


**THE CONCEPT OF "THE HUMAN" IN THE WORK OF
HERMANN HESSE AND PAUL TILLICH**

Wilbur B. Franklin

**A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD
at the
University of St Andrews**



1977

**Full metadata for this item is available in
St Andrews Research Repository
at:**

<http://research-repository.st-andrews.ac.uk/>

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

<http://hdl.handle.net/10023/11823>

This item is protected by original copyright

ProQuest Number: 10166503

All rights reserved

INFORMATION TO ALL USERS

The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.



ProQuest 10166503

Published by ProQuest LLC (2017). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author.

All rights reserved.

This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.

ProQuest LLC.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway
P.O. Box 1346
Ann Arbor, MI 48106 – 1346

2nd copy

ABSTRACT

"The Concept of 'the Human' in the Work of Hermann Hesse and Paul Tillich" by Wilbur B. Franklin is an interdisciplinary study in theology and literature. Three chapters each on Hesse and Tillich discuss the life, work, and critical significance of both men. The seventh chapter compares their similarities and their contrasting views.

In his work Hermann Hesse singles out the artist as the best example of true personhood and believes that individuals become fully human by being aesthetes, possessing ironic humor, learning to love unconditionally, expressing themselves while at play, transcending themselves through magical thinking, i.e., bringing into harmony the polarities of life, and finally, by assuming ethical responsibility for life to the point of sacrificial service.

In the work of Paul Tillich existential man experiences estrangement, but essential man possesses a vision of wholeness and therefore of potentiality. However, maturity is to be found in becoming reconciled. Jesus as the Christ is the New Being who reunites man with God. Sanctification describes what it means to be fully human, and participation in a theonomous culture requires that one help make human life more human for others.

The final chapter compares the life and work of Hesse and Tillich and concludes: both men have a tripartite view

of human nature, they recognize the ambiguities of life as well as the demonic element in man, perfection is beyond an individual's grasp but fulfillment is not, and both men are humanists who oppose dehumanization. They differ in that Tillich is more interested in ontology than in psychology. Hesse stresses self-realization, whereas Tillich stresses becoming whole by way of reunion with Being-itself. Hesse appreciates the aesthetic and ethical stages of life but lacks Tillich's emphasis on the depth dimension. Hesse's answer to the human situation is autonomous rather than theonomous as advocated by Tillich.

The implications of both Hesse's and Tillich's thought include the following: becoming fully human is a lifelong process; man is most human when he reflects his best self or the image of God; being human must address itself to the perennial problems of man (sin, suffering, and death); anthropology rather than dogmatic theology is the arena in which the theological enterprise should take place; and finally, the contemporary church needs to be aware of the necessity for both personal religious experience and social action.

THE CONCEPT OF "THE HUMAN" IN THE WORK OF
HERMANN HESSE AND PAUL TILlich

A Thesis
Presented to
the University of St. Andrews

by
Wilbur B. Franklin A.B., B.D., S.T.M.

In Application
for the Degree of Ph.D.



Tu 8824

DECLARATION

I hereby declare that the following thesis is based upon the result of research which I carried out at St. Mary's College, the University of St. Andrews, that the thesis is my own composition, and that it has not been presented previously for a higher degree.

Wilbur B. Franklin

CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that Wilbur B. Franklin has spent nine terms in research work at St. Mary's College, the University of St. Andrews, that he has fulfilled the conditions of Ordinance General No. 12, and that he is qualified to submit the accompanying thesis in application for the degree of Ph.D.

The Reverend Professor
JAMES A. WHYTE
Supervisor of Research

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Pursuing research at St. Mary's College, the University of St. Andrews, was an enriching experience for the author of this thesis. The entire academic community was most cordial in including him in its faculty seminars and social life. The resources of the library and admittance into the faculty center were very much appreciated.

The graduate seminars in the Theology Department were most helpful in providing an understanding of the intellectual background that gave birth to the thinking of Hesse and Tillich.

The insights gained in the Christian Ethics seminars taught by the Reverend Michael Keeling were thought-provoking and stimulating. The Reverend J. D. Trotter's penetrating grasp of Paul Tillich's theology provided guidance and perspective.

As Supervisor of Research, the Reverend Professor James A. Whyte gave wise counsel and constructive criticism. He gave generously of his time and opened his home, sharing holiday occasions as well. This author is most grateful for his able assistance and gracious friendship. The opportunity to serve as part-time tutorial assistant in his department was a valuable experience that is prized highly.

The historic community of St. Andrews was a unique setting in which to live and study. Creative interchange with each of the above persons mentioned contributed to experiences that were meaningful and memorable.

DEDICATED

TO MY WIFE, MARY LOU

Honor, anger, valor, fire,
A love that life could never tire,
Death quench 'or evil stir,
The Mighty Master gave to her.

Teacher, tender comrade, wife,
A fellow-farer true through life,
Heart-whole and soul-free,
The August Father gave to me.

--- Robert Louis Stevenson

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION	1
Chapter	
I. HERMANN HESSE THE MAN	6
The Life of Hermann Hesse	
Intellectual Influences	
Analytical Psychology	
II. THE CONCEPT OF "THE HUMAN" IN THE WORK OF HERMANN HESSE	58
Man as an Individual	
Man as a Social Creature	
Man as a Religious Being	
Becoming Fully Human	
III. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF HERMANN HESSE	129
Literary Significance	
Theological Significance	
Evaluation of Hermann Hesse's Concept of "the Human"	
IV. PAUL TILLICH THE MAN	171
The Life of Paul Tillich	
Intellectual Influences	
Methodology	
V. THE CONCEPT OF "THE HUMAN" IN THE WORK OF PAUL TILLICH	225
Existential Man: Estrangement	
Essential Man: Potentiality	
Reconciled Man: New Being	
Theonomous Culture: Social Fulfillment	
VI. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF PAUL TILLICH	275
The Contributions of Paul Tillich	
The Critiques of Paul Tillich	
Evaluation of Paul Tillich's Concept of "the Human"	
VII. A COMPARISON OF HERMANN HESSE AND PAUL TILLICH	318
Similar Elements in Hesse and Tillich	
Contrasting Elements in Hesse and Tillich	
Implications of Hesse's and Tillich's Concept of "the Human"	

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION	351
NOTES	365
BIBLIOGRAPHY	408

INTRODUCTION

One of the most serious problems of modern man is whether or not he is going to have a human future. There are ecologists who are very concerned about the survival of the human species. Responsible Christians are equally concerned about human survival. But those who believe man will survive the enormous problems that face him are just as concerned about the quality of life he is, and will be, living. Is it, and will it be, a human life? The emphasis here is on the quest for a human future.

Although human existence is a concern for every generation, it is especially so for this generation. The power man possesses, and the magnitude of the problems he both has inherited and is creating, force him to confront the human situation with greater alarm and urgency than in previous generations. Much is being written by persons in many academic disciplines about the future of man. The quality of life man will have will depend upon his responsible use of freedom.

Out of the general concern over human existence, the specific purpose of this thesis is to raise the fundamental question: what does it mean to be human? Is it something man is by birth; or, is it something he becomes? Certainly there is evidence in every century (and the twentieth century, in particular) of those persons who choose to live less than human lives.

An attempt will be made to answer this question by comparing the thought of two men from different professional disciplines and seeing what they have to say about what it means to be human. Paul Tillich will be one of the two men selected to assist in this search

for self-understanding. He has been a philosophical theologian with significant influence in the Christian community as well as outside of it. Because of his profound grasp of the human condition, his Christian commitment through which he sought constantly to enter into meaningful conversation with other persons in various disciplines, and his genuine concern over a human future for man, he has been chosen as a theological spokesman who addresses himself to the issue.

Tillich has said that if you want to know the values and ultimate concerns of any age you will find that it is not the theologian or churchman who gives the best clues. It is always the artist who is most able to reflect the values of any given period of history. For modern man, Tillich includes the social scientist and depth psychologist along with the artist, as being the persons most able to tell where man is and where he seems to be going. However, if he were to choose between the persons just mentioned, Tillich would say it is the artist who expresses himself in novels, poetry, or in painting who gives the best analysis of human experience. Is this observation true?

Hermann Hesse has been chosen to test Tillich's high praise for the artist. Hesse was a novelist and poet by profession and enjoyed painting as an avocation. Because of his enormous influence upon the youth culture of this century and because his life style and writings have included so many contemporary concerns, he deserves serious attention as a person who may be helpful in the quest for what is human.

Therefore, this thesis is an interdisciplinary study in theology and literature with "The Concept of 'the Human' in the Work of Hermann Hesse and Paul Tillich" being the subject of research. Brief definitions of what it means to be human are impossible. Man is more than a concept and defies being categorized in a capsuled statement. That

is why the concept of "the human" is set off in quotation marks. Consequently, it will be necessary to paint with broad strokes, so to speak, the portrait of human existence.

The method of research will be to examine various human experiences as observed by a literary figure and to compare his findings with the thoughtful reflections of a Christian theologian. With what do they agree, and wherein do they differ in assessing what is human? Is there an ethical dimension to their concept of "the human"? How does man become fully human? Can he accomplish it on his own, or is assistance necessary? These are some of the questions Hesse and Tillich will be asked to answer. It is hoped that some clues will be found to one of the crucial questions of modern man: what does it mean to be human?

Primary sources are in abundance since each man was a prolific writer. They will be depended upon for the central substance of this study. Practically all of the primary sources (certainly the most important) have been translated into English. Whenever significant ideas are not available in English (e.g., cogent insights from Hesse's Gesammelte Schriften), they will be translated from the German into English.

In addition, there are numerous volumes of secondary sources. Reference to the selected bibliography at the end of this thesis will show the extent to which Hesse and Tillich have provoked a response from other scholars. However, the writers most helpful in understanding Hesse's work are: Mark Boulby, J. C. Middleton, Joseph Mileck, and Theodore Ziolkowski. The writers most helpful in comprehending Tillich's work are: Guyton B. Hammond, Alexander J. McKelway, Bernard Martin, William L. Rowe, and J. Heywood Thomas. These persons write

from differing points of view, but all of them have something worth saying. Everything in the selected bibliography has been examined and has contributed to this study.

Seven chapters will comprise the structure of this thesis. Three chapters will focus on Hermann Hesse. Chapter one will be entitled "Hermann Hesse the Man." The work of Hesse is inseparable from his life. Therefore, it is essential to know the man if one is to appreciate his understanding of what it means to be human. Chapter two will be most important. "The Concept of 'the Human' in the Work of Hermann Hesse" is at the heart of this research. Different human experiences present in Hesse's work will be isolated for interpretation. A chronological presentation of his work will be made. Chapter three will look at "The Significance of Hermann Hesse." It will try to see Hesse in perspective by evaluating his literary efforts in general and by presenting a theological critique of his concept of "the human" in particular.

The next three chapters will focus on Paul Tillich. Chapter four will look at "Paul Tillich the Man." His personal life was not as closely related to his work as was Hesse's, but it is to be expected that, from his life, insights into what it means to be human would be made evident in his work. The fifth chapter will be vital, because it is "The Concept of 'the Human' in the Work of Paul Tillich." It will include a systematic presentation of Tillich's threefold view of man. Chapter six will be an evaluation entitled "The Significance of Paul Tillich." Positive and negative critique of his theology plus response to his concept of "the human" will be given.

The seventh and final chapter will be a comparative study of the elements which Hesse and Tillich had in common and the lines of

thought that separated them. In addition, an attempt will be made to show the implications of Hesse's and Tillich's thinking.

In this introduction the specific problem that will occupy our attention has been presented. The scope of the problem will be inclusive and broad, because man is a complex and many-faceted being. A brief reference to the relevant resources has been made. And the structural shape this work will take has been suggested by looking at the main topics of each chapter. Following the substance of this study, an attempt will be made to summarize the lessons learned about being human through examining the life and work of Hermann Hesse and Paul Tillich.

CHAPTER I

HERMANN HESSE THE MAN

If what Hermann Hesse has to say about what it means to be human is to be understood, it is necessary to look first at Hesse as a man. It is true that the thinking of most writers is affected by their personal experience, but this is especially true with Hesse. His writing is that of self-portrayal and self-analysis; he consciously restricts his writing to what he can draw from his own immediate environment and from his own experience of life.¹ Upon carefully examining his work, one can practically write his biography (certainly his spiritual biography). It has been said, "Hesse's work reflects his life transformed into art."² The timing and internal action of each of his novels or short stories reveal the dynamic level of his life.

Therefore, in this chapter the main biographical factors that have affected the thinking of Hesse will be related. Secondly, the most important intellectual influences of Hesse will be discussed. And finally, the Analytical Psychology of Carl Jung that so profoundly shaped Hesse's life and work, will be examined.

The Life of Hermann Hesse

The life of Hermann Hesse divides into three natural periods: his early years (1877-1916) tell of his life from birth to his personal crisis; his middle years (1916-1931) tell of his triumph over his crisis and his reestablishment as an important author; and his later years (1931-1962) tell of his mature life and work and the honors granted to him in recognition of his accomplishments. Attention will be paid to

his struggle and growth as a person; the relationships that were important to him; and the historical events that coincided with, and contributed to, his development as a writer.

Early Years

Hermann Hesse was born on July 2, 1877, into a family of Protestant missionaries in the town of Calw in Württemberg, Germany. His father, Johannes, came from Estland, and his mother, Marie Gundert, was from Swabia. His parents met through their common involvement in missionary work. Hermann was given the Christian name of his two grandfathers. His paternal grandfather, Dr. Carl Hermann Hesse, was a physician who was known as ". . . the doctor who gives everything away."³ His maternal grandfather, Dr. Hermann Gundert, was a distinguished Pietistic scholar and a missionary to India for many years prior to returning to Germany where he directed a Calwer publishing house. Dr. Gundert's familiarity with numerous European and Asiatic languages was evident in his work but also in the number of international visitors he had from all parts of the world.

Marie Gundert Hesse was a small but lively person with imagination and warmth. She had been married previously. She and her first husband were missionaries to India, and they had two sons, Theodore and Karl. When her husband died Marie came to live in her father's house in Calw. Johannes Hesse served three years as a missionary to India but because of poor health had to return to Germany where he was employed as an assistant to Dr. Gundert. In 1874 Johannes married Marie; they had six children, two of whom died in infancy. Adele was their first child, and she was followed by Hermann who was born two years later. Then another daughter, Marulla, was born, followed by

a son, Hans. Of the four Hesse children and the two stepbrothers, Adele and Hermann were particularly close, although there was harmony among them all.

From 1881 until 1886 the Hesse family lived in Basel where Johannes was called to edit a missionary magazine. Very early Hermann's mother detected unusual traits in her son: "The boy shows liveliness, physical robustness, and strength of will, and in addition a perceptiveness that is astounding in a four-year-old."⁴ By the time Hermann started to kindergarten his independence was beginning to be a problem.

In 1886 the family moved back to Calw where Hermann attended the town's preparatory school until 1890. During these four years Calw became the town that would be idealized as Gerbensau in his writings. It was a quiet town with beautiful natural surroundings, and Hesse, with his sensitivity and keen observation, identified with everyone and everything.

It is interesting to note that Hesse, when reflecting about his early years, could say: "Like all boys, I loved and envied many callings: the hunter, the raftsman, the railroad conductor, the high-wire performer, the Arctic explorer. My greatest preference by far, however, would have been to be a magician."⁵ This meant a rejection of reality, for with magic he would transform reality. Already the polarity of what was, versus what could be, via his imagination, was evident.

The strange Indian symbols of the curios kept by his grandfather Gundert in a glass cabinet fascinated him. The international visitors who came to his home and the various dialects spoken added to the mystical and magical dimension of reality. Eastern religions and philosophies occupied daily conversation. The home library contained

mysterious and awe-provoking titles and authors, and they were impressive factors that influenced young Hermann.

He made noteworthy comments about his parents and their differences in personality and temperament. He saw his mother as one who, like her father, possessed the veiled wisdom and magic of the East. She was clever and humorous and full of music. But his father was different. He was learned and kindly, a person who stood on the sidelines. He was a seeker and a lonely sufferer, a person with no trace of mystery.⁶

One of Hesse's biographers, Franz Baumer, points out that young Hermann was very musical. At an early age he learned to sing Lieder melodies and chorales by heart.⁷ When he was nine years old he received a small violin which he learned to play well. He later learned to play the flute and continued to play both the violin and flute as an adult.

Hesse's school experiences were not happy ones. He had trouble with teachers. They were demanding and at times inhuman. He said, ". . . there were so very few who had not completely unlearned and forgotten what a child is, how it lives, works, plays, thinks, what it likes and what it hates."⁸ He found them condescending and many times superior to children only in strength. They taught him to lie and to disguise the truth and one's honest feelings. There were but two exceptions: a Mr. Schmid, a teacher of Greek at the Calw Latin School; and Rector Bauer, a distinguished Latin and Greek teacher at Göppingen. Hesse respected both teachers because they assumed the best in him and regarded his highest accomplishment as natural while at the same time they allowed him to be a boy of his age. He went to Göppingen to prepare for the district examinations that would enable him to go to seminary.

After passing the district examination at the head of his class, he was expected by his parents to follow in his father's footsteps in preparing for the ministry. Maulbronn was an Evangelical theological seminary with a rich history that extended back to pre-Protestant days. In fact, it was a Roman Catholic Cistercian monastery with beautiful buildings and memorable surroundings (the setting of several future novels).

The rigid daily routine and the regimented way of life at Maulbronn were in direct opposition to the spirit of young Hermann. He later said: ". . . from my thirteenth year on, it was clear to me that I wanted to be either a poet or nothing at all."⁹ These two factors resulted in his running away from seminary and creating considerable alarm. He spent a night in the woods when the temperature dropped to ten degrees centigrade, and he almost died from exposure. He returned to school, but it was only a matter of time before it became obvious that Maulbronn was not for him. His parents tried to cope with him by sending him to other schools. Some of these were exceedingly strict, with a purpose of breaking his will. Other schools were sympathetic to problem children. On one occasion a faith healer was sought to cure Hesse's restlessness and inability to adjust to school life. From May of 1892 onward, the sensitive and easily excitable young man lived in a period of psychological turmoil. At different times he suffered minor nervous breakdowns and at times seriously considered suicide. He wrote his mother on January 20, 1893, saying that he had sold some school books and bought a pistol, as life was too great a burden.¹⁰ Suicide would later become a repeatable literary theme, but at this time of his life he was experiencing it existentially. He was sick (having severe migraine headaches), angry, and unhappy.

"Hesse was struggling to discover and assert himself, and to protect his identity from the inroads of the stubborn religious attitudes and traditions of his family and from the powerful complex of authority by which he saw himself surrounded."¹¹ He attended the Gymnasium for over a year and began drinking at the local bars and running up debts. In his rebellion and flight he tried to be an apprentice at a bookshop in Esslingen, but it lasted only three days. He then became an apprentice mechanic in a clockmaking business for fourteen months.

Finally, between June of 1894 and September of 1895, Hesse began to find and master himself. While living at his home, he started to read seriously many books in his father's and grandfather's library. He read widely in the areas of world literature and the history of art, languages and philosophy. Although he did not have much formal education after the age of fifteen, he read during these unsettling years what would have been equivalent to a college degree.

By October of 1895 he was ready to take on responsibility. He moved to Tübingen and became an apprentice in a bookshop. In his private hours he subjected himself to a rigorous program of self-education. "He replaced friends and social life with the world of books and poetry, and with neither teachers nor close acquaintances he proceeded to build a world of his own."¹² He wrote poetry and expressed his feelings. His first poem was published a year later and was significantly entitled "Madonna."

Hesse became financially independent from his parents the autumn of 1898 at the age of twenty-one. But more important was his personal identity that exerted itself. "He constructed for himself an aesthetic world picture, a kind of poetic pantheism, and though he told his worried parents in his letters that the Christian faith signified for him

a strong and living power, it was the world of beauty in which he found faith--and that meant the world of poetry."¹³

During his last two years at Tübingen he was part of a group of friends who met weekly to drink beer and discuss the important questions and issues of the day. It was a happy experience in which Hesse was not the lonely outsider but was included as an important member of the inner circle.

After finishing his apprenticeship in Tübingen in 1899, he assumed a position in Basel where he was to live for five years. Basel was the town of Nietzsche and Jacob Burckhardt. His acquaintances were related in some way to the University. He drank in the Basel taverns with a group known as "The Failures' Club" and dreamed of the transience of things and was plagued with hypersensitivity.¹⁴

It was during this time that Hesse fell in love with a proud young lady named Elizabeth LaRoche, but because he was shy he would not reveal his feelings. Also, it was in Basel that he came into his own as a writer while working as an assistant in a bookshop. His first collection of poems, Romantic Songs, was published in 1899 followed by his first prose, An Hour after Midnight. Hesse's attention had long been turned backward--to his origins, to childhood, to the fairy tale. His early work would reveal these themes.

In July, 1900, Hesse went for a physical examination for the Army selective service. He was rejected due to serious nearsightedness. "But his weak eyes were to plague him throughout his life, and he frequently suffered the headaches and neuralgia of which his father was a lifelong victim."¹⁵

On April 24, 1902, Hesse's mother died after a long and painful illness. He dedicated his third book, a large collection of poems, to

her since it was published the same year as her death. He wrote, "I have my dear mother, whose living spirit I constantly feel around me, to thank for what is best in me."¹⁶

One year later Hesse became interested in Maria Bernoulli, a woman nine years older than himself. She was from a well-known family in Basel, and she ran a photography studio with her sister.¹⁷

Hesse was able to leave the book business in 1903 and devote all his time to his writing. Although he was barely existing on what he was able to earn writing, he was enthusiastic about his work. When the novel, Peter Camenzind, was published in 1904, it brought its author immediate fame and success. He became a celebrity and received the "Wiener Bauernfeldpreis," the first of many literary awards.¹⁸

By the summer of 1904, Hesse had received enough royalties from the sale of Peter Camenzind to enable him to marry and pursue a full-time literary career. The many years of struggle had now brought recognition and stability and a sense of satisfaction. The youth of Hermann Hesse was behind him.

Maria Bernoulli was very much like his mother and could easily have stepped out of one of his early poems. The wedding was celebrated in Basel, and together they decided to live a simple life in the country, somewhat in the vein of Ruskin or Tolstoy. In the village of Gaienhofen on the shore of Lake Constance he and his wife found an empty farmhouse (half of which was the house and the other half barn). They had to draw water from a nearby well, and there were no utilities such as gas or electricity. But Maria ". . . laid great emphasis on living beautifully as well as simply, meaning in handsome, dignified houses in a lovely landscape with a beautiful view, in short, in houses that were not ordinary but had beauty and character."¹⁹ It should also

be noted that there was a movement current in Germany of flight from the city to life on the land, a movement with moral and artistic foundations.²⁰

Hesse felt secure for the first time, and his three years in this Bauernhaus were happy ones. His first son, Bruno, was born there in 1905, and there became need for a larger and more comfortable house. They decided to build further outside of the village of Gaienhofen with a view of the shore and distant mountains. But while he was still building his home, he sang the praises of the vagabond and the wanderer as a way of life. Nevertheless, in his new location there was room for a garden, and Hesse spent considerable time working in it.

On the surface things went well. Two more sons were born: Heiner in 1909 and Martin in 1911. And these years were most productive professionally. He created dozens of stories, poems, and such novels as Beneath the Wheel and Gertrude. He also contributed to papers and journals, wrote reviews, and did some editorial work. As early as 1907, together with two other persons, he founded the periodical, März, which was directed mainly against the personal rule of Kaiser Wilhelm.²¹ But he did not as yet take these political activities too seriously.

He had several friends; e.g., Ludwig Finckh, a friend from his Tübingen days, was a medical doctor practicing in the vicinity. Friends who were musicians were frequent guests, as Hesse enjoyed music, and his wife was an accomplished pianist.

However, Hesse's restlessness began to evidence itself. He would have to go for walks with no particular aim, and there were times when he would question whether or not he was really happy. His loneliness was revealed in a poem he wrote in 1911. It was entitled "The Poet" and was obviously autobiographical.

Only on me, the lonely one,
 The unending stars of the night shine,
 The stone fountain whispers its magic song,
 To me alone, to me the lonely one
 The colorful shadows of the wandering clouds
 Move like dreams over the open countryside.
 Neither house nor farmland,
 Neither forest nor hunting privilege is given to me,
 What is mine belongs to no one,
 The plunging brook behind the veil of the woods,
 The frightening sea,
 The bird whirl of children at play,
 The weeping and singing, lonely in the evening,
 of a man secretly in love.
 The temples of the gods are mine also, and mine
 The aristocratic groves of the past.
 And no less, the luminous
 Vault of heaven in the future is my home:
 Often in full flight of longing my soul storms upward,
 To gaze on the future of blessed men,
 Love, overcoming the law, love from people to people.
 I find them all again, nobly transformed:
 Farmer, king, tradesman, busy sailors,
 Shepherd and gardener, all of them
 Gratefully celebrate the festival of the future world.
 Only the poet is missing,
 The lonely one who looks on,
 The bearer of human longing, the pale image
 Of whom the future, the fulfillment of the world
 Has no further need. Many garlands
 Wilt on his grave,
 But no one remembers him.²²

He found more and more reasons to get away from his home in the country. He said, "I am the exact opposite of a peasant, i.e., a nomad, a hunter, an unsettled lone wolf."²³ Finally, he found life unendurable at Gaienhofen, and in 1911 he took a trip to the East with a painter friend, Hans Sturzenegger.

Hesse, who had been intrigued with the East, found that the language barrier and his own poor health prevented him from getting to know the countries and their people as well as he would have liked. But he said, "I have achieved my main object which was to observe tropical scenery and the Asiatic way of life, and I must be satisfied with that."²⁴

However, the trip was a flight from Europe and from himself, and he did not find in the East the inner peace of mind and the contentment he was seeking. From this standpoint his journey was a failure.

After his return from the East, it was clear that life at Gaienhofen would have to end. He would not admit that his marriage was over yet, but signs that it was were beginning to increase. His wife wanted to move to Bern. He wrote,

She wants the children to have Swiss nationality. It's all the same to me, since I have the feeling that I won't put down roots anywhere: at least wife and children might as well attempt to do so. My relationship with my family began a long while ago to become nothing more than concern to bring them in enough money to care for them . . . ²⁵

At the end of 1912 they moved to the outskirts of Bern into the home of the recently deceased painter, Albert Welti. Hesse did write Rosshalde, a novel depicting the dichotomy of art and life, which to a considerable extent portrayed the tension of his own marriage and vocational calling.

When Hesse was thirty-seven the First World War broke out. He went to the German consulate in Bern and volunteered for military service as a noncombatant. He did not want to shirk his duty as a German citizen, but he was refused. He offered his services in humanitarian work, and a little later he was assigned to the Prisoners of War Welfare Organization. He worked selflessly in the local internment camp and edited books, journals, and newspapers, providing reading material for distribution to German prisoners of war in other countries. ²⁶

He published three short stories in a book entitled Knulp in 1915, but the war brought with it mental agony and privation for Hesse. "Deeply upset by what was happening, he opposed the madness of nationalism and appealed to humanity and reason."²⁷ He was an outspoken

pacifist, and as a result he was attacked and his work was considered disreputable. The German press called him a traitor, and he was harassed incessantly, even though he lived in Switzerland.

Added to this, in 1916 his father died; his youngest son, Martin, became seriously ill with meningitis; and his wife suffered a nervous breakdown that resulted in her being put into a mental institution. "Hesse himself was compelled to seek relief in psychoanalysis."²⁸ The secure world of Hermann Hesse had fallen apart.

Middle Years

When a long rest did not produce any results, in 1916 Hesse went to a private clinic near Lucerne for help. Dr. Joseph B. Lang, a disciple of Carl Jung, became not only Hesse's analyst but a trusted friend. "From May, 1916, to November, 1917, Hesse had seventy-two sessions with Lang."²⁹ While undergoing analysis he was also doing war relief work. It was at this time that Hesse began to study the writings of Freud and Jung.

Analysis revealed to him new dimensions that he had previously only surmised. Hesse had succeeded in controlling the conflicts that had pursued him since youth. He found himself forced to put the blame for his suffering and despair not outside himself but within himself:

I was entirely wrapped up in myself and my own fate, though occasionally I did strongly suspect that my case had to do with everything that is inhuman . . . first I had to lose my self-respect, and then my self-contempt; my task was quite simply to endure to the end my glance into chaos in the hope of finding nature and innocence on the other side.³⁰

Demian was an attempt to interpret himself to himself, as becoming conscious of oneself leads to self-knowledge. This new novel conveyed Hesse's experience with psychoanalysis in that it revealed the vital unity of opposites and the law of countermovement.

By the time Demian was published Hesse had come to terms with himself. Since his wife was in a mental institution he had to board his children at homes of friends, or when necessary, to place them in institutions. In the meantime, he had sat alone in his desolate home long enough. In the spring of 1919, he said:

It had become clear that from now on there was morally only one possibility of existence for me: to put my literary work ahead of everything, to live for it, and no longer to take seriously money troubles or any other considerations. If I did not succeed in this, I was lost.³¹

The same year his marriage ended in divorce, although it was not officially dissolved until 1923.

Hesse found in Ticino, in southern Switzerland, the place where he wanted to live. He discovered a home, Casa Camuzzi, in the village of Montagnola. He buried himself in his work and lived as a hermit for four years. He called his balcony his "Saint Jerome's study" and observed:

I see the world down there and think, "They can have it." I have no luck in this world, I have not fitted well with it, and it has answered and repaid my aversion abundantly. But it has not killed me. I still live, I have defied it and held my ground, and if I have not become a successful manufacturer or boxer or movie star, I have become the thing that as a boy of twelve I set myself to be--a poet. And I have learned, among other things, that if one desires nothing of the world and simply observes it quietly and attentively, the world has much to offer of which the world's successful darlings know nothing.³²

In the last years of the war Hesse had lost faith in the value of his creative work. While still at Bern he did discover a new joy, painting. It was an activity of an almost meditative kind, and in Ticino it was to bloom. Already past forty, Hesse painted because it made him more glad, more patient toward reality, for it gave him an additional means of transforming that reality.

His work was beginning to be published again. Demian, published under a pseudonym, Emil Sinclair, proved to be most successful and even won a prize, which forced Hesse to reveal his identity. Other books that followed were: Klein and Wagner, Klingsor's Last Summer, Siddhartha; and a collection of essays, In Sight of Chaos.

Hesse saw the collapsing culture of Europe, and he saw the role of the artist and poet as a reintegrating factor in the cultural situation following World War I. He saw the reconstruction as a gamble because of the temperament of some artists. This was illustrated by a comment in his Autobiographical Writings:

. . . the old somewhat antisocial hermit and lone wolf Hesse, the old wanderer and poet, the friend of butterflies and lizards, of old books and religions, that Hesse who faced the world with determination and strength and who became deeply disturbed if he had to have a certificate of residence filled out by the authorities, or even had to fill out a form for the census takers.³³

He was able to combine his interest in painting with his writing when he published Wanderings, a book that contained his poems, prose, and pictures. Painting was a pleasant pastime, and Hesse did not care whether what he produced had artistic value.

Also, he edited a monthly journal, Vivos Voco, whose object was to assist in the creation of the new Germany and a new way of life. The periodical treated practical social and educational problems. For example, one article Hesse wrote for the journal was a response to the nationalism beginning to occur among the youth. Jews were being blamed for the problems of Germany. Hesse wrote in 1922:

Whether one loves the Jews or not, they are men, frequently much more clever, more active, and better men than their fanatical opponents . . . to make a whole race the scapegoat for the evil in the world and for the thousand serious faults of the German people is a vile exhibition of decadence.³⁴

Such writing brought more personal abuse for Hesse.

In 1923 he sought and was granted Swiss citizenship. Although he had been living in Switzerland for several years, he did not want to sever his ties with Germany during the war years, as it would seem as though he were running away when his country needed him. He also thought that he would be able to assist the cause of German culture if he remained a citizen. Historical developments within Germany changed his mind.

However, the hermit from Montagnola was becoming a stronger person inwardly. He periodically would leave his retreat-like existence and his work to visit friends. On one occasion he met Ruth Wenger, the daughter of a Swiss authoress, Lisa Wenger, and a courtship developed. In January, 1924, he married Ruth. The marriage lasted only a few months, but it was not until 1927 that the divorce actually took place.

He was approaching fifty and was bothered with rheumatism. He made trips annually to the health resort in Baden for the mineral baths available there. He recorded his observations about life in such a place in his little book, A Guest at the Spa. During these years he gave selected readings from his work at various universities and cities. A brief book, Journey to Nuremberg, described such an experience.

In 1927 one of the most important of his novels, Steppenwolf, was published. The leading character, Harry Haller, not only had Hesse's initials but revealed the inner life of a man the same age as he. A fragment from his journal, along with a few poems, entitled Crisis, was published a year later. In it he wrote: "My life is characterized by alternating periods of intense sublimation, asceticism of the spirit, and surrender to naive sensuality, childlike behavior, and also madness and peril."³⁵

When Hesse celebrated his fiftieth birthday quietly with a few Swiss friends, among them was Ninon Dolbin. She was an archeologist,

philologist of ancient languages, and scholar of fairy tales.³⁶ Hesse called her affectionately his Ausländer, i.e., his foreigner, since she was from Austria. They had met a year before, and prior to that they had corresponded for several years, but in 1927 they began to live together. She was more than twenty years younger than Hesse, but it was a relationship that would continue until his death.

In 1928 he was at work on another significant novel, Narziss and Goldmund. It was a spicy book that was very popular (it more than doubled the sale of his other books). In the same year that it was published (1930), Hesse was at a social gathering with a friend, Dr. H. C. Bodmer, and in conversation shared his dream of a house he would like to build someday. His wealthy benevolent friend said he would build it for him and give it to him as a gift to last his lifetime. A new turning point was taking place in the life of Hermann Hesse.

Later Years

In November, 1931, Hesse and Ninon were married and together moved into their new home, "Casa Hesse," situated on a hill just outside Montagnola. It had a beautiful view of Lake Lugano and the peaks of Monte Generoso. This was to be his home for the rest of his life. Here he would balance his life as a writer with the demands of nature in gardening. He would paint, too, and in general enjoy a degree of serenity. But life was not over yet. Changes would take place in fascist Germany that would dramatically affect him, and his last two books of consequence would be new ventures in allegory and in futuristic thinking that would reflect a maturity unknown in his earlier work. Certain perennial themes would still be evident but with a new sense of responsibility. His work was changing from "aestheticism to engagement."³⁷

With the rise of the Third Reich Hesse chose to hold himself apart from political involvement, but from the beginning of the new regime his work was placed on a list of unwelcome literature. His books were not burned, as were those of others, but paper was unauthorized for the publication of his writing by the time The Glass Bead Game was ready to be published.

Hesse had been recognized as a critic of literature, and he reviewed about a thousand books over a sixteen-year period. However, he did not consider himself a real critic; in fact, if he came across a book he did not like, he would not review it. Because of the persecution by Hitler's government, significant Jewish authors were black-listed. It was these writers that Hesse would make a point to review. "Quality, not the author's standing in Germany, was Hesse's sole criterion."³⁸ He recommended books by Jews, and as a result, inflammatory articles were written attacking him. It became clear that in Germany Hesse's antinationalist and antimilitarist attitude had never been forgiven since the First World War.

With the increased persecution of Jews, members of the intelligentsia were critical of what was taking place in Germany. Consequently, the "Casa Hesse" became a frequent resting place for those persons having to escape from Germany by way of Switzerland. Thomas Mann and Martin Buber were among the many such visitors during these years. It also should be noted that Hesse's wife, Ninon, had a Jewish background.

The crisis created by Hitler affected Hesse. He said it was the moment in which he had to summon up all redeeming powers in him to examine and make secure all he possessed of faith. "In the midst of the threats and dangers to the physical and spiritual existence of a

writer in the German language, I turned to the salvation of every artist--work."³⁹

Hesse once declared that The Journey to the East was his first attempt to formulate and set out his credo for life. The action took place in the inner world of the spirit. The leading character was H. H. (an obvious reference to himself) and was an allegorical representation of Hesse's own journey through life--from innocence through despair to self-knowledge and meaning. It was published in 1931.

The ten years before the outbreak of World War II made Hesse " . . . increasingly aware that his poetic mission was by creating to educate: and to construct an image of the humanist tradition as he saw it, with a kind of patient defiance of the times in which he was encircled."⁴⁰ Two things mattered to him during these years: the need to construct a refuge in which he could breathe and live in defiance of the poison around him; and to express the spirit's resistance against the barbaric powers and, if possible, to encourage his friends across the border in their resistance and perseverance.⁴¹

Besides working on his last novel, The Glass Bead Game, he revised and combined some of his shorter works into new editions. He worked daily in his garden, and his wife said his favorite pastime was making earth fires, feeding them, and then dreaming and meditating in front of the smoldering embers. Fire was a sign to him of the return of all things to unity, of purification and refinement.⁴²

The Glass Bead Game was several years in the making. It was to be Hesse's final statement about life. He saw it as the culmination of his life's work. It was finally completed and published in Switzerland in 1943. Very little attention was given to it until it was published in Germany in 1946. The imaginary utopian community, Castalia, existing

several hundreds of years in the future, was the setting for The Glass Bead Game. Castalia was to be the model for a world that had lost its integrity, and the purpose of the game was serenity.

The Nobel Prize for Literature was awarded to Hesse in 1946 for The Glass Bead Game. The city of Frankfurt's Goethe Prize was also awarded to him in the same year. And the University of Bern granted him an honorary Doctor of Philosophy degree in 1947 in recognition of his literary achievements.

During the last twenty years of his life Hesse received thousands of letters, and between answering many of them, plus receiving visitors, there was little time left to do much else. Most of his letters were from young people. Hesse commented: "For twenty years these letters have been the only real proof of the meaning of my existence and work, though they have also been my daily burden and trial."⁴³ Young people were seeking his advice. The letters were personal in nature and reflected confidence in Hesse. On one occasion Hesse gave this reply:

I can no more answer your questions than I can my own. I am as much oppressed by life's brutality as you are. But I have faith that life's meaninglessness can be overcome insofar as I am always able to assert a meaning for my own life. I believe I am not responsible for the meaningfulness or meaninglessness of life, but that I am responsible for what I do with the life I've got.⁴⁴

Although he put a sign at the entranceway to his home to discourage mere curiosity seekers and tourists, one rarely could go to his home without finding some visitor there. In spite of it all, he did find time to write some short stories, essays, a few poems, diary entries, meditations, and open letters published privately and in newspapers.

Looking back over his work, Hesse commented in 1953: "This was a fine feeling, alternating between a timeless, primeval world and the brief epoch of one's own life, but it fatigued one too, to realize that everything experienced and able to be experienced by humans seems so transitory and unimportant."⁴⁵ On the whole he believed that he had remained true to his own nature and had not abandoned the path of self-realization even at times of crises.⁴⁶

The last eleven years of his life he had been suffering from leukemia, although he was unaware of it. He wrote his last poem during the first days of August, 1962. It was called "The Creaking of a Broken Branch."

The broken, splintered branch
 hanging year after year,
 dryly rattles its song in the wind;
 without foliage, without bark,
 it is barren and faded.
 Tired of living too long,
 tired of dying too long,
 its song is hard and tenacious;
 it sounds arrogant, hiding the fear

One more summer.
 Another long winter.⁴⁷

Hesse, the creaking broken branch, was tired and old (he had celebrated his eighty-fifth birthday in July), and he was not looking forward to living another long winter. He died August 9, 1962, in his sleep, of a cerebral hemorrhage.

Intellectual Influences

The intellectual influences that affected Hesse's thinking are important in understanding his work. Many persons were responsible for shaping his thinking, and it would be impossible to suggest in what way they all contributed to his development as a creative author. Therefore, only those persons and movements that most influenced him

will be included in this section. It must be recognized that whereas a certain person or school of thought might have been appreciated by Hesse, he did not completely follow anyone or any particular philosophy. He understood life to be dynamic and open, and he believed it absolutely essential that each person be himself.

His intellectual influences will be divided into three general areas: religious mysticism, German romanticism, and humanism (a term representing a composite of several diverse ideas, personalities, and thinkers). The following influences contributed to making Hesse the kind of man he was.

Religious Mysticism

Hesse was influenced by mysticism, and he would agree with Paul Tillich's definition of it: "Mysticism means inwardness, participation in the Ultimate Reality through inner experience."⁴⁸ It is the union of the Divine with the human. Feelings of timelessness, bliss and serenity are the result of this immediate contact with the Divine. And it is contemplation that leads the way to self-mastery. Some mystics have rapport with the world while others withdraw from the world. Both of these types will be represented in Hesse's characters.

Christian mysticism, by way of Protestant Pietism, was very much an integral part of Hesse's life. His parents and grandparents were committed Pietist Christians, and while it was true that he rebelled against this strict Pietism, nevertheless, he had an appreciation for the deeper issues at stake. From his religious background Hesse received the critical analysis of motives, the search for conscience, and the emphasis upon reflection present in his work. Also, the conflict

between the spiritual and the sensual poles within man was a consciousness he possessed as a result of his religious heritage.

Hesse remarked: "Christianity, not preached but practiced, has been the strongest among the powers which have educated me and formed me."⁴⁹ Yet Hesse's father tried to break his son's will; he tried to get him to submit to his parents' interpretation of the Christian faith. Hesse's will could not be broken. As a result, he was an individualist, even a nonconformist. "I am an individualist and I regard the Christian veneration for every human soul as what is best and most holy in Christianity."⁵⁰ But his nature remained Protestant in that it was unrelenting and critical, for he preferred the risk of uncertainty to the security of orthodoxy. He could admire the heroes of Pietism, e.g., Friedrich Christoph Oetinger (1702-1782), an eighteenth-century Swabian Pietist pastor, who was a dedicated Christian with great sensitivity to human need. Oetinger was a theologian of some consequence, and his thought was oriented toward the central question of being. This ontological concern Hesse appreciated.

But Hesse's liberal, indeed radical, interpretation of Christianity was a problematic area for his family. At the time of his sister Marulla's death in 1953, he wrote her a letter stating that he could never seriously talk out with their parents his doubts and criticisms of the Christian faith. They did not like to hear of his extra-confessional piety drawn from other religions as well as from the Christian religion. He said, "I have taken leave of you, Marulla, without believing in that reunion of which you were certain . . . you are with me . . . to warn me against forgetting in everyday life the divine and solemn . . ." ⁵¹

Attention should be called to the influence of Roman Catholicism on Hesse. Although the authoritarianism and institutionalism of the Roman Catholic church contradicted his own free spirit, there were certain elements he valued. The inward stress on meditation, as present in the monastic movement, intrigued him. Notice the monastic settings of several of his novels, such as Narziss and Goldmund and The Glass Bead Game. Persons in control of their emotions, frequently celibates, appear as important characters in his work. St. Francis of Assisi was the model for Hesse's first novel, Peter Camenzind. The commitment and sacrificial character of St. Francis' life was inspiring to Hesse. On one occasion he traveled to Assisi in Italy to catch the flavor of the community that produced the humble man who chose the servant role.

One of the significant contributions of Roman Catholicism was its emphasis on symbols and aesthetics as a means of communicating the reality of its beliefs. But perhaps the most influential contribution was the maternal element of Catholicism. For Hesse, Mary symbolized more than the fact that she was the mother of Jesus. She represented the feeling level of existence, a feminine and earthy dimension absent in Protestantism. Analytical Psychology made this evident to him.

Intellectually, Hesse had difficulty with the Christian faith. At an early age he deserted the Protestant faith; subsequently, he never belonged to any church. "In letters and essays he repeatedly asserted that he would join the Catholic church if he should ever feel the need for an institutionalized religion."⁵² He considered Catholicism to be superior to Protestantism as a power to create and preserve culture. At the opposite extreme, he rejected nihilism as an answer to the fundamental questions of existence. "He was deeply aware of an all-embracing divinity which could not be expressed in concrete anthropomorphic images;

but was always accessible to mystic intuition."⁵³ The intellectual giants he read and revered led him in the direction of pantheism and a mystical attachment to nature.

It should be recalled that in the eighteenth century German intellectuals (such as Goethe and Novalis) turned to pantheism after rejecting traditional Christianity and after being unwilling to adopt an atheistic position. Pantheists essentially affirmed two things: that everything that exists constitutes a unity, and that this all-inclusive unity is divine. Pantheists have a capacity for awe and wonder in the face both of natural phenomena and of the apparent totality of things.

J. C. Middleton, a Hesse scholar, says that the radical pantheism of Hesse can be observed in that he traces all problems of evil to God, where there is no choice between evil and good.⁵⁴ Poetry is another place where we see evidence of pantheism in Hesse. Among the most serene of poems are those pantheistic confessions of faith in which death is welcomed as a bridge between the individual life of man and the cosmic life of the whole.⁵⁵ This pantheistic view of death can be seen in an interview between Hesse and Miguel Serrano. Hesse is reported to have said:

If you can live in fantasy, then you don't need religion, since with fantasy you can understand that after death, man is reincorporated in the Universe . . . it is not important to know whether there is something beyond this life. What counts is having done the right sort of work; if that is right, then everything else will be all right. The Universe, or Nature, is for me what God is for others.⁵⁶

The religions and philosophies of the East must also be added to that of pantheism and Christian mysticism as having entered Hesse's stream of consciousness in a meaningful way. From childhood on, the East held a fascination for him. Grandfather Gundert's library

provided an introduction to Eastern thought. Later, while studying Schopenhauer, Hesse's interest was furthered when he read a number of basic works of Indian philosophy in the German translations. Hesse's conception of the soul was drawn from the then current texts and commentaries on Oriental thought. Intuition became the psychic organ of cognition, for through the eyes of such intuition the soul saw immediately into existence, and its knowledge was not theoretic but organic.

"In Siddhartha Hesse aimed to establish his 'Asiatic' values: the justification of impulse and the transfiguration of evil."⁵⁷ The emphasis on discovering and following one's own dharma, the search for the self through correct action, and the river symbolism for oneness with the All, were examples of Eastern values. The name Siddhartha was one of the names for Buddha, i.e., one who attained perfection. So, too, were the other names in the novel taken directly from Eastern thought. "Siddhartha was largely an actualization of the concepts of the Gita."⁵⁸

The irresponsible urge and the detached mind were fundamental aspects of human life, in Eastern thought. In Hesse's thinking the mind was the father side of man. It was here that reverence for, and obedience to, spiritual values took place. Contemplation was an important means to the spiritual life. The influence of these ideas on Hesse came first from Indian, and later from Chinese, philosophy and literature.

Death also was understood by Hesse from an Asiatic point of view. Death was never absolute--it was absolved in rebirth. Even the glass bead game had an Oriental origin. A Chinese game called "Go" was played similarly to chess and had a variety of complex strategies that required real intellectual mastery.⁵⁹ Although the glass bead game was a fictional game created by Hesse, there was a pattern of play and a

history that was similar to "Go." The academic concern for the East revealed Hesse's respect for Eastern values. His intellectual curiosity included other esoteric interests such as Gnosticism, astrology, and the occult. Some of these ideas appeared in his work as well.

German Romanticism

The second major intellectual influence upon Hesse was the phenomenon of romanticism. Hugo Ball, Hesse's first biographer, called him the last knight in the glorious cavalcade of romanticism.⁶⁰ According to Bernhard Zeller, Hesse said, "I began to study romantic literature at the age of eighteen, and along with the literature of India and China it has greatly influenced my own thought and writing."⁶¹

Romanticism was a literary, artistic, and philosophical movement originating in the eighteenth century, characterized chiefly by a reaction against neoclassicism; it emphasized the imagination and emotions; it made use of autobiographical material, exalted the primitive and the common man; it had appreciation for nature, and was interested in the melancholy and even remote aspects of human life.⁶² Historically, it was a reaction to the Age of Reason and the overemphasis on fact, devoid of mystery. Tillich observed: "The symbolic-romantic interpretation of nature attempts to give back to nature its qualitative character, its depth, its meaningfulness, by interpreting nature as a symbol of the spirit."⁶³

Romanticism was an intense attitude toward life that included such elements as: the reunification of nature and spirit, obsession with the absolute, irrationalism (if not antirationalism), a longing for the Middle Ages and the Orient. It was a temperament that stressed the uniqueness of the individual (frequently to the point of eccentricity).

The romantic valued intuition and natural feelings to such an extent that he could be accused of subjectivity and sentimentality.

Historical romanticism had long since passed (it covered approximately the period 1770-1830) when Hesse began to write. However, it was German romanticism and the cultural heroes of that era that left a mark on Hesse. One of the "immortals" was Johann Wolfgang Goethe (1749-1832). Hesse said:

Of all German poets, Goethe is the one to whom I owe most, the one who has preoccupied me most, oppressed, encouraged, and forced me to follow him or to rebel . . . To surrender myself to Goethe the poet was easy, for he brought with him the fragrance of youth, together with the fragrance of forest, meadow, and wheat field, and in his language, beginning with the counselor's wife, all the profundity and playfulness of folk wisdom, the sounds of nature and men at work, and in addition a high degree of music.⁶⁴

Goethe had a passion for nature, and his early work revealed the "Storm and Stress" that was characteristic of the period. He possessed an enthusiasm for Greek culture, especially the Dionysian elements in it.

Goethe's novel, The Sorrows of Young Werther, expressed the soul of a hypersensitive individual who was unable to adjust to the real world. This theme was evident in Hesse. Also, in the first part of Faust (written early in Goethe's career) magic had replaced learning as the means by which the mysterious universe could be fathomed. In the second part of Faust (written near the end of Goethe's life) the skepticism over knowledge had been replaced with a trust in the capacity of man to use his mind as well as his heart and with a belief that man could find relative contentment in serving his fellowman. Similarities could be found in Hesse's work.

Hesse accepted other convictions held by Goethe. For example, Goethe believed the universe contains and expresses a creative force

which appears as a duality but is in fact a unity. The idea of polarity, of attraction and repulsion, was seen as basic cosmic forces present in life. Reason alone was insufficient for grasping reality. Imagination and intuition were necessary in order to comprehend the infinite whole. Goethe outgrew these earlier inclinations, and the Greek emphasis on balance and harmonious expression of body and soul became apparent. This found a similar response in Hesse. The idea of striving was important to Goethe and Hesse alike. They thought every man innately felt an urge to strive upwards. And there was a mutual respect for the wisdom of the East. Hesse's high praise for Goethe is apparent in the essay, "Gratitude to Goethe."

. . . I would forbid the reading of Goethe and keep him in reserve as the highest reward for the best, maturest, and worthiest students. . . they would find, in the spirit that can save us and in the readiness to serve that spirit by every sacrifice, no better guide and comrade than Goethe.⁶⁵

In Steppenwolf Hesse made the confrontation with Goethe a major motif. And in The Glass Bead Game ". . . a good case could be made for associating Joseph Knecht with Goethe and with Goethe's alter ego, Faust: both experience a crisis in middle age, after mastering the extant body of knowledge; both manifest an insistent striving; both arrive at a practical, limited sphere of activity."⁶⁶ Certainly there is little doubt between the kinship of The Glass Bead Game and Goethe's Wilhelm Meister. Hesse's chief inspiration for what is universal in man seems to have been Goethe.

Another of the "immortals" who had a great bearing on the thought of Hesse was Novalis, i.e., Friedrich von Hardenberg (1772-1801). Novalis represented the intentions and achievements of romanticism with the emphasis on yearning. According to Karl Barth, Novalis studied life as an artist (be he painter or musician) and believed the more

poetic a thing was the truer it was.⁶⁷ The true poet was considered a genius, and was the true man. Poets exercised a magic power, and were rare nomadic men. The creative man in every age finds himself driven at times to the edge of an abyss of appalling loneliness, yet the secret path to meaning leads inward.

Novalis was a romantic on the border between: the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, philosophy and art, nature and history, and between love and religion--all of which merge into each other at times.⁶⁸ He considered philosophy in its original form to be feeling: it was nostalgia, an urge to be at home everywhere.

Hesse's novels revealed this yearning quality. It was evident in man's restlessness and in his search for ways to fulfill himself. And Hesse chose artists (painters, musicians, and poets) as his main characters. He believed the aesthetic life was in touch with what was real. His characters were wanderers, very much at home in the woods or in mountain climbing. They were able to sleep under the stars without cover, for they had an ability to survive in nature. Hesse emphasized feeling, nostalgia, loneliness, and inwardness--dimensions of romanticism present in Novalis.

Hesse said, "I consider him (Novalis) to be the finest of all recent German poets because he never wrote a single word that was merely decoration or rhetoric."⁶⁹ And a major concern for Novalis was his search for the self. It was

. . . tantamount to monastic contemplation and discovery of Self, the ultimate reunion of the spirit with Creator, the magical merging of truth and love. Novalis' emblem for the mystery of the revelation of Self was the veil of Isis; the visionary lifting of the veil was an outward symbol of inward triumph--Hesse, too, seemed to discover in the vision of the veiled Other the imminent recognition of Self.⁷⁰

Novalis died at an early age (twenty-nine years), but his death was not considered tragic. Hesse said Novalis withdrew into death:

. . . he died by consciously consuming himself from within, a magical, early blossoming followed by an enormously fruitful death. --It is precisely from this strange end of the poet, from his positive, magical, extraordinary relationship to death, that his strongest influence radiates.⁷¹

While it was true that Novalis died of tuberculosis, his will to live was affected by his own personal convictions and by the loss of his young wife. It was his attitude toward death that affected Hesse. Death was not to be feared but to be accepted as a meaningful part of life. This view of death was a familiar theme in Hesse as he confronted the issue of suicide.

Another influential person was Johann Paul Friedrich Richter (1763-1825), a German romantic novelist who wrote under the name of Jean Paul. Sentimentalism, formlessness, irony, and whimsical humor characterized his writing.⁷² His work portrayed the struggle between idealism and reality. He thought that small joys of the senses were to be valued higher than great joys; and man was made happy by little strokes of luck. His romanticism could be seen in the themes of freedom-at-any-price and the transition of youth to adulthood. His books portrayed the idyllic forms of ordinary life, and he saw the contrast between aim and achievement clearly. Hesse said: "Jean Paul is the perfect example of a genius who has not cultivated a single specialty but whose ideal is the free play of all the powers of the soul, who would like to say yes to everything, enjoy everything to the full, love and experience everything."⁷³

But Jean Paul's greatness derived essentially from his relationship with the unconscious. He had a profound intuitive sense, and he sought to combine thinking and feeling in a juxtaposed but harmonious way. Hesse gained from Jean Paul the sense of the continuity and transcendence of the self. Self-consciousness was a means of fathoming the universal in man.

The person responsible for inspiring Hesse to be a writer was Friedrich Hölderlin (1770-1843), a German poet who wrote lyrical verse and prose-poems. Part of Hölderlin's originality was his desire to satisfy his religious longing within the realm of Greek myth and the gods or in some realm where Greek myth could be united with Christian or Germanic or Indic divinities.⁷⁴ In a poem entitled "The Only One" he tried to bring together Apollo, Zeus, and Hercules, with Christ and the Christian God in a syncretistic way. He advocated a universal harmony between incompatible theological affirmations.

However, it was Hölderlin's poem, "Night," that continued to enchant Hesse as no other poem did. It was this poem, that he had encountered as a child, that made him want to be a poet. It was not surprising that in a collection of poems written by Hesse he would include an "Ode to Hölderlin."

Friend of my young manhood, on many an evening
I return gratefully to you, when in the elder bushes
Of the garden fallen asleep
Only the rustling fountains still make a sound.

Nobody knows you, my friend; this new age has driven
Far away from the silent magic of Greece.
Without prayer, and cheated out of gods,
People stroll reasonably in the dust.

But to the secret gathering who sink in their inner lives,
Whose souls God has stricken with longing,
The heavenly strings of your songs
Are ringing, even today.

We turn passionately, exhausted by day,
To the ambrosia, the night of your music,
Whose fanning wing casts us into
A shadow of golden dream.

Yes, and luminously, when your song delights us,
Sorrowfully burning for the blessed land of the past,
For the temples of the Greeks,
Our homesickness lasts forever.⁷⁵

It was Hölderlin's restless life--his defiance of the contemporary world, his loneliness, his vagrancy, and finally, his long period of insanity that caused Hesse to have empathy for him.

In the early poems of Hesse the influence of German romanticism was very much in evidence. After writing Peter Camenzind Hesse said:

My intention was to familiarize modern man with the overflowing and silent life of nature. I wanted to teach him to listen to the earth's heartbeat, to participate in the life of nature . . . I wanted to remind people that, like the songs of the poets and our night-time dreams, rivers, seas, drifting clouds, and storms are symbols and bearers of our yearnings . . . ⁷⁶

Hesse was a romantic in his estimation of feeling. He would not deny all feeling in order to avoid being called a sentimentalist. The capacity to love and to experience the "more than normal" was for him exactly what made a writer.

Romanticism was not something " . . . that inspires teenage girls and causes sensible men to shake their heads, . . . it was not a question of progress or romanticism, of moving forward or moving backward, but of the exterior and the interior world."⁷⁷ Even the nature that he loved he occasionally observed with realistic detachment. And with the passing of time his undisciplined romanticism began to be tempered by the social realities of the twentieth century. Personal and political tragedies brought existential awareness.

Humanism

The third and last category of thought that influenced Hesse includes a strange assortment of individuals. It is difficult to find a term that designates diverse ideas and personalities; therefore, this section is called "humanism." An alternative choice is "individualism." Humanism and individualism are basic concepts which Hesse valued highly. Individualism advocates the liberty, rights, or independent action of the individual.

Humanism is any philosophy which recognizes the value of man and makes him the measure of all things. The limitations and interests of human nature are taken as its themes. Humanism is also a return to the classical world. The exaltation of freedom which man can exercise in nature and society is important. Man is seen to have the capacity to form his world, to vary it, and to better it. Humanists exalt the soul of man, but they also call attention to the body. The value of pleasure is recognized in contrast to asceticism. Note, however, that for Hesse humanism does not necessarily have an antireligious character. The religious views held by most humanists are permeated by a spirit of tolerance.

The persons who most influenced Hesse all have something to say about man, but the convictions held by these persons range from the religiously committed, to the indifferent, to the hostile. Each, in his way, makes his contribution.

A significant influence on Hesse was another "immortal," Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart (1756-1791). Karl Barth suggests that the most obvious qualities of Mozart's music are probably brightness, gaiety, and serenity.⁷⁸ Mozart's acute insight into human nature made it possible for him to penetrate into the hearts of men. "The exciting and appealing aspect of his music was that it came from a height where everything is known and from where the right and left side of existence, happiness and pain, good and evil, life and death have all been perceived in their reality as well as in their limitation."⁷⁹

The music of Mozart is universal because it has no message. To Mozart it was all the same: religious aspiration or amorous pursuit--there was no difference between such extremes for him as an artist. It is interesting that even though Mozart's own subjective experience was

far from happy, his music is free and objective. He did not use music to speak about himself.

It is to be expected that Mozart would appear in a prominent way in the work of Hesse. For example, in Steppenwolf he is the one to pronounce sentence on Harry Haller. And the impact of Mozart on Hesse can be observed in Hesse's journal of 1920 in which he made this entry:

At the start of this day, of this page from the colorful leaves of my life, I should like to write a particular word, a word such as 'world,' or 'sun,' a word full of magic and radiant power, full of sound and richness, fuller than full, richer than rich, a word signifying total fulfillment, total knowledge.

And now in a flash the very word occurs to me, the magic sign for this day. I shall write it large at the top of the page: MOZART. That means: the world has meaning and we can sense this meaning allegorically through music.⁸⁰

Hesse included Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche (1844-1900) among his "immortals." It was Byron, Hölderlin, Schopenhauer, Darwin, and Wagner that Nietzsche most admired. He respected the man who had the courage to follow his instincts, and he believed absolutely in becoming who you are.⁸¹

According to Nietzsche, God, if He existed, was unknowable--only an idea in the minds of man. Nothing that existed in the phenomenal world could have come from "outside" man. If the universe were intelligible it must be from within. Man was in touch with no "beyond." Nietzsche preferred religious uncertainty to certainty, and his aphoristic style in Thus Spake Zarathustra was formulated to shock and to give offense.

Even though Nietzsche lost his mind and died after several years of not knowing who, or where, he was, he left a tremendous impact on German intellectuals. He called for an authentic existence, for man to affirm himself, to have courage to say yes to life when there is

so much evidence for saying no, and for man to stand and be counted--to master himself and become the Übermensch. "Nietzsche was the greatest critic, not of the Christian idea of love, but of the sentimentalized idea of love, where love is reduced to compassion."⁸²

When Hesse was twenty years old he discovered Nietzsche's greatness. He read Thus Spake Zarathustra and later purchased all of Nietzsche's available books, and he read them as though possessed or drunk. Nietzsche was a rebel, a wrecker of traditions, the foe of the self-satisfied bourgeoisie. He had a genius for suffering, a boundless capacity for pain. Hesse appreciated Nietzsche's discriminating mind. On one occasion Hesse said: "It is more proper to be a psychopath than to adapt oneself to circumstances of the time at the sacrifice of all ideals."⁸³ Hesse had two pictures of Nietzsche in his room when he lived in Tübingen and Basel, and from that time on he considered Nietzsche his spiritual mentor.

While Nietzsche was an existentialist who proclaimed that "God is dead!", Fyodor Mikhailovich Dostoyevsky (1821-1881) was an existentialist who believed God was very much alive. Hesse was fascinated by the thinking of both men. At the center of Dostoyevsky's writing is the problem of freedom. Man wants to be totally free, but in fact he is limited by society, economic conditions, history, and especially by God. Man is constantly in revolt against anyone and anything that denies him his freedom. But total freedom can lead to destruction as well as to new life.

During the First World War Hesse studied Dostoyevsky's work and benefited from his thinking about man's ambiguity. For example, Hesse concluded in an essay he wrote in In Sight of Chaos:

The "Russian man" (which we have long since had in Germany also) is not signified by the single word "hysteric," neither is it by the word drunkard, or criminal, or poet, or saint--but by all these characteristics simultaneously co-existing. Russian man--Karamazov--is at once murderer and judge, ruffian and creature of most tender soul. He is the most perfect egoist, just as he is the hero of the most perfect self-sacrifice. Together in this man are exterior and interior, good and evil, God and Satan.⁸⁴

He also learned from Dostoyevsky that every individual bears the guilt and responsibility for everyone and everything.

Hesse was an existentialist in the sense that he took the individual as his starting point and saw the concrete uniqueness of each person. Most of his characters knew the fate of the prodigal son whose inner needs made him break out of the shelter of his father's house, and away from the security of fixed mores and traditions, in order to face the naked reality of life. The motif of "awakening" extended throughout Hesse's work. It was an adventure that could never last longer than some flashing moments in duration. But these moments transformed the human being and his consciousness. The emphasis was on experiencing life rather than being merely a spectator of life. Narziss and Goldmund and Steppenwolf would illustrate this.

The man who became a spiritual brother to Hesse was Romain Rolland (1866-1944), a French novelist, playwright, and musicologist. They corresponded over a period of several years, and it was no secret that through Rolland's pacifism, and consequently, his persecution, a friendship was produced that meant much to Hesse.

As a young man Rolland had been seeking spiritual guidance after being oppressed by the materialism of his day.⁸⁵ He turned to Tolstoy for help, and it resulted in a changed life for Rolland. When he became a recognized writer his themes included: the conqueror being conquered, the great being defeated, and criticism of contemporary civilization. During the First World War he wrote pacifistic papers in which he

appealed to a spirit of internationalism. Due to his unpatriotic stance he was threatened with imprisonment.

It is interesting to note that Rolland's most significant work is Jean Christophe, a novel about a musician who is confronted with the problem of being an artist in an alien world. This "outsider" approach to writing is a repeated theme of Hesse's.

The last person included in this section is Jacob Christoph Burckhardt (1818-1897), a Swiss historian and native of Basel, praised by some as the wisest man of the nineteenth century. Hesse said that three strong influences, at work throughout his life, made him what he was: the Christian and almost totally nonnationalistic spirit of the home in which he grew; the reading of the great Chinese thinkers; and the work of one historian, Jacob Burckhardt.⁸⁶

Burckhardt's specialty was art history, especially Italian Renaissance History. His early romantic ideas of youth lost their attraction for him, and he turned to classicism. He was interested in the Middle Ages and in the dawning of a new civilization from the ancient world to Christianity.

During his student days Hesse read two of Burckhardt's works, Civilization of the Renaissance and Constantine, and came to appreciate the importance of history in regard to values that endure. It is no mere coincidence that a significant character in The Glass Bead Game was a Christian historian named Father Jacobus. The wisdom of the ages seemed to be present in this sage. A study of history contributed to the movement from romanticism to realism in Hesse. It was his long look at man that made him think on the level of universals and the common values of all men. "Jacob Burckhardt was to occupy in the second half of my life a place that formerly had belonged to Nietzsche."⁸⁷

Many more outstanding thinkers and creative artists (such as Lao-tse, Shakespeare, Bach, Schopenhauer, and Tolstoy) played their part in making Hesse the man he was. It is impossible to discuss all the people who shaped his mind and work. In the final analysis great personalities elude all attempts at classification. Drawing from many sources and traditions, they remain themselves. This is true of Hermann Hesse. However, one last section must be presented if his life and thought are to be understood--the impact of psychoanalysis upon him.

Analytical Psychology

In the biographical section it was learned that Hesse sought help for his personal crisis in psychoanalysis. In order to grasp the significance of this experience it will be necessary to examine the relationship between Hesse and his analysts; attention will be given to the principal concepts of Analytical Psychology; and illustrations of Hesse's use of these psychological insights following analysis (in the references and imagery obvious in his work) will be presented.

Psychoanalysts

Hesse underwent psychoanalysis with Dr. Joseph B. Lang, a disciple of Carl Jung. Jung commented on Lang:

He was a curious, though extremely learned man, who had studied oriental languages (Hebrew, Arabic, and Syrian) and was particularly interested in gnostic speculation. He got from me a considerable amount of knowledge concerning gnosticism which he also transmitted to Hesse.⁸⁸

Hesse's analysis with Lang was directly reflected in Demian.

Hesse said that he first met Jung in person in 1916 and read Jung's Symbols of Transformation the same year.⁸⁹ Jung made an impression on Hesse, so that he read some of Jung's other books. In 1921 Hesse had several analytic sessions with Jung. The origins of

Siddhartha and Steppenwolf were, to a certain extent, the direct or indirect result of talks with Jung. Although Hesse read selections from some of his own works to Jung's psychoanalytic association (as he had much respect for Jung), analysis did not greatly interest Hesse after 1922. "Then too I had a fine impression of him [Jung], though at that time I began to see that for analysts a genuine relationship to art is unattainable: they all lack sense for it."⁹⁰

There seemed to be some reticence beneath the surface regarding Jung, for Hesse said that Freud made the stronger impression on him. Hans R. Schmid, in his book, Hermann Hesse, published in 1928, says:

Hesse's abnormal preoccupation with nature and with childhood are considered manifestations of a mother fixation which is rooted in an Oedipus complex and is commonly accompanied by an obsession of guilt . . . Hesse's anxiety neurosis, in turn, can be considered a by-product of an attempt to sublimate his Oedipus complex.⁹¹

Another scholar, Max Schmid, agrees with Hans Schmid, and adds the thought that Hesse's efforts to adjust himself to a peaceful bourgeois way of life are expressions of a ceaseless quest for a Heimat. Viewed psychologically this unrest would suggest an Oedipus complex.⁹²

However, the confidential analytical data that resulted from the many sessions with Lang and with Jung are not available. One cannot determine what unique problems of Hesse's were discussed. A critic, Stephen Koch, accuses Hesse of being an overt homosexual.⁹³ But Hesse's many biographers do not reveal this aspect of his life, if it is a well-known fact as Koch suggests. It could be read into his work if one were trying to do so. For example, in 1931 Hesse wrote a letter in reference to the essential bisexuality of life as explored in Steppenwolf and in Narziss and Goldmund. In Narziss' chaste kiss and confession near the end of the book the latent emotional bond of homosexuality is particularly obvious, and it has led critics to suspect Hesse of this problem. But Hesse replied:

Dass diese Freundschaften, weil zwischen Männern bestehend, völlig frei von Erotik seien, ist ein Irrtum. Ich bin geschlechtlich "normal" und habe nie körperlich erotische Beziehungen zu Männern gehabt, aber die Freundschaften deshalb für völlig unerotisch zu halten, scheint mir doch falsch zu sein.⁹⁴

That these friendships, because they exist between men, are completely free of eroticism is an error. I am sexually normal and have never had physical sexual relations with men, but to insist friendship therefore to be entirely unerotic seems to me false, however.

A case also could be made for a Freudian analysis of Hesse.

But the internal evidence of Hesse's work reveals the extent of the influence that Jung's Analytical Psychology had on him. It is actually the key to understanding his work, particularly after 1917. For that reason, some of the basic elements of Jung's thought must be presented. Only those ideas of Jung's that have a direct bearing on the thinking of Hermann Hesse will be considered.

Psychic Reality

Jung uses the terms, psyche and psychic, to cover both consciousness and the unconscious. He insists upon the psyche being no less real than the physical side of man's life. But Jung says, "Consciousness grows out of an unconscious psyche which is older than it, and which goes on functioning together with it or even in spite of it."⁹⁵ Man participates in a reality that goes far beyond that of consciousness. Jung gives the inner psychic process a value equal to the outer physical process, but the psyche is not dependent upon the physical.

The psyche is dynamic and in constant movement. It serves the purposes of life. In opposition to Freud, Jung prefers to think of the psyche in terms of general psychic energy rather than as a bundle of impulses organized into the adult sexual drive.⁹⁶ Psychic energy is the "libido." The individual cannot control the libido at will.

Irrational elements coming from the unconscious often determine the actions of man. Jung says, ". . . there can be no reality without polarity."⁹⁷ These opposing poles are called "the opposites." The libido progresses, i.e., adapts to one's environment, or it regresses, i.e., adapts to one's inner needs. Man has a need to be in harmony with himself, which means taking into consideration his inner world.

"But the psychic phenomenon cannot be grasped in its totality by the intellect, for it consists not only of meaning but also of value, and this depends on the intensity of the accompanying feeling-tones."⁹⁸ Symbols are the means by which we come to understand the psyche. The symbol unifies the conscious and the unconscious, the rational and the irrational factors, and is the expression of the psychic totality as manifested spontaneously at any given moment. A symbol signifies something relatively unknown in itself but known to be present by its dynamic effect. Dreams are natural and spontaneous products of the psyche, and dream language is symbolic. "Considered from the standpoint of realism, the symbol is not of course an external truth, but it is psychologically true, for it was and is the bridge to all that is best in humanity."⁹⁹

Myths are also important for Jung. "Myth, says a Church Father, is 'what is believed always, everywhere, by everybody'; hence the man who thinks he can live without myth, or outside it, is an exception."¹⁰⁰ Man receives the security and inner strength needed to cope with life by way of religious myth. Myths are expressions of human nature and put man in touch with the creative forces of his being. They express the unconscious.

The ego is the center of consciousness. It is the matrix of knowing and willing. It is what a person means when he refers to "I."

The ego is able to forget or repress what is socially unacceptable. The area that contains the memories of these repressions is called the "personal unconscious." However, all our experience of the outer and inner world must pass through our ego in order to be perceived, and our consciousness is dependent on the unconscious.

Consciousness is composed of four psychic functions: thinking, feeling, intuition, and sensation.

Thus thinking is the function which seeks to apprehend the world and adjust to it by way of thought or cognition, i.e., logical inferences. The function of feeling, on the other hand, apprehends the world through an evaluation based on the feelings of "pleasant or unpleasant, acceptance or rejection." . . . Sensation perceives things as they are and not otherwise. . . . Intuition also "perceives," but less through the conscious apparatus of the senses than through its capacity for an unconscious "inner perception" of the inherent potentialities of things.¹⁰¹

Thinking and feeling are antithetical but rational functions, whereas sensation and intuition are just as antithetical but are irrational functions.

Individuals have a tendency to develop one function more than the others. The way one reacts to inner and outer experience will indicate either of two attitudes: extraversion or introversion. The extraverted attitude is characterized by an outward interest in people and things--a relationship with them, and a dependence on them is evident. This person is sociable and confident even in unfamiliar surroundings. The earliest mark of extraversion in a child is his quick adaptation to the environment.¹⁰² The child moves and lives among objects with trust. He is less cautious, and everything unknown seems alluring. Extraverts have a tendency to be superficial, and they lack the ability to be self-critical. The introverted attitude is characterized by withdrawal and a looking within. This type is very subjective and lacks confidence--tending to be unsociable and preferring

reflection to activity. Introverted persons are very sensitive and overly conscientious, pessimistic, and critical of themselves.


For Jung, persons are a combination of the four functions of the psyche, and it is a matter of degree as to whether one is an introvert or an extravert. In the life of an individual an attitude of extraversion or introversion is usually constant, but the two attitudes can alternate at certain times.

Most people use one function (or its modification), more complicated people use two functions, and a very highly differentiated personality would make use of three functions. The inclusion of the fourth function belongs to what Jung has called the individuation process, and the reconciliation of the opposing trends of one's nature.¹⁰³

Individuation will be discussed later.

In the process of living, however, man adapts himself to his world. He develops along the line of least resistance, and he develops a side of his personality that is turned toward the outside world. It is called the "persona" and is a mask behind which people live.

"Fundamentally the persona is nothing real: it is a compromise between individual and society as to what a man should appear to be."¹⁰⁴ In a sense, the persona mediates between the ego and the outside world. The relationship of the various aspects of consciousness can be seen in the following diagram by Jolande Jacobi.¹⁰⁵



Archetypes

Another Jungian term is the "shadow." It is to be found in the personal unconscious and is the inferior being within us. It is that dimension of life that wants to do all the things one is not allowed to do. "The shadow is the personal unconscious; all those uncivilized desires and emotions that are incompatible with social standards and our ideal personality, all that we are ashamed of, all that we do not want to know about ourselves."¹⁰⁶ The shadow is the instinctive side of man. It takes moral effort to become conscious of the dark aspects of the personality, for the shadow challenges the whole ego-personality. The integration of the shadow marks the first stage in the analytic process, and that is necessary, for without it a recognition of archetypes is impossible.¹⁰⁷

As one passes through the personal unconscious one discovers a deeper and darker area of the unconscious. Jung calls it the "collective unconscious." Just as the body contains elements that are common to all men, so also are certain characteristics in the psyche common to all men. Primordial images, or archetypes, are left over from bygone evolutionary stages. An archetypal image is like a portrait of an unknown man in a gallery. His name, biography, and existence in general are unknown. But it can be assumed that the picture portrays a once living subject, a man who was real. The collective unconscious is the reservoir of human psychic experience from man's ancestral past. Dreams, myths, and religions reveal these images of the collective unconscious. Archetypes can be recognized as human or semi-human forms such as gods or goddesses, dwarfs, or giants. But archetypes are not only images, they are experienced as emotions as well.

The "anima" and "animus" would be two examples of archetypes in

the collective unconscious. They are the feminine and masculine components within a person. A man contains a feminine element (anima) and a woman a male element (animus). They serve as mediators between the conscious mind and the unconscious. "An inherited collective image of woman exists in a man's unconscious, with the help of which he apprehends the nature of woman."¹⁰⁸ The anima expresses herself in fantasy, mood, and in emotional outburst. The anima is a ". . . semiconscious psychic complex, having partial autonomy of function."¹⁰⁹ She is wise and good and goddess-like, or she can be the opposite, a prostitute or witch.

The animus in woman is ". . . the collective image of man which a woman inherits; her own experience of masculinity coming through the contacts she makes with men in her life; and the latent masculine principle in herself."¹¹⁰ The animus is the opinion side of woman, the side that craves power. It is evident in acts of aggression. "The animus corresponds to the paternal Logos just as the anima corresponds to the maternal Eros."¹¹¹ These two elements are most important in understanding Hesse--note Narziss and Goldmund, in particular.

Two other archetypes are the "wise old man" and the "great mother." The wise old man is the archetype of meaning. He possesses "mana," i.e., power. A person possessed with this archetype has a feeling of being godlike or a superman. He feels endowed with unusual powers of wisdom, prophecy, and even healing.

Persons possessed with the great mother archetype believe themselves to be capable of infinite love and understanding--a person who will be willing to help another at any price. This involves the motif of a dual-mother. One of the mothers is the real, human mother, the other (the archetypal) is the symbolic mother. "He who stems from two

mothers is the hero: the first birth makes him a mortal man, the second an immortal half-god."¹¹²

There are other archetypes, but they do not directly affect the work of Hesse. What needs to be examined next is the concept of "the self" in Analytical Psychology.

Selfhood

Whereas the ego is the center of the conscious life of man, "the self" includes the conscious and the unconscious. Its function is to unite the opposing elements in man and woman. It involves struggle and suffering. "For, paradoxically, the self is not only the centre, but represents the whole man; making a unity out of the contradictions of his nature, all that is felt to be good, and all that is felt to be bad; maleness and femaleness, the four functions of thinking, feeling, sensation, and intuition: the conscious and the unconscious."¹¹³ The experience of the self is archetypal and frequently it is a child who symbolizes the self. The expression in dreams of roundness, the circle or sphere, or by the "quaternity," are symbols of wholeness which the child archetype represents.

Historical figures, such as Buddha and Christ, are examples of those persons who achieved full selfhood, i.e., they realized their potential. They were individuated, and consequently, fully human. For Jung the self is the center of man worth coming to know. Becoming a self is dangerous. It can lead to a sense of realized potential, of peace and harmony within; or, it could lead to madness. Symbols of the self are mandalas in the form of a magic circle, wheel, egg, or even a cross. Mandalas serve as symbols of the nature of deity, and a typical mandala is based upon the number four. It brings together many diverse elements into a single unity, and it points to a center or goal.

A hermaphroditic figure is also a symbol of completeness. Hesse uses such a figure in Steppenwolf and in The Journey to the East. The symbolic conjunctio oppositorum is reflected in Haller's mind in the conjunction of Pablo and Hermine--they represent the creative union of male and female principles (the hermaphrodite) in his own soul. "Yet Haller is proven unable to recognize this symbol of the unity of his psychic and conscious life in the self."¹¹⁴ In The Journey to the East H. H. discovers a figure that unites Leo and H. H. (back-to-back like Siamese twins). This symbolizes the fact that Leo is in reality H. H., an image of his own self at a deeper level of consciousness.

According to Jung, in the past, when symbols of wholeness appeared in dreams, man felt reconciled or at one with a deity. This is not true today. "There is no deity in the mandala, and there is also no submission or reconciliation to a deity. The place of the deity seems to be taken by the wholeness of man."¹¹⁵


If a man wants to be happy, he cannot live at odds with himself. Self-realization, or coming to selfhood, is what Jung means by "individuation." It means bringing to consciousness what is unconscious. Individuation is to Jungian psychology what reconciliation is to Christian theology--both are concerned with the idea that man becomes what he is meant to be. Man becomes psychologically whole.

Experiencing the self is the same as experiencing the God within. The self is a God-image, or at least cannot be distinguished from one. However, for Jung, God includes both good and evil (he points to the Old Testament concept of a God who is both good and evil, i.e., gets angry and punishes people, as well as loves them). Evil is psychic and can be accounted for within man. In order to avoid a dualism, Jung adds the evil, or negative, side of reality to the Trinity to form the

four-sided deity. At other times he realizes that the feminine component is missing in the deity, so she becomes the fourth element. On one occasion Jung combined the negative and the feminine to make up the completed quaternity. He was not always consistent, but he did believe quaternity was a symbol for integration. "The quaternity is an organizing schema par excellence, something like the crossed threads in a telescope."¹¹⁶

The concept of opposites was a problem for Jung in accepting Christ as an archetype of the self. He opposed traditional theology and the perfect goodness of Jesus by saying: "There can be no doubt that the original Christian conception of the imago dei embodied in Christ meant an all-embracing totality that even includes the animal side of man."¹¹⁷ The Antichrist corresponds to the shadow of the self. God and Christ are psychological realities that can be known, but whether either have a "higher" or "other" reality cannot be established.

The important thing for Jung is that the experience of the self means the personality is liberated, healed, and transformed. Wholeness is a human experience. The following diagram may be helpful in understanding the various elements present in the unconscious.¹¹⁸



Implications

The significance of the impact of Analytical Psychology on the thinking of Hesse will become more explicit in the next chapter, but a few of the implications can be shown at this time. For example, in 1916, at the age of thirty-nine, Hesse arrived at a crisis in his life. Jung said, in his book, Modern Man in Search of a Soul: "Among all my patients in the second half of life--that is to say, over thirty-five--there has not been one whose problem in the last resort was not that of finding a religious outlook on life."¹¹⁹ It was not surprising that Demian, Siddhartha, and other of Hesse's writings reflected this searching within for answers to the problem of what it means to be man. Jung was a person who lived on the boundary of poetry and science, of philosophy and psychology, and his unique observations and findings affected Hermann Hesse.

Certainly Hesse was an introvert. He was a Seelenmensch and his whole life reflected a quest for a Heimat, for a Seelenzustand, a world in which life's tensions would be resolved.¹²⁰ He was concerned about self-knowledge and self-realization. Acceptance of life and loving relationships centered upon looking within and meditating.

Hesse would defend himself when he was criticized for being too inward looking by agreeing with Jung's thinking: "In the East, the inner man has always had such a firm hold on the outer man that the world had no chance of tearing him away from his inner roots; in the West, the outer man gained the ascendancy to such an extent that he was alienated from his innermost being."¹²¹

Psychoanalysis allowed Hesse to experience the raw materials of the mind in which the primitive and instinctual exist in relation to reason and the intellect, and all of this had its effect upon his

imagination. He profited from finding in psychoanalysis what he regarded as a living philosophy of inward phantasy, an insight into the relation between myth and fiction.

Hesse possessed a personal belief in the reality of a force within oneself that one could surrender to and from which one could take direction. He referred, in his Autobiographical Writings, to "the little man" within him who appeared in times of danger and whom he was compelled to follow.¹²² Obviously in Jungian terms this was an archetype manifesting its power over Hesse.

Both Hesse and Jung considered themselves magicians, and they emphasized being true to oneself. Man was to live according to his own nature. After coming to self-knowledge, one should then live with the truth about oneself.

A number of Jungian ideas can be seen in Hesse's work. Demian reveals the shadow side of man, and Abraxas is the Gnostic god of the opposites. Steppenwolf portrays man's various selves, and the anima of Harry Haller is Hermine. She exercises authority over him. She gives Harry lessons on how to live. "Harry recognizes that the special attraction he has for Hermine is based on the fact that she serves him as a kind of mirror in which he learns to know himself."¹²³ Jung believes that a person who expresses his inner life must progress beyond the anima archetype to that of the wise old man. Mozart is metamorphosed into Pablo at the end of Steppenwolf and can do wonderful things with his powders, cigarettes, and liqueurs, and of course he is the operator of the Magic Theater in which processes of psychological transformation take place.¹²⁴ Also, water is a symbol that is understood in Jungian thought as representing the mother of man. Several characters drown (e.g., Hans Giebenrath, Friedrich Klein, and Joseph Knecht), and yet

their death is not seen as tragic in the usual sense of the term. Sometimes it is meant to be understood as fulfillment.

Under analysis Hesse came to see the relativism of all concepts and the need to accept the ambiguities of life. The polarities of human existence (such as contemplation and action) were constantly in tension in Hesse. Another Jungian concept that was frequently symbolized in Hesse's work was the motif of rebirth. Present in all rebirth symbolism is the transcendent dimension which results in an increase of consciousness.

The impact of Jung's thought on Hesse has been indicated. However, to temper what has been said, reference may be made to an essay on "Artists and Psychoanalysis," written by Hesse, in which he says: What analysts have recognized and formulated scientifically has always been known by the poets.¹²⁵ They are the dreamers; the analysts are the interpreters of their dreams. Analysis cannot make a man into an interpreter of the soul who has not been a poet before, who has not felt the inner flame and heartbeat of the emotional life.¹²⁶ The poet has a grasp of emotional processes, and this is an intuitive thing--not an analytic thing. Analysis confirms the value of fantasy or fiction and helps one come to terms with his own unconscious. "It teaches us to see, to acknowledge, to explore, and to take seriously exactly that which we have most successfully repressed."¹²⁷ It makes visible what has been repressed, and it helps one to see the significance of life and the importance of personality. But note also that Dostoyevsky and Jean Paul are examples of artists who explored the same avenues of thought and experience as the analysts.

In summary, Hermann Hesse was a man whose life and work revealed many crosscurrents. First of all, his personal destiny dramatically

affected his writing. Biographical circumstances were constantly being translated into his literary efforts. In the second place, there were three main intellectual influences upon Hesse's life: mysticism by way of Christianity, pantheism, and the religions of the East; German romanticism by way of the personalities of Goethe, Novalis, Jean Paul, and Hölderlin; and humanism by way of Nietzsche, Dostoyevsky, Mozart, Rolland, and Burckhardt. Psychoanalysis was the last major contributing factor in making Hesse the man he was. Freud and Jung's disciple, Lang, each played a part, but it was the thought of Jung that influenced his work the most. Analytical Psychology was a source of stimulation for Hesse's creative imagination.

Hermann Hesse has been seen to be a very human writer. What he has to say in his work about being human will be the task of the next chapter.

CHAPTER II

THE CONCEPT OF "THE HUMAN" IN THE WORK OF HERMANN HESSE

What does it mean to be human? It is something man is by birth; yet it is also something man becomes. History is full of examples of persons who lived less than human lives. The purpose of this chapter is to examine the concept of "the human" in the work of Hermann Hesse.

Man is a complex being with a variety of dimensions to his personhood: he is a physical being, possesses a life of the mind, lives in society, and experiences a depth dimension within him that can be designated as spirit or soul. Hesse's writing is concerned about these different elements in man. This chapter will be divided into four main sections: man as an individual, man as a social creature, man as a religious being, and man as a fully human person.

Man as an Individual

In a sense it is artificial to take man out of a context, i.e., a community of other men. Although it is true man can only be man when in relation to others, it is also true he needs to see himself as a person separate from others. What Hesse has to say about human nature is not exhaustive. He has some favorite ideas and themes which he uses frequently. Attention now will be focused on Hesse's thinking regarding the individual's experience of being human.

The starting point for Hesse is: a person must learn to be himself. "The questions may be the same for every man, but the answers vary from individual to individual. 'Loneliness is the way by which destiny leads man to himself.'"¹ Most of Hesse's characters (especially

in his early work) are lonely individuals trying to discover who they are and what life is about, in the fullest sense. In the short story, "The Poet," the leading character, Hans Fook, ". . . realized that at all festivals and with all joys of this earth he would never feel wholly comfortable and serene at heart; even in the midst of life he would remain solitary and be, to a certain extent, a watcher, an alien."²

To be human man must be honest with himself. Demian illustrates this: "Through total honesty he is able to discover himself and the way appropriate to him and to affirm this way as his own destiny."³ The character, Knulp, makes it clear that ". . . no matter how close two human beings may be, there is always a gulf between them . . . In the end, we all have a life of our own that we can't share with anyone else."⁴ This uniqueness of man is seen in a further statement when Knulp says, "Every human being has his soul, he can't mix it with any other . . . A father can pass on his nose and eyes and even his intelligence to his child, but not his soul. In every human being the soul is new."⁵

The novel, Demian, shows not only the uniqueness of man but the importance of each individual.

. . . Every man is more than just himself; he also represents the unique, the very special and always significant and remarkable point at which the world's phenomena intersect, only once in this way and never again. That is why every man's story is important, eternal, sacred; that is why every man, as long as he lives and fulfills the will of nature, is wondrous, and worthy of every consideration. In each individual the spirit has become flesh, in each man the creation suffers, within each one a redeemer is nailed to the cross.⁶

If we are to find out who we are we must look within. "There is no reality except the one contained within us. That is why so many people live such an unreal life. They take the images outside them for reality and never allow the world within to assert itself."⁷

This sense of inwardness and introspection is prevalent in Hesse's work. It is essential for man to come to terms with himself and then to do what his inmost heart desires. "An enlightened man had but one duty--to seek the way to himself, to reach inner certainty, to grope his way forward, no matter where it led."⁸ The difficulty is that human beings rarely live in touch with their inmost selves. But for Hesse this is essential.

The reason that it is difficult for man to live a real life is the ambiguity that he experiences everywhere. "If only there were a dogma to believe in. Everything is contradictory, everything tangential; there are no certainties anywhere."⁹ Man has to be prepared for conflicts because everywhere in life there is simultaneously nobility and baseness, eternity and death, grandeur and absurdity. Throughout Hesse's work there is the longing to find a reconciliation of opposites, to discover an absolute behind the polarity in man's nature.

For ambiguity to exist there must be polarity, and for Hesse the basic issue man encounters is the pulling within himself to obey the life of the mind or spirit (Geist) or to obey the natural life of the instincts (Natur). Steppenwolf illustrates this when Harry Haller says:

. . . he was always recognizing and affirming with one half of himself, in thought and act, what with the other half he fought against and denied . . . It is open to a man to give himself up wholly to spiritual views, to seeking after God, to the ideal of saintliness. On the other hand, he can equally give himself up entirely to the life of instinct, to the lusts of the flesh, and so direct all his efforts to the attainment of momentary pleasures.¹⁰

This conflict or tension is the cause of man's ambiguity. Hesse fluctuates between these two poles which lead him " . . . to define his own artistic ideal as a 'counterpoint for two voices.'"¹¹

The first night Harry Haller, in Steppenwolf, spends with Marie (a prostitute) he discovers " . . . a new interior of his mind opens

by his discovery of the body."¹² Man lives in time and space and the call of the flesh is loud while at the same time the call of the spirit haunts man with what can be. This theme of antagonism between the ideal world which is pure, and a real world that is impure, dominates Hesse's work. Consequently, Hesse's characters vacillate between noble hopes and disillusionment. His early work, e.g., An Hour after Midnight (1899), draws images from the fantasy world of dreamland.

Hesse is not always clear when he uses the term, "soul." At times he sees it as something which is pure and not affected by the will, desire, or intellect. It is something which is spontaneous--it is unbiased instinct and feeling.

The terms "soul" and "spirit" in the work of Hesse are comparable to clouds which continually change their shapes and outlines . . . some refer to the "world of images" and to the sphere of truly human feelings . . . the Soul could be defined as the battleground and meeting place of Nature and Spirit . . . in Hesse's later stages, the spirit at times appears as equivalent to God the Father.¹³

The soul is not to be understood in a psychological way, nor is it to be understood as merely intellectual activity, for Hesse. Soul, or Seele, is to be understood on a metaphysical level. It possesses an element of transcendence above that of mind or intellect.

Whenever one looks at the polarities in Hesse, one discovers that Geist and Natur have a masculine and feminine interpretation. The father element is the head and the mother element is the heart. The novels Beneath the Wheel, Demian, Steppenwolf, and Narziss and Goldmund all have this motif. Conflict exists between the creative sensuality (feminine) and the controlling intellectuality (masculine). A desire for a synthesis is seen in a quest for the integration of a transcendental soul. It is interesting to note that the feminine pole has a " . . . double function of mistress and mother, woman embodies for Hesse the libidinal force which

represents the artist's material (the world of nature which he must incorporate and merge with his own) and the maternal goal, the Ungrund, in which salvation and aesthetic reconciliation are found."¹⁴

In the last chapter it was learned that Hesse was spiritually akin to his mother in whom mystery and magic were present. This mother-principle was explicit in Goldmund who said: "The thing I love and hanker for is mysterious . . . in her the furthest opposites shall be reconciled, living together in my work: birth and death, pleasure and pain, life and destruction; all which, outside her, could never make peace in the world."¹⁵ Hesse saw the poet as one who belongs to the world of the naive and the individual, to the world of children and women--even to the world of fools--hence he is constantly longing for the night, the Eternal Mother, the symbol of death, for the night transports him again to the dreamworld of childhood.¹⁶

In addition to the life of the child, the vagabond is a popular character in Hesse, and he is usually the kind of a person who gives in to "nature," i.e., he lives an unrestrained life, without consideration for social concerns. He experiences loneliness but also a radical freedom. He follows the mother side of life in which chaos can be found. It is important to note that Carl Jung, too, locates the evil and emotional side of life in the feminine component. It should not be surprising that Hermine in Steppenwolf is the feminine archetype of Haller and brings him to new levels of consciousness by way of physical pleasures. Hesse's heroes are out to master life. "They want to be artists in the art of living."¹⁷ And this means coming to terms with the dark and mysterious (feminine) side of life.

The opposite pole is the Geist. Thinking is a most important part of being human. Hesse's early heroes are all thinker types, i.e.,

they are most alive when they are using their minds. His work portrays mental histories, and the plots of his stories are monologues. For example, Peter Camenzind is a mental history of a single person seen during a brief period of mental conflict--the excursion of a private and eccentric young man into the public world and his return home.¹⁸ Hesse is criticized for having two-dimensional characters that are flat--not real live human beings. This is due to his overdevelopment of the mental life (typical of introverts), and it is not until Demian that a fuller characterization takes place.

Mental man lives detached from much of life. Hesse identifies with these persons, and he is able to describe the existence of a person such as Lauscher (one of his earliest characters, in An Hour after Midnight) who is caught in the dichotomy between the ideal and actual worlds. Lauscher is the first Narziss, i.e., a reflective person who lives most fully in the life of the mind.

In Steppenwolf a portrait of an intellectual is depicted. "Harry Haller leads a highly verbal existence; he soliloquizes in solitude, his silent words circling that most familiar of monologic questions: to be or not to be."¹⁹ In spite of everything, Harry remains actively cerebral. He cannot forget himself and let himself go. That would take an act of irrationality, and he could not relax the controlling checks on his inhibited life. He cannot live with reckless abandonment. Haller can recognize the fact that many people refuse to stop thinking. "After-all, they are made for life, not for thought. Yes, and he who thinks, what's more, he who makes thought his business, he may go far in it, but he has bartered the solid earth for the water all the same, and one day he will drown."²⁰ Water is a Jungian symbol for mother, and Haller is condemning his predicament.

In his musings recorded in the book, Wandering, Hesse says that
 " . . . there is no center in my life; my life hovers between many poles
 and counterpoles. . . . between my urge to travel and my homesickness.
 . . . My concern is to be unsatisfied and to endure restlessness. . . .
 But to be satisfied was the very thing I could not bear."²¹ Everything
 is built on opposites, on division: man or woman, vagabond or citizen,
 lover or thinker. His poetic words say it best.

Saying yes to my heart . . .
 Gaze at the circling moon and stars,
 Guessing their direction,
 Feel myself one with them
 On a journey
 No matter where.²²

To be human means to live with ambiguity--to accept life with its
 contradictions. This acceptance of life in all its forms finds its most
 emphatic expression in Hesse's poetry. "The relative insignificance of
 one man's life does not release him from the perpetual civil war within
 himself. Each man's life is the plaything of two forces, mind and mat-
 ter, and few there are who reach a synthesis."²³

Hesse's work also shows the tension between an individual's use
 of freedom and his sense of personal destiny. In the collection of
 three short stories named after its central figure, Knulp, the importance
 of freedom in Hesse's thinking is seen. Knulp says, " . . . I've never
 relied on anyone's word and I've never given my own. . . . I've lived my
 own life as I saw fit, I've had my share of freedom and good things, but
 I've always been alone."²⁴ On a different occasion Knulp portrays the
 independence he has experienced as a directionless wanderer:

I'm a pretty good whistler, I can play the accordion, and I make up
 a little poem now and then; I used to be a good runner and I wasn't
 a bad dancer. That's the sum of my talents. But I didn't enjoy
 them alone. . . . My little gifts gave them pleasure and sometimes
 they were thankful to me. Why ask for more?²⁵

But later on Knulp came to realize the misuse of freedom. He had wasted his life. "He had thrown himself away, he had lost interest in everything, and life, falling in with his feelings, had demanded nothing of him. He had lived as an outsider, an idler and onlooker."²⁶ He was very much aware of what he could have been. He could have been something more than a poor tramp. He had gifts, more than a lot of other people, but he made no use of them.²⁷

Opportunities can be lost if one is indecisive and fails to exercise one's freedom responsibly. Rosshalde is a story about a middle-aged painter, Johann Veraguth, who has an estranged relationship with his wife--the only reason for remaining together is the love they have for their youngest son. Although they are living on the same estate, they sleep in separate buildings and live separate lives--trapped in an empty marriage. A friend of Veraguth's tells him:

You sit here buried, engrossed in your work and your unhappy marriage. Take the step, break away from all that; you'll open your eyes and see that the world has thousands of wonderful things to offer you. You've been living with dead things too long, you've lost your contact with life.²⁸

This at least starts him thinking about his hollow life and his refusal to seek an authentic existence. He has to admit that he ". . . had lived the unnatural but consistent life of a man who, having immured himself of his own free will, had lost interest in life, which he endured rather than lived."²⁹

Just as Veraguth has to act in order to alter the circumstances that keep him from living a full life, sometimes also a person has to accept the circumstances that become part of his destiny. This is true in Gertrude, a novel about a crippled composer, Kuhn, who loves a woman (Gertrude). She, however, loves and marries another man. In spite of being lonely and frustrated in love, Kuhn expresses himself through his

music and the creative process. Kuhn could say, ". . . my inner life has been of my own making. I deserve its sweetness and bitterness and accept full responsibility for it."³⁰ But at the same time there is an awareness that destiny is the other pole, opposite of freedom, with which one must reckon. "If what matters in a person's existence is to accept the inevitable consciously, to taste the good and bad to the full and to make for oneself a more individual, unaccidental and inward destiny alongside one's external fate, then my life has been neither empty nor worthless."³¹

To live is to choose. But choices are limited by the "givens" of each person's personal history. It is important to see that the poles of man's being are not contradictory but parts of a greater whole. In the short story, "Klein and Wagner," Klein is a man on the run from his domestic and vocational life. He is trying to make sense out of a predicament he created (he embezzled money from his company). He tries to rationalize his current existence in another country. After attempting to forget what he has done, he still cannot make peace with himself. He is having difficulty living with the guilt involved.

Freedom does involve risk. In Narziss and Goldmund, the story of a scholar and celibate (Narziss) and a handsome artist (Goldmund) who is irresistible to women, the Apollonian and Dionysian theme again appears. Usually this tension is within the life experience of one man, but Hesse chooses two characters to live out these counter pulls. Goldmund is a person willing to take all kinds of risks to enjoy the pleasure of the moment--a person who lets his senses have free rein. "He had no care for any heaven. He wanted nothing but the passing, uncertain life on earth--but to breathe, and be at home in his own skin. He wanted nothing but to live!"³²

This most popular of Hesse's work might seem to advocate promiscuity and the sensual life, devoid of commitment. But Goldmund, attractive and lovable though he might be, is a tragic figure. What he seeks to accomplish in life (an artistic creation of Eve, the Mother of man), he is never able to realize. And although he has sexual experiences with many women, and loves them in his way; not one returns his love, all are temporary relationships. "That had been his life, he thought, leave-taking, running away, being forgotten, being alone again with empty hands, and an icy heart."³³ Choosing to live one's life only on the feeling level comes at a high price. It is emotionally costly.

In Hesse's last novel, The Glass Bead Game, the leading character, Joseph Knecht, rises through the ranks to become head of the elite community, Castalia, only to find it a sterile and utopian environment lacking in reality. Freedom in Castalia extends only to choosing one's profession--afterwards, all freedom ceases. Knecht says, ". . . we haven't done anything, we haven't taken any leaps. . . . I mean being able to take a plunge, to take things seriously."³⁴

This existential demand for risk and decision is absent in Castalia. "If the high Authority appoints you to an office, know this: every step upward on the ladder of offices is not a step into freedom but into bondage."³⁵ A person who is chosen to be a member of the elite finds himself in a rarified atmosphere devoid of many valuable human emotions. An individual like Knecht feels confined and locked into a fate that is lacking in personal satisfaction and over which he has little control.

Just as the element of freedom is important for the individual in the work of Hesse, so is the element of destiny. Each individual's destiny is unique, and fulfillment is not to be gauged by objective

standards; it should instead be subjective, indicating only the extent to which individual potential is realized. "Lest all this emphasis on subjectivity and individuality be taken as an injunction to megalomania, Hesse warns of the dangers of egocentricity."³⁶ But Hesse is more concerned about the person who will not be true to himself--who conforms to what others want him to be, or refuses to make the journey inward to discover the possibilities of his own personhood.

In the essay, "Zarathustra's Return," the Nietzschean call is to every man to act as his own need and conscience dictate.

Zarathustra is a man, he is you and I. Zarathustra is the man for whom you are searching in yourselves, the forthright, unsexed man . . . He has learned to be Zarathustra. . . . You must learn to be yourselves . . . You must unlearn the habit of being someone else or nothing at all, of imitating the voices of others and mistaking the faces of others for your own."³⁷

This call for an authentic existence means living your own life and seeking your own destiny. It is essential to follow the path of solitude and suffering. This radical individualism does not mean self-improvement or changing the world. "The world wasn't made to be bettered. You were made to be yourselves. . . . Be yourself, then the world will be rich and beautiful!"³⁸

Hesse believes that built into the natural man is someone or something that knows who man is and that directs his life toward fulfillment. This divine power (in the form of the Gnostic deity, Abraxas) is what Sinclair, in Demian, can affirm: "It's good to realize that within us there is someone who knows everything, wills everything, does everything better than we ourselves."³⁹

According to Hesse there is a dual pull in man: he can exert his freedom to decide and make of his life what he wants, or he can relinquish personal control over his life and surrender to a "given"

power that will direct him toward fulfillment. The nature of this "given" is blurred. Hesse does not clarify its content. It certainly is not the Providential Deity known in the Judeo-Christian tradition of ethical monotheism. For example, in "Klein and Wagner," the central character, Klein, vacillates between feelings of absolute evil and absolute good. "But finally there is submission to fate, in the belief that 'all is innocent,' since all beings and things proceed out of God."⁴⁰ This understanding of the nature of God is very Jungian, i.e., it is the god of the opposites. Nevertheless, Hesse understands it to be an underlying force that affects human destiny.

In the short story, "The Marble Works," a twenty-four-year-old young man falls in love with a girl who is engaged to another older man. The agony over this dilemma is climaxed with the girl's death by drowning. It is uncertain whether it was an accident or a suicide. Prior to the tragedy the young man's attitude toward life can be seen: "Life, I told myself, was a brisk and spirited horse, to be ridden boldly, but also with caution."⁴¹ Hesse uses the term, fate, interchangeably with destiny, and both terms can be influenced by free will. Fate and destiny do not mean a total predestination. Willful action can alter and affect, at least in some degree, the course of one's life. A quotation in the same short story illustrates this: ". . . each one of us has his fate in his own hands and is in duty bound to make himself a life that is entirely his own work and belongs to him alone."⁴² Therefore, it is not fair to Hesse to call his concept of human destiny merely fatalism. It is closer to Nietzsche's amor fati. Reflecting upon this issue, in Gertrude, Kuhn says: "One can acquire money, fame and distinction, but one cannot create happiness or unhappiness, not for oneself or

for others. One can only accept what comes, although one can, to be sure, accept it in entirely different ways."⁴³

This requires a considerable amount of self-understanding. It can mean seeking and finding the center of one's life. It can mean running away from what one may discover. It can mean that dissension is at the center of one's existence. It can mean discerning some degree of meaning in life, in spite of the absurdities experienced. Being able to see life clearly is necessary in order to have some understanding of who one is.

To be an individual entails a lifelong search for understanding the many facets of human nature. It is a quest for personal values and identity. What is involved is a struggle in the art of becoming. "Man . . . is not an animal; he is not a determinate, finite entity, not a being completed once and for all, but a coming-into-being, a project, a dream of the future, a yearning of nature for new forms and possibilities."⁴⁴ Yet man does not always exercise his reason; in fact, man's actions rarely spring from rational considerations. Hesse says, "I was beginning to feel that what is really interesting and worthwhile, what can truly concern us, excite us, and give us fulfillment, is not outside us but within us."⁴⁵ Many people abandon this inner world of the truly important. Hesse urges those who have not forgotten the inner world to go on searching until they find that for which they are looking.

In the "Flute Dream," contained in the collection of short stories, Strange News from Another Star, the concept of struggle and movement in life is evident. "Death was life, and life was death, and they were locked together in an eternal, mad love-battle, and this was the final word and the meaning of the world."⁴⁶ The only direction is forward if one wants to understand life.

The road man must travel is toward himself.

No man has been entirely and completely himself. Yet each one strives to become that . . . each as best he can. Each man carries the vestiges of his birth--the slime and eggshells of his primeval past--with him to the end of his days. Some never become human . . . Each represents a gamble on the part of nature in the creation of the human.⁴⁷

However, on the basis of the amount of time and attention man gives to the task of becoming human, it seems that nothing is so distasteful to him as the path that leads to himself. But loneliness and solitude can drive a person to discover himself.

This struggle to be a whole person is lifted to the level of a quest for perfection in The Glass Bead Game. "Each of us is merely one human being, merely an experiment, a way station. But each of us should be striving to reach the center, not the periphery."⁴⁸

It may be helpful to turn to the wise old men portrayed by Hesse as clues to what a mature individual would be. What is found in his early work is the experience of psychic instability and pathos. But in his later work the old sages range from a primitive magician to Jungian archetypes. The monastic historian, Father Jacobus, in The Glass Bead Game, is patterned after Jacob Burckhardt. Jacobus is worldly-wise, and " . . . his balance of scholarly pursuits and practical politics places him in an exceptional position among the wise old men; he achieves an equilibrium between the vita contemplativa and the vita activa."⁴⁹ Hesse's interest in Oriental learning is reflected in his elderly sages in so far as they portray mystical beings at peace with themselves and the world.

As an individual, man must live with ambiguity, possess freedom and have a destiny, yet experience finitude while questing permanence. Hesse is very much aware of man's limited time in space. In Klingsor's Last Summer a painter named Klingsor lives with wild extravagance--

intensely and madly. In his comparatively short life he has lived ten lives, and he is very much aware of how short life is. For example, he is aware that his bright watercolors will fade in but ten years into white again, for the colors have no lasting quality. So, too, is he aware that the color of his hair (brown) will be gray in the same number of years. This consciousness of finitude became acute when he declared, "How much longer, and then this wonderful game was over! How much longer, and then hand and mouth and eyes would be full of earth!"⁵⁰

A poem adds to this feeling:

Leaf after leaf descends
From my life's tree.
O world's magnificence
How you fill me,
How you fill and satiate,
How you inebriate
What burns today
Is soon decay.⁵¹

This consciousness of finitude gives the individual a passion for the moment, an existential concern for making the most of the time allotted to him. This means possessing a sense of urgency about life, an intensity about one's subjective experience. In "A Dream Sequence" one is told: "All the books of the world full of thoughts and poems are nothing in comparison with one minute's sobbing when feeling surges in waves, soul perceives and finds itself in the depths. Tears are the melting ice of the soul, all angels are close to one who weeps."⁵²

Hesse has his characters conscious of transiency, the swift movement of time. He has made them aware that the whole world is in process, and this means individuals must see the significance of the now.

In the novel, Peter Camenzind, a story is told of the adolescence and early manhood of a writer who leaves his Swiss mountain village home and takes to the road to encounter the world. St. Francis of Assisi

becomes his model for a meaningful life; and Peter, after several escapades that occur during his wandering, returns home to care for a helpless cripple. But during his drifting stage Peter makes significant comments about life as a journey: " . . . I would drift through life like a cloud--voyaging, everywhere a stranger, hovering between time and eternity."⁵³ He sees himself as rudderless and adrift, going where the currents lead him. Although he considers himself to be incompetent in the art of living, he is able to differentiate between the momentous and the trivial. For Camenzind, life involves learning, creating, seeing, and voyaging.

This characteristic of wandering is a prized human experience for Hesse. He writes a book by that title, and the vagabond motif is a favorite subject of his. In Wandering Hesse sees himself as a nomad; a person who searches but does not find; a person who admires the unfaithful, the changing, and the fantastic; a person who follows his inner calling. He likens this quest to trees that " . . . struggle with all the force of their lives for one thing only: to fulfill themselves according to their own laws, to build up their own form, to represent themselves."⁵⁴

Despair is a human experience that is part of being an individual. Man cannot live intensely except at a price. Despair can bring man to the point of suicide. Because Hesse himself is haunted by this possibility it is natural that his characters consider suicide seriously, and several succumb to it (Hans Giebenrath and Friedrich Klein are but two examples). In Steppenwolf Harry Haller, contemplating taking his life, says, " . . . suicide, though a way out, is rather a mean and shabby one, and that it is nobler and finer to be conquered by life than to fall by one's own hand."⁵⁵ This interpretation of suicide differs with the

earlier positive reference to it (see supra, p. 63). Harry has to come to see that the motive power behind the lives of all outstanding men is the struggle against death--an unconditional and self-willed determination to live.

But Hesse has a different twist in understanding suicide. He does not see it as merely the tragic ending of life--he thinks it can be fulfillment as well. Hesse scholar, J. C. Middleton, is of the opinion that death by drowning has the meaning (for Hesse) of returning to one's origin. Hesse illustrates this idea with the death of Hans Giebenrath in Beneath the Wheel. "Giebenrath's death cannot be called suicide; since his lack of a mother is in some respects his reason for defeat, his death as a 'return to mother' in the mother-element of water makes it appear that the misdirection of his life is corrected in death."⁵⁶ When Klein, in "Klein and Wagner," takes his life by drowning, one is left with the feeling that it is not tragic but an appropriate end to a life that seemed pointless. Hesse describes the experience as almost pleasant, rather than traumatic.

It would be unfair to Hesse to suggest that suicide is an option equal to living, in his thinking. He is only trying to point out the reality of meaninglessness and emptiness in human existence and the difficulty in being able to cope. Life is bearable for most individuals because of brief, meaningful moments. "Hesse does not attempt to give an answer to the unanswerable question (how to eternalize the moment) . . . there is the attempt to face the insoluble bravely and honestly."⁵⁷ This requires courage. He turns to the religions of the East for help in dealing with temporality. Some of the religious conclusions Hesse reached in regard to the question of meaning in life will be examined later in this chapter.

Lauscher, a character in "November Night," says: "Life isn't worth living altogether; a life without purpose is barren and a life with purpose is torment."⁵⁸ In "The Latin Scholar" another character, Karl Bauer, says: "He learned that inexorable fate is not the highest and ultimate power, and that weak, frightened, bowed human beings can get the better of it."⁵⁹ Hesse's characters are not all out of touch with reality, i.e., dreamers who do not see the real world. Some of them believe it is essential to accept what is, rather than longingly to desire the ideal without hope. In "Dream Journeys" the central character is a writer who would like to write something of the quality equal to the immortals. He wants to have his work read and remembered by generations to come. "Only at long last he abandoned these wishes and efforts and realized that he must content himself with being a true poet, a dreamer, a seer only in his soul, and that his handiwork must remain that of a simple man of letters."⁶⁰ An individual may have goals, but sometimes he is limited in his ability to realize them. It then becomes necessary to adjust one's goals to match one's capabilities. This means compromise.

In "Walter Kömpff," a young boy seeks to fulfill a promise made to his dying father, that he would carry on the business in the family tradition. Walter's life is made miserable in trying to be a merchant like his father. "A secret yearning, which he himself did not understand, for the freedom of a life that was its own clear meaning and satisfaction never left him, but it lost its intensity and came to resemble the faint sorrow with which, as he outgrows his youth, a man with deeper aspirations resigns himself to the inadequacy of life."⁶¹ This attitude of resignation is one way in which an individual accepts his own personal history. "It's plain that very few people find what's

right for them in life. Everyone has his share of trouble and suffering, even if he doesn't show it."⁶² Calm resignation is only one answer, not the answer for everyone.

The opposite of accepting life with resignation is seen in the individual who lives with high resolutions. This would be the person who energetically drives himself to compete and succeed at all costs. Hesse does not concern himself with this characteristic in man, except indirectly. He criticizes the person who becomes too dependent on fame, title and rank, or money and possessions. A man who is prey to such dependencies will live like a madman.⁶³ He calls this type of person a philistine--one who lives off others and is not true to himself. This person is too outward directed and superficial. Hesse prefers inwardness. He says, ". . . man should not wish for greatness or happiness, for heroism or sweet peace, that he should wish for nothing at all but the pure and wakeful mind, the brave heart and faithful, knowing patience that will enable him to endure happiness as well as suffering, tumult as well as silence."⁶⁴

When one journeys inward one discovers not only a divided self, but many selves. In Steppenwolf this is one of the key ideas--Harry Haller looks into his soul in "the Magic Theater" and finds a picture gallery consisting of a hundred, or even a thousand selves. His life oscillates not merely between two poles but between thousands of poles. "Man is an onion made up of a hundred integuments, a texture made up of many threads."⁶⁵ One needs to face these many selves and realize they are there, but one should not take any one of them too seriously: in fact, one should be able to laugh at some of the images mirrored in one's soul.

In summary, this section has been looking at man as an individual. Elements Hesse has suggested as important in the human experience are: solitariness or loneliness, honesty, uniqueness, inwardness, ambiguity (as seen in the Apollonian and Dionysian man, Geist und Natur, masculine and feminine), freedom and destiny, wandering and aimlessness, indecisiveness, finitude, passion for the moment, despair that could lead to suicide, risking, willing, struggling, searching, accepting, and coping with one's many selves by either resignation, resolution, or courage that has an "in spite of" quality to it.

Man as a Social Creature

Hesse is more at home in relating the life of an individual. He could identify with the outsider--the lonely, struggling introvert who would rather be on the move than face up to the problems and satisfactions that are part of interpersonal relationships. Of course his work includes leading characters who are involved with other people; after all, man lives in a social context. But Hesse dwells on the inner, subjective experience of his heroes (there is a conspicuous absence of heroines), for it is here that Hesse knows the most about what it means to be human.

In this section Hesse's world of social relations will be explored. The areas of: love, friendship, marriage, sexuality, middle-class society, technology, education, and international relations (as observed in Europe during the war and in postwar years) will be examined. Hesse is more or less explicit (depending on which area you are looking at) in his expression of these different concerns. He is limited to broad, sweeping opinions and convictions rather than a deep, penetrating analysis of social conditions. As usual, his value judgments reflect his own personal experience.

Love is a fundamental human experience. Man cannot be man alone. He needs a relationship with someone else to bring to his consciousness who he is. When Harry Haller, in Steppenwolf, is at the point of despair and seriously considering taking his own life, he is prevented from doing so by Hermine breaking into his lonely world. He could be a human being once more because:

All of a sudden there was a human being, a living human being, to shatter the death that had come down over me like a glass case, and to put out a hand to me, a good and beautiful and warm hand. All of a sudden there were things that concerned me again.⁶⁶

It is love that makes him recognize the fragmented existence he has been living. A new interest has entered his life when he finds a human being once more--one who wants to teach him to dance and to laugh and to live. Hermine starts her task by telling Haller he has to stop taking himself so seriously. She tries to bring out what is present within Haller's life. Hermine serves a double role: as a female character with a life of her own but also as the anima within Harry. She has a separate existence as a vital member of the plot who interacts with Harry as a person, but she fulfills the Jungian role as well.

It is not always a woman who assists a man in seeing greater dimensions of reality. For Peter Camenzind it is St. Francis of Assisi who teaches him to love other people, and in the process he conquers the human fears of pain and death. Peter comes to see that the purpose of love is not to be happy; it is, rather, to help one endure the difficulties in living. As St. Francis discovers the language of the eternally human, so Camenzind offers his love to every visible thing and sets out to regard nothing with indifference or contempt, for nothing is nobler than dispassionate love.⁶⁷ All children are of the earth and need to listen to the pulse of nature. One needs to partake of the

wholeness of life. Peter wants, like St. Francis, to implant the secret of love in everyone's heart. He wants to teach everyone to be brothers to all living things and become so full of love that one will not fear even sorrow and death.⁶⁸ Whereas Peter fails to communicate with people (to be aware of other people's needs) earlier in his experience--the novel ends with Peter taking the cripple, Boppi, to live with him, and by so doing being able to gather the ideals and fragments of his life about one living center, external to himself. St. Francis had taught Peter to suffer as well as to love. "That's the way it is when you love. It makes you suffer, and I have suffered much in the years since. But it matters little that you suffer, so long as you feel alive with a sense of the close bond that connects all living things, so long as love does not die!"⁶⁹

It is essential that people accept each other. Love given and received helps one to accept oneself, and in turn, be more accepting of others. In Gertrude Kuhn weeps secret tears for himself because he feels he lives among everything as if on another planet, not understanding life and longing for love, yet afraid of it.⁷⁰ He could remember when someone cared for him and that he felt part of all people, but that was some time ago. He wants to remain himself but not in such a restrictive way. He is ready to devote and sacrifice himself to someone who wants him, to someone who really understands him. When it happens he knows what love is, and it seems that a thin, gray veil has fallen from his eyes and the world lay before him in its original light as it does to children, and as it appears to one in dreams of Paradise.⁷¹ This sounds like infatuation but it is not. Kuhn has come to love Gertrude even though the same kind of love is not returned. It is a mature love that gives and does not count the cost. It is not a sexual love (although Kuhn wishes that

circumstances would have made this possible), but it is a relationship with depth. Kuhn knows, as Klingsor came to know, ". . . to be loved is not happiness. But loving--that is happiness!"⁷² It is Hesse's conviction that man knows only one happiness: love--and only one virtue: trust.

Even in Siddhartha, the story of one man's pilgrimage to find himself, love is portrayed as the most important thing in the world. "It was true that he had never fully lost himself in another person to such an extent as to forget himself; he had never undergone the follies of love for another person."⁷³ He has come to see that passivity is not the answer. Active concern for others is the answer. Siddhartha chooses not the role of a monk, but a ferryman, one who could show his concern for other travelers, as well as for his friend, Govinda, and his son.

Friendship is important in Hesse's understanding of love. He seems to grasp the significance of this relationship, whereas the depth of the male/female sexual relationship is not to be found in his work. This can be understood in his early work since Hesse lacked a personal knowledge of this kind of relationship. But when his involvement and later, marriage, with Ninon Dolbin occurred, one would think he then would have included something in his work to convey this experience, but not so.

Friendship in Hesse's world resembles the role of marriage in that there is a commitment to one another, and a responsibility for one another, as is usually part of a primary relationship. More than one critic has called attention to the role of women in Hesse's work. "Women are there only as objects to serve for the satisfaction of the hero."⁷⁴ Women are not rounded and active characters in their own right.

They are the result of man's fantasy world; consequently, they appear as illusory characters.

In the one novel, Rosshalde, where marriage is a crucial part of the plot, it is portrayed in a negative light. Veraguth and his wife are so estranged that they block out the real hurt they inflict on each other. They do not want to come to terms with the things that cause the hurt. A hopeless coldness prevails. Veraguth says,

But I was disappointed and I didn't hide it very well, I kept demanding the very thing that Adele was unable to give. . . . Her only response to my demands and my moods, my passionate yearning and in the end my disappointment, was a long-suffering silence, a touching, quiet, heroic patience which often moved me but was no help either to her or to me.⁷⁵

So he abandoned himself to painting. This retreat into himself and refusal to communicate honest feelings continued until the death of the youngest son, whom he loved very much. "At the bedside of his dying child he had known, all too late, his only true love; then he had forgotten, and risen above, himself."⁷⁶ It is interesting to note that it is a father's love for his son, rather than a husband's love for his wife, that Hesse describes as true love.

But it is unfair to overlook the value of family life, for he is conscious of the importance of the family when in The Glass Bead Game he criticizes the sterile community life of Castalia, with the absence of the feminine presence. "You people of the Province have your Order and your hierarchy, but you do not have a family, you do not know what family, blood, and descent are, and you have no notion of the powers, the hidden and mighty magic of what is called 'family.'"⁷⁷

Still, when Hesse discusses good remedies against depression he suggests the drinking of wine, the making of music, the writing of poems, or just wandering. He does not include women as part of the

cure for overcoming depression. Obviously, the women in his own life (or, more correctly, his reactions to women) are the cause of depression and not an aid in coping with depression.

However, sexuality is not absent in the work of Hesse. He is very much aware of the human need for sexual expression. A variety of sexual manifestations are present in his writing. In "Iris" the motif of incest is dominant. If man is to live at one with himself it means accepting the shadow side of his being. Man has to integrate the irrational and unpleasant sides of his life with the actual world, even if it means dealing with such taboos as incest.

Nor is homosexuality ignored in Hesse's presentation of man's sexuality. Beneath the Wheel is about Hans Giebenrath's inability as an adolescent to adjust to an adult world. Adults (father, teachers, and minister) put pressure on Hans as he struggles with the problems of puberty. Hans' friend, Hermann, refuses to be cast into the typical mold of good student. He rejects the educational system and seeks to escape through art. But the significant thing is a relationship, be it only friendship, that develops between Hans and Hermann. It reveals innocent and naive sexual experimentation.

Comment has already been made on the sensual nature of Steppenwolf. Not only does Harry Haller have sexual contact with a prostitute, Maria, but he also is approached by Pablo to engage in homosexual and group sex. Haller refuses these offers, but Hesse is showing that he recognizes this side of human existence. In a conversation with Hermine, Harry Haller recalls that:

. . . she talked to me about Herman and about childhood, mine and her own, and about those years of childhood when the capacity for love, in its first youth, embraces not only both sexes, but all and everything, sensuous and spiritual, and endows all things with a spell of love and a fairylike ease of transformation such as in later years comes again only to a chosen few and to poets, and to them rarely.⁷⁸

The imagination that leads to art deals with the world of the senses, including human sexuality. Sensuality makes possible artistic integration, but it must be wedded to the intellect or chaos will result.

Hesse sees man as a social creature in need of love that man can both give and receive. Love involves friendship and sexual expression with one's own sex as well as with the opposite sex, in or outside of marriage.

It is true that Hesse prefers to write about the eccentric, the isolated, provincial person who is rootless in society, but he does touch upon the larger community at times. He would pit the men of soul against the men of the world, or those committed to the interior world of the mind against those given to exterior convention. Hesse's heroes are outsiders, those who stand over against society and its values. The Outsider is depicted by Colin Wilson " . . . as the lonely individual who is estranged from the conventional way of life, revolted by it, who seeks through the cultivation of his individuality to achieve a better way of life, and who because of his very endeavors in defiance of the every-day world (especially bourgeois) prevents it by way of stimulation from becoming completely obsolescent."⁷⁹ Hesse's characters live on the fringe of society and refuse to participate in what they consider the hypocrisy of people who conform to the usual norms of society. The simple way of life sought by the outsider is considered escapist and is in direct opposition to most of society.

It is not strange that;

There is nowhere any real society in Hesse's work. Neither the family, nor the nation, nor time are realities that mean anything to the individual. The individual is alone, on the one hand, but always in search of an ideal condition of something universal that belongs to him.⁸⁰

Society is, nevertheless, an essential need of man.

The way of conformity and compromise is, for Hesse, the middle-class way, the philistine way, a way of falsehood and delusion. Hesse sees the middle class as neither good nor bad, neither heroic nor immortal. It is such a contrast to the realm of the genuinely great, i.e., that of Mozart and Goethe.

Paul Tillich reminds us that "bourgeois" is a French word which means "he who lives inside the walls of the town."⁸¹ And members of the bourgeois class compare the man of dreams and visions to madmen. Therefore, one can see that the poet who elevates wandering as a worthwhile use of life is in direct opposition to a bourgeois society. However, Hesse (like his literary double, Haller) and most intellectuals still have their roots in the middle class. The comforts and security of middle-class society are desired. For example, even though Harry Haller is in a middle-class rut and wants to break free of conventionality, he still appreciates the scents and appearances of the tidy house where he rooms--symbols of bourgeois values. He is an educated man, in the formal sense, but not really educated for life. In fact, Steppenwolf ". . . tells what happens when the intellectual becomes isolated from the society which gave him birth and from which he derives his support."⁸² But at the same time Harry can criticize the foibles and scruples of middle-class intellectuals by shunning demands for compromise and by being repelled by its hypocrisy.

Hesse, like many intellectuals after the First World War, was quick to predict the downfall of European culture. Hesse saw the appropriateness of Dostoyevsky's and Kafka's writing and the readiness with which German youth appeared to understand and accept it. He believed that Europe was in the process of "returning to the mother."⁸³

With the historical situation being what it was immediately following the First World War, Hesse wrote Siddhartha (note the Oriental setting and the emphasis on inner values) and was critical of property, possessions and riches, that almost trapped Siddhartha. For Hesse this was a criticism of the superficial values of the bourgeois world of Europe.

One of the concerns of Hesse that was part of middle-class society, was the rise of mechanization. "Hesse regarded it as his life's work to help defend the individual existence against the threat of mechanization."⁸⁴ He felt that the individual's freedom and identity were at stake. He singled out technology and nationalism as the two greatest sicknesses of our era, and he called resistance against these "megalomaniacs" the most important task and justification of the artist and the intellectual.⁸⁵ Hesse was disturbed over the technology used during the war, but he also abhorred even the inventions of the radio and telephone. Radio was popular with the masses, but for Hesse, its commercial use and unsophisticated entertainment were repelling. Notice his attack on the radio (and the jazz music it played) in Steppenwolf.

In 1961 (the year before Hesse's death) Miquel Serrano reported that when Hesse was asked about the nature of man in the future, he said, ". . . in fifty years the earth will be a graveyard of machines, and the soul of the spaceman will simply be the cabin of his own rocket."⁸⁶

In The Glass Bead Game such devices as radios, films, loudspeakers, and television sets appear, but they are always servants of the game itself. The problem of modern technology is not the machines or gadgets themselves but their misuse.

Hesse is overly critical of machines. He has little appreciation for them. This is partly due to his growing older and refusing to appreciate the new and modern conveniences of life. But it is also due to his being able to see through the obvious (like Thoreau) to the more serious problems that result from mechanization and technology, e.g., the dehumanization of man. In his Autobiographical Writings he says:

I saw all this only in the exhaust fumes from the damned machines, everything swallowed up, everything vibrating with a life that I cannot believe to be human but only satanic, everything ready to die, ready to turn to dust, longing for collapse and destruction, disgusted by this world, weary of existence without purpose, of beauty without soul.⁸⁷

These negative attitudes are an exaggeration of the threat caused by machines. But Hesse is fearful of machines because of his low estimation of human nature. "We are compelled to say that mankind is still far closer to the gorilla than to man. We are not yet human, we are on the way to humanity."⁸⁸ He wants man to overcome this pessimism, i.e., he would like to see man reverse his low opinion of him by learning to value ideas more highly than money or weapons of war. He would like for man to advance more rapidly from his instinctual level toward his potential of full manhood. The various ways Hesse suggests by which man may attempt to accomplish this will be discussed in a later section of this chapter.

Another middle-class social phenomenon Hesse commented on was the educational system. He saw early, through traumatic personal experience, the weakness of the educational system in Germany. Themes that motivated his writing called attention to the gulf between youth and society, and he blamed the educational institution as a major cause of this gulf. For example, in his Autobiographical Writings, Hesse said: ". . . we had grown accustomed to teachers whom we either feared and hated, avoided and

deceived, or laughed at and despised. They possessed power, that was unalterably true, an overwhelming power completely undeserved, often frightfully and inhumanly exercised. . . ."⁸⁹ He thought teachers were trained to restrict human freedom; consequently, students were not inspired to accomplish much. The novel, Beneath the Wheel, was about such a youth who was crushed by the inhuman demands placed upon him to excel but only by way of the method of authoritarianism. Hesse knew existentially the pressure that adults could exert in trying to break the will of young people. To be a nonconformist meant paying a terrible price--it cost Hans Giebenrath his life.

Satirical literature in Germany between 1890 and 1914 (mostly novels) discussed the dilemma of the school system, with its long school day and quasi-military ethos and discipline. Irreparable damage was done to the emotional life of many students, and there was an epidemic of suicides among high school boys which continued during those years. "At their deeper level these school novels were a rebellion not merely against the school system, but against the whole ethos of Wilhelminian Germany and against the monolithic intellectualism of the later nineteenth century, the overwhelming preoccupation with fact."⁹⁰ These novels elevated the cult of "life" and biological vitality. They appealed to the emotions and were antireason, in a Nietzschean way.

Hesse was one of the writers who criticized German education, and his ideas are currently popular among the youth culture who desire a revolution in the structure of the educational process. Hesse's recognition of accepting youth where they are (in age and stage) and appealing to their better selves, plus letting them participate in the teaching/learning experience, are favorite themes today. Motivation for learning should not be out of fear of punishment or failure;

rather, one's native curiosity and interest should be stimulated and provoked by an imaginative teacher. In Hesse's day his thinking was considered unconventional and radical by those in positions of authority, but young people knew exactly what he was saying and they were in agreement with his fundamental ideas. This was illustrated in The Glass Bead Game when Joseph Knecht sought a relationship with Tito, his pupil, in which they would teach and learn from each other. When Tito jumped into the mountain lake and began to race to the other side, Knecht tried to emulate his pupil and overestimated his own strength and died of heart failure in the freezing water. Knecht was enacting the educational principle he believed was important if the maximum learning were to take place.

The last social concern to be considered in this section will be Hesse's stand on war and peace. In the biographical section it was noted that Hesse was a pacifist and was opposed to war. His own experience was a painful one when it came to living by his convictions. There were few who supported his antinationalistic stands. But he passionately believed:

. . . the elimination of war remains our noblest aim and the ultimate consequence of the Western, Christian ethic. . . . Human culture comes into being through the conversion of animal drives into more spiritual impulses, through the sense of shame, through imagination and knowledge. . . . the conviction that life is worth living is the ultimate content and consolation of all art. . . . love is higher than hate, understanding than anger, peace than war.⁹¹

He believed that everyone was to blame for letting war exist in a civilized world, and he exhorted everyone to demand more of himself. Only through overcoming indifference, through voting out political leaders, and by devoting himself exclusively to overcoming the barriers to peace, has man any hope. "And it is only through ourselves, through our insight and our will, that a change can come about."⁹²

Hesse was an internationalist in the tradition of such great personalities as Goethe and Tolstoy. He was in a company of very few intellectuals (such as Rolland) who thought about peace on a world, rather than a national, level. Here is another reason that Hesse was ahead of his time and a reason for his contemporary popularity among the young.

In this section an attempt has been made to look at the areas of interpersonal relations and to observe man as a social creature, especially in a middle-class society. Only on occasion does Hesse address himself directly to social institutions, but he alludes indirectly to the values and conventions of the bourgeois. He comments on conformity and compromise, mechanization and technology, the educational system, and the issue of war and peace. Hesse is not a systematic critic who argues his case. He would periodically write public letters in the newspapers or express his views in his published work. Only segments of his thoughts and feelings, therefore, have come to our attention.

Man as a Religious Being

The third section of this chapter will be devoted to man as a religious being in the concept of "the human" in Hesse's work. The human predicament of sin, suffering, and death will be discussed, along with the content of religious experience. Hesse's understanding of the nature of God and the meaning of salvation will conclude this section. Hesse's grasp of the human situation starts with the reality of man and does not postulate a God who explains man.

Man can be less than man, and never is he as conscious of this being true as when he sins against himself. It is expected that a

writer with a German Pietist background would address himself to man the sinner. Hesse does not ignore this factor; early in his work this Christian doctrine appears. "Natural man is unpredictable, opaque, dangerous, like a torrent cascading out of uncharted mountains. At the start, his soul is a jungle without paths or order."⁹³ Man is not basically good. In fact, the scales lean toward his propensity for evil.

When man is reflective and meditates, i.e., when he is honest with himself, he realizes a sense of sin. Hesse attempts to deny this awareness in such a lovable character as Knulp. When a mishap occurs in Knulp's love life, and is the cause of his wandering without direction, Hesse has God intervene and accept Knulp's wasted life by blessing it. God justifies what appears to be a meaningless existence by saying Knulp may not have done anything with his life; yet because of what he is (childlike, foolish, and happy) he brings these characteristics into the lives of people with whom he lives even temporarily. Knulp's spontaneity and his naturally passive disposition make him enjoyable company. He does not bring with him a sense of dread or sin.

It was in the experience of psychoanalysis that Hesse came to recognize the depth of evil and ugliness that is part of being human. He could not avoid this reality, and he began to articulate its presence in his work that followed his analysis. Man's irrationality and the "shadow" side of his personhood began to evidence itself. Analysis made him more aware of the role of the subconscious in artistic creation . . . consequently, a total picture of man emerged, not the simple one-sided rational man of his earlier work.⁹⁴

Demian is the first novel after analysis and reveals explicitly the consciousness Hesse now has for sin. The Kromer episode portrays the debilitating action of sin. Kromer epitomizes the devil for Emil

Sinclair--in fact, he calls Kromer Satan. Sinning requires a conscious act. An act of disobedience can be seen in Demian. For example, Sinclair goes against his parents' traditions and values and shows the willfulness and ease with which an individual enters the sinful life. But what is important in Demian is Hesse's belief that sin is imposed on human nature from circumstances that create the possibility for betrayal of one's true or best self. Without the possibility of sin, man would live only in a state of innocence and in ignorance of the world. Sin is an aid in the development of one's consciousness of a full life. A guilty conscience serves man in this way.

Sin is seen as essential, and Hesse is able to portray its hold over man. In his short story, "A Child's Heart," a quotation reveals: "Again and again I rose up, ardent and devout, prepared to dedicate myself to God and to tread the ideal, pure, noble path toward the heights, to practice virtue, to suffer evil silently, to help others. And alas, again and again it remained only a beginning, an attempt, a brief fluttering flight!"⁹⁵ Sin is the experience of all but heroes and saints, and even those rare elect seem possessed by their struggle against it.

Sin is misplaced love. It is self-love. To be human means to have to cope with this tendency to love oneself unreservedly. In "A Man by the Name of Ziegler" Hesse says, "Like every other man, he regarded himself as an individual, though in reality he was only a specimen, and like other men he regarded himself and his life as the center of the world."⁹⁶ Sin is placing oneself at the center of one's world. When this happens one experiences disorder and dissension. Friedrich Klein is aware of two Friedrich Kleins within: ". . . one visible and one secret, a civil servant and a criminal, a paterfamilias and a murderer."⁹⁷

Disintegration and chaos can result when man loses his innocence and faces the reality of sin.

Sin has to do with the will of man. In his early work Hesse cannot reconcile his belief in the goodness of man with Pauline theology concerning the sinful nature of man. He later comes to see the presence of evil in the human heart but believes man is left alone to deal with it. In Steppenwolf Hermine says, "Oh, Harry, we have to grope through so much dirt and senselessness, to reach home. And we have no one to lead us, our only guide is our homesickness!"⁹⁸

The will of man becomes the key to coping with human perversity. Hesse knows, from his religious background, that the will of man has to be broken if a "Christian man" is to emerge. But he chooses to follow Nietzsche's lead and elevates the will of man to that function that affirms and brings into being man's full humanity. In his essay on "Self Will" Hesse says:

There is one virtue that I love, and only one. I call it self-will. . . . Only an individual who has fashioned his "self-will," his noble, natural inner law, into his destiny can be a hero. . . . But in reality life would be richer and better if each man independently followed his own law and will.⁹⁹

Hesse's understanding of sin has an Eastern influence. The East is a metaphor for the Kingdom of the Spirit. In The Journey to the East Leo is the man in whom light and darkness are intertwined. H. H. cannot write the history of the League so long as he remains in ignorance of his true self. The willful personal self must die in order that the suprapersonal self may come into being. But H. H. is unaware of the hold that sin has on him. His isolated egotism is the flaw, and until he comes to terms with it, forgiveness is not possible.

With The Glass Bead Game Hesse is still struggling with the significance of sin. Father Jacobus says to Knecht:

"You do not know man, do not understand him in his bestiality and as the image of God."¹⁰⁰ It is revealing that it is a Christian historian in a monastic setting that has to remind Knecht that Castalia lacks a real understanding of human nature. However, in the "Rainmaker," a story that is at the conclusion of The Glass Bead Game, there is the following quotation:

You had to learn to see man as a weak, selfish, and cowardly creature; you also had to realize how many of these evil traits and impulses you shared yourself . . . man is also spirit and love, that something dwells in him which is at variance with his instincts and longs to refine them.¹⁰¹

Man sins in being human, and he also suffers. In "The Cyclone," the story of a storm during which the metamorphosis of innocence occurs, a boy moves from the stage of innocence to the stage of innocence lost. When the storm is over he sees his town in a new way, a more adult way, the rose-colored view of permanent bliss has now changed into reality. Life is a process; there is movement (some gradual, others traumatic); there is transiency. Consequently, there is suffering. Man is tormented over the conflicts arising from within his divided nature. Hell is being out of control of the forces within. Suffering can be abated if one learns to know oneself, if one becomes free.

Suffering occurs when one has never said yes to oneself. One needs to descend into the subconscious, into the lower world. "To know oneself, to explore the hidden corners of one's soul, not to flinch even if one finds these corners populated with beasts and demons, this is the purpose of Emil Sinclair's, Steppenwolf's, Goldmund's travels."¹⁰²

Whenever man asks the question, "Why?" or whenever he is concerned about the meaning of life, he is involved in some degree of suffering. Peter Camenzind tries to philosophize his way out of this predicament. He says, ". . . suffering and disappointments and melancholy are there

not to vex us or cheapen us or deprive us of our dignity but to mature and transfigure us."¹⁰³ Camenzind is distressed over the lack of a motivating force or great passion in his life. Most upsetting to him is the feeling that he is living life as a spectator. This means living with anxiety and the threat of meaninglessness.

Steppenwolf establishes this point too. Everything is marked ". . . with the plight of lonely men, with the problem of existence and with the yearning after a new orientation for an age that has lost its bearings."¹⁰⁴ Harry Haller is experiencing suffering because he feels he is caught between two ages and two cultures. He is approaching fifty, no longer young nor yet old. He has been reared on the culture of the immortals (Mozart and Goethe), and now he is faced with the inane, popular culture of jazz and the mass medium of radio. Harry has a genius for suffering and a boundless capacity for pain. He is not a man who has made peace with himself. He is the cause of much of his own suffering. Hesse suggests that it is self-contempt that is at the heart of the problem. "It was always at himself first and foremost that he aimed the shaft, himself first and foremost whom he hated and despised."¹⁰⁵

Whereas one message of Steppenwolf is that the way to true manhood is through suffering and loneliness, another message is that the surest way to death is to cling to the self and to life. The answer comes in self-surrender. This means living victoriously with suffering. Man must not succumb to cynicism and pessimism. Required is an act of will--an act of moral courage. Hesse's elevation of suffering to a virtue would have had Nietzsche's approval, for it is in suffering that man participates in a universal human experience. How he deals with the phenomenon will reveal the substance of a person.

The highest place in Hesse's hierarchy is reserved to the greatest sufferer, to the man who lives in complete defiance of the Philistines. ". . . the hero who perishes because he follows his own stars in defiance of the accepted laws." . . . However, its highest honors are not granted to the patient and docile but to the few who are stubborn, who follow their inner voice and remain true to their own mind.¹⁰⁶

In the collection of essays, If the War Goes On, Hesse says:

"As long as a man is well off, he can afford to do superfluous and foolish things. When well-being gives way to affliction, life begins to educate us."¹⁰⁷ Man only comes to a level of existence of being able to smile in the midst of sorrow when he lets love help him master himself. Progress toward achieving selfhood comes when both pleasure and pain are seen as intersecting streams that flow from the same source.

In regard to the thinking of Hesse concerning death, it is important to see that Hesse was in a group of contemporary novelists (e.g., Rilke, Mann, and Joyce) who unanimously react to death by striving to create an aesthetic realm of simultaneity or timelessness in which the threat of death is annulled.¹⁰⁸ This attempt to cope with transience by ignoring it can be seen in Hesse's words:

Dagegen habe ich mein Leben lang viele Wege versucht, auf denen man die Zeit überwinden und im Zeitlosen leben kann . . . ¹⁰⁹

On the other hand, my entire life I have tried many ways by which one can overcome time and live in the timeless . . .

But the question of a living death, i.e., not really being alive, is a most important question for Hesse. This possibility of meaninglessness is what plagues Kuhn in Gertrude. The lonely composer is driven to distraction over the emptiness of his life. He expresses his feelings in a poem entitled "Is That God's Will?"

When the south wind blows
The avalanche tumbles
And death's dirge rumbles,
Is that God's will?

Through the lands of men
I wander alone,
Ungreeted and unknown.
Is that God's will?

Pain is my lot,
My heart is like lead.
I fear God is dead.
--Shall I then live?¹¹⁰

Klingsor, also, is concerned about finitude. He takes aim at death, with empty wine bottles as cannon, and tries to shoot down time, death, and suffering.¹¹¹ And Friedrich Klein tries to deal with nothingness by refusing to cling to anything and just falling into the water and into death. He would resist nothing, including God's will. Mark Boulby makes a relevant comment at this point. He says Klein could have just as easily let himself fall into life since "letting-oneself-fall-in life" is the doctrine of Demian and of the Tao. Siddhartha, too, lets himself fall into life. This act of submission is equivalent to the German mystics' "de-becoming" (Entwerden).¹¹²

Knulp has a different approach to the subject of death. In his eccentric way he wants nothing but to make "Sundays out of weekdays."¹¹³ He lives with an existential awareness of the passing of time. He thinks one should make the most of each day and not worry about tomorrow. He says, "If a beautiful thing were to remain beautiful for all eternity . . . I'd say to myself: You can look at it any time, it doesn't have to be today."¹¹⁴ Life is to be enjoyed and death is not to be resisted. There is little room for agony or anxiety. Apparently the existential void does not haunt Hesse very much, nor does the possibility of personal extinction. His characters surrender to the inevitability of death and do not fight against its eventuality.

In Steppenwolf Harry Haller's inner war causes him to raise the question of life's meaning. He wonders whether human existence is a

terrible mistake. Is man born to be immortal as a child of God? He receives an answer, as the novel concludes, that is very much this-world oriented. Qualitative existence, here and now, is all men can hope to expect. Only the elite, the great of history, become immortal.

Goldmund has a passion for filling his life with as many amorous pursuits as possible (although none of them are permanent nor do they produce any children). As he moves from lover to lover he becomes increasingly fearful of the loss of sense experience. "The transience of orgasm is the kernel of all experience, and it is the germ also of the 'kernel of his frequent tendency to sadness and disgust.'" ¹¹⁵ This realization is responsible for Goldmund's artistic endeavors. His vision of creating the mother figure, Eva (a quest deriving from his own loss of his earthly mother), by way of artistic expression, symbolizes this search for permanence. Goldmund confides to Narziss that he seeks to suspend death through sexual ventures, but it is to no avail.

Death and suicide, actual and projected, are very much in evidence in Hesse's work. However, the best illustration of Hesse's handling of death is seen in The Glass Bead Game. Theodore Ziolkowski points out the fact that the power of death, i.e., the threat of death, is sublimated to the extent that it becomes unimportant. For example, "The old Magister Musicae does not really die; he gradually dematerializes until his spiritual element is subsumed, as it were, in the abstract realm of spirit." ¹¹⁶

The posthumous writings, added to the narrative of Knecht's life, are significant. They are the creative writings from his student days; they serve to emphasize the real motif of Knecht's life and death. One of the poems in these posthumous writings is called "Stages" and is not only an integral part of Knecht's life; it shows a strong element in

Hesse's life that wants to accept the Christian affirmation of Eternal Life even though it contradicts the main ideas of Hesse regarding death.

As every flower fades and as all youth
 Departs, so life at every stage,
 So every virtue, so our grasp of truth,
 Blooms in its day and may not last forever.
 Since life may summon us at every age
 Be ready, heart, for parting, new endeavour,
 Be ready bravely and without remorse
 To find new light that old ties cannot give.
 In all beginnings dwells a magic force
 For guarding us and helping us to live.

Serenely let us move to distant places
 And let no sentiments of home detain us.
 The Cosmic Spirit seeks not to restrain us
 But lifts us stage by stage to wider spaces.
 If we accept a home of our own making,
 Familiar habit makes for indolence.
 We must prepare for parting and leave-taking
 Or else remain the slaves of permanence.

Even the hour of our death may send
 Us speeding on to fresh and newer spaces,
 And life may summon us to newer races.
 So be it, heart: bid farewell without end. ¹¹⁷

The human experience of sin, suffering, and death provokes speculative philosophical questions. It also causes one to enter the area of religious experience in search of some of the answers to these questions. Hesse's work does not start with a faith commitment that can be labeled. His ideas are a combination of many different religions.

It is important to look at the content of religious experience, and this involves Hesse's understanding of the nature of God. This will mean looking at the Divine/human encounter that results in the experience of salvation. Although Hesse is not a systematic theologian he is consistent about one aspect of what he thinks is present in the Divine Life. God contains the opposites of male and female, good and evil, light and darkness. Hesse objects to the Judeo-Christian belief in a God of ethical monotheism. He agrees with Jung in wanting to attribute the negative

as well as the positive aspects of existence usually ascribed to deity, to a dynamic tension within the Godhead. The reason for this is not an attraction to Zoroastrianism but to the Oriental emphasis on wholeness and unity. Dostoyevsky influences him as well. In his essay on "The Brothers Karamazov" Hesse claims: "In the Russian man, good and bad, God and Satan, are one and the same. He worships a god who at the same time is the devil and who resides in a (Nietzschean) realm beyond good and evil."¹¹⁸

Hesse looks within man to discover what deity there is. "In each one of you there is a hidden being . . . Bring it to life! In each of you there is a call, a will, an impulse of nature, an impulse toward the future, the new, the higher. Let it mature, let it resound, nurture it!"¹¹⁹ Hesse constantly exhorts people to look within their own being and not elsewhere. He wants man to listen to his inner voice. He cautions people against looking to external sources for the Divine Presence, e.g., Bibles, pulpits, or thrones. He also cautions men against an absolutistic arrogance, for he thinks it is better not to be certain whether there is a God than to know without doubt. But he asserts, "Our mission is solely to remind you that there is a God and only one God; he dwells in your hearts, and it is there that you must seek him out and speak with him."¹²⁰

The significance of this one God that lives in all men is that every man is seen as a brother. Therefore, man cannot be divided into race and nationality, for everyone is related to one another and is responsible for one another: ". . . the only way to a higher and nobler humanity leads through this forever-repeated experience of unity, through the forever-renewed insight that we men are brothers and of divine origin . . ." ¹²¹

Therefore to us erring brothers
 Love is possible even in discord.
 Not judgment or hatred
 But patient love
 And loving patience lead
 Us closer to the goal.¹²²

The content of this God within is other than Hesse's Protestant background would indicate. For example, the eternal mother is a symbol that fascinates Hesse. It is the maternal principle that indicates a sense of permanence and rebirth. What is permanent, for Hesse, is the continuity of change, and it is the mother figure that symbolizes both change and permanence. The mother is a panentheistic symbol and, as seen in Goldmund's experience, has grown from his idea of his earthly mother into a universal mother image, Eve--the "One" in whom the opposites (pleasure and pain, good and evil) reside.

It is with Demian that Hesse develops his God of the opposites. The reason for Demian's protest against the traditional religion of Christianity is because it ignores the reality of sex within its understanding of God. Demian wants a deity that combines sexual and evil aspects as well as the usual positive characteristics of deity.

Prior to Hesse's contact with Analytical Psychology, his writing gives hints of what disturbs him about the religious tradition of his ancestry. In Gertrude the quest for meaning is reduced to a series of brief, meaningful moments. Only occasional flashes of light make a long weary life bearable. "However, I do know that if there is a state of bliss and paradise, it must be an uninterrupted sequence of such moments . . ." ¹²³ What is more significant is the belief, indicated later in the novel, that unless there is something better ahead, the whole of life is not worthwhile. But it is his concern over finding so much meaninglessness that requires a religious belief that would include the negative as well as the positive dimensions of life.

Well, either the world is bad and worthless, as Buddhists and Christians preach, in which case one must do penance and renounce everything . . . Or else the world and life are good and right-- then one can just take part in it and afterwards die peacefully, because it is finished. . . . Most people believe in both . . . And those who really believe do not live in accordance with their beliefs. . . . For instance; I believe as Buddha did that life is not worthwhile, but I live for things that appeal to my senses as if that is the most important thing to do.¹²⁴

This conflict between belief and practice, plus the reality of evil in the world, prompts Demian to say:

The Christian God is simply not adequate for our times. As the divine manifestation of all that is good, noble, beautiful and lofty, He is fine. "But the world consists of other qualities. And all that is simply ascribed to the devil. This whole part of the world, this entire half, is denied and buried in silence." Demian, however, feels that all of creation should be affirmed and worshipped.¹²⁵

Abraxas, the ancient Gnostic deity, becomes the acceptable name of a deity for modern man. But for Sinclair, Abraxas is merely the symbolic representation of the realm beyond good and evil, to which he aspires. He realizes Abraxas represents a stage he must pass through as he continues to find himself and his personal God.

Siddhartha is a character whose life implies perfection (his name suggests it and the narrative concludes with that impression). Water is the symbol for the eternal. It flows continually and yet it is always there; it is always the same and yet every moment it is new. Listening to the water means hearing " . . . the voice of life, the voice of Being, of perpetual Becoming."¹²⁶

Steppenwolf further elucidates the development of Hesse's idea of deity. Harry Haller admits that the Divine in life is blurred most of the time. But there are times in which golden sparks gleam through for a short time before being lost again. Haller could say, "I might be a beast astray, with no sense of its environment, yet there was some meaning in my foolish life, something in me gave an answer and was the

receiver of those distant calls from worlds far above. In my brain were stored a thousand pictures."¹²⁷ What he has in mind is suggestive of Jung's Collective Unconscious.

Although Haller can see the meaning of life in these rare experiences that occur, there are other times when he thinks that ". . . perhaps the whole of human life is but a bad joke, a violent and ill-fated abortion of the primal mother, a savage and dismal catastrophe of nature."¹²⁸ However, the novel does affirm love as an important value that gives meaning to life. "The sacred sense of beyond, of timelessness, of a world which had an eternal value and the substance of which was divine had been given back to me today by this friend of mine who taught me dancing."¹²⁹ It is love that provides Harry with a sense of meaning as he discovers it in Hermine. He then projects the source of love to a divine origin, but he does not expand on this.

In The Journey to the East it is clear that ". . . the East was not only a country and something geographical, but it was the home and youth of the soul, it was everywhere and nowhere, it was the union of all times."¹³⁰ The problem is that on the journey to find oneself, and one's God, man is plagued with forgetfulness. It is easy to get sidetracked and lost.

The League represents a rare, organized group search for meaning. It resembles a religious community, in that one joins by way of an "awakening" experience which is given by grace, similar to Christian conversion as known in the Pietistic tradition. Hesse is opposed to institutional religion, although he repeatedly asserts that he would join the Catholic church if he should ever feel the need for an institutionalized religion. It is interesting to note that a Protestant minister officiates at Hesse's funeral, but it is because he is a

personal friend from Maulbronn days rather than as a representative of the church.

Hesse does not usually write about institutions even though he places the setting of some of his novels, such as Narziss und Goldmund, in a religious monastery. He concerns himself with the life of the individual rather than with the institutional life of an organization. In The Glass Bead Game Castalia is portrayed as a secularized church (the ideal secular monastery).¹³¹ The Roman Catholic church is seen as yet surviving in the year 2400 A.D., and although smaller in size, still producing capable people, such as Father Jacobus, who are wise and worthwhile witnesses to traditional values that manage to endure. Hesse appreciates the altar and the confessional, and in spite of his Protestant background and natural criticism of the political life of the Roman church, he sees it as a maintainer of a culture worth continuing. Also, it is an interesting aside to realize that Dr. Lang, Hesse's analyst, had had a Benedictine education.

To summarize this section it can be said that Hesse is fascinated with a religious understanding of man, but when he discusses the nature of God he is vague and unclear. He knows man has religious experiences and that usually they are uncertain feelings rather than coherent ideas that can be articulated clearly. These experiences are ecstatic and mystical in nature, but sometimes they seem to be nothing more than yearning or wishful thinking. The unique characteristic, in which Hesse is consistent, is that the experience originates within man and possesses a bipolar dynamic that includes both the feminine and masculine, as well as good and evil, qualities.

A theme that is repeated in the work of Hesse is that of "awakening," i.e., the existential experience of reality (in contrast to the

abstract view of life). He believes man is capable of experiences that are life-giving, occasions of rebirth and renewal. Man need not be only what he is--he can become what he is meant to be. Most of the time, an awakening comes after a process of considerable time and thought--the product of little decisions and attitudinal changes. Veraguth and Knecht would illustrate this slower process of change. At other times, an insignificant event, but with considerable ramifications, would cause an awakening, e.g., Knulp's unhappy romance as a young man. Occasionally an awakening would occur as a result of a traumatic experience, such as Klein's crime or Haller's elimination of Hermine.

The term, awakening, is being used to mean a human experience during which one's consciousness is expanded. Man comes to see reality more clearly, himself more honestly, others more sensitively, and sometimes receives a small glimpse of God.

Salvation, from the viewpoint of humanism, can be seen in Hesse's work. In Wandering he says: "Everything is within you, gold and mud, happiness and pain, the laughter of childhood and the apprehension of death. Say yes to everything, shirk nothing, don't try to lie to yourself."¹³² Man is a free spirit and needs only to trust in himself. Whoever says no to himself cannot say yes to God. Man needs to obey the law within himself, his own law, the law of self-reliance. To be true to yourself is more important than being obedient to laws that are made by others or considered given by God. This means man must take upon himself the burden of responsibility of choice in a pluralistic world devoid of a deity. "Hesse does accept, with distress, that 'God is dead'; he accepts the consequences that the individual must rethink metaphysical concepts by himself, that is, without the support of recognized religions."¹³³ For Hesse, the God of traditional theism is dead and with

this Ziolkowski would agree. Instead of cringing in despair, or being driven to suicide by this new found freedom, man should respect himself and accept the new morality that will come as a result of the breakdown of old values.¹³⁴

In the Kurgast Hesse follows Nietzsche's lead in agreeing that it is better to become a psychopath than to adapt oneself to conditions that deny all ideals. And Goldmund dies declaring: "I want no peace with God. He made the world too ill, we need not esteem it, and He will not care much that I praise or blame Him. He bungled the world!"¹³⁵

In humanism salvation means man saves himself. Hesse says in one of his Letters:

Ich habe im "Glasperlenspiel" die Welt der humanistischen Geistigkeit dargestellt, die vor den Religionen zwar Respekt hat, aber ausserhalb derselben lebt.¹³⁶

I have presented in The Glass Bead Game the world of humanistic intellectuality, which has true respect for the religions, but exists outside of the same.

It is for this reason that some scholars (e.g., Walter Naumann) believe Hesse must be considered nothing but a humanist. Man is in the middle between nature and mind, and the artist is the measure of man, for he is responsible only to himself.¹³⁷ The artist's goal is to perfect his individuality and not to be a mediator of the Divine Life to man.

Certainly Hesse is a humanist, but is he not also a Christian humanist? A case could be made that Hesse talks as though he is very much grounded, i.e., he limits life only to what is verifiable and present in the here and now. But he writes a considerable amount of material that hints at, or alludes to, the real possibility that there is a divine dimension in life that transcends human existence. It is true that the tormented Klein could say life becomes more meaningful when a person loses hold of all meanings. But he later says, "Why,

everything was so simple, so good, so meaningful, as soon as you saw things from inside, as soon as you saw the essence dwelling behind everything, saw him, God."¹³⁸

It is true that some persons can find meaning in life without a metaphysical orientation. Such a person is the old typesetter in "Tragic" who finds that all he needs to live is a task, a job to do. This is sufficient to provide meaning. But in "Dream Journey" Hesse tells us that

. . . every man, even the apparently normal, even the apparently happy and successful, nourishes within himself exactly the same foolish and hopeless self-deception, that every man strives constantly and incessantly after something impossible . . . striving for something valid, enduring, valuable in itself . . . All human beings were striving in some fashion, however cleverly or stupidly, to transcend themselves and the possible, fired by secret desires, dazzled by models, enticed by ideals.¹³⁹

It is this transcendent quality that introduces one to the religious life in Hesse. There is a sense in which all of his work seems preoccupied with the process of awakening. His Protestant Pietism gives him a consciousness of original sin, and the temptation to eat of the forbidden fruit of the tree of knowledge is present in his work. Awakening from innocence comes with fear and trembling, and yet to remain in innocence is to deny the fascination and attraction of reality. "The urge to find out the 'secret' about one's self and the hidden corners of life, curiosity in the widest and most dangerous sense, is the driving force behind Hesse's work."¹⁴⁰

Awakening to new life is a favorite theme. Its origin can be traced back into Hesse's childhood when he first becomes conscious of wanting to be a magician--for then he can change things. This is true also when Hesse discovers the joy of painting. "I could change reality, make houses laugh or weep, give face and wings to trees."¹⁴¹ As man,

by way of artistic expression, can alter things, so man himself can be changed. When a soul is awakened transformation takes place. One feels taken hold of by reality, and life cannot be the same again.

The experience of individuation is the psychological description of spiritual experience. It is

. . . a painful and yet wonderful process of "coming into being"
 . . . He will experience shocks which reveal things that are hidden to him and stood in the way of his inner progress. The experience of being "awakened" will enable him to shed the past, to be transformed and to go forward.¹⁴²

Hesse believes each individual needs to be "awakened," i.e., "reborn," for this is the only way the evolution of man will come about. Awakening brings with it an expansion of consciousness and an inspiration for venturing into new directions that otherwise would not occur.

In the short story, "Inside and Outside," a statement is made that is peculiarly similar to Pauline theology: "A man in search of rebirth must be prepared to die."¹⁴³ The old man passes away to make room for the new man. The process of change is not easy. Jung is aware that striving to achieve individuation can mean disintegration for some persons. In "Walter Kömpff" such an experience does take place. Walter possesses a belief in an absolute transcendent God with whom he has a relationship of consequence. However, due to circumstances within the plot, Walter moves from security and stability to insecurity and disillusionment. At the conclusion Walter loses contact with reality, and his faith (rather than helping him cope with life) contributes to a shallow and lonely existence forming a community of one--which is madness.

Demian is illustrative of the struggle involved in the birth of consciousness. "The only duty and destiny we acknowledged was that each one of us should become so completely himself, so utterly faithful to the active seed which Nature planted within him, that in living out its

growth he could be surprised by nothing unknown to come."¹⁴⁴ The central symbol of the novel is religious in nature: the bird breaking out of an egg is a symbol of spiritual rebirth of the individual. This symbol has a religious basis in Jung's concept of the Collective Unconscious.

Siddhartha is filled with the awakening motif. He begins with recognizing that he knows little, if anything, about himself. He awakens and feels like he is just born. He says, "I will no longer try to escape from Siddhartha . . . I will learn from myself, be my own pupil; I will learn from myself the secret of Siddhartha."¹⁴⁵ But he also learns the pleasure of love from his wife. He observes how many people drift through life like leaves falling to the ground, and all he knows is that he is on the way--he is becoming--he is in search of self perfection within natural limits.

Achieving salvation, for Hesse, is a threefold process. Ziolkowski calls it a " . . . triadic rhythm of the sort ideally represented by the Christian conception of an original state of grace followed first by the fall into sin and despair and finally, the ultimate redemption."¹⁴⁶ In Hesse's essay, "A Bit of Theology," he says that there are three stages of human development. It

. . . begins with innocence (paradise, childhood, the irresponsible first stage). From there it leads to guilt, to the knowledge of good and evil, to the demands for culture, for morality, for religions, for human ideals. . . . consistent goodness is unattainable. Now this despair leads either to defeat or to a third realm of the spirit, to the experience of a condition beyond morality and law, an advance into grace and release to a new, higher kind of irresponsibility, or to put it briefly: to faith.¹⁴⁷

He says most people prefer remaining in the childish state and resist moving into the second stage of conflict and development. Many would prefer the animal world of impulses and infantile dreams. Those who do enter the

second stage encounter despair which can lead to meaninglessness and suicide or to the third stage (salvation) which Hesse calls the Kingdom of the Spirit. This level of existence is one of faith and responsibility. It is one of authenticity whereby a person lives according to his beliefs. Another term for this third stage is individuation, which leads beyond the individual back to the community, where service to others is important. Such characters as the old Siddhartha, Leo in The Journey to the East, and Joseph Knecht, are examples of those who achieve this third stage. And each of them assume the role of the servant. "Hesse has admonished others to be true only to themselves, in the understanding that consummate self-knowledge will ultimately bring the individual back into the community on the third level of humanization."¹⁴⁸

Hesse tries to follow Jung's path to integration until he realizes that introspection alone will never lead to salvation. A social approach to culture is necessary, too. Upon entering the third stage one has an awareness of the Holy and of the relationship of one's whole being to the sacred Ground of Being. The methods used to achieve salvation will be discussed later. What is important to see now is the fact that man can experience union with reality, even though reality contains the demonic and lawless. Man can know moments of inspiration during which he is awakened to a new reality. There is no reason for ultimate despair, as there will always be a chance for a new beginning. Somewhere near will be a human being who will be a channel for the possibility of new life. Man can be hopeful because there are Joseph Knechts in the world who are willing to sacrifice themselves to awaken the young, like Tito, to what it means to be human. Knecht is under the magic spell of a new beginning himself, and in the swimming race with Tito he

follows his will rather than his instinct to save himself. Hilde Cohn makes an interesting observation in pointing out the maternal significance of water in Jungian psychology where the sea is the symbol of birth.¹⁴⁹ Knecht and Tito are submerged in the water, the religious symbolism of baptism, and even though the novel has a tragic ending with Knecht's death, there is hope that it is not in vain. His death is sacrificial and demonstrates his commitment to, and concern for, Tito. Consequently, a redemptive act has taken place.

Knecht's leap into the water, the sun upon the lake, is sacrifice, integration of opposites, "marriage of heaven and earth," and Tito is a "new man" born alchemically out of that process in which the "old man" is consumed. In picking up his drowned master's bathing robe Tito accepts the discipleship.¹⁵⁰

Reconciliation is the experience of salvation. What has been fragmented and partial is made whole. The key word in Hesse's concept of reconciliation is balance. To be human means to become a person, an individual, who can think, feel, and act independently of the masses while accepting the ambiguity and chaos within--yet obeying the high ideals and demands of one's inner self. A person must fight the pressures of society to conform, but at the same time he must not completely withdraw from society. The individual must establish a balance between the poles of existence.

The achievement of balance is most difficult. According to Demian Sinclair wanted to try and live with the promptings from his true self, but this is not easy. To be fully alive requires being in battle with the world and oneself.

Siddhartha, too, shows how problematic it is to let the self die--to experience one's goal--a peaceful and meaningful existence. But the way of the Buddha is not the way for Siddhartha. He has to find his own way--as each person must. Hesse is often called a Buddhist on the

basis of Siddhartha, but a close examination shows this cannot be the case. Overt world denial is nowhere to be found in the book. In fact, it reveals

. . . Hesse's movement away from Buddhism, not toward it, as his interest was more in the multiple Indian gods. Hesse was throughout his life probably more influenced by Hinduism than by Buddhism; he apparently found that yoga answered better the needs or yearnings of himself and his contemporaries than did the Eightfold Path.¹⁵¹

From Klingsor it is learned that balance means accepting the spiritual and the sensual as belonging together and not to be separated. Passion and contemplation belong together. Apollonian man and Dionysian man must be balanced against each other by recognition and acceptance of these dynamic elements within man. "Klingsor is convinced that all feelings are good, 'even hatred, even envy, even jealousy, even cruelty.'"¹⁵²

Harry Haller, in his loneliness, restlessness, and homesickness, knows emptiness, boredom, and despair. He has to learn to love himself, in the right way, as well as his neighbor. He has to come to terms with the irrational in himself--he has to learn to dance, which means self-surrender.

After writing Steppenwolf Hesse comments, in a letter, that his own personal life has not reached the level of reconciliation.

Ich bin ein Dichter geworden, aber ein Mensch bin ich nicht geworden. Ich habe ein Teilziel erreicht, das Hauptziel nicht. Ich bin gescheitert. . . . mein Leben ist nichts als Arbeitsbereitschaft; . . . Der Wert und die Intensität meines Lebens liegt in den Stunden, wo ich dichterisch produktiv bin, also wo ich gerade das Unzulängliche und Verzweifelte meines Lebens ausspreche.¹⁵³

I have become a poet, but I have not become a human being. I have reached a partial goal, but not the important one. I am frustrated . . . my life is nothing else but a readiness to work; . . . The value and the intensity of my life lie in the hours when I am poetically productive, also when I speak out directly about the inadequacy and despair of my life.

Hesse has come to disbelieve in self-development, by 1929. He could see that his ideal aims in life would not be reached. He would have to be satisfied with limited goals.

Balance means achieving a synthesis of the mother and the father principles. The answer to life's problems means balancing thinking and doing, contemplation and activity in an alternating rhythm which constitutes the summum bonum toward which the art of living should be directed.¹⁵⁴ This message of Hesse's follows Goethe's lead. "For Goethe, man must first contemplate what is above him, secondly, that which is below him, and thirdly, what is beside him--his fellow man. This contemplation results in reverence for all three."¹⁵⁵ The inner and outer worlds are real, and man's destiny has to do with both. The only hope of salvation for man is in the fusion of thinking and doing.

An example of this balance can be seen in the Music Master in The Glass Bead Game. His wisdom combines an inner balance of reason and emotion which permeates his whole life. Hesse calls him a secular saint and shows him aging by merging his personhood with a suprapersonal unity of all life. He fulfills Jung's archetypal projection of the wise old man in that he appears at critical moments in Knecht's life. "He is responsible for Knecht's calling to the Eliteschule; he answers philosophical questions which perturb the student; he rescues Knecht as a student when his emotional equilibrium is most seriously threatened; he appears, finally, with advice when Knecht is inaugurated as Magister Ludi."¹⁵⁶

In addition to balance, another key word that conveys the concept of reconciliation in Hesse's work, is harmony. It is a synthesizing word. "As a writer, Hesse longs to be a musician, not because he might feel more at home in a nonliterary metier, but because music embodies the very concept of harmony within dissonances which is his prevailing theme."¹⁵⁷ Since man is caught between the pull of Geist and Natur he finds himself dangerously fragile and desires harmony--a blending of

these two notes of his existence. In his early work Hesse is following romantic faith in the belief that man lives fully only in nature; and therefore, he seeks to achieve harmony with the earth. This return to nature motif is popular with today's youth culture. Vitalism allows no dualism, says J. C. Middleton, and life and death are understood by Hesse as processes in one vital current in which every separate existence participates.¹⁵⁸ Harmony between the abstract and the concrete, knowing and acting, is part of the same quest of man for fulfillment.

In Demian people are not in harmony with themselves. "People are afraid because they have never owned up to themselves. A whole society composed of men afraid of the unknown within them!"¹⁵⁹ In order to bring one's life into harmony it means discovering one's own destiny, and this means standing alone like Jesus in the Garden of Gethsemane.

Siddhartha is Sanskrit for "he who achieves his goal," and the term is synonymous with "one in whom harmony dwells"--another definition for his name is "the man who is on the right road."¹⁶⁰ He is the one who has confidence in life and is in harmony with nature. He is the one who recognizes the need to express both the sensual and spiritual dimensions of life. A man is free who is in harmony with himself and the world.

Hesse's understanding of reconciliation does not require a Judeo-Christian view of God. It has to do with reconciling the opposites of beauty and ugliness, light and darkness, sin and saintliness. If, for one brief moment, these contrasting human experiences could merge into one another, then harmony could be known. This is one reason why the hermaphrodite figure is used by Hesse on different occasions. For instance, when H. H. in The Journey to the East lifts the veil, he finds nothing but a small sculptured figure. However, upon closer inspection

he finds that the form is two figures which are united in the back. The one is an image of his own imperfect self. The other is his best self--the features of Leo. The hermaphrodite symbolizes the blending of opposites into a unity. It suggests wholeness, harmony and balance.

Becoming Fully Human

The concept of "the human" in Hesse affects man as an individual, as a social creature, and as a religious person. Man can be less than human, but he can also realize his potential--he can be fully human. It has already been noted that man can become what he is meant to be. The concern in this section is how Hesse believes man could accomplish his full humanity.

Hesse begins his literary career as an aesthete. He preaches disinterested love as the only remedy for sorrow and disappointment, and he combines this sense of detachment with a rural mentality of self-sufficiency and an antagonism to urban life. Peter Camenzind reveals the introspection and lack of involvement in much of real life.

It is by artistic expression that man is enabled to cope with the problems of human existence. Hesse says he was ". . . convinced that the contemporary world was as much out of joint as his own life."¹⁶¹ He thinks the poet is the prototype of man, for the poet is in continual conflict with the external, commonplace world of the philistine. The poet is the mediator between the polarities in man. "According to Hesse, poetry and, indeed, all the arts have a spiritual function. Through them the universe achieves self-awareness and self-expression."¹⁶²

As meditation assists man in perceiving the unity of all things, so art is one of the means by which the polarities in human life are overcome. As Veraguth paints in Rosshalde because he needs some form of self-expression, so other Hesse characters use art in the same way.

Sinclair is not really an artist, but in successive drawings he portrays his own changes. Klingsor is an artist whose self-portrait is a true revelation of his inner world dissolving around him as death approaches. And Goldmund contemplates the permanence of art as he compares his own aging image, mirrored in a wall, with an artist's ageless creation of the image of man.

"Art is the medium through which opposites are reconciled and the threat of death annulled, in which totality of life is eternalized and simultaneity of spirit broadened to include nature."¹⁶³ The artist tries to capture the abstract in the concrete, the idea takes on form, the passing takes on permanence (at least to a degree). One may ask if the reality of death is the cause of all art. It can make mortal man immortal to the extent that he will be remembered for generations, or even centuries, after his death. An explanation of this characteristic of permanence can be seen in a statement by Ziolkowski. Art is a ". . . unification of the worlds of the Father and of the Mother, of mind and blood; it could begin in the most sensuous experience and lead to the most abstract."¹⁶⁴

Goldmund is the best example of the aesthetic way. He emphasizes the theme of Hesse's, to be yourself. For example, Narziss says to Goldmund:

Men are transitory, we become, we are possibilities, and for us there is no perfection, no final being. But in all by which we pass on, from potentiality into action, from possibility to fulfillment, we have our share in this true being of God. That is what I mean when I say, "to fulfill oneself."¹⁶⁵

Man is a combination of matter and spirit. Natural man is in conflict with spiritual man--the one draws him to the perishable and the other to that which is eternal. Narziss, reflecting on the way Goldmund lives his life, says:

. . . perhaps it was not merely simpler and more human to live a Goldmund-life in the world. Perhaps in the end it was more valiant, and greater in God's sight, to breast the currents of reality, sin, and accept sin's bitter consequence, instead of standing apart, with well-washed hands, living in sober, quiet security, planting a pretty garden of well-trained thoughts, and walking then, in stainless ignorance, among them--the sheltered beds of a little paradise.¹⁶⁶

Narziss cannot help comparing his life with that of his friend. He has chosen the secure environment of the monastery whereas Goldmund has plunged into a sensuous sea of lust and even murder. Yet does Goldmund ". . . never kill the God in his mind, and though he wander for years through the blackest darkness still carry, without risk of its extinction, the light which made him a creator."¹⁶⁷ Goldmund is a wood carver, a sculptor. He finds meaning in the way of the aesthete.

The eternal nature of art fascinates Hesse, and in The Journey to the East he has H. H., a violinist and storyteller, speaking for him when he says to a friend, Lukas: "I either had to write the book or be reduced to despair; it was the only means of saving me from nothingness, chaos, and suicide."¹⁶⁸ It is interesting to note that writing is an artistic expression whereby a person can defend himself against disintegration or chaos. H. H. is on a voyage that includes both faith and despair; it is in Leo that he finds at-one-ment. Leo is a man who is both a leader and a servant. He is one in whom darkness and light are intertwined. There is consistency between who he is and what he does. He represents the conjunction of the opposites. H. H. has tried to write the history of the League without knowing himself. He comes to see the vanity of his egotism and the intimate relationship he really possesses with Leo, and in the image of the double figure with a single back individuation begins to take place. H. H. comes to discover that Leo is his own best self.

Music, perhaps more than any other of the art forms, is elevated by Hesse to the highest of the disciplines that produce reconciliation of the opposites within man. Music demands a synthesis of the abstract and the concrete and is one of the most conspicuous elements in Hesse's life and work. He says, in his Autobiographical Writings:

I would like to find expression for duality, I would like to write chapters and sentences where melody and counter-melody are always simultaneously present, where unity stands beside every multiplicity, seriousness beside every joke. . . . I would like always to show that the beautiful and the ugly, the bright and the dark, sin and holiness are always opposites just for the moment, that they constantly merge into each other.¹⁶⁹

He feels compelled to write in such a way as to attempt, at least, to force the poles of life together into life's melody, even though it is an impossible task. Hesse longs to be a musician because music embodies both harmony and dissonance. Music suggests a transcendent solution, albeit an aesthetic solution, to the opposing motifs of life.¹⁷⁰

Kuhn, in the novel, Gertrude, is a composer in whom the excitement and importance of music can be seen as the means by which a man is assisted in becoming more fully human. The ego satisfaction that comes to Kuhn when he creates music provides meaning for his thwarted life (in adolescence, an accident left him crippled). He tries to compose so that everyone can feel the pleasure and pain that are present in life. Composing enables him to weather the storm within that he experiences. At times, he even questions the value of music. "Could it really have a meaning and justify and fill a person's life, this building up of sound patterns and the exciting play with images, which at the best would help other people to pass a pleasant hour?"¹⁷¹ His answer is yes! Music stirs his very being, and he can understand everything without the aid of words. He can say, "I was then aware of pure harmony in the essence of life and felt that there must be a meaning and a just law behind everything that happened."¹⁷²

Music is equated with blessedness and service to God, for Hesse. In the short story, "The Poet," music is the key to being a good poet, so Hans Fook learns to play the lute, the zither, and the flute. With music, time and eternity seem to be one. The central importance of music is seen, in Steppenwolf, with the jazz of Pablo and the sublime harmonies of Mozart. What counts is not music theory or passive music appreciation but the making of music. Pablo sees his purpose in life to be that of making music, as often as possible, with all the intensity of which he is capable. He says he enjoys seeing " . . . eyes sparkle, legs twitch, and faces begin to laugh. That is why one makes music."¹⁷³ This kind of music belongs to the will and not to the intellect or feeling level of man. Music is not to be thought about but performed. Obviously, Pablo represents Dionysian man in that he is absorbed in sensual delights, but he is also a Nietzschean man in that he exercises his will in the playing of music rather than in the Apollonian emphasis of talking about music, as Harry Haller is tempted to be satisfied with doing.

Other of Hesse's characters have musical talent (such as H. H. who plays the violin) and music is a minor theme in the plot of The Journey to the East, but with The Glass Bead Game music plays a major role in the entire narrative. Joseph Knecht is an accomplished pianist and music theorist, and he thinks perfection is achieved in the works of Bach because the intellectual and the sensual are in delicate balance. As a boy, Knecht was drawn to the study of music as a vocational choice, attracted to the joy-giving harmony that symbolizes the best in the world of the mind. When he encounters music as created and played by the Music Master, Knecht has what approximates a religious experience--he is in touch with the whole of the cosmos and the spirit of music. He says:

"the soul is awakened by it, transformed or exalted . . . A portion of reality presents itself and makes its claim."¹⁷⁴ He has come to know a vocational call.

Castalia is based on the game which Hesse compares to an organ on which one can play the music of the intellectual cosmos. The human and the Divine meet in music. The game is played as an aesthetic expression of the spirit--it combines music and meditation. The game seeks to show the superiority of the life of the mind over that of the senses, and the novel seeks to work out a harmonious synthesis between them. However, music is the aesthetic means by which one becomes fully human.

Another way in which man is able to achieve wholeness is through humor. For Hesse, humor serves as a mediator between the real and the ideal. It is the quality of irony and humor in his work that attracts many sophisticated readers. Yet it is the ability to suffer that develops humor in a person. Hesse is indebted to Novalis, Jean Paul, and the romantic tradition, for it is here that dreaming and reality are reconciled in humor. It is humor that enables a person to live in the world without being overcome by it.

Those of Hesse's characters that become aware of the unity, totality, and simultaneity of all being can be identified with the smile--this is the symbol of inner perfection. "The beatific smile in Siddhartha as the symbol of fulfillment recurs in many of Hesse's novels; we find it again in Steppenwolf, The Journey to the East and The Glass Bead Game."¹⁷⁵

In Steppenwolf Goethe approaches Haller and tells him that he takes life too seriously--he must learn to laugh and enjoy jokes. Notice, too, that each time Haller encounters Goethe and Mozart they

laugh at him for his " . . . reluctance to forsake bourgeois prejudices, for his inability to laugh at appearances and look for a deeper reality beneath the surface of things."¹⁷⁶ The tractate in the novel suggests that to survive, those on the fringe of life (such as Harry Haller) have to develop a sense of humor, for it is necessary to learn to laugh at those aspects of life that obscure eternal values. One could sum up Steppenwolf as " . . . an act of faith imposing form on chaos, time on space, and music on life, by the sovereign acceptance of the old Calw dualism, by the apotheosis of irony (laughter of the Beyond)."¹⁷⁷

Because of his view of humor it is not a coincidence that Hesse sees life as a game. A beautiful life is happy when a person makes of it a game rather than a duty, a battleground, or a prison. It is for this reason that Hesse's final novel is about a game. It is a serious game that helps one on the path from becoming to being, from potentiality to reality. The game is elevated to almost an act of worship, and it takes Father Jacobus to interpret this fact to Knecht. After all, it is only a game and not real life. The significant thing that Hesse points out is that sometimes man is only truly himself when at play. It is the Music Master who encourages Knecht to move from the periphery of life to its center, through the playing of music and the glass bead game. And it is the Music Master who possesses the beatific smile and who arrives at the center of living and achieves blessedness.

In addition to humor Hesse uses the term, "Magical Thinking," as a means of accomplishing the experience of reconciliation. Hesse defines Magical Thinking as the ability to exchange inner and outer reality--the acceptance of the reversibility of nature and spirit.

Magical Thinking is Hesse's rather romantic term for the act of mental projection that permits us to escape the sphere of polarities: it is a spiritual revaluation of life, proceeding from an uncompromising examination of the chaos in our own souls. The very opposite of anarchy, Magical Thinking implies the acknowledgment of a meaningful totality beyond chaos.¹⁷⁸

Fire can be a symbol of Magical Thinking in that it suggests boundaries that disappear. Magical Thinking is similar to Novalis' "magical idealism" in that magic is equated to the art of using the world of the senses at will. Hesse does not use the term in the usual superstitious and derogatory connotation that accompanies immature and wishful thinking.

Magical Thinking has a transcendent quality to it in that it means getting outside of oneself and seeing the synthesis of nature and spirit. It is the affirmation of all being, which includes sensual gratification and intellectual or spiritual pursuits.

Art embodies the union of dualities--of self and world and the projection of their conflict into the self--and portrays it in a state of "magic" . . . the act of "magic," which is linked to the aesthetic mode of harmonizing, is a merging of dissonance in harmonies; in individual experiences it may manifest itself in madness, but, if publicly exhibited and consciously applied according to rules, it becomes analogous to art.¹⁷⁹

An example of Magical Thinking, outside of Hesse's work, is seen in Prince Myshkin in Dostoyevsky's The Idiot. He is in touch with the unconscious and possesses the wisdom of a mystic in whom all antitheses are resolved. Polarities are denied and unity is experienced. There is no separation of the outside and inside world.

The magical conception of life has long been a part of Hesse's life. As a writer of fairy tales he displays this desire to cross over the barriers of logical thinking. Hesse thinks opera is the highest form of fairy tale and wants to compose an opera because "In my opera I wanted to do what I had never quite succeeded in doing in my poetry: to establish a high and delightful meaning for human life."¹⁸⁰

Magical Thinking makes use of imagination and the intuitive side of life. The tale, "Augustus," illustrates this. Binswanger, the godfather of Augustus, possesses magic. He does not age and has power to

accomplish extraordinary things, e.g., he grants Augustus' mother her wish to have a son who is popular with everyone. Being loved by everyone becomes a problem for Augustus. He finally asks Binswanger to fulfill his wish: to be able to love others rather than to be loved. It is done. Binswanger is an example of the wise old man archetype in Jungian thought. He is a wise teacher with a serene radiance emanating from his person while at the same time he possesses power to affect life dramatically.

Demian portrays " . . . a world which is not fully obeying the laws of reality, but is rather moving in its own magic orbit."¹⁸¹ At the end of the book, Sinclair finds the ultimate synthesis of the conflicting worlds within himself through Magical Thinking.

Significant also is the "Magic Theater" in Steppenwolf. It is the place where one encounters the depths of one's own being--where one is forced to embrace the realms of light and darkness. It is here Haller learns to stop viewing life as a dichotomy and to accept all aspects of his personality as being natural.

It is important to see the means by which one enters the Magic Theater--through the use of drugs. It is interesting to realize that Hesse is saying that drugs can be used to expand one's consciousness of reality. Pablo is not only a musician, he is an expert on various drugs that can produce beautiful dreams and insightful experiences. "At the first meeting Pablo offers Haller a powder to improve his spirits . . . and later Haller admits that he frequently partook of Pablo's narcotic cocktails."¹⁸² The Magic Theater is an opium fantasy that Haller indulges in with Hermine and Pablo.

Everything Haller is to see in the Magic Theater is a reflection of his own inner life and a product of his eidetic vision under the influence of narcotics . . . As the effect of the drugs begin to wear off, Harry has his most sublime experience: direct contact with the Immortals in the person of Mozart.¹⁸³

Most of Hesse's work relies on aesthetics as being the means by which a person becomes fully human. It is not until he writes The Glass Bead Game that a noticeable shift in his thinking occurs. This is due to both a personal maturity and to a disenchantment with the detachment that accompanies aestheticism. Also, he is alarmed by the world situation caused by the Nazi menace. The result is a change from aesthetics to ethics as the solution to man's dilemma--detachment to engagement.

The inward way must include the outer world of reality. Difficulties must be faced. It is significant that the study of history provides the aid for coming to terms with what is. "Hesse argues that history may be the one field in which the man of intellect can find the outer world merging with inner reality, with inner truth."¹⁸⁴

It is the Benedictine historian, Father Jacobus, who precipitates the rejection of the aesthetic realm of Castalia by Knecht. Father Jacobus' function in the novel is that he forces Knecht, the representative of a province which knows practically no history, to confront historical reality. Castalia cultivates only the history of ideas rather than the history of man. To think historically is to think inhumanely, for Knecht. Therefore, the recognition of the importance of history prompts the change in thinking that has important consequences. During the apprenticeship under Jacobus, Knecht has made the discovery that he ". . . was not only a Castalian, but also a man; that the world, the whole world, concerned me and exerted claims upon me. . . . My Teacher Jacobus had kindled in me a love for this world which was forever growing and seeking nourishment."¹⁸⁵

This sense of responsibility for the world becomes a new theme for Hesse. He creates Knecht as a humanist endowed with some of the qualities of Universal Man. "In this world of the humanist, each individual is himself responsible, being the mediator between his beast and his angel."¹⁸⁶

Hesse creates Castalia as a community of the future, and the time of Knecht is approximately 2400 A.D.. Castalia comes into being as a result of the turmoil of the twentieth century. People " . . . did not take the time and trouble to strengthen themselves against fear, to combat the dread of death within themselves; they moved spasmodically on through life and had no belief in a tomorrow. . . . The dreary mechanization of life, the profound debasement of morality, the decline of faith among nations, the inauthenticity of art. . . ." ¹⁸⁷ Such are the alarming signs of the time.

Through the exercise of meditation, the well-spring of energy can be tapped, and the renewal of mind and soul can take place. But the world is present; history reveals that it has been present. The problem is how to combine the contemplative life with the active life. During the early years that Knecht is in Castalia (as recorded in the "Rainmaker" biography), the seeds of discontentment with Castalia are planted. For example, a quotation from the "Rainmaker" indicates this. "A man is the more useful, the more his life and thinking is turned towards matters of the spirit, matters that go beyond the personal realm, the more he has learned to venerate, observe, worship, serve, and sacrifice." ¹⁸⁸

Knecht comes to the conclusion that his task is to continue a life in the Castalian sense but in the midst of the world where he can be a mediator, interpreter, and arbitrator. He says, " . . . I did not want to be a hermit, cultivating my peace of soul and preserving a calm, meditative state of mind. I wanted to conquer the world, you see, to understand it, to force it to understand me. I wanted to affirm it and if possible renew and reform it." ¹⁸⁹

With time Knecht's attitude toward Castalia becomes increasingly more critical. More and more he sees it as a place where eunuchs,

confined to an eternal childhood, live in a neatly tidied playground where emotions that are troublesome are soothed and safe, bloodless games are played for a lifetime. It is " . . . an artificial, sterilized, didactically pruned world; a mere sham world in which you cravenly vegetate, a world without vices, without passions, without hungers, without sap and salt . . . drones' lives . . . while outside in the filth of the world poor harried people live real lives and do real work."¹⁹⁰

It is time for a decision when Knecht realizes history is made by those who take responsibility for the world. He believes that those who receive the elite training for membership in the select society of Castalia should be the ones who shoulder some of this responsibility. "The higher a person's cultivation, the greater the privileges he has enjoyed, the greater must be his sacrifices in case of need. . . . He would be a coward who withdrew from the challenges, sacrifices, and dangers his people had to endure."¹⁹¹ He feels a summons to serve his fellowman. He tries to convince Alexander, the next in command, that he is not desirous of freedom but of a commitment to someone who needs him. What he seeks is not so much the possible satisfaction of a worldly life, but rather, the unconditional.

The ethical stance requires a commitment to be responsible for one's fellowman. It is not enough to know the truth; a person has to live it. Commitment to some person is essential if Knecht is to put into practice the very meaning of his name. "Knecht in German means 'menial servant.' It is connected with knight and carries the connotation of noble faithfulness."¹⁹² He decides to leave Castalia and go into the world where he intends to devote himself to the service of man. He has come to see that divorced from life and moral commitment, art is

suicide. He wants to educate and help develop the personalities of others. He wants to undertake the difficult task of teaching his friend's problem son, Tito. His commitment cost him his life, but he does fulfill his mission.

Knecht is not rejecting Castalia totally. He really wants a marriage of Castalia with the world. It is not either/or but both/and. Commitment that leads to ethical action is seen in the three stories that follow the death of Knecht. They are an integral part of the novel and have in common not only service but ". . . the transmission of the spiritual seed--the essential function of Knecht's contact with Tito."¹⁹³

Self-realization through service is another way of saying salvation depends upon the individual--through education, will power, and moral effort. Needless to say, this works-righteousness method of salvation is in conflict with New Testament theology. But it is a step further than the aestheticism earlier advocated by Hesse. It at least takes seriously the real world and man's need to participate responsibly in it.

A further comment needs to be made about the message of The Glass Bead Game. Intellectual responsibility and personal devotion to a life of service are only part of the ethical message. Being a servant to the point of self-sacrifice means going all the way with one's commitment. "The sacrifice of Knecht's death, however, is not a question of atoning for sin, but one of at-one-ment with the divine."¹⁹⁴ It consummates an integration of the opposites. "Knecht's plunge into the frigid mountain waters symbolized the immolation of the Self in the All, the recognition of Truth, the acquisition of immortality in the transcendence to a Higher Self, to union with God."¹⁹⁵

Hesse believes he is making a contribution to life by writing his last novel. "Such themes as the sacrifice of the individual, the continuity of Geist, the polarity inherent in the dialectical process, service to Geist becoming in a higher synthesis service to life."¹⁹⁶

Sacrificial service to others produces new life. It has already been mentioned that an obvious change in Tito's life is implied when he puts on Knecht's discarded bathing robe. It appears that the seeds of faith, hope, and future service have been planted in Tito's life. Middleton says that the name, Tito, stands for the "young," or "new man," who is born out of the elements in which the "old man," (Knecht), is consumed, and in a sense Tito becomes the "fiery youth" as symbolized in the Phoenix of Western alchemy.¹⁹⁷

In addition to the effect on Tito, Ziolkowski says, "Knecht's sacrifice had profound implications for Castalia itself, which underwent a revaluation of its principles after the abrupt defection of the renowned Magister Ludi."¹⁹⁸ And the narrator of The Glass Bead Game has been substantially influenced by Knecht's sacrificial life. The entire community of Castalia has undergone reform because of the cogent criticisms made by Knecht prior to his defection. The ethical way can produce constructive results. At least it has more effect upon life than the way of aestheticism.

In the ethical stage the attitude of detachment is impossible, because love is at the center of an ethical life. Love is the motivating factor that opens up and brings a person out of self-seclusion, and in so doing conquers the demonic.¹⁹⁹ Detachment is overcome by existential involvement. Notice Leo in The Journey to the East. The more loving one is, the more understanding one will have for others, and the less self-conscious and egocentric one will be. Self-abandoned love

produces sacrificial living. "For all those torn between the two poles of nature and the spirit there is but one remedy: the miracle of love-- not only the personal love of man for woman but above all the humanitarian love of man for man. Self-dedication to humanity heals the elemental rift in man and leads from chaos to harmony."²⁰⁰

Hesse's essay, "My Belief," states:

Later on, my own personal religion often changed in form, never suddenly in the sense of a conversion but always slowly as growth and development. The fact that my Siddhartha puts not knowledge but love ahead of everything, that he rejects dogma and makes the experience of unity the central point, may be interpreted as a swinging back toward Christianity, yes, as a truly Protestant characteristic.²⁰¹

And in a "Letter to Adele" he writes: "If anything can cure the world and make mankind pure and whole again, it is the actions and sufferings of those who refused to be bent or bought, who were more willing to lose their lives than their humanity . . ." ²⁰²

It is love demonstrated that is the hope for man and the world. Love enables man to live with courage. Following the Second World War Hesse wrote a letter that says: "Today we all live in despair, all awakened people, and all thus cast between God and Nothingness. Between these poles we breathe, sway, and pendulate. Each day we are tempted to throw away our lives, but we are sustained by that within us which is suprapersonal and supratemporal. So our weakness . . . becomes bravery."²⁰³

In conclusion it can be said that man becomes human by exercising the inward way of meditation and contemplation, artistic self-expression, humor, Magical Thinking, and finally, by living an ethical existence. In the next chapter Hesse's work will be evaluated.

CHAPTER III

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF HERMANN HESSE

This chapter is a critical evaluation of the work of Hermann Hesse. An attempt is made to be fair to him by including the positive and negative dimensions of his literary endeavors. Perspective is gained when the extent of his influence is seen in the context of those who appreciate, and those who criticize, his writing.

In order to present a balanced appraisal of Hesse's work, a general literary critique is followed by a theological critique, and finally, by a specific critique of Hesse's concept of "the human." In each of the three areas the strengths and weaknesses of his efforts are examined.

Literary Significance

Hesse is appreciated by many uncritical young people and by many literary critics. His influence has extended from the publishing of his first novel in 1904 to the present time. In the English-speaking world, however, his influence was slight prior to the 1960s. When Timothy Leary pronounced Steppenwolf his favorite work of literature, a Hesse cult developed in America.¹ Today his popularity goes beyond the counter-culture. His work is read in progressive high schools, and Hesse seminars are taught on the university level. Before information is presented that is critical of Hesse, his accomplishments need to be viewed.

Literary Appreciation

Hesse was held in high esteem by many of his literary peers.

According to Baumer,

The very critical André Gide stated that in Hesse what is moderate is neither the emotion nor the thought, but--through an exquisite feeling for the seemly and reserved--the expression. This is marked by a restrained irony . . . ²

This trait was rare in German writers, according to Gide. Baumer also made reference to Thomas Mann's statement that Steppenwolf was not inferior in experimental boldness to Joyce's Ulysses or Gide's The Counterfeiters.³ Furthermore, in his introduction to Hesse's Demian, Mann commented on Hesse's work: ". . . the many levels of thought it touches and its concern with the problems of the world and the self is without peer among his contemporaries."⁴

The reasons for Hesse's recognition and appreciation include the following. In the first place, he was one of the first to recognize the significance of the subjective world and its power over man. He, along with Kafka and Marcel Proust, was able to plumb the depths of man's inner world (coming to light by way of Freud and psychoanalysis). Hesse used portraiture as a lyrical form, and his hero (although neurotic and vulnerable) became a symbolic representation of himself, and his world, on the way to salvation.⁵ He was successful in creating a distinctive lyrical novel in the tradition of Jean Paul and Novalis:

. . . his novels evolved a sharp diagnosis of modern life, directly psychoanalytic in the work of the early twenties, tempered by more spiritually defined harmonies in the work of old age. . . he condensed the time-bound hero and the timeless ideal into a dual vision, embodying equally a dialectic of ideas and the physiognomy of the generation for which he wrote.⁶

To a considerable extent Hesse's popularity could be attributed to the contemporary themes that occupied his attention. These themes were evident in chapter two of this thesis.

In the second place, Hesse was a prophet who pointed to what is universally human. He had a clear understanding of his vocation.

Our business is not to preach or command or to plead but to stand fast amid hells and devils. . . . If we poets and thinkers are of any importance, it is solely because we are human beings, because for all our failings we have hearts and minds and a brotherly understanding of everything that is natural and organic. . . . I have many times raised my voice and have devoted a large part of my life to the responsibility that was then borne in on me. . . . I have time and time again reminded my readers of the fundamental commandments of humanity . . . ⁷

Hesse's life and work testified to his degree of commitment and his ability to be responsible. His work was praised by literary critics because it went into " . . . the realm of universal humanity, emulating the wide-ranging love of Saint Francis, the mysticism of Buddha, the psychological insight of Dostoyevsky, the world-embracing striving of Goethe, and the Europeanism of Nietzsche."⁸ Man, in the final analysis, may be an unsolved problem. The ambiguities of life may remain in tension with each other. For Hesse this did not mean that man should give up and resign himself to the inevitable. Rather, he must learn to live with his ambiguities. He must engage in the struggle for that which is uplifting and universal in the human condition.

The official citation of the Nobel Prize for Literature which Hesse received stated: "For his inspired writing which, in its development toward daring and depth, also represents classic humanistic ideals and high stylistic quality."⁹ This prize increased the reading audience of Hesse. According to Stanley R. Townsend, "It is from such poets as Hesse, maladjusted and 'immature' in terms of the normal person, who are driven to question every aspect of human personality, that we learn the significance of our own experiences."¹⁰

On Hesse's eightieth birthday, in 1957, a few friends gathered in Stuttgart to honor him. Martin Buber was present and summed up Hesse's life and work with the words "service to the spirit."¹¹

The third reason for Hesse's literary acceptance was the way in which he expressed this concern for the spirit. He was a critic of society. He understood his mission

. . . to be a custodian of the spiritual and cultural values of the past and the protagonist of those values in the present . . . He lashes the modern world unsparingly for its scientific rationalism, its unfeeling intellectualism, for its worship of the machine, whose logical masculinity is insensitive to dreams, fantasy, music and love.¹²

His writing had a definite ethical impulse--he insisted that the primary impulse of his writing was in the broader sense religious, and his life and work embodied a rejection of anything that contributed to the dehumanizing process. According to Hesse,

Our era is one of moral depravity and intellectual mediocrity, of surface glitter, smug comfort, sham conventionality, and foolish optimism. It is a materialistic age where science has become a religion, and the ultimate criterion of value is function. Man has lost his soul in this world of money, machines, and distrust. . . . He has become a mere "Frommer des Fortschritts" (Bilderbuch, p. 224), worshipper of the slide rule.¹³

Hesse's analysis of modern life struck at the core of middle-class culture. He considered the bourgeoisie to represent all that was negative: mediocrity, cowardice, compromise, irresponsibility, and servility. Although he could not appreciate the positive side of middle-class society, he was one of the few who were concerned about cultural values and their meaning for people. For these reasons, and for those mentioned earlier, his peers praised his literary accomplishments.

Literary Criticism

In order to understand the significance of Hesse it is necessary to examine his literary weaknesses. The most common criticisms of his writing are the following.

First, he is criticized for his subjectivity. "Hesse becomes so engrossed in his psychological self that his art tends to suggest the

efforts of an analytic talent more than the work of a creative artist."¹⁴
 A large part of his work is written in the first person singular. His earliest work, i.e., that written prior to 1917, reveals an uncertainty and a sense of groping. He resorts to fantasy and retreats into the realm of beauty. A lethargic atmosphere pervaded by melancholy, along with a sentimental introversion and melodramatic exaggeration, is accompanied with an emotionally intense romanticism.¹⁵

Because Hesse was an outsider he wrote about outsiders. He refused to adjust to the way things happened to be in life. He could sympathize, so he claimed, with the saint and with the libertine, but not with the man who timidly lived between both.¹⁶ This affected his scope as a writer in that it narrowed his concern to the state of mind and the psychological feelings of the individual. His obsession with his own personality produced sentimental monologues that were what Hesse called "Seelenbiographie."¹⁷

Hesse placed an undue amount of emphasis on inwardness--another phase of his subjectivity. The genuine achievements of man, he thought, took place in the inner realm, and whatever reality was experienced outside the inner realm would always be disappointing. Existence was a process which appeared in the soul, something private, intricate, and mysterious, and when it became necessary for Hesse to face social reality he was not inwardly comfortable.¹⁸ Hesse, however, came to recognize his refusal to accept life as it is.

When Hesse reviewed books and acted as a critic he did not strive for objectivity. He considered subjectivity to be a virtue in being a good critic. He thought it was impossible to be neutral in reading another person's work and that the more one could experience what was being read the better one would be as a critic. His reviews were

a response to ideas and ideals he himself held. When he did not like what he read he would refuse to review the work. Nevertheless, Peter Gontrum stated, "Hesse has deprecated long-windedness, extolled economy, deplored artificiality, praised fidelity to nature even to the point of naiveté; he has decried tones of cynicism and skepticism and favored an optimistic view of life and the future."¹⁹

Secondly, Hesse's concern for the life of the mind, or the life of the spirit, has prompted accusations that many of his major characters (e.g., Joseph Knecht) are unbiological. An author who scorns the "shabby reality" of the material world and who has heroes with a melancholy mandarin quality is not to the taste of many readers living in today's world.²⁰ An illustration of this criticism can be seen in Rosshalde. Johann Veraguth is a famous artist who hardly exists as a man. "He, who never sent a bungled drawing or painting out into the world, suffered deeply under the dark weight of innumerable bungled days and years, bungled attempts at love and life."²¹ Such caustic comments as the following have been made: "Hesse is a highly cultivated person, he is the ideal second order writer for the sort of serious-minded reader desirous to believe that he is grappling successfully with intellectual and artistic profundities of the first order."²²

A third major criticism focuses on Hesse's passive characters. One gets the impression, especially in his early work, that his characters are constantly waiting for life to begin. His heroes are dreamers and not doers. He praises meditation rather than action, and his literary figures are plagued with chronic indecision. They are ". . . timid souls who ask too little of life, yet expect too much of it, and hence live in perpetual frustration and disillusionment."²³ They are persons who cannot carry out their intentions. It is not surprising that they are escapists by nature

and are always running--from themselves and from responsibility. For example, Klein and Wagner, Harry Haller, Goldmund, and Knulp defy established values and institutions and are satisfied with a pleasurable vagrancy that includes passive drifting. These are characters who cannot master their lives.

This passive quality was evident in Hesse's own life. He remained an amused observer, never a member of movements but whose themes included the quest for identity, the search for personal values, and the impulse to moral commitment.²⁴

A fourth criticism which can be leveled at Hesse is his preoccupation with adolescence. This is an emotional and intellectual immaturity in his work. His work provokes such sarcastic remarks as:

His art springs from an unshakably profound infatuation with adolescence, and his vision of youth is underwritten by his incapacity to break loose from youth's fascination. . . . corny tenderness of narcissism, or the wild thrill of discovering feelings that are entirely new, never felt before. . . . he is invariably second-rate . . . His thought is never cheap, never trashy, but neither is it ever intellectually exalting . . .²⁵

His youthful heroes are notoriously unstable and ill-equipped to face the demons of uncertainty.

His emphasis on the problems of adolescence contributes to his tendency towards sentimentality. This can be seen in the following poem:

I walk so often, late, along the streets,
Lower my gaze, and hurry, full of dread,
Suddenly, silently, you still might rise
And I would have to gaze on all your grief
With my own eyes,
While you demand your happiness, that's dead.

I know, you walk beyond me, every night,
With a coy footfall, in a wretched dress
And walk for money, looking miserable!
Your shoes gather God knows what ugly mess,
The wind plays in your hair with lewd delight--
You walk, and walk, and find no home at all.²⁶

In addition to the criticism of sentimentality, scholars such as Ralph Freedman note that Hesse can be criticized for the flatness of his characters, for the poverty of his imagination, and for the fact that his work has borrowed much from his contemporaries and predecessors.²⁷ This is a reference to similar themes and plots to those of other writers and not to plagiarism. Nevertheless, this contributes to the belief of certain persons (e.g., Karlheinz Deschner, an iconoclastic journalist), that Hesse is merely a second-rate writer.²⁸

Unthinking romanticism is the fifth major criticism leveled at Hesse. Hesse's identification with the romantic movement has been discussed (see supra, pp. 31-37), but he tempers this tendency with an existential dimension in his later work. However, Egon Schwarz says, "The French Germanist, Claude David, speaks of Hesse as a retarded Romantic, disenchanted with Western civilization, once destined for the clergy, who escaped into literature."²⁹ Critics such as Mark Boulby believe that there is an element of regression towards infantilism. The neo-romantic conflict between feeling and reflection can be seen throughout his work, but it is unfair to suggest that the same criticism (retarded romanticism) is true of his mature work. "It is the modern reformulation of the romantic framework which has given Hesse an important place in modern literature."³⁰

Alfred Werner refers to Hesse's writing as ". . . romantic and slightly effeminate novels appealing to the average German citizen."³¹ If the thinking part of human experience is to be understood as masculine and the feeling part as feminine, this may be true, but this is a false assumption. Women do not play a substantive role in Hesse's work, and they are conspicuous by their absence. Consequently, the feminine dimension is present in the male characters.

Hesse responds to this criticism by saying:

I am a non-modern man, in that I do not disdain and hate feelings and sentiments . . . qualities that make the poet, excitability of soul, the ability to fall in love, the ability to love and glow, to surrender oneself and to experience in the world of feeling the unprecedented and super-normal . . . my feelings are a thousand times dearer to me than all the smartness in the world . . . ³²

In spite of Hesse's justification of the feeling level of existence in his work, he really stresses the importance of Geist as the guiding principle of life over that of Natur. This is especially true from the time of the writing of Demian to the last of his work. The dichotomy continues to be a vital issue for Hesse, but the way of Geist becomes the formulative factor in human existence when it is mellowed by a humanitarian spirit of love, service and sacrifice as exemplified in Knecht's way of life. ³³

Ziolkowski points out that "Hesse is an heir of the chronic dualism that has afflicted German writers since Schiller; he tends quite casually to use such earfilling generalities as Spirit and Nature, Intellect and Sense, Ideal and Reality, Art and Life, Yin and Yang."³⁴ Hesse is cognizant that conflicts of opposites need to be reconciled, or they can lead to an individual's disintegration. "The resolution of conflict, ultimately in mystical vision or aesthetic imagination, is Hesse's most consistent romantic theme."³⁵

The romanticism of Hesse is evident in his giving full rein to his creative urges by recklessly yielding fully to the mood and necessity of the moment. Joseph Mileck contends that Hesse's early " . . . art became confessional in form and therapeutic in function."³⁶ However, his mature work reflects his craftsmanship. This enables him to be a modern man even though some of his themes and concerns can be labeled romantic.

In summary it can be said that not all scholarly critics can appreciate Hesse's literary efforts. Some praise him for his ability to explore

the inner world of man; for his being able to point to what is universally human; and for his being a custodian of the spirit, i.e., a critic of society. But his work can be criticized by others for subjectivity that contains sentimentality and a preoccupation with the psychological and emotional side of man. He emphasizes inwardness to the point that his characters are at home in the dream world and not the real world. His characters are passive by nature and inclined to be spectators in life. He is fascinated with adolescence and may reveal a poverty of imagination resulting in a flatness of his characterizations. He is a romantic who can be accused of writing novels that are slightly effeminate and lacking in tough-mindedness. Nevertheless, his impact upon thousands of persons in his day has been significant, and his influence since his death has continued to grow, especially in the English-speaking world. More time is necessary before critics can fairly judge whether or not Hesse is to be classified as a second-rate writer.

Theological Significance

Having presented information on the literary significance of Hermann Hesse, it will now be necessary to examine the theological significance of his work. In this section the theological ideas with which Hesse struggled will be presented, along with a theological critique from the viewpoint of traditional Christianity. In the last section of this chapter Hesse's concept of "the human" will be evaluated in the light of the author's theological posture.

Theological Affirmations

Hesse does not claim to be a theologian. He does claim to be a poet, and the content of his prose and poetry reveal a considerable amount of theological concern and philosophical reflection. Since his

theology is not articulated in a systematic way, his religious insights will be approached chronologically.

His first major work, Peter Camenzind, raises the question of the meaning of life. Why do things happen the way they do? Man has need for relationships that matter, i.e., where caring occurs. Although there are "givens" in life: birth, individual circumstances, aging and death, which must be accepted, there is still room for decision-making that can be meaning-producing. Peter has to stop running from responsibility and begin to meet the needs of other people. His becoming aware of opportunities for service is the result of a life inspired by and patterned after St. Francis of Assisi. When one demonstrates one's love for the unlovely nothing is to be feared--not even death itself. Beauty (and God) can be experienced in tragic circumstances; indeed, it is here that God will probably be experienced if the belief of the Christian faith is true. Every person has something of himself to give to others. Even the hunchbacked cripple, Boppi, can teach others to observe, create, love, and share experiences. Love is the central and most important element that provides purpose and meaning in life, and it can be known in suffering. Giving to others and receiving from others sacrificially is the basis for a satisfying life. Becoming mature involves accepting responsibility for other people.

In Beneath the Wheel the ordinariness of life is portrayed. The work-a-day world is seen as filled with ". . . all sorts of remarkable people and beautiful talents, and crazy fools."³⁷ In the midst of this world there is imperfection. It takes form in pressures exerted by Hans' elders who want him to be something other than what he is--a young boy with a soul. Hans is aware that if he does not keep pace he will be dragged beneath the wheel of people's expectations. The tragedy of

unrealized potential is placed in the context of an attack on educational systems that foster intellectual accomplishment to the detriment of the emotional and instinctual life of young people. A person's soul is smothered. The world contains conflicting priorities. For example, duty to a friend is in conflict with Hans' personal ambition to become the best student of which he is capable. Hesse suggests the need for caring love. Love changes things--life with its melancholy and depression and loneliness can be transformed. This humanistic love does not have a theological origin, at least not explicitly, but it is a statement about a fundamental human need.

With Rosshalde the theme of personal alienation is presented. Meaning resides in Veraguth's unbalanced love for his youngest son, Pierre. It is his only reason for living. In his sterile studio, in a life devoid of passion, Veraguth experiences alienation from his wife and his oldest son, Albert. His work and one friend, Otto, are the only contacts with the outside world. In his loveless silence he remains unreconciled to life. He plays the role of a spectator in his own home with loathing, and he is barely able to keep up appearances. There is an obstinate refusal to face facts and to come to terms with reality. He lives in a mood of self-destruction, resigned to a cowardly stance, refusing to leave the unsatisfactory security of the known to venture into the new and unknown. He lives in an environment where no real listening to one another occurs--where no real meetings on the depth level take place. But Veraguth does not know that genuine love causes one to forget oneself and to transcend the less important details of life. It frees one to concentrate upon relationships that matter.

The agony of one-sided love, i.e., unreturned love, is encountered in Gertrude. Kuhn comes to see the life-giving source of creativity,

his musical compositions. He is able to express himself in music, but more importantly, he assumes responsibility for others (his parents) which gives him a reason for being. The novel shows how easily persons can victimize one another, e.g., Muoth and his self-destructive ways and their effect on Gertrude. The ambiguities of the human situation are seen in the hope and despair, bliss and tragedy, love and fear present in Gertrude and her husband. At the same time the longing for harmony is a goal sought by the characters.

Commitment and the "in spite of" quality are also evident in Gertrude. It shows the depth of human resources when circumstances force one to cope with what appears to be the inevitable. Tenderness and sympathy are human characteristics that point in the direction of the key message of the novel--love endures! There is beauty in friendship (such as that of Gertrude and Kuhn) and value in the making of music. Kuhn says, ". . . however much I thirsted for God, understanding and peace, I always found them in music alone."³⁸ As noted in the last chapter (see supra, pp. 114-128), the aestheticism of Hesse becomes apparent.

The message of Wandering is the need for acceptance of life as it is, since ". . . mere existence needs no justification . . ."³⁹ Be what you are! That is happiness. Yet this is contradicted with a restlessness for the "not yet"! There is a discontentedness with arriving--a yearning for what will be. The movement of life is seen in the desire to be a pilgrim who is always on a journey. Man is by nature hopeful and future-oriented, and it is only death, or the achievement of Nirvana, that causes the journey to end.

With Demian the irrational factors of human experience become known. Hesse portrays man as doubting and questioning. These are

important human elements. It is difficult becoming one's whole self. Man is filled with contradictions and tensions arising from the polar life of the opposites within his subconscious.

In the short story, "A Child's Heart," the struggle in the human heart with temptation and baseness is present. Guilt and its impact on the inner life (its agony and pathos) become evident. Yet growth and maturity come as the result of coping with conflicting views of oneself. The observation can be made that hostility toward oneself is often expressed toward others. The importance of communication is seen when well-intentioned human beings, father and son, torment each other.

In "Klein and Wagner" Hesse conveys the struggle between the rational and respected citizen (Klein) and the terrible thief and libertine (Wagner). Both characters reveal aspects of the same person. It is the struggle of all men. Hesse shows how difficult it is to distinguish between decency and indecency when one accepts a relativistic position. When meaninglessness and despair are experienced it is a short distance to suicide.

With "Klingsor's Last Summer" the issue of finitude is the central focus, and the anxiety about dying is seen in the wild reaching out of Klingsor to absorb all of life now. This stress on the present can be seen in the following quotations: ". . . this day will never come again and anyone who fails to eat and drink and taste and smell it will never have it offered to him again in all eternity. . . . Paradise isn't Paris and peacetime, Paradise is here."⁴⁰ On the other hand, the message is one of pessimism and doom. The swiftness of life and its shortness are present in the quotation: "We are driving in a carriage on the edge of an abyss, and the horses have already shied."⁴¹ It is important to note, too, that when Klingsor finishes his self-portrait it contains many faces.

They say: this is man, ecce homo, here is the weary, greedy, wild, childlike, and sophisticated man of our late age, dying European man who wants to die, overstrung by every longing, sick from every vice, enraptured by knowledge of his doom, ready for any kind of progress, ripe for any kind of retrogression, submitting to fate and pain like the drug addict to his poison, lonely, hollowed-out, age-old, at once Faust and Karamazov, beast and sage, wholly exposed, wholly without ambition, wholly naked, filled with childish dread of death and filled with weary readiness to die.⁴²

The Jungian "collective unconscious" can be seen in Klingsor's observation that even deeper behind the faces are prehuman forms of past ages. This theme is developed later in Steppenwolf. Man is a complex composite of many selves. The more this is realized the better man will understand himself and others.

Siddhartha teaches that man is a searching creature, one who is concerned about the meaning of life. It is easy to be preoccupied--to give oneself to distracting tangents. Man is always on the way; he never ceases seeking. The pilgrimage inward becomes a way of life. This involves an acceptance of what is, i.e., of the polarities of existence. Yet, in the final analysis, love is the answer for Siddhartha (and for Hesse).

In the essay, "The Brothers Karamazov, or The Decline of Europe," Hesse states: ". . . we cannot kill the primal instincts, the animal in us, for we ourselves would die with them. But we can in some measure restrain and calm them, make them to some extent serviceable to the 'good' . . ." ⁴³ He considers Dostoyevsky to be a prophet, but he thinks that, in comparison to the ordinary person living in society, a prophet is a sick man who no longer cares about himself. The prophet interprets the movement of his own soul in terms of what is universal in man. Such a person is Prince Myshkin in The Idiot. He is like Christ, possessing a timid chastity (according to Hesse), and both men are so utterly human,

so utterly alone, so utterly persons of suffering. Both are so in touch with levels of the unconscious that when others encounter them, devastating truth seems to be present. The individual is thrown back upon himself, and a decision is required: "Each of us for an hour in his life will have to stand on the Myshkin boundary where truths can cease and begin anew."⁴⁴

With Steppenwolf man is portrayed as not always being at home in the world as it is. He is an outsider, lonely, and alienated. When man is on the boundary of his existence, he is closest to reality but also to madness. Man is separated and cut off from life until he opens himself to love and the possibility of being hurt. Only when one is vulnerable can one learn to dance, laugh, and make music. Man cannot live in the past only or melancholy results. To be healthy, man must live a balanced life. The Goethes and Mozarts are important, but so also are the Pablos and Hermines. Finding oneself is costly, and not everyone is willing to pay the price. It can lead to wholeness or to insanity--to life or to death. Man's reason for living comes from others, and only when man trusts another person, and puts his life at the disposal of that person, can he live with hope.

Harry Haller learns that real living is possible when man alternates between experiencing aloneness and community. Both are essential to vital living. People need people, and real living is giving yourself away. It is caring for someone.

In Narziss and Goldmund human existence is a battleground between the spiritual and the sensual life of man. Narziss and Goldmund characterize what is in all men. Too much discipline limits and restricts life, while giving too free reign to the sensual side of one's life results in meaninglessness and futility. The incompleteness of life is

communicated in that Goldmund never realizes his artistic goal--that of creating Eve, the Mother of man. Time runs out on him. The tragedy of life lived without fulfilling love (in *Narziss and Goldmund*) is most evident. There is considerable sexual exploitation, but it is devoid of an enduring relationship in which there is a future. Wasted talent is seen in Goldmund whose life produces so little that is creative. In contrast, *Narziss* recognizes the inadequacy of a controlled and rigid life devoid of emotional involvement with another human being. Both Apollonian and Dionysian dimensions need to find expression in a life that is whole.

The Glass Bead Game is Hesse's last major statement about human nature. Castalia is a safe world without any risks. It does have the danger of a one-sided life. The Oriental emphasis on inwardness and the psychological views of Jung are very much present. Also, man must pay attention to world history, noting that, significantly, it is the Christian church that has had staying power. From *Father Jacobus, Joseph Knecht*

. . . became fully aware of how phenomenal this Christianity was--a religion that through the centuries had so many times become unmodern and outmoded, antiquated and rigid, but had repeatedly recalled the sources of its being and thereby renewed itself, once again leaving behind those aspects which in their time had been modern and victorious.⁴⁵

This is to be contrasted with the secular centers of the arts and sciences which have not survived historical events.

Man can lose his humanity in his work, such as when *Joseph Knecht* becomes *Magister Ludi*, he is changed into an inhuman instrument. Personal matters, such as friendship, vanish. Current events reveal the temporality of Castalia too. What is important is for one to be responsible for world history. It is not something that just happens, but it can be shaped and affected by individuals actively participating in the events of history.

The key concept that The Glass Bead Game communicates is commitment to mankind, to the point of sacrificial service. The death of Knecht can be interpreted as demonstrating "the suffering servant" role of the biblical witness. Knecht comes to see that his mission in life is to put himself at the disposal of another human being in an effort to teach the values of Castalia in the reality of the everyday world. What higher ethic is there than sacrificial love expressed in human relationships?

Hesse's theology is obviously unconventional. He is not a traditional theist. Indeed, as will be seen in the next section, there is much of his thinking that can be challenged as nontheological. If the starting premise is one of theological positivism, this may be true. However, if self-transcendence and psychological expression are allowed to be interpreted as "spiritual" experiences possessing theological content, then Hesse has religious insight worthy of attention.

Hesse's affirmations include the following, in summary: man raises the question of the meaning of life (Tillich suggests that this is a sign of God's activity); he discovers meaning when he enters into relationships that matter, i.e., when genuine caring occurs. Peter Camenzind and Joseph Knecht illustrate this. Being responsible for others is love demonstrated. Life is imperfect, and tragedies do take place: loneliness, suffering, alienation, despair, and suicide are examples of this imperfection. Meaninglessness and an empty existence cause man to search for, and abandon himself to, values he considers purposeful, such as did Siddhartha and Harry Haller. The human condition is filled with ambiguity, but man is capable of living with courage "in spite of" overwhelming odds. Contradictions and tensions are part of every person's life. Guilt, anxiety, temptation, and finitude need

not conquer the human spirit. Man has the inner resources to cope with the unique circumstances of his individual destiny. It is true that some persons succumb to the pressures of existence (such as Klein and Giebenrath), but other persons (e.g., Kuhn and Veraguth) manage to survive with some degree of hope. The acceptance of life as it is need not mean bland resignation. It can mean a contentment that comes with the giving of oneself to that which is (note Siddhartha's experience). Inner peace and relative contentment can also be seen in the conclusion of The Journey to the East. The subconscious of man may contain demons, and there may be many selves struggling for dominion over one another within man, as is true in Steppenwolf. Nevertheless, the battleground between the sensual and spiritual sides of man (as seen in Narziss and Goldmund) can be channeled and given meaningful expression. Hesse's final statement about man is contained in The Glass Bead Game. Sacrificial love and redemptive action coalesce in the character of Joseph Knecht. He fulfills the "suffering servant" role and represents the pinnacle of human achievement. To be fully human, for Hesse, does not require a supernatural theology, but his thinking does take man to the boundary of his existence and hints at something more than that which is verifiable. Hesse's theology is this-worldly and limiting if measured by other than the terms he sets for himself. But, granting him his ground rules, there is much in his work that is inspiring and uplifting--Christian affirmations in humanistic disguise, some might say.

Theological Critique

Much of what concerned Hesse is noble and admirable in its humanistic and religious concern. However, when examined from the viewpoint of traditional Christianity his ideas are problematic. This author's

theology is not orthodox, and his evaluation will be presented later. At this time it is thought that a comparison of Hesse's thinking with that of historic Christianity will sharpen the distinctive elements present in Hesse. According to Baumer, Hesse states:

I do not believe in any system of religious dogma. I do not believe, then, in a God who has created men and made it possible for them to perfect their progress from the stage of killing with stone hatchets to the stage of killing with atomic weapons--and has let them be proud of it. I do not believe, then, that this bloody world history has its "meaning" in the plan of a superior Divine regent, who has thereby devised for us something that, though we cannot discern it, is divine and glorious.⁴⁶

What Hesse is challenging is God's apparent willingness to not interfere in the chaos and brutality that man inflicts upon man. He thinks that a personal God would not permit such atrocities. Hesse does not see that the alternative would be for man to have no freedom.

Hesse is critical of the traditional Judeo-Christian concept of God. The major reason for his criticism is the presence of evil in the world. From his observation of life and the study of Analytical Psychology, he concludes that whatever deity there is is a god who also encompasses within himself the devil--a deity before whom one would not need to close one's eyes in shame when the most natural things in the world go on.⁴⁷ It is for this reason that Abraxas, the Gnostic deity that combines the qualities of good and evil, becomes the name for divinity in Demian. Of course, this understanding of deity is unacceptable for the Jew and the Christian. Anything less than a belief in a God of ethical monotheism is repulsive. A good God is not the source of evil, although he permits it to exist.

To be human means to face the experience of chaos in life. Reality contains fragmentation, and man knows uncertainty and doubt. Whenever he tries to find meaning in life, he is thrown back upon himself and his own

resources. As far as Hesse is concerned, revelation as understood in the Bible does not occur. Meaning comes from within man by human initiative and imagination. Hesse attributes this occurrence to divine activity but not in the traditional sense of the term. The quest for meaning is linked to the quest for identity.

When man looks within his own life, he discovers demons that inhabit his interior world. Hesse's characters who seem to be possessed by their demons include Klein, Klingsor, and Goldmund. Hesse is taken to task for his unorthodox affirmations and his agnosticism. Is Hesse naive in his hope that man is to have a future, when the presence of evil seems to dominate the activities of man?

Can man find himself without God? The Christian affirmation says that man is made in the image of God; and therefore, if man is to find himself it is necessary for him to be found by his Creator. Hesse is unconventional in that he does not believe he can be saved by a God outside of himself. He believes he can be saved by the God within. This is synonymous with discovering the self. But is God merely the Self with a capital S? It may be true when Hesse says in his Letters:

Ich selbst halte für das entscheidende Kennzeichen meines Lebens und meiner Arbeiten den religiösen Antrieb.⁴⁸

I myself consider the religious impulse to be the decisive characteristic of my life and work.

The content of his religious faith is heretical. It leads to Gnosticism or to the god of the opposites of Jung.

Reality for Hesse is another name for nature. His involvement with nature can be seen in the following segment of the pantheistic poem, "Holiday Music in the Evening."

Again, every time, comforting
And, every time, new in the gleam of endless creation,
The world laughs in my eyes,

Comes alive and stirs into a thousand breathing forms,
 Butterflies tumble in the wind streaming with sunlight,
 Swallows sail into the blessing, the blue light,
 Sea waves stream on the beach rocks.
 Again, every time, star and tree,
 Cloud and bird, my close kindred;
 The stone greets me as brother,
 The unending sea calls me, friendly.
 My road, that I do not understand, leads me
 Toward a blue, lost distance,
 Nowhere a meaning, nowhere a definite goal--
 Nevertheless, every forest brook speaks to me,
 And every humming fly, of a deep law,
 A right way that is holy,
 Whose firmament spreads out above me also,
 Whose secret tones,
 As in the pace of the stars
 Beat time in my heart as well.

A dream gives what the day wore out;
 At night, when the conscious will surrenders,
 Some powers, set free, reach upward,
 Sensing something godly, and following.
 The woods rustle, and the stream, and through the night-
 blue sky
 Of the quick soul, the summer lightning blows.
 The world and my self, everything
 Within and without me, grows into one.
 Clouds drift through my heart,
 Woods dream my dream,
 House and pear tree tell me
 The forgotten story of common childhood.
 Streams resound and gorges cast shadows in me,
 The moon, and the faint star, my close friends. . . . 49

Hesse considers himself a freethinker. He never wishes to be called anything but a seeker, a thinker, a polar opposite, a colleague from another far-removed but equally competent faculty.⁵⁰ His pantheism is made explicit again in the following quotation from his Autobiographical Writings:

To be specific, I believe in nothing in the world so deeply, no conception is so holy to me, as unity, the conviction that everything in the world forms a divine whole, that the "I" takes itself too seriously. I had suffered much pain in my life, had done much that was stupid and unpleasant, but again and again I had managed to free myself, to forget my "I" and yield to the feeling of oneness, to recognize that the division between inner and outer, between "I" and the world, is an illusion and to enter willingly with closed eyes into the unity. It had never been easy for me, no one could have less talent for the holy than I; nevertheless, again and again

I had encountered that miracle to which the Christian theologians have given the beautiful name of "grace," that divine experience of reconciliation, of ceasing to rebel, of willing agreement, which is indeed nothing other than the Christian surrender of the "I" and the Hindu realization of unity.⁵¹

His reference to Christian theological terms, such as "grace" and "reconciliation," is not to be interpreted in a particularistic and exclusive way. His combining of Christian terms with Hindu ideas shows his syncretism. "The oneness I reverence behind multiplicity is no boring, gray, intellectual, theoretical unity. It is, in fact, life itself, full of play, full of pain, full of laughter. It is represented in the dance of the god Siva, who dances the world to bits, and in many other images; it rejects no representation, no simile."⁵² For him the religions of the East and West can be brought together without any difficulty.

Die Lehre Jesu und die Lehre Lao Tses, die Lehre der Veden und die Lehre Goethes ist in dem, worin sie das ewig Menschliche trifft, dieselbe. Es gibt nur eine Lehre. Es gibt nur eine Religion. Es gibt nur ein Glück. Tausend Formen, tausend Verkünder, aber nur einen Ruf, nur eine Stimme. . . . [Es gibt] einzige ewig gültige Wahrheit. Es ist die Lehre vom "Himmelreich," welches wir "inwendig in uns" tragen.⁵³

The teaching of Jesus and the teaching of Lao-tse, the teaching of the Vedas and the teaching of Goethe are, as far as the eternally human is concerned, the same. There is only one teaching. There is only one religion. There is only one happiness. A thousand forms, a thousand prophets, but only one call, only one voice. . . . [there is] one eternally valid truth. It is the teaching of the "Kingdom of Heaven" which we carry within us.

Can this inclusive interpretation of the "Kingdom of Heaven" be correct? Conservative theologians would say that the above quotation is an example of Hesse's lack of understanding of the serious differences between Christianity and the Eastern religions:

. . . the religion ultimately embraced by Hesse is one of direct communion with the divine, and of supreme faith in man, the meaningfulness of life, and the unity of the world's apparent diversity. It is a religion whose God seems more pantheistic and philosophical than Christian, a religion for which Christ is the great apostle of love and humaneness, and whose saints are the great religious spirits, thinkers, and artists of all times.⁵⁴

One may admire Hesse's universalism, but he accomplishes this at the price of diminishing the Christian claim that Jesus Christ reveals the God who creates, redeems, and sustains man. This God has made himself known in historic events--but supremely in Jesus Christ. A Gnostic god, a pantheistic god, or a syncretistic god is no substitute for the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob--the God who is the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ; such is the stand of the advocates of traditional Christianity.

The second major theological criticism of Hesse centers on his understanding of the nature of man. Although Hesse comes from a conservative religious background that emphasized the doctrine of original sin, his work gives little evidence that this is a significant issue. Thomas Colby indicates in his article, "The Impenitent Prodigal," that Hesse could not help but have a sense of sin since:

The techniques used by both parents to make their children aware of sin and the relentless demands of the law was to send them into exile until they had repented and confessed. . . . there are accounts of the children being locked into attics or rooms apart and of being sent away to school as punishment.⁵⁵

But for the most part, Hesse's heroes, like himself, play the role of the prodigal who does not return.

Hesse's concept of sin is consistent with his humanistic understanding of the nature of God and the nature of man. The one area that is unequivocally offensive, if not sinful, is the refusal to be true to oneself--to deny becoming one's full self.

Irrational forces are active on the subconscious level of man, and Hesse recognizes the ambiguities of human existence. Man can be selfless and noble at times, but he can also be self-centered and bestial at other times. For example, in Gertrude Hesse comments on the presence of evil in the world, but he elevates man's power of goodness in overcoming evil.

Fate was not kind, life was capricious and terrible, and there was no good or reason in nature. But there is good and reason in us, in human beings, with whom fortune plays, and we can be stronger than nature and fate, if only for a few hours. . . . We can then be gods for moments, stretch out a commanding hand and create things which were not there before and which, when they are created, continue to live within us.⁵⁶

Such thinking places man at the center of the universe with the power to play god. This is a biblical definition for sin, and Hesse appears to ignore the insidious reality of it.

Hesse's ethical ambiguity is clearly evident. He is a principled person who stands for the value of the individual. He believes in personal honesty and integrity. He opposes injustice and war, and he is an internationalist in an age of rampant nationalism. There is much that is highly ethical in Hesse's life and work.

However, there are ethical implications in his thinking that are disturbing. There are times when he appears to be amoral. For example, there is little sense of accountability in Knulp. A wasted life is apparently alright in God's sight. When Knulp is at the end of his life he is approached by God:

"Look," said God. "I wanted you the way you are and no different. You were a wanderer in my name and wherever you went you brought the settled folk a little homesickness for freedom. . . . There is nothing you have enjoyed and suffered that I have not enjoyed and suffered with you."⁵⁷

This is a fine quotation for God's acceptance of Knulp, but at a time when Knulp is feeling guilty for having contributed so little to life the only comment he receives is, "I wanted you the way you are . . ." This is difficult to reconcile with the biblical witness of a covenanted people who are expected to live in response to a relationship that places demands upon both God and his people.

Hesse's amorality is again expressed in Klingsor's Last Summer:
 ". . . all our art is merely a substitute, a painful substitute bought

ten times too dearly for missed life, missed animality, missed love. But it really isn't so. . . . Sensuality isn't worth a hair more than spirituality, and it's the same the other way around. It's all one, everything is equally good."⁵⁸ It is this indiscriminate acceptance of life devoid of value judgments that is problematic for the Christian.

Such an act as homicide can be committed by characters like Goldmund without the least concern for the moral question it raises regarding the sanctity of human life. Peter Heller speaks to this issue when he refers to Hesse's thinking as revealed in Blick ins Chaos:

The poet must realize "that God is everywhere and in everything," he must show that "everything and nothing has importance." He must know "that of everything that is true the contrary must be true also."⁵⁹

If Hesse is correct, it is a denial of every ethical code. Hesse is criticized by theologians for his belief that good and evil are interchangeable.

Society is unable to cope with individuals who live with a radical sense of freedom in which there is no differentiation between right and wrong, good and evil. The world cannot tolerate Hitlers who disregard such recognizable wrongs as genocide. This is the negative side of radical freedom. But Hesse intends radical freedom to mean freedom to be one's best self. Society would not be threatened by living without rules if man could accomplish this. Is man capable of doing so on his own?

The character, Pablo, in Steppenwolf depicts an amoral person. His only desire is to play music (he is a jazz trumpeter), and when he is not doing that it makes little difference to him whether he takes drugs (cocaine or other hallucinogens) or engages in sexual activity of various types, e.g., heterosexual, homosexual, or group sex. To him everything is permissible.

The serious implication is that nothing is expected of man. He just stumbles through life without any sense of the "shoulds" or the "oughts." Furthermore, there are no guidelines. This poses a problem when youth turn to Hesse for assistance in achieving self-realization. It is most difficult to find your way in the midst of darkness when there are no signposts or lights to aid you along the way. "The absence of general standards leaves youth suspended in a moral vacuum in which it becomes extremely difficult to maneuver, particularly since their ethical sense is not yet fully developed."⁶⁰

Hesse admonishes his followers to face the despair of individual development with courage. He has disdain for group commitments and leaders of youth. Therefore, the individual is left on his own, and it takes a rare mature person to possess the moral fiber to make wise use of this kind of freedom.

In his later work (e.g., The Glass Bead Game) Hesse advocates responsible living, but much of his work contains amoral statements about life. He does seem to distinguish between being amoral in the Natur dimension of living and moral in the Geist dimension. It is the amoral element that needs to be scrutinized, as it can be misleading to those persons who read his work without discernment.

For the Christian who desires to live freely but responsibly, there is a moral demand that has a claim upon him. "You shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, and with all your soul, and with all your mind. . . . You shall love your neighbor as yourself."⁶¹ Here are obligations that cannot be overlooked. Indifference to right and wrong is not an option for the Christian.

The third major theological criticism centers upon Hesse's understanding of salvation. If he does not believe man is separated from

God, what value is there in discussing salvation? Hesse's theology ignores the supernatural. He does not believe man needs to be saved from hell nor does he believe in heaven. Man does not need to be reconciled to the Creator from whom he is estranged. Hesse can talk about salvation only on the level between man and himself or between man and other men.

He sees this process as being tripartite. Every individual makes his way through life by participating in three important stages: innocence of childhood; innocence lost, as one comes to know reality; and finally, a succumbing to despair, or the finding of a worthwhile life. "Ideally man's journey should proceed rhythmically, fluidly like a harmony in music. Hesse's figures have had to overcome self-centeredness, to battle a way out of the world that confined them and yet make their peace with it."⁶² For example, the crucial struggle for Joseph Knecht is to find the way into the center of his own individuality. He wants to experience as much of life as it is possible for him to experience within his given limitations. This means accepting the risks, dangers, and difficulties present in the world outside Castalia.

There is a considerable difference between the human experience of awakening only to oneself and that of having a religious experience in which one is addressed by the "Wholly Other." It can be argued that when man comes to discover who he is, he is coming to know God, inasmuch as the two are related. But Hesse does not mean this except to the extent that Jung means it. This is not what historic Christianity affirms.

Salvation is what man does for himself, according to Hesse. Man comes to see that all feelings are acceptable--including hatred, jealousy, envy, and cruelty. This is a matter of self-acceptance rather

than of "accepting God's acceptance of us," as Tillich would say. Human reason plays a part, even though reason can be responsible for creating illusions at times.

Human love plays another important role in helping man achieve salvation, i.e., in becoming his best self. Illustrative of this is Siddhartha. As one who has achieved fulfillment, Siddhartha embodies love for all of life. This is Christian in content in contrast to the Indian way of renunciation. In an essay, "A Bit of Theology," Hesse has divided people into principal types: men of reason and men of piety.

Many exceptional men seem to oscillate between the two basic types and to be mastered by profoundly opposing gifts which do not stifle but strengthen each other; among the many examples of this belong the pious mathematicians (Pascal). . . . the highest spiritual experience of which we human beings are capable is always a reconciliation between reason and reverence, a recognition that the great contradictions are one and the same thing.⁶³

Oskar Seidlin refers to Hesse's statement: "There are two roads to salvation, the road of justice for the just ones, and the road of grace for the sinners. I who am a sinner have again committed the mistake of seeking the road of justice. . . . Only by an act of grace can serenity be envisaged; man cannot deserve it, he can only hope for it."⁶⁴ This sounds acceptable, but Hesse does not mean what the words can be interpreted to mean. He is not thinking in terms of orthodox Christian theology. Disobedience by man against the will of God, the concept of the Fall from Grace, the need for a Redeemer to bring forgiveness of sins and a reestablishment of a broken relationship, are not part of his thinking. Grace is interpreted much more widely than in the Christian religion. It is a term that means something personal to Hesse, but if pressed, he would be unwilling to affirm the particularities of Christian faith. In fact, he lived without any meaningful relationship

to the institutional church, and he disavowed any affiliation with the Christian life.

The key to salvation, for Hesse, involves the will. The emphasis on self-will sets Hesse apart from that which is negative in romanticism. For self-realization the will is essential. Hesse knows this personally, as it is a component part of his own unyielding individualism. Self-reliance and independence are qualities he most admires, and the Buddha, Jesus, and Nietzsche are exemplary examples of persons who possess these traits. *Narziss* conveys the value Hesse places on will power: "I call that man awake who, with conscious knowledge and understanding, can perceive the deep, unreasoning powers in his soul, his whole innermost strength, desire, and weakness, and knows how to reckon with himself."⁶⁵ It is reason, but above all, will power, that helps man discover and control himself. Self-sufficiency and stubbornness can be seen in the following poetic creation of Hesse's, recorded in an article by Seidlin:

Heaps of shards and shambles far and wide:
Thus ends the world, thus ends this life of mine.
And I wished but to cry and to resign -
If there were not this stubbornness inside,

This stubbornness to ward off and to fight,
Defiance deep deep in my heart below,
And then my faith: that what torments me so
Must, must one day turn into light.⁶⁶

The theological issue is whether or not the individual can fulfill himself without God's help. The conservative Christian obviously says no. For man to become fully human, the presence of God in Christ is required. And the consciousness of this activity is what is known as "being born again." The basic biblical position is that man cannot save himself. He needs assistance in overcoming his self-centeredness--his sin. He needs to "deny himself" before he can affirm himself.

It is only with God's help that true reconciliation between God and man, man and man, and man and himself can take place.

Ziolkowski goes to some length to build a case for Demian being a Christ figure. "He is a 'healer' by the sheer force of his personality. . . . He disputes with his teachers, preaches a coming kingdom, and instructs his band of disciples through parables . . . a book about a Christ written by a disciple is called a gospel."⁶⁷ One has to stretch an analogy to read this into the novel. The amorality of Demian is but one difference between himself and Christ. The ethical content of Jesus' teachings, e.g., Jesus could love the sinner but hate the sin, plus the Resurrection event, are other important differences. These dimensions are missing in Demian. Ziolkowski's observation is an interesting hypothesis but is unfounded.

In the final analysis, Hesse is accused of having a religion without a Savior. This is unacceptable for orthodox Christians. Christ is central to the process of man's becoming fully human. Without Christ there will always be something lacking. The fundamental criticism of Hesse's theology is that of Christian faith over against the affirmation of humanism. The nature of God, the nature of man, and Hesse's understanding of salvation are major areas of criticism.

Evaluation of Hermann Hesse's Concept of "the Human"

Whereas the above information pertained to a literary and theological critique of Hesse as a writer and thinker, the following section will address itself to this author's evaluation of Hermann Hesse's concept of "the human." The particular reasons for appreciating Hesse will be presented after which a few problematic areas will be suggested.

In the first place, Hesse is appreciated for his commitment to an authentic existence. He sees the value of human personality and the

quest for selfhood as a consuming worthwhile endeavor. Frank Trippet states it well when he says:

What could they [youth] possibly get out of him? Well, Hesse offers but a single thing. Hesse spent his whole life trying to know himself, losing himself to find himself, grasping for wholeness, integrity, and often pained by the integrity he found. . . . All of Hesse's heroes, Siddhartha, Sinclair, Goldmund, burst out of old selves into new. Self-search is all he offers, the quest, the thrust toward awareness, the yearning for the meaning and dimensions of being.⁶⁸

There is a reckless abandonment in Hesse regarding the value of becoming oneself. "Hesse's fiction glorifies the strategies of attempting to become a full human being, and it celebrates the nobility of failure."⁶⁹ Young people see themselves as unchained. There are few, if any, authorities or institutions a person need follow. Be true to oneself--that is all one needs to do. Hesse possesses a rugged individualism that is admirable. He elevates the significance of the nonconformist, i.e., the outsider, in society. He does not fear the unconscious and the shadow sides of man.

In a pragmatic society that measures a man's worth by what he does or by what he earns, Hesse advocates the value of being. An illustration can be seen in The Journey to the East in which the League does not do anything; it is composed of people who just are. Most of Hesse's characters are not doers--they simply exist. Hesse is criticized for this, but he is making a statement about the value of human life, in and of itself. Human beings, by the mere fact of their existence, are important.

The authentic life, for Hesse, is one that accepts the ambiguities of human existence and goes on living. Harry Haller descends into the cellar of his subconscious in search of an integrated life. He finds much that is ugly and displeasing to him. When the novel concludes "Harry is condemned to go on living and to try to find his unified self.

He can find it only by looking through all the disguises of life and by not taking any one of them seriously, be they completely sensual or completely spiritual."⁷⁰ One has to accept the primitive forces within and then attempt to disarm their power to unconsciously influence one's life. The physical and spiritual dimensions of life both need expression. It is Goldmund who notes that expressions of pain in a woman's face during labor are very similar to the expressions of desire and pleasure during sexual intercourse. For this reason Eve symbolizes, for Goldmund, love and cruelty, the sacred and the profane.

Hesse sees the complexities of life with its tension of polar opposites. He encourages a discontentment with anything that threatens the individual. In his Autobiographical Writings Hesse states:

. . . to come to an understanding with this world, to belong to it, to have a place in it and to feel comfortable there . . . that is not for me, that is forbidden, that is a sin against everything good and holy that I know and in which it is my happiness to be a part.⁷¹

In a world that is becoming more computerized and impersonal, Hesse pleads for what is human and opposes that which is dehumanizing.

Hesse's contributions to the personal dimension of life can be matched with a social dimension. This area has not received the attention that it should have, for Hesse was a social critic. Although he was concerned about the individual, he did not avoid the social problems of his day. He was critical of Germany politically and educationally, as documented in the previous chapter (see supra, pp. 86-89). As early as 1910 he wrote a short story, "The City," in which he sketched a pessimistic parable on the rise and fall of Western culture. This was ten years before the work of Spengler. And his pacifistic articles certainly addressed themselves to the issue of the day. In Demian, written during the war, the following statements echo Hesse's thinking:

. . . I had given much thought to why men were so very rarely capable of living for an ideal. Now I saw that many, no, all men were capable of dying for one. . . . The more singlemindedly the world concentrated on war and heroism, on horror and other old ideals, the more remote and improbable any whisper of genuine humanity sounded . . . 72

Whereas most of Hesse's prewar writings were escapist in nature, his work during and following the First World War saw civilization sick and consumed with the nonhuman. Man was a social being as well as an individual, but it was up to the individual to assume responsibility for life as it was. In reference to German youth,

He told them they should recognize themselves for what they were--average people with many faults and perhaps a few virtues. They should try to improve the world by beginning with themselves. Certainly they were now suffering, but they must recognize suffering as a constituent part of life and learn to live with it instead of opposing it. "From suffering comes strength, from suffering comes health (VII, 213)."73

Hesse's ethical awareness can be seen in his unpopular stand on internationalism. He is like Romain Rolland in his belief in humanity. Man has something in common with all men--whether European or Asiatic.

An important comment by Peter Heller reflects Hesse's high estimation of a poet:

. . . the poet must strive to preserve "the life of the soul" or, at least, the longing for it. We must play "our little flutes" amidst the noise of cannons and loudspeakers. We must accept the fact that this activity seems quite hopeless and, indeed, ridiculous. This must be "our form of bravery."74

It is the poet who has the gift of song and can speak about himself, and in doing so, speaks for everyone. Hesse ". . . defines the writer as the man who takes upon himself the common burden, as the prophet who interprets his private sorrows in terms of public significance."75 The prophet points to what is universally human. Hesse is such a person.

He did not remain silent when Hitler came to power. In an open letter in 1932 he expressed his opinions:

I confess that I positively hate the word "leader," so much misused by German youth. Those who need and demand a leader are those who do not like to be responsible or to think for themselves. . . . Germany is morally sicker even than in 1914. All has been forgotten that could have been learned through the war and its consequences.⁷⁶

It took courage to publish such convictions, since both his publisher and reading public were German.

Selflessness and social responsibility become important themes in Hesse's last two major works. In The Journey to the East Leo imparts to H. H. the law of service. "He who wishes to live long must serve, but he who wishes to rule does not live long."⁷⁷ One must have faith in the meaning and necessity of one's actions. Although one may falter along the way, there is hope.

In The Glass Bead Game Hesse makes a plea for commitment to one's fellowman. He has a grasp of the human situation, and he challenges modern man to accept responsibility for life on this planet. The statement by Ziolkowski that follows is true:

For an age in which electronic music has combined music and physics, in which sculpture and painting are plotted according to the table of logarithms, in which philosophy has fused with mathematics to create the new language of symbolic logic, an age in which "literary" and sociological research is carried on by IBM machines--for such an age it is difficult to conceive of a more appropriate symbol than the Glass Bead Game.⁷⁸

For Joseph Knecht the inner peace and serenity of Castalia require an ethical dimension in which responsibility for other persons must be assumed. This is what is needed if man is to fulfill himself and to aid others in fulfilling themselves. The values of Castalia must be lived in the real world, a human world--at whatever cost is necessary, even to the point of sacrificing one's own life.

In the second place, this author appreciates Hesse's religious insights. If either religious orthodoxy, or the theological positivism of Karl Barth, is the last word in understanding the meaning of Christian

faith, the criticisms leveled earlier in this chapter still apply. However, those of us who are of another theological persuasion believe God works incognito in the lives of persons who may not affirm his reality. Paul Tillich illustrates this when he maintains: "The answers of the humanists come from hidden religious sources. They are matters of ultimate concern or faith, although garbed in a secular gown."⁷⁹

Hesse considers the decisive characteristics of his work to be religious in nature, and even when he is making the most heretical of statements he is expressing his awareness of the importance of religious experience, albeit limited to an autonomous dimension. And at times, Hesse's position of autonomy is pressed to something more. For example, in his little autobiographical book, A Guest at the Spa, he describes his experience with a Dutchman who lives in the room next to his at a health resort. The door that separates their rooms does not keep out the sound. The daily habits of the Dutchman are exceedingly disturbing to Hesse. Hesse comes to hate him and all the irritating habits that interfere with his own concentration and different life style. Finally, in exasperation, he decides to transform his hatred into love for his neighbor. He willfully makes the Dutchman an object of his interest, sympathy and brotherly concern. He seeks to fulfill the command to love his enemy--and it works. He is able to recast his antagonist in a new light through the means of poetic imagination. He conquers his animosity by being able to love. Of course, Hesse describes this experience with humor, but underneath he is thinking about the power of love to change the human heart.

Hesse confines himself to descriptions of human experience--to speaking about himself. But according to Bultmann, "The question of God and the question of myself are identical."⁸⁰ Hesse's quest for wholeness

and fulfillment is a humanistic way of talking about salvation. For the twentieth-century secular mind Hesse's language is acceptable, i.e., understandable and meaningful in terms that do not offend reason. God becomes known within rather than beyond the context of human actions. Although Hesse adheres to the necessity of ethical behavior, he does not recognize that genuine ethical existence is dependent upon a religious foundation. For Hesse, being ethical involves a faith commitment. Knecht's commitment to Tito, in The Glass Bead Game, illustrates this. Hesse is not explicit in saying why Knecht should make such a radical and costly commitment. Tillich would say that it is indicative of a commitment that is more profound--to that which is Ultimate. Whenever the "shoulds" enter man's experience and cause him to act responsibly, more is implied than humanists are willing to admit. Faith commitments or human questions about the meaningfulness or meaninglessness of life, are signs of God's activity.

Hesse may not be able to be numbered among the Christians who consciously affirm their allegiance to Christ and his church, but certainly he is included among the members of the "latent church" (to use Tillich's terminology). Beneath the surface of what Hesse says is a firm belief in the value of human existence--a belief that this value is built into the nature of reality.

Considered as a whole, Hesse's achievement can hardly be matched in modern literature; it is the continually rising trajectory of an idea, the fundamental religious idea of how to "live more abundantly." . . . Before all, he is a novelist who used the novel to explore the problem: what should we do with our lives?⁸¹

For the above reasons, this author believes that Hesse has made an admirable attempt to elevate human concerns (personal and social), in which he has succeeded, to a certain extent. He is a religious writer with a significant message that has merit for modern man.

There is much that is commendable in Hesse's concept of "the human." However, his thinking does have some questionable implications, the first of which centers on his being a spiritual mentor for youth. It is understandable why Hesse's ideas are attractive to many young people. He can be interpreted as anti-establishment and anti-intellectual.

Whether it be the sensual Goldmund, the drug-happy Pablo in Steppenwolf, or the ferryman in Siddhartha, Hesse determinedly contrasts the more cerebral, conventional culture with another culture that is essentially mystical, spiritual, inarticulate, or magical. . . . the youth market these days is leaning irrepressibly East-ward. Hesse has been there and back.⁸²

There is too little critical assessment of Hesse as a model for the genuinely human life. Youth see him as a mystic and a metaphysician. Perhaps there is too much unthinking acceptance of his work. One critic, George Steiner, states: "When Hesse would define he blurs."⁸³ It is this esoteric and vague quality of his thinking that generates a feeling rather than a clear perception of reality. "Hesse seems to offer ecstasy and transcendence on the easy-payment plan."⁸⁴ And Hesse does not appear to be certain of what he means by self-realization. It is impossible for a person to live with the ecstatic moment all the time. Hesse does not provide a discipline by which one can achieve the intensity of the "timeless moment" that results from aesthetic creation. Too much of what he seeks is romantic wishful thinking.

In the second place, Hesse's followers may not realize that his humanism derives from his reaction to Pietism. His ethics are frequently Christian in content, even though he denies the source as being that of God. His disciples may not have anything against which to react. Many students operate from a relativistic or neutral ethical position and have not had a background of Pietistic values such as influenced Hesse. For example, a person can use selected portions of Hesse's work to justify

sexual promiscuity or experimentation with drugs and yet fail to appreciate the strong call to live responsibly that is present in other segments of his work.

Also, youth may miss Hesse's respect for history and the lessons that history teaches. The "now generation" may respond enthusiastically to the Dionysian elements in his work but fail to realize that he argues for the validity of the Apollonian elements as well. He advocates a meaningful balance of the thinking and the feeling dimensions of human existence. Man needs to dance and to make music, but he also needs to think and to control himself. It is not either/or but both/and. Some of his followers do not see this.

A third area of concern is that of Hesse's attractive portrayal of wandering as a way of life. The carefree tramp who merely follows the sun--who makes no commitments and contributes little to life--can result in the tragic waste of a talented life. This can lead to a parasitic existence in which individuals live off others. It encourages irresponsibility and can contribute to a person's being satisfied with being a spectator. There is no note of accountability in Knulp. The misuse of life is a negative characteristic that needs to be recognized as such. Hesse's work has escapist qualities in it. He appeals to dreamers and indecisive persons who are satisfied with drifting and with running away from the unpleasant realities which all people must face.

Hesse assumes a maturity that is not always present in his readers. And he possesses a naive awareness of the self-centeredness and self-gratification present in human beings. Consequently, he does not adequately confront the ugliness and evil aspects of life. He offers a secularized soteriology that suggests the possibility of new life, but is it realistic to expect that his readers will experience this new life?

The above issues are problematic areas for this author in accepting Hermann Hesse as a spiritual mentor for youth. It is true that Hesse never sought to be anyone's leader; nevertheless, thousands of young people asked his advice, as indicated by the number of letters he received. And many thousands more look to his work for guidance in becoming authentic human beings.

Hesse cannot be held responsible for persons misinterpreting his ideas. He is not always consistent in his thinking, nor does he pursue his convictions to their logical conclusions. In spite of the aspects of his work that can be criticized, evidence is overwhelming, in his favor, for his being a literary figure with theological insights of consequence. What he has to say about man's relationship to other men is of enduring value. For example, in Gertrude he exhorts: "Youth ends when egotism does; maturity begins when one lives for others. . . . a man is happier when he lives for others than when he lives just for himself . . ." ⁸⁵ Hesse does not ask why this is so; he just believes that it is. Later in the same novel he comments:

You must cultivate a certain indifference toward your own well-being. Learn to think, what can I do? There is only one expedient. You must learn to love someone so much that his or her well-being is more important than your own. . . . Give yourself a task, inconvenience yourself a little. . . . Live for others! Don't take yourself so seriously! ⁸⁶

In Narziss and Goldmund Hesse has Narziss say, "My aim is this: always to be where I can serve best, where my disposition, talents, and industry may find their best soil and be most fruitful. That is the only aim in my life." ⁸⁷ Unfortunately, the impact of Narziss' message is muted in comparison to that of the sensuality of Goldmund.

Hesse comes closest to connecting the ideal of service to its grounding in the Holy in The Journey to the East. Leo characterizes

the idea of humanitas in which the individual, of his own free will, is bonded to society and to the sacred. "Leo was a prudent observer of the contingent in time, a custodian of essential personal and communal unity, a pilot of souls through chaos toward light."⁸⁸

Joseph Knecht, in The Glass Bead Game, also takes on a larger-than-life dimension. Hesse denies regarding Knecht as a Christlike figure, adding:

In Knecht I would rather see a brother of the saints. There are many of them . . . they are the "elite" of cultures and world history, and they are distinguished from "ordinary" human beings through the fact that they achieve subordination and devotion to something suprapersonal, not because of a lack of personality and originality, but through a plus of individuality.⁸⁹

The intention of Hesse is to identify his heroes with the knowable and the known--in other words, with what is fundamentally human. There is nothing wrong with this, but it does show Hesse's humanistic stance as opposed to a theistic one.

Hermann Hesse has a philosophy of humanism which includes a religious dimension that verges, at times, on ultimacy, but this ultimacy is implied only, not elucidated. Although it is important for man to discover who he is, man's full humanity is not to be found in himself--for the Christian it is found "in Christ."

For this author, being "in Christ" affects one's relationship with others. There is an ethical demand to not only love the neighbor but also the enemy. Can man demonstrate the fruits of a moral life (love, sacrifice, service) without also possessing its roots? Christians maintain that the fruits are dependent upon the roots.

Achieving full humanity requires participating in the process of assisting others to achieve full humanity. This involves an accepting and a caring love that takes part in the social and political processes

that uplift and enable others to live as full human beings. It means seeking a just society for all. It involves cultivating the inward life as well as assuming responsibility for the direction of life in the external world.

Hesse is a man with strengths and weaknesses. He shares the human predicament which involves imperfection. But there is value in following Hesse's lead when he encourages man to be faithful to his ideals, committed to his goals, and desirous to know and become his best self. He challenges man to be a meaning-producer and a music-maker even when man does not feel like it. A person needs to practice the discipline of his faith even when he is not so inclined. Man can become fully human--at least relatively so.

The significance of Hermann Hesse has been presented with critiques of his work from both a literary and a theological perspective. In addition, a personal evaluation of Hesse's concept of "the human" has included specific reasons for appreciating Hesse's thinking as well as conveying concern over problematic areas of his work. Attention now must be given to Paul Tillich before a comparison of the thinking of the two men can be made.

CHAPTER IV

PAUL TILLICH THE MAN

In order to appreciate more fully Paul Tillich's concept of "the human," it would be helpful to view him as a person. A philosophical theologian does not rely as much upon subjective experience to accomplish his work as does a poet or a novelist. Knowledge of a philosopher's life or a theologian's biography need not necessarily indicate a direct correlation between his life and work. Nevertheless, every person's experience is reflected in his work to some degree. For example, Paul Tillich's encounter with suffering and death (which he experienced as a military chaplain in the First World War) contributed to the existentialist elements in his theology. The demonic is not only a functional term that describes a vital part of every person's life; for Tillich, it signified a lifelong struggle over which he was not always very successful. This was true in his relationship with his wife. Also, the threat of nonbeing and the quest for acceptance can be seen in viewing his life's story.

Another reason for including Tillich's biography centers on the fact that he was, to an extent, an autobiographical thinker. In his work there are frequent references to persons or to particular periods in his life that provided a stimulus to his own theological posture. An illustration of this would be the publication of Rudolf Otto's book, The Idea of the Holy. Tillich claims that he received it with enthusiasm and that it determined his method in the philosophy of religion. He states that, thereafter, he started with the experience of the Holy and advanced

toward the idea of God rather than the reverse.¹ Another instance was the influence upon him of the secular existentialism of Martin Heidegger, while they were colleagues at the University of Marburg.

The following section on the life of Paul Tillich will attempt to reveal human characteristics and personal traits that are absent in the "Autobiographical Reflections" presented at times by Tillich. Through these occasions he was being introduced to a wider reading public in the English-speaking world. Personal references are contained in On the Boundary, My Travel Diary: 1936, and in published sessions of informal seminars, such as D. Mackenzie Brown's book, Ultimate Concern: Tillich in Dialogue. Additional information of a personal nature appears in the books, Paulus by Rollo May and From Time to Time by Hannah Tillich. They are subjective interpretations, however, and limited in scope. An authoritative biography is yet to be written.

Following the section on the life of Paul Tillich, this chapter will examine his intellectual heritage--the movements and persons who influenced him the most. A section on his methodology will conclude the chapter. Each of these sections should provide some assistance in understanding Tillich's concept of "the human."

The Life of Paul Tillich

On August 20, 1886, in the village of Starzeddel, Paul Johannes Tillich, the eldest of three children, was born. The small industrial town in the German province of Brandenburg was the community in which Tillich's father, Johannes, was a minister of the Prussian Territorial church.² Johannes Tillich was a native of eastern Germany, of which it was said: ". . . an inclination to meditation tinged with melancholy, a heightened consciousness of duty and personal sin, and a strong regard

for authority and feudal traditions are still alive."³ His mother, Mathilde (Dürselen) Tillich, was a native of western Germany where the Rhineland implanted other characteristics, such as a ". . . zest for life, love of the concrete, mobility, rationality and democracy."⁴ These characteristics were in tension with his father's temperament and disposition. This caused a struggle between father and son that spurred occasional outbursts of self-assertion from young Paul. Although his father had a dominating personality, his mother's influence was the more prevalent in the home. With the passing of time two sisters were born, Johanna in 1889 and Elisabeth in 1893.

When Tillich was four years old, his father became superintendent of the diocese of Schönfliess-Neumark, and the family moved to Schönfliess. The community was rural in environment, but the town itself was one rich in history, the architecture revealing its link with the Middle Ages. The narrow streets and the town wall contributed to a strong sense of tradition. Tillich always revered history as something alive in the present. He described, "The sheltered, protective quality of the town with its hustle and bustle, in contrast to the seriness of the forest at night and the silent fields and sleepy hamlets, is one of the earliest and strongest of my childhood impressions."⁵

At six years of age Tillich entered a public school which was a Lutheran confessional school.

And there we had classes in religion for at least four hours a week. I learned the catechism; I learned the biblical stories; I learned the hymns. And I was a person for whom these symbols were more than adequate. They were received avidly by my subconscious and even by my consciousness, and they remained there. They have been alive there ever since.⁶

And living in the home of a minister introduced him to the experience of the Holy, i.e., the mystical, sacramental, and aesthetic implications of the idea of the Holy.

During these formative years Tillich enjoyed nature daily, not only where he lived, but at the North Sea where his parents would holiday many weeks each year. In nature he found his first freedom as an individual. He possessed a mystical involvement with nature that made him feel as though he could commune with it. This romantic tendency, verging on pantheism, was liberating; he said that it had a profound effect on him. "Many of my ideas were conceived in the open and much of my writing [was] done among trees or by the sea."⁷

It was at this early stage that his struggle against authoritarianism (as epitomized by his father) began. He considered his father to be conscientious and dignified. He loved him, but the senior Tillich was ". . . tyrannical, competitive, and jealous of this son who showed such remarkable promise."⁸ Young Tillich found that philosophy was the best tool with which to combat his father and his father's ideas. The metaphysical discussions which they had together were some of the happiest memories for both father and son. It was philosophy that enabled Tillich to gain his independence.

During his public school experience, Tillich identified with the children who were not part of the privileged social class to which he belonged. He learned early the meaning of class hatred, and he had a consciousness of social guilt that later would be important to his life and work.⁹ These early years stressed a sense of duty and placed a high value on obedience to authority.

In 1898, at the age of twelve, Tillich entered a humanistic Gymnasium in Königsberg-Neumark. This was a larger medieval town than Schönfliess. However, in 1900 Tillich's father was called to a prominent church post in Berlin. His family's moving to Berlin was a significant step in Paul Tillich's life. He had visited large cities,

including Berlin, on many occasions, and he was attracted by the quality of life that a major metropolitan community offered.

At a secular Gymnasium in Berlin he studied Latin and Greek and developed a love for Greek culture. In addition to the formal subjects he was studying, he was learning something taught quite implicitly, but definitely--patriotism. He stated, ". . . in those schools where religion was not taught, something was lacking. Germany was still in the Bismarckian era, so something else was indoctrinated by teachers--a terrible nationalism."¹⁰ Hatred for England was cultivated since it was the most powerful of the European nations at the turn of the century. Hatred existed also for France, the natural enemy of Germany for many years. Tillich remarked:

This hatred was indoctrinated in us, and for me it took much inner purging and a trip to England, and a love for the English people, to overcome that false indoctrination. . . . And it took my love of the French language, and then for French wines, to overcome this kind of indoctrination.¹¹

As a boy, though, he had been enthusiastic about uniforms and parades, military history and strategy.

In 1903, when Tillich was seventeen, his mother died of a painful form of cancer, melanoma. For a sensitive young man who was quite attached to his mother, her death was a traumatic experience. He turned inward and knew the reality of nothingness.

In 1904 he passed his final examinations and was graduated from the Gymnasium, but not before he had experienced a period of withdrawal into a fantasy world in which imaginary worlds seemed to be truer than the real world.¹² His delight in imaginative play (games and youthful sports) which was expressed during this time remained with him in the ensuing years, particularly his active interest in chess and in hiking. He considered that "Art is the highest form of play and the genuinely

creative realm of the imagination."¹³ He was not artistically inclined (though his father was an amateur musician), but he did appreciate literature, especially the German translation of Shakespeares. The character, Hamlet, was one with whom he could identify. Interestingly enough, Goethe and Dostoyevsky did not capture his youthful imagination.¹⁴

Before becoming a student of theology, Tillich had been studying philosophy privately and had a grasp of the history of philosophy. He studied under the theological faculties of the universities of Berlin, Halle, and Tübingen from 1905 to 1909. Academic life was individualistic in Germany at that time, and the thinkers who influenced him the most will be discussed in the next section of this chapter.

During these university years Tillich participated in the social life of the academic community. He joined a fraternity that had Christian principles, and he recalled his experience as being a very happy one " . . . in which friendship, spiritual exchange on a very high level, intentional and unintentional education, joy of living, seriousness about the problems of communal life generally, and Christian communal life especially, could daily be experienced."¹⁵

He never doubted that he was destined for an academic life that would include both philosophy and theology. He differentiated between the two disciplines by saying: "In religious truth, one's very existence is at stake. The question is: to be or not to be. Religious truth is existential truth; to this extent it cannot be separated from practice. Religious truth is acted, as the Gospel of John says."¹⁶

He passed his first theological examination in 1909 and his second in 1911. His dissertation on Schelling resulted in his receiving the Ph.D. degree from the University of Breslau, and the following year he received the Licentiate of Theology at Halle. That same year (1912)

he was ordained into the Evangelical Lutheran church of the province of Brandenburg.

After his university studies he served in parish work for two years prior to the outbreak of the First World War. During this period Tillich married a woman named Greti who was considerably older than he was. He enlisted during the war and served as a field chaplain from September of 1914 to September of 1918. While he was in the Army a minister friend (Dox) " . . . seduced his wife. She was carrying the other man's child when he returned from the war."¹⁷ Although this affected his relationship with his wife, it did not alter his friendship with Dox--strange as that may seem they remained best friends.

Although enthusiastic when he entered military service, it was not long before he could see the disastrous effect of the war. He observed the definite split between classes of people within Germany. And " . . . the industrial masses considered the Church as an unquestioned ally of the ruling groups."¹⁸ He was convinced that the war would go on forever and ruin all of Europe.

Besides the social consciousness that came into being, later involving him in politics, a personal kairos occurred:

. . . during one terrible night of the battle of Champagne, in July of 1916, he witnessed the suffering and death of hundreds of casualties in the division in which he served as chaplain. The horror of that night, during which he lost some of his friends, never left him, and the whole structure of classical idealism under which the war had taken place was shattered.¹⁹

He became a tragic realist as a result of his war experiences.

When the war was over, Tillich worked for a brief period in church administration but found it unrewarding. His interest in the theoretical realm was satisfied when his academic career began as a free lance instructor of theology at the University of Berlin in 1919.

He introduced the use of class discussion, at a time when the idea was yet innovative and exceptional. His wide interest in subjects (and in how theology related to these subjects) could be seen in ". . . his effort to create a new 'apologetic theology': a theology which enters into constructive conversation with philosophy, politics, art, psychoanalysis, and sociology."²⁰ He saw his role as that of a mediator, one who is (to use his favorite expression) "on the boundary" of many disciplines and areas of concern. He wrote articles that expressed his "theology of culture."

During these postwar years Tillich's personal life was in a state of transition. In 1919 he was separated from his first wife and in the process of getting a divorce. The baby, conceived during his absence, died in infancy, of pneumonia. Berlin was socially active, and the young professor was not alone in participating in the night life of the exciting urban German capital. On February of that year he attended a fancy dress ball at the Academy of Art. He met a handsome girl named Hannah Werner who was wearing green silk tights.²¹ Her recollection of their first meeting noted the fact that he had no money and looked moth-eaten in his ordinary, ill-fitting clothes at a costume ball. At that time Hannah was unmarried but engaged to another person. Tillich and Hannah saw each other frequently, and then she would stay once a week for the entire night at his place. This romantic relationship, however, did not change Hannah's plans to marry her fiance. She became accustomed to the emotional pendulum of Paulus (as she and his close friends called him) swinging from elation to despair and back again, but there was a basic distrust that she felt about him that prevented her from marrying him as he was wanting her to do. Hannah described herself as a masculine woman, and "Paulus had a feminine

component that made him vulnerable to masculine women."²² Rollo May said that Tillich " . . . had a spiritual quality combined with sensuousness which women found highly attractive."²³ In any case, Hannah was not the only woman in his life at that time or in the future. She married her fiance (an artist) on schedule, but she maintained her relationship with Tillich by secret mail and through rare meetings. In time she became pregnant by her husband, Albert, and this factor precipitated a decision on Hannah's part to leave her husband and to marry Tillich. Before both of their divorces were finalized, the baby was born but died of brain fever in its first year. Finally, in March of 1924 Hannah and Paulus were married. He was then thirty-eight years of age and she was ten years younger.

A year later he accepted a position as Professor of Theology at the University of Marburg. He was encouraged to accept the post by a professor friend, but Tillich was not personally convinced that he should accept it. However, at the University of Marburg he became a colleague of Martin Heidegger, and he encountered existentialism (both atheistic and Christian) which he tried to reconcile with his own system of thought. During this same period, the popularity of Karl Barth's thinking was increasing. Tillich did not approve of Barth's separating theology from culture.

In the decade of the twenties Tillich became involved in the "Religious Socialist" movement. It was a Christian alternative to the social and political chaos that resulted from Germany's defeat in the war. The thinking of Karl Marx had contributed to Tillich's understanding of what was then needed in Germany. Tillich " . . . became one of the founders of German religious socialism and, as one of the major theoreticians of the movement, developed some of its key concepts."²⁴

In 1925 he received a call to Dresden and also to Leipzig. He moved to Dresden because of its being a cultural center, but he taught at both universities. Tillich preferred the visual arts to that of literature, poetry, or drama. In Dresden he could enjoy the visual arts; he commented that ". . . this is one of the points where I am not considered fully Protestant, but rather 'Catholicistic.'"²⁵

In Dresden their first child was born. Naming the child provoked impassioned arguments. Tillich wanted his daughter to be named Christiane, whereas Hannah argued for Erdmutha. Hannah won, and "Mutie" (as she was affectionately called) became an important member of the family.

Although all the outward signs of a happy personal and professional life appeared to be evident, this was not the case on the inner dynamic level of their existence. Extramarital affairs were acceptable to both of them, but these did create tension. Hannah was jealous of his involvement with other women, but she became involved with other men (for instance: a mutual friend, Heinrich; a student assistant, Wolfgang; and an industrialist, Erwin). Tillich had many similar adventures. According to Hannah, "Paulus and I had established the rule that, when he was on lecture tours, there would be 'no questions asked,' . . . Paulus dealt with sex in utmost secrecy."²⁶ He did not want to know about his wife's escapades, and he did not want any questions asked about his. "He had a special Eros for his students in any city in the world."²⁷ It was not unusual for some of the women in his life to come to his wife and to complain about his faithlessness to them. "No one could ever speak of Paulus as 'adjusted,' . . . he had to live Dionysian and think Apollonian, and he seemed to have been born to do precisely that."²⁸

Discussing the sexuality of Tillich raises the question of his honesty and sincerity. Obviously, to the outside world, his life and work were incongruent. But Rollo May is of the opinion that Tillich was psychologically honest, at least; his openness with his wife, and his willingness to let her have the same freedom that he demanded, was not being dishonest with himself. The attempt here is not to judge his behavior--only to comment on it as revealing an aspect of his character that is definitely Dionysian. He did not live only a life of the mind. One can see the reason that he could write about the demonic: it was something that he experienced within himself and that he knew existentially.

In spite of the inner tensions, the Tillichs enjoyed life in Dresden and remained there until 1929 when he accepted a call to become Professor of Philosophy at the modern and liberal University of Frankfurt. He then remained at Frankfurt until 1933 when he was forced to leave because of his conflict with the Nazi movement.

At public lectures Tillich frequently spoke in opposition to the rise of nazism. On one such occasion, at Kassel, he attacked Hitler directly. But the specific event that caused his dismissal from his position at Frankfurt " . . . was precipitated one day in the winter of 1931-32 when he witnessed the beating of leftist students by a gang of Nazi storm troopers. His outspoken condemnation of this brutality and his continued criticism of National Socialism led to his dismissal from the university the following year."²⁹ Eleven Jewish professors were dismissed at the same time. Tillich had the honor of being the first Christian to be dismissed from his university professorship when Hitler came to power.

He was disappointed with the response of German Protestantism to the Nazi peril. Nationalism had drawn many Christians into an uncritical acceptance of national socialism and of Hitler's leadership. Those who would be most vocal later (such as Barth in Switzerland) were slow to speak out. Tillich said, ". . . I seem to have only two alternatives: either the Roman church or a nationalist paganism in Protestant dress."³⁰ He would have chosen Catholicism but he did not need to do so, as a movement began within German Protestantism that opposed the tyranny of Hitler's regime. If Tillich would have remained in Germany, he would have worked with the underground. "Paulus volunteered to write for the underground press. But others thought his style was too easily recognizable; it would be dangerous for them."³¹

At the age of forty-seven his distinguished career in Germany had ended. Although he was highly esteemed throughout the country, having been recognized with an honorary Doctor of Theology degree by the University of Halle as early as 1926, his future looked bleak. However, during the summer of 1933 Reinhold Niebuhr was in Germany, and upon learning of Tillich's predicament, invited him to be part of the faculty at Union Theological Seminary in New York City. Tillich accepted the invitation and emigrated with his family, arriving in New York in November, 1933. Needless to say, it was an upsetting experience, having to make this adjustment. But he had a sense of the providential in his life, and he believed: "A Christian is to leave his own country over and over again, and go into a land that is shown unto him, and to trust the promise which is for him purely transcendent."³² Although he was German by birth he was a man, and that was more important than his national origin. He came to America as a stranger, under difficult circumstances, and he made it his home. He had to learn a new language but never mastered its pronunciation.

Several years later he commented upon the spirit of the English language: he thought that it had helped him to be more clear and concrete in expressing himself.³³

His experience at Union was satisfying personally (a son, Rene, was born in New York) as well as professionally. Despite his language problem, he was productive and soon was recognized as the creative theologian that he was. In addition to his scholarly pursuits, he was immersed in the devotional life of Union (his chapel meditations and sermons were later published as The Shaking of the Foundations and The New Being), and he thus began to reach many persons beyond the walls of the seminary.

He assisted the Federal Council of Churches in refugee work, became involved with the Depth Psychology movement, and participated in the Religious Socialist movement in America (although his political involvement was much more subdued than in Germany). He was a member of the Graduate Faculty of Political Science at the New School for Social Research in New York, so he was able to keep his political interest alive in this way, too; and he worked with the refugees, many of whom were Jews, with the Self-help for Émigrés from Central Europe.³⁴ He was chairman of this organization for fifteen years.

Life was demanding during these years, and social and professional obligations were infringing upon his personal life. For example, "Christmas, the most intimate family and children's feast, became a representative enterprise devoted to our Jewish émigré friends, to our Jewish American friends, and to other friends as well."³⁵ At times his wife resented his life being so occupied with other people. She found home life to be irritating and thought that it was easier for a student in trouble to see her husband than it was for one of his children or for his wife.³⁶

An interesting aside that revealed a personal dimension of Tillich was his attitude toward decorating the Christmas tree. It was something that only he would do. He decorated it carefully and aesthetically and did not want other members of the family to take part in the process. He was a perfectionist, and even what could have been a happy family occasion he insisted upon doing himself.

Tillich participated in ecumenical work during the decade of the thirties, and on occasion he found it necessary to travel to Europe--as was the case at the time of the preparations for the 1937 ecumenical conference in Oxford. This prompted an extensive trip in 1936 that he recorded in a travel diary. Several insights into his character (and life style) could be seen (as revealed in the following pages) in his observations and daily encounters with people from various countries as recorded over a period of several months. He had numerous friends from all walks of life, and " . . . he never permitted his unusual gift for abstract thought to cut him off from the human and the historical."³⁷ He thoroughly enjoyed talking with people about practically everything. His range of interests was limitless.

Tillich's admission that he did not read very much was a statement that is surprising. He said that he felt " . . . like a barbarian because I never read."³⁸ There could be little doubt that he had read the most important books of Western culture and that he had assimilated their basic ideas. He had mastered the classics, but apparently he had not read much contemporary literature.

His diary revealed such human qualities as enjoying dancing with the attractive girls aboard ship. He commented candidly upon the appearance of the women he would meet and about his drinking with them. He appreciated his wine and would not overlook an opportunity to tell his

wife about what he was drinking and whether he had a "hangover" the next day. For example, he commented upon an English vicar and himself drinking two bottles of wine while they talked in the parsonage until midnight.

In each country he visited the art galleries and museums whenever there was an opportunity to do so. And he attended concerts. He commented upon everything he saw in passing, from prostitutes (in several major cities) to the observation that "St. Giles Cathedral has a steeple shaped like the Scottish crown. Inside, the usual Puritan devastations."³⁹ He described the landscape of Scotland and his feelings when he saw the North Sea. It brought back strong memories of happier days in Germany. He still enjoyed taking bicycle rides, playing chess, hiking in the mountains, and swimming.

His diary also made it clear that he enjoyed going to bohemian places. This had been true since his student days in Berlin. He would describe the people that he would see there. In addition, he would relate his effect upon those who had come to hear him lecture, and he would speak about the quality of the discussion that would follow his presentation. And on every opportunity, he would talk politics and religion with whomever he encountered.

While he was in Paris his interest ranged, in a day's activity, from visiting the Louvre to attending a cabaret with a floor show featuring nude girls.⁴⁰ He told of visiting houses of prostitution with friends who found the human nature interesting there. He was fascinated by prostitutes. Wherever he had been, for instance, he had eagerly sought out the location of the "red-light" districts in that city, and he would then take his wife to see where they were. According to Hannah, Paulus had never engaged in sexual activities with whores, but he did,

on one occasion, take his wife to a brothel in Paris where they sat and talked.⁴¹

A curious contradiction could be seen in that he greatly disliked dirty or sexual jokes, but he enjoyed pornography.⁴² In addition to pornographic books and magazines, his wife found a pornographic letter under his blotter on his desk. In moments of bitterness she was tempted to place it between the pages of his life's work so that all the world could see " . . . the obscene signs of the real life that he had transformed into the gold of abstraction--King Midas of the spirit."⁴³ There were times when she considered getting a divorce, but Tillich did not want one and together with mutual friends he would talk her out of it.

Although he would visit historic cathedrals and churches when he traveled, Tillich would not seek out a congregation with whom to worship on Sunday. However, even when he was not traveling he did not take an active interest in a local church. This was true when he lived in New York. The reasons for this would be speculative. But in his book, Theology of Culture, he said:

While in Continental Europe the theological faculties were the leaders of the Protestant churches, in American Protestantism the real power was in the hands of the presbytery or the corresponding bodies. Theology is not dismissed, but it is reduced to a secondary role in American Protestantism--a lesson we had to learn.⁴⁴

This awareness contributed to his lack of local church involvement. Still, he was affiliated with an American denomination, the United Church of Christ. And he frequently would be asked to preach on Sunday in churches of many denominations.

A serious theologian, reserved in appearance, Tillich was also a person who would reveal his emotions in public. On his fiftieth birthday his friends surprised him with a party of cake, flowers, and singing that caused him to "bawl without restraint."⁴⁵

He had been a prolific writer and had written three books and numerous articles before leaving Germany. In America his books were translated into English. These were: The Religious Situation, The Interpretation of History, and The Protestant Era. What was significant was that Tillich wrote out of a demand for his thinking about a certain topic. A lecture frequently related to the historic situation of the time. These early books were collections of his essays and lectures.

His writing of articles in America continued in considerable abundance, as an annotated bibliography would indicate. Suffice it to be said, that in spite of the language barrier, his ideas were being recognized for their breadth and depth of analysis and were becoming increasingly popular. In 1940 Yale University honored him with a Doctor of Divinity degree.

During the decades of the 1940s and the 1950s his teaching and writing attracted the attention of a wider audience. In addition to his work in the United States, he lectured at German universities, Marburg in 1948 and the Free University of Berlin in 1951. At Nottingham, England, he delivered the Firth Lectures; they were published as Love, Power, and Justice.

His working habits would be of interest to us. He was a night person and found it difficult to start his day early. It was his custom to sleep late, and he would complete only an hour or two of working time before lunch. He usually had classes in the afternoon. His most productive hours were from ten at night until one or two in the morning, and he prized highly these hours that he had alone. His wife related the story that the president of Union Theological Seminary had suggested that Tillich attend chapel every morning, as did everyone else, and Tillich supposedly answered in jest, "But that is before midnight."⁴⁶ It was

well known that he was jealous of his solitude and that he often got his best ideas while he was walking by the ocean or in the mountains.⁴⁷

In spite of his heavy German accent, Tillich was a popular lecturer. He had the capacity to convey the impression that what he was discussing really mattered, and each person listening had the feeling that he was talking to him. "'Sometimes I think it is my mission to bring faith to the faithless, and doubt to the faithful,' he wrote."⁴⁸ His lectures communicated this.

In 1951 the first volume of his Systematic Theology was one of the significant theological publishing events of the year. This was the first stage of his three volume work. He said that he had started to work on it in 1925, so it was slow in coming to fruition, but his central ideas had not changed much in the little more than a quarter of a century that his Systematic Theology had been in the making. The favorite concepts that he had been advocating in his own unique system were presented with a careful coherence.

Tillich's career continued at Union Theological Seminary until 1955, when he retired at the age of sixty-nine, only to become University Professor at Harvard University. Tillich was praised for being a mature human being with a rare combination of a stimulating mind and a charismatic personality.

Rollo May tempered this praise by saying: "I used to say to him that, while his mind had developed magnificently, his emotions had been left behind at the twelve-year-old level."⁴⁹ Tillich was a troubled man who could say, "I have produced the phrase, 'You are accepted.' But I can never say it to me."⁵⁰ He must have been depressed when he wrote this, because he surely must have known acceptance experientially. His inability to cope with the demonic in his life contributed to his living

a life that appeared to contain contradictions. An illustration of this would be his relationship to his secretary at Union; it was far from being merely professional. He spent many evenings at her apartment, across the street from his own apartment; and his wife knew that his secretary was also his mistress.

For a philosophical theologian, not only was the sexual side of Tillich far from conventional, but he experimented with drugs, too. According to Hannah, "Paulus and I had gone through many ecstatic experiences and demonic letdowns and we both felt that drugs provided a shortcut without the personality development that must accompany such experiences to make them fruitful."⁵¹

It was true that Tillich had a side to him that could experiment with life and could participate in the latest developments that were on the fringe of acceptable social behavior (his curiosity could run the gamut from modern art to burlesque, from Beethoven concerts to jazz in Negro night clubs in Harlem). He had a nervous disposition that contained many "highs" and "lows."

He was ecstasy and despair, with no discrimination. For him, everything was power and force. . . . He forsook life for the word. . . . Paulus lived in fear. His nervous body was tense; his desires many. His fingers would fiddle with a pebble from the beach, a silver coin, or a paper clip. He breathed unevenly and sighed heavily, an ever guilt-ridden Christian in distress.⁵²

In spite of the restlessness and the disturbing emotional conflicts that were present in his life, Tillich was able to concentrate and to be creative. Before leaving Union his Yale Terry Lectures were published as: The Courage to Be (a most influential book), and Biblical Religion and the Search for Ultimate Reality.

At Harvard his teaching load was reduced to enable him to have more time for writing. He published Dynamics of Faith in 1957, and he

was finally able to complete volume two of his Systematic Theology that had been delivered as the Gifford Lectures in 1953-54 at the University of Aberdeen, Scotland. A compilation of essays were published as the Theology of Culture in 1959.

Harvard was an excellent personal and professional experience for Tillich. It meant associating with scholars who had achieved distinction in their respective fields. According to his wife, he was paid large sums of money for lecturing, and they both enjoyed traveling during these years. In 1960 they traveled to Japan, and later they visited Egypt and Israel. He had achieved such national recognition that he was one of two hundred and fifty intellectuals that were invited to John F. Kennedy's inauguration as president of the United States.⁵³ During this period Tillich's domestic situation had improved considerably, too.

It was harvest time for Paulus and me. . . . I felt compassion for Paulus, I could enjoy him again, loving his noble aging face, listening to him on social evenings. Paulus and I indulged in a new, secret marriage pact. He gave me a heavy gold ring made after our own design. We felt close again in these years of our advancing age, when he felt sheltered in my new understanding of him.⁵⁴

Many honorary degrees were bestowed upon him from several colleges and universities. Among some of the most notable of these institutions were: the University of Glasgow (1951), Princeton University and the University of Chicago (1953), Harvard University (1954), and the Free University of Berlin (1956). In 1956 he received the Grosse Verdienst Kreuz of the West German Republic and the Goethe Prize at Hamburg the same year.

Tillich remained at Harvard until 1962, when he retired the second time, only to take up teaching responsibilities at the University of Chicago. Although a collection of sermons was published, entitled The Eternal Now, as well as a small book, Morality and Beyond, the most

important accomplishment was the publishing of the third and final volume of his Systematic Theology in 1963. At the completion of his theological system, Tillich was asked what he was going to do next. "His first answer was, 'One translates it into German.' . . . he hoped to write a series of 'retractationes' (reconsiderations) as Augustine did in his later years, seeking to take account of major criticism."⁵⁵ Unfortunately, he did not live long enough to do this.

In Chicago Tillich's health was under the constant supervision of a doctor. He had had a heart condition for several years.

On the evening of October 12, 1965, Paul Tillich presented a public lecture entitled "The Significance of the History of Religions for the Systematic Theologian." It was the concluding lecture in a conference on history of religions held by his colleagues of the Divinity School of The University of Chicago. . . . At four o'clock the next morning Paul Tillich suffered a severe heart attack, . . .⁵⁶

He was taken from his hotel apartment (the Tillichs had lived in hotel apartments at both Harvard and at Chicago) to the hospital. He knew the seriousness of his illness, and at the beginning of his stay in the hospital he had said to his wife, "My poor Hannah, . . . I was very base to you, forgive me."⁵⁷ On his tenth day in the hospital he knew that today was dying day. On October 22, 1965, he died. His body was cremated but not before his brain had been donated to the University of Chicago Medical School for study--another reflection of his humanitarian concern.

His ashes were taken to East Hampton, Long Island, for burial. It was at East Hampton that the Tillichs had a summer home near the coast. It had been a personal refuge for them; what happy times they had as a family had been there. Hannah spent two days going through his personal papers that he had kept locked in his desk at East Hampton. She burned them in the fireplace as he had requested. "Eight months

after Paulus was cremated, the jar containing his ashes was disinterred in East Hampton, where it had been buried, and brought to New Harmony, Indiana, where the Paul Tillich Park is located."⁵⁸

One of the theological giants of the twentieth century was dead. He was seventy-nine years old. Whenever he had been introduced as the greatest theologian of this century, he had always denied it and had said that that honor belonged to Karl Barth.

A brief look at the life of Paul Tillich has been presented, with an emphasis upon his human characteristics, as seen within his personal destiny. In the next section the focus will be upon the intellectual development of the man. The persons and the movements that had most affected his thinking and, consequently, his life's work, will be examined.

Intellectual Influences

The thinking of Paul Tillich was influenced by many individuals, some with whom he agreed, others against whom he reacted, but who left their mark on his intellectual development. This section is concerned with the men and the movements that influenced him the most. The major impact upon his thought occurred prior to the middle 1920s. His basic ideas did not change much after that time; his thinking sharpened and his expression became more articulate, but the foundation of his theology had been laid.

At various times Tillich referred to the important influences upon his thought, but since he frequently did not document his sources, it remained for other scholars to indicate the minds who obviously had affected him. Tillich assimilated significant ideas and made them a part of his system without always giving credit where it was due. This was

not intentional; he was an original thinker who gave to the ideas of others a new interpretation that was uniquely his own.

The following areas of thought will be examined: Greek philosophy, the Christian tradition, German idealism, existentialism, and personal influences (such as his professors and colleagues). These areas will include those persons who were most influential in shaping Tillich's thinking, and the specific ways in which they determined his thinking will be presented.

Greek Philosophy

As a young boy Tillich began his lifelong love of Greek culture. He learned the Greek language and Greek philosophy. He preferred the pre-Socratics, particularly Heraclitus and Parmenides, because they devoted their attention to the phenomena of external nature. They raised the question of why there is something instead of nothing.

Heraclitus (540-470 B.C.) taught that all things were in constant change. Everything was in a process of becoming and decaying. Everything was in a state of impermanence. "That is, there is a fundamental tension in every living being, a tension of the creative power of being going down, and the saving power of being going up."⁵⁹ What Tillich found significant was Heraclitus' interpretation of the concept of the Logos. For Heraclitus it was synonymous with the universal law of reality. "The Logos for him was the law which determines the movements of all reality."⁶⁰ The law of nature, or universal reason, was the only thing constant in a world of change. Reason enabled man to grasp reality. For Tillich this meant that reality and man's mind had a logos structure in which everything participated.

Another aspect of Heraclitus' thinking that influenced Tillich was the emphasis upon man being subject to the law of change, unable to

alter it or to escape from it. Heraclitus believed that good and evil were two notes in a harmony. Evil was another aspect of what was good. Evil contributed to the whole of life, and Heraclitus affirmed that as good. Tillich recognized the creative tension between good and evil in man, but he did not accept the ethical implication present in combining the contradictions as harmony. Heraclitus saw the destiny of man as being determined not by man's actions but by the facts of his creation. Heraclitus dealt with the powers of fate by "a paradoxical affirmation of them."⁶¹ Tillich would not relinquish the element of freedom within man in order to accept Heraclitus' view of fate, but Tillich did discuss the tension of the polarity between freedom and destiny.

For Heraclitus, it was necessary for man to accept the inevitable if man were to understand his fate. But Tillich believed that man's use of freedom made it possible for man to alter his destiny to some degree. Nevertheless, Tillich did appreciate the philosophical advancements made by Heraclitus.

Another pre-Socratic philosopher was Parmenides (sixth century B.C.). According to Tillich, "Parmenides, the first and greatest of the ontologists, knew that being and the logos of being, that is, the rational word which grasps being, belong together, or, as we should say, that being is always subjective and objective at the same time."⁶² Nonexistence was incomprehensible. In order to speak about nonbeing, some kind of being would be attributed to it, resulting in a contradiction. "The genuine mystery appears when reason is driven beyond itself to its 'ground and abyss,' to that which 'precedes' reason, to the fact that 'being is and nonbeing is not' (Parmenides), to the original fact (Ur-Tatsache) that there is something and not nothing."⁶³ Whereas Parmenides sought to eliminate nonbeing as a concept, he did ascribe characteristics to being

that were usually attributed to God--eternal, without beginning, invisible, unchangeable, indestructible, beyond passions, and needing nothing.⁶⁴

Because of the profundity of the concepts with which the pre-Socratics struggled, Tillich praised the above two philosophers: "I have never found a philosopher who I could say progressed over Parmenides the Eleatic of the sixth century B.C. Of course, there is much more empirical knowledge, there is much more refined analysis, but the vision of this man, and of Heraclitus, his polar friend and opposite, cannot be surpassed."⁶⁵

Another important Greek philosopher who was superior to all others was Plato (427-347 B.C.). The idea of Plato's that had the most influence upon Tillich was the stress on the essential nature of reality. For Plato, the real world was the world of "ideas" or "forms." The true essence of things was not the world of sight, touch, or sensual experience; it was the world of truth, goodness, and beauty. Such ideas were never created--they were in the beginning and always had been. They possessed an independence from the world of matter. Physical existence was not the real world. "The idea of transcendence, that there is something that surpasses empirical reality, was prepared for Christian theology in the Platonic tradition. Plato spoke of essential reality, of 'ideas' (ousia) as the true essences of things."⁶⁶ Man was different from the other animals because his soul was part of divine reason; and therefore he was capable of knowing the eternally real things of the universe, i.e., the "universals." Plato taught: "God is the spiritual sphere. The inner telos of human existence is participation in the spiritual, divine sphere as much as possible."⁶⁷ Plato advanced the idea of providence as being an attempt to overcome the anxiety of fate

and the eventuality of death. However, Plato's argument for essential reality could be seen in his reference to perfection.

Some things are better or more beautiful or more true than others. But if there are degrees of perfection, there must be something absolutely perfect by which we can distinguish between the more or less of perfection. Whenever we make value judgments, we presuppose an ultimate value. Whenever we observe degrees, we presuppose something which is beyond degree.⁶⁸

Plato considered the happy life and the good life to be synonymous. But man did have freedom of choice and could choose to live his life unwisely. While Tillich did not accept all of Plato's thinking, he was impressed with certain aspects of it. His concept of essential man was dependent upon Plato.

This section will conclude with a reference to Neo-Platonism. By the third century of the Christian Era " . . . Greek philosophy reached a state in which philosophy had become religion, and religion had become mystical philosophy."⁶⁹ The philosopher most responsible for promoting the system of Neo-Platonism was Plotinus (205?-270 A.D.). He understood God to be the transcendent One who points to that which is beyond the basic cleavages of reality, i.e., between subject and object, and between the self and the world.⁷⁰ What influenced Tillich was Plotinus' stress on the world originating in the ultimate Ground of Being. Plotinus also believed that the Logos was the dynamic principle of reason (the universal principle of the divine self-manifestation) which organizes life and brings order out of chaos. Another name for the Logos would be the natural law. The concept of the Logos was fundamental in Tillich's thinking, too. For Plotinus, however, God was the source of goodness, and matter was the source of evil. Since God was the Ground of Being and of good, God was not the source of evil. Tillich would agree with this. Evil was nonbeing and negated the spiritual. It had no power of being by itself--it was not ontologically real. "Plotinus described this non-being (mē on) as that

which is matter and can become being. . . . evil is the presence of this non-being in our bodily existence. It is the absence of the power of being, the power of the good."⁷¹ The purpose of man, according to Plotinus, was to become like God, and since man was free he could sell his soul to the sensual or he could strive toward union with God. Tillich appreciated the ontological thinking of Plotinus.

Although other Greek philosophers (such as Aristotle and his conception of "first philosophy" as the study of "being qua being") contributed to Tillich's thought processes, it would not be possible to include all the persons who influenced him. In the next chapter the familiar Tillichian ideas that were shaped by the Greek thinkers already mentioned should be evident. Greek thought was existentially concerned with the eternal, and it was this that Tillich could understand and appreciate. He did not see philosophy as something that was abstract and removed from life.

The Christian Tradition

At an early age Tillich, the son of a Lutheran minister, came into contact with the Christian tradition. The Old Testament biblical stories, plus the teachings of Jesus and the theology of Paul, were introduced to him along with secular education. The biblical witness had a central impact upon his thought that stimulated his desire to be a theologian, albeit a philosophical theologian. The following section will not focus on this particular aspect of his intellectual development.

But certainly Augustine (354-430 A.D.) would have to be included as a major contributor to Tillich's thought. He commented, "I would say, almost unambiguously, that I myself, and my whole theology, stand much more in the line of the Augustinian than in the Thomistic tradition."⁷² Augustine was able to bring together Athens and Jerusalem, so to speak.

Both reason and revelation were necessary for a proper understanding of God and the world. Augustine utilized the thinking of Neo-Platonism but with a biblical interpretation that turned a philosophical pessimism into a philosophy of religion that had an optimistic view of reality. At the same time Augustine held a doctrine of original sin that needed divine grace to make it possible for man to be saved. Augustine's starting point was significant: it was the inner man instead of the experience of the external world.⁷³ It was in man's soul that God appeared to man. It was this immediacy of the presence of God, the experience of the Unconditional, that Tillich could speak of as the experience of Ultimate Concern. In the depth dimension of life the immediacy of God was encountered, causing one to transcend oneself. Augustine saw the continuous threat of finitude and nonbeing. He saw God as the supporting Power of Being, which has the character of love, and this love was the power that united the mystical and ethical elements in his idea of God.⁷⁴

Another aspect of Augustine's thought that influenced Tillich was his emphasis upon the will of man. It was the will, whose substance was love, that united man and God. This did not mean that man could use will power to bring about reunion with God (as in Pelagianism). Man sinned by willfully turning away from God and towards himself; consequently, there was nothing man could do about his pride. Only the power of God could reestablish this broken relationship. It was the grace of God and not man's merit that could reunite man and God. Grace was irresistible although received by faith. And faith, for Augustine, meant believing directed toward God or Christ and believing into God and into Christ.⁷⁵ This meant both an intellectual acknowledgment and a personal communion with God.

Tillich admitted his dependence upon certain elements in Augustine's thought. A friend of Tillich's, Wilhelm Pauck, also commented that evident in Tillich's system of thought is: ". . . Augustine with his complex doctrine of God as infinite truth which can be immediately experienced in the depth of the soul, and as infinite will which nobody can fully comprehend, . . ." ⁷⁶

The next person who affected Tillich was Meister Eckhart (1260?-1327). This German Dominican mystic believed that God created the world out of nothing. Pantheistic elements were in his mysticism, in that he held that God was all and that man could find salvation only if he could lose himself in God. The good life was one of being, not one of doing. Eckhart considered God to be an indefinable spiritual substance--the ground of the universe in which all things were united. The principle in Eckhart's thought that most appealed to Tillich was that God is being (Deus est esse) and that man participates in being.

This is not a static concept of being. . . . Being is a continuous flux and return; he calls it Fluss und Wiederfluss, a stream and a counter-stream. It always moves away from and back to itself. Being is life and has dynamic character.⁷⁷

God was, for Eckhart, the eternal now who meets man in his existential situation, i.e., in his estrangement. Man could empty himself, or lose himself, by receiving in a quiet way the birth of God in his soul. This was a passive act, but it did not stop there. The inner experience expressed itself in concrete ways of action. In this way Eckhart combined quietism and activism in the Christian life. Tillich had a romantic view of the medieval church and responded positively to the mysticism present in such men as Eckhart. Tillich's concept of theonomy was in part the result of his appreciation for the place of the church in the Middle Ages.

Another meaningful figure for Tillich was Nicholas of Cusa (1401-1464). This fifteenth-century Roman Catholic cardinal taught that the universe was God, divided into parts. God was in everything (but not identified with everything, i.e., he was not everything), and each part of the universe was a part of God. He was the whole of it. This would be pantheism if God and the world were indistinguishable. Nicholas did not go that far. Man was capable of having an immediate experience of God intuitively. Man could know God by reason alone, but if he were to go beyond reason he could experience a "learned ignorance" which would be knowledge of God. It would be similar to a mystical experience, for " . . . we do not know anything special any more when we have penetrated into the ground of everything that is."⁷⁸ But when one would arrive at this point, contact would be made with the Ultimate. There would be the presence of the Infinite in the finite, and there would be mystical union between man and God. According to Tillich, Spinoza was the real heir of Nicholas of Cusa when Spinoza saw rationalism and mysticism as compatible. Furthermore, Nicholas of Cusa laid the metaphysical foundation for the modern mind. His thinking was basically ontological. "His main principle was the coincidentia oppositorum (the coincidence of opposites), the coincidence of the finite and the infinite. . . . The finite is in the infinite potentially; the infinite is in the finite actually. They are within each other."⁷⁹ It is clear that Tillich benefited from the thinking of Nicholas of Cusa.

The next important person who contributed substantially to Tillich's development was Martin Luther (1483-1546). Tillich commented, "I am a Lutheran by birth, education, religious experience, and theological reflection."⁸⁰ Though it would not be necessary to discuss Lutheran theology in general, attention should be given to the specific ideas

that grasped Tillich and made a contribution to his theology. In the first place, Luther started with a personal, merciful, and gracious God who required that man merely receive (not earn in any way) his grace by faith. Tillich interpreted Luther to mean accepting God's acceptance of us.⁸¹ The result of this acceptance would be reunion with God. Man in his sin, i.e., separation, could be reunited with the God known in Christ. For Luther, the message of the Gospel was the message of forgiveness. "We cannot fulfill the will of God without being united with him. It is impossible without the forgiveness of sins."⁸² Tillich frequently corrected the popular understanding of Luther's "by faith alone" phrase. It should be ". . . by grace alone, received through faith alone."⁸³ An ethical life would follow the religious experience of grace.

Tillich, along with Luther, could not accept a pietistic biblicism --it offended their reason and common sense. The "Protestant principle" would not permit anything that was relative to be elevated to a position of ultimacy--whether it be the pope or the Bible. Both Luther and Tillich had a profound sense of the distance between man and God. Sin was unbelief for Luther. He was not moralistic or concerned about specific sins. He saw sin in a larger framework, as that which fundamentally separated man from God. In all areas of life man lived with self-contradictions. The demonic was real and exerted power over man. Only grace could overcome man's unbelief--man's sin. This understanding was parallel to Tillich's understanding of the nature of sin.

Luther's idea of God was not that of a finite God but that of a God who was nearer to his creatures than they were to themselves, yet absolutely transcendent.⁸⁴ God was made known supremely in Christ: he was incarnated, the Word that became flesh. Luther's conception of God

contained the elements of wrath and love. God was humble enough to have been born in a stable, yet great enough to be the judge of the world. Tillich claimed at times that his was not an incarnational theology (he thought that the doctrine of the Incarnation was nonsensical), but his concept of the "God above God" approximated Luther's doctrine of God. Although irrational at points Luther's paradoxical thinking maintained a sense of mystery which Tillich appreciated.

The various ways in which Tillich was influenced by Luther could be summarized in the following quotation:

The substance of my religion is and remains Lutheran. It embodies the consciousness of the "corruption" of existence, the repudiation of every social utopia, including the metaphysics of progress, the knowledge of the irrational demonic character of life, an appreciation of the mythical elements of religion, and a repudiation of Puritan legality in individual and social life. Not only my theological, but also my philosophical thinking expresses the Lutheran substance.⁸⁵

Jacob Boehme (1575-1624) was the philosophical spokesman for German mysticism who influenced many persons, including Schelling, and consequently Paul Tillich. The mystical feeling for depth could be seen in Boehme's concept of the Ungrund, the abyss in the Divine Life.⁸⁶ For Boehme, God was the ground of everything--the union of the opposites in the universe. Boehme saw the importance of the unconscious element in life long before Freud called attention to it. And he recognized the presence of the demonic in both man and God. For example, Boehme

. . . saw in his visions the full demonic power, the will element, in God himself. He called it the nature of God and saw that element in God which contradicts the light in God, the logos in God, the wisdom and truth in God. He understood the conflict in the divine life, the tension between these two elements.⁸⁷

This tension made the Divine Life a dynamic process, one in which the Logos would be victorious over the demonic, the darkness would be defeated by the light. At times Boehme wrote as though evil were necessary, and at other times he wrote as though evil spoiled the cosmic

harmony. He was not always consistent. However, it was the dialectical thinking in mystical-ontological categories that appealed to Tillich.

Boehme thought that the material and spiritual world could achieve harmony in moments of divine breakthroughs. Psychologically, the breakthroughs revealed choices that man could make. Man could remain on the level of the sensations or he could deny himself and identify with the abysmal will.

German Idealism

Another important part of the Christian tradition that influenced Tillich was German idealism. Idealism was the view that mind and spiritual values were fundamental to the world as a whole. Idealism was an antimaterialistic metaphysic. It was opposed to naturalism. The prime example of idealism would be the thinking of Plato. However, in Germany in the eighteenth century, several leading philosophers and theologians adopted the idealist position with modification.

Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) affirmed a "transcendental philosophy" in which the mind transcended sense experience and acted as the coordinator of experience. Kant distinguished the appearance of a thing (i.e., the phenomenon) from the thing itself. He believed that reason would lead man behind the thing-in-itself to God and that man's moral sense would command him to believe it. A sense of duty came from the categorical imperative: every person should act in such a way that all men could follow the same action. The moral law within called man to respect the dignity of all men and to treat persons as ends and never as means. Man needed God in order to fulfill the moral life even though he could not prove the existence of God. God transcended human experience but was a being who possessed the moral ideals to which man aspired. Although man could not know that God existed, he could act as if he did exist.

So, too, with Kant's concept of the human soul; man could not prove the existence of an immortal soul, but he could act as though one existed.

Tillich considered Kant's description of autonomy and the free use of reason to be praiseworthy when Kant defined the ". . . enlightenment (Aufklärung) as man's conquering the state of immaturity so far as he is responsible for it. Immaturity, he said, is the inability to use one's own reason without the guidance of somebody else."⁸⁸ Tillich responded to Kant's reference to autonomy by saying that it did not mean subjective arbitrariness. It did not mean opposing the will of God. For Tillich, autonomy was reason divorced from its depth. "Autonomy which is aware of its divine ground is theonomy; but autonomy without the theonomous dimension degenerates into mere humanism."⁸⁹ However, Tillich recognized that in Kant's Critique of Practical Reason reason was united with its depth in the categorical imperative.

Kant stood for a reasonable religion. This meant taking man's limitations seriously. "The finite mind is not able to reach the infinite. . . . you cannot make God a first cause or a universal substance."⁹⁰ Kant was the philosopher of Protestantism, according to Tillich, because ". . . he is the philosopher who saw most clearly and sharply the finitude of man and man's inability of breaking through the limits of his finitude to that which transcends it, namely, to the infinite."⁹¹

"The influence of Kant is most evident in his description of the philosopher's central task as the exploration of the conditions of the possibility of experience."⁹² Tillich's philosophical position developed in critical dialogue with Kant's philosophy of value and phenomenology, but he thought that Kant, and Neo-Kantianism, could not comprehend the experience of the abyss and the paradox.⁹³ Kant was too reasonable to be concerned about the mystery of nonbeing or the inconsistencies of life.

From time to time Tillich would be criticized for being an idealist, to which he would reply: ". . . if idealism concerns itself with finding the essential structure of reality, then I am an idealist; . . . But the very moment in which we make a judgment about anything we are, at least then, 'essentialist.'"⁹⁴

Contributing to Tillich's idealism was Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814). As a young man Tillich had read Fichte's Theory of Science, but it was Tillich's philosophy professor, Fritz Medicus, who was most influential in representing Fichte's philosophy. Fichte began his philosophy with the principle of freedom and believed that the self, or ego, was creative and not limited to the material world. Like Kant, Fichte thought that moral activity was the free, dutiful commitment of will in ideal devotion. Evil consisted of being disloyal to one's moral duty. Man's real life was in self-commitment to the godly life, for belief in God was essentially a recognition of the fundamental moral dynamic in reality. Morality demanded that there be a God. The individual ego was part of the absolute ego, or God. Since the innermost nature of reality was freedom, "Fichte construed the whole world as a fight between the principle of freedom in every individual self and the resistance of a nonego, an 'id' as Freud would call it, against that freedom."⁹⁵

Both Kant and Fichte (as well as Schelling, as will be seen later) were idealists who contained elements of romanticism in their thought. The romantic spirit influenced Tillich greatly. "Romanticism is a philosophy of imagination. He who is not able to transcend the given situation in which he lives through his own imagination finds himself imprisoned in that situation."⁹⁶ Already mentioned in the biographical section of this chapter was Tillich's romantic attachment to nature that had become a

lifelong attraction for him. This identification with nature in his early life prepared him for the emotional impact of Schelling's philosophy of nature.

Of the various persons who influenced Tillich, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling (1775-1854) was one of the most significant. It was Schelling's concern to unite mysticism and the Protestant principle that prompted Tillich to make it the subject of his doctoral dissertation. And his thesis for the degree of Licentiate of Theology was entitled Mysticism and Guilt-consciousness in Schelling's Philosophical Development. In it Tillich attempted to synthesize Kant's critical epistemology and Spinoza's mystical ontology.

Schelling was known for his contribution to the German romantic movement. His early philosophy had elements of antirationalism, organicism, and vitalism present in it. Schelling proclaimed the presence of the Infinite in the finite, insisting at the same time that the finite was not "absorbed" by the Infinite but enhanced, asserted, and fulfilled.⁹⁷ The romantic element of Schelling's early work could be seen in his philosophy of nature. Tillich read ". . . in a state of intoxication, as it were, surrounded by the beauties of nature . . ." ⁹⁸, for Schelling spoke directly to Tillich's own emotional involvement with nature. "Schelling showed the inner powers of nature, the conscious and the unconscious. . . . What the romantic philosophers of nature wanted to show is that in nature spirit is struggling for its full actualization in man."⁹⁹ Man, according to Schelling, possessed freedom to know and to act upon what he knows. Man perceived sensations, could reflect upon these perceptions, and then could willfully act upon his reflections. Man could not separate knowledge from its objects, for concepts had no existence apart from their objects. It was the self that was the

condition of all knowledge, for knowledge was where the subject and the object met. It was the community of interacting intelligences that constituted the historic life of man. Objectivity was intersubjectivity.

The problem of the one and the many, Schelling (like Spinoza) solved, by affirming the ontological unity of everything in the eternal substance.¹⁰⁰ In this early period of his thought, he did not separate the spiritual from the material. "His whole philosophy of nature was an attempt to show the indwelling of the potential spirit in all natural objects and how it comes to its fulfillment in man."¹⁰¹ Nature, in Schelling, was presented as partly biological and partly psychological. Therefore, the question of consciousness and unconsciousness entered his thought. And the importance of aesthetics could be seen, in that artistic intuition, for Schelling, revealed the self-consciousness of intelligence. The artist was the one who made man aware of the Absolute, i.e., God.

The thinking of Schelling shifted from a romanticism that was close to Spinoza to a period later in his development when his romanticism took a turn toward existentialism. He preserved a philosophy of essence, but he added an existential concern. In this period the depth dimension of human existence included not only an upward quest for the Divine but a downward attraction for the demonic. "Here the darkness in man's understanding and in the human situation becomes manifest."¹⁰² The power of the unconscious was made evident. Because of the demonic in man, the tragic dimension of human existence could be seen. Evil was to be taken seriously.

God, for Schelling, was the ungrounded, the abyss, the eternal nothing, as well as the grounded, i.e., being. "The principle of contradiction within God affords a ground for human sin; it is not itself sin. Particularity, individual existence, is an expression of God's

separation of himself from himself; a necessity of existence."¹⁰³ Evil, for Schelling, was nonbeing. Only against the ungrounded could the ground arise, because nothing could become evident without resistance. Man participated in sin (hubris), but the grace of God overcame sin. For Schelling, God became man (in Christ) in order that man might return to God. "The Spirit is God's on-going struggle against perverted selfhood; it is a movement beyond repentance to an affirmation and realization of the 'ought-to-be.'"¹⁰⁴ What began as a concern for identity and a desire to define the truth was brought to an end with a call to man to do the truth.¹⁰⁵ In man there was a drive to actualize, i.e., to existentially realize, his essential or potential being. This unconscious drive was the will of man.

Schelling produced a theology of mediation which sought to combine the reality of the Christian message with the modern mind. For example, he would interpret biblical passages symbolically, rather than literally, as was done by traditional orthodoxy. He would express the Christian hope in unconventional (but meaningful) ways for those who required a freshness of approach. Schelling taught: "... eternal life means the essentialization of what we are in our essential being as seen by God. It is not a continuation of existence in time and space but participation in eternity with what we are essentially."¹⁰⁶ Tillich would agree with this thinking.

In addition to Schelling, Tillich was indebted to both Hegel and Schleiermacher. Friedrich Ernst Daniel Schleiermacher (1768-1834) and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831) attempted to find within autonomy the dimension of theonomy without weakening autonomous thought. Both were interested in developing a theology which would transcend naturalism and supernaturalism.

Schleiermacher, the father of modern Protestant theology, had his roots in Zinzendorbian Pietism. He was a great romantic theologian who translated Plato's thought and rediscovered the language of eros. "It is the creative eros in which the emotional and the cognitive elements are united in the intuition of the infinite in the finite."¹⁰⁷ It should be understandable why the romantic was so interested in aesthetic categories. Religious thinking emphasized aesthetic intuition. Art was interpreted as having a revelatory character.

Schleiermacher was important because he combined piety and philosophy. He thought that a true believer could also be a good philosopher. His theology was apologetic theology. Tillich responded positively to Schleiermacher's "answering theology," i.e., a theology which answers the criticisms of the day. To deal with the question of identity, Schleiermacher maintained: "Religion is not theoretical knowledge; it is not moral action; religion is feeling, feeling of absolute dependence."¹⁰⁸ The immediate experience of the Divine did not mean merely a subjective emotional experience. It meant the transcendence of subject and object in the depth of one's being. Schleiermacher understood the element of the unconditional to be present in the feeling of absolute dependence, and this element placed it beyond subjectivity. The similarity between Schleiermacher's "unconditional dependence" and Tillich's "ultimate concern" should be noted. Both were definitions for religious experience. Each man relied upon the Gospel of John as the best biblical guideline in understanding religious experience. For example, Tillich accepted Schleiermacher's interpretation of eternal life: "The unity with God, participation in him, is not a matter of immortal life after death; it is not a matter of accepting a heavenly lawgiver; instead it is a matter of present participation in eternal

life."¹⁰⁹ Both men were trying to overcome the conflict between rationalism and supernaturalism by stressing the immediate consciousness of a God who was not an object among other objects.

Schleiermacher viewed every moment of life as being lived in the presence of God; and it was love that could drive man beyond the finite to the Infinite. Schleiermacher emphasized the concreteness of religion, but it was a spirit-filled concreteness. A meaningful existence was the objective of this theology.

In Schleiermacher's thinking Christ was the representative of what man essentially could be when united with God. Christ had a fully developed religious consciousness; therefore, he did not need salvation; rather, he became the Savior.¹¹⁰ Tillich followed the same methodology as Schleiermacher, but their doctrine of God and their Christology had different emphases. Also, Tillich thought that sin was relativized in Schleiermacher. However, there were many points of agreement between them. Tillich could say: "Although I am not a mystical theologian, I would say I am more on the side of the theology of experience and inwardness, for I believe that the Spirit is in us."¹¹¹

Further word about the significance of Hegel in Tillich's thought was given by Gordon D. Kaufman: "Many Tillichian concepts are reminiscent of Hegelian notions, for example, 'kairos,' 'estrangement,' 'dreaming innocence,' love and salvation conceived of as primarily a kind of ontological reunion, Christ viewed as the principle of the relationship between God and man, the strong philosophical interest in history, etc."¹¹²

While Schleiermacher excelled in trying to produce a 'synthesis in theology, Hegel excelled in trying to produce a philosophical synthesis-- the great synthesis of the cultural elements present in Western culture, and the synthesis of the conflicting polarities present in religious

thought.¹¹³ The chief concern of Hegel centered in his thinking about religion and politics. The methodology of Hegel became that of dialectical thinking. Tillich's thinking was dialectical, too. However, he was able to criticize Hegel for hubris since Hegel's philosophy was a closed system that did not allow room for any other interpretation of history than his own.

"For Hegel God is absolute spirit and man is relative spirit; or God is infinite spirit and man is finite spirit."¹¹⁴ Hegel thought that God was the creative power in man that produced self-consciousness, and with it--culture. God was not an absolute, static, finished entity. To the contrary, God was present in all of the life processes actualizing himself. Hegel stated:

God is not a person besides other persons. . . . everything in its essential nature is the self-expression of the divine life. . . . God does not find himself in himself, but he comes to himself, to what he essentially is, through the world process, and finally through man and through man's consciousness of God.¹¹⁵

This was a mystical understanding of God, similar to that of Spinoza; however, there was a dynamic quality in God's coming to know himself that was absent in Spinoza. Hegel was an essentialist. God was the structure of reality. He was not a separate being, but the Ground of Being. Tillich's dependence upon Hegel at this point should be obvious.

Hegel saw nature as estranged and fallen from what it essentially was to be. In his philosophy of religion he recognized the need for reconciliation. Man, in his historical situation, experienced what was paradoxical, i.e., in spite of the immense irrationality in reality there was a hidden providential power working behind human activity, willing, and planning, which, through man's rationality and irrationality, would accomplish his purpose.¹¹⁶ Jesus was seen in his universal dimension as the Logos--the self-manifestation of the divine mind. And Eternal Life

was understood as individuals participating in the Divine Life but through the historical process. Immortality belonged to God and not to man.

Hegel was interested in seeing the truth in all of reality. With the passing of time, there were those who attacked Hegel's ideas and his method of inquiry. Some of these persons, such as Kierkegaard and Marx, influenced twentieth-century thought in general and Tillich in particular. For this reason the next important theological development to be discussed would be existentialism.

Existentialism

Existentialism was a revolt against the thinking of Hegel--against consciousness and the rational control of life. As stated by Tillich: "Existentialist philosophy is a revolt against the predominance of the essentialist element in most of the history of Western philosophy."¹¹⁷ It saw the weakness in so-called objectivity. And the existentialist was aware of the baseness and irrationality of man. The unconscious and the subjective dimension of human existence became important elements in the understanding of man. Emphasis on the freedom of man to participate fully (or passionately) in the human situation was one of the basic ideas of existentialism. Concern for the "nowness" of life took precedence over abstract thinking about life.

Existentialism was a movement that rebelled, in the name of personality, against the depersonalizing forces of technical society.¹¹⁸ It was a fight for what was human against the dehumanizing powers of modern society. While Tillich was in sympathy with some of the themes of existentialism, he was not committed to the existentialist posture in opposition to essentialism. He considered both of these dimensions of thought to be necessary. He said,

. . . for me essentialism and existentialism belong together. It is impossible to be a pure essentialist if one is personally in the human situation and not sitting on the throne of God . . . On the other hand, a pure existentialism is impossible because to describe existence one must use language. Now language deals with universals. In using universals, language is by its very nature essentialist, and cannot escape it.¹¹⁹

Existentialism could raise questions, but it could not give answers. Tillich's theology required a both/and, rather than an either/or, response to existentialism and essentialism.

The thinking of Soren Kierkegaard (1813-1855) made a definite impression on Paul Tillich. In 1905 Tillich discovered the Dane, and with great enthusiasm he found that Kierkegaard's teaching about the "finite freedom" of man, the ambiguous and tragic dimensions of man, appealed to his own youthful observations of human experience. Tillich pointed out the need to see Kierkegaard's response as a reaction to Hegel. For example, since Hegel did not address himself to the area of personal ethics in his system, Kierkegaard emphasized decision-making as being absolutely vital to what it meant to be a man. Social ethics took second place to the importance of the individual who was engaged in making a serious decision.

Kierkegaard's key criticism of Hegel centered upon the concept of reconciliation. For Kierkegaard, man was not reconciled: "Existence is the place of decision between good and evil. Man is in the tragic situation, in the tragic unavoidability of evil. . . . Only in the inner divine life is there reconciliation, but not in our situation."¹²⁰ Estrangement was the human lot. Anxiety and despair and guilt were real; subsequently, they were the subject of Kierkegaard's creative efforts.

Because of the human predicament, Kierkegaard gave a radical interpretation of the nature of faith. Tillich remarked:

You cannot overcome the sickness unto death, the anxiety of estrangement. This can only be done by faith. Faith therefore has the character of a nonrational jump in Kierkegaard. He speaks of the leap from the point of view of the individual.¹²¹

This required an act that went beyond the aesthetic or ethical stage-- it required an unconditional interest in, or a passionate commitment to, the Infinite. This unconditional interest was what Tillich meant by Ultimate Concern. But Kierkegaard believed that in order for man to be reconciled to God, it was necessary for God to come to man. This God did in Christ. Here Tillich would differ with Kierkegaard: "According to him, you cannot start with man, not even in terms of questioning. You must start with God who comes to man."¹²² And Kierkegaard meant by this that God came to man from outside of man. Tillich started with man as a questioning being, and God was to be found within the depth experience of man.

However, there would be agreement on the fundamental question: "to be or not to be." This involved the meaning of man's life; only the person who was completely involved in seeking the answer would find it. For Kierkegaard the answer centered upon God's action in Christ. But when he was pursued as to the content of this relationship, i.e., with a developed Christology, Kierkegaard was not interested in dealing with historical criticism or with a systematic theology. Tillich was not satisfied to stop with the leap only; he wanted to discuss the direction of the leap as well. Tillich thought that Kierkegaard emphasized the contemporaneity of Christ, but it was possible only if Christ were seen as the Spirit--which Kierkegaard's theology did not consider. In fact, Kierkegaard could be faulted for his theological refusal to take the structure of thought seriously. But he was a prophetic voice who witnessed to the vertical dimension of the Christian faith at a time when there was a tendency to speak too much of the horizontal dimension.

Kierkegaard was a corrective to the trend of his day (but he was not given a serious hearing until the twentieth century). He saw a need ". . . to resist a world in which everything was transformed into a thing, a means, an object of scientific calculation, psychological and political management."¹²³ The individual was being devalued.

Another existentialist (with an entirely different interest) who influenced Tillich was Karl Marx (1818-1883). Marx reacted against Hegel, as had Kierkegaard, while at the same time he used the dialectical methodology of Hegel to develop his own system of thought. Also, Marx used the concept of estrangement in Hegel but applied it to an interpretation of capitalism and of religion. "Religion is the escape of those who are oppressed by the upper classes into an imaginary fulfillment in the realm of the absolute."¹²⁴ Marx introduced the sociological element into Hegel's thought and then arrived at his own interpretation of history and of the human situation.

Tillich agreed with Marx that the laboring masses were completely estranged from the Christian church and that historically the church had been on the side of the upper classes. Tillich had experienced this firsthand while serving as a chaplain in the First World War. He had actively participated in, and had been one of the founders of, the Religious Socialist movement in Germany following the war. According to Tillich, the most successful of all theologians since the Reformation was Karl Marx.¹²⁵ While Tillich endorsed much of Marxist thought, he rejected its utopianism. "What Tillich hoped to develop was a Marxism purified by Christian insight."¹²⁶ Religious socialism sought to provide a meaningful interpretation of the times and attempted to contribute to the reform of society. "The productive capacities of mankind are to be used for the advantage of everyone. . . . The creative powers of the

soul are to be liberated from the fear, despair, and meaninglessness of ruthless competition. Neither religious utopianism nor religious escapism is tolerable."¹²⁷ While Tillich and the Religious Socialists were sympathetic to Marxism, it was a Marxism tempered with the Old Testament prophetic sense of justice and the Protestant principle of being able to be critical of any idea or institution that would seek to make absolute that which was relative. It was this critical function of religious socialism that was important.

As a Religious Socialist Tillich was concerned about the demonic structures of destruction which were trying to prevail over the creative elements in individuals and society. And he was concerned about the concept of kairos, i.e., qualitative breakthroughs of the Eternal in history when what was demonic was recognized and opposed.¹²⁸ Also, the Religious Socialist movement aimed at achieving a theonomous state of society in which the whole of life would be related to the Ultimate.

Tillich and Marx agreed on the idea that man could be distorted by social conditions in such a way that his humanity could be lost, and they presupposed that there would be a time when a sense of community would be reestablished.¹²⁹ Man was to be seen as a person, not as a thing--as an end, not as a means or a commodity. Dehumanization and estrangement could be observed in history.

Tillich appreciated the truth in much of what Marx had to say about the horizontal relationships of man, but he felt that ". . . Marx lacked a vertical criticism against himself."¹³⁰ Still, Tillich viewed Marx as a modern secular prophet.

The thought of another existentialist, Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche (1844-1900), was discovered by Tillich during the First World War. Since Nietzsche's thought was dealt with in the first chapter (see supra,

pp. 39-40), further attention will not be given to him except to say that Tillich appreciated his ecstatic affirmation of life. In the name of life Nietzsche fought against the nihilism of technical culture and for the humanity of man. He knew the ambiguities of life (both the creative and the destructive elements); yet he called man to will-to-power. What made a tremendous impression upon Tillich was Nietzsche's vitalism and experience of the abyss.¹³¹ In addition to those persons already mentioned, there were individuals Tillich knew personally who contributed to his thought.

Personal Influences

The philosophers and theologians who have been discussed up to this point have all been persons in history whom Tillich encountered by way of their work. A few references to his days as a student at the various universities which he attended, and to the teachers or senior colleagues by whom he was influenced, will be noted next.

In a letter to Thomas Mann, dated May 23, 1943, Tillich reviewed his student years:

The summer semester of 1907, when I was the presiding officer of the student-corporation 'Wingolf' numbering then about seventy men, appears to me until today as the greatest period of my life. What I have become as a theologian, a philosopher, a man, I owe partly to my professors but mostly to this fraternity. The theological and philosophical debates we had then till late after midnight and the personal conversations before dawn, have remained decisive for my entire life.¹³²

This was undoubtedly a nostalgia for his student days, but it did indicate the personal exchange of ideas that had contributed to his learning experience. In the years that followed, he utilized the dialogue method in his teaching.

Martin Kähler, Professor of Systematic Theology at the University of Halle, was one of the most important theological teachers under whom

Tillich had studied. "Kähler was a man whose intellectual ability and moral and religious power were overwhelming. . . . In many respects he was the most profound and most modern representative of the nineteenth-century theology of mediation."¹³³ From him Tillich learned the significance of doubt. Whereas Kähler emphasized Luther's doctrine of justification by faith, "Tillich carried the concept further than his professor: not only is the sinner justified while yet a sinner, but even the doubter is justified while he continues to doubt."¹³⁴ Kähler stressed the combination of the subjectivity of experience with the objectivity of the biblical witness. Kähler resisted historical criticism, but he was responsible for giving Tillich " . . . the insight that even our thinking is broken and is in need of justification and that therefore any dogmatism of thought is the intellectual form of pharisaism. Loyalty to Kähler prevented Paul Tillich from being a dogmatist."¹³⁵

Ernst Troeltsch was a colleague of Tillich's at the University of Berlin. Nevertheless, in a special way Tillich considered him to be one of his teachers, even though he did not attend his lectures. He appreciated certain aspects of Troeltsch's philosophy of religion. For example, "His main problem dealt with the meaning of religion in the context of the human spirit or man's mental structure. . . . there is something which belongs to the structure of the human mind itself from which religion arises."¹³⁶ Troeltsch stressed that it was within the mind of man that the finite and the Infinite met.

Tillich valued Troeltsch's philosophy of history, too. If one were to determine the aim of history, one could determine the meaning of history. Troeltsch wanted the present generation to transform history by caring for the immediate next stage of history.¹³⁷ This obviously concerned the social implications of the Christian faith.

At the University of Marburg, Tillich encountered another colleague, Martin Heidegger, who caused him to consider new directions of thought:

The influence of Heidegger was acknowledged by Tillich to have been the source of one of the leading ideas of his philosophical theology --the idea that a philosophical anthropology might throw light on the nature of, the necessity for, man's religious quest and thus enable the apologetic theologian to articulate the revelation-grounded message of Christianity in a relevant way.¹³⁸

While an attempt has been made to view the most important of the influences upon Tillich's intellectual development, it has been necessary to be selective in the persons and movements included. For example, the seminal minds of Spinoza, Ritschl, and Jung, as well as the significant twentieth-century phenomena of modern art and depth psychology, have been excluded.

It should also be mentioned that several scholars (such as Alistair Macleod and J. Heywood Thomas) called attention to some of the noticeable schools of thought that were conspicuous by their absence in Tillich--English empiricism, for example. Tillich ignored the whole English philosophical tradition of the eighteenth century and its twentieth-century counterparts. However, the question could be raised as to how many twentieth-century English philosophers have the grasp of the vast scope of historical and contemporary interdisciplinary developments that Tillich had. Indeed, there were omissions in the range of Tillich's interests, but one could not help but be impressed with the breadth and depth of his mind. It was true that he did not alter his basic concepts after 1925; nevertheless, he was open to new possibilities. An illustration of this would be the impact of Zen Buddhism upon his thought, following a visiting lectureship in 1960. "While not becoming a convert to Zen Buddhism he was impressed with the ultimate concern he found in forms of religious life uninfluenced by Christianity."¹³⁹ In the last lecture

that he gave prior to his death, Tillich indicated that he would have liked to have pursued a theology that would have included the history of religions--he called it the "Religion of the Concrete Spirit."¹⁴⁰ His creative mind was ready to go in new directions, even in his advanced age. He was a man who found many stimulating ideas that challenged him to think and to rethink, if necessary, his own comprehensive systematic theology.

Tillich's intellectual influences included Greek philosophy, the Christian tradition, German idealism, existentialism, and personal influences as revealed in numerous individuals and contemporary movements. This heritage, coupled with his own experience, contributed to his methodology which will be the concern of the last section of this chapter.

Methodology

Before examining Tillich's concept of "the human," his methodology should be presented. Tillich started his systematic theology with man and was sensitive to the human situation, but he was always consciously a Christian theologian, i.e., one who was inside the theological circle--one who had a faith commitment that would determine the outcome of his theological reflection. At the same time he was concerned about mediating between the eternal truth as evident in Christ and the changing times in which this truth needed to be reinterpreted. He wanted to bring together the changing and the changeless.

He combined the art of dialectical, with that of systematic thinking, seeking for truth by talking with others from different points of view, moving through Yes and No, and then proceeding to put the results of such thinking together in an orderly system of thought.¹⁴¹

Tillich felt a special mission to those individuals who had difficulty overcoming doubt or who had a hypercritical attitude toward

religion in general and Christianity in particular. He said,

I presuppose in my theological thinking the entire history of Christian thought . . . and I consider the attitude of those who are in doubt or estrangement or opposition to everything ecclesiastical and religious, including Christianity. . . . My work is with those who ask questions, and for them I am here. . . . And to those who are actually in a situation of doubt and are even being torn to pieces by it, I hope to speak in such a way that the reasons for their doubts and other stumbling blocks are taken away.¹⁴²

Tillich saw his role as an apologetic theologian, and he stated: "Apologetic theology is 'answering theology.'"¹⁴³ Contemporary theology needed to take seriously the questions that man always had about the meaning of his existence. Tillich found the answers in the Christian faith but in a Christian faith that was grounded in ontology. The specific method he used in providing theological answers to philosophical questions was the "method of correlation."

Man is the question he asks about himself, before any question has been formulated. . . . Being human means asking the questions of one's own being and living under the impact of the answers given to this question. And, conversely, being human means receiving answers to the question of one's own being and asking questions under the impact of the answers.¹⁴⁴

As soon as one would apply the method of correlation, one would become aware of the theological circle, i.e., the " . . . point where individual experience, traditional valuation, and personal commitment must decide the issue."¹⁴⁵ For Tillich the Christian message was based upon an immediate experience of what one was intuitively aware of as the Ultimate. This was the experience of the Holy. "Ultimate concern is the abstract translation of the great commandment: 'The Lord, our God, the Lord is one; and you shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, and with all your soul and with all your mind, and with all your strength.'"¹⁴⁶ This meant accepting the Unconditional in an existential way, for the Unconditional would determine one's being or not-being. Man was ultimately concerned about that which provided meaning in his life and which would determine his ultimate destiny.

But just because one was committed to the Christian message and was inside the theological circle, did not mean that one should be uncritical of this message. "Every theologian is committed and alienated; he is always in faith and in doubt; he is inside and outside the theological circle."¹⁴⁷ A systematic theologian, or a philosopher of religion, was dependent upon the reasonableness of faith. This required reflection, which meant having some distance from the object of faith, in order to be able to make value judgments. For it to be possible to discuss theology (or anything else) in an orderly or coherent way, it was first necessary to trust the structure of knowledge. In fact, man could not have a language or a culture without the presupposition that there was a rational basis to reality. For Tillich it was the Logos that made any theological discussion possible, since theological inquiry was the logos about theos--the study of God. The unique affirmation of Christian theology was that the Logos became flesh in Jesus Christ. The absolutely universal (Logos) had become absolutely concrete in Jesus Christ. But what could be affirmed by the theologian could be criticized by the philosopher of religion. Tillich believed that both the philosopher and the theologian were necessary, but he distinguished between them. "Philosophy deals with the structure of being in itself; theology deals with the meaning of being for us."¹⁴⁸ Whereas ideally the philosopher tried to maintain a detached objectivity, the theologian was committed existentially to the content of his faith.

Tillich's understanding of systematic theology involved being both a philosopher and a theologian. As a philosopher Tillich dealt, with a degree of detachment, with the structure of being, but as an existential theologian he was passionately involved with the meaning of being--the totality of existence. As a theologian he was interested in "saving

knowledge," and for Tillich the Christian symbols were the means by which he participated in reality. Therefore, his methodology would be expected to reflect a Christian interpretation of reality. And it did. His existential analysis of the human situation evoked many questions that could not be answered except by means of revelation. His method of correlation showed the interdependence of the questions and the answers. His theology was a philosophy of religion, albeit a Christian existential philosophy of religion. A systematic theologian would methodically explain the content of the faith; and this included apologetics, dogmatics, and ethics. The sources of systematic theology were: the Bible, church history, history of religion and culture. However, "Experience is the medium through which the sources 'speak' to us, through which we can receive them."¹⁴⁹ By experience Tillich meant participation in what was mystical and ecstatic. The content of this experience and the norm of his systematic theology was the "New Being in Jesus as the Christ."¹⁵⁰ This was paradoxical in that the appearance of that which conquered existence was at the same time submitting to the conditions of existence.

Having said the above, it should be noted that Tillich's methodology included a "phenomenological approach." Edmund Husserl made the term "phenomenology" popular and meant by it an analysis of certain types of human consciousness. Husserl's method pointed to the contents of consciousness but without his becoming involved in explanations that went beyond appearances. Husserl believed that man's experience of the world was immediate--on an intuitive level. The phenomenological method aimed at describing the meaning of appearances. Tillich defined this approach:

The test of a phenomenological description is that the picture given by it is convincing, that it can be seen by anyone who is willing to look in the same direction, that the description illuminates other related ideas, and that it makes the reality which these ideas are supposed to reflect understandable.¹⁵¹

This approach was consistent with Tillich's emphasis upon experience and reason, and he employed phenomenological analysis extensively in his theological method.

In summary, although Tillich's life did not affect his work to the same extent that Hesse's life did, nevertheless, Tillich's ". . . thinking was autobiographical in a remarkable way."¹⁵² The personal habits and human characteristics that were part of his life gave insights into his personality. The intellectual influences helped to determine the foundation of his systematic theology and his methodology. He started with man's ecstatic experience of the Holy and tried to make sense out of the content of this experience. He used the method of correlation which was dialectical in nature. Although Tillich operated within the theological circle, he was predominantly an apologetic theologian. He was a philosopher of religion who appealed to reason and revelation, and his methodology included the phenomenological approach as well.

It has been hoped that this chapter has revealed an appreciation for Paul Tillich as a man and as a theologian. This has been in preparation for understanding Tillich's concept of "the human" in his work, which will be the concern of the next chapter.

CHAPTER V

THE CONCEPT OF "THE HUMAN" IN THE WORK OF PAUL TILLICH

Paul Tillich, like Hermann Hesse, has a tripartite view of human existence. In fact, Tillich believes that there are three considerations of human nature present in all genuine theological thinking: man's essential goodness, man's existential estrangement, and man's possibility of reconciliation. These three elements will form the basic structure of this chapter, with the addition of a fourth element that discusses how man expresses himself socially when he seeks to be fully human.

Tillich's work will be approached systematically. His three volume Systematic Theology will be the primary source, along with his other work (including his trilogy of sermonic books), adding to his comprehensive system of thought. It will not be necessary to include Tillich's entire system but only those areas that are pertinent to his understanding of what it means to be human. Anthropology is the starting point for Tillich's theology, whereas Karl Barth starts with revelation. Therefore, a considerable amount of Tillich's theological position must be elucidated but only to the extent that it intersects with his concept of "the human."

Existential Man: Estrangement

Before the question of man's essential nature can be raised, or before the question of the fulfillment of human existence can be presented, the question of man's current state of being must be delineated. What is the human condition? The answer to this question means examining man in his existential situation.

Man as Questioner

Tillich's theology begins with man. "Man is the question he asks about himself, before any question has been formulated."¹ Man is not content merely to accept life as it is without being concerned about why it is the way it is. "Being human means asking the questions of one's own being and living under the impact of the answers to this question. And, conversely, being human means receiving answers to the question of one's own being and asking questions under the impact of the answers."² Tillich makes clear the correlation between questions and answers. "But, in order to be able to ask for something, we must have it partially; otherwise it could not be the object of a question. . . . If man is that being who asks the question of being, he has and has not the being for which he asks. . . . We are a mixture of being and non-being."³

Man is a philosopher by nature, as the following statements reveal:

You cannot prohibit man from asking the most human question . . . Man is more than an apparatus for registering so-called "facts" and their interdependence. He wants to know, to know about himself as thrown into being, to know about the powers and structures controlling this being in himself and in his world. He wants to know the meaning of being because he is man and not only an epistemological subject.⁴

Not to ontologize is to destroy what is human in man, and ontological reason is at the heart of Tillich's thought.

Classical reason is Logos . . . Its cognitive nature is one element in addition to others; it is cognitive and aesthetic, theoretical and practical, detached and passionate, subjective and objective. The denial of reason in the classical sense is antihuman because it is antidivine.⁵

Man's capacity to raise questions about his existence means he experiences self-transcendence. This enables him to be a philosopher and a theologian. "Theology deals with what concerns us inescapably,

ultimately, unconditionally. It deals with it not so far as it is but as far as it is for us." ⁶ Man as a theologian is that creature who asks questions about ultimate reality as well as about human existence. "Anyone who raises a question about true reality is in some way separated from reality; whoever makes a demand upon reality presupposes that it is not at hand." ⁷

In discussing Tillich's methodology, the relationship between philosophy and theology, between faith and reason, has already been noted. Suffice it to be said: ". . . reason is identical with the humanity of man in contrast to all other beings. It is the basis of language, of freedom, of creativity. . . . If faith were the opposite of reason, it would tend to dehumanize man." ⁸ Both are necessary. Faith is reason reaching ecstatically beyond itself--fulfilling itself.

Man's existential situation is one of estrangement, and this means that all of creation participates in it, including man as philosopher and theologian. Man's faith and man's reason are imperfect. "But revelation is revelation to man in his state of corrupted faith and corrupted rationality." ⁹ In spite of his corrupted rationality, man's reason is sufficient to point out certain factors of his experience which he has come to know as true: his present situation is seen in terms of disruption, conflict, self-destruction, meaninglessness, and despair in all realms of life. ¹⁰

Man has a world to which he belongs but it is a broken world, and he participates in its brokenness. He is aware of himself, and he knows he is related to the world. "Self-relatedness is implied in every experience. There is something that 'has' and something that is 'had,' and the two are one. The question is not whether selves exist. The question is whether we are aware of self-relatedness." ¹¹ The term, self, includes

the subconscious and unconscious elements as well as self-consciousness. But being a self means separation from everything else. Every self has an environment in which it lives, but it is never completely bound to its environment. Man has the capacity to transcend himself. For example, language " . . . is the basic expression of man's transcending his environment, of having a world."¹² Man cannot be conscious of himself without having a consciousness of the world. "When man looks at his world, he looks at himself as an infinitely small part of his world. Although he is the perspective-center, he becomes a particle of what is centered in him, a particle of the universe. This structure enables man to encounter himself."¹³ And when he encounters himself he discovers finitude, self-contradiction, and ambiguity. It is reason that makes a self a self; and without reason, i.e., the Logos of being, being would be chaotic.

"Knowing is a form of union. In every act of knowledge the knower and that which is known are united; the gap between subject and object is overcome."¹⁴ Knowledge is part of the fulfillment, transformation, and healing of man. But knowledge alone is not sufficient. Revelation is necessary to answer man's existential concerns. "The word 'revelation' ('removing the veil') has been used traditionally to mean the manifestation of something hidden which cannot be approached through ordinary ways of gaining knowledge."¹⁵ The reality of revelation has both a giving and a receiving side to it. Man encounters mystery by way of revelation in an ecstatic experience, and this encounter reveals something valid about the relationship between the Unconditional, or Ultimate, and oneself. This will be discussed in a later section of this chapter. It is sufficient at this time to call attention to Tillich's statement: "Revelation is the answer to the questions implied in the existential conflicts of reason."¹⁶

Man as Finite

The fundamental fact of human existence is finitude. "The question of being is produced by the 'shock of nonbeing.'⁵ Only man can ask the ontological question because he alone is able to look beyond the limits of his own being and of every other being. Looked at from the standpoint of possible nonbeing, being is a mystery."¹⁷ Man is that creature who knows that there was a time when he did not exist and that there will be a time in the future when he will not exist. Man is mortal. "Finitude unites being with dialectical nonbeing. Man's finitude, or creatureliness, is unintelligible without the concept of dialectical nonbeing. . . . Being, limited by nonbeing, is finitude. Nonbeing appears as the 'not yet' of being and as the 'no more' of being."¹⁸ This theme permeates Tillich's theology. To be a man is to experience the threat of nonbeing. It is this threat that makes man conscious of the fragmentariness of life. "Man is a fragment and a riddle to himself. The more he experiences and knows that fact, the more he is really man."¹⁹ This fact forces man to question the meaning of his life. "Finitude taken alone is not self-explanatory; it is a question rather than an answer."²⁰

Man need not be driven to despair by the experience of finitude. According to Tillich: "Finitude implies the question of the 'infinite' for man could not look at himself as finite if he were not in some way beyond it. This is the root of the religious question."²¹ But before this direction can be pursued, other human experiences that are part of man's awareness of finitude must be cited.

To be human, for Tillich, involves the experience of anxiety: ". . . the state in which a being is aware of its possible nonbeing."²² To be aware of finitude philosophically is one thing, but to experience one's own finitude is something else. One is not afraid (this would

require having an object to fear), but one is anxious about death, meaninglessness, guilt and condemnation.²³

Man's concern about death is partly due to the significance of time and the element of transitoriness. "It is anxiety about having to die which reveals the ontological character of time."²⁴ Without time man would not have a present, and without space he would not have a place. But living in time and space means insecurity. Life is continuously changing, and man is forced to live with contingency. "Anxist is the situation of the isolated individual facing the abyss of nothing and the threat of annihilation of all around him."²⁵ This produces a sense of loneliness, even melancholy at times.

Man belongs to the human family, but he does not always experience a sense of belonging. He knows what it means to be lonely. "Man is alone because he is man! . . . Being alive means being in a body--a body separated from all other bodies. And being separated means being alone."²⁶ This need not be a negative feature of human existence--this separation allows man enough distance for reflection and love that he might participate in the transformation of his world. But while he is experiencing this separation, man frequently feels isolated in his loneliness.

Another source of anxiety is meaninglessness. "Man's being includes his relation to meanings. He is human only by understanding and shaping reality, both his world and himself, according to meanings and values."²⁷ Existential man is a spiritual creature; this is very evident when he encounters the phenomenon of meaninglessness. "The anxiety of meaninglessness is anxiety about the loss of an ultimate concern, of a meaning which gives meaning to all meanings."²⁸ How man copes with this problem will be discussed later in this chapter, but it is only necessary now to notice the profound effect it has upon him.

A third source of anxiety present in finitude is man's experience of guilt. Within the ethical sphere of human existence, man is conscious of the ambiguity of moral decisions. Nonbeing is present in his moral self-affirmation. Man is responsible for what he has made of himself. He judges himself for what he has or has not become. The awareness of nonbeing is present in this activity and produces the feeling of guilt. This awareness can drive one to self-rejection--even to the point of despair and a feeling of condemnation. "Despair is an ultimate or 'boundary-line' situation. One cannot go beyond it. . . . No way into the future appears. Nonbeing is felt as absolutely victorious."²⁹ Suicide can result from this state of hopelessness. Though everyone suffers periods of anxiety, one does not want to succumb to its depth, i.e., to the will to lose one's self. Human life is a continuous attempt to avoid despair.

Tillich's understanding of being human involves: asking questions, being aware of one's finitude and transitoriness, living with anxiety and loneliness that can reach the point of despair. However, another important area that reveals man's estrangement is that of human sin.

Man as Sinner

Man as he exists is not what he ought to be. Man is free to contradict himself, i.e., his true (essential) humanity. When he does, self-estrangement is the result. "Man is caught between the desire to actualize his freedom and the demand to preserve his dreaming innocence."³⁰ When he moves from potentiality to actuality, the tendency toward sin is strong. Sin is separation from that to which one belongs. Sin is estrangement. "Man is estranged from the ground of his being, from other beings, and from himself."³¹

The question could be raised as to whether it is necessary for man to sin in order to actualize himself. When Tillich was asked to respond to the Pauline concept of sin (in Adam all sinned), he replied: "The Pelagian or Erasman question was always, Does this not identify 'being man' and 'being sinner'? It certainly does, but as existential fact, not as essential necessity. For every individual man affirms with finite freedom and therefore with responsibility his state of estrangement."³² Man is not required to sin, but in fact he invariably chooses to sin. "It is our human predicament that a power [Tillich calls it the demonic] has taken hold over us which is not from us but in us, hated by us and at the same time one which we gladly accept. . . . We are fascinated by that which can destroy us, and in some moments we hiddenly desire to be destroyed by it."³³ Tillich does not believe in a supernatural being (Satan or Devil) who is the source of man's propensity toward sin. He just recognizes man's natural inclination to raise his finiteness to infinity (playing God, so to speak). If man has no real choice in being a sinner, then why does he accuse himself of not being what he ought to be? This must suggest some awareness of a choice, and therefore, awareness of responsibility for his actions. In Tillich's sermon, "The Good I Will, I Do Not," he states:

Sin is the name for the act in which we turn away from the participation in the divine Ground from which we come and to which we go. Sin is the turning toward ourselves, making ourselves the center of the world and of ourselves. Sin is the drive in everyone, even the most self-restraining one, to draw as much as possible of the world into oneself. But we can be fully aware of this only if we have found a point above ourselves.³⁴

Christianity combines the belief in the tragic universality of sin and man's personal responsibility for it. While creation is essentially good, it falls into universal estrangement when actualized. Tillich differentiates between "sin" and "sins": ". . . sins are deviations

from moral laws. This has little to do with 'sin' as the state of estrangement from that to which one belongs--God, one's self, one's world."³⁵ Of course, "sins" are expressions of "sin" and are not to be considered inconsequential. The key issue is the basic brokenness of human existence. It is this state of alienation that permeates the human condition.

In order to focus more precisely upon the meaning of estrangement, Tillich emphasizes three characteristics of it: unbelief (willful turning from God towards oneself), hubris (pride or self-elevation), and concupiscence (distorted libido, i.e., unlimited desire to draw the whole of reality into one's self).³⁶ God gives man freedom, which opens the door to the possibility of sin. The presence of moral evil in the world is not caused by God but by sin, i.e., man's misuse of freedom. If man chooses self-contradiction and self-destruction, that is his choice. God punishes sin by throwing man back upon himself. Man is forced to cope alone with sin, which in turn creates more sin. He experiences restlessness, emptiness, and meaninglessness. His alternative is salvation. What Tillich maintains is that man on his own will never achieve wholeness of life. Disintegration of his centered self takes place when man tries to go it alone. In the end man will be less than he was meant to be; he will not realize his full potential without God's help.

What Tillich does in pointing out the estrangement of man, is to portray the honest ambiguity that makes up so much of life. He shows the tensions that are present within the human experience. To be human is to live without certitude. In any person's honest perception of his existence doubt is a reality, and this doubt extends to a profound doubt as to the existence of the Ultimate. Genuine skepticism rejects any certainty. "But serious doubt is confirmation of faith. It indicates

the seriousness of the concern, its unconditional character."³⁷ Doubting may indicate insecurity, but it also implies making a decision for honesty. The man who faces up to the various elements of his limited existence, according to Tillich, will discover an unknown force present within him that makes him restless in the hope that he will be made ready to receive an act of grace. In other words, man's restlessness and doubt are not necessarily negative. They can be the preparation for religious experience.

But even for those who have experienced the Unconditional, it is man's plight to have to continue to face the ambiguity and brokenness of human existence.

The strong being is strong only if he watches his strength, aware of the fact that there is weakness in his strength. There is a non-Christian in every Christian. There is a weak being in every strong one. There is cowardice in every courage, and unbelief in every faith, and hostility in every love. Watchfulness means that the Christian never can rest on his being a Christian, that he who is strong can never rely on his strength.³⁸

Yet, an honest man is unwilling to submit to anything that would deny him his honesty.

In this section the emphasis has been on man's experience of estrangement. While attempting to deal with Tillich's understanding of man's existential situation, it becomes clear that inherent in his system is the important area of potentiality.

Essential Man: Potentiality

The subject of man as he is, in the human predicament of estrangement, could not even be discussed without an underlying assumption that within human nature there must be another dimension that aids in the evaluation of man's present condition.

There is no existentialist description of the negativities of the human predicament without an underlying image of what man essentially

is and therefore ought to be. The cutting power of existentialist novels, paintings, even philosophical analyses of man's predicament, is rooted in the implicit contrast between the negativities they show and the positives they silently presuppose.³⁹

What is man essentially? What is man potentially? What is his intentionality? The term "essence" has several facets to it.

Essence can mean the nature of a thing without any valuation of it, it can mean the universals which characterize a thing, it can mean the ideas in which existing things participate, it can mean the norm by which a thing must be judged, it can mean the original goodness of everything created, and it can mean the patterns of all things in the divine mind.⁴⁰

It is that which empowers and judges existence.

Essential man is what he is before he becomes actualized. It is a state of potentiality: ". . . man never could have appeared if the essence 'man' had not belonged to the potentialities of being."⁴¹ Tillich is consistent with his ontological approach to understanding man. There would be no such words as "man" or "human nature" if there were no universal essence that enabled one to recognize man as man.⁴²

Also, man has a capacity for understanding the term "infinite." While it is true that man is finite, "He is aware of his potential infinity while being aware of his actual finitude. If he were what he essentially is, if his potentiality were identical with his actuality, the question of the infinite would not arise."⁴³ It is this self-transcending quality that contrasts man with other beings. Whereas man has the potentiality of having a world, other creatures have only an environment. Man has a capacity for the sublime. "The structure of life shows that the sublime is the greatest potentiality of life. . . . But the sublime is something qualitatively new, it demands a creative act-- and this means freedom . . ."⁴⁴

If existence means standing out of one's own nonbeing, then
existence

. . . participates in potential being before it can come into actual being. As potential being, it is in the state of relative non-being, it is not-yet-being. But it is not nothing. Potentiality is the state of real possibility, that is, it is more than a logical possibility. Potentiality is the power of being which, metaphorically speaking, has not yet realized its power. The power of being is still latent; it has not yet become manifest.⁴⁵

Man never exhausts his full potentiality. He contains potentiality even when he exists in actuality, i.e., he is a combination of essential and existential reality. In a sense, existence is the expression of essence.

Finite Freedom

That which enables man to move from essence to existence is finite freedom. "One can say that nature is finite necessity, God is infinite freedom, man is finite freedom."⁴⁶ It is this quality of freedom that makes man different from all other creatures. Illustrations of human freedom can be seen in the fact that man has a language, raises questions about life, receives moral and logical imperatives, and has the power to deliberate and to decide. He can play and he can build imaginary worlds; he has the power to contradict himself and his essential nature; he is even free of his freedom (but this is at the price of surrendering his humanity).⁴⁷ This radical sense of freedom is what Tillich believes is unchangeable in human nature. Man can deny what he essentially is, he can try to escape from himself and his true being by becoming a conformist, or by succumbing to compulsive self-seclusion, or by active hostility towards himself and other people. Although he may misuse his freedom, the reality of his freedom remains evident. Tillich says that for him, the philosophical argument over whether man is really free is no longer an issue. B. F. Skinner may wish to differ with him, but insofar as Tillich is concerned, this issue was clarified with the reappearance of the phenomenological method after 1900. If one begins with man as an object,

then determinism is certainly true; but if one begins with man as a subject, then determinism is not the answer. "When we give a phenomenological description of what happens in an act of moral decision, we know that neither necessity nor contingency is involved, but a total reaction of our centered being. Now we call this total act of our centered being 'freedom.'"⁴⁸

To be human means to possess freedom, albeit limited freedom. Dehumanization occurs when man does not exercise it. In order for him to experience freedom in actuality, it must be part of man potentially. "Freedom which has ceased to be the power of determining itself in history has ceased to be freedom, and men who have lost this power have lost their full humanity."⁴⁹ Man would not be man without freedom.

But in actuality, freedom is in tension with its polar opposite, destiny. When man lives out the "givens" of his circumstances (caused by hereditary and environmental factors) plus the consequences of his use of freedom (the outcome of former decisions), the unique events that result compose his destiny. Therefore, freedom is not in real opposition to destiny. Destiny is made up of the unique circumstances of each person's life. One's destiny includes the results of one's use of freedom. The concern at this point is not with the tension between freedom and destiny, but it is with the finite freedom present in man's potential nature.

Man is anxious to use his freedom, for he dreads remaining unfulfilled. This is part of the telos (inner aim) of essential man. In order to be acknowledged as a person, man must exercise his creative freedom, and he must recognize that the degree of freedom varies with the individual. "Man's particular nature is his power to create himself. And if the further question is raised of how such a power is possible

and how it must be structured, we need a fully developed essentialist doctrine in order to answer . . . "50

Tillich maintains that human beings can be changed. For example, external events can cause changes in man. And internal questioning as well as the experiencing of what ought to be in the moral realm of life can alter the centered self of man's world. However, the " . . . unchangeable element in man is his freedom to change himself and his world. It is not an unlimited freedom."⁵¹ Man participates in all dimensions of reality, and it is because of this that he can understand himself. He is a microcosm of reality, and self-awareness brings with it an understanding of what is. Freedom is " . . . the reaction of a centered self to a stimulus in such a way that the center, and not a part or a partial process within the whole, determines the reaction."⁵² Each time that one experiences deliberation, makes a decision, reflects upon an issue, or accepts oneself--freedom is experienced.

Finite freedom is the most embracing description of man's basic nature; it is in this that both man's creative self-expression and the possibility of his estrangement from himself are rooted. The actual estrangement, however, even though a tragically unavoidable fact, is not a basic part of his nature, and therefore man can be healed.⁵³

This healing aspect will be discussed later in this chapter.

The underlying concept that permits man to grasp his essential nature is the Logos. It designates the reasonableness of being itself, its true, essential nature, its form and structure.⁵⁴ Logos is universal reason. "It is in all things, everything participates in it. It becomes self-conscious and distorted in man. It is the active, divine power which forms and shapes the passive matter. It is always present, although in different degrees."⁵⁵ Language, and therefore communication and philosophical reflection, would be impossible without the Logos.

The essential power of things is the Really Real. "Knowing the really real of our historical existence presupposes the knowledge of the really real in ourselves. But knowing one's self on this level is transforming one's self."⁵⁶ Without finite freedom man could not transcend his existence in order to say yes or no to life; man could not be a religious creature. Finite man would not be able to respond to the Infinite, the Unconditional. But this he does, and it is because of man's essential nature that such things as religious commandments are taken seriously. Tillich declares, ". . . it is our own true or essential being that confronts us in the moral command, demanding something from us in our actual being with all its problems and distortions."⁵⁷

It is necessary for man to actualize himself if he is to be man, for ". . . the separation of man from his essential nature is really the separation of man from God, understood as the ground of being or the power of being."⁵⁸ It is within the sphere of finite freedom that God is able to get outside of the divine life. Here is an example of Tillich's dependence upon Schelling's thinking. Man's capacity for self-consciousness and self-transcendence is God's way of transcending himself. "The divine life is realized through the separation of the creatures from the Ground."⁵⁹ Divine freedom and finite freedom are identical. So, too, God would be unable to love his creatures if man were not separated from him. It is important to God as well as to man that man move from the state of essentiality to actuality.

Dreaming Innocence

Tillich uses the term "dreaming innocence" to describe man's essential nature.

Both words point to something that precedes actual existence. It has potentiality, not actuality. It has no place, it is ou topos

(utopia). It has no time; it precedes temporality, and it is supra-historical. Dreaming is a state of mind which is real and non-real at the same time--just as is potentiality. Dreaming anticipates the actual, just as everything actual is somehow present in the potential. In the moment of awakening, the images of the dream disappear as images and return as encountered realities.⁶⁰

What drives dreaming innocence beyond itself is temptation. Essential man is not any more perfect than was Adam before "the Fall." Created goodness is possibility, not perfection. "The symbol 'Adam before the Fall' must be understood as the dreaming innocence of undecided potentialities."⁶¹ When man actualizes his freedom, he loses his dreaming innocence. But before he does this, man experiences what Tillich describes as "aroused freedom" which is the desire to sin, prior to actually committing the sin. "In the state of dreaming innocence, freedom and destiny are in harmony, but neither of them is actualized. . . . The tension occurs in the moment in which finite freedom becomes conscious of itself and tends to become actual. This is what could be called the moment of aroused freedom."⁶² At the same time a reaction occurs in which dreaming innocence wishes to preserve itself. "Man is caught between the desire to actualize his freedom and the demand to preserve his dreaming innocence."⁶³ If he does not actualize himself, he experiences anxiety over losing himself; and if he does, he is anxious over losing his innocence. Temptation is the anxiety created by the ambiguous situation. With human possibility at stake, he is pulled in two directions. His anxiety, i.e., temptation, forces him to make a decision. Man decides for self-actualization. "Innocence cannot be lost by a natural process but only by a spiritual decision."⁶⁴

If it is necessary for man to actualize himself, the question can be raised as to man's responsibility for "the Fall." Tillich copes with this seeming contradiction by saying: "Every ethical decision is an act both of individual freedom and of universal destiny."⁶⁵ The Christian

faith affirms both dimensions of this statement as being true. Moral freedom is always connected to tragic destiny. The Creation and "the Fall" must be seen as being together. "Actualized creation and estranged existence are identical. . . . Creation is good in its essential character. If actualized, it falls into universal estrangement through freedom and destiny."⁶⁶ This is not a logical coincidence even though it is consistent with Tillich's system of thought. Sin becomes a rational necessity, and it is at this point that Tillich has been criticized (e.g., by Reinhold Niebuhr).⁶⁷

Reconciled Man: New Being

It has been established that existential man is alienated, i.e., separated from himself, others, and God. When man seeks, on his own, to reestablish his lost unity and essential manhood, he meets with failure. Man is driven elsewhere for the answer to his dilemma. Before discussing Tillich's answer to the human situation, it should be noted:

If, however, the question--What can I do in order to experience the New Being?--is asked with existential seriousness, the answer is implied in the question, for existential seriousness is evidence of the impact of the Spiritual Presence upon an individual. He who is ultimately concerned about his state of estrangement and about the possibility of reunion with the ground and aim of his being is already in the grip of the Spiritual Presence.⁶⁸

Being estranged need not be as explicit and direct as the above quotation. It could be as subtle and implicit as "Our sighing in the depth of our souls, which we are not able to articulate . . ." ⁶⁹ Whenever man is striving for some ultimate meaning in life, whenever he is wanting to believe in God and yet is doubtful that there is a God, whenever there is a longing for the Unconditional (however vague this yearning may be), Tillich says that God is at work in man. This is God taking the initiative.

Also, Tillich's use of symbols should be commented upon briefly before his understanding of reconciliation is presented. Religion expresses itself through the means of symbols. "Religious symbols are distinguished from others by the fact that they are a representation of that which is unconditionally beyond the conceptual sphere, they point to the ultimate reality implied in the religious act, to what concerns us ultimately."⁷⁰ Through genuine symbols (i.e., those that are alive) man has an awareness of reality; but it is not objective knowledge. Authentic religious symbols have an experiential basis to them. "What determines the truth of a religious symbol is its self-negation and transparency to the referent for which it stands."⁷¹ Religious symbols point to the Holy, i.e., that which transcends finitude. The various key aspects to the meaning of symbols can be summarized as follows: Symbols point beyond themselves to something else; they participate in that to which they point; they open up levels of reality which otherwise are closed for us; they unlock dimensions and elements of our soul which correspond to the dimensions and elements of reality; they cannot be produced intentionally; and they cannot be invented.⁷² One other characteristic can be added, i.e., symbols have integrating and disintegrating power.

Tillich reminds one that the term "God" is the basic symbol of faith and that the various qualities ascribed to God are taken from human experience and applied symbolically to that which transcends human experience. When combined in a story, these symbols become myths about the Divine/human encounters.⁷³

According to Tillich, man's true nature is to be found in unity with God. Because of his estrangement man experiences separation from God, and life begins to disintegrate. "Reconciliation with God is at

the same time self-reconciliation. Thus, Tillich combines the religious concern for union with God with the humanistic concern for self-realization."⁷⁴ Tillich's understanding of the nature of God must now be articulated. All of the data to which Tillich alludes in his systematic presentation of the meaning of "God" need not be included. The focus will be upon his basic ideas, which will be helpful in grasping his understanding of the experience of reconciliation. The content of religious experience, for Tillich, is seen in a trinitarian perspective: Being-itself, the New Being, and the Spiritual Presence.

The Reality of God

Man, on his own, cannot find himself or his God. Revelation is necessary if man is to find the ultimate meaning of life. Man knows a restlessness that is caused by the anxiety of his estrangement. To man in his predicament, God does speak.

The problem of man is not that God does not speak to him: God does speak to everyone who has a human countenance. For this is what makes him man. He who is not able to perceive something ultimate, something infinitely significant, is not a man. Man is man because he is able to receive a word from the dimension of the eternal. . . . Human existence is never without that which breaks vertically into it. Man is never without a manifestation of that which is ultimately serious and infinitely meaningful.⁷⁵

Revelation is Tillich's term for the insight gained from man's direct encounter with God.

The concern at this point is to describe the human experience in this encounter. Tillich uses the term "ecstasy." "The ultimate power of being, the ground of reality, appears in a special moment, in a concrete situation, revealing the infinite depth and the eternal significance of the present."⁷⁶ Tillich distinguishes between human encounters that are ecstatic (e.g., love) and the Divine/human encounter. It is not only an emotional experience; it involves the mind as well as the heart.

It is as in a thunderstorm at night, when the lightning throws a blinding clarity over all things, leaving them in complete darkness the next moment. When reality is seen in this way with the eye of a self-transcending realism, it has become something new. Its ground has become visible in an 'ecstatic' experience, called 'faith.' It is no longer merely self-subsistent as it seemed to be before; it has become transparent or, as we could say, 'theonomous.'⁷⁷

This ecstatic experience takes one beyond the limits of one's own being. It moves toward union the other one. On the human level, man knows ecstasy when in genuine communion with another person, when conscious of the depth dimension of his own being, when he experiences freedom, and when the categorical imperative places its claim on him.

Religious ecstasy contains an unconditional element. It is being grasped by the Really Real. Tillich uses this poetic term when he describes an encounter with the Holy. "Such experience is the most human of all experiences. . . . It is effective in the restlessness of the heart, in the anxious question of one's own value, in the fear of losing the meaning of one's life, in the anxiety of emptiness, guilt, and of having to die."⁷⁸

Revelation is not the reception of supernatural information. It is an event in which: "The genuine mystery appears when reason is driven beyond itself to its 'ground and abyss,' to that which 'precedes' reason, to the fact that 'being is and nonbeing is not' (Parmenides), to the original fact (Ur-Tatsache) that there is something and not nothing."⁷⁹ Revelation can be defined as being grasped by an Ultimate Concern. It provokes a human response of commitment to what one believes is valuable (love and human personality), instills a meaningful confidence in life, and provides a sense of personal security and worth.

Tillich has difficulty describing the content of religious experience, and he reinterprets the usual theistic characteristics in discussing his doctrine of God. He maintains, "'God' is the answer to the question

implied in man's finitude; he is the name for that which concerns man ultimately."⁸⁰ Human beings cannot produce Ultimate Concern (i.e., the Really Real) although the object of Ultimate Concern may have many names. For Tillich, God is Being-itself.⁸¹ God is not a being, but the Ground of Being. This definition has caused Tillich to be called an atheist or a pantheist. These criticisms will be investigated in the next chapter. But it is necessary at this time to call attention to a distinction in Tillich's thought that is important. Man can elevate what is less than ultimate to ultimacy, but this is idolatry. Artistic expression can be so interpreted, for example. Aesthetic experience, when held to be ultimate, becomes that person's religion. But usually the word "ultimacy" means nothing finite. "Nothing which by its very nature is finite can rightly become a matter of ultimate concern."⁸² Man may seek to make it so but will fail in the process, for ". . . the ultimate that grasps us will be more powerful, demanding a decision of our whole personality. Yet it is not produced by our own intellect or will; it is something that transcends our decision."⁸³

God is the Power of Being that transcends every being as well as the totality of beings--the world.⁸⁴ God is the eternal power that resists nonbeing, for Being-itself does not participate in nonbeing. Tillich realizes that little can be said about God literally. Symbolically speaking, man has attributed to God self-transcendence and such personal qualities as love (agape). Because he communicates with man, God is, of necessity, seen in a personal way. "Therefore, man symbolizes that which is his ultimate concern in terms taken from his own being. . . . He sees the divine life as personal, dynamic, and free."⁸⁵ God cannot be less than what man is, i.e., a-personal, for it is God who makes man completely personal. Consequently, God is completely personal

in his encounter with man. It is this very reciprocity that provides the dynamic character of biblical religion.

Although, in biblical religion, God is the one who gives and man the one who receives, reciprocity is always present in the divine-human relationship and expressed without any fear that it might limit the absolute divine supremacy. God reacts differently to different human actions. Logically, this means that he is partly dependent upon them.⁸⁶

God is alive as the life process in which potential being becomes actualized. On the human level, "Ultimate concern is the integrating center of the personal life. Being without it is being without a center. Such a state, however, can only be approached but never fully reached, because a human being deprived completely of a center would cease to be a human being."⁸⁷ When man encounters the Ultimate, he experiences a degree of integration; but it is never a completed action. "Man is integrated only fragmentarily and has elements of disintegration or disease in all dimensions of his being."⁸⁸ God may be fulfilled in himself (and therefore called Spirit), but man possesses the limitations of finitude.

"God's life is life as spirit, and the trinitarian principles are moments within the process of the divine life."⁸⁹ Tillich uses such terms as originating creativity, sustaining creativity, and directing creativity, to describe God's participation in the processes of life.

Man is made in the image of God in that man has a rational structure. It is essential man that is made in the image of God. It is this creation that is good. Estrangement occurs in the process of actualization, and assistance is necessary for man to achieve any degree of reunion or fulfillment. Tillich refers to this activity of God as "providence." "Providence is a quality of every constellation of conditions, a quality which 'drives' or 'lures' toward fulfillment."⁹⁰ It takes into consideration man's freedom, and it works within the wholeness of life as inner

directedness in every situation. The inference is that God does not interfere with natural law. He works through the interdependence of all things.

God is the "God above God." Tillich uses this phrase at the conclusion of his book, The Courage to Be, to differentiate his interpretation of God as Being-itself from the traditional theistic interpretation of God. He wants to make it clear that God is not a being besides others. "The ultimate source of the courage to be is the 'God above God' . . ."⁹¹ Man, in his anxiety and estrangement, is enabled by God to take doubt and meaninglessness into himself and say yes to life. It is absolute faith in the Power of Being that makes this possible. Nonbeing and the threat of death are conquered.

The traditionalist who objects to Tillich's terminology can be reassured when Tillich states: "God and love are not two realities; they are one. . . . he who does not speak of God may abide in Him if he is abiding in love. . . . many of those who do not know Him, belong to Him, . . . The criterion, the only ultimate criterion, is love."⁹² The traditionalist may object to the ideas in the latter part of the quotation, but the humanist would find himself included as a religious man according to Tillich's definition. "If we speak of the ontology of love we indicate that love belongs to the structure of Being-itself, that every special being with its special nature participates in the nature of love since it participates in Being-itself."⁹³ Love toward God is the love of love, and this is an ecstatic experience which involves the process of self-realization. If the Ground of Being (God of love) is understood to have the character of self-separating and self-returning life, then that which was separated is reunited when one experiences this love.⁹⁴ Loving God means finding oneself. It means affirming

oneself: " . . . man discovers himself when he discovers God; he discovers something that is identical with himself although it transcends him infinitely, something from which he is estranged, but from which he never has been and never can be separated."⁹⁵ This does not mean that estrangement is an illusion or that it is not real. It just means that it is not total or absolute separation. In order to further elucidate Tillich's meaning of love, one must begin to use New Testament terminology such as agape to describe Christian love, and this leads to Tillich's Christology. It is here that the abstract can be seen in the concrete, i.e., in a historic person, Jesus as the Christ.

Jesus as the Christ

Tillich's Christology has a unique emphasis that retains the element of paradox in its interpretation of the traditional concept of the Incarnation, but he also affirms a liberal criticism of this concept. He says that it is nonsensical to take the Incarnation literally. "The Word became flesh" is at the heart of incarnational theology, but for Tillich, the Divine does not become flesh--it always remains what it is--divine. "The Incarnation of the Logos is not metamorphosis but his total manifestation in a personal life."⁹⁶ The two natures of Christ suggest two realities. Tillich copes with this dilemma by saying: " . . . the name Jesus Christ must be understood as 'Jesus who is called the Christ,' or 'Jesus who is the Christ' . . ." ⁹⁷ This maintains the paradoxical necessity in understanding the mystery and depth present in the historical fact of Jesus of Nazareth.

However, Tillich prefers to discuss this theological issue by shifting from thinking about the two natures of Christ to thinking in terms of the essential and the existential. The fundamental Christian assertion has been " . . . that Essential God-Manhood has appeared within

existence and subjected itself to the conditions of existence without being conquered by them."⁹⁸ In Jesus as the Christ is the reestablishment of essential man. The reconciliation of essence and existence is achieved. In Christ is the fulfillment of human life. He is what man is potentially and what man ought to be. Even more important: "The Christ is God-for-us!"⁹⁹ The source of these affirmations is the biblical picture of Jesus as the Christ.¹⁰⁰ Tillich stresses the fact that New Testament scholarship has been unable to come up with the historical Jesus. All that it can do is to shed light upon the historic witness of Christians, which has been a picture of who Jesus was and what he did. Tillich does not accept the view that the Jesus of history is in competition with the Christ of faith; he wants to maintain the necessary tension between the two interrelated concepts.

Jesus as the revelation of God is the Messiah, the Christ. Christians believe that he is the center of history. Indeed, he is the "Son of God" because he is

. . . the one in whom the essential unity of God and man has appeared under the conditions of existence. The essentially universal becomes existentially unique. But this uniqueness is not exclusive. Everyone who participates in the New Being actualized in him receives the power of becoming a child of God himself.¹⁰¹

The full humanity of Jesus must not be sacrificed in understanding his various titles. According to Tillich, Jesus had human weaknesses (e.g., eros), and as all men, he participated in the tragedies of human existence. But the significant difference was that he maintained his relationship with God, in the process. He was transparent to God. He never allowed the relative to be elevated to the position of the Ultimate. He surrendered himself completely to God. Therefore, in him man encountered the best in man as well as the clearest picture of God. Jesus had "continuous communion with God."¹⁰² If sin is that power which separates man

from God, then it would have to be said that Jesus conquered sin. He overcame the demonic in man.

For Tillich it was the New Being that created the picture of Jesus as the Christ. The disciples knew the reality of the New Being because it had transforming power.

New Being is essential being under the conditions of existence, conquering the gap between essence and existence. For the same idea Paul uses the term "new creature," calling those who are "in" Christ "new creatures." "In" is the preposition of participation; he who participates in the newness of being which is in Christ has become a new creature. . . . In him has appeared what fulfillment qualitatively means.¹⁰³

Christians affirm that the New Being has appeared in the life of a person, a person who could transform human life. The character of the bearer of the New Being is known because he sacrificed himself as Jesus to himself as the Christ.¹⁰⁴ He took suffering and death upon himself.¹⁰⁵ "The Cross is the symbol of a gift before it is the symbol of a demand."¹⁰⁵ This introduces the element of grace into Tillich's Christology. The Cross symbolizes the suffering of Christ and is an expression of the New Being in him. It is important because it clearly shows the humanity of Christ and the extent of his participation in the human situation. "And salvation can be derived only from him who fully participated in man's existential predicament, not from a God walking on earth, 'unequal to us in all respects.'"¹⁰⁶ Participating in human existence, Christ conquers it.

The Resurrection (as the Cross) is both symbol and reality for Tillich. "It is the certainty of one's own victory over the death of existential estrangement which creates the certainty of the Resurrection of the Christ as event and symbol; but it is not historical conviction or the acceptance of biblical authority which creates this certainty."¹⁰⁷ The personal experience of Jesus' disciples was that their picture of

the Christ as he who was the New Being could not be destroyed with the death of Jesus of Nazareth. What Tillich appeals to is an interpretation of the New Testament that "deliteralizes" rather than "demythologizes" as Rudolf Bultmann would suggest. Tillich is trying to affirm the reality of the Resurrection experience without ignoring reason. "Resurrection is not an event that might happen in some remote future, but it is the power of the New Being to create life out of death, here and now, today and tomorrow. Where there is a New Being, there is resurrection, namely, the creation into eternity out of every moment of time."¹⁰⁸

The emphasis here has been on the content of religious experience for the Christian. The focus will now be upon man's part as the receiver of this content, as understood in Tillich's interpretation of salvation. Recognizing that all religions have a message of healing, he emphasizes "salvation as 'healing.'"¹⁰⁹ However, it is the New Being who brings salvation for all men. All men participate in the healing power to some degree. "In this sense, healing means reuniting that which is estranged, giving a center to what is split, overcoming the split between God and man, man and his world, man and himself."¹¹⁰ No one is ever totally healed, nor is healing power totally withheld from man. "Providence means that there is a creative and saving possibility implied in every situation, which cannot be destroyed by any event."¹¹¹ Although even the Christian is in a state of relativity regarding his salvation, the New Being in the Christ transcends this relativity.

While it is God in Christ who initiates the process of reunion, man does play a dynamic part in the process as well. The element of free participation is basic to Tillich's threefold character of salvation. Regeneration is man's participation in the saving power of the New Being in Jesus as the Christ.

It is the new state of things, the new eon, which the Christ brought; the individual "enters it," and in so doing he himself participates in it and is reborn through participation. The objective reality of the New Being precedes subjective participation in it. The message of conversion is, first, the message of a new reality to which one is asked to turn; in the light of it, one is to move away from the old reality, the state of existential estrangement in which one has lived. . . . Regeneration is the state of having been drawn into the new reality manifest in Jesus as the Christ.¹¹²

This action involves faith. Regeneration is the call of faith and the objective action of God.

The second characteristic of salvation is man's acceptance of the New Being. This is Justification. It involves a subjective element. Faith " . . . is participation in the subject of one's ultimate concern with one's whole being."¹¹³ It is not merely a matter of belief (i.e., an intellectual activity), or a matter of the will, or a matter of emotional feeling. "Faith, in the New Testament, is the state of being grasped by the divine Spirit. As Spirit it is the presence of the divine power in the human mind; as holy Spirit it is the Spirit of love, justice, and truth."¹¹⁴ There is a tension between participation and separation, however. Man cannot possess the object of his faith; therefore, separation will always be part of his experience of having faith. There is a "having" and a "not having" that make up the dynamic quality present in the experience of the Ultimate. "Out of the element of participation follows the certainty of faith; out of the element of separation follows the doubt in faith. And each is essential for the nature of faith."¹¹⁵ Faith is being able to say yes to God in spite of the anxiety of the no. This involves the total personality. It is an ecstatic experience of the Holy that includes both an awareness of truth and an ethical awareness.

If sin is being separated from oneself, one's neighbor, and God, then being saved involves the overcoming of separation in each of these areas. This is the experience of grace--the reunion of life with life,

overcoming estrangement. It is reconciliation. How this happens can best be seen in Tillich's famous sermon on acceptance.

Grace strikes us when we are in great pain and restlessness. It strikes us when we walk through the dark valley of meaninglessness and empty life. It strikes us when we feel our separation is deeper than usual, . . . Sometimes at that moment a wave of light breaks into our darkness, and it is as though a voice were saying: "You are accepted. You are accepted, accepted by that which is greater than you, and the name of which you do not know. Do not ask for the name now; perhaps you will find it later. Do not try to do anything now; perhaps later you will do much. Do not seek for anything; do not perform anything; do not intend anything. Simply accept the fact that you are accepted!" If that happens to us, we experience grace. . . . In that moment, grace conquers sin, and reconciliation bridges the gulf of estrangement.¹¹⁶

A sense of peace and wholeness results for the person who knows acceptance. Tillich saw the therapeutic value of this experience of acceptance. But he stressed the fact that it meant accepting the demonic in man, i.e., the very worst elements. Only when man can accept the worst in himself can he accept it in others. The power of the New Being in Christ enables him to do this. It is a liberating and freeing experience. In traditional language it means being justified. It is life-affirming and puts man in touch with the mystery, the depth, the greatness of existence.

Reconciliation involves the experience of forgiveness. This is implicit in acceptance. Because man has received love and forgiveness, he can respond in love for God. To be genuinely forgiven is to participate in the reunion that overcomes estrangement. It is becoming whole or healthy again. It means being healed. "Forgetting in spite of remembering is forgiveness. We can live only because our guilt is forgiven and thus eternally forgotten. And we can love only because we forgive and are forgiven."¹¹⁷ Life is still possible.

In Tillich's thinking the third characteristic of salvation is Sanctification. It is in this dimension of experience that one might

speak of the possibility of becoming fully human. "Sanctification is the process in which the power of the New Being transforms personality and community, inside and outside the church."¹¹⁸ The important word here is transformation. Man is transformed by his participation in the New Being.

Experiencing Sanctification does not mean arriving at perfection. "Perfection means actualization of one's potentialities . . ." ¹¹⁹ But this is always a matter of degree. It does not mean a finished product. It does not mean being divine. "Man can be healed, he can be saved. But it is man who is healed and saved."¹²⁰ Man may achieve self-realization, he may become liberated, he may realize his potential, but these are all ways of saying that growth is an important element in man's experience. All of life is limited by the law of growth. Man may go beyond ordinary life to that which Christians call "abundant life," but it is still human life, albeit life under the impact of the Spirit. Struggle, pain, and death will still be part of the human lot, but abundant living means taking these realities into oneself and saying yes to life in spite of the noes. The impact of the Unconditional, i.e., the Eternal, upon man enables him to endure the ambiguities of life. A mature person is one who lives with his ambiguities.

The reconciled person knows the depth of human experience, and although he recognizes the demonic that he discovers there, he also recognizes the joy that is present.

But eternal joy is not to be reached by living on the surface. It is rather attained by breaking through the surface, by penetrating the deep things of ourselves, of our world, and of God. The moment in which we reach the last depth of our lives is the moment in which we can experience the joy that has eternity within it, the hope that cannot be destroyed, and the truth on which life and death are built. For in the depth is truth; and in the depth is hope; and in the depth is joy.¹²¹

To be reconciled is to know this joy. The lack of it is caused by separation from God. "But only the fulfillment of what we really are can give us joy. Joy is nothing else than the awareness of our being fulfilled in our true being, in our personal center. . . . Joy is born out of reunion with reality itself."¹²² Fulfillment is the realization that the inner aim of life and the experience of salvation are one. It is a state of blessedness.

Being reconciled brings a sense of fulfillment, but Tillich warns that it does not mean becoming divine. The "old Adam" may be conquered, but he is still there. Even sanctified man will continue to be human, i.e., he will have to cope with the contingencies of life. He will still have to face his inner doubts and uncertainties--but he will not be alone in doing so. In a thought-provoking sermon entitled "Be Strong," Tillich comments upon the strong Christian personality. He would possess watchfulness, faith, courage, and love. According to St. Paul, the Christian could be expected to be what he is--Christian. He will be honest with himself and accept his own weaknesses.

There is a non-Christian in every Christian, a weak being in every strong one. There is cowardice in every courage, and unbelief in every faith, and hostility in every love. Watchfulness means that the Christian never can rest on his being a Christian, that he who is strong can never rely on his strength.¹²³

Recognizing one's weaknesses is part of recognizing one's dependence upon the divine Ground of Being. Even reconciled man can be dominated at times by forces that conquer parts of his being. What helps him to stand, i.e., to exist meaningfully, is the power of love that is present in the New Being. It is this love (God) that participates in human weakness and gives man strength.

The Spiritual Presence

That Tillich's systematic theology is trinitarian in structure has been stated. Since his doctrine of God and his Christology have already been examined, it will now be necessary to view his thought centering upon the Spiritual Presence. In addition, his thinking about the multidimensional unity of life will be considered. In this section attention will be limited to man as an individual; his social relationships will be explored in the last section of this chapter.

Tillich begins by describing the different dimensions of life (time, space, causality, and substance). These dimensions were commented upon earlier, e.g., when reference was made to man's finitude; attention will now be focused upon the importance of man as a spirit. "Spirit as a dimension of life includes more than reason--it includes eros, passion, imagination--but without logos-structure, it could not express anything."¹²⁴ Only man has this spirit dimension. He may share the other dimensions, more or less, with others in the animal world, but it is the dimension of spirit that singles him out. "Man cannot not be man, as animal cannot not be animal. But man can partly miss that creative act in which the dominance of the psychological is overcome by the dominance of the spirit."¹²⁵ For example, whenever man makes a moral decision it is the centered self, under the dominance of the spirit, that makes distinctions, choices, and value judgments. "Morality is the function of life by which the realm of the spirit comes into being."¹²⁶

Although life is ambiguous due to the essential and existential elements in it, Tillich calls attention to ". . . the three functions of life: self-integration under the principle of centeredness, self-creation under the principle of growth, and self-transcendence under the principle of sublimity."¹²⁷ Of course, man's unity can be threatened by disintegration, destruction, and profanization.

Human life oscillates between the possible and the real and requires the surrender of the one for the other.¹²⁸ This is the sacrificial character of life. Choices and risks are involved in human existence. But with the dimension of self-awareness man can get beyond himself, i.e., he can transcend himself, so that he has access to resources that assist him in living with the ambiguities and risks that are part of his life. The tragic dimension of existence can be faced and taken into oneself. One may have a terminal illness, for example. Accepting the reality of it will not alter the fact that one is going to die within a given period of time. But the attitude with which one faces death can be altered by taking the tragedy into oneself and accepting it. This does not mean stoically accepting it. It means cooperating with the Power of Being and allowing the strength that comes from the Spiritual Presence to support one in the midst of tragedy. Religion can be defined " . . . as the self-transcendence of life under the dimension of spirit."¹²⁹ Religion is the answer to man's ambiguous situation, i.e., it enables him to transcend his finite tensions and conflicts.

This quest for the unambiguous life has produced three religious symbols: Spirit of God, Kingdom of God, and Eternal Life. "The Spirit of God is the presence of the Divine Life within creaturely life. The Divine Spirit is 'God Present.' The Spirit of God is not a separated being."¹³⁰ The symbols of the unambiguous life are interrelated, but Tillich distinguishes between them in the following quotation: "Spiritual Presence for the conquest of the ambiguities of life under the dimension of the spirit, Kingdom of God for the conquest of the ambiguities of life under the dimension of history, and Eternal Life for the conquest of the ambiguities of life beyond history."¹³¹ They are all facets of the same reality.

The concern here is with human experience as a dimension of spirit. Even though man desires a unified life, he encounters estrangement and disintegration. The human spirit is ambiguous, and although it may seek the ecstatic moment that would overcome his ambiguity, it eludes him. Man cannot control the Spiritual Presence. "When it grasps man, it creates unambiguous life. Man in his self-transcendence can reach for it, but man cannot grasp it, unless he is first grasped by it."¹³² When man is grasped by it, he experiences meaning--he experiences faith and agape. Through the means of prayer, the Word, and the sacraments, the Spiritual Presence makes contact with man's spirit: ". . . the Spiritual Presence elevates the human spirit into the transcendent union of unambiguous life and gives the immediate certainty of reunion with God."¹³³ This is the same as being grasped by the New Being manifested in Jesus as the Christ. This is not speaking of two separate experiences. Two symbols are being used to convey the same meaning, i.e., reconciliation.

To return to the concept of Sanctification, seen as the work of the Spirit--Sanctification is the life process under the impact of the Spirit. It is the same thing as experiencing the New Being. Sanctification is a process, however, and in it can be seen the following four characteristics which best illustrate man's becoming fully human.

The first characteristic is that of increasing awareness. Man ". . . becomes increasingly aware of his actual situation and of the forces struggling around him and his humanity but also becomes aware of the answers to the questions implied in this situation."¹³⁴ This implies being aware of the divine and the demonic in man. It means affirming life, in spite of its ambiguities. "Such awareness includes sensitivity toward the demands of one's own growth, toward the hidden hopes and

disappointments within others, toward the voiceless voice of a concrete situation, towards the grades of authenticity in the life of the spirit in others and oneself."¹³⁵

The second characteristic of Sanctification is that of increasing freedom. This refers to liberation from compulsions that impede spiritual growth. Morally this indicates freedom from the commandments of law, i.e., being more conscious of the spirit of the law than of following the letter of it. It means overcoming one's willfulness and one's enslaving habits. Maturity seeks to create and maintain the conditions that would make this freedom available for others. Conversely, maturity resists anything that would destroy this freedom. Tillich says that such action as asceticism, or even martyrdom, would be resorted to in order to preserve freedom in the concrete situation.¹³⁶

The third characteristic of Sanctification under the influence of the Spirit is that of increasing relatedness. "Relatedness implies the awareness of the other one and the freedom to relate to him by overcoming self-seclusion within oneself and within the other one."¹³⁷ The key emphasis here is a mature relatedness which keeps in balance man's need for solitude and for communion with others. These elements are interdependent, and the result is victory over loneliness. Immaturity cannot sustain solitude and is frequently superficially outgoing. Maturity is both inward looking and outgoing, making it possible for responsible relationships to take place. It involves the vertical and horizontal dimensions of life in complementary tension with each other. Hostility and unhealthy introversion is replaced with loving acceptance and balanced extraversion. A mature self-relatedness involves exercising self-control and self-discipline. The individual becomes more spontaneous and self-affirming without engaging in self-elevation or self-humiliation.¹³⁸

A person's search for identity reaches the stage of arriving, i.e., of finding one's identity. One's essential self becomes evident through one's existential self.

The fourth characteristic of Sanctification revealing the process of growth is that of increasing self-transcendence: ". . . sanctification is not possible without a continuous transcendence of oneself in the direction of the ultimate--in other words, without participation in the holy."¹³⁹ Possessing a devotional attitude toward the Ultimate is entailed. Not withdrawal into a private devotional world but, to the contrary, participation in corporate devotion is indicated. Tillich makes it clear that that maturity in this area does not limit itself to worship services (although it would include it). Private meditation, mutual sharing of meaningful experiences with others, and appreciation of creative works of art are examples of ways in which one's devotional life can be expressed. "Perhaps one can say that with increasing maturity in the process of sanctification the transcendence becomes more definite and its expressions more indefinite."¹⁴⁰

The four characteristics, or principles, of life under the Spirit point toward perfection. But perfection is a goal beyond the grasp of man's reach. Even a sanctified life has its ups and downs. The important thing is that it is a "movement toward maturity."¹⁴¹ Perhaps the term "saint" indicates the direction toward which one should be striving. According to Tillich, a saint is one who is transparent to the Divine. Certainly Jesus had this quality, but he was more than a saint; he was the bearer of the New Being. Still, a saint has an image of perfection, but in reality saints remain sinners (although justified ones). Obviously Tillich is not advocating a Roman Catholic conception of a saint as a special person who is canonized by the church. He is thinking in

Pauline terms, in which ordinary followers of Christ are called saints. Saints are persons through whom the Ultimate can be seen. "The saint is saint, not because he is 'good,' but because he is transparent for something that is more than he himself is."¹⁴² Saints point the way, they are sign-events for others.

This discussion of the significance of the Spiritual Presence can be concluded with quotations from one of Tillich's sermons in

The Eternal Now:

. . . this is what Divine Spirit means: God present to our spirit. . . . in communities and personalities, grasping them, inspiring them, and transforming them. For Spirit is first of all power, the power that drives the human spirit above itself towards what it cannot attain by itself, the love that is greater than all other gifts, the truth in which the depth of being opens itself to us, the holy that is the manifestation of the presence of the ultimate. . . . The Spirit can work in you with a soft but insistent voice, telling you that your life is empty and meaningless, but that there are chances of a new life waiting before the door of your inner self to fill its void . . . The Spirit can give you the courage that says "yes" to life in spite of the destructiveness you have experienced around you and within you.¹⁴³

This brings us to the final major section of this chapter. Up to this point Paul Tillich's view of what it means to be human, with God's help, has been the main concern. The following division of human experience--what man is essentially, what he is existentially, and what he may become if reconciled--has been observed. Attention has been on man as an individual. It is now necessary to look at man in his relationship to others, i.e., man in community. What man does when he is involved in becoming fully human will be seen.

Theonomous Culture: Social Fulfillment

In Paul Tillich's concept of the human, maturity is equated with fulfillment. "A mature man is one who has reached his natural power in life and thought and is able to use it freely."¹⁴⁴ This is the equivalent of being wise, which involves being aware of the mystery in life

but also of the conflicts within life. However, becoming mature as a person necessitates another dimension--the social dimension of man. "A person becomes aware of his own character as a person only when he is confronted by another person. Only in the community of the I and the thou can personality arise."¹⁴⁵ Man needs to be in relationship with other men in order to realize his full humanity.

To be truly human, i.e., to be an individual embodiment of creative freedom, is to be a person. But to be a person is to be simultaneously a member of a community of persons. One can become a person --a self-determining being with the power to grasp and shape reality --only by entering into communion with other persons.¹⁴⁶

Tillich makes it clear that the interdependence of man is part of the process of becoming human.

Because Tillich understands religion to be essentially social (culture is the form of religion and religion is the substance of culture),¹⁴⁷ this dimension needs to be explored. What he advocates is a theonomous culture, i.e., one whose creations express an Ultimate Concern. Transcendent meaning would be explicit in this culture; it would not be viewed as something strange or foreign to it. In contrast to autonomy (obedience to the law of reason) or to heteronomy (obedience to laws external to man), Tillich speaks of theonomy: "Theonomy does not mean the acceptance of a divine law imposed on reason by a highest authority; it means autonomous reason united with its own depth."¹⁴⁸ The Middle Ages would be an example of a time in which culture was conscious of, and oriented to, an unconditional concern. Obviously Tillich does not suggest a return to the Middle Ages (as some romantics would desire). He does seek a consciousness of the depth element of existence such as was present at that time.

The Spiritual Community

"The divine Spirit's invasion of the human spirit does not occur in isolated individuals but in social groups, since all the functions of

the human spirit--moral self-integration, cultural self-creation, and religious self-transcendence--are conditioned by the social context of the ego-thou encounter."¹⁴⁹ Tillich uses the term "Spiritual Community" to describe the social correlate of the New Being. This can include the social reality of the institutional church, but it is not limited to social or religious organizations. The Spiritual Community is a community of faith and love and is the unity of religion, culture, and morality. It is known in great moments (kairoi) of history. Those who are grasped by an Ultimate Concern form a community of faith, but it is a community that is universal in nature, i.e., it desires to include all mankind. And it is a community that has the mark of holiness since its foundation is the New Being, the Really Real.

Before commenting on Tillich's thought about the nature of the Christian church, further attention must be given to man as an ethical creature (whether he is inside or outside the institutional church). A person " . . . is a moral concept, pointing to a being which we are asked to respect as the bearer of a dignity equal to our own and which we are not permitted to use as a means for a purpose, because it is purpose in itself."¹⁵⁰ Man's relationship to other men requires respect for personhood. The experience of the moral imperative is a substantive part of being man; he would not be a man without it. "A being without the consciousness of a moral demand is not human."¹⁵¹ The moral command is unconditional in character, and without the reunion of man with his own essential nature moral action would be difficult. That is, in estrangement man is still wrapped up in himself, and he is insensitive to other persons' "having" and "not having." It is only after liberation to full humanity that man realizes:

In every death we encounter, something of us dies, and in every disease, something of us tends towards disintegration. . . . no one

can be liberated from himself unless he is grasped by that power which is present in everyone and everything--the eternal, from which we come and to which we go, and which gives us to ourselves and liberates us from ourselves.¹⁵²

This is another way of saying that man becomes responsible for others when he is freed from himself.

The moral experience of mankind has been expressed in such codes of conduct as the Ten Commandments and the Sermon on the Mount. But Tillich says that these, and the codes of other religions, are not absolutes. The only absolute principle that he recognizes is agape; the codes are derived from it. Whereas codes may be relative, i.e., transient, human beings are immersed in these relativities. While being part of the relativities, man has the power of knowing what enables him to transcend them. "A conscience may be called 'transmoral' which judges not in obedience to a moral law but according to the participation in a reality which transcends the sphere of moral commands."¹⁵³ Man's ethical existence is based upon his relationship to God; therefore, his religious existence is fundamental to his ethical and social existence.

The ethics of Tillich can be found at various places throughout his writings. However, his book, Morality and Beyond, goes into considerable detail in explaining his ethical ideas. "The moral act establishes man as a person, and as a bearer of the spirit."¹⁵⁴ Man has the freedom to respond responsibly to the world, or he can ignore or reject the moral claim on his life. Man's essential being was created in the image of God, and it was considered to be "very good" by God in the creation myth. According to Tillich, it is this essential being of man that can be interpreted to be "God's Will." To do "God's Will" man seeks, as much as possible, to approximate his essential being. This can occur only when he has experienced reconciliation. "For us the 'Will of God' is manifest in our essential being; and only because of this can we accept the moral

imperative as valid. It is not a strange law that demands our obedience, but the 'silent voice' of our own nature as man, and as man with an individual character."¹⁵⁵ What this means in terms of human relationships can be seen in the demand to treat other persons as subjects and not as objects. People are persons, not things. "The 'Spiritual Presence,' the presence of the divine Ground of Being toward and in the human spirit, opens man's eyes and ears to the moral demand implicit in the concrete situation."¹⁵⁶

Agape serves as the motivation for loving others and justice is the social form of uniting love. Therefore, man is to act responsibly by ". . . being guided by the divine-human wisdom embodied in the moral laws of the past, listening to the concrete situation, and acting courageously on the basis of these principles."¹⁵⁷ Acting responsibly is not out of a requirement to obey the moral laws present in the ethical commandments of one's religious heritage. Rather, it is out of a genuine response to man's being accepted that his moral action is motivated. "The unconditional character of the moral imperative, love as the ultimate source of the moral commands, and grace as the power of moral motivation are the concepts through which the question of the relation of religion and morality is fundamentally answered."¹⁵⁸

Only love, i.e., agape, is able to adapt itself to a changing world. It can meet the specific needs presented by each concrete situation. It is able to be found in every kairos situation. While each ethical system needs laws and institutions, the true meaning of ethics is: ". . . the expression of the ways in which love embodies itself, and life is maintained and saved."¹⁵⁹

A further word needs to be said regarding the interrelationship of love, power, and justice. In his book by that title, Tillich makes

it clear that love, power, and justice are rooted in an ontological basis. "Constructive social ethics presuppose that one is aware of the element of love in structures of power and of the element of power without which love becomes chaotic surrender."¹⁶⁰ Love is the foundation of power, and love is the principle of justice. Whenever man treats other men as things, justice is violated. One needs to be conscious that: "Love does not do more than justice demands, but love is the ultimate principle of justice. Love reunites; justice preserves what is to be united. It is the form in which and through which love performs its work."¹⁶¹ Since Being-itself is God, love, power, and justice come from God. For Tillich they are symbols of the Divine Life. Therefore, an ethical person who has experienced reconciliation is one in whom love, power, and justice are evident and in the proper perspective. Not only does he embody these principles but he works in society to show the unity and interrelatedness of love, power, and justice. He is a witness to their source, God.

In order to live an ethical life, man must have the courage of his convictions. His intentionality is to live "in" meanings, i.e., in that which is valid logically, aesthetically, ethically, and religiously.¹⁶² Ethical man participates in the social structures that are meaning-producing. This means political and economic involvement in the social fabric of life. A sensitivity to the values that create and sustain life by making it more human receive high priority for ethical man. It means being a conciliatory factor in life, and even at times having to absorb hostility from others, in the process of conciliation. The ethical man affirms being, in realistic ways, in spite of the presence of nonbeing. He can do this because he has had the courage to accept himself as having been accepted in spite of his being unacceptable.¹⁶³ He is free to become involved in concrete ways of improving the social conditions of man.

The ethical life is an expression of man's life in relationship to the Spiritual Presence. Tillich's purpose is to show man as one who stands in nature, taking upon himself inevitable reality, not fleeing from it either in the world of ideal forms or into the related world of the supernatural, but making decisions in concrete reality.¹⁶⁴

The Christian Community

While it is true that man is man only when he is in community, comment needs to be made upon the particular community of Christians. "Such words as 'body of Christ,' 'assembly (ecclesia) of God' or 'of Christ,' express the unambiguous life created by the divine Presence, in a sense similar to that of the term 'Spiritual Community.'"¹⁶⁵

Although it is a fragmented community because it is limited to the conditions of finitude, it is, nevertheless, unambiguous in that it has overcome the human predicament of estrangement. This community possesses such characteristics as: ecstasy, faith, love expressed in mutual service (especially toward those in need, whether members of the group or not), unity, and universality.¹⁶⁶

An interesting facet of Tillich's thought involves what he calls the "latent" community. By this term he means those who are part of the community before the encounter with the New Being. "Latency is the state of being partly actual, partly potential; . . ." ¹⁶⁷ For example, Christian humanism would be the Spiritual Community in its latent form. There are people within the Spiritual Community of most of the major religions of the world who have not been really grasped by what is ultimate. Tillich even goes so far as to suggest that world communism is living in the latent dimension of the Spiritual Community.

The manifest Christian community is the church. "The church in New Testament Greek is ecclesia, the assembly of those who are called

out of all nations by the apostoloi, the messengers of the Christ, to the congregation of the eleutheroi, those who have become free citizens of the "Kingdom of the Heavens."¹⁶⁸ Wherever the Gospel has been preached and a fellowship has come into being, there is a church. The church is both a sociological and a theological reality. "The paradox of the churches is the fact that they participate, on the one hand, in the ambiguities of life in general and of the religious life in particular and, on the other hand, in the unambiguous life of the Spiritual Community."¹⁶⁹ Such attractive characteristics as faith and love and holiness can be found in the church, but so can the unattractive characteristics of the demonic and the destructive be found there. In other words, the church is human, i.e., with all the grandeur and misery of man. At the same time, the church is the community of the New Being. The church contains the ambiguities of life; it is the point at which the ambiguities are recognized and rejected but not removed.¹⁷⁰ It is a community that points to and affirms the New Being in Jesus as the Christ. It is a community of love that tries to make love possible in others. Because its members have received grace and have known the experience of worship, it has a purpose to expand itself, i.e., to actualize the Spiritual Community within concrete churches all over the world.¹⁷¹ This requires that the church be involved in educational and evangelistic work. The evangelist does not address himself to "lost souls," men without God, but to people in the stage of latency who need to be transformed into persons who are consciously in the Spiritual Community.¹⁷² It is beyond our scope to go into further detail concerning Tillich's understanding of the church and its various functions. What need to be emphasized are some of the specific things which a person does when a member of the Christian community.

For example, a person who has been saved, i.e., healed, has the responsibility of helping others also to become liberated and to be set free. In a sermon on salvation Tillich says:

Who are these healers? Where are these saviours? . . . They are here; they are you. Each of you has liberating and healing power over someone to whom you are a priest. We all are called to be priests to each other; and if priests, also physicians. And if ¹⁷³ physicians, also counsellors. And if counsellors, also liberators.

The person who has been the recipient of the Gospel has a responsibility to communicate the Gospel. This means helping man to understand his predicament, i.e., helping others to become conscious of the factors that cause estrangement. In some cases this would mean making people aware of their predicament. A Christian's task " . . . is to heal those ¹⁷⁴ who are sick, which includes those who are not aware that they are sick." This is done by communicating through participation. "Participation means participation in their existence, out of which the questions come to which we are supposed to give the answer." ¹⁷⁵ Their predicament, after all, is everyone's predicament. By identifying with people, wherever they are, persons can help in sharing their concerns so that when the questions are asked Christians can point to the Christian answer. The responsibility that the Christian has in communicating the Gospel is " . . . putting it before the people so that they are able to decide for or against it. The Christian Gospel is a matter of decision. It is to be accepted or rejected." ¹⁷⁶ It is not a Christian's responsibility to make disciples. His task is to give an invitation for decision-making. His responsibility is to provide a state of readiness in which others might experience the New Being. Whether or not they say yes to the healing reality of the New Being is up to them.

The strategies used to communicate the Gospel may be implicit or explicit. Whatever means are consistent with the individual who is

communicating the Gospel and are not repulsive to the Gospel itself should be employed. It may be a silent penetration of society or a highly visible approach to society; the point is that the reconciled member of the Spiritual Community has an obligation to share his experience. He is called upon to make a difference in the larger human family. Tillich refers to these approaches as "priestly" and "prophetic" functions. "The churches silently give Spiritual substance to the society in which they live, and the churches silently receive Spiritual forms from the same society."¹⁷⁷ But there are times when there must be a critical attack upon the dehumanizing structures of society. This is what is meant by the prophetic function. Sometimes this attack is directed against the church itself. Tillich calls this the "Protestant principle." Whenever anything relative is elevated to the position of that which is ultimate, the prophetic spirit criticizes, attacks, and condemns whatever authority is responsible for this idolatry. This power to be self-critical is most important for the church. At other times the church may find it necessary to level criticism against the state, and this has political ramifications.

Christian action today must preserve the tradition of social criticism, and it must attack wherever social patterns become visible by which persons are treated as means or transferred into things or deprived of their freedom to decide and to create, or thrown into anxiety or bitterness or hate or tragic guilt.¹⁷⁸

The Christian is required to engage in battle wherever the demonic threatens to make human life less than human. If it has not already been started, the Christian must initiate the rebellion against the dehumanizing actualities of social existence; or he must join in it if it has already been started. This means participating in the social revolutions of the time that seek to make human life more human. For example, it means being involved in such social realities as the fight against

poverty, racism, war, and ecological suicide. It also indicates that sacrifice and risk taken in social service are necessary in living out one's Christian faith. Social action is an important part of demonstrating one's theological commitments. What is at stake is the survival of man. The problems are monumental; the need is urgent. Christians are to join with other Christians and even with those who have different reasons for being (such as humanists and communists), in order to work for a future for man. God has given man creativity and responsibility; the time for man to act is now. The kairos is here and the Christian is one who bears witness to it. In spite of the pessimistic predictions about man's future, the Christian responds to the current crises with hope because God is at work within his creatures and within his creation.

Tillich, however, was very conscious of the possibility that man may act irresponsibly and become "rebarbarized." "Every newborn infant has, when it comes to a certain point of self-awareness, the possibility of stopping progress by contradicting fulfillment in man's essential nature."¹⁷⁹ Tillich opposed any belief in natural progress in humanity. He preferred the concept of maturity and the need to rise to the occasion of pregnant moments. For example, "Perhaps there are great moments in history. There is in these great moments not total fulfillment but there is the victory over a particular power of destruction, a victory over a demonic power which was creative and now has become destructive."¹⁸⁰ Tillich challenged persons to participate in the fight. Comment was made in the last chapter upon the particular battlefronts in which Tillich was actively engaged (e.g., religious socialism, anti-Nazi cause, Jewish refugee work, etc.).

In an article on "The Person in a Technical Society," Tillich revealed his concern for homo faber, industrial man. He said that

everyone must join in the rebellion of creative life against any structure that contributes to the degradation of man.

The technical development is irreversible and adjustment is necessary in every society, especially in a mass society. The person as a person can preserve himself only by a partial non-participation in the objectifying structures of technical society. But he can withdraw even partially only if he has a place to which to withdraw. And this place is the New Reality to which the Christian message points . . . the picture of Jesus as the Christ.¹⁸¹

The Christian can help a technical society by pointing to the ultimate roots of personal being. Only the ground of the personal can save the personal. "It is the New Reality which is manifest in Christ and against which even technical society and its power of destroying the person as person cannot prevail."¹⁸² Out of the depth of human existence arises the courage to resist patternization and dehumanization in contemporary social life.

Tillich saw the demonic power of capitalism. He saw the injustice that resulted from its misuse. This was the reason that he participated in the Religious Socialist movement of post-World War I in Germany. While it was Marxist in philosophy, it did not have utopian goals nor did it lack a self-critical element. Although religious socialism as a movement was not successful (if judged by its effect upon the twentieth century), Tillich maintained that it had the ingredients for political ideals of the future. Reflecting upon the lack of reception that religious socialism received, he thought that its time had not yet come (although he thought differently in the 1920s). However, he believed that because it was based on the concept of a theonomous culture the main objectives of the movement of religious socialism would be present in the social reality of the future, whatever form the future would take. If man is to survive into the future, he must be a part of a theonomous culture--one in which healing can take place. Modern man cannot tolerate a society with a

spiritual vacuum. He cannot live long with a lack of ultimacy. The Christian and the church need to ". . . return to the frontier, to cross over it and wrestle for the Beyond in the to-and-fro between church and culture."¹⁸³ For Tillich, who was at home "on the boundary," this was a call to border-crossing. Modern man will either fall back upon the familiar and static ways of the past, or he will transcend himself and move into the untried future. He will cross over the boundary into a theonomous culture where existence will continue to be full of tension but with a consciousness in culture of the Ultimate. Theonomy is ". . . the state of culture under the impact of the Spiritual Presence."¹⁸⁴ It is the Spiritual Presence that creates a theonomous culture. It is a culture in which grace abounds. Those who will live in a theonomous culture will live with hope. "Hope unites the vertical and the horizontal lines, the religious reservation and the religious obligation. Therefore, the ultimate word that religion must say to the people of our time is the word of hope."¹⁸⁵ For a theonomous man is one who lives in history but as one who is also above history. Theonomous man is in touch with the Really Real. He has entered deeply into the contemporary moment and has discovered the Ultimate transforming the personal and historical situation. The future of this world may be in man's hands, but:

. . . there is another order to which we, as human beings, belong, an order which makes man always dissatisfied with what is given to him. . . . He passes, as no other being is able to pass, beyond the limits of his given world. He participates in something infinite, in an order which is not transitory, not self-destructive, not tragic, but eternal, holy, and blessed.¹⁸⁶

The Christian community is part of the Spiritual Community. It has members who participate in the Kingdom of God (a term which Tillich uses to include all elements of reality). The Kingdom of God in its fulfillment is identical to Eternal Life: it is the nonfragmentary and total conquest of the ambiguities of life.¹⁸⁷ In a sermon on "The

Mystery of Time," Tillich refers to the Gospel of John in which Eternal Life is seen as a gift in the present time;

. . . he, who listens to Christ, has eternity already. He is no longer subject to the driving of time. In him the "now" becomes a "now eternal". . . Time is not meaningless. It has a hidden meaning--salvation. It has a hidden goal--the Kingdom of God. It brings about a hidden reality--the new creation.¹⁸⁸

Man becomes fully human when he arrives at the state of blessedness. The Spiritual Presence produces a feeling of fulfillment in which man, while recognizing the negativities of life, cannot be threatened. It is a state that has personal and social implications.

The concept of "the human" in the work of Paul Tillich has been examined. All of his various avenues of thought have not been summarized, but an attempt has been made to pursue those which were most pertinent in conveying his understanding of man. Attention must now be given to the significance of Paul Tillich as a contemporary theologian, which will be the subject of the next chapter.

CHAPTER VI

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF PAUL TILlich

In this chapter an attempt will be made to see Paul Tillich and his work in perspective. There will be three particular areas of concern: first, the reasons for Tillich's wide influence and his possible lasting theological contributions; second, the various critiques of his philosophical theology; and third, an evaluation of his concept of "the human" as discovered in this study.

The Contributions of Paul Tillich

At the time of his early work, Tillich's popularity was limited. He had been recognized in Germany as an outstanding theologian prior to his exodus to the United States. But the extent of his influence did not reach its height until the latter part of his career (during the 1950s and early 1960s). Since he lived a long life and was a prodigious writer, his fame increased up to the time of his death in 1965. The reasons for his popularity were manifold.

First of all, Tillich was a theologian of culture. Daniel Day Williams praised ". . . Tillich's extraordinary power to speak to contemporary culture in its own terms."¹ This was because Tillich took seriously the questions of modern man. On another occasion Williams commented that the effect of Tillich's intent to unite personal faith and rational understanding was that secular culture and the Christian church deepened their self-understanding. As Edward Dowey, Jr. noted, "The incorporation of the whole range of human experience, indeed 'open experience,' into the matter of Christian theology is a hall-mark of

Paul Tillich's thought."² He was not interested only in a specialist's approach to life--to the contrary, he saw life in its wholeness, and this forced him into contact with persons of many different fields. His colleague for many years, Paul Lehmann, said: "No theologian in the tradition of the Reformation has addressed himself to the tremendous responsibility for culture, for the life of man as it is actually lived in space and time, with the passion and persistence, the consecration and the learning that mark Professor Tillich's life-long work."³ Another colleague, Reinhold Niebuhr, called Tillich " . . . the Origen of our period, seeking to relate the Gospel message to the disciplines of our culture and to the whole history of culture."⁴ Tillich was not limited to his own narrow discipline. He saw his work in the larger context of all of life. Religion and culture were directly related to each other. Reality was the subject of his interest, and it took him into many avenues of thought.

Tillich stands forth as the theologian for Everyman in the predicament of his existence. He sees his central task as one of mediating between faith and culture . . . It is his passion for reconciliation that has made Tillich so sensitive to the antagonism of separation and struggle which he finds on all levels of individual and social life.⁵

The emphasis here is on the word mediation. His concern for the boundary situation (he saw himself as always on the boundary) gave him a unique position from which he could play a mediating role. His dialectical methodology enabled him to see both sides of issues. For example,

Tillich seems to emerge as a prophet of both doom and promise. It is the vision of holiness, the ultimacy of the divine, the God beyond, which moves him. He has, in his "Protestant principle," forged a hammer for crushing the idols of modern man: he rejects all attempts to make the conditional into the unconditional.⁶

Perhaps the reason for Tillich's preference for the boundary situation was the fact that it was his own existential experience. Erik

Erikson thought that part of Tillich's charismatic and personal appeal was a result of the combining of " . . . his opposites--and his occasional extremes--in what he called his gläubiger Realismus, his blend of realism and faith, his utter sensual and spiritual Hereness."⁷ He could talk about what was noble in man, but he never lost sight of the demonic in man. While reason played an important part in man's self-understanding, for Tillich, the element of depth which belonged to reason pointed to the ultimate realities of truth, goodness, beauty, love, and justice. At the same time, Tillich diagnosed the human situation as " . . . one which is experienced in terms of disruption, conflict, self-destruction, meaninglessness, and despair in all realms of life."⁸

He saw the tensions of life, and he knew what it meant to live with these tensions. "He was himself a living example of the divinely given power and courage to be; he was a union of Apollonian and Dionysian powers, a marriage of undogmatic humility with the abundance of daring exploration of creative possibility. . . . He was more than a hero of the mind."⁹ He recognized the interdependence of reflective and responsive thought, i.e., that reason and revelation were necessary in order for man to grasp the meaning of reality. "The point of juncture for reflection and response is the christological paradox. This paradox is a concept which expresses the ungraspability of being-itself and a symbol which embodies the utter transcendence of God."¹⁰ In Jesus as the Christ the mystery of ultimacy became intimate and concrete in the life of one man. Tillich had the ability to press reason to its limits and then to suggest that it is in the arena of the paradoxical that the truth can be found.

As a theologian of culture, Tillich was a creative thinker.

Samuel H. Miller remarked, in a critical review of The Courage to Be:

There are two kinds of books in the world; one, the Liber originalis, in which the insights of the author form a perspective peculiar to his creative relationship with the world in which he lives; and two, the Liber requiritas, in which the author, having more or less chewed on the meat of other authors, comes up with certain conclusions reached by a process of addition or subtraction of opinions. . . . There are few of the former in our day, and too many of the latter. Dr. Tillich's book belongs to the former class. It is the work of an "original" mind, in whose breadth and depth this confusing world is reflected with new meanings and clarity.¹¹

Certainly Tillich was appreciated for his original thinking. While his critics pointed to his dependence upon certain historical figures, such as Hegel, and accused him of warmed-over Hegelianism, this was really unfair. His thinking reflected that he was both a nineteenth-century and twentieth-century man. Although his thinking mirrored some of the major movements (e.g., existentialism), his theology was nevertheless a new creation. Tillich did have a fresh way of approaching the theological enterprise, and his influence was definitely related to his unique way of expressing his thought. Even Nels Ferré, who was very critical of Tillich's key ideas, could say: "Tillich is a scientist in his respect for fact, a philosopher in his demand for explanation, and a theologian in his insistence on relevance for life. . . . Above all, however, Tillich is the profound wrestler with reality who refuses intellectual short-cuts and spiritual sedatives."¹²

In the second place, Tillich was an apologetic theologian, and this contributed to his influence. The existential foundation to his theology was at the same time thoroughly apologetic in intent. He tried to unite Athens and Jerusalem. He was attracted by Greek thought and by revelation as evident in the Judeo-Christian tradition. In a very real sense he was called an "apostle to intellectuals."

Occasionally, he was called an "apostle to the intellectuals speaking in their language." What is correct about this description of Tillich is that he felt himself to be sent as an interpreter of the Christian religion to intellectuals who had become disaffected from the church

and thrown into the spiritual emptiness which in modern life has so often been the result of secularization. But what is not correct about it is that he spoke their language. He understood their condition and felt empathy with them in their anxiety, but he spoke to them in his own language, not theirs.¹³

Tillich was a reasonable man and would react vigorously to anyone who would deny a religious man the value of thinking. He asserted on one occasion: "The intellect is also a God-given function, and I resent it very much when somebody accuses the theologian of sin when he thinks. This is his job."¹⁴ He had little patience for the literalist with a closed mind. He did not consider it his mission to reach that segment of the population. "My work is with those who ask questions, and for them I am here."¹⁵ He was not an elitist in the sense of being indifferent to some people.

He saw more clearly than most the predicament of the intelligent, educated, concerned people in the twentieth century who had been cut off from the energies of faith by the cultural orthodoxies of this period. . . . he could be of help in this age, and was of help, because artist and philosopher as well as theologian, he cared for culture as well as for Christ.¹⁶

Tillich was fearful that students would fail to develop their full humanity.

Tillich had the ability to speak to modern man with a penetration unequalled by most contemporary theologians. He was concerned about truth, but the truth of man's being, i.e., the meaning of life.¹⁷ He used reason to drive man to the depth of reason--the purpose being the truth of Ultimate Concern. Jerald C. Brauer remarked: "Paul Tillich stood alone as the interpreter of Christian faith to American culture as one of the few theologians who could speak to the entire modern world so it would listen. It is one matter to speak to the world; it is quite another matter to be taken seriously."¹⁸ He had the ability to speak across denominational lines, and in his charismatic appeal to students he could cross diverse

boundaries and reach such persons as agnostics, Buddhists, Unitarians, and nonbelievers, as well as Christians. "Above all, Paul Tillich made it possible for countless modern men to become or remain Christian without ceasing to be modern men. He demonstrated what it meant to love God with the mind as well as with the heart and the soul."¹⁹

A physician, Hal B. Richerson, M.D., wrote in an open letter in The Christian Century:

For a man involved in life's ambiguities, no one speaks to the point as Tillich does. Perhaps to the analytic philosopher the question of life's meaning is irrelevant; to the academic theologian wrapped up in logic, mathematics and semantics, life may have no ambiguities or questions. But to the layman, struggling with life's frustrations and joys, shaken by doubt, attempting to find significance in his Christian heritage, Tillich's apologetics is God-sent. What Christian thinker is in closer communication with twentieth-century man?²⁰

This ability to communicate to both laymen and professionals made him a great apologetic theologian.

In the third place, Tillich made a significant contribution as a preacher. It might seem contradictory to comments made earlier, but a study of his sermons would reveal that his preaching was evangelical. He excelled as a biblical preacher. "He communicated best with persons of a philosophical orientation and he had an almost evangelistic zeal to recommend the Christian message to the intellectual doubters and scoffers of the faith."²¹ He could communicate effectively with people from all walks of life because he spoke as one who was involved in the same world as those to whom he was speaking.

It needs to be recognized that Tillich's deepest concern is to be an evangelist. If this has a strange sound to some, we should remember that a sophisticated evangelist is still an evangelist, and in certain circles the only kind of evangelist who can have any hope of a hearing. When it is viewed from the side of motivation, Tillich's thought is strikingly similar to that of the Schleiermacher of the "Speeches" to cultured despisers of religion, and to that of Bultmann, both of whom should be appreciated as sophisticated evangelists.²²

Robert C. Johnson continues: "While Tillich is standing within the church, he is not facing the altar as he thinks theologically. He faces the world outside the church, his basic concern being that those for whom Christ died shall not fail to hear of him because of unnecessary clinging to tradition, to ineffectual Biblicism, and to outmoded forms of thought."²³

Notice some of the characteristics of Tillich's sermons. Thought, rather than structure, is the most important feature of his preaching, and there is little illustrative material. He frequently uses questions and word studies as a stimulus for thought.²⁴ His conclusions are open-ended and not final.

He does not preach a "how to" gospel. His is a gospel which speaks of a transformation of life, a transformation which is slow, limited to series of "ecstatic" moments, a transformation performed by God after which the "how to" message is no longer necessary. And Tillich speaks to the level of life where men are lost and where new birth must begin.²⁵

Tillich was more concerned about attitudes than he was about preaching a gospel of activism. But his sermons were aimed at developing Christian attitudes that would affect one's behavior. For example, in a sermon on "Holy Waste," with Mark 14:3-9 as his text, Tillich comments: "The history of mankind is the history of men and women who wasted themselves and were not afraid to do so. . . . Keep yourselves open for the creative moment which may appear in the midst of what seemed to be waste."²⁶ In his famous sermon on acceptance he advocates adopting an attitude rather than believing certain truths or joining in some project of social action. "The sermons Tillich wrote manifest in their strategy the conclusions to which he comes in the theological argument about the dynamics of revelatory events."²⁷ D. H. Kelsey further notes that Tillich was more concerned about human experience in general and life as a whole than about

the particularities of Jesus as the Christ.²⁸ Criticism of Tillich's work will be made later, but now the point must be made that he was an effective preacher with considerable outreach and influence.

In the fourth place, Tillich made a contribution as a theologian of synthesis. "Only Tillich among the major theologians may be fully described as a theologian of synthesis, one whose consuming desire has been to take seriously and utilize positively the cultural needs, patterns, and modes of expression in reformulating and attempting to communicate Christian truth."²⁹ It was the ability to speak to the existential situations of man that marked him as a valuable member of the Christian community. This was very evident in his preaching, and it certainly was evident in his comprehensive system of thought.

His system, for example, reverses the trend, characteristic of both liberalism and Neo-orthodoxy, toward a radical cleavage between man and nature. Rather, he sees human existence as the fulfillment of the drive of nature (indeed of all being) toward individualization and self-relatedness. This systematic construction brings Tillich's thought into contact with the sciences of physics and biology, as well as psychology and sociology. . . . As a result, Tillich can enter into appreciative dialogue with a wide variety of concerns manifested in modern culture: existentialism, psychoanalysis, modern art, non-Western religions, secular religions (such as Marxism), Western secular humanism, etc.³⁰

This rare ability to be conversant with so many other disciplines was a valuable asset as a Christian theologian. "Tillich's uniqueness, his creativity and originality, lay in his power of thought, the comprehensive scope of his vision, his depth of insight, the systematic consistency with which he developed the internal relations of the various elements of his philosophy and theology, and the daring he displayed in crossing borders into new fields."³¹ He was able to show the essential relatedness of each discipline to its religious ground.

It was Tillich's border-crossing that was significant. One of the borders he crossed, in particular, illustrates his impact upon it.

He was interested in entering into dialogue with practically everyone, but nowhere was this more obvious than in the area of psychoanalysis. "There is a difference between a technical scientific understanding of man as a conditional 'thing' and an ontological understanding of man as a subject or self. Psychoanalysis belongs to the latter. Both as theory and as therapy, psychoanalysis is predominantly ontological."³² Since Tillich was an ontologist, he could appreciate this facet in psychoanalysis. In a study entitled "Implications for Ego in Tillich's Ontology of Anxiety," S. J. Beck comments on the relationship between a person's ego and a person's values.

One's values are also the measure of one's ego . . . for living is ego and ego is living; and the more ego--as honoring value--the more one lives. Here begins immortality . . . The persons who have in human history lived at the furthest limits of their ego's boundaries, are those who continued to be esteemed after their somatic deaths.³³

When one incorporates (i.e., accepts) anxiety with courage in spite of the difficulties that it presents, this is equivalent to affirming one's self. In order to be oneself, one must live with anxiety courageously.

"Tillich believes that psychoanalysis has helped man realize the 'existential' predicament--the meaninglessness, the loneliness of existence with which man is confronted when he wakes from the state of 'dreaming innocence' of childhood to realize his own finitude, his own limitations."³⁴ Theology has been able to learn much about the inner and unconscious self from psychoanalysis. For example, in the acceptance of one's own inner conflicts and in suffering under their ugliness without an attempt to suppress them and to hide them from one's self, they lose their destructive power. While psychology can be informative in regard to aspects of the self, it has difficulty presenting a model of wholeness. Theology is better able to offer this. Earl A. Loomis, Jr. reports: "Among other criteria for being a person or a self versus an

automaton or something subhuman, one must, according to Tillich, be individual, separate, discrete; but one must also simultaneously be a participant, engaged and involved in the lives of others."³⁵ This polarity corresponds to that of the psychoanalytic theory of human development.

J. Heywood Thomas has pointed out that Tillich ". . . has used psychological ideas in his discussion of the doctrine of original sin and in the analysis he has himself offered of the concept of sin. . . . psychology is for Tillich one of the most instructive teachers the theologian can find."³⁶ With his ability to see the interrelationship between theology and psychology, it is not surprising that Tillich contributed many articles to such journals as Pastoral Psychology. In his article "The Contribution of Paul Tillich to Pastoral Theology" Wayne E. Dates has shown such factors as: the psychological method in the study of theology, the method of correlation (by which Tillich sought to unite message and situation, questions and answers, human existence and divine manifestation), ontological and pathological anxiety, the concept of the demonic, and the fact that Tillich was able to bridge the gap between the disciplined naivete of biblical images of man and the secular images of man set forth by contemporary psychology and psychotherapy.³⁷ All of these factors contribute to the clarification of the pastoral task.

While others have praised Tillich's contribution to psychotherapy, Tillich's own words express his dependence upon other disciplines for the theological insights that he gained. "I do not think it is possible today to elaborate a Christian doctrine of man, without using the immense material brought forth by depth psychology."³⁸ The field of psychology is but one example of the multiple interests of Tillich. In addition, he was influenced by the thinking in politics, education, sociology, and

art (especially expressionism), and he was stimulated to write about them from his theological viewpoint. It is beyond the purpose of this study to discuss his contribution to each of these areas of contemporary thought.

In the fifth place, Tillich is appreciated because of his contribution to making human life more human. His theology addresses itself to modern man's experience of meaninglessness. He observed the dehumanizing power of technical society, and he participated in the fight against these dehumanizing powers. "Tillich's intention was nothing else than to work for the reconstitution and rehabilitation of the human, including spiritual and material concerns, in the context of modern life."³⁹ He could bring the wisdom of the ages to bear upon the current situation with creative results. "He was a humanist in the fullest sense of the word."⁴⁰ But his humanism was a Christian humanism that contained the ideal of a theonomous culture, i.e., a culture in which everything was related to the Ultimate. He was a humanist who saw the place of mystery in life, and he chose a position of "belief-ful realism" as his theological posture. "One of the things that contributed to Paul Tillich's tremendous influence was that he spoke out of our broken culture but he always spoke believing . . . He knew only too well the tragedies and suffering, the demonic and evil aspects of human love. But he loved believing, and always with ultimate concern."⁴¹ The meaning of life, for Tillich, was to give meaning to life. Man is that creature who is a meaning-producer in spite of the meaninglessness and ambiguity that he encounters in the process. Man on his own cannot do this, but as one in whom the New Being is present he is in touch with the source of healing power, i.e., the power of God.

Wilhelm Pauck, a close friend of Tillich's, makes the following references to one source of Tillich's richness.

In all his works and throughout his activities, Paul Tillich gave expression to this dimension of life in which man is most authentically human. . . . [His systematic theology] had never ceased to think of plans of action for himself and his fellowmen through which a true humanity would be realized, namely a way of life which renders man human and separates him from all that is inhuman, superhuman, or subhuman.⁴²

How the authentically human is to be realized in a broken world has been discussed in the last chapter. Certainly Tillich worked for the realization of a theonomous culture in which the secular would discover the possibilities of the sacred, i.e., the presence of the Holy in the profane.

In addition to the above reasons given for Tillich's wide acceptance, there are many specific points of his theology that have elicited praise. An example would be found in Robert P. Scharlemann's article "After Tillich, What?" He refers to Tillich's enduring contribution being due to his use of the method of critical reflection and distancing by doubt. "Tillich solved the problem of reflection and doubt not by equating the absolute with the whole content of a system of thought or of religious feeling, but by identifying it with a paradoxical object--one whose objectivity can be grasped only in its self-cancellation and whose power is exercised by its self-negation."⁴³ Even though Tillich's Christology comes under heavy attack (as will be seen in the next section), it needs to be stressed that his doctrine of Christ played a most important role in his systematic theology. This contributed to his ability to speak in a meaningful way to an age in which nihilism and atheism were live options. Tillich was able to speak to those persons who in honesty could not accept the traditional theism offered to twentieth-century man.

In summary, it has been suggested that there are five major reasons for Tillich's greatness: he was a theologian of culture, an apologetic

theologian, a theologian of synthesis who crossed borders into other disciplines, an excellent preacher, and an outstanding teacher who was committed to making human life more human. Perhaps the praise by one of his former assistants, Paul Lee, expresses it best: "Tillich was a one-man theological symphony."⁴⁴

The Critiques of Paul Tillich

It is true that Paul Tillich was held in high esteem for his theological efforts and that he received many honors from the best universities in America, Britain, and Germany; nevertheless, he did not escape considerable criticism from various parts of the theological spectrum. As he was richly praised, so he was vehemently damned. Many of his critics appreciated his work, but there were some who were much more extreme in their condemnation, out of fear of the serious implications of his thought. In this section the focus will be upon the most important criticisms made against Tillich's work.

First of all, a common criticism of Tillich is that he was frequently obscure in the presentation of his ideas. He chose words that clouded rather than clarified the meaning of his subject. When he could not find words to express himself, he created words to convey his real meaning. Paul Edwards is quite scathing in his attack upon this point of obscurity. He finds the following words descriptive of Tillich's thought: meaningless, unintelligible, devoid of cognitive content, failing to make an assertion, saying nothing at all, and lacking referential meaning.⁴⁵ For instance,

Being-itself is, even in principle, inaccessible to anybody's observation . . . merely saying that a sentence, or any part of it, has meaning does not by itself give it meaning . . . Tillich constantly engages in circular translations . . . he "explains" the meaning of one "symbolically" used expression in terms of another which is really no less symbolic.⁴⁶

Edwards agrees with Sidney Hook that ". . . despite Tillich's denial, Being is endowed with a certain kind of existence--that which cannot not be."⁴⁷

David Hopper thinks that part of Tillich's problem of being obscure is a result of having shaped ". . . a philosophical-theological idiom that in its strangeness and novelty worked against his purpose of speaking to and for his time."⁴⁸ Some of Tillich's favorite terms, such as "Ultimate Concern" or "Being-itself," have a peculiar quality that makes one unsure of their full meaning. Hendrik Kraemer approaches the same criticism from a different theological stance. He says that Tillich ". . . lives in the incompatible situation of wanting to be wholeheartedly an ontological philosopher and as wholeheartedly a Christian thinker or theologian. This is impossible . . . Tillich has in his definitions avoided a single-minded decision, and has to pay for this omission by imprisonment in opaqueness."⁴⁹

Too often Tillich's terms conceal rather than reveal what is being discussed. Kenneth Hamilton's polemical work, The System and the Gospel, states: "Ambiguity of language can apparently reconcile the irreconcilable and make incompatibles agree."⁵⁰ Tillich's obtuseness can be seen in what he means by God. Being-itself needs elucidation, and "Power of Being" and "Ground of Being" do not help much as they need interpretation. How can one love Being-itself? It is so vague and elusive.

The experience and awareness of the power of being is not equivalent to a sense of being accepted by this power of being. We feel accepted by the divine only when we believe that the divine literally knows or experiences our distortions and yet accepts us in spite of them. Since being-itself cannot literally be said to know or experience, it becomes impossible to know that one is accepted.⁵¹

Charles Hartshorne addresses this theme of Tillich's being non-intelligible: ". . . that Being-itself is 'neither abstract nor concrete'

can legitimately mean only that it is not exclusively either. For what is in no aspect either is, I contend, sheer nonentity."⁵² Therefore, the definition for God falls outside the boundaries of intelligibility. In his recent book on Tillich, Alistair Macleod, a Canadian scholar, is even more harsh in critical comment. He sees Tillich's view of ontology as containing many linguistic confusions. For example,

. . . the ontological doctrine that Being is "the Power of Being in everything that is" and that "everything that is" is only in virtue of its "participation" in Being. So bafflingly opaque are such pronouncements--even when they have been traced to their source in Tillich's sense of the mysteriousness of the fact that there is a world at all--that it is difficult not to feel that Tillich would have been wiser to adhere more consistently to the view that the existence of the world would not be a "mystery" if it could be explained.⁵³

Macleod believes that Tillich's ontological solutions are the result of a reaction to nominalism and an interest in etymology.

Lewis S. Ford expresses his concern over the direction of Tillich's thought: "If we limit ourselves solely directly to a religious foundation for symbolic predication of God, we find that we are left with nothing but a referent without content, a mere cipher, 'God.' The language of ultimate concern fares badly when subjected to a non-symbolic theoretical analysis."⁵⁴

Bruce L. Smith reacts to Tillich's use of symbols: He ". . . has produced a symbolic theology that injects into Christianity an epistemological uncertainty and religious comprehensiveness that are quite foreign to its original character."⁵⁵

How seriously the criticisms are to be taken depends, of course, upon the particular theological commitment of each critic of Tillich. Such authors as Michael Novak and J. Heywood Thomas attribute Tillich's obscurity to his not taking Anglo-American empiricism seriously. Ronald Gregor Smith accuses Tillich of obscuring the positive implications of the Christian doctrine of Creation. He asserts that Tillich

. . . loses both man and God in the Ungrund in which, if he were true to his conclusion, there would be nothing to say. For the Ungrund in which the "polarities of being disappear" is by definition nothing, nihil: it is the formless void, the unmoving ground, out of which all movement comes. Tillich has rescued the concept of being at the expense of the concept of beings and of any ultimate distinction between beings.⁵⁶

According to Smith, the end of Tillich's theology is not far from a worldly mysticism. He thinks that Tillich violates biblical faith. Smith quotes Carl Michalson's words, "The Bible . . . does not ask the question of being but of historical meaning and act."⁵⁷

The second major criticism of Paul Tillich is that his thinking is unbiblical. Although he knew his Bible and selectively chose passages supportive of his thought, he is accused of omitting threads that are important in maintaining a Christian theology. His impersonal philosophy appears to be alien to the spirit of the Christian faith. Walter Marshall Horton calls attention to the question of whether the Greek metaphysical conception of God as Absolute Being advocated by Tillich can be reconciled with the biblical conception of a Creator God who is the Father of mankind. "Tillich begins with the ontological element in the concept of God, and then adds the Biblical attributes of holiness, love, and power, as Thomas Aquinas does."⁵⁸ Certain scholars (e.g., Lewis S. Ford) believe that Tillich tells us more about what God is not than about what he is. "The assertion that God is not a being runs counter to the monotheistic character of the Judaeo-Christian tradition, which conceives of God as a living personal being. It is more akin to the monistic view of the unconditioned, impersonal Brahma of Hinduism."⁵⁹ This line of thought is similar to Rabbi Bernard Martin's statement: "One may doubt, indeed, that Tillich and the Bible are even talking about the same God. The God who is described by Tillich as 'being-itself' seems to have little in common with the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob or the God of Jesus and

Paul."⁶⁰ It is just this question of the personality of God that prompts Nels Ferré to call Tillich a dangerous theologian.

The deepest significance of finite spirit is its capacity to have intercourse with the infinite Spirit. Being-itself unfortunately affords no such significance, really, and offers no hope or help for prayer as an I-Thou relation. Neither can man count on the personal Purpose of God in providence. What happens to him is not, at the deepest, ordained by a loving Will who creates and controls, directly and indirectly, human lives and the order of nature. We can participate in Reality, adjust ourselves to It by powers inherent in It and available to us, but God never literally acts in our behalf, answers prayers, or shares His purpose in special providence. The security, the intimacy, and the fullest creative conditions for personal growth within the eternal Purpose are therefore gone.⁶¹

But it is Ferré's thought that Tillich was so profound and persuasive that if he would ever defect from the mainline of the Christian faith he would choose Tillich's theology as the next best thing.

Roman Catholic thinkers have faulted Tillich for his lack of dependence upon biblical material. George H. Tavard alleges, "Actually it would be difficult to discover a systematic theology that appeals less to the historical sources of Christian doctrine than that of Tillich. . . . the notion of faith, the notion of original sin, the notion of revelation, have been stripped by Tillich of their specifically Christian elements and made into universal philosophical concepts."⁶² And Avery R. Dulles states: "The Biblical message is reduced to the dimensions of an all-too-human philosophy."⁶³

It is thought that Tillich reduces Christianity to a set of sophisticated rational propositions and that he is guilty at times of oversimplifying and caricaturing biblical personalism and theism (e.g., the traditional conception of "a God walking around on earth").⁶⁴ To persons such as T. E. McCollough, it is a question of biblical personalism or ontology. In order to accept Tillich's theology, it is necessary to accept his philosophy.

Reinhold Niebuhr takes issue with Tillich on this point:

Yet I shall dare to ask whether in this field his ontological speculations have not, despite the great precision of his thought, falsified the picture of man as the Bible portrays it, and as we actually experience it. . . . Faith in the Bible is not so much the "ecstasy of reason" thinking beyond the limits of reason to touch the divine mystery, as an apprehension of the divine made possible by a destruction of the idolatry of the self, and a destruction of the idolatry of the self by the recognition that the ultimate source and end of life stands against the pretensions of the self.⁶⁵

And John B. Cobb is very conscious that many biblical ideas cannot be taken at face value in Tillich's system.

With respect to what is said about God, it is ontology and not a specific appeal to revelation in Jesus Christ that is decisive. . . . it leaves Tillich highly vulnerable to the objection that in fact his philosophy does not do justice to the specifically Christian vision of reality as embodied in Scripture or Christian tradition. It forces us at point after point to abandon Biblical and traditional beliefs.⁶⁶

It is in the area of Christology that the most criticism of Tillich is provoked. Rabbi Bernard Martin comments: ". . . we cannot help wondering if the price is not too high and if most Christian theologians would not ask whether, in Tillich's doctrine that Jesus negates all personal claims for himself, Jesus is not lost as the unique person classical Christian thought has considered him to be throughout the centuries."⁶⁷

Certainly Tillich's position on the Incarnation has been misleading. Nels Ferré says, Tillich's writings show two faces, e.g., he states at times that the Incarnation is indispensable to the Christian faith but on other occasions he maintains that the doctrine is blasphemy and nonsense as a historical and factual statement.⁶⁸ Further in the same article, Ferré is more pointed in his criticism of Tillich. Since the Christian faith stands or falls with the reality of the Incarnation, Tillich's ". . . position simply cannot be held or confined within the

Christian faith without fundamentally altering and destroying it. In intellectual honesty a person is Christian or Tillichian, but he cannot be both."⁶⁹ It is no surprise, according to Ferrá, that Tillich was the father of the American death-of-God theologians and that Altizer and Hamilton's book, Radical Theology and the Death of God, was dedicated to him.

"The Christ which Tillich produces is not the Christ of the Bible. He is a human man who becomes divine, while the Biblical Christ is a divine person who becomes man by taking upon Himself a complete human nature."⁷⁰ Objection is raised in regard to Tillich's not believing in the Christian God who works personally in history and who raises the dead. Christians

. . . must affirm that the human nature and personality of the man Jesus were not obliterated by death, but were resurrected, consummated, and survive. Yet, this is the witness of the scriptures; and this is just what the church has said. Furthermore, it would appear that it is what the church must say if its faith is to remain faith in Jesus Christ, and not an analogia imaginis kind of faith in a "picture," or an empathetic faith in the faith of Peter in the Christ.⁷¹

Even Tillich acknowledges that some persons could interpret his system as being self-sufficient and as possessing a content derived from itself rather than from the Bible. Robert C. Johnson is of the opinion that Tillich shifts the questions and reverses the biblical order of concern. For example, "Hubris, and unbelief or unfaith, are related to estrangement, rather than estrangement being related to hubris and unbelief . . . it is much as though Adam and Eve had found themselves outside the Garden, and had been prompted by this estranged situation to eat the forbidden fruit."⁷² It is for this reason that Tillich interprets salvation in terms of healing and not in terms of redemption. "Instead of the biblical question, 'What must I do to be saved?' Tillich has substituted the question, 'How can man best pursue the quest for the New Being

upon which he is universally engaged because he is man?"⁷³ According to Kenneth Hamilton, Tillich's concept of salvation as "healing" is little more than impersonal "reintegration," and forgiveness of sins is merely the conquest of the contradictions of human existence.

Grover E. Foley's article, "Paul Tillich and the Bible," states: "Tillich, in fact, confesses that Christology only became possible for him after the concept of the 'New Being' had given him the key."⁷⁴ Therefore, one should have the clue to Tillich's diluted Christology. His soteriology becomes subordinate to his ontology. This contributes to a de-emphasis upon the particularities of the Christian faith and to an openness to other religions. Consequently, ". . . the church should not 'convert' but should enter into creative conversation with other vital religions of the world. In fact, at times it seems that the church has no 'mission' except the task of interpreting the world to itself."⁷⁵

The New Testament proclamation does not always align itself with Tillich's thinking. But what is upsetting to biblical scholars is his view of the relationship between historical research and Christology.

To hold, however, that "faith cannot be shaken by historical research even if its results are critical of the tradition in which the event is reported" . . . is, in fact, to insulate faith from any real questioning of the object of faith and thereby to hold that nothing, in effect, can really count against the object of faith. For this reason, Tillich's sharp distinction between faith and history . . . makes him as liable to the charge of seeking an "indubitable basis" of belief as the most positivistic of historians in search of the "real" Jesus of Nazareth.⁷⁶

Tillich emphasized the experience of the New Being at the expense of the historic event, and if objective evidence could be produced and he would deny its significance, he could then be accused of subjectivism or of presuming to possess the mind of God. Without historical research, how can any proper interpretation be given to the biblical account of Jesus as the Christ?

[Tillich] . . . is therefore guilty, as is Barth, of imputing to the historical Jesus a self-understanding and self-actualization which is based on purely theological requirements. For instance, since Tillich's Christology requires that the new being "surrender himself completely," such claims are made concerning Jesus. Since "a revelation is final if it has the power of negating itself without losing itself," therefore "in the picture of Jesus as the Christ we have the picture of a man who possesses these qualities." How does Tillich know that the biblical picture of a Jesus "who possesses these qualities" corresponds to "a concrete historical actualization" without opening the theological claim to historical research?⁷⁷

Father Tavard believes that "Paul Tillich has failed to account for the biblical picture of Jesus and for the Christological dogma as the Church has always believed it."⁷⁸ Tillich is open to the charge of being unbiblical and heretical. And to try to interpret the cornerstone of the Christian faith, the physical resurrection of the body of Christ, using a "restitution theory" is blasphemous, according to Tavard. "The main deficiency in the Tillichian solution is, as we have seen, that it provides no definite passage from the philosophical conception of 'eternal Godmanhood' to the concrete existence of the man Jesus."⁷⁹

Paul Ramsey expresses his concern over Tillich's ethics. Ramsey thinks that an ethic grounded in ontology is inadequate. It fails to define love in terms of a covenant. "The one meaning Tillich assigns to love is reunion, which is a philosophical concept quite different from covenant-fidelity."⁸⁰

Enough illustrations have been given to show the critical response to Tillich's use of the biblical witness. The range of criticism includes both conservative and liberal Protestants, and Roman Catholics who argue from the standpoint of tradition. No attempt will be made to answer these various attacks upon Tillich's thought. Only a quotation in Tillich's defense from Daniel Day Williams will be included: "Dr. Tillich has accepted fully the distinctive historical claim of the Christian faith to the saving event in history; and yet has faced

profoundly the issues concerning historical factuality and the limits of our historical knowledge. He does not dissolve the meaning of Christ into a general abstract idea."⁸¹

The third major criticism of Paul Tillich originates with kerygmatic theologians, i.e., those who represent theological positivism. Tillich's reliance upon reason, and the fact of his starting point being man (rather than God), are the source of their objections. ". . . Tillich's starting-point in an idea of (universal) theology by-passes the starting-point of Christian theology in an authoritative kerygma, and for that reason has cut loose from the specific ground of faith out of which all Christian thinking grows."⁸² What is offensive to such persons as Kenneth Hamilton is that "Tillich makes faith the servant of knowledge because he has started out from the assumption that truth comes nowhere else but in the whole that a system gives."⁸³

G. D. Kaufman has written an article entitled "Can a Man Serve Two Masters?" in which he locates the theological difficulties that arise in Tillich's attempt to include philosophy and theology in the theological enterprise. If reason participates in "the Fall," then it cannot be relied upon in any way to aid man in coping with his predicament.

In The Courage to Be Tillich describes the nature of man in terms of the idea of "ontological anxiety" and then shows that this anxiety is overcome through "ontological courage" which is rooted in the nature of "being-itself." Now the significant thing about this analysis is that the whole of it proceeds with scarcely any reference to the historical Christian revelation as the source of the answer.⁸⁴

Kerygmatic theology begins with revelation--the particularity of Christian revelation. Any other starting point is suspect.

Not only must one start with Christ but one must start with a certain interpretation of Christ in order to be considered orthodox.

In other words, there can be a post-Chalcedonian Christology employing twentieth-century categories; but there cannot be a non-Chalcedonian Christology fashioned to conform to the categories of an ontology recognizing eternal God-manhood but not Jesus the God-man. There can be a restatement of traditional doctrine; but there cannot be a sudden discovery of the "real" meaning of doctrine.⁸⁵

Hamilton objects to Tillich's assumption that discovering one's self is the same as discovering God, and vice versa. He attributes this weakness to the fact that Tillich's system denies the existence of God.

T. E. McCollough is supportive of Hamilton's criticism by noting in an article on Tillich: "As the philosopher Walter Kaufman says, the atheist can agree with Tillich in his denial of the 'existence' of God and the affirmation of 'being-itself'--only why name it God?"⁸⁶

Many persons attack Tillich from the Barthian kerygmatic posture. It is feared that where the kerygma does not control ontology there is danger of it becoming pagan. If it is to remain Christian, apologetic theology must be the servant of kerygmatic theology. David Hopper believes that Tillich places Christology in a secondary position. "However broad Tillich's starting point in ontology, the place he finally allows for Christ is really too narrow, too restrictive . . . Christology itself is reduced to the statement that 'essential manhood has appeared under the conditions of existence.' In effect Tillich brings the whole of Christology down to a single theory of the atonement, the moral exemplar theory."⁸⁷ Tillich appears to be more concerned about presenting an intellectual construct that attempts to resolve ontological problems than he is about bearing witness to the message of what God has done for man through Christ. It is not what man does (e.g., affirming himself through courage) but what has been done for man through the Cross that is at the heart of Christianity. Man's separation and sin have been overcome, from the side of God. Man receives God's grace which enables him to act with courage. It is

the message that makes this possible, not something within man that assists him in living "in spite of" the circumstances of life. "The effort to baptize courage with grace leads on to a major dilution of the Gospel . . . the church would do well to remind itself that 'courage' as a concept, a way of life, does not appear in the New Testament."⁸⁸ This was a Greek concept rather than a Judeo-Christian one, according to David Hopper.⁸⁹

Other thinkers, from differing theological viewpoints, have criticized Tillich's Christology. William Hamilton suggests that Tillich's ". . . unwillingness to relate Jesus to the doctrine of forgiveness of sins may be taken as unfortunate, leading to some real inadequacies in their formulations."⁹⁰ Man needs not only "acceptance" but a word of judgment to "go, and sin no more." In Tillich's understanding, Jesus is abstract, a possibility of existence rather than the Lord of life. Robert C. Johnson agrees with William Hamilton's concern over Jesus' abstractness in Tillich. There was ". . . an orientation of Tillich's thought that has permitted him, increasingly in his later writings, to employ such concepts as faith, hope, love, revelation, conversion, and salvation without reference to the act of God in history in Jesus Christ."⁹¹

George S. Hendry states in his review of Tillich's second volume of Systematic Theology: "However Christian he may be in intent (as all heretics have been), he cannot prevent his readers from shying at what looks suspiciously like an attempt to put Hindu wine into Christian bottles."⁹² Later he observes: "The reading of this volume strengthens the impression that this conception forms a bed of Procrustes which the Christian message has to be trimmed to fit."⁹³

A much more polemical and unlearned critique is given by Leonard Wheat: "Tillich's theology, as theology, is a sham from beginning to

end, and nobody knew it better than Tillich."⁹⁴ He accuses Tillich of cleverness and of deception--a masquerade designed to undermine Christian theology. "For Tillich, salvation is becoming a humanist."⁹⁵ Wheat thinks that Tillich's work was satirical in intent--that he was an imposter: "Tillich's chief claim to fame will be that he fooled a lot of people."⁹⁶

Certainly the imbalanced attack by Wheat upon Tillich cannot be taken seriously. A more balanced view is maintained by Edward A. Dowey, Jr. who thinks that Tillich is in danger of "being swamped in generalities" and that Barth risks "babbling in tongues." "Tillich's formalized criteria run the risk of being made to contain almost anything, but Barth's wholly material, concrete event of Jesus Christ risks being so particularistically understood as to be discontinuous with life and culture and thus irrelevant."⁹⁷ For Dowey, in the final analysis, "The only criterion of Christian theology, finally, is Barth's: Jesus the Christ, as event and un' translated.' But a task of translation remains and to this Tillich is a great contributor so long as there remains a self-conscious and critical kerymatic theology to keep the language of any one translation from becoming canonical."⁹⁸

Perhaps the best defense against an overly critical attack from Barthian theology is Tillich's own word on the subject. He wrote an article entitled "What is Wrong with Dialectic Theology?" in which he declared, "A dialectic theology is one in which 'yes' and 'no' belong inseparably together. In the so-called 'dialectic' theology they are irreconcilably separated, and that is why this theology is not dialectic. Rather, it is paradoxical, and therein lies its strength; and it is supernatural, which constitutes its weakness."⁹⁹ He raises important issues after singling out Barth's fundamental affirmations. For example,

"Between God and man there is a hollow space which man is unable of himself to penetrate. . . . But if the act of faith is purely a work of God, then man can be allowed no antecedent possibility of knowing God."¹⁰⁰ While it may be true that God reveals himself to man, still there is something within man that recognizes and responds to the God who is revealing himself. Therefore, man does play an important part in the Divine/human encounter. "But when he deprives the human of any relation to the divine, as he does in his teaching about the God-likeness of man, about Christ, about God's word, and about the Bible, Barth's peculiar formulations are objectionable or wrong."¹⁰¹ Tillich summarizes the significance of Barth in the following quotations:

He believes in a godless objectivity of human action ravaged by sin and without any relation whatever either to the divine or to the demonic. This seems to me to be one of the weakest points in Barthian teaching; and on this ground his refusal to recognize a theological ethics is also based. Now belief in an objective existence, indifferent with respect to both divine and human dominion, is an illusion. We never live merely in the first and second dimensions of our existence (in dead matter and in the form we give to it), but we also live constantly in the third dimension (on the divine mountain-top and in the demonic abyss). . . . By his mighty proclamation of the Christian paradox Barth has saved theology from forgetting the deity of God and has saved the church from lapsing into secularism and paganism. . . . But there is this defect: although he has been called a dialectic theologian, he does not think dialectically, but supernaturally.¹⁰²

The fourth major criticism of Paul Tillich centers upon his alleged pantheism. Sidney Hook says, "For all his talk of God as an 'unconditioned transcendent,' Tillich's God is the all-in-all of pantheistic spiritualism. . . . Substitute nature, the universe, the totality of things, or any similar expression for God as being-itself and denial of its existence gives the same result."¹⁰³ Because Tillich denies the existence of God, the charge of atheism is frequently leveled at him. "The pantheistic nature of Tillich's view of God thus comes fully to the fore--pantheistic, that is, in its denial of a true

relationship between God and creation, where individuals are real because God made them and not simply because they participate essentially in being."¹⁰⁴ Separation from God is understood to be separation from our deeper selves. Transcendence becomes not a theological category but a human experience of self-transcendence. When God is seen as the Ground of Being, the elements of unity and totality enter the picture and invite the possibility of criticism. It then becomes easy to identify God with the reality of the universe.

N. H. G. Robinson does not call Tillich a pantheist, but he does call attention to pantheistic elements in Tillich:

. . . characteristics of Tillich's thought render ambiguous and problematical his references to person-to-person encounters, whether between humans or between man and God. They do so because unmistakably they point towards an ultimate pantheistic monism and mysticism in which is fulfilled "the drive toward reunion with essential being in everything . . . with things and persons in their essential goodness and with the good itself," and for which inevitably "the moral stage is a station on the way." The centrality of the concept of love in Tillich's thought should not be allowed to deceive us. It was an important idea too of Benedict Spinoza.¹⁰⁵

And Tillich would admit to a certain strain of pantheism. "I myself have spoken of a 'pantheistic element' in every adequate doctrine of God. This, of course, has been said against the half-deistic theism of much Protestant theology."¹⁰⁶ Because of Tillich's definition of God and his reliance upon the laws of immanent reason, the problem of pantheism arises within his system. Tillich's attachment to nature and comments that he has made in conversation could give one the impression that if he is not a pantheist he has at least a tendency toward pantheism. Tillich recognized the embodiment of Ultimate Concern in finite realities. For instance,

Jesus was a finite reality. Buddha was a finite reality. But through them ultimacy shone. Which can even happen through a mother! . . . And it can happen through a child, or a flower, or a mountain.

It has happened to me innumerable times through the ocean. It is not the ocean in its empirical reality, but its transparency to the infinite, that makes it great.¹⁰⁷

When one hurriedly calls attention to the implications of these statements, Tillich replies: "God is in every moving atom, in it as its creative ground. He is not identical with it; that would be pantheism. But he is its creative ground. And he is in it, not substantially only but also spiritually, and therefore knowingly. That is what divine knowledge means."¹⁰⁸ Tillich's conception of being is not static (i.e., it is the Power of Being). A tension is maintained between the pantheistic elements and the self-transcending and ecstatic elements present in his theological system, so that he does not succumb to this criticism in toto.

The fifth major criticism of Tillich centers upon the philosophical problems raised by his philosophical theology. Some of these issues have been discussed in criticisms mentioned earlier. Attention is now called to specific flaws in his system as seen by other philosophers and theologians. William L. Rowe's book, Religious Symbols and God: A Philosophical Study of Tillich's Theology, is an excellent critique of Tillich's thought from a philosophical point of view. Rowe finds Tillich's language disturbing. For example, Tillich claims that God does not exist, but he claims this in such a way as to imply that God does exist. This leads one to believe that there is a fundamental incoherence in Tillich's theology. "It may be that the question 'Why is there not nothing?' is inappropriate in the sense that no answer is possible. But one who asks that question cannot be accused of attributing being even to nothing."¹⁰⁹

According to Rowe, the distinction that Tillich makes between symbols and signs seems to be uninformative. Tillich may be correct in

saying that symbols are similar to the reality that they symbolize, but ". . . this fact about symbols does not seem to be regarded by Tillich as an explication of the participation of symbols in what they symbolize but as a consequence of that participation."¹¹⁰ The issue here is between the means by which one participates in reality and the consequences of participating in reality. Therefore, the distinction between signs and symbols becomes blurred.

Another issue for Rowe is Tillich's statement that everyone has an Ultimate Concern, that everyone is grasped by the Holy. "For to claim that everyone has an ultimate concern is to imply that everyone has an awareness of the holy."¹¹¹ The fact that all people are not aware of the Holy is puzzling to Rowe. Having an Ultimate Concern of which one is not aware is like having a sharp pain and yet being unaware of it. And Tillich's use of the concrete and the abstract creates problems for Rowe. If a humanist is committed to an abstract ideal, to which Tillich refers as the foci of Ultimate Concern, then ". . . if something quite abstract (the natural opposite of 'concrete') can be the concrete content of ultimate concern, the word 'concrete' has been taken from its natural environment and given a technical meaning within Tillich's system."¹¹²

Tillich uses the phenomenological method in his theology (in fact, he is criticized by Edward D. O'Connor for being too much at home on the phenomenological level of the history of philosophy).¹¹³ Yet Rowe concludes that the phenomenological approach of Tillich does not establish the objective existence of the Holy. "We may, I am suggesting, experience something as 'out there,' as existing independently of us, as 'grasping us.' In thus describing what we have experienced we are not implying that it does exist independently of us, only that we experience it as independent of us, as something 'out there.'"¹¹⁴

Tillich does not distinguish between what is phenomenologically ultimate and what is ontologically ultimate. A description of religious experience can establish the Holy as being phenomenologically objective, but it cannot establish that the Holy is the ontological ultimate.¹¹⁵

Furthermore,

It is impossible on Tillich's theory to ever explain or interpret any religious statement about God. For, since "God" stands for being-itself, the symbolic statement about God would be correctly interpreted only by some ontological statement about being-itself. But, since "being-itself" is ineffable, every ontological statement about being-itself is necessarily symbolic.¹¹⁶

This is inconsistent with the semantic principle (i.e., a symbolic statement is meaningful only if its cognitive content can be expressed by a literal statement). Tillich's symbolic language becomes autonomous.

Another problem for Rowe focuses upon Tillich's reference ". . . 'to exist as a man' and 'to be estranged from one's essential nature' are either equivalent or the second is presupposed by the first."¹¹⁷

The question of man's responsibility is at stake. If estrangement is a necessity of existence and also the result of the misuse of freedom, how then can man be held responsible? Tillich's answer to this question was discussed in the last chapter (see supra, pp. 231-233 and pp. 240-241).

In Religious Experience and Truth, a book edited by Sidney Hook, several philosophical premises of Tillich's are challenged. Appearing in this book, Brand Blanshard's essay entitled "Symbolism" takes issue with the distinction Tillich makes between symbol and sign--it is not of philosophical importance but is a matter of degree psychologically. And Tillich's insistence upon God being "the unconditioned transcendent" presents a dilemma because any attempt by reason to understand God's nature must end in complete frustration. "An absolute that goes beyond reason in the sense of being wholly alien to it is a notion without meaning."¹¹⁸

In an article by Paul Weiss, "Thank God, God's Not Impossible," the problem of Tillich referring at times to God and Christ as though they were symbols of a higher reality (the God above God) makes one wonder whether Tillich is inside or outside the Christian religion. "But what he does not make clear is his appreciation of the truth that not all symbols are on a footing, and that even apart from all revelation it is possible to recognize some to be better than others."¹¹⁹

Paul F. Schmidt takes issue with Tillich's criterion for recognizing one's Ultimate Concern. Schmidt (like Rowe) cannot accept a person's having an Ultimate Concern without being aware of it. "The criterion for an ultimate concern is now so stretched that whatever he claims, positive or negative, passive or active, is said to be his ultimate concern."¹²⁰

Tillich's ontology is a source of much criticism, for ". . . ontology cannot explain how being, in its finitude, sustains itself. The quest for an unconditioned being fails."¹²¹ Guyton B. Hammond raises such interesting questions as: ". . . is God's life in Tillich's view complete in itself or completed only through the life of the creature?"¹²² Also, "Does Tillich break with reductionist naturalism only to reinstate a 'self-transcending' naturalism?"¹²³ Others criticize his naturalism (e.g., Edward D. O'Connor), but Tillich defends himself by saying, "My thinking is not naturalistic. Naturalism and supernaturalism provoke each other and should be removed together. Protestant theologians have criticized me on the grounds that 'God above God' is mystical."¹²⁴

A concern has been voiced over the depersonalization of reality when one starts with an ontological premise. "Tillich's real God always tends to emerge mysteriously near the end of his analysis, so that God

often seems to have been the end product of the consideration rather than its guiding force."¹²⁵ According to Tillich, however, God is the ground of the personal. But it is argued that God could not be a personal center without being a being. This would mean that God was a Self. The adequacy of Tillich's concept to express the ontological foundation for selfhood may be debated. Certainly the Power of Being possesses the power to create personhood, but ". . . Tillich's ontology does not preserve the ultimacy of a personal divine-human encounter."¹²⁶ What does it mean to love Being-itself? Peter Bertocci raises the question: "Unless God's being and my being are to some extent and in some way ontologically distinct--at least so that the center of my being and the center of God's being exclude each other ontologically (without denying interaction)--can there be real individuality for me, and individual freedom in any degree?"¹²⁷ Tillich responded by saying, "One cannot speak of a relation of the divine to the human center as if they were in the same ontological dimension. If we speak of a divine center at all--symbolically--we must say that the periphery of which one's center is the center is infinite and includes everything that is (therefore the symbols 'omnipresence' and omniscience')."¹²⁸

Another accusation which is hurled at Tillich is that of Gnosticism.

When the Gospel is made into something which cannot be understood by unlettered men through the reading of the Holy Scriptures and by faith, and becomes only accessible to men developed in the science of myth, demythologization, and interpretation . . . [so that] only those who know the language of Gnosticism and the philosophy of religion can decipher it, then we have a distinct trait of Gnosticism.¹²⁹

Indeed, W. F. Albright has called Tillich a modern Gnostic. This is because of the transhistorical symbolism of Tillich. This has lead J. Heywood Thomas to say that ". . . Tillich's profundity turns out to be merely verbal."¹³⁰ Thomas agrees with Father O'Connor's statement

about Tillich: "He is not so much a 'philosopher' . . . as a lover of philosophies, or better, a man with a taste for philosophies, like an aesthete's taste for works of art."¹³¹

Thomas also criticizes by describing some of Tillich's statements as tautology, e.g., "Jesus is the Christ because he is the bearer of the New Being."¹³² And at other places in his system Tillich misinterprets the expression ex nihilo by giving it a descriptive function which it does not have and hypostatizing the nihil.¹³³ Thomas finds Tillich's use of psychological categories problematical, but " . . . the central difficulty in Tillich's doctrine of man is the ambiguous status of finite freedom. From one point of view it is man's end, the telos of creation, but from another point of view this is man's shame."¹³⁴ This is the same criticism leveled by other theologians, such as Reinhold Niebuhr, over the issue of Tillich's understanding of sin and human responsibility.

Perhaps Tillich could have eliminated some of his critic's misinterpretation of his thought if he had taken British empiricism more seriously. It might have helped him to overcome some of the charges that were made against his use of language. "Consider these three statements: (1) every concrete thing is less than the ultimate; (2) we can be ultimately concerned only about something concrete; (3) we are ultimately concerned about the ultimate. We cannot assert all three statements without contradiction."¹³⁵ H. Richard Niebuhr questions Tillich's terms "Ground of Being" and "Ultimate Concern." "The problem of ultimate concern to many men does not seem stateable simply in terms of being but only of being and value; they know of the ground of being, but what they do not know is the goodness of that ground."¹³⁶

The last philosophical criticism to be mentioned comes from Raphael Demos, who regards Tillich as a profound but abstract theologian. He

considers Tillich's Christianity to be closer to the Hegelian school of philosophy than it is to any other.¹³⁷ And he is baffled by Tillich's devoting only two pages in the first volume of Systematic Theology to the problem of evil. Demos considers this a weakness. Also, the notion of Being-itself is inadequate for the Christian idea of God because

I don't think it proper to refer to being by a name ("being-itself") in the fashion in which one refers to a particular. . . . for being is not a "that" any more than it is a "what." . . . [Tillich] treats existence as an "it" or as a "something" to be pointed at, an entity or substance. . . . Value by itself is impotent; being by itself is morally indifferent.¹³⁸

This, for Demos, is a misuse of language. But in the final analysis (in another article) Demos commented: "Perhaps the trouble with Professor Tillich is that he has all the answers; I miss that anguish of doubt which, he tells us, is part of faith."¹³⁹ For some critics Tillich knew too much, others thought that he did not know enough to avoid contradictions and confusions, some thought that his thinking was fresh and original, yet others thought that his thinking was eclectic. Tillich's system provoked a diversity of philosophical criticism.

The sixth and last major criticism of Tillich's work is aimed at his being outdated. This is a reaction to the uncritical acceptance of the relevance of his thought. "Harvey Cox, arguing that religion and metaphysics 'are disappearing forever,' pronounces Tillich passé for his attempt to foist on modern man 'religious' questions that this man does not really ask."¹⁴⁰

Even though Tillich has been called "the modern father of radical theology,"¹⁴¹ it is from the radical theologian that this criticism of being outdated comes. "Altizer feels that Tillich's subjectivity-faith equation has been rendered obsolete by the contemporary Christian experience, and that in consequence Tillich's dialectic fails to be a theology and is actually only a metaphysic of the sort made obsolete by Nietzsche."¹⁴²

Paul Van Buren has an appreciation for Tillich as a philosopher who has been a penetrating observer of life. However, "Something in the obscure, logically chaotic, German-accented, assured words of this fatherly figure may speak to a nostalgia for a world where everything fitted in, for a monistic whole which has been lost in nuclear uncertainty in our pluralistic age."¹⁴³ The damning emphasis here is upon a nostalgia for a bygone day. According to Van Buren, modern man is not the kind of man that Tillich portrays. "Perhaps he would not find so many questions if he weren't so burdened with a way of thought loaded with so many answers."¹⁴⁴

Other persons attack fundamental elements in Tillich's thought. The concept of finitude, for example, is basic to Tillich. "It is questionable whether there is any such thing as a normal fear of death; actually the idea of one's own death is subjectively inconceivable."¹⁴⁵ And added to this, Earl A. Loomis states: "I should like to propose that what Tillich called existential anxiety is the normal anxiety of everyday life, the usual signal anxiety, the normal inquietude of human beings in the face of their innate sensitivity to vulnerability."¹⁴⁶

Whenever Tillich's accuracy in describing modern man as being anxious over the contemplation of his own death was challenged, the late Professor Joseph Haroutunian would come to his defense by saying: "He could not conceive human life without anxiety. And when men claimed to be free from it, he saw them in bondage to the demonic and sick to the death at the core of their being."¹⁴⁷ Haroutunian would point out that human beings are saddened when their loved ones die, and the loss of love relationships poses the question of personal extinction that for many causes considerable anxiety. "A society in which men live without anxiety, caring not whether they are alive or dead, is one in which they care

not whether their neighbors are alive or dead, which may be a sign of death itself."¹⁴⁸ The awareness of finitude is at the heart of an authentically human existence.

More serious evidence of Tillich's being out-of-date is given by James Sellers.

Despite the contemporaneity of his theology, in his appraisal of the human situation Tillich now and then almost seems to recur to the cultural anthropology of the sixteenth century. . . . We may seriously doubt whether the life-is-meaningless formula, with its implied appeal to healing meaning from beyond, really gets at the essential predicament. . . . Man's problem is not that he is naturally strengthless and finds no meaning in life, but on the contrary that he is too strong, too able, finds too much meaning on interesting side journeys.¹⁴⁹

Walter Kaufmann argues similarly in the conclusion of his analysis of contemporary students:

Not only frivolous people lack any ultimate concern and are in an important sense uncommitted but the same is true of millions of very serious college students who wonder what they should do with themselves after graduation. There is nothing to which they greatly desire to give themselves, nothing that matters deeply to them.¹⁵⁰

Michael Novak argues from the same point of view.

The truly serious threat to Tillich's future relevance comes from the widespread indifference among the active and the intelligent to ultimate questions. Tillich himself seemed to sense this threat in his definition of indifference as the only true atheism. A growing band of young religious thinkers believes that Tillich relied too much upon the inwardness, the romantic wonderment, the pervading religious experience of finitude, so natural to German romanticism but so foreign to American urban pragmatism.¹⁵¹

Novak includes Rabbi Richard L. Rubenstein's reference to Tillich: "He had spoken for and to his time, but we have moved beyond that time."¹⁵² And in Kai Nielsen's sardonic article "Is God So Powerful that He Doesn't Even Have to Exist?" is stated the following: "Tillich doesn't put new wine into old bottles, he puts in grape soda and then labels it Chateau Latour."¹⁵³

Sufficient references have been presented to show that Tillich was not accepted uncritically. Many critics have given their reasons as

to why he is now considered to be out-of-date. However, an outspoken critic, Nels Ferré, could also say: "Tillich as a towering theological figure is now more relevant than ever. To call him passé is to classify oneself as theologically superficial, as a journalist rather than a scholar."¹⁵⁴

Attention has been called to six major critiques of Paul Tillich. He has been accused of obscurity, of being unbiblical, of being unchristian from the viewpoint of kerygmatic theology, of being a pantheist, of being an inadequate philosopher, and finally, of being irrelevant. These are all serious charges, but they must be balanced with the many words of appreciation that were expressed on behalf of Tillich, as referred to in the first section of this chapter.

Evaluation of Paul Tillich's Concept of "the Human"

Having presented a critique of Paul Tillich's thought in which an attempt was made to reveal an understanding of Tillich's significance as a contemporary theologian, the author will now represent his personal evaluation with the following views. The shortcomings of Tillich's thought have been recognized, and it has been conceded that there is an element of heresy in some of his affirmations; nevertheless, there is much in his thought that is commendable.

First of all, his world view is that of modern man. He takes seriously the realities of the twentieth century. The world continues to become a smaller place in which to live; and other faith commitments, including secular faith commitments, must be encountered. Tillich's attitude of openness and dialogue rather than confrontation and conversion is appealing. This may mean accommodation in order to maintain an inclusive stance, but so be it. There is too much at stake (survival, in fact). Tillich addresses himself to universal issues. He is caught

"on the boundary" between Christian faith and philosophy--but perhaps that is where one ought to be. Truth is universal and Tillich tries to interpret Christian truth in a way that reveals consciousness of the scientific and cultural achievements as well as the political and economic disasters of this century.

Tillich may have idealistic tendencies, but he counterbalances these with a realistic awareness of the demonic and the need for a "Protestant principle." His starting point (man) is in harmony with that of the author. The criteria for evaluating Tillich rests upon the interrelationship of three elements: self-authenticating human experience; a reference point that serves as a norm consistent with life experiences; and the corporate experience of the community of faith which validates by demonstration its faith commitments. Tillich's system, with all of its weaknesses, comes the closest to meeting the criteria just mentioned.

In every person's experience there occurs a time in which questions are raised as to the meaning of life. While not everyone will answer these questions in the same way, man is that creature who asks questions. And whatever answers may be found come from within man on the depth level. This means that the need to be within the theological circle is essential for finding ultimate answers. Indeed, revelation is necessary, but it finds a response that does not come from foreign territory. There is within man a spirit that can know the Spiritual Presence and respond actively, not merely passively to the Divine/human encounter, i.e., man does not only receive grace, but he takes the initiative as well in seeking grace (by the raising of questions and searching for answers to his existential situation). Tillich would say that this is evidence of God's activity, too. But man has a personal

center, and it is not only God who can initiate the relationship; or, prayer would be merely a response. The relationship between God and man is a dynamic one.

Being-itself may be inadequate for a meaningful definition of God, but other alternatives have limitations, too. If one is to avoid the problems of the supernatural world view of the first century, then other words are necessary in order to communicate the experience of self-transcendence present in authentic religious experience. The author finds Henry Nelson Wieman's definition for God as "Creative Interchange"¹⁵⁵ to be suggestive of the direction that one could go. God is experienced through persons--an encounter in which creativity and concern for fulfillment results in reconciliation. The assumption here is that the human condition is in a state that needs reconciliation (therefore, grace), but that the human condition is not totally corrupt and incapable of significant interchange. It is grace that makes it creative because forgiveness and acceptance are part of the interchange, opening the way for it to be so. Man is not experiencing only Man with a capital M. It is not his ideal or best self. It is an experience of transcendence that is beyond (or within) oneself that is ecstatic and paradoxical in nature. But it is not nonsensical or absurd in content.

The author agrees with Tillich that it is Jesus as the Christ who is the norm and the means by which the Ultimately Ultimate is experienced and the invitation to participate in the New Being is extended. He is the historical event that is the clue and the reality that men have known since the first century.

When man is honest with himself there is an awareness of inadequacy, of being less than he ought to be, of failing to realize his potential, of being "full of himself," i.e., self-centered, and there is a need

to become free from the inhibiting and binding elements of human existence. Freedom and liberation come from participation in the New Being. When he participates, man becomes a new creature. His awareness and sensitivities are expanded, and he is freed to be more responsible for himself and his neighbor. When he is acting responsibly, i.e., caring in concrete ways, God is present: New Being is made available to others. It is in God's working through persons and events that he is made known and man is made more fully human.

The trinitarian concept indicating God's activity as that of creating, redeeming, and sustaining becomes descriptive of the kind of activity that a Christian is called to perform. He is to bring order out of chaos; he is to be a life-changing influence by way of participation in the New Being; and he is to be a supportive and an enabling presence wherever human life seeks to become more human.

Since all of life has been engaged in the creative process, death is faced with hope because man returns to the creative ground from which he came. The nature of Eternal Life cannot be discussed, since it lies outside of human imagination. Personal experience in this life has had qualitative moments (kairoi), and participation in them hints at what may be in store for man following physical death. Whether or not there is a Day of Resurrection, the author cannot say. He can only say that he has had experiences that have caused him to participate in a graceful love that suggests no limits or boundaries. More than this cannot be known. The symbol of the Cross is the central symbol that indicates that redemptive love cannot be destroyed. It always rises from the dead. Wherever two or three persons experience unconditional love there is community, there is hope, there is God, there is creative interchange in which grace abounds. Certainly these views are not orthodox, but neither

do they go so far as to suggest the possibility of having Christian faith without belief in God (as advocated by Alistair Kee).¹⁵⁶

Tillich's thought is important because he does make the Gospel intelligible to modern man. He may be accused of diluting the Christian message, but he tries to enable modern man to love God with his mind as well as with his heart. His theology may be speculative, but it is also existential. On the one hand, contemporary man may be more concerned about surviving as a species on this earth than about having a meaningful existence; yet, on the other hand, there is in evidence a profound interest in Eastern religions, the occult, and a resurgence of Neo-Pentecostalism and the charismatic ministries. In the modern world, apparently, man is both more secular and more religious. Tillich has something to say to that man.

Although indebted to Tillich for his seminal philosophical theology, the author raises several questions about Tillich's concept of "the human."

First, must one be consciously religious, i.e., can a person be an honest agnostic, or humanist, without Tillich calling him religious by saying he has an Ultimate Concern? Tillich's categories are so broad and inclusive that he does not give a person room to be without an Unconditional or "Really Real" content of faith. It is the author's observation that many people find life meaningful without a conscious reference to the Ultimate (e.g., the many persons who consider family, occupation, and human causes to be sufficient reasons for being).

Second, does defining God as "Being-itself" really tell anything about God? Tillich thinks that to say anything more is to say too much, i.e., more than can be honestly articulated. But does Being-itself say enough? Is the "God above God" another example of a contentless faith?

Also, his doctrine of God does not seem to need a doctrine of Christ, in that his ideas of providence and of the "courage to be" seem to be sufficient in and of themselves. One wonders whether man on his own can live courageously "in spite of" the human predicament. Is faith in Jesus as the Christ necessary in order that man may experience "the acceptance of being accepted"? Tillich is not clear at all times about the real role in his theology that Christ plays. It at least appears that his Christology is brought into his system by the back door, so to speak, regardless of his claim to the contrary.

Tillich's concept of reconciliation raises the question: How essential for reconciliation is the New Being? If salvation is possible for those in the latent church, the result is a universalism that may be reasonable and inclusive of other religions but it is at the expense of the uniqueness and particularity of traditional Christianity. This interpretation may make sense, but it does emasculate the Christian claim to a considerable degree. Perhaps Tillich the theologian concedes too much to Tillich the philosopher. Nevertheless, Tillich is working in the right direction.

Third, his discussion of essential man raises the question of whether the responsibility for sinning in "the Fall" and the necessity to actualize oneself by way of "the Fall" have been adequately explained (this has been discussed previously). Tillich makes an admirable attempt but still leaves something to be desired.

Fourth, Tillich's concept of estrangement makes much of man's experience of finitude. Does Tillich make too much of the unnaturalness of death? It is questionable whether he is correct in this. For many persons, humanism and "this worldly" answers appear to be sufficient. Death does not seem to be a haunting problem that drives man to despair,

but meaninglessness does continue to be a problem. Perhaps emptiness and purposelessness are but symptoms of the deeper malady of finitude.

In this chapter the significance of Paul Tillich's thinking has been presented. His strengths and weaknesses have been examined. The author has added his personal evaluation of Tillich which reflects his appreciation for, and his difficulty with, Tillich's understanding of man. In the final chapter the concept of "the human" in the work of Hermann Hesse and Paul Tillich will be compared.

CHAPTER VII

A COMPARISON OF HERMANN HESSE AND PAUL TILlich

Having examined the life and work of Hermann Hesse and Paul Tillich in regard to the concept of "the human," a comparison of them will now be made. There are definite parallels in their life and thought as well as definite areas of departure. In this chapter three particular aspects will be presented in comparing the two men: first, the similarities between them; second, the contrasting differences between them; and finally, the implications of their thinking.

Similar Elements in Hesse and Tillich

There was much that Hermann Hesse and Paul Tillich had in common. To begin with, there were some striking biographical similarities. Both men were born in Germany. Their parents were Pietistic Christians who were vocationally in the Christian ministry. Tillich later commented: ". . . Pietists were right in stressing that theology involves existential commitment, but wrong in making that commitment a matter of absolute certainty."¹ Besides being children of clergymen, they were also close enough in age (Hesse was nine years older than Tillich but died only three years before him) to share the same historic period.

Tillich's youth was more stable and less turbulent than Hesse's, but because of the dominance of their parents both young boys coped with them as best they could: Tillich, by turning to philosophy, and Hesse, by willful self-assertion. Adolescence was much more traumatic for Hesse than for Tillich, but the loss of Tillich's mother when Paul was still a teenager produced psychological and spiritual problems of growth.

What was significant during these early years was the fact that both persons had a sense of destiny and a belief that they were to be the kind of persons that they actually became in later life: Hesse knew that he was to be a poet (his future was to be a literary one), and Tillich knew that he was to be a teacher of philosophy and theology. In 1925 while reflecting upon his writing career, Hesse commented: "I saw my task, or rather my way of salvation, no longer in the realm of lyric poetry or philosophy or any one of the occupations of specialists but rather simply in letting what little there was in me that was vital and strong live its life, simply in unqualified loyalty now to what I felt to be still alive within myself. That was Life, that was God."²

As young men away from home and on their own for the first time, they were attracted to the bohemian life that was present in academic communities: Hesse at Tübingen and Basel, and Tillich at Berlin, Halle, and Tübingen. They identified with bohemians who ". . . followed international artistic and literary movements; they were skeptical, religiously radical, and romantic; they were antimilitaristic and influenced by Nietzsche, expressionism, and psychoanalysis."³ The two young men delighted in the independence and personal freedom that they experienced.

The first marriages of both Hesse and Tillich were to older women, and these marriages ended in divorce shortly after the First World War. Although Hesse was a pacifist during the war and Tillich was a front line chaplain, they both saw the serious implication that the war had upon European culture, and each in his own way tried to help with the reconstruction of that culture. It was only with the passing of time that Hesse saw that he could not alter anything in Germany (so

he became a Swiss citizen), and Tillich's religious socialism was ineffective against the rise of national socialism and the Nazi movement.

Hesse and Tillich opposed the anti-Semitism in the Germany of the 1920s and the 1930s, and they were victims of nazism. While Tillich's attack upon nazism was explicit (see supra, pp. 181-182), Hesse's response was implicit (see supra, p. 19 and p. 22). Both men were critics of culture and saw the danger of emotionalism connected with ignorance. They criticized members of the intelligentsia who refused to see the inhumanity present in the Germany of that period: " . . . if the philosophers remain in their closed spheres of mere logical inquiry of logic, and do not go into relevant problems of life, then they abandon the reality of our existence to movements which unite emotionalism and ignorance."⁴ Hesse and Tillich were humanists in the best sense of the word. They viewed life from a universal point of view rather than from a nationalistic one. Each man spoke out against the demonic in the twentieth century. They saw the distortions of truth in a controlled press and feared the final destruction toward which nazism would lead. Whereas Tillich saw the dehumanization and injustice of society rooted in man himself, Hesse saw it as a product of certain men and not as a result of the sinfulness of all men. They were part of a minority of influential persons who recognized the sinister characteristics of the period and who addressed themselves to it (ineffective though they were to combat it). There were many who refused to even recognize it, let alone try to do anything about it.

On the personal level, their life styles were similar. They were "night" people who were committed to their work, and they were prolific in their creative efforts. However, it was at the expense of their family life. Rollo May remarked, "Ralph Waldo Emerson wrote to the

effect that he turned a deaf ear to friends, family members, and every other demand 'when my genius calls me.' Though this appears as ruthlessness, and often is, it is present in greater or lesser degree in every creative individual I have known."⁵ Whether this justified the lack of emotional investment in their families would not be possible to say. Each man treated his family as secondary to his work. Regarding Paul Tillich, his wife asserted: "His children had to bear the brunt of knowing that he had sensitivity and eros in abundance for hundreds of other persons in the world but not much for them."⁶ One could see the reason for considerable resentment in this area. And it was known that Hesse's children were passed around between relatives and friends who assisted in providing a home for them while Hesse devoted himself completely to his work.

Both men appreciated the Apollonian and Dionysian sides of life. The life of the mind attracted them (their work witnessed to this fact), but they were not limited to an appreciation of only the mental side of life. They each enjoyed the sensuous in life and had a this-world emphasis. At age fifteen Hesse wrote to his parents: ". . . that though they foresaw a better life after the one on earth, he thought differently, and therefore would either do away with this life or enjoy it."⁷ Many of his literary characters have a reckless abandonment to the physical side of life. Hesse lived in Goldmund as well as in Narziss. And Tillich had a similar aspect to his nature: "While he greatly appreciated the 'madonna' side of women, he also from time to time saw them as prostitutes."⁸

Both individuals were free spirits and looked upon orthodoxy as intellectual pharisaism. Their personal ethics were similar in that Hesse lived with Ninon Dolbin five years before marrying her, and Paul

and Hannah Tillich lived together prior to marriage. Both Hesse and Tillich enjoyed good music and art and associated with artistic people. Their closest friends were free thinkers who represented diverse life styles and commitments.

Hesse and Tillich were each recognized and honored for their achievements, and their mature years were similar in that they were expatriates with an international following. They lived long lives and left sizable intellectual legacies. Their work reflected their lives to a considerable extent. Indeed, the methodology of each mirrored his personality.

The biographical circumstances were not the only parallel factors affecting Hesse and Tillich. They shared an intellectual background containing many similar influences. This might be expected even though Hesse was a novelist and Tillich was a philosophical theologian. For example, there were idealistic elements present in each man's work. German idealism as a philosophy left its mark upon Tillich directly and upon Hesse indirectly. Essentialist categories were evident in each of them. Tillich's entire system of thought was heavily dependent upon these categories, and Hesse (like Jung) thought that there were essential structures in the human soul and that it was possible to search for personhood and true humanness and attain it to a certain degree.

Romanticism was another common element in their development. Their aesthetic appreciation and nature mysticism illustrated romantic characteristics with pantheistic overtones. They saw the value of an "aesthetic-meditative" attitude toward nature (water, in particular) and history. Their ancestry made them value the mystic tradition with the ecstatic dimension of human experience. Hesse was influenced by Novalis who had been influenced by Schelling who in turn influenced

Tillich. It should be noted that Schelling " . . . belonged to the old tradition of Württemberg piety which extended back over the theosophist Oetinger to the great biblicist Bengel."⁹ And Württemberg piety produced Hesse's spiritual ancestry.

Hesse and Tillich were conscious of the polarities of existence, the ambiguous nature of reality, and they sought to overcome these polarities: Hesse, by obtaining harmony and balance in life by way of aestheticism and Magical Thinking; Tillich, by participating in the unambiguous life through the New Being. Hesse used the symbol of the hermaphrodite and Tillich used the symbol of Eternal Life to describe the oneness of mystical union.

Symbols such as divine androgyny, orgy (in which all opposites such as right and wrong, male and female, are overcome), mystical experience (which wipes out sensitivity to pleasure and pain, etc.), myths in which God and Satan are brothers, and so on, all point to a state of ultimacy in which the conditions of this life are overcome. Thus, the symbol embodying the coincidence of opposites is a transcendent, noncosmic, nonnatural, nonhistoric form, since nowhere in this world are the "pairs of opposites" reconciled. Here, in this world, all is relative: there is always pleasure and pain, male and female, heat and cold, I and Thou, up and down.¹⁰

Hesse and Tillich shared this concept of the union of opposites and the validity of mystical experience. The experience of transcendence was an inner experience of depth. Hesse would agree with much of the following statement by Tillich:

[Love] strives for a union with that which is a bearer of values because of the values it embodies. This refers to the beauty we find in nature, to the beautiful and the true in culture, and to the mystical union with that which is the source of the beautiful and the true. Love drives toward union with the forms of nature and culture and with the divine sources of both.¹¹

Existentialism was another area of mutual influence upon their thought. They each prized freedom and responsibility in a world that reflected considerable meaninglessness. Hesse scholar, Theodore Ziolkowski, maintained that Hesse was neither a romantic nor an

existentialist in the full sense of the terms but that he was somewhere in between.

. . . Hesse's conception of humor lies somewhere between Romantic irony, which for Novalis and Friedrich Schlegel is an objective aesthetic attitude, and the more subjective existential awareness of the absurd. We can observe over and over again in Hesse's major themes a reduction of transcendence to immanence, of the ontological to the ethical, of the speculative to the existential. . . . But the shift in emphasis from romantic resolution to problems of existence in this world is a step in the development of existential thought.¹²

Certainly Hesse and Tillich were concerned with being, i.e., with what it means to be human. The previous quotation contained several of their differences; however, the interest here is in the similarities between them and in the existential elements present in each. Their interpretations were uniquely their own. For instance, Hesse advocated joy and Tillich recommended courage, as that which enables man to face despair. And they both had an "in spite of" quality about them.

They appreciated aesthetics and viewed symbols as means by which one could communicate with deeper levels of reality. Tillich pointed out the limitations of aestheticism, though. "Aestheticism deprives art of its existential character by substituting detached judgements of taste and a refined connoisseurship for emotional union. No artistic expression is possible without the creative rational form, but the form, even in its greatest refinement, is empty if it does not express a spiritual substance."¹³ The difficulty arises when artistic expression becomes one's Ultimate Concern, and therefore, one's God, according to Tillich. Hesse suggested this in *Klingsor* and in *Goldmund*. Tillich would say that this was idolatry.

They each stressed being what you are (even though Tillich meant by this being Christian), but they realized that discovering what this meant would involve a tripartite view of human nature. In man's process of becoming human, he would move from innocence through the Fall, to

reconciliation. Their differences in interpreting the meaning of the process of becoming more fully human will be discussed in the next section of this chapter.

They were alike in their appreciation of certain movements and developments in intellectual circles: for example, they were attracted by Eastern philosophy and culture; and they saw the significance of psychotherapy in general and of certain aspects of it in particular (such as the reintroduction of the female element in the idea of God).¹⁴

Together they saw the multidimensional quality of man's personality. For Hesse and Tillich, the problem of ambiguity was experienced by man because life was seen as a multidimensional unity of the essential and existential states of being. And they were conscious of the demonic in man. Hesse was more accepting of it than was Tillich, but both saw the power of the demonic and the need to deal with it. "The courage to affirm oneself must include the courage to affirm one's own demonic depth."¹⁵ Finitude was very evident in their thinking, but Hesse did not agonize over it as Tillich did.

The human predicament needed answering and each man approached it in different ways, but the answer for both was religious in content. The unambiguous life (Tillich) and the balanced life (Hesse) had as their models of transparency Jesus as the Christ and Siddhartha. Sanctification for Christians was ". . . the realization or progressive attainment of likeness to God or to God's intention for men."¹⁶ Siddhartha accepted the principle of being in becoming, embraced reality as a harmonious unity, and considered the unifying principle to be that of love. Balance and harmony, in Hesse, was equivalent to the reconciliation of estranged man in the healing creation of the New Being, in Tillich. In a sermon entitled "I Am Doing a New Thing," Tillich referred to the ". . . deep

things for which religion stands: the feeling for the inexhaustible mystery of life, the grip of an ultimate meaning of existence, and the invincible power of an unconditional devotion."¹⁷ It might appear on the surface that Hesse and Tillich were diametrically opposed to each other when discussing Ultimate Concern, but both affirmed a feeling for the mystery, meaning, and power within the depth dimension of man's existence. They would articulate this depth experience differently, but the basis of the experience would be similar.

Man is again a child of Natur whose destiny is Geist . . . a discordant composite . . . prey to life's relentless flux . . . The acceptance he [Hesse] had long and vainly sought in philosophical speculation is now realized instead in religious experience: a faith in the ultimate meaningfulness of life. In this faith, that love is now made possible which can make harmony of chaos, alleviate anxious loneliness in humaneness, reconcile the principles of Geist and Natur . . . and acclaim life's flux . . . ¹⁸

In the thought of either Hesse or Tillich, man never achieves perfection; nevertheless, a significant (but relative) degree of achievement can be realized. Man experiences oneness, or wholeness, in Siddhartha and Joseph Knecht, for Hesse, and by participation in the New Being, for Tillich. While perfection is beyond human reach, fulfillment is not. This experience is not supernatural but self-transcending. "As Hesse confesses in 'My Faith,' the idea of the fundamental oneness of all being is his deepest belief. Again and again he tries to communicate his noumenous experience, although he knows (and tells us in Siddharta) that no one can describe what happens to him in the hour of illumination."¹⁹ Self-realization, in Hesse, and salvation, in Tillich, are qualitatively similar.

Both Hesse and Tillich were sensitive to the mystical and social dimensions of life. This was evident in their personal involvement in the social and historical developments of their day. They each saw the universal significance of man and the need for dialogue and openness

between all countries and cultures. Tillich's emphasis upon Logos stressed reason as a structural part of reality. His interpretation of Christian theology enabled him to be at home with humanists and Marxists as well as with Christians and persons of other faith commitments. Hesse shared this inclusiveness in his belief in internationalism. Hesse would agree with Tillich that if there is a God he must be revealed in other religions as well as in Christianity. It would have been interesting to Hesse that the direction of Tillich's thought at the end of his life was moving toward the history of religions. Hesse and Tillich argued for the same human values and opposed the dehumanizing elements in society as they encountered them. For example, they recognized the achievements of technological man; but at the same time, they saw the dehumanizing effects of the misuse of technology. While they opposed a prescriptive ethic (of laws and codes that must be obeyed), they were both moral men in the sense that they were witnesses to truth that was not mere abstraction. The realities of daily life required concrete action. Joseph Knecht considered the educating of youth to be a worthy goal that required him to leave Castalia and to become a tutor to a particular problem student. This was a literary allusion to Hesse's ethical awareness. And Tillich maintained the creative tension of the boundary situation between abstraction and concreteness. In My Search for Absolutes he revealed his both/and posture of keeping in proper tension the accumulated ethical wisdom of the ages and the immediate needs of the current concrete situation.

This section on the similarities in Hesse and Tillich could be concluded by noting: " . . . the greatest surprise of all, surely, is to see how faithful Hesse remained to himself from start to finish . . ." ²⁰

This could be said of Tillich also. The authenticity of their personhood

was evident in their work. Their interaction with other human beings revealed a confidence in the life process and an outlook of hope toward the future if man would harness his destructive potential and realize his constructive possibilities.

Contrasting Elements in Hesse and Tillich

While Hermann Hesse and Paul Tillich had much in common, they also differed with one another. Some of their differences were merely a matter of degree, but others were quite marked. In this section the focus will be upon the contrasting elements in their concepts of "the human."

In the first place, Hesse and Tillich differed over the importance of ontology. "The belief in an ontological unity of nature and spirit underlies all of these [Hesse's] visions. But ontological questions are secondary. It is not an exaggeration to say that ontological monism is an accepted fact of twentieth-century thinking."²¹ Ziolkowski saw this factor in Hesse and believed it to be the cause of Hesse's immanent mysticism (rather than transcendent mysticism); still, Hesse's emphasis differed from that of Tillich. Ontology was the cornerstone of Tillich's thought.

Hesse stressed the concept of becoming, above that of being. For Hesse the essence of man was seen in searching, in being on the way (e.g., Siddhartha, Goldmund, and Knecht). Certainly the process of becoming was important to Tillich's understanding of being, but the difference was significant (and was one reason why Tillich did not follow the lead of process theologians such as Whitehead and Hartshorne). Jacob Boehme provided Tillich with a powerful model of dialectical thinking in mystical-ontological categories; whereas, Goethe by way of poetry was for Hesse the model for understanding reality. Faith, for Hesse, was anthropocen-

trically conceived as a feeling (emotionalism); Tillich understood faith to be a state of being grasped by an Ultimate Concern. Tillich believed that the solution to the problems of existence had an ontological basis, but Hesse believed that the solution was an ethical one. Man would undergo an ethical transformation rather than an ontological transformation. Of course, Tillich's understanding of transformation included an ethical side, but it involved other dimensions of human existence as well. Tillich's system was based upon his observation of reality, but Hesse found reality unpleasant and unworthy of his wholehearted attention; therefore, he exercised the phenomena of phantasy and imagination. Also, Hesse mistakenly understood the Protestant temperament to be one that affirmed becoming rather than being. "I consider reality to be the last thing one need concern oneself about, for it is, tediously enough, always present, while more beautiful and necessary things demand our attention and care. Reality is what one must not under any circumstances be satisfied with . . ."²² With this attitude of Hesse's, one could see why escapism was so prevalent in his writings and why he lived so much in the future. But for Tillich, reality was what should be man's main concern. It should receive the highest priority in one's system of values.

The second fundamental difference centered upon the importance of aestheticism. For Hesse, aesthetic self-expression was at the heart of what it meant to be human. He could not conceive of life devoid of artistic creativity. To be man was to engage in one or more of the arts. It was in this experience that man was driven beyond himself to a fuller and more complete level of existence. The aesthetic realm was where man came to know who he was and what he was meant to become. It was there that true selfhood could be explored and discovered. It was there that man drew near the ultimate, i.e., for Hesse, the closest thing to God.

This theme appeared more often in Hesse's earlier works than in his mature works; nevertheless, he never completely abandoned this conviction (as evidenced by the role of music in The Glass Bead Game).

Tillich saw the significance of man's aesthetic experience. He considered artists to be those persons who created essential images in various media of expression: painting, drama, poetry, novels, etc. And these forms of creative expression pointed beyond themselves. "This pointing beyond itself of every work of art shows the presence of something absolute in art, despite all changing styles and tastes in the realm of artistic creation."²³ But whereas Tillich saw the creative encounter involving contact with the Ultimate, Hesse would be more Jungian in his interpretation by giving it a psychological rather than a religious or spiritual interpretation. It would be the Collective Unconscious rather than God that was mediated through the symbols used by the artists. The archetype of the mother in Demian and Narziss und Goldmund and the water symbol in Siddhartha and The Glass Bead Game illustrated this. Tillich would respond to this explanation of the source of symbols in aesthetic expression by saying:

. . . we have shown by analytical description the presence of absolutes within the universe of relativities and have pointed to the ground of everything absolute--the Absolute itself. . . . whether it is called "God," or the One, or Brahman-Atman, Fate, Nature, or Life. That to which our analysis led us, the Absolute itself, is not an absolute being, which is a contradiction in terms. It is Being-Itself.²⁴

Tillich thought that the artist was expressing Being-itself whether or not he was consciously aware of it.

But there was danger in being an aesthete because the aesthetic attitude could succumb to demonry. Man might create the world of meaning by aesthetic activity, but there was a tragic quality in human experience. Authentic works of art would reveal this: an example would

be Picasso's "Guernica." Man's powerlessness and estrangement could be seen in the painting. "Demony breaks down only before divinity, the possessed state before the state of grace, the destructive before redeeming fate."²⁵ It was this very weakness of aestheticism which Tillich pointed out that Hesse failed to accept. For example, Hesse treated death aesthetically and did not see such existential anxiety as it produced in Tillich. One could not help but be conscious of Kierkegaard's description of the aesthetic stage. "The characteristic of the aesthetic stage is the lack of involvement, detachment from existence."²⁶ However, Hesse was not satisfied to remain within the aesthetic stage; he moved on to the ethical stage. Detachment became impossible for him, and responsibility became a critical part of what he considered to be essential (as was true with Joseph Knecht),

Hesse and Tillich parted company concerning the religious stage. "The religious stage is beyond both the aesthetic and the ethical and is expressed in relation to that which interests us infinitely or which produces infinite passion."²⁷ Hesse was content to stop with the ethical stage, Tillich was not. Hesse hinted at what was ultimate but did not spell it out. Tillich certainly was quite explicit in discussing what he meant by Ultimate Concern.

The third contrasting element in the thought of Hesse and Tillich was the nature of sin. Hesse did not ignore the reality of sin, but he saw it as underachievement. He did not see sin as a given part of man's inner life. Rather, ". . . sin is imposed on human nature from without, being no intrinsic element in the soul. Sin is seen nevertheless as a necessary channel for the soul's progression out into consciousness: without a guilty conscience, the child would not be fully aware of the world."²⁸ But for Hesse, sin and guilt were not due to a

broken relationship with God; they were due to a failure to become one's whole self--one's best self. It was not a state of having fallen from grace as Tillich understood it to be. The description by Tillich of sin as unbelief, hubris, and as concupiscence would go beyond anything that Hesse could honestly say was the truth of his observation of human experience.

Hesse would agree with some of the descriptions of the human condition that Tillich would give. For example, Hesse could accept the following statements by Tillich:

It is my conviction that the character of the human condition, like the character of all life, is "ambiguity": the inseparable mixture of good and evil, of true and false, of creative and destructive forces--both individual and social. Of course, there are degrees to which the one or the other side prevails, but there is nothing unambiguously destructive. They accompany each other inseparately. . . . The awareness of the ambiguity of one's own highest achievements (as well as one's own deepest failures) is a definite symptom of maturity.²⁹

The human experience of ambiguity was not the same as a broken relationship with God, according to Hesse, as he was unable to speak about such a relationship. Therefore, he would not be expected to be concerned about God's liberating forgiveness. In other words, Hesse did not speak in terms of traditional theistic categories. Tillich did not affirm a traditional theistic position either, but he did use theological language that discussed faith and disobedience, forgiveness and grace, etc.

The fourth difference between Hesse and Tillich centered upon a humanistic definition of man's existence versus a religious one. At various times Hesse proclaimed his belief in man and denied possessing any belief in the Christian understanding of God. At other times he approximated some of the religious experiences that were closely allied to human experience. For instance, "Hesse finds that faith, irrespective of the particular religious garb it wears, is essentially a

realization of the need for submission to the forces which rule man, a state of confident acceptance."³⁰ This was close to Tillich's "accepting acceptance." In "the Father Confessor" narrative that was added to The Glass Bead Game, Hesse attributed to the character the following words: "We are believers because the faith, the power of the Redeemer and His death for the salvation of all men, has overwhelmed us."³¹ This was very close to Tillich's being grasped by the God made known in the picture of Jesus as the Christ. Hesse's stress on harmony had an "in spite of" quality to it. Tillich was conscious that harmony was the ultimate concern of the Enlightenment.³²

A significant difference between Hesse and Tillich was their understanding of humanism. According to Tillich,

Humanism is the attitude which makes man the measure of his own spiritual life, in art and philosophy, in science and politics, in social relations and personal ethics. For humanism the divine is manifest in the human; the ultimate concern of man is man. . . . For this reason the humanist faith is called "secular," . . . Secular means, belonging to the ordinary process of events, not going beside it or beyond it into a sanctuary.³³

Tillich recognized the fact that modern humanism rested on a Christian foundation and possessed a sense of the "ought to be." But it had no unconditional concern that possessed a demanding, directing, or promising element in it. For Tillich the humanist answer was inadequate. "According to it, the divine Spirit is nothing but the religious function of the human spirit. If this were so, healing would be self-healing. But only something healthy can heal what is sick. The sick cannot overcome itself by itself. It can only receive healing powers from beyond itself."³⁴ The difference between Hesse and Tillich would be that Tillich would say that man could not gain power over himself because he could not gain power over what was ultimate; in the process of becoming fully human man would fall into sin. Hesse's humanistic

faith might rest on a Christian foundation, but it was still humanism and subject to the above criticisms by Tillich. "If sin is separation from and contradiction of one's true nature, and if salvation is the realization of that nature through reunion, . . ."³⁵ then man could not save himself.

Hesse emphasized the importance of "awakening," but a growing consciousness of the self was not the same thing as a growing consciousness of the Holy. Indeed, Tillich included self-awareness in religious experience, but he did not limit it to only that. Salvation was more than the achievement of harmony within--more than the balance of the Apollonian and Dionysian elements in man. The presence of divine grace actively at work within man was affirmed by Tillich. He would agree with Ronald Gregor Smith's statement: "Man does not make himself. He is made."³⁶ And he would agree with A. D. Galloway's statement: "When man reflects the image of God, it is then that he is fundamentally human."³⁷ Tillich's own words would best illustrate this cleavage between his thinking and that of Hesse: ". . . we must realize that the content of theology is not to be found by 'looking at one's self,' but must be sought by 'looking beyond one's self.'"³⁸ Hesse, in his early work, was opposed to this idea. In his later work, he was not content with the idea of looking only at oneself; but he was looking beyond, to other men, however, and not to God. For the mature Hesse, man was truly human when he assumed personal responsibility for others.

Alistair Kee would be supportive of Hesse's position. One need not be driven to nihilism because of lacking a belief in God: ". . . it would be absurd to say that a life without God is a life without meaning. Many atheists give their lives to serve higher causes than their own self-interest. . . . the life which transcends our 'nature' may ultimately

prove more natural, since in it we find fulfillment."³⁹ People could live mature lives without God. Some people might not be interested in asking the question of the meaning of life (and therefore fall into nihilistic skepticism), but those people would be in the minority.

Tillich would remind the person who claimed to be an atheist: ". . . he who seriously denies God, affirms him. Without it I could not have remained a theologian. There is, I soon realized, no place beside the divine, there is no possible atheism, there is no wall between the religious and the nonreligious."⁴⁰ If this were true, Hesse would not be diametrically opposed to Tillich after all. "According to the Protestant principle, it is possible within the secular world grace is operating not in a tangible but in a transparent form. . . . God may speak for a time more powerfully through a nonreligious, and even anti-Christian, movement, such as the early social democracy, than through the Christian churches."⁴¹ If this were the case, Hesse might be one of those persons who, although claiming a secular position, would have grace operating in him. Although not referring to a supernatural being, Hesse could meet Tillich's definition of being religious: "Religion in this sense is the state in which we are grasped by the infinite seriousness of the question of the meaning of our life and our readiness to receive answers and to act according to them."⁴² The content of these answers might not be that of traditional Christianity, but there could be little doubt that Hesse was religious:

. . . that there is a meaning to life" sprang from a religious ground. The state of having been thrown into nothingness he [Hesse] rejected. . . . His religion corresponded to the Taoist experience of the unity of all being. . . . In terms of consciousness, this faith means the integration of the paradoxical. Religion and faith as a cosmic experience constantly break through the confines of rationalist logic and causation-linked realities in the direction of the ultimate, absolute reality.⁴³

Hesse and Tillich both affirmed a human experience of transcendence by way of the depth dimension of existence. Hesse's humanism contained religious elements, but the content of these elements was not that of Tillich's content. The difference was due to the content of Christian theology, made explicit by Tillich. Hesse's theology was syncretistic, whereas Tillich's Christian theology was not. For Tillich, everything was to be subjected to the picture of Jesus as the Christ. He was the norm for understanding man and God. "A mixture of religions destroys in each of them the concreteness which gives it its dynamic power."⁴⁴ Hesse appealed to Eastern thought and emphasized self-liberation; Tillich called attention to revelation, specifically the Christian revelation as the means by which man could be liberated. Tillich sought to reconcile the humanistic and the Christian traditions. Hesse was not limited by any particular faith commitment to Christianity. Herein would lie a major difference between Hesse and Tillich.

Concerning the question of Christology, Hesse saw no need for revelation in order for man to break out of his self-centeredness. Jesus of Nazareth was a noble or admirable human model for individuals to follow (along with the Buddha and other great personalities of history), but Jesus remained an example rather than the bearer of the New Being as believed by Tillich. For Hesse, man had it within himself to will his better self. Self-reliance was the key for Hesse, not being "in Christ," as advocated by Tillich. The Christian man would become responsible for the world and history because: "The Christian cannot be indifferent to this world which God made and loves."⁴⁵ It was only when man would be "in Christ" that he would be lifted out of himself and would become "the man for others." Therefore, becoming fully human would be directly related to the reception of new life that

complete balance."⁴⁹ Man would need help if he were to cope with the elements that would limit his becoming what he was meant to be. He would need revelation. "Revelation occurs when some concrete event, object, or interpersonal relationship becomes 'transparent' to its own ground and thus reveals the unity of finitude with being-itself. This may occur, for example, in the apprehension of a moral imperative, in an aesthetic experience, or in a recognition of some ultimate meaning."⁵⁰ Providence, for Tillich, was God actively involved in human life, urging man by persuasion to realize his potentiality by becoming reconciled to the Ground of Being: ". . . providence means that God is creating in every moment, and directing everything in history toward an ultimate fulfillment in the kingdom of God."⁵¹ For Hesse, man's destiny was determined by human choices within each person's unique circumstances but with a distinct additional ingredient of what was similar to Eastern Oriental fatalism. Destiny called from within, but the source of this call would be closer to Jung's Collective Unconscious than to biblical revelation as Tillich would maintain.

Autonomous man and theonomous man called for one to become mature, i.e., to be able to live with ambiguities. Hesse claimed that this was possible without belief in God, but Tillich disagreed: man was most human when he became theonomous man. Both Hesse and Tillich called for man's responsible use of freedom: For what was man free, and to whom was he responsible? The content of their answers was the difference between autonomy and theonomy.

The sixth and last major difference between Hesse and Tillich centered upon the issue of community. Hesse was very much a solitary person, and his early literary characters reflected his solitariness. This contributed to the criticism that his characters were one-dimensional,

resulted from an encounter with the reality of the New Being. "It is not in the individual himself that we find the reality of man."⁴⁶

The fifth point of departure could be seen in Hesse's emphasis on autonomy while Tillich's emphasis was on theonomy. This difference grew out of the arguments presented earlier. Tillich defined each of these terms in the following quotations:

Autonomy asserts that man as the bearer of universal reason is the source and measure of culture and religion--that he is his own law. . . . Theonomy asserts that the superior law is, at the same time, the innermost law of man himself, rooted in the divine ground which is man's own ground: the law of life transcends man, although it is, at the same time, his own.⁴⁷

The key omission in autonomy would be that of an Ultimate Concern. Tillich understood theonomy to have a spiritual ground that transcended the secular sphere with a reference to the Ultimate. Autonomy could be indirectly religious, but it possessed no direct relationship with the Unconditional.

Both Hesse and Tillich appreciated the need for autonomy, but Tillich found it necessary to go beyond it to theonomy. For Tillich, the concept of theonomy was healthy-minded and life-affirming and humanistic to an extent: ". . . man discovers himself when he discovers God; he discovers something that is identical with himself although it transcends him infinitely, something from which he is estranged, but from which he never has been and never can be separated."⁴⁸

Hesse argued that autonomous man was "on his own" and free to develop his potentialities. He would set up his own standards and work toward his own goals. By exercising his freedom, man could discipline himself so that he would realize his goals and would become fully human in the process. Tillich would say that that was naive because it did not come to terms with the irrational and demonic elements in man: ". . . man is finite and he can never unite all elements of truth in

living mainly in their own experience (which was predominantly mental). Whenever interpersonal relationships did occur in Hesse's work, they were usually one-to-one relationships rather than one-to-many or one person to a group. Therefore, his work revealed a conspicuous void in regard to the usual social institutions of family, church, vocational or political organizations, etc. It was for this reason that Hesse was unfair in his overreaction to external authority. Tillich, likewise, was wary of heteronomous culture, but he was fairer in his assessment of institutional life: ". . . every individual, even the most creative, needs given structures that embody the experience and wisdom of the past, that liberate him from the necessity of innumerable decisions of his own, and that show him a meaningful way of acting in most cases."⁵² Tillich considered institutional forms of the faith to be its concrete expressions, and he thought that external sources could be helpful in assisting one to know oneself. He was critical of the institutional forms of religion (note the Protestant principle), but he could not imagine a formless expression of religion. Some sense of community involvement was an essential part of being human.

He who cannot relate himself as an "I" to a "thou" cannot relate himself to the true and the good and to the ground of being in which they are rooted. He who cannot love the friend cannot love the artistic expression of ultimate reality. Kierkegaard's stages of the aesthetical and the ethical and the religious are not stages but qualities which appear in structural interdependence.⁵³

Tillich stressed the need for seeing the interrelationship of the "I" and the "thou." According to him, agape, redemptive love, had an ontological basis, and every human enterprise was rooted in it.

Hesse had difficulty in perceiving the different dimensions of love. Only a motherly image conveyed the sentiment of unconditional love, for Hesse (e.g., in Narziss and Goldmund). Goldmund remarked that his mother was everywhere:

She was Lisa the gipsy, and the sorrowful madonna of Master Nicholas. She was life and wantonness, and fear and hunger, and love. . . . Even a short while ago I should have thought it unbearable to die without having carved my mother's image. My life would have seemed so useless. But now, see how well she contrives it. Instead of my hands moulding her shape, it is she who moulds me, and informs me. She has her fingers round my heart, and loosens it, and makes me empty. She has led me to death, and my dream dies with me--my statue of Eve, in wood, the Mother of all men.⁵⁴

Tillich argued against separating justice from love and against separating love from its ground, God. Both Hesse and Tillich saw the importance of love; the difficulty came in regard to the shape of its expression when it involved more than two people.

In several of his novels, Hesse dealt with unselfish love (love that continued to give without expecting a return). Joseph Knecht's commitment to Tito in The Glass Bead Game illustrated sacrificial love. But again it was a one-to-one relationship. For Hesse, community life was unimportant in his concept of "the human." For Tillich, being fully human was synonymous with being Christian: ". . . nobody can be Christian in isolation from the historical event, or in isolation from the Church--or better, the community (I call it the spiritual community), for outside of this we cannot be called Christian."⁵⁵ Achieving blessedness meant having relationships that mattered.

This line of thought would need to be tempered if it were to mean excluding Hesse from the human family. It should be remembered that he personally sacrificed a considerable amount on behalf of other people. His pacifism forced him to absorb much hostility, and his humanistic values came at a high price. Among other things, it cost him his homeland. For this reason, Tillich would say that Hesse was a member of the latent church. He rejected the choice of becoming a member of the manifest church, but he was what Karl Rahner would call an "anonymous Christian." Hesse's thinking lacked a developed sense of community: ". . . to

make life human will be composed of many who cannot 'name' him [Christ] but who are just as concerned for koinonia in such basic human issues as the supply and distribution of bread, civil liberties, race, peace, pollution, population control, literacy, law reform, minority rights, etc., etc."⁵⁶ Indeed, for man to be man, a community was needed--even if the community was only a small one.

To summarize the differences between Hesse and Tillich, the following should be recalled: the contrasting views of ontology, the importance of aesthetics, the interpretation of the nature of sin, the humanistic versus the religious tradition, the emphasis upon autonomy versus theonomy, and the issue of community life.

Implications of Hesse's and Tillich's Concepts of "the Human"

A considerable distance has been journeyed in viewing the subject of what it means to be human according to Hermann Hesse and Paul Tillich. The particular concern in this concluding section will focus upon certain specific implications of their thought.

First of all, becoming human is a lifelong process, and one never arrives at a stage of completion. Life is a restless driving toward fulfillment, a person's reach exceeding his grasp. One engages in self-discovery and participates in the process of continual exploration of reality. And reality has destructive as well as creative elements in it. Roger Shinn quotes Glenn Grey: "I have become profoundly convinced that man is never on the level of animals. Either he falls below them, as so often in his mad rages, or he rises above them when he achieves humanity."⁵⁷ Whether recognized or not, the biblical view affirms that God is involved in the process of helping man to become human and to move into a responsible use of the future.

In the twentieth century it has been evident how subhuman man can be, but there has been evidence, too, of the self-giving expressions of man. Tillich advocates consciousness of the arts if man is to understand the values and directions of his time. Hermann Hesse has been selected as a contemporary literary figure who has influenced the current university generation. What has been discovered in him is a man who has a firm belief in the goodness of human possibilities and who thinks that man can realize his potential if he desires to do so. Hesse believes in man becoming human by utilizing the spiritual dimension. But he is referring to a spiritual dimension that is grounded, so to speak. He speaks of transcendence and of the inward way of meditation, but he does not mean by this an encounter with the God made known in Christ. However, it is this author's contention that Hesse could not have arrived at the place that he did without a profound dependence upon his Christian background. He is able to speak about an ethical existence and of sacrificial living because he had been taught the significance of the suffering servant role that Jesus assumed. Hesse reacts against the excessive pietistic desire of those who attempted to break his will and who tried to make him accept certain theological doctrines. Even though he did not submit to this pressure, he had a value-affirming background to which he could react. Many of his youthful followers have not been so fortunate. They desire to arrive at his mature position, but they are without the philosophical and religious presuppositions that were part of Hesse's experience. A heritage with a spiritual void, or one that witnesses to the meaninglessness and absurdity of life, will not produce the quality of life advocated by Hesse. Therefore, there is danger in unthinkingly following Hesse as one's spiritual mentor. There is truth in Tillich's statement:

Autonomy is able to live as long as it can draw from the religious tradition of the past, from the remnants of a lost theonomy. But more and more it loses this spiritual foundation. It becomes emptier, more formalistic, or more factual and is driven toward skepticism and cynicism, toward the loss of meaning and purpose. The history of autonomous cultures is the history of a continuous waste of spiritual substance. At the end of this process autonomy turns back to the lost theonomy with impotent longing, or it looks forward to a new theonomy in the attitude of creative waiting until the kairos appears.⁵⁸

Hesse's thought has benefited from his theonomous cultural heritage. His followers may not be aware of this source that had affected his thinking. Tillich directly acknowledges his dependence upon the Christian revelation, and his work portrays this dependence. Man becomes fully human when he participates in the New Being. Perfection is not a state of being that is ever attained, but reconciliation and Sanctification produce a sense of fulfillment.

In the second place, man is most human when he mirrors the image of God. When the author takes Hesse seriously and is as honest with himself as he can be, he arrives at different conclusions. It is true that many persons appear to live without a conscious reference to a theologically transcendent dimension. But it has been the author's experience that on rare occasions meaningful moments occur in which a mysterious Presence makes itself known. A sense of awe and wonder prevails over the gift of life and the miracle of birth. Pascal's statement is appreciated:

When I consider the short duration of my life, swallowed up in the eternity that went before me and the eternity that comes after, the small extent of space I fill, the narrow limits of my field of view, swallowed up as I am in the infinite immensities of space, which I do not know, and which know not me, I am terrified and astonished to find myself here rather than there. For there is no reason whatever why I should be here rather than there, why now rather than then.⁵⁹

The author's response to the experience of the unknown is that it is more than self-transcendence--it is a glimpse of the Eternal. When

significant moments occur during life (the giving and receiving of love, forgiving and being forgiven, sacrificing and being the recipient of others' sacrifices, and experiencing the death of loved ones), there is an overwhelming, even ecstatic, awareness of something more, a Someone who is present and known in that moment. This exceeds what humanism can affirm. But life can be meaningful for both humanists and Christians in the following ways: by possessing relationships that matter; by fulfilling one's vocation, i.e., having a job worth doing and doing it well; and by giving oneself to a cause that will outlive oneself.

For the author, fulfillment has a Christian orientation. Christian theology is relational at its center (man to God, man to man, and man to himself); it has a vocational dimension that seeks to do all to the glory of God, and the only cause big enough is the Kingdom of God. Certainly these purposes have concrete and "down to earth" expressions: living responsibly by loving the neighbor, participating in an occupation or profession that uplifts human values, and being involved in the social concerns of the day that seek to make human life more human. However, for the author the motivating factor is commitment to Christ. Creative interchange is related to a covenant relationship with the God who is made known in Christ. Although the covenant expresses itself in human relationships, there is a definite distinction between the glory of God and the glory of man.

If the source of man's future hope rests only on man, there is little historic precedence to justify this hope. The question may be raised as to the justification for Christian hope. Historically there have been times of kairos when new impetus for living has occurred. For example, the rise of the Franciscan movement in the latter Middle Ages, the birth of Christian humanism during the Renaissance, the spiritual

renewal present in the Reformation, the missionary expansion of the nineteenth century, and the radical involvement of the church in social issues of the twentieth century illustrate theonomous periods of history.

Many persons are indebted to Hesse for making a case for authenticity, but authenticity (for Tillich and for this author) comes in those moments when man is pressed to the limits of human experience and the "beyond" breaks in or the "within" breaks out. Hesse speaks of ecstatic moments in which the contradictions of life can be accepted, if not resolved. He points to a reality that suggests there is something more, but his faith is contentless. Christ incognito may have been present in Hesse and may be present in the world, but why deny modern man spiritual content that could give substance to his faith? Tillich succeeds in giving this substance. He reacts to supernaturalism and to the world view of traditional Christianity, but he attempts to restate these views in contemporary terms that are more acceptable. This author is appreciative of Tillich's efforts.

In the third place, an adequate understanding of being human must address itself to the universal problems of sin, suffering, and death. Hesse speaks eloquently about man, but he is lacking when it comes to addressing himself to the perennial problems of man. Hesse may have done well to have followed the advice of Goethe: "Only as we see the 'limits of humanity' . . . do we see what man is, that is, not what this or that man is, but man as such."⁶⁰ Hesse writes about modern man's propensity for the mysterious. He hints at the deeper levels of human existence, but his own experience and his commitment to humanism do not allow him to penetrate more deeply or to say much more about the nature of reality encountered in fulfillment. Perhaps Dean Inge's remark, as quoted by Peter Berger, is applicable to Hesse: ". . . a man who

marries the spirit of the age soon finds himself a widower."⁶¹ Nevertheless, there is much that commends Hesse to modern man in that at the core of humanitas Hesse believes there is something that a person can trust. What it is he cannot say. Tillich calls it Being-itself or Ultimate Concern. While it may be argued that this does not tell us much more than what Hesse is saying, it could be that both Hesse and Tillich are trying to use different words to convey the same reality. Does one need to consciously profess Christ in order to be Christian in attitude and action? If the answer is yes, then Hesse is not a Christian and Tillich is. But if the answer is no, then there is evidence in Hesse's work that indicates that he is a Christian. From his writing of Peter Camenzind (patterned after St. Francis of Assisi) to The Glass Bead Game (with a suffering servant motif), Hesse admires Christian values and suggests they are worth emulating. Hesse is not a Christian theologian, so he should not be expected to do more than he does in his writing. He makes one conscious of the universal problems of man even though he does not affirm specific Christian answers to these problems. His answers are his own answers, however inadequate they may be from the viewpoint of Christian theology. "The knowledge of self and the encountering of oneself behind all the phenomena of the world are basic experiences of a new, transparent consciousness, as it manifested itself in Hesse's life and work."⁶²

Hesse and Tillich both make a case for man realizing his own potential within the given limits of his talents and capabilities. The important implication centers upon how this is done: ". . . the true dimension of humanness is not what we are when left to ourselves, but what we have it in us to become when taken out of ourselves into the full potential stature of humanity in Christ . . . The Christian sees

what it means to be a man in Christ . . . " ⁶³ Nothing human is foreign to him. In him the problems of sin, suffering, and death are met.

The fourth implication derived from studying Hesse and Tillich is that anthropology rather than dogmatic theology is the arena in which the theological enterprise should take place. However, it is an anthropology that includes ecstatic human experiences. Hesse is at home in Eastern mysticism. "This fundamental quality of mysticism has been classically formulated in Hinduism by the formula tat tvam asi--'thou art that,' that is, the depths of the human soul are identical with the divine depths of the universe." ⁶⁴ Hesse approaches this understanding in his thinking. Tillich's mysticism is more in accord with the Christian tradition. However, the content of ecstatic experiences remains problematic. How to maintain an absolute distinction between man and God (while at the same time sustaining a meaningful relationship between man and God) is one of the most obvious problems that appears in comparing the two men. If God is to be understood by understanding man, then some human model is needed. Hesse's ideal man (whether Siddhartha or Joseph Knecht) leaves one with something yet to be desired. It is the figure of Christ who is " . . . the living exemplar of our possibilities as human beings. We encounter the unexpected and the unimaginable, the presence within history of the consummation of human reality: the reality of spirit which joins us to one another, and to God." ⁶⁵ Interpersonal relations may be the place where God is encountered, but it is in Jesus as the Christ that the final clue of who God is and what it means to be human is discovered. In him the transcendent and immanent characteristics of divinity are in proper creative tension. God is separate from man but personally related to man. In other words, the Ultimate is experienced as intimate.

The fifth implication that is significant centers upon the need for the contemporary church to be aware of the necessity for both personal religious experience and social action. Individuals have found in Hesse a modern man who is fascinated by, and concerned with, the spiritual dimension of what it means to be human. He appeals to those who are seekers, to those who are hungry for reasons for being that are more than the obvious ones advocated by a secular or materialistic culture. The human spirit has a life within that needs to be explored, and Hesse is willing to try various ways (including the use of drugs) to expand one's consciousness of reality. His emphasis upon the inner life of man suggests that considerable spiritual needs are going unmet.

Tillich's thought contains the combination of rational coherence and appreciation for the ecstatic in human experience. His concern for depth and ultimacy is very much a part of his preaching, and there is little reference to becoming active in the social causes of the day.

Although Hesse and Tillich were personally involved in social concerns, their work elevates personal needs that require attention. This suggests that modern man needs deep roots that nourish personal faith, hope, and love. A church oriented toward social action will be failing in a most important part of its purpose if it ignores this need for spiritual nourishment. There are signs of this need for the mysterious to be encountered experientially seen in the rise of the charismatic ministries within the mainline churches. Even contemporary secular films reveal: "Man is not alone on earth, and the space explorers are searching among the stars for evidence that man is not alone in the universe."⁶⁶

The church of today must be sensitive to modern man's need for a faith that is both warmhearted and tough-minded. While the vast majority

of churches never broke out of the spiritual compartmentalization of life, there may be a tendency on the part of some churches to over-compensate for the social activism of the 1960s by retreating into an insulated capsule of spirituality. A both/and posture is necessary if the church is to be faithful to its calling and if it is to fulfill its ministry. Hesse illustrates this message in that Joseph Knecht is not forsaking the values of Castalia when he makes his decision to leave the seclusion of the secular monastery. He is taking Castalia's values into the real world where he will continue to practice meditation while at the same time providing a useful service by teaching Tito. The method he uses to accomplish this indicates Hesse's relevant message for the church of today. The role of the suffering servant must be rediscovered and applied, not with grandiose scales of operation but by starting with the need nearest at hand (even if it is a friend's son who requires tutoring). There is a direct connection between the roots of faith and the fruits of faith; they belong together if one listens to Hesse and Tillich. Sensitivity to the God within will produce outward manifestations of this experience.

In summary, this section has attempted to see the implications of Hesse's and Tillich's concepts of "the human": becoming human is a life-long process that can result in fulfillment but can never arrive at completion; man is most human when he reflects the image of God; an adequate understanding of being human must address itself to the universal problems of sin, suffering, and death; anthropology is the arena in which the theological enterprise must take place; and the contemporary church must keep in balance both personal religious experience and social action.

Hesse and Tillich have much to say about what it means to be human, and considerable benefit can be derived from their thinking.

However, neither man wanted disciples, but each wanted those who took their work seriously to go beyond them. Neither man has the answer (if there is one), but both have made valuable insights that are worthy of attention and careful study. They counsel those who seek advice to be true to the best within themselves and to make their own way with all the possibilities that comprise their unique destinies. Critics of Hesse and Tillich may consider them to be dangerous spiritual mentors: one can get lost in vague aestheticism or in ontological speculation with spurious Christian content. Others hail them as exceedingly modern men with something relevant to say. While recognizing their shortcomings, this writer agrees with those who appreciate them. The reasons for this should be clear now that a comparison of the work of the two men has been made. Their similarities, their differences, and some of the implications aroused by their thought have been presented.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

This study began with an interest in the question: what does it mean to be human? The life and thought of two men, Hermann Hesse and Paul Tillich, were selected as an interdisciplinary study in theology and literature. Tillich was chosen as a philosophical theologian who addressed himself to cultural concerns and who claimed that the artist best reflected the values of any given period of history. Hermann Hesse, a novelist and poet by profession and an amateur painter and musician by avocation, was chosen to test Tillich's high praise for the artist's perception of the human situation. "The Concept of 'the Human' in the Work of Hermann Hesse and Paul Tillich" was the specific subject of this research.

Because Hesse's writing was that of self-portrayal and self-analysis, it was essential to examine his life if his work was to be understood. He was born in Germany in 1877. His personal independent spirit came into conflict with his parent's desire that he conform to their faith commitment. His struggle during adolescence became a later favorite literary theme. From the age of thirteen he knew that he wanted to be a poet, and finally in 1904 he was able to support himself as a writer. His first marriage ended in divorce. His pacifist stand during the First World War, plus personal circumstances, contributed to a crisis in his life for which he sought relief in psychoanalysis. After a brief second marriage ended in failure, he did achieve a lasting relationship with his third wife. His middle years were productive and successful. In spite of difficulties caused by Hitler's rise to power, Hesse went on to achieve international recognition as a writer,

and one such honor he received was the Nobel Prize for Literature. He died in 1962 at the age of eighty-five.

There were several intellectual influences that affected Hesse's thinking: religious mysticism as seen in the Christian tradition of Roman Catholicism and German Protestant Pietism; pantheism and the religions and philosophies of the East; romanticism as seen in Goethe, Novalis, Jean Paul, and Hölderlin; and finally, humanism as evidenced in such diverse personalities as Mozart, Nietzsche, Dostoyevsky, Rolland, and Burckhardt. The last major influence on Hermann Hesse was that of Analytical Psychology. Jungian psychology not only helped Hesse personally but professionally, as his literary efforts were filled with illusions and imagery that had Jungian connotations.

The work of Hermann Hesse reveals the following information about his concept of "the human." Hesse regards the artist as an example of true manhood, but he believes that all persons (if they are to become what they are meant to be) must pass through three stages of development: innocence and irresponsibility, innocence lost with knowledge of good and evil and the accompanying guilt which can lead to despair or on to the third stage, that of victorious faith. This is the Kingdom of the Spirit. It is individuation and authenticity. It is the stage of servanthood. Balancing both the sensual and the spiritual aspects of life is necessary for a fully human life. Thinking and doing must be synthesized. They must be brought into harmony--another term which Hesse finds descriptive of maturity.

How man becomes fully human can be seen in the aesthete. The poet, the artist, the musician, mediate between the polarities in man. Humor, especially when it is ironic, serves as a mediator between the ideal and the real areas of existence. For example, humor in a person

may be developed through suffering. The beatific smile in many of Hesse's characters is a symbol of fulfillment.

Relationships are necessary if man is to become that which he is meant to be. To love someone, to experience suffering because of someone, to know acceptance, to love unconditionally--these are what make human life worthwhile. Friendship in which responsible caring for one another occurs is also important. The threat to man that technology and mechanization create is brought to attention by Hesse as is the inhumanity of the educational system of his day. Regarding the issue of war and peace, Hesse is an internationalist.

Hesse's work also reflects that man is a religious being who struggles with self-love (which can be a definition for sin). Suffering, too, is a part of human reality. The questions that arise within man about the meaningfulness of life and the transiency of life are sources of suffering. Death is another human concern. However, for Hesse, finitude is not a preoccupation of man. To live fully in the here and now is all that can be expected. Immortality is reserved for the great people of history, even though there is a yearning on occasion within ordinary people for something beyond this life.

Hesse's conception of God includes the polarities of male and female, good and evil, light and darkness. His understanding of the nature of God is vague and unclear, but he does maintain that man has ecstatic experiences that are mystical in content. Their source, however, is not revelation but originates in experiences within man. Man can be awakened to an expanded consciousness of reality. Man is a free spirit who needs to be honest with himself and to trust himself.

There are times when man is only truly himself when at play, for life can be seen as a game. Blessedness arrives when life is not taken

so seriously, when one relaxes and enjoys the game. And it is Magical Thinking that aids man in his quest for wholeness. Inner and outer reality are reversible, i.e., they can be exchanged. The polarities of life can be overcome when man transcends himself and sees the synthesis of nature and spirit. All antitheses are resolved, as in mystical experience. Even drugs can be one of the means by which Magical Thinking is induced.

Hesse indicates that if man is to become fully human it is in the inward way that results in man acting responsibly in historical events. Regarding the human condition Hesse shifts from an answer that is aesthetic to one which is ethical. His final statement is one in which meditation and responsible action belong together. It is in sacrificial commitment that man realizes the meaning of full personhood. Self-realization through service is love demonstrated; for Hesse this is the higher way.

In this study the significance of Hermann Hesse was viewed from a literary and a theological perspective. Hesse was praised by his literary contemporaries for being one of the first writers to recognize the importance of the subjective world and its power over persons. He pointed to that which is universal in man. In his writing he expressed his concern for the spirit of man and his fear over the negative aspects of an age of science and technology.

Hesse was criticized for being too inward looking and subjective. His characters lived mainly a life of the mind; they were unbiological, according to some literary critics. These same individuals were disturbed at the passive nature of Hesse's characters. It was true that Hesse was preoccupied with the theme of adolescence and that this contributed to an emotional and intellectual immaturity in his work that

tended toward sentimentality. Unthinking romanticism was another major criticism of his writing. He did stress the feeling level of existence but not to the neglect of the mental or spiritual levels.

Hesse was not a theologian, but his work did concentrate on the question of the meaning of life. From his first major book to his last, the idea of love and sacrificial service of others was central to his thinking. Hesse recognized the reality of alienation and the irrational factors in human experience, but he also elevated commitment and the "in spite of" quality of man coping with the circumstances of personal destiny. Finitude was seen as a concern of man but not one that contained existential anxiety. In fact, death was frequently portrayed as a welcomed friend, maternal in characteristic.

Hesse adhered to a belief in a god who encompassed both good and evil. He could not explain the presence of evil in any other way. He rejected the traditional Judeo-Christian conception of the God of ethical monotheism. He affirmed the god of the opposites of Jung. God was understood in pantheistic categories. Hesse was too syncretistic in his thinking, and his critics would say that he did not take seriously the uniqueness of the Christian God made known in Jesus Christ.

Hesse's view of human nature centered upon an interpretation of sin as man's refusal to be his full self. Sin was not disobedience to the living God. There were amoral dimensions to his thought, too. In his early work there was little sense of accountability for one's life. Good and evil were interchangeable at times. It was life devoid of the "shoulds." Consequently, he offered few ethical guidelines. However, in his mature work he did advocate responsible living: the reference point being one's own best self--not the Creator of man's life with whom there is a covenanted relationship. Awakening to oneself was

not the totality of religious experience. Discovering who God is was not the same as discovering oneself. According to Hesse, salvation was what man did for himself. Historic Christianity always claimed that true reconciliation, i.e., salvation, happened only with God's help because it meant being reconciled to God as well as to oneself and to other people. It was religion without a Savior.

This author believes that Hesse did argue for an authentic existence. In a world that too often values doing, Hesse stressed the value of being. He accepted the ambiguities of life. He recognized the primitive forces and the polar opposites within man. As an internationalist he was a witness to what was universally human. Important themes in Hesse's mature work were selflessness and social responsibility.

His theology was more anthropological than theological, but beneath the surface of his religious humanism there was a hint at something more. He suggested an Ultimate Concern although not explicitly.

On the other hand, his thinking has questionable implications: as a spiritual mentor to youth there is little critical assessment of Hesse. His young admirers have not had the benefits of his background against which to react. For example, Hesse's elevation of wandering as a life style can encourage a person to become a parasite and to waste his life. Some selections of his work are escapist in nature. A maturity is assumed that is not always there on the part of his readers. Nevertheless, Hesse's concerns seek to make human life more human. He desires that man be faithful to his ideals and, above all, that man be true to his best self. For these reasons, Hesse's life and work need to be taken seriously.

Although Paul Tillich's work was shaped by his life experience less than was Hermann Hesse's, the events of his life did affect his

concept of "the human." Born in 1886 in the home of a German Lutheran pastor, he was introduced early to the experience of the Holy. A relationship with his authoritarian father was made possible through philosophical discussion. His mother's death when he was seventeen was a traumatic event for him. His interest in philosophy and theology prompted him to prepare for a career that would permit both disciplines to be part of his vocation. This meant an academic future. He was graduated from the University of Breslau in 1911 and was ordained the following year as an Evangelical Lutheran minister. During the First World War he served as a front line military chaplain, with the result that he became a tragic realist. While teaching at the University of Berlin after the war, he met Hannah Werner. He married her in 1924 after a turbulent courtship. He taught at the universities of Marburg, Dresden, Leipzig, and Frankfurt. He was active in the Religious Socialist movement. His personal life was erratic: outwardly it was happy, but inwardly his infidelity and that of his wife were taking their toll. His opposition to national socialism caused him to be the first Christian professor to lose his position at the time of Hitler. Consequently, he came to the United States and taught at Union Theological Seminary in New York City. As a warmly personable individual with considerable creativity, it was not long before his talents were appreciated. His popularity continued until the time of his death in 1965. His many books received a wide reading audience, and numerous universities granted him honorary degrees. After his retirement from Union Theological Seminary, he taught at Harvard University and at the University of Chicago. In the last years of his life his domestic life improved, so that he experienced satisfaction in his personal life and in his professional accomplishments.

The intellectual influences upon Tillich's thought were many. Greek philosophy, particularly the thinking of Heraclitus, Parmenides, Plato, and Plotinus, was instrumental in the shaping of his own ideas. The Christian tradition was most influential in the development of his theology. Biblical study, along with the thought of Augustine, Meister Eckhart, Nicholas of Cusa, Martin Luther, and Jacob Boehme, left its impression upon him. German idealism, as revealed in the persons of Immanuel Kant, Johann Fichte, Joseph von Schelling, Friedrich Schleiermacher, and Georg Hegel, played its part also, as did existentialism interpreted by Soren Kierkegaard, Karl Marx, and Friedrich Nietzsche. Personal influences on his life and thought included his teachers and colleagues: Martin Kähler, Ernst Troeltsch, and Martin Heidegger.

All of the above persons and movements contributed to Tillich's methodology. He was an apologetic theologian. His method of correlation started with man asking questions from within the theological circle. As a systematic theologian he was a philosopher of religion but one who was existentially involved with the meaning of being. Yet his concern was also for "saving knowledge," and for Tillich, Christian symbols were the means by which he participated in reality.

Paul Tillich's concept of "the human" begins with man's existential predicament--which is one of estrangement. Man is a questioner who asks the questions of being. Man is a philosopher by nature and experiences self-transcendence, but he is also a theologian who raises questions about ultimate reality. Finitude is the fundamental fact of human existence. The threat of nonbeing and the anxiety that it produces contribute to a feeling of loneliness and guilt. Man is a sinner, i.e., he is estranged from himself, from others, and from the Ground of Being (God). To be human means to live with the ambiguities of life

and with the demonic: it means to know doubt and uncertainty.

In order for man to know that he is broken and separated from what he is meant to be, an assumption is made which is based upon essential man. A vision of wholeness, of potentiality, underlies man's experience of alienation. Finite freedom is that which enables man to move from essence to existence. Human beings can deny what they essentially are; they may feel anxious about exercising their freedom, but unless freedom is exerted unfulfillment will result. Universal reason, Logos, is what permits man to grasp his essential nature. "Dreaming innocence" is Tillich's term for man's essential nature. It possesses potentiality and not actuality. Temptation drives innocence beyond itself. Man before "the Fall" is but the prelude to participation in "the Fall," at which time potentiality becomes actuality, and with actuality comes estrangement.

Man's true nature is to be found in unity with God. The encounter with Being-itself is an ecstatic experience in which man is in touch with the Unconditional, the Really Real. Loving God means finding oneself. In order for this to happen, Jesus as the Christ is the one who helps a person to re-establish essential manhood. In Christ is the fulfillment of human life. He is transparent to God. He is the New Being who conquers the gap between essence and existence. The New Being brings healing, i.e., salvation. That which was separated is reunited. But man must accept God's acceptance of him. For Tillich, faith is the state of being grasped by the New Being; it is saying yes to God. It means being justified. Becoming whole involves accepting the demonic in oneself; it involves being forgiven and becoming healed. Sanctification is becoming fully human: it does not mean perfection; it means maturity and being able to live with the ambiguities of life;

it means fulfillment; it means reconciliation. It is the Spiritual Presence that enables man to participate in the process of Sanctification: man experiencing increasing awareness, freedom, relatedness, and self-transcendence. It points toward perfection. It means being a Christian--transparent to the Divine Spirit.

Being fully human requires that the individual participate in the Spiritual Community, a theonomous culture, one in which an Ultimate Concern is expressed. Seeking to be conscious of the depth dimension in life, the person has a moral imperative to assume responsibility for others. Agape motivates one to love others, to accept persons as persons, to embody love, power, and justice. It means being involved in concrete social ways of making human life more human for others. Helping others to become liberated, extending an invitation to people so that a decision can be made regarding Christ, and encouraging a state of readiness in which others might experience the New Being, are all aspects of being Christian. Theonomous man lives his life under the impact of the Spiritual Presence. It is a state of blessedness.

In order to examine the significance of Paul Tillich, it was necessary to focus attention upon his contributions. He was praised for being a theologian of culture, an apologetic theologian who tried to unite Athens and Jerusalem; and he was called "an apostle to intellectuals." Tillich was an outstanding preacher as well as a theologian of synthesis. His ability to cross borders into other disciplines and to show their religious ground was unique. He sought to make human life more human with his "belief-ful realism," and he worked at creating a theonomous culture.

On the other hand, a considerable number of critiques were made from various segments of the theological world, attacking Tillich's thought with such comments as: he was obscure in presenting his ideas; he was unbiblical in his thinking, and his Christology was more ontological than Christian; he compromised theology to philosophy by starting with man rather than with revelation; he had pantheistic elements in his theology that seriously distorted historical faith; there were philosophical inadequacies in his system of thought (e.g., his use of language and his Gnostic tendencies); and the final criticism centered upon the accusation that he was outdated.

This author believes that Tillich's world view is that of modern man. Tillich addresses himself to universal issues, including the demonic in man. His starting point for interpreting theology is man; therefore, he makes Christian faith intelligible to modern man. However, does he by definition permit anyone to be without an Ultimate Concern? Does the term "Being-itself" really communicate anything, i.e., is it contentless? Is his Christology necessary? There is a question concerning man's responsibility for sin if it is necessary for him to sin in order to become actualized. All things considered, for this author, Tillich is closer to reality than any other contemporary theologian. His strengths outweigh his weaknesses.

In comparing the life and work of Hermann Hesse and Paul Tillich, similarities as well as contrasting elements were revealed. Biographical factors and intellectual influences appeared that were similar. Both men had a tripartite view of human nature, and each saw the significance of psychotherapy. The ambiguities of the human situation were recognized along with the demonic in man. Balance, harmony, unity within, as seen in Siddhartha, were similar to Tillich's understanding of reconciliation

and his concept of Sanctification. Both men believed that man when fully human never reaches perfection but that he can achieve fulfillment as a person: when this occurs it is not a supernatural but a self-transcending experience. Hesse stressed self-realization, and Tillich stressed becoming whole, healed, or reunited with the Ground of Being. At points the qualitative content of this manifestation had similar characteristics. Hesse and Tillich opposed the dehumanizing elements in society and were humanists in their appreciation for the common experiences of man. They each had a strong ethical emphasis and remained true to himself. They were authentic human beings who lived with hope for man's ability to create a human future.

There were also contrasting dimensions in the thought of Hesse and Tillich. Ontology was the foundation of Tillich's thinking. For Hesse, becoming was more important than being. The search in which feeling prevails was significant for Hesse in his early work, but an ethical faith commitment was his final statement.

Tillich appreciated the aesthetic and ethical stages of existence but believed that the depth dimension was grounded in reality. Hesse disliked reality and preferred fantasy and imaginative flights from reality. Tillich saw the limitations and the possibilities of idolatry inherent in aestheticism. He enjoyed artistic expression but only to the extent that the art pointed beyond itself to the Ultimate. Hesse's interpretation of art would be more psychological than religious. The relative must never be elevated to ultimacy, according to Tillich. Hesse was content to stop at the ethical stage but Tillich was not.

According to Hesse, sin was underachievement and was not due to a broken relationship with God. For Tillich, becoming one's whole self could only happen when grace enabled man to overcome his estrangement.

In Tillich's thinking, self-reliance and will power were insufficient as answers to man's brokenness, but in Hesse's thought they were adequate in overcoming ambiguity and alienation.

A basic difference between the two men could be seen in their understanding of humanism. For Tillich, man could not save himself; revelation was necessary. For Hesse, Jesus was a model to follow, like Buddha; but for Tillich, Jesus was the bearer of the New Being. Hesse's emphasis was on autonomy whereas Tillich emphasized theonomy. In Hesse's work reference to the Ultimate was lacking or veiled, but it was very much a part of Tillich's system of thought and was made explicit by him.

The last contrasting element between Hesse and Tillich was the issue of community. In Hesse's concept of "the human," community life was unimportant. For Tillich, being fully human meant being Christian which meant requiring participation in the church. Hesse could be included as a member of the latent church, but he did not concern himself with institutional life and even small communities were absent in his thinking. He favored one-to-one relationships. This was in contrast to Tillich's consciousness.

The implications of both Hesse's and Tillich's thought about becoming fully human would include the following: first, it is a life-long process and one never arrives at perfection; second, man is most human when he reflects his best self or the image of God; third, being human must address itself to the perennial problems of man (sin, suffering, and death); fourth, anthropology rather than dogmatic theology is the arena in which the theological enterprise should take place; and finally, the contemporary church needs to be aware of the necessity for both personal religious experience and social action.

The artist may best indicate the values of man at any given period. He may portray the moral confusion of the day or the new ideas and persons on the scene that will affect tomorrow's interests and concerns. However, it is the theologian who must bear witness to the presence of God in the events of history and who must serve as an interpreter of his activity if history is to be seen as going somewhere and not merely repeating itself. Hesse reflects the values of contemporary man, to a degree, but Tillich places these values in a religious context--it is God's world as well as man's.

It is hoped that the insights of Hermann Hesse and Paul Tillich about what it means to be human and the direction man must go if there is to be a human future have been presented with fairness and with a grasp of the essential elements of the life and thought of both men. It is believed that what they have to say to modern man is significant.

NOTES

CHAPTER ONE

- ¹ Bernhard Zeller, Hermann Hesse: An Illustrated Biography, trans. by Mark Hollebhone (London: Peter Owen, Ltd., 1972), p. 8.
- ² Anna Otten, ed., Hesse Companion (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1970), p. 12.
- ³ Zeller, Hermann Hesse, p. 11. Zeller is dependent upon primary sources, but when he uses them he (or the translator) does not document the sources. This will be true in the references that follow by Zeller when it is obvious that the information is Hesse's and not Zeller's.
- ⁴ Ibid., p. 16.
- ⁵ Hermann Hesse, Autobiographical Writings, trans. by Denver Lindley (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, Inc., 1972), p. 4.
- ⁶ Ibid., p. 9.
- ⁷ Franz Baumer, Hermann Hesse, trans. by John Conway (New York: Frederick Ungar Publishing Co., 1969), p. 31.
- ⁸ Hesse, Autobiographical Writings, p. 17.
- ⁹ Ibid., p. 45.
- ¹⁰ George Wallis Field, Hermann Hesse (New York: Twayne Publishers, Inc., 1970), p. 26, quoting Ninon Hesse, ed., Kindheit und Jugend vor Neunzehnhundert: Hermann Hesse in Briefen und Lebenszeugnissen 1877-1895 (Frankfurt, 1966).
- ¹¹ Zeller, Hermann Hesse, p. 30.
- ¹² Ibid., p. 36.
- ¹³ Ibid., p. 38.
- ¹⁴ Ibid., p. 48.
- ¹⁵ Ibid., p. 50.
- ¹⁶ Ibid., p. 51.
- ¹⁷ Ibid., p. 54. Zeller, or his translator, is incorrect in designating that Hesse's first wife, Maria Bernoulli, was nine years younger than Hesse. In fact, she was nine years older than he, according to Joseph Mileck, Hermann Hesse and His Critics (Chapel Hill, North Carolina: University of North Carolina Press, 1958), p. 7.

NOTES TO PAGES 13-23

- ¹⁸ Ibid.
- ¹⁹ Hesse, Autobiographical Writings, p. 233.
- ²⁰ Ibid., p. 236.
- ²¹ Baumer, Hermann Hesse, p. 42.
- ²² Hermann Hesse, Poems, selected and translated by James Wright, Noonday (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, Inc., 1970), pp. 17-19.
- ²³ Hesse, Autobiographical Writings, p. 237.
- ²⁴ Zeller, Hermann Hesse, p. 74.
- ²⁵ Ibid., p. 76.
- ²⁶ Theodore Ziolkowski, Hermann Hesse (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966), p. 13.
- ²⁷ Zeller, Hermann Hesse, p. 81.
- ²⁸ Mileck, Hermann Hesse and His Critics, p. 9
- ²⁹ Ibid., p. 298.
- ³⁰ Zeller, Hermann Hesse, p. 85.
- ³¹ Hesse, Autobiographical Writings, p. 244.
- ³² Baumer, Hermann Hesse, p. 6. This is another example of Baumer quoting Hesse but without documentation.
- ³³ Hesse, Autobiographical Writings, p. 148.
- ³⁴ Zeller, Hermann Hesse, p. 98.
- ³⁵ Ibid., p. 111.
- ³⁶ Baumer, Hermann Hesse, p. 79. Either Baumer or his translator has incorrectly designated Ninon Dolbin's last name as Ausländer. That was Hesse's affectionate name for her which means "foreigner." She was from Austria.
- ³⁷ Ziolkowski, Hermann Hesse, p. 45.
- ³⁸ Zeller, Hermann Hesse, p. 124.
- ³⁹ Baumer, Hermann Hesse, p. 84.
- ⁴⁰ J. C. Middleton, "Hermann Hesse as Humanist" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Oxford University, 1954), p. 367.
- ⁴¹ Zeller, Hermann Hesse, p. 143.

NOTES TO PAGES 23-31

- ⁴²Ibid., p. 139.
- ⁴³Ibid., p. 158.
- ⁴⁴Ibid., p. 161.
- ⁴⁵Hesse, Autobiographical Writings, p. 284.
- ⁴⁶Ibid., p. 288.
- ⁴⁷Miguel Serrano, C. G. Jung and Hermann Hesse, trans. by Frank MacShane (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1966), p. 36.
- ⁴⁸Paul Tillich, Perspectives on 19th and 20th Century Protestant Theology, edited and with an Introduction by Carl E. Braaten (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, Inc., 1967), p. 22.
- ⁴⁹Ernst Rose, Faith from the Abyss: Hermann Hesse's Way from Romanticism to Modernity (London: Peter Owen, Ltd., 1966), p. 7.
- ⁵⁰Hermann Hesse, If the War Goes On: Reflections on War and Politics, trans. by Ralph Manheim, Noonday Books (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, Inc., 1971), p. 6.
- ⁵¹Hesse, Autobiographical Writings, p. 268.
- ⁵²Theodore Ziolkowski, The Novels of Hermann Hesse (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1965), pp. 236-237.
- ⁵³Rose, Faith from the Abyss, p. 157.
- ⁵⁴Middleton, "Hermann Hesse as Humanist," p. 219.
- ⁵⁵R. C. Andrews, "The Poetry of Hermann Hesse," German Life and Letters, VI (1953), 123.
- ⁵⁶Serrano, C. G. Jung and Hermann Hesse, p. 22.
- ⁵⁷Middleton, "Hermann Hesse as Humanist," p. 206.
- ⁵⁸Eugene F. Timpé, "Hesse's Siddhartha and the Bhagavad Gita," Comparative Literature, XXII (Fall, 1970), 350.
- ⁵⁹Harry Goldgar, "Hesse's Glasperlenspiel and the Game of Go," German Life and Letters, XX (1966-67), 133.
- ⁶⁰Baumer, Hermann Hesse, p. 90, quoting Hugo Ball, Hermann Hesse: Sein Leben und Sein Werk (Berlin und Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1963).
- ⁶¹Zeller, Hermann Hesse, p. 122.
- ⁶²Webster's Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary (16th ed.; Springfield, Massachusetts: G. & C. Merriam Co., 1967), p. 746.

NOTES TO PAGES 31-40

- ⁶³Paul Tillich, The Protestant Era, trans. by James Luther Adams, Phoenix Books (Abridged ed.; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957), p. 101.
- ⁶⁴Hermann Hesse, My Belief: Essays on Life and Art, edited and with an Introduction by Theodore Ziolkowski, trans. by Denver Lindley and Ralph Manheim (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, Inc., 1974), p. 181.
- ⁶⁵Ibid., p. 188.
- ⁶⁶George W. Field, "Goethe and Das Glasperlenspiel: Reflections on 'Alterswerke,'" German Life and Letters, XXIII (October, 1969), 97.
- ⁶⁷Karl Barth, From Rousseau to Ritschl, trans. by Brian Cozens (London: SCM Press, Ltd., 1959). The chapter on Novalis was most helpful.
- ⁶⁸Ibid., p. 231.
- ⁶⁹Zeller, Hermann Hesse, p. 38.
- ⁷⁰A Leslie Willson, "Hesse's Veil of Isis," Monatshefte, LV (1963), 313.
- ⁷¹Hesse, My Belief, p. 130.
- ⁷²Ibid., pp. 113-122. The information in this section was dependent upon Hesse's essay, "About Jean Paul."
- ⁷³Ibid., p. 120.
- ⁷⁴Burton Feldman and Robert D. Richardson, The Rise of Modern Mythology: 1680-1860 (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1972), p. 328.
- ⁷⁵Hesse, Poems, p. 37.
- ⁷⁶Zeller, Hermann Hesse, pp. 52-53.
- ⁷⁷Baumer, Hermann Hesse, p. 90.
- ⁷⁸Karl Barth, "Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart," in Religion and Culture, ed. by Walter Leibracht (London: SCM Press, Ltd., 1959), p. 68.
- ⁷⁹Ibid., p. 67.
- ⁸⁰Zeller, Hermann Hesse, p. 114.
- ⁸¹The information on Nietzsche is dependent upon two sources: Arthur C. Danto, Nietzsche as Philosopher (New York: Macmillan Co., 1965), and R. J. Hollingdale, Nietzsche: the Man and His Philosophy (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1965).
- ⁸²Tillich, Perspectives on 19th and 20th Century Protestant Theology, p. 200.

NOTES TO PAGES 40-47

- ⁸³Hesse, Autobiographical Writings, p. 87.
- ⁸⁴Baumer, Hermann Hesse, p. 56.
- ⁸⁵Hesse, My Belief, pp. 329-333.
- ⁸⁶Hesse, If the War Goes On, p. 7.
- ⁸⁷Hesse, Autobiographical Writings, p. 232.
- ⁸⁸Benjamin Nelson, "Hesse and Jung: Two Newly Recovered Letters," Psychoanalytic Review, L, No. 3 (1963), 15.
- ⁸⁹Eugene Webb, "Hermine and the Problem of Harry's Failure in Hesse's Steppenwolf," Modern Fiction Studies, XVII (Spring, 1971), 116.
- ⁹⁰Nelson, "Hesse and Jung," p. 16.
- ⁹¹Mileck, Hermann Hesse and His Critics, p. 69.
- ⁹²Ibid., p. 83.
- ⁹³Stephen Koch, "Prophet of Youth," The New Republic, CLVIII (June 13, 1968), p. 24.
- ⁹⁴Hermann Hesse, Betrachtungen und Briefe, Vol. VII of Gesammelte Schriften (7 vols.; Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1952-57), p. 508. Whenever the German text is included throughout this and other chapters, the translation that follows (unless otherwise documented) is that of the writer of this thesis.
- ⁹⁵Carl Jung, The Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious, Vol. IX, Part I of The Collected Works of C. G. Jung, ed. by Gerhard Adler, Michael Fordham, and Herbert Read; trans. (except for Vol. II) by R. F. C. Hull (20 vols., 2nd ed.; London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1961-), p. 281.
- ⁹⁶Avis M. Dry, The Psychology of Jung: A Critical Interpretation (London: Methuen and Co., Ltd., 1961), p. 300.
- ⁹⁷Carl Jung, Aion: Researches into the Phenomenology of the Self, Vol. IX, Part II of The Collected Works of C. G. Jung, p. 267.
- ⁹⁸Ibid., pp. 27-28.
- ⁹⁹Carl Jung, Symbols of Transformation, Vol. V of The Collected Works of C. G. Jung, p. 231.
- ¹⁰⁰Ibid., p. xxiv.
- ¹⁰¹Jolande Jacobi, The Psychology of C. G. Jung: An Introduction with Illustrations, trans. by Ralph Manheim, Yale Paperbound (6th ed., rev.; New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962), p. 12.
- ¹⁰²Carl Jung, Psychological Types, trans. by H. G. Baynes (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1923), pp. 333-336.

NOTES TO PAGES 48-56

- 103 Frieda Fordham, An Introduction to Jung's Psychology, A Pelican Original (3rd ed.; Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, Ltd., 1966), pp. 45-46.
- 104 Carl Jung, Two Essays on Analytical Psychology, trans. by R. F. C. Hull, Meridian Books (Cleveland: World Publishing Co., 1961), p. 167.
- 105 Jacobi, The Psychology of C. G. Jung, p. 27.
- 106 Fordham, An Introduction to Jung's Psychology, p. 50.
- 107 Jung, Aion, p. 22.
- 108 Jung, Two Essays on Analytical Psychology, p. 200.
- 109 Ibid., p. 201.
- 110 Fordham, An Introduction to Jung's Psychology, p. 55.
- 111 Jung, Aion, p. 14.
- 112 Jung, Symbols of Transformation, p. 322.
- 113 Fordham, An Introduction to Jung's Psychology, p. 64.
- 114 Middleton, "Hermann Hesse as Humanist," p. 269.
- 115 Carl Jung, Psychology and Religion, Yale Paperbound (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1960), p. 99.
- 116 Dry, The Psychology of Jung, p. 305.
- 117 Jung, Aion, p. 41.
- 118 Jacobi, The Psychology of C. G. Jung, p. 126.
- 119 Carl Jung, Modern Man in Search of a Soul, trans. by W. S. Dell and Cary F. Baynes, Harvest Books (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1955), p. 229.
- 120 Mileck, Hermann Hesse and His Critics, pp. 87-88.
- 121 Carl Jung, Psychology and Religion: West and East, Vol. XI of The Collected Works of C. G. Jung, pp. 492-493.
- 122 Hesse, Autobiographical Writings, p. 12.
- 123 Eugene Webb, "Hermine and the Problem of Harry's Failure in Hesse's Steppenwolf," p. 119.
- 124 Ibid., p. 121.
- 125 Hermann Hesse, "Artists and Psychoanalysis," Psychoanalytic Review, L, No. 3 (1963), 6.

NOTES TO PAGES 56-62

¹²⁶Ibid., p. 7.

¹²⁷Ibid., p. 9.

CHAPTER TWO

¹Ziolkowski, Hermann Hesse, p. 19.

²Hermann Hesse, Strange News from Another Star: and Other Tales, trans. by Denver Lindley, Noonday (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, Inc., 1972), p. 32.

³Zeller, Hermann Hesse, pp. 86-87.

⁴Hermann Hesse, Knulp: Three Tales from the Life of Knulp, trans. by Ralph Manheim, Noonday (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, Inc., 1971), p. 57.

⁵Ibid., pp. 64-65.

⁶Hermann Hesse, Demian: The Story of Emil Sinclair's Youth, trans. by Michael Roloff and Michael Lebeck, with an Introduction by Thomas Mann, Bantam Books (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, Inc., 1965), pp. 3-4.

⁷Ibid., p. 96.

⁸Ibid., p. 107.

⁹Hermann Hesse, The Glass Bead Game: (Magister Ludi), trans. by Richard Winston and Clara Winston, Penguin Books (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, Ltd., 1971), p. 79.

¹⁰Hermann Hesse, Steppenwolf, trans. by Basil Creighton, Bantam Books (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1963), p. 59.

¹¹Peter Heller, "The Creative Unconscious and the Spirit," Modern Language Forum, XXXVIII (1953), 37.

¹²Middleton, "Hermann Hesse as Humanist," p. 258.

¹³Heller, "The Creative Unconscious and the Spirit," p. 33.

¹⁴Ralph Freedman, "Romantic Imagination: Hermann Hesse as a Modern Novelist," Publications of the Modern Language Association of America, LXXIII (1958), 279.

¹⁵Hermann Hesse, Narziss and Goldmund, trans. by Geoffrey Dunlop, Penguin Books (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, Ltd., 1971), p. 178.

NOTES TO PAGES 62-68

- ¹⁶R. C. Andrews, "The Poetry of Hermann Hesse," German Life and Letters, VI (1953), 124.
- ¹⁷Walter Naumann, "The Individual and Society in the Work of Hermann Hesse," Monatshefte, XLI (1949), 36.
- ¹⁸Middleton, "Hermann Hesse as Humanist," p. 32.
- ¹⁹Dorrit Cohn, "Narration of Consciousness in Der Steppenwolf," Germanic Review, XLIV (1969), 121.
- ²⁰Hesse, Steppenwolf, p. 18.
- ²¹Hermann Hesse, Wandering: Notes and Sketches by Hermann Hesse, trans. by James Wright, Noonday (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, Inc., 1972), pp. 105-107.
- ²²Ibid., p. 109.
- ²³Andrews, "The Poetry of Hermann Hesse," p. 124.
- ²⁴Hesse, Knulp, p. 90.
- ²⁵Ibid., p. 84.
- ²⁶Ibid., pp. 103-104.
- ²⁷Ibid., pp. 107-108.
- ²⁸Hermann Hesse, Rosshalde, trans. by Ralph Manheim, Noonday (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, Inc., 1970), p. 78.
- ²⁹Ibid., p. 82.
- ³⁰Hermann Hesse, Gertrude, trans. by Hilda Rosner, Noonday (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, Inc., 1969), p. 3.
- ³¹Ibid.
- ³²Hesse, Narziss and Goldmund, p. 246.
- ³³Ibid., p. 263.
- ³⁴Hesse, The Glass Bead Game, pp. 73-74.
- ³⁵Ibid., p. 134.
- ³⁶Rudolf Koester, "Self-Realization: Hesse's Reflections on Youth," Monatshefte, LVII (1965), 185.
- ³⁷Hesse, If the War Goes On, p. 92.
- ³⁸Ibid., p. 109.

NOTES TO PAGES 68-75

- 39 Hesse, Demian, p. 72.
- 40 Middleton, "Hermann Hesse as Humanist," p. 192.
- 41 Hermann Hesse, Stories of Five Decades, edited and with an Introduction by Theodore Ziolkowski; trans. by Ralph Manheim, with two stories trans. by Denver Lindley (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, Inc., 1972), p. 42.
- 42 Ibid., p. 49.
- 43 Hesse, Gertrude, p. 167.
- 44 Hesse, If the War Goes On, p. 57.
- 45 Ibid., p. 62.
- 46 Hesse, Strange News from Another Star, p. 48.
- 47 Hesse, Demian, p. 4.
- 48 Hesse, The Glass Bead Game, pp. 78-79.
- 49 Rudolf Koester, "Portrayal of Age in Hesse's Narrative Prose," Germanic Review, XLI (1966), 113.
- 50 Hermann Hesse, Klingsor's Last Summer, trans. by Richard Winston and Clara Winston, Noonday (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, Inc., 1970), p. 199.
- 51 Ibid.
- 52 Hesse, Strange News from Another Star, p. 93.
- 53 Hermann Hesse, Peter Camenzind, trans. by Michael Roloff, Noonday (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, Inc., 1969), p. 15.
- 54 Hesse, Wandering, p. 57.
- 55 Hesse, Steppenwolf, p. 56.
- 56 Middleton, "Hermann Hesse as Humanist," p. 54.
- 57 Oskar Seidlin, "Hermann Hesse: the Exorcism of the Demon," Symposium, IV (1950), 341.
- 58 Hesse, Stories of Five Decades, p. 31.
- 59 Ibid., p. 97.
- 60 Ibid., p. 295.
- 61 Ibid., p. 115.

NOTES TO PAGES 75-85

- ⁶² Ibid., pp. 118-119.
- ⁶³ Hesse, If the War Goes On, p. 130.
- ⁶⁴ Ibid., p. 145.
- ⁶⁵ Hesse, Steppenwolf, p. 69.
- ⁶⁶ Ibid., p. 116.
- ⁶⁷ Hesse, Peter Camenzind, p. 121.
- ⁶⁸ Ibid., p. 146.
- ⁶⁹ Ibid., p. 182.
- ⁷⁰ Hesse, Gertrude, p. 88.
- ⁷¹ Ibid., p. 98.
- ⁷² Hesse, Klingsor's Last Summer, p. 97.
- ⁷³ Hermann Hesse, Siddhartha, trans. by Hilda Rosner, A New Directions Paperbook (New York: New Directions Publishing Corp., 1957), p. 99.
- ⁷⁴ Naumann, "The Individual and Society in the Work of Hermann Hesse," p. 37.
- ⁷⁵ Hesse, Rosshalde, p. 65.
- ⁷⁶ Ibid., p. 212.
- ⁷⁷ Hesse, The Glass Bead Game, p. 274.
- ⁷⁸ Hesse, Steppenwolf, p. 190.
- ⁷⁹ Kurt J. Fickert, "The Development of the Outsider Concept in Hesse's Novels," Monatshefte, LII (1960), 170.
- ⁸⁰ Naumann, "The Individual and Society in the Work of Hermann Hesse," pp. 38-39.
- ⁸¹ Tillich, Perspectives on 19th and 20th Century Protestant Theology, p. 45.
- ⁸² S. L. Flaxman, "Der Steppenwolf: Hesse's Portrait of the Intellectual," Modern Language Quarterly, XV (1954), 357.
- ⁸³ Maurice Benn, "An Interpretation of the Work of Hermann Hesse," German Life and Letters, III (1950), 205.
- ⁸⁴ Mark Boulby, Hermann Hesse: His Mind and Art, (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1967), p. 177.

NOTES TO PAGES 85-95

- ⁸⁵Roger Norton, "Hermann Hesse's Criticism of Technology," Germanic Review, XLIII (1968), 267.
- ⁸⁶Ibid., p. 268.
- ⁸⁷Hesse, Autobiographical Writings, p. 221.
- ⁸⁸Hesse, If the War Goes On, p. 123.
- ⁸⁹Hesse, Autobiographical Writings, p. 22.
- ⁹⁰Boulby, Hermann Hesse: His Mind and Art, p. 41.
- ⁹¹Hesse, If the War Goes On, p. 14.
- ⁹²Ibid., p. 32.
- ⁹³Hermann Hesse, Beneath the Wheel, trans. by Michael Roloff, Noonday (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, Inc., 1968), p. 49.
- ⁹⁴Rose, Faith from the Abyss, pp. 49-50.
- ⁹⁵Hesse, Klingsor's Last Summer, pp. 7-8.
- ⁹⁶Hesse, Stories of Five Decades, p. 152.
- ⁹⁷Hesse, Klingsor's Last Summer, p. 66.
- ⁹⁸Boulby, Hermann Hesse: His Mind and Art, p. 203.
- ⁹⁹Hesse, If the War Goes On, pp. 79-82.
- ¹⁰⁰Hesse, The Glass Bead Game, p. 177.
- ¹⁰¹Ibid., p. 434.
- ¹⁰²Seidlin, "Hermann Hesse: the Exorcism of the Demon," p. 336.
- ¹⁰³Hesse, Peter Camenzind, p. 100.
- ¹⁰⁴Hesse, Steppenwolf, p. 33.
- ¹⁰⁵Ibid., p. 12.
- ¹⁰⁶Peter Heller, "The Writer in Conflict with His Age," Monatshefte, XLVI (1954), 140.
- ¹⁰⁷Hesse, If the War Goes On, p. 73.
- ¹⁰⁸Ziolkowski, The Novels of Hermann Hesse, p. 48.
- ¹⁰⁹Hesse, Betrachtungen und Briefe, Vol. VII of Gesammelte Schriften, p. 501. As mentioned in the previous chapter, whenever the German text is included, the translation is that of the writer of this thesis.

NOTES TO PAGES 95-105

- 110 Hesse, Gertrude, pp. 41-42.
- 111 Boulby, Hermann Hesse: His Mind and Art, p. 129.
- 112 Ibid., pp. 143-156.
- 113 Hesse, Knulp, p. 23.
- 114 Ibid., p. 55.
- 115 Boulby, Hermann Hesse: His Mind and Art, p. 231.
- 116 Ziolkowski, The Novels of Hermann Hesse, p. 49.
- 117 Hesse, The Glass Bead Game, p. 414.
- 118 Ziolkowski, The Novels of Hermann Hesse, p. 19.
- 119 Hesse, If the War Goes On, p. 116.
- 120 Ibid., p. 122.
- 121 Ibid., p. 146.
- 122 Ibid., p. 147.
- 123 Hesse, Gertrude, p. 152.
- 124 Ibid., pp. 230-231.
- 125 Ziolkowski, The Novels of Hermann Hesse, p. 109.
- 126 Hesse, Siddhartha, p. 88.
- 127 Hesse, Steppenwolf, p. 40.
- 128 Ibid., p. 51.
- 129 Ibid., p. 176.
- 130 Hermann Hesse, The Journey to the East, trans. by Hilda Rosner, Noonday (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, Inc., 1956), p. 27.
- 131 Boulby, Hermann Hesse: His Mind and Art, p. 294.
- 132 Hesse, Wandering, p. 67.
- 133 Eva J. Engel, "Hermann Hesse," German Men of Letters, II (1963), 263.
- 134 Ziolkowski, The Novels of Hermann Hesse, p. 24.
- 135 Hesse, Narziss and Goldmund, p. 298.
- 136 Hesse, Betrachtungen und Briefe, Vol. VII of Gesammelte Schriften, p. 685.

NOTES TO PAGES 105-114

- 137 Naumann, "The Individual and Society in the Work of Hermann Hesse," p. 41.
- 138 Hesse, Klingsor's Last Summer, p. 101.
- 139 Hesse, Stories of Five Decades, pp. 283-285.
- 140 Seidlin, "Hermann Hesse: the Exorcism of the Demon," p. 328.
- 141 Rose, Faith from the Abyss, p. 65.
- 142 Engel, "Hermann Hesse," p. 256.
- 143 Hesse, Stories of Five Decades, p. 263.
- 144 Hesse, Demian, pp. 123-124.
- 145 Hesse, Siddhartha, p. 32.
- 146 Ziolkowski, The Novels of Hermann Hesse, p. 35.
- 147 Hesse, My Belief, p. 189.
- 148 Ziolkowski, The Novels of Hermann Hesse, p. 57.
- 149 Hilde Cohn, "The Symbolic End of Hermann Hesse's Glasperlenspiel," Modern Language Quarterly, XI (1950), 356.
- 150 Boulby, Hermann Hesse: His Mind and Art, p. 318.
- 151 Ibid., p. 137.
- 152 Benn, "An Interpretation of the Work of Hermann Hesse," p. 206.
- 153 Hesse, Betrachtungen und Briefe, Vol. VII of Gesammelte Schriften, p. 487.
- 154 Inge D. Halpert, "Vita Activa and Vita Contemplativa," Monatshefte, LIII (1961), p. 159.
- 155 Ibid., p. 162.
- 156 Koester, "Portrayal of Age in Hesse's Narrative Prose," p. 116.
- 157 Ralph Freedman, The Lyrical Novel: Studies in Hermann Hesse, André Gide, and Virginia Woolf (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 53.
- 158 Middleton, "Hermann Hesse as Humanist," p. 84.
- 159 Hesse, Demian, p. 115.
- 160 Rose, Faith from the Abyss, p. 69.
- 161 Heller, "The Creative Unconscious and the Spirit," p. 28.

NOTES TO PAGES 114-124

- 162 Ibid., p. 35.
- 163 Ziolkowski, The Novels of Hermann Hesse, p. 246.
- 164 Ibid., p. 248.
- 165 Hesse, Narziss and Goldmund, p. 268.
- 166 Ibid., p. 287.
- 167 Ibid., pp. 287-288.
- 168 Hesse, The Journey to the East, p. 57.
- 169 Hesse, Autobiographical Writings, pp. 167-168.
- 170 Freedman, "Romantic Imagination," p. 283.
- 171 Hesse, Gertrude, p. 123.
- 172 Ibid., p. 210.
- 173 Hesse, Steppenwolf, p. 151.
- 174 Hesse, The Glass Bead Game, p. 57.
- 175 Ziolkowski, The Novels of Hermann Hesse, p. 172.
- 176 Ibid., p. 210.
- 177 Boulby, Hermann Hesse: His Mind and Art, p. 204.
- 178 Ziolkowski, Hermann Hesse, p. 25.
- 179 Freedman, "Romantic Imagination," p. 280.
- 180 Hesse, Autobiographical Writings, p. 58.
- 181 Rose, Faith from the Abyss, p. 56.
- 182 Ziolkowski, The Novels of Hermann Hesse, p. 217.
- 183 Ibid., pp. 217-219.
- 184 Engel, "Hermann Hesse," p. 264.
- 185 Hesse, The Glass Bead Game, pp. 371-372.
- 186 Middleton, "Hermann Hesse as Humanist," p. 428.
- 187 Hesse, The Glass Bead Game, pp. 25-26.
- 188 Ibid., p. 433.

NOTES TO PAGES 124-131

- 189 Ibid., p. 278.
- 190 Ibid., p. 291.
- 191 Ibid., p. 334.
- 192 Rose, Faith from the Abyss, p. 139.
- 193 Hesse, The Glass Bead Game, p. 309.
- 194 Middleton, "Hermann Hesse as Humanist," p. 391.
- 195 Willson, "Hesse's Veil of Isis," p. 321.
- 196 G. W. Field, "On the Genesis of the Glasperlenspiel," The German Quarterly, XLI (1968), 686.
- 197 Middleton, "Hermann Hesse as Humanist," p. 301.
- 198 Ziolkowski, The Novels of Hermann Hesse, p. 302.
- 199 Tillich, Perspectives on 19th and 20th Century Protestant Theology, p. 170.
- 200 Andrews, "The Poetry of Hermann Hesse," p. 126.
- 201 Hesse, My Belief, p. 179.
- 202 Hesse, If the War Goes On, p. 157.
- 203 Ziolkowski, The Novels of Hermann Hesse, p. 339.

CHAPTER THREE

- ¹ Koch, "Prophet of Youth," p. 23.
- ² Baumer, Hermann Hesse, p. 97.
- ³ Ibid., p. 78.
- ⁴ Thomas Mann, "Introduction" to Hesse, Demian, p. vii.
- ⁵ Freedman, The Lyrical Novel, p. 72.
- ⁶ Ibid., p. 118.
- ⁷ Hesse, If the War Goes On, pp. 182-183.
- ⁸ Alfred Werner, "Hermann Hesse," South Atlantic Quarterly, LII (1953), 388.
- ⁹ Stanley R. Townsend, "The German Humanist Hermann Hesse," (Nobel Prize Winner in 1946), Modern Language Forum, XXXII (1947), 1.

NOTES TO PAGES 131-137

- 10 Ibid., p. 5.
- 11 Baumer, Hermann Hesse, p. 80.
- 12 Andrews, "The Poetry of Hermann Hesse," p. 126.
- 13 Mileck, Hermann Hesse and His Critics, p. 35.
- 14 Joseph Mileck, "The Prose of Hermann Hesse: Life, Substance, and Form," The German Quarterly, XXVII (May, 1954), 168.
- 15 Ibid., p. 164.
- 16 Heller, "The Writer in Conflict with His Age," p. 138.
- 17 Middleton, "Hermann Hesse as Humanist," p. iv.
- 18 Ibid., p. 432.
- 19 Peter B. Gontrum, "Hermann Hesse as a Critic of French Literature," Symposium, XIX (Fall, 1965), 234.
- 20 Eugene F. Timpe, "Hermann Hesse in the United States," Symposium, XXIII (Spring, 1969), 74-75.
- 21 Hesse, Rosshalde, p. 100.
- 22 D. J. Enright, Man Is an Onion: Reviews and Essays (London: Chatto and Windus, 1972), p. 73.
- 23 Mileck, "The Prose of Hermann Hesse," pp. 172-173.
- 24 Ziolkowski, Hermann Hesse, p. 45.
- 25 Koch, "Prophet of Youth," p. 23.
- 26 Hesse, Poems, p. 3.
- 27 Ralph Freedman, "Hermann Hesse," Contemporary Literature, X (Summer, 1969), 421.
- 28 Egon Schwarz, "Hermann Hesse, The American Youth Movement, and Problems of Literary Evaluation," Publications of the Modern Language Association of America, LXXXV (October, 1970), 978.
- 29 Ibid.
- 30 Freedman, "Hermann Hesse," p. 426.
- 31 Werner, "Hermann Hesse," p. 386.
- 32 Hesse, Autobiographical Writings, p. 187.
- 33 Mileck, "The Prose of Hermann Hesse," p. 170.
- 34 Ziolkowski, Hermann Hesse, p. 3.

NOTES TO PAGES 137-155

- 35 Freedman, "Romantic Imagination," p. 276.
- 36 Mileck, "The Prose of Hermann Hesse," p. 172.
- 37 Hesse, Beneath the Wheel, p. 180.
- 38 Hesse, Gertrude, p. 5.
- 39 Hesse, Wandering, p. 50.
- 40 Hesse, Klingsor's Last Summer, pp. 167, 169.
- 41 Ibid., p. 190.
- 42 Ibid., p. 213.
- 43 Hesse, My Belief, p. 79.
- 44 Ibid., p. 92.
- 45 Hesse, The Glass Bead Game, p. 163.
- 46 Baumer, Hermann Hesse, p. 108.
- 47 Ziolkowski, Hermann Hesse, p. 16.
- 48 Hesse, Betrachtungen und Briefe, Vol. VII of Gesammelte Schriften, p. 497.
- 49 Hesse, Poems, pp. 55-59.
- 50 Hesse, Autobiographical Writings, p. 87.
- 51 Ibid., pp. 121-122.
- 52 Ibid., p. 164.
- 53 Hesse, Betrachtungen und Briefe, Vol. VII of Gesammelte Schriften, pp. 94-95.
- 54 Mileck, Hermann Hesse and His Critics, p. 177.
- 55 Thomas E. Colby, "The Impenitent Prodigal: Hermann Hesse's Hero," The German Quarterly, XL (1967), 15-16.
- 56 Hesse, Gertrude, p. 235.
- 57 Hesse, Knulp, p. 113.
- 58 Hesse, Klingsor's Last Summer, p. 160.
- 59 Heller, "The Creative Unconscious and the Spirit," p. 31.
- 60 Koester, "Self-Realization," p. 184.

NOTES TO PAGES 155-166

- 61 Matt. 22:37-39. (R.S.V.)
- 62 Engel, "Hermann Hesse," p. 270.
- 63 Hesse, My Belief, p. 199.
- 64 Seidlin, "Hermann Hesse: the Exorcism of the Demon," p. 346.
- 65 Hesse, Narziss and Goldmund, p. 45.
- 66 Seidlin, "Hermann Hesse: the Exorcism of the Demon," p. 348.
- 67 Ziolkowski, The Novels of Hermann Hesse, p. 140.
- 68 Frank Trippett, "The Hesse Trip," Look, XXXV (Feb. 23, 1971), 54.
- 69 Webster Schott, "A German Guru Makes the U.S. Scene Again," Life, LXV, No. 1 (July 12, 1968), 8.
- 70 Rose, Faith from the Abyss, p. 91.
- 71 Hesse, Autobiographical Writings, p. 134.
- 72 Hesse, Demian, p. 138.
- 73 Rose, Faith from the Abyss, p. 57, quoting Hesse, Betrachtungen und Briefe, Vol. VII of Gesammelte Schriften, p. 213.
- 74 Haller, "The Writer in Conflict with His Age," p. 142, quoting Hesse, Briefe (Berlin-Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1951), p. 187.
- 75 Ibid., p. 146.
- 76 Baumer, Hermann Hesse, pp. 100-101. Baumer quotes Hesse's reply to Dr. M. A. Jordan which was in an open letter entitled "The Writer's Mission." The letter appeared in the Benediktinische Monatschrift of the Arch-Abbey of Beuron.
- 77 Hesse, Journey to the East, p. 34.
- 78 Ziolkowski, The Novels of Hermann Hesse, p. 289.
- 79 Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology (3 vols.; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951-63), II, 26.
- 80 Rudolf Bultmann, Jesus Christ and Mythology (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958), p. 53.
- 81 Colin Wilson, The Outsider (3rd ed.; London: Pan Books, Ltd., 1963), p. 70.
- 82 Henry S. Resnik, "How Hermann Hesse Speaks to the College Generation," The Saturday Review, LII, No. 3 (October 18, 1969), 35-36.

NOTES TO PAGES 166-176

- ⁸³ George Steiner, "Eastward Ho!" New Yorker, XLIV (January 18, 1969), 93.
- ⁸⁴ Ibid.
- ⁸⁵ Hesse, Gertrude, pp. 132-133.
- ⁸⁶ Ibid., pp. 156-157.
- ⁸⁷ Hesse, Narziss and Goldmund, p. 65.
- ⁸⁸ Middleton, "Hermann Hesse as Humanist," p. 366.
- ⁸⁹ Field, Hermann Hesse, p. 172, quoting Hesse, Briefe, p. 457.

CHAPTER FOUR

- ¹ Paul Tillich, "Autobiographical Reflections," The Theology of Paul Tillich, Vol. I of The Library of Living Theology, ed. by Charles W. Kegley and Robert W. Bretall, Macmillan Paperbacks (New York: Macmillan Co., 1952), p. 6.
- ² Ibid., p. 4.
- ³ Paul Tillich, On the Boundary: An Autobiographical Sketch, Part I of The Interpretation of History, The Scribner Library (Rev. ed.; New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1966), p. 14.
- ⁴ Ibid.
- ⁵ Ibid., p. 16.
- ⁶ D. Mackenzie Brown, ed., Ultimate Concern: Tillich in Dialogue (London: SCM Press, Ltd., 1965), p. 181.
- ⁷ Tillich, On the Boundary, p. 18.
- ⁸ Rollo May, Paulus: Reminiscences of a Friendship (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, Inc., 1973), p. 78.
- ⁹ Tillich, On the Boundary, p. 20.
- ¹⁰ Brown, Ultimate Concern, p. 181.
- ¹¹ Ibid., p. 182.
- ¹² Tillich, On the Boundary, p. 24.
- ¹³ Ibid., p. 26.
- ¹⁴ Ibid., p. 27.

NOTES TO PAGES 176-183

- ¹⁵Paul Tillich, My Search for Absolutes, with drawings by Saul Steinberg, Credo Perspectives, planned and edited by Ruth Nanda Anshen (New York: Simon and Schuster, Inc., 1967), p. 38.
- ¹⁶Tillich, On the Boundary, p. 31.
- ¹⁷May, Paulus, p. 52.
- ¹⁸Tillich, "Autobiographical Reflections," The Theology of Paul Tillich, p. 12.
- ¹⁹Brown, Ultimate Concern, p. xv.
- ²⁰Guyton B. Hammond, The Power of Self-transcendence: An Introduction to the Philosophical Theology of Paul Tillich, The Library of Contemporary Theology (St. Louis, Missouri: Bethany Press, 1966), p. 27.
- ²¹The personal information that is included in this paragraph is dependent upon the following source: Hannah Tillich, From Time to Time (New York: Stein and Day, 1973), pp. 84-86.
- ²²Ibid., p. 103.
- ²³May, Paulus, p. 49.
- ²⁴Bernard Martin, Paul Tillich's Doctrine of Man (Digswell Place, Welwyn, Herts: James Nisbet and Co., Ltd., 1966), p. 20.
- ²⁵Brown, Ultimate Concern, p. 39.
- ²⁶Hannah Tillich, From Time to Time, p. 129.
- ²⁷Ibid., p. 144.
- ²⁸May, Paulus, p. 45.
- ²⁹J. Frederick McKirachan, "The Preaching of Paul Tillich," The Princeton Seminary Bulletin, LIII (January, 1960), 33.
- ³⁰Tillich, On the Boundary, p. 39.
- ³¹May, Paulus, p. 10.
- ³²Paul Tillich, The Interpretation of History, trans. by N. A. Rosetzki and Elsa L. Talmey (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1936), p. 68.
- ³³Paul Tillich, "Beyond Religious Socialism: How My Mind Has Changed," Christian Century, LXVI (June 15, 1949), 732.
- ³⁴Tillich, "Autobiographical Reflections," The Theology of Paul Tillich, p. 19.
- ³⁵Hannah Tillich, From Time to Time, p. 181.
- ³⁶Ibid., p. 182.

NOTES TO PAGES 184-193

- 37 Paul Tillich, My Travel Diary: 1936: Between Two Worlds, edited and with an Introduction by Jerald C. Brauer; trans. by Maria Pelikan; Drawings by Alfonso Ossorio (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, Inc., 1970), p. 14.
- 38 Ibid., p. 77.
- 39 Ibid., p. 50.
- 40 Ibid., p. 95.
- 41 Hannah Tillich, From Time to Time, p. 175.
- 42 May, Paulus, p. 63.
- 43 Hannah Tillich, From Time to Time, p. 241.
- 44 Paul Tillich, Theology of Culture, ed. by Robert C. Kimball (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959), p. 165.
- 45 Tillich, My Travel Diary: 1936, p. 162.
- 46 Hannah Tillich, From Time to Time, p. 171.
- 47 May, Paulus, p. 32.
- 48 Ibid., p. 71. Although Rollo May is quoting Tillich, he does not document his source.
- 49 Ibid., p. 80.
- 50 Ibid., p. 84.
- 51 Hannah Tillich, From Time to Time, p. 185.
- 52 Ibid., p. 24.
- 53 Ibid., p. 201.
- 54 Ibid., p. 202.
- 55 Hammond, The Power of Self-transcendence, p. 30.
- 56 Paul Tillich, The Future of Religions, ed. by Jerald C. Brauer (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, Inc., 1966), p. 7.
- 57 Hannah Tillich, From Time to Time, p. 223.
- 58 May, Paulus, p. 106.
- 59 Paul Tillich, A History of Christian Thought, ed. by Carl E. Braaten (London: SCM Press, Ltd., 1968), p. 93.
- 60 Ibid., p. 7.

NOTES TO PAGES 194-202

- 61 Tillich, The Protestant Era, p. 6.
- 62 Ibid., p. 86.
- 63 Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology (3 vols.; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951-63), I, 110.
- 64 Tillich, A History of Christian Thought, p. 29.
- 65 Tillich, The Future of Religions, p. 74.
- 66 Tillich, A History of Christian Thought, p. 6.
- 67 Ibid.
- 68 Ibid., p. 195.
- 69 Ibid., p. 50.
- 70 Ibid., p. 51.
- 71 Ibid., p. 54.
- 72 Ibid., p. 104.
- 73 Ibid., p. 108.
- 74 Ibid., pp. 115-117.
- 75 Ibid., p. 129.
- 76 Wilhelm Pauck, "The Sources of Paul Tillich's Richness," in Tillich's book, The Future of Religions, p. 25.
- 77 Tillich, A History of Christian Thought, p. 202.
- 78 Ibid., p. 93.
- 79 Tillich, Perspectives on 19th and 20th Century Protestant Theology, p. 77.
- 80 Tillich, On the Boundary, p. 74.
- 81 Tillich, A History of Christian Thought, p. 229.
- 82 Ibid., p. 235.
- 83 Ibid., p. 236.
- 84 Ibid., p. 248.
- 85 Tillich, Interpretation of History, p. 54.
- 86 Tillich, Perspectives on 19th and 20th Century Protestant Theology, p. xxix.

NOTES TO PAGES 202-210

- 87 Ibid., p. 194.
- 88 Ibid., p. 24.
- 89 Ibid., p. 27.
- 90 Ibid., pp. 64-65.
- 91 Ibid. p. 66.
- 92 Alistair Macleod, Paul Tillich: An Essay on the Role of Ontology in His Philosophical Theology (London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1973), p. 19.
- 93 Tillich, On the Boundary, p. 53.
- 94 Brown, Ultimate Concern, p. 56.
- 95 Tillich, Perspectives on 19th and 20th Century Protestant Theology, p. 81.
- 96 Ibid.
- 97 Walter Leibrecht, "The Life and Mind of Paul Tillich," Religion and Culture, ed. by Walter Leibrecht (London: SCM Press, Ltd., 1959), p. 66.
- 98 Tillich, Interpretation of History, p. 7.
- 99 Tillich, Perspectives on 19th and 20th Century Protestant Theology, p. 125.
- 100 Ibid., p. 143.
- 101 Ibid., p. 145.
- 102 Ibid., p. 88.
- 103 David Hopper, Tillich: A Theological Portrait (New York: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1968), p. 122.
- 104 Ibid., p. 125.
- 105 Ibid.
- 106 Tillich, Perspectives on 19th and 20th Century Protestant Theology, p. 148.
- 107 Ibid., p. 82.
- 108 Ibid., p. 96.
- 109 Ibid., p. 100.

NOTES TO PAGES 210-217

- 110 Ibid., p. 110.
- 111 Ibid., p. 21.
- 112 William L. Reese, "Interrogation of Paul Tillich," Philosophical Interrogations, ed. by Sydney Rome and Beatrice Rome, Harper Torchbook (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, Inc., 1970), p. 359.
- 113 Tillich, Perspectives on 19th and 20th Century Protestant Theology, p. 115.
- 114 Ibid., p. 120.
- 115 Ibid., p. 121.
- 116 Ibid., p. 131.
- 117 Ibid., p. 244.
- 118 Paul Tillich, "The Person in a Technical Society," Christian Faith and Social Action, ed. by John A. Hutchison (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1953), p. 137.
- 119 Tillich, Perspectives on 19th and 20th Century Protestant Theology, p. 245.
- 120 Ibid., pp. 164-165.
- 121 Ibid., p. 168.
- 122 Ibid., p. 173.
- 123 Tillich, "The Person in a Technical Society," p. 138.
- 124 Tillich, Perspectives on 19th and 20th Century Protestant Theology, pp. 140-141.
- 125 Ibid., p. 180.
- 126 R. E. Fitch, "Social Philosophy of Paul Tillich," Religion in Life, XXVII (Spring, 1958), 251.
- 127 Ibid., p. 252.
- 128 Tillich, Perspectives on 19th and 20th Century Protestant Theology, p. 238.
- 129 Tillich, "The Person in a Technical Society," p. 140.
- 130 Tillich, Perspectives on 19th and 20th Century Protestant Theology, p. 187.
- 131 Tillich, On the Boundary, p. 53.

NOTES TO PAGES 217-226

- 132 Tillich, The Future of Religions, p. 30.
- 133 Tillich, On the Boundary, pp. 47-48.
- 134 Tillich, Interpretation of History, p. 24.
- 135 Tillich, The Future of Religions, p. 25.
- 136 Tillich, Perspectives on 19th and 20th Century Protestant Theology, p. 231.
- 137 Ibid., p. 233.
- 138 Macleod, Paul Tillich, pp. 18-19.
- 139 T. E. McCollough, "Ontology of Tillich and Biblical Personalism," Scottish Journal of Theology, XV (September, 1962), 266.
- 140 Tillich, The Future of Religions, p. 88.
- 141 Ibid., p. 29.
- 142 Brown, Ultimate Concern, p. 191.
- 143 Tillich, Systematic Theology, Vol. I, p. 6.
- 144 Ibid., p. 8.
- 145 Ibid.
- 146 Ibid., p. 11.
- 147 Ibid., p. 10.
- 148 Ibid., p. 22.
- 149 Ibid., p. 40.
- 150 Ibid., p. 50.
- 151 Ibid., p. 106.
- 152 Pauck, "The Sources of Paul Tillich's Richness" in The Future of Religions, p. 24.

CHAPTER FIVE

- ¹ Tillich, Systematic Theology, Vol. I, p. 62.
- ² Ibid.
- ³ Paul Tillich, Biblical Religion and the Search for Ultimate Reality, Phoenix Books (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955), p. 11.

NOTES TO PAGES 226-230

- ⁴Tillich, The Protestant Era, p. 87.
- ⁵Tillich, Systematic Theology, Vol. I, p. 72.
- ⁶Tillich, The Protestant Era, p. 87.
- ⁷Ibid., p. 197.
- ⁸Paul Tillich, Dynamics of Faith, World Perspective Series, Vol. X, planned and edited by Ruth Nanda Anshen, Harper Torchbook (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957), p. 75.
- ⁹Ibid., p. 79.
- ¹⁰Tillich, Systematic Theology, Vol. I, p. 49.
- ¹¹Ibid., p. 169.
- ¹²Ibid., p. 170.
- ¹³Ibid., p. 171.
- ¹⁴Ibid., p. 94.
- ¹⁵Ibid., p. 108.
- ¹⁶Ibid., p. 147.
- ¹⁷Ibid., p. 186.
- ¹⁸Ibid., p. 189.
- ¹⁹Paul Tillich, The Shaking of the Foundations, The Scribner Library (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1948), p. 112.
- ²⁰Guyton B. Hammond, Man in Estrangement (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1965), p. 88.
- ²¹Paul Tillich, "The Nature of Man," Journal of Philosophy, XLIII (December 5, 1946), 676.
- ²²Paul Tillich, The Courage to Be, Yale Paperbound (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1952), p. 35.
- ²³Ibid., p. 41.
- ²⁴Tillich, Systematic Theology, Vol. I, p. 193.
- ²⁵Paul Tillich, "The Conception of Man in Existential Philosophy," Journal of Religion, XIX (July, 1939), 211.
- ²⁶Paul Tillich, The Eternal Now (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1963), p. 15.

NOTES TO PAGES 230-238

- 27 Tillich, The Courage to Be, p. 50.
- 28 Ibid., p. 47.
- 29 Ibid., pp. 54-55.
- 30 Tillich, Systematic Theology, Vol. II, p. 35.
- 31 Ibid., p. 44.
- 32 Reese, "Interrogation of Paul Tillich," p. 400.
- 33 Paul Tillich, "The Good I Will, I Do Not," Religion in Life, XXVIII (Fall, 1959), 540.
- 34 Ibid., p. 545.
- 35 Tillich, Systematic Theology, Vol. II, p. 46.
- 36 Ibid., pp. 47-55.
- 37 Tillich, Dynamics of Faith, p. 22.
- 38 Tillich, The Eternal Now, pp. 148-149.
- 39 Paul Tillich, "Existentialism, Psychotherapy, and the Nature of Man," Pastoral Psychology, XI (June, 1960), 12.
- 40 Tillich, Systematic Theology, Vol. I, p. 202.
- 41 Tillich, My Search for Absolutes, p. 73.
- 42 Ibid., p. 74.
- 43 Tillich, Systematic Theology, Vol. I, p. 206.
- 44 Tillich, "Existentialism, Psychotherapy, and the Nature of Man," p. 14.
- 45 Tillich, Systematic Theology, Vol. II, p. 20.
- 46 Ibid., p. 31.
- 47 Ibid., pp. 31-32.
- 48 Brown, Ultimate Concern, p. 17.
- 49 Paul Tillich, "Freedom in the Period of Transformation," in Freedom: Its Meaning, planned and edited by Ruth Nanda Anshen (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1940), p. 125.
- 50 Tillich, "Existentialism, Psychotherapy, and the Nature of Man," p. 11.

NOTES TO PAGES 238-243

- ⁵¹Paul Tillich, "Human Nature Can Change," American Journal of Psychoanalysis, XII, No. 1 (1952), 66.
- ⁵²Paul Tillich, "What Is Basic in Human Nature?" Pastoral Psychology, XIV (February, 1963), 16.
- ⁵³Ibid., p. 13.
- ⁵⁴Tillich, The Protestant Era, p. 29.
- ⁵⁵Ibid., p. 30.
- ⁵⁶Ibid., p. 73.
- ⁵⁷Tillich, My Search for Absolutes, p. 95.
- ⁵⁸Hammond, Man in Estrangement, p. 137.
- ⁵⁹Ibid., p. 165.
- ⁶⁰Tillich, Systematic Theology, Vol. II, p. 33.
- ⁶¹Ibid., p. 34.
- ⁶²Ibid., p. 35.
- ⁶³Ibid.
- ⁶⁴Tillich, "The Conception of Man in Existential Philosophy," p. 209.
- ⁶⁵Tillich, Systematic Theology, Vol. II, p. 38.
- ⁶⁶Ibid., p. 44.
- ⁶⁷Reinhold Niebuhr, "Biblical Thought and Ontological Speculation in Tillich's Theology," in The Theology of Paul Tillich, pp. 216-227.
- ⁶⁸Tillich, Systematic Theology, Vol. III, p. 223.
- ⁶⁹Tillich, The Shaking of the Foundations, p. 139.
- ⁷⁰Paul Tillich, "The Religious Symbol," in Symbolism in Religion and Literature, edited and with an Introduction by Rollo May (New York: George Braziller, Inc., 1960), p. 77.
- ⁷¹Paul Tillich, "The Meaning and Justification of Religious Symbols," Religious Experience and Truth, ed. by Sidney Hook (New York: New York University Press, 1961), p. 11.
- ⁷²Tillich, Dynamics of Faith, pp. 41-43.
- ⁷³Ibid., p. 49.
- ⁷⁴Hammond, The Power of Self-transcendence, p. 75.

NOTES TO PAGES 243-249

- ⁷⁵Paul Tillich, The New Being (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1955), pp. 120-121.
- ⁷⁶Tillich, The Protestant Era, p. 78.
- ⁷⁷Ibid.
- ⁷⁸Tillich, The Eternal Now, p. 160.
- ⁷⁹Tillich, Systematic Theology, Vol. I, p. 110.
- ⁸⁰Ibid., p. 211.
- ⁸¹Ibid., p. 235.
- ⁸²Brown, Ultimate Concern, p. 24.
- ⁸³Ibid., p. 10.
- ⁸⁴Tillich, Systematic Theology, Vol. I, p. 237.
- ⁸⁵Ibid., p. 243.
- ⁸⁶Tillich, Biblical Religion and the Search for Ultimate Reality, p. 29.
- ⁸⁷Paul Tillich, "Faith and the Integration of the Personality," Pastoral Psychology, VIII (March, 1957), 11.
- ⁸⁸Ibid., p. 12.
- ⁸⁹Tillich, Systematic Theology, Vol. I, p. 250.
- ⁹⁰Ibid., p. 267.
- ⁹¹Tillich, The Courage to Be, p. 186.
- ⁹²Tillich, The New Being, p. 26.
- ⁹³Paul Tillich, "Being and Love," in Moral Principles of Action, ed. by Ruth Nanda Anshen (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1952), p. 661.
- ⁹⁴Ibid., p. 671.
- ⁹⁵Tillich, Theology of Culture, p. 10.
- ⁹⁶Tillich, Systematic Theology, Vol. II, p. 149.
- ⁹⁷Ibid., p. 98.
- ⁹⁸Ibid.
- ⁹⁹Ibid., p. 100.

NOTES TO PAGES 249-256

- ¹⁰⁰Ibid., pp. 117-118. This sentence and those that immediately follow are dependent upon these pages.
- ¹⁰¹Ibid., p. 110.
- ¹⁰²Brown, Ultimate Concern, p. 143.
- ¹⁰³Tillich, Systematic Theology, Vol. II, pp. 118-119.
- ¹⁰⁴Ibid., p. 123.
- ¹⁰⁵Ibid., p. 106.
- ¹⁰⁶Ibid., pp. 146-147.
- ¹⁰⁷Ibid., p. 155.
- ¹⁰⁸Tillich, The New Being, p. 24.
- ¹⁰⁹Tillich, Systematic Theology, Vol. II, p. 166.
- ¹¹⁰Ibid.
- ¹¹¹Tillich, The Shaking of the Foundations, p. 106.
- ¹¹²Tillich, Systematic Theology, Vol. II, p. 177.
- ¹¹³Tillich, Dynamics of Faith, p. 32.
- ¹¹⁴Ibid., p. 71.
- ¹¹⁵Ibid., p. 100.
- ¹¹⁶Tillich, The Shaking of the Foundations, pp. 161-162.
- ¹¹⁷Tillich, The Eternal Now, p. 32.
- ¹¹⁸Tillich, Systematic Theology, Vol. II, pp. 179-180.
- ¹¹⁹Tillich, Systematic Theology, Vol. III, p. 36.
- ¹²⁰Tillich, "Human Nature Can Change," p. 67.
- ¹²¹Tillich, The Shaking of the Foundations, p. 63.
- ¹²²Tillich, The New Being, p. 146.
- ¹²³Tillich, The Eternal Now, p. 149.
- ¹²⁴Tillich, Systematic Theology, Vol. III, p. 24.
- ¹²⁵Ibid., p. 26.
- ¹²⁶Ibid., p. 38.

NOTES TO PAGES 256-264

- 127 Ibid., pp. 31-32.
- 128 Ibid., p. 42.
- 129 Ibid., p. 96.
- 130 Ibid., p. 107.
- 131 Ibid., p. 109.
- 132 Ibid., p. 112.
- 133 Ibid., p. 128.
- 134 Ibid., p. 231.
- 135 Ibid., pp. 231-232.
- 136 Ibid., p. 233.
- 137 Ibid.
- 138 Ibid., p. 235.
- 139 Ibid.
- 140 Ibid., p. 236.
- 141 Ibid., p. 237.
- 142 Tillich, The Protestant Era, p. 212.
- 143 Tillich, The Eternal Now, pp. 84-85.
- 144 Ibid., p. 157.
- 145 Tillich, The Protestant Era, p. 125.
- 146 Clark A. Kucheman, "Professor Tillich: Justice and the Economic Order," Journal of Religion, XLVI (January, 1966), 167.
- 147 Tillich, Theology of Culture, p. 42.
- 148 Tillich, Systematic Theology, Vol. I, p. 85.
- 149 Tillich, Systematic Theology, Vol. III, p. 139.
- 150 Tillich, The Protestant Era, p. 115.
- 151 Tillich, Theology of Culture, p. 134.
- 152 Tillich, The Eternal Now, p. 46.
- 153 Tillich, The Protestant Era, p. 145.

NOTES TO PAGES 264-271

- 154 Paul Tillich, Morality and Beyond, Religious Perspectives Series, Vol. IX, planned and edited by Ruth Nanda Anshen, Harper Torchbooks (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, Inc., 1963), p. 18.
- 155 Ibid., p. 24.
- 156 Ibid., p. 43.
- 157 Ibid., p. 46.
- 158 Ibid., p. 64.
- 159 Ibid., p. 95.
- 160 Paul Tillich, Love, Power, and Justice: Ontological Analyses and Ethical Applications, A Galaxy Book (New York: Oxford University Press, 1954), p. 12.
- 161 Ibid., p. 71.
- 162 Tillich, The Courage to Be, pp. 81-82.
- 163 Ibid., p. 164.
- 164 Tillich, Interpretation of History, pp. 134-135.
- 165 Tillich, Systematic Theology, Vol. III, p. 149.
- 166 Ibid., p. 151.
- 167 Ibid., p. 153.
- 168 Ibid., p. 162.
- 169 Ibid., p. 165.
- 170 Ibid., p. 173.
- 171 Ibid., p. 193.
- 172 Ibid., p. 220.
- 173 Tillich, The Eternal Now, p. 115.
- 174 Ibid., p. 58.
- 175 Tillich, Theology of Culture, p. 205.
- 176 Ibid., p. 201.
- 177 Tillich, Systematic Theology, Vol. III, p. 213.
- 178 Tillich, "The Person in a Technical Society," p. 152.
- 179 Tillich, The Future of Religions, p. 71.

NOTES TO PAGES 271-278

- 180 Ibid., p. 77.
- 181 Tillich, "The Person in a Technical Society," p. 151.
- 182 Ibid., p. 153.
- 183 Tillich, The Future of Religions, p. 55.
- 184 Tillich, Systematic Theology, Vol. III, p. 249.
- 185 Tillich, The Protestant Era, p. 191.
- 186 Tillich, The Shaking of the Foundations, p. 22.
- 187 Tillich, Systematic Theology, Vol. III, p. 401.
- 188 Tillich, The Shaking of the Foundations, pp. 36-37.

CHAPTER SIX

- ¹ Daniel Day Williams, "Review of Tillich, Systematic Theology, Vol. I," The Christian Century, LXVIII (August 1, 1951), 893.
- ² Edward A. Dowey, Jr., "Tillich, Barth, and the Criteria of Theology," Theology Today, XV (April, 1958), 48.
- ³ Paul Lehmann, "Critical Review of The Protestant Era by Paul Tillich," Journal of Religion, XLVI (January, 1966), 199.
- ⁴ John H. Randall, Jr., "Critical Review of Systematic Theology (Vol. I, 1951; Vol. II, 1957; Vol. III, 1963)," Journal of Religion, XLVI (January, 1966), 218.
- ⁵ Leibrecht, Religion and Culture, p. 10.
- ⁶ Ibid., p. 16.
- ⁷ Erik H. Erikson, "Words for Paul Tillich," The Harvard Divinity Bulletin, XXX (January, 1966), 15.
- ⁸ John Burnaby, "Towards Understanding Paul Tillich," Journal of Theological Studies, V (October, 1954), 195.
- ⁹ James L. Adams, "Words for Paul Tillich," The Harvard Divinity Bulletin, XXX (January, 1966), pp. 9-10.
- ¹⁰ Robert P. Scharlemann, Reflection and Doubt in the Thought of Paul Tillich (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969), p. 188.
- ¹¹ Samuel H. Miller, "Critical Review of The Courage to Be by Paul Tillich," Journal of Religion, XLVI (January, 1966), 200.

NOTES TO PAGES 278-283

- ¹²Nels Ferré, "Three Critical Issues in Tillich's Philosophical Theology," Scottish Journal of Theology, X (September, 1957), 225.
- ¹³Wilhelm Pauck, "Paul Tillich, 1886-1965," Theology Today, XXIII (April, 1966), 7.
- ¹⁴Brown, Ultimate Concern, p. 191.
- ¹⁵Ibid.
- ¹⁶Nathan N. Pusey, "Words for Paul Tillich," The Harvard Divinity Bulletin, XXX (January, 1966), p. 2.
- ¹⁷Leibrecht, Religion and Culture, p. 3.
- ¹⁸Jerald C. Brauer, "Paul Tillich's Impact on America," in Tillich's book, The Future of Religions, p. 15.
- ¹⁹Ibid., p. 21.
- ²⁰A physician, Hal B. Richerson, M.D., published an open letter in The Christian Century, LXXXI, No. 11(March 11, 1964), 344.
- ²¹Carl E. Braaten, "Paul Tillich and the Classical Christian Tradition," in Tillich's book, Perspectives on 19th and 20th Century Protestant Theology, p. xxxiii.
- ²²Robert C. Johnson, Authority in Protestant Theology (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1959), p. 172.
- ²³Ibid., p. 173.
- ²⁴McKirachan, "The Preaching of Paul Tillich," p. 40.
- ²⁵Ibid., p. 42.
- ²⁶Tillich, The New Being, pp. 47-48.
- ²⁷D. H. Kelsey, The Fabric of Paul Tillich's Theology (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), p. 193.
- ²⁸Ibid.
- ²⁹Robert C. Johnson, "Theologian of Synthesis," Theology Today, XV (April, 1958), 36.
- ³⁰Hammond, Man in Estrangement, pp. 180-181.
- ³¹Braaten, "Paul Tillich and the Classical Christian Tradition," p. xiv.
- ³²Harry M. Tiebout, Jr., "Tillich, Existentialism, and Psychoanalysis," Journal of Philosophy, LVI (July, 1959), 610-611.

NOTES TO PAGES 283-289

- ³³S. J. Beck, "Implications for Ego in Tillich's Ontology of Anxiety," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, XVIII (June, 1958), 465.
- ³⁴David C. McClelland, "Religious Overtones in Psychoanalysis," Theology Today, XVI (April, 1959), 61.
- ³⁵Earl A. Loomis, Jr., "The Psychiatric Legacy of Paul Tillich," in The Intellectual Legacy of Paul Tillich, ed. by James R. Lyons (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1969), pp. 85-86.
- ³⁶J. Heywood Thomas, Paul Tillich, Makers of Contemporary Theology (Richmond, Virginia: John Knox Press, 1966), p. 47.
- ³⁷Wayne E. Oates, "The Contribution of Paul Tillich to Pastoral Psychology," Pastoral Psychology, XIX (February, 1968), 11-16.
- ³⁸Tillich, My Search for Absolutes, p. 50.
- ³⁹John Dillenberger, "Paul Tillich: Theologian of Culture," Religion in Life, XXXV, No. 5 (Winter, 1966), 689.
- ⁴⁰Pauck, "Paul Tillich, 1886-1965," p. 4.
- ⁴¹Rollo May, "Paul Tillich: In Memoriam," Pastoral Psychology, XIX (February, 1968), 10.
- ⁴²Pauck, "The Sources of Paul Tillich's Richness," in Tillich's book, The Future of Religions, pp. 23 and 28.
- ⁴³Robert P. Scharlemann, "After Tillich, What?" The Christian Century, LXXXII, No. 48 (December 1, 1965), 1480.
- ⁴⁴Paul Lee, "Words for Paul Tillich," The Harvard Divinity Bulletin, XXX (January, 1966), 17.
- ⁴⁵Paul Edwards, "Professor Tillich's Confusions," Mind, LXXIV (1965), 195.
- ⁴⁶Ibid., pp. 201-205.
- ⁴⁷Ibid., p. 194.
- ⁴⁸Hopper, Tillich: A Theological Portrait, p. 10.
- ⁴⁹Kenneth Hamilton, The System and the Gospel: A Critique of Paul Tillich (London: SCM Press, Ltd., 1963), p. 36, quoting Hendrik Kraemer, Religion and the Christian Faith (London: Lutterworth Press, Ltd., 1956), p. 428.
- ⁵⁰Hamilton, The System and the Gospel, p. 36.
- ⁵¹Don Browning, "Analogy, Symbol, and Pastoral Psychology in Tillich's Thought," Pastoral Psychology, LXIX (February, 1968), 50-51.
- ⁵²Charles Hartshorne, "Tillich's Doctrine of God," in The Theology of Paul Tillich, ed. by Kegley and Bretall, p. 187.

NOTES TO PAGES 289-294

- ⁵³ Macleod, Paul Tillich, p. 153.
- ⁵⁴ Lewis S. Ford, "Three Strands of Tillich's Theory of Religious Symbols," Journal of Religion, CDLXVI, No. 2 (January, 1966), 125.
- ⁵⁵ Bruce L. Smith, "What Price Tillich?" Christianity Today, XVI (December 17, 1971), 18.
- ⁵⁶ Ronald Gregor Smith, The Doctrine of God, edited and prepared for publication by K. Gregor Smith and A. D. Galloway (St. James's Place, London: William Collins Sons and Co., Ltd., 1970), pp. 102-103.
- ⁵⁷ Carl Michalson, Worldly Theology: The Hermeneutical Focus of an Historical Faith (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1967), p. 105.
- ⁵⁸ Walter Marshall Horton, Christian Theology: An Ecumenical Approach (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1955), p. 99.
- ⁵⁹ Lewis S. Ford, "Tillich and Thomas: The Analogy of Being," Journal of Religion, XLVI (April, 1966), 243.
- ⁶⁰ Martin, Paul Tillich's Doctrine of Man, pp. 174-175.
- ⁶¹ Ferré, "Three Critical Issues in Tillich's Philosophical Theology," p. 233.
- ⁶² George H. Tavard, Paul Tillich and the Christian Message (London: Burns and Oates, 1962), p. 51.
- ⁶³ Avery R. Dulles, "Paul Tillich and the Bible," Theological Studies, XVII (September, 1956), 345-367.
- ⁶⁴ McCollough, "Ontology of Tillich and Biblical Personalism," p. 280.
- ⁶⁵ Niebuhr, "Biblical Thought and Ontological Speculation in Tillich's Theology," pp. 218-219.
- ⁶⁶ John B. Cobb, Jr., Living Options in Protestant Theology: A Survey of Methods (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1962), pp. 277-278.
- ⁶⁷ Martin, Paul Tillich's Doctrine of Man, p. 77.
- ⁶⁸ Nels Ferré, "Tillich and the Nature of Transcendence," Religion in Life, XXXV (Winter, 1966), 662.
- ⁶⁹ Ibid., p. 671.
- ⁷⁰ R. Allan Killen, The Ontological Theology of Paul Tillich (Kampen: J. H. Kok, 1956), p. 240.
- ⁷¹ Johnson, Authority in Protestant Theology, pp. 142-143.
- ⁷² Ibid., p. 122.
- ⁷³ Hamilton, The System and the Gospel, p. 156.

NOTES TO PAGES 294-299

- 74 Grover E. Foley, "Paul Tillich and the Bible," Interpretation, IV (October, 1964), 470.
- 75 Ibid., p. 472.
- 76 James C. Livingston, "Tillich's Christology and Historical Research," Religion in Life, XXXV (Winter, 1966), 700. Included is a quotation from Tillich's The Protestant Era, p. xiv.
- 77 Ibid., pp. 703-704. The quotation includes a reference to Tillich's Systematic Theology, Vol. I, p. 133.
- 78 Tavard, Paul Tillich and the Christian Message, p. 132.
- 79 Ibid., p. 172.
- 80 Paul Ramsey, Nine Modern Moralists, A Spectrum Book (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1962), p. 186.
- 81 Daniel Day Williams, "Critical Review of Systematic Theology, Vol. II by Paul Tillich," Journal of Religion, XLVI (January, 1966), 217.
- 82 Hamilton, The System and the Gospel, p. 29.
- 83 Ibid., p. 49.
- 84 Gordon D. Kaufman, "Can a Man Serve Two Masters?" Theology Today, XV (April, 1958), 62.
- 85 Hamilton, The System and the Gospel, p. 230.
- 86 McCollough, "Ontology of Tillich and Biblical Personalism," p. 279.
- 87 Hopper, Tillich: A Theological Portrait, p. 178.
- 88 Ibid., p. 185.
- 89 David Hopper's attention should be called to the Greek word θάραξις.
- 90 William Hamilton, The New Essence of Christianity (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, Ltd., 1961), p. 94.
- 91 Johnson, Authority in Protestant Theology, p. 131.
- 92 George S. Hendry, "Review of Tillich's Systematic Theology, Vol. II," Theology Today, XV (April, 1958), 80.
- 93 Ibid., p. 83.
- 94 Leonard F. Wheat, Paul Tillich's Dialectical Humanism: Unmasking the God above God (Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins Press, 1970), p. 242.

NOTES TO PAGES 299-304

- ⁹⁵Ibid., p. 264.
- ⁹⁶Ibid., p. 276.
- ⁹⁷Dowey, "Tillich, Barth, and the Criteria of Theology," p. 57.
- ⁹⁸Ibid., p. 58.
- ⁹⁹Paul Tillich, "What Is Wrong with Dialectic Theology?" Journal of Religion, XV (April, 1935), 127.
- ¹⁰⁰Ibid., pp. 130-131.
- ¹⁰¹Ibid., p. 141.
- ¹⁰²Ibid., pp. 144-145.
- ¹⁰³Sidney Hook, ed., Religious Experience and Truth (Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd, 1962), pp. 60-61.
- ¹⁰⁴Hamilton, The System and the Gospel, p. 192.
- ¹⁰⁵N. H. G. Robinson, The Groundwork of Christian Ethics (St. Jame's Place, London: William Collins Sons & Co., Ltd., 1971), p. 290. Robinson includes quotations from Tillich's book, Morality and Beyond, pp. 59-60.
- ¹⁰⁶Paul Tillich, "Appreciation and Reply," in Paul Tillich in Catholic Thought, ed. by Thomas A. O'Meara and Celestin D. Weisser (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, Ltd., 1965), p. 308.
- ¹⁰⁷Brown, Ultimate Concern, p. 28.
- ¹⁰⁸Ibid., p. 173.
- ¹⁰⁹William L. Rowe, Religious Symbols and God: A Philosophical Study of Tillich's Theology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), p. 93.
- ¹¹⁰Ibid., pp. 113-114.
- ¹¹¹Ibid., p. 149.
- ¹¹²Ibid., p. 152.
- ¹¹³Edward R. O'Connor, "Paul Tillich: An Impression," in Paul Tillich in Catholic Thought by O'Meara and Weisser, p. 37.
- ¹¹⁴Rowe, Religious Symbols and God, p. 161.
- ¹¹⁵Ibid., p. 170.
- ¹¹⁶Ibid., p. 182.

NOTES TO PAGES 304-307

- 117 Ibid., p. 203.
- 118 Brand Blanshard, "Symbolism," in Religious Experience and Truth, ed. by Sidney Hook, p. 54.
- 119 Paul Weiss, "Thank God, God's Not Impossible," in Religious Experience and Truth, p. 87.
- 120 Paul F. Schmidt, "Frustrating Strategies in Religious Discussion," in Religious Experience and Truth, p. 294.
- 121 Hammond, Man in Estrangement, p. 94.
- 122 Ibid., p. 177.
- 123 Ibid., p. 178.
- 124 Paul Tillich, "Paul Tillich Replies," in Paul Tillich in Catholic Thought, p. 23, is a reply to the article by Gustave Weigle entitled "The Theological Significance of Paul Tillich" in the same book.
- 125 Frederick Sontag, "Ontological Possibility and the Nature of God: A Reply to Tillich," Journal of Religion, XXXVI (October, 1956), 239.
- 126 Guyton B. Hammond, "Tillich on the Personal God," Journal of Religion, XLIV (October, 1964), 293.
- 127 Reese, "Interrogation of Paul Tillich," p. 384.
- 128 Ibid.
- 129 Killen, The Ontological Theology of Paul Tillich, p. 239.
- 130 J. Heywood Thomas, Paul Tillich: An Appraisal (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1963), p. 195.
- 131 Ibid., p. 198. Thomas quotes Father O'Connor's article in Theological Studies, p. 522.
- 132 Ibid., p. 95.
- 133 Ibid., p. 119.
- 134 Ibid., p. 132.
- 135 William L. Rowe, "The Meaning of 'God' in Tillich's Theology," Journal of Religion, XLII (1962), 276.
- 136 H. Richard Niebuhr, "Critical Review of Systematic Theology, Vol. I by Paul Tillich," Journal of Religion, XLVI (January, 1966), 204-205.

NOTES TO PAGES 307-315

- 137 Raphael Demos, "Critical Review: Systematic Theology, Vol. I by Paul Tillich," Journal of Religion, XLVI (January, 1966), 208.
- 138 Ibid., p. 213.
- 139 Raphael Demos, "Religious Symbols and/or Religious Beliefs," in Religious Experience and Truth, ed. by Hook, p. 58.
- 140 Roger Shinn, "Paul Tillich as a Contemporary Theologian," in The Intellectual Legacy of Paul Tillich, ed. by James R. Lyons, p. 60. Shinn makes reference to Harvey Cox's statement in The Secular City (New York: Macmillan Co., 1965), p. 4.
- 141 Thomas Altizer, The Gospel of Christian Atheism (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1966), p. 10.
- 142 Donald J. Keefe, Thomism and the Ontological Theology of Paul Tillich (Leiden, Netherlands: E. J. Brill, 1971), pp. 144-145.
- 143 Paul van Buren, "Tillich as Apologist," The Christian Century, LXXXI, No. 6 (February 5, 1964), 178.
- 144 Ibid.
- 145 Beck, "Implications for Ego in Tillich's Ontology of Anxiety," p. 454.
- 146 Loomis, "The Psychiatric Legacy of Paul Tillich," p. 92.
- 147 Joseph Haroutunian, "The Question Tillich Left Us," Religion in Life, XXXV (Winter, 1966), 713.
- 148 Ibid., p. 717.
- 149 James Sellar, Theological Ethics (New York: Macmillan Co., 1968), pp. 51-53.
- 150 Walter Kaufmann, The Faith of a Heretic (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1961), p. 95.
- 151 Michael Novak, "The Religion of Paul Tillich," Commentary, XLIII (April, 1967), 65.
- 152 Ibid.
- 153 Kai Nielsen, "Is God So Powerful that He Doesn't Even Have to Exist?" in Religious Experience and Truth, ed. by Hook, p. 281.
- 154 Nels Ferré, "Tillich and the Nature of Transcendence," p. 673.
- 155 Henry Nelson Wieman, Man's Ultimate Commitment (Carbondale, Illinois: Southern Illinois University Press, 1958).
- 156 Alistair Kee, The Way of Transcendence: Christian Faith without Belief in God, A Pelican Book (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, Ltd., 1971).

CHAPTER SEVEN

- ¹Carl E. Braaten, "Introduction," in Perspectives on 19th and 20th Century Protestant Theology, by Tillich, p. xxx.
- ²Hesse, Autobiographical Writings, p. 54.
- ³Tillich, On the Boundary, p. 23.
- ⁴Tillich, Perspectives on 19th and 20th Century Protestant Theology, p. 53.
- ⁵May, Paulus, p. 32.
- ⁶Ibid., p. 60.
- ⁷Otten, Hesse Companion, p. 37.
- ⁸May, Paulus, p. 61.
- ⁹Foley, "Paul Tillich and the Bible," p. 467.
- ¹⁰Mac Linscott Ricketts, "Mircea Eliade and the Death of God," Religion in Life, XXXVI (Spring, 1967), 49.
- ¹¹Tillich, Love, Power, and Justice, p. 30.
- ¹²Ziolkowski, The Novels of Hermann Hesse, p. 360.
- ¹³Tillich, Systematic Theology, Vol. I, p. 90.
- ¹⁴Paul Tillich, "The Impact of Pastoral Psychology on Theological Thought," Pastoral Psychology, XI (February, 1960), 19.
- ¹⁵Tillich, The Courage to Be, p. 122.
- ¹⁶Sellers, Theological Ethics, p. 187.
- ¹⁷Tillich, The Shaking of the Foundations, p. 181.
- ¹⁸Otten, Hesse Companion, pp. 269-270.
- ¹⁹Ibid., p. 32.
- ²⁰Theodore Ziolkowski, "Introduction," in Stories of Five Decades, by Hermann Hesse, p. xx.
- ²¹Ziolkowski, The Novels of Hermann Hesse, p. 31.
- ²²Hesse, Autobiographical Writings, p. 56.
- ²³Tillich, My Search for Absolutes, p. 126.
- ²⁴Ibid., p. 127.
- ²⁵Tillich, Interpretation of History, p. 122.

NOTES TO PAGES 331-337

- ²⁶Tillich, Perspectives on 19th and 20th Century Protestant Theology, p. 169.
- ²⁷Ibid., p. 170.
- ²⁸Middleton, "Hermann Hesse as Humanist," p. 181.
- ²⁹Paul Tillich, "The Human Condition," Criterion, II (Summer, 1963), 22.
- ³⁰Boulby, Hermann Hesse: His Mind and Art, p. 153.
- ³¹Hesse, The Glass Bead Game, p. 475.
- ³²Tillich, Perspectives on 19th and 20th Century Protestant Theology, pp. 36-37.
- ³³Tillich, Dynamics of Faith, pp. 62-63.
- ³⁴Tillich, "The Impact of Pastoral Psychology on Theological Thought," p. 22.
- ³⁵Hammond, The Power of Self-transcendence, p. 75.
- ³⁶Ronald Gregor Smith, The Whole Man: Studies in Christian Anthropology (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1969), p. 42.
- ³⁷This statement was made by Professor Allan D. Galloway in a lecture he gave at the University of St. Andrews' Summer School on the 21st June, 1973.
- ³⁸Johnson, Authority in Protestant Theology, p. 134.
- ³⁹Kee, The Way of Transcendence: Christian Faith without Belief in God, pp. xxv-xxvii.
- ⁴⁰Tillich, The Protestant Era, p. xi.
- ⁴¹Ibid., p. 213.
- ⁴²Tillich, "The Human Condition," p. 24.
- ⁴³Baumer, Hermann Hesse, p. 109.
- ⁴⁴Tillich, Christianity and the Encounter of the World Religions, Bampton Lectures in America, No. 14 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963), p. 96.
- ⁴⁵Smith, The Whole Man, p. 107.
- ⁴⁶Ibid., p. 148.
- ⁴⁷Tillich, The Protestant Era, pp. 56-57.

NOTES TO PAGES 337-348

- 48 Tillich, Theology of Culture, p. 10.
- 49 Tillich, Dynamics of Faith, p. 57.
- 50 Hammond, The Power of Self-transcendence, p. 113.
- 51 Tillich, Perspectives on 19th and 20th Century Protestant Theology, p. 38.
- 52 Tillich, The Protestant Era, p. 159.
- 53 Tillich, Love, Power, and Justice, p. 31.
- 54 Hesse, Narziss and Goldmund, pp. 299-300.
- 55 Brown, Ultimate Concern, p. 217.
- 56 John A. T. Robinson, The Difference in Being a Christian Today (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1972), pp. 54-55.
- 57 Roger L. Shinn, Wars and Rumors of Wars (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1972), p. 263, quoting Glenn Gray (On Understanding Violence Philosophically).
- 58 Tillich, The Protestant Era, p. 46.
- 59 Shinn, Wars and Rumors of Wars, pp. 280-281. Without documenting his source Shinn quotes Blaise Pascal.
- 60 Helmut Thielicke, Nihilism: Its Origin and Nature--with a Christian Answer, trans. by John W. Doberstein; Introduction by Michael Novak; Schocken Books (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, Inc., 1969), p. 62.
- 61 Peter L. Berger, A Rumor of Angels: Modern Society and the Rediscovery of the Supernatural (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Co., 1969), p. 28. Dean Inge is quoted without documentation.
- 62 Baumer, Hermann Hesse, p. 111.
- 63 Robinson, The Difference in Being a Christian Today, pp. 18-19.
- 64 Berger, A Rumor of Angels, p. 111.
- 65 Smith, The Doctrine of God, pp. 138-139.
- 66 John Charles Cooper, Religion in the Age of Aquarius (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1971), p. 80.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY FOR HERMANN HESSE

A. PRIMARY SOURCES

1. Books

- Hesse, Hermann. Autobiographical Writings. Translated by Denver Lindley. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, Inc., 1972.
- _____. Beneath the Wheel. Translated by Michael Roloff. Noonday. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, Inc., 1968.
- _____. Demian: The Story of Emil Sinclair's Youth. Translated by Michael Roloff and Michael Lebeck. Bantam Books. New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, Inc., 1965.
- _____. Eine Stunde hinter Mitternacht. Gesammelte Dichtungen. Vol. I. Berlin und Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1952.
- _____. Gertrude. Translated by Hilda Rosner. Noonday. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, Inc., 1969.
- _____. Gesammelte Schriften. 7 vols. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1952-57.
- _____. The Glass Bead Game. Translated by Richard Winston and Clara Winston. Penguin Books. Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, Ltd., 1971.
- _____. Hermann Lauscher. Gesammelte Dichtungen. Vol. I. Berlin und Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1952.
- _____. If the War Goes On: Reflections on War and Politics. Translated by Ralph Manheim. Noonday. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, Inc., 1971.
- _____. In Sight of Chaos. Translated by Stephen Hudson. Zurich: Verlag Seldwyla, 1923.
- _____. The Journey to the East. Translated by Hilda Rosner. Noonday. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, Inc., 1956.
- _____. Klingsor's Last Summer. Translated by Richard Winston and Clara Winston. Noonday. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, Inc., 1970.
- _____. Knulp: Three Tales from the Life of Knulp. Translated by Ralph Manheim. Noonday. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, Inc., 1971.

- _____. My Belief: Essays on Life and Art. Edited by Theodore Ziolkowski. Translated by Denver Lindley and Ralph Manheim. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, Inc., 1974.
- _____. Narziss und Goldmund. Translated by Geoffrey Dunlop. Penguin Books. Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, Ltd., 1971.
- _____. Peter Camenzind. Translated by Michael Roloff. Noonday. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, Inc., 1969.
- _____. Poems. Selected and translated by James Wright. Noonday. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, Inc., 1970.
- _____. Rosshalde. Translated by Ralph Manheim. Noonday. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, Inc., 1970.
- _____. Siddhartha. Translated by Hilda Rosner. A New Directions Paperbook. New York: New Directions Publishing Corp., 1957.
- _____. Steppenwolf. Translated by Basil Creighton. Bantam Books. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1963.
- _____. Stories of Five Decades. Edited by Theodore Ziolkowski. Translated by Ralph Manheim and Denver Lindley. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, Inc., 1972.
- _____. Strange News from Another Star: and Other Tales. Translated by Denver Lindley. Noonday. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, Inc., 1972.
- _____. Wandering: Notes and Sketches by Hermann Hesse. Translated by James Wright. Noonday. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, Inc., 1972.

2. Articles

- Hesse, Hermann. "Artists and Psychoanalysis." Translated by Miriam M. Reik. Psychoanalytic Review, L, No. 3 (1963), 5-10.
- _____. "The Brothers Karamazov or the Downfall of Europe: Thoughts on Reading Dostoevsky." Translated by Harvey Gross. Western Review, XVII (1953), 185-195.
- _____. "Dream Journeys: A Record." Translated by Denver Lindley. Partisan Review, V (1954), 473-482.
- _____. "Eigensinn" (1919). Betrachtungen und Briefe. Gesammelte Schriften. Vol. VII. Berlin und Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1957, 194-200.
- _____. "Ein Stückchen Theologie" (1932). Betrachtungen und Briefe. Gesammelte Schriften. Vol. VII. Berlin und Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1957, 388-402.

- _____. "In the Old Sun." Translated by P. Coleman. German Classics, XIX (1914), 325-372.
- _____. "Mein Glaube" (1931). Betrachtungen und Briefe. Gesammelte Schriften. Vol. VII. Berlin und Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1957, 370-374.
- _____. "Tragic." Translated by Denver Lindley. Partisan Review, V (1954), 482-491.
- _____. "Von der Seele" (1917). Betrachtungen und Briefe. Gesammelte Schriften. Vol. VII. Berlin und Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1957, 68-78.
- _____. "Youth, Beautiful Youth." Translated by Richard Winston and Clara Winston. German Stories and Tales (1955), 1-38.
- _____. "Zu Zarathustras Wiederkehr." Vivos Voco, I (October, 1919), 72-73.

B. SECONDARY SOURCES

1. Books

- Ball, Hugo. Hermann Hesse: Sein Leben und Sein Werk. Berlin und Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1963.
- Baumer, Franz. Hermann Hesse. Translated by John Conway. New York: Frederick Ungar Publishing Co., 1969.
- Boulby, Mark. Hermann Hesse: His Mind and Art. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1967.
- Enright, D. J. Man Is an Onion: Reviews and Essays. London: Chatto and Windus, 1972.
- Field, George Wallis. Hermann Hesse. New York: Twayne Publishers, Inc., 1970.
- Freedman, Ralph. The Lyrical Novel: Studies in Hermann Hesse, André Gide, and Virginia Woolf. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1963.
- Mileck, Joseph. Hermann Hesse and His Critics: the Criticism and Bibliography of Half a Century. Chapel Hill, North Carolina: University of North Carolina Press, 1958.
- Otten, Anna, ed. Hesse Companion. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1970.
- Rose, Ernst. Faith from the Abyss: Hermann Hesse's Way from Romanticism to Modernity. London: Peter Owen, Ltd., 1966.

- Schmid, Hans Rudolf. Hermann Hesse. Frauenfeld: Verlag von Huber & Co., 1928.
- Schmid, Max. Hermann Hesse. Zurich: Fretz & Wasmuth, 1947.
- Serrano, Miguel. C. G. Jung and Hermann Hesse. Translated by Frank MacShane. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1966.
- Zeller, Bernhard. Hermann Hesse: An Illustrated Biography. Translated by Mark Hollebhone. London: Peter Owen, Ltd., 1972.
- Ziolkowski, Theodore. Hermann Hesse. New York: Columbia University Press, 1966.
- _____, ed. Hesse: A Collection of Critical Essays. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1973.
- _____. The Novels of Hermann Hesse. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1965.

2. Articles

- Andrews, R. C. "The Poetry of Hermann Hesse." German Life and Letters, VI (1953), 117-127.
- Beerman, Hans. "Hermann Hesse and the Bhagavad-Gita." Midwest Quarterly, I (1959), 27-40.
- Benn, Maurice. "An Interpretation of the Work of Hermann Hesse." German Life and Letters, III (1950), 202-211.
- Boulby, Mark. "Der Vierte 'Lebenslauf' as a Key to Das Glasperlenspiel." Modern Language Review, LXI (1966), 635-646.
- Buchanan, Harvey. "Hermann Hesse's Pilgrimage." Shenandoah, IX (1958), 18-22.
- Cohn, Dorrit. "Narration of Consciousness in Der Steppenwolf." Germanic Review, XLIV (March, 1969), 121-131.
- Cohn, Hilde D. "The Symbolic End of Hermann Hesse's Glasperlenspiel." Modern Language Quarterly, XI (1950), 347-357.
- Colby, Thomas E. "The Impenitent Prodigal: Hermann Hesse's Hero." German Quarterly, XL (January, 1967), 14-23.
- Craven, Thomas. "German Symbolism (Demian)." Dial, LXXIV (1923), 619-620.
- Engel, Eva J. "Hermann Hesse." German Men of Letters, II (1963), 251-274.
- Farquharson, Robert H. "The Identity and Significance of Leo in Hesse's Morgenlandfahrt." Monatshefte, LV (1963), 122-128.

- Fickert, Kurt J. "The Development of the Outsider Concept in Hesse's Novels." Monatshefte, LII (1960), 170-178.
- _____. "Symbolism in Hesse's 'Heimond'" German Quarterly, XXXIV (March, 1961), 118-122.
- Field, George W. "Goethe and Das Glasperlenspiel: Reflections on 'Alterswerke.'" German Life and Letters, XXIII (October, 1969), 93-101.
- _____. "Hermann Hesse: A Neglected Nobel Prize Novelist." Queen's Quarterly, LXV (1961), 514-520.
- _____. "Music and Morality in Thomas Mann and Hermann Hesse." University of Toronto Quarterly, XXIV (1955), 175-190.
- _____. "On the Genesis of the Glasperlenspiel." German Quarterly, XLI (November, 1968), 673-688.
- Flaxman, S. L. "Der Steppenwolf: Hesse's Portrait of the Intellectual." Modern Language Quarterly, XV (1954), 349-358.
- Foran, Marion N. "Hermann Hesse." Queen's Quarterly, LV (May, 1948), 180-189.
- Freedman, Ralph. "Hermann Hesse." Contemporary Literature, X (Summer, 1969), 421-426.
- _____. "Romantic Imagination: Hermann Hesse as a Modern Novelist." Publications of the Modern Language Association of America, LXXIII (1958), 275-284.
- Friedrichsmeyer, Erhard. "The Bertram Episode in Hesse's Glass Bead Game." Germanic Review, XLIX (November, 1974), 284-297.
- Goldgar, Harry. "Hesse's Glasperlenspiel and the Game of Go." German Life and Letters, XX (1966-67), 132-137.
- Gontrum, Peter B. "Hermann Hesse as a Critic of French Literature." Symposium, XIX (Fall, 1965), 226-235.
- Gross, Harvey. "Hermann Hesse." Western Review, XVII (1953), 132-140.
- Halpert, Inge D. "The Alt-Musikmeister and Goethe." Monatshefte, LII (1960), 19-24.
- _____. "Vita Activa and Vita Contemplativa." Monatshefte, LIII (1961), 159-166.
- _____. "Wilhelm Meister und Josef Knecht." German Quarterly, XXXIV (January, 1961), 11-20.
- Heller, Peter. "The Creative Unconscious and the Spirit: A Study of Polarities in Hesse's Image of the Writer." Modern Language Forum, XXXVIII (1953), 28-40.

- _____. "The Masochistic Rebel in Recent German Literature." Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, XI (1953), 198-213.
- _____. "The Writer in Conflict with His Age." Monatshefte, XLVI (1954), 137-147.
- Hill, Claude. "Hermann Hesse als Kritiker der bürgerlichen Zivilisation." Monatshefte, XL (1948), 241-253.
- _____. "Hermann Hesse and Germany." German Quarterly, XXI (January, 1948), 9-15.
- Joyce, Robert E. "Toward the Resolution of Polarities in Hermann Hesse's Steppenwolf." American Benedictine Review, XVII (1966), 336-341.
- Koch, Stephen. "Prophet of Youth." New Republic, CLVIII (June 13, 1968), 22-26.
- Koester, Rudolf. "Hesse's Music Master: In Search of a Prototype." Forum for Modern Language Studies, III (1967), 135-141.
- _____. "Portrayal of Age in Hesse's Narrative Prose." Germanic Review, XLI (March, 1966), 111-119.
- _____. "Self-Realization: Hesse's Reflections on Youth." Monatshefte, LVII (1965), 181-186.
- Lesser, J. "Nobel Prize Winner." Contemporary Review, CLXXI (January, 1947), 31-34.
- Malthaner, Johannes. "Hermann Hesse. Siddhartha." German Quarterly, XXV (March, 1952), 103-109.
- Mann, Thomas. "Hermann Hesse: Liberator of a Stifling Provincialism." Saturday Review of Literature, XXXI (January 3, 1948), 5-7.
- Middleton, J. C. "Hermann Hesse's Morgenlandfahrt." Germanic Review, XXXII (December, 1957), 299-310.
- Mileck, Joseph. "A Visit with Hermann Hesse and a Journey from Montagnola to Calw." Modern Language Forum, XLI (1956), 3-8.
- _____. "Hermann Hesse's Glasperlenspiel." University of California Publications in Modern Philology, XXXIV, No. 9 (1952), 243-270.
- _____. "Names and the Creative Process." Monatshefte, LIII (1961), 167-180.
- _____. "The Poetry of Hermann Hesse." Monatshefte, XLVI (1954), 192-198.
- _____. "The Prose of Hermann Hesse: Life, Substance, and Form." German Quarterly, XXVII (May, 1954), 163-174.
- Misra, Bhabagrahi. "An Analysis of Indic Tradition in Hermann Hesse's Siddhartha." Indian Literature, XI (1968), 111-123.

- Naumann, Walter. "The Individual and Society in the Work of Hermann Hesse." Monatshefte, XLI (1949), 33-42.
- Negus, Kenneth. "On the Death of Josef Knecht in Hermann Hesse's 'Glasperlenspiel.'" Monatshefte, LIII (1961), 181-189.
- Nelson, Benjamin. "Hesse and Jung: Two Newly Recovered Letters." Psychoanalytic Review, L, No. 3 (1963), 11-16.
- Norton, Roger C. "Hermann Hesse's Criticism of Technology." Germanic Review, XLIII (November, 1968), 267-273.
- Peppard, Murray B. "Hermann Hesse's Ladder of Learning." Kentucky Foreign Language Quarterly, III (1956), 13-20.
- _____. "Hermann Hesse: from Eastern Journey to Castalia." Monatshefte, L (1958), 247-256.
- Peters, Eric. "Hermann Hesse: the Psychological Implications of His Writings." German Life and Letters, I (1948), 209-214.
- Pick, Robert. "Nobel Prize Winner Hesse." Saturday Review of Literature, XXXII, No. 3 (October 15, 1949), 15-16.
- Puppe, Heinz W. "Psychologie und Mystik in Klein und Wagner von Hermann Hesse." Publications of the Modern Language Association of America, LXXIII (1963), 128-135.
- Resnik, Henry S. "How Hermann Hesse Speaks to the College Generation." Saturday Review of Literature, LII, No. 3 (October 18, 1969), 35-37.
- Schott, Webster. "A German Guru Makes the U.S. Scene Again." Life, LXV, No. 1 (July 12, 1968), 8.
- Schwarz, Egon. "Hermann Hesse, the American Youth Movement, and Problems of Literary Evaluation." Publications of the Modern Language Association of America, LXXXV (October, 1970), 977-987.
- Seidlin, Oskar. "Hermann Hesse: the Exorcism of the Demon." Symposium, IV (November, 1950), 325-348.
- _____. "Hermann Hesse's Glasperlenspiel." Germanic Review, XXIII (November, 1948), 263-273.
- Shaw, Leroy R. "Time and Structure of Hermann Hesse's Siddhartha." Symposium, XI (1957), 204-224.
- Spector, Robert Donald. "Artist Against Himself: Hesse's Siddhartha." History of Ideas Newsletter, IV (1958), 55-58.
- Spirack, C. "The Journey to Hell, Satan, and the Self." Centennial Review, IX, No. 4 (Fall, 1965).
- Steiner, George. "Eastward Ho!" New Yorker, XLIV (January 18, 1969), 87-97.

- Stelzmann, Rainulf A. "Kafka's Trial and Hesse's Steppenwolf: Two Views of Reality and Transcendence." Xavier University Studies, II (1966), 165-172.
- Taylor, Harley U. "The Death Wish and Suicide in the Novels of Hermann Hesse." West Virginia University Philological Papers, XIII (1961), 50-64.
- _____. "Homosexual Elements in the Novels of Hermann Hesse." West Virginia University Philological Papers, XVI (1967), 63-71.
- Timpa, Eugene F. "Hermann Hesse in the United States." Symposium, XXIII (Spring, 1969), 73-79.
- _____. "Hesse's Siddhartha and the Bhagavad-Gita." Comparative Literature, XXII (Fall, 1970), 346-357.
- Townsend, Stanley R. "The German Humanist Hermann Hesse (Nobel Prize Winner in 1946)." Modern Language Forum, XXXII (1947), 1-12.
- Trippett, Frank. "The Hesse Trip." Look, XXXV (Feb. 23, 1971), 53-56.
- Webb, Eugene. "Hermine and the Problem of Harry's Failure in Hesse's Steppenwolf." Modern Fiction Studies, XVII (Spring, 1971), 115-124.
- Werner, Alfred. "Hermann Hesse." South Atlantic Quarterly, LII (1953), 384-390.
- Willson, A. Leslie. "Hesse's Veil of Isis." Monatshefte, LV (1963), 313-321.
- Ziolkowski, Theodora. "Hermann Hesse's Steppenwolf: A Sonata in Prose." Modern Language Quarterly, XIX (1958), 115-133.
- _____. "Saint Hesse among the Hippies." American-German Review, XXXV, No. 2 (1969), 19-23.

3. Unpublished Materials

- Colby, Thomas E. "Hermann Hesse's Attitude Toward Authority: A Study." Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University, 1959.
- Farquharson, Robert H. "The Treatment of Love in Hermann Hesse." Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, 1961-62.
- Halpert, Inge D. "Hermann Hesse and Goethe." Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1957.
- Maier, Emanuel. "The Psychology of C. G. Jung in the Works of Hermann Hesse." Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, New York University, 1952.

Middleton, J. C. "Hermann Hesse as Humanist." Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Oxford University, 1954.

Taylor, Harley Ustus. "Friendship in the Novels of Hermann Hesse." Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Indiana University, 1963.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY FOR PAUL TILLICH

A. PRIMARY SOURCES

1. Books

Tillich, Paul. Biblical Religion and the Search for Ultimate Reality. Phoenix Books. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955.

_____. Christianity and the Encounter of the World Religions. Bampton Lectures in America, No. 14. New York: Columbia University Press, 1963.

_____. The Courage to Be. Yale Paperbound. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1952.

_____. Dynamics of Faith. World Perspective Series, Vol. X. Harper Torchbook. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957.

_____. The Eternal Now. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1963.

_____. The Future of Religions. Edited by Jerald C. Brauer. New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, Inc., 1966.

_____. A History of Christian Thought. Edited by Carl E. Braaten. London: SCM Press, Ltd., 1968.

_____. The Interpretation of History. Translated by N. A. Rosetzki and Elsa L. Talmey. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1936.

_____. Love, Power, and Justice: Ontological Analyses and Ethical Applications. A Galaxy Book. New York: Oxford University Press, 1954.

_____. Morality and Beyond. Religious Perspective Series, Vol. IX. Harper Torchbook. New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, Inc., 1963.

_____. My Search for Absolutes. Drawings by Saul Steinberg. Credo Perspectives. New York: Simon and Schuster, Inc., 1967.

_____. My Travel Diary: 1936: Between Two Worlds. Edited by Jerald C. Brauer. Translated by Maria Pelikan. Drawings by Alfonso Ossorio. New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, Inc., 1970.

- _____. The New Being. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1955.
- _____. On the Boundary: An Autobiographical Sketch. Part I of The Interpretation of History. The Scribner Library. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1966.
- _____. Perspectives on 19th and 20th Century Protestant Theology. Edited by Carl E. Braaten. New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, Inc., 1967.
- _____. The Protestant Era. Translated by James Luther Adams. Phoenix Books. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957.
- _____. The Religious Situation. Translated by H. Richard Niebuhr. Meridian Books. New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1932.
- _____. The Shaking of the Foundations. The Scribner Library. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1948.
- _____. Systematic Theology. 3 vols. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951-63.
- _____. Theology of Culture. Edited by Robert C. Kimball. New York: Oxford University Press, 1959.
- _____. The World Situation. Social Ethics Series, No. 2. Facet Books. Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1965.

2. Articles

- Tillich, Paul. "All Things to All Men." Union Review, VI, No. 3 (May, 1945), 3-4.
- _____. "An Ecumenical Dialogue." Dublin Review, No. 504 (Summer, 1965), 162-182.
- _____. "Appreciation and Reply." Paul Tillich in Catholic Thought. Edited by Thomas A. O'Meara and Celestin D. Weisser. London: Darton, Longman and Todd, Ltd., 1965.
- _____. "Autobiographical Reflections." The Theology of Paul Tillich. Vol. I of The Library of Living Theology. Edited by Charles W. Kegley and Robert W. Bretall. Macmillan Paperbacks. New York: Macmillan Co., 1952.
- _____. "Basis of Genuine Hope for Peace on Earth." Social Progress, LV (May-June, 1965), 16-20.
- _____. "Be Strong." Christianity and Crisis, XXIII (August 5, 1963), 144-147.
- _____. "Being and Love." Moral Principles of Action. Edited by Ruth Nanda Anshen. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1952.
- _____. "Beyond Religious Socialism: How My Mind Has Changed." Christian Century, LXVI (June 15, 1949), 732-733.

- _____. "Christian Criteria for Our Culture." Criterion (New Haven), I, No. 1 (October, 1952), 1, 3-4.
- _____. "Communicating the Gospel." Pastoral Psychology, VII (June, 1956), 10-16.
- _____. "The Conception of Man in Existential Philosophy." Journal of Religion, XIX (July, 1939), 201-215.
- _____. "Conformity." Social Research, XXIV (Fall, 1957), 354-360.
- _____. "Estrangement and Reconciliation in Modern Thought." Review of Religion, IX (November, 1944), 5-19.
- _____. "Existentialism, Psychotherapy, and the Nature of Man." Pastoral Psychology, XI (June, 1960), 10-18.
- _____. "Existentialist Aspects of Modern Art." Christianity and the Existentialists. Edited by Carl Michalson. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1956.
- _____. "Faith and the Integration of the Personality." Pastoral Psychology, VIII (March, 1957), 11-14.
- _____. "Freedom and the Ultimate Concern." Religion in America. Edited by John Cogley. New York: Meridian Books, Inc., 1958.
- _____. "Freedom in the Period of Transformation." Freedom: Its Meaning. Edited by Ruth Nanda Anshen. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1940.
- _____. "The Good I Will, I Do Not." Religion in Life, XXVIII (Fall, 1959), 539-545.
- _____. "Grandeur and Misery of Man." Christianity and Crisis, XV (November 14, 1955), 149.
- _____. "Heal the Sick; Cast Out Demons." Union Seminary Quarterly Review, XI (November, 1955), 3-8.
- _____. "The Human Condition." Criterion, II (Summer, 1963), 22-24.
- _____. "Human Nature Can Change." American Journal of Psychoanalysis, XII, No. 1 (1952), 65-67.
- _____. "The Immortality of Man." Pastoral Psychology, VIII, No. 75 (June, 1957), 23-24.
- _____. "The Impact of Pastoral Psychology on Theological Thought." Pastoral Psychology, XI (February, 1960), 17-23.
- _____. "The Kingdom of God and History." Church, Community, and State. Vol. III. London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1938.
- _____. "Let Us Dare to Have Solitude." Union Seminary Quarterly Review, XII (May, 1957), 9-15.

- _____. "Man and Society in Religious Socialism." Christianity and Society, VIII (Fall, 1943), 10-21.
- _____. "Man, the Earth, and the Universe." Christianity and Crisis, XXII (June 25, 1962), 108-112.
- _____. "The Meaning and Justification of Religious Symbols." Religious Experience and Truth. Edited by Sidney Hook. New York: New York University Press, 1961.
- _____. "Natural and Revealed Religion." Christendom, I, No. 1 (Autumn, 1935), 165.
- _____. "The Nature of Man." Journal of Philosophy, XLIII (December 5, 1946), 675-677.
- _____. "Nietzsche and the Bourgeois Spirit." Journal of the History of Ideas, VI, No. 3 (June, 1945), 307-309.
- _____. "On Healing." Pastoral Psychology, VI (June, 1955), 25-30.
- _____. "Paul Tillich Replies." Paul Tillich in Catholic Thought. Edited by Thomas A. O'Meara and Celestin D. Weisser. London: Darton, Longman and Todd, Ltd., 1965.
- _____. "The Person in a Technical Society." Christian Faith and Social Action. Edited by John A. Hutchison. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1953.
- _____. "Philosophy of Social Work." Social Service Review, XXXVI (March, 1963), 13-16.
- _____. "Psychoanalysis, Existentialism, and Theology--Interdependence." Christian Register, CXXXV (March, 1956), 16-17, 34-36.
- _____. "Psychotherapy and a Christian Interpretation of Human Nature." Review of Religion, XIII (March, 1949), 264-269.
- _____. "Rejoinder." Journal of Religion, XLVI (January, 1966), 184-196.
- _____. "The Relation of Religion and Health." Review of Religion, X (May, 1946), 348-384.
- _____. "Religion and Secular Culture." Journal of Religion, XXVI (April, 1946), 79-86.
- _____. "The Religious Symbol." Symbolism in Religion and Literature. Edited by Rollo May. New York: George Braziller, Inc., 1960.
- _____. "Religiousphilosophie." Lehrbuch der Philosophie. Edited by M. Dessoir. Berlin: Ullstein, 1925.
- _____. "Reply." Religion in Life, XXV, No. 1 (Winter, 1955-56), 19-20.
- _____. "Reply to Interpretation and Criticism." The Theology of Paul Tillich. Vol. I of The Library of Living Theology. Edited by Charles W. Kegley and Robert W. Bretall. Macmillan Paperbacks. New York: Macmillan Co., 1952.

- _____. "Riddle of Inequality." Union Seminary Quarterly Review, XIII (May, 1958), 3-9.
- _____. "That They May Have Life." Christianity and Crisis, XXIV (September 21, 1964), 172-174.
- _____. "The Theology of Missions." Witness to a Generation: Significant Writings from Christianity and Crisis (1941-1966). Edited by Wayne H. Cowan. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1966.
- _____. "Trends in Religious Thought That Affect Social Outlook." Religion and the World Order. Edited by F. Ernest Johnson. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1944.
- _____. "Vertical and Horizontal Thinking." American Scholar, XV (Winter, 1945), 102-105.
- _____. "What Is Basic in Human Nature?" Pastoral Psychology, XIV (February, 1963), 13-20.
- _____. "What Is Wrong with the 'Dialectic' Theology?" Journal of Religion, XV, No. 2 (April, 1935), 127-145.

B. SECONDARY SOURCES

1. Books

- Adams, James Luther. Paul Tillich's Philosophy of Culture, Science, and Religion. New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, Inc., 1965.
- Armbruster, C. J. The Vision of Paul Tillich. New York: Sheed and Ward, 1967.
- Barrett, William. Irrational Man: A Study in Existential Philosophy. New York: Doubleday and Co., 1958.
- Brown, D. Mackenzie, ed. Ultimate Concern: Tillich in Dialogue. London: SCM Press, Ltd., 1965.
- Cobb, John B., Jr. Living Options in Protestant Theology: A Survey of Methods. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1962.
- Hamilton, Kenneth. The System and the Gospel: A Critique of Paul Tillich. London: SCM Press, Ltd., 1963.
- Hammond, Guyton B. Man in Estrangement. Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1965.
- _____. The Power of Self-transcendence: An Introduction to the Philosophical Theology of Paul Tillich. The Library of Contemporary Theology. St. Louis, Missouri: Bethany Press, 1966.

- Herberg, Will, ed. Four Existentialist Theologians. Garden City: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1958.
- Hook, Sidney, ed. Religious Experience and Truth. New York: New York University Press, 1961.
- Hopper, David. Tillich: A Theological Portrait. New York: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1968.
- Hutchison, John A., ed. Christian Faith and Social Action. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1953.
- Keefe, Donald J. Thomism and the Ontological Theology of Paul Tillich. Leiden, Netherlands: E. J. Brill, 1971.
- Kegley, Charles W. and Bretall, Robert W., eds. The Theology of Paul Tillich. Vol. I of The Library of Living Theology. Macmillan Paperbacks. New York: Macmillan Co., 1952.
- Kelsey, D. H. The Fabric of Paul Tillich's Theology. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967.
- Killen, R. Allan. The Ontological Theology of Paul Tillich. Kampen: J. H. Kok, 1956.
- Leibrecht, Walter, ed. Religion and Culture. London: SCM Press, Ltd., 1959.
- Lyons, James R., ed. The Intellectual Legacy of Paul Tillich. Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1969.
- McKelway, Alexander J. The Systematic Theology of Paul Tillich: A Review and Analysis. A Delta Book. Richmond, Virginia: John Knox Press, 1964.
- Macleod, Alistair M. Paul Tillich: An Essay on the Role of Ontology in His Philosophical Theology. London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1973.
- Macquarrie, John. Principles of Christian Theology. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1966.
- _____. Twentieth-century Religious Thought. London: SCM Press, Ltd., 1963.
- Martin, Bernard. Existentialist Theology of Paul Tillich. New York: Bookman's Associates, 1963.
- _____. Paul Tillich's Doctrine of Man. Digswell Place, Welwyn, Herts: James Nisbet and Co., 1966.
- May, Rollo. Paulus: Reminiscences of a Friendship. New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, Inc., 1973.
- Michalson, Carl, ed. Christianity and the Existentialists. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1956.

- O'Meara, Thomas A. and Weisser, Celestin D., eds. Paul Tillich in Catholic Thought. London: Darton, Longman and Todd, Ltd., 1965.
- Ramsey, Paul. Nine Modern Moralists. A Spectrum Book. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1962.
- Rowe, William L. Religious Symbols and God: A Philosophical Study of Tillich's Theology. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968.
- Scharlemann, Robert P. Reflection and Doubt in the Thought of Paul Tillich. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969.
- Tavard, George H. Paul Tillich and the Christian Message. London: Burns and Oates, 1962.
- Thomas, J. Heywood. Paul Tillich. Makers of Contemporary Theology. Richmond, Virginia: John Knox Press, 1966.
- _____. Paul Tillich: An Appraisal. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1963.
- Tillich, Hannah. From Time to Time. New York: Stein and Day, 1973.
- Unhjem, A. Dynamics of Doubt. Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1966.
- Wheat, Leonard F. Paul Tillich's Dialectical Humanism: Unmasking the God above God. Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins Press, 1970.

2. Articles

- Alston, William P. "Tillich on Idolatry." Journal of Religion, XXXVIII (October, 1958), 263-268.
- Ashbrook, James B., ed. "Paul Tillich in Conversation: Culture and Religion." Foundations, XIV (January, 1971), 6-17.
- _____, ed. "Paul Tillich in Conversation: Culture and Theology." Foundations, XIV (April, 1971), 102-115.
- Beck, S. J. "Implications for Ego in Tillich's Ontology of Anxiety." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, XVIII (June, 1958), 451-470.
- Bloy, Myron B., Jr. "Counter-Culture and Academic Reform." Christianity and Crisis, XXX (April 27, 1970), 85-90.
- Boozer, J. "Religion and Culture." Journal of Biblical Religion, XXVIII (April, 1960), 229-234.
- Browning, Don. "Analogy, Symbol, and Pastoral Psychology in Tillich's Thought." Pastoral Psychology, LXIX (February, 1968), 41-54.

- Burnaby, John. "Towards Understanding Paul Tillich." Journal of Theological Studies, V (October, 1954), 195-205.
- Cherbonnier, E. La B. "Biblical Metaphysics and Christian Philosophy." Theology Today, IX (October, 1952), 360-375.
- _____. "The Theology of the Word of God." Journal of Religion, XXXIII (January, 1953), 15-30.
- Cox, Harvey. "A Conversation with Harvey Cox and T. George Harris." Psychology Today, III, No. 11 (April, 1970), 45-62.
- Dean, William D. "The Universal and the Particular in the Theology of Paul Tillich." Encounter, XXXII (Autumn, 1971), 278-285.
- Demos, Raphael. "Critical Review: Systematic Theology, Vol. I by Paul Tillich." Journal of Religion, XLVI (January, 1966), 205-214.
- Dicken, Thomas M. "The Biblical Picture of Jesus as the Christ in Tillich's Theology." Journal of Religious Thought, XXV, No. 1 (1968-69), 27-41.
- Dillenberger, John. "Man and the World." Christian Century, LXXVI, No. 22 (June 3, 1959), 669.
- _____. "Paul Tillich: Theologian of Culture." Religion in Life, XXXV, No. 5 (Winter, 1966), 686-696.
- Dixon, John, Jr. "Is Tragedy Essential to Knowing?: A Critique of Dr. Tillich's Aesthetic." Journal of Religion, XLIII (October, 1963), 271-284.
- Dowey, Edward A., Jr. "Tillich, Barth, and the Criteria of Theology." Theology Today, XV (April, 1958), 43-59.
- Dulles, Avery R. "Paul Tillich and the Bible." Theological Studies, XVII (September, 1956), 345-367.
- Edwards, Paul. "Professor Tillich's Confusions." Mind, LXXIV (1965), 192-214.
- Erikson, Erik H. "Words for Paul Tillich." Harvard Divinity Bulletin, XXX (January, 1966), 13-15.
- Ferré, Nels F. S. "The Fabric of Paul Tillich's Theology." Scottish Journal of Theology, XXI (June, 1968), 157-169.
- _____. "Review of Tillich's The New Being." Interpretation, IX (October, 1955), 465-467.
- _____. "Three Critical Issues in Tillich's Philosophical Theology." Scottish Journal of Theology, X (September, 1957), 225-238.
- _____. "Tillich and the Nature of Transcendence." Religion in Life, XXXV (Winter, 1966), 662-673.

- _____. "Tillich's View of the Church." The Theology of Paul Tillich. Edited by Charles W. Kegley and Robert W. Bretall. Vol. I of The Library of Living Theology. Macmillan Paperbacks. New York: Macmillan Co., 1952.
- Fitch, R. E. "Social Philosophy of Paul Tillich." Religion in Life, XXVII (Spring, 1958), 247-256.
- Fletcher, Joseph. "Tillich and Ethics: the Negation of Law." Pastoral Psychology, XIX (February, 1968), 33-40.
- Foley, Grover E. "Paul Tillich and the Bible." Interpretation in Contemporary Theology, IV (October, 1964), 463-478.
- Ford, Lewis S. "Three Strands of Tillich's Theory of Religious Symbols." Journal of Religion, CDLXVI, No. 2 (January, 1966), 104-130.
- _____. "Tillich and Thomas: the Analogy of Being." Journal of Religion, XLVI (April, 1966), 229-245.
- _____. "Tillich's Implicit Natural Theology." Scottish Journal of Theology, XXIV (August, 1971), 257-270.
- Forstman, H. P. "Paul Tillich and His Critics." Encounter, XXV (Autumn, 1964), 476-481.
- Furuya, Y. C. "Apologetic or Kerygmatic Theology." Theology Today, XVI (January, 1960), 471-480.
- Gragg, A. "Paul Tillich's Existential Questions and Their Theological Answers." Journal of Biblical Religion, XXXIV, No. 1 (January, 1966), 4-17.
- Hall, R. C. "Tillich's Apparent Inconsistency." Anglican Theological Review, LII (January, 1970), 52-55.
- Hamilton, Kenneth. "Critical Review of Systematic Theology Vol. III by Paul Tillich." Journal of Religion, XLVI (January, 1960), 226-228.
- _____. "Paul Tillich and the Idealistic Appraisal of Christianity." Scottish Journal of Theology, XIII (March, 1960), 33-44.
- Hammond, Guyton B. "An Examination of Tillich's Method of Correlation." Journal of Bible and Religion, XXXII (July, 1964), 248-251.
- _____. "Tillich on the Personal God." Journal of Religion, XLIV (October, 1964), 289-293.
- Haroutunian, Joseph. "The Question Tillich Left Us." Religion in Life, XXXV (Winter, 1966), 706-718.
- Hartshorne, Charles. "Tillich and the Non-theological Meaning of Theological Terms." Religion in Life, XXXV (Winter, 1966), 674-685.

- Hendry, George S. "Review of Tillich's Systematic Theology, Vol. II." Theology Today, XV (April, 1958), 78-83.
- Hiltner, Seward. "Paul Tillich and Pastoral Theology." Pastoral Psychology, XVI (December, 1965), 5-10.
- Holmer, Paul L. "Paul Tillich: Language and Meaning." Journal of Religious Thought, XXII (1965-66), 85-107.
- Homans, P. "Towards a Psychology of Religion: by Way of Freud and Tillich." Zygon, II (March, 1967), 97-119.
- _____. "Transference and Transcendence: Freud and Tillich on the Nature of Personal Relatedness." Journal of Religion, XLVI (January, 1966), 148-162.
- Hopper, David. "Towards Understanding the Thought of Paul Tillich." Princeton Seminary Bulletin, LV (April, 1962), 36-43.
- Johnson, Robert C. "Theologian of Synthesis." Theology Today, XV (April, 1958), 36-42.
- Kaufman, Gordon D. "Can a Man Serve Two Masters?" Theology Today, XV (April, 1958), 59-77.
- Kuchaman, Clark A. "Professor Tillich: Justice and the Economic Order." Journal of Religion, XLVI (January, 1966), 165-182.
- Lam, E. P. "Tillich's Reconstruction of the Concept of Ideology." Christianity and Society, VI (Winter, 1940), 11-15.
- Lee, Paul. "Words for Paul Tillich." Harvard Divinity Bulletin, XXX (January, 1966), 16-18.
- Lehmann, Paul. "Critical Review of The Protestant Era by Paul Tillich." Journal of Religion, XLVI (January, 1966), 197-200.
- Leibrecht, Walter. "The Life and Mind of Paul Tillich." Religion and Culture. Edited by Walter Leibrecht. London: SCM Press, Ltd., 1959.
- Livingston, James C. "Tillich's Christology and Historical Research." Religion in Life, XXXV (Winter, 1966), 697-705.
- Loomer, B. M. "Tillich's Theology of Correlation." Journal of Religion, XXXVI (July, 1956), 150-156.
- McClelland, David C. "Religious Overtones in Psychoanalysis." Theology Today, XVI (April, 1959), 40-64.
- McCullough, T. E. "Ontology of Tillich and Biblical Personalism." Scottish Journal of Theology, XV (September, 1962), 266-281.
- McCord, J. "Excessive Preoccupation with Man: Systematic Theology II, Existence and the Christ, by Paul Tillich." Interpretation in Contemporary Theology, XII, No. 4 (October, 1958), 460-463.

- McKirachan, J. Frederick. "The Preaching of Paul Tillich." Princeton Seminary Bulletin, LIII (January, 1960), 33-42.
- Macquarrie J. and Randall, J. H. "Discussion: Tillich's Systematic Theology, Vol. III." Union Seminary Quarterly Review, XIX (May, 1964), 345-359.
- May, Rollo. "Paul Tillich: In Memoriam." Pastoral Psychology, XIX (February, 1968), 7-10.
- Midgley, L. C. "Ultimate Concern and Politics: a Critical Examination of Paul Tillich's Political Theology." West Political Quarterly, XX (March, 1967), 31-50.
- Miller, Samuel H. "Critical Review of The Courage to Be by Paul Tillich." Journal of Religion, XLVI (January, 1966), 200-203.
- Mitchell, Kenneth R. "Paul Tillich's Contributions to Pastoral Care and Counseling." Pastoral Psychology, XIX (February, 1968), 24-32.
- Niebuhr, H. Richard. "Critical Review of Systematic Theology, Vol. I by Paul Tillich." Journal of Religion, XLVI (January, 1966), 203-205.
- Niebuhr, Reinhold. "The Contribution of Paul Tillich." Religion in Life, VI (1937), 574-581.
- _____. "Faith as the Sense of Meaning in Human Existence." Christianity and Crisis, XXVI (June 13, 1966), 127-131.
- Novak, Michael. "The Religion of Paul Tillich." Commentary, XLIII (April, 1967), 53-65.
- Oates, Wayne E. "The Contribution of Paul Tillich to Pastoral Psychology." Pastoral Psychology, XIX (February, 1968), 11-16.
- O'Connor, Edward R. "Paul Tillich: An Impression." Paul Tillich in Catholic Thought. Edited by O'Meara and Weisser. London: Darton, Longman and Todd, Ltd., 1965.
- Pauck, W.; Eliade, M.; and Brauer, J. C. "In Memoriam: Paul Tillich 1886-1965." Criterion, V, No. 1 (1966), 1-23.
- _____. "Paul Tillich, 1886-1965." Theology Today, XXIII (April, 1966), 1-11.
- Paul, W. W. "What Can Religion Say to Its Cultural Despisers? A Comparison of Schleiermacher (1799) and Tillich (1959)." Reformed Review, XXIII (Summer, 1970), 208-216.
- Peters, Eugene H. "Tillich's Doctrine of Essence, Existence, and the Christ." Journal of Religion, XLIII (October, 1963), 295-302.
- Pusey, Nathan N. "Words for Paul Tillich." Harvard Divinity Bulletin, XXX (January, 1966), 1-28.

- Randall, John H., Jr. "Critical Review of Systematic Theology (Vol. I, 1951; Vol. II, 1957; Vol. III, 1963)." Journal of Religion, XLVI (January, 1966), 218-223.
- Reese, William L. "Interrogation of Paul Tillich." Philosophical Interrogations. Edited by Sydney Rome and Beatrice Rome. Harper Torchbook. New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, Inc., 1970.
- _____. "Theology of Culture, Review." Metaphysics, XIII (March, 1960), 447-468.
- Richerson, Hal B. "Tillichian Trio." Christian Century, LXXXI, No. 11 (March 11, 1964), 343-344.
- Ricketts, Mac Linscott. "Mircea Eliade and the Death of God." Religion in Life, XXXVI (Spring, 1967), 40-52.
- Roberts, David E. "Theological and Psychiatric Interpretations of Human Nature." Christianity and Crisis, VII (February 3, 1947), 3-7.
- Robinson, N. H. G. "Faith and Truth." Scottish Journal of Theology, XIX (June, 1966), 144-159.
- Rowe, William L. "The Meaning of 'God' in Tillich's Theology." Journal of Religion, XLII (1962), 274-286.
- Salzman, Leon. "Observations on Dr. Tillich's Views on Guilt, Sin, and Reconciliation." Journal of Pastoral Care, XI (Spring, 1957), 14-19.
- Scharlemann, Robert P. "After Tillich, What?" Christian Century, LXXXII, No. 48 (December 1, 1965), 1478-1480.
- _____. "The Scope of Systematics: An Analysis of Tillich's Two Systems." Journal of Religion, XLVIII (April, 1968), 136-149.
- _____. "Tillich's Method of Correlation: Two Proposed Revisions." Journal of Religion, XLVI (January, 1966), 92-103.
- Sellers, J. E. "Five Approaches to the Human Situation." Theology Today, XV (January, 1959), 521-530.
- Skinner, J. E. "Being, Selfhood, and Presence." Lutheran Quarterly, XII (November, 1960), 293-302.
- _____. "Critique of Tillich's Ontology." Anglican Theological Review, XXXIX (January, 1957), 53-61.
- Smith, Bruce L. "What Price Tillich?" Christianity Today, XVI (December 17, 1971), 16-18; and (January 7, 1972), 13-15.
- Smith, D. Moody, Jr. "The Historical Jesus in Paul Tillich's Christology." Journal of Religion, XLVI (January, 1966), 131-148.

- Sontag, Frederick. "Ontological Possibility and the Nature of God: A Reply to Tillich." Journal of Religion, XXXVI (October, 1956), 234-240.
- Tavard, George H. "Critical Review of Systematic Theology Vol. III by Paul Tillich." Journal of Religion, XLVI (January, 1966), 223-226.
- _____. "Paul Tillich's System." Commonweal, LXXIX (February 7, 1964), 566.
- Thomas, J. Heywood. "Some Comments on Tillich's Doctrine of Creation." Scottish Journal of Theology, XIV, No. 2 (June, 1961), 113-118.
- Thomas, O. C. "Barth and Tillich: A Conversation on Contemporary Theology." Religion in Life, XXXII (Autumn, 1963), 508-520.
- Tiebout, Harry M., Jr. "Tillich, Existentialism, and Psychoanalysis." Journal of Philosophy, LVI (July, 1959), 605-612.
- _____. "Tillich and Freud on Sin." Religion in Life, XXVIII (Spring, 1959), 223-235.
- Trotter, F. Thomas. "Variations on the 'Death of God' Theme in Recent Theology." Journal of Bible and Religion, XXXIII, No. 1 (January, 1965), 42-48.
- Van Buren, Paul. "Tillich as Apologist." Christian Century, LXXXI, No. 6 (February 5, 1964), 177-179.
- Watson, M. "The Social Thought of Paul Tillich." Journal of Religious Thought, X (1952-53), 5-17.
- Williams, Daniel Day. "Critical Review of Systematic Theology, Vol. II by Paul Tillich." Journal of Religion, XLVI (January, 1966), 214-218.
- _____. "Paul Tillich's Doctrine of Forgiveness." Pastoral Psychology, XIX (February, 1968), 17-23.
- _____. "Critical Review of Tillich's Systematic Theology, Vol. I." Christian Century, LXVIII (August 1, 1951), 893.

3. Unpublished Materials

- Barrett, J. Edward. "Contemporary Theology and the Meaning of Life." Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of St. Andrews, 1965.
- Rich, Maynard Leslie. "Paul Tillich's Utilization of Depth Psychology in the Existential Analysis of the Human Situation." Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Drew University, 1969.

GENERAL BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Altizer, Thomas J. J. The Gospel of Christian Atheism. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1966.
- Altizer, Thomas J. J. and Hamilton, William. Radical Theology and the Death of God. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 1966.
- Barrett, William. Irrational Man: A Study in Existential Philosophy. Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Co., 1958.
- Barth, Karl. From Rousseau to Ritschl. Translated by Brian Cozens. London: SCM Press, Ltd., 1959.
- Berger, Peter L. A Rumor of Angels: Modern Society and the Rediscovery of the Supernatural. Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Co., 1969.
- Berlin, Isaiah. Karl Marx: His Life and Environment. A Galaxy Book. New York: Oxford University Press, 1959.
- Bithell, Jethro. Modern German Literature 1880-1950. London: Methuen and Co., Ltd., 1959.
- Blum, Gerald S. Psychoanalytic Theories of Personality. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1953.
- Bultmann, Rudolf. Jesus Christ and Mythology. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958.
- Cooper, John Charles. Religion in the Age of Aquarius. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1971.
- Cox, Harvey. The Secular City. New York: Macmillan Co., 1965.
- Danto, Arthur C. Nietzsche as Philosopher. New York: Macmillan Co., 1965.
- Demetz, Peter. Postwar German Literature: A Critical Introduction. Pegasus, New York: Western Publishing Co., 1970.
- Dornandi, Agnes Korner, comp. and ed. Modern German Literature: A Library of Literary Criticism. Vol. I. New York: Frederick Ungar Publishing Co., 1972.
- Dry, Avis M. The Psychology of Jung: A Critical Interpretation. London: Methuen and Co., Ltd., 1961.
- Ebeling, Gerhard. The Nature of Faith. Translated by Ronald Gregor Smith. The Fontana Library. London: William Collins Sons and Co., 1967.
- Feldman, Burton and Richardson, Robert D. The Rise of Modern Mythology: 1680-1860. Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1972.

- Fordham, Frieda. An Introduction to Jung's Psychology. A Pelican Original. Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, Ltd., 1966.
- Hamilton, William. The New Essence of Christianity. London: Darton, Longman and Todd, Ltd., 1966.
- Hatfield, Henry. Goethe: A Critical Introduction. New Directions Books. New York: James Laughlin, 1963.
- _____. Modern German Literature: the Major Figures in Context. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1967.
- Herberg, Will, ed. Four Existentialist Theologians. Garden City: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1958.
- Hollingdale, R. J. Nietzsche: the Man and His Philosophy. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1965.
- Horton, Walter Marshall. Christian Theology: An Ecumenical Approach. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1955.
- Jacobi, Jolande. The Psychology of C. G. Jung: An Introduction with Illustrations. Translated by Ralph Manheim. 6th ed. Yale Paperbound. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962.
- Johnson, Robert Clyde. Authority in Protestant Theology. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1959.
- Jung, Carl G. The Collected Works of C. G. Jung. 2nd ed. Vol. V: Symbols of Transformation; Vol. IX, Part I: The Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious; Vol. IX, Part II: Aion: Researches into the Phenomenology of the Self; Vol. XI: Psychology and Religion: West and East. Edited by Gerhard Adler, Michael Fordham, and Herbert Read. Translated (except for Vol. II) by R. F. C. Hull. 20 vols. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1961- .
- _____. Modern Man in Search of a Soul. Translated by W. S. Dell and Cary F. Baynes. Harvest Books. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1955.
- _____. Psyche and Symbol: A Selection from the Writings of C. G. Jung. Edited by Violet S. de Laszlo. Anchor Original. New York: Doubleday and Co., 1958.
- _____. Psychology and Religion. Yale Paperbound. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1960.
- _____. Psychology of the Unconscious. Translated by Beatrice M. Hinkle. London: Kegan, Paul, Trench, Trubner and Co., Ltd., 1921.
- _____. Two Essays on Analytical Psychology. Translated by R. F. C. Hull. Meridian Books. Cleveland: World Publishing Co., 1953.

- _____. The Undiscovered Self. Translated by R. F. C. Hull. Mentor Book. New York: New American Library of World Literature, Inc., 1958.
- Kaufmann, Walter. The Faith of a Heretic. Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Co., 1961.
- Kee, Alistair. The Way of Transcendence: Christian Faith without Belief in God. A Pelican Book. Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, Ltd., 1971.
- Kenniston, Kenneth. The Uncommitted. New York: Dell Publishing Co., 1968.
- Kraemer, Hendrik. Religion and the Christian Faith. London: Lutterworth Press, Ltd., 1956.
- Lilje, Hanns. Atheism, Humanism, and Christianity: Today's Struggle for the Mind of Man. Translated by Clifford Davis. Minneapolis, Minnesota: Augsburg Publishing House, 1964.
- Liptzin, Sol. Historical Survey of German Literature. New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1936.
- Michalson, Carl. Christianity and the Existentialists. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1956.
- _____. Worldly Theology: the Hermeneutical Focus of an Historical Faith. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1967.
- Miller, Samuel H. Man the Believer: In an Age of Unbelief. Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1968.
- Nietzsche, Friedrich. Thus Spoke Zarathustra. Translated by R. J. Hollingdale. Penguin Books. Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, Ltd., 1969.
- Pike, James A. Doing the Truth: A Summary of Christian Ethics. New edition, completely revised. Macmillan Paperback. New York: Macmillan Co., 1965.
- Robinson, John A. T. Christian Freedom in a Permissive Society. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1970.
- _____. The Difference in Being a Christian Today. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1972.
- Robinson, N. H. G. The Groundwork of Christian Ethics. St. James's Place, London: William Collins Sons and Co., Ltd., 1971.
- Sellers, James. Theological Ethics. New York: Macmillan Co., 1968.
- Shinn, Roger Lincoln. Wars and Rumors of Wars. Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1972.

Smith, Ronald Gregor. The Doctrine of God. Edited by K. Gregor Smith and A. D. Galloway. St. James's Place, London: William Collins Sons and Co., Ltd., 1970.

_____. The Whole Man: Studies in Christian Anthropology. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1969.

Thielicke, Helmut. Nihilism: Its Origin and Nature--with a Christian Answer. Translated by John W. Doberstein. Introduction by Michael Novak. Schocken Books. New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, Inc., 1969.

Webster's Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary. 16th ed. Springfield, Massachusetts: G. & C. Merriam Co., 1967.

Wieman, Henry Nelson. Man's Ultimate Commitment. Carbondale, Illinois: Southern Illinois University Press, 1958.

Wilson, Colin. The Outsider. 3rd ed. London: Pan Books, Ltd., 1963.

separations

6.

GENERAL BOOKBINDING CO.
ESTD 1911
7" CA149 1 021
QUALITY CONTROL MARK

T 2V ~~032~~ H2