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Women, the Media and Modernity in Zanzibar: 'Ninjas, Mamas and Good Girls'

by

Thembi Mutch

PhD thesis 2015

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Abstract

This thesis is an interdisciplinary work that explores research questions on women's discourses about media and politics in Zanzibar. How do Zanzibar women become modern in order to participate in public spheres? What lacunae operate within the conventional tropes of modernity that limit a full exploration of their conversations?

This is the first inter-disciplinary ethnographic work within the audience/reception studies genre of media studies to focus specifically on Islamic women and their iterations of voice, agency and interiorisation of control in East Africa. Located within post-colonial debates, the work prioritises gender in East Africa as a key marker for localised behaviours and responses to globalised modernity, accessing women and girls' voices and opinions to explore this.

The work critically interrogates existing work on public spheres and asks us if we (in the Global North) are looking in the wrong places and asking the wrong questions. We need to reimagine the Southern public sphere from the perspective of women in Zanzibar; we need to examine the meanings of agency, modernity and civil engagement in an African context, factoring in the particularities of shame, secrecy, concealment, precariousity, gossip, corruption and non-state engagement. Using polyvocal definitions of media and empirical research, this thesis redefines the nature of public and political agency for Islamic Women in Zanzibar and explores issues of agency and the 'self-help' qualities of the media. It also examines the complexities of the weak state and partitioned-off local elites who have access to global networks and influences that often do not include the Global North.

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In memory of my mum, an intellectual, intersectional and emotional Amazon: Hilary Claire (1941-2007) And dedicated to my fierce, beautiful, FUNNY smart neice, Natasha Mutch-Vidal, who understands, and carries the baton.

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Glossary

Adab: Arabic term, meaning good behaviour

Babu: older man, grandfather, term of respect

Bado: not yet

Bibi: Grandmother, older woman, respected woman

Bobo: fool, idiot, mentally ill person

Buyi-Buyi: literally 'web' in Swahili. Common term for hijab/face covering. Younger women use the term to include floor length dress, often used as slang to refer to younger women.

Choyo: selfish tittle-tattle

Chuko: envy, small-mindedness

Curios: the local term for tourist knick-knacks

Daladala: small local bus, transit van, or open top vehicle, cheap transport for the majority of people on Zanzibar, who do not own a car

Dini: used in Zanzibar to mean fate, way of being, destiny

Furaha: happiness

Kwenda ya wakati: to go with the times

Mwana: daughter

Heshima taribu: good proper discipline, appropriate

Izzat: shame, face

Khali: hot, angry, fierce (both good and bad connotations, depending on the context)

Kijana/Vijana: youth, depending on gender

Kongwe: Older female employed by bride's mother for several weeks before wedding to teach her the arts of cooking, housekeeping, seduction and managing the relationship

Mbarrassa: porch, area outside the house, terrace, but also used an activity—to sit and be outside chatting

Malaya: prostitute, whore

Mandaleo: Modernity, change, development

Mamatiles: women who work selling cooked food at the side of their houses at dusk, fried fish, small cakes, in Tanznaia and Zanzibar

Masikaani: gossip social chat, also the actual pavement or corner where chatting takes place. Usually applied to women.

Ma'undagraundi: derived from 'underground'; a type of hip hop music

Mganja: clever, smart, but also shrewd and cunning.

Mutile: a metaphor, short story or cameo illustrating a particular moral or behavioural point

Mzee: older man, often slang for bureaucrat civil servant who does v little, also term of respect. Plural *wzee*

Mzungu: a term that derives from 'Kisungu zungu'—to run in circles, referring to anyone who is from outside. It is not a colour related term, as many white European visitors think. Plural *Wazungu*

Ninja: the headscarf (or cloth) used to cover a muslim women's head, and the mask that covers the face. Also used to refer to young women, as a derogatory term, implying they are concealing something.

Ongea Mbeya (lit. bad talk.) More generally, gossip, badmouth

Pole pole: slowly, gently or, in the singular, 'pole': I am sorry, I feel your pain.

Serikali: government

Sisi Watu: us people, the citizens; often used as a subtle dig at the royal family or the elites

Shida: problem

Shindwa: to be defeated

Shamba: countryside

Sheha: chief

Shenzi: scoundrel, rogue

Soma: teacher, guide.

Tabia Nzuri: of good character

Uasherati: promiscuity, extramarital sex and indecency

Uhuni: moral degeneracy, wastefulness

Uhuru: Freedom

Ujamma: termed popularised by President Julius Nyerere, 'Father of the Nation' to mean unity, the nation

Ulaya: outside, abroad

Umma: Muslim term for unity, community

Unyago: initiation rites for young women, a term only used by historians or older women

Upuuzi: men's banter

Ushogo: jealousy that can only be applied to women and only women experience

Utani: jokes, riddles, teasing (both men and women)

Uvumi: chit chat, *rizazi breeze* is male slang (only used by men) for shooting the breeze

vuki: general talk about people's business

Wageni: travellers, outsiders

Wazungu: plural of *Mzungu*

Wivo: general gossip

Wzee: plural of *Mzee*, old people

Prologue: April 2013

The sun is setting over an idyllic beach scene. We're on a balcony at the Archipelago, a well-established locally run café in the centre of Stone Town that's perfectly positioned to give a 180-degree view of the town at sunset. There's a whir of generators (Zanzibar's capital has had no electricity for months now) and the shrieks and yells of the local teenage boys as they leap off the harbour into the sea. Sunset is the swimming time, but only for boys and younger men. Girls in small groups, fully clothed, cluster around.

Below us there's a handful of women in their thirties beginning to light their kerosene lamps lined up by the side of the road—*mamatiles*, who sell the Zanzibar speciality *Mandazi* (sweetened dough fried in oil), fried fish (not octopus, that's the men's domain) or samoosas (sic). There's a group of mainlander female tourists easily recognisable by their loud chatter, bad Swahili, their giggles in the street, small shorts and lack of *buyi-buyi*. Meanwhile, less obviously, older women dart quickly into their neighbours' houses.

There's also a garrulous, confident woman, curvaceous and ostentatious in her purple nylon hijab and *kanzu* (gown), also fully covered. She's got Ray-Ban sunglasses (either fake or real) and matching bright gold jewellery: nose ring, necklace and an adornment of rings, almost certainly real judging by the lustre. She flicks her mobile phone (decorated with trinkets, key ring type baubles) from one ear to another, cradling it in her shoulder. The phone, and the conversation, is being paraded very conspicuously as she walks along the street. All this public talking on her new (possibly also fake) mobile phone is a subtle and calculated act of defiance. She knows she's being looked at, she might even want to be talked about, as she certainly will be. A large Toyota SUV pulls up, a new model from Japan, so Maryam says, and like a film star the woman gracefully sweeps up her dress and gets into the car, turning only slightly to the young, handsome male driver, who's similarly disguised behind tinted windows and Ray-Bans.

Maryam, my 28-year-old researcher whom I accosted on a local bus several years earlier when I was lost and stumbling with the intricacies of Swahili grammar,

turns to me. She is wearing full burkah, with a gap for her eyes, and under her black dress there are several more layers. “Ninja! She’s out on some secret mission. I’m not sure who she is… I bet she’s off to see her boyfriend!” Maryam struggles to contain her giggling, and her eyes are twinkling: we both know the joke. On this small parochial island, a younger woman’s virtue is paramount, but there’s a huge number of people having extra-marital affairs—with members of the same sex as well as the opposite. It’s the subject of gossip, conjecture and rumour, and this purple-clothed beauty is simultaneously breaking and reinforcing so many unspoken ‘rules’ of Zanzibar life in this brief, two-minute cameo.

Over three years of field work, Maryam has invited me into this conspiratorial world of women’s talk with her friends. It takes place in homes, hair salons and massage parlours, but rarely in public spaces. When we do meet in public (in the market, in a local café) much is left unsaid, and it’s not uncommon for us to sit in silence. We meet twice, sometimes three times a week. We meet for coffee (me) and sodas (Maryam and her friends) and discuss everything—relationships often, work, global politics, Zanzibar gossip, the Madrassas, what we’ve been doing, our futures, the elections (home and abroad) and if or how the media features in our worlds. There are others involved too: recommendations, references, people who just turn up because they want to join in and older, professional women whom I actively seek out.

Chapter One: Introduction and Literature Review

Introduction

This thesis is based on an ethnography of 37 women (and six men) between the ages of 14 and 87 in Zanzibar: how they "interiorise control" of their lives, (Ndlovu 2013:379) and what role the media plays in this process. "Ninja", "Mama", and "good girls" are terms they and the Zanzibar community use about themselves, categories that are self-appointed, mutable, familiar, funny, empowering and self-orientalising and reflect global concerns all at once. Ninja is just the latest knowing, reflexive, ironic and modern term that women of all ages use to describe how they go 'undercover' in public spaces to carry out activities that would be frowned on if carried out openly. The ninja is a fictive reference to cartoon comic characters, warriors, a metaphorical amalgam of ideas that none of my informants was precisely able to locate. It's also a name for the actual headscarf the women wear. Mama is the generic term of address (followed by the name of the child) and thus indicates Mama of 'X' rather than the actual woman's name. It is rare in Zanzibar to address women as I do, by their actual names, when a woman has children (her own or fostered) to care for. Good girls (*nzuri vijana*) is another much used synecdoche for a collection of behaviours explored in this work.

Building on reception studies and ethnographies of media audiences, (Madianou 2005 Matar 2005) and Abu-Lughod (1986, 1990, 1993, 2002) this work is situated within the audience/reception studies genre of media studies that focuses on Islamic women and *their* iterations of voice, agency (Mahmood 2006), *their* interiorising of control or power in East Africa (Ndlovu 2013). The research draws on post-colonial debates, particularly the work by Chabal Chabal (2009) and deliberately prioritises informal modernities (plural) gendered agency in East Africa as a key marker for localised behaviours and responses to globalised modernity, accessing women and girls' voices, performances and opinions to explore this (Mahmood 2006, Butler 1990). Informality, precarious living, life lived beyond the formal institutions is an important vector in this work. It critically ininterrogates existing work on agency for women and girls in an Islamic public spheres as

conceptualised by Asad (2009) and Bayat (2010), Sabry, (2010) and asks if the academe in the Global North are looking in the wrong places and asking the wrong questions: we need to reimagine what a Southern public sphere looks like for women in Zanzibar. Furthermore, using intersectionality (Krenshawe 1991) I try and provoke discussion about the media as a self-help tool, within an ecologies of available media, using the term 'polyvocal media' (Madianou 2012, 2014).

This thesis speaks to four bodies of literature: Empirical research/audience/reception studies about agency and the 'self-help' qualities of the media exploring the media as Polyvocal in private spaces. Work redefining the nature of public and political agency for Islamic women outside and beyond their relationship to the state. Literature looking at behaviours around social respectability, informal spaces, precarious living, visibility, reputation, secrecy, disclosure and gossip. Lastly, work on provincialising the particularities of place within global political and historical epistemes relating to South-South information flows.

As a Sunni Muslim society the paradoxical terms of citizenship for women constitute their oppression, if viewed through the lens of Western normative ideations of an autonomous 'free' self. (Mahmood 2006). In other words, the very qualities which invite membership to being a Zanzibari woman- passivity, demure behaviours, discretion, keeping a low public profile, (Caplan 2004, Saleh 2000) are those which provoke horror and despair in liberal advocates, who argue for a voice (Tufte 2012, 2014) or women as agents of public, social transformation and development.

Putting Butler's theorisation of subject formation at the fore (1997), and Mahmood's development of this theory (2006) I argue that there are different forms of relational agency at work in Zanzibar that do not speak to, nor are they relevant to, current neo-liberal (feminist) iterations of agency. Zanzibar female agency involves a strong investment in the gendered *public* performance and performativity of womanhood, (in behaviours, attitudes, sexual activities, employment and social capital (Reay 2004). Using Chabal's critiques of African

society, state, identity and relational legitimacy, (2009) I explore how Zanzibar women use the media to explore their domesticated modernities.

Short Synopsis on Zanzibar

Zanzibar is in the political union and is part of the national territory of Tanzania.[1] It is a small island 27 miles off the East coast of Africa with a diverse population drawing from Asia, the Middle East, Europe and mainland Africa. The majority (99%) of the people there identify as Swahili, and as Sunni or Sufi Muslim[2]. The population of mainland Tanzania is 44.9 million (World Bank 2012)[3], with over 74% of the population living on under $1.25 day (ibid). Zanzibar has a population of 1.3 million (World Food Programme 2012)[4]. Over the last two thousand years, Zanzibar has experienced invaders, evangelists, traders, tourists, anthropologists, civil servants, colonial governors, philanthropic advocates, health care personnel, political insurgents and slave traders. The recent arrival of new media—SMS messaging, mobile phones, internet access and as of 2010, the new fibre optic cable enabling broadband connections in East Africa—are the latest invaders.

Politically, Zanzibar has been ruled since independence from Tanzania in 1964 by the CCM (Chama Cha Mapinduzi) party. Since the 2010 elections there has been a power-sharing agreement with the opposition CUF (Civic United Front) party.[5] Privatization and foreign investment have been in evidence only since the late 1980s, and in many areas socialist state structures and nationalized co-ordination of agriculture is dominant. Ujaama (the social and agricultural policies pursued by Nyerere in the 1960s and 70s) are gradually being replaced by entrepreneurial economics as part of the Structural Adjustment Programmes and IMF interventions in the 1990s. In Zanzibar, as transport improves, the number of hotels increases: over the eighteen month period of the fieldwork, eighty-seven new hotels were granted licences, and the number of foreign tourists exceeded a million.[6] Zanzibar is a significant recipient of Chinese aid: the airport received a seventeen million dollar cash loan from the Chinese, and the number of flights from Europe tripled between 2008 and 2010. The number of consumer durables—cars, i-phones and clothes—is steadily increasing.

Zanzibar's ethnic diversity reflects a prolonged history of trade (Hofmeyr, 2011). However, some of these assumed, adopted, actual or chosen ethnic, racial and tribal identities reflect attempts at economic organisation by British colonial rule (Longair 2012: 31–32). In Zanzibar, as Asad (1991) and Mbembe (2007) write, and Longair significantly validates (2012: 40–45) the four ethnic divisions (African, Indian, Arab and expatriate) used in colonial legislative documents are in fact invented and contrived constructs. This point is reiterated and emboldened by Longair (ibid) referencing Glassman:

> *A consistent theme was the desirability for an identity (in Zanzibar) with an explicit connection to external places—Persia and Arabia in particular. This led to the creation of an overarching historical narrative which positioned Zanzibar as the recipient of waves of migration of more sophisticated 'others'. Such a perspective naturally suited Arab scholars of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and British administrators writing their histories of the island. They perpetuated this pre-existing conceptualisation of the island's history.*
>
> – Longair (ibid).

1.1 Women, Modernit(ies) and the Media: overview

The literature review covers areas from gender and sexuality, voice and agency, audiences and representation, public sphere and national identity.

Some discussions in this ethnography are prompted by uses of the media, but often it is the media absence that is remarked upon, echoing findings of Matar (2005) and Madianou (2005). The discussion engages with the informants' on-going projects of establishing their identities and situating themselves within their locales, communities, the wider world and virtual space. These localised iterations of globalised concerns also address debates about 'Unstructured acts of disobedience and avoidance' (Chaball 2014: xiv) and the logic of conviviality (Mbembe 210: 2001), suggesting that it is unnecessary to 'insist on oppositions or on the logic of resistance, disengagement or disjunction' (Obadare, Willems, 2014: 7). Similarly, as Mahmood (2006) argues, agency does not signify resistance, and

theories of agency must be located within discussions of embedded Islamic piety, not held up against the normative expections of a neo-liberal critique that expects the language of subversion of hegemonic norms, or the over-turning of Islamic Patriachy.

The first part of this chapter will examine the discussions of multiple modernities (Marwan 2008, Lu 2010, Masoud 2012, Eisnestadt 2012, Kamali 2012) used for this work. I will then review the current debates on media, anthropology and post-coloniality in Africa to look at where this research fits: which works are augmented, deviated from or side-lined, and how. Studies in gender are woven through all three bodies of literature and applied as a methodology.

Female talk about media and politics in Zanzibar is peppered with references to 'being a good girl' even amongst older women. Zanzibari women define respectable behaviour as ways both to become 'modern' and to validate the traditional behaviours sanctioned in their communities. Age becomes an important vector in this ethnography: seniority enables the women of Zanzibar to re-invent their public personae, and moral and sexual limitations that stymie the younger informants appear to be jettisoned.

The second part of this chapter will review the anthropological works that deal in more detail with behaviours, agency, age and voice.

My research raises questions about media as a relational, social phenomena (Madianou 2005a, Couldry 2010), an ecology of material practices that is polyvocal (Madianou 2012) and operates (and not exclusively) across many platforms. How is this polyvocal media being utilised, by whom, what conversations does it prompt, and how does it contribute to gendered self-reflexive subjectivities, and debates about voice and agency? The research explores what happens when women feel excluded from, or 'ex-hailed' (Althusser 1970) by the state. What happens in the precarious spaces, the informal spaces? (Sabry 2010) As such, it draws on work started by Askew (2002) which looks at Taarab in Zanzibar as a cultural creation by the state and develops into a critique of agency that employs belonging and locality (Chabal 2009) as key vectors.

My work is strongly influenced by Mahmood's theory of agency and her critiques of the secular (democratic) vs Islamic (repressive) binary (2006, 2009). She

positions agency not as a synonym for resistance to the limiting language (and logic) of subverting (colonial, male, Northern) hegemonic norms. Thoroughly critiquing (and demolishing) Northern normative liberal views on agency based on autonomy and freedom, (and nodding to the problems raised by feminists such as Chodorow 1992, Dworkin 1986 and McClintock 1993) Mahmood instead insists on agency within tropes of Islamic societies and embedded Islamic piety. For her, Islamic piety is unfixed, labile, lived, individually and communally interpreted, and the simplistic registers of submission and patriarchy do not open up discussion, but limit it. She acknowledges that "The idom used to assert presence in male spaces is one of subordination: passivity, modesty perseverance and humility are the constituent embodiment of feminity" (182:2006). For the Northern Liberal academe the veil represents suffering and patriarchy; to reject this position is to condone oppression. Yet for Mahmood there are other key factors: that self-mastery, self-reflexivity and self-knowledge are not the sole provenance of the Judeo-Christian Colonial outlook. A fundamental inversion of Western aesthetics and selfhood is required to understand that the veil is worn externally to encourage the heart to follow suit… thus shy behaviours are encouraged by adopting certain clothes and performances and enactments of sexual behaviours.

Tarik Sabry's (2010) work on self-reflexivity amongst Islamic audiences is important. He offers a way to theorise the quotidian, the normal, the everyday, and the ways in which modern-ness and modernity become narrative categories and descriptors of behaviour, rather than fixed entities. For him modern-ness is the act of being (or acting) modern; a process, a concept bought in by global processes. Sabry particularises the complexity of people in communities that have strongly prescribed notions of *haram* (drinking for example) yet can entertain foreign business clients with a large bottle of whisky (2010: 49). His work is also positioned in a specific geo-spatial locale, where informants actively create global networks and introduce global practices in their traditional worlds.

Asad (2009) also reminds us not to use exceptionalist or peculiarist readings of agency within the Islamic context, and his work is particularly helpful in making sense of marginalised, sub-altern lives in the precarious margins, where protest and dissent may be the subtlest, smallest nuanced tweak. He also draws attention to

the multiple resistances and reworkings of power that have happened in contemporary Middle East, with women playing a central role.

The Context of the Research

I carried out fieldwork against the backdrop of American elections and dissent and rebellion in Egypt and Tunisia, and later local uprisings in Zanzibar. I situated local behaviours in these historical and global contexts to assess how the cultural effects of transnational and trans-global flows of people, artefacts, consumer goods and ideas are experienced locally (Castells 1996, Appadurai 2001), and to simultaneously address how behaviours and respectability contribute to a triangulations of discourse about modernism mediated through media, or how modernism contributes to notions of shame and respectability (Ahmed 2004, Madianou 2011). However, the path of local articulations of modernity is a well-trodden one: what this research tries to do is to discover what emerges when agency is grounded in a female Muslim audience.

A variety of authors (Wouters 2004, 2009; Curran 2010; Couldry, Livingstone & Markham 2010) suggest that the creation of the modern subject (and citizen) is contingent on the development of stylised, respectable behaviours and emotions which reflect and constitute the hierarchies and applications of the modernising process. Posel however is far more arch: "The Cultural logic of capitalism particularly with its valorisation of the pleasures of consumption articulates closely with the national trajectories of class, sexuality and status formation...the urge to consume has become the fulcrum of intersecting political interests, economic imperatives, cultural aspirations and notions of selfhood" (133:2011)

Voice is key to this process: the voice to contribute, articulate, be visible and participate. Taachi (2008) and Tufte (2012, 2014) refer to finding a voice—without realising that to those outside the donor-liberal paradigm (Mercer 2011, 2012, 2012a) it was never lost in the first place. Tufte concedes (2012) that the COMDEV (communication for development) project is in crisis for precisely these reasons: notions of development and voice need to be significantly stretched and made more inclusive and flexible. It is also problematic locating a voice from the position of the centre (the Northern Academe), as Mohanty (2013) and Willems (2014) both

articulate, since these descriptions often sit within the nexus of Northern development interventions, and framing of a ‘problem’ that is implicity Eurocentric and hints at the need to increase representativity or include more voices from the periphary in a totemic manner, rather than destabilising normative predilictions on which the assertions are made.

The modern subject performs certain behaviours as a civic and domestic citizen. For working class women in the UK, sexual currency (and availability) is also a marker for their citizenship (Skeggs 2004): thus for them, and women in Zanzibar, shame, class, morality, and subjectivities are intertwined. The organisation of sexual behaviours into hierachies and respectability becomes intermeshed as indicators of the civilising and rational capitalist project. I show that women experience acute and highly stylised behaviours of respectability in non-modern contexts, in which consumption of ‘modern things’ is important. I therefore review the literatures associated with respectability, voice and reputation in the anthropology sections. In the final section of this chapter I explore the ideas of behaviour (and shame) in post-colonial bodies of literature, locating this work within the ‘doubly-subaltern’ paradigm described by Spivak (2003) and look at how local (Zanzibar) literatures speak to performances of *tabia nzuri* (good behaviour and affect) within post-colonial material and social constraints.

The gaps in conventional modernity tropes limit a full exploration of the tensions and conversations of Zanzibaris, and lead me to suggest that a new imagination of the public sphere (Habermas 1989) is needed, a public sphere that incorporates serecy (Moore 2013, Schulz 2011) mimicry (Fanon 1953, Ferguson 1993) concealment and a theory of agencies that utilises imagination (Archambault 2012, 2013) reputations (Moloney 2009, Schulz 2011, Nyanzi 2011), shame, emotional effects, intersectional understandings of agency (Mahmood 2006) and ‘domestic conviviality’ (Chabal 2013: 5).

Resistance and manoeuvre for Zanzibar women is very different from the versions expected in the Global North: street protests, pressure groups and protest movements and using the media to complain are not channels they commonly use. Instead Asad’s notion of the Political Street (2010) is far more useful- a place where performances of acquiescence or rebellion, nuanced humour and subversion is

woven into daily lives. The political street is an occupied street, an authored street, a place of business, and theatre, which is applicable also to Zanzibar- for men.

Furthermore, whilst elements of modernity exist in Zanzibar (especially women's attitudes to work, romance, legal and financial independence, increasing importance of respectability and manners and a growing consumer culture), many institutional and conceptual embodiments of modernity are lacking—particularly an integrated, trusted and effective state, a functioning judiciary, educational and medical system. Chabal discusses the consequences of this new informalisation—a political and economic space that embodies working within and outside the functioning of the state and the mixing of traditional and modern into expedient daily praxis. (2009).

Additionally, Southern[8] encounters with the outside world are plagued by the over-arching defining theme of 'what it means to be Zanzibari'. Historians agree that every category of person living on Zanzibar (Africans, Indians, Arabs and ex-pats)[9] has continuous connections with a community *off* the island. Identity and place are not resolutely fixed, as Ferguson and Gupta argue (1992). Zanzibari identity becomes a fictive essentialised category; and are impressively, creatively, obviously good at adopting and co-opting new ideas, modes of trade, music, other people, dance forms, material objects, phenomena and languages (Prestholdt 2002, Vernet 2003[10]). They adopt and adapt new technologies such as boatbuilding, literacy and astronomy (Shariff 1987), create networks of learning and print media (Hofmeyr 2011)[11], make them their own and add tomfoolery, wordplay and jokes (Thomson KD 2010: 493). Such traditions and approaches have existed in Zanzibar for centuries, and include concrete phenomena such as Sufi Koranic texts (Bang 1997, 2003), mobile phones or more ephemerally, philosophies and trading patterns.

1.1.1 Gendered Consumerism

Two strands that clearly come out in this work run in parallel: the way women manage their own lives, opinions, gossip and agency in public and in private, within Mahmood's notion of embedded Islamic Piety (2006) and the way they relate to

and absorb the various features of modernity/Modern-ness. Media are important to both these processes.

Despite rejecting the simplistic binaries of male:female/public:private (Ortner 1984, Strathern 1987, Moore 1988) it is still important that media is *consumed*, listened to and utilised by women in the private spheres of their homes (Abu-Lughod 1986, Willems 2011, 2014). None of informants had fixed internet access at home, their own home PC or a dedicated laptop, and at present this is still very uncommon, despite the mobile plug-in modems supplied by the major cell phone companies. (The reason cited for this is expense: at just under twenty dollars to purchase, and usage costing roughly twenty dollars a month, this is still too high a cost for the informants.) Few of the thirty seven women I talked to used the popular male spaces of internet cafes (unlike women on mainland Tanzania) , saying that to do so would invite unnatural advances, negative gossip, and damaged reputations.

There is a strong argument for positioning modernity as a feminising process (Barlocco 2009, McRobbie 2001) or viewing *consumption* (Willems 2011) as a gendered activity (Billig 1999). Certainly, some material manifestations of modernity—kitchenware, electricity, laptops, televisions, clothes and home appliances—are deliberately marketed for an intended idealised middle class female consumer. The dialogic relationship between female consumer and object is made real by middle class Zanzibar women's aspirational ideations (of national belonging, being middle class), of consumer ownership (Mankekar 1999) and by embodiment and affect (Mankekar 2012)—their visceral reactions to TV, beyond ideogical hailing (or lack of it). The availability of products and the novelty of new and different ones create discourses dealing with their economic, social or health value, and become ciphers for discussions on belonging and nationhood. The territory of home is a female one in Zanzibar. Beckerleg (2005) and Beckmann (2009) argue that here is where female agency (decisions about education, health, food, domesticity) can be exercised. Foster (2002), Barlocco (2009) and Billig (1999) offer a frame of reference for (nationalist) identity that materialises through everyday consumption practices, but their work lacks elements of agency, self-

reflexivity and emotional variations of commitment that will be suggested by the empirical evidence I gather.

There is a shared culture of appreciation and consumption of certain commodities in Zanzibar, but I would argue it is localised, more relevant to the capital, Stone Town (where the fieldwork took place), and is not necessarily national. The emergence of more rigid Islamic Imams in local mosques over the last twelve years, and the ongoing tensions—political and economic—with the mainland has resulted in an uneasy relationship with materialism and ownership. This island, buffeted by many forces, actors and factors (Thomson 2007) is itself at an intersection geographically, politically and culturally, and its residents are too. After years of socialist austerity and weak currency, Zanzibar's markets are literally flooded with certain models of cars, particular brands of soaps or shampoos, mobile phones, various plastic items for cooking and housework and footwear.

Owning and consuming modern commodities contributes to performances and discourses of womanhood for Zanzibari women (Butler 1997, 2006, Mankekar 1999). Butler's convictions that gender discourses (within sociality) contribute to the social formation of gender subjectivities (and their performances) and in fact often exceed the performances themselves to feed into a meta-narrative allow us to move beyond the individual iterations of 'being female in Zanzibar' and into more structural readings of how colonialism is constantly modernised and has influenced current iterations of appropriate gendered citizenship. Furthermore, the forceful consequence of affect moves beyond Williams' structures of feeling (1967), and as Mankekar (2012) asserts:

> *"…Is transitive and cumulative… is temporal in that it builds up (within seconds, or over days, months or years) within and across collectivities; it congeals around objects and technologies; it leaves traces on us so as to constitute us as subjects".*

The affect and embodiment of media(s), the sensuous reactions it/they provokes across communities and groups are important vectors in looking at collective and individual resonances of certain tropes and themes that emerge.

1.1.2 What are the research questions engaged in this work?

With this context in mind, I now turn to the questions this research engages with.

1.1.3 Modernit(y)ies

I am intrigued by how media contribute to, promote, stimulate, alter, block or ignore discussions around being modern, respectable and traditional women in Zanzibar.

The term modernity is highly contested. Whether it is travel and movement (Baumann 2000), access to tourism, drugs, or physical and intellectual capital (Jacobs 2012, Beckerleg 2004), a conceptual cipher (Slater 2000), access to media and public spheres (Sabry 2010), or consumerism, "an imagined way of life" and actual hard goods (Topan 2004, Archambault 2010, Spronk 2012). For post-colonial theorists (Mekuria 2012, Mamdani 2006, Khanna 2007, Ahmed 2008) modernity is a problematic term fraught with loss, melancholia and affect. The trauma of the colonial era and the periods of revolution following this, surfaces in this work.

The term multiple modernities (Eisenstadt 2002, 2005, Wittrock 2005, Schmidt 2006, Volker 2012, Fourie 2015) has gained traction as a useful cyper to explore agency, institutional expectations and autonomy. Using terms from Northern academe imposes taxonomies and norms that do not account for the flexibility and variety of African agencies, do not foreground post-colonial legacies of rule (Willems 2014, Chaball 2009) or conversely over-emphasise the resilience and enduring stoicism of the African (Mbembe 2001). Media here is used in a homographic sense as a synecdoche and a vehicle for material change, and this study attempts entry points in how to theorise this, an island complicated by the lack of functioning industrial institutions in Zanzibar (which means there is a lack of trust in these institutions) and a paucity of media spaces (Featherstone 1995, Thomson 2007, Wittrock 2005). However, the process of engagement with modernity/ies, and accompanying self-reflexivity, is vibrant and organic and takes place outside media spaces.

The project asks what media is being used by women young and old; where, how and in what circumstances. It does not distinguish new and old media, focusing instead on modalities of usage and conversations prompted and stimulated by media. This 'polymedia' (Madianou 2014)[14] or 'media ecology'

approach (Slater 2012) prioritises the use and incorporation of different media into everyday lives, focusing on the daily and the domestic rather than on textual analysis of media content or statistical or political analyses of blockages and inequalities to accessing media.

1.1.4 Voice and Agency.

A major research challenge is describing the voice and theorising the agency that Muslim women in Zanzibar have in public and private, in media and non-media spaces, and what factors influence their participation. Previous works on voice and agency (Tufte 2010, 2014, Taachi) are not sufficient because voice is only acknowledged within privileged and limited settings of NGOs, CSOs and the teleological framing of donor development and external involvement and do not privilege the growth of a vocal middle class independent of aid interventions (Mercer 2011, 2014). These works only highlight the uneasy tensions between media studies and post-colonial work including ethnographies, taking a much more reflexive, broad yet particular socio-cultural view of these issues. The research asks how reputation, age, gender authority and locality (Chabal 2009) influence the performances of Islamic piety, and the performance of personhood, and how this limits, changes and expands the landscapes in which discussions can take place.

Mahmood (2006) offers a Deluezian toolbox (1990) which allows me to move between contradictions and labile mutabilities of agency that transcends Neo-Liberal democratic demands that agency be exercised in terms of freedoms, public participations, or autonomous manifestations of visible, authored action. Developing Butler's work, Mahmood explicitly understands that the category of 'Islamic Woman' is inherently unstable, and whilst it is potentially very problematic for a Western Liberal Feminists to take on, the idiom used to assert presence in male spaces is one of subordination: passivity, modesty, perserverance and humility are the constituent embodiment of femininities.

Mahmood stresses that within Islam there are structures and discourses, (which may be closed to Western Ethnographers) about where one practices, and debate and counter-debate is key to lived-in notions of Islam. Bayat echoes this: his work talks of non-social movements where shared solidarities are forged on the

shared experiences and feelings of working and being on the 'political street' (2010). These voices are the ones I am attempting to theorise.

Chabal explores agency from a post-colonial Africanist viewpoint, critiquing previous discussions of voice and agency between the dual tensions of those who position Africa (and thus Africans) as essential powerless and victim of external forces of colonialism (with misguided notions of tribalism, and judicial, economic, conceptual, racial and spatial impositions), or Africa as victim to the internal forces of neo-patrimonial elites who are led astray by the false development objectives of the Western aid machine. (11-46; 2009). Identity—particularly tribal identity as an instrument of colonialism and internalised by Africans—is extremely problematic: it cannot be subsumed under the colonial or academic rubrics of tribalism (or kinship), which are not dynamic enough.

Chabal's work is powerful because he articulates the tensions and complexities of failed states on the citizen and how we imagine subjectivities. He positions the structure of agency with four vectors: identity, origin, reciprocity and locality. Like Mahmood, Chabal believes agency is not the ability to be 'free' or autonomous, but operates within, and is affected by, gender, age and authority within the context of locality, specifically the privatisation and informalisation of state activities. Like Geertz (1973), humanity is systemic, relational, and contingent on being part of a framework of meanings. Kinship contributes to a sense of being socially meaningful, but also involves legitimacy and social value in a collective dimension.

Chabal's analysis also troubles issues of corruption embedded in local life and local agency (Gupta 2012, Ronning 2009) by suggesting that reciprocity (giving and exchange), particularly by rent-seeking elites and opportunistic bureaucrats, governs interpersonal relationships. In Zanzibar, Identity-based reciprocity needs legitimacy (or reputation), which speaks to the issues raised about why local reputations are so important. For Zanzibar women, retaining legitimacy and accountability in the locale is paramount. As Chabal notes "African rulers … will eventually buried at home" (52:2009).

Tufte's work (2014) on voice creates more problems than it solves: his neo-liberal template is situated—in fact cemented—in offering platforms for pre-

scribed and pre-imagined forms of sexuality and agency that bear no relation to the realpolitik of the worlds described by the informants. All humour, desire, contradictions and silences are subsumed within the paradigm of 'answering a need' advocating or filling a gap (that is incidentally offered by the Tanzanian NGO Femina about which he writes, and these informants had no knowledge of at all). Equally, Taachi's work "Finding A Voice" (2008) and Mckenna (2009) immediately presupposes a vantage point from which we all stand, both subject, object, author and reader, homogenously agreeing that the voice is 'lost'. The emphasis should shift onto why they are being ignored, who is not hearing. Both these works sit within the canon of media for development, a heavily critiqued subject that supposes modernity is synonymous with development (Ferguson 2008) and versions of civil society and participation that focus on Western notions of inclusion and the privatisation of aid (Mercer 2011, 2012).

Increasingly, terms such as subjectivity and identity (Brylla & Ayisi, 219:2014), voiceability (Engleart 2008, 2012) voice and agency (Schulz 2006, 2014) are employed to identify polyvalent terms that encompass a relationship to state, the economy and the family. Agency has replaced 'engagement' or 'empowerment' as the latest buzz word. The World Bank for example says:

> *Increasing women's voice and agency are valuable ends in themselves. And both voice and agency have instrumental, practical value too. Amplifying the voices of women and increasing their agency can yield broad development dividends for them and for their families, communities, and societies.* World Bank, Voice and Agency 2014[15]

As Mbembe (2001) cautions, it is important not to get distracted by romanticised notions of 'the inventiveness and autonomy' of the sub-altern, which has reactivated and celebrated ideas of agency and resistance, without engaging sufficiently in questions of power(lessness), failed state-hood and inequalities. (5:2001)

Existing theories of voice offer no way to theorise the use of WAP-enabled devices, and texting and web-surfing are private and solitary activities.

One challenge is to find ways to adapt theories of agency, subjectivity, performances of gender and voice, to make them 'speak' to this work. Horst and Miller's (2008) work gives valuable insights into the multi-functionalities of mobile technologies, and their relationship-enhancing capacities, and Madianou looks at the 'gaps that are plugged' by mobile conversations (2014).

1.1.5 Being Swahili: performing the self

Imposing definitions of self, personhood and agency from Northern academe are problematic (Mahmood 2006, Moore 2013, Chakrabarty 2000, Arnfred 2010). The superiority of the enlightened modern rational self can not be assumed (Ferguson 2005, Moore ibid) and the taxonomies of race and ethnicities must be interrogated with a clear understanding of the essentialist prescriptions embedded in difference (El Tayeb 2006). The 'conflicted self' (reason v's emotion) might be a template onto which colonial minds impose their own struggles with imperialism (Chakrabarty 2000) but *only* using ideations of the rationalist European self for this study do not work. Similarly, post-feminist interpretations of self and agency that incorporate inner and outer worlds (relying as they do on Western psychoanalytic theory) are helpful but there are pitfalls in imposing these on Islamic women in Zanzibar… for whom psychoanalysis has no meaning at all. (Brah and Phoenix 2004).

There is, in popular Zanzibar discourse, echoes of what Spronk describes as the degenerating effect of Westernisation, (2009: 507) with an assumed direct causal link between exposure to Western media and dropping of moral and sexual standards:

> *The representation of sexuality in Kenyan public debates remains limited to invocations of chastity based on images of a glorified past and a defiled present. 'Immorality' is often mentioned in the same breath as 'Westernization'…This glorifying notion of a lost culture that strictly regulated sexual behaviour and sexual patterns reveals a nostalgia which invariably postulates 'African' in opposition to 'Western' and employs the notion of 'Westernization' as an amoral disposition which comes about from being 'non-African'.*

-Spronk, 2009: 506

Instead I look at how particular behaviours are lauded and approved of, whilst others are socially condoned. Media is employed, erratically, to endorse or support evolving contentions of self. For example, sexual boasting and womanising is tolerated among young men particularly in *bongo fleva* songs (Eisenberg 2012, Stroeken 2005) though frowned upon by elders. Girls and young women are monitored and scolded for being gregarious, and are glaring in their absences at street corners (*masikaani*, *kona*), *dukana chai* (tea stalls), games of bao and dominos, and 'camps' where the elders, young men and teenagers sit publicly in age-defined groups. Shyness and respect make for *tabia nzuri*, 'good character', and are highly desired in terms of marriageability. In this respect, though Butler (2007) writes about modern, industrialised societies, her approach to the manifestations of identity being evidenced in relational dynamics is true: Zanzibaris bring their identities into being by interacting with each other; it is the social performances of being Zanzibari that make them real. (2007)[33]

Putting behaviour, performance of gender (Butler 1991) and emotions—melancholia, loss, affect—into a central place in this work reflects the post-colonial layers of history that Zanzibaris are still actively working through, just fifty years after the revolution. Spronk's and Schulz's work locates the enactment of gender as a performance—nuanced, coded and relational—lifting directly from Butler's theories that so far are applied in the Global North.

The problematic stories (families split up, mass murders in public places, and a residual violence that continues to this day in Zanzibar)[34] remain as schisms and rifts, and inequalities many experienced under a divisive colonial British regime that operated an apartheid policy on the island, delineating legal and social privileges on the basis of race, remain in living memory. The 'emotionality' in subjects (and fluctuations in this), the absences in public speech is dealt with by Khanna, (2003) Prestholdt (2008) Glassman (2010) and Ahmed (2004). Ahmed's work is pertinent because she allows me to theorise jealousy and fear as inhibitors of agency and ultimately the failure of democratic institutions. Fear is present in interviewees, within the context of a segment of the population frustrated by the lack of open

debate (see later chapters 6 and 7), the refusal of the media to engage with the interests of the women I interviewed, and the high levels of poverty. Fear informs responses to media and Ahmed is interested in how the democratic citizenship becomes synonymous with movement:

> *Fear is seen as stopping people from expressing their freedom--a kind of blockage or restraint to meaningful human action. But a positive definition of freedom is implied here as well: a freedom to. But freedom to do what? Freedom in this positive sense is of a particular and restricted type: a freedom 'to do' some things and exist in some ways, but not in others. Freedom to 'go about your daily business', freedom to travel, freedom to consume: these are all freedoms that 'support' the mobilities required by global capitalism. Positive freedom in this sense is reduced simply to the 'freedom to move'*
>
> -Ahmed 2008[35]

1.1.6 Women and The Gaze—Being Visible

> *"Men Act. Women Appear. Men look at women. Women watch themselves being looked at."*
>
> - Berger, 1972, Ways of Seeing

The final research question is how to imagine and theorise public spheres that include Islamic women in Zanzibar. Using Mahmood's understanding of Islamic agency, I focus on how women and girls in this study use the media, in the context of their socialities, to subvert and rework the male gaze (Mulvey 1975, 1990) and appropriate female spaces and private spaces in new forms of subjectivities. The ethnographic and post-colonial gaze that holds institutional control over who is studied, and who studies, creates taxonomies of authority of who can see, and who can be seen (Mohanty 2013) is reworked by the young and old women, out of site of (local and international) institutional gazes they forge vital communications,

make arrangements, counter loneliness, get advice, link up (Horst and Miller 2006) and create 'distilled intimacies' (Batson Savage 2007) across time and space that augment existing relationsips (Miller 2006a, Madianou 2013).

So, whilst the street is a place of performance, (Brissett-Foucault 2011), politics, (Bayat 2010) a place for living, the hustle (Ndijo 2014), social interactions and business (Moloney 2007) women are not necessarily welcome: they do not walk in public streets alone at night and are almost always veiled. Moving alone at night attracts comment and criticism, because the absence of light brings with it different rules and different permissions (Archambault 2012). Some (affluent, older) women on Zanzibar drive, but a woman alone in a car is extremely rare. Scott (2007) argues for the need to recognise the open and closed codes of the veil: it is only oppressive if exposure and lack of clothing is held up as the normative benchmark of freedom.

The privileged patrichal gaze with the "Power to look while women function primarily as the image or object of sight" (Columpar 27:2002) is destabilised by informants in this study by 'going ninja'. This means using the hejab as an article of deceit, trickery, concealment and disguise. (Archambault 2012). They 'complicate the male gaze as a monolith' (Columpar 26-32:2002) by challenging their subjectivities as a site of difference, (which gives some groups have a licence to look, whilst others look illicitly, and creates a taxonomy of authority in which to see) (Columpar, ibid). Within their own terms, the women (especially the younger ones) in this work enthusiastically justify full or partial hejab, arguing it gives them power, as they are able to subvert, ignore, or trick the male gaze (Mulvey 1990) that is so persistent.

Whilst the media may not constitute, create, foster or stimulate a public sphere in Zanzibar, it compounds the sense of geographical locality, and a central organising principle around which identity moves (Ferguson 1992) media invigorates discussions around belonging, boundaries, (Anderson 1991) and nationalism. A sense of 'we are Zanzibaris' which is set up in strong contrast to the 'otherness' and 'foreign-ness' of the modern (Madianou 2005, 2012). Where then does the female Zanzibar citizen express her disdain, her frustration at political

processes, her iterations of conflict if the media are not offering a viable public sphere for her?

1.2 What are the Key Themes Emerging from this Work?

1.2.1 Gender in East Africa (Zanzibar) a key vector for accesses women and girls' voices and opinions of media

The literatures on gender and media and are grouped around the poles of Swahili women as viewers and consumers (audience studies), their representation in the media and women as producers of media content.

The first theme is that Muslim Women's voices are under-represented in African media. In this research I illustrate how Muslim Swahili Women's opinions and perspectives are affected by *their own* perceptions of what is appropriate gendered behaviour in public and private spaces, which creates an interesting tension as they negotiate and are swayed by competing forces of respect, credibility, Islamic piety and reputation in Zanzibar, and being modern, forward thinking and flexible.

Highlighting and/or problematizing gender allows an examination of the extent that local familial power structures and behaviours might be tied to larger ideological and global structures (Donaldson, 1997, Mikell 1994, Butler 1990). It also speaks to issues of representation and ventriloquism, mimicry (Ferguson 2002) and the problematics of speaking on behalf of and romanticising groups, whilst imposing the normative referents and agenda of the North (Moore 2013, Rigg, 2007: 12, Spivak 1988).

This study, unlike many others, normatises the experience or reality of womanhood. The informants, in their multiple roles as women, are not considered exceptional or peculiar (Bayat 2010); rather it is the men's voices that are an adjunct to the main body, provided for variety and contrast. The issues surrounding iterative representations of gender in Africa are explored here. The trope that women's empowerment is a (post) colonial, or Western hangover, is also considered in this section.

Gadzekpo's (2004, 2007) work assesses the number of stories in African newspapers with women protagonists, victims, passive carers, incidentals,

sexualised victims or casualties. Her work makes for bleak reading, with an overwhelming number of stories perpetrating stereotypes of women as dependent, mothers, passive, ‘victims of HIV’ or simply non-existent (Nyanzi 2011, 2013). Myers (2008, 2009, 2011) attempts to discover whether women in Tanzania ‘relate’ to the female protagonists in community radio development settings, and comes to similar conclusions: that stories that promote women as advocates are rare. Tufte’s recent work on Tanzanian NGO Femina (2014) is more description of a civil society advocacy platform than a nuanced look at the sexuality and how it is contextually experienced, iterated and discussed. Nyanzi (2013) revisits Arnfred’s work (2009) and asks for the centring of desire and erotic agency in medical analysis of HIV in women in Uganda, and more fluidity in understanding how transactional sex infiltrates all areas of life. Aysisi and Brylla (2014) consider the portrayal of Islamic women in Zanzibar and in the film *Zanzibar Soccer Queens*, (Aysisi 2012) and look at the active creation of agency in the film, which counteracts prevailing tropes of passivity, objectification and oppression.

Some of the Arab Spring discourses surrounding modernity and the media interrogate Islamic women’s participation and voice (Bayat 2010, Asad 2010, Pfeffer, Carley 2012:9)[16] (Natana J. DeLong-Bas 2011)[17]. Amidst the vast scholarship, there is one that seeks out the opinions of female activists and students (Gerbaudo 2013)[18]. He asks specifically how the experience of global Islam—via Facebook groups and internet-based friendships—is altered by gender. I intend to do the same, exploring how women’s discourses are relevant as ways to incorporate the strong influence of Islam and the global connections that many of my informants have with Dubai. The Swahili Muslim woman, as a self-determined and self-reflective agent—or voice—in media studies is largely missing.

The main authors who engage critically with Zanzibar, media and gender are Fair (2001), Edmondson (2004) and Askew (2003, 2005, 2009). The first examines dress as a public articulation of change and modernity, using the lens of ‘culture’ (clothes and Taarab) to examine the symbolic unification of women[19]. Askew’s work examines Taarab music, a popular performance style that provides valuable spaces for women to be producers and consumers of media that is directly related to (and in fact always draws directly from) the experiences of the audience.

The canon of work surrounding Swahili identity in anthropology does not interrogate gender, but revolves around origins, language, affinity to a relatively recent version of Sufi and Sunni Islam (Nurse and Spear 1985, Abdallah Khalid 1977; Mazrui and Shariff 1994; Middleton1992). The 'subject' of being Swahili (not the Swahili subject), or Swahili identity is a topic of much debate, and this thesis does not go down that road. However, it is relevant that, as Eiseburg notes that:

> *Swahilis are recognizable as a social unit by virtue of their shared primary socio-spatial context … religion (Islam, primarily Sunni), language (Swahili with Arabo-Islamic elements), and genealogical link to the pre-colonial Islamic trading civilization that long ago came to be called 'Swahili' from the Arabic word for 'coastlands'*
>
> - Eisenburg 2012: 1

Placing gender at the centre of the work, and writing from the Northern episteme, creates methodological hurdles. Oyewumi (1997), writing about Yoruba women in Nigeria, states that Western feminists are obsessed with the body, and by extension the clothing and the covering of the body. She evidences the way (North European) judicial citizenship emphasizes the body, and how gender is enshrined in voting. Her argument is relevant because my informants are considerably less interested in the clothing or the cover-up debate, and never reference the burkah, except as a way to move mysteriously around Stone Town, as ninjas. They make jokes about veils, addressing themselves directly to the theme of sexual repression and expression, choosing not to conjoin the issues of the veil with their own sexuality in this way. Tamale (2012) explores the Madonna/Whore (Malaika/Malaya, Swahili) binary prevalent in Ugandan tropes of women's sexuality, and similar binaries are powerful as frames for understanding the empirical results of this work.

1.2.2 Women as audiences and producers of meaning in Africa

Current debates describe and theorise inequalities of access to media, including recent digital and internet technologies (Myers 2009, King 2011, Sorenson 2011,

Fugelsang 2004). These studies show that women are less likely to access the media, and rural women are bottom of the hierarchy of access. (Kanyongo 2012) Time, access to electricity, more pressing chores- material life- all 'get in the way' of accessing media, although new work on mobile phones is changing the perceptions.[20] In the work of the Media For Development Canon (of which Myers and Femina are key players) from local NGOs through to the World Bank—and also in academic writings (Millanga 2014)—there is an established and repeated consensus on the need to see greater female participation in institutions and political structures, and to improve the working and living conditions of Women in East and Sub Saharan Africa (Myers 2010, Myers 2014, Kandiyoti 2009). However, the terms of engagement, the emphasis on liberties, the role of donors, the mainstreaming of gender and the rise of the 'gender elites' (Kandiyoti 2009) all present serious areas for contestation and debate (Mercer 2010, 2012, 2012a, 2014).

Women as audiences are dealt with in Angela Impey's work on tape cassettes (2013) which explores the intimate world of Muslim women and their processes of self-reflexivity and managing loss and geographical separation via the tape cassettes they make and send to each other. The term she borrows, 'affiliative objects' (Suchman, 2005), is useful to describe the power of tape cassettes:

> *Cassette audio-letters play an important role in support ongoing interaction— both real and imagined—between clan members and their homeland, melding old cultural forms and technologies with new geographies and concerns*
>
> -2013: 102

Suchman's work is valuable for understanding privacy and the need to keep up appearances over space and time, and for managing reputation over distance. Moore introduces ways to examine the importance of the communal secret—the maintenance and emphasis of secrets are vital to constitution of subjectivities, and the ability to have 'many faces' is also considered key to social and sexual maturity in Zanzibar, as it is in Moore's work in Kenya (2013). By looking at shame and

reputation management as political and civic acts, co-opting the Islamic piety that Mahmood describes so eloquently (2006) and by acknowledging the prime importance of discretion, secrecy and concealment (Moore 2013, Archambault 2012, 2013) I can theorise that texting in private is central to the findings of this work.

The main work on Islamic women and the media is Abu-Lughod's studies on the Arab world, arguing that audiences cherry pick their media (Abu Lughod 1996, 1997), an idea picked up by others: (Larkin 1997, Mercer 2005, Englert 2008, Matar 2005) and shown to be the case in f media audience studies. I interviewed women in their homes, often in their own languages, and they steered the direction of the time and the content of discussions. I have fused both etic and emic approaches, (accepting local perceptions of what is happening, and also imposing my own, [Kottak 2006: 47]) articulating and honouring the way informants approach the media—as something that is varied, flexible and adapted to their own uses.

As such, the 'meanings' of news reports, films, SMS messages or election coverage are not fixed and transferrable. Instead, each informant has her own understanding of how the media affects, modifies, and even sometimes introduces new discussions, dilemmas and behaviours. This study investigates slippages between the public sphere (created partially by media) envisaged by modernity and what is actually happening. There are instances where media is integrated into performances of sexuality (Archambault 2012, Batson-Savage 2006) and arguably becomes an extension of it.

Abu Lughod (1985, 1992, 1993) suggests that men and women in Islamic societies live in two separate worlds, occupying parallel but distinct realms. Holmes Eber (2003) draws attention to the way that Tunisian homes have become 'public' private spaces, and are viewed as such by the people who live in them. The idea of home as a sanctuary, an inaccessible private space, is an anathema to the subjects of her ethnography. Although the 'visiting' phenomenon (Holmes Eber) is not as common in Zanzibar there are relevancies to this work, primarily because these visits and the exchange of goods (tea, coffee, rice) and favours (babysitting and childcare) provide a vital way for Zanzbaris to communicate. These practices are augmented by texting and in some cases substituted completely by phone contacts,

(in other words texting plugs the gaps, replaces a social call) as Horst and Miller (2006) and Madianou (2014) both identify in their respective studies. As Holmes Eber says: ‘Often these drop-ins have a specific purpose, whether covert or overt, perhaps to borrow a cup of tea or flour… and frequently to transfer information rapidly and personally in a country where television and newspapers only report government approved information….’ (2003: 91) Thus these simple, informal and primarily unannounced visits are one of the primary ways that women disseminate information and trade assistance and services on a day to day basis.

Abu Lughod suggests there is transferability of meaning with some of the media for informants: the same storyline or character means very different things for people in different contexts, a line of thinking consistent with Hall’s encoding/decoding model (1990). Her descriptions of honour codes (which allow women to reveal personal emotions via the communal autonomy of poetry, and not as authored expressions to non-intimates [Lughod, 1988:244–247)[21] allow me to access important discussions around honour. However Lughod’s later work (2005) suggests a U-turn, arguing that the soap operas on Egyptian state TV provide melodramas that reproduce specific consumer and subject sensibilities (2004: 113), thus implying that the viewer is much more dictated to. One overall problem with Lughod’s work is that it is too conspicuously grounded in traditions of marriage and patrilineality to be completely relevant.

Women of all ages and social classes in this research valorise moral choices facing characters in soap operas, and use their fictive dilemmas to discuss a ‘parallel modernity’ (Larkin 1997), reflecting upon their choices of love partner, ‘as narrative modes of enquiry to explore the limits of acceptable local behaviours’ (Larkin 1997: 407). Rather than emphasise the ‘backwardness’ of Zanzibar, the films and soap operas, as Larkin maintains…

> *…give insight into the local reworking and indigenising of transnational media flows that take place within and between Third World countries, disrupting the dichotomies between West and non-West, coloniser and colonised, modernity and tradition, foregrounding instead the ability of media to create parallel modernities.*

Where gender is signposted by the informants (Fair 2002), there is consensual agreement that Hindi films—which are widely circulated and watched by all ethnicities in Zanzibar—provide ‘a grammar for romance, lifestyles, fashions, and a model of values’ (quoted in Roy 2011: 2) and also offer ‘…access to an idealised self that is cosmopolitan, urbane, and travelled’ (Ebrahim 2009: 12).[22]

The materiality or technological domesticity of media (Morley 2006) is not investigated, nor is the canon of work on audience studies, largely because it focuses on Northern domestic settings, which differ irreconcilably in material, physical, social and economic ways from homes in Zanzibar.

However, given the absence of media spaces, I lean heavily on the work of anthropologists who acknowledge that the role of music, dance, posters and performance (Mano 2011, Gadzekpo 2011, Willems 2011) are valuable places of embodiment and affect (Mankekar 2012) to express individuality, play out personal conflicts and gripes, and take what is private gossip into the public domain. I draw on the work investigating the citizens’ dialogic management of the State relating to Zanzibar (as well as opposition to it), which appears in Askew’s work exploring how dance and music allows a rejection of state messages about *ujaama* from certain dance companies, and a wholesale embrace of the nationalist project from State-sponsored musicians (who are open about their affiliations with the ruling party on Zanzibar the CCM).

Askew’s work in particular offers women as producers of content and meaning in media. The women in her study are strong role models, with agency, power and humour, a theme picked up vigorously by Ayisi (2011), whose film *Zanzibar Soccer Queens* is critiqued by Brylla (2013), who draws attention to the methodological approaches of the film which allow for agency[23] and the active representation of Islamic women on Zanzibar exercising control, thought, humour, skills, ambivalence and self-reflexivity

1.3 Representational North, Material South

1.3.1 Problems with studying Africa

One of the problems of researching women in Swahili East Africa is the way they are represented in the Northern episteme. Some issues are covered here, the remaining in the methodology sections.

A lack of integration and dialogue between different subject areas and uneasy tensions between disciplines results in Media Studies playing catch up with representation, voice and agency, issues that have been extensively discussed in African Studies and Anthropology, noted by Willems (2011, 2014). This section focuses on this literature, offering useful approaches to theorise issues of community, self, family and gender in Zanzibar.

Three major problems arise in the study of Africa: the first is the trend to build upon an already problematic canon of literature that arises from (male) colonial reporters or administrators and the 'privilege' of their epistemological viewpoint (Mulvey 1989, Mbembe 2003) which assumes the centrality of Western rationality, and the supremacy of Western civilisation. (Mamdani 2006, Chabal 2009, Mekuria 2012: 11, Mohanty 2013). Africa is systematically devalued, or viewed as a victim of external circumstances or neo-patrimonial elites (Chabal 2009). The second is that post-colonial theorists and those writing from within Africa have only recently begun describing and theorising the enormous variety of indigenous platforms and media (Willems 2014). The third is that commentators concentrate on Africa's material and structural constraints, leaving representational issues for the Western (Northern) episteme (Mamdani 2006, Chaball 2009, Tamale 2012).

Some prevailing tensions in gender studies lie between material and structural analysis and discussions around representation. This argument can be generalised as a struggle for emphasis on material and structural limitations and conditions in which many women in 'the Global South' actually live, and the finessed debates around representation that dominate some gender theorists in the Global North (Al Ali, 2004). Until recently, literatures emanating from the Global North academe in media studies continued to concern themselves with public/private binary (or domestic/international) conflicts characterising women's

unequal access to public spheres and their participation in public platforms (Mikell 1997, Gadzekpo's 2004, Arnfred 2009, Myers 2010). There is an added complexity of frictions between Western and African feminists (Oyewumi 1997) that seeks to manage the tensions between age superiority, traditional cultural practices, and Western feminists' interest in sexuality, rights and representation.

Mikell's work on contemporary African women suggests they are walking a tightrope, grappling to affirm their own identities whilst transforming societal notions of gender and familial roles (1997: 27–32), and addresses my need to position this research in material conditions. Mikell writes of the failure of male-dominated multi-party democracies, the instability and collapse of national economies and the imposition of Western-mediated structural adjustment policies, all of which create pressure on women to democratise and participate: there are clear moments in this research when the informants articulate just these sentiments. Mikell's work is a springboard for the interrogation of how citizens—women—operate globally when the theoretical role of the state is under scrutiny and its *actual performance* needs to be considered. Although her work is nearly twenty years old, it is still prescient, as Zanzibar politicians are under pressure to democratise their agendas and 'include' women in public dialogues. As such, opportunities for inclusion are also viewed as pressures.

Mikell and Nzomo (1997) raise important points about the Western episteme's prevailing model of womanhood as 'corporate'—a very specific reading of maintaining the group's harmony and wellbeing, arising from the specific contexts of industrial capitalism, a working legal system and bourgeois notions of individual and self. They assert how important it is in Africa to focus on the community. Schulz (2010, 2014) looks carefully and subtley at mutuality, agreed signifiers of communality and public notions of 'we-ness'. Sabry (2010) and Bayat (2010) also successfully interrogate how Islamic notions of community consensus dominate public and private discourses, and are interwoven into daily life.

African women's struggle against material gender asymmetry and inequality is often framed in terms of the relationship between public and private spheres, or domestic and public spheres (Arnfred 2004, 2011), with women's bodies being the hotly contested touchstone for anxieties about the nation-state and nationalism

(Mankekar 1999, Fair 2008). Western feminists are accused of failing to understand importance and status of womanhood, their power over the home, management of domestic life and decisions about education. Oyewumi's argument (1997: 35–46)[24]—that Western feminism centralises language, body and vision to 'create' gender (which does not exist in Yoruba societies)—is clearly jettisoned in this work (as it is not factually accurate), but her observations about the importance of family and women's power within it do hold true for Zanzibar.

1.3.2 Let's Talk About Sex

Writing specifically about sex and women in Africa is problematic because as Becker (2002) notes, it invariably plays out the noble/ignoble savage trope. Mama speaks of the North's 'racist fascination with Africans' profligate sexuality' (1996). This preoccupation, with women as victims of gender violence, FGM, rape and exclusion establishes epistemic traditions into which newer debates—HIV for example—feed and flourish. African sexuality is rarely written about by Africans, (Arnfred 2004) although recently work by Spronk (2012, 2014) Tamale (2012) and Haram (2004) in Kenya and Tanzania begins to address some of these concerns in constructive ways by allowing the complexities, humour and intersectionality of their subjects to shine through.

Haram's ethnography (2004) provides social context, theoretical weight and importance for this thesis. Exploring Tanzanian young women's sexuality,[25] she investigates the prevalence of extra-marital affairs, sex for pleasure and material gain rather than for legal or business reasons. She interrogates how behaviours reflect a deep social and emotional, economic need for survival, *sauti laini*—smooth tongue (being docile)—and *tabia nzuri* (good behaviour), and how even the language of sex reflects associationswith international donors and Western financial interventions: project (*Mradi*) and donor (*mfadihili*). Her assertion that extra-marital affairs are different from marriage, and are common, is echoed in my work.

Haram's reading is rather functionalist, seeing women engaged in necessary and rather desperate quests for money, not love. Deeply aware of their double binds (husbands bring respectability, income and protection and social approval, but also will control the money and limit the choices women can make), they juggle multiple tensions. My informants do not present these dilemmas (no one actually admitted to having a lover, many said their friends did and found it immensely complicated) but their lives are a fusion of micro and macro pulls and pushes.

Spronk's work on urban professionals' intimate and sexual relationships in Nairobi (2012, 2014[26]) clearly moves away from 'sex as a social problem' or a public health approach, which dominates academic themes on Africans having sex. She interrogates s the 'socially appropriate, erotic, sensual and natural' element of sex (2014: 504–517) and posits that sex and sexual identity are performative acts "…that embody postcolonial transformations regarding culture, gender and sexuality" (2012: 6). Sex, intimacy and desire—with women foregrounded (Nyanzi 2013)—are mentioned my work, and Spronk's framing of masculinities, femininities, desire and social context is a compelling methodological template. Similarly, by focussing on a small group (as I do), and incorporating those who identify themselves as middle class (as I do), agency and potency is to some degree moved back to the subject.

The prevailing thinking in Western academic discourse is that using the word 'different' when referring to others strongly implies that the academic is above and better than the subjects of the research. The tendency to generalise and to place the issues within the state/subject paradigm, or to be interested and excited when women in Southern locales exercise subtlety or manifest their choices to reveal contradictory behaviours can be patronising. The 'othering' of third world women (Mohanty 1991, 2013) and victimising or universalizing of the 'downtrodden Southern women's experience' often results in an obsession with HIV and women as victims of sex and rapacious sexual expression, with no meaningful exploration of desire and sexual needs (Spronk 2012, Nyanzi 2012, 2014). Arnfred suggests there is a near obsession with 'African sexuality' based on a censorious attitude to women having extra-marital sex (sexual networking), money for sex, or having sex at all (Arnfred 2004).

Taking all this into account, gender inevitably suffers from being made doubly subaltern (Spivak 1991). Africa is marginalised and misrepresented (via the media), and women remain almost invisible. It is therefore a fertile research area.

> *Western media's coverage of Africa (is) fraught with stereotypes gathered from explorers' narratives, yet still dominating the flow of information, thus leading to a deliberate neglect or distorted view of the continent. …what is news . . . is basically decided by middle-class, middle-aged males with little knowledge of African affairs.*
>
> - Ugochukwu, 2010: 79.

The super-imposition of Africa as a complete fantasy often dominates Northern commentaries those living within specific locales. As Mbembe (2001: 241–242) observes, when it comes to the 'category of Africa' (Ferguson 2008) the "oscillation between the real and the imaginary, the imaginary realized and the real imagined, does not take place solely in writing. This interweaving also takes place in life."[27]

Essentializing and homogenizing 'differences' between cultures (Chatterjee 1993, Mankekar 1999) reproduces those perceptions and representations which were and are (mis-)representations, cameos and stereotypes created and distributed by colonizers. Accentuating differences or boundaries between races may mask racism and oppression, albeit personal or structural (Maynard 1994). Instead, an intersectional (Krenshawe 1991) approach exploring different experiences of being female, poor, in the Global South and outside the dominant hegemonic decision-making processes (Yuval-Davis 2006) makes for more fertile research. My question then, of what it means to be 'a Zanzibar girl' (rather than a girl in Zanzibar, echoing Mankekar 1999) is investigated through incorporating informants' discourses around agency, sexuality, resilience, humour, maintaining contradictions, running a business, nurturing relationships and 'not being spoiled' as central elements. It is important to challenge frameworks, or the 'silent Northern referent' (Rigg 2007: 7) that assume Islamic women are oppressed or limited by 'patriarchal society', 'fundamentalism' or 'the veil' (Van Santen 2012, Kresse 2007).

It is problematic and potentially racist to frame the thesis in terms of what (Islamic) religious or cultural constraints determine women's behaviour, without questioning how global, national or potentially invasive external actions shape outcomes, as Abu-Lughod argues in her essay "Do Muslim Women Need Saving?" (Lughod 2002)[28].

1.4 Islamic agency, shame, reputation and local gossip

This empirical, evidence-based study asks us to reconfigure any assumptions of inferiority, oppression or disempowered 'second class-ness' of women in the South (Mahmood 2006) and to investigate (and give value to) the importance of conversation undertaken in precarious, daily informal settings—gossip—that goes on in informal spaces like homes and hair salons. This is the third key theme of the study.

Examining the way Islamic women use gossip to manipulate and manage tensions and demands of local and global pressure in their discourses on shame and reputation is not new, neither is examining public presences, public agency, performance and political engagement in Tanzania.

However, grappling with the nature of their agency in precarious spaces, and how this can be reconciled with notions of voice in media studies is new. Work on gossip in Zanzibar tends to be oblique, and the key literature valorising gossip is Laura Fair's work which looks at female Swahili identity through dress and performance (Fair 2001). Her study exmaines the importance of colour, clothing and dress as an articulation of change, modernity, liberty (from slave to freewoman) and nationhood. Ornate clothing, dextrous speech and knowledge of Islamic texts become markers of status in a complex hierarchy of meanings. Fair's work informs the complex taxonomies of status that my informants also use, although one of the work's major limitations is the under-prioritisation of daily life, instead choosing Taraab and poetry as particular events to view the power of (state) culture both to unite and disenfranchise. Fair over-emphasises exoticism, dress and clothing, focusing on clothing (the veil) as a signifier of sexual independence and arguably situating a Eurocentric and orientalising gaze.[29]

The subaltern—or economically disempowered—is not privileged and does not speak in a vocabulary that will obtain a hearing in the institutional locations of power. The subaltern enters official and intellectual discourse only rarely, and usually through the mediating commentary of someone located within these discourses.

- *Spivak 1991*

I define gossip, social chat or *maaskaani* as talk that includes women and takes place on the porch, outside the home, in public. Throwaway gossip, idle chit-chat that takes place in the hair salons, homes, streets and cafes where the ethnography took place often contains important jokes or references to politics that are coded and subtle.

The importance of social banter, chat and wordplay is covered by Archambault (2013), whose work examines concealment, display and the ability to exercise and show *visao* (vision) and articulacy as survival skills “In a brutal environment of economic inequality” (2013: 90). In studying the use of mobile phones in Mozambique, Archambault considers in a nuanced way how Islamic men and women use their phones to create an image of a life they are living, to zone out, to tell stories, to imagine and to travel in their heads, and to gossip. She looks at how men use their phones to check on lovers and wives, and how women use their phones to avoid the ‘surveillance and secrecy’ of daily life (2013: 94). Her work challenges conventions of honesty, disclosure and privacy and is situated on a global stage, acknowledging that her informants are some of the poorest people in the world economically, yet are adept at manipulating their daily worlds in disguise, disclosure and display.

Englert (2009), Eissenberg (2012), Brisset-Foucault (2010), Moyer (2010) and Suriamo (2007) all make compelling cases for the importance of having something to say, the presence of subtle codes denoting class and hierarchy in speech and the role of wordplay as markers of social status and the role of discussion in social life as a pleasurable, self-improving pastime. Other work on Tanzania deals with trust, jealousy, and *rohonzuri* or *rohombaya* (good spirit, bad spirit) which can be

interpreted literally or figuratively, echoing some discourses around witchcraft (Moyer 2001).

1.4.1 Subject/State Critiques

Literature on media and nationalism concentrates on mechanisms and performances of inclusion and exclusion (Madianou 2005) and media roles in facilitating the creation of national communities (Anderson 1999, Brissett Foucault 2010). Extensive literatures from anthropology use state nationalism as an over-arching narrative, they discussing music (Perullo 2012, Stroeken 2005), poetry, dress and repetitive behaviours (Fair 2001, 2002, Askew, Caplan 2004, Black, Topan 2004) as factors of national difference.

The three main critiques of these important ethnographies is that they do not explore what happens beyond the state, in the precarious spaces, the informal worlds. Similarly, none of these works interrogates the positionality of the researcher. Thirdly, the informant is relegated to second place (and indeed is rarely quoted); these are wholly etic readings. Zanzibari identity is not deconstructed with the subject at the centre; her voice is never heard. This research places the informants at the centre of the work, and although there are considerable limitations (explored in the methodology chapter) in representing Zanzibar women, there is an acknowledgement of the processes, biases and pitfalls.

Post-colonial theorists, position this work within a specific socio-historic locale, and acknowledging the after-shocks of colonialism in Zanzibar. Mudimbe (1997) and Mbembe (2003) critique the entire ontological validity and mechanics of the post-colonial state, arguing that these fictions arise from borders drawn arbitrarily, and many of the post-colonial regimes were designed (in geographical, judicial and material terms) by those who were in power in colonial eras. Mudimbe's 'necropolitics' practiced by independent post-colonial regimes often do little more than reproduce colonial attitudes to the citizen as disempowered and dispensable, with power exercised when there are wars to be fought and subjects to be enlisted as soldiers. This critique allows for an understanding of why Zanzibar's iterations of belonging and identity are so pronounced, and why there remains so much tension around what this means.

Appadurai (1996) explores these tensions in terms of the pull towards cultural homogenisation and cultural heterogenisation, which leads to an understanding of how external forces (or modernity) become ‘indigenised’ or appropriated by individuals and communities (Appadurai 1996). Appadurai looks a series of scapes which are ‘deeply perspectival constructs, inflected very much by historical, linguistic and political situated-ness of different sorts of actors’. (1996: 297). Appaduarai’s ‘ethnoscapes’ are…

…the landscapes of persons who constitute the shifting world in which we now live: tourists, immigrants, refugees, exiles, guest workers, and other moving groups and persons (who) constitute an essential feature of the world.

- ibid 297.

Zanzibar is such an ethnoscape, with its ‘multiple modernities’ (Caplan 2004, Eisenstadt 2002. Appudurai himself is keen to highlight the way modernity and globalisation, as terms, have been conquered:

The academy (especially in the United States) has found in globalization an object around which to conduct its special internal quarrels about such issues as representation, recognition, the "end" of history, the specters (sic) of capital (and of comparison), and a host of others. These debates, which still set the standard of value for the global professoriate, nevertheless have an increasingly parochial quality

– *(2001:2)*[30].

The most important element of Appadurai’s work is his recognition that media creates fissures, disjuncture between source and audience. The audiences of ‘global flows’ can be devastated by the impact of media, and experience a form of crisis. Globalization is a cover term for world of disjunctive flows:

Further, these disjunctures themselves precipitate various kinds of problems and frictions in different local situations. Indeed, it is the disjunctures between the various vectors characterizing this world-in-motion that produce fundamental problems of livelihood, equity, suffering, justice, and governance. Examples of such disjunctures are phenomena such as the following: Media flows across national boundaries that produce images of wellbeing that cannot be satisfied by national standards of living and consumer capabilities. …What they have in common is the fact that globalization… produces problems that manifest themselves in intensely local forms but have contexts that are anything but local.

– (2001: 9)

This summarises the dilemmas that some interviewees raised, suggesting that empirical work should not be treated as a tug between old and new, but as an exploration of a deliberative, constantly changing and nuanced dynamic in which a smorgasbord of options and choices distilled from a variety of locals and origins are utilised.

I draw on Mbembe's (2003) notion of space and colonial territories. Zanzibar's history of invasion creates a fragmentation of identity positioned by colonialism (logistically, practically, and also conceptually) within the context of East Africa and Africa as a whole. Mbembe suggests 'Africa' has become a binding concept and a geographical place, and investigates the literal binding of identity to place, an apposite inroad into looking at why identity becomes such a central concept for the Zanzibaris interviewed. His work allows an alternative positioning of narratives and naming of nationhood as created via brutal revolution, the disembowelling of colonial practices and the tentative establishment of 'modern' institutional practices.

Ferguson's extensive critiques of the state (1992, 2002, 2010) explore the vertical and encompassing nature of the post-colonial state—the ways it distributes, embeds and routinizes functions into daily lives of its subjects, and the troubled problems of a civil society ("in contrast to the state") that is in fact leaves great swathes of civil society undefined and unquestioned (Ferguson and Gupta

2002). His fascinating broad sweeps do not drill down to the intersectional nuances needed for this work, but his scepticism and critical interrogation of fear of modernity, change, powerlessness, or trans-national processes and development so often implicit in anthropological works, is a refreshing attack on endless academic fault-finding.

1.5 <u>Key debates. Where does this work fit?</u>

Theoretically this work asks us to reconsider what Islamic female agency is, particularly in informal or precarious spaces. Triangulating local attitudes to media, I try and reconcile the uneasy tensions between definitions of voice in media studies and work done in more ethnographic settings. I also revisit what happens when the state fails (Mamdani 2006, Chabal 2009) and look at voice and agency in precarious, informal settings. Local ideas of appropriate expressions of agency are also explored.

This work takes off where Tanya Winther's work on electricity (2008) and Kelly Askew's work on theatre and Taarab performances stop. Both works look broadly at 'power'—electricity as facilitator and bringer of change in domestic life, and theatre as facilitator in public and political life. Both are 'media' in the broadest form: Winther's work looks at the taxonomy of domestic space; how televisions, radios and light bulbs alter the way people live. Women in her study complain about listening to people's domestic rows, their children being tired for school because they have watched too much TV, and having to find extra money to pay the electricity bill.

Despite being not about media, the analysis and descriptions of market life in central Nairobi in Lindell and Ihaleinen's work (2014) resonate in many ways with my study. Lindell and Ihaleinen never directly quote their informants, but the work breathes great life into the rivalries and the importance of local dynamic and micro-politics of the people involved, and like Suriano's work (2007) and Perullo (2003) on hip hop and DJs, a strong sense of the struggle to survive coupled with ingenious ways to undermine and compete with others dominates the work. The sheer complexity of survival is referenced often by my informants: negotiating their own reputations, keeping abreast of community rivalries and jealousies, supporting

family and extended relatives, furthering their own educations, trying to sustain romantic and sexual lives: all require a great deal of intellectual and emotional effort and investment.

The variety, complexity and paradoxes of the many roles that people maintain in their precarious lives in informal spaces (where bribery, Islamic piety and social consensus are key, but contradictory vectors) speaks to theories of agency which are far less static, and require imagination and flexibility.

1.5.1 Empirical research/reception studies about agency and the 'self-help' qualities of the media in precarious settings

Conventional approaches to voice, participation and agency are framed around participation in social and political processes, which are not sufficient for this thesis. Academic work specifically in the fields of media studies that assesses the ways media incorporate and feed into a trajectory of self-help and self-improvement in Eastern and Southern Africa is incredibly limited. It is an area clearly worth exploring[31]. Ndlovu's gripping study of South African television viewers (2013) gives us a glimpse into the processes of family-building and the construction of individuated personal appropriate sentiments as South African attempts to personalise and reclaim what were formerly heavily politicised concepts. Similarly Ndijo's (2012, 2014) work on Cameroonian and Nigerian con men (who access the internet to carry out their business) speaks to a complex notions of global retribution, 're-citizenisation' (2014: 90) and ameliorating the inequalities experienced by global capitalism. His work, like Brissett Foucault's (2011), speaks directly to the local politics and an emerging educated elite who work hard to maintain the performances of self-advancement and reputations, using the media to showcase their skills. In Ndijo's work it is the internet (the 491 scams) which are deliberately articulate, complicated and elaborate, masking the (often) marginalised and uneducated status of the authors. In Brissett-Foucault's study of a Ugandan radio station's *Ebemeezer* discussion/phone in programme, she analyses the precision of the gatekeeping qualities of the (all male) participants, via language and reputations, to exclude and include others. Her work is an important exploration of politics, class and divisions played out in everyday life, and the actual

process of problem-solving, and is firmly positioned as a critique of local elites, although there are keen ‘self-help’ elements running through.

Schulz’s exploration of Malian Islamic female preachers and local radio stations (2014) concentrates on the nature of coming together, ‘connectedness and public intimacy’ (2014: 198) amongst listeners. The importance of this togetherness, familiarity, an understanding of familial connections and the listeners’ place within this is part of an elaborate and extended process of radio greeting, which also reflects the ‘outside’ world (i.e. non-media space), is stressed repeatedly. Schulz’s work is an insightful tool for understanding the sheer depth and importance of local reputations, and what processes contribute to their structuration. Like Mankekar (2012) she argues that a moral, sensual and aesthetic code is developed by audiences, and citizenry and belonging are meshed. Her work highlights the importance of seniority, generosity, and agreeable and authentic music in a setting where it is consensual communalism, rather than resistance, that is important.

Again, her work is not specifically framed as self-help: howevermy reading of this work is that it is clearly a description of a community that avoids direct conflict (as in Zanzibar), using metaphors and discreet suggestion to provide agency, reflexive spaces, public clues and suggestions about how people should pursue the social interactions of their lives.

All these works speak directly to Chabal’s, Willem’s and Obadare’s (ibid) more nuanced understandings of active citizenship that firmly place authorship and control in the hands of the global South.

1.5.2 Good Girls: Local literature in Zanzibar

This study intends to speak to literatures that examine resistance, collusion and acceptance to the national project. Focusing neither on identity nor on national ‘markers’ (Madianou, 2005) this work explores the social tensions and contradictions of flawed complicated traditionality and problematic modernity.

One of the major contradictions that emerged during the fieldwork was the emphasis on tolerance in gossip, manuals and literature such as those cited above, and simultaneously on informants’ mentions of jealousy. Saleh (2002) lists *ka*

uddhiniwa (the call for prayers for the newborn child), *uaminifu* (honesty) *uadilifu* (ethics), *ku chukiliana* (tolerance) and *imani* (trust, uprightness and integrity) as keys parts of being Zanzibari; the overall effect is to keep one's ego in check and acquire a capacity for consideration, compassion and generosity (Saleh 2002). Despite all this, however, jealousy and cunning—*mjanja*—are mentioned consistently by informants both as powerful methods of enforcing quiet behaviour and as barriers to progress, friendship and trust. Certainly there are elements of coming into selfhood revealed within the research. Previous work looked at Zanzibaris' ability to work within the spirit world and have multiple spirit identities (Caplan 2004), but not the literal identities they manage and manifest in the more visceral realm. Arguably Zanzibar identities are as dynamic as any other. Larsen (2004) and Cameron (2004) are fairly sure that identity is strongly associated with sexual activities, political affiliations, and that people use many varied (and sometimes competing) terms to describe themselves.

In the last five years, Saleh (2005)[32] notes some fascinating developments. *Kwendanawakati* (literally, to go with the times) is associated with corruption. So the 'old traditional ways' (as articulated by the informants)—women remaining in the home, working only as *Kongwes*—are being replaced by new ways: women working and participating in public life, becoming louder and more visible, representing an erosion of old values and mores. Sexual prolificacy and immoral behaviour in public are taken very seriously, and remarked upon in the context of 'being modern' or 'copying Westerners'. L puts it eloquently:

> *We don't approve of a lot of what you—Wazungu—do. Like fighting in public, or being loud. Actually we're a bit afraid of you, but at the same time if we want to copy you, or borrow your styles, like fancy underwear, we do. After all you don't know what goes on in our heads, or under our burkahs!*

1.5.3 The public sphere in Counter-Culture and Music

Existing and emerging work in Tanzania tackles the public sphere as a space for the formation of culture in the post independent nations, and obliquely focuses on

musical forms such as Bongo Flava and Ma'undagraundi (Englert 2008, Stroeken 2005, 2006, Perullo 2003, Willems 2011, Mano 2011). These authors and others (Lwanda 2004, 2009) argue for a parallel informal sphere (eg in dance halls, weddings, beer gardens) where critique of patrimonilism and the state can occur, in coloquial argot in an informal setting.

The distinctions between public and private space in Zanzibar are initially apparent and delineated, however closer inspection throws up a range of paradoxes and competing interpretations by people living in Zanzibar. Bayat's 'Political Street' (2010) offers a fascinating way to examine how streets become sites of public performance, of commerce, of acquiescence, of socialising, and describes aptly the way that the street (largely for men in Zanzibar) takes a unique character.

Similar work looks at popular culture as a site of resistance (Musila 2014, Willems 2011, Obadare 2014,) or 'the public' as a space for mimicry, subversion (Perullo, 2005, Stroeken 2002, Fouere 2011) and reclamation of agency, divesting power over the African body, mind, sense of beauty from coloniality (Ndlovu 2014). These works all speak to the versatility of African agency, to notions of embodiment and affect (Mankekar 2012) and this is the most dominant theme of this work: we need to re-imagine what civic agency looks like, move beyond NGOs or CSOs as sites of resistance or 'community voice' (Chaball, 2014:5) because these spaces and organisations speak to a rarefied form of citizenship that is largely created in response to donor needs (Cornwall 2011a, Mercer 2010, Beckmann 2009). Agency and voice are often experienced via culture and music, (Perullo) hip-hop, (Meyer, Suriano) Street corners, reggae, taaraab performance groups (Askew,) dress and theatre (Fair), and social interactions (Anderson, Caplan 2004). These academic works reveals the fascination with the public/private binary, the relationship between citizen and state (Askew) and the role of language, hip hop and music in resisting the dominant discourses of political inclusion.

All these works attempt to investigate why and how certain locally produced music has become associated with political criticism, and speaks for a large section of urban unemployed (male) youth. Stroeken's analysis, whilst complex and fascinating is markedly very male: no attempt is made whatsoever to ask how

women or young girls interpret or receive the lyrics, many of which are deliberately grandiloquent about male sexual exploits.

1.5.4 Gossiping the Nation: new ideas on nationalism

This work uses the concepts around nation-making or imaginary communities (Anderson 1999) in the context of Zanzibar. Anderson argues that there is a strong historical, psychological and communal element to the commitment and creation of national life. Nationalism co-opts pre-existing features of society in order to deal with the impossibility of personal relationships between all the members of the society. There are powerful varieties of national consciousness, and nationalism is less an ideology such as liberalism or fascism, and more a form of cultural expression. His work makes the key contribution that nationalism has an inside and an outside, and is internalised (within imaginations of subjects) less by commerce and economic structures, and more by language, communications and printing technologies. These concepts underpin—and are evidenced often by the informants—the imagining of Zanzibar nationhood, emphasizing the importance of social history, and the articulation and discussion of nationalisms.

Developing the theme of an imagined nation (Anderson 1991), Spivak's observations on the subject location and formation in the sovereign project are important. She interrogates the voice used on a structural level, positioning her arguments as a development of Althusser (1977) and Gramsci's (1971) work on being hailed as a subject/citizen and hegemony respectively. Again, like Anderson, her work looks at the manifestations of cultural and social power of dominant ideologies, including nationalism. Her observations on the 'epistemic violence' (1988: 78–80), as meted out by the colonial project in defining the dominant narratives and ontologies, speaks to a central problem of representation and the structural reproduction of this violence in this study. Spivak's work provides a vital intellectual foundation, or springboard, for the development of concepts about the materiality of self, our understandings of accessing and influencing the dominant narratives, embodiments and constructions of nationalism. Gupta too talks of the structural violence meted out to the poor (2012) through their interventions with

the embedded corruption of the bureacratised state which force reactive behaviours of survival.

Spivak (1991) draws attention to the need to locate subaltern power and to highlight precisely which discourses and discussions are being actively side-lined and deprived of influence. Like Mignolo (2002) (who rejects the ontology and linear 'progress' of the modernity project, including the supposed dominance of the Northern Academe and our public spheres), she is also generous to her subjects: in her analysis it is the agency of the person being analysed/interrogated in the study who has power, not necessarily the academic who writes it all down. This approach allows me to disinvest power away from the corporate flows of information and the media under scrutiny and back to the informants, to listen to their versions of which of the media is important in their lives, and why. Thus their interrogations of what respectability and 'being a good girl' actually are, are situated within a wider discourse of being triple-marginalised from power—within national boundaries of Zanzibar, on the continent, and on the global stage.

A key tenet of the nationalist project is how the citizens, particularly the Middle Classes (Mankekar 1999), are created, interpolated and communicated to in the context of promoting nationalism. As Mercer stresses, although it is not academically fashionable, Nationalism is vibrant in Tanzania (2012, 2011, 2010). Foucault suggests, there are regimes of truth and 'an explosion of numerous and diverse techniques for achieving the subjugations of bodies and the control of populations' (1976: 40) which include complete control of how nationalism is manufactured and dispersed. Foucault is instrumental in laying out the links between the conceptual and material expressions of nationalism for this study, the extent to which 'biopower' or government control is bound into the fabric of society. Clearly Zanzibar is not neo-liberal, nor has it strong institutions (which are key to Foucault's explanations). Nevertheless both Anderson and Foucault allow for theoretical exposure of the all-pervasive nature of power and its ability to control definitions, ontological structures and the nature of citizenship within this.

A complete inversion of the dominant narrative of subject creation is needed, and a rejection of reactive narratives that emphasise agency or autonomy (Mohanty 2013, Chabal 2009, Mahmood 2006). Dialogic engagement (between the

citizen and the state) as articulated by Khanna (2003) Madianou (2012) and Ahmed (2004, 2008) lends an analytical tool to look at how shame, emotions, affect and agency are experienced by my interviewees in relation to the media without burdening the arguments with diversions around shame and '*izzat'* being an integral part of Islamic practice (Armstrong 2000). The challenge then in this work is to reconceptualise nation-making, which involves themes of melancholia, nostalgic loss and trauma. These three factors emerged repeatedly by interviewees. Khanna systematically lays out how the trauma and violence perpetrated by colonial regimes is internalised within the subjects of former colonial countries, and indeed becomes a constitutive ingredient of their subjectivity and self-hood.

The cumulative failure to deal with this fear and pain leads to an inherent structural failure of the democratic project and a culture of normalised violence and conflict (Chabal 2009). Khanna's work talks of loss in post-colonial states (although she doesn't specify which ones), and as a conceptual tool this is an important factor in the reworking of the narratives of resistance and rejection in the Zanzibar context[36].

1.5.5 Redefining the nature of public and political agency for Islamic women

It would be difficult to ignore spaces and the relationship to agency in a work of this kind. This work suggests agency goes on in female spaces: hair salons, bedrooms, porches, outside of the formality of conventional public spheres and institutions (Chabal 2009). A less fixed, more labile, sensitive, (Mahmood 2006) localised and provincialized (Chakrabarty 2000) approach must be adopted.

For the theorizing of this issue I outline the critiques (led by Gall 2002, Fraser 1990) and move on to discuss more recent work on public spheres in Africa which looks at alternative resistances in popular forums. I will begin with a brief discussion of the subaltern, and how it is useful for this work.

The public sphere, as argued by Thompson (1995) and Habermas (1963, 1989) is a derivative function of (bourgeouis industrialised) modernity and a place where private individuals, irrespective of gender, ethnicity, class and status come together and debate the social rules governing their polity. In fact one of the defining characteristics of 'public-ness' is its ease of access for all.

The criticisms of these arguments are numerous and wide (Ferguson 2002, Hansen 2005, Weiss 2005, Ellis 1989, Chabal 2009, 2014), ranging from a failure to factor in the socio-cultural particularities of the non-industrialised, post-colonial Southern World to the subtleties of the emerging East African post-colonial middle class (Brisset Foucault 2010, Kanyongo 2012, Mallimani 2014). The dominance of super elites (Englert 2008, Moyer 2000) and the side-lining of women as role models, producers and participators of the media and the public sphere (Van Zoonen 2002, Gadzepo 2007) is also important to consider. Similarly the particular role of the emerging state in Africa (Mudimbe 2005, Willems 2010, Obadare 2014, Chabal 2009) and how it has been captured by opportunistic leaders (Chaball 2009) who manipulate the agendes of development to reflect the sustenance of foreign aid and play out tropes of modern and traditional culture driven by 'foreign intrustions' (15:2009).

1.5.6 New iterations of the public sphere and civic agency in non-media spaces

The complexities and nuances of Zanzibar public life include informants' clearly articulated (and substantiated—see Cooksey 2010 and Englert 2010) fear of speaking out, a sophisticated understanding of the corrupt processes at work, a fear of political demonstrating and of bringing shame to the community or the family. This, coupled with their clear needs to grapple with the 'Rights Agenda' and the prevalence of privatisation of development (Mercer 2012b) and 'briefcase NGOs' (Beckmann 2009) has created a mentality where there are hierarchies of victimhood, with water rights competing with education for girls' rights, in turn competing with HIV rights. Concomitantly the rise of organisations such as the complex semi-nationalistic Uamsho (Mutch 2012) does not lend itself to the existing derivative theories of the public sphere arguments[41].

Gall (2000)[42] argues that there are atomised public spheres and many disparate places where the definition of public and private intermingle, or where the definition is blurred, such as women working at home doing piece work who don't admit to having jobs. Fraser (1990) looks at the way subaltern social groups invent and circulate counter discourses; either through public sphericles (small, discreet areas) or parallel discursive arenas where subordinated social groups form

oppositional discourses to deal with their own specific needs and definitions. These works effectively permit a way to politicise and identify the precarious ways that Zanzibar women speak, highlighting the blurred definitions between private and public and disassociating the talk from the intuitive knowledge we bring to what 'should' be public space, and what 'should' be private.

There are distinct overlaps between Gall's ideations of atomised public spheres and Appurdurai's concepts of scapes: both allow for the active interpolation and agency of the subjects, and both acknowledge that this process of reinventing and creation takes place continuously. Both also recognise that it is possible to 'be a member' of different scapes at the same time, and that there are marked contradictions between within subjects themselves.

1.5.7 Post-Coloniality: Pavements, Parliaments or Porches. Where's the Public Sphere?

This research positions voice within the practices of precariousness, quotidian living and sociality, and not via platforms or CSO's (Taachi 2008 and Tufte 2010, 2014). first suggestion that civic agency might be occurring in spaces different from the West occurs in Ellis's work on pavement radio, (1989) which looks at how debate, conversations and discussion taking place on street corners are carefully and intricately brokered, and completely sidestep the conventional channels. Brissett Foucault's work on radio (2011, 2013) moves beyond the project of subaltern voices and into the terrain of agency exercised through performance (e.g. owning a mobile phone, as explored by Archambault 2012), or gossip and oral dexterity (Fair 2001) and personally managing shared moral reactions and public reputations (Schulz 2011, 2014).

Verandah politics and informal politics (Ellis 1989, Kelsall 2002, Pels 2002) challenge conventional literature's approach to public spheres. In the context of Africa (Ellis writes about West Africa, Kelsall and Pels about East), the easily identifiable arenas of parliament, radio news programmes or newspaper editorials are rejected as too industrial, too urban, grounded in Northern development processes, and not relevant to populations in informal employment or have limited

schooling. They assume the normative to be male, and there is no referencing of sex or performances of gender as promoters or hurdles to participation.

Conclusion

Chaball and Mahmood's critiques of Gidden's modernity thesis offers a valuable springboard from which to investigate localised iterations of global issues, especially regarding behaviour, institutions and global flows of information. However, in order to explore and look more deeply into the ways that women in this study use the media and the discussions this provokes, it is necessary to broaden the scope of the study to look at how we describe discussions, where these take place, the labile nature of modernity, and the contradictory elements of traditionalism. It is also important to significantly trouble the existing tropes of what communication means and how local pressures of respectability and shame lead women to place more value on informal talk (or gossip) than they do on formal media information. In the following chapter there is a discussion of the methods and methodology—what happened over the course of the fieldwork and which theoretical positions informed my approaches.

My research hopes to make an important contribution to the local practices around polyvocal media use and the discussions that media—in its broadest forms—inspires. Set in specific environments—hair salons and homes—where national media is largely dismissed or side-lined by informants, this research challenges conventional views of women in an East African Muslim country as subjects lacking agency or as people communicating only in the private sphere, behind closed doors. Simultaneously it takes a nuanced look at how articulations of identity, voice, self-articulation in informal talk and reputation (particularly in public spaces and public spheres) need to be re-envisioned to incorporate their discussions and uses of the media.

[1] http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/7302553.stm

[2] Afrobarometer 2011

[3] World Development Report 2014, World Food Programme

[4] World Bank Database, accessed Jan 24 2011http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/africa-development-indicators

[5] http://www.unpo.org/article/15390

[6] ZATI figures for tourism 2010–2011

[7] During the fieldwork period (2008–2011) the American elections took place, and there were disturbances which were later to be dubbed 'The Arab Spring' by some media; the informants remarked upon these events.

[8] The use of the term Southern refers to the Mercator projection of the map. Instead of referring to Africa, or Asia, the Global South, the Southern Sphere and The South are used to refer to countries which are characterised by having high birth rates, low mortality rates, and a high density of agricultural production. (See Rehbein 2010, referencing World Bank indicators, and Odeh 2010). I do not use the terms Europe or Western Europe or North America but instead refer to them as Global North (Rehbein 2010). Global North is referring to the world region that has economically dominated the world during the past two centuries. I use the term "global South" and at times couple it with the term "global North",

[9] Longair (2012: 45) provides a detailed and fascinating description of the colonial project, including the categorisation of native and immigrant subjects into political and legal subjects. This categorisation, which has far-reaching effects on urban planning, the legal framework and educational and social policies which continue today, was invented by the British, and is viewed in hindsight to be 'incoherent.' Longair's analysis reveals the intense contradictions and guesswork at the heart of the rule of Zanzibar, and the submergence of certain facets of cultural and economic life (the intense inter-marriages between groups for example, the distinctions of education between the Manga and Scholar classes of Omani Arabs for example) in the colonial project.

[10] Vernet, T "*Le commerce des esclaves sur la côte Swahili, 1500–1750*,"Azania 38 (2003), 69–97.

[11] Print Cultures, Nationalisms and Publics of the Indian Ocean

Isabel Hofmeyr, Preben Kaarsholm and Bodil Folke Frederiksen Africa: Journal of the International African Institute Vol. 81, No. 1, Print Cultures, Nationalisms and Publics of the Indian Ocean (February 2011 pp. 1–22)

[12] There is a significant body of work that sets out to express how globalisation is manifested in the international economic arrangements and corporate interests of media, and how this affects content, (McChesney, Appadurai, Castells, Bhaba,) yet this work overlooks the considerably different ways that global flows impact on women and the differing nature of their access to economic and social capital in places such as Zanzibar.

[13] Benjamin Lee and Edward LiPuma. Cultures of Circulation: The Imaginations of Modernity Public Culture 14(1): 191–213 Duke University Press 2002

[14] Madianou, M. "A Voice of One's Own? Migration, Gender, and Citizenship in a Polymedia Environment" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Communication Association, Hilton Metropole Hotel, London, England 23–05–2014

[15]http://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/document/Gender/Voice_and_agency_LOWRES.pdf

[16]http://www.casos.cs.cmu.edu/publications/papers/2012SocialNetworksSocialMediaSocialChange.pdf

[17] http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/Public/focus/essay0611_social_media.html

[18] The 'Kill Switch' as 'Suicide Switch': Mobilizing Side Effects of Mubarak's Communication Blackout in WESTMINSTER PAPERS in communication and culture VOLUME 9 / ISSUE 2 / APRIL 2013The role of social media in the Arab uprisings past and present (https://www.westminster.ac.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0004/220675/WPCC-vol9-issue2.pdf) accessed 20 May 2014)

[19] The singers are plied with money and in return relay jokes, mutiles, inneundos and obvious slurring of characters, in a dialogic interchange with their public. Fargion Topp argues these spaces provide room for Zanzibar Muslim women to significantly transgress the community and communal expectations of women. (2014: 151)

[20] The Fuhamu project in Cambridge, a collaboration between Fuhamu NGO and Cambridge University, is investigating mobile phone use in urban populations. Kutubana project in Zimbabwe breaks down its media data in terms of gender. Most work however, is not gender-sensitive.

[21] Veiled Sentiments: Honour and Poetry in a Bedouin Society Abu-Lughod, Lila University of California Press, Berkeley, 1988.

[22] From "ghetto" to mainstream: Bollywood in South Africa, Haseenah Ebrahim. Scrutiny2: Issues in English Studies in Southern Africa, 13:2, 63–76, 2009

[23] Allowing interviewees to decide how and where they wish to be interviewed, which language to be interviewed in, and which clothes they want to wear, leaving in pauses and moments of reflection, as well as inter-subject banter and moments of intimacy in domestic settings.

[24] The Invention of Women: Making an African Sense of Western Gender Discourses, University of Minnesota, 1997

[25] Haram, Liv. (2005) "'Eyes have no Curtains': The Moral Economy of Secrecy in Managing Love Affairs among Adolescent in Northern Tanzania in the Time of AIDS". Africa Today. Volume 51 (4).

[26] Spronk, R. The idea of African men: dealing with the cultural contradictions of sex in academia and in Kenya, Culture, Health & Sexuality: An International Journal for Research, Intervention and Care Volume 16, Issue 5, 2014

[27] This problem occasionally arose in the early days of the research "You know what we are like in Africa" Maryam would sigh if she wasn't sure how to define, defend or justify yet another probing question. The problem disappeared as she realised that I was not looking for 'the correct' explanation, just her opinion.

[28] Do Muslim Women Need Saving? Anthropological Reflections on Cultural Relativism and Its Others. Abu-Lughod *American Anthropologist* Vol. 104, No 3, September 2002

[29] What is omitted from this thesis is the considerable debate about the evolution, reformist traditions, influence of the Wasaabi schools, and iterations of Islam in Zanzibar, which I do not feel qualified to comment on. There is a parallel thesis that could be written about the 'elite-making' effects of Islam as a trading religion in Zanzibar, which continues to this day.

[30] *Globalization*, Edited by Arjun Appadurai DUKE UNIVERSITY PRESS * DURHAM & LONDON 2001

[31] Personal discussion with Professor Wendy Willems, May 8th 2014

[32] Saleh, A M, in *Swahili Modernitie*s, eds Caplan and Topan, Africa World Press 2005

[33] Butler and Spivak, 2007 IBID

[34] Bombing of St Georges Church, acid attacks on tourists, numerous unreported assaults on youth in prisons, and a huge amount of closet abuse of children, according to Director of Save the Children, Zanzibar

[35] Ahmed, S, 'Be Very Afraid' *New Internationalist*, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0JQP/is_376/ai_n13503319/pg_3, accessed April 1 2008

[36] Certainly the depth and range of 'trauma' uncovered in this research is far greater than I ever anticipated. I was highly sensitive and alert to the 'Western Feminist doing anthropology' cliché (looking for examples of how oppressed Islamic women are), throughout the research. Yet the amount of references to child abuse, violence in marriages and beatings voiced by the interviewees was not an expected outcome.

[37] Butler J, 2007: *Who Sings the Nation-State?: Language, Politics, Belonging* (with GayatriSpivak) : ISBN 1905422571

[38] Goffman, E, *Stigma, Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity*, Simon & Schuster, 1963

[39] Goffmann E, *Representation of Self in Everyday Life*, Anchor 1959

[40] Quoted on p181 of McNay, Agency and Gender as Lived Relation, in *Feminism After Bordieu*, 2004, Blackwell

[41] Women markedly did not participate in the Zanzibar's capital public square. They talked in 'private' spaces, although their versions of private referred to who was allowed to access the information, and its symbolic meaning, not where it took place necessarily.

[42] Gall, S and Kligman Gail. (2000a) *The Politics of Gender after Socialism* (Princeton University, Princeton, NJ)

Chapter Two: Methods and Methodology

Introduction

My research hopes to make an important contribution to the local practices around polyvocal media use and the discussions that media in its broadest forms inspires. Set in an environment—hair salons and homes—where national media is largely dismissed or sidelined by informants, this research challenges conventional views of women in an East African Muslim country as subjects lacking agency or as people communicating only in the private sphere, behind closed doors. Simultaneously it takes a nuanced look at how articulations of identity, voice, self-articulation in informal talk and reputation (particularly in public spaces and informal, non-mediated public spheres) need to be re-envisioned to incorporate their discussions and uses of the media. I also discuss the ethics of this research and the processes of resolution of some of the problems.

In this chapter, I divide the methods and methodology used in this research into two parts. The first part outlines what I did, how I did it and why I did it that way. The second part looks at some of the debates not previously examined in the literature section and examines the ways in which theoretical and logistical factors and restraints impinged upon, augmented and altered the direction of the work. Lastly I discuss the ethics of a work of this type.

I will begin by outlining the narrative of events—what happened and when—and then investigate the praxis of research, gathering material, recording, participant observation sites, watching and thematising the material. The research question altered over the fieldwork period from investigating women in Zanzibar politics (incorporating the media's role) to the conversations and reflections that media prompts. I will endeavour to explain the theoretical and practical rationale that drove the change in focus and breadth of the study as it progressed. This ethnography has complicated practical and theoretical factors: the multiplicity of participant observation sites, the transience of some of the interviewees, the fluidity of definitions of the media and the lack of importance of the media against other issues the informants brought to my attention, and the irregularity of the

fieldwork spread over three years.[1] In addition I will situate the research within an overview of the pertinent methodological debates to explore the use of the first person (locating the ethnographic author) and some the ethical issues, academic pitfalls and problems associated with this.

The specific limitations and constraints of doing ethnography for this research include the difficulty in marrying precarious, informal 'real life' with the media content they encountered. Further hurdles included finding a defined group of women I could meet regularly and gaining their trust. Incorporating the influence of localised corruption, Muslim influences and attitudes on the informants' responses, theorising social class and the role of state mechanisms and 'traditional' culture posed particular challenges of inter-discipliniarity and inter-textuality. Similarly, incorporating informal non-mediated talk—and where it occurred—opened more academic avenues than it closed. The lack of existing qualitative data about Zanzibar, as opposed to Tanzania, at times compromised this research (because I have to assume that the data from Tanzania is transferable and relevant). Contextualising the research within the global statistical canon of researching Africa, (for example World Bank, United Nations and International Monetary Fund statistics), situates the research but does not necessarily add gravitas and weight, because of the highly problematic nature of this kind of data.

2.1 <u>Ethnography in Practice</u>

2.1.1 Who did I interview and why?

In September 2007 I began a period of pre-research. In London and Zanzibar I read about the Zanzibar's political and historical context and researched the practicalities of working with a discreet group of women in one location over a period of a year. I intended to interview between twenty and thirty women from Zanzibar and find out how they influenced political and public life, and what role the media played in this. I wanted to focus on women because Zanzibar is a society divided along gender lines[2]. How women cope in the public sphere intrigued me because, having worked for over twenty years in neighbouring mainland Tanzania and Kenya, (also identified as 'Swahili' and with large Muslim populations), I was struck by the low visibility of Zanzibar women in public spaces.

Whilst reading Zanzibar newspapers (in English and Swahili) and listening to domestic and international radio stations in Zanzibar, my starting point was to identify a selection of interviewees (I use the terms ‘informants’ and ‘interviewees’ interchangeably) who would come from a wide social and cultural spread.

Academic work regarding gender studies on rural or urban women (Moyer 2001, Myers 2010, Donaldson 1997) locates ethnicity and tribe as significant drivers for investigation (Donaldson 1997) and geography as an important vector. Work on Swahili coastal people (Mazrui and Shariff 1994) exists in abundance, including specific (e.g. Mombassa or Nairobi) urban identities (Eisenburg 2012: 558–561). Social class, professionalism, or being cosmopolitan (Spronk 2012) are rarely used as criteria for ethnographies, which is problematic given that Zanzibar ethnicities are highly blurred (and contrived), tribes are non-existent and other factors are more relevant . Cosmopolitanism, ‘being local’ have replaced tribe as referents or sign posts (Ferguson 148:2005) but obfuscate what local actually means, and local to whom. These factors came up during the fieldwork and will be discussed in detail in the findings chapters.

I was keen to find women, teenagers and elders who identified themselves as part of intellectual and cultural networks (informal or not), women who were the major breadwinners, and I was keen to be flexible in my interpretations of power, geographic position and agency. Additionally I wished to interview equal numbers of women from across the age ranges, and with different professional aspirations and employment statuses. I wanted to get inside their private sphere, their private world. I started with no rigorous intention of mapping and cataloguing all media programmes that dealt with Zanzibar womanhood (see Fugelsang 2003, Saunders 2006). At the end, the choice of number of interviewees came down to pragmatism: how many people could I build up a relationship and maintain a consistent dialogue with over the course of a year?

The criteria for selecting people emerged during the fieldwork: levels of literacy, access to cultural capital, political participation past and present, social class, level of media read, watched and listened to, urban/rural position, size of social networks and involvement in the mosque. As Chaball (2009) and Moore (2013) emphasise, age is an important vector in the ‘field’: the difference in

discussion and opinions between age groups was striking, and I was keen to pursue this fertile seam. The drivers for selecting interviewees were chosen because I wanted a broad range of women from Zanzibari society, including women who worked in the media and those who felt positive about the role of media in their lives, those who were studying at post-graduate levels, those who worked for the state and in the civil service (Nzomo 1997) and those who had lived abroad, or were about to embark on foreign travel.

In the end, the selection was dictated by practical matters such as whether the interviewees/informants were available to talk to me, their level of interest and health[3]. The interviews, discussions and meetings actually took place over three years.[4] Given that there was no financial or material incentive for those who took part in this research, those who stayed for the full period did so because they could, and perceived the experience as beneficial. The informants themselves played a role in the selection process: farmers such as Mama P, Mama K and Mama Mw (all women in their early forties) were only available to talk to me twice due to their family and working commitments. Others, (Mm, Da, Oi, Ta—all of whom are women in their twenties in higher education living in the capital, Stone Town) became part of a core group, and participated for the full three year period.

Much of the rationale for focussing on women and teenagers in this study is discussed in the literature review. There are further practical considerations for the decision to include some men: all the women in my study had a great deal of interactions with men; all of them lived with, or were strongly associated with brothers, uncles, fathers or husbands. Yet if their domestic lives were ostensibly peopled with males, and they had few public arenas of expression, I wanted to find out how they thought about this and how they made sense of it. Where actually *were* their private spaces?

All the discussions and interviews were carried out in single sex groups, as having mixed gender discussion and interview groups would have been entirely inappropriate and ethically questionable in Zanzibar and would have created many problems for the females involved. Mixed gender groups perhaps are not even possible, as Zanzibar is a society in which men and women conversing together (particularly in public) is not considered appropriate. Women effectively fall silent

when men are present—whether formally in debates or informally at the *Uroyo* soup stall. It was important to circumvent this in order to hear what women really wanted to say with no fear of being criticised, humiliated or losing face. There are exceptions of course: the women over the age of sixty I interviewed had no problem articulating power; but they were the not the norm, and were a product of a much more lenient time with a different, pre-revolution, education. They also benefitted from the respect and status conferred upon seniority for both men and women (Shivji 2007, Moore ibid, Ferguson 1992).

The forty three[5] informants (37 women, six men) who ended up participating were chosen using the snowball approach as well as a more systematic method. New contacts and friends were asked to participate and to recommend friends and relatives.

2.1.2 How did I select my informants?

Locating a constituted group of women who knew each other seemed to be the most obvious way to pursue the ethnography, and this was theoretically possible via friends' contacts, family groups, or professional, hobby, savings and religious associations. Previous ethnographies of Zanzibar, notably Askew (2002) Beckermann (2009) and Winther (2008, 2012), identified musical performance groups, an NGO focussed on providing support to people living with HIV and a discreet geographical village (and their responses to electrification) respectively as the focus groups for their studies.

In September 2008 there was no central directory of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) available for Zanzibar[6]. There was no directory—either online, in a library or in someone's head—of the community organisations, finance groups, Islamic study groups, cultural groups or other groupings that existed. I relied completely on word of mouth, yet apart from Save the Children and the two organisations dealing with HIV/AIDs and the orphanage, it was not at all clear which NGOs were legitimately operating on Zanzibar[7]. Locating where groups of women met outside of their homes seemed impossible. Even the Taarab groups, the concern of Kelly Askew's work, met only sporadically, and wanted money for any time I spent with them.

I approached a sewing collective of rural women that met three times a week in a large community centre in Stone Town, the capital of Zanzibar. The collective was co-ordinated by a friend and colleague, Farid Hamid, with whom I had previously worked for the BBC. This unfunded NGO existed to create sewing opportunities for single parent families (women) and women who were divorced and/or socially ostracised[8].

For a month, I came at 8.30 three times a week and sat on the floor listening to between three and eight women talking as they embroidered cushions, quilts and bedcovers. They had been identified by the co-ordinator as marginalised, without employment and vulnerable. They often turned up for work in the same clothes; they worked through the day without eating, drinking only water. Their speech was fast, colloquial, hard for me to understand, and rarely, if ever, referenced the media. When they did speak to me the discussions felt unnatural, defensive and false, and I suspected they told me only what they thought I wanted to hear. It quickly became clear that I could not afford to buy lunch for everyone every day, and I was not prepared to take myself off to eat whilst they had nothing. I felt uncomfortable about trying to push questions and issues the women appeared to have no interest in. I was self-conscious and I felt that I should probably be paying the women for taking up their time.

This period marked a crisis in the research: it appeared impossible to locate women who were able to talk to me, and the conceptual and actual problems of being perceived as a Western, white, rich researcher seemed too huge to overcome. I felt like the physical embodiment of colonial privilege: transient, educated, olive brown, mobile, inquiring, rising above it all. As Spronk identifies, talking about herself, 'my presence as a foreigner, a Westerner… was related to his [sic] defensive attitudes and anxieties arising from the issues of Westernisation' (2012: 5)

In November 2008 I recruited a researcher and translator whom I met on a local bus (*daladala*) when she helped me with my faltering Swahili. I asked Mm to select four friends from university, who in turn asked other friends and older relatives of theirs. Mm proved invaluable: aged 23, educated in Zanzibar, she described herself as orthodox Muslim, wearing full hijab at all times in public. She

was completing a degree in Education when I met her and was bi-lingual, speaking English and Swahili. Originally from Pemba (the smaller, poorer adjoining island), her personal story of achieving education, a university degree, and eventually marriage and a job (as a local primary teacher, at the end of the research) exemplifies tenacity, resourcefulness and a stubborn re-invention of what was expected of her and what she wanted for herself. She was also my Swahili teacher for eight months at the beginning of the research, which gave us an opportunity to get to know each other as well as to disentangle some more problematic elements of the public/private binary and to learn some very basic things about Zanzibar life: where and when women socialised, and when they did hang out on the porches and *mbarrassa* for *masikaani*.

Mm introduced me to four of her friends, who contributed to the three year research fieldwork period and made many suggestions about who should be included. They identified 'famous women', older women I should listen to, and made recommendations about which men might have interesting or thoughtful contributions. This core group also recommended two women in this study who could be regarded as ethnically non-Zanzibari—expatriates who are long term residents in Zanzibar, are socially integrated into female Zanzibar society, speak fluent Swahili and have made very tangible efforts to 'become' Zanzibari—for example by marrying Zanzibar men and involving themselves in family matters, integrating into local marriage and religious ceremonies and living in areas that are not associated with *Wazungu*.

With advice and contacts from the first set of younger women, I arranged interviews with locally prominent professionals who had a political profile and high status in society or who had respectability. I defined 'women with agency' as female journalists, the captain of the women's football team, an Executive Director of the Tanzania Women's Bank[9] and older women in their sixties, seventies and eighties who had taken active political roles on Zanzibar (both in the ruling CCM party and other avenues)[10].

In December 2008, after living on Zanzibar for three months, I developed routines: arriving at the market at 8.30 a.m. for breakfast at the *uroyo* stall, going to the salons and interviewing people individually. In March 2009 I started working

with a group of young people in my neighbourhood (I lived six kilometres out of the capital) who approached me to advise and consult for their organization which informally advises young people on a range of issues from employment to relationships and sexual matters. They met at my house or in an office nearby, and through their membership I actively sought out younger women and teenage girls who were willing to contribute and meet me. I continued with the methodology of selecting women from different income brackets, ages, and employment status, asking young people to recommend their mothers, aunts and cousins. I also broadened the research, interviewing women from the mainland who were from Zanzibar or who had worked there. However, the geographical focus remained fixed on Zanzibar.

By August 2009—nearly a full year after I had started the research, and technically when I was supposed to be finishing—I felt I was just beginning to understand what I was doing and how. I spent about four hours a week in one of the two hair salons, about three hours a week in the main market at the *uroyo* stalls, between three and eight hours a week doing individual interviews or group discussions and the rest of the time writing, transcribing or recovering.[11]

2.1.3 What did I ask the informants?

In this work I investigate the debates, changes and themes that aroused controversy and discussion when the topic of media is raised. I started with an open question such as “what have you been watching on the TV or listening to the radio this week?”, and then encouraged and facilitated the discussion that arose.

The challenge was to gather and collect material from several different sources (interviews, informal discussions, participant observation) from different people, in different locations, about a large, inchoate term: ‘the media’. I adopted Madianou’s term polyvocal media (2012, 2014) which encompasses the many forms and voices the media takes in daily life. As the interviews and discussions progressed over the months we returned to the themes of media and world events, considering specifics—the plot of a particular soap opera that was resonant for one group of interviewees, for example.

For the core group there were many topics that piqued their interests: the events in Egypt, a particular report in the newspaper after Barack Obama's election victory, and the internet coverage of the US election. All these events and many others provoked dynamic discussion and disagreements. The themes in the discussion sessions often departed from my suggestions: usually with a prompt from me such as "what has caught your attention this month/week in the media? Tell me about it…" The cues for interview content often came from the interviewees themselves. At the time of the US election my informants all brought this up. The electricity outages on Zanzibar between October 2009 and February 2010 also prompted discussions about local accountability, democracy, the roles and rights of citizens, (thus including conversations about structural violence of the state, and operational agency outside of the state, Ferguson 2005, Chabal 2009) and why the national media was so doggedly avoiding reporting the power failures. On another occasion I wanted to discover how the informants viewed their futures, which became a conversation covering marriage, the BBC, divorce, Western men and underwear.

This flexibility and fluidity served two purposes. It devolved the control over the research process and agenda back to them, and blurred the lines between social event and work, and meant I could put into practice what I knew to be true—that Zanzibar is place where indirect 'soft' (*sauti laini*) speech is valued and where time invested in people is highly regarded. I could listen and allow them space to be self-reflexive. For example, a question about what '*mandeleo*' meant to them (literal translation: 'development') segued into a long discussion about management techniques and the Beijing Women's Conference, and what women's empowerment might *really* mean, in practice. Thus we were using their vocabulary to explore broader processes (Ferguson 2006, 2010). On another occasion, an informant introduced the subject of tourism, nudity of women in western media and on Zanzibar beaches. This became a long discussion about mutual friends who had emigrated and rejected the hijab (*buyibuyi*, or 'web', as it's affectionately known in Zanzibar) and whether the baring of flesh constituted freedom and power.

Over the three years of fieldwork, I would sometimes turn up with questions about a specific media—we spent several months discussing text messages and mobile phones for example. Often, however, conversations took a direction I had never envisaged, for example the section on sexual violence, familial control and virginity is completely instigated by the informants.

By December 2008 it became obvious I had underestimated four material significant factors: firstly, the availability of women to interview, linked in part to the absence of community or civic organisations with women members; secondly, the logistical material problems of accessing interviewees; thirdly the electricity power cuts and the effect it had on all our time to work (this became a particularly strenuous hurdle with renewed intensity from November 2009 to March 2010), and fourthly the disconnection between media content and real life. In addition, the theoretical limitations of this sort of ethnography became much more vivid when actually undertaking the fieldwork. A fuller exploration of these and other limitations, challenges and resistances is explored in Part Two of this chapter.

The small size of the middle class in Zanzibar resulted in a limited pool of educated and literate women available for participation. Those that are educated were either consumed with actually pursuing their goals or had left the island to pursue their studies abroad[12]. So many potentially interesting subjects did not have time or the inclination to be part of PhD research. The absence of civic and communal organisations (only the women's football team and the Taarab music group existed) meant it was difficult to approach ready-formed groups of women. Beckmann (2009) worked with the HIV positive group ZAPHRA on Zanzibar for her research. I did not want to return to another anthropologist's former domain, and I felt that if I selected that group I would have to impose my agenda very significantly and 'force' conversations about the media, when their preoccupations were centred on HIV and coping strategies.

Logistical hurdles to gaining access to the *shamba*—the countryside—proved insurmountable: transport to these areas was limited; I did not have a travel budget to supplement my research: without a motorcycle or small car, accessing the rural areas was not possible. Women from the *shamba* were extremely busy—they simply did not have several hours a week to chat to me. Compounded with the

knowledge that there was limited media (radio and TV) coverage in the rural areas due to patchy electricity provision, these concerns informed my decision to concentrate my research on women in the capital, Stone Town. In hindsight, an ethnography of the *shamba* would have required a complete re-think, approach and re-focus, looking instead at mobile phones and their roles in the professional and personal relationships of female farmers and their connectivity with larger networks.

With the onset of the fuel and electricity crisis from October 2009 to February 2010, travel to rural areas became impossible, and my own daily routines—eating, sleeping, writing and washing—were significantly impeded: without clean water to drink and with no fan at night to cool temperatures of 45° centigrade it was hard to function, for me and for the informants. These material and visceral pressures created openings, valves for discussion and an aura of permissiveness which emboldened people to critique the state, the government and Zanzibar's dependency on Mainland Tanzania.

In the first six months there was a reticence amongst the informants to discuss the media, and discussions lacked focus. Recognising that this potentially vital challenge was an indication of my own errors as well as reticence on the part of the interviewees, I allowed the informants much more control over all our interviews. The materiality of their situations all severely impinged on their abilities to listen to, watch, or use the 'conventional' media, such as radio or newspapers. The disconnection between media content and their 'real lives' (expanded upon in part two of this chapter) created alternative media uses and new dependencies: for example extensive use of texting or accessing the internet via WAP-enabled phones.

In practical terms, my approach as an ethnographer is informed by two important standpoints: first of all it is crucial to 'own the standpoint' following the edicts of Standpoint Theory (Harding 1987[13]) and to elaborate and incorporate the material and objective (and to embody, take responsibility for) the conditions which contribute to the formation both of the author and the production of (this body of) knowledge (Hooks 1994, Rothenberg 2000). Secondly, my intellectual, professional and intuitive experience views questionnaires, pre-set questions,

formal interviews, surveys and formal structured interviews as being highly problematic. They limit possible responses, do not tease out or develop the content that informants actually mention, materialise and reinvigorate the power inequalities between researcher and researcher (Moore 2013) and impose a very rigid, linear narrative before the research has even started. Just as I wished to trust my informants, I wished to trust myself: that I would listen well (Back 2007), allow the conversations to develop organically, and let the informants lead the direction and agendas of each 'session'[14].

The important issue is that the point of the first meetings was not to extract information. It was to establish a rapport, as Spronk details (2012: 39). However the communalities of gender are not enough to create intimacy, or good research (Moore ibid). It became increasingly clear that one of the main challenges that Zanzibaris experience with *wazungu* is our need to get everything done too quickly (indeed the word for foreigner, *Mzungu*, is a derivative of *kzungu-kzungu*: to run in circles like a headless chicken, achieving nothing). The point of these early meetings was to establish a relationship, to start the process of building trust and to prioritise the quality of the interactions, as Zanzibaris do, rather than the outputs. Furthermore, it seemed common sense to me that there needed to be a 'buy-in' from the informants point of view: something in it for them, in colloquial argot. I sought to establish how they might also benefit—socially, emotionally, intellectually—from our meetings and discussions[15].

The first meetings followed the same format: an introduction of my study, a brief history of myself and where I was from, where my parents were from, why I had chosen to study Zanzibar and why I had taken a break from journalism. In turn interviewees were asked to give basic details; where they lived, where they'd grown up, the sort of education and/or work they did or were not doing, where their parents were from, whether they were married or single, had a boyfriend or were dating. I did not take notes from the first five sessions, but recorded them on a small portable recorder (with Maryam interjecting *in situ* if I didn't understand a phrase) and then listened back to them and transcribed them later at home[16].

In the first meeting I also asked what media people listened to, read or used. Some, for example Oi, Aa and Ta, were frequent mobile phone users (particularly

for texting) and started using the internet during the research probably directly as a result of help, ideas and encouragement from Mm, who with her university degree (a first) emerged as a leader and perceptive facilitator. Others, such as Bibi J, Mama Mm, Mama Aa, Mama La and Mama By, only used radio and television and had no intention of learning how to use either the internet or a mobile phone. These women are all in their seventies and eighties and they saw no need or relevance.

I recorded all of these casual conversations because I wanted to give the informants my full attention. My tape recorder is the twice the size of a credit card and very unobtrusive, with no visible microphone. Listening back to these interviews later offered clues about what to follow up in further discussions. I transcribed all the interviews as they happened, typing them word for word, including my own interjections. I sometimes took notes during interviews, (a word or phrase perhaps), depending on who was talking and how many others were talking at the same time. I had one main notebook which I preferred to leave at home, and smaller books in which I jotted down conversations, descriptions, a sense of place, diary entries and random thoughts. The sound interviews are on a CD and four hard-drives that have long since died, and the transcripts were kept in one continuous file (on my laptop) that I added to. The transcripts of jottings diary entries and random thoughts amounts to over forty typed pages.

2.1.4 The Ethics of Research:

In this multi-sited ethnography (Janson 2007) ethical issues suffused all elements of the research: I lived permanently on Zanzibar near the interviewees' homes, places of work or study, and the sites of the ethnography. Secondly the complex informality of quotidian life—and the precarious nature of it (Misztal 2008)—masked or signficantly complicated requests and arrangements (for example a request to meet in a central venue required all participants to have enough money to get there, and sensitivity on my part to ascertain if they did not, and tactful ways to resolve this without drawing attention to the power and financial differentials in the relationships.)

The power differentials, constraints expectations of the relationships created and maintained during this field work process were influenced by age (mine and

theirs, with the more junior participants perceived as ‘weaker’ than me, and also less financially solvent) economic status, geographical mobility (of the participants) and social capital. This finessed and complex process invoved an intersection (Brah and Phoenix 2004) of several factors, as Moore (2013) also explores: for example Mama H, a successful veg farmer exorting to Dubai and older than me (and significantly wealthier too), is defined by her rural, uneducated status (junior) which does not balance out her age (senior to me) and wealth (senior to me). Conversely, Bi J, who is double my age, a widower of a former MP, and politically active in the ruling party, would unquestionably be my senior. These factors are mentioned because they are referents for appropriate behaviours that infuse all areas of life and arrangements…. Interviewing the older women it would have been the height of insouciance for me to suggest the time, place and length. This was their instigation.

I did not take photos or any DVD footage, ever, in the salons or during personal interviews or group discussion, despite a strong temptation to do so. This was an ethical decision based on my interpretation of the distancing mechanisms at work (my physical presence, my education, Swahili as my fourth language, and my identity as a *mzungu* and journalist turned ethnographer) (Spronk 2012, Nzegwu 2006). I would like to return to take photographs in a separate, formalised and defined fashion, offering my informants an opportunity to collaborate in the negotiation of their visual representations. There were further reasons for reticence in committing the informants to visual media: their anonymity (psuedonyms are used in this work) and ability to maintain discretion, confidentiality and secrecy lies at the heart of this study and pervades all elements of the work. Moore’s observations on the problematics of being ‘allowed in on the secret’ (2013) are especially helpful and pertinent: secrecy exists at the mundane level- for example skipping a class and remaining vague about the reasons- and at more profound levels- the need to keep face, lie about their marriages or affairs in order to maintain reputations in the much bigger project of being operational in Zanzibar life.

At the start of the fieldwork period Maryam and I would discuss what time we could meet the rest of the ‘group’. Between us we would text people, and there

was an informal understanding that she would bring anyone (female) to these discussions that she thought was appropriate. All people introduced via this way (and they are a separate group from the women in the salon) were given an explanation and research rationale for this work which continued through the length of the work: the focus of the study and the knowledge that they were free to come and go as they wished. I explained that their ideas and discussions would be recorded, transcribed and reproduced (on paper, via this thesis only) and potentially for a book, should I ever make it that far. Written agreements were not done, but over the three years the codicil "Will you put this in?" became a kind of joke… an exploration of where the boundaries lay of acceptable inclusion into academia.

The interviewees and I were all aware of the ethical issues of a study such as this: to forground younger women's opinions was controversial enough (in Zanzibar); to then ask them about politics, oppositional movements, political society and management was downright extraordinary. The more confident members of the group joked about why I wasn't focusing on the 'normal' *wazungu* concerns: HIV and gender inequality; why was I deviating from the script? This sense of doing something different and difficult injected a dynamism into the process, and consolidated the sense of trust and intimacy we felt as a group. To conflate this emotional sense of group wellbeing into intellectual rigour is erroneous: as Moore highlights, being in 'on the secret' is the ethnographer's dream, yet it is a fallacious construct, if only because I left the fieldwork sites and my identity is temporal and labile, while the informants mostly stayed on Zanzibar.

In the *uroyo* stall in the market where I conducted participant observation, I used a different methodology. Informed by Studs Terkel, I was keen to immerse myself in the atmosphere, the thick description (Geertz 1987), the incidentals: cadences of speech, what was being joked about: from here I realised how important *sauti laini* and *mutiles* are for Zanzibaris. I did not announce or explain myself and did not say I was doing research. I never asked direct questions, and positioned myself as a listener, never initiating direct or indirect questions, nor did I attempt to distract people away from the activity—whether it was quietly eating soup or discussing something with others. Inevitably these are still not 'neutral'

events: my presence engendered conflicts, self-censorship, reticence, confidence and an element of performance in others and in myself.

I never recorded at the open air cafes or at the *uroyo* stalls, as it would have been inappropriate as I was not interviewing. Instead I wrote diaries and impressions—never dialogues—of what was happening after the event.

In the hair salons—Maggies [sic] and Pinky's—I was asked directly what I was doing as soon as it became clear I was not a 'normal' tourist and was living in Zanzibar (because I was still there months later). I explained my research, trying different ways to explain what it was for, over the years I was there. The feedback of the staff was to tease me: "*How was it possible to waste time listening to women gossiping and tittle tattle in hair salons and get a qualification? Was the UK education system completely broken and mad? If this was what constituted education could I then get them degrees, since they were the ones producing the content?"*

There are beautiful prosaic layers in this quote: mockery, disbelief, possibly anger underneath the humour, knowledge of the global inqualities…women in salon say fatalistically, "*in the end it's just luck where you are born*".

This does raise uneasy issues: in the end who does own this research? Am I obliged to pay the hairdressing salon a portion of the royalties should this thesis ever get published? Hill Collins (1989) and Cohen (1990) both explore these ethical minefields…and like me, remain on the fence. Data ownership was constantly revisited as a theme, at a meta and micro level, with it being circulated knowledge that my notebooks were private, and never shown to anyone else, including other people involved in the interviews. The snowball effect of the research resulted in many interviewees knowing each other; for example the aunt of one of the younger members was interviewed. Despite risking being labelled impolite, her request to know what her neice had said was refused, with a broad smile on my face, to indicate no disrespect was intended. Personal responsibility came up as a theme often, and one of the tenets of this was an agreement that it was perfectly acceptable for me to blur the identities of the informants, (or be vague about compromising details such as where they lived or studied) for their privacy.

During the periods of watching—the participant observation—I looked at how women sought status, operated as businesswomen, interacted in public and in private, how they spoke about their lives in relation to the media representations of themselves. Inevitably the research sprawled as I attempted to map boundaries on subjects as diverse as domestic abuse, working lives, childcare, American presidential elections and Chinese flowers.

The ethics for this period of the research were particularly challenging: first because what was being discussed was very sensitive (domestic abuse, infidelities) and required privacy, and total discipline on my part about never talking about my work during social times. I did not socialise with my informants; Zanzibar's complex social and geographical topography means it would have been very easy for word to spread I was being indiscreet. The confidentialty of the informants, respecting their dignity, the investment they had in their reputations on the island, was one of the key elements of this work.

Secondly, the lines between social talk and research were diffuse and muddled. I deliberately underplayed the formality of my research, and made it 'fit' to the informal style I was seeking. Topics such as class, wealth, sexuality and sexual choices were, in contrast to Brah's experience (2004) not problematic to raise in this non-English environment. What was more ethically difficult was my own growing anger at the disconnect between how these women were represented (in their own local media, and internationally) and how I experienced them. Madison (2012) writes of a similar process, the inability to remain neutral, uninvolved, a frustration with the limits of Northern Academes discussions of what I was experiencing, and a desire to an advocate, and 'tell it like it is'.

Thirdly, all the salon workers became my friends: whilst the clients came and went (and with only two exceptions where formal permissions were gained, I never used what they said anyway) but over the course of three years on Zanzibar the five staff who worked there were my constants. Moore writes of the difficulties in explaining her acceptance to her colleagues (if not agreement and collusion with) some of the practices that she has been involved in. I too occupy an unhappy relativist space, where, as a bi-cultural feminist educated in the UK, I am happy to wholeheartedly accept and explore why the burkah or the Koran is useful,

meaningful and productive for people in my study, and explore their versions of agency theorietically backed up by El Tayeb (2006) Chakrabarty (2012) and Mahmood (2006).

As the research progressed, there was a constant insistence on 'real life' from the informants. This hinted at submerged performances (Butler 1997), or back faces (Goffman 1963) that were struggling to surface. I recognized undercurrents, important taboos that provided context for how to be a good girl (something the informants referred to directly) and offered prompts for questions or suggestions of discussions. Ethically this called for discretion, tact and dignity which was (verbally and demonstratively) emphasised in all collective and individual discussions. In practical terms this meant never repeating another person's interview, or showing anyone (not even the supervisors!) my transcripts.

Infidelity, divorce, domestic violence and same sex relationships are prevalent practices in Zanzibar and key topics for the informants. Community Watch (*Askari Jamaani*) and *Sheha* police these issues, both literally and via discourse. Punishments and opprobrium are meted out via these locally-formed organisations. There exist no forums, formal societies, associations or rights-based advocacy groups for any of these issues. To be unmarried or single is considered a curse; a failure, something to be pitied—yet many women are in fact single in practice (Haram 2004). Lesbianism and homosexuality are technically illegal in Zanzibar, yet it is an open secret that of the President's ten children, one is a gay man and another a lesbian. Sex outside marriage is illegal in Zanzibar, yet affairs are common. The *AskariJammani*, (a self-appointed taskforce, literally the community soldiers) stoned a man and women to death for having an adulterous affair in 2008 on Pemba, according to local talk. Beckmann (2009) cites a case of a young woman staying out all night with a lover twice her age, who lost her job and was ostracised as a result of her infidelities, and was socially vilified and accused of being HIV positive.

Ethically I called on my training as a youth worker, where brokering difficult and emotionally charged conversations was standard, as was working with people who were undertaking illegal activities. In Zanzibar I tried to encourage women to talk to each other and consider setting up informal mechanisms to deal with

domestic violence. Several sessions were spent explaining how Women's Aid and Rape Crisis (NGO's in the UK) function, with some participants exploring how to adapt it for Zanzibar. I never directly intervened, took a leadership role, called the police, or broke confidentiality.

Ground rules were reiterated (avoid defaming or insulting others, avoid overtly critical talk of others, let people talk, try not to interupt) and often revisited, within the group discussions with younger women. We stressed the importance of malicious rumours, or implicating others in what would potentially be libellous, and I made it very clear that the research time was not a place to badmouth others, nor to take the material we'd talked about into different spheres, as this would break emerging trust bonds and jeapordise the entire process. Similarly I made it very clear it was possible to interrogate me about all the subjects I was raising, and attempted to be as honest as possible about my own positions and thoughts on the issues we were talking about, including in the later years, disagreeing with them. Trying to 'turn the microphone back on myself' is a nod to destabilising the inherent power inequalities in the ethnographer/researched relationship and reinstating some parity. It is impossible to judge how effective it was, or whether it is little more than feelgood exercise which does little to mitigate against the fictive narratives of race, (El-Tayeb 2006) global structural violence (Chaball 2009, Ferguson 2005) and globalisation that prevents any real power for women as peripheral as this (Spivak 1989, Freidmann 2005,Willems 2011). The structurations of colonial power, and performances as white subjects are still largely un-interogated or discussed in Zanzibar, thus to actively destabilise these in the research process was energising and new for all of us.

The informants began to relish and enjoy the chance to ask me difficult questions (about my sexual relationships, my family relationships.) Again communalities may have helped to erode the mystique (for the participants) of the aloof, cultured and flawless other. On the other hand, as Moore (ibd) suggests, they may be delusions to sweeten the pill of total imbalance.

Bartering, corruption and informal economies emerged as intricately bound to all aspects of women's lives (Gupta 2012). Unlike the other themes these matters were always referred to obliquely, or actually observed rather than

discussed. For example at the hair salons various people got reduced prices (including me after six months, as I was such a regular) as favours were called in. Unless one looks for it, bartering is disguised; slightly more change is returned than is necessary, or a bill is waived till a later date. It took me two years to realise how central this practice is to Zanzibar society[17] and the revelation had major implications: it became clear that at the heart of this research lay trust. Bartering, doing favours and gossiping feed into bigger conversations of corruption, social capital and status—on national and local levels—which involve favours and money being exchanged, reputations being managed and status negotiated. These are dealt with in more detail in the findings chapters. Bartering and corruption are some of the many unarticulated assumptions in Zanzibar that the media often fails to address.

This presented ethical problems as the consequences of a developing relationship within the research context implied to the interviewees that I was available for other tasks/advice/loans of money, as reciprocal arrangement. Again this required consideration and thought and managing expectations of the relationship: the risk of having favourites, or prioritising certain interviewees was real. I had to be careful that all 'advantages' of research and of me as a person were distributed equally. I also became aware that as a white, Northern academic with good Swahili, I was a trophy for my Zanzibar friends, and imbued *them* with social capital and cache (Osella 2010). I side-stepped lending money, to anyone, ever, as it would entirely complicate matters.

Over the course of the fieldwork all the informants had a relative or friend who was directly or indirectly affected by the violence of the last election. These are problematic areas of conversation, and often completely taboo. Politics was discussed only by people who considered each other trusted intimates, and not in public spaces. Again this required understanding of the culture of spying and fear on the island in order to make ehthically informed decisions about what to raise where and with whom. It took several years before my presence was tolerated during discussions on local politics. The electricity failure was one of the rare occasions where national and local politics were considered in public spaces.

The Electricity failure occurred between October 2009 and February 2010 and sparked a permissive quality to discussions in previously taboo political areas: suddenly strangers, taxi drivers and friends spontaneously started vocalizing their critiques and annoyance with state provision and government. Radio stations were suddenly thrumming with callers, all complaining about the failures of the local leaders to maintain Zanzibar's independent power supply, and this actual power failure prompted obvious metaphors with discursive understandings of power[18]. This communal event exposed and brought attention to what is 'allowed' to be said in public and moments when these rules can be transgressed.

2.1.5 The Locations of interviews

2.1.6 Participant observation sites.

Outside family groups and the *madrassa*, women do not meet in public for social reasons. It was easy to locate women in public, but difficult to talk or listen to them: the obvious places to consider participant observation were hair salons and specific cafés where women meet for lunch and breakfast.

I conducted participant observation in three sites: Maggies Saloon [sic], Pinky's Saloon and the Uroyo soup stall in the main market. I chose Maggies in Hurumzi, because it is one of the most established, oldest streets in Zanzibar, because it has a regular and consistent clientele of women I would struggle to access in any other way— Zanzibari women in their mid-thirties to late sixties, married, affluent, middle class. Maggies is a cramped ground floor room set back from the street; no windows, about fifteen feet square, with ten chairs and a sofa in it. There is a TV in the corner which is always on if there is electricity. Families have stayed in the same houses on this street for generations. Despite the upsurge of small tourist 'curio' shops, Hurumzi remains, unlike the streets around it, one of the most unchanged streets over the last fifteen years[19]. After six months the salon women teased me, joked and bantered, an approach I later found very common amongst close friends and an oblique form of acceptance. I did no formal interviewing in the salon, staying for up to three hours listening to the almost

constant teasing and joking about who was having an affair with whom, and the latest scandals.

The salon had the Filipino soap opera *Promise* playing for a year of my fieldwork during my visits. Clients and hairdressers alike discussed the narratives, the dilemmas the characters faced, and the 'reality' of the situations presented, whilst I took notes.

Pinky's Saloon is nearer the main market, in Stone Town, in one room (attached to an outside toilet and small courtyard) with windows that are covered. The salon has no sign, and is less tucked away in a side street than Maggies. Pinky's is also a single, dark room of about two by four metres, with an erratic electricity supply, mirrors, six hair-dressing chairs, a concrete floor, a hair dryer and no television. It has one sink, and Pinky works alone, although there is a cleaner who comes at the end of the day. Pinky is in her late twenties, and her clientele would identify themselves as modern, cosmopolitan and urbane—often single women or newly engaged, they talk often of travel (to India, Oman, Dubai). They work—in IT, hospitality or import/export—and are more markedly influenced by ideas, fashions, ephemera, cultural flows and global scapes (Appudarai 1996, Lee 2002) from beyond Zanzibar. The cramped layout of the room means that the salon services—haircuts, dyes, straightening, weaves, extensions and braiding, tweezering and hair removal—are all performed in very intimate circumstances. Unlike Maggies, where treatments are done on a bed in a separate room (which has no door, and is in full view), there are no cubicles or curtains and everything is done in full sight of everyone else. In some respects this pronounced visibility, the 'we-ness' (Schulz 2012) of women all being naked together, enhances the meaning and constitution of privacy as communal, female affair.

At no point in the year I spent in Pinky's did men ever set foot in this space. It was firmly declaimed as female. The casting off of veils, *buyibuyi*, shoes and nudity (women often sat in their underwear) proclaimed this whole salon off-limits to men. In both salons the busiest times were late afternoons towards the end of the week, which is when I would attend. I tried to keep my visits to a maximum of two three hour slots a week, partly because the salon was physically airless and hot and it was too hard and tiring to take notes after a few hours. I always had a 'treatment'

of some sort—a pedicure, a leg wax or an eyebrow threading whilst I was doing participant observation, which always took several hours, including the wait to get served. Though I explained several times over the years what I was doing, I am not sure it was ever really understood, partly because I wasn't always clear myself which direction the research was taking, but also because I had no desire to create an 'answer-shaped-space' where they told me what they thought I would want to hear. Both salons are small, so being an onlooker would have been uncomfortable, and would have deprived the hairdressers of valuable clients. I started by taking notes concurrently at the salons, but soon came to realise that I was able to listen for half an hour, write the conversations down, and then listen some more.

The conversation, banter and gossip in the salon were at times bawdy, sexual and innuendo-laden. Jibes about love-making techniques and sexual generosity (fucking for favours) were commonplace: this was a female space, almost 'laddish' in its timbre. In contrast such attributes were never shown at the café, and women did not remove their veils, as they did in the salons.The endless gossip about who was doing what became centred and less peripheral (although it is extremely difficult to replicate the gossip in transcripts), forcing a re-evaluation of its role for women (for example playing an extremely important role in a quasi-democratic process), running completely parallel yet outside the actual institutional legal process.

Another space for participant observation was Mahmoodi's *uroyo* stall, an outdoor café in the central market area of Stone Town. The stall is one of many, but considered to be the 'queen' of the *uroyo* stalls for its superior recipes (which are secret and uniquely Zanzibari). The stall is a public place and anyone is free to come and eat. The soup is 500 TZ shillings (about 25 pence) a bowl, and people of all social classes and ages eat there. *Uroyo* is a uniquely Zanzibar soup, made of potatoes, cassava, mango, ginger and with grated lettuce and cabbage sprinkled on top.

Mahmoodi's excellent cooking, the quality of his ingredients and his relaxed attitude to women eating at his stall, are, so people tell me, the reason he is 'apparently a millionaire'. When I started fieldwork in 2008 it was the only eating

place where women sat and ate publicly. Mahmoodi's has a cooking area, covered with tarpaulin, and no tables. People sit eating from their laps.

The wooden seating, the tarpaulin shading the diners from the sun (and the rain in the rainy season) is arranged to provide space for women and men. Women of all ages and social classes drift through between 8am and midday, and then the lunch shift starts. This time was an opportunity for me to just absorb, watch and observe in a very general way and to see how women behaved in public. What was noticeable was how they didn't stand and talk in the open: men tended to sit away from the women at the café, physically separated by a large brazier on which the cooking took place. The chefs (all male) were the only people allowed into the women's seating areas, apart from small boys. This space came to resonate for its uniqueness on Zanzibar: it was simultaneously a private space and a public one.

Two years later, in April 2014, there are a few more places women can eat (in the daytime at least; the logics of night spaces are completely different), but still the *uroyo* stalls are often mostly silent, and conversation extremely stifled, for fear of being overheard. The logic of trying to undertake participant observation in a place where women rarely talk is not obvious: however at the time it was so striking to see women together, in groups, in public, that it was enough just to watch this and notice body language. I never interviewed anyone at this site.

2.1.7 The interviews, discussions and group meetings

The location of interviews and group meetings was dictated by physical and social constraints. There are no public halls, rooms or enclosed spaces where privacy could be guaranteed or that were free to use in Stone Town. The majority of the informants had no disposable income, even the bus fare to and from the venue (about twenty pence) was problematic for them over a protracted period. It was important to choose a place within walking distance of the main residential areas that also guaranteed discretion. Maryam and I discussed an appropriate venue in a central location that would be suitable for teenagers and younger women to come to together which would not draw attention to them, or make them the subject of gossip and conjecture. None of the women in this core group were married, and

their virtue and reputations, during the fieldwork and beyond, required maintenance.

I mentioned my problem of finding a venue to the owner of a local teashop that also sells art, sculpture and curios. Her teashop is behind the market, in the centre of Stone Town, in a neighbourhood that is considered conservative and respectable (there are three mosques in a two hundred metre radius, and it is a middle class Zanzibar residential neighbourhood). She had a spacious back room with seating which was rarely used by customers. It was offered to us, and I bought sodas and snacks from her, so the meetings were sociable. The discussions mostly took place after 4pm, when the heat and humidity became less aggressive and people had completed their studies or work. Some of the informants said they told family members they were studying with a *mzungu*, improving their English, rather than participating in research.

For other interviews—all the women over forty for example—I went to their houses at their invitation, and we chatted in their lounges with no-one else present. For individual interviews with younger women, they came to my house which had a large garden wall surrounding it, was set back from the road and was completely private. It also had a big open-air patio and a large open plan lounge: thus there was a selection of spaces where people could gather and congregate socially or pursue their own projects if they wished. My decision to have a large, accessible space with no landlord or Zanzibar family on the premises was deliberate: the first six months I lived on the top floor of a family house: I found the interventions and discussion about my 'private home' life very intrusive and disruptive[20]. Though the patio had no roof or door, it was interesting to note that all the covered informants disrobed (took off their headscarves, outer layers of dress, shoes and unfastening constrictive clothing) on entering, marking it as a private space. A total of fourteen discussions took place here, but more commonly we would meet in town, in the backroom of the tea room.

None of the younger women under twenty ever invited me to her home. Three interviews, with Ba, La and C L, took place in public spaces—the Milimani shopping centre and the Pearl Beach Hotel in Dar es Salaam. In all cases this was predicated by work and childcare obligations. All the interviews with men took

place in their offices, apart from Idi, who talked to me over three years as we drove in his taxi around Zanzibar.

2.2 Methodology: Putting Theory into Practice

2.2.1 Definitions and Terms

Spronk (2012: 39) outlines the three components of good ethnographic practice: checking the validity of the data, creating the intervieweer/subject rapport, and substantiating the consistencies and inconsistencies of narratives and thoughts offered in the context of fieldwork. In this section I will explore and expand upon Spronk's definitions in an attempt to unmask the practice of fieldwork and writing (Clifford and Marcus 1986).

My dominant way of working is based on extensive participant observation and informal 'interviews' (unplanned, *in situ*, arising as and when they do). I use the word interview to indicate a general conversation which I focus on or direct, rather than just listen. However, this does not imply having a preordained set of questions, surveys, or indeed privacy and a one-to-one situation. Additionally, ethnography typically relies on the methods of noting, listening, or recording which way the conversations go (Hobart 2000, 1997) and analysing them later. Within the rich pickings of subject matter, the challenge for me was to find a way of sifting out themes, identifying criteria for relevance and underpinning all of this with a solid theoretical foundation. Additionally, I ideally wanted to highlight subjects which provoked disagreements or which were discussed extensively, or 'structures of feeling' (Williams 1967) which illustrated areas of tension and offered revealing clues as to the contested areas of life for my informants.

This qualitative ethnographic work identified themes and undercurrents in the conversations generated by media amongst audiences: I have rejected the term *audiences* in favour of *informants*, as this work is not based in linguistic, cultural or textual studies (Ong 1975:9)[21] and the use of the term *informants* suggests greater agency and dialogic engagement with the media. The informants are *also* audiences, and are 'sociocentric' (Spitulnik 2000: 339) not ego-centric or subject-centric, moving away from a Western reading of audiences that prioritises the self, and the personal character or characteristics (Ang 1996, Ong 2002). These

informants (audiences) are very firmly located as real people, in real life, with a combination of multiple identities in which media features—sometimes as a central animator, sometimes more peripherally.

Similarly, the word *media* is problematic: is it all-encompassing, essentialising, vague, polyvocal entity (Madianou 2012) or a single, bound physical thing or unit, in a particular place? Is 'old media' the actual physical TV set, the radio that relates to 'The Castellian Future of Connectivity' (Slater 2013). Or is media a term that includes the studio, the legitimising of certain language, the limits the producers set on political power, business, a particular DJ or a particular programme? Turning specifically to radio—even if one defines which channels or stations are being investigated—they are, as Spitulnik (1994) definitively notes, not phenomena. Neither the media nor the audiences are fixed essential mediums with distinct identities (Hobart 1996).

Slater's definition of the Ecology of Media (2012, 2013)[22] rejects the Universalist Northern episteme's fascination with particular material media products (or artefacts) and the discourse around globalisation and development, arguing instead for a process of media assemblage as symbolic material resources: a range of media—the internet, mobile phones and radio broadcasts—which fulfil particular roles and provide prompts for particular subjectivities (both communally and individually).

Spitulnik's work (1994, 2000) resonates with my approach not only because she is dealing with radio listening practices in Zambia, but because she recognises that some questions are effectively unanswerable. For example, what constitutes research? What epistemological, ontological and practical restraints are there to research? At what point are the informants and the researcher 'off duty'? How does one turn a bundle of random conversations, dense descriptions and observations over a long period of time into a theoretical whole? When we talk of radio, or media, what do we mean? The actual physical set, the studio, the legitimating of certain language, the limits the producers set on political power, the business, a particular news broadcaster or programme?

'The media' is often equally hard for my informants to define, and for this work the 'ecology of media' (Slater 2012) includes mobile phones, newspapers,

internet, satellite news and films, Hindi films or imported women's magazines. The polyvocal media (Madianou 2012) is multifaceted, speaking from many platforms with many voices… an interlacing of internet, texting, and radio, so locating the exact source is impossible. More important is the new relationship between the social and technology: what moral, social and practical consequences are there on existing relationships when different medias are chosen? The media becomes a vehicle for the future, for change, for religion, for clues as how to behave. As Slater (2008) explores, its very specificity remains elusive. The media's function is more akin to a quasi-religious transformative process; 'the connection of things'—the actual cost of the TV for example, the ritual of watching as a group (when there is electricity available), the 'event' of discussing the programme, is much bigger than any of these single components.

These questions are never wholly resolved, and compromises exist throughout the whole process. Perhaps only by 'unmasking the ethnographic process' (Clifford 1986) as authors, acknowledging the 'symbolic domination' (Bourdieu 1977), the subjugated knowledges (Foucault 1980) and power embedded in the research process do we move towards addressing this.

2.2.2 Studying Media

The informants state that local media (internet, satellite stations, national TV and radio) does not address their real life concerns, and this section explores what these concerns are. There is a lacuna of stories relevant to women (which is teased apart in detail in Chapters Four and Five[23]). Theorising conversations around media usage is equally problematic. At what point does a conversation become prompted by the media? A rhetorical question; there is no beginning or end point for the media, neither is there a beginning or end point for a conversation. The artificiality of the interview situation, or even the transitory moment of participant observation, is a moment in time, and the research must be viewed with this in mind. The media is treated as being muddily involved with people's lives, popping up here and there, interwoven within the context of many other practical, political, social and conceptual concerns, not as a linear dart cleanly penetrating a one-dimensional canvas of predictable routine.

Nominating *when* and *at which point* people become listeners, consumers or producers of meaning (Ang 1991 and Morley 1990) is clearly not possible. The informants are people with rich and diverse lives who sometimes listen to the radio, scour the internet, text their lovers, friends or family. Within the nominative hierarchy of consumer, listener and audience I do not imbue any one term with a higher value than others. However, with the rise of consumer agendas and the growth of market research, there is a temptation to link the notion of audience with that of consumer, or focus on consumption and everyday practices (De Certeau 1984, Sabry 2010, Asad 2009) and with that attach an implied inherent agency—albeit a rather contrived market agency—which is only to purchase. The other problems associated with using the 'consumption' lens for a radio programme or pamphlet are the practical constraints of concentration and the fact that people are doing other things whilst they watch, listen or read the media (Ang 1991, Morley 1990.)

I argue that for this work, the decoding, (Hall 1980, 1997) interpretation or nominative hailing (Althusser 1970) is firmly taking place in social contexts which guide the conversations. In other words, the media takes second place to the more powerful forces of social acceptability and opprobrium, 'fitting in' and shame and reputations. Unlike Spitulnik (2000) and Schulz (1999, 2012) I do not accept that technology—the material physicality of the media, whether it was a radio or a laptop or an i-phone—is especially important for this study, rather it is the way that media embodies ideologies of status and modernity (Larkin 1999) and possibilities of change—metaphysical and actual (Slater 2008)—travel, fantasy and mobility (Archambault 2010, Baumann 2000).

I have determinedly avoided terms like 'listening habits' or 'television preferences' or 'media discussions', because defining a habit or preference suggests regular listening or a way of listening that incorporates other activities taking place at a particular time. Media discussions imply that the discussion is bounded, essentialised, neat, and only concerns media, which is not the case here. The message or meaning of this media is not a single directed one (Hobart 2002), and language is never a transparent vehicle or conveyor of meanings, as many analysts have established (Ang 1991). The 'gaze'—the view from which one stands

(Radway 1994, Columpar 2002)—both as consumer (or audience, or informant) and author, and the positionality of the author must be dissected and laid bare.

Almost all my interviews were conducted in Swahili with a translator present. The interviews were recorded, although inevitably meanings and nuances have been lost or misread in translation. As the study progressed, I began to actively seek out patterns and repetitions in themes, replication and order, and this is a contrived process. The results of interviews are so varied, complicated and diverse that inevitably in order to impose order I have had to accept this process, which is an artificial construct, or jettison the idea of a cohesive body of research. I have chosen the former.

I cannot categorically argue for a process of understanding what the media is, or does, for these informants. I cannot talk of 'identification' either of the actual audiences or of identification and understanding between my informants and the media, or between the informants and myself, as this suggests a fixed sense of identity that is acted upon, brought into being by the act of experiencing the media. So, whilst the paucity of language will probably lead me to use words such as 'identity', it's done with the caveat of knowing that the hypodermic 'cause-effect' model of watching, receiving and discussing (with me or others) can in no way be satisfactorily described as identification. Similarly I use words like 'representation' or 'discourse', knowing well that however much they fail me, they will have to do.

To argue that there is a substantial 'essence' (of an individual, a group or an opinion) that can be arrived at, or a 'window' that can be viewed through (which somehow privileges the anthropologist with her extra special ability to see or know Moore 2013) is patently erroneous. Equally, arguments around representation and ventriloquism (Ferguson 2002) cover similar territory. There is no way I am representing informants or their opinions, instead I am writing down a version of a moment in time when they were saying or expressing a particular idea. And what I write is my understanding and interpretation of it. It's not just that language or metaphors fail us, it's that we are forced to face the inadequacies of our own subjectivities and the restrictions of reflecting and describing what we see, hear,

touch and feel around us—let alone what our informants see, hear, touch, and feel. As TS Eliot eloquently puts it:

And so each venture
Is a new beginning, a raid on the inarticulate
With shabby equipment always deteriorating
In the general mess of imprecision of feeling,
Undisciplined squads of emotion.
- Eliot, *Four Quartets (East Coker)* 1969

2.2.3 What is ethnography?

There are two over-arching problems with ethnography: there is no clear consensus about what it is (Anthropology is what anthropologists do [Geertz 1977]) and many of the theoretical problems concerning interpretative practice, meaning, representation, bias, authorship, embedded power relationships and influence are in my view unresolvable.

Spitulnik describes ethnography as three things:

1. A research method, however problematic, of participant observation or participant intervention, which is part of a long term immersion in the daily practices of a single community.
2. A writing method of detailed documentary description
3. A topical or analytical focus on the 'taken for granted' (or lived reality) and the 'everyday' (or ongoing practices) of a particular people.
- Spitulnik 1994[24]

I have adopted all three of Spitulnik's definitions, but all require further clarification.

The numerous debates over ethnography itself (Clifford 1988) are often presented as reinterpretations of old issues (Spitulnik 2000: 337). The act of struggling for a definition of ethnography is in itself a hugely powerful act. 'Ethnography is not simply a collection of the exotic "other"; it is reflective of our

own lives and cultural practices even when discussing another culture' (Tomaselli 2008: 352). Being an ethnographer is already an embodiment of power, the manifestation of the ability to detach, observe, retract, think, analyse, organise and ontologically define, control and manipulate from a social, geographic, political, academic and intellectual position. (Prus 1999: 5)[25]

Then there is the fusing of disciplines, the reckless disregard for subject areas:

> *Many anthropologists have an aversion to the policing of disciplinary borders. They draw broadly from comparative literature, cultural studies, critical race theory, gender studies, performance studies, philosophy, post-colonial studies, queer theory and social history. Efforts to determine what is or is not media 'anthropology' may be viewed as insular and self-defeating.*
>
> - Peterson 2003: 339[26]

With all this at the forefront, the added complexity of physical removal from the site of the fieldwork, my emotional detachment from conversations, the more theoretical I am, the greater the distance between 'what happened' and my theorising of it, the greater the opportunity becomes for fantasy, invention and contrivance. As John Berger eloquently puts it:

> *What separates us from the characters about whom we write is not knowledge, either objective or subjective, but their experience of time in the story we are telling. This separation allows us, the storytellers, the power of knowing the whole. Yet, equally, this separation renders us powerless: we cannot control our characters, after the narration has begun …..The time, and therefore the story, belongs to them. Yet the meaning of the story, what makes it worthy of being told, is what we can see and what inspires us because we are beyond its time. Those who read or listen to our stories see everything as through a lens. This lens is the secret of narration, and it is ground anew in every story, ground between the temporal and the*

timeless. If we storytellers are Death's Secretaries, we are so because, in our brief mortal lives, we are grinders of these lenses

- Berger 1984, 30–31

There are contradictions, inconsistencies and diversions in the findings. When the informants' responses and information does not fit with a line of reasoning or a particular theoretical stance I have included it anyway: it is in the paradoxes and tensions of ideas that the real substance lies. Similarly even acknowledging the diversity of informants, the complexity of lives they live, the myriad processes and dynamics they engender, create, and are living within, the very act of writing down their conversations, removing them from the immediacy and the vitality of the actual moment adds a layer of deception, if not sterility. Donham (1999) expresses this well (and very amusingly)—returning to the Nuer studied by Evans Pritchard he is at a complete loss as to where this 'harmonious' society that Evans Pritchard rhapsodises about and packages neatly into an essay. If anything, he sees extensive domestic abuse. Like Parker (1999) he concludes that ethnography is more a reflection of bringing to the fore the concerns of the writer and her society, not the one she is writing about during fieldwork.

I have used the term, 'ethnographic interviews', but not in the sense given to the term by US anthropologist James Spradley, who coined the expression. He uses the term to describe a culture. In contrast, Mol suggests that the term ethnographic interviews should mean that the interviewees themselves become ethnographers (Spradley 2002: 15). In other words they observe and describe what is happening and accord agency in the construction of the ethnography. Furthermore, Mol replaces the concept of tacit knowledge with embedded knowledge in her analysis…

…to denote knowledge accumulated in various parts of an action net, created by the actions of the producers, their suppliers, and their clients, which is activated by each of them for the purpose at hand without the need for anybody to master the whole of it.

- Czarniawska (2012: 129)

2.2.4 Being the Author/Ethics

Hartstock (1983) developed an episteme that was significantly expanded upon by Patricia Hill Collins (1990)[27] and Sandra Harding (1991). These early proponents acknowledge the subjectivity of the author and the power processes implicit in the academic project. Furthermore, they condone being actively self-reflexive about the ongoing impact of being the author and manipulating the material for particular epistemological ends. This process is spectacularly acute for me, since I am used to the process of making broadcast documentaries, turning this sort of raw material into media, and not fashioning and reworking it for academic ends.

Thus the subjectivities of who I am—female, a child of political exiles, educated in Europe and of mixed race parentage, a twenty-seven year career as a national journalist working in Africa—are important, because they are the consequence of a dialogic process: my presence significantly alters the empirical findings I gathered: another person, at another time, with the same informants, would not get these findings. At least five times in the fieldwork period I worked for international media: I was known as both a researcher and a journalist. This would have increased my social capital but also inspired fear and caution amongst informants. Therefore I use the first person, the grounding 'I', aware that I am an intersectional, knowing, self-reflexive being, just as my informants are. As Moore (2013) notes, much of my identity and agency is dependent on my role of ethnographer *being seen* to be able to manage secrecy and trust.

Like Hill Collins, I use extensive detailed reproduction of my informants' conversations, their dialogues. Hill Collins developed these ideas further by concentrating on the conflicts between herself and the informants, focussing on their resentment of her class and adademia in general. Her informants question, fairly aggressively at times, her right to use them for furthering her career, when they are stuck at the bottom of the socio-economic pile. So in some respects her work comes a full circle: once again the anthropologists' notebooks take centre stage. I do not do this—because there were no vocalised conflicts, although the one 'disagreement' with Oi about the Koran is replicated in detail.

There is no single unified identity of the informants, and even by reproducing the conversations—or fragments of them—the implied essentialized 'authorship' of

this process is misleading…. Hill Collins advocates taking down the informants transcripts of the events too, and getting their versions of what is happening simultaneously. I have not done this because of time constraints. Perhaps what is striking about Hill Collins's work is that by pushing for as much transparency in the process as possible, she creates the conditions for obvious trust, and in what is clearly a dynamic relationship the possibility for blips, contradictions and change is embodied in the work. In this I have tried to copy both authors' methods: perhaps the richest material emerges when I begin—late in the fieldwork—to challenge the informants' received and conventional understandings of the Koran, and to be fairly tenacious in my disagreements.

2.2.5 Trust, Intimacy and Research

The ethical issues of using information from informants that has been given in a particular circumstance and then used by academics in a completely different one for a completely different purpose are complex. As Les Back so poignantly puts it: 'All research is an act of betrayal' (Back 2007).

If one tries to factor in the possibility of change, trust becomes further compromised[28]. The fact that enough trust was established to argue with my subjects leaves me paradoxically feeling a sense of pride: over the three years some of the subjects—Deddah, Mt, Oi and Mm in particular—became good friends. They are people I still keep in touch with, and I have attended their weddings. Like all ethnographers I indulge and delude myself that I 'got closer' than others have previously, I was 'let inside' in ways that are hard to achieve (Moore 2013). But despite my fantastical delusions, the ethical issues are still pertinent. It might be accurate to describe some of this PhD as the work of woman raised in London who made friends with women in Zanzibar of similar ages, educational levels and aspirations.

However, a more realistic version is that a great deal of thought and work went into designing research questions (all of which were abandoned as oblique and irrelevant) and thinking through the bias, misrepresentations and slants my presence would consciously or unconsciously impose, and the global structurations imposed on us. This thesis is the reflection of significant interventions by

interviewing men (expanded upon in more detail later), older women, younger women, women who came from rural backgrounds and women who had a high profile socially, economically and professionally[29].

Trust remains a huge component of this study, and is key to relationships in Zanzibar. It is maintained in very real and obvious ways—by not disclosing names or identities of informants to each other, by honouring the confidentiality of informants, by turning up on time and by being available, and by not getting angry or irritable when people failed to turn up (which happened often in the first six months, and was a struggle). Trust was also manifested—and created—in much more subtle ways: by changing my sexual behaviour, my clothes, my leisure habits, and ultimately by letting some of the informants into my life as much as they let me into theirs.

At the beginning of the research it proved very difficult to meet women and develop a level of intimacy and trust. There is a startling lack of Zanzibar-based ethnography; Askew (2002) Beckmann (2009) Caplan (2004) and Beckerleg (2004) are notable exceptions who have done extensive ethnographies in this archipelago. The obvious reason for this is that Zanzibar society is a very challenging one into which to gain access, both literally and geographically. Until ten years ago almost no part of the island had any useable roads. Flights were expensive, ferries dangerous, unreliable and slow. Even with the coming of better infrastructures, other complexities have arisen.

Trust is important in this society. To become 'known' by Zanzibaris, to be more than just another tourist, is a long and complicated journey (a potential future ethnography would be to focus on attitudes to tourism amongst Zanzibaris). To undertake ethnographic research has many parallels with Cohen's work on high level cocaine dealers. The rituals, performances, tests, conversations and paths that have to be navigated before people start talking, opening up their private spaces and moving beyond the public performances, is notable.

Cohen's sociological ethnographic work on Chicago drug addicts (Cohen 1990, 2009) was illuminating, validating and inspirational. In it she describes the process of performing an ethnography of her next door neighbours, and the highly tenuous nature of the trust developed, plus the tensions of being both inside and outside

the research project (insofar as she was not a drug user, but was witness to many illegal activities, and was required by her informants to be entirely trustworthy and not report their activities to the police). Like Moore (2013) She also describes the fascinating process of the muddying of boundaries between personal and academic life, and the fact she was never 'off duty'—a feeling I experienced very strongly.

I lived in Zanzibar during the fieldwork: I visited Maggies Saloon, the outdoor café and markets as part of the mechanics of living: after only a few months I realised I was never 'off duty': any interaction could be fuel for my fieldwork. It required discipline and honesty on my part to divulge that this was happening to informants, even when it was not necessarily in my best interests to do so. This is not however participatory research as outlined by Cornwall and Jewkes (1997). Much of the discussions with Pinky, Hatoumi and others in the saloon took place whilst she was painting my fingernails. Again, in the context of 'being a customer' I heard and watched hundreds of hours of valuable discussions and gossip[30].

It is important to stress that the only people quoted in this work are those who were expressly asked their permission, and explained the purposes of the work, and not incidental passers-by, clients or customers in the salon. Some of my interviewees at times appeared to fear controversy or talking in ways that would compromise group identity or draw attention to themselves. Facebook, for example, was not often utilised by the informants at the time of my research, largely because the time and money they wished to spend in internet cafes was used to investigate current affairs or academic scholarships. Facebook is a medium undertaken in private by the writer, but very much a public event. This Facebook comment from Aa (one of my informants) in 2011 is an example: 'You might call me uncivilised or disgusting because I think homosexuality is wrong and depraved. I don't care, I am willing to stand alone in this one!' She knows that what she has written will be talked about in 'real life' beyond Facebook, and may have consequences for her.

Interviewees were also sometimes unsure of how to express what they were saying as a complete sentence, leaving it to be inferred, or looking to the group, and me, to fill in the gaps, with the understanding that we 'knew' the answer, or that this was a composite process of accumulated responses. The temptation then

was for me to butt in, to add the extra phrases they appeared to be searching for. I resisted this, but it required me to monitor my reactions carefully. This process indicates the level of learning and self-reflexivity occurring, the very process of collectively building the responses, as important as the words that were actually said.

With this in mind, my presence often required a great deal of reassurance: reassuring people I wouldn't judge them, pass the information on to their friends, or use it inappropriately. Les Back's words came back to haunt me many times. In some ways I tried as much as possible to mimic my informants: my clothes were long, covering my body, I wore Hejab (not a burkah), I shopped and ate locally. I never fraternised with or greeted men in public, and was very clear with the few older male friends I had (and relied on) that they assumed a more avuncular attitude towards me. I had never been a fan of the Western bars or the party scene on the island, and the transient world of the tourist was now completely out of my ambit, as it was my informants'. During the fieldwork I remained single and celibate, a conscious choice to respect and reflect to my informants that I understood their values of sexual purity.

However, the minutiae of creating intimacy, of allowing the people I was studying to do something other than just focus all their attentions on me, does not detract from what are some fairly serious barriers to trust. I am not Zanzibari, I am pale olive brown, of mixed race heritage. I am tall and plump, *I look different*. Despite my long association with Zanzibar, I am clearly an outsider. Literally everything I say and do indicates my outsider status: using Butler and Haraway's (1991) theoretical loci, I am the embodiment of "other-ness". Given that at times this work considers notions of outsider-ness and othering, it is of course essential to acknowledge how given even the many ways that people 'say what the researcher needs to hear' on Zanzibar, this is compounded by their own experiences of negotiating outsiders.

Academic neutrality became (and continues to become) a rather laughable pretence: my very presence was a distance-creating mechanism, before I even open my mouth. My understanding of Zanzibar culture (limited or not), and my linguistic proficiency will never change the constants for my informants: I am an

outsider, I am foreign, a *mzungu*. I have had (and will continue to have) a reality outside the island that none of my informants can check, although I can check theirs. This is an ontological barrier that is very hard to quantify or demarcate. The literature on 'whiteness' and privilege (Dyer 1997) explores the privileged platform from which we work, and I believe this goes deeper than simply acknowledging there is a Eurocentric bias, but explores problematic (and I believe insoluble) issues around the schisms created in the process because of my colour and my physical embodiment of so many intersectional colonial narratives.

At the beginning of the research I exploited the novelty value of being a *mzungu* researcher who spoke good Swahili, and used this as a way to strike up conversations. As the research progressed, the strategies to maintain trust became far more sophisticated. I was very flexible about where we met, I accepted invitations to birthdays, marriages and funerals, and made a point of not probing if people cancelled, but accepting their decisions. I also tried hard to respond to their conversational tacks, and to always remember that people are essentially shy, and quite intimidated by *Wazungu*.

All the people in this work knew that I was doing a PhD, very few of the women working in Pinky's salon had heard of a PhD, and it was explained several times by a prominent customer, who was due to emigrate to England. I am indebted to her for her patience and skills in explaining it in a socially relevant manner. In Maggie's salon the project was explained in terms of Zanzibar women's lives, their work, family and social relationships. The 'media' element was the most problematic, as for Maggie's employees, this was an adjunct. In a culture where there is a fear of state bureaucracy none signed consent forms, nor were they shown a 'letter of informed consent' as they were for broadcast media projects I have undertaken. Ethically it was essential to me that I did my best to convey why I was watching and listening, but often the mention of the word 'research' (*utafiti*) stopped conversation dead in its tracks. It is important not to overlook that in Zanzibar culture there has been a history of spying and informers (Glassman 2008) for over forty years. It would be extremely rude for a woman, particularly one younger than me, to ask too many questions. This would be interpreted as showing bad faith and distrust. Interestingly though, none of the men I interviewed were

particularly questioning of me either, which may be because the profusion of (marine) researchers on Zanzibar has dulled the novelty, or more likely it comes under 'everything the *wazungu* do is pretty weird and shouldn't be questioned' umbrella. Certainly, to have a job (mine) that involves essentially socialising (which is what it was called) is a strange notion for people who are getting up at 5am to study, get water, wait tables, open up shops or sell vegetables.

Finally, the research benefitted a great deal from two difficult (and dangerous) events—illness and violent harassment by a male expatriate. Both events resulted in the fieldwork period being extended from one year to three. They also contributed to creation the conditions of vulnerability, isolation, impotence, fear and dependency for me, which I shared openly with the informants. This struggle with material and social life on Zanzibar at one level equalised some of the power relationship, as the informants articulated their surprise at how similar our lives were, and how problematic it could be being a single woman (without the protection of male relatives) on Zanzibar.

2.2.6 Real life and media—the disconnect

Defining the lacuna of media in people's lives presents opportunities for reimagining the polity, subjectivities, and indeed the location of the Southern Public Sphere. Amongst the informants there was common agreement that media was untrustworthy, inauthentic, or propagandist. There are absences in media (TV, press and radio) where informants want to see their stories, their lives reflected back to them, both for narrative purposes and to consolidate feelings of nationhood and belonging (Anderson 1991, Madianou 2005).

These absences feed into creating two significant problems for the theorising of this work. Firstly there is a slippage between what people 'know' to be going on around them in their communities—which they may or may not discuss in private—and what is talked about as a public issue. There are many mechanisms—social, religious, structural and imagined—that contribute to the sense that certain issues just cannot be talked about in a public arena.

The second issue is that violence and sexual affairs are not regarded as positive things, indeed it is not regarded as agency at all to 'speak out' about

domestic violence or other transgressions which the community regards as problematic. Thus the language of some Northern Feminists (Mahmood 2006) and Taachi (2008) and Tufte (2010) 'having a voice', 'Breaking the Silence', or similar rhetoric, is actually meaningless in this context (Tamale 2012).

The third issue is whether these sorts of problems should be in the media, in the public sphere. There was no clear consensus—some of the older women felt these were things that should and would be sorted out within the family, and there was no real reason to transport them into a media public sphere. Notably, however, amongst the younger informants, there is a very strong sense that such matters must be brought into the public arena. Theoretical agency that respects existing norms but does not require that they 'name and proclaim' their problems in a public sphere is necessary.

The sense of not breaking the silence, speaking out about the political issues (violence) and domestic strife in the public sphere in Zanzibar needs to be situated in a broader theory, one that acknowledges the historicity of the island, and polyvalent readings of silence. This silence, this refusal to nominate on the public stage may stem from many factors: resistance, disavowal and opt-out, or possibly repression. The decision to personalise and individualise concerns may be part of a structure of feeling or a patriarchal mechanism at work to sublimate real material disadvantages that women experience, and may represent part of the 'mutedness' (Moore 1988) that women experience in certain settings[32].

There are economic reasons why Zanzibaris are perceptively 'managing' the public airing of their dirty linen and the silencing of issues of political violence, corruption and bullying. The island's image is worth a great deal of money: tourism and investment are big revenue earners for the island. Tourism is responsible officially for 49% (see ZATI figures 2010) of the GDP. Unofficially, the figure is considerably higher than this. Violence, intimidation and rigged elections are bad for the image. When 16 donor countries openly criticized Zanzibar's government for violence and intimidation in October 2009, it was not reported in the local media. The progress of the building of parliament, and the results of an EU inquiry into electoral roll misdemeanours, were deliberately left unreported by national media. The international media—by its very existence—contravenes all kinds of

social rules in Zanzibar, and I attempt to unpick the reasons for this, as well as what the consequences are. The domestic media however, play by different rules.

Conclusion

Overall, what became clear was that Zanzibar has few formal or perceived bureaucratic structures: the judiciary, the municipal services, the taxation system, the army and the police are not running to recognizable rules in any real sense. The legal system—from the police in the streets to the courts—is inefficient and often non-existent in the informants' lives, except as a hurdle to be overcome or manipulated, via favours. Thus a project which had originally been a thesis about the media in women's lives in Zanzibar found an additional layer added: their experience of living in a corrupt, violent and undemocratic society[32]. This absence of solid institutional structures and practices is an indicator of poor governance, and its absence in societies is documented by Menocal and Sharma (2008):

> *Since the 1990s, the quality of governance has been recognised as one of the central factors affecting development prospects in poor countries. Governance goes beyond the formal institutional framework of the state, to encompass the interaction between formal and informal institutions, rules, processes and relationships.*[33]

These themes are pursued more comprehensively in chapters three and five, which detail the ways that women operated a kind of double-think: working round the norms in Zanzibari society and using the media to prop up subaltern realities. What emerges is the profound power of gossip (*mbarrassa* and *masikaani*), which is much more than the English word suggests. The Swahili words imply leisure time spent in discussion, consensus, norm setting, as well as idle chatter about who is doing what. The wards are also are gendered. Women for example never engage in '*upuuzi'* except if the speaker is making a joke about her ambiguous sexuality. Swahili has five words for gossip: (*masikaani*, *mbarassa*, *uvumi*, *upuuzi*, *rizazi breeze* (literally shoot the breeze),[34] and the ways that media actively avoided the world inhabited by my interviewees became clearer as the research progressed.

Gossip plays an extremely important role in a quasi-democratic process, running completely parallel to, and outside of, the actual institutional legal process. As an ethnographer, corruption presents very real challenges. Having ingested what my subjects were saying about favours and bartering, it became obvious that I was also entering into a conditional relationship by doing this research. By taking up people's time, by demanding that they explore, expose and discuss some of their private ideas, I was in effect creating a distortion: a debt to be repaid to them. My interactions were of course serving many different purposes for everyone involved. What became clearer as the research went on is that my 'contribution' to the subjects and interviewees was an impartial ear. I could listen and not pass judgement or pass on their problems with boyfriends, parents, or relatives.

In a poetic twist, it became a theoretical possibility that this research is corrupted. No money changed hands, I never agreed any concrete material goods in exchange for people's time. However there was undoubtedly a feeling that I was being used as a resource. I became inveigled into the bartering process I was writing about. Subjects would text me or talk to me about their own lives—business budgets, help with travel plans, a pressing emotional problem or a homework assignment or help correcting their English—for various reasons. How I dealt with these requests or demands was to acquiesce, and to recognise this complex dynamic affects the presentation and analysis of the material. The fact that my own trustworthiness, my 'insider status' (Moore 2013) is integral to my identity (and agency) was so important to the interviewees, and was constantly re-invogorated, needs to be highlighted.

[1] Meetings took place about once a month with the groups, depending on the season, other obligations they had, and illness.

[2] I was familiar with Zanzibar because I had been working as a journalist for the BBC World Service. This opened a door into a previously private and utterly intriguing world: so far I had only seen women fully clothed behind burkahs and hejabs, quiet and compliant in public, hardly speaking, let alone talking loudly. Despite being a journalist I had thus far little experience of women's opinions, perspectives in Zanzibar specifically, as they were not visible in public life.

[3] Illness was commonly cited as a reason for absence or a no-show: I began to read it as a subtle way of informants needing more time to think, not wishing to upset me or reject the research, or genuinely being ill. As Chabal identifies (2009) The 'performance' of being ill has a great deal of gravitas and meaning in Africa, and thus Zanzibar: partly because rates of serious infections—TB, Malaria, influenza and cholera—are all so high, and the sanitary conditions so poor. Partly also because the hospital and medical treatments are either extremely time-consuming (and do not guarantee an outcome of good health) or expensive and involving bribing, favours, and a great deal of logistical organisation as hospitals do not provide food for patients. Being able to pay for illness and treat it severely impacts on the ability to perform as a citizen/subject (Chaball 2009)
[4] This occurred through a combination of personal circumstances
[5] A list of the informants is in the appendix
[6] This was compiled in April 2012, when my fieldwork had ended, by USAID, who funded Save the Children on Zanzibar to do this work, as part of a project on child abuse prevention.
[7] Beckerman writes critically of Briefcase NGOs (2009, politics of the queue), a phenomena in which people set up mobile NGOs (literally operating out of a briefcase, to cut down on overheads of an office or equipment) and survive hand to mouth with small funds as they respond to donor funding criteria.
[8] This social ostracising of women who leave their husbands, and the difficulties they have in accessing land (institutionalised child support or financial contributions do not exist) or means to support the families after they have broken down is common, and the informants talk about it a great deal.
[9] Set up in 1999 with strong party support from the CCM and the President Benjamin Mkwapa, the Tanzania Women's Bank embodies a combination of capitalism and radicalism that typifies this period in Tanzania. Ms Chacha was the first, and continuing, CEO. http://www.womensbank.co.tz/
[10] Zanzibar is a small place. Marissa Hamid, Mariam Hamidi, BibiJinja, Bibi Anna, NasraHimid and Chiko Leno (the ITV main newsreader) are all 'powerful women' on Zanzibar. All have, or did have, senior positions, in government, the media or politics. These publicly nominated and self-proclaimed opinion formers, in the absence of more traditional media such as public civic organizations, could illuminate how women have agency.
[11] I began to keep detailed diaries about how I felt about the work, how I was changing slowly, subtly, getting better at knowing what I was looking for, and understanding far more Swahili. I stopped feeling so frustrated by the difficult sensitivities, the slow pace; the reticence of women to talk. I came to realise that the ethnography demanded much more than just active listening on my part: I needed to instinctively be able to contextualize and proportion meaning as I was watching. I needed to impose more of my own thinking and feeling, not less in order to make sense of the tsunami of information, in order to steer a course through the many times I was told 'ah but the Koran says so!'. If anything, rather than aiming for the 'chaste ethnographer' role, I

took the opposite tack. I realised that challenging the opinions of my subjects yielded much longer and more involved responses.

[12] During the course of the research this happened with Muzdat, Deddah and Serina.

[13] Harding, S. (1987). Introduction: Is there a feminist method? In Sandra Harding (Ed.), *Feminism and Methodology* (pp. 1–14). Bloomington: University of Indiana Press.

[14] As with many things on Zanzibar, practical limitations defined our sessions: the weather, people's duties and obligations, and physical stamina. No 'session' ever exceded 2.5 hours, and always involved lots of soft drinks and local snacks, which I paid for.

[15] It transpired at the end of the three year fieldwork that many of the 'core group' and younger informants were excited and interested in being able to be 'close quarters' with a *mzungu* and ask questions about our (my) culture in regard to work, relationships, friendships, sex, life in general, and family obligations. Despite the 30 year history of tourism (with Europe) in Zanzibar, many of these women lack any real opportunities to meet and interact with *wazungu*, since their English is not proficient, and it is not socially condoned for them to mix.

[16] Where people spoke to me in English I quote them verbatim, so there are grammatical and linguistic mistakes. Where I translated, I sought help from two bilingual SOAS graduates resident in Zanzibar at the time of research.

[17] Conversely, paying too much, tipping generously (all prices are negotiated; few apart from staples are fixed,) is appreciated, and stores up favours for the future.

[18] Zanzibar 'buys' electricity from the mainland, which travels via an underwater cable between Tanzania and Zanzibar. Zanzibar had not paid the bill to the mainland for over thirteen years at the time of the disruption.

[19] From being a quiet, rather embarrassed participant observer, sitting on the side, (also taking care to get a pedicure done) every week, I began responding to the jibes about my sex life. "Where was my husband? Or did I prefer to be the husband!" was one of the most overt and unusual references to lesbianism I have encountered.

[20] All my personal activities were commented on by my landlord: my status as an unmarried woman, whether I drew my curtains, what time I went to bed, whether I came home late in the evening, and with whom. Very quickly I realised the gossiping and commentary my informants were referring to was real and problematic, and limited my 'independence'.

[21] Walter Ong, "The Writer's Audience Is Always a Fiction", *PMLA*, Vol. 90, No. 1 (Jan., 1975), pp. 9-21 Published by: Modern Language Association

[22] Don Slater at the LSE, You Tube lecture, March 2013
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Zmd29V2BDns

[23] For example, the senior African women in the World Bank and the several Tanzanian women MPs were absent from Zanzibar media. Their absences from public opinion as leaders, protagonists and speech makers, their absence from the media and public space prompts many theoretical problems.

[24] Spitulnik, PhD Thesis, 1994

[25] Prus, R. Beyond the *Power Mystique, Power as intersubjective Accomplishment*, NYU press 1999

[26] http://www.academia.edu/4149841/What_is_the_point_of_media_anthropology

[27] Collins, P.H. (1990). *Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness, and the Politics of Empowerment*. Boston: Unwin

[28] After a year of interviewing, a fellow academic remarked that many of my subjects seemed to be presenting a very negative picture of life. Simultaneously I was having problems with a difficult tenant in my home. Oddly, this seemingly inconsequential event provided great insight into the dispute-resolving mechanisms for women of living in Zanzibar. In short I resorted to the techniques of reputation management: (improving my own and destroying my tenant's). I appealed to two senior Zanzibari men, both of whom are held in high regard and are well connected (and happened to be friends of mine) the situation was immediately resolved. I was never able to find out what was said, or to whom, however the money owed to me was returned, the violence and verbal assaults stopped, and the tenant moved out and pretty much disappeared. A great deal of trust and social capital was gained between the informants and me at this point. Early in the research, all that I did, undertook, was on a pedestal for M: with the arrival of a tenant who reduced me to tears, who left me powerless and scared, the pedestal fell away. Instead the informants saw me as much more like them—trapped in structures that didn't allow public expression of male violence, (patriarchy perhaps, but also a completely absent legal or police service) with a man who was potentially violent. My informants knew I was single at the time of researching, and spent time fending off advances from Zanzibari men. These stories, told at my expense, allowed my informants to see that despite my 'differences' in wealth, education, age and occupation, I was also vulnerable, got annoyed, frustrated and stymied by the things they did.

The only way to answer these concerns is by referring to the findings: yes, there are more mentions of violence, of sex, of infidelity, of problems, of harassment, inequality and more anger than I anticipated. And conversely there is also much rich material which is not bleak: discussions of democracy, American elections, participation, desire for change, discussions of plot lines of soap operas, animated discussions of the Koran, of other countries, of different approaches, a desire for education, new skills and information.

[29] This work benefits from the fact that I got very ill in the course of the fieldwork (ending up in hospital twice). This had the double advantage of prolonging my exposure to various institutions on the island, increasing my dependencies on Zanzibar friends and exacerbating my own vulnerability as a human being, and not a privileged white researcher who could pick up and jump on an aeroplane when life got hard.

[30] In a particularly intimate moment getting a bikini wax, Noor really opened up and starting discussing her divorce, and how difficult it was to do business in Zanzibar. How much, I still wonder, was the quality of this interaction affected by the fact she was tweezering out my pubes at the time?

[31] Is this just a classic domestic/public binary, where women only had agency at particular hours, and particular activities in the home, (Spivak 1992, Gall 2000) or a structural, systematic patriarchal oppression augmented by limited control over sexuality, reproduction, labour and political representation? (Walby). Then there were some contradictions: older women seemed to be able to flout the rules that applied to women aged up to roughly 40 years old.

[32] During the period of writing up, 2012-2014 many of my predictions and worries about Zanzibar materialised, with several acid and tear gas attacks on a priest, individuals, kidnappings, and bombing of churches and other public places. http://www.thecitizen.co.tz/News/15+arrested+in+Zanzibar+after+acid+attack+on+church+official/-/1840392/1995252/-/gnd74c/-/index.htmlhttp://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-24131648 and http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-25502661. Informants texted me with other events—including a riot in Darajani market where the *uroyo* stall is—that had resulted in over 20 people getting beaten by police, that received no national media coverage at all.

[33] Rocha Menocal, A. and Sharma, B. (2008). *Joint Evaluation of Citizens' Voice and Accountability*: *Synthesis Report*. p2 London: DFID

[34] *Masikaani* is home, hangout, den, area, can be both the literal place, and broader, usually female. *mbrazza* is porch, stoop, area outside of house, and also parliament, but can be used to denote political talk.

Chapter 3: History and Context, Zanzibar and Tanzania

Introduction

It is important to consider the political, social, economic and human rights context within Zanzibar when looking at the question of where the media fits in. I argue that historical events, the surrounding silences and the collective avoidance of recent historical analysis have contributed to the weak tradition of public debate and critique. Furthermore, the impact of local and centralized state politics—particularly the efforts of the ruling CCM—to organize and streamline the performativity and actual undertaking of civic participation, have created templates, habitus and habits which are extremely difficult to cast off. The fraught relationship of the union between Zanzibar and Tanzania has created significant tensions which impact upon iterations of belonging, nationhood and expressions of agency and subjectivity. Lastly, the problem of analyzing social class within Zanzibar is situated within the burgeoning tropes of civil society within the dynamic of aid and international giving.

Perhaps counter-intuitively, media is dealt with last in this section, as it is positioned within the materialities of life on the island and global debates surrounding new media, digital activism and ICT. This allows us to view issues which arise in the findings sections as being situated under this lens. Whilst I do not endorse a wholly structuralist reading of political and economic factors, I do think it is crucial to situate this work within the constraints of political economy.

It is useful to disentangle the political mood and the backdrop to the experiencing of media by the informants by setting out an account of the combination of socio-political circumstances and historical factors that have led to these situations. My fieldwork revealed an identifiable reluctance by women to openly engage in political forums. This section therefore interrogates the contextual factors which situate and add depth to women's low participation in organizations, community groups, as well as the high level of religious participation and lack of agency by women in Zanzibar in the public sphere (evidenced and corroborated by Afrobarometer)[1].

The total adult population of Tanzania is 44.9 million[2]. Of this, 52% are women and 48% are men. 71% live in rural Tanzania and 60% have a primary education. Zanzibar's population is just under one million, at 984,625 (BBC website 2007, Othman 2007, Abdalah 2007). There are seven broadcasting stations on the islands: two national, three religious and two commercial (UNESCO 2008). Media presence in Tanzania and Zanzibar is deceptively high: the aggregate figure is that there are over 18 daily newspapers, 41 weekly papers, 60 radio stations and 15 television stations (3 are state run)[3]. However the quantity and availability of national media available on the island is hampered severely by transport, freight costs (even batteries are beyond the means of most of the population of Zanzibar), and the internet is accessed by only 1% of the population Tanzania as a whole.[4]

In this section I look at four significant areas: the history of Zanzibar and its independence from Tanzania, the political and economic situation within Zanzibar, the dominating debates and tropes for media in Africa, and the types of media in Zanzibar and issues coupled to their existence.

The historical circumstances of the Zanzibar revolution of 1964 were chaotic, driven by revenge, bloody and without political ideology (Shariff 1994, Babu 2001, Wilson 2014) and were important in fashioning the present situation. Specifically, the inexperience of public political debate on the island and the accompanying silences about this period since the revolution (Abdullan and Othman 2007, Shivji 2007) have left a difficult legacy.

3.1 <u>History and Context</u>

Zanzibar has been documented as Sunni, Ibadhi, Shahafi and Hanafi Muslim (97% of the population) since 8AD. Whilst Zanzibar has its own devolved parliament and president, it is still part of Tanzania.[5] Legally, the situation is unclear: constitutional law, local village law and Sharia law all operate simultaneously. The judiciary has been attempting to coalesce and synthesize these strands since 2007[6].

Much of this section explores the history of Zanzibar's relationship with mainland Tanzania, partly because their political and cultural commonalities are many. Through this lens it is possible to examine the constructions included and excluded in the Zanzibar discourses around identity and belonging, and provide a

context for how media fits in. A historical foundation also provides vital clues to the continuing disagreements (some violent) about the mainland-island relationship, and what informs and underpins much of the informants' reactions.

Tanzania was colonized by the Germans and the British until 1963, when it achieved independence, under Julius 'Mwalimu' (teacher) Nyerere. Zanzibar was a British protectorate from 1890 (the treaty of Heligoland) until its independence on December 10th 1963. A month later, the bloody revolution in 1964 led by the Afro-Shirazi party and a disillusioned army resulted in a merger with Tanganyika, and the renaming of the mainland as Tanzania. From 1967 the island was under the unbroken rule of mainland Tanzania (with a Zanzibar vice president, Abeid Karume), by the broadly socialist Chama Chapa Mapinduzi (CCM), until 2011 when the joint Government of National Unity was elected, with the opposition Civic United Front (CUF) party.

The period of British Protectorate rule for Zanzibar was typified by schisms between the British Colonial office and the Sultan in Zanzibar, (Longair 2012), the abolition of slavery (1897), personality clashes, acts of performance verging on pantomime (Longair2012:72) and the British need to maintain the clove trade throughout manumission. There was also complex manoeuvring between African, Arab, Indian and ex-patriot populations on the island. Colonial political life appears dominated by charismatic personalities, incompetence, socialising and bickering rather than clear policies (Longair 2012: 58). British rule in Zanzibar was a conspicuously orientalised affair, and

> *…was synonymous with the exotic in the Western imagination; the word itself epitomised mysterious otherness. Writers regularly described it as an 'Arabian Nights' city; a world of sultans, bazaars and labyrinthine streets. Elements specific to Zanzibar were fused with more generic images of the Orient formed from books, exhibitions and performances in the West*[7]
>
> Longair 2012: 65).

As with other African countries after independence, the imperial powers in Tanzania and Zanzibar had knowingly and self-consciously withheld voting rights,

imposed rigorous systems of categorization and left behind weak understandings of governance and no discernible hand over systems. (Pakenham 1991). Mamdani (2006) posits that the colonial rulers, as well as actively creating the categories of 'race' (Arab and African), prevented access to literacy, information and cultural and political networks. He maintains that land ownership and tax and legal infrastructures were set up to drain the capital towards Britain and then Germany. Glassman disagrees, arguing that in fact it is Zanzibar nationalists who constitute and aggravate social inequalities, ideological manipulation and racial distinctions and boundaries to create increased economic differentiation, resulting in the politicization and opposition of two 'races' into the locally-built identity categories used, namely 'Africans' and 'Arabs' (2011).[8]

A small and under-skilled middle class in Zanzibar hampered intellectual and economic growth[9]. Unlike other British colonies, where colonial administrations used the countries as experimental laboratories to try out methods of administration and management (Prestholdt 2008, Thomson 2007), the lack of resources in Tanzania and Zanzibar, plus the relatively short imperial occupation, ensured that there was no educated elite of bureaucrats who knew how to run a former empire colony on a day-to-day basis. British records of the time document the (colonial) fears of the emerging young Arab elite on Zanzibar and their inability to run the clove plantations and other businesses (Longair, Glassman 2008). Thus the Zanzibar population of the sixties and seventies lacked cohesion at the start of independence.

Another potential source of political modeling was also missing in Zanzibar at the time of the revolution. Unlike Tanzania, it has no history of grassroots and national political organization, including funeral and savings societies and high church attendance (Thomson 2007). Localised, organised wage labour conflicts were a marked feature of the Tanzanian struggle for independence. The Tanzanian independence movement was funded by local people out of their meagre incomes (in the same way they still contribute to ethnic burial societies, rotating credit associations or funeral expenses, with meticulous accounts kept in exercise books). This experience of communalism and organizational activity had two functions: during the period of socialism under President Julius Nyerere some contention was

'officially' sanctioned and expressed, and Tanzania also established a practice of democratic information sharing, which formed the foundations for the hybridized communitarian systems that still exist there. The growth of state power gradually co-opted or repressed alternative/subaltern voices (Thomson 2007).

Fouere[10] maintains that Nyerere has become a reference point, a benchmark against which the qualities and behaviours of today's leaders are measured and judged (Fouere 2008). However, crucially for Zanzibar, Nyerere and his ideas were never as vigorously co-opted by the population on the island, who due to their experience of British, (and then Sultanate rule, and extreme exposure to and co-option into slavery), have very different expressions of nationalism and the meanings of the national project.

Nyerere's 1967 Arusha Declaration—in which via *ujaama* he called for self-reliance through the creation of cooperative farm villages and the 80% nationalization of factories, plantations, banks and private companies—was not greeted with enthusiasm on Zanzibar, which had no large factories and far fewer farms and plantations anyway. (The philosophy of *ujaama* was a national slogan, and roughly translates as togetherness). *Ujaama* is now critically contested in academic circles, both for its efficacy and for its long term effects on Zanzibar and Tanzania (Ibhawoh, Dibua 2003, Fouere 2013, Wilson 2014). Some, such as Caplan, see *ujaama* as underpinning the notions of communalism in Zanzibar, and as resilient as the concept of 'individuality' in parts of the Global North (Caplan 2004).

Fouere argues that Tanzanian citizens' adherence to Nyere's policies were patchwork and inconsistent. She says:

> *Many academic works have shown that, at the time of Nyerere, popular adhesion to socialism was variable, and the populations remained uncaptured by the state. References to Ujamaa in contemporary social struggle should be seen as a strategic tool, selected for its expected efficiency in a certain situation, and which can be combined to other moral reservoirs such as the international language of democracy and good governance.*
>
> - 2012:2[11].

Despite this, according to Fouere, Nyerere is often spoken of in present day Tanzania as achieving hagiographic status, with many older informants harking back to the 'good old days' when Tanzania was socially cohesive, had a strong identity, and maize, soap, ugali and rice were distributed to all households. His poster, a photo with the caption *Babu Ya Taifa* (father of the Nation) has only come into circulation on Zanzibar since his death. (Fouere 2012). Fouere makes the important point:

> *The persisting traces of Nyerere and Ujamaa in the present post-socialist context are not so much to be looked for in actual political practices or public policies but rather in debates and controversies about politics, morality and the common good—in short, in contemporary imaginaries of the nation.*
>
> - 2012:3

Crucially, Nyerere's *ujaama*, a policy of self-reliance rooted in traditional African values and designed to lift the rural *Tanzanian* peasantry out of dependency, emphasised the family and communalism of traditional African societies. At the same time, it was 'influenced by a mix of Fabian socialism and Catholic social teachings' (Ibhawoh Dibua 2003: 62). Zanzibar's majority Muslim population could neither relate to, nor were included in, the political-spiritual aims of this project (Wilson 2014). Nyerere's intervention in Zanzibar after the revolution, and the allegations that he wished to dismiss the central role of Islam in the Swahili coastal culture in order to limit its diffusion and control its political influence is still parochially a contested and thorny issue[12]. Crucially, as Hofmeyr and Bang show, Islam was experienced and embedded through educational, cultural and economic modalities in the Indian Ocean Islands, and included many informal social groupings which bypassed the rigid impositions of *ujaama* (2011). In practical terms, *ujaama* involved nationalising all the large industries (sugar, cotton, coffee,) and espousing 'a philosophy of development that was based on

three essentials—freedom, equality and unity. The ideal society must always be based on these three essentials (Nyerere 1967: 16).

More than a geographical, idealistic and economic plan, *ujaama* espoused a particular morality as well as a form of socialism (Rasmussen 1997), an upstanding sense of what being Tanzanian, (but not specifically Zanzibari) involved. Between The Arusha Declaration of 1967 and 1982 the 120 tribes of Tanzania were subsumed under the identity of being Tanzanian. Crucially everyone, including people on Zanzibar and the smaller sister island of Pemba, had the unifying language of Swahili as a national *lingua franca*.

However, as Cooksey (2009) argues, the result of this veneration of Nyerere resulted in a gradual move towards Bejing as an international trade partner, with Tanzania distancing itself from the US and UK. Nyerere's distaste of western colonialism did not sit well for Zanzibaris, who had enjoyed a peculiarly intimate, and sometimes beneficial experience of the British.

Tanzania still looms large in many Zanzibari discussions in material and discursive ways. The conversations around the revolution and cessation from the mainland continue in oblique ways, and dramatic ones too: in the manifestations of violent acts against property, religious figures and tourists in public places, and in the rise of the UAMSHO nationalist movement[13]. Over a third of Zanzibaris blame poverty, unemployment, loss of traditional beliefs, theft and growth of fundamentalist Wa'habi Islamic sects on *Wabara* (mainlanders)[14]. Economically, over 60% of all goods (including fresh vegetables) are imported daily on one of the three ferries from the mainland: furthermore peoples' families, histories and geospatial realities are deeply intertwined. Everyone has a relative on the mainland, has lived there or plans to. Zanzibar's contemporary ambivalences towards Westernisation and the mainland can be viewed with this in the background[15].

Overall, the mainland African Socialism of Nyerere was marked by the rejection of individualism, aggression, selfishness and egotism which were viewed as central to capitalism (Fouere 2012). However, on Zanzibar the complexities of religion, mercantilism and slavery created significant intersectionalities. Thus *ujaama*'s co-operative spirit created a double edged sword: via the tiered

centralized system of elected village, local, regional and CCM representatives, villagers made decisions and had decisions imposed upon them via their local collective representative. The voice of the individual was subsumed into the communal consensus (Beckmann 2009, Whalley 2004). The system of the *Sheha* (village chief) is still present in urban Dar es Salaam and on Zanzibar. In practice there is a strong affinity to locality, place and an imagined idea of community, but simultaneously a marked feature of this research is the 'overlocalised' nature of politics[16] (Whalley 2004).

Nyerere's failures are well documented: the ruralisation programmes designed to streamline agricultural learning and distribution of both skills and material goods resulted in enforced relocations (Glassman 2008, Askew 2002). The failure to develop an educated middle class elite had strong implications for the economic and intellectual developments of the seventies and eighties under the next president, Ali Mwyini, for both the mainland and increasingly for Zanzibar, which suffered a dramatic economic slump after the revolution (Thomson 2007). The Tanzanian and Zanzibari economies had collapsed completely by 1989, and people were hungry: educated but starving. Nyerere was part of the Pan-Africanist brotherhood of the first wave of African liberationists (including Kenneth Kaunda, Nelson Mandela, Jomo Kenyatta and Patrice Lumumba), men who were driven by intellectual and ideological constraints rather than practical ones.

In the nineties foreign debt totalled several billion dollars, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank intervened in Tanzania and Zanzibar with the Structural Adjustment programmes. These were designed to liberalise the economy, decrease bureaucracy, revalue the currency and create conditions more favourable for trade and investment (World Bank 2010). Nyerere took the unusual step of publicly apologizing for his mistakes.

These measures changed the educational experience of some Tanzanians, but crucially introduced international business to the capital, Dar Es Salaam, at an incredible speed. The international corporate presence—the embodiment of modernity—became manifest, highly visible in the number of glass and steel skyscrapers replacing the crumbling Arab and colonial two-storey buildings. In the last twenty years a 'business district' has emerged, along with at least seven

international chain hotels, the incongruous trappings of 'hole in the wall machines' and crowded, car congested streets.

Since 2000, the private sector in Tanzania and Zanzibar has increased dramatically, setting off a domino effect on Zanzibar, where mainlanders buy second homes or construct hotels as a safer option than putting money in the bank. As the most recent UNDP African Stock markets booklet (2003) outlines, 'the Government's observance of the IMF's restructuring plans has resulted in a more sensible fiscal approach and unprecedented stock market returns'. The document details 'spectacular' and 'significant' returns, only to ruefully include as a finishing sentence that for the moment only local investors are allowed to participate. With the current discussion in the Kenyan-based Paper *The East African* about the loosening of borders (Jan 22nd 2011) and the imminent trade changes as a result of the East African Union, Tanzania and Zanzibar's rising GDP and the encouragement of foreign investment looks like continuing to increase.

3.1.1 Zanzibar's Political Climate

Franklin, Madianou and Ortner[17] (2014) express the need to contextualize multi-site ethnographies in material and political contexts. This section shows where the media 'fits' in Zanzibar, and outlines some of contemporary concerns and debates around the island functioning as a democratic polity.

There are three debates which influence this study. Firstly, the lack of democratic practices on Zanzibar, evidenced by the experience of over 50 years of one party rule on the island, the poor human rights record, and violence. Much of this is un-documented and unnoticed in the local public sphere, and nominated by the international community, which adopts the roles of monitor, witness and advocate. As Fouere (2013) remarks, this long record of rule—much of it by Nyerere—has done much to vilify the party, and to hold Nyerere personally responsible for 'impoverishing the nation' (2013: 1). Secondly, the history of donor involvement and interventions on the island, and donors' roles in defining the production of locality in a global setting and global materiality (both micro and macro), continues to shape the intellectual and political climates (Mosse 2005, Cornwall 2012). Thirdly, within the 'architecture of global aid' (Fosse 2005:2) the

potential for systematic social consequences and distortions on Zanzibar as a result of these donor interventions, particularly in relation to the framing, discursive practices and normative constitution of notions of civil democratic society (Mercer 2002).

The election in 2005, which brought in the ruling CCM for the forty-fifth consecutive year, was strongly criticized by all the main donors (USA, Denmark, Britain and Norway) as being unsound (mainly for voter registration and intimidation) and violent. There were between 27 and 35 fatalities (BBC, Amnesty or Human Rights Watch). Internally, Zanzibaris voiced dismay and frustration via the web and on the streets.

Zanzibar's human rights record has improved since 2006 for a number of reasons, including greater donor interference and monitoring and increased tourist presence (Human Rights Watch 2012). However, racial thought and violence 'far from falling into oblivion, lurks under the surface' (Fouere 2013) and acid attacks[18], police violence against civilian populations and 'kangaroo courts' are still a prevailing part of Zanzibar life. (Othman and Abdallah, 149: 2007) Additionally, there are reported cases of '*Askari jammii*' (literal translation 'community soldiers'—self-appointed Muslim leaders) killing people after they committed 'immoral' acts—almost always sex outside of marriage[19]. The 2010 election also saw a CCM victory, this time for the fiftieth year. Whilst it was generally accepted as a peaceful election, the drafting in of the army in an electoral role in Pemba and the violence and bullying (allegedly 16 people beaten up , also on Pemba, a stronghold for the opposition) which went unreported in the media[20] undermine the claim that the election was trouble-free.

The most recent national Zanzibar election in October 2010, and the USA election in 2009, were key events in Zanzibar, for several reasons which I shall outline.

The 2010 election was marked as being peaceful and for having a high voter turnout. For the first time in 49 years, the ruling CCM party had to agree to a power sharing deal[21]. At the same time, increased revenue and tourism under a well organised tourism forum (ZATI) over the last few years has ensured the presence of visitors to witness the brutality at first hand. The process of concealment and

obfuscation is hampered, and violence and corruption makes it harder for the government to promote the 'paradise island' image (the tourism advisors for Sharm El Sheikh in Egypt have been employed recently to rebrand Zanzibar's image).[22] Just after the election results were published, four bars selling alcohol were burned to the ground across the island[23].

3.1.2 The Global Architecture of Aid

Fosse's work on aid (2005) intertwines streams of thought on how governance is enacted, exercised and represented, raising important debates about the dynamics of state-citizen control, and the distorting effect of huge global players (the donors) who have interests firmly linked to multi- and transnational organisations. Fosse's work raises important debates on idioms of freedom, and those who are systematically and structurally excluded from this process. Fosse dissects the ways in which aid subjects are turned into citizens and enrolled into the rhetoric of freedom, consensus and empowerment, and outlines the various state activities that develop from this. Perhaps most poignantly there is a reification of 'donor viewpoints' (2005: 6) that problematize local issues and deal with universal ones which are inherently pro-liberal and actually disguise (or conceal) some of the inherent problems of neo-liberalism. Mercer's work (2010, 2012, 2012a) endorses this viewpoint and directs us towards critically dissecting and challenging the assumption that NGOs are inherently democratic.

The critiques of Mohanty (2013) Ferguson (1992, 2010) and Chabal (2009) explore the taxonomies of aid and development as highly problematized. Civil society, development and globalisation have become messy synonyms (Friedman 2006, Ferguson & Gupta 2002, Ferguson 2010) and no one is very clear who is included in these categories and what they mean. The writers are critically eloquent about the 'framing' of global development as helpful, when it exists actually and ontologically within transnational global flows of commerce, resources (actual and intellectual) and money which prioritise the capital expansion of the Global North. Perhaps Mohanty (2013), picking up on Chabal's work (2009), goes furthest, with her scathing attacks on the insistence of 'localisation' and depoliticised multiplicities within neo-liberal critiques, that disavow the very real

structural violence present in economic relationships North-South. Chabal's description of state-inspired violence and the normalisation of violence to citizens via privatised elites, functionaries of the state and elites within patriomonial clientilist states speaks unequivocally to the resistances, desistances, silences, disavowal and ignoring of the state that these interviewees reveal in this work. 'Generalised violence' (Mbembe 2006:302) of the private market, and social violence that permeates all aspects of informal life is another iteration of the pressures on citizens to work inside and alongside highly problematic political and social processes.

The 'scapes' described by Appadurai and the subaltern voices articulated by Spivak (1989) recognise distinctly created platforms for international aid, spaces that are highly politicised and contain the unequal power dynamics of Global North dictating to Global South.

Thus the tangible structural support for peaceful democratic change, coming largely from the international donor community in the form of EU and UN monitors, can be viewed as a mechanism for placing value on issues nominated by external forces (donors) in collaboration with a few powerful local elites (in this case hotel owners and the donor community). Drilling down to the specifics of Zanzibar, this thesis was affected by a dramatic increase in the economic role of tourism (and thus of hoteliers demanding change)[24] over the course of this fieldwork, and the arrival of diaspora Zanzibaris to settle—two in particular, Mm On and Rh Rb: young women who harnessed the media, specifically the internet, to draw attention to issues of mental health, orphans and drug abuse on the island.

This thesis is not primarily about manifestations of democracy on Zanzibar, or the media's role in the functioning iterations, contestations or failures of democracy. However it is important to acknowledge the enormous canon of (post colonial) work around the praxis of democracies now emanating from Southern writers, the importance of this work within the global discussion of defining citizenship, citizenry and subjectivity, and how this ongoing conversation has numerous entry points, more contributors, and many places where it occurs.

Zanzibar's democracy is further complicated by low status and high unemployment (only one in ten young people are likely to find formal jobs (Shivji

2007). Comaroff and Comaroff (2006) explore this process as 'youthification' which simulataneously covers the fetishism of youth (largely emanating from the modernity tropes of the Global North) and the high rates of social alienation, unemployment, violence and disenfranchisement of African young men. The youth are:

> *a generation of people who have been born into social environments in which their possibilities of living decent lives are negligible and in which many have found themselves stuck in positions of inadequate life chances and bleak prospects….*
>
> – Abbink 2005:7.

The new Government of National Unity, whilst a change to fifty years of single party rule, is viewed with scepticism by informants. As Peters remarks:

> *Democracy, based on the principle that the majority of the people decide, has another meaning in [the African] context. Here a minority (above 18 years) of the population decides for the majority (below 18 years).*
>
> – Peters 2004: 25

Arguably the problem is even more acute for women in Zanzibar, as they experience pressure to not work, and stay out of the market.

3.2 The flourishing of Civil Society in Zanzibar

Whilst I reject the 'ComDev' approaches to media, I do include a section on the NGOs in Zanzibar for several reasons: they are key to the landscape of contextualising the informants' responses. The logics of donor/donated are iterations of modernities and modern-ness (Sabry 2009) and it is crucial to acknowledge this.

It would be difficult to write about the media and discussions around it in Zanzibar without considering the larger context, in which Zanzibar and Tanzania are in world's top five donor recipients. In 2010 and 2011 over half the national budget

consisted of donor aid[25]. This section offers factual information whilst exploring informants' reactions in the context of Zanzibar's dependency on global aid and the proliferation of NGOs. NGOs, compounded with the high visibility of tourists on Zanzibar, contribute to the overall discourses and the symbolic referents and actual interactions with the Global North. NGOs on Zanzibar are often responsible for delivering basic services such as maternal health care and support for single mothers. It would be disingenuous to discuss modernity and development without referencing the very real power relations manifest in the donor/donated relationships on Zanzibar. Some interviewees bring up the subject of development and dependency in the course of the ethnography. Donor intervention is firmly positioned right at the heart of Zanzibar life: recent concerns for the capacity and accessibility of the parliament and parliamentarians prompted DFID to become a major donor partner in a project supporting governance and democratic change in Zanzibar[26].

ComDev rhetoric is rejected for this work. Agreeing with Mahmood, Mankekar, Mohanty, Asad and others (2006, 1999, 2013, 2009) the subject is granted situated and reflexive agency. Islamic women, and their reference points, including a strong emphasis on 'umma' (consensus), the virtuous self (Janson 2007) an assimilative (rather than representational) relationship with Islam (Asad 2009), applied Islamic piety (Mahmood 2006), harmony and we-ness (Schulz 2014) are at the heart of this work. The 'platforms' that Tufte refers to (2012, 2014) are also essential constituent parts of civil society for the Northern Academe (Mercer 2010, 2012a, 2014). They are vital for developing, expressing and advocating views in the public sphere by writers in the Global North writing with 'a non-situated all-seeing ego' (Willems 2014:13). Crucially, the ontological terms civil society, platform, voice etc are meaningless and materially, no one in this study every had any interaction with an NGO, including FEMINA, that Tufte writes so enthusiastically about. Conceptually, the problematic notions of agency and voice need to be iterated in terms that are meaningful to the people being talked about (Lourde 1989, Nzegwu 2006, Brah and Phoenix 2004). NGOs employ and develop a class of people who are potentially critiquing society, and whose first priority is aquiring wealth and capital

for salaries and projects (Beckmann 2009) and who therefore siphon important sources of intellectual capital away from academia (Mudimbe 2003).

ComDev is also rejected because it is constituted by, and an integral part of, a representational lexicon (referencing Butlers' work on linguistics 1990, 2000) including civil society, sphericles and platforms (Ferguson 2006) that are far too narrow and disavow or even negate important strategies of silence, humour, mockery and mimicry (Obadare 2014).

However, informants' responses *are* affected by NGOs in subtle and obvious ways: the tradition of 'not biting the hand that feeds you' and recognizing that relationships with foreigners are framed in a long history of patronage and support by outside influences.

NGOs, as part of the donor machine, are relevant insomuch as applying Mouffe's agonisism concepts (2005), they provide the spaces for Western donors to believe they are satisfying and creating neo-liberal spaces. They become vital conduits in imagining and organising, 'the mutually constitutive state-citizen relationship'. (Cornwall 2011: 7) They create and re-orientate the debate about whether or not there are public spaces for citizens to express their needs and their desires without ever addressing problematic issues within parallel economies, racketeering and informal networks (Chabal 2009, Mbembe 2006). Many NGOs are international organs, subsidised by the IMF, and the 'NG' prefix is spurious, as they clearly are aligned to governements, (Ferguson & Gupta 2002, Ferguson 2010). NGOs in East and Southern Africa (specifically in Uganda, Kenya, South Africa and mainland Tanzania) are perceived by donors (but not necessarily local populations [Cornwall 2011]) as responsible for encouraging debate in the public sphere, and at times for lobbying and affecting the content of media[27]. They hail the subject and the citizen of the global South as the aid recipient, the 'institutionalised recipient' (Cornwall 2012, Coelho 2004, Escobar 2008), and often provide the actual, real organisation and the bank accounts through which aid can happen.

The UNDP, the IMF and World Bank are comfortable at articulating, reproducing and creating the jargon and tropes of civil society and donor intentionalities. As the Commission for Africa emphasised in its 2005 report[28], the way states function and articulate their relations with society is increasingly seen as

one of the most important factors affecting development in the poorest countries. I reject these notions, favouring instead more complex and problematic relationships (Friedman 2006). I also wish to acknowledge the existence of parallel or phantom states, (Burgis 2015, Mbembe 2006) and informal channels and performances in precarious spaces described by Chabal, Mbembe Mohanty et al.

However, there are complicating factors of definition and scope. Ferguson (2002, 2006) asks where exactly does civil society stop and start? Who is excluded, included? and the growth of '*Fundi Ya Mandeleo'*—people who make a living from being development specialists, with no real skills except an aptitude for negotiating and understanding donor agendas (Beckmann 2009). In Zanzibar, boundaries between state, civil society, family and market are often complex, blurred and negotiated (Gupta 2012, Ferguson 2010). Civil society commonly embraces a diversity of spaces, actors and institutional forms varying in their degree of formality, autonomy and power. The pervasive nature of corruption, detailed in the literature and again in the findings section means that even where an NGO 'exists' on paper, it may possibly be little more than a front for a rich politician's wife to be seen to be doing something, or a 'briefcase NGO' (one that is set up specifically to get an assigned fund of money that the donor needs to spend before the tax year is out, and with no office, staff or actual members. See Beckmann [2009] for a further description).[30]

Civil society organisations (CSOs) include registered charities, development NGOs, community groups, women's organisations, faith-based organisations, professional associations, trades unions, self-help groups, social movements, business associations, coalitions and advocacy groups. Thus, CSOs include a much broader set of organisations than NGOs alone. In Zanzibar there are over 115 NGOs listed[31] in a register that is currently being compiled by USAID.

In Tanzania and Zanzibar civil organisations do not always reflect people's actual practices. As both the Afrobarometer papers (Nos. 40, 93, 127 [2011]) extensively document, and Mckenna (2010) emphasizes, civil society is still weak, and electoral democracy is still emerging. So whilst the rhetoric of decentralisation abounds, actual accountability is still lacking. Local government, argues Mckenna

(2010), responds more to central government, not the needs or directives of their constituents. (Taylor, 2008; Ahluwalia & Zegeye, 1998).

One of the contradictions in Zanzibar society is the early flourishing of NGOs in the nineties; organisations that have subsequently withered, mostly due to lack of funding.[32] As a result of the massive civil service and government restructuring in the 1990s, 'civil society' was privileged, but in a limited role as a partner in a 'neo-liberal offensive' (Shivji, 2007: 29). The late eighties and nineties saw a (geographically related) burgeoning of NGOs in the urban centres such as Dar es Salaam, Mwanza and the political capital Dodoma. However, rejecting Tufte's thesis, (2012, 2014) this did not create much space for change, as the NGOs derived 'not only their sustenance but also their legitimacy from the donor community' (ibid: 31). Thus Tanzania and Zanzibar went from being locations where politics was happening, but not necessarily named, to societies where NGOs were visible, but their role and agency was unclear.

Over time the state reasserted its surveillance over non-state actors' activities, most notably in the NGO Bill of 2000, which restricted NGOs to a 'non-partisan' role (RePOA, 2009; Shivji, 2007: 61). Donors all assumed they were operating on a *tabula rasa* rather than building on existing or historical examples of organization. The consequences of this were twofold: organisations in particularly deprived areas sprang up in the hope they could access money (often just to eat) and a trend of 'briefcase NGOs created a new class of career development worker or '*fundi ya mandelo*'[33]. The paucity of policy directives, demands, newspapers, conversations and evidence of action is detailed methodically and authentically by Beckmann in 'The politics of the Queue', where she looks at HIV organisations' abject failure to do these things, with one notable exception (Beckmann 2010). In her case study on HIV groups and PLHA (people living with HIV and Aids) groups, Beckmann asserts:

> *This (the 90's) led to a 'capacity-building' phase in Tanzania. UN and US donors predominate amongst the major funders for PLHA in Tanzania, with lesser funding from Europe, South Africa and the Tanzanian government. The Politicization of PLHA in Tanzania in which new civil society*

organizations were 'taught' how to establish themselves, keep accounts and provide evidence of their probity to those who fed them. Benchmarks for action reflected current debates in the development field—empowerment, gender equity, democratization and so on. Similar pressures were brought to bear on emergent PLHA organizations, limiting their autonomy.

- Beckmann 2009

The dependency of grassroots associations on national, state and international bodies is underlined here, but national PLHA networks also rely heavily on donors. The donor community not only provides sustenance, it also demands and defines new ways of thinking[34].

3.2.1 Who are the chattering classes?

It is imperative to consider social class (Mankekar 1999) in this study, to acknowledge that the majority of the people I interviewed for this work would be identified as having middle class traits: they are educated beyond standard four (end of primary school), they have surplus income and they have an awareness of the hierarchy and where they fit within it. As Spronk (2014) identifies, this emerging hybridised middle class is constituted of many types of actors, behaving in new and interesting ways, and taking very particular forms of cultural appropriation, discarding others and having a complex relationship to the state, depending on whether they work within it or not.

The lack of legal and judicial structures mentioned, and the privatatisation of state functions are cited continuously in literatures as undermining the materiality of a stable state (Chabal ibid, Mbembe 2003, 2006, Ferguson 2005, 2010)—most recently in the Economic Council for Africa/African Unions Expert Committee notes (Feb 2011). The absence of these structures led me to change direction through the research and begin to look at where and how agency—rather than class—is being expressed, if not in the more conventional forums. Arguments around class are dealt with by Brissett- Foucault (2012), Ellis (1989), Archamboult (2012) Ndlovu (2013) and Stroeken (2005), all of whom pinpoint the creation of a new elite in

Africa which controls access to the media and indeed redefines and contribute to a dialogic creation of citizenry and voiceability (Ong 2002, Englert 2012, Chabal ibid, Comaroff and Comaroff 2006). These definitions develop and compliment issues of access to water and land rights, and contribute to a discourse that acknowledges that within Zanziabr, class needs to be considered as a vector.

Class does not feature in the the recent and first mapping of media and media usage of Zanzibaris by two Zanzibar Non-Governmental Organisations was funded by the USAID in 2013 (See Appendix 2). This research was prompted by the high rates of child abuse, child rape and teen pregnancies in Zanzibar and Pemba[35], and fears of repeat manifestations of the violence dominating the 2005 elections[36]. The research, as with all base-line data, is superficial, although it shows that security, corruption, and crime are the issues most concerning female Zanzibaris. (See appendix 1).

With limited theoretical material to draw upon, I pooled together a number of subjective markers to make informed guesses about class, including dress, styles of speech, fluency in English, ownership of certain material possessions, home ownership, ability to travel abroad, ability to access civic structures and knowledge of legal rights. I do not draw upon literature relating to class, as it is too heavily theoretically and materially grounded in Northern Europe. However, as Foucault-Brisset acknowledges (2010) and Spronk (2014) identifies, East Africa certainly does have a class system, founded around ideas of 'acceptability' and particular behaviour traits, rather than citizenship or rights.

Social class in Zanzibar is defined, visible, and very present. Yet it is un-nominated, thereby presenting peculiar ontological challenges for this work. Whether it is a legacy of British rule, or a hybrid of other influences, the '*sauti laini*' (sweet tongue, good accent) and ability to behave decorously is openly discussed and reiterated in terms of social capital and marriagability. However there is no base line data on income, lifestyle, or attitudes as linked to class in Zanzibar. Social class is never considered directly in Zanzibar, and the categories of working class or middle class do not exist. People refer to '*sisi watu*' (us people) or '*serikali*' (government) or the Royal Family (the ruling family who have been in power since 1964).

The majority of statistical work on Zanzibar comes from Afrobarometer in the University of Michigan. Their work prioritizes geographic markers, concentrating on the location of habitation or origin, or where the research was carried out and the age of the people involved. The terms 'rural' and 'urban' are often used as synonyms for class—with urban being associated with higher class. Afrobarometer statistics draw attention to educational achievements, are broken down by gender, and though fascinating, they only offer tantalising numbers on political engagement, rather than the thinking, context and decisions of the subjects. Education is theoretically free in Zanzibar until standard four (equivalent to the last year of primary school in the UK) but in practice school uniforms, the cost of books and pencils and 'extra fees' mean that people pay for their education all the time. Thus having reached A level is a clear marker of being 'middle class', as is having a university education.

The effects of a small middle class are many as Mbembe (2006) notes. There are clear absences where 'the intellectuals' should be: those that occupy the universities, the editorial boards, the think tanks which nominate critique, direct the intellectual climate and offer alternatives to the state-agendas of the newspapers, radio and press. As well as a strong role in determining 'what is newsworthy' for both the internet and the press, intellectuals offer a valuable independent role outside of the functioning of business and politics. Zanzibar suffers from a lack of an identifiable non-party (CUF and CCM) intellectual elite which is not entwined in business and politics.

The academics at nearby Dar es Salaam University tend to keep a low profile publicly (It is rare to see a comment or editorial from an academic in a national or local paper), and there are few networks or professional associations promoting innovation, critique and discussion. It is locally acknowledged that the Tanzanian and Zanzibari education system is not as competitive or rigorous as that offered in Kenya[37]. It is often the donor community in Tanzania and Zanzibar, an elite of foreign educated individuals each promoting their national priorities, which provides the strongest critique to the Tanzanian and Zanzibari government.

3.3 Media in Zanzibar: an Overview

Media in Zanzibar is still relatively new. Television arrived in Dar es Salaam (mainland Tanzania) in the eighties, and on Zanzibar in the early nineties. The media sector was small and state-controlled. The growth of private broadcast media is expanding, but has been hindered by a lack of capital investment. Dozens of private FM radio stations broadcast, mostly from urban areas. News bulletins from international radio stations—including the BBC, Voice of America and Germany's *Deutsche Welle*, are carried, relayed by transmitter on many stations, though timings of the actual broadcasts vary from region to region.

Quantitative and qualitative studies of media and ICT in East Africa are limited because, as Brissett-Foucault eloquently describes, the studies risk becoming so methodologically fraught as to be difficult to use (Brissett-Foucault et al, 2012: 10). The limited evidence suggests that the media in Zanzibar is not 'an everyday' part of people's lives: levels of internet connectivity are low, with only around 1%, of the population having regular access, and that percentage is highly gendered and age specific.Television watching is equally rare, due in part to the high cost of television ownership, the extremely erratic nature of the electricity supply and a shortage of time, according to the informants. The media they mainly accessed was internet sites in public cafes, and newspapers.

The government project of 'creating nationalism' and liberation under Nyerere was propped up by the state-owned media and the flourishing samizdat press, led conceptually by the models of Russia and Eastern Europe. This continued until private television emerged, and although there is some difference between output and content, private television is still hampered by the very major problems of finance, lack of resources, trained personnel and cheap syndication of old American and British re-runs (*Mr Bean*, *CSI*, *Friends*) which are available on satellite television. Of the media I explore in this thesis, it is (satellite) TV and mobile phones that my informants mention the most. This is counter-intuitive, as TV is not the most widely listened to or watched media according to the evidence. Also, interestingly the internet is mentioned more than I would have anticipated, given the statistics on internet usage across Africa.

The only publicly available table of baseline media use in Zanzibar is one collated by an NGO called The Search for Common Ground (see Appendix 2).[38] A second one was undertaken by a large national NGO, Femina HP in October 2009[39] (see Appendix 2). There are three major problems with both these pieces of work: they are done by NGOs with a clear agenda to justify their own existences. Both pieces of work are short, and the methodologies are questionable. For example, people are asked if they are informed or not informed about government policies, with no fleshing out of the answers. The Femina research is now nearly five years out of date. Later research is so insignificant and so generalised that its credibility is significantly jeopardised.

The FEMINA research deals only with Tanzania, and not Zanzibar (See Appendix 3). It samples the use of Radio, TV, internet, SMS text messages, newspapers and magazines. The usage in every category is higher for those in urban locations, with radio usage topping 74% in rural areas and 84.9% in urban areas. Internet usage was 1% in rural areas, and 3.8% in urban, whilst texting was recorded as 35.7% in rural areas, and 57.8% in urban.

Both tables reveal a few obvious trends: male consumption of media is always higher than women's, irrespective of education levels and age. There is a decline in media use with the older informants, and there is a pattern of increased media consumption with increased wealth and urban locations.

Making that leap to the 'how' of media interpretation of Zanzibar audiences is troubling because there is very limited qualitative baseline data about African radio and television audiences or about content providers, particularly governments or indeed, in a broader context, the plethora of independent media aid producers who provide content from the global North (Myers 2010). Even straightforward market research statistics are lacking. However, Myers asserts that:

> *Africans' news and information-seeking behaviour would seem to depend mainly on radio, TV to some extent, and to a growing extent on mobile phones….The prevailing culture of African radio is that of the live broadcast, rather than pre-prepared programmes (e.g. dramas, magazines, talk-shows*

involving experts) -although there are many excellent examples in the latter categories.[40]

- Myers 2008.

Fouere's recent paper (2011)[41] uniquely examines Tanzanian audiences and the role of Nyerere, the *Babu Ya Tarifa* (Father of the Nation) and looks at iconography of the President via the newspapers, memorial buildings, and in the memories of older Tanzanians. Her emphasis is on the moral authenticity of Nyerere and the way he is invoked to represent a 'golden time' before materialism, greed and corruption.

3.3.1 Television

Television is not common in Tanzania. Only 6% of the population own a set, whilst 43% claim to have 'weekly viewing'—presumably in a social context in one of the many lounges (usually corrugated iron sheds) that are dotted around, showing popular programmes and sports, often for a small fee. Again, there is no breakdown on programmes, social and personal preferences or gender.[42] On a micro level, in the few houses where I have seen a television in Zanzibar, it takes pride of place. Often situated in a prominent position in the communal room (I have never ever witnessed a television in the bedroom), it will be draped with a decorative piece of lace material (to prevent dust). As Nick Couldry and Jon Dovey[43] note, watching television has a ritualistic element. It is turned on for special occasions, and is usually surrounded with other personal ornaments: graduation certificates, sculptures, all of which signal that television is an important thing to own, and watching it is a significant event. In Zanzibar society it is a clear signifier of being middle class.

Television is not necessarily private. In the smaller villages on the East Coast of Zanzibar, there are many small shacks that house a computer terminal and a television. In the evenings, when there is constant electricity, you can watch the television for a small fee (about ten pence). Significantly more (two pounds) buys an hour on the internet. These 'public media booths' are used almost completely by men and young boys. This is due to the difficulty and taboos around women and

young girls leaving the houses at night, either for practical reasons (domestic chores) or because this event has somehow 'become a male one.'

Television is rarely watched as a solitary pastime in Zanzibar: neighbours and relatives come and watch the television, although without the regular soap operas or tele-novelas (as in Latin and South America), there are not the weekly or daily programmes that can't be missed, or the media ritual events that provide the social glue and impetus for further discussions. As Couldry observes, watching TV is both an active consuming event and a chance to engage and interact.

3.3.2 The Internet

Internet cafés are a recent feature on Zanzibar, and have been present since 2005 when the president's son, educated in Boston, set up Livingstone's Restaurant, a bar with wireless connectivity. He also owns a telecommunications company and various satellite/network transmitters, and can access the capital for his endeavours. The restaurant is still the only public wireless connected site on the island (apart from the elite hotels) where normal Zanzibaris can enter. Having said that, laptop ownership is limited to the very privileged few—no more than a handful of people. The restaurant is an informal office for many postgraduates and the abundance of Scandinavian researchers who have generous marine postgrad programmes based in Zanzibar. Increasingly local young Zanzibaris—in their 20s and 30s, male and female—can be found there too, but they are the minority.

There are between fifteen and twenty informal internet cafés dotted around the island: connectivity is patchy, and the two most reliable and popular cafés are near the central market, Darajani, and are owned by Indians who travel regularly to China to import IT and hardware. Both owners are Muslim, and well-liked in the community: one is an elderly gentleman who runs the internet café with his daughter. He is generous and respected, often waiving fees for excess use, and providing a safe and comfortable environment with his daughter always present. For this reason young Muslim women have started using his facilities. The place is completely public; these young women can never be accused of meeting someone on the sly, although in fact that is exactly what they may be doing via the ethernet.

Estimates vary on the usage of the internet, from a meagre 1% from the World Bank Global Indicators report[44], to 11% across the continent. (Megenta 2011)[45]. Either way, there are difficulties accessing reliable data on internet usage in Zanzibar because the internet is accessed most commonly by WAP enabled phones. This would make sense, given the prominent and obvious nature of going into an internet café, sitting down, logging on and surfing. For Zanzibaris, an interesting trend is emerging—voiced by the younger women—that the internet is associated with viewing porn. There is little to be gained in this reputation-driven society being seen accessing the internet. It is certainly true from my observations that the few internet cafes there are, (apart from the two identified above) are often small, secretive affairs, tucked behind a shop, and they are male spaces: physically it would be compromising for a Zanzibar woman to be in this small spot with another man—as it is there are suspicions about why she would be accessing the internet anyway.

3.3.3 Mobile phones

> *The World Bank and African Development Bank report there are 650 million mobile users in Africa, surpassing the number in the United States or Europe. In some African countries more people have access to a mobile phone than to clean water, a bank account or electricity*
>
> - UN 2013[46].

Mobile phone penetration is high in East and Sub Saharan Africa[47] (Nyamnjoh 2009), whilst use of the internet is not. Mobile phones and radios buck the overall media trend of low usage in East Africa. There is a national span of network coverage even in areas where there has been no drilling of wells for water. There is a noticeable proliferation of mobile phone advertising in towns, villages and even very desolate areas. Various tactics are used to promote the names of different mobile companies: TIGO, VODACOM and SAFARICOM will paint entire houses in their colours and with their brand names in order to ensure visibility and presence. Statistics on mobile phone coverage in East Africa congregate around the 40-50%

coverage mark, depending on who is doing the reporting: in other words 45% of the populations of the countries of East Africa own a mobile phone. However, statistics are problematic as the mobile phone companies tend to chart the number of SIM cards sold, not whether one person owns several. The most comprehensive report to date, commissioned by the Swedish International Aid Agency (SIDA)[48] gives a very detailed breakdown of mobile phone usage, and asks the pertinent question of how we measure how much ICT usage (in mobile phones) is affecting society.

With a literacy rate of only 27% (Tanzania Central Research Authority, TCRA 2007) and over half of disposable income spent on mobile phones (according to them), commercial companies are cashing in. Tanzania now has a fully competitive telecommunications sector with six operational mobile networks. The major companies are Vodacom Tanzania, Zain Tanzania, Tigo and Zantel, BOL and recently Bharti Airtel, which is owned by TATA.

More than 1.7 million new subscribers registered in the first half of 2009, which means that every day almost 1,000 people bought a new SIM card (TCRA 2009). The SIM card penetration level is still low though, estimated at 32% of the population (ITU 2009a), with many families and neighbours sharing phones. Currently estimated growth is projected at 60% penetration of the population by the end of 2012, overtaking Kenya at 45%.[49]

One study claims that with the ability to transfer monetary credit telephonically via MPesa[50] (established in Kenya, but nascent in Tanzania at the time of writing), mobile phone usage is much higher than this, with 97%[51] of Tanzanians having access to a mobile phone,[52] either because they can purchase SIM cards (at less than fifty cents, US) and insert it into a friend's phone, or access credit from a richer relative who is working, probably in an urban setting.

Much of my research addresses debates around mobile phones. This is problematic as no quantitative material exists at all for Zanzibar, and the phone companies would not provide information about usage relating to age, location or gender. I countered this by asking the interviewees direct questions about their usage, and the patterns I observed were that the mobile phone is used discreetly. Not to talk on, as this is relatively expensive for most people, and only a tiny

minority have pre-paid contracts. According to the informants, most phone users are pay-as-you-go. Texting is most common, and has become incorporated into the elaborate dance of flirting and romance that takes some of my informants' time. In keeping with the private nature of seduction, affairs and wooing, texting has become the equivalent of the scented letter, the dropped handkerchief, both for legitimate and adulterous affairs.

Certainly the importance of having a phone (to be used as phone, a time-keeper and to send texts), cannot be underestimated. As S told me:

> *When I got my first salary cheque, the first thing I did was buy a phone. I can't visit my mum in Iringa- it's two days away by bus. But I can phone her! A phone is more vital than* sembe*, it is food!*

Mobile phones are more than just mobile phones: as Batson Savage (2007) and Horst and Miller (2006) idenitify, social relationships are forged, 'link-ups' are conretised, large social networks are invigorated by 'checking in' and deficiencies are countered or plugged (Madianou 2014). Mobile phone technology augments and changes existing relationships, promotes access to global prices (Moloney 2007)and is also a referent for modern-ness (Sabry 2009). Many younger informants had embellished and decorated their phones: key rings they jangled with trinkets, beads and stickers. All the younger informants knew which models were expensive, and which had prestige. My choice of the cheapest, most solid phone was constantly remarked upon, and I was teased. Why hadn't I got a phone that reflected my status and wealth, my informants joked. I was obviously rich—I could afford to fly out to Zanzibar and do research! One of my informants made a point of taking out her Blackberry (which got upgraded over the course of the research) and laying it prominently on the table in front of us. She was clearly aware of what it said about her: she was modern, popular, connected, liberated and wealthy. She claimed to make over forty SMS text messages a day!

In Zanzibar many used beeping to call another mobile phone and hang up before the call is answered, often with the hope to be called back. A person who beeps is a beeper and the practice is considered a bit rude, yet very popular. This

practice is also called a flash or a tickle. To have beeping power means to have sufficient funds to beep, as prepaid credit is needed to be able to place the call. People usually beep to avoid paying for the call and can therefore be seen as initiating a collect call.

Family and business owners (economic seniors) are often beeped. It might be possible to establish that it is the 'weaker' partner who beeps—certainly women beep a great deal[53]. To beep someone could also symbolise a particular message, i.e. to communicate something already decided like "I will beep you when I get there". Jonathan Donner, from Microsoft Research, argues that beeping is "a form of code which serves to strengthen relationships and reinforce social norms" (Donner 2007). Often the receiver of the beep knows the intention behind it. Sometimes it is a simple "hi how are you?" other times it's "please call me".

Vodacom Tanzania rolled out a beeping replacement application in 2008 under the slogan "Cannot call? Send a 'Call Me'!" The free service enables Vodacom Tanzania subscribers to request a call from any other mobile network subscriber in Tanzania. Subscribers can send three 'Call Me' requests per day.

There is little documentation on how mobiles are used by local citizens to increase political participation, although the frontline project in Cambridge is currently designing a methodology to start this work, monitoring listeners' use of mobile phones to contact and direct the course of radio programmes broadcast out of Pamoja Radio in Kibera, Nairobi. To date, the heaviest use of radio phone-ins (where listeners ring the station whilst it is on air and contribute either discussion or a request) and use of mobiles is in urban centres in Uganda and Kenya (Brisset-Foucault 2012).

Instances of East Africans using their mobile phones as cameras and sound recorders are rare due to cost factors, but in Zimbabwe (in 2011), Zanzibar (2010), Pemba and mainland Tanzania (2011) informal witnesses (i.e. not those in formal employment as election monitors) used their mobiles to report incidences of voter violence, vote rigging and to take photos. In Arusha people used their phones to record the post-election demonstrations which coincided with the funerals of political opposition. These images were not disseminated on the internet, partially through constraints on costs and bandwidths.

3.3.4 Radio

Systematic and reliable data on the radio sector is underdeveloped or non-existent (Myers 2009).[54] There is still a need for baseline data for developmental purposes and social and anthropological work. According to the FEMINA and Afrobarometer statistics, radio is still the dominant mass medium, with the widest geographical reach and the highest audiences. Statistically, radio is enjoying a renaissance and the number of small local stations has exploded over the last twenty years, due to democratisation and liberalisation and more affordable technologies (Myers 2008). In Tanzania, whilst 'official' (TAMPS Surveys) ownership of radios stands at 41% for Tanzania (there no statistics on Zanzibar), 93% of the population claim to listen to it according to Myers' research. There is no gender breakdown within these statistics.[55] Qualitative research and analytical trends in technology—what the audiences access by radio, what they like and dislike, how it 'works' (in the context of health messages and whether these are effective for donor programmes)—and more data on how, if and where broadcasters are using new ICTs is very much on the current donor horizons.[56]

There are a few obvious trends: male consumption of media is higher, irrespective of education level and age. There is a decline in media use with the older informants, and there is a pattern of increased media consumption with increased wealth and urban locations. The radio is played in the background a great deal, but only two of my forty two informants actually made a point of staying in to listen to particular programmes or to catch the news. Music stations dominate in Zanzibar, and that is what people listen to, as well as the broadcasting of *ghazals* on the Islamic station.

3.3.5 Digital Activism: the revolution will be texted?

Media in Africa is often 'colonised' by debates around development or governance. ICT in development debates focuses on the digital divide, and struggles for access. The Development via ICT debates prioritise the 'good governance' agenda (Gagliardone, Srinivasan & Brisset-Foucault, 2012).[58] The Global North academe and large financial institutions (Ibid 2012) often privileges, funds and intellectually prioritises tropes of technical application and technological material interventions,

arguing that digital developments will intrinsically influence change. As Zuckermann says:

The only technology that compares to the mobile phone in terms of pervasiveness and accessibility in the developing world is the radio. Indeed, considered together, radios and mobile phones can serve as a broad-distribution, participatory media network with some of the same citizen media dynamics of the Internet, but accessible to a much wider, and non-literate audience

– 2007[57]

There is a repetition and reworking of debates that surfaced in the 1960s with Marshall McLuhan and Schumacher (*The Medium is the Message*, *Small is Beautiful*). They suggest that large (i.e. Northern defined and driven) interventions focusing on technical solutions do not address the complexities of social organisation and local cultural normative iterations. Social and information cascades (Clay Shirky 2008, Bikchandani 1992) centre on numbers, geographic location and social demographics (and education) of those accessing media. They posit that key individuals introduce new ideas into the ether, and via their social networks these ideas and promotions cascade and multiply. These arguments detach media and ICT from the social and political institutions within which they operate and are still largely universalist, whilst recent discourses prioritise hybridity as a way to explain the mix and match of technologies.

The fascination with 'kit' still prevails. Echoing structure vs agency debates in sociology, current debates position the binary of communication networks (and technology) at one pole and local usage and perceptions at the other. Sometimes media is seen as a kind of miracle intervention:

Successful support to local media should facilitate its independence from government and other outside influences, promote freedom of information, represent the public's needs to decision-makers, and improve the quality of the news that is produced.

- Susman, 2011:2[58]

Whether and how media and ICT precipitate social change, openness, upheaval, democratic progress or fruitful debates on the nature of governance is still not resolved: Zuckerman (2010) and Shirky (2009) argue that technology is not sufficient for open societies and challenging discussion: it is the ICT used in the context of civic action of groups, and conversations, not individuals accessing a twitter account, that promotes and fosters change. Morozov counters this by affirming that digital activism and social networking has actually made it easier for autocratic and despotic governments to gather information about their citizens, dissident or not (Morozov 2009).

Brissett-Foucault and others suggest rather than focus on hybridity, it is more prescient to examine:

> *How are political structures characterized by a high level of patronage and recourse to coercion shaping a media space that is becoming increasingly plural as a result of the internal and external pressures to liberalize and guarantee freedom of expression?* (2012:4)

This approach speaks directly to political and social actualities at a localised level, and the push-me-pull-you of local/external tensions which is exactly what this thesis tries to dismantle.

> *Large-scale and comparative research programmes on governance in Africa (Booth, 2011) and on the impact of citizens' engagement on governance processes in developing countries (Gaventa, 2010) show us that there is a multiplicity of actors often occupying the same socio-political spaces: state institutions, development partners, 'traditional' authorities, community and religious organizations, foreign non-governmental aid organisations and private operators.*
>
> - Brissett Foucault et al 2012:5[59].

This quote addresses the problem of isolating where and how media (and power) is used in citizen interactions. Crucially, rural areas are still isolated from

media, old and new, and are very dependent on corrupt and privatised state structures (Gupta 2012, Mbembe 2006): health, education and agricultural advice and subsidies (Gupta and Ferguson 2002). Geography and mobility are key indicators of access (Baumann 2000): whether the informants are rural or not determines access to electricity and the internet (Winther 2011, Ferguson Furuholt and Kristiansen, (2007). There are few actual facilities in many rural areas, and the everyday needs of survival and pastoralism dominate. For rural people in Zanzibar resources are very limited indeed: there are no mobile libraries or rural internet cafes, limited mobility and finances, and there is a basic reliance on one person or state officials for a combination of complex needs (money changer, fertiliser supplier, local bus operator…) (Gupta 2012). Thus to citicise local management politics, decisions or business dealings can result in complete loss of ability to function. This, says Chabal (2009) is why origin and idenitity are so key in the functioning within a corrupt, violent patriominal state: where you are from and who you are nominated as being is integrally bound up with survivial. Accessing online newspapers, discussion boards or critiques can be dangerous: as De Sardan illustrates, the actual practice of living in a place where roles are confused and complicated almost automatically engenders the conditions for corruption and over-personalised relationships (2011). An interrogation of the functioning of independent media is beyond the scope of this research, however as the prominent commentator Gumede says:

> *Private media, where present, often does not have a wide reach. Furthermore, such private media is often financially vulnerable. The state in many African countries still directly controls most of the economy—whether in North Africa or Africa south of the Sahara. And if they don't, they have indirect influence, through their ability to restrict private companies' trading licenses, and so on, should they refuse to tow the government line.*

- March 2011, African Review

Conclusion

This chapter has shown that any examination of media and the discussions it prompts needs to be situated in a multiplicity of social arrangements, and acknowledge the ways in which historical legacies of shame, disorder and categorisation have disrupted terms of belonging, race and gender. Similarly, post-colonial theorists such as Chakrabarty, Chabal, Ferguson, Mohanty, Gupta and Mahmood are called upon to speak to the particularities of informal and precarious existences containing many iterations of symbolic and actual violence meted out by elites against the citizen.

Set within the contexts of donors and NGOs that frame the debate and influence attitudes, Madianou, Brissett-Foucault, Mankekar and Spronk speaks to issues of class, and the importance for women as identifying themselves as middle class Zanzibar female subjects, and the particularities of this project. The specific history of Zanzibar and its evolution in relation to the mainland Tanzania have affected notions of nationalism, belonging and statehood, in turn feeding into discourses around the efficacy of political participation in the public sphere.

Keeping face, patronage, corruption, prioritising certain social networks and pragmatism in the face of power cuts and water shortages all feed into a grand soup in which media, old and new, plays particular roles at specific times.

The next chapter attempts to interrogate women's frustration and irritation at the (old) media's failure to address them and their concerns in the content, the factual inaccuracy of news reports and a willingness to engage with new media. I then consider the implications of this, and the second major finding, which is that the media does not promote, circulate or maintain a public sphere—a space where citizenship can be iterated and conceived—or provide a forum for meaningful critiques of national issues and policies. Politics remains an issue of personalities and is largely 'un-nominated'; secrecy is elevated and maintained.

[1] The Afrobarometer series was developed by select Africanist scholars with funds from a variety of sources. The series represents a large-scale, cross-national survey research project designed to systematically map mass attitudes to democracy, markets, and civil society in more than a dozen sub-Saharan African nations, and ultimately to track the evolution of such attitudes in selected

nations over time. (From http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/series/162 accessed September 2014)

[2] World Bank Global Indicators say 43 million, The TAMPS survey (wrongly) says less

[3] Afro-barometer, page 5, Tanzania Afro-barometer 2010

[4] Ibid

[5] Conversation with lawyer Rashid Hamid, March 2009

[6] As D, one of my informants who volunteers regularly for an NGO specializing in free legal advice for women on Zanzibar (dealing with domestic violence, land disputes and divorce in the main) says, "more than 90% of women we see have no clue of their legal situation, and it's not helped because in Sharia law a divorce can be obtained by simply saying this 'I divorce you' three times in the presence of a witness, but this doesn't mean a woman will get any property or income once she is divorced."

[7] Robert Irwin, *The Arabian Nights: A Companion* (London, 1994); Bissell, *Urban Design, Chaos, and Colonial Power,* p. 274. See also Dane K. Kennedy, *The Highly Civilized Man: Richard Burton and the Victorian World* (Cambridge, MA, 2005).

[8] Glassman J, *War of Words, War of War*, 2011

[9] There are many absences in Zanzibar: absence of a strong diaspora community who make interventions either via the internet, regarding current democratic transgressions. There is also an absence of internal liberal critique (academics, intellectuals from Dar es Salaam University, think tanks in Kenya or Tanzania, policy-orientated NGOs). There is a history of NGO intervention in Zanzibar, specifically Save the Children's campaign to raise awareness around paedophilia in rural communities, and the distribution of condoms. This resulted in the country director at the time being asked to leave, and all work suspended until three years ago. The new director of SCF, who was interviewed for this work, has had to tread very carefully.

[10] Marie-Aude Fouéré, *Ujamaa, Julius Nyerere and Political Morality in Contemporary Tanzania* Institut Français de Recherche en Afrique (IFRA), Nairobi, Kenya Les Afriques dans le Monde (LAM), Bordeaux, France, 2012, http://www.nai.uu.se/ecas-4/panels/1-20/panel-11/Marie-Aude-Fouere-Full-paper.pdf accessed 17.6.14

[11] Marie-Aude Fouéré, ibid

[12] A convincing and evidenced explanation for Nyerere's intervention after the Zanzibar revolution and his suppression of 'Babu' and the Zanzibar communists was his desire to prevent 'another Cuba' but also his belief that Arab communities on Zanzibar had done a great deal to enable and facilitate the slavery of Africans. The extent of local collusion, and the role of the Slave Traders within Zanzibar is still very publicly contested and refuted. (Fouere 2012, Wilson 2014).

[13] http://www.economist.com/blogs/baobab/2013/08/violence-zanzibar; http://www.ibtimes.com/murder-zanzibar-christians-muslims-struggle-keep-peace-tourist-hotspot-1092046

[14] The Economist: http://www.economist.com/blogs/baobab/2013/08/violence-zanzibar; http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/zanzibartanzania/10230675/Zanzibar-acid-attack-warning-signs-were-there.html

[15] Haj, an educator an activist, explained to me (Feb 2008) that children are not taught about the social and political ramifications of this period of great violence in schools, Zanzibar history of this period is banned from the curriculum. This has interesting connotations in terms of oral history, memories, stories about 'normal people'—others apart from leaders and MPs. The story of the ordinary person, 'the little man/woman', is notable in its absence both now, and in past media.

[16] I would therefore argue that the combined forces of social policies pursued by Nyerere, and the macro real-politik of the CCM machinery, plus the weak notions of citizenship have all contributed to a weak media and weak public sphere.

All geographical locations are divided into small units, (similar to barrios) who in turn elect a representative. This person, always a CCM member, is beholden to sort out his constituents issues: so complaints and problems are amassed individually: issues which crop up routinely—sanitation, electricity supply and water—all of which are persistent problems for all but the rich minority in Zanzibar, are treated not as group matters, but as individual problems. This is explored further in the findings section, with one of my informants who did actually try and set up a community group and mobilize a political demonstration, and then finally gave up.

[17] Quoted in person, except for Ortner referenced by Marianne Franklin, Imagining Ethnographic Realities, Conference Goldsmiths June 16th 2014

[18] http://www.ipsnews.net/2014/02/zanzibars-rising-violence-women/
http://www.christianlifenews.com/world/
43021-more-violence-in-zanzibar-stokes-fears-of-increasing-christian-persecution

[19] Sex, sexual expression, the body, again reveal themselves to be repositories of inflammatory and potent debates playing out the meta-dramas surrounding

[20] Fouere 2012

[21] This arose because there was a combination of external pressure from the aid community. Increased international media attention on Zanzibar which came about because of the power failures affecting the whole island.

[22] Private discussion with Julia Bishop, head of ZATI June 2009

[23] http://www.christianlifenews.com/world/43021-more-violence-in-zanzibar-stokes-fears-of-increasing-christian-persecution

[24] Private discussion with Julia Bishop, head of ZATI June 2009

[25] DFID, USAID and NORAID websites, accessed April 24th 2012

[26]http://www.tz.undp.org/content/tanzania/en/home/operations/projects/democratic_governance/disaster_management/ Farid, a community worker, historian, and most recently travel guide, explains to me that there is a tradition of silence is embedded around the revolution. The habit of not debating past political and public issues then segues into the normalisation of not explaining

or critiquing social and political issues. This in turn, has engendered a situation of unfamiliarity with public debate.

[27] A notable example is Soul City in South Africa, a popular soap opera dealing with relationships, sexuality, fidelity and families, with an overall message of decreasing HIV rates Tanzanian Natural Resources Forum in Tanzania, has very significantly influenced land policy.

[28] Policy Paper: Economic Council for Africa, African Union, Addis Ababa, Feb 2011., accessed web July 20 2011

[29] Rocha Menocal, A. and Sharma, B. (2008)
Joint Evaluation of Citizens' Voice and Accountability: Synthesis Report. London: DFID

[30] Beckmann, N, politics of the queue: the Politicisation of People Living with HIV and Aids. Development and Change, Insititute of Social Studies, The Hague, 2009

[31] Zanzibar USAID NGO register, private loan. Unpublished as of April 2012

[32] Figures not available, discussion with Director of Save The Children, Mubarak Maman, June 2010

[33] Literally, a Development workman. In Swahili *fundi* = workman, and is more commonly used in relation to trades such as building, plumbing or electricity. What this suggests then, is that there is a great Tanzanian appetite for entrepreneurism, just not enough of a market to support it.

[34] One of my informants, a senior ex-pat woman (who wished to remain anonymous) commented "The donors have to a large extent created political moods and behaviours here, you ask why there's so little advocacy, political involvement and contribution to policy by people here, I don't think people (Tanzanians, sic) are frightened, not at all. I think there's just been so much money thrown at Tanzania, and the 'briefcase NGO's' have learnt to change their tune according to the piper. It was poverty reduction at first, then 'The Masaii', then child mortality, gender, whatever, then aids and HIV, now it's climate change. It's not that donors actually look at what the pressing issues are, and respond. What it is, they tell us what they think the issues and problems are, and then fund projects if it fits in with their core agendas."

In her words there is an underlying assumption then that by funding advocacy groups and NGO's (which arguably could potentially be the platform for the stirrings of citizenship and a society humming with conversations, and agents, of change) donors, international organizations and wealthy sponsors dictate the agenda, and stifle democracy, ironically.

[35] http://www.ipsnews.net/2014/02/zanzibars-rising-violence-women/

[36] http://www.unesco.org/new/en/media-services/single-view/news/scaling_up_the_impact_of_community_media_in_zanzibar/back/121349/#.U6BqeflhyQc and
http://www.sfcg.org/programmes/tanzania/Media%20Sector%20Mapping%20Zanzibar%20Key%20Findings%2030%20April%202013.pdf

[37] It may be more pertinent to focus on the societal and economic issues that are necessary to create this elite. Arguably, if there is already in place a body of intellectuals, students or opposition

who are critiquing government information, it is likely they will co-opt the internet to further augment existing strategies (Megenta 2011).

[38](http://www.sfcg.org/programmes/tanzania/Media%20Sector%20Mapping%20Zanzibar%20Key%20Findings%2030%20April%202013.pdf

[39] Femina HIP is an NGO based in Dar Es Salaam that produces written magazines and radio programmes with health messages, supported by a variety of donors.

[40] Radio and Development in Africa A Concept Paper Prepared for the International Development Research Centre (IDRC) of Canada Mary Myers August 2008 (revised March 2009)

[41] *Ujamaa, Julius Nyerere and Political Morality in Contemporary Tanzania* Marie-Aude Fouéré Institut Français de Recherche en Afrique (IFRA), Nairobi, Kenya, 2011
Les Afriques dans le Monde (LAM), Bordeaux, France

[42] BBC WS Trust Find Report. See Bibliography

[43] Couldry, N, *Media Rituals, A critical approach*, London, USA, Canada: Routledge. 2003

[44] World Bank Global Indicators 2011

[45] Megenta A, Can Africa Twitter its Way to a Revolution? Participatory Media in Africa. Reuters Institute for Journalism, May 2011 accessed July 23rd 2011

[46] http://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/may-2013/africa%E2%80%99s-mobile-youth-drive-change#sthash.vAYpRQyk.dpuf and http://www.emarketer.com/Article/Smartphone-Usage-Nearly-Double-Middle-East-Africa/1010249

[47] James and Versteeg (2007) use data from Vodafone suggesting that the penetration rate (number of phones per 100 people) for Africa as a whole was 6 per cent in 2005, with penetration as high as 36% in
South Africa.

[48] Hellstrom, J, 2010, SIDA, The Innovative Use of Mobile Applications in Africa Data Sheet

[49] Ibid, p12

[50] MPesa is a popular system in Kenya: a purchaser buys credit, and keys in, via SMS the amount into her phone. This can then be transferred to another phone user, and the money ‘cashed in’ at the nearest shop with an MPesa sign on it.

[51] Zuckerman, E, quoted in Draft paper on mobile phones and activism Filed under: Blogs and bloggers, Developing world, Geekery, Human Rights, Media 2007

[52] ICT AND DEVELOPMENT STUDIES: TOWARDS DEVELOPMENT 2.0 Paper presented to DSA Annual Conference 2007, Brighton, Mark Thompson

[53] I would be tempted to argue that women do beep more than men, as an indicator of their ‘lower’ public status and the perception that they had less disposable income.

[54] Radio and Development in Africa A Concept Paper Prepared for the International Development Research Centre (IDRC) of Canada Mary Myers August 2008 (revised March 2009)

[55] 'New communication technologies and citizen-led governance in Africa', Feb 2012, https://www.repository. cam.ac.uk/bitstream/handle/1810/245112/CGHR_WP_2_2012_ICT-Citizen-Governance.pdf?sequence=4

[56] Recent examples include the elephant tagging project run by Cambridge University: http://www.geog.cam.ac.uk/research/projects/heccapacity/, the Cambridge/Fuhamu collaboration https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/bitstream/handle/1810/245112/CGHR_WP_2_2012_ICT-Citizen-Governance.pdf?sequence=4

[57] http://ethanzuckerman.com/blog/index.php?s=%22vastly+exceeds+internet+usage%22

[58] The Media Map Project, Kenya, Allen and Gagliardone, 2011 http://www.mediamapresource.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/Kenya_web1.pdf

[59] Even if the actual computer and network exists for people to access the internet, how they use it (to access football scores? Dating sites?) is linked to their levels of exposure to information counter to the government line, levels of perceived risk in countering 'the authorities', their own existing levels of social activism and levels of literacy.

Chapter Four: Findings. Media Failures and Absences

Introduction

In this chapter, I present and analyse the discourses of Zanzibari women about media, politics and everyday life. There is an absence of active, trusted and relevant media content that speaks to women and reflects their lives, concerns and interests. However, through a process of cherry-picking, (Abu-Lughod 1993) incorporation, reinvention and imagination, and active agency (Mahmood 20006) women of all ages adapt and rework existing (local and internationally produced) content and narratives to speak to their own emotional, intellectual, political and sexual worlds. With this lacuna of women's voices from Zanzibar in the media public sphere, the debates that are conventionally articulated by the media move to different places: the bedroom, the porch and the hair salons. In effect political talk is 'reduced' to gossip. The informants use non-media spaces to make discussions, iterate their realities, negotiate relationships, interpret their lives and order the constant influx of information from a variety of sources.

This chapter and the following two attempt to address the consequences of this failure of the local media to address women, and to create and maintain a meaningful public sphere for them. I argue that the media in Zanzibar is extremely problematic—partly through absence, partly though the lack of manifestation of neutrality, balance or accuracy. This fact is only very recently beginning to be catalogued (Mallimani 2014)[1]. The old media[2] (newspapers, radio shows, TV shows, magazines) are not viewed by women as spaces in which they can express their views. Some Zanzibar media, as producers of content information, create and maintain pervasive understandings and performances of womanhood and contribute to the tropes that maintain the passivity of women, excluded from the (male) public realm. However as my research shows, where women do engage in demonstrations or public acts of political activity, they are actively denied space in the media public sphere. Younger women in particular are using new media (internet, mobile phones) in novel ways, to cement and augment social

relationships (Horst and Miller 2006), and to conduct affairs—both business and personal.

The old media is not perceived as neutral by the Zanzibari people I interviewed; in fact it is often treated with great fear and caution. These are not unfounded concerns, as both the Media Council of Tanzania and the Committee for Protection of Journalists maintain[3]. In 2012, there were more than sixty violations of the press, and the closure of a popular and vocal newspaper on Zanzibar, *MwanaHalisi*. In addition, two very high profile (private, independent and critical) Tanzanian editors were killed in highly suspicious circumstances[4]).

A weak media coupled with weak institutions and embedded corruption (Gupta 2012) all influence the hierarchy of truth, in which media becomes a secondary player against a background of social relationships, life and accruing social capital. Jealousy, shame, reputation and 'standing out' contribute significantly to Zanzibari women's ability to perform political acts in public or indeed have much of a presence at all in public life. This however does not mean they are without agency; they find alternative public spheres. They go 'ninja' and use concealment, disguise and reconfiguration to express themselves. As Mahmood observes, their agency is unstable, labile, and not defined in terms of autonomy or individuality. (Ibid).

The central strand of this PhD is that because of the prevalence of corruption and maintaining face in public, Mahmood's notion of agency (2006) invites notions of female 'Southern' public spheres. Women's documented lack of engagement with parliamentary and institutional processes (Afrobarometer 2010,) coupled with Zanzibar's repressive government, weak media and the prevalence of locally produced information (gossip) necessitates new ways of viewing political engagement. The lack of nomination and the interpolation of being hailed by media (Hall 1991) is crucial not only to the informants' experience of the media but also to the democratic process.

There are four major findings of this work:

1. Women articulate frustration and irritation at the (old) media's failure to address them and their concerns in the content, the factual inaccuracy of news reports and a willingness to engage with new media.

Media content does prompt discussion amongst interviewees, but is predominantly viewed as unsatisfactory, inaccurate, irrelevant and, crucially, untrustworthy. Inaccuracy and a lack of depth in media analysis are cited by interviewees, which I catalogue in its own sub heading. These observations are backed up by The Tanzania Media Council and The Committee for Protection of Journalists, two independent Non-governmental Organisations. By the end of my research—in May 2011—there was an increased frequency of stories about women, but the media overall is still not viewed by subjects as an honest and reliable player, and often my informants expressed dissatisfaction at inaccuracies or gaps and a desire to tell me about 'real life' as they viewed it. In the later stages of fieldwork, interviewees became vociferous about the subjects they wanted to see covered in the media, specifically violence against women and children on Zanzibar. The gaps where the media is not present include context, statistics, debates and points of view, and thus raise interesting ontological questions about how to frame questions about Southern Public spheres.

2. The media does not promote, circulate or maintain a public sphere—a space where citizenship can be iterated and conceived—or provide a forum for meaningful critiques of national issues and policies. Politics remains an issue of personalities and is largely 'un-nominated'; secrecy is elevated and maintained.

The lack of public dialogic media engagement (newspaper editorials, radio phone shows, chat shows) results in content that rarely reflects human issues on Zanzibar, nor does it promote the achievements, issues and opinions of those who live there (Mallimani 2014). Consequently, informants suggest that (old) media does not act as an advocate, or as an instrument of change, a critic of the state, politicians, the legislature, businesses, individuals or national policy. Although some of the interviewees are familiar with the constraints of media content production (several informants are themselves former or current journalists) the concept of the media

operating as a public sphere, or as a check on government, is not taken seriously. Overall, the media in Zanzibar is seen as a propaganda arm of the government, and is not experienced—or expected to act as—a public sphere for the people in of this research. New definitions of public spheres must be imagined.

3. Local corruption affects the veracity of media information, as does its point of origin: media from 'outside' Zanzibar provokes problematic and conflicting responses and highlights tensions of the juggling of competing iterations of agency.

Against a backdrop of economic corruption, the origin of information itself becomes the focus. Repetition, iteration and gossip all feed into the creation of information, which often supplants the media's version of the reporting of events. Bartering and reputation in the formation of Zanzibari agency becomes heightened: The media feeds into the discussion about the creation of information (and whether it is 'true'). Gossip replaces the bigger debates which could take place in a public sphere. Space and geography is central to media analysis. Information is distinctly place-specific and author-specific; where things 'happen' or are talked about is crucial. The research showed that the origin of the media is important, whether it is produced locally or abroad. The media essentialises notions of 'inside and outside' space and categories of belonging and not belonging: therefore notions of the public sphere as understood in literature originating from the Global North must be adapted and transformed to cope with the uniquely Zanzibari approach to public space, the public sphere and its colonial past. The media can transcend location as it becomes internalised into a narrative particular to each interviewee. The impact of 'globalisation' is explored with reference to flawed and complicated traditionality and problematic contradictory modernity.

4. Southern Spheres and the new media as a self-help manual and a 'conduit' for modernity

New media is often viewed as a resource both in its materiality and as a vehicle for information—like a giant library of ideas, information or facts, and as an example of 'otherness' in the case of foreign media. Media brings new ideas about fashions,

educational scholarships, job opportunities, political events, development, rights-based agendas, toppled dictatorships, flower arranging and football. This information is reworked, adapted and creatively co-opted with agency, flair and humour. The ownership of media (laptop, mobile phone, television) is a marker of status, access and education. The media becomes a cipher for discussions about change, difference, embracing newness, Westernisation, and rejecting tradition. It becomes one of many ways for Zanzibaris to explore notions of self and agency.

As well as changing and reworking boundaries of home and work, outside and inside, and inventing new codes of privacy and disclosure (as well as display and subterfuge), subjects are questioning themselves, their identities, their Zanzibari ways of life, their moralities and the ways they relate to, and flirt with, each other. Age, educational level, marital status (class) and 'movement' (ability to travel) are key drivers in how the media is used, discussed and incorporated into daily life. There is a consensus about old media's ineffectiveness as a forum for discussion, and instead it is viewed as a prompt for discussions around modernity.

4.1.1 The Media Directly Addressing Women: Gaps in Content

Here I look at Zanzibari women's articulations of the media in Zanzibar. I analyse their interpretations and their critiques of the way the media addresses women. I elaborate this with examples of media inaccuracies cited over the course of the fieldwork, and follow with an exploration of what 'real life' is for the interviewees, and the issues that they feel they would like to see in the media. Lastly, I investigate child abuse and domestic abuse, and interviewees' thoughts and perceptions of how the media treats these subjects.

Most women feel that the media rarely addresses women directl. Although I did not conduct content analysis, my interviewees remark that women are rarely featured in news stories, and the opportunities for media interactions are few.

There are only a few instances in three years of fieldwork where interviewees felt they were being talked to directly. However the spotlight on women as 'Voiceless subalterns' (Kolawole 2004:253) and nomination as a marker of meaning is also problematic, as Kolawole notes:

Another focus ….is the recognition that gender in Africa needs to transcend the question of naming or self-definition, which are basically preoccupations for the academic women and not for the majority of ordinary non-literate African women.

– 2004: 252

The media is not regarded as 'reflecting real life', and this section ends with a discussion of topics that my subjects raised that they wished to see covered. These are important findings, feeding into other conversations about the invisibility of women (in a public sphere, or public sphericles) and broader social silences which are developed in sections five and six. The rhetoric (in local and national NGOs, the Millennium Development Goals and parts of the UNDP) revolves around gender issues and the importance of recognising women's political and social contributions. The media does not appear to contribute to or engage with these conversations[5] (Brah and Phoenix 2004).

I reproduce only a tiny smattering of the constant refrain over the 20 months of field work spread over three years: "I don't see myself in the media!"

Initially the aim was to interrogate women's uses of old and new (polyvocal) media, and specifically to investigate the 'political' discussions and debates it generated.[6] I did not monitor, count or evaluate or analyse media content. I attempted to read the newspapers weekly, listen to the radio, and ask my informants if there was any coverage that specifically focussed on women. This proved difficult as the electricity was erratic and newspapers were hard to access. The trope that the public sphere is male, made by men, for men, and the domestic sphere is for women, is played out:

…it boils down to social stereotypes defining women's space as being in the private rather than public sphere. Politics and the media are among the most public of public spaces and it therefore the most hostile for women to access.

- Lowe, Morna and Made, 2009).

According to interviewees over three years of field work, the media in Zanzibar is described by many of the interviewees as being of poor quality, absent in reporting of their lives, unreliable and inaccurate. For example Mb, a graduate from Dar es Salaam (who worked in Zanzibar) talks generally about media in both places. She is educated to degree level, and comes from a large middle class family, and says:

The newspapers don't talk to us, about us, our interests, not at all. Like last week, there was this headline, the President says so and so, but the article wasn't even about the President, or his speech, which was addressing the needs of women! Honestly. I read the whole article, but nothing about the bit about women was mentioned. Nothing! I only knew it was about women from Dad.

She went on to talk about the recent bomb blast in an army camp, which had killed people she knew.

Then you know this bomb that went off? Near the army? Well the army said this number was dead. The other newspaper said six, this other said nine. There was no facts. I have relatives in this area, they told me that there were up to twenty dead, the school got shut down, several people had lost their houses, but the newspaper didn't even tell you why there was a bomb blast, or anything at all in fact! That's the problem with our media here. It's completely inaccurate. Like last week I got a call from this journalist, wanting a quote about Miss World. He believed I was her mother! Honestly. I put the phone down in the end. What a nonsense. I kept saying I AM NOT MISS WORLD'S MOTHER. He didn't believe me.

Mb is angry and articulate about the absences: "Our media is a joke really, a scandal. It has to improve in so many ways, and I hope it will".

Mb's sister Aa works for an NGO in Dar es Salaam encouraging women to participate in media and get their stories in the press. Anna says:

We have an enormous amount of work to do. We work with TAMWA (Tanzania Media Women's Association) and we go out to women's NGOs and we read the newspapers together, we discuss what is in the papers, we build and mobilise. We talk about our feelings of the way things are reported. I would say that I am happy that there is more discussion of gender bias and gender issues, and violence against women is now featured in some newspapers, but people don't make the connections with their own lives, and we definitely don't see stories about women in more, you know, normal situations, like life here in Mobibo [they live in Mobibo, a large township about 15km from the central business district of Dar es Salaam] ….when you say like what, I mean, hair salons, love affairs, friendships, trying to study and improve myself, life in the church, sitting with our families, you know how our lives really are! Myself, I am single, I am single woman and I am educated, a professional, and I am very proud of myself! I think I should be in the paper [laughs]. With my media organisation every month we profile a special woman. Maybe she is special because she has several children and has taken on the relatives' children [many families take in Aids orphans, and receive no extra financial or other support] or maybe she is excellent at her job and we ask her colleagues for comments. So in this way we try to address the gender imbalance.

Mb and Aa live with their parents, two aunts, their brother and his wife in a largely female household. Mb's father is a journalist[7], and they discuss political affairs and life in general with great frequency. Both women feel the media deliberately downplay women's achievements, stifling their creativity, sense of self-esteem and their public profile. Mb is the first of my interviewees to mention Facebook, which she uses prolifically. She advertises her business there, the only woman I interviewed who uses it for professional purposes. Mb is not Muslim, and unlike other interviewees she does not link Muslim sites or use the internet in a didactic fashion (e.g. to get instructions), she says:

I run a catering company, as well as having a full time job as a mental health co-ordinator for an NGO. I use Facebook to publicise my professional work- the catering bit. I am proud of myself, I cook for over 200 people for weddings. I do this in a tiny kitchen, on three fires (I don't have cookers or stoves) – you've seen it [laughs] and still turn out exceptional meals. If the local paper or radio is not interested in how well we are doing, if they don't want to promote an example of two sisters running a business, successfully, I'll do it myself! I can do it myself! I don't need them!

There are a number of personal and structural attributes which enable Mb and Aa to articulate such confident positions of agency and interiorised control (Ndlovu 2013). They both live in a district that is well served by basic amenities: electricity, water and (unpaved) roads. They live in a lively suburb of Dar es Salaam, are well travelled and are surrounded by a matriarchy of successful and vociferous women, many of whom have been to university. There are five sisters in this family and one brother, and they all work as well-paid professionals. They can afford to risk being talked about or socially ostracised, they are a strong family unit of over fifteen people, all of whom are working, so money is not an issue. Pertinently three members of the family are successful media practitioners. The father is a prominent journalist on a leading national Tanzanian paper and Mb has worked for international media outlets as a researcher. Aa contributes regularly to local media. This suggests that in order for women to be publicly challenging, they need to be able to access the system as insiders and have excellent role models, social capital and concrete examples of people who've successfully negotiated the public sphere. Both women display many strategies and coping mechanisms, as well as social support structures, access to resources, advice and guidance, and a great deal of personal confidence.

At the other end of the social scale in a very rural location on the East Coast of Zanzibar, bringing up her five children as a single mother, is seaweed farmer Mama Patina. She lives in a one-roomed house which she built, and has no electricity. Water is collected from a communal tap two kilometres away when it is on, usually about an hour a day. As with the women in Winther's study, (2008) the

lack of electricity and the time she spends working significantly impacts her quality of life. She comments:

I don't often get the time to watch the news, and we don't have electricity at home. It's a special event to watch television, and I like to keep up with the news, but honestly I am often disappointed. There's so little stuff about us, women as farmers. I know that we are everywhere all over Tanzania, but the information is lacking. What is there situation, on the mainland, what are they farming? Do they have ideas to help us? Do they face the same problems? These are things I want to know, but I can't.

This finding strongly echoes that of Beckmann (2009) in her study of the politicisation of HIV in Tanzania, and the failure of NGOs and PLWA (people living with Aids)[8], as well as Audrey Gadzekpo's work (2009).

Women in more senior professional positions, with agency in the public sphere, also say that they do not see their lives reflected in media spaces. Mth, the only woman who runs a bank in Tanzania and Zanzibar, has this to say:

Our women in Tanzania, a very high proportion are in retail. Small export and importers. Most of our women are migrant entrepreneurs. Retail means women go to Dubai to bring clothes, shoes, sofas, food items, the big ones bring in cars. Middle ones are doing food processing: honey, banana wine… very nice, you have to taste it… knitting, batik, carvings. We have women owning shops, selling fish. There's plenty of opportunity for women in business and tourism, and we need to support this. Unfortunately the media don't really cover this, not yet, I don't know why. All these sectors are invisible to the media. These things I say, I don't know if the media knows it, maybe they don't? That's why they don't report it? It seems a shame, a wasted opportunity!

Age became important for agency, echoing previous work by Askew (2002), Chabal (2009) and Haram (2004) in which age confers seniority, and conversely

being a youth limits participation in public spheres (Suriano 2007, Perullo 2008). Older women were markedly more opinionated and vociferous. Older women were confidently able to nominate and discuss media absences of thorny issues such as incest, child abuse and familial violence.

With no initial interest or intent to pursue this theme, the issue of child abuse and domestic violence (against women) came up a great deal in the research, and I was forced to confront the role it played within the context of my research. For example Cu, a female journalist and national newsreader, mentions child abuse, which was raised on Radio 1 in Zanzibar in mid-2009. She says:

It was interesting, this discussion, with this panel, and they had a lawyer, so they were saying this and this is illegal, you must not beat the child, but they didn't really tell you what to do about it, or look at why women might experience abuse, or where to go if they do, so it was dissatisfying. It was like they didn't make a connection between us as listeners and the studio. It was surface. Even though I know there are many woman NGOs in this country, and many women who would want to know about this stuff, it didn't feel like they were taking it seriously. I myself find this frustrating. We have so many possibilities here.

There is a clear sense from interviewees like Cu that she wants media to reflect reality, but in fact media content is often cited as a counterpoint to real life. So the media version of events is often considered wrong, inaccurate, or morally deficient on cultural levels. Cu continues:

The attempt by the UNDP, the Beijing conference to put women's issues on the agenda was great, I remember being very excited. But there's two major problems as I see it. First of all these are things that we only really hear about on the foreign media, or maybe once or twice they are news items on our stations, or in our press, then they disappear. The other thing is this, it's too, I don't know, too vague. We're left wondering but what do the Millennium Goals actually mean? We talk about this, I do, with my

> *friends, but we are left trying to work out how they might affect our lives, you know, what they might mean for us!* [Laughs]

Another senior female manager in the international finance sector felt the media didn't address her and hadn't contributed to her considerable achievements in the public sphere in Tanzania and the USA (several articles were written about her there). Her confidence and professional success was nothing to do with the media and could be attributed, she says, to her father and to her education. Mama Aa is a woman in her seventies, the first woman executive director in Tanzania, who ran the Tanzania national bank. Educated in the States, she jokingly mentions that she was often called a *mzungu* (white person) for her high levels of efficiency and her insistence on meeting deadlines:

> *No, I can't say the media had anything to with my success or confidence. And in the USA, it was the civil rights movement, not the media coverage of it—which was wrong and distorted—that influenced me. I still don't listen to radio to any of those women's programmes, I only watch the evangelical channel, which gives me faith and confidence, it's satellite, from Nigeria? I am not sure. I get my confidence from my late dad, he was always preaching to us how one has to be very proficient in whatever you do. That you should do a good job, no matter what you do. And not do it in you know, half measures. That give me, it made me want to work hard achieve things and have a better life than my countryman. It didn't matter to me that I was a woman, that I would not achieve it, it's because our parents brought us up to believe we could do whatever we planned to do or wanted to do. The support of my parents, the encouragement to make me a better person, the encouragement in my education, to go as far high up as I could, and I wanted. My communication skills and my love of people, that's all.*

I ask Mama Aa about television and the media, and whether or not it's influenced her thinking. She answers that she gets much inspiration from religious cable channels and no longer follows news or politics at all, although she was

inspired by media coverage of the black civil rights movements in the USA when she was studying there. Mama Aa is aware that she actively rejected central ideas of Tanzanian ideology: *Ujaama*, and *Umma*, in order 'to be modern'.

> *Now I watch evangelical TV, the preaching, that is what inspires me, gives me courage. When I studied, there was a lot of change going on in the USA. When I was at school in the USA civil rights was just ending, but there was women's liberation, it was a me generation, I was influenced by that, before I went to the USA I was always doing things for other people, then I had no one else to take care of, except me. I wanted to achieve things for myself, just for myself. There was a conflict in me, I was sometimes brutally frank, when I returned to Tanzania, I said I will take care of myself and my career, then other people. There was a conflict. If you have a good education you will always overcome. With me my education, the sky was the limit. If there were hurdles I found ways round it: either tell people to stop hassling me, or to leave.*

Mama Aa's comments problematize the role of Islam and provoke the question that possibly it is the iterations and interpretations of Islam (via a few particularly strident Imams on the island) that are catalysing reactions to media and modern life.

4.1.2 The lack of women's public profile in the media

The media silences around women's activities and the way they remain unrepresented in the local media are strikingly at odds with the local gossip, in which people's activities are discussed at length. The ex-nomination of the normal, the gossipy, the *African feminised* familiar (Nurunsky-Laden 2011) leads to slippage between what people are talking about on street corners, in cafés and hair salons, and what is reported in the local media, which does not reflect the tensions of working women. Over half of my interviews or discussions took place whilst we were engaged in a household activity. In this research, the informants articulate many of the pressures on them to provide financially, to work for their families. I

would like to explore some of the issues connected to running a home whilst holding down a job, as this was common for many of the interviewees.

Thirty per cent of all households are headed by women, according to the census.[9] This is a conservative statistic according to my informants. Being without a husband forces women to find work to support their families. The options for work are clearly delineated: as a *mamatile* (food preparer) in the evenings on the street, which is done often on the porch in front of the home, or in a government position, or running a small business. Whilst divorce is legal, there are three operational legal systems in Zanzibar: Sharia, national and village law, leading to numerous confusions. As M puts it:

> *I am training to be a lawyer here in Zanzibar for several reasons. I was educated in Kenya, where there is at least a functional legal system. Here there isn't, we're still thrashing it out, and in the* shamba*, women have no idea about their rights. I work in the* shamba *because women get divorced by the* sheha*, and then they're stuck, socially isolated, looked down on, and often with no income.* That *[her emphasis] is why I want to be a lawyer.*

Single, widowed or divorced women experience the most pressure in daily life trying to meet their basic needs. They also form the group that repeatedly features in having least access to media—either reading or listening to it, or being featured in it,[10] whether they be farmers (70% of women work on small-holder plots, growing maize, tomatoes, peppers, aubergines and spinach)[11], in the tourism industry, or even working in the media. So whilst there is an acceptance of the economic imperative to work, women face opposition in the form of criticism and malicious gossip, and are perceived within the community to have failed in some way.

There are three examples of Zanzibar women, who during the three years I lived there, initiated 'political' events that on the mainland might have merited some activity in the public sphere (news coverage). They are Mm On, Mama Hd, and Mama Sy. On Zanzibar their actions and activities get no mention at all in the local media, thus rendering them invisible.

Mm O is a bi-cultural Danish-Zanzibar woman in her early thirties who has returned to Zanzibar and has over four years set up an events company that regularly runs fundraising events for charities and local NGOs. She has a public profile and has convinced hotel owners and tour operators to participate in sailing races, fashion shows and buffet suppers to raise money for issues that prior to her involvement did not get any media coverage. The BBC World Service made a documentary about the increasing use of heroin and crack cocaine (Freddy Boswell, BBC World Service African Perspective, broadcast December 2009) in Zanzibar. Freddy is British Kenyan and not a permanent resident of Zanzibar, and the programme was accessible only to Zanzibaris who can access the internet in their own homes consistently (literally a handful of people). The programme explored problems of begging, robbery and the drug trade. For obvious reasons of negative publicity for tourism, these issues had hitherto not been discussed openly. Yet Mm O has managed to discuss heroin addiction and the problems it causes for tourism in the public arena, in direct contradiction of the prevailing trend to hide embarrassing and difficult issues from view[12]. Mm O has never featured in any local media, nor has she been asked to.

Mm O is well known in her community, and her work is appreciated. In Maggies Hair Salon, Ra and Fa are discussing the fact that their street is now an area where drug addicts are working, making it difficult and possibly dangerous for their clients and customers. Ra says:

> *Everyone knows there's a problem, it's right in our faces. That one, Chipsy, I have known him since he is a child, he comes from a good family, he was sent to Kenya for a time, when he came back, he was sober and off the drugs for a bit. Now he's back, always asking the tourists for money for his health. It's not for his health, it's for drugs. None of us would give him money, he knows that. But we give him food. We don't want our salaries spent on his drugs! The funny thing is, he's honest, in a way, even though he's an addict. There's nothing at all about this in the papers. Or the radio. But I can understand why, what good would it do? He doesn't need media, he needs help, you know, to tackle his problems.*

Ra is aware that the drug problem is not made public because of the negative impact it will have on tourism for Zanzibar. However for Mm O the issue is very media-worthy. She has approached all the local newspaper editors, and had her requests for in-depth articles rejected. The local media has left Mm O well alone. Her work has been publicised internationally (via the BBC WS), but Mm O, who understands completely her status in society and is aware of the sensitivities of the issue of drug abuse, did not want to be interviewed for this research.

Another example is Mama Hd, a single female vegetable seller in Stone Town. She is one of two women on the entire island who work in the capital's main market. She works full time, sourcing, selecting and selling vegetables, and supports five of her own children as well as three of her sister's. With no other income, living with her family in a single room and no husband, she manages to save, and envisages sending her children to university. In January 2010 she was interviewed (by me) for a piece for the *Sunday Times* for a section about exceptional people who have achieved against the odds. Despite this, she is not considered worthy of attention by local media. She works in a solidly male environment, has experienced thefts and attacks on her business and has raised eight children on her own whilst building up a business exporting home-made cassava chips to Dubai and Oman, working a 70-hour week.

The local media has missed or ignored Mama Hd's story. She is a local woman farmer with a primary education from a poor family. She is not connected to a political elite, she is not famous nor particularly philanthropic and has no political clout. Despite, or because of this, she is extremely successful at a commercial level exporting her cassava chips to Dubai on a weekly basis. When asked about her feelings about being interviewed for a foreign newspaper but ignored by local media, she had this to say:

> *I am proud that the foreign media likes my business, and my cassava chips are popular in Dubai, but I suppose I am surprised. I am just getting on with my business, my life, and there are many women like me who work hard, to achieve, to make opportunities for my children. In a way I am glad the*

newspaper is in English, and not Swahili, many men here are jealous of my business already (I am the only one here who locks everything away at night) and I don't really want to draw attention to myself.

The media also missed an even more obvious story in Mama Sy, a prominent hotel owner who started a campaign to close down the nightclub next door in Zanzibar in January and February 2011. A controversial topic for the community, the nightclub and Mama Sy's campaign ostensibly supplied a great opportunity to unpick some of the tensions of a conservative society grappling with drugs, public sexual activity and an intrusive nightclub—all set in the context of the country's first experience of multi-party democracy.

Mama Sy did not manage to generate any coverage in the newspaper for her campaign. She eventually succeeded in getting a long interview in the paper, but only after the club was closed. This took place after five months of evening campaigning, walking door to door, and pasting handwritten placards on the club entrance, night after night. Here was a story with a female protagonist involving the female Zanzibar community, a story that was widely talked about on the streets. Yet it was entirely overlooked by local radio, press and TV. Mama Sy commented:

The media here is corrupt, bent. The owner just writes about himself or his friends. I didn't expect to get any support, that's something I can get from foreigners, from people who don't live here. Zanzibaris are jealous, bitter because I have foreign friends, and I dared to speak out. It never occurred to me to get the local media to help me, they wouldn't, that's not what they do. If I had been in Kenya, [she lived there as a teenager and has a sister there] I would have probably been famous! I might have had a radio show, or something, but not here. I knew I had to do it myself, be brave and make an outcry, make a problem, take no notice of the people here, until they took notice of me. Why not! I have nothing to lose, I am an old lady, I know what I am capable of, I am not frightened like they want me to be!

Mama Sy frames her response in an interesting way. I ask her whether the nightclub and the fact that it sold alcohol (in a conservative Muslim neighbourhood) is part of a modernisation of Zanzibar, a sea change to the conservative politics of the area. She replies:

> *This is not about politics, or becoming Western. Not at all, this is about noise in our community. We accept foreigners, we accept how they are. We accept there is change. But we do not accept people making a loud noise so we cannot find (Sic) sleep. [She then refers to the burning down of four other places selling alcohol on the island, which happened earlier in the month], these places were burned down because they are disrespectful. It is not important who drinks- Muslim or Mzungu. What is important our culture is understood.*

Her comments are oblique and contain contradictions. She is not willing to outwardly criticise 'Western' or outside ways, yet she is certain that Zanzibar must hold onto the right to a quiet lifestyle and alcohol-free bars. She refuses to be drawn on whether these are 'Islamic' or 'Un-Islamic' ideas, instead focussing on the noise issue and the ways she has managed to persuade people to see her point of view, not by utilising media but by talking to them herself, directly[13].

Like Janson's subject 'Fatty' (Janson 2007) Mama Sy can change behaviours dramatically in public. She is permitted to operate outside of norms of being quiet and discreet because she is known to have Islamic piety, has high social capital (Adkins and Reay 2004) and is respected for her appropriate socio-sexual morals (Skeggs 2004). She is older, and underneath her hijab she's cut all her hair off, a pragmatic decision because there are water shortages and she is extremely busy.

4.2 The inaccuracy and lack of depth and information in the Media

The factual inaccuracy of reports—newspaper coverage is specifically mentioned—and the lack of continuity in complex news stories is dealt with here. This nominated failure (by informants) of the media to occupy a fourth estate function, compounded with lack of relevant discussions and debate (nodded towards by

Mallimani 2014), all contribute to a lack of faith and trust in the media. The media then is not seen as an organ, or an adjunct of democracy. This finding directly contradicts the Afrobarometer (2013)[14] paper which says that overall 81% of East Africans (including Zanzibar) feel the media has a crucial role to play as watchdogs for unmasking corruption, and 76% of Tanzanians feel "completely free to say what they want about the government". (2013:3)

During the course of my fieldwork there were three major events, markers which generated much discussion amongst the informants. The first was the electricity power outage from October 2009 to February 2010, during which time the whole island was cut off from electricity[15]. Secondly there was Barack Obama's election victory in January 2009 and thirdly there were the Zanzibar elections in October 2010. All three events inspired my informants to behave differently in public, to cross lines that were not usually crossed. The rules for behaviour in public changed; the power cut and the Zanzibar election prompted profound reflection about the failure of media to perform the functions expected of it, and the US election took people in a very different series of directions, which are examined later in chapter seven. This section explores media reflections of particular themes during the power cut and the local elections, how this happened and why.

The five month power faiure impacted on all areas of life. People were queuing for hours in the morning for water—which was previously free but was now being charged for. Petrol, diesel and kerosene were all in limited supply. Days were orientated around finding necessities; fuel to cook or run a generator. Most generators blew up after a short period, costing people hundreds of dollars. Food prices rose by a third, as did local transport costs in some areas. Everything from making bricks to ice uses electricity, as do food stalls, consequently all prices went up. This was also a period that emphasised the importance of social relationships. Said Ba:

> *Although the media didn't talk about this strike at all, it showed us that we are a community, that we can help each other. We're all suffering, we're all hot, and prices have gone up for everyone. We're all standing together queuing for water. That's something that they can't punish us for!*

The lack of media coverage so glaring it became treated as a source of humour. Ii joked about not being able to run his radio, which was why the government weren't bothering to tell the citizens why there was no electricity. Oi and Ta greeted with enthusiasm a BBC report which asked ordinary people how they were coping without electricity. Oi says:

> *It was great to hear a bricklayer, a fisherman talk about how he can't get ice, the bricklayer he needs water pumped to make bricks, you really heard how normal people are suffering, I just wonder who is listening.*

Ta says:

> *I just think it's rude not to give us updates in the newspaper, as if we haven't noticed. It's a bit crazy really, I think this government is struggling now. They know they'll lose the election because of this electricity thing, they're not even bothering.*

The 2010 Zanzibar election was also notably free of national media coverage. There was an increase in posters for opposition parties plastered on the walls of the designated (male) political space, Jaws Corner. There was an increase in the 'talk' that took place on the *barazzas* and communal spaces dominated by men. The 'mythos' (public talk, Beard 2014[16]) was very evidently male, and female voices were not deemed necessary to, or capable of presenting public talk, either in person on the streets, or as radio commentators or narrators in the media.

The international media positioned itself above the proceedings, creating and signposting clear mainstream and subaltern voices (Spivak 1988), and drew attention to behind-the-scenes vote-rigging, power sharing and corrupt land deals involving the outgoing president Amani Karume (Moulidi 2010)[17]. The local government-owned media were meanwhile enthusiastic about the new power-sharing deal and the prospects of the coalition government[18]. Private media was curiously light in its reporting of events.

The reports from the EU observers were more positive about the elections than my interviewees:

Election Day was peaceful and generally orderly. Overall, polling stations procedures were applied evenly across the country and voting was conducted in a calm manner with only a few incidents of minor nature in over 549 observed polling stations. Unfortunately, the secrecy of the vote was compromised in 12 percent of observed polling stations and EU observers reported that in 20 percent of cases the layout of the polling station did not guarantee the secrecy of the vote[19].

- *EU 2010*

Zanzibaris in exile, such as Makulilo (Makulilo 2011)[19], are critical of the election processes, for example saying:

In Zanzibar, the main opposition party, the CUF (Civic United Front) accuses the electoral management body of being partial and hence contributing to the regular political conflicts that characterize elections in those East African islands. Zanzibar elections are characterized by a pattern of confrontations between the major competing parties, i.e. Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM) and CUF and between the opposition party and state officials, including security forces, local government officials, and (ZEC) the Zanzibar Electoral Commission.

Makulilo asserts that not only are there issues around the democratising process, but that the bodies set up to monitor the process are flawed and biased, weighted in favour of the ruling party.

While modern democracy cannot operate without elections, elections alone are insufficient to end authoritarianism. Brownlee (2007)[20] argues that elections can be utilised as little more than a safety valve for regulating societal discontent and confining the opposition. Zanzibar's authoritarianism is durable, and its elections could be viewed as little more than mechanisms of control and a safety

valve, an agonistic practice to keep authoritanirism running (Mouffe 2005). Thus there is no direct causal relationship between elections and the death of authoritarian regimes.

Brownlee's analysis is helpful when discussing Zanzibar, and exploring why, despite an awareness that the open riots and tear-gassing of the elections of 2005 happened, they were rarely discussed in media. These events are and were extremely shaming, and were difficult for Zanzibaris to process and discuss, at least in public—not least because events of this nature are disastrous for tourism and foreign investment. Dd, a Tanzanian international businessman, well-travelled and educated in the UK and USA, remarks of the media in Zanzibar:

> *It reminds me of when I was living in Cuba. It's [the media] is basically an organ of the state. It has no independence, none whatsoever, and is really just a way to print press releases or tell us which stadium Amani Karume (the president of Zanzibar) is opening this week. There's been some OK reporting about this guy Rostam Aziz[21], but actually all of that came from the East African (a regional paper produced in Nairobi but available in Tanzania) now that I think about it!*

For Hi, a male activist, the case is clear cut:

> *Our media is absolutely just a mouthpiece of the government. It's not independent in any way. It's propaganda from the CCM. The private newspapers, even they are a joke really, the good one is the East African, which comes out of Kenya…. Why I don't like them? They don't offer both sides of the story. They don't have any neutrality. There's no facts, just someone telling us what to think. It relates to our poor education here, we're not encouraged to question.*

Az and Aa, trainee journalists at the local Radio station Zenj FM, were more optimistic:

We had the leader of the opposition CUF on the radio two days ago, talking about policies. I think we feel much safer. I was too young for the last election, but there's a combination of knowing we have international observers, and the World's media watching us, and also they say that there will definitely be a government of national unity, so that is a good thing.

Mt however was not so keen:

We need a complete overhaul of the system, they're basically both the same, and the problem is that our leaders are not used to be questioned, so it really doesn't matter who is in power, we have so much to learn still about how to do elections. Like televising them! Honestly I don't even know what the policies of the two parties are, there's no election broadcasts, no information.

Mm, in her twenties and recently graduated, was also disillusioned:

It makes not a bit of difference to me who is in power, honestly. You know my life, I am trying to find a job, the salary for teachers won't go up whoever is in power, they won't employ more women if a new person is president. What I want is that the election is quiet, that's all. We don't even know if the election lists are accurate, they aren't in Pemba [where she is from], I know that definitely. Whole families were registered there who don't even exist.

4.3 The Integrity of the Media, Nepotism and Corruption

This section explores the positioning of media within society, providing setting and context for a more specific discussion of media content. As previously discussed, my interviewees viewed the media as lacking integrity. Citizens do not feel that the media is honouring its end of the contract—it does not critique, advocate or provide space for the active dissemination of political life. This section provides examples of informants' understandings of what should be reported but isn't, and

how this impacts on democracy and manifestations of corruption within Zanzibar. This is in turn feeds into the analysis of the media's institutional inability to perform a neutral critical role, and contributes and augments corruption and an increasing reliance on gossip, rumour and hearsay.

In the absence of stories that resonate and are produced locally, informants get their information from sources other than the local media: international radio, internet and television.[22] Informants draw attention to the absence of media reports about issues that directly affect daily Zanzibar life (electricity shortages, failure of policing, legislature, domestic abuse), and see this as a form of moral corruption, of being sold short. Critiques, question and answer interviews and profiles of politicians or public figures are not a feature of radio, TV or press coverage.

One interviewee, Fe, explained the lack of investigative journalism, the media's failure to critique national politics and policies and the lack of critical media watchdogs (she has a degree from Britain) in this way:

> *I think at a superficial level Zanzibaris somehow feel it's not polite to hold their leaders to account, to set up an actual, physical organisation to investigate or challenge say the municipal authorities on water, or how our electricity works, or doesn't. Or to complain in public in a newspaper. Yet we also complain about these things all the time, and we are really cross now, and have lost patience. But somehow we hold ourselves back, in the name of being Zanzibari.*

Fe touches on something that pervades Zanizbar life; consensus and the appearance of harmony (Schulz 2014, Nzegwu 2006) being manifested as a dialectic between community and individual, not an expression of individual power (Mahmood 2006). Echoing Silverstone (1999) Curran (2010) and Couldry (2010), it is not what is being said that is important, but how and where—the tones, the inflections and the emphasis. For her the 'banal nationalism' (Billig 2004) of the Zanzibar media is important. Somewhat counter-intuitively perhaps harmony, consensus and agreement is important for Zanzibar life. Conflict is sublimated for

the sake of appearance, of reputation. Disagreement and conflict of opinion, at least in public, is taboo.

The role of information in the public sphere, including content created by the media, is discussed at length by Zanzibari women, but not in the public sphere, and women are not granted access to the male idiom, public speech (Beard 2014). In fact women's voices are systematically excluded, regulated, and displaced from the public spheres, moving instead to different sites.

In the absence of agonistic or antagonistic debates in the public sphere (Mouffe 2009), truth is a contested proposition (Gupta 2012). Within a corrupt society in which money is not the only way to trade, the ability to sustain complicated social networks, favours, bartering and social resourcefulness become important (Ferguson 2005). What emerges is that gossip becomes a much more powerful 'social glue' (Couldry 2002) than the media. Thus 'link ups' (Holst & Miller 2006) where the mobile phone performs important functions of maintaining social networks comes into view. Alevdeva (2010) writes that in Russia there is such an absence of money in most people's lives that they have been forced to find alternative ways to exchange goods and operate in their daily lives. The same is true in Zanzibar, where one aspect of good reputation is being publicly acknowledged as someone who participates, assists, has a good character and contributes to the overall good.

Women gossip on their porches at dusk and very occasionally in public (much older women). There is a gendered word for male gossip and tittle-tattle—*masikani*—and although the word can be applied to women, in practice it never is. Generally, women gossip behind closed doors. Gossip seems to be extremely powerful here: how you are considered is crucial. But locating the source of gossip is philosophically ambiguous and problematic. It swirls around; who starts it, what does it become, where does it go? It is constantly regenerating. The media seems to be yet another voice in this plethora of voices, and NOT a privileged one.

Gossiping, a culture of barter and favours in informal spaces are interlinked in Zanzibar. They form part of a fabric—or 'privatised indirect government' (Mbembe 66:2001)—where information is traded, and rumours and counter-rumours determine your reputation, popularity and ability to get things done. Says Fa:

Absolutely, bartering is central to life here, definitely, but it is not so straightforward as you think. Someone will do something, a favour for you, I don't know, something small like walk you around town and show you some shops. But he'll do it totally with the expectation that he would get something out of it. On one hand maybe money, a good tip, but also probably he'll show you his friend's shops, and then maybe in the future you'll help each other, a friendship will develop. So nothing is ever done here just for its own sake, just because it's a good or helpful thing to do. It extends right up the social ladder.

Fa gives examples of how the media is personalised and incorporated into gossip when she describes two brothers of a wealthy local family, Salim and Samai. The former is a drug baron on the island, the latter keen to get into politics. What is interesting about the exchange is how for her the public sphere of politics is interchangeable with the local tittle-tattle on the corner: Samai's reputation has been forged by contacts and sheer force of personality, not by policies or political positions.

This exchange reveals how politics really works on the ground in Zanzibar. A prominent politician with aspirations to be president makes a big show of 'saving' a prestigious music festival. It indicates how fluid, informal and transgressive the political process is, how little institutional integrity is invested in it, and how much politics revolves around community and personality.

I ask Fe about politics.

In politics it's absolutely the worst! This is completely about favours, about being seen to do something or about being associated with something reputable. It doesn't matter what you say or do, what matters is how you are viewed, your reputation, about keeping face….
Say Simai, Simaia Kichwa, he stood for MP. Nobody actually wanted him to be MP! God, he doesn't have any policies, he doesn't actually stand for anything! But you saw how he got himself all these positions, like CEO of

Busara, CEO of Zati, he got those positions BECAUSE he wants to be taken seriously, to be a big man. Not because he cares about tourism, or music. Actually it was probably so he could cover up all the shit that's in his family!

Simai is a big man in Zanzibar: he puts a lot of effort into forging alliances and networking, and spends a great deal of time gossiping, albeit in a high profile way at social functions. As members of a wealthy Omani family, Simai and his brother Salem have a high political profile on Zanzibar. Says Fe:

They have an extensive network at the ports. No-one can prove it, but apparently they turn a blind eye to all the drugs coming into Zanzibar. So everyone knows really that one side of the family is dealing drugs, and actively making it happen, the other side is standing up and going on about stopping drugs and whatever. So when Samai did that whole thing at Busara and got the generator going, he did it because he's the CEO, and his reputation as CEO means he HAS to do something, literal, and real, like physically connecting up a generator and bringing power to the music festival. We all know it was the technicians who did the work, but Samai takes the credit. That's how it works. At every level people are bartering, trading, doing something that will reflect well on them immediately, or perhaps at a later date. Nothing is done for its own sake, nothing.

Fe's views effectively describe the 'pariah parallel international economy' [drugs] which Mbembe refers to (67:2001). This transnational drug trade extends to the North, and embodies and supports a 'Lawlessness that is a murky North/South collaboration" (Comaroff & Comaroff, 8:2006). Contempt for politicians is intertwined with cynicism about media failure to hold them to account. What is unusual is her Fe's ability to explain it all in such bald detail. In both cases, public institutions are neither trusted nor imbued with the formal structures in modern societies.

Hn describes the central problem in Zanzibar as the lack of free speech and debate, which is supplanted by gossip. She highlights a philosophical issue—that in the absence of institutional truth, truth becomes a free-for-all. She says:

> *There is no personal truth here. I mean people really don't have a clear idea of what is really honest. I am not saying that people lie, more that their version of what happens is highly dynamic: they can deny things that we all know happened, for instance an affair, or an outbreak of disease…. The point is it's about keeping personal face, not being embarrassed, this is an Islamic thing. The sense of* umma*, or community. It's more important than the actual truth. So the Koran is used in a very dogmatic way here, it is the one thing that IS true, in a context where there is no personal truth.*

Her sentiments are echoed by a senior woman, Mama P, who runs an international mainland-based NGO training children to read in Zanzibar:

> *The whole thing comes down to reading. We're not a reading culture. We're not a questioning culture. You see* Wazungu *on the airplanes, they're reading. The best we do is self-help manuals. It starts at schools. We don't teach our children to question, to criticise, we teach them to copy, so when it comes to the media! Oh my dear. It is terrible. We don't have a media here. We don't have an independent media. That's it. It's because we lack training, and it's not a priority.*

4.4 Real Life as narrated by my informants

I include this section because the issue of 'why don't the media show life as it is?' emerged repeatedly throughout the fieldwork. By failing to describe the socio-economic realities of women in Zanzibar, or their micro-experiences within that, the media creates a further gap between itself, its functions and its ability to engender credibility or build platforms for a more robust participatory democracy. The sparse literature which deals with this says:

"The [Tanzanian] public broadcasters operate within a bureaucratic legal system and politically centralized environment, characterized with a culture of secrecy, which does not fully promote justice, social security, equality and human dignity".

- *Millanga, 15:2014*

For many women, the media is seen as extraneous and irrelevant to the business of living. It doesn't address their realities or the content of their lives. The interviewees tended to concentrate on the negative aspects of their lives—domestic violence, being estrangedestrangement, divorce or community exclusion, although this is understandable in the context of the material limitations of their situations. They experience financial, social and emotionally stringent penalties when they decide to leave violent marriages. Violence lurks beneath the surface of social life in Zanzibar, as Chabal (2009), Freidman (2006) and Comaroff & Comaroff (2006) notice too. For example Mna, (who has five children and left her marriage after she was beaten) focuses on her material well-being. Her words draw attention to the importance of social networks and the 'we-ness' of Zanzibar society, not her personal interiority and suffering.

When I left my husband the situation was terrible, we have no electricity in our house, so I don't have a television. I don't have time to read the paper. I don't have electricity, so even charging my phone was a problem. I asked my neighbours, I listened to the radio, what could I do? There was no one I knew to ask to tell me how to go forward. I have five kids, school fees, and food to buy. If the radio had given me information I would have really thanked God. As it was, I went to a rich lady from the mosque, she advised me to come to you for money. In fact my neighbours were awful, they didn't help at all. When I asked my husband to leave they stopped inviting me round to watch television in their houses. I felt I was being punished by them, but I had done nothing wrong, it was him beating me, not the other way round.

For Zanzibari women, foreign media presents another issue: women are more prevalent as reporters (on screen and on the radio), and their representation is very different from the models being served up by local media. Mm, who is a trainee teacher, takes the tape recorder from me in the course of a discussion, and begins to mimic "Here, I am Mm reporting from the café in stone town, and we are discussing the Koran" She is giggling as she does this.

I asked her if she wanted to be a journalist. She replies:

I would love to be a journalist, I think there are so many things to say, that I can talk about, but I would have to do it in another place, maybe Europe! Here my brother would beat me if he saw me on television, talking about the real life of ourselves here. He is a bully, and I would expose him, for trying to stop me doing my education and marrying [Maryam's brother fiercely objected to her boyfriend, whom she had chosen] but I would be good at it. Seriously I would like to discuss democracy, and change, and women's empowerment. That is what we need to know, and what we can aim for, what there is in the world.

For women journalists working on Zanzibar there are many hurdles to overcome, and change seems impossible, as Aza asks, "Is it possible to change like you did in South Africa? Is it possible to do that in Zanzibar? Really?" Ge, a young journalist from Zanzibar who completed two years training in Dar es Salaam, is clear about what she wants to see the media doing:

I want to see more coverage of women and children, there's a lot of abuse going on here, and there's a lot of HIV infection, even though the government says there isn't. I am a journalist because I want to help the women, and my role is to broaden information and to educate. Education is very important. People are not open here, so finding stories is really difficult, women especially won't talk about their lives in public, it's a very big problem. It's because of culture and religion. I experience a lot of problems because I am Christian, they call me Kafiri*, which means non-*

believer. I am not offended; I am a journalist, I am a professional, I don't feel anything, I just want to understand what is going on.

Her colleague Aza, also working at the radio station, but a few years older, puts the situation for young female journalists in context:

The situation is not improving not much, they don't have enough money to find the stories, to research. We lack exposure.[23]

For La, the problem goes way beyond the local and parochial limitations of bad journalism or lack of resources. She locates the problem as unequal power dynamics between the Global North and South, and the ontological definitions imposed by those who benefit from these trade flows. When it comes to the media's discussion of global issues—for example loans, debt dependency and development—La, a broadcaster in her twenties originally from Zimbabwe and now in exile in Tanzania and Zanzibar, is most eloquent:

We don't seem to even want to help ourselves. Aid is crippling Africa; it's not sustainable. We get offers of aid, and yeah we say, sure, bring it on, ok thanks, I'll take it! But actually how are we going to sustain it? We need to ask ourselves this. Rarely do we ask what do we do with this, and how will we pay it back? They're making us dependent, how am I going to sustain myself if it is you managing it, your schedule, your people, and I still have to pay you back. You don't care about my debt pile, I still have to pay it back! How come we're not really taking this on?

I ask her where she gets her critical overview and her information:

I read a lot, one novel got me reading: something about Africa in Shackles, Africa in Chains...? It was non-fiction, it had specifics, facts how the World Bank functions, it got me thinking about these things. How aid is a loan; these grants are not as pretty as they sound. The corruption here is also

part of the problem; we're dead two ways. We shoot ourselves in the foot and finish ourselves off … We actively discourage journalists from investigating corruption here. If you want to investigate corruption you better be very very careful. Honestly. People get shot here for digging around. For asking who is being awarded hunting concessions, or allowed to open up a big private game park. It is GENUINELY dangerous, but of course because we have this peace-loving reputation, it all gets covered up and we just don't seem to organise ourselves to be accountable…

La's remarks show acuity, anger, agency and a nuanced understanding of how the networked society (Castells 2008) and structural violence (Chabal 2009, Comaroff & Comaroff ibid) filter down to actual manifestations of self and the role of the media. The "patchwork mosaic of spheres of violence" perpetuated by illegal global cartels, the imbalanced global ecommic systems, and the low premium on African lives (Mbembe 302:2006) is localised on Zanzibar. La places the 'blame' for the problems she identifies in Zanzibar and Tanzania at the foot of her own government, and offers a critique of how difficult it becomes to offer a version of events when the dominant discourse is one of collusion. She continues:

But getting back to aid. Rarely do we consider anything without the word Aid: we're so locked into dependency syndrome. We've got to the point where the World Bank <u>tells us</u> what we need. We need to upgrade our electricity and water systems, so they say, but we're not allowed to think for ourselves. We do pay taxes, not much, but we pay. So shouldn't we decide what we need? In Tanzania we're not interested in helping ourselves first, we ask for help, we ask donors. We let them tell us what to do. It's pathetic.

4.5 Child Abuse and Domestic Violence in the Media

Child abuse and domestic violence were not originally a topic of research, but they were so often cited by informants as subjects common in Zanzibar society which needed media attention. These subjects are positioned firmly as manifestations of

violence normalised within African societies (Chabal ibid, Mbembe ibid, Ferguson 2005). The lack of media coverage and information was articulated by people who had no professional or known links with either child abuse or domestic violence, people who wanted to highlight the ubiquity of violence against women and children and the media's refusal to cover it. On the subject of child abuse informants were candid and animated, and for those who worked in NGOs specialising in this work, the media's (and individual journalists') inability to engage with the topic was a source of real frustration.

Mk is the director of an international children's rights NGO on Zanzibar.

Over the last two years we have done sensitisation [sic] campaigns across Pemba and Zanzibar. This means we've tried to work with journalists, editors, police, shehas of the local community, just telling them what domestic violence and child abuse are, and what they're not. The level of knowledge is so poor that people don't even realise that what they are doing is child abuse. The local media doesn't cover child abuse at all, it doesn't see it as a story.

Mk's 'outsider' status confers the advantage of being able to nominate issues that are considered highly sensitive and problematic within Zanzibar society. He recognises the great value in nominating and clarifying destructive behaviours, avoiding any mention of whether they are traditional, Koranic, or modern:

So we have three cases of invalid children under ten tied to palm trees and being systematically abused. By uncles and brothers. Another case of a crippled child who is kept in the basement. She is mute and retarded, but she also is being sexually used by male members of the family. When I approached an editor from the newspaper here to advertise the training courses so that our staff could show communities how to recognise abuse, he refused. It doesn't help that I am Sudanese, he was hostile. He said this is not Zanzibar culture. He refused to believe that these things are

happening, even though they are in court right now! We have Zanzibar families in court, right now, for child abuse cases. So the chances of that being reported is nothing….it is very tricky. We must go softly softly. We won't get anywhere going into the media, or publicising this by the media. As far as the Zanzibaris are concerned I am lying. Or making this up.

Cl, a trainee journalist working at Zenj FM, a private station agrees:

It really is so bad here. There is so much sexual abuse of children. They don't really think it's a problem, it's seen as normal. We don't have refuges or a place for children to go if they are abused. When I tried to do a programme about this, I got nowhere. No-one would talk. It's frustrating. I'd like to go back to the mainland when the traineeship is finished. It's too closed here.

Conclusion

The combination of media inability and unwillingness to engage with female audiences, to address them as subjects with agency or to produce relevant and lively content creates and exacerbates distances between the government and the citizen. The media's failure to nominate or address important problems creates a vacuum of trust between state and subject. This, compounded with economic inequality and sporadic spatialised aid interventions, creates an unpredictable landscape where the citizen struggles to find support and information about basic, and not so basic issues. This gives rise to privatisation and profiteering of government functions, and a series of parallel spaces (phantom states/governments) and channels where Zanzibaris exist and operationalize in order to function. Within this, Zanzibari women are neither impotent nor paralysed; instead they adopt different performances, performativities and strategies of agency that compliment and work within prevailing Islamic notions of piety.

Five informants raised the issues of child abuse, and directly voiced frustration at the local media's refusal to engage with the subject, indicating that

people clearly understand at a cause and effect level the role the media has in nominating issues as newsworthy.As Mk indicates, there is a need for journalists to cover issues in a more sensitive, informed and conscientious way.

The consistent raising of the issue of child abuse within the fieldwork context—by the interviewees—and the articulated and forceful ways in which they asked for the media to address their concerns suggests a recognition, as yet unrealised, that media needs to address women and their concerns. The consistent and continual media de-citizenisation results in people finding their own spaces such as bedrooms and hair salons to access the foreign public spheres via the internet.

> Despite the conceptualisation of women as an absence by the media producers (perhaps a potentiality, an audience waiting to be envisioned?), there is still interest in and engagement with media by women. They find ways to be addressed, to use media information and tailor it to their own ends. This uage remains unacknowledged, thus much of their talk is 'reduced' to gossip, but as I will argue later, this gossip *is* in fact their opinion, hinting at much deeper preoccupations which are never addressed. The research shows that so far, the active addressing of women as political and media subjects is still in its infancy in Zanzibar. There is little or no coverage of issues relating to women, and what there is exists within the parameters of marriage, child rearing, violence in the home, female genital mutilation; these are all defined as women's subjects.

The next chapter details how corruption strongly influences personal behaviours, and encourages a high level of concealment and secrecy about activities, emotions and ideas.

[1] http://mtega.com/2013/07/22/changing-headlines-in-habarileo-but-why/#more-1540 Ben Taylor, Blog, accessed Aug 13 2013

[2] Old media is characterised by paper-based forms of media, radio and TV. New media is a heading comprising mobile phone communications, internet sites, email notice boards and satellite channels, none of which are free on Zanzibar.

[3] Annual Report of the Media Council of Tanzania, http://mct.or.tz/Annual%20Report/Annual%20Report%202012.pdf accessed August 12th 2013

[4] See report by the Committee for Protection of Journalists http://www.cpj.org/reports/2013/08/the-invisible-plight-of-the-tanzanian-press.php, accessed August 12th 2013, the report says "The government held a press conference announcing the closure without having notified MwanaHalisi that the shutdown was being ordered, veteran journalist and media analyst Ndimara Tegambwage said. The suspension order cites no specific alleged violation, only vaguely claiming that three editions in July 2012 were seditious and could instigate public fear".

[5] Further work could investigate how these silences could be addressed in a more personal, private way.

[6] Accessed online (no page numbers) https://www.google.co.uk/search?q=Roadmap+to+Equality%3A+Lessons+Learned+in+the+Campaign+for+a+SADC+Protocol+on+Gender+and+Development+Editors+Patricia+Made%2C+Colleen+Lowe+Morna&rlz=1C1CHFX_en-GBGB532GB533&oq=Roadmap+to+Equality%3A+Lessons+Learned+in+the+Campaign+for+a+SADC+Protocol+on+Gender+and+Development+Editors+Patricia+Made%2C+Colleen+Lowe+Morna&aqs=chrome..69i57&sourceid=chrome&es_sm=93&ie=UTF-8

[7] He works for the *Guardian*,owned by Reginald Mengi, who owns eight newspapers and three radio stations in Tanzania, who is hailed as a role model by Forbes, but implicated in corruption by others.

[8] The politics of the Queue, Beckmann 2009 http://www.thecitizen.co.tz/News/Mengi--From-bedroom-to-boardroom-with--550m-/-/1840392/2379822/-/item/1/-/cgwaeiz/-/index.html

[9] Tanzania National Census, most recent figures 2008, accessed online March 2012

[10] Afrobarometer, Tanzania report 2010, Femina HP (Ibid)

[11] (ibid)

[12] The subject is made even more interesting as the interviewees told me that the most well-known drug users in Zanzibar are the middle class sons of current political ministers in government office.

[13] At the same time, her lawyer wrote a 1500 word essay about the benefits of The Government of National Unity (GNU). It was published in the local English paper on Zanzibar, the *Guardian* (February 2011). It did not draw attention to the fact that was the first time that anyone can remember a woman spearheading a campaign to inform and mobilise the local community. Her gender is not a feature of the article, neither is the fact that this is the first time people can remember a 'normal' (ie not in government office, not with a title, and not a chairperson of an NGO) person organised a campaign of such size.

[14] http://www.afrobarometer.org/files/documents/policy_brief/ab_r5_policybriefno3.pdf

[15] The causes are unclear, the accepted wisdom is that the underwater cable connected the island with the mainland was fifteen years old, and was either snagged by a ship's anchor, or decayed.

[16] London Review of Books, recorded talk of Mary Beard, accessed March 17th 2014, http://www.lrb.co.uk/v36/n06/mary-beard/the-public-voice-of-women

[17] Zanzibar at 47: Orwellian tragedy or Kwei Armah African satire? Salma Mauolidi, http://www.pambazuka.org/en/category/comment/70449/print

[18] P3, Election Observation Report to Tanzania, EU, 2010, http://eeas.europa.eu/eueom/pdf/missions/tanzania-final-report_en1.pdf (English version), accessed August 8th 2013

[19] Makulilo, Alexander B.Journal of Third World Studies Date: Spring 2011 Volume/issue:Vol. 28, No.1

[20] 'Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization', Cited in *Comparative Political Studies*, 2008, published Cambridge University Press 2007

[21] The Rostam Aziz scandal hit the papers in March 2011. A prominent Minister in the Tanzanian government, it was revealed that he had executive board status on every company receiving a tender from the president in the last year, despite it being illegal to hold office and chair companies going for government tenders.

[22] Informants mentioned: *Deutsche Welle*, Voice of America, BBC World Service, Al Jazeera English, CNN, DSTV and internet web sites: AllAfrcica.com, Pambazuka, http://www.missionislam.com/health/ emotional disorders.htm, Muslim code of behaviour Facebook).

[23] As an aside, I never ever heard the terms 'sexist' or 'misogynist' used in two years of research and two years of writing up, by any of my informants. Yet practically much of what they describe- being pushed sideways out of jobs, overlooked for promotion, an expectation they would use sex to get favours, violence at home, decisions made by fathers and husbands about education, pregnancy, career and marriage amounts to this).

Chapter Five: Findings Media Modernity and Mamas

Introduction

This chapter explores the third finding—that local corruption affects the veracity of media information—in greater depth. For audiences, the point of origin of media is also important. Media from 'outside' Zanzibar provokes problematic and conflicting responses, highlighting tensions of juggling competing iterations of agency. This finding is investigated whilst looking in detail at how age significantly impacts on women's ability to produce and maintain agency.

This chapter explores the (media and non-media) informal and precarious spaces (Misztal 2008) that operate in place of public spheres, and what kind of talk takes place in these spaces. It reproduces informants' words at length, with the recognition that they must speak for themselves within the limitations of this type of work. I examine the role of gossip in people's everyday lives—how gossip is a key part of life for women of all ages—and I try and theorise how it operates and what its functions are. These non-media spaces are where discussions about politics, affairs, aspirations, life, jokes, relationships, work and the future take place[1]. The previous chapter outlined four principal findings from my research, and discussed in detail the first two. Jealousy and uncertainty and fears for their future all impact informants' need to maintain respectability, the virtuous self (Jansens, 2007), often via subterfuge and concealment.

Archambault's work (2012) discusses the disconnect and dissonance felt by young people between the expectations bought about by rapid influx of consumer goods, the improved education systems and the harsh and acutely felt knowledge that young people will not achieve what is expected of them due to the 'structural violence' of corruption (2012: 89) and insidious colonial legacies. Newell's work on male youths in Cote D'Ivoire (2012)[2] talks of the paradox of education that promotes the expectations of jobs that are in reality not there, under the bluff of appearing modern and economically labile. Both authors speak to my findings across many subjects: the (near obsession) with love affairs as escapist strategies, the use of mobile phones to carry out and enhance social and sexual relationships (Horst & Miller 2006, Batson-Savage 2007), the complex local landscapes of

information and economic poverty and the importance of respectability and how informants perform their notions of femininity and sexuality.

It is an overwhelming finding, from the standpoint of the female gaze (Mulvey 1979, Harraway 1988, Harding 1991, Columpar 2002), that there is 'not enough' media for Zanzibar women, and anything relevant is clearly authored with a male audience in mind. With the lack of news items, talk shows and soap operas that inspire conversations and reflexive imaginings, people turn to other forms of communication.

Thus locally produced information—gossip—supplants media-produced information. The informants discuss each other, they text each other, and they employ strategies to allow for the significant corruption present on the island at various levels. The gossip goes on via texting and link up (Horst and Miller 2006) where friends and social/commercial/romantic networks are kept 'alive' by the occasional text or call. However, within this gossiping there is little or no overt discussion about personal problems: it is considered 'bad form' to offload one's problems and this is marked by an absence of communality evident in other areas of life (Fouere 2011, Eisenburg 2012). Some issues that women face, such as education and employment, are facets of political and global structurations (Ferguson & Gupta 2002) and violence (Koonings 2001), yet these are viewed in an individuated and personalised way. The lack of media discussion (and information) on issues such as single parenting, unemployment or domestic violence contributes to the discourse that these are personal or individual responsibilities (and failures) rather than structural problems facing communities.

5.1. <u>Keeping Up Appearances</u>

The informants not only grappled with the widening rift between the "expected and the possible" (Vigh 2006: 41) but also contended with contradictions between expansive potential and declining opportunity (Weiss 2005: 107; see also Mains 2007).

> *Such contradictions were compounded in a social environment not only scared by an abrupt transition from an… economy of extreme scarcity to*

one characterized by a sudden influx of modern consumer goods (Sumich 2008) but also one in which, despite, or perhaps because of, an insidious colonial legacy, the realization of self had become intimately entwined with consumption and display.

- Comaroff and Comaroff 1999; Nyamnjoh 2005; Stambach 2000, quoted in Archambault 2012: 89.

Keeping up the appearance of success, of coping in what is often a battle for survival—even amongst relatively affluent women—is a strong motif of life in Zanzibar. Some of the 'real life' issues—access to land, building, domestic violence, breakdown of electricity generators—described in the previous chapter, are (anecdotally) extremely common and impinge on people's daily lives. Even those working still do not have regular clean water and do not necessarily know when they will get paid[3]. Yet there is reticence to air these grievances collectively, to pool resources and to communalise individual issues[4]. Here the old cliché is reversed—a problem shared is a problem doubled, so they say. Advice is handed down through the generations. Ba explained her granny said to her in no uncertain terms:

Whatever your problems, when you step out the door, put the best clothes you have, and don't let the neighbours know your business, it won't help you at all. Women are junior here, and no-one believes your potential, or even considers it. There's no real friendship here, so people don't talk about these sort of things: people make useful friendships, pragmatic friendships, for example if you invest here, you need the royal family, you have to ask yourself who will do me a favour, who can help me? Although we have 30% of women in parliament, there's no equal opportunities here, and no women in high positions.

One consequence of people not sharing their problems or pooling their intellectual resources is that friendship takes on a unique quality. Mt remarks:

People are in friendship groups or business groups, even though they don't really like each other. They don't want each other to do well. Information is power; there's a real culture of not sharing information. You give people information if you like them, but only if you feel they can help you in some way. People are jealous and don't like success: there's a tall poppy syndrome. Don't stand out, don't draw attention to yourself.

Yet despite this, friendships do emerge. For example, when we were waiting for the other women to arrive Mm commented:

Since these discussions have been taking place, and since Oi and I have been talking with you, our friendship is changed. Studying is very very hard at the moment (it was Feb 2010 and the hottest part of the year) we have no fan at home, and I am so exhausted. Oi texted me last night, and said I am her closest friend. We have talked about our hearts, in ways that we would not have before, and maybe because we are struggling together, with no money and no electricity, and because you force us to answer these hard questions, we are becoming closer.

Possibly Mm and Oi are the exceptions: they study together and have particularly difficult home lives with brothers who are not keen for them to marry or pursue independent careers, which they want to do. Otherwise, a much more common response to questions about female friendship is that it doesn't exist.

Ge tells me there is actually no such thing as friendship here: all relationships are ones of convenience.

I've come as an outsider, as a Christian, I absolutely haven't made friends here, the women are impossible to be friends with. I am waiting to get back home to Arusha, that's where my friends are!

5.2 Younger Women and the Media: "Future generations will look at me and what I achieve!"

This work deliberately avoids examining the nature of media flows (Thussu 2006) and contra-flows, instead incorporating the existence of transnational ownerships and conglomerate monopolies of media (McChesney 1999), foregrounding the elements of endemic normalised violence against the citizen (Mbembe 2001, Chabal 2009) and the problematics of patrimonial clientilist states that create pockets of order and protection, leaving much of the populace to fend for themselves. (Ferguson & Gupta 2002, Ferguson 2005). The violence of Zanzibar is

> "*Increasingly availableto a variety of social actors, is no longer an exclusive resource of elites orsecurity forces, and includes everyday criminal and street violence, riots, social cleansing, private account selling, police arbitrariness, paramilitary activities, post-Cold War guerrillas, etc*."
>
> - Koonings 403: 2001).

Much of this work implicitly references mobile phones, which all of my informants owned. Moloney (2008) wryly notes that in Tanzania—like everywhere else in the world—mobile phones are often used for 'non-developmental' or 'self-improving' uses, a fact overlooked by almost all research into mobile phone use. Batson-Savage (2007) develops the work of Horst and Miller in Jamaica, looking at the ways phones are used by women to track down baby-fathers, (the sociality of the phone) and Madianou (2012, 2014) finesses ways phones fill gaps in social relationships and reflect the type of relationships they are used in.

The younger women use new and old media in particular ways, and it is important to detail the factors that influence how the informants perceive the media. These include age, education, wealth, geographical mobility and family connections. Age is a problematic term, as it is a relational description of social access, status, and not simply a number (Mains 2014)[5]. Age is an important indicator and marker of status in Zanzibar society, just as it is in other East African and Sub-Saharan societies (Stroeken 2005, Askew 2002, Kresse 2007, Archamboult 2012, Mains 2014): younger women are accorded less respect than older women,

and those who have high status jobs, or an overseas education, experience conflict. Although educational achievements and professional merit also contribute to one's place, age is a key driver for Zanzibar society. For younger women, the barriers to gaining access to Zanzibar's public sphere all add to their uncertainties about their place in society.

The younger women in this fieldwork are exposed to a greater range of media—specifically the internet—which they access via their phones; they access specific advice and news sites, newsrooms and chat sites. The older women, however, did not access internet news sites or personal internet sites at all. For older women, their use of the internet was for email or specific information about their relatives. Younger women were much more active in accessing international media and bringing the content into their own lives. Fascinatingly, despite their lower use of media across all platforms—radio, internet and newspapers—older women were also generally more enthusiastic about radio, TV and press, and I include a section which discusses their positive reactions to it.

My research indicated that there were marked differences between the generations about the frequency of using media, the ways they used media, which media they used, and the level of confidence they had in applying narratives and content from media to their own lives. The younger generation (in their thirties and under) in Zanzibar is more exposed to media than their parents, because television only arrived on Zanzibar in the late 1980s. In 1991, on my first visit to Zanzibar, I cannot remember ever seeing a TV for sale or in people's houses. A television set was rumoured to cost several thousand dollars, and Marissa, a member of the royal family now in her forties, is exceptional for being exposed to television and Hindi films as a child.[6]

Young people in this work are excited about internet sites, mobile phones and satellite TV, in terms of material technology and content. As Horst and Miller (2008) note, younger interviewees spend time discussing mobile phones, checking out the newest models, downloading ringtones of popular (East African) music and pursuing numerous free offers that are texted to them. Their phones are a part of their identities and status. They have customised them with beads, jewels, trinkets and stickers, and often place them prominently in full view (almost as a totem),

particularly newer models[7]. Echoing the power differentials noted by Horst and Miller (ibid) and Batson-Savage (ibid), younger women for the most part use their mobiles to text, a habit dictated by the high costs of call charges across all networks. No one I interviewed said they used their phone for any form of political activism, even those who were politically active, but it is important to bear in mind that there is a large reticence to describing oneself in political terms for Zanzibar women, which is elaborated upon in later sections.

The younger generation showed considerable understanding of the practical sides of media production, for example the cost of having reporters based in country, the time taken to make reports, the cost of technology and the pressures and limitations that affect journalists. This might be because many of the informants are exposed to foreign media (*Al Jazeera* in Arabic and English, Hindi films, Philippine soap operas, the web, the BBC World Service, East Africa radio, and *Deutsche Welle*,) and are able to compare their local media with this. They are aware that their local media, both private and state, has a different style, is made differently and does not possess the budgets of international media. A combination of information flows from relatives in the diaspora and involvement with local media productions, plus the very obvious cheapness of the productions, makes budget disparities obvious. Said Mb:

> *It's common knowledge here that journalists barely have the budgets to get out of Dar es Salaam, let alone to Zanzibar. You almost feel embarrassed for the journalists. They pay for their own phone calls, they don't have expenses. I worked for an English television company: [Laughs], they could afford everything, drivers, vehicles,* per diems*, to hire aeroplanes. So different from here.*

The older generation listen to the radio, read newspapers and watch DVDs, Echoing Madianou's work (2005), the older generation and seemed able to fall back on an abstract but essentialised protean, refined and emphatic notion of 'culture' as a point of reference (Kolawole 2004). They were keen to show ways in which modern life and the media had varying merits, value and weight in contrast to their

interpretations of traditional Zanzibar life. Overall older respondents had better social networks, (Reay 2004) more social capital (Adkins 2004, Skeggs 2007) and seemed distinctly less bothered about their social standing: they had reached a point where they expressed confidence and a lack of interest in fitting in or how they were talked about.

The younger informants reveal they are grappling with personal and more general problems concerning the political economy and the functioning of democracy. However this 'conflicted self' (Chakrabarty 2000) is problematic: it speaks more to the rational/emotional, male/female/ or old/new binary that dogs pre-works in anthropology, and is jettisoned as Eurocentric. These are literal and ephemeral issues—marriage, jobs, respect and a place in society, their contributions to society or democracy. The lack of articulation and debate for younger women is discussed by Oi and Mm. They are talk about their role models for women in the media, which women they admire and who they look up to. The question is not understood, and I am asked to clarify what a positive role model example actually means.

> Oi responds: *Like what? Like single women? Or women who have achieved higher position?*
>
> Mm then interjects*: What! There are no role models, none! [Laughter] Bado. Not yet. I want to be admired. I want to be the one [Laughter] younger women, future generations will look at me and what I achieve!*
>
> Oi: *I admire women in the UN, that woman Margaret Sita, the secretary of the UN. Er… because they have responsible job, they are taken seriously, they contribute to change, to improvement and progress of life*

I ask them if there is anyone they admire that they know personally like friends, cousins, their mother?

Oi: *No, there is none, I want to, I need to meet more educated people, I am isolated, on my own, in some place maybe people know me, but actually I want to be like you, with a PhD. Studying hard, you have goals. I admire you! [laughter] Me, I want to help women, to develop and help the women of our country, like Margaret Sita, from Tanzania, like her. I really admire her. She's in the UN. I'd love to be one of those people who promote development, who brings this country forward.*

Mm: *Me too, to have a PhD, to know so many people like you do, to be connected with friends all over the world. That is a dream! Will you help me achieve it?*

Mimicry (and internalised oppression Fanon 1952), Goffman 1963, Butler 1990) and mimesis (Friedman 2006, Ferguson 2002) are fertile pickings, concealing uncomfortable racial power dynamics and inbalances, envy, deceit, anger and loss: substance for further work. Baumann (2000) and Ahmed (2005) assert that movement and ability to travel is a form of social capital, a marker of class and access to other scapes of power that proves resonant here. The conversations continue:

Dh: *there is a woman newsreader, Chiku Leno, she is a relative of a friend of mine. I admire her, she is in the news, and she is also a journalist…. I admire her because she is strong, and clever, she is not afraid to speak her mind. She is for the women and women's rights.*

Mt expresses regret that a prominent female academic misused and abused her relationships and networks, and has effectively made it harder for women to occupy public positions:

Mt: *That woman Fatma Alloo, she was a Zanzibar professor, she was good, but then I heard she is nasty and also she was married to Professor Shariff? Everyone knew about how she was rude and fierce, so she isn't liked here.*

She isn't good to people, she doesn't help people who are weaker than her. She was running the ZIFF festival and she fought with everyone! It's a shame.

Hidden within this sentence is a key component of Zanzibar's 'social glue' — the ability and display of being helpful to those perceived to be socially weaker as a manifestation of power. This attribute—whether it's for work, capital or loans, is a very important element to Zanzibar society, and becomes intertwined with the system of bartering and favours, which in turn blurs into practices that might be termed corrupt.

One of the biggest concerns for the younger women are their futures. They are vocal about their expectations, their acute need for their challenges, interests and concerns to be addressed in the media. They identify their challenges as getting a job commensurate with their skills, tackling the 'old guard' (*Wzee*) of elders who were very resistant to change, combining education or a career with being a wife and a mother and an interest in global politics and leadership. Earning money is a backdrop: without it nothing else is possible. My informants are articulating the widespread concerns of many younger Zanzibaris who feel themselves limited by systematic factors like lack of vacancies, a widespread apathy to new or difficult ideas, donor dependency and lack of funding at a micro and societal level. It emerges that younger women are not sure what is expected of them, or what to aim for themselves. They play with the possibility of just marrying a rich man, but know that even that is a vulnerable position. They are keenly aware of being watched, being viewed (Madianou 2011, Scott 2007, Columpar 2002) The conversation drifts onto the future.

Ta: *I am attracted to being a teacher, but the pay is really awful, so maybe if I could do a business as well on the side... so marrying to be rich, or marrying a rich man, is not good. Because that man is not yours! There's a chance he'll just refuse you, and then you'll do what! It only leads to trouble… men don't let you take their money, they know you want it".*

Mm: *If you want to be rich you start with education and with friends, and a good name. Without this your business will suffer, or you will be stolen from, or ripped off.*

Within these comments are labile versions of agency they see available at this point that work within their contexts of lived Islamism, (Jansons 2007, Kea 2007, Mahmood 2006, Schulz). I ask them if they think this society supports women as business people or as wives, if they are encouraged.

Oi: *We are supported, because business is viewed as a good thing. Our society supports us to start with. But also we are encouraged to be good wives, so business is useful in terms of schooling your kids, buying medicine. Business is first and foremost a way to be a good wife.*

Mm: *Other societies know that education is good, especially girls. Here in Zanzibar we prioritise being a wife. There is no specific rule, it really starts with the family; for my own education has been the first, I am the first girl to go to University, my parents are rural people, they work on a farm, they understand tomatoes and maize! [laughs] They were surprised I wanted education. But as far as I am concerned, there is no marriage without education, and now, that's how my family views it too. They want first us to get job, but actually they NEVER support us (her emphasis); if you want a good job, or education, you have to sort it out yourself, even your own uncles won't give you money or support me. You suffer for yourself, and you earn the money yourself. They NEVER support you. It's very hard, it's MUCH easier not to study, really. So I teach part time, to* Wazungu*, and to younger children I teach Swahili, that's how I get money, to put myself through university.*

The conversation is pushed back towards the media. I ask them if the media can play a role in furthering girls' education. Mm says:

It's talked about in the UN and such, but not in our media. I can't even imagine how it would be if the media covered these subjects. It would just be so good, so good.

For daughters of parents in 'good' jobs, like ministers or senior civil servants, it is an accepted wisdom that there will be positions for their children too. For Dh however, this is a mixed blessing, and the recent expansion of the private economy offers the lure of a more 'entrepreneurial' (modern, western, Comaroff and Comaroff 2006) lifestyle:

I was offered a job in the ministry (my mother is in charge of it) when I left University. I didn't really want it, I have no interest in working in tourism, and actually the job is so boring! All day I compile statistics. But I took it: the hours are easy, I can get on with other things, the pay is awful, but it's secure. I can run a business on the side, and gain some capital, and maybe increase my shamba *[She owns a plot of land that she grows vegetables to supplement her income, and runs a small tourist shop selling trinkets]. I know! I am still young [she is 27] but I am strong, and I am doing all these enterprises. It is the only way forward for me!*

Dh references the world beyond Zanzibar. Her family have lived in Kenya, the Tanzanian mainland and Zanzibar and this has given her a much wider canvas, multiple modernities (Eisenstadt 2000) and an ability to ignore local gossip:

I know, from seeing outside influences that much more is possible, so I am making it happen! I will not be limited by what some silly gossip says of me.

La, a 25-year-old post graduate broadcaster, is not from Zanzibar, but is based there temporarily. The geo-conceptual limitations of the island and the constant iterations of other and non-other are redundant for her. She can look beyond to parallel modernities (Larkin 1997) and imagined cosmopolitanism (Ebrahim 2009) She says:

I am Zimbabwean originally, I came here as political refugee, so I have an outsider's perspective, or maybe just a bigger perspective...... But it's just so ironic: I mean here we are, all technology and geared up for the 21st century: iPods and blackberries amongst the brightest and best, watching Hollywood, Bollywood and Nollywood, flicking between Al Jazheera and Fox news. We're so connected, yet we're still at the bottom of the pile, scavenging around, as if Africa is just one big civil war or dustbin.

La's ability to nominate the problem, to observe East Africa from both within and without, holding both the outsiders' (Northern) gaze and the insiders' (Southern) gaze, is a voice rarely heard in academic or media circles. Her resignation and sense of defeat however, is tangible:

I'm too lazy to bother to change it. It is bad, it IS bad, but when I look at the majority, I can't do it by myself, one disadvantage I have, is that I am the youngest, I am female, I working with African men, who are know-it-alls, and the only other female has been with the company for ever, but can't be bothered. At the moment I am cynical, yes, even though I'm young, barely 25! I am tired you know, tired, but not out.

La's friend Ba also wants the media to talk directly to her, to nominate the issues she is currently thinking about. She is articulate about how much resistance she is facing to securing good employment and being independent. She names and positions the tensions between 'the old and new schools' of thought.

I've got great ideas, a great CV, a fantastic graduate education from Boston USA, but still I can't get work. But you know I am sick of starting things and they never get off the ground. There is a huge 'tall poppy' syndrome, we are told to be passive! Believe it or not, my mum actually says this. [her mother has one of the most senior positions in Tanzania as an economist] But she says there is a way to be successful without drawing attention to yourself.

Ba is caught in a balancing act: she is globally educated and has an excellent degree from a world-renowned university. She, like Mama Aa mentioned in the previous chapter, has tasted the various flavours of self-improvement, her own skills, and prioritising her own agency and self-reflexivity and will not internalise the impotence imposed on her by categories of race, youth and gender (Schein 1997, Brah and Phoenix 2004). She has experienced a society where being an elder is not a firebreak from criticism. She continues:

> *We must leave bosses alone, never challenge them...it's so frustrating at the moment, some of us are modern, we're exposed to the world, we're ambitious, we can compete with the world's best, but all the time we've got this old school mentality going on, 'know your place. Respect your elders' I'm pissed about it! Why doesn't the paper run a weekly section job tips? You know, how to get an interview, how to break into banking, or journalism? Or why aren't there radio shows like we had in the states, where they take caller's views and ideas on the job market?*

With her Boston education, parents in high profile jobs, large stable family in various positions of power across Tanzania, Ba is in the Tanzanian elite. She is also in a prime position, with her ability to travel, to try out different ideas and to have perspective to compare what is possible for her in 'the modern world' (USA) and in Tanzania.

For other younger women, their futures are determined by other factors, including marriage. Combining marriage with a working life is socially acceptable, yet also difficult to maintain. Many younger women are challenging their parents' expectations that they must marry for social reasons, and instead are choosing relationships based on notions of romantic love. In this respect they are rewriting the rule book. In addition, life for single women is vulnerable. These women are left open to abuse, both verbal and physical, and without protection from the numerous problems of Zanzibar life.

Dh says:

> *Through my work in the* shamba *[She is a lawyer working in the rural areas] I know there are many women struggling to get a divorce. I would really love to hear a programme that could help them. These women work very long hours, living in absolute poverty, they don't know the law and they could really benefit from advice, especially in regard to divorce. There's misunderstanding here, people use the sharia law, so the men just say 'I divorce you three times' and then they are divorced, the men free to take another wife, the old wife is just left stranded. Also, the police never ever intervene in domestic abuse cases, so if a woman hasn't got friendly neighbours or relatives, she is completely stuck.*

5.3 The senior status of older women

In Zanzibar the seniority of women is recognised and acknowledged throughout society. Their use of concealment and disguise (going ninja) is much less pronounced, they have other channels available. Academic work on agency of older women in Africa is scant (Impey 2012, Askew 2002, Schulz 2013, Mbouje Pouey 2010, Moore 2013). Older educated women occupy an interesting intersection (Crenshawe 1991, Mohanty 2013), with profession, access to political channels, education, physical location, links to Arab Culture, marital status and sexuality all contributing to their cultural capital and cultural 'cache'. Senior female power is often nominated and acknowledged in Zanzibar.[8] The status conferred by age is influenced by personal characteristics and *busara* (wisdom), an intangible and labile term that enables older women to openly flout the rules, for example drinking alcoholic 'status drinks' like Whisky (Gratz 2012), taking younger (same sex) lovers, or having outspoken and public opinions. The enormous contradictions that permeate older women's lives deserve further research, for which there is insufficient space here.

What older women have gained (or indeed earned) within their homes translates into authority in the public sphere. The island's most famous and prominent older woman is a singer called Biki Dude. Her age (possibly over 100) and her sexual reputation are both vague[9]. She is now praised and recognised for

ignoring what people think of her, for letting her talents determine her outcome, and for not bowing to social mores[10].

Mama Sy is an informant I first met interviewing for the BBC in 2004, when I covered the nightclub problem touched upon in an earlier chapter. Mama Sy exemplifies a woman who has completely redefined her rules of engagement in the public sphere. She lives a professional landlady hosting overseas undergraduates from London and the USA in a respectable and conservative area of Stone Town. Over several years she had complained about the noise levels of a night club next door to her home—a small club that opens after midnight, has no soundproofing and attracts Zanzibar elite and tourists. It has no bouncers, and no entrance policy. As a result it's a popular spot for drunkenness and drug deals.

In February Mama Sy had had enough. She says:

> *I cut my hair short since you last met me, I couldn't be bothered with all that long hair. I also have continued to be vocal, and now I consider myself an activist, a woman community leader. Yes, I am definitely the first, the first one to do this. Why should I be afraid? What is there to be afraid of? From my students I host from America, from the TV I see of the news in other places, I apply this to my life. At the moment I have a battle with my neighbour. He runs a nightclub: the smoke comes directly out into my home, the noise, they turn it up when I appear in my nightdress to tell them to quieten down, and even last month there was a drunk naked girl lying in the street! I asked my neighbour to bring a kanga to cover her. This isn't normal! Not for Zanzibar, not your* wazungu *culture. So, I want this nightclub shut down.*

We move on to talk about the new coalition government and whether she feels listened to, represented and inspired by it.

> Mama Sy: *Not really, I just am fed up. I represent the women, the mothers, the community, everyone, I know I have support, and I also know I will win, because we have the law on our side. This is a residential area, not an area for a club! And this Salem Kichwa (the owner) is an arrogant drug dealer*

who thinks that because his father was a minister he can do what he wants… he can't, he has decided to fight with the wrong woman!..... I am writing an article for the newspaper, they come to see me later today [In fact this never happened]. I am the first woman to do this, to use the media, to challenge, but what must I be afraid of? For what? This is not a Muslim thing- against drink, drugs, this is about having a club in a residential area, where our kids see people behaving disgracefully, and we don't want that.[11]

Mm Hi is another older woman, fully-burkahed, in her seventies, who is now retired. Professionally she worked as a reporter for *Deutsche Welle*, the German equivalent of the British World Service radio. Like other informants who have lived and worked in Europe, she has what she jokingly refers to as a 'modern perspective'. Her age, education, opportunities and experience of living outside of Zanzibar give her these opinions:

I would say I am completely different from my contemporaries, women who stayed here. For a start, I worked for the media! When I started, in my twenties, it was the 1960's, Zanzibar was actually very liberal. Women were encouraged to work: I did get married, but I also had a career. You didn't see the buyi-buyi *everywhere like you do now. Women were uncovered. We even wore mini-skirts! I wore a mini skirt! This was the Paris of Africa—the fifties and sixties were a good time here. It was progressive. There were no tourists, none at all, but I never feared the* Wazungu *or their culture. Actually I embraced it.*

I ask her to tell me what role working for the media had in her life. She said:

I met other journalists, I had great exposure. I lived in Germany, my opinion was valued. It caused problems when I came home back here; my husband was being a vagabond, drinking too much, gossiping, lazing around, wasting time, so I chucked him out! I was confident, I knew I could do it on

my own, with my own brains. He came back, eventually, but not before a lot of trouble and wazi wazi *[commotion] [laughs]…. I had a good family, my sister in law was the Health Minister on the mainland, I had their support, as far as I was concerned my husband was lucky to have me, and he could take it or leave it!*

5.3.1 Older women are generally more enthusiastic about 'old media'

Positive endorsements and enthusiasm for local media content were limited in this research, and examples of women exploiting the media were very few. Arguably the five women who talked in positive terms (or less scathing ones) about old media—Mama Sy, Ma, CL, Na, and Mama Aa—share some attributes. They are all educated to degree level, they have travelled extensively and all lived in Northern Europe or the USA for a minimum of two years. They are all over sixty five, and crucially, they all come from established affluent families. Additionally, Mama Aa is not a Muslim, and is very vocal in her support for the evangelical protestant church she is a member of, saying it is "more modern."

Of these five women, easily the most positive exponent of the media is CL. She works in the media in an elevated and high profile position. CL is a famous national senior journalist and TV newsreader. She is also the *only* female journalist whom two of my informants mentioned as a significant role model and inspiration. Originally from Zanzibar, media has provided her with a good livelihood, a platform for her opinions and a chance to develop intellectually. Having her own income has prompted confidence and independence. Over the course of her interviews she divulged she is leaving her husband, a process which has been aided by her involvement in media.

As a consumer and a creator of the media I've had opportunities I wouldn't have had. For example when I ventured into consultancy, I used the media: I looked on the internet. But then I registered myself as a media and PR company. There was a radio programme about aspiring entrepreneurs, there was a competition, if you won….but the point is I get contacts from

the internet, I do PR using the internet, I won five thousand dollars of vouchers in this competition. For use in marketing…. I am still developing it…. All these women empowering, NGOs there is information in the media, if they have their eyes open, they don't have to just sit round feeling sorry for themselves. I don't know if it's enough, but there's something. The human rights organisations are always in the media. Only last week, on ITV1 they were talking about… what was it? They had a lawyer, they were talking about raising kids properly. And a minister or something, they were debating about how to help street kids. What they were trying to say that if there is peace in the family we'll avoid creating street kids, but the lawyer said the point that if the marriage doesn't work, you can go to the conciliatory board, get advice and get a lawyer. For me, for me personally, [her emphasis] that was a very important bit of information. For me… I… er, that was interesting.

CL sees the media as a place where debates can—and should—happen, and need to feed into wider concerns about agency, governance, accountability and ultimately democracy. She links her personal situation to the broader public sphere. In a sense this is not surprising; the public/private sphere for her is highly blurred, working as she does most nights on national television bringing information into millions of people's homes. She criticises the passivity of women in public life and public debate, and feels it is a question of personal motivation.

Like CL, Mama Aa is a senior employee with a long working life in the public eye, gaining a good salary, commanding power and managing others. Mama Aa is unique for a number of reasons. She is Protestant Evangelical, and has rejected the dominant Islamic community she lives in. Her family is Christian but with her two sisters, with whom she now lives, she has created a very distinct subaltern sphere, where these three women, all over sixty, live life as they want to according to their own rules. Her direct way of facing difficulties and confronting them and her ambition in the public sphere is not seen as typically Tanzanian, and she is self-aware about her concerted effort to 'become more foreign' which she has embraced. There is also an element of retrospective reworking of her own

narrative, I suspect: her regular wage, her senior age, and a sense that she no longer feels she has anything to prove, have given her confidence.

Her enthusiasm for Evangelical TV broadcasts has come late in her life; initially, like other older women she was a devoted member of the ruling party, CCM. For women of their generation, media was a very late arrival in their lives. They did not grow up with it (televisions were in fact illegal until 1973) and for Mama Aa there is no real problem with the media repeating party press releases.[12] She claims that her inability to find a husband or to settle down with a partner can be attributed to a general fear from her countrymen and women, a fear that she had, by being female and enjoying such a powerful public senior role, simply become ineligible for marriage. For her the willingness to embrace the facets of modernity she has chosen is careful and systematic, by choosing to study abroad and then embracing a lifestyle and adopting a professional approach which she has found intellectually enriching. Yet it has certainly—and she acknowledges this—come at the expense of 'being Tanzanian' and she has had to forfeit friendship groups and the possibility of marriage.

Ma is in her forties, has travelled widely, went to university in Cuba, and runs a successful coffee shop and hotel in Stone Town. She is related to a local celebrity, Bibi Ja, a prominent political figure now in her eighties. She spent her youth watching Indian films, although she is not of Indian Asian origin. As Bertz (2011: 69) notices, she is one of many 'non-diasporic' people who enjoys the plots, cultural references, English language, internationalism and imaginations of these films. Ma says:

> *There wasn't television when I was growing up here, actually it was considered counter revolutionary! [Laughs]. Even though I am not Indian I grew up with Indian films. They were so wonderful, so wonderful, all that romance, those locations, the music, [starts singing one of the songs] it was very perfect really. So I knew from the films that I wanted a great romance, and I am lucky because I got that, with my husband, who is Zanzibari like me, but we met when we were studying in Cuba…. Actually being in Cuba made me appreciate Zanzibar even more. We have a flat in London, so I do*

see the media there, and from that I got the idea to start a woman's football team. I am a defence! I run around in a track suit, we are all women, so we cover, but still we can play, and it's a good inspiration for women to see us and to know that we can play football if we want.

Na is the captain of the football team that Ma plays in. She is the subject of a film, *Zanzibar Soccer Queens* (Brylla and Asissi 2012) and a piece of academic work also by the film-makers which analyses how the film successfully relocates agency, control, power and interiority to Muslim women. The team is made up of sixteen Zanzibari women of all ages. Na is confident, and more strident about naming exactly what the problems in relation to Zanzibar women's reticence in performing in public spheres are, including playing football in public places.

Look, the women here, the Muslim women, they are frightened. We talk to the husbands, to the uncles and fathers, we say there is nothing whatsoever haram about a woman playing football. It is good for the health, for the circulation, for the confidence, for to get out of the house and not sit around all the time talking chit chat and rubbish. Show me the Koran where they say woman cannot do sport! It's not there.

I ask her about how she co-ordinates the team.

We all have mobile phones, I text everyone with the practice times. I go and talk to husbands or brothers I myself am Muslim, I know my Koran, I talk with leaders, I am faithful to my god Al Ham du li lah. I emphasise that there is nothing in the Koran that says women can't play football! We started the team when a group of Swedish ladies came to play us. We were beaten sixteen nil! But we got the idea, the support….

I ask her how she is perceived, both within the realms of gossiping, and more officially, in the media.

The local media and the newspaper has not been so encouraging, but actually the international media has been so good to us. So now we are accepted. This lady Florence from Wales made a film about us, and donated a new kit for the whole team, and then the BBC did a piece on us too. So although our local media hasn't paid us much attention, they haven't criticised us. I would say now we are accepted. They say 'Ah' that is the Na lady, she is captain of the football team!

Na has reworked, subverted and re-organised social rules to fit her own agenda, enacting two key tropes of Zanzibar life. Firstly, gender roles within Zanzibar are fluid. Older women can perform male gendered roles, including taking lovers of either gender. Secondly Zanzibar is strikingly flexible: in practise most rules can be broken by sheer force of personality, particularly by older women with access to social and actual capital. Na's personal situation is interesting; she comes from a large family of nine children, three of whom were international sportswomen. Na had a twenty year career as an international badminton player, and travelled and competed internationally.

5.4 <u>Corruption and Jealousy</u>

Jealousy and corruption are interlinked in this study: fetishized, heroic, mythic and rich, and constituting the state (Gupta 2012, 2005, Chakrabarty 2000, Ronning 2009). Personal behaviours are influenced by leaders, be they elected party members of the ruling CCM party or leaders (*Sheha*) at a community level. The inclusion of jealously significantly troubles tropes of community cohesion and chimes with the findings of others who highlight the often brutal competitive nature of life in East Africa (Suriano 2007, Moyer 2005). My research revealed that contrary to the literature surrounding traditional societies, Zanzibar society is highly networked, where social relationships are hyper-accentuated. This provokes the question of why gossip, jealousy and bartering come up so often when apparently unrelated subjects are being discussed.

The lines between business and pleasure, state and non-state (the phantom state referenced by Mbembe 2006) in Zanzibar are often blurred, and the country's

resulting fluid social capital involves many things; a good network of powerful people, a good reputation, proper behaviour in public and a maintenance of the Zanzibari narrative. This problematizes the conventional definitions of public and private places and spheres and conventional approaches to behaviours—informal or casualised—that are expected to accompany these areas (Wouters, 2004, 2009).

Jealousy is a key concept for this study because it is one of the mechanisms that prevents collective action and encourages fear, suspicion and individuation. In Zanzibar there are four words for jealousy; *chuko*, *wivo*, *choyo* and *ushogo*. *Chuko* is akin to envy. *Wivo* is general gossip, news. *Choyo* is selfishness and tittle-tattle, and *ushoga* is jealousy that can only be applied to women and which only women experience.

Jealousy affects equilibrium, it can be rational or the result of spirit possession (shetani). This association with the devil as negative (alluding to both tradition and modernity, Moore 2013, El-Tayeb 2006, Kea 2012, Comaroff and Comaroff 2006) and obstructive causes people to say and do things that they may not normally think, do or say. The ramifications of this is an acceptance that there is no fixity of truth. Something that Zanzibaris acknowledge as *nimechanganikiwa*—a beautifully passive construction announcing, 'I was caused to be mixed up'; a state that can arise from struggling to survive in the heat of the sun. (Moyer 2005: 50)[12]

Truth is contingent and spatial: where something is said, by whom and when, must be taken into account. It also partially explains why I was so initially bewildered by the sheer repetition of what sounded like detailed trivia. Repetition brings things into being, reinforces their existence and acts as social glue, emphasizing the connections, the 'we-ness' (Schulz 2014) between people.

5.5 Information and ontological security. What's true?

This section interrogates how corrupt local practices impinge on taxonomies of knowledge. Information is distinctly place-specific and author-specific, and affects everyone, of all ages. Moyer catalogues the importance of *maasikani* (the male gossip on the street corner—interestingly in Swahili the word means both hanging out informally and talking, for men) as a place where peace and truth prevail in her

study of Rastas in Dar es Salaam (Moyer 2004, 2004b, 2005[13]). The media feeds into discussions on information creation and truth. Gossip in private spaces replaces bigger debates in the public sphere. This section develops the ideas of gendered space, and looks at how media becomes a 'gossiping voice' and how gossip can be viewed as serious discussion.

The lack of investigative reporting in Zanzibar, or of holding political leaders to account, is well established. In the last two years the failure of what might be called civil society in East Africa is well documented (Interpress reports, Ronning 2009, Transparency International 2008), but this research suggest that in Zanzibar this has been psycho-socially pathologised, in the form of people policing each other, and self-censoring to a great degree. There is a history of East German trained spies in Zanzibar in the seventies and eighties—according to two informants—and the fact that owning a television was illegal until the eighties has also contributed to a climate where free speech is limited (Malyiamkono 2001, Abdalah and Othman 2007) Instead, there is a concomitant failure of faith in the judicial process, the process of talking things through, and violence is often resorted to.

Corruption on Zanzibar is manifest in the privatisation, informalisation, (absence) disorder and violence of state functions of society (Ferguson & Gupta 2002, Chabal 2009) and the devolvement of state obligations to privatised outsourced units (Mbembe 2003) and implicit in the structural violence of poverty (Gupta 2012). Procedures are not established within structures and stay within the realm of individuals who can have personal likes and dislikes. Personal relationships and favours replace institutional procedures. Corruption also operates at the level of information, institutions and in the public sphere. One of the facets of Zanzibar society is what is perceived as 'truth' is dependent not on it being reproduced by the state (in fact all my informants were scornful of 'official' government statistics) but by being reproduced by people themselves. Thus on Zanzibar there is a distrust of the state which in turn feeds into a decision not to probe into ownership issues, locus of power and power inequalities. As my research shows, this is often done in oblique ways, using foreign media, particularly foreign news, as a way in to discuss sensitive political issues.

Informants distinguish between media that is originated and produced locally (e.g. radio shows, print media, SMS texts, television) and media that comes from beyond the island; international media. Locally originated media fails to reflect or report on corruption. Media is therefore part of the problem of corruption according to informants, and the international media, by extension, is not necessarily trusted. The reporting of corruption at governmental level is not catalogued systematically in the media, and in fact little or no attention is given to these matters in Zanzibar.

In this excerpt, Mm, Ta, Mt and Oi draw attention to nepotism and system of favours, counter-favours and trading described at length by both Ronning (2009) and Gadzekpo (2008). What is pertinent in this exchange is how the concept of a critical media is positioned as a gossiping role, rather than a neutral, institutional role. The media becomes just another gossiping mouthpiece, neither privileged nor inferior.

I ask the women—in conversational terms—if they know about the idea of the media as an essential part of democratic praxis (Seaton J, 2009, Couldry 2010) and whether they can envisage it as detached from, perhaps even being critical of the government. What do they think the main roles of the media are, and does the media in Zanzibar play a part in monitoring the government, in being a mouthpiece for people, checking up on big business or organisations. Oi and Mm both reply:

Mm: The media IS [their emphasis] the government here. Have you seen the papers? There's nothing in them except for press releases, and they are not accurate either.

Oi: You are saying can the government check on itself? I am not clear. What are you asking again? I am confused. The journalists will not criticise the government. They will lose their jobs, they are friends together. You see them drinking at that club in Vuga…..the job of the media is, like the news, on daily, is to tell us about crop prices, or a school opening on the mainland, or a foreign visit, or maybe if we have a sporting victory [laughs] but that isn't so often is it?

The idea that the government, business, corrupt practices or prominent individuals, should be checked on by the media, by newspapers, was raised during the fieldwork. The coverage of the specific example of the Bank of Tanzania scandal on Tanzanian blogs[14] and in British media[15] prompted discussions: informants knew about the case, and some had personally experienced the fraud of the bank via their relatives. In this instance, the media coverage of a very long drawn out trial of sixteen people in Tanzania during 2009, which received only sporadic reporting, was brought up. I asked them if any media, local or otherwise, had covered the corruption in the bank:

> Mm: *we see examples of people going to court, I think was it sixteen people were convicted, and the results of the court ruling, but the battles here are so long drawn out, and they don't tell us about the issues. So myself, I am not clear how each and every one was involved in this bank problem, only that some people were arrested, but I cannot for honest tell you why. Sorry!*

> Ta: *but I do listen to the news on television when I can. I like to know what is happening in the mainland, but the news on Zanzibar is mostly about farming. Or health campaigns. At present they are trying to give out mosquito nets. So that is on the televisions…*

I asked them about the issues and problems around the use of DDT sprayed onto the mosquito nets. Did the media bring attention to this?

> Mm: *no, the problem is that in rainy season we have mosquitos, and malaria is a big problem here…*

I ask them if they have debates and chances to question how things are done, whether the government is acting in their best interests, as citizens.

Mt: *I don't think you are properly understanding us. Of course I know now the government is not acting in our interests, because I look at other websites, like Pambazuka, and AllAFrica.com, which gives me various informations [sic]. But no, on the local television or in local papers they don't have debates or discussions questioning the government. Maybe some days there is a debate about, I don't know, the price of copper or oil prices, but the tradition of asking our government what they are doing is not part of our culture, not at all. I cannot even imagine it. I will give you a strong example. In the elections in 2005 we had problems in my area. The police surrounded the whole block of flats where I lived, the whole of Michenzani was a no-go zone. The police were shooting and we couldn't get in or out to go to market, to our work, whatever, nothing. In this time there was a man died. We couldn't even get out to bury him, in our Muslim tradition we do this in 24 hours. This was a terrible, shocking situation. Can you imagine? Not a single Zanzibar paper reported this, can you imagine?*

There are so many problematic issues in this small section. It is revealing for example how quickly the interviewees change subject and dismiss the possibility of any meaningful reporting from their local newspapers, TV or radio. Their expectations of how journalism works are that they will not have a voice, and that the guilty will not be bought to trial. There is an element of weary resignation to yet more corruption.

In a later session, media ownership comes up. Both Ba and La are working journalists, and understand that the local oligarch (Reginald Mengi[16]) owns the private media in Tanzania, and that he is actively protecting his interests. They caution against any journalist who wants to start investigating his business interests, citing a young Tanzanian journalist who was killed in the last few years. At the level of inaccuracy around reporting and content there is also a recognition that the media gets it wrong, which feeds into the general distrust of the media. However cross-ownership of media houses is not knowledge that is widely circulated[17].

All of this leads to the often cited belief that the media simply does not tell the truth. With no positive local-originated models to contradict this, this trope is continuously circulated. As Mama P comments:

The people don't expect the media to tell the truth, or to fight for their rights, or to ask why their education is so lacking. They don't. We have to change this. We have to change this.

In order to develop the arguments about the media's perceived failure to operate as a 'witness', a neutral critic or a creator of a public sphere, it is important to look at the non-media spaces where discourses deemed important to Zanzibaris do take place. These non-media spaces for women include private homes, the porch, the salon, but not the 'pavement' or the street, or barazza, as explored in work by Englert (2008), Stroeken (2009) and Moyer(2004, 2005).

Zanzibar is not a highly literate society; officially the literacy rate is 53% but in practice it seems lower. It is an oral society, talk is the key medium and mobile phones (texting in particular) are a major way relationships are cemented and added to and contact is maintained (Horst & Miller 2006, Madianou 2014). Zanzibar is primarily a society where relationships are key: accrual of favours, access to networks, inclusion and access to nodules of information are an important part of living.

Idi illustrates this to me:

At the moment I am taking my neighbour's pickle to the port, so she can send it across to Dar es Salaam to make some extra money. Things are very difficult at the moment. Price of fuel is up, and food is more expensive. I take her pickle to the port, for free, in return she is cooking the meals for me and my wife in the evening. In this way my wife can work in the shop in the evening. She is nurse in the hospital, but the pay is so poor, and the conditions so bad, that she has opened up a small shop in the evenings, so we get extra income. Really we can't survive on just the normal income like

before. Our neighbours we're all helping each other, sharing tasks, getting water, cooking, it's the only way to survive.

This is '*umma'*—the Muslim notion of community—in practice. For some subjects, this bartering, system of favours, is compromising. It makes it impossible to criticise people, or policies, or to have open debates. Hn, an expatriate, struggles with the ontological lack of truth on Zanzibar:

I am a very honest person; I find this lack of personal honesty very hard indeed. So that, in terms of debates, you know public discussion, or even at a dinner party, people won't parry and spa opinions, to learn, or to get to the bottom of things… this dynamic honesty as I call it, it's everywhere, it's completely embedded in life, so it becomes really hard just to have basic stuff verified. ….and for me it's a relief to have something like the BBC World Service, which at least I know is honest, and true.

The indeterminate nature of truth and the importance of social capital, relationships and reputation over factual accuracy is the canvas in which women must exercise agency. So, despite the bartering, the favours, and the importance of maintaining reputations, trust is paramount but also scarce. Interviewees repeatedly stressed there was no capital to be accrued in publicising one's problems, and no distinction is made between issues that are universal and those that are specific and personal. For example the electricity and water shortages, affecting everyone, were not discussed as a communal problem, and significantly there was no coverage of it in the local media. The BBC ran a report on these things, but there was a marked lack of reporting, information and updates in local media throughout the three month continuous cuts.

This was categorically identified by some interviewees as corruption, but also dismissed as being the norm. Corruption and lack of transparency in Zanzibari society has become so accepted, so daily and normalized, (Gupta 2008) so internalized, so integrated into the 'complexs of corruption' (Ronning 2009) that to

draw attention to it is considered extremely impolite, and irrelevant by the media editors and owners on Zanzibar. Dh recounts a story which illustrates this:

Some years ago, was it last year, there was this case about this lodger, here we have this thing where people rent out a room in the house when they are poor, so this lodger came. It's a very common way of women to make money. He was a man, they, the family didn't know him, he wasn't a relative. It was in the Michanzani area [an East German built block of flats in Stone Town] where I live, so I knew about it first-hand. He abused the daughter of the family, she was ten. Some neighbours came to hear about it, and so did I. we decided to organise a demonstration. We wanted to draw attention to a few things. It was women, yes it was women, there were some men involved, but I think it was the women who were the majority. We were going to show that first of all you can't abuse children. Especially if you have opened up your home to a stranger, and then he is sexually abusing her! We were horrified. That is so terrible. But also we wanted to show that people have limited choices. They have to take lodgers because they have to feed their kids. So there should be some regulation, or something, so that we know who is living in our houses.

I ask Dh if the demonstration went ahead.

No, unfortunately, I don't know, it just became chaotic, and people starting talking, and getting scared, that maybe this man's relatives would come after us for revenge. Or they would think we are member of CUF [the opposition, not actually illegal, but still not an open functioning party until the elections of October 2010]. So nothing happened, it all just died down. Of course there was NO coverage in the media, nothing at all, it was so frustrating, because this issue of lodgers is important here for us. And it happens a lot, sexual abuse, a lot. And again it's women who suffer, because we're the ones who can't go out and get work, and having

someone in your house as a lodger is a good way of getting round this. But we never talk about it.

Dh's story shows how an initial desire to create a public issue in a public space by women lost momentum partly because of fear of a bad reputation emerging for those who brought the issue to light, but also a lack of belief in the process. There simply was no point in organizing a demonstration, or getting media involvement, because the prevailing belief was that it wouldn't work. Deddah goes on to say:

I think if we'd have been in Kenya, or Uganda, or even the mainland, we could have made it happen. When I mentioned getting media involvement that made it worse! Then I really lost supporters. No-one wants to be known as a demonstrator, because then they've got you on your list, they think you're political. They is the government, the army. People get picked up and put in prison, for nothing, for no excuse, if you've got no money or no relative in the police force high up, you won't get out [sic].

Dh's remarks concisely indicate how closed societies work. The fact that locally originated media consistently and continuously fail to give attention to the things that are happening in Zanzibaris' lives further compounds its reputation as a minor player, and makes it much harder for other media to gain credibility and authenticity in the eyes and minds of the listeners and readers.

5.5.1 Jealousy, friendship, bartering and Favours: (Or How gossip replaces a functioning police force, judiciary and Media)

These issues appeared late in the fieldwork, after eighteen months of interviewing. A central tenet of the Islam practiced in Zanzibar is *adab*—good behaviour, rules of etiquette and an ethical code involving every aspect of life. This can be summarised as refinement, good manners, morals, decorum, decency, humanity. While interpretation of the scope and particulars of *adab* may vary among different cultures, to exhibit *adab* would be to "show proper discrimination of correct order,

behaviour, and taste." (Sharif 2005). *sauti laini* (Haram 2004) and *tabia nzuri* (Beckman 2009) also feature as behavioural attributes to be aspired to.

Despite this, people list fear, suspicion, not being family, being an outsider, as reasons to gossip. This type of Jealousy is *vuki* and the reasons why Zanzibaris will not talk about personal issues to each other, why women will not collectively deal with a problem: namely why women are not overtly political. Hn, who is an expatriate, remarked on this when I expressed dismay at the ability of my informants to be elusive when trying to pin down about their opinions.

> *It's hardly surprising. This jealousy and gossip. It's partly boredom I think, it's partly small island syndrome. This island has been invaded for several centuries, I think you see it on all islands, this parochialism, this obsession with themselves.*

Another informant, a (male) senior civil servant on Zanzibar, called Di says:

> *Look, gossip and jealousy is a national obsession, it's what we do to pass the time, it's because we are bored, and there's nothing on television! No actually, seriously, it's a product of poor education and fear. This population has been terrorised for centuries, they're scared to speak out, so they gossip. When you look at the silences around the revolution, the sheer numbers of people killed, the horrors of slavery, it's not surprising we're repressed, there's a lot to repress. This part of our history really hasn't been processed. Until we start to teach it in schools, to get programmes on TV that we Tanzanians and Zanzibaris have made, it will continue as a trauma, as gossip.*

These collective traumas are hinted at by Khanna (2003) and Ahmed (2004), who theorise they are the aftermath of colonialism showing in personal behaviours, in the individual interiorising and absorption of many years of fear, pain and personal repression. Longair (2012) and Wilson (2014) expressly name the painful periods of Zanzibari history. In the absence of a working police and court system,

gossip is a social mediator, providing ways for people to control what is happening in their communities, and to hold people to account. Gossip begins to take on roles which the media, the police or the judiciary notably do not perform. There is a strong link between jealousy and gossip. What one is seen to be doing can make or break people's lives.

As Mt explains:

Part of the reason gossip is so vital here is that we need to know what's going on, what people are doing, who's doing what, to check up on them I suppose. But also to find out who is ill, who's not, who's been caught doing something corrupt, who's creating trouble. We hardly ever get this news from the media, the television or whatever. So that big case, the paedophile, the gay, the guy who was getting kids to come to his house, 'N', we all just knew about it. We were all talking, but it wasn't in the papers. The only thing that has been in the papers is all this stuff about Dayans or whatever [a corruption case involving a prominent cabinet member and illegal tenders of electricity services].

I ask Mt how she knew.

We talk, like I tell you, everyone knows everything, it's how it is here.

La says:

Look, gossip is everything here. It's not just boredom, it's much more than that. How you are viewed, talked about in the street is absolutely central to whether you can function in this society. So someone will be passing someone else on the street, they exchange gossip, someone else hears, the story changes, a small bit is picked up… there's no one story on anyone here, there's thousands of different stories!

In Maggie's Hair Salon Ray, Nr, Py, Hi and Ma are discussing marriage (in English). Their discussion also touches on subjects raised earlier in this chapter—how women are expected to behave and dress, and men's lust. Hi and Py get very animated about men. "I don't give a damn shit" says Py about what is expected of her. Hi says:

The problem is men's lust here, and the fact they have nothing to do; so they sit around gawping at women, asking us if we are married. That's why women have to cover up; the men are so awful.

She would prefer a wazungu (white, foreigner) type set up:

From what I've seen on TV and films, you wazungu *have a better life. You talk about things, have equality, you can challenge your men and the laws are better, for us this multiple wives thing is a real problem, that's where jealousy starts, the first wife doesn't like the second, and it just goes like that.*

Py and Hi are both very angry with the way men behave; they want to do something about it, but are not really sure what. I suggest they set up a meeting or a group that meets regularly to discuss this.

Py: *we couldn't; people would just start to gossip, to talk, to say bad things, and it would get all fucked up. Me I don't give a damn fucking shit about the men here, they're all dogs, but people talk a lot about me, I know they do. I don't like the way people gossip here, hold each other back. But in the end I'm 27, it's me that's been running a salon here for five years, not them, and I don't give a fucking shit. I am the one that has money in my pocket at the end of the day, can go out freely to Mzungu clubs, can buy my own drinks, date men if I want.*

What comes out in a later interview (when she and I are in speaking privately) is that Py is dependent on her community: she constantly gives away free pedicures, eyebrow treatments or waxing treatments. She is a young, separated Hindu woman in a Muslim community: like Nr she survives by doing favours—essential ones (in her customers' eyes)—for the female Zanzibaris who can afford it. In this way she gains both credit for favours and status as a single young woman doing business, even though in some ways she is doing exactly what the older conservative members of society do not wish her to do.

Zanzibar society contains some problematic paradoxes: people are scornful about friendships and don't trust each other, and yet the tropes of social bartering and favours, which rely on trust, are a constantly reiterated and reworked into daily discourse. Bartering—literally and more metaphorically—is an important part of the way people operate. Gossip is an extension of this bartering: there is a sense that one is trading, or attempting to influence, others' opinions in many social interactions. At a basic level, greeting appropriately, and at length, is an essential part of being Zanzibari. As I got to know my interviewees I asked why it was that no one ever actually gave any information on how they feel or what is happening in their life. I was politely informed that this information comes only much later, and always in private. Agency is contingent on the ability to trade, to get loans and function as a businesswoman. Nr, a divorcee who owns Maggie's Salon, comes from the mainland, and arrived in later 2009. Only two of her staff are Zanzibari. She had to build up the business and struggled with envy, jealousy and negative gossip. Nr says:

> *Oh my god, jealousy is huge here. I have had real problems because I came from the mainland with money, after I divorced. I kicked my husband out. On the surface the staff say they are proud of me and I am* kali *(an ambiguous word meaning strong, but also forceful and rude) and they know I wanted to get this salon going, to make money. But still, the neighbours gossiped about me, watched to see if there were different men coming in, listened to see if there were screams from my bedroom! They know I am divorced, they wanted to see if I was a good Muslim, and respectful. It gives me headaches.*

I just put my head down, concentrate on painting the saloon, getting better products for the clients, and trust in Allah. You know the television was on all the time, that Filipino soap opera. I turned it off and now we play Muslim Ghazals. It's better, and the staff see me pray five times a day. It's important, I need the business to survive. It's closed here, it's backward.

Nr is a strategic businesswoman. She kept the prices in the salon low, and did favours for the existing clients so they wouldn't desert her. Haircuts and steaming treatments were done for free. She used a favour from a friend to get advertising for the salon on the local television and radio stations, and produced her own advert. Nr, like Mama Sy, is very knowingly using her knowledge and understanding of society and media to make Zanzibar life work for her.

Zanzibar is a barter society, a society of doublethink where personal relationships are forged on the basis of usefulness and expediency. Status is gained through many complex routes. So for example Nr is forced to renegotiate her new role in Zanzibar:

Look, in Dar es Salaam I lived in a big house, I had servants, a Mercedes. I was somebody. You see me here, in this small shop! No-one knows my past. But after I threw out my husband I had to start again, I had to come here and be humble, to ask favours of people, to make sure I helped people, otherwise as a single Muslim woman I just would've been chased out. I know I have got to use local media to my advantage- that's why I made my advert, but also I have to make sure people think good of me here, otherwise I am nothing.

The other side to this is an extensive performance of greeting, bartering, acknowledgement, concealment and disguise (Ugunzi 2011, 2013)—discussed at length in Archamboult's work in Mozambique(2011, 2012). Public secrets (Taussig 1999) and fatherless daughters (Arnfred 2011) are a large part of Zanzibar life, and an ability to be discreet, if not downright dishonest, is necessary. On the other

hand, the privacy that M is so keen to emphasize when she accesses her internet alone at night under her bedcovers affords a special sort of privacy. Writing about diaries in Mali, Mbodji-Pouye notes:

> *Notebooks draw their value from the sense of privacy attached to this practice. The personal notebooks stand out as distinct from all other community documents that are subject to control and supervision. They offer the writer a way of delineating a world of one's own, putting together figures of the self without necessarily providing a view of the united self.*
>
> - Mbodj-Pouye 2013: 223)

Conclusion

This chapter explores the manifestations of agency and control that the informants perform using new media to appear modern, and appear more mobile and fluid than perhaps they actually are. Using labile agencies that change according to who is watching, where it is taking place, and interior monitoring of the virtuous self and negotiated conversations about Islamic piety, I have tried to show that agency in this work moves way beyond simply having an autonomous voice. Agency is reactive to vectors of locatility, age, origin, (Chabal 2009) social capital and the task performed. Agency is highly dialogic, bound up with performances that locate the subject within specific socio-historic locales (Butler 1990, 2009). 'Soft' factors, such as affect, emotions, respectability, mimcry and mimesis, keeping up appearances, are very important factors in the understandings of iterations and manifestations of power. I have explored how gossip, jealousy and obligation operate within the framework of much broader violences and social inequalities, and are tactics employed to energetically work within the numerous state and informal channels that exist. I have shown that the media is a small part of this complicated patchwork, and there are other factors influencing how and how much women and young girls wish to put themselves 'on show'. Unwillingness to draw attention to themselves prevents women from protesting in the public sphere. This is compounded with the ex-nomination of their lives in the media sphere. Thus the

informants' dynamic conceptualisations of trust, shame and reputation strongly influence behaviours. Local versions of information and social talk replace, supplant or modify institutional discourses, which are treated with suspicion and reserve.

Additionally, when formal institutions (media or the judiciary) contain neither the structures nor the trust necessary to enact the functions expected of them people find new ways to tell their stories and resolve their disputes that involve personal relationships. This can include bartering of material things and of information. The maintenance of their social relationships and the circulation of information are key, and friendships are predicated often on expediency and a utilitarian need to know how people can be useful. Friendships often have an element of concealment and jealously, as keeping up appearances, going ninja, and being able to function in society takes precedence.

The following chapter looks at how these different iterations of agency are affected by the factors described above, and the complexities and varieties of modernities available. (Slater 2012, Sabry 2010, Bayat 2010) involves.

[1] In hindsight, I should have probed at how the female audience of the mainstream media is imagined. This question is entirely problematic to address, largely because I failed to ask it during my fieldwork.

[2] Sasha Newell. 2012. *The Modernity Bluff: Crime, Consumption, and Citizenship in Côte d'Ivoire.* Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press.

[3] During the entire period of the fieldwork many teachers, doctors, nurses and civil servants had not been paid for months on end, none of which was reported in the local press, and the farmers interviewed had not received the fertiliser subsidies promised to them by the government.

[4] The electricity failures were dealt with autonomously—neighbours and families helped each other—but there were no 'campaigns' or officially organised collective efforts to publicise, or protest against, the situation.

[5] Daniel Mains, 2012. *Hope is Cut: Youth, Unemployment, and the Future in Urban Ethiopia.* Pennsylvania: Temple University Press.

[6] There was no television at all on Zanibar until the late 1990s. See Appendix 4.

[7] Inadvertently one of the big icebreakers for this research was the age and decrepitude of my beloved Nokia phone, which had survived being dropped in the sea twice, and stolen.

[8] So for example, is a woman over 40, working as a university professor, married to a senior ruling party leader who travels regularly to Oman is on an equal if not slightly higher footing than her

male contemporary. The key here is education: a rural women, with little education, also married (or divorced) will have not have access to similar levels of social and cultural/political capital.

[9] Biki Dude was living in relative obscurity as a praise singer, working at weddings and performing at small local functions until she was promoted via the local music festival, from 2003. Via this process she became first wealthy, and then famous, predominantly on the World Music scene, and gained exposure in the international media.

[10] Two factors contribute to Biki's success. (see Appendix 7)

[11] In February 2011, at the time all this was happening, Zanzibar was settling into a new power-sharing arrangement, a Government of National Unity, collaboration between the long term ruling party CCM, and the more hard-line Islamic group, CUF.

[12] To me it is highly unusual and provocative that this woman who has spent over five years living in the USA, who held an extremely prominent role in the international banking world, now eschews the news and any other current affairs programmes which she can easily access via radio or satellite TV at home.

[13] Moyer, Eileen (2005) 'Street Corner Justice in the Name of Jah: Imperatives for Peace among Dar es Salaam Street Youth.' *Africa Today* 51 (3).

[14] http://www.jamiiforums.com/jukwaa-la-siasa/197601-corruption-scandals-in-tanzania-history-just-to-memorize.html and http://wewrite.or.tz/2011/12/corruption-with-a-futile-tanzania%E2%80%99s-independence/

[15] http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7181065.stm

[16] http://www.thecitizen.co.tz/News/Mengi--From-bedroom-to-boardroom-with--550m-/-/1840392/2379822/-/item/2/-/cgwaehz/-/index.html

[17] Only one other informant (Eddy, quoted in Chapter 6) directly mentioned media ownership in this research, and no-one talked about conflict of interests.

Chapter Six: Findings. Public Spheres and Public Spaces

Introduction

In this chapter I seek to explore how notions of agency in Zanzibar interact with media. This chapter also looks at how—with new notions of agency (Mahmood, 2006, El-Tayeb 2006, Asad 2009) we challenge the convergence of Western secularism, rationalism, privileged supremacy in the project of self-reflexivity. With notions of privacy, Islamic piety and keeping face foregrounded, the new media functions less as a vehicle for digital activism and more as a self-help manual and a 'conduit' for modernity in local situations.

I argue that both the style and the content of 'women's talk' suggests it should not be dismissed as gossip, since it often covers political, philosophical and international issues, as well as complicated discussions of social obligations the informants experience. Furthermore, the places where this talk takes place—kitchens, bedrooms, hair salons, and occasionally public all-female eating spaces—suggests a strong need to re-think what women's agency in this context entails and involves. Lastly, I look at how (paradoxically, given the strong value given to communalism on Zanzibar) politics is in fact not undertaken in any public manner at all in order to avoid being identified and potentially vilified as an 'author', an identification that would attract attention and possible rumours, misinformation and gossip. In order to develop this argument I look at how space itself is gendered.

6.1 Corruption and Space, Reinventing a Notion of the Southern Public Sphere

Corruption on Zanzibar is manifested in many ways: in the lack of institutions that perform the functions of society, the lack of embedded or transparent procedures within institutions that do exist, the extended delays in processes being enacted, the over-emphasis on form-filling and proceedes, the high emphasis on personal character, friendships and reputation to 'get things done' (Gupta 2012). Zanzibaris are not helpless in this process, in fact they collaborate with the "parallel economy of the inauthentic" as they are forced to "circumvent the arbitrariness of state procedures" (Gupta 230-1:2012).

Jealousy becomes centralised. In Zanzibar social capital (Bourdieu 1990), is integral to the performances of 'being modern' and an important part of life for the younger generation: they co-opt the bits they want (clothing, ideas on working, foreign politics, application of Islamic lore, relationships and marriage,) and leave the bits they do not. This is explored in greater detail in Chapter 7.

At a non-material level, my research reveals that 'modern thinking' (Bayat 2010, Asad 2009) is problematic and contradictory for two reasons. First it is 'othered' and made distinct from the tradition of being inside the nation state and being Zanzibari. Secondly, the protean ideations of modern thinking essentially challenge the corruption of information as well as the corruption endemic in the public sphere. Despite this there is a keen appetite and curiosity about modern ways (Sabry 2010) and often both traditional and modernity are invested with interchangeable positive (or negative) characteristics, making the very categories slippery and unstable (Mohanty 2013, Spronk 2014).

One of the facets of Zanzibar society is the spatialised nature of truth. (Ferguson 2002) When truth comes from 'on high' (the party, the state) it is distrusted. Truth is *local*, *near*, and dependent not on being reproduced by the state but by being reproduced by people themselves. In many ways, despite ignorance of ownership issues, the media is viewed sceptically by informants and as part of the bigger problem of corruption which permeates all areas of Zanzibar life. Conversely, certain informants recognised that the media could be part of the solution to corruption by offering alternative political models and by holding presidents and high ranking officials to task. Says Dh, talking about the first presidential election in the US in 2009:

> *For me the most incredible thing about Barak Obama's election is the fact that Bush actually stepped down, he accepted that he lost, so he left office, that is so great, don't you think? And then there was that news about the vote rigging, or something, in Florida, I mean for me, to see that the most powerful country in the world can make sure its leaders behave properly is just so good. We, in Zanzibar, we need to learn from this. Our leaders need to accept democratic results.*

Space and geography is central to this analysis of media. Where things happen or are talked about is crucial. Where the media originates from is important. Media and modernity inevitably alter people's perceptions of locality, and the local. The media essentialises notions of 'inside and outside' spaces and categories of belonging and not belonging: the notion of the public sphere as understood in literature originating from the Global North has to be adapted and transformed to cope with the uniquely Zanzibar approach to the public space and the public sphere, and its colonial past.

6.2 Gendered Space: public male space, private female space

A typical journey by foot (much of Stone Town is inaccessible by car) from home to work in Zanzibar may only be a couple of hundred yards. But it can take up to an hour to complete. Along the way there are necessary greetings, enquiries about the home, the family, health and the neighbourhood. These are not just formalities, they are a necessary and even an essential part of life; often less direct questions are jettisoned in favour of 'mutile'—jokes, metaphors or riddles. Zanzibaris value linguistic dexterity, inference and subtlety (Fouere, 2011, Englert 2013). It may take a while, it may not be expedient, but no matter; the connection, the news, the update is important and feeds into the swirling existence of 'talk' about each other.

Where this talk takes place is important. There is a clear demarcation between public and private space. Entering a house is ritualised: shoes—and for women, layers of clothes—come off immediately[1]. This signifies a change of pace, tempo, levels of intimacy. Space is highly contested and highly gendered: women do not walk in public streets alone at night, they walk accompanied by men. If they move alone, it causes comment and criticism because at night the absence of light brings with it different rules and different permissions (Archamboult 2012). Some women drive, but a women alone in a car is extremely rare. The one woman who is often seen driving her own car is the Land Minister's wife. When asked about this, she dismissed the question, saying it was "The most convenient way to get about". No women drive public transport, on Zanzibar, ever. One female policewoman (apparently, I have never seen her) drives a motorbike in the North of the island. In

contrast to other Swahili areas (in mainland Tanzania), women do not ride bicycles, drive taxis, or drive motorbikes. Zanzibar women do not shop in the public markets unless in groups, later in the evening after prayer. Women sit on the *barazzas* (steps/porches) of their own houses; groups of women do not stand outside on the pavement talking.

Clear demarcations between public and private spheres are often seen. For example curtains shrouding doorways, and shutters and curtains across windows. Public spheres, such as they are, exist in very prescribed places—the outdoor meeting place in the capital, Jaws Corner, is a small square reminiscent of the 18th century coffee houses of Europe, where vendors sell coffee from flasks at small outdoor stalls. Jaws Corner is a four-way intersection of streets in a mixed residential souk area. It is a male space: in two years of going there only one woman was present—an elderly lady selling sweetmeats. Otherwise, with the television hooked up to a local house and perched outside on a ledge, there are throngs of men, boys and elders all chatting, taking coffee and talking at dusk. Jaws Corner is cited as a tourist attraction in guide books, a place where tourists can hear people discussing politics and see opposition posters in public view; in fact during pre-election violence in 2005 it was the site of several police raids and a known stronghold for the opposition party, the CUF.

Not only are women absent from this environment, they are actively discouraged from contributing to the public sphere. Mm Hd, a foreign university educated senior journalist who reported for the German News Service, *Deutsche Welle*, said:

> *When I got my job as a reporter there was a lot of noise, a lot of resentment, fuss. 'Who is this woman brandishing a microphone, commenting on our affairs? Who does she think she is?' On the one hand my family was proud that I had such a high status prestige job, on the other, there was an overall contempt for me from my community. It didn't matter to me, I had studied in Germany and I knew what I was capable of: also, my sister had a position in government as a minister, and overall the family were very supportive.*

The central tenet of the conventional public sphere argument offered by Habermas (1997) is that in the creation of public spheres there are clear areas and sharp and recognisable divisions between the behaviour and discussions of people in public and in private. Habermas also posits that the public sphere is a place vital for the iteration of democracy, a place where citizens can take a firm grasp of mutual contemporary concerns and shake them up a little. Again in Zanzibar this is not the case: the gatekeeping of information (by the ruling party), the 'public secret' (Taussig 1991) that controversial journalists and activists face intimidation and threats—as explored by the Tanzanian academic Mallinga (2014) and one interviewee called Hj—prevents access to information being equal. In fact one of my informants (Fe) remarked:

> *There's a systematic process of forgetting here. Information is power, and at all levels, people trade information for favours.*

David Weinberger expansively argues that public space is that which one does not require permission to use:

> *Indeed, fundamentally the public world is about permission. While the definition of private space may involve laws and contracts, the operant definition is easy: if it's a private space, you can keep me out. Public spaces are those for which we don't need permission.*
>
> - Weinburger 2004.

This research suggests quite the contrary. Public space in Zanzibar is highly gendered and women need permission to use it. Although the streets and parks of Dar es Salaam and Stone Town are literally public, in practice there are very obvious limits on what people can say, do or wear or how they act in public. These may be public spaces, but in fact tacit permission is being constantly sought and negotiated between groups using this space all the time, and consensus sought for appropriate behaviour. The limits to what is possible in these public spaces are

different from a Global North democratic model: demonstrations, protests or meetings are not possible, ever, whilst shows of public affection and courtship are more flagrant than in a park in Sussex. However there are strict limits to what is done in public: there can be intimate association, but definitely no fondling, kissing or actual touching.

In March 2012 a young girl, Camerina, threw herself from the rooftop of a popular school in the centre of Stone Town. Her suicide was important for several reasons: it was very public, in full daylight, in front of several hundred other children. The suicide was publicised by internet (Facebook, and in a blog written by a resident expat) on a blackboard outside the school, but not in the local papers or local news. It was talked about in the local *barazza*, but the women who commented on the suicide were emphatic about two things only the day after: "This was *mashetani*, (spirit possession) and we are over it, we are recovered"[2] As the blog author wrote:

> *There are those who will say that suicide is a social fact, not news. Desperate people take desperate measures to relieve themselves of the insane pain of the material world. Farmers living with drought. The impoverished living with debt. Widows living without husbands. But, how many individual reports of suicides does it take to sound off the alarm of a growing global trend? If we consider other reasons for wanting to end one's life, it would mean facing the debilitating failure of our days. It would require us to confront a collective responsibility to feel, think, and respond in a way that stimulates our brain waves to produce hope, perceive love. It would mean major conversations on systemic accountability. Legitimate proposals for social change. ……It would mean the extreme halt of intolerable working conditions. A listening revolution.*

The author[3] wrote, comparing the reasons cited in USA, her birthplace, and Zanzibar, her home:

Here in Zanzibar, it's spirit possession. There, it's austerity. Chemical imbalance. Forced marriage. Impossible laws. Patriarchy. Drought. No way out….Sometimes mourned. Sometimes featured on major news programs. Most times, not.

Her piece was published on Facebook, and one of my interviewees (Mt) who is now in Germany, contacted me and said, via private messaging:

It's incredible that this is being written, it seems things really are changing in Zanzibar! I wish I was there. We've shut up and kept these things secret for too long. This is amazing. Sad that this girl is dead, but good that finally this is in the open.

The teenage girl who threw herself off the roof broke many social rules at once: she took her own life (*haram* for Islam), she did it in public, and in doing so she challenged her community and her neighbours to look at why her situation had become so desperate, and what she was grappling with.

Yet only days after the blackboard with the news of her death was put up beside the school where she killed herself, local women were saying "we have recovered. We have recovered." Saving face, publicly, was essential. The girl's suicide was so dramatic because Zanzibar women are low key in public: they do occupy public space, and they are not forbidden to venture outside. However, Zanzibar women laughing, arguing, doing anything loudly in public is a rare occurrence. Women in public life, such as the waitress, the newsreader—specifically working in the media—are unusual. The public sphere is male, whilst the private sphere is female. My research uncovered that whilst there is an absence of women in the public sphere, there exist a few exceptions who occupy both public space and the public sphere. Whilst there are no women judges on Zanzibar, there are five high profile women—the Singer Bi Kidude, the journalist and cultural ambassador Miryiam Hamidi, Amina Karume the president's daughter (and also a hotel owner), Mama Mchame also a hotelier, and Bibi Jinja, a veteran of the revolution now in her eighties. They are able to traverse, bend and negotiate the

‘rules’ of working in public which apply to others. Singer Bi Kidude often improvises, making up sexually explicit and bawdy lyrics hinting at impotence or virility. Her age (she is over one hundred years old), her international validation and recognition serve to bracket her exclusively, making her effectively immune from the strictures that apply to most women.

The women who do perform in the public space in a more quotidian way in Zanziba are Kenyan or from mainland Tanzania. And when they are not, there are special circumstances, which they are keen to impress upon you. The one local Zanzibari woman working in her father’s shop was young, and the decision to employ her was practical: her father had died, her brother was studying, and the family needed to make a living. In the market the absence of women selling produce is a stark contrast to the mainland, where the public market is concertedly a female space.

6.3 Inside the Home: the private sphere

Problematic as this subject is, (Nzegwu 2006) the home is clearly the women’s domain. This is iterated and re-iterated constantly, through social talk, role models, pamphlets and messages from all relatives in the family. Zanzibar informants hint at very clear boundaries between inside space and outside space. This maintenance of the private space is an art form, and goes way beyond keeping the house clean and food on the table. Housekeeping and managing the home is an academic area that deserves more attention, but both extend far beyond just ‘keeping the place clean’. Problems of sanitation, sewage and accessing clean, non-salinized fresh water are all compounded by temperatures that encourage the spread of viruses and infections and the knowledge that the medical system is slow, ineffective, and expensive. Imposing order on the natural chaos—biological and epidemiological of Zanzibar—is a symbolic and actual task. With limited electricity, and fridges being way beyond the means of most people, keeping food fresh, safe and clean is difficult. Food is central to the Zanzibar home, (Rohinger 2005) yet the purchasing and buying of it is something that all women prefer if possible to delegate to the ‘housegirl.’

Where media is consumed, listened to and utilised is important. The house is a private space, and listening to radio, watching TV or texting often goes on in private. This privacy is important, and protected, part of the 'back face' (Goffman 1963) and secrecies (Moore 2013) that underscore living. None of my interviewees had fixed internet access at home, or their own home PC or a dedicated laptop, and at present this is still very uncommon, even with the introduction of mobile plug-in modems, which are available from all the major cell phone companies, because it is unaffordable.

Echoing Gal's work on public sphericles (Gal 2002), where bedrooms become workplaces for home-workers, Zanzibar women maintain and promote parallel discursive areas in their kitchens, in the hair salon and via SMS, my research has shown. The use of SMS is particularly interesting, as Se comments:

> *I can do it where I want, I can flirt, send a message, spend the evening with him, even though we're not together, we are, because of SMS, and without it, the love affair is boring. Before, without mobiles, we had to meet, it was so difficult, now we can communicate through text.*

Thus for many Zanzibaris, letting the world in via the internet is in itself a major event; a pyscho-spatial challenge to the established order of things. The global and the local are both emphasised, thrown into relief. Although few have a static fixed (non-WAP-enabled) internet connection in their own homes, the instant symbolic existence of this level of connection is still relatively new, and offers incredible potential for them. It is too reductionist to argue that the internet is perceived as a threat to the traditional way of life for Zanzibar women—the role it occupies is far more nuanced than this. Unlike newspapers the internet is accessed in an instant (via the mobile phone), and represents a private encounter with modernity. The internet offers not just news or information, but ambivalence, humour, insight, difference, and possible challenges, as well.

Of all my informants, Mm was the most candid about the role media took in her life. Over the course of the research, her time on internet sites increased, the time spent listening to and watching foreign media programmes (particularly Al

Jazeera and the BBC World Service radio in Swahili) also went up. When questioned why, she said she felt a personal connection with some of the things she was listening to or accessing on the internet. Internet sites were particularly helpful for her at a point in her life when she was considering marriage and trying to get a managerial job commensurate with her recently acquired degree. She mentioned sites that gave advice on “the correct way to be a woman, to be a manager”. She started looking at Islamic advice online when she discovered that she found there was a Facebook page that dealt with Islamic behaviour. She began surfing.

I can tell you a secret. Often at night, on my own, I look at the internet via my phone. It is a comfort for me.

I ask her why she doesn’t you look at this stuff in the internet café:

This stuff is very personal indeed, I don’t want people looking at me whilst I check the sites, then they would talk about me, and I would be so embarrassed. I am looking at firstly whether the sites about what is haram or not in relation to being a girlfriend. What is acceptable as a Muslim lady? Am I allowed to kiss, am I allowed to let my boyfriend touch me? I have a question: how do you KNOW if you are a virgin? If the sheets are not bloody on the wedding day, that means I am not a virgin? I look this up.

We discuss the technicalities of being a virgin—how a hymen can break.

This troubles me a great deal, I wanted to look it up on the internet, but I found it difficult and complicated…. What about advice on say getting a job in Zanzibar, or being a manager? If I go to an interview then I want to be prepared, but there are so many sites telling me this and that, I don’t know which ones to listen to…

Perhaps of all the interviews, over the whole fieldwork, this sums up some of the central contradictions that lie at the heart of this work.

There is a hunger and curiosity for new information, concerning her private body, her intimate world (her virginity, her relationship) and her family and community (her marriage). She also wants to make the 'correct' and appropriate (in Zanzibar, Islamic terms) choices in terms of micro and macro-behaviours, yet she's simultaneously aware that she is capable of working in a senior job which, according to previous conversations, is not something her immediate family approves of at all. So she is both modern and traditional, acting with agency to direct the course of her future. She is embodying Mahmood's version of agency (2006).

It is striking that internet sites, accessed late at night via her phone, provide sources of information which are so important to her, so central to her ability to function as a legitimate married woman. That this is the option she feels that is available to her, in contrast to talking to a female relative or getting the information from sex education classes at school, is also pertinent. She is accessing information via her WAP-enabled Blackberry phone, using mobile networks to download information from sites that have content she either cannot, or feels she cannot, access in hard material form in her own community. Nor does she feel it's acceptable for her to ask local friends, or relatives. These are not subjects to be raised face to face, with real people.

Despite the physical proximity of living in Zanzibar, my informants revealed a real desire to share their personal lives and a frustration that they are unable to do so with each other. So whilst there were many personal self-reflexive moments they divulged to me as researcher, they did not feel comfortable talking to each other. This failure to cement cohesive areas of communality and the consequent absence of trust speaks to the tropes of agency that require them to strive towards Islamic piety rather than weaken to their earthly personal whims (Mahmood ibid). Mm highlights the absence of trust for her in her community:

> *This is an intensely jealous society, we don't share our personal lives, not even with our sisters or mothers. We don't talk about what is burning in our heart, we don't, not ever. [I have dealt with jealousy specifically in its own section in this chapter.] If you open your heart, your problem will be*

everywhere. Someone will take the chance to laugh at you and celebrate your problem! Really! At present I have a big problem in my family due to my brother who does not want me to study. He is threatening to make me leave his house. I am talking to you about this. But I would not talk to my mother. It's just not what we do here. She is an elder, she is not concerned with these things. It's hard to explain. But we just don't.

Mm's comments indicate that personal information is currency in Zanzibar: it has value and it can be used to trade, to barter, and to obtain leverage. Revealing personal information to others in Zanzibar society gives them power over you, gives them an advantage. Thus to allude to personal issues and dilemmas via metaphors (Abu-Lughod 1993, 1996, Yuval-Davis 2007, Nurunsky-Laden 2011) or media, or websites or films is a much safer tactic. Indeed for some of my informants it's the only tactic. But examples of different relationships in the media also give people tangible templates to build from. As the quotes show, there is a lack of vocabulary for dealing with emotional problems, particularly in sexual relationships, in work environments or in families.

Clearly the local media (radio, print and TV) is not addressing and catering to the obvious desires of potential audiences. The locally originated media is neither observant of nor reactive to the possibility that it could function as an instrument of individual change and modernity in a traditional society. Nor does it reflect the incredible complexity and agency of young women's lives. For example Oi and Mm in a remonstrative tone say to me:

You think we always wear this buyi-buyi*? No! Not at all. Only outside, because men have uncontrollable desires. Underneath we wear our thongs, inside our houses we look like you! It is only outside we behave like this!*

Given the official statistics of internet usage amongst women (see Chapter Four) the amount that the informants said they used the internet is surprising. Except for the rural farming women, all the women interviewing had WAP-enabled phones and used special deals and promotions to take advantage of using the

internet and get cheaper SMS calls. They use it to get advice on how to combine career with being a good mother or wife, what to do if your husband is violent, unfaithful, and sexual advice. This way of using the internet was an unexpected discovery: it prompted research questions about why women were not talking to each other, given the amount of times informants raised similar problems.

6.4 Southern Agency: Being Muslim, Being Modern, Being Zanzibari

New media, I argue, 'slots in' to women's lives. It is a part of the jigsaw of daily living, not the centre from which all ideas flow. But crucially, media represents modernity, a glimpse into a bigger and more interesting world, a window onto the new (Barlocco 2009, Abu-Lughod 1993, Asad 2009).[4] Sometimes a particular programme prompts a major life change—as in the case with S's career and her marriage. Younger women and older women embrace media, engage with discussions it provokes, and use it pragmatically to test ideas used in dramas or films against their own situations. Younger informants live precarious lives struggling with changing practices around power, relationships with elders and the role of a state that is transient and dynamic. There are constant reinventions of agency and of narratives around agency. The media, as a vehicle for modernity, plays a role. Not a central role necessarily, but a role nonetheless. There are many ways and various media they access; primarily websites and SMS texts.

The informants exercise agency, imagination and control as they negotiate discussions around change, love affairs, salaries, money, consumerism, wealth distribution, political democracy, piety and the politics of the everyday (referencing Mahmood 2006). But, as they keep stressing to me, they must always be 'good Zanzibari girls'.

This virtuous self (Janson 2007) is part of a reflexive project of self-control and discipline that Mahmood (ibid) argues has been integral to Buddhist, Judaic and Islamic practices for millennia. It entails maintenance of personal control and self-restraint; *heshima taribu* is a key part of the performance of womanhood. Public performances of being balanced, calm and in control of one's emotions and actions are ideal character traits for Zanzibar men and women, young and old.

It is acknowledged that being calm needs constant work and becomes easier with growing age and piety: people make jokes about 'being hot and young' (*khali na vijana*) or 'overflowingly-young' (*vijana kabisa*) eating too much ginger, or octopus or nutmeg (for women) which overly excites the senses and sexual appetites. Sexual boasting and womanising is tolerated among young men, particularly in *bongo fleva* songs (Eisenberg 2012, Stroeken 2005). Girls and young women are closely monitored and scolded for being gregarious, and are glaring in their absences from street corners (*masikaani*, *kona*), *dukana chai* (tea stalls), games of *bao* and dominos, and 'camps' where the elders, young men and teenagers sit publicly in age-defined groups. Shyness and respect make for *tabia nzuri*, 'good character', and are highly desired in terms of marriageability. In this respect, though Butler (1990, 2007) writes about modern industrialised societies, her approach to manifestations of identity being evidenced in relational dynamics is true: Zanzibaris bring their identities into being by interacting with each other; it is the social performances of being Zanzibari that make them real.

New forms of modernities actively targeting middle class women (Mankekar 1993, 1999) and promoted by the media are slowly penetrating Zanzibar, and modifying the lifestyle of many of the relatively well-off inhabitants. Those who have a direct contact with its practical embodiment are particularly affected. There are many ways this is manifest: copying the working and shopping practices of tourists in Zanzibar, visiting Dar es Salaam or travelling to Oman, where affluent women from Zanzibar with family connections go for the latest fashions. At a broader level, everyone is affected by the absences, failures and violence of the state as detailed in previous chapters, and privatised economies (drugs) that are equally emblems of modernity.

These multiple modernities in turn prompt new forms of agency, some actively feminized. (Barlocco 2009). Ideas, material objects, gizmos and gadgets play into a narrative which already resonates deeply with the proper way to be Zanzibari: managing the house and cooking, household products, raising the children, beauty and ways to use leisure time.

Thus paradoxical processes of nomination, identification, being 'seen' and longing are all at play (Althusser 1970). The 'project' of being Zanzibari is further

complicated by a need to affirm that certain activities (such as wearing skinny jeans or performing oral sex) are indeed halal. This information is easily accessed via the web, ISP addresses are swapped and tips exchanged, suggesting that the local imam, until recently the key sources of Islamic interpretation, are now being usurped. Informants iterated the need to affirm their position in relation to these issues in a process of either accepting them, or othering them as foreign, halal, and to be avoided. As Mm comments:

> *For us girls right now this is a terrible time, the young boys are looking at pornography in the internet cafes, I would say 90% of those boys you see in the cafes right now are accessing porn. They are like crazy dogs, for so long they've been forbidden to look at porn, and they couldn't get it anyway. Now it's so easy and then we know they are looking at us, or want us to do certain things, and we don't know what to do, or we don't want to do it. I wouldn't say girls look at porn particularly, no, not really. It's the boys. But you can't ask your parents or the Imam if this and that is acceptable in our religion, that just is not our culture.*

Against a backdrop of job-seeking, making ends meet, whether or not to be sexually active, how to avoid pregnancy or being branded a angel/whore (Tamale 2012), are some bigger concerns for some of my informants—working out who they are and what they can achieve. When Mm, at the end of my research, finally gets satellite TV (and a job, after being a student) she is delighted:

> *You see, I am like you now, I have education, money, a nice house and television!*

Zanzibar is in a state of profound transition, and the repeated encounters with various manifestations of the outside world and versions of forms of capitalist modernity allow for polyvalent identities and juggling of competing agencies. The encounter with the modern world is continuing apace and there is an adept

recognition that with modernity comes the ability to be several things at once. Mt is deliberately vague about who she is, in order to protect herself:

For a start I am the only girl on my course, which is IT, and it's all men, and some days I wear the buyi-buyi*, and some days I don't. Maybe I wear it with jeans. Maybe not, and I never ever tell them if I am dating or single. They would love to know, they always ask. The course is hard work, the last thing I want is for all these guys just to see me as a possible girlfriend, so far I've come top of the class, because I want to prove something, to myself, and to them, and I intend to keep it that way! I stay off Facebook because I don't want my class mates knowing too much about me or what I get up to. It's important that I just do well, and get the scholarship, that's it. If they decided I was a* malaya *(prostitute) then that would be it. Over, really, it would be the end for me. So that won't happen.*

I ask her how she knows this.

I don't invite men or boys home, and my mum and dad are very supportive, they support me when I need to work, and make sure there's no-one gossiping about me. And I keep to myself. That's the main thing. I deliberately don't socialise, I really avoid going out with Zanzibaris, otherwise my whole life would be 'who is saying what', and 'what did they think of this and that'. It gets boring. I made an exception for you!

Younger women are edging towards wanting to make different decisions, to affirm their agency in all areas of their lives, including marriage and boyfriends. Back in the salon, the conversation continues. Hatoumi is about to emigrate:

I'm leaving for the UK; when I go, I told my husband (he is Kenyan) that I want changes. We're going to live differently in the UK. I am going to live like an English woman! HE suggested I don't wear the buyi-buyi *when we go to England. I'm really pleased. I've seen from Hindi movies that you have*

a big population of Muslims in the UK, so I know we'll fit in, and I know it will be different, and I'm really so excited! Do the Muslims wear buyi-buyi *in your country? Are they forced to, or do they choose?*

6.5 North South conversations, agency, selfhood and tradition

The growing interiority and self-reflexivity that some media prompts is akin to the processes described by Wouters (ref 2004, 2009) and Comaroff (2009) where the stratification and acknowledgement of personal manners and behaviours assumes prominence for markers into modernity. However as Mahmood is keen to remind us, (2006) Northern, rational, post-industrial Europe does not have the monopoly on self-reflexivity and dialogic growth. Her (contested within Islamic scholarly critique) version of agency starts from an assimiliationist position, that is to say there is no separation in Islamic life between the being of pious agency, and the Koranic interpretations of it. The centrality of religion, the absence of choice of whether to be Muslim or not (Mahmood 2009) is fundamental to the informants in this work, just as their right to debate and rework Islam as a lived, reflexive, integrated practice is too. As Skeggs (writing about Northern English working class women 2004) Nyanzi (2013) and Tamale (2012) detail in their discussions of African sexualities, the codification of respectable behaviours is intrinsically linked to notions of class and purity. Shame and shameful behaviour are now societal markers and indicators of 'how modern' young women are. The younger informants wrestle with internal and external conversations about themselves, who they are, what is Islamic and what is not.

Sa is a young woman who moved from Europe to Zanzibar. With one Zanzibar parent and one Italian, she is poised between the two cultures. In many ways she exemplifies (or amplifies) the pulls in different directions that other younger women on Zanzibar experience. She is firmly caught between Western notions of individuality, Western notions of friendship and networks, and the traditional authority structures of Zanzibar that in her case demand she behave in certain ways and limit, moderate and restrict her activities. What is interesting and illuminating about Sa is the level of self-reflexivity, articulation and agency she brings to her understanding of the present situation. Similarly, because she arrived

in Zanzibar aged twelve she has had to learn what is expected and appropriate for her. The project of being Zanzibari has been foisted upon her. Even more interesting is

the way the community has taken it upon itself to inform her of the 'correct way to be', as her mother, who is Italian, is very lenient, and possibly not very well-informed about the nuances of Zanzibar life for teenage girls.

Sa's body, the decision to cover up, how to dress, who she talks to and how she talks to them has all been a site of contestation and comment from the community. She is failing in a key part of her agency according to Mahmood's (ibid) definition- acknowledging that her subjectivity is mutually constituted by community, and not just herself. Her behaviour in public, her conduct in relation to members of the opposite sex, how she spends her leisure time and her use of media all are manifestations of her assimilation of Islam, and her acceptance of being Zanzibari. By contesting these, she is crossing boundaries that are not communally acceptable. As a teenager she is concerned about her appearance anyway. But at sixteen she is also at the cusp of adulthood, a poignant time for Zanzibar women when the strictures of adulthood come into play. As a child, reputation is almost meaningless. As a sexualised, educated young adult, she is having to negotiate and learn the rules. However, as a child brought up in Europe (and not a practicing Muslim prior to her arrival in Zanzibar) she struggles with interpreting and choosing which routes to take.

You can see I wear a headscarf, it's not buyi buyi*, but I am making an effort, just because it was so difficult when I had my hair loose. But they see my Italian clothes, my Blackberry, how I talk with the boys when I say 'Hi' and I am friendly, and it is difficult. I will leave, go to University in Italy"*

I ask her who "they" are:

Everyone, people around me, at school, people in this bar now. I am lucky I have my mum—who is Italian, my father is Zanzibari—she understands,

and she tells me to just ignore the girls here. But I would like some friends. I have no friends.

As long as one is in public there are strict rules to be obeyed. Mm and Oi recount a time at the beginning of university, when one of their fellow students mysteriously stopped turning up for classes. They have actually told me the story before in a shorter version, but this time there is a different emphasis:

Oi: *This girl she was there, in class, coming like normal, and then one day she just wasn't. We didn't really pay much attention, then a neighbour said, oh, you know she is pregnant!*

Mm: *It was shocking to me. She didn't know she was pregnant! Imagine, she didn't know how she was pregnant, or that she was carrying a baby, and everyone was saying, she is oh so stupid. But then I began to think about it, what if it was me? That could happen to me! We were all saying bad things about her, but she didn't know what had happened, she didn't agree to become pregnant. And suddenly her life is over, she has no future, no education, I don't know if she married this boy, or if anything happened to him. But it was her that got the bad discussions, her that got the pain, and her life is over now, completely over, it makes me sad.*

The young woman's pregnancy elicits a number of responses: fear, alarm, shock, mild reproval, but also an acknowledgement that sex, or lust, is a powerful force, and it's easy to lose control.

As Oi explains, the covering up of women—which is such a central part of whether you are viewed respectfully or not—is part of the natural order of things. Men are lustful and attracted to women, so women must protect themselves.

Oi: *The role of Muslim girl, well. Well we have to cover up, we have to wear the hijab, we need to cover because the men are attracted to us when they see us, they cannot control themselves, it is natural for us, our habit, the*

men in Britain are not like ours, if you walk with your clothes like you, you will get raped. If I dress like you [they are all in full burkah] then the men know you are maybe a prostitute, why is she a prostitute they will say.

We discuss why this happens.

Oi: *It is not men's desire, it is what God wants from us. The Koran has no wrong, make no mistake never, everything is clear in Koran, which is why we follow it, it is right! Those Egyptian, Iran, they are not real Muslim, not complete Muslim, if you want to be different people will gossip about you, they will think you are maybe crazy. As a Muslim woman you need to do what is God [wants]. You want to be a complete Muslim, this is principle, you should cover your body. If not, something will happen to you, you must not take a risk. Yes, it is a moral issue, and issue of religion, of principle.*

I tell them I think there is nothing in the Koran that says you should cover, except for your breasts:

Oi: *No, you are wrong, the Koran says it is immoral to uncover. The Koran, that is our religion, we know about it. If you say that they do 'this this' in Iran, that is different. In Iran they do the minimum, we won't change our mind, it is already done, we won't change our minds. Different religions, they have different ways; we know you are not sleeping with everyone, you are not different from us, but in our religion, but you wear like you, I wear like me, we cannot comment on each other, we each have different religions. Because of that there is no problem.*

In her own way, Oi is making it clear to me that I neither have the right to pass judgement on her situation, nor do I really understand it. She believes my interpretation of Islam is wrong, flawed, however it is perfectly acceptable that I should contest her interpretation, since this dialogic debate lies at the heart of her lived and embodied faith. (Mahmood 2009)

In a later series of interviews, a group of newly trained female journalists bought up the same issues. Again the Koran is highly vocal about the issue of women's sexuality. To not cover up, to express too much personal desire (Mankekar 2012) is to risk being called a whore (Parkin 2004, Nyanzi 2014, Tamale 2012) and thus risk the venom of all of society's fear of prostitution.

> Ge [who is from Arusha but living in Zanzibar]: *In Muslim society women are not allowed to go out, it's very difficult. Their religion the women have to stay inside, not working outside: the whole thing is reinforced since the revolution. You never see the women, they are always inside. And even if they want to work they are forbidden, some uncle will say NO stay inside. Anyway they have a lot of house chores to do too.*

> Aa: *Also they are uneducated, these women and these men who don't like women working. Even if you look at the women working in hotels, they are often foreign; for us Zanzibar women it really is a problem having a public life. To work in public is a problem. They are not going to say to you directly, but they think it.*

I ask her who 'they' are.

> Aa: *Everyone, even the children, they will ask you for money, they can tell you 'how much money do you want, how much do I pay to sleep with you', even child! You'll be very surprised. We want to change, the world has changed. We are like a global village. We have the system of science and technology, we need to make them ….everyone! Parents, friends… but you know, Imams, understand what we are actually doing as journalists. Because you know, our ancestors did not use technology, computer, we have cell phone, radio, they didn't have it. It's very different now, we need them to know how we are in the world. Yes, we are slow here, just like how they feel being a journalist is a prostitute, we need to change that. It's the culture here, that's all, that views us like this.*

Younger women are particularly vulnerable to having no voice or status in society. This sentiment was echoed again and often in the context of being Muslim, being Zanzibari. Aza is a journalist on the local private radio station in Zanzibar:

> *For the position of younger women? No we are not angry, we are passive, no no, not at all, it's our culture, our Zanzibar culture, we are very polite, anger is rude, it's wrong! It is not correct to argue in public, to challenge, that is not the right way to do it. If someone who is your senior, your boss, says something and you know it is faulty, there is nothing you can do. You must accept it.*

La disagrees, and considers the low status conferred on her by her youth a real problem:

> *For two years I had this boss, at the radio station [she was an announcer at Radio East Africa] a really terrible man. I would come home and say to my dad, he said this and this, and then he made me do this and this. I can't think of examples, but you know even really obvious things like the day of South African liberation, he'd get wrong. My dad laughed. He said 'you are so lucky to have a job, don't even start to become challenging'. I was disappointed; I hoped my dad would support me. But I did start to challenge. I couldn't stop myself, this boss spoke such* taka taka *[rubbish] plus he was so nasty to me. So I left in the end. My new boss is lovely though. She's a woman, she likes my opinions, and I am happy!*

Caught between the expectations of a (prominent and highly sought after job) as a radio DJ, and the constraints of a society that values maleness and seniority, there are no obvious forums for La to express her agency or work through her dilemmas.

6.6 Marrying the Personal and the Problematic

Discussions around marriage and sexual relationships reveal the most pertinent, contradictory and academically rich material. Wary of imposing European secular choice as the normative baseline (Butler 2009, Asad 2009, Mahmood 2009) it is here that the personal and the communal collide, and the religious and 'modern' are sometimes at odds: the younger women are in a vibrant dynamic lived contestation of their faiths so the challenge for them is to rework secular modern ideas into mutually acceptable iterations that embody Islamic living (Mahmood 2006, 2009). They live in families, communities and groups that expect to have an opinion on who they will marry. The issue of marriage is an economic and spiritual one: the 'wrong' marriage, or no marriage at all, is for some more conservative members of some of their families a real disaster. Yet all the younger women I interviewed, from the most religiously observant and conservative to the most well-travelled and secular, have rich internal romantic lives. They are not necessarily romantically involved, but through a diet of pirated DVD films, or flirting SMS messages to their dates, or from romantic films from Bollywood, the Phillipines, Tanzania or Dubai, they are very clear they want to experience 'love', and express erotic yearning via metaphors and hankering after particular indefined concepts such as 'love' or 'stability'. As Mankekar observes, "Media texts [are] embedded in the subjectivities, imaginaries, and fantasies of my informants… they inhabited the texts with which they engaged in profound and intimate ways" (404: 2004).

There is rich material here to explore ideations of romance and love for these younger Muslim women specifically, in further work. This research suggests that "the influence of television (has a role) in the development of new subjectivities" (Barlocco 2009), in line with Mankekar's argument that media consumption is "a contested space in which subjectivities are constituted" (1993: 471). There are strong parallels too with Abu-Lughod's work, where informants allow new worlds into theirs, creating possibilities for new ideas, new scripts and new ways of viewing their realities (1992, 1993, 1996).

The reproduction of the discourse, content and rhetoric women use in daily life may be non-existent in the media, and it may appear to be 'just gossip'.

However, this talk is actually central to the political process, and by not acknowledging this, the locally generated media misses out on commercial opportunities, while women are creating alternative forums for their discussions. These forums are their own homes, their hair salons and their bedrooms.

Marriage is never a subject I need to raise. It is alluded to in most interviews and group discussions. I have tried to show a range of ideas and discourses that populate the marriage trope. Mm and Ta, for example, reflect a common view that to marry a foreigner—to therefore 'expand' Zanzibar culture, rather than dilute it—is a good thing. Says Ta:

> *I will definitely marry an* mzungu*. From what I see on the films, I know that I will be treated better by an* mzungu *[foreign, white] man. I would like him to be Muslim, it is best if he is Muslim, but then I can show him Zanzibar styles. He will love them! He will love me. I do not trust the Swahili, I know my life is better with a* mzungu*!*

And Mm has this to offer:

> *Is it true that it is easy to get a divorce if you are an* mzungu*? Also that you do not beat your women? Is this true? Why do you think that many Zanzibar women would like to marry an* mzungu*? Are they better to you? I believe from what you say that* mzungu *are more trustworthy, they want you to get ahead, that they are not so jealous as the Zanzibar, but then I see Oprah Winfrey, hear all these people talking about what, and I am confused. What do you think?*

So far none of these women have dated an *mzungu* man, and their experiences are gleaned from what they see around them in the streets of Zanzibar from the resident expat population, the tourists, and of course the media to which they refer. For these three there's a sense of excitement about differences, and a keen desire to know more. Unlike the women quoted in Haram's (2004) or Tamale (2012) or Nyanzi's (2014) work there are no overtly transactional sexual

relationships amongst my informants (or none they tell me about) partly perhaps because the opportunities for the worlds of the *mzungu* tourist and the Zanzibar young women, are very few: only a handful of the women speak conversational English, and none of them go to bars or clubs where the possibilities for meeting Westerners exist.[6]

Underneath jokey references to being single and remaining unmarried lurks a serious conversation about financial independence and domestic violence. Reproducing the gossip that was being talked about whilst I was present is not an exact science: conversations were left unfinished, took off at a tangent, or circumvented. However, in the hairdressing salon I overheard many conversations specifically about affairs, marriages and boyfriends. Ra for example is debating with her friend Nr whether to wear the hair accessories from Oman or not for an upcoming marriage. Nr thinks she should 'adopt the modern style' and gestures to the television. Meanwhile, Ma starts an entirely new conversation about whether to get married at all. Turning to me she asks:

> *Why didn't you get married? Did you want to keep your freedom? Is that what is normal in your culture? You don't want to be tied down, right? But you have a job, you have independence, so it's easy for you. In your position I would love to marry an* mzungu *man, I hear they're better, they make better husbands?*

The conversation continues, in a very jolly manner:

> *They don't beat you, that's why they're better, they don't cheat so much, and they're not so jealous. I know this! Yes, I know this! I watch you: I watch you here in Stone Town, wandering around, or on films, and it's obvious that the* mzungu *man is better, plus, he has that essential thing; money!*

The references to violence, including their own domestic violence, are surrounded in humour. The whole tone of these conversations is often

embarrassed, and disguised in laughter. No-one directly admits to experiencing violence, but the subject comes up often. A few months later, Mm and Oi and Ta quiz me for a few hours about marriage and divorce, starting with very general questions “Do you think marriage in your country is a good idea?” They move onto specifics, referencing a local Swahili film that they have all watched:

> *If you marry someone and decide you want to work, what happens? Do you get a divorce? Or will your husband allow it? What about romance: is your marriage always very romantic? What happens if a relative doesn’t like you or is jealous? Does your husband intervene on your side, or on the relative’s side?*

They go on to describe in minute detail the plot of the Swahili film involving betrayal, infidelity, family squabbles, land disputes and the eventual triumph of the young couple at the centre of the film, who stand up for themselves in the face of a family that is determined to undermine their love for each other. Again, superficially this is a conversation about a love story. This is one of the few moments when they directly address the normative emotionality and narrative of the media (Abu-Lughod 2002). What is striking at the time—and later when re-reading the notes and referencing Ahmed (2009) and Mankekar (2004, 2012)—is the emotional intensity and conviction of the speakers. For the three young women they inhabit this film, which for them summed up some very difficult and prescient problems: whether to disobey their elders, to choose men they loved rather than were expected to marry because they were in their communities or to opt for a ‘different’ and perhaps more modern version of marriage. In this version, domestic violence is challenged, financial independence is accepted and the idea of divorce does not leave them in complete desolate isolation.

Critically, and most importantly, this film gives them agency, a voice.

6.7 Morality: The community and moral enforcement—sexuality and shame

The ability to publicly perform iterations of womanhood, or woman-ness (Butler 1997, 2009), is strongly influenced by local iterations and notions of acceptability

and face and located within structured discourses of gender performances. These are self-regulating tropes that are reaffirmed amongst the informants. The women under 24, Mt, Dh, Se, Sa, Oi, Mm and Ta all make comments that centralises the project of being a morally 'good' person and a virtuous self (Janson 2007) who intimately inhabits and assimilates Islam (Mahmood 76:2009). The informants use terms to describe immorality and most of them have some sexual connotations: *uasherati* literally means promiscuity, extramarital sex and indecency; *uhuni* is translated as vagrancy and decadence, while *zinaa* (non-marital sex) and *umalaya* (prostitution) explicitly refer to sexual immorality. As Mm's story about the pregnant school girl illustrates, it is both shaming and sad that this young woman did not have more information. Mm also says:

> *I think the thing is we should have been told how that girl got pregnant, how she ended up in that situation, not left to work it out and feel confused. This could happen to us. We know that sex is happening, from television, but we're not really sure how it happens, and we need more information, so we don't get caught.*

Being perceived as sexually loose or getting pregnant outside marriage are more than just inconveniences for women and young girls, they are a marker that the girl in question is essentially not worthy of citizenship. TAMWA research (Uromi, 2014) indicates that the problem of teen pregnancies is very real in Zanzibar. Thus when Aa asserts that her parents believe that being a journalist is exactly the same as being a prostitute, this is a serious matter. (And echos Tamale's work on the commonplace use of the binary angel/whore in East Africa, 2012). Interestingly journalism—speaking about things in public, creating debate—is completely associated with prostitution, and is therefore utterly morally, socially, culturally wrong.

Aa says:

> *As a female journalist I am regarded as a prostitute. Our parents they think that we will be journalists, they are worried. In Zanzibar we are very*

religious; they don't think it's a good job for their child, they are a bit primitive. What we do as journalists is provide information, we have our profession, we want to help people, we don't want to kill our profession, no, we want to broaden information, to educate. To create debate. ….For me, the talk about us as prostitutes, because it depends: not all of us they have that idea we are prostitutes, that journalists wear clothes that are not allowed. But others of us, we wear clothes that are allowed.

Similarly, the accusation against younger women that they are ruined, or behaving as prostitutes, is not taken lightly. For Sa, who is 16, the whole matter causes her a great deal of anxiety. Sa in the next section, refers repeatedly to 'they' and 'them' and I have to keep asking for clarification. I focus on Sa, because she is the literal embodiment of two cultures: Zanzibari and Italian.

Sa *When I came to Zanzibar from Italy I was really in trouble. There was so much to do in Italy, by the age of 12 I was going out on my own, going to cafes, meeting friends. Not doing anything wrong, you know, my mum is VERY cool, and she knew where I was, who I was with. But there was so much choice! It was fantastic: the pizza parlour, the square, the ice cream shop, someone's house. I was hardly ever home. Now, here in Zanzibar. I've been here a year. Honestly I am not so happy here. ….it's boring, there is one place here, we are in Livingstone's. One place to go in the whole town! And the girls, at first they were friendly, then very quickly they talk about me behind my back, they start talking, they say 'she greets everyone! Have you seen how she greets all the boys?' They think I am sleeping with them just because I am outside, and greeting boys. They are very ignorant, and stupid, and jealous, they are jealous of me. They are jealous because I grew up in Italy, because I have nice clothes, I speak three languages. I don't have any female friends. None. And so it is hard, because some of the boys, now I realise they do want more than friendship, and that is not what I am offering.*

These comments reveal the young women's interiority, and how highly attuned they are to the ways in which they are perceived: the performances of young womanhood, how they engage with others, 'perform' their sexuality (in terms of availability or not) is being keenly watched by other members of their societies (Butler 1997, Columpar 2002).

6.8 Hindi Films and Filipino Soap Operas, South-South Flows

It is important to question the tropes that suggest information flows are from North to South. Hindi films have been a feature of Zanzibar life since the original labour was transported from Gujerat to construct the colonial railways in Kenya in the mid-19th century, and on the mainland and Zanzibar in the 1960s. Hindi films have retained an appeal for Zanzibaris, Indian émigrés and indentured labour alike. As Fair (2009) and Englert (2010) discuss, Bollywood films have a long history in both Zanzibar and Tanzania, and provide templates for making love—both literally and metaphorically. The themes of Colonial rule (and resistance to it after 1947) and the tantalising glimpses of a more glamourous international lifestyle (Bertz 2011) position Zanzibar very much at the centre of an Indian Ocean existence, looking to both Arab countries and India for cultural references (Bertz, Hofmeyr 2011). The films are sometimes dubbed—there is a thriving industry around this (Englert 2010)—and sometimes subtitled into English. The films appeal to all, in sensuous, embodied ways (Mankekar 2012) from subsistence farmers on the island who watch them in video shacks, to the richer elites who watch them at home (because being able to understand English and to afford to buy them are prerequisites). As a result the films are associated with a more international, cosmopolitan (and therefore modern) 'sophisticated' type of lifestyle by those who watch them.

Larkin's work on Asian films in Nigeria (1997) identifies the threads that appeal—the escapism, the magical realist narratives, the complex family feuds—all of which resonate with Zanzibar, where 'Shetani' (spirits) can influence behaviours if not appeased. His work is the springboard for many subsequent studies of Indian films in Africa, including video piracy (Englert 2010) and anti-modernist narratives in film (Garritano 2012).

Ma, now in her forties, and a member of the Zanzibar royal family, grew up watching Hindi films. As a member of the Royal Family she is under the spotlight, and she is acutely self-reflexive about the fact that there is much invested in her having a successful, happy marriage, despite the fact that she is unable to woo in public or find a boyfriend in more 'normal' (for Zanzibar) ways. Although her marriage was not arranged Ma is in many ways more embedded in traditional Zanzibar mores and edicts than some of her less privileged friends. She says:

> *They (Hindi films) were so lovely, I really enjoyed them, real romance, and real love, with lots of wooing, and presents and dancing. They gave me the idea of how I wanted my marriage to be, I knew I had to have respect, and love, and for my love to be* taribu *(proper, discreet, respectful. Actually it worked out well for me, I met him in Cuba, he was studying like me, and we both had the same dream, plus he likes that I am educated. I didn't follow any Western media, none at all, and I felt no pressure to wear Western clothes or follow your ideas. I am totally secure as I am.*

For her, having an illustrated visual example of what 'romance should look and feel like' (Mankekar 2004, 2012) and how to dress and seduce was extremely helpful. There is also clearly an element of needing to combine the ephemeral ideas of how romance works and the reality of a closed, critical society, in which her reputation as an 'unspoiled' woman is paramount. Echoing Fair (2009), Ma wants positive role models to aim for. Ma is disdainful and actively rejecting of the autonomous view of desire and agency, (echoing Mahmood's theorising 2009) and dismissive of European or American originated television or films which are also available via pirated DVDs (or on shopping trips to Europe).

> *Those romance films, you know like* Four Weddings and a Funeral*, or whatever, I have no interest in them. They show people fighting, being selfish about things that aren't relevant to my life. The Hindi films are much more what I admire, what I aim for.*

For other women such as Wa, who works in IT and is studying long distance via internet on the mainland, Indian films are also a good marriage aide.

> *My husband really doesn't like me working—he gets too jealous. But together we watch these films on Zee TV, (A Hindi cable channel originating from the UK) I can't remember what they are called, but I do know who is in them. I do love them a lot! They show happy relationships, people becoming in love, treating each other well, loving each other, and that is why we watch them together, they give us ideas. If we have a problem in our marriage maybe the programme helps us! Really!*

It is not simply that the Indian films are flashier and have more exciting dance routines or that the cast is brown, like them. Hindi films deal with a traditional society—and also champions the charms of skinny jeans and café lattes—and are characterised by kinship obligations, complicated extended families with feuds over land, resources and the protected higher status of parents and grandparents who often are caricatured as being 'old fashioned' and not going with the times. An element of self help creeps into this discussion: these films are being treated as menus of options, from which choices are made.

Dubbed into English, with no Swahili voice overs or sub titles, *Promise,* the weekly Filipino TV soap opera, inspired some of my informants. Intriguingly, none of the women in the salon where the show was on for the period of six months spoke English at all. Yet even without dialogue they could literally interpret, *Promise* provided an outlet for the desire to talk, and to share problems. Informants weaved and inserted their own meanings, their own debates of the media into their lives and created subaltern spheres of discourse in dynamic and inventive ways. The Philippine soap opera that came up in several discussions was enthusiastically lauded as the only TV show that really showed life as it is. Feuds between stepdaughters and stepmothers, endless antagonism around money, love, alcohol and career choices. This warts-and-all show was popular and resonated a great deal.

It shows all the stuff we have to deal with in real detail, as we live it, and afterwards we discuss it because it creates choices and we decide what the characters should do [said Ry]. *It shows us our lives, the complications we face, the problems we have inside the family. These are things we all face, and it's a small society, so imagine, you can hear your neighbours arguing about this stuff, same as you. But the … sometimes you feel you are crazy, you knowing, carrying this weight, life is HARD, hard here! So in a way it's a relief to see the soap opera, they are as crazy as we are….*

Mt, who preferred current affairs to the soap opera endorses this:

Even though my family is quite unusual, and quite liberal (because my father lost a lot of money when I was teenager, so we went from being part of high society, and I was at a good private school in Kenya, to a state school, so I suppose that changed us as a family and brought us together) so we do talk. I definitely can talk to my parents, even about personal stuff, so it's different from [sic] me I think, I know I am not like my friends. But there's this other side to Zanzibar that you tourists don't see. There's a LOT [her emphasis] of family dramas, tensions, a lot of arguments here. The younger people can get very frustrated with the old mzees *[older men] and the old styles. So when it comes to television or films, anything that shows the nitty-gritty of family life, and people fighting, I think we almost welcome it, yes we love it! [Laughs].*

When asked why this happens, she says:

It's hard to say. It is just not in our culture to talk about our problems, we are not used to it, we don't know how to do it really. But for me, when I have seen Oprah Winfrey and her chat show [on Satellite channel MTN, beamed in from South Africa and available on subscription] I really love it! I do, I really love it. It's like we can see that you wageni *[visitors] are the same as us, but you don't feel ashamed to tell everyone your problems, in*

*public, on television. And some of their problems are so big compared to mine, so I feel better. When I first heard about this person killing his wife because she was unfaithful, I was so shocked. I think '*Mzungu *don't do that!' But now I know you do! So we know we are equal to you, that we are the same, even if we wear* buyi buyi*.*

Idi, the taxi driver, had a unique interpretation of *Promise*. He watches it with his wife:

These days I would say I am an Mzee*. I like the stable life, and I am content to see the same patterns in our leaders, in our people. Nothing much changes, it's all blah blah! We are a lazy society, here. We like talking and we like grumbling, and we have everything, so really there is no excuse for those who complain ….. At the end of a day, around 8pm, I go home, and my wife makes some food, and we watch the television together. I do enjoy this soap opera, although I am sure it is for the ladies really and not an* mzee *like me. It's clever, it makes me think 'Ah, why did the director do this, why they make the camera do this thing, or this actor say this thing? It makes me see the consequences of dishonesty and lying. If you are always honest you avoid many problems. That is the problem here, Swahili are lazy and don't be honest! It is very dramatic, there is always something going wrong, someone fighting with someone. It makes me think about how you have choices, and they are acting to a script, and then I ask myself 'am I acting to a script? Have I got the choices I think I should have? If I could be the director then what would I make them do?'*

Like Ry, Idi regards the soap opera as a chance to discuss moral problems, behaviour and consequences. The finer points of particular characters do not concern Idi, he observes the over-arching trajectories that the characters take, not as a textual ananlysis, but an *actual* way to behave He continues:

If I look at these characters I am asking myself, is this their destiny? Or have they got control over their lives? That is the one thing I would like you to answer. Is this our destiny, or can we change things here? I have read Shakespeare, your English writer, and I believe we are in control of our destiny. Do you agree?

Idi's comments are illuminating for several reasons. Firstly, unlike many other informants, he sees himself as a character in a play, a production or possibly even a film: the film of life. He has a part to play, a performance to carry out, and he has contingent choices—moral, actual and emotional. Idi is a deeply religious man who prays five times a day, knows his Koran and is observant. So for him the director of this play or film is Allah, but within that, he clearly acknowledges that he has direction, control, agency over the day-to-day route his life takes. He is interested in the bigger picture, the end result, and has a sophisticated take on how he can alter the direction of his life. Idi is unrelentingly positive about the media and uses it systematically and imaginatively as a self-help tool, taking Ndlovu's (2013) work a step further. Otherwise, only those actually involved in the production process recognise the actual achievements of the media in Zanzibar and Tanzania.

Conclusion

Spatiality is important in the theorising of modernities and operational agency: location, origin and a sense of belonging are all relevant, referencing Chaball (2009, Mankekar 2012, Butler 2007). Appropriate behaviours, linked to material spaces in Zanzibar are constantly discussed and reiterated, and the polyvocal media plays a strong role in the acting out, and embodiement of structures of feeling. Women police their own behaviour themselves in social talk and conversations circulating in the informal social world of gossip. Women self-censor, and what they think and feel in 'private' is rich, textured and limited to a small group of people whom they choose to share the information with. Similarly, the importance of Islamic behaviours and community-approved activities and presentations is implicit in the intimate inhabitation of Islam.

It is not just social approval that motivates ideations of agency and self-discipline, the inhabiting of Islam is key to the materiality of life, and thus how one acts, and 'is', is an all consuming project. At some levels the 'private' texting and accessing of problematic content, is the 'back face' (Goffman 1963) that is contained with the agonised problematics of daily living (Mouffe 2005).

Thus mobile phones occupy a key position, because they allow discretion, concealment, disguise and secrecy. As Mahmood (2009) and Asad explore (2009) there is a big difference between thinking un-Islamic deeds, and committing them to paper, or acting on them. So mobile phoens are used often to convey important hints and discussions—although the conversations go on amongst trusted intimates, in private spaces (for example the bedroom late at night) or at the hair salon. Women who wish to participate in public spheres —such as by working as journalists or contributing to blogs or Facebook—often do so knowing they risk vilification or criticism—or the ultimate community condemnation of being branded a prostitute.

Younger women in particular juggle the competing tensions of understanding what is secular and what is not, and wishing to access more information in order to participate in wider public spheres and knowing they must keep their reputations intact in their communities. They are actively and flexibly seeking out new language, models and methods to express themselves.

From international media, women continuously critically observe different geographies, alternative (secular) realties, other modes of being, ways of behaving, and new ways of emotional engagement, whether from 'real' publics like the US electorate, or imagined ones from soap operas. In all cases they insert their own meanings, characterisations and narratives and apply content, tone, affect, emotionality and a moral compass to their own situations. They develop strategies and abilities to merge and co-opt the modern, and outside behaviours are often seen as a good thing. There are high levels of creativity and inventiveness involved in the reworking of strategies of agency, voice and inclusion, which work outside 'conventional' spaces including parliament and media spaces.

Female talk, female agency and female gossip goes on in private, alone, in domestic spaces. Media in this context is used as self-help manual—via particular

internet sites, mobile phones—for advice on behaviour and intellectual and political pursuits.

[1] I had a house with a big patio extending from the lounge. It was interesting watching people assess exactly WHERE the garden stopped and the house began. Where to take the shoes off, then for women the outer shawls, hijab, the burkah. The fact that my researchers sat in my house in a slip (it was very hot) in the second year of research—having arrived in three layers of hejab including a face mask—somehow comforted me, made me feel as if I had achieved something as an anthropologist, been let in on 'the secret'. (Moore 2013).

[2] Quoted in http://blog.contrarymagazine.com/2012/04/suicide-local-suicide-global/, (author Amanda Leigh Lichtenstein, accessed 25th April 2012

[3] Amanda Leigh Lichtenstein, April 2012 (ibid)

[4] Media and belonging to the nation in Sabah, East Malaysia, Dr. Fausto Barlocco 2009

[5] Butler and Spivak, , 2007 IBID

[6] There is a very rich seam of work to be done on the women and men who engage with sexual relationships with *Wazungu* on Zanzibar. By doing this—unless they are in an elite class—they risk effectively being labelled as prostitutes, or beach boys, highly stigmatised terms which effectively allude to living 'beyond' social norms, a sort of self-nominated madness.

Chapter Seven: Findings. “Losing our Dirty Past”

Introduction

The first part of this chapter looks at the fourth finding: modernity, examining it as a polyvalent, polyvocal ecology; a threat, but also something exciting, offering opportunities for change and full of potential. The second part examines discussions and ideas articulated during and after the media coverage of the national American Election (in 2009) and the national Zanzibar election, (in 2010). In the context of Southern public spheres and the new media, we need to consider media both as a self-help manual instrumental to the construction of agency and models for behaviour, and as a ‘conduit’ for modernity. This ethnography suggests that there is a dynamic process involved which at times exacerbates the binaries (of North and South, old and new) and at times undermines them. There is dynamic ambivalence for the informants about what to adopt and what to reject, and the whole process is more of a conversation, a dialectic that questions traditional secular ideations of agency. This process includes discussion around working, behaving and ‘performing politics’ in public, and demands from interviewees that their media is more in step with their interests.

It is too simplistic to argue that by questioning their job prospects, marriage options or democracies the younger informants are straightforwardly rejecting ‘old Zanzibar’ and embracing a casualised, self-centred modern way (Wouters 2009). Instead the context in which they are asked to be modern is critical (Sabry 2009, Asad 2010) and the agency they exercise is different according to contexts (Janson 2007, Mahmood 2006) and reflects the virtuous self (Janson 2007). The virtous self for the Zanzibar women embodies their active embrace of their faith, of being Zanzibari, and of having agency to alter their own behaviours.

In relation to their parents, younger women want more radical, liberal marriages, more expansive working horizons. However when faced with scrutiny from *wazungu*, the same girls will vigorously defend their culture, the *dini* and *tabia nzuri*. Thus ironically what occurs is an internalisation of the more ‘Zanzibari’ parts of self-hood (and an ‘internalisation of their African past’ Garritano 2013: 26, or

self-orientalising Schein 1997) as well as the embrace of the modern. This section reviews why this co-opting of African 'traditions' and re-modernising them (Chabal 2009), and internalisation of orientalism (Schein, ibid) is dynamically reworked to offer agency within multiple modernities which is pragmatically effective in Zanzibar and allows for the manifestation of a female middle class modern identity (Mankekar 2013).

Many younger women use the internet late at night on their phones in private. This important finding shines a spotlight on privacy and concealment, and need to be 'ninja' if one is to operate in the public sphere. Their internet-enabled phones are vehicles for transporting new ideas—particularly of fashion, design ideas, political policies and models, rights-based citizenship, and technology. The informants develop reflexively as intelligent critical consumers of the media (De Certeau 1984) and explore the limits of their existing selfhoods, including the language available to them, in these moments.

The second part of this chapter explores how the American elections in 2009 and the Zanzibar elections in October 2010 gave Zanzibaris excellent opportunities to draw comparisons and to vocally critique their own processes. The ritual publicness (Couldry 2002) of the American election encouraged and inspired informants to be self-reflexive. Similarly, the quantity (and quality) of commentators, the ways policies and personalities were explained to the electorate, the very conspicuous naming and recognition of an electorate all resonated deeply with the informants. The fact that George Bush Jr. stepped down, that the electoral results were legitimate, all had profound effects on the people I listened to. Perhaps most dramatically, it was Barack Obama's Kenyan links, his existence as an East African Black man who really 'spoke' to and for people in Zanzibar. In a wonderful backflip of academic poetry, Barack became Zanzibari. A rumour started that he was potentially from a Zanzibar grandmother, and he was co-opted into the islands' rich ancestry.

But the reactions on the ground in Zanzibar to their own national elections (and the media coverage of them in 2010) were far more muted and restrained. Critiquing the media's representation of their own politics and lifestyles, a range of themes emerged. The media mirrors a version of their lives to people: one which

they often reject, both for the discursive style and for the content. The actual act of stepping back, detaching, reporting, reproducing, is viewed by one informant as intrinsically problematic and liable to cause community condemnation. The origin of the media—whether it is locally produced, from the mainland, or international, is also important to the informants. There is a nuanced understanding that the international producers of media have very different political, global and nationalist agendas from their own.

7.1 Modernity and tradition, a smorgasbord of options

Eighty-seven hotels were built on Zanzibar during the eighteen month period of my fieldwork. During that time Zanzibar played host to a million foreign tourists[1], the airport received a seventeen million dollar cash loan from the Chinese and the number of flights from Europe tripled. Modernity is a reality, made manifest by the number of 'things' available for people to buy. The materiality of this change is evident in new buildings, new cars and new investors. There is certainly a shared culture of appreciation and consumption of certain commodities but I would argue it is localised, fragmented, mostly evident in Stone Town (where the field work took place) and is not necessarily national as Askew (2006) and others suggest. After years of austere socialism and an extremely weak currency, Zanzibar's main markets are literally flooded with certain models of cars, particular brands of soaps or shampoos, mobile phones, various plastic items for cooking and housework and footwear.

As Walker (2004) notes, there is a fear and trepidation amongst Zanzibaris that they are losing their culture and history in the face of tourists, who tend to be much more casual about their attire, discussion and debate and as far as Zanzibaris are concerned. As Lr's comment reveals, discussions of tourism becomes one of many ways for Zanzibaris to explore notions of self-presentation, agency and identity. The media is an agent of change, but not in the literal cause/effect paradigm as presented by classic modernity theorists. Subjects are questioning themselves, their identities, their ways of life, their moralities and the ways they relate to each other. However to do this, they arguably need access to their histories, which is extremely problematic.

History or tradition is iterated, lived and framed through the lens of the present and the future, viewed as a dynamic continuum of ideas and information and incorporated into notions of agency (Mahmood 2006, Asad 2010). The silences around the very violent revolution in 1964 and slavery deserve their own thesis. The space to explore, explain and dissect these problematic discourses is missing in the public sphere, and very often in the private sphere too. I never directly asked any interviewees about Zanzibar's history, or how it is or is not being dealt with in the present. The history of Zanzibar came up obliquely, and unexpectedly, which I will try to detail.

Mm arrived at my house one morning, complaining about the local transport, and how slow and hot it was. Taking off her shoes, and her *buyi-buyi*, she remarked:

> *You know it's funny that now this area is for the rich people. This is funny! This was a bad area before. The land minister lives very near here, and now you see all these* wageni *building: and the army base is just over the road. But it wasn't like this before.*

Pressing her to continue, which she clearly wasn't very comfortable to do, she said:

> *I never saw it myself, but my brother told me that there were bodies everywhere on this beach. Up to ten thousand people killed just on this beach, all the bodies lying around…. It stunk for a long long time, months; people wouldn't live here, or work here, until really recently, they said* Shetani *(devils, spirits) were here, which is why the area is so undeveloped. No-one could live here, it was haunted by bad spirits.*

She was referring to the massacres of many Indian (*Wahindi*) and Arab people during the 1964 revolutions. Later I interviewed other people, including Professor Abdul Shariff, an ex Dar es Salaam University historian now living in Zanzibar. His

work is not social history but an account of the spice trade, the history of boat building and the colonial rulers. Locally produced literature and his own academic work explores the romance of the sea, the technical abilities of the sailors and their navigation techniques, and of royalty such as Princess Salme and other Omani luminaries who lived in beautiful palaces, the ruins of which still remain and are a key feature of Zanzibar's tourist appeal (Shariff 1988, 1991, 2004). The activities of traders (vanilla, cinnamon cloves, sugar) are also described. Unlike Glassman (2012) and Longair's work (2013) Shariff's concentration on dates, events and the almost complete obliteration of any political economy or power, class or ethnicity is striking. The land tenure and voting systems are not described, nor are the bizarre details of Africans being forbidden to wear particular brightly coloured cloth (described in Fair, 2001). In short the exploitation, slavery and institutionalised repression described by other authors (Bang 2011, Kresse 2007, Wilson 2014[2]) and personal interviews (Mutch 2012) is entirely absent. Shariff sidesteps most contemporary authors who concentrate on the mechanics of the Omani invasions, the logistics of slavery, the political ideologies underpinning the 1964 revolutions, and in the case of Maliyamkono (2000) a very long and detailed discussion of the present political feuds and wrangles between the two dominant parties, the CUF and CCM (Wilson 2014).

The conversation with Professor Shariff did not flow smoothly or easily[3]. We tried to discuss why there are no sign boards at these sites, no pamphlets or information boards in the two national museums on Zanzibar referencing either the slave trade or the revolution. In a bizarre, semi-Stalinesque or Orwellian moment, history has been literally rewritten[4]. Eventually he said:

> *Look, I really am not interested in discussing the role of Zanzibar in slavery. It has been deeply and insensitively overblown by* Wazungu *who come here, who seem obsessed with digging up what is for us, a dirty and shameful past. This is not the correct emphasis on historical study, there are still many pains and sufferings in our society about this event. It is not right to be looking at this, nor to concentrate on our revolution. These were difficult times for us and many communities left the island. My community, which is*

part Omani and part Hindu, suffered a great deal. Now is the time to celebrate our unity and to enjoy the harmony we live in.

Hi, a political activist (affiliated to the opposition party CUF), was the second person to mention the lack of education about both the revolution, and the country's three hundred year history in the slave trade. He remarked that to draw attention to slavery would be to point the finger at the Omani and Indian populations—who still live on the island—as collaborators (Wilson 2014, Longair 2013). Certainly in the 1964 bloodshed these visibly wealthier families suffered many deaths. He continued that it had effectively become a taboo subject, or perceived as 'anti-CCM' to discuss it. He concluded:

We all know the CCM did this, committed a lot of violence. Against our people. They stop us discussing this, and it's not taught in schools, it's too dangerous. Honestly. We are not taught Zanzibar history or sex education in our schools. Both are illegal.

Farid Hamid is an auto-didact and historian. For forty years he has been collecting and chronicling ephemera from Zanzibar—quotidian objects that tell stories and have histories woven into them.[5]

He has never left Zanzibar except to go to Tanzania a few times, and says mockingly:

I am pure Zanzibari! A little bit Indian, a little bit Bantu, a little bit Omani, a bit Arab, probably a bit German, and probably Persian too! Pure Zanzibari!

Farid's perspective on the failure of the educational system, the media and the 'history business' to excavate the more problematic elements of their past was pragmatic:

We rely on tourism, we rely on people coming here and appreciating that we are literally the first multi-cultural country, we got there long before the

USA or Europe. We have to promote harmony, to look at the positive, and not concentrate on what happened bad in the past, what is the use of that? People don't come on holiday to be miserable!

7.2 <u>Battling with Modernity. Threats to The Zanzibar way of Life: Clothing, drugs and Prostitution</u>

I have previously explored how the absences of media coverage of events on Zanzibar instills and encourages jealousy and distrust. The conspicuous 'othering' and exoticism of Zanzibar (Gingrich 2004, Baumann 2000, Rigg 2007), at least for foreigners, is mentioned by some informants, although much of the emphasis on the escapist, fantasy elements of life there is generated for the outsider's (tourist industry) gaze (Honey 2012, Jacobs 2010). The aesthetic and conceptual paradox between the ways Zanzibar is experienced by those who visit the island as tourists and those who live there, is too bold and obvious to ignore[6]. The growing number of petty thefts and personal assaults on tourists (anecdotally and broadcast via the *wanawake* email noticeboard) and the prevalence of heroin on the island have not escaped the notice of my informants. Mm says:

Everything is changing here in Zanzibar. Development. Imitations, Politics maybe. Somehow, some of it we like. Development, like democracy. We like. Sex. That is changing. Maybe in dressing we are changing, the sex of girls and boys; girls are behaving as if they are not in Zanzibar. Gender, this is becoming more divided. As people imitate more.

When I asked her to clarify, she added:

I mean when we see on television on satellite, the girls behaving like men, they are imitating, like they are strong, they get good jobs, they stick up for themselves!

As Ferguson notes (1992) mimicry is an uncomfortable term. It hints at power relationships in which the subject (Mm) envies, desires and covets the superior

options offered by the Global North (Sreberny 2002). The prescient word in this statement is ‘imitating’: in Mm’s view it is possible literally to copy what she sees from tourists and from the media, so the desire to adapt is already in place; what is lacking is practical applications. This suggests also that there is a large amount of re-visioning and reflexivity in relation to their personal behaviours, including performances and performativity (Butler 1997) of gender which are constituted by, and reinforce, structures of cultural meaning~~s~~. There is also an interesting spatial relationship between the ‘outside’ and the inside: the modern and the new—despite being external—is very close, and can be reached out and grabbed. Mm is also aware that there are superficial changes, such as in dress codes, but they are linked to deeper changes in gender roles, sex, work and ‘development’. Her linkages are fascinating to me: this woman has not studied economics, yet in her mind there is a sophisticated and considered intersectional thinking at work: her structural, economic, personal and behavioural traits are all linked, and again what is pertinent is her link with place and behaviour: “They behave as if they are not in Zanzibar”.

Her friend Oi endorses her opinions:

> *We are changing very quickly, but I prefer this change. I like the way we are developing, for example, there is more than a lot of building public building, harbour, airport. They are building. Every day we increase our chances for people coming here, for development.*

Oi expresses eagerness about tourists and outsiders visiting Zanzibar, but she’s very ambivalent about the culture they carry with them. Simply by being there they advertise public affection, open sex before marriage~~,~~ and drugs. One of the stories that circulates on Zanzibar is that the prevalence of drugs on the island (crack, heroin) can be directly attributable to the arrival of the Italian hotels and the Mafia. It is an idea that the media also endorses.[7]

Oi is particularly keen to explain her views on the state of moral decay in Zanzibar society:

For the social side, it's not so good, we are imitating bad things. Our age [group] imitate something which leads to evil. Drug abuse and prostitution. People who live along the coast they are SO good at imitating. It is our strength but in terms of the negative things, it's politics.

Again Oi identifies imitation (Fanon 1953, Moore 2013) as the vector of description: the flexibility and ability to adapt and imitate that is so central to Zanzibar culture. But for her it is also a negative attribute, and she is keen to stress the essentialist nature of Zanzibar culture. Later Oi tells me about a website that she likes, and refers to often: Mission Islam.com, which gives advice and direction for Muslims. I quote a small section of the site.

Unfortunately, today's western society, the religious, moral and ethical values have been declining. The society is plagued with moral decay. Families are disintegrated, [sic] divorce rate and number of unwed mothers have increased sharply. Drug abuse and excessive sexual indulgence are predominant in adolescents and young adults. These events lead to conflict, loneliness, guilt, loss of self-esteem which result in manifestation of a variety of pathological disorders. Many young persons are confused about self-identity, lose meaning in life and often turns toward pseudo religious cults, drugs or suicide.[8]

In the context of Zanzibar Oi adopts the language of the website: that the disintegration of Western society can be attributed to undisciplined sexual activity and drug use, activities that are resonant for Zanzibaris. However, prostitution in Zanzibar is not new, neither is it a taboo subject. Ma jokes about it:

Only the ninja wear buyi buyi*, so they can sneak around and visit their lovers!*

She is referring to the slang name for prostitutes—Zanzibar girls who have 'fallen' and now offer sex for money are referred to as Ninjas because they cover their faces so that only their eyes are showing, like the Ninja cartoon characters. On

the other side of the scale are the visible prostitutes, women like Sally who work Livingstone's Bar (for expatriate clientele) and the Starehe Bar (for Zanzibaris) sitting at the bar in tight hot pants, small halter tops or skinny vests. Their bodies are on show, they advertise what's available and the contradictions of Zanzibar are evident: as in Uganda (Tamale 2012) it is a terrible slight for a young girl to be called a *malaya* (whore) but working girls are seen openly on a daily basis in the bars, and are part of the fabric, the scenery.

As well as drugs and prostitution, new styles and fashions are arriving in Zanzibar. This is not a new phenomenon. Both Bibi Ja and Mm (in their seventies) reflect that fashion in the forties and fifties in Zanzibar was of great importance. A well cut suit or a tailored dress amongst the dust, humidity and heat of Zanazibar life indicated refined living and high status.

7.3 Reaching Out. The Ripples of the Arab Spring

The violence that occurred in Tunisia, Egypt, Iraq and Algeria in early 2011 occurred after my fieldwork had finished, but there were rumblings of dissent in Egypt towards the end of the fieldwork time. In early 2011 Zanzibaris became caught up in the excitement. The links to the Middle East—particularly Oman and Dubai—are strong for historical and contemporary reasons: many Zanzibaris have families in these regions and regularly travel to Dubai for shopping. Zanzibar is both African and Arabian: influences in the food, architecture, music and dance draw from both places. The prevalence of Arabic spoken in the Madrassas, and the actual travel that takes place. In January 2011, in Stone Town, Dh also said of the Egyptian protests:

> *The point is change; that corrupt leaders must go, resign, we don't want leaders sitting in office for twenty, thirty forty years. This is democracy, and we Zanzibaris are waking up to that! We're connected to the modern word! It's exciting.*

Fa, twenty-one, works in a small shop in the centre of Stone Town selling makeup. Mid purchase she leans across to me and says, out of the blue:

Have you been watching what is happening in Egypt?

I say yes, and ask her why she asked me. She plunges straight in—in English:

I woke up last night, after I had watched the news on Al Jazheera, and I thought, I want to go and join them in Egypt! I want to support them! Not because I am a Muslim, it's not that, it's NOT a Muslim thing, it's a human rights thing! It's just obvious, no one wants a leader for thirty years. I mean even Bush didn't rule for thirty years did he? The whole point is, I thought to myself, why is it I want to have this for Egypt, and not for my own country?

Her conversation reveals a new sense of urgency and fearlessness that becomes more apparent in the interviews: for a young woman to start a conversation of this nature with an unknown foreigner *in public* is unheard of in my experience. I quietly wonder whether 'my reputation' (referenced in the methodology section) is actually beginning to work in my favour. We continue, talking about whether she should start a discussion group here in Zanzibar:

You do think there would be other people interested in these things? Really, I thought it would just be you and me! Where are they? Are they young women like me, who are Muslim? Really? How do I find them....? That's a good idea, I did think of a Facebook group…. But I don't want to be challenging about Islam per se, I want to discuss human rights…so you are saying your British government with allow a Muslim to marry a non-Muslim? Where does you get this idea from? Well that's wrong, that's not what the Koran says…

We talk about whether Islam is flexible around the world, that there's not just one version of it, which is why it's so resilient and dynamic and popular. She begins to question her position:

Actually, what you are saying is very Islamic. You are saying we shouldn't get caught up in defining god, or the Koran, but remain higher, and see the true spirit, and I think that's what I was trying to say about Egypt, it's not about having solidarity with other Muslims, or defining the right Muslim way, it's about promoting a form of humanity and human rights, and that, I believe actually IS in the Koran, but we get caught up with the small stuff like wearing buyi-buyi *or whether the man I love is Muslim or not. I would like to instruct you in Islam, because I can see basically you have a very deep and profound understanding, and really are a Muslim in your heart…*

This exchange is poignant and stands out partly because it came unexpectedly: I had not had any previous contact with Fa and was struck by the boldness and intensity of her conversation: the desperation behind her dialogue, the need to express what had been keeping her awake at night, the sense of isolation I gathered from her opinions. And most pertinently, the fact that our conversations went on in public: she was in her shop, I was leaning on the counter. As we talked we were joined by her brother and another friend, and in between discussing the logistics of trying to hook up a second hand modem in order to have constant access to the internet, Fa was determined not to have the conversation sidetracked. Several times her brother interrupted with statements which tried to shut her down such as "We can't question the Koran" or "What is happening in Egypt can never happen here".

Fa is doggedly undeterred: we exchange email addresses and the conversation ends jokily, with her admonishing her younger brother for trying to tell her what to think. Fa's questions suggest that despite Zanzibari insistence that the madrassa is a place where Islam is discussed, it does not address the full complexity or internpretation of Islam. (These are, admittedly, big assumptions—that Fa's need to discuss tolerance and co-existence with other religions hints at her need to draw the outside world into her spiritual way, to make connections).

Fa engages with Islam as an assimilated practice of virtues to live by and aspire to (Mahmood 2006, Janson 2007) and a lens through which to observe wider issues, but poignantly the madrassas in Zanzibar do not seem to be tolerant of

broader debate, and follow rote learning models with rigid definitions of what is Islamic and what is excluded. The tradition of debate is not questioned. Says Oi:

> *Materialism is non-Muslim, that's what it means. I went to madrassa for two to three hours a day until I started university. I teach at madrassa as well. When I am a teacher I only do it for teaching, but I am student as well in university. I teach them the alphabet, there is no discussion, no never, we do* hadids*, and Koran, we only read, no discussion. Yes, we love it. We learn about God and the prophets. In university we do discuss, in Madrassa we don't. For madrassa is already the reality, there is nothing to discuss. In school we do discuss, not the Koran [laughs]. No, not the Koran, we believe it already, there is nothing to discuss.*

7.4 Challenging the West

The thorny issue of clothing interests my informants, but the debate is not orientalised to suggest sexual possibilities or the tantalising exotic other (Mohanty 1991, 2013), nor is it reduced to the veil as a site of intrigue or oppression that requires male penetration (Shohat 2007). Concealment is important to the informants, but their lexicons are different to those emanating from the Southern academe: to be naked is to be vulnerable and at risk. They remark that people from Dar es Salaam, *Wageni* (tourists) and prostitutes are all scantily clad—and they are obvious and visible. The clothes the tourists wear and the images of Western fashion are initially welcomed as good but very quickly a conversation develops about greed and desire, emotions which are intrinsically un-Islamic and therefore must be rejected.

In line with strong anti-materialist messages of many films emerging from West Africa (Garritano 2013[9]), greed leads to pursuit of money, which for my informants can only be gained via immoral means. The rejection of Western values(a synecdoche greed, selfishness, impatience) is overlaid to cap their uncontrollable natures, which if left to run riot would cause only problems. The younger women also reveal that they think it unlikely they will earn large amounts of money legitimately, so the only avenue left is prostitution. The leap between

wealth and prostitution is unchallenged and accepted as a norm for many women in Zanzibar, even for those who are educated or in the process of being educated. For Oi, Ta and Mm, they believe the only way to get rich is to sell sex. This is not the fanciful assertion that Archambault (2012,) Spronk (2012) and Haram (2004) all emphasise; transactional, opportunist sex is a well-trodden route in East Africa, and falls into a different category than prostitution.

It is a clear exposition of the tensions my informants exert on themselves: the secular pull of Westernism=possibilities of anti-Islamic behaviours. A dichotomy is set up between modern secular 'consumer freedom' (or affluence) and being Zanzibari. Buying the latest handbag shown in a film is counterbalanced by 'what is expected' of young women—which does not involve greed or selling sex: this conversation is not the conflicted self (Chakrabarty) it is a sophisticated dynamic communal conversation.

Thus sometimes international media is nominated as non-Arabic, or Non-African media. It is therefore tarred with the same brush—as being *haram* (un-Islamic, or unclean)—and like another category, 'tourists' are positioned as negative.

I recount the following interview in full because it shows a fascinating train of logic at work—the media gives my informants ideas for new clothes, it's a vehicle for new ideas about dressing, some of which prove extremely challenging to the prevailing conservatism. Zanzibaris see Westerners wearing clothes which they want, but are unable to purchase, for lack of resources.

> O: *Yes, it is important to get new things, phones, you are going with time, you are going with fashion, every fashion it come and you must do it. Like globalisation, everything happens and you must buy it, if you have the ability. Today we look at catalogues, we share them, we search them out, or radio, or television, newspapers, internet, now actually not internet not so much. But I am going to learn.*

> M: *I go out strolling and look for the new styles, see what others are wearing. "Aaahaa! She's got something new, I like that I wonder where she*

got that!" I watch what they wear on ITV, TBC, Channel 5, CNN and I wonder, how will I get that? Here in Zanzibar! [laughs]

T: *We get fashion from the people who go from one country to another, to Dubai. My neighbours move all the time when they go abroad—especially Oman, Saudi Arabia, Dubai. They have beautiful* buyi-buyi. *It's more from people, rather than media, that we get ideas*

M: *Most Zanzibaris get their ideas from tourists. First we see you in films, on TV, then you walk in our streets. [laughs] Even though you don't wear* buyi-buyi*, we Muslim girls imitate you. For example a tourist wears like, er, an attractive… from anywhere, we don't know where, he wear, or she wear trousers, shirts, good, we think 'I want to wear like that! In England do they wear like that? When this person comes to the shop she tries to copy the tourist. We don't ignore you! We imitate you! And also you imitate us! We wear* buyi-buyi *but you have no idea what we have underneath! Sometimes underneath I have only bra and mini dress, and we think to ourselves "we are* muzungu*!" You know, underneath our burkahs, we wear thongs! We do this in private, it's like a joke. We also imitate Arabian people...... but you know, I try and just know my ability, and I don't want new things every day, because it's endless, so it's pointless to be competitive, I would waste my money.*

B: *I wouldn't want to look too flash, to buy too many clothes. In the end you would just become a prostitute. Today, there are good, maybe 40,000 Tanzanian shilling handbags, (about $30) and the only way you could earn this sort of money is being a prostitute, remember our monthly salary is only 60,000 Tanzanian shillings. So media can lead to greed, which leads to prostitution, you will use men, you will only be able get money from men, so you are prostitute.*

What about getting a good job and getting educated, and getting money that way? I ask them.

O: *No, it doesn't work like that. There are many who are educated and are poor, and many who are not educated who don't have money. They have masters, but no money. Education does not equal wealth. That is the sad thing in Zanzibar.*

M: *Yes, I agree, it's not true that educated and good job equals good salary. But sometimes you can. For example, next month I finish my degree. I will get a better salary than she who has diploma or certificate. But the person who has masters, I will be different. For me education does give me a way up, and gives me a way to be in a corporation, to take on several jobs.*

What is pertinent about O's comment to is that she is being playful, that she is aware of the symbolic importance of appearance, and what is not seen. There is clearly a tension for Zanzibaris: the media is a connector, a transporter of new ideas and of choices, playing a provocative role in people's lives, demanding that they question and challenge, yet there seems to be few places to exercise this. It seems that under the veil life is complex, dynamic and sometimes claustrophobic.

Despite the paucity of media dealing directly with women, or that addresses them, the *idea of media* is greeted with enthusiasm. Or rather, it is as if the idea, the simulacra of transnational connectedness (Castells 2000), the possibilities of media and technology are the epitomes of change, of modernity.

La says:

Technology and internet makes me feel, oh, I feel very connected. This is my ray of hope. In high school we were a group of friends, we were a very close unit in the hostel. We all started together until form 6, from when we were little. Then we all went our separate ways; it's the greatest to receive a text from USA or Australia. We keep in contact, these are people I know really well. We trade war stories. We keep ourselves abreast of our news. If you

have a problem, we let the others know, and then we say 'solution' ABC...you know we share like this

Accessing Facebook via phone contributes to a sense of moving out of isolation—geographical, intellectual and emotional. Media consolidates friendships across spaces, charting progress in work, as well as offering a vital way to find solutions to the rigours of living. Others are aware of the exclusivity of new technology, of their elite status, and the opportunities it gives them to enlarge their social circles:

Ba:

I was on Facebook on 2002 when it was only students, and it was just to announce parties. Now it's changed, you know before it was just students, we told each other the latest things, we all knew each other. It was brilliant, part of a club. Now it's anonymous and corporate and I really hate it... all the world knows my business. No good! No good at all!

The media then is viewed as a connection, a way of assessing change, and also, at times, a marker of change. When Mm, finally at the end of research gets satellite TV (and a job, after being a student) she is delighted:

You see, I am like you now, I have education, money, a nice house and television!

The media is a bringer of new ideas, democracy and ways to communicate with friends. And more than this, a medium showing possibilities for political change.

7.5 <u>Holding the Mirror up to ourselves: Self-help, self-talk and selfies</u>

The reproduction of women's discussion and their rhetoric may be non-existent in the media, and it may at first glance appear to be 'just gossip', but there exists a lively subaltern economy of talk, activity, humour and reinvention of critique. As the fieldwork developed, it became clear to me that many informants were trading

‘selfies’ of each other which were taken at home in private and sent in the early hours of the morning. When questioned, I was told. “We want to see how we look, so we send each other our ideas of dresses, hairstyles, or approaches.”

As well as sending selfies, the younger women were also sending each other links to websites with information about scholarships, training, jobs or education off the island. They were also accessing a large amount of foreign-originated media content, both via satellite channels watched communally or via the internet. Clearly the appetite for knowledge, for new information and new ideas, for conceptualizing the global, for being connected with emerging trends, was evident: Oi says:

> *We want to know about globalization, the world is a village, we* need *[her emphasis] to exchange ideas…on things like* maendeleo *(development, progress, modernity). We need our own information, so we can make up our own minds. We don’t discuss these things at home, or at school, so it really is a good chance for us; our priority is* maendeleo*, in terms of economics, communications, social relations, and politics… we are interested in lots of things: Bejing Women’s Conference, when was that? In 1994 I think, and OPEC, the oil crisis: we followed that…*

I ask her about the Women’s Conference, why it is interesting:

> *Because it got me thinking about rights and power, what they mean, what the difference is between them, about what we need here in Zanzibar….*

Mm takes up the subject of selfies enthusiastically:

> *I started taking photos of myself and sending them to Ta because I liked that I could see myself, and so she sent me photos back*

There is a sexual and flirtatious element to these selfies, as Eprecht says “such relationships provide(d) a safe way to experiment with the ideals of modern courtship” (2013: 90). Safe means avoiding social opprobrium and carrying no risk

of pregnancy. She continues that with a low demand on the bandwidth late at night, she was able to access internet sites on her phone:

> *But then it got bigger. I wanted to know about managerial skills, you know, how to be a good manager, how to be a good employee, what is needed here in Zanzibar, and also, maybe, abroad. What is the difference? Is a good manager the same thing in both places?*

Mm and her friends represent women who are only recently being acknowledged as subjects reflecting the 'stylisation of consumption' (Mbembe 2004: 400) and a "celebration of cosmopolitan possibilities that have been ushered in by the processes of globalisation" (Spronk 2012: 11). They aim to apply Western ideas to their own situations, customise them and make them their own. Abu-Lughod (2002) writes of Egyptian soap operas offering particular ways to experience intense individuation, and placing "strong emotion in the everyday interpersonal world" (2002: 117). I would argue that it is the other way round—younger informants are searching out ways to express their heightened sense of emotionality. Mm, who is young, single, and actively using the internet from her phone to look up information on the internet for university assignments, has a broader view.

> *I do like the foreign stations, like BBC or Al Jazeera, but more because it's a way of getting information, and information is power! We feel isolated here, if you don't listen to the foreign radio like BBC you don't know.*

When I ask Mm if she would like to be a journalist, she replied:

> *I would love to be a journalist, I think there are so many things to say, that I can talk about, but I would have to do it in another place, maybe Europe! Here my brother would beat me if he saw me on television, talking about the real life of ourselves here. He is a bully, and I would expose him for trying to stop me doing my education and marrying [Mm's brother fiercely*

objected to her boyfriend, whom she had chosen] but I would be good at it. Seriously I would like to discuss democracy, and change, and women's empowerment. That is what we need to know, and what we can aim for, what there is in the world. I would like to be like you, doing a PhD, with power, able to say what you think, to learn, and to criticise.

This comment asks us to consider Maryam's combining of traditional and modern in a highly dynamic way (Chabal 2009) for voice, access, power, a desire to change what is articulated in the public sphere, her personal frustration at traditional networks that keep her from pursuing romantic and professional desires and her attraction to the 'modern' lures of education, agency, professional independence and a desire to control her own agenda. Thus Tufte's concept of voice is far to restricted, and does not speak to the multi-dimensional, intersectional, complex aspects of Mm's comments.

Rather than look to any one form of the media, or a particular narrative within film, Oomi, Thanya, Muzdat, Deddah and the others are seeking ways to articulate what they know is strongly present in their lives, looking for other articulations and narratives to define their lives. These describe strong emotions (affect) where perhaps once the Taarab forms and structures were, as Askew (2008) argues, sufficient spaces for women to express the frustrations and distractions of female Zanzibar life, and also spaces to enjoy booze, gossip and transgression (Fargion Topp 2014), there is now a more diverse and nuanced vocabulary needed. For this, both local and international media can be extremely useful as modelling tools, offering a palette of possibilities.

The international media is notably louder (for informants) amongst the swirling throng of locally created chatter (which never makes it to the airwaves, or the newspaper or television, but instead stays in the realms of talk, SMS and internet blogging). By its very existence and the roles it performs, international media represents an interesting paradox perfectly summed up in the following quote, by F:

I listened to a debate on Al Jazeera English on the Palestine Israel question. Er, no, I can't remember exactly what. Maybe the settlers? Anyway. The people were so rude to each other! Literally they were shouting, it was almost embarrassing. I was wondering why they hated each other so much. But I couldn't stop watching, I was learning so much. Part of me wished that we would do things like this in Zanzibar, for one thing they were actually talking about issues, and not just personalities, but then I thought, oh no, if they did this, we would have civil war! It would be out of control, we could never argue like this, in public, in Zanzibar. And not on television.

For F, the debate holds special pertinence because of the importance of *umma* for Muslims and the sense of connection felt by people in other parts of the world, whom she perceives to be experiencing injustice as a result of their faith. Yet whilst she is fascinated, the style and tenets of debate, the challenging and animated discussion of this distinctly un-Zanzibari and foreign programme is directly at odds with what she considers to be decorous and proper ways to behave in Zanzibar society.

Only one subject is actually openly hostile to the Western media, and sceptical of the West *per se* as a reliable source of information, as this excerpt from Lr (43, fully burkah-ed and with two jobs) reveals:

People here are very moral, very judgemental, and yes, honestly, we don't really like Wazungu *culture; it seems chaotic, rude, impolite. Actually we're a bit afraid of you! [Laughs] "Because of what we see on TV as well, the robberies, the action films. So even if what they talk about on the BBC Radio is important, it is done in a way that doesn't work for us, it's too rude. And we know all this other stuff about you, so the news stuff is not so important.*

Lr is applying 'ninja logic' to Westerners. She knows how 'they really are', which undermines any grander, formal authenticity or moral integrity that

Westerners claim to have. I suggest that Zanzibaris hide it well, it's hard to know that they disapprove. Lr responds:

> *Yes, but most people don't ask like you are, they don't bother, they don't even think to ask what we think of you! To be honest you have your* dini *[religion, culture, destiny], we have ours; if we see you doing something we don't like, we tell our children not to do it that way, otherwise, we don't pay much attention to* wazungu*, they're not important to us; for example kissing in public or wearing no clothes—we don't like that.*

For women such as Lr, exposure to foreign media is limited: she only listens to the Muslim prayer broadcast on the radio, and watches films made outside of Africa (usually Hollywood or Bollywood) only if she's in the room when her children are watching a DVD. She travels regularly to Dubai to visit relatives and to buy clothes to re-sell on Zanzibar. Her global is orientated towards the Arab, her Modern is Middle Eastern, not European or American. She says:

> *I really dislike the kissing that you have on your media, that is unnecessary, and when our children see you wear small skirts or bikinis and being affectionate in public it is not good for us. I accept that you have different ways from us, but I will definitely turn the television off, or change the channel, if there is too much kissing. I want to see the styles of clothing, to get ideas, but I don't think the kissing part is necessary.*

So foreign media potentially creates a troubling dilemma for some Zanzibaris: with its antagonistic, sometimes overtly sexual and argumentative nature, foreign media is both desired and disliked. Thus Zanzibaris challenge their own notions and definitions of what being Zanzibari is, and cherry-pick the bits of information that they considered relevant and necessary for modernization.

7.6 Media and Politics "Barack Obama is Zanzibari!"

The American presidential elections were mediated public events, with visuals from US TV screened on a large film screen erected in the Old Fort in the centre of Stone Town. The actual results were broadcast live to a party atmosphere, with old and young, urban and rural, *wazungu* and Zanzibaris watching together as the results came through. The event became both a media ritual (Couldry 2002) and a binding social event that emphasised communalism and performance of cohesion (Silverstone 2002, Garritano 2013, Couldry 2010, Curran 2010). The US election prompted new and radical ways of talking about issues such as democracy for the people I was listening to at the time. This event arguably operated as a 'permission catalyst'. But it would be disingenuous to discount the social context: the very fact that the American election happened is more important to informants than the media which carried the message.

The particular way in which the American election was broadcast was crucial to the conversations being generated. For the first time for Zanzibaris in living memory democratic elections were public, announced, named and discussed—and not shrouded in violence and fear has they had been previously.

Dh and Mt watched the election results at the Old Fort. They are most vocal about how the media reveals new ways of doing politics.

> Mt: *Today I am completely inspired, I am elated. This is fantastic, that Obama got elected, that he overturned Bush. Bush has been in power for how many years? Five? I am not sure. The point is he was voted out, the elections were fair and monitored, the whole world was watching, and Bush lost, like that, so he left the presidency! He didn't make crummy excuses about how the elections were unfair or rigged, like our leaders do. He just left the White House! We must learn from this. We must do like this.*

> Dh: *For myself I like the way they have these televised debates, we can actually follow what they believe in, what the policies might be. I am watching to see how they mention Africa…*

I asked Dh what was said about Africa, and she replied:

No, I am not sure they did talk about Africa specifically in these debates, but to see a Black African man talking about he is going to run the world, run America that is something for me very inspiring, you know maybe he even is Zanzibari? I am not sure. But this is a good example for us, about how democracy must work, about how our leaders must explain to us what they are doing, and then accept the election results. We talk too much about democracy, we are never sure what it really means, now we can see from this election what it has to mean, and it gives us ideas. The idea that a ruler cannot just be in power for ever, that he can do what he wants, for ever! Like Mugabe. NO! A leader is voted by the people, and he must remember that.

In the same vein the media provided answers about the 'correct' way to perform democracy. There are many dilemmas, gaps in information and much desire to learn and improve, and the media can sometimes fill these needs. It is the *process of identification,* and the validation of a global African identity, not the outcome that appears to be the point.

Dh continues:

I was inspired when I watched Obama get elected, I felt connected to the world- at last An African man running the USA, the most powerful in the world. If he can get elected, can make changes, then so can we. He is an African, I am an African, not just a Zanzibari.

Against a complex political landscape where suspicion is rife and overt political talk is problematic and problematized, the discussions prompted by the US election became 'safe' ways to discuss big subjects, disguised behind the façade of gossip—or excused at least, in the eyes of the Zanzibar public. There is a slippage between the 'naming' of certain talk as political by the women interviewed, and the

doing of it(Sreberny 2005). Women's political reflection and discourse takes place in gossip spaces, in private spaces, and not in the public spheres such as the media.

There are clearly large gaps in media coverage, and possibly even a complete failure by local media to adopt a position on many issues such as child abuse, domestic abuse or in creating and critiquing a public sphere. Despite this, the international media acts at a conceptual and symbolic level as a unified external voice, a focus for consolidating opinion. Thus Tufte's notion of voice (2012) is complicated into something both material and meta-conceptual. So even if the content of international media is not *actually* critical of Zanzibar society, it is conceptualised as such: says Oi:

> *Politics is s a problem here. We have change in politics, but it needs to improve, it could be better, everyone outside knows our politics, and they criticise us; England know their own politics, but Zanzibar we don't know the policies, our own politics. For example our politics, we need to have a more broader example, much much more discussion of policies. We only follow the English politics, we don't know really understand, or know what is going on in our country. It's very frustrating!*

So in one conversation, Oi isolates the things that she finds problematic but also asserts that the solution lies in political processes by reforming the system of discussion and accountability. She does not elaborate on this but highlights her desire to understand more; she reflexively indicates her agency in nominating what she doesn't know. Dh says to me at the end of the night:

> *Honestly, this election is just incredible, in the USA. For a start we have a black man, a Zanzibari, who is in charge of the biggest most powerful country in the world. He is Muslim! You know that, a Muslim! Second of all, we have that man Bush stepping down, leaving office, and abiding by democratic rules. Then they are open about it, we are all watching it here, in Africa, they are not frightened, not using the police to control voters, not like our elections.*

Dh's comments are so provocative. Like many I spoke to that night in January, she believed that not only was Barack Obama an African Muslim, he was actually from Zanzibar. He was 'one of us'. This misconception grew organically, encouraging Zanzibaris to believe that suddenly they were visible, that one of the most successful people in the world was one of their own. In the context of extremely violent elections ever-present in people's memories in Zanzibar, the model of an effective, calm and expedient election, *which the leaders actually abided by* (my emphasis) induced near euphoria. In this the research echoes the conclusions of Madianou (2005): that the closed narratives of belonging and identity are peculiarly permeable and elastic. Once there is success, the other is no longer othered, but incorporated.

The American election in January 2009 allowed people the opportunity to openly discuss democracy and processes of democratic change, specifically how people step down from power and whether elections can be held without violence. Mimicry (Ferguson 2002, Fanon 1953) and performance came into play: when Barack Obama's election campaign started, a young man calling himself Barack, and styling himself with two minders dressed as Matrix-style honchos appeared on the streets beside the town's most expensive hotel.[10]

7.7 The Zanzibar Elections

The Zanzibar election in October 2010 was greeted with trepidation by my informants. The most commonly expressed sentiment was a desire for peace, and a peaceful transition. What had not been made public was that both the USA and the European Union had threatened to withdraw all aid from Zanzibar if there was any suggestion of violence (personal conversations with US information Officer David Scott July 2010). There was also significant intervention by Norwegian, Swedish, Canadian and UK governments, subsequently discussed by Wilson in her book (2014).

The majority of this section discusses the way that foreign media prompts Zanzibaris to reflect on their own situation, democracy and agency. Informants are keen to vocalise their direct views on foreign media, how it works, and whether it

has the required authority and integrity to be taken seriously. Their comments reveal the contradictions of their subjectivities being defined by the Global North (or West) set against the desire for information they can trust.

During the weeks leading up to the elections, the Zanzibar informants were unsure what lay ahead of them. Idi the taxi driver remarked:

> *I am surprised you ask me about this. You know my views. Nothing will change. We've seen nothing new on the TV, or on the radio, I honestly don't know why I bother to listen. It is the people that will change things here, not the media. It just keeps repeating the same things, I really haven't seen any difference in the news reporting since we've announced the election. The only thing is, people are hopeful I think. They need to believe in something. At least the young. I don't think anything will change really. Us, we like blah blah, we like to sit around and chat, and not to really change anything, we are lazy.*

Informants want the media to reflect the rapid and enormous rate of change, not just in the realm of large, televised political change of leadership in the US, but in the representation of women in their working lives in Tanzania and Zanzibar. In Dar es Saalam, Mth the head of the women's bank in Tanzania, notes that gender roles are changing and women are taking positions of power and decision-making, but the media does not reflect this. She wants the election coverage to be far more coherent and informed:

> *In the parliament we had very few, now we have more than 15% of women MPs. In organizations, for example my own, there are more women. We are women being trusted to take a bank! It was a dream. But now we have judges, parliamentarians. I love my government, we are making a change. I want to be like South Africa. I can see a bright future, in one month we have registered more than 1,646 accounts, 81% of these are women. The way women are coming up, they are starting to be empowered. They have been out of the system, they have been migrant entrepreneurs, we want our*

expertise to count in our country. We are the majority of farmers—73%—and we need to be at the front of business. We are voters, the media must show this.

There is clearly a professional agenda behind her support for greater coverage of women as economic agents. However, she expresses frustration at the slippage between her reality of women working extensively and effectively across a range of professions and the media's portrayal of them.

Our media needs to show this happening, the change in women's work. The changes in women's voting. We have more women voting now. Unfortunately the media don't really cover this, not yet, I don't know why. All these sectors are invisible to the media. These things I say, I don't know if the media knows it, maybe they don't? That's why they don't report it? Nyerere started from a blank page, from scratch. We praise him, I praise him. We had free education. Especially the ladies. …. Sure, it's dunia wanaume—*men's world: even if you went to register a business, all your relatives would give you a hard time, but now the culture is changing…. And the media will catch up, this new generation will, I sure.*

Interestingly, having criticised the media, Mth is quick to state her allegiance to Nyerere. She is of the generation described by Fouere in her work (2011, 2013) who regard Nyerere as a moral compass, and who are often dismissed by younger people as '*wzee*'. It is no longer essential to constantly reiterate allegiance and loyalty to the 'the party' (CCM) as she does[11].

Another informant, Hj, who is related to the main CUF opposition leader, refuses to engage at all with local media about the elections. He listens to the BBC World Service Radio precisely because it throws some light on the corruption and political problems in Zanzibar. He listens in a ritualized way: every day at 5am he prays, then turns on the radio to catch first the news in English, and then in Swahili. Hajj refers to the local Zanzibar elections of 2005:

I absolutely rely on it, it is really the only, I mean only reliable source of information on this country, the BBC, when it comes to politics. They reported on the mass graves in Pemba, and on the intimidation of ordinary people, I think they did report on the numbers of fatalities, but not completely. But actually they left some stuff out… There were incidences of rapes, of the army being called in to the shamba *and using tear gas. I got gassed, remember? I texted you.*

I ask him if this was after the election, or during it.

They stopped people from voting during the elections; afterwards there was violence, and Human Rights Watch reported it. But the BBC did some of it, not all of it, but much more than our media, which said nothing. At least I know I can trust the BBC. It's like South Africa, they were watching us, watching our government.

Hj had personally experienced harassment.[12] Part of his political identity was listening to the World Service:

The local radio here doesn't report what I need and want to hear: I am proud to listen to the World Service, I know it makes people think I am a CUF member, it doesn't matter. I need to know that the World knows about Unguja and Pemba.[13]

Hj reiterates that he will not be following the local media at all for the coverage of the forthcoming elections.

At the other end of the political spectrum, Amina Karume is the daughter of the president of Zanzibar, Abeid Karume. She is scornful and disdainful even of the idea of institutional media neutrality:

You claim to be impartial, you at the BBC, but you're not. What happened when the CUF guy said 'I will make this another Rwanda?' you didn't report

that comment, and none of the disgusting things that happened in Stone Town that the CUF hardliners did were reported. Like when that woman got stoned in the market, by hardline CUF fundamentalists, just for wearing a shorter skirt, you know women were getting stoned for not wearing a buyi-buyi, *for not covering up, CUF were dominating our lives. Nothing was said about this, nothing at all.*

Within this context, the models of debate offered by the World Service, of critique and evaluation explored by the BBC output are viewed with skepticism by Amina. The model of broadcasting offered by the BBC WS is an unfamiliar anathema to most Zanzibari listeners. The BBC WS stands alone in Tanzania, in that in that it offers speech-based radio about current affairs, across Africa, which no local or regional radio station offers. What is typified as objective reporting by the BBC is often just seen as rude by some Zanzibari listeners.

In relation to the broader discussion raised in this chapter about the project of being Swahili, international media such as the BBC World Service is seen as directly competing with these Swahili or Zanzibar values for many people and rather than just being another way of doing things, or taking a different approach, it takes on a much stronger role. This role is as a very direct critic of the Zanzibari way of life. Fa said:

The BBC reporters can say things we can't, they can challenge senior officials in ways that are dangerous, and impolite for us.

This approach was not valued by Zanzibaris, and the comment was made disdainfully, as if being a journalist was not a professional job but more a display of bad manners.

These comments suggest that the 'right' way to be is polite and not question authority, or ask journalistic questions in the first place. Schulz's work on female radio preachers (2013) and Brissett-Foucault's work on the Ebemeezer parliaments in Uganda (2011), (which focuses on the political and behavioural etiquette at work when local politics are discussed via talk show radio) both suggest that there are

tight codes surrounding the questioning of senior figures in authority in the public sphere, which conflict with expected understandings of democratic communication from the Northern academe.

I try and discuss how politics is presented by Zanzibar media and foreign media to Ey, who did his university degree in the UK and lived in Zanzibar for most of his life. Ey is dismissive of Zanzibar's political bartering. He regards all local media reporting as a ridiculous and pointless exercise.

> *They're all bobos here! You know, nothing in their heads, these fat bobos, all helping each other out, doing each other favours, they don't see the media as a tool, or a thing to use, in fact they just think the media is there to get in the way, to cause problems for them. They don't want to answer questions, they're not there to answer questions. Not if they're ministers, not even the prime minster. Don't you remember Amani Karume at the stadium? Yes yes yes! He said, he didn't want to speak to the reporters, they were a disturbance!*

Like the political public sphere, the media is also divested of neutrality and integrity, or any sense of being more reliable or separate from personal gossip Some people, such as Ey, are also openly critical of foreign media, pinpointing the BBC WS as the 'worst': The BBC WS, for Ey, is not representative of examples of liberal debate, but of 'The Colonial mouthpieces of the West' trying to impose its foreign policy on Africa. Says Ey:

> *The way the BBC presents things is difficult for us: we are struggling with modernizing, becoming more Western. There are changes that we in Zanzibar are experiencing at present, if we don't do what the West wants, then the BBC criticizes us. The BBC WS is very much a mouthpiece for the West, they don't go deep enough, like Al Jazeera, they tell us what we should be doing, what we should be thinking. Like with Sudan, it is just automatically assumed that the president is bad, but what is missing is*

both sides are bad, both sides are dictators, but it's presented by the BBC WS as the good South against the bad North.

I ask why that is:

Media houses are umbrella organizations, they are corporate businesses, so they have a line, and the BBC is just the same. You stereotype only Zimbabwe as being anti-Colonialist, questioning the European or American narrative. Actually there are many of us, over the continent, who question how you deliver our realities to us, how you tell our own stories back to us.

We discuss the idea that media has some sort of obligation to neutrality or to independent critique. Is the media ever independent?

It's meaningless, they have an editorial line just the same as commercial media houses, and there's no real objectivity or neutrality. If the BBC was serious about it, they would let us, the listeners dictate the subject matter much more… like roads, electricity, water, family issues, things that we talk about, that we really want to know about. Even, I don't know, Rastafarianism, jazz music, flashbacks to eighties dance music, that kind of thing.

Ey's comments reflect a low culture voice (Sabry 2010) that rarely gets an airing in Northern Academe: anger at being told how to view the world from a 'Western' (English) point of view and a sense of being de-territorialised and excluded from the agenda. Are his comments "incoherent acceptance or coherent rejection" (Sabry 2010: 91)? His anger may be directed towards the fact that the only version of his reality being offered to him is from a knowledge regime he regards as colonialist and patronizing, and not one generated with credibility and accuracy from his own continent.

Ey, like many Zanzibaris, is grappling with the real possibilities of political change, and negotiating the manifest reality of living in a climate where open

political discussion is not nominated, generated and sanctioned, and a discussion separated from personalities is not common.

Conclusion

Without clear narratives and trajectories about the past in schooling and in the media spheres, finding meaningful engagement with the more problematic elements of Zanzibar remain elusive. New imagined selves are coming into being, but the competing anti-Islamic narratives and the struggle to live a life of Islamic integrity and authenticity create real struggles for some of the informants. These new selves—or ideations of agency—may not be a version of modernity that is instantly recognisable, and the people in this study may not be searching for the same language as those in the North in which to express those same dilemmas.

Being modern, or having modern accessories, technologies or attitudes (or husbands) is not straightforward for these young women, and is not necessarily within reach either, even with their excellent educations. Greed and 'becoming spoiled' are still major preoccupations for many of the younger informants, so agency and ideations of it must be tempered with this at the fore.

What is clear, however, is the strong need to listen to the Southern versions of their own lives, and to take seriously the possibility that the Global North is deeply entrenched in reproducing colonial knowledge forms via its insistence on public spheres and ideas of agency that are primarily relevant only to itself.

[1] ZATI figures for tourism 2010-2011

[2] Kresse, K. (2007) 'Philosophising in Mombasa: knowledge, Islam and intellectual practice on the Swahili Coast', *The Journal of the International African Institute*, Volume 79, Number 1, 2009, pp. 148-167 Edinburgh University Press. 2009,

[3] He resisted discussing why he had not really mentioned the violence and confusion of the revolutions except in passing in the book. Slavery had no mention, and all opportunities for public commemoration of history (the museum and the site of the slave auction) are overlooked.

[4] If the information on Zanzibar slavery is so hard to find, how did I know about it? My mother was an academic historian who specialised in how to teach history. Slavery on the East Coast of Africa was one of her main topics of study, thus I was exposed to many books and discussions with her.

[5] Unlike Professor Sharriff, Farid has never had academic tenure, or taught. However he is well liked, often out in public with his notebook and tape recorder, and is a mine of information. Farid is a good friend of mine, and is, and was, a valuable springboard and critic during the research and writing of this thesis.

[6] Amongst those interviewed in this ethnography, it was an unexpected finding to discover how very unperturbed and disinterested in the transient tourists the majority of them are, except of course if they work in tourist-related businesses, as over half of the informants do. The relationships that develop on Zanzibar because of the tourist trade, and reliant on it, including a significant majority of men in their late teens and twenties (Papazi) who set out to woo and form relationships with *Wazungu* (white women) deserves their own thesis, written from the standpoint of the Zanzibar men. Sadly, there is not the time to look at this subject here.

[7] See *Kenya Weekly Post*, Dec 9th, 2009, http://www.kenyaweeklypost.com/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=1291, Bagdals Radio, http://badgals-radio.com/zanzibars-lessons-are-our-truths-everywhere/, Reuters, Heroin Use in Zanzibar, 30.12.2009http://www.news24.com/Africa/News/Heroin-use-up-in-Zanzibar-20091230)

[8] The quote continues: "In order to protect an Islamic society and culture from the abovementioned influences, the moral, social and inspirational forces of the Islamic religion are to be enforced. The second reason that the Islamic revival has proved so popular is that it is obvious to many of the Muslims, especially the more literate and educated, that the West itself does not really believe in 'democracy', or indeed any of those ideals, such as 'Freedom of Speech', 'Human Rights' and so on, which it claims to cherish so dearly - except when it suits their self-interest. Both of these points of view are not confined to the Muslim fundamentalists. Indeed a growing number of Westerners are beginning to voice similar sentiments. In fact, past defeats, the need to prove oneself, incompetent and corrupt governments is hardly an explanation for the phenomenal rise of Islam among Westerners." http://www.missionislam.com/quran/Authenticity.htm accessed June 2013

[9] *African Video Movies and Global Desires: A Ghanaian History*, Carmela Garritano, Ohio University Press, 2013

[10] The international media (international Herald Tribune and a Belgian Newspaper) are quick to run articles on him. He gets no coverage in local press. But as an example, a figurehead, he is popular, he regularly attracts crowds of young Zanzibari men, stopping to hear his latest speech. Ray in the hair salon jokes about bringing change to Zanzibar: "We have our own American president, he can make sure all the tourists come and we get all the money for development!" The mini-Barack develops a manifesto, arguing for cheaper school fees and more scholarships. Unfortunately he fades out of the public eye after Barak's actual victory.

[11] Margaret peppers her discussion with approving references to the ruling party CCM, the existing president Kikwete, and the ex-president Nyerere, hardly surprising since the bank is only in existence due to the prolonged efforts of Nyerere's party, the CCM.

[12] He was known to the police and various government officers; his laptop had been confiscated twice from his home, he had been beaten up and arrested, for no reason, on two occasions.

[13] Unguja is the name many, but not exclusively, CUF members use for Zanzibar.

Chapter Eight: Conclusions and further work

This thesis explores the experiences of local iterations of globalised womanhood and identity within a cross section of women in Zanzibar. It speaks to three bodies of literature: firstly, empirical research/audience/reception studies about agency and the 'self-help' qualities of a Polyvocal media in private spaces; secondly work redefining the nature of public and political agency for Islamic women in the informal and precarious spaces beyond the state, and thirdly provincialising behaviours around social respectability, visibility, reputation, secrecy, disclosure and gossip within global political and historical epistemes relating to South-South information flows. I will briefly summarise the findings and end this section with recommendations for further research avenues.

This inter-disciplinary work with inter-sectionality at its core builds upon debates in media studies, African Studies and anthropology about agency, modernity and civil engagement in Africa, factoring in particularities of gender, shame, affect, informal and precarious lives, gossip and corruption. It also continues and excavates the new debates around the complexities of the weak African state, patchwork sphericles of privatisation and violence and partitioned-off local elites who have access to global networks and influences that often do not include the Global North.

I have critiqued the modernity binary from a post-colonial feminist perspective and looked at the emotional subject with agency and interiorised control negotiating the various manifestions (outside and within) the spatiality of a precarious and corrupt state (Ferguson 2010, Gupta & Ferguson 2002, Mamdani 2006). The undercurrent of violence prevalent in daily lives (Chabal 2009), and the informal channels/cultural spheres that exist in different spaces beyond the media have been critiqued.

Africa cannot be summed up with romantic notions of resilience (Nyamnjoh 2009, 2011) nor complicated by positioning it caught between tradition and modernity (Nyamnjoh ibid, Chabal 2009). Global flows, (Thussu 2006), global inequalities (Freidman 2006), global violence (Mbembe 2003, Chabal 2009) and 'globalisation', (transnational capital flows in the stock market, geopolitical,

organisational interactions and informational flows Castells 2000, Escobar 2007) influence and constitute the local, but there is agency within the structures, and powerful local resistance, subversion, humour, desire and value beyond and within these mega-flows.

Ideations of agency can not fall back on ersatz reified subversive versions (Mankekar 1999) that disavow complex power inequalities and continue with the 'whiteness as usual' (Mohanty 2013) taxonomies. In this work I have built upon the notions of Islamic agency described by Mahmood (2006, 2009) on Zanzibar, referencing Askew's study on the performance of Taarab acknowledging that actually a critique of gender, class or power, are central to analyses of the state. Askew (2001) prioritises the chaos, logic and inclusion of modernity (with reference to being a citizen of Zanzibar) and the importance of dialogic discourse in this process. For my purposes, I have used her idea that Zanzibaris are constantly in 'opposition' and highly dialogic. Their opposition can be to many things: perhaps to the state (the Mainland) or to the Arab outside, or to the 'new'. What is specific is the transferability of this opposition, their assumption that their agency is intrinsically better than the agency of women in the West and the elastic boundaries which allow them to alter and define what is 'not us' and 'not Zanzibari'. This broadly references Madianou's work on nationalism which allows for audiences to creatively invent fictive notions of inside/outside that resonate with the project of national borders, belonging and othering. (2005).

I have tried to show that the tropes of 'Mama' (mother of child/children), Good Girl (virginal archetype) and Ninja (dirtied, sexually active deceiver) encompass a wealth of performative possibilities, and that media is used as a material and transecting, ideamatic aid to dicsuss and explore the practical applications of these concepts.

One important finding of this research is the role of media within the development of self: self help, self-improvement. Thus far writing about Africa only Ndlovu (2013) and Neransky-Laden (2011) explore detailed empirical (fascinating) critiques of how soap operas and phone-ins are used very literally by South African audiences as guides and templates for behaviours where the over-arching narratives of apartheid and politics have been supplanted by an emphasis on the

personal. My empirical findings reveal that amongst female audiences, there is a hunger for new ideas, from Dubai fashions to international political events, different applications of rural development, rights-based agendas, toppled dictatorships, flower arranging, new formations of relationships, and football.There are tensions emerging between the 'traditional' communalism (Chabal 2009, Schulz 2012) and self-reflexive gendered modern subject who is grappling with languages and concepts that address her realities.

The research uncovered a need to move beyond the public/private = male/female binary that dominated early anthropology (Moore 1999, Haram 2004), or the centre/periphery models (Bhabba 1994, Thussu 2006) and explore complexities, particularly for younger women who move between many different scapes and undermine traditional mainstream dominant discourses and ideations of networked societies (Hofmeyr 2011). There is no 'overarching women's voice' (Gall 2002), nor do these accounts represent at any level the story of repression, rebellious protest, female Islamic identity, or a cohesive whole. Several informants draw attention to their burkahs, or praise Allah mid-sentence, indicating that Islamic piety is assimilated, occupied, lived in and an active positioning of interiority (Mahmood 2006). The informants' voices are contradictory and non-linear, and reveal people making decisions about their dynamic lives in which Islam is lived in very different ways, even amongst Zanzibaris.

Modernities are not bounded polities. Even within the range of television and cable channels available to the minority who have access (about 2% of the island) there are contestations of media outputs. The patchwork undercurrent of violence that Chabal, Ferguson and Mbembe all refer to, are manifest on the political street: drugs and prostitution are for the first time being publicly talked about, possibly because they are both so visible: addicts are in the main tourist area of Shangani and prostitutes now openly work in bars at weekends. The younger women are aware that, in their own words, "everything is changing", and they need to stay ahead, or at least keep abreast of the changes.

Some elements of the 'outside'—this 'Westernisation' so eloquently described by Brissett-Foucault (2012) Archamboult (2012) and Spronk (2012)—are highly seductive, and the 'sensous affect' (Mankekar 2012) absorbing new ways of

talking, relating to people, of joking, of having sex, are extremely appealing to the informants. These spaces open up the possibilities of escape, concealment, ninja, mimcry and disguise. Actual or imagined ownership indicates access to 'the cosmopolitan outside'—often Dubai (Baumann's equations of freedom with mobility come to mind, 2000)—and a bigger 'realler' more sophisticated and interesting world than Zanzibar. Modern white goods ownership and media access is constructed, for Zanzibaris, as an indicator of wealth, social placing and also as a referent for social and cultural capital and habitus, as Mankekar so fulsomely describes (1999, 2012). The media's effect is profound for Zanziabr women: there is a constant process of assessment and evaluation, a more complicated and coded version of 'what is she wearing/driving/using and where did she get it?' which contributes to a greater narrative about female power[12] and allows informants to address some of the contradictions they face and come closer to idealized versions of themselves (Slater 2000: 12).

Whilst it is tempting initially to view the latest media through the lens of a single narrative about consumerism and attitudes to modernity (Billig 1999, Slater 2012) and to locate this work within debates on consumerism, modernity, public popular culture or national identity, in fact this triangulation of citizen/state/market limits the discussion. As I showed in the literature review, there are theoretical nuances and complexities which mean this thesis moves the debates about modernity on to 'a more considered one about agency, which better reflects how actual politics on the ground is organised and functions' (Chabal 2014) and notions of convergence between disciplines and subjectivities are highly useful (Willems 2011).

The media, this work argues, contributes to the discussions around, the materiality of, and performativity of gendered performances that are manifest and citational, contingent on their recognition by the informants. Thus media is part of a discourse and a structure of relations (Butler 1990, 2007) that provides a menu of options for contesting and negotiating appropriate behaviours and agency. This negotiation comes through the emotionality (Abu-Lughod 2002) and affect (Mankekar 2012) of content in foreign-generated soap operas, or broadcasts of

crowds and the sense of belonging invoked by national events such as rebellions, protests and elections (Couldry 2010). There is some modelling going on, or 'imitating' as the informants like to describe it (Larkin 1997, Madianou 2005, Ferguson 1993), from many sources—the tourists in Zanzibar, the characters in Hindi Films, the news reporters and presenters on Al Jazeera and mainland TV. By triangulating the views of journalists, broadcasters and the public in one study, there is a unique series of glimpses at the development of self, interiority, self-reflexivity and power as works in progress.

In any intersectional work conflating personal relationships, intimate discussions of sex and public participation, it is easy to confuse a desire to be private, to not share one's business with everyone (and risk shame) with a default position that implies a 'intensified coming into being' as a subjective individual and citizen (Foucault 1984). A's comments about wanting to be her own woman, run her own business, or needing to avoid rumours, must acknowledge the materiality of her situation (Tamale 2012, Nyanzi 2012) that she has left her family and her marriage, leaving herself adrift and liable to be rendered homeless and without income. Instead it is more fertile to invigorate the idea of being watched and acknowledge how this surveillance and monitoring (Columpar 2002) impacts on the citational and actual performances of gender (Butler 1997).

At times the informants essentialised their definitions of being Zanzibari, agreeing on ideal characteristics. It is here that the media can provoke new and modern interpretations of these definitions, trouble the conventional understandings of public and private spheres, and create categories of 'outside' and 'inside' (Madianou 2005, 2012) which open up possibilities for conversations about un/acceptable behaviour, shaming and thoughts. The media also nominates or hails particular subjects as Western, or other, which is also a 'safe' way for Zanzibaris to pursue otherwise risky, inflammatory issues, for example styles of leadership and democracy, or their own erotic desires and need to stay within Haram practices (Mahmood 2006, Nzegwu 2012, Nyanzi 2014).

In particular instances—for example Barack Obama's heritage and ancestry—there is complex reworking of old and new, communal and personal, modern and traditional (Chabal 2009) and belonging, to publicly cement the national. Outsiders

(including myself) get co-opted into being Zanzibari, which is viewed as the ultimate accolade, a true compliment. When Barack Obama (who actually is of Kenyan heritage) won the US elections in January 2009, he was adopted by a delighted Zanzibar audience in the informal spaces, claiming him as their own. He is a 'traditional' man who also succeeds in the 'modern' world of global politics and US elections.

The fact that this was never reproduced in any local or international media did not matter either: *Masikaani* (porch) politics triumphed. *Masikaani* (informal street corners) is where people 'find the truth'.

Over the course of the fieldwork, which took place from December 2007 to May 2011, the discussions we had were many and diverse: Osama Bin Laden's death on 3rd May 2011, the results of the US elections, the continued saga of the electricity and power outages. The upheavals in Egypt, Tunisia and Libya were watched avidly by Zanzibaris, mostly on Al Jazeera (usually English, as those who can afford satellite TV are likely to be fluent in English, and Arabic is not commonly taught in Zanzibar) and listened to on the radio. Their own elections in October 2010, and domestic disturbances and riots on the mainland, again in 2010, also prompted discussion.

Over eight years of fieldwork and writing up over half of my subjects opened Facebook accounts. The majority of them started using, or increased the use of their phones, to access the internet, in private, rather than using internet cafes. Against a backdrop of activism in Syria, Bahrain, Tunisia, Egypt and Israel which some of the subjects knew about, conversations were constantly going on. At a local level, the opening of a new journalism college in Tanzania (Dar es Salaam, 2009) also had a slight impact (or was a reason) for the changes I observed. A new coalition government operational from October 2011 (after the fieldwork had finished, unfortunately) had a huge impact: suddenly opposition posters and graffiti were seen in public spaces, people were markedly more open about discussing politics, and were admitting that "it was better", in general terms. When pressed, they responded "it is open, we are less afraid.[1]" Conversely there was a rise in

media attention on UAMSHO in Zanzibar, and more international coverage of violent attacks against tourists at this time.

On Zanzibar new debates are constantly being invigorated and created, and the media spaces are not necessarily there to support or provide a platform for them. Nationalism, and national belonging is dynamic and contested: drawing on work by Butler (1999, 2007)[37] and Goffman (1963)[38] the informants articulate clear performances to avoid shame and loss of face and maintain reputations, and constant efforts to enforce the definitions of what the 'right way to be Zanzibari' is[39] in the public sphere. For example their sexuality is hyper-emphasised as a way to indicate either being a good girl, a mama, or a ninja. Butler's assertion that the domains of the social, linguistic, material and symbolic cannot be separated, '…because the discursive constitution of the subject is inextricable from the social constitution of the subject…' helps me understand why the nomination of being a mama, or a *malaya* matters profoundly in community discourses. It is in the essence of social interactions, the actual performing of the social relationships, the naming of types of womanhood, that identities become constituted. (Butler 1999: 120)[40] The media is but one of many in a competing array of processes and interactions that vie for attention, reputation and power, and feed into a broader discussion about national identity, moral codes and change.

The language is unfamiliar, and still evolving. That does not mean, as Mignolo (2002) and Mbembe(2003) confirm, that informants have in any way 'lost' their Zanzibari essences. If anything, one of the key facets of modernity is an increase in agency, freeing up resources and imaginative possibilities to be more Zanzibari in terms of throwing lavish weddings, cooking big communal meals or decorating their houses in traditional wood-carved ways. In other ways, modernity challenges people to rewrite their histories, obliterating the more problematic elements such as the violence and chaos of the revolution in 1964 and the earlier and prolonged periods of slavery, which unofficially did not disappear until the First World War. (Shariff 2011, Longair 2014, Wilson 2014)[2]

The findings reveal that post-colonial and intersectional gender critiques provide helpful jumping off points for a nuanced and complicated critique of how we talk about agency and engagement for women—particularly younger women—

in Zanzibar. I have worked hard to ‘de-Westernise’ this study, by foregrounding and normalising African and Arab writers (Nynamnjoh 2009, 2011, Willems 2014) and using them as central referents, not peripheral representational add-ons. Similarly I have tried to situate this work firmly in the Southern sphere and acknowledge that agency must be triangulated with community reputations, erotic ideations of consumerism (Mankekar 2012) iterations of Islamic piety, and behaviours as expression of self. Thus African studies are not examples of how Western ways translate to the South, they are completely different in approach, framing and conclusions.

In this work, some of my results, such as the need to include labile notions of agency, (Mahmood ibid) privacy, community reputations, affect, emotions or the role of corruption in influencing information and relationships (Gupta 2012), can arguably be extended to other regions of the Swahili-speaking Islamic coastal areas, including mainland Tanzania and Kenya. Swahili Islamic female agency is foregrounded as a normative experience, in which resistance or subversion of the hegemonic whole, or an individuated, autonomous voice, is not considered relevant. (Mahmood 2006,2009). This prioritising of privacy gives great purchase for further work into how agency, behaviours and responses are evolving in the Swahili Coast areas, the expansion of port and rail structures and the impacts these are having on women’s lives in these regions.

One of the key new findings of this work is that in the absence of a commercial or state generated ‘old’ media that speaks to women, women *privately* generate their own content and find new ways of accessing information, particularly via their WAP-enabled phones. This is a central finding, and highlights the importance of the ‘secret’: the community secret, the secret as entrusted to the researcher and her role in identifying with it, and the secrecies amongst peers (Moore 2013). This emphasis on discretions speaks to different methodologies and approaches needed in future. Specifically engaging with the strong need to gain trust of informants and dignify confidentiality as part of the research process. It also suggests that there are exciting future topics: ways to look at peer-peer communication, influencing behaviours, and how texting and private internet use offers extensive large networks of access to girls and young women.

The relationship with 'Westernising' or modernising takes many forms, and there are many examples where non-Zanzibari attitudes are exuberantly welcomed and instances where there is more caution and reticence. What emerges as key finding is a lack of terms in which to discuss the disconnect between the virtuous self (Jansons 2007) and Islamic Piety (Mahmood 2006, 2009) and the 'modern-ness' (Sabry 2010) embodied in secular influences and practices. Intimate issues of self or the casualization of behaviours that Wouters (2004, 2009) Reay (2004)and Skeggs (1997, 2004)—specifically in relation to femininity—explore, presents particularly challenging choices for girls/younger women.

It is this disconnect which is being excavated by the informants, and the themes examined by Archambault (2012), Moore (2013) Impey (2011) and Newell (2012) about bluffing, secrecy, concealment and disguise, are rich seams of future work. Evidently 'keeping up appearances' in particular spaces (Springer 2010, Harvey 1999) feeds into complicated dynamics that echo, mimic and recreate the political situation, and this is also an area I would be keen to research. This location of agency within the lexicon of consensus and 'we-ness' (Schulz 2014) prioritises community engagement, and not autononmous self-hood.

The definition of the media for this thesis was, and remains, unwieldy and large, taking on different genres including radio news, TV, novellas, films, internet sites and mobile phone interactions. As such the research, almost by default, has to consider the uses of media as well as the context of this usage, rather than the media itself or the technology (Madianou 2012, 2014). For this reason the informants' relationships within which media is used (Horst & Miller 2006) not the materiality of technology, is prioritised.

The temptation is to get drawn into debates about the 'empowering', 'radicalising' 'surveillance' or 'revolutionary' nature of technology (Nyamnjoh 2005, 2009). During the course of this work the ComDev critiques (Tufte, Taachi, Myers et al) proved themselves to be insufficient to capture the 'non-self-improving' elements of media use (Moloney 2008, 2009) and the spaces where the choice of media – e.g. texting- reflects a conscious choice to alter, fill the gap or change the existing social relationship (Horst & Miller ibid, Madianou ibid). The ComDev debates rarely captures the uneasy ways that people dip in and out of their roles

and obligations, have many different identities running alongside each other (Cornwall 2012, Mercer 2012a) and occupy bureaucratic, familial, and entrepreneurial roles all at once. The ComDev debates do not allow for the contradictions of Islamic Agency—the setting up of a haram Islamic women's football team, Dh's conscious decision to obfuscate her sexual status and avialabiity, the interest in enjoyable erotic sex that the young women express.

Despite all the investment (donor and private), all the cables laid to improve digital connectivity on Zanzibar, the dominance of American baseball caps, the proliferation of Chinese plastic tea strainers and Kung Fu movies pirated on the streets of Zanzibar, despite the increase in the strength and visibility of informal South-North economic flows (drugs), despite all this the application of high-level, or mid-range theory remains problematic and non-linear. Finding ways to speak to the highly internationalised, yet parochial quotidian routines and ideations of tension prompted by the versatile, unstabile polyvocal media (Madianou 2012) that informants describe, has no one-size answer.

There is no word for culture in Swahili, there is for tradition. There is no direct translation for the words materialism, modernity or fourth estate. Consequently many of the ideas introduced in this thesis are, or were, philosophical anathemas to the interviewees. The leap from Arabic notions of 'religion' to European ideas of 'culture' is a huge one. Similarly, jumping from *mandaleo* (improvement, movement, progress, modernity) to discussions about institutional integrity and reflexive agency are cultural and geo-spatial border crossings that may be more useless than useful (Ferguson 2005, 2010, Mamdani 2006). It may be pragmatic for informants to flexibly position modernity metonymically as a threat, a contamination, a vessel for opportunities a closed discourse (Madianou 2005) or structures of feeling (Williams 1967, Mankekar 1999).

Echoing Mahmood, Asad and Butler (2009) I tried to show that the self-reflexivity, awareness, interiorised control (Ndlovu 2013, Ndijo 2012) and restraint is not the domain of 'modern Europe ' it goes on in all societies. In this sense, Haraway's assertion that being modern is an empty signifier, (1991) is correct. What 'modernity' in all its guises presents is a collection of very challenging ways of

thinking about new ideas for the subjects, and many new options. Given the importance then—for younger women particularly—of having privacy when they access delicate subjects, one of the recommendations of this study would be for media practitioners to take this more seriously and try to factor in ways to invite women as listeners, viewers and users of the internet, to participate in the media whilst not drawing attention to themselves. To this end, the SMS message is the perfect medium. It is discreet, personal and private. In terms of content, mental distress, suicide, domestic abuse, being a single mother, options for work, recipes, ideas for clothes, how to make a happy marriage, sex education, how to be independent and ways to behave within marriage are all topics that should be expanded upon and discussed in public, in their own media, using language and in a presentation that resonates with local audiences, and moves away from the didactic approach.

Further research interests for me would be to interrogate more rigourously exactly when mobile phones are used in romantic relationships and why, foregrounding Islamic agency (Mahmood 2006) and discretion. I would like to focus explicitly on romantic affairs and 'ninja' relationships and explore how they play out political, economic and social roles for women on Zanzibar in the informal, precarious spaces, perhaps zooming in on a very tight single-site ethnography: following the trajectory of a small group of educated younger women and their use of the internet via their phones.

One of the strongest recommendations of this research would be to listen carefully to what Zanzibaris want to see in their media. Another practical recommendation, based on the low 'sense of connection' with radio dramas or radio output in general on Zanzibar (in contrast to the rest of Tanzania, with a reading of the statistics cited by Femina in Chapter Three), would be to think imaginatively about radio programme content and style for in a way that would appeal to and interpolate female audiences.

Further research could include a detailed empirical study of the role of religious broadcasters (private and only available in the capital of Zanzibar) their

roles in the self-help discourses, and their dialogic relationships with their audiences. There is much scope for the convergence (Willems 2011) between the informal cultural spheres of cartoons, music and impromptu performances (Askew 2002, Perullo 2005) and self-help. Intriguing work on informal and precarious spheres in Southern and Eastern Africa covering the extent and complexity of informal precarious living (bartering and bribery Ndijo 2012, 2014) speaks to further research on polyvocal media and the implementation of mobile phones particularly in illegal or covert activities. For example the securing of trading permits, licences and residential visas and for women farmers. Phones themselves are often fakes—suggesting work on the natures of mimcry and mimesis, developing Fanon’s work (1953).

Not once in three years of discussions, observations or interviews did any of my informants refer to herself as ‘African’ in this research. But the glorification of real, unsullied or pure ‘Zanzibari’, an identity conspicuously threatened by contaminating (Mankekar 1999) influences of the West, came up repeatedly. Zanzibar becomes more than a way of life. It’s a home, a national geography, an all-encompassing notion that grew goliath-like as the research progressed. For the informants, Zanzibar itself is feminised and held up as a trope of emotional discipline, restraint, good manners and importantly, sexual purity and restraint (Saleh 2005). It is often contrasted and defined in relation to slacker, looser Western approaches to sex, and not always in straightforward, linear or condemnatory ways.

There are so many colourful and divergent approaches to making good using of modern-ness (Sabry 2010) that perhaps the only solid conclusion can be that reactions remain highly individuated, personalised in a society that still has no words for selfish, self, or personality.

I argue that media use must be viewed through the less defined, more all-encompassing lens of meta-process: the women (and many of the men) on this self-nominated Muslim island are torn between the conflicting traditions of the old and the pull of the new, but at a meta-ontological level. They often struggle with how to think about thinking. How to prioritise and organise this information, what is secular or not, and the expression of this in their private lives, rather than the

actual information. Perhaps also whilst these debates remain outside the institutional public spheres and are officially un-nominated by the media, they retain the renegade, unpredictable, inventive qualities that make them so alluring to research.

[1] In many ways, with hindsight now the fieldwork is over, I feel I 'missed a trick'. The changes happening in Zanzibar were slow and gradual during the fieldwork. There was episodic violence during and after the elections, demonstrations after I had finished fieldwork relating to the new power-sharing government, and four bars burned down (again after I left). Whilst I was watching and listening to informants talk about customising their phones, or the latest soap opera chapter, activists in Kenya were using their mobiles to chart post-election violence (Usahidi, Kenya 2008), the NGO Fuhamu also in Kenya was using SMS to get petitions off the ground which resulted in 15 nation states changing their protocols and endorsing gender equality.

[2] Personal discussion with Abdul Shariff

[3] At the start of the research, only Anna, Chiku Leno and Meab had Facebook accounts. After five years, over 30% of the people interviewed said they had signed up to Facebook accounts.

Appendices

The appendices contain seven additional pieces of information.

Appendix 1 lists those people interviewed over the three year period of fieldwork, including their approximate age, their position or job, level and place of education.

Appendix 2 is a reproduction of the Search for Common Ground's Table of Media participation. http://www.sfcg.org/programmes/tanzania/Media%20Sector%20Mapping%20Zanzibar%20Key%20Findings%2030%20April%202013.pdf (accessed June 15th 2014)

Appendix 3 is a reproduction of pages 6-11 of the Tanzania Media and Production Study. Femina: "Reaching Millions, Changing Generations" study 2012 http://www.feminahip.or.tz/fileadmin/femina/Publication_uploads/Reaching_Millions__ Changing_Generations_II_Aug._2013.pdf

Appendix 4 is from– the Tanzania Media Fund (http://www.tmf.or.tz/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/121222-TMF-Baseline-Survey-Report-1.0.pdf) and

Appendix 5 is a list of radio stations, private and public, from the BBC website (accessed July 2014)

Appendix 6 is a list of radio stations from an alternative site: (Source http://www.radio-africa.org/fm/fm.php?itu=Tanzania®ion=zbw, accessed July 15th 2014)

Appendix 7 is a short description– of Zanzibar's most famous singer: the Singer Biki Dude, who passed in 2014.

Appendix 1

List of informants and interviewees

1. Aloysius L: NGO advocacy organization manager, educated abroad, sixties, male, resident Arusha
2. Amina Karume: Daughter of the president of Zanzibar, wealthy, educated abroad, early forties, living on Zanzibar
3. Anna Karume: Zanzibari woman, wife to prominent MP, wealthy, educated abroad, late fifities, Zanzibar resident
4. Anna Mdimi: female, late twenties, NGO consultant, educated Tanzania, resident Dar es Salaam
5. Annie McIntyre: Ex pat, resident Tanzania, 25 years, academic, advocate and activist
6. Anthony Mkeya: male, early forties, businessman, educated abroad (USA and Kenya), resident Zanzibar
7. Asha: 19, university graduate, educated Dar and Zanzibar, media professional
8. Bianca: Female, Educated privately abroad, wealthy, early twenties, economist, lives in Dar Es Salaam, working temporarily Zanzibar
9. BibiJinja: married to two prominent politicians, prominent spokeswoman, in her eighties, original member of CCM in revolution. Resident Zanzibar
10. Carol: 27, Tanzania educated, university graduate, media professional
11. Chiko Leno: news reader, educated privately abroad and Zanzibar, forties
12. Cinda: 38, standard 6 education, Tanzania, Housekeeper, single mother
13. Daoudi: male, late fifties, media professional, educated Tanzania, resident Arusha
14. David Glen: expat Zanzibari returned after fifteen years of living in Cuba and the UK. Resident in Zanzibar/Tanzania, entrepreneur, extremely wealthy, male, 60’s
15. Deddah: 25, educated Tanzania, studying economics and runs small business
16. Eddy: male, media professional, mid-thirties, educated Tanzania

17. Frederica: female, late twenties, educated UK, Oman, media professional, resident Zanzibar
18. Furaha: 22, educated Zanzibar, no degree, shop worker
19. Haj el Haj: son of opposition leader (CUF), mid-thirties, no degree, born Pemba, educated Zanzibar, living on Zanzibar
20. Helen Peeks: British Ex pat, educated UK (post grad), forties, resident Zanzibar 10 years, prominent spokeswoman
21. Linda: female, educated Kenya, early twenties, media professional, living Dar es Salaam, temporarily resident Zanzibar
22. Mama Anna: seventies, first female CEO of Tanzanian bank, educated Tanzania, post grad USA, resident Dar es Salaam
23. Mama Asha: forties, vegetable seller, single mother, no education, resident Zanzibari
24. Mama Betty: political activist in ruling party CCM in 1960s and 70s, aged 69, educated Tanzania, resident in Dar es Salaam
25. Mama Kadima: 4 children, fifties, no education
26. Mama Lydia: aged 57
27. Mama Miriam: Zanzibari, seventies, prominent spokeswoman, media professional, worked and educated Zanzibar and Germany, now resident Zanzibar
28. Mama Patima: seaweed farmer, East coast, 4 children, forties, no education
29. Mama Sejaba: ditto 3, children, no education
30. Margaret Chacha: late fifties, political activist in CCM currently, president of Women's Bank of Tanzania, resident Dar es Salaam
31. Maryam: Female student, degree level, 23, Zanzibari/Pemban, educated and resident Zanzibar
32. Maryam Hamid: Zanzibari, businesswoman, distant relative of president, wealthy, educated in Zanzibar and Cuba, forties
33. Meab Mdimi: female, early thirties, NGO Manager, educated Tanzania, resident Dar es Salaam
34. Muzdat: 24 IT consultant, educated Kenya and Zanzibar, now on scholarship
35. Mwana: 43, no education, domestic worker, female, Zanzibari

36. Mzee Idi: male, Zanzibari, Standard 4, taxi driver, late 40's
37. Oomi: student, Zanzibari, 23, university educated, resident Zanzibar
38. Saleh Ibrahim: male, early sixties, NGO manager, CUF supporter, educated Tanzania, resident Zanzibar
39. Salma: 23 years old, Waitress, standard 4 education, Zanzibar, divorced
40. Selina: 16, female, educated Italy and Zanzibar, wealthy, mixed parentage, resident Zanzibar since 2008
41. Thanya: female student, secondary level, educated and resident Zanzibar
42. Warda: 23 educated Zanzibar, IT consultant

Appendix 2

Media Sector Mapping Zanzibar 2013 Search for Common Ground, Key Findings

What are the most critical problems that you are facing?

Issue	Male	Issue	Female
Corruption	21	Corruption	20
Other	17	Other	19
Crime	13	Security	14
Political will by government	11	Crime	12
Drugs	10	Access to education	10
Security	9	Employment opportunities	10
Employment opportunities	9	Political will by government	10
Human rights	9	Access to potable water	9
Access to potable water	6	Child abuse	8
Infrastructure	6	Discrimination against women	8
Communication between leaders and citizens	6	Economic activities	7
Access to education	5	Human rights	7
Discrimination against women	5	Drugs	7
HIV/AIDS	5	Access to land/Land rights	5
Freedom of expression	4	Prostitution	4
Environmental degradation	4	Infrastructures	4
Child abuse	3	Environmental degradation	4
Access to land/Land rights	2	Access to land/Land rights	2
Economic activities	2	Domestic violence	2
HIV/AIDS	2	Freedom of expression	1
Hygiene	1	Hygiene	1
Domestic violence	1	Prostitution	1

Conclusions and Recommendations

Based on the interviews, surveys and discussion groups, the media sector mapping exercise has several insights for a way forward in developing one of the key pillars in open, participatory governance—the media.

One central finding is a need to increase government openness in reporting. Participants cite a lack of open communication between civil society, the media and government; similarly, respondents emphasized the need for a more professional journalist corps capable of investigating claims rather than merely reporting in collaboration with the government or producing superficial reports. A theme across the mapping report is a need to strengthen trust between the media and government, and while some of the respondents' content demands are met through reporting, there are still some gaps between what people want to hear reporting on and what is actually reported.

Addressing issues around media training; increased communication and trust between government and the media; openness in reporting and dialogue; and matching content with expectations can strengthen the media sector's role in shaping an open, democratic process.

Appendix 3

<u>FEMINA RESEARCH ON AUDIENCES (from Reaching Millions, Changing Generations, 2012):</u>

P6 Tanzazian Media Consumption Habits:

The report focuses on media consumption habits among youth aged 15, as this is Femina's primary target group. Among this age group, media consumption has in general decreased in 2012 compared to earlier (2009 and 2011). Radio persists as the most popular and widespread media cutting across demographics, while TV is the second most popular followed by newspapers. Consumption of internet is the only media, which is steadily increasing. Overall media consumption in Tanzania in 2012 has decreased compared to earlier years (2009–2011) as illustrated in Figure 1 below. Radio persists as the most common and popular provider of information with 80% of youth aged 15–30 having listened to radio in the past 7 days. This is a drop compared to 2011 where 87% had listened to radio in the past week, however similar to the 2009 result. Consumption of TV has likewise dropped from 49% of young people having watched TV in the past week in 2009 over 56% in 2011 to 41% in 2012.

Consumption of newspapers has fallen dramatically from 24% having read newspapers in the pastweek in 2011 to 8% in 2012. The engagement of magazines has likewise dropped from 14% in 2011 to 9% in 2012. The reach and readership of Fema and SM magazines, however, has not dropped compared to the 2009 findings, which will be elaborated later in the report.

The use of internet however has steadily increased from 2009 (4%) to 2011 (6%) and finally to 2012 (9%). The increase use of internet might partly explain the decreased consumption of other media for example newspapers, as news can also be sourced via the internet.

Other trends in media consumption from TAMPS 2012 include an urban/rural divide, as urban youth consume more media than their rural peers. The biggest discrepancy is found in the consumption patterns of TV and newspapers with 83% of urban youth versus 47% of rural youth having watched TV within the past month and 21% of urban youth versus 8% of rural youth having read or paged through a newspaper within the past month. Same urban/rural divide was identified among the general population in *Reaching Millions, Changing Generations* analyzing the TAMPS.

Another interesting observation presents itself in relation to listening to radio on a mobile phone, as this by far also seems to be an urban activity with 40% or urban youth versus 20% of rural youth having listened to radio on a mobile phone within the past 4 weeks. A more equal balance in consumption patterns are found in relation to reading magazines (26% urban/18% rural), while listening to radio remains the most pro-rural media (94% urban and rural) as also found from the 2009 data. In addition, making a call from a mobile phone is a frequent activity among youth in both rural and urban areas with 91% of urban youth and 83% of rural youth having made a call within the past month.

Gender is a divider when it comes to media consumption in the TAMPS 2009 data. In general male dominance occurs in relation to all media products with the biggest gap in reading or paging through a newspaper (16% versus 9%). A more equal balance is again found in relation to reading magazines (23% versus 20%), listening to radio (96% versus 93%) and making calls from mobile phones (86% versus 84%).

In relation to age, the media consumption pattern is more or less equal among In relation to age, the media consumption pattern is more or less equal among the 15–30 year olds with few exceptions. One of those is in relation to the use of mobile phones, which increases with age (67% among 15–17, 89% among 18–24 and 91% among 25–30) and is most likely linked to the issue of costs from the assumption that adolescence have lesser resources than young adults. Using internet is most common among the 18–24 with 11% having done so within the past month compared to 6% among 15–17 year olds and 7% among 25–30 year olds.

Appendix 4 Tanzania Media Fund TAMPS survey

All media usage, Tanzania All Media and Products Survey (TAMPS) in September-October 2009

Zone	Rural/Urban (%)		Male/Female (%)		Age (%) 15-24 /25-34 />35			Education (%) Prim/Sec	
Dar es Salaam	0	100	37	63	51	22	26	43	47
Central	76	24	60	39	19	43	28	24	37
Northern	73	27	40	60	30	18	52	58	32
Southern	78	22	46	54	22	24	54	75	14
Lake	82	18	54	46	35	22	43	61	27
Coast	78	22	44	56	28	25	46	70	20
Zanzibar	**55**	**45**	**65**	**35**	**39**	**24**	**37**	**27**	**58**
Southern Highlands	78	22	53	48	40	28	32	59	31
TOTALS	**71**	**29**	**48**	**52**	**36**	**23**	**31**	**60**	**28**

Media reach and usage:

http://www.tmf.or.tz/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/121222-TMF-Baseline-Survey-Report-1.0.pdf

Radio as a medium reaches most Tanzanians (96.5%) with half the sample surveyed (50.4%) having access to radio only. Significant differences are apparent across urban/rural lines. In rural areas approximately two-thirds (61.5%) remain reliant on radio as a sole means of formal communication on news and current affairs while in urban areas this proportion drops to just under a quarter (24.3%). According to TAMPS4 data on media consumption collected annually since 2006, affordability and access are still core barriers to television usage with only 42.1% of the respondents having access to this media type overall. Unsurprisingly, television boasts significantly greater usage in urban areas (67.5%) as opposed to the less affluent rural areas (31.2%).

Overall, newspapers have the lowest reach of the three mediums (32.0%), with illiteracy preventing many Tanzanians from using this medium. Although dual usage of the media types is relatively low, it is positive to see that approximately a quarter (24.3%) of respondents overall are able to access radio, television and newspapers. This figure jumps to 38.7% in urban areas and drops to 18.1% in rural areas.

Overall media consumption in Tanzania in 2012 has decreased compared to earlier years (2009, 2011) as illustrated in figure 1 below. Radio persists as the most common and popular provider of information with 80% of youth aged 15–30 having listened to radio in the past 7 days. This is a drop compared to 2011 where 87% had listened to radio in the past week, however similar to the 2009 result.

Consumption of TV has likewise dropped from 49% of young people having watched TV in the past week in 2009 over 56% in 2011 to 41% in 2012. The proliferation of privately funded channels on the island in the last two or three years and the introduction of satellite television from South Africa and the rest of the world has greatly increased their ability to watch television. Similarly the introduction of the high speed internet cable in 2010 across East Africa has also significantly reduced the cost of internet and made it faster. Although having personal internet at home is extremely rare, in the course of the fieldwork at least five new internet cafes sprung up in Stone Town. These were markedly in use by women and young girls, although I never ever saw older women (over forty) using them.

Consumption of newspapers has fallen dramatically from 24% having read newspapers in the past week in 2011 to 8% in 2012. The engagement of magazines has likewise dropped from 14% in 2011 to 9% in 2012. The reach and readership of Fema and SM magazines, however, has not dropped compared to the 2009 findings, which will be elaborated later in the report. The use of internet, however, has steadily increased from 2009 (4%) to 2011 (6%) and finally to 2012 (9%). The increased use of internet might partly explain the decreased consumption of other media, for example newspapers, as news can also be sourced via the internet. Other trends in media consumption from TAMPS 2012 include an urban/rural divide, as urban youth consume more media than their rural peers. The biggest

discrepancy is found in the consumption patterns of TV and newspapers with 83% of urban youth versus 47% of rural youth having watched TV within the past month and 21% of urban youth versus 8% of rural youth having read or paged through a newspaper within the past month.

Appendix 5

Table of Key Media Participants in Zanzibar and Tanzania (BBC Website):

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14095831

The Press

- Daily News - government owned, Tanzania's oldest newspaper
- Uhuru - government owned, in Swahili
- The Guardian - private
- Daily Mail - private
- Nipashe - private, in Swahili
- Alasiri - private, in Swahili
- Business Times - private weekly
- The Express - private weekly
- Arusha Times - private weekly

Television

- Televisheni ya Taifa (TVT) - state-run TV, has yet to achieve complete national coverage
- Independent Television (ITV) - widely-watched private network, owned by IPP group
- Dar es Salaam Television (DTV) - private network operated by Africa Media Group
- Coastal Television Network (CTN) - private, Dar es Salaam
- Star TV – China owns 49% stake, Tanzanian government owns 51%
- TV Zanzibar - state-run

Radio

- Radio Tanzania Dar es Salaam (RTD) - state-run, accessible in Zanzibar
- Parapanda Radio Tanzania (PRT) - state-run FM station set up to counter competition for younger listeners from private stations, mainland only

- Radio Free Africa - private FM network accessible in Zanzibar
- Radio One - private network owned by IPP group- based in Dar Es Salaam, accessible in Zanzibar
- Radio Uhuru - private FM station, mainland only
- Kiss FM - private Dar es Salaam English-language station, poor reception in Zanzibar
- Clouds FM - pop music station available in Dar es Salaam and Arusha, and Stone Town Zanzibar
- Orkonerei Radio Service (ORS) - community network operated by non-governmental agency (Mainland Tanzania)
- Voice of Tanzania-Zanzibar - state-run radio on Zanzibar
- Zenji radio (Zanzibar, Private)
- Coconut FM
- BBC World Service - good reception in Stone Town, poor in rural areas.
- Voice of America
- Deutsche Welle

Appendix 6

<u>Directory of FM radio stations in the region Zanzibar West</u>

MHz	Station	transmitting from	
87.50	Radio Bomba	Zanzibar (Unguja)	
88.20	Coconut FM	Zanzibar (Unguja)	website
90.90	Chuchu FM	Zanzibar (Unguja)	
92.60	Al-Noor Radio	Zanzibar (Unguja)	website
93.50	Hits FM	Zanzibar (Unguja)	website
94.10	BBC WS Africa	Zanzibar (Unguja)	1
96.80	Radio Zenji FM	Zanzibar (Unguja)	website
97.10	Zanzibar 1 FM	Zanzibar (Unguja)	
97.40	Sauti ya Tanzania	Zanzibar (Unguja)	
98.30	Bhaa FM	Zanzibar (Unguja)	
99.70	TBC Taifa	Zanzibar (Unguja)	website
103.50	Radio Maria Tanzania	Zanzibar (Unguja)	website live audio
103.80	Radio Doxa FM	Zanzibar (Unguja)	
104.50	Radio Imaan FM	Zanzibar (Unguja)	1
104.90	Radio Adhana	Zanzibar (Unguja)	

Appendix 7: Biki Dude

Biki Dude has received a great deal of international media attention. For Zanzibaris at home this has presented a challenge to their sensibilities, and notions of what is acceptable and to be promoted. Why did it take an international audience to show Zanzibaris how good their own singer is? Secondly, Biki is very old indeed: there is a begrudging sense of acknowledgement it is rather astonishing she is even alive, let alone wooing international audiences in Stadiums containing several hundred thousand people.

Biki Dude's fame, reputation, the importance she holds in the public mind, has changed the way that women can operate in the public realm, but not in a widespread way. However it has established that once the social norms are transcended drastically, it is possible for people to operate in a separate category, one labelled 'eccentric.' In this category one 'trades' on the reputation of being unusual, being different, and having access to international resources. Biki's international contacts have ensured that in some ways she has exchanged conventionality for acceptance as a completely unique public woman.

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