterion by which to judge the suitability of students and finally, schools in the country were obliged to become communities and centres of production. This is what Nyerere espouses when he writes: “schools must in fact become communities – and communities which practice the precepts of self-reliance” (Nyerere, 1977, p. 64). In more practical terms:

> All schools …must contribute to their own upkeep; they must be economic communities as well as social and educational communities. Each school should have, as an integral part of it, a farm or a workshop which provides the food eaten by the community and makes some contribution to the total national income (*ibid.*)

With this policy statement, the dichotomy between study and manual work was abolished and productive activities became part and parcel of the education system in Tanzania. Whether the policy produced socialists who were self-reliant is the question I address in the sixth chapter of this thesis. Suffice only to note here that these were the basic tenets of the programme of ESR, one of the main policies of *Ujamaa*.

**Conclusion**

The aim of this chapter was to outline the basic tenets of *Ujamaa* and the implementation of its policies and programmes, as they were depicted in the following texts: (i) the TANU pamphlet of 1962, (ii) the Arusha Declaration, and (iii) the policy papers issued after the AD.

In the TANU pamphlet, *Ujamaa* was simply an expression of brotherhood based on family bonds. In the brotherhood, members cared for one another, there were no classes, everybody
worked, property was held in common, and there was sharing of produce. This view of *Ujamaa* as a kind of brotherhood is refined in the AD, where the key ideas depicting *Ujamaa* or socialism are the principles of equality, freedom, democracy, and state ownership of means of production and self-reliance. It was shown that in order to build socialism the government decided to nationalise the major means of production, create *Ujamaa* villages in rural areas and introduce a leadership code or rules prohibiting political actors from participating in capitalist endeavours. An examination of the programme of nationalisation showed that the government did not control all the major means of production. There were some companies that were under full state control, and there were also some activities in which the government had either majority or equal shares.

To transition from being a nation of individual peasant producers with capitalist instincts to a nation of socialist producers, the government decided to create *Ujamaa* villages. An examination of the programme of *Ujamaa* villages showed that they were created by force.

In order to cease being a nation dependant on developed countries and become a self-reliant nation, the government discouraged the use of money and emphasis was instead placed on agriculture, hard work, intelligence and dependence on local resources and manpower. To reach this goal, the government launched the policy of education for self-reliance, which restructured the Tanzanian education system by turning schools into communities that practiced the precepts of socialism and self-reliance.
In sum, *Ujamaa* was an expression of human equality, popular democracy, state ownership of property, self-reliance and freedom. To create a society where these principles would prevail, the government embarked on a systematic implementation of a number of programmes, including, nationalisation of the means of production, creation of *Ujamaa* villages in rural areas, establishment of the leadership code and implementation of education for self-reliance. The question that this account raises is why did Nyerere articulate *Ujamaa*? Put simply: why *Ujamaa*? This is the question that will be answered in the following chapter.
CHAPTER TWO
HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF UJAMAA

2. Introduction
In the previous chapter I described the fundamental ideas of Ujamaa and the implementation of its policies and programmes in order to depict it in its concrete historical manifestations. It was emphasized that Ujamaa was anchored in the notion of brotherhood that embraces the principles of equality, freedom, democracy, state property ownership and self-reliance. Yet, it is also the affirmation of such attitudes and principles that differentiated Ujamaa from other political movements of post-colonial Africa.15

Having described the core beliefs that comprise the foundations of Ujamaa in the foregoing chapter I now investigate the conditions that influenced its development by raising the following question what were the circumstances that influenced the formulation and articulation of Ujamaa? Why did Nyerere construct Ujamaa? What inspired him to conceive the policy of Ujamaa? The argument that is advanced in this chapter is that Nyerere’s construction of Ujamaa was influenced, at least in part, by his interpretation of the slave trade and colonialism. In order to establish the impact of these historical events on the formulation and articulation of Ujamaa, two major tasks will be undertaken: firstly, a description of the historical facts followed immediately by the second task, a depiction of the perceived consequences and how they fed into Ujamaa.

15 For example, Consciencism, a political movement which was started by Kwame Nkrumah, the first president of Ghana, and Negritude, which was started by Leopold Sedar Senghor, the first president of Senegal, and Humanism by Kenneth Kaunda, Zambia’s first president.
Before considering these historical events and their consequences, however, a precautionary note must be made. Although Nyerere studied British and Economic History, during his second year at the University of Edinburgh in Scotland, Nyerere did not write any essays on the subject of the slave trade and colonialism (Hatch 1976). The historical narratives described here, therefore, are not his; rather they are from historians who have commented on the history of Tanzania and Africa. However, this does not mean that Nyerere was uninterested in history or that historical events did not influence his thoughts or that he was indifferent to the slave trade and colonialism. On the contrary, history was very important to Nyerere and according to Hatch (1976), historical events that shaped Tanzania and wider Africa were the reason Nyerere chose to study in Britain and why he decided to study an arts/humanities based course despite his background in biology. This is what Hatch writes with respect to Nyerere’s objective of study in Britain.

Nyerere arrived in Britain on 12th April 1949. ...He liked the biology he had been teaching...and it had been his strongest subject in the examinations...But he had not come to Britain to expand his scientific knowledge. His object was to develop his own philosophy, to read extensively, to listen and exchange ideas with students and staff, to seek the answers to the many queries which increasingly perplexed him [and] above all, he was searching to understand why his country was ruled by foreigners, why he and his people had to obey orders given by aliens with little comprehension of African values, traditions or ambitions” (Hatch, 1976, p. 26).

It is clear from this passage that colonialism was one of the issues that concerned Nyerere and he was searching for answers on the subject. Given the political activities initiated by Nyerere following these studies, such as the formation of a political party to demand independence, and given the way Ujamaa was articulated, it can be observed that Nyerere returned from the UK with some clear ideas about why Africans were enslaved, why Africa was partitioned and
eventually colonised and what needed to be done in order to counter the consequences of the slave trade and colonialism. My aim in this chapter, therefore, is not to describe the origin of the transatlantic slave trade and colonialism according to Nyerere, but rather to simply state the facts as they are recorded by historians and to identify which consequences Nyerere believed to be, at least in part, rooted in those events and subsequently the influence of those consequences on the formulation and articulation of *Ujamaa*. The purpose of this is not to endorse Nyerere’s view of the slave trade and colonialism but to demonstrate the conditions that inspired him to articulate *Ujamaa* in the way that he did.

Having detailed the aims of this chapter, I will now examine each of the events and their respective consequences in the chronological order beginning with the slave trade, especially from the second half of the 18th century to the end of the 19th century.

### 2.1. Slave Trade

Slave trade, on a small scale,\(^ {16} \) has a long history in Tanzania (Roberts 1969; Alpers 1969) whereas the trade on an industrial scale\(^ {17} \) was relatively a new phenomenon that developed during the second half of the eighteenth century due to two factors: (i) the involvement of

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\(^{16}\) Historians believe that slave trade on a small scale existed in Tanganyika and that it began in pre-1000 AD. It is most probable that it began in the 8th or 9th century, when Islam was starting to grow and expand into regions of East Africa (Roberts, 1969, p. 35). Whilst the number of slaves involved in the trade increased during the 16th century, when Portugal occupied the East African coast even with Portuguese involvement, this did not exceed one thousand slaves a year (Alpers, 1967, p. 5). Because of the small number of slaves involved, slave trade did not, become historically significant, in a sense that it did not radically change the history of Tanganyika, in particular, and East Africa, in general (Alpers, 1968, p. 235).

\(^{17}\) From the beginning of the second half of the eighteenth century to the end of the nineteenth century, slave trading was no longer a small incidence, instead it became what Alpers (1967) termed a “factor of continuing historical significance” for Tanganyika, in particular and East Africa, in general. It became a phenomenon that radically changed the history of Tanganyika and the other Eastern and central African countries. It was slave trade on an industrial scale (see Alpers, E. Historical Association of Tanzania Paper No.3, *The East African Slave Trade*, East African Publishing House, Nairobi, 1967, p. 1-26).
many European countries and (ii) the establishment of cloves on the islands of Pemba and Zanzibar. Until 1850, Portugal was the only European country involved in slave trade. Later, however, the French and British also engaged in the trade when they established plantations of sugarcane, cotton and cloves in the Comoros, Sainte Marie, Mauritius and the Seychelles, which were labour intensive (Alpers 1967). Lacking indigenous agricultural workers they turned to East Africa to acquire slaves (Alpers, 1967; Roberts 1969).

Next, having gained control of Zanzibar and Pemba, the Imam of Muscat, Seyyid Said, established “cloves and coconut farms [which] needed plenty of labour to collect the abundant harvests” (Roberts, 1969, p.37)\(^\text{18}\) and the number of slaves increased to reflect this. Thus, in addition to their shipment of slaves to Arabia and Persia for domestic servitude, Oman settlers now required labourers specifically for the clove plantations on the islands of Zanzibar and Pemba (Alpers, 1969, 1968). To meet the increasing demand, Arab caravans could not confine themselves solely to the coast; rather they had to push into the interior of Tanganyika in search for slaves (Listowel, 1965). There were four main routes into mainland Tanganyika\(^\text{19}\) which enabled slave traders to reach almost every tribe.\(^\text{20}\)

\(^{18}\) Initially the indigenous populations of the two islands were compelled to work for the Arabs during the forest clearance, timber–cutting and harvest seasons. But when the plantations began to produce crops, indigenous labour proved insufficient and had to be supplemented by slaves from mainland Tanganyika (see Rweyemamu (1973), p. 10).

\(^{19}\) The first route (or the southern route) that passed along the Ruaha valley through Ukimbu, originated in Kilwa Kivinje and ran to Lake Nyasa. The second route, also originated in Kilwa Kivinje but passed through Zungumero, Kilosa, Mpwapwa, to Unyamwezi (present day Tabora), where it continued on to Mwanza and Mombasa or to Buganda through Karagwe in Bukoba. The third route or the central route, which was the most active route, started in Zanzibar and ran to Bagamoyo, Sadani, or Pangani. From these three coastal towns, the route then passed through Ugogo (present day Dodoma) to Unyanyembe, also present day Tabora, where the route split and branched off to Ujiji, on Lake Tanganyika. There were also other routes that did not go into the mainland. The fourth or the coastal route, for example, connected towns such as Kilwa Kivinje, Dar-es-Salaam (Mzizima), Bagamoyo, Sadani and Pangani.
2.1.1. Consequences of the Slave Trade

The effects of the slave trade that had a direct bearing on the origin of *Ujamaa* mainly occurred in the social and economic sphere. In the following section, these two areas will be discussed in turn beginning with the social aspect.

2.1.1.1. Effects of Slave Trade in the Social Sphere

2.1.1.1.1. Dehumanisation of the African Person

The dehumanisation aspect of many Africans was a crucial factor influencing the formulation and articulation of *Ujamaa*. During the slave trade, the humanity and self-esteem of the slaves were reduced to a bare minimum if not completely eliminated, for instance, at the time they were captured and during their transportation. According to Walter Rodney (2001), slaves were not obtained through trade in the normal sense of buying and selling of goods, but through warfare, trickery, banditry and kidnapping. Judith Listowel (1965) has also noted that on other occasions traders bribed local chiefs to procure slaves, who when unsuccessful through bribery, raided villages and took captives. This method of obtaining slaves is an example that shows the extent to which the humanity of slaves was reduced.

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20 The Ha and the Zinza in the west, the Haya in the North-West, the Gogo, Sukuma and Nyamwezi in the centre, the Sagara, Zaramo and Luguru in the East and the Yao, Makonde, Makua and Hehe in the southern parts of the country were either directly involved in or felt the consequences of slave trade.
With regard to the transportation of slaves Listowel (1965) and Alpers (1967), have shown that slaves were trekked from mainland Tanganyika to Bagamoyo.\textsuperscript{21} Describing the journey of the captives from the mainland to the coast, Listowel writes:

\begin{quote}
[they] walked in long pathetic lines, yoked together, carrying on their heads elephant tusks, bundles of cloth, beads and grain with raiders escorts matching beside them with ready whip for the weary and ready to sword down those who could not march any more (Listowel, 1965, p. 12)
\end{quote}

Describing how the captives were chained together, Alpers (1967) explains:

\begin{quote}
Adults were usually fastened to each other by means of the infamous heavy wooden sticks (Swahili: kongwa), or by metal collars and chains. Children were normally tied together with ropes (Alpers, 1967, p. 23-24)
\end{quote}

These methods of obtaining slaves and transporting them show the extent to which the dignity of slaves was diminished. This treatment of slaves reduced them to a level of chattels or commodities that could be bought and sold in a market.

This is the back-story of \textit{Ujamaa}; it was, conceived against the background of a trade that had reduced many Africans to commodities. Instead of endorsing social organisations that incorporate slavery and slave trade, systems that treat human beings as objects, Nyerere was adamant that such as trade, or other structures of power and powerlessness must not be a feature of future organisations in Tanzania, such as \textit{Ujamaa}. Rather, as will be discussed in Chapter Three of this thesis, Nyerere stressed that these organisation must incorporate the principles of equality of all human beings and their rights and freedom.

\textsuperscript{21} Bagamoyo is a coastal town in Tanzania, not far from Dar-es-Salaam, the commercial capital of Tanzania, where the slave market was located and where slaves were shipped to various locations around the world.
2.1.1.1.2. Loss of Self-Confidence

Another factor witnessed in the social sphere that influenced the formulation and articulation of Ujamaa is the ‘loss of self-confidence’ among some Africans. Nyerere believed that one of the most damaging effects of the slave trade was that “it caused our people to have grave doubts about their own abilities” (Nyerere, 1966, p.3). ‘Our people’ refers to Africans in Tanzania, since they were the victims of the slave trade and who, according to Nyerere, ‘lost confidence in their own abilities’ (ibid.). Nyerere maintained that the ‘loss of self-confidence’, was not accidental but rather it was an essential characteristic of all oppressors. He argues that, “any dominating group seeks to destroy the confidence of those they dominate because this helps them to maintain their position” (Ibid). This is another backstory of Ujamaa, which was formed and articulated against a backdrop of people who, as a consequence of the slave trade, had lost confidence in their abilities. In contrast to views that continued to undermine the confidence of Africans, Nyerere asserted that a future movement of liberation, such as Ujamaa, must have as its “vital task...to restore the people’s self-confidence” (Ibid). The measures taken to restore confidence among the African people will be examined in chapter four of this thesis. At this juncture I merely point out that loss of self-confidence is one of the conditions that influenced the formulation and articulation of Ujamaa.

2.1.1.2. The Economic Effects of Slave Trade

Having described in the last section, the consequences of slave trade in the social sector which influenced the development of Ujamaa, I will now in this section examine the economic consequences of slave trade and their influence on Ujamaa. One of the main
consequences of slave trade in the economic sphere was poverty. The economic factors that aggravated poverty were essentially twofold: inter-tribal (civil) wars and population depletion.

2.1.1.2.1. Poverty due to Civil Wars

Inter-tribal wars during the slave trade era arose out of the desire for wealth and political power; desires that drove, some Chagga chiefs to raid neighbouring chiefdoms in order to obtain captives that could be sold to slave traders (Alpers, 1967). Other chiefs, like the chief of Usangu, for example, acquired guns from slave traders and battled to ascend to power. Once in power and armed with these weapons the chief carried out extensive slave raids against other chiefdoms therefore unleashing widespread violence and inter-tribal conflicts (ibid.).

Inter-tribal wars had devastating consequences for the traditional economy. Describing the effects of civil wars, Alpers (1967, p.25) notes that “whenever a raid on a village took place there was death and destruction [and] many more people died defending their homes and families”. Consequently, Alpers continues:

“It was not always possible to grow enough food for all the people. Famine increasingly became a problem. People were often so badly off that they sold themselves, or their children, into slavery as a way of keeping themselves and their families alive. Some were reduced to kidnapping other people (Alpers, 1967, p.20).

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22 Throughout this thesis, I will be using the term poverty to signify a situation of deprivation, both spiritual and material.

23 This is an area in south central Tanzania.
Hence, the civil wars created chaos, killed or led to the enslavement of many people, destroyed property and, seriously stunted the traditional economy by reducing its productivity. As a result endemic famine and hunger ensued. This inability to meet even the most basic human nutritional requirements is the impoverishment that Nyerere and his colleagues in government were reacting against when they formulated and articulated *Ujamaa*.

### 2.1.1.2.2. Poverty due to Population Loss

One of the characteristic features of the slave trade is that almost all the captives from Africa were shipped to the outside world (Rodney 2001). Estimates of Tanzanian captives shipped abroad differ, but Alpers (1967) claims that in 1811 approximately 10,000 slaves arrived at the coast for sale. The number of slaves more than quadrupled to 45,000 in 1839. In the 1860s the number of slaves sold at the market in Zanzibar increased to approximately 70,000 (*ibid.*). The situation in Kilwa Kivinje, another slave market in Southern Tanganyika, was also dire. Drawing upon the records preserved by eminent explorer Captain Richard Burton, Alpers (1967) reports that, between 1862 and 1867, a total of 97,203 slaves were legally exported24 from Kilwa Kivinje. The combined number of enslaved individuals from Tanganyika alone is staggering. Such a massive displacement and transfer of people from diverse areas of the country for the purpose of forced labour elsewhere in the world inevitably depleted the number of inhabitants in this region25 (Rodney, 2001).

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24 This number does not include the “several thousands more [slaves who] were smuggled away from Kilwa to avoid paying taxes to the Sultan’s treasury” (Alpers, 1967, pp. 11-12).

25 Due to the lack of records, it is not possible to ascertain the population of Tanganyika before, during and after the period of slave trade. However, Rodney has shown that from 1650 to 1850, the slave trade era, the population of Africa in general did not exceed one hundred million. Thus for two centuries, the population of the African continent was stagnant, indicating that few children were born during this period. It is reasonable to
The impact of population loss on the economic development of the Tanzanian society becomes even more apparent when one considers that slave traders took the most able, strong and competent members of society. In Rodney’s (2001) account, these included young men and women between fifteen and thirty-five years old, who were healthy insofar as they had survived small-pox and were subsequently immune to further attacks of that nature. These are the kind of slaves who could be bought by the European merchants and who are the people who eventually left the country. As such, the problems to Tanganyika’s economy were not limited merely to the quantity (the numerical toll of the population loss), but also by the quality of that loss (the loss of the healthiest and productive members of society).

The consequences of population loss, is succinctly summarised by Tanzanian nationalist economist Justinian Rweyemamu:

The productivity of the traditional economy was determined by the available manpower. The slave trade, which drained the country of the most active section of its population, seriously undermined the traditional economy by reducing its productivity [and as a result] famines increasingly became a problem (Rweyemamu, 1973, p 9).

By depleting the country of its workforce, the slave trade triggered low production, which in turn gave rise to famine, hunger and a general lack of basic material goods. It was against this background of poverty or material deprivation as a combined effect of civil war and population loss, which Nyerere was reacting against when he formulated *Ujamaa*. In sum, this section on slave trade has set out three conditions which influenced the development of *Ujamaa*: the dehumanisation of the African person, the loss of self-confidence in most

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assume that the population of Tanganyika also remained stagnant during this time. This is in contrast to Europe where statistics show an increase of the population (See Rodney, 2001, p.98)
Africans, and material poverty due to civil wars and population loss. Besides aiming at restoring rights and freedom of Africans, restoring self-confidence and eradicating poverty, *Ujamaa* also developed in order to counter the consequences of colonialism and the colonial system that had dominated Tanzania for more than seventy years. In the following section, consideration will be given to formal colonialism in Tanganyika, the second major external factor that influenced the formulation and articulation of Nyerere’s *Ujamaa*.

2.2. Formal Colonialism

Tanganyika formally became a colony of Germany in 1885, following the Berlin conference (1884-1885), which regulated European colonisation and trade in Africa. Then, after the First World War (1914-1918), Tanganyika became a League of Nations protectorate placed under Great Britain (1920-1961). In the following section, the colonial rule of these two powers is discussed in turn commencing with an account of German colonial rule.

2.2.1. German Colonial Rule

Although German explorers were present in Tanganyika prior to the Berlin conference, the official occupation of the territory did not take place until in 1891, when German soldiers, under the leadership of General Herman von Wisesmann, invaded Tanganyika, secured it as

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26 A full examination of the reasons for colonisation is outside the scope of this section. However, it is significant to note that Nyerere and his colleagues in government believed colonialism occurred because industrialised countries in Europe urgently needed colonies in order to exclusively monopolise their market and use their raw materials to feed the new European factories (Lenin, 1917, p.80). On this showing, colonialism was considered to be a product of the highest stage capitalism, the product of western liberalism.

27 Nearly all scholars of Tanzanian history, including Listowel (1965) Gwassa (1969) and Iliffe (1979), agree that the German conquest of Tanganyika was preceded by a visit of German explorer Karl Peters. In 1884 he duped chiefs in mainland Tanganyika into signing bogus treaties which effectively relinquished their territories and governance to Otto von Bismack, the then German chancellor.
a German colony\textsuperscript{28} and installed Julius von Soden, as the first governor (Duggan-Civille, 1976). Between 1888 and 1907, however, there were a total of eleven revolts or rebellions in various parts of the country against the German occupiers\textsuperscript{29} (Rweyemamu, 1973). It is worth mentioning at this juncture that the two major revolts famously known as the ‘Mkwawa Resistance’\textsuperscript{30} and the ‘Maji Maji\textsuperscript{31} Resistance’\textsuperscript{32} were ruthlessly crushed by German soldiers. Although the Germans had suppressed all revolts by 1908 and there was an uneasy calm in the territory, World War I broke out in 1914 and spread from Europe to their overseas colonies\textsuperscript{33} (Duggan-Cerville 1976). In German East Africa (Tanzania), General Lettow-Vorbeck put up a fierce resistance against the forces of the British General Smuts but was overpowered and finally fell to the British forces in 1918 (Duggan-Cerville, 1976). The

\textsuperscript{28} The Germans conquered the territory by terrorising the local chiefs through a public display of military prowess which included bearing firearms and holding mock battles to demonstrate the deadly qualities of the German army and its weaponry. When this mode of intimidation failed, actual military force was used to bring people under the control of the Germans (see Gwassa, 1969, pp.95-96).


\textsuperscript{30} This rebellion arose due to the refusal of the Germans to pay the levy for the trade route which passed through Mkwawa’s empires. Mkwawa responded by blocking the trade route. Angered by the closure of the route the Germans resolved to attack Mkwawa and his people. It was the beginning of a war that was to last seven years, and only end in 1898 when Mkwawa and his armies were finally defeated (see Listowel, 1965, pp.25-31).

\textsuperscript{31} The ‘Maji Maji’ rebellion or resistance is so named due to the faith that the warriors placed in water medicine. It was believed that upon drinking the medicinal water, the German bullets would dissolve and not penetrate the body of the fighters. The rebellion started because the Ngoni people of the south were tired of forced labour on cotton farms, the low cotton prices paid by the Germans and the cruelty of the German-appointed leaders, known as \textit{akidas}. In 1905, the people revolted. The Germans started a systematic suppression of the rebellion and quelled it in 1907 (Illife, 1979, pp.168-170).

\textsuperscript{32} The German version of the account still maintains that the ‘Maji Maji’ was the \textit{Aufstand}, literally meaning ‘an uprising and not a’ resistance’. Resistance, they argue is a British invention bent on portraying the German rule as brutal and thus not worthy of having colonies (see, Sunseri Thadeus, “Statist Narratives and the Maji Maji Ellipses”, The International Journal of African Historical Studies, Vol. 33, No.3, 200, pp.567-584). Many historians of Tanzania including Illife (1979), and Gwassa (1969), have taken the British interpretation of the event and refer to it as a war of resistance against foreign domination.

\textsuperscript{33} This war began as a conflict between two opposing European alliances: the Allied Coalition, centred around the Triple Entente of Great Britain, France and Russia but also including Serbia and Montenegro, and the Central Powers originally centred on the Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy. (Duggan-Civille, 1976, pp.22-23)
capitulation brought to an end the German control of the territory and the beginning of the British colonial rule, to which I now turn.

### 2.2.2. British Colonial Rule

The exact beginning of British rule in Tanganyika is difficult to determine. At the end of the First World War in 1918, an Allied supreme council consisting of victorious powers, including France, Britain, Italy, Japan and the United States was established to decide, *inter alia*, the future of the territories that prior to the war were under German rule (Duggan-Cirville 1976). The Allied council decided that German East Africa (present day Tanganyika, Rwanda and Burundi) should be placed under British and Belgian rule. Rwanda and Burundi were mandated to Belgium while Tanganyika became a British mandated territory under the League of Nations. Following this decision, the British appointed Sir Horace Byatt as its first governor of Tanganyika and the commander-in-chief of the armed forces (Duggan-Civille, 1976; Illife, 1979).

Before the Great Depression\(^ {34}\) came to an end in the 1940s, World War II broke out in September 1939. Although, Tanganyika did not become a battlefield for this war it had to contribute manpower to the war efforts of Britain as the imperial power.\(^ {35}\) At the end of

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\(^{34}\) It is generally accepted that this was the deepest, most widespread and longest economic collapse in the history of the modern industrial world. The Great Depression originated in the United States in 1929 following the Wall Street stock market crash and quickly spread to almost every country in the world. It caused a rapid decline in the production and sale of goods and a sudden rise in unemployment. see McElvain Roberts, “the Great Depression in the United States” in *Microsoft Encarta Encyclopaedia standard, 2004*

\(^{35}\) Estimates differ, but according to Listowel (1965), more than 92,000 people joined the ranks of the British army, the King African Rifle (KAR), to fight in Somalia, Abyssinia, Madagascar and Burma (Listowel,1965, pp.120-121).
WWII, the status of Tanganyika changed from being a mandate territory to a Trusteeship\textsuperscript{36} of the newly formed United Nations Organisation, with Britain maintained as the administrative power (Lisowel, 1965). Britain operated in that capacity until 1961 when Tanzania became independent.

2.3. Consequences of Formal Colonialism

Having sketched out formal colonialism under both German and British rule, I will now examine the consequences of colonialism\textsuperscript{37} in the social, political and economic fields. In the following section, these three fields will be examined in turn, beginning with the social sphere.

2.3.1. Social Consequences of Colonialism

There were numerous effects of colonialism in the social sector but the focus here will be on those that had a direct bearing on the origin and development of \textit{Ujamaa}, namely ‘rac(ial)ism’, the disappearance of the attitude of ‘brotherhood/familyhood’ and the individualism or selfishness. Let us describe each of these consequences beginning first, in the following section, with racialism.

\textsuperscript{36} The basic principles of mandate and trusteeship were essentially the same. Both pledged to protect and develop the interests of the African people, at least in theory; both provided that the administering power could not be unilaterally abolished and both allowed the administrative power to enable the African people to stand on their own feet as independent nations (Duggan-Civille, 1976, p.28) However, the United Nations Charter, was more explicit than the League of Nations in its objectives. It instructed the imperial power to provide education, social and political advancement as well as respect of human rights (Listowel, 1965, p.124), a request which was obviously not heeded given the situation in the territory.

\textsuperscript{37} It is not the intention here to enter into the well known debate between imperial scholars, such as Perham (1961), Gann (1967) and Duignan (1967), who have argued that the benefits of colonialism outweigh the negative effects and Marxist and nationalist scholars, such Rodney (1972), Nkrumah (1957) and Nyerere (1966) who have maintained that the negative effects of colonialism outweigh the positive ones because colonialism impoverished and underdeveloped Africa. Rather the aim is to describe some of the conditions which influenced the formation and articulation of \textit{Ujamaa}.
2.3.1.1. Ra(cial)ism

Racialism is the basic epistemological position that not only do races exist, but also that there are fundamental differences between them; it distinguishes people on the basis of the colour of their skin. This is to be contrasted with racism which assumes that some races are superior to others; or, in an altered meaning, refers to discrimination based on the concept of race. In Tanganyika, both concepts can generally be traced back to the colonial period, when the authority divided citizens along racial lines of Europeans, Indians and Africans. At the top of the hierarchy was the European race. This ethnic group was considered to be superior, insofar as it was the ruling race that controlled the economy, and whose social ethos was imposed in the territory. It was the race that enjoyed more privileges, rights, educational and employment opportunities and entitlements than any other in the territory. This statement from *Freedom and Unity* shows how Nyerere himself understood the racial situation in Tanzania:

The [European community in Tanzania] has a monopoly of political power and uses that power not only to prevent the other communities from having any share in the political power, but also to keep those other communities in a state of social and economic inferiority (Nyerere, 1966, p.24)

The second class comprised Indians who were the majority and other non-blacks, such as Lebanese and Arabs. The Asians, in particular were “in a dominant economic position, controlling wholesale, and retail trade and commerce” (Mwakikagile, 2002, p.92). On the racial ladder, Indians, Arabs and Lebanese occupied the middle class. They had fewer rights compared to their European counterparts but more rights, privileges and entitlements than Africans. At the bottom of the racial and social ladder were black Africans. Although people of the black race were the indigenous and majority population they did not possess the same level of civil rights and privileges as their European and Indian counterparts (Nyerere, 1968).
In the legislative council (LEGCO), for instance, “Africans were not only grossly under represented but deliberately discriminated against, and ignored in decision making (Ibid p.93). So in social terms, the society was characterised by rac(ial)ism. In Nyerere’s opinion, the organisation of a society along racial lines was a negative development which had to be rectified.

*Ujamaa* was shaped by Nyerere’s understanding of the racial problem in Tanzania. In contrast to views of hierarchy and superiority based on race, Nyerere asserted that all human beings are equal in dignity and worth and that in any country all citizens must have equal rights and duties. In order to counter rac(ial)ism Nyerere formulated *Ujamaa*, the fundamental principle of which was, as we shall see in the course of this thesis, the acceptance of the ‘principle of human equality’.

### 2.3.1.2. Disappearance of the Attitude of ‘Familyhood’

Another factor which influenced the conception and the development of *Ujamaa* concerned itself with the disappearance of the ‘attitude of familyhood or brotherhood’ which Nyerere believed enabled people in traditional African societies to care for one another. Throughout the colonial period almost all aspects of African traditional culture were undermined\(^\text{38}\) but it was the disappearance of the spirit of brotherhood, the spirit that motivated people in community to care for one another, which led Nyerere to think that future policy, such as

\(^\text{38}\) In the social sphere, colonialism destroyed African languages and religions. African languages were undermined in order to elevate English as the language of the colonial masters. Regarding religion, Albert De Jong (2001), a well known ecumenical researcher and missiologist has shown that missionaries in general and Dutch missionaries in particular, abolished African traditional religions which were considered to be less developed (de Jong, 2001, p.56) and replaced them with Christianity, the main religion of Europeans.
Ujamaa should aim at restoring it. Understood in this way and taking into account Nyerere’s understanding of the consequences of slave trade and colonialism, his construction of Ujamaa can be seen in part, as his attempt to restore the attitude of brotherhood or familyhood, which enabled people to care for one another and which was therefore, the foundation of community in traditional Africa. This is why he writes: “we must regain our former attitude of mind – our traditional African socialism – and apply it to the new societies we are building today” (Nyerere, 1977, p. 8). The attitude of mind that Nyerere is referring to here is the ‘attitude of brotherhood or familyhood’, that was discussed in chapter one of this thesis.39

2.3.1.3. Development of Individualism or Selfishness

In addition to the loss of the spirit of familyhood, another factor which influenced the development of Ujamaa concerned itself with the rise of individualism or selfishness in Tanzania and Africa as a whole. Nyerere believed that before the arrival of colonialists, Africans were ‘communitarians’ (Nyerere, 2000, p. 14) in their way of thinking and living and that they were “members of a genuine community or a brotherhood” (Ibid). He maintained that “an African could not think of himself apart from that community in which he lived” (ibid. p.13) and although as an individual he had his own wives and children, “he saw himself all the time as a member of a community” (ibid, pp.13-14). He could not, therefore, hoard wealth or let another member of the brotherhood go hungry without sharing food with them.

39 See, Chapter One, section 1.1.1.
The practices of the members of the brotherhood have already been explained in the last chapter. What is to be added here is that during the colonial period the central practices in the brotherhood, such as co-operation and sharing were in Nyerere’s thought undermined by the education system that was offered. That is what Nyerere means when he writes:

> The education system introduced into Tanzania by the colonialists...was based on the assumption of a colonialist and capitalist society. It emphasized and encouraged the individualistic instincts of mankind, instead of his cooperative instincts [and] it led to the possession of individual material wealth being the major criterion of social merit and worth” (Nyerere, 1977, p. 47).

It is the prevalence of the attitude of individualism and selfishness in society which led Nyerere to think that future policies such as *Ujamaa*, should aim at restoring the spirit of co-operation and sharing which prevailed in Africa before the arrival of colonialism. In sum it can be said that this section on the social consequences of formal colonialism shows that Nyerere’s construction of *Ujamaa*, was in part, an attempt by him to counter racism, and to restore the attitude of familyhood/brotherhood as well as co-operation and sharing.

### 2.3.2. Political Consequences of Colonialism

#### 2.3.2.1. Loss of Freedom or Independence

I will now examine the political consequences of colonialism and their influence on the development of *Ujamaa*. In the political sphere it was Nyerere’s determination to maintain and protect the independence of Tanzania and the freedom of its people which led to the development of *Ujamaa*. Nyerere believed that in the political sphere, one of the direct consequences of colonialism was the loss of freedom or independence. He maintained that

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40 See, Chapter One, section 1.1.2.
during colonialism Tanzanians lost the freedom to choose and act on their own political will and were instead forced to act on the will of other people, namely, the colonial masters.

The list of issues that Tanzanians were forced to accept is long but I shall only mention a few examples here: the first concerns itself with the colonial administration. One of the situations which in Nyerere’s opinion Africans were forced to accept and act upon it against their will was colonialism or colonial rule. The resistance mounted by Africans against colonialism has already been mentioned above, it suffices to simply mention here that after many crushed rebellions against colonial rule, most Africans were, “forced to recognise the framework of colonial rule as a fact and to concentrate on improving their positions within it until they could challenge it with some hope of success” (Iliffe, 1997, p. 124).

Thus, one of the political consequences of colonialism on the people of Tanzania was the loss of their independence, that is, the loss of the power for Tanzanians to govern themselves, to control themselves and decide about their destiny. For, instead of governing themselves according to their tribal political structures, Tanzanians were governed first by the Germans and then by the British, who established their own administrative bodies that were headed by governors (Gwassa 1997). In the case of the Germans, the governor enforced law, imperial edicts, and chancellor’s instructions. He was in charge of the defence forces and had power to make local decrees” (Gwassa, 1997, p. 103). Below the governor “were district officers who were in charge of everything in their districts” (Ibid). According to Gwassa (1997), the functions of the district officers included the collection of taxes, to administer justice, and to
appoint and dismiss local chiefs. This is the structure under which Africans were dominated and which deprived Africans of the power to act upon their own political choices and will.

Having lost the power to govern themselves, Tanzanians also lost control of their economy and the power to determine their economic activities. Another way of expressing this is to say that having been forced to accept the colonial rule Africans were also forced to accept colonial economic policies which emphasized “commercial agriculture, especially the growing of cash-crops for the world market such as coffee, sisal, cotton, rubber, tea, and timber” (Iliffe, 1997, p.134). Before, the arrival of colonialism the basis of Tanzania’s economy was not commercial agriculture but subsistence farming, whereby people cultivated the land not to produce crops for sale in foreign countries but for consumption in the family. The point is well made by Iliffe (1997) when he writes:

commercial agriculture was not the most important type of agriculture [but] the production of food for consumption at home and for local exchange has always been the basis of the Tanzanian economy (p. 134).

However, with the arrival of colonialism, commercial farming also began. Initially, most Tanzanians did not accept these commercial crops because they did not recognise them and as such they did not know how to produce them. One place where they were rejected was in southern Tanzania. There, the cotton programme was rejected not only because it was a foreign crop, but also because the Germans had occupied large tracts of land that was traditionally used for food production, a situation which “decimated the economy of the Wamatumbi” a tribe in southern Tanzania (Gwasssa, 1997, p. 121), but the resistance was
crushed. Later on commercial agriculture became compulsory through the introduction of a ‘hut tax’. According to Hyden (1980), the payment of the ‘hut tax’ was “possible both in kind, cash and public labour” (p. 43). This was not possible, however, for a people who did not have money and who had never had a monetary economy. To make payment of the hut-tax possible, the German colonial administration established certain conditions. The first condition was to plant cash crops such as coffee, sisal, tea, timber and cotton. But since Tanzanians did not know how to grow them, a person who took this option was supposed to enter into commercial dealings with the Germans in order to secure the money to pay the ‘hut tax’. The other alternative was to migrate and work on German-owned plantations where a labourer was paid money for the levy they owed. And the last option was to be arrested and face forced labour as a prisoner.

The payment of hut tax, therefore, obliged many people in different parts of the country to cultivate the cash crops the Germans wanted to produce in the territory. In northern Tanzania, for instance, coffee became the main cash crop for the people, whereas around the Lake Victoria Zone and in central Tanzania, cotton became the chief crop grown for profit. However, those who could not cultivate those crops became labourers, mostly in settler plantations. Sunseri (1993), has estimated that during German colonial rule, “more than ten per cent of the population of Tanganyika of about four million people were slaves or slave labourers” in the plantations of the German settlers (p.490). This means that on the one hand, the ‘hut tax’ obliged some Tanzanians to produce cash crops while on the other hand, the tax forced Tanzanians into cheap or slave labour. Whatever the outcome, this suggests that during the colonial period, Tanzanians were acting not on their own economic choices and will but rather on those of the colonial masters.
When Africans began to complain about the autocratic nature of the colonial governments, later following the Germans departure from the territory, the British introduced some seats in the Legislative Council 41 (LEGICO) or parliament. However, even in the LEGICO, Africans “were not only grossly underrepresented but deliberately discriminated against, and ignored in decision making” (Mwakikagile, 2002, p.93). Thus, in running the affairs of the territory, decisions of Africans did not count and even with their involvement in decision making bodies such as the LEGICO, Africans continued to act on the will of the colonisers.

This is the setting for Ujamaa. It was developed against the experience of a people who during more than seventy years of colonialism were not acting on their own accord and will but on those of the colonial administrators. Instead of maintaining the same system Nyerere believed that future policies must protect the independence or the freedom of Tanzanians to act on their own choices and will. Moreover, those future policies such as Ujamaa, must help Tanzanians to realise their own course of action, their own policies without impediments from foreign countries. Furthermore, the policies must help Tanzanians to be masters of their own destiny and not mastered by people from foreign countries. As will be shown during the course of this thesis, Ujamaa incorporated principles that also intended to prevent Tanzanians from being dominated by internal as well as foreign powers. Ujamaa’s success in heeding the will and choice of Tanzanians will become clearer in the sixth chapter of this

41 The Legislative Council was inaugurated on the 7th December 1926 and comprised twenty members, thirteen of whom were senior government officials and seven members who were appointed by the governor. The appointed members included five Europeans and two Asians. There were no Africans (See Listowel, 1965, p.79).
thesis. It is enough to state here that lack of freedom or independence was one of the factors that influenced the development of Ujamaa.

2.3.3. Economic Consequences of Colonialism

Having depicted the consequences of colonialism in the social and political spheres and their influences on the development of Ujamaa, I shall now explore what Nyerere considered to be negative consequences of colonialism in the economic sector, namely poverty and dependence and their influence to the development of Ujamaa.

2.3.3.1. Poverty

To Nyerere, the colonial system impoverished Tanzania through an unfair balance of trade with industrialised countries. The production of raw materials such as coffee, tea, sisal, and cotton during the colonial period depended to a large extent on slave labour. During the colonial period, for example, Tanzanians were used as cheap labourers wage by colonialists to produce raw materials as such coffee, tea, sisal, rubber and cotton. These commodities were then exported to Europe where they were processed, manufactured and sold back in the territory at exorbitant prices. Nyerere believed that, the system was not conducive to the eradication of poverty in Tanzania since “[what the producers of Tanzania] were in fact doing, was paying wages and profit to people in other countries for processing [goods from Tanzania]” (Nyerere, 1974, p.19). Instead of creating jobs and profits for the people of Tanzania, the system was sustaining industries and jobs in other countries. Expressing similar sentiments, Nsekela (1974), argued that the system was exacerbating poverty because producers of material goods in Tanzania were exploited, in that, they were poorly paid for producing raw materials, but well paid for the manufactured goods. Whilst it is accepted that processed goods have added value, which has to be paid for by the consumer, which is not
the point. The real issue for Nyerere was that the system was deliberately designed to exploit local producers. If the colonial system wanted to develop Tanzania, it should have created manufacturing industries to help provide employment and profit for local people. The absence of such development was a clear indication to Nyerere that colonialists were not interested in eradicating poverty in Tanzania. By insisting on exporting raw materials to their manufacturing industries, the internal sector of the Tanzanian economy deteriorated leaving the government unable to pay decent salaries, build infrastructures or provide better social services to its people.

In addition to the unfair international trade, poverty was intensified by the massive transfer of capital from the territory. In the estimation of nationalist scholars such as Nsekela (1974) and Mbilinyi (1974), Tanzania became poorer partly because of the activities of foreign investors who owned more than 90 per cent of the monetised sector of the economy (Mbilinyi et. al., in Ruhumbika, 1974). In short, foreign investors controlled the commercial banks, and manufacturing industries. These foreign companies, which were branches of multinational corporations, were “exporting more surplus than they invested” and this “stunted the growth of the indigenous capital” (Nsekela, 1974, p.110). The practical consequences of a stunted economy were many. They included hunger, famine, poor housing, poor clothes, poor health services and poor education for the majority. In short, the effects of a stunted economy were very poor conditions of living for the people.

*Ujamaa* was shaped by Nyerere’s understanding of international trade. In contrast to views which maintained that Tanzania’s or Africa’s trade with the developed nations was fair and
that foreign investors were the engine of development in the developing countries, Nyerere asserted that international trade was not fair and foreign investors were not to be relied upon because they exacerbated rather than eradicated poverty. This is why Nyerere thought that future policies such as *Ujamaa* must contain safeguards against the exploitation embedded in international trade and against foreign investors. As it will be discussed in Chapter Six of this thesis, *Ujamaa* aimed to emphasize self-reliance and nationalisation of the major means of production as safeguards against poverty caused by foreign exploitation and investors.

2.3.3.2. Dependence

Nyerere identified several factors which caused dependence. Poverty has been addressed above, it is therefore enough at this point to highlight that the condition of dependence was aggravated by two other factors: the lack of heavy industries and of technology. Nationalist scholars such as Mbilinyi (1974) have argued that prior to colonialism Tanzania was on a very secure technological foundation. After the arrival of colonialism, however, the technology developed by Africans was dismissed as “primitive” and replaced with the ‘imported’ European technologies which the local people did not understand (Mbilinyi, 1974, p.66). In order to function effectively the indigenous people would have to learn the newly introduced technology. However, the colonial administration had no intention of teaching the native population how to use it. Even when formal requests for European technology were made, “Europeans deliberately ignored African requests for skills and technology” (Rodney, 2001, p.107). To nationalists this refusal to transfer technology ensured that European

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42 The people of Tanganyika had developed an industrial manufacturing sector which produced farm tools such as axes and hoes, fishnets, fish traps, fishing rods, hooks, and lines for fishermen, and spears, bows, arrows, snares and knives, for hunters (Mbilinyi *et al.*, in Ruhumbika, 1974, p.62).
industries, established in the colonies, could only be maintained by Europeans and this inevitably led to technological dependence on the developed countries of the world.

Besides this dependence on European technologies, Nyerere also believed that the European industries that replaced traditional African ones were not essential manufacturing or priority industries but rather what nationalist economist, Mbilinyi has termed, “tertiary industries” (Mbilinyi, 1974, p. 67). That is to say, industries which “cater for elite tastes” (ibid.) and which could not be used to meet the needs of the people for further development. Typical tertiary industries include breweries and the cigarette-tobacco industries. Basic manufacturing such as the iron and textile industries, fertiliser plants, and farm implement factories were not built by the colonial administrators (ibid.). The failure of the colonial powers to establish an industrial infrastructure meant that Tanganyika did not have a strong economic or industrial base from which real economic development could take place. Ultimately, Tanzania found itself in a position where it had no choice but to depend on imports from the industrialised countries of the world.

Importing virtually everything from industrialised countries at a very high price, eventually eroded the financial capability of the country, and thus reinforced dependence on aids, loans and grants, from industrialised nations of the world for survival. *Ujamaa* reflects the desire of Nyerere to challenge this dependence on the industrialised countries by advocating the policy of self-reliance.
2.4. Conclusion

The aim of this chapter was to describe the historical conditions that influenced the development of Ujamaa. It was suggested that the development of Ujamaa was related to the historical events of the slave trade and colonialism. An examination of the slave trade identified several conditions that influenced the development of Ujamaa. In particular, it identified dehumanisation of the African person, the loss of self-confidence and material poverty due to civil wars and population loss as conditions which influenced the development of Ujamaa. An examination of formal colonialism also identified some conditions which influenced the development of Ujamaa. In particular, it identifies the conditions of racism, the disappearance of the attitude of brotherhood or familyhood, the development of individualism and selfishness, the loss of freedom or independence, and the conditions of poverty and dependency as conditions which influenced the development of Ujamaa.

Taking into consideration Nyerere’s understanding of both the slave trade and colonialism, his construction of Ujamaa can be considered in part, as an attempt to restore the human rights of the African people, to restore their self-confidence, and eradicate material poverty. In addition, Nyerere’s construction of Ujamaa can also be seen as an effort to eradicate racism, restore the attitudes of brotherhood, and of sharing and co-operation, and to protect the freedom or independence of Tanzania through self-reliance. Beyond the problems of the slave trade and colonialism, Nyerere’s Ujamaa was also linked to liberalism, the political philosophy that emerged in Europe during the Enlightenment age. The way this philosophy influenced the formulation and articulation of Nyerere’s Ujamaa will be the subject of the next chapter, to which I now turn.
CHAPTER THREE

LIBERAL ROOTS OF NYERERE’S UJAMAA

3. Introduction

The previous chapter suggested that when Nyerere’s understanding of the phenomena of slave trade and colonialism is taken into consideration, Nyerere’s construction of Ujamaa can be seen, in part, as him attempting to restore racial equality; restore respect for human rights, especially the human rights of African people; restore freedom or independence, eradicate poverty, restore self-confidence and community spirit, and restore the attitude of brotherhood and of self-reliance, conditions which in Nyerere’s consideration were either exacerbated or caused by slave trade and colonialism.

The question that is asked here is how did Nyerere think those conditions could be restored? To put the question differently, where did the solution to the problems of human rights abuse, poverty, racial inequality, individualism and selfishness, and loss of freedom come from? The answer to these problems came from various sources in different ideological traditions. The most prominent of these, were the ideological tradition of western liberalism, particularly Kantian liberalism and communitarian ethos of indigenous society. That is what Viktoria Stoger-Eising (2000) also means when she writes: “Nyerere tried to fuse European concepts deriving from Kantian liberalism with ethos derived his more communitarian native society” (p. 135). The communitarian elements which were integrated into Ujamaa will be examined later in the fourth chapter of this thesis.
In this chapter, the focus will be on some of the concepts that Nyerere borrowed from Kantian liberalism, particularly the concept of equality and the concept of freedom. The concept of individualism, which according to Heywood (1997), is “the core principle of liberal ideology” (Heywood, 1997, p. 41), will not be examined here because, as it will be shown in Chapter Four of this thesis, in Nyerere’s thought *Ujamaa* was based on the belief in community. It is upon this belief in community that *Ujamaa* was based but it is also here that Nyerere found himself in stark opposition with liberalism which, on the whole, had doubted if not totally rejected, community in its social, political and economic organisation. The question as to whether having rejected individualism *Ujamaa* could genuinely be said to be rooted in liberalism is a complex issue to pursue here. Suffice only to state that Nyerere incorporated into *Ujamaa* certain elements and not all elements of Kantian liberalism. It is hoped that by focusing on the specific concepts which Nyerere fused into *Ujamaa*, the extent to which *Ujamaa* is rooted in liberalism can be properly understood.

The procedure for showing that in his construction of Ujamaa Nyerere was influenced by some elements from the liberal tradition -- particularly by Kantian liberalism -- will be as follows: the first task will be to describe Nyerere interpretation of Kant’s conception of equality and freedom, and following immediately by the second task which is to describe the implication of those principles in *Ujamaa*. But before considering Nyerere’s interpretation of Kant and its implications for *Ujamaa*, a precautionary note about the link between Nyerere and Kantian liberalism is now in order. Nyerere, who constructed *Ujamaa*, rarely acknowledged his intellectual and academic sources. His writings have no footnotes, references or bibliography and for that reason it is not easy to determine the sources of his ideas, particularly those which fed into *Ujamaa*. However, it is generally accepted by the
scholars of Nyerere and *Ujamaa*, such as Bogues Anthony (2003), Bonny Ibhawoh & J.I.Dibua (2003), P.L.E. Idahosa (2004), and Anabel Skinner (2005), to mention but the most recent studies, that in his construction of *Ujamaa*, Nyerere was influenced by a particular brand of socialism known as Fabian socialism or democratic socialism. However, according to Michel Doyle (1983), Fabian or democratic socialism is a derivative of Kant. In his words:

From Kant’s moral philosophy, the liberal tradition did, evolve two high roads to individual freedom and social order; one is laissez-faire, or “conservative,” liberalism and the other is social welfare or social democratic, or “liberal” liberalism” (Doyle, 1983, p. 84)


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43 Fabian socialism sought to advance the principles of Democratic Socialism gradually through reforms. It was considered to be a moderate form of socialism because it rejected violence in bringing about a revolution. In addition it demanded a minimum wage, social justice, and espoused equality and other fundamental rights such as freedom of religion and press, democracy, the right to private property including ownership of the means of production and economic decisions are shaped by the market (see Doyle, Michael, ‘Kant, Liberal legacies and Foreign Affairs, Part Two, in Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 12, No. 4 (Fall 1983)

44 This is a moderate form of socialism adopted in western Europe, especially in Britain and Germany after the second world war partly as a reaction against libertarianism, or conservative liberalism.

45 Robert Nozick has argued that the ‘different principle’ which Rawls proposes is inconsistent with Kantian respect for the moral equality of the individual person and Communitarians, such as Michael Sandel (1997 [2006], and Charles Taylor, have argued that egalitarian commitments cannot be made through Kant’s conception of an individual person as an autonomous being (see Sandel, 1997 [2006], p. 239-247). Other scholars, however, such as Maria Cecilia Liotti (2003), have argued in defence of Rawl’s claim that his welfare liberalism is derived from Kant.
while Nyerere’s link to Kant’s liberalism is open to critique, it stands supported by one strand, the Kantian strand – the strand that argues that welfare liberalism is a derivative of Kant - of contemporary discussion. Having said that let me now begin to describe how Nyerere understood the concept of equality in Kant.

3.1. The Concept of Equality

First is the concept of equality, one of the European concepts derived from Kantian liberalism which was fused into Ujamaa. For Nyerere, the principle of equality in Kant is described in terms of rights and opportunities. In the following section these two aspects of the principle of human equality will be explored in turn beginning with the aspect of equality in terms rights.

3.1.1. Equality of Rights

In the first part of the Arusha Declaration, Nyerere (1977), identified a number of rights that he considered essential for Ujamaa. They include: the right to dignity and respect, the right to equal participation in government, the right to freedom of expression, movement, belief and association, the right to life and property, and the right to receive just wage. Since our space is limited I shall, in what follows focus on three rights: the right to dignity and respect, the right to democracy, and the right to receive a just wage. The procedure of examining each of these rights will be as follows: first, the right will be stated followed immediately by a passage showing the Kantian roots of that right. Finally a passage reflecting Nyerere’s use of the right will be presented.
3.1.1.1. Right to Dignity and Respect

First is the right to dignity and respect. Nyerere’s basic assertions about rights to dignity and respect, though expressed differently, are taken from Kant. Let us look at some examples: Nyerere’s assertion that “every individual has a right to dignity and respect” (Nyerere, 1977, p. 13), is basically a summary of Kant’s (2008) discourse on the concept of ‘person’. Similarly, Nyerere claims that the status of a person permitting or giving a person the right to respect is “his basic humanity” (Nyerere, 1966, p. 15), which is rationality and autonomy or freedom, is paraphrasing Kant, who in his Metaphysics of Morals (2008), argues that in a person, a status that has to be taken for granted and which therefore, gives a person dignity, is his nature as a rational and morally autonomous being.

Furthermore, Nyerere’s instruction to party and government leaders that people should not be treated as ‘things’ or as ‘objects’ which have no purposes of their own and, therefore, decisions about development “must come from the people themselves and that they themselves must carry out the programmes they have decided upon,” (Nyerere, 1974, p. 29) and should not be forced into action as if they have no purpose of their own, is derived from Kant’s second formulation of the ‘categorical imperative’ which directs a rational agent to “act so as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of any other, in every case as an end withal, never as means only” (Kant, 2008, p.50). Given this kind of reliance on Kant and the emphasis Nyerere placed on the dignity and respect of human person, we will now in this section describe some of the relevant sections of Kant. This is done from Nyerere’s perspective and is intended to help explain Nyerere’s reading of Kant.
In his reading of Kant’s moral philosophy, Nyerere understood that Kant linked the right to dignity and respect with a specific understanding of person. He understood that in Kant’s account, a person is described as a rational agent and an autonomous being. Kant states that, in the “kingdom of ends,” everything has a dignity or value, whatever is above all value, and therefore admits no equivalent has a dignity” (Kant, 2008, p.58). In Nyerere reading, the agent who is above all value, who has no equivalent and who, therefore, has a dignity or intrinsic worth is a person. According to Kant, “persons are called persons because their very nature points them out as ends in themselves, [which] is as something that must not be used merely as means” (ibid. p. 50). The very nature of persons is understood to be rationality and autonomy and this led Nyerere to believe that for Kant, a person has a dignity or intrinsic worth because her nature as a rational agent and autonomous being points her out as end in himself. Another way of expressing this is to say that, for Kant, “that, which can be an end itself, has an intrinsic worth, [a] dignity” (ibid. p.58) and since man conceives his own existence as an end in itself, rather than as a means to an end, he has intrinsic worth or dignity.

Nyerere believed that in Kant the notion of respect is also linked to the notion of person. For him, Kant believed that in his capacity as a rational agent, a person unlike a thing has the capacity to both enact laws for himself and to freely choose to abide by them. Nyerere believed that in Kant, it is the capacity for a person to enact laws and then abide by them

46 Kingdom of ends denotes a union of different rational agents into a system of common law. In this hypothetical or symbolic kingdom, all ends combine in a systematic whole (see Kant, 2008, p.56).

47 To understand the existence of a person as an end in itself is to recognise that “persons are not merely subjective ends whose existence has a worth for us as an effect of our acting but objective ends, that is, things whose existence is an end in itself; and end moreover for which no other can be substituted” (Kant, 2008, p. 50).
which makes persons deserve our respect as ends in themselves (Kant, 2008, p.56). In addition, in his capacity as an autonomous being, a person, unlike a thing, obeys no law which he has not enacted, and because he acts only on laws that he has himself enacted, Kant suggests that morally autonomous beings deserve our respect as ends in themselves and not as objects or means to an end only. Otteson (2009) has succinctly summarized Kant’s arguments on the dignity and worth of a person by writing that:

[in Kant] individual human beings have a dignity because of their natures as beings of a certain kind (namely, rational and autonomous), and this fact about them entails that these individuals must be respected, both by themselves and by others” (p. 290).

This brief account has been done to help us understand and articulate Nyerere’s understanding of Kant. The purpose of this thesis is to provide a conceptual map of Nyerere’s Ujamaa, in which some elements of Kant as Nyerere understood them are important. So following this initial sketch of Nyerere’s reading of Kant’s account of the right to dignity and respect let us now investigate their incorporation into Nyerere’s Ujamaa.

3.1.1.1. Dignity and Respect in Ujamaa

In Nyerere’s construction of Ujamaa, the idea of right to dignity was interpreted in a variety of ways: firstly, the right to dignity was considered to imply private or individual rights. Nyerere admitted that the word ‘equality’ is very difficult to describe because “there is no absolute and simple rule which can be easily applied everywhere and to all aspects of life in relation to equality” (Nyerere, 1966, p.15). Consequently, Nyerere stated that “we are

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48 If an old man and an active young man are both given ten acres of land to cultivate and a hoe, it would be a travesty to claim that they are equal because although each has been given equal means of production, one is handicapped and frail and the other is young and strong. It is the existence of such differences that make it impossible to have a simple rule of equality (see Nyerere, 1968, p.15).
forced back to the concept of human dignity” (ibid. p.15). How then is the right to dignity translated in Ujamaa? Explaining what human dignity means, Nyerere writes:

Every member of society must have safeguarded by society his basic humanity and the sacredness of his life-force [and] He must both be regarded, and be able to regard himself, as the human equal of all other members in relation to the society” (ibid. p. 15).

He suggests that in practice, the right to dignity imposes certain obligations on the individual as well as on the society to which the individual belongs. The first obligation is on the society; for it requires that the basic humanity, those elements that give worth to humankind namely, rationality and autonomy, of every of its member has to be protected. In other words, in a society there must not be people who are considered to be rational and autonomous or free and others who are considered not to be rational and free. In Nyerere’s view, these basic elements of humanity must be protected and respected by society. The second obligation is that society must protect the life of each of its members because as he says in the quotation, life is sacred. And lastly, the right to dignity requires an individual to consider all persons, including ones own self, as equal members of society. That is to say, one should consider all persons in one’s society as equal bearers of rights. The overall point, however, is that in Nyerere’s thought, the right to dignity is translated to mean the right to personal or individual rights. Furthermore, according to Nyerere, in the course of realising these individual rights the state has a \textit{prima facie} duty to protect\footnote{The word usually means to defend, to save from harm and to safeguard.} the rights of its citizens.

Secondly, having interpreted the word ‘equality’ to mean human ‘dignity’ and having described ‘dignity’ in terms of ‘rights’, Nyerere, goes on to argue that the dignity of a human
being is also a matter of a person’s well-being. Nyerere expresses the point in this way: “there is no human dignity in extreme poverty or debilitating disease – nor in the ignorance which buttresses these things” (Nyerere, 1968, p.15). This means that to Nyerere, there is no dignity in poverty, ignorance and diseases. To express this differently it can be said that for Nyerere, extreme poverty, debilitating diseases and ignorance are indications of the absence of rights. Where the basic rights of a certain group of people are not respected as it was for instance the case with colonialism, Africans became poorer and ignorant. Those whose rights were respected were materially prosperous and literate. Dignity in Nyerere view has therefore two aspects: the aspect of rights and the aspect of well-being, for the respect of one’s rights leads inevitable to one’s well being.

In Nyerere’s thought, a person’s well-being consists of goods that are necessary for a person to function. In addition to the basic human rights, Nyerere’s list of goods also includes basic material goods such as food, shelter, and clothing. He writes:

To a socialist, the first priority of production must be the manufacture and distribution of such goods as will allow every member of the society to have sufficient food, clothing and shelter to sustain a decent life (Nyerere, 1976, p. 11).

Thus, in Nyerere’s thought expression of the right to dignity requires the state to not only safeguard the basic rights and liberties of the citizens but also ensure that the basic material needs of every individual in society are met. That is to say, society has a prima facie duty to create and sustain conditions that enable people to produce enough food, erect decent houses and dress satisfactorily.
Thirdly, in Nyerere’s *Ujamaa*, “persons are not merely subjective ends whose existence has a worth for us as an effect of our acting but objective ends, that is, things whose existence is an end in itself; and end moreover for which no other can be substituted” (Kant, 2008, p. 50).

As explained in the previous chapter the status of Africans during slave trade and during colonialism contradicted this position entirely. Suffice it to say here that Nyerere’s *Ujamaa* was formed as an attempt to restore the dignity, the worth and the respect of Africans. The provisions of *Ujamaa* included guidelines that challenged “arrogant, contemptuous and oppressive leaders in the workplace” (Kweka, 1995, p.73). The guidelines also advised greater respect for the humanity of Africans in the workplace, a move that resulted in increased freedom for workers. In addition to the guideline against exploitative and abusive employers, Nyerere’s *Ujamaa* also opposed all forms and systems of slavery and colonialism. This included capitalism since Nyerere viewed it as a system with a propensity for using people, especially Africans as objects or a means to an end.

3.1.1.2. The Right to Democracy

I will now examine the Kantian root of the right to democracy. Nyerere’s assertions about democracy have parallels to Kantian assertions about the same. For instance, Nyerere’s claim that “Tanzania shall remain a republic with an executive head of state” (Nyerere, 1966, p. 261) is in conformity with Kant’s assertion that “republicanism is the best form of government” (Kant, 2009, p. 174). Similarly, Nyerere’s emphasis on the ‘the laws which govern the [people]’ (Nyerere, 1976, p. 5,) which is the constitution, has parallel with Kant’s assertion that “the republican constitution is the ultimate end of all public rights (Kant, 2009, p. 174). Finally, Nyerere’s assertions about the “freedom of the people to choose their
representatives” (Nyerere, 1966, p. 262), and about the formation of government with the separation of powers between the executive, legislative, and the judiciary, are assertions taken from Kant (2009), who in the *Science of Rights* argued for a republican form of government with a separation of those powers. Given Nyerere’s reliance on Kant’s views and given Nyerere’s emphasis on democracy, this section will describe some of the relevant sections of Kant from the position of how Nyerere interpreted them and is intended to help explain Nyerere’s reading of Kant and not as any kind of overview or summary of the right to democracy as it actually argued for by Kant.

Nyerere studied Kant in order to find out the best form of government that would replace the colonial government. In his reading of Kant, particularly, the *Science of Right* (2009), Nyerere came across different types of administration such as autocratic, aristocratic and democratic governments as well as republicanism (Kant, 2009). Nyerere understood that Kant drew a distinction between republicanism, in which the executive and the legislative powers are separated, and democracy, which Kant believed was destined to lead to despotism, when the executive powers begin to claim that they represent the popular will. Whatever the merits and disadvantages of each form of government, Nyerere believed that for Kant, the best form of government was republicanism because “(in it) the law is itself sovereign and is no longer attached to a particular person” (*ibid.* p.174). Since the constitution did not reflect the will of a particular person, Nyerere thought that for Kant, the republican constitution is “the ultimate end of all public right” (*ibid.* p.174). Moreover, Nyerere understood that for Kant, the republican state represents “the state in which every citizen can have what is his own peremptorily assigned to him” (*ibid.* p.174). This is how Kant argued it:
Every true republic is and can only be constituted by a representative system of the people. Such a representative system is instituted in name of the people, and is constituted by all the citizens being united together, in order, by means of their deputies, to protect and secure their rights.

From this Nyerere became convinced that for Kant a true civil state requires representative institutions, protection of individual rights, and the separation of the legislative, and executive powers. This brief account has been done to help articulate Nyerere’s understanding. The purpose of this thesis is only to provide a conceptual map of Nyerere’s *Ujamaa* in which elements of Kant are essential.

### 3.1.1.2.1. Democracy in Nyerere’s *Ujamaa*

Having described Nyerere’s understanding of democracy in Kant, we will now describe how Nyerere employed that understanding in his construction of *Ujamaa*. It is worth noting that Tanzania was not a democratic country during colonialism. Attempts to establish democracy in Tanzania were initiated by Nyerere. In the Arusha Declaration, Nyerere proclaimed that “every citizen is an integral part of the nation and has the right to take an equal part in Government at local, regional and national levels” (AD in Nyerere, 1968, p.13). Describing the aim and purpose of the right to democracy, Barcalow (2003) writes:

> [It is] intended to protect people from being excluded from government decisions that can have profound effects on their lives. It is directed against various forms of tyranny, and is intended to ensure that government is based on the freely given consent of the governed [and] in its general form, it is the right to participate in political decision making” (p.158).

Democracy as it was practiced in Tanzania had the hallmarks of democracy in western liberal societies insofar as representative institutions were established. The first representative institution, created almost immediately after independence in 1961, was the promulgation of
a republican constitution in 1962. The next was the parliament or legislature and the third was the establishment of the judiciary. The constitution identified the executive, the legislative and the judicial powers and defined their respective roles in a way as Nyerere had noted in Kant. Nyerere understood that for Kant, the executive power belonged to the president who is the regent of the state and the appointer of magistrates. The president or governor is under the authority of the law, bound to it by the supreme control of legislators, the parliament. Both the executives and the legislators do not exercise judicial functions rather they appoint judges as magistrates (Kant, 2009). Thus, when he came to power in 1962, state powers were constructed by Nyerere in a very similar arrangement\(^50\) with only minor departures. For example, the executive power in Tanzania comprises the President, who is the regent of the state, the Vice-President who is usually the President of Zanzibar, and the Prime Minister. Although over time Nyerere abolished multipartyism and Tanzania remained a \textit{de facto} one party state -- a move that tarnished the democratic credentials of Nyerere’s -- the representative institutions that he believed in were those spelt out by Kant, and they remained intact.

During colonialism people did not have any official say in the decision making process of the colonial government machinery nor were they called upon to elect their leaders. Using Zanaki, the place where Nyerere was born, as an example, Stoger-Eising (2000) points out that chiefs were appointed by the colonial administrators rather than the people. It was Nyerere’s government \textit{which} initiated the first attempt to get the people involved in choosing

\(^{50}\) See the 1977 Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania. For the executive powers, see Chapter Two, Article 33-61; for the legislative powers, see Chapter Three, Article 62-101 and for the functions of the Judiciary, see Chapter Five Article 108-128.
their political leaders. After independence they used the ‘right to democracy principle, to mobilise people into the decision making process. In popular democracy, the model promoted in Tanzania, the individual is considered an equal participant, and is usually placed at the centre of all social political and economic activities (Kweka 1995). The people have a positive role insofar as they elect and direct their representatives and initiate policies. The representatives act on behalf of the people by taking their views to the high organ of decision making. Thus, the ordinary citizen has a role in the government’s decision making process and in self governance (Kweka, 1995). The programme of creating Ujamaa villages, (which will be explored in depth in Chapter Five of this thesis was, in part, “[to enable] peasants to participate in the decision making on issues that affected their lives” (ibid. p.70), an idea which is reminiscent of Kant.

3.1.1.3. The Right to a Just Wage

Attention now turns to the Kantian roots of the right to a just wage. Like the other two rights described above, the right to a just wage is also rooted in Kant. Nyerere’s assertion that “every individual has the right to receive a just return for his labour” (Nyerere, 1977, p. 14), is a conclusion that is derived from Kant’s (2009), Discourse on the State. Since it is derived from there, this section will describe some of the relevant sections of Kant from Nyerere’s perspectives. Nyerere understood that for Kant, the question of a just wage was related to the question of the origin of the civil state and to Kant’s formulation of the categorical imperative. Kant describes the state as:

a civil union of men …who on account of their mutual influence on one another, require a juridical constitution uniting them under one will, in order that they may participate in what is right” (Kant, 2009, p.124).
By this account, Nyerere appreciated that the only reason people come together in a state, that is, in a civil union, is their desire to participate in what is right. If people knew that in a civil state their rights, including their right to a just wage would not be realised, they would have stayed in the state of nature, which according to Kant “is a state of society not yet regulated by right” (ibid. p.126). But people form the civil state precisely because it is regulated by right and in this state “everyone has his rights determined by law, what shall be recognised as his” (ibid, p.126). What belongs to a worker after labouring, that is their salary or wage, is already determined by law, the constitution. So the right to a just wage, to receive what they deserve after labour, is in a sense already contained in the original contract. Thus, in Nyerere’s reading of Kant, a just wage is not only a right in virtue of the nature of the state, but it is also a right in virtue of the external law, the constitution under which the people forming a state subject themselves. Conversely, an unjust wage is a violation of the original contract and as such it is a constitutive dimension of the state of nature and not a civil state.

With respect to the categorical imperative, Nyerere recognised that Kant identified two formulations: the first directs a rational agent to “act only on that maxim whereby he cannot at the same time will that it should become a universal law” (Kant, 2008, p.42). By this maxim, Nyerere understood that paying a just wage does not involve a contradiction when universalised since the employer who pays an unjust wage would like to receive a just one as labourer. With respect to the second formulation, Nyerere understood that it directs a rational agent to “act so as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of any other, in every case as an end withal, never as means only” (ibid. p.50). Nyerere interpreted this to mean that treating persons as an end in themselves involves having genuine and true regard for that person’s autonomy and rationality and paying them a just wage, would seem to be
consistent with a genuine regard for the person’s freedom and rationality. This brief account is done to help articulate Nyerere’s understanding. The purpose of this thesis is to provide a conceptual map of Nyerere’s *Ujamaa* in which elements of Kant’s liberalism are integrated. For that reason Nyerere understanding of Kant’s right to a just wage is important. This discussion then is in this context, not as broader critique of Kant.

### 3.1.1.3.1. Just Wage in *Ujamaa*

Having looked at how Nyerere understood the nature of the right to a just wage in Kant, I will now examine the use of that right in Nyerere’s *Ujamaa*. It has already been shown in the previous chapter how, for instance, the German colonial administration in Tanzania turned large numbers of people into slave labourers. Suffice only to mention here that during colonialism there were no systematic attempts by the colonial administrators to address the issue of unjust wage apart from the brutal repression of those who demanded a just wage.51

After independence Nyerere’s government initiated attempts to pay workers just wages because Nyerere believed that “every individual has the right to receive a just return for his labour” (Nyerere, 1977, p.14). Expressed in that way the assertion sounds easy to understand until the question is asked: what constitutes a ‘just’ return? In Nyerere’s thought the answer to that question stood between the status of the economy, the contribution of a worker to society and need. Discussion now turns to each of these factors beginning with the economy.

In his discourse on *Ujamaa*, Nyerere argued that a just wage is contingent upon the level of the economy of a particular society (Nyerere, 1974). He maintained that Tanzania, as a poor

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51 See the causes of the Maji Maji resistance described in Chapter One.
country, could not afford to pay its workers European or American salaries (Nyerere, 1974).

From a socialist perspective on the matter of a just wage, Nyerere writes:

The true socialist will demand only that return for his skilled work which he knows to be a fair one in proportion to the wealth or poverty of the whole society to which he belongs (Nyerere, 1977, p.10).

Since Tanzania was a poor country Nyerere stated that demands for just wages should be consistent with the poverty of the country. This translates into the belief that a just wage in a poor country is that which the country can afford to pay. This pragmatic approach acknowledges that society cannot pay what it does not have. It also makes it clear that just wage cannot be universalised because it depends on the economy of a particular country.\(^{52}\)

The second factor that influenced Nyerere’s understanding of a just wage was the contribution an individual makes to society. In his discourse on development Nyerere insisted that “every person [must] get a return commensurate with the contribution he makes to the society” (Nyerere, 1968, p.103).\(^{53}\) Nyerere goes on to explain that a society which prevents its citizens “from getting a fair share of the products of their own sweat and toil, needs putting right” (ibid. p.6). Thus to Nyerere, paying a just wage is a \textit{prima facie} duty of society; it is something society must do as part of its obligation to the individual. In regards to the general framework within which Nyerere described society, paying a just wage is a \textit{prima facie} duty of society. This is because it is the “basis on which society [could] hope to

\(^{52}\) If, for instance, an average Tanzanian citizen lives on less than one dollar a day, and an employee earns two dollars a day, by Tanzanian standards, the employee is much better off than the average Tanzanian and if the two dollars per day is what the government can afford to pay professionals, then to Nyerere that is a just wage – a just wage or an unjust one?

\(^{53}\) This does not include the sick, lame or elderly, who in Nyerere’s view should be cared for by society (1968, p.135).
operate harmoniously and in accordance with its purpose” (Nyerere, 1966, p.12), for, unless citizens get just rewards for their toil, “there will always be an inherent, although sometimes concealed, danger of a breakdown in society” (ibid. p. 12). The reason to pay just wage was, therefore, clear. What is questionable, however, is the maxim of ‘each according to his contribution’ that Nyerere defends as an approximation of equality. Ake (1975) states that the maxim is open to debate as a principle of justice because it does not establish the criteria for determining what constitutes a contribution to society. In Ake’s view it is imperative to set out what constitutes a contribution and what does not. Nyerere’s way around this conundrum was to argue that miners, for example, contribute more since their products command such a high artificial value as opposed to farming products which have intrinsic value (Nyerere, 1968). Hence, Nyerere asserted that workers in the mining sector could claim higher pay. A just wage in Ujamaa, then, not only depended on the economy but also the contribution made to society.

The third factor that influenced Nyerere’s stance on a just wage was need. The ‘need’ factor was employed because the application of the maxim that “every person [should] get a return commensurate with the contribution he makes to society” (Nyerere, 1977, p. 103) resulted in greater inequality rather than the equality it sought to achieve. Workers in the mining sector, for instance, received more income than their counterparts in other sectors who consequently went on strike to demand equal pay. Nyerere’s solution was to propose that workers whose jobs contribute more to society should not claim “a greater share of the profit of their own industry than they actually need; and if they insist …then that group is exploiting (or trying to exploit) its fellow human beings [and] it is displaying capitalist attitudes of mind” (Nyerere, 1968, p.9). In order to reflect a socialist attitude, employees in the mining sector
were discouraged from demanding more than they actually needed, which in Nyerere’s view were the bare essentials; food, shelter and clothing. Thus, a just wage for those who contribute more equated to the amounted required securing these basic needs. Does this mean that there were different standards for those who contributed more, and those who contributed less? And if the criterion is need, and the basic needs are the same for everyone, why was it wrong to pay all workers the same wage? A circular argument arises here: it was considered unjust to pay all workers the same wage since some contributed more to society than others yet in order to avoid greater inequality those who contributed more were not paid more. This is the circular argument that Nyerere employed to a disastrous effect.

3.1.2. Equality in Terms of Opportunity

Having looked at the principle of equality in terms of rights, and its use in Nyerere’s *Ujamaa*, I now turn to the principle of equality in terms of opportunity. In order to understand how Nyerere employed the idea of equal opportunity in Ujamaa, it is helpful to describe some of the relevant sections of John Rawls (1971), because the similarity between them is striking. For instance, Nyerere’s assertion that the “aim of TANU is to see that the government gives equal opportunity to all men and women irrespective of race, religion or status” (Nyerere, 1977, p. 15), is a practical application of the second principle, the ‘fair opportunity principle’ of John Rawls which states that “social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both …attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity” (Rawls, 1971, p. 302).

In Nyerere’s view, the purpose of making the arrangement open to all is to grant equality of opportunity. Equality of opportunity seeks to provide individuals with equal chances to
realise their unequal potentials (The practical implication of this for Nyerere was that, an individual should have the same chances to acquire the same qualifications regardless of the social and economic situations into which the individuals are born. Through his familiarity with social democracy or Fabian socialism that Rawls elaborates so well, Nyerere came to believe that people in society should not be entitled to goods simply because they happen to have the ‘right’ social status or simply because they happen to be from the ‘right’ race, gender, tribe or religion or ethnic group. Nyerere understood that Rawls rejected this system of share distribution because “it is so arbitrary from a moral point of view” (Rawls, 1971, p, 72). He understood that people with the same natural talents and willingness to use them should have equal prospects of success, regardless of where they start in life. For individuals to have equal chances and qualifications, individuals should have equal access to educational opportunities and health care services, and equal employment opportunities. For example, when an individual applies for a job, their case is considered entirely on the merits of their talent, skills and qualifications and not on social status. This brief account can help to understand Nyerere’s thought in which elements of Rawls’ theories, arguably a derivative of Kant, play an important part. The purpose is not to present an overview of the principle as it appears in Rawls but to show Nyerere’s reading of Rawls.

3.1.2.1. Equal Opportunity in Ujamaa

Having explored the roots of the right to equal opportunity in welfare liberalism, we will now examine how Nyerere constructed Ujamaa using his understanding of Rawls theory or principle of equal opportunity. The situation of educational and employment opportunities during the colonial period was described in Chapter Two of this thesis. It is enough at this juncture, therefore, to point out that race, religion and gender ceased to be the criteria for educational and employment opportunities after independence. Essentially, Nyerere
employed the principle of equal opportunity to initiate two main programmes in the education sector: first, was the nationalisation programme. Under this programme, the government nationalised all private schools in view of creating more educational opportunities available for Africans who had been alienated from education during colonialism. Secondly, the programme of education for self-reliance, which as will be discussed in the sixth chapter of the present thesis, was also one of the main programmes of which intended to provide qualifications for all who wanted.

The aim was not only to create more educational opportunities for all Tanzanians but also to create the kind of education that was needed in the society that was emerging. The criteria for employment opportunities was no longer race but educational qualifications, skills and good character, a condition which translates into a socialist attitude of serving the nation and of caring for one another. Thus, the institutions established by Nyerere’s government became open to everyone who possessed the necessary academic qualifications and the right mindset, that is to say the socialist attitude.

3.2. The Principle of Freedom

The foregoing section described the principle of equality and its application in the construction of Ujamaa. In this section, I will now examine another principle of western liberalism that was integrated into Ujamaa, namely, the principle of freedom. In a social setting, freedom is “the absence of constraint or restraint” (Merquior, 1991, p.6). A constraint or restraint can be construed as anything placed by one individual onto another so as to prevent them from doing what they otherwise could. Freedom, therefore, is independence from coercion. Coercion implies a deliberate interference by another human
being, within the area in which one could otherwise act (ibid). According to Muller (1971), freedom “always enters consciousness as ‘Free, hurrah’” (p.75). Keeping in mind this general meaning, Nyerere identified specific types of freedoms: i) national freedom or independence, ii) freedom from poverty, iii) personal freedom for the individual (i.e. freedom of speech, and freedom from arbitrary arrest, to mention a few rights) and iv) political freedom or democracy (Nyerere, 1974). The discussion in the current section, however, will be limited to the two freedoms awarded highest priority in Nyerere’s Ujamaa, namely, freedom from poverty, that is, development\textsuperscript{54} and national freedom or national independence.

3.2.1. National Freedom or Independence

First is an account of national freedom or independence and how it was used by Nyerere to construct Ujamaa. Nyerere’s description of national freedom is derived from Kant conception of external freedom. For instance, Nyerere’s assertion that rebellion against colonialism “rose …in response to a natural call, a call of the spirit, ringing in the heart of all men, and of all times, educated or uneducated, to rebel against foreign domination” (Nyerere, 1966, p. 41), is derived from Kant's account of external freedom. Since Nyerere relies so much on Kant’s account of external freedom, let me examine some relevant sections of Kant from Nyerere perspective. Kant described external freedom thus:\textsuperscript{55}

\textsuperscript{54} Given the requirements of different types of freedom and the concrete situation of poverty in Tanzania, Nyerere concluded that it was impossible to attain freedom in all the dimensions at once. Consequently, Nyerere argued that “we have somehow to reconcile desires which conflict in the short term and choose our priorities (Nyerere, 1966, p.313). In choosing priorities Nyerere asks: which of the following societies are better: is it better to have a society where everyone can talk while they are starving or to have a society where everyone has enough to eat but with limited freedom of expression? Nyerere’s response to the question is that “the freedom for all to live a decent life must take priority [and therefore], development must be considered first, and other matters examined in relation to it” (Nyerere, 1966, p.314).

\textsuperscript{55} I refer to Kant, The Science of Right, translated by W.Hastie, eBook@adelaide, 2009.
Freedom is independence of the compulsory will of another; and in so far as it can coexist with the freedom of all according to a universal law, it is the one sole original, inborn right belonging to every man in virtue of his humanity (Kant, 1797 [2009], p.21).

Nyerere understood this passage to have two components: the first explains external freedom as independence from coercion of other people’s will or choice. He understood that for a person to be externally free it is not the laws of nature which must be overcome, but rather human beings determining the choice and acts of other human beings. A person then is in Nyerere’s reading of Kant, politically or externally free, when they are not coerced to choose and act on the will of another person.

The second component that Nyerere observed concerns itself with the nature of external freedom. The passage elucidates that independence from coercion of the wills of others is the only innate right that belongs to all human beings by virtue of their humanity. This was interpreted by Nyerere to mean that for Kant, human beings are born free, which is to say, human beings are by nature free. As such human beings are by nature made to choose and act on their own will and not that of others. So much for Nyerere’s understanding of Kant’s idea of external freedom. Let me now in the following section examine Nyerere’s construction of Ujamaa using Kant’s idea of external freedom.

3.2.1.1. Negative Liberties in Ujamaa

In his construction of Ujamaa, Nyerere described national freedom as the “ability of the citizens of Tanzania (or any other society) to determine their own future and to govern

56 The concept of innate political freedom, contains within itself inextricable rights such as the right of every man to be a master of himself, the right to be treated justly, the right not to infringe the rights of others, and the right to communicate thought and say anything regardless of whether it is true or false (Kant, 2009, p. 22).
themselves without interference from non-Tanzanians” (Nyerere, 1974, p.25). As with Kant’s external freedom, the constraint in Nyerere’s national freedom is other people i.e. non-Tanzanians who interfere in the choices of Tanzanians. We have already seen in the first chapter of this thesis that during colonialism there was no national or external freedom, it is adequate then to simply highlight here that for Nyerere, national freedom signified independence of choosing and acting on the will (i.e. desires, values, principles, policies, ideas and development programmes) of the Tanzanian people and not that of the colonisers. This is a claim that resonates with Kant’s account of external freedom. Yet, not every will of the colonisers constituted interference, for this, in Nyerere’s view, consisted of constraints which prevent one from doing something that one wants to do and not the other way round.57

Nyerere’s Ujamaa, used national freedom to promote several liberties. In the social sector, for example, national freedom was used to guarantee freedom of expression, even though the media was owned by the government and the ruling party.58 Other freedoms guaranteed by the AD include that of movement, religious belief and association (Nyerere, 1968). The aim of promoting these and other liberties was to protect the autonomy of the Tanzanian people. In the economic sector, individual farmers were free to produce what they wanted but were

57 For instance if as a result of Tanzania’s decision to pursue socialist policies the international community suspends all financial aid to Tanzania, and Tanzania subsequently stops pursuing socialist policies, it can be said that Tanzania was prevented from doing something it wanted to do. The freedom of Tanzania to make its own choice of policy is in this case curtailed by the suspension of financial aid. The suspension of financial aid is, in this example, a constraint that constitutes interference. The non-suspension of funds by the international community, however, would not constitute a constraint, and it is therefore not interference.

58 There were only two daily newspapers, the government owned Daily News and Uhuru, (Swahili for freedom), and two weekly newspapers, the Sunday News, also government owned, and Mzalendo (Swahili for Nationalist) which belonged to the ruling party. There was only one Radio Station, Radio Tanzania Dar-es-Salaam (RTD), and there was no television.
prohibited from selling their products anywhere apart from the cooperative unions, which in turn could only sell at the State Trading Co-operation (STC). Traders and businesspeople were only permitted to sell goods produced in the country. Individuals could spend their money as they wished but were not allowed to use it to bribe government or party officials or set up illegal business such as prostitution or drug trafficking. As a matter of policy the government owned the major means of production. However, as we have already indicated in Chapter One and as we will come to see in Chapter Six, there were also some owned by private individuals. In sum it can be said national freedom facilitated the realisation of certain freedoms and liberties that did not exist during the colonial period.

3.2.2. Freedom to Development

I will now trace the Kantian roots of Nyerere’s freedom to development. Nyerere’s assertions about freedom to develop are derived from Kant’s account of the second type of freedom, namely, interchangeably termed transcendental freedom, freedom of the will or internal freedom. Because of the close link let me examine some section of Kant from Nyerere’s point of view. In Kant the freedom of the will or internal freedom is described as the “independence of the will from the determinate causes of the sensible world” (Kant, 2008, p.78). Nyerere understood this to mean that for Kant, a person is internally free when he/she is in control of himself, that is, when he is a master of oneself, and when he can actualise or realise himself. Nyerere understood that this kind of freedom is more concerned with internal factors affecting the degree to which an individual or community act autonomously. In sum, this is how Nyerere understood Kant’s account of internal or transcendental freedom. It is provided here not as a review of the concept as it is argued for by Kant but as a help for a conceptual map of Nyerere’s Ujamaa in which elements of Kant’s ideas of freedom are important.
3.2.2.1. Development: the Liberty Promoted

Having described in the last section, Nyerere understanding of Kant’s idea of internal freedom, I will now in this section show how the idea was used in the construction of Ujamaa. The establishment of external freedom, or political independence in Tanzania paved the way for Nyerere to deal with the much more complex task of helping Tanzanians to be masters of themselves and to realise themselves as rational and autonomous beings. Nyerere understood that Ignorance, disease and poverty were the internal factors which affected the autonomy of Tanzanians (as individuals and as a society as a whole) and which prevented them from fully realising themselves even following independence. He believed that internal freedom could not be achieved without embarking on a process designed to alleviate poverty, ignorance and disease, a process he called development. Nyerere concluded that a model of development conducive to the attainment of the freedom of the will must centre on freedom of the people (Nyerere, 1974). He explained that there were two factors which were essential for ignorant people to freely develop: “the first is leadership through education, and the second is democracy in decision making” (ibid. p.29). With respect to leadership through education Nyerere (1974), asserted that people should be persuaded and issues explained to them patiently without shouting at them, forcing or ordering them around. This was to be achieved through constructive suggestions and working with the people to actively demonstrate exactly what it is that they were being urged to do. It is through this kind of leadership and education that people can be helped to develop freely and thus gain the freedom of the will to realise themselves. In regards to democracy in decision making, Nyerere (1974), postulated that the discussion leading to decisions about development must be free, everyone must be listened to. Moreover, when a decision was reached, the view of the majority must be allowed to prevail and be accepted as a decision of all since, ‘freedom
without discipline is anarchy and discipline without freedom is tyranny’ (ibid. pp.30-35). It is through this kind of democracy that people can be helped to develop freely and thus gain the freedom of the will to realise themselves. The ideology which embodied this model of development is *Ujamaa* and as will shown in Chapter Four, Nyerere believed it was *Ujamaa* policy of self-reliance, that could aid Tanzanians bring about their own development, and in doing so gain the freedom of the will, the freedom to fully realise themselves.

### 3.3. Conclusion

This chapter has explored the roots of the core assumptions of Nyerere’s *Ujamaa*. In particular, it has shown that the principle of human equality, regarded by Nyerere as “the core and essence of [Ujamaa] socialism” and the principle from which “all the other characteristics of [Ujamaa] socialism follow” (Nyerere, 1976, p.4). I have also illustrated that the principle of freedom, considered by Nyerere as essential for describing man and development (Nyerere, 1974), had its roots in one of the major strands of western liberalism, the Kantian liberalism. In regards to the principle of human equality, Nyerere’s assumptions about rights and opportunities do not differ from Kant’s even though terms such as ‘dignity’ are expanded to include development and the word ‘respect’ is interpreted to mean protection. Similarly, Nyerere’s assumptions about the right to democracy and a just wage align with that of Kant even though in Nyerere’s Ujamaa (NU), there was difficulty determining exactly what constitutes a ‘just’ wage. The failure to reward those who contributed more to society and Nyerere’s own circular arguments did not help to solve the just wage question. Regarding the principle of freedom, we find the presumptions of Kant incorporated in *Ujamaa*. *Ujamaa* emphasized two main types of freedoms: national freedom and freedom from poverty. National freedom evokes Kant’s account of external freedom, that is to say independence from acting on the will of other people. By integrating Kant’s
idea of external freedom, which promoted negative liberties, Nyerere’s Ujamaa was able to protect personal freedoms for the individual including those of speech, movement, thought, and religion.

Freedom from poverty, on the other hand, evokes Kant’s account of the freedom of the will. Its role in Ujamaa was to promote the freedom to development. By integrating Kant’s idea of internal freedom, which promotes positive liberties, Nyerere’s Ujamaa pursued the development agenda, in the belief that the elimination of poverty, ignorance, and disease would enable people to gain the true freedom of full self-realisation. Yet Nyerere also understood that the multiple problems of poverty, racial inequalities, ignorance and dependence could not be resolved by pursuing a liberal agenda alone; in addition to the western liberal assumptions input from the local culture was also required. What then are the cultural elements or presumptions that formed Ujamaa? This question will be considered in the following chapter. During this exploration of the cultural roots we will come to see that the question surrounding the conceptual genesis of Ujamaa is almost fully answered and the conceptual map of Ujamaa has taken shape.
CHAPTER FOUR

INDIGENOUS ROOTS OF NYERERE’S UJAMAA

4. Introduction

In the preceding chapters we looked at two of the elements which Nyerere used to construct
Ujamaa: in Chapter One the preceding context of slave trade and colonialism and Nyerere’s
belief that Ujamaa should directly address some of the ills of the period. In Chapter Two, the
key elements which Nyerere took from his reading of Kant, namely, views of human rights,
equality and freedom. In this chapter we will explore a third constituent part of Ujamaa,
which is Nyerere’s commitment to traditional African beliefs and the features of these which
he used to construct Ujamaa. In particular, we will examine in this chapter Nyerere’s belief
in the extended family -- the smallest unit of society in traditional Africa -- and the features
of this unit which he used to construct Ujamaa.

In Socialism: The Basis of African Socialism (1977), Nyerere identified a number of features
from the extended family of traditional Africa but because of lack of space we will in this
chapter focus only on three characteristics which are easily recognisable in Ujamaa: (i)
participation or inclusion; (ii) sharing and co-operation; and (iii) communal ownership of
property.

In Nyerere’s thought each of these characteristics are exhibited in extended families of
traditional Africa and we will consider each characteristic: first, the practice or the
characteristic will be stated, followed immediately by a description of its roots in extended families in traditional African societies, and finally, a reflection of how it was used in Ujamaa. This procedure will be repeated for each feature but before getting underway, for the sake of clarity and logical connection, I will first preface this discussion with an account of the nature of extended families and its functions. Once this is done the three key elements which Nyerere used to construct Ujamaa will have been set out.

4.1. Nature of the Extended Family in Africa

Anthropologist Shorter (1973) has shown that traditional African societies were composed of many groups of various sizes: the basic unit or group was the extended family. The clan was slightly bigger and consisted of more than two extended families. Tribe was a bigger still as it was composed of numerous clans but the biggest was the ethnic group that comprised many tribes (Shorter, 1973). All members of an ethnic group were linked by common ancestry. Kinship established through a common ancestry was what distinguished one ethnic group from the other. The extended family occupies a central place in Nyerere’s thought because he believed that its ethos was the “foundation and the objective of African socialism” (Nyerere, 1977, p. 11). Extended families are usually made up of a “large number of people related by descent in one line from a living or recently dead common ancestors” (Shorter, 1973, p.64). The extended family comprises numerous nuclear households, which, unlike the nuclear families of the West, do not operate independently of each other.

There are two types of extended family, which are by nature different: the first is patrilineal, the “family situation in which status and property are inherited through the paternal line” (ibid. p.64) and the second is matrilineal, the “family situation in which status and property
are inherited through the maternal line” (ibid. p.164). Shorter estimated that the patrilineal family prevailed in Africa. Marriage was the supporting institution of the extended family in traditional African societies most of which were polygamous, insofar as they were “marriages which involves more than one wife” (ibid. p.172), rather than monogamous, “marriages involving a union of a man with one wife” (ibid. p.175). Polygamous marriages help explain why extended families were made up of so many people. Moreover, marriage in Africa is “communitarian, the alliance between groups” (ibid. p.166). It is precisely because of the size of extended family, that anthropologists including Shorter (1973 p.203), have noted that “the African extended family, more than the western nuclear family, is a community”. The term community has been defined differently by different scholars. According to Robert Bella (1998), for instance, the term community is “used to mean small-scale, face-to-face groups like the family, the congregation, and the small town” (Bella, 1998, p. 15). For Nyerere, however, (the term community refers to a “group of people who live together and work together for the good of all” (Nyerere, 1977, p. 120). He fails to mention, however, the ties that united people; in extended families, people lived and worked together because they were first and foremost, relatives bound by a common ancestry. Extended family was the basic unit of traditional African societies, and it exercised the strongest influence on Nyerere. This thesis will, therefore, examine this unit and some of its functions in the following section.

4.1.1. Functions of Extended Family

The functions of the extended family in traditional Africa were many but here I will limit the focus to those whose influence is most readily discernable in Nyerere’s *Ujamaa*: socialisation, security and production.
Extended family in traditional Africa was the natural context, in which a person was born, raised, socialised and educated. It is in the extended family that “an [African] child [was] indoctrinated” (Nyerere, 1966, p.14), or made to assimilate crucial information concerning themselves, the family to which they belong, and the society at large. Early on, a child was told “‘go to your brother’” or “‘that is your share’” and “criticised and punished if he disregards the courtesies due to other members of the social group, or fails to share the remaining food with a late-comer, or ignores the small duties entrusted to him” (ibid. p.14). Nyerere contends that this is the way a child raised in an extended family grew up knowing the courtesies due to particular family members, the values underpinning the family, and his rights within it.

The role of extended family was also to protect life, in a sense of defending its members from dangerous situation that can threaten life. The conditions of life in traditional Africa were hostile to human beings. As Nyerere (1977) observes, “the uncertainties of weather and sickness, the depredations of wild animals and the cycles of life and death” (p.106) threatened the very existence of Africans. Furthermore, people were “poor, insecure and frequently fear ridden” (Nyerere, 1966, p.12) because they lived in forests where animals and natural disasters posed a threat to their existence. It was impossible for an individual to survive alone in these conditions. The only way to overcome the hostile environment in which they lived was “to create a social unit which was strong enough to withstand all but the worst disasters, and which accepted the necessity for social stability, so that the struggle for food, and shelter could go on under conditions tolerable to human beings” (Nyerere, 1966, p.12). Nyerere believed that the extended family was the social unit strong enough to overcome harsh nature, and that it was deliberately created for the purpose of dealing with natural hostilities to man.
It is by dealing with the hostilities of nature, the conditions that threatened man’s existence, that the extended family fulfilled its *raison d’être*, the protection of life.

Another task of the extended family was to produce material goods. In traditional societies, productive activities were few and were related to an ethnic group. For instance, “the first food–producers in Tanzania were [a] mixed Negroid-Caucasoid type” of people who entered into the country from the Ethiopian Highlands (Sutton, 1969, p.8). The Bantu, originally fishermen who had settled around the great lakes in Tanzania, went on to develop farming while the Nilotic ethnic group remained pastoralists and the Hadzabe, a Bushmanoid stock continued to live by hunting and gathering (*ibid* pp.7-13). Therefore, every ethnic group had its own specific productive activity (although over time other activities were also adopted). The factual function of producing meat, fish or food crops, however, was carried out in the basic unit, the family. Production was thus “undertaken by intimate communities of persons sharing a multitude of social ties and functions, one of which happened to be the production of material goods” (Rweyemamu, 1973, p.6). This reference to ‘intimate communities’ and ‘social ties’ is an indication of extended families where members were intimately related and possessed multiple social ties. So the basic unit of production in traditional Africa was the extended family. In Nyerere’s terminology the extended family was, “a self-contained economic and social unit” (Nyerere, 1966, p.8), because it depended on its own labour force and on its own resources.59

59 In his study of African egalitarian societies James Woodburn (1982), has shown that in some societies, especially nomadic societies, “people had free and equal access to wild food, water, and various raw materials they needed for making shelters, tools, weapons and ornaments” (Woodburn, 1982, p.437). As such resources were readily available for use by everyone irrespective of their social circumstances.
4.1.2. Extended Family in *Ujamaa*

This institution of African extended family informed Nyerere’s *Ujamaa* in three significant ways: firstly, it was used as a paradigm for Nyerere’s *Ujamaa* before it was then nationalised and universalised and finally idealised. Let us consider each of these uses in turn.

In his account of *Ujamaa*, Nyerere explicitly states that “the foundation and the objective of African socialism is the extended family” (Nyerere, 1968, p.11). The basis of African socialism,\(^{60}\) in this case Nyerere’s *Ujamaa*, is then, the institution of the extended family. This institution, its functions and structure, were by Nyerere’s own admission, used to formulate and articulate *Ujamaa*. But how does he employ extended family as the basis of his policy? Essentially two procedures are used to achieve this: nationalisation (and universalisation) and idealisation of the functions and presumption of extended family.

4.1.2.1. Nationalisation and Universalisation

In Nyerere’s *Ujamaa* the institution of the extended family was nationalised and universalised. Extended family did not become a property of the government (as it is usually the case with the major means of production), rather it was nationalised in the sense that every person in the country was considered as a brother or sister, a process which in Nyerere’s thought was intended to make the entire population of Tanzania to be one big extended family. This is consistent with the declaration of Nyerere that: “modern African

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\(^{60}\) African socialism is a generic term for post-colonial socialist movements, the most prominent of which were *Consciencism*, initiated by Kwame Nkrumah, the first president of Ghana; *Ujamaa*, initiated by Julius Nyerere, the first president of Tanzania; *Ngritude*, initiated by Leopold Sedar Senghor, the first president of Ivory Coast; and *Humanism*, initiated by Kenneth Kaunda, the first president of Zambia. All of these are described as forms of African socialism.
socialism can draw from its traditional heritage the recognition of ‘society’ as an extension of the basic family unit” (Nyerere, 1968, p.12). Modern African socialism, (embodied by Nyerere’s *Ujamaa*), considered the whole nation of Tanzania as an extended family, and not an amalgamation of more than 120 tribes put together by the Berlin conference. The whole nation of Tanzania became the ‘extended’ in the term extended family. This was a ‘nationalisation’ of the institute since in Nyerere’s *Ujamaa*, extended family transformed from a relatively small group of people within a tribe, to the entire population of approximately twelve million people, and more than 120 tribes. Furthermore, it became a group of people who lived together in one country, and who worked together for the common good even though they did not share a common ancestor.

Having turned the whole country into one big extended family, the nation was expected to assume all the functions and roles of an extended family. Thus, where the function of an extended family was to indoctrinate young people, instill family values and teach them individual rights and responsibilities, Nyerere’s *Ujamaa* saw the state take over these roles. Hence, the state became the extended family, insofar as, it assumed the function of indoctrinating young people through state education and schooling them in the values and principles of traditional society. In a passage from *Freedom and Unity* Nyerere (1966) demonstrated, in a characteristically paternalistic manner, his resolve to have the values of traditional society indoctrinated among the Tanzanian youths:

> If these principles are to be preserved and adopted to serve the larger societies which have now grown up, the whole of the

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61 The 1967 census showed that the country had a total of 12.3 million people.
new modern educational system must also be directed towards inculcating them. They must underlie all the things taught in the schools, and all the things broadcast on the radio, all the things written in the press. And if they are to form the basis on which society operates, then no advocacy of opposition to these principles can be allowed (p.14).

The core principles or practices of traditional society will be discussed shortly, for the time being it suffices to acknowledge that the functions of extended family, such as socialisation or indoctrination, were re-activated or preserved and adopted in NU in order to serve the new extended family, which as explained above, it was the nation.

In Nyerere’s thought the extended family was socially and economically independent or self-sufficient. That is what he means when he writes: “the traditional African family was an almost self-contained economic and social unit” (Nyerere, 1966, p. 6). Nyerere’s Ujamaa encouraged the nation to follow suit. Nyerere’s words are explicit: “for our development we have to depend upon ourselves and our own resources” (Nyerere, 1977, p.95). Thus, just as in traditional societies where extended families were self reliant, Tanzanians were also encouraged to depend on themselves and their own resources during their quest for development. The point was not the kind of resources that the country and the extended family owned but the principle. Although the resources of the extended family was different from the resources of the country, the principle of self-reliance which prevailed in traditional society must also be upheld in the wider community, the nation. The idea of self-sufficiency was embodied in Nyerere’s Ujamaa via the policy of self-reliance, which we have already alluded to in Chapter One of this thesis. For now, I simply point out that in Nyerere’s Ujamaa, the state assumed the functions of an extended family and as a result the Tanzanian
state became a state characterised by protectionism, economic intervention and regulatory policies.

As well as aiming to nationalise the functions of an extended family, in Ujamaa Nyerere also wished to extend the ethos of the extended family; the attitude of brotherhood. This spirit of brotherhood, referred to by Nyerere as the spirit of *Ujamaa* or familyhood, is an outlook that enables a person to “regard *all* men as his brethren” (Nyerere, 1977, p. 12). In Nyerere’s *Ujamaa* this attitude of brotherhood, of caring for one another, was hoped to be a feature of the whole nation. Tanzanians were not only supposed to care for one another but also consider “every individual on this continent [the African continent as] his brother” and “embrace the whole society of mankind”, as brothers and sisters (*ibid*. p.12). In Nyerere’s thought, this is how the spirit of brotherhood was expected to become a position applicable not only to members of a relatively small familial group but rather to a nation, a continent and the world at large.

**4.1.2.2. Idealisation**

In *Ujamaa* extended family was used as an ideology to motivate or encourage unity and certain types of social relationship that Nyerere wanted to inculcate amongst Tanzanians. The attitude of caring for one another, for instance, was idealised, as members of the extended family were only inclined to consider other family members as brothers or sisters because they shared a common ancestry. They did not regard all others, even their enemies as brothers or sisters; otherwise there would have been peace between families, tribes, clans and ethnic groups in Africa. Since the history of Tanzania is replete with wars (Gwassa, 1969; Alpers, 1969; Listowell, 1965), it is obvious they did not regard all human beings as siblings.
Therefore, to say that members of the extended family regarded all men as brothers is clearly an exaggeration, intended to foster a spirit of brotherhood amongst Tanzanians, the spirit of caring for one another.

In the absence of any meaningful bond between Tanzanians or between Tanzanians and people of other nationalities, the only principle Nyerere could rely on to justify the attitude of brotherhood or familyhood amongst the people (by extension, the people of Africa and the world), was the aforementioned liberal principle of human equality. Nyerere had to argue that all human beings were brother and sisters because of the humanity they all share. This was why the first Article of the creed of TANU stated that “I believe in Human Brotherhood and the Unity of Africa” (Nyerere, 1968, p.12) and the opening statement of the AD proclaims that “all human beings are equal” (ibid. p.13). In integrating these principles into the party creed, Nyerere hoped that Tanzanians would treat each other as brothers and sisters not because they have a common ancestor or family ties but because they are above all, human beings equal in worth and dignity as the discussion in the last chapter has shown. By inserting the principle of equality in the creed, Nyerere was in effect suggesting that in a modern state, it is no longer family ties or extended family that should bind people together but a common humanity. Thus, what qualifies a person as kin deserving of care and concern is, for Nyerere, not the family ties but the very fact of being human. By introducing humanity as a measure of brotherhood Nyerere was undermining the traditional family bonds, which continued to flourish even as Nyerere was proclaiming human equality.


63 For instance, corruption and nepotism existed even though the system of Ujamaa opposed them.
Following this account of extended family and its functions I now turn to the practice of participation or inclusion, one of the core practices of extended family.

4.2. Practice of Participation and Inclusion

Nyerere believed that the practice of participation was a factor that sustained extended families in traditional Africa. Members participated in family activities for a number of reasons, but primarily, their own well-being. Nyerere postulated that most people did not participate willingly in a social relation or in family activities if there is no benefit to them:

Men do not freely agree to participate in social relations for the purpose of material wealth, for efficiency, or for the glory of the group, except in so far as these things serve them (Nyerere, 1966, p.7).

Elaborating further on the worth of wealth and power, Nyerere continues:

Group wealth and group power are not themselves virtues for which men would sacrifice themselves or for which they should be sacrificed. They are virtues only in so far as they serve the object of society – which is man (ibid)

According to Nyerere, then, individuals participate in family activities because the family is there to serve the well being of its members in terms of their growth, health, security, dignity, and happiness. They know that through participation in family relations and activities, their own well-being will be enhanced and their own happiness attained.

Secondly, in the extended family, members readily participated in family activities because there was equality. The purpose of an extended family, its reason for existence was, as Nyerere puts it “[to serve]…every man equally with every other man” (ibid. pp.7-8). The purpose of the extended family was not to serve only a particular kind of people, i.e. only
men, or only women, or only blacks, but rather it was there to serve all people from every race, tribe, and gender equally. Thus, according to Nyerere “the equality of all members is fundamental to any social grouping to which an individual freely belongs” (ibid. p 8), since individuals cannot be expected to freely belong to a group that harbours inequality. Human equality, therefore, is a fundamental aspect of the principle of participation in community.

Individuals also participated in family activities and relations in order to realise their own connectedness and unity in diversity. This is expounded by high profile African theologian, Mulago (1969), when he writes:

> Participation is the element of connection, the element which unites different beings as beings, as *substances*, without confusing them. It is the pivot of the relationships between members of the same community, the link which binds together individuals and groups, the ultimate meaning, not only of the unity which is personal to each man, but of that unity in multiplicity, that totality, that concentric and harmonic unity of the visible and invisible worlds (p.145)

With minimal analysis of the theology contained in the text, it can be said that participation is an important factor in human relationship and association that binds together various constructed realities in their distinctiveness. The key word is ‘bind’ for it implies that, without participation, the bonds between individuals and family are relinquished. Participation, therefore, is for Mulago, the actualisation of the bond that ties together relationships between individuals and between individuals and family. In addition, the unity created by and through participation in family is not one in which individual identity is absorbed or annihilated but, rather it is a unity in which the identity of a particular individual or a particular family is maintained and enhanced. For example, if an individual wishes to participate in a community activity, the individual is not required (by the community) to
abandon their culture, i.e. language, religion, and dress, but rather they are allowed to participate in it as they are, regardless of their personal circumstances.

4.2.1. Participation and Inclusion in *Ujamaa*

Integration of the practice of participation or inclusion into *Ujamaa* -- had numerous ramifications in the social, political and economic sectors. In the economic sector, the emphasis was placed on participation in agriculture. Every adult able to work, including students in schools, were supposed to participate in productive activities such as farming, keeping livestock, and poultry (Nyerere, 1977). For their part academics were called upon to reject the idea that they are “a special breed of men and women, who by their very existence deserve privileges and rewards denied to others” (Nyerere, 1974, p.12), but participate in “helping people transform their lives from abject poverty that is, from fear of hunger and always endless drudgery, to decency and simple comfort” (ibid. p.7). In regards to the political arena, the participation of citizens in the decision making process at all levels of government has been described in the foregoing chapter. As such, it is only necessary here to point out that in Nyerere’s *Ujamaa*, political participation was based on the belief that “involving people in deciding and influencing decisions in issues likely to affect them, not only raises their political consciousness but it also makes them more committed to the goals decided upon” (Mwansansu and Rweyemamu, 1974, p.7). If the goal was to establish *Ujamaa* villages, for example, the participation of people in the process leading to that decision, would make them more committed to achieving that goal.

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64 See, Chapter Three of this thesis, ‘Democracy in Nyerere’s *Ujamaa*’ (section, 3.1.1.2.1).
In order to remain faithful to its cultural traditions of participation and inclusion, Nyerere’s *Ujamaa* adopted an ‘open door policy’ which eased restrictions on associations and allowed Tanzania to become a hospitable nation. As a mark of its hospitality, Tanzania became a place where refugees from neighbouring countries found a second home. For instance, by the early 1980s Tanzania had received over 630,000 refugees from Rwanda, Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), which resulted in the country being given a Nansen Award in 1983 (Kamanga, 2005). In addition to becoming a sanctuary for refugees from neighbouring countries, Tanzania was also home to almost all the liberation movements in southern Africa, such as Frelimo of Mozambique, ANC of South Africa, ZANU-PF of Zimbabwe and the MPLA of Angola, and not to mention Namibia (SWAPO) (Othman, 2010; Mwakikagike, 2002). Furthermore, the commitment to the traditional ideal of inclusion implied that during the Cold War era Tanzania did not take sides between the conflicting blocs. To be true to its traditional base, Nyerere’s *Ujamaa* adopted a policy of non-alignment (Nyerere, 1974), which was an open policy towards the two ideological powers, the Soviet Union and its eastern allies and the United States and its western allies.

Commitment to open policy, in Nyerere’s *Ujamaa* was compatible with commitment to particularism, in this instance to the cultural tradition of the people of Tanzania. As it opened up to the outside world, Tanzania under the leadership of Nyerere, did not abandon its *Ujamaa* policy, or its efforts to revive the cultural values of community, sharing, and hospitality, but consolidated them by establishing a new “Ministry of National Culture and Youth” (Nyerere, 1966, p.186). Explaining the rationale behind the consolidation of African culture, even as it was opening up to foreigners, Nyerere writes:
Culture is the essence and spirit of any nation. A country which lacks its own culture is no more than a collection of people without the spirit which makes them a nation (ibid. p. 186).

African culture, therefore, had to be preserved because Nyerere considered it to be the essence and the spirit of the nation. Expressing similar sentiments, Selznick (1998, p.70) has noted that maintenance of culture helps “most people flourish, morally and psychologically” as a result of the sense of authenticity and rootedness it bestows on people. Thus, particularism or commitment to African culture, which according to Nyerere is a culture of hospitality, of caring for one another, of sharing and co-operation, was also a way of making citizens flourish spiritually, in a sense of becoming self-confident in themselves and in what they do.

4.3. Practice of Sharing and Co-operation

The practices of sharing and co-operation were also in Nyerere’s view, integral elements of life in the traditional African extended family. He notes that sharing was “basic to a harmonious family, and [was] a practical recognition of their equality” (Nyerere, 1966, p.10). He argued that it was the principle of sharing which promoted harmony and inequality in the family. Yet, equality in sharing did not mean that every family member would “get an equal share” (ibid. p.10) of the product available. As Nyerere explains, some members of the Zanaki family, such as the head of the family, warriors, and hunters got larger shares of the food produced or of the animal slaughtered. Rather all family members had an “equal right to their share”, a portion that was “determined by need” (ibid. p.10). Sharing was therefore, equal not in terms of quantity or measure but in terms of rights. No member of the family had more right to a share than another. This is what Nyerere means when he writes, “the different shares of different members of the family unit [could] never get very unequal; [as] all customs [operated] to bring them constantly back towards equality” (ibid. p.10).
Sharing was also an important element of social life for the Hadzabe of Tanzania. Expressing this observation, Woodburn (1982, p.440), noted that in nomadic tribes like the Hadzabe of Tanzania, there are formal rules to “[control] the development of inequality”. The leveling mechanism comes into effect when quantities of the items which individuals obtain on their own or in co-operation with other people, vary greatly, and when “the potential for the development of inequalities of wealth, power and prestige is greatest” (ibid.). For example, according to Woodburn, the extended family did not allow a successful hunter to make use of his kill to accumulate wealth and prestige or to attract dependants. After killing, the animal was brought to the extended family, where the meat was shared between members and the prime cuts are given to the initiated young men and women (ibid.). The meat “may not under any circumstances be eaten by the hunter on his own”, as it is an offence which can cause violence to the hunter, sickness and at times death (Woodburn 1982, p.441). This indicates that sharing was an essential part of life in traditional Africa and although the manner of sharing differed from one tribe to another, the practice was the same and had the role of maintaining harmony as well as serving as a leveling mechanism against the development of inequality within an extended family.

In some societies, the principle of sharing was contingent upon the principle of co-operation. For example, among the Zanaki, the tribe to which Nyerere belonged, a family member who did not cooperate in production or in family activities was likely to be excluded from the sharing process:

An individual who can work – and is provided by the society the means to work – but does not do so, is equally wrong. He has no right to expect anything from society because he contributes nothing to society (Nyerere, 1977, p 6)
The only people whose share did not depend on their participation in productive family activities were “children and the infirm” (ibid. p.5) or the disabled. Others, however, who did not fall into these categories, were expected to “contribute [their] fair share of effort towards the production of [societies] wealth” (ibid. p.5). Co-operation in family activities was, therefore, at least among the Zanaki, the requirement for being considered a shareholder. Without participation in family activities, an individual was in danger of not only their right to a share but also subsequently jeopardising their well-being.

4.3.1. Sharing and Co-operation in Ujamaa

Nyerere’s description of sharing in the extended families of traditional Africa was again used as a model in his construction of Ujamaa. His declaration is unambiguous:

“We must …regain our former attitude of mind – our African traditional socialism – and apply it to the new societies we are building today” (Nyerere, 1977, p.8).

The former attitude that is being referred to here is the practice of sharing in extended families. It is this approach to sharing that citizens were obliged to apply to the new society, the Tanzanian nation, despite the different nature of the modern state and its economic activities. It was an issue of distributing modern goods using traditional principles.

In practical terms, the principle of sharing in traditional society did not have to be applied to the proportioning of bushmeat, wild food, ornaments or material goods of traditional society, but rather to the wealth of a nation, which included industrial productions, minerals, agricultural products, banks, transportation companies and insurance companies. How then was the national wealth to be distributed according to the traditional principles? One way was through a just wage. The practical realisation of this principle of sharing in terms of wage
was explained in the previous chapter. What has to be added here is that those people not in receipt of monthly wages or salaries, that is peasants in rural areas, were encouraged to “work co-operatively, sharing the proceeds at harvest time according to the work they each have done” that is to say the contribution that they have made to society in terms of wealth production (Nyerere, 1977, p.132). However, as described beforehand, the concept of ‘each according to contribution and need’ failed for peasants. Instead of rewarding peasants who worked harder, the principle of sharing according to contribution or need frustrated many farmers in rural areas, a predicament which contributed to the collapse of agriculture.

As well as applying the principle of sharing to the whole nation, Nyerere’s *Ujamaa* also established sanctions on wealth accumulation. Following the example of some traditional African societies rules were established to control the development of inequality in wealth. These rules, contained in the Arusha Declaration prohibited the accumulation of wealth by an individual or group of people, and were termed the “Leadership Code” (Nyerere, 1968, p.36). The ‘Leadership Code’ was a leveling mechanism that prevented or at least impeded TANU members and government leaders from accumulating wealth for themselves. In particular, the code prohibited party and government leaders from owning shares in any company, holding directorship in private companies, having more than one salary, and from owning houses for rent (*ibid*). As we have already indicated in Chapter One and as we will elaborate later in Chapter Six, the aim of the ‘leadership code’ was to stop individuals or groups of people within the party and the government from using their position as a springboard to wealth accumulation.

65 See, Chapter Three: ‘Liberal Roots of Nyerere’s *Ujamaa*’, section 3.1.1.3. and 3.1.1.3.1.
Another leveling device that Nyerere’s *Ujamaa* employed was the nationalisation of the major means of production. By declaring ownership of the major means of production, the government’s key aim was, as indicated in Chapter One to curb the growing trend among Tanzanians of accumulating wealth through private acquisition of these means. Furthermore, Nyerere used his devotion to the practices of co-operation drawn from his idealisation of the extended family to inspire the establishment of Ujamaa villages. Nyerere understood that multinational companies from industrialised countries dominated the global economy. He was convinced that no individual Tanzanian could have the capital and skills to compete with the multinational companies without being bought out by them, thus endangering his own independence and that of the country (Nyerere, 1974). Nyerere concluded that the only way to overcome the limitations that confronted Tanzanians was by working together; “the truth is that when human beings want to make great progress they have no alternative but to combine their efforts” (Nyerere, 1977, p.120). Hence, Tanzanians were called upon to voluntarily combine their efforts so as to make great progress:

We shall achieve the goals we in this country have set ourselves if the basis of Tanzanian life consists of rural economic and social communities where people live together and work together for the goal of all, and which are interlocked so that all the different communities also work together in co-operation for the common good of the nation as a whole (*ibid.*)

The principle upon which the extended family was based was re-activated to meet the challenges of the modern state. Citizens of Tanzania, especially those in the rural areas, were encouraged to emulate the close living and working arrangements of the traditional extended family in what became known as *Ujamaa* villages. These are described in detail in the fifth chapter of the present thesis. At this juncture, it suffices to simply mention that in NU, the principle of co-operation gave rise to *Ujamaa* villages.
4.4. Communal Ownership of Property

Discussion now turns to the principle of property ownership and how Nyerere used it to construct Ujamaa. Diverse societies around the world have at various times and ages emphasized different aspects of ownership of property. When Nyerere’s Ujamaa was formulated in the 1960s, for example, there were only two systems which emphasized different types of property ownership: Capitalism, the system that was favoured in the ‘western bloc’, which included the USA and Western Europe, emphasized the private ownership of property. Whereas the public form, the ownership of property by the government, was prevalent in communist countries of Eastern Europe and the USSR, which during the Cold War it formed the ‘Eastern bloc’.

In other societies, like that of traditional Africa, the two types of property ownership co-existed. Individuals had their own personal properties; in particular, they were permitted to own a house or a hut, cows, goats, and chickens. They also possessed equipment related to their specific roles or work. Farmers, for instance, possessed their own hoes, machetes, seeds, and a hut to store harvests. Hunters also owned their own tools such as spears, bows and nets.

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66 Property is any object that can be owned or possessed and it is usually obtained by purchase, inheritance or gift. There are two types of properties: Real property and personal property. Real property is usually the land and anything that is firmly attached to it such as buildings, and the minerals beneath the surface of the land. Personal property is anything that can be owned other than real property.

67 To own something is to possess it and to possess something is to own it. In modern societies, ownership is far more complex than that, for it involves the right to use, the right to prevent others from using it, the right to dispose it, and the right to be protected by the state.

68 Technically personal properties can be divided into two categories: tangible and intangible property. Tangible property exists physically and can be seen and touched like a book, a house, etc… Intangible personal property has no physical existence but can nevertheless be legally owned, like patent rights.
to catch animals. Fishermen owned boats, hooks, and nets. Nyerere clarifies this when he writes:

[In a community] a farmer can own his hoe, a carpenter can own his hand-saw; any worker can own the tools which he uses by himself as a supplement to his own hands. Similarly a family can own the house in which it lives, the furniture and the equipment which increases the comfort of its members and so on (Nyerere, 1977, p.8)

Elaborating further on personal property in African traditional societies, Nyerere states:

Personal property does …exist and is accepted. But it takes second place in the order of things. Certainly no member of the family goes short of food or shelter in order that personal property may be acquired by another member. It is family property that matters, both to the family as such and to the individuals in the family. And because it is a family property all members have an equal right to a share in its use, and all have a right to participate in the process of sharing – in so far as time has not created its own acceptable divisions. Indeed so strong is this concept of ‘sharing’ that even in relation to private property there develops an expectation of use in case of need; the distinction, however, remains. In the case of family property each individual has a right; in the case of private property there may be an expectation but there is no automatic right (ibid. pp. 9-10).

There are two key points that can be isolated from this explanation. Firstly, individuals owned property but this, along with their other wealth, was to be shared if a member of the extended family was in need.

The second point that can be drawn from the text regards priority of property ownership. Although individuals owned property that could be shared with the other members of the community, personal property was not strongly emphasized since Nyerere argued, “society [was] so organised that it cared about its individuals” (Nyerere, 1977 p.2). Thus, as long as an individual worked, there was no need for them to hoard wealth because society took care of
them. Since the well being of the individual could not be separated from the good of society, it was in everybody’s interest that the corporate body should stay healthy and strong, in order to ensure the welfare of each member of the community. This is why, in some African societies, real property, such as, “land, belonged to the ancestors and the chiefs and kings held land only in trust” (Ayittey, 1999, p.117). The true meaning of ancestors owning land is that, a particular piece of land belonged to the extended family, or to the community who descended from those ancestors although the practical details were often decided by male members of the family. Thus, ancestral ownership is a way of acknowledging that land belongs to the community. Communal ownership of land is what Nyerere emphasizes when he states that:

To us in Africa land was always recognised as belonging to the community. Each individual within our society had a right to the use of land….but the African’s right to land was simply the right to use it; he had no other right to it (Nyerere, 1977, p.7).

The underlying message is that in traditional Africa, real estate was considered the property of the community, which is the extended family.

4.4.1. Ownership of Property in Ujamaa

The pattern of property ownership in Nyerere’s Ujamaa resembled that which existed in extended families of traditional Africa. No one could command this more forcefully than Nyerere:

The TANU government must go back to the traditional African custom of land holding. That is to say, a member of society will be entitled to a piece of land on condition that he uses it. Unconditional, or ‘freehold’, ownership of land (which leads to speculation and parasitism) must be abolished (Nyerere, 1968, p.8)
The return to land holding was fulfilled when the party and government leaders made the following declaration in the AD:

To build and maintain socialism it is essential that all the major means of production and exchange in the nation are controlled and owned by the peasants through the machinery of their government and their co-operatives” (ibid. p.16)

Just as the land was owned by the extended family (the community) in traditional societies, in NU, the major means of production such as land, forests, minerals, water, electricity, banks, insurance companies, industries, and factories were in theory supposed to be owned by the bigger extended family, the nation or the government (Nyerere, 1968). Anything that was not classified as a major means of production, could be owned by individuals. However, as will be demonstrated in Chapter Six, the aims of the Arusha Declaration were not realised in practice. Rugumamu (1997) has shown that the government secured only partial ownership of the means of production leaving a large segment under the control of private individuals.

4.5. Conclusion

This chapter has explored another source of Nyerere’s Ujamaa. In particular, it was shown that Nyerere drew on a particular and idealised conception of African traditional societies, the extended family, as a contributing factor in his development of the policy of Ujamaa. The examination of the nature of the familial unit, and its functions and practices has shown that it was used as a template by Nyerere to formulate and articulate Ujamaa. More specifically, functions such as socialisation, protection of life and production were re-activated in Nyerere’s Ujamaa and subsequently applied to the whole nation. Besides functions, I have also suggested how Nyerere’s understanding of the core practices of extended family, such as participation and inclusion, sharing and co-operation and communal ownership of property, were mobilised in Nyerere’s development of Ujamaa and applied to the whole nation. To
accommodate its tradition of participation and inclusion, Nyerere intended *Ujamaa* to emphasize participation of all citizens in social, political and economic activities, and to adopt an open policy towards strangers, while at the same time remaining committed to African culture. To ensure that these practices of sharing and co-operation were embedded in *Ujamaa* Nyerere developed a leadership code, nationalised the major means of production and established *Ujamaa* villages. Through the partial nationalisation of the major means of production Nyerere intended to embody what he saw as an established tradition of common property.

Overall, this chapter has shown that most of the major policies and programmes developed by Nyerere were rooted in his views regarding the basic unit of traditional societies, the extended family. Taken together with his understanding of what he termed the liberal ideals of human equality and freedom examined in the previous chapter and in the context of the prevalent conditions outlined in Chapter Two, we have a complete picture of the genesis of Nyerere’s *Ujamaa* and a glimpse of what Nyerere intended *Ujamaa* to look like. Understanding of Nyerere’s *Ujamaa* will increase further as progress moves into the fifth chapter where I question the ideological character of *Ujamaa*. 
CHAPTER FIVE
THE IDEOLOGICAL CHARACTER OF UJAMAA

5. Introduction

The contexts, ideas, and influences that led Nyerere to construct Ujamaa have been described in chapters two and three of this thesis. In particular, it was suggested that in his construction of Ujamaa Nyerere was influenced by the conditions of poverty and human right abuses, whereby in his thought these problems could be very well addressed by fusing some elements from the western liberal tradition, especially, the liberalism of Immanuel Kant and from the African tradition, particularly, elements from extended family, the smallest unit of society in traditional Africa. The picture presented so far, then, is one in which Ujamaa is a blend of two traditions: the liberal tradition from the west and communalism from the African tradition. Having described the origins of Nyerere’s Ujamaa, I will now examine the doctrine in its entirety and consider in particular its status as an ideology. The procedure begins with a discussion on the definition of ideology followed by an account of the sense in which Ujamaa may be so categorised.

5.1. Describing the Meaning of Ideology

Before describing the meaning of ideology I will first discuss some definitional challenges and the approach that will be taken to explain the term. One of the main challenges when attempting to describe the term ideology, is facing an “oversupply of meanings” (Gerring, 1997, p.979). In fact a cursory glance at the literature on the term ideology shows that there is an incredible diversity of meanings “which are directly at odds with one another” (ibid. p.957). In part, this is because the term ideology is still “an essentially contested concept” (Sargent, 2009, p. 2 italics in the original), and therefore there is little consensus among
scholars on the precise meaning. Since the term has been variously defined and remains contested, there are two tasks that I will not undertake. Firstly, I will not attempt to construct yet another meaning because doing so may only add to the confusion. Secondly, I will not adopt the approach of Gerring (1997) of making a list of definitions and then use the core attributes as the definition of ideology. I also reject the approach of Jost (2006), that of making a list of definitions and taking what they have in common as the definition of the term. Though tempting, I will stay clear of these approaches for two main reasons: they will take me too far afield and space here is limited. Rather, I will select an approach, in itself problematic but useful nonetheless, which does not involve bringing together a plethora of definitions of ideology. In particular, I will adopt the approach of a French Philosopher Louis Althusser (1918-1990). Justifications for this are threefold. First of all, Althusser’s analysis of the question of ideology is “paradigmatic,”69 in the sense of being a model for the analysis of ideology as a concept. Secondly, Althusser is chosen because in his account, ideology is not a privilege of class societies or a privilege of European societies alone but it is a reality in the life of every human being. Lastly, ideology as elaborated by Althusser is interesting because it is thought to have a material existence, which is to be governed by institutions and not by individuals, as it is commonly understood.

Althusser’s ideas about ideology changed considerably during his lifetime. The way he described ideology in 1965, early on in his academic career differs from the description contained in *Ideology and Ideological State Apparatus*, which he wrote in the 1970s (Montag, 2003). Furthermore, Althusser’s ideas about ideology are scattered throughout his

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69 See introduction to Louis Althusser (1918-1990), Ideology and Ideological State Apparatus: Notes Towards an Investigation
body of work⁷⁰ and “nowhere [Althusser] gathers them together in a coherent whole” (ibid. p78). In light of this consideration, I will not attempt to establish the coherence of Althusser’s ideas on ideology nor will I collate his scattered views. Whilst tempting, I will shy away from such tasks because this thesis is on Nyerere’s *Ujamaa* not Louis Althusser. To understand Althusser’s views on the nature of ideology I will simply focus on his “most influential essay” (Ferretter, 2006, p.75), namely, *Ideology and Ideological State Apparatus*.⁷¹ However, even in regards to this essay, I will not attempt to present the entire contents of the article no matter how interesting. I will, for instance, omit the discussion on reproduction of productive forces and reproduction of the relations of production in capitalism, because although it has some relevance and is linked to Althusser’s view of ideology as an instrument of social reproduction, it has no direct relevance to the character of ideology. I will also omit the discussion on the functions of state apparatus because although it is helpful to understand the subtle ways ideological state apparatus functions in securing the reproductions of forces and relations of production respectively, the discussion does not inform us of what ideology actually is. For the purpose of describing the term, it will be sufficient to focus on Althusser’s discussion concerning the nature of ideology.

Ideology, as described by Althusser (2002) is characterised by four main features:

- Trans-historical reality
- Imaginary reality.

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⁷⁰ See, for example, his Essays: *For Marx* and *Lenin and Philosophy*

• Material existence.

• Interpellation of individuals as subjects

In the following section, these traits will be examined sequentially in the order in which they are mentioned here.

5.1.1. Ideology Has No History

I begin with the claim that “ideology has no history” (Althusser, 2002, p.159), (equivalent to suggesting that it is a trans-historical reality) and its ramifications for Ujamaa as an ideology. The notion that ideology has no history existed in the writings of Marx but Althusser (2002) takes it up and gives it a different meaning. To clearly elucidate the meaning behind the claim that ideology lacks history, and as such is trans-historical, Althusser (2002) makes a distinction between specific ideologies and ideology in general. He argues that socialism, capitalism, liberalism, and feminism, which are specific ideologies “have a history of their own” (p.160). They are specific, historical, and have real content, that “always express class positions” (p.159). Ideology in general, however, has, according to Althusser, no history.

Explaining why this is the case Althusser writes:

“[ideology in general] is endowed with a structure and a functioning such as to make it a non-historical reality, i.e. an omni-historical reality, in the sense in which that structure and functioning are immutable, present in the same form throughout what we call history…the history of class struggle…” (p.161).

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72 The idea that ‘ideology has no history’ is discovered by Althusser in the writings of Marx, especially the German Ideology. Althusser (2002) claims that Marx believes ideology to lack history because it is not related to the material reality of the “concrete material individual materially producing their existence” (Althusser, 2002, p.160).
Althusser contends that ideology lacks history because it is provided with a structure and a function that are always present in the same form everywhere and all times throughout history. For Marxists this is the history of class struggle.

By presenting ideology as a phenomenon devoid of history, that is, as a structural and functional necessity whose form does not change irrespective of the socio-historical circumstances in play, Althusser means to accentuate two important points: (i) ideology is our way of being in the world and (ii) ideology is not a conscious phenomenon. I will expand on each of these points in the order in which they appear. When Althusser (2002) claims that ideology has no history, what he means is that ideology is not a phenomenon specific only to certain modes of production, nor is it a creation of the European culture, but rather, it is “a necessary feature of any society, in so far as any society must provide the means to form its members and transform them to their conditions of existence” (Thomson, 1984, p.90). Consequently any society that wants to direct its members towards a particular goal must possess ideology, otherwise it resolves to violence. Expressing similar sentiments Lewis (2005) also notes that Althusser perceives ideology as that which allows human beings to function in the world:

[Ideology is] our lived experience in the world. We practice ideology when we use the stock of concepts it provides us with to make our way in the world. It is a necessary background that allows us to function in the world. As such ideology is a sort of knowledge that is always present and is always being used” (p.169).

But the ever presence of ideology does not mean that it is a static phenomenon unyielding to change. Ideology as Lewis correctly points out, can change when, for example it meets conflicting ideology and reacts when the mode of production also changes. Crucially,
however, the changes do not result in a vacuum absent of ideology, on the contrary, they generate a new ideology since it “is a structural construct” from which no one can ever be free (ibid.). Thus, to claim that ideology has no history is in effect to argue that it is a human phenomenon, practiced by all people, everywhere at all times irrespective of the specific socio-historical conditions in question.

The second point is that Althusser (2002) considers ideology to be an unconscious phenomenon. It was deemed necessary to emphasize this since ideology was traditionally described as a form of false consciousness, implying that it involves the human consciousness. Althusser (2002) directs his readers to reject these claims, which he dismisses as misleading. Of course ideology is, (as will be shown later in this chapter), “an imaginary representation of the real world” but this is unrelated to consciousness (p.164). Althusser explains that the ‘imaginary representations’ are usually images, concepts, myths and occasionally ideas, but most frequently they are structures imposed on people through a process that they are unaware of never mind in control of. This can be partially explained by the fact that human beings are born into subject-hood or to use Althusser’s expression, “individuals are always-already interpolated by ideology as subjects” (ibid. p.175). I elaborate on the interpellation of individuals in ideology later in the present chapter, for now however, it is sufficient to note that Althusser regards ideology as an unconscious phenomenon. Just as Freud, concluded the “unconscious is eternal,” Althusser maintains “ideology is eternal” (ibid. p.161). He argues that ideology is eternal not because it is “transcendent to all temporal history” but rather because it is “omnipresent, trans-historical and therefore immutable in form throughout the extent of history” (ibid.). According to Althusser, therefore, there is no difference between the eternity of the unconscious and that of
ideology since they are both endowed with a structure and a function that is constant and valid across history. In sum Althusser’s thesis that ideology has no history means: (1) that ideology is the means by which members of society are formed and directed to a particular goal and (2) that ideology is an unconscious phenomenon. Did *Ujamaa* exhibit these features? This is the question we will answer in the following section.

### 5.1.1.1. Forming and Transforming Society

The question that is posed for consideration here is: did *Ujamaa* play a formative and transformative role? Was *Ujamaa* used as a means of forming and transforming people towards a particular goal? The answer to this question is yes. The formative character of *Ujamaa* has already been alluded to in Chapter One of this thesis when the policy of education for self-reliance was explained and both the formative and the transformative functions of *Ujamaa* will be the subjects of a detailed discussion when in Chapter Five of this thesis we discuss the functions of the ideology of *Ujamaa*. To avoid repetition I will limit my observation here to few remarks. *Ujamaa* was constructed at the period of great change in the history of Tanzania. The colonial order was fading away and a new society, a society liberated from colonialism, was emerging but the direction which this newly independent country would take was not clear. This point is expressed by Nyerere when he writes:

“The traditional order is dying; the question which has yet to be answered is what will be built on our past and, in consequence, what kind of society will eventually replace the traditional one” (Nyerere, 1966, p. 6).

When Nyerere wrote this passage, *Ujamaa* was not yet an official policy of the party and government but it is known from the previous discussion in this thesis that the kind of society Nyerere was thinking about was the socialist society. To build this new society and transform people from the colonial order, which was a capitalist order, to the new order, the socialist
order, radical alteration of behaviour, attitude, new belief patterns and policies were necessary. To bring about new behaviours and attitude and to rally people behind a cause, Nyerere constantly appealed to two factors: the African tradition and morality. For instance, the argument that won people to his movement TANU was a moral one: As he says, “TANU called for equality …human respect…and called for equality of opportunity” (Nyerere, 1966, p. 4), promises which resonated with people. In addition, when he wanted Tanzanians to accept the practice of co-operation, he appealed to African tradition, and presented co-operation as a virtue, as a special feature of what it means to be human and the failure to co-operate was described as a feature of animals. His words are to the point: “But a failure to co-operate together is a mark of bestiality, it is not a characteristic of humanity” (Nyerere, 1974, p. 107). This means that to Nyerere to be human is to co-operate with other people and not to co-operate is not human. The point here is not the morality of co-operation but to get people to understand that co-operation is better than non-co-operation and thus begin to co-operate. This strategy of appealing to tradition and to morality so as to form and transform people’s behaviour pattern is so common that Ujamaa can well be described as an ideology.

5.1.1.2. Ujamaa: Conscious or Unconscious phenomenon?

The question that is posed here for investigation is whether Ujamaa was a conscious or an unconscious phenomenon. Having spent two chapters of this thesis showing how Nyerere constructed it from different sources, it would be self-contradicting at this juncture to argue that Ujamaa was an unconscious phenomenon. For all the arguments we have advanced show that Ujamaa was a conscious phenomenon. It was a policy that Nyerere developed consciously and deliberately over time and it operated for twenty four years during which Nyerere was the head of state. To say that it was an unconscious phenomenon would mean that Tanzanians were not aware of what they were doing. The key to the solution of this
problem lies in the definition of ‘unconscious’ and in the distinction that Althusser makes between specific ideologies and ideology in general. It has to be recalled here that for Althusser, specific ideologies have a history and are therefore conscious as activities. As a specific ideology Ujamaa has a history and is therefore a conscious phenomenon. As a specific ideology, Ujamaa was developed in Tanzania by Nyerere, implemented in Tanzania and abandoned by Tanzanians. It has a history and content of its own which expressed class positions and specific contents which we have described in the first chapter of this thesis. To express this differently it can be said that Ujamaa as a specific ideology, had a history of its own, which is to say it was a conscious phenomenon.

However, Ujamaa as ideology in general, has no history; that is to say, it is not a ‘conscious phenomenon’ because it is sometimes represented by images, myths, ideas but most of the time it is represented by structures that are imposed on people through processes that people are not aware of never mind in control. Some of the structures that are imposed on people without being conscious and without power to control them are family structures and the state. Family structures are not chosen and in Althusser’s estimation, there is no individual who comes into the world with his/her own family structure ready constructed or with the power to decide the kind of family structure she wants to be born in. Family structures which inevitably define our identities are imposed on us. This point is clearly described by Althusser (2002) in the following terms:

Before its birth, the child is always-already a subject, appointed as a subject in and by the specific familial ideological configuration in which it is ‘expected’ once it has been conceived. …this familiar ideological configuration is, in its uniqueness, highly structured, and that, it is in this implacable
and more or less ‘pathological’ …structure that the former subject to-be will have to ‘find’ ‘its’ place” (p.176).

This means that a child is born into a pre-structured world and much of what they become is largely determined by the family Ideological State Apparatus (ISA). Extended families had specific ideological patterns and a ready made structure in which a child is raised. When this situation is taken into consideration, it becomes easy to understand that some of the ideas, concepts and belief systems which most Tanzanians believed in were imposed on them even without their knowledge. This is because (as will be shown later in this chapter when discussion turns to Althusser’s notion of interpellation) it is the nature of ideology in general to constitute people as subjects even before they are born. In Althusser’s famous quote “individuals are always-already subjects” (Althusser, 2002, p.176). The subjectification73 of Tanzanians, therefore, occurred because they were interpolated before birth. Additionally, some people became subjects by ‘themselves’ by merely abiding by the law, which was enacted by the ruling Ujamaa ideology. For example, a Tanzanian who decided to go to live in a Ujamaa village, because the law required it, may not have been conscious of the fact that such a move was an ideological obligation. The state, according to Foucault (1982), is “a political structure of individuation techniques and a totalising procedure” (p. 782). This means that the state is entity with methods which can make individuals acquire identity without being conscious of it. In short, it can be said that Ujamaa as an ideology in general refers to structures and ideas which were imposed on Tanzanians without knowing or being conscious of it.

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73 This theme is also developed by Michel Foucault’s (1985, 1997).
5.1.2. Ideology: An Imaginary Relationship to Reality

Having examined the claim that ideology has no history, I will now examine Althusser’s second claim, that it “represents the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence” (ibid. p.162). Althusser (2002) uses traditional Marxist teaching as a springboard for his own definition of ideology. He observes that in the traditional view, it was agreed that in ideology “men represent their real conditions of existence to themselves in an imaginary form” (Ibid p.163). Explanations for this are varied and contested. For example, in the 18th century, the need for imaginary representation was caused by the “existence of a small number of cynical men” (Ibid), namely priests, who duped people into believing their own, self-serving and false ideas about the world. For Feuerbach and his supporters, however, the need was not caused by priests or despots but rather by the “material alienation which reigns in the conditions of existence of men themselves” (Ibid pp.163-164). Since people cannot easily deal with the conditions of alienation instead they “make themselves an alienated (imaginary) representation of their condition of existence” (ibid. p.164). In other words, they create stories (representations) to convince themselves that their relations of production are tolerable.

A limitation of Althusser’s (2002) argument about representations is his presupposition that “what is reflected in the imaginary representation of the world found in an ideology is the condition of existence of men, i.e. their real world” (Ibid p.164). Althusser argues that what is represented in ideology is not the real condition of existence of individuals, their real world, but their relation to the conditions of their existence. Moreover, this is the essence of every ideology:
It is not the real conditions of existence, their real world, that men ‘represent to themselves’ in ideology, but above all it is their relation to those conditions of existence which is represented to them there [and] it is this relation which is at the center of every ideological, i.e. imaginary representation of the real world” (ibid. p. 164).

Underpinning Althusser’s (2002) argument is the belief that the real world cannot be known directly. Following Lacan, Althusser is convinced that the real is impossible for human beings, because it cannot be expressed in language. The very entrance of man into language, the symbolic order, marks an irrevocable separation of the human person from the reality. However, the real is approximated when we are made to acknowledge the materiality of our existence or when we are scientific in our search for knowledge. Since it is impossible to know the real world, what we know are always representations of the real world or representations of our relation to that world. To express this in Marxist terms, it can be said that ideology presents people not with “the existing relations of production…but above all the (imaginary) relationship of the individuals to the relations of production” (ibid. p.165). Is this an accurate assessment of Ujamaa as an ideology? What did Ujamaa present to people? In the next section, I will analyse the validity of this argument by examining the ideology of Ujamaa (Nyerere’s socialism).

5.1.2.1. The Family Metaphor

The key concept that Althusser employs to express the idea of an ideology is ‘imaginary representation’ which is the equivalent of a metaphor, an allegory, a symbol or an image. It means that what is presented in ideology are imaginary symbols or metaphors about the real conditions of people’s existence. Against this background, the question that needs to be answered here is what was presented in the ideology of Ujamaa. Simply put, what did Ujamaa present to people? In Ujamaa the image which was represented, the imaginary
representation was the metaphor of the extended family drawn from traditional Africa and the metaphor of western liberalism. These images will be discussed in turn beginning first with the family metaphor.

First is an account of the family metaphor. Eudene Luther (1983) has noted that “in the ideology of Ujamaa, Nyerere uses the metaphor of the traditional African family in order to explain to his citizens the new and the transformed society he envisions for the future” (p. 74). Luther explains that the use of metaphor was preferable because it is the easiest way of explaining the unknown, the idea which Nyerere wanted to be realised in society. Luther (1983) writes:

> the use of the metaphor is the simplest way of proceeding from the known to the unknown. It is the way of cognition in which the identifying of qualities of one thing are transferred in an instantaneous, almost unconscious flash of insight to some other thing …which is completely unknown to us (Ibid).

In terms of Ujamaa, this means that Nyerere transferred some of the principles and practices of extended family in traditional Africa to the new nation. The qualities which Nyerere wanted Tanzanians to embrace from the extended families were the principles of mutual respect or the attitude of caring for one another, the obligation to work and readiness to share. He also wanted them to embrace the practices of co-operation and participation, and communal ownership of property. These are some of the principles and practices that he wanted to underpin social relations and institutions in the new state.
5.1.2.2. The Liberal Metaphor

In addition to the family metaphor, Nyerere also constructed a symbolic representation of the ideal society from liberalism. The ideal society is one which is based on the principles of human equality, democracy, and religious tolerance.

5.1.2.2.1. The Principle of Human Equality

The core principle of a socialist ideology succinctly states that “all human beings are equal” (Nyerere, 1977, p.13). The equality of human beings was discussed in Chapter Two, it therefore suffices to briefly mention here that in Nyerere’s socialism, the acceptance of equality “as a basic assumption of life in society is the essence of socialism” (Nyerere, 1976, p.4). For Nyerere, equality was the benchmark of socialism. A society that is organised in such a way that social, political, and economic activities promote the well being of one race, or religion or tribe, Nyerere claims socialism is absent. In his own words:

A society is not socialist if in its organisational structure and practices, it discriminates or allows discrimination, between its members because of their parentage, their place of birth, their appearance, their religious beliefs, or anything other than their behaviour in relation to their fellows. The existence of racialism, of tribalism, or of religious intolerance, means that a society is not socialist - regardless of whatever other attributes it may have (ibid.)

Nyerere’s socialism was unbiased. In particular it did not discriminate against people on the basis of race, tribal or religion. The purpose of Nyerere’s socialism was the “well being of the people” (Nyerere, 1977, p.78), meaning all people, regardless of their colour, tribe, origin or religion. Consequently, in a socialist society, “every individual man and woman, whatever colour, shape, race, creed, religion, or sex, is an equal member of society, with equal rights in

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74 see, Chapter Three, section 3.1.
the society, and equal duties to it” (*ibid*). This is ideology of equality; I now investigate the second feature of Nyerere’s socialism, namely, popular democracy.

5.1.2.2. Popular Democracy

Democracy is -- in Nyerere’s estimation -- a feature that flows directly from the first principle of human equality, in that, an ideal society, which believes in the equality of all human beings, must *ipsa facta* also believe in the sovereignty of the people. A society that claims to respect the equality of human beings but does not believe in the rule of the people and their freedom to elect their leaders cannot, in Nyerere’s view, be a socialist society. This passage from Nyerere’s *Freedom and Socialism* (1976) helps clarify the point:

People’s equality must be reflected in the political organisation; everyone must be an equal participant in the government of his society. Whatever devices are used to implement this principle, the people must be the sovereign, and they must be able to exert their sovereignty without causing a breakdown of the law and order (p.5).

Nyerere’s socialism, therefore, is democratic insofar as people are sovereign. They express their sovereignty when, for example, they participate equally in the decision making process of government at all levels, in changing the legislation which governs them, and in free and fair election of their leaders. In Nyerere’s socialism, ideal individuals are not supposed to be a passive recipient of decisions made elsewhere by other people. Instead they are supposed to play an active role in choosing their representatives and in making decisions that affect their lives.
5.1.2.2.3. Public Ownership of Means of Production

I now outline the principle of public property ownership as another feature of Nyerere’s socialism. Nyerere maintained that for socialism to be consistent with its core principle of human equality, citizens in a socialist state must control their own means of production:

If a society is to be made up of equal citizens, then each man must control his own means of production. The farmer must own [his own] tools – his hoe or plough. The carpenter must have his own saw and not be dependent upon the whims of another for its use” (Nyerere, 1977, p.81).

Thus, when the principle of human equality is the basis of society the existence of one man or a group of people “who control the means of production by which another group of people earns or obtains the food, clothing, and shelter which are essential to life, [is a clear indication that] that there is no equality” (ibid. pp. 80-81). The transition from an unequal society to one of equal citizens, Nyerere concluded that, each individual must control their own means of production or at least have an equal opportunity to do so. Yet, realistically, not every member of society can own a tractor, a factory or an industry. Consequently, Nyerere concluded that:

Group ownership of the means of production is the only way in which the exploitation of man by man can be prevented. This communal ownership can be through the state, which represents every citizen, or though some other institution which is controlled by those involved – such as, for example, a co-operative, or a local authority (ibid. p. 82)

Yet, it is incorrect that communal ownership of the means of production always eliminates exploitation and establishes equality among citizens. As Nyerere highlights “it is possible …for farmers to be exploited even by their own co-operatives and their own state if the machinery is not correct, or if the managers and workers are inefficient or dishonest” (Nyerere, 1968, p.83). While communal ownership may be the best way to safeguard against
exploitation and promote the equality of all citizens, it does not guarantee either a complete absence of exploitation or a complete presence of human equality. In the final analysis, efforts must constantly be made by socialism or *Ujamaa* to make sure that societal organisation is such that it serves all human beings and not only a few.

**5.1.2.2.4 Socialism is Secular**

Nyerere’s socialism is secular and there are several explanations for this. Socialism is silent about a person’s religious belief because “a man’s relationship with his God is a personal matter for him and him alone; his beliefs about the hereafter are his own affair” and they remain so until they infringe on the freedom of others (Nyerere, 1976, p.12). Socialism is also secular because belief in God is irrelevant and unnecessary to its philosophy. Socialism does not need God in order to function and moreover, its decisions are not motivated by religious beliefs. Socialism is a secular ideology in that it is concerned with “the organisation of life on earth” and not in heaven (*ibid.*). Therefore, in its organisation of society socialism does not involve faith in God. Nyerere’s socialism is also secular because “it has nothing to say about whether there is a God” (*ibid.* p.13). Being skeptical, it “cannot require that its adherents be atheists” or theists, for that matter (*ibid.*). To conclude: Nyerere uses the African family and the liberal philosophy, as metaphors to explain to people the principles upon which the institutions of the new nation will be built. At the same time he legitimises his regime by appealing to tradition and thereby suggesting that it is not foreign but local. Then he legitimises his regime by appealing to liberalism, and thereby suggesting that it is a liberal society. Thus, *Ujamaa* is an ideology because it was essentially a symbolic representation of the ideal citizen and ideal society.
5.1.3. Ideology has a Material Existence

I have shown that to Althusser (2002) ideology is the imaginary representation of the relation of individuals to the real world and the ramifications of this for Ujamaa. I will now outline Althusser’s third claim that “ideology has material existence” and subsequently show the sense in which Ujamaa takes this form.

The argument surrounding the material existence of ideology is presented immediately after the argument that ideology is an imaginary representation of individual’s relation to the real world. This flow of argument raises a question: how can something imaginary have a material existence? How is it reasonable to state that ideology is imaginary and simultaneously claim that it is material? This puzzle is solved by Montag (1995), who has rightly indicated that for Althusser (2002), the point of positing two seemingly contradictory arguments is not to contradict his argument about ideology as imagination, but to advance a rather radical claim that “ideology even as it could be said to be imaginary, did not consist of false or illusory ideas ‘contained’ in the mind of the individuals (and still less in some collective mind or spirit) that would then cause them to act in certain ways” (Montag, 1995, p.62). Hence the discussion about the material existence of ideology is not about the existence of ideology in the mind of the individual or society. Althusser maintains that although it is customary to think that belief systems are generated in the mind of the individual, and that each of the ideological state apparatuses are “the realisation of an ideology” in reality belief systems exist in material institutions and their practices (Althusser, 2002, p.166). He qualifies this by stating “an ideology always exists in an apparatus, and in
practice, or practices [and] this existence is material” (ibid.) because matter “exists in different modalities, all rooted in the last instance in ‘physical’ matter” (Ibid).

Althusser (2002) further advances the argument that ideology does not exist in the mind of the individual when he examines “individuals who live in ideology” (p.166). He notes that individual beliefs, whether in God, duty or justice are “[derived] from the ideas of the individual concerned, i.e. from them as “a subject with a consciousness which contains the ideas of his belief” (p.167). In translating ideas into his own freely accepted belief “the (material) attitude of the subject concerned naturally follows” (ibid.). Thus, for instance, “if [the person] believes in God, s/he goes to church to attend mass, kneels, prays, [and] confesses” (ibid.). This means that every person who believes in the ideas which his conscious inspires in him “must ‘act according to his ideas’” (ibid. p.168), or in a technical language, the person must “inscribe his own ideas as a free subject in the actions of his material practice.” If for some reason an individual does not act according to his belief he is considered as “inconsistent, cynical or perverse” (ibid.). The key point to make is that according to Althusser, (2002) the “ideas of a human subject exists in his action” or to use his terminology, the ideas of a person exists in his “actions inserted into practice” (p.168). The crux of Althusser’s argument is that the practices into which individual actions are inserted are “governed by the rituals” and these customs are in turn defined by social institutions, in other words, the “material existence of an ideological apparatus” (ibid.). Summarising the argument Althusser (2002) writes:

When only a single subject… is concerned, the existence of the ideas of his belief is material in that his ideas are his material actions inserted into material practices governed by material...
rituals which are themselves defined by the material ideological apparatus from which derive the ideas of that subject” (p. 169).

Whilst it appears that ideology exists in the mind of individual subjects, in reality ideas belong to institutions. Commenting on this text, Ferreter (2006) expresses a similar understanding:

The ideological state apparatus logically precedes the individual members of it. It is not because we hold certain beliefs that we construct the ideological state apparatuses, rather, it is because ISAs have been constructed that we hold certain beliefs. The material apparatus, which is the institutions with all their practices and rituals, govern the belief of its members (p.87)

When Althusser (2002) claims that ideology has material existence he is illustrating that worldly apparatuses and their practices and rituals do not only precede our belief systems they also govern and determine them. The question to deliberate in the case of Ujamaa is what came first? Did the existence of material apparatus precede the beliefs in Ujamaa? Who governed the ideology of Ujamaa? I will answer these questions in pursuit of determining whether or not Ujamaa had a material existence.

5.1.3.1. The Material Existence of Ujamaa

Did Ujamaa have a material existence? Was this belief system the property of Ideological State Apparatus (ISA) or of individuals? The answer to these questions is that Ujamaa was property of material institutions. Although it may initially appear that Ujamaa was conceived by Nyerere this was not in fact the case because the principles, the values and practices it espoused such as co-operation, sharing, community, are the same as those which sustained extended families in traditional Africa. In other words, concepts underpinning Ujamaa actually came from the extended family of traditional Africa. The beliefs, ideas, principles practices and rituals that Nyerere advocated for were embodied in the institution of the
extended family. They were particularly entrenched in the Zanaki tradition of extended families into which Nyerere was born and raised. Hatch (1976) alludes to this when he writes:

Nyerere took …from his tribal upbringing …the concept that a leader’s first duty was service to the community; that the interests of the group superseded those of any individual member; that the leader is responsible to the community …that the welfare of society depends on co-operation not competition. This was the Zanaki legacy which the young Nyerere inherited from his family, clan and tribe…” (p.7)

The family, clan and tribe which influenced Nyerere are institutions or to use Althusser’s word, apparatuses. Nyerere articulated the ideas that already existed in the institutions to which he belonged. Nyerere did not generate the notions of community, co-operation, sharing, and care for one another, but rather, the ideas which constitute *Ujamaa*, already existed in apparatus, in the traditional African setting. Similarly, the liberal principles and values, which fed directly into *Ujamaa*, such as equality, freedom, democracy and religious tolerance, were not invented by Nyerere. As Nyerere himself pointed out he was just a believer in those values. That is what he means when he writes:

I am simply a believer…I believe in the equality and dignity of all human beings, and the duty to serve, their well-being as well as their freedom in a peaceful and co-operative society. I am an ardent believer in the freedom and welfare of the individual” (Nyerere, 2000, p. 23).

Like the ideas of co-operation and sharing the liberal ideas of equality, freedom and democracy also existed in institutions or apparatuses, particularly the institutions of Christian churches. The principle of human equality, in particular, was according to Hallowell (1942) “not a scientific doctrine” (p. 327) because it “rests upon an ethical basis derived, in part from the Christian concept of the salvation of the individual souls” (*Ibid*). Thus, it can be said that the ideas constituting *Ujamaa* (both liberal and African) were not invented by Nyerere because they existed in well established apparatuses or institutions that were there well before
Nyerere came into existence. What Nyerere did was to articulate them and give them a visible form. Nyerere himself acknowledged publicly that the ideas underpinning *Ujamaa* were in a sense not his own. In a passage from *Africa Today and Tomorrow* (2000), Nyerere makes this point clear when he writes:

> There are many good and honest people who believe that those ideas which in this country are associated with my name are now dead and should be properly buried. You will not be surprised to hear that I disagree! Great ideas do not die so easily; they continue nagging and every human society in history ignores them at its peril. And I can say this without inhibition or pretended modesty because in a real sense they are not my ideas. I never invented them…I repeat: those ideas are not mine; but I am a believer. I have articulated them and I will continue to articulate them with passion (Nyerere, 2000, p. 23)

It is in light of this consideration that it can be ascertained that *Ujamaa* had a material existence in the sense in which Althusser uses the term.

Approaching material existence from another direction, it is equally valid to state that Tanzanians did not believe in *Ujamaa* immediately and subsequently constructed the ISAs. A careful reading of Nyerere, clearly shows that people believed in *Ujamaa* because ISAs had been constructed. This is supported by the fact that people first learnt about the ideas of *Ujamaa* in a pamphlet that Nyerere published in 1962. But, its influence in the country was limited. A turning point was reached after the AD of 1967 when TANU’s National Executive Committee (NEC), adopted the basic assumptions of traditional African life as ideological guidelines and reference points for policy and action. *Ujamaa* became known worldwide but this was only possible because the ISAs, such as TANU, the government, the administration, the police, the army, the media, (newspapers, radio, television), had been constructed. TANU, the ruling party, for instance, was a political ISA that was constructed in 1954, prior to the
existence of *Ujamaa*, for the purpose of gaining independence for Tanzania. It did not subscribe to any political ideology until 1967 when the AD was proclaimed. This indicates that the institutions preceded the ideas of *Ujamaa* that came to be known thanks to the existence of those institutions. When analysed in this way, it is reasonable to state that *Ujamaa* as an ideology had a material existence, in the sense of a pre-established setting.

Moreover, it is important not to lose sight of the fact that *Ujamaa* was a state ideology. It was formulated and articulated by tangible people who were part and parcel of the concrete material institutions that comprised the Tanzanian state apparatus. For example, Nyerere, the main architect of the ideology of *Ujamaa*, was the head of state, commander-in-chief of the armed forces and the chairperson of TANU, the ruling party (Nyerere, 1966). Furthermore, members of the National Executive Committee (NEC), who met in Arusha from 26th to 29th of January 1967 to deliberate the ideology of *Ujamaa*, and the attendees of the annual conference who endorsed it, were all members of the ruling party, TANU (Nyerere, 1977). It was the government that “[hammered] out details, policies and strategies for the translation of [Ujamaa] into effective actions” (Rue, 1973, p.41). It was the government’s responsibility to ensure that the new policy was correctly implemented. All the key programmes of *Ujamaa*, such as nationalisation, education for self-reliance, and village establishments, were implemented by the state. To summarise it can be said that *Ujamaa* had a material existence not only because the state governed the system of its ideas but also because material institutions preceded it.

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75 When *Ujamaa* was made the official ideology of the ruling party, Tanzania was a one party state following the banning of the multi-party system in 1965.
5.1.4. Ideology Interpellates Individuals as Subjects

I will now turn to what Montag (2006, p.119) has called “Althusser’s most productive theoretical contribution” namely his claim that “ideology interpellates individuals as subjects” (ibid. p.170). I aim deduce whether or not this claim also applies to Ujamaa. To clearly outline the main points of the argument it is helpful to begin with a clarification of the key terminologies employed, especially, the terms ‘interpellation’ and ‘subject’. According to Althusser (2002), “‘interpellation’ [is a] hailing”, a specific process or procedure through which ideology “recruits subjects among individuals (it recruits them all), or transforms the individuals into subjects (it transforms them all)” (p.174). In his account of Louis Althusser, Montag (2003) also noted that to be interpolated is to be “hailed or addressed as subjects” (p.119). The meaning of subject will become clearer later in this chapter but presently it is important to note that the term interpellation refers to the hailing, or addressing of people that ideology employs in order to gain their belief, when ideology is viewed both as a structure and as a belief system.

Althusser (2002) compares ideological hailing or interpellation to a police officer hailing “Hey, you there!” to an individual in a street. The individual turns around to ask: who? You mean me? To which the police officer replies: Yes, I mean you (p.174). Althusser contends that by turning around the “hailed individual …becomes a subject… because he has recognised that the hail was ‘really’ addressed to him, and that ‘it was really him who was hailed (and not someone else)” (ibid.). But Montag (2003) argues, “it is not only the act of interpellation that ‘constitutes’ the individual as a subject.” He goes on to say, that interpellation is a “prelude to an interrogation during which the interpolated subject will be
called upon to answer for himself: what is your name, what are you doing here, where are you going?” (p.119). It is by answering such questions that an individual is constituted as a subject and a similar process occurs in ideology. A particular ideology may say in effect ‘Hey, you there!’ and we ask: Who? Me? And the ideology replies: Yes, I mean you. It is Montag’s (2003), conviction that we become subjects when a specific ideology hails us, but since according to Althusser (2002) “the existence of ideology and the hailing or interpellation of individuals as subjects are one and the same thing” (p.175), it can be said that the existence of ideology makes it necessary for us to become subjects. This aligns with Althusser (2002), who writes that, “Individuals are always-already interpolated by ideology as subjects” a claim that leads to the conclusion that “individuals are always-already subjects” (p.176). Althusser’s position is clearly evidenced in rituals surrounding an unborn child. He explains that an individual is named before they are even born. “Before its birth the child is therefore always – already a subject, appointed as a subject in and by the specific familial ideological configuration in which it is expected once it has been conceived” (2002, p.1). There is never a time in a human being’s life when they are not already a subject of ideology. We are born into subject-hood and we are already subjects of the specific ideologies in which we find ourselves and live our lives.

When making his interpellation argument Althusser (2002) makes a distinction between a “remarkable Subject” symbolised by a capital ‘S’ and “ordinary subjects” symbolised by a lower case ‘s’ (p.178). Taking the ideology of Christian religion as a representative structure of all ideologies, Althusser (2002) argues that individuals are interpolated as subjects by positing another subject, “a Unique, Absolute, Other Subject, i.e. God” (p.178). This Absolute Subject presents itself to individuals through the scriptures and through the “the
innumerable subjects of God’s people, the Subject’s interlocutors” (p.179) or representatives, i.e. Jesus Christ, the disciples, popes, bishops and priests, who serve as mirror images. Having recognised that the scriptural message is meant for them and that the place they occupy in the world is the one described by the scriptures and by God’s representatives, individuals begin to think and act as subjects. In this respect the subjects are “subjected to the Subject”, i.e. God. The point that Althusser (2002) makes through his extensive discourse on Christian ideology is that the interpellation of individuals as subjects in the name of God, the unique and absolute Subject, is a constitutive dimension of ideology that also ensures its functioning. In ideologies that do not have a God as an absolute subject, such as political, ethical, and legal ideologies, the situation is slightly different. Instead, a subject that is not God is posited as a kind of model or representation of the basis on which individuals within that ISA, learn to think of themselves and act as subjects, in the ordinary sense of the word, which is to act as “a free subjectivity, a centre of initiatives, author of and responsible for its action” (p.182). Another way of expressing this is to say that ideology interpellates us as subjects in the sense that it leads us to think of ourselves as free and autonomous beings.

Ideology, however, does not only address us subjects, who are authors and owners of our own words and actions, but it also interpellates us as subjects in a second sense, that of “a subjected being, who submits to a higher authority, and is therefore stripped of all freedom except that of freely accepting his submission” (Althusser 2002, p.182). Althusser explains

76 (for example being born in structured society…p. 176)
Structure of ideology p. 180, the duplicate mirror-structure of ideology (pp.180-181)
that becoming a subject in the first sense and becoming one in the second are not two different processes. When we become subjects in the first sense we simultaneously become subjects in the second sense. Therefore, apart from a few stubborn subjects who occasionally need the intervention of repressive state apparatuses, the majority of subjects become obedient and willing agents of the mode of production that is perpetuated by the dominant ideology through the ISA to which they belong:

“caught in this…system of interpellation as subjects, of subjection to the Subject…the subjects ‘work’, they work by themselves in the vast majority of cases, with the exception of the bad subjects who on occasion provoke the intervention of one of the….repressive state apparatus” (ibid. p.181)

Most subjects ‘work by themselves’, fulfilling their different functions, and roles without being forced, arguing or questioning why they are in a productive relationship that is exploitative and dehumanising. They do not argue or question because “they ‘recognise’ the existing state of affairs …, that it really is true that it is so and not otherwise, and that they must be obedient” (ibid.). In this way, “the concrete, material behaviour is simply the inscription in life of the admirable words of the prayer: “Amen…So be it” (Althusser, 2002, pp.181-182). But this response does not mean that the current state of affairs is considered to be natural by the subjects. As Althusser (2002) points out, this phrase “proves that it is not ‘naturally’ so…that it has to be so if things are to be what they must be…” (p.183). Working by themselves, subjects come to believe that they are free, responsible and autonomous beings when in reality they are told how to think and act in the interests of the ruling class:

The individual is interpellated as a (free) subject in order that he shall submit freely to the commandments of the Subject, i.e. in order that he shall (freely) accept his subjection, i.e. in order that he shall make the gestures and actions of his subjection ‘all by himself’…that is why they ‘work all by themselves’” (p.182)
This is Althusser’s central argument: within ideology people erroneously believe they are free and responsible agents who think and act for themselves freely and autonomously, when in fact it is the opposite which is true. People are not free in either their thoughts or actions and as such they are not responsible agents, rather they are controlled by the ruling ideology, through the ISA. But what are the ramifications of this account of ideology for *Ujamaa*? This is the question to which I now turn.

5.1.4.1. The Interpellation of Individuals as Subjects by *Ujamaa*

Did *Ujamaa* interpellate individuals as subjects? The short answer to this question is yes: if Althusser’s insights are accepted, it can be claimed that *Ujamaa* interpellated or addressed individuals as subjects. However, *Ujamaa* hailed individuals not by positing God, the Absolute Subject, but by positing the extended family as a model or representation of how individuals were called upon to structure their understanding of themselves and their actions as free and responsible subjects. The extended family, however, could not in itself interpellate individuals as subjects since it is not a person. Therefore, in order to interpellate individuals as subjects of *Ujamaa*, that is, the attitudes, principles and practices of the extended family in traditional Africa, a subject known as Nyerere emerged.

Nyerere took several steps in order to transform Tanzanians into subjects of *Ujamaa*. Here, I will focus on the readily discernable influence of two steps: the pamphlet on *Ujamaa* and the Arusha Declaration. The pamphlet was published in 1962 under the title *Ujamaa: the Basis of African Socialism* (1962). It contained a specific appeal. Nyerere used it to call upon Tanzanians to look back to pre-colonial times, to the life in the pure traditional African societies. In taking them back to their own traditional roots, Nyerere was reminding them of
their African origin and identity. He was telling them that whilst they were called upon to live as Europeans during colonialism they were not Europeans but Africans. Nyerere (1968-77), told them that in the African way of life people cared for one another; an individual did not acquire wealth for the purpose of gaining power and prestige at the expense of others, the products of labour were shared, there were no classes of those who owned the means of production and those who did not; everybody was a worker, and property was owned by the community. In essence, Nyerere was telling Tanzanians that they were born socialists, that socialism was “rooted in [their] own past – in the traditional society which produced [them]” (Nyerere, 1977, p.12). There is no need, therefore, to be “converted” to socialism just as there was no need to be converted to democracy (ibid.). All that is required is to act as free and responsible agents by agreeing to regain the former attitudes and practices that existed in the traditional Africa extended family institution. Nyerere espouses this when he writes:

Our first step, therefore, must be to re-educate ourselves; to regain our former attitude of mind. In our traditional African society we were individuals within a community. We took care of the community, and the community took care of us. We neither needed nor wished to exploit our fellow men (ibid. pp. 6-7)

Nyerere called upon Tanzanians to re-educate themselves, to make efforts to understand what life was like in their own African tradition and apply the essential elements of that life to the modern reality. With respect to ownership of property, Nyerere’s interpellation is blunt:

In rejecting the capitalist attitude of mind which the colonialists brought into Africa, we must reject also the capitalist methods which go with it. One of these is the individual ownership of land. To us in Africa land was always recogniserecognised as belonging to the community (ibid. p 7)
Hence, Tanzanians, individually and collectively, were urged to reject capitalism and its methods and adopt African practices of land tenure. In short, the pamphlet was a call back to the roots, back to the African traditional attitudes and practices.

The Arusha Declaration (AD), the document that defined the ideology, was the second step in establishing subjects of *Ujamaa*. The AD, was “a manifesto which launched a fundamental political option of TANU… It was a declaration of principles, objectives and intentions couched in general terms” (Ngombale-mwiru, 1967, in Cliffe and Saul, 1973, p. 52). It was also a call, a form of interpellation. In particular, the AD called upon all Tanzanians to embrace the policies of socialism and self-reliance. Socialism, however, was a destination, a point of arrival and not the point of departure. Nyerere (1977), told Tanzanians that in socialism no person is more important than another in terms of rights and opportunities, there is no exploitation or class system, everybody is a worker, the major means of production are owned by the peasants and workers, the people are sovereign, people of different religious beliefs are tolerated, there is material prosperity, and there is no ignorance or death by curable diseases. In order to reach that state of socialism, Nyerere urged all Tanzanians to accept the strategies outlined in the AD: namely, nationalisation of the major means of production,\(^77\) improved agriculture,\(^78\) education for self-reliance,\(^79\) and the creation of *Ujamaa* villages.\(^80\)

\(^{77}\) Arusha Declaration p.16  
\(^{78}\) Arusha Declaration p.29  
\(^{79}\) Arusha Declaration p.14  
\(^{80}\) Arusha Declaration p.15
Nyerere was able to gain recognition from Tanzanians that they genuinely do occupy the place that the AD designated for them: namely, workers and peasants. Furthermore, he was able to persuade Tanzanians to recognise their own destination: namely, well-being for all or well-being for a few and suffering for the majority, according to the respect or contempt they show to the precepts of the Arusha Declaration. Most Tanzanians affirmed themselves as subjects by answering the appeal that Nyerere was making though the ISAs. They became subjects by subjecting themselves. They spoke and acted as free agents because they had been called upon to answer for themselves. Other Tanzanians freely subjected themselves to the authority embedded in law and work. There existed, however, an exceptional minority who refused to subject themselves until the intervention of the repressive state apparatus. These ‘bad subjects’ became subjects in the ideology of *Ujamaa* only by force. The best example of this force was the programme of the resettlement of peasants in rural areas into *Ujamaa* villages.

5.2. Conclusion

This chapter has shown that Nyerere’s *Ujamaa* or socialism is an ideology. In order to demonstrate this I introduced Althusser’s conception of ideology. Using Althusser, it was possible to present *Ujamaa* as an ideology for four key reasons: in the first instance *Ujamaa* was evidenced as an ideology because it was a functional necessity, required to transform the lives of the people. It was then established as an ideology because *Ujamaa* was an unconscious phenomenon, moreover, an imaginary representation of the relationship between individuals and their real conditions of existence. The imaginary version of Tanzania was called socialism or *Ujamaa*, which emphasized the equality of human beings, popular democracy, state ownership of the means of production, and religious tolerance. Thirdly, it was demonstrated that *Ujamaa* was an ideology because it had material existence. Although
the concepts of *Ujamaa* initially appear to be generated by Nyerere, I attested that the ideas that he articulated already existed, first in the institutions of traditional Africa and then in the institutions of state. Thus, *Ujamaa* had material existence, because it existed in the apparatus and practices of the traditional African extended family. Finally, it was concluded that *Ujamaa* is an ideology because it interpelletes individuals as subjects. In particular, it was shown how the extended family in traditional Africa was projected as a model or paradigm to be emulated and how Nyerere emerged as the ‘Subject’, who, using the state apparatus as a medium, called upon Tanzanians to be subjects. Whilst confirming *Ujamaa* as a political ideology moves us closer to a better understanding of the doctrine, it does not reveal a complete picture. To visualise this it is necessary in the following chapter to consider the functions of the political ideology of *Ujamaa*. It is only when we know how it functioned as an ideology that *Ujamaa* can truly be understood.
CHAPTER SIX:

FUNCTIONS OF UJAMAA AS A POLITICAL IDEOLOGY

6. Introduction

With the help of Louis Althusser it was possible to establish that Nyerere’s socialism was first and foremost a political ideology. It was the ruling ideology, an imaginary representation of the state, formulated, articulated and governed by the state apparatus, and one which was more concerned with the social, political and economic organisation of the society than with religious beliefs. But an understanding of Nyerere’s *Ujamaa* would be eschewed and therefore incomplete if it was formed under the impression that the ideology was articulated for no purpose at all. It was instead formed and articulated for specific purposes and objectives and to complete my account of the doctrine, therefore, I will now consider its functions. For example, how did *Ujamaa* function after establishing itself as an official ideology of Tanzania? To frame the central question of this chapter differently, what were the purposes or functions of the ideology of *Ujamaa*?

There were several ideological functions of *Ujamaa* and this chapter will outline three: to create unity, to establish a classless society, and to build a new work ethic. The procedure of presenting the role of ideology will be as follows: first I will describe the specific situation transformed by the ideology of *Ujamaa*: namely division, class (conflict) and laziness. This is followed by the functions of *Ujamaa* as an ideology.
6.1. Sources of Divisions and the Creation of Unity

There were three main sources of division in the Tanzanian social terrain: tribalism, religion, and race. These will be examined in turn beginning with tribalism.

6.1.1. Tribalism

Tribalism, the tendency and practice of segregating people on the basis of their tribes, became more acute in Tanzania after the Berlin conference of 1884 that partitioned Africa. The arbitrary nature of the partitioning brought together numerous ethnic groups and tribes who lived separately prior to the conference. In regards to Tanzania, historians including Sutton (1969) and Roberts (1969) have noted that the partition brought together four main ethnic groups: Bushmen and Hottentots (most notably the Sandawe and Hadzabe, who now live in central Tanzania), the Cushitic group (the Iraqw), the Bantu ethnic group (the Sukuma, Haya, Ngoni, Nyamwezi, and many others) and the Nilotes (the Masai, the Luo, the Mang’ati). These ethnic groups produced the approximately 120 tribes and languages that exist in Tanzania today. During the colonial period all the tribes were united in the quest for independence but as soon as this was achieved, unity between them began to crumble. This was, in part, due to post-colonial privileges; the big tribes (such as the Sukuma and Nyakyusa) and the tribes with most educated members (such as the Chagga and the Haya) thought they deserved more privileges and power in government than other tribes. In some African countries such as Rwanda and Burundi, tribal conflicts arising from the desire of one tribe to rule over the others has sparked civil war with disastrous consequences. Tanzania,

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81 For a detailed account of the tribal and ethnic configuration in Tanzania see Sutton (1969) and Roberts (1969).
however, was fortunate enough in this regard to have a leadership that recognised that the restoration of unity depended on ideology rather than on force.

The first ideological function of *Ujamaa* with regard to this particular source of division was to eradicate evidence of tribalism and conceal its existence. In order to destroy the evidence of tribalism, the government took several measures: the first was to abolish chieftaincy, an institution founded on tribalism (Omari, 1995). The second measure, aimed at diverting allegiance away from tribalism to the nation and the party, whereby Swahili as a national language\(^8^2\) was used as the tool. At the ideological level, this move transformed Swahili from being an Arabic language with some Bantu words, to an African language, to be used by the state and its apparatuses as a medium of communication. These steps weakened tribal allegiances and strengthened nationalism, a sign of unity. In addition to these actions designed to eradicate tribalism, the ideology of *Ujamaa* also tried to conceal its existence.

There were two main ideologies applied in attempts to eliminate tribalism, those of human equality and of the brotherhood of man. The ideology of *Ujamaa* proclaimed that all human beings in general and all Tanzanians in particular, were equal irrespective of their tribes. Thus, on the ideological level, individuals in Tanzania did not belong to any tribe because there was then only one tribe; *Tanzanianism*. But since there was no tribe called Tanzanians and never had been, this was an imaginary representation. Nevertheless, according to this ideology, all citizens of Tanzania, whether Chagga, Maasai, Ngoni, Sukuma, Zaramo or Nyamwezi, were described first and foremost as *Tanzanians*. These Tanzanians belonged to

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\(^8^2\) For a different opinion see Omari, C.K. ‘the management of Tribal and Religious Diversity’ in Legum and Mmari (eds), *Mwalimu: The Influence of Nyerere*, (1995), where it is argued that Swahili was already widespread in Tanzania. Even if it true, Swahili was not the language of the state and its apparatuses.
one country, Tanzania, where they were all equal members of the society with equal rights, duties, and opportunities.

Tribalism was also concealed by another ideology, the brotherhood of man, named due to its espousal that a true socialist is one who “regards all men as his brethren as members of his ever extending family” (Nyerere, 1977, p. 12). Therefore, all Tanzanians regardless of their tribal affiliation were ‘Ndugu’ Swahili for brothers and sisters. Ndugu became the title of everyone. Grander titles such as mister, sir, honourable, Excellency, were discouraged and the word ‘ndugu’ was promoted. At the ideological level, a person who insisted on being addressed as ‘honourable’ was deemed to possess bourgeois mentality, and as such seeking that sought to render other people as their servants. In the final analysis a person who insisted on this manner of address and whose attitude was to oppress, or even enslave others was not a brother. In sum, it can be said the function of the ideology of Ujamaa was to convert the population to nationalists by eradicating evidence of tribalism and concealing the remaining elements. It was in this way that unity among the many tribes of Tanzania was secured and consolidated.

6.1.2. Religious Divisions

Historically Tanzania has been dominated by three main religions: Christianity, Islam, and African traditional religions. Although, a segment of the Muslim population “called for independence to be postponed until Muslims in the country had attained more education” (Omari, 1995, p.26), most religious people in the country supported the liberation movement and played a significant role in bringing about the independence of Tanzania. However, after independence, cracks along the religious lines began to show and this was partially a result of
unequal employment opportunities. In a modern state, employment opportunities depend heavily on one’s level of education. Formal education in Tanzania (and the rest of Africa) was introduced by Christian missionaries, so inevitably the Christian population was better educated and more readily employable at the time of independence (Nyerere, 1966). Some Muslims, who formed the majority members of TANU, resented the ascendancy of Christians into top government jobs and prime employment opportunities. The dissatisfaction of Muslims “constituted a potential threat to unity” (ibid. p.179). Across Africa, divisions of this nature toppled governments and sparked civil wars. In order to create and build unity among people of different religions Nyerere preferred ideological tactics rather than violence.

The first direct ideological reaction to this particular kind of division was religious tolerance which provided all religions with the freedom of worship and the right to conduct their affairs without state interference provided that in doing so they did not infringe upon the freedom of others. In the AD it reads as: “every citizen has the right to freedom of expression, of movement, of religious belief, and of association within the context of the law” (Nyerere, 1977, p.13). To ensure that the state did not get involved in religious matters, religious denominations were encouraged to create “their respective national organisations which acted as their representative” (Omari, 1995, p.29). In practical terms this meant that Christian denominations would negotiate through the Christian Council of Tanzania (CCT) and Muslims would resolve their issues through BAKWATA 83 (ibid. p.29). In addition to the freedom of worship the ideology of Ujamaa also attempted to eradicate religious dominations. One method of achieving this was to claim that at the ideological level,

83 This is a Swahili acronym for Baraza Kuu la Waislamu Tanzania or in English, The Muslim National Council of Tanzania.
religions did not exist. The state and its apparatus, such as the Repressive State Apparatuses (RSA), (that is, the army, the police, the prisons, the executive) and the Ideological State Apparatuses (ISA) (that is, the family; educational institutions such as schools; colleges; and universities as well others such as the churches; the media; and the party) were not affiliated to any religion. Although individual members of these institutions were believers of one religion or another, their religious beliefs were supposed to have no consequence to the policies and functions of the institutions. In other words, the decisions of these institutions were not influenced by religious beliefs. Thus, at the ideological level, there was no religion or better still, religion did not exist. In this way no religion could claim to have influence on the state because its policies were secular. This helped to consolidate religious unity. Furthermore, the ideology of equality and of the brotherhood of man also helped to blur religious differences since all Tanzanians were told that they were equal brothers and sisters irrespective of their religions.

6.1.3. Rac(ial)ism

I now examine rac(ial)ism, the third source of division in the country, and how the ideology of Ujamaa reinforced unison. In Tanzania racism and racialism are both usually traced back to the time of colonialism, when society was divided along racial lines.84 However, racism, the belief that one particular race is superior to another, did not disappear immediately after independence:

The Tanganyika we inherited from colonialism was one in which the injustices of colonial days survived; in which there was racial discrimination; and from which the degradation and evils which sprang from colonialism had yet to be banished (Nyerere, 1966, p.179)

84 See, Chapter Two, section 2.3.1.
Whilst racism still existed this time it was not the Europeans who were segregating Africans rather it was the Africans who were segregating foreigners. Following independence, Africans who had been victims of racism themselves, and who united against colonialism, sought revenge by segregating non-black Tanzanians. In a complete *volte face* they became convinced that the black skin was more superior to other skin colours. Nowhere was this more pronounced than in the employment sector. Black Tanzanians believed a free and independent Tanzania must be for them alone, a claim whose practical implication was that non-black Tanzanians, such as Indians and Europeans, must either be repatriated or turn their jobs over to black Tanzanians. Africanisation of the civil service was the manifestation of racism and the lasting solution depended not on violence but on ideology.

On the ideological plane, racism did not exist and was explicitly rejected by an article, published in the *Nationalist*, a daily paper, on the 14th February 1967, in which Nyerere declared that “socialism is not racialism” (Nyerere, 1977, p.38). In practical terms, this meant that “socialism has nothing to do with race” (*ibid*, p.40), and socialist policies, programmes and decisions were not determined by race or racial considerations and by extension nor were the functions of the state. Underpinning the ideology of *Ujamaa* was a belief in the equality and in the familyhood of human beings. *Ujamaa* viewed all human beings whether red, white, black or yellow, as equal members of society, with equal rights and duties. It is in this sense that it can be said that race did not exist in *Ujamaa*. The function of ideology in this regard was to deny or to conceal the existence of rac(ial)ism, while simultaneously destroying evidence of racial discrimination. *Ujamaa* both concealed racism and undermined it. In particular, *Ujamaa* presented racialism as a vice; for example, Nyerere does not mince words when he writes, “racialism is evil” (Nyerere, 1977, p.43). Since racialism is an evil, by
extension a racist individual who believed their own skin colour to be superior and who would consequently segregate others, was not only evil but was also in effect “[sabotaging] the work [Tanzanians] have embarked upon” (ibid. p.41), namely, the work of creating racial equality, and unity between races. By presenting racialism in this way, the underlying relation between individuals from different racial backgrounds became concealed and to a certain extent eradicated.

6.2. Class and Creation of a Classless Society

Having seen how *Ujamaa* was used to bridge religious and racial divides I will now examine its role in transforming Tanzania from a class society to a classless one. The structure of society during the colonial period was described in detail in Chapter One. What remains to be added at this juncture, is that the racial division coincided with economic power. Europeans were, for example, the bourgeois or upper class, not only because of the colour of their skin but also because they controlled the major means of production. They evicted the indigenous population from fertile lands and established settler plantations. In the financial sector, insurance companies, building societies and hire purchase companies were owned by individuals of British origin (Loxley, 1973). Conversely, Africans were in the lower class, not only because they were black but also because they owned none of the major means of production. They survived by providing cheap labour to the owners of the means of production. A desire to end slave labour was a primary motivation of the Africans to support the freedom movement. They believed that after independence they would no longer be enslaved in the settler plantations and to a large extent this was the promise made to them by TANU. After independence, however, the lot of most Africans did not change and this was in part due to corruption. Some of the Africans, who lived in poverty during colonialism, began
using their education and positions in the party and government to amass wealth for themselves. During an interview with Ikaweba Bunting, Nyerere describes the situation:

Tanzania had been independent for a very short time before we began to see a growing gap between the haves and have-nots in our country. A privileged group was emerging from the political leaders and bureaucrats who had been poor under colonial rule but were now beginning to use their positions in the Party and the Government to enrich themselves.\(^85\)

After independence a class system emerged with an upper class comprising Tanzanians who occupied positions of leadership in the government and in the ruling party and a lower class, comprising Tanzanians, who did not own the means of production on account of not holding the aforementioned political positions. These classes presented themselves as real forces which posed a threat to the socialist development strategy (Heyden & Leys, 1973). Expressing similar views but in specific terms, Shivji (1973) also points out that classes existed in Tanzania and they involved the administrative bureaucracy; the petty bourgeoisie and the sub-capitalists (or comprador) stratum which was composed mainly of Asians who were involved in the commercial sector. In addition, there was also a large portion of the population, the peasants and kulaks, who formed the agricultural sector and there was also a small working class \((ibid)\). But, according to Shivji, these classes were dormant and elaborating further he writes:

Tanzania was in a situation of flux – a situation of latent but definite class struggle \([\text{where}, \text{on the one hand, there [was] the economic and political bureaucracy (objectively backed by the international bourgeoisie, the country being still in the neo-colony framework), and on the other are the workers and the peasants as represented in their most vocal and conscious elements – largely small groups of intelligentsia, including a few enlightened leaders’} (ibid. pp.313-314).\)

\(^85\) [http://www.newint.org/issue309/anticol.htm](http://www.newint.org/issue309/anticol.htm)
This analysis identified the classes that existed in Tanzania and the struggle that was taking place. It makes it clear that whilst there was class struggle going on in Tanzania, it was still in its embryonic stage insofar as it was not so pronounced and sufficiently developed to usher in a socialist revolution. Nonetheless, classes definitely existed and the tension, though not overwhelming, was real and posed a threat to the socialist development strategy.

6.2.1. The Creation of a Classless Society

One of the main functions of the ideology of *Ujamaa* was to remove evidence of class domination in society. Four measures were taken to achieve this. At the ideological level the first move was to conceal class domination; the second was to nationalise the major means of production; the third strategy involved the establishment of a leadership code of ethics; and, the last was the creation of *Ujamaa* villages. In the following section each of these measures will be examined in the order in which they appear here.

6.2.1.1. Concealing Class Domination

First then let us consider how the existence of class (conflict) was concealed and the ramifications of this for the creation of a classless society. At the ideological level, class and therefore conflict between them did not exist in Tanzania. Class (conflict) was categorically denied by the leadership of TANU and its members. Nyerere, in particular, made it clear that he was not ready to tolerate views which considered class and its conflicts as prerequisites for the establishment of socialism. In a passage that reveals this stance, Nyerere writes:

> Without capitalism and the conflict which capitalism creates within society, there can be no socialism! This glorification of capitalism by the doctrinaire European socialists, I repeat, I find intolerable” (Nyerere, 1977, p.11).
Nyerere maintained that *Ujamaa* “did not start from the existence of conflicting ‘classes’ in society” (*ibid.* p.11) but from the extended family of traditional Africa. Thus, at the ideological level, class (conflict) was suppressed by this blatant denial of their existence. Besides this denial, the ideology of *Ujamaa* also tried to conceal evidence of class domination (past and present) by refusing to recognise individuals as members of a particular class. Since classes were not recognised at the ideological level, *Ujamaa* found it difficult to categorise people, thus to remain consistent it simply described Tanzanians as workers and peasants which is how Nyerere described the entire population of Tanzania: “Tanzania is a nation of peasants and workers” (Nyerere, 1977, p.16). But who were the peasants and who were the workers?

‘Peasant’ is a term that refers to a “small agricultural producers who produce primarily for their own consumption and primarily use the labour of their family members, though they are involved in wider economic and political association” (Mchenry, 1977, p.44). Estimates differ, but according to Freund (1981), this group constituted more than 90 per cent of the Tanzanian population of about thirty million people (in 1978). Hence, the term is synonymous with the Tanzania populace. Mwansansu and Pratt (1979) have described workers as those members of society who earn their living from non-agricultural employment, including party leaders, civil servants, and all those who have managerial, entrepreneurial or technical skills in different fields. The terms ‘peasant’ and ‘worker’ as described here are too broad to express the existence of class. Clearly most Tanzanians were peasants but not all peasants were the same. As Freund (1981) has pointed out there were peasants who owned tractors, shops and means of transport and peasants who survived on subsistence farming. Similarly, not all workers were the same. Government and party
workers owned means of production and were getting richer than their counterparts who served as office messengers or porters. Although classified as workers, party and government leaders were in a class of their own that can properly be termed “the ruling class” (ibid. p.484). One of the main functions of *Ujamaa* as an ideology was to conceal the presence of class (conflicts) in Tanzania yet paradoxically, it took measures which clearly confirmed their existence. For, in addition to concealing the existence of class, *Ujamaa* embarked on a programme of nationalisation of the major means of production.

6.2.1.2. Nationalisation of Major Means of Production

The strategy of building socialism in Tanzania was clearly outlined in the AD as follows:

> To build and maintain socialism it is essential that all major means of production and exchange in the nation are controlled and owned by the peasants through the machinery of the government and their cooperatives” (Nyerere, 1977, p.16).

Hence, in order to move from a class society, in which one class controls the major means of production, and another class does not, to a classless society where no one class owns them, it is necessary for the state to assume their control. Having made this decision, the government embarked on a systematic nationalisation of the major means of production. In February, 1967, for example, commercial banking, and insurance activities were completely taken over by the government. A week after the AD, “on the 11th February, the *State Trading Corporation* (STC), was established as the vehicle through which the import, export, and wholesale trade of Tanzania would be placed” (Loxley, 1973, p.112). A few days later the President announced nationalisation of eight major import/export companies and promised

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86 They included Smith Mackenzie and Co. Ltd; Dalgety East Africa Ltd; International T Baumann and Co. (Tanganyika) Ltd Trading and Credit Company of Tanganyika; Co-operative Supply Association of Tanganyika Ltd; Twentsche Overseas Trading Company Ltd; African Mercantile Company (Overseas) Company Ltd; Wigglesworth and Company (Africa) Ltd; Source: ( see, Biersteker, 1980, p. 238).
full compensation\footnote{Compensation discussions moved smoothly and rapidly with all other companies except Barclays Bank, the Standard bank and the two partially nationalised industrial firms (Loxley, 1973, pp.45-46).} (Biersteker, 1980). The programme of nationalisation did not continue with the same zeal and speed, however, and six years after it was announced, the government was still not in full control of the commercial sector (Loxley, 1973). In the process the government lacked personnel and funds, and was, therefore, forced to enter into joint ventures with some companies or own majority share in others. In sum, the “nationalisation measures [did] not achieve levels of ownership and control commensurate with socialist program” (Nursey-Bray, 1980, p.65). Hence the government did not achieve total control over the means of production. Moreover, whilst total state control was not achieved, attempts were made to destroy evidence of class formation.

6.2.1.3. Creating Leadership Code of Conduct

I now turn to the third function of the ideology of Ujamaa, the Leadership Code of Conduct, and its implications for the creation of a classless society, the main objective of NU. The code emphasized five main points: first, it stipulated that “every TANU and government leader must be either a peasant or a worker, and should in no way be associated with the practices of capitalism and feudalism” (Nyerere, 1977, p.36). The practices of capitalism that are rejected here are private ownership of the means of production and individual’s “accumulation of wealth for the purpose of gaining power and prestige” (Nyerere, 1977 p.3). Secondly, “no TANU or government leader should hold shares in any company” (ibid. p.36). Holding shares in a company was a capitalist practice and like the first code of conduct, the intention was to prevent leaders from owning means of production and thus creating a class of their own. Thirdly, leaders were not allowed to “hold directorship in any privately owned enterprise” (ibid.), since this was an incentive to engage in capitalist practices, which as shown, were not
conducive to the creation of a classless society. Next, leaders were not permitted to “receive two or more salaries” (ibid. p.6), presumably because this was interpreted by the leaders as a form of wealth accumulation incompatible with creating a classless society. Finally, no leader was allowed “to own houses which he rents to others” (ibid. p.36) because collecting rent from tenants would also be a capitalist practice of wealth accumulation considered by Ujamaa to be detrimental to the creation of a classless society. Considered as a whole, the Leadership Code of conduct was a measure to curb the development of classes and reduce conflict between them.

6.2.1.4. Creation of Ujamaa Villages

Having explored the emergence of Tanzania’s class system and its struggles, it is now timely to explore the notion of Ujamaa villages. In the ideology of Ujamaa, a village is a place where people in the rural areas lived and worked together for the common good. In Nyerere’s terminology Ujamaa villages are “economic and social communities where people live together and work together for the good of all” (Nyerere, 1977, p.120). To be able to live together, “each member of the family [has to recognise] the place and the rights of the other members” (Nyerere, 1977 p.107), otherwise it becomes impossible to live together in close proximity. Agriculture was the main activity of the rural population and Nyerere describes how this ought to be undertaken in Ujamaa villages:

Farming would be done by groups of people who live as a community and work as a community. They would live together in a village; they would farm together; market together; and undertake the provision of local services and small local requirements as a community (Nyerere, 1977, p.124)

Needless to say, the “land this community farmed would be called ‘our land’ by all the members; the crops they produced on that land would be ‘our crops’” (ibid). As such Ujamaa
village members did not just live and work together, they also shared ownership of the major means of production. In short, the nature of the Ujamaa villages made the formation of classes and class conflict difficult if not impossible; the creation of the villages helped to minimise if not to eradicate class (conflict).

6.3. Forces of Production and their Transformation

In addition to the creation of a classless society another key objective of Ujamaa was the elimination of poverty through increased production. One of the basic requirements in order to increase agricultural or industrial production is the force of production, that is, machinery, skills and people. As Sayers (1980, p.14) has pointed out, “there is no greater force of production than people” because all the others, require people to build, operate and maintain. The force of production in Tanzania was characterised by three features: the machines were primitive, the manpower was unskilled and a segment of manpower was lazy. In the following section, we will examine each of these issues in turn and the role Ujamaa played in their transformation.

6.3.1. Primitive Tools and its Transformation

One of the most common machines of production especially in agriculture was the hoe. In traditional societies, which conducted on subsistence farming, hoe use produced enough for people to survive on. In a modern society, however, which requires mass production of goods, or production on industrial scale, the hoe was no longer a viable force of production. Its use could not produce enough for mass consumption.
At the ideological level *Ujamaa* argued for the modernisation of machines and skills of production. In some instances, the state provided farmers with the most modern tools of production such as tractors and combine harvesters, but modernisation was a gradual process which was envisioned to occur through evolution or progression, from the traditional technologically primitive phase to a more technologically advanced stage. In practical terms, this meant that “the jembe [hoe] will have to be eliminated by the ox-plough before the latter can be eliminated by the tractor [for] we cannot hope to eliminate the jembe [hoe] by the tractor” (Sayers 1980, p.97). The hoe could not be fully replaced by the tractor because realistically, the government could not afford such a move. Tanzania could not take a quantum leap forward into the use of technologically advanced agricultural equipments without first going through the use of intermediary equipment that are cheap, easily available and which could be operated by Tanzanians themselves.

6.3.2. Unskilled Labour Force and its Transformation

Another challenge that Tanzania had to overcome was the lack of “skilled manpower” (Nyerere, 1977, p. 96). Although there was recognition that “knowledge does not only come out of books or lecturers” but also “from our own past”, the truth of the matter was that “the traditional knowledge accumulated in the tribal past” was not scientific and technical enough to produce the skilled manpower needed in a modern state (Nyerere, 1974, p.10). Most farmers with traditional knowledge did not know anything about fertilisers or insecticides. They cultivated the fields, planted seeds, and did nothing to increase the fertility of the soil or protect their crops from diseases. The lack of skill was also exacerbated by modernity, because all the forces of production, machinery, and techniques were new or modern. Not many Africans, for instance, knew how to apply a tractor, let alone operate and maintain it. At the ideological level, the long term solution was to train skilled labour power. One of the
ISAs that played a crucial role in achieving this was the school and the programme of ‘education for self-reliance’ was tasked with this training. Under this programme, the primary schools in Tanzania enrolled children from the age of seven, and educated them in farming for approximately seven years. Most of them were then placed into production, as workers or small peasants. A small number continued on to secondary school for another four to six years until they were employable as middle technicians, white collar workers, small or middle executives, and petty bourgeoisies. A small number, who achieved academic excellence at universities and colleges, became managers, chief executive officers (CEOs) and ideologists. If Althusser’s intuitions are accepted, it can be said that each stage in the education system “[was] provided with an ideology which suits the role it has to fulfill in class society: the role of the exploited or the role of the agents of exploitation” (p.155). Clearly, Althusser (2002) was concerned with the capitalist society and what he describes is relevant to the class society, but as shown here, Ujamaa followed the same path, and the same ISA, was used to not only produce skilled labour but also reproduce the socialist relations of production.

In addition to formal training, the AD also urged peasants to acquire proper knowledge of the development activities they were involved in. In order to disseminate agricultural knowledge to peasants, the AD appealed to the government and party leaders “to spend time in the villages showing the people how to bring about development through their own efforts” (Nyerere 1977, p.32). There was clear recognition that “unintelligent hard work would not bring the same good results as the two combined” (ibid. p.31). Thus, an appeal was made to leaders and to the educated members of society, to help peasants improve their production potential. The task, according to the AD, was to convince farmers that “using a big hoe [is
much better] than using a small hoe” (Ibid); that “using a plough pulled by oxen [is better than] an ordinary hoe”, (Ibid), and that the use of fertilisers and insecticides was beneficial (ibid. p.31). Moreover, according to AD, it was also necessary to educate farmers so that they knew “the right crop for the right season or soil, the good seeds for planting and the right time for weeding” (ibid. p.31). Underlying this was the belief that when the peasants were educated agricultural production would increase.

At the ideological level, the short term solution to unskilled manpower was to continue depending on foreign expatriates. Although it was claimed that “for our development we have to depend upon ourselves and our resources” and that “only Tanzanians are sufficiently interested to develop Tanzania in the interest of Tanzanians” (Nyerere, 1977, p.95), when it came to providing solutions foreign expatriates were welcome. Nyerere reasoned that “it was not being self-reliant to refuse to carry out the directions of a foreign engineer, or a foreign doctor, or a foreign manager; it is just being stupid” (ibid. p.101). It was neither sensible nor self-reliant, for Tanzanians, under the guise of the doctrine of self-reliance, to refuse to work with people from other countries. If the implementation of a particular programme required someone with skills and experience, it was not very prudent according to Nyerere, to let that programme fail out of sheer pride. On the issue of achieving skilled labour Nyerere explains that there was “no false pride in this matter” (ibid.). Those who have the skills should, in Nyerere’s opinion be welcome to offer their contribution irrespective of where they come from.
6.3.3. Laziness and its Transformation

The general perception of Nyerere was that in the Tanzanian society there were some people who were working harder than others. In particular, the rural women worked harder than people in urban areas:

It is impossible to deny that the women did, and still do more than their fair share of the work in the fields and in homes (Nyerere, 1977, p.109).

In a more practical vein it means that:

At times [women] work for 12 or 14 hours a day [and] they even work on Sundays and public holidays. Women who live in the villages work harder than anybody else in Tanzania (Nyerere, 1977, ibid. p.30)

This indication that a segment of society, particularly women worked harder than men, was reason why Nyerere laments:

the energies of the millions of men in the villages and thousands of women in the towns which are at present wasted in gossip, dancing and drinking are a great treasure which could contribute more towards the development of our country than anything we could get from rich nations (ibid. pp. 30-31).

Men did not work as hard as women and if the country was to make progress in terms of production, and if the war against poverty was to be won Tanzanians were required to toil harder. The question is: what to do in order to transform a people from being lazy to being hardworking?

On the ideological plane, the first reaction against laziness was to emphasize the importance of work and extend working hours. The AD clearly stated that “the biggest requirement [for development] is hard work” (Nyerere, 1977, p.30) and it continued to insist that “hard work is
the root of development” (ibid. p.32). Underlying this emphasis was the belief that Tanzania could not be said to be developing, much less to be waging war against poverty, if its people remained idle, hoping that the international community would continue to pour in money for its development needs. People in a nation cannot cease work and still expect to develop or eradicate poverty. The AD asserts that work is an essential component of the war against poverty. Consequently it was decreed that in the post-AD period, the objective of employees should be to work longer hours, preferably “more than 45 hours a week” (Nyerere, 1977, p.30).

In addition to working longer hours, work was represented in Ujamaa as a virtue and laziness as a vice. As a moral virtue, work was presented as the only “way of earning a living in community” and a way to be respected even in old age since those elders who are admired now “worked hard all their [younger] days” (Nyerere, 1977, p.4). An upright man takes pride in work, for even if he goes somewhere as a guest, he knows that he must work after a day or so because “that is what is expected of him” (ibid. p.5). As a vice, a loiterer or idler is a “form of modern parasite”, because he is a person “who accepts the hospitality of society as his ‘right’ but gives nothing in return” (ibid. p.5). Since a loiterer gives nothing in return, he was presented in Ujamaa as an exploiter. This attitude presents lingering as an “unthinkable disgrace” (ibid. p.5) and a shame. So at the ideological level work is exulted and laziness is castigated; by praising work, people would be motivated to work harder. Work is also presented as an essential characteristic of socialism or as Nyerere states, “there is no such thing as socialism without work” (ibid. p.6). Everybody in a socialist society is a worker and if a society cannot provide individuals with means to work, then that society “needs putting right” (ibid. p.6). Similarly, “an individual who can work and is provided by society with the
means to work but does not do so is equally wrong” (ibid. p.6). This presentation of work as a virtue and laziness as a vice is brought to a conclusion with some deliberations:

In our country work should be something to be proud of and laziness, drunkenness and idleness should be a thing to be ashamed of (Nyerere, 1977, p.34).

Furthermore,

In order to prevent exploitation it is necessary for everybody to work and live on his own labour. And in order to distribute the national wealthy fairly, it is necessary for everybody to work to the maximum of his ability (ibid.).

Consequently,

Nobody should go and stay for a long time with his relative, doing no work because in doing so he will exploit his relative. Likewise, nobody should be allowed to loiter in towns or villages without doing work which would enable him to be self-reliant without exploiting his relatives (ibid.)

It is not usually the role of the state to tell its citizens where to go or not go and how long to stay. The fact that this was done in Tanzania is a clear indication of the extent and seriousness of lazy tendencies. The ideology of Ujamaa attempted to resolve the issue by representing work as an ideal, as something very attractive and dignified and something to which people should aspire. It urged people to see that work was something positive that could bring about development for themselves and others. It attempted to convince people that working longer hours was not only desirable but necessary if the war against poverty was to be won. It is in trying to persuade people to change their attitudes to work, in trying to move them from the state of laziness to that of hardworkingness that Ujamaa played a transformative function.
6.4. Conclusion

The present chapter illustrated the main functions of *Ujamaa* as an ideology. In particular, it demonstrated that the ideology of *Ujamaa* had at least two main functions: integrative or cohesive function, and transformative function. In order to establish the integrative function of *Ujamaa*, the sources of divisions which existence in the country were examined followed by the role that Nyerere’s *Ujamaa* played in addressing them. It became apparent that one of the main cohesive functions of *Ujamaa* was to unify the tribes, religions and races. It was also established that *Ujamaa* had a transformative function. This was confirmed by examining class (conflict) in Tanzania as well as the forces of production in the country. It became evident that *Ujamaa* played a significant role in eliminating or minimising evidence of class domination, the modernisation of the productive forces and in changing people’s attitude to work. Taken together with the discussions of previous chapters the picture of *Ujamaa* is now complete. The account of *Ujamaa*’s functions revealed the full picture of Nyerere’s *Ujamaa* but whether or not it is valid, is the question that remains to be answered in the following chapter.
CHAPTER SEVEN
THE CONCEPTUAL EFFECTIVENESS OF UJAMAA

7. Introduction

Having examined in the last chapter the main functions of Ujamaa, we will now in this chapter propose to examine the conceptual effectiveness of Nyerere’s Ujamaa. For instance, did Nyerere succeed to integrate the liberal and the communitarian strands of African tradition? Was the idea of socialism well represented in Ujamaa? The procedure for determining the effectiveness of Ujamaa will be as follows: first we will examine the reasons for integrating elements from different traditions, then we will examine whether Nyerere succeeded to fuse the elements of freedom of the individual and the community and lastly we will determine whether or not Nyerere succeeded to represent conceptually the idea of socialism.

7.1. Reasons for the Synthesis

First let us examine in this section the validity of the reasons for the synthesis between liberal principles and the communitarian ones. There were two key factors behind Nyerere’s reasoning: one was political, the other cultural. In the following section, these reasons will be described in turn.

7.1.1. Political Reason: the Cold War Politics

There were essentially two political reasons that necessitated the integration of African and European values: the first was to befriend the existing powers and thus remain secure as a country, and the second was that neither capitalism nor socialism alone held the ultimate truth
about economic and social organisation. When *Ujamaa* was formulated in the 1960s, the “international political environment…coincided with the height of the bipolar ideological and military confrontational policies of the Cold War” (Rugumamu, 2005, p.41). During the Cold War, there was what Nyerere (1966) has called, the “the second scramble for Africa” (p.205). During this second struggle for Africa, the powerful nations in the capitalist Western bloc represented by the USA and those from the communist Eastern bloc headed by the USSR, were covertly competing for the ideological “control of Africa” (*ibid.*). Since ideologically, there were only two systems of economic and social organisation, namely “capitalism and socialism” the “first choice [for countries like Tanzania] had to be between them” (Nyerere, 1974, p.113). Yet, in reality poor and younger economies did not have freedom of choice. Tanganyika was under pressure from both capitalists and socialists to join either of them; the powerful nations from each bloc “were anxious to get even so new and poor a country as Tanganyika on their side” (Nyerere, 1966, p.120). To join one bloc was automatically to become an enemy of the other. Nyerere concluded, therefore, that Tanzania “did not have to be either” (*ibid.* p.121), that is to say; Tanzania did not have to be either capitalist or communist.88 This position, which Nyerere describes as ‘positive neutrality’ or ‘non-alignment’ means “trying to be friends with all and not quarrelling with one half of the world in order to seek a security with the other half” (*ibid.* p.29). It was better to befriend all the major powers by creating an ideology that had elements from both blocs. In this way, neither side could attack Tanzania or seek to destabilise it because of ideological differences.89

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88 According to Rugumamu (1995), in a bipolar world, cold war rivalries did not only determine Africa’s ideology, but they also exacerbated some local and regional conflicts in Africa.

89 During the cold war, the safety, security and the stability of the African states was not guaranteed. Regime change could take place anytime the powerful nations wanted. Aware of the hostilities and rivalries between the two ideological blocks and conscious of their own lack of power to defend themselves against external military threats, African states “relied on tacit coalitions or open alliances with major foreign powers” (Rugumamu, 2005, p.42) for their security and safety. In exchange for security and protection from external aggression, the
Tanzania, however, was, as a former British colony, already part of the cold war as part of the capitalist ideology. In order to tread a middle ground, Tanzania had to move towards the other side of the conflict, the socialist side. Clarifying the point Nyerere employs the following analogy:

If you start from a point to the west of the meridian line, and want to reach that line, then you have to move east. There is no way of getting there. But that does not mean that you intend to go past it and finish up equal latitude to the east of it (Nyerere, 1966, p.330).

Nyerere argued that the acceptance of some elements from communism did not mean that Tanzania was a fully communist or socialist state. Of course, “socialism and especially Marxism provided the analysis of inequality and exploitation through which the colonial experience could be understood and colonial rule challenged” (Heywood, 1997, p.116), but this did not mean that Tanzania was completely communist.

Besides the desire for friendship, the integration of various elements from different cultures was necessitated by the appropriateness of the systems to address the conditions found in Tanzania. For example, Nyerere (1977) considered capitalism to be inappropriate for Tanzania because the emphasis that it placed on individualism was irreconcilable to African societies that were communitarian in nature. Furthermore, capitalism was in Nyerere’s opinion, the cause of colonialism, the system which he and his colleagues in TANU had fought against and which they believed had exacerbated poverty across Africa.
Furthermore, capitalism was incompatible with the aspirations of the Tanzanian people to have “full national independence” and to develop without the creation of two classes of people: “a small group whose ownership of the means of production brings them wealth, power, and privilege; and a very large group whose work provides that wealth and privilege” (Nyerere, 1974, p.119 and p.121). Scientific socialism was rejected by Nyerere because it required class conflict, and by implication, violence, for its development. It was also dismissed because it was not democratic. The doctrine of the ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’ did not in essence allow freedom, so was inappropriate for a people who had just got attained their independence from colonialism.

Finally, communism was not right for Tanzania because its citizens in particular and Africans in general were “notoriously religious” (Mbiti, 1969-1994, p.1). As such (scientific) socialism which proclaimed that religion was the “opium of the mind” (Marx 1843, p.261), and therefore, a prohibited practice, was not suitable for them. In sum, the integration of traits from different traditions was deemed necessary by Nyerere because neither capitalism nor socialism were perfect; they exhibited limitations.

7.1.2. Cultural Reasons

The cultural reasons behind the decision to blend liberal and communitarian elements cannot be well understood unless how humanity has been described in western philosophy is recalled. In Chapter Two of this thesis, it was suggested that for Nyerere, Kant described humanity in terms of rationality and autonomy. However, not all western philosophers extended these attributes to Africans. For example, Hegel (1956), Levy-Bruhl (1975), Westermann (1934 [1969]) and Carothers (1972), among others, believed that Africans did
not reason or if they did then the process was not sufficiently developed. Consequently they maintained that Africans could not have a history, culture or religion. These philosophers believed reason to be the source of these humanities and if a people had no reason or if their reasoning capacity was not adequately developed, then such a people could not be a civilised culture with a recognised past or creed. It was in this belief that early Christian missionaries in Africa, “interpreted culture and civilisation ethnocentrically.

The Christian norms and values lived in the European context were declared to be suited to African culture without any critical discernment” (de Jong, 2001, p.49). Similarly, the European social, political and economic systems were considered suitable for Africa without any critical distancing. The consequences of such an imposition have been described in the first chapter of this thesis. It is enough here then, to merely highlight, that after independence, African intellectuals started to react to the condescending attitude of some western philosophers by producing their own academic works\textsuperscript{90} and establishing political movements bent on showing their western counterparts that Africans possessed reason, a history, a culture and religion. The African reaction was widespread and it touched upon all academic disciplines in the social sciences. For example, the attempts to show that Africans have reason gave rise to African Philosophy, African Theology and three political movements in Africa: Negritude,\textsuperscript{91} Consciencism\textsuperscript{92} and Ujamaa.\textsuperscript{93} Ujamaa in particular, made elements of

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\item In philosophy see the seminal work of Placidius Tempel, \textit{Bantu Philosophy} (1956), in Theology see the seminal work of John Mbiti, \textit{African Religion and Philosophy} (1969) and in Politics see Nyerere seminal Work, \textit{Ujamaa: The Basis of African Socialism} (1962).
\item Négritude was a movement of Black Africans, which sought to restore the dignity of the Black people in Senegal and Africa.
\item This was a form of scientific socialism, which depended on the awakening of the African consciousness.
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African culture the basis of its socio-political and economic organisation. The message was clear: not everything African was evil; Africans had reason and were capable of using it to create their own ideologies.

In his argument that Africans have their own belief systems and culture, Nyerere did not mean to imply that African culture has a complete explanation of reality definitively encapsulated in its view of the world:

> We in Tanganyika do not believe that mankind has yet discovered ultimate truth – in any field. We do not wish to act as if we did have such a belief. We wish to contribute to man’s development if we can, but we do not claim to have any ‘solution’” (Nyerere, 1966, p.121)

This is a clear admission that Africa’s world view by itself was/is limited and limiting and as such it alone cannot produce the “best that man can be” (*ibid.*). These limitations of the African world view led Nyerere to conclude that “there is a need for a new synthesis” (*ibid.*). Although he did not know ahead of time what the new synthesis would look like, he knew that it would be achieved by integrating wisdom from the East, West and from the African tradition: “We have the lessons of the East and the West before us and we have our own traditions to contribute to the Mankind’s pool of knowledge” (*ibid.*). The contribution from the African traditions had been missing from human knowledge because Africans were not considered to be rational beings with anything to offer in terms of wisdom or understanding. But Nyerere was very optimistic: “If we can integrate these things into a new pattern of society then the world will have reason to be grateful that we have gained our independence”

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93 As outlined in the Arusha Declaration (1967), *Ujamaa* was committed to the creation of a socialist state and self-reliance through cooperative agriculture, education for self-reliance and nationalisation of the major means of production.
Nyerere was of the conviction that Tanzania would resolve the problems of economic and social organisation of human society and the world would be happy. To conclude, Nyerere justified his synthesis on two accounts. Firstly, to demonstrate that Africans have a tradition and a culture that is not barbaric, and as such has something to offer to fellow human beings. The second was the recognition that African culture on its own was limited and limiting. All these claims were true and validated Nyerere’s quest for integration but there was a gap which must be explained in the following section.

7.1.3. The Gap in the Synthesis

I now wish to draw attention to one of the chief shortcomings in the whole integration process which relates to the values and practices from the African culture which constituted Ujamaa. It must be noted that the ideals which fed directly into Ujamaa were those which were practiced in the institution of the extended family of traditional Africa long before the arrival of colonialism and by the time Nyerere formulated Ujamaa, they were almost non-existent. To express the point differently: the principles and customs which informed Ujamaa were not those of post-colonial Tanzania but those which existed before Tanzanians came in contact with Europeans. Why then did Nyerere ignore the post-colonial African culture, the modern African culture, and focus on Africa prior to colonialism? What was his basis for the selection? The answer lies in the fact that Nyerere did not consider the values and the practices of post-colonial Africa as truly African as they did not originate in African culture proper. In Nyerere’s opinion post-colonial African culture had already been corrupted and/or adulterated. Presumably, he considered the proper culture as the way of life of the African people before intermingling with Europeans. But cultures are not formed in isolation but through interactions with other people, which allows them to grow and develop.
Furthermore, Nyerere focused too heavily on the African culture prior to colonialism because he believed that culture is static. This explains why he constantly called upon Tanzanians, most of whom did not know how their ancestors lived a hundred years before, to “regain [their] former attitudes of mind” (Nyerere, 1977, pp.6-8), as if those attitudes are always there just waiting to be re-embraced, and “to make sure that the socialist attitude of mind is not lost” (ibid. p.8) as if at one moment they had it and then lost it. There is very little recognition in Nyerere’s views that attitudes change, and change rapidly. Nyerere did not seem to appreciate that the attitudes which prevailed in the extended families of traditional Africa had changed with the arrival of colonialism, and that culture as “people’s traditions, manners, customs, religious beliefs, values, and social, political or economic organisation” has its own dynamics which cannot be reversed (Makinde, 1988-89, p.15). Surprisingly, it is the elements of traditional Africa, elements which people in post-colonial Africa could hardly relate to, which Nyerere chose to integrate into Ujamaa, in the belief that they were the true values and practices of Africa proper. In the circumstances in which Ujamaa was formulated, however, they were not. Expressing similar doubts but in the context of modernisation, Hyden (1980-82) writes:

Nyerere tries with his Ujamaa ideology…to universalize the unwritten rules of living within a rural household and apply them to larger social and economic forms of organisation with modern objectives [and] nobody has more aptly described this than Samuel Mushi, who calls it ‘modernisation by traditionalisation’” (p.98).

Modernisation by traditionalisation is of course a contradiction in terms. It does not make sense to modernise something by traditionalising it. It is either modernisation or traditionalisation but the two cannot coexist or synergise. However, the point, in connection with modernisation that Hyden is trying to make, with the help of Samuel Mushi, is that
Nyerere was attempting to modernise Tanzania by using values and practices of traditional Africa which most of the post-colonial population could not relate to.

Interaction with Europeans during the colonial period led to a completely new African culture and it was radically different from the one that existed before it. African societies emerged from colonialism with new manners, customs, religious beliefs, languages, life styles, values, and new social, political and economic organisations. To claim that the new way of life set in motion by colonialism did not constitute contemporary African culture is false. Christianity, for example, was/is to all intents and purposes an African way of life since it was lived and experienced by more than half of the population of Tanzania. For many Tanzanians, therefore, Christianity had become their way of life, their culture. To keep on insisting that Christianity and its values and practices, are not an aspect of African culture is misleading.

7.2. Freedom of Individual and Community

Now we turn to the tension between the freedom of the individual and community. In fusing liberal and communitarian strands, Nyerere was convinced that he was creating a new synthesis which strikes a balance between the freedom of the individual and the community. He believed that “despite all the variations, and some exceptions, where the institution of domestic slavery existed in [Africa]” (Nyerere, 1966, p. 8), development of individual, was generally not obliterated or obscured by the community but rather maintained and enhanced. How then was freedom of individual fostered and maintained? Nyerere argued that in African traditional societies, the well-being of an individual was maintained and protected by the spirit of interdependence and mutuality. He claims that, in traditional society, there was recognition of mutual interdependence between the community and the individual. People in
traditional society knew that society could exist without the individual and the individual could not exist without society. In this connection, Benezet Bujo, has also noted that “the individual and the community were not in opposition to each other [and] rather than impede each other, they complement each other” (Bujo, 1997, p. 28). This means that the relationship between individual and community is not one of antagonism or conflict because one does not hinder the other. Development of the Individual and development of community go together and do complement one another so that attempts to prioritise one at the expense of the other can only run the risk of obscuring the advantages that can be obtained when they are all held together in a balance. That is what another communitarian, Amitai Etzioni, emphasizes when he writes in reference to community and attempts to advance one at the expense of the other:

> Individual and communities are constitutive of one another, and their relationship is, at one and the same time, mutually supportive and tensed. The mutual character of the relationship between individuals and communities also suggests that any effort to advance one at the expense of the other is likely to undermine the important benefits that arise from keeping these two essential factors in proper balance (Etzioni, 1995 [1996] p 17).

The traditional understanding of the relationship between the freedom of individual and the freedom of community was, therefore, according to Nyerere, not misplaced. They recognised the existence of an organic bond between the development of community and the development of an individual and that of an individual and of the community. In addition, they knew that to protect the rights of an individual, was to protect community development and to harm the rights of a member of the community was to harm the rights and well-being of the whole community.
The situation of mutual dependence between development of the community and development of an individual is not, according to Nyerere, an artificial one. The complementary nature of the relationship between freedom of the community and that of an individual is in Nyerere’s view, inherent into the basic desires of the human person and on the nature of society itself. In Nyerere’s estimation, the human person desires, on the one hand, “freedom to pursue his own interests and his own inclinations” and on the other hand, the human person desires “the freedom which can be obtained only through life in society” (Nyerere, 1966 [1978, p. 7]. Let us unpack this claim. Freedom is here used in the sense of the independence of an individual; his right to pursue goals and ideas of the good that interests him without interference from other people. His own rights, such as a right to well-being or development are part and parcel of the objects of his desires and interests. But, in Nyerere’s view, the desires of the human person are not limited to what he or she can achieve on his or her own. Beyond the rights that she can obtain on her own, a human person also desires rights that can only be obtained by being a member of a community. Such rights include, “freedom from fear of personal attack, and freedom from the effects of natural dangers which from time to time hit every individual and which cannot be withstood without help” (Nyerere, 1966, p. 7). The list is clearly not exhaustive, and more could be added but, it is sufficient to make the central point. There are certain rights of an individual, including the right to development or well-being that can only be obtained by an individual through the community.

Following the desire of an individual to also attain those rights that can be obtained through community, an individual decides to become a member of a community. But, as soon as an
individual becomes a member, Nyerere’s argument is that the individual cannot, by virtue of the nature of community, continue to maintain the freedom or the right to pursue his /her own interests and desires without consideration of other members of the community to which he now belongs. In fact, as soon as he becomes a member of the community, the individual has to surrender some of his rights for the good of the community. That is what he means when he writes that as soon as an individual accepts to be a member of the community “he must sacrifice, in the interests of the society, a certain amount of the private freedoms which he possessed outside the society” (Ibid. p. 7). To gain his own safety, for example, Nyerere maintains that an individual must give up his own power to attack others. Moreover, to benefit from co-operative activities, Nyerere argues that the individual must at times co-operate with others regardless of his own particular wishes (Ibid. p. 7). It is a hypothetical negotiated settlement of ‘give-and-take’ which according to Bujo, is necessary “so that one’s life and of the [community] can experience more opportunities for development” (Bujo, 1997, p. 74). But its origin is according to Nyerere, in the “nature of society – all societies” (Nyerere, 1966, p.7). Freedom of both the individual and community then, depends on reciprocity: on the one hand, the individual has to give up some his rights for the development of the community and on the other hand, the community has to give up some its rights in order to serve the well-being of individuals. Otherwise, if the community cannot also give up its rights for the sake of the individual, then according to Nyerere, an individual becomes a slave in the community. And the situation of enslaving individuals can only be maintained in community through force but, force can only be used up to a point because in the long run, it creates disharmony in the group, especially when individuals decided to struggle for their freedom. Nyerere puts across that point using the following words:
By joining a social group ... a man is surrendering certain freedoms. His gain is that others do likewise. If they do not he has not become a member of society; he has becomes a slave or a servant of another individual or group of individuals. In such a case, there is no hope of stability or harmony within the group. It will continue only as long as power – physical power – remains sufficiently strong to enforce it” (Ibid. p. 8).

The point is that Nyerere did not believe that the welfare of an individual is of greater value than the welfare of the community. As far as Nyerere is concerned, “both [the individual and the society] have constantly to be served” (Nyerere, 1966, p. 7). Therefore, the individual has to serve the society and the society, on its part, has to serve the individual, for according to Nyerere, “the very purpose of society – its reason for existence – is and must be the individual man, his growth, his health, his dignity, and therefore, his happiness” (Ibid. p. 7). Expressing that in somewhat different words, it can be said that for Nyerere, the purpose of society, the reason for its existence is the well-being or development of the individual and so when society ceases to serve the well being of individual it loses its legitimacy, its right or reason to exist. Community then, has in Nyerere’s consideration, a very important role in the life of the individual. It is the foundation of the welfare or of the development of the individual but, the community can only be the foundation of the development of the individual if society is also well served by the individual for as Nyerere cautions again, if community is not well served there is always an “inherent, though sometimes concealed, danger of a breakdown in society – that is, a split in the family unit, a civil war within a nation, or war between nations” (Nyerere, 1966 [1978], p. 12). This means that just as the freedom of the individual is the reason for the existence of society, so too the freedom of the community is the reason for the existence of the individual. Understood in that way, therefore, it cannot be said that in community, the freedom of individual is obliterated or obscured but that by being a member of community an individual stood a better chance of
attaining his own freedom than trying to obtain it alone, singlehandedly, outside community. In other words, an individual acquires greater freedom if his own development is situated within the perspective of the freedom of the larger social unit, the community. In sum, it can be said that Nyerere’s understanding of the traditional African communities involves the acceptance of egalitarian rather than libertarian individuality.\(^4\) Here a person is an individual member of the community who has varying degrees of individuality. He can assert himself in terms of the equality between himself and other individuals rather than in freedom from them. As Etzioni puts it, an individual is an integral member of the community but he is not consumed by it or submerged within it. Like a hammer and nail, neither is more essential; they require one another” (Etzioni, 1995, p. 18). In terms of development, it means that an individual is part and parcel of the development of the community but he is not consumed by the community development. That is how development or well-being of the individual is understood in the community.

Nyerere’s *Ujamaa* arose against this background as his response to the loss of proper balance between the well-being of the community and that of the individual. In his own assessment of the post-colonial Tanzania, Nyerere noticed that the society was moving further and further in the direction of the welfare of the individual rather than in the direction of the welfare of the community. Development seemed to be a prerogative of few individuals rather than a prerogative of all in the community. To put it in a more familiar language, the gap between the rich and the poor was growing bigger and bigger as few individuals were getting richer and richer at the expense of the community. The community was serving individuals but

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\(^4\) In Libertarian individualism, it is only the individual who counts.
individuals were not serving the community. In that sense Nyerere saw the real danger of the breakdown of society. To counter that imbalance, Nyerere had the choice of capitalism or communism, the two economic systems of the last century. Nyerere, however, declined to adopt capitalism as the solution to redress the imbalance, because in his view, capitalism as an economic system was leaning far too much in the direction of the individual.\(^{95}\) Nyerere also declined to adopt communism as the solution to the impending imbalance, because in his view, communism as an economic system was tilting the balance far too much in the direction of the community as to obscure or obliterate the development of the individual.\(^{96}\) The only system which Nyerere thought had struck a proper balance between the development of the individual and the development of the community was the African traditional system of \textit{Ujamaa}. But even in \textit{Ujamaa}, the balance was tilted too much on the community rather than the individual. Thus in the end, the balance was not struck.

\textbf{7.3. Socialism: Conceptual Effectiveness}

I will now aim to deduce whether the synthesis designed by Nyerere deserved to be called ‘socialism’. To determine the validity of Nyerere description of socialism as a concept, it is necessary first to establish the legitimacy of the meaning attached to the word “socialism”. What exactly is socialism? Basing himself on the concrete historical manifestations of socialism and on the ‘observable traits’ of socialism as it has been existing in various countries, Kornai (2000), has identified three fundamental characteristics. The first is the absolute power of the communist party, next is state ownership of property (the major means

\(^{95}\) It was allowing the individual to amass wealth and accumulate wealth at the expense of the community.

\(^{96}\) In communist societies, individual rights, for example, were no longer of any use because they claimed to have attained the complete integration of individual and community. Class conflicts had been eliminated and every individual becomes a participant in the whole society without there being any further obstacles or interruptions to the realisation of the developments and aspirations of the individual (Antonio Cassese, \textit{Human Rights in Changing World}, Polity Press, 1994, p.32)
of production), and finally state coordination of economic activities. I pose and examine each of these attributes in the order in which they are mentioned here.

7.3.1. Absolute State Power

Kornai (2000) states that, socialism in its concrete historical manifestations is characterised by “undivided power of the Marxist-Leninist Party” (p.297). A Marxist-Leninist party is a communist party, a communist party is a vanguard party and a vanguard party is a party of workers and peasants that has absolute control of state power which it consolidates after overthrowing capitalism (Shivji, 1973). It is the concentration of political power into the hands of the members of the vanguard party which Kornai (2000), considers as a specific attribute of socialism, and as a feature that distinguishes it from capitalism.

The status of TANU, the ruling party in Tanzania, has not been easy to interpret and classify as a vanguard party. This is in part due to discrepancies in Nyerere’s account of what TANU was. In Nyerere’s view TANU was not a vanguard party of workers who were seriously committed to a socialist revolution as other communist parties were. Rather, he perceived TANU as a nationalist movement, the sole aim of which was to abolish colonialism:

TANU had a very different origin. [It] was not formed to challenge any ruling group of our own people. [It] was formed to challenge the foreigners who [ruled] over us. [TANU] was not, therefore, a political ‘party’ – i.e. faction – but a nationalist movement. And from the outset, it represented the interests and aspirations of the whole nation…..we built up TANU as a nationalist movement to rid ourselves of their colonialism (Nyerere, 1966, p.198)

Whilst it is true that the majority of TANU members were peasants and not workers, it is also true that TANU did not represent the interests of one faction (workers), but rather the
interests of the majority of the population which included civil servants (workers) and peasants. Furthermore, TANU was not initially committed to a socialist revolution because as a party it did not identify itself with any particular ideology. (Hyden & Leys, 1972; Ruhumbika, 1974). From the outset, the main agenda of TANU was independence from colonialism. Following independence, however, TANU quickly moved to become a vanguard party. As early as 1963, the National Executive Council (NEC) of TANU passed a resolution that described the desirability of instituting a one party state. In 1964, only three years after independence, a commission was set up to review the changes necessary for the establishment of a one party system. The commission submitted its report in early 1965, and after translating the recommendations into a bill, it was sent to Parliament and passed in July 1965. Tanzania became a one party state with Nyerere serving as both, Chairman of the ruling party, and President, the head of state or government (Kweka, 1995). Overall, in spite of the rhetoric, the ruling party in Tanzania, TANU and later on CCM, was a vanguard party that assumed absolute control of state power following independence.

7.3.2. State Ownership of the Major Means of Production

According to Kornai (2000), the second attribute of socialism, state ownership of the major means of production, calls for dominance of public property but not absolute dominance. Private property and profit making organisations can play a secondary role. The essential factor is that private property must not prevail. In short, the minimum that socialism requires from the political sphere is to discourage the private property market and any acts hostile to the institution of the public property. In retrospect, this sums up socialism in Tanzania. Having assumed total control of the state power, the leaders of TANU unveiled the AD (the equivalent of the communist party’s manifesto), which was hostile to private property. In
particular it introduced regulations, such as nationalisation, which seriously and systematically damaged the economic interests of the property owning class.

Reactions from property owners show how damaged their interests were. Explaining the outrage of Bankers, de la Rue (1973), explains that the owners of the British banks in Tanzania were so angry that they “adopted a strategy of non-co-operation clearly aimed at ensuring public sector banking in Tanzania would fail” (p.40). Other property owners left the country in protest taking with them assets and “substantial sums of money” (Loxley, 1979, p.76). Just as vanguard parties overthrow the bourgeoisies in order to control the means of production, so the TANU removed the colonial set up with this aim. Although it continued to play a role in Nyerere’s *Ujamaa*, the political leadership made it difficult for private property to gain dominance in the country, which is all that is required for socialism to function.

### 7.3.3. State Coordination of Economic Activities

The third and final essential attribute of socialism is the “preponderance of bureaucratic coordination” (Kornai, 2000, p.297). This term indicates that in socialism, the main mechanism of economic coordination does not occur through the market, regulated by the laws of supply and demand, but through state intervention, which plans and coordinates all economic activities. Central economic planning was the mainstay of Nyerere’s *Ujamaa*. Economic planning in Tanzania was carried out after every five years by the government which had established two ministries for that purpose: namely, the “Ministry of Economic affairs and Development Planning which [was] responsible in planning and economic policy matters; and Treasury which [dealt] with fiscal and monetary policy, external debt
management policy, and …general economic policy’’ (Arkadie, 1973, p.27). The first five year plan (1964-1969), focused on growth targets, capital formation, rural transformation, ownerships, manpower, social equality and structural changes, even though most of the targets were not realised due to the suspension of funds from donor countries (Arkadie, 1973). The second five year plan (1969-1973), concentrated on growth, investments of the central government, and improvement of agriculture through the establishment of Ujamaa villages. In short, based on the principles of the AD, during the second five year plan the government, “set the pace for economic development both through its own budget and through the semi-governmental institutions” (Laar, 1973, p.79). The crux of the matter is that during Ujamaa economic activities were coordinated by the government and not by market forces.

7.3.4. Valid or Not Valid?

Having established what is meant by the term socialism, I will now determine the validity of the Nyerere’s claim that Ujamaa was characterised by this economic system. Measured against Kornai’s description of socialism as it manifests itself in concrete historical situations, it becomes very difficult to classify Nyerere’s concept of Ujamaa. On the one hand, Nyerere’s Ujamaa meets all the specific attributes of socialism. In particular, it shows that contrary to the propaganda, TANU was in reality a vanguard party which held absolute state power, prominence was given to public ownership of property and economic activities were coordinated by the state and not by the market. Therefore, according to the attributes provided by Kornai (2000), Tanzania’s version was in essence socialism. Alternatively, in his

discourse on socialism, Nyerere insists that the essence of socialism is the acceptance of the principle of human equality, democracy, communal ownership of property, and religious tolerance rather than vanguard party rule or the coordination of economic activity.

This leads us to the scrutiny of those principles: for instance, are democracy, human equality, and religious tolerance, specific attributes of socialism. Do these elements distinguish socialism from capitalism? The answer to this question is clearly negative. Equality in terms of rights and opportunities is not a necessary condition for socialism to function. Socialism can operate in racist societies and in unequal situations as long as the vanguard party monopolises state power, the state controls the major means of production and economic activities are planned by the government and not the market. I shall substantiate this with some examples. Nyerere frequently stressed that in a socialist state “it is possible …for farmers to be exploited even by their own co-operatives and their own state if the machinery is not correct or if the managers and workers are inefficient or dishonest” (Nyerere, 1968, p.83). Expressing similar observations, Freund (1981), also notes that a socialist state can exploit its citizens when, for example, the state takes a lot of surplus from the goods produced by peasants or when the conditions are such that the peasants are in servitude to the state. Hence, when citizens are in servitude to the state or when state representatives are exploiting citizens through dishonesty, socialism does not cease to be socialism. On the contrary, it continues to function as socialism, despite the presence of corruption, dishonesty and gross human rights violations. Similarly, democracy is not an essential component of socialism. Although socialists claim “to be the only true democrats, the exclusive sellers of the genuine staff, never to be confused with the bourgeoisie fake” (Schumpeter, 2006, p.235), the truth is that democracy is not necessary for socialism to function. The Soviet Union, for example,
was the icon of socialism during the Cold War but it was not democratic. Moreover, socialist talk of ‘the dictatorship of the proletariat’ is an indication that socialism can function without democracy, as long as the political powers are in the hands of the vanguard party and the government controls the means of production and plans economic activities in the country. Furthermore, socialism does not necessarily tolerate religious beliefs in order to function. The Soviet Union, the epitome of socialism abolished religion and remained a socialist state. Thus some of the key features of Nyerere’s socialism are not essential to its historical practice.

The conclusion that must be drawn from the above considerations is that at the ideological level, Nyerere’s account of socialism was not accurate since the principles of human equality, democracy and religious tolerance that he postulated do not align with the specific attributes of socialism in its concrete historical manifestations. In this respect, Nyerere’s measures did not represent the concept of socialism particularly well. Expressing similar doubts Rugumamu (1997), has also noted Nyerere’s conception of socialism was ambiguous and as such served to confuse rather than clarify:

The apparent ambiguity and imprecision in meaning over the nature and content of guiding concepts [such as socialism] tended to obfuscate and confuse instead of clarifying and illuminating (p.130)

Nyerere’s account of socialism is not one that scholars would accept as a measure of socialism. In practice, however, Nyerere’s Ujamaa met all the criteria of socialism in its concrete historical manifestations; it was established by a vanguard party, which after independence monopolised state power, undermined private property, emphasized state ownership of property and planned economic activities. Thus, from a practical perspective,
Nyerere’s *Ujamaa* met the basic requirements of socialism and it was, therefore, valid to categorise it as such.

**7.4. Ujamaa-Socialism: Validity of its Strategy**

Attention now turns to the authenticity of Nyerere’s Strategy on socialism and its implications on the validity of *Ujamaa*. To analyse this effectively, it is helpful to first establish the legitimacy of the meaning attached to socialist transition. Basing himself on the concrete historical manifestations of socialism and on the ‘observable traits’ of socialist transitions as they have been taking place in various countries, Kornai (2000) has argued that, “the process of transition [to socialism] begins when society shifts away from the fundamental characteristics of [capitalism]” (pp.297-298). This thesis raises a number of questions: for instance, what are the fundamental characteristics of capitalism? Did the features of capitalism exist in Tanzania? If so, how does this impact on the validity of Nyerere’s *Ujamaa*? According to Kornai (2000), there are three fundamental characteristics of capitalism: first, a positive attitude of the political authorities towards the institution of the private property and market; secondly, the dominant role of the institution of private property and finally, coordination of economic activities by the market.

**7.4.1. Open Attitude to Private Property**

The characteristics of a political authority required by capitalism in order to function are described by Kornai (2000) in the following terms:

> The minimum required of the political sphere is not active support of the private property and the market, but rather that authorities refrain from outright hostility. They must not carry out mass confiscation or undermine private property in other ways. They cannot introduce regulations that seriously, systematically and widely damage the economic interests of the
property owning strata. They cannot lastingly banish market coordination from most of the economy. Rhetoric does not count for much here. The essential factor is the behaviour in the political sphere (p.298).

The political environment necessary for capitalism to operate is clearly stated here. Essential to the functioning of capitalism is the commitment by political leaders to protect the institution of the private property through the constitution or other such means. This involves encouraging free enterprise, promoting privatisation, and refraining from enacting laws or regulations that can damage the interests of property owners.

A careful consideration of the political attitude of the authorities during colonialism, and shortly after independence, indicates that leadership in the respective periods was fond of, or at least not hostile to the institution of private property. In particular, the political attitude described above prevailed in Tanzania during and after colonialism. The colonial administration was not opposed to private property and although it confiscated fertile arable land from Africans, it did not do so in order to place it into the hands of the state, rather it confiscated it in order to give it to individual European settlers (Sunseri, 1993). Furthermore, during the seventy or so years that they were in control of Tanzania, the colonial administration did not introduce any regulations that threatened the interests of property owners even though events such as the Great Depression of 1929 slowed down the economy.\footnote{In Tanzania many projects, such as the construction of roads, railways and other infrastructure stopped because of the lack of funds from the imperial power. But even in such difficult times, the government still remained open to the institution of the private property.} Even after independence, the political atmosphere was not adverse to private property and prior to 1967 did not take any measures that damaged the interests of the owners of the means of production. As such, during and after independence the political sphere was
very amenable and open to the institution of the private property, an indication that capitalism was operating in the country.

7.4.2. Dominance of Private Property

Another essential quality of capitalism, namely, the dominance of private property is now discussed along with its influence on the legitimacy of Nyerere’s *Ujamaa*. According to Kornai (2000), the attribute of private property “calls for dominance of private property. It need not rule absolutely. In modern capitalism, state owned and non-profit organisations can also play a role” (*ibid.* p.298). In modern capitalism, then, there is room for state owned companies to operate but crucially state owned and non-profit organisations must not gain a prominent role in the ownership of property. This is also reminiscent of the circumstances that prevailed in Tanzania during and after colonialism. During the colonial period, for example, a person could claim “a piece of land as his own property whether he intends to use it or not” (Nyerere, 1977, p.7). Land was distributed on a freehold basis. According to this system a land-holder had unconditional rights, including the right to grant lease and take out mortgages. It is this system that produced the landlords who, according to Nyerere, exploited their tenants by charging exorbitant land rents (Nyerere, 1966). In the financial sector, for example, insurance companies, building societies and hire purchase companies were owned by British individuals (Loxley, 1973). Yet, not all companies were privately owned; the Post Office Saving Bank (POSB), 99 for instance, was owned by the colonial government and in the opinion of John Loxley was the only financial institution that catered for the financial needs of African customers (*ibid.*).

99 The POSB like the currency board was legally bound to invest in the British Government or British Government guaranteed securities, while insurance companies chose to remit vast sums of money for investment overseas and also to Kenya. Public sector pension funds were also invested in British government stocks (Loxley, 1973, p.103).
After independence, the pattern of property ownership did not change significantly. With respect to land, the government rejected legislation that upheld its distribution on a freehold and racial basis and nationalised it. However, only 17 per cent of the land was nationalised; 83 per cent remained in private hands. The nationalised land was governed by the leasehold system, through which the leaseholder, (an adult man\textsuperscript{100}) is granted use by the state without fear of eviction. Moreover, the leaseholder could use the land as security to raise a loan. However, when the leaseholder stopped using that land, or when land remained disused for a long period without being developed, the leaseholder was required to return the land to the state, so that members of the public can use (Dunning, 1973; Nyerere, 1966). With respect to land, therefore, the dominant mode was still the private ownership of land. In the financial sector, the situation was the same. Although the government began establishing state companies, such as the National Development Credit Agency (NDCA), Tanzania Bank of Commerce (TBC), National Housing Corporation (NHC), National Insurance Company (NIC). National Development Corporation (NDC), and National Provident Fund (NPF), to mention a few, (Loxley, 1973, 1979) the dominant mode of property ownership in the country was private, testimony to capitalism operating in the country.

7.4.3. The Free Market

According to Kornai (2000), for capitalism to function it is necessary for the economic activities to be coordinated by the market. Clarifying this characteristic of capitalism Kornai (2000) notes that the criterion “does not rule out the presence of other coordination mechanism, like bureaucratic intervention; however, an essential feature of capitalism is that the main mechanism of economic coordination occurs through the market, through mutual,\textsuperscript{100} Although after nationalisation land law did not make any segregation between men and women, traditional customs made it difficult for women to lease land.
decentralised adjustments of supply, demand, quantities and prices” (ibid. p.298). Hence, a free market is essential for capitalism to function. However, as a colony, Tanzania did not have a market of its own, because the structure of Tanzania’s economy, i.e. the production structure, export and import trade, and financial sector, were all under the control of the colonising power’s metropolitan market (Loxley, 1979). Thus, although currency supply was managed by the East African Currency Board (EACB), the board itself was under the control of the Secretary of State for the Colonies (SSC) whose head office was in London. Issues of policy or transactions involving large sums of money had to be referred to London or Nairobi, where they had a local head office (Loxley, 1973). Currency supply to the EACB, was fully “backed by sterling assets, and local currency in circulation could only be increased by the investment of an equal amount of sterling in London” (ibid. p.102). In short, the financial needs of Tanzania were met by the colonial power, and “there was therefore no local long-term capital market and, indeed, there was really no need for one” (Loxley, 1979, p.76). But this does not mean that economic activities were not controlled by the market, it simply means that economic activities were controlled and coordinated by the imperial powers market in metropolitan London, a clear indication of capitalism at work.

7.4.4. Valid or Not Valid?

Measured against Kornai’s description of the basis from which socialist transformation usually takes place, it becomes clear that Nyerere eschewed, deliberately or otherwise, the basis of socialist transformation in Tanzania. As outlined above, Tanzania was a colony with all the hallmarks of capitalism. Nyerere (1968) himself admits as much when he writes:

Tanzania …still contains elements of feudalism and capitalism – with their temptations. These feudalistic and capitalistic features of our society could spread and entrench themselves” (p.16).
This is being conservative with the truth; after more than seventy years of colonialism, capitalism in Tanzania was not only widespread but it was also deeply entrenched among the people. It was the only modern economic system the colonial administration introduced, and the only system to determine the economic life of all Tanzanians for more than seventy years (the period of colonisation). It is the only modern economic system the people of Tanzania knew and functioned under. Needless to say, that Tanzania inherited capitalism upon independence and it is the system that Nyerere and his colleagues in TANU were attempting to counter when they founded *Ujamaa*. Following this analysis it must be concluded that capitalism was the parent system of Tanzania’s socialism. In his discourse on the basis of socialist transformation in Tanzania, however, Nyerere reacted aggressively against this claim.

Considering it a European construct, Nyerere argued that it is not necessary for socialism to arise from capitalism and the inherent conflicts in it. For Nyerere, whilst European socialism was born out of capitalism, Tanzanian socialism had neither the advantages nor the disadvantages of the system. As Nyerere points out, “African socialism did not have the ‘benefit’ of the Agrarian Revolution or the Industrial Revolution. It did not start from the existence of conflicting ‘classes’ in society” (Nyerere, 1968, p.11). Hence Nyerere does not consider capitalism the parent system of socialism in Tanzania. This argument, however, is not credible for two key reasons: firstly, class conflict is not an essential attribute of capitalism and secondly, as evidenced in Chapter Five of this thesis, there was in fact class (conflict) in Tanzania. To summarise, it can be said that at the ideological level, capitalism did not exist in Tanzania and, therefore, the transition to socialism was out of poverty. In reality, however, Tanzania was a capitalist country as it had all the trappings of capitalism
and as such it is prudent to accept that the transition to socialism in Tanzania was not from poverty but from capitalism.

7.5. The Means of Transition to Socialism

The stages necessary for the establishment of socialism are so well articulated by Kornai (2000), that it is worth quoting him at length. With respect to socialist transition he writes:

The original transition to socialism did not arise by organic development: the socialist system does not originate spontaneously from the intrinsic, internal forces of the economy. Instead the socialist system is imposed on society by the communist party with brutal force, when it gains power. It liquidates its political opponents and breaks up any opposition. The communist party that comes to power has a vision of what society, economy and culture it wishes to create: a system that eliminates private property and the market, replacing them with state ownership and planning. This vision has an ideological monopoly, so that any statement with sympathy with capitalism brings reprisal (p.299).

There are three features in the passage which deserves special attention: the imposition of socialism by force, the elimination of political opponents and state ownership of the means of production and government planning of economic activities. The question I contemplate now is, how did socialism begin in Tanzania? Put simply, was socialism imposed on the Tanzanian society?

7.5.1. Imposition of Socialism by Force

To answer this question, it is helpful to bear in mind that TANU did not assume state power in Tanzania through violence. They were voted into power in 1961 by the Tanzanian electorate, in a free and fair election, which was supervised by the imperial power. However, soon after gaining political, power Nyerere proposed changes to the Constitution in 1963 that would allow a one-party state (Nyerere, 1966). The President set up a Commission to review
the changes necessary to achieve this aim and their report was translated into a bill and passed by Parliament in July 1965 whereupon Tanzania became a single-party state (Kweka, 1995). Shortly after being declared as the only party, in 1967 TANU released the AD, in which it proclaimed its vision of a socialist society, the realisation of which included nationalisation of the major means of production, coordination of economic activities by the government and creation of Ujamaa villages in rural areas. As described previously, the programme of nationalisation did not happen voluntarily, owners of the means of production did not simply hand over their companies to the state. Almost all the owners of companies which were to be nationalised or in which the government needed shares were obliged to comply with the government directives, and negotiate the takeover bid with full compensation. Whilst there was no brutal force in the nationalisation exercises and it was not total, the programme was not optional; rather it was imposed by the government. The establishment of Ujamaa villages in rural areas was also compulsory. Despite all of the rhetoric about socialism through development the system was imposed by the government through mandatory programmes. Socialism in Tanzania was not a consequence of spontaneous development of internal economic forces; it is not a system that evolved from the free will of the people. Tanzania’s socialism, was “Ujamaa - Socialism from above” (Boesen, et. al. 1977); it was impressed on the Tanzanian society by political leaders and not by the people. Whilst at the ideological level, the transition to socialism was peaceful it was in reality forced through.

7.6. Conclusion

Nyerere wanted to create a system that incorporated various elements from different traditions. His reasons for creating such a synthesis were valid insofar as the only elements in the African tradition were pre-colonialism practices that only a few people could relate to.
Calling this synthesis socialism was valid at the practical level but not so on the ideological plane. Similarly, the transition to socialism exhibited the same duality: at the ideological level, the move to socialism in Tanzania was from poverty whereas in reality it was from capitalism. This explains the nationalisation of the major means of production and similar measures. The means of transition was also binary: at the ideological level, the changeover was supposed to be peaceful and non-violent but in practice, socialism in Tanzania was established by force. This duality is unsurprising since *Ujamaa* was an ideology, moreover, in a real sense it is this twofold quality that validates it as such.
CHAPTER EIGHT

THE CONTRIBUTION OF NYERERE’S UJAMAA

8. Introduction

After examining the various components of Nyerere’s *Ujamaa* I am better placed to determine what the doctrine proffers when it was the ruling ideology and then its status today, after being abandoned (in practice, since it still exists in the written form in the Constitution).

8.1. Offer of Nyerere’s *Ujamaa* 1960s - 1980s

As evidenced, *Ujamaa* as was an ideology. An ideology is a constructed symbol or metaphor regarding the relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence. The metaphor that Nyerere drew upon was the extended family institution of traditional Africa. According to Nyerere (1977), in this familial unit there was no desire to accumulate wealth because people care for one another. Society took care of the individual and vice versa; everybody was a worker; the produce was shared, and property such as land was held in common. These are the qualities and practices of the African tradition on which Nyerere wanted to structure the new society but, in the context of ideology, these are also incentives for people to act in a particular way, incentives which inspire people to alter their behaviour. By assuming these historical qualities and practices, scholars including Hedlund *et. al.* (1989) have drawn parallels between Nyerere and Jean Jacque Rousseau. They observe that while they both call for a re-embracing of the past Rousseau advocated a return to the *noble savage*, whereas Nyerere proposed the ‘*noble African*’ of traditional society (Hedlund *et. al.*, 1989, p.18). The ideology of *Ujamaa* certainly presents the traditional African as a righteous human being who embodies the ideals and who can, therefore, serve as a role model of ‘*noble Africa*’. The
limitations of this noble African are overlooked entirely. It is unsurprising then, that Nyerere’s glorification of pre-colonial Africans was criticised from all sides.\textsuperscript{101} Nyerere’s proposal was not an attempt to modernise society but rather an attempt to create a new order by traditionalising it. Mushi (1971) expresses this process as “modernisation by traditionalisation”, which simply refers to the assimilation of traditional values into the modern society (p.1).

Hyden (1980) considers this an unsuitable approach since the social and economic forms of organisation in a modern society have “modern objectives” (p.98). Though unidentified, the modern objectives can be understood to mean, \textit{inter alia}, mass production, scientific knowledge and advanced technology, liberalism, monetary economy and democracy. Furthermore, it is considered inappropriate to “universalise the unwritten rules of living together within rural household and apply them to [the nation]” (\textit{ibid.}). However, the return to the noble African is unrelated to traditionalisation since the return to the past, was a way to “rationalise not only Nyerere’s new goals but the alteration of behavioural and attitudinal patterns he saw as being necessary for the accomplishment of those new goals” (Luther, 1989, p.74). By positing a \textit{noble African}, Nyerere’s aimed to develop the right attitudes in people necessary for the creation of unity, eradication of poverty, ignorance, and diseases, establishment of a classless society, rapid economic development through modernisation of the forces of production, and equality. While this explains, at least in part, why, Nyerere returned to past ideas, there can be no doubt that he wanted the values, attitudes and practices of the \textit{noble African}, to feature predominantly in the new society. Hence the criticisms of

Mushi and Hyden hold up and as such it important to question whether values can be traditionalised. Can love and justice, for example, be rendered inappropriate today simply because they were practiced by the Athenians well before the birth of Christ? Would it be traditionalisation if contemporary societies attempted to practice justice and equality? While Mushi and Hyden seem to suggest so, this valuation is misleading.

To fully understand Nyerere’s return to the noble man it is unnecessary to separate Ujamaa from its broad moral agenda. The moral agenda is weaved so tightly into the ideology of Ujamaa that it cannot be separated without affecting the ideology itself. Moreover, this bond was established from the outset:

For it is now clear that the independence campaign has had great influence on the attitudes of independent Tanzania. TANU’s emphasis on the morality of its case...has created among the people certain expectation…(Nyerere, 1966, p.4)

Asked by Bunting about the contribution of the anti-colonial movement to humanity, Nyerere’s emphasis on morality is clear:

The liberation movement was very moral. It was not simply liberation in a vacuum. Gandhi argued a moral case and so did I. 102

To argue a moral case, in this context is to claim that colonialism is immoral. It is to claim that the system ought to be rejected because it has negative consequences on the colonised.

To argue a moral case, is to claim that freedom is a right of every individual. The moral agenda is therefore, not incidental to Ujamaa but rather an essential part of it. As evidenced throughout the course of this thesis, the ideology of Ujamaa proclaims a moral way of life.

102 (http://www.newint.org/issue309/anticol.htm)
This emphasis on morality has led Shepherd (1965) to describe *Ujamaa* as a belief system or religion. It is in this context of a strong moral agenda that Nyerere’s return to the past must be understood.

Nyerere, therefore, returns to the *noble African* not because they are scientifically advanced or technologically sophisticated but because they are ‘morally noble’. It is this moral integrity that makes them a suitable role model for Nyerere and by extension, all Tanzanians. To begin with the noble African “does not look on one class of men as his brethren and another as his natural enemy. He does not form alliance with the ‘brethren’ for the extermination of the none-brethren, rather [he] regards all men as his brethren – as members of his ever extended family” (Nyerere, 1977, pp.11-12). Nyerere believed, that which was considered morally good in traditional African societies before the arrival of colonialism, must also be morally good for Tanzanians in a modern state. Thus, if traditional society considered it morally wrong for a brother to kill another, then such an act must also be morally wrong in modern society. The modern state may have new institutions and new social and economic organisations but if these new bodies consider killing a person morally good, then they are unsuitable for Tanzania, however noble their objective may be. Yet, even those who are sympathetic to the moral argument may reject the idea of being judged by moral standards from another era. Cultural relativists, in particular, would object to being judged by a moral standard they neither played a part in formulating nor consented to. This kind of observation would be difficult for Nyerere to counter although it could be argued that moral values are not made and as such exist independently of what we may think about them. This, however, would stoke the debate between moral realists and anti-realists that has yet to be resolved.
But it must be acknowledged that even if one does not agree with Nyerere’s attempt to restore
the noble African, it is difficult to dispute the morality that characterises Ujamaa. As
Hedlund et.al. (1989) have observed, the ideology of Ujamaa “carries a moral overtone, and
seeks legitimacy in terms of what it stands for on moral grounds than in terms of what it will
deliver in material terms” (p.18). Although the elimination of poverty was a key objective
Nyerere and his colleagues in TANU did not promise the people of Tanzania material wealth:
this was restricted to the acquisition of the basic material needs, such as “food, clothing and
shelter” (Nyerere, 1976, p.11). Rather Nyerere promised non-material incentives for people
to change their behaviour and attitudes. As he states, “TANU called for equality”;… [it]
called for human respect:…[it] called for equality of opportunity” (Nyerere, 1966, p.4).
Unsurprisingly given Nyerere’s background and training in Christian schools, TANU called
for a moral way of life. But Nyerere’s curriculum vitae is not necessarily relevant. Ujamaa
was offering an alternative moral and free way of life to a people who experienced slavery
and slave trade for five centuries, and colonialism for over seven decades. Ujamaa was
offering a way of life that rejected colonialism and slavery in all its forms as morally wrong
and abhorrent. Ujamaa offered the oppressed, the exploited, the disregarded, and the
humiliated, a new life of freedom, equality and respect, a life of enjoying the fruits of one’s
labour without exploiting or being exploited. In practical terms, each individual, irrespective
of race, religion, tribe or gender, was offered a life of equal rights and duties. This is what the
ideology of Ujamaa offered to the people of Tanzania. The oppressed and exploited -- but
also the oppressor and exploiter -- were offered liberation by Ujamaa. Nyerere expresses his
hopes when he writes:

The Arusha Declaration offered hope. A promise of justice,
hope to the many, indeed the majority of Tanzanians continues
to like this hope. So long as there is this hope, you will
continue to have peace…. [Ujamaa] did not do away with poverty but it has given you all in this hall, capitalists and socialists alike, an opportunity to build a country which holds out a future of hope to the many… (Nyerere, as quoted by Nyirabu, 2003, p 6).

The word ‘hope’ appears five times in this passage, a clear indicator that Nyerere was convinced Ujamaa was offering the people of Tanzania an alternative way of life full of hope for a better future.

Nyerere decided to engineer a socialist society but he was not starting from scratch because this economic system already existed in the form of Marxism or scientific socialism. The expectation was that Nyerere would either take the existing model of socialism and implement it in Tanzania or at least borrow a leaf or two from Marxism. Instead he chose to go back to the ‘noble African’, to the African traditional societies. This was a unique decision that had profound implications for the ideology of Ujamaa insofar as it allowed Nyerere to claim that Ujamaa was African socialism. However, to give credence to this claim Nyerere had to deny the obvious. For instance, his claim that Tanzania did not have a class system as discussed in chapters Five and Six of this thesis was shown to be untrue. Furthermore, his claim that Tanzanian socialism was borne out of the extended family institution of traditional Africa rather than capitalism only holds true at the ideological level. According to Rodney (1972), for example, Socialism emerged as an ideology within the capitalist society. Other scholars, including Kornai (2000), have also argued that the transition to socialism begins when society shifts from the basic tenets of capitalism. Nonetheless, Nyerere’s claim that this need not be the case everywhere and at all times carries weight. Moreover, if Tanzania had not been dominated by the capitalist mode of production that gave rise to particular effects on the population, Nyerere’s argument would have won out. But, as noted in Chapter Six of this
thesis, the capitalist mode of production dominated Tanzania throughout its colonisation and it is this economic system that Nyerere vowed to counter. But why did he set out to counter something that was non-existent? Nyerere’s argument here is weak and cannot be defended.

Similarly, the argument that scientific socialism is not socialism because of its undemocratic credentials and it propensity to violence is arguably controversial. Furthermore, his assertion that true socialism must be based on equality, popular democracy, public ownership of property and religious tolerance is equally contentious since, as demonstrated in Chapter Six of this thesis, these qualities are not essential for a system to be classified as socialism. This is not to suggest, however, that there can be only one version of socialism. Socialist ideology has many variations and the one that bears the qualities with which Nyerere identifies, and which he attempted to articulate for Tanzania, has many names: democratic socialism, social democracy, Fabian socialism, or Christian democracy. Pratt (1979-1981), one of the most prominent scholars of Nyerere’s *Ujamaa*, has consistently argued that it was neither Marxism nor scientific socialism but democratic socialism. *Ujamaa* can only be described in this way or as African socialism, because Nyerere refused to adopt the principles of scientific socialism and instead replaced them with those of traditional African society. Moves such as this indicate the strong sense of pride *Ujamaa* took in African culture. Nyerere’s *Ujamaa* offered self-confidence to a people whose culture and tradition had been dismissed as primitive for centuries:

The decision that TANU should accept membership only from Africans was a political decision necessary because of the prevailing lack of self-confidence in the African community. Years of Arab slave raiding, and later years of European domination, had caused our people to have grave doubts about their own abilities…A vital task for any liberation movement
must therefore be to restore the people’s confidence (Nyerere, 1966, p.3).

One way of restoring the confidence of the people was to show them that their (world) views counted and were not as primitive as they have been led to believe, moreover, something positive, namely a new society, could be constructed upon them.

Nevertheless, as previously noted, Nyerere’s *Ujamaa* was flawed, especially in his style and manner of presentation. Firstly, there is no single text in which Nyerere articulates his ideology of *Ujamaa*; the ideology is described in a series of speeches, policy papers and books. Delineating *Ujamaa*, from these media is not an easy task as “the writings and speeches of Nyerere do not lend themselves to easy analysis, but do lend themselves to easy misreading as hopelessly self-contradictory” (Green, 1995, p.81). The contradictions in Nyerere’s writings arise from two main factors: the first is that “Mwalimu’s thought has not been static” (ibid.). Thus, Nyerere’s understanding of *Ujamaa* was not fixed rather it evolved with time and experience. Secondly, “as President he had no time to write reflective overall volumes” (ibid. p.82). Nyerere’s ideas about *Ujamaa* are expressed in various articles, policy papers and speeches written at different times, for various audiences in diverse locations in the world and for different purposes. This is why Nyerere’s writings are contradictory and confusing to analyse. This is exemplified in the following point. It has been noted throughout the current thesis that Nyerere’s *Ujamaa* was secular, but when one pauses to consider its moral emphasis, it becomes virtually impossible to distinguish between NU and religion. Like religion, Nyerere’s *Ujamaa* provided moral prescriptions. For example, socialism, working and sharing are good whereas capitalism, laziness and individualism are

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103 *Mwalimu* is a Swahili word for a teacher and it is to this day an affectionate title for Nyerere.
bad. The list is endless; everything is judged in moral terms. The only difference is that
religions prescribe morality in the name of God while Ujamaa does not make any (explicit)
reference to a deity. To people for whom “religion permeates into all the departments of life
so fully that it is not easy or possible always to isolate it “(Mbiti, 1969, p.1), and for whom
therefore, divine commands carry weight, Nyerere’s Ujamaa was offering them an alternative
morality, a secular morality, whose source is not God but reason. This offer of an alternative
moral foundation whilst modern, did not gloss over the self-evident contradictions that
Nyerere failed to reconcile. Hence, the offer of secular morality or ethics was given at the
expense of noticeable contradictions.

The conclusion of Tanzanian scholars, especially those who analysed Ujamaa in its totality
from a Marxist perspective, including inter alia Shivji (1973), Loxley (1981) and Rugumamu
(1997, p132), is that it was essentially “‘utopian” and/or “populist” as opposed to “scientific.’
Ujamaa is described as utopian or populist because “the cardinal tenets of a socialist
revolution and transformation were inadvertently ignored by the framers of the [Arusha]
Declaration” (Rugumamu, 1997, p. 132). In addition, Ujamaa was considered utopian not
because it aimed to establish a better society but rather because Nyerere wanted to establish a
perfect society based on the principles of socialism in traditional society, principles with a
strong moral overtone. Nyerere wanted to construct a perfect society based on equality,
freedom, and love or caring for one another. Responding to charges that he ignored the basic
tenets of socialism, Nyerere countered that “there is no theology of socialism” (Nyerere,
1976, p.14). Furthermore, that “there is no religion of socialism” (ibid.), whose task it is to
supply ready-made answers for permanent universal application irrespective of “the objective
conditions prevailing in the time or place” (ibid. p.19). He continues, “there is not a book
which provides all the answers”, there is no “socialist road map which depicts all obstacles” and “there is no magic formula and no short cut” in the construction of socialism (ibid. p.19). The challenge of building socialism was not easy for Nyerere and the sole way to ensure success was “to grope our way forwards, doing our best to think clearly - and scientifically – about our own conditions in relation to our objectives” (Nyerere, 1976, p.19). Countering allegations that the fundamental values of *Ujamaa* were too idealistic especially for a large population such as an entire nation, Nyerere writes:

> This criticism is nonsensical. Social principles are, by definition, ideals at which to strive and by which to exercise self-criticism. The question to ask is not whether they are capable of achievement, which is absurd, but whether a society of free men can do without them (Nyerere, 1966, p.13)

The social principles that underpinned *Ujamaa*, were not only goals members of society should strive for, but they were also standards by which a society could morally assess itself. Consequently, Nyerere was not concerned with whether or not the principles could be lived but rather whether individuals in a free society can afford to live without some basic principles. Nyerere believed that it is only on the realisation of social principles that “society can hope to operate harmoniously and in accordance with its purpose. Unless they adopted there will always be an inherent…danger of a breakdown in society - that is a split in the family unit, a civil war within a nation, or a war between nations” (Nyerere, 1966, p.12). Considering the tumultuous transition Africa was going through few would disagree with Nyerere on this point. Therefore, whilst the social principles of *Ujamaa* were judged by Marxists to be utopian, it cannot be denied that, after years as a rudderless society in terms of ideals, NU offered the Tanzanian people a moral foundation for harmonious living and moral standards they could endeavour to achieve.
The rejection of Marxism or scientific socialism raises the question about *Ujamaa’s* world view. Analysing *Ujamaa* holistically, it did not have a strong theoretical foundation. Unlike scientific socialism which was all embracing, the AD was in the words of one of the chief whips of TANU, “a declaration of principle, objectives, and intentions couched in general terms” (Ngombale-Mwiru, 1973, p.52). This implies that the AD is not a rigorous theoretical study of man and society but a collection of insights, rulings, opinions, some of which are penetrating, others contradictory, and others still, superficial and unconvincing. The principle linking them is the transformation of life of Tanzanians. In addition to the AD, the theory of *Ujamaa* is also found in other policy papers, such as ‘*Education for Self-Reliance*’ (1967) and ‘*Socialism and Rural Areas*’ (1967) that were published after the AD. These clarified some issues or corrected some mistakes that were made in the implementation of *Ujamaa*. On the whole it can be said that some of the theories of *Ujamaa* were formulated on the run whilst it was being implemented; what did not work out was corrected or substituted by another solution. Nyerere was groping forward as if in the dark, with no manifesto or readymade answers and at times *Ujamaa* looked like a matter of trial and error. It must be noted, however, that after sometime, the political process in Tanzania produced “several noteworthy declarations of principles and sufficient actions which [gave] meaning to the [AD]” (Rodney, 1972) and by extension to *Ujamaa*. The principles and actions of *Ujamaa* have been described throughout the course of the present thesis and in light of these it can be said that “Tanzania was on the third way: in that it did not promote free market principles nor the centrally planned model of the Soviet Union” (Jennings, 2002, p.510). Whilst Nyerere may have argued for some contentious principles and in doing so may have adopted a controversial stance on some issues, there can be no doubt that *Ujamaa* offered the people of Tanzania an alternative method of development, a third way, in which “human beings are
perceived …as the ends as well as the chief means; as the justification for, as well as the judge of, development (Green, 1995, p.80). *Ujamaa* was offering Tanzanians human rather than material centred development.

**8.2. Offer of Nyerere’s *Ujamaa* Today**

Much has happened in Tanzania since *Ujamaa* was abandoned in the mid 1980s that must be acknowledged when seeking to determine the contribution of NU in the country today. Although the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania, Article 3 (1), still provides that it is a democratic and socialist state, in practice, however, Tanzania today is not a socialist country, but a capitalist, liberal state that adheres to multiparty democracy. The Tanzanian government abandoned the ideology of *Ujamaa* and its practices and embraced the ideology of capitalism or more accurately that of neo-liberalism. The move away from *Ujamaa* began in 1985, when Nyerere retired from the presidency and Ali Hassan Mwinyi took office. President Mwinyi’s administration soon signed a number of agreements with the IMF and the WB that paved the way for implementation of Structural Adjustment Policies (SAPs) (Nyirabu, 2003). SAPs were prescribed to all Third World countries by the West through the Britton Wood institutions (the World Bank [WB] and the International Monetary Fund [IMF]). SAPs required the following criteria: devaluation of national currencies (the Shilling in Tanzania); liberalisation of trade, investment and foreign currency transactions; deregulation of prices and interest rates; the promotion of cost-cutting, deficit reducing measures such as subsidy withdrawal, cost sharing and cost recovery; retrenchment of

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104 In the mid 1980s capitalist policies were advocated by neo-liberals, among whom were Margret Thatcher, the British Prime Minister (4th May 1979-- 28th November 1990), Ronald Reagan, president of the USA (20th January 1981 – 20th January 1989), and Chancellor Helmut Kohl of (West) Germany (1st October 1982 – 27th October 1998).
workers in the public sector; privatisation and commercialisation of the public enterprise, essential for anti-statism; pro-market philosophy and promotion of private property. In order to receive funds from the WB and the IMF, Tanzania embarked on the implementation of SAPs which brought about the following changes: firstly, in regards to Tanzania, SAPs implied a shift from “state-shape-society to market-shape-society assumption” (Mushi, 2001, p.7). In practical terms, this meant the end of government involvement in commercially oriented businesses and in the eradication of exploitation. Moreover, the abolition of state controlled means of production and exchange. The withdrawal of the state from these principle aims of Ujamaa, led to “state contraction” (ibid.), that is to say it was, “reduced to maintaining law and order” (Nyirabu, 2003, p.5). Secondly, the government withdrawal from economic activities fostered private development agents and civic groups. This process, which Mushi termed the “democratisation of development” (Mushi, 2002, p.7), inevitably gave rise to the formation of civic groups and organisations, in both rural and urban areas that sought to take on the mantle of developing Tanzania. Thirdly, as the state continued to shrink, government development projects in the rural areas ceased and the provision of social services, including schools, health care and water, which had been a significant feature of Nyerere’s Ujamaa deteriorated further because according to the new dispensation of neo-liberalism, such services were supposed to be provided at a fee by government, Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs), and private entrepreneurs. Private schools and hospitals emerged but the capacity of non-state agents was very limited and as a result they could not afford to provide social services in the country as the wisdom of neo-liberalism dictates (Mushi, 2002). The fees charged by the owners of various social service centres were so high that ordinary people could not afford the cost. As a result, two tiered healthcare and education systems emerged. Government schools and hospitals became
considered the preserve of the poor, were ill-equipped, without qualified staff and the most
expensive hospitals and schools were considered the preserve of the middle class and
wealthy. Fourthly, in less than a decade, the government that had controlled the major means
of production for more than 20 years, embarked on a privatisation exercise. As a result
almost all economic institutions built during Ujamaa were privatised. They included, inter
alia, the Tanzania Telecommunication Company Limited (TTCL), National Shipping
Agency Company Limited (NASACO), Air Tanzania Corporation (ATC), Tanzania
Railways Corporation (TRC), Tanzania Electric Supply Company, (TANESCO), the
National Bank of Commerce (NBC), Tanzania Harbours Authority (THA), Cement factories
(Songwe, Wazo Hill, Tanga), Sugar Industries (Mtibwa in Morogoro and TPC in Lower
Moshi), Textile Industries and NAFCO. It is estimated that more than 400 public entreprises
were privatised resulting in numerous retrenchments of workers. In many cases workers
resisted privatisation due to various reasons including, lack of consultation, exclusion in
acquisition of shares of the privatised companies, and delays in payment of their lawful
entrenchment entitlements. Worker demonstrations and (threatened) strikes have continued
even after privatisation (Mukandala, 2008). Through privatisation, and liberalisation of
the economy, international capitalism, assumed full control of the Tanzanian economy.
Furthermore, the state became the protector (through the investment code) and the promoter
(through the Presidential Parastatal Sector Reform Commission (PSRC)) of the interests of
multinational corporations. Expressing similar sentiments, Nyirabu writes: “with
privatisation, society is stripped of its most valuable national assets and faces the risk of
manipulation and dictation by global corporate elites” (Nyirabu, 2003, p.5). Finally, the

\[105\] See, ‘Speech by Prof. R.S. Mukandala, the Vice-Chancellor of the University of Dar-es-Salaam on the
Occasion of Official Opening of the 16th Conference on the State of Politics in Tanzania, Nkrumah Hall,
liberalisation of the economy was followed by the liberalisation of politics, insofar as the ruling party, the one party which had hitherto dominated politics in the country and which was characterised by features of Nyerere’s *Ujamaa*, was challenged by the emergence of more than 18 opposition parties. The most prominent were Chama cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo (CHADEMA) or Democracy and Development Party, the National Convention for Construction and Reform (NCCR-Mageuzi), The Tanzania Labour Party (TLP), and the Civic United Front (CUF). The emergence of multi party democracy in 1992 “completed the process of installing the market as the dominant force in the country’s development agenda [because] at least in theory, there was now a ‘free’ economic market and a ‘free’ political market” (Mushi, 2001, p.7). It is significant to note that ‘free’ is in inverted commas, because the triumph of freedom was questionable and highly suspect.

By 1995, it was capitalism rather than Nyerere’s *Ujamaa* that to all intents and purposes informed the social, political and economic activities in the country. Mushi (2003) has stated that “the Mwinyi era 1985-1995, was the liberal decade *par excellence*” (p.4). Under the presidency of Hon. Hassan Mwinyi (in office 1985-1995), Tanzania became completely liberalised. Moreover, as there have been no major policy changes since 1985, Mushi’s estimation can be extrapolated to include subsequent decades. In light of this observation, the last two and half decades have been liberal decades *par excellence* since even the ruling party CCM which spent more than 20 years fighting capitalism made a dramatic u-turn and advocated this economic system. In what became known as the Zanzibar Declaration, on the 23rd February 1991, the NEC of CCM abolished the Leadership Code (LC),106 and contrary

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106 The Leadership Code (LC) was a key feature of the AD and Nyerere’s *Ujamaa*. 
to the AD opened the way for politicians to partake in capitalist ventures, such as owning rental property, starting private business and earning more than two salaries (Nyirabu, 2003). Hence, since 1985, Tanzania has been shaping itself along the social, political and economic policies of capitalism as expressed in neo-liberalism rather than the principles of Nyerere’s *Ujamaa*.

I have briefly outlined the main features of neo-liberalism in Tanzania in order to highlight the ideological shift that has taken place ever since Nyerere resigned as President. During *Ujamaa* the state was a moral bearer and policies were justified on ethical grounds, whereas under the current ideology the state is morally neutral, pursuing no particular view of good, and its policies are justified on what they can deliver in material terms. What then is *Ujamaa* offering to Tanzanians today? It must be kept in mind that *Ujamaa* did not change, rather it was replaced by the ideology of capitalism. The core principles and the values of *Ujamaa* have not altered. Therefore, if Tanzanians were to revert to the ideology of *Ujamaa*, they could still get a new life, the life of equality and freedom, of self-confidence, and development that is centred on humanity rather than material possessions. The state and its apparatuses, including the ruling class are, however, entrenched in a capitalist ideology, and as long this remains the case it will be very difficult to bring about ideological changes in Tanzania. Nevertheless there is a counter ideology in Tanzania. Though not formally pronounced, *Ujamaa* is still the ideology most likely to replace that of capitalism. Although no political party in Tanzania presents *Ujamaa* as its official ideology, almost all opposition parties and NGOs have been using the ideas, principles and values enshrined in NU to criticise the government and its capitalist policies. Even the ruling party -- that has abandoned the ideas of its founder -- occasionally evokes Nyerere’s teachings. His ideas
have often been quoted to criticise the contemporary socio-political and economic dispensation and its practices. Thus, *Ujamaa* is the yardstick by which people are evaluating the rightness or wrongness of the current policies. It offers the people of Tanzania standards with which to evaluate policies in the country. It provides tools with which to criticise the current policies of liberalism.

*Ujamaa* carried a very strong moral overtone and people expect that to continue. But during the last twenty years of liberalism, the nation has been shocked at the level of corruption, particularly grand corruption. Corruption is widespread throughout all the ministries and governmental departments but the focus here will be on two sectors: the mining and energy sectors. According to Mukandala (2008), the purchase agreements between the government and private power generating companies, such as Richmond, Dowans Holdings, IPTL, and Songas, to mention a few, have been tainted by allegations of corruption. In addition, it has been claimed that corruption has also featured heavily in the privatisation agreements between the government and the following companies: Kiwira Coal Mining Company (KCMCO), the International Container Terminal Services LTD (TICTS), the purchase of Air Tanzania (ATCL) by the South African Airways (SAA), the purchase of radar from the British based BAE Systems, the buying of the presidential jet, and the selling of government houses located in prime areas to public servants and leaders. In the mining sector, corruption has been reported in the selling and ownership of all large-scale gold mines to foreigners. It is alleged that corruption led leaders to abandon the principle of partnership in lucrative areas of investment that makes investors in the sector pay a very small loyalty of 3 per cent (This has now been raised to 4 per cent). The solution of Tanzanian neo-liberals to the problem of corruption has been the establishment in 2007 of the Prevention and Combating
of Corruption Bureau (PCCB) and of a Presidential Ethical commission for leaders. However, these attempts have not reduced let alone prevented corruption in the country. Similarly, the Presidential Ethical Commission (PEC) has failed to ensure political leaders maintain ethical standards in government purchases or when they sign contracts with foreign firms (Mukandala, 2008). In every direction one finds criticisms against this culture of corruption that permeates issues of national interests. Those old enough to remember recall that it was not like this during *Ujamaa*. Corruption is being linked to an ideology, that exults individualism and materialism, and which has no strong moral resonance. It is unsurprising, therefore, that some individuals have been calling for the return of the Leadership Code established by *Ujamaa*, and others for a training in ethics. The general consensus is that the moral crisis set in after the collapse of *Ujamaa*. Moreover, this is because during the new ideology, the state has distanced itself from any particular conception of good and as such it cannot endorse anything that gives value to life. The real solution, however, lies not in a return to one or two aspects of *Ujamaa* but rather a return to the social principles and values that underpinned Nyerere’s *Ujamaa*.

*Ujamaa* promised the well being of every individual through equality in terms of rights and opportunities. Although at the point of abandonment this was not fully realised, people could see that the government was making genuine efforts to shape the society towards that end. Ordinary people expected those efforts to continue which was unfortunately not what transpired. Currently, every individual adult is left on their own to pursue their own wellbeing. The government claims that its responsibility is to create conditions conducive for each individual to pursue their own welfare. But the right conditions are absent. Rather it is evident is that there are a small number of Tanzanians who own the major means of
production and a majority proletariats who survive by providing cheap labour to the companies of the rich. Consequently, the system has created well established classes: the ruling class, the middle class, and the class of peasants, ordinary people in rural areas. The huge gap between the ‘haves’ and the ‘have not’, is not a development that Nyerere would have endorsed.

He believed that a system which develops a few while neglecting the majority contained within itself the seeds of destruction and disintegration of society. Nyerere believed that a system which did not accept the principle of human equality, and which thought there was merit in developing only a small elite was doomed to failure. Criticisms against the development of only a few individuals echo the sentiments of Nyerere.

Furthermore the development of all people, which is often proposed as a solution, was also the answer according to *Ujamaa*. Therefore, although *Ujamaa* is no longer the ruling ideology, its offerings are still attractive to many people who are waiting for the day they will be realised.

It has also been noted that during the last two decades or so the allocation of resources, particularly land, has been problematic. There has been an increase in investment projects in sectors that require large plots of land including agriculture and livestock, construction, energy, natural resources, tourism, manufacturing, commercial buildings, petroleum and mining. The Land Law of 1999 was amended in 2003 to allow non-citizens the right of
occupancy or a derivative title for investment proposes. Recent events in various regions of the country have shown that powerful investors have grabbed huge chunks of land leaving nothing for small land users and their activities. Again, *Ujamaa* is the benchmark, during which smallholdings as well as big farms had a right to land. The land rights bestowed by Nyerere’s *Ujamaa* on every individual capable of work are slowly being eroded by the government and foreign investors. Many reminisce and say, it was not like this during *Ujamaa* when land was available to all Tanzanians, small and big users alike, for the development of the country and its people.

During *Ujamaa*, national assets were protected and the interests of ordinary workers were respected. But this changed in the last two decades when national assets were sold at rock bottom prices. This is best exemplified in the selling of TTCL to Detecon, a Dutch based multinational Mobile Systems company. In 2002, the workers of TTCL requested the then head of state, Benjamin William Mkapa, to ask the mobile company to settle their outstanding debt of US $60 million (the purchase price of 35 per cent shares in TTCL). President Mkapa did not take any action and it is believed the Dutch company bought the firm at a throw away price (Nyirabu, 2003). To compound such problems, the process of privatisation has been accompanied by massive redundancy and low wages. Redundancy, low wages, and poor working conditions in private companies have been the source of many grievances among private sector workers. Prime examples in this regard are Tanzania Railways Corporation (TRC, which after privatisation changed to TRL) and TANESCO. In the case of TRC payments due to those who were retrenched were delayed and workers who retained their jobs were not paid their salaries on time while the top leadership from India was being paid huge sums of money by the Tanzanian government. Events around
TANESCO were virtually the same. Employees accused the management of South African Net Group Company (SANGCO which took over TANESCO in 2002), of paying themselves huge sums of money without doing any work (op.cit. p.6). Such feelings of discontent, which are now a common feature in many companies, have caused riots, strikes, and strong resentment of the government as well as its liberal policies. It has led many workers to think of Nyerere’s *Ujamaa* as a policy that truly cared for national assets and the well being of the ordinary people and workers. Nyerere’s *Ujamaa* is the prism through which many ordinary Tanzanians perceive the new dispensation. As such, they are constantly making comparisons between life during Nyerere’s *Ujamaa* and the current situation. Generally, life under *Ujamaa* is judged to have been good and life under capitalism as bad. Nyerere’s *Ujamaa* is still the standard measure, and the litmus test for judging whether an ideology is positive or negative. It is in this sense that, while no longer dominant, it is still *Ujamaa* that offers Tanzanians the tools to evaluate and criticise the ruling ideology.

8.3. Conclusion

This concluding chapter has demonstrated what the ideology of *Ujamaa* has to offer. In particular it was shown that *Ujamaa* offered an alternative way of life, a life that rejects evils such racism, exploitation, slavery, colonialism, and slave trade and embraces the good, such as freedom, equality in terms of rights and opportunities, and tolerance. It was pointed out that *Ujamaa* was offering liberation to a people who had long lived in oppression and exploitation. Furthermore this liberation was for the perpetrators as well as the victims of those injustices. It was also shown that *Ujamaa* offered self-confidence to Tanzanians. This is supported by Nyerere’s pride in African culture. It was evidenced that Nyerere rejected all the key theories of socialism and instead adopted the principles that guided the African way of life as the basis of *Ujamaa*. I proposed that for people whose culture was for a long time...
denigrated as primitive, Nyerere’s 
Ujamaa was offering them confidence in their own
customs and practices. The assessment of the relationship between the ideology of 
Ujamaa and religion verified that the line distinguishing the two is very thin indeed; the only
appreciable difference was that religion prescribes morality because God commands it
whereas in Ujamaa morality is stipulated because reason or humanity demands it. In this
regard it was pointed out that Nyerere’s Ujamaa offered a people who have historically
looked to God for direction, an alternative, secular source of morality. It was further
explained that the ideology of Ujamaa offered Tanzanians an alternative route to
development, one that is human rather than material centric. Finally, it was suggested that
even after it was abandoned Ujamaa continues to offer ordinary people the tools with which
to criticise the ruling ideology.
CONCLUSION

CONCEPTUAL MAP OF NYERERE’S UJAMAA

Our aim in this thesis was to provide a conceptual construction of Ujamaa as Nyerere saw it. In order to map out the conceptual construction of Ujamaa I have traced the rise of the concept that informed Nyerere’s social and economic development policies and outlined its origin. It was suggested that Ujamaa did not occur in vacuum but rather it was brought about by the social, political and economic conditions which were exacerbated by two historical events: slave trade and colonialism. It was suggested that the trade in slaves was socially dehumanising, insofar as the rights, worth and dignity of the African person were not respected. Moreover, it was economically impoverishing as a result of the civil wars unleashed by the trade and the population transfer, particularly the transfer of the most productive segment of the society, that is, the young and healthy.

It was suggested that colonialism did not improve the situation but merely maintained the status quo albeit in a different form. If the trade in slaves depleted the African population, colonialism depleted the natural resources of Tanzania and Africa in general. Thus, like slave trade, colonialism also exacerbated poverty in Tanzania through transfer of resources to the outside world. It was suggested that in social terms, colonialism introduced rac(ial)ism, and destroyed the African spirit of community. Education came with mixed blessings: it fostered the spirit of individualism that the founders abhorred whilst it simultaneously created a class of African élites amongst who arose the protagonists of independence. Politically, it was suggested that colonialism signified a lack of freedom and civil liberties. In sum, it was proposed that Ujamaa arose against this background as a response to dehumanisation,
rac(ial)ism, lack of freedom and civil liberties, poverty and dependency on the metropolitan powers. But this merely placed *Ujamaa* in its proper historical context; it did not however, explain where *Ujamaa* originated.

The task of explaining the genesis of *Ujamaa* was carried out in the second chapter of the current thesis, which examined the presumptions of Kantian liberalism that fed directly into NU. It was proposed that some of the assumptions and values that Nyerere incorporated into *Ujamaa*, such as equality, in terms of rights to dignity, democracy, a just wage, equal opportunities, as well as freedom, including national freedom and freedom to develop, came from Immanuel Kant. These views were combined in *Ujamaa* by Nyerere with conceptions and influences taken from his reading of the African tradition. This second component of *Ujamaa* was described in Chapter Three of this thesis where it was suggested that some of the core conceptions which informed *Ujamaa* Nyerere borrowed from the model of the extended family institution of traditional Africa. Particularly that Nyerere drew upon principles and practices which he identified with this social structure; namely, those of participation and inclusion, sharing and co-operation and communal property ownership. In *Ujamaa*, Nyerere attempted to extend them and make them national practices which would lead to national identification and unity.

Nyerere upheld what he saw as a tradition of participation and inclusion. It was suggested that this is why *Ujamaa* emphasized partaking in agriculture, a sector in which everybody has to contribute, including students and teachers. It was explained that in the political arena, participation meant involvement of people in the decision making process at various levels of
government. The principle of inclusion, was upheld in *Ujamaa* by the adoption of an open policy, which made Tanzania a hospitable nation, receiving refugees from the neighbouring countries of Rwanda, Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia and Uganda and becoming a home to all the liberation movements of southern Africa. It was argued that in *Ujamaa* the commitment to open policy went hand in hand with commitment to the cultural tradition of the people of Tanzania.

What Nyerere saw as the African principle of sharing and co-operation, was implemented in *Ujamaa* by ensuring that the wealth of the nation was shared through just wages, and provision of social services such as schools and hospitals. With respect to the principle of co-operation it was argued this was promoted in *Ujamaa* villages in rural communities in which people cooperated in fulfilling various projects. To uphold the African principle of communal property ownership *Ujamaa* nationalised the major means of production, but as aforementioned the nationalisation was incomplete due to financial constraints and a lack of skilled labour force. Nonetheless, nationalisation of all the major means of production was the main objective of the AD. In sum, it can be said that in *Ujamaa* Nyerere promoted what he saw as traditional African practices in the modern state.

With only its roots described it was still not possible to fully elucidate *Ujamaa*. A description of *Ujamaa*’s essential nature was provided in the fourth chapter of this thesis where it was discovered that *Ujamaa*, the concept I have been trying to unravel, was neither a political philosophy nor a political theory, but a political ideology. In order to characterise an ideology the expertise of Louis Althusser, a French philosopher of Marxist leanings, was called upon.
The choice of Althusser was deliberate. As apart from being the philosopher, whose analysis of ideology has been acknowledged as paradigmatic, Althusser also universalised ideology; describing it as a way of being for all humanity, including Africans, and not a privilege of class societies or Europeans. Furthermore, Althusser was deemed appropriate for this study due to his notion that ‘ideology has material existence’ meaning we hold certain beliefs not because ideas are our property but because they are the property of material apparatus, the institutions with all their practices and rituals. Why then is *Ujamaa* an ideology? The answer to this question lies in four key points: firstly, it was a functional necessity, required to transform the lives of the Tanzanian people from the waning ‘traditional order’ (Nyerere, 1966, p.6), to modernity and like all ideologies *Ujamaa* has the trappings of an unconscious phenomenon. Next, *Ujamaa* was shown to be an ideology because it is also an imaginary representation of the relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence. It was proposed that the invented symbol in *Ujamaa* is the extended family in traditional Africa. In this familial unit everybody was a worker, people cared for each other, there was cooperation and sharing, and property was held in common. It was put forward that during the AD, the metaphor was refined to include the principle of human equality, democracy, tolerance communal ownership of property and freedom. The third point that characterised *Ujamaa* as an ideology was its material existence. It was clarified that although the ideas of *Ujamaa* appear to be conceived by Nyerere, the thoughts that he articulated already existed, both in the institutions of traditional Africa and those of the state. To summarise, *Ujamaa* has material existence, because it existed in the apparatus of the extended family in traditional Africa and in its practices. Finally, *Ujamaa* was confirmed as an ideology since it interpellates individuals as subjects. The way that the extended family in traditional Africa was projected as a model or paradigm to be copied was illustrated and consequently how
Nyerere emerged as the ‘Subject’ who, through the state apparatus, called upon Tanzanians to be subjects. It was shown that most individuals became willing subjects but a few had to be forced, especially when it became necessary for peasants in rural areas to move into Ujamaa villages.

Having established that Ujamaa is an ideology I proceeded to consider its functions. It was argued that Ujamaa had one main function, to transform society from the old order characterised by colonialism and slave trade to a new, modern order. Numerous situations needed transformation but I focused on the following three: racial, tribal and religious divisions, the class system, and backwardness especially in agriculture and the forces of production. The integrative role played by Ujamaa, was identified in that it attempted to create unity where there were racial, religious and tribal divisions. It was evidenced that at the ideological level all Tanzanians were equal irrespective of their colour, race and tribe. However, several measures were taken in order to persuade individuals to move towards national unity: the first was to present unity and co-operation as a good quality, as an essential element of human existence and division or lack of co-operation is portrayed as an animalistic trait: “A failure to co-operate together is a mark of bestiality; it is not a characteristic of humanity” (Nyerere, 1974, p.107). The message seemed to be that only animals can live in division and conflict but human beings must live in co-operation and union.

Furthermore, it was argued that rac(ial)ism, tribalism and religious divisions were rebuked as morally wrong whereas equality and brotherhood were virtues to be embraced. Whilst
tribalism, racism and religious divisions were described as evil at the ideological level, in reality specific measures were being taken to curb these problems. The measures taken to curtail tribalism included the abolishment of chieftaincy and the wide promotion of Swahili as the national language. Action taken to address religious divisions and conflicts included freedom of worship, tolerance, and the establishment of organisations to cater for the problems of each religion. Racism was tackled by portraying it as a real evil. The transition from a class society to a classless one followed a similar pattern. The class system was, at the ideological described as a highly negative consequence of capitalism. Moreover, capitalism per se was depicted as bad, evil, exploitative, dehumanising, un-African, and a threat to the development and independence of the country. Conversely socialism was held up as morally good, as typically African, as humanising, non-exploitative and a virtue. A socialist was portrayed as an upright person, one who considers all others a brother, and who does not conspire with foreigners for the downfall of another. This was an attempt to convince individuals to make decisions for the good, in this instance Ujamaa or socialism, which is classless.

Beside these ideological efforts, in reality several steps were taken to eradicate or minimise the influence of class. They included nationalisation of some of the means of production and the creation of the Leadership Code and of Ujamaa villages. I proposed that the transformation of society from backwardness in agriculture to modernisation and knowhow followed a similar pattern: traditional tools and techniques were discouraged as outdated, unfit for modern production, and incapable of eliminating poverty. The modern means of production were viewed as positive and necessary for development. This is what occurred along the ideological plane. In reality the government also took action to revolutionise
farming. In the short term the state provided modern tools to some communities. In general, however, the traditional instruments were replaced gradually due to limited resources. In response to the lack of skilled labour, the government used the education system, particularly the school ISA, to train a proficient work force. The (Ujamaa) programme of education for self-reliance aimed to secure skilled labour and relations of production through socialist leaning. However, a skilled labour force was not enough to transform agriculture in the country, they needed to be mobilised to work hard. To encourage a strong work ethic, Nyerere resorted to his usual technique and portrayed toil as a moral virtue, and laziness as a vice.

The account of its functions completed the explanation of Ujamaa’s nature. It was now identifiable as a political ideology whose main function was to transform the Tanzanian society from the old order burdened with fragmentations, divisions and conflicts, class status and exploitation, primitive tools of production and a lazy, unskilled labour force, to a new order of national unity, classless society, modern agriculture, and skilled, motivated workers. This is how Ujamaa is defined in the present thesis. The question that remained was ‘Is this account of Ujamaa valid?

The quest to validate Ujamaa, involved a critique of Nyerere’s blending of Kantian liberalism with African presumptions, the meaning of socialism and the transition to this economic system. It was suggested that Nyerere was justified in blending the traditions together on two grounds: political and cultural reasons.
The international political climate was hostile to poor countries that did not seek ideological affiliation with either of the superpowers. As such, the attempts to appease both powers were justifiable on security grounds. Furthermore, I demonstrated that the integration of the two traditions was reasonable on the premise that some elements of both socialism and capitalism were inappropriate for the cultural and real conditions of the country. It was suggested that given the patronising attitude of western scholars, Nyerere was justified in presenting African custom as civilised, moreover, as a reality that does not claim to have an exhaustive explanation of reality definitively encapsulated in its world view.

Since the world view of African culture was admittedly limited, the assimilation of various assumptions from different traditions enriched the ideology itself and its people. It was proposed, however, that Nyerere’s conception of culture was flawed because he erroneously perceived it as static and pure. By omitting post-colonial Africa culture and returning to pre-colonial traditions and customs, Nyerere risked incorporating outdated values and practices into *Ujamaa* which were unrecognisable to the post-colonial population. Nonetheless, on the whole, it was accepted that fusing elements of two traditions was defensible and enriched the ideology. This acceptance then gave rise to the next question: was Nyerere justified in calling the resultant hybrid *Ujamaa* or socialism? But what is *Ujamaa*? And what is socialism? It was explained that ‘*Ujamaa*’ is the Swahili word for socialism; its “literal meaning is family-hood” (Nyerere, 1976, p.2), and was deliberately chosen in order to “emphasizes the African-ness” of the policies that Nyerere intended to follow (*ibid*.). Using Kornai’s (2000) model three key characteristics of socialism were presented: absolute control of state power, state
ownership of the major means of production, and the co-ordination of the economic activities by the state. Moreover, these main features occur as socialism manifests itself in concrete historical circumstances. *Ujamaa* was confirmed to have met all these criteria and therefore deserves to be called socialism. Problematically, however, these features do not appear in Nyerere’s account of socialism. According to Nyerere, at least in theory, socialism is about equality, freedom, communal ownership of property, democracy, tolerance, and care of one another. Are these elements essential for socialism? It was clearly evidenced that equality, democracy and tolerance are not essential for socialism, which can function in racist, undemocratic and religiously intolerant societies. This was starkly exemplified by the USSR, the paragon of socialism, which abolished religion and was arguably undemocratic. It was concluded that at the theoretical or ideological level, Nyerere’s account of socialism was unsound but in reality it had all the hallmarks of socialism as it manifests itself in concrete historical circumstances. Was it reasonable to suggest, then, that Nyerere’s strategy to socialism was valid?

Reading Kornai (2000), it becomes clear that a transition to socialism begins when society shifts away from the basic characteristics of capitalism. This raises the question: what are the basic characteristics of capitalism? Following Kornai (2000), the basic features of capitalism were presented as including an open attitude to and dominance of private property and a free market. Furthermore, before turning to socialist policies Tanzania had a very amenable attitude to private property ownership and was following a free market economy that was dominated by British investors. Although Nyerere rejected this characterisation of economic life, in reality the transition to socialism in Tanzania was from capitalism. In this sense his theoretical account of the transition to socialism is unfounded. Finally, with regard to the
means of transition to socialism Kornai (2000) notes that “the socialist system does not originate spontaneously from the intrinsic, internal forces of the economy. Instead the socialist system is imposed on society by the communist party with brutal force, when it gains power.” (p. 299) Initially, Ujamaa did not use violence because, at least to begin with, the transition was peaceful. However, as it became apparent that many individuals were unwilling to move into Ujamaa villages, Nyerere relied on force as a last resort.

In summary I theorised that at the ideological level, Nyerere’s accounts of socialism, transition to socialism, and the means by which the transition occurred were unsound. However, in practice they were valid.

Despite incoherence and inconsistencies between theory and practice, the ideology of Ujamaa had a lot to offer the people of Tanzania. In seeking to determine the benefits of Ujamaa, it was deemed necessary, in Chapter Seven, to take a holistic view. I asserted that if Ujamaa is examined in its entirety, its broad moral agenda cannot be overlooked. Although the return to the ‘noble African’ has had different interpretations and implications, I argued that it has to be understood in light of Ujamaa’s moral agenda.

Nyerere perceived the ‘noble African’ as dignified, and gracious not because of their scientific discoveries but because of their moral integrity and fortitude. It is this moral integrity that Nyerere wanted to awaken in the nation state. He wanted citizens to seek legitimacy of their deeds based on moral grounds rather than material reward. In short,
Nyerere wanted transformation to come as a protest against what was deeply wrong with the world. Hence everything was presented in moral terms: people were supposed to reject capitalism as morally wrong and conversely accept socialism because of its moral goodness. It was due to this strong moral resonance that I highlighted how the ideology of *Ujamaa* offered liberation to a long oppressed, humiliated and segregated population. It enabled their freedom from exploitation and domination and brought a life of equal rights and opportunities. It also offered to liberate the perpetrators of colonialism, racialism, exploitation and domination by describing a life in which they no longer oppressed and exploited their fellow human beings.

Religion is entwined with this strong moral message from *Ujamaa*. As discussed, to the casual reader, the ideology of *Ujamaa* may at first glance appear secular. But when its moral tone is taken into account the differences between the ideology of *Ujamaa* and religion diminish. They both prescribe a moral way of life but in religion this hails from God whereas the source of morality in the ideology of *Ujamaa* is reason. I, therefore, theorised that, Nyerere’s *Ujamaa* offered Africans, who are generally considered to be deeply religious, an alternative moral foundation; reason, the main pillar of modernity.

Nyerere’s recognition that Africa has a past, a culture, on which a new order could be built, coupled with his sense of pride in African tradition, significantly contributed to the formulation and articulation of *Ujamaa*. I argue that if Nyerere had incorporated Marxist or scientific socialist principles into *Ujamaa* it would not have taken the shape that it did and it certainly would have not offered Tanzanians the conditions they were aspiring to. The
decision to return to the past and source values, principles and practices from traditional Africa in order to guide the nation, whilst controversial, was testimony to his belief in African culture.

The ideology of *Ujamaa*, offered a people whose customs and traditions had been dismissed as primitive and meaningless, a sense of confidence in both their own culture and their wider worldview. They began to see that African ideas, whilst not definitive, were a worthy foundation of a new nation. After blending various elements from different traditions, the ideology of *Ujamaa* emerged distinct from all others of the last century. It was not capitalism nor was it communism or socialism. *Ujamaa* was not capitalism since it did not pursue a free market economy. Although nationalisation was an essential element not all major means of production were nationalised. The majority remained under the control of private individuals. Similarly, the ideology of *Ujamaa* could not be classified as communism or socialism in the Marxist sense because whilst it nationalised major means of production, it was essentially democratic and tolerant of religion. Above all, it did not adhere to the centrally planned model of the Soviet Union. Taking this into consideration, it was argued that *Ujamaa* offered Tanzanians a third way, neither capitalist nor socialist (in the sense of Marxism or scientific socialism). This third way is social democracy or democratic socialism.

Many events have occurred in Tanzania since the mid 1980s but none starker than the end of *Ujamaa* as the dominant ideology i.e. that of the ruling class. Today, Tanzania is more accurately described as a capitalist country rather than a socialist one. Over the last twenty years of capitalism a small minority has become richer while the majority have become
poorer; corruption in high places has developed; the land ownership rights of peasants are violated; the shrunken state is incapable of providing adequate social services; the rate of unemployment is high; and with every privatisation of state owned enterprise people lose jobs, sometimes without severance pay. The Tanzanian shilling is weak against the major world currencies and the purchasing power of the people is very low. There is a litany of problems and society is beginning to disintegrate. The old divisions along race, religion and tribe have been reignited and are widespread. Moreover, the pride which people took in Swahili as the national language is on the wane. Many people are proud to speak English and prefer to send their children to schools whose medium of instruction is English. Tanzania is losing out on all fronts. In the political sphere, the emergence of opposition parties, though desirable and necessary, have not helped to cement the strong sense of nationalism and they are beginning to be formed along tribal and religious lines. Today, even though it is no longer the official ideology of the state, *Ujamaa* still offers Tanzanians the tools with which to criticise the current socio-political and economic dispensation. While a return to *Ujamaa* as it was previously practiced may not be a realistic option, a return to its fundamental values may be long overdue.

In one sense, the answer to the question ‘What is *Ujamaa*?’ is very simple. Formed from Kantian liberalism and African traditional values and practices, *Ujamaa* or socialism is a political ideology or vision constructed and articulated by Julius Nyerere, the first President of Tanzania, in the mid-1960s. It was intended to lift Tanzanians in particular and Africans in general, out of domination, oppression, and exploitation to a of life freedom for all – or at least to offer them this hope. At its most idealistic it was presented as a means by which it would be possible to transform Tanzanians from self-doubting to being self-confident, from
division and fragmentation to unity and from traditional farming to modern agriculture, but above all from a class society to a classless one. These transformations remain an urgent necessity in the current socio-political and economic dispensation.
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