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Implications of Austerity for Community Safety within Merseyside

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Implications of Austerity for Community Safety within Merseyside

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Abstract

Community safety sector stakeholders in Merseyside are finding it increasingly difficult to remain financially sustainable and deliver the necessary community safety, crime prevention and diversionary services. Over the course of the immediate past parliament, Merseyside Local Authorities within the Liverpool City Region Combined Authority (LCRCA) and the police force area had to restructure staffing and service provision extensively in order to deliver efficiency savings of over £650m. This research study used a mixed-methodological approach to explain how cuts to funding impacted on the delivery of public safety priorities under the coalition government (2010-2015). We discovered that the cuts had severe repercussions not just in terms of stakeholders capability to provide key services but also for the morale of their staff. Based on feedback from the study participants, we project a further 33% cutback in funding over the course of the current parliament though subsequent more favourable Government announcements suggest a more modest figure of up to 15%. This undoubtedly will result in the further streamlining of public services with potentially serious ramifications for levels of public safety.

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Contents

1. Background and Executive Summary

Since the emergence of the coalition government in 2010, funding for public services has nose-dived across England and Wales. Reduction in funding is directly linked to the government's plan to reduce the national deficit. Not only has funding reduced across the board, the nature of funding has changed markedly thereby further increasing uncertainty.

With the challenge of having to achieve efficiencies of over £650m over the period 2010 to 2016 and the prospect of further cuts to come within the next few years, the Merseyside Local Authorities within the Liverpool City Region Combined Authority (LCRCA), and the police force area are experiencing monumental change. The crucial role of the community safety workforce in maintaining service levels for the 1.4m residents of the five metropolitan areas of Merseyside cannot be over-emphasised. They combine the delivery of statutory and non-statutory services with the targeting of resources where they are most needed. Ensuring that community safety stakeholders across Merseyside remain financially sustainable is becoming increasingly difficult in a climate of deeper funding cuts.

This study used a mixed-methodological approach to capture and detail the depth and breadth of financial cuts among a wide range of Merseyside Community Safety Partners (MCSP) since 2010.

The partners include:
- Office of the Police and Crime Commissioner, Merseyside;
- Merseyside Police;
- Knowsley Community Safety Partnership;
- Liverpool Community Safety Partnership;
- Sefton Community Safety Partnership;
- St. Helens Community Safety Partnership;
- Wirral Community Safety Partnership;
- Her Majesty's Prison Service;
- Merseyside Fire and Rescue Service;
- Merseyside Community Rehabilitation Company;
- Merseyside's Registered Social Landlords; and
- Travelsafe.

In addition to the CSPs, the study also outlines how the cuts have affected the five Youth Offending Services across Merseyside and the National Probation Service.

Furthermore, the research uncovers the scale and nature of financial reductions that each of the stakeholders will be required to make beyond the current financial year (i.e. post April 2016). It is important to stress that we conducted the study and solicited stakeholder views and relevant information in the autumn of 2015 just prior to the announcement of the Comprehensive Spending Review and that the funding position of community safety partner organisations has since changed, in some cases significantly.

We encountered problems collecting comprehensive data on the extent of expenditure cuts in the community safety sphere and also found it difficult to gauge their impact since funding is just one of a number of factors influencing levels of community safety, real and perceived.

Whereas there was ample funding for community safety, crime prevention and diversionary services prior to 2010 especially in deprived areas suffering from a high incidence of crime and anti-social behaviour, most stakeholders have experienced significant spending cutbacks in the period 2010-2015. These cuts have also led to marked staffing reductions.

Community safety service providers have had to operate in a city region which continues to face some of the most serious socio-economic problems in the country - a region where there are relatively large concentrations of vulnerable individuals and communities either at risk of entering into criminality or becoming the victims of crime.

Spending cuts have forced all community safety bodies to focus on core, mandatory services and pare back discretionary spending, introduce efficiency measures and adopt a targeted, risk-based approach and time limited interventions.

There is widespread concern that lack of funding for preventive measures, especially diversionary measures, could result in growing demands being placed on the criminal justice system. Since stakeholders have interlocking agendas and tackle inter-related problems, cuts in their respective budgets are having significant knock-on effects on their sister bodies.

Most stakeholders felt that public confidence in service providers has not been dented so far by austerity as they have maintained a good standard of services and done their best to maintain frontline services. There seems to be a perception that they are doing their best in difficult circumstances and involvement of the public in the rationalisation of services may have helped.

There is concern, however, that the recent upturn in recorded crime, especially incidence of violence against the person, which has led to crime levels returning to 2011 levels, could damage public confidence, notwithstanding the fact that some of the increase has been due to improved reporting.

Austerity has had a largely detrimental effect upon the morale of staff working in the sphere of community safety, crime prevention and diversionary services. Cuts have variously led to restructuring, mergers, voluntary or compulsory redundancies, redeployment, changes to working hours, additional responsibilities and workload. This has in turn affected job satisfaction and caused uncertainty, worry, additional stress, sickness and loss of expertise.

Many local authorities have been particularly badly hit by staff cuts. Frustration with the increasingly limited scope for action could tip into disillusionment if cuts persist. The prospect of further cuts is a general dampener on morale. Organisations which have sought to adjust working cultures, scrutinise closely their staff's use of time, innovate and adapt and maintain a good reputation with service users have softened the impact of cuts on staff morale.

Going forward to the end of the current parliament in 2020, a projection of around 33% further cuts are expected. Further disruption to funding will trigger further cutbacks to research and intelligence units forcing many stakeholders to rely more on soft intelligence with the exception of Liverpool which despite a reduction in analytical ability still has such expertise.

In view of what lies ahead, there is growing appetite amongst the MCSP stakeholders to consider some possible coping mechanisms which may help to mitigate these pressures. One such mechanism is to pursue an interoperable and collaborative working agenda in the form of a Pan-Merseyside strategy. Whilst taking into account the peculiarities of the different jurisdictions of MCSP stakeholders and the continuing need to respect local delivery, priorities and funding decisions, such partnership working could focus on areas presenting common challenges including: the exploitation of children and young people; Domestic violence; Hate crime; Organised crime; and Neighbourhood anti-social behaviour.

2. The Social, Economic and Demographic Configuration of Merseyside

Numerous studies have shown that crime and its determinants are closely linked to the demographic, social and economic contexts in which victims and perpetrators find themselves (Kelly, 2000). In recent decades, Britain's community safety agenda has been shaped by critical issues linked to socio-demographics and economics of communities. Some of these policy drivers include issues like poverty, social exclusion, income inequality, unemployment and social mobility, educational attainment, age distribution, gender dynamics and urbanisation (Webster and Kingston, 2014). There is no gainsaying that the changing face of the country's social, demographic and economic landscape has had direct and indirect knock-on effects on community safety (Whitworth, 2012).

It is difficult to separate the historical antecedents of Merseyside from its contemporary social and economic challenges. Over a period of at least two hundred years, Merseyside (and Liverpool in particular) has experienced the extremes of opulence and acute need. During this period, the economic prosperity of the region was largely undergirded by the emergence of a globally renowned port which enabled flourishing international trade. Merchandise like salt, slaves and raw materials thrived during the 18th and 19th centuries (Wilks-Heeg, 2003).

Societal prosperity is usually a magnet for people. Therefore, as a result of a thriving economy, Merseyside and Liverpool in particular attracted people from all over the world. The population of the region peaked during the 1930s (Sykes et al., 2013).

However, following a lengthy period of economic boom, the good fortunes of Merseyside nose-dived rapidly soon thereafter due in part to heavy and sustained bombing experienced during the Second World War, unfavourable economic restructuring and key planning decisions (Sykes et al., 2013).

This section presents a synopsis of the historic decline in the population of Merseyside. An attempt is also made to explain how this decline triggered enormous social problems including crime and how it affected economic regeneration efforts. Later parts of the section focus on an overview of more contemporary indicators of demographic, social and economic status within a framework of crime and community safety.

2.1. Merseyside's Historic Population Decline

From the beginning of the 1980s to the middle of the first decade of the current millennium, no other English Region witnessed a faster and larger fall in population than Merseyside. During this 25 year period, the population of Merseyside fell by approximately 7% (Dorling et al., 2008). This drop in population was the legacy of the severe economic hardship which the region had endured since the 1970s.

To contextualise their findings, Dorling et al. (2008) showed that the East of England experienced the highest population increase between 1981 and 2006, an increase of 23%. Conversely, the North West and Scotland witnessed population declines of 1% during the same period. As shown in Figure 2.1, the population of Merseyside fell significantly during the period.

Dorling and his team also showed that between 1970 and 2000, Merseyside gradually rose through the ranks to become the region with the highest share of people classed as breadline poor alongside Scotland. Figures 2.2 to 2.6 capture this transition.

Figure 2.1: Percentage Population Change 1981-2006

Data Source: Dorling et al. (2008)

Figure 2.2: Percentage Population Who Were Bread-line Poor (1970)

Data Source: Dorling et al. (2008)

Figure 2.3: Percentage Population Who Were Bread-line Poor (1980)

Data Source: Dorling et al. (2008)

Figure 2.4: Percentage Population Who Were Bread-line Poor (1990)

Data Source: Dorling et al. (2008)

Figure 2.5: Percentage Population Who Were Bread-line Poor (2000)

Data Source: Dorling et al. (2008)

Dorling defined 'bread-line poverty' as "people living below a relative poverty line, and as such excluded from participating in the norms of society" (Dorling et al., 2008 p. 18). The analysis reveals a stark north-south divide with the south of England exhibiting fewer traits of poverty. Even more worryingly, it shows that by the beginning of the current millennium roughly a third of Merseyside residents were living beneath the poverty line.

Poverty can be demoralising. It often creates a sense of insecurity and an inferiority complex which trigger a process of detachment from the rest of society (Pemberton et al, 2013). Evidence shows that there are strong links between social isolation and crime. People with weaker feelings of societal belonging not only become vulnerable to criminals but can also become exposed to the "underworld" (Patel, 2013).

Poverty triggered high levels of polarisation and segregation across Merseyside which consequently led to stronger feelings of isolation and weaker feelings of belonging. Following population and economic decline in Merseyside, Dorling et al. (2008) used the 'anomie index' to capture how the feelings of loneliness change over time. The computation of this index of loneliness is based on a weighted combination of the following indicators:

▪ Numbers of non-married adults;
▪ Number of 1-person households;
▪ Number of people who moved to their current address within the last year; and
▪ Number of people renting privately.

Just over 375,000 people across Merseyside were lonely and isolated in 1971. By 1981, some 20,000 more people had become lonely taking the number to roughly 397,000. Merseyside witnessed the most significant rise in levels of fragmentation during the 1981 to 1991 decade. There was a 4 percentage point increase (77,000 people) in the number of people who had become socially isolated. By the beginning of the current millennium, approximately 480,000 residents of Merseyside (24%) were classified as socially isolated.

The changing dynamics of Merseyside's population provided one of the biggest challenges to those tasked with pursuing the region's regeneration. The rapid loss of talented segments of the population to other parts of the country and to the rest of the world made it difficult to attract new businesses (Rink et al., 2012).

2.2. Contemporary Demographics

Deliberate attempts to revamp the economy of Merseyside in the last decade, coupled with more in-migration and wider economic growth have resulted in a slight growth in population more recently (+1.8%, 2004 - 2014). There are currently approximately 1.39 million people living in Merseyside (ONS, 2015). Virtually all its residents (99%) live in urban communities which contrasts with roughly 4 out of 5 (82%) residents in England as a whole. Figure 2.6 shows the population spread across the five Local Authorities within the region. Together, Liverpool accounts for more than a third of the entire population, Wirral almost a quarter and Sefton a fifth with only just over 1 in 10 Merseyside residents based in St Helens and a similar proportion in Knowsley. Figures are based on the 2014 Office for National Statistics mid-year population estimates.

Figure 2.6: Merseyside Population Shares by Local Authorities (2014)

Data Source: ONS Mid-Year Population Estimates

Figure 2.7: Merseyside Percentage Population Change (2010 - 2014)

Data Source: ONS Mid-Year Population Estimates

In terms of population change, the region witnessed a growth of 1.1% (15,200 people) between 2010 and 2014. The strongest growth has occurred in Liverpool with a 2.5% increase (11,700 people), followed by a 1.1% (2,000 people) increase in St. Helens. Wirral witnessed a rise of 0.6% (1,800 people). Population has remained relatively stagnant in Knowsley while Sefton experienced a slight fall of 0.1% (300 people). Overall Merseyside's population increase has been small when compared with the national figure (3.2%).

Figure 2.8 provides a visual representation of population change at Lower Super Output Area (LSOA).[1] More than half of the LSOAs in Wirral (56%) and Liverpool (51%) experienced growth, whilst in St. Helens, 47% of LSOAs saw a rise in population. In Sefton and Knowsley, 42% of LSOAs saw a rise in population. The 15 LSOAs with the highest percentage increases in population, ranging from 26.6% to 154.3% were all in Liverpool. However, 9 of the 15 LSOAs with the largest percentage population falls were also in Liverpool.

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[1] Super Output Areas are a geography for the collection and publication of small area statistics. They are used on the Neighbourhood Statistics site and across National Statistics. There are currently two layers of SOA, Lower Layer Super Output Area (LSOA) and Middle Layer Super Output Area (MSOA). The SOA layers form a hierarchy based on aggregations of Output Areas (OAs). Lower Layer SOAs were first built using 2001 Census data from groups of Output Areas (typically four to six) and have been updated following the 2011 Census. They have an average of roughly 1,500 residents and 650 households. Measures of proximity (to give a reasonably compact shape) and social homogeneity (to encourage areas of similar social background) are also included.

Figure 2.8: Merseyside Population Change at Lower Super Output Area Scale (2010 - 2014)

Notes: Boundaries downloaded from the UK Data Service. Contains Ordnance Survey data Crown copyright and database right 2015. Population data from ONS Small Area Population Estimates.

Male Population Change

The pattern of change in Merseyside's male population is largely similar to that of the total population. However, increases in numbers of males have been slightly higher than the total figures for nearly all parts of Merseyside. There was a greater rise amongst males compared to females. Figure 2.9 shows that the strongest growth has occurred in Liverpool (2.8%). Merseyside's overall increase remains small when compared to the national figure of 3.5%.

Figure 2.9: Merseyside Percentage Male Population Change (2010 - 2014)

Data Source: ONS Mid-Year Population Estimates

Significant Fall Amongst 10 to 20 Year olds

Whilst there were rises amongst males and the entire population, there was a significant fall amongst the 10 to 20 year old cohort. This trend is also apparent nationally. However, the fall amongst this age bracket is 6 percentage points greater than that of England.

Age Structure

Figure 2.10 presents Merseyside's 2014 population in 'pyramid' form. Some of Merseyside's largest population groups are males in the 20-24 and 25-29 age brackets and females in the 20-24 and 50-54 age brackets. The 15-19 age group is inflated somewhat by student numbers, with net internal migration data for Merseyside showing a net gain of 1,427 persons in the 15-19 age group for 2013-2014.

Figure 2.10: Merseyside's Population Pyramid by Age Bands (2014)

Data Source: ONS Mid-Year Population Estimates

Long-term International Migration

Population change is also impacted by long-term international migration. Figure 2.11 shows that amongst the five Local Authorities within Merseyside, international migration has recently been highest in Liverpool. Liverpool exhibits a net inflow of 0.54% of the city's population. Figures for the other Local Authorities are lower or negative. Merseyside's overall net inflow is 0.18%, compared with a national figure of 0.45%.

Figure 2.11: Long-term International Migration as % of Total Resident Population (2013 - 2014)

Data Source: ONS

Population Forecast

The ONS produced the latest available long-term population forecasts based on 2012 population data. The analysis forecasts how population will change between 2012 and 2037. Forecasts should always be treated with a degree of caution. The expectation for Merseyside is for low growth of just 4.2% compared with a 16.2% increase nationally. The strongest rates of growth are forecast for St. Helens (7.6%) and Liverpool (5.6%) with more modest growth anticipated in Wirral (3.4%), Sefton (2.2%) and Knowsley (1.2%).

Focusing on the 10-19 age group, Figure 2.12 shows the expected numbers in this bracket. We believe this age group is a crucial cohort in terms of targeting early interventions. The 2012-2037 population forecast for Merseyside suggest that numbers will initially fall to 150,000 in 2018 and 2019, followed by a 10% rise up to 166,000 in 2030 and 2031 before declining to 163,000 in 2037.

Figure 2.12: Population Forecasts for Merseyside Population Aged 10-19 (2012 - 2037)

Data Source: ONS

Ethnicity

Around 95% of Merseyside's residents define their ethnicity as 'white' compared with 85.4% nationally. Merseyside is noticeably less ethnically diverse than the national average. However, Liverpool is the most ethnically diverse amongst the five Local Authorities, with proportions of different ethnic groups that are more akin to the national picture.

Looked After Children

Virtually all children in care tend to come from backgrounds of deprivation, poor parenting, abuse and neglect – factors that together are risk factors for a range of emotional, social and behavioural difficulties, including antisocial and offending behaviour (Schofield et al., 2012).

Figure 2.13: Looked After Children by Local Authority (2011 - 2015)

Data Source: Department for Education

Merseyside has much higher rates of children who are looked after by the Local Authority compared with the national average. The region's figure rose gradually from 92 to 102 per 10,000 children between 2011 and 2015. Conversely, during the same period, the figure for England remained fairly stable rising from 58 to 60 per 10,000 children. Within Merseyside the highest rates of looked after children are found in St. Helens (113 per 10,000 children) and Liverpool (111 per 10,000 children). All Merseyside authorities face the added challenge of having to look after children placed there from other parts of the country.

2.3. Deprivation

There is an inherent link between economic deprivation and crime. The Indices of Deprivation combine numerous dimensions of deprivation: Income; Employment; Education, Skills and Training Deprivation; Health Deprivation and Disability; Crime; Barriers to Housing and Services; and Living Environment Deprivation. A very high proportion of Merseyside LSOAs fall within the most deprived 10% of LSOAs in England as shown in Figure 2.14.

Figure 2.14: Index of Multiple Deprivation (2015)

Data Source: The Indices of Deprivation 2015 have been constructed for the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG) by Oxford Consultants for Social Inclusion (OCSI)

Overall, 31.8% of Merseyside's LSOAs fall within this category with the highest proportions in Knowsley and Liverpool where nearly half of all LSOAs fall within the most deprived 10% nationally. St. Helens, Wirral and Sefton each have more than 20% of their LSOAs in the 'most deprived 10%' category.

Figure 2.15 shows the geographic distribution of deprived areas in Merseyside. Spatial concentrations of high deprivation areas are evident in each of the Local Authorities.

Figure 2.15: Deprivation in Merseyside (2015)

Notes: Boundaries downloaded from the UK Data Service. Contains Ordnance Survey data Crown copyright and database right 2015. The Indices of Deprivation have been constructed for the Department of Communities and Local Government (DCLG) by Oxford Consultants for Social Inclusion (OCSI).

Worklessness

Levels of deprivation can also be mirrored by statistics on workless households. Figure 2.16 shows the percentage of households that were workless in 2014. This analysis only includes households that have at least one person of working age and excludes all households that contain only students. Workless household rates provide an indication of a variety of deprivation aspects including employment, health, education and opportunity-related deprivation. All of Merseyside's 5 Local Authorities have above national shares of workless households, with the highest proportion found in Liverpool (29.6%) and the lowest in Sefton (19.2%).

Figure 2.16: Percentage of Households that are Workless (2014)

Data Source: ONS

Unemployment and NEET

Unemployment rates for persons of working age are high in Merseyside compared with England. Liverpool's rate, at 10.7%, is nearly twice the national figure. Rates in St. Helens, Knowsley and Wirral exceed the national average. However, Sefton's unemployment rate is lower than national at 3.3%.

The proportion of 16-18 year olds who are 'not in employment, education or training' (NEET) are an interesting group to examine given the relatively higher incidence of crime vulnerability amongst this cohort (LSN, 2009).

Table 2.1: Share of 16-18 Year Olds who are 'Not in Employment, Education or Training' (NEET) (2014)

Area	16-18 year olds NEET (%)
Knowsley	8.0
Liverpool	8.2
Sefton	5.7
St. Helens	6.6
Wirral	4.3
Merseyside	6.6
North West	5.2
England	4.7

Data Source: Department for Education
Note: In Liverpool LA the proportion of 16-18 year olds whose current activity is not known is 23.7% compared with the England average of 9.0%. As a result, the number and proportion of NEETs in Liverpool may be inaccurate.

From Table 2.1, it is obvious that NEET rates in Merseyside are higher than the national figure. The highest NEET rates are in Liverpool (8.2%) and Knowsley (8.0%) while Wirral exhibits the lowest rate within Merseyside (4.3%).

2.4. Criminogenics

In 2014, Merseyside recorded 70 crimes per 1,000 head of population compared with a national rate of 61. Out of the 6 Police Forces, Merseyside exhibited the second highest rate of recorded crime behind Greater Manchester. However, rates were broadly similar for the regions shown in Table 2.2. Recorded crime rates in Northumbria during 2014 were significantly lower than the other regions.

Table 2.2: Recorded Crime per 1,000 Head of Population in Police Force Areas, Major Urban Areas (2014)

Police Force Areas	Crimes per 1,000 people
Greater Manchester	71.5
Merseyside	70.2
Northumbria	49.9
South Yorkshire	69.1
West Midlands	63
West Yorkshire	68.1
England & Wales	61.4

Data Source: HMIC

Figure 2.17: Crime Deprivation in Merseyside, Index of Multiple Deprivation (2015)


Notes: Boundaries downloaded from the UK Data Service. Contains Ordnance Survey data Crown copyright and database right 2015. The Indices of Deprivation have been constructed for the Department of Communities and Local Government (DCLG) by Oxford Consultants for Social Inclusion (OCSI). Crime domain data are based on violence, burglary, theft and criminal damage data provided by the Association of Chief Police Officers via the Home Office for 2013/2014.

The map in Figure 2.17 shows the spatial distribution of 'crime deprivation' across Merseyside using Indices of Multiple Deprivation (IMD) data for 2015. Data are based on crime figures for violence, burglary, theft and criminal damage for 2013/14. They show relative crime deprivation levels within Lower-layer Super Output Areas (LSOAs) in England. Spatial concentrations of the worst areas for crime deprivation are particularly evident in north Liverpool and in parts of Sefton and Wirral. However, each of the Local Authorities contain some high incidence of crime deprivation.

Relative to the rest of England, Merseyside has a slightly higher than average proportion of its LSOAs falling within England's 'most deprived 10% for crime'. Approximately 12% of Merseyside's LSOAs fall within England's most deprived 10% for crime. However, there is considerable variation across Merseyside. Liverpool is the worst performing with 23% of its LSOAs in this category, while Merseyside's other 4 Local Authority each have less than 10%. In Knowsley just 3% of its LSOAs fall into this category while Sefton and Wirral each have 7%. St. Helens has 8% of LSOAs in the category.

Figure 2.18: Crime Deprivation in Merseyside, Index of Multiple Deprivation (2015)

A comparison of crime deprivation data from the 2010 IMD and the 2015 IMD, shows that the share of Merseyside's LSOAs falling into the worst 10% nationally has increased from 8% to 12%. Ironically, during the same period, community safety funding for the region has diminished – a mismatch between needs and priorities. Figure 2.18 shows that four of the five Local Authorities have seen a larger proportion of their LSOAs fall into the 'most crime deprived 10%' over the 2010 – 2015 period. Only Knowsley remained unchanged.

2.5. Crime Demographics

In 2014, the Ministry of Justice released data showing persons found guilty or cautioned for indictable offences by individual age categories and gender. Rates for males within Merseyside are high between the ages 16 to 38 and highest between the ages 17 to 29. Nationally the male peak offending age range is 17-27.

Figure 2.19: Males Found Guilty or Cautioned for Indictable Offences in Merseyside (2014)

Data Source: Ministry of Justice

Figure 2.20: Females Found Guilty or Cautioned for Indictable Offences in Merseyside (2014)

Data Source: Ministry of Justice

The picture for females is generally different. For females, rates are high between ages 24 to 44, and highest between ages 32 to 39. Nationally however, the peak for females is between the ages 24 to 32. After age 32, rates begin to decline nationally but they start to peak in Merseyside.

3. An Overview of Direct and Indirect Impacts of Austerity

We now turn to the core purpose of this report which is to gauge the scale, dimensions and implications of austerity in terms of community safety within Merseyside. To do this we have primarily drawn on key stakeholders' views and related academic and policy literature. We interviewed representatives of the main agencies operating in this policy sphere:

- The Police and Crime Commissioner for Merseyside;
- Merseyside Police;
- Merseyside Fire and Rescue Service;
- The five district authorities (Community Safety Partnership leads);
- Liverpool Youth Offending Service;
- Public Health Liverpool; and
- A large Registered Social Landlord with pan-Merseyside stock – Riverside Housing[2]

In total we spoke to 16 interviewees. Each stakeholder was asked to describe their community safety activities in 2010 and their impact; compare funding in 2010 with the current position; describe how funding changes have impacted upon their strategic approach and operations, staff morale, public confidence, engagement and perceptions of their activities; reflect on how their operational context and challenges have changed in the 2010-2015 period.

We also asked them to forecast the scale of future funding cuts post-2015 until the end of the current parliament and the likely implications and ways of mitigating the impact of the cuts and to discuss the political, economic, social, technological, environmental, legislative and moral arguments for maintaining or increasing funding in these policy areas. These topics are covered in the next section.

While it is relatively straightforward to measure the extent of funding cuts, many interviewees pointed out that gauging their impact is much more difficult for a number of reasons. As in many areas of public policy it is difficult to isolate the impact of funding cuts on community safety from a host of other factors such as societal trends, performance of service providers and so on. This policy sphere is a crowded arena as there are many agencies involved whose policies and programmes interact in a multitude of ways. Consequently, cuts have complex knock-on (indirect) effects in related service areas which are difficult to define, fully capture and measure accurately. This can lead to 'cost shunting' where the burden of responsibility shifts from one agency to another, placing yet more pressure on restricted budgets (House of Commons Public Accounts Committee, 2015). Disentangling the effects of individual community safety, crime prevention and diversionary measures is also challenging, especially if they are running concurrently. Furthermore, it is difficult to demonstrate the effectiveness of different kinds of preventative measures because the lack of 'policy off' control areas makes it hard to establish what would have happened in their absence. The benefits of preventive measures may also take time to materialise.

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[2] We also approached Merseyside Probation Service, Merseyside Community Rehabilitation Company and Her Majesty's Prison Service but it was not possible within the project's tight timescale to arrange a mutually convenient time for the interview.

Similarly, there are time lags before changes in funding register an effect. Conceivably current public perceptions of public safety may partly be a legacy of initiatives introduced in the relatively benign pre-2010 funding environment.

Finally, there is a dearth of intelligence on the impact of funding cuts, especially at grassroots level given the lack of formal monitoring and evaluation and in many agencies this problem has been compounded because cuts have resulted in the cessation of perception surveys and closure or downsizing of intelligence units. Also, assembling a comprehensive picture of changing community safety funding proved very difficult because it covers a number of different organisations and budget heads and data obtained varied in its level of detail, composition and quality.

Attempts to gauge the impact of services on community safety and incidence of crime must also take into account that the current context is very different to what it was in 2010. New legislation has been introduced changing agencies' respective roles and responsibilities. Some community safety issues are less of a challenge than they were then, while others are more so as new forms of criminal activity such as cybercrime have emerged.

Prior to 2010 there was ample funding for community safety, crime prevention and diversionary services within Merseyside. The then Labour Government made it obligatory for public sector organisations to collaborate in the reduction of crime through participation in community safety partnerships and this was reflected in a host of related targets and funding streams. Attainment of targets in some cases triggered further 'reward' funding. This helped promote a holistic, joined-up approach and spawned packages of complementary initiatives ranging from target hardening to diversionary activities and preventative measures. In addition, special funding (e.g. Neighbourhood Renewal Funds and Area Based Initiatives) could be tapped in order to improve socio-economic conditions in deprived areas which often experienced the highest incidence of crime and anti-social behaviour. Owing to the extent of Merseyside's challenges and past incidents of unrest, public agencies received relatively generous funding settlements and the fact that the city region had its own dedicated Government Office gave it a voice in Whitehall.

The position in 2015 is much different to what it was in 2010. Table 3.1 shows that most stakeholder bodies have experienced significant spending cutbacks, though their extent significantly varied. Likewise staffing levels have fallen dramatically by between 15% and 80%. While bodies have continued to deliver core, mandatory services, cuts have meant that partners have had to pare back non-statutory services and responses. This is a particular issue for Crime and Disorder Partnerships since a lot of the services they provide are non-statutory – for example, Multi-Agency Risk Assessment Conferences (MARACs). All stakeholder organisations have had to carefully consider the business case for different lines of expenditure and prioritise accordingly and target resources on addressing the most salient issues and problems. Generally, agencies have moved away from seeking to provide services on a universal basis and towards adopting a risk-based approach. They are also designing briefer intervention models (for example, with domestic violence victims) which make the most of limited resources.

On a more positive note, acute funding pressures have underlined the need for community safety organisations to maintain a partnership philosophy and work together even more closely in order to dovetail approaches, avoid duplication and make the most of limited resources available.

Government legislation, principally the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014, has urged organisations to place vulnerable people and communities at the heart of everything they do. This has prompted an intelligence-led approach in the case of Merseyside Fire and Rescue Service in which they look to intervene much earlier to prevent escalation and reduce demand on other services.

Table 3.1: Impact of Austerity on Community Safety Organisations

Agency	Change in funding 2010-2015 (%)	Change in staffing levels (%) 2010-2015 (%)
Merseyside Police	-15	-20
Merseyside Fire & Rescue Service	-12	-31
Public Health, Liverpool	n/a	n/a
Liverpool Youth Offending Service	-48	-62
Liverpool Council (Safer Communities)	-78	-90 (estimate)
Wirral Council (Safer Communities)	-0.6	-50
St Helens Council (Safer Communities)	-26	-66 (estimate)
Sefton Council (Safer Communities)	-70 (estimate	-70 (estimate)
Knowsley Council (Safer Communities)	-80 (estimate)	-80 (estimate)
Riverside Housing - RSLs	-25 (estimate)	n/a

Source: Survey of community safety organisation
Note: CSP figures vary considerably because some included cuts in the number of Neighbourhood wardens as well as core staff and also because they were in some cases ball park estimates

More detailed budgetary information supplied by the Wirral Community Safety team has shown that cuts have fallen unevenly, depending on the type of community safety service provided (Table 3.2).

Table 3.2 Community Safety Funding Changes in the Wirral

	2010 (£m)	2015 (£m)	% change 2010 - 2015
Domestic violence victims services	0.236	0.227	-3.8
Offender services	0.558	0.599	7.3
Housing support for young people at risk	2.545	2.126	-16.5
Youth diversionary services (Sport Development	0.378	0.055	-85.4
Community safety partnership funding (including Local Area	1.102	1.097	-0.5

Many organisations are finding that resources for certain kinds of preventative measures, especially diversionary activities are no longer available which is making such legislative demands hard to fulfil. Most stakeholders felt that the lack of such services will rebound because it will lead to growing demands and pressures upon the criminal justice system. As already noted, local authorities have also had to cut back intelligence units which in the past have highlighted community safety needs in specific areas.

One stakeholder pointed out that the funding to the key community safety stakeholders covered in this report does not represent the whole picture. Significant funds relating to community safety are distributed directly to individual Merseyside organisations rather than via Community Safety Partnerships or local authorities. This potentially militates against achieving a strategic approach and can lead to duplication, and the risk that money goes to those who shout loudest rather than where it is most needed or effective.

3.1. Impacts of Austerity on Service Provision

Most stakeholders found it very hard to separate out their activities into the three main areas of concern to this study: community safety, crime prevention and diversionary services. We have therefore opted to report the impact of austerity primarily on the main service providers before concluding with a brief illustrative look at the indirect effects of cuts to one organisation on others working in the community safety sphere.

Merseyside Police

In 2010, Merseyside Police played a prominent part in multi-agency Crime and Disorder Partnerships (later Community Safety Partnerships) within each district – indeed many were chaired or deputy chaired by the relevant District Commander. These sought to ensure partners adopted a holistic response to each authorities' community safety issues. The lion's share of resources was invested in crime prevention initiatives focussed around target hardening such as alley-gating, smartwater and security lighting. However, significant resources were injected into diversionary services such as youth engagement programmes, in the hope those would lead to reductions in burglary, robbery, car crime and anti-social behaviour and also Domestic Violence Advocates.

Tables 3.3 and 3.4 show that Police budget has fallen by nearly 15% in the 2010-2015 period and that staffing levels have fallen by around 20% during that time. The reduction in the number of Police Community Support Officers (PCSOs) during that time has been of similar magnitude. In total the Force has lost about £81m in funding compared with what it would have received had 2010 levels of spending continued. This has impinged on all of its services but especially neighbourhood resources and policing which have been cut by 40%. Rationalisation has resulted in the closure of 22 general enquiry offices and 2 custody suites. The cuts have prompted the Police to:

- streamline performance management arrangements;
- focus attention on delivering core priorities of reducing crime and anti-social behaviour, maintaining public safety, providing neighbourhood policing;
- focus on the most serious, persistent community safety problems using incidence of crime data rather than responding to temporary upturns and cyclical patterns;
- allocate resources on a threat, harm and risk basis – for example by deploying PCSOs more in crime prone than in affluent areas;
- introduce efficiency savings by conducting an estates review, opening a new joint command centre with MRFS, investing in IT for frontline officers, improving procurement; and
- conduct multi-pronged operations in areas with a high incidence of crime (e.g. Evaluation of Operation Aquilla in Anfield revealed that it had reduced business robbery by 60% over a six month period through a combination of target hardening (cloaks, DNA sprays and a marketing campaign).

Table 3.3: Merseyside Police: Budget

	2010	2015	% change 2010 - 2015
Budget	£366m	£313m	-14.5

Table 3.4: Merseyside Police: Change in Staffing 2010-2015

	2010	2015	% change 2010 - 2015
Police officers	4562	3706	-18.8
Staff	2287	1769	-22.6
Community support officers	466	361	-22.5
Total	7315	5836	-20.2
Specials	547 (Dec 2011)*	352 (December 2015)	-35.6

Source: HMIC, 2014

Merseyside Police has sustained deeper cuts to their workforce than forces as a whole in England and Wales in the 2010-15 period though some other metropolitan forces have been even harder hit (Figure 3.1). However, only Northumbria has seen a greater percentage reduction in its numbers of PCSOs during that time (Figure 3.2)

Figure 3.1: Percentage Change in Total Workforce (FTEs) 2010-2015[1]

Source: HMIC
Note: 2010-2014 data are actual while 2015 data are projected

Office of Police and Crime Commissioner

Since the office was established in late 2012/early 2013, it has cut its annual costs dramatically from £2.4m to £1.3m and by restructuring it has reduced its staff complement from 29 to 20 people. This has resulted in savings of about £2.5m over the period 2013–2015. The Office has sought to maximise available resources by conducting research to determine how best to target funding (e.g. commissioning victim services) and bringing local authorities, voluntary bodies and other partners together to deliver some services on a consistent pan-Merseyside basis thereby freeing up resources for other purposes, notably in the areas of domestic violence advocacy, rape and sexual assault referral and third party reporting of hate crime.

Figure 3.2: Percentage Change in Police Community Support Officers (FTEs) 2010-2015[1]

Source: HMIC
Note: 2010-2014 data are actual while 2015 data are projected

Local Authorities

Austerity has had a harsh impact upon the five district authorities leading their respective Community Safety Partnerships. They utilise a cocktail of funding for community safety purposes and without exception all their funding streams have been cut back dramatically. Table 3.6 for example shows the extent of cut backs in community safety funding and also City Watch (CCTV) operations in Liverpool in the 2010-15 period. This picture has been replicated in the other Merseyside authorities.

Table 3.6: Liverpool City Council: Funding for Community Safety Activities

	Funding 2010/2011	Funding 2015/2016	% change
Community safety function/service	9.506m	2.102m	-78
City Watch Operations	6.372m	3.025m	-53

Note: The Community safety function figure comprises a variety of funds/grants. Community safety and City Watch Operations figures in each case include: income, grants, contributions, charges for services, internal recharges.

Local authorities also receive more modest amounts of Community Safety Funding from The Police and Crime Commissioner for crime reduction and community safety initiatives. Such funding has fallen by about 10% overall in the 2010-2015 period to around £2.87m (Table 3.5). In the past, local authorities have largely been granted discretion to spend their Community Safety Fund (CSF) allocations as they see fit given local needs. For example, some spend more on initiatives, others more on staffing. Cuts have therefore impacted CSF funded activities in varying ways in the different district authorities. The Commissioner has drawn upon reserves in order to maintain Community Safety Fund support at broadly the same level - otherwise the cuts would have been worse still. However, cuts in other kinds of funding have impacted upon local authorities and their Community Safety Partnership partners.

Accurately gauging the extent of CSF cuts has proved difficult because in March 2013, the Home Office consolidated a number of funding streams[3] which had previously been allocated to Local Authorities into a single funding pot, the Community Safety Fund, and made the Police and Crime Commissioner responsible for its allocation. It has not proved possible to assemble comprehensive information on each funding source.

Table 3.5: Community Safety Fund Allocations to Merseyside District Authorities: 2015/2016

Merseyside District Authorities	2015/2016
Merseyside Police	0.746
Wirral MBC	0.388
Liverpool CC	0.962
St Helens MBC	0.197
Sefton MBC	0.374
Knowsley MBC	0.204
Total	**2.871**

Source: Merseyside Police and Crime Commissioner, 2015.

NB. Figures include Youth Offending Service and Drug and Alcohol Team (DAAT) funding but exclude allocations to Positive Futures which were £0.094m in 2015/2016.

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[3] These funding streams included: Drug Interventions Programme (DIP); DIP Drug Testing Grant; Community Safety Partnership Funding; Youth Crime and Substance Misuse Prevention activities; Positive Futures; Communities against Gangs, Guns and Knives; Ending Gang and Youth Violence programme; Community Action Against Crime: Innovation Fund; Safer Future Communities.

Viewed collectively the cuts have impacted more on some activities than others because of the combined effect of cuts in different grant sources and other pressures on income. Local authorities and their partners in the Community Safety Partnerships have, however, been affected in some common ways:

- There has been a dramatic cut in the number of partnership posts and secondments by the main community safety organisations as their budgets have come under pressure and they have found it difficult to maintain non-core services.
- Anti-social behaviour teams have been disbanded, scaled back or subsumed within other departments – cutbacks have been especially marked in Merseyside Police, for example.
- There is less resource to pay for specialists in particular forms of crime or community safety issues.
- Councils have had to become more selective with legal interventions, though this is also due to new legislation concerning anti-social behaviour which has meant that enforcement leads to civil actions where the onus is placed on the party bringing the case to enforce it.
- Intelligence units which used to organise community safety surveys for example have been disbanded or significantly cut which has meant that agencies have had to rely more on soft intelligence.
- Resources for target hardening such as alleygating and CCTV are much less now than in 2010.
- Youth diversionary projects have been markedly scaled back because of cuts in CSF and also cuts to Youth Offending Teams.
- Service provision has tended to shift from seeking broad coverage to a much more targeted, needs led, risk-based approach.

Table 3.5: Community Safety Fund Allocations to Merseyside District Authorities: 2015/2016

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Merseyside Police	0.746
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Knowsley MBC	0.204
Total	**2.871**

Source: Merseyside Police and Crime Commissioner, 2015.

NB. Figures include Youth Offending Service and Drug and Alcohol Team (DAAT) funding but exclude allocations to Positive Futures which were £0.094m in 2015/2016.

Interviewees from local authorities were especially concerned at the way in which the cuts have limited their ability to respond to community safety issues such as anti-social behaviour and forms of crime which are on the increase, notably domestic violence.

Merseyside Fire and Rescue Service

Introduction of Crime and Disorder Partnerships in 1998 encouraged MFRS to work with others in taking a holistic view of community safety and as a result of the 2004 Fire and Rescue Services Act, community safety and fire prevention became a central part of the Fire and Rescue service's *modus operandi*. This encouraged a lot of innovation and thinking outside the box such as working with prison offenders to reduce the future likelihood of anti-social behaviour, promoting safe cooking, hosting obesity clinics at fire stations, youth engagement work, appointing school fire liaison officers to raise young people's awareness of fire hazards in the home. MFRS activities in recent years have been organised around its four strategic aims: operational preparedness, operational response, prevention and protection and developing and valuing its staff.

Since 80% of MFRS's budget comprises staff costs, reductions in government grant (typically around 60% of its budget) of about 35% in the period 2010-2015 (Table 3.7) have inevitably led to staff losses. However, the service has worked hard to minimise these through efficiency savings to just over 30% (Table 3.8). The number of frontline fire appliances has also fallen by a similar degree (33%).

Table 3.7: Merseyside Fire and Rescue Service: Budget and Government Grant

	2010	2015	% change 2010-
Budget	£73.3m	£64.4m	-12.1
Government Grant	£49.9m	£37.0m	-25.9

Table 3.8: Merseyside Fire and Rescue Service: Change in Staffing and Equipment Levels 2010-2015

	2010	2015	% change 2010-
Fire fighters	980	676	-31.0
Community safety advocates	48	36	-25.0
Total staff	1028	712	-30.7
School fire liaison officers (included in above)	20	2	-90.0
Prince Trust programme participants	c.60	c.36	c.-40
Fire engines	42	28	-33.3

Although MFRS remains committed to preventative measures, emphasis on protecting frontline services has meant that cuts have impacted more on support services. By maintaining ten key stations which can reach anywhere in the county in ten minutes, the service has ensured that response times of first on the scene emergency vehicles remain good – the average is a respectable 5.2 minutes. However, the reduced number of vehicles and pumps has meant that the response time of the second engines is now over 8 minutes, 2 minutes slower than it was in 2010. Cuts have led to a significant reduction in diversionary services. Whereas Merseyside Fire and Rescue Service delivered about 100,000 home safety checks (its flagship community engagement programme) each year before 2010, now the figure is more like 40,000. These are targeted at the most vulnerable and those in greatest risk. Mentoring of young people on issues of anti-social behaviour and home safety was originally delivered by 20 school fire liaison officers but since only 2 remain this work is now on a much smaller scale. Also, Princes Trust programmes have been scaled back by about a 40%.

MFRS used to work with businesses to facilitate recovery after a fire but in the light of cutbacks it is no longer involved in such work. Also, it no longer has the funds to commission evaluations to prove whether its interventions have proved effective.

MFRS has sought to mitigate the impact of cuts by targeting its services on those at greatest risk, improving data sharing with other partners such as the NHS, investigating the scope for co-creation with local authorities in the employment of healthy home advocates, changing shift patterns so as to balance more day and night time shifts and also putting advocates on flexible contracts to improve productivity.

Social Housing

Registered Social Landlords are committed to tackling anti-social behaviour because it adds to maintenance costs, problems with voids and reduces the popularity of their properties. Direct measures range from injunctions, anti-social behaviour and criminal anti-social behaviour orders to eviction orders though the latter are only used as a last resort. RSLs also work with a variety of partners in supporting a wide range of youth development and diversionary activities, cultural integration, elderly, victim support and community engagement projects. Given that we interviewed only one major Registered Social Landlord it is not possible to specify the precise impact of cuts on all the preventative services supplied by RSLs on Merseyside. However, if one assumes that other housing associations have responded to austerity in broadly similar fashion to Riverside Housing, their collective spending on anti-social behaviour initiatives has fallen by about approximately £250k a year or £1.25m over the 2010-2015 period. RSLs remain committed to anti-social behaviour initiatives even in a harsh spending climate for commercial reasons but they have had to resort to rigorously testing the business case for each project.

The interviewee from Riverside Housing also offered an insight into the cost-shunting phenomenon. He estimated that the cuts in resources sustained by the police, fire service and local authorities effectively meant that Riverside's resources have had to be spread over a wider range of activities resulting in an effective 25% cut in its resources. RSLs have tried to offset the impact of cuts by thoroughly vetting prospective tenants, allocating properties carefully and tackling problems more intelligently through improved data sharing and joint working with partners.

Public Health

The impact of austerity on public health in the period 2010-2015 is difficult to gauge. The main development in this sphere has been the 2012 Health and Social Care Act which resulted in the transfer of responsibility for public health matters from the NHS to local authorities. The Act has come into force in the last two years. While cuts of around £2.8m are only taking effect this year, there is great concern that responsibility for a range of services with a community safety angle to them such as alcohol services and rehabilitation services for substance misusers, domestic violence, preventative services and health visiting is being transferred without sufficient funding.

Also, there appears to be no funding to cater for the increase in the incidence of certain problems such as domestic violence. There is talk of the need for more preventative action to avoid the need for NHS treatment but it remains unclear how such services are to be funded.

Youth Offending Service

The Youth Offending Services in Merseyside gave us an indication of how austerity is impacting on preventive work with schools and individual young people. Grants from both central government via the Youth Justice Board and the local authorities have been cut significantly, resulting in a major scaling back in the size of the service. The service has been faced with the twin pressures of coping with the cuts and dealing with a much more complex and entrenched cohort of young people who offend. On the other hand, the merger of the Youth Offending Service and the Youth Service within the district authorities has resulted in new ways of working and a more integrated service for young people.

It is worth noting that the above analysis underrepresents the overall impact of austerity because we have not investigated the impact of spending cuts on community and voluntary sector organisations which are active in the community safety sphere and a support to other organisations covered in this report. Central and local government grants to such organisations have been cut back in many cases during that time. This is having particularly serious implications where the incidence of specific types of crime are on the increase such as domestic violence (McRobie, 2013).

Indirect Impacts

Organisations have not just had to cope with cuts to their own budgets. They have also had to deal with the consequences of cuts in other bodies. While it is beyond the scope of this paper to identify every type of indirect impact, the following examples give an indication of how cuts in a series of Liverpool City Council departments have had knock-on effects upon their partner bodies and wider community safety implications:

- The city council's ASB Unit which once comprised a large team with legal staff and police officers now has just 4 officers, dramatically limiting its scope.
- Loss of City Watch wardens and environmental enforcement staff and City Centre goldzone policing funded by the council has reduced scope to nip problems in the bud at the grassroots level.
- There is less community engagement activity – particularly through Neighbourhood Services and a Community Cohesion team.
- Loss of Citysafe Grant has resulted in fewer community safety projects.
- Marketing cuts have meant fewer communication campaigns and less community consultation.
- Corporate Grant Fund – cuts to this fund have impacted on victim services.
- Funding reductions have resulted in the closure of community facilities or reduced opening hours.
- Cuts to Youth services have led to a reduction in diversionary activities and outreach services.
- Cuts to Trading Standards have lessened the ability to tackle fraud against vulnerable people and led to a scaling back of alcohol-related initiatives.

3.2. Impacts of Austerity on Public Perceptions of, Confidence in, Services

Most stakeholders felt that public confidence in service providers has not so far been dented by austerity. Some felt that this was a consequence of steady falls in many types of crime over the last decade, though some did wonder if the recent upturn could in time result in a change in attitudes. Others felt that public confidence was a legacy of goodwill generated pre-2010 because of the fruits of partnership working between agencies on community safety issues. Yet others thought many members of the public made allowances for what service providers can deliver given spending reductions. Some pointed out that prominent local politicians and officials have contributed to this perception by highlighting the serious implications of the cuts for service delivery.

Many stakeholders added the rider that their answers were based on soft, anecdotal evidence and guesswork by colleagues working in the same arena rather than hard intelligence now that community perception surveys of crime and community safety services are no longer conducted by community safety partnerships. Public confidence in the police and emergency services is now only measured at a generalised level in the British Crime Survey. Stakeholders therefore conceded that the story on the ground may be rather different from what they perceive it to be.

Public confidence is closely associated with the performance of service providers. Available data suggests that the performance of the emergency services is holding up well and that it has not so far been adversely affected by the cuts in the 2010-2015 period. Indeed, in the 2010-2014 period, the percentage of Merseyside Police emergency and priority calls on target (under 10 minutes and under an hour, respectively) went up, significantly in the case of the latter, from 77-92% (HMIC, 2014). Police victim satisfaction levels remain high and better on Merseyside than in England and Wales as a whole. As already noted, MFRS's first vehicle response times remain good and compare favourably with most services in England and Wales. The police did indicate that some members of the public see attendance at the scene of the crime rather than dealing with it over the telephone as an indication of the seriousness with which they are treating the case. This has proved increasingly difficult to achieve given pressures on budgets. However, the police have not detected any fall off in crime reporting because of reductions in confidence.

Research has shown that public confidence in the police is also linked to their visibility – for example, neighbourhood patrols, response to 999 calls and serious traffic collisions (ONS, 2014). Allocation of police officers and PCSOs to visible roles is better in Merseyside than the average for England and Wales in the former case and on a par in the case of the latter, despite a fall in the percentage of about 5% since 2010 (HMIC,2014). Deployment of specials and prioritisation of frontline policing has meant that the proportion of police officers on the frontline on Merseyside has increased slightly from 89% to 91% from 2010-15, despite overall staff cuts.

Crime trends reveal a more complex picture. Most categories of recorded crime continued to fall in the period 2010-2013 in line with longer term trends, save for fraud. Incidence of anti-social behaviour has fallen considerably since the mid-2000s which has probably bolstered community satisfaction and confidence with service providers in the community safety sphere. Since 2013, however, ONS data has shown that there has been a slight upturn in recorded crime on Merseyside with significant rises (of more than 10%) in the incidence of violence against the person, shoplifting and sexual offences. Incidence of all types of recorded crime on Merseyside in 2014 had returned to levels found in 2011. This is unlike England and Wales where recorded crime has fallen during the 2011-2014 period and other metropolitan regions where the recent upturn has been less marked except in the case of South Wales (Figure 3.3). It is not yet clear, however, to what extent the recent upturn is due to cuts or economic factors, new types of criminal activity and changes in recording methods. It is the case that the 2014 HMIC inspection of crime data found significant under-reporting of violence against the person and sexual offences which has led to a significant increase in reported crime in these categories (HMIC, 2014). If such trends persist, whatever the precise causes, they could begin to affect confidence in the Police and other service providers.

Stakeholders reported there is an understanding and acceptance, even sympathy amongst the general public that most agencies are doing the best they can with increasingly limited resources. This especially applies to those that are well regarded for the services they provide. That said, some stakeholders thought that the public do not always appreciate the full implications of spending cuts and that it is only when things go wrong and appropriate support is not forthcoming that the penny drops. There have been local complaints, for example, when CCTV cameras have been removed in parts of Knowsley and when youth diversionary and other services have been cut back in Liverpool. Some stakeholders were concerned that the move to more general rather than specialised support in some areas because of staff cuts might in time damage public confidence.

Some agencies have devoted additional time and effort to engaging the public in difficult decisions about rationalisation of services. For example, Merseyside Fire and Rescue Service have closely involved local communities in consultation exercises concerning the possible closure and merger of fire stations. Merseyside Police have sought to communicate to the general public that non-attendance at small scale incidents such as retail thefts and vehicle damage does not signify that they are not taking such matters seriously and recording such crimes. Evidence suggests that if emergency response times are good, then public confidence is maintained. That said, the Police know that street presence does provide public reassurance and are very concerned that reductions in funding and manpower could detrimentally affect public confidence especially given current concerns that forthcoming cuts could result in the loss of their Police Community Support Officers. It is widely acknowledged that PCSOs help to reassure the public and nip localised anti-social behaviour in the bud.

3.3. Impacts of Austerity upon Staff

Austerity has had a largely detrimental effect upon the morale of staff working in the sphere of community safety, crime prevention and diversionary services. That said, there is a lot of variation within the sector. Some service organisations have had to endure more draconian cuts than others – most local authorities have been particularly badly hit. Some staff have more favourable terms and conditions than others. For example, uniformed police cannot be made compulsorily redundant unlike their non-uniformed counterparts which has meant that morale amongst the former has tended to hold up much better than in the latter. The way in which funding cuts have impacted on staff working conditions and prospects has also had a crucial bearing on morale. We found that organisational culture and the political standpoint of individual employees have also affected staff morale.

Figure 3.3: Total Recorded Crime per 1,000 Head of Population in Police Force Areas Covering Major Urban Areas (2011-14)

Source: HMIC

Persistent spending cuts have had a range of effects upon staff. Cuts have led to restructuring, mergers, voluntary or compulsory redundancies, redeployment, changes to working hours, additional responsibilities and workload. This has in turn affected job satisfaction and caused uncertainty, worry, additional stress, sickness and loss of expertise.

Reorganisation has also resulted in the need to forge new working relationships. While the vast majority of staff remain dedicated to their task, some - particularly those delivering the more vulnerable non-statutory preventative services - are beginning to wonder if they will be able to address effectively the extent of demand and needs of the general population if services are cut any further. One interviewee put it succinctly – 'we are beginning to ask ourselves "what's the point?"' This feeling is reinforced when staff see their sister organisations also having to cut back which leaves the vulnerable even more exposed. Hence frustration with the limited scope for action is a very real issue which could tip into disillusionment if cuts persist which seems likely. The prospect of further cuts is a general dampener on morale because staff do not see any light at the end of the tunnel.

Detailed analysis of feedback from stakeholders based within Public Health Liverpool also revealed that legislative changes have also affected morale within the sector. The transfer of public health responsibilities from the NHS to local authorities though in many respects logical has affected staff morale. The change has caused disruption and resulted in the loss of staff and expertise through retirement or switching to other careers. Staff felt that the focus has been on getting internal structures right and clarifying division of responsibilities at the expense of service users such as those at risk of substance and alcohol abuse.

On a more positive note, both staff and host organisations are adopting various coping strategies. Year on year cuts have bred such widespread 'austerity fatigue' that many staff are adopting a stoical philosophy of making the best of a difficult situation and seeking to adapt to a more austere spending climate. News and updates are issued by senior management on a 'need to know' basis to enable staff to get on with the job. Generally, those organisations which have sought to adjust working cultures, innovate and adapt and maintain a good reputation with service users have ameliorated the negative effects of austerity on staff morale to a greater extent than those which have not done so. There have been instances where cuts have led to considerable organisational disruption and poor morale in their immediate aftermath but where the consequent restructuring has led to efficiencies and new ways of working in the longer term.

Austerity has also prompted community safety organisations to scrutinise closely their staff's use of time. For example, police officers traditionally had to spend inordinate time with those suffering from mental illness who were reported for threatening behaviour. Police discussions with mental health trusts resulted in the latter allocating staff to provide a joint response, which in turn avoided the need for officers to spend many hours in accident and emergency departments accompanying such people.

The way organisations respond can also either build or detract from resilience. *Esprit de corps* tends to have been maintained where senior management has adopted a positive, encouraging attitude and kept staff in the picture when required and all tiers of staff have taken on additional workload to compensate for reductions in staffing.

4. A Forecast of the Depth, Breadth and Implications of Future Budget Cuts

The key community safety stakeholders within Merseyside have now endured half a decade of budget cuts. During this period, they have had to endure deep reductions ranging from 12% to 80% of their funding. Having already delivered a huge amount of savings between 2010 and 2015, the organisations are confronted by the herculean task of delivering even deeper cuts over the next five years. The implementation of the first phase of funding cuts under the immediate past parliament has already had serious ramifications for services captured in the third chapter of this report. As a result of planned future budget cuts, it is unlikely that Merseyside's community safety stakeholders will have sufficient funds to maintain the necessary range of services to provide the same level of community safety delivered prior to the introduction of austerity measures. Merseyside's Community Safety stakeholders will find especially difficult deciding which non-statutory services and responses to retain.

At the time of drafting this report, a joint Spending Review and Autumn Statement was being planned by the Chancellor of the Exchequer and scheduled for delivery on 25th November 2015. However, it is widely believed that five Whitehall departments would have to bear the brunt of significant deeper cuts which could translate to around 30% their funding (Elliott, 2015). The five Whitehall departments include:
- The Police;
- Local Government;
- Courts;
- Education; and
- Business.

At least three of these departments (The Police, Local Government and Courts) subsume partner organisations that deliver community safety services and initiatives within Merseyside. The expectation therefore is that community safety funding will take another hit over the course of the current parliament.

Merseyside CSPs receive annual grants from the Merseyside PCC. The grants are used to provide services which aim to stop criminal activities before they are committed; reduce the risk of committing crime; and deal with issues after the occurrence of a problem.

The five CSPs received around £2.1m Community Safety grant from the PCC in the 2015/16 financial year for a range of initiatives summarised in Appendices 1, 2, 3 and 4. It is important to note that the list of activities in the appendices is by no means exhaustive of all the programmes and projects delivered by the CSPs but it gives a snapshot. This information highlights some of the projects that could be under threat in the face of funding reduction.

Table 4.1 shows the breakdown of community safety grants received by each CSP from the OPCC whilst Figures 4.1 to 4.3 help to give a snapshot of the key activity areas to which each CSP dedicated their funding.

Table 4.1: Shares of Community Safety Grants Received by Merseyside CSPs in the 2015/16 Financial Year

CSP	Grant Received (£)	% Share
Knowsley CSP	204,000	10
Liverpool CSP	962,000	45
Sefton CSP	374,000	18
St. Helens CSP	197,000	9
Wirral CSP	388,000	18
Total	**2,125,000**	**100**

Figure 4.1: Percentage of Community Safety Grants Used for Primary Activities (2015/16 Financial Year)

Data Source: OPCC

Note: Primary crime prevention activities are designed to stop crime before it occurs both in situational and social terms.

Figure 4.2: Percentage of Community Safety Grants Used for Secondary Activities (2015/16 Financial Year)

Data Source: OPCC

Note: Secondary crime prevention activities are designed to change people at risk of committing or being the victims of crime.

**Figure 4.3: Percentage of Community Safety Grants Used for Tertiary Activities (2015/16 Financial Year)**

Data Source: OPCC
Note: Tertiary crime prevention activities deal with issues after the event.

The remainder of this section of the report projects the expected scale of cuts to community safety funding within Merseyside from April 2016 onwards. This is followed by an assessment of the possible repercussions of further budget cuts. The section concludes by testing the rationale for additional cuts to community safety budgets against a framework of political, economic, social cultural and legislative drivers that undergird the overall well-being of the inhabitants of Merseyside.

4.1. Projection of the Scale of Future Budget Cuts

The future outlook for funding Community Safety Partners across Merseyside whilst not positive is now less bleak than feared at the time of the research. Local authorities indicated to us that they expected funding for community safety related services to contract by an average of 33% during the current parliament with the expected budget cuts ranging from around 20% to around 40%. However, the Chancellor's promise in the 2015 Autumn spending review to protect police budgets has meant that Community Safety Funding cuts from the Office of the Police and Crime Commissioner (OPCC) will not now occur with funding levels for 2016/17 continuing at the same levels as for 2015 for Merseyside Police, the five local authorities and other partners. Furthermore, the latest local authority settlement has indicated that cuts will not be as great as expected in late 2015. Another positive development which will offset the impact of the cuts, has been the introduction of longer term budgeting for local authorities which will provide greater certainty and enable more informed medium term planning. In future budgets will be set for a four year period. That said, continuing cuts of between 7-15% in the period 2015-2020 will still make it extremely difficult for Merseyside local authorities to sustain current funding levels, especially for discretionary rather than statutory services, and on the back of swingeing cuts in period 2010-2015.

Youth Offending Services (YOS) across Merseyside are expecting budget reductions in the region of 20% - 30%. Like other organisations, the Merseyside YOS are already down to the bare bones. The Mayor of Liverpool has already openly declared that it is unlikely that Liverpool will be able to deliver statutory services by 2017.

The current budget of the Merseyside Fire and Rescue Service (MFRS) is around £60 million. It is expected that this will shrink to £56m by 2021. What is not immediately clear is whether budget cuts within the FRS will be front loaded or back loaded. If the bulk of the cuts take place in the first few years from April 2016, the challenges will be much greater. However, if the cuts take place a little later, the FRS may have just a little more room to manoeuvre. The current funding forecast suggests that the FRS may reduce their fire stations from 25 to 16 by 2020.

Prior to the 2015 Comprehensive Spending Review, Merseyside Police were given warning that there would be cuts within the region of 25% to 40% over the four year period from April 2016 to March 2020. It was not known how the cuts will be spread out over the four years. However, due to a combination of the Paris attacks and sustained campaigning locally and nationally by the Police Federation, Crime Commissioners and also online public petitions spelling out the serious consequences of further cuts, the immediate past Chancellor opted not to cut the police budget further. In the eventual grant settlement, a modest 0.6% grant cut was offset fully by a modest increase in the local precept and use of reserves. While there is still the need to search for significant savings, changes and reforms, the announcement averted the threat of losing most if not all PCSOs, the loss of the mounted police and major cuts to teams tackling serious and organised crime, hate crime and investigation of rape and sexual offences.

The other challenge confronting Merseyside Police has to do with the Police Allocation Formula (PAF). The government accepts that the current model is inappropriate. The PAF is not capable of estimating the total amount of central government funding required for the police. Rather, the formula was designed to determine allocations between the 43 police force areas of England and Wales once the total amount of central Government funding for the police has been confirmed (Home Office, 2015). Figure 4.4 provides a summary of the PAF computations. The way in which funding is allocated from central government to forces, although not perfect, has served Merseyside well because Merseyside's allocation per head of population is the second largest in the country to the Metropolitan Police Service. The formula has been re-worked a couple of times. The most recent revision has seen Merseyside lose out about £3.5 million a year. This translates to roughly 5% year on year. The fairness of the process of re-calibrating the formulae is subject to debate and an ongoing review.

Funding for social housing providers is essentially the income derived from rent paid by tenants. Whilst the government claim they pay a proportion of that through benefits, there are numerous tenants in social housing who do not receive any government benefits. Additionally, a quarter of tenants like elderly people on pensions receive only partial benefits. However, some government funds accrue to the social housing sector to develop new homes. When policies are put in place which impinge upon the income of social housing tenants who are on benefits, this also translates to a systematic cut in funding for the social housing sector.

Figure 4.4: The Process of Allocating Police Main Grants using the PAF

Indicators are selected on the basis of being correlated with police recorded crime.

1. Indicators are used in 7 regressions at Community Safety Partnership level to estimate their relationship with different crime outcomes.

2. Indicators are used in 3 regressions at force level to estimate their relationship with different non-crime outcomes.

Regression coefficients are used with force level data to estimate total workloads. In addition, estimates of special event workloads are based only on population data. An adjustment is made for police force area sparsity.

Activity Based Costing is used to weight the amount of time the police spend on different types of crime.

Activity Based Costing is used to weight the time the police spend overall on different activities (crime and non-crime)

An Area Cost Adjustment index is used to adjust for cost differences across police force areas

Weighted workloads are converetd to proportions for each force, whaich are applied to the overall police main grant budget for that year.

Force level allocations

Source: Home Office

Additional pressure is being put on the social housing sector because the government seems to have reneged on an earlier agreement with stakeholders within the sector. During the last coalition government, a deal was done with social housing providers which enabled them to increase their rent on an annual basis. The increase was pegged to the Retail Price Index (RPI) plus 1%. Using this model, housing associations across Merseyside had a ten year plan for rent increase. However, following the change of government in 2015, the new government changed the policy and housing providers now have to effectively reduce their rent by 1% which will be compounded year on year for the next four years.

4.2. Anticipated Consequences of Additional Cuts to Funding

Based on discussions with key stakeholders on the MCSP, 2016/17 onwards is shaping up to be a period when many of them will have to make exceedingly difficult choices regarding the services they chose not to prioritise. The level of provision of some services has already been reduced during the last parliament. However, many more services may need to be cut altogether as a result of deeper budget cuts.

The dimensions of the cuts are unlikely to present a universal picture and the consequences are likely to vary depending on the timing and level of exposure of each MCSP stakeholder to the cuts. Some stakeholders may feel the bite more significantly at the later stages of the parliament. Whatever the case, consultations with stakeholders reveal that all of them are planning for some degree of planning reduction in order to help bridge the budget gap. It is also vital to note that some of the forecasts used in Section 4.1 are illustrative. This implies that they may be subject to change following the delivery of the Autumn Statement in November 2015 by the Chancellor of the Exchequer. The fact that these figures may be subject to change certainly adds further uncertainty to the discomfort of MCSP stakeholders.

For some stakeholders, additional funding cuts will mean an instant end to all discretionary services unless there is a strong business case not to end them. This literally means that public parks for instance will no longer be maintained. From a community safety perspective, this means that parks are likely to become overgrown, unsafe and less frequentable. There are other less obvious impacts of the reductions to local authority budgets that, although may be felt within a different portfolio, can have negative consequences for community safety.

Shrinking budgets could trigger the adoption of more of a pan-Merseyside approach to many aspects of community safety. This approach certainly has major benefits for stakeholders but it is also important to be mindful of some of the challenges it may present. Local authorities receive additional funding for community safety activities on top of OPCC grant which is determined locally and based on local priorities which will place limits on the extent to which it will prove possible to pursue a 'one size fits all' approach. Also, community safety challenges vary in the districts because of their different character and make up. For instance, community safety challenges presented by night-time economies for various local authorities vary. For instance, the night time economy in Knowsley is miniscule compared to St. Helens where there is a busy town centre. The presence of a town centre also presents different substance abuse priorities for St. Helens when compared to Knowsley. So whilst budget cuts may point to the need for a more pan-Merseyside model of

community safety, it is important to be mindful of the gaps that such a model may inadvertently create and the limits of such an approach.

Future budget cuts will also affect the ability of community safety stakeholders to commission services. For instance, in Liverpool, the CSP currently commissions the Fire Service Street Intervention Team to do work around Anti-social Behaviour. This would be at risk in future.

Future budget cuts will impinge innovation and creativity amongst MCSP stakeholders. Hardly any of them would have the funds to experiment on alternative solutions. In a world gravitating towards evidence-based practice which is the corner stone for innovation and creativity, budget cuts could ultimately prove counter-productive and stifle any hopes of efficiency and effectiveness within the community safety sector.

The City Council will experience huge change in the next few years. The number of city council staff supporting the CSP is always at risk of cuts along with other staff in the Council. Having a community safety unit is not considered a statutory duty even though having a partnership is. More favourable recent Government spending announcements since the interview, and decisions within the Council to protect the community safety function, have meant that cuts will be less severe than feared so there has been a reprieve for CSP support staff.

The Drug Intervention Programme (DIP) may no longer be supported in the future, although it is perceived that funding for such a programme could be available via public health.

A wide range of diversionary programmes for instance those linked to the bonfire night will have to be moved to the back burner. In addition to this, support will shrink for Integrated Offender Management Services in St. Helens for instance.

On the Wirral, a community patrol service exists at the moment. There is debate about whether local authorities should be providing a community patrol service to support the sustainability of neighbourhood policing. Wirral's intention is to build a project team for twelve months from 2016 into 2017. One of the options on the table is that this service will cease to exist in future or alternatively work to a point where it funds itself. This will fundamentally change how Anti-social Behaviour services are delivered on the Wirral.

Another future consequence of deeper cuts will be the rationalisation of research, data and intelligence services. Resources for such activities will take a hit and this will no doubt have consequences on evidence-based decision making.

Ahead of the Comprehensive Spending Review (CSR), Wirral Council were looking at an operating budget of around £200m of which possibly 90% may be ring-fenced around social health care issues. Therefore, anything that is statutory or targeted will be priorities but the danger is that the agencies that are tackling issues which do not quite qualify as statutory activities may disappear altogether which would inevitably pile pressure on the statutory and targeted services.

There is concern that a myriad of crime prevention activities will be forfeited as a result of future budget cuts. This could trigger a corresponding increase in young people coming into the criminal justice system and an increase in the more expensive statutory side of work.

Given increasing calls for Bobbies on the beat, there is widespread relief that future police budget cuts will be much more modest and community policing will not therefore be hit as severely as once feared. There are a couple of emergencies and rapid response activities that require the visible presence of the police. However, there are many other 'invisible' activities that the police perform. For instance, the investigation of rape, domestic violence, sex offences, serious and organised crime and terrorism often takes place behind the scenes. Although the public do not see these activities because they are not overt policing, they still need to be done. Reconciling such demands with continued calls for police to respond to new forms of crime and maintain frontline policing will continue to prove challenging despite better recent news about future funding.

From a comparative perspective, it is difficult to fully gauge the full impact of continued budgetary pressures on neighbourhood and other kinds of policing across the country because a lot of police forces are creating one pool of uniformed officers. Essentially, some of the forces are deciding when to undertake response activities and also when to undertake neighbourhood policing activities. Resources for these activities are drawn from the single pool of uniformed officers. Essentially, the lines are being blurred and although some forces are claiming they have actually got more people deployed in neighbourhood policing, the reality is that they don't because the same officers have response responsibilities as well.

The Independent Domestic Violence Advisory (IDVA) service which provides independent and impartial support for all high risk victims/survivors of domestic violence looks set to remain a priority for most CSP's.

Sefton CSP would also be hit by reductions in workforce numbers. The Sefton Borough Council which supports the CSP lost a third of its workforce over the course of the last parliament and more people are set to be made redundant during the current parliament and community safety staff are likely to have to share in the pain.

The St. Helens CSP workforce is already a very small team. The current model being used to pay for staff is not exclusively linked to community safety grants or grants received from the OPCC. This gives the St. Helens CSP staff a little room to manoeuvre and staff do not appear to be immediately vulnerable to redundancy. However, they are not entirely shielded from any potential organisational-wide (across the Borough Council) restructure.

Currently, the staff strength at Merseyside Fire and Rescue Service (FRS) is 676 people. By the end of the current parliament, this could be reduced to around 476 Firefighters. Alongside the reduction in Firefighters, Merseyside FRS will also lose between 30 and 50 non-uniform staff. Merseyside Police is considering whether to go down the police officer route or the police staff route. Currently, there are three hundred and fifty PCSOs that cost Merseyside Police about £10m a year. The PCSOs are not likely to be made redundant in the light of the Autumn Statement. If they do not go, then there will still have to be reductions in police officer numbers.

4.3. Ameliorating the Impacts of Budget Cuts

The challenge confronting MCSP stakeholders is to look forward rather than backwards and to continue to seek to introduce new approaches and methods of working after a period of sustained funding cuts and service rationalisation.

In view of what lies ahead, MCSP stakeholders need to consider some possible coping mechanisms which may help to mitigate these pressures. In some scenarios, there is no doubt that universal strategies (Pan-Merseyside) will be required. In other situations, local circumstances will dictate the options available to stakeholders. A positive and constructive discussion needs to take place amongst the MCSP stakeholders to ensure a proper balance is struck between universal and competing demands. In the immediate future, there appears to be scope for closer collaborative working between community safety partners, joint commissioning of services in order to obtain best value and a consistent offer and adoption of common processes.

Where a Pan-Merseyside strategy is pursued for instance, a more robust case could be made when trying to secure funding from non-traditional external donors to boost whatever comes through from central government. The findings of this study reveal that areas presenting common challenges for stakeholders include but are not limited to:

- The exploitation of children and young people;
- Domestic violence;
- Hate crime;
- Organised crime; and
- Neighbourhood anti-social behaviour.

The new funding climate will also require stakeholders to come up with innovative ways of dynamically undertaking needs assessments. Such assessments will help stakeholders determine collective and peculiar priorities and focus on core challenges. In Liverpool, the ruling party is not represented politically nationally. In a sense, this presents challenges as there is no voice to smooth the path of government and pressurise from the centre.

Some partners did have proactive neighbourhood teams in the past. Such teams undertook a lot of engagement. Where there is still capacity, public engagement will be necessary in order to send out messages for instance on behavioural change.

An additional difficulty is that stakeholders within the third sector still feel they can rely on the public sector agencies for funding. However, this has shrunk significantly. There is room for the public sector and the third sector to join forces to ensure that the necessary range of community safety data is collected to compensate for cutbacks in many agencies' research and information teams and to provide collective evidence of policy's impact on the lives of local residents (and its effectiveness), including the effect of spending cuts.

There are concerns with the future policing model which will result in a significant shift away from what is currently in operation. If there is a shift away from the current model, there will still be an appetite to deliver a local partnership programme to deal with issues locally. However, if the police are absent from the table, then the local knowledge, influence and ability to deal with certain key problems will be missing.

Alternative delivery models will be required. Some stakeholders may consider outsourcing although that in itself does present challenges and is not always a cost-effective approach. A higher degree of transition towards the third sector and voluntary agencies may be preferred.

There will always be debates and counter-debates around greater involvement and control of local issues by local communities. One of the suggestions put forward by a stakeholder in the course of this study is captured in the statement below:

"There needs to be investment in changing the culture of our communities and our societies and I personally do not think there is anything bad in making our communities and societies self-sustainable. I think that is the model we should have always adopted when we were rich as well. We have got no money for them to invest to change the culture now so we are just going to force it upon them and that will put pressure on statutory services again because people will fall out of engagement" (Wirral CSP, 2015).

Other measures that could be considered include:
- Targeted interventions;
- Improving data and information sharing protocols; and
- Exploring co-creation with local authorities.

The depth and breadth of budget cuts mean that a more joined-up public service driven by integration and collaborative ways of working is inevitable. The big picture emerging at this stage is that some form(s) of standardisation (which takes into account the individuality of each partner) in terms of organisational culture, strategic & operational definitions, measures and priorities is required in the immediate future. Such standardisation could ultimately strengthen interoperability and facilitate better collaborative working - a herculean task but certainly achievable.

Summary and Conclusion

This study is the first attempt to capture the broad impact of austerity on multiple aspects of community safety within Merseyside. This report examined a wide range of comparative patterns of transition in income, spending and financial and service sustainability across the region since 2010.

The role of crime in influencing individual characteristics, family relations, attitudes to education and social networks means that successful early interventions may not only stimulate safety but could also have benefits on other areas such as life chances and aspirations. Cutting community safety funding crucial for some of these early interventions is therefore likely to prove counterproductive.

We briefly examined some population profiles for the region alongside criminogenic issues. One of the most striking observations from the analysis is that scores of young people within the region remain out of employment, education or training. Despite the plethora of academic and policy publications calling for urgent action in this area, it is disheartening that the rate of NEETs within Merseyside is nearly double the national figure. This continues to have severe implications both for individual young people and for the entire region. The link between high crime rates and young people in NEET status remains an area of serious policy concern. Attention has been drawn to understanding why some young people in high crime areas choose to disengage from education and employment and subsequently face social exclusion.

In addition to exploring various ancillary secondary datasets, with the help of the Office of the Police and Crime Commissioner for Merseyside we gathered primary information directly from the key community safety sector stakeholders stationed across the region. This enabled us to gain insight into the financial challenges the community safety sector is experiencing and the different possible mechanisms that may be deployed towards managing the impact of funding cuts in future.

We detected that the message emerging from central government towards MCSP stakeholders is that the community safety sector needs to pull itself up by its own bootstraps and introduce new ways of working and achieve new service efficiencies. However, stakeholder services within Merseyside are already stripped to the bone, which limits the scope for this to happen.

At a time like this, we believe some form of sanguine leadership is required across the region - a form of leadership which values the best of what is, envisions what might be, engages in dialogue about what should be, and seeks to innovate.

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Appendices

Appendix 1: Snapshot of Planned CSP Primary Projects for the 2015/16 Financial Year

Victim-Focused	Offender-Focused	Location-Focused
▪ Child Sexual Abuse Assemblies ▪ Hate Crime: Stop Hate UK promotional materials, Body Cameras, CCTV installations	▪ Young People's Prevention Services and Substance Misuse Services (YOS) ▪ Organised Crime Gangs promotional materials, events and school visits ▪ Organised Crime Gangs projects linked to gun and gang crime which can be offered to schools ▪ Drug Interventions: Funds 'Lifeline' ▪ Alcohol related crime ▪ Support 'Operation Stand' and raise awareness via the 'One Punch can Kill' campaign ▪ Arson reduction activity by MF&RS staff targeted at young people involved or at risk of fire starting or fire related ASB ▪ Positive Futures: Diversionary sports activity	▪ Community Resilience: Promotional activity, reassurance events, social media presence, information website. ▪ Business support including night-time economy, shop watch and taxi marshalling ▪ Hate crime marketing campaigns and 'Safer in Town' initiative ▪ Serious Acquisitive Crime: Identify and target harden acquisitive crime hotspot areas

Notes: Primary activities are designed to stop criminogenic events before they occur

Appendix 2: Snapshot of Planned CSP Secondary Projects for the 2015/16 Financial Year

Victim-Focused	Offender-Focused	Location-Focused
▪ Coordination and administration of multi-agency high risk victim conferences/multi-agency meetings	▪ Youth Crime and Substance Misuse Prevention ▪ Project development to tackle emerging issues identified gaps as appropriate. Areas may include a perpetrators programme, complex needs domestic violence pilot, serious organised crime, alcohol and mental health ▪ Organised Crime Gangs: Development of a baseline academic report on the issue and suggestion of potential ways of working via research proven to work ▪ Youth Offending Team: Tackling high risk perpetrators ▪ Targets Class 'A' drug users by intervention through the Criminal Justice System to get offenders into effective treatment. ▪ Prevent youth crime and substance misuse ▪ Drug Intervention Programme ▪ Youth Offending Services: Intervention work	▪ REST Centre: Wet Facility for street drinkers ▪ Fire Service's Street Interventions Team to tackle ASB: to focus on areas of highest need identified by ASB problem profile

Notes: Secondary activities are designed to help reduce risk

Appendix 3: Snapshot of Planned CSP Tertiary Projects for the 2015/16 Financial Year

Victim-Focused	Offender-Focused	Location-Focused
▪ Victim Support Service aimed at reducing re-victimisation and challenging of offenders to reduce re-victimisation ▪ Increase the capacity of the IDVA service for high-risk DV cases, including young person's IDVA ▪ ISVA Service for victims of sexual violence ▪ DV (RASA) – Children's ISVA ▪ DV (RASA) - Resources for Children's Service ▪ Support Cabinet Member Working Group in their work regarding DV ▪ Youth IDVA	▪ VOMU and non-statutory work – probation staffing costs for partnership working. Focuses on prolific violent offenders enabling them to exit their offending behaviour and gain employment, training, overcome addictions etc. ▪ VOMU and non-statutory work ▪ Budget for VOMU and PPO Unit to spend on routes into education and employment ▪ NOMS and CRC funded to assist in breaking the cycle of reoffending, Clear Choices programme ▪ Probation/CTC staff attached to Integrated Offender Management Unit delivering interventions with identified prolific and priority offenders to reduce their offending and reoffending ▪	▪ Target Hardening: Improving the security of vulnerable victim's properties to enable them to remain in their own home and prevent repeat crime and disorder ▪ Flexible and responsive service to tackle issues in vulnerable locations identified through Problem Profiles, and support for vulnerable victims of Domestic Violence, Child Sexual Exploitation, Hate Crime and repeat ASB ▪ Organised Crime Gangs: Community interventions reacting to incidents across the borough ▪ Business Crime grant to small businesses suffering with crime and disorder ▪ Target hardening for a number of properties to prevent re-victimisation for hate crime, victims of domestic violence and vulnerable people.

Notes: Tertiary activities are designed to deal with issues after the occurrence of a criminogenic event

Appendix 4: Snapshot of Other Planned CSP Projects for the 2015/16 Financial Year

Other Spend
▪ Community Safety Partnership Training
▪ High-risk vulnerable victim target hardening/emergency budget
▪ Domestic Homicide Reviews
▪ Strategic Programmes Management
▪ Analytical services
▪ Domestic Violence: DHR costs, contribution to IDVA provision and Domestic Violence Enforcement programme
▪ ASB: Legal costs associated with the use of the council for ASB cases, marketing 'Spring Watch - Spring', 'Safe Space - Summer' and 'Be the Good Guy
▪ Stop Hate UK
▪ Running costs (£9479.75)