

Title: *“It’s just a Trojan horse for gentrification”:* austerity and stadium-led regeneration.

Mark Panton and Geoff Walters, Birkbeck, University of London

Abstract

Austerity was the driving principle behind the UK Coalition Government Comprehensive Spending Review in October 2010, with local government facing a disproportionately high share of the spending cuts. Research has focused on the impact of ‘austerity urbanism’ (Peck, 2012; Watt and Minton, 2016) and urban regeneration (Dillon and Fanning, 2015; Pugalis, 2016), however there is relatively little focus on sports-led regeneration. This article presents case study research of the stadium-led regeneration project involving Tottenham Hotspur FC and the London Borough of Haringey, focusing on the community perceptions of urban regeneration. It has two aims: first, to understand the local authority’s approach to regeneration in the context of the austerity agenda; and second, to understand how this approach was perceived by, and the impact on, those communities living within the geographical locality of the developments. Three themes emerged: first, that austerity led the local authority to adopt a pragmatic approach to regeneration; second, that regeneration in a period of austerity is perceived by local communities as a strategy of gentrification; and third, concerns over the lack of community consultation served as a stimulus for community engagement. Two implications arising from this research are that while community groups in Tottenham had limited success in gaining major changes to the stadium-led regeneration in Tottenham they have arguably been able to slow down the process. Moreover, they have been successful in bringing together diverse groups across the community to share knowledge in order to challenge further proposals from Haringey Council.

Keywords: Austerity urbanism; urban regeneration; stakeholder salience; gentrification; consultation.

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Introduction

The global financial crisis in 2008 resulted in governments implementing austerity policies aimed at reducing government spending and the budget deficit through a range of measures such as reducing labour costs and reforming the delivery of public services through increased marketisation (Meegan et al, 2014; Warner and Clifton, 2014). In the US, Peck (2014) argues that the impact of the neoliberal approach to austerity has been to redistribute the consequences of the financial crisis from the market to the state, and the costs and risks from federal government to state and municipal authorities. This ‘strategy of displacement’ (Peck, 2014) has also been evident in the UK where there has been a shifting of the costs and risk from central government to local authorities, with austerity measures implemented by the coalition government after the general election in 2010 having had a significant impact on local government that faced a disproportionately high share of the funding cuts (Lowndes and Prachett, 2012).

A number of authors have focused on the notion of ‘austerity urbanism’ (Peck, 2012; 2014; Watt and Minton, 2016), arguing that austerity measures have impacted disproportionately on the urban environment (Meegan et al, 2014). Related to this, some have considered that the economics of austerity (Dillon and Fanning, 2015; Pugalis, 2016) have been used as a “Trojan horse for an accelerating neo-liberal drive towards privatisation and marketization”, particularly in the context of urban regeneration (Glynn, 2006: 3, quoted in Pugalis, 2016: 53). In the UK, this is evident through central government funding cuts to regeneration schemes, the replacement of Regional Development Agencies with Local Enterprise Partnerships that came out of the Localism Act in 2011 (Pugalis and McGuinness, 2013), and the inability of local government to borrow the required financial resources, thus opening up the space for enhanced private sector involvement in regeneration. It can be argued therefore

that urban regeneration during a period of austerity involves three interrelated elements: firstly, a central government change in policy that legitimated economic concerns above anything else (Pugalis, 2016); secondly, a greater reliance by local authorities on private developers to assist with regeneration; and thirdly, a resulting loss of local accountability with a retreat from efforts to engage communities in urban renewal (Dillon and Fanning, 2015).

This article draws on empirical research to illustrate how these three interrelated elements impact upon community perceptions of urban regeneration. Specifically, it presents the findings of a longitudinal qualitative case study of the Northumberland Development Project (NDP), a stadium-led urban regeneration project involving Tottenham Hotspur FC and the London Borough of Haringey. The article has two objectives. First, it seeks to understand the local authority's approach to regeneration in an era where programmes are being downsized, funding is reduced, and institutions are being dismantled (Pugalis and McGuinness, 2013). Second, it looks specifically at how the approach taken by the local authority was perceived by, and the impact on, those communities living within the geographical locality of the developments. Existing literature on community involvement in regeneration suggests it is not easy to balance wider community or stakeholder participation with successful developments (Henderson et al, 2007) and regeneration agencies often limit participation to groups seen as legitimate, or most in tune with its objectives (Harvey and Schaefer, 2001). In light of some arguing that austerity urbanism offers the opportunity to stimulate participatory democracy within local communities (e.g. Havers, 2013), this article will consider the extent to which community stakeholders in Tottenham feel they have been involved and have had the opportunity to participate in the regeneration of the area. As such, it applies the stakeholder salience framework developed by Mitchell et al. (1997) as a way to understand

the approach local authorities take towards stakeholders such as private sector developers and local communities within the context of urban regeneration.

The article begins by reviewing the literature on austerity and urban regeneration which serves to contextualise the research on stadium-led regeneration. It also sets out how stakeholder theory, and more specifically, the stakeholder salience framework (Mitchell et al, 1997), are relevant to position research on austerity and urban regeneration. Details of the research methods follow this before the findings and discussion section set out the main results of the research through the analysis of the perceptions and interpretations of individuals involved in the stadium-led regeneration scheme taking place in Haringey against the backdrop of austerity budgets. A discussion follows before the article concludes by summarising the central issues.

Austerity and urban regeneration

Donald et al (2014) emphasise that austerity is not a new phenomenon, having framed government policy during periods of financial crises; they also argue that the recent austerity measures are peculiar in that they have a local nature due to the decline in central grants to urban areas within the UK context. This aligns with the arguments made that austerity has impacted more greatly on the urban environment due to the fact that cities have faced uncertainty and challenges as they are disproportionately reliant on public services, employ greater numbers of people in the public sector, and contain greater numbers of marginalised groups that are impacted by welfare cuts (Meegan et al, 2014; Warner and Clifton, 2014). Thus, various commentators have proposed that cities are experiencing “austerity urbanism” (Watt and Minton, 2016, McKenzie, 2015, Peck, 2012: 628). For Peck (2012), in the context of the USA, this emergent phenomenon is underpinned by the fact that cities are more

exposed to austerity policies and as a result, are experiencing a fiscal crisis that has led to a restructuring of public services that will have long-term consequences, both positive and negative, for many. Similarly, Warner and Clifton (2014) have argued that US cities have the responsibility to provide social services but that austerity, alongside recession and high unemployment, has meant that many cities have faced financial crises with some such as San Bernardino in California having declared bankruptcy (Davidson and Ward, 2014).

The focus on the local context is a result of governments pursuing a 'strategy of displacement' (Peck, 2014) underpinned by transferring the risk and costs from Federal (national) government to state and municipal (local government). In the UK, the equivalent process has been described as the "devolved axe" in which there is an "apparent devolution of power and responsibility to local actors, but in a context of wide-ranging expenditure cuts" (Deas and Doyle, 2013: 375). As Peck argues (2014: 18), this has resulted in a "strategic opportunity for new rounds of fiscal discipline, local-government downsizing and privatization". This has been recognised by researchers looking at the UK context with Bailey et al (2015) stating that local government in the UK is in a period of crisis while Lowndes and Gardner (2016: 359) argue that local government is in the grip of "super austerity". Indeed, while austerity was the driving principle behind the UK Coalition Government Comprehensive Spending Review in 2010, in practice, local government faced a disproportionately high share of the cuts. For example, the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG) saw a 27 per cent cut in its local government budget and a 51 per cent cut in its communities budget over the four year period, (Lowndes and Pratchett, 2012). This compared with other departments, such as Education which saw a 3.4 per cent cut and Health, a 1.3 per cent rise over the same period (Government Comprehensive Spending Review, 2010). In 2015, after five years of spending cuts, the new Conservative Government

announced a further 56 per cent reduction in central grant funding to local authorities over the period of the next parliament (HM Treasury, 2015; quoted in Lowndes and Gardner, 2016: 358).

Austerity may have been the defining principle of the Spending Review, but it proposed more than simply cutting budgets. It also sought to foster innovation among local authorities and encourage entrepreneurial activity in order to promote economic development by reducing regulation, reforming the delivery of public services through outsourcing and entering into collaborative arrangements with other authorities, thus freeing up the ability to use their budgets in new ways (Lowndes and Pratchett, 2012: 25; Donald et al, 2014). One of the ways in which these entrepreneurial opportunities may present themselves is through developing new ways to engage in urban regeneration schemes. This has been brought about by central government funding cuts to regeneration schemes with a reduction of approximately two thirds compared to previous spending after the election of the coalition government in 2010 (Pugalis and McGuinness, 2013). At the same time, the limited ability of local authorities to borrow money, the steep rise in London residential land values in particular, and a failure by central government to provide local authorities with the investment needed to maintain and renew their social housing stock (Watt, 2013) demonstrates the need, and potential, for local authorities to think more entrepreneurially in relation to urban regeneration.

This new model for urban regeneration purports to involve an increased role for communities (through the Localism Act) and for private sector organisations: as Deas and Doyle state (2013: 377), “the contraction of direct state involvement means that urban regeneration may become exclusively or largely the province of private-sector funders and local citizens, assuming that market conditions are sufficiently buoyant to provoke some form of developer

interest and that local social relations are conducive to the mobilisation of residents”. However, what does this mean in practice? Does this lead to private sector developers having greater influence due to their ability to provide finances necessary to pursue regeneration strategies? Does the era of ‘austerity urbanism’ represent an opportunity for private sector developers, alongside those directly engaged in regeneration schemes, for example, builders, estate agents, lawyers, surveyors, and consultants (Watt and Minton 2016: 205), to more aggressively pursue urban regeneration schemes without explicitly focusing on the impact on existing communities? What if there is limited ability for communities to mobilise? If communities are able to mobilise, do their efforts result in any influence at all?

It can be argued that in light of the focus by previous researchers on how local community interests are taken into account (or not) in the context of urban regeneration schemes, stakeholder theory is an appropriate lens within which to position this research. As advanced by Freeman (1984), stakeholder theory positions organisations as social institutions with responsibilities beyond their fiduciary duties to shareholders, directors and employees. Urban regeneration schemes can also add local communities to the list of interested constituents, thus aligning with the often quoted (broad) definition of a stakeholder as “... any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the organisation’s objectives” (Freeman, 1984: 46). However, the ‘local community’ is to some extent an ambiguous term and can encapsulate a variety of different ‘types’ of community (e.g. Brown et al, 2006). As such stakeholder theory can bring particular focus to the impact that regeneration schemes have on different community constituents whilst also helping to understand whether community activists, advocacy groups and other non-governmental organisations (Eesley and Lennox, 2006) are able to influence a regeneration scheme.

Laplume et al (2008) identify a range of key issues addressed in stakeholder literature. Stakeholder identification is one of the issues of relevance to organisations (how do they identify and deal with relevant stakeholders) and also to stakeholders. In this particular theme within the stakeholder literature, the stakeholder salience framework developed by Mitchell et al (1997) is extremely relevant to understanding how different stakeholders are prioritised and given prominence by organisations based on the relational attributes of power, urgency and legitimacy, or overall salience. Salience was defined by Mitchell et al., (1997: 854) as “the degree to which managers give priority to competing stakeholders’ claims.” The presence of one, two or all of these relational attributes provides a way for organisations and managers to categorise different stakeholders and to identify and manage those groups to which their claims are the most salient. The authors (1997: 881) recognised that their typology considered that each attribute was either present or absent, “...when it is clear that each operates on a continuum or series of continua.” Also that it could be dynamic, rather than a steady-state. Stakeholder types were categorised. Definitive stakeholders have all three relational attributes. Ultimately it is the cumulative number of the three attributes of power, legitimacy and urgency that contribute to a stakeholder group’s claim being salient from the perception of management. Expectant stakeholders have two attributes, while latent stakeholders have only one of the defined attributes. Non-stakeholders or potential stakeholders possess none of the attributes. The authors predicted that the salience of a particular stakeholder to the firm’s management is low if only one attribute is present, moderate if two attributes are present and high if all three attributes are present.

According to this model, entities with no power, legitimacy, or urgency in relation to the firm are not stakeholders and will be perceived as having no salience by the firm’s managers. This has major implications for such stakeholders that seek to influence an organisation,

although it is a subjective evaluation by managers of these qualities and is therefore open to change over time. Stakeholders that are not perceived to possess any of the three attributes can rapidly become influential and this has been recognised by other researchers (e.g. Friedman and Mason, 2004). It means that although managers may pay most attention to definitive stakeholders, they cannot ignore other groups without risking future difficulties (Senaux, 2008).

It is important to understand how this framework has relevance when considering urban regeneration. Previous research has argued that the physical transformation of derelict areas must be balanced against the failure, at least initially, to engage adequately with community groups and a belief that positive effects will “trickle down” (Bianchini *et al.*, 1990; Henderson *et al.*, 2007). More recently, Deas and Doyle (2013) have argued that the emphasis of regeneration schemes tends to be on economic growth and that local community involvement in such schemes is very limited. Thus, one can see how local community stakeholders are often marginalised or ignored by local authorities and developers that have the responsibility for urban regeneration. This can be explained by the Mitchell *et al.* (1997) framework in that they could be seen as latent stakeholders where only one attribute (legitimacy) is perhaps present.

In the context of austerity urbanism, the changes to central government policy prioritising economic concerns and the increased reliance by local authorities on private developers to assist with regeneration means that they can be categorised as definitive stakeholders in that they possess all three relational attributes of power, legitimacy and urgency. As such, local authorities may feel that they have a “clear and immediate mandate to attend to and give priority to that stakeholders claim” (Mitchell *et al.*, 1997: 878). This raises further concerns

surrounding the ability for local people to be able to influence the developments in their communities (Minton, 2012). This has been shown in previous research by Harvey (2008) who identified the opportunistic behaviour and exercise of direct power by large private organisations involved in regeneration developments in the USA. He focused on the role of universities including Yale, Johns Hopkins and Columbia, who are involved in the re-design of the ‘urban fabric’ of New Haven, East Baltimore and New York respectively, to suit their own needs. The concerns of local communities led to resistance to the developments (Harvey, 2008).

The prioritisation of private sector organisations and the marginalisation of community stakeholders have also been seen in the context of sports-led regeneration. For example, on the 18th July 2013 the city of Detroit became the biggest US municipality to declare bankruptcy after years of decline. The city had more than \$18 billion in long-term debt. At the time, half of the city’s street lights didn’t work and nearly a quarter of the city’s high school students dropped out before graduation, while the state dropout rate was one in ten (Guardian, 29 March, 2014). Yet six days after the filing, the state’s economic development corporation gave approval to sell \$450 million in tax exempt bonds to help finance a new stadium for the city’s ice hockey team, the Red Wings. Almost 60 per cent of the funds to pay for the arena came from the tax payer (Bloomberg, 3 September, 2013). In February 2014, the city then approved a deal that gave Mike Illitch, the Red Wings’ billionaire owner, 39 vacant lots in the area near to the new arena, valued at \$3 million, for \$1. It was said to be a “transformational project” by Mark Morante of the Michigan Economic Development Corporation (Guardian, 29 March, 2014).

Developments in Sochi also serve to illustrate the universality of the issues such sport-led regeneration can provoke. The top-down nature of the Sochi project meant that it was not without serious controversies, especially in regard to the extent of benefits to the local residents as opposed to real estate and big business, government or tourist outsiders. The scale of the projects also made them less sensitive to public oversight, exposing the democratic deficit and corruption risks (Golubchikov, 2017: 15). However, in Russia, as in many other countries, in the era of retrenched welfare state, there are not many alternative levers that governments can similarly use to legitimise large-scale interventions (Golubchikov, 2017: 16).

In the context of the UK, there have been similar concerns with numerous studies having shown that the benefits of different forms of urban regeneration often fail to trickle down to local people who lack the skills and capital to benefit from emerging employment or business opportunities (e.g. Henderson *et al.*, 2007). Further criticisms have been directed towards the gentrification effects associated with regeneration (e.g. Bianchini, 1991; Henderson *et al.*, 2007; Watt, 2013). These will inevitably impact negatively on stakeholders with limited salience. Whilst Brown (2008) argued that gentrification problems can be avoided with partnerships between the development and key stakeholders such as local government and community groups, the austerity measures advanced by the Comprehensive Spending Review in 2010 and the funding cuts to regeneration schemes have led to local authorities being more reliant on private sector developers in their regeneration efforts. Development is seen as ‘the only game in town’ as it is a sphere in which local authorities continue to exercise some leverage to pursue their strategic regeneration aims (Dillon and Fanning, 2015).

This was the case with the 2014 Commonwealth Games, which was used as part of a regeneration effort in a deprived neighbourhood in the East End of Glasgow. Paton et al., (2016) argue that the developments reveal much about austerity and neoliberal capitalism. That gentrification and territorial stigmatisation work in tandem within urban regeneration policy interventions as a punitive strategy for managing poor populations. This involves land value and (de) valuing of people and creates new localised class inequalities and insecurities, (Paton et al., 2016: 1). The combination of neoliberal urban policy setting, stagnating economy, powerful vested interests, and a sporting event as a catalyst is precisely the kind of combination of issues that can produce the familiar mantra of “public pain, private gain” in large scale Urban Development Projects (Gray and Porter, 2015: 390).

It was noted earlier however that the Localism Act promotes an increased role for those communities affected by developments to ensure that they are able to have some input into urban regeneration schemes. This requires first, that there is the necessary desire to follow the legislation; second, that there is the motivation for mobilisation; and third, that their voice will be listened to and taken into account. Whilst urban regeneration in a period of austerity points to the increasing power of local authorities and private sector developers, there have been examples where community stakeholders have been able to exercise considerable influence. Reid (2014) provides evidence of how a diverse range of astute campaigners formed an uneasy, but effective, alliance to prevent the ‘regeneration’ (i.e. closure) of the Meadowbank stadium and its surrounding land in Edinburgh. In this rare defeat for the urban growth coalition groups, the Save Meadowbank Stadium campaign originated from local anger over Edinburgh council’s decision to close, with limited consultations, Meadowbank stadium, to fund new facilities deemed in the strategic interest of sport throughout the city. This body of literature serves to illustrate the point made by Mason and Slack (1996) that the

recognition of wider stakeholder interests must become an essential element of the business strategies of sporting organisations. However, to date there has been little research seeking to explicitly draw on stakeholder theory as a way to better understand urban, and sports-led, regeneration. This research involving the stadium-led regeneration scheme involving Tottenham Hotspur FC and the London Borough of Haringey illustrates how members of the community perceive the developments. It draws on the stakeholder salience framework (Mitchell et al, 1997) to better understand the approach that the London Borough of Haringey took towards the local community and how this was perceived by community stakeholders.


Methodology

Case study background

This article emanates from a wider research project that sought to gain an in-depth understanding of how stakeholders seek to influence stadium led regeneration schemes. Purposive sampling allows cases to be chosen because they illustrate features and processes of interest (Silverman, 2010). Pettigrew (1990) accepted that a mix of forethought, intention and chance opportunism can play their part in site selection, but also that access to a highly visible case and publication of significant results about an elite institution can have significant positive knock-on effects. One of the case studies involved the stadium development at Tottenham Hotspur Football Club. This development was part of the Northumberland Development Project (NDP), and spans the period of austerity urbanism with the original application in 2010 and eventual approval of revised plans by Haringey Council in December 2015. Central to this regeneration scheme was the building of the new football stadium alongside associated developments that proposed a public square, new retail facilities, new homes on the site of the existing football ground, establishment of a university technical college and an increased role for the Tottenham Hotspur Foundation – a charity

connected to the football club (THFC website: new stadium plans). The NDP together with High Road West were part of wider regeneration going on in Tottenham that followed on from the serious rioting that occurred in the area in the summer of 2011. As part of the NDP and High Road West regeneration schemes, Haringey Council also proposed to build a walkway to connect the new stadium with a re-developed train station across the High Road, which would involve the demolition of privately owned homes and retail businesses, together with the Love Lane (social) housing estate and the Peacock Industrial Estate. In September 2011, Haringey Council granted planning permission to the football club for most of their proposed developments within the NDP, including the new stadium. In 2012, the *Plan for Tottenham* was developed by Haringey Council: a regeneration plan that set out in some detail the aspirations for the area. However, work did not start on the stadium development until early in 2016. Superficially this was due to a long delay related to a compulsory purchase order over the privately owned business Archway Sheet Metal Works Ltd on the site of the proposed new stadium. However, some sections of Haringey Council's earlier viability report that were made public raised serious questions about the adequacy of the financing for the stadium at that stage (Haringey Report for Cabinet, 7 February 2012). Below, Figure 1 displays a timeline of the regeneration with key dates around the planning process.

Figure 1: London Borough of Haringey / Tottenham Hotspur FC: Northumberland Development Project Timeline



Data collection

Data for this case study research were collected in three ways during a period of over three years between December 2012 to December 2015: by semi-structured interviews (14); participant observations of meetings and other events (28) (see table 1); in addition to secondary material. The interviews were one-to-one and each lasted between 40 and 90 minutes. All individuals that participated in the research did so on the basis of anonymity, although some spoke publicly and on the record through various media formats. Using purposive sampling demands critical thought about the parameters of the population under study. From the outset of the research design, it was important to be able to work with a diverse group of stakeholders that represented different groups involved in the stadium-led regeneration. This was necessary to obtain the rich detail and for the validity of the study. It can thus be seen that an interpretive approach was adopted for the research design, with access to reality (given or socially constructed) through social constructions such as language, shared meanings and instruments, all in context (Myers, 2013). Interpretive research examines how particular meanings become shared, dominant, and/or contested in situations in which alternative meanings and understandings are present, (Gephart, 2004: 457). Stakeholders, both individuals and groups, were chosen who could provide the most information about their involvement with the stadium-led regeneration at both sites. The stakeholders included employees and representatives of the football clubs, local residents, owners of local businesses, councillors, police, community groups, and football club supporters.

Following the guidelines for purposeful sampling in choosing respondents, (Lincoln and Guba, 1985), a snowball technique was used, asking individuals for recommendations of others who could provide relevant information for the study. It follows from the above that

not all of the individuals or organisations that were involved in this research were identified at the start of the process. In this research, the goal was to understand the case site in as much depth as possible through a wide range of perspectives. So it made sense to take advantage of new data collection opportunities as they arose in order to improve the research (Eisenhardt, 1989).

A short interview guide that contained the main research questions was drafted in order to ensure that the main issues and areas of interest were covered. The interview questions related to involvement in the regeneration process, views about stadium-led regeneration, observations on other organisations or individuals involved in the process, perceptions of influence and likely outcomes. The questions were open-ended and the respondents were encouraged to talk as much as they wanted, even when this strayed away from the starting point. This approach allowed the interviewee to feel comfortable and more prepared to open up to provide greater disclosure around the issues. It also allowed the discussions to cover wide areas, but provided consistency and focus by using the same original questions. From the perspective of qualitative, interpretive research, the more interesting the story, the better it is, so long as it does not become fictional (Myers, 2013: 119). The challenge is to enter the social world of the research subjects and understand their world from their point of view.

The interviews were recorded on a digital voice-recorder with the permission of the interviewees. Transcripts of the interviews were produced by the author as soon as possible after the interviews (generally within 3 days) and sent to all of the interviewees to check the accuracy of their responses in word and in meaning. This process proved helpful for fact-checking and also to elicit further information. Although no formal coding was carried out at this stage, the process of transcribing and discussing the interviews with informants in some

cases did informally start the process of data analysis. It involved a process of thinking about the interview questions, about the informant’s responses and some of the themes that started to recur.

Table 1: Data sources

Interviews (14 interviews)	Observations (28 full meetings)
Local councillors, London borough of Haringey (4 separate interviews) Local business owners (4 separate interviews) Local resident and community activists (2 separate interviews) Education consultant Parliamentary assistant Supporter of THFC and Journalist Executive of community sport trust	Community group, Tottenham (18 meetings) Business group, Tottenham(2 meetings) Planning consultation, Tottenham Street assembly, Tottenham Street rally, outside Haringey Council meeting Meeting of Haringey Council full cabinet Community conference, Tottenham THFC ‘fun day’ THFC v CPFC community street assembly Haringey Council Planning sub-committee

The participant observations in this research included meetings of Haringey Council; planning consultations in Tottenham; and public meetings of community groups, conferences and demonstrations (see table 1). They also included private and quasi-private meetings involving Tottenham Hotspur FC and a range of community group meetings in Tottenham. Apart from public meetings, such as those of the local council, the participation was overt and all groups were informed of the author’s background and nature of the research. Direct observation provides access to group processes and can confront the researcher with discrepancies between what people have said in interview and casual conversations, and what they actually do. For example, within community meetings there were sometimes discrepancies between the people that stated their intention to turn up at future events such as further meetings and those that did actually attend. Such observations can also be used to

uncover the patterns of interaction that create more or less shared meanings (Bartunek and Seo, 2002).

The interviews and participant observations were triangulated with secondary data from a number of different sources, which included planning documents, newspaper reports, webcasts of local authority meetings, company annual reports, corporate communications, community publications and material from various social media formats such as on-line forums and blogs. The secondary data sources were used to categorise, investigate, interpret and identify limitations of the primary data. They also allowed for a richer picture than could be obtained from interviews and participant observation alone (Myers, 2013). Although time was spent evaluating secondary sources in terms of their reliability and bias, ultimately they were analysed and coded using the same methods as for the primary data sources and as set out below.

Data analysis

The research generated a large amount of data in different formats, including interview transcripts, reflexive notes from participant observations, photographs, audio files and secondary data in a variety of formats. In order to assist in the movement from the “shapeless spaghetti” (Langley, 1999: 694) of data towards theoretical understanding, the NVivo software programme was used. Throughout this process there was no intention to transform the qualitative research into an automated analysis of the text. It assisted in making sense of the “captured complexities” of the real world (Pettigrew, 1990: 281). The coding was an iterative process that started once the majority of the interviews and participant observations had been completed. The analysis started by identifying relevant concepts in the data, using the language of the respondents, and grouping direct quotations under different categories.

Van Maanen (1979) calls these first order concepts the “facts” of an investigation. In this research, this involved concepts linked to stakeholder’s views as expressed in interviews with the researcher and in meetings at which the researcher attended as a participant observer. During the coding process numerous other concepts relating to austerity began to emerge and demonstrated the importance of the wider political context underpinning the stadium-led regeneration scheme. This work was carried out by the first author with the assistance of the NVivo software programme. To verify the trustworthiness of the data analysis (Lincoln and Guba, 1985), two separate methods were employed. Details of the coding and concepts were discussed with the second author in order to consider alternative explanations for the emerging findings. Secondly, samples of the coding of the documents were reviewed by an outside researcher. Any discrepancies were discussed in order to reach agreement on how to code the concept. For the purposes of this article, both authors began to look at the relationships between austerity and regeneration and how these related to the ability of stakeholders to influence stadium-led regeneration. From this analysis the authors identified three overarching themes: these themes are explored in more detail in the next section. It is acknowledged that whatever strategy is used, there will always be an un-codifiable step that relies on the insight and imagination of the researcher (Langley, 1999:707, acknowledging Weick, 1989).

Limitations

The fundamental purpose of this research was to understand community perceptions of the stadium-led regeneration in Tottenham and the majority of those that were interviewed, or in the meetings that were observed, were critical of the developments. Therefore it is acknowledged that there is a potential limitation in that those community voices that are reflected in this research tended to be more negative to the development. Whilst there were

some positive reflections, these were in the minority and as such, the critical stance taken by many members of the community receives more weight in this research. It is recognised however that stadium-led regeneration is likely to attract a range of different opinions and interpretations and therefore the conclusions drawn from this paper will likely relate to a particular set of individuals and will not generate unanimous approval; the results must be considered in this context. To counteract this, effort was made during data collection to reflect a wide range of stakeholder views. For example, it would have been helpful to interview representatives of Tottenham Hotspur FC, but the club was reluctant to speak on the record during the period in which the research was being carried out. This reflects the methodological challenges in undertaking case study research.

Moreover, you could also question the extent to which the results are relevant more widely. Clearly within a complex local environment that included prolonged riots in 2011, it is difficult to generalise to other local councils, communities and sports organisations. Again, this represents a methodological challenge in that it is always potentially problematic to argue for extensions from case studies. However, some sites may share commonalities with other domains, (Corley and Gioia, 2004: 205) and many of the features and processes of the stadium-led regeneration developments could be applicable to other locales as well (e.g. formal consultations, community reactions, forms of local governance, etc.). For these reasons, there is confidence that the research is likely to have applicability (not generalisability) beyond this particular study.

Local authority pragmatism and private sector opportunism

There was clear evidence that during the process of the planning application, decisions were taken by Haringey Council to ensure that the regeneration scheme was able to proceed. For

example, the original planning permission included a series of section 106 community infrastructure requirements amounting to £16,436,000, that set aside sums for highways, transport and parking improvements; education; heritage and community projects. Planning obligations under section 106 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 (as amended) are a mechanism which makes a development proposal acceptable in planning terms. They are focused on mitigation of the impact of development and are often referred to as 'developer contributions'. Common uses of planning obligations are to secure affordable housing, and to secure financial contributions to provide transport infrastructure. Local authorities are required to ensure that the combined total impact of such requests does not threaten the viability of development sites, (Planning Practice Guidance, 26 March, 2015).

The original planning permission additionally required that 50 per cent of the proposed two hundred housing units to be built on the site of the existing stadium were to be classified as affordable housing (Haringey Report for Cabinet, 7 February 2012). Tottenham Hotspur FC provided a report to Haringey Council that expressed concern over the extent of the section 106 obligations and that the requirements of the planning permission would mean that the stadium would not be financially viable. This sought to put pressure on the local authority for which the regeneration was part of the long-term strategic re-development of the area. Although the move was ultimately unsuccessful, the football club further increased the pressure by making a bid to move to the Olympic Stadium in Stratford outside of the borough.

This situation evidenced the salience of Tottenham Hotspur FC in this context, demonstrating that they could be seen as a definitive stakeholder (Mitchell et al, 1997) possessing power, legitimacy and urgency, and illustrates well some of the difficulties that local councils' face

when dealing with a professional sports team. This is an issue long recognised in the USA where there is a propensity for professional sports teams to threaten to leave their city as leverage in negotiations for a new or improved stadium: “In a confrontation between a firm and a city, the city is like a boxer with his shoes nailed to the ground” (Euchner, 1993: 167, quoted by Schimmel in Gratton and Henry, 2001: 262). In the case of Tottenham Hotspur FC, the club was the largest landowner and employer in the area, which immediately put the local council at a disadvantage when negotiating over a planning application that is central to the council’s strategy for the redevelopment of the locality. The council accepted that “the new Stadium development faces a funding gap that has been exacerbated by the current challenging conditions in the financial and property markets” (Haringey Report for Cabinet, 7 February 2012: 145), but that it was seen as a catalyst for attracting new investment into the area. The Reports Pack (Haringey, 13 February 2012) made clear that the decision was also made against the back-drop of the changed institutional planning context provided by the Coalition government in which the Minister for Decentralisation and Cities’ ‘Statement on Growth’ in March 2011 called for local authorities to review existing s106 agreements on schemes that were unviable. The Draft National Planning Policy Framework (July 2011) provided further support by encouraging local planning authorities to avoid non-essential conditions or obligations that would undermine the viability of development proposals, (Haringey Planning Sub-Committee, 13 February, 2012, Reports Pack: 15).

In response to these local and institutional pressures, in February 2012, the council granted revised planning permission. This reduced the football club’s infrastructure commitments by almost £16 million to a total of £477,000. The fact that the football club had been successful on viability grounds in reducing an original 2011 Section 106 requirement for 50 per cent of 200 units on the site of the old ground to be affordable housing to 585 units at full market

value by December 2015, provided evidence that Haringey Council were taking a pragmatic approach: by that it means that the threat of the football club leaving the area or not being able to pursue the stadium development due to financial concerns, together with a changed institutional context linked to an austerity budget from central government, resulted in the council making additional concessions to enable the scheme to go ahead. In the context of the Mitchell et al. (1997) framework, this further evidenced Tottenham Hotspur FC as a definitive stakeholder; possessing power, legitimacy and urgency.

This is reflected in the interviews with local residents when asked about the relationship between Tottenham Hotspur FC and Haringey Council. The feelings expressed revealed that there was the perception that the football club was *“holding the council to ransom”* and also that *“the council are pandering towards Spurs”*. Even one of the local councillors expressed the concern that: *“we know Tottenham Hotspur have got a track record of having the ear of the council”*, (Councillor Bull, webcast of the meeting of the Overview and Security Committee of Haringey Council on 25 November 2013). There was clear recognition of this in one of the interviews with a local councillor in which it was stated the need for some special arrangements for the football club:

“Well then it depends, because the council obviously wants Tottenham Football Club to stay and maybe that’s why, from the section 106 point of view, various sweeteners...”

This can be seen as the response to regeneration in an era of austerity. On the other side of the road, (literally), the Chairman of Tottenham Hotspur FC put forward a different perspective:

“The new stadium, visitor attractions, homes and other uses proposed for the site would support a total of 2,500 jobs in the locality – a net 1,700 directly employed at the site with a further 800 supported through the supply chain and other direct spending. We are determined that this scheme delivers something that becomes an iconic landmark, instantly recognisable around the world and capable of acting as the catalyst needed to kick-start the regeneration of this area” (Daniel Levy, Chairman, THFC, The Hotspur, July 2015).

There were other examples where Haringey Council was seen to be overly dependent upon private sector investment. For example, in a bid to further emphasise the opportunities that were available to investors and property developers, Haringey councillors attended the MIPIM property conference in Cannes in 2014, with property developers covering some of the costs (Haringey Independent, 12 March, 2014). Concerns about the relationship between the council and big business were further raised when Haringey Council returned to MPIN in Cannes in 2015 and in 2016, where Tottenham Hotspur FC were one of six sponsors that paid £2,500 towards the costs of attending the event (Haringey Regeneration, 2016).

This provides further evidence that the council’s approach to regeneration in an era of austerity was driven by the need to involve private property developers in providing solutions to some of the regeneration issues within the borough. Following the changes to planning regulations discussed above, private developers are seen as possessing increased levels of the relational attributes of power, legitimacy and urgency by the local council. This could be argued to reflect an entrepreneurial approach towards regeneration that Lowndes and Prachett (2012) recognised local authorities having to engage in. However, this could also be seen as overstating the entrepreneurial nature of this approach: ultimately, it is simply the council

adopting a strategy of following the money in the face of austerity-led funding cuts. It therefore is more representative of a pragmatic approach (rather than an entrepreneurial approach) on the part of the local council. It also demonstrates that in an era of austerity, private sector organisations such as Tottenham Hotspur FC and development companies are able to take advantage of the financial difficulties faced by local authorities and work this to their own advantage. The need for local authorities to demonstrate greater innovation (Lowndes and Pratchett, 2012; Donald et al, 2014), especially those in urban areas, coupled with the lack of central government funding further opens up the space for powerful private sector organisations such as developers and in this case, a Premier League football team, to become more embedded within local regeneration schemes. However, both the local council and the football club were keen to clarify their own positions:

“I think the kind of characterisation that somehow the council is dancing to Spurs’ tune is something I find quite curious”, (Clare Kober, Leader of Haringey Council from webcast of Overview and Security Committee of Haringey Council, 25 November 2013).

“We are not taking public money. That £41m is not coming in to the club. It’s not a walkway to the stadium, it’s not our walkway”, (executive of THFC, participant observation at meeting, 4 July 2013).

Regeneration or gentrification?

The details contained within the *Plan for Tottenham* (the regeneration plan developed by Haringey Council in 2012) reveal there were aspirations to create thousands of new homes and jobs. It also included the demolition of property in the Tottenham High Road West area,

to be replaced with new flats, houses, shops, cafes, a library and a proposed cinema. Much of High Road West is adjacent to the new stadium now being built. It has been argued that in comparison with previous local regeneration initiatives in Tottenham, after the 2011 riots there has been very little emphasis on community development in the urban policy initiatives proposed (Dillon and Fanning, 2015). Although launched with the usual caveats concerning consultation, both the new stadium and the wider development proposals soon became the focus of controversy, dissent and protest in the local community. As one local resident and community activist noted in an interview:

“But in the last year it has been clear that Tottenham has been earmarked by property developers and the council and indeed the GLA and the government for special attention in terms of mega-development and social engineering. They’ve clearly got their eyes on council estates as a potential for what they call decanting - what other people could call destruction of well-established communities - and by hoping to grab some of that land and sell off some of the housing and generally they have stated that”.

Many people in the local community felt disengaged with the council’s approach to the regeneration proposals due to a perceived lack of genuine consultation with decisions made during the process (discussed below). This reflected the perceived lack of salience of these individuals, arguably viewed as latent stakeholders, possessing only the relational attribute of legitimacy by the focal organisations. These decisions included those related to: demolition of homes and businesses linked to the building of the new walkway; to reduce Tottenham Hotspur FC’s Section 106 community infrastructure payments and release it from a 50 per cent affordable housing requirement for property built on the existing football ground, and

overall lack of benefits for the existing community. Furthermore, in the final planning application that was finally approved by Haringey Council on 16 December 2015, planning approval was also granted for an increased 585 properties to be built on the site of the existing ground, all of which would be for sale at the full market rate (i.e. no affordable housing at all). This demonstrates the pressure under which local urban authorities are working to develop more housing, but without the means to fund such schemes and are therefore willing to accede to such demands. It supports the wider re-emphasis on property-led regeneration (Dillon and Fanning, 2015:189) rather than regeneration that is led by the needs of existing communities. Indeed, it was clear that many in the local community were unhappy with the progress of the regeneration in Tottenham and claims that were being made, especially where they were seen to be at the expense of the local community. Although social-engineering or social cleansing was not always mentioned explicitly, the issue was an undercurrent to much of the conversations around the regeneration developments, with local people lacking salience. For example, in an interview with a local resident and business owner it was stated that:

“We are people that contribute greatly to the community, but we are being pushed out of the area we were born and raised in, Tottenham, and punished for not fitting in with the new plans.....” “Spurs are holding the council to ransom and the council are pandering towards Spurs and saying this is going to be good for the community, but it’s not the community already existing here. It’s a community they’ve got planned to bring in over 15, 25 years”.

Similarly, these concerns were echoed by another local business owner:

“They said that these plans would benefit the community and the community wanted enhanced facilities and la, la la. But I said we don’t and none of the shopkeepers do, because that walkway is not going to help anyone, it’s not. It’s going to get rid of four generations of a family business that’s been there for thirty years...”

Scherer and Sam (2006, quoted in Reid, 2014: 42) argue that urban growth coalitions, aided by narratives of community decline and regeneration solutions, *“frame debates in favour of stadia constructions”* and this can be to the sever detriment of the local community. As one local resident and business owner revealed in an interview that her family, business and home all felt under threat:

“Well this thing has caused so much stress to us and as a business and as a family and as a couple. Because like I say, you go to bed with a question mark over your head, you wake up with a question mark. You’re faced with your life. They’re on the block for the chop”.

Some supporters of the football club were able to see the problems the regeneration strategy adopted by Haringey council caused for the local community and the impact of austerity:

“It’s not hard to see why the walkway is so controversial. It flies in the face of all the fine words about community benefit the club was so anxious to utter in the aftermath of the riots and symbolises the growing unease at the divide between private benefit and public good that colours much current debate”.

The walkway would involve the demolition of a social housing estate and large numbers of retail businesses with private homes above in order to provide a more direct route for fans to walk between the railway station and the new stadium. This latter quote also reflects the concern that previous critical research on regeneration has identified – that regeneration schemes are directed by a neoliberal drive for increasing the role and power of the private sector at the expense of both the local authority and local communities living within the area outlined for regeneration (Glynn, 2006; Pugalís, 2016). Whilst a variation on the following was heard on a number of occasions during this research, the quote from a local resident at a community meeting – *“Spurs’ stadium is being used as a Trojan horse for gentrification”* – summarised the views of many. It succinctly emphasises much of the distrust of the local community that grew out of a perceived lack of genuine consultation and transparency that has been noted in other regeneration projects (e.g. Jones, 2002). This lack of consultation is the third theme to which we now turn.

Lack of consultation: the stimulus for community engagement

One of the key issues identified during the interviews and observations that linked to the concerns around social engineering and gentrification was that many local people felt there had not been a legitimate consultation between the council, football club and the community. For example, in an email from a member of the Our Tottenham group (discussed below), there was a clear sense that council members were not forthcoming about the development:

“We have been lied to and lied to by our own elected representatives. The key decisions for this master plan were made long before the consultation. Key factors were decided at the beginning of 2012. That’s when our small businesses were sacrificed in order that one very big business could become even richer”.

Concerns were also expressed by supporters of the football club that although the fans and the local community should be at the centre of this discussion, “...we are all too frequently told that options are simply not possible without further detail being given. This fuels a culture of suspicion” (Haringey Independent, 15th September 2014). It should be noted that Tottenham Hotspur FC’s stated position was that the club had no involvement with plans for the demolition of homes and businesses or the proposed walkway from White Hart Lane station. An executive of the football club made the point at a meeting between the club and Our Tottenham Group that it was “...useful to hear the concerns of residents, and that “...as a club, the way we operate is to take as much of the community along as possible”. Indeed, both Haringey Council and Tottenham Hotspur FC were more sanguine about the planned development together with the results of consultation and engagement efforts, as one local councillor stated in the Guardian newspaper in October 2014: “The project has the overwhelming support of the local community, 98% of which gave the proposals its whole-hearted endorsement during last year’s consultation period”.

Partly in response to Haringey Council’s *Plan for Tottenham*, but also due to the perceived lack of consultation and suspicion noted above, the *Our Tottenham* network was formed early in 2013 for local people to defend community assets and participate in the changes by putting forward their own community plans (*Our Tottenham* website). It started up as a network of local community organisations and during the period of the research over 50 groups became affiliated. Previous research has shown that through mobilising, networking and the formation of such groups that increased salience was built-up with the focal organisations (Harvey and Schaefer, 2001). Members of the group reflected the considerable disquiet amongst sections of the local community about plans that were eventually approved by

Haringey Council for the new football stadium and wider regeneration proposals to which it was linked. *Our Tottenham* focused on affordable housing and the protection of local services and amenities. One resident specifically credited the council's 'rhetoric' about consultations with encouraging the formation of groups such as *Our Tottenham* and much of the resulting dissent and protest. For example, it was felt that the council's actions did not match its words by many within its community. This was clearly evidenced when local traders presented a petition signed by over 4000 people against the proposed demolitions and the displacement of existing shops. Campaigners also used the media in its various forms whenever possible to make their case. The traders argued that there had been little or no community consultation in arriving at the *Plan for Tottenham*. ... a disjuncture between property-led goals and the interests of existing communities was emphasised (Dillon and Fanning, 2015: 200). This was felt most strongly by those most affected; those who had homes and businesses that would be demolished under the regeneration proposals to build new developments and a walkway to connect White Hart Lane Station to the new ground. This resulted in local businesses starting the petition as part of their own consultation, as one local business owner revealed:

“The High Road West community was never consulted over the demolition of their local shops and businesses. The recent consultation never gave an option to retain them. Only the petition gave the community the chance to have its say”.

The above demonstrates that there were strongly held views, especially from those that lived or worked in the vicinity of the football ground, that they were not seen as legitimate contributors to the regeneration process to the extent that their participation was not to be encouraged. This resonates with previous research that has found that various stakeholder

groups have been excluded in the stadium-building process (Collins, 2008; Lee, 2002). People were keen to stress that the regeneration issues in Tottenham were not just marginal points picked up by one community group, with large numbers of individuals willing to sign a petition to save local homes, shops and other businesses.

As a response to this perceived lack of voice, a range of strategies for trying to ensure that communities were able to have a voice were observed during the discussions at one community meeting in Tottenham:

“We don’t have one strategy; we have a whole range of strategies: lobbying, protesting, planning, support alternative planning ideas, we’ve got a positive charter, we’re supporting groups and networks”.

These multiple strategic approaches to try to gain influence in the stadium-led regeneration of Tottenham by community groups was supported with shared knowledge from other groups in London. These included ‘resistance by design’ (ASH), the forensic dissection of planning documents and data (35%) and the input of academics and students from a number of universities. Gaining media publicity had also been important in several campaigns, including in Tottenham, where members of *Our Tottenham* were prominent. Examples included interviews carried by local media; letters published in the *Evening Standard* (28.03.13) and the *Guardian* (11.11.2013, 18.04.2014, 17.05.2015); an interview with Dave Morris of *Our Tottenham* carried by *BBC Radio London* (24.09.13) and an item for the *BBC 1 London News* evening bulletin (05.09.2013), which contained an interview with Lia Clera Gomes a local resident and business owner, who was also a member of a number of community groups.

Local groups also used social media sites such as Facebook and Twitter to update each other and put information into the community, which in turn could be updated rapidly. Previous research has shown that activists have found social media to be a highly effective tool (Watt and Minton, 2016: 216). As one local resident from Tottenham stated during a community meeting:

“It is through media and social media that we can keep the pressure on. They [Haringey Council] accused me of low-grade media hackery – I take that as a compliment”.

Discussion

As Dillon and Fanning (2015: 204) point out, beneath the rhetoric of localism and the Big Society, one of the key elements of the austerity policy shift was the lack of any national urban renewal programmes in place providing dedicated regeneration funds to deprived communities. Instead local authorities have been expected to look to the market for the resources they need for physical, economic and social renewal – thus providing opportunities for private developers. This case study research into the stadium-led regeneration in Tottenham corroborates this, revealing that firstly, within the context of central government funding cuts, Haringey Council have taken a pragmatic approach towards regeneration which has resulted in concessions towards the needs of Tottenham Hotspur FC - a private company - in order for planning applications to go through. This demonstrates how austerity-led regeneration opens up the space for an increased role for the private sector with the football club able to take considerable advantage of the opportunities that were offered by Haringey council. By drawing on the stakeholder salience framework developed by Mitchell et al (1997) and the relational attributes of power, legitimacy and urgency, this research has been

able to provide a more theoretically informed understanding of how the position of the football club as a definitive stakeholder (Mitchell et al, 1997) of the local authority meant that it was able to ensure that revised planning permissions were granted that benefited the football club at the expense of certain local community stakeholders. In the Mitchell et al (1997) parlance, community stakeholders lacked salience. Pugalis and McGuinness (2013) questioned whether urban regeneration in the era of austerity represents a pragmatic strategy enacted by the local authority to withstand economic turbulence or whether it demonstrates a more covert strategy that seeks to continue the neoliberal agenda to reform and reduce the role of the state. This research would suggest that it is both; the adoption of a pragmatic approach is taken by the local authority primarily out of necessity but the decision exists in a broader political context in which austerity urbanism forms part of the ideological drive of central government to reduce state involvement and move us further towards a neoliberal economy. The Mitchell et al (1997) framework helps to better understand how this particular political context ensures that certain stakeholders are able to possess more power, legitimacy and urgency, and thus underpins why decisions around urban regeneration are made.

The second, related point is that the pragmatic approach highlights one of the key tensions inherent in the policy of austerity urbanism and the aim to promote local economic development (Meegan et al, 2014). Local authorities have to cede some degree of control of the regeneration of their local area to private sector organisations and this raises concerns over whose interests are served by the regeneration schemes. Framing this again in the context of stakeholder theory helps to understand how local community groups with a lack of salience are therefore marginalised or simply ignored. Invariably, private sector firms are driven by market logics and the needs of the consumer. This is problematic when it comes to regeneration. As Warner and Clifton (2014: 52) argue, by privileging market demand over

citizenship and community interests, it “fundamentally alters the avenues for citizens to interact with government. It weakens direct citizen claims on the state, and simultaneously establishes citizen channels via the market mechanism”. Despite the claim, mentioned earlier, made by an executive of the football club that they seek to “*take as much of the community along as possible*”, the rolling back of the initial section 106 agreements, many of which were put in place for community benefit, it is difficult to agree with this sentiment. Although there was considerable rhetoric about their commitment to the community, the key objective for the owners of Tottenham Hotspur is the development of a new stadium and community obligations that form part of the initial section 106 agreement are not fundamental to this. This was found in previous research on the development of the Emirates Stadium in Islington although in this case, the football club contributed substantially more to community and council services (Walters, 2011). The fact that Tottenham Hotspur was able to reduce their initial contribution is underpinned by the broader political and economic climate from which the austerity agenda has emerged. It also evidenced the greatly increased salience of private developers during this period. Essentially, regeneration during austerity leads to the orientation of economic and social policy towards the needs of the private sector.

This research therefore supports the findings in previous studies that have examined some of the urban injustices prevalent in state-backed regeneration strategies, making the case that ‘new urban renewal’ often amounts to state-led gentrification (Lees, 2014). It has shown that stadium-led regeneration has extended a process begun under New Labour in which urban working-class neighbourhoods were deliberately targeted for gentrification by replacing apparently ‘obsolete’ terraced and estate housing (and its apparently ‘obsolete’ inhabitants) with new private housing developments attractive to middle-class households (Hodgkinson et al, 2012; Watt and Minton 2016). Indeed, local residents and business owners expressed their

views that as part of the wider regeneration linked to the new stadium in Tottenham, “social engineering”, “social cleansing” and “gentrification” were taking place around them; phrases that were frequently used in community meetings. Equally, council representatives were very keen for these phrases not to become part of the discourse linked with regeneration in Tottenham. The London Olympic Park development has provoked similar controversy over the displacement of lower-income East Londoners (Watt, 2013). In the USA community resentment as a result of reduced social housing and dislocation, has been found to be an enduring feature in stadium-led regeneration projects (Rutheiser, 1996, quoted in Matheson, 2010: 12).

For Haringey Council, highly dependent on the private sector for the financing of the regeneration scheme within Tottenham, their approach to the regeneration of the area aligns towards this market citizenship perspective, underpinned by discussions of the economic benefits that the regeneration will bring. This leads to the third point: it fundamentally changes the ways that citizens in Tottenham are able to interact with local government in regard to the stadium-led regeneration scheme. Rather than being granted devolved powers, they are kept at arms-length, their ability to participate is reduced, and they become further disassociated from the development taking place in the urban environment in which they live. This undermines some stakeholders’ rights to the city. This is the process of displacement and what Harvey (2008) called ‘accumulation by dispossession’, which he saw as laying at the core of urbanisation under capitalism.

Whilst community groups push back against this development, research has shown that participation in regeneration schemes is limited to those groups seen as legitimate or most aligned with the objectives of those making the decisions (Harvey and Schaefer, 2001). In the

current era of austerity, this research has suggested that communities are even less able to influence a development due to what Donald et al (2014) term an ‘austerity machine’: this is where the political networks and local coalitions that give legitimacy to political projects are strengthened in favour of the interests of private capital. In these circumstances, urban regeneration schemes will often go ahead at the expense of the local community. Instead of experiencing devolved powers, the relative lack of voice and the power has a knock on effect of increasing stress, tensions and leading to potentially more desperate strategies to make their voices heard. One of the ways in which the pragmatic situation could be improved would be to allow for greater participation by all stakeholders through consultations that are perceived to be genuine by the local communities. This could lead to positive effects for all stakeholders (Impact of Regeneration, 2007), with potential issues dealt with at an early stage and fewer triggers for community protests.

To summarise, this study supports previous work (e.g. Butterfield et al, 2001) that stakeholders with institutional power, such as the local council, and economic power, such as the football club, are likely to be the most influential in the context of stadium-led regeneration. The Mitchell et al (1997) framework provides the ability to understand why this is the case through the attributes of power, legitimacy and urgency. Community stakeholders in the sports-led regeneration of Tottenham have been marginalised due to their perceived lack of salience by decision making bodies. The logical conclusion of this is that, in the interest of local democracy, there is a need across a wide range of regeneration projects for local authorities to take into account the needs of community stakeholders, broadly construed, due to their lack of salience. However, as noted in this research, the political and economic climate has ensured that local authorities are more reliant upon the private sector and thus the definitive nature of private sector developers ensures that balancing their needs with those of

the community has become even more skewed in favour of private sector developers. Notwithstanding the excellent work of Reid (2014), further research is needed as to how community groups respond to sport-led regeneration and how they can seek to implement strategies that allow them to gain or increase salience with local authorities, especially in times of austerity. The framework of Mitchell et al. (1997) offers a useful lens through which to analyse these often complex issues.

Conclusion

The first objective of this article was to understand the approach of the London Borough of Haringey to the sports-led regeneration scheme involving Tottenham Hotspur FC in the context of austerity. The evidence presented supports the contention that austerity has resulted in the local authority having to adopt a pragmatic approach which has opened up the space for further entrenchment of the private sector within regeneration private sector. This can be seen, as previous research has argued, as part of central government's broader neoliberal drive towards increased privatisation and marketization (Glynn, 2006) that will lead to the increased commodification of the public sphere and will alter the relationship between the voluntary and community sector, citizens, and the local authorities (Meegan et al, 2014). As Pugalis (2016: 69) writes, "Austere conditions provided a 'legitimate' alibi for a neoliberal assault on the remaining welfarist features of state modes of regeneration". This paper has empirically demonstrated how this process has played out in the context of the Northumberland Development Project (NDP) that is taking place in Tottenham. The second objective was to understand how this approach was perceived by, and the impact on, those communities living within the geographical locality of the developments. The research revealed that austerity-led regeneration and the development of the football stadium was perceived by many in the local community as a Trojan horse for the gentrification of

Tottenham. This was reinforced by the perceived lack of community consultation, with this shown to have acted as a stimulus for community engagement.

There are two key implications arising from this research. Despite the fact this research has shown that many members of the local community believed they had not been consulted or allowed to participate in the stadium-led regeneration of the area, and given that they had very limited success in gaining major changes to the stadium-led regeneration in Tottenham, it can be argued that they were able to slow down the process. For example, there was a considerable delay in years of granting final planning permission for the new stadium, and associated regeneration developments on the other side of High Road have not even begun. Community groups and individuals were also able to publicise local issues related to the regeneration developments. This in itself is important as it gives credence to the idea that despite how powerless community groups may feel in the face of regeneration projects that are driven predominantly by the needs of the private sector they can make some impacts on the regeneration process.

The second point, related to this, is that the community opposition served to engage disparate groups of people and therefore one of the key successes is the bringing together diverse groups across the community to share knowledge. By doing so, they increased their salience with the focal organisations. This might be an important instrumental weapon that could be used in future to challenge further proposals from Haringey Council. Thus, it is important to re-iterate the call from others for further research into the impacts of austerity of sports organisations (e.g. Parnell et al, 2017) and their local communities but specifically argue the need to focus on the issue of stakeholder mobilisation to better understand how community groups come together and seek to influence sport-led regeneration schemes.

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