



Durham E-Theses

The superpowers and the Maghreb: political, economic and strategic relations

Albursan, Ahmed Salim

How to cite:

Albursan, Ahmed Salim (1992) *The superpowers and the Maghreb: political, economic and strategic relations*, Durham theses, Durham University. Available at Durham E-Theses Online:
<http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/6121/>

Use policy

The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes provided that:

- a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
- a [link](#) is made to the metadata record in Durham E-Theses
- the full-text is not changed in any way

The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.

Please consult the [full Durham E-Theses policy](#) for further details.

Academic Support Office, Durham University, University Office, Old Elvet, Durham DH1 3HP
e-mail: e-theses.admin@dur.ac.uk Tel: +44 0191 334 6107
<http://etheses.dur.ac.uk>

The copyright of this thesis rests with the author.
No quotation from it should be published without
his prior written consent and information derived
from it should be acknowledged.

The Superpowers and the Maghreb: Political, Economic and Strategic Relations

by

Ahmed Salim Albursan

B.A. Pol. Sci., B.A. Geog., Dip. Ed., M.A. IR.

**A Thesis submitted in fulfilment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy**

Politics

**The University of Durham
1992**



- 9 JUL 1993

Abstract

The study focuses on superpower relations with the Maghreb from independence until 1985. It contains eight chapters and conclusion together with a bibliography.

The introduction defines the scope and objectives of the study, as well as discussing the methodology and techniques employed in the research. Chapter two gives a historical background to European relations with the Maghreb states and explains how the Maghreb became part of European political, economic and strategic objectives in the European multipolar system. Chapter three presents a theoretical basis for superpower relations with the Third World. Chapter four examines the historical relations between the Maghreb and the superpowers until the independence, and the role of the superpowers in Maghreb independence.

Chapter five deals with political relations between the Maghreb and the superpowers and chapter six examines the economic relations between the superpowers and the Maghreb states. Chapter seven deals with superpower strategic relations with the Maghreb focusing on Mediterranean security, arms transfers, military bases and intelligence cooperation. Chapter eight examines superpower behaviour toward regional conflict and stability in the Maghreb. The final chapter contains a summary and conclusion and future prospects for superpowers relations with the Maghreb and the role of the EC in future relations.

Copyright © 1993 by Ahmed Salim Albursan

The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. No quotation from it should be published without Ahmed Salim Albursan's prior written consent and information derived from it should be acknowledged.

Declaration

This thesis results entirely from my own work and has not been previously offered in candidature for any other degree or diploma

Acknowledgements

In completing this thesis I wish to express my profound gratitude to thank my supervisors Dr. Richard Lawless and Mr. Robert Williams whose moral support and friendly attitudes have helped me and have made this work a better one.

My gratitude is also due to the Department of Politics and the Middle East Centre, especially to Dr P. Kneen for his helpful and insightful discussion of Soviet foreign policy. I thank the university library staff at Durham University especially inter-library loan section for their high standard of work and help.

I would like to acknowledge the great debt I owe to my family. Needless to say this dissertation would not have been completed without the inspiring, reassuring supportive attitude of my wife, Zineb. She has demonstrated utmost patience and dedication throughout. I owe to her and to my children Ibtehal and Malik my deepest debt of gratitude and love.

Contents

Abstract	ii
Declaration	iv
Acknowledgements	v
1 Introduction	1
1.1 The Issue:	1
1.2 Objectives of the study:	4
1.3 Definition of terms:	7
1.4 The Methodological Parameters:	12
1.5 Literature Review:	12
1.6 Organisational Framework:	15
1.7 Field Research	17
1.8 Sources of information:	17
2 Maghreb in World Politics: From European Multipolar System to a Bipolar System, 1815-1945	22
2.1 Introduction	22
2.2 Maghreb Geopolitics and Corsairing	23
2.3 The Maghreb in European Diplomacy and Alliances	26
2.4 European states and the two Moroccan Crises	30
2.4.1 Algeciras Conference, 1906, and the First Moroccan Crisis	31
2.4.2 The Second Moroccan Crisis and Diplomacy of Compensation	33
2.4.3 Italy and the Occupation of Tripoli (Libya)	34
2.5 Maghreb between the two World Wars, 1919-1945	35
2.5.1 Competition between the Great Powers	35

2.5.2	Maghreb National Movements	37
2.6	Conclusion	49
3	Superpowers and the Third World: From Decolonisation Policy to Military Intervention	58
3.1	Introduction	58
3.2	The Evolution of Superpower involvement in the Third World	60
3.2.1	Phase One: 1950-1965: the Cold War Era	61
3.2.2	Phase two: 1965-1975	63
3.2.3	Third Phase: 1975-1980	65
3.2.4	Phase Four: 1980-1985	67
3.3	US-USSR Political Systems, Foreign Policy and Third World	68
3.3.1	Soviet Political System, Foreign Policy and The Third World	69
3.3.2	The American Political System, Foreign Policy and The Third World	71
3.4	Superpowers, Ideology and Foreign Policy	81
3.5	Superpowers and Third World Liberation Movements	89
3.6	Superpowers and the Non-Aligned Movement	93
3.7	Superpowers, Military Coups and the Third World	98
3.8	Conclusion	107
4	Maghreb relations with the US and Soviet Union: From World War One to Independence.	131
4.1	Introduction	131
4.2	Maghreb-US relations	132
4.2.1	Maghreb-US relations prior to World War Two	132
4.2.2	US-Maghreb Relations during World War Two	134
4.3	Maghreb Independence and International Trade Unions. . .	141
4.3.1	Superpowers and International Trade Unions	142

4.3.2	The Creation of the World Federation of Trade Union . . .	143
4.3.3	International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU).	144
4.3.4	WFTU, ICFTU and the Maghreb Labour Unions	145
4.4	Soviet-Maghreb Relations	155
4.4.1	Soviet-Maghreb relations between two world wars :	156
4.4.2	Soviet Union and Maghreb independence :	159
4.4.3	Soviet Union and Algerian Revolution :	161
4.5	Conclusion	163
5	The Political Relations between the Superpowers and the Maghreb: Pragmatism or Ideology?	174
5.1	Introduction	174
5.2	United States and the Maghreb 1960-1985	178
5.2.1	American-Libyan Relations 1969-1985	178
5.2.2	American-Tunisian Relations	190
5.2.3	American-Algerian relations	197
5.2.4	American-Moroccan relations	203
5.3	Soviet-Maghreb relations	215
5.3.1	Soviet-Libyan relations 1969-1985	215
5.3.2	Soviet-Tunisian relations	220
5.3.3	Soviet-Algerian relations	226
5.3.4	Soviet-Moroccan relations	233
5.4	Conclusion	237
6	The Superpowers and the Maghreb: Economic Relations .	260
6.1	Introduction	260
6.2	United States Economic Relations with Maghreb states . .	264
6.2.1	American-Libyan Economic Relations	265

6.2.2	American-Tunisian Economic Relations	271
6.2.3	American-Algerian Economic Relations	276
6.2.4	American-Moroccan Economic Relations	282
6.3	Soviet-Maghreb Economic Relations	286
6.3.1	Soviet-Libyan economic relations	288
6.3.2	Soviet-Tunisian economic relations	291
6.3.3	Soviet- Algerian economic relations	294
6.3.4	Soviet-Moroccan economic relations	299
6.4	Conclusion	303
7	The Superpowers and the Maghreb: Strategic relations . .	316
7.1	Introduction	316
7.2	Maghreb geostrategic values	317
7.3	Superpowers, Arms Transfers and the Maghreb	318
7.3.1	The United States, Arms Transfers and the Maghreb States	318
7.3.2	The Soviet Union, Arms Trade and the Maghreb	337
7.4	Superpowers, Maghreb and Mediterranean Security	351
7.4.1	The Soviet Union and the Mediterranean: Objectives	353
7.4.2	The United States and the Mediterranean	358
7.4.3	The Maghreb States and Mediterranean Security	360
7.5	Superpowers, Military bases, and the Maghreb	368
7.5.1	The Soviet Union, Maghreb and military bases	374
7.6	Superpowers, military intervention, and Maghreb:	376
7.7	Superpowers, Intelligence and the Maghreb:	382
7.8	conclusion	388
8	Superpowers, Regional Conflicts and Stability in the Maghreb	
	subsystem	409

8.1	Introduction	409
8.2	Superpowers, areas of influence, and grey areas	410
8.3	Superpowers and regional stability in the Maghreb	414
8.4	Arab-African Union and the Superpowers reactions	415
8.4.1	United States reaction to the Arab-African Union	420
8.4.2	Soviet Union reaction towards Arab-African Union	423
8.5	Superpowers and the Western Sahara Conflict	425
8.5.1	Historical background	425
8.5.2	The Soviet Union's behaviour toward the Western Sahara:	427
8.5.3	United States behaviour towards Western Sahara:	431
8.6	Superpowers, Civil war in Chad, and Regional Stability	441
8.6.1	Internal Setting	441
8.6.2	Libyan intervention in Chad	444
8.6.3	United States, the civil war in Chad and regional stability	446
8.6.4	Soviet Union, Civil War in Chad, and regional stability	450
8.7	conclusion	453
9	Conclusion	469
	Bibliography	501

LIST OF TABLES


Table 1:1 Maghreb Population (millions) Present and Future	9
Table 1:2 Maghreb States	11
Table 2.1: Average Imports of Cotton into Morocco by main Countries	36
Table 5:1 Academic Students being trained in USSR & E. Eu- rope and USA as of 1981 and 1983	226
Table 5:2 North African Students in France 1978	232
Table 6:1 US Exports to and US Imports from the Third World, 1960-85.	261
Table 6:2 Soviet Foreign Trade with the Third World 1970-1982 (Billion Roubles)	262
Table 6:3 US crude oil imports from major Arab world oil ex- porting countries, 1977-1982 (Billions of Barrels).	265
Table 6:4 USA economic assistance to the Maghreb 1953-1972 (\$Million).	266
Table 6:5 Libya Principal Sources of Imports 1967-1969 (Million Libyan Pounds)	267
Table 6:6 Libya's exports 1973-81 (value of percentage of total exports)	270
Table 6:7 Libya's imports 1973-1982 (value of percentage of total general imports)	271

Table 6:8 Tunisia imports 1975-1984 (value as percentage of total imports)	274
Table 6:9 Tunisian Export 1975-1984 (value as per cent of total exports)	275
Table 6:10 Algerian foreign imports 1975-1984 (% of Algerian total imports)	280
Table 6:11 Algerian Foreign exports(%)	281
Table 6:12 US trade with Morocco 1968-1985 (millions of US\$)	283
Table 6:13 US foreign assistance to Morocco 1980-1985(\$million)	286
Table 6:14 Soviet and Eastern European Economic Aid 1954-1981 (in millions of Dollars)	287
Table 6:15 Soviet and East European Economic Technicians in North Africa in 1981 and 1984.	288
Table 6:16 Soviet Trade with Libya, 1962-1966 (in million of Libyan Pounds)	289
Table 6:17 Soviet Foreign Trade with Libya 1970-1974 (million of Roubles; per cent)	291
Table 6:18 Soviet trade with Libya 1976-1984 (millions of Roubles)	291
Table 6:19 Volume of Soviet foreign trade with Tunisia 1970-1982(millions of Roubles)	293
Table 6:20 Soviet foreign trade with Algeria (millions of Roubles)	295
Table 6:21 Soviet foreign trade with Algeria 1975-1986 (millions of Roubles)	296
Table 6:22 The number of new Soviet foreign aid projects planned and completed	298

Table 6:23 Soviet foreign trade with Morocco 1970-86 (millions of Roubles)	301
Table 7:1 World's arms transfers 1963-1986 four years average(US \$million constant 1981 Dollars).	319
Table 7:2 World arms transfers, four year averages (percentage).	320
Table 7:3 Main Suppliers of Weapons to Maghreb states 1950-1973 (US \$m constant 1973 prices)	321
Table 7:4 Arms imports in North Africa (\$ million)	327
Table 7:5 U.S foreign military transfers to Morocco 1974-1985 (\$m). (agreements, deliveries, credits and commercial arms exports)	330
Table 7:6 Value of arms transfers, cumulative 1981-1985 to North Africa by major supplier (\$million)	332
Table 7:7 Soviet Military Aid to the Third World, 1955-1964 (\$m)	339
Table 7:8 Libyan Arms Purchases between 1974-1984(\$m)	347
Table 7:9 The Leading Third World Customers of Soviet arms sales 1982- 1986 (% of total the USSR arms transfers to Third World)	348
Table 7:10 A cumulative totals of Soviet Naval port visits in the Maghreb ' region and other Mediterranean States, 1956-1980.	362
Table 7:11 Military balance in Maghreb	377
Table 7: 12 Libyan sponsored attempts of destabilisation 1976-1986, military training, direct military interventions on behalf of regimes and anti-regimes.	381
Table 9:1 The United States aid and Credits to Maghreb 1988-1990	487

Table 9:2 Net Transfers of funds by Maghreb workers (\$ million)	489
Table 9:3 Financial aid from EC members to Maghreb (average over 1985-1988)	490

The Greater Maghreb



XV

"There are three wasps' nests besides the Balkans: Morocco and the Mediterranean, the Persian Gulf and the American Monroe Doctrine: God grant that we may never fall into one of them". **Otto von Bismarck**, quoted in Sarbadhikari, P. "The UAE in international relations" *The Indian Journal of Political Science*, vol.38, 1977, p. 143.

"If Germany were to allow France to create 'a new, great, and valuable colonial territory [in Morocco]..., our credit in the world, not only for the moment, but also for all future international actions, suffers an intolerate blow". **Alfred Kiderlen**, German Foreign Minister during the Second Moroccan crisis, quoted in Ima Barlow, *The Agadir Crisis*, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1940, p. 266.

"The American-Soviet relationship is a classic historical conflict between two major powers. But it is more than merely a national conflict. It is also a struggle between two imperial systems. And it involves -for the first time in history- a two-nation contest for nothing less than global predominance". **Zbigniew Brzezinski**, the former National Security Advisor to President Jimmy Carter 1977-1981, *Game Plan: A Geostrategic Frame Work for the Conduct of the U.S-Soviet Contest*, New York: The Atlantic Monthly Press, 1986, p. 8.

Chapter I

Introduction

1.1 The Issue:

Over the past two decades, many books and articles have been published about the states of North Africa: Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, and Mauritania. Most of these publications have dealt with political and economic development in the Maghreb states, and they have examined the superpowers' relationship with the *Arab Maghreb states* either briefly or not at all. Some political scientists, for example, William Zartman, John Damis, John Entelis, Lisa Anderson, John Waterbury and others have written on the foreign policy of the Maghreb states, but little attention has been focused on relations between the two superpowers and the Maghreb states.¹ One exception is John Damis who has written on superpower policies toward the conflict in the Western Sahara.²

Only two French works have been published about Soviet-Maghreb relations. They have dealt with political analysis only briefly: one author focuses on Moroccan-Soviet relations until 1970, whilst the other gives a general historical background to relations between the Maghreb and Soviet Union until Algeria's independence in 1962. Both of these publications are more descriptive than analytical.³

Since independence, Morocco has been associated with the US in providing military facilities. In 1982 the US and Morocco signed a use agreement in connection with Rapid Development Forces (RDF) for the Middle East which, since 1983,

has been called 'United States Central Command' (U.S.CENTCOM).⁴ Tunisia has no such agreement with the US. However, the US has been extending security guarantee to Tunisia, most notably in the 1980s, when Tunisia was infiltrated by subversive groups from Libya, particularly during the Bourguiba era. Morocco and Tunisia have weaker economic links with the US. Their attachment to the US has been primarily political and ideological and has involved attaching themselves to the Western capitalist bloc.

Algeria and Libya are revolutionary states with a pan-Arab ideology. They have, in theory, a political and ideological orientation toward the Soviet Union and they maintain an arms trade with the Soviet Union. However, both also maintain strong economic links with Western Europe and with the US, especially regarding oil and natural gas.

The Libyan leader, Mammour al-Qaddafi shares political and strategic objectives with the Soviet Union, but is strongly opposed to communism and communists. Qaddafi views the US as the most aggressive, imperialist state in the world. American officials view Libya as a terrorist and a pariah state, and Qaddafi as a "*mad dog*". In reality, the conflict between the US and Libya is influenced by American interests and Libyan regional politics in Northern Africa and the Middle East rather than by international terrorism. The Soviet Union has never come to the aid of Qaddafi against the US despite Soviet rhetoric, condemnations and lip-service support. Libya maintains active trade relations with West Germany, Italy, France and other European countries. American oil companies have worked in Libya since the 1950s, until the Reagan administration's economic sanctions against Libya in 1986. Even despite sanctions, the US oil companies continue to operate in Libya through the use of European-based companies. American oil technicians and other

personnel also work in Libya.

Algeria, as a Non-Aligned state with a revolutionary reputation in the Third World, has political and ideological attitudes which differ markedly from those of the US. Nevertheless, Algeria conducts a significant volume of economic trade with the US. Natural gas is a major element in the Algerian national income and it has been particularly important in Algeria's trade with the US. In 1984, the US purchased about \$3.6 billion from Algeria, whilst Algerian imports from US in the same year came only to \$520 million.

On the other hand, Morocco, more allied to the West, maintains economic relations with the Soviet Union. Soviet economic ties with Morocco were strengthened in March 1978 by the signing of a phosphate agreement, a principal Moroccan export and income. The two states also signed a fishing agreement in April 1978. The phosphate agreement, described as the "Contract of the Century"⁵, was the largest commercial agreement the Soviet Union had ever concluded with a Third World country. Morocco and the Soviet Union also signed an agreement of cultural co-operation.

It is ironic that, whilst Morocco and Tunisia have legal communist parties, despite their economic and political orientations, the communist party in Algeria was illegal until September 1989 when Algeria has adopted a multiparty system.⁶ There is no official political activity in Libya, and all political parties have been banned. It is significant that thousands of Algerian and Libyan students studied and graduated in the US, particularly in technological and scientific training.

The two superpowers have different political and ideological systems. From 1945 until the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the system of international re-

lations, could be described as a bipolar system. Such a system raises important questions. How, if at all, did the respective political ideologies of the superpowers determine their foreign policy relations with the Maghreb? To what extent have their respective national interests formulated their international behaviour toward Maghreb, despite their ideological differences?

1.2 Objectives of the study:

Since 1945 the two superpowers have involved themselves in Third World politics. They both denounced colonialism but used different means and tactics to achieve their respective objectives in Third World countries. During the cold war era, Third World countries became the most dangerous and volatile area of superpower confrontation.

It is the objective of this study to analyse the behaviour of the superpowers in the Maghreb States from their independence until 1985. 1985 is the turning point in superpower behaviour because when Gorbachev came to power, a new era was born in the Soviet Union. New Soviet objectives and priorities in its foreign policy toward the Third World were formulated and ideological rhetoric disappeared from the Soviet-Third World relations. He pursued detente with the West more actively than Leonid Brezhnev because of the priority he gave to economic reform (*perestroika*). On the other hand, in his second term, Reagan was preoccupied with the Iran-Contra Affairs, the hostage crisis, and arms control agreements with the Soviet Union rather than involved in confrontation with the Soviet in the Third World. Accordingly, the Gorbachev era is not included in this study. Although the period covered by the thesis ends in 1985, the present tense is employed in much of the thesis. The focus of this thesis is the superpowers' objectives and activities

in the Maghreb as a case study of superpower behaviour in a theatre beyond their direct influence. During this period, Latin America and Eastern Europe were theatres within the spheres of influence of the United States and the Soviet Union respectively.

After independence, the Maghreb states remained, if indirectly, within the sphere of influence of Western Europe, particularly of France, for geostrategic and economic reasons. This thesis attempts to offer an explanation for US and Soviet relations in what is a grey area of a sub-division within the Middle East subsystem (North Africa). The Middle East subsystem has been subject to the political influence of the superpowers since 1945. The Gulf, Iraq, Iran and Turkey had all been part of the Western area of influence, especially of the United States and Great Britain. North Africa is the only part of the Middle East now within the French sphere of influence. Historically, Lebanon was under French cultural influence, especially the Maronites.

Cultural diplomacy has become an important factor in foreign relations. Most of the Maghreb elites use the French language and French is still competing for importance with the Arabic language in North Africa. Cultural relations are important in strengthening political relations between nations and Hans Morgenthau even describes cultural imperialism as the most successful of imperialist policies.⁷ Foreign culture creates a "*fifth column*" in most Third World countries, be it Russian culture, American culture, the British or French legacy in their colonies. In developing societies, and particularly in Africa, most of the elites in power have been influenced by their state's cultural experience during the colonial era.

This thesis has been guided by the following hypotheses: 1. The conflict

and rivalry between USA and the Soviet Union is not caused so much by different political cultures as factors embedded in their respective system by their geographic location. As Brzezinski puts it, "Soviet-American relations is a classic historical conflict between two major powers... a struggle between two imperial systems... for nothing less than global dominance."⁸

2. In the world of "*realpolitik*", the geopolitics of small states plays a major role in their relations with great powers and the Maghreb has played a significant part in European rivalry during the 19th and 20th centuries. It is important to examine to what extent this factor influenced superpower behaviour towards the Maghreb States.

3. Despite the emphasis on ideological aspects of the superpowers' international behaviour, the realist school of international politics argues that states act in world politics according to their national interests rather than according to ideology. Ideology is an inadequate explanation of alliance formation in Third World relations with the great powers and the superpowers.

4. Colonial powers had influenced the superpowers' behaviour in the Third world. For example, when superpower interests lay with France, they ignored French colonial policy in the Maghreb. The superpowers preferred to maintain existing relations with former colonial powers, rather than confuse matters by dealing with the grey area of the Third World.

5. The superpowers preferred stability in the grey areas of the Third World, rather than revolutionary change, to protect their national interests. The superpowers used military force and military intervention within their spheres of direct influence in the Third World, rather than in the grey areas outside their spheres of direct

influence.

1.3 Definition of terms:

The term Maghreb is used here as it is used in the Arabic literature. European and American scholars tend to use the term North Africa (French often use Maghreb). This latter can be misleading because some authors include Egypt and Sudan in North Africa, whereas others do not. Northern Africa⁹ includes Egypt and Sudan and other Maghreb States, but here we use Maghreb or Greater Maghreb in this thesis as North Africa. The Maghreb is a division of the Middle East subsystem. In this thesis the terms subsystem, Middle East subsystem and Maghreb States are defined as below.

1. International system, subsystem

Among the terms in use today are system, subsystem and international system. These terms have been over used and their meaning has lost precision. However, for analytical purposes it is useful to work with a more precise definition. The idea of a system was first used with respect to Natural Sciences in describing the relationships between the particular elements in a complex whole such as the solar system. The term was not applied to the study of society until the 19th century. Historians often speak of diplomatic systems, such as Metternich's or Bismarck's, by which they mean a combination of forces intended to guarantee the triumph of a state on a political principle which safeguards the interests of state. In this study the term 'system' is used as follows: "a network of relationships ... connected to its environment by 'inputs' and 'outputs'. It means a set of interacting parts."¹⁰

Also, we define the international system as "the total view of all action and

interaction taking place at all levels from the micronational components of foreign policy process to the supranational character of the United Nations.”¹¹ The international system is also divided into sub-systems. The Maghreb states have been active members of international system and subsystems such as the United Nations, Non-Aligned movements, 77's group, Organisation of African Unity, Islamic Conference Organisation and Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organisation.

Subsystems (often called subordinate systems) are usually delineated geographically, proximity being the important element. However, functional elements are also important. Functional elements are based primarily on the points of interaction between states, and their importance varies with the intensity of the interaction. One needs, therefore, to take into account such components as the social, economic, political, military and cultural relations of the system. There are countries which belong geographically to a specific region, but as a result of the pattern and intensity of the relations of that country, are identified as belonging to an alternative subsystem, and may in fact be relatively isolated, in terms of interaction from the subsystem to which they should belong on geographical criteria, for example, Israel in the Middle East subsystem. The Maghreb states are members of the Arab League. Tunisia was the headquarters of the League for eleven years until its removal to Cairo in 1991. Algeria and Libya are members of OPEC and OAPEC. They are also members of the African Petroleum Producers Association.

According to its geographical and functional elements, the Middle East forms a sub-system. Scholars differ in their concept of what constitutes the boundaries of the subsystem.¹² American scholars define the Middle East as Egypt and other Arab eastern states. Israeli scholars define the boundaries of the Middle East as Egypt and eastern Arab states, and add Ethiopia, Turkey and Iran. The Israeli

definition has been influenced by the Israeli military concept of *the Peripheral doctrine*. This doctrine lays emphasis on the regional balance of power, that non-Arab states such as Iran, Turkey, and Ethiopia would play a significant role on the fragmentation of Arab power by creating other regional conflicts instead of concentrating on the Israeli front. This argument helps to explain Israeli behaviour in the Iran-Iraq war and the Horn of Africa conflicts which absorbed Arab resources on other fronts.¹³

In this study the Middle East is defined as stretching from Morocco in the west to Afghanistan in the east, and the Arab-Islamic region, culturally, geographically and historically. This definition of the Middle East has been adopted by the Middle East Centre of the University of Durham. The Middle East has been sub-divided: North Africa (Maghreb) or Greater Arab Maghreb; Nile Valley (Egypt and Sudan); the Fertile Crescent; Arabian Peninsula and Muslim non-Arab countries such as Turkey and Iran.

Table 1:1 Maghreb Population (millions) Present and Future

State	1990	2000	2010
Libya	4.5	6.3	8.4
Tunisia	8.3	10.6	13.1
Algeria	25.3	33.2	40.2
Morocco	25.2	31.8	38.7
Mauritania	2.2	2.9	4.00

Source: *OAPEC Monthly Bulletin*, August-September 1989, p. 20.

2- Arab Maghreb:-

Arab historians and geographers speak of the Maghreb usually as part of Islamic Northern Africa to the west of Egypt. This has been clear ever since the ninth century. The term *Maghreb* simply means the western part of Islamic world, as distinct from the eastern part (*Mashrig*). In certain instances the term Maghreb was used in a political sense, e.g. for the area under the rule of the Fatimids in the second half of the tenth century.

Arab names of the regions, which have in modern times come to include the countries of Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco and Mauritania, were originally applied to the cities of Tripoli, Tunis, Aljazair and Marakesh. The Maghreb was a peripheral area of Islamic Caliphate in Damascus, Baghdad, Cairo and Istanbul, each of which were the centre in different periods.

Using functional elements and geographical proximity the Maghreb is part of the Middle East sub-system.¹⁴ The Maghreb is religiously coherent, with the Malikite rite of Sunni Islam predominating. There are no indigenous Christian minorities, and only two Islamic sects: the Kharijites of Jerba, and the Mzabites of Algeria. Indigenous Jews constitute an insignificant and steadily diminishing minority. Because of this uniformity, North African, or Maghreb, Islam serves as an important common denominator, transcending and mitigating the differences of tribe, language and life style. Unlike other historical or contemporary forces, Islam remains paramount in all Maghreb countries, notwithstanding the different policies towards religion and religious practice adopted by the various political leaders of the Maghreb.¹⁵ In this study we do not include Mauritania because it is such a poor country and so dependent on France on security and economic issues

Table 1:2 Maghreb States

States	land area (sq km)	length of coastal line(km)	GNP-Capital \$
Libya	1,775,550	1,685	5,410
Tunisia	163,610	1,028	1,230
Algeria	2,381,741	1,104	2,760
Morocco	710,850 ¹	2,177 ²	750
Mauritania	1,030,700	666	480

1- This area includes the disputed territory of Western Sahara which covers 252,120 sq km; 2- Both on Mediterranean and the Atlantic coasts. **Source:** *The Europa World Yearbook 1990*, London, Europa Publication Limited; *Encyclopedia of the Third World*, third edition, 1987.

that the superpowers have paid little attention to it.

3- Geopolitics and Geostrategic are used to convey the following meaning:

Geopolitics reflects the combination of geographic and political factors determining the conditions of a state or region and emphasised the relation of international political power to the geographical setting; and geostrategic merges strategic considerations with geopolitical ones.

4- Corsairing and piracy: Corsairing was a system in which the governments organised fleets to attack the merchant shipping of other states with the purpose of raising revenue or for political motives. The proper distinction between corsairing and piracy is a legal one, the corsair had a commission from a government or a recognised authority against a designed enemy. The pirate had no commission and attacked any one.

1.4 The Methodological Parameters:

The historical approach has been chosen, particularly in explaining early relations between the two superpowers and the Maghreb states. Comparative analysis has also been used. In examining economic relations between the superpowers and the Maghreb, the analysis is supported with statistical and tabular information to compare the Maghreb states' economic relations with the superpowers with the Maghreb states' economic relations with various European states. Official declarations and documents, material from joint visits and announcements by officials of Maghreb states has been subjected to a content analysis.

The historical evolution of US relations with the Maghreb is important in understanding US interests in the region.¹⁶ In most cases, US involvement in the region was dictated by economic interests. The Soviet Union also has an historical relationship with the region, particularly with Morocco. In many cases content analysis and a cognitive approach helps to understand official behaviour toward other states. The French decision-makers' perception of the American and Soviet presence in the Maghreb influenced French reaction to the policies of the superpowers in North Africa, and this in turn affected the policies of the decision makers of both superpowers toward the Maghreb states. Comparative analysis of the two superpowers' political, economic and strategic behaviour can be used to explain Soviet and American behaviour in the Maghreb.

1.5 Literature Review:

Maghreb states have been studied from different perspectives. There is much economic and political development literature on the Arab Maghreb. Authors such as R. Lawless (1984); H. Baraket (1985); R. Parker (1984), John Damis and

Lisa Anderson(1986)¹⁸ have written on political and economic development. Lisa Anderson has concentrated on Libya and Tunisia. Whilst William Zartman has written widely on Moroccan affairs since the 1960s, his contribution with others in 1982 has been one of the most important publications on North African political development and the elites in Maghreb States. John Entelis in 1980 wrote on comparative politics in the Maghreb States, and in 1986 published a general study about Algeria. Most of these publications fail to address in any kind of detail Maghreb relations with the superpowers.

Rachid Tlemcani (1986) applied a Marxist political economy approach in his analysis of the Algerian economy. M. Bennoune (1988) also emphasised Algerian economic development from the Ben Bella regime to Chadli Benjadid, but failed to discuss Algerian foreign policy or the superpowers' relations with Algeria. William Zartman (1987) contributed with others in special study on the Moroccan political economy. John Damis has repeated his argument on the superpowers and the Western Sahara conflict, and its influence on Morocco's regional policy.

Much attention has been focused on Tunisia because of its internal upheaval after the 1986 arrest of the Islamic fundamentalists. The successionist crisis in Tunisia was an important factor in accounting for this attention. Since President Ben Ali took power in Tunisia in a peaceful coup in November 1987, the spotlight has turned to Tunisian stability. Kenneth Perkin (1986) has written about Tunisia from an historical perspective. He is a historian, and has published general works on Tunisia. Norma Salem (1984) has also contributed, with her work on the Bourguiba phenomena in Tunisia, but her argument does not go beyond the role of Bourguiba in Tunisian political development, and the role of a charismatic leader in a traditional society.

The 1980s may be described as the “Libyan decade” in English publication, because of the tension in United States-Libyan relations. The US accusation of Libyan involvement in international terrorism has created much debate over Libya serving as a proxy for the Soviet Union, or even as a puppet regime in the hand of the Soviets. E. Haly (1984) has contributed work on Libyan-USA relations, but his work is mostly descriptive rather than analytical. Harris (1986) published a general work on Libya and its revolution. El-Hawis (1986) presents the opposition point of view on Qaddafi, rather than a systematic and objective analysis of Libyan foreign relations. Only one Russian book has been published about Libya-USSR relations.¹⁷

In general, the literature on Libya and the Maghreb States could be summarised as projecting the line held by American scholars, that if a state holds international political views which differ from those of the US, that state is labelled a Soviet puppet, or a Soviet proxy, and represents a threat to US interests.

In the late 1980s, two studies were published by North African scholars about US relations with the Maghreb states. They concentrate on applying foreign policy theories, especially using a cognitive approach, to US policy towards Libya. El-Warfally (1988) has focused on American perspectives of Libya. His study is short on analysis, and is more a theoretical rather than a comprehensive analysis. He ignores early contact between Qaddafi and the US. Layachi (1990) applies a cognitive approach to the study of elite images in foreign policymaking process. He focuses on two relatively narrow case studies. The first issue analysed is a proposed arms sale to Morocco in 1979; the second issue is a natural gas contract between Algeria and the United States in 1981. The study does not constitute a comprehensive analysis of US relations with North Africa.¹⁸

During the cold war era, US scholars tended to describe most Non-Aligned states as Soviet clients and therefore as against the US in the world arena. According to the realist school of international politics, states have always acted on behalf of their national interest in world politics. Ideology, according to this school, has less influence on foreign policy if the ideology contradicts national interests.¹⁹

In the Maghreb, revolutionary states maintain economic relations with the capitalist US and EC. Algeria condemned US policy on the Third World, but still maintains economic relations with the US. Libya has greater economic ties with the West and the EC than with the Soviet Union, despite the Libyan claim they have relations with the Soviet Union. Whilst conservative, capitalist states, such as Morocco and Tunisia, maintain economic relations with the EC, Morocco was the first state to supply the Soviets with phosphate. It is important to analyse these kinds of relations and alliances, and not be beguiled by ideological differences.²⁰

1.6 Organisational Framework:

This study contains eight chapters. The second chapter discusses both the historical background of European rivalry in Maghreb from 1815 to 1945, and how North Africa became part of European diplomacy and colonial competition. The geopolitics of the Maghreb and European colonialism is also analysed.

The third chapter deals with the involvement of the superpowers in Third World countries from 1945 to 1985. It is a theoretical study of the superpowers' behaviour in the Third World. In the fourth chapter, the focus narrows to historical relations between the superpowers and the Maghreb states until North African States independence in the 1950s. The behaviour of the superpowers towards the independence of the Maghreb states is analysed, as well as superpower involvement

with African trade unions supporting Maghreb independence through international trade unions.

Chapter five deals with superpower political relations with the individual Maghreb states with regard to their political objectives and means, and their cultural relations. In chapter six, superpower economic relations with North Africa are analysed, focusing on the direction of exports and imports, and on economic co-operation. Emphasis is laid on European economic relations with the Maghreb, and how these affect superpower economic relations with the Maghreb.

Chapter seven focuses on superpower strategic relations with the Maghreb states. Five themes of strategic relations are analysed: military bases; arms trading; Mediterranean security; military intervention; and intelligence co-operation. In chapter eight, superpower behaviour towards regional stability in North Africa is examined, and the superpowers' reactions to regional conflicts. The Arab-African Union, the Western Sahara conflict and the civil war in Chad, are also considered in this chapter.

In the conclusion, analysis of superpower behaviour toward Maghreb states is generalised. The superpower behavioural model in a third party area of influence is explained. The conclusion also deals with future prospects for superpower relations in a new multi-polar system which has been characterised as economically multipolar. In terms of economic competition, the strengthening European economic presence in North Africa is anticipated, and it is suggested that this will lead to US-European competition in North Africa after the decline of the Soviet Union as a superpower/economic competitor to the US, Europe and Japan.

The bibliography includes primary and secondary resources.

1.7 Field Research

This thesis is a result of many years of monitoring events in North Africa and the behaviour of the superpowers. The author spent five years in North Africa notably Morocco, followed by many years in the US, researching and reporting international affairs for various Arab newspapers and magazines. Over this ten year period, he has collected interviews and conducted library research. The author has also contacted many policy makers in the Arab World and in the US, Middle East experts, former officials and Arab journalists familiar with the US, Soviet Union, and the Arab World. Most of the interviewees remain anonymous and unidentifiable. Exceptionally, there are a few interviewees who placed no restriction on their words. The author uses Arab, French, American and Russian newspapers. In the case of the Soviet newspapers the author depends on Current Digest of Soviet Press (CDSP) and the Soviet Union and the Third World which translate major events in the Soviet newspapers and monitor Soviet publications. This thesis is a result of professional experience, fieldwork and academic research.

1.8 Sources of information:

This thesis utilises information drawn from a variety of sources. Whilst presenting a variety of historical, theoretical, comparative and analytical approaches, emphasis is placed on primary sources, which were considerable in number:

1. Official documents of the US, the Soviet Union and the Maghreb states. Most of these documents have been published by governments of the respective states.
2. US congressional hearings also serve as a source for US official policy towards

Maghreb.

3. Memoirs, diaries and biographies of foreign policy decision makers in past or present administrations of all states under research. Extensive use is made of government publications, official statements, records and interviews of foreign policy decision makers.
4. Published material. All published books and articles that deal with the topic of this thesis and were available to the writer have been utilised, they constitute the majority of the sources.
5. Unpublished material. This includes M.A. and Ph.D theses, and unpublished diaries and memoirs.
6. Newspapers and magazines in English, Arabic, French and Russian.

Notes

1. For all the scholars we have mentioned in this chapter particularly in the literature review, please see their publications in the bibliography of this thesis.
2. Damis, John. *Conflict in Northwest Africa*, Stanford: Hoover Institution Press 1983.
3. For French publication in Soviet-Maghreb See: Constant, J.P. *Les relations-Marocco Sovietiques 1956-1971*, Paris: Lebrairie Generale De Droit. 1973 and also, Hadhri, M. *L'URSS ET LE Maghreb: De la Revolution d'Octobre a l'independance de l'Algerie 1917- 1962*, Paris: Editions l'Harmattan.1985.
4. RDF was formed during the Carter years in the White House particularly after events of 1979; Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Iranian revolution and Mecca

uprising in Saudi Arabia.

5. Damis, J, op cit.
6. *Al-Ahram Al Dawli*, 27/9/1989 (in Arabic)
7. Hans Morgenthau describes cultural imperialism as an effective imperialist method “*the most successful of imperialist policies*” see Morgenthau, H. *Politics among Nations*, six editions, N.Y. Alfred A. Knopf 1985, p. 74.
8. Brzezinski, Z. *Game Plan: The US-Soviet contest*, New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1986, p. 8.
9. Beling. W. “Political elite in North Africa: Review Article” *The American Political Science Review*, vol.77 no.2, June 1983, p. 516.
10. Merle, Marcel. *The Sociology of International Relations*, New York: Berg 1987, pp. 107-112. See also, P.A. Reynolds. *An Introduction to International Relations*, second edition, London: Longman 1980, p. 187.
11. Ismael, Tarq. *International Relations of the Contemporary Middle East*, New York: Syracuse University Press 1986, p. 9.
12. Kaufman, Edy. *The Superpowers and their Sphere of Influence*, London: Croom Helm, 1976, pp. 9-10 and for definition of subsystem. See also a) Kaplan, M. *System process in International Politics*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1964, b) Thompson, W. “The regional subsystem: A conceptual explication and a propositional inventory” *International Studies Quarterly* vol.17 no.1 March 1973, pp. 89-117, c) Cantori, L; Spiegel, S. “International regions: Comparative approach to five subordinate subsystems” *International*

Studies Quarterly vol.13 no.4, December 1969, pp. 361-380.

13. For the definition of Middle East subsystem See: 1) Binder, L. "The Middle East as subordinate international system" *World Politics* vol: X no.3 1958, pp. 408-429. 2) Brechan, M. "The Middle East subordinate system and its impact on Israel's Foreign Policy" *International Studies Quarterly*, vol:13 no.2, June 1969, pp. 117-39; see for Israeli peripheral doctrine, Brecher, M. *The Foreign Policy system of Israel: Setting, Image and Process*, London: Oxford University Press, 1972, pp. 47-64. Also, see Evron, Yair. *The Middle East: Nations, Superpowers and Wars*, London: Elek Books limited 1973, pp. 192-207. 3) Thompson, W. "Delineating regional subsystems: Visit networks of the Middle Eastern case" *International Journal of Middle East studies*, vol.13 no.2, May 1981, pp. 213-235. 4) Brown, Carl, *International Politics and Middle East old rules, dangerous games*, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1984, p 7. 5) Korany, B and Dessouki, A. "The global System and Arab Foreign Politics, The Primacy of Constraints" in Korany, B and Dessouki, A (eds). *The Foreign Policy of Arab States*, London & Boulder: Westview Press 1984, pp. 19-39. 6) Lebovic, James "The Middle East: The region as a system" *International Interaction*, vol.12 no.3 1986, pp. 267-289
14. Ibid; see also Sigler, John. "News flow in the North Africa International Subsystem" *International Studies Quarterly*, vol:13 no.4 1969, pp. 381-397. For historical background about Maghreb see Abu Nasser, J. *The History of Maghreb*, London: Cambridge University Press, 1971.
15. Entelis, John. *Comparative Politics of North Africa*, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1980, pp. 5-15.

16. Merle, M, pp. 83-97; pp. 98-99.
17. Rumantsyev, V; Shvyedov, A. *Al-Alaqat al-Sufyatiyya al-Libiyya*, Moscow: Dar-al-Taqadum, 1985. (Soviet-Libyan Relations, Moscow: Progress Press), it was published in both Russian and Arabic.
18. All the publications of these authors in this chapter will be listed in the Bibliography at the end of this thesis.
19. See Morgenthau, Hans. *Politics Among Nations*, pp. 101-113.
20. Stephen Walt argues that "ideology is a weaker cause of Alliance formation in the Middle East" see his work, "Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power" *International Security* vol.9 no.4, Spring 1985, pp. 3-43.

Chapter II

Maghreb in World Politics: From European Multipolar System to a Bipolar System, 1815-1945

2.1 Introduction

The period of European history from 1815 to 1945 was the 'Golden Age' for diplomacy, balance of power and alliances. The age of one empire dominating European politics was gone and many European nations had emerged to shape European politics. In this period, the international system has been described by scholars of international politics as a multipolar system. The multipolar system survived until 1945, when it was destroyed by World War II and a new bipolar system emerged. The world divided into two ideological blocs: the US as capitalist leader, and the Soviet Union as leader of the socialist world.

The Ottoman Empire was a non-European state, but had helped to shape European and Mediterranean politics from the 16th century until WW1. North Africa, what is called the Arab Maghreb, was part of the Ottoman Empire, with the exception of Morocco which was outside Ottoman control and domination. Governments in other parts of North Africa were semi-autonomous in their internal, and, to a lesser extent, in their external affairs. As the Ottoman Empire weakened during the 18th and 19th centuries, its presence in Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli became more symbolic than real, until it was completely destroyed by European states.

This chapter examines the historical relationship between the Maghreb and Europe. From the 16th century until World War II, North Africa was important to European diplomacy. This chapter investigates why the European countries were interested in the Maghreb, and whether the geopolitics of Maghreb affected European politics.

2.2 Maghreb Geopolitics and Corsairing

Three factors influenced Maghreb relations with Europe. First, its geographical continuity, and the location of the Maghreb on the Mediterranean. The Maghreb had been used as a bridge between Europe and Africa for trade and raw materials, and the Maghreb coasts were used by European navies during their journeys to the Atlantic or to the Far East.

Second, the Arab invasion of Spain in 711¹ had created an historical linkage between the Maghreb and Europe. Spain was ruled by Arabs for several centuries until 1492. Spain involved in war with Muslims with the help of the Holy Roman Empire under Charles V (1519-1556) one of the greatest kings of Spain and of the Holy Roman Empire who was the last Emperor to attempt to realise the mediaeval idea of a united Empire embracing the entire Christian world. The war between Muslim and Christian Spaniards led to expulsion of many Muslims from Spain to the Maghreb. The Muslim refugees who left Spain for the Maghreb were involved in corsairing against Spanish and European trade in the Mediterranean and it became a serious issue with regard to the shaping of Maghreb-European relations.

Corsairing, the third factor to affect Europe-Maghreb relations up to the 19th century, was a geopolitical struggle to dominate the Mediterranean. The Muslims who had been driven out of Spain were impelled by hope of revenge and

by economic necessity to attack Spanish shipping, but the attack extended beyond Spanish shipping, to European shipping as a whole, and to US trade in the Mediterranean. Malta was a strong base for christian corsairs, and in 1798 Napoleon, on his way to Egypt he freed the 2,000 Turkish and North African slaves still held in Malta, and abolished the corso.²

Despite the perpetual hostility between Spanish Christians and Muslims in the Maghreb, there was a type of co-operation between some European countries and the Maghreb. Britain was one such country and its policies were shaped by British national interests.

However, the conflict of interest between European countries motivated some European nations, such as Britain, to ally with Morocco for economic and strategic reasons. For example, in 1661 British forces captured Tangier from Portugal, and in 1684 returned Tangier to Sultan Ismael of Morocco. For this action, Britain gained, during the 18th century, the friendship of Morocco, the latter offering substantial assistance to Britain during the Anglo-French wars (1689-1763).³ The Moors aided Britain in the capture of Gibraltar in 1704 and profitable commerce developed between Gibraltar and Morocco. The British control of the strategic post of Gibraltar added a new dimension in European diplomacy towards the Maghreb, not only in the 18th and 19th centuries, but also during modern times.

With the creation of the nation states in the 19th century, Europe became the centre of world politics until the Second World War. The international system between 1815 and 1945 has been described as a European multipolar system⁴. The United States of America was isolated in the western hemisphere, in accord with the Monroe Doctrine of 1823. The Doctrine was directed mainly towards prevent-

ing a European presence in, never mind the development of interests in, Central and Latin America. Moreover, during the 19th century, Europe had been deeply affected by the spread of nationalism and the industrial revolution, in addition to the ideas of the French Revolution. These factors had contributed to the 19th and 20th century disputes and bloody conflicts in Europe.⁵

Before 1870 the two chief Mediterranean powers were Britain and France. After the Napoleonic defeat in Egypt in 1801, Britain had become the master of sea power. Despite British naval power, the continued rivalry between these two European powers had spread along the Mediterranean and into the Far East.⁶

When Charles of France occupied Algeria in 1830, he was influenced by domestic considerations and internal conditions at home. The French interest in Algeria was shaped by the British control of India and the control of the sea routes to Africa and the Indian Ocean.⁷ Despite British and French competition during that period, British interests were threatened by Russian ambition in the Ottoman Empire and the Russian search for warm water in the south. This ambition was one of the causes of British and French war with Russia in the Crimea in 1854. War between the latter and the Ottoman Empire occurred on the Black Sea.⁸

The reasons for the competition between the European powers for colonies in the 19th century was that they perceived colonies and spheres of influence as a normal and necessary part of world politics. Colonies were perceived economically, as sources of raw material and markets, and the development of standing armies and navies was undertaken in order to protect and exploit the colonies by enhancing the military status of the nations. From a European perspective, colonial possession was a clear indication that a state had defined its national interests

in a global manner, and that it would fight to protect such interests. The severe conflicts of interest between European powers after 1870 had both created and dissolved alliances. It was believed that alliances with other powers were essential to protect national interests, and they were felt likely to prevent the outbreak of war.

2.3 The Maghreb in European Diplomacy and Alliances

The Maghreb had become a bargaining item between European rivals and, to some extent, this had led to the creation of European alliances. When France occupied Algeria in 1831, there was implicit approval from Britain and Spain for the French invasion, but that approval was limited to some parts of Algeria, and did not extend to Morocco or Tunisia. The British Foreign Minister declared in 1854 that

“the British government would not permit the temporary or permanent occupation of any port or point in the territory of Morocco by any foreign government.”⁹

The British had economic and strategic interests in Morocco. There was indeed a strong possibility that, in the event of war, the Maghreb, and particularly Morocco, might become the sole convenient source of supplies to Gibraltar and to other armed forces stationed in the Mediterranean or other parts of the region.¹⁰

Spain also declared that she had a vital interest in the Maghreb, and especially in Morocco. The Spanish Minister at Tangier from 1860-1874 revealed that:

“neither politically nor economically could Spain live if France or England should take possession of Morocco. Morocco must some day belong to Spain ... the question of Morocco with that of Portugal and Gibraltar comprises the whole international policy of Spain.”¹¹

In addition to Britain, Spain and France, Italy and Germany also became involved in Maghreb affairs in the 19th century. They saw the Maghreb as an im-

portant region for their economic and strategic interests, and Tunisia had become the principal focus of Italian and French competition in North Africa.

Strategically, Tunisia was the meeting place of the interests of three major powers. Italy is close physically to Tunisia and, after Italian unification, Italy was searching for a place as a great power in Europe and the Mediterranean. Tunisia is the mid-point of the whole Mediterranean between Gibraltar and Suez. The British interest in Tunisia was geostrategic, particularly after the unification of Italy, and the apparent defeat of France in the Franco-German war. Britain felt that it might be preferable to have two different powers rather than a single power in control of the opposite side of the Sicilian strait.¹²

During the Berlin Congress of 1878, Britain indicated her willingness to see France in Tunisia, in exchange for an acceptance of Britain's role in Egypt. Britain was interested in Egypt to protect its maritime route to India, the Jewel of the British Empire. There was also the strategic importance of Egypt and the Suez Canal, the British being the principal users of the Canal. In 1881, the situation in Europe was ripe for France to occupy Tunisia, and the weak Ottoman Empire accepted French control of Tunisia at the Treaty of Bardo (Cassar Saiid), 12 May 1881. France then abolished the system of international control over Tunisia in 1884, and abrogated the extra territorial rights of other European nations.¹³

From the German perspective, the French conquest of Tunisia served to raise an issue between Italy and France. After three years of French occupation of Tunisia, in 1884, Bismarck explained his encouragement of French occupation of Tunisia as being part of German strategy in the Mediterranean:

“What I want is to establish a sort of equilibrium on the sea, France has a great role to play on this side if she will enter into our views.”¹⁴

Bismarck delighted in creating a rift between Italy and France over Tunisia while Germany was competing with British naval power in the Mediterranean. German annexation of Alsace-Lorraine created a feeling inside France of the need for an alternative to increase her power and prestige both inside and outside France. After the French defeat, the French Prime Minister, Leon Gambetta remarked,

“because the old Continent is stifling. Outlets such as Tunisia are needed.”¹⁵

Kenneth Waltz, a neo-realist political scientist, explained French occupation of Tunisia in terms of the balance of power. He wrote that France acted as a search for the power alternative

“It might strengthen France for another round in the French-German contest.”¹⁶

After the defeat of France by Germany, French military leaders realised that not only would Tunisia be vital for French national security, but so would the whole of the Maghreb in general and Morocco in particular. No potential enemy should be allowed to establish itself in Morocco and thus endanger France by encouraging a Muslim Holy Crusade in North Africa. In the event of war, French troops would have to withdraw to Europe.¹⁷

From the Italian perspective, the French occupation of Tunisia disturbed the balance of power in the Mediterranean and endangered the fate of Tripoli. Italy was keen for support against France by means of an agreement with the central powers, Germany and Austria-Hungary and in May, 1882, Italy signed the Triple Alliance agreement. According to Salvenini,

“Italian adherence to the Triple Alliance depended on the threat of France to disturb the status quo in North Africa.”¹⁸

Austria and Germany had seen that the strength of this Triple Alliance would be affected by a weakening of Italian forces in the event of war because France con-

trolled all of North Africa. It is interesting to note that Britain, France and Russia had formed a Triple Entente to balance the Triple Alliance. Correspondingly, Austria and Germany had to support and strengthen Italian demands in North Africa in order to balance the Triple Entente. The Maghreb became part of secret European diplomacy between 1887 and 1912. Italy engaged in secret, separate negotiations with France over Tripoli (Libya) and Morocco and signed a treaty with France in 1902. The two countries agreed on Libya and Morocco, the former to be under Italian occupation and the latter under French protection. The Italian rapprochement with France suggested that by the 1890s, Italy had come to feel that completely loyal membership in the Triple Alliance was less advantageous to her than a policy of better relations with France. Better relations with France could end the Franco-Italian tariff problem. It could also do more to advance her Mediterranean ambitions than could the connection with Austria and Germany.

While France and Italy had their secret deal, Italy, Spain, France and Britain had become involved in the Mediterranean agreements which included North Africa. Italy looked to Britain in 1887 and negotiated with her to protect the status quo in the Mediterranean and she promised to support Britain in Egypt, while Britain supported Italy in Tripoli.

Spain identified Morocco as an area vital to Spanish interests and so approached and reached an agreement with Italy. This agreement assigned Tripoli to Italy and Morocco to Spain. In 1887, Spain, Britain and Italy arrived at a Mediterranean agreement, called by the French ambassador in Spain, Theodore Roustan, the "Moroccan Triple Alliance."¹⁹ The results of all this secret diplomatic negotiating were two principal agreements. First, in April 1904, France and Britain had resolved their colonial dispute with France accepting British hegemony in Egypt

and Britain agreeing to French predominance in Morocco. However, the Anglo-French agreement respected the Spanish interest in Northern Morocco. Strategically, Britain was interested in keeping France away from Gibraltar. Second, towards the end of 1904, France reached an agreement with Spain over Morocco and the Western Sahara.²⁰

Germany shifted towards a colonial policy outside Europe, particularly after Bismarck left power in 1890. During the Bismarck era, Germany had concentrated on Europe. For Germany a new era had emerged and Morocco and Tripoli became the centre of European competition in North Africa. German involvement had led to two European crises over Morocco, in 1906 and 1911. The first Moroccan crisis did, in fact, bring Europe uncomfortably close to war.²¹

2.4 European states and the two Moroccan Crises

In 1880, the European nations held an International Conference in Madrid. The objective of the conference was to discuss the sovereignty of Morocco. The US participated in the conference and all the participants of the Conference agreed to preserve Moroccan sovereignty. Despite the Madrid Treaty, France violated Moroccan sovereignty by intervening in Moroccan internal affairs.

Morocco became a second “Eastern question”, similar to the first “Eastern question”, the Ottoman Empire. The great powers were waiting to control or partition it, but none wanted to put it down. The great powers used the Moroccan question to settle their differences in Europe and to change the balance of power on the Continent more than to protect Moroccan interests. The two Moroccan crises were in reality a consequence of European alliances.

2.4.1 Algeiras Conference, 1906, and the First Moroccan Crisis

Germany raised the Moroccan question and the French violation of the Madrid Treaty for four principal reasons. The first was economic; Germany was interested in Morocco as a market for German goods and as a source of raw materials, and to have a strategic presence in Moroccan ports. Germany was looking for an open door policy, that Morocco should be open without restriction to all European and American economic investments and trade. Kaiser Wilhelm of Germany told his minister that *“Morocco was unimportant as long as there was an open door policy.”*²²

The second objective was to destroy the Anglo-French Entente. The Anglo-French Entente of 1904 raised the spectre of Britain joining the Franco-Russian Alliance against Germany. It was this fear that prompted desperate German leaders to provoke a confrontation with France. Germany was encouraged by the removal of fear of Russian intervention in the event of a Franco-German war because Russia was preoccupied by war with Japan, 1904-1905.

The third objective Germany hoped to exploit was the division of opinion in France with respect to the Entente to bring about the fall of Delacasse, the French Foreign Minister, and an architect of Anglo-French understanding. Moreover, the German Kaiser was also motivated by the goal of achieving a Continental League: an alliance of France, Italy, Austria-Hungary and Russia led by Germany and directed against Britain and the British Empire. Germany was concerned to change the balance of power in Germany's favour. ²³

The fourth German objective was the humiliation of France and for the sake of German prestige in Europe more than for the sake of Moroccan interests. Within

its own confines, Morocco was little more than another imperial problem. What gave it greater importance was the fact that it was the occasion for a major European powers crisis. No one wanted war over Morocco, and most policy makers assumed that diplomacy would resolve the crisis. Some accommodation could and would be found, so Germany asked for an international conference,

The conference was held on 16 January 1906 at Algieras. Germany had miscalculated European support, and so was faced with defeat from the outset. It was well known to the British that the German objective was to have a port on the Moroccan coast, but the British strongly opposed even the possibility of Germany establishing a base in Morocco. As a naval power, Britain did not wish to have Germany as a strong power on the opposite side of Gibraltar. The Conference was attended by thirteen states including delegations from Morocco, the US and Russia. According to the Algieras Treaty, all states supported "*economic liberty without inequality in Morocco.*"²⁴ The establishment of French protectorate over Morocco was agreed upon by all signatories to the treaty produced by the Algieras conference except the US, which withheld recognition until it entered World War One in 1917.

The Conference also supported French interests in Morocco and recognised Franco-Spanish control over Morocco's police, and the establishment of a Moroccan State Bank. This was financed by the European powers, but was dominated by France because she provided one third of the capital.²⁵ Despite the Algieras Treaty, France continued the policy of the gradual colonisation and peaceful penetration of Morocco. The Algieras Conference did not satisfy the ambition of Germany which was supported only by Austria-Hungary and Morocco. This led to the second Moroccan crisis in 1911, and the Italian invasion of Tripoli in

September 1911.

2.4.2 The Second Moroccan Crisis and Diplomacy of Compensation

As France and Germany continued to compete in Morocco, Germany was not only losing commercial interests in Morocco, but also prestige in Europe as a great power. France violated the 1906 Treaty of Algeciras.

The German right wing press criticised the German government for its failure to achieve its objective of colonising Morocco. Germany used “*gun-boat diplomacy*” when France reacted to the Moroccan Revolt in Fez in 1911. Despite such “diplomacy” in Agadir, the German Kaiser was looking for compensation elsewhere.²⁶ Germany knew that nothing could be done in Morocco without the consent of the British. The crisis receded because of prevailing international conditions. Russia did not wish to be drawn into war over Morocco. Britain and Germany were discussing a general political understanding: such a settlement could be at France’s expense. It was clear to France that a bilateral agreement with Germany had to be reached, and used “*quid pro quo*” diplomacy to compensate German demands, offering part of the French Congo to Germany.²⁷

After the German-French agreement, France took advantage of the internal situation in Morocco to dominate the country. Until 1894, Morocco remained stable under the rule of a strong and effective Sultan, Moulay Hassan (1873-1894). He maintained internal order and financial stability as well as encouraging Moroccan exports. Moreover, Moulay Hassan, obtained the diplomatic assistance of Great Britain to preserve Moroccan sovereignty from French and Spanish ambitions.

After Moulay Hassan’s death, his young son, Moulay Abd al-Aziz (1894-

1908) proved to be corrupt and without political experience. During his reign, Morocco borrowed large sum, from France and with the decline of the Moroccan economy, Moulay Abd al-Aziz was removed, being accused of abandoning Morocco to foreigners. His brother Moulay Hafid replaced him.

In 1910, the Sultan had to negotiate a further loan of FF100 million to pay off debts contracted in the previous reign, to cover work carried out by French companies in Morocco, and to compensate Europeans in Casablanca for losses sustained in the disturbances of 1907. This time, the Moroccan Treasury got nothing. The next year, Moulay Hafid was besieged in Fez by the tribes. He appealed to France for help and the result was the French intervention. At Fez, on 30 March 1912, France and Morocco signed the Protectorate Treaty, making Morocco a French Protectorate.²⁸

2.4.3 Italy and the Occupation of Tripoli (Libya)

In September 1911, reacting to the Franco-German crisis, Italy occupied Libya. This was motivated by Italian nationalism, and the desire to assert Italy's status as a great power and not to be left by Britain and France without a position in North Africa. Italy had signed the Triple Alliance, and had negotiated with France and Spain over Libya and other parts of North Africa. With the gradual strengthening of the French presence in Morocco, and the Italian bilateral agreement with Germany, Italy found herself ready to attack Tripoli. The attack came in 1911, despite Libyan and Ottoman protest and resistance. Italy then encouraged Italians to settle in Tripoli. By the end of the First World War, the whole of North Africa was under European colonialism. Italy was in Libya. Tunisia and Algeria were under French colonial rule. Spain occupied Northern Morocco, Ifni,

the Western Sahara, the Canary Islands, Ceuta and Melilla (claimed by Morocco). France was in the other areas of Morocco and in Mauritania.

A new era of Maghreb history emerged: the struggle for independence and liberation. It is interesting to note here that in North Africa, financial debt and loans had been used as an excuse for direct European intervention in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria (France refused to pay for Algerian wheat).

2.5 Maghreb between the two World Wars, 1919-1945

After the First World War, many world events had their effect on North Africa: the Russian Revolution; the defeat of Germany; US President Wilson's Principles; the end of the Ottoman Empire and the fall of the Arab world under British and French colonial rule; the involvement of the US and Japan in world politics.

The Wilson Principles and the Russian revolution gave hope for a new ideology to protest against the policy of colonialism and towards self-determination, (see below). The Ottoman and German defeat in WWI led to frustration among North African nationalists and they looked to Wilson as a hope for their national aspiration.

2.5.1 Competition between the Great Powers

The economic interests of the great European powers in North Africa played a considerable role in Maghreb independence, particularly after the Second World War. This was because the Europeans and Americans were both interested in an open market which should not be controlled economically by one state. The history of the European struggle over the Maghreb is demonstrated by the open

door policy.

Despite the Treaties of Madrid (1880) and Algeciras (1906), France dominated the Moroccan economy and monopolised trade. In the mid 1930s, Morocco became an important market for Japanese textile goods. Accordingly, France applied for a system of quotas in the French Protectorate, but such action was refused and opposed by the US, Japan and Britain. According to previous international treaties, Morocco in particular was an open door for all nations²⁹ (Table 2:1).

Table 2.1: Average Imports of Cotton into Morocco by main Countries

State	Rank	Average Imports 1925-35 %
UK	1	39. 90
Japan	2	19. 19
France	3	15. 49
Italy	4	14. 62
Others	5	10. 80
Total	-	100%

Source: Hiroshi Shimizu, *Anglo-Japanese Trade Rivalry in the Middle East in Interwars Period*, London: Ithaca Press, 1986, p. 178.

The French policy led eventually to the submission of the Moroccan case to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) during the conflict between the US and France over the Moroccan market. The verdict of the court, on 27 August 1952, upheld the American claim to economic liberty without any inequality based on the treaty of 1836, and the Act of Algeciras. According to the ICJ decision, Morocco

remained a sovereign state under the 1912 Treaty of Fez despite being a French Protectorate.

Between 1934-38, during the Spanish protectorate of Rif, iron ore exports to Germany and Italy increased respectively from 21 percent and 5 percent to 52 percent and 10 percent of the protectorate's average annual iron ore export. On the other hand, by 1939, iron ore export to Britain and France dropped noticeably. Britain imported on average 19 percent of total exports for the period 1934-1938, but only 12 percent in 1939. France imported 6 percent for the period 1934-1938, and less than half of 1 percent during 1939 period. The figures reflect the European political alliances during the era between the two world wars. Moreover the German Nazis tried to contact the leaders of the national movements in the Maghreb and the king of Morocco.³⁰

2.5.2 Maghreb National Movements

After World War One, the new world powers (the US and the fledgling Soviet Union) developed relations with the young nationalist movements of the Maghreb. This affected relations between the new powers and the European colonial powers. Accordingly, some national movements felt an ideological affiliation with the new powers.

The national movements in the Maghreb emerged as a consequence of many powerful forces:

- 1- Maghreb nationalism began as a direct reaction to Western colonial rule.
- 2- Arab nationalism, particularly in the Arab east, affected the Maghreb National Movement with the spread of Islamic reformism throughout parts of

the Arab world, particularly in Egypt.

- 3- President Wilson's Principles for self-determination encouraged many nationalists to attend the Paris Conference in 1919 to persuade the international community to take account of their demand for independence and their just cause. In 1919, Tunisian leaders were one of the Arab groups attending in Paris.
- 4- The spread of liberal ideas and socialist attitudes in Europe affected Maghreb nationalists. This encouraged them to participate in socialist and workers organisations to win their independence.

Algeria: When, in 1830, the French began to settle in Algeria, they encountered stiff resistance from the Algerian leader Abd al-Kadir al-Jazaïri who led the struggle from 1832-1847. Britain was unhappy about the new French foothold on the coast of North Africa, and was determined to prevent French expansion in Morocco. In order to gain political support and secure weapons against French occupation, Abd al-Kadir had written to the British and to the Americans to draw their attention to the French occupation of Algeria, and to Algerian resistance to France. In January, 1836, Abd al-Kadir wrote to the British consul in Tangier, Drummond Hay, and also to the British monarch, William IV, to canvas British support. Abd al-Kadir somehow obtained British arms imported by way of Morocco, or supplied by the Sultan, or bought by Abd al-Kadir's agents in Tangier. French newspapers accused the British of supplying weapons to Abd al-Kadir. After his exile in Syria (Damascus) and, during a visit in 1856 to Jerusalem, Abd al-Kadir confirmed to the British Consul there, James Finn, that he had obtained large supplies of arms and munitions from Britain. In April 1836, Abd al-Kadir also wrote to the Amer-

ican Consul in Tangier, James R. Leib. He offered the Algerian Coast to the US if the Americans would assist him against France. Despite his resistance, French captured Abd al-Kadir in 1847, and he was sent to France. He was released from prison in 1852, and went into exile in Syria until his death in Damascus in 1883.³¹

Resistance continued in Algeria. After World War One, there was a new dimension to the national movement. It arose within France, despite its Algerian roots in traditional Islamic society. In 1926 the North African workers in that country established a nationalist movement with a socialist orientation. Messali al-Haj emerged as a charismatic nationalist leader. He organised the *Etoile Nord Africaine (ENA)* "North African Star" in 1927 which had contact with the French Communist Party. When it was banned in 1937, he moved to Algeria and organized the Algerian People's Party which called for total independence for Algeria. As well as his geographical move, Messali shifted ideologically: from socialism to an Islamic and anti-communist ideology. He was influenced by Amir Chekib Arslan, a Syrian Islamic reformist.

In 1935, the Algerian Communist Party was formed, independent from the French Communist Party but was politically ineffective because most of its members were French settlers and Jews.

The most powerful group in Algeria was the Islamic reformist movement, under the leadership of Ben Badis who stressed the Islamic-Arab character of Algeria, together with the Islamic education system and traditional schooling as a challenge to French cultural hegemony in Algeria. Ben Badis represented the Pan-Islamic Salafiyya which saw Islam and the memory of Abd al-Kadir as the principal motivating forces of Algerian nationalism. In 1931 he formed the Association of

Algerian Muslim Ulama.

After the death of Ben Badis in 1940, the Association of Algerian Ulama entered a new phase in the 1940s and 1950s. Under new circumstances, the Association gave the leadership of the movement in exile to Bashir al-Ibrahimi (1889-1965). Al-Ibrahimi was educated in Mecca and Syria, where he witnessed the Arab revolt against the Turks in 1916. When he returned to Algeria in 1945, he continued his reformist work and became a leading figure in the movement. The destruction of the mosques, the French attack on Islam, and forcing Algerians to become French citizens, all led to the view among Algerian Ulama that the French were just like the crusaders, and therefore *“the enemy of Islam”*.³²

Apart from the traditional Salafiyya school in Algerian resistance to French occupation, other Algerian intellectuals looked to France as an ideological model. Farhat Abbas who called for self-determination within an entirely French framework. In 1936, denying that Algeria had a separate identity, he called for an assimilationist approach. The French refusal of the Algerian demand led Abbas to shift ground from a position of full integration with France to the development of a Muslim Algeria, with close French associations, but a separate identity. In 1946 he formed the Democratic Union of Algerian Manifesto, promoting the idea of a free, secular and republican Algeria loosely federated with France. Farhat Abbas later formed the first Algerian Provisional Government in 1958.

Messali al-Haj, having been released from house arrest in 1946, formed a new party the *“Mouvement Pour le Triomphe des Libertés Democratiques”* (MTLD) to replace the *Parti de Peuple Algerien*.

Despite all Algerian attempts to compromise with the French, there was no

solution to the Algerian problem. The rejection by France of Algerian national aspirations; the opposition of the French settlers to any concessions to Muslim demands, the ruthless suppression of Algerian riots and the subsequent arrest of Algerian national leaders, all led to the belief that political means seemed ineffective. The Algerian nationalists, impressed by the successful use of force and violence in other countries, themselves turned to extreme means: the armed struggle, and the Algerian Revolution of 1954.³³

Tunisia: Tunisia was the first Arab Maghreb country to be influenced by modern nationalism. In 1905 the Young Tunisian Movement - a new Tunisian national organisation - copied the experience of other movements such as the Young Italian, and the Young Turk Movements. The Young Tunisians accepted the French protectorate, and admired the French system as a model. Before the end of World War One, the Young Tunisians exercised considerable influence. They attended the Paris Conference in 1919 to win support for Tunisian self-determination but failed in their attempt. Despite the Young Tunisians struggle they failed to win support for their reforms from the older Tunisian generation, that is until France tried to transfer large areas of Muslim land, the endowment "*Habous*" land, from Muslim religious groups to European farmers. This attempt led the old Tunisian generation to join the Young Tunisians in confronting the French actions. France was seeking to pursue its colonial economic aims and to recover from the frightful losses sustained during the First World War.

In 1920, the Constitutional Party was founded in Tunisia, in Arabic, 'Hizb al-Destour'. Sheikh Abd al-Aziz al-Thaalibi, a Zitouna sheikh, was its founder. Although a Muslim reformist in the Egyptian Salafiyah tradition, unlike most of the more conservative Tunis Ulama, he was more liberal and when in Paris he

published his famous book "*Tunisie Martye*" in 1920.

The Destour was known more as a party for urbane conversation than for mass activities. The failure of the party in 1925 to support the first Tunisian trade union movement and to recruit the masses into the party led to the unpopularity of the party, and to the struggle inside it. Between 1920 and 1934, the Destourian nationalists called for a self-governing constitutional regime with a legislative assembly.

In 1934, an internal dispute among the old and new generations in the party prompted The Young Tunisians to form a Neo Destour party. The Neo Destour group was more westernised than the Destour aristocrats, and represented people from humbler backgrounds. Habib Bourguiba emerged as the leader of the Neo Destour party. Bourguiba managed to mobilise the Tunisian people by manipulating the religious symbols of the old society in their revolutionary spirit rather than in accordance with the rhetorical, orderly style of mediaeval tradition. The party emphasised economic issues among peasants. The party was a secular movement, separating religion from politics in Tunisian political life. Although many Ulama, such as Sheikh Taher Ben Achour, participated in the struggle, the secular nationalists held power after independence.

While Tunisia was under German occupation between November 1942 and May 1943, the nationalists enjoyed little freedom. The Nazis tried to use the Tunisian nationalists for German objectives. Bourguiba, who was in prison in France, was released upon the intervention of the Germans and returned to Tunisia. The nationalist movement broadcast anti-French nationalist propaganda on the Tunisian radio, but when the Allies ejected the Germans from Tunisia in May

1943 the French resumed control over Tunisia and the nationalist parties were once again declared illegal. The French also ousted the popular reigning sovereign, Moncef Bey, because of his sympathies with Axis forces and his favourable attitude towards Tunisian nationalism. Moreover, France accused Bourguiba and the Neo-Destour of collaborating with Nazis and Fascists. Bourguiba used the Italian 'Bari Radio' to broadcast an anti-French speech. He went to Cairo, and in 1946 visited the US, to win support for the Tunisian cause. He also petitioned the United Nations for support.³⁴

Morocco: Of the Maghreb states, only in Morocco can a continuity of resistance be identified. Tribes of the Rif Mountains rejected Spanish and French colonial occupation under the leadership of Abd al-Karim al-Katabi. In 1922 al-Katabi founded the *Rif Republic*, the first central government that much of the region had known for centuries. France and Spain sent in 400,000 troops to defeat al-Katabi and to end the Rif Republic.

Al-Katabi surrendered to the French in 1926, and was sent into exile on *La Reunion* (Indian Ocean) until 1947. There was much speculation that he would get help from Russia and from the British zone in Gibraltar, through the international zone of Tangier. When the traditional tribal battles and countryside war ended in the north, another urbanised version of the nationalist resistance immediately emerged. The goal of the new resistance was the freedom of Morocco. The Moroccans were frustrated by the French presence, particularly with the Berber Dahir in 1930.

The national movement in Morocco during 1930s was comprised of two ideological schools. The traditional, religious Salafiyya school was influenced by the

Qayrawaiyin University in Fez. The other school was of French educated students who were influenced by western political thought and fought for their freedom. Moroccan students in Paris such as Mohammed al-Ouazzani, Ahmed Balafrej and others, formed the *Young Moroccans*, and in July 1932 published in Paris the newspaper *Maghreb*. It lasted until May 1934 when it was outlawed by the French authorities. The struggle between the two schools was fundamental and presented a handicap to organisational activities in Morocco. It did not, however, prevent joint action vis-a-vis France when a crisis occurred, as after the Berber Decree.³⁵ In 1934, the *Comite d'Action Marocaine* was set up and represented the first nationalist party in the country. On the French dissolution of the Comite in 1937, the Comite continued the struggle through a new political organisation (the Nationalist party) until the formation of the Istiqlal party in January 1944. The Istiqlal was the first national party with popular support, and it was based on the alliance of three elements which all belonged to the most sophisticated segment of the urban elite: the traditional bourgeoisie of northern towns, particularly Fez, represented by Allal al-Fasi from the traditional school; the modern sector of big business such as Omar ben Abd al-Jallil and Ahmed Balafrej, representing European culture, more dynamic, but angered at being kept apart from the management of economic renewal to which it aspired; young, left-wing intellectuals, of less important bourgeois origin, with westernised education, such as Mehdi ben Barka, Abd el-Rrahim Bouabid and Abd al-Ilah Ibrahim.

Sultan Mohammed V was convinced that independence from France was a legitimate and attainable objective. The Sultan's objective coincided with the nationalist objective. The first contact between the Sultan and the nationalists started in 1934 when the Sultan visited Fez and saw the public support for his

throne. For many years, the French tried to isolate the Sultan from the nationalists. The contact between the Sultan and the leaders of nationalist movement had secretly continued until the Istiqlal-Throne alliance was publicly formed in 1947 (Tangier Speech), and it increased pressure on France.³⁶

Istiqlal and the Sultan tried to mobilise the internal front within Morocco, to confront France after World War Two. They also tried to benefit from American-Moroccan relations which were developed during World War Two as a result of US forces landing in North Africa. The Moroccan Nationalist leaders approached the Arab League in Cairo and also tried to win British support in the United Nations. Egypt was the centre of Maghreb nationalist activities during and after World War Two, and the British were sympathetic to their objectives.³⁷

Libya: The traditional Sanusi movement was the strongest movement in Libya. It resisted the Italian occupation during World War One: the Sanusi leader, Sayyid Ahmed al-Sharif, decided to ally with Turkey and Germany, so the Sanusi fought against British and Italians. In 1915, the Germans encouraged the Sanusi to launch an attack on British positions in Egypt in the western desert. After the defeat of the Turks and Germans, Sayyed Ahmed al-Sharif, in 1916, relinquished his position to his cousin Sayyid Mohammed Idris, who later made peace with Britain. The British Authorities in Egypt established amicable relations with Sayyid Idris in the hope that they would not need to make another military diversion westwards. They made concessions in order to strengthen the hand of Sayyid Idris against the pro-Ottoman party in Cyrenaica, and the British acted as mediators between the Sanusis and the Italians.³⁸

In Tripolitania, Abd al-Rahman Azzam (an Egyptian Arab Nationalist and

the future first Secretary-General of the Arab League) had been trying to create a centralised authority since 1916. After Turkey surrendered, Azzam tried to create a united Tripolitanian front; he succeeded at the al-Qasabat Conference on 18 November 1918 to proclaim the foundation of a Tripolitanian Republic. It was in fact a coalition of notables rather than a state. The republic did not last long and dissolved in 1922. With the traditional tribal rivalries in Tripolitania, there was no united front to resist the Italians. In 1922 at the Sirta Conference, Sayyid Idris was announced as the leader of Libya. He went into exile in Egypt and led the anti-Italian resistance from there.

Omar al-Mukhtar, one of the Zawias religious leaders fought a guerrilla war against the Italians in Libya which prompted the Italians to build a 200-mile barbed wire fence along the border with Egypt to stop Libyans escaping into the Egyptian western desert. Libyan tribes were forced to flee into Chad. Al-Mukhtar had fought the Italians until he was captured by Italian forces in September 1931, and was executed.

After the execution of al-Mukhtar the Italians controlled Libya until World War Two. During the war the British backed the exiled Idris and a new phase of the struggle emerged. The French forces were in Fezzan in 1943, France was anxious to protect its central and West African interests and was keen to stay in southern Fazzan. The American Air Force took over Mellela base (later Wheelus) east of Tripoli in 1943.

By 1949, the Italians were in Tripolitania (according to Bevin-Sforza plan which had been turned down by the UN General Assembly, 17 May, 1949), the British were in Cyrenaica, and the French were in Fezzan. Despite its struggle,

Libya was the only Maghreb state to win its independence under the United Nations Charter.³⁹

The Maghreb national movements co-operated with each other, and they used a variety of means to carry their cause to other European states. They played on European interests to limit French influence in their region. However, another issue also affected the Maghreb Nationalist struggle: the French and Italian settlement policy.

France had encouraged French and other European nationals to settle in Tunisia in the name of France, granted them favours, and eventually (1923) French citizenship. The largest group of nationals to accept the offer were Italian. The Italian immigrants came chiefly from Sicily and Sardinia, and were similar to the majority of the French nationals, most of whom were from Corsica.

At the outbreak of World War Two, the European population in Tunisia totalled 240,000. Of these, 160,000 were French, another 80,000 had retained Italian citizenship. There were also some 6,000 Maltese.⁴⁰ European immigrants controlled the fertile land and left the Tunisian peasants without much on which to live.

In Algeria, before the revolution of 1954, Europeans owned approximately one-third of cultivable land, and nearly all the best land. The average European holding amounted to roughly 124 hectares, compared to the Muslim holding of 11 hectares: an 11 to 1 ratio. A French official source published in 1955 placed the ratio at 17 to 1 in favour of the Europeans. By 1954, 90 percent of the unemployed in Algeria were Muslims. The settlers had the privileges of land and jobs, and the native Algerian was forced off the land facing only poverty. There were 1.5 million

French and European immigrants in Algeria. The Jewish community in Algeria, and in other Maghreb states, was granted French citizenship.

In Morocco the situation was little better than in Algeria and Tunisia. French immigrants were estimated to total 425,000 in 1953, with thousands more Spanish and Portuguese nationals. Again, the immigrants controlled the fertile land.

The French policy of agriculture and land distribution exerted a deleterious effect on the Maghreb.⁴¹ The policy of land holdings was guided by General Bugeaud in 1841, when he stated French policy in Algeria.

“Wherever the water supply is good and the land fertile, there we must place colonists without worrying about previous owners. We must distribute the lands in full title to the colonists.”⁴²

The French settlers were the cause of much strife inside France during the Algerian revolution, because the French right wing would not accept compromise on the Algerian problem. France was close to civil war itself over Algeria, particularly, after the formation of the Organization Armee Secrete (OAS) by right wing officers in French-Algeria.⁴³

The Italians adopted the French settlement policy. In 1938 Libya had a population of just over 880,000 of which 10 percent (89,000) were Italians and about 86 percent (763,000) Libyan Muslims. Italian settlers controlled the fertile lands in the coastal areas.⁴⁴

The policy of colonialism had pushed the leaders of the national movements to seek assistance from many directions: from the British, the Americans and to some extent to be in sympathy with the Axis powers.

We have concentrated here on Libya, Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco. Mau-

ritania was part of Greater Morocco, and throughout the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries the tribes of Mauritania, *Hassani*, participated in Moroccan Sherifian expeditions as far as Tindouf, Toghaza, and Toudeni, beyond the present Mauritanian boundaries, in successive efforts to keep Maghrebi trade caravan routes open. Various alliances between different tribes of *Hassani* and the Moroccan government were limited to enterprises of common interest.

On 27 June 1900, Spain and France signed a treaty in Paris in which Mauritania was to be under French control, and Spain would control Spanish Sahara, the region now called Western Sahara and now under Moroccan control. This treaty was confirmed by the Franco-Spanish Treaty of 3 October 1904. Mauritania won its independence from France on 28 November 1960, and joined the U.N. on 27 October 1961.⁴⁵

2.6 Conclusion

The main theme of this chapter is that the Maghreb was a factor in European diplomacy for the following reasons:

- 1- Britain was interested in the Maghreb for strategic reasons. North Africa was vital to British interests in order to protect its trade routes, and to protect the strategically important Strait of Gibraltar. Spain also had the same interest. Germany asked for a port on the Maghreb coast in order to reach the Atlantic. Italy was interested in the security of its southern border, the balance of power and the status quo in the Mediterranean area. These geostrategic objectives were a major factor in European competition in the Maghreb.
- 2- There were economic factors. There was a struggle between the European

nations over the Maghreb for an open door policy. The US pushed hard to protect its economic interest in the region. Germany was also motivated by economic interests for an open door policy. When France violated international treaties, it was condemned by both the US and Germany.

- 3- The Maghreb was also used to settle the European balance of power and to break Alliances. For example, the German action in the two Moroccan crises was motivated to isolate Britain and to destroy the Anglo-French Entente. Moreover, the Maghreb was made use of by the foreign policies of certain European countries, such as France and Germany, in order to satisfy domestic demands.
- 4- On the other side of the coin, individual Maghreb governments tried to use European competition to protect themselves and to win their independence and sovereignty. In Algeria, Amir Abd al-Kadir asked the US to help him against France, and offered the US privileges on the Maghreb coasts. Also in the Rif war, Amir Abd al-karim looked forward to Britain and Russia balancing France and Spain's presence in Morocco during his war with these two countries.
- 5- Maghreb leaders tried to benefit from two new ideological principles to support their struggle. They looked to US President Wilson's Principles and to the values of international communism. Both ideologies condemned colonialism. The US and the Soviet Union declared their respective policies towards colonialism and called for the decolonisation of the Third World.

The Europeans were affected by strategic, economic and political factors in their presence in and competition for the Maghreb. To what extent had the super-

powers been affected by these three factors, and did the ideological factor influence their policies in the Maghreb? Did the two superpowers differ in their means and objectives?

The ensuing chapters examine the superpowers' political relations with the Maghreb. As a case study for superpower behaviour towards Third World countries, did they try to replace European colonialism? What did they offer the Maghreb in place of the European powers? Did they win much influence in the Maghreb?

It is necessary, first, to discuss the superpowers' relations with the Third World.

Notes

1. Abun-Nasr, Jamil. *A History of the Maghreb*, London: Cambridge University Press, 1975, pp. 86-91.
2. Hall, Luella J. *The United States and Morocco 1776-1956*, New Jersey: The Scarecrow Press, 1971, p. 40. See for Corsairing and Piracy, Earle, P. *Corsairs of Malta and Barbary*, London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1970; Pennell, C. *Piracy and Diplomacy in Seventeenth Century North Africa*, London: Associated University Press, 1989.
3. Ibid, p. 44.
4. Waltz, Kenneth. *Theory of International Relations* London: Addison-Wesley Publishing, 1979, p. 162. For multipolar and bipolar systems see Deutsch, Karl; Singer, J. D., "Multipolar Power Systems and International Stability" *World Politics*, Vol. xvi, no. 3, April 1964, pp. 390-406; Waltz, K. "The Sta-

- bility of a Bipolar World” *Daedalus*, Summer 1964, pp. 881-909; Morgenthau, Hans, *Politics Among Nations*, 6th ed. New York: Alfred Knopf, 1985.
5. Grabb, Cecil Jr. *The Doctrines of American Foreign Policy*, Baton Rouge & London: Louisiana State University Press, 1982, pp. 11-45.
 6. Mayall, James. *Africa: The Cold War and After*, London: Elek Books, 1971, p. 47.
 7. Carrie, Rene Albrecht. *A Diplomatic History of Europe since the Congress of Vienna* London: Methuen, 1965, p. 49.
 8. Ibid, pp. 84-94.
 9. Hall, op.cit., p. 176.
 10. Flournoy, F. R. *British Policy Towards Morocco*, Westport: Negro Universities Press, 1970, p. 35.
 11. Hall, op. cit., p. 183.
 12. Carrie, op.cit., pp. 186-1888.
 13. Yapp, M. E. *The Making of the Modern Near East*, London: Longman, 1982, p. 245.
 14. Dickinson, G. L., *An International Anarchy 1904-1914*, London: George Allen & Unwin, 1937, p. 50.
 15. Waltz, op.cit., p. 190.
 16. Ibid.

17. Parson, F. V. "The Morocco Question in 1884: an early crisis", *English Historical Review*, vol.lxxvii, October 1962, pp. 659-83.
18. Dickinson, op. cit., p. 98.
19. Ibid., pp. 94-96; also see Cardon, Louis B. *The Economic Bases of Franco-German Rivalry in Morocco , 1906-1909*, unpublished PH.D thesis, Berkeley: University of California, 1966, pp. 1-13, and see J.Dean O'Donnell, Jr. "Ambassador Theodore Roustan: Spain, Morocco and Tariffs" *Iberian Studies*, vol:17 nos.1&2, 1988, pp. 26-33.
20. Hodges, Tony, *Western Sahara, Roots of a Desert War*, Westport: Lawrence Hill, 1983, p. 47.
21. Cardon, Louis B., op cit, pp. 10-29.
22. Beckman, P. *World Politics in the Twentieth Century*, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1984, pp. 44-47.
23. Dickinson, op. cit., p. 211; also see Lebow, Richard. *Between Peace and War*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982, pp. 59-63.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid.
26. Beckman, op cit., pp. 44-47; Lebow, op. cit., pp. 312-314.
27. Ibid., p. 69; Lebow, op. cit., pp. 59; 312-314.
28. Abun-Nasr, op. cit., pp. 303-312. See also Lorna Hahn. *North Africa: Nationalism to Nationhood*, Washington.D.C: Public Affairs Press,1960, pp.

55-62.

29. Shimizi, Hiroshi. *Anglo-Japanese Trade Rivalry in the Middle East in Interwars Period*, London: Ithaca Press, 1986, p. 178.
30. Bernard, Stephen. *The Franco-Moroccan Conflict 1943-1956*, New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1968, p. 3; See also Shannon, E. Fleming. "Spain Morocco and the Alzamieno National, 1936-1939: The Military, Economic and Political mobilization of a protectorate." *Journal of Contemporary History*, vol:18, no.1, 1983, pp. 27-42; Hall, op cit, pp. 1066-1076.
31. Entelis, John. *Comparative Politics of North Africa*, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1980, pp. 29-32. See for Abdel-kader relations with British and American , Saadallah , B, "Premiere relation de l'Emire Abdelkader avec Britanniques et les Americains" *Societe Historique Algerienne* , no.13, January 1976, pp. 19-40 . Also see John King "Arms and the man : Abdel-kader" *History today*, vol.40 no.8, August 1990, pp. 22-28 .
32. Ibid.; see also Quandt, W., *Revolution and Political Leadership: Algeria 1954-1968*, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1969, p. 39. See also for Ulama in Algeria , Fahd Abdullah AL-Semmari "The role of Ulama in the Algerian Revolution 1945-1954", *Jusur: The UCLA Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, Los Angeles, California, vol:2 1986, pp. 83-102; See also L.Carl, Brown. "Islamic Reformation in North Africa" *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, vol.2, no.1, 1964, p. 59. See for British and Moroccan support to Abdel-Kader, Jone King op cit. See also P.G. Rogers, *A History of Anglo-Moroccan relations to 1900*, London: Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 1989.
33. Saadallah, B, *Al-Harakah al-Wataniyah al-Jaz'iriyah*, vol. 1, Beirut: Al-Adab

Publisher, 1969, pp. 445-555. See also AL-Semmari, Ibid.

34. Abun-Nasr, op. cit., pp. 313-392; for further analysis of Maghreb nationalist movements see al-Fasi, Alall, *Independence Movements in North Africa*, translated by Nuseibeh, H. S., (Washington, D.C.: American Council of Learned Societies, 1954); Joffe, George, "The Moroccan Nationalist Movement: Istiqlal, the Sultan, and the Country, *Journal of African History*, vol.26 no.4, 1985, pp. 289-307. See also , Hahn, op cit, pp. 18-47; and also Clement Henry Moore , *Tunisia Since Independence*, Berkeley and Los Angeles : University of California press, 1965, pp. 24-39; See also for historical background of Tunisian Nationalism, Charles A. Micaud, *Tunisia : The politics of Modernization*, London and Dunmow: Pall Mall Press, 1963, pp. 22-66. See also, Benjamin Rivlin "The Tunisian Nationalist Movement Four Decades of Evolution" *Middle East Journal*, vol:vi no.2, Spring 1952, pp. 167-193.
35. For al-Katabi Republic, see Woolman, David, *Rebels in the Rif*, London: Oxford University Press, 1969; also Pennell, C. K., *A Country with a Government and a Flag 1921-1926*, Cambridgeshire (England): Middle East and North African Studies Press, 1986; also Joffe, op. cit. Hahn, op cit, p. 69.
36. Al-Fasi, Alall, op. cit., (Arabic edition 1948), pp. 270-271; pp. 475-504. For secret contact between the Sultan and the nationalist leaders after Fez visit in 1934 and after see Ghullab, A. *Ta'rikh al-Harakah al-Wataniyya fi al-Maghrib* (the History of Nationalist Movement in Morocco), Casablanca: Maghreb Company for Publications and Distribution, 1976, pp. 112-115. In 1943, the Sultan officially contacted the leaders of the nationalist party and before the announcement of Istiqlal party in 1944.

37. See al-Fasi, op cit, and also see Joffe, George, op cit, and Hahn, op cit, pp. 76-83. See also M. Palazzoli, "The Evolution of the Moroccan National Movement since Independence" in Michael Brett(Ed), *Northern Africa: Islam and Modernization*, London: Frank Cass, 1973, pp. 123-141.
38. Abun-Naser, op cit, pp. 379-80; See also for German Perspective on Omar al-Mukhtar and Libyan struggle against Italy, Helmut Mejcher, "Umar al-Mukhtar and the Jihad against Italian colonialism the contemporary German Perception" *Addarah: An Academic Quarterly* (Riyadh), vol:15 no.2, October 1989, pp. 4-25.
39. Ibid, and also Mohammed Rayan "The Franco-Libyan Relation During the French Occupation to Fazzan 1943-1955", *Arab Journal For The Humanities*, vol.9 no.35, Summer 1989, pp. 42-73, (in Arabic).
40. Hahn, op cit, p7.
41. Richard M. Brace, *Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia*. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc, 1964, pp. 49-54; See for the influence of French agriculture policy and land distribution in Morocco during the protectorate period, Will D. Swearingen. *Moroccan Mirage: Agrarian Dream and Deceptions 1912-1986*. New Jersey: Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1987, pp. 143-185. For French immigrants in Morocco see *Alsharq-Alawsat*, August 28 1987, p. 6 (in Arabic).
42. Brace, R, p. 49.
43. See for the influence of the French Algerian settlers on French Policy toward Algeria, Alistar Horne, *Savage War for Peace Algeria 1945-1962*, London: Macmillan, 1973, pp. 548-9. For 1,2 million French immigrants in Algeria,

see Alexander, Harrison. *Challenging de Gaulle: The OAS and the Counter-revolution in Algeria 1954-1962*. New York: Praeger, 1989.

44. Ruth, First. *Libya: The Elusive Revolution*, Harmondsworth: Penguin books Ltd, 1974, p. 55.
45. Tony Hodges, op cit, pp. 60-88; See also for historical background on Mauritania, Alfred G. Gerteiny. *Mauritania*, London: Pall Mall Press, 1967, particularly, pp. 11-35; See also Brian Dean Curran; Joann Schroan. *Area handbook for Mauritania*, Washington.D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972.

Chapter III

Superpowers and the Third World: From Decolonisation Policy to Military Intervention

3.1 Introduction

Since World War II, the United States and the Soviet Union have been locked in a struggle for political influence, economic and ideological advantage, and military security. There were many factors influencing the Soviet-American struggle over the Third World, some of which were domestic and related to the conduct of foreign policy, others which were related to the regional and international milieu.

The USSR was preoccupied during Stalin's era with the institutionalisation of the Soviet political system, and the strengthening of communist power inside the Soviet Union. In addition, Stalin was struggling to strengthen Soviet influence in Germany and Eastern Europe, and supporting the coming to power of communist China. The Third World was less important or attractive to Stalin because of the presence of the colonial powers domination and his distrust of the bourgeoisie class.

In the United States, the globalist politicians had succeeded in pushing the USA into world affairs after the victory in World War II. As a leader of the free world, with unrivalled economic power and the monopoly of nuclear weapons, the USA had won a military superiority in the world and as the dominant power in the western hemisphere.¹

The United States was concerned about the collapse of the European economies and of the whole of the European colonial system, the domestic problems of the USSR and later on the breaking of the US nuclear weapon monopoly. The United States developed the Marshall Plan² in order to build a solid economic bloc to stop the spread of communism in Europe and to encourage the anti-communist element inside Europe and the Soviet Union.

Europe was -and still is- the geographical focus of superpower struggle to dominate the continents, because of its geostrategic value for both superpowers, and the balance of power in Europe. But despite the longstanding the struggle in Europe and later competition over South East Asia, the two superpowers devoted an increasingly large share of their attention and resources to other areas in the Third World.

The United States had been involved in the Third World, particularly the Middle East, before the USSR. After World War II, the USA had engaged in political and economic competition with Britain over the Middle East's oil, particularly in Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia and the United States was determined to keep an open door to the Middle East's oil. The head of the Near Eastern Office in the State Department wrote in November 1945:

“ We have no intention of becoming again a mere passive spectator in the Near East. We have been supporting the policy of open door in the Near East with regard to Investments and Commerce.”³

Moreover the USA had participated in political competition with Britain over Syria and Egypt.⁴

Decolonisation, the polarisation of regional politics in the Third World, the rejection of capitalism in newly independent Third World countries, and the at-

titude of the superpowers towards the Third World national bourgeoisie were all elements affecting superpower behaviour towards the developing world.

This chapter focuses on superpower involvement in the Third World from decolonisation policy to military intervention. We examine the conduct of foreign policy by the superpowers and how it affected relations with the Third World. As the two superpowers have confronted each other ideologically we examine the role of their ideology in Third World politics and its pragmatic effect on how they have used ideology to legitimise their behaviour in the Third World. The superpowers have both encouraged the independence of Third World countries, but to what extent have they supported the National Liberation movements? With the emergence of the Non-Aligned movement, why they supported Non-Alignment and why did the USA attack Non-Alignment as immoral? We also examine the superpowers' relations with the military in the Third World, to see to what extent the superpowers have seen the military as a tool for furthering their influence in the Third World.⁵ We examine all these factors from the perspective of the superpowers' relationship with the Arab Maghreb States: how the decision making processes, ideology, National Liberation Movements, Non-aligned Movement and the relationship with the military have affected the Superpowers' relations with the Maghreb.

3.2 The Evolution of Superpower involvement in the Third World

Superpower involvement in the Third World has passed through many phases. After World War II, the superpower priority was to establish the security of Europe and the Far East. From the Soviet perspective, East Europe and South East Asia were more important than the other new states in the Middle East, Africa, and

Latin America. The USA was more interested in the Middle East because of the strategic importance and oil. The superpowers became gradually involved in the Third World, until they felt military intervention was necessary to protect their interests. The Truman Doctrine focused on Turkey and Greece, and the US was ready to use military force to block Soviet communist influence there.

3.2.1 Phase One: 1950-1965: the Cold War Era

During the 1950s the United States dominated Third World affairs and strongly influenced Third World politics. The US also experienced the influence of and competition from the USSR. The American role was encouraged by the decline of Europe and the USA's monopoly of nuclear weapons; Third World states had turned to the US for help in their efforts towards independence.⁶

When Eisenhower came to office, he set out the USA's policy of employing military force against communism in the Middle East. According to Eisenhower's doctrine, the President was authorised to assist the Middle East region economically as well as with armed forces to secure and protect the territorial integrity of any nation requesting help. During Eisenhower's years, the USA took on the role of self-appointed policeman and patron of the Middle East.⁷ Eisenhower's administration had also begun to build a series of Alliance Systems⁸ which could form a barrier against the extension of communism, according to the "domino theory", and provide a form of global containment.⁹

The United States, as a nation without experience or previous record of imperialism, had become more attractive to the Third World than any other European nation. American policy during the Suez Crisis, and its anti-aggression reaction, was part of the USA's effort to prevent Soviet exploitation of the conflict to en-

hance Soviet influence in the Middle East. The USA also sought to loosen Nasser's link with the Soviet Union by opposing the Anglo-French policy.¹⁰

When John Kennedy became President, he criticised Eisenhower's policy in the Third World for failing to align America with Nationalist movements and not acting to meet the real problems of the developing world. Kennedy supported freedom everywhere to Africa, Asia and Latin America, and was on record as opposing colonialism in Africa before he came to power. He viewed American foreign policy as mistaken in its dealings with the Middle East and other Third World countries in the context of the East-West struggle. Moreover, he criticised President Eisenhower for a military cost-cutting programme that "left America unprepared to fight limited wars in grey areas"¹¹ of the Third World. Kennedy did not neglect the use of military force to protect American interests within the Third World, but he used a different approach to strengthen America's influence. He understood that nationalism, economic development, Arab refugees and local political instabilities were factors shaping Soviet influence in the Third World. Military force was not the only way to protect the Third World from communism.

"It offers guns and money but guns and money are not the Middle East's basic guide."¹²

Kennedy had far stronger sympathies with Third World nationalism than Eisenhower had. Kennedy was also even more committed to preserving the Western position through military force. North Africa had won strong support from Kennedy both as a Senator and later as President of the United States.

The Soviet Union started to support indirectly arms and economic aid to the Third World countries, as in the case of the Egypt-Czechoslovakian arms deal of July 1955. The Soviet Union tried a policy of keeping a low profile to avoid con-

frontation with Western powers. The Soviet Union had influence through peaceful coexistence, being more interested in the northern tier of Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan.¹³ Moreover the Soviet Union had lost some prestige and allies, including China and Third World countries such as Iraq, Syria, Egypt, Tunisia and Algeria, that suppressed communist parties. Prestige was also lost in the international community and with military coups in Africa, the Soviet Union lost the friendship of Ghana (1966), Mali (1968)¹⁴ and Algeria (1965).

3.2.2 Phase two: 1965-1975

This decade has been described as a transition period in Soviet and American relations with the Third World. Soviet influence in Third World countries had increased during this era, encouraged by many international and regional developments. At the international level, the Soviet Union moved towards strategic parity with the United States in nuclear power. It had become more involved in the United Nations and had also benefited from the detente and arms control agreements (SALT I).¹⁵ The Soviet economy had become more relaxed and self confident than in the 1950s. The development of the Non- Aligned group, and American involvement in Vietnam and support for Third World liberation had advanced the Soviet penetration of the Third World. The Arab-Israeli conflict in 1967 was one important active factor in advancing Soviet strength in the Third World, particularly in the Middle East. The Arab defeat increased their reliance on the Soviet Union for weapons. Soviet experience had led to the avoidance of Khrushchev's mistakes in Cuba, and the gaining of more friends during the 1960s and early 1970s.

The Soviet Union had increased its military and economic aid. Between 1955

and 1965. The Kremlin extended over \$2 billion in economic aid and \$4.5 billion in military assistance to Third World countries. These figures climb respectively to \$9 billion and \$9.2 billion during the following decade (1965-1975).¹⁶ But despite Soviet progress in this area there were a series of setbacks in the Third World, such as in Egypt during the Sadat era.

On the other hand, the USA experienced a decline in its presence in the Third World during this period. Its involvement in Vietnam and the bombing of civilians led to Third World condemnation. Inside the USA, its foreign policy was handicapped by the Watergate scandal and congressional restrictions on CIA activities and covert action abroad. American public psychology had been affected by the Vietnam defeat.¹⁷ American relations with Western Europe entered a sensitive stage, because of the US nuclear strategy in Europe over the flexible response doctrine and General de Gaulle's suspicion of America's nuclear commitment to Europe.

The growth of the European economies had led to more economic competition between Europe and America, particularly in the former colonies in Asia and Africa.¹⁸ American economic aid declined in this decade. In 1965 the USA spent \$3 billion (about 0.5% of the USA GNP), whilst in 1975 it spent \$2 billion on aid to the Third World(in 1961 dollars).¹⁹ The Arab-Israeli war in 1967 had affected USA-Arab relations because the USA supported Israel. Many Arab countries had broken relations with the USA as a result of increasing Soviet influence.

The US view of colonialism had dominated America's relations with the Third World. But the American perspective on the Third World was shaped by East-West tension.

“Nixon-Kissinger strategy of Detente sought to entice Moscow into a web of

economic ties that would deepen the USSR material stake in continued detente with the United States.”²⁰

American experiences in Vietnam forced the USA to turn more of its Third World burden over to friends and allies. President Nixon and his Secretary of State Henry Kissinger focused on the role of regional middle powers. In that sense he adopted a 'Two Pillars' policy in the Middle East, using proxy forces such as Iran and Saudi Arabia to further American interests. This was later to be termed the Nixon Doctrine. In non-nuclear conflict the United States would furnish economic aid and military assistance in accordance with its military commitments. The American military supplies were the linchpin of the twin pillars'. As Henry Kissinger explained

“The Iranian armament drive accorded with US global strategy. Owing to the Vietnam trauma the United States could not play a balancing role in the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf. But by arming Iran, Washington would enable a regional power to do what America could not do.”²¹

In sum, this period witnessed the increase of Soviet influence and the decline of the USA's influence in the Third World.

3.2.3 Third Phase: 1975-1980

The Soviet Union had engaged in arms control talks with the USA (SALT II), and the Soviets for the first time extended the Brezhnev Doctrine to neighbouring countries such as Afghanistan. The Soviet Union was also involved in Angola and other Third World countries and enjoyed strategic influence in Ethiopia. In this phase, Soviet economic aid to Third World countries reached \$9.9 billion between 1976 and 1980, and the arms deliveries to Third World states totalled \$33 billion for the same period.²²

The Soviet Union also concluded seven treaties of friendship and cooperation with Third World states, including Vietnam. Between 1971 and 1972 USSR had concluded four treaties with Third World states.²³ Moreover the USSR had encouraged the participation of Eastern Europe and Cuban advisors with Third World countries. Although America accused Cuba of acting as a proxy force for the Soviet Union, in reality Cuba's close relations with the Soviet Union were not quite so simple. In one scholar's view,

"The Cubans were not mere proxies for the Soviets. They act on their own, while consulting and collaborating with their allies in Moscow."²⁴

Meanwhile, the Americans suffered a setback during this phase. President Carter developed a new approach to American foreign policy. He shifted the American policy on Third World countries to a more regional approach. He was committed to building a relationship with Third World countries which was based on a greater sympathy for their political and economic aspirations and was designed to reduce the potential for Soviet influence in the Third World. Carter's foreign policy approach emphasised the economic factor in the age of interdependence, and also raised Human Rights issues and called for *World Order Politics*. During his time as President, many Third World dictators had been thrown out of power, such as the Shah in Iran and Somoza in Nicaragua.²⁵ After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the fall of the Shah of Iran, Carter adopted a policy of more direct intervention in the Third World, particularly in the Persian Gulf. He announced the formation of American Rapid Deployment Forces in 1980.²⁶ He also supported his National Security advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski's argument for linking Soviet-American Arms Control talks (SALT II) to Third World countries. According to Brzezinski, "*the SALT negotiation was buried in Ogedon.*"²⁷ The United States connected the progress in arms control with superpower co-operation in regional

conflicts.

Before 1975, the USA was more inclined to responses military than the Soviet Union but, in 1975 and after, the Soviet Union moved to more military means. After the invasion of Afghanistan (December 1979), the United States shifted to a new political-military strategy (offensive and strength) This policy was motivated by the American hostage crises in Iran, the US economy, the US military build up, the formation of American Deployment Forces and the new US Strategic Forces (MX) missiles.

3.2.4 Phase Four: 1980-1985

When Reagan came to power in the USA, he adopted a realist approach to foreign policy, emphasising an American globalist approach which related Third World problems to the East-West conflict. He also developed the Reagan Doctrine' which was a *roll back strategy*, designed to limit and eliminate the Soviet presence in the Third World. He linked arms control and improved relations between the USA and the Soviet Union to Third World issues. During his first term, Reagan supported the Afghanistan Resistance with weapons, and also created and encouraged the Contras in Nicaragua.²⁸ He adopted a more interventionist approach to Central America, the Middle East and Africa. The USA supported UNITA with weapons and invited Zvimbi to the United States. The CIA also worked directly with UNITA. The United States invaded Grenada in October 1983, and sent troops into the Lebanon. Reagan's policy was influenced by American antagonism to the 1970s, wishing to change the American image after the legacy of Vietnam, and he was influenced by the American Cold War era.

During Reagan's years, the US ignored Human Rights issues in foreign policy,

and concentrated on the overthrow of anti-American and radical regimes in the Third World. The USA had looked for military bases in the Third World, especially in Egypt, Somalia, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Kenya, and Transit in Morocco. They had also engaged twice in military confrontation with Libya, in 1982 and 1986.

Reagan was more realistic in using military force in its foreign policy to achieve political objectives. He tried to persuade American public opinion in the aftermath of the Vietnam War,²⁹ that the United States had the capability to counter communist expansion.

Meanwhile, the Soviet Union pursued a more moderate policy towards the Third World after 1980. The USSR was criticised by the Third World countries for its intervention in Afghanistan. Moreover, the USSR faced a succession of problems after the death of three Soviet leaders between November 1982 and March 1985. It also faced economic problems which reduced the Soviet capacity to send economic aid to the Third World. Despite the growth of military strength and military aid, especially after 1985, the USSR has become less attractive to, and lost the interest of, the Third World.³⁰ Gorbachev's new thinking had led the USSR to emphasise its domestic problems and economic recovery rather than its competition with the West in the Third World. His strategy focused on Soviet security in Europe, the Far East and America more than Soviet adventures in the Third World.

3.3 US-USSR Political Systems, Foreign Policy and Third World

The political systems of states greatly influence their conduct of foreign policy. There are important links between domestic policies and foreign policy. The two Superpowers have different political systems, so their conduct of foreign policy is significantly different in style.

States with democratic systems have complicated foreign policy processes, which makes it more difficult to formulate coherent and consistent policies. Authoritarian state conducts its foreign policy according to their leadership's objectives and perception. The next section analyses the impact of democratic and authoritarian systems on foreign policy, particularly toward the Third World.³¹

3.3.1 Soviet Political System, Foreign Policy and The Third World

The USSR has an authoritarian system, and its foreign policy has been conducted by the Politburo and the General Secretary of the Communist Party has been the chief person responsible for foreign policy.

In authoritarian regimes, the personality of the leadership has much effect on the foreign policy of the regime. In this sense, Stalin's cult of personality and his charismatic style dominated Soviet foreign policy. Stalin could effectively ignore public opinion in making the Soviet Union's foreign policy. He was more interested in Soviet relations with Europe and concentrated on Soviet control of Eastern Europe. He adopted a continental approach in his foreign policy and his relations with developing nations were less effective, except in the USSR involvement with China, Turkey and Iran. Stalin did not trust the national bourgeoisie in Third World states, and he suspected the new independent states of being puppets in the hands of colonial powers.³²

After Stalin's death in 1953, the Soviet Union had a short period of collective leadership. After a brief power struggle between Molotov and Khrushchev, Molotov was ousted. Khrushchev strengthened his power and held the USSR foreign policy under his direct control. The Cuban missile crisis provides an example of such a concentration of decision making authority in a circle even smaller than the Party's

Politburo.³³ During Khrushchev's time in power, the military were involved in foreign policy to the extent that the political leader would seek their advice but their role was more effective in defence policy than in foreign policy or in military aspects with the Third World. After Khrushchev's era, the military had much more influence in the Politburo and as a lobby, particularly when the Communist Party invited the soldiers to participate in decision making on foreign policy issues. The promotion of Marshall Andrey Grechko (1973) to full membership of the Politburo was naturally significant, as this gave the military access to key decision makers. They worked as professional advisors to the political leaders.³⁴

During Brezhnev's era, Soviet foreign policy was under Politburo control despite military influence in the Party itself. To some extent Soviet decision makers no longer have quite the same free hand in foreign policy affairs as their predecessors such as Stalin. As Adam Ulam has argued, foreign policy successes are for the Soviet elite a principal means of legitimising their political system.³⁵ But it remains true that the Politburo has the deciding say in determining foreign policy in all major issues including Third World countries.³⁶ General Yurii Lebedev, Deputy Chief of Soviet General Staff, in 1984, explained the relation between the military and civilian politicians as follows:

"Those who refer to a so called military lobby in the USSR are deliberately lying or know nothing about my Country's political organisation and structure. The military, however high their rank, are placed under the permanent control of state and party organs. If, to take a pure hypothesis, there were some deviation, believe me it would be very quickly crushed."³⁷

In any event, foreign policy making in the Soviet Union has been described as centrally controlled in the hand of the Politburo, and despite expert or professional advice, has been seen as one of the major factors behind Soviet failure in the Third World. Foreign policy making is centralised and highly controlled from above in a

routine manner. As Khrushchev observed about Foreign Minister, Gromyko's role in Soviet foreign policy:

“Gromyko only says what we tell him to. At the next Geneva meeting he will repeat what he has already told you. If he does not, we'll fire him and get someone who does.”³⁸

Under Brezhnev, the International Department (ID) of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) had played a large role in controlling the Soviet foreign policy towards the Third World. But under Gorbachev, the role of the International Department has been declining and the Foreign Ministry under Shevardnadze has held the power and been with Gorbachev, in control of foreign policy.

3.3.2 The American Political System, Foreign Policy and The Third World

The United States has a democratic system with two main political parties competing for power. Despite the influence of an international system and environment on American foreign policy, domestic factors have played a great role in determining foreign policy particularly toward Third World countries. Within the United States, there are three factors to consider in the foreign policy process. (i) The relation between the Congress and the executive branch of government; (ii) bureaucratic policies and politics within the executive branch of government; and (iii) the nature of public opinion with its attendant effects on foreign policy. There are also special interest groups and important elites exercising a powerful role over certain aspects of foreign policy such as Think Tanks and the media.³⁹

i. The Congress and US Foreign Policy:

One of the oldest conflicts in the American political system is that between Congress and the President of the United States as the head of the Executive

branch, over the right to formulate and implement foreign policy. The struggle for control over foreign policy came to the fore in the twentieth century, with America's reluctant entry into world affairs. After World War II, the US has become more active in world politics. It functioned in a bipolar system facing the communist bloc and the struggle for influence over the Third World. Foreign policy had become more difficult for the Congress and the US government in a situation of international interdependence. The role of Congress increased in foreign policy but, since Vietnam, Congress has become even more assertive in American foreign policy. The war was a watershed in the American executive's relation with Congress.⁴⁰

The 1970s were marked by Congressionally initiated foreign policy legislation that limited the President's range of options on a number of issues such as arms sale, human rights, trade, economic and military aid, CIA intervention and covert action, and dispatching American troops abroad in crisis.

The President's freedom of action was restricted and limited by a series of legislative Amendments. For example, the Hickenlooper Amendment passed by Congress directed the USA government to terminate aid programmes to any country that nationalised American owned property without fair compensation.⁴¹

In 1974, the Nelson Bingham Amendment to the Arms Export Control Act (PL.93-559) required the President to give advance notice to Congress of any offer to sell to foreign countries defence weapons valued at \$25.00 million or more. The Congress has rejected many times arms sales to Third World countries, such as the selling of AWACS to Saudi Arabia in 1980, or HAWK missiles to Jordan, or the Turkish arms embargo of 1974 after the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, and arms

sales to Morocco in 1979. Another major area of congressional intervention was a series of anti-war amendments. The Congress forced the US government to early withdrawal of American forces from South East Asia and cutting American aid to Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. The most important act in Congress during the 1970s was the War Powers Act (PL.93-148) of 1973.⁴² The Act grew out of Congress's frustration with the war in Vietnam and its desire to prevent such a situation from ever happening again. The Act probably influenced President Nixon's decision to formulate the Nixon doctrine to use regional powers as proxy forces in regional conflict or upheaval to protect American interests, such as the role of the Shah of Iran in the 1970s, and the policing of the Gulf.

Congress also restricted CIA activities abroad, the Church Committee (1975-1976) and the Hughes-Ryan Amendment of 1974 prohibited any CIA activities without Congress knowledge. During the years 1974-1976 Congress enacted a series of measures restricting military, economic and financial assistance to gross violators of human rights and humanitarian affairs, and established in the State Department a new bureau of human rights headed by the Assistant Secretary of State. During Reagan's era, Congress's restriction on arms shipment and delivery to the Contras in Nicaragua helped create the Iran-Contra scandal.⁴³

Finally, Congress has played a major role in the restriction of American involvement in Third World countries, particularly military intervention, and created a situation where American foreign policy makers have to depend on foreign countries to use forces for the sake of American interests, such as Morocco's intervention in Zaire in 1977, and Egyptian forces creating regional alliances to protect unpopular regimes in Third World countries such as GCC after the Iranian revolution. The United States approached Jordan to create Jordanian Rapid deployment

force to be used in the Gulf States instead of direct American forces.⁴⁴

ii. Bureaucratic policies:

The American administration has several voices speaking on foreign policy, and sometimes they contradict each other. The State Department is the main responsible body regarding foreign policy, but inside the department itself there are conflicts of ideas on foreign policy, particularly in regional policies. In the 1950s, the struggle inside the State Department on foreign policy issues was clearly between the globalists and regionalists. For example, to avoid alienating North Atlantic Alliances (NATO), the State Department Bureau of European Affairs opposed the use of pressure on European states, especially France, in respect of decolonisation policy, while the Bureau of Near Eastern South Asia and African Affairs on its part favoured using American influence to further decolonisation such as in North Africa. The African Affairs of the Commerce Department supported the open door policy.

“They accepted the view that open door was mutually beneficial for the host country and the United States.”⁴⁵

On the other hand, the Departments of State and Commerce were divided largely on geographical and functional lines. Not only were there disputes in many cases between the Departments of States and Commerce, but also between Defence and State over foreign policy. Moreover, the National Security Council has been involved in conflicts over foreign policy, as in the case between Cyrus Vance, the Secretary of State during the Carter era, and Zbigniew Brzezinski, the National Security Advisor to President Carter over intervention in Iran during the Iranian revolution in 1979.

When Morocco asked President Carter’s administration for arms in 1979, the

USA administration was divided on the issue. Cyrus Vance, USA Secretary of State, and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, sought to distance the US from the Moroccan invasion of Western Sahara, because they did not like to alienate Algeria, or to encourage Soviet arms sales to Libya and Algeria by supporting Morocco with arms. Within the State Department, the Near East Bureau was strongly in favour of meeting King Hassan's demand for arms because of the peace process in the Middle East and King Hassan's role in it, and the African Bureau in the State Department advised against arms to Morocco from a regional perspective, (because of Algeria and other African neighbours of Morocco). On the other hand, President Carter and the Secretary of Defence, Brown, and Chief of Staff and National Security Advisor Z. Brzezinski, supported Hassan to prevent another Iran. The Congress was similarly divided on the Moroccan issue, Stephen Solarz, Chair of the Subcommittee on Africa for the House Foreign Affairs Committee, argued against arms to Morocco while other members of the Congress and Senate supported Morocco's request.

The major conflicts in American foreign policy during the 1980s were Iran-gate and Conragate during the Reagan era. The case reflected the deep division amongst the bureaucratic foreign policy makers, while the Secretary of Defence, Caspar Weinberger, and Secretary of State George Schulz, had refused in principle to participate in Iranian-American arms deals for hostages. The CIA and National Security Council had carried out the mission. The personality of the President and his knowledge of and involvement with foreign policy played a great role in the control of the bureaucratic conflict and the decision making process.

Moreover, the other major contradiction in opinion towards foreign policy estimation has come from the intelligence community. While the United States

has numerous intelligence organisations, the CIA has played a major role in foreign affairs. The CIA has assessed the stability of regimes and advised in respect of King Hassan of Morocco that his regime was too weak to survive. Despite the Intelligence community role as providing information rather than intervening in politics, the CIA Director is close to the President and plays a great role in decision making. William Casey's relations with Reagan appear to have influenced US foreign policy decisions. The Bush administration has tried to put a limit to the CIA involvement in decision making, putting the main emphasis on its duty to supply information.⁴⁶

iii. Public Opinion:

The American public is poorly informed about foreign policy and world affairs but public opinion has a powerful influence on American decision makers. The United States has an open society and its government responds to public opinion.

The American public are against any kind of military commitment which would involve American troops in a way such as that which took 50,000 American lives in the jungles of South East Asia. It is axiomatic in American politics that the American people want no more Vietnams'.⁴⁷ In some cases, American public opinion determined US action in Third World countries, for example, 24 hours after the American Marines were bombed in Beirut, Lebanon in October 1983, when 143 Americans were killed, US troops invaded Grenada. The deaths of servicemen were a personal blow to President Reagan, who was keenly aware of his role as Commander in Chief. So many men had not been lost since Vietnam. He had to shift public attention from Lebanon to Grenada. The invasion of Grenada was a public relations coup for the White House and distracted attention from the Beirut

tragedy.

Moreover, America's act against Libya, in April 1986, was part of an attempt to appease American public opinion following American failure to counter anti-American terrorism. An important factor shaping American action is electoral considerations. Presidency elections handicap the President in foreign policy issues and many Congressmen and Senators support Israel to win the Jewish lobby's support in elections.⁴⁸

iv. Interest Groups:

In a democratic society with private businesses, interest groups play an active role to protect their interests, particularly in the Third World where American companies are seeking economic projects, oil, raw materials and markets.

Some interest groups have been powerful to the degree that they influence the decision makers in many cases, or they cooperate with government agencies in covert action in the Third World. American businesses in the 1950s had pressed the US government to act against France because of French restrictions on American businesses in Morocco. On the other hand France also complained that Moroccan Nationalists in the United States solicited money from businessmen and others to buy arms. Among backers of Moroccan nationalists were Coca-Cola company representatives, James Hall and Kenneth Pendar, a former American auxiliary vice-consul at Casablanca, who had been involved in intelligence activities in Morocco during the Second World War. Also, American oil companies had supported the independence of Libya, and many oil companies had been involved with the politics of the Middle East.⁴⁹

American multi-national companies have cooperated with the American gov-

ernment and CIA covert action when it is in their interests. The CIA cooperated in 1973 with the company International Telephone and Telegrams (ITT) to help overthrow Allende in Chile. Also, several American firms opposed the embargo of high technology trade with the USSR that President Carter imposed in retaliation for the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Some have equated America's national interests with American corporate interests:

"What is good for General Motors is good for America."⁵⁰

In addition, there is the proliferation of new single interest lobbies that are often able to hamstring foreign policy. There are many and various religious groups, the human rights lobbies, the nationality groups and the political action committees.

More recently, when the State Department proposed to cut Morocco's foreign aid for 1990, Morocco hired Mill & Co., a Washington lobbying firm. It recruited Senator Robert Kasten, an Appropriations Committee member, who got \$8 million restored. To do so, Kasten enlisted the support of Senator Daniel Inouye, another Committee member, in exchange for Kasten supporting \$30 million for Inouye's pet country, Tunisia. Inouye in turn got White House backing for Tunisia in exchange for his earmarking \$20.00 million extra that President Bush wanted for Jordan.⁵¹

v. The Media :

The media has been playing an increasing role in foreign policy. It can be accurately termed the Fourth Estate'. The causes of this new media involvement are principally money, power, or the desire for it. The United States are more vulnerable to the influence of the media than any other state, because it is an open society and the media is owned by private companies or rich families or groups. The American constitution protects the freedom of the press. President Nixon had

resigned from office after the press uncovered the Watergate scandal. American public opinion reaction to America's involvement in Vietnam was strongly anti-USA policy after the media coverage of the mass killing in Vietnam. The media coverage of the hostage crisis during 1979 generated a negative view of Carter during the 1980 election. Moreover, the human rights abuse in most Third World countries and the media coverage of this had a strong effect on USA foreign policy towards such areas, and affected American military and economic aid. The media coverage of terrorists in the 1980s during Reagan's era led to many confrontations with Third World countries such as Iran, Libya and Syria. The USA attacked Libya in 1986 largely as the result of American failure to combat terrorism in other areas and media coverage of Libya involvement.⁵²

vi. **Think Tanks :**

In democratic societies the government may be advised on policy problems by bodies of individuals not part of government. Think Tanks play a great role in USA foreign policy as external advisory bodies to the government. Think Tanks could be reasonably referred to as the *Fifth Estate*.⁵³

There are several means by which the Think Tank can influence foreign policy. Most of the Think Tank experts have moved between government institutions and the Think Tank, and most of the Think Tanks have been preparing studies for the government organisations on foreign policy issues, or by influencing Congress with background papers on foreign policy issues.

The Rand Corporation has been the most influential private organisation on Defence policy since the 1950s.⁵⁴ In 1989, Rand had a \$95.5 million annual budget, 78% of which comes from the USA military branches.⁵⁵ Moreover, the Brookings

Institute has much influence over Democratic policy makers, especially during the Carter era. Brookings had prepared the Carter Middle East proposal. Z. Brzezinski and William Quandt were affiliated to Brookings before they joined Carter's administration. The Heritage Foundation has much influence in Republican party circles, particularly during the Reagan era. As a conservative Think Tank, the Heritage Foundation had argued that the Reagan Administration should support Morocco in the Western Sahara and argued that the USA government should offer military and economic aid to Morocco. On the other hand, the Foundation argued that the USA government should use military force and sanctions against Libya and had labelled Libya as a terrorist state'.⁵⁶

Moreover, the Think Tanks have strong relations with academic institutions, and they have been involved with the preparation of major studies and hold conferences with the support of the US government to discuss major issues. Rand Corporation studies in terrorism and Soviet Third World policy have been widely distributed. Harvard University also held a conference on Islamic Fundamentalism which was sponsored by the CIA; the Defence Intelligence Agency supported studies on Islamic organisation in the Third World. One important study was prepared by Samuel Huntington and Richard Bett, which focuses on the dictators and authoritarian regimes in the Third World and the instability of their countries in case of sudden death and disappearance.⁵⁷ The United States have tried to avoid Iranian mishandling of 1979, and had adopted a policy of easing out dictators, as in the case of the Philippines (1985), Tunisia (1987) and others in Third World countries.

In general, the democratic states have more complicated foreign policy processes than totalitarian states. The United States has a crisis management and

crisis foreign policy rather than a systematic foreign policy. The democratic state's foreign policy is less effective because of conservative paralysis and a corresponding inability to deal with pressing problems. In authoritarian regimes and closed societies such as the Soviet Union, they have less difficulty in pursuing their foreign policy because of the reduced influence of public opinion or bureaucratic or interest groups. They have a more systematic policy because the foreign policy is concentrated in the hands of the leadership.

3.4 Superpowers, Ideology and Foreign Policy

After the Second World War, the world had been divided ideologically into two blocs. The United States has represented the capitalist world, and the Soviet Union dominated the Eastern bloc.

Ideology was a major factor in the Cold War, despite the revisionist school's emphasis on American economic interests as a main cause of the Cold War. Ideology could not be separated from the economy, because the economic system is founded upon ideology. With the spread of the Cold War and ideological conflict, the United States has adopted the Containment Policy to control the spread of communist ideology to Europe or Euro-Asia.⁵⁸

Hans Morgenthau, one of the realist school theorists, has explained the way ideology tends to change the international system. Ideology not only contributes to the development of unlimited national objectives, but it also eventually creates states whose goal is to overthrow the existing international system.⁵⁹ Historically, the new revolutionary states in the grip of fundamental ideological principles have tried to change the international and regional system. Revolutionary Iran in 1979 tried to change the regional system, while revolutionary Russia in 1917 tried to

change the whole international system.

But despite concern with the emphasis of the role of ideology in the policies of the superpowers, reality suggests other factors predominate in the relations with the Third World. Ideology might explain some aspects of Soviet foreign policy, particularly in the early days of communist revolution, but not every action of Soviet foreign policy. Lenin had concentrated on building an ideological state, but the ideas of Marx and Lenin were not the only influences affecting the Soviet diplomats' perspectives on international affairs.

There has been a long evolutionary process, as a result of which the perceived national interests of the USSR superseded the ideological dimension of Soviet politics. The Brest-Litovsk Treaty of 1918 between Germany and Russia, the entry into the League of Nations; the Hitler-Stalin pact (1939), the 20th Communist Party Congress, and the Sino-Soviet split are taken as landmarks that demonstrate the increasingly deep contradiction between national and state interests and ideology in Soviet international behaviour.⁶⁰ There has therefore been a tension between ideology and pragmatism in Soviet behaviour toward the Third World countries.

Soviet leaders have closed their eyes to the oppression of local Communist Parties in the Third World while engaging in cooperation with the ruling circles in the Third World. The Communist Parties in most of the Arab countries have been banned, oppressed, jailed and executed, while the Soviet Union has kept full political and economic relations and has given military and weapon support. Iraq has arrested Communist Party members on many occasions, Tunisia banned the Communist Party, Algeria limited its political activities and, in the Sudan, a Communist Party leader was executed. The failure of the Communist Parties in

the Arab world, and as small parties with little support from the Arab masses, has led the Soviets to build a two way contract with Arab regimes, one with communist parties, the other with the official channels of Arab governments. In this regard, ideology has less influence in Soviet relations with the Arab world than the links with the ruling classes in the Arab regimes. Moreover, the Soviet Union stands by when Marxist regimes are being crushed in many Third World countries such as Chile and Guatemala.

From a historical perspective, the Soviet Union was more ideological in its foreign policy orientation towards the Third World during the Stalinist period. When Krushchev held power in the USSR, he developed a peaceful coexistence ideology to legitimise policies of cooperation with the USA and other national-bourgeoisies in Third World countries. Robert Tucker has described the Soviet ideological behaviour as follows:

“Its leadership remains ideologically committed to the goal of a world wide communist revolution, but the pattern of Soviet conduct in world affairs has increasingly become that of a status quo power rather than a revolutionary power.”⁶¹

The post Stalinist leaders give little evidence of being radical in their outlook. The Soviet Union can no longer be accurately described as a revolutionary power because revolutionary organization is not central to Soviet policy in the Third World. The Soviet Union was attractive to the Third World ideologically, but the USSR also had the advantage of being a new major power on the Third World scene. It came with clean hands, unburdened by a colonial past in the Arab world, South Asia, Africa and Latin America.⁶²

The ideological split between Moscow and Peking meant that there was competition between China and the Soviet Union in influencing Third World states. China was seen by some Third World countries as a true communist state while

the Soviet Union tilted toward peaceful coexistence with the capitalist world. But because of the Soviet Union power and military and economic aid most of the Third World built strong relations with the Soviets. China was not a member of the UN, was preoccupied with its internal cultural revolution and too poor to offer much aid or political support in the UN to the Third World.

In sum, whereas ideological disposition was the measure of an ally in the past, economic imperatives make relations with the bigger capitalist orientated states more attractive because the economic imperatives offer great opportunities for direct trade and better returns on Soviet investments. Soviet foreign policy makers sought therefore to expand its ties with the newly industrialised economies of South East Asia, Brazil, Indonesia and Nigeria.

When the Soviet Union moved towards supporting Third World countries in the 1970s, it was Soviet military power and the ideological orientation towards detente that encouraged Brezhnev to do so. It should be said that, with Soviet foreign policy in the Third World, the ends justify the means, and that manoeuvring, flexibility, pragmatism and opportunism are thought necessary in Third World relations. The new Soviet leadership no longer seeks to revise the international order in accordance with the principles of world communism, but rather to join the international system in pursuit of more conventionally defined Soviet national interests. The Soviet Union has withdrawn from Ethiopia and Angola, has also established diplomatic relations with the conservative Arab Gulf states, and has sought economic relations with the Iranian fundamentalist state. The Soviet Union has moved to a pragmatic de-ideologised foreign policy in search of a permanent position in international society.⁶³

Ideologically, the United States has adopted two approaches in foreign policy towards the Third World. One approach focused on US ideological confrontation with the Soviet Union, and tried to eliminate any Soviet ideological influence in the Third World. The second approach, in practice, involves the United States ignoring the Third World problem, has worked to support dictators and oppressive regimes as long as they have served American interests, despite a rhetoric of political modernisation and democratic values.

In confronting the Soviet Union ideologically, the US policy has been influenced by George Kennan's argument in his article on Foreign Affairs *The Sources of Soviet Conduct* in 1947.⁶⁴ Kennan alerted American officials to the danger of Soviet ideological expansion in the Third World, particularly the Euro-Asia belt surrounding the Soviet Union.

On the other hand, the spread of nationalism and the liberation movements in the 1950s, along with the anti-colonialism of the Third World, created a vacuum of power in the Third World. The colonial experience had led Third World peoples to look to communist, socialist and American values as an alternative to the European colonial legacy.⁶⁵

In the case of the Muslim world, which represents a large part of the Third World, the defeat of Islamic political power, the Ottoman Empire in the First World War and the abolition of the Islamic Caliphate (which represented the central authority of Islam as a sign of unity) in 1924, had led to a psychological defeat among the Muslim elites, and they had turned to socialist and Western capitalist values as a way of life to follow in the industrialised and civilised world. Historically, the conquered nations adopted the values of the victors. Moreover, we have

to note here that the new communist regime in Russia in 1917 had withdrawn from the First World War. The new revolutionary regime in Russia uncovered secret negotiations between France and Britain to divide the Ottoman Empire and condemned these secret plans of colonising the Muslim world. Hence the Third World was ready to absorb the new ideological values of communist Russia.⁶⁶

The United States had encouraged and participated in the Alliance system to counter Soviet influence in the Middle East and South East Asia, despite the ideological rhetoric of its foreign policy. By 1951, two western allies - Britain and America - were at odds not only in South Asia but also in the Middle East. The Baghdad Pact was more a product of Anglo-American rivalry for supremacy than a well considered military strategy to bolster Middle Eastern and South Asian defences against a Soviet threat. The US attended the Baghdad pact merely as an observer, not as a member in the pact. It was intended to be a political and ideological screen behind which to preserve pro-western ruling groups in the member states. After the July 1958 military coup in Baghdad, Iraq left the pact which was then renamed the Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO).⁶⁷

During the Nixon era, the US showed little concern for the Third World from an ideological perspective. The Nixon administration was preoccupied with the Vietnam war and took strong action in the Indo-Pakistan situation, and the October war in 1973 between the Arabs and Israelis. Nixon was also occupied with the US-Soviet detente and rapprochement with China. Nixon and Kissinger adopted a geopolitical approach in dealing with Third World countries, being interested in states which were strategically valuable to the USA. Under Carter, human rights issues began to play a significant role in foreign policy. Despite this, Carter used the theme of self-determination and human rights to advance his own crusade

against the Kremlin's strategy of expansion and its repressive practices at home.

The US supports democracy in the Third World countries but, if democracy contradicted American national interests in the Third World, the United States often preferred to pursue its interests rather than promote democracy. The USA has supported repressive regimes in the Third World i.e Philippines, Indonesia, Guatemala and Korea because of perceived US national interests. George Bush praised the Philippine dictator F. Marcos before he was ousted

“We stand with you sir ... We love your adherence to democratic principles [sic] and to the Democratic processes. And we will not leave you in isolation.”⁶⁸

Later, America was involved in his removal because of American experiences in Iran, and to avoid the upheaval before it occurred. The USA adopted a preemptive removal strategy to protect American interests from democratic regimes opposed to American domination. In some cases American policy makers did not support the desires of the Third World people, and reacted to events with a military coup to prevent a democratic government from holding power. As with Chile, Kissinger stated clearly

“I don't see why we have to stand back and watch a country go communist because of the irresponsibility of its own people.”⁶⁹

During the Reagan era Jean Kirkpatrick stated that Third World peoples are not ready for democracy, and she criticised Carter's human rights approach in the Third World because it did not protect American interests.

“Because of the miseries of traditional life are familiar, they are bearable to ordinary people who are growing up in society, learn to cope, as children born to untouchables in India acquire skills and attitudes necessary for survival in the miserable roles they are destined to fill.”⁷⁰

In foreign aid, the US is more ideologised than the Soviet Union. The United States has been reluctant to give dollars to any nation that could not support

American policy. When Jordan adopted an independent position during the Gulf crisis, August 1990 because of Jordanian national interests, the United States stopped aid to Jordan. When Jordan accepted the James Baker peace plan to the Arab-Israeli conflict June 1991, the United States released economic aid to Jordan. As John Spanier put it,

“If countries wanted US money surely the last thing they could do was to stand up and be counted.”⁷¹

In the case of morality in US foreign policy towards the Third World, President Kennedy pledged that the US would pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe, in order to assure the survival and success of liberty, but in practice the US has not always supported the values of liberty and freedom inside Third World countries.⁷² The US has adopted the realist approach in its foreign policy and has abandoned democracy when it opposes or threatens the US national interests in the Third World. George Schultz describes USA foreign policy as

“A foreign policy based on realism, therefore cannot ignore the importance of either ideology or morality. But realism does require that we avoid foreign policies based exclusively on moral absolutes divorced from political reality. Hans Morgenthau was right to warn against the dangers of such moral crusades or escapism.”⁷³

George Schultz’s argument supports the idea that US presidents, who largely formulate US foreign policy, are not over concerned about social justice in Central America or other Third World areas. The White House is willing to tolerate a variety of Central American governments if they are supportive of American national interests. Dictators are easier to do business with and American presidents regularly clamp down on popular rebellions.⁷⁴ Practically, the USA supported the regimes sympathetic to USA foreign policy and opposed to the Soviet Union. Despite the rhetoric about liberalism in the US foreign policy, US administrations

have approached issues from the position of the US interests. Kissinger emphasised this when he described US foreign policy after World War II:

“If you look at the entire American post war foreign policy, you will find that changes in the major directions of foreign policy have not been all that significant. What is different between various presidents is the style, the method of doing business.”⁷⁵

The two superpowers had approached the Third World in the 1950s from an ideological perspective, but in the next decades the realist approach has dominated their relations in this area. It does not seem that ideology has played any significant role in Soviet Third World policy in the last three decades. For example, Third World communists were always dispensable if they became an obstacle to Soviet interests.⁷⁶ Although the realist and geostrategic perspectives have dominated USA foreign policy, to some extent American administrations have been more ideological in their foreign economic and military aid and political support to Third World countries than Soviet administrations have been.⁷⁷

3.5 Superpowers and Third World Liberation Movements

The superpowers have supported national liberation movements from two perspectives; ideology and national interests.

Ideologically, the Soviet Union as a Marxist-Leninist power has supported anti-colonialism, anti-feudalism and anti-imperialism, and it has encouraged the revolutionary struggle in the Third World, particularly since Khrushchev. The Soviet Union encouraged nationalism, and supported Arab nationalism because it was anti-colonial. The Soviets also encouraged national liberation movements because it saw political and economic independence and social revolution as leading ultimately to socialism. The USSR has accepted the use of violence as a legiti-

mate means of liberation, in order to achieve the political and social objectives of nationalist movements in the Third World. In *Pravda* on 28 June 1965 Soviet officials explained the Soviet approach to national liberation movements as anti-imperialist struggles by any means,

“The Soviet Union advocates the use of every form of struggle for national liberation. The people’s right to freedom and independence, whether established by peaceful means or in armed struggle, is sacred. The Soviet Union gives comprehensive assistance to the people fighting with weapons in hand against imperialism and colonialism.”⁷⁸

From an ideological perspective, the Soviet Union has seen the revolutionary struggle against capitalism in global terms, and national liberation as wars of the oppressed classes against the oppressing classes.

From the perspective of national interests, the USSR has seen the liberation movements as a chance to eliminate western influence in the Third World. The Soviet purpose in supporting the national liberation movements was to overthrow an indigenous orientated anti-Soviet leadership, as in their support of the Dhofar in Oman. The Soviet Union has supported anti-western movements in Central America such as the left wing organisation in Salvador, and had helped Castro to hold power in Cuba. In Africa, the Soviet Union supported the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa, and the People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) group holding power in Angola in 1975. The Soviet Union has also supported the national movement in the Horn of Africa, and has helped the Southern Yemen Socialist Movement to win in South Yemen. The Soviet Union’s strategic considerations such as in the Middle East and South East Asia stimulated efforts to eliminate any western presence which threatened Soviet national security, regardless of the ideological differences between movements.⁷⁹ Also, in supporting Third World countries in their revolutionary struggles, the Soviets calculated that

the nationalisation of national resources in the Third World would cut Europe off from raw materials and economic advantage there. Economically, the Soviet Union was interested in weakening the western countries' economic relations with the new Third World countries.

Moreover, the Soviet Union supported the national liberation movements to counter Chinese influence in Third World countries, and to limit the Chinese ideological challenge to the Soviet Union as a more radically socialist state than the Soviet Union itself. The USSR had sought prestige in international politics and world affairs, particularly among new Third World countries and the Non-Aligned movement, and with the anti-war groups in the west.

Despite the Soviet support for national liberation, they have adopted a cautious approach to avoid military confrontation with the West.⁸⁰ In the late 1960s and 1970s, the Soviet Union had moved to more direct involvement in Third World liberation movements. The Detente and Soviet nuclear parity with the USA had encouraged the Soviet Union to move from an indirect approach to a more direct policy of military and economic aid in Africa and Asia. Brezhnev's view of peaceful coexistence was similar to Krushchev's, but Brezhnev had come into a more relaxed international environment. In 1966 Brezhnev declared that

"There can be no peaceful coexistence when it comes to the internal process of national liberation struggle."⁸¹

Although it has never experienced colonialism, the US President Wilson argued in 1919 for self-determination for the peoples of Asia, Europe and Africa which were under European colonialism. The US, from an ideological and cultural point of view, has been more familiar with the concept of self-determination than that of liberation in the Third World. The US also opposed the use of violence to

gain economic independence and social revolution. As a global power after World War II, the US has shifted to a global policy with global interests in economic and strategic directions.

The US found itself obliged to support the national liberation ambitions of the Third World because of its interest in limiting Soviet influence in new Third World independent states. But the USA regards radicalism of any sort as counterproductive and as an invitation to communism. Eisenhower's administration supported North African independence politically, and asked for an open door policy. He used the communist threat as an excuse to oblige France to withdraw from North Africa.⁸² The USA has used double standards with regard to liberation movements and terrorism: if the liberation movement is loyal to the Soviet Union or at least does not cooperate with the United States, then US officials label the movement radical, violent and terrorist, such as the Palestine Liberation Organisation. If the movement serves US interests, then it is a liberation movement involving freedom fighters' such as Mujahedin in Afghanistan. The US hopes to use anti-communist national liberation groups as instruments of leverage to force Soviet clients to moderate their behaviour, but also the US has sold out on movements such as those supporting the Kurds in Iraq. After the Algerian agreement in 1975 between the Shah of Iran and Iraq, the US stopped the support which it had been offering to the Kurds, despite the USA's direct involvement. The CIA has had direct relations with many liberation movements, and in many cases the US has used its influence to limit the radicalisation of the movement's attitude and to stop its activities when the US prefers to deal with another party. Hence the US used its relations as a containment of revolutionary attitudes, such as in Afghanistan and with Savimbi's Unita in Angola, or in Central America.⁸³

The superpowers supported national liberation but with different concepts and objectives to replace European colonialism and to counter each other's influence. Despite their ideological orientations, the two superpowers stopped their support for national liberation movements when it clashed with their national interests. The US supported Algeria indirectly to keep its relations with France as a member of NATO and the Soviet Union supported Algeria in the last phase of the liberation movement so as not to disrupt its relations with France because the Soviet Union had tried to isolate France from NATO. The US has also seen liberation from political points of view and has denied its economic and social aspects, while the Soviet Union has seen liberation movements from a Marxist perspective as part of a social revolution.⁸⁴

3.6 Superpowers and the Non-Aligned Movement

The two superpowers had reacted to the Non-Aligned movement from different perspectives, ideologically and according to national interests. In 1955, the Bandung Conference of Afro-Asian states was the first gathering in the Third World. The gathering was a result of the Cold War between East and West. The 29 nations which attended the conference addressed many issues, denouncing colonialism, speaking with urgency of the need to promote economic development in the Third World and calling for friendly cooperation and peaceful coexistence. It was not until 1961 that a major international conference brought together the leaders of Third World countries in their first Non-Aligned conference in Belgrade. Morocco and Tunisia attended the conference along with 25 other nations, and Algeria attended as a revolutionary movement before its independence.

The Soviet Union reacted positively to the Non-Aligned movement, because

the Soviet strategy of military denial in the Third World was originally designed to hamper the creation of new alliance systems by the West in the 1950s and to prevent military links between the newly independent states and the Western powers. Also the Soviet Union tried to isolate the USA and Western Europe through the nationalisation of foreign holdings in the Third World, which led to contradictions between the capitalist states because the area open to alleged exploitation had been reduced and the struggle between the capitalist states for markets and areas of investment was intensified. The Soviet Union also calculated that Non-Aligned states might adopt the Soviet Union as a model for rapid industrialisation and modernisation, which would create conditions ripe for the development of communist parties. The Soviet Union further sought to obtain the support of neutral states for specific proposals in the United Nations, or at least *neutralist abstention* and the acceptance of Soviet foreign policies such as general and total disarmament, and the reduction of nuclear weapons.⁸⁵

The four criteria of the Non-Aligned movement: an independent foreign policy devoted to peaceful coexistence, the support of national liberation movements, non-participation in military pacts, and unwillingness to grant military bases to great powers, were all acceptable to the Soviet Union.⁸⁶

The Soviet Union reacted favourably because peaceful coexistence had become the cornerstone of Khrushchev's foreign policy. The Chinese were less in favour of this, but praised the Non-Aligned movement while warning against the illusion of peaceful coexistence with imperialism. Ray Allison stated the objective of the Soviet Union toward the Non-Aligned movement in the 1950s and 1960s as a hope for close relations with the socialist bloc anti the West.

“Soviet officials, at least until the late 1970s, considered non-alignment ideally as a policy of short-term military and political denial to the West which prefigured a

longer term tendency common to the Third World as a whole of increasing political and possibly military integration with the Eastern system of states.”⁸⁷

The evolution of Non-Alignment has not been as complete as the Soviet Union expected. The first decade of its policies were defined by the Cold War conflict between East and West, and in this decade the Soviet Union’s objectives had been achieved. In the second decade of its existence, its policies were defined largely by the members’ grievances against the West alone; the Algerian summit in 1973 had condemned the economic domination of the Western world and argued for a new international economic order in favour of Third World countries. After the Havana summit in 1979, its policies and politics have been determined by interaction with both of the world’s power blocs, and this is more complex than that which characterised the movement’s first two decades. It has become more heterogeneous with conservative, radical and moderate elements, and the issues raised reflect the South-North relationship more than decolonisation, and the movement has been penetrated by the superpower clients.⁸⁸ Egypt became closer to the United States with Cuba supporting the Soviet Union.

In the case of the United States, when the Non-Aligned movement was formed the US tended to ignore it because the combined political, economic and military power of its members was so negligible. In the 1950s US foreign policy had been hostile towards neutralism and John Foster Dulles had a strictly bipolar vision of world politics, black and white, and there was no in-between. The weight of Bandung’s anti-colonialism, and economic development principles, had seemed to be directed against the West. Dulles persisted throughout the decade to denounce the principle of neutrality as immoral and short-sighted.

During the 1960s and after, the US had begun to moderate its policy toward

the Non-Aligned movement. It was no longer openly antagonistic towards either neutralism or non-alignment. The moderate reaction of the US was a result of many factors. First, the size and influence of the neutralist camp had grown; second, American experience with Egypt in 1956 and the cut off Aswan Dam funding had not changed Egypt's foreign policy. President Kennedy noted in November 1963 that the withdrawal of American aid to Egypt had not induced Egypt to follow the US, and in fact produced the opposite result. Third, the US received diplomatic support from the NATO members and the Non-Aligned movement during the Cuban crisis. The Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, said in 1965

"US also received powerful support, much in private behind the scenes from the non-aligned countries who wishes the US well in coming through in a way satisfactory to the free world."⁸⁹

Fourth, Afro-Asian nationalism provided a far better barrier against communism for the free world than Western sponsored alliances like the Baghdad Pact and SEATO. Fifth, the US welcomed the concern and interest of neutralists because the initiative of the Non-Aligned movement brought the idea of peace and cooperation. Sixth, the Non-Aligned states had been used as mediators between the superpowers, for example Indian mediation during the Vietnam conflict. Moreover, the US was satisfied that communism was not attractive to the Third World. As Kennedy said, no nation from the fifty in the United Nations had succumbed to communism.

The Maghreb states, as members of the Non-Aligned movement, had played a great role in the movement, particularly in Algeria. In 1973, the Algiers Non-aligned Summit effectively adopted the economic platform of the group of 77.⁹⁰ The group of 77 had been set up at the first United Nations Conference on Trade and Development in 1964, as a kind of Third World lobby on economic issues.

The Soviet Union hoped to direct Third World radicalism over economic issues against the Western states, but had to overcome the suspicions of Non-Aligned states through the policy of detente. The Soviet Union was seen as cooperating with the West to the economic detriment of the Third World.

In their message to the conference, Podgorny and Kosygin noted that detente opened up favourable prospects for reducing military expenditure and increasing allocations of aid to developing countries. These assurances notwithstanding, Algeria brought economic issues to the forefront of the agenda of the Non-Aligned states. The summit called for a new international economic order, and demanded the convention of a special session of the UN General Assembly to discuss it. In the following year (1974) the Algerian President, Houari Boumedienne, addressed the General Assembly. But it is interesting to note that during the Algiers summit, Algeria and Libya adopted the theory of "*two imperialisms*", the Soviet Union and the USA. Brezhnev's letter to the conference on 5 September 1973 criticised the theory and said there were differences between socialism and imperialism and that the summit should side with the socialist camp. Fidel Castro of Cuba, who attended the summit the first time, also opposed Algeria's and Libya's theory.⁹¹

In general terms, the Non-Aligned movement itself could be categorised into three groups: those of socialist orientation (Algeria, Yemen, Libya, Syria), the pro-Western orientation (Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Tunisia, Zaire, Zambia) and the legitimately centrist group which supported the first principle of the Non-Aligned movement in the 1950s and 1960s (India, Yugoslavia). But the problem of this category is the unstable situation in Third World countries, from pro-Soviet to pro-West. For example, since independence in 1960 Somalia followed first a Non-Aligned policy, then a pro-Soviet one, and now a pro-Western foreign policy; Libya

was anti-Soviet in the 1960s and early 1970s, then pro-Soviet, at least politically.⁹²

The two Superpowers have penetrated the Non-Alignment movement, and the concept itself has become more confused. Some states have American military bases, such as the Philippines, and security cooperation with the USA, such as Morocco. Cuba has a strong ideological relationship with the Soviet Union. The weight of the movement in the United Nations and other international organisations has led the superpowers to give considerable political value to the non-alignment movement.

When the United Nations General Assembly voted 113 to 18 to call for Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, Third World states comprised the bulk of the majority.⁹³

Maghreb states, particularly Algeria, as representatives of non-alignment, had become attractive not only to both superpowers but to France as a gate to the Third World. The superpowers, with cooperation from their friends in the Non-Aligned movement, have been trying to contain Third World radicalism in their political and economic policies, hoping to guide them to more moderate policies with the West, and it seems they have been successful in this.

3.7 Superpowers, Military Coups and the Third World

The superpowers have paid much attention to the military in the Third World. During the past three decades the military in the Third World has played a great role in intervention in internal politics and government. A number of studies have pointed out the importance of the military, and it is the strongest and most powerful institution in society. The military has power to be well organised and

compared to politicians they often appear to be less corrupt, so they determined the leadership and foreign policy orientation of the country, the military being able to intervene successfully against other groups.

Western political scientists, such as Samuel Huntington, have discussed the importance of the military and the best way to deal with it. It has been thought that only a military regime can have the power to prevail against communist parties. Others believe that military regimes can and will be more effective than political parties in modernising their societies. According to Keith Hopkins, politicians in the Third World lacked an appreciation of, or had neglected, modernisation, and the military was the group most likely to favour modernisation.⁹⁴

The US have supported the military in Third World countries, and focused on the military in the 1950s, leading many military coups in the Third World through covert action. The US has realised the importance of the military in the Third World for many reasons: first, according to Rand's 1959 conference on the Military, the military alone in the Third World possessed the technical and administrative proficiency essential for more rapid modernisation and was in fact the leading carrier of industrial and secular values.⁹⁵ Second, modernisation theorists, particularly in the USA, added that civilian institutions could not direct or control civilian demands but the military's efficiency, honesty and nationalism could do more for the country. Third, the low political participation by civilians in government in states where coups occur. Fourth, absence of a strong sense of legitimacy of the existing government also increases the likelihood of a coup. The US had removed many Third World leaders after their political legitimacy had come under question, as in the Philippines, Haiti and Tunisia. Fifth, despite the rise of nationalism, most Third World states have very low levels of meaningful

participation in politics.

The US has used different means to penetrate the Third World military. The US government has offered a police training programme which operated under American international development. It opened American police training schools in both Panama and Washington, as well as in Liberia (Africa). By 1968, the USA had 458 US police experts in 34 countries, and by 1973, it had trained over 7300 foreign police in the USA alone. Many Third World leaders had trained in the USA, including former President of the Sudan, Nimeri and the President of Tunisia, Ben Ali.

The US has successfully overthrown regimes hostile to US interests and replaced them with a pro-American leadership, also defending a sympathetic regime from a coup in the case of Ethiopia in December of 1960. The US was also sympathetic to Mousadeq's demand for a greater Iranian share of oil revenues and recognised that Mousadeq was not a communist. The US supported the Egyptian revolution in 1952, and encouraged Nasser. According to the late Egyptian president Anwar Sadat,

“We were sitting with an American Ambassador while the British Ambassador was looking for the identity of the Coup's leaders.”⁹⁶

In 1962 the USA National Security Council approved a national policy on a grant strategy towards the Third World. The National Security Council favoured a greater readiness to act even when there was no direct Russian or Chinese involvement, but when they might objectively form other types of subversion inimical to USA interests.

In class terms, both superpowers were interested in middle class officers because they are thought to be more loyal. Most Middle Eastern officials were from

middle class backgrounds and deeply linked to it. The middle class in the Middle East is more loyal to the army, on which they depend completely for their income. Other classes are less dependable and less loyal to the army. Most officers in Libya, Algeria, Tunisia, Iraq, Syria and Egypt have come from the middle classes. In the sense of interest, organisation, power and loyalty, the armies in the Third World are fertile for US penetration. So US policy has been that it is better to deal with the military than with the civilian government. The former American National Security advisor, Walt Rostow, stated that the United States supported the coups when it is in the American interest to have military in power,

“it is USA policy when it is in the USA’s interest.”⁹⁷

The Soviet Union approached the Third World military organisations after the United States. The first time, the Soviet Union was suspicious of the military in a new independent state as a legacy of colonial power. M. Heikal described the Soviet position during the first phase:

“Their thinking has been largely influenced by the long history of right-wing military coups organised by the armed forces in Latin America, and by the early armed coups in Syria, which they regarded, with a good deal of reason, as being the outcome of rivalries between the big British and American oil companies in the era.”⁹⁸

The Soviet Union was suspicious of the bourgeoisie and despite approaches to this group in the time of Khrushchev, the Soviets still did not trust them. For example, they persisted in seeing Jamal Abd al-Nasser as simply a pawn in the struggle between the colonial rivalries of Britain and America in the Middle East. Even after the Bandung Conference of 1955, the Soviet radio continued to describe Nasser as a tool of imperialism.⁹⁹

In the 1960s and after, Soviet ideas about armies in the Third World began to change. The Soviets realised the power of the military and that this was the only



group organised enough to hold power in the absence of vanguard parties. But they also emphasised the class element of the military, preferring the military of the lower class, and accused the military of being a bourgeois tool of colonial power.

Soviet *Izvestia* , 15 January 1965, supported this argument in Latin America:

“In Latin America military coups occur in countries with strongly pronounced class divisions in society. Coups as a rule are designed to strengthen the authority of the capitalist landowner clique which is closely connected with foreign monopolies and relies on the support of foreign powers.”¹⁰⁰

Also, the Soviet Union had seen the army as alternative to class; in the Soviet concept, when classes in the modern sense are embryonic, weak and unorganised in the newly emerging states in the Third World, the army can act objectively as the most important stable, broad and independent organisation. According to Lenin the army is not a class by itself, or a supra-class force; rather it is a tool in the hands of a certain class,

“In every class society, the oppressing class is always armed.”¹⁰¹

Despite the Soviet emphasis on the role of the military in the Third World, they have realised the weakness of the military without a vanguard party. In the Soviet view, if the victory of a revolution is to be made secure and a new society is to be built, there must be a party that reflects the ideology of the working class and bases its activities on a knowledge of the objective laws of social development. Moreover, an army lacking social and ideological unity will find itself split into two opposing camps as soon as it comes to choosing the road to national development.¹⁰² Vanguard parties would strengthen regimes against coups through their centralisation of power, politicisation of the military and mobilisation of the masses in support of the existing pro-Soviet regimes. Vanguard parties may also have facilitated the backing of a Soviet coup. Despite all Soviet efforts, its influence has only increased after coups with the military, as in Benin in 1972, Ethiopia

1974-1977, Afghanistan 1978, Southern Yemen in 1978 and Grenada 1979.

In Arab Maghreb states, as in other Third World countries, the military has emerged from the middle or lower classes. The military is the only organised and powerful group in the society, but the Maghreb states also have trade and labour unions which go back to the French colonial era. These were part of French unions but, despite them, the military has a powerful role. Most African military officers, particularly in Tunisia and Morocco, trained at French academic schools or had worked with the French before they joined the national armies after independence. The lack of confidence and trust in political parties in Maghreb states has given the military a potential role in the future.

In four out of the five states in Maghreb (Libya, Tunisia, Algeria and Mauritania), the military has been in power. Only Morocco has a civilian government with a King in control; but, despite this, the Moroccan military has been involved in many attempted coups.

Libya witnessed its first military coup in September of 1969, led by the present head of the Libyan government, al-Qaddafi, originally from the nomadic tribes of Libya, which are of the middle rather than lower classes of the country. There was much debate about the role of external powers in the Libyan coup. According to American and British sources, Libya's internal situation before 1969 was ripe for such a coup and political change, and the army was the only organised and powerful enough organisation to overthrow King Idris of Libya. The decline of King Idris's popularity and the presence of foreign military bases because of the Arab-Israeli conflict put the monarchical regime in danger.

The former American Ambassador to Libya, David Newsom, until shortly

before the coup in 1969, stated that there had been widespread rumours about a military coup. But, according to other reports, US officials knew ten years before that the King was unpopular. In a Presidential Committee study, March 1959, it suggested

“the possibility of grooming a reliable military elite for a future governing role merits thoughtful consideration. The creation of a national staff unifying the various forces at the top level may prove desirable as step toward facilitating the transfer of political power.”¹⁰³

According to the US sources the United States had seen the Military as a solution to the succession problem, national unity and the stability of Libya. Other reports to the White House from the National Security Council on 17 June 1967 stated the possibility of Nasser influencing Libya and thus putting pressure on Tunisia, which had a conservative pro-West government. Abd al-Hamid Bakoush, former Libyan Prime Minister and then a Libyan Ambassador in France, confirmed that Americans knew of the coup because he was told by the CIA station chief during a visit to the American Embassy in Paris two months before the coup. Mr. Bakoush later led an anti-Qaddafi group, with the support of the CIA and the Egyptian government.¹⁰⁴

Despite American denials of knowledge of the Libyan coup, it has been stated by Colonel Ted Lough, the head of the British military mission in Libya 1960-1966, that a lot of Libyan officers were pro-Nasser, anti-Western and particularly anti-American. Colonel Lough also stated that the British and American claims of ignorance were incredible. The British had a record on Qaddafi dating back to 1966 when he was under training in Britain. Wilbur Eveland, a former CIA officer who was involved in the Libyan affairs emphasised American Knowledge of the political situation inside Libya, and both the American oil companies and

American officials in Washington were well informed about the Libyan political upheaval.¹⁰⁵

Despite all these arguments, the Libyan army was only 5,000 strong, the USA and UK had military bases and an intelligence station in Libya. They had received reports of growing disturbances and popular unrest, so in this case the external factor played an important part in the Libyan military coup (see chapter five).

In Algeria, the FLN was the only organised group. Algerians had fought for their independence, and the FLN has been in power since independence in 1962. So the military operated through the legal powerful political organisation (FLN) until 1988 when the Algerian government allowed a multi-party system.

Since Algeria won its independence from France, President Ben Bella of Algeria was engaged in a power struggle with the army Chief of Staff, Colonel Boumedienne. Ben Bella's support came largely from local political leaders and from their guerrilla forces, while Boumedienne's strength was drawn from the regular army. When Ben Bella attempted to supplant the role of the army by creating a people's militia composed of guerrilla troops loyal to him, Boumedienne replaced Ben Bella as the head of state in a military coup in June 1965. The Soviet Union played no role in the coup, but they were affected by its consequences. While the removal of Ben Bella did not result in Algeria adopting a pro-Western stance, the strength of Algeria's Soviet alignment was diminished and Moscow had lost one of its earliest and closest friends in the Third World.

The US knew of the military coup before it occurred. On 24 November 1963, a CIA memorandum predicted a coup in Algeria and named Houari Boumedienne as its likely leader. The document outlined the kind of policy he was likely to

pursue.¹⁰⁶ One American source told the author that he had been informed of the coup when he was working as a consultant to American oil companies in Algeria in 1964. Whatever American knowledge of Algeria was, the Americans had evaluated the situation and the political struggle, and Boumedienne was not seen as pro-Soviet and thought to be easier to deal with than Ben Bella.¹⁰⁷ But it does not mean that the American had supported the coup. The American found themselves in position of being unable to stop internal struggle in Algeria.

In Tunisia the army had been isolated from politics during Habib Bourgiba's era, but had been brought in when there was political unrest. The rise of Islamic Fundamentalism in Tunisia, the struggle between trade unions and the conflict among the opposition groups had led to a reevaluation of the role of the army in Tunisia. In 1986, a study was released by MaxAir Force Base in the USA which focused on the role of the military in Tunisia after Bourguiba. In November 1987, Ben Ali ousted Bourgiba in a palace coup. Many sources confirmed Ben Ali's connection with America; when he held the presidency of Tunisia the military entered political life for the first time, and Ben Ali himself has worked all his career as a military man, trained in the US and France. Vernon Walters, after a trip to Tunisia in spring 1987, reported to the US government that Ben Ali and the military were the only force capable of holding power in Tunisia.¹⁰⁸

In Morocco, the military, despite its isolation from politics, had been involved in two military coups against King Hassan. The military played a complicated role in Moroccan politics after the two attempted coups and the war in the Western Sahara. The corruption inside the government, the frustration of the people with the political parties, and the military relationship between the King and external influences will be discussed in the following chapters.¹⁰⁹

3.8 Conclusion

The superpowers have used different means to penetrate the Third World countries and to extend their influence. At the same time, they try to limit or eliminate each other's influence. The Third World has become during the last three decades part of the superpowers grand strategy. In this chapter we have seen that;

- i. The United States' grand strategy in the Third World started directly after World War II. The US adopted its global approach and left its isolationist policy. It has sought to dominate the world as a global power economically, politically and militarily. During the first phase in the 1950s, the US was influenced by its strategy of containment in the Euro-Asia belt. On the other hand, the Soviet Union's policies evolved later and in reaction to the United States, and the Soviets have attempted to undermine the US containment policy, particularly in the Arc of Crisis, to reduce the Western presence in the area surrounding the Soviet Union, and to weaken the Alliance system which was formed by Western powers to control Soviet ideological and military penetration of the Northern belt. The Soviets adopted a cautious approach to the Third World and they have benefited from a stepping stone theory of expansion of their presence in the Third World, firstly in South East Asia, the Northern belt of the Middle East, and then in Africa and Latin America.
- ii. The two superpowers have been influenced in their foreign policy towards the Third World countries by the nature of their political systems. While Soviet decision making is more centralised and concentrated in the hands of the Politburo, practically eliminating the pressure of public opinion, the US has

a complicated decision making process which limits US action in the Third World. Congress, public opinion, the media and the Think Tanks have much influence on the foreign policy-making networks. Congressional restrictions on US foreign policy has led to many scandals and covert action to avoid public disapproval and congressional constraints.

- iii. The two superpowers have used ideology to legitimise their intervention and policy in the Third World. Although the Soviet Union has allied itself with leftist regimes and the US has not, neither superpower has insisted that its allies follow domestic policies similar to its own. The superpowers appear not to care very much about internal ideology or democratic values inside Third World countries. Superpowers are more pragmatic and realistic about achieving their interests, despite oppression and dictatorship. The USSR has ignored the communist parties in Third World countries when it has come to its own interests, and it has built relations with governments to protect these interests. The US has been more ideological in its aid to the Third World in many cases.
- iv. The two superpowers approached the Third World with new ideological perspectives after WWII, condemning European colonialism, and trying to replace Europe in the Third World. They have used their ideological perspectives as non- imperialist states, to attract the new independent states to their side. The two superpowers have supported national liberation movements with different concepts to liberation. The US concept of liberation is limited to self-determination and to political parties. The Soviet Union has a broad concept of liberation as being economic, social and political. The USSR has supported violence as a legitimate means to liberation. Theoretically, the

US has supported non-violence to achieve independence, but even so the US has encouraged the use of violence when it has been in its own interests. It has armed the Contras of Nicaragua, Unita in Angola, and Mujahedin in Afghanistan with weapons. The US displays inconsistent standards in its attitude to liberation movements.

- v. The two superpowers have approached the Non-Aligned movement with different perceptions. In the first phase of the movement, the US condemned the Non-Aligned movement and neutrality as immoral, then in the 1960s and after, the US supported non-alignment and has built up a relationship with Third World states which have potential and practical influence in the movement, and it has also encouraged its client states to join the movement. The US has penetrated the movement and has restrained its radicalism, and directed it towards a more conservative, moderate line. In 1979, the Havana Summit failed to side with the Soviet Union in spite of the Cuban proposal. In the case of the Soviet Union, it has supported non-alignment from the beginning because it has served USSR objectives, at least to limit Western influence, presence and military bases in the Third World. The USSR has supported non-alignment principles despite its disappointment with the movement's behaviour in the 1980s. The USSR has encouraged non-alignment to be neutral in East-West conflict if they do not wish to support the socialist camp.
- vi. The two superpowers have realised the value of the role of the military in the Third World. Soviet support for military regimes and coups in the Third World has been characterised as selective and it has been seen from a perspective of class struggle. In the case of the US, it has adopted the military coup as its strategy as a means to protect US interests. The 1960s were called the

Decade of the Generals because of the USA's leading role in the military coups in the Third World. From 1945 to mid 1985, there have been 183 successful and 174 unsuccessful coups in the Third World. The US strategy in these coups has been to overthrow regimes hostile to US interests, and to defend regimes from coups if this is in US's interest. The USA has trusted the military regimes in the Third World as more powerful, stable and easy to deal with than civilian governments, and moreover the military are more supportive to modernisation and to American secular values than other governments.

Notes

1. The USSR broke the United States atomic monopoly with an atomic test in August 1949. During 1950s the Soviet capacity for massive retaliation grew, and in 1957 Soviet ICBM tests had been monitored the missile gap in which the Soviet Union deploy ICBMs quicker and in greater numbers than USA. The USSR then had decisive superiority. See for Soviet and American Nuclear weapons. Freedman, Lawrence. *The Evolution of Nuclear strategy*, New York: St. Martins 1981. see also, Catudal, H. M. *Soviet Nuclear strategy from Stalin to Gorbachev*, Arnospitz: Berlin Verlag 1988, pp. 41-57, and also for more detail on American Nuclear strategy; Marc Tracjcnberg, A "Wasting Asset" American strategy and the shifting Nuclear balance 1949-1954" *International security* vol.13 no.3 Winter 1988-89, pp. 5-49.
2. For Marshall plan, see Joyce and Gabriel Kolko. *The limits of power*. New York: Harper and Row Publishers 1972, pp. 359-383, pp. 428-476, (Hereafter Kolko 1972).
3. Kolko, G. *Confronting the Third World: United States Foreign Policy 1945-*

1980, New York, 1988, p. 21, (hereafter Kolko 1988).

4. For the British-American struggle over oil in the Middle East see, - K. Kozarez, "Struggle of British and U.S. Monopolies for near Eastern oil." *Pravda*, June 11, 1953, p. 3 in the Current Digest of the Soviet press, vol.v no.23, July 18, 1953, pp. 19-20; Little, D. "Cold War and covert action the United States and Syria 1945-1958." *Middle East Journal*, vol:44 no:1, Winter 1990, pp. 51-75; Rubin, B. "America end the Egyptian Revolution" *Political Science quarterly*, vol: 97 vol.1, Spring 1982, pp. 73-90; Turner, L. *Oil Companies in the International System*, London; The Royal Institute of International Affairs, George Allen & Unwin, 1978; W. Lucas, S. "The Other Collusion: Operation straggle and Anglo- American Intervention in Syria, 1955-1956," *Intelligence and National Security*, vol:4 no.3, July 1989, pp. 576-595.

5. See, for Soviet and United States Policy toward Third World, Walter, C. Clements, J. "Soviet Foreign Policy since 1917: achievement and failure." *Survey a Journal of East-West studies*, vol:30 no 4(131), June 1989, pp. 87-112; Roger Kent. "The Soviet Union and the Third World from Krushchev to Gorbachev: The Place of the Third World in evolving Soviet global strategy." in R. Kant (Ed), *The Soviet Union. Eastern Europe and the Third World*, London: Cambridge University Press 1987, pp. 3-22; Alvin Z. Rubinstein. *Moscow's Third World strategy*, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1988, pp. 17-20; For Stalin, Cold War in Europe 1945-1953, Khrushchev peaceful coexistence and sino-Soviet conflict see, Ashton, S.R, *In Search of Detente. The politics of East-West relations since 1945*. London: McMillian 1989, Particularly chapters one and two. See also, Robert Tucker, "United States-Soviet Cooperation: Incentives and obstacles." *Annals of the American Academy of*

Political and Social Sciences, July 1967, pp. 1-16, Tucker used the concept of competitive coexistence or flexible coexistence to describe US-USSR cooperation in 1950s and 1960s.

6. For the meaning of Cold War see, Fred Halliday: "Triumph of the West" *New left review*, no.180, 1990, pp. 5-24; See also Thompson, K. *Cold War theories vol.1* Baton Rouge & London: Louisiana States University Press, 1981; Cox, M. "The Cold War as A System " *Critique*, vol.17 1986, pp. 17-82. Cox, M. "From Truman Doctrine to the Second Superpower Detente: The Rise and Fall of the Cold War" *Journal of Peace Research*, vol.27 no.1, 1990, pp. 25-41.
7. William Stivers. *American confrontation with revolutionary change in the Middle East 1948 - 1983*, New York: St Martins Press 1986, pp. 16-17. See also Cecil Crabb, Jr. *The Doctrines of American Foreign Policy*, London and Baton Rouge. Louisiana State University Press, pp. 153-186.
8. Such as alliances see for Baghdad pact, Ayesha Jalal. "Towards the Baghdad Pact: South Asia and Middle East in the Cold War 1947-1955." *The International Historical Review*, vol.xi no.3, August 1989, pp. 409-432; See also H.W. Brand. "Cairo-Tehran Connection in Anglo-American Rivalry in the Middle East 1951-1953" in *Ibid*, pp. 434-456; and for South East Asia See Roger Dingham. "John Foster Dulles and the creation of the South-East Asia Treaty Organization in 1954" in *Ibid*, pp. 457-477.
9. Despite the alliance systems which had focussed on military perspectives, according to George Kennen, the Father of Containment Policy, the objective was ideological containment more than military containment because the USSR was militarily weak compared to United States military power; See

- "X" [George F. Kennen]. "The Sources of Soviet Conduct" *Foreign Affairs*, 25 July 1947, and Also Kennen, "Reflection on Containment" in T. Deibel and J.L. Gaddis (ed). *Containing the Soviet Union*, London: Pergamon-Brassey's 1987, pp. 15-20, the book is about containment from different perspectives.
10. See Kolko, G, pp. 71-72; See also Stivers W. op cit, pp. 22-26; For more detail in USA policy during crisis, see the special volume on Suez Crisis. Louis W.R.A; Owen, Roger (ed). *Suez 1956: The crisis and its consequences* London: Oxford University Press 1989, Particularly chaps 10 and 12.
 11. Henry Kissinger, "Military Policy and Defence of the Grey Areas" *Foreign Affairs*, vol:33 no:3, April 1955, pp. 416-428; also Stivers, William, op cit, p. 38.
 12. Stivers, W, p. 3.
 13. See for Soviet historical policy in Northern Tier, Alvin Rubinstein. *Soviet policy toward Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan: the dynamic of influence*. New York Praeger 1982, pp. 3-23, see also Malcolm Yapp. "Soviet relation with the countries of Northern Tier" in A. Dawisha (ed). *Soviet in the Middle East* London: Heinemann Educational Books Ltd 1984, pp. 24-43.
 14. See for African Military Coups, *Izvestia*, January 15, 1966, p. 2, in *CDSP*, vol.xviii no.2 1966, p. 30. Also, Jenkins, J.C; Kposowa, A.J. "Explaining Military Coups d'Etat: Black Africa, 1957-1984" *American Sociological Review*, vol.55 no.6, December 1990, pp. 861-875.
 15. See for SALT treaty Robert Litwak. *Detente and The Nixon Doctrine*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984. See also George Breslauer "Why

- defence failed: An interpretation” in Alexander George (Ed). *Managing U.S-Soviet Rivalry problem of crisis prevention*, Boulder Westview Press, 1983, pp. 319-340.
16. Daniel Papp. *Soviet Policies toward the developing World during the 1980s*, Alabama Air University Press, 1986, pp. 14-19.
 17. Ibid.
 18. See, for French reaction to American nuclear strategy on Michael Harrison. *The Reluctant Ally: France and Atlantic security* Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1981, pp. 72-77; See also Lawrence Freedman op cit.
 19. D. Papp, 1986, op cit.
 20. See George Breslaner, op cit, p. 326.
 21. Stivers, W, *America's Confrontation with Revolutionary Change in the Middle East, 1948-83*, New York: St Martin's Press, 1986, p. 66.
 22. Papp, D. 1986, op cit, p. 14-25.
 23. Imam Zafar “Soviet Treaties with Third World Countries” *Soviet Studies*, vol. 35 no. 1, January 1985, pp. 53-61.
 24. See, for the exaggerated Cuban role in Soviet Foreign Policy in the Third World in Robert Johnson. “Exaggerating Americans stake in third world conflicts.” *International Security*, vol:10 no3, Winter 1985/86 , pp. 32-68; See also for the quotation Raymond L. Garthoff. *Defence and Confrontation American-Soviet relations from Nixon to Reagan*. Washington.D.C. Brookings, 1985, p. 514’ and for Soviet-Cuban relation see. Mark Katz. “The

- Soviet-Cuban Connection" *International Security*, vol:8 no.1, Summer 1983, pp. 88-112, and also Durch William "The Cuban Military in Africa and Middle East: From Algeria to Angola." *Studies in comparative Communism*, vol:11 nos:1-2, Spring-Summer 1978, pp. 34-74, also see Durch William, *The Soviet Union and Cuba: interests and influence*, New York: Praeger, 1985.
25. See, for Carter's Foreign Policy, William Stivers, op cit, pp 77-94. During Carter administration, there were two sides to his policy, the globalist (Hawks), Brzezinski, Harold Brown, Samuel Huntington and David Aaran, and the regionalists, Carter, Andrew Young and Cyrus Vance, see C. Crabb Jr, op cit, pp. 325-36.
26. For Carter Doctrine background, see Maxwell O. Johnson, *The military as an instrument of U.S. Policy in South East Asia*. Boulder (Colorado): Westview Press, 1983, pp. 5-45.
27. Z. Brezinski. *Power and Principles: Memories of National Security Council 1977-1981*. New York-Farrar, Straus, Giroux Publishers 1985, pp. 178-9; 184-5.
28. See for American Foreign Policy and Reagan Doctrine, Jack Wheeler, "In defense of Reagan Doctrine" in David Carlton and Herbert Levine, eds, *The Cold War debated*, N.Y: McGraw Hill Book Company, 1988, pp. 226-228; Christopher Layne, "The Real Conservative Agenda" *Foreign Policy*, no.61, Winter 1985-86, pp. 73-93; for Vietnam influence in USA Foreign Policy, see Elliot Cohen, "constraints on America's conduct of small wars" *International security*, vol.9 no.2, Fall 1984, pp. 151-181.
29. Jeane Kirkpatrick, *The Reagan Doctrine and U.S. Foreign Policy*, Washing-

- ton.D.C. Heritage Foundation, 1985. See also James Dougherty and Robert Pfaltzgraff, Jr. *American Foreign Policy from FDR to Reagan*. N.Y: Harper and Row Publishers, 1986, pp. 380-389.
30. Papp, D, 1986, pp20-25; and also Rubinstein Alvin, 1988, op cit, pp. 260-275.
31. For linkage Politics see James Rosenau, ed, *In Search for Global Pattern*, New York: Free Press, 1976. James Rosenau, *The Adaptation of National Societies: A Theory of Political System Transformation*, N.Y: McCaleb-Seiler 1970, p. 1; See also Kissinger, H, "Domestic structure and Foreign Policy." *Daedalus*, vol.95 no.2 Spring, 1966, pp. 503-529.
32. The authoritarian governments merely see to monopolize authority, or political power, leaving the existing economy, social structure and cultural or religious patterns largely to tradition or market forces, while the totalitarian governments are those which seek to monopolize control over over the totality of life in the society they have seized, including economic, religious and cultural matters. For the concept of totalitarian states see Vernon Aspaturina "Soviet Foreign Policy" in Roy Macridis, ed, *Foreign Policy in World Politics*, sixth edition, New Jersey, Prentice Hall Inc, 1985, pp. 170-245. also see Donald Barry; C. Barry, *Contemporary Soviet Politics*, second ed, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc, 1982; and an excellent analysis in Soviet domestic politics and Foreign Policy see, Alexander Dallin, "The domestic sources of Soviet Foreign Policy" in S. Bialer, (ed). *Domestic context of Soviet Foreign Policy*, Boulder: Westview 1981, pp. 335-408; See Jon Glassman. "Soviet Foreign Policy decision making" in *Columbia Essays in International Affairs* vol:11 1967, pp. 273-402. See also Bell, C. *The Reagan Paradox*, Aldershot

(UK): Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 1989. p. 102.

33. See for Khrushchev era F. Teher & R.F. Miller, *Khrushchev and the Communist World*, London: Croom Helm, 1984; also see Alexander Dallin, op cit; and also S. Bialer, "Soviet Foreign Policy, sources perception and trends" in Bialer, op cit, pp. 409-441. For military influence in Soviet Foreign Policy during Khrushchev. see Mark Katz, *Third World in Soviet Military thought*, Maryland and Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1982, pp. 16-30; and other chapters to Brezhnev years. See also Alvin Z. Rubinstein, 1988, op cit pp. 19-27; and also Dallin, op cit, p. 348. See for military role in Khrushchev struggle over power in Jerrey Azrael, *The Soviet leadership and the Military High Command 1976-1986*, Rand Corporation, R-3521-AF Santa Monica, 1987.
34. Malcolm Mackintosh, "The Soviet military influence in Foreign Policy" *Problem of communism*, vol.xxii no.5, September-October 1973, pp. 1-12; and see David Holloway, "state, society and military under Gorbachev" *International Security*, vol:14 no 3, Winter 1989-90, pp. 5-24; also Kenneth Currie, "Soviet General Staff" *Problem of Communism*, vol.xxxiii no.2, March-April, 1984 pp. 32-40; and Walter Jacobs, "Soviet Strategic Effectiveness" *Journal of International Affairs* (New York), vol.26 No.1, 1972, pp. 60-71. See also regarding Elite in Foreign Policy, William Zimmermann, "Elite Perspective and Explanation of Soviet Foreign Policy" *Journal of International Affairs*, vol:xxiv no.1 1970, pp. 84-98. For military-civilian relation see Jerrey Azrael, *The Soviet-civilian leadership and The Military High Command 1976-1986*, Rand corporation no. R3521-AF Santa Monica, 1987.

35. Adam Ulam and Russian Nationalism in S. Bialer, ed, op cit, pp. 3-18.
36. See Hannes Adomeit, "Soviet Foreign Policy Making: The internal mechanism of global commitment" in H. Adomeit, R. Boardman, W. Wallace, *Foreign Policy in Communist countries*, London: Saxon House, 1979, pp. 15-48, specially p. 37. See also Neil Malcom, "Soviet decision making in the Middle East" in P. Shearman & Phil Williams (ed), *Superpowers, Central America and the Middle East*, London: Brassey, 1988, pp. 90-104.
37. Jeremy Azrael, p. 1. For more detail on the role of International Department of CPSU, and the KGB, see Kramer, M, "The Role of the CPSU International Department in the Soviet Policy Relation Security Policy" *Soviet Studies*, vol.42 no.3, July 1990, pp. 429-446. McFaul, M. "The Demise of the World Revolutionary Process: Soviet-Angolan Relations Under Gorbachev" *Journal of Southern African Studies* vol.10 no.1, March 1990, pp. 165-189. Knight, A.W. *The KGB: Police and Politics in the Soviet Union*, London: Unwin Hyman, 1988, pp. 288-299.
38. Jon Glassman, op cit, also for Soviet decision making processes see Richard Starr, *USSR Foreign Policies after Detente*, Stanford (CA): Hoover Institution Press, 1985, pp. 21-42; and also see McFaul, M, op cit; McFaul adopted the idea that Gorbachev was more democratic in his Foreign Policy than his predecessors; the central Committee have gained greater power under Gorbachev, he also explains the role of the ministry of Defence and Foreign Affairs but Shevardnadze has suggested that past mistakes in Soviet Foreign Policy were made in part because the Foreign Ministry was not in control of Decision Making.

39. Robert Art, "American Foreign Policy" in Roy Macridis (ed), *Foreign Policy in World Politics*, (sixth ed), New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc, 1985, pp. 114-169; see also J. Nathan, James Oliver, *Foreign Policy making and the American Political System* Second Edition, Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1986.
40. Foreign Policy powers of President and congress, in the *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, vol:499, Sept 1988, pp. 148-159; See also Nathan, J & J Oliver, *ibid*; See also Howard Wiarda, "The Paralysis of Policy: Current Dilemmas of U.S. Foreign Policy Making" *World Affairs*, vol:149 no.1, Summer 1986, pp. 15-20.
41. Papp, Daniel, *Contemporary International Relation*, New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1984, pp. 60-73; and also Nathan and Oliver *Ibid*, pp. 130-180. See also Egya Sanginuah, "Interest groups and Decolonization" *Maghreb Review* vol:no 34, 1988, pp. 161-174. See also Robert Art: "Congress and the Defense Budget" *Political Science Quarterly*, vol:100 no.2 Summer 1985, pp. 227-248.
42. The full text of War Powers resolution see Robert Turner, *The war powers resolution; its implementation in theory and practice*. Philadelphia: Foreign Policy research institute 1983, pp. 143-147; See also Michael Rubner, "The Reagan Administration, the 1973 war powers resolution and the invasion of Grenada" *Political Science quarterly*, vol:100 no.4, Winter 1985-86, pp. 627-647. See also Fred Greenstein, "The dynamic of Presidential reality: Evidence from two Vietnam Decisions" *Political science quarterly*, vol:104 no.4 Winter 1989-90, pp. 557-580.

43. See for CIA and the Congress John Johnson, *American secret power, The CIA in a democratic society*, Oxford: Oxford University Press 1989, pp. 20-21; 183-184, and also Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, *The CIA and American Democracy*, London & New Haven Yale University Press, 1989, pp. 200-214; See also Samuel Huntington, "Coping with the Lippman Gap" *Foreign Affairs*, vol:66 no.2, 1987/88, pp. 453-477.
44. See for the dependence on Foreign Forces Andrew Terrill, "Jordan and the Defense of Gulf" *Middle East insight*, vol:4 No.1 1985, pp. 34-41, See also Al-Bursan, *Rapid Deployment Forces and the stability of South West Asia*, unpublished research paper Spring 1986, pp. 26-36. See also Johnson M. op cit (1983); and T McNaugher, *Arms and Oil*, Washington.D.C: Brookings Institution, 1985.
45. Egya Sangmuah, 1988 op cit; Also for the personality of the president, and the role of individual in International relations, see Herbert Kelman, "The role of individual in international relations: Some conceptual and methodological consideration" *Journal of International Affairs*, no1:xxiv no:1, 1970, pp. 1-17.
46. See for more detail in case of Moroccan Arms sale Stephen Solarz "Arms for Morocco" *Foreign Affairs*, vol:58 no.2, Winter 1979-1980, pp. 278-299; and Leo Kamil, *Fueling the Fire US Policy and the Western Sahara Conflict*, Trenton New Jersey: The Red Sea Press, 1987, pp. 46-57; and for more details in Bureaucratic conflict over Foreign Policy and Iran, see Zbigniew Brzezinski 1985, op cit, pp. 354-400 and Brzezinski, "NSC's Midlife crisis" *Foreign Policy*, no 69 Winter, 1987-88, pp. 80-99. See also for conflict inside National Security Council Staff, Constantine Menges, *Inside National Security*

Council, New York: Simon and Schuster 1988; Also see Carter, Jimmy, *Keeping the Faith*, New York: Bantam Books, 1982; Cyrus Vance, *Hard Choices: A Critical Years in American Foreign Policy*, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983; and for the struggle between Intelligence Community see, Franklyn Holzman, "Politics and Guesswork: CIA and DIA estimate of Soviet Military spending" *International Security*, vol:14 no.2 Fall 1989, pp. 101-131; and for conflict over Iran arms deal, see Casper Weinberger, *Fighting for Peace: Seven Critical Years at the Pentagon*, London: Michael Joseph 1990, pp. 248-270; and see for struggle inside the State Department Bary Rusin, *Secret of State: The State Department and the struggle over Foreign Policy*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985.

47. See Eliot Cohn, 1984, op cit.

48. James Nathan & J. Oliver, pp. 200-225; See also Michael, Roskin, "From Pearl Harbour to Vietnam: Shifting Generational Paradigms" *Public opinion quarterly*, no.89 Fall 1974, pp. 563-588, and for use of USA military abroad see Bruce Russet and Miroslay, "American opinion on the use of Military Force Abroad" *Public opinion Quarterly* no:91, Fall, 1976 pp. 411-431 and also B. Russet and Donald R. Deluca "Don't Tread on me: Public Opinion and Foreign Policy in the Eighties" *Public Opinion Quarterly* no.96 Fall 1981, pp. 382. See also V.O. Key, Jr, *Public opinion and American Democracy*, New York: Knopf, 1961, pp. 552-54; and Spencer, Donald, *The Carter Implosion. Jimmy Carter and Amateur style of diplomacy*, New York: Praegar 1988, p. 119. In the World of Geopolitics if you lose one place you will be tested in another. If you lose successively, you will be tested in more and more ways. If you start not even to put up a fight every one will start to bully you." For

- electoral cycles, see William Quandt, "The electoral cycle and the conduct of Foreign Policy" *Political Science Quarterly* vol:101 no.5 1986, pp. 825-836. See also Phil Williams and S. Croft, "US decision-making and the Middle East" in Peter Shearman and Phil Williams (ed), *The superpowers, Central America and the Middle East*, London: Brassey's Defence Publishers 1988, pp. 59-74.
49. Egya Sangmuah, 1988, op cit.
50. Papp, D, 1984, pp. 68-75. See for more details on Chile and CFA John Edelman Sepro, *Politics of International Economic relations*, N.Y: Martin's Press Inc, 1981, pp. 230-233.
51. Douglas Waller, "Foreign Aid Follies" *Newsweek*, April 16 1990, pp. 22-23, and for interest group in general see Chambers, F. P. "Interest groups and Foreign Affairs" *The year book of World Affairs*, London: Institute of World Affairs, Stevens and Sons Limited 1954, pp. 220-241.
52. J. Nathan & J. Oliver pp 233-237.
53. Albursan, A. "American Universities and American Foreign Policy" *Al Majalla*, no.415, January 20-26, 1988, pp. 20-22 (in Arabic).
54. Peter Baehr, "Think tanks who needs them: Advising a government in Democratic Societies" *Future*, June 1986, pp. 389-400. See also E.J. Donne, Jr. "After decades of rehearsals: War Experts leave the stage" *International Herald Tribune*, May 31, 1990, p. 8.
55. Ibid.

56. Butterfield, Ian. *Morocco: An ally in Jeopardy*, Backgrounder no:185, Washington D.C. The Heritage Foundation, 1982. For Libya Backgrounder no.27 "Responding to Libya's Terrorist War" October 10 1986, and Backgrounder update no.3 "Libya must pay a price for Terrorism" January 9 1986. See also James Phillips, "Problems mount for Libya's Gaddafi" Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No.42 April 14 1987.
57. There are many studies which have been conducted for various intelligence organizations towards Third World Countries and stability. See for example:
1. Richard Bett and Samuel Huntington, "Dead Dictators and Rioting Moles: Does the Demise of Authoritarian Rulers lead to Political Instability" *International Security* vol:10 no.3, Winter 1985/86, pp. 112-143. 2. Hair Dekmejian prepared his book for the Defence Intelligence Agency see his book, *Islam in Revolution: Fundamentalism in the Arab World* New York: Syracuse University Press 1985. Also Nevada Safran has a CIA connection in his Islamic Fundamentalism in Harvard University 1985 and his book in Saudi Arabi was sponsored by CIA. See MERIP report Oct-December 1985 p. 33, and his book Nevada Safran, *Saudi Arabia: ceaseless quest for Security*, Cambridge(Mass): Harvard University Press, 1985. The CIA paid \$107,000 for the book, see *MERIP Report*, nos. 136-137, October-December, 1985.
58. George Kennen had focused on American ideological containment rather than on the containment of Soviet Military adventures. See for Containment Policy, T. Deible & J. Gaddis (ed) op cit.
59. Hans Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations*, sixth ed, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985.

60. See for the debate of ideology and Foreign Policy in Hannes Adomeit, "Soviet Decision Making and Western Europe" in E. Mopreton and G. Segal *Soviet Strategy toward Western Europe*. London: George Allan and Unwin, 1984 pp. 39-84. See also Barrington Moore, *Soviet Politics: The Dilemma of Power*, Boston: Harvard University Press, 1950; Chapter 17 and also Alfred Meyer "The Functions of Ideology in Soviet Political System." *Soviet Studies* vol: xvii no.3 January 1966, pp. 273-85.
61. Robert Tucker, op cit, See also Kirby, S. "National Interests versus ideology in American Diplomacy" in Benewick, et al, (ed), *Knowledge and Belief in Politics, the Problem of Ideology*, London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1973, pp. 227-244.
62. The Soviet Russian Imperialists record toward Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan was ignored or deemed irrelevant by most Third World Countries.
63. Francis Fukuyama "The Tenth Period of Soviet Third World Policy" Santa-Monica: Rand R-7390, October 1987.
64. Kennan, G. See Footnote No.9.
65. Spainer, John, *American Foreign Policy since World War II*, 8th edition, New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston 1979, pp. 112-136.
66. For political and ideological vacuum in Islamic World see, Carl Brockelmann, *The History of Islamic Peoples*, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd, 1952, pp. 443-508. The abolition of the Caliphate led to Kurdish uprising, Indian Muslims revolt, Arab Nationalist ideology, Turkish nationalism and the division of Islamic world and regional conflict over borders, and the Palestinian

- issue. See also, Dawn, C. Ernest, *From Ottomanism to Arabism*, Chicago, London: University of Illinois Press, 1973.
67. For USA and Alliance System in Middle East see Ayesha Jalal, *op cit*. See also H. W. Brands, *op cit* and Roger Dingman, *op cit*.
68. See Ted. Galen Carpenter "The U.S.A. and Third World dictatorships: A case for Benign Detachment" in Steven Spiegal (ed): *At issues: Politics in World*, Area Fifth ed, New York: St Martin's Press, 1988, pp. 9-23; p. 13.
69. Melvin Gurtor and Ray Maghroori, *The Roots of Failure United States in the Third World*, London, Westport: Greenwood Press, 1984 pp. 24-25.
70. Jean Kirkpatrick, "Dictatorships and Double Standards" *Commentary*, November 1979, pp. 34-45.
71. Spanier, John, *op cit*, p. 129.
72. George Shultz, "Morality and realism in Foreign Policy" *Current Policy* . no:748, Department of State Bureau of Public Affairs Washington D.C. 1986.
73. *Ibid*.
74. Martha Gellhorn, "The demand of Panama City" *Weekend Guardian* June 30-July 1 1990, pp. 3-6.
75. R. Maghroori & M. Gurtov. *op cit*, p. 26.
76. Rubinstein 1988, *op cit*.
77. See, for human rights issues in US Foreign Policy, Jerome J. Shestack "Human rights, the National interest, and U.S. Foreign Policy" *Annals of the American*

Academy of Political and Social Science, vol:506 November 1986, pp. 17-30, and see also Aryeh Neier "Human rights in the Reagen Era. Acceptance in Principles" in *Ibid*, pp. 30-41. See also David Forsythe, *Human rights and U.S. Foreign Policy: Congress Reconsidered*, Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1989.

78. See *Pravda*, June 28 1965, pp. 2-3 for Soviet Union and the National Liberation Movement in CDSP vol:xvii no.26 1965 and Alvin Z. Rubinstein op cit p. 80. See also, Margot Light, *The Soviet theory of International Relations*, London: Wheatsheaf Books 1988, pp. 111-135.
79. The Soviet Support for PLO has been oriented by Soviet national interest in the Arab World not completely by ideological consideration. For theoretical details of Soviet involvement in Third World Liberation Movement, see Golan, Galia, *Soviet Union and Third World Liberation Movements*, 1988; and for case studies see Richard Shultz, *Soviet Union and revolutionary Warfare*, Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1988.
80. Rubinstein 1988, pp. 90-100.
81. *Ibid*, p. 97.
82. S. Neil MacFarlane, *Superpower Rivalry and Third World Radicalism: The idea of National Liberation*, London: Groom Helm, 1985, pp. 198-205.
83. Francis Fukuyama, "US - Soviet interactions in the Third World" Rand-Occasional papers, OPS-004 March 1985, pp. 7-15.
84. McFarlane 1985, pp. 210-212.

85. See William M. LeoGrande "Evolution of the Non-Aligned Movement" *Problems of Communism*, vol:xxix vol:1, Jan-Feb 1986, pp. 35-52.
86. Ibid, see also for Soviet objective in Non-Alignment John Reshetar Jr, "The Soviet Union and the Neutralist World" *Annals of American Academy of Political and Social Science*, vol:362 Nov 1965, pp. 102-112.
87. Roy Allison, *The Soviet Union and the Strategy of Non-Alignment in the Third World*, London: Cambridge University Press, 1988, p. 3.
88. See W. LeoGrande, op cit.
89. Cecil Crabb Jr. "The United States and the Neutralists: Adecade in Perspective" *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Philadelphia, PA, November 1965, pp. 92-101. See also G. Kolko, 1988, p. 62 and Jackson, R.L. "United States and Non-Aligned Movement." *Review of International Affairs* 37:860 1986.
90. The group of 77 first created in 1964 wields a sizeable influence in UN Affairs. The group of 77 by 1982 numbered over 100 states is still retained its original name. See Daniel Papp, 1984, p. 77.
91. See for more details, Roy Allison, 1988, op cit, pp. 111-125.
92. Ibid, pp. 43-46.
93. See Samuel Huntington, "Political development and Political decay" *World Politics*, XVIII April 1965, pp. 386-430. and also Huntingtons, *Political order in changing societies*, New Heaven: Yale University Press, 1968, pp. 220-228; See also for more detail John Johnson (ed), *The Role of Military in*

- Underdeveloped Countries*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962; and particularly, Manfred Halpern, "Middle Eastern Armies and the new middle class" in *Ibid*, pp. 277-315. Also see Henry Bienen (Ed), *The Military Intervenes*, New York: Russel Sage Foundation, 1968, pp. xiii-xxiii.
94. See Keith Hopkins, "Civil-military relations in developing countries" *The British Journal of Sociology*. London vol.xvii vol:2, June 1966, pp. 165-182.
95. Kolko G. 1988, op cit, pp. 132-139.
96. See Anwar El-Sadat, *In search of identity*, London: Collins St, James Place 1978, p. 108 ; See also Kolko G. *Ibid* and Steven David, *Third World Military Coups D' Etat and International Security*, Baltimore & London: John Hopkins University Press, 1987, and also Steven David, "Soviet Involvement in Third World Coups." *International Security*, vol:11 No:1, Summer 1986, pp. 3-36.
97. Kolko, G. 1988, p. 133.
98. Heikal, M. 1978, p. 23, see for the history of military coups in Syria, Douglas Little 1990, op cit, and Copeland, Miles. *The game of Nations*. New York: Simon and Schuster 1969, and his book *The Game Player*, London: Aurum Press, 1989. The author was a former CIA agent and he described his contacts in the Middle East and its military coups in detail.
99. Heikal, M. 1978, op cit.
100. See V. Kudryavtsev. "African Tremors" *Izvestia*, January 15 1966, p. 2 in *Current Soviet Digest of Soviet Press*, vol:xviii no:2, February 1966, pp. 30-32.

101. Y. Zhukov , et al, 1970, pp. 186-200.
102. Ibid.
103. See "Case Studies of the military Assistance Program in North Africa (Libya) and Latin America (Brazil)," in "A Study of the United States Military Assistance Program in Underdeveloped Areas" Annex C, in William Draper Committee, March 1959, pp. 55, 78-80; Eisenhower Library, cited in Cook, B, *The Declassified Eisenhower*, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc, 1981, pp. 329-332. See also, McConnell, J, op cit, p. 25.
104. See D. Blundy and Andrew Lycett, *Qaddafi and the Libyan Revolution*. Boston: Little Brown and Company 1987, pp. 44-70, see also for the role of America in Qaddafi Coup, P. Edward Haley. *Qaddafi and the United States since 1969*. New York: Preager publisher, 1984, pp. 20-30 , see also John Cooley, *Libyan Sandstorm*, London: Sidgwick & Jackson 1982, pp. 10-14, see also P. Seale and M. McConville: *The Hilton assignment*, London: The Quality book club, 1974. According to the opposition information, Egypt Supports Bakoush and USA has approved that support.
105. See Cooley, J., op cit; Blund and Lycett, op cit; Eveland, Wilbur, *Ropes of Sand: America's Failure in the Middle East*, London: W.W.Norton & Company, 1980, pp. 316-317.
106. Walter Laqueur, *A World of Secrets: the Uses and Limits of Intelligence*. New York: Basic Books Inc, publisher, 1985, footnotes no.58, p. 360. See also Stephen David, op cit, p. 71 and for the full account of international situation before Boumedienne Coup see Fathi-Al Dib. *Abdel Nasser et al Revolution Algerienne*. Paris, Editions L'Harmattan, 1985, pp. 421-430, the

book published in Arabic and French.

107. Interview with W. Beling, an American Consultant to American Oil Companies in Algeria before the Revolution, Los Angeles, Fall, 1982.
108. See, Dianna Johnstone. "What's playing in the Mediterranean Theatre French scenarios" *ZETA Magazine* vol:1 No.1, January 1988, pp. 37-42 and also Fred Halliday, "Tunisia's uncertain future" *Middle East report*, March-April 1990, pp. 25-27. See for the role of military after Bourguiba, Lewis B. Ware, *Tunisia in the post-Bourguiba Era: The role of the military in a civilian Arab Republic*, Maxwell Air Force Base (Alabama), Air University Press, February 1986.
109. The author feels at home in Morocco, and he has been following Morocco's internal politics since 1976. See also, G. Joffe, "Morocco: Monarchy, Legitimacy and succession" *Third World quarterly* vol:10 No.1, January 1988, pp. 201-228, and also John Waterburg. "The Coup Manque" in E. Gellner & Charles Micaud, eds, *Arabs and Berbers: From Tribe to Nations in North Africa*, London Duckworth, 1972, pp. 397-424, and for Moroccan Political structure, see Mark Tessler "Morocco: Institutional Pluralism and Monarchical Dominance" in W. Zartman et al, (Ed). *Political Elites in North Africa*, London: Longman, 1982, pp. 35-84.

Chapter IV

Maghreb relations with the US and Soviet Union: From World War One to Independence.

4.1 Introduction

Maghreb relations with US and Russia reach back to the eighteenth century, when the US attempted to protect its shipping from piracy in the Mediterranean. As Russian shipping was also affected by piracy, Tsar Alexander, threatened to send Russian ships to North African coasts to protect American and European ships. Russia had built up commercial relations with North Africa and assigned a British merchant James Simpson as a Russian Consul in Tangier. Russia was also concerned to protect its routes to the Atlantic.

Maghreb relations with Russia were affected by Turkish-Russian relations because the North African states, with the exception of Morocco, were part of the Ottoman Empire. North Africans fought alongside Turkish Muslims against Russia, and many North African sea captains had answered the call of the Grand Sultan during his war with Russian in the Black Sea.¹

This chapter focuses on Maghreb relations with the US and the Soviet Union between the two world wars; on the role of the US and the Soviet Union in the movement for the independence of the North African states; and the superpowers objectives and means during this period.

4.2 Maghreb-US relations

Before North African states independence, Maghreb relations with the US can be divided into two phases: first, prior to World War Two; second, during World War Two. The second phase is a turning point in the US-Maghreb relation because of American landing forces in North Africa. The North Africans saw the United States as a great power and had much influence over France after the latter defeat in the war. On the other hand, the United States started to perceive the Maghreb from new American global strategic interests.

4.2.1 Maghreb-US relations prior to World War Two

The first US contact with the Maghreb was the establishment of diplomatic relations and a permanent consulate in Morocco in June 1786 for the protection of commercial interests and the safety of American citizens. In 1785, Morocco had almost entirely given up sea raiding; but Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli continued to send out their armed cruisers in the Mediterranean. Most of the Christian nations were quite willing to pay cash or its equivalent for the privilege of having their ships trade in the Mediterranean unmolested. The US paid North African principalities for the safety of its ships, and sometimes it engaged in hostilities to protect its citizens and ships. It finally signed a treaty of friendship with Algiers in September 1795, with Tripoli (Libya) in November 1796, and with Tunisia in August 1797.² While the Monroe Doctrine restrained the US from pursuing an active role in the Maghreb, there was another important factor exercising a restraining influence on US-Maghreb relations. It was the special diplomatic relations with France, in contrast with other European powers.³ Until the Second World War, and even until now, the “**French element**” in the Maghreb has required special attention

in the formulation of US foreign policy in the Maghreb.⁴

When the French began to settle in Algeria, they were confronted with strong resistance by the Algerian leader Abd al-Kadir al-Jazauri. In order to gain political support and secure weapons against French occupation, Abd al-Kadir offered the US the Algerian coast if it would assist him against France. The US, unwilling to antagonise France and unconcerned about European affairs in the Maghreb, refused to assist Abd al-Kadir in his resistance against the French occupation.⁵

Morocco took a positive attitude towards the US. As expressed by an American consul, the US was in Moroccan eyes

“about the only nation that attends to its own business and that acts upon just and bilateral principles.⁶”

In deterring European intervention, Morocco continuously and forcefully fought to win American support. During the 1849 crisis over French rights in Morocco, the Moroccan sultan tried to submit the dispute to American arbitration, but France rejected arbitration and demanded direct negotiations.⁷

In 1871, Sultan Sidi Mohammed appealed to the new American consul in Tangier for greater American support for Morocco. He went as far as requesting that the US bring Morocco under its direct protection. The US government declined to make such a commitment. In 1904, the Moroccan government turned to the US and Germany to obtain loans, both of which rejected the Moroccan request.⁸ When French ambitions in Morocco were being realised, Sultan Abd al-Aziz of Morocco wrote a letter in 1906 to President Theodore Roosevelt indicating that

“we also confidently hope that your good offices and those of your great nation will be vouchsafed to this Moroccan Empire in accordance with the traditional pure love which has always existed between your most exalted nation and our ancestors

and our Shereefian Empire and thus shall the existing state of affairs be improved and the empire of Morocco shall realise its fondest hopes.”⁹

In the closing decades of the 19th century, American public opinion and American officialdom perceived Germany’s aim in Europe and elsewhere to be disruptive to the political balance of power of the world system. The US supported France (the second state to have recognised the US after Morocco) in its ambitions in Morocco. However, the US supported the open door policy in Morocco. It is interesting to note that America was the first to popularise this policy when Secretary of State, John Hay tried to get the European nations to agree to the principle of an open door policy for China in 1898.

After WWI the United States focussed on its commercial interests in North Africa and its trade relations with the region. The United States adopted an official neutral position on the Riffian war between Amir Abd al-Karim and Spain despite Amir Abd al-Karim’s appeal to the American Charge d’ Affaire in London, he sent two letters to the latter, the first one, was in January 1922, it recited a long list of grievance which had implied to the Riffians, but the only aid to the Riffians came from an American volunteer organization, the “*American Friends of the Rif*” which established the America’s Commission for the Rif. The Commission’s objective was to secure justice and autonomy for unconquerable people. The Commission also condemned Spain for its graft, inefficiency, and exploitation.¹⁰

4.2.2 US-Maghreb Relations during World War Two

The international system changed during World War Two. Many factors influenced this change. These factors also affected the Maghreb: the defeat of France in 1940; the Atlantic Charter of August 1941; the landing of American

forces in the Maghreb 1942; the Casablanca (Anfa) Conference of January 1943; and the Tehran Conference later in 1943.

When France was defeated in 1940, the defeat shook President Franklin Roosevelt's confidence in France and influenced his attitude about Morocco's future relations with France. In August 1941 in his eighth point of the Atlantic Charter, Roosevelt promised decolonisation and freedom of all colonies under European power. He emphasised decolonisation for all countries, European and non-European, and stressed self-determination for all countries.¹¹

The landing of American forces in Casablanca, Oran and Algiers, in November 1942 added another card to the hand of Maghreb national movements which they could use to try to win their independence from France. This was the beginning of *operation Torch*, the American portion of the combined Anglo-American operation to drive Rommel and the Axis Forces out of Northern Africa. By April 1943, 400,000 American troops were in the Maghreb, and by the end of that year the operation had been brought to a successful conclusion. The American presence had a substantial psychological and social effect on the nationalist movements. Farhat Abbas, the Algerian nationalist, sent on 20 December 1942 (just six weeks after the American landing) a "*Message of the Muslim Algerian Representatives*" to the responsible authorities, the Anglo-American landing forces. This was the first time Americans were mentioned in the nationalists' petitions. By the end of 1943, the Moroccan nationalists had collected signatures for an independence manifesto which was presented on 11 January 1944 to the embassies in Cairo of the governments of France, US, Britain and Soviet Union.¹² The North African nationalists perceived the American presence as having the capability of bring about fundamental change in the status of their countries because they became

aware that France was no longer the power it had been.

Roosevelt tried to create a favourable atmosphere for the alliance forces in the Maghreb by promising independence for the Maghreb states. During the Casablanca Conference of January 1943, President Franklin Roosevelt and the British Prime Minister, Winston Churchill met with the Sultan of Morocco, separately from the French authorities. According to the Sultan's conversation with the President, he believed that the US would support Moroccan and Algerian demands for independence. Both the Algerian and Tunisian nationalists also contacted Roosevelt in Casablanca in order to win American support for their nationalist cause.¹³ It is interesting to note that the Maghreb soldiers in the French army had fought together with the Allied forces against the German forces. Moreover, the Sultan himself refused the German and Vichy government demands to attack the Moroccan Jews. Some leaders of Maghreb nationalist movements visited Germany, such as Balafrej and Taqi Adden al-Helali from Morocco; al-Hamami from Algeria; Abd al-Rahman Yaseen from Tunisia. However, there were no serious promises from Germany except for a hint that, were the Axis Forces victorious, Italy would replace France in North Africa. Accordingly, the Maghreb nationalists ignored Hitler and Germany's request for co-operation. The Sultan of Morocco refused to receive the German representative in Morocco, pledging support for the Allies, despite the French collapse and defeat.¹⁴

General Franco of Spain had sympathy with Hitler during World War Two, and the Allies tried to put pressure on Spain from bases in the northern part of Morocco. In 1947 France, for its own interests, tried to bring back Amir Abd al-Karim al-Katabi (the Amir of the Rif, see chapter two) from exile in Reunion Island. The French objective was to lean on the Sultan of Morocco because of his

Alliance with the Moroccan National Movement against France, and threatened him with being replaced by al-Katabi. The US had different objectives from those of France. The Americans tried to use al-Katabi as a card against Spain in Northern Morocco that the historical leader of the Riff might encourage the Riffian to revolt against Spain. It seems, however, that Britain was cleverer than either, for when the news reached Cairo, the leaders of the Maghreb nationalist movements, who were in exile in Egypt, arranged for al-Katabi to land in Egypt during his passage from the Suez Canal. This was without the knowledge of France. It is hard to believe that the plan, which was approved by King Farouq of Egypt, was without the knowledge and approval of Britain. The British tried to influence the Maghreb nationalist movements by allowing them to use Cairo as a centre for their activities against the French, and as a place for exile. Britain also attempted to increase her popularity in North Africa in general, and in Morocco in particular, because of British and Spanish conflict over Gibraltar.¹⁵

It is perhaps surprising that despite the depths of the Maghreb's co-operation with the Allies and to the cause of Free France during the war, France ignored North Africans efforts and their achievement in the war and refused to give independence to the Maghreb states. The blow to North African aspirations came out of Brazzaville Conference, 30 January 1944, when General de Gaulle pledged that France would lead the colonial people in Africa down the road to integration in the French community. General de Gaulle refused the United States and Britain's request to send Allal al-Fasi back to Morocco with his endorsement of Moroccan independence. It was a sign to the North Africans that despite their support for the Allies and their fighting against the Axis Forces, there was no hope of independence for them.¹⁶

The most important change after the war was that the American attitude in favour of decolonisation hardened. The US clashed with France and Britain over Morocco and Libya respectively. This clash was part of the American global strategy after World War Two as a leading world power to replace the European allies in their colonies.¹⁷

At the Tehran Conference in 1943, the US and the Soviet Union reached a preliminary agreement on the need for decolonisation to continue after the war. The US, with the world economy in mind, had encountered many obstacles to its economic and commercial interests in the restraints and protection of colonial areas. The American experience with French economic restrictions was well known, and according to French scholars, the Americans challenged the French in North Africa,

“The Franco-Moroccan conflict may be considered as having begun on 22 January 1943 with the meeting at Anfa between Sultan Mohammed ben Yousef and President Franklin D. Roosevelt.”¹⁸

The US perceived Morocco as a strategic and economic asset after the war. The US urged the Maghreb towards independence. King Hassan II of Morocco (then Crown Prince) described President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s position regarding Morocco:

“If he had not died, the US would not have failed to accelerate the process of liberation of Morocco.”¹⁹

The most serious crisis between France and the US over Morocco came when France issued a decree on 30 December 1948, restricting imports from outside the French zone by imposing a special licensing control for such imports, at the same time exempting France and other parts of the French union. The US protested at the French restriction, and American businessmen appealed to Congress. They

succeeded in attacking the Hickenlooper amendment to the French economic aid bill in 1951.²⁰

According to the Hickenlooper amendment, economic aid would be withheld from France if it failed to comply with the existing treaties of Madrid (1880) and Algeciras (1906). When the US government submitted the case to the International Court of Justice, the Court's decision was in favour of the US government. The decision stated that the 1948 decree by the French authorities in Morocco was a clear violation of the Algeciras Treaty. The US saw the Maghreb as part of its global strategy after the Second World War.²¹

The effects of World War Two on Libya were significant: 1. Italian colonial rule had been brought to an end by the Allies, after the Italian and German defeat in North Africa. 2. The war created a limited alliance between Amir Sayyid Idris (then Amir of Cyrenaica and the head of Sanusi order who was in exile in Egypt and later on the King of Libya until 1969) and the British. Idris succeeded in dominating those of his countrymen who were alarmed about the dangers of antagonising the Italians, and he resisted the approaches of those who argued that the alliance should be made only on the basis of a promise of independence. 3. Under British organisation and command, a Sanusi Force was recruited, eventually numbering some 10,000 men, to take part in the Libyan Campaign, and to embrace those Libyans who deserted from the Italian Army. 4. On the defeat of the Axis armies, Libya was placed under British and French military administration, the British responsible for Cyrenaica and Tripoltania, the French for Fezzan.²²

When the peace treaty with Italy was signed in 1947, Italy renounced all claims to its colonies, and the allies agreed that the problem of Libya should be

taken to the General Assembly of United Nations if no settlement were agreed. Libyans were opposed to the partitioning of their country. Moreover, British interests appeared secure, reinforced by the continuing alliance with Idris which produced an agreement for Cyrenaican independence shortly before the UN vote of October 1949. In November, a U.N resolution was proposed calling for the establishment of Libya as a sovereign state no later than January 1952, with the assistance of the U.N Commissioner. The resolution was upheld by a vote of 48:1 with 9 abstentions. Rivalry between the European partners had prevented an imperial division of Libya under the guise of trusteeship. On 24 December 1951, the Kingdom of Libya was proclaimed and diplomatic relations established between Libya and the United Kingdom and the United States of America.²³

Regarding the Libyan question, the US had denounced in 1949 the proposal for the partition of Libya between the British, French and Italians. The US saw this partition of Libya as an imperialist method of control, and the US supported self-determination for Libya and the unity of the country. The Americans had pushed for the independence of Libya as a part of the grand design of American strategy towards the Maghreb and the whole of the Middle East. American reaction in Libya it was hoped would affect the French position in Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco. W.R. Louis explained the American support of Libya in terms of the American desire for independence for the Maghreb. He stated that

“the State Department continued to press the idea of Libyan independence in the hope that the pressure on the French might force them to move in the same direction in Tunisia, Morocco and even in Algeria.”²⁴

After Libya won its independence, the Americans and British built their military bases in Libya for strategic reasons connected with the Mediterranean area. In the assessment by the British Chief of Staff, they regarded Libya as the future

pillar of British strategy, because it might affect the strategic balance of power in North Africa and the Mediterranean.²⁵ A major advantage for Britain was the siting of alternative bases to the Suez base in Egypt as a route to East Africa and the Far East.

The US was successful in negotiating the continuation of the lease of its base at Wheelus Field, for which a payment of \$42 million over the period 1954-1971 was agreed, together with immediate aid in the form of wheat valued at \$3 million. During the Libyan monarchy the US maintained close relations with King Idris until his overthrow on 1 September 1969. In the 1950s, Libya welcomed the Eisenhower doctrine and received visits from Vice-President Richard Nixon and Eisenhower's special representative, James P. Richards.

The discovery of oil in Libya added a new dimension to the strategic value of Libya, and American oil companies were encouraged in Libya. In November 1955, the first concessions were granted to American oil companies.²⁶ It is interesting to note that France was unsuccessful in its attempts to secure military bases in Libya. The US was strongly against French bases anywhere in Libya, because of the French presence in Algeria. By the end of 1956, all French troops were withdrawn from Fezzan.²⁷ During the Algerian war of liberation against France 1954-1962, Libya became a supply route for arms coming from Egypt through Libyan desert to Algeria. Libya and Egypt were strong supporters of Algerian independence.

4.3 Maghreb Independence and International Trade Unions.

The US was unable to announce directly and unequivocally its support for Maghreb states' independence. This was for strategic and political reasons on the eve of the cold war. US relations with France took precedence over the indepen-

dence of the Maghreb. The French role in NATO was vital to the US strategic interests in Europe. The Americans used two approaches to avoid French criticism of American official support for Maghreb: first, the US government encouraged American trade unions to push for Maghreb independence through international trade unions. Second, it built direct contacts with the leaders of the Maghreb labour unions. During the Tangier Conference of American Consular officials in North Africa, in June 1949, the conference suggested to the State Department that it appoint a regional labour attache for Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria. According to the official report

“It was unanimously agreed that the labour attache and political officers should co-operate intimately in view of the obvious close connections between labour problems, politics and more particularly communism.”²⁸

American relations with Maghreb labour unions would prevent communist influence on one hand, and avoid the disruption of American relations with France. The American behaviour was influenced by the cold war and possible communist influence in North Africa and Franco-American relations in NATO.

4.3.1 Superpowers and International Trade Unions

International trade unions played a major role in superpower relations with Third World countries, particularly with the Maghreb states. They supported the struggle of the Third World trade unions for independence, decolonisation and national aspirations. Neither superpower wanted to disrupt their relations with Western Europe. In the 1950s and early 1960s, the two superpowers used the international trade union movement to support the Third World indirectly. The Soviet Union used the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) to penetrate the trade unions of Western Europe and Third World countries, whilst the US

controlled the Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU). The US had used ICFTU as a tool of influence in American relations with the Third World trade unions and national liberation movements. Since WWII the United States, had become seriously interested in foreign labor as part of its global concern. Reflecting this new interests the States Department in 1944 created the post of labor attache, a position often staffed by men with the American Federation of Labour (AFL) or the US Congress of Industrial Organisations (CIO) connections.²⁹

4.3.2 The Creation of the World Federation of Trade Union

At a congress held in London and Paris in 1945, the British Trades Union Congress, the French Confederation of Labour, the Soviet Trade Unions and the US Congress of Industrial Organisations (CIO) combined to form a new organisation the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU). Its headquarters were in Paris. The new organisation had a wide programme of construction, social reform, and political independence and economic development for Third World countries. During the first two years of its existence, the WFTU made rapid progress and began to exercise influence in the construction of Western Europe and in the Trade Union movements in Asia, Africa, Latin America and in the United Nations.

After World War Two, there were sharp political differences inside the WFTU because the world had become ideologically split into two camps. Moreover, there were other factors which had led to the division of the world labour movement. The opposition of the Soviet Union to the Marshall Plan of 1947 had shocked the leaders of the labour unions of Western Europe and the US. The active role of American Federation of Labour (AFL) inhibited co-operation with Soviet Trade Unions or with their allies in other countries. Failure to compromise on political

and ideological issues led to split in the WFTU, in 1949, and to the creation of new international Labour Unions. After the split, the WFTU underwent a change in its composition, structure and character: about 90% of its eighty million members were now in the Eastern Bloc.³⁰

It is interesting to note that the Soviets did not create the WFTU, but captured it after it was established and had had a good start. In the 1950s, the WFTU had had affiliates in the Middle East such as in Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco and Sudan, but it did not win much support in the Maghreb states, especially after independence, except in Algeria.

4.3.3 International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU).

The Soviet domination of WFTU led to the creation of a new International Federation. The British Trades Union Congress and the central labour organisations of several other western European countries and the US Congress of Industrial Organisations (CIO) broke with the WFTU and in December 1949 created the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions. The US dominated the new Federation behind the scenes. The American Labour Movement took positive stands on foreign aid, nuclear armaments, totalitarianism, colonialism, the Hungarian revolt, the Berlin wall, and other big issues of the post-war period. Labour formulated these stands largely within the context of the cold war which remained a dominant consideration in the American Labour movement's foreign relations, particularly with North African Labour movements.

The ICFTU was the first international labour organisation to be accepted as the sole representative of free world trade and labour unions. It was an American tool to penetrate the Third World. The CIA and State Department used it as

a cover for their activities in Third World countries. The CIA also dominated the regional branches of the ICFTU. The US government's objectives were to use the ICFTU to oppose communism, to adopt a strong anti-colonial position and to provide aid directly to international areas through the ICFTU.³¹

4.3.4 WFTU, ICFTU and the Maghreb Labour Unions

The Maghreb Labour Unions from its foundation were part of French Trade Unions, except in Libya which was under Italian control. During the period between the two world wars, the Maghreb Labour Unions in Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco formed independent labour unions, and tried to contact international labour unions to win support for their national cause.

1. Tunisia and American Labour Movements:

The Tunisian Labour Union was part of the *French Confédération Générale du Travail* (CGT). On 20 January 1946, in response to the broadening of Tunisian nationalist aspirations, the *Union Générale Tunisiene du Travail* (UGTT) was established as an autonomous organisation and split from its parent organisation, the CGT. In the meantime, there was another small group, which had also broken away from the French CGT, such as the *Union des Syndicats des Travailleurs de Tunisie* (USTT) which had also raised the nationalist issue. The latter (USTT) was dominated by the communists, and sought unification with the UGTT, but without success. Finally, in 1956 it dissolved itself and its members sought admission on an individual basis to the UGTT which became the strongest trade union in Tunisia.

When the UGTT applied to join WFTU in 1946, the WFTU sent a team to investigate the UGTT's qualifications for affiliation. However, the WFTU approved

the communist-oriented USTT in 1947 instead, rejecting the UGTT application. After a hard struggle inside WFTU, and when the non-communist unions walked out of WFTU Executive Bureau session in Paris, January 1949, the UGTT were finally admitted into the WFTU. The failure of the WFTU to support Tunisian nationalist aspirations led the UGTT to renounce its affiliation to WFTU in July 1951. The UGTT decision was taken under the pressure of US Consul General John Jernegan in Tunisia.³²

The Tunisian Neo-Destour party and UGTT had cooperated in the fight for Tunisian independence. In December 1946 Bourguiba, the leader of Neo-Destour, visited the US to win American support. He returned home frustrated. The cool American reaction to Tunisian demands was due to a number of factors. First, the ignorance of American public opinion about North African issues. Second, the effectiveness of French propaganda there regarding the Maghreb. However, Tunisia did win strong support for its cause from the American Federation of Labour (AFL). The AFL protested strongly to the French authorities for using force against Tunisian strikers. In 1951, when the UGTT applied for membership of the ICFTU, the AFL supported its application, and a very close relationship developed between the UGTT and the American controlled ICFTU.³³

The UGTT's link with the ICFTU and American labour groups secured international support for both the Union and the Neo-Destour party. In addition to funds, the Union gained many contacts outside Tunisia. Irving Brown of the AFL in Europe, who had connections with the CIA and US State Department invited Ferhat Hached, the General Secretary of UGTT, and Habib Bourguiba, of Neo-Destour, to attend the 1951 AFL Convention in San Francisco, arranging for them to meet State Department and other government officials. Brown also arranged for

Bourguiba to broadcast his criticism of French colonialism on the Voice of America (VOA) radio.³⁴

When the Neo-Destour party leaders were arrested in January 1952, Hached assumed an enlarged role in the Neo-Destour party. The Sub-Committee of the ICFTU Executive Board in emergency session in March, 1952, condemned the measures taken by the French authorities against the arrest and the freedom of speech in Tunisia. Moreover, the ICFTU protested directly to the French authorities, when the later subjected Hached to search on his return from an ICFTU meeting in Brussels. In February, 1952, the AFL Executive Council passed a resolution favouring immediate Tunisian internal autonomy and negotiations between the French and the Neo-Destour to prepare for full national independence. The French authorities were aware of Hached's relationship with the ICFTU and AFL and this led to his assassination in December 1952 by the French settlers in Tunisia. In July 1953, with AFL support, the Third ICFTU Congress adopted a strong anti-colonial position, the AFL support for Tunisian national cause continued until Tunisia won its independence in March 1956.³⁵

The US won Tunisia in terms of the cold war, because the outcome of the ICFTU-WFTU conflict in Tunisia was obviously in favour of ICFTU. During the early 1950s, there was a struggle over the policy of the Neo-Destour party towards France. Bourguiba favoured a compromise with the French over Tunisian independence. Bourguiba's policy toward France was influenced by his personal and cultural relations with France. He married a French woman, was affiliated with French culture, and was awarded a degree in French law. Saleh ben Youssef, who was the general-secretary and controlled the Neo-Destour party in Bourguiba's absence in 1945-1949, took a strong line against the French. This political difference

led to confrontation between Bourguiba and Ben Youssef over control of the Neo-Destour.³⁶ Saleh ben Youssef was more orientated towards Arab nationalism and the Tunisian role in the Arab world. He built up a warm relationship with Nasser of Egypt, and when he was ousted from Neo-Destour in October 1955, he left to live in exile in Cairo, from where he plotted to overthrow the Bourguiba regime in Tunisia until he was assassinated in Frankfurt, August, 1961.

In summary, the ICFTU gave strong support to the Tunisian independence movement; the UGTT in turn became one of the ICFTU's strongest supporters. Ahmed Talili, the new secretary general of the UGTT, became a member the ICFTU's executive board. The ICFTU itself held its fifth World Congress in Tunis in 1957, the first time it had been held outside Europe. The UGTT played a major role in Africa against the WFTU, and was used as a tool to strengthen the ICFTU in Africa.³⁷

2. US and Morocco's independence:

The Moroccan Trade Union movement began in the 1930s, when Moroccans had been forced off the land to work in the colonial economy. The French policy toward Moroccan workers led the workers to establish a secret organisation and anti-colonial movement. After the Allied Forces landed in Morocco in November 1942, the Moroccan workers began to rebuild the Unions mostly under the sponsorship of the *Confédération Générale du Travail* CGT, because the French authorities had refused to recognise autonomous Moroccan unions. In May 1951, the Moroccan workers staged a large demonstration against the French. They also protested in December 1952 at the assassination by the French of Ferhat Hached, the Secretary General of the UGTT in Tunisia. In late 1951, the Moroccan workers

elected Taib Bouazza the first Secretary General of the Moroccan trade union, before it formally announced in 1955. The election came as a challenge to the French authorities, who were still refusing to recognise the Moroccan trade unions. On 20 March 1955, the *Union Marocaine du Travail* (UMT) was formally established, and was closely allied with the Istiqlal party in its struggle for independence. Mahjoub Ben Seddiq was elected as the Secretary General with strong support from the Istiqlal party.³⁸

The Americans used a different approach to strengthen their position in Morocco. Through the AFL and ICFTU, they offered training and support for Moroccan nationalists and trade unions. Irving Brown, head of the AFL's office in Europe who acted as unofficial agent to the State Department and George Meany the head of the AFL, helped Moroccan nationalists to open an office in New York. They also offered financial aid to Moroccan Trade Unions and African national movements. As in the case of the Tunisian UGTT, the AFL and ICFTU supported the Moroccan UMT in the UN, and put pressure on the French to offer independence to Morocco. At the same time as Irving Brown was arranging American support, he was also used as a cover for the CIA and US State Department connections with Morocco.³⁹

After World War Two, the US used an unofficial approach to influence events in Morocco. In 1947, the leaders of the Moroccan nationalist movement opened an office in New York with Mehdi Banounni as its head. The Moroccans tried to win support in the UN and draw in American public opinion. Banounni described his relation with the Americans in Tangier and in the US as a competition between the Americans and French. For instance, the American Consul in Tangier, Edwin Plitt, had issued a travel document to Banounni to travel to New York. According to

Banounni's account, he was helped by a CIA official, W.M. Hamilton who argued with the Consul to help Banounni because Banounni's passport would not be valid in the US. Rom Landau, an American Jew, had also connections with Moroccan nationalist leaders such as Ben Barka and the American, Benjamin Rivin of New York University, was a strong supporter of the Maghreb, particularly Morocco. He used his academic skills to encourage American public to support the Maghreb cause.

On the other hands, the Moroccan nationalists sought to broaden their contacts with the Americans. Abd al-Latif Sbihi, editor of *La Voix Nationale* in Morocco, formed the *Roosevelt Club* in the summer of 1943, which lasted until Morocco's independence in 1956. The Club was a place where social contact between the Moroccan elites and American political and military officials could take place. Thus the Americans were in contact with Moroccan nationalists without antagonising the French and, they also tried to influence the Moroccan elites. Its members for the most part became political independents, few of them joined the Istiqlal party, and others, have dominated the Moroccan government, such as Ahmed Reda Guedira, who is now the Special Advisor to the King of Morocco.⁴⁰

When the French ousted Sultan Mohammed V in August 1953 sending him to live in exile in Madagascar (Malagashi) and replaced him with a puppet Sultan Ben Arafa, the Americans, in spite of their quiet diplomacy, put pressure on France to return the deposed Sultan from exile. Nationalist Moroccans formed the Liberation Army and carried out a liberation war against the French. The Atlas mountains and the Rif, under Spanish control, were where the Liberation Army had its strength. Spain under General Franco did not recognise the new Sultan, and allowed the Moroccans to broadcast anti-French propaganda from Rif

Radio. However, Americans played great role to Moroccan cause through clandestine relations between the CIA (formerly the OSS and after 1947, the CIA) and the nationalists, by use of the AFL and its influence in ICFTU, and through the General Assembly and the Security Council of the UN. The US also used Latin American votes in the UN to support North African independence.⁴¹

3. US and Algerian Independence:

The American Federation of Labour was less active in Algeria before 1956. The only reported case was in November 1953, when the US Consul in Algiers, Leon Dorros learnt that the AFL's European Office gave the *Mouvement Pour le Triomphe des Libertés Démocratiques (MTLD)*, \$90,000 for a new printing press that was used to publish the MTLD's weekly newspaper *L'Algerie Libre*. The MTLD was a middle class organisation it was formed when Messali al-Haj transformed the *Parti de Peuple Algerien* into the MTLD which also transformed in 1955 into the *Mouvement National Algerien (MNA)*. The MTLD was not a trade union, it was formed as a political party to work for the Algerian cause, but after the creation of the FLN, the MTLD in its new form MNA entered in serious conflict with the FLN which led to the domination of FLN over political struggle against France.⁴²

In 1956, the Algerian trade union, the *Union Generale du Travailleurs Algeriens (UGTA)* was created, when the FLN ordered Algerian to leave the French trade unions. The UGTA claimed 150,000 members and it joined the ICFTU in 1956 with active support of the American labour movements. The Americans used the ICFTU as a channel of communication with Algerian nationalists through UGTA, and in 1957, the Algerian issue was dominant at the ICFTU's

Fifth Congress in Tunisia. The ICFTU's position on Algeria was based on recognition of the right of the Algerian people to self-determination. The ICFTU sent a mission to Algeria, led by Irving Brown. The mission was banned from entering Algeria by Governor General Roberte Lacoste, who accused Brown of planning to give a million US dollars of AFL-CIO Funds to Algerian fighters. Governor Lacoste also repressed the UGTA, which moved from Algeria to Tunisia where the AFL-CIO supplied it with facilities and training.⁴³

When the Algerians declared the war of independence in 1954, the US was handicapped by the French role in NATO and cold war issues. France insisted that the issue in Algeria was a Communist attempt to take North Africa. The French government tried to use the communist threat to win domestic support inside France to its policy in Algeria. Also, this ploy by France was intended to force NATO members to support the French position. The major issue was whether NATO forces should be used only inside NATO, rather than outside NATO as preferred by the French. The shift in American policy came after Senator John Kennedy (later President Kennedy) delivered a major speech on African independence, particularly focusing on Algeria.⁴⁴ In 1957, at a Congressional meeting John Kennedy criticised Eisenhower's policy towards North Africa, particularly towards the Algerian revolution, he stated

"The President and Secretary of State ... hereby are strongly encouraged to place the influence of US behind efforts, either through the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation or through the good offices of the Prime Minister of Tunisia and the Sultan of Morocco, to achieve a solution which will recognise the independent personality of Algeria and establish the basis for a settlement interdependent with France and the neighbouring nations; and be it further resolved, that, if no substantial progress has been noted by the time of the next United Nations General Assembly Session the United States support an international effort to derive for Algeria the basis for an orderly achievement of independence."⁴⁵

Senator Kennedy feared alienating Third World nationalist movements, which

could push them towards the communist world. Kennedy recognised that Algeria was no longer solely a French problem in a cold war era.

Despite criticism by US Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, of Senator Kennedy's speech, Dulles still used the speech to put pressure on France. Tunisia asked the US for weapons, threatening that if he did not receive Western support, Bourguiba might turn to the Soviet Union. There were rumours that Russian weapons had reached Algeria through Egypt. It was clear that the French participated in the Suez Crisis of 1956, partly because of Nasser's support for the FLN. When the FLN announced the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic in Cairo, it was recognised by Tunis and Rabat. The US did not recognise it because of French influence.

When Kennedy was elected US President in 1960, the French were aware of his attitude towards the Algerian Revolution. During 1961 a coup was attempted and rumours spread in France about American involvement in the attempt against de Gaulle. In practical terms, President Kennedy proved considerably more restrained on the Algerian issue than Senator Kennedy indicated he might be. Kennedy was acutely conscious of the French role in NATO, and despite his sympathy with Algerian nationalism, he stressed American support for France in Algeria, even while trying to find a political solution to the Algerian crisis. President Kennedy tried to keep France in NATO to strengthen Western Europe defence against the Soviet Union. It seems that there was contradiction in the US foreign policy toward the Algerian issue, but the American interests in NATO were more important than Algeria. Kennedy also used unofficial channels to support Algeria through American labour movements. After De Gaulle announced the French desire to negotiate with Algeria, then President Kennedy felt free to announce American

support to Algerian independence. At that point the official American contact with FLN began. On 17 October, 1961, the first high level talks with the FLN were started with the American Ambassador in Tunisia.

The US applied double standards in its policy towards North Africa. While publicly announcing US support for France through diplomatic channels and public statements, the US encouraged North African nationalists to achieve their independence. The US had been using American Trade Unions and their influence in international trade unions to support North African independence. Moreover, the American officials went further to support North African nationalists with information on the French labour movement. The American Consular officials in North Africa suggested that,

“the Office of Intelligence Research could usefully supply the North African posts with any studies prepared on the French labour movement and more specifically on the present status of French labour organisations and their inter-relationships.”⁴⁶

Between 1958 and 1962, the CIA took an important step for helping the Algerian cause and it organised secretly vouchered educational grants for Algerian students who were expelled from French universities because of their nationalist activities. The CIA also helped a leading literary opponent of French colonialism, Franz Fanon to an extent that apparently annoyed de Gaulle .

“while the State Department had cordial relations with government of France, the CIA was secretly helping Algerian nationalists in their fight for independence. Franz Fanon, the Algerian philosopher of revolution, was flown to Washington and treated at CIA expense for the cancer that eventually killed him.”⁴⁷

France was afraid of being replaced in North Africa by the US. On the eve of the cold war, however, the US was more afraid of communism than of failing to meet nationalist aspirations in North Africa, and the Arab world. The French government feared the nationalists more than the communists in the Maghreb because

the French communists supported the French Empire. Arab public opinion was strongly against France because of its harassment of nationalists and the kidnapping of Algerian nationalist leaders, which activities forced Morocco and Tunisia to ask for American political support and military aid.

Finally, most NATO members refused to use the NATO forces outside Europe and no European country supported the French demands that North Africa was part of French NATO or believed French rhetoric that the struggle in Algeria was between the communist and France in North Africa, it was nationalist struggle for independence and not for Soviet influence in Algeria. France rhetoric for using the cold war was unsuccessful to win NATO members for her help in Algeria.

4.4 Soviet-Maghreb Relations

Russian contact with the Maghreb states began many centuries ago. Letters of friendship were exchanged between Catherine II and the Sultan of Morocco, Mohammed Ben Abdullah around 1782-1783, which led to commercial relations between the two countries.⁴⁸ Other Maghreb states, Libya, Tunisia and Algeria, were part of the Ottoman Empire. Their strategic location on the Mediterranean and their involvement in trade and piracy affected relations with Russia as with other European countries.

After the Congress of Vienna in 1815, Tsar Alexander proposed an international squadron in the Mediterranean to abolish piracy. Britain refused to agree to any plan which would admit Russian warships into the Mediterranean. Britain feared that Russia was merely seeking a pretext to secure a naval base there from which to attack Turkey.⁴⁹

During the second half of the 19th century, Russian explorers and travellers had journeyed through North Africa. In 1848 and 1857 the anthropologist A. Alexandrovitch visited Tunisia and Algeria and Colonel Berens travelled to Algeria respectively. In 1877 the explorer P.S. Tchihatcher travelled to Algeria and Tunisia.⁵⁰

In 1880, Russia attended the Madrid Conference and the convention of the Conference discouraged any foreign intervention, thus safeguarding the independence and territorial integrity of Morocco until the beginning of the 20th century. The Russian government signified its adherence to the convention on 4 April 1881,⁵¹ and a Russian consulate was opened in Tangier in 1890.⁵² The Russians participated in and played a role in the two Moroccan crises. Russia attended the Algeiras Conference in 1906 and also supported French policies in North Africa during the Agadir crisis in 1911 because Russia was more interested in the Far East, South and Southwest Asia (the Northern Tier and the Gulf). Russia tried to get French support against Britain because the latter was the only European country that was challenging the Russian interests there. The Russians were also against the German policy in Morocco, and supported French demands because Germany had strong relations with the Ottoman Empire. The Russian policy was to win the support of France for Russian adventures in the Far East and in Southwest Asia.

4.4.1 Soviet-Maghreb relations between two world wars :

In 1924 Lenin denounced the Italian occupation of Libya. After the Russian Revolution of October 1917, a new Soviet foreign policy had been formulated. Lenin had focused on the strategic and geopolitical importance of North Africa in

fighting capitalism, and European power in particular. Lenin stated that

“the road to Paris goes through the Maghreb.”⁵³

When Stalin held power in the Soviet Union after Lenin’s death, he stated on 19 January 1925 that a new international situation faced the Soviet Union. He related the question of the colonies to the internal security of the Soviet Union, and North Africa was a part of the colonial question in Stalin’s perception.

“All this shows that forces being prepared and regrouped throughout Europe in connection with the complications beginning in the Far East, and with the new prospects opening in North Africa. All this is the premiss of a new war. And a new war is bound to touch our country.”⁵⁴

Moreover, Stalin argued that the communist element in North Africa could create a united front against imperialism.⁵⁵ The most important factor in Russian relations with North Africa emerged during the Rif war in Northern Morocco when Abd al-Krim announced the “Rif Republic” against Spanish occupation. The French press accused the Soviet Union of supporting Abd al-Krim. The Soviet ambassador to France, Krassin, issued in August 1925, an important statement denying Soviet involvement in the Rif war

“As to the reports in certain French and foreign newspapers that the government of the USSR has sent envoys to Abd el-Krim [sic] and has given financial help to the Rif leader, may I state, officially and in the most categorical terms, that these reports are devoid of any foundation whatever, and that the Soviet government has never intervened and is not intervening in any way whatever in the events in Morocco, and has no relations whatever with the Moroccans.”⁵⁶

However, despite Soviet denial of their involvement in Rif affairs in Morocco, the Soviet representatives in Europe in 1926 had proposed participation in the International Conference. According to the Soviet representatives, they saw the involvement of Russia in the Algeiras Conference of 1906 as giving them rights to attend any conference related to Moroccan affairs. The Soviet Union were interested in involving themselves in Maghreb affairs at an international level despite

their internal problems and their conflict in Europe.⁵⁷

During the 1930s the Soviet Union involved itself in North Africa through local communist parties, although all the communist parties in North Africa were a part of the French Communist Party. More important, the founder leaders of the communist parties in North Africa were Jewish (the Algerian Jews were French citizens according to the Cremieux decree of 1870), for example the founder of the communist party in Morocco was Leon Sultan, from the Jewish minority there. In Muslim society such as in North Africa the Communists had less influence on the events. The Bolsheviks had little knowledge of the region and relied mostly on information provided by the French communist party.⁵⁸ After the end of the Second World War, Russia showed interest in the Mediterranean and saw great strategic value in the North African states. In fact, the Soviet Union requested the Allies to allow them bases in Libya and Morocco.⁵⁹

Despite Soviet interest in the Italian colony of Libya as a trust territory, the Soviet Union maintained an intense and vocal opposition to colonialism in Africa. However, closer examination reveals certain paradoxes and inconsistencies which in fact diluted the Soviet anti-colonial role until the mid 1950s. Stalin was hostile to national bourgeois leadership into which virtually all African leaders came.⁶⁰ But he felt the transfer of power to this group greatly weakened the prospects of communist parties and he recommended a united front between the communist and the national bourgeois to strengthen the revolutionary process against the imperialist. He stated that:

“For countries like Morocco, where the national bourgeoisie has so far no reason to split into a revolutionary and a conciliatory party, the task of the communist elements is to do everything possible to create a united national front against imperialism.”⁶¹

Ironically, the French Communist Party, was not committed to the abolition of French empire in Africa. The French communist party argued that once a proletarian regime had been established in France, the colonial problem would automatically disappear, simultaneously with the end of capitalist exploitation.⁶² The French communists only changed their attitude toward Algeria after the Algerian bloody war was well under way. It is interesting to note that Stalin had never viewed the Third World as a major element in Soviet foreign policy, so he did not pay much attention to the Third World during his reign.

4.4.2 Soviet Union and Maghreb independence :

The Soviet attitude toward North Africa was influenced by two elements: first, the Soviet Union saw its relations with the Maghreb in terms of East-West relations in the eve of the cold war. Second, Soviet-French relations played a major role in influencing the Soviet perspective towards the Maghreb. For example, when Libyan independence was under consideration in the General Assembly of the UN, the Soviet Union, in January 1953, submitted a draft to the effect that the General Assembly considered it essential that all foreign troops and military personnel must be withdrawn from Libya, and all military bases there must be evacuated within three months. The Soviet Union was against military bases in Libya because of the Soviet national security in the Black Sea and the Mediterranean. The Soviet Union also opposed the admission of Libya to the UN because of the American and British there. Despite Libyan independence in December 1951, it was only until September 1955 that Libya and USSR had agreed to diplomatic relations.⁶³

The Soviet Union criticised French behaviour inside North Africa by interpreting French local reforms in Tunisia and Morocco as part of a French conspiracy

against the Maghreb nationalists' demand for independence. But despite the Soviet criticism of the French, the Soviet Union was aware of the American military and economic presence in North Africa, because the Soviet saw the presence of weak France in North Africa as less harmful to Soviet interests than the presence of strong America in North Africa.

“The North African countries have been covered with a network of American military and air bases. Wall Street monopolies are pumping important strategic materials out of this region. Between 1950 and 1952, exports from the French colonies to the U.S.A have risen in value as follows: 89% from Morocco , 49% from Tunisia and 7% from Algeria”.⁶⁴

When the French authorities in Morocco removed the Sultan of Morocco from his throne and sent him into exile, in 1953, the Soviet press reaction praised the Sultan's refusal to bow to French demands in Morocco, and accused the US of approving the French action. The Soviet Union also condemned jointly the US, Britain and France in the UN Security Council in refusing the petition of 15 Arab-Asian states for the return of Sultan Mohammed V to Morocco.⁶⁵

However, the Soviet support for North Africa was political and the Soviet did not get involved in military aspects of North African national movements. The Soviet's first priority was to protect Soviet interests in Europe, and the Soviets had no wish to disrupt their relations with France over North Africa because the French role in NATO was an important factor in Soviet strategy.

There was not much Soviet support to Tunisia, but the Americans were more active in Tunisian independence. However, when Tunisia won its independence, the Soviet Union established diplomatic relations in June 1956, three months after Tunisian independence, and in August 1958, ambassadors were exchanged between Morocco and the Soviet Union.⁶⁶

4.4.3 Soviet Union and Algerian Revolution :

Despite Soviet support for the national liberation movement and the Soviet Union's anti-imperialist policy, the Soviet interests were orientated more towards Europe, South East Asia, the situation in China, and in the Northern Tier of Middle East or Southern frontier of Soviet Union. When Algeria declared their war of Liberation against French occupation, the Soviet Union paid little official attention towards Algeria, but the Soviet Press criticised the French policy in Algeria. On 7 July 1956, after two years of Algerian revolution, the Soviet newspaper *Pravda* stated:

“The Soviet Union has always been opposed to all forms of national oppression and its representatives to the French-Soviet talks held in May 1956, expressed the hope that the French government, acting in a liberal spirit, would be able to find the right solution for this important problem in the spirit of the times and in the interests of the people. It is well known that the spirit of the times is expressed by the fact that the old colonial system is being destroyed and is becoming a thing of the past. Those who try to oppose this inevitable historical process doom themselves to defeat. The example of the peaceful settlement of the Moroccan and Tunisian questions could be very helpful in this matter.⁶⁷

Pravda, the communist party official newspaper expressed the Soviet concern, but in practical terms the Soviet Union was more cautious than to risk supporting Algeria with economic and military aid. In the 1957, the third anniversary of the Algerian revolution, French Journalist, and specialist on Soviet affairs, Michael Tatu, pointed out that the Soviet media rarely reported on the Algerian liberation organisation, FLN. He attributed this neglect to Moscow's reluctance to see the influence of a weak France replaced by that of a strong US in Algeria.⁶⁸

In February 1958, the Soviet government announced its first contribution of any kind to the Algerian refugees in Tunisia and Morocco. Seven months later, during a visit to Egypt by N.A. Mukhitdinov, a member of the CPSU's Presidium and Secretariat, a Soviet official, met for the first time with representatives of the

Algerian Provisional government which had recently been established in Tunisia to enhance the FLN's bargaining position. In December 1958, an FLN mission visited Moscow, but was refused diplomatic recognition and left empty-handed, and even had its request for Soviet arms rejected.⁶⁹

When de Gaulle returned to power in autumn 1958, Khrushchev saw opportunities to exploit France's differences with Britain and the US. Accordingly, he curbed his criticism of French policy in Algeria with the exception of the occasional comment that independence was inevitable. De Gaulle's policies were causing serious strains in NATO and the European Economic Community (EEC), and his policy complemented Soviet objectives in Europe. The Soviets went too far in barring a shipment of Chinese arms for the Algerians from crossing the Soviet Union, as this later led to Chinese criticism of Moscow's position toward the Algerian Revolution.⁷⁰

While China recognised the Algerian Provisional government shortly after it was set up in 1958 as *de facto* recognition, it also recognised it *de jure* in early 1960. The Soviet Union did not recognise the Algerian Provisional government even as *de facto* until September 1960. The Sino-Soviet split in 1960 led to concern in Moscow that China, by adopting an irreconcilably anti-French stand, in sharp contrast to Moscow's middle-of-the-road stand would be able to increase its own influence with the Algerian FLN and ultimately with the independent Algerian government at the expense of the Soviet Union.⁷¹

Khrushchev had many reasons for keeping his distance from the Algerian revolution. First, he wanted to avoid any action that might discourage de Gaulle from downgrading France's relationship with NATO and the US, or might damage the

Franco-Soviet rapprochement. Second, the Soviet policy of "Peaceful Co-existence in Europe" transcended the sympathy he may have had for a revolution in a Third World country remote from Soviet interests. Third, the French and Algerian communists had ambivalent feelings about the FLN because the French working class in the French communist party were against Algerian independence, and in Algeria many communists were Jews, whose French citizenship made them suspect in the eyes of the FLN leadership which was Muslim and Arab. The FLN was a nationalist organisation which was intensely suspicious of communist participants.⁷²

Khrushchev's position on Algeria changed very slowly, and when Farhat Abbas, the first president of the Algerian Provisional government stopped in Moscow on his way back from China late in 1960, he received a great deal of attention, but no diplomatic recognition and no arms, only promises. Moscow extended *de jure* recognition to the Algerian Provisional government on 19 March 1962, only after de Gaulle had agreed at Evian to a ceasefire and accepted the inevitability of Algerian independence.⁷³ Like the US, the Soviet Union had been influenced by France's role in NATO and in the EEC. The Soviet policy towards the FLN led to Algerian suspiciousness of communists after its independence in July 1962. The Algerian communist party was banned and Algerian-Soviet relations were built on national interest more than ideological principles.⁷⁴

4.5 Conclusion

The US and Soviet Union had a marginal role in North Africa and the Mediterranean in the 19th century. The US abandoned its isolationist foreign policy only after World War Two, despite US involvement in World War One, after which it had returned to the policy of isolation. The Soviet Union developed a global

foreign policy after its October revolution of 1917. The two superpowers played a major global role after World War Two. Despite their global role, they played a limited role in Maghreb until the 1950s.

This chapter develops the following themes:

1. Neither superpower had solid historical relations with the Maghreb states before World War One. The Russians were preoccupied with the Ottoman empire in the eastern Mediterranean, and despite its involvements in international conferences regarding Moroccan issues, did not play a major role in the Maghreb, but remained a part of European diplomacy. On the other hand, the US had greater trade relations with the Maghreb, especially with Morocco. The piracy issue was one of the American political difficulties with the Maghreb states.
2. After World War One, the new Soviet revolution had influenced the national movements in North Africa and the Soviet model became attractive to North African elites, specially those who were in France.⁷⁵ So most of the Maghreb nationalist movements and workers affiliated with the French communists before they developed their own organisations or political parties, but despite their ideological affiliation they received little support from the Soviet Union apart from some general statements. The US had equally little enthusiasm for North African affairs, except for economic relations.
3. During World War Two, North Africa became incorporated into the Allies strategy. The US landing in North Africa raised the strategic value of North Africa to both the US and the Soviet Union. When the US built military bases in Libya and Morocco, the Soviet Union asked for a political and military

presence in Libya, but the Soviet request was refused by the Allies.

4. After World War Two, North Africa become part of the superpowers cold war. Complicating this, the French affected superpowers relations with North Africa. Both the US and the Soviet Union were aware of, and sensitive about, direct relations with Maghreb national movements. The French roles in Europe and in NATO were more important to the superpowers than direct involvement in the Maghreb which could alienate France on the eve of the cold war.
5. The Soviet Union and the US used labour unions to support North African independence. The US was more active in international trade unions, and both superpowers used international trade unions as indirect involvement in African labour unions. Both superpowers tried to control Third World labour unions during the cold war era and the control of labour unions in the Middle East and in North Africa were part of both superpowers' political strategies.
6. Soviet and American political and strategic objectives determined the superpowers' relations with the Algerian revolution. Despite the cold war and ideological rhetoric, the superpowers avoided direct political confrontation with France over Algerian independence because of their own interests in Europe. The Soviet Union recognised the Algerian revolution only at the last phase, after the French had reached agreement with Algeria. The Soviet faced a hard choice between the French in Algeria or a strong American presence in North Africa and the Soviet preferred the French option more than the American one. On the other hand, the US supported Algerian revolution financially and politically more than Soviet Union and the French accused the US of

encouraging the Algerian revolution.

Notes

1. H.G. Barndy. *The Prisoner of Algeria*, London: Oxford University Press, 1966, pp. 96-108.
2. Hall, op. cit., pp. 59-63 and see Ben Yahia, Habib "The place of the Maghreb in US-Arab relations" *American-Arab Affairs*, no. 13, Summer 1985, pp. 35-38; Barndy, pp. 20-24.
3. Hall, p. 45.
4. Hodges, op. cit., pp. 96-102.
5. Hall, op. cit., p. 47.
6. Ibid., p. 48.
7. Ibid., p. 49.
8. Ibid., p. 600.
9. Ibid.
- 10 Ibid., p. 57; pp. 758-759. Dickinson, op. cit., p. 211.
11. British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, attempted to limit the Charter's application to the European nations under the Nazi yoke, but President Roosevelt asserted that all the Atlantic Charter must apply to all nations; Rivlin Benjamin, "The United States and Morocco in International Status 1943-1956: A contributory factor in Morocco's reassertion of independence from France" *International Journal of African Historical Studies*, vol. 15 no.1. pp.

- 64-82; see also Abu-Taleb, M. "Roosevelt and the Independence of Morocco" *Al-Sharq-Al- Awsatt*: London, 22 November 1989, (Arabic newspaper).
12. See Brown ,Carl "United States and the Maghreb" *Middle East Journal* vol.20 no.3, Summer, 1976 pp. 272- 290; Also Knapp, Wilfried. *North West Africa*, third edition, London & New York: Oxford University Press, 1977, p. 277.
 13. A US State Department Policy Planning Staff paper prepared for the National Security Council in March 1948 states, " there is a strong evidence that President Roosevelt during Casablanca Conference of 1943, personally encouraged the Sultan to hope for American support in throwing off French control and in preparing Morocco, possibly under a joint US, British and French protectorate, for independence some years hence." quoted in Rivlin Benjamin, op.cit, p. 65, note 3, also Abu-Taleb op.cit.
 14. Ibid.
 15. Bannoui, Mehdi, *Memories; Foreign relations of the United States 1949: Vol: VI. The Near East and Africa*, Washington.D.C. United States Printing Office , 1977, p. 1783 .(Here after United States Foreign relation 1949)
 16. For North Africans role in war Marshal Juin stated, "I can say that never in the course of our history have we had a more useful instrument of war than that which came out of North Africa in 1943." qouted in Blair , Leon, *Western Window in the Arab World*, Austin & London: University of Texas Press, 1970, p. 101.
 17. Louis, W. L., "American anti-colonisation and the dissolution of British Empire" *International Affairs*, London: vol:61, no.3, Summer 1985, pp. 395-420.

18. Bernard, op. cit., p. 3.
19. Rivlin, op. cit., pp. 64-82.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid.
22. See Knapp 1977, pp. 184-185.
23. Knapp, W., ibid pp. 184-185; Lillian Craig Harris *Libya :Qaddafi's Revolution and the Modern State*. Bolder, Colorado: Westview, 1986 pp. 7-11; Adrian Pelt *Libya Independence and the United Nations : A case of planned Decolonization*, New Haven & London: Yale University press 1970.
24. Louis, op. cit.
25. Ibid.
26. Knapp, 1977, pp. 190-191.
27. Ibid, See also, Rayan op cit .
28. *Foreign Relations of the United States 1949, vol. vi, The Near East, South Asia and Africa*, Washington.D.C: United States Government Printing Office, 1977, p. 1789.
29. Willard Belling, *Modernization and African Labor: A Tunisian case*, Second edition, New York & London: Frederick Praeger Publishers 1967, (Here after Belling 1967). See also Peter Weiler "The United States International Labour and the Cold war: The break of the World Federation of Trade Unions." *Diplomatic History*, Vol.5 Winter, 1981, pp. 1-22.

30. Ibid,
31. See Beling , W “W.F.T.U and Decolonization : Tunisian case study.” *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol: 2 no.4 1964, pp. 551-64, (Here after Belling 1964), see also, Lewis Lorwin, “The Structure of International Labour Activities.” in *Annals of the American Academy of political and social science*, vol: 310, March 1957 , pp. 1-11; See also Arnold Steinbach “Regional organizations of International Labour”. in Ibid pp. 12-20.
32. Ibid , also see Beling, W. *Pan- Arabism and Labor*. Harvard Middle Eastern Monograph Series, IV, Cambridge , Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1960, pp. 55- 61; (Here after Belling 1960).
33. Belling 1962, see also Egya Saugmagh 1988; Jean-Francois Clement & Jim Paul “Trade Unions and Moroccan Politics” *MERIP Reports*, no.127, vol.14 no.8 October 1984, pp. 19-24.
34. Ibid, see also Banounni, Op cit .
35. Beling, 1967, pp. 95-99; Sangmuah, E. N, 1988.
36. Beling, 1967, op cit. Beling, 1960, p. 59-62. Knapp, W, 1977, pp. 264-265.
37. Slem Bouyahia, “Les Relations entre les Travailleurs Tunisiens et Egyptiens de 1945 a 1958”, *Revue D'Histoire Maghrebine*, vol.16 no.53-54, July 1989, pp. 7-33.
38. Jim Paul & Clement, op cit. See also Willard Wirtz, *Secretary Labor, Law and practice in Morocco*, United States Department of Labor, bureau of Labor Statistics, BLS no.282, Washington.D.C , U.S. Government Printing office,

September, 1964.

39. Ibid.

40. Blair , op cit .

41. Peter Weiler, op cit. *Egya Sangmuah* 1988, op cit.

42. There was another group, the *Union des Syndicates de Travailleurs Algériens (USTA)*, it claimed a membership of 50,000, most of whom worked in metropolitan France, but the UGTA became the single trade union in Algeria and it emerged from the revolution second- only to the army in organisational strength and unity. The UGTA was taken over by the FLN in January 1963, and withdrew from ICFTU in 1963. Beling 1960 op cit; *Egya Sangmuah* 1988, op cit. Knapp, W, 1977, pp. 85-91; *Algeria: Country Study*, 1985, p. 259.

43. Ibid.

44. For American relations with Algerian revolution and Senator Kennedy Speech, see R.D.Mclaurin, "The United States and the Algerian revolution: A review of policy Formulation" *Maghreb Digest*, vol.V no. 1, January - March 1967, pp. 28-60.

45. Quoted in Ibid. See also *Foreign Relations of the United States 1955-1957*, vol.18. Africa, Washington: D.C. US government printing office, 1989, (Here after US Foreign Relations 1989),

46. For the full text of the conference on North Africa see, *Foreign Relations of the United States 1949* , vol. vi, op cit, pp. 1780-1797, quotation p. 1790.

47. John Ranelash, *The Agency :The rise and the decline of the CIA*, NewYork:

- Simon & Schuster, INC; 1987 p. 20; Also see Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, op cit, p. 124.
48. Hadhri, Mohieddine, *L'URSS et le Maghreb, de la Revolution d'Octobre a l'Independence de l'Algerie 1917-1962* Paris: Editions de l'Harmattan, 1985, p. 16; see also for historical background of Russian relations with North Africa: Musatova, T. L., "Russian-Morocco links in the 19th century" *Peoples of Asia and Africa*, vol. vxixv, Part 1, January-February 1987, pp. 97-103 (in Russian).
49. Hall, op. cit., p. 65.
50. Hadhri, op. cit., pp. 16-18.
51. Hall, op. cit., pp. 221-226.
52. Hadhri, op. cit., p. 19.
53. Peltier, Marius "The Suez Canal and Indian Ocean" in *Africa and the Defence of the West*, Paris: le Monde Moderne, 1975, pp. 108-110.
54. Degras, J., *Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy 1925-1932*, vol.2, London: Oxford University Press, 1952, p. 1.
55. Ibid, p. 17.
56. Ibid, p. 53; see also Edwin, J., & Slusser R. *Soviet Foreign Policy 1928-1934*, vol.1, London & University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1966, p. 107.
57. Degras, 1952, op. cit., p. 134.

58. Zoubir, Yahia, "Soviet Policy towards the Western Sahara Conflict" *Africa Today*, Vol. 34, No. 3, 1987, pp. 17-32.
59. Ibid.
60. Gann, Peter and Duignan, P., *Colonialism in Africa: The History and Politics of Colonialism 1914-1960*, Cambridge: University Press, 1970, p. 453.
61. Degras, op. cit., p. 47.
62. Gann & Duignan, op. cit., p. 47.
63. Adrain Pelt , op cit .
64. See *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, vol.5 no.23, June 18, 1953, p. 23.
65. See V. Osipov "Failure of another Surprise" *Izvestia*, June 12, 1953, p. 12, in CDSP, vol.v no.24, July 25, 1953, p. 27.
66. Charles B. McLane, *Soviet Middle East Relation*, vol.1, London: Central Asian Research Centre, 1973 pp. 15-18, 80-82, 100-102.
67. See *Pravda* July 7, 1956 p. 4, in CDSP, vol.viii no.27, August 15 1956, p. 19.
68. See Michel Tatu *Le Monde* November 30, 1957, quoted in Rubinstein, Alvin 1988, p. 92.
69. Ibid.
70. For Sino-Soviet relation See Donald S. Zagoria *The Sino- Soviet Conflict 1956-1961*, London: Oxford University Press 1977, pp. 270-276; See also Bruce D. Larkin, *China and Africa 1949-1970* , Los Angeles: University of California

Press, 1971, pp. 38-40. Also Alan Hutchison *China's African Revolution*, London: Hutchinson of London, 1970; Also Alaba Ogunsanwo, *China's Policy in Africa 1958-1971*, London: Cambridge University Press 1974, p. 21.

71. See Alistair Horne, *A Savage war of Peace: Algeria 1954- 1962*, London: Macmillian, 1977 pp. 404-406.
72. See *ibid*, and also Henry Jackson, *The FLN in Algeria: Party development in a revolutionary Society*, Westport Conn: Greenwood Press 1977, p. 28-30; also Rubinstein 1988, *op cit*.
73. *Ibid*.
74. *Ibid*.
75. One of al-katabi men stated that Russia freed herself from the oppressors and they should follow her path. He added that nothing should stop the war until we attain full liberation, see Perry, J.R. p. 187.

Chapter V

The Political Relations between the Superpowers and the Maghreb: Pragmatism or Ideology?

5.1 Introduction

The emergence of the Third World has been one of the most significant events of the post WWII era. The two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union have sought to attract as many countries in the Third World as possible to their own political sphere of influence. Both Superpowers tried to increase their international prestige, political influence, economic interests, and to win the Third World's support in international organizations. When the United Nations was founded in 1945, it had only 31 members that would now be described as Third World countries. Since then, this number has swollen to more than 122 states. These countries comprise 49% of the World land surface and 51% of the world population.¹

The superpowers have pressured Third World countries to adopt their economic and political systems and orientations . The United States has supported the adoption of liberal democratic systems, at least for public consumption, and a capitalist free market economy, while the Soviet Union supported the communist systems and state controlled economy. So the two superpowers have competed in generally with each other in the Third World to spread their ideologies and influence.

The Soviet Union has encouraged the development of vanguard political parties in the Third World. Also the Soviet Union was more sympathetic toward Socialist states than Capitalist oriented states. In particular, the Soviet Union encouraged Egypt, South Yemen, Ethiopia and Algeria to adopt Socialist systems.²

The superpowers have recognized that their credentials as Superpowers are legitimized not only by their massive nuclear arsenals but also by their abilities to influence and even determine the course of events in regions far away from their homeland. The credentializing aspects of US-USSR political competition in the Third World is one of several reasons why the US provided Stinger missiles to Afghanistan's Mujahedin and why the Soviet Union sent Mig-20s to the Sandinista's regime in Nicaragua. Similar reasons explain why the Superpowers compete in the Middle East, particularly in times of crisis.³

In the case of the Middle East, the United States has tried to replace the European colonial powers, particularly Britain and France, as the most influential state. Oil was the major subject of competition between American companies and European companies, particularly the British companies, and this competition had influenced the incidence of military coups in the Middle East in late 1940s and in the early 1950s such as in Syria (1949) and Iran (1953).⁴

The United States has had a number of political objectives in the Middle East since the 1950s. These objectives are: first, the security of Israel; second, to deny opportunities to the Soviets in the region; third, to control the oil or at least the Free World's access to the oil; fourth, to protect pro- American regimes and to contain radicalism in the Middle East. To achieve these objectives America had opposed the Arab nationalist movement, and Persian nationalism as, for example,

when the US helped to overthrow the Mousadaq regime in Iran in 1953.

United States' objectives in North Africa were no different to its objectives in the Middle East, but the United States faced French opposition in North Africa. During the cold war era, the United States tried to replace France and to combat the Soviet presence in the region, contain the radicals, and protect the pro-Western regimes such as Tunisia and Morocco. The Maghreb States have considerable influence in the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the US could use them to support Western interests, for example when Tunisia and Morocco participated in UN forces in the Congo in 1961. Moreover, the United States had sought to expand American cultural relations with North Africa.⁵

The United States only began to develop policies toward Africa after WWII, (North Africa was part of the Bureau for African Affairs until recently). It was only in 1957 that the Bureau for African Affairs was established in the State Department, then there were fewer Foreign Service officers in all of Africa than there were in the Federal Republic of Germany alone. When John Kennedy was chairman of the African subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, he developed a reputation as a supporter of African nationalist, anti-colonial movements. During the 1960 presidential election campaign, he criticized the Eisenhower-Nixon administration for having ignored the needs and aspiration of the African people. Kennedy's support for North African independence, particularly the Algerian revolution, had disturbed the French. As President, his first State Department appointment was a former civil rights activist, Michigan Governor G. Mennen Williams, as First Assistant Secretary for African Affairs.⁶

Soviet involvement in North Africa only began in the late 1950s. The Soviet

Union was interested first in the Northern Tier of the Middle East, Afghanistan, Iran and Turkey because of their geostrategic value to the southern borders of the Soviet Union . After the Palestinian problem in 1948 and the Suez Crisis, the Soviet Union tried to extend its influence in the heartland of the Arab world, Egypt, Syria and Iraq.

Soviet political objectives in the Middle East were : **First**, To reduce USA and western presence and influence in the region. **Second**, To increase Soviet influence and presence in the area. **Third**, To enhance Soviet security in the Middle East. **Fourth**, To combat Chinese presence and influence. China's subsequent approach to Morocco in the Spring of 1959 ,and its growing interest in the Algerian war, coincided with an increasing apparent divergence in Soviet and Chinese policy toward the FLN. This issue and others were by late 1959, creating a critical new factor in Soviet relations with Africa. **Fifth**, To encourage socialist ideas in the Middle East, to support the activities of local communist parties and develop Soviet cultural relations with the region. Khrushchev endorsed the Algerian people's aspiration to build their life on Socialist principles. Moreover , the Soviets tried to destabilize the pro-western regimes in the area and to support anti-colonial feeling and nationalist aspirations in the Middle East.⁷ In this stage, the Soviet Union adopted the line that it was ideologically sound to support "bourgeois nationalist" regimes and movements, even those that suppressed communist parties eg the classic example of Egypt under Nasser.

As in the United States, North Africa has been treated as part of the Africa Department within the Soviet Foreign Ministry and Soviet political objectives in North Africa are the same as they are in the Middle East, with more emphasis on Africa and the Mediterranean for political and strategic reasons. But the Soviet

Union during the Cold War was much more aware of American influence in North Africa than of French influence. The Soviet Union preferred weak French influence in the area to a stronger American influence.

5.2 United States and the Maghreb 1960-1985

The Maghreb formed part of the American strategy of containment. In 1948, George Kennan, the father of containment, outlined the areas of the world which America should not allow to fall to hostile powers . Kennan's list of such areas included: **1- The nations of the Atlantic community, which include with others Western Europe, the Iberian Peninsula, Morocco and the west coast of Africa, and the countries of South America; 2- The Countries of the Mediterranean and the Middle East** as far east as, and including, Iran; **3-** and Japan and the Philippines. Kennan reflected State Department thinking toward these areas and the American objective, according to Kennan, was the creation in these regions of

“Political attitudes favorable to our concepts of international life”⁸

The American approach to North African states after independence has been influenced by Kennan's concept of containment. In this chapter we analyze USA and USSR political relations with Maghreb states, including both behaviour and the factors which shaped it.

5.2.1 American-Libyan Relations 1969-1985

The United States enjoyed warm relations with Libya after its independence and it signed an agreement with the Libyan government in 1954 for military bases. Richard Nixon, Vice President of the United States, visited Libya in July 1954 and met King Idris of Libya and, at the same time, the Libyan Prime Minister Mustafa

ben Halim visited the United States of America and met President Eisenhower. The United State granted Libya \$40 million for a 20 year lease of military bases in Libya and also supplied Libya with wheat. According to American officials, the USA was planning in 1957 to create a *Southern Tier Concept* through coordinated programs with North African States, Sudan and Ethiopia, not through military cooperation, but by drawing these countries into closer relationships with the USA by economic and political means.⁹ This approach did not fit with French interests in Africa. King Idris of Libya supported the Eisenhower Doctrine and adopted an anti-communist policy. After Libya entered the oil era, American companies dominated the oil industry there.

After the Arab-Israeli war in 1967, Arab national sentiment developed in Libya and the Libyan monarch became unpopular after the accusation that the Americans had used its military bases in Libya to support Israel in the war. The unpopularity of the regime led the American Ambassador (1964-1969), David Newsom, to inform King Idris in 1967 that the United States had no obligation to defend any particular regime in Libya. Newsom's analysis of political development in Libya suggested that there was too much money flowing through oil revenue and too much obvious corruption. The King himself was uninterested in ruling the country¹⁰ and the situation was ripe for political upheaval and unrest. Ruth First argues that the American reaction to the Libyan situation was to encourage a change of regime.¹¹ First suggests that the Americans encouraged the plot against King Idris to prevent anti-western feeling from getting out of hand. After Qaddafi led his successful military coup in September 1969, there was much speculation spread about the coup and the motives of the organizers. As mentioned before, some diplomats accused America of instigating the coup. Historically, according

to American sources, King Idris was in the British pocket.¹²

Mary Brannan and others in their special report, *The Real Story of Libya's Muammer Qaddafi*, interpreted the situation inside Libya as a struggle between American and British supporters in the army. They described American relations with King Idris thus;

“After the 1967 war Idris had begun to make increasing pressures on the Americans. It is rumoured that the American government then began to support Omer al Cheihly [sic], advisor of the king and the expected heir of the throne. Omer al Cheihly began to organize a coup. His attempt was planned for September 5th 1969; four days before, with the support of Idris, Qaddafi succeeded in killing the plotters and making his own coup. Immediately afterwards there was a sophisticated operation of misinformation. The coup was publically announced, but for ten days nobody was informed on the real nature of the coup. Qaddafi waited all this period before revealing himself. It seems that the American government believed that its own coup had taken place...”¹³

In any event, the United States Administration recognized the new regime in Libya with a recommendation from David Newsom, who was now Under Secretary of State for African Affairs, and Joseph Palmer, the American Ambassador in Libya. The rise to power of Qaddafi in Libya opened a new era in Libyan-American relations.

5.2.1.1 Nixon-Kissinger and Qaddafi.

United States reaction to the Libyan revolution was low profile, because US interests were not threatened and Qaddafi's actions after the revolution fitted in with America's strategy in East-West confrontation. Qaddafi was seen as anti-Soviet, an Arab nationalist and Muslim zealot. Henry Kissinger, National Security Advisor to President Nixon and later Secretary of State for Nixon and Ford, argued that energy supplies were in jeopardy only if the US did something to antagonize the new Libyan revolutionary regime

“we see no immediate threat to these [oil] interests, although such could result if the regime is threatened, or becomes increasingly unstable, or if there were a real confrontation over Wheelus, or in the event of renewed hostilities in the Middle East.”¹⁴

During the Nixon era, the United States informed Qaddafi of two military coup attempts and Qaddafi's behaviour was seen to be in American interests despite US differences with Qaddafi over the Rogers Plan, King Hussein's conflict with the PLO in September in 1970 and American support for Israel and Libyan support for the PLO.

In 1970, Qaddafi closed the American and British bases, but Qaddafi had also denounced the USSR on many occasions and there were still mutual interests between Libya and the USA in oil, trade and in limiting Soviet influence in the Middle East and Africa. During the Indo-Pakistan war in 1971, he denounced the Soviet role in the conflict and he sent Pakistan several of Libya's squadrons of Northrop F-5 delivered before the revolution to the royal regime. He cooperated with Sadat of Egypt in crushing the military coup in Sudan in 1971, by ordering Libyan military aircraft to intercept a British airliner carrying two of the coup leaders. They were handed over to President Nimeri of Sudan who hanged them. It was a plot against the Soviets in the Sudan. The leaders of the Sudanese Communist Party were executed because of their involvement in the coup. Qaddafi had also approved Sadat's expulsion of Soviet military advisors from Egypt in July 1972 and he criticized Iraq for signing the Soviet-Iraqi treaty in 1972. Qaddafi armed the Oman government against the Dhofar guerrilla movement which was supported by South Yemen and China. He criticized the Soviets for allowing Jewish migration to Palestine.¹⁵

America saw him as hostile to the Soviet Union because he would never allow

the Soviets to obtain any kind of bridgehead, military, political, or ideological in North Africa. Qaddafi banned political parties in Libya and he has never allowed communist activities in Libya. In this sense, he supported America's political interests against the USSR. The Nixon Administration alerted Qaddafi when Adam al-Hawaz and Musa Ahmed (Ministers of Defense and Interior respectively) attempted to take power away from Qaddafi, four months after the coup in December 1969.

The CIA also informed Qaddafi of the Hilton Assignment in 1971 which was Omer Shalhi's plot against Qaddafi with the support of mercenaries from Europe. The CIA's reason for informing Qaddafi about the Hilton assignment was that it was a "*total failure coup*" and its failure would have been attributed to the United States. This it was feared would endanger the American community in Libya. There was also concern that France who was opposed to the US in Libya would gain advantages on the expense of American commercial interests. The United States informed the Italians who sent a message to Qaddafi informing him of a plot against him.¹⁶

The United States had paid little attention to Qaddafi in this period because he had not challenged US interests. American action against Qaddafi would have run exactly contrary to the step by step peace policy of Kissinger in the region from 1973-1975, and also Qaddafi had not taken any serious action to affect the American peace process for a number of reasons: First, because he had not much power to do so; Second, because Qaddafi had not much influence in the Arab world, particularly with the Palestinians, and third, Qaddafi was trying to strengthen his power inside Libya. Moreover, Qaddafi had limited political experience in Arab politics because he had only been in power for four years. He had not broken

completely his relations with Egypt and Sudan. But on the other hand, Qaddafi's interpretation of Islam had created a serious problem with Islamic organizations and he had become less popular in the Arab world.¹⁷

During the Nixon-Kissinger era, the United States had developed a new strategic approach to regional problems in the light of the Vietnam disaster. The American public were against military intervention, and Western Europe opposed any kind of military-economic action against Qaddafi. Sanctions or other action against Qaddafi would have strengthened his position both in the Arab world and inside Libya. A former American official in Libya, David Newsom, described American interests in Libya as: Protection of oil; Protection of American community in Libya; preservation of pro-Western orientation and minimization of the degree to which Libya can frustrate the United States peace process in the Middle East. The United States had protected its interests with low profile confrontations with Libya. American Ambassador Joseph Palmer had asked to leave Libya in 1972 because he had not been able to deal with high level officials such as Qaddafi. Since then the USA had been represented at Charge d' Affaire level until the withdrawal of American diplomats from Libya in the last year of Carter's presidency. But despite that, the United States had won Libyan support over oil prices in 1971-1973¹⁸ (see chapter 6).

5.2.1.2 Carter and Qaddafi: The Policy of Detente

When Carter became President, he adopted a regional approach to United States foreign policy, and he focused on the Arab-Israeli conflict. On the other hand, Qaddafi sought to intervene more in regional and international politics. The shift in Qaddafi's intervention had started in 1973 when he criticised Ethiopia in

May and threatened to move the headquarters of OAU from Addis Abbaba to Cairo because of Ethiopian diplomatic relations with Israel. Qaddafi also put pressure on Black African states to break their relations with Israel. Qaddafi helped Idi Amin in Uganda in 1973 by training several hundreds of Amin's troops in Libya. In the mid 1970s, he moved to support Muslim minorities even more widely and provided money and training to the Muslims in Thailand and the Philippines (*Moro Front*), and it was also reported that Libya supported the Baader Meinhof gang in Germany, the Japanese Red Army and insurgents in Salvador, Nicaragua, Sudan, and Spain. Qaddafi had also moved closer to radical Palestinians and supported the Black Muslims and Red Indians in the United States.

While the United States saw many of these groups as terrorist organizations, Qaddafi described them as national liberation movements. Qaddafi offered his Third Universal theory, as set out in his *Green book*, as a solution to world problems. His theory has not won popularity in the Arab world but it has won at least some respect in many poor countries in Africa and Asia. He was also seen by Third World masses as a supporter of oppressed people in the world and so extended his political influence.¹⁹

Despite Qaddafi's and Carter's differing views on regional issues, national liberation movements and the Palestinian issue, American interests were protected in Libya. American oil companies were working in Libya, Libyan oil flowed to the United States and trade between the two countries had not been affected. Qaddafi had approached Carter to improve US-Libyan relations but Carter requested that Libya abandon international terrorism and support Carter's Middle East peace process. Qaddafi refused Carter's demands. But despite Qaddafi's failure to accept Carter's request, the United States during the Carter era had only used quiet and

secret diplomacy to solve Libyan-US differences.

The United States defended Qaddafi from Egyptian attack on Libya in July 1977 when Qaddafi and Sadat had reached breaking point in their relations. Sadat mobilized Egyptian troops on Libya's border and the American objective was to prevent the Egyptians from attacking Libya because it would endanger Tunisia; the Algerian position was not clear and the whole Maghreb would be in danger.²⁰

After Sadat's visit to Jerusalem in November 1977, Qaddafi had led the attack on Sadat and the United States, and he demanded the removal of Egypt from the Arab League. In December 1977, at the Tripoli summit which was attended by Syria, Algeria, Iraq, South Yemen and the PLO, Qaddafi announced the Tripoli Declaration to freeze relations with Egypt and establish an Arab Front against the USA- Egypt peace plan. The summit also called for boycotting all Egyptian individuals and firms dealing with Israel and the summit declared a defence pact that any attack on one of the states participating would be an attack on the others. So it was clear that Qaddafi tried to protect himself from any attack on him by Egypt or America for his strong condemnation of the Sadat-Carter-Begin peace plan.²¹

Despite Qaddafi's strong public condemnation of the American-backed Middle East Process, there were important aspects which reflected the other side of Qaddafi-American relations during the Carter presidency: *First*, the Edwin (Ed) Wilson case; *Second* The Billy Carter case, the brother of President Carter. Ed Wilson a former marine served in the CIA for twenty years in a variety of assignment such as the Bay of Pigs operation and other jobs in South East Asia, Latin America and Taiwan. Wilson has a history of involvement in secret operations all

over the world and also has wide contacts with government officials in Washington.D.C. He retired in 1971 from CIA service but enjoyed friendly relations with Theodore Shackley, the assistant to the Deputy Director of Clandestine Operations in the CIA, who retired in 1979.²²

Wilson began his contacts with Libya in 1976, when he approached the Libyans as a businessman with a firm conducting technology transfers from the United States to Libya. He recruited dozens of former Green Berets (US Special Forces) to teach Libyan soldiers how to handle volatile explosives, shipped arms explosives to Libya with the aid of forged and fraudulent State Department export certificates, and he involved other CIA employees in export and training. Despite accusations of violating American law, he continued his work until his arrest on 15 June in 1983 during the Reagan Presidency and he was later sentenced to 15 years in prison. Wilson confessed publicly that he had reported regularly to the CIA about all his activities in Libya. The most likely explanation for Wilson's activities was that the United States had used Wilson and his associates to penetrate Libyan circles involved in the training of Third World revolutionary movements. It is interesting to note that during Wilson's activities, Carter had been informed about a plot to assassinate American Ambassador, Hermann Frederic Elits, in Cairo in 1977 and he wrote a personal letter directly to Qaddafi about the plot.²³

Added to Wilson's activities was the assassination of Libyan opponents of Qaddafi outside Libya. For example, in the United States, Faisal Zagallai was shot in his flat in Colorado October 14, 1980 by a former member of US Special Forces, Eugene Fafoya, who confessed later on that he had carried out the assassination, but claimed he thought it was a CIA operation. He thought that Ed Wilson was working with the CIA.²⁴ During Wilson's trial, the CIA refused to share its

information with the US Attorney General's Office. It encouraged the belief that Wilson had refused a CIA order to assassinate Qaddafi in October 1981 when William Casey became CIA director and the CIA returned to its covert actions. In any event, the United States had tried to penetrate Qaddafi's regime and at the same time to keep an eye on the opposition to Qaddafi, and to encourage the opposition to work more closely with the USA. The American policy had been to work with the two sides at the same time.²⁵

Libya had approached Billy Carter to help improve their relations with United States. Libya tried in 1978-1979 to gain influence in the US through labor unions, black organizations, oil companies and politically important individuals. Billy Carter visited Libya in the Fall of 1978 for eight days as a guest of the Libyan government. The Libyans had promised him opportunities to do business and make investments in oil. During this period Libya asked for American Boeing and C-130s which the United States had refused to sell it because of the Libyan position on the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Camp David negotiations and allegation of involvement in international terrorism.²⁶

David Newsom, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs visited Libya on June 9, 1979 for three days of talks with Libyan Foreign Minister, A. Turaki about the Camp David Peace Process, terrorism and Libyan intervention in Africa. Brzezinski, President Carter's National Security advisor met Libyan diplomats in Washington.D.C in November 1979 to ask for Libyan help to release the American hostages in Tehran

"This anxiety prompted very intense diplomatic efforts, both conventional and unconventional, the latter including the PLO and even the Libyans. One of these efforts involved the much-publicized conversation between me and Billy Carter, who had been cultivated by the Libyans. Both the Libyans and PLO actually did urge the release of the hostages, but their influence was not significant."²⁷

In reality, Qaddafi did not have much influence in Iran because of the disappearance of Imam Musa al-Sadr 1978, or with the Middle East fundamentalist groups because of his interpretations of Islam. Officially, in 1979, Libya was close to the Carter's policy; Libya condemned hostage taking in Tehran and Libya also condemned the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, and when the Libyan demonstration attacked the American embassy in Tripoli and burnt it, December 1979, Qaddafi wrote to Carter and the Libyans later paid compensation for the damage.²⁸ With the end of the Carter Presidency a new phase of American-Libyan relations started which contrasted with the Carter political detente and secret diplomacy with Qaddafi.

5.2.1.3 Qaddafi-Reagan: Diplomacy of confrontation

Ronald Reagan adopted a global approach in dealing with the Third World, and he understood the world in east-west terms. Reagan intended to restore American power and prestige around the world. The shift in American policy against Libya was dramatic. The Nixon, Ford and Carter Administrations had ignored Libya as an unimportant nuisance which could not be punished because America's allies in Europe would not approve. But because Libya was unimportant and a weak state it was an ideal target for Reagan to enhance US's reputation and prestige after Carter's humiliation in the hostage crisis. As William Quandt put it because Libya was a weak target unlike Iran or Syria it was an attractive target. The Reagan administration had labelled Libya as a terrorist state, a Soviet puppet, fundamentalist and a destabilizing element, particularly after the assassination of Sadat in October 1981. In December 1981, the US Administration leaked a false report that Qaddafi had sent a team to assassinate Reagan but the report was to prepare public opinion for US military action against Libya and to increase the

CIA's role in covert operations after years of restrictions.²⁹

The US government closed the Libyan People's Bureau in Washington in May 1981, and also called all American diplomats in Libya. In March 1982, the Reagan Administration barred further imports of Libyan oil, and the US began to support Libyan opponents of Qaddafi. The United States accused Libya of supporting radical groups in Latin America and the "Nation of Islam" sect inside the USA. On August 19, 1981 the first military confrontation occurred between Reagan and Qaddafi over the Gulf of Sdra, during which two Libyan SU-22s were shot down by US Navy F-14s. The US has never recognized Libya's so-called "Line of Death" in Gulf of Sdra 32' 30"N, and it used the line as part of the war of nerves. Reagan's objective in destabilizing Qaddafi was to provide a lesson to Third World countries who would like to oppose American policy. But US actions have strengthened Qaddafi inside Libya and in the eyes of the Arab masses and in Third World revolutionary movements. As Claudia Wright put it

"Qaddafi has survived to date, not just because he has a good East German and Soviet intelligence network, but because he has anticipated the Americans more shrewdly than they have anticipated him."³⁰

Libya votes with radical states and the Eastern Bloc in the United Nations. For example, Mozambique voted least of all African states with the United States, 8.7 percent, followed by Angola and Libya at 11.4 percent. But in cultural relations Libya has between 3000-4000 students in US, most of them specializing in technology; the number of Libyan students in the USA is much bigger than in the USSR. Culturally, Libya has been oriented to the West more than the Eastern bloc despite Qaddafi's rhetoric.³¹ The US put pressure on Qaddafi not because he had threatened directly US interests, but because of US regional policy and US-Soviet relations. David Newsom, former US Under Secretary of State, has argued that if

the United States was flexible towards Qaddafi, he would not align himself with Moscow to such a degree as to affect the military balance in the Mediterranean.³²

5.2.2 American-Tunisian Relations

American relations with Tunisia were influenced by American support for Tunisian independence, the cold war, relations with France, the personality of Bourguiba, his ideology and pro-Western orientation, his adaptation of European culture to Tunisia and his criticism of Islamic values. Bourguiba had been in power in Tunisia from 1956 until he was ousted in November 1987. So the Americans had dealt with Bourguiba for more than thirty years and his charismatic leadership dominated the Socialist Destourian party and Tunisian foreign relations.³³

During the struggle for independence, there were two organized nationalist movements, the Tunisian Labour Union UGTT, and the Neo-Destour party. The Americans had a strong relation with the UGTT, and they penetrated it through American trade unions as discussed above (see chapter 4). After independence, Bourguiba had tried successfully to bring the UGTT under his political control. After that, Bourguiba managed to gain control of the Neo-Destour party after a struggle over the leadership of the party with Saleh Ben Youssef. Ben Youssef was opposed to Bourguiba's policy toward the French because he was orientated to Arab Nationalism and Islamic values and to continuing the struggle against France. In 1956 Bourguiba managed to dismiss Ben Youssef from the Neo-Destour party and he tried to arrest him. Ben Youssef fled to exile in Egypt. Between 1956 and 1961 Ben Youssef had led a political struggle against Bourguiba from exile in Cairo until he was assassinated in Frankfurt, Germany in August 1961 by Bourguiba's agents.³⁴

During the Suez crisis, America condemned the French-British action against Egypt, and during that period Egypt enjoyed good relations with the US. On the other hand, Egypt's relations with France were poor because of Egyptian support for the Algerian revolution. American anti-colonial policy had been appreciated by Tunisian leaders and the Tunisian UGTT had adopted the American approach toward Arab-Israeli conflict,³⁵ and in these circumstances Ben Youssef had built political links with Americans in Cairo.

When Bourguiba controlled both the UGTT and the Neo-Destour party, the Americans found themselves having to co-operate with him because he was in full command of Tunisia. Bourguiba had also supported American policy in the Middle East. Tunisia supported the Eisenhower Doctrine in 1957 to use force in response to Soviet aggression in the Middle East.³⁶ Tunisia, newly independent, welcomed it, perhaps in the hope of American generosity in return and Tunisia also welcomed close and friendly relations with the United States partly as a counterpoise to France.³⁷

5.2.2.1 American- Tunisian relations 1958-1968

In the late 1950s, Tunisia and France were at odds during the long Algerian war of independence, the US was able to be the neutral broker, strengthening its ties to the newly independent North African state. During the Sakhiet-sidi Youssef incident, February 1958, when French aircraft bombed a Tunisian frontier village, which French authorities alleged was being used as a base by FLN for raids into Algeria,³⁸ Tunisia demanded the evacuation of French forces from Tunisia, and an Anglo-American mediation team (the Murphy-Beeley mission) set out to solve the problem. Robert Murphy, Deputy Under Secretary of State was appointed

mediator in the Franco-Tunisian dispute by the US government on February 19, 1958. Murphy acted during WWII as the US diplomatic representative in North Africa and political advisor to General Eisenhower, then commanding Allied forces in the Mediterranean.³⁹

The US put pressure on France and it used the argument that French action would push Tunisia toward the Soviets. When the government of Gaillard of France submitted its policy (evacuation of French forces) to the National Assembly on April 15, 1958, it was violently denounced by both the right wing and the communist deputies who accused it of accepting a policy dictated by the USA. The Gaillard government resigned on April 17 1958. M. Duclos (deputy) said in the General Assembly

“Bourguiba is a puppet in the hands of the American Administration. To tell us that we risk driving him in the hands of the Soviet is a travesty of the truth, of the two dangers threatening us, the Soviet and the American, the second is the more immediate...”⁴⁰

Bourguiba had tried to use the American card against France because the latter had military bases in Tunisia and also to solve the Algerian question. On the other side, the United States, in the cold war era, was ambitious to have political influence in Tunisia as a foothold in Africa and to use Bourguiba against Nasser who had begun to approach the Soviet Union. On May 3, 1961 Bourguiba visited the United States, and President John Kennedy greeted him as “*a distinguished world statesman who had fought for freedom and principle.*”⁴¹ Kennedy compared Bourguiba to George Washington as a revolutionary leader.

Bourguiba addressed a joint session of Congress, and repeated his demand for the evacuation of the French Naval base at Bizerta and for a solution to Algerian question. The Bizerta question led Tunisia to submit the dispute to the UN security

council and then to a special session of the General Assembly. The Assembly endorsed the Tunisian demand on August 25 1961. The French evacuated the base on October 15 1964. There was another factor which had led Tunisia to approach the United States, the Tunisian's government nationalization of French -held land which affected over 670,000 acres. The French reacted to the action by cancelling a loan and imposed strict quotas on imports from Tunisia. The French action had pushed Tunisia to strengthen its relation with the USA.⁴²

The United States welcomed Bourguiba's attitude toward the Arab-Israeli conflict. He was the first Arab leader to call for a United Nations solution for Palestine (partition plan) in 1947. In 1965, Bourguiba argued for Arab-Jewish cooperation, and the argument had created a cold war between the Arab states because Egypt, Syria and other Arabs supported the liberation of Palestine. Tunisia was isolated in the Arab World because Arab public opinion was strongly against political compromise with Israel. After the June 1967 war, most of the Arab states broke off diplomatic relations with the US but the United States continued to enjoy good relations with Tunisia at the expense of American-Egyptian relation and Soviet relations with radical Arab states. In May 1968, Bourguiba made a second state visit to the United States, where he met President Johnson and recalled the longstanding interests of the United States in Tunisia. Also, in the 1960s, Tunisia welcomed American Peace Corp Volunteers an organization formed by President Kennedy to help Third World countries. The program had over 200 volunteers in Tunisia in 1968.⁴³

5.2.2.2 American-Tunisian relations in the 1970s

The United States cultivated Egypt in the early 1970s, and after Nasser's

death in 1970, Sadat oriented Egyptian politics toward the West, and this new orientation had important implications for American-Tunisian relations because Egypt was a more important country than Tunisia. Soviet influence had been replaced by American after the Soviet advisors were expelled from Egypt. Sadat took a more moderate position than Bourguiba in the Arab-Israeli conflict. During the 1970s, Tunisia faced a variety of difficulties, for example, the question of the succession, and serious social and economic problems, especially trade union strikes.

Bourguiba had never liked his ministers to become too powerful and many ministers had been cast aside: Ahmed ben Saleh, the country's economic overlord until 1969; Mohammad Masmoudi after the signing of treaty with Libya in 1974; Ahmed Mestiri, a former minister of defence who later on led the opposition *Mouvement de Democraties Socialistes*.

The United States was aware of the succession problem in Tunisia particularly, after the *Black January* incident in 1978, when many workers were killed as a result of trade union confrontations with the government. It is perhaps interesting to note that Irving Brown of the AFL-CIO, who had a connection with the CIA, gave evidence favourable to Achour, the leader of the UGTT during his trial in Tunisia; as did the Secretary General of ICFTU, Otto Kersten. The Tunisian Government had accused the trade union leaders of cooperating with outside powers.⁴⁴

At the end of the 1970s, Tunisia had become a political player in Arab politics, After the Camp David agreement in 1979, Tunisia broke off diplomatic relations with Egypt, and the Arab embassies in Cairo - except Oman and Sudan- were closed, and Tunisia became the headquarters of the Arab League. In American

eyes, Tunisia moved to the centre of Arab politics, and with fears about the spread of the Iranian revolution, the Americans looked to Tunisia as an important state in North Africa, and the question of the succession to Bourguiba became an increasing American concern in the early 1980s.⁴⁵

5.2.2.3 American-Tunisian relations from 1980-1985

Four factors had influenced American relations with Tunisia in the early 1980s: First; the Gafsa incident January 1980. Second; The transfer of PLO headquarters from Beirut to Tunis in 1982. Third; the unresolved succession problem in Tunisia, and Fourth; the popularity of *Mouvement de la Tendance Islamique (MTI)*.

In January 1980, Tunisian dissidents attacked the Tunisian town of Gafsa, a small mining town 300 kilometers southeast of Tunis. The attack was timed to coincide with the anniversary of a general strike in Tunisia two years earlier, during which the Tunisian army had fired on the strikers, killing dozens of them. The Tunisian Government accused Libya of the incident. It claimed that Tunisians were being trained in Libya to destabilize the Tunisian regime. Libya denied the incident and accused Tunisia and other foreign intelligence services of engineering the incident. But the United States reacted strongly to the incident and announced, on 31 January, 1980, that it was considering an expansion of its military program to Tunisia.⁴⁶ The United States also stressed that it would “*view with concern*” any outside interference in Tunisian affairs and, at the end of February, the State Department announced a decision to send a total of thirty armored personnel carriers and six helicopters to Tunisia worth \$23 millions.⁴⁷ The United States Ambassador to the United Nations, Donald McHenry, visited Tunisia on February 20 1980, and expressed United States support for Tunisian security. But President Carter had

no special interest in Tunisia, and did not give it much attention in relation to his human rights policy.⁴⁸ It was France which dispatched its warships to the Tunisian coast.

In the wake of the Iranian revolution and events in Afghanistan, the West had been keen to assume a more active role in the Middle East. It seems that the Gafsa incident had a positive side for the United States because the incident occurred as the Carter Administration was pressing for the US Congress to allow a controversial arms sale to Morocco. The Gafsa incident helped the Carter Administration to put pressure on the Congress to send arms to Tunisia and to pass the arms sale to Morocco.⁴⁹

The United States saw Tunisia as a moderate Arab state and the US had welcomed the move of the PLO headquarters to Tunisia, because it might lead the PLO to adopting a more moderate policy in the Arab-Israeli conflict. But the PLO moved because Tunisia was the headquarters of the Arab League and, in Tunisia, the PLO would have more independence than in Syria and Iraq. But the presence of the PLO created other problems for the United States when Israeli aircraft attacked the PLO headquarters in 1985.⁵⁰ The Tunisian media strongly attacked the United States for the first time since the 1967 war. Many Tunisians believed that the United States had known of the Israeli raid in advance and did nothing to stop it. President Reagan's reaction increased Tunisian suspicion. Reagan stated after the Israeli raid that it was a *"legitimate response and an expression of self-defense."*⁵¹ The statement disturbed Tunisian-American relations, Reagan was not interested in Tunisian public opinion or in solving the Arab-Israeli conflict but in American public opinion and in his relations with Israel.

Only after intense Tunisian pressure on the US, the US preferred abstention rather than veto of the Security Council resolution condemning the Israeli raid. The United States Deputy Secretary of State, John Whitehead, visited Tunisia to rebuild the US relations, but the US was still concerned about the unresolved problem of succession. American officials preferred a pro-American successor rather than a radical one close to Libya who might change the North African balance of power and stability.⁵² The spread of the Islamic movement in Tunisia had created a problem for the US because the Americans did not want the Islamic movement to hold power in Tunisia or to spread in North Africa because of America's experience with Islamic fundamentalists in Iran.

An American Embassy function in Tunis in February 1985 was a clear sign of American involvement in the succession problem in Tunisia. The US Embassy invited government leaders and critics to an evening's dinner and discussion of the country's future. A seminar was also held in Georgetown University attended by American and Tunisian officials and other American experts on Tunisia to discuss the Tunisian succession. The United States was attracted to the Tunisian model for thirty years because Bourguiba was seen as pragmatic, non-ideological, open to the West and secular.⁵³

Although Tunisia had a cultural agreement which was signed on November 18th 1963, it was not active, and French culture and language dominated Tunisian life in 1970s and 1980s. As of September 1983 only 450 academic students had been trained in the USA compared to more than a thousand in France.⁵⁴

5.2.3 American-Algerian relations

Algeria won its independence during the Kennedy Administration. Kennedy

had been a strong supporter of Algerian independence in the 1950s when he was a senator and a member of the committee on Foreign Relations.

5.2.3.1 American and Algeria: Ben Bella and Kennedy

After independence a special relationship had developed between Algeria and the United States of America. The United States recognized the new Algerian government on 29th of September 1962, and Ben Bella visited the United States in October 1962, only three months after Algerian independence. It was the first trip Ben Bella made outside Algeria as a President. After his visit to the United States, Ben Bella visited Cuba where he met Castro at the time of the Cuban crisis. The Ben Bella visit to Cuba was not a sign of support for Castro against the US, but it was intended both to gain a type of legitimacy for Ben Bella as a revolutionary leader and for consumption inside Algeria and in the Third World. William Quandt described America's relations with Algeria as part of Kennedy's new approach toward new Third World regimes

“During the Kennedy years, there seems to have been a desire to identify the United States with non-communist but progressive Third World countries. because of Kennedy's early interest, Algeria for a brief period was seen as a country to be courted in the hope of convincing neutral governments throughout the world that the cold war mentality of the Dulles era was over.”⁵⁵

Ben Bella had close relations with Nkrumah and Nasser but he was not supportive of Communist ideology. Ben Bella had won a reputation as a revolutionary leader. He had influence in the Non-Aligned Movement as a progressive leader. In that sense he was a potential target for America to develop relations with. On the other hand, Algeria was desperate for economic aid and to balance its relations with France, it had built links with both the US and USSR, although its relations with the USSR were handicapped because of the USSR's position during the strug-

gle for independence from France. Ben Bella developed effective relations outside Algeria but his domestic policy had isolated him within the FLN and it led to his overthrow in a non-violent coup in 1965.⁵⁶

5.2.3.2 American-Relations with Algeria: Boumedienne era

The Boumedienne coup was directed at Ben Bella's internal policy, but Boumedienne had also a more Islamic-Arabic background than Ben Bella because Boumedienne had studied one year in al-Azhar University in Cairo and he was less enthusiastic toward the Eastern bloc. The United States was unable to stop the coup and it realized that Ben Bella had lost popularity inside Algeria despite his popular reputation outside Algeria. The United States believed that Boumedienne would be more moderate in his foreign policy and that he would adopt a Non-Aligned policy.

After the 1967 War, and Arab accusations of United States involvement, Algeria broke its diplomatic relations with the United States. Algeria sent to Egypt a battalion-size combat team of infantry and artillery and about 100 MIGs planes to fight for the Arabs. Algerian demonstrators attacked the American Embassy and US information centre, but despite the broken diplomatic relations, consular relations were not broken, which left two American consulates operating in Oran and Constantine.⁵⁷ The Palestinian issue and the Vietnam conflict were points of political dispute between the US and Algeria in the 1960s. After the Paris peace agreement in 1973, the Palestinian problem has been at the centre of Algerian-American political differences because Algeria has been one of the strongest supporters of the Palestinian cause. As a leader of the Third World and Non-Aligned movement, Algeria has adopted anti-imperialist policies and allowed liberation movements to

open offices in Algiers.

The United States was affected by the Algerian nationalization policy in the 1960s and, despite American requests for compensation, the issue was critical to their political relations. In addition, Algeria became the headquarters of the American Black Panther party in 1970 because the leader of the group, Eldridge Cleaver, had fled to Algeria as a political exile. But, in 1972, two hijacking ransoms collected by the Black Panthers were returned to the US and the Algerians cut off relations with and support for the group. Algeria had a conflict with France in the early 1970s over Algerian natural gas, and this conflict encouraged Algeria to develop trade relations with the United States.⁵⁸

Economic interests between the two countries in 1973 and after had encouraged a political rapprochement between them. After the Arab-Israeli war in 1973, Algeria was frustrated from the Soviet policy during the war. After Kissinger's disengagement policy following the War, the US and Algeria started to minimize their differences and they adopted a more pragmatic approach in their contacts. In 1973, Kissinger regularly consulted with Boumedienne in the course of his shuttle diplomacy. Kissinger has stated that he used Algeria to mediate between him and Syria and also to learn about Syrian objectives from Algeria during the disengagement policy between Syria and Israel in the Golan heights.⁵⁹

Two events combined to reduce Algeria's anti-American policy in the Middle East and Algerian weight in Arab politics in 1970s. One was the assassination of King Faisal of Saudi Arabia and the other was the Western Sahara problem with Morocco. King Faisal was a strong supporter of the anti-Kissinger policy in the Middle East, and through Saudi Arabia's money he had won influence in Egypt

and Syria and, in 1973, the Arabs used the oil weapon for the first time. Faisal and Boumedienne were strong supporters of the Palestinian issue.⁶⁰

Kissinger claimed that Boumedienne distrusted Soviet policy in the Middle East, especially after Soviet behaviour in the October war in 1973. On the other hand, when Vernon Walters, the deputy chief of the CIA, met secretly with PLO leaders in Rabat, it was a sign of American flexibility toward the Arab-Israeli conflict. Algeria was encouraged by American policy toward Pakistan in 1971 during its conflict with India. Algeria saw an American tilt toward Pakistan as a progressive policy. From an American perspective, the Non-Aligned Summit in Algiers in September 1973, Algerian adoption of New International Economic Order and South-North Dialogue, Algeria had become an important element and a positive factor in the Non-Aligned Movement because of Algeria's role in countering radicalization of the movement and encouragement toward positive neutral in East-West conflict. In 1973, Algeria and the United States resumed their political relations. Boumedienne paid an unofficial visit to President Nixon during Boumedienne's address to the General Assembly in 1974.⁶¹

American-Algerian relations had been influenced by Algerian relations with France. In 1969 and 1970, the French-Algerian relations were influenced by two elements: France introduced protectionist measures against imports of Algerian wine, and Algeria nationalized French oil companies' interests. As a result, Algeria initially looked towards more cooperation with United States. But Giscard d'Estaing visit to Algeria in 1975, the first visit by a French President to newly independent Algeria, led to a settlement of the Algerian-French disputes over trade relations and French immigration policy (there were around 850,000 Algerian immigrants in France). The French-Algerian rapprochement had its impact on American-

Algerian relations, especially on the eve of Carter's policy in the Middle East in 1977. Algeria condemned American policy in the Middle East and the Camp David agreements, and Algeria joined the anti-Camp David camp and the steadfastness front against Sadat's peace with Israel. Boumedienne had adopted an Arab-Islamic policy with support for liberation movements until his death in 1979.⁶²

5.2.3.3 American-Algerian relations 1979-1985

After Boumedienne's death, Chadli Bendjedid became Algerian president, (with the support of the military). The new President has developed a more moderate approach in foreign policy, and he adopted a less revolutionary ideology. In his early years as President, Algeria played a major role as a mediator between the United States and Iran in the American hostage crisis. Algeria gained a reputation as a successful international mediator. Brzezinski, Carter's National Security Advisor, visited Algeria and met Iranian officials there. The Carter administration was inclined toward Algeria and the US adopted a neutral policy in the Western Sahara conflict between Morocco and Algeria, (see chapter eight). Carter, like John Kennedy, had adopted a regional approach in his foreign policy and he tried to combat Soviet influence in the Third World by new means, in particular he raised the Human Rights issue and he leaned toward more progressive regimes and distanced America from reactionary policies. Unfortunately, this new approach did not survive the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

Algeria has increasingly orientated its need for technology towards the West, and especially the United States. In 1970, there were only 46 Algerians in graduate programs in North America, in 1978, there were 1,720, and by 1981, the figure reached 2,066. The first cultural co-operation agreement between Algeria and the

US was signed in June 1987.⁶³

During Reagan's first term in the White House, Algeria's relations with the United States were less warm than during the Carter years. Reagan's globalist policy led him to support Morocco. Alexander Haig described Carter's relations with Algeria in the following terms;

"Certain State Department bureaucrats, whose sympathies clearly lay with Algeria, the revolutionary republic, rather than with Morocco, the kingdom, maintained that concessions to Algiers would encourage the friendlier trend in our recent relations following many years of gingerly contacts. I raised this matter with Bud Mcfarlane, who had done outstanding staff work on this question. I decided that the issue of Morocco's defence against a Marxist insurgency and Soviet intimidation was so important in itself, and as a means of alerting Moscow and the world at large to the revival of American will, that some other means of acknowledging our genuine gratitude to Algeria would have to be found."⁶⁴

The influence of conservative elements in the Reagan administration had limited Algeria's ability to approach the US. There were also differences with American companies over natural gas prices which helped distance Algeria from the US. Bendjedid visited the United States in 1985 to push the Reagan Administration toward a solution for the Palestinian problem but Reagan failed to respond.⁶⁵

5.2.4 American-Moroccan relations

American relations with Morocco were influenced over three decades by America's perception of the stability of Morocco's monarch. George Lambrakis, Director of the Office of Regional Affairs within the State Department's Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs from 1979 to 1982, describes the American attitude toward the monarch in the early days of independence

"I'm constantly reminded that my first job in the Foreign Service in 1957 was reporting on North Africa. At that time, a very senior colleague explained to me that now Algeria had gone radical, in a very short time King Hassan of Morocco and President Bourguiba in Tunisia would be gone. That was almost 30 years ago and they are still in power. He was not being silly; he had the indicators."⁶⁶

Lambrakis's view was repeated by Americans many times in the 1960s, which the CIA reported in 1979 that Hassan's regime would not survive another year, and the same argument was used again in 1981 and 1983. The perception was derived from the widespread corruption surrounding the monarchy. According to Richard Parker, who was Deputy Chief of Mission in Rabat 1970 to 1974 and later on American Ambassador to Morocco 1978-1979, Hassan II or his relatives have been criticized for corruption, inefficiency, and ostentatious living, while 60 per cent of the population remains poor.⁶⁷

However, American policy makers were interested in Morocco for geostrategic reasons in the cold war era and because of the American military bases there. The United States had been influenced by France's role in Morocco because France perceived Morocco as within its sphere of influence and area of interests.

5.2.4.1 American-Moroccan relations: Mohammed V reign 1956-1961

King Mohammed V of Morocco tried to build a direct relationship with the United States after Moroccan independence in 1956, while the Americans had negotiated with France to settle their military bases in Morocco after WWII. According to an American official in 1956, King Mohammed V did not trust the French and particularly the role of the French communist party in Morocco. The King also had problems with France over Algeria and the migration of French from Morocco (after the destruction of many government files) left the new independent state without much experience to cope with government.⁶⁸

Moreover, Morocco was in a difficult economic position and the Moroccan army required a great deal of financial aid and equipment, so the King was inclined to seek help from the United States. On the other hand, the United States

discouraged Morocco from establishing relations with the Soviet Union, because the US was aware of Soviet interests in Morocco's strategic location. Also, the Americans had seen the King as a moderate voice in the Arab world and he had not only protected the Jewish community in Morocco, but his first cabinet included Jewish members.

King Mohammed V of Morocco visited the United States in November 1957 to strengthen his relations with the United States and to ask for economic aid. President Eisenhower visited Morocco in 1959, and reached agreement with Mohammed V to withdraw from all bases by 1963. The United States also supported Morocco in its request for unification of Moroccan territories, particularly Tangier, where America had a station for Voice of America. The American reaction to Tangier's status was similar to the USSR, both supported Morocco on the Tangier Question to remove the International status of Tangier.⁶⁹

When Morocco established diplomatic relations with the USSR in 1958 and received several MIG's in 1961, the United States informally criticized Morocco. But the United States implicitly supported Morocco in its attempt to establish the Casablanca group for African unity against colonialism in 1960. Neither the USSR nor the USA had a record as imperialist powers in Africa and both superpowers tried to encourage anti-colonialism.⁷⁰

5.2.4.2 American-Moroccan relations 1961-1970: suspicion and mistrust

When Hassan succeeded to the throne in 1961, many observers, Moroccan and foreigners alike, felt that Hassan II, having none of his father's charisma and spiritual qualities, would not last more than a year. Mohammed V had held the respect of the seasoned politicians and the adoration of the ordinary people,

but Hassan II possessed neither.⁷¹ Hassan II visited the United States when he was crown prince in 1956, and in April 1963 as king of Morocco. In the second visit, his official reception was warm, but his personal extravagances, exemplified by the purchase of five cadillacs, as well as an apparent disregard for his young wife and daughter, resulted in some criticism. The American image of Hassan II was that of a playboy rather than a statesman.⁷²

Political developments in Morocco in the early 1960s caused difficulties for Hassan II. The Istiqlal party, the strongest Moroccan party after independence, and the only challenge to the king's power, had experienced a division inside the party. Al-Fassi, the charismatic leader of the party, was in favour of a one party system, and a constitutional monarch, while Balafrej argued for a multi-party system; Mehdi ben Barka, Abdelrahim Bouabid and the General Secretary of Moroccan Trade Unions (MUT) Mahjob Ben Sidiqi, were republican and Socialist in their ideas.⁷³

The Istiqlal party had split in the late 1950s, and the radical wing had formed the *Union Nationale de Forces Populaires* (UNFP), the latter had a more radical stance. The leadership of the new party were ex-members of the Istiqlal such as Ben Barka, Abdullah Ibrahim and Faqi Basri. King Hassan II adopted the first constitution in December 1962 but the UNFP had a negative attitude toward Hassan II and it had much influence over the National Union of Moroccan Students. To confront the Istiqlal party and UNFP, the government had encouraged Ahmed Reda Guedira to form the *Front pour la Defense des Institutions Constitutionnelles* (FDIC).⁷⁴ It was coalition of parties in support of the monarchy.

During 1963 there were political struggles inside Morocco between the political

parties and the *Front pour la Defense des Institutions Constitutionnelles* (FDIC) was accused of buying votes with wheat donated by the American programme “food for peace”. Four Istiqlal deputies and a mayor addressed a letter to the United States embassy in Rabat⁷⁵ complaining about the misuse of American donation. The government’s response to that accusation was to arrest these five despite the parliamentary immunity that the new constitution gave four of them. The government also brought libel suits against *La Nation* and *Al-Alam* newspapers for printing the letter and arrested 130 members from UNFP including their leaders al-Basri and Abdulla Ibrahim. Ben Barka was in Cairo at the time but he was charged with supplying funds and aid to the plotters, and vague charges also implicated the United States and the United Arab Republic.⁷⁶

It seems that the United States had doubts about Hassan’s survival and it had developed warm relations with, and given implicit support to, the radical republican party, the UNFP. The United States had built close links with Ben Barka and the General Secretary of MUT, Ben Sidiqi. In 1956, during the MUT strike Ben Sidiqi stated that “*we do not want the Americans to leave; they have done a great deal for the country.*”⁷⁷

Ben Barka left Morocco in 1963 for exile to live in Paris, and to organize an opposition front against the regime. He cultivated a close relationship with Egypt. In 1965, riots spread in Moroccan cities particularly in Casablanca and they posed a major threat to the regime. During the riots, the King was denounced by name! and hundreds of people were wounded and about 100 people were killed. The causes of the riots were related to the economic recession in 1964 and to Arab nationalist feeling in Morocco. The Egyptian teachers in Moroccan high schools were thought to have played a major role in spreading nationalist attitudes.

The King declared a state of national emergency and suspended the constitution on June 7, 1965 and a period of direct rule began that lasted until 1970.⁷⁸ The most important element in the 1960s in US-Moroccan relations was the assassination of Mehdi Ben Barka in Paris in 1965. He was kidnapped and later killed and despite much speculation that Moroccan intelligence and some elements in French intelligence were involved in the episode, it seems that the incident itself was related to the struggle between France and the US for political influence in Morocco.

It is hard to believe that the Moroccans had committed the crime without French knowledge, because General Oufkir, the head of security police in Morocco after 1960, and then Minister of Interior from 1964 to 1971, was in the French army before Moroccan independence and according to Mehdi Banounni (Moroccan politician), Oufkir was an agent of French intelligence. Oufkir's personal ambition and French interests had met together. Oufkir tried to eliminate his political rival, and the French protected their interests by preserving the regime. On the other hand, the United States, during the Kennedy years, had attempted to distance America from conservative regimes particularly those derived from a European colonial legacy, and Ben Barka had developed a reputation for socialism and progressive ideas. Kennedy's new approach was to support the forces of Third World socialism as a counter to communism in the Third World.⁷⁹

Ben Barka was well known in America because, in 1957, the State Department invited him as a President of the National Assembly to visit the United States. He claimed to be a true democrat, and for a certain time, in sympathy with both the British and American democratic systems. According to Rom Landau, an American Jew, and a university professor in San Francisco University who was

close to Ben Barka from the 1950s, Ben Barka was anti-communist, and when the UNFP leader Abdullah Ibrahim became Prime Minister in Morocco in early 1960, the communists in Morocco had shrunk away almost to nothing. Socialist was used in the Third World as a political slogan but it did not mean communism, Ben Barka stated

“we are socialists and we are aiming at a genuinely democratic government that will represent the true will of the people without wasting its time in constant inter-party warfare.”⁸⁰

Hassan II had succeeded in the 1960s in neutralizing the opposition to his regime, and he had consolidated his power in Moroccan internal politics in a way which left no room to manouver to challenge his rule through political parties. It seems that the American approach to political change (in favor of American influence and interests) in Morocco through the political parties and Moroccan Trade Unions (MUT) had failed⁸¹ because of the French influence and the support of the traditional politicians to the King. However, during this period, the charismatic opposition leader was assassinated, political parties lost their power, and then the military was the only force to emerge.

5.2.4.3 American- Moroccan relations 1973-1980: From Coups to Co-operation

Hassan II faced critical challenges in 1971 and 1972 when there were two attempted military coups. The King had become more dependent on his military forces for his survival after he had excluded Moroccan political rivals in 1960s and suspended the constitution. Moreover, in this kind of situation, corruption had spread because loyalty to the throne was more important than efficiency and honesty.

Ali Benjelloun, former ambassador to the United States, was removed from

office as a Minister of Justice in 1967 because of corruption when he was Director-General of the Sherifian Office of phosphates. He was never tried, but forced to retire. In Autumn 1970, two ministers were fired, allegedly for corruption; Mohammed Imani, Minister of Public Work and Mohammed Benhima, Minister of Agriculture. Also in early 1971, four further ministers were fired because of corruption: Mamoun Tahiri, Minister of Finance; Mohammed Jaidis, Minister of Commerce; Mohammed Kriem, Minister of Tourism and Yahya Chefchauni, Director General of the Bureau of Mines.⁸²

The United States was concerned about corruption in Morocco because of its strategic interests in an important geopolitical area in the cold war and its importance to NATO. The instability of Morocco or a new radical regime would affect the strategic situation in the Mediterranean. So in Spring 1971, the CIA prepared an intelligence report on Morocco for a Congressional Committee in which the gravity of corruption in Morocco was stressed.⁸³

In April 1971, Mohammed Medbuh who was the leader of an abortive military coup in June 1971, was sent to Washington on a military mission but in reality, the King asked him to find out why Pan-American Airways had shown no interest in constructing an Intercontinental hotel in Casablanca. It had been rumoured that the sacked ministers had asked Pan-American for over a million dollars to be deposited in foreign banks. However, General Medbuh had close ties with the United States and he was a golf-partner of US Vice-President, Spiro Agnew, who had a visit to Morocco planned in July 1971. Despite the coup attempt and the killing of Medbuh, he went through with his scheduled visit two weeks after the coup.⁸⁴

The United States had telecommunication facilities for its Mediterranean fleet in Morocco and an air base in Kenitra. The American bases were evacuated in 1978. The second abortive military coup was in August 1972 when the air force, using US supplied F-5 aircraft, attacked the King's Boeing on his return from Paris. Diplomatic circles in Rabat and in the Arab World generally accused the US of instigating the coup attempt because the F-5s left with ammunition from the Kenitra base which was under American control and the rebel pilots had been trained in the United States. It is therefore hard to believe that the Americans in Kenitra did not have some kind of knowledge of the coup. The leader of the second attempt was Mohammed Oufkir who had emerged as a powerful man in Morocco as the new Minister of Defence after the first attempt in 1971. He had been Minister of Interior for seven years before he assumed control of the Ministry of Defence. The most likely interpretation that because of the French long standing relationship with the monarch, Oufkir found the Americans more helpful to his ambition.⁸⁵

Hassan had emerged from the coups as more powerful. He executed the conspirators and controlled the military directly. Hassan II claimed that the first coup was externally instigated because 600 Moroccans had called at the Moroccan embassy in Cairo asking for passports in order to return. But Hassan became more cautious in the following years, and in order not to disturb his relations with America he suggested that

“until it is proved conclusively to the contrary, I shall remain convinced that Generals Medbouk and Oufkir did not act as instruments of a foreign power.”⁸⁶

In 1972, King Hassan II produced the third constitution (the second was in 1970) but it was not until 1977 that the elections were conducted. The multi-party

system had furthered Hassan's interests because the leaders of the parties were in Hassan's pocket, and the competition intensified between the political parties. In the case of the military, it was formally dominated by Berber officers but after the two attempted coups he had eliminated the military influence of the Berbers.⁸⁷

Hassan II adopted a more pragmatic approach in his foreign policy in the 1970s, and his relations with America and particularly with Henry Kissinger had become closer. As a result of the Vietnam war, the United States adopted a geopolitical approach to further American interests, the "Nixon doctrine", which focused on regional powers to protect American interests as proxy forces instead of direct American military intervention. In this term, Hassan's power inside Morocco had convinced the Americans there was as no alternative to Hassan. On the other hand, the deployment of Moroccan forces in Syria in 1973 had increased Hassan's popularity inside Morocco. After 1973, Hassan supported Kissinger's step by step policy and disengagements. The Western Sahara issue has played an important role in Hassan's stability in the 1970s because all political parties supported Hassan's Western Sahara policy and his domestic failure was partly compensated by his success in the Sahara.⁸⁸

Morocco had become a leading state in Arab and Islamic politics in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Hassan had hosted the Organization of the Islamic Conference and Arab summits and he also became the Chairman of the Higher Committee for the Liberation of aL-Quds, the so called "Jerusalem Committee". More important still, Hassan played a great role in the peace arrangements between Egypt and Israel; Hassan Tehami, the advisor of President Sadat of Egypt met Moshe Dayan in Rabat in 1977 to arrange peace negotiations between Egypt and Israel. Hassan was a strong supporter of the Camp David peace treaty and he had built good

relations with the Jewish community both inside and outside Morocco. The King allowed Moroccan Jews in 1985 to organize a world conference of Moroccan Jewry which was held in Canada. The World Assembly of the Moroccan Jewry held a second world congress in 1986 in Morocco. So the Jewish lobby in Europe and US were strong supporters of Hassan II. The influence of the Jewish community in America's media and in the Congress helped Hassan to improve his image in American political circles.⁸⁹

Despite Hassan's role in the Middle East, there were misperceptions between Hassan and Carter in the early days of the Carter Administration. During that era, Morocco had warm relations with the French President, Giscard d'Estang, and France and Morocco, with the help of the US, had intervened in Zaire in 1977 and 1978.⁹⁰ But Carter had adopted a regional approach in American foreign policy and raised human rights issues. Carter initially was cool towards Morocco and more orientated towards Algeria, and he did not support Morocco in the Western Sahara or sell arms to Morocco. Carter only supported Morocco with arms after the fall of the Shah of Iran and Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the perceived American need for military bases for the Rapid Deployment Forces (RDF). The US was afraid to lose another friend. It was written in Casablanca during the Shah of Iran's temporary stay in Morocco after the Iranian revolution that "*we have a Shah, we do not need another one.*"⁹¹

5.2.4.4 Reagan and Hassan II: Close relations

Reagan adopted a global approach to American foreign policy and he was influenced by the Iranian revolution and perceived Carter's weakness in supporting American friends. As a conservative and with the support of Jewish lobby and

Saudi Arabian mediation, Morocco and the United States had for strategic reasons become close allies. The new socialist government in France which had criticized Hassan's human rights record had more sympathy with Algeria and Polisario. Hassan found himself closer to Reagan than to Mitterrand of France because the latter was a socialist, had close relations with the Moroccan socialist USFP and was critical of Morocco for the arrest of Abderrahim Bouabid, the leader of USFP in 1981. United States officials visited Morocco; Vice President Bush, Secretary of State Haig (October 1981 and February 1982), Secretary of Defence Weinberger, and American Chief of Staff General John Vessy, they were all interested in military co-operation with Morocco,⁹² (chapter seven).

Hassan II visited the United States in 1982, and an agreement was signed for American use of Moroccan military bases when needed by the RDF. In January 1983, Hassan executed General Dlimi on suspicion of a military coup attempt, and despite riots in Morocco in 1981 and 1984, Reagan continued to be a supporter of Hassan.⁹³ Vernon Walters, an influential figure in the Reagan administration and US representative in the United Nations, has been close to Hassan for many years and has lobbied for him in Washington.

Morocco's rapprochement with Libya in 1984, produced a strong condemnation by Washington. The Reagan Administration tried to isolate Qaddafi and to discredit him while the Oujda treaty for Arab-African Union between Morocco and Libya had given legitimacy to Qaddafi and this disappointed the United States. The United States recalled its ambassador, Joseph Reed, and then replaced him with Thomas Nassef who was also recalled when Morocco made a sudden rapprochement with Algeria. On the other hand, Morocco had strengthened its relations with the socialist government of Mitterrand. In the area of cultural relations

the French still dominated Morocco despite the arrival of Peace Corps volunteers in the 1960s. Morocco had fewer students in the USA than Libya or Algeria⁹⁴ (Table 5:1).

5.3 Soviet-Maghreb relations

Soviet relations with North Africa had been influenced by the cold war and by Soviet attempts to limit Western influence in the region. The Soviets had also used aid and cultural cooperation as a means of building influence in the future. The major regional conflict in the Middle East, the Palestinian problem had been an important factor in increasing the level of Soviet political contacts with the Maghreb states because all North African states support the Palestinian cause. Moreover, the role of Algeria and Morocco and other Maghreb states in the Arab world, the Non-Aligned movement, Islamic countries and Africa had encouraged the Soviets to develop political relations with the Maghreb.⁹⁵

5.3.1 Soviet-Libyan relations 1969-1985

Soviet-Libyan relations have been influenced by the personality and the ideology of the Libyan leader, al-Qaddafi, and Soviet political links with Egypt and other regional states. Libyan conflicts with America had pushed Libya in many ways closer to the Soviets. The superpowers' regional competition had influenced superpower behaviour in the region.

5.3.1.1 Soviet-Libyan Relations before 1969 Revolution

The Soviet perception of the Libyan monarch was of a reactionary state under American and British control, an impression reinforced by the presence of American and British military bases. But despite that perception, the Soviets saw Libya more

as a victim than as an accomplice of Western imperialism. Full diplomatic ties were not established until 1955, and diplomatic and commercial interchange developed slowly. Libyan parliamentary delegations visited the Soviet Union in 1961 and 1968, and a delegation from the Supreme Soviet visited Libya in 1966. During this period, the Soviets kept channels open and awaited developments, because there was no communist organization in Libya, and the radical elements among the youth were orientated to Cairo rather than Moscow.⁹⁶

5.3.1.2 Soviet-Libyan relations: Suspicion and Cautious Relations

The Soviet Union recognized the new Libyan government on the 4th September, 1969, and the Soviet Charge d' Affaire in Tripoli stated that his government supported Libya and was ready to provide any necessary assistance. The Eastern Europe states followed the Soviet Union, and East Germany and Bulgaria also recognized the Libyan revolution.⁹⁷ The Soviet newspaper *Pravda*, on September 6th, 1969 welcomed the revolution

“There is no doubt this is an important event. Libya is one of the major oil producers of the Near East. Wheelus Field, the American Air Force base, near Tripoli, and British military bases at Tobruk and El Adem are on Libyan territory. Libyan oil, as well as the foreign military bases located on its soil, were used by the English against the Egyptian people in 1956, during Tripartite imperialist aggression against Egypt.”⁹⁸

Despite Soviet support for the new Libyan regime, Qaddafi was strongly anti-communist, and he criticized the Soviets during the Pakistan-India war in 1971. Qaddafi explained to *Le Monde* in 1971, that the Soviet supply of arms to Arab countries was a commercial affair. He saw Libya's relations with Moscow as one of mutual interest. He stated his view of Moscow and communism as follows;

“We are against communism because communism is hostile to Islam. If the Soviet Union allows relations with the Arabs to deteriorate through the activities of the communists, such action will contradict the international policy proclaimed by Moscow and will prejudice its interests.”⁹⁹

Qaddafi's attitude toward communism has never changed, and the Soviet Union has consistently built its relations in the Middle East with governments rather than with communist parties for economic and geostrategic reasons. Libya and the Soviet Union shared many political objectives, for example, they were anti-imperialist and against the American political and military presence in the region. The Soviets had also been supporting the Arabs in the Arab- Israeli conflict, particularly after the 1967 war. Qaddafi had been calling for Arab unity, and the Soviets, at least in public, encouraged Arab Unity.

During the visit of Libya's Prime Minister, Abd al-Salam Jallud, to Moscow on 23 February 1972, the two sides condemned US imperialist support for the Israeli military build up and reaffirmed their support for the Palestinian people. When Libya, Egypt and Syria announced their new Arab Federation, the Soviet Union welcomed the Federation of the Tripoli charter states in Benghazi on 17th April, 1971.¹⁰⁰ The Soviet Union had seen Arab unity as a progressive force against imperialism, while the Americans had seen Arab unity as a threat to American interests. The Soviets tried to support the Arab aspiration for unity to win the Arab masses to the Soviet side.¹⁰¹

5.3.1.3 Soviet-Libyan Relations 1975-1981

After 1973, as a result of the October war, a new Arab regional alliance had emerged between Libya, Sudan and Egypt. Kissinger had won Sadat's confidence and started his step by step policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Soviets had felt that they had been ousted from the Middle East peace process and the Egyptian rapprochement to the United States meant that Sadat had all his cards in United States hands. The Soviet perception was that they had lost Egypt,

the core of the Arab world and the gate to Africa, and Libya offered them some compensation for the loss of its position in Egypt.¹⁰² In the case of Qaddafi, despite his long standing hostility toward communism and his criticism of the Soviet role in the Middle East during the October war, he carefully cultivated warmer relations with the Soviet Union during 1974. The main incentives were his quarrel with Egypt, Sadat's policy with the US and Qaddafi's own need for arms.¹⁰³

Kosygin visited Libya in May 1975, and during that visit, the Soviets signed an economic, technical and cultural co-operation agreement. In the joint communique, the Soviet and Libyan officials condemned Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, and the Zionists. They called for the liquidation of imperialist bases and Kosygin asserted that

“The strengthening of Soviet Libyan friendship was regarded by the USSR as a main element in strengthening the general anti-imperialist front of the socialist and developing countries.”¹⁰⁴

The Soviet Union's objective in Libya was geopolitical, as a gate to Africa after they lost political influence in Egypt. The close relations between the USA and Egypt led Qaddafi to visit the Soviet Union for the first time in December 1976. The Soviets praised the Non-Aligned movement and Libya's active role in it. The Soviets regarded the Non-aligned countries including Libya as their allies in the anti-imperialist struggle.¹⁰⁵

Sadat's visit to Jerusalem in November 1977 had created a rift in the Arab world, and the Soviets supported the *Rejectionist Steadfastness and Confrontation Front* which was formed in Tripoli in December 1977 as a reaction to Sadat's visit. Jallud visited Moscow in February 1978 to discuss Sadat's peace with Israel as representative of the Steadfastness Front. Jallud met Brezhnev and Premier Kosygin and the Soviets called for a comprehensive peace settlement of the Arab-

Israeli conflict. Kosygin said

“The Soviet Union and Libya regard the task of a just settlement of the Middle East conflict as the most urgent of the tasks of contemporary international politics.”¹⁰⁶

However, Libyan political isolation in the region and the Camp David peace treaty had forced Libya to build close relations with the Soviet Union to counter the balance of power between Egypt and United States. The Soviets, despite their distrust of Qaddafi, favoured Libya over Egypt. Qaddafi was alienated from the United States and he courted Russia not because he loved Russia but to protect himself.

5.3.1.4 Soviet- Libyan relations during Reagan era

When Reagan came to power, Qaddafi was notably in conflict with America's allies, Egypt and the Sudan, and isolated in the Arab world but he was also in difficulty with many of his African neighbours because of Libyan intervention in Chad. In 1981, Sadat was assassinated and Nimeri was facing difficulty and instability in Sudan. America was keen to restore its influence and Reagan had increased the American defense budget to confront Soviet influence in the Third World. In these circumstances, the Soviets distanced themselves from Libya while Qaddafi tried to be close to the Soviets. In 1981, Qaddafi paid his second visit to the Soviet Union as a representative of Steadfastness but he antagonized the Soviets by saying prayers at the Grand Mosque in Moscow and by visiting cemeteries where he read Quranic verses.¹⁰⁷

Ideologically, the Soviets had realized that Qaddafi's rapprochement was unreliable, but Soviet entente made sense only for hard currency and major oil deposits; from this perspective, Libya was a highly desirable partner for the Soviet Union.

To avoid direct confrontation with the United States, the Soviets had encouraged Libya to build relationships with Eastern Europe. The Soviets did not like to disrupt their relations with the Americans over Libya because of the US accusation that Libya was a terrorist state, and the American-Libyan clash in the Gulf of Sdra. The Soviet Union praised the Tripartite Treaty of Ethiopia, South Yemen and Libya. The Soviets saw it as an important stage in strengthening the national liberation's solidarity and in stepping up their struggle against imperialism and reaction and for peace and progress.¹⁰⁸ When Jallud visited Moscow in May 1982, the Soviets supported the Tripartite alliance, but in reality, Qaddafi tried to put pressure on Nimeri, to encircle Sudan, and to create a regional balance of power between US, Egypt and Sudan on the one hand and USSR, Ethiopia, South Yemen and Libya on the other hand.¹⁰⁹

According to Gregorii Arbatov, director of the American and Canadian Institute in Moscow, the Soviet Union had never taken Qaddafi seriously and during the American-Libyan clash the Soviet offered only a rhetorical condemnation. In cultural co-operation, although Libya and the Soviet Union had signed many agreements, cultural co-operation was at a low level compared to the number of Libyan students in the USA and Western Europe. In 1981, Libya had only 275 students being trained in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.¹¹⁰ Whereas in 1972, there were over 600 Libyan students in the United States, by 1982 the number reached 3000, many of whom were studying at graduate level,¹¹¹ (see Tables 5:1;2).

5.3.2 Soviet-Tunisian relations

Soviet relations with Tunisia were often an inverse reflection of Tunisian relations with France. The Bizerte crisis of 1961 led to a significant improvement

in Soviet-Tunisian relations.¹¹² After Tunisian independence, diplomatic relations had been established more or less routinely in 1956. The Tunisian Communist Party played a minimal part in the attainment of Tunisian independence, and it pursued without success a policy of coalition with the Neo-Destour party (Socialist Destour party after 1962). From 1957 on, the Soviet Union was highly critical of Bourguiba's co-operation with the West which was dubbed "*The policy of collaboration.*"¹¹³ Soviet criticism and Bourguiba's anti communist policy had led to a ban on the Tunisian Communist Party in January 1963. But despite that, the Soviets ignored the Tunisian communists and tried to build government relations with Tunisia to reduce Tunisian reliance on the West, to penetrate Tunisian social and economic sectors and to win Tunisian public opinion to the Soviets side¹¹⁴ through the latter's support of the Arab cause and anti-colonial policy. Bourguiba was seen by the Soviets as a leader who had frozen the revolutionary forces of Tunisian society in the interest of an emerging bureaucratic bourgeoisie and state capitalist system. The Soviets saw him as a leader who had resisted Soviet influence on foreign policy.¹¹⁵

5.3.2.1 Bizerte Crisis and the improvement of Soviet-Tunisian relations

The Soviet Union had tried to use the Bizerte crisis to improve its relations with Tunisia. On the other hand, Tunisia also tried to put pressure on France by approaching the Soviet Union and also to alert the United States and NATO members of the need for political support in the crisis. Gromyko, the Foreign minister of the USSR explained to Sadiq Mokaddem, Tunisian Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, that the Soviets supported the just demand of Tunisia for the immediate cessation by France of all actions in the violation of sovereignty and independence of the Tunisian republic and the withdrawal from Tunisia of French

troops.

Mokaddem tried to encourage Soviet support, and he stressed the position of the Tunisian government on the question of its refusal to participate in military blocs and the necessity for liquidating foreign bases on foreign territory and the entire question of supporting and preserving international peace and security as coinciding with the position of the Soviet Union.¹¹⁶ The Soviet Union supported Tunisia in the UN security council, and it was the only permanent member to support Tunisia in the crisis.¹¹⁷ Moreover, the Soviet Union had connected the Bizerte crisis to NATO and the American military bases in Europe. According to the Soviet newspaper *Pravda*

“The events in Bizerte have exposed to the Tunisian people the true character of the NATO military bloc. It was no accident that after one mass demonstration a crowd converged on the building of the U.S. Information Service with shouts of “B-29! B-29!” The Tunisians know well that the American B-29 planes, with which the member countries of NATO are armed, took part in the bombing of the peaceful population of Bizerte and of the border villages in the south of the country.”¹¹⁸

Soviet support of Tunisia had improved relations and despite the banning of the Tunisian Communist Party, it did not affect the modest Russian-Tunisian detente.¹¹⁹ The Tunisian-Soviet detente continued during the 1960s despite ideological differences. The Soviet rapprochement to Tunisia was influenced by its geostrategic value and to distance Tunisia from the West in the cold war, or at least to neutralize Tunisia in East-West conflict.

Bourguiba condemned the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, but the Soviet Union minimized the effect on Soviet-Tunisian relations by ignoring his condemnation and continuing relations with Tunisia. They accused Bourguiba of mobilizing Tunisian public opinion against the USSR, and they saw the anti-communist, anti-Soviet propaganda in Tunisia and the recent mass trial of

Tunisian students as imperialist conspiracy.¹²⁰ When Tunisia obtained an Association Agreement with the European Common Market in 1969, the Soviet Union criticized Tunisia's decision. The Soviets saw Tunisia's association with the Common Market as part of an economic strategy to force political change in the developing countries toward the west.¹²¹

Tunisian-Chinese relations had influenced Soviet relations with Tunisia because of the Sino-Soviet ideological split and their competition in the Third world. Tunisia had seen China as more radical and the Soviet Union as more moderate. Tunisia sided with the Soviet Union when the Chinese Embassy protested in Fall 1967 against a published speech by Bourguiba, and accused him of siding with the United States imperialists and the Soviet revisionists.¹²² The Soviet Union had built detente with Tunisia during the 1960s and, during that era, Bourguiba's secular attitude and modernization were more encouraging for the Soviets than the monarch in Libya and they distrusted Algeria after the fall of Ben Bella's regime.

5.3.2.2 Soviet-Tunisian relations in 1970s

Tunisia welcomed the SALT treaty between the two superpowers. The Tunisian government saw it as a relief to Europe and as opportunity for peace and co-operation in the Mediterranean and for the USSR to increase its influence in Latin America and Africa.¹²³ On regional issues, Tunisian Foreign Minister, Mohammed Masmudi, arrived in Moscow on 17 April 1973, for talks with Gromyko, the Soviet Foreign Minister, and with the Ministers of Trade and Culture. Tunisia and the Soviet Union supported the Middle East settlement on the basis of UN resolution 242 and both welcomed the Vietnam peace agreement signed in Paris, January 1973. Also the two sides had agreed to extend their co-operation and their

diplomatic relations.¹²⁴

Despite Tunisia's close relations with the United States, it managed to maintain good relations with the Soviet Union. Kosygin visited Tunisia on May 15, 1975 and, during his visit, he pushed the idea of economic and political co-operation between socialist and developing countries. Kosygin and Bourguiba both expressed their support for the Palestinian cause and for the liberation movements in Afro-Asian countries. The Soviet Union had Tunisian support on regional issues and Tunisia had received Soviet support in scientific assistance and the Arab-Israeli conflict.¹²⁵

Soviet-Tunisian relations were disturbed by an incident of espionage in Tunisia by Soviet officials. In 1966, the Secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Tunisia was declared "*persona non grata*" by the Tunisian government. This decision was followed by a similar measure taken against a member of the Tunisian Embassy in Moscow.¹²⁶ Also, in 1973, two Soviet diplomats had been declared *persona non grata*, and the Soviet News Agency Novosti's former correspondent in Tunisia was expelled after allegations of espionage. The Tunisian government discovered a Soviet espionage network which included nine Tunisians and the former Press Attache of the Soviet embassy. The Soviet government apologized for the espionage incident. In view of Tunisia's pro-West foreign policy, it seems that the Soviet Union was preparing for the post Bourguiba era, because the problems over the succession began in the early 1970s.¹²⁷

Tunisia condemned the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979. When Tunisia boycotted the Olympic games in Moscow, the Soviets reminded Tunisia of their support for Tunisian Independence and economic aid

"The Soviet Union was surprised by the Tunisian refusal to take part in the

Olympic Games,when Soviet coaches had done so much to build up Tunisia's National Sports movement."¹²⁸

In the early 1980s, the Soviet reaction to the Gafsa incident was to describe it as a domestic issue but the Soviets criticized the Tunisian government and the Soviet press called for the extension of democracy in Tunisia. The Soviet reaction was different from the American, the latter shipped military assistance and blamed Qaddafi for the incident. The Soviet News Agency, *Tass*, reported the incident under a headline "*the Tunisian National opposition movement*" and it criticized French military intervention.¹²⁹ The Tunisian government allowed the communist party to resume its activities in 1983, as a counter to the Islamic movement (MTI) which remained illegal. The three major political organizations in Tunisia in the 1980s were Socialist Destour party (Government party); the trade union (UGTT) and the Islamic movement (MTI).

5.3.2.3 Tunisian -Soviet Cultural relations

The Soviet Union developed cultural links with Tunisia as an instrument to advance its influence. In 1963, the first cultural agreement between Tunisia and the Soviet Union was signed. The Soviet Minister of Culture visited Tunisia in January 1968 to strengthen Tunisian-Soviet co-operation and a cultural protocol was agreed. The Soviets also offered medical aid to Tunisia in 1964, and a group of Soviet doctors went to Tunisia to work in medical centres and to train local cadres. In 1973, there were 30 Soviet doctors working in Tunisia.¹³⁰

Just as the Americans had used the Peace Corps to assist Tunisian society and further its interests, the Soviet cultural and medical assistance had a similar objective. Indeed, both the American and the Soviets sought to influence the devel-

oping countries through cultural cooperation. The Soviets established the Tunisian National Engineering School in Tunis, and opened a centre for the study of the Russian language; in 1974 about 250 Tunisians had started to study Russian.¹³¹ The Tunisian- USSR Friendship Society was formed in Moscow in December 1975, and during the following years, there was further cultural co-operation. During 1984, the Soviet Minister of Culture and the Minister of Higher and Secondary Specialized Education visited Tunisia and both ministers emphasized the importance of Tunisian-Soviet co-operation in cultural fields.¹³²

In terms of relative population, Tunisia had more students in the Soviet Union in the 1970s and 1980s than the other North African states. It was a sign of the Soviet objective to build a solid relationship with Third World elites as a way of securing long term political influence.¹³³

Table 5:1 Academic Students being trained in USSR & E. Europe and USA as of 1981 and 1983

State	USSR & E. Europe, Dec 1981	USA, Sept 1983
Algeria	2,225	2066
Libya	275	3000
Morocco	650	356
Tunisia	1,055	450

Source: Parker, R. 1987, p. 151.

5.3.3 Soviet-Algerian relations

Algeria became the fourth Arab country to have close relations with the Soviet

Union after its independence. There were three phases of Algerian-Soviet relations; the first phase was during the Ben Bella era; the second phase was the Boumedienne period from 1965-1978 and the third phase, the Bendjedid era.

5.3.3.1 Soviet Union-Algerian relations 1962-1965: Ben Bella era

The Soviet reaction to the Algerian revolutionary struggle and the war of independence with France had handicapped Algerian relations with the USSR. The Soviet reaction was cautious because of Soviet relations with France over Europe and NATO. But, despite that Ben Bella adopted the Socialist path and he permitted Algerian communists to participate in his government as *individuals* but not as a political party. He also nationalized segments of Algeria's agriculture and industry.¹³⁴

Ben Bella had used socialist and radical policies as a way of legitimizing his government. The Arab masses were against the West because of the legacy of imperialism and the Palestinian problem. Most leaders of Third World countries had taken a similar stance to legitimize themselves with Third World masses.¹³⁵

In 1955, Ben Bella declared that he was anti-communist but he needed support for the Algerian revolution from both east and west. When he had gained power, he banned the Algerian Communist Party in 1962, after only a few months of independence.¹³⁶ Ben Bella supported a single party-system. There were many factors that influenced Soviet-Algerian relations despite the Communist Party in Algeria being made illegal: First; the socialist attitude of the Algerian leader; Second, the Sino-Soviet ideological split; Third, Ben Bella's personal relations with Nasser of Egypt as an Arab hero opposed to the imperialist powers and politically (at least in public) oriented toward the Eastern bloc; Fourth, Khrushchev's policy

to extend Soviet relations with Third World countries.¹³⁷

Ben Bella visited the Soviet Union in 1964 and he emphasized solidarity and cooperation between the two countries. He saw Soviet-Algerian relations as one of mutual respect of the two states, and he saw the relationship more in economic than in political terms. Ben Bella described the relationship in 1964, one year before he was overthrown as follows;

“the Soviet Union always assists greatly in the development in our economy. Algeria, being a weakly developed country wants to expand its relations with all countries. We have to carry out several industrial projects, and we accept the participation of all those who sincerely desire to cooperate with us on the basis of mutual interests.”¹³⁸

5.3.3.2 Soviet-Algerian relations: Boumedienne era

The Soviet Union reacted coolly to Boumedienne's coup, but did not directly condemn the coup. The Soviet press criticized the Algerian government for the political arrests of persons they described as *patriotic figures* in Algeria. The Union of Soviet Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies sent a telegram to the Algerian authorities expressing their concern in the matter of the arrests. The Soviets described them as a violation of principles of humanity and the rights of man, because Boumedienne arrested communists and was less sympathetic to socialist attitudes.¹³⁹ Both the US and USSR have used the issue of human rights to discredit unfriendly regimes in the Third World. America is more successful in raising the issue of human rights in its foreign policy.

The military coup against Ben Bella in 1965 was not orientated against the Soviet Union directly, it was an internal struggle over power inside Algeria and against Ben Bella because he centralized power in his hands and personalized decision-making, and also tried to limit the power of the FLN. The Soviets con-

tinued state to state relations with Algeria and, in December 1965, Boumedienne visited the USSR at the invitation of Podgorny, the Chairman of Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet. The two sides declared their firm stand against imperialism, colonialism, neocolonialism and they called for national independence, and peaceful co-existence.¹⁴⁰

The Soviet Union and Algeria supported the Vietcong and condemned the American intervention in South Vietnam. Despite some differences between Algeria and the USSR over the conflict between Pakistan and India, both supported the People's Republic of China as the sole representative of the Chinese people. The Soviet Union had gained Algerian support on China, Vietnam, Southern Rhodesia and the Soviets supported the Arab cause in the Arab-Israeli conflict.¹⁴¹

In the later 1960s, Algeria had cooler relations with Western Europe and America. Algeria broke relations with Western Germany because of the latter's recognition of the state of Israel, and she also broke relations with Britain over Rhodesia in 1966, and with the US in 1967 after the Arab-Israeli war. Boumedienne visited the USSR in October 1967 to seek Soviet support for the Arabs after their defeat in the war with Israel. Algeria was dissatisfied with Soviet support during the war, but tried to push the Soviets more towards the Arab side. Algeria's reputation as a revolutionary state with influence in the Third World, as a supporter of national liberation movements and as a principal member in Non-Aligned movements had become important to the Soviet Union.¹⁴²

Despite Algeria's refusal to condemn the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, and its neutrality in the conflict between China and the USSR in 1969, there were still differences with the USSR over, for example, the Middle East conflict and

Soviet natural gas trade with Europe. Algeria had felt threatened by Soviet trade policy in Europe, because Algeria's major export was threatened by competition from the Soviet Union's lower natural gas prices. Algeria had asked the Soviets to share the market instead of competing with each other, but the Soviets ignored the Algerian proposal. The issue had continued until early in the 1970s when Algeria established trade relations with the United States to sell natural gas.¹⁴³

Soviet-Algerian relations remained good throughout the 1970s. Algeria allowed Soviet aircraft en route to Angola to use Algerian airports. Boumedienne continued to use socialist rhetoric.¹⁴⁴ Kosygin, the Soviet Premier, visited Algeria in October 1971 and claimed there were no political problems in Soviet-Algerian relations that stood in the way of development and co-operation. In his speech in Algeria, Kosygin stressed the principles of equality and mutual respect between Algeria and the Soviet Union. Also the two sides emphasized co-operation between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN), and even though the Algerian Communist Party remained banned, the CPSU and FLN exchanged visits during the 1970s. The Soviets tended to ignore the local communists and emphasised on state relations.¹⁴⁵

Algeria continued to support Vietnam, and was the first country to allow the Vietcong to open their offices outside the communist countries. But Algeria also had political disagreements with USSR over the Indo-Pakistani war in 1972 and the emigration of Soviet Jews to Israel.¹⁴⁶

During the Non-Aligned conference in Algeria, in September 1973, Algeria called for a New International Economic Order and the South-North dialogue. In reality, the Soviet Union had no clear ideas about the "New International Economic

Order” despite their customary criticism of capitalism.

The Arab-Israeli conflict had been the major issue in Algeria’s relations with the USSR. Boumedienne visited Moscow in 1973 to ask the Soviets to support Egypt with arms following the Arab-Israeli war. After Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem in 1977, and the division of the Arab world after the formulation of the Steadfastness Front, Boumedienne visited Moscow in January 1978 to win Soviet support for the Arab coalition against what was seen as the separatist action of Sadat. Boumedienne described the Algerian view of co-operation with the Soviets as a balance of forces against the imperialists.

“I wish to say that from point of view of the Algerians, the USSR will always remain a friend of the Arabs. Its presence in our region is not out of any mercenary motives; its aim is a balance of forces which is in our, the Arab interests.”¹⁴⁷

5.3.3.3 Algeria-Soviet relation: Bendjedid era.

Bendjedid adopted a more pragmatic, reformist and moderate approach than Boumedienne. He was involved in mediation in the American hostage crisis in Iran and tried to liberalize the Algerian economy. He also tried to diversify the sources of military equipment instead of complete reliance on Soviet arms. During the invasion of Afghanistan, Algeria and Libya abstained in a UN vote to condemn USSR, but, in the Islamic Conference, Algeria condemned the Soviet invasion.¹⁴⁸

Bendjedid visited the USSR in 1981 after the Reagan Administration shipped arms to Morocco, and the Algerian-American dispute over natural gas prices. Algeria was aware of the new Reagan strategy in the Third World, and close American relations with Morocco could affect the regional balance of power in the Maghreb. The USSR supported self-determination for the Western Sahara and Algeria was afraid that American support for Morocco would affect the outcome of the con-

flict. In contrast, the Carter Administration had adopted a neutral approach to the conflict.

Table 5:2 North African Students in France 1978

State	total students abroad(A)	total students in France(B)	%B to A
Algeria	13,342	8,909	66.7
Libya	3,531	113	3.2
Morocco	16,285	13,948	85.6
Tunisia	10,739	9,258	86.2

Source: UNESCO Statistical Yearbook 1981.

Algeria had developed cultural relations with the USSR after independence. In November 1963, Algeria and the Soviet Union signed a cultural agreement which enabled Algerian students to go to the Soviet Union for academic studies and training. Most of the training was for geologists, hydrologists, construction engineers and metallurgists. In 1971, there were 700 Algerian students studying in the USSR, while in 1970 Algeria had only 46 students in North American graduate programs.¹⁴⁹ The Soviet Union also supported Algeria with doctors and teachers and other professionals. According to *Pravda*, the USSR sent 400 doctors to Algeria in 1975 and there were also about 1000 Soviet professors and teachers working there.¹⁵⁰ Most Soviet aid was related to the oil industry. The cultural ties with Algeria were the greatest of all the North African states.

In short, the Soviet Union was interested in Algeria as a revolutionary state, which was anti-colonial, a supporter of national liberation movements, an active member of the Non-Aligned Movement and a founder member of group 77 which

hosted its first conference in 1967, and a member of Opec.

5.3.4 Soviet-Moroccan relations

The Soviet Union had supported Morocco in the 1950s to put pressure on the US to evacuate American military bases from Moroccan territories. The cold war era between the superpowers and the geostrategic importance of Morocco had influenced the Soviet attitude toward Morocco. The Soviets were also worried about American penetration of North Africa as a new global power which would dominate them economically and politically. Bulganin wrote to the Moroccan Sultan concerning imperialist bases in the newly independent Morocco and asking for the removal of the American bases there.¹⁵¹

Mohammed V of Morocco had taken the initiative toward the Soviet Union because of the American bases and the French presence in Algeria. Mohammed was a strong supporter of Algerian independence and was humiliated by the French kidnapping of Algerian leaders from a Moroccan plane in 1956. He had played the American card against the French and at the same time he played the Soviet card against the Americans. Moroccan political elites were supportive of King Mohammed's initiative, because the Soviet Union had supported the Moroccan position over the removal of Tangier's international status and its return to Moroccan control. The Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs supported the self-determination of the Moroccan people and Moroccan unification. The Soviet opposition to the British-French and Israeli invasion of the Suez Canal had been welcomed in Morocco.¹⁵²

When the United Nations issued a resolution condemning Soviet intervention in Hungary in 1956, the Moroccan delegation abstained. The Moroccan repre-

sentative explained that he believed it was inconsistent of the UN to condemn the USSR and not Britain, France and Israel over Suez. The primary Moroccan interest at the General Assembly had been the Algerian question. In 1961, the Soviets were supportive of the Casablanca Group as an anti-colonial force in Africa (Morocco was the principal founder with Egypt and Ghana).¹⁵³

The Soviet Union supported Morocco's claim in Mauritania and on 28 November 1960, the Soviet veto banned Mauritania from joining the United Nations. The Soviets supported Morocco because the Arab League was in support of Morocco, then the Soviet Union was on good terms with Morocco, and in 1961, Brezhnev, the chairman of the Presidium of Soviet Union, visited Morocco. Eventually, the Soviet Union shifted in its position of supporting Morocco's claim in Mauritania following an agreement between the USA and the USSR. According to this, the USSR provided for the admission of Mauritania to the United Nations in exchange for US support for Mongolia's admission, October 1961.¹⁵⁴

5.3.4.1 Soviet- Moroccan relations : Hassan II era

Moroccan-Soviet relations faced some difficulties during the 1960s, especially after the Algerian-Moroccan conflict in 1963, when the USSR tilted toward Algeria and shipped tanks and MIG fighters (4 MIG through Cuba and 8 Il-14 transports from USSR) to Algeria. Despite the minor effect of arms shipments on the settlement of the conflict, it damaged relations with Morocco. But in 1967, the USSR had repaired the damage with the shipment of arms to Morocco indirectly through Czechoslovakia. However, the shift in the Soviet policy over Mauritania had harmed Soviet-Moroccan relations.

The French-Moroccan crisis over Ben Barka in 1965 damaged, at least in

public, Morocco's relations with France. The growing Moroccan role in Arab politics after the 1967 war, also encouraged the two sides, Morocco and the USSR to approach each other. The Soviet Union was supportive of Arab moderates to find a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict and to avoid nuclear confrontation with the USA. Also the Soviets wanted to discredit the USA rather than France, and it accused the CIA of assassinating Ben Barka.¹⁵⁵ Hassan II visited the Soviet Union in October 1966, when the Moroccan and the Soviet sides exchanged views on the international system and regional problems

“the two sides confirmed their adherence to the principles of peaceful co-existence among states with different social systems and declared their firm determination to strive along with other peace loving states to relax international tensions, and to strengthen peace and the international system.”¹⁵⁶

The Soviets appreciated Morocco's Non-Aligned policy and its support for the Vietnamese people as well as its condemnation of colonialism and neo-colonialism. Moroccan condemnation of colonialism was related to Moroccan territorial disputes with Spain. The Soviets supported Arab unity and the liquidation of foreign bases and the latter was a signal directed to Morocco itself. The Soviet support for Arab Unity had been regarded as a way to avoid the impact of intra-Arab disputes on Soviet relations with Arab States, such as Algeria and Morocco, Iraq and Syria.¹⁵⁷

In 1969, Podgorny, Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, paid a visit to Morocco at the invitation of King Hassan II. The two sides focussed on economic relations more than on politics. They reached an agreement on a permanent Soviet-Moroccan intergovernmental commission on scientific co-operation. The Soviet Union had encouraged intergovernmental relations with Third World countries, to overcome the weakness of communist parties in the Third World. When Kosygin, the Chairman of the USSR council of ministers, visited Morocco in 1971, the two

sides focussed on the Arab-Israeli conflict and the rights of the Palestinian people to self-determination. Morocco and the Soviet Union declared their support for a settlement in South East Asia.¹⁵⁸

During the 1970s, Morocco was preoccupied by the Western Sahara conflict. The Soviet Union had adopted a neutral approach in the conflict, despite Hassan II's accusation that the USSR sent arms to Polisario. The accusation seems to have been a political manouver to put pressure on the United States to support Hassan II with arms (see chapter 8). The USSR had benefitted from economic relations with Morocco and it had no interest in getting involved in the Western Sahara conflict. As an intra-Arab conflict, it was a sensitive issue for the Soviets, but nevertheless, the Soviet Union had stable relations with Morocco and according to Hassan II

“Moroccan-Soviet cooperation has always been quoted as an example in the African countries. I am most anxious to maintain the old friendship linking us with the USSR.”¹⁵⁹

5.3.4.2 Communist party in Morocco

The Communist party in Morocco had been tolerated more than other communist parties in any North African state. It was originally part of the French communist party and at first contained no Moroccan members.¹⁶⁰ Its first Secretary-General was Leon Sultan, a Jew who was born in Algeria. By 1945, a Moroccan Ali Yata who was trained by the Comintern, had become the secretary general of the party. The party was banned by the French in 1952. After independence, it was banned again by King Mohammed V in 1959. The party remerged in 1968 as the party of Liberation and Socialism to be outlawed again in 1969 by King Hassan II. In 1974, a pro-Soviet communist group was granted legal status in return for sup-

porting Hassan II. The new party called itself the party of Progress and Socialism and during all these changes Ali Yata has remained the Secretary-General.¹⁶¹

The party had only 500 members in 1975, and it was seen as became serving Hassan's interests the Soviets have never taken the party seriously. During the early days of the Western Sahara conflict, Hassan had sent Yata on numerous occasions the Soviet Union to win support for his policy in the Sahara issue. Comparing Morocco with Algeria, Tunisia and Libya, the Soviets had found the communists enjoyed more freedom than in other North African countries.¹⁶²

In cultural relations, Soviet Union had offered Moroccan students places to attend Soviet universities, as part of their policy to influence Third World elites in the ideological struggle with the West and as an instrument of political influence. Patrice Lumumba University was founded by the Soviets specifically for Third World students. Morocco was a poor country and had experienced many years of French cultural domination which the Soviets had been trying to penetrate. The Soviets signed their first cultural agreement with Morocco in October 1966, and a Soviet consulate was opened in Casablanca in 1967, and a new cultural centre was opened in Rabat in 1968.¹⁶³ Morocco also signed many cultural protocols with the USSR. The Soviets also supported their cultural centre in Rabat with a library (in 1971, 85% of the books were in the French language). The centre offered Russian language classes (there were 100 students in 1972), and in 1983, Morocco signed a cultural cooperation agreement with the Soviet Union to increase the number of Moroccan students in the USSR.¹⁶⁴

5.4 Conclusion

We can see some important themes in superpower political relations with the

Maghreb states.

- i. Both the United States and the Soviet Union have tried to enhance their political influence with the Maghreb States, and to reduce each others presence, but they have been inhibited by French influence in the region. In a French area of interest, it has been more difficult for the superpowers to exercise influence or to challenge the French position.
- ii. The pragmatic approach has dominated superpower relations with the Maghreb despite the ideological rhetoric of both superpowers. The United States has been to some extent more ideological than the USSR in its relations with the Maghreb states. Pragmatism has also characterized the Maghreb states' foreign policy toward the superpowers. For instance, the Soviet Union built relations with conservative states such as Morocco and Tunisia, while the United States relations with radical states were minimal. The Maghreb's radical states such as Libya and Algeria built strong economic ties with the West.
- iii. The Arab-Israeli conflict has influenced the Maghreb orientation toward the superpowers. It was an important factor affecting the Libyan and Algerian attitude toward the Soviet Union and a setback in their relations with the USA. The conflict also shaped Moroccan and Tunisian relations with the USA because of the Israeli raid on the PLO headquarters in Tunisia in 1985. The Soviets had gained over the conflict which enhanced their influence with Arab public opinion.
- iv. French relations with the Maghreb States had much effect on Maghreb policy toward the Superpowers, such as Tunisia in 1958; Morocco in 1965; Algeria in

the early 1970s and Libya during the Reagan era. In time of crises in French-Maghreb relations, the Maghreb states used the superpowers as means of putting pressure on France.

- v. The Maghreb states used the superpower competition to win support of one of the superpowers for their policy. On the other hand, Maghreb states tried to use the superpowers against each other to serve their interests. The United States used the Soviet threat during the cold war era to moderate the French position toward North Africa in times of crises between France and the Maghreb States, such as Algeria's independence, and the Bizerta question.
- vi. The regional balance of power had affected both superpowers' relations with the Maghreb. Both the Soviet Union and the United States had tried to balance their relations with Algeria and Morocco, the two major regional actors in the subregion.
- vii. The Maghreb states had used a balance of power approach in dealing with the USSR and the USA or France. In the case of Morocco's relations with the United States, it seems that Hassan had adopted, in late 1970s, a policy of bandwagoning¹⁶⁵ rather than balance. There was no danger from the Soviet Union but the threat to Hassan II came from the United States and France. Hassan used his relations with the United States to counter the French threats to his regime and to appease the United States.
- viii. Distrust shaped superpower relationships with the Maghreb states; Algeria and Libya lacked confidence in Soviet political intentions as did Morocco and Tunisia with the USA.
- ix. The Soviet Union concentrated more than the United States on inter-

governmental institutional relations because of the weakness of communist parties in the region or because of restrictions on communists. The United States was less effective in inter-governmental institutional relations and America's peace corps was not a successful means of gaining political objective in the Maghreb. There were no cultural cooperation agreements between the United States and the North African States, except inactive agreements with Morocco and Tunisia in the early 1960s. Algeria after much hesitation, signed its first cultural agreement with the United States as late as 1986.

- x. French cultural domination in the Maghreb contained the Superpowers in their cultural relations with the Maghreb. But the Soviet Union had concentrated on cultural relations more than the United States, as a way of winning influence among Maghreb elites. The policy of free education in Russia was attractive to the poor countries of the Third World. While the US dealt directly with the Third World governments, the USSR had tried an indirect approach to influence the elites in the long run, a policy adopted because of the USSR's limited financial resources to help the Third World. France has continued to dominate culturally the political elites of North Africa.

- xi. Both superpowers have used the Human Rights issue to put pressure on North African States, particularly when there were political differences. The Soviet Union raised the Human Rights issue after Boumedienne's coup when he arrested the communists and the pro-Ben Bella group. But the Soviets did not raise the issue with Morocco or Libya. After Algerian-Soviet relations had improved, the issue disappeared. The United States had used the Human Rights issue as a form of political pressure to discredit Third World regimes when they had political differences with the United States. It had raised the

issue with Morocco during the first two years of Carter's presidency, and with Libya because of political differences. But it had never raised the issue with the Bourguiba regime. Reagan simply ignored the issue in Morocco.

Notes

1. Kurian, G.T. *Encyclopedia of the Third World* vol.1 New York: Fact on File INC, 1987, P ix. See also Peter Lyon, "The emergence of the Third World" in Bull, H & Watson, A, ed, *The Expansion of International Society*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984, pp. 229-238. See also, Maghroori, R & Gurtov, M, op cit, pp. 7-53.
2. Gaddis, J.L. *Strategies of Containment*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982, pp. 30-33. See also Papp, D. *Soviet Policies toward the Developing World During 1980s*, Alabama: Air University Press, 1986, pp. 27-45.
3. See for Power and Prestige in International Politics Hans Morgenthau op cit, pp. 86-92. Jervis, R. "Domino beliefs and strategic behaviour" in Jervis, R; Snyder, J, eds. *Dominoes and Bandwagons: Strategic beliefs and Great power competition in the Eurasian Rimland*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 20-50.
4. See former British ambassador in Iran, Denis Wright, "Ten Years in Iran" *Asian Affairs* (London), vol.xxii part.iii, October 1991, pp. 259-271. See also, Lucas, W.S, 1989; Copeland, M, 1989.
5. For American interests in the Middle East see, Tillman, S. *The United States in the Middle East*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982, pp. 51-62; Stivers, W. *America's Confrontation with Revolutionary Change in the*

- Middle East, 1948-83*, New York: St. Martin Press, 1986, pp. 1-26. Kolko, 1988, op.cit.
6. Dougherty, J & Pfaltzgraff, Jr R. *American Foreign Policy: FDR to Reagan*. New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1986 pp. 163-166.
 7. Legvold, R. *Soviet Policy in West Africa*. Cambridge(Mass): Harvard University Press, 1970, pp. 62, 189-191.
 8. Gaddis, J. op cit, p. 30.
 9. See for Southern Tier concept the Letter of the Ambassador in Libya "Tappin" to the Deputy Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asia and Africa "Palmer" January 1, 1957, in *United States Foreign policy 1955-1957*, pp. 459-462; but the plan was not completed. For military bases in Libya, see Shuaib, Ali. *Asrur Al-quwaid all-Amrikiyyah Fi-Libya* (The secret of America bases in Libya), Tripoli(Libya), 1982, p. 47.
 10. Haley, op cit. p. 114.
 11. First, R. Op cit, p. 114.
 12. Interview with American politician and expert in North Africa and the Middle East, Los Angeles, October 1984.
 13. Brannan, M; et al. *The real report of Libya's Mummer Qaddafi*, Executive intelligence review Special report, June, 1981, p. 15.
 14. Kissinger, H. *Year of Upheaval*, p. 860.
 15. See for Qaddafi attitude toward Sadat and the Soviet, Haley, H, pp. 56-70; First, op cit, pp. 241-245; Heikal, M. 1983; Cooley, J. op cit, pp. 106-24. For

- Qaddafi support to Pakistan in 1971, Hall, D. "The Laotian war of 1962 and the Indo-Pakistani war of 1971" in Blechman, B; Kaplan, S. *Forces without war* , Washington.D.C: Brookings, 1978, pp. 135-221, specially pp. 187-88, the US approved Arab states' demand to support to Pakistan by American arms against India.
16. Cooley, op cit p. 85; Haley op cit. P ; Kissinger, op cit. P . Deeb, Mary-Jane, 1991, pp. 54-55. First, R, p. 108. According to Bluny, D; Lycett, A (1987) the CIA informed Qaddafi of Musa Ahmed's and Hawaz's plot against Qaddafi. The authors also state that Fathi al-Dib informed Qaddafi of the plot. Al-Dib was an Egyptian intelligence officer who had connections with the French, and was Nasser's messenger to Algeria as well as having close relations with Ben Bella see his book in the bibliography.
 17. Haley, H, pp. 5-6; Cooley, pp. 80-98; Elwarfally 1988, pp. 54-67.
 18. Haley, E, p. 24; also Davis, Brian *Qaddafi, Terrorism, and the Origin of US attack on Libya*, New York: Praeger 1990, pp. 31-51.
 19. Andrew Carvely, "Libya: International relations and Political Purposes" *International Journal* vol:xxviii no.4 Autumn, 1973, pp. 706-728. See also, Qye Ogunbadejo " Qaddafi and Africa's international relations" *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, vol.24 no.1, 1986, pp. 33-68.(Here after Ogunbadejo 1986). Also, Wright, C. "Libya and the West: Head long into Confrontation " *International Affairs* vol:58 no. 1 Winter 1982 pp. 13-41.(Here after Wright 1982A)
 20. Haley, op cit . See for Black American relations with Qaddafi, R. Brown, "Qaddafi's quiet call to US Black servicemen" *Africa Now* April 1985 pp.

- 12-13. Also Davis, B, op cit pp. 35-36.
21. Taylor, A 1982, pp. 49-72.
22. Haley, op. cit, pp. 135-145; Cooley, J, pp. 161-177; 192-194. See for more details on Ed. Wilson; Goulden, J; Raffio, A, *The Death Merchant: the Rise and Fall of Edwin P. Wilson*, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1984.
23. Ibid. Waldo Dubberstein of Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) was to send the Libyans regular written reports, drawn from U.S. Intelligence data, about their Middle East rival. Dubberstein cribbed material from the highly classified DIA, CIA reports that came across his desk and incorporated into estimates specially written for the Libyans. He sent the material through Ed Wilson; see Goulden & Raffio, pp. 166-170.
24. Ibid
25. Ibid
26. Ibid
27. Brzezinski, 1983, p. 479.
28. Carter in American ABC TV network Night Line programme. Anderson, Lisa, 1985; Haley, E, op cit.
29. William Quandt to the author April 1985. Davis, B 1990, pp. 57-100.
30. Wright, C. 1982A.
31. Ogunbadejo 1986. Also Parker, R 1987.
32. Wright, C. 1982A, p. 31.

33. Newsom in Wright, C, 1982A.
34. Madam Wasela, the Widow of Saleh Ben Youssef, interview, *Almajalla* no.414, January 13-19 1988, pp. 20-23.
35. Bouyahia, Salem. "Al-Alakat Bayen Alomal fe Tunis wa Felestin wa mawakef atabaka alamelah fe Tunis mena Alqudea Alfelestina 1945-1956" *Almajalla Al-Taregheya Al-Maghrebia*, Vol.16 nos.55-56, December, 1989, pp. 15-32.(Les relation ouvriers tuniso -palestiniennes et les prises de position de la classe ouvriere tunisienne sur la question palestinienne 1945-1956, French summary pp. 171-174).
36. Laipson. "US Policy in North Africa" *Arab-American Affairs* no.6 1983, pp. 49-56.
37. Rees, H; et al. *Hand book for the Republic of Tunisia*, Washington.D.C, US Government publishing office 1970, pp. 200 (here after Tunisia Country study).
38. Keesing, 1958 pp. 16205-16209.
39. Ibid
40. *Keesing's Contemporary Record*, 1958 p. 16207.
41. *Keesing's Contemporary Record*, 1961, p. 18327.
42. Tunisia Country study, 1970, p. 216; Keesing's 1961 op cit.
43. Tunisia Country study, 1970, pp. 211- 212.
44. *Financial Times*, April, 4th 1979, p. 11; *Financial Times*, July 14 1986, p. 11.

- African Contemporary Record*, vol.xi 1978-1979, p. B141; see also, Amnesty International, (London), *Tunisia Imprisonment of Trade Unionists in 1978*, February 1979, AIINDEX: AFR 58-03-79.
45. Ware, L, 1986, op cit; Taylor, A, 1982, op cit.
 46. For Tunisian domestic politics see Salem, Norma. *Habib Bourguiba, Islam and the creation of Tunisia*, London: Groom Helm, 1984; Also, Stone,R " Tunisia: A single party system hold a change in abeyance" in Zartman,W et al *Political elite in Arab North Africa* London: Longman, 1982, pp. 144-175, (here after Zartman 1982).See also, New York Time February 1 1980, Washington Post February 5 1980 and Haley 1984, p. 112. Also Robert Grassner "Transition in Tunisia" *Harvard International Review* vol.xi no.5 May-June 1987 pp. 29-30.
 47. Haley, E, op cit, p. 112.
 48. Ibid, Wright, C " Tunisia: Next friend to fall" *Foreign Policy* no.46, 1982 pp. 120- 137 (hereafter Wright, C, 1982b).
 49. Ibid ; *International Herald Tribune*, February 16th, 1980.
 50. US House of Representatives. *A review of the political, economic, and security situation in Tunisia: Implications for US policy*. Report of a staff study mission to Tunisia and France, November 17-22, 1986, Washington.D.C US Government printing office, 1987 (here after Congress report 1987).
 51. Ibid. See for Islamic Fundamentalist in Tunisia, Burrell, R. *Islamic Fundamentalism*, London: Royal Asiatic Society, 1989. The author relies on first hand information from members of Islamic movement.

52. Grassner, R op cit; Rupert, J. "Tunisia: Testing America's Third World Diplomacy" *World Policy Journal* vol. iv no. 1, 1987 pp. 137- 157. see also, Jeff Gerth "Qaddafi Describes talk with American envoy" *New York Times*, June 14th, 1984, p. 2. US Department of State "Tunisia" Background Notes, February 1987; M.C. Dunn, "Tunisia: Untold Story From the Arab world" *Los Angeles Times* Part v, August 28, 1988, p. 2.

53. Rupert, J op cit. Georgetown University held a seminar on Tunisia on the risk of instability, see Helen Kitchen, moderator, *Risks of instability in the Region and the outlook for Western interests: Tunisia's Assessment*, ACSIS, African studies notes, Center for Strategic and International studies, Georgetown University, Washington.D.C April, 1987.

54. Parker, R 1987, p151; See also Gerald Gutek(ed), *Standard Education almanac 1984-1985*, Chicago: Marquis Professional Publications, 1984.

55. William Quandt, "Can we do Business with radical nationalists Algeria: Yes" *Foreign Policy* no.7 1972, pp. 108-131, especially p. 126,(here after Quandt 1972); See also for Kennedy attitude toward Third World countries in Coker, C *Reflections on American Foreign policy since 1945*, London: Pinter Publisher, 1989, pp. 104-127. For Ben Bella visit to USA see Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff op cit, p. 164.

56. see Fathi al-Dib, op cit, for more detail regarding conflict between Ben Bella and Algerian FLN leaders and the Boumedienne's Coup .

57. Quandt 1972, p. 120; Aaron Segal, "The United States and North Africa" *Current History* vol.80 no.470 December 1981 pp. 401-405. See also for Algeria and Arab-Israeli conflict, Richard Roughton, "Algeria and the June 1967

- Arab-Israeli war" *Middle East Journal*, vol.23 no.4, Autumn 1969, pp. 433-444; also M. Yazid "Algeria and Arab-Israeli conflict" *Journal of Palestinian Studies* vol.1 no.2 1972, pp. 1-18.
58. Ibid; Also see Tlemcani, R. *State and Revolution in Algeria* Boulder: Westview press 1986, pp. 144-150. Quandt 1972; Algeria; Country study, 1985; also see Mortimer, R. "Global Economy and African foreign policy Algeria model" *African Studies Review* vol. 27 no. 3, 1984, pp. 1-22(Here after Mortimer 1984).
59. See Kissinger, *Years of upheaval*, 1982, about Algeria's role in Syria-US relations after October war in 1973, pp. 1061; 1050-1051; 1066; 1089.
60. Sam Younger, "Ideology and pragmatism in Algerian foreign policy" *World today*, vol.34 no.3, March 1978, pp. 107-114.
61. Korany, B. "Third Worldism and pragmatic radicalism: The Foreign policy of Algeria" in Korany & Dessouki Eds. *The Foreign policy of Arab states*, Boulder: Westview, 1984, pp. 79-118. Also, Mortimer. R. "Algeria and the Politics of International Economic order" *Orbis* vol. 21 no. 3, 1977, pp. 671-700, (hereafter Mortimer 1977). See also Younger, S, op cit; Kissinger, op cit; Algeria country study.
62. Taylor, A 1982 op cit; For Algeria's relations with France, see Tony Hodges "Francois Mitterrand master strategist in the Maghreb" *Africa Report*, May-June 1983, pp. 17-21 (hereafter Hodges Africa Report 1983).
63. Parker, 1987, p. 153; *Alsharq Alawsat*, June 4th 1987, p. 15.
64. Haig, Alexander. *Caveat, Realism, Reagan, and Foreign Policy* London: Wei-

- denfeld and Nicolson Ltd, 1984, pp. 97-98.
65. See for Bendjedid visit, see *Algeria Country Study 1985*.
66. Hans Binnendijk, *Authoritarian Regimes in Transition*, Foreign Service Institute, US Department of State 1987, p. 10.
67. See for American official view on Moroccan corruption, and its effect on the stability of the regime, see Parker 1987 op cit; New York Times, October 12, 1979; Los Angeles Times October 31 1979, and see also Waterbury, John "The Coup Manque" in Gellner, E & Micaud, C, eds, *Arabs and Berbers* London: Duckworth, 1972, pp. 397-424,(hereafter Waterbury 1972). Waterbury, John, "Corruption in Morocco" *World Politics* vol.25 1975 pp. 533-555. Also Coram, A. "The Berbers and the coup" in ibid, pp. 425- 431. See also, Frank Braun" Morocco: Anatomy of a palace Revolution that failed" *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, vol.9 no.1 1978, pp. 63-72. Peter Duignan, "African from a Globalist Perspective" in Bender, G; et al eds *African Crisis Areas and US Foreign Policy* Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1985, pp. 291-307.
68. *US Foreign policy 1955-1957*, op cit.
69. ibid.
70. For superpowers in Africa, see Rubinstein, A. *Moscow Third World Strategy*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988. Laidi, Z. *Superpowers in Africa 1960-1990*, Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1990.
71. Cohn, Mark & Lorna Hahn, *Morocco: Old land and New nation*, London: Pall Mall Press, 1966, p. 131 (hereafter Cohn&Hahn). Also Waterbury 1972.

72. Ibid.
73. Ibid pp. 131;261.
74. See for political life in Morocco, Tessler, M, *Politics in Morocco: Monarch, the war, and the opposition*, Hanover, N.H, American Universities Field Staff, Africa, Report no.47, 1981, (hereafter Tessler, M 1981), and also Tessler, M. "The impact of the Sahara dispute on Moroccan Foreign and domestic policy" in Zartman, W, ed 1987, op cit, pp. 188-210, (hereafter Tessler 1987).
75. Cohn& Hahn p. 145. The United States protested about the incident of using American aid for buying votes, but it seems that it is common in the Third World governments to use aid for personal interests.
76. Ibid.
77. Cohn & Hahn, pp. 131; 261; see for riots Waterbury 1972, p. 414.
78. Morocco Country Study 1985, pp. 237-8.
79. See for Ben Barka incident; *Times*, December 29, 1975, pp. 21-22; *Africa Now*, March 1983 pp. 14-18; Banounni, op cit, pp. 470-474; Stewart Steven, *The Spymasters of Israel*, New York: Ballantine Books 1980, pp. 239-52.
80. Landau, Rom. *Morocco Independent* London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1961, pp. 70-74.
81. Tessler, Mark. "Morocco: Institutional Pluralism and Monarchical dominance" in Zartman, et al, ed, 1982, op cit pp 35-90. See also Parker, 1987; Damis 1986; See also, for Arab press reaction to the coup, *Arab Report and Record*, issue 13, 1-15 July 1971, pp. 355-356. The rebel pilots were trained

- in the United States, *Washington Post*, 17; 18, August 1972.
82. Ibid, for Medbouh visit to Washington and CIA and Congress reports on corruption see Waterbury 1972;
83. Ibid. *Keesing's* 1971, pp. 24797-24799.
84. See Wright, C "A Journey to Morocco" *International Security*; Also See, *Africa Contemporary Record 1971-1972*, pp. A136; B53-61.
85. See Cooley, J, for an American woman who married to Moroccan colonel in Kentria, pp. 96; 296-297 notes 10;11. Ahmed al-Tawel released after twenty years from prison in Fall 1991, and he joined his American wife and daughter in the United States. Parker, 1987 op cit Damis 1986. *Washington Post*, 17, 18 1972. for Coup rebels who trained in US. , .
86. Hassan II King of Morocco *Challenge* 1978 p 154; For outside intervention see *Arab Report & Record* issue 13, 1-15 July 1971, pp. 355-356; King Faisal of Saudi Arabia who was well known for his anti-Kissinger policy sent his advisor to Morocco while King Hussein of Jordan also visited Morocco and Boumediene and Bourguiba also supported Hassan; criticism came from Cairo and Libya; *Al-Ahram* on July 11, 1971, Egyptian official newspaper carried reports of the attack on Morocco.
87. Morocco Country Study, pp 237-38. Tessler 1982 op cit .
88. See for the Sahara and Moroccan internal situation, Tessler, M, 1981; Tessler, M 1987; and also Tessler, M " Morocco: Institutional pluralism and monarchical dominance" in Zartman et al, 1982 op cit, pp. 35-86.

89. Mark Tessler, "Moroccan-Israeli Relations and the Reasons for Moroccan Receptivity to Contact with Israel" *The Jerusalem Journal of International Relations*, Vol.10 no.2, June 1988, pp. 76-108.
90. For Morocco involvement in Zaire see, Schatzberg, M 1989 op cit, also Mangold, Peter "Shaba I and Shaba II" *Survival* vol.21 no.3, May-June 1979, p. 110. See De Borchgrave, Arnauld "Africa's policeman" (interview with king Hassan II) *Newsweek*, May 16 1977, pp. 58-69.
- 91 The Author has seen this on Moroccan walls in Casablanca during his work in Morocco 1976-1981.
92. Leo Kamil 1987; Tony Hodges, 1983, *Roots of Sahara conflict*, pp. 360-63; Hodges, 1985, *African Crisis Area*, pp. 268-274. Damis, J, 1986, op cit.
93. Tessler, M, 1988, op cit; see also relations with Vernon Walters, Ray, E; Schaap, W, "The Modern Mithridates Vernon Walters: Crypto-diplomat and terrorist" *Covertaction Information Bulletin*, no.26, Summer, 1986, pp. 3-8.
94. See Parker 1987, p. 153.
95. See for Soviet historical relations with North Africa, Hadhri, M, *L'USSR et Le Maghreb: De la revolution de la Octobre a l'independance de l Algerie 1917-1962*, Paris: Edition's L' Harmattan, 1985. Musatova, T.L, "Sviazit Rossii Morokko vxixv" (Russia-Morocco links in the 19th century), *Narody Aziis Afriki* (People of Asia and Africa), Vol.vxixv no.1 January-February 1987, pp. 97-103.
96. Ronald Bruce St John. *Qaddafi's World Design: Libya's Foreign Policy 1969-1987*, London: Saqi Books, 1987 p. 73, (here after St John 1987); St John,

- R.B, "The Soviet Penetration of Libya" *The World Today*, vol.38 no.4, April 1982, p. 133. Yadfat, A, "The USSR and Libya" *New outLook*, vol.13 no.6 July-August 1970, p. 38. See Also Charles McLane *Soviet-Middle East Relations* vol: 1 of *Soviet-Third World Relations* London: Central Asian Research Centre, 1973, pp. 77-79, (Here After McLane Vol.1973). See Also Charles McLane, *Soviet-Middle East relations; US Foreign relation* 1989 op cit.
97. St John 1987 p. 73. See also Ramet, P. "Soviet-Libyan Relations Under Qaddafi", *Survey*, vol.29 no.1 (124), Spring 1985, pp. 96-112. also Martin Sicker, *The making of a Pariah State: The Adventurist Politics of Muammer Qaddafi*, New York: Praeger 1987.
98. *Pravda*, 6 September 1969 p5 in *CDSP* vol.xxi no. 36 October 1969, p. 17.
99. *Le Monde*, 29th March 1979.
100. *USSR -Third World* vol.2 no.3 14 February- 12 March 1971 p. 171.
101. *USSR-Third World* Vol.1 no.4, 22 March -25 April 1971, pp. 186-187. also the Auther's phone conversation with Robert Hunter, Former member of US National Security Council under Carter. He stated that United States has been opposing to Arab unity because it is not in the interests of the US, Washington.D.C, March 1989.
102. St John 1987 p. 75.
103. *Africa Contemporary Record 1974-1975*, p. B64.
104. *USSR-Third World*, vol. V no. 5 13 May - 6 July 1975, also *Tass*, (Soviet News Agency), 15 May 1975.

105. *USSR- Third World*, vol. vi nos. 5-6, 12 September-31 December 1976, p. 227.
106. *USSR-Third World*, Vol.8 nos. 2-3 1978, p. 55. St John, op cit, p. 76.
107. St John 1987 p. 77.
108. Freedman, R. "The Soviet Reaction to the Reagan Middle East policy: From the Inauguration to the Arab Summit at Fez" in Kauppi & R. Craig Nation Ed, *The Soviet Union and the Middle East in the 1980s*, Massachusetts: Lexington Books,1983, pp. 71-111.
109. See for Libyan Relations with south Yemen, Halliday, Fred. *Revolution and foreign policy: the case of South Yemen 1967-1987*, London: Cambridge University Press 1990, pp. 172-1973. See also, St John 1987, pp. 101-105. See also, Arnold Hottinger. "Three way-pact: Again for the Kremlin" *Swiss Review of World Affairs*, October 1981, p. 27. Dhombres, D. "Moscow tries to cool crisis over Libya" *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, January 19, 1986, p. 11.
110. Parker, 1987, p. 151.
111. See *American Foreign Policy: Current Document 1972*, Department of State, Washington.D.C. see Libyan section. See also, Parker, 1987, p. 153; and *UNESCO YearBook*, 1977-1984, p. 87.
112. McLane, vol.1, op cit, p. 100.
113. Waterbury, John "The Soviet Union and North Africa" in Lederer, I & Vucinich, W, *The Soviet Union and the Middle East* Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1974, pp. 78-120.(hereafter Waterbury 1974).

114. *Ibid*; McLane, vol.1, p. 100.
115. Waterbury, 1974, p. 80.
116. *Pravda*, 6 August 1961, in *CDSP* vol. viii no. 31 August 30 1961, p. 16.
117. *Pravda* July 27, 1961 in *CDSP* vol.viii no.30 August 23, 1961, p. 28.
118. *Pravda* July, 27 1961, p. 4 in *CDSP* Vol.viii no.30 August 23 1961 p. 28;
Also *Izvestia*, June 30 1962, in *CDSP* vol. xiv no.26, July 25 1962, p. 19.
119. *Pravda* June 1 1963; also see McLane vol.1 p. 100.
120. *Mizan supplement* no.5, Sept-Oct 1968, p. 15.
121. *Mizan supplement* no.2, March-April 1969, p. 17.
122. *Tunisia country study*, 1970, p. 213.
123. *USSR-Third World* vol.iii no.1, December 4 1972-14 January, 1973.
124. *USSR-Third World* vol.iii no.4 April -27 May 1973, pp. 287-288.
125. *Pravda* , 18 May 1975, p. 2 in *USSR- Third World* vol. v no.5, 13 May 1975-6 January 1975.
126. *Mizan supplement* no.3, May-June, 1966, p. 12.
127. *USSR-Third World* vol.vi no.4 22 April- 9 June 1976, p. 269; *African Contemporary Record* 1974-1975 p. B125; *USSR-Third World* vol. iii no.7 1973, p. 514; *Mizan Supplement A* no.3 May-June 1966, p. 17.
128. *USSR-Third World* vol.10 nos 4-5-6 June 11 1979- 6 January 1980 p. 101.

129. USSR-Third World vol.10 nos. 2-3 1980 1 February- 31 June 1980 p. 61.
See also, Wright C 1982B; for secret meeting between Soviet Ambassador and Tunisian officials for arms from Soviet Union after 1980 incident.
130. *USSR-Third World*, vol.iii no. 6 July-16 February 1973, p. 441. See Also McLane vol.1 p. 100.
131. *USSR-Third World*, vol.iv nos.7-8, 1974, p. 488.
132. *USSR-Third World* vol.15 no.1, 7 November 1984- January 6 1985, p. 22;
Izvestia December 8, 1984.
133. Parker, R, 1987, p. 151. According to the Tunisian Ambassador to Moscow, in a speech to Soviet-Tunisian Society, there were 650 Tunisian students in USSR in 1990, *Radio Moscow* in Arabic, Saturday, 1 December, 1990.
134. Papp 1986, pp. 86; 227.
135. Adeed Dawish. *Arab Radicals*, New York: Council of Foreign relations, 1986.
136. McLane Vol.1, op cit, pp. 1-17.
137. Legvold, op cit.
138. *Pravda* November 1, 1964, p. 1, in CDSP vol.xvi no.44 November 1964 p. 23.
139. *Pravda*, November 13, 1965 p3; in CDSP vol.xvii no.46 January 12 1965 p. 66.
140. CDSP vol.xvii no.51, January 12 1965, p. 66. Korany op cit.
141. Ibid.

142. Yahia Zoubir "Soviet policy in the Maghreb" *Arab Studies quarterly* vol.9 no.4 Fall 1987 pp. 399-421. See also, Valeri Yevgenyev. "Lasting Friendship: Soviet-Algeria relation" *International Affairs*(Moscow), No.8, July 1987, pp. 46-51.
143. Nicole Grimmand *La Politique exterieure de l'Algerie 1962- 1978*, Paris: Karthala, 1984, pp. 115-142. See also, Daily Telegraph 12 October 1971; also USSR-Third World vol.ii no.4, 13 March- 17 April 1972 p. 227.
144. Papp 1986 pp. 236-37.
145. CDSP vol.xxiii no.41 November 9, 1971, pp. 9-12.
146. USSR-Third World vol.ii no.4, 13 March-17 April 1972, p. 227.
147. Pravda 13, 1978; USSR-Third World vol.8 no. 1 January 1978, p. 12.
148. Papp, D, 1986, p241. Lassassi, A op cit, 1988, p159. *African Contemporary Record, 1979-1980*, p. B17. *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, vol.xxxi, 1980, pp. 30241-30242. For Bendjedid's visit to the Soviet Union see *USSR-Third World*, vol.11 nos.3-4, 7 March-6 July 1981, p. 64.
149. Korany 1984, op cit, p. 80; USSR-Third World vol.1 no.8, 16 August-19 September 1971,p. 468; also ibid vol.ii no.8, 1972 p. 467.
150. Pravda July 5th 1975; USSR-Third World vol.5 no.5 1975, p. 237.
151. Cohn & Hahn, op.cit, p. 213n; Up to the 1975, 2500 students were graduated from the Soviet Union.
152. Tishin, I. "Arena of Imperialist Intrigues" *International Affairs*, (Moscow), April, 1958, pp. 98-99.

153. Casablanca group consisted of Morocco, Algeria (GPRA), Guinea, Ghana, and Mali and United Arab Republic, see Zartman, W *International Relations in the New Africa* New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, INC 1966 pp. 29-35.
154. Cohn & Hahn, p. 198.
155. For Soviet reaction to the Ben Barka assassination, see "CIA and Ben Barka" *Izvestia* February 1 1966, p. 2 in CDSP vol.xviii no.5, 23 Feb, 1966 p. 21-22. Ben Barka was the Chairman of the International preparatory committee for the January 1966 convocation of a conference of Solidarity among people of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. He was assassinated in 1965 and it is interesting to note that the solidarity was immediately dissolved after Ben Barka's death. It is hard to believe that the Soviets were behind it, or it would have continued, *Pravda*, November 29, 1965, p. 3.
156. See for Hassan II visit to Moscow, *Pravda*, Oct 29, 1966, pp. 80-85; in CDSP vol.xviii no.43 Nov 16 1966, pp. 21-22. See also Jean-Paul Constant *Le Relations Maroco-Sovietique 1956-1971* Paris: Librairie De Droit et De Jurisprudence 1973 pp. 19-36.
157. Ibid.
158. Ibid.
159. Hassan II. *Challenge*, p. 173. See also, A. Shvedov & A. Podtserob. "The Soviet Union and North African countries" *International Affairs(Moscow)* no.6 June 1983, pp. 54-62.
160. See Banounni op cit for Moroccan Communist party

161. R. Staar, ed. *Yearbook in International Communist Affairs*, Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, pp. 558-50, specially p. 559 for Morocco.
162. Ibid. Also see Tessler, M. 1981; Tessler 1982; Tessler 1987, op cit.
163. McLane vol.i, op cit
164. Parker 1987, p. 153.
165. Bandwagoning refers to Alignment with the source of danger, but balancing refers to alignment with others against the prevailing threat. See for more detail, Waltz, K. *The Origins of Alliances*, Athaca: Cornell University Press, 1987.

Chapter VI

The Superpowers and the Maghreb: Economic Relations

6.1 Introduction

Economic interests are an important source of superpower competition in the Third World . The economic interests of the US dwarf those of the Soviet Union (see Tables 1,2,3). To the US, the Third World is important in term of natural resources, trade, and economic investments. The US is more dependent on foreign natural resources and oil and natural gas than is the Soviet Union. Western Europe and Japan also rely heavily on Third World countries for raw materials.¹ In this chapter we concentrate on three themes; superpower trade with the Maghreb, economic aid and investments in Maghreb states, and the way economic relations have influenced the Superpowers' political relations with the Maghreb.

US trade with Third World countries was sizeable; in 1960, for example, 41% of total US imports were from the Third World, and 35% of total US exports were to the Third World. In 1981, the US exported \$89 billion of manufactured goods to the Third World, which represented 40% of total US manufactured exports and exceeded the value of manufactured exports to Japan and Western Europe. In 1985, 33% of total US trade was with the Third World.²

The Soviet Union has expanded its trading relations with Third World countries, but compared to the USA, it is less reliant on the Third World. In 1965, the Soviet Union had concluded intergovernmental trade agreements with only nine

Third World countries, whereas by 1985 the Soviet Union had concluded 79 trade agreements with Third World countries. Soviet trade relations have largely been based on trade agreements and economic cooperation and aid. In the 1970s, Soviet trade with Third World countries made up 12% of Soviet foreign trade. By 1982 the figure had reached 14%. In comparative prices, the Soviet's trade with Third World countries was 120% higher in 1981 compared with 1970, and 40% higher than in 1975. In 1980, Soviet imports from the Third World countries were only 8% raw materials.³

Table 6:1 US Exports to and US Imports from the Third World, 1960-85.

Years	%Exports to Third World	% of US Imports from Third World
1960	35%	41%
1970	30%	26%
1980	37%	48%
1985	34%	34%

Source:US Bureau of the Census, *Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1973*, 93rd ed. Washington D.C: US. GOP ,Table no.1292; *Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1987*, 107th ed. Table no.1406.

Significantly, in every year between 1975 and 1984 , the Soviet Union enjoyed a positive trade balance with the Third World.⁴ Soviet economic relations concentrated on scientific and technical cooperation, and Soviet assistance to Third World countries was largely concerned with bringing natural resources into production. The Soviets assisted Morocco in phosphate mining, Iraq in gas production, and

Guinea in bauxite production. This assistance with credit and loans was prepaid by Third World raw material and resources production.

Table 6:2 Soviet Foreign Trade with the Third World 1970-1982
(Billion Roubles)

Years	1970	1975	1980	1981	1982
Foreign trade turnover	2.9	6.3	12.0	16.5	16.9
Exports	1.8	3.3	6.9	8.7	10.2
Imports	1.1	3.0	5.1	7.8	6.7
Foreign trade balance	+0.7	+0.3	+1.8	+0.9	+3.5

Source: V. Klochek, et al. *Soviet Foreign Trade today and tomorrow*, Moscow: Progress Publisher, 1985, pp. 177-180.

In terms of investment, US firms had over \$50 billion invested in the Third World states in 1986. The combined debts of Third world countries to American and Western European banking and lending institutions in 1986 topped \$900 billion. US banks have spread throughout Third World countries. For example, Latin America has more than 134 branches of US banks. President Gorbachev claimed that during a ten year period stretching through the 1970s and 1980s, US corporations removed profits from Third World states four times as great as the corporations total investments there. Gorbachev also asserted that the US annually takes over \$200 billion from Third World states.⁵

In comparison, Soviet Union's investment in the Third World countries is negligible, and the Third World debt to the Soviet Union is correspondingly small:

about 3% of the Third World total external debt. Politically, the Soviet Union has found it necessary to grant grace periods to twenty countries that have had difficulties in repaying their debt, for example, Egypt.⁶

Thus the United States clearly has greater economic interests in the Third World than has the Soviet Union, and is consequently more likely to be motivated by economic concerns in the Third World than is the Soviet Union. Economic objectives have therefore shaped US foreign policy toward the Third World more than they have in the Soviet Union. The United States has threatened to use force to protect its economic interests in the Third World and the protection of oil supplies in the Middle East constituted a major justification for the establishment of the US Rapid Deployment Forces (CENCOM) in 1980. Secretary of Defense, Harold Brown, said in 1979 that the flow of oil was clearly one of the vital national interests of the United States and that

“In protection of those vital national interests we will take any action that is appropriate, including military force.”⁷

The United States has a major economic involvement in Middle East investments and construction. In turn, Arab oil investments have played a major role in the US economy and Saudi Arabia and other Arab oil exporting countries have invested heavily in U.S. Treasury bills and bonds and commercial bank deposits. Total Saudi financial reserves in 1980 exceeded \$110 billion, of which 75-85 percent was held in dollars. In 1980, about \$60 billion of Saudi Arabia's foreign assets were believed to be in US government securities and other American banking and financial institutions.⁸ At the start of Gulf crisis, in August 1990, the Kuwait government in exile announced that it had around \$100 billion of its assets in Europe and United States, 70% of which were in the US. This level of economic investment

is of such value to the US economy that the strength of US reaction to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait becomes rather more intelligible.

Soviet economic interests in the Middle East, particularly in the Arab World, are much smaller than those of the United States and Western Europe. Whilst the Soviet Union fostered trade with the Middle East, Soviet political and strategic interests have taken precedence. In the 1981-89 period, 26 percent of all Soviet products sold to the Third World went to the Arab Countries and the Soviet Union has been exporting oil for more than two decades, to Morocco. Soviet economic priorities during the cold war era were to deny the West and the US domination of the economies of the Middle East states and to weaken the Western economic presence in the region for strategic and political reasons. Accordingly, the Soviets encouraged the nationalisation of resources and state control of the economy.⁹

6.2 United States Economic Relations with Maghreb states

The first US contact with North Africa was for economic purposes in the nineteenth century. Contact was maintained during the Moroccan Crisis in 1906 and before United States had sought an open door policy. After WWI, the US clashed with France over access to North African markets, particularly over Morocco. After WWII, the American conflict with France over access to Moroccan markets reached the World Court of Justice. US companies and businessmen gave financial support to Maghreb national movements to offset French influence. Since independence, and with the discovery of oil and minerals, phosphates, lead, iron, zinc, and manganese, the Maghreb has become more important. US oil companies have become involved in North African oil and gas in Algeria and Libya. US companies also started to invest in Morocco and Tunisia, and the US offered fi-

Table 6:3 US crude oil imports from major Arab world oil exporting countries, 1977-1982 (Billions of Barrels).

State	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982
Algeria	198	231	222	167	95	33
Iraq	27	23	32	10	-	1
Kuwait	15	2	2	10	-	1
Libya	257	233	234	200	116	8
Qatar	24	23	11	8	3	3
Saudi Arabia	501	417	492	458	406	194
UAE	122	141	103	63	28	30

Source: US Bureau of the Census: *Statistical Abstract of the United States 1984*, 104th ed .U.S. Department of Commerce, p. 580.

nancial assistance and loans to the Maghreb in order to penetrate North African markets.¹⁰

6.2.1 American-Libyan Economic Relations

Libya was a poor country before the discovery of oil in 1959, and the US offered Libya wheat in exchange for the siting of US military bases in Libya. In 1954 the US supported Libya with 24,000 tonnes of wheat. Libya started to import from the US food stuffs such as rice and in 1966 Libya was importing \$61.6 million of agricultural imports, and by 1971 imported a total of \$122.7 million. US interests in Libya increased because of Libyan oil and the US came to dominate the Libyan oil industry with 20 US companies exploring and producing oil. By 1968, Libya

**Table 6:4 USA economic assistance to the Maghreb 1953-1972
(\$Million).**

States	US development assistance*	US export-import(bank loans)	US total
Algeria	178.9	34.0	212.9
Libya	182.9	0	182.9
Morocco	747.0	33.2	780.2
Tunisia	727.7	7.6	735.3

*US development assistance includes assistance granted under the Agency for International Development, and it does not include security and military aid.

Source: Mclaurin,R.D. *The Middle East in Soviet Policy*. New York: Lexington Books, 1975, p. 82.

was second only to Saudi Arabia as the most profitable base for US oil companies, with \$1.5 billion of investment. In 1970, American companies had a market value of several billion dollars, and operations in Libya accounted for 88% of Libyan oil production, and returned about \$60 million to the US balance of payments in 1969.¹¹

Before the Libyan revolution, the US was the second largest exporter to Libya after Italy. Italy's trading position was due to its colonial history with Libya (see Table 6:5).

6.2.1.1 US- Libya and Oil Prices 1969-1974

The most important factor in US-Libyan economic relations in the early 1970s was the controversy over oil prices and revenues. After the Libyan revolution, Libya

Table 6:5 Libya Principal Sources of Imports 1967-1969 (Million Libyan Pounds)

States	1967	1968	1969	Rank
Italy	48.8	56.8	54.9	1
USA	21.4	38.8	45.3	2
UK	18.6	26.4	29.8	3
FRG	13.3	19.1	21.5	4
France	10.2	10.9	12.0	5
Japan	6.8	8.5	11.8	6

Source: *African Contemporary record 1971-1972*, p. B51.

entered into negotiations with the oil companies over oil prices and revenues and threatened the companies with control of production levels and nationalisation. The US objective at that time was to raise the price of energy to affect adversely the economies of Europe and Japan because the availability of relatively cheap oil facilitated the recovery of Western Europe and Japan and it also transformed these countries into rivals of the United States. The Europeans believed that the US helped Qaddafi to power as part of an attempt to allow significant oil price rises to occur, this would have increased energy costs for Europe and Japan, thus affecting adversely their industrial efficiency vis-a-vis the United States, itself a major oil producer.¹²

The United States also had other objectives. It intended to preserve the positions of US oil companies in the Middle East, and to provide the Shah of Iran with the revenues he needed to turn his country into the leading military,

economic, and political power in the Gulf in order to fulfil the aims of the Nixon Doctrine.¹³ The rise in oil prices required much more effective political action, and the conservative states did not have the ability to put pressure on oil companies because they depended for their security on the foreign powers. Libya was the ideal tool for the job because it had a revolutionary government and oil revenues from rising oil production. The new Libyan government could afford to get tough with the companies concerned. Using appropriate tactics, the Libyan government tackled the oil companies one by one. Kissinger described Libya as the state with most power to put pressure on the oil companies

“Until then the role among the oil-producing countries was played by essentially conservative governments whose interest in increasing their oil revenues was balanced by their dependence on the industrial democracies for protection against external (and perhaps even internal) threats. Qaddafi was free of such inhibitions. An avowed radical, he set out to extirpate Western influence. He did not care if in the process he weakened the global economy.”¹⁴

Kissinger mentioned US interests in Libya in economic terms. He said that the return of US balance of payments, and the security of US investments in oil were considered their primary interests.¹⁵ Moreover, Americans would benefit from oil assets and the taxes in the United States. Peter Odell added that the US objective of establishing a new collective stability in the oil system was for two reasons. First, it sought to provide a political solution to Arab-Israeli conflict and the higher revenues would force a compromise and political stability in the Middle East.¹⁶ Ensuing events did not support his arguments.

6.2.1.2 US-Libyan trade relations

During the 1970s, Libya maintained strong trade relations with the US, particularly in oil and agricultural goods. The US had banned the export of all types of technology related to military and security affairs, and this led Libya to deal

with US companies and private individuals to obtain US technology. Ed Wilson, a former CIA agent (see chapter five) was accused of shipping banned technology to Libya, and Jerome Brower, president of an explosives firm in Pomona, California, was indicted on explosives charges for conspiring to ship a variety of high-powered explosives to Libya. The US tied selling technology to Libya with political progress in improving US-Libyan relation on regional and international political issues.¹⁷

Ironically, between 1969 and 1981, the United States became the most important Libyan customer in trade, particularly regarding oil (Tables 6:3; 6:5). The only countries competing with the US were Italy and West Germany because they imported oil from Libya and exported technology. During the Reagan era (1981-1988) however, US trade with Libya declined rapidly because Reagan adopted a hostile approach to Libya.

After the Libyan revolution of 1969, the United States improved its trade relations with Libya. In 1973, Libya exported to the US 7.8 per cent of its total exports, and in 1978, Libyan exports to the US reached 40.7 per cent of total Libyan exports. The major export was oil, and the decade of the 1970s had been the strongest decade in Libyan-American trade relations, despite their political differences. Italy had fallen second to the US in Libyan exports, while the Federal Republic of Germany trailed in third place (see Table 6:6).

Regarding Libyan imports, the US ranked sixth or below during the 1970s and 1980s. In 1973, Libya imported from the United States 5.3 per cent of its total imports, whereas Italy accounted for 25.8 per cent of Libyan imports in the same year. In the 1970s, Italy topped the list of Libyan imports followed by West Germany, France, Japan and the United Kingdom respectively. The EEC

Table 6:6 Libya's exports 1973-81 (value of percentage of total exports)

States	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981
USA	7.8	0.1	21.9	25.8	39.8	40.7	36.1	35.5	27.4
Italy	28.0	33.4	21.9	19.4	16.8	21.8	18.0	18.5	23.8
FRG	21.3	22.0	19.5	20.4	17.0	10.7	14.8	12.6	10.3
Spain	1.8	3.7	5.1	5.2	5.5	6.2	5.3	4.9	6.7
France	5.3	5.9	3.7	5.2	4.0	5.4	5.9	2.8	3.7

Source: *International Trade statistics Yearbook 1985*, p. 597.

has clearly been a major supplier to Libya (Table 6:7). In historical perspective, Western Europe has exported more to Libya than has the United States except to some extent with wheat. Libyan technological imports have mainly come from Europe.

In March 1981, the US banned Libyan crude oil imports. The choice of economic rather than military or covert action against Libya characterised US policy until late 1985. The United States tried to put pressure on Libya by virtue of being the major Libyan oil customer. Total oil revenues were \$15.22 bn in 1979, and \$22.53 bn in 1980. They fell to \$15.65 bn in 1981 and \$11.13 bn in 1984. The Reagan administration restricted exports to Libya, and arrested many businessmen, such as Ed Wilson. In 1981, the US oil company Exxon, represented since 1955 by Esso Standard and Esso Sirte, withdrew from Libya, and in 1982, Mobil followed. The Reagan administration declared doing business with Libya illegal.¹⁸ But despite Reagan's action, US oil companies continued to operate in Libya through foreign subsidiaries. Americans employed by Libya's National Oil

Table 6:7 Libya's imports 1973-1982 (value of percentage of total general imports)

States	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982
USA	5.3	3.9	4.0	4.1	5.2	6.3	5.3	6.3	6.3	4.2
Italy	25.8	24.8	25.9	25.5	27.5	24.1	26.4	29.5	30.2	25.4
FRG	10.4	11.5	12.1	14.3	12.9	12.8	14.3	13.3	10.5	14.4
Japan	6.4	7.0	8.3	8.3	7.4	7.4	8.9	7.5	7.6	5.1
UK	6.9	5.0	5.5	5.4	5.7	7.1	6.9	7.0	6.9	8.0
France	8.2	10.4	8.8	8.2	7.6	8.3	8.2	6.8	6.3	5.7
Spain	2.5	2.8	2.5	4.3	3.3	3.2	2.8	4.4	3.0	3.2

Source: International Trade Statistics Yearbook, 1985, p. 597.

Companies were paid on average close to £100,000 a year tax free and received free accommodation. According to American employees

"The whole thing is just so hypocritical, they're still pumping oil and making millions of dollars."¹⁹

6.2.2 American-Tunisian Economic Relations

American economic relations with Tunisia have comprised two elements: aid and trade.

6.2.2.1 American economic aid to Tunisia

The United States provided economic and technical aid to Tunisia under a bilateral agreement signed on March 26, 1957. In the years 1957 to 1962, the aid totalled about \$147 million, and in 1962 the United States undertook to provide

about \$184 million toward the Tunisian first 3-year development plan.²⁰ By mid 1967, total US aid to Tunisia reached over \$500 million, the largest amount per capita of any African country.²¹ Since Tunisian independence and until 1985, US aid to Tunisia amounted to almost \$ 1billion, or about one-third of Tunisia's foreign assistance.²² Additional US assistance was provided by various foundations, religious groups, universities, and philanthropic organizations.

The major elements of US assistance to Tunisia were programmes undertaken by the Agency for International Development (AID) and the Peace Corps. The US provided aid to Tunisia under U.S. Public Law 480 (Food for Peace Program),²³ and it tried to encourage development in Tunisia so as to increase the stability of a pro-American regime. The US programmes included rural development, family planning, health care facilities and cultural, scientific and technological equipment.

In the late 1970s, the Carter administration judged that Tunisia, amongst other countries, had reached a relatively high level of development as measured by its annual per capita income of \$1,100 and cut off economic aid which had averaged nearly \$40 million a year since the early 1970s. This step was intended to redirect aid where it was needed. In reality, the Camp David peace process had influenced the American decision because Egypt was granted economic aid, and Tunisia was seen as a stable country. The simple criterion of a rising income level appeared to ignore the regional and sectoral imbalance in Tunisia's state of economic development. In the early 1980s, Tunisia experienced economic and social upheaval, and the stability of the regime was in danger. The Reagan administration took an essential first step in 1984 by re-establishing the economic aid cut off under the Carter administration.²⁴

The US aid was intended to win political influence during the cold war era and to stabilize pro-Western regimes. Moreover, it attempted, in the case of Tunisia, to direct the economy toward American interests and investments. In practice, there has been a positive relationship between economic aid and the stability of a regime. The US aid was directed at protecting the regimes in the Third World within the US sphere of influence. In the 1970s, Tunisia was affected by the general mood in the US due to Vietnam, when the US became less encouraging about the modernization of Third World countries.

Within Tunisia, it became clear that the investment programme run by the statist administration, Ben Salah's project for a planned socialist economy, was not paying off, and by 1969 with the fall of Ben Salah it had been reversed. The United States was finding more fertile fields for investment in Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Algeria. It was less concerned about Tunisia as an American ally in the Maghreb states and the stability of the subregion had slipped in American priorities because America had acquired more influential allies in the Middle East such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia and simultaneously the US had improved its relations with Algeria. The internal turmoil which shook Tunisia in January 1978 severely changed the image of Tunisia as a stable society under Bourguiba.

6.2.2.2 American trade with Tunisia.

The United States did not have a balanced trading position with Tunisia. In general, during the 1960s, US products imported by Tunisia averaged close to 17 per cent of Tunisia's total imports.²⁵ On the other hand, the US took about 1% of Tunisia's total exports. In part, this imbalance was due to the fact that US exports to Tunisia included Public Law 480 agricultural shipments. Further,

Tunisian imports of US products were relatively great because many US foreign aid loans to Tunisia stipulated the use of US imports in the completion of certain projects.²⁶

In the 1970s and early 1980s, Tunisia had made progress in developing its trade with the US, but France still dominated Tunisian foreign trade. France remained Tunisia's major supplier and accounted for 34% of all imports in 1975 and 1976. The other major suppliers were Italy, West Germany and the USA. Tunisian trade with the European Economic Community (EEC) expanded after an agreement was signed in 1976, giving Tunisia's agricultural products and industrial exports unrestricted access to the EEC market.²⁷ In 1984, the US ranked fourth after France, Italy, and Germany respectively in Tunisian imports, (Table 6:8).

Table 6:8 Tunisia imports 1975-1984 (value as percentage of total imports)

State	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984
France	34.4	32.2	28.1	33.2	26.2	25.2	24.3	26.0	26.1	24.9
Italy	9.4	9.0	9.9	10.0	13.3	15.8	14.7	14.8	11.5	14.7
FRG	8.5	10.0	11.2	11.7	9.9	9.5	9.2	11.5	11.5	10.8
USA	6.7	6.2	7.0	4.6	6.0	5.9	7.6	7.9	9.3	7.1
Greece	2.6	2.4	2.5	4.0	5.8	5.5	3.7	3.3	7.8	0.7
Spain	2.5	2.6	3.7	3.1	3.8	3.3	3.3	4.1	4.5	6.2
Japan	0.8	1.5	1.2	1.0	0.7	1.2	3.0	2.2	2.2	4.3
USSR	0.4	1.0	0.7	0.7	0.8	0.8	1.0	0.5	0.4	1.4

Source: International trade statistics Yearbook, 1985, p. 961.

Tunisia's principal export in 1975 and 1976 was crude oil which accounted for 38% and 40% of export revenues in those respective years. Other major export commodities were phosphates (19% of the total in 1975), and olive oil. In 1975, France was Tunisia's largest export market, taking 19%, and 17% in 1976. Italy ranked second, the United States third and West Germany fourth²⁸ (Table 6:9).

The 1985 figures of Tunisian imports-exports reflected the stability of Tunisian trade relations. The principal markets for Tunisian exports were France (25.3%), Italy (16.2%), West Germany (11.1%) and USA (6.6%). The major suppliers to Tunisia were ranked as follows: France (26%), West Germany (12.3%), Italy (12%) and United States (5.8%). The UK ranked below the US in trade relations with Tunisia.²⁹

Table 6:9 Tunisian Export 1975-1984 (value as per cent of total exports)

State	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984
France	19.1	17.1	17.9	16.8	19.4	15.4	17.7	19.3	24.3	20.5
Italy	17.0	21.5	13.9	15.9	20.2	15.8	20.6	16.2	18.6	17.9
FRG	7.6	6.9	16.3	16.4	10.5	12.9	8.2	10.4	11.4	9.5
USA	10.3	13.8	10.6	8.5	8.7	14.5	17.4	23.0	20.6	19.1
Greece	14.1	15.4	13.6	10.0	15.5	18.1	8.1	2.7	1.4	1.3
UK	0.5	0.6	0.8	0.7	0.8	1.6	0.5	2.4	1.1	3.9
USSR	1.1	0.9	0.4	0.4	0.2	0.2	0.0	0.2	0.0	0.1

Source: International Trade Statistics Yearbook, 1985, p. 961.

It is important to note that Tunisian-European economic relations were vulner-

able to US economic policy toward Europe. US pressure for *free trade* directed at Europe threatened Tunisia and the other Southern Mediterranean nations that traditionally exported to European markets. For example, the Reagan administration proposed to sell more Florida citrus fruit in Europe, and tried to force the EEC to eliminate tariff concessions for competing fruit from Mediterranean countries such as Tunisia.³⁰ The United States economic policy focused on economic aid in exchange for political influence, and competed with Europe in Tunisian markets; for instance, the EEC protested when US sold wheat to Tunisia at lower than European prices in order to dominate the Tunisian market.³¹

6.2.3 American-Algerian Economic Relations

Algerian economic relations with the United States could be divided into three economical levels of analysis: US economic aid to Algeria; the oil and gas trade relations; the Algerian initiative for a New International Economic Order (NIEO), and the American reaction to the NIEO as a Non-Aligned economic initiative.

6.2.3.1 United States economic aid to Algeria

United States economic links with Algeria were separate from their political relationship during the Boumedienne era. Despite Algerian-American political differences, Algeria was the first trading partner of the US in North Africa. After independence, during the Ben Bella years, Algeria received large amounts of US economic aid. In 1963, Algeria's agriculture minister announced that US was offering Algeria \$60 million in grants. The US tried to use economic aid to win political influence in radical states such as Algeria. Ben Bella's relations with President Kennedy strengthened the Algerian position in the PL-480 program.³² The keystone of US aid to Algeria was the PL 480 wheat program. Following

the drought of 1963, Algeria became a major recipient of PL 480 food for peace. During the programme's six years, Algeria was given wheat valued at over \$175 million.³³

When in 1963 Ben Bella nationalized the vacant properties which were left by former French owners, some Americans were affected and the United States asked Algeria for compensation but Algeria refused. The Algerian fear was, that if the US received compensation, France would ask for compensation, and that would amount to a great deal. In 1965, the US decided against renewing the PL-480 program's aid because of that issue, but in 1966, the programme was renewed, albeit on a modest level as a sign of improvement in Algerian-American relations over the compensation issue. After Algeria severed diplomatic relations with the US, the PL 480 program was prohibited under the terms of the Gruening Amendment which forbids US humanitarian assistance for countries which sever relations with the US.³⁴

Despite the US prohibition of PL 480 aid, by mid-1972, the US Export-Import bank had nearly \$500 million in credits and guarantees extended to Algeria to finance the purchase of US products. The same bank in 1976 lent Sonarem \$15.8 million for mining equipment, and later gave a further loan amounting to \$37.1 million to Sonatrach in order to finance the purchase of drilling equipment from the US.³⁵ With the expansion of US trade relations with Algeria in the 1970s, US banks extended their financial support to Algerian companies.

6.2.3.2 US and New International Economic Order

Algeria clashed with the US in 1973 over the New International Economic Order. As a chair of the Non-Aligned summit, Boumedienne called for an emergency

Session of the General Assembly on petroleum, raw materials, and development. The session took place in April 1974. During the meeting Algeria put forward several recommendations: First; that all Third World countries should gain control of their own resources by nationalisation, and by establishing control over the machinery for fixing prices. Second; there should be a major international aid effort for the poorest countries. The session was followed by a call for a conference between raw material producers and consumers. Algeria intended to relate the costs of raw materials to the prices of producers, but the US refused to agree to Algeria's suggestion that raw materials and not just oil should be on the agenda. The US softened its position in 1975, when 35 nations met at a Paris conference on International Economic Cooperation. The United States Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, argued that the newly rich oil-producing countries, which had quintupled the price of oil should be blamed for much of the economic anguish in the Third World and should share the burden. Kissinger was not really telling the Opec nations drastically to reduce the price of oil. But rather his aim was to drive a wedge between the oil producers and the truly poor countries in the Third World. The United States approach included plans for using the International Monetary Fund to underwrite low export earnings in the developing countries and opening capital markets to the poor nations.³⁶ However, this was not so important as issue as to affect Algerian-American economic relations, despite its political aspects. Algerian economic interests were involved with the United States, but it was also interested in its prestige and political reputation in the Third World and the Non-Aligned movements.

6.2.3.3 US-Algerian trade relations

Algeria emphasised trade relations with the US, especially oil and natural gas. US

oil companies including Esso, Mobil, Sinclair, El Paso, Philips, Getty Petroleum and Newmount Mines had worked in Algeria for many years.³⁷ In 1969, an important turning point was reached in US-Algerian economic relations when El Paso signed an agreement with Algerian Sonatrach for annual delivery of 10 billion cubic meters of liquefied natural gas to the US over a period of 25 years. In 1971, the amount was increased by 50%.³⁸ The contract was similar to the Moroccan deal with the Soviet Union in 1978 over phosphates.

Despite the absence of diplomatic relations between Algeria and the US, between 1967 and 1968 US trade with Algeria nearly doubled from \$33 million in US exports to almost \$64 million, elevating the US to become Algeria's third most important trading partner, after France and West Germany.³⁹ In 1973, 64.7% of Algeria's exports went to the ECC and 7.5% to the US; in 1977 the figures were 38.1% to the EEC and 51.8% to the US. The change is largely accounted for by a sharp growth in exports of oil and natural gas to the US.⁴⁰

Algeria's exports to the US reached around \$1.2 billion and \$1.7 billion in 1975 and 1982 respectively, and by 1984 it was \$2.5 billion. On the other hand, United States exports to Algeria are estimated for 1975 and 1982 to have been around \$673 million and \$816million respectively, and by 1984 decreasing to \$580 million⁴¹ (Table 6:11). Algeria's orientation toward the US came after the conflict with France over Algeria's nationalisation of French capital in Algeria in the early 1970s. The United States encouraged Algeria to nationalise so as to replace the French companies in Algeria. France retaliated by reducing the volume of oil and wine imports from Algeria and by threatening to expel Algerian labourers from France. Algeria cut down vineyards on the one side and exported the wine to the Soviet Union and opened up its oil and gas to the US. France's relations with Algeria played a major

role in Algerian relations with the US. When Algeria had an economic conflict with France, it approached the US to minimise economic isolation and difficulties.⁴²

Table 6:10 Algerian foreign imports 1975-1984 (% of Algerian total imports)

states	1975	1977	1979	1981	1983	1984
France	33.5	24.0	18.3	18.5	23.6	23.6
W.Germany	11.6	14.5	18.2	13.6	11.3	10.7
USSR	1.2	0.3	0.5	0.6	0.5	0.1
UK	3.4	3.0	3.1	3.6	3.3	3.5
Spain	3.7	4.9	5.3	6.4	7.0	4.4
USA	11.3	8.7	6.5	8.1	6.0	5.7

Source: *International Trade Statistics Yearbook, 1985* p. 98.

Comparative analysis of Algerian trade with the US and Western Europe shows that France was the major supplier to Algeria in the 1970s and 1980s. Germany became the second supplier to Algeria followed by other European countries such as Spain and the UK. In 1975, France's exports to Algeria reached 33.5% of total Algerian imports, and in 1984, it was 23.6% which gave France first place in the Algerian market. The United States had a minor percentage of Algeria's imports (Table 6:10). El Paso Corporation which was the largest American importer of Algerian natural gas in 1978, cancelled its deal because Algeria attempted to force up natural gas prices. Algeria has asked for a special relationship with the EEC and, if granted, it would undoubtedly shape future Algerian economic relations with the US. Geographical, historical and cultural relations have all played a major

role in strengthening Algerian economic relation with the EEC, especially with France, despite Boumedienne's perception of the superiority of US technology.

Boumedienne was impressed by US technology, or he used technology as an excuse for his orientation toward the US on technology issue, following his differences with France. He stated that

"If Europe was capable of equalling the US in this area, then the situation would be quite different, and if we have for some time been working with the Americans in various fields, and working profitably, this is solely because their firms have demonstrated much greater initiative, efficiency and skill than European firms."⁴³

Table 6:11 Algerian Foreign exports(%)

states	1975	1977	1979	1981	1983	1984
France	14.7	12.7	13.7	18.7	34.0	28.4
W. Germany	19.0	14.7	11.5	10.9	3.6	3.0
USSR	2.2	1.0	0.6	0.9	0.1	0.2
USA	26.8	51.8	52.3	32.4	22.7	21.7
UK	4.0	1.4	1.5	1.6	1.3	1.4
Spain	3.1	2.4	2.5	3.7	5.3	3.4

Source— *International Trade Statistics Yearbook, 1985*, p. 98.

In late 1979 and 1980 the US and Algeria were in conflict over the price of natural gas. Both Presidents Carter and Reagan refused to allow the import of Algerian or any other imported gas at world market oil prices. The US showed no sympathy for the Algerian case, raising the price of natural gas as the prices of oil went up in the early 1980s. Algeria's problem was that it had to get a deal with the USA because the Soviet Union had been the major competitor to

Algerian gas in Europe. Algeria was showing signs of conciliation in the mid-1980s because it recognized that natural gas was not in short supply on the world market. However, the United States has exported foodstuffs, agricultural commodities to Algeria. According to US Department of Agriculture, in 1989, Algeria imported \$2,980 million of foodstuffs 23% from the US and 24% from the EEC.

6.2.4 American-Moroccan Economic Relations

The main reason for the United States conflict with France over Morocco was the American call for an open door policy to the Moroccan market. After Moroccan independence, US companies invested in Morocco which led the Soviet Union to criticise capitalist control of the Moroccan economy. Despite US investment, Moroccan trade relations were still dominated by France and US trade was minimal despite significant economic aid to Morocco.⁴⁴

6.2.4.1 American trade with Morocco

Since the early days of Moroccan independence, France had been Morocco's major trading partner. For example, in 1969, Morocco exported to France goods to the value of 863 million Dirhams, whereas it exported to the US goods to the value of only 48 million Dirhams. In the same year, Morocco imported from France goods to the value of 866 million Dirhams and from the US goods to the value of 214 million Dirhams. In 1970, Morocco imported goods to the value of 392 million Dirhams from US and from France 1,074 million Dirhams.⁴⁵

France dominated Moroccan trade partly because French is spoken throughout Moroccan markets, financial institutions and banks. Additionally, the US has been the world's largest agricultural exporter and the largest producer of phos-

phates in competition with Morocco in European markets. America's concern for Moroccan stability led private US companies to be suspicious of the Moroccan market. In January 1983, a leading investment risk analysis firm in New York, *Fout and Sullivan* produced its political risks report in which Morocco was rated a country at high risk of violence. The country witnessed urban unrest and violence in 1981 and 1984, and widespread riots broke out over prices increases. According to World Bank definitions (in the early 1980s), 40 per cent of Moroccans have been living below the poverty line.⁴⁶

Table 6:12 US trade with Morocco 1968-1985 (millions of US\$)

Years	US imports from Morocco	US exports to Morocco
1968	11	70
1969	9	53
1971	7	102
1972	11	58
1977	22	372
1979	40	271
1982	51	396
1985	44	279

Source: Damis, J. 1986, p. 18.

Morocco encouraged foreign investments through tax concessions and special investment codes (1973 and 1982) in order to develop its economy. In 1978, the total value of foreign investment in Morocco was estimated as \$1,120 million, of which \$235 million had been made since 1956. French investments represented 32.7

per cent of foreign investments in Morocco, whereas US investments represented only 9.5 per cent of total investments which although much less than of France was still larger than that of West Germany, UK, Italy and Spain.⁴⁷ In the early 1980s, the US government encouraged US companies to invest in Morocco and in January 1982, the US and Morocco signed a treaty which permitted the avoidance of double taxation. The two governments also agreed to establish a joint commission for economic relations. The commission met on annual basis at ministerial level and at the fourth meeting of the commission in Washington.D.C in July 1985, a bilateral investment treaty and a bilateral tourism agreement were signed.⁴⁸

However, US investments in Morocco increased during the years of the Reagan administration and it seems that, in the case of Morocco, economic investments followed improvements in political relations. Hassan built good relations with the conservative policy-makers in the Reagan administration. In 1985, there were 36 US firms and 14 US regional and technical services companies with offices in Morocco, and 77 major US manufacturers had one or more agents in the country.⁴⁹

Moroccan imports from the US have remained at a higher level than from the Soviet Union. But US exports to Morocco fell from 14.1 per cent of total Moroccan imports in 1971, to 9.7 per cent in 1983. During the same period exports from the Soviet Union rose from 4.0 per cent of total Moroccan imports to 5.5 per cent. The level of US-Moroccan trade had been quite modest in comparison to US trade with the major oil producing countries such as Algeria and Libya.⁵⁰

6.2.4.2 American economic aid to Morocco

Morocco was the first North African state to receive aid from the US after independence. Economic assistance extended between 1954 to 1981 totalled \$1,622

million. Tunisia received \$1,256 million over the same period. US economic assistance to Morocco between 1953 and 1972 totalled \$780 million, whereas the Soviet Union's assistance is estimated over the same period at \$88 million.⁵¹

US economic aid was related to political objectives. When Morocco was in conflict with France over Algeria, and over Moroccan nationalization of French owned-farm land in the years after independence, the US was the first foreign country to offer aid to Morocco. In the years 1957 to 1959, US aid to Morocco totalled \$28 million, \$28 million and \$48 respectively, whereas French aid fell from \$14 million in 1957 to nothing in 1959.⁵²

The US Agency for International Development (AID) programme was designed to promote and assist economic development in Morocco, and in particular, in the agricultural sector. In early 1963, the AID programme had been supplemented by a large Peace Corps program in which US volunteers provided services in family planning and other aspects of development.⁵³

US economic aid to Morocco increased dramatically in the 1980s, due to the Reagan administration's globalist policy (East-West relations) toward Morocco. Aid was concentrated on agriculture, education, family planning and low-cost housing as well as to alleviate balance of payments strains by financing imports of agricultural equipment and supplies from the US (Table 6:13).

In 1984, the US and Morocco signed a treaty which would protect US investors in Morocco. Agreements were also concluded with US companies for exploratory drilling, for example, the Mobil oil company which conducted offshore drilling in the Atlantic off Tarfaya in Southern Morocco. The US companies have seen Morocco as an asset for US investments with the settlement of the Western Sahara

Table 6:13 US foreign assistance to Morocco 1980-1985(\$million)

Years	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985
Development assistance (grants)	9.1	12.1	10.7	13.5	19.0	19.5
Economic support fund (grants)	0	0	0	0	7.0	15.0
Public law 480 title I (loan)	5.8	25.0	35.0	27.5	45.0	55.0
Public law 480 title II (grant)	9.9	16.1	13.5	10.5	14.9	8.8
Total	24.8	53.1	59.2	51.5	85.9	98.3

Source: Damis, 1986.

issue, because Morocco is rich in minerals especially uranium and phosphates.⁵⁴ The Moroccan open door policy and free market capitalist system, have encouraged the US into the Moroccan market. From the point of view of Moroccan foreign debts, which in 1985 stood at 13-14 billion, or 80-90 per cent of Morocco's gross national product (GNP), Morocco has been obliged to solicit US assistance with the IMF and World Bank.

6.3 Soviet-Maghreb Economic Relations

Subsequent to the independence of North African states, the Soviet Union attempted to establish commercial relations with them. The Soviets criticized capitalist investment in the Maghreb states, and also offered economic aid to the Maghreb. Morocco was the first North African country to receive aid from the Soviet Union. After Algerian independence and its adoption of socialism, the Soviet Union started to support Algeria with technical and economic assistance. Libya received less Soviet assistance than the other Maghreb states because of

its conservative government and King Idris was under American pressure not to receive or approach the Soviet Union for aid.

**Table 6:14 Soviet and Eastern European Economic Aid
1954-1981 (in millions of Dollars)**

State	Millions of Dollars
Algeria	1,570
Morocco	2,315
Tunisia	325
Libya	3

Source: Parker, R, 1987, p. 151.

The Soviet Union was aware of the depth of US economic penetration into the Maghreb states. In 1958, the Soviet Union claimed that the US controlled Moroccan minerals: US Morgan group controlled 40 per cent of Moroccan lead output and 80 per cent of zinc production. The Soviet Union criticised US capital as a tool of imperialism, and in 1972 claimed that almost a quarter of private US investment in Africa was in Libyan oil. The Soviet Union encouraged socialist regimes, and it offered economic aid in order to challenge US capitalist influence in the Maghreb. The Soviet Union created an intergovernmental commission on economic, scientific, technical and trade co-operation with the Maghreb. The Soviet Union invested its capital in raw materials in North African states, such as Morocco, and in construction projects, and re-exported imported goods and oil from the Maghreb for hard currency.⁵⁵

**Table 6:15 Soviet and East European Economic Technicians
in North Africa in 1981 and 1984.**

State	1981	1984
Libya	31,700	53,800
Tunisia	600	415
Algeria	11,150	10,750
Morocco	2,350	2,325
Total	43,685	53,800

Source: Parker, R, 1987, p. 198.

6.3.1 Soviet-Libyan economic relations

In March 1961, the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister visited Tripoli and announced the successful conclusion of trade agreements, but it was not until two years later that any trade was actually recorded. By 1962, Libya had finally appointed an ambassador to Moscow, and the following year Libya received shipments of machinery in exchange for exports to the Soviet Union of wool, hides and tobacco. By the end of the 1960s Libya's annual per capita income had risen to US \$1500, representing considerable dollar buying power. Nevertheless, the value of Libyan-Soviet trade in the 1960s was very low, partly because of the Libyan political attitude towards the Soviet Union and partly due to US influence in Libya (Table 6:16).

After the revolution, the Soviet Union started to view Libya as a potential target for economic co-operation. The Soviet Union expressed its support for the firm stand taken by the Libyan government regarding the monopolist oil compa-

Table 6:16 Soviet Trade with Libya, 1962-1966 (in million of Libyan Pounds)

Years	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966
Import	.5	1.2	1.4	1.1	1.3
Export	.06	.13	.24	.11	.05

Source: *Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, 1966*, p. 481.

nies. On December 13th, 1971, Radio Moscow indicated the Soviet reaction to the nationalisation of Libyan oil

“This reaction indicates above all that Libya’s action in the struggle against oil colonialism has scored a direct hit.”⁵⁶

In March 1972, an agreement on economic and technical co-operation between Libya and the Soviet Union was signed. It provided for co-operation in refining oil, developing power generation, and in other branches of the Libyan economy, particularly in prospecting for mineral deposits and gas. The Soviet Union also offered training for Libyan personnel.⁵⁷ During Kosygin’s visit to Libya in May 1975, the Soviet Union agreed to build a large metallurgical plant, a number of power lines, a reinforced concrete factory, to establish state firms and to train Libyan specialists in Moscow.⁵⁸

More striking was the development of Libyan-Soviet co-operation in atomic energy for peaceful purposes. An agreement was signed in this regard in Moscow in 1976. The Soviet Union was to train Libyan atomic energy specialists. Soviet aid in the nuclear field was the first outside the socialist bloc excepting Finland. However, the Soviet Union did not deliver any nuclear energy aid until 1978.⁵⁹

During Qaddafi's visit to the Soviet Union, Libya was offered 200 km high tension power lines. Soviet design institutes were drawing up blue prints for a standardised power network, atomic power stations, and the complete development of the Libyan gas industry up to the year 2000. These blue prints also involved the exploitation of the large iron ore deposits in Southern Libya.⁶⁰

Despite Soviet-Libyan co-operation in the early years of 1970s, the value of trade between the two countries was not high. The figures in Table 6:17 give little indication of economic co-operation because of the strength of Libyan relations with Western Europe and with the US. We can divide Libyan trade relations with the Soviet Union into three time periods: The pre-revolutionary period, during which Libyan-Soviet trade was slight; a period of transition from 1969 to 1980, during which trade relations rose to a moderate level; and a period from 1980 to 1985 which witnessed a high level of trade between the countries reflecting Libya's trade conflict with the US (in particular the US economic embargo). During this last period, Libya received weaponry from the Soviet Union in exchange for oil (Tables 6:17; 6:18).

At the end of the 1970s, Libya and the Soviet Union had increased their economic co-operation in response to US restrictions on trade with Libya and because of the political differences with the US. During the Reagan administration, politics had affected economic relations with Libya and economic relations between Libya and the Soviet Union had improved. Soviet-Libyan non-military trade had a value of Roubles 450.9 million (293 million Pounds) in 1980, 5 per cent more than in 1979.⁶¹ In March 1984, the Soviet news agency *Tass*, reported that Libya had become the Soviet Union's main trading partner in the Arab world, as the value of trade had risen 160% from 1981 levels to US\$ 1.7 billion a year.⁶²

Table 6:17 Soviet Foreign Trade with Libya 1970-1974 (million of Roubles; per cent)

Years	1970	%	1971	%	1972	%	1973	%	1974	%
Imports	0	0.00	0	0.00	30.0	0.23	30.4	0.20	-	-
Exports	12.9	0.11	8.9	0.07	8.6	0.0	14.1	0.09	28.5	0.14
Turnover	12.9	0.06	8.9	0.07	38.6	0.15	44.5	0.14	28.5	0.07

Source: *The Soviet Union 1974-75*, London: C.Hurst&Company, 1976, p. 156.

The Soviet Union had started to buy Libyan oil in exchange for arms and to resell the oil for hard currency. The Soviet Union gained from Libya both in terms of hard currency and in construction projects inside Libya. As Helen Kitchen put it

“The USSR, some leading analysts believe, could buy much more Libyan oil for itself or allow its satellites to buy more than it does now, and then try to resell it. This happened in 1980 in a small way, when Greece took a total of 850,000 tons of Libyan oil directly from the Soviet Union in addition to the 3 millions tons or so it brought directly from Libya.”⁶³

Table 6:18 Soviet trade with Libya 1976-1984 (millions of Roubles)

Years	1976	1978	1980	1982	1984
Export	16	52	163	221	140
Import	0	107	288	1,126	1,133
Total	16	159	451	1,347	1,273

Source: Papp, D, 1986, p. 96.

6.3.2 Soviet-Tunisian economic relations

The Soviet trade policies represented an instrument with which to chip away at the economic linkages of neo-colonialism.⁶⁴ Regarding Tunisia, the Soviet intention was to offer a new market with the aim of impeding Tunisian progress towards association with the EEC. The Soviet Union also had sought the immediate pay-off of port facilities and markets for its own goods.⁶⁵ Economic relations with Tunisia has two sides: trade relations and economic aid.

6.3.2.1 Soviet trade with Tunisia

The Soviet Union and Tunisia signed their first trade agreement in July 1957, and a Tunisian trade delegation visited Moscow in January 1961. Trade had not been extensive: Tunisia's total foreign trade in 1966 was around \$408 million of which the Soviet share was \$12.5 million or roughly 2% of total trade. Tunisian trade with the Soviet Union did not approach that between Tunisia and the United States⁶⁶ (see Table 6:18). In 1973, Tunisia and the Soviet Union signed another trade protocol and announced an increase in trade between the two countries of 20 per cent. The Soviet Union exported to Tunisia machinery and equipment, ships, timber and other commodities. Tunisia exported to the Soviet Union olive and cork, olive oil, and almonds⁶⁷ but Soviet trade with Tunisia was small in comparison with trade with Europe or the United States (Tables 8 and 9)

As the figures in Table 6.19 show, Soviet-Tunisian relations remained low key. This was in spite of agreements concluded between the two countries in October and December 1983 on a \$25 million irrigation project and on various maritime issues such as establishment of a regular Tunisian-Soviet shipping line and naval repair facilities in Tunisia. In April 1985, the Soviet Union and Tunisia signed

**Table 6:19 Volume of Soviet foreign trade with Tunisia
1970-1982(millions of Roubles)**

Years	1970	1975	1980	1981	1982	1985	1986
imports	2.6	7.0	5.5	2.4	5.1	11.6	19.2
exports	3.1	3.5	19.5	12.7	6.1	11.4	19.7
total	5.7	10.5	25.0	15.1	11.2	23.0	38.9

Source: Shearman, Peter, 1987, pp. 1083-1117.

an agreement that created a permanent commission on economic, scientific and technical, and trade relations; it was a sign of the strengthening of their economic cooperation.⁶⁸

6.3.2.2 Soviet economic aid to Tunisia

Tunisia was not the major recipient of Soviet economic aid to Africa. The first Soviet aid to Tunisia came in 1961, when the Soviet Union offered aid for the construction of dams, hospitals and educational facilities. The Soviet credits were extended at the time of the Franco-Tunisian crisis over the disposition of the naval base at Bizerte in 1961. The Soviets intended to take advantage of the Franco-Tunisian conflict in the cold war to penetrate, and extend relations with, Tunisia.⁶⁹

Soviet aid to Tunisia by the end of 1967 totalled \$11.5 million, of which \$0.5 million was in the form of grants, and the remainder in bilateral long term loans. This amount accounts for merely 2.2 per cent of all Soviet and Eastern European aid to the African continent.⁷⁰ Between 1965-1967, Soviet aid to Tunisia

represented only 4.6 per cent (\$11.5 million) of total foreign aid (\$253 million) to Tunisia. During the same period US aid represented 58.5 per cent (\$148m) of total foreign aid.⁷¹

By 1965, Soviet aid and loans had enabled the constructions of four dams, and two power stations. Soviet technical assistance was also provided for the extraction of uranium from Tunisian phosphate. Capital aid from the Soviet Union to Tunisia between 1954-1972 totalled \$34.0 million.⁷²

6.3.3 Soviet- Algerian economic relations

6.3.3.1 Soviet-Algerian Trade relations

Soviet trade with Algeria grew steadily after 1962. Its exports to Algeria exceeded its imports and the Soviets spent foreign exchange earned in this way on importing goods from industrialized capitalist countries. In 1968, Algeria and the Soviet Union signed a seven-year trade agreement, and trade between the two countries increased. The Soviet Union pledged to purchase one third of Algeria's annual wine production in exchange for agricultural machinery.⁷³ The price of wine later became an issue affecting Algerian-Soviet economic relations because Algeria had asked for an increase in the price of wine paid by the Soviet Union in order to decrease the deficit in trade between the two countries. Between 1966 and 1969, Algeria ranked fifth among Soviet Union's Third World trading partners.⁷⁴

Algerian trade with the Soviet Union was influenced by Algeria's relations with the West. When the West, particularly France, refused to buy Algerian wine, Algeria signed with the Soviet Union a contract under which it would supply the Soviet Union with five million hectolitres of wine. The agreement covered the

Table 6:20 Soviet foreign trade with Algeria (millions of Roubles)

Years	1970 ; %	1971 ;%	1972 ;%
exports	62.5 ; .54	52.6 ; .42	55.9 ; .44
imports	55.8 ; .53	69.3 ; .62	58.6 ; .44
turnover	118.3 ; .54	121.9 ; .52	114.5 ; .44

Source: *The Soviet Union 1973*, London: C. Hurst & Company, p. 97.

period 1969-1975, during which Algeria supplied a total of 35 million hectolitres of wine. France had been affected by the Algerian nationalisation of oil companies, by Algerian agricultural reform and Algeria's emphasis on the industrial sector. The Soviet Union welcomed the nationalisation because for ideological reasons, and supported Algeria with technology which was not available from the West.⁷⁵

In the 1970s, Algerian trade with the Soviet Union increased, and Algeria signed a second trade agreement with the Soviet Union in February 1972. The overall volume of Algerian trade, which was \$126 million in 1970, rose to approximately \$149 million in 1973. Between the years 1968 and 1972, Algeria had a trading balance surplus with the Soviet Union. In 1973, this trading surplus turned to a deficit of \$8,624,758 due to the diversification of products, especially equipment exported by the USSR to Algeria.⁷⁶ On the other hand, exports of Algerian oil and wine were greatly reduced and restricted. The Soviet Union was importing oil from Algeria and reselling it for hard currency. Algerian oil was exchanged for Soviet arms.⁷⁷

In 1983, Algeria celebrated the 20th anniversary of Soviet-Algerian economic

and technical co-operation. During that 20 year period, Soviet assistance had above all been concentrated in the industries of mining, metallurgy, oil and gas production and power. The Soviets had completed about 66 out of 122 projects in Algeria. In order to increase trade, the Soviet Union and Algeria in 1974 had established a joint Algerian-Soviet shipping line operating between Algerian ports, the Black Sea and Azov Sea.⁷⁸

Table 6:21 Soviet foreign trade with Algeria 1975-1986 (millions of Roubles)

Years	1975	1980	1985	1986
exports	112.3	92.6	132.3	88.4
imports	134.7	62.5	272.9	239.9
total	247.0	155.1	405.2	327.8

Source: Shearman, P, 1987, p. 1093.

In the early 1980s, Soviet trade with Algeria had increased particularly in term of Soviet imports. By 1985 the volume of trade reached 405.2 million roubles.

6.3.3.2 Soviet economic aid to Algeria

Soviet economic aid to Algeria was extended in two credits, in 1963 and 1964, totalling \$250 million. Algeria was desperate for Soviet aid after a costly revolutionary war. The early aid was concentrated on major projects, such as the steel works at Annaba which cost \$125 million. The Soviet Union initially offered Algeria 500 tractors, and more than 100 combines. They also built dams, irrigation systems, technical institutes and training schools, and carried out a

number of oil and mineral surveys. The Soviet Union adopted a pre-emptive strategy in order to prevent US or Western companies from controlling the Algerian economy. Soviet economic credits extended to Algeria between 1975 and 1979 have been estimated of \$304 millions, while over the same period Soviet economic credits extended to Morocco totalled \$2.0 billion.⁷⁹ The explanation is the Soviet agreement with Morocco over phosphates, the largest Soviet agreement with a Third World country.

Between 1954 and 1981 Soviet aid to Algeria amounted to \$1,045 million. The Soviets increased their aid in the early 1980s, and in 1980 alone, Algeria received \$315 million. Most Soviet aid to Algeria concentrated on developments and investments in technology which had not been offered by the West. In 1972, eighty deep wells were drilled in the Algerian Sahara region with the help of Soviet experts, and the Soviet Union estimated it had designed 21 dams.⁸⁰ The Soviet Union built the Jarada thermal power station and concentrated on hydro-electric projects in Qabail which involved the building of 21 dams there. The major part of Hajjar steel complex at Annaba was built with Soviet aid in 1972, producing 410,000 tons of high quality steel a year during the 1970s⁸¹ (Table 6:22). An important element of Soviet aid to Algeria was the Soviet advisors. The number of advisors reached 2500 in early 1980 but declined to 800 advisors by 1985. The decline reflected Algerian reorientation in development and technology toward the West, after a long period of socialist development.

Despite Soviet aid and trade with Algeria, the EEC and North America had been the major Algerian partner in trade. In 1973, 76 per cent of Algeria's exports went to the EEC and the US; in 1977, the figure had risen to 90 per cent. The change which occurred was the sharp growth of exports to North America primarily

**Table 6:22 The number of new Soviet foreign aid projects
planned and completed**

Years	total before 1975	1975-77*	1977-79*	1979-81*	total 1982
Planned	90	8	2	7	120
operational	45	9	4	5	65

*increase. **Source:** Papp, D, 1986, p. 105.

to the United States.⁸²

6.3.3.3 The Soviet Union and New International Economic Order.

Despite the Soviet Union's declared policy of supporting the Third World, it adopted a critical attitude toward Third World demands for a New International Economic Order. The Soviet Union asserted that the capitalists were responsible for Third World problems because of their colonial history. It went further to accuse the multinational corporations, the World Bank, the IMF, the arms sales, and the control of the international media by the US and the West as the main factor responsible for the economic problems of the Third World. The Soviet Union's diplomacy toward NIEO was an indirect rejection of the NIEO and attachment of sole blame on the West for the grievances of the Third World.⁸³

After the fourth United Nations conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) held in Nairobi in May 1976, the Soviet Union adopted a clear position toward Third World demands. The Soviet Union's response was that it should not be asked to devote a certain percentage of its GNP to assist the Third World. The Soviets had taken the opportunity to ask for a restructuring of all sectors of world

trade, not only those affecting the Third World, but all countries including the Socialist countries. The Soviet Union saw the restructuring of the world economy as a global problem not only one for the Third World. It called for the concept of International Economic Security. In fact both East and West were sufficiently apprehensive to eschew the rhetoric of sympathy and concentrate on the diplomacy of rejection. The Soviet position was less radical than the Third World's and to Algeria's radical demands.⁸⁴

However, the Soviets tried to use the issue of NIEO to their political and economic advantage. It sought equitable and non-discriminatory terms and they asked that any West-South concession should be applied to East-West trade. In 1979, the Soviet Union complained that international measures against protectionist tendencies could be effective only if they were not confined to the interests of one group of countries.⁸⁵

6.3.4 Soviet-Moroccan economic relations

Soviet trade with Morocco developed after Moroccan independence in 1956. The Soviet Union criticised US capitalist companies in Morocco as tools of imperialism, and in 1958 the first trade agreement with Morocco was signed. Between 1965-1968, Morocco ranked seventh among the Soviet Union's trading partners in the Middle East and North Africa, while the Soviet Union ranked fourth among Morocco's trading partners in 1966-1967, accounting for 4 per cent of total Moroccan trade.⁸⁶

The trade balance was in the Soviet Union's favor between 1965-1975, with the increase in Moroccan imports of Soviet oil, and the Soviet oil deliveries met about 60 per cent of Moroccan oil needs. In addition, the Soviet Union exported

chemical products, timber, glass, medicines, machinery and equipment. In 1983, there were over 3500 Soviet-made tractors working on Morocco's fields. Morocco exported to the Soviet Union citrus fruit and phosphates. Canned fish, especially sardines, had been the third item of Soviet imports next to phosphates and citrus fruit from Morocco. The latter sold 174,000 tons of oranges to the Soviet Union during the 1973-1974 season, and overall the Soviet Union accounted for one third of Morocco's citrus exports in the 1970s.⁸⁷

In 1978, Soviet-Moroccan trade relations moved into a new phase with a thirty years, \$2 billion accord for Soviet development of the Meskala phosphates deposits in Southern Morocco. The 1978 agreement was billed by King Hassan II of Morocco as the "*contract of the century*". It was Moscow's largest commitment to a single project in the Third World and marked the first Soviet agreement to import phosphates. Most of the 10 million ton annual output from Meskala would be exported to the Soviet Union to repay the \$2 billion loan, and the surplus would be exchanged for Soviet goods. Morocco's reservations about a close relationship with communist countries did not extend to commercial relations. Even before the 1978 Meskala agreement, Soviet-Moroccan trade relations had developed and increased. Also in 1978, Morocco agreed to a joint ownership arrangement with the Soviet Union for developing Moroccan fisheries.⁸⁸

In order to strengthen trade relations with Morocco, the Soviet Union had built two cold stores, one at the port of Agadir and the other at Casablanca docks. The stores were linked to the Moroccan cold storage system planned for the main citrus fruit and vegetable growing areas, and for agricultural and fishery products. The Soviet Union had also signed a shipping agreement with Morocco in 1971 and Soviet ships annually carried 400,000 tons between ports in Morocco and third

Table 6:23 Soviet foreign trade with Morocco 1970-86 (millions of Roubles)

Years	1970	1975	1980	1981	1982	1985	1986
exports	32.5	45.7	92.6	92.6	126.9	112.5	65.6
imports	17.6	41.2	105.4	105.4	134.2	66.2	52.5
total	50.1	86.9	198.0	198.0	261.1	178.7	118.1

Source: Shearman, P, 1987, pp. 1083-1117.

countries.⁸⁹

It is important to note here that the Soviet-Moroccan agreement in 1978 also had a political objective in addition to its economic purpose: Morocco was trying to put pressure on the Carter administration to sell arms to Morocco. The Soviet Union hinted at co-operating on the development of Moroccan strategic minerals such as uranium. However, the Carter administration refused to favour Morocco in the Western Sahara conflict, despite the fact that Morocco is estimated to have, along with the Sahara, 70 per cent of the world's known reserves of phosphates.⁹⁰

In comparing Moroccan trade with the Soviet Union and the US, Morocco imported more from the United States than the Soviet Union; for example, Moroccan imports from the US amounted to \$271,424,000 in 1980 and \$486,954,000 in 1984, whereas in the same years imports from the Soviet Union amounted to \$149,246,000 and \$154,843,000 respectively. On the other hand, Morocco exported more to the Soviet Union than to the USA; for example, in 1980 and 1984, Moroccan exports to the Soviet Union amounted to \$121,063,000 and \$46,970,000

respectively, and to the US \$32,713,000 and \$32,899,000 respectively.⁹¹

6.3.4.1 Soviet aid to Morocco

Soviet economic aid to Morocco amounted to \$2,100 million dollars between 1954 and 1981. The Soviet Union aided Morocco in the construction of dams and hydro-electric projects: between 1956 and 1981, the Soviet Union had completed 82 projects.⁹² In 1971, Soviet aid to Morocco amounted to 39.6 million Dirhams. Aid from the Soviet Union focused on development and construction which Third World countries had been requesting. The dams, power stations and hydro-electric projects were important for Moroccan development, and were hard to get from western countries. Further, the Soviet Union supplied Morocco with experts and technology, and as helping countries to cope with the various tasks of national economic development and exploitation of their national resources.⁹³

The Soviet Union assisted Morocco in constructing important facilities such as the Mansur Eddakhabi hydro-electric power complex, the Jerada thermal power station and the Moulay Youssef hydro-electric station. The Mansur Eddakhabi dam agreement was signed in 1969, as a joint project to develop the southern region of Morocco. It was opened in the presence of the Soviet Foreign Trade Minister. The contract for the construction of Ait Adel hydro-electric power station was signed between Morocco and the Soviet Union in October 1971. Most of the projects were built with loans from the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union supported Morocco with 39 experts dispatched to work on the projects, as advisors.⁹⁴

The Soviet Union and Morocco developed co-operation in the area of utilizing Morocco's rich oil shale deposits and thus were competing with the US companies in this area. Soviet geologists produced a map of Morocco's mineral resources, the

first time in Morocco's history that such a map had been compiled and published.⁹⁵ Moroccan-Soviet economic relations developed much further than in other Maghreb states. Ideology was abandoned, and national and mutual interests won over ideological differences. The Soviet Union had penetrated the area in which the US had failed to participate. When the US pulled back its support for the Aswan dam in Egypt, the Soviet Union supported it and in this way had won influence with Egypt. The same principle applied to different degrees in Morocco and other Third World countries. The Soviet Union took advantage of Third World economic difficulties and the lack of US support.

In general terms, the Soviet Union conducted trade with a small number of Arab countries. For instance, in 1961 as much as 88.3 percent of Soviet trade with Arab states was concentrated in five states: Egypt (64.9%), Libya (0.6%), Morocco (2.7%), Iraq (13.3%) and Syria (6.8%). Soviet trade with Arab states have varied according to the country's commitment to the socialist model and political attitude. For instance, Egypt's share of total Soviet trade with the Arab world decreased from 68.0 percent in 1965 under Nasser to 14.3 percent in 1985. Maghreb states shared 32.6 percent of Soviet trade with the Arab States in 1980, while seven Arab states including Maghreb States shared 93.2 percent of Soviet trade with the Arab states in the same year.⁹⁶

6.4 Conclusion

The Superpowers relations with the Maghreb states reveal a number of themes which characterise more generally superpower relations with Third World countries, particularly in the French area of interest.

- i- Political relations have been generally separated from economic relations in

the Maghreb's relations with the Superpowers except in specific cases, e.g. Libya's relations with the Reagan administration. Algeria and Libya had strong trade relations with the US despite their political differences, and Morocco had strong economic relations with Moscow rather than with the US. Mutual interests dominated economic relations, despite ideological and political rhetoric. The Maghreb states were different to Eastern Arab countries which had politicised their economic relations with the Soviet Union, for example, Egypt.

- ii- Both superpowers encouraged the development of their preferred economic systems in the Maghreb states and, when Tunisia adopted socialism in the late 1960s, the US was not encouraging. The Soviet Union encouraged Algerian socialism and supported the nationalisation of economic sectors in the Maghreb. The US was sensitive to the nationalisation issue but when it served American interests, for example, in Algeria, it supported the nationalization policy.
- iii- EEC countries have dominated the markets in Maghreb states, but economic relations between the Maghreb states and the superpowers have been encouraged as a result of differences between EEC countries and the Maghreb states, such as France with Algeria, Tunisia and Libya. When the Maghreb states had no other market for their oil or natural gas, they turned to the superpowers.
- iv. Economic relations between the superpowers and the EEC have also influenced their relations with the Maghreb states. US agricultural trade with the EEC affected the Maghreb states and the Soviet Union's natural gas trade

with the EEC affected the Algerian natural gas market in Europe.

- v. Both superpowers have used economic aid to win political influence. The United States tried to eliminate the Soviet presence in the Maghreb states by means of economic aid to the Maghreb. The US also tried to limit the economic influence of France in the region. The Soviet Union used its economic aid as a pre-emptive strategy to distance the Maghreb states from the West, particularly, the United States.
- vi. The Soviet Union has been more successful in Maghreb states in creating intergovernmental commissions on economic, scientific and technical and trade co-operation. The Soviet Union offered a great deal of credit for developing Maghreb states' natural resources. Hard currency has been another economic objective of Soviet trade with North Africa.
- vii. The United States has concentrated on oil and natural gas investments in the Maghreb states. The major US projects which generate huge profits, needed more capital and higher technology than the Soviet Union was able to offer.
- viii. Both superpowers had paid lipservice to Third World demands for NIEO and the Soviet Union tried to use the issue for its political and economic interests, and to win economic concession from the West for East-West trade relations. The United States refused the Third World demands and it put the blame on Opec including its two North African members.
- ix. The economic aid and programmes of both superpowers were based on three criteria: the strategic importance of the region; the region's economic importance as a market for the exports of the superpowers, and as a source of raw materials. These criteria are relevant to superpower policies toward other

Third World countries.

Economically, the Maghreb states have been under EEC economic domination because of historical and political ties. Geography has played a major role in those relations, and for the foreseeable future the EEC will continue to limit the economic relations of the superpowers and North Africa. EEC aid, trade, investment and North African workers in Europe are major factors in consolidating links between the Maghreb and the EEC countries.

Note

1. Between 1980 and 1983, the US imported 35 percent of its bauxite from Jamaica and another 34 percent from Guinea; 25 percent of its cobalt from Zaire; 29 percent of its manganese from Gabon; 63 percent of its tin from four Third World countries, *Time*, May 25, 1987 .
2. David, Steven "Why the Third World Matters" *International Security* , vol.14 no.1, Summer 1989 pp. 5-85. See also Kesselman op cit, p. 342. See also, Fled, W. *American Foreign Policy*, New York: John Willy & Sons Publishers, 1984, pp. 282-313, particularly for US economic aid to the Third World.
3. For the Brezhnev era alone, starting in 1965, Soviet exports of finished products to the Third World accounted for 73.8% in 1965, 82.5% in 1970, 72.5% in 1975, and 74.2% in 1980 of all Soviet Trade with Third World. See Papp, D. 1986, p99. Also see V. Klochek, et al. *Soviet Foreign Trade today and tomorrow*, Moscow: Progress Publisher, 1985, pp. 177-180.
4. Ibid.
5. Gorbachev, M . *Selected Speeches and Articles*, Moscow: Progress Publishers,

1987 pp. 359-361.

6. Koshelev, Pyotr. *Soviet -African Economic and Technical Cooperation in 1980s: Records and Prospects*. Moscow: African Institute. 1986, pp 11 . See also, Ogunbadejo, O. "Soviet policies in Africa" *African Affairs*, vol.79 no.316, July 1980, pp. 297-326. R.E.Kant. "The Soviet Union and the Developing World" *The World Today*, vol.31 no.8 August 1975, pp. 338-346.
7. Tillman, seth. *The United States in the Middle East: Interests and obstacles*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press,1982, p. 97.
8. Ibid, pp. 77-79. See also Preston, L. *Trade Patterns in the Middle East: United States Interests in the Middle East*. Washington.D.C: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, October, 1970.
9. For Soviet oil exports, Institute of Petroleum, *Oil in the USSR*, London: March 1974, pp. 4-10. See also for Soviet oil export in 1980s and 1990 the issue of *Petroleum Economic*, August 1990 pp. 23-25. See also for pattern of Soviet trade with the Arab World, Isayev, V. "Soviet-Arab Economic Relations: Results, Problems, Prospects" *Mediterranean Quarterly*, vol.2 no.3, Summer, 1991, pp. 71-85.
10. Sangmuah, E. 1988, op cit.
11. Haley, E, p. 74. See also, Peter Odell, *Oil and World power* Fourth Ed. London: Penguin books, 1975, pp. 192-197. See Arms and Oil.
12. Haley, E, p. 20; Odell, P, op cit, pp. 192-196. See also, Bartley, R. "Nixon's Worst Weekend" *Wall Sreet Journal*, August 16-17 1991, p. 6. Davis, B, *Qaddafi, Terrorism, and Origins of the U.S. Attack on Libya*, New York:

Praeger, 1990, p. 34. Adelman, M, "Is the Oil Shortage Real? Oil Companies as OPEC Tax Collectors" *Foreign Policy*, Winter 1972-1973, pp. 73-103. Gilpin states that dollars could be recycled from oil consumers to oil producers and back to the market again in the form of OPEC deposits, for example, Saudia Arabia was invested in the US and into American Treasury bills; in effect, this important friend of the United States uses part of its surplus to assist the American balance of payment; see Gilpin, R, *The Political Economy of International Relations*, Princeton (New Jersey): Princeton University Press, 1987, pp. 315-316. Also, the oil high prices have recycled through arms transfers, such as in Iran and Saudi Arabia in the 1970s. It is important to note that the destruction of the Bretton Wood treaty affected Nixon's policy toward oil prices, see for that Calleo, D, *Beyond American Hegemony; The Future of Western Alliance*, New York: Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, 1987, pp. 92-95. Calleo explains the effect of Nixon's policy on Japan and Europe. It increased unemployment and inflation. See also, Yergin, D, *The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money and Power*, London: Simon & Schuster, 1991, pp. 610-611.

13. Ibid. See also, Tlemcani, R. Op cit, p. 152.

14. Kissinger, H. p. 860.

15. Ibid.

16. Odell, P, op cit.

17. Haley, E, op cit; Cooley, J, Op cit.

18. For Reagan economic restriction on Libya see "U.S. Economic measures

against Libya” in *American Foreign policy*, U.S. Department of state, Washington.D.C. US Government printing office 1982, pp. 886-7. See also “Economic sanction to combat terrorism” Special report no.149, *United States Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs*, Washington.D.C. July, 1986, pp. 1-5. Also “Libya Sanctions” *Current Policy*, no.780, U.S. Department of State 1986.

19. Manchester Guardian Weekly, January 7th 1986.
20. Tunisia country Study 1970 ; See also Tunisia background paper pp. 6-7.
21. Tunisia Country study, p. 212.
22. Tunisia, background paper, pp. 6-7.
23. Ibid; Tunisia country study, p. 338; Rupert, J. Op cit.
24. Ibid.
25. Tunisia Country study, p. 329.
26. Ibid.
27. Tunisia: Investment Guide, *Citibank* in Tunis, Tunisia(no date), p. 18. For the EEC-Tunisia interm agreement, see Secretariat of the Council of the European Communities, *Association-between the European Economic Community and the Tunisian Republic*, Collected acts.
28. Ibid.
29. Tunisia, background paper.
30. Rupert, J, op cit.

31. Al-Ahram, September 1987.
32. Quandt 1972, op cit. See also Nicole Grimaud, op.cit, p. 147, note 7.
33. Ibid.
34. Ibid.
35. *African Contemporary Record 1976-1977*, p. 19.
36. Younger, Sam. Op cit. See also, B. Cosovic & G. Ruggie "On the creation of a New International Economic Order" *International organization*, vol.30 no.2 Spring 1976, pp. 309-346. Also, Caroline Thomas, *In search of Security: The Third World in International Relations*, Boulder (Colorado), Rienner, 1987 pp. 75-81. J. Amuzegar, "The North- South dialogue" *Foreign Affairs*, vol.54 no.3 April 1976, pp. 545-562. See for Kissinger's arguments, "The Rich v. the Poor in Paris" *Time*, December 29, 1975, p. 22. Kissinger adopted a wait-and-see attitude.
37. Quandt 1972, op cit.
38. Ibid.
39. Ibid.
- 40 Michel Nancy, "Algeria: Chronique Economique Algerie" in *Annuaire De L'Afrique du Nord* vol.vxiii 1979, pp. 579-607; p. 466. See *Yearbook of International Trade Statistics 1978*, New York: United Nations, 1979, p. 201.
41. *International Trade Statistics Yearbook 1980*, p. 66.
42. Tlemcani, R, pp. 144-152.

43. Ibid, p. 152.
44. Cohn & Hahn, op cit.
45. *Africa Contemporary Record 1971-1972*, p. 67.
46. *Africa Now*, March 1983. See the urban riots and poverty, Economic Intelligence Unit (EIU), *Morocco: country profile*, 1986-1987. London, p. 8.
47. See for foreign investments, G. Brown "Morocco invites U.S. Business" *Sirius: The World & Africa*, vol. iii no.1 1983 pp. 6-8. Also, see *Morocco: Country profile, 1987-1988*, EIU, London, p. 13.
48. Damis 1986, p. 19.
49. Ibid.
50. *International Trade Statistics Yearbook 1985*, p. 665.
51. Parker, 1987 p151. Mclaurin, R, 1975, p. 84.
52. Cohn &Hahn, pp. 160-163.
53. *Morocco Country Study 1985*.
54. Damis 1982; See also G. Brown, op cit. Also, Robin Knight "Why U.S. is taking interests in Morocco." *U.S. News & World Report*. March 1, 1982, pp. 31-32.
55. See Tishin, I. "Arena of Imperialist Intrigues" *International Affairs*(Moscow), April 1958, pp. 98-99. Also see, "US penetration of Maghreb" *Radio Peace and Progress*, 19.9. 1972, in *USSR-Third World* vol.ii no.9 11 September- 22 ctober 1972, p. 536.

56. St John, 1987, p. 77. Tass 4 March 1972, in USSR-Third World vol.2 no.3, February 14- 12March 1972, pp. 172-3; Also Vol.2 no,1 December 1971- January 16 1972, p. 71; p. 55. Guardian March 7th 1972; USSR-Third World vol.2 no.3 1972, Radio Moscow 10 March 1972. See also Anderson 1985 op cit; McLane vol.1 , pp. 78-81.
57. Ibid.
58. USSR-Third World vol.6 nos.5-6, September 12- 31 December 1976, pp. 226-227.
59. Anderson, L. 1985, p. 34.
60. USSR-Third World vol.6 nos.5-6, 12 September- 31 December 1976, pp. 226-227.
61. *Financial Times*, June 11 1981, p. 10.
62. Anderson 1985, p. 42.
63. Cooley, J 1982, p. 287; Helen Kitchen, *US interests in Africa*, Washington Papers no.98, New York: Praeger publishers 1983, p. 19.
64. Waterbury, p. 87.
65. Ibid.
66. McLane vol.1, op cit, p. 100. Also Waterbury 1974. See also, V. Golovko, "SSSR-Tunis: Tridtsatiletie torgovykh otnoshenii " *Vneshnyaya Torgovlya*, no.7, 1987, pp. 28-29.(in Russia), (USSR-Tunisia 30 years of Trade relations).
67. USSR-Third World Vol.3 no.2, 1973, p. 122. See also, ibid.

68. Papp 1986, p. 242.
69. Waterbury, p. 110.
70. Tunisia country study.
71. Ibid, p. 336.
72. Soviet Union 1973, p. 101. See also, Mizan Supplement A vol.1 January-February 1966 p. 15.
73. McLane vol.1, pp. 5-15.
74. McLane vol.1, pp. 15-17 see also Papp 1986, p. 94; Parker 1987; See also, David Albright " Soviet Economic Development and the Third World" *Soviet Studies* vol.43 no.1, 1991, pp. 3-26.
75. USSR-Third World vol. 1 no.3 February 15- 21 March 1971, p. 134.
76. USSR-Third World vol. iv no.6 1974, p. 367.
77. Ibid.
78. USSR-Third World vol.iv no.3 1974.
79. McLane vol.1, op cit, pp. 1-15. See also, David Albright, " Soviet Economic Development and the Third World" *Soviet Studies*, vol.43, no.1, 1991, pp. 27-60.
80. Papp 1986 p104; USSR-Third World vol.2 no.10 1972, p. 605.
81. USSR-Third World vol.2 no.6 1972, p. 344. Also, many countries were involved in El Hajjar steel complex such as Polish companies and other East

European.

82. Nancy 1979, p. 465.
83. For more details on Third World demands see Gilpin, R. 1987, pp298-304. See for the USSR stands, Papp, D. 1986, pp. 57-60.
84. See Graziani, G. *Gorbachev's Economic Strategy in the Third World*, New York: Prager 1990, pp. 11-12. For International economic Security concept, see Artemiev, I & Halliday, F. *International Economic Security: Soviet and British approaches*, Discussion paper no.7 London: Royal Institute of international Affairs, 1988.
85. Lawson, C. "The Soviet Union in the North-South negotiations: revealing preferences" in Cassen, R, ed. *Soviet Interests in the Third World*, London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1985, pp. 177-191.
86. USSR-Third World vol.4 no.4 1974, p. 256.
87. USSR-Third World vol.4 no.2 1974, p. 99. See also, Hadhri, M, 1985 op cit.
88. Damis 1982; see also, Shelepin, V. " USSR-Morocco: Links" *New Times*, vol.II March 1983, pp. 10-11; for more details see also, *Pravda*, 24 January, 1983, p. 6. Also, "Morocco: Soviet-American rivalry" *Africa Confidential* vol.19, October 1978, pp. 5-6.
89. T. Ariah & A. Damovne, *Development of Prospect for Trade and Economic Cooperation between Morocco and the Socialist countries of Eastern Europe*, UN Conference on Trade and Development, Trade and Development Board, Nineteenth Session, Geneva, 8 October 1979. (here after UN report).

90. Ibid. See also, Congress of USA, *The Political Economy of the Middle East 1973-1978*, A compendium of papers submitted to the joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States April 21, 1980, Washington.D.C US Government Printing office 1980, pp. 300-301.
91. *International Trade Statistics Yearbook 1985*, p. 665.
92. Papp 1986, pp. 104-106.
93. *USSR-Third World*, vol.2 no.7, 1972, p. 407; also see Arab Maghreb Press July 5 1972.
94. UN report.
95. *Pravda*, January 24, 1983 p6, in *CDSP* vol.xxxv no.4 February 23, 1983, p. 23.
96. Isayev, V; op cit.

Chapter VII

The Superpowers and the Maghreb: Strategic relations

7.1 Introduction

The United States and the Soviet Union both considered the Third World important to their geostrategic plans. As a maritime power, the U.S. is concerned to secure its routes of communication and trade, and in the 1950s concluded a number of treaties with Third World states in an effort to contain Soviet influence and expansion. The American strategic objective could be summarised in the following points: 1) to have military bases in the Third World; 2) to sell arms to the Third World; 3) to co-operate with Third World countries in military affairs and to intervene in the Third World by using proxy forces to project American interests; 4) to deny the Soviet Union any military presence in the Third World; 5) to penetrate Third World military elites through training and military co-operation; 6) to encourage the Third World military to adopt American military doctrine and 7) to co-operate with the Third World in intelligence sharing against the Soviet Union and other pro-Soviet regimes.¹

The Soviet Union had geostrategic objectives of its own: 1) to deny the West a presence, particularly military bases, in the Third World; 2) to jeopardise western lines of communication in time of war, and to have military bases or facilities in the Third World; 3) to promote and maintain pro-Soviet regimes, as Soviet proxy forces, in Third World countries; 4) to sell Soviet arms and weapons to Third World countries in order to earn hard currency and to station military facilities

there; 5) to spread Soviet military doctrine and to build military co-operation with the Third World elites; 6) historically, the Soviet Union has sought to reach the warm waters of the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean in order to realise strategic objectives in the chokepoints straits² such as Gibraltar, Dardanelles and Suez.

In this chapter we concentrate on the superpowers strategic relations with the Maghreb States, with an emphasis on the following strategic themes: 1) Arms transfers; 2) Mediterranean relations; 3) military bases; 4) military intervention and 5) intelligence co-operation.

7.2 Maghreb geostrategic values

The Maghreb States have a geostrategic value which has been important to the Superpowers. In World War II, Germany and Italy sought to use their North African holdings to disrupt Allied Mediterranean communication, and in turn the Allies used North Africa as a launching pad for their conquest of Italy and their advance into Germany itself. These historical facts encouraged both the United States and the Soviet Union to concentrate on the Mediterranean as a vital area in their military planning in time of war and peace. In addition, the Maghreb's location on the Mediterranean means that the North African states control the Mediterranean strategic chokepoints. Morocco controls the entrance of Gibraltar where it monitors the 50,000 ships that pass through the Straits each year. This is obviously of considerable importance to Western defence.³

The Maghreb has been considered as a bridge both to Black Africa and to the Middle East. Both superpowers have tried to station military facilities there. The United States was keen to maintain a sizable military presence in North Africa in

order to monitor the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union was selling huge quantities of arms to the Maghreb States, particularly to Libya and Algeria, and it used Algerian airports as a bridge to Central Africa and Angola. From a military perspective, in time of war, the Maghreb was seen as a vital area regarding the European theatre.⁴

7.3 Superpowers, Arms Transfers and the Maghreb

Arms transfers are a significant phenomenon of international relations and as a tool of the foreign policies of superpower relations with Third World countries. Arms transfer decisions are heavily influenced by political and economic motives, and are used to affect the behaviour and attitude of Third World countries toward the superpowers.⁵

Until 1979, the United States was the leading world power in arms transfers, the Soviet Union ranking second, and France third (Tables 7:1;2). From 1979 until 1989, the Soviet Union took over as the leading world power in the arms trade and the United States ranked second. After 1989 the United States once again took the lead from the Soviet Union.

7.3.1 The United States, Arms Transfers and the Maghreb States

It is possible to distinguish five phases in US arms transfers to the Third World:

1. Phase One 1950-1963:

The United States provided weapons to Western Europe in furtherance of its containment policy against the Soviet Union. During this period, Western Europe received more than \$18.4 billion of arms from the United States, ranking first in

Table 7:1 World's arms transfers 1963-1986 four years average(US \$million constant 1981 Dollars).

States	1963-6	1967-70	1971-74	1975-8	1979-82	1983-6
USA	3,660	6,504	7,877	8,456	7,968	9,034
USSR	3,238	3,206	6,399	8,275	11,143	14,806
France	364	384	1,116	1,673	3,019	3,596
UK	421	303	824	1,207	1,971	1,045
W.Germany	273	249	366	1,047	1,261	1,249
Italy	56	62	231	623	890	763
Others	1,409	1,518	2,547	4,161	6,378	7,733
Totals	9,421	12,216	19,360	25,442	32,630	38,226

Source: *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers*, various years. US Arms and Disarmament Agency, Washington.D.C: U.S.Government Printing Office.

arms purchases from the US. East Asia and the Pacific received \$8.9 billion of arms and the Middle East and South Asia \$1.57 billion of arms.⁶ The priority of the United States during this period were such that security, political and strategic objectives dominated US arms transfers policy and took precedence over economic objectives. Most arms transfers were on credit and long term loan. The United States also delivered arms to the Middle East as part of its containment policy but United States arms sales to North Africa were limited because France remained the major arms supplier to North Africa. Between 1950-1973, North Africa imported 14.2% of French arms transfers to the Third World, whilst the United States and the Soviet Union transferred respectively 1.3% and 3.2% of their arms transfers to

Table 7:2 World arms transfers, four year averages (percentage).

States	1963-6	1967-70	1971-74	1975-8	1979-82	1983-6
USA	38.8	53.2	40.7	33.2	24.4	23.6
USSR	4.4	26.2	33.1	32.5	34.1	38.7
France	3.9	3.1	5.8	6.6	9.3	9.4
UK	4.5	2.5	4.3	4.7	6.0	2.7
W.Germany	2.9	2.0	1.9	4.1	3.7	3.3
Italy	0.6	0.5	1.2	2.4	2.7	2.0
Others	15.0	12.4	13.1	16.3	19.6	20.2
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers*, various years. US Arms and Disarmament Agency, Washington.D.C: U.S.Government Printing Office.

the Third World to North African states (Table 7:3).

2. Phase Two: 1964-1973 After the Cuban crisis, the United States shifted its geopolitical perspective on arms transfers away from Western Europe and toward Third World countries. Due to the Vietnam War, this shift was especially to East Asia and the Pacific. John Kennedy, as US President, added the concept of counter-insurgency to the military strategic objective for arms transfers, in order to counter the increasing influence of the Soviet Union. By 1964, the Vietnam War dominated US foreign policy, and the domino theory influenced the US decision makers toward East Asia. East Asia and the Pacific region ranked first in receiving American weapons. It is estimated

Table 7:3 Main Suppliers of Weapons to Maghreb states 1950-1973
(US \$m constant 1973 prices)

States	1950-60	1961-65	1966-70	1971-73	Total ¹	Total ²	% ³
USA	2.5	2.7	109.6	5.2	120	8817.5	1.3
USSR	-	123.8	166.4	18.6	308.8	9486.8	3.2
France	22.6	19.7	48.7	280.5	371.5	2604.7	14.2

1- Total of arms transfers to Maghreb states. 2-Total of arms transfers to the Third World excluding Vietnam. 3- percentage of arms transfers to Maghreb states to total arms transfers to the Third World. **Source:** Prepared by the author from SIPRI. *Arms Trade Registers: The Arms Trade with the Third World*, Sockholm (Sweden): Almqvist & Wiksell International Stockholm, 1975.

that \$19.1 billion of arms were delivered to East Asia by the United States, \$2.7 billion to Europe and Canada, and the Middle East received only \$582 million.⁷

During the Johnson Administration, the United States reviewed its policy of arms transfers to the Third World and it sought to focus on social and economic development in the Third World, instead of supplying arms assistance to counter revolutions. This policy rejected the prevailing attitude of American foreign policy makers toward countering communism.⁸ But the credibility of this policy was overwhelmed by the war in Vietnam. It was an aspiration more than a practical policy.

3. Phase Three: 1974-1976, Kissinger Policy.

After the American defeat in Vietnam, US policy makers questioned the arms transfers policy in countering the threat posed by insurgent groups in the Third World. During this phase, the arms transfers policy was influenced by the Nixon doctrine of using regional powers to protect American interests. Economic motives dominated American objectives, particularly with the increasing price of oil. There was a geographical shift in American arms transfers policy away from East Asia and the Pacific toward the Middle East and, in consequence, the Middle East ranked first in arms transfers.

Once British military forces had been withdrawn from the Gulf, President Nixon and his Secretary of State gave Iran *carte blanche* to buy American weapons. The backlog of Iranian arms ordered climbed from \$500 million in 1972 to \$2.2 billion in 1973 to \$4.3 billion in 1974.⁹

Henry Kissinger, the architect of arms sales policy to Iran, had another objective in selling American arms. He believed that the economic situation and post-Vietnam political imperatives made these massive sales more compelling than ever they were before 1976. Such analysts saw the relationship between the prices of oil and gold and the decline in the value of the dollar as a way to absorb the effect on the industrialised nations of the oil price increase.¹⁰

The rate of increase in the US balance of payments deficit was being accelerated by the rapid rise in the price of oil. The United States intended to recover as many Petrodollars as possible. American Deputy Secretary of Defense William Clements testified before the Congress that the arms sales to Iran, Saudi Arabia and to the Gulf, strengthened both free world security and the United States balance of payments.¹¹ Andrew Pierre went further, explaining the arms transfers

policy of the United States and the Western Europe as way

“to recycle the large amounts of Petrodollars which were paying for oil.”¹²

Moreover, the burgeoning arms trade was benefiting both the American economy and employment. For example, it is estimated that the impact of a total ban on sales would have increased unemployment by 0.3 per cent and reduced the US gross national product by \$20 billion (0.8 per cent).¹³ Economic factors dominated this phase of United States arms transfers. The Maghreb states, especially the oil producing countries (Libya and Algeria) were clients of the Soviet arms industry. Morocco and Tunisia were more dependent on credit and aid, particularly from Western Europe, especially France.

4. Phase Four: Carter era

The Carter Administration developed a different perception of United States policy toward the Third World. Instead of arms sales, it adopted an economic and social development policy in order to stabilise Third World countries and counter the influence of the Soviet Union. Carter perceived that the spread of conventional weapons threatened international stability, and the US had a special responsibility as the world's leading military power to shape the pattern of the world arms trade. Carter viewed arms sales as an exceptional foreign policy implement.¹⁴ Carter emphasized human rights and democratization as a more effective way of influence and stability than arms sales.

Carter's arms trade policy faced criticism from arms dealers and lobbyists attacking Carter's policy because of the damage to US economic interests. During this phase, for the first time, the Soviet Union dominated the arms trade market in the Third World (Tables 7:1,2). During his first two years in office, Carter refused

to sell arms to Morocco on political grounds, and banned the sales of arms and other technological, military-related equipment to Libya.¹⁵ But after the Iranian revolution 1979, Carter supported arms sales policy to protect America's friends.

5. Phase Five: Reagan's Pragmatic Policy:

The Reagan Administration's approach to arms transfers was very different from that of President Carter. Reagan emphasised the use of arms sales as a foreign policy tool. The United States military and embassy staffs were instructed to provide courtesy and assistance to firms which had obtained licenses to market items. During his first three months in office President Reagan allowed more than \$15 billion in arms transfers to governments around the world.¹⁶ His policy was influenced by his "rollback strategy". The United States was prepared to help its friends and allies, to strengthen them through arms transfers. Economic factors played a major role in fashioning the United States arms trade policy. Middle East countries were the principal importers of American weaponry. The Iran-Iraq War gave a major increase to the sale arms to Saudi Arabia and to other Gulf States.

In the 1950s and 1960s, the United States transferred weapons as assistance to its clients for political allegiance in the East-West conflict. After 1970, the United States supported its allies and friends in order to gain economic advantage from the arms sales. Strategic and political objectives, therefore, had characterised the two decades of arms transfers. In the 1970s and 1980s, the United States received much revenue from its arms sales, particularly from selling to the Middle East OPEC States.¹⁷

In addition to economic benefits from arms transfers, the United States was using arms trade as a political means to influence Third World military institutions

and military doctrine. Richard Murphy, the former Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and Southern Asian Affairs, stated American objectives in arms transfers in the following terms

“For thirty years Arab states friendly to the United States have turned chiefly to us as a source of arms and technology - to the near exclusion of the Soviet Union. The Arab intelligentsia is schooled in American Universities; their technicians are skilled on our systems. Perhaps most important, members of their military learn our doctrine, train on our systems, and develop lasting professional and personal ties with American counterparts that they carry back to their own countries.”¹⁸

Murphy's argument was intended to win congressional support for arms sales to Saudi Arabia and reflected the strategic importance of the arms trade. However, an economic consequence was that buyers subsequently became dependent on a continuous flow of spares from the United States, and the sophisticated weapons systems required large amounts of training and assistance from the US. For instance, Iran was heavily dependent on American spare parts, especially during the Iran-Iraq War, and this led in part to so the called “Iran-gate Scandal”.

The Maghreb states were less dependent on the United States, and comparing the Maghreb with other Middle Eastern states, (with the exception of Libya), the Maghreb states were moderate in their arms purchases. For example, between 1978 and 1982 the Maghreb states bought a total of \$28.5 billion of arms and this amount decreased between 1983 and 1987 to \$13.3 billion.¹⁹ Libya was the major importer of weapons in North Africa. Between 1978 and 1982, arms totalled 44.2 percent of total Libyan imports. Between 1983 and 1987, Libya bought arms to the value of \$8.3 billion, comprising 26.8 percent of total Libyan imports. The decrease in oil prices influenced the Libyan decision to buy arms. Algeria ranked second in North Africa for the purchase of arms (Table 7:4).

7.3.1.1 United States-Morocco arms transfers

The American supply of military hardware to Morocco began in 1960, when Morocco signed a military agreement with the United States organising the military bases in Morocco and setting a time for their withdrawal from Morocco in 1963. The military agreement included a restriction on Moroccan use of American military equipment. The United States stated that the weapons should not be used outside Morocco and must be used for internal security. The United States was afraid that Morocco would use the military weapons in the Arab- Israeli conflict either directly, or indirectly by transferring them to other Arab states.²⁰

During the 1960s, the United States supported Morocco with 24 Northrop F-5A and F-5B fighter bombers, and anti-tank weapons, C-130H Hercules transport aircraft, 50 M-48 tanks and 330 M-113 armoured personal carriers. In 1963 and 1965, the United States tried to reward Morocco for the American military bases (Kenitra base was used by US until 1978) there and to strengthen the Moroccan position in its border conflict with Algeria. The Soviet Union supported Algeria during the conflict by supplying weapons through Egypt.²¹

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the United States arms programme with regard to Morocco concentrated on strengthening Morocco's overall military posture. This programme did not relate to the war in the Western Sahara, but to the Moroccan role in Africa, and to the regional balance of power in North Africa. In 1974, the US Army General Edward Patrin, visited Morocco to assess its defence needs. He recommended equipping two Moroccan armoured brigades stationed along the Algerian frontier. This equipment was to be provided through military sales (not aid) at a cost of about \$500 million, with delivery to be completed by

Table 7:4 Arms imports in North Africa (\$ million)

States	1978-82	% of total imports	1983-87	% of total imports
Algeria	6,037	8.9	3,440	6.2
Libya	19,315	44.2	8,347	26.8
Morocco	2,645	9.9	911	4.4
Tunisia	489	2.3	629	3.9

Source: *World military expenditure and arms Transfers, 1988*. US Arms Control and Disarmament: Washington.D.C: U.S.Government Printing Office.

1980.²²

United States military credits to Morocco from 1975 to 1980 ranged between \$14 million and \$45 million a year, which was far too small to finance major arms purchases and therefore Morocco was not attractive to American arms dealers. During and after the 1970s, with the increase in the oil prices, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States supported Moroccan arms purchases and financed the deals with the United States.²³

In 1977, Morocco asked the United States for military assistance to deal in particular with the Polisario because of the conflict over Western Sahara. The Moroccans requested OV-10 aircraft and attack helicopters, but the United States Congress opposed the Moroccan request because of the probable use of American weapons in Western Sahara. According to the Carter administration, the use of US weapons outside Morocco was a violation of the American-Moroccan military agreement in 1960.²⁴

In 1977 and 1978 the United States rejected Moroccan requests to provide assault helicopters and fixed wing COIN aircraft because this equipment was particularly suited for operations against the Polisario. The ban on American weapons sales was influenced by Carter's regional approach toward North Africa and by his favourable view of revolutionary Third World countries such as Algeria. Human rights issues also played a role. The Carter Administration and the United States Congress supported a peaceful resolution to the Western Sahara conflict. To support Morocco with weapons would encourage Morocco to refuse a political settlement and negotiation with Polisario which the United States favoured.²⁵

Morocco maintained a cool relationship with the Carter Administration. It was suspicious about the Americans apparent concern for human rights, to the extent that there were accusations of a Carter conspiracy to overthrow the Shah of Iran. It was well known that the Shah had close relations with King Hassan of Morocco. Carter was not at all enthusiastic about arms transfers to Morocco.²⁶

Morocco reacted to Carter's restriction on the sale of American weapons to Morocco with bitterness. In December 1977, King Hassan postponed his scheduled visit to the United States. The bitterness deepened and in 1979 Morocco asked for the withdrawal of the US Ambassador, Richard Parker, one of America's Arabists in the State Department.²⁷

However, in 1979, the Carter administration reversed its arms transfers to Morocco, and approved the sale of a \$235 million arms package including six OV-10 Bronco armed reconnaissance planes, 20 F-5E Fighter bombers, and 2Y Hughes MD-100 Light helicopters to be delivered in 1981-82. There were several reasons for the shift in Carter arms policy toward Morocco in 1979. First, the Carter Ad-

ministration sought to assure friends abroad that the United States was a reliable ally after the fall of the Shah of Iran in February 1979. Second, Morocco had played a major role in backing American and French interests in Zaire in 1977 and 1979. Third, Hassan II sheltered the Shah of Iran after his final departure from Iran. Fourth, Saudi Arabia paid for Moroccan arms purchases, and using its close relations with the United States, Saudi Arabia had mediated between the United States and Morocco. Fifth, Hassan supported Carter's peace process in the Middle East. Sixth, Polisario attacks against positions within Morocco had demonstrated a new threat that could justify, in certain situations, the use of American weapons against the Polisario as being more defensive than offensive. This latter 'point made the sale of arms to Morocco justifiable in the eyes of the American Congress. Morocco was facing a threat to its internal security, and the defeat of Hassan II would lead to instability not only in Morocco but in the whole of North Africa and the Iberian peninsula.²⁸

During Reagan's first term in the White House, Morocco received special strategic-related attention from the United States. This was for a number of reasons: Reagan's offensive policy toward East-West relations; his use of the Third World countries; and Morocco's geostrategic position. The United States strengthened Morocco's military position with arms. Between 1974-1985 the United States gave Morocco between 1974-1985 about \$2.3 billion in arms (Table 7:5) 53.8 percent of that amount was transferred during Reagan's first term in the White House. Most of the arms were paid for by Saudi Arabia, an ally of Morocco.²⁹

Each year between 1975 and 1982, Saudi Arabia gave Morocco between \$500 million and \$1 billion to buy arms and for government expenditures. When Saudi Arabian financial assistance was reduced because of the decline in oil prices af-

**Table 7:5 U.S foreign military transfers to Morocco 1974-1985 (\$m).
(agreements, deliveries, credits and commercial arms exports)**

Year	amount	Year	amount
1974	15.038	1981	220.1
1975	298	1982	105
1976	155.1	1983	209
1977	122.6	1984	144.5
1978	149	1985	132.9
1979	191.9		
1980	428.4	total	2304.4

Source: Damis 1986, p13.

ter 1983, Moroccan arms imports declined and its arms purchases were limited to spare parts and light weapons.³⁰ The United States military credits which varied from 1976 to 1982 were insufficient to cover payments on all new equipment acquisitions.(Table 7:5).

The increase in America's arms transfers to Morocco in the early 1980s was related to military co-operation between the United States and Morocco. The co-operation started when the two states signed a military co-operation agreement in 1982. The agreement allowed United States military forces to use the Moroccan air bases in the event of need for the rapid deployment of forces to the Middle East.³¹

The co-operation agreement in 1982 had nothing to do with the conflict in

Western Sahara, it was related to military operations in southern NATO countries, Portugal and the South Atlantic and the stationing of B-52 bombers. By its presence in Morocco, the United States tried to link the American Telecommunication Centers in Kenitra, Bouknadel and Sidi Yahia with American bases in the Azores (Portuguese) and to the new NATO naval base at Port Santo in the Madeira islands (Portuguese) west of Morocco in the Atlantic. It was also intended to connect the American bases with both French bases in West Africa, Senegal, and Gabon, which would provide a satellite communication centre for ocean surveillance.³² Despite the emphasis on the possibility of using Moroccan bases, it was only in 1958, when the United States forces intervened in the Lebanese civil war, that United States aircraft landed and refuelled at Kenitra *en route* from the United States.³³

Although in 1983 there were joint military exercises between US and Moroccan military forces entitled "Bright Star", it is hard to believe that arms transfers influenced Moroccan policy. Despite United States pressure to settle the Western Sahara conflict by negotiation (especially during Carter's Administration), Morocco had never accepted this American policy. The American-Moroccan disagreement led to withdrawal of two American Ambassadors from Morocco during Reagan's first term in the White House. Morocco had other differences with the United States on regional issues. France had the upper hand in Morocco in terms of arms sales and between 1981-1985, Morocco purchased 45.8 per cent of its total arms purchases from France, but only 27.8 per cent from the United States (Table 7:6).

7.3.1.2 The United States-Tunisian arms trade

Tunisian arms imports were low, coming principally from France, but also

Table 7:6 Value of arms transfers, cumulative 1981-1985 to North Africa by major supplier (\$million)

States	Total	USSR	USA	Fr	UK	GFR	China	Ita	Poland	Cze	others	%USSR	%US	%Fr
Algeria	3,890	3,200	170	100	160	160	0	40	0	10	50	82.2	4.3	2.5
Libya	10,455	4,600	0	725	5	180	320	850	300	875	2600	43	0	6.9
Morocco	1,255	0	350	575	0	10	0	20	0	0	300	0	27.8	45.8
Tunisia	580	0	330	200	0	10	0	30	0	0	10	0	56.8	34.4

Source: World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1986, pp. 143-145.

the United States. A number of factors influenced Tunisian arms transfers: the stability of Tunisia; Bourguiba's passive attitude towards the Arab-Israeli conflict; and Bourguiba had deliberately kept the army weak and therefore out of any power struggles. Bourguiba feared army participation in politics, and was afraid of a military *coup d'etat*. As a homogeneous society, 95 percent Sunni Muslim, Tunisia was stable. Tunisia did not attempt to match Algeria or Morocco by building a strong army. Few Tunisian Muslims were recruited into the French army during Tunisia's years as a protectorate, and Tunisia acquired its independence more or less peacefully.³⁴

After Tunisian independence in 1956, Bourguiba asked the United States to supply arms when France refused his demand for arms. The United States hesitated at first to support him, but after Tunisia indicated its needs to the Soviet Union and Egypt because of refusals by both France and the US, in 1959 the United States started supplying Tunisia with a small military aid programme.³⁵

According to the figures of *Arms Trade Registers 1975*, France dominated arms transfers to Tunisia in the 1960s, with the exception of 12 NAF-86 Sabre aircraft which were delivered by the US in 1969, with other light weapons in 1959-1960.³⁶

In the 1970s Tunisia modernised its army. This was in response partly to internal troubles and unrest, especially in 1978 during the strikes by Tunisia's UGTT; partly to the spread of Islamic Fundamentalism (after 1978); and partly to the external threat posed by Tunisia's neighbours, notably Libya. The internal and external situations led Bourguiba to increase military expenditure. Between 1976 and 1977 the military budget more than doubled, and Tunisian armed forces personnel grew in number from 22,000 to 32,000. Between 1975 and 1978, military spending averaged 4.5 percent of the state budget, and grew to average 10.2 percent between 1979 and 1982.³⁷

Between 1979 and 1983, Tunisian arms imports reached \$385 million. The United States took \$110 million of this trade and France only \$30 million. Despite Tunisian intentions to increase the size of its army, a number of factors encouraged Tunisia to become more dependent on aid and grants from the United States: the decrease in oil revenues; the fall in phosphate prices; the weakness of agricultural prices; and the limiting of aid to Tunisia from rich Arab states.³⁸

The Reagan administration was interested in Tunisian security and stability and was aware of Libya's threat to Tunisia. With that perspective the United States and Tunisia formed a US - Tunisian Joint Military Commission. This commission met annually to discuss military co-operation. Between 1982 and 1984, the Reagan Administration decided to raise military aid to Tunisia after it was annually \$20 million. The increase in United States aid was due to the Reagan

Administration's response to the Tunisian dissidents supposedly (backed by Libya) attack on Gafsa in 1980.³⁹

The burden of military spending on Tunisia was very high. Between 1979-1982, Tunisia's military increased its manpower by 45 percent. Military expenditures increased from 4.5 per cent of state budget to 10.5 per cent. It is estimated that the purchase of military hardware accounted from 40 to 45 percent of this military expenditure. The United States increased its arms transfers to oil producing countries for economic revenue, but for poor states such as Tunisia without the ability to pay for American arms, the United States offered limited help through aids and credits.

Between 1981 and 1985 (Table 7:6), Tunisia imported a total of \$580 million of arms, the United States shared \$330 million of this total amount, 56.8 percent of Tunisia arms imports, France \$200 million, 34.4 percent. The increase of American arms transfers was due to the Libyan threat, and to American long term credit to Tunisia. France offered only limited military aid to Tunisia because of the French economic situation and French economic interests in Libya. However, American arms transfers to Tunisia became available only during the early 1980s, and did not play as major a role in American-Tunisian relations, for example, as in OPEC arms imports from the US.⁴⁰

7.3.1.3 The US - Algeria Arms Trade

Despite strong Algerian-American economic ties in natural gas, the United States arms transfers to Algeria were very limited. In 1963, the United States supported Algeria with 2 Beech D-18s aircraft, the first and only arms transfers during the 1960s and 1970s. The absence of an American-Algerian arms trade was

due to Algeria's political attitude towards the United States and NATO, and the restriction which the United States placed on the use of military weapons.⁴¹

After 1978, Algeria started to look for American military equipment because it tried to restore its arms purchases. Between 1978-1982, the United States sold Algeria \$370 million worth of American weapons. Algerian mediation for American hostages in Iran in 1980 opened up a new phase in American-Algerian relations. Algeria asked for Lockheed C-130 transport aircraft, twenty of which were delivered between 1981-1985, 17 for the Algerian Air Force and three for Air Algérie. The United States also supplied telecommunications equipment and military trucks during that period. In 1985, the US Department of Defense provided Algeria with \$50,000 of credit for training Algerian naval officers under the international military education programme. This was the first co-operation between Algerian army personnel and the US military. By December 1985 the US had only 9 military personnel in Algeria; 3 in the military and 6 in the maritime corps training the Algerian armed forces.⁴²

Since its independence, Algeria had been dependent on the Soviet Union and France in the content of military doctrine and training. France was more effective in influencing Algerian military doctrine because of French historical military relations with Algeria. The military schools in Algeria were staffed by French officers, whilst the Russian advisors concentrated on training Algerian personnel on the use of Soviet weapons.⁴³ However, between 1981 and 1985, the United States shared only 4.3 percent of Algerian total arms imports (Table 7:6).

7.3.1.4 The United States-Libyan arms Trade

Until 1959, Libya was extremely poor and dependent on British and American

aid. The American and British military bases led them to offer military aid to Libya. King Idris was not interested in a strong army, and preferred to depend on tribal rivalry rather than the regular army. He did not trust the regular army which was created by the United States and Britain.⁴⁴

During the 1960s, the Libyan monarch was threatened by Arab nationalism in Egypt. After the 1967 war, the spread of this feeling among the Libyan elites led to political pressure over the monarch for military modernisation. In 1968 the Libyan government set a \$1.1 billion budget for a defence programme. The oil revenue helped the king to buy arms but he was more dependent on his arms imports on British and American sales.⁴⁵

United States military aid to the Libyan monarch was due to three elements: its military base in Libya; oil interests, there were 20 US companies producing 90 percent of Libyan oil: and to reduce the Soviet influence in the Mediterranean. In 1954, the United States signed a treaty with Libya providing aid and formally establishing Wheelus airbase near Tripoli.⁴⁶

From the time of Libya's independence until 1964, the United States provided Libya with \$8 million in military grants. Between 1965 and 1969, America granted aid amounting to \$9.4 million, and sold Libya \$50.2 million worth of military equipment. Before 1969, Libyan aircraft were bought from the United States, naval vessels were British and the armoured fighting vehicles were bought from the US and Britain.⁴⁷ After the revolution in 1969, the direction of Libyan arms imports re-orientated towards the Socialist bloc. However, in the early 1970s France was the leading source for Libyan Arms sales. The revolutionary government requested the withdrawal of American and British military bases, the evacuation being completed

in 1971.⁴⁸

Following the 1967 war, France adopted an embargo on arms transfers to Israel. The Arabs saw France as neutral and closer to the Arab's view of the Arab-Israeli conflict. France was no longer regarded in the same light as the United States and, for radical Arab States, it became a potential friend, along with the Soviet Union. In 1970, the Libyan government asked France to modernise the Libyan Air Force. It announced a deal with France over 110 Mirages; 50 Mirage Vs and 50 Mirage IIIs. The deal was worth \$144 million. France dominated Libyan arms imports until 1976.⁴⁹ Between 1979 and 1983 France exported arms to Libya amounting \$856 million, ranking second after the Soviet Union. Between 1981 and 1985 French arms sales to Libya amounted to \$725 million, ranking fourth after the Soviet Union, Italy and Czechoslovakia.⁵⁰ The civil war in Chad also affected French-Libyan arms sales relations (see chapter 8).

During the 1970s the United States refused to sell arms or military equipment to Libya. It has continued to ban arms trade with Libya because of its political differences with Qaddafi. Most of the technological equipment from the United States sold to Libya is transferred in illegal ways (see chapter 5). The absence of American arms sales to Libya led the Soviet Union to dominate Libyan arms purchases (table 7:6).⁵¹

7.3.2 The Soviet Union, Arms Trade and the Maghreb

Soviet arms sales to the Third World can be divided into three phases.

1. Phase one: Containment; the Political-Strategic Objective

The Soviet Union entered the arms market in the Middle East for the first

time in 1955 when they supplied Egypt with arms through Czechoslovakia. The Soviet shipments were a response to America's refusal to sell arms to Egypt. The Soviet strategic objective was to encourage Egypt to challenge the *Baghdad pact* which was formed to encircle the Soviet Union in the early years of the Cold War.⁵² Despite Soviet arms transfers, however, the Soviets shared only a small percentage of the world arms market. Between 1963 and 1966 the Soviets had only 4.4 percent of total arms transfers, whereas the United States had 38.8 percent of the world market. After the Arab-Israeli war in 1967, Soviet arms transfers were increased in an effort to attain political objectives in the Arab World. Soviet arms exports increased to reach 26.2 percent of the total world arms trade (Table 7:2). The increase in Soviet arms exports was due in part to regional conflicts such as the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Vietnam War, and in part to the Soviet support for national liberation movements. Major quantities of Soviet arms were offered to Third World countries as military aid on low interest credit terms. The Soviets were usually prepared to accept repayment in local soft currencies, or in raw materials to be resold on the international market. The Middle East ranked first in Soviet arms exports during this phase.⁵³

2. Phase Two: Strategic diffusion

The Soviet Union attempted to strengthen its strategic role in the Third World through arms sales. In the 1970s it extended its arms transfers to geostrategic regions in order to achieve regional equality with the United States. The Soviets added to their existing clients in the Middle East clients in the Horn of Africa, Angola and India, as well as other Third World states. The 1970s' war in the Horn of Africa, the civil wars in Angola, Chad and the Middle East increased Soviet arms transfers. North African states also became major clients of the Soviet Union,

particularly Algeria and Libya because of the civil war in Chad, and the Western Sahara conflict.

Table 7:7 Soviet Military Aid to the Third World, 1955-1964 (\$m)

Region	amount
Middle East	1437
South Asia	1695
Africa	735
East Asia	404
Latin America	30
Total	4291

Source: Gu Guan-Fu "Soviet aid to the Third world" *Soviet Studies*, vol.xxxv, no.1 1983, p74.

'Moreover, the Soviets tried to counter Chinese influence in the Third World particularly after the ideological split between the two major Communist States. In this phase, strategic objectives were more important to the Soviet Union than economic objectives. Arms sales were also exchanged for military bases, landing rights, and facilities, for example, in South Yemen, Somalia and North Vietnam.⁵⁴

3. Phase Three: economic interests - Hard Currency

In the 1970s the ideological element became less important in Soviet arms transfers to the Third World. It sold arms to conservative states, some of which even waged war against local communist parties, for example, in Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, Egypt and Guinea. Algeria and Libya, despite banning local communist

activities, also received large quantities of Soviet arms.

Between 1975 and 1978 the Soviet Union ranked first in arms transfers to the Third World. It was the first time the Soviet Union had led the world in arms transfers. It shared 33.5 percent of the world arms trade. The Soviet Union continued to challenge US domination of the arms trade until 1988. In 1978-1982 and 1983-1985 the Soviet shared 34.1 and 38.7 percent of world arms trade respectively⁵⁵ (Table 7:2).

In the 1970s the growth and change in the values and structures of the arms trade were further stimulated by the increase in oil prices. In 1970, Third World imports amounted to \$11 billion and, by 1980, imports had increased to \$20 billion. The oil states bought arms not only for themselves but they also lavished arms on poor allies. For instance, the Arab Gulf States and Libya pledged \$2.3 billion for four years to the front line states with Israel: Syria, Jordan and Egypt. By the end of the 1970s, 80 percent of the Soviet arms exports were delivered to the Middle East. The Iran- Iraq War also played an important role in Soviet arms transfers to the Middle East.⁵⁶ Between 1970 and 1981 more than two thirds of Soviet arms transfers to Third World states were paid in hard currencies. Arms sales accounted for half of the USSR's exports to the Third World, and 60 percent of the USSR's trading surplus.⁵⁷

By 1980 over 40 percent of Soviet arms transfers agreements were invoiced in hard currency or commodities such as oil amounting to \$4.2 billion increasing to \$6.1 billion in 1982 before falling back to \$4.2 billion in 1985.⁵⁸ In the 1980s economic interests dominated arms trading with the Third World, and the Soviet Union was ready to sell arms for hard currency without respect for political ideology

and human rights records, as in the cases Iraq, Iran, Syria and Libya.

7.3.2.1 The Soviet Union-Algeria Arms Trade

The Soviet Union dominated arms sales to the Maghreb, particularly to Algeria and Libya. In the 1960s, Algeria was the main importer of Soviet arms. Between 1960-1973, the Soviets ranked second to France in supplying arms to North Africa. (Table 7:3). In this period the Maghreb received 3.2 percent of Soviet total arms transfers to the Third World. In the 1960s, Tunisia and Morocco depended on France and the United States, while Libya received military aid from the United States and Britain.⁵⁹ Algeria looked to the Soviet Union because the Europeans and the United States were not ready to disturb their relations with France by supplying arms to Algeria and changing the regional balance of power in North Africa. The conflict over borders with Morocco pushed Algeria to strengthen its army. Boumedienne, then Defence Minister, visited the Soviet Union in October 1963, and signed an agreement with the Soviets for arms supply and training.⁶⁰

During the Algerian War of Independence with France, the FLN received arms from the Soviet Union through Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco. China was the first communist country to send arms to the FLN. The competition over political influence between China and the Soviet Union was partly why the Soviet Union supported Algeria in its conflict over borders with Morocco. Ben Bella also tried to create a popular militia, similar to China's popular army. It was part of Ben Bella's policy aimed at reducing the power of the regular army. In April 1965, Ben Bella dismissed the Minister of the Interior, a Boumedienne supporter, and attempted to force the resignation of another of Boumedienne's close allies, Abd al-Aziz Bouteflika, the Algerian Foreign Minister. The army overthrew Ben Bella in

August 1965, and since then the army controlled the political life of Algeria.(Table 7:6).

Algeria strengthened its army for several reasons: its regional competition with Morocco; internal unrest in the Kabylie mountains; and the Arab-Israeli conflict. Algeria was a strong supporter of the Palestinian armed struggle against Israel.⁶¹ In many cases Algeria had bought arms and transferred a proportion to other Arab states. Between 1965 and 1967 Soviet military sales to Algeria amounted to \$116 million and included tanks, aircraft and naval aircraft. The increase in Algerian arms imports was due to the Arab-Israeli conflict, when Algeria sent forces to Egypt and 3000 men were deployed along the Suez Canal, MIG squadrons were sent to Egypt during 1967 war and provided facilities to Egyptian aircraft.⁶²

During the 1960s, France competed with the Soviet Union to supply Algeria with military training. The domination of the French language in Algeria, particularly among the military elite and the historical relations between France and Algeria increased the Algerian-French co-operation in the military fields. Algeria signed agreements in 1963 and 1967 with France, maintaining a permanent presence in Algeria. Military co-operation increased after France imposed an arms embargo on Israel. The Engineering School was established with French military assistance at Cape Matifou and was staffed by a French military assistance mission. In 1970, it was reported there were 341 French military training officers in Algeria, 13% of French military personnel overseas. The French also provided Algeria with a number of spaces at the St. Cyr Military Academy and the French School of Gendarmerie at Melun. French Defence Minister, Pierre Messmer, disclosed in 1969 that 673 Algerians were being trained in French military services.⁶³

In the 1970s Algeria increased its purchases of Soviet arms. There were many reasons for this: the rise in oil prices; the Arab-Israeli War in 1973; and the Western Sahara Conflict. During this decade, French-Algerian relations were at a low ebb because of French support for Morocco and Mauritania in the Western Sahara Conflict. It has been estimated that, between 1963 and 1974, Algeria received \$350 million of Soviet weapons and, between 1975 and 1985 the amount reached \$3.5 billion. Between 1981 and 1985, the Soviet Union shared 82.2 percent of Algerian arms imports, while the US shared 4.3, and France only 2.5 percent of all Algerian arms imports⁶⁴ (Table 7:6).

Algeria relied on the Soviet Union to train Algerian cadets, and to advise on military doctrine, because of the Soviet arms supplies. Between 1963 and 1965, 1000 Algerian officers were trained in the Soviet Union. It is estimated that by 1981 3,395 Algerian military personnel had been trained in the Soviet Union. Soviet advisors were stationed in Algeria to train the Algerian army on the use of Soviet weapons. By 1985 there were 1000 Soviet advisors in Algeria but the number has decreased since then because Algeria has reduced its military spending. While the Soviets dominated the military training in Algeria because of Soviet weapons, the French influenced the military doctrine because they penetrated and dominated the military academies in Algeria.⁶⁵

As the Soviet presence declined in the early 1980s, the French presence increased especially after the Socialist Administration took office in Paris. The French government opened up more places in French military schools for Algerian cadets, and extended Algerian credit in arms trade. In 1984, the French provided Algeria with approximately \$52 million for the purchase of French military equipment. Algeria approached France and the US for electronic equipment to improve

its C3I system. Despite Algeria's reliance on Soviet weapons for the previous three decades, it actually shared only a small percentage of Soviet arms sales to the Third World. Between 1982 and 1985 Algeria accounted for only 2.2 percent of Soviet arms transfers to the Third World, whereas Libya shared 8.2 percent.⁶⁶

Algeria spent little on arms imports compared to the amount spent by the Gulf states. In 1984, Algeria ranked 48 of 144 states in world military expenditure, and in terms of the percentage of military expenditure to GNP, it ranked 82. In 1976 military expenditure represented 3.4 percent of total Algerian GNP, and in 1984 this had declined to 2.7 percent, despite the Western accusation of Algeria being a Soviet arms trade client.⁶⁷ The arms trade as such did not influence Algerian foreign policy and France still influenced Algerian military doctrine.

7.3.2.2 USSR - Libyan Military Relations

Since World War II, the Soviet Union has had a strategic interest in Libya. In 1945, after the Italian defeat, the Soviets asked the Allies to control Libya. In the following years, after independence, the United States blocked the Soviet offer of supporting Libya with arms. The Americans and the British maintained military bases in Libya and therefore organised the Libyan military forces. Libya was attractive to both the Allies and the Soviet Union because of Libya's strategic importance on the Mediterranean, and in particular its control of the southern end of the Mediterranean region.⁶⁸

After the Libyan revolution in 1969, the Soviet Union supported Libya with weapons. In the early 1970s the Libyan government asked France for more than 100 Mirage fighter planes to build up the Libyan Air Force. In the early years of the revolution, Libya turned to France for arms sales more than to the Soviets.

The United States refused arms to Libya for a number of reasons: Libyan support for various national liberation movements; the Arab-Israeli conflict; and Qaddafi's conflict with Sadat and Nimeri, two of the United States' closest Arab friends.

The first Libyan contact with the Soviets was in 1970, when the Soviets delivered to Libya 30 medium-sized tanks, and 100 armoured personnel carriers and military vehicles. The competition was between France and the Soviet Union, not with the United States after the latter refused to support the Libyan revolution with military equipment. In 1970, the US and Britain evacuated their military bases in Libya.⁶⁹

The Libyan decision to seek Soviet help for arms purchases was due to the refusal of Western countries to support Libya with weapons. For example, France was concerned about the balance of power in North Africa and Libyan intervention in Chad. The Libyan policy during the early stage of the revolution was hostile to Soviet policy in the Middle-East but moving from this position in May 1974, Libyan Prime Minister, Jallud, asked the Soviet Union for weapons. The Soviet Union signed an agreement with Libya to sell arms in exchange for Libyan oil. The Soviets made their terms of arms' delivery easier than those of the West, with low interest, cheap prices, an easier method of payment, and credits without any limitation on the use of weapons.

In the early 1970s, the Soviets kept a low profile in Libya. In the Arab-Israeli war in October 1973, Libya made a substantial contribution to the Arab cause in the form of financial assistance to Egypt and Syria.

Despite Soviet arms delivery to Libya, the Libyan government was against offering the Soviets any facilities in the Mediterranean. Soviet arms transfers to

Libya were seen by the Libyans as being on a commercial basis more than on an ideological one (Table 7:6).

The largest Libyan arms agreement with the Soviet Union was concluded in December 1974. The Soviets supplied Libya with TU-22 supersonic bombers, Mi-8 helicopters, SA-3 and SAM6 missiles, tanks, and anti-tank missiles, with MIG-23 jet fighters. More than 600 tanks of the 1000 reportedly ordered in 1974 were from the Soviet Union, and 100 Libyan naval personnel were sent to the Soviet Union for submarine training.⁷⁰

The main objective of Soviet arms sales to Libya was to earn hard currency. Political objectives, although secondary, also shaped the deals. The first stage was characterised by the low profile of Soviet arms transfers. Between 1969 and 1974 Libya received \$750 million worth of Soviet equipment. After 1975, Libya paid in hard currency from oil revenues and the second phase of Libyan-Soviet arms transfers started. In this stage Libya strengthened its army to 27,000 troops and modernised its equipment with 1000 tanks. The Air Force numbered 5000 troops with 100 Mirage fighters. The Libyan conflict with Egypt in 1977, involvement in Chad and the Soviet relations with Egypt, all increased the arms transfers to Libya. In 1979, Qaddafi's intervention in Uganda forced Libya to strengthen its army.⁷¹ According to USACDA estimates, between 1979 and 1983, the spending on Libyan armed forces totalled \$12.095 billion. In 1983 alone, Libyan military expenditure totalled \$4.2 billion giving Libya the highest military expenditure per capita in Africa and the Arab world.⁷²

The increase in arms purchases reflected the political relations between Libya and its neighbours: Chad, Egypt, Sudan and Tunisia. Between 1979 and 1984,

Table 7:8 Libyan Arms Purchases between 1974-1984(\$m)

Years	\$m	Military Expenditure to GNP %
1974	726	6.2
1975	794	7.0
1977	1679	9.5
1979	3000	12.4
1982	3311	10.7
1983	4301	15.1
1984	5101	17.8

Source: World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1986, p83.

Libya reached the peak of its military purchases. During this period Libya was involved in conflicts with these neighbours, and the United States was strongly against Libya. US pressure isolated Libya, and Libya feared American support for Libya's neighbours.

The Soviet Union found the golden opportunity to support Libya with weapons. Between 1981-1985, Libya accounted for 6.9 percent of Soviet Union arms transfers to the Third World. Libya ranked third amongst countries in the Third World after Iraq (15.9%) and Saudi Arabia (9.8%) in its arms purchases. In this period, Libyan total arms purchases were 10.4 billion, the Soviet shared 43.9 percent, Italy 8.7%; Czechoslovakia 8.3%; France 6.9% and the rest distributed among different countries, (see Table 7:6). The Libyans tried to vary its arms purchases, but most Western arms came from Italy and France. Western countries' refusal of arms to Libya pushed it towards the Soviet Union.⁷³

Libya sent its military personnel for training in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Between 1955 and 1984 the total numbers reached 7630 comparing to 3555 and 145 from Algeria and Morocco respectively trained there in this period.⁷⁴

Table 7:9 The Leading Third World Customers of Soviet arms sales 1982- 1986 (% of total the USSR arms transfers to Third World)

State	per cent	State	percent
Syria	24.7	Angola	4.8
India	20.3	North Korea	3.4
Iraq	19.5	Vietnam	2.6
Libya	8.2	Afghanistan	2.6
Cuba	4.8	Algeria	2.2

Source: SIPRI Yearbook, 1987.

In summary, Soviet arms transfers did not influence Libyan politics despite the US charge that Libya was a Soviet surrogate. There is no evidence of military bases or naval facilities being offered to the Soviet Union. In North Africa, arms transfers hardly influence politics and the Soviet Union had been selling arms but for a basic economic reason: hard currency. The United States offered most of its arms to North Africa as credit and aid. The principal clients of American arms were Arab oil producers in the Gulf, which dominated the market, especially Saudi Arabia. The US absorbed the Petrodollars through arms trading. The United States has been transferring arms to Israel and Egypt for strategic and political reasons.

7.3.2.3 USSR-Morocco Arms Trade

After Morocco's independence in 1956 the Soviet Union offered to sell arms to Morocco, but the Moroccan government rejected the suggestion under US pressure. The Soviets intended to encourage Morocco to press for evacuation of French and American military bases on Moroccan soil. In the Cold War era, the Soviet Union was impressed by Morocco's strategic importance in Northwest Africa and its control of the Gibraltar Strait, the gate to the Atlantic Ocean.

On the other hand, Moroccan public opinion, especially that of the political elite, was strongly against the American military bases in Morocco. Most of the Moroccan elites were in favour of Soviet arms. When the Soviet Union supported the Arab League decision on Mauritania, Morocco responded by opening the way for Soviet weapons to be exported to Morocco. The Moroccan political elite criticised France and the US for their position toward Moroccan demands in Mauritania. Morocco also asked the Americans to evacuate their bases from Morocco by 1963. The Soviet Union intended to encourage Morocco to adopt a neutral position in Northwest Africa. The Soviets were encouraged by their success in Egypt.⁷⁵ The Soviet Union's stand in Suez crisis, and the Palestinian issue, the legacy of colonialism, and Arab nationalist movements, all helped the Soviets to gain popularity in the Arab World.

The presence of American military bases, the Spanish occupation of Ifni and Western Sahara, and the Algerian war against French colonialism forced Morocco to use Soviet-Moroccan relations as political leverage against the American and European military presence in Morocco.

The first shipments of Soviet equipment accompanied by Soviet advisors ar-

rived in Morocco in November 1960 and early in 1961. The weapons included 12 Mig-17 jet fighters and two Mig-15 jet trainers which were delivered in 1961. In 1962, the Soviets delivered 4 Mig-17s, its last arms sales to Morocco until 1967. The Algerian-Moroccan border conflict, and the shift in the Soviet position on Mauritania, both influenced the Moroccan arms purchases from the Soviet Union. The second Moroccan-Soviet arms deal was in 1967-1968, when the Soviets shipped arms to Morocco through Czechoslovakia. Morocco received 120 Soviet T-54 and T-55 tanks. It was estimated that the deal amounted to \$20 million⁷⁶

After 1968, Morocco did not receive weapons from the Soviet Union because Morocco did not spend much on weapons and usually it had received arms on credit or aid from Western countries. In addition, France was the major supplier to Morocco dominating army training and military doctrine. Moroccan naval vessels were completely equipped by France (Table 7:6). The Royal Military Academy at Dar al-Bayda near Meknes is the principal training institution for the Moroccan officer corps and was founded by the French in 1918. The instruction received at the Royal Military Academy was the highest level attained by most Moroccan officers. The school was staffed by a core faculty of nine French officers on secondment and its curriculum included training in tactics, logistics, and terrain analysis. The competition over influence in Moroccan military elites is now between France and the United States. The Soviet Union no longer has influence on the Moroccan military.⁷⁷

7.3.2.4 USSR-Tunisia and the Arms Trade:

After independence, the Soviet Union approached Tunisia to offer military aid and co-operation, but Tunisia refused the offer. Politically and ideologically

Bourguiba was more oriented toward France and the United States. As a pragmatic politician, Bourguiba used the Soviet Union to achieve political and military support from the West. He used his contact with the Soviet Union to pressurise France and the United States. Bourguiba approached the Soviet Union in order to force the United States to put pressure on France during the 1958 crisis, and in the 1980 crisis he contacted the ' Soviet Union in order to get arms from the US. In other words, Bourguiba was using the Soviets to satisfy his own interests.

Tunisia is a small and poor country. Its expenditure on arms was very small. Tunisia has never been a target for arms sales for economic reward, and is of little interest to the Soviet Union in terms of arms trading.⁷⁸ Tunisia opened its ports to the Soviet navy in the Mediterranean, but still there are no military relations.

7.4 Superpowers, Maghreb and Mediterranean Security

After World War II, the Mediterranean became part of the superpowers' global and regional strategy. Both the United States and the Soviet Union saw the Mediterranean as a vital area for their economic, political and strategic interests. The United States intended to transform the Mediterranean into "*an American lake*".⁷⁹ Being situated at a crossroads of world trade, especially for oil, the Mediterranean encourages the US to maintain a permanent presence.

The American military campaigns of 1942-1943 in North Africa were the opening for an historic transformation of the Mediterranean into 'an American lake'. It also opened the eyes of American strategists to the importance of the Mediterranean and North Africa to European security and NATO operations in time of war. In geopolitical term, the United States sought to ensure that no core power, especially industrial power such as Nazi Germany would dominate the Eurasian

heartland. The Mediterranean is an important part of 'World Island'. Economically, the United States aimed to ensure that the peripheries of the Pacific Rim and the Mediterranean basin, and also Latin America would be integrated, under American aegis, into a global market economy. The US prepared itself to replace its British ally in the Middle East and the Mediterranean. Britain was the dominant sea power in the Mediterranean until the decline of the British empire after World War II, from which it emerged as an exhausted power with inadequate resources to keep its overseas colonies.⁸⁰

After World War II, the Soviet Union was an ideological power in the Eurasian heartland. It saw the Mediterranean as a vital part of the Soviet southern flank. For strategic, economic and political reasons the Soviet Union started to increase its naval forces in the Mediterranean.⁸¹

The Maghreb states occupy 88.7 percent of the Mediterranean southern shores and its coasts extend 4169 km from Tangier to Egypt. This location encouraged both superpowers to develop their political and military relations with Maghreb states both generally and individually, because they are part of the Mediterranean with geostrategic importance to both superpowers in time of peace or war. The Maghreb states themselves raised the issue of the Mediterranean which they saw as part of Maghreb security. They were aware of their political, strategic and economic interests. Historically, the Maghreb states were part of Mediterranean diplomacy from the time of piracy to World War II. They are strongly involved with the Non-Aligned Movement, and have historical relations with France. The Maghreb states have called for the Mediterranean to be a zone of peace and neutrality.⁸²

7.4.1 The Soviet Union and the Mediterranean: Objectives

The Soviet Union perceived the Mediterranean and the Middle East to be an integral part of American-Soviet global competition. Historically, the Soviets have had ambitions toward the warm waters of the Mediterranean since Tsarist times. Imperial Russia devoted over a century of effort to breaking out of the Black Sea and becoming a Mediterranean power. Geographically, the Soviet Union has limited room for northward expansion, and it tried to break the lockout at the Turkish straits. However, it was faced by the British who wanted to keep the Russians out of the Mediterranean, and Moscow wanted to protect the Black Sea Coast against invading naval forces.⁸³

In strategic terms, the Soviet Union tried to create the impression that in the event of any serious conflict in this part of the world, it could shut off naval routes of crucial importance to the Western countries and Japan. The Mediterranean straits, Gibraltar, Otranto, Bosphorus and Suez had an important strategic importance to the Soviets and the Americans. Moreover, the Soviets had the desire to parry the US fleet in the Mediterranean, especially, FBS system which could hit Soviet territory.⁸⁴

The initial Soviet presence in the Mediterranean was for reconnaissance purposes, keeping an eye on the American Sixth Fleet, and to send arms to the Soviet allies in the Middle East and Africa and other parts of the Third World. For the Soviets, the Mediterranean has a defensive and offensive objective. In Soviet strategy, the Mediterranean is both vital for the defence of Soviet territory, and offensive against US maritime force in the Mediterranean. The historical experience of World War II taught the Soviets that, with the allied force having attacked

Germany from the south after they landed in North Africa, to win the war in the southern theatre they needed potential forces in the Mediterranean. The Soviets also intend to strengthen the military balance in the Mediterranean.⁸⁵

In political terms, the presence of Soviet naval forces in the Mediterranean was a political instrument more than military one, especially during peacetime. The Soviet Union tried to establish the fact that the Soviet Union was a Mediterranean power with legitimate interests in the area and that its perfectly natural intention was to win friends and influence people. The Soviet presence in the Mediterranean gave a signal to Third World countries surrounding the Mediterranean, including North African States, that the Soviet Union had the power to help them. In the crises of 1967 and 1973 the Soviet Union supported the Arabs with arms through the Mediterranean.

In economic terms, the Mediterranean plays an important role in the Soviet economy as an essential pathway to the Atlantic and for the Black Sea Fleet. Soviet economic interests in the Atlantic, especially the African coasts, Indian Ocean and Far East depend on the Mediterranean route. It is estimated that 70- 80 percent of the Soviet Union's⁸⁶ supplies to Vladivostok are shipped via the Mediterranean and according to Bruce Kunihom that

"over 60 percent of Soviet exports and 50 percent of its imports go through the Bosphorus and an average 150 Soviet merchant ships ride the Mediterranean at any one time".⁸⁷

The Soviet Union has trade interests and fishing agreements with many Mediterranean states, such as Morocco. Soviet fishing trawlers based in Spain, the Canary Islands, and ranging as far as Angola, pass through the Mediterranean. Soviet fishing vessels equipped with highly sophisticated radar equipment are known to be engaged in military espionage. Soviet auxiliary ships have supported naval

operations in Guinea and elsewhere in the Atlantic.⁸⁸

The Soviets gradually increased their presence in the Mediterranean. During the first phase, in 1953, the Soviets started to use Volna port in Albania. This phase ended abruptly in June 1961 as a result of a deterioration of Soviet-Albanian relations. The Albanians expelled the Soviets and seized two submarines when the two countries severed diplomatic relations as a result of the Sino-Soviet split.⁸⁹

In 1958, the Soviets attempted to establish a permanent naval presence in the Mediterranean for the first time, as a reaction to political upheaval in Jordan and Iraq and the American intervention in Lebanon in 1958. The Soviet Union moved dramatically to the Mediterranean. Its out of area ship days in the Mediterranean grew by 66 percent in 1958 over 1957. There were additional increases of 310 percent and 37 percent in 1959 and 1960 respectively. Because of the Arab-Israeli conflict in 1967 and the strategic parity between the two superpowers, the Soviet Union increased its activities in the Mediterranean. In May 1967, 20 Soviet ships passed through the straits of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles and another 27 passed through the following months as a sign of support and protection for friends.⁹⁰ After the 1967 war, the Soviet navy also kept some of its warships at Port Said in Egypt in a manner intended, perhaps, to deter the Israelis from attacking by the sea.

During the Jordanian crisis in 1970, the Soviet fleet swelled from 46 to 60 ships as a signal to the US Sixth Fleet not to intervene against Syrian forces in North Jordan. These were positive correlations between political upheavals in the Mediterranean and Soviet naval increase in the area. After the signing of the 15 years Soviet-Egyptian treaty of friendship, in June 1971, the Soviet naval presence

in Egyptian ports was increased. At the time, the USSR had a total of 96 ships in the Mediterranean, 34 of which were combat ships and only 23 submarines.⁹¹

When the 1973 war approached, the Soviet navy helped Arab states by taking a number of Moroccan troops from Oran in Algeria to the battle field in the Golan Heights in Syria.⁹² When it began, the Soviet navy rapidly became involved in an operation to move over a million tons of crucial military supplies to the Egyptians and the Syrians, in order to increase their capability to fight the Israelis. The Soviet navy was involved in an active war zone for the first time since 1945. In all the Middle East crises 1967, 1973 and 1982 the Soviet threat of action was designed to bring pressure on Israel. The Soviet navy had a psychological deterrent on the US and Israeli behaviour in the Middle East and North Africa.⁹³

Between 1956 and 1980, the Mediterranean became foremost in Soviet naval visits. It is estimated that the Soviet presence increased from 500 ship days visits in 1956 to 16,900 in 1980. In 1956, the Mediterranean ranked third in Soviet ship days visits: 13% in 1956, after the Atlantic Ocean (62%) and the Pacific Ocean (25%). In 1980, the Mediterranean ranked equal first with the Atlantic in Soviet naval ship days visits, (29%), compared with the Pacific Ocean and Indian Ocean (both 20.5%). This presence indicates the importance of the Mediterranean to the Soviet Union as a gateway to the Atlantic Ocean, the Red Sea, the Indian Ocean and the Far East⁹⁴ (Table 7:10).

7.4.1.1 Soviet Policy toward the Mediterranean:

The Soviet policy was intended to create a zone of peace in the Mediterranean by effectively balancing the US Sixth Fleet. In the 1950s, the Soviets argued that the Mediterranean should become a “nuclear free zone”.⁹⁵ This campaign

intensified in the 1960s after the addition of SSBNs to the United States existing nuclear strike capability from carrier born aircraft. The Soviets also supported the idea of reduction and complete prohibition of external naval operations in the Mediterranean. The Soviet Union claimed to be itself a Mediterranean power, because of its access from the Black Sea, as compared with the US which was an aggressive interloper. The Soviet Union saw its navy as a stabilising factor in the Mediterranean, and as a counter to the American presence, Admiral Navoitsev said that

“Presence of the Soviet Squadron in the Mediterranean is the most important factor in stabilising the situation in this most unstable part of the world.”⁹⁶

In June 1981, during the visit by Chadli Bendjedid, President of Algeria, to Moscow, Leonid Brezhnev proposed that the Mediterranean should be transformed from an area of military- political confrontation into a zone of lasting peace and co- operation. Brezhnev suggested an international agreement to supervise the Mediterranean. Brezhnev’s proposal included: 1) reduction of armed forces in the area; 2) withdrawal from the Mediterranean of naval ships armed with nuclear weapons; 3) no development of nuclear weapons on the territory on non-nuclear Mediterranean countries; 4) the restating by the nuclear powers of commitments not to use nuclear weapons against any Mediterranean country that does not allow these weapons to be stationed on its territory.⁹⁷

In 1988, President Gorbachev called for the freeze on the US- Soviet fleet strength to be followed by the establishment of naval ceilings and eventually of superpower warships. He went further in suggesting a conference of representatives of the Mediterranean states and other parties concerned as a forum at which solutions could be discussed. Gorbachev also called the Soviet Union and the US

to notify each other and all Mediterranean countries in advance of the movements of the warships and of military exercises. He also called for observers to monitor them.⁹⁸

Seeing a major threat to their southern front from the US Sixth Fleet, the Soviets intended to neutralise the American fleet or remove it from the Mediterranean. The Soviet Union has developed a policy of co-operation with the Maghreb and other non-aligned states to eliminate the danger from the Mediterranean.⁹⁹

7.4.2 The United States and the Mediterranean

The American military presence in the Mediterranean, and their interests in the Middle East coincided with the transformation of the United States into a global military power with a permanent global foreign policy. The first act of the United States Policy that could be qualified as Mediterranean was the enunciation of the 'Truman Doctrine' to protect the independence of Greece and Turkey. The US Secretary of Defence (then War) explained that the independence of Greece and Turkey was strategically vital because of their location near the cross-roads of the world.¹⁰⁰

In 1946 the United States warned about the Soviet's Mediterranean ambitions. The US decision-makers suggested the establishment of a permanent naval presence in the Mediterranean as first line of defence against Soviet expansion. On 11 January 1946, the Department of Navy issued a press release announcing the proposed deployment of elements of the Twelfth Fleet to operate as a Mediterranean Squadron, first referred to as "*The United Naval Forces Northwest African Waters*", but on 1 February 1946, renamed "*The United States Naval Forces Mediterranean*".¹⁰¹

Having announced its policy of maintaining US naval forces in the Mediterranean, with a civil war in Greece, and with the British notice to the United States that it would be unable to continue economic and military support for Greece and Turkey, the US government considered the policy of containment to be necessary.¹⁰² On 12 February 1950, less than six months after the North Atlantic Treaty came into force, and only four months before the outbreak of the war in Korea, the US Sixth Fleet came into being. In the years that followed, the US Sixth Fleet repeatedly proved the value of naval forces as an instrument of national policy.¹⁰³

The United States increased its Sixth Fleet, with mutual security treaties concluded through bilateral approaches. This was to define the future orientation in US relations with the countries of the Mediterranean, including those joining NATO, the Middle East and North Africa. US bilateral accords for naval, air and intelligence installations were signed during the 1950s with Italy, Spain, Morocco, Portugal, Greece, Turkey and Libya.¹⁰⁴ The United States naval objectives in the Mediterranean were to maintain the security of its allies in the Mediterranean and to contain Soviet expansion.¹⁰⁵

The United States guaranteed the security and the survival of Israel, and of the Egyptian regime after 1972 after the expulsion of the Soviet advisors. The US also tried to protect its trade, routes and oil supplies. About 40 percent of the oil consumed by France and West Germany passes through the Mediterranean. Italy and Austria receive almost all of their imported oil by this route. The United States intended to keep the influence of the Soviet Union out of the Mediterranean and it tried to promote regional stability on the Southern NATO Front.¹⁰⁶

Geostrategically, the Mediterranean might be considered an extension of the

US Atlantic Strategy. As the sea area with the heaviest concentration of naval forces, it thus posed the most likely threat of future naval warfare. The United States used its Sixth Fleet to protect its allies and friends in the area. It intervened in Lebanon in 1958, to protect pro-Western conservative President Chamoun from Arab nationalist groups, and in 1967 the United States Navy moved to Israel and the Egyptian coast which resulted in the Israeli attack on the American ship "*Liberty*". In 1970, the US Sixth Fleet moved to the Eastern Mediterranean, potentially to intervene in the Jordanian Civil War. The US Sixth Fleet is major instrument of American foreign policy in the Middle East and the Mediterranean.¹⁰⁷

7.4.3 The Maghreb States and Mediterranean Security

The Maghreb States regarded the Soviet Naval Squadron in the Mediterranean as part of the military balance of the area. They believed that in a time of constant conflict in the Middle East, the Soviet Squadron could stabilise the region and counter the American naval presence. The Maghreb states' perception of Mediterranean security was influenced by many factors: the Arab- Israeli conflict; the French attitude toward Mediterranean; the US presence in the Mediterranean; the Maghreb economic interest in the area, because the main routes of Maghreb trade passes through the Mediterranean; and the Maghreb states' security. Historically, the Maghreb had experienced invasion from its northern borders rather than the south. The French, Spanish and Italian invasion of North Africa came from Europe and through the Mediterranean. The Spanish legacy is still evident in the enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla on the Moroccan Coast.¹⁰⁸

The Maghreb states reacted differently to the presence of the Superpowers in the Mediterranean. President Boumedienne called for

“the departure of the navy of all countries that are not part of the Mediterranean. What we need is co-operation among countries bordering on the Mediterranean”.¹⁰⁹

The Algerian government refused to offer the Soviet Navy a permanent base in Mers el-kebier, even though the base was evacuated by the French Navy in 1968. Algeria, however, allowed the Soviet navy to visit the Algerian port on a regular basis, and it ranked first among Maghreb States in Soviet naval total shipdays visit (Table 7:10). Algeria had no naval co-operation with Sixth Fleet, seeing the US presence in the Mediterranean as part of American hegemonic policy in the world and as a tool of imperial policy.¹¹⁰

Algeria, being an oil and natural gas producer, has much interest in the Mediterranean. Through the Mediterranean, Algeria exports its oil and there is a gas pipeline from Hassi R'mel in Algeria through Tunisia to Menerbio in Italy. In April 1991, the ministers of Industry of Algeria, Morocco and Spain signed an agreement in Madrid to complete pipelines to carry gas from Algeria through Morocco to Spain. This economic co-operation increased the importance of the Mediterranean to Algerian economic interests and national security.

Algeria supported the Soviet proposals that the Mediterranean should become a 'Zone of Peace', and that there should be an international agreement to arrange Mediterranean Security. During the Cold War era, Algeria, an influential member of the Non-Aligned Movement, raised the issue of Mediterranean neutrality in the Cold War between the superpowers.

The Bourguiba government took a realistic approach toward the naval presence of the superpowers in the Mediterranean. He agreed that the Mediterranean should become a 'lake of peace', but considered the continued Soviet presence in

Table 7:10 A cumulative totals of Soviet Naval port visits in the Maghreb ' region and other Mediterranean States, 1956-1980.

Country	total shipdays visits	rank
Algeria	2252	2
Tunisia	1695	3
Libya	13	6
Morocco (Atlantic coast)	666	4
Gibraltar	4225	1
Spain (Mediterranean coast)	171	5
Malta	6	7

Source: Watson, B. *Red Navy at Sea*, 1982. pp 197-209

the Mediterranean fruitful in balancing the two superpowers. Tunisia built co-operation with the US Sixth Fleet and the Soviet Squadron in the Mediterranean. Between 1956 and 1980, it was the second most important Maghreb State after Algeria in Soviet naval port visits (Table 7:10). The Soviets met with success in Tunisia. In 1976, there were port visits to Sfax and Sousse and visits to Menzel-Bourguiba began in 1977. From 1977 through to 1980, the average duration of the calls of the Soviet Navy to Menzel-Bourguiba exceeded the normal 4 to 6 day limit, which indicated that the Soviets enjoyed some port facilities. The Soviet presence there increased from 1961 days in 1977 to 392 days in 1980 suggesting that the Tunisians granted the Soviets unlimited access.¹¹²

Menzel-Bourguiba port ranked as the ninth most used Mediterranean port by the Soviet navy through 1980, with a total of 1210 ship days visit, and Tunisia as

a whole ranked as the sixth most visited by Soviet Squadron for all Mediterranean nations. The Soviet increase in its visits to Tunisian ports was due to Egyptian-Soviet relations. After the expulsion of Soviet advisors from Egypt in 1972, and the cool relations between Moscow and Sadat, the Soviet used Tunisia for their Squadron facilities and repairs.¹¹³

On the other hand, Bourguiba also welcomed the US Sixth Fleet visits to Tunisian ports. For political reasons, however, (Arab public opinion and Tunisian domestic politics) the Bourguiba government kept relations with the Sixth Fleet on a low profile.

Despite Libyan-Soviet political relations, the Libyan government did not give the Soviet Union permanent bases in Libya. It was the last Maghreb State to have a regular visit of a Soviet Squadron. From 1956 to 1980, it was reported that Soviet naval ship days visit to Libyan ports only counted 13 days after 1980 (Table 7:10). When Libya confronted the United States in the early 1980s, the Soviet Naval Squadron in the Mediterranean increased their visits to Libya.¹¹⁴

Libya refused to replace the US Sixth Fleet with the Soviet Fleet, especially after the 1969 revolution, despite rumours in 1969 that the Soviet Fleet in the Mediterranean manoeuvred to prevent British intervention to return Idris to power. Officially, Libya stressed that there should be neither Soviet nor American military forces in the Mediterranean. Qaddafi's confrontation with the United States, especially during Reagan's years 1981 to 1986, offered the Soviet Union the opportunity to build naval relations with Libya. The United States used its Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean to put political pressure on Qaddafi, because of Libyan-American differences on the regional issues of Chad, Tunisia, Egypt and Sudan.¹¹⁵

The US Sixth Fleet confrontation with Libya went back to October 1973 when Libya claimed the Gulf of Sidra to be part of Libyan territorial waters. The United States did not recognise the Libyan claim. In February 1974, the United States described the Libyan claim as unacceptable and a violation of international law. The claim became a political issue in Libyan-American relations. During the Carter presidency, the issue played a major role in US relations with Libya.

When Reagan came to the White House, he used the issue of the Gulf of Sidra to put political pressure on Qaddafi. He challenged Libyan claims and in August 1981, he ordered an US naval exercise within the area claimed by Libya. After one day of American manoeuvres in the Mediterranean, on 19 August 1981, American F-14 fighter planes shot down two Libyan Soviet-built SU-22 planes. The Libyan fighter planes were carrying out military exercises 60 miles off the Libyan coast over the Gulf of Sidra. The American fighters were patrolling a sixteen ship naval task force in the Mediterranean. The 1981 incident followed the 1973 high seas incident between Libyan and American fighter aircraft.¹¹⁶

During Libyan intervention in Chad in 1983, the United States moved its Sixth Fleet towards the Libyan coast and France intervened with military force to support the Habre government.¹¹⁷

The major confrontation between Libya and the Reagan Administration was in April 1986, when American F-111 attacked Libya in an attempt to kill Qaddafi and to destabilise his regime. The Mediterranean states such as France and Spain refused to allow the American F-11 fighters to pass through their space to attack Libya. The Thatcher government in Britain, however, permitted the US F-111 planes to attack Libya from their bases in Britain. The incident came after weeks

of US Naval flight operations intended as a psychological humiliation to Qaddafi.¹¹⁸ The American attack was condemned by all the Maghreb States and the USSR. Non-Aligned countries supported Libya against the United States. The attack increased the Maghreb states' demands for the Mediterranean to be demilitarised, and to create an area of "Peace and Cooperation".¹¹⁹

Libya encouraged the neutral policy of Malta and the evacuation of foreign military bases there. Libyan economic aid and co-operation with Malta was due to Malta's strategic location, and its influence on Libyan national security. British forces left Malta in 1979 and in 1981, the Italians signed a bi-lateral treaty with Malta guaranteeing its independence. The Maltese government then proceeded to re-established its connection with Libya, and in 1984 the two countries signed a renewable treaty of friendship whereby the Libyans agreed to supply arms and training to Maltese armed forces.¹²⁰

Morocco developed a moderate policy toward both the superpowers' presence in the Mediterranean. As a Mediterranean state, Morocco has one natural port at al-Husemis, the other natural ports being the Spanish enclaves: Ceuta and Melilla. US and Soviet naval ships visited Moroccan Atlantic ports. Between 1954 and 1980, the Soviet Squadron visited Morocco's Atlantic coast 666 shipdays visit. Morocco signed an economic agreement with Moscow particularly for phosphates and fishing. The Mediterranean is the main route for Soviet-Moroccan trade.

There are other reasons behind Moroccan co-operation with superpowers in the Mediterranean. The main issue is the potential conflict over Ceuta and Melilla. The two ports are in a position to control the Strait of Gibraltar. Hassan compared the return of Ceuta and Melilla to Morocco with the Gibraltar issue between Spain

and Great Britain. Hassan saw the Soviets as a balancing factor in the issue especially after Spain officially joined NATO in 1986. He stated that Morocco will have to regain Ceuta and Melilla as soon as Spain restores Gibraltar, he looks for Soviet support since

“The Soviet Union will not allow one country to control the Straits from both sides.”¹²¹

Historically, the Soviet Union was against control of Gibraltar strait by one state. European states were also against one state control of the Gibraltar Strait. The internationalisation of Tangier City was part of this policy. Britain, France and Germany resisted Spanish ambitions in Morocco. When France and Spain divided ‘ Morocco, the Tangier issue was raised because of the chokepoint Gibraltar.¹²² Morocco might seek not only Soviet support in its case against Spain in Ceuta and Melilla, but also it might get Great Britain, United States and France in terms of two state control of Gibraltar.¹²³

Moreover, the Mediterranean became important in terms of military strategy and regional conflicts involving superpowers. In the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Maghreb used the Soviet Squadron to support other Arab countries. In April and July 1973, the Russian Navy sea-lifted several thousand troops and about 60 tanks from Morocco and took them to Syria. They were carried from Oran port in Algeria to Tartus in Syria in two Soviet Alligator Amphibious warfare ships and provided with an escort which included SAM-equipped cruisers and a destroyer to protect them from Israeli air and submarine attack.¹²⁴ When the war came the Soviet navy was involved in a competitive re-supply operation with the United States. While the United States were helping the Israelis with tens of thousands tons of military supplies, the Russian did the same for the Egyptians and Syrians.

The Soviet Navy escorted its merchantmen in and out of the war zone.¹²⁵

At the sixth conference of Non-Aligned countries in Havana in 1979, for the first time, the conference placed the item of zone of peace and co-operation in the Mediterranean on the conference's agenda. At the seventh conference of heads of states or governments of Non-Aligned countries convened in New Delhi in 1983, the conference condemned the mounting tension in the Mediterranean, and the Middle East, and supported Malta's specific status of neutrality. In 1986, the Non-Aligned Ministers of Foreign Affairs condemned the renewed attack of the United States against Libya which constituted a serious threat to peace within the region, as well as on a broader world scale to security and peace.¹²⁶

The Non-Aligned nations called on the US government to desist from those kind of actions, including military manoeuvres in the Gulf of Sidra. The Ministers stressed once again their support for the idea of transforming the Mediterranean into a zone of peace and co-operation. They expressed their full solidarity with Libya, and they sent a special delegation to Tripoli, after the US attack in April 1986, to convey expressions of support and solidarity to Colonel Qaddafi. The Non-Aligned states shared the Maghreb and Soviet view toward peace in the Mediterranean.¹²⁷

France held a view towards the Mediterranean which was different from that of NATO in that President de Gaulle stressed regionalism over globalism in the Mediterranean. De Gaulle and his successors were trying to take the Mediterranean out of Cold War policy. The French adopted the policy of neutralisation of Mediterranean as a zone of peace. In June 1971, President Pompidou stated the French public opposition to the Mediterranean situation,

“France and the Mediterranean countries would like to be left alone and we

have ' no desire to see the presence of fleets foreign to the Mediterranean".¹²⁸

The French raised the slogan of "*la Méditerranée aux Méditerranéens*",¹²⁹ and, as a political gesture, de Gaulle removed the French navy from the Mediterranean in 1959. After 1975, with the withdrawal of French Naval Forces from the Atlantic, the French government strengthened its naval forces in the Mediterranean. France saw that the more massive the military forces in the Mediterranean became the harder it would become to settle conflicts regionally, and the greater would be the danger to peace and security regionally or globally. Historically, regional conflict threatened the Mediterranean itself. The superpowers were close to direct involvement because of the Arab- Israeli conflict.

In sum, the United States was seeing its Sixth Fleet as vital to American interests and European trade and energy consumption, but France, Maghreb and the Soviet Union called for demilitarisation of the Mediterranean as a zone of peace without foreign forces. The Maghreb and France moved closer towards a joint policy in the Mediterranean. The Russians saw themselves as a Mediterranean power and the Maghreb States considered the Soviet presence vital for as long as the US Sixth Fleet remained there.

7.5 Superpowers, Military bases, and the Maghreb

After World War II, the superpowers engaged in geopolitical competition for strategic access, and denial of such access to its rival. They remained a faithful reflection of traditional geopolitical theories (Mackinderian heartland-Spykman's rimland) from which the patterns of basing access naturally followed.¹³⁰

The Soviet Union, largely boxed in within its own continental empire, slowly

expanded its basing facilities, most importantly in the Middle East and Cuba. During the 1960s, the United States adopted the strategy of wide military bases in Europe, South East Asia and the Middle East. The US enthusiastically annexed North Africa to rimland as part of its strategy of containing of Soviet Union by building military bases in Libya and Morocco.

“From this rimland, nuclear armed B-36 bombers could strike at Soviet military concentrations if required; war supplies could be pre-stocked with the assurance they would not fall into the hands of adversaries; Soviet maritime and naval activities could be kept under surveillance; facilities in North Africa and the Central Africa could be used to transport equipment to the Middle East; communications and other intelligence activities could be carried out in comparative security, anti-submarine patrols in the Atlantic, the Red Sea, and the Indian Ocean could be facilitated.¹³¹

7.5.0.1 United States-Morocco and Military bases

The United States military bases in Morocco went back to World War II when the United States signed a secret agreement with France to use Moroccan airfields for B-47 bombers, when Morocco was still under French colonial rule. The US was controlling four military bases, Kenitra, Benguerir, Nouassir and Sidi Slimane. The Sultan of Morocco was upset because the United States ignored the King and negotiated with France, and it stationed on Moroccan soil 20,000 troops. It was the largest base in Africa.¹³² After Moroccan independence in 1956, the Moroccan King viewed the United States forces as a matter of some concern, feeling that the US presence impinged on the country's sovereignty. This was a sensitive problem for Moroccan public opinion and the Arab world, and affected Moroccan neutrality.

When President Eisenhower visited Morocco in 1959, he reached agreement with the Moroccan Sultan, Mohammed V to transfer all bases from Morocco by the end of 1963. In that year, the American bases were reduced to small military communication facilities at Kenitra, Sidi Boukendel and Sidi Yahia. In 1977,

the United States announced that their usefulness was outdated and they were evacuated in 1978. But, despite the US official announcement, there were rumours that some of the American bases were converted into more powerful and useful intelligence gathering posts connecting the important Western flank of the Atlantic network with the Canary Islands installations.¹³³

The major shift in American military relations with Morocco regarding the military bases occurred during Reagan's first term. In 1982, the United States signed a military agreement with Morocco allowing American forces to use Moroccan bases. It provided US access to Moroccan air base facilities in the event of South West Asia deployments. In 1982, a joint military commission was established between Morocco and the United States. The agreement was achieved following the visit of King Hassan of Morocco to the United States in 1982.¹³⁴

The agreement was initiated by former Secretary of State, Haig, and Moroccan Foreign Minister, Boucetta. The agreement did not provide blanket access for the United States. Morocco retains the right to deny the US access to airfields should it be in their best interests to do so. When the United States requested permission to use the facilities for the transit of two C-SA aircraft during the Middle East of "Bright Star" exercises of 1983 with Egyptian forces, permission was denied, as the Moroccan government sought to indicate its displeasure over its impending loss of military assistance funds.¹³⁵

Moroccan political relations with the US were disturbed in the early 1980s despite the military agreement. Morocco had been using the granting of bases to gain United States support for Moroccan regional ' interests especially with Spain and Portugal and other issues in Northwest Africa and the Iberian Penin-

sula. On the other hand, the United States had been using Morocco's geostrategic importance as an alternative to Portugal and Spain, particularly in bargaining for aid; for instance, when Spain asked the US to withdraw F-16 fighter planes from Spain 1987. Portugal and even Morocco were under consideration as possible sites for basing F-16s. Morocco was being surrounded by American military bases in Southern Europe, and the Moroccan bases gave Hassan more room for diplomatic manoeuvre.

Morocco was also under consideration in 1987 when the Portuguese socialist government wanted to increase the rent of its bases to the United States, which was \$17 million annual payment for the use of Lajes air base in Azores, the United States raised Morocco as a potential strategic alternative to put pressure on Portugal and also, in case of conflict with Spain over the bases.¹³⁶

7.5.0.2 The United States, Algeria and military bases

The United States tried to encourage Algeria to deny the Soviet Union military bases or naval facilities. The United States also assured Algeria that American military bases in Morocco were not directed against Algeria but for East-West strategic competition in case of war. Algeria had never allowed the United States military bases in Algeria and attacked the presence of American military bases in North Africa and other African countries. It also condemned American military bases in the Mediterranean¹³⁷

7.5.0.3 The United States, Libya and military bases

The United States signed an agreement with the Libyan government for an American military base near Tripoli. The first agreement was in 1951, and it was

renewed in 1954 for 20 years. According to the agreement the United States offered Libya \$40 million, on average \$2 million military and economic aid every year. The United States had full control over the base which was called 'Wheelus Air Force Base'. With the strategic value of Libya on the southern Mediterranean, and the climate of Libya which is ideal for pilot training, the United States used it for training and as a base in case of military confrontation with the Soviet Union in the Mediterranean. The United States trained the Libyan Air Force and organised the Libyan Army.

The bases were a major political problem to the Libyan government particularly after the Arab-Israeli war. In 1967, the Arabs accused the United States of using the American bases in Libya for supplying Israel. Demonstrations spread in Libya against the United States presence.¹³⁸

In 1953, Libya signed a treaty with Great Britain "*Libyan-United Kingdom treaty of friendship*". Both US and Britain used the military bases along the Mediterranean Coast in exchange for extensive military supplies and training assistance. During the reign of King Idris, the United States and Great Britain were the dominant powers in Libya, both in controlling the military bases, and in the Libyan economy through the oil companies. The US was training the Libyan Air Force, while the British were building and training the Libyan Army.¹³⁹

After the Libyan revolution in 1969, the British evacuated their military bases near Tobruk and Benghazi in March 1970. The United States operational and maintenance support of the Libya Air Force ended in June 1970, when the American personnel evacuated Wheelus Air Base near Tripoli. US military aid to Libya was relatively small and between ' 1958 and 1970 amounted to US \$17.4 million in

grant aid and US ' \$43.4 million in sales. With British and American evacuation, the Libyans approached France to build its Air Force. In 1970, the Libyan government signed a purchase agreement with France to buy 100 Mirage planes.¹⁴⁰ The French government agreed to sell Libya the Mirages, and declared that it had agreed to establish a training school in Libya. The French instructors engaged in the training of Libyan pilots and ground crew to operate and maintain the Mirage aircraft. Additional numbers of Libyans attended training programmes in France.¹⁴¹

7.5.0.4 The United States, Tunisia and military bases

Tunisia's government did not allow the US a military base. It tried to take a neutral position in the East-West conflict. On the other hand, the United States had military bases in Libya and Morocco and there was no need for the US to put pressure on Tunisia for military bases, provided that the US Sixth Fleet was allowed to visit Tunisian ports.

The Reagan Administration provided Tunisia with arms in exchange for the commitment by Tunisia's government to allow the United States to use the Tunisian airspace and ground facilities in the event of a Soviet supported conflict including Algeria, Libya or Egypt or in another Arab-Israeli conflict. The United States was encouraged by the uncertainty of the US position in Egypt and the conflict over the US military bases in Greece. The United States saw Tunisia as a potential alternative for United States forces.

Whereas the Carter Administration had refused Tunisia's proposal for an American military base in Tunisia, the Reagan Administration was more enthusiastic about such a proposal. According to Tunisian opposition sources, in particular,

Ahmed Ben Saleh, the Secretary General of the Socialist Movement, the United States supported Tunisia with arms during the Reagan era as part of Tunisia's permission to use their ports and air bases, particularly Bizerte base as an American monitoring station. But it is very hard for Tunisia to admit publicly to such a deal with the US because of Tunisian public opinion and its reputation in the Arab World, particularly with the increasing opposition to the Tunisian regime from radical group such as the Islamic fundamentalist, al-Nahda Party,¹⁴² or the other opposition groups such as Trade Unions and Socialists.

7.5.1 The Soviet Union, Maghreb and military bases

The Soviet Union's strategic objective in the Maghreb was to deny the United States a military presence and to encourage local governments to close foreign military bases on their soil. It was also in the Soviet interest to have military facilities there. Two North African states (Algeria and Libya) had military relations with the Soviet Union but Algeria refused to offer the Soviet Union military bases despite Soviet support for Algeria with arms. There were rumours of Soviet access to Algerian bases particularly to Mersel-Kebir, the former French military base in Algeria, which was evacuated in 1968.¹⁴³ When Marshal Grechko visited Algeria in July 1968, the Algerian army newspaper *El- Djeich* wrote

"Algeria had not rid herself of French bases with the intention of letting another power install itself there".¹⁴⁴

The official position of the Algerian government was a position neutral in the East-West conflict. When it was reported in 1971 that the Soviet Union had signed a secret agreement with Algeria to operate MIG-23 aircraft out of bases there, the Algerians denied the reports. Rumours were spread by French and Moroccan press. The Soviet Union reacted to these reports as groundless. During the Presidency

of Giscard d'Estang, France maintained close relations with Morocco. The latter tried to win American political support by using these rumours. The Soviet Union then had facilities (limited access) in Algeria but not as a military base (exclusive extraterritorial control via treaty) as the United States had in Libya or Morocco.

When French and Moroccan media reported of bases in Tindouf in 1976, the Soviets claimed that Tindouf was not a military base but a railway line from iron ore mines in the Tindouf area to the Mediterranean. Soviet experts had been asked by Algeria to carry out necessary technical survey work on the line.¹⁴⁵ The Soviet official condemned the whole idea of military bases in the Third World as an idea of colonialism,

“The Soviet Union was firmly against the presence of troops and foreign military bases on the territories of the other countries”.¹⁴⁶

Algeria's neutral policy determined the Algerian position, but was in co-operation with the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union developed major intelligence gathering sites in Algeria as it had done in Libya, Ethiopia and South Yemen, among other locations. Even though the sites may not be in every case under the exclusive control of the Soviet military, their function dovetails perfectly with Soviet military intelligence and reconnaissance activities.

Libya approached the Soviet Union in the early 1970s, for arms sales. Libya did not offer the Soviet Union military bases, but it offered the Soviets access to facilities. Despite Libya's dependence on Soviet weapons and military training, Libya maintained a policy independent of Soviet military co-operation. There were over 1000 Soviet military advisors, and the Soviets had facilities to reach Africa through Libya, but not military bases.¹⁴⁷

Both Morocco and Tunisia were strategically important to the Soviet Union

because of the Atlantic and the Mediterranean, the Soviet objective was to deny the United States a military presence and military bases in North Africa. The Soviet Union was anxious for access to Moroccan bases for strategic reasons. The Soviet Union condemned the presence of American bases in Morocco and encouraged the Moroccan demands of American evacuation. During the 1980s, the Soviet Union criticised Reagan's military policy of deployment and military bases in Morocco and even in Portugal and Spain.¹⁴⁸

7.6 Superpowers, military intervention, and Maghreb:

The superpowers were using regional powers to intervene on their behalf in regional issues. For example, after Vietnam, the United States adopted the 'Nixon Doctrine'. This Doctrine encouraged proxy powers to intervene in the Third World.

The Soviet Union avoided intervening directly in Third World countries, the only exception was the Afghan case, for geostrategic reasons. The Soviet Union preferred to intervene indirectly by supporting third parties with weapons, economic aid and political support to achieve its political objectives in the Third World. The Soviet Union supported the Arabs with weapons in order to balance US support for Israel with direct intervention. It also supported the Angolan government (MPLA) by shipping arms to Angola. But it did avoid direct involvement in the Civil War in Angola. The Soviet Union also supported the Cuban military presence in Angola. The Cuban forces were also protecting American companies in Angola. It is interesting to note that the United States sold more American goods in Angola than they were selling to Liberia, which has a special relationship with the United States.¹⁴⁹

The Maghreb states have more military power than any sub-Saharan African

state. During the past three decades the Maghreb states' forces were used to keep the peace in Black Africa and have protected many African governments. When Tunisia and Morocco sent their forces to Congo in 1960 as United Nations Peacekeeping Forces, it was the first military involvement of North African states in the continent, as a Pro-Western move to contain communism.¹⁵⁰ While Tunisia had a limited military role, Morocco and Libya were more active in Africa by sending their military forces to intervene in regional conflicts. Morocco intervened in Zaire in 1977 and 1978, but the intervention was not as Proxy Forces to the United States but to protect European interests notably French and Belgian and to achieve political objectives for Moroccan interests itself by winning support for Morocco's claims in Western Sahara.

Table 7:11 Military balance in Maghreb

State	Armed Forced, Active: Reserve	Planes	Tanks
Algeria	169,000 : 150,000	346	910
Libya	76,500 : 40,000	544	2100
Morocco	203,500 : ?	117	220
Tunisia	42,100 : ?	31	173

Source: Military balance 1987-88, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies.

In March 1977, Zairian dissidents based in Angola attacked across the border into Zaire's western Shaba province. After it became apparent that Zaire's armed forces were unable to cope with the invasion, all three of the most directly concerned Western governments, the United States, Belgium and France, found

themselves constrained in one way or another by domestic political factors.¹⁵¹

The French were preoccupied with municipal elections in which a coalition of French communists and socialist was scoring major gains against Giscard's government. The United States was handicapped by the Vietnam legacy and congressional restrictions on American foreign interventions. Moreover, the Carter administration focused on a regional approach and avoided an East-West approach in Third World conflicts particularly in Africa. The European interests were more involved than the United States in the African continent.

King Hassan of Morocco took the initiative and sent Moroccan troops to Zaire, 1,500 Moroccan troops being committed to Zaire's defence. France provided eleven French aircraft to assist in the airlift of Moroccan troops and equipment. Hassan's decision was influenced by France more than any other foreign state. Giscard d'Estang supported Morocco financially in its war with Polisario and convinced Hassan of the danger of Soviet and Cuban involvement in Africa. The French involvement though limited, was criticised by the French Socialist and Communist parties.¹⁵²

During Shaba I, 1977, the United States kept its role to a minimum. The US did not have a major interest in Africa, and it doubted the allegations of Cuban involvement and was anxious to avoid the spread of superpower rivalries to Africa. Mobutu of Zaire, did receive assurances of American support, plus deliveries of existing orders for non-lethal equipment, but they were sent by chartered civilian, rather than military transport, and requests for arms were refused.

President Carter saw France as the greater competitor in Africa threatening the interests of the United States more than the Soviet Union. Historically, France

had more influence and interests in Africa than the United States. Most African States had been created by France and Great Britain. President Giscard d'Estaing told a news conference

“I should like to tell the French that Africa is quite close. Africa is a continent from ‘ where, traditionally, a certain number of our resources as well as a certain number ‘ of raw materials come, and with which we have very close links, and Africa, even if remote for many Frenchmen, is the continent neighbouring ours. So that a change in the political situation in Africa, would have consequences for France and ‘ Europe”¹⁵³

King Hassan II criticised the United States reaction to Shaba I. He accused the United States of abandoning its role and of not distinguishing between friends and foes. It was clear the Hassan's reaction to Shaba I was a response to the French government's request more than to the United States which reacted slowly to Shaba I.

In 1978, the United States reacted differently to Shaba II, when the dissidents attacked Shaba from Angola. The United States wanted to signal to African and Middle Eastern governments, notably Egypt and Saudi Arabia, its willingness to support friends and oppose Communist intervention. Carter saw it as an opportunity to demonstrate to critics at home and doubters abroad American determination to oppose Soviet-Cuban adventurism. The United States was criticised for its behaviour in Shaba I, and in Shaba II, it tried to recover its reputation among American allies in Africa and the Middle East more than challenging the Soviet or the Cuban in Africa.

Morocco refused to intervene alone in Shaba II, and it requested other African states to send troops in addition to France and Belgium. Hassan II did not intend to put himself up as “*Africa's Policeman*”. Senegal sent its forces to participate with others in Shaba II, and the United States and Saudi Arabia financed Shaba

II and the Moroccan forces were carried by American military aircraft.¹⁵⁴

Whatever the American position in Shaba I and II, Hassan responded for Moroccan domestic political reasons. The King probably wished to keep some of his troops occupied and Zaire provided an occasion. The situation in the Western Sahara meant that Morocco was coming under increasing pressure within the OAU and since Zaire had voted against Polisario, Hassan might well have seen that as a chance not only to repay a diplomatic debt but also to collect some kind of support from the US and France for arms and support on the Western Sahara issue. Moreover, Hassan saw the long reach of Moscow and Havana in Zaire, but it might be closer to collective self-defence than to collective security. The Shaba incident might threaten the principles of territorial integrity and the immutability of post colonial borders.

Hassan used his intervention in Zaire to win American support but he did not act in response to an American request. He calculated steps such as his act in the Gulf crisis in 1991. Hassan also sent forces to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, the Moroccan forces in the latter has been there for many years to protect the Royal Family in Abu Dhabi. He built a personal relationship with the Amir of Abu Dhabi and King of Saudi Arabia to get financial support for Morocco. Whatever the situation, the Moroccans might better be labelled as French proxy rather than American proxy in Africa. Despite Hassan's intervention in Zaire, this appeared not to endanger his relations with the Soviet Union, particularly his economic relations.¹⁵⁵

Morocco supported Jonas Savimbi in Angola, when the Congress prohibited aid for Unita, the guerrilla group seeking to overthrow the Angolan government

(MPLA faction). In 1981, Jonas Savimbi met American officials in Morocco. He received military training and weapons through Morocco. It was well known that the CIA supported Unita to topple the Angolan government. Hassan's political objective in supporting Unita was to win Reagan's support in Western Sahara and to appease the American administration.¹⁵⁶ Morocco sent troops to other African ' States: Morocco had 300 troops in Equatorial Guinea in 1986.¹⁵⁷

Table 7: 12 Libyan sponsored attempts of destabilisation 1976-1986, military training, direct military interventions on behalf of regimes and anti-regimes.

Training of anti regime elements	Intervention ¹	Anti-regime ²
Burkina Fasso : 1982-83	Uganda: 1976-1979	Egypt: 1977
Chad : 1970-86	Chad : 1980-1986	Chad: 1973; 1983;1984-86
Gambia: 1981		
Niger: 1976; 1982		
Mali: 1982		
Sudan: 1975-85		
Tunisia: 1980; 1982; 1984		
Somali: 1978-85		
Western Sahara: 1976-84		
Zaire: 1976-86		

1= direct military intervention on behalf of regimes 2= direct military intervention on behalf of anti-regime factions against governments. **Source:** Rene Lemarchand 1988. pp.9-10

In the late 1970s and early 1980s, Libya increased its intervention in the Third World particularly in Africa. Despite American accusations, it is hard to believe that Qaddafi acted on the Soviets behalf. The Reagan administration confronted Qaddafi and deliberately accused him by destabilising Africa. There was no evidence of Soviet support apart from arms transfers for hard currency.¹⁵⁸ The Soviets did not mind if it saw a pro- Western regime destabilised or overthrown and a new radical regime installed. There is a difference between acting as a surrogate on the one hand, and acting in self-interest which overlaps with the interests of a superpower. The Soviet Union denied involvement in any Libyan intervention.¹⁵⁹

7.7 Superpowers, Intelligence and the Maghreb:

Two geostrategic areas which concern North Africa dominate the strategic strong points: Gibraltar and Cape Bon in Tunisia. The Cape controls the passage between the Western and Eastern part of the Mediterranean basin. The location of North Africa on the Southern Mediterranean gives it a strategic value of monitoring Southern Europe, Mediterranean, and the Middle East.

Intelligence gathering was an important element in superpower strategic objectives in North Africa. There were three dimensions of superpower intelligence co-operation with the Maghreb States: the external dimension of the intelligence to superpower security and political objectives in the area; superpower influence inside the Maghreb States as monitoring the internal political situations; the contact with the political elites, both superpowers made use of their political and cultural relations notably with elites in Third World countries, and attempted to recruit them to superpower objectives.

The United States was using the Maghreb states, particularly Morocco and Libya, for its intelligence gathering through US military bases there. After the Libyan revolution and evacuation of American bases there, the United States' limited presence in Libya affected its intelligence gathering with the exception of CIA contacts with elements of Libyan opposition to the Qaddafi regime.¹⁶⁰

In Morocco, the United States had been using military bases. The facility at Sidi Yahia was a listening post for the American National Security Agency. It is reported that the post is still being used by the United States despite American denial of its presence there. The United States had its electronic listening post to counter the Soviet Union presence in North Africa and the Mediterranean. The United States did not have freedom of action in Algeria and Libya, and it had no strategic co-operation with these two countries.

The Soviet Union tried to have a military presence in North Africa but without any success. In 1958, the Soviet Union encouraged Morocco to ask the United States to evacuate its military bases in Morocco. The 1960 military aid to Morocco was part of Soviet political and military objectives to distance Morocco from the United States. The Soviets went further and criticised Morocco over the presence of American military bases there.¹⁶¹ Algeria and Libya had closer relations with the Soviet Union in military affairs. The Soviet Union had no military co-operation with Morocco except in the early 1960s, when Moroccan Soviet relations were close over the Mauritanian issue.

In 1972, in pursuit of regional co-operation, Kissinger encouraged military co-operation between the intelligence services of Saudi Arabia, Iran, Morocco and Egypt. All of these states then had close relations with the United States. Ac-

According to the Egyptian journalist and former Minister of National Guidance and political advisor to late President Nasser, Mohammad Heikal, the co-operation led to the formation of the Safari Club, in 1972 and included the French intelligence service (SDECE). The Club's aim was to counter Communist activities in Africa, and more specifically to protect the heavy investments in Africa of French companies and Western banks such as Chase Manhattan.¹⁶² Its first successful achievement was when Egypt and Morocco sent their troops to Zaire in 1978. The rescue operation had the blessing of the US and France. The main objective of Nixon and Kissinger's support for the Club was part of American global strategy particularly after Congress limited American direct intervention in regional conflicts. The Club enabled the US to intervene directly without any expense.¹⁶³

Both superpowers attempted to penetrate political and military elites in North Africa. The CIA started its relations with North African elites through labour unions, becoming the most organised in North Africa in the early 1950s. Through the trade unions, the United States cultivated a relationship with the Maghreb elites such as Ben Barka in Morocco and Yosseff Ben Saleh in Tunisia.

The success of the United States was limited in its connection with North Africa because of the domination of French language and culture. The French continued to monitor the superpower situation there.¹⁶⁴ Language, historical relations, cultural co-operation, all these factors gave the French the advantage of penetrating the political elites in North Africa in a way similar to that which the British intelligence presence in Pakistan and India grew from the use of English, and British colonial history and cultural domination especially over the elites. The French assisted North African states in the surveillance of opponents to North African regimes. The contacts of opponents of the regimes with foreign states

other than France were under French surveillance.¹⁶⁵

Military elites are the most powerful in the Third World. In North Africa, except Tunisia and Morocco, the military have been controlling the governments. The Tunisian military elites are becoming powerful in Tunisia after Bourguiba, and the President of Tunisia, Zine Al Abdin Ben Ali, trained in France and the United States. The Moroccan military was strong in the 1960s but its political power declined after the attempted military coups in 1971, 1973 and 1983. ¹⁶⁶

However, France had strong historical links with North African armies. For example, during World War I some 200,000 Algerians were conscripted into military service with the French and fought against Germany. There were 40,000 Moroccan troops serving in the French army during World War I. Moroccans also fought with the Allies against the Axis Forces in Tunisia. By the end of World War II 300,000 Moroccans had fought with the allies in the North African campaign. In 1954, it was estimated that some 126,000 former soldiers of all ages were living as civilians in Morocco. The rural areas were traditionally sources of recruits for the French army.¹⁶⁷

When the French organised the Moroccan Army in 1956, many Moroccan units transferred from the French army. There were 10,000 troops serving in the Spanish protectorate forces. During 1963, 80 per cent of the Moroccan officers were Berber and had served in the French or Spanish armies. That huge number of officers and troops who were serving in the French army gave France much more influence on Moroccan and other North African elites. In 1983, there were rumours surrounding the killing of Ahmed Dlimi the Commander of Moroccan intelligence, and the commander of Moroccan Southern Arms. A Moroccan official reported

that his death was due to a car accident but there were some rumours that the king had executed him after evidence that he was preparing a military coup. It was claimed that the incident was a power struggle between the CIA and the French Secret Services in Morocco. In November 1982, Dlimi met in secret in Paris with Algerian foreign minister, Ahmed Taleb al-Ibrahmi, to discuss the Sahara issue. The French officials knew of that meeting and a negotiated settlement would have been a blessing for French African policy. It is interesting to note that in the early 1980s, Mitterrand's government was not on good terms with Morocco, and just two days before Dlimi incident, the French *Antenne 2* television channel presented a 30 minute portrait of Dlimi.¹⁶⁸

Moroccan-American intelligence co-operation increased after 1982 for many reasons: the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982; the evacuation of the PLO; the bomb attack on the American Embassy in Beirut in 1983; and the kidnapping of William Buckley, the head of CIA office in Beirut who was directing CIA activities in the Middle East. The United States reevaluated its intelligence position and it was reported that the United States moved the CIA headquarters for Middle East activities from Beirut to Rabat in Morocco. The change in location was emphasised with the appointment of Joseph Pettinelli as a head of CIA station in Rabat who was in Pakistan just before the overthrow of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, as his expertise and advice could be useful to Hassan. Pettinelli was appointed in 1981, at the time of Reagan's active military relations with Morocco. His role was not limited to Morocco alone which was only a stationing operation in North Africa and the Middle East.¹⁶⁹

The United States and the Soviet Union kept an eye on internal political developments to monitor domestic politics and to recruit local agents. In Libya

and Algeria, Soviet citizens were granted freedom to contact local citizens in civil or military installations because there were more than 1000 Soviet Advisors in Algeria and around this number in Libya. United States citizens were more suspicious in Algeria and Tunisia, and to some extent their movements were monitored by local secret services. US academic field research was also limited in both countries.

US citizens enjoyed freedom of activities in Morocco and Tunisia. They conducted their research without restriction from local authorities. American intelligence agents were even active in recruiting and monitoring the Soviet Union in Tunisia and Morocco. In 1982, Anatoli Bogaty, a KGB officer, defected from the Soviet Embassy in Morocco to the United States. In June 1986, Oleg Agranyauts, a KGB agent, defected from the Soviet Embassy in Tunis to the United States. This action reflected the ability of American intelligence to move in Tunisia and Morocco more freely than Libya and Algeria.¹⁷⁰

The Soviet Union was looking to recruit local agents in the Maghreb States. Agranyauts revealed the KGB network in North Africa after his defection in 1986. In 1966 and 1973, the Tunisian government discovered a Soviet espionage network in Tunisia. On the other hand, the United States was monitoring Moroccan public attitude towards political change, and also focussing on the Morocco's elites. The American cultural centres played a major role in assessing the elites' reaction to any possible changes.¹⁷¹

Intelligence activities were part of the superpowers' strategy in North Africa to counter each other's influence. The superpowers were faced by extensive French intelligence activities. Most Moroccan elites, especially in the military, had worked with the French before independence. These elites had also become the majority of

North African officials after independence. A former American diplomatic and intelligence official stated that the US intelligence about Morocco was still dependent on French sources. The United States increased its military training aid to Morocco with the objective of providing additional independent sources from France. The GRU (the Soviet Military Intelligence) and the Soviet advisors through their military training was able to monitor the military in Algeria and Libya, but lacked influence because of the lack of success of communism in Muslim ' society.¹⁷²

In sum, both superpowers were unsuccessful in increasing their presence in North Africa, but the United States was more able to do so than the Soviet Union, for the US could share with France intelligence information on North Africa. The Soviets developed major intelligence gathering in Algeria and Libya through their military advisors there but even that may not be with official Algerian or Libyan knowledge. ¹⁷³

7.8 conclusion

In this chapter we have argued that North Africa became a target for both superpowers' influence. The United States saw North Africa as part of American strategic planning to counter the Soviet Union's expansion. Moreover, North Africa was important in time of war because of its strategic importance and its control of strategic straits. The American bases in post war times were used to achieve a balance of forces with the Soviet Union in the Mediterranean and even in the European theatre.

- Both the United States and the Soviet Union used arms transfers to achieve political, strategic and economic objectives in North Africa. In the early 1950s and 1960s, the arms transfers were credits and aid, and the economic

objective dominated Soviet policy. In the 1970s, hard currency became more important to the Soviet economy. Both superpowers separated ideology from arms transfers in North Africa except in the case of the United States and Libya. The United States was relating arms transfers to political co-operation. There was no positive correlation between Soviet arms transfers to North Africa and political influence. The Soviet Union had political differences with Libya and Algeria but it supported them with weapons for economic reasons. The United States politicised arms transfers to North Africa as with Libya and Morocco, but it had little success because there were alternative supplies to the US such as France and the Soviet Union.

- The Maghreb States did not act as proxy forces to either superpower. The Moroccan intervention in Zaire was as proxy for French interests more than the United States, and Morocco acted to achieve its political interests more than as a client of the United States. Qaddafi's military intervention in Africa can hardly be seen as being in Soviet interests or as a Soviet proxy. Qaddafi had a self-perception of his role as independent in Africa rather than serving the Soviet Union.
- The Maghreb States had emphasised the neutrality of the Mediterranean and their approach to Mediterranean security was closer to the French perception than to that of either superpower, but Algeria and Libya shared the Soviet view of security and peace in the Mediterranean. No state in the Maghreb announced its support for the presence of the US Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean.
- Both superpowers focussed on the military elite in North Africa, but they had

been faced by France's strong relationships with the North African military elite. Most of the Maghreb's elite had been trained by the French. The domination of the French language in North Africa made it difficult to challenge the French intelligence resources there. The Maghreb had become a theatre of espionage for both US and the Soviet Union but the confrontation between French and American intelligence there was strong enough because of French sensitivity towards America. There is a history of French-American competition there. Overall, most North African military elites remained oriented to France rather than the superpowers.

Notes:-

1. Papp, D. 1986. pp. 36-40. Richard B. Foster. "A Preventive Strategy for the Middle East" *Comparative Strategy*. vol.2 No. 3 1984, pp. 191-198. Theodore H. Friedgut "The Middle East in Soviet Global Strategy" *the Jerusalem Journal of International Relations*, vol. 5 no. 1, 1980, pp. 66-85. See also Richard Murphy statement in Congressional hearing; Proposed Arms sales to Saudia Arabia, hearing and mark up before the committee on Foreign Affairs and its subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, House of Representatives, Ninety Ninth Congress, second Session on H.J. Res 589, April 22,23, 1986, U.S. government printing office Washington D.C. 1986, pp. 20-41. (hereafter Proposed Arms sales to Saudia Arabia). Colin Gray, "Ocean and Continent in Global Strategy" *Comparative Strategy*, vol:7, 1989, pp. 439-44.
2. see Friedgut, T.H. op cit. Papp 1986 op cit; Papp D. 1989 op cit. See John Morrison, "Russia and Warm water" *Proceedings, United States Naval*

- Institute*, vo. 78 no.11, November 1952, pp. 1169-1179.
3. George Joffe "Strategic Significance of the Maghreb" *Navy International*, July, 1981, pp. 388-391. See William Foltz "Africa in Great-Power strategy" in W. Foltz and H. Bienen eds *Arms and the African influence on Africa's International Relations*, New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1985, pp. 1-27. See "Gibraltar's Open Door" *Los Angeles Times* February 15 1985.
 4. see Papp D. 1986, pp. 121
 5. Keith Krause "The political economy of international arms transfer system: the diffusion of military technique via arms transfers" *International Journal*, vol.XLV no.3 Summer 1990, pp. 687-722. See also, S. Neuman and R. Harkavy, eds, *Arms Transfers in Modern World*, New York: Prager 1980.
 6. Stephen Daffron "U.S. Arms Transfers: New Rates, New Reasons", *Parameters: US Army War College Quarterly*, vol.XXI no.1, Spring 1991, pp. 77-91.
 7. Ibid.
 8. Ibid. See also, Stockholm International Peace Research institute, *The Arms Trade with the Third World* London: Paul Elek limited, 1971, pp. 135-175.
 9. Andrew J. Pierre, *The Global Politics of Arms Sales*, Princeton, N.J. Princeton University Press 1982, pp. 45-50. See also, Anne Hessing Cahn "United States Arms to the Middle East 1967-76: A critical Examination", in Milton Leitenberg and Gabriel Sheffer eds, *Great power Intervention in the Middle East*, New York: Pergamon Press, 1979, pp. 101-133. But most of the backlog was not delivered to Iran.

10. When the oil prices went up, so did the gold prices, and the Dollars value went down, and all those ups and down as nearly by the same percentage. Analysts believe that the industrial nations as importer of oil, increased the price of gold, because of the oil producers were the main buyers of gold, and the United States decreased the value of the Dollar and in this case the increase of oil prices did not affect the United States and Industrial Nations, it was a recycle. This point mentioned to the author Arab Politician, and former American oil expert, see also Gath, O. "Al-Enheart Almalea Alalamea..wa Natharyat Almoamara" (International Financial Collapse..and the theory of conspiracy), *Al-Ahram Adawli*, July 27, 1991, p. 5.
11. Daffron, S. op cit p. 82.
12. Quoted in Albursan, A. *the Middle East and Arms trade*, unpublished paper, prepared for Arab Press House Almajalla, London 1988 p. 4 (in Arabic).
13. Keith Krause op cit. Anne Hessing Cahn "The Economics of Arms Transfers" in Harkavy, E; Neuman, S, eds, 1980, pp. 173-183.
14. Daffron, S. op cit.
15. See also, H. Maull "The Arms Trade with the Middle East and North Africa" *Middle East Review Annual, General Survey 1990*, pp. 159-166).
16. Ibid, See also *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1986*, US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Washington, D.C.; U.S. Government Printing Office 1987.
17. See Ibid.

18. Proposed Arms sales to Saudi Arabia 1986, op cit, p. 24.
19. World military expenditure and arms transfers 1988, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.
20. SIPRI. *The Arms trade with the Third World 1971*, pp. 48-50; 591-593.
21. Stockholm International Peace Research, Institute, *Arms Trade Registers*, London: The MIT Press, 1975, pp 69-70. (Hereafter Arms Trade Registers).
22. David Dean. *The Air Force role in low-intensity conflict*, Alabama: Maxwell Air Force, Air University, Air University Press 1988 p. 65.
23. Ibid p40. John Damis, U.S. Arab Relations: The Moroccan Dimension, Washington, D.C.: National Council on US-Arab relations, 1986, p. 11, (hereafter Damis 1986).
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid, see also Harold Nelson Ed. *Morocco a country study*, pp. 352-360.
26. Keith Krause op cit for Carter Arms Trade Policy; Daffron, Stephen op cit; for Carter and Shah of Iran see James Bill op cit. The Shah accused the Carter Administration for his overthrow. Reagan also accused Carter for the fall of the Shah, Reagan stated that in his debate with Mondale in 1984 during his campaign for his second term. See also, Pahlavi, M. *Answer to History*, New York: Stein and Day Publishers, 1980; Ledeen, M; Lewis, W. *Debacle: The American Failure in Iran*, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1981.
27. Damis J, 1986, p. 15.
28. Ibid; Nelson, H. *Morocco a country study* op cit; Leo Kamil op cit, pp. 42-44.

29. Damis, J. 1986; Nelso, H. ed, op cit, pp299-300. See also, Wright, C. "Journey to Marrakesh: U.S. - Moroccan Security Relations", *International Security*, vol.7 no.4 1983 pp 163-179. See also Wright's reply to R.T. Curran, American Charge d'Affairs in Rabat, *International Security* vol.8 no.3, 1984, pp. 206-210.
30. David Dean op cit, p. 40
31. Wright, C. 1983 op cit.
32. Ibid; Dean, D. op cit.
33. Ibid.
34. SIPRI. *The Arms Trade with the Third World*, pp. 48-50; 594-595.
35. Ibid.
36. *Arms trades registers*, op cit, pp. 71-72
37. Lewis, B. Ware, 1986 op cit pp. 47-55. James Rupert op cit. note 19, p. 157.
38. Ibid. Also, see E.P. Thompson, *Mad Dog: The U.S. Raids on Libya*, London, Pluto Press, 1986, pp. 157-158. *World Military Expenditure and Arms Transfer 1984*, Washington.D.C. pp. 48; 90.
39. James Rupert op cit; United States Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, background notes *Tunisia* February 1987, pp. 6-7. For military modernization see also; L.B. Ware 1985 op cit.
40. *World Military Expenditure and Arms Transfers, 1986*, different pages.
41. *Arms Trade Registers*, pp. 66-67.

42. Harold Nelson, Algerian country study 1985 pp. 341-344.
43. Ibid. See also, United States Department of Defence, *Soviet Military Power*, 1986 pp. 134-135.
44. SIPRI. *The Arms Trade with the Third World*, pp. 48-50, 587-88.
45. Ibid.
46. Ibid; see also Ali Shuaib, 1982 for more details about military bases on Libya.
47. Ibid; See also, Arms Trade Registers, p. 68.
48. See for French-Libyan deals, *The Arms Trade with the Third World* p. 590
49. Ibid.
50. *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1986*, p. 143
51. See for more details on American Military Trade with Libya during Carter and Reagan, Edward Haley 1984, op cit.
52. Rubinstein, A. 1988, p. 21; 130. Efrat, M. "The Economics of Soviet Arms Transfers to the Third World - A Case Study: Egypt." *Soviet Studies* Vol. 35 no. 4 October 1983, pp. 437-56.
53. Keith Krause, op cit. SIPRI, *The Arms Trade with the Third World*
54. Ibid. p.201-205. p. 196-201 Maddock, r.T. *The Political Economy of the Arms Race*. London: MacMillan, 1990 p. 164.
55. Ibid. See also Krause, K. op cit;
56. Robert Culter; L. Despres and A. Karp "The Political Economy of East-South

- Military Transfers" *International Studies Quarterly*, vol.31 no. 3 September 1987, pp. 273-299. See also, Maddock, R.T., op.cit
57. Ibid. See also, Rajan Menon "The Soviet Union, The Arms Trade and the Third World " *Soviet Studies*, Vol. XXXIV, no.3, July 1982, pp. 377-396.
 58. Moddock op cit, p167; Culter, R, et al "The Political Economy of East-South military Transfers" *International Studies Quarterly*, vol.31, no.3, 1987, p. 229.
 59. SIPRI. *The Arms Trade with the Third World*, pp. 190-191.
 60. Ibid. p. 585-86.
 61. Ibid. pp. 583-584.
 62. Ibid.
 63. Ibid, see also Harold Nelson (ed.) *Algeria: A Country Study*, pp. 337-340
 64. *World Military expenditures and Arms Transfers 1985, 1986*.
 65. See Algerian Country Study op cit. See also, U.S. Department of Defence. *Soviet Military Power*. 1985, pp. 134-135.
 66. Algerian: A Country Study op cit. Papp D. 1986 op cit, pp. 120-140. See also, SIPRI 1987, for Algerian and Libya percentage of Soviet Arms imports.
 67. *World military expenditures and Arms Transfers 1986* pp. 18-20.
 68. See MacDougall, A.S. "Libya" in R. Gabriel, ed, *Fighting Armies: Antagonists in the Middle East A Combat Assessment*, London: Greenwood Press, 1983, pp. 127-144.

69. SIPRI. *The Arms Trade with the Third World*, pp. 587-588.
70. Roger Pajak "Arms and Oil: The Soviet-Libyan Arms supply Relationship" *The Middle East Review* Vol. XIII no.2, Winter 1980-81 pp. 51-56. See also, Cooper, O; Fogarty. "Soviet Economic and Military Aid to the less developed countries, 1954-1978" *Soviet and Eastern European Foreign Trade* Vol.XXI Nos. 1-2, Spring-Summer Fall, 1985, pp. 55-77. Also Papp 1986. op cit.
71. R. Pajak op cit.
72. E.P. Thompson, et al. *Mad Dog*, op cit, pp. 156-160.
73. Ibid. See *World Military Expenditure and Arms Transfers 1986*.
74. Ibid. See also Department of Defence, *Soviet Military Power*, 1985 p. 134.
75. SIPRI. *The Arms Trade with the Third World*, op cit, pp 593-94. See also, *Arms Trade Registers* op cit, pp. 69-70.
76. Ibid.
77. Harold Nelson Ed. *Morocco: A Country Study, 1985*, pp. 345-347. See also, Richard Holmes "Algeria-Morocco" in Richard Gabriel ed. Op cit. pp. 109-126.
78. SIPRI. *The Arms Trade with Third World*, pp 594-596; also see, *Arms Trade Registers*, p 71. Wright, C. "Tunisia: Next Friend to Fall?" *Foreign Policy*, No.46, 1982, pp. 128-37.
79. McCormick T. *America's Half-Century: United States Foreign Policy in the Cold War*, London: The Johns Hopkins University Press 1989, pp. 33-35.

80. See Jones, H. *A new kind of War: American Global Strategy and the Truman Doctrine in Greece* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989.
81. See Ibid, and McCormick, T. Op cit.
82. Gerald Blake "Mediterranean non-energy Resources: Scope for cooperation and dangers of Conflict" in Luciani, G. *The Mediterranean Region*, London:Groom Helm, 1984, pp. 41-72. See also chapter two.
83. Chomeau, J. *Seapower as a Political Instrument: The Soviet Navy in the Mediterranean*, Unpublished PhD. Dissertation, University of Notre Dame, 1974, pp. 10-24. See also, R. Vukadinovic. *The Mediterranean between War and Peace*, Beograd, Institute Za Zemlje U Razvoju 1987, pp. 55-60.
84. Chomeau, J. op cit. pp. 61-63; Vukadinovic. R. op cit. Bruce Watson. *Red Navy at Sea: Soviet Naval operations on the high seas, 1956-1980*. Boulder: Westview Press, 1982, pp. 73-82; Etzold, T. "The Soviet Union in the Mediterranean" in Kaplan, L. R. Clawson, Luraghi, R. *NATO and the Mediterranean*, Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources Inc. 1985, pp. 29-50. see also, J. Campbell. "Communist strategies in the Mediterranean," *Problem of Communism*, vol.XXVIII No.3 May-June 1979, pp. 1-17.
85. Weinland, R. "Soviet Strategy and the objective of their Naval Presence in the Mediterranean" in Luciani, op cit, pp. 267-289. See also Watson op cit, pp. 85-98.
86. See Farington, H. *Confrontation: The Strategic Geography of NATO and the Warsaw Pact*, London: Routledge, 1986, pp. 151-152. Stearns, M. *updating the Truman Doctrine: The U.S. and NATO's Southern Flank*. Working paper

- no.86 International Security Program Wilson Centre, 1988 p. 40.
87. Bruce Kuniholm. "Rhetoric and Reality in the Aegean" *SAIS Review*, Vol.6 No. 1 Winter-Spring 1986 pp 137-158 quoted in Stearns, M. op cit, p. 40.
88. See chapter 6 for economic relations with Maghreb States; see also Watson, op cit, pp. 57-68. See also Weinland, R. op cit.
89. Watson, p77; McGuire, M. *Military Objectives in Soviet Foreign Policy*, Washington, D.C. Brookings Institute. 1987, pp 220-226. Vukadinovic, R. Op cit.
90. Watson, pp. 86-91.
91. Ibid
92. See more detail for Soviet Navy in 1973 war, Watson, pp. 101-117. Etzold, T. "The Soviet Union in the Mediterranean" in Kaplan; Clawson; Luraghi, op cit, pp. 29-51. Vukadinovic, op cit. p. 65.
93. McGuire, M. 1987, pp. 222-225.
94. Watson, 1982 p 183 table 3. See also Harkavy, R. *Bases Abroad*, London: Oxford University Press, 1989, pp. 60-61.
95. Vukadinovic, R. op cit. pp 195-198B. Ranft, G. *Till The Sea in Soviet Strategy*, Annapolis: Naval Institute Press 1989, p. 62. D. Volsky. "The Mediterranean and Peace", *New Times* No. 29 July 16, 1971, p. 10.
96. Vukadinovic, R. op cit.
97. Usvatov, A. "Common Approach" *New Times*, part 25, 1981, p. 7.
98. Dedvedkov, L. "The Global Threat to Local Wars", *New Times*, part 13,

March 1988, pp. 12-13.

99. Ibid
100. See Jones, H. 1989 pp. 36-37. See also, McCormick, T. 1989 pp. 33-37. See also, Traver, S. *The Strait of Gibraltar and the Mediterranean*, Alphen aan den Rijn (Netherlands): Suthoff & Noordhoff, 1980, pp. 72-83.
101. Truver, S. op cit.
102. Ibid.
103. Ibid.
104. Zoppo, C. "American Foreign Policy, NATO in the Mediterranean, and the Defence of the Gulf", in Luciani, G. op cit, pp. 292-324. See also, Truver, op cit.
105. Ibid
106. Ibid. See also Rowden, W. "The Mediterranean: Environment of the Sixth Fleet" in NATO and Mediterranean, pp. 19-28.
107. Ibid. See for Israeli attack on Liberty, Taylor, J. *Pearl Harbour II*, London & New York: Regency Press 1980.
108. Kolendic, D. in "Ceuta and Melilla" *Review of International Affairs* vol. XXXVIII, no.892, June 1987, pp. 22-24.
109. quoted in Chomeau, J. op cit, p. 134.
110. Zartman, W. "Maghreb Politics and Mediterranean Implications" in Luciani, G. op cit. pp. 149-177; for the treaty between Morocco, Algeria and Spain

- over natural gas to Europe through these states, Radio, Morocco (in Arabic) April 30 1991.
111. Chomeau, J. op cit.
 112. Ibid, see also, Watson, B. 1982, pp. 125-126.
 113. Ibid
 114. Ibid p209. See also Chomeau, J. op cit, pp. 136-137.
 115. Zimmermann, T. "The American bombing of Libya" *Survival*, vol: XXIX No.3 May-June 1987, pp. 195-214.
 116. Ibid.
 117. Washington Post August 2 1983, p. 1.
 118. Zimmermann, op cit.
 119. The Soviet Reaction to American raid on Libya, Gorbachev called for withdrawal of forces from the Mediterranean, Vukadinovik, p221. The Soviet News Agency Tass termed the US attack on Libya as "State terrorism" and bloody crime. The Official USSR government statement called it "belligerent chauvinism and an aggressive bandit action" of sort that cannot but affect relations between the USSR and USA; Davis, B, 1990, pp. 146-47.
 120. Smith, A. "Malta: from NATO base to Libyan outpost" *Global Affairs* Vol.1 No. 4. Fall, 1986, pp. 87-99.
 121. Kolendic, D. op cit p. 23
 122. See Truver, S. "Naval Dimensions of Spain in NATO" *Proceeding U.S. Naval*

- institute*, vol.112-3-997. March 1986, pp. 154-157. See also; Alba, V. "Spain's Entry into NATO" in *NATO and Mediterranean*, op cit, pp. 97-114.
123. See chapter two.
124. See Watson, op cit; *Le Monde*, April 21 1973; Chomeau op cit, pp. 123-124.
125. Ibid
126. Vukadinovic, R. Op cit, pp. 200-213.
127. Ibid.
128. Quoted in Chomeau, J. p. 138.
129. Kaplan, L. Clawson, R. "NATO and the Mediterranean powers in Historical perspective" in *NATO and Mediterranean* op cit, pp. 3-17, quotation, p. 11. See also, Andre Martel; C. Carlier "French and the Mediterranean" in Ibid, pp. 125-135. See also, Vukadinouic, R. 1987
130. William Foltz "Africa in Great-Power Strategy" in Foltz, W; H. Bienen eds. *Arms and Africa*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985, pp. 1-27. For influence of Geopolitics on American Foreign Policy and Strategy see; G.R. Sloan. *Geopolitics in United States Strategic Policy 1980-1987*, New York: St. Martin's Press 1988.
131. William H. Lewis "How a defence planner looks at Africa", in H. Kitchen, ed. *Africa: From Mystery to Maze* Lexington Books, 1976, p. 278.
132. Wright, C. 1983, op cit.
133. Ibid. Leo Kamil stressed that the American used the bases after 1978, see

- Kamil 1987, p6. See also R.T. Curran, American Charge d' Affairs in Rabat reaction to Wright, C. article, and see Wright's reply to Curran in *International Security* , vol.8, no.3 1984, pp. 266-210. See also Parker, R. 1987, p142. Lewis, Jr, Jesse. *The Strategic Balance in the Mediterranean*, Washington.D.C: American Enterprise Institute, 1976. Bamford, J. *The Puzzle Palace*, Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, 1982, p. 212.
134. Damis, J. 1986, op cit. Harold Nelson, ed. Op cit. Leo Kamil, 1987, op cit. See also Morocco as alternative to Spain *Times Magazine* February 1 1988 pp. 33-34.
135. Harold Nelson, ed. Morocco Country Study, 1985 p. 355.
136. See John D. Mayer Jr. *U.S.-Moroccan Agreement: costs and effects on RDF Capabilities*, Washington D.C. The Congress of the United States: Congressional Budget Office, March 1983. For the US negotiation with Spain and Portugal see SWB-BBC monitoring summary of world Broadcasts 22 January 1988, 8 January 1988 SU-0055-A1-5: 22 August 1988, W. Echikson "US bases welcome: At a price" *The Christian Science Monitor*, October 22, 1987.
137. See the Algerian Policy toward the Mediterranean.
138. Ali Shuaib op cit, pp. 42-51.
139. See SIARI, Arms trade Registers op cit, pp68-69. Also SIPRI, The Arms Trade with the Third World, op cit, pp. 587-590.
140. See Ibid, and Ali Shuaib, op cit.
141. Ibid.

142. Wright, C. *Foreign Policy* No. 46 1982, op cit. See the issue of the Bizerte base, *Radio France International*, 30 March 1986 in the Summary of World Broadcasts part 4, Middle East, Africa, Latin America, ME-822-A-O-15 April 1986.
143. *The USSR and The Third World*, vol. 6 no. 1 January 1 - March 31, 1976, p.69. See also, Ibid, vol.1 No.4, 22 March - 25 April 1971, p. 197. *The Guardian*, 20 April, 1971.
144. quoted in *Le Monde*, July 26, 1968.
145. *The USSR and the Third World*, vol.6 no.1, 1976.
146. *The USSR and The third World*, vol. 6 no. 1 1976, p. 51
147. The United States Department of Defence, *Soviet Military Power*, 1986 p. 134.
148. I. Tishin, 1958, op cit.
149. Andrew Young former United States Representative in the UN stated at a Congressional hearing that there was no relation between Soviet influence and arms, also he stated that American trade with Angola had been greater than with Liberia. His argument challenged conservative criticism of Carter's approach to Angola. see Alburan, A. "Soviet Union in Arabian Peninsula: Review article" *Sh'oun Arabiyya* (Journal of Arab Affairs), Tunis: Arab League, no.36, February, 1984, pp. 235-240.
150. Katz, M. 1982, op cit. Zaire has a total army 51,000; 20 planes; and 50 tanks, while Nigera has a total 94,000; 67 planes and 132 tanks, according to *Military*

Balance 1987-1988. These figures emphasize that North African states are the strongest in Africa with Egypt.

151. G. Moose. "French Military Policy in Africa" in W. Foltz; H. Bienen, eds, 1985, op cit. pp. 59-97.
152. Ibid: see also Mangold, P. "Shaba I and Shaba II" *Survival*, vol.21 no.3, 1979 pp. 107-115. It has been reported that in 1977, the Saudis financed the airlift of Moroccan troops to Zaire to save the Mobuto regime, see Marshall, J. "Saudia Arabia and the Reagan Doctrine" *Middle East Report*, no.155, November-December 1988, pp. 12-17.
153. Quoted in Ibid p.110. Zaire is rich in mineral and diamonds, 38 per cent of world diamonds in Zaire, and Belgium has \$700 million investment in Zaire.
154. See Ibid. Also for more detail on military intervention in Zaire see Michael Schatzberg "Military intervention and the myth of collective security: the case of Zaire", *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, vol.27, no.2 1989, pp 315-340. As "Africa's Policeman" see *NewsWeek* May 16, 1977, pp. 58; 69.
155. Hassan praised President Valery Giscard d'Estaing and criticised the Carter Administration See *Newsweek* May 16, 1977, p. 58; Moose G. op cit.
156. Wright C. 1983, op cit.
157. *Military Balance 1987-1988* p. 108.
158. See chapter 8 and Libyan regional strategy.
159. Rene Lemarchand 1988 op cit, pp. 9-10.
160. See Wright C, 1983 op cit; and Libya and US in Chad see chapter 8.

161. Tishin, I. 1958 op cit.
162. Mohammed Heikal. *Autumn of Fury*, London: Andre Deutsch, 1983, pp 70,96. Also, Heikal M. *The Return of the Ayatollah*, London: Andre Deutsch, 1981, pp. 113-6. See also for the same point, Faligot, R; Krope, P. *La Piscine: The French Secret Service since 1944*, translated by Halls, W. D, London: Basil Blackwell, 1989, p. 257.
163. Ibid.
164. According to Foreign Diplomat in Rabat, the French have the ability to run a military coup against Hassan at any moment. This also confirmed to the author by Mahmmod Sariolghalam in 1985 during his research in Morocco, He is now in University of Tehran, Iran.
165. Most of the Arab Maghreb opposition leaders stayed in France, e.g Ben Barka, Alfaqih Albasri, Ben Bella, Ait Ahmed, Almazali, and others. Even the Islamic leaders were in France such as Al Shabeba Al-Islamia (Moroccan). Atejani Haddam was appointed in Algerian State Council, January 1992, while he was in France as a Director of Paris Mosque.
166. See Chapter 5 and 12 relation between Tunisia and the U.S. and Morocco.
167. H. Nelson ed. *Morocco Country Study, 1985* op cit. especially chapter five.
168. Leo Kamil op cit. P. 70. lit Kayhan Al-Arabic (Tehran) reported on 29th April 1984, p. 12, that the CIA moved its Middle East headquarter to Rabat. See for more details of Dlimi incident and French intelligence knowledge of al-Ibrahmi meeting with Dlimi, *Africa Confidential*, vol.24 no.4, February 16, 1983, pp. 1-3. When French President Mitterrand Visited Morocco two

days after Dlimi death American Ambassador Joseph Reed was not present at official functions in honour of the French president. Reed said he was ill, see *ibid*. Also Ahmed Rami confirmed in an interview in *Africa Now* March 1983, that the CIA was behind Dlimi execution and the Moroccan government expelled the *Le Monde* correspondent in Rabat after *Le Monde* claimed the death was not accidental, *ibid*.

169. *Ibid*.

170. West, N. *Game of Intelligence*, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1989, pp. 20-23. The author was informed by Moroccan scholar that the American cultural center in Fez was a center for collecting information in 1960s. He told me that he was with other Moroccan student were being asked if they were like republic or monarch. The Moroccan secret service were monitoring that which led to closing the center in Fez because the students were afraid of such a development.

171. For Soviet espionage in Tunisia see Chapter 5 note 128.

172. It was reported during the Gulf Crisis that the Soviet military intelligence GRU had been informed of Iraqi preparation for invasion of Kuwait two weeks before it took place through its military advisor in Iraq. P. Salinger 1991 p. 187. Also according to Claudia Wright 1983, *op cit*; the American military training of Moroccan soldiers was one of American ways of penetrating the Moroccan military.

173. Cordesman, A. "The Soviet Arms Trade" *Armed Forces Journal International*, No.121 August 1983, p41. See also for American intelligence cooperation with Morocco, David Dean, *op cit*. Also for the U.S. military training and penetra-

tion of the Third world elite see, C. Windle and T.R. Vallance, "Optimizing military Assistance Training" *World Politics*, vol. no. October 1962, pp. 91-107.

Chapter VIII

Superpowers, Regional Conflicts and Stability in the Maghreb subsystem

8.1 Introduction

Regional conflicts and regional stability were major concerns of superpower relations and competition in the Third World. After World War II, the United States sought to replace the European powers as the dominant influence in the Third World. The US supported a particular kind of *status quo* in the Third World which saw political instability as a threat to American interests. In this chapter, the term *stability* is used as an antonym of revolutionary change, and implies minimal unpredictability.¹ The responses of the superpowers towards regional conflicts and the stability of North African regimes, are also analysed in this chapter.

Whilst the United States supported regional stability and the *status quo*, the Soviet Union - as a new world power with ideological ambitions - challenged that *status quo* of international and regional systems. The Soviet Union favoured a change in regional balance of power and wanted to shift it to the Soviet side. It supported national liberation movements as part of the Soviet challenge to the *status quo* in the Third World. The two superpowers viewed regional stability/*status quo* in different terms. In Christopher Coker's words

“For the Soviet Union instability still represents an opportunity to exploit; for the United States it still represents a threat, not even all challenge to which it might rise by displaying greater imagination”.²

8.2 Superpowers, areas of influence, and grey areas

The United States and the Soviet Union were both concerned with the stability of certain regions in the Third World and there was some sort of unwritten agreement, a *tacit pact*, regarding the superpowers' respective spheres of influence. For example, Latin America was part of the American sphere of influence (Monroe Doctrine, 1823) as was the Arabian Gulf (Carter Doctrine, 1980).³ The United States singled out Saudi Arabia as vital to American interests. After the assassination of King Faisal of Saudi Arabia in 1975, the United States and Saudi Arabia signed a 'secret pact', under the terms of which Saudi Arabia pledged to invest a large proportion of its surplus earnings in US bonds in exchange for American political and military protection for the Saudi Arabian royal family.⁴

Afghanistan, by way of contrast, was treated as if it lay within the Soviet sphere of influence long before the Soviet invasion in 1979. Africa, to a large extent, was an unmarked area, a grey area for which the superpowers competed freely. It was mostly within the European sphere of influence, particularly of France and Great Britain. The Soviet Union only became involved in African affairs in the early 1970s: notably in the Horn of Africa and in Angola in 1975. The United States' policy toward Africa in the early 1960s, supported African decolonisation.

The United States saw the regional power in grey areas as part of East-West balance of power. In 1955, Henry Kissinger described the importance of peripheral areas to the national interests of the United States and to American balance of power in facing the Soviet Union:

"The Soviets can achieve their ultimate goal, the neutralisation of the United States, at much less risk by gradually eroding the peripheral areas, which will imperceptibly shift the balance of power against US without ever presenting US with a clear challenge."⁵

In order to achieve a balance of power, and to further its policy of containment of Soviet influence, the United States supported the "Baghdad Pact", the pact was led by Britain to alert *the Northern Tier of Muslim States* (Turkey, Iran and Pakistan) against the Soviet threat in the early 1950s. In seeking to counter the Soviet Union, the Baghdad Pact managed to accomplish the reverse. It provided the motivation for Moscow to make its historic Czechoslovakia arms deal with Egypt, and thus establish its first real outpost in the region in 1955. Soviet behaviour toward the Baghdad Pact was mainly a reaction to counter the new regional alliance. The Soviet foreign minister V.M. Molotov stated at the time that Moscow's major concern was to oppose the pact. It did not intend to arm Egypt against Israel, for it was too premature for the Soviet Union to shift to the Arab side because the Soviets had supported Israel with arms in the 1948 Arab-Israel war. The Soviets intended to encourage Egypt to oppose the pact. Moscow provided Egypt with arms at a time when the West would not. This Soviet act was a geopolitical achievement which helped to shift the regional balance in favour of the Soviet Union.⁶

The United States and the Soviet Union have intervened to prevent governments from coming to power that they believe might represent, directly or indirectly, an unacceptable threat to their security. There are many instances of the United States supporting authoritarian regimes, for example, in South Korea, Chile, Pakistan and even in Morocco. The Soviet Union similarly offered assistance to many governments that they were by no means socialist or democratic. It cannot be said that one side supports legitimate and recognised governments, and the other supports revolutionaries.⁷

The United States intervened in Central America because it saw radical

change there as a direct threat to American interests. Strategically, Latin America is considered the United States' 'backyard' and any change in Latin America is considered to affect United States interests and the regional balance of power. In October 1962, the United States announced a total blockade on Cuba despite a limited Soviet presence there at that time because it feared that the continued existence of a communist government there with Soviet offensive missiles might precipitate unacceptable change to the US in Latin America as a whole. In the 1980s, the United States supported the 'Contras' in Nicaragua to overthrow the Sandinista government which was accused by the United States of being communist. The United States feared Sandinista support for Salvadorian rebels, which could, in turn, lead to a change in the balance of power between radicals and conservatives in central America.⁸

The United States did not only exert its power within its immediate area of influence, but also in the 'grey areas'. The United States supported the regional centres of power which they called the *Linchpin States* (e.g. Iran, Pakistan, Philippines and South Korea) which could determine the outcome of the rivalry. They were local surrogates acting on America's behalf to preserve her strategic and economic interests despite the fact that they were oppressive regimes.

American short-term strategic objectives, however, created long-term instability, as in the case of Iran and other dictatorships with a record 'of serious human rights violations. By placing great reliance on Iran to be *the Policeman of the Gulf*, as part of Nixon Doctrine of using regional hegemonies to protect American interests, it transformed the Shah from being a minor despot to a leader with ambitions for great power. But the Shah had systematically alienated most of the key elements in Iranian society, and this led to the Iranian revolution of 1979.⁹

More recently, the United States intervened in the Arabian Gulf when the balance of power and regional stability were threatened by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The balance of power shifted towards Iraq and endangered the stability of Saudi Arabia, the America's key ally in the Gulf. Whatever the reasons behind American intervention in the Gulf, the United States could not tolerate the Iraqi action because of the threat it posed to American interests.¹⁰ Ironically, the United States had previously supported the regime of Saddam Hussein during the Iraq-Iran war.

The Soviet Union intervened in Afghanistan when the Soviets considered that the internal situation in Afghanistan might lead to instability and threaten Soviet national interests. The Soviet invasion in 1979 was mostly a reaction to internal developments in Afghanistan. During the last decades, the Soviet Union supported the conservative monarchy in Afghanistan because it was not allied with the West. Historically, Afghanistan had acted as buffer zone between Russia and, initially the British Empire in India and then the US in Pakistan in the 1950s and after. As the civil war spread in Afghanistan because of widespread opposition to the government of the People's Democratic party (pro-Soviet Communists) the United States supported the Mujahedin in attempting to destabilise the Afghan regime, just as the Soviets had been doing in Southeast Asia and Vietnam in the 1960s.¹¹

Both superpowers used regional conflicts to increase their influence and to decrease each other's presence in the Third World. In some cases, the superpowers saw their competition in Third World conflicts as a zero-sum game. They exploited regional conflicts to enhance their strategic, political and economic interests and the United States involved itself directly or indirectly in Third World conflicts whenever it saw a threat to US interests. The interventions in Vietnam, Central

America and the Middle East fit in this category.

In many cases, the superpowers tried to exploit regional conflicts for the benefit of their own interests by not emphasising political solutions to the conflicts. The Iran-Iraq war lasted for eight years (1980-1988), and the superpowers played only a minor role in trying to stop the conflict until the last stage of escalation when they forced a resolution to the conflict through the United Nations. Both the radical fundamentalist regime in Iran and the Arab Nationalist regime in Iraq were seen by the US as dangers to the stability of American friends in the region. The Soviet Union was concerned to weaken the Iranian Fundamentalist regime because of Muslim aspirations within the Soviet Union and accordingly sold arms to Iraq. The Soviets were also interested in obtaining hard currency. To this end, the Soviet Union took advantage of the Arab-Israeli conflict to win friends in the Arab world. Thus, a political objective of the Soviet Union was continuing regional conflict.

The Soviet Union tried to prevent resolutions to regional conflicts because Soviet allies in the Third World were dependent on the USSR for as long as the conflicts continued. Once the conflict was at an end, Soviet allies no longer needed to depend on the Soviet Union, and they drifted away. As the superpowers intervened to protect their respective spheres of influence in the Third World, they also tried to preserve stability in some areas.

8.3 Superpowers and regional stability in the Maghreb

Three major issues have affected Maghreb stability and the regional balance of power since World War II: the Western Sahara conflict; civil war in Chad; and the Arab-African Union. The behaviour of the United States and the Soviet Union

towards these issues reflects their perception of the stability of the North Africa subregion.

The Maghreb has enjoyed relative stability over the past thirty years. The Libyan revolution in 1969 and the military coup in Algeria in 1965 were the only major events which really threatened political stability in North Africa. Despite the fact that the King of Morocco has faced military coup attempts and internal riots, he has been in power for more than thirty years. Bourguiba was in power for more than thirty years before he was ousted in 1987. In terms of regional stability, there have been no upsets apart from a minor border conflict between Morocco and Algeria in 1963. Libya has been involved in border and political disputes with its neighbours, but even these disputes were contained. The major issues in the Maghreb have not led to foreign intervention, except by France in Tunisia in 1980, and French protection for Mauritania in the early days of the Western Sahara conflict.

8.4 Arab-African Union and the Superpowers reactions

On 13 August 1984, King Hassan II of Morocco and Colonel Qaddafi of Libya met in Oujda in western Morocco and signed an agreement of unity between their two countries. The result was the formation of a political union, the Arab-African union, a loose confederation, rather than a unified state to which participants would surrender sovereignty.¹⁴

The Union caught many observers by surprise, because Hassan II and Colonel Qaddafi had a long history of political disputes and a conservative monarch had made a common cause with the most radical state in the Arab world. Moreover, Qaddafi had attempted to destabilise the Hassan II regime for more than a decade,

and each one of them was providing active support to opponents of the other. It was even more surprising that the initiative came from Hassan II, who then abrogated the union agreement two years later in August 1986 after Qaddafi criticised Hassan II's meeting with Shimon Peres, the Prime Minister of Israel.¹⁵

The Union was a response to the situation in which both countries found themselves in 1984. Morocco was facing economic problems in the early 1980s: the country was crippled by an unemployment rate of at least 20%; an \$11 billion foreign debt; and inflation.¹⁶ In the riots in Morocco in June 1981 and January 1984, many people were killed. In the light of these domestic events, King Hassan hoped that Libya would find jobs for many thousands of unemployed Moroccans. The King sought economic aid and oil from Libya, and popularity inside Morocco by allying Morocco with Libya's radical policy. For domestic political reasons, Hassan intended to demonstrate his independence from the US.¹⁷

The number of Moroccans working in Libya increased from 10,000 to 14,000 in 1985, and Libya loaned Morocco \$100 million as a gesture of friendship. Morocco benefited from Libyan oil: by the end of 1985, Morocco was receiving 500,000 tons annually at concessionary rates. Qaddafi had been a major supplier and supporter of Polisario in the Western Sahara conflict, supporting Polisario with weapons, arms and financial aid. Qaddafi promised to cut off support for the Polisario guerrillas fighting Morocco for control of Western Sahara. Senior Moroccan officials argued that the main purpose of the Moroccan-Libyan treaty of union was to strengthen Morocco's hand in its war against the Algerian-backed Polisario Front in Western Sahara. In addition, Hassan built a personal relationship with Qaddafi which is an important factor in Arab diplomacy.¹⁸

On the other hand, Qaddafi was isolated within Libya. There were indications that Qaddafi had trouble with the armed forces particularly after his unsuccessful adventure in Chad and with the death of Hassan Ishkal in 1984, the military commander of the central region of Libya. Those opposed to Qaddafi's regime such as the National Front for the Salvation of Libya attacked his headquarters, Babal-Azziziya barracks, in May 1984.¹⁹

Libya also faced a decline in oil revenues.²⁰ Earnings shrank from \$22 billion in 1981 to \$10 billion in 1983 and \$9 billion in 1984; per capita income fell from \$11,000 in 1981 to \$8,000 in 1984. Declining oil revenues forced Libya to reduce its overall demand for imported labour and many Egyptian, Tunisian and other nationals were deported, and were replaced by Moroccan nationals. The economic situation also affected Libya's political objectives. With increased opposition inside and outside Libya, Qaddafi concluded that he could increase his popularity inside Libya by reducing his ideological distance from the conservative, pro-western regime in Morocco.

In spite of Qaddafi's ideological rhetoric, Libya is a traditional and conservative society. After Libyan opposition elements attacked his residence²¹, he became very aware of his domestic situation. Qaddafi was also able to acquire new legitimacy both domestically and in the Arab, African and Islamic worlds by allying his regime with that of Hassan II, the founding member of OAU, principal ally of the Western powers in North Africa, founding member of the Islamic Conference, and the head of the Islamic Committee for Jerusalem.²²

Morocco had been providing assistance to the *National Front for the Salvation of Libya* (NFSL). The NFSL was set up in 1981 by former Libyan Auditor General

Mohammed al-Magaryef after his resignation as Libyan Ambassador to India. The NFSL received military training in Morocco in 1981, and it held its first anti-Qaddafi congress in Morocco in May 1982. Libya welcomed Morocco curtailment of support for the NFSL, and Morocco went further by handing over to Libya some of Qaddafi's opponents. It was the diplomacy of *quid pro quo*, Polisario for NFSL.²³

Geopolitically, the Arab-African Union redressed the regional balance of power in northern Africa. It created a third axis joining the two states that had been isolated and felt threatened by the other two axes.²⁴ In October 1982, Egypt and Sudan announced the integration of their two countries, which came to be known as the *Takamal* Project. It has been suggested that the *Takamal* Project was an American idea because Egypt and Sudan were close allies of the United States.²⁵

In response, Algeria and Tunisia formed the alliance of brotherhood and concord in March 1983 and, in December, Algeria invited Mauritania to join them.²⁶ Libya considered that the Egyptian-Sudanese alliance threatened Libyan security, and in particular, Qaddafi felt that Sudan and Egypt might be involved in military action against him by supporting his opponents.

Algeria had a cool relationship with Libya for many reasons: during the struggle for Algeria's presidency on Boumedienne's death in 1979, Qaddafi backed Bendjedid's rival, colonel Saleh Yahiaoui; Libya supported former Algerian President Ben Bella who was released from jail; Libya encouraged Islamic Fundamentalism in Algeria to win influence and to put pressure on the ruling party (FLN); Libya criticised Algeria's Non-Aligned positive policy because Bendjedid had adopted a

moderate policy in international affairs; Qaddafi had built his own power base in Western Sahara which Algeria did not like, as it did not want to let Polisario out of its control and influence. Algeria also assumed a different policy over Chad and enjoyed good relations with African states outside the Algiers-Tunis-Noukchott axis. In 1983, Algeria signed treaties with Niger, and Mali concerning frontiers as well as aid for projects in border regions, and Algeria-Senegal relations improved with Abdo Deouf.²⁷

By allying with Morocco, Libya was placing itself in a situation to counter the Egyptian-Sudanese alliance in the East, and the axis of Mauritania-Tunisia-Algeria, the Brotherhood and Concord alliance. Morocco and Libya co-operated together to counter Algeria's growing regional influence and power in North Africa. They intended to put pressure on Tunisia to resume a position of relative neutrality in regional affairs in North Africa. By allying with Libya, Morocco managed to tilt the regional balance of power in the Maghreb in its favour. Morocco hoped that Qaddafi would curtail his support for Polisario, and in return Hassan publicly acknowledged Libyan co-operation by issuing a number of statements explaining the legitimacy of Libya's involvement in Chad.²⁸

It has been claimed that Hassan, who was in close contact with France and the United States over the Chad situation, warned Qaddafi that he might have to send troops into Chad against Libya and, by so doing, Hassan successfully managed to stem Qaddafi's support for Polisario and Morocco agreed to support Libya in Chad. Hassan became a mediator between Libya on the one hand and France and Chad on the other hand in negotiations leading to the withdrawal of foreign forces from Chad.²⁹ Qaddafi was isolated in North Africa, the Arab world and Black Africa and the Union helped Qaddafi to enhance his legitimacy inside

and outside Libya and to end his isolation.³⁰

Hassan II hoped to score points for himself at a diplomatic level, especially with the United States and other Arab, African and European countries, by demonstrating that he had the ability to moderate Qaddafi's international behaviour, especially regarding international terrorism and foreign adventures in Africa and other parts of the world. Hassan tried to convince the US that he had partially neutralised Qaddafi's anti-US activities; had helped to induce Colonel Qaddafi to moderate his policies in bringing Qaddafi back into the Arab political framework; and had restored unity to the Islamic Conference in which Hassan was a prime mover; and begun to patch up divisions within the OAU.³¹

By allying himself with Hassan of Morocco, America's friend in the Middle East, Qaddafi believed he could moderate American policy toward Libya. When President Reagan came to power, the United States had adopted a hard line against Qaddafi, who became a major target of the United States counter-terrorism policy. With his isolation, Qaddafi became an easy target. Qaddafi saw Hassan II as a means to decrease American pressure.³²

8.4.1 United States reaction to the Arab-African Union

Hassan II surprised the United States by his initiative to form the Arab-African union with Libya. The Reagan administration viewed the Union as an intelligence failure, and there was speculation that the American Ambassador to Morocco, Joseph Reed, had not been informed in advance. Reed was called to Washington and was removed for his failure to predict the Union. Reagan saw that an American ally had suddenly initiated a treaty of friendship with Libya's radical strong man, Colonel Qaddafi, Washington's 'Public Enemy Number One'.³³

Hassan reacted speedily to American reaction. In September 1984, he sent his special advisor Ahmed Redia Guedira to visit Washington to explain Moroccan objectives for the Union. Odderia met with George Bush, then Vice-President, and with United States Secretary of State George Shultz.³⁴ When America criticised Morocco over its relations with Libya, Hassan reacted sharply that

“before being a friend of the US, I am the King of Morocco.”³⁵

Hassan knew that the Reagan Administration with its new global strategic interests could not ignore Morocco because of American interests in Moroccan military bases and the Voice of America (VOA) in Tangier.

The United States dispatched its roving Ambassador, Vernon Walters, a long-time friend of Hassan, to Rabat to warn Hassan that an angry Congress might try to block the \$140 million in military and economic aid agreed for Morocco in fiscal year 1985. Despite that, American aid to Morocco continued without delay. Morocco hired the Washington public relations firm Gray and Co. to ensure a sympathetic hearing in the US.

The United States was aware that the rapprochement between Morocco and Libya might give Qaddafi a legitimacy in Libya and outside, whereas the United States' objective was to discredit Qaddafi in the Arab world and in international areas in order to destabilise him. The United States also thought that the Union might give Qaddafi an opportunity to make mischief in Morocco, exploiting the vulnerability of the Rabat regime in the wake of domestic unrest and rising internal opposition. Of even greater concern was Washington's fear that the new alliance might strengthen Qaddafi, whom the US considered an international outlaw.³⁷

Morocco responded that US fears were without foundation. Hassan II and

other Moroccan officials declared that Morocco is a free and sovereign state with the right, and indeed the obligation, to pursue its own national interests. Morocco argued that the behaviour of Qaddafi might in fact be moderated. In July 1985 Hassan did send his Prime Minister Karim Lamrani to Washington to explain the Moroccan situation, but despite that, later in 1985 and in early 1986, relations between Morocco and the US became increasingly strained³⁸ because of the US confrontation with Libya over international terrorism.

Morocco tried a different approach to improve its relations with the United States and to protect its national interests by signing that treaty with Libya. In March 1985, the United States was the only country to be represented at the annual feast of allegiance to the Moroccan throne, and by no fewer than three presidential envoys: the US Ambassador to the United Nations Jeanne Kirkpatrick; her designated replacement General Vernon Walters, and then the US Ambassador in Morocco, Joseph Reed. One other important gesture made to the US by Hassan in March 1986 was an invitation to CIA Director, William Casey, and American Ambassador to the UN, Vernon Walters to be honoured guests at the Throne Day ceremonies in 1986. Hassan's tactic was to build a closer relationship with Reagan's influential circle and to appease Washington.³⁹

Morocco extended an invitation to Shimon Peres, the Prime Minister of Israel in July 1986. Morocco was the second Arab State, after Egypt, to contact Israel directly. Hassan's main objective was to rebuild his relations with Washington. As a result, the federation broke down when it was no longer useful after Morocco improved its relations with both Algeria and Tunisia. Further, the United States' political and economic pressure on Morocco was successful in turning the alliance into a liability.⁴⁰

The serious problem for America's political allies in the Third World was that the US wanted them to behave according to American principles and to follow American lines. In the Third World, however, no leader can afford to be labelled pro-American if that means he will be seen as serving America's interests rather than those of his own people, as a former American diplomat put it:

"Americans, however, like to personalise relations with foreign states, to place foreign leaders in convenient, over-simplified categories. Like Pluto's dog, they like what they know."⁴¹

8.4.2 Soviet Union reaction towards Arab-African Union

The Soviet Union reaction to the Arab-African Union differed from that of the United States. The Soviet Union enjoyed good relations with both Libya and Morocco. It has strong economic relations with the two countries. Politically, the Soviet Union saw the Arab-African Union as an opportunity to avoid the serious dilemma in which the Soviet Union found itself over Soviet-Arab relations. Soviet diplomacy had been suffering from intra-Arab conflicts. The Soviet Union was enjoying warm political relations with Algeria. The brotherhood and concord alliance might strengthen the Soviet relations with Algeria's allies, Tunisia and Mauritania. Moreover, it might have been possible to use the two axes, brotherhood and concord and the Arab-African Union, to counter the American axis in Northern Africa, the Egyptians-Sudanese.⁴²

The Soviet Union saw stability and co-operation in the Maghreb as part of Soviet interests. The Soviet Union built economic and political relations with North African states despite their ideological differences. The Soviet Union's view of stability in the Maghreb was described by the Soviet Premier, Kosygin, and it has continued as a basis of Soviet policy in the region.

"The victory will be brought closer by the cohesion of the Arab countries in

the struggle against aggression and colonialism, as well as the consolidation of co-operation between its Arab countries on the one hand, and the peaceful-loving countries on the other. We defend honest co-operation between countries in questions connected with liquidation of international problems, but we are opposed to foreign policy which may be based on temporary calculations or on calculations designed to achieve personal gain by creating tensions in relations between other countries and by making them clash with one another."⁴³

In 1976, the Soviet Union called for Maghreb unity and a peaceful solution to the Western Sahara conflict.⁴⁴ The Soviets preferred co-operation between Arab states, and were in support of stability of the regimes, because change in the region might not be in the best interests of the Soviet Union. Conservative Muslim societies were giving way to the wave of Islamic fundamentalism in North Africa and the rest of the Arab World.

Whereas the US perceived Qaddafi as a dangerous element in the Maghreb and Africa, and worked to destabilise his regime, the Soviet Union took a different view. For example, when Libya announced it had reached agreement with Algeria in principle on political unity, the United States protested to Algeria against any political union with Libya. Vice President George Bush expressed American concern to the French government over the proposal of unity. The United States tried to isolate Libya in the Arab world. Moreover, in September 1987, the United States tried unsuccessfully to prevent Iraq's reconciliation with Libya by giving Iraq intelligence about Libya's shipment of Soviet-made mines to Iran in exchange for chemical weapons. The American actions were in accordance with its policy of maintaining the *status quo*. On the other hand, when the Maghreb states announced the formulation of the Arab Maghreb Union in February 1989, the USSR publicly supported the Greater Maghreb concept as well as its extension to Libya, but because of Libya, the United States adopted a cautious and reserved approach to the union. The Union would, however, moderate Qaddafi's policies, and con-

trol his behaviour, more effectively than any American bomb. As the Algerian President argued "*the United States bombed Libya but Libya is still there.*"⁴⁵

8.5 Superpowers and the Western Sahara Conflict

8.5.1 Historical background

In 1975, after a long period of Spanish colonial rule (in 1884 the Spanish government declared a protecorate over Rio de Oro and, in 1934 the Spanish troops occupied the interior part of the Sahara) the government of Spain announced its withdrawal from the Western Sahara. Spain left the Sahara without leaving behind a structure for political authority. The Spanish decision came after a long period of political struggle between the Maghreb states and Spain which passed through different phases.⁴⁶

During 1960s and until 1974, the parties to the conflict concentrated on diplomatic efforts to reach a solution to the Western Sahara conflict. The Maghreb states shared a common interest in the decolonisation of Western Sahara. On the opposing side was Spain, the colonial master of the Sahara. In 1974, when Spain began to take steps to leave the Sahara, preparation accelerated on all sides in anticipation of a potential conflict.⁴⁷ Between 1974 and October 1975, Morocco made clear its intention to take over the Sahara and reached an understanding with Mauritania over the Sahara. Under a trilateral agreement reached in Madrid on 14 November 1975, Spain handed the Western Sahara over to Morocco and Mauritania, both of which took the responsibility to administrate the Sahara jointly.⁴⁸

In April 1976, Morocco and Mauritania agreed to divide the Sahara between them. Algeria, after its initial support for Morocco and Mauritania, then came out

strongly in favour of Saharan self-determination. Algeria felt that its interests were challenged by Morocco in the Sahara.⁴⁹ Algeria and Polisario (Algerian-backed and formed in 1973) challenged the division of Sahara. The conflict broadened into a wider dispute between the Maghreb's two leading powers,⁵⁰ Morocco and Algeria, especially after the announcement of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) on 26 February 1976. Algeria recognised and supported the Sahrawi Republic.⁵¹

Morocco claimed that Western Sahara was part of Greater Morocco and it was taken by the Spanish during the colonial period. On 16 October 1975 the International Court of Justice announced its advisory opinion that the Western Sahara was not a territory without a master (*terra nullius*). The Court (14 to 2) found that there were legal ties between the Moroccan Sultan and some tribes in the Western Sahara. It also reaffirmed the rights of the Sahrawi populations to self determination.⁵² Hassan II took the opportunity of the Court's decision and called upon Moroccans for a peaceful march, '*The Green March*', in November 1975 as a political manoeuvre to control the Western Sahara. Hassan II reached agreement with Spain, the "Madrid agreement", on the 14 November 1975. Under the agreement, Spain transferred the administration, but not the sovereignty, of the Sahara and authority over its coastal waters to Morocco and Mauritania. According to the Madrid agreement, Spain shared 35% of investment of phosphates in the Western Sahara, whilst Morocco and Mauritania were allocated 55% and 10% respectively.⁵³ After Spain's departure from the Sahara in February 1976, Morocco and Mauritania agreed in April 1976 to divide the Sahara between them, and to absorb the Sahara into their own national territories against the diplomatic opposition of Algeria and the military opposition of the Polisario Front.

In 1976, Polisario concentrated its attention on the weaker and economically over-strained Mauritania whose economy depended heavily on iron ore mined at Zouerate and moved only via a 300 mile vulnerable rail link to the sea. After two years of fighting, Mauritania was finding it increasingly difficult to sustain the burden of the fighting despite French help. Morocco therefore stepped up its military assistance to Mauritania. In early 1978 there were 10,000 Moroccan troops in Mauritania.⁵⁴

On 10 July 1978 the President of Mauritania since independence, Mokhtar Ould Daddah, was overthrown by military coup. The new military government agreed to a cease-fire with the Polisario, and the two parties sought a solution suitable and acceptable to all parties of the conflict. In 1978 Moroccan forces added Mauritania's part of the Western Sahara to Morocco, and since then, the whole Western Sahara has become part of Morocco.⁵⁵

Algeria has supported the Polisario Front, motivated by its geopolitical and economic interests in the region. Despite Algeria's support for Polisario, Algeria preferred to avoid direct military confrontation with Morocco. The question of the Western Sahara has been unresolved since 1975 between Morocco on one hand, and Algeria and Polisario on the opposing side. The conflict has become a domestic issue for Hassan II, and an economic liability for Morocco. The United Nations and OAS has called for a referendum on self-determination for the Western Sahara.⁵⁶

8.5.2 The Soviet Union's behaviour toward the Western Sahara:

The Soviet Union adopted a neutral position in the Western Sahara conflict, and placed its priority on advancing beneficial relations with the two major actors in the conflict, Morocco and Algeria. Soviet commercial interests and investments

in Morocco were balanced by its military and political commitments to Algeria.⁵⁷

When Spain was occupying the Western Sahara, the Soviet Union denounced Spain as a colonial power, and accused the Spanish government of keeping the people in Western Sahara as underpaid workers on the rich phosphate deposits. In October 1974, Leonid Brezhnev said that the struggle of Western Sahara against Spanish domination had entered a decisive stage. Brezhnev cited Morocco as the leader of the struggle, although he added that Algeria, Mauritania and Tunisia were supporting the struggle. The Soviet Union perceived the Western Sahara issue as part of colonial policy in Africa.⁵⁸ Before 1974, the Soviets condemned Spain over colonial policy because at that time there was no public conflict among the Maghreb states over the Western Sahara. The Soviet Union was in a strong position to attack Spain and to strengthen Soviet ties with the Maghreb states and the Non-Aligned movement and to win Maghreb public opinion.⁵⁹

When the Western Sahara conflict created tension among the Maghreb States, particularly after 1975, the Soviet Union faced a serious dilemma in attempting to satisfy all parties. Soviet commentators accused the Western press of attempting to create differences between the Maghreb States on the Western Sahara issue. When Morocco opposed Spain on Western Sahara, the Soviets had no difficulty in extending their support to Morocco. But when tension between Algeria and Morocco became serious, the Soviets took pains to demonstrate their neutrality.⁶⁰ After 1975, the Soviet Union no longer saw the Western Sahara as a problem of colonialism in North Africa. Anatoly Gromyko (son of late Soviet Foreign Minister) Director of the USSR Academy of Science Institute of Africa and Director of African Affairs in the Soviet Foreign Ministry, in an *Analytical Survey of African Achievements, Problems and Prospects*, published in 1983, did not mention the is-

sue of independence in Western Sahara or the Polisario movement or the SADR.⁶¹

In November 1975, the Soviet Union's representative to the United Nations Security Council, Jacob Malik declared that

“the people of Western Sahara have the full right to determine their future.”⁶³

The Soviet declaration in the UN on the Saharan question was influenced by Algerian support for Soviet policy in Angola. Algeria supported Angola's “MPLA” faction, and allowed the Soviet airlift transit through Algiers airport. In 1976, the Moroccan navy intercepted a Soviet vessel near the Sahara coast, and it declared that the vessel was carrying weapons and three Algerian officers. Morocco accused the Soviets of sending arms and weapons to the Polisario through Algeria and Libya.⁶³ Morocco gave a warning to Moscow, severed diplomatic relations with East Germany and froze the Meskah phosphate negotiations (which were later concluded in 1978).⁶⁴

Morocco's anti-Soviet rhetoric was a tactical step to gain French and American support in the Sahara conflict. For this reason, Morocco tried to portray the conflict in East-West terms. There was no evidence that the Soviets had directly supplied arms to the Polisario, and the Soviet Union did not place legal and specific end-use limitations on its weapons in the case of Algeria and Libya in contrast to the restrictions placed by the United States on its customers.⁶⁵ The Soviets built up a diplomatic and cultural presence in Morocco, and in 1978 signed the Meskala agreement which accounts for the largest Soviet investment in the Third World.⁶⁶

The neutrality of the Soviet Union in the conflict proved to be genuine. When Polisario proclaimed the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) on 27 February 1976, Soviet reports made no comment other than to say that the majority of

the OAU states were in favour of recognising it. However, Polisario and the SADR obtained neither diplomatic recognition from the USSR and the Eastern block nor did they receive direct military support.⁶⁷

The Soviet Union set forth a strategy of maintaining a balanced relationship between the two antagonistic sides in the Sahara dispute. The Soviet Union offered Sahrawi students places to study in Soviet Universities, and yet tolerated Algerian support of Polisario with Soviet made weapons, supporting the Sahrawi in the United Nations and OAU solutions for self-determination in Western Sahara. One Soviet official went further, when the Soviet Ambassador in Senegal stated that it is impossible to ignore the Polisario Front in the search for a solution to the Sahara problem. Whilst, in November 1979, the Soviet Union voted with African states and the Non-Aligned Movement for the Polisario as the sole and lawful representative of the Sahrawi people,⁶⁸ this does not necessarily contradict genuine Soviet neutrality. The Soviet Union was manoeuvring to appease Algeria and other Third World countries and at the same time monitoring the secret negotiations between Polisario and Moroccan officials.

The Soviet Union tried to satisfy all parties to the conflict and official Soviet policy stated that

“The USSR favours the solution of the Western Saharans problem by peaceful and political means, taking into consideration the interests of all sides concerned without any outside interference, to say nothing of military interference. The Soviet Union proceeds from its principled stand in support of the Western Saharan people to self-determination and takes into account the relevant decisions of the UN and the OAU.”⁶⁹

The Soviet Union emphasised a position of principle i.e. the right of Sahrawi to self-determination based on UN and OAU resolutions. The Soviets did not, however, elaborate on what self-determination meant in this case. The Soviets

encouraged a peaceful solution and the consideration of the interests of all parties in the conflict. Implicitly, the Soviets might simply withdraw recognition of at least some of Morocco's claim over the Western Sahara territory.⁷⁰ The Soviets did not antagonise or alienate any of the parties in the dispute and thus sustained their multi-dimensional interaction with both Morocco and Algeria.

The Soviet Union justified its policy on a number of grounds: the initial absence of an international consensus on the conflict; caution on the part of the United States; the Soviet Union's own direct interests; the position of the communist party in Morocco, the Party of Progress and Socialism, as a strong supporter of Moroccan claims in the Sahara and the Soviet perception that communism as an ideology had no roots in the tribal society of Western Sahara.⁷¹

The Maghreb has been marginal to Soviet global policy and the conflict has been kept within regional limits. Soviets interests in Morocco, and American interests in Algeria explain why the Western Sahara conflict is so little internationalised, and the conflict has never brought the two superpowers to confrontation because both superpowers have avoided policies likely to alienate either Algeria or Morocco.

8.5.3 United States behaviour towards Western Sahara:

The United States policy towards the Western Sahara issue should be seen on three levels of analysis; first, the domestic level; i.e. the political situation inside Morocco and the stability of the regime; second, the regional level in the Maghreb and Iberian Peninsula: Portugal and Spain; third, the global level, particularly, the increase of the Great Powers' involvement and East-West reaction to the conflict.

On a domestic level, by 1973, King Hassan was politically isolated on several

fronts. These included: the refusal of opposition parties to participate in a coalition government; direct attacks from within the military coups; urban terrorism and rural guerrilla operations. In 1970, the political opposition boycotted the Parliamentary elections and referendum on the Constitution. There were two attempted *coups d'état* in July 1971 and August 1972. In March 1973, bombs were set at selected targets in Casablanca and Rabat and in the countryside. The guerrillas failed to rally popular support and were quickly killed or captured by Moroccan National Security Forces. In April 1973, several hundred left-wing activists were arrested and many of them were tortured. Moreover, the Moroccan government suspended the Rabat faction of the UNFP. The economy was in bad condition, in 1973, drought led to a poor harvest. Also, the unemployment ranged from 20 to 30 percent in the cities and probably averaged about 40 percent in the rural areas. In those circumstances King Hassan II was looking for a political manoeuvre to bind the political parties behind him.⁷²

In mid-1974, the Western Sahara issue provided a common nationalist cause to which all major political parties rallied. All the parties enthusiastically supported and worked with the king as he orchestrated and led the national campaign to recover the Sahara. The left wing (communists) Party of Progress and Socialism and the Socialist Union of Popular Forces (SUPF) became as militant on the Western Sahara issue as the moderate Istiqlal Party was.

As the former American diplomat in Rabat put it in 1975,

“The king was able to divert attention from his internal problem last summer by focusing on an external issue—the recovery of the Sahara territory to the south of Morocco, more commonly known as the Spanish Sahara.”⁷³

Henry Kissinger, then American Secretary of State recognised the domestic political importance of the Sahara to King Hassan. The Western Sahara crusade

enabled the king to recover politically from the previous crises which had rocked his regime. At that time, Kissinger was more enthusiastic for King Hassan than any other American official and had managed to build a personal relationship with him.⁷⁴

On a regional level, the political upheaval in Portugal threatened the United States' base rights at Lajes in the Azores, which had proved invaluable. In July 1974, the coup in Lisbon paved the way for decolonisation of Portugal's African Empire. Portugal's decision also contributed to the Moroccan decision to mobilise the Sahara campaign.⁷⁵ When Spain announced its intention to abandon the Sahara, it was part-motivated by the revolution in neighbouring Portugal which withdrew from both Angola and Mozambique. The King of Morocco considered this to be the time to intervene, it was a golden opportunity after a hard political struggle.

During the Kissinger era, the United States was adopting a geopolitical approach in its foreign policy to enhance American influence and to counter the Soviet Union in the Third World. There was also another concern, the United States intended to solve the Western Sahara before the death of General Franco, because the new political democratic process in Spain could complicate the issue, and the Spanish right would have to concentrate on possible domestic turmoil following Franco's death rather than on a conflict in the Maghreb.⁷⁶

General Vernon Walters, then Deputy Director of the CIA played an important role in the 1975 negotiations. A friend of Hassan since the general's day as an intelligence agent in Vichyite North Africa, Walters tied Spain's co-operation on the Western Sahara to the renewal of the lease of the Spanish bases for \$1.5 billion

in new US weapons. Within two months of the signing of the Madrid accords, a five-year US-Spanish treaty was signed which included an agreement favourable to Spain. Walters has kept silent on his role in the Morocco-Spanish agreement over Western Sahara.

“It would look like the king of Morocco and the king of Spain are pawns of the US and that would not be in anybody’s interest.”⁷⁷

There is circumstantial evidence, including US lack of support for UN resolution (3458a) against the Green March that lends credence to the allegation. The Spaniards, for their part were convinced that Hassan II could not organise the Green March without outside help, especially the United States. The Green March was organised in November 1975.⁷⁸

The United States realised that the instability in Morocco might destabilise the whole of North Africa. An American scholar Lewis Ware put it thus in 1975,

“political instability in the Sahara could easily destabilise the entire Iberian Peninsula and have serious consequences on the United States’ strategic interests in Spain”.⁷⁹

Despite the United States proclaimed ‘neutrality’ in the conflict, it was, in fact, more theoretical than real. In January 1976, King Hassan sent his former Prime Minister, Karim Lamrani, to the United States with a military shopping list. In the same year, the State Department continued the flow of arms and ammunitions and notified Congress of the US’s willingness to sell 24 F-SE aircraft to Morocco. Most of the time, Kissinger kept his support for Morocco away from Congress to avoid a Congressional protests.⁸⁰ Kissinger was motivated by his Middle East disengagement process after the October 1973 war, and Morocco was one of his mediators with Egypt, Syria and the PLO. The first meeting between the PLO and the US was in Rabat, Morocco in 1973, when Vernon Walters met Khalid Al-

Hassan, Arafat's political advisor. Kissinger's first visit to an Arab State was to Morocco in November 1973, on which occasion his purpose was to ask Morocco to moderate the PLO and Sadat of Egypt's policy toward the Palestinian problem.⁸¹

On the global level, Kissinger was influenced by the Vietnam war and the American geostrategic perspective toward the Soviet Union. After Vietnam, the surrogate strategy became a cornerstone of the United States foreign policy toward the Third World. The main theme of this strategy was the United States would arm reliable Third World allies to play the role of regional gendarmes in trouble spots to contain the threat of leftist insurgencies and to maintain conservative pro-US governments. Kissinger supported Morocco and after the Soviet involvement in Angola in 1975, the United States became more aware of Soviet influence and competition in the continent. When Kissinger returned from South Africa in October 1975, and stopped in Madrid on his way to Washington. He stated

"The United States will not allow another Angola on the East flank of the Atlantic Ocean".⁸²

The United States supported Morocco with weapons but it did not recognise Moroccan *sovereignty* over the Sahara, the US did acknowledge Moroccan *administration* over the Sahara.

When Carter was elected President, he adopted a regional approach to American foreign policy in the Third World. In his first two years in the White House from 1977 to 1979, Carter had banned and restricted American arms sales to Morocco. Carter called for a political settlement to the conflict and distanced himself from Kissinger's policy. He asked for self-determination and, as a gesture, the United States contributed \$100,000 to the International Committee to the Red Cross for the Sahrawi Refugee Relief Fund, and the first public US Con-

gressional hearing on the conflict was held. Moreover, the United States officials visited Polisario Camps and met directly with Polisario leaders. Carter's policy toward Morocco led many to believe that Carter wanted to cut short past administration alignments with King Hassan.⁸³ The Carter administration believed that Hassan's regime lacked stability, and his human rights record was not particularly respectable. The CIA believed that Hassan's regime might not survive one more year. Many members of Congress visited the Western Sahara and supported self-determination and criticised Moroccan policy toward the Sahara. After a visit to the Western Sahara and Polisario camps in August 1979, Stephen Solarz, Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Africa, argued that the arms sales was not in the United States national interest because it would reward King Hassan for his policy in the Sahara and would damage United States relations with key African states such as Algeria and Nigeria.⁸⁴

The Carter administration imposed restrictions on arms sales to Morocco and accused the Moroccan government of violating the US-Moroccan agreement in 1960 which prohibited use of American arms against third parties.⁸³ The 1960 US Moroccan military agreement prohibited weapons for any other purpose than the self-defence of Moroccan territory, and America did not recognise the Western Sahara as part of Moroccan sovereignty.

In February 1978, under pressure from Congress, President Carter ordered a ban on the delivery of ammunition and weapons to Morocco. The liberals in Congress, and Carter himself, were appeasing Algeria, the main American trade partner in North Africa. Early in 1980, Carleton Coon, Director of North African Affairs at the State Department convened a regional ambassadorial meeting at the American Embassy in Madrid to co-ordinate US policy toward the Western

Sahara conflict. The State Department arranged a meeting with the Polisario Front. The United States sent several envoys to confer with the Polisario leadership about the possibility of direct negotiations between the parties. Paul Simon, representative from Illinois; Andrew Young, US ambassador to the United Nations Security Council and the Deputy Chief of Mission of the US embassy in Algiers were among the envoys. The latter visited the Tindouf region in December 1980, and had discussions with the Polisario Front.⁸⁶

While the Carter administration was trying to approach Algeria and Polisario by putting pressure on Morocco for a political solution, French President Giscard D'Estaing, a personal friend of Hassan, opposed the proclamation of the SADR in 1976. During Giscard's visit to Morocco in 1977, he stated that on the question of the Western Sahara, France would vote in the United Nations for Morocco and Mauritania. Giscard D'Estaing sent a squadron of Jaguar jet planes to Mauritania in 1977 and 1978 to provide air cover in an attempt to defend the shaky regime there. In addition, Giscard D'Estaing asked President Carter in 1978 to help the French effort in Africa. He spoke of the heavy burden of French intervention in Africa and wanted American involvement to help.⁸⁷

However, France lobbied to put pressure on Carter to support Hassan II's regime. The United States was reluctant to provide arms for what Morocco considered self-defence. The ban introduced an element of friction into the United States harmonious relations with Morocco and in spring of 1979 King Hassan asked for the withdrawal of the United States ambassador in Rabat, Richard Parker.⁸⁸

In October 1979, the Carter administration changed its policy and agreed to deliver arms to Morocco and the State Department defended its decision in the

Congress as being vital to American interests in North Africa. The change of Carter's policy was due to the third party element, the loss of American allies in the Third World. The Carter administration, following the losses of Somoza in Nicaragua, the Shah of Iran, Ethiopia and Afghanistan, was highly alarmed and quickly moved to enhance Hassan's position in the war against the Polisario.⁸⁹

However, there was a split within the Carter administration over the question of supplying Morocco with reconnaissance aircraft and helicopter gunships. The CIA felt that new weapons would do Hassan little good since the basic problem lay in an inflexible command structure. Following the 1972 coup attempt, King Hassan took strong steps that stripped the military, especially the air force, of much of its power. Hassan took over as his own Minister of Defence and Chief of Staff. Hassan showed his apparently well-founded mistrust of the military by virtually disarming the ground forces and tightening control on ammunition and all military operations. The State Department tilted toward the CIA argument but added that the sales of arms would endanger American relations with Algeria.⁹⁰

The National Security Advisor to President Carter, Zbigniew Brzezinski argued that a show of support for a long term ally should be made in order to reassure other allies, particularly Saudi Arabia, in the aftermath of developments in Iran and Nicaragua on 22 October 1979. The sale of OV-10 reconnaissance aircraft was approved, but at the same time the United States put pressure on King Hassan to negotiate for a political solution.

Deputy Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, was sent to Rabat to urge the King to compromise with Polisario, and Brzezinski went to Algeria to reassure President Bendjdid and explain the American policy to him regarding American

arms sales to Morocco.⁹¹

However, Morocco's human rights record was still under suspicion by Carter. This pushed Morocco more toward its historical ally; France. Giscard d'Estang was a strong supporter of the Moroccan monarch. The Conservative Government of Giscard d'Estang attempted to renew French political influence in Africa. After Carter's failure in Iran in 1979, and the Soviet involvement in Horn of Africa and Angola, the United States acknowledged that Morocco was integral to US security needs in the Mediterranean and Africa. The escalation of the Sahara War through American military reinforcements was apparently of concern to the Carter administration. The strengthening of Morocco's position in the Sahara was equal to the stability of the throne. Hence, the Americans saw Morocco in terms of American security requirements and plans in the area. A policy that was vigorously reinforced by the Reagan Administration.

In 1981, the Reagan Administration came to power with a different agenda, tried to strengthen American military power, roll back the Soviet presence in the Third World particularly after the American humiliation in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, both of which added psychological consequences to the Vietnam legacy.

The Reagan administration saw American-Moroccan relations in geostrategic terms and passed over the human rights issue and the regional approach to the conflict over Western Sahara. He had seen American relations with Third World countries in terms of East-West competition, and he adopted a realist and geopolitical approach toward the *"evil Empire"*.

The Reagan administration removed the limitation placed on arms sales to

Morocco by the US Congress in 1980. The State Department announced its refusal to create a linkage between political settlement and arms sales to Morocco as the Carter administration had. In 1982, the United States negotiated with Morocco a military facility in Morocco for the use of Rapid Deployment Forces (in 1983 and after CECOM). King Hassan visited Washington in May 1982, following Alexander Haig's visit to Morocco in February 1982. The principal theme of the Reagan administration concerning Morocco was military co-operation.

Despite American arms support to Morocco, the Reagan administration's official policy toward the Western Sahara conflict (at least in public) was neutrality. It did not recognise Moroccan sovereignty over the Sahara, but it supported Moroccan administration there.⁹⁴

The United States had tried to respond to legitimate Moroccan needs for national defence, but the US had no desire to be caught in the middle of the conflict, which was not of its making and did not affect its real interests. In the wake of Polisario's October 1981 victory at 'Guelta Zemmur' in which the Front employed Soviet made SA-6 missile for the first time, the United States responded by sending a three-man training team to the Moroccan F-05 Unit at Meknes. The United States team -US Air Force Pilots- stayed in Morocco 60 days to train Moroccan pilots how to fly over SA-6 missile launchers and destroy them. The US also offered a team of 20 US ground forces experts to train the Moroccans in Commando style tactics. The aim was to develop a special unit that could make Commando-type attacks on SA-6 units in the desert, perhaps using helicopters. The United States went further and supplied the Moroccan Air Force with cluster bomb units which had been requested by Morocco for several years.⁹⁵

Unlike Moscow's genuine neutrality, Washington pursued a rather contradictory policy despite its official neutrality: although unwilling to recognise Morocco's sovereignty over Western Sahara, it had accepted its administration. The United States support for Morocco has remained almost unconditional except for two years during Carter's term of office.

When Bendjedid came to power in Algeria, Washington seems to have decided that Algeria was no longer a radical, intransigent, and revolutionary state and like Rabat has come to regard President Bendjedid as a pragmatist whose economic and political reforms should be given support, not least in the hope that Algeria will limit its friendship with, and military dependence on, the Soviet Union.⁹⁶ Moreover, the United States seems to be convinced that Algeria is no longer interested in toppling King Hassan. Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union intended to escalate the conflict or to use it for political advantage.

8.6 Superpowers, Civil war in Chad, and Regional Stability

8.6.1 Internal Setting

Chad was under French Colonial rule from 1900 until its independence in 1960. The geographical position of Chad gave it a critical role in French strategic policy in Africa.⁹⁷ Black Africa under French rule was larger than all of Europe, minus the Soviet Union, but with a population smaller than that of France alone. The French adopted a policy of Balkanisation of its African colonies. It created fourteen separate states out of what had previously been ruled as two large African Federations, French West Africa and Equatorial Africa. France encouraged its former colonies to form the Defence Council of Equatorial Africa in 1961. This was established with the help of France from the Central African Republic, Chad,

the Congo and Gabon.⁹⁸

The civil war in Chad had its roots in the sheer diversity of ethno-cultural aggregates comprised with its boundaries. The internal situation in Chad is complex and tragic. It has a heterogeneous society: Northerners versus Southerners, Muslims versus animists and Christians, Arabs versus black African groups. The southern people of Chad are black, Christian, Animist and more educated - with French help - than the Northerners, and more oriented to French culture and language. The Southerners are completely dominated by the Sara tribes which constitutes the largest ethnic group in the whole (30%).⁹⁹

The Northerners were Muslim nomads. They were against the French role in Chad. They had more of a common culture, values and tribal relations with Sudan, Egypt and Libya than with the Southerners. The Civil War in Chad represented a personal conflict between the North and the South. It was also part of personal ambition between the Northerners themselves: Habre and Goukouny were from the North.¹⁰⁰

In economic terms, the population in the North is nomadic or semi sedentary, while in the South all the people are agrarian and sedentary. The economy of the North is based on livestock raising, while the South cultivates the cotton which earns up to 80% of Chad's export income. The dividing line between the Muslim North and the Christian-Pagan South is also the boundary between "Cotton Chad" and "Cattle Chad". While the North comprises 80% of Chad's territory, one half of Chad's population resides in the populated South-West. In the South, about half of the school-age children go to school, while in the North only 3% acquire some kind of formal education.¹⁰¹

The French favoured the Southerners and offered them most of the administration. In effect, France used the policy of divide and rule to dominate Chad. While the French were welcomed in the South, they were seen in the North as foreign invaders and infidels. France was faced in the North by fierce resistance. After independence in 1960, French forces were stationed in the North because the Northerners were hostile to Southerners ruling the country. The French continued to administer and police the North because the situation was uncontrollable in the North. There was continuing hostility between North and South.¹⁰²

After the French forces withdrew from the North in 1964, the Northern regions were in revolt against the independent government of Chad, which they saw as a French puppet surviving only with the help of France.¹⁰³ France intervened in Chad many times to protect the government of Chad. In 1968; 1978 and 1982, French Forces were dispatched to Chad after the rebels of the North, with Libyan support, threatened the central government of Chad.¹⁰⁴

Continued French involvement in Chad was influenced by many factors. First, the domino theory prevalent during the period of French involvement in Indo-china, when France was defeated. Second, failure to support the central authority in Chad would have destroyed French credibility with all former African colonies, who looked to France as a protector from internal and external danger. Third, France had economic interests in Libya, along with the presence of some 2500 French citizens, and it did not intend to destroy its relations completely with Libya or to become involved in a direct confrontation with Libya over Chad. Fourth, the French aim was also to protect the uranium fields in neighbouring Niger. Moreover, in 1978 the French tried to stabilise the situation in Chad by drawing up a French-Libyan understanding about their respective spheres of influence in Chad.

8.6.2 Libyan intervention in Chad

In 1966, the rebel *Front Liberation Nationale du Tchad* (Frolinat) was founded by urban, educated Northerners who were fiercely opposed to French colonialism and Southerners, the Christian of Chad. The Frolinat leaders were inspired by Nasser's doctrine of Arab socialism and radical anti-colonialism.¹⁰⁵ The Libyan government under King Idris supported *Frolinat* but, in reality, relations were never close between the leaders of Frolinat and King Idris because of *Frolinat's* ideology. In the late 1960s King Idris reached agreement with Tombalbaye of Chad to maintain Islamic institutions in Chad and the status of Chadian workers in Libya.

After the Libyan revolution in 1969, the new Libyan government continued to support *Frolinat* in Chad. Qaddafi's was more revolutionary than Idris' regime. He was motivated by Libyan national interests; uranium, Pan-Arabism, Pan-Islamism and anti-colonialism. The first Libyan intervention in Chad was in 1972, when Libyan troops occupied the Northern border of Chad, the Aouzou Strip. Libya claimed that the strip was part of Libyan territory, for the strip contains rich uranium deposits. Despite Libya's occupation of the Aouzou Strip, Tombalbaye signed a treaty of friendship in December 1972, in exchange for Libyan financial aid to Chad and Libyan promises to reduce support to Frolinat.

Chad broke relations with Israel and agreed to concessions over the Aouzou strip in Northern Chad. Qaddafi did not want to jeopardise its Mirage deal with France and Libya was ready to come to terms with France in Chad, in 1971-1972, as a *quid pro quo* for the 110 Mirages. In essence, Libyan state interests temporarily overrode public ideological commitment. In 1975, Tombalbaye was assassinated,

after France learnt that he was preparing to sell oil prospecting rights to a US company, and a new government was established by Chad's Chief of Staff, Malloum.¹⁰⁶ Whilst he moved a little closer to the Muslims in the North, this was a tactical move which would not challenge the basic character of the Malloum government of being southerners, Christian, Sara tribes, Pro-French and Conservative. The rebels continued their struggle to overthrow the Central government in Chad.

President Sadat publicly announced his support for the Malloum government in 1977 while Libya supported the rebels. The regional enemies of Libya, such as Saudi Arabia, Morocco and Sudan, supported the Chad government. These states were strongly representing the view of the United States. France and Libya had their own interests in Chad and, in 1978, France and Libya divided Chad into two sphere of influence: Libyan influence in the Muslim north, and French domination in the Christian south. France stationed a military force in Chad particularly in the south and Libya built a military base in Northern Chad.¹⁰⁷

The second Libyan intervention in Chad occurred in 1980, when 700 Libyan troops entered Chad at the invitation of the then President, Goukouni, to put down an uprising led by Hissein Habre. Habre's forces were defeated and withdrew to Sudan's borders in the East. It is interesting to note that Goukouni and Habre are both from the North. The struggle over power in Chad had emerged between the two rivals from the Muslim North, the quarrel having tribal roots.¹⁰⁸

After Habre's defeat, Libya announced its goal of unification with Chad in January 1981. The announcement created an international outcry and under pressure from African States, France, and the US, Goukouni requested the complete withdrawal of the Libyan forces from Chad. In November, 1981, the Libyans pulled

back to their position in the Aouzou strip.

The third Libyan intervention occurred in 1982, when Hissene Habre strengthened his forces with the support of Sudan, Egypt, France and the US. Habre successfully overthrew the Goukouni government. But with Libya's support, Goukouni's troops in the Tibesti mountains, and in the summer of 1983, Goukouni launched an offensive attack against government positions in Northern and Eastern Chad but French forces were dispatched to Chad with Zairian military forces to protect Habre's government.

In 1984, France and Libya negotiated an agreement to withdraw all foreign forces from Chad and although France and Zaire honoured the agreement, Libyan military forces remained in Northern Chad. The internal struggle continued in Chad until December 1990 when the Habre government was overthrown by Idris Deby, who visited Libya and France to gather support to stabilise Chad. Habre had stayed in power with French and American support from 1983 until he was overthrown by rebel forces in Chad, in December 1990 .¹⁰⁹

8.6.3 United States, the civil war in Chad and regional stability

The United States established diplomatic relations directly after Chad won its independence. Despite diplomatic relations, Chad's economic relations with US companies did not grow until the late 1970s. The United States remained cautious about becoming involved in Chad's internal politics because the United States had few interests there.¹⁰³

During the Carter administration, the US was preoccupied with other regional issues and paid little attention to the civil war in Chad. The US encouraged

its regional allies: Sudan, Egypt, Morocco and Saudi Arabia to counter Libyan involvement in Chad. France was the only European state involved in Chad. In 1977, a joint Egyptian-Sudanese delegation headed by Egypt's Vice President Hushi Mubarak, visited Chad and declared its support for the Chadian demand to open negotiations about the Aouzou Strip. President Sadat publicly voiced his support for Malloum. The Carter administration, however, was not in favour of destabilising Qaddafi, although it did support Egypt, Sudan, Saudi Arabia and Morocco in their support for Malloum. The United States preferred indirect American pressure in Chad.¹¹¹

The turning point in US policy toward Chad started in 1980, especially when President Goukouni met with Qaddafi in January 1981 in Tripoli to announce the Libyan-Chadian unity proposal. The United States reacted strongly against the union between Chad and Libya. The United States encouraged its allies in the OAU, Europe and the Middle East to stop the union.¹¹² The United States took a direct stand against the merger of Chad and Libya. The US opposition was expressed in part through the decision of the Reagan administration to boost military aid to the countries opposing Libya, such as Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt and Sudan.¹¹³ The US also criticised the decision of the OAU in Nairobi in 1982 to give the Presidency of the OAU to Libya. The United States backed and pushed French military intervention in Chad to secure Libyan withdrawal.¹¹⁴

The US had no desire to send American troops to Chad or acquire permanent bases but, in early 1981, the CIA proceeded to funnel significant quantities of cash, armaments, and vehicles into Habre's hands thereby jeopardising the chances of success of the OAU peace-keeping operation before it even materialised. Reagan's covert aid to the Habre guerrillas in 1981 undermined the one test that the

French, the Libyans, the OAU and Goukouni's government had agreed on: the establishment of a peace-keeping force. This, however, did not prevent the Reagan administration from paying lip-service, as well as \$12 million worth of logistical assistance, to the OAU peace-keeping force.¹¹⁵

The collapse of the Goukouni regime in June 1982 had far-reaching implications: it dealt a severe blow to French policies in Chad, spelled the defeat of the formula advocated by the OAU committee on Chad, and exposed the importance of the OAU peace-keeping force on the ground. For this triple defeat the Reagan administration could claim much of the credit.¹¹⁶

In response to Libyan intervention in Chad, the US, on 7 August 1983, sent AWACS and F-15s to Sudan. On 24 August, the US announced the withdrawal of the AWACS from Sudan. French resources said one reason why the US AWACS planes in Sudan were being withdrawn was because there would have been communication difficulties between them and French aircraft and equipment and because the French air force did not intend to attack the Libyan planes. France hesitated to confront Libya directly because of French interests in Chad and Libya. The French had understood the civil war in Chad to be an internal conflict more than a design of Qaddafi.¹¹⁷ Moreover, in August 1983, the US aircraft carrier Eisenhower which was operating in the Mediterranean, moved to the Libyan coast to put pressure on Qaddafi if the hostilities in Chad continued.¹¹⁸

In 1983, in response to the Libyan invasion of Northern Chad, Reagan authorised \$25 million in military equipment for Chad and offered \$10 million of aid. The US also sent advisors to Chad to help Habre with 1000 paratroopers from Zaire as well as Redeye missiles. The Moroccan, Egyptian and Sudanese

governments also helped.¹¹⁹ The United States provided economic aid to Chad, including substantial emergency food aid as well as relief and rehabilitation assistance. For fiscal years 1983 through 1986, US economic and humanitarian aid to Chad totalled almost \$100 million; security assistance totalled \$48 million.¹²⁰ In March and December 1986, Reagan authorised \$25 million in emergency assistance including small arms, ammunition, trucks, jeeps, anti-aircraft and anti-tank weapons, uniforms and first-aid kits. The Reagan administration's main objective was to destabilise Qaddafi's regime, as the US saw Qaddafi as a major threat to American friends in Egypt, Sudan and other African states. According to a US State Department official statement

"The US believes that resistance to Libyan domination of Chad is important for regional security and is concerned about the threat posed to Chad and its neighbours by the continued Libyan occupation of parts of Northern Chad".¹²¹

The United States used Chad for training the Libyan opposition, the *National Front for the Salvation of Libya* (NFSL). It attempted to penetrate and destabilise Libya through Chad. When Hissene Habre was defeated in December 1990, by rebel forces led by Idris Deby, American planes carried the Libyan opposition to Zaire.¹²² The CIA had penetrated the Libyan opposition in the early 1980s in Cairo and Chad. In a secret base near Ndjamena, US military advisors trained anti-Qaddafi Libyan exiles and Libyan prisoners of war in Chad who had changed sides. These "*Libyan Contra*" from the NFSL, the main Libyan movement opposed of Colonel Qaddafi, were used by the US in Chad in an attempt to overthrow Qaddafi. It is estimated that there were 600 opponents to Qaddafi in Chad in December 1990.

The United States let Habre be overthrown because of his links with Iraq. The Iraqi occupation of Kuwait made Qaddafi and Chad strategically irrelevant.

France and the US saw that Habre had lost his credibility in Chad. France and the United States were in favour of political change in Chad in order to stabilise the internal situation.

Moreover, despite Habre having requested intervention from France, the US and Morocco, no one offered any help to Habre. Qaddafi adopted a neutral position in the Gulf crisis, and he built a closer relationship with Mubarak of Egypt, the key American ally in the Gulf crisis. The US saw Qaddafi's stand in the Gulf crisis as more important than the failing regime in Chad. Qaddafi has been trying to improve Libyan relations with the United States since George Bush became President in 1989.¹²³

8.6.4 Soviet Union, Civil War in Chad, and regional stability

The Soviet Union established diplomatic relations with Chad in 1964 and offered cultural and economic aid to Chad. But Soviet political relations with Chad were at a low level for a number of reasons: it saw little of economic interest in Chad; the Soviet had strong economic ties with Libya, particularly in arms sales; it did not therefore like to sacrifice its relations with Libya for the sake of minor interests in Chad and it perceived Chad as a French area of interest.¹²⁴ The Soviet Union saw Chad as a tribal society and with no potential for communist ideology there especially in a poor country with high levels of illiteracy.

The Soviet Union did not support the insurrectionary movement of the *Frolinat* which was formed by Ibrahim Abacha in 1966, despite the Front's socialist and anti-colonialist attitudes. The Soviet Union even thought more favourably of the Tombalbaye regime, to the point of congratulating him in 1972, on the annihilation of the armed movement of the Northern rebels, which was, after all, supported by

French troops.¹²⁵ In the Soviet perspective, as soon as a state no longer manifested any declared hostility toward the Soviet Union, it did not fail to make a show of its diplomatic receptivity and political leniency.¹²⁶

After the overthrow of President Tombalbaye in 1975, the new President of Chad, Malloum, hoped to establish privileged relations with other major world powers and to distance Chad from total dependence on France. Malloum's objective was to increase his popularity in the North. President Malloum ordered French troops to leave Chad because of his conciliation with Northern Chad and the Muslim rebels. At one time, it seemed as if the USSR might fill this role but since the Soviets were supplying arms to Libya this possibility was lost.¹²⁷ When France intervened in Chad in 1978, in support of Malloum's government, against the threat from the Muslim North, the Soviet Union viewed France's intervention in Chad as part of a French colonial policy to dominate Africa.¹²⁸

The United States accused the Soviet Union of involvement in the civil war in Chad. The American accusation came in 1981 when President Reagan escalated American confrontation with Libya. The Soviet Union denied the American/Western accusation. The Soviet Union was also accused, in 1977, of sending Soviet advisors to train the rebels and the Libyan forces. The American media went further to describe Chad as a new Soviet bridgehead and a communist base in the heart of Africa. The US government tried to use the Soviet threat to win America's public and congressional support for America's policy in Chad.¹²⁹ The Soviets refuted the United States propaganda as disinformation and they accused the United States of preparing public opinion in America and Europe for military intervention in Chad in order to destabilise the Qaddafi regime in Libya.¹³⁰

While the United States attempted to use the Soviet presence in Libya as a sign of Soviet involvement in Chad, other regional powers in Africa were trying to use the Soviet threat to wrest economic and military aid from the West. In January 1981, the Nigerian Foreign Minister described Libya as a proxy force for Soviet influence in West Africa, and he went further to accuse the Soviet Union of seeking control of uranium and other strategic minerals. Egypt was also trying to use the civil war in Chad and the superpowers' competition in Central Africa to obtain further military aid from the United States. The issue was becoming a way for getting arms and economic aid from US and France.¹³¹

The Soviets criticised the French presence in Chad. They accused the French of using the civil war in Chad for preserving France's special relationship with a group of African countries including Chad which has a strategic value to France in Central Africa. The Soviet newspaper *Pravda* asserted that the Soviet Union had nothing to do with what was going on in Chad and that the Soviet objective was to see foreign troops evacuated from Chad.¹³² In 1982, when France and the United States intervened in Chad, a Soviet official described the American objective in the following terms;

“The US is trying to use the present phase of the crises in Chad, caused by the rebellion of Habre, in its own interests. Washington is attracted by geographical position of the country which can easily be turned into a strong point for exerting pressure on Libya, which adheres to anti-imperialist positions.”¹³³

The Soviet Union saw American secret arms supplies to Habre as a destabilising factor against Libya. In 1983, the Soviet Union demanded an immediate stop to foreign intervention in Chad where the domestic conflict risked degenerating into an area of international tension through the fault of the Western powers. The Soviets indirectly warned France against serious aggravation in the Chad situation.

The Soviet Union criticised the involvement in Chad of Western powers who were trying to attract certain African countries into the conflict. The aim of western foreign interference, in the Soviet view, was to force a neo-colonialist government in Chad and to transform the territory of this sovereign state into a new arms base in the fight against the liberty and independence of African people.

The Soviet Union was in favour of overthrowing of Habre regime and replacing it with a new government which would limit French and American interference in Africa. The Soviets were naturally against an American puppet regime in Chad.¹³⁴

Whilst the United States wanted the stability of the Habre regime, the Soviet Union wanted to preserve Qaddafi's stability in Libya. The USSR viewed the French intervention in Chad in 1983 as a result of American pressure on France to intervene. The USSR accused the CIA of being the main supporter of the Habre regime. On 28 January 1983, *Pravda* reported that Habre had been put into power with the assistance of the CIA and that Habre had no support from the Chadian people. The Soviets also said that the Habre government was of doubtful legitimacy, in much the same way as Reagan was doubtful of the legitimacy of Qaddafi's regime in Libya. The Soviet Union denied accusations of Libyan involvement in Chad, and argued that the French and the US were using Libya as an excuse to intervene in Chad and to strengthen their presence in Africa and to protect their puppet regimes in the African continent.¹³⁵

8.7 conclusion

The Maghreb was not "an area of influence" for the US or the Soviet Union. It was not as vital a region as Latin America and Afghanistan or Eastern Europe to the United States or the Soviet Union. The Maghreb might best be considered

a grey area for the Soviet Union and United States. France had seen the Maghreb as 'living space' for French interests and this perception had encouraged French intervention in the region directly or indirectly as in Mauritania, Tunisia, Chad and Morocco.

The superpowers intervened directly with military force in other regions in order to stabilise the situation and to preserve the regional balance of power. Both superpowers had supported stability in the Maghreb and maintained the balance of power except in the case of United States with Libya.

There were similarities in the behaviour of the superpowers towards Maghreb stability and regional conflicts. They saw regional stability and the status quo as the best way to protect their interests. Neither of the superpowers tried to destabilise the situation. Arms sales to North Africa were part of their political and economic objectives.

Both superpowers used regional conflict to extend their influence and presence, but in the case of the Maghreb, both superpowers adopted a cautious approach, and publicly declared a neutral position in the Western Sahara conflict. The prolongation of war was not due to external factors but rather to domestic factors in Algeria and Morocco.

In the case of the stability of North African regimes, both the Soviets and the US supported stability except the American attempts to overthrow Qaddafi and to destabilise his regime because the United States viewed him as a destabilising factor among its allies in the Maghreb, Sudan and Egypt. While the Soviet Union had been supporting Arab and Maghreb unity, the United States worked against Arab and Maghreb unity. The US had seen Arab or Maghreb unity as a threat to

American interests and to Israel.

Notes

1. Coker, C. *Reflection on American Foreign Policy since 1945*, 1989, pp. 120-123. See more For stability in International relations see Bogaturov, A and Pleshakov, K. "The Dynamic of International stability" *International Affairs* (Moscow), March 1991, pp. 30-39.
2. Coker, C. p. 123.
3. For the relation between stability and the status quos See Mohammed Ay-oob, "The Superpowers and Regional Stability", *The World Today*, vol:35, no.5 May 1979, pp. 197-205. See Luard, E. "Superpowers and Regional Conflict" *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1986, pp. 1005-1025. For the tacit pact see, Udo Steinbach "Sources of Third World Conflict" in *Third World Conflict and International Security*, part. 1 no.167, International Institute for strategic studies (IISS), London 1981, pp. 21-28. See also, Nacht, M. "Toward an American Conception of Regional Security", *Daedalus* vol.110 No. 1, 1981, pp. 1-22.
4. For Saudia Arabia's secret pact with the United States, see Sabra, N. "Regional Powers and Superpowers Rivalry", *Politics Internationale* (English Ed), vol:2 no. 1 Spring, 1981, pp. 29-43 also see, For Superpower involvement in certain areas; Luard 1986; Coker 1989.
5. Henry Kissinger, "Military Policy and defence of the grey areas" *Foreign Affairs*, vol.33 no.3 April 1955, pp. 416-429. Vayrynen, R. "Regional Conflict Formations: An Intractable Problem of International Relations" *Journal of*

Peace Research, vol.21 no.4 1984, pp. 337-359.

6. For more details see; Donald Neff "Nixon's Middle East Policy: From balance to bias" *Arab Studies Quarterly*, vol.12 nos.1-2 Winter-Spring, 1990, pp. 121-152.
7. Luard, E. 1986; Coker 1989 op cit. Rejai, M. "On superpowers: Global and Regional" *Co-existence* vol.16 No.1, 1979, pp. 129-141.
8. Ibid; See also for Nicaragua and Contra, the report of the congressional hearing, Daniel K. Inouye, Lee Hamilton, *Iran contra-Affair, The Report of Congressional Committee investigating the Iran-Contra Affair* Random House Inc, 1988. For USA and Sandinistas see Richard Foster. "American Policy toward Sandinistas" *Global Affairs* vol.2 no.2, Spring 1987, pp. 112-122.
9. Michael Nacht "Internal Change and Regime Stability" in *Third World Conflict and International Security*, part. 1 no. 167 IISS (London), 1981, pp. 52-58. Bruce Jentleson "American Commitments in the Third World: Theory vs Practice" *International Organization* vol.41 no.4, 1987, pp. 667-704.
10. For the American objective in the Gulf War with Iraq see Charles William Maynes "A Necessary War?" *Foreign Policy*, No.82, Spring 1991 pp. 159-177.
11. For the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan see, Fred Halliday "Global Conflict and Regional sub-systems: the Case of Afghanistan and the Gulf" in Lawless R. (ed), 1985, pp. 7-23.
12. Luard, 1986, op cit; also Bruce Porter. *the USSR in Third World conflicts*, London: Cambridge University Press, 1984. See also Katz, M. 1982; Shahram Chubin, *Regional Perceptions of the impact of Soviet Policy in the Middle*

- East*, Working Paper no. 28. International security studies program. Wilson Centre Washington, D.C. 9 September 1981.
13. Entessar, N. "Superpowers and Persian Gulf Security" *Third World Quarterly*, vol.10 No.4, October 1988, pp. 1427-1451; MacFarlanes S.N. "Superpower rivalry in the 1990s" *Third World quarterly*, Vol:12 No.1 January 1990, pp. 1-25. Ramati, Y. "Israel and the Iraq-Iran Conflict A Perspective" *Global Affairs* vol.1 No.4 Fall 1987, pp. 135-148. Barry Rubin, "Drowning in the Gulf" *Foreign Policy* No. 69, Winter 1987-1988, 120-134. Kelly, P. "Escalation of Regional Conflict" *Political Geography Quarterly* vol.5 no.2 April 1986, pp. 161-180.
 14. Parker, R. "Appointment in Oujda" *Foreign Affairs* vol.63, no. 5, 1985, pp. 1095-1110. (hereafter Parker 1985). See also Tessler, Mark *Explaining the surprises of King Hassan II: The linkage between domestic and foreign policy in Morocco: Part II: The Arab-African Union between Morocco and Libya*, Universities Field Staff International Inc, no. 39 Indianapolis, 1986 (Here after Tessler UFSI 1986/39). See also, *Washington Post*, September 14 1984; *Christian Science Monitor*, September 7, 1984.
 15. Tessler, M. UFSI 1986/39, op cit.
 16. *The Time*, September 13 1984; *Time magazine*, September 17, 1984, p. 51.
 17. Parker, R. 1985, op cit. Tessler, M. UFSI, 1986/39, p. 4.
 18. Ibid P9. see also *Los Angeles Times*, May 28, 1985, Part I. Tessler, R. UFSF, 1986/39; See also, Wilkinson, Ben "Shifting alignments in the Maghreb" *The Middle East*, May, 1984, pp. 42-44. In an interview with Italian TV, Hassan

stated that "I realized that we did not know each other [Qaddafi] and that becoming closer to him might in my opinion [lead to] understanding the right wayand I say for the sake of history that President Qaddafi pledged many years ago and kept his pledge. He never failed to keep his commitment towards Morocco and towards me personally". Moroccan TV, Rabat in Arabic, 26 November 1991, in SWB, ME-1241 A-1 28 November 1991.

19. It has been reported the Qaddafi was behind the assassination of Hassan Ishkal, former French Prime Minister, Chirac, praised Ishkal he said " This was the man we had hoped would succeed Qaddafi one day". See An interview with Jacques Chirac, *Middle East Report*, vol.17, no.1; January-February 1987, pp. 39-43. Anderson, L. "Libya's Qaddafi: Still in Command?" *Current History*, vol.86, no.517, February 1987, pp. 65-68.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid.
22. Deeb, Mary-Jane. "Inter-Maghribi Relations since 1969: A study of the Modalities of Unions and Mergers" *Middle East Journal*, vol:43 no.1 Winter 1989, pp. 20-32. (Hereafter Deeb, Mary 1989).
23. Tessler. M. UFSI 1986/39 op cit. See For NFSL *New Africa*, October 1983, p. 13, and Deeb, Mary 1991, pp. 142-162.
24. Deeb, Mary, 1989, op cit.
25. Ibid.
26. Parker, R. 1985, op cit.

27. Wilkinson Ben. op cit. Deeb, Mary, 1989, op cit. *The Middle East*, May 1984.
28. Parker, R. 1985, op cit. Tessler M. UFSI, 1986/39 op cit.
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid. See also, Wilkingson, Ben op cit.
32. Tessler, M. UFSI, 1986/39, op cit. Parker R. 1985, op cit.
33. Ibid. *Los Angeles Times*, May 28 1985.
34. *Time Magazine*, Septemer 17 1984, p. 51.
35. *Washington Post*, May 15, 1985. *Los Angeles Times*, May 28/1/1985.
36. *Los Angeles Times*, May 28, 1985, p. 4.
37. Tessler, M. UFSI, 1986/39 op cit.
38. Ibid.
39. *Los Angeles Times*, May 28 1985, P.4. See also Tessler, M. UFSI, 1986/39, op cit.
40. Ibid, See also Tessler, M. UFSI, 1986/40.
41. Parker, R. 1985, p. 1109.
42. The Soviet Union welcomed the Arab Unity on many occasions and it accused Israel and the United States of being the main enemies of Arab Unity. For

- example, the Soviet Union reacted positively to the Arab Federation between Syria, Egypt and Libya in 1971. See *Pravda*, 3 September 1971, in *USSR and the Third World*, vol.1 no.8, 16 August-19 September 1971, p. 451. Soviet *Pravda* described the Arab Federation as a victory against the forces of aggression, zionism and neo-colonialism in the Middle East. *Pravda*, 18 April 1971 *New Times*, no.35, 1971, pp. 20-22.
43. See *Pravda*, 11 October 1971, in *USSR and the Third World*, Vol.1 No. 9 20 September - 24 October, 1971, p. 548.
44. See for Maghreb unity and the Soviet Union, *USSR and Third World*, vol.6 No.1 January 1 - March 31 1976, p. 69.
45. For Libya and Algeria proposal for unity and reconciliation with Iraq see Sciolino, E. "Libya says Political Treaty with Algeria is near" *New York Times*, October 8 1987 p. 3. See also, Deeb, M. 1989 op cit. See, for US and Libya dispute over Tunisia, *New York Times*, June 14 1986 p.2. See, for American and Soviet reaction to Arab Maghreb Union, Mortimer, R. "Maghreb Matters" *Foreign Policy*, no.76, Fall 1989, pp. 160-175, for Bendjedid argument p. 171.
46. For more details, see Hodges, T. *Western Sahara: The Roots of a Desert War*, London: Croom Helm Ltd, 1983.
47. Ibid, See also John Damis *Western Sahara: the Roots of a Desert War*, London: Croom Helm Ltd, 1983.
48. Ibid, also see International Institute for Strategic Studies, *Strategic Survey 1979*, London, 1979, pp. 93-98.

49. Ibid.
50. Ibid.
51. Ibid.
52. Damis, J. *Conflict in Northwest Africa*, pp.52-63. For the text of ICJ in Hodges, T. *Western Sahara*, 1983, pp. 368-372.
53. Ibid. see also, Al Bursan, A. "The Conflict in Northwest Africa: review Article *Arab Strategic thought*, nos 15-16, January-April 1986, pp. 273-278, (in Arabic). See also, John Gretton, *Western Sahara Research Paper No 1 1976*.
54. Damis, J. *Conflict in North West Africa*, pp 34-44. See also Hodges, T. *Western Sahara*, pp. 240-266.
55. Ibid.
56. John Damis, "The Western Sahara, Conflict, Myths and Realities", *The Middle East Journal*, vol:37, no:2, Spring 1983, pp. 169-179.
57. Zoubir, Yahia. "Soviet Policy in the Maghreb," *Arab Studies quarterly*, vol:9, no.4 Fall 1987, pp. 399-421, (Here after Zoubir 1987a). Zoubir, Y. "Soviet Policy toward the Western Sahara conflict," *Africa Today*, vol:34, no.3, 1987, pp. 17-32, (Hereafter Zoubir 1987b). Zoubir, Y. "The Western Sahara Conflict: Regional and International Dimensions", *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol.28, No.2, 1990, pp. 225-244, (Hereafter Zoubir 1990).
58. See *USSR and the Third World*, vol:4, Nos:7,8, September 9 - October 13, 1974, P. 429.

59. Zoubir, Y. 1987b. op cit.
60. Ibid.
61. Gromyko, Anatoly. *Africa: Progress, Problem and Prospects* Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1983.
62. Quoted in Zoubir 1987b, p. 20.
63. Damis, J. 1983, op cit, pp. 127-131. Zoubir, 1987b, op cit.
64. Ibid.
65. Damis, John, 1983, pp. 127-131.
66. Ibid.
67. Zoubir, Y, 1987b; 1987b, op cit.
68. *Le Monde*, November 5 1977, Mentioned in Zoubir, Y. 1987b, op cit, P. 22.
69. Andreyev, K. "The Referendum Issue", *New Times* No. 50 December 1981, pp. 12-13, quotation p. 13.
70. Zoubir, 1987b.
71. Laidi, Zaki. "Stability and Partnership in the Maghreb", in John Stremlau, (Ed.) *Soviet Foreign Policy in an Uncertain World*, the Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, vol:481, September 1985, pp. 127-137.
72. See more details in, John Damis, "The impact of the Saharan Dispute on Moroccan Foreign and Domestic Policy", in Zartman, W. (ed.) *The Politi-*

- cal Economy of Morocco*, New York: Praeger Publisher, 1987, pp. 188-211 (Hereafter Damis, 1987). Mark Tessler, "Politics in Morocco", *American Universities Field Staff*, Report 1981, no:47 Africa. Jone Damis, 1983, pp. 45-73. Tony Hodges, *Western Sahara: The Roots of a Desert War*, West-point, Lawrence Hill & Company, 1983, pp. 174-185. John Mercer, "Confrontation in the Western Sahara Conflict", *The World today*, June 1976, pp. 230-239. Werner Ruf, "The Role of World Powers" in Lawless, R. & Monahan, L, eds. *War and Refugees*, London: Pinter Publishers, 1987, pp. 65-97.
73. John Damis, "Morocco: Political and Economic Prospects". *World Today*, January 1975, pp. 36-46, particularly p. 45.
74. Leo Kamil 1987, op cit. pp. 10-15. Stephen Zunes, "The United States and Morocco: The Sahara War and Regional Interests". *Arab Studies Quarterly*, vol.9 No.4, Fall 1987, pp. 422-441.
75. Ibid.
76. Ibid.
77. *Africa News*, November 2, 1979, quoted in Zunes, S, 1987, p.42. also, Leo Kamil 1987, p. 12.
78. Parker, R. 1987, op cit. P. 126, ft7.
79. Ware, Lewis B. *Decolonization and the Global Alliance in the Arab Maghrib: the Case of Spanish Sahara*. Montgomery, Alabama: Air University Institute for Professional Development 1975, p. 3; quoted also in Kamil, 1987, p. 11.
80. Tony Hodges "At odds with Self-Determination: The United States and West-

ern Sahara” in Bender G. et al, *African Crisis Areas and U.S. Foreign Policy*, Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1985, pp. 257-276.

81. Kissinger H. *Years of Upheaval*.

82. Quoted in Kamil 1987, p. 10.

83. Damis, J. 1983 pp119-130; Hodges, T. 1985 op cit; W. Ruf, 1987, op cit. Kamil 1987, op. cit.

84. Ibid, also, Stephen Solarz, op cit.

85. Ibid.

86. Ibid.

87. Ibid.

88. Kamil op cit. Damis 1983, pp. 114-119.

89. Damis 1983 p. 123.

90. Kamil 1987; Hodges 1983; Damis 1983.

91. David J. Dean. *The Air Force Role in Low-Intensity Conflict*, Alabama: Maxwell Air Force base, Air University, Air University Press, 1988, p. 56.

92. Strategic Survey 1979, pp97-98; Kamil op cit, Hodges 1985.

93. Wenger, M. “Reagan stakes Morocco in Sahara Struggle” *Merip Reports*, May 1982, pp. 22-26.

94. Ibid. Hodges 1985; Hodges 1983, pp. 356-359

95. Dean, D.J. op cit.
96. Yahia Zoubir "The Western Sahara Conflict: Regional and International Dimensions", *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol:28, No. 2, 1990 pp. 225-244.
97. Wright, John *Libya, Chad and the Central Sahara*, London: Hurst and Co, pp. 126-127.
98. See also Yost, David. "French Policy in Chad and the Libyan Challenge" *Orbis* Vol:26 No:4 1983, pp. 965-997. Morgenthau, Ruth; Stevenson, A. *Current French Policy towards Africa* Research paper, Brandeis University, n.d. pp. 348-36. See also, Moose, G. "French Military Policy in Africa" in Foltz, W.; Bienen, H. (Ed) op cit.
99. Neuberger, Benyamin. *Involvement, Invasion and Withdrawal: Qaddafi's Libya and Chad 1969-1981*, occasional paper no.83, Tel Aviv University, 1982, pp. 9-21.
100. Ibid. See also Yost D. op cit.
101. Ibid.
102. Ibid. See also Wright, John op cit, pp. 126-140.
103. Ibid. See also Lemarchand, Rene. "The Crisis in Chad" in Bender, G.; Coleman, J.; Sklar, R. *African Crisis Areas and U.S. Foreign Policy*, Los Angeles; University of California Press, 1985, pp. 239-256, (hereafter Lemarchand 1985).
104. Neuberger, B. op cit, pp. 25-37.

105. Ibid p.60, Lemarchand 1985 op cit. See also, Francis S. "Libya's empire of terror" *Africa Insight* vol:12, No. 1, 1982, pp. 4-10.
106. Neuberger, op cit. pp 25-30. Wright, John op cit, pp. 126-137. Also, Yost, David, 1983, op cit. The French did not trust Tombalbaye after fifteen years in power because he tried to distance himself from France under the US pressure, Faligot, R; Kroppe, *La Piscine: The French Secret Service since 1944*, translated by Halls, W. D, London: Basil Blackwell, 1989, p. 262.
107. Neuberger, op cit. pp. 31-41.
108. Ibid; Culley, H. "Chad: US Policy", *gist, Department of State: Bureau of Public Affairs*, Washington D.C. 1987, pp. 1-2. R. LeMarchand, 1985, op cit.
109. Ibid.
110. Legum, C, (ed.) *Africa Contemporary Record: Annual survey and Documents, 1977-1978* New York: American Publishing Company, 1979, p. B547.
111. Lemarchand, R. 1985, Op cit. See also *American Foreign Policy*, 1981, pp. 1147-1156.
112. Ibid.
113. Ibid. See also Cully, H. op cit.
114. Ibid; Haley, E. op cit. p. 208-210.
115. Ibid. Wright, C. 1982A op cit.
116. Lemarchand, R. 1985 op cit.
117. *Washington Post* 2, August 1983, p.2. *Washington Times*, 26 August 1983,

- p. 6. *Washington Post*, 24 August 1983 Part II, main edition.
118. *Washington Post*, 2 August 1983, p. 1.
119. Culley, H. op cit.
120. Ibid.
121. Ibid. p. 2.
122. *New York Times*, 11 March 1991. Down, R. "Gaddafi gains as Chad expels
"Contra Forces" *Independent* (London), 14 December 1990, p12. Lucas, E.
"How CIA found a home for its hot potatoes" *Independent* (London). 13
March 1991, p. 9.
123. Ibid.
124. Legum, C. (ed), 1977-1978, op cit.
125. Laidi, Z. *The Superpowers and Africa: The Constraints of a Rivalry 1960-
1990*, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1990, pp. 36-38.
126. Ibid.
127. Legum, C. op cit. p. B547.
128. *Pravda* 14 January 1981, in *USSR - Third World*, vol:11, nos. 1-2, pp. 34-35.
129. I. Tarutin. "The Tragedy of Chad" *Pravda*, 17 May 1982, in *USSR-Third
World*, vol.12, Nos.3-4, 1982, 7 March 6 July, 1982, p. 41. See for American
perception toward Libya in Chad. Amos John. "Libya in Chad: Soviet Sur-
rogate or Nomadic Imperialist?" *conflict*, vol.5, no.1, 1983, pp. 1-18. Francis
S. op cit.

130. Ibid.

131. Haley, E. op cit. p. 205-9. Times (London). 8 January 1981.

132. Ibid. *Pravda*, 15.1.1981.

133. Tarutin, I, op cit.

134. *Pravda*, 12 July, 1983. *Izvestia*, 6 July 1983.

135. Ibid; Also, Tarutin, I, op cit.

Chapter IX

Conclusion

This thesis has traced the superpower involvement with North Africa and, in particular, it has analysed the political, economic, and strategic relations of the superpowers with the Maghreb states. The thesis begins by arguing that economic and strategic interests have shaped the superpowers' behaviour toward North Africa. Overall, national interests have dominated their behaviour, and ideology has been a relatively less important factor in superpower relations with the Maghreb. It is argued that France has influenced the superpowers' attitudes towards North Africa and both of the superpowers paid more attention to their relations with France rather than with the Maghreb states because of the important French role in Europe.

In the introduction to this thesis, I pointed out that systematic studies of superpower relations with the Maghreb are few. This thesis is therefore offered as a contribution, if not pioneer to the literature on superpower-Maghreb relations. The usefulness of this study is found in its comprehensive analysis of superpower involvement in the Maghreb and, partly in its exploration of the particular themes which have contributed to superpower relations with the Third World. The Maghreb is a unique case in superpower relations with Third World countries, particularly because of the French historical involvement there. The thesis also explored the interdependence of political, economic, geostrategic and external elements in the superpowers' relations with the Maghreb.

Three tasks remain: the first is to summarise the analysis and the themes; the second is to see whether the analysis has a relevance beyond the Maghreb, and the third task is to outline the prospects for future relations.

The thesis emphasises that the European powers were interested in the Maghreb states for strategic and economic reasons. During the multipolar system which prevailed in the 19th and early 20th centuries, the European powers competed to dominate North Africa for strategic, economic and political reasons. France saw North Africa as its backyard, and struggled hard to dominate the region. Great Britain saw North Africa as vital for British naval power, and strategically important for the protection of its trade routes in the Mediterranean and the Atlantic.

The European multipolar system evolved in such a way as to produce a balance of power policy to protect the different interests. Africa was divided up so as to appease these interests rather than produce confrontation. Great Britain supported France in North Africa after it had won French support in Egypt. Italy dominated Libya, while Spain shared Morocco with France, and Germany was compensated by Cameroon. The European multipolar system was not motivated by ideological considerations but rather by economic interests and the struggle for political power within Europe. The struggle was extended to the colonial areas. Geopolitical factors in the multipolar system influenced the behaviour of European states towards North Africa and European states were eager to discourage other states from outside the European system from gaining a foot-hold in North Africa. France had fought hard to prevent the United States from gaining an economic base in North Africa, particularly in Morocco. Great Britain tried to prevent Russia from gaining maritime bases or influence in the Mediterranean.

The evidence presented in this thesis demonstrates the value of the multipolar system to North African states. As we saw in chapters two and four, the European states competed strongly over North Africa, and it took them many years to reach agreements over Morocco, Tunisia and Libya because of the colonial ambitions of the new powerful nation-states in Europe such as Germany and Italy. It was easier for France in the early 19th century to occupy Algeria (1831) because Britain was the only powerful state able to challenge France but historically it is easier to reach an agreement with one actor and to share interests rather than to reach an agreement with many different actors and interests. It had taken France more than thirty years to reach agreement with Spain over dividing Morocco because Germany, Italy and Great Britain all had different interests in North Africa.

I believe that a multipolar system would serve the Third World countries better because it is easier for small states to resist powerful states and to find an ally for protection in a multipolar system rather than in a unipolar or a bipolar system. When France occupied Algeria, Amir Abd al-kadir asked the United States and Great Britain for help against French occupation, but the US was not (until WWI) part of the European system and the Mediterranean was dominated by only one European power, Britain, which had more interest in co-operating with France rather than confronting her over Algeria. Until 1912, the Sultan of Morocco had successfully maneuvered to protect Morocco's sovereignty by exploiting his diplomatic ties with Spain, Germany, the United States and Britain.

1- Indirect Support for the Independence of the Maghreb States

In the more recent bipolar system, despite the presence of ideological conflict and the cold war, the superpowers' behaviour in North Africa was dominated by

their respective national interests. Both of the superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, were influenced by strategic and economic interests. Neither superpower directly supported the independence of North Africa, despite the United States' adoption of the self-determination principle and the Soviet Union's hostility to colonialism. Both superpowers prioritised their strategic interests in Europe, leaving France a role in North Africa. Despite the Soviet rhetoric of supporting national liberation movements, it did not support the Algerian cause until the eve of the FLN's political victory when France recognized the Algerian demand for independence. Both superpowers adopted an indirect approach to support Third World countries and, in particular, they created and used the international trade union movement as one means of influencing events.

The evidence suggests the fact that the international trade unions, ICFTU and WFTU were used by the United States and the Soviet Union respectively to increase their influence in the Third World and to avoid direct confrontations with France or other colonial powers in the Third World. The United States went further to support North African trade unions by providing information on French activities. The CIA links with North African nationalists were largely through trade unions, and the United States was more interested in trade unions because they were well organized and they were part of French trade unions before they became independent. Trade unions in North Africa had a greater power than the trade unions in other parts of the Middle East.

It has been argued in this thesis that the American trade unions, American Federation of Labour and Congress of Industrial Organizations were successful in North Africa because of North African trade unions' experience with the communists in France. First, the communists had influence in French trade unions but

the majority of the French communists supported the French presence in Algeria. Second, the founders of the communist parties in North Africa were non-Muslim, and the majority of them were Jewish who affiliated with and supported the French policy in North Africa.

2- Ideology is Secondary to National Interest with France

We have argued in this thesis that the behaviour of both superpowers in third party areas of influence were not primarily determined by ideological factors, but by the superpowers' interests with the third party itself. The priority lay with the superpowers' relations with the third party (France) and the superpowers' relations with the third party's area of influence was secondary to their relations with France. If there were contradictions between the superpowers' interests with France and superpowers' support for North Africa, the superpowers preferred to deal with France rather than with North Africa, despite the superpowers' ideological principles of anti-colonialism and self-determination. Both superpowers were therefore pragmatic in their policies towards the Maghreb. The thesis supports the argument of the realist school of world politics which emphasises that nations behave according to their national interests rather than their professed ideology.

In the 1950s, France was suspicious of the United States' relations with the Maghreb states. The French were sensitive to American attempts to displace them in North Africa, particularly for economic reasons. The French suspicion was a reaction to American efforts in Iran and Egypt to replace or to share interests with the British. The Soviet priorities were in the Northern tier of the Middle East and with Europe rather than with North Africa. North African leaders therefore focused on the US rather than on the Soviet Union to put pressure on France to

gain their independence.

In the case of the ideological factor in the foreign policies of Maghreb states, the thesis argues that radical states in North Africa, such as Algeria and Libya, have used radicalism as a means to legitimise their regimes. This is also the case in other radical states in the Third World. Both Algeria and Libya suppressed and banned the communist parties. The Algerian government worked with communists but only as individuals rather than as members of a legal political organization. The evidence confirms the view that there is often a gulf between rhetoric and reality which produces highly ironic situations, for example, a radical Angolan regime using Cuban troops to guard Gulf Oil facilities against the black Unita forces supported by a racist South African government and the CIA.

Comparing the superpowers' behaviour in other Third World areas, the United States did not hesitate in the Cuban Missile Crisis to precipitate a nuclear confrontation with the USSR to protect its sphere of influence. The Soviet Union supported Vietnam in furtherance of ideological and strategic objectives in South-east Asia. It was a matter of vital interests and balance of power for the USSR. Even in 1968, the Brezhnev doctrine in Eastern Europe was part of its protection of its sphere of influence and, when the Soviets felt their interests threatened, it was extended to Afghanistan. Historically, French behaviour in North Africa has been to some extent similar to both US policy in Latin America and to the Brezhnev doctrine. When Mitterrand threatened to use force in Algeria in June 1991 if the Islamic Salvation Front endangered the Algerian regime, it demonstrated clearly the continuing French concern with North Africa.¹

Superpower competition was greater in the eastern part of the Middle East

than in North Africa as each sought to replace each other or limit each other's presence. The British withdrawal from east of Suez left a power vacuum, which was rather different from the French withdrawal from North Africa where she left behind strong cultural, political and economic influences. This French legacy has limited the superpowers' role in the area.

3- Political conflict with France encourages the Maghreb states to approach the US or USSR while conflicts with the US encourage the Maghreb states to approach USSR and vice-versa

The superpowers' political relations with North Africa were at a normal level, not dramatically strong as in the case of Egypt and the Soviet Union. On the other hand, the governments of North Africa were cautious about dealing with the superpowers and even Algerian relations with the Soviet Union passed through suspicious and critical periods. The conflict between the United States and Algeria over international political issues encouraged Algeria to build political ties with the USSR. Also, Qaddafi turned to the USSR after his conflict with the United States over political issues despite him being strongly anti-communist. Morocco turned to the United States after its conflict with France over Algeria, Mauritania, and other political issues. Bourguiba approached the United States after his difficulties with France over Bizerta and Algerian independence.

4- The superpowers tried to build cultural ties with North Africa so as to influence the political elites in the Maghreb but French cultural domination proved a major obstacle

In cultural terms, the superpowers were unsuccessful in influencing elites in North Africa. Despite the fact that cultural co-operation was part of the super-

powers' political strategy, they were unsuccessful because the French were maintaining and spreading the French language. France was the first colonial country to strengthen its relations with its colonies through language. Most of the former French colonies in Africa still use French as the official language. Most of the superpowers' efforts to exploit domestic political forces through cultural cooperation have been counterproductive because of the strong French cultural presence there.

The political relations with both superpowers tend not to influence cultural cooperation, for example, more Algerian and Libyan students have chosen to study in the United States than in the Soviet Union. Whilst Morocco has close relations with the United States, most Moroccan students attend French universities. Soviet educational assistance is the principal reason why many North African students attend higher institutions in the USSR. The Soviet Union offered scholarships and this policy was attractive to poor countries such as the North African states. Returning students have not greatly increased Soviet influence, even fewer seem to have changed their political persuasions after four or five years of study in the USSR; indeed, they became anti-communist.

French cultural co-operation is still strong in North Africa, in spite of the tensions between the Arabists and Francophonists in Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco over domestic policy such as the Arabianisation of educational institutions. In 1989, there were 12,948 Algerian; 25,834 Moroccan and 7,172 Tunisian students in France and there were 1,705 and 2,242 North African students in the USSR and the USA respectively.²

The thesis draws attention to a neglected dimension in international relations theories, the role of cultural factors in the analysis and interpretation of superpower

involvements in the Third World. The cultural element is an important factor in great power influence in the Third World. The colonial powers still have influence in their former colonies because of their cultural influence among elites there. The French cultural influence is an important factor in preserving French influence in North Africa.

Human rights issues have been used by the superpowers to put pressure on North African states. In 1965, after the overthrow of Ben Bella's regime, the Soviet Union criticised Algeria because of the political arrest of communists and other political opponents. The Soviets preferred an indirect reaction to the coup. The United States also used human rights as a political means to discredit Qaddafi's regime; even Carter's administration used the human rights issue against Morocco to put political pressure on Hassan II.

5- Strong economic ties despite political differences

The superpowers built up economic relations with North Africa despite their political differences. Soviet economic links with the Maghreb were not influenced by political concerns, as was the case in the eastern part of the Arab World. For instance, Egypt's share of Soviet trade with Arab countries plummeted from 68.0 per cent in 1965 under President Nasser's leadership to 15.5 per cent in 1980 when Egypt abandoned the socialist model and turned to the United States.³ The case was different in the Maghreb because of the Soviet need for hard currency and the Maghreb states' need for Soviet economic co-operation, particularly in construction projects and arms sales. The United States had substantial oil investments in both Libya and Algeria, while the Soviet Union had strong economic ties with Morocco. However, despite all this, in general economic terms Europe ranked first in dealing

with the Maghreb states, particularly as a market for European exports.

American economic interests influenced American relations with the colonial powers. United States applied pressure on France over Morocco to secure an open door policy; the US intended to force France to remove the French commercial restriction over the Moroccan markets for American goods. The open door policy also affected relations with Britain. The latter complained of American pressure for an open door policy in Third World countries, especially in former British colonies.⁴

American oil companies actively sought a place in the Middle East oil industry but in the inter-war period British-based oil companies appeared to have a strong advantage in that Britain was still the key military and political power in much of the region. In their efforts to penetrate the Middle East oil industry, the American majors had the strong and active support of the American State Department. The United States supported Mousadeq's nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian oil company (now British Petroleum), then almost 100% owned by the British. The US turned (US-British coup in 1953) against Mousadeq only after the American companies had acquired 40% of the Iranian oil. The United States helped Algeria when the latter nationalized its oil. The Soviet Union also supported the nationalization of the oil companies in the Middle East for ideological and economic reasons. This economic competition might well return in the new multipolar system of the 1990s. Both superpowers welcomed and encouraged the increase in oil prices in the early 1970s. The Soviet Union benefited from oil's prices, and the United States benefited from the effect of high oil prices on the European and Japanese economies.

The United States and the Soviet Union both offered economic aid to the Maghreb states, but American aid was linked with American political objectives, for example, the United States refused to offer economic aid to Algeria because of political differences, and they did not offer aid to Libya. American aid to Morocco had increased in the 1980s because of Reagan's strategic objective in gaining access to Moroccan military bases. The Soviet Union was not able to offer considerable financial aid because of domestic economic difficulties but also Soviet aid was linked to Soviet political objectives in North Africa.

6- Economic interests behind arms transfers

Economic interests tended to dominate superpowers arms transfers to the Maghreb states. The Soviet Union transferred arms for hard currency without any restrictions or ideological inhibitions. The United States was not a major supplier to Morocco and Tunisia because they did not have the financial resources of other American friends such as Saudi Arabia, Iran until 1979, and the GCC states, who paid billions of US dollars for American weapons. This thesis argues that it was economic factors rather than security considerations which dominated arms transfers to North Africa.

The superpowers paid considerable attention to military training programmes to influence the North African military but they were not successful in supplanting French military influence. French trained military personnel have been in power for decades in Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco. Ben Bella served in the French army before the Algerian revolution, the present Algerian Defense Minister, Khalid Nazzar, joined the Algerian revolution after he had served in the French army, and only left the French for the FLN on the eve of the Algerian victory.⁵

In Morocco, the Commander of the Moroccan military, King Hassan was trained in France and graduated from Bordeaux University. President Ben Ali of Tunisia trained in French and American military academies. Qaddafi is the only military leader in the Maghreb who trained in the United Kingdom. The thesis argues that the superpowers were not able to challenge the French. The Soviet Union was not able to influence the military in Algeria or Libya despite a large Soviet military programme directed at the Third World.

The American International Military Education and Training (IMET) programme achieves considerable success in other parts of the world but not in North Africa. According to a 1991 congressional presentation prepared by the Department of State and the Defense Security Assistance Agency, over 1,500 IMET-trained personnel (as a whole) are now cabinet ministers, ambassadors, chief of military services and commandant of senior professional military schools. The French and the French-trained personnel in North Africa are suspicious of such American training programmes. In the unsuccessful F-5 air assassination attempt against King Hassan of Morocco in 1972, the rebel pilots were trained in the United States. The death of Adlemi in 1983 was part of the French-American struggle to influence military elites in Morocco.⁶

The thesis confirms that geostrategy played a major role in superpower relations with the Maghreb states, particularly during the cold war era. Regional states, however, tended not to take sides between the superpower, despite the American bases in Morocco, because the Americans did not have complete mandate over these bases as they did in Iran under the Shah or in the Philippines. Geopolitical considerations therefore prevailed over ideological affinity in the superpowers' strategic relations with the Maghreb states.

The study also confirms that neither radical states in North Africa such as Algeria or Libya nor the conservative states such as Morocco and Tunisia have served as proxy forces for the superpowers in cases of regional conflict or intervention. In the case of Moroccan intervention in Shaba I and Shaba II in Zaire, the thesis demonstrates that Morocco worked closely with the French and Hassan II tried to use this act as a political gesture to win American congressional support in the Western Sahara conflict. The Moroccans might therefore be considered as proxy for the French more than for the United States.

The superpowers were in favour of stability in the Maghreb and they did not intervene directly in regional conflicts. Both superpowers saw the stability of North African regimes as being in their interests because they could not usually gain enough influence to enable them to change the regimes to their sphere of influence as happened in the cases of Gaafar Nimeri in Sudan, or Najibullah in Afghanistan.

The superpowers' behaviour in other regional conflicts was rather different, for example, Afghanistan, where the CIA were involved in helping the Afghan Mujahedin to destabilise the Afghanistan government. The superpowers confronted each other in Vietnam, and supported opposing factions in Angola because of the superpowers' vital interests. The United States intervened in Panama for American geopolitical interests as it intervened in other Central American conflicts. The Soviet Union intervened in Czechoslovakia in 1968 because of direct Soviet interests there. In the case of the Maghreb, the superpowers saw that there were no advantages to exploiting the regional conflicts there. Moreover, as we have seen their relations with neighbouring governments were insufficiently close to allow them to intervene on behalf of one side or the other. In general terms, the superpowers

intervene when their sphere of influence is under threat. American involvement in Chad was not serious enough to destabilise Qaddafi. Even the Carter administration saw Chad as an area of French interest.

The United States antagonised the Arab nationalist movement in 1950s and it saw Arab unity as a threat to American interests in the region. The United States opposed to the Arab unity in 1960s, and the United States adopted the same attitude toward the case of the Arab African Union between Morocco and Libya. The United States favoured political fragmentation in the Arab world because any united front in the Arab world would jeopardise American interests because of the United States longstanding support of Israel. The United States criticised Algeria over the proposed unity with Libya and put pressure on Morocco to abrogate the unity agreement with Libya. The United States also reacted cautiously to the Arab Maghreb Union.

On the other hand, the Soviet Union welcomed Arab unity because it furthered Soviet interests. A strong Arab front against the US would serve Soviet interests against the US. Moreover, Arab unity would strengthen the Soviet Union's relations with the Arab world and the Soviet Union would avoid the dilemma of taking sides in intra-Arab conflict between conservative and progressive regimes. The Soviet Union saw unity in North Africa as way of a strengthening of the Soviet position in North Africa as it might reduce the isolation of Soviet friends such as Libya.

In the case of the Western Sahara conflict the thesis supported the argument that the conflict is related to the domestic and regional policies of both Morocco and Algeria. Morocco has been using the conflict for long term domestic stability

to distract attention from political and economic difficulties such as 1981 and 1984 riots.

Both superpowers have not directly involved themselves in the dispute. In order to sustain their vital interests with two North African rivals, the superpowers subordinated the issue of independence for the Western Sahara to untroubled interaction with both Morocco and Algeria. The two superpowers have maintained cordial relations with Morocco and Algeria through effective management of the Western Sahara conflict.

Comparing the Western Sahara conflict to the Eritrea or Namibia conflict, Western Sahara is not directly linked to Algeria's national interest as Eritrea is to Ethiopians. An Ethiopia without the Eritrean coast's access to the Red Sea would be a land-locked state with almost no strategic value. In this sense, both Addis Ababa and the superpowers are concerned about their interests in the Horn of Africa and the Middle East, but the Western Sahara is not vital to Algerian national security.

The strategies of South Africa and the Western countries were based upon the defense of their interests while they managed the Namibian problem. Moreover, the Namibian issue became an American domestic issue in American foreign policy because of black and liberal concern in the US. In the case of Western Sahara the issue is different. Algeria is not a land-locked country, and cooperation is possible with Morocco, and the phosphate resources of the disputed territory are already divided between Spain, Morocco and Mauritania. Also, French companies are active both in Morocco and Algeria, and for the two superpowers there is no vital interest to get involved directly.

Compared to the Palestinian issue and the Iran-Iraq war, the Western Sahara is different because the other two conflicts are linked to domestic, regional and global interests and the strategic objectives of both the United States and the USSR, and these interests have tended to complicate the two issues and encouraged direct involvement in the conflicts. The United States is directly involved in the Palestinian issue partly because it is a domestic issue in the US through the work of the Jewish lobby. The Soviet Union supported the Arab states by political means and arms. Both superpowers also sided with Iraq and Iran during the Gulf war to protect their interests and to maintain the regional balance of power.

The Maghreb is a special case in the superpower relations with the Third World. While the East-West conflict tended to shape the superpowers' behaviour in the Third World countries, North Africa's relations with the superpowers have been influenced by other external factors, such as the EC, especially France.

7- Prospects for the Future

When Gorbachev came to power in March 1985, he focused on Soviet internal problems and adopted the policies of *glasnost* and *perestroika* to deal with Soviet economic problems. Gorbachev also adopted a new approach to Soviet foreign policy and his new thinking and the downgrading of Marxist-Leninist ideology in world affairs was a radical departure. Moreover, Gorbachev decreased Soviet involvement in the Third World and focused on Soviet economic problems.

The disintegration of the Soviet Union and its retreat from the Third World has shaped the international system. The military confrontations between the US and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) are mostly eliminated, and a new international system has emerged. The new system is characterised by

economic factors. A new multipolar system has emerged and economic competition is the main issue in this new system. Japan, the EEC, China and the United States are now the main players in this new system.

The CIS is preoccupied with its own economic problems. The Republics are desperate for financial aid from the West to rebuild their economies. The Commonwealth market has become attractive to capitalist competition. In the meantime the Russian withdrawal from the Third World and its economic problems has left the Third World to the EC states, China, the United States and Japan. In the Middle East, Russia has turned towards the Gulf states for financial aid. During the Gulf Crisis the Soviets obtained \$5.5 billion from Saudi Arabia and \$2.0 billion from Kuwait. This is the first time the Soviets have shifted their attention to concentrate on the Gulf.⁷

The CIS is unable to compete with the EEC in the development of the North African economies. As a result of the Soviet disintegration, the independent Muslim republics of Central Asia have become another factor in influencing future Russian relations with the Maghreb States. Historically, Russia engaged in bloody wars with Muslims, particularly with the Ottoman Empire in the eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries.

With the spread of Islamic fundamentalism in both the Maghreb and the Muslim republics of the former Soviet Union, the Maghreb outlook will be focused towards the Muslim republics because the new Commonwealth has nothing to offer to North Africa in international affairs as a result of the decline of Russian power at international level. The Russians might continue construction projects in the Maghreb, or fishing cooperation as with Morocco, but it will be very hard

for Russia or other republics to replace or compete with the US or the EC in investment, or export and import relations with the Maghreb states.⁸

The major competition in the Maghreb in the 1990s will be between the United States and the EC countries. The EC states will also compete amongst themselves over the North African market particularly between France and other EC countries, but this will depend on how well the integration policy develops in the EC in 1992. The integration of the EC seems likely to lead to intense competition between the US and the EC in Third World markets.

The United States has signed economic co-operation agreements with the Maghreb States in the past three years. But American economic aid is limited compared to the EC aid to North Africa (Tables 9:1; 9:3). But on the other hand, there are two possible levels of tension; first, competition between the US and the Maghreb for agricultural markets in Europe, American agricultural products might compete with North African products in Europe, just as Soviet natural gas and oil had competed with North African gas and oil in Europe. The United States demands a free trade market or only limited protection for agricultural trade in Europe. This policy might affect the North African states because both the United States and the Maghreb states compete over the agricultural market in Europe. Second; there is also competition between the US and Europe for agricultural markets in the Maghreb e.g. cereals and livestock products. In February 1990, the EC countries protested to the US when the latter sold wheat to Tunisia at 8% less than the EC price.

The Maghreb states try to have some kind of special status in their agricultural relations with the EC, and to avoid conflict over agricultural issues in the EC

market, and to strengthen their economic relations. The Maghreb states signed an agreement for co-operation with Southern European states, Italy, France, Spain and Portugal in Rome in October 1990, to strengthen their economic cooperation in the Western Mediterranean (4+5 group). Malta joined them in December 1991.

Table 9:1 The United States aid and Credits to Maghreb 1988-1990

States	US economic aid	US military aid	US agricultural export credits
Algeria	0	\$2.2 million	\$2.1 billion
Libya	0	0	0
Morocco	\$268.8 million	\$147.4 million	\$495 million
Tunisia	\$90.2 million	\$91.3 million	\$437.1 million

Source: Joe Stork "North Africa Faces the 1990' *Middle East Report*, no.163, vol.20 no.2, March-April 1990, p5.

The Maghreb states have recently encouraged foreign investment and have privatised much of their economic sectors to develop their economies and cope with the rise in unemployment and their heavy debts (Algeria \$24.8 billion, Morocco \$19.9 billion, Tunisia \$ 6.6 billion in 1989).⁹ The United States' war against Iraq under the UN umbrella created anti-American feeling and support for Iraq in the Maghreb (on the public level) but the continuation of this feeling will depend on American behaviour towards the Palestinian problem and internal political change in the Maghreb. The struggle now in the Maghreb is between secular regimes and fundamentalist movements. The outcome of this struggle will shape Maghreb relations with Europe and the US.

Four factors still dominate EC economic relations with the Maghreb states: trade, investment, labour and financial aid. Political relations are still dominated by regimes which have good relations with the EC in general and France in particular. In the multipolar system in the 1990s, European economic relations with the Maghreb have penetrated all North African economic sectors, and the EC, particularly France, Germany and Italy is the dominant economic force in the Maghreb.

The EC is the leading trading partner of Maghreb states. The EC accounts for about two thirds of the Maghreb states' foreign trade (60% of imports and 67% of exports), while the Maghreb states accounted for 3.8% of the EC's imports and 3.3% of its exports in 1989.¹⁰ Obviously, the Maghreb states are a major market for European industrial products. On the other hand, preferential trade arrangements ensure free access for industrial products and tariff concessions for most of the Maghreb's agricultural exports to the EC.

The EC is an important market for the Maghreb states' products, particularly hydrocarbons: 96% of Algeria's and 95% of Libya's exports are to the EC. Moreover, more than 10% of the EC's gas requirements come from Algeria. The Maghreb states are desperate to build stronger economic relations with the EC.¹¹

The Maghreb states have encouraged European investment projects in the Maghreb. In 1989, 15% of Morocco's total investments were from foreign resources, 71% of this from the EC. France, Germany and Italy are the leading investors in North Africa. The dependence of the Maghreb economies on the EC played a major role in strengthening the economic ties between the Maghreb states and the EC.¹²

There are 1,840,346 North Africans in the EC, 76.9% of them are in France. Most of the North Africans are migrant workers, they came from Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia. Very few Libyans emigrate to the EC. It has been estimated that there are 819,000 Algerians in the EC, 747,000 Moroccans, and 238,000 Tunisians. The financial transfers these migrant workers make are an important part of the balance of payments of the Maghreb countries, particularly Morocco.¹³ The transfers are a prime source of foreign exchange for Morocco and exceed even phosphates and tourism, amounting to 22% of the current balance in 1987.¹⁴

The North African migrant workers have become a political issue between the Maghreb states and the EC, particularly France. France has been trying to limit immigration or even to expel migrant workers. They have become a major issue in French domestic politics.

Table 9:2 Net Transfers of funds by Maghreb workers (\$ million)

States	1970	1987
Algeria	178	434
Morocco	27	1587
Tunisia	20	486

Source: Commission of the European Communities, *The Countries of the Greater Arab Maghreb and the European Community*, Europe Information, DE 68, January 1991, p11.

The most important factor in economic co-operation between Europe and the Maghreb states is financial aid. Europe is still the Maghreb's biggest source

of official aid, providing almost half of its total world aid (an average of 47.3% between 1985-88). France provides the most aid, 40% of all bilateral aid from Europe to Tunisia and more than 90% to Algeria. Germany is also a major donor and it is followed by Italy and Belgium (Table 9:3).

Table 9:3 Financial aid from EC members to Maghreb (average over 1985-1988)

States	Algeria	Morocco	Tunisia
France	91	69	39
Germany	2	23	14
Italy	3	4	41.5
Belgium	3	2	3
Member States total	100%	100%	100%
Average (\$ million)	54	232	132

Source: Commission of the European Communities, *The Countries of the Greater Arab Maghreb and the European Community*, op cit.

Comparing American and French economic aid to the Maghreb, France is still the dominant influence over the Maghreb economy through trade, migrant workers, investment and financial aid. The most likely route for US penetration of Maghreb states is through political issues in a future struggle between secular and French orientated elites and Islamic fundamentalists. France will simply not allow American companies to penetrate Maghreb states in the French sphere of influence and its geopolitical backyard. Pierre Marion, the former chief of French intelligence, who

headed the French intelligence agency DGSE in 1981-1982, admitted that French government has been spying on US corporations and their executives in France. French spies went further to follow American business travellers, particularly in Africa. Marion stated "*in economic competition we're competitors*".¹⁵

Future scenario of France-US relations in Maghreb:

The United States might conduct a policy of competition with France and other EC countries to penetrate North Africa after the decline of US-USSR competition because Europe is the only economic force which could compete with the US after Japan. There are a number of potential scenarios:

1- Islamic Fundamentalist Scenario: Maghreb governments have been facing a challenge from Islamic fundamentalists. The failure of economic development, social problems, unemployment, poverty (in 1985 40% of Moroccans lived below the poverty line, and in 1991 30% of the workforce is unemployed) and the political situation in North Africa has created a ripe environment for the Islamic Fundamentalists as an alternative to the failure of existing regimes.¹⁶

In Tunisia, the al-Nahda party and the Islamic Liberation party (Hizb al-Tahrir) are the main challengers to the Ben Ali regime. They have accused Ben Ali of being an American puppet. The al-Nahda party is more moderate in American eyes and an American congressional delegation met with al-Nahda in 1986. The French government has welcomed the Tunisian Islamic members in France but, under pressure from Ben Ali, France expelled their leaders. Rashid al-Ganoshi, the leader of al-Nahda, is living in exile in the United Kingdom, before that he was travelling with a Sudanese diplomatic passport.

In Algeria, the *Front Islamique du Salut (FIS)* (Islamic Salvation Front) is the

strongest opposition group in Algeria and became legal in 1988 winning a majority in municipal elections in June 1991. But it has clashed with the Algerian government. France threatened to intervene in Algeria if the Islamic Fundamentalists threatened the regime there. After the FIS major victory in the Algerian new general election, in December 1991, the Algerian government has become more aware of the Islamic threat. In January 1992, President Bendjedid resigned, and the military-controlled council cancelled the second round of national elections, banned the activities of the FIS and arrested its leaders. Morocco is less threatened by Islamic fundamentalists because they have been outlawed. King Hassan claims that he is a descendant of the Prophet and the Commander of the Faithful. The main group is *al-Adl wal-Ihsan*, its leader, Abdel Salam Yassin, is under house arrest. The militant group in Morocco is the Islamic Youth (*al-Shabiba al-Islamiyya*), its leader, Abd el-Karim al-Muti, is in exile in France.¹⁷ Nevertheless, the fundamentalists are still the potential threat to the North African regimes because of the failure of political parties in North Africa, e.g. FLN in Algeria.

The North African migrant workers in France are a potential point of confrontation between France and Islamic fundamentalists. Islam is the second largest religion in France after Roman Catholicism. There are many public criticisms of migrant workers in France. The right wing describes the presence of Muslim North African people as an "invasion". The spread of Islamic fundamentalism disturbed France because they fear it will spread in the Maghreb community in France. In 1989 and 1990 there were political battles over Muslim girls wearing veils (Hejjab) in French schools. This conflict over Islamic issues will be a potential route for the United States to compete with France.¹⁸

An American option in the Maghreb is to develop links with these Islamic

forces and to try to encourage the replacement of the Islamic militant leaders with less radical "*Rafsanjani style*". The Americans might exploit this option through anti-French sentiments derived from French relations with existing regimes or the French colonial legacy of fighting Muslims in North Africa. The American ambassadors have already built bridges with the leaders of Islamic groups, and the former US ambassador to Tunisia, Peter Sebastian, visited all North African capitals and met the leaders of these groups.¹⁹ The United States has a successful track-record of supporting China in 1940s to create a nationalist front against communist Russia and in 1970s, the US had used the China card against the USSR. The United States might adopt the political strategy of supporting moderate Islamic groups against radical militants to win allies and to protect interests with Islamic groups.

The United States tried to contain Islamic fundamentalism in Iran through arms for hostages in 1985, while the US was condemning dealing with terrorists or conducting diplomacy with Islamic fundamentalists in Iran, the Reagan administration was secretly dealing with the Iranian and the Islamic groups in Lebanon behind the back of its European allies.

2- Conflict with Spain over Ceuta and Melilla:

Another potential option for the United States to penetrate North Africa is by supporting Morocco in its demand to reclaim the Ceuta and Melilla enclaves. In this case it will win over Maghrebi public opinion. During the bipolar system, the United States used Europe as a counterweight to the USSR in the shape of the US presenting nuclear safeguards to its European allies against the Soviet threat. The situation now may eventually change markedly. After the end of the cold war, the situation in Europe may not be so desperate for the US to have military bases

in Spain or strategically important to NATO. In this case the United States might find it in its interest to support Morocco to gain economic advantage in the Arab Maghreb Union.

The Spanish general staff identifies North Africa as the only likely source of an attack directed specifically at Spain. The most visible threat is an attempt to seize back Spain's North African enclaves. But despite the strong economic ties between Morocco and Spain, their future relations depend on the internal situation in Morocco after solving the Western Sahara conflict. King Hassan might turn Moroccan public attention towards Ceuta and Melilla to avoid internal problems. Historically, France and Spain divided Morocco between themselves. This scenario depends to what extent France might side with Spain in this potential conflict.²⁰

3- Military coups :

Historically, the United States supported the military as a means of replacing the European powers in the Middle East. For example, the US supported Hosni Aza'am's coup in Syria in 1949, and the military coup in Egypt in 1952. Also the United States tilted towards Mousadeq in Iran when he nationalised the oil companies there. The Americans turned against Mousadeq after they had set a deal with the British over the Iranian oil. The United States might use this approach to overthrow regimes friendly to France in North Africa to penetrate these countries, and even to encourage the nationalisation of French economic investments there. More recently, during Algeria's political crisis the United States favored the Military-controlled Council more than the Algerian Islamic Fundamentalists in power.²¹

4- French-US cooperation in North Africa:

Another option for the United States to penetrate North Africa is through co-operation with France in the Maghreb. The French have dominated the market there. It is very hard for the United States to challenge France in North Africa because France has much influence in political, cultural, and economic life. On the other hand, the Maghreb states have involvement with the EC in many economic agreements. For example, The Mediterranean Financial Club (MFC) was established in April 1991 to assist Southern Mediterranean countries through European financial institutions and the establishment of the Mediterranean Development Bank has similar objectives. Moreover, Algeria, Morocco and Spain signed agreements in April 1991 to build a natural gas pipeline to carry Algerian natural gas via Morocco and the Straits of Gibraltar to Europe which will begin to operate in 1995. Algeria has a pipeline to carry natural gas to Italy through Tunisia.

In the multipolar system, the EC will have the upper hand over North Africa. The United States will have a hard time finding its place there except during conflicts between European states, as was the case before World War One. The United States has already begun major cultural cooperation with North African states. It established the American Centre for North African studies in Tunisia in 1986, as a basis for a potential American university in Tunisia in the near future. France reacted to the American presence by establishing a French centre for research in Tunisia in January 1992. The American Agency for International Development (AID) signed an agreement with Morocco in September 1991, according to this agreement the AID will offer \$28 million to Morocco in the 1990s for transferring technology, training and language programme. The cooperation will include: 240 postgraduate research students in American universities, 130 academic visits, and a short training programme for 240 Moroccans in the US. Moreover, the AID will

offer public administration courses to 5800 in Morocco, and offers English language courses to 2300 Moroccan employees. Through cultural programmes the United States tries to penetrate the Moroccan and Tunisian markets. The French language has dominated the business market in North Africa for many decades.²²

After the disappearance of the Soviet Union, the struggle for influence in North Africa will be between the EC and the United States. France will struggle hard to keep its economic and cultural relations with the Maghreb, and American advanced technology will be an effective element in challenging France in North Africa. Geographically, Japan and China are too far away to challenge the Europeans in their backyard, North Africa, and the coming struggle for influence will be among EC countries in the Maghreb and also between the EC and the US. The geopolitics of the Maghreb is still a major factor in political, economic and strategic relations with EC, US and CIS.

In brief, this conclusion has outlined the contribution of the thesis to the literature on the superpower relations with the Maghreb, its relevance to superpower relations with the Third World countries, and its contribution to the themes of international relations theories.

Notes

1. *Alsunnuh* (Birmingham), No.14, July 1991, special issue on Algerian Islamic groups. Frightened by the prospects of an Iranian style of fundamentalist regime in Algeria which could set off a mass migration to Europe, the governments of France, Italy and Spain provided of more than \$1 billion loan after the October 1988 anti-government riots that ended the national liberation front's monopoly of power.

2. *UNESCO Statistical Yearbook 1991*, Paris.
3. It is interesting to note here that there is not a single Soviet magazine on Arab issues published in the USSR. Nor are there any magazines in the Arab countries that regularly cover the Soviet Union. Isayev, V, op cit.
4. Verrie, P. "Echoes of Empire: Satellities, Surrogates and Sources" *Encounter*, vol.lxvi no.2, February 1986, pp. 56-58. See also, Wright, D, op.cit.
5. *Alsunnah*, no.20, 1992, pp. 1-20; *Al-Arab* (London), May 8, 1992, p. 4.
6. Quoted in Steven Metz "Letters to the editor" *Foreign policy*, no. 86, Spring 1992.
7. *MEES*, December, 3, 1990; *MEES*, 28 January, 1991; *MEES*, August 19, 1991; Freedman, R. "Moscow and the Gulf War" *Problems of Communism*, vol.xl no.4, July-August, 1991, pp. 1-17.
8. *MEED*, 16 February 1990, pp. 4-6. *Middle East*, March 1990, p. 44.
9. *Middle East Report*, March-April, 1990, p. 8.
10. Commission of the European Communities, *The Countries of the Greater Arab Maghreb and the European Community*, Europe Information, DE 68, January 1991, (hereafter the Commission of European Community).
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
13. Eurostate, 1990, calculated by the author, pp. 212-213.
14. *Commission of European Community, the countries of the Greater Arab*

Maghreb op cit.

15. *Time (Weekly)*, September 23, 1991, p. 36. See also for economic espionage, Walter, D. "The Open Barn Door: the US firms face a wave of Foreign Espionage" *Newsweek*, May 3, 1992, pp. 42-44.
16. According to the Moroccan government, the poverty line has fallen to 15% in 1991, Jacque de Barrin "Morocco dissident Goaled" *The Guardian Weekly*, May 3 1992, p. 14. For unemployment in Morocco, see *Foreign Report* (London), June 11th 1992, p. 8.
17. According to al-Nahda sources, the United States understands the Fundamentalists demands, but under pressure from Ben Ali the United States refused to offer a visa to the leader of al-Nahda party, Rashid al-Gunoshi in November 1991 to attend the annual conference of the Muslim Student Association. This does not necessarily mean that the United States cut its contact with al-Nahda, *Alsharq Al-Awsat*, 28th November 1991, p. 1. See for more detail on Islamic Fundamentalists in North Africa; Tunisia, Al-Mansouri, W. *Al-Etejah Al-Islami and Bourguiba* (Movement de la Tendence Islamique (MTI), (no publisher no date), but it seems it was published in 1988, it is a full account of MTI relations with Bourguiba and Ben Ali by one of its members, (in Arabic). See also, *Alsunnah*, no.2 February 1990. See also, Anderson, L. "Obligation and accountability: Islamic Policies in North Africa" *Daedalus*, vol.120 no.3, Summer 1991, pp. 93-112. Benomar, J. "The Monarchy, The Islamic Movement and religious discourse in Morocco" *Third World Quarterly*, vol.10 no.2, April 1988. Munson, Jr, H. "Morocco's Fundamentalist" *Government and Opposition*, vol.26, no.3, Summer 1991, pp. 328-344. Boulby, M. "The Islamic

challenge Tunisia since independence" *Third World Quarterly* , vol.10 no.2, April 1988. For Libya see *Al-Ghuraba*, vol.127 no.1, January 1990, pp. 12-13. Also, Joffe, G. "Islamic opposition in Libya" *Third World Quarterly*, vol.10 no.2 April 1988, but he cites Mohammed Nabatani as a founder of Islamic Liberation Party instead of Tuqiudine al-Nabahani, a Palestinian who died in Beriut in 1977.

18. For the battle over the veil in French schools, see *Al-Guraba*, vol. 27 no. 1, January 1990, pp. 14-15.
19. *Al-Hayat* (London), 28 February, 1992.
20. *Middle East International*, October 6, 1989, p. 11.
21. For American and French reaction to the political crisis in Algeria in January 1992, and the military backed council see, *International Herald Tribune*, January 16, 1992, p. 3. An American political scientist and a former CIA agent, Graham Fuller, wrote in favor of an Islamic take over in Algeria "let's see How Islamic Politicians Cope and Learn" *International Herald Tribune* , January 14, 1992. p. 6. Despite cautious French reaction to the Algerian crisis, Claude Cheysson, a former socialist foreign Minister said "There is nothing that I feared more in the world than the proclamation of an Islamic state in Algeria" *Independent* (London), January 17, 1992, p. 12.
22. To encourage cultural co-operation, the United States and Morocco established Moroccan-American Commission for Educational and Cultural exchange in Rabat in Morocco. The US also signed a cultural agreement with Algeria in June 1987. See *Al-Sharq Al-Awsat*, June 6, 1987, p. 15. Also, the United States recently signed agreement with Tunisia. For more detail

on French-American cultural competition in Maghreb for 1990s, see *Al-Hayat* (London), February 10, 1992, p. 1.

Bibliography

1. Primary Sources

Al-dib, Fathi, *Abd al-Nasir Wa thawrat al-Jaza'ir* (Memoir), Cairo: Dar Al-Mostaqbal Al-Arabi, 1984.

Al-Dib, Fathi, *Abdel Nasser et al Revolution Algerienne*, Paris, Edition L'Harmattan, 1985.

Ariah, A & Damovne, A. *Developments of Prospects for Trade and Economic Cooperation between Morocco and the Socialist Countries of Eastern Europe*, UN Conference on Trade and Development, Trade and Development Board, Nineteenth Session, Geneva, 8 October 1979.

Banounni, Mahdi. *Al Maghreb: Alsanawat Al Hareja*, (Magreb. The Critical Years, Memoir), Jedda: Saudi Research and Marketing Co., 1989. (in Arabic)

Brzezinski, Z. *Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Advisor 1977-1981*, New York: Farrar. Straus. Giroux 1983.

Bush, G. *National Security Strategy of the United States 1990-1991*, London: Brassey's Inc. 1990.

Carter, Jimmy, *Keeping Faith; Memoirs of a President*, New York: Bantoms Books, 1982.



Congress of the United States, *The Political Economy of the Middle East*,
A Compendium of Papers Submitted to the Joint Economic Committee
Congress of the United States, 96 Congress, 2nd Session, Joint Committee
Prints, U.S. Government Printing Office, April 21 1980.

Culley, H. ed. *Africa: U.S. Policy*, gist, U.S. Department of State: Bureau of
Public Affairs, August 6 1986.

Culley, H. ed., *U.S. - Egyptian Relations*, gist, U.S. Department of State, Bu-
reau of Public Affairs, July 1986.

Degras, J. *Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy 1917-1924*, Vol. 1, London:
Oxford University Press 1951.

Department of Defence, *Soviet Military Power*, Washington D.C. U.S. Government Printing Office,
1985.

*Foreign relations of the United States 1949: Vol.vi, The Near East, South Asia
and Africa*, Washington.D.C: United States Government Printing Office,
1977.

Foreign Relations of the United States 1955-1957, Vol.18 Africa, Washing-
ton.D.C: United States Government Printing Office, 1989.

Golden, N. ; Wells, S.B., *American Foreign Policy Current Documents, 1989*,
U.S. Department of States, Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of the Histo-
rian, Washington D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1989.

Gorbachev, M. *Perestroika: New Thinking for our Country and the World*,

- New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1987.
- Gorbachev, M. *Selected speeches and articles*, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1987.
- Gromyko, A. *Memories from Stalin to Gorbachev*, London: Arrow books, 1989.
- Haig, Alexander. *Caveat, Realism, Reagan and Foreign Policy*, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1984.
- Hamilton, Lee. *Iran Contra Affairs, the report of Congressional Committee investigating the Iran Contra Affairs*, New York: Random House, Inc. 1988.
- Hassan II, King of Morocco, *Message of his Majesty delivered November 14, 1986 at Old Dominion University*, by Moroccan Minister of Culture Mohammed Benaissa, Embassy of the Kingdom of Morocco, Washington D.C., November 14 1986.
- Ikle, F; Wohlstetter, A; et al. *Discriminate Deterrence*, Report of the Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy, prepared for the Secretary of Defence, Washington.D.C. U.S.Government Printing Office 1988.
- Khrushchev, N. *Khrushchev Remembers*, translated by Talbot, S. London: Sphere Books Limited, 1971.
- Kissinger, H. *Whitehouse Years*, Boston: Little, Braun & Company, 1979.
- Kissinger, H. *Years of Upheaval*, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson and Michael Joseph, 1982.
- Reagan, Ronald, President, *Libyan Sanctions*, Current Policy No. 780, United

States Department of State: Burea of Public Affairs, Washington. D.C.,
January 7 1986.

Reagan, R. *National Security Strategy of the United States*, London: Brassey's
International Defence Publishers, Inc. 1988.

Sarietz, C.R. ed. *The Soviet Union in the Third World*, Boulder: Westview
Press 1989.

Shultz, G. "Morality and Realism in Foreign Policy" *Current Policy*, No. 748,
Department of State Bureau of Public Affairs, Washington. D.C., 1986.

The Islamic Trend Movement, Official reports distributed in the United States,
1985-1987.

U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. *World Military Expenditures and
Arms Transfers 1986*, Washington.D.C. U.S.Government Printing Office,
1987.

U.S. Department of State. *American Foreign Policy 1982*, Washington.D.C.
U.S.Government Printing Office, 1987.

U.S. Deparment of State. *Economic Sanctions to Combat International Ter-
rorism*, Special Report No. 149, Bureau of Public Affairs, Washington.
D.C., July 1986.

U.S. Department of State. *International Terrorism*, gist, Bureau of Public
Affairs, May 1987.

U.S. Department of State. *Libya: Background notes*, Bureau of Public Affairs,
August 1985.

- U.S. Department of State. *Libya Under Qaddafi: A Pattern of Aggression*, special reports No. 138, Bureau of Public Affairs, Washington. D.C., January 1986.
- U.S. House of Representative, *War Powers, Libya and State*, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Arms Control International Security and Science of the Committee on Foreign Affairs House of Representatives, Ninety-Ninth Congress Second Session, April 29, May 1 and 15 1986, Washington. D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986.
- U.S. House of Representatives, *Warpowers, Libya and State sponsored terrorism*, Hearings before the Sub-committee on Arms Control, International Security and Science of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representative, Ninety-Ninth Congress, Second Session, April 29, May 1 and 15 1986, Washington.D.C. U.S.Government Printing Office, 1986.
- U.S. House of Representatives, *Proposed Arms Sale to Saudi Arabia*, Hearing and Markup before the Committee on Foreign Affairs and its Sub-committee on Europe and the Middle East, House of Representative, Ninety-Ninth Congress, Second Session on April 22,23 1986, U.S.Government Printing Office 1986.
- U.S. House of Representatives, *A Review of Political, Economic and Security situation in Tunisia*, Implication for U.S. Policy. Report of a Staff Study Mission to Tunisia and France, Committe on Foreign Affairs U.S. House of Representative. 100th Congress, 1st Session, November 17-22 1986, Washington. D.C. U.S.Government Printing Office, May 1987.
- U.S. House of Representative, *Libya, Sudan-Chad Triangle: Dilemma for*

- United States Policy*, hearing before subcommittee on Africa on the Committee of Foreign Affairs, House of Representative, Ninety-Seventh Congress, First Session, October 29 and November 4 1981, Washington D. C. U.S. Government Printing Office 1982.
- United States Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, *Foreign Assistance Program: FY 1986 Budget and 1985 Supplemental Request*, Washington D.C., U.S. Government Publication Office, May 1985.
- United States Department of State, *Algeria: Background notes* Washington D.C., Department of States; Bureau of Public Affairs, October 1985.
- United States Department of State, *Morocco*, Background notes, Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, July 1986.
- United States Foreign Policy 1972*, A report of the Secretary of State 1972, Department of State Publication 1973.
- U.S.S.R. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Foreign Policy and Diplomatic Activity of the U.S.S.R., November 1989-December 1990, A Survey Prepared by the U.S.S.R. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *International Affairs* (Moscow), No. 4, April 1991.
- U.S.S.R. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Foreign Policy and Diplomatic Activity of the U.S.S.R., January 1985- 1989 A Survey Prepared by the U.S.S.R. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *International Affairs* (Moscow), No. 1, January, 1990.
- Vance, C. *Hard Choices: A Critical Years in American Foreign Policy*, New York: Simon & Schnister, 1983.

Weinberger, C. *Fighting for Peace: Seven Critical Years at the Pentagon*, London: Michael Joseph, 1990.

Wright, Denis. "Ten Years in Iran: Some Highlights" *Asian Affairs* (London), Vol.xxii part.iii, October 1991, pp. 259-271.

Wirts, W, Secretary of Labour, *Labour, Law and Practice in Morocco*, United States Department of Labour, Bureau of Labour Statistics, BLS No. 282, Washington. D.C., U.S. Governments Printing Office, September 1964.

2.Secondary Resources

Abun-Nasr, Jamil. *A History of the Maghreb*, London: Cambridge University Press, 1975.

Adelman, M. "Is the Oil Shortage Real? Oil companies as OPEC Tax Collector", *Foreign Policy*, Winter, 1972-1973, pp. 73-103.

Aghrou, A & Sutton, K. "Regional Economic Union in the Maghreb" *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 28, No. 1, March 1990, pp. 115-140.

Al-Fasi, Allal. *Al-Harakat al-Istiklalyya fi al-Maghrib al-Arabi*, first edition, Cairo: Al-Ressala Press, 1948.

Al-Fasi, Alall. *Independence Movements in North Africa*, translated by Nu-seibeh, H.S. Washington. D.C.: American Council of Learned Societies, 1954.

Al-Mashat, A.M. *National Security in the Third World*, Boulder: Westview Press, 1985.

Al-Semmari, Abdull. "The role of the Ulama in the Algerian Revolution 1945-

1954". *Jusur: the U.C.L.A Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* (Los Angeles), Vol. 2, 1986, pp. 83-102.

Albright, D. "U.S.S.R. and the Third World" *Problems of Communism*, Vol. XXXVIII, Nos 2-3, March-June 1989, pp. 50-70.

Albright, D. "Soviet Economic Development and the Third World" *Soviet Studies*, Vol. 43, No. 1, 1991, pp. 3-26.

Albright, D. *The USSR and Sub-Saharan Africa in 1980s*, The Washington Papers No. 101, New York, Praeger Publisher, for the Center of Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, 1983.

Albursan, A. "Mackinder's Heartland Theory: A geostrategic perspective" *Arab Strategic thought*, No. 10, January 1984, pp. 279-293.

Albursan, A. "American Universities and their influence on the White House and Department of State decisions" *Almajallah* No. 415, January 20-26, 1988, pp. 419-421 (in Arabic), reprinted in *Jell Al-Mustqbal* (Bonn), March, 1989.

Albursan, A. "The influence of American Jewish Academics on American strategy" *Almajallah*, No. 488, June 14-20, 1989.

Albursan, A. "Libya approaching Bush: Review Article" *Almajalla*, No.82, May 3-9, 1989.

Albursan, A. "The Middle East Concept" *Al Majallah* No. 426, June 15-21, 1988, p. 4, (in Arabic).

Albursan, A. "American Congress and Islamic Movement in Tunisia" *Almajalla*,

No. 402, October, 21-27, 1987, p. 5. (in Arabic).

Albursan, A. "Inter-Arab diplomatic relations" *Allmajalla*, No. 428, April 20-26, 1988, pp. 25-27. (in Arabic)

Albursan, A. "Arab-African Relations" *Almajalla*, No. 446, August 24-30, 1988, pp. 26-27, (in Arabic).

Albursan, A. "The battle of the Wadal-Makhazin between Moroccan and Portuguese" *Alfaisal*, (Monthly, Saudi Arabia), June 1980, pp. 69-72, (in Arabic).

Albursan, A. "Geopolitics and Hitler's Foreign Policy" *Alfaisal*, No. 110, 1986, pp. 95-100, (in Arabic).

Albursan, A. "Soviet Union and the Arabian Peninsula: Review Articles" *Journal of Arab Affairs*, Tunis, No. 36, February 1984. pp. 235-240, (in Arabic).

Albursan, A. "Comparative Politics of North Africa: Review Articles" *Journal of Arab Affairs*, Tunis, No. 29, July 1973, pp. 157-158, (in Arabic).

Albursan, A. "Conflict in North Western Africa: Review Articles" *Arab strategic thought*, Nos. 15-16, January-April 1986, pp. 273-278, (in Arabic).

Alexander, N. "The Foreign Policy of Libya: Inflexibility Amid Change" *Orbis*, Winter, 1981, pp819-846.

Alimov, Y. *The Rise and Growth of the Non-Aligned Movement*, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1987.

Akins, J. E. "The Oil Crisis: This Time the Wolf Is Here" *Foreign Affairs*,

April 1973, pp. 462-490.

Allison, R. *The Soviet Union and Strategy of Non-Alignment in the Third World*, London: Cambridge University Press, 1988.

Al-Mansouri, W. *Al-Etejah Al-Islami and Borquiba* (Movement de la Tendance Islamique (MTI), (no publisher no date).

Amoretti, B.S. "The Domestic and International Impact of Libyan Ideology" *The Atlantic Community Quarterly*, Vol. 23, No. 2, Summer 1985, pp. 191-203.

Amos, John, "Libya in Chad: Soviet Surrogate or Nomadic Imperialist" *Conflict*, Vol. 5, No. 1, 1983, pp. 1-18.

Amuzegar, J. "The North-South dialogue" *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 54, No. 3, April 1976, pp. 545-562.

Anderson, L. "Obligation and accountability: Islamic Policies in North Africa" *Daedalus*, Vol.120, No.3, Summer 1991, pp. 93-112.

Anderson, L. "Libya's Qaddafi: Still in Command?" *Current History*, Vol. 86, No. 517, February 1987, pp. 65-68.

Anderson, L. *The State and Social Transformation in Tunisia and Libya, 1830-1980*, Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1986.

Anderson, L. "Qaddafi and the Kremlin" *Problem of Communism*, Vol.XXXIV, No.5, September-October 1985, pp. 29-44.

Andreyev, K. "The Referendum Issue" *New Times* No. 50, December 1981, pp. 12-13.

- Artemiev, I. and Halliday, F. *International Economic Security: Soviet and British Approach*, Discussion paper No. 7, London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1988.
- Ashton, S, *In Search of Detente: The Politics of East-West Relations Since 1945*, London: McMillian, 1989.
- Astrow, A "Interview with Ahmed Ben Saleh" *Africa Report*, May-June 1988, pp. 56-59.
- Ataov, T. "The United States and Libya I" *Democratic World*, June 2 1985, pp. 10-14.
- Ataov, T. "The United States and Libya II" *Democratic World*, June 9 1985, pp. 10-14.
- Ataov, T. "The United States and Libya III" *Democratic World*, June 16 1985, pp. 10-14.
- Ayoob, M. "The Superpowers and Regional Stability" *The World Today*, Vol. 35, No. 5, May 1979, pp 197-205.
- Azar, E. "Soviet and Chinese Roles in the Middle East" *Problems of Communism*, Vol. xxviii, No. 3, May-June 1979, pp. 18-30.
- Azrael, J. *Soviet Leadership and the Military High Command 1976-1986*, Rand Corporation, R 3521-AF, Santa Monica, 1987.
- Baehr, P. "Think Tanks who needs them: Advising a government in Democratic Societies" *Future*, June 1986, pp. 389-400.
- Ball, J; Hodges, J. "Is There Oil in Western Sahara" *African Business*, August

1982, pp. 14-16.

Bamford, J. *The Puzzle Palace*, Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1982.

Barakat, H, ed. *Contemporary North Africa: Issues of Development and Integration*, London: Croom Helm, 1985.

Barndy, H.G. *The Prisoner of Algeria*, London: Oxford University Press, 1966.

Barrid, A.M. "NATO, the EEC, Gibraltar, North Africa: Overlapping Issues for Spain" *International spectator*, Vol. XXI, No. 1, January-March 1986, pp. 43-46.

Barry, D., Barry, C. *Contemporary Soviet Policy*, second edition, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1982.

Bartley, R. "Nixon's Worst Weekend" *Wall Street Journal*, August 16-17, 1991, p. 6.

Bassani, A; Zartman, W. *Algerian Gas Negotiations*, Washington.D.C: Foreign Policy Institute (John Hopkins University), 1987.

Bearman, J. *Qaddafi's Libya*, London: Zed Books, 1986.

Beckman, P. *World Politics in the Twentieth Century*, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1984.

Becker, A. *The Soviet Union and the Third World: The Economic Dimension*, occasional paper, OPS-005, Rand Corporation, March 1986.

Behbehani, Hashim. *The Soviet Union and Arab Nationalism 1917-1966*, London: KPI, 1986.

- Beling, W. *Pan-Arabism and Labour*, Harvard Middle Eastern Monograph Series, IV, Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1960.
- Beling, W. "W.F.T.U. and Decolonization: Tunisian Case Study" *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 2, No. 4, 1964, pp. 551-64.
- Beling, W. *Modernization and African Labor: A Tunisian Case*, second edition, New York: Praeger publishers, 1967.
- Bell, Coral. *The Reagan Paradox: American Foreign Policy in the 1980s*, London: Edward Elgar, 1989.
- Ben-Zvi, A. *The American Approach to Superpower Collaboration in the Middle East, 1973-1986*, Tel Aviv-University: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, JCSS Study, No. 5, 1986.
- Bender, G; et al, eds. *African crisis areas and US Foreign Policy*, Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1985.
- Bender, G. ed. *International Affairs in Africa*, The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 489, London: Sage Publications, January 1987.
- Benewick, et al (ed). *Knowledge and Belief in Politics, the Problem of Ideology*, London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1973.
- Bennoune, Mahfoud. *The Making of Contemporary Algeria, 1830-1987, Colonial Upheavals and post-independence development*, London: Cambridge University Press, 1988.
- Benomar, J. "The Monarchy, The Islamic Movement and religious discourse in

- Morocco" *Third World Quarterly*, Vol.10 No. 2, April 1988, pp. 539-555.
- Benyahia, Habib. "The Place of the Maghreb in U.S. - Arab relations". *American - Arab Affairs*, No. 13, Summer 1985.
- Bernard, S. *the Franco-Moroccan Conflict 1843-1956*, New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1968.
- Berramdane, A. *Le Maroc Et L'Occident 1880-1974*, Paris: Editions Karthala 1987.
- Bett, R; Huntington, S. "Dead Dictators and Rioting Moles: Does the Demise of Authoritarian Rulers lead to Political Instability" *International Security*, Vol. 10 No. 3, Winter 1985/1986. pp. 112-143.
- Bialer, S. ed. *Domestic Context of Soviet Foreign Policy*, Boulder: Westview Press, 1981.
- Bienen, H. ed. *The Military Intervenes*, New York: Russel Sage Foundation, 1968.
- Binder, L. "The Middle East as Subordinate international System" *World Politics*, Vol.x, No.3, 1958, pp. 408-429.
- Binnendijk, H. ed. *Authoritarian Regimes in Transition*, U.S. Department of State, Foreign Service Institute, Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs, 1987.
- Blair, Leon. *Western Windows on the Arab World*, Austin & London University of Texas Press, 1970.
- Blechman, B; Kaplan, S, eds. *Force without war: U.S. Armed Forces as a*

- Political instruments*, Washington.D.C: Brookings Institution, 1978.
- Blundy, D. & Lycett, A. *Qaddafi and the Libyan Revolution*, Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1987.
- Boardman, R., Adomeit, H., Wallace, W. *Foreign Policy in Communist Countries*, London: Saxon House, 1979.
- Bolger, D. "Shoot Down off Libya" *Modern Warfare*, Premiere Issue, July 1989, pp. 34-41.
- Boulby, M. "The Islamic challenge: Tunisia since independence" *Third World Quarterly* , Vol. 10, No. 2, April 1988, pp. 590-614.
- Bouyahia, S. "Le Relation entre les Travailleurs Tunisiens et Egyptiens de 1945- a 1958" *Revue D' Histoire Maghrebine*, Vol. 16, No. 53-54, July 1989, pp 7-33. (Also in Arabic).
- Bouyahia, Salem. "Al-Alakat Bayen Alomal fe Tunis wa Felestin wa mawakef atabaka alamelah fe Tunis mena Alqudea Alfelestina 1945-1956" *Almajalla Al-Taregheya Al-Maghrebina*, Vol.16 nos.55-56, December, 1989, pp. 15-32.(Les relation ouvriers tuniso -palestiniennes et les prises de position de la classe ouvriere tunisienne sur la question palestienne 1945-1956, French summary, pp. 171-174).
- Brace, R.M. *Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia*, New Jersey: Prentice-HAll, Inc, 1964.
- Brand, H.W. "The Cairo-Tehran Connection in Anglo-American rivalry in the Middle East 1951-1953". *The International Historical Review*, Vol. XI, No. 3, August 1989, pp. 434-456.

- Brannan, M. et al. *The Real Story of Libya's Muammar Qaddafi*, Special report, Executive Intelligence Review, New York, June 1981.
- Braum, F. "Morocco: Anatomy of a Palace Revolution that failed" *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 9, No. 1, 1978, pp 63-72.
- Brecher, M. "The Middle East Subordinate System and its impact on Israeli Foreign policy" *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol.13, No.2 June 1969, pp. 117-39.
- Brecher, M. *The Foreign Policy System of Israel: Setting, Image, and Process*, London: Oxford University Press, 1972.
- Breslauer, G. "Ideology and Learning in Soviet Third World Policy" *World Politics*, vo.39, No.2 April 1987 pp. 429-448.
- Brett, M. ed. *Northern Africa: Islam and Modernization*, London: Frank Cass 1973.
- Brown, B. *The Crisis of Power*, New York: Columbia University press, 1979.
- Brown, C.L. *International Politics and the Middle East: Old Rules, dangerous games* New Jersey: Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1984.
- Brown, C.L. "United States and Maghreb" *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 20, No. 3, Summer 1976, pp. 272-290.
- Brown, G.A. "Morocco invites U.S. Business" *SIRIUS: The World and Africa* Vol. III, No. 1, 1983, pp. 6-8.
- Brown, L.C. "Islamic Reformation in North Africa" *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 2, No. 1, 1964, pp.

- Browne, R. "Qaddafi's quit call to U.S. Black Servicemen" *Africa Now*, No. 48, April 1985, pp 12-13.
- Brzezinski, Z, ed. *Africa and the Communist World*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1963.
- Brzezinski, Z. "NSC's Midlife Crisis" *Foreign Policy*, No. 69, Winter 1987-88, pp. 80-99.
- Brzezinski, Z. *Game Plan: How to Conduct the U.S. - Soviet Conflict*, New York: The Atlantic Monthly Press, 1986.
- Bull-Berg, Hans Jacob. "United States International Oil Policy 1973-1983: Pursuing a cooperative regime or an imposed order?" *Cooperation and Conflict*, Vol. XX, 1985, pp. 173-194.
- Bull, Hedley; Watson, A eds. *Expansion of International Society*, Oxford: Clarendon, 1984.
- Butterfield, Ian. *Morocco: An Ally in Jeopardy*, Backgrounder No. 185, Washington, D.C. The Heritage foundation, 1982.
- Buzuev, A. *Transnational Corporations and Militarism*, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1985.
- Campbell, J. "Communist Strategies in the Mediterranean" *Problems of Communism*, Vol. XXVIII, No. 3, May-June 1979, pp. 1-17.
- Cantori, L; Spiegall, S. "International Regions: Comparative approach to five subordinate subsystem" *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol.13, No.4, December 1969, pp. 361-380.

- Cardon, L.B. *The Economic Bases of Franco-German rivalry in Morocco 1906-1909*, Ph.D. Thesis., Berkeley: University of California, 1966.
- Carlton, D. Levine, H. ed. *The Cold War Debated*, New York: McGraw Hill Book Company, 1988.
- Carpenter, T.G. "The U.S.A. and Third World Dictatorships: A case of Benign Detachment" in Spiegal, S. ed. *At Issue: Politics in World the Arena*, Fifth ed. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1988, pp. 9-23.
- Carrie, Rene Albrecht. *A Diplomatic History of Europe Since the Congress of Vienna*, London: Methuen, 1965.
- Carvely, A. Libya: International Relations and Political Purposes" *International Journal*, Vol. XXVIII, No. 4, Autumn 1973, pp. 707-728.
- Cassen, R. *Soviet Interests in the Third World*, London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1985.
- Carlsnaes, W. *Ideology and Foreign Policy*, London: Basil Blackwell, 1986.
- Catudal, H.M. *Soviet Nuclear Strategy from Stalin to Gorbachev*, Arnospitz: Berlin Verlag, 1988.
- Chambers, F.P. "Interest groups and Foreign Affairs" *The Year Book of World Affairs*, London: Institute of World Affairs, Stevens and Sons Limited 1954, pp 22-241.
- Chomeau, J. *Seapower as a political instrument: The Soviet Navy in the Mediterranean*, Unpublished, Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Notre Dame, 1974.

- Chomsky, N. "Libya in U.S. Demonology" *Covert Action Information Bulletin*, No. 32, Summer 1989, pp. 7-10.
- Chubin, S. *Regional Perceptions of the Impact of Soviet Policy in the Middle East*, Working papers No. 28, The Wilson Center, International Security Studies Program, Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Building, September 1981.
- Churba, J. "Strategic Reality in the Middle East" *Global Affairs*, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1985 pp. 41-58.
- Classman, J. "Soviet Foreign Policy decision Making" *Columbia Essays in International Affairs*, Vol. 11, 1967, pp. 273-402.
- Clement, J.F., Paul, J. "Trade Unions and Morocco" *MERIP Reports*, No. 127, Vol.14, No. 8, October 1984, pp19-24.
- Clements, C; Walter, C. "Soviet Foreign Policy Since 1917: Achievement and Failure" *Survey: A Journal of East-West Studies*, Vol. 30, No.4 (131), June 1989, pp. 87-112.
- Cline, W. "Nationalism in Morocco" *The Middle East Journal*, January 1947, pp 18-28.
- Cohen, E. "Constraints on America's Conduct of Small Wars", *International Security*, Vol. 9, No. 2, Fall 1984, pp. 151-181.
- Cohn, M; Hahn, L. *Morocco: Old Land and New Nation*, London: Pall Mall Press, 1966.
- Cohn, Saul. "A New Map of Global Geopolitical Equilibrium" *Political Geog-*

raphy Quarterly, Vol. 2, No. 3, July 1982.

Cohn, Saul. "Asymmetrical States and Global Geopolitical Equilibrium" *SFAS Review*, Vol.4, No.2, 1984, pp. 181-192.

Coker, C. *Reflections on American Foreign Policy Since 1945*, London: Printer Publisher, 1989,

Constant, J.P. *Le Relations Maroco-Sovietique 1956-1971*, Paris, Librarie de Droit et de Jurisprudence, 1973.

Cook, B. *The Declassified Eisenhower*, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc, 1981.

Cooley, J. *Libyan Sand Storm*, London: Sidgwick Jackson, 1982.

Cooley, J. "Libyan Menace" *Foreign Policy*, No. 42, Spring 1981, pp. 74-93.

Cooper, O; Fogarty "Soviet Economic and Military Aid to the less developed countries, 1954-1978" *Soviet and Eastern European Foreign Trade*, Vol. XXI, nos. 1-2, Spring-Summer 1985, pp. 55-77.

Copeland, M. *The Game of Nations*, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1969.

Copeland, M. *The Game Player*, London: Aurum Press, 1989.

Cosovic, B; Ruggie, G. "On the creation of a New International Economic Order" *International Organization*, Vol. 30, No. 2, Spring 1976, pp. 309-346.

Cottrell, A; Theberge, J. ed. *The Western Mediterranean: Economic and Strategic Importance*, New York: Praeger, 1972.

- Cox, Michael. "The Cold War as a System". *Critique*, Vol. 17, 1986, pp. 17-82.
- Cox, Michael, "From the Truman Doctrine to the Second Superpower detente: The Rise and the Fall of the Cold War". *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 27, No. 1, 1990, pp. 25-41.
- Crabb, C. Jr. "The United States and the Neutralists" *The annals of Political and Social Science*, Philadelphia, November 1965, pp. 92-101.
- Crozier, B. ed *Libya's Foreign Adventures* Conflict Studies No. 41, London: Institute for the Study of Conflict, December 1973.
- Culter, R; Despres, L; Karp, A. "The Political Economy of East-South Military Transfers" *International Studies Quarterly* Vol. 31, No. 3, September 1987, pp. 273-299.
- Curran, B.C.: Schroan, J. *Area handbook for Mauritania* Washington. D.C.; U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972.
- Currie, K. "Soviet General Staff" *Problems of Communism*, Vol. XXXIII, No. 2, March-April 1984, pp. 32-40.
- Daffron, S. "U.S. Arms Transfers: New Rules, New Reasons" *Parameters: US Army War College Quarterly*, Vol. XXI, No. 1, Spring 1991, pp. 77-91.
- Dalby, S. "American Security discourse: The Persistence of Geopolitics" *Political Geography Quarterly*, Vol.9 No. 2, April 1990, pp. 171-188.
- Dalby, S. "Geopolitics Discourse: The Soviet as other" *Alternative*, Vol.13, No.4, 1988, pp. 415-442.

- Damis, J. "The Western Sahara Conflict: Myths and Realities" *The Middle East Journal*, Vol. 37, No. 2, Spring 1983, pp. 169-179.
- Damis, J. "Morocco: Political and Economic Prospects" *World Today*, January 1975, pp. 36-45.
- Damis, J. *Conflict in North West Africa*, Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1983.
- Damis, J. *U.S.-Arab relations: The Moroccan Dimension*, Washington.D.C, National council on U.S.-Arab relations, 1986.
- David, S. *Third World coups de Etat and International Security*, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987.
- David, S. "Soviet Involvement in Third World Coups" *International Security*, Vol. 11, No. 1, Summer 1986, pp. 3-36.
- David, S. "Why the Third World Matters" *International Security*, Vol. 14, No. 1, Summer 1989, pp. 5-85.
- David, S. "Explaining Third World Alignment" *World Politics*, Vol.43, No.2, January 1991, pp. 233-283.
- Davies, I. *African Trade Unions*, Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1966.
- Davis, B. *Qaddafi, Terrorism, and the Origins of the U.S. Attack on Libya*, New York: Praeger, 1990.
- Dawisha, Adeed, ed. *Islam in Foreign Policy*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983.

- Dawisha, Adeed. *The Arab Radicals*, New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1986.
- Dawisha, Adeed. ed. *Soviet Union in the Middle East*, London: Heinemann Educational Books Ltd., 1984.
- De Borchgrave, A. "Africa Policeman: Interview with King Hussan II" *Newsweek*, May 16 1977, pp. 58-69.
- Dean, Davis. *The Air Force Role in Low Intensity Conflict*, Alabama: Maxwell Air Force Base, Air University, Air University Press, 1988.
- Dedvedkov, L. "The Global Threat to Local Wars" *New Times*. part 13, March 1988, pp. 12-13.
- Deeb, Mary-Jane. "Qaddafi's Calculated Risks" *SAIS Review*, Vol. 6, No. 2, Summer-fall 1986, pp. 151-162.
- Deeb, Mary-Jane. "Inter-Maghribi Relations since 1969: A study of the Modalities of Unions and Mergers" *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 43, No. 1, Winter 1989, pp. 20-32.
- Deeb, Mary-Jane. "The Arab Maghreb Union in the context of regional and International politics" *Middle East Insight*, Vol. 6. No. 5, Spring, 1989, pp. 42-46.
- Deeb, Mary-Jane. *Libya's Foreign Policy in North Africa*, Boulder: Westview, 1991.
- Dekmejian, H. *Islam in Revolution: Fundamentalism in the Arab World*, New York: New York University Press, 1985.

- Deluca, D.R; Russett, B. "Don't Tread on me: Public Opinion and Foreign Policy in the Eighties", *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 96, No. 3, Fall 1981, pp. 381-399.
- Derrick, J. "Algeria: Looking forward to the next quarter century" *The Middle East*, July 1987, pp 6-10.
- Deutsch, K; Singer, J.D. "Multipolar power Systems and International Stability" *World Politics*, Vol. XVI, No. 3, April 1964, pp. 390-406.
- Dhombres, D. "Moscow tries to cool crisis over Libya" *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, January 6th 1986, pp. 11.
- Dickinson, G.L. *An International Anarchy 1904-1914*, London: George Allen & Unwin, 1937.
- Down, R. "Qaddafi gains as Chad expels Contra Forces" *Independent*, (London), 14 December 1990, p. 12.
- Drysdale, A; Blake, G. *The Middle East and North Africa: Political Geography*, Oxford. Oxford University Press, 1985.
- Dunn, Michael Collins. "Tunisia: Untold Story From the Arab World" *Los Angeles Times*, Part V, Sunday August 28 1988, p 2.
- Dunne, E.J., Jr. "After decades of rehearsals: War Experts leave the stage" *International Herald Tribune*, May 31 1990, p. 8.
- Dupuy, J, "The 1982 CIA Coup in Chad" *CovertAction Information Bulletin*, No. 36, Spring 1991, pp. 27-31.
- Edwin, J., & Slusser, R. *Soviet Foreign policy 1928-1934*, Vol. 1, London &

University Park: Pennsylvania University Press, 1966.

Efrat, M. "The Economics of Soviet Arms Transfers to the Third World - A Case Study: Egypt" *Soviet Studies*, Vol. 35, No. 4, October 1983, pp. 437-56.

El-Hussini, M.M. *Soviet-Egyptian Relation, 1945-1985*, London: Macmillan Press, 1987.

El-Khawas, M. *Qaddafi: His Ideology in Theory and Practice*, Brattleboro (Vermont), Amana Books, 1986.

El-Sadat, A. *In search of Identity*, London: Collins St, James Place, 1978.

Elwarfally, M. *Imagery and Ideology in U.S. Policy toward Libya, 1969-1982*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1988.

Entelis, J. "The Crisis of Authoritarianism in North Africa: The Case of Algeria" *Problems of Communism*, Vol. XLI No.3, May-June 1992, pp. 71-81.

Entelis, J. *Culture and Counterculture in Moroccan Politics*, Boulder: Westview Press, 1988.

Entelis, J. *Algeria: The Revolution Institutionalized*, Boulder: Westview 1986.

Entelis, J. "Algeria in World Politics: Foreign Policy Orientation and the New International Order" *American-Arab Affairs*, No. 6, 1983, pp 70-78.

Entelis, J. *Comparative Politics of North Africa*, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1980.

Entessar, N. "Superpowers and Persian Gulf Security" *Third World Quarterly*,

Vol. 10, No. 4, October 1988, pp. 1427-1451.

Eveland, W. *Ropes of Sand: America's Failure in the Middle East*, London: W.W.Norton & Company, 1980.

Evron, Yair. *The Middle East: Nations, Superpowers, and Wars*, London: Elek Books limited, 1973.

Faligot, R; Kropr, P. *La Piscine: The French Secret Service since 1944*, translated by Halls, W.D, London: Basil Blackwell, 1989.

Falk, P. "Cuba in Africa" *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 65, No. 5, Summer 1987, pp. 1077-1096.

Faringdon, H. *Confrontation: The Strategic Geography of NATO and the Warsaw Pact*, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1986.

First, Ruth. *Libya: The Elusive Revolution*, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Ltd, 1974.

Fled, W. *American Foreign Policy*, New York: John Willy & Sons Publishers, 1984.

Flournoy, F.R. *British Policy Towards Morocco*, Wesport: Negro Universities Press, 1970.

Forsythe, D. *Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Policy: Congress Reconsidered*, Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1989.

Foster, R. "American Policy toward Sandinistas" *Global Affairs*, Vol. 2, No. 2, Spring 1987, pp. 112-122.

- Foster, R. "A Preventative strategy for the Middle East" *Comparative Strategy*, Vol. 2, No. 3, 1984, pp 191-198.
- Francis, S. "Libya's Empire of Terror" *Africa Insight*, Vol. 12, No. 1, 1982, pp. 4-10.
- Freedman, R. "Moscow and the Gulf" *Problems of Communism*, Vol.xl No.4, July-August 1991, pp. 1-17.
- Freedman, R. *Moscow and the Middle East: Soviet Policy since the invasion of Afghanistan*, London: Cambridge University Press, 1991.
- Freeman, L. *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy*, New York: St. Martins, 1981.
- Friedget, T.H. "The Middle East in Soviet Global Strategy" *Jerusalem Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 5, No. 1, 1980, pp. 66-85.
- Fukuyama, F. "Patterns of Soviet Third World Policy" *Problems of Communism*, Vol.xxxvi No. 5, September-October 1987, pp. 1-14.
- Fukuyama, F. *US-Soviet interactions in the Third World*, Occasional papers, OPS-004, March 1985.
- Fukuyama, F. *Gorbachev and the New Soviet Agenda in the Third World*, R-3634-A. Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, June 1989.
- Gaddis, J., Deibel, T. ed. *Containing the Soviet Union*, London: Pergamon Brassey's, 1987.
- Gaddis, J. *Strategies of Containment*, New York & Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1982.

- Gallagher, C.F. *The United States and North Africa*, Cambridge (Mass.): Harvard University Press, 1963.
- Gann, P., Duignan, P. *Colonialism in Africa: The History and Politics of Colonialism 1914-1960*, Cambridge; University Press, 1970.
- Garthoff, R. *Detente and Confrontation: American - Soviet relations from Nixon to Reagan*, Washington, D.C. Brookings, 1985.
- Gassner, Robert J. "Transition in Tunisia" *Harvard International Review* Vol. IX, No. 5, May-June 1987, pp 29-30.
- Gasteyger, C. "Moscow and the Mediterranean" *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 46, No. 4, July 1968, pp. 676-687.
- Gavrilovic, M. "Mediterranean Challenges" *Review of International Affairs*, Vol. xxxvii, No. 859, January 20 1986, pp. 7-9.
- Gellner, E; Micaud, C, eds *Arabs and Berbers*, London: Duckworth, 1972.
- Gelman, H. *The Soviet Union in the Third World: A Retrospective overview and Prognosis*, Sanata Monica: Rand Corporation: Occasion Paper, Ops-006, March 1986.
- George, A. ed. *Managing U.S.- Soviet Rivalry; Problems of Crisis Prevention*, Boulder: Westview Press, 1983.
- Gerteiny, A.G. *Mauritania*, London: Pall Mall Press, 1967.
- Gerth, Jeff. "Qaddafi Describes Talk with American Envoy" *New York Times*, June 14 1986, p. 2.

- Ghiles, F. "A Mysterious Death" *Middle East International*, 18 February 1983.
- Ghullab, A. *Ta'rikh Al-Harakah al-Wataniyya fi al-Maghrib*, al-Dar al-beda (Casablanca): al-Shareka al-Maghrebia li-atawzi wa al-nasher, 1976.
- Gilpin, R. *The Political Economy of International Relations* 1 New Jercey, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987.
- Golovko, V. "USSR-Tunis: Tridtsatiletie Torgovykh Otnoshenii" *Vneshnyaya Torgovlya*, No. 7, 1987, pp. 28-29, (In Russia), (USSR-Tunisia 30 years of Trade Relations).
- Gordesman, A. "The Soviet Arms Trade" *Armed Forces Journal International*, No. 121, August, 1983, p. 41.
- Goulden, J; Raffio, A, *The Death Merchant: The Rise and the Fall of Edwin P. Wilson*, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1984.
- Grabb, C. Jr. *The Doctrine of American Foreign Policy*, Bacon Rouge & London: Louisiana University Press, 1982.
- Gray, C. *Geopolitics of Superpower* The University Press of Kentucky, 1988.
- Gray, Colin. "Ocean and Continent in Global Strategy" *Comparative Strategy*, Vol. 7, No.4, 1989, pp. 439-44.
- Graziani, G. *Gorbachev's Economic Strategy in the Third World*, New York: Praeger Publishing, 1990.
- Greenstein, F. "The Dynamic of Presidential Reality: Evidence from two Vietnam Decisions" *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 104, No. 4, Winter 1989-90, pp. 557-580.

- Grimaud, N. *La Politique Exterieur de L'Algerie 1962-1978*, Paris: Karthala, 1984.
- Gromyko, A. *Africa: Progress, Problem and Prospects*, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1983.
- Gullab, A, *Ta'rikh al-Harakah al-Wataniyya fi al-Maghreb*, Adaralbayda (Casablanca): Ashareka al-Maghrebia Littawzah wa Annasher, 1976.
- Gupte, Pranay. "Morocco: A Friend in Need" *Atlantic Monthly*, December 1982, pp. 22-28.
- Gutek, Gerald ed. *Standard Education Almanac 1984-1985*, Chicago: Marquis Professional Publications, 1984.
- Gutteridge, W. ed. *Libya: Still a Threat to Western Interests?* Conflict Studies No. 160, London: The Institute for the Study of Conflict, N.D.
- Habib, H. "Changing Patterns in Libya Foreign Policy" *Journal of South Asia and Middle Eastern Studio*, Vol. x, No. 2, Winter 1986, pp. 3-14.
- Hadhri, M. *L'URSS et le Maghreb, de la Revolution d'Octobre a L'Independence de l'Algeria 1917-1962*, Paris: Editions de L'Harmattan, 1985.
- Hahn, L. *North Africa; Nationalism to Nationhood*, Washington. D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1960.
- Haley, E.P. *Qaddafi and the United States Since 1969*, New York: Praeger Publishers, 1984.
- Halliday, F. *Soviet Policy in the Arc of Crisis*, Washington: The Institute for Policy Studies, 1981.

- Halliday, F. "Letter from Madrid" *MERIP Reports*, No. 127, Vol. 14, No. 8, October 1984, pp. 19-24.
- Halliday, F. "Gorbachev and the Arab Syndrome: Soviet Policy in the Middle East" *World Policy Journal*, Vol. IV, No.3, Fall 1987, pp. 415-442.
- Halliday, F. "Islam and Soviet Foreign Policy" *Arab Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 9, No. 3, Summer, 1987 pp. 217-233.
- Halliday, F. "Triumph of the West" *New left Review*, No. 180, 1990, pp. 5-24.
- Halliday, F. "Tunisia Uncertain Future" *Middle East Report*, March-April 1990, pp. 25-27
- Halliday, F. *Revolution and Foreign Policy: The Case of South Yemen 1967-1987*, London: Cambridge University Press, 1990.
- Halliday, F. "The Pertinence of International Relations", *Political Studies*, Vol.XXXVIII September 1990, pp. 502-516.
- Harbeson, J, ed. *The Military in African Politics*, New York: Praeger, 1987.
- Harkavy, R. *Bases Abroad*, London: Oxford University Press, 1989.
- Harkavy, R; Neuman, G, eds. *The Lessons of Recent Wars in the Third World*, Vol.1, Lexington (Massachusetts): Lexington Books, 1985.
- Harkavy, R. *Great Powers Competition for Overseas Bases: The Geopolitics of Access Diplomacy*, New York: Pergamon, 1982.
- Harkavy, R; Neuman, S, eds. *Arms Transfers in the Modern World*, New York: Praeger, 1979.

- Harris, Lillian Craig. *Libya: Qaddafi's Revolution and the Modern State*, Boulder (Colorado): Westview, 1986.
- Harris, Lillian Craig. "Europe and North Africa: Conflict and Opportunity" *Arab Affairs* , No. 8, Winter 1988-89, pp. 78-91.
- Harris, Lillian Craig. "North Africa Union: Fact or Fantasy" *Arab Affairs* , No. 12 Autumn 1990, pp. 85-95.
- Harrison, Alexander. *Challenging de Gaulle: The O.S.A. and the Counter-revolution in Algeria 1954-1962*, New York: Praeger, 1989.
- Harrison, M. *The Reluctant Ally: France and Atlantic Security*, Baltimore: John Hopkins Univeristy Press, 1981.
- Hassan, II, King of Morocco, *The Challenge*, London: Macmillan, 1979.
- Heggoy, A.A. "Education in French Algeria: An Essay on Cultural Conflict", *Comparative Educational Review*, June 1973, pp. 180-197.
- Heikal, M. "Mustagbal Al Alakat Al Arabia Al Sovietgi" (The Future of Arab-Soviet Relations). *Alahram*, November 26 1989, p. 8, (in Arabic).
- Heikal, M. *The Road to Ramadan*, London: Collins, St James's Place, 1975.
- Heikal, M. *Autumn of Fury* , London: Andre Deutsch, 1983.
- Hodges, Tony. "Francois Mitterrand: Master Strategist in the Maghreb" *Africa Report*, May-June 1983, pp. 17-21.
- Hodges, T. *Western Sahara: Roots of a Desert War*, Wesport: Lawrence Hill, 1983.

- Holloway, D. "State, Society and Military Under Gorbachev", *International Security*, Vol. 14, No. 3, Winter 1989-1990, pp. 5-24.
- Holzman, F. "Politics and Guesswork: CIA and DIA Estimate of Soviet Military Spending" *International Security*, Vol. 14, No. 2, Fall 1989, pp. 101-131.
- Hopkins, K. "Civil-Military relations in developing countries" *The British Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XVII, No. 2, June 1966, pp. 165-182.
- Horne, A. "King in a corner: Review Article", *The New York Time Review of books*, December 4 1984, pp. 37-40.
- Horne, Alistar, *Savage War for Peace; Algeria 1945-1962*, London: Macmillian Limited, 1973.
- Hottinger, A. "Arab Communism" *Problems of Communism*, Vol. XXX, No. 4, July-August 1981, pp. 17-32.
- Hottinger, A. "Three Way Pact: A gain for the Kremlin" *Swiss Review of World Affairs*, October, 1981, p. 27.
- Hull, L. *The United States and Morocco 1776-1956*, New Jersey: The Scarecrow Press, 1971.
- Huntington, S. "Coping With The Lippman Gap", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 66, No. 2, 1987-88, pp. 453-477.
- Huntington, S. "Political Development and Political Decay" *World Politics*, Vol. xvii, April 1965, pp. 386-430.
- Hutchison, A. *China's African Revolution*, London: Hutchinson of London,

1970.

Hyland, W. ed. *The Reagan Foreign Policy*, New York: A Meridan Book, New American Library, 1987.

Imam, Zafar. "Soviet Treaties with Third World Countries" *Soviet Studies*, Vol. 35, No. 1, January 1983, pp. 53-61.

Ingledow, M. "Gadaffi: Aftermath of U.S. Raids" *Africa Now*, May 1986, pp 7-8.

Institute of Petroleum, (London). *Oil in the USSR*, March 1974.

Isayev, V. "Soviet-Arab Economic Relations: Results, Problem, Prospects" *Mediterranean Quarterly*, Vol.2, No.3 Summer, 1991, pp. 71-85.

Ismael, T. *International Relations of Contemporary Middle East*, New York: Syracuse University, 1986.

Jackson, H. *The FLN in Algeria: Party development in a revolutionary Society*, Westport: Conn. Green Wood Press, 1977.

Jackson, R.L. "United States and Non-Aligned Movements" *Review of International Affairs*, 37: 860, 1986.

Jacobs, W. "Soviet Strategic Effectiveness" *Journal of International Affairs*, (New York), Vol. 26, No. 1, 1972, pp 60-71.

Jalal, Y. "Towards the Baghdad Pact: South Asia and the Middle East in the Cold War 1947-1955" *The International Historical Review*, Vol. xi, No. 3, August 1989, pp. 409-432.

- Jeffreys-Jones, R. *The CIA and American Democracy*, London, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989.
- Jenkins, B.M. "Libya's Continuing role in International Terrorism" *TVI Report*, Vol. 7, No. 2, June 1987, pp. 1-6.
- Jenkins, J.C; Kposowa, A. "Explaining Military Coups d'Etat: Black Africa, 1957-1984" *American Sociological Review*, Vol.55 No.6, December 1990, pp. 861-875.
- Jentleson, B. "American Commitments in the Third World: Theory vs Practice" *International Organization*, Vol. 41, No. 4, 1987, pp 667-704.
- Jervis, Robert. *Perception and Misperception in International Relations*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976.
- Jervis, R; Snyder, J. eds. *Dominoes and Bandwagons: Strategic beliefs and great power competition in the Eurasian Rimland*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1991.
- Joffe, G. "The Maghreb and Europe" *Maghreb Review*, No. 2, June-July 1976, pp. 16-18.
- Joffe, G. "The Moroccan Nationalist Movement: Istiqlal, the Sultan, and the Country" *Journal of African History*, Vol.26, No.4, 1985, pp. 289-307.
- Joffe, G. "Monarchy, Legitimacy and succession" *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 10, No. 1, January 1988, pp. 201-228
- Joffe, G. "Islamic opposition in Libya" *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 10 No. 2, April 1988, pp. 615-631.

- Joffe, G. "Strategic Significance of the Maghreb" *Naval International*, July 1981, pp. 388-391.
- Johnson, M. *The Military as an Instrument of U.S. Policy in South East Asia*, Boulder (Colorado): Westview Press, 1983.
- Johnson, J. *American Secret Power: the CIA in a Democratic Society*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989.
- Johnson, J. ed. *The role of Military in Underdeveloped Countries*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962.
- Johnstone, D. "What's Playing in the Mediterranean Theatre French Scenarios" *ZETA Magazine*, Vol. 12, No.1 January 1988, pp 37-42.
- Joyce, A. "Interview with Mohamed Sahnoun" *American - Arab Affairs*, No. 21, Summer 1987, pp. 99-102.
- Kahn, Jr, E.J. "The King and his Children" *The New Yorker*, July 9 1984, pp 43-59.
- Kamil, Leo, *Fueling the Fire: U.S. Policy and the Western Sahara Conflict*, New Jersey, Trenton: The Red Sea Press, 1987.
- Kant, R.E. "The Soviet Union and Developing World" *World Today*, Vol. 31, No. 8, August, 1975, pp. 338-346.
- Kaplan, M. *System Process in International Politics*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964.
- Kaplan, S. et al. *Diplomacy of power: Soviet Armed Force as a Political Instrument*, Washington. D.C. Brookings Institute, 1981.

- Karsh, E. *Soviet Arms Transfers to the Middle East in the 1970's*, Jaffee Center of Strategic Studies, paper No. 22, Tel Aviv University, December, 1983.
- Katz, M. "The Soviet - Cuban Connection" *International Security*, Vol. 8, No. 1, Summer 1983, pp 88-112.
- Katz, Mark. *The Third World in Soviet Military Thought*, Baltimore & London: The John Hopkins University Press, 1982.
- Katz, Mark. *Russia and Arabia: Soviet Foreign Policy toward the Arabian Peninsula*, Baltimore & London: The John Hopkins University Press, 1986.
- Katz, Mark. *Gorbachev's Military Policy in The Third World*, The Washington Papers No. 140, New York: Praeger, 1989.
- Kaufman, Edy. *The Superpowers and their Sphere of influence*, London: Croom Helm, 1976.
- Kauppi, R; Nation, C. ed. *The Soviet Union and the Middle East in the 1980s*, Lexington Books, 1983.
- Kelly, R. "Escalation of Regional Conflict" *Political Geography Quarterly*, Vol. 5, No. 2, April 1986, pp 161-180.
- Kelman, H. "The Role of Individual in International Relations: Some Conceptual and Methodological Considerations" *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. XXIV, No. 1, 1970, pp. 1-17.
- Kennan, G. X. "The Sources of Soviet Conduct" *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 25, No.4, July 1947, pp. 566-582.

- Kent, R. *Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and the Third World*, London: Cambridge University Press, 1987.
- Key, V.O.Jr. *Public opinion and American Democracy*, New York: Knopf, 1961.
- King, J. "Arms and the Man: Abdel-Kader" *History today*, Vol. 40, No. 8, August 1990, pp 22-28.
- Kirkpatrick, J. *The Reagan Doctrine and U.S. Foreign Policy*, Washington, D.C. Heritage Foundation, 1985.
- Kirkpatrick, J. "Dictatorships and Double Standards" *Commentary*, November 1979, pp. 34-45.
- Kissinger, H. "Military Policy and Defence of the Gray Areas" *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 33, No. 3, April 1955, pp. 416-428.
- Kissinger, H. "Domestic Structure and Foreign Policy" *Daedalus*, Vol. 95, No. 2, Spring 1966, pp. 503-529.
- Kitchen, H. ed. *Africa: From Mystery to Maze*, Lexington Books, 1976.
- Kitchen, H. *US Interest in Africa*, Washington Papers, No. 98, New York: Praeger Publishers 1983.
- Klochek, V. et al. *Soviet Foreign Trade Today and Tomorrow*, Moscow: Progress Publisher, 1985.
- Knapp, W. *North West Africa*, third edition, London & New York: Oxford University Press, 1977.

- Knight, A.W. *The KGB: Police and Politics in the Soviet Union*, London: UNWIN HYMAN, 1988.
- Knight, R. "Why U.S. is taking interest in Morocco" *U.S. News & World Report*, March 1 1982, pp. 31-32.
- Kofas, J. *Intervention and Underdevelopment: Greece During the Cold War*, London & University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1989.
- Kolendic, D. "Ceuta and Melilla" *Review of International Affairs*, Vol. XXXVII, No. 892, June 1987, pp. 22-24.
- Kolk, G., Kolko, J. *The Limits of Power*, New York: Harper & Raw Publishers, 1972.
- Kolko, G. *Confronting the Third World: United States Foreign Policy*, New York, 1988.
- Korany, B; Dessouki, A. ed. *The Foreign Policy of Arab States*, Boulder: Westview Press, 1984.
- Koshelev, P. *Soviet-African Economic and Technical Cooperation in 1980s: Records and Prospects*, Moscow: African Institute, 1986.
- Kramer, M. "Soviet Arms Transfers to the Third World" *Problem of Communism*, Vol. XXXVI, No. 5, September-October 1987, pp. 52-68.
- Kramer, M. "The Role of the CPSU International Department in Soviet Foreign Relations and National Security Policy" *Soviet Studies*, Vol. 42, No. 3, July 1990, pp. 429-446.

- Kuniholm, B. "Rhetoric and Reality in the Aegean" *SAIS Review*, Vol. 6, No. 1, Winter-Spring 1986, pp 137-158.
- Kupchan, C. "American globalism in the middle East; Roots of regional policy", *political science Quarterly*, Vol.103 No.4 1988, pp. 585-611.
- Kurian, G.T. *Encyclopedia of the Third World*, Vol. 1, New York: Fact on File, Inc, 1987.
- Labow, R. *Between Peace and War*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982.
- Laidi, Z. "Stability and Partnership in the Maghreb" in Stremmler, J. Ed. *Soviet Foreign Policy in an uncertain world*, The Annals of the American Academy of Political Science Vol. 481, September 1985, pp. 127-137.
- Laidi, Z. ed. *The Third World and the Soviet Union* New Jersey & London: Zed Books Ltd, 1988.
- Laipson, E. "U.S. Policy in Northern Africa" *American-Arab Affairs*, No. 198, pp. 48-58.
- Landau, R. *Hassan II: King of Morocco*, London: George Allen & UNWIN Ltd, 1962.
- Landau, R. *Morocco Independent Under Mohammed the Fifth* London: George Allen& Unwin Ltd, 1961.
- Landau, R. *Moroccan Drama 1900-1955*, London: Robert Hale Limited, 1956.
- Landau, R. *The Sultan of Morocco*, London: Robert Hale limited, 1951.

- Laqueur, W. *A World of Secrets: The uses and limits of Intelligence*, New York: Basic Books, Inc. Publishers 1985.
- Larkin, B.D. *China and Africa 1949-1970*, Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1971.
- Lassassi, Assassi. *Non-Alignment and Algerian Foreign Policy*, Hampshire Gower Publishing Group, 1988.
- Law, J. "Letter from Morocco" *Middle East International*, No. 289, December 5, 1986.
- Lawless. R. and Monahan, L, eds. *War and Refugee: The Western Sahara Conflict*, London: Pinter Publishers, 1987.
- Lawless, R. ed. *Foreign Policy issues in the Middle East*, Center for Middle Eastern Studies, Occasional papers series No. 28, University of Durham. 1984.
- Lawless, R; Findlay, A, eds, *North Africa*, London: Croom Helms, 1984.
- Lawless, R, et al. *Return Migration to the Maghreb: People and Policies*, Arab papers No.10, London: Arab Research Centre, 1982.
- Lawson, C.W. "Soviet Economic Aid to Africa" *African Affairs* (London), Vol. 87, No. 349, October 1988, pp. 501-518.
- Layachi, A. *The United States and North Africa: A Cognitive Approach to Foreign Policy*, New York: Praeger Publishers, 1990.
- Layne, C. "The Real Conservative Agenda" *Foreign Policy*, No. 61, Winter 1985-86, pp. 73-93.

- Lederer, I; Vucinich, W. *The Soviet Union and The Middle East: The Post-World II Era*, Standford: Hoover Institution Press, 1975.
- Leffler, M. "The American Conception of National Security and the beginning of the Cold War". *American Historical Review*, Vol. 89, No. 2, 1984, pp. 346-400.
- Legal, A. "The United States and Northern Africa" *Current History* Vol. 80, No. 470, December 1981, pp. 401-405.
- Legvold, R. *Soviet Policy in West Africa* Cambridge (Massachusetts): Harvard University Press, 1970.
- Leighton, M. "Algeria: Beyond the Politics of Gratitude" *Global Affairs*, Vol. ii, No. 2, Spring 1988, pp. 134-162.
- Leighton, M. "Regional Conflicts: Their Impact on Detente" *Global Affairs*, Vol. II No. 2, Spring 1987, pp. 67-81.
- Leitenberg, M. and Sheffer, G. *Great Power Intervention in the Middle East*, New York: Pergaman Press, 1979.
- Lemerchand, R, ed. *The Green and Black: Qaddafi's Policies in Africa*, Blomington: Indiana University Press, 1989.
- Lemarchand, R. "Chad: The Roots of Chaos" *Current History*, Vol. 80, No. 470, December 1981, pp. 414-418.
- LeoGrande, W. "Evolution of the Non-Aligned Movement" *Problem of Communism*, Vol. XXIX, Vol. 1, January-February 1986.
- Letalik, N. "Boundary Making in the Mediterranean" in Johnston, D.M., Saun-

- ders, P.M. *Ocean Boundary Making: Regional Issues and Development*, London: Croom Helm, 1988, pp. 109-141.
- Lewis, W. "The Mediterranean Basin: Strategic Realities" *Global Affairs*, Vol.II, No.2, Spring 1987, pp. 67-81.
- Lewis, W. "Northen Africa: An Embattled Strategy" *Global Affairs*, Vol. 1, No. 1, Winter 1986, pp. 59-66.
- Lewis, W. "Western Sahara: Compromise or Conflict", *Current History*, Vol. 80, No. 470, December, pp. 410-414.
- Lewis, , W. Jesse. *The Strategic Balance in the Mediterranean*, Washington.D.C: American Enterprise Institute, 1976.
- Light, M. *The Soviet theory of International Relations*, London: Wheatsheaf Books, 1988.
- Light, Margot. "The Soviet Union and International Revolution: Changing Theoretical Perspectives" *Paradigms*, Vol. 3, No. 1, 1989, pp. 1-14.
- Little, D. "Cold War and Covert Action: The United States and Syria 1945-1958" *The Middle East Journal*, Vol. 44, No. 1, Winter 1990, pp. 51-75.
- Litwak, R.S. *Detente and the Nixon Doctrine*, Cambridge University Press, 1984.
- Litwak, R.S; Wells, S. Jr, eds. *Superpower Competition and Security in the Third World*, Cambridge (Massachusetts): Ballinger Publishing Company, 1988.
- Lorwin, L. "The Structure of International Labour Activities" in *Annals of*

the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 310, March 1957, pp. 1-11.

Louis, B. *Economic bases of Franco-German Rivalry in Morocco, 1906-1909*, Unpublished Ph.D thesis, Berkeley: University of California, 1966.

Louis, W.R. *The British Empire in the Middle East 1945-1951*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984.

Louis, W.R. "American anti-Colonization and the dissolution of British Empire" *International Affairs (London)*, Vol. 61, No. 3, Summer 1985, pp. 396-420.

Louis, W.R.; Owen, R. ed. *The Crisis and its Consequences*, London: Oxford University Press, 1989.

Luard, E. "Superpowers and Regional Conflict" *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1986, pp. 1005-1025.

Lucas, E. "How CIA found a home for hot potatoes" *Independent (London)*, 13 March 1991, p. 9.

Lucas, W.S. "The Other Collusion: Operation Straggle and Anglo-American Intervention in Syria, 1955-1956" *Intelligence and National Security*, Vol. 4, No. 3, July 1989, pp. 576-595.

Luciani, G. ed. *The Mediterranean Region*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984.

MacFarlane, S.N. *Superpower Rivalry and Third World Radicalism: The idea of National Liberation*, London: Groom Helm, 1985.

- MacFarlane, S.N. "Superpower rivalry in the 1990s" *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 12, No. 1, January 1990, pp. 1-25.
- Mackintosh, M. "The Soviet Military Influence in Foreign Policy" *Problem of Communism*, vol XXII, No. 5, September-October 1973, pp 1-12.
- Macridis, R. ed. *Foreign Policy in World Politics*, Six edition, New Jersey: Prentice Hall Inc., 1985.
- Maddock, R.T. *The Political Economy of the Arms Race*, London: Macmillan, 1990.
- Maghroori, R; Gurton, M. *The Roots of Failure: United States in the Third World*, London, Westport: Greenwood Press, 1984.
- Magrini, L. "Maghreb Integration Attempts and Elements of Divergence" *Politica Internazionale*, Vol. IV, No. 2, Autumn 1985, pp.
- Mangold, P. "Shaba I and Shaba II" *Survival*, Vol. 21, No. 3, May-June 1979, pp. 107-115.
- Marksman, B. "Libya Qaddafi and Chad" *Covert Action Information Bulletin*, No. 30, Summer 1988, pp. 70-71.
- Marshall, J. "Saudia Arabia and the Reagan Doctrine" *Middle East Report*, No.155, November-December 1988, pp. 12-17.
- Mauil, H. "The Arms Trade with the Middle East and North Africa" *Middle East Review Annuals, General Survey*, 1990, pp. 159-166.
- Mayall, J. *Africa: The Cold War and after*, London: Elek Books 1971.

- Mayall, J; Navari, C, eds. *The End of the Post-War Era: Documents on Great-Power Relations 1968-1975*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980.
- Mayer Jr, John. *U.S.-Morocco agreement costs effects on RDF capabilities*, Washington.D.C., Congressional Budget Office, March 1983.
- Maynes, Charles William. "A Necessary War" *Foreign Policy*, No. 82, Spring 1991, pp. 159-177.
- McConnell, J. "Libya: Propaganda and Covert Operations" *Counter Spy*, Vol. 6, No. 1, 1981, pp. 20-40.
- McCormick, T.J. *America's Half-Century*, Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989.
- McFaul, M. "The Demise of the World Revolutionary Process: Soviet-Angolan Relations Under Gorbachev" *Journal of Southern Africa Studies*, Vol. 16, No. 1, March 1990, pp. 165-189.
- McCgwire, M. *Military objectives in Soviet Foreign Policy*, Washington. D.C. Brookings Institute 1987.
- McLane, C. *Soviet-Middle East Relations*, Vol.1 of Soviet-Third World Relations, London: Central Asian Research Centre, 1973.
- McLaurin, R.D. *The Middle East in Soviet Policy*, Lexington (Mass.); Lexington books, 1975.
- McLaurin, R.D. "The United States and the Algerian Revolution: A review of policy formulation" *Maghreb Digest*, Vol. V, No. 1, January - March

1967, pp 28-60.

McNaugher, T. *Arms and Oil*, Washington. D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1985.

Medvedoko, L. "The Mediterranean: The Global threat of Local Wars", *New Times*, No. 13, March 1988.

Mejcher, Helmut. "Umar Al-Mukhtar and the Jihad against Italian Colonialism the Contemporary German perception" *Addarah: An Academic Quarterly* (Riyadh), Vol. 15, No. 2, October 1989, pp. 4-25.

Menges, C. *Inside National Security Council*, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1988.

Menon, R. "The Soviet Union, The Arms Trade and the Third World" *Soviet Studies*, Vol. XXXIX, No. 3, July 1982, pp. 377-396.

Merle, M. *The Sociology of International Relations*, New York: Berg, 1987.

Mesa, R. "Spain's Mediterranean Policy" *Review of International Affairs*, Vol. XXXVIII, No. 892, 5 June 1987, pp. 6-8.

Meyer, A. "The Functions of Ideology in the Soviet Political System" *Soviet Studies*, Vol. XVII, No. 3, January 1966, pp. 273-85.

Micaud, C. *Tunisia: Politics of Modernization*, London and Dunmow: Pall Mall Press, 1963.

Migliavacca, P. "Controversial Complementarity with Libya", *Political Internazionale*, Vol. V, No. 2, Autumn 1986, pp. 39-49.

Miller, R., Teher, F. *Khrushchev and the Communist World*, London: Croom

- Helm, 1984.
- Montagne, R. "Morocco between East-West" *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 26, No. 2, January 1948, pp. 360-372.
- Moore, C.H. *Tunisia Since Independence*, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1965.
- Moore, Barrington. *Soviet Politics: the Dilemma of Power*, Boston: Harvard University Press, 1950.
- Morgenthau, H. *Scientific Man vs Power Politics*, London: Latimer House Limited, 1947.
- Morgenthau, H. *Politics Among Nations*, 6th ed, New York: Alfred Knopf, 1986.
- "Morocco: Soviet-American Rivalry" , *Africa Confidential* Vol. 19, October 1978, pp. 5-6.
- Morrison, J. "Russia and the Warm Water", *Proceeding, United States Naval Institute*, Vol. 78, No. 11, November 1952, pp. 1169-1179.
- Mortimer, R. "Algeria and the Politics of International Economic Reform" *Orbis*, Vol. 21, No. 3, 1977, pp. 671-700.
- Mortimer, R. "Algeria's New Sultan" *Current History*, Vol. 80, No. 470, December 1981, pp. 418-422.
- Mortimer, R. "Global Economy and African Foreign Policy: The Algerian Model" *African Studies Review*, Vol.27, No.1, March 1984, pp. 1-22.

- Mortimer, R. "Algeria and the Politics of International Economic Reform" *Orbis*, Vol. 21, No. 3, 1977, pp. 671-700.
- Mortimer, R. "Maghreb Matters" *Foreign Policy*, No. 76, Fall 1989, pp. 160-175.
- Munson, Jr, H. "Morocco's Fundamentalist" *Government and Opposition*, Vol. 26, No.3, Summer 1991, pp. 328-344.
- Musatov, T.L, "Sviazit Rossii Morokko vxixv" (Russia-Morocco links in the 19th century), *Narody Azii i Afriki* (People of Asia and Africa), Vol.VXIXV, No.1 January-February 1987, pp. 97-103, (in Russia).
- Nacht, M. "Internal Change and Regime Stability" in *Third World Conflict and International Security*, Part 1, No. 167, IISS (London), 1981, pp 52-58.
- Nacht, T. "Toward an American Conception of Regional Security" *Daedalus*, Vol. 110, No.1, 1981, pp. 1-22.
- Nancy, M. "Algeria: Chronique Economique Algerie" in *Annuaire De, L'Afrique du Nord*, Vol. vxiii, 1979, pp. 579-607.
- Nathan, J; Oliver, J. *Foreign Policy Making and the American Political System*, Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1986.
- Naylor, P. "Spain and France and the Decolonization of Western Sahara: Parity and Paradox, 1975-87" *Africa Today*, Vol. 34, No. 3, 1987, pp. 7-16.
- Neff, D. "Nixon's Middle East Policy: From balance to bias" *Arab Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 12, nos. 1-2 Winter-Spring, 1980, pp . 121-152.
- Neier, A. "Human Rights in Reagan Era" *Annals of the American Academy of*

- Political and Social Science*, Vol. 506, November 1986, pp. 30-41.
- Nelso, Harold, ed. *Libya: A Country Study*, Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979.
- Nelson, H. *Morocco: A Country Study*, Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Publication Office, 1986.
- Neuberger, Benyamin. *Involvement, Invasion and Withdrawal: Qaddafis Libya and Chad 1969-1981*, Occasional paper, No. 83, Tel Aviv University, 1982.
- Newson, D. "America Engulfed" *Foreign Policy*, No. 43, Summer 1981, pp. 17-32.
- Newson, D. "Qaddafi's Solo Adventurism" *The Christian Science Monitor*, May 21 1984, p. 15.
- Nichols, R. "Diplomacy in Barbary" *Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography*, LXXIV, January 1980, pp. 113-141.
- Nolan, R.W. "Tunisia's Time of Transition" *Current History*, Vol. 80, No. 470, December 1981, pp405-410.
- O'Donnell, Jr. "Ambassador Theodore Roustan: Spain, Morocco and Tariffs" *Iberian Studies*, Vol. 17, nos. 1-2, 1988, pp. 26-33.
- O'Reilly, G. "The Great Maghreb Union: Geostrategic and Geopolitical Significance" *Gulf Report* No. 16, December 1988, pp. 2-8.
- Odell, P. *Oil and World Power*, 4th Ed. London: Penguin Books, 1975.
- Ofer, G. "The Economic Burden of Soviet Involvement in the Middle East"

- Soviet Studies*, January 1973, pp. 329-347.
- Ogunbadejo, O. "Qaddafi and African International Relations" *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 24, No. 1, 1986.
- Ogunbadejo, O. "Qaddafi's North African Design" *International Security*, Vol.8, No.1, Summer 1983, pp. 154-178.
- Ogunbadejo, O. "Soviet Policies in Africa" *African Affairs*, Vol. 79, No. 316, July 1980, pp. 297-326.
- Ogunsanwo, A. *China's Policy in Africa 1958-1971*, London: Cambridge University Press. 1974.
- Oseth, J. "Combating Terrorism: The Dilemmas of a Decent Nation" *Parameters: U.S. Army War College Quarterly*, Vol. XV, No. 1, 1985, pp. 65-76.
- Osipov, V. "Failure of another surprise" *Izvestia*, June 12 1953, p. 12.
- Pajak, R.F. "Arms and Oil: The Soviet-Libyan Arms Supply Relationship" *Middle East Review*, Winter 1980-1981, pp 51-56.
- Papp, D. *Soviet Policies toward the developing World during the 1980's*, Alabama: Air University Press, 1986.
- Papp, D. *Contemporary International Relations*, New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1984.
- Parker, G. *Geopolitics of Domination*, London: Routhledge, 1988.
- Parker, R. *North Africa; Regional Tensions and Strategic Concerns*, second

- edition, New York: Praeger, 1987.
- Parker, R. "Appointments in Qujda" *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 63, No. 5, 1985, pp. 1095-1110.
- Parson, F.V. "The Morocco Question in 1884: An early crisis" *British Historical Review*, Vol. lxxvii, October 1962, pp. 659-83.
- Pazzanita, A. "Mauritania's Foreign Policy: the Search for Protection" *The Journal Modern African Studies*, Vol. 30, No. 2, 1992, pp. 281-304.
- Pelt, A. *Libyan Independence and the United Nations: A Case of planned Decolonization*, New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1970.
- Peltier, Marius. "The Suez Canal and Indian Ocean" in *Africa and the Defense of the West*, Le Monde Moderne, Paris, 1975, pp. 108-110.
- Pennar, Jean. *The U.S.S.R and the Arab, the ideological dimension 1917-1972*, London: C.Hurst & Company, 1973.
- Pennell, C.K.A. *A Country with a Government and a Flag 1921-1926*, Cambridgeshire (England): Middle East and North African Studies Press, 1986.
- Perkins, K. *Tunisia: Crossroads of the Islamic and European Worlds*, Boulder, Westview Press, 1986.
- Perry Jack Richard. *Soviet Policy toward French North Africa*, Ph.D. thesis, Columbia University, 1972.
- Pfaltzfraff, R. Jn., Dougherty, J. *American Foreign Policy from FDR to Reagan*, New York: Harper and Row: Publishers, 1986.

- Pfaltzfraff, R. Jn., Dougherty, J. *Contending theories of International Relations*, second edition, New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1981.
- Phillips, J. "One Year Later: Problems mount for Libya's Qaddafi". *Backgrounder* No. 42, Washington, D.C.: The Heritage Foundation, 1987.
- Pierre, A. *The Global Politics of Arms Sales*, Princeton (New Jersey): Princeton University Press, 1982.
- Platt, A. *Arms Transfers to the Middle East: European and other Suppliers*, Rand Corporation p 7286, Santa Monica, December 1986.
- Porter, B. *The USSR in Third World Conflict*, London: Cambridge University Press, 1984.
- Poskin, M. "From Pearl Harbour to Vietnam: Shifting Generational Paradigms" *Public Opinion Quarterly*, No. 89, Fall 1974, pp. 563-588.
- Preston, L. *Trade Pattern in the Middle East: United States interests in the Middle East*, Washington. D.C. American Enterprise Institutes for Public Policy Research, October 1970.
- Quandt, W. "Can we do Business with Radical Nationalists: Algeria: Yes", *Foreign Policy*, No. 7, Summer 1972, pp. 108-131.
- Quandt, W. *Revolution and Political Leadership: Algeria 1954-1968*, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1969.
- Quandt, W. "The electoral cycle and the conduct of Foreign Policy", *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 101, No. 5, 1986, pp. 825-836.
- Ramati, T. "Israel and the Iraq-Iran Conflict a perspective" *Global Affairs*,

Vol. 1, No. 4, Fall 1987, pp. 135-148.

Ramet. P. "Soviet-Libyan Relations" *Survey*, Vol. 29, No. 1, (124), Spring 1985, pp. 96-112.

Rami, Ahmed, (interview). "An accident to forestall coup" *Africa Now*, March 1983, pp. 14-18.

Ranelagh, J. *The Agency: The Rise and the Decline of the CIA*, New York: Simon & Schuster Inc, 1987.

Ranft, B. & Till, G. *The Sea in Soviet Strategy*, Second Edition, Annapolis, (Maryland): National Institute Press, 1989.

Ray, E, Schaap, W. "Vernon Walters: Crypto-diplomat and Terrorism" *Cover-tAction Information Bulletin*, No. 26, Summer 1986, pp. 3-8.

Ray, E, Schaap, W. "The Murder of Mehdi Ben Barka" *Time* December 29 1975, pp. 21-22.

Rayan, M. "Franco-Libyan Relations During the French Occupation to Fazzan 1943-1955" *Arab Journal for the Humanities*, Vol.9, No.35, Summer 1989, pp. 42-73.

Rees, H, et al. *Hand Book for Republic of Tunisia*, Washington D.C. US Government Printing Office, 1970.

Rejai, M. "On Superpowers: Global and Regional" *Co-existence*. Vol. 16, No. 1, 1979, pp. 129-141.

Reshetar, J.Jr. "The Soviet Union and the Neutralist World" *Annals of American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 362, November 1965,

pp. 102-112.

Reynolds, P A. *An Introduction to International Relations*, second edition, London: Longman 1980.

Rivlin, B. "The Tunisian Nationalist Movement: Four Decades of Evolution" *Middle East Journal*, Vol. VI, No. 2, Spring 1952, pp. 167-193.

Rivlin, B. "The United States and Morocco in International Status 1943-1956: A Contributory factor in Morocco's reassertion of Independence from France". *International Journal of African Historical Studies*, Vol. 15, No. 1, 1982, pp. 64-82.

Rogers, P.G. *A History of Anglo-Moroccan relations to 1900*, London; Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 1989.

Romdhani, O. "The Arab-Maghreb Union" *American-Arab Affairs*, No. 28, Spring 1989, pp. 42-48.

Rosenau, J. ed. *In Search for Global Pattern*, New York: Free Press, 1976.

Rosenau, J. *The Adaptation of National Societies: A Theory of Political System Transformation*, New York: McCaleb-Seiler, 1970.

Roughton R. "Algeria and the June 1967 Arab-Israeli War" *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 23, No. 4, Autumn 1969, pp. 433-444.

Rowen, H; Wolf, C.Jr. eds *Impoverished Superpower*, San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1990.

Rubin, Barry. "America and the Egyptian Revolution" *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 97, No. 1, Spring 1982, pp. 73-90.

- Rubin, Barry. *Secret of State: The State Department and the struggle over Foreign Policy*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985.
- Rubin, Barry. "Drowning in the Gulf" *Foreign Policy*, No. 69, Winter 1987-1988, pp. 120-134.
- Rubinstein, A. *Moscow's Third World Strategy*, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1988.
- Rubinstein, A. *Soviet Policy toward Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan the Dynamic of Influence*, New York: Praeger, 1982.
- Ruble, B.A. *Soviet Trade Union*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981.
- Rubner, M. "The Reagan Administration, the 1973 War Powers Resolution and the Invasion of Grenada" *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 100, No. 4, Winter 1985-86, pp. 627-647.
- Ruedy, J. "The Maghreb: Another Arab World", *Journal of Defense and Diplomacy* Vol. 2, No. 1, January 1984, pp. 44-51.
- Rumantsyev, V; Shvyedov, A. *Al-Alaqat al-Sufyatiyya al-Libiyya*, Moscow: Dar-al-Taquadum, 1986.(Soviet-Libyan Relations, Mocsow: Progress Press).
- Rupert, I. "Tunisia: Testing America's Third World Diplomacy" *World Policy Journal*, Vol. IV, No. 1, 1987, pp. 137-157.
- Russet, B.; Miroslay. "American Opinion and the use of Military Force abroad" *Public Opinion Quarterly*, No. 92, Fall 1976, pp. 411-431.

- Saadallah, B. "Premiere relation de L'Emire Abdelkader avec Britanniques et les Americans" *Societe Historique Algerienne*, No. 13, January 1976, pp. 19-40, (Also in Arabic).
- Saadallah, B. *Al-Harakah al-Wataniyah al-Jaza'iriyah*, Vol. 1, al-Adab Publisher, 1969.
- Sabra, N. "Regional Powers and Superpowers Rivalry" *Politics Internationale*, (English editon), Vol. 2, No. 1, Spring 1981, pp. 29-43.
- Safran, Nevada. *Saudia Arabia: Ceaseless Guest for Security*, Cambridge (Mass.), Harvard University Press, 1985.
- Saivetz, C. "Islam and Gorbachev's Policy in the Middle East", *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol.42 No.2 Spring 1989, pp. 435-444.
- Salem, Norma. *Habib Bourguiba, Islam and the creation of Tunisia*, London: Groom Helm, 1984.
- Salinger, P.; Laurent, E. *Secret Dossier: The Hidden Agenda behind the Gulf War*, London: A penguin book, 1991.
- Sangmuah, E.N. "Interest Groups and Decolonization: American Businessmen and Organized Labour in French North Africa 1948-1956" *The Mughreb Review*, Vol.13, nos.3-4, 1988, pp. 161-174.
- Sangmuah, E.N. "Eisenhower and Containment in North Africa, 1956-1960". *The Middle East Journal*, Vol.44, No.1, Winter 1990, pp. 76-91.
- Sarioshalam, M. *The International Dimentions of the Western Sahara Conflict*, Ph.D. Dissertation University of Southern California (Los Angelas), 1987.

- Schaap, B. "Disinforming the World on Libya" *CovertAction Information Bulletin*, No. 30, Summer 1988, pp. 68-76.
- Schatzberg, M.G. "Military Intervention and the Myth of Collective Security in Zaire". *the Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 27, No. 2, June 1989, pp. 315-340.
- Schraeder, P. *Intervention in the 1980s: U.S. Foreign Policy in the Third World*, Boulder (Colorado): Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1989.
- Schultz, S; Machowski, H. *US and Soviet Trade and Aid Relations with the Third World*, No. 3, Koln (Germany): Berichte des Bundesinstituts fur Ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien, 1983.
- Schumacher, E. "United States and Libya" *Foreign Affairs*, Vol.65 No.2, Winter 1986-1987, pp. 329-348.
- Sciolino, E. "Libya says Political Treaty with Algeria is near" *New York Times*, October 8 1987, p. 3.
- Seale, P. & McConville, M. *The Hilton Assignment*, London: The Quality Book Club, 1974.
- Segal, G; Mopreton, E, ed. *Soviet Strategy toward Western Europe*, London: George Allen & Unwin, 1984.
- Shannon, E. Fleming. "Spain, Morocco and the Alzamieno National, 1936-1939: The Military, Economic and Political Mobilization of a Protectorate" *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 18, No.1, 1983, pp. 27-42.
- Shearman, P. "Gorbachev and the Third World: An era of return" *Third World*

Quarterly Vol. 9, No. 4, October 1987, pp. 1083-1117.

Shearman, P., Williams, P. *Superpowers, Central America and the Middle East*, London: Brassey Publisher, 1988.

Shelpin, V. "U.S.S.R-Morocco: Links many and varied" *New Times*, No. 11, March 1983, pp. 10-11.

Shestack, J. "Human Rights, the National interest and U.S. Foreign Policy" *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 506, November 1989, pp. 17-30.

Shimizi, H. *Anglo-Japanese Trade Rivalry in the Middle East in Interwar Period*, London: Ithaca Press, 1986.

Shlaim, V. "The Maghreb Countries and the EEC" *Maghreb Review*, No. 2, August-September 1976, pp. 10-13.

Shuaib, Ali. *Asrun Al-guwaid ali-Amrikiyyah Fi-Libya* (The Secret of American bases in Libya), Tripoli, 1982.

Shvedov, A.; Podtserob, A. "The Soviet Union and North African Countries" *International Affairs* (Moscow) No. 6, 1983, pp. 54-62.

Shyltz. R. *Soviet Union and Revolutionary Warfare*, Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1988.

Sicker, M. *The Making of a Pariah State: The Adventurist Politics of Muammer Qaddafi*, New York: Praeger Publisher, 1987.

Sigler, J. "News Flow in the North African International Subsystem". *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 13, No. 4, December 1969, pp 381-397.

- Skinner, E, ed. *Beyond Constructive Engagement: United States Foreign Policy Toward Africa* New York, Paragon House Publishers, 1986.
- Sloan, G.R.,. *Geopolitics in United States Strategic Policy 1890-1987*, New York: St. Martins Press, 1988.
- Smith, A. "Malta: From NATO base to Libyan outpost" *Global Affairs*, Vol.1, No.4, Fall 1986, pp. 87-98.
- Smith, W. *The Ideological Origins of Nazi Imperialism*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1986.
- Snow, D.M. ed. *Soviet-American Security Relations in the 1990s*, Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1989.
- Snyder, G. "The Security Dilemma in Alliance politics" *World Politics*, Vol.XXXVI No.4, July 1984, pp461-495.
- Solarz, S. "Arms for Morocco", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 58, No. 2, Winter 1979/1980, pp. 278-299.
- Somerville, K. *Foreign military intervention in Africa*, New York. St. Martin's Press, 1990.
- Spainer, J. *American Foreign Policy since World War II*, 8th edition, New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1979.
- Spencer, Donald. *The Carter Implosion: Jimmy Carter and the Amateur Style of Diplomacy*, New York: Praeger, 1988.
- Spero, J. *Politics of International Economic Relations*, New York: Martin's Press, Inc. 1981.

- Spiegel, S. ed. *At Issue: Politics in the World Arena*, fifth ed, New York: St. Martins Press, 1988.
- St John, Ronald Bruce. "The Soviet Penetration of Libya" *The World Today*, vo.38 No.4, April 1982, p. 133.
- St John, Ronald Bruce. "Libya's Revolution in Vietnamese Mirror: Building a new Political Order" *Asian Affairs (Bangladesh)*, Vol. VII, No. 1, January-March 1985, pp. 12-42.
- St John, Ronald Bruce. "Libya's Foreign and Domestic Politics" *Current History*, Vol. 80, No. 470, December 1981, pp. 426-430.
- St John, Ronald Burce. *Qaddafi's World Design: Libya's Foreign Policy 1969-1987*, London: Sagi Books, 1987.
- Starr, R. *U.S.S.R. Foreign Policies after Detente*, Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1985.
- Starr, R. ed. *Yearbook in International Communist Affairs*, Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1976.
- Stearns, M. *Updating the Truman Doctrine: The U.S. and NATO's Southern Flank*, Working paper No. 86, International Security Program Wilson Centre, 1988.
- Steinbach, A. "Regional Organizations of International Labour" in *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 310, March 1957, pp. 12-20.
- Steinbach, U. "Sources of Third World Conflict" in *Third World Conflict and*

- International Security*, Part 1, No. 167, International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), London, 1981, pp. 21-28.
- Steven, S. *The Spymasters of Israel*, New York: Ballantine Books, 1980.
- Stivers, W. *American Confrontation with Revolutionary Change in the Middle East 1948-1983*, New Yorks: St Martin's Press, 1986.
- Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. *The Arms Trade with the Third World*, London, Paul Elek Limited, 1971.
- Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. *Arms Trade Registers: The Arms Trade with the Third World*, Sockholm (Sweden): Almqvist & Wiksell International Stockolm, 1975.
- Stremlau, J. *Soviet Foreign Policy in an uncertain world*, The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 481, London: Sage Publications, September 1985.
- Strpic, P. "A New Mediterranean Policy" *Review of International Affairs*, Vol. XXXVIII, No. 892, 5 June 1987, pp4-6.
- Swearingen, D. *Moroccan Mirage: Agravian Dream and Deceptions 1912-1986*, New Jersey: Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1987.
- Tarutin, I. "The Tragedy of Chad" *Pravada*, (Moscow) 17 May 1982.
- Taylor, A. *The Arab Balance of Power*, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1982.
- Taylor, J. *Pearl Harbour II*, London & New York: Regency Press 1980.

- Taylor Jr, W, et al. *Strategic Responses to Conflict in 1980s*, New York: Free Press, 1984.
- Tazi, Abdelhadi. *Moroccan-American Relations: Unbroken Peace from Revolutionary Times at the Present*, The Embassy of the Kingdom of Morocco, Washington, D.C. May 1982.
- Terrill, A. "Jordan and the Defense of the Gulf", *Middle East Insight*, Vol. 4, No. 1, 1985, pp. 34-41.
- Tessler, M. "Moroccan-Israeli Relations and the Reasons for Moroccan Receptivity to Contact with Israel". *The Jerusalem Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 10, No. 2, July 1988, pp. 76-108.
- Tessler, M. *Politics in Morocco: The Monarch, the War, and the Opposition*, Hanover, N.H.: American Universities Field Staff, Africa, Report No. 47, 1982.
- Tessler, M. *Continuity and Change in Morocco; Part I; Challenge and Response in Hussan's Morocco; Part II: New Troubles and Depending Doubts In Universities Field Staff International Reports*, 1984.
- Tessler, M. "Morocco, Israeli Relations and the Reasons for Morocco receptivity to contact with Israel" *The Jerusalem Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 10, No. 2, July 1988, pp. 76-108.
- Tessler, M. *Explaining surprises of King Hussan II: The linkage between domestic and Foreign Policy in Morocco: Part II The Arab-Africa Union between Morocco and Libya*, Universities Field Staff International Inc. No. 39, Indianapolis, 1986.

- Thomas, Jr. F. "The Peace Corps in Morocco" *The Middle East Journal* Vol. XIX, No. 3, Summer 1965, pp. 273-284.
- Thomas, C. *In Search of Security: The Third World in International Relations* Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 1987.
- Thompson, E.P, et al. *Mad Dog: The US Raids on Libya*, London: Pluto Press, 1986.
- Thompson, K.W. *Cold War Theories*, Vol. 1, Baton Rouge & London: Louisiana States University Press, 1981.
- Thompson, W. "The Regional Subsystem: A Conceptual explication and a propositional inventory" *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol.17, No.1 March 1973, pp. 89-117.
- Thompson, W. "Delineating regional subsystems: Visit networks of the Middle Eastern case" *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol.13 No.2, May 1981, pp. 213-235.
- Till, G. and Ranft, B. *The Sea in Soviet Strategy*, Second Edition Maryland, Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1989.
- Tillman, S. *The United States in the Middle East: Interests and Obstacles*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982.
- Tishin, I. "Arena of Imperialist Intrigues" *International Affairs* (Moscow), April, 1958, pp. 98-99.
- Tlemcani, R. *State and Revolution in Algeria*, Boulder: Westview Press, 1986.
- Trachtcenberg, M.A. "A Wasting Asset American Strategy and Reshifting Nu-

- clear Balance 1949-1954" *International Security*, Vol. 13, No. 3, Winter 1988-1989, pp. 5-49.
- Trachtenberg, M.A. "Strategic thought in America 1952-1966" *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 104, No.2, 1989, pp. 301-334.
- Truver, S. *International Straits of the World*, Maryland, Germantown: Sijthoff and Noordhoff, 1980.
- Truver, S. "Naval Dimension of Spain in NATO" *Proceeding U.S. Naval Institute*, Vol. 112, No. 3, 1997, March 1986, pp. 154-157.
- Tucker, R. "United States - Soviet Cooperation; Incentives and Obstacles" *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences*, July 1967, pp. 1-16.
- Tukuyama, F. *The Tenth Period of Soviet Third World Policy*, Rand Corporation, R-7390, Sanata-Monica, October 1987.
- Turner, L. *Oil Companies in the International System*, London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, George Allen & Unwin, 1978.
- Turner, R. *The War powers Resolution; Its Implementation in Theory and Practice*, Philadelphia: Foreign Policy Research Institute, 1983.
- Ulyanovsky, V. et al. *Fighters for National Liberation* Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1983.
- Usvatov, A. "U.S.S.R.-Algeria: Common Approach" *New Times*, No. 25, 1981, pp. 7-8.
- Usvotov, A. "Common Approach" *New Times*, Part 25, 1981, p 7.

- Valkenier, E.K. "New Soviet Thinking about the Third World" *World Policy Journal*, Vol. Iv No.4, Fall 1987, pp. 651-674.
- Vayrynen, R. "Regional Conflict Formations: An Intractable Problem of International Relations" *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 21, No. 4, 1984, pp. 337-359.
- Vidal, F.A. "Religious Brotherhoods in Moroccan Politics" *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 4, No. 4, October 1950, pp. 427-446.
- Volsky, D. "The Mediterranean and Peace" *New Times*, No. 29, July 16 1971, p. 10.
- Vukandinovic, R. *The Mediterranean between War and Peace*, Beograd: Institute Za Zemlje U Razvoju, 1987.
- Walker, M. "The U.S. and the Persian Gulf Crisis" *World Policy Journal*, Fall 1990, pp. 791-99.
- Wallander, C. "Third World Conflict in Soviet Military Thought" *World Politics*, Vol.XLII, No.1, october 1989, pp. 31-63.
- Waller, D. "Foreign Aid Follies" *Newsweek*, April 16 1990, pp. 22-23.
- Walt, S. *Origin of Alliances*, Ithaca; New York: Cornell University Press 1987.
- Walt, S. "Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power" *International Security*, Vol.9 No.4, Spring 1985, pp. 3-43.
- Waltz. K. *Theory of International Relations*, London: Addison-Wesley Publishing 1979.

- Waltz, K. "The Stability of a Bipolar World" *Daedalus*, Summer 1964, pp. 881-909.
- Ward, A.W. & Gooch, G.P. *The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy 1783-1919*, Vol.3, London: Cambridge at the University Press, 1973.
- Ware, L.B. "Toward a Euro-American Policy for the Maghreb" *American-Arab Affairs*, No.28, Spring 1989, pp. 49-59.
- Ware, L.B. *Tunisia in the Post Bourguiba Era: The Role of the Military in a civilian Arab Republic*, Alabama: Air University Press, February 1986.
- Ware, L.B. "The role of the Tunisian military in the post Bourguiba era" *Middle East Journal*, Vol.39 No.1 Winter 1985, pp. 27-47.
- Ware, L.B. *Decolonization and the Global Alliance in the Arab Maghrib: The Case of Spanish Sahara*, Montgomery (Alabama): Air University Institute for Professional Development 1975.
- Waterbury, J. *The Commandor of the Faithful*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1970.
- Waterbury, J. "Endemic and Planned Corruption in a Monarchical Regime" *World Politics*, Vol.XXV No.4, July 1973, pp. 533-555.
- Waterbury, J. "Corruption, Political Stability and Development: Comparative Evidence From Egypt to Morocco" *Government and Opposition* Vol.11 1976, pp. 426-45.
- Watson, B.W. "Maritime Problems in the Mediterranean Sea as we approach the Twenty-First Century", in George, J. ed. *Problems of Sea Power as*

- we approach the Twenty-First Century*, Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1978, pp. 97-122.
- Watson, B. *Red Navy at Sea: Soviet Naval Operations on the High Seas, 1956-1980*, Boulder: Westview Press, 1982.
- Weiler, P. "The United States Labour and the Cold War: The break of the World Federation of Trade Unions" *Diplomatic History*, Vol. 5, Winter 1981, pp. 1-22.
- Wenger, M. "Reagan Stakes Morocco in Sahara Struggle" *MERIP Reports*, May 1982, pp. 22-23.
- Wiards, H. "The Paralysis of Policy: Current Dilemma of U.S. Foreign Policy Making" *World Affairs*, Vol. 149, No. 1, Summer 1986, pp. 15-20.
- Wilkinson, B. "Shifting Alignments in the Maghreb" *The Middle East*, May 1984, pp. 42-44.
- William, D. "The Cuban Military in Africa and Middle East: From Algeria to Angola" *Studies in Comparative Communism*, Vol. 11, nos 1-2, Spring-Summer 1978, pp. 34-74.
- William, D. *The Soviet Union and Cuba: Interests and Influence*, New York: Praeger, 1985.
- Williams, P. "The Limits of American Power: From Nixon to Reagan" *International Affairs*, Vol.63 No.4, Autumn 1987, pp. 575-87.
- Windle, C; Vallance, T.R. "Optimizing Military Assistance Training" *World Politics*, Vol. No. October, 1962, pp. 91-107.

- Woodman, D. *Rebels in the Rif*, London: Oxford University Press, 1969.
- Wright, C. "Libya and the West; Headlong into Confrontation" *International Affairs (London)*, Vol. 58, No. 1, Winter 1982, pp. 13-41.
- Wright, J. *Libya, Chad, and the Central Sahara*, London: Hurst and Co. 1989.
- Wright, C. "Libya and the West: Head Long into Confrontation" *International Affairs*, Vol. 58, No. 1, Winter 1982, pp. 13-41.
- Wright, C. "Tunisia: Next Friend to Fall" *Foreign Policy*, No. 46, 1982, pp. 128-37.
- Wright, C. "A Journey to Marrach: U.S-Moroccan Security Relations" *International Security*, Vol.7 No.4, Spring 1983, pp. 163-179.
- Yadfati, A. "The USSR and Libya" *New Outlook*, Vol.13 No.6 July-August 1970, p. 38.
- Yapp, M.F. *The Making of the Modern Near East*, London: Longman, 1982.
- Yazid, M. "Algeria and Arab-Israeli Conflict" *Journal of Palestinian Studies*, Vol. 1, No. 2, 1972, pp. 1-18.
- Yergin, D. *The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money and Power*, London: Simon & Schuster, 1991.
- Yevgenyev, V. "Lasting Friendship Soviet-Algerian relations" *International Affairs (Moscow)*, No. 8 August 1987, pp. 46-51.
- Yost, D. "French Policy in Chad and the Libyan Challenge" *Orbis*, Vol.26, No.4, 1983, pp. 965-997.

- Young, A. "The United States and Africa: Victory for Diplomacy" *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 59, No. 3, 1981, pp. 648-666.
- Younger, S. "Ideology and Pragmatism in Algerian Foreign Policy" *The World Today*, Vol. 34, No. 3, March 1978, pp. 107-114.
- Zagoria, D.S. *The Sino-Soviet Conflict 1956-1961*, London: Oxford University Press, 1977.
- Zartman, W. ed. *The Political Economy of Morocco*, New York: Praeger Publishers, 1987.
- Zartman, W. *Ripe for Solution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1985.
- Zartman, W. "Urban Uprising in Morocco" in Taylor Jr, W, et al, 1984, pp. 385-389.
- Zartman, W. "Qaddafi's Foreign Policy" *American-Arab Affairs*, No. 6, Fall 1983.
- Zartman, W. "Issues of African diplomacy in the 1980s" *Orbis*, Winter 1982, pp. 1025-1043.
- Zartman, W. et al. eds. *Political elites in Arab North Africa*, New York: Longman, 1982.
- Zartman, W. ed. *Man, State and Society in the contemporary Maghreb*, New York: Praeger, 1971.
- Zartman, W. *International Relations in New Africa*, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1966.

- Zilian, F. "The U.S. Raid on Libya" *Orbis*, Fall 1986, pp. 499-524.
- Zimmermann, T. "American bombing of Libya: A Success for Coercive diplomacy" *survival*, Vol. XXIX, No. 3, May-June 1987, pp. 195-215.
- Zimmermann, W. "Elite Perspective and Explanation of Soviet Foreign Policy" *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. XXIV, No. 1, 1970, pp. 84-98.
- Zingg, P. "The Cold War in North Africa: American Foreign Policy and Post-war Muslim Nationalism 1945-1962" *The Historian*, Vol. XXXIX, Part 1, 1976, pp. 41-46.
- Zoubir, Y. "Soviet policy toward the Western Sahara Conflict" *Africa Today*, Vol. 34, No. 3, 1987.
- Zoubir, Y. "The Western Sahara Conflict; Regional And International Dimensions". *The Journal of Modern Africa Studies*, Vol. 28, No. 2, June 1990, pp. 225-244.
- Zoubir, Y. "Soviet Policy toward the Western Sahara Conflict" *Africa Today*, Vol. 34, No. 3 1987, pp. 17-32.
- Zoubir, Y. "Soviet Policy in the Maghreb" *Arab Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 9, No. 4, Fall 1987, pp. 399-421.
- Zoubir, Y, "The Western Sahara Conflict: Regional and International dimension" *The Journal of Modern Africa Studies*, Vol. 28, No. 2, 1990, pp. 225-244.
- Zunes, S. "Nationalism and Non-Alignment: The Non-Ideology of the Polisario", *Africa Today*, Vol. 34, No. 3 1987, pp 33-46.

Zunes, S. "The United States and Morocco: The Sahara War and Regional Interests" *Arab Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 9, No. 4, Fall 1987, pp 422-441.

3. Newspapers, Journal and Magazines

Annuaire De L'Afrique Du Nord

Al-Sunnah

Al-Ghuraba

Al-Ahram

Al-Alam (Rabat)

Al-Hayat

Al-Mojahed

Al-Shaq-Alawsat

African Contemporary Record

African Bulletin

Africa Confidential

Africa Now

Africa Report

Christian Science Monitor

Current Digest of Soviet Press

Independent

International Affairs (Moscow)

Jeune Afrique

Keesing's Contemporary Archives

Le Monde

Los Angeles Times

Maghreb-Machrek Monde Arabe

Mizan

The Mizan Newsletter

MERIP Report (Middle East Report)

Middle East Economic Digest (MEED)

Middle East Economic Survey (MEES)

New Times

New York Times

Newsweek

The Maghreb Review

Time

USSR and Third World

Washington Post

Washington Times

World Armaments and Disarmament SIPRI Yearbook

