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ABSTRACT

GARY R BUNT

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FORMATIVE CONTACTS BETWEEN BRITAIN AND ISLAM, AND THEIR REPERCUSSIONS FOR CONTEMPORARY BRITISH MUSLIM COMMUNITIES

Chapter 1 introduces the Terms of Reference, Methodology, and Dissertation Structure. In Chapter 2, formative contacts are discussed chronologically and regionally, specifically concentrating on primary sources as indicators in the development of perceptions and knowledge of Islam within Britain - forming part of European interpretation of Islam. The historical narrative incorporates a discussion of earliest contacts between Britain and Islam; 'evolution' of knowledge about Islam; movement of British agents into the Islamic world - and their importance in providing crucial information about different forms of Islam; (mis)representation of Islam; isolation of themes regarding perceptions of Islam.

In Chapter 3, contemporary issues concerning Muslims in Britain are surveyed in the context of themes emerging as important in assessment of Islam, during the discussion of formative contacts. These themes are discussed within the context of a Survey of Islam in Britain; an analysis of 'Fundamentalism'; The Satanic Verses controversy; British Muslim Community Representation and Leadership; the position of Women in British Islam; Islam in Europe; the role of the contemporary Media in perceptions of Islam; a survey of the 1991 Gulf War, in which many impressions of Islam conveyed by formative contacts were re-articulated.

Within Chapter 4, other important issues affecting Muslims in Britain, notably education, interfaith dialogue, and social welfare, are incorporated into a discussion on British Muslim identity. The dissertation concludes with establishing whether there is correlation between formative contacts and contemporary British Muslim issues. It assesses the way forward for Islam in Britain in the light of lessons learnt - and what work needs to be done by Muslim and non-Muslim communities in Britain to improve the perception of Islam.

FORMATIVE CONTACTS BETWEEN BRITAIN AND ISLAM, AND THEIR REPERCUSSIONS FOR CONTEMPORARY BRITISH MUSLIM COMMUNITIES

by

GARY RICHARD BUNT

B.A. (Hons) University of Kent at Canterbury

A Dissertation Submitted for the Degree of

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University of Durham

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Centre for Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies

University of Durham

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- 2 JUL 1993

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GRB

وَمَا كَانَ النَّاسُ اِلاَّ أُمَّةً واحِدَةً
فا خْتَلَفُوْا
وَلَوْ لاَ كَلِمَةٌ سَبَقَتْ منْ رَبِّكَ
لَقُضِيَ بَيْنَهُمْ فِيمَا فِيهِ يَخْتَلِفُونَ

Mankind was but one nation,
But differed (later). Had it not
Been for a Word
That went forth before
From thy Lord, their differences
Would have been settled
Between them.

SURAH X "Yunus" 19

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Terms of Reference

This dissertation discusses how pre-twentieth century perceptions of Islam have been sustained within interpretations of contemporary British Muslim issues. Certain of these perceptions were distorted, inaccurate , and/or based on rumour and myth. Despite the presence of Muslim communities in Britain, and closer contacts with the Islamic world developing during the twentieth century, general impressions of Islam remain reliant on old archetypes. Despite a sophisticated pre-twentieth century knowledge of Islam in some circles, observers may say that a basic ignorance remains, and that this knowledge did not diffuse itself completely.

Limitations of space and time mean that it is not possible to discuss every British contact with a Muslim culture. Formative contacts are those which isolate themes regarding Muslims, Islam, and Islamic societies: examples cited demonstrate a level of pre-existing knowledge about Islam; new information which contributes to the overall images of Islam; contacts which reinforce stereotypes which are familiar today; encounters which offered a radical

challenge to pre-existing conceptualisation of Islam. Formative contacts selected provide insight into British attitudes towards Islam, and illustrate events seen as influential in changing the relationship or policies of Britain regarding Islam and the Islamic Worlds. The term 'formative contacts' represents encounters chronicled or otherwise diffused in Britain - not only in 'academic' works, but publications of a popular nature. Whilst no contact had a specific influence on contemporary approaches towards Muslims in Britain, in being synthesised towards building a more complete picture of conceptions of Islam, the events and sources could be deemed as formative or illustrative of a certain level of knowledge, with a pervasive influence on how Islam has been perceived in the United Kingdom. In an overview of history, events deemed 'major' often involve leaders (kings, prophets, nobility) on specific time-bound occasions where a radical change is obvious (a battle, a coronation): significant changes also take place over a longer period and involve factors whose place in history is less conspicuous. Such low-key events or changes are not always surrounded by myth, hagiography, or - more importantly - detailed historical information: they have to be pieced together, and involve a certain degree of

imagination and lateral thought. Abstract patterns emerge in the development and progress of approaches to Islam in Britain.

The term 'Britain' is flexible, and can have social, economic, geographical, and/or political connotations: historically, it can range from part of the Roman Empire, to a series of frequently changing kingdoms under different forms of leadership, to a colonial and world power; the term incorporates a diversity of peoples, cultures, and religious beliefs. The 'British' can be described today as the inhabitants of England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland: at other times, the term has incorporated inhabitants of various colonies, and exclusively used to describe the activities of the English - excluding other inhabitants of Britain and leading to accusations of Anglo-centrism. The term can be used selectively, to apply to those conforming to perceived values of 'race', religion, and/or cultural values.

A single, arbitrary, concise definition of Islam is difficult to provide, a problem compounded as this dissertation studies certain arbitrary, concise definitions of Islam made by non-Muslims. Many incorporate misunderstandings, orientalism,

propaganda, patriotism, racism, and other elements. In Arabic, 'Islām' is: "submission, resignation, reconciliation [to the will of God]" (1). It is incorrect when commentators state that Islam has 'evolved', as this indicates improvement from God's Revelation received and transmitted by the Prophet Muhammad (570-632). The Qur'ān states that "Mankind was one single nation" (Surah II.213) (2), without boundaries, to be governed by sharī'ah. The Umma is the Muslim people, who should live in dār al-islam - the single Islamic nation. This suggests a monolithic structure, rather than diverse communities. Despite variations, there may be agreement on Arkān al-Islām zakat, salat, shahādah, hajj, and sawm). Differences of dīn within Islam incorporate divisions between Sunni and Shi'i Islam, and multiple-interpretations within these forms, including Sufism. Islam is non-exclusive: the Prophet's Revelation was for all humanity: "Any who believe in God and the Last Day, and work righteousness, shall have their reward with their Lord" (Surah II.8). Islam's religious essence is encapsulated in sūrat al-fātihah (Surah I), containing within its seven verses the essential doctrine of 'submission' to Allah. For this dissertation, a Muslim is an individual born of

Muslim parents (or a parent), or a convert to Islam - however secular or religious.

Every Muslim will have different priorities and issues, and the large number of variables means that it is difficult talking about a collective singular community. The varied opinions of 'who is a Muslim' means that certain communities who recognise themselves as Islamic are not recognised by other Muslim groups, and vice versa. There is considerable variation within broadly defined communities: within a small geographical area, there may be several mosques representing different interpretations of Islam, with different leaders, religious interests, and little or no contact (or even hostilities) between each other. This geographical area is frequently considered a singular community by outsiders such as (Muslim and non-Muslim) academics, politicians, social services, religious leaders, media, etc.

As well as aspects such as gender, religious affiliation, ethnic identity, and age, Muslim individuals, families and communities could be further divided by factors including:

(i) place of birth, especially whether the individual or family is British-born and educated.

(ii) number of generations of a family that have been born and resident within the United Kingdom.

(iii) whether contact is maintained with any country, culture, or religious authority outside of Britain - and if so the level of that contact.

(iv) conversion: whether the individual has embraced Islam.

(v) social-class (self perceived and/or externally perceived) or position of the individual and family (linked to social-class of any region of origin, and any social class acquired subsequent to an individual arriving in Britain).

(vi) status of the individual or family's country or region of origin.

(vii) family prestige, strength of any family network, and intermarriages across (inter)national cultural and religious boundaries.

(viii) migration reasons: reasons for migrant origin Muslim individuals or families coming to and staying in Britain i.e. political, military, religious, social and/or economic pressures, exercise of citizenship rights (prior to imposition of restrictions), acquisition of education, family reunification; marriage, to gain asylum or entry as a refugee, to acquire employment or develop business opportunities - in short or long term, to provide military service, etc.

(ix) location of residence, and whether that is within a strongly-defined Muslim community (i.e. with mosques, *halāl* butchers, specialist shops and restaurants serving Muslim needs, social and community services containing components directly allowing for religious as well as any cultural requirements, etc.).

(x) employment: the nature of an individual's employment (if any) or daily activity, and the level to which that brings the individual into contact with others (Muslim and non-Muslim).

(xi) assimilation (self and externally perceived) into non-Muslim British society, and acquistion of values not regarded as 'Islamic' by

religious authorities, peers, or non-British Muslims - or loss of Islamic or Qur'ānic values (themselves variable throughout the Islamic world(s).

(xii) languages used, and acquired.

(xiii) education - level and type of education-establishments attended (Islamic and non-Islamic, British and foreign).

(xiv) religious activities (if any) i.e. i.e. observation of arkān al-Islām and sharī'ah; membership of mosque(s); activities that may be personal, or intangible to observers (levels of belief, invocation of God, prayer in domestic setting, reading of Qur'ān and other Muslim texts); social, religious, community and/or cultural activities which participants interpret as Islamic; religious and social leadership.

These examples are not exhaustive or in order of importance. Neither is it being divisive to establish these differences between Muslims. Interpretations of Islam in Britain should be guided and encoded with the preceding factors, in order that the issues can be evaluated with a greater degree of accuracy. One of the problems

interpreters (Muslim and non-Muslims) have in interpreting Islam and Muslim issues is seeing the Islamic communities as a collective whole, rather than individually - with their own facets, identities, affiliations, and issues. The umma shares religious values, but each component has a specific individual identity.

A very generalistic view towards British Muslims provides an homogenous identity affiliating them directly and indirectly with Muslims and Islamic issues internationally (whether they have any direct interest, concern or contact themselves). This is influential in interpretations of Islam in Britain, and in the manifestation of forms of direct and indirect discrimination, prejudice, and anti-Muslim bias. Certain Muslim religious, sectarian, or political issues are raised in the Islamic press which other Muslims find invalid or antagonistic: there should never be any assumption that British Muslims have fixed, universal opinions. The debate on relevant issues within British Muslim communities is lively and incorporates wide views and diverse platforms on many issues. Attempts have been made to bridge the gap between different Muslim communities in Britain, or even within specific sectors of communities. Like any society, there might never be

uniformity, but the shared Islamic values between different Muslim communities have been seen by some commentators as a basis for dialogue or a strengthened platform: issues that might be lost on non-Muslim commentators, relating to religious factors including observance of different sharī'ah forms and practices or adherence to different leadership - as well as more 'obvious' inter-Muslim identity divides such as Sunni, Shia, Sufi, Ismaili - are all relevant divisive factors. These may often be linked to ethnic, cultural, political, linguistic and other issues which might not necessarily have a basis in Islam. The point of distinguishing between Islamic ideals and reality might also be made, and the use of an Islamic banner for issues which some observers might deem not in a common Muslim interest.

It would be patronising, one-sided and negative to emphasise only the differences. There are dangers of approaching Britain's Muslim societies as if they can do no wrong, or in perceiving them as defenceless and requiring demeaning support and assistance. Recent events have proven that Muslim communities can defend themselves forcefully on certain issues, and raise public awareness on

matters seen as important to specific communities or to Islam in Britain as a whole:

"This new ethnic assertiveness... arises from genuine social conditions and a sense of threat to identity and will challenge the stereotype that Asians are passive and accepting." (3)

(This assertiveness is not limited to Britain's Asian Muslim communities, but to many sections of British Muslim communities. This raises further discussion regarding valid representation of Muslims in Britain, and the conflicts between different groups for leadership.)

Origins of Islam in Britain

It is not proposed here to provide a full history of Islam in Britain. Much is unchronicled, and the diversity within British Muslim communities means that extensive historical research is required. From the nineteenth century, Muslim communities existed in several ports (including Cardiff, Liverpool, London, and Tyneside), centred around Indian and Arab sailors - and with strong colonial links. There were also Muslims studying and living elsewhere in Britain, and a number of converts: in

Liverpool, Sheikh Abdullah (William) Quilliam encouraged da'wa through foundation after 1889 of a mosque, Muslim Institute, and Children's Home - which declined after he left Britain in 1908. In 1889, an Indian-funded purpose-built mosque and Institute were constructed in Woking, Surrey: although not used consistently since construction, the mosque is used today. (4) The early communities in particular may not have had a central place for salat, especially important for Friday prayer, or had an imām to lead salat: the history of the communities' development shows a growing number of converted-structures becoming mosques, or purpose-built mosques. There are an estimated 500 mosques in Britain in 1992 - although the estimate does not define how a mosque is determined (5).

The greatest proportion of Muslims in Britain today have post-World War Two origins, dating from the 1950's to the immigration restrictions in the 1960's (6). Muslims from the British Commonwealth were a significant portion of the two million immigrants to Great Britain (during 1965-1975 two million people also emigrated from Britain). During Britain's 1950's economic growth, many Muslim immigrants were young, single males - who came to work, save, and subsequently buy property in 'home countries': they

played an important part in British industrial growth. Acquisition of property and businesses, family ties, alienation from origins, Westernisation, desire of education opportunities, and/or the birth of children in Britain persuaded many temporary-immigrants to stay. Specifically Islamic 'community infrastructures' were formed, by immigrants who felt a need:

"...to preserve religion and culture in a minority situation. It is not simply the predominance of another religion which caused concern to Muslims; they wanted to safeguard Islam from the growing secularisation of British society." (7)

This desire for preservation of Islam has not always been successful, and British Muslim communities fear assimmilation tendencies - especially of British-born and/or raised Muslims - and the attendant loss of Muslim identity. Their wishes may be for a multi-cultural society in which religious identities are preserved, or more unrealistically, an Islamic society created through da'wa activity.

Examining statistics could make a contribution to understanding the diversity within Islam in Britain: the 1991 Census introduced a question on ethnic-

origin, but not religious affiliation: the results of this section of the Census will be available in 1993, and may provide data for an assessment of the number of Muslims in Britain. Calculating the Muslim population using ethnicity is difficult; because of British-born Muslims (converts, post-immigration generations); and because ethnicity identities are not exclusively 'Muslim'. For example, 'Arab', 'African', 'Afro-Caribbean', 'Indian', 'Bangladeshi', and 'Pakistani' include non-Muslim and Muslim components. Recent sources vary considerably regarding numbers of Muslims in Britain, from an estimated two million to 750,000 (8). It is not possible or feasible to provide a statistical break-down of varied Muslim adherence in Britain.

METHODOLOGY

Orientalism

Discussion of the formative contacts has some basis in studies of Edward Said's "Orientalism" (9), which is a study of Western perceptions of the East, centred around academic interpretations from the eighteenth century onwards. As a paradigmatic model, particularly in the areas of scholarship and

literature, the study is useful in the context of British studies of Islam. Orientalism has several definitions, and not every aspect can be discussed here: Formative contacts during the seventeenth and eighteenth century might be interpreted as early manifestations of 'orientalism'. The term does not refer specifically to the Islamic worlds, rather to a determination of non-European peoples as a whole:

"Orientalism is a style of thought based upon an ontological and epistemological distinction made between 'the Orient' and (most of the time) 'the Occident'. Thus a very large mass of writers, among whom are poets, novelists, philosophers, political theorists, economists, and imperial administrators, have accepted the basic distinction betweeen East and West as the starting point for elaborate theories, epics, novels, social descriptions, and political accounts concerning the Orient, its people, customs, 'mind', destiny, and so on." (10)

It is reductive to view the British and Muslims historically as two groups, because of divisions within each group, based on nation, class/caste, wealth, and ability. Across the divide, certain sub-groups may have had more in common with one another than with those on 'their' side of the division.

After the development of British Muslim communities in Britain, use of the terms British and Muslim become problematic. Much as 'the East' has been re-evaluated through studies such as those by Said, Schwab **(11)**, and Rodinson **(12)**, so the approach of Britain - in this case towards Islam - should be examined fully. Not so much through the academic realms of particular schools of thought alone, but by charting international relationships and individual contacts. In determining the relations between Britain and Islam within the context of the Muslim World, it is important not to isolate the international from the domestic environments. Such separation suggests a form of orientalism, rather than an integrated approach to history. Events that took place in Britain had direct relevance to peoples thousands of miles away - and vice versa.

Dissertation structure

Chapter 2

Formative contacts are discussed chronologically and regionally, specifically concentrating on primary sources as indicators in the development of perceptions and knowledge of Islam within Britain - forming part of European interpretation of Islam.

Emphasis is on British agents' encounters and interpretations of the Islamic world, demonstrating understanding of Islam and the diversity of Muslims, as well as misconceptions and distortions. The historical narrative incorporates a discussion of earliest contacts between Britain and Islam; 'evolution' of knowledge about Islam, movement of British agents into the Islamic world - and their importance in providing crucial information about different forms of Islam; (mis)representation of Islam; isolation of themes regarding perceptions of Islam.

Chapter 3

Contemporary issues concerning Muslims in Britain are surveyed in the context of themes emerging as important in assessment of Islam, during the discussion of formative contacts. There is a marked continuity in the levels of knowledge, forms of (mis)representation, and conceptions of Islam - which might suggest that no progress has been made since the end of the nineteenth century. These emerge in a discussion of a Survey of Islam in Britain; its themes are developed in an analysis of 'Fundamentalism', an extension of the idea of Muslims as fanatics. This was articulated in

particular during The Satanic Verses controversy, which raises issues of Islamic values and British Muslim Community Representation and Leadership, which is discussed here with particular emphasis on the claims of new Islamic leadership - especially the Muslim Parliament. The formative contacts present demeaning perceptions of Muslim women: the position of Women in British Islam demonstrates continuity in these images. British perceptions of Islam were part of wider European issues, examined in relation to potential changes in European structures. The role of the contemporary Media is studied because of its importance in sustaining many of the impressions about Islam conveyed partially by the formative contacts. The chapter concludes with a survey of the 1991 Gulf War, in which many impressions of Islam conveyed by formative contacts were re-articulated.

Chapter 4

The numerous other important issues affecting Muslims in Britain, notably education, interfaith dialogue, and social welfare, are incorporated into a discussion on British Muslim identity. The dissertation finishes with establishing whether there is correlation between formative contacts and

contemporary British Muslim issues. It assesses the way forward for Islam in Britain in the light of lessons learnt - and what work needs to be done by Muslim and non-Muslim communities in Britain to improve the perception of Islam.

CHAPTER TWO

FORMATIVE CONTACTS BETWEEN BRITAIN AND ISLAM

Emphasis in studies of formative contacts between Europe and Islam focuses upon the region around the Mediterranean basin. The inter-continental distance between North and South is more of an historically created barrier than a geographical gulf of distance. North Africa formed a fertile and rich region of the Roman Empire: any early perceptions in Europe of Islam were influenced by knowledge of the Mediterranean basin and regions beyond, predating Muhammad by several hundred years. Roman forces and their leaders were drawn from, and served throughout, the Empire. Some occupants of Britain (and their descendants ?) therefore had knowledge and experience of distant places, including Africa and Syria. Perceptions were also influenced by written sources - providing knowledge of the Mediterranean geography and peoples for a select, literate minority Western European audience. Sources included Greek and Roman writings (themselves often developments of Egyptian and other sources), and Biblical texts. Such sources, handwritten and rare, would have an erratic circulation in Britain. Elements of texts could have been passed to a non-literate select

audience through readings. The presence of the Romans in Britain implies an availablility of some Graeco-Roman texts. The existence of Christianity in some areas by at least the third century would indicate the presence of Biblical texts. Audiences for and knowledge of the material was extremely limited.

Herodotus (b. 484 BC) and Pliny (AD 23-79), provide outstanding examples of early knowledge of Africa, part of the corpus of understanding until at least the sixteenth century, and cited authorities in works written in the Islamic, Byzantine and Western Christian worlds. Formative impressions in all spheres of educated travellers, merchants, diplomats, and colonists could be partially based around such texts. Many familiar themes later incorporated into understanding of Islam are present in these early works: Herodotus' account of Graeco-Persian wars, and the rise of the Persian Empire, digresses into descriptions of Egypt. Travelling up the Nile, he suggests that Egypt's inhabitants had bizarre religious practices, and were fanatical in their beliefs. He has a romantic view of Arabia: "I have said enough of the spices of Arabia; airs wondrous sweet blow from that

land." (1) Herodotus approaches sources with caution: "I know not what the truth may be, I tell the tale as 'twas told to me." (2) Pliny's "Natural History" shows how 'knowledge' about the unknown or unfamiliar incorporated unsubstantiated facts, myth, and conjecture. Pliny describes people living close to the known world, who acquire supernatural capabilities, strange customs, and/or bizarre appearance. In interpreting written and oral sources, Pliny was relating the folklore of his generation as knowledge. He warns of but justifies unsubstantiated sources by noting how many things once deemed impossible were found to be true. Pliny raised expectations of the diverse and fantastic, in his descriptions of peoples and lands that were to become Islamic. Pliny's work, accepted as fact, was augmented by additional information in later works (for example about the Islamic world). Historical and geographical knowledge about the Mediterranean basin was incorporated within Biblical texts. Precepts and interpretations of the Bible were to form a basis of approach towards Islam.

In interpreting pre-Islamic formative influences, there are variations within Europe depending on

when a region was fully Christianised. The separation of the Roman Empire into Eastern and Western divisions led to greater diversity within Christendom. Both East and West Empires were dominated by their pasts, and conscious (generally, if not consistently) of the Roman Law heritage. They were also both threatened constantly by invasion. Constantinople was generally stronger in its particular concept of Christianity than Rome, which with an extensive tradition of varied paganism, had cults until at least 410 AD - when Rome fell to Arian Christian Goths. Invasion of 'heretical' tribes caused members of the Roman church to re-evaluate their approaches towards non-Catholics, and stimulated the articulation of these approaches. Such polemical work would surface in Western Christian interpretations of Islam, and were formative in creating a perception of Islam in Britain.

The Bishop of Hippo and leader of the African church, St Augustine (354-430), articulated views towards paganism and heresy in works later fundamental in shaping the Roman Church's approach towards Islam (and other 'heresies'). He believed there would be a greater world future if the Roman Empire followed Biblical precepts to

form a City of God on Earth: ideas encapsulated in "De Civitae Dei". Heretics and pagans were seen as a trial sent by God to punish lapsed Christians. Augustine's work encouraged bellum justum - a justified Holy War - and provided divine sanction for striking down infidels: "The evil of war lies in the mind: the soldier who strikes down his enemy from benevolence and pity acts in accordance with Christ's teachings." (3)

The emergence of Islam and its early impact on the West has been discussed in detail by Daniel (4) (5) and Southern (6) (7). Any perception of Islam in Britain from the eighth century onwards would be part of the Western European world view(s). Interest of many British inhabitants in the views and affairs of Europe and the 'outside world' would have been extremely limited - perhaps to realms of fantasy, or biblical knowledge - or non-existent. Inhabitants would have been more concerned with personal and family survival, and the encroaching presence of other forms of 'pagan' or 'heathen' - the Vikings.

Northern European learning was generally confined to the religious domain. Knowledge was transmitted between religious houses throughout

Western Europe, involving arduous journeys and potentially tedious copying sessions of precious manuscripts, mainly in Latin. Monasteries also produced original Chronicles and articulated their particular views of the world. An approach was evolving in the eighth century towards 'Saracens', notably by Bede of Northumbria, who believed the Saracens to be the descendants of Ishmael - the son of Abraham and his slave girl Hagar - and outside of the Covenant established between God and the Jewish people. Southern states that Bede was the first to introduce Saracen-Ishmael identification into medieval exegesis, although he was not the first to make the Ishmael identification that became commonplace within medieval thought, The sheer distance made Muslims less of an immediate threat to Christian Northern Europe than closer enemies, or the cosmic struggle between Good and Evil (8). Bede also noted in one line the incursion of 'Saracens' into Spain in 710/1. The presence of Muslim kingdoms in Spain had a direct effect on British approaches towards Islam - through military campaigns or intellectual contacts - and an indirect effect - through the creation of legends and folklore in Europe about Muslims, passed orally and in literary form to Britain.

The spread of Islam after the death of Muhammad in 632, the establishment of the Umayyad caliphate in Damascus by Mu'awiya (r.661-80), its extension, and eventual conquest by Abu'l-Abbas (r.749-54) which lead to the establishment of the Abbasid caliphate in Baghdad were events largely without direct immediate impact in Western Europe. The Umayyad conquest led to the founding of an Umayyad caliphate in Spain, but that was after the initial conquest. It would be unrealistic to imagine any immediate concern, in the unlikely event that news filtered through into Western Europe. These events were of more direct concern to the Eastern Roman Empire, which lost large amounts of territory and faced further incursions from Islam.

Early contacts between non-Muslim Europe and the Islamic world included exchanges of embassies between the Franks and Baghdad (797, 801, 802, 807). Merchants were not to follow these missions, although both sides were in conflict with Byzantium, and had much to gain in mutual trade (9). The ninth century saw Muslim inroads made into Italy, strengthening Church resolve to deal with the Saracens. Spanish Muslims raided Gaul's southern coast, and close ties English

monasteries had with religious houses across the Channel may have increased their awareness of Muslims, although raids by Vikings were a greater threat. (10)

Tenth century Western European contacts with the Muslim world and the Eastern Christian world were extremely limited, as were links with minorities who might have provided information. Southern demonstrates that through individual contacts, European society built a picture of what was beyond its boundaries of knowledge: "...The significant events are often the obscure ones, and the significant utterances are often of those men withdrawn from the world and speaking to the very few." (11) This is illustrated by the monk John of Gorze's protracted mission to establish contact between Frankish Emperor Otto I and Cordova in 953, where John met Mozarab Arabised Christian dhimmi who gave him information about Islam. Southern believes the world-view was slowly shifting and expanding, with an approach being shaped towards Islam, and new (albeit limited) knowledge was acquired. Contacts made in this visit encouraged a subsequent History by Liudprand (Bishop of Cremona 961-72), interlocking histories of Byzantium, Italy and

Germany: "His History bears witness to a real, though faint, pulse of life across the estranged communities of Islam and Christendom." **(12)** This pulse would eventually filter through to Britain.

Travel, especially pilgrimage, brought western Europeans directly in contact with Muslim culture. Generally, pilgrims were tolerated, and were a source of some income for Byzantine and Muslim rulers. Jerusalem had been conquered from the Byzantines by the Caliph 'Umar ibn al-Khattab (634-44). During the eleventh century, there had been at least two notable European pilgrimages (1064, 1088). Dangers encountered were regarded as penance, whilst Jerusalam held status as the supreme 'holy relic'. Pilgrimages to Jerusalem can be regarded as the precedent to the concept of crusading. The pilgrims' knowledge of Palestine and Syria prior to 1099 was not necessarily relevant to habits and customs of the native population, perhaps reliant on Herodotus, hearsay, and biblical imagery.

Fatimid Caliph al-Hakim's (996-1021) destruction of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre in 1009 focussed Catholic reforms to assist the Church of Jerusalem, whilst Pope Gregory VII (1076-85)

wanted to combine chivalric ideals with service to the Church, applying a favourite biblical quotation: "Cursed be he who keepeth back his sword from blood." (13) Circumstances leading to the conquest of Jerusalem were influential in creating a formative conceptualisation of Islam in Europe, which would have had an impact on Britain's inhabitants. The First Crusade was dominated by French feudal groups, whose motives were not always religious, but materialistic. They were encouraged by Pope Urban II's 1095 Claremont speech - repeated throughout France - against Muslims threatening Christendom: it suggested that through combination of military skill and God's grace, all taking crusading vows would receive special blessing and commution of penance. The ideal of 'Christendom' was potent and novel, increasing group solidarity between different Christians. The conquest of Jerusalem had a fundamental effect on perceptions of Islam throughout Western Europe: it led generations of Britain's inhabitants towards battle with Muslims, or to live amongst them. The First Crusade marks a point where scant perceptions of Islam formed by Europeans had opportunities to be altered by first-hand experience. This did not necessarily negate the application of myth,

fantasy, hearsay, and imagination in the creation of an evolving image of Islam - transmitted through the centuries, ultimately influencing contemporary perceptions of Islam in Britain.

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On July 15, 1099, the pilgrim armies breached Jerusalem's walls: "No mercy was shown to anyone, and the whole place was flooded with the blood of the victims..." **(14)** Biblical injunctions to eradicate pagans, the sense of Divine Intervention in an 'miraculous' journey; euphoria of victory, an incomprehension of Islam and a hatred of Jews, and perhaps a sense of 'making history' inspired the crusaders' systematic, apparently indiscriminate slaughter of Jerusalem's inhabitants - a savage rite of passage: "So frightful was the massacre throughout the city, so terrible the shedding of blood, that even the victors experienced sensations of horror and loathing." **(15)**

After the conquest of Jerusalem, a Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem was founded - a Western European style of feudal kingdom whose expansion and consolidation brought it into contact with Muslim

tribes and armies, under different leaders and often with different religious views. The absence of a singular Muslim army contributed to the Kingdom's early success. The Latin Kingdom encountered several forms of the Islamic World, which changed during the 1099-1187 period - in response to the Latin presence and other factors. Alliances were formed between Muslims and the Latin Kingdom. The virtually bloodless re-conquest of Jerusalem in 1187 can be linked to: gradual weakening of the Latin leadership, lack of settlers, the (brief) alliance of diverse Muslim armies, and a lack of Western European interest in the Kingdom, which led to military and financial reductions. There was no mass English settlement, but frequently individuals and small groups appear within the Chronicles. There were several English pilgrimages after 1099, and a presence on the unsuccessful Second Crusade of 1147. The Anglo-Norman/Norman Angevin connection in the Latin Kingdom had significance in terms of individual knights, or the contribution of funding, rather than providing any specific primary information.

The progress of the First Crusade, and its culmination, became specific later reference

points in the European (and therefore 'British') conception of Islam. The principal influence in the perception for future generations came from the Chroniclers such as Fulcher of Chartres and William of Tyre, rather than the combatants: they provide accounts of events, not always observed at 'first hand' experience and perhaps steeped in hagiography, propaganda, and biblical phraseology. Evidence suggests early crusaders' loyalties remained with Western Europe, and even knowledge of Arabic did not mean a knowledge of Islam - or a greater tolerance of the native population. William does mention that he wrote a work about Islam (now lost), and shows familiarity with local practices, although he is very much a Latin Christian writer; limited evidence does suggest growing tolerant treatment, if not respect for Muslim religious practices. Arab Chroniclers indicate some social interaction between Muslims and crusaders: the passage of traders continued unhindered, even in times of unrest or war, moral objections not being allowed to interfere with profits. Two sources, Ibn-Jubayr (16) and Usamah ibn-Munqidh (17), describe Latin-Muslim relations, including friendship, trade, access to Muslim holy sites, and military assistance. Admiration for the exploits of

specific Muslims might emerge, particularly on the battlefield. In the Third Crusade (1189-92), led by King Richard, Salah-al-Din was admired for his military skill and courtly attributes. The Third Crusade was significant in that its composition of English and Welsh Knights and soldiers was proportionally greater than other crusades, and involved large financial and personal risks. As a formative contact between Britain and aspects of Islam, in numerical terms it has importance because it represents the first **major** incursion into the Mediterranean world of a specifically English force. Different Islamic groupings could be identified. In terms of knowledge about Islam, the impact appears negligible: the Muslim remained a dangerous heretical foe, whose military prowess was the attribute best known and feared.

There were specific British royal contacts with Islam (other contacts were unlikely to be chronicled). These included Henry I's employment of the physician Petrus Alfonsi, an Arabic speaking convert to Christianity from Judaism who became Henry I's physician. Petrus introduced Arabic astronomy, an Christian apologia which gives details about Islam, and a

morality textbook which refers to the Qur'an, and borrows from Arabic literary sources. **(18)**. Other contacts included the expulsion of a visiting 'Saracen' by Henry III in 1238, who was believed to be seeking military support against the Mongols, and crusades by Richard of Cornwall ((1240) and Prince (later King) Edward (I) (1270). Domestic concerns, civil war, and the consolidation of the English crown were generally of greater importance than the fighting of 'heretics' in distant lands.

Twelfth and thirteenth century developments increased knowledge about Islam. There was also a more significant corpus of propaganda about Muhammad and his 'heresies'. As part of the European view of Islam, the central argument was: "Christianity is a religion of love, Islam is opposed to Christianity, therefore Islam is the religion of cruelty, therefore Muhammad was cruel and claimed divine justification for it, as suitable circumstances arose." **(19)** Although this polemic was centred around the Holy Land, the entire Islamic World suffered - and it inspired later attacks and opinions on Islam. There is no doubt that the Crusades, and the conquest of Spain, determined the image for

Islam. There were also other, more subtle contacts: in the transmission of philosophy influenced by Islamic values, the Qur'ān or knowledge of Islam itself might be at best secondary, a subtext, or not obvious at all. The importance of the knowledge to scholarship in Britain during this period frequently lay in its essence, rather than its origins, which might only be alluded to or be ignored altogether. The centres of learning changed between the twelfth and fourteenth centuries, with the development of a more secular education format, itself influenced by the transmission of the learning "pulses" (described by Southern) from the Islamic World to Europe

The lure of knowledge led the inquisitive far afield. This led to a measure of direct and indirect contact with Muslims, and naturally increased awareness of Islam. Southern states that he only found one reference to "Muhammad" outside Spain and South Italy prior to 1100: the opening up of the Mediterranean to extensive Latin traffic was to change this. A good English example of such a traveller was Abelard of Bath (1079-1142), a collaborator with Petrus, who travelled in Sicily and the Holy Land during the

twelfth century; he translated works from both Greek and Arabic, showing respect for Muslim scholars, philosophers, science and writings - but in terms of information on Islam, of limited value. (20).

The vehement desire to baptise 'heretics' and 'pagans' has contributed to discord between Muslims and Christians through the centuries. Peter, Abbot of Cluny, sought knowledge of Islam in order to engage in polemic dialogue: an 1142 visit to Toledo in Spain (conquered from Muslims in 1088) led to a decision that Islamic studies were essential to Christian missions. Peter felt Muslim acceptance of Christ's nativity provided a basis for conversion. He sought the translation of a Christian Arabic book disputing Islamic doctine into Latin. In Spain he discovered Herman of Dalmatia and Robert of Ketton (in England) - studying Arabic astronomy and mathematics. Peter paid for their collaboration with a Mozarab and a Muslim: Robert contributed a Qur'ān translation and a compendium of Islamic tradition. (21) This "Toledan Collection" was edited, copied and distributed by Peter, who wrote to his Muslim readers: "I attack you not, as some of us (Christians) often do, by arms, but

by words; not by force, but by reason; not in hatred, but in love..." **(22)** Peter's exempla to Muslims was English King Ethelbert (561-616) "who lived almost contemporaneously to your Muhammad", and accepted a Christian mission. **(23)** Robert's work was the first unabridged Qur'ān translation **(24)**, although he changed chapters and rearranged verses. It is a fundamental contact between Europe and Islam, although Muslims may dismiss a translation, because Arabic was the medium for pure, untampered Revelation of God to Muhammad. Hourani sees the Toledan Collection as the start of serious study of Islam in Western Europe. (25) Christian Europeans assumed that Muhammad was not an authentic Prophet, that Muhammad denied the Crucifixion, Incarnation and Trinity, and that Muhammad built a worldy kingdom upon violence. **(26)**. Islam was perceived as a heresy from Christianity, not as paganism.

Determining English approaches to Muslim sources of knowledge, from the twelfth to fifteenth century, requires extensive study of scholars in religious houses and universities, in order to evaluate any 'Islamic' influence: for example, in work by John Blund (1175-1248) **(27)**, Roger Bacon (1214?-1294) **(28)** and Uthred of Boldon (1320-96)

(29). Within the Western Church, a fear of Islam was engendered to encourage fervour in its own believers. In England, the advance of Islam might be applied as a indicator of Papal sin, for example by John Wyclif (1324?-1384):

"The Koran of Mahomet and the Decretals of the Pope have attracted attention from the incomparable pre-eminence of the Bible. This is a sign of the approach of Antichrist, and the only remedy for modern superstition is to believe solidly in the faith of scripture, and to believe no one else on any topic except to the extent to which he bases himself on scripture." (30)

The unfavourable comparison between Muhammad and the Pope, and the implied analogy between the Qur'ān and "modern superstition", was not written to harm a sensitive domestic Muslim audience: it was aimed at papal supporters. Islam provided a convenient, flexible weapon: the Qur'ān and Muhammad did not have to be explained, nor could they be defended.

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The fifteenth century saw 'transitional events'

inspiring further formative contacts between Britain and Islam: in particular, 1453 was significant - for the Ottoman (Osmanli) Turks conquest of Byzantine Constantinople, and the printing of the first book using moveable metal type, by Johann Gütenburg (1394/4-1468). The Ottoman factor is significant in analysing British-Islam relationships, although the conquest of Constantinople went largely unnoticed at the time in Western Europe. Turks were 'familiar' from Crusader folklore and chronicles, although dominant twelfth century Seljük tribes were superceded by Osmanli. The Turkish conquest of Anatolia was a gradual process, of which the Christian capitulation of Constantinople was an important event rather than a conclusion. Many of the conquered had a preference of Ottoman tolerance to the rigours and ineptitude of the Byzantines **(31)** The lack of Western Crusade reaction after 1453 can be attributed to the concept's debasement, European military changes, papal divisions, and European fragmentation. In England, finance was intermittently raised, to assist the Byzantines or Military Orders; pilgrimages and trade maintained a semblance of links with the Eastern Mediterranean. Coupled with the 1492 expulsion of Muslims in the final

phase of the Spanish Reconquista, the division between Western Europe and Islam might appear to have been more clear cut.

However, despite the political and religious 'division' of Europe, this theory does not incorporate assessment of the trading links between Muslims and Western Europeans. Trade is important, because when all else had broken down in terms of relations, there was still enthusiasm and necessity for specific products. Where there was trade, there was also knowledge: of the peoples, because knowledge of their demands and supplies was sound business sense; of the regional geography, in terms of trade routes and ports; of the leaders, military forces and armies; and of Islam. Some knowledge of religion, culture, customs and protocol was conducive to survival and success. Trade was a formative conduit of knowledge about Islam, and influenced opinions about Muslims.

Northern European and Near East trade links can be traced back to at least the twelfth century: after the First Crusade, the Levant influence of the Italian merchant cities increased. Population and town growth in Western Europe

increased demands for luxury articles which often underwent a long journey, via overland caravans, before reaching ports. From at least 1278, Italian galleys brought oriental merchandise to London. Conceivably England's products might reach the Sudan (or vice versa), indicating a symbiotic relationship between two distant edges of the known world. Ashtor notes the impact of navigation improvements, Genoese links with Ilkhan (ruler of Iraq and Persia) leading to the creation of European trade in India, the impact of Acre's loss in 1291, and how papal bulls legislating against trade with Muslims were circumnavigated. **(32)** Islamic markets were important in English export of agricultural and industrial goods, frequently re-exported from the Levant to Persia and India. Technological improvements increased European production, whilst Muslim industry generally was in decline.

Trade had existed with the Ottomans prior to conquest. In Istanbul, Italian maritime cities renewed Byzantine privileges. Whilst Muslims might be disliked or despised for their beliefs, that did not sever trading links. Turks were not as involved in trade as Arabs and non-Muslims in the Levant **(33)**. Traders, as least, would have

conceived a difference in attitude between ethnic groups within the Islamic world. Fear of Turks diminished after the failure of Suleyman's siege of Vienna in 1529, seen as a turning point in European-Islamic world relations. (34) Italian mercantile dominance eroded, notably in 1536 when France and the Ottomans agreed a Trade Treaty. The Far East sea-route was opened by Portugal, after Vasco da Gama's 1499 voyage to India: this further affected Levant trade. England - suffering from domestic upheavals - lagged behind other Europeans in trade and navigation. Henry VIII's 1545 English Royal Navy development provided impetus to expansion. Prestige was raised by voyagers including Thomas Wyndam (Morocco: 1551-2), and Francis Drake sailing around the world (1577-80). Shipping competition diminished after the 1588 Spanish Armada defeat.

English-Ottoman mercantile communications commenced in 1575; in 1580, Elizabeth I and Murad III signed a formal capitulation, allowing Levant Company activities in Istanbul. William Harborne was appointed ambassador in 1578. Profits were considerable, as was Harborne's reputation: "...mercurial-breasted Mr Harborne... who... hath noised the name of our island and of

Yarmouth so tritonly that not an infant of the cur-tailed skin clipping pagans but talk as frequently as that of their prophet's tomb at Mecca." (35) Harbourne's success resulted in Levant Company consuls being appointed in Egypt, Syria, Tripoli (Libya), and Tunis. Levant Company history charts an uneasy English-Ottoman relationship, which survived through incentives of riches rather than mutual-respect. A variety of talents emerged, notably Benjamin Bishop: this consul swindled English creditors, sold alcohol to Turks, and vanished from the records after conversion to Islam. (36)

In 1600, Levant Company members created the East India Company, and John Mildenhall travelled via Aleppo to trade with the Indian Mughal Empire. Hawkins was at the Mughal Court in Agra in 1608, applying Levant-acquired Turkish as ambassador and military commander to evade perceived intrigues of the Portuguese Jesuit interpreter. Sir Thomas Roe, under King James' orders, followed as Agra ambassador to Emperor Jehangir, who was not persuaded to sign a Treaty unbefitting regal status. Roe believed Agra was "the dullest, basest place that I ever saw and maketh me weary speaking of it...I know these

people are best treated with the sword in one hand, and the Caducean in the other."(37) Other sources demonstrate a growing awareness in local conditions, together with an understanding of risks undertaken.

James I (1603-25) encouraged the East Indian Company, which established a Surat station. He told the Levant Company to pay for their Charter, or leave Istanbul, as he had no particular wish for relations with the Ottomans. Cheaper alternative routes for 'Eastern' goods now existed, for example through Persia, which forged a complex relationship with England. The embassy of Anthony and Robert Sherley travelled to Shah Abbas via Antioch, Aleppo, and Baghdad - arriving in Qazvin in 1611. The Sherleys gained footholds in the Shah's court, with limited success. The London arrival of a Persian envoy saw him greet Robert's assertation of Shah accreditation with physical assault. (38)

Perhaps more influential in creating unfavourable impressions of Muslims were Maghrebi 'corsairs' or pirate activities. Whilst their ports, including Tunis, Algiers and Tripoli, were under Ottoman suzerainty, the Turks had limited scope

to intervene - even when Treaties were broken. Between 1609-16, 466 English vessels were captured and their crews enslaved. The Algiers Consul was forced to attempt negotiations for their freedom. Accounts were published from English survivors: others 'turned Turk', converting to Islam and committing acts of piracy. The activities of pirates generated a fearsome, violent image of a specific (perhaps in a nominal sense) Islamic group - that developed into a stereotypical view of Muslims.

The sixteenth and seventeenth centuries show development of a specifically English rather than European view of Islam and Muslims. Careers of Istanbul Ambassadors are examples of successful efforts in learning Muslim languages. Opinions expressed about Islam would be increasingly recorded in English rather than Latin. Merchants obtained Arabic and Persian manuscripts, presented to university libraries. Graduates sought Company positions to study the Levant *in situ*, using this experience to found academic careers. Theologians worked as chaplains, pursuing classical and biblical interests: Edward Pococke (1604-91) was chaplain in Aleppo

and Istanbul, before taking the first Oxford University Arabic chair in 1636.

Practical experience in Istanbul was not the only influence on Pococke: his teacher William Bedwell (1563-1632) can be attributed with a proportion of English knowledge about Arabic and opinions about Islam. Bedwell also taught the first Cambridge Professor of Arabic (appointed 1632), Abraham Wheelock. Bedwell's achievements included an extensive Arabic-Latin lexicon, a Qur'an guide, a navigation text, and the translation of a Christian Arabic polemical work. He learnt Arabic to translate scientific texts, and to compare compatability of Arabic Christian texts with Anglicanism. Bedwell was limited in primary Arabic sources, never visiting a Muslim land; he relied on Leiden University library, the few documents that reached England, and contacts with merchants. Bedwell's approach is shown in his 1615 translation of the anti-Muslim polemic: "Mohammedis Imposturae: That is, A Discovery of the Manifold Foregeries, Falshoods, and horrible impieties of the blasphemous seducer, Mohammed: With a demonstration of the insufficiencie of his law, contained in the cursed Alkoran..." (39) These are the views of an age: they belong to an

'armchair scholar' whose motivation was not an understanding of Islam, but whose work influenced generations.

Knowledge provided by Bedwell may have been synthesised with other texts and sources: for example, learned works about Muslim regions, and information provided by merchants and travellers, which achieved wide circulation. Pivotal was the publication in 1600 of an English translation of "The History and Description of Africa", by Leo Africanus **(40)**. Leo was Al-Hassan Ibn Mohammed Al-Wezas Al Fasi (b. c.1496), who became Johannes Medices upon his conversion to Catholicism. He was a well-educated scholar, who wrote his text first in Arabic, and then Italian (1526). It was translated into French (1556), Latin (1558), and from Latin to English by John Pory (1600). The Latin text has been criticised for inaccuracies, and Pory was to add his own gloss upon it: the publication thus provides both an insight into the information about Islam entering England from reputable sources, and the attitudes towards it by a learned translator in 1600. **(41)** It provides eyewitness accounts of Islamic culture, and knowledge of Islam from someone who was born a Muslim. His account demonstrates the

considerable diversity between ethnic and religious groups, provides detailed histories of African-Arabic nations, and describes their geography. Leo demonstrates the extent of 'civilisation' in terms that a European would understand, providing perhaps the most extensive source on the lands south and east of the Mediterranean since Pliny, Ptolemy, and Herodotus. Coming from the convert's pen and through the matrices of translation, a completely objective account would be unexpected. Leo emphasises personal Catholicism, for example by describing early Muslims as 'bewitched', whilst Christian terms have been applied for Muslim institutions. Leo provides valuable information about Islam. Through the application of eyewitness accounts, it opens up the region with a comprehension that might be denied to the passing traveller. Leo had access to a wide variety of social, ethnic and religious groups. Leo marks the point that Africa enters universal history (42). The realisation that Islam was complex and diverse, having nobility, history and components similar to European society may have caused readers to challenge any basic political, religious and social stereotypes of Islam.

The impression that civilisation after the demise of Roman influence in North Africa had been ruined would have been re-evaluated. Old misconceptions might fade gradually on the arrival of new knowledge, or be ignored completely. An example of this is Pory's translation. Pory was a trained geographer and a devout Anglican, and in 1616 he visited Constantinople. He influenced literary figures, including John Donne, Ben Jonson, and William Shakespeare (43). He has to justify Leo as an authoratitive source and a Christian, and felt obliged to add personal interpretations of the translation. Pory interprets Islam as "Mahumet" framing a law to bring together components of 'schismatic religions', and the Caliphs as "sect foremen".

Pory was a pupil of Richard Hakluyt (1552?-1616), whose life's work is fundamental in any interpretation of formative influences on the English perception of Islam. Hakluyt was a collector of primary sources about travel and geography, rather than a 'historian' or 'chronologer': travellers' and merchants' accounts, and navigation information, was placed in volumes designed to aid future voyagers. Data

included religious and cultural knowledge on the Islamic world, initially only from English sources, but later incorporating European experiences. The series was continued by Samuel Purchas (1575?-1626) (Pory had been Hakluyt's choice), to maintain contemporaneous accounts of world travel. Official documentation was incorporated into the volumes, providing examples of protocol and forms of address. In terms of Islam, emphasis is on the Ottoman Empire. There is a reliance on foreign writers for areas of limited commercial interest, such as Western Arabia. Hakluyt did not wish to reprint existing texts, but to publicise new opportunities and potential connections for English merchants: some of this information was in the form of correspondence. Hakluyt and Purchas edited and relayed sources often not originally written for publication, allowing for certain insights that might have been lost in romanticised, glossed accounts of journeys.

An example of the knowledge about Islam and an Islamic society imparted in Hakluyt's volumes is the account by Geffrey Ducket on his fifth voyage to Persia (1574), which is full of religious detail - if not insight. Ducket commences with

a description of commodities and towns of Persia, and then provides a discussion of the Shah's character and extensive harem (44). Perceived sensuality within the Islamic world is a popular theme in accounts - perhaps it was a gauge of Christian 'superiority', or a source of jealousy. Ducket left certain habits to the imagination: "What I have heard of the manner of their marriages, for offending of honest consciences and chaste ears, I may not commit to writing." (45)

Ducket discusses "the religion of the Persians"... all one with the Turkes, saving that they differ who was the right successor of Mahumet. The Turkes say that it was one Homer and his sonne Usman. But the Persians say that it was one Mortus Ali..." (46) "Homer" (Caliph 'Umar ibn al-Khattab (634-44) was assassinated, and "Usman" (Caliph 'Uthman ibn 'Affan (644-56)) was chosen by a Quraysh committee: he was not the son of 'Umar. The different successors to Muhammad is the reason behind the Sunni - Shi'i division, and therefore was more significant that Ducket believed. The account is interesting in its incorporation of a <u>hadith</u> regarding Muhammad's decision on his successor. Traditions regarding Ali's death follow. Ducket

continues with a differentation between Christ and Muhammad:

"Their opinion of Christ is, that he was a holy man and a great Prophet, but not like unto Mahumet: saying, that Mahumet was the last prophet by whom all things were finished, & was therefore the greatest. To proove that Christ was not Gods sonne, they say that God had never wife, and therefore could have no sonne or children."(47)

Ducket makes value judgments on Islam for his account of laws: "Their lawes are as in their religion, wicked and detestable." (48) Ducket provides eyewitness accounts and interpretations of Shi'ism through discussions with different peoples encountered. A proportion of this data might be deemed "stereotypical" in contemporary eyes, although it gives an accurate impression of some Shi'i aspects. He believed Muhammed was worshipped alongside God and "Mortus Ali". Ducket applies Christian terminology: "priests", "churches", and "Lent" - and certain Persian terms which are not explained.

Ducket's account can be compared, in terms of attitudes and approach, with Robert Withers'

account on the Turks, written in 1620. Withers commences with an accurate account of Sunnism. The description of Heaven and Hell reflects the Qur'ān. Other aspects of Wither's account suggests contact with Sufism, and he describes "the Teckehs of the Meulevees, (which are an order of Derveeshees, that turne round with Musike in their Divine Service)..." (49) Withers provides his explanation of Arabic terms: "All the Prophets are held in great honour amongst them. They call Moses, Musahib Alloh, that is, a talker with God; and Christ, Meseeh, Rooh-ulloh, and Hazrette Isaw, that is, Messias, the Spirit of God, and venerable Jesus: and Mahomet, Resul Alloh, that is, the Messenger of God." (50) Withers reflects his age with a subtle and damning comparison of Catholics and Muslims: "...whereas the Papists say the Ave Maria, so they say only Subhawn Alloh, that is, God is pure and true, and sometimes Alloh Ekber, that is, God is great." (51)

The rak'ah is misinterpreted, Withers believing that the "Eemawm (imām), which is the Parish Priest, beginnes to pray, and all they which are present imitate him in gesture: for, of themselves a great part of them would not else know how to performe that businesse. For their Prayers consist chiefly in rising up, falling downe, kissing the ground, and

sometimes sitting still, one while touching their eyes, sometimes their faces, then their beards, then their heads..." (52)

The seventeenth century sees clarification of Islamic terms, and some accuracy. Encounters with Muslims were taking place in a variety of settings, and differences were being noticed. Muslims could be vilified or admired. Islam was a point of comparison with perceived reduced standards of Anglicanism. Contacts between British agents and Islamic communities increased. Perceptions of Islam would continue to be exotic, mysterious, and castigating at times. There was a greater basis of substantial facts, and a familiarity of aspects of Islam: faith had been described, and those who were interested might find out the differences between areas of the Islamic World. Printing meant that there was wider access to these texts, but that fundamentally the knowledge remained in the hands of a select minority. No longer simply clerics, but also merchants.

Daniel Defoe describes students studying Arabic as a dead language, unemployable even as translators, whom Defoe compares with merchants, speaking several Arabic dialects, yet not being regarded as scholars

by university men. (53) It was a combination of practical experience, serious scholarship, and a synthesis of previous knowledge that would result in Islam becoming widely known - if not completely understood - as Britain became a colonial power.

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British contact with the Islamic world became more commonplace in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, leading to a greater diversity of primary information about Islamic peoples. Greater British power in the Islamic world did not necessarily lead to more respect for Islam: to justify a position of superiority, Islam might be downgraded as 'primitive' and 'heretical'. Trade links are possibly the most substantial of contacts between Britain and the Islamic world during the seventeenth century, in terms of: influencing and generating industry and financial institutions, encouraging contacts between Companies, the Crown, individuals, and their Muslim counterparts; and also through the development of new social practices and customs. These are very much the 'Europeanisation' of aspects of Islamic worlds, some becoming simple novelties, whilst others became more enduring: an

example of a successful 'transplant' was coffee-drinking.

Such 'new' social customs in Britain would also influence their region of origin. For example, the seventeenth century success of the coffee trade led to a British presence in an exclusive production area in Arabia (Mokha, Yemen) transfer of the industry to other areas where coffee could be produced (in the eighteenth century) and transported more economically [causing hardship in Yemen]. Tangible cultural acquisitions from Islamic sources included coffee houses (1650 on), Turkish baths, staffed by Muslims and Eastern Christians (1679), wearing of Eastern silks and fashions in Royal Court, observed by Pepys in 1666 and also by Eveyln (54), and a growing interest in antiquities found in the Islamic world (although culturally belonging to other eras).

Embassies in the Ottoman Empire continued, with the increasing coffee market - centred in Yemen - providing a substantial financial incentive. The writings of Lady Mary Wortley Montague (1689-1762) provide insight into English contacts with Ottoman Muslims, and a perception of Islam. As the wife of the Ambassador to Istanbul (appointed in 1717),

Montagu had an insight into the Ottoman Court denied many outsiders: as a woman, she could visit the harem, and her posthumously published correspondence - in numerous editions - inspired many subsequent impressions of Islam. Montagu is interested in how Islam has been described by writers and travellers, and with what degree of accuracy. In conversation with local people, she attempts an understanding of Islam, and sees similarities between it and the Church of England. There is a natural tendency for her to use the Christian matrix to approach her subject, comparing sects of Islam with Christian sects, and using Christian terminology for Muslim institutions. Montague was conscious of gaps within her knowledge, perhaps derived from sources cited earlier:

"Tis certain we have but very imperfect relations of the manners and Religion of these people, this part of the World being seldom visited but by merchants who mind little but their own Affairs, or Travellers who make too short a stay to be able to report any thing exactly of their own knowledge." (55).

Montagu was encouraged to read the Qur'ān (an English translation only became available in 1734, produced by George Sale). She said of the Qur'ān:

"tis the purest morality deliver'd in the very best language" (56). She also believed Christian evangelism would be successful in the Ottoman Empire.

Montagu's letters were personal, not catering to a specific literary audience. In them, she exposes the faults of her contemporaries in their conception of Islam - and also some errors of her own. The insight into the Muslim women's world - particularly in Istanbul - is one of the earliest from a Western European writer. Montagu believed Muslim women had more liberty: in wearing the hijab, Montagu believed illicit affairs were easier, and that with women's anonymity "...no Man dare either touch or follow a Woman in the Street."(57) Montagu has a low opinion of European views on Muslim women: "... I cannot forbear admiring either the exemplary discretion or extreme Stupidity of all writers that have given accounts of them..." (58) She has a later unusual opportunity to observe the devotions within a Sufi monastery, and saw the tarīqah order's activities as being "...as Whimsical as any in Rome". (59). Montagu's letters demonstrate that objectivity was possible in the eighteenth century perception of Islam. This was atypical, but negates the usual

stereotype of all writings about Islam being damning.

There is an significant increase in published material about Islam during the eighteenth century, reflecting an increase in scholarship, travel, and general interest. A more detailed representative study of 'mainstream publications' would incorporate a selection of eighteenth century texts, including: Joseph Pitts "A Faithful Account of the Religion & Manners of the Mahometans" - including an early description of the hajj (1704); and George Sale's translation of Qur'ān (1734). The interest and knowledge in the East was reflected in many areas of society during the eighteenth century. King George I (r1714-24) took his interest in the East to the extent of importing two Muslim servants, Mustapha and Mahomet, who discretely practised Islam whilst serving the Royal Court. Developments in Britain were increasingly linked with European and World issues, indicating a transition from foreign policies linked primarily to Europe and the Mediterranean, to further afield. A familiarity with Islam was more relevant, as awareness increased that Muslim communities existed over a world-wide area.

A high proportion of Arab trade was in the hands of European merchants. This presence was perceived in Muslim eyes as a threat to the holy cities, especially considering the dominant British position in Mokha. **(60)** Trade with Europe was less important for Arab economies than with countries further east - or trade on the Nile and Sahara routes between the Mediterranean coastlands and Africa.**(61)** Control of Egypt meant easier access from the Mediterranean to the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean - where the European presence was increasing. In 1798, Muslim fears were realised with Napoleon's occupation of Egypt.

The seventeenth and eighteenth centuries demonstrate changing attitudes towards Indian Muslims, and an insight into how British Imperialist policies in India were justified. Historical assumptions of an Islam decline during the eighteenth century must be re-assessed: Islam was well organised and expanding (especially rurally) **(62)**. Indians were active agents in the colonial process, through application of capital, manpower, and administrative aptitude during the eighteenth century. The British took care in observing respect for local religious and administrative practices, which they saw as contributory to trade success. **(63)**

Fortunes were to be made in India in many different classes, British and Indian. In 1772, Warren Hastings allowed European officials into the Indian hinterland, a role previously the domain of Indian entrepreneurs. Hastings thought Indians should be subject to Hindu and Muslim law. In 1781 Hastings encouraged the founding of the Calcutta Madrassa, which recovered and edited Islamic/Persian texts: "...reinforcing the search for pure, authoritative and codified statements on law and religion 'to qualify the sons of Muhammadan gentlemen for responsible and lucrative offices in the state'". (64)

In 1786, Lord Cornwallis was sent to reform the Company's activities. One of the principal causes of the perceived decline, according to Cornwallis, was the corrupt association of Europeans with Indians, especially in matters of finance. This policy affected Hindus and Muslims, who were removed from all except the most minor of offices. The colonial character of cities such as Calcutta was emphasised by a house-building policy which created affluent 'European-only' suburbs, separated from Indian habitation by roads. This was conscious development of Separateness, through establishment of symbols of assertion: the Company was deliberately cutting

itself off from personal associations built up over many years. By 1793, the Company's power was limited, and an Indian Board of Control had been created in London.

Such formative contacts were influential. Also important in terms of providing information about Islam was Edward Gibbon (1737-1794) (65). In his reliance upon European sources, he gives indication of scholarship reached in the late eighteenth century, which was to enter the mainstream of knowledge rather than being confined to academia. Gibbon believed Islam's origins lay in "blind mythology" - "a primitive and specious mode of superstition" (66); the idea that the ka'bah is encircled by naked worshippers is maintained; customs such as sacrifice and abstention from pork "...without the censure or the precept of the Koran, have been silently transmitted to their posterity and proselytes." (67) Gibbon's biography of Muhammad is reliant on sunnah, and suggests Muhammad had a limited conception of what lay "beyond the limits of the Arabian world". (68). He sees Muhammad as being religious from his youth, and that:

"...in the cave of Hera, three miles from Mecca, he consulted the spirit of fraud or enthusiasm, whose abode is not in the heavens, but in the mind of the prophet. The faith which, under the name of Islām, he preached to his family and nation, is compounded of an eternal truth and a necessary fiction, THAT THERE IS ONLY ONE GOD, AND THAT MAHOMET IS THE APOSTLE OF GOD." (69)

Within arkān al-Islām, the shahādah declares Muhammad is the messenger of God. The Qur'ān emphasises that he received Pure Revelation from God, transmitted by the Jibrail - this is dismissed by Gibbon. He suggests Muhammad wrote the Qur'ān, possibly with assistance of Jews, Zoroastrians, and Eastern Christians. Gibbon concludes:

"The talents of Mahomet are entitled to our applause; but his success has, perhaps, too strongly attracted our admiration. Are we surprised that a multitude of proselytes should embrace the doctrine and passions of an eloquent fanatic?" (70)

Gibbon has been widely read since 1776, influencing opinions of Islam worldwide. Attitudes suggesting Muslim sensuality, centred around "the amorous prophet" (71) and the Arabs in general, are

reflected in nineteenth and twentieth century texts. Gibbon is not the only source of these assumptions, which were or became stereotypical. He is an important reference point in perceptions of Islam, as the Islamic world began to open up to Britain during the nineteenth century.

In the nineteenth century, Britain's policies in Asia formed an integral part of an evolving Imperial world view, in which protection of land routes from the Mediterranean and Asia Minor to India were essential in preserving a growing economic security based on trade and natural resources within these regions, and British India from incursion by other powers. Policies in Central Asia could reflect European tensions, for example making Central Asia a 'buffer' at various times between Russia and Britain. Policies could also reflect tensions within different British factions, for example between the East India Company and the British Government. Knowledge of local conditions, in particular tribal, class, and/or religious allegiances and tensions, meant that forms of steppe diplomacy might be applied, where these differences could be played off against one another.

Events prove that inadequate British knowledge of local conditions - coupled with poor military tactics or leadership - could be damaging to British lives, property, policy, and self-esteem. Imperial designs were fallible, and the confident myth of British military superiority over Asian peoples disproved. In some circumstances, 'natives' were armed to equivalent standards of firepower as British forces (often as an integral part of British armies), and were drilled in European strategy by British officers: combining these factors with a greater knowledge of local conditions, and a highly-motivated, often numerically superior force to 'loyal' troops, made a contribution to defeats of British forces, for example in Afghanistan (1842) and India (1857).

Accounts circulated about these events would influence British opinion about Islam. For example, the account by Lady Florentina Sale (1787-1853) of the January 1842 Kabul-Jellabad retreat **(72)** illustrates many British attitudes towards Islam, whilst also showing a level of knowledge and interest of Muslim society in Afghanistan. It is interesting too in that Lady Sale does not apply any severe anti-Islamic rhetoric in her account of the demise of 16,000 British personnel (including non-

Afghan camp followers). Here was a perfect opportunity for the venting of anger or application of polemic against Islam or Islamic society.

The narrative applies Muslim terms without explanation, indicating their place in a common vocabulary: "The insurgent chiefs have set up a King, and a wuzeer; they went to the mosque, and read the fatcha or prayer, for the reigning monarch. Several of the Moollahs refused to recognise the name of Shah Seman..." (73) They also demonstrate a knowledge, through experience, of Islamic principles including jihād. Acceptance of customs was aided through linguistic knowledge and close relationships with local people, including marriages.

Subsequent hand-to-hand fighting induced Sale to apply a familiar analogy: "It was very like the scenes depicted in the battles of the Crusades..." (74). Sale describes how a number of children and women were abducted, and the desire for British blood: "From their expressions of hatred towards our whole race, they appear to anticipate more delight in cutting our throats than in the expected booty." (75) Some of the kidnapped were liberated, including a child, speaking only Persian: "My father and mother are infidels, but I am Musselman." (76) Some

women embraced Islam and married Afghans. Lady Sale eventually returned to Britain, to be fêted despite the disaster to Britain within Afghanistan.

The nineteenth century provides extensive primary source material: policies and incidents in Central Asia overlap, because of the flexibility of Iranian borders, which included at times control of Central Asia, Afghanistan, Baluchistan, and Caucasia. Diplomatic contacts between Iran and Britain are notable for Mirza Abul Hasan Shirazi's missions, commencing in 1809. Diplomat James Morier accompanied Shirazi, and used him as the basis for two "Hajji Baba" novels. Shirazi was not amused at the novels' satirical nature. Later editions were edited by 'experts' and incorporated Persian antiquities and art illustrations irrelevant to the text - a policy repeated in other 'Eastern' fiction. Hajji undergoes several incarnations, including dervish and executioner. Muslim values are derided and perceived religious hypocrisy exposed. Muhammad is seen as a magician. Emphasis is on the supposedly overtly sensual aspects of the societies encountered. Many tales have a basis in local Shi'i folklore. Aspects of the society portrayed in Morier's work certainly did exist, and whether all the information provided degenerate Islamic society,

or provides it with a more human face, is open to discussion. (77)

Prejudices against the Islamic world are found in journals of travellers who had sympathy for Islamic cultures and peoples, such as Edward Eastwick (1814-83) and George Curzon. Eastwick knew Persian, and laments the lack of British knowledge about Iran, which he attempts to alter in the publication of his travel journal. En route in "Constantinople" (sic) he notes that: "A Muhammadan population is always dangerous when a religious cry is raised." (78). Eastwick has knowledge of Shi'ism, providing a detailed portrayal of Meshed mosque. Eastwick was later informed that mosque officials sought revenge, as his presence had desecrated the premises. Eastwick believed that, had he been killed, compatriots would say:

"'Served him right; what business had he to go into the mosque. Besides, he ought to have remembered that, when such an imprudence might have brought about a public difficulty! This is what will be said, whereas God knows I am the last man living to wantonly offend any one's religious prejudices..." (79)

European appreciation of Iranian peoples involved physiological and/or physiognomical value systems, influenced by prevalent theories of European descent from Indo-Aryans. George Curzon sees the British as 'returning' descendants of the Persia's 'original stock'. The emphasis is on ancient 'glories'. Prior to 1888-9 Iranian travels, Curzon studied extensively, and felt existing sources were inadequate. Many old judgments and stereotypes about Islam and Islamic peoples emerge:

"A creditable acquaintance with the standards of civilization does not prevent gross fanaticism and superstition... Religion is alternately stringent and lax, inspiring at one moment the bigot's rage, at the next, the agnostic's indifference..." (80)

Curzon visits Meshed - but does not go into the mosque: "Though my emotions were not those of the devout pilgrims who have very likely travelled hundreds, perhaps thousands, of miles to see the hallowed spot, though I did not break into wild cries of 'Ya Ali, Ya Husein'..." (81) Curzon reinforces stereotypes of Muslim women, and perceived sexual deviancy is implicitly linked with Islam, especially in an account of temporary marriages.

The beginning of the twentieth century marked a real turning point in British-Iranian relations, with granting of extensive petroleum rights to British entrepreneur William Knox d'Arcy. Oil exploration/exploitation increased interaction between Britain and Iran: companies tried to placate local tribal powers and workers, through the provision of halāl kitchens, medical facilities, and a promise of remuneration. (82) Agreements between tribal leaders and the companies were attacked by Muslim religious leaders. Problems were compounded by the management bringing perceptions, attitudes, and prejudices instilled in India with them.

Extensive contacts between Britain, its agents, and Muslims during the nineteenth century cannot be generalised, occurring at many levels of society, varying from region-to-region, influenced by different political, military, and economic policies - and numerous external factors. The concept of India as a single entity was perhaps one result of the massive generalisations and ignorance revolving around the region. The barriers between the British and the 'Indians' became wider after the 1857 Mutiny. The British military launched counter-attacks - applying Company, European, Sikh, Afghan, Gurkha and Punjabi troops. Revenge was motivated by

"...a suggestive scene of desolation that inflamed the minds of our men with a fierce desire for revenge." (83) "Christian women had been crucified nude against the homes, and native women and children, butchered by the sepoys to avert the same fate at the hands of the British, lay scattered in the streets and homes..." (84) Punishments were subject of paintings, with hagiographic paintings of heroic combatants, reinforcing mythic elements into British Empire folklore. Mutineers' punishment including being blown from guns: "...the thought that perhaps a limb of some one of a different religion to himself, might possibly be buried or buried with the remainder of his own body, is agony to him." (85)

After the Mutiny, British-Muslim relations deteriorated: "...the sympathy which Englishmen, whether long resident or fresh to India, felt for the natives has changed to a general feeling of repugnance if not of antipathy." (86) The British impression was that the Mutiny had been a Muslim conspiracy. The relationship between India and Britain changed when the British Government took control, through the Act for Better Government of India 1858. The Mutiny directly affected army recruitment, where loyal regions were favoured:

separate units were formed linked to caste and tribe. Religious law was enforced. This trauma to the Empire was significantly instrumental in changing the relationship between Britain and Islam. It was a <u>second</u> major defeat: it required policy changes, and hardened British attitudes towards the area. The changing relationship saw a gradual assertion of Indian rights, including Muslim groups.

In 1858 Queen Victoria issued a Royal Proclamation, that subjects "of whatever race or creed, be freely and impartially admitted to offices in our service, the duties of which they may be qualified, by their education, ability, and integrity, duly to discharge." **(87)** Such ideals were not realised in reality, and there were great difficulties in Indians obtaining high positions within the Indian Civil Service and other administrations. Cultivation of archetypes about India and its native peoples reinforced the British position, and was a matrix for interpreting the different world that was encountered. If unchallenged, their perpetuation sustained what were often fictions - especially Islam. Two underlying tensions formed perceptions of India: (i) the "unknown, mysterious, and seductive"; (ii) the "self-mastering and self-sacrificing

repressing and denial involved in the commitment to govern." (88)

The opinions of John Strachey, Lieutenant-Governor of North Western Provinces, reflect these archetypes: "The better class of Mohammedans are already a source to us of strength and not of weakness, and a continuously wise policy might, I believe, make them strong and important supporters of our power." (89) Strachey readily identified with these "better classes", whom he saw as generally loyal. His views of lower-class Muslims are predictable: "... the larger proportion of these so-called Mohammedans are so ignorant of the religion to which they nominally belong, and so little devoted to any of its tenets, that they might almost as properly be counted among the innumerable classes of Hindus." (90)

Attitudes were pervasive through domestic institutions: memsahibs tried to reproduce British domestic values; children were brought up by an ayah, providing knowledge of Indian culture and language surpassing their parents - children were frequently sent to Britain for education, inculcated with British values. The number of liasons British Indian male personnel had with native women probably

decreased. Earlier liasons had laid the foundations for the community of 'Anglo-Indians', which gradually formed a community apart. There had been a limited number of marriages between British males and Indians/Anglo-Indians. A Company General had thirteen local wives; a Delhi Commissioner had several legitimate wives, and his children were raised according to the wife's religion i.e. either as Hindus or Muslims. **(91)**

Queen Victoria's attitude towards Muslims, as Empress of India from 1876, was that British rule was advantageous to India: "We do strictly charge and enjoin all those who may be in authority under us that they abstain from all interference with the religious belief or worship of any of our subjects on pain of our highest displeasure." **(92)** Victoria had an association with a Muslim: Abdul Karim became her groom in 1887, teaching her elementary Hindustani, when he was "... a vy. strict Master... a <u>perfect</u> Gentleman". **(93)** Karim helped Victoria in Indian correspondence, until government pressures enforced a curtailment of the practice.

The nineteenth century saw growth in British knowledge of Indian Islam, and an increasing institutionalisation of literary, linguistic, and

cultural studies - with Indian and British teachers. There was realisation in diplomatic circles that the Britain-India relationship had to change or progress, if it was going to continue. Curzon "...believed one way to neutralize growing Indian discontent of the educated was 'to perpetually build bridges over that racial chasm that yawns eternally in our midst, and which, if it becomes wider... will one day split the Empire asunder.' Racial violence must be checked, he felt, lest it boil over into rebellion and the time come when 'the English may be in danger of losing their command of India, because they have not learned to command themselves'." (94)

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The pre-eminent role of Egypt in determining Western European perceptions of Islam and the Islamic world during the nineteenth-century was shaped by several significant factors, including strategic importance; Muhammad Ali's 'independence' from the Ottoman Empire and his policies (95); economic factors, as a consumer of European goods, raw-material producer, and a potential industrial power. A considerable number of travel journals, histories, and accounts of Egypt were published. Many had an emphasis on

the ancient rather than the modern Egypt, due to the extensive Western European archaeology and scholarship that had been undertaken. Travels in Egypt stimulated a body of fiction, poetry, and art in Europe - which was influential in perception of Islam.

Edward William Lane (1801-1876), played a crucial role in disseminating information about Islam **(96-99)**. Lane's work was utilised by many levels of British society - including academics, politicians, imperial representatives, and authors: it was also cited by Egyptian writers. Lane spent three years in Egypt from September 1825. He lived a self-perceived Arab style of life. Whilst not professing Islam, he joined in Muslim activities, including shrine-pilgrimages and prayers at mosques. Lane returned to Egypt in December 1833, living in Cairo, apparently being accepted by local scholars and following shari'ah. In 1835, he returned to England with a completed illustrated manuscript, published the following year as "An Account of the Manner and Customs of the Modern Egyptians" **(100)**. Lane applies many quotes from the Qur'ān within his book, and demonstrates a depth of understanding that previous published studies of Islam had not reached. For example, he provides extensive details of prayer,

from the times of different calls to prayer, to a illustrated description of rak'a and supererogatory acts. Aspects of the account rely on personal experience:

"The utmost solemnity and decorum are observed in the public worship of Muslims. Their looks and behaviour in the mosque are not those of enthusiastic devotion, but of calm and modest piety. Never are they guilty of a designedly irregular word or action during their prayers. The pride and fanaticism which they exhibit in common life, in intercourse with persons of their own, or of a different faith, seem to be dropped in their entering the mosque, and they appear wholly absorbed in the adoration of their Creator..." (101)

Lane distinguished between 'Superstitions' and 'Ritual and Moral Laws', and demonstrates an affinity towards non-syncretic practices of Islam orthodoxy. He shows detailed knowledge of Islamic schools and sects. Lane was impressed by Islamic practices of ḥajj, ramaḍān, and dhikr: "With the religious zeal of the Muslims, I am daily struck; yet I have often wondered that they so seldom attempt to make converts to their faith." (102) This is contrasted with what he sees as the

inconsistency of Arabs regarding prayers for forgiveness, and an idolatrous approach towards Prophet Muhammad. Lane sees Cairo as representative of the whole of the Islamic world, which of course raises accusations of generality, as the practices he observed within Cairo were not necessarily representative of every Muslim practice even within a small section of Cairo.

Lane's descriptions of Muslim women with the benefit of hindsight might be criticised by modern critics. Lane goes into specific details on the women's eyes: "...black, large, and of a long almond-form, with long and beautiful lashes, and an exquisitely soft, bewitching expression: eyes more beautiful can hardly be conceived." (103) The image of perceived sexually-alluring females is amplified, and contrasted with the ḥijāb.

Lane sought to provide a complete picture of the societies he encountered: certain aspects would have been of particular interest to his readers. Within a linear account of Egyptian rites of passage, marriage and specifically heterosexual practices are discussed - naturally from a male viewpoint. Lane cites the Qur'ān in discussing Prophet Muhammad's marriages: "It is true that he assumed to himself

the privilege of having a greater number of wives than he allowed to others; but, in doing so, he may have been accentuated by the want of male offspring, rather than impelled by voluptuousness." (104) Lane balances perceived abuses of divorces with a belief that only one in twenty men had two wives.

Lane's book is a step forward in the European knowledge of Islam and an Islamic society, which had repercussions for generations to come. Ahmed sees Lane's work as "innocent" of "connotations and implied judgments... This does not mean that Lane is never critical of the society he describes, but merely that his writings appear to be free from criticism that have their roots in or are even expressed in terms of an ethnocentric prejudice." (105) Lane's use of disguise and acceptance by Cairo Islamic scholastic society, not without precedents or antecedents, could be seen as providing a veneer of authenticity and integrity to the work.

The arrangement of knowledge within authoritative works on Islam, such as Lane's, was an attempt to exhibit Cairo and portray things exactly as they were. Lane used the camera lucida for his sketches, a prism device which projects an exact image of an

object on paper. This desire for 'reality' extended to an immersion within the culture to obtain an 'experience': "To establish the objectness of the Orient, as something set apart from the European presence, required that the presence itself, ideally, become invisible." (106) Within Lane, Said believes "the Orientalist ego is very much in evidence, however much his style tries for impartial impersonality". (107)

The routes of knowledge do not follow clearly defined linear paths, and much can be lost or re-interpreted to suit other purposes - making determination of 'influence' difficult. Edward Stanley Lane-Poole (1830-1867), Lane's nephew, was an 'authority' on Egypt and Islam, who was to edit subsequent editions of Lane's work, and wrote several books of his own. Lane-Poole's "Cairo" (108) borrows considerably from Lane's (occasionally uncredited). Lane-Poole's book contains more value-judgments than Lane's, and lacks much of the detail and authority. There is an emphasis on architectural detail, demonstrating professional interest in Islamic art. Residence in Cairo during a period of British colonial presence must have reinforced the archetype of 'Oriental' life. Lane-Poole is not an 'insider'; whatever the merits of

'disguise' may be, reading Lane-Poole demonstrates how much of an 'exhibition' Cairo had become. Lane-Poole sees Cairo through an interpretive-matrix based partially on Lane's work and images from 'Arabian Nights'. The perception that Egypt was a 'primitive' place, where time had stood still, was important in reinforcing the justification for imperial practices. Lane-Poole perceives the working people of Cairo as being unchanged for centuries.

It is unlikely Lane would have agreed with his nephew's opinions regarding Islam. The implicit suggestion in use of terminology such as "Mohammedan" and "the dogmas he founded" (109) is that Islam was created by and originated from Muhammad, rather than being the product of direct Revelation from God. References to "the trivial observances of the founder" cast aspersions on ḥadīth, which in Sunnism especially are complementary to (but not superseding) the Qur'ān. Within Islam, there have been problems where Muhammad's traditions (and others) supersede Qur'ānic teaching, but few religious Muslim commentators would declare ḥadīth as "trivial". The concept that Muhammad himself "allowed" the "social system" to become "part of the religion" is problematic: much

of the social system formed part of Arabian culture prior to Muhammad, whilst many aspects of the Islamic social system had no direct connection to the Prophet such as practices based on later Islamic legal interpretations. Therefore, the idea that Muhammad himself was responsible for all of the social system is erroneous (the term 'social system' is problematic) **(110)**.

Unlike his great-uncle, Lane-Poole's is critical of the solemnity in aspects of Islam, which contrasts with criticism of the number of religious holidays, especially deriding the Sunni celebration of Husain. **(111)** He describes Islam as as a development of Judaism and superstition, whilst the Qur'ān is: "...the strange and complex record of Mohammed's impassioned rhapsodies, studied harangues, legal decisions, ordinances of ritual, and other heterogeneous matters..." **(112)** Muhammad is seen to enforce Islam by "...prayers and threats, entreaties, arguments, and denunciations. This is Islam - no Eastern calls it Mohammedanism; it is a form of pure theism, simple, austere, exacting; lofty in its conception of the relation of man to God, and noble in its doctrine of the duty of man to man. Over-rigid and formal it may be in practice; it puts a prophet and a book between man and his Maker; it

lacks the loving-kindness of Christianity; but in its high, stern monotheism it is supremely grand." **(113)**

This passage corrects misconceptions Lane-Poole makes elsewhere in the text. The comparison with Christianity is unfavourable; the archetypal theory that Muhammad applied violence to achieve a spread of Islam can be disputed. Lane-Poole discusses European difficulty in understanding Islam, and Muslim conception of God "commonly represented as a pitiless tyrant... there is a certain truth in the figure... Mohammed conceived of God as the Semitic mind has always preferred to think of him; his God is the Almighty, the All-knowing, the All-just." **(114)**

There is continuity between Lane's approach of 1835 and Lane-Poole's of 1892: Lane has greater originality, depth, and serious scholarship. Lane-Poole's contribution is more modest: he had a role both in editing his great-uncle's work, and in publishing books and articles on aspects of Egypt; the name cachet assisted his authority. Lane-Poole has deep knowledge of Islam, which is selectively applied.

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Formative British contacts with aspects of Islam in the African continent were diverse. It is pertinent to consider what level a pre-existing knowledge contributed to interpretations of Islam and Islamic societies 'discovered' for the first time by Europeans. Use of language such as 'discovery' and 'exploration' contains certain problematic assumptions, representing a form of European/Western-centred thinking which suggests that a place is unknown to man until it was found by white Christians: peoples found in these places were often assumed to be uncivilised or undeveloped, providing imperial, missionary and/or colonial movements with a moral basis for 'progress'. British representatives were not necessarily dominant partners in any African-British relationships: the concept of a passive African is itself a prevalent stereotype. Emphasis in this chapter is on encounters with particular Islamic cultures which happen to be African. Islam itself is more of a common identity than any communal concept of 'the African': Africans encountered would have seen themselvesthrough tribal, clan, and family identities as much as any religious affiliation.

Formative contacts are those which isolate themes regarding Muslims, Islam, and Islamic societies:

examples cited demonstrate a level of pre-existing knowledge about Islam, new information which contribute to the overall images of Islam, contacts which reinforce stereotypes familiar today, and/or encounters which offered a radical challenge to pre-existing conceptualisation of Islam. Published accounts, demonstrating sophistication and civilisation of Muslims encountered, may have engendered romanticism about the subject matter. The contacts presented for perhaps the first time in detail Muslim Western and Central African peoples described by British travellers. This offered a new perspective of Islam - away from Ottoman, Mediterranean, Arab and Indian groups. African Muslims resembled the 'known' Islamic World. This 'universal' system, based on respect of the Qur'ān and application of often highly developed Islamic legal systems, might have challenged assumptions of Muslim 'primitivism'.

Central and Western Africa was an unknown region to Europeans, where sophisticated Muslim tribes were discovered. There was familiarity with each other's goods, with a European need for new markets and raw materials, together with the quest for scientific enlightenment and/or the legendary riches of Africa. The African Association was founded in 1788 by Sir

Joseph Banks. Many of its agents were lost through disease, natural dangers, or attacks. Mungo Park, seeking the River Niger's source in 1795, was astonished by high civilisation standards encountered amongst diverse peoples. He was surprised that Islam was peacefully propagated through education, which conflicted with his perception of its spread by the sword. **(115)**

Park discovered that the Negroes were familiar with the Torah, Psalms of David, and the Gospel: "My surprise... was not greater on hearing these accounts from the lips of the Negroes, than theirs, on finding that I was already acquainted with them." **(116)** Parks admires Mandigo practice of shari'ah. Parks' surprise reflects a limited knowledge of Islam and the Qur'ān: his observations broke down stereotypical homongenous singular images of Muslims, Africans, or "the Other". The African Association produced maps and expand horizons of knowledge about this 'hidden' Islamic world. The British government assumed responsibility early in the nineteenth century. There were British inroads in Northern Africa, via the Tripoli (Libya) route. In 1821, Denham, Oudney and Clapperton used a northern African route to reach the Sheik of Bornu, Muhammad al-Kanami, and the Sultan of Fultani, Muhammad Bello. The Muslims encountered

were surprised to learn that the English were monotheistic and prayed.

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John Lewis Burckhardt (1784-1814), Baslé-born and educated in Germany, wrote to Joseph Banks offering his services in 1808. He learned Arabic in Cambridge and London, intending to travel in Africa in the guise of an Arab. Two years in Syria were designed to improve his colloquial Arabic and knowledge of "Oriental manners". Burckhardt's period in the Levant and other travels will be discussed later. In February 1813 Burckhardt arrived in Nubian Aswan disguised as a poor trader from Aleppo. Burckhardt travelled to Shendi, before heading for Suakin and Jiddah - assessing individuals and groups encountered, and attempting to analyse customs and religious practices. His journals were published posthumously, as he died in 1814. The text that is read is not necessarily the text that might have been published, had Burckhardt been able to exercise some editiorial control or hindsight in his assessments: the narrative is also fragmented. The journals are useful in terms of the detail, first impressions, and perspectives of different religious practices and customs. Burckhardt notes regional differences,

especially between Egyptians and Nubians, finding the latter more moral. Burckhardt links Islamic culture with barbaric or perceived immoral sexual practices - a constant theme in formative literature about Islamic societies. Slave-girls, prostitution, and the veil are discussed. Burckhardt provides an early reference to female 'circumcision' in the Sudan, and also discusses a eunuch "manufactory" in Upper Egypt.

Burckhardt provides considerable detail about the slavery trade, and his encounters with slaves:

"In Soudan (sic), the slaves, though made Mussulmans by the act of circumcision, are never taught to read or to pray: and even in Egypt and Arabia this instruction is seldom given to any but those for whom their masters take a particular liking. It may be observed, nevertheless, that they are greater fanatics than the proudest Olemas (ulamas), and that Christians and Franks are more liable to be insulted by slaves than by any other class of Mussulman." (117)

The implication here is that although the converted Muslims are enthusiastic in their beliefs, they are ignorant of their religion. The idea of 'fanatics' being somehow unlearned is a theme that acquires

popularity amongst British observers in Sudan during the Mahdist period - and has contemporary currency. Burckhardt makes comments regarding the level of faith he encounters:

"The Nubians who have resided in Egypt, and can speak Arabic, are for the most part good Mussulmen, and repeat their prayers daily; but in general the only prayer known to the others is the exclamation of Alluhu Akbar. A few make the pilgrimage to Mekka, by the way of Suakin." **(118)**

Burckhardt's writes on syncretic practices: it is not clear whether he is able to distinguish whether these are 'Islamic' rather than 'Qur'ānic' in substance. He encounters 'fakirs':

"In the schools of Damer they teach the true reading of the Koran, and deliver lectures of the Tefsyn (explanations of the Koran) (tafsīr), and on the Touhyd (tawḥīd), or the nature of God, and his divine attributes." **(119)** The training of the fuqahā' combines 'orthodox' Qur'anic teaching with 'magical' cultural aspects - Burckhardt does not distinguish the two:

"...they are taught to read and write, and to learn by heart as much of the Koran, and of some other prayer books as their memory can retain. They are taught the secret of writing amulets or charms; and at the age of twenty they return to their homes, where they live, affecting great uprightness of conduct and strictness of morals, which amount however to little more than not to smoke tobacco, or drink Bouza in public, and not to frequent the resorts of debaunchery." (120)

During Burckhardt's period of language and cultural 'acquisition' in Aleppo, he read the Qur'ān twice and learnt certain passages by heart. There is enthusiasm for aspects of the Muslim societies he encountered, although evidence is not conclusive that he actually embraced Islam. That action in itself would not necessarily make his journey any more credible as an authority. Burckhardt does exercise some of his era's prejudices towards Africans encountered, but also respects many and patronisingly feels that with (a European Christian?) education "...the Black nation might be taught to approach, and, perhaps, to equal the white." (121) It would be interesting to locate Burckhardt's unedited texts, to determine exactly how 'tolerant' he was towards African Muslim peoples.

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Richard Lander (1804-1830) accompanied Clapperton on his last African expedition, encountering a variety of Muslim beliefs en route. Clapperton was to perish during this journey in 1827: Lander survived, wrote the journal, and then died himself whilst exploring the River Niger with his brother in 1830. The journal describes the Falatah, whose <u>da'wa</u> activity converted part of Western Africa to Islam; the form in which Islam was presented allowed for continuance of animistic-syncretic beliefs. Clapperton died before committing any views to record, and they were unable to write <u>in situ</u> because the people they encountered feared that the pair "...were making <u>fetishes</u> (charms) and enchantments prejudicial to their lives and interests." (122)

Lander perceives substantial differences between 'Arab Islam' and 'Negro Islam', and does not believe conversion amongst the West African peoples 'improved' them: "Those who profess the Mohammedan religion among the negroes are as ignorant and superstitious as their idolatrous brethren..." (123) Islam is understood as manipulative. Lander believes

the Arabs were promoting and applying Islamic tenets and _da'wa_ for subversive reasons:

"The Falatahs, who profess Islamism, understand and make use of a few Arabic prayers, but the negro than can utter so long a sentence as: 'La illah el Allah rasoul allahi!' (There is but one God, and Mohammed is his prophet) is styled _mallam_, or learned, and is regarded with looks of respect and reverence by his less intelligent countrymen." **(124)**

Lander examines the role of _mallam_ in their communities, and believes them to be fetish makers selling amulets to a credulous multitude - and compares them to priests in Catholic countries. Not all the 'natives' are understood to be completely credible, and some attacked _mallam_ as frauds. As Lander ventures further into the interior he sees Islam as better than animistic religions, which makes earlier accounts contradictory and confusing:

"The Mohammedan faith is spreading daily and rapidly by the means, particularly in Nyffe, hundreds of the natives of that kingdom having lost sight of their ancient prejudices, and the religion of their forefathers, and embraced the more conjenial tenets of Islam." **(125)**.

Lander believed that within two generations, Islam would be "universally adopted in Western and Central Africa." **(126)** Such an assessment may have influenced Christian missions in the 'scramble' for the spiritual territory of African souls. The combination of animistic beliefs and Islam struck Lander as bizarre, although many Islamic cultures do have a strong reliance on amulets, charms, and non-Qur'ānic traits. It is perhaps unrealistic for da'wa imposing full orthodoxy upon converts - missions had variations in Islamic beliefs: "When a child is small, we give him milk; the meat will come later. Charms bring peace to the heart. Islam tries to ennoble them by lending them God's name." **(127)**

Lander's Hausa guide Pasko ('Abbu Becr') is criticised for superficially adopting the religion of the culture in whose land he happens to be travelling in, a somewhat ironic reflection of Lander given the disguises of European travellers within the African continent. **(128)** Lander assumes evil in this character without evidence, based simply on his appearance. (The notion of sinister appearance was not a one-sided phenomena: Burckhardt and Lander note that white people were assumed to be cannibalistic on Africans, and that consumption was one of the reasons for a slave trade. Skin colour was cited as a class

typology system amongst some Arab/African peoples). Assessment of Africans based upon stereotypes affected opinions of Islam, by portraying adherents as simple, ridiculous characters with no real culture, religious values, or human compassion. **(129)** Lander does not see every aspect of cultures encountered as negative. He encounters, in a 'Goober' chief in 'Housa', a well-educated Muslim:

"This man is well versed in the religion of Mohammed, and had derived from the figurative language and splendid diction of the Koran, a visionary and romantic turn of mind, which prompted him to undertake novel and daring exploits, not unworthy of that great legislator whose work he had so intently studied." **(130)**

The criteria Lander applies is uncertain: indigenous Muslims with a tradition in Islam appear more highly regarded than the Falatah - who were seen as having no courage, religious integrity, or imitative arts! **(131)** Lander and Clapperton saw erosion of potential British influence in the continuing perceived incursion of Falatah into Western and Central Africa.

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Heinrich Barth (b 1821) provides a useful formative contact, in terms of locating previously unrecorded Islamic cultures, and in the sheer quantity of material published. His route was Tripoli- Ghat-Bornu-Sokoto-Timbuktu. German by birth, he was a fluent English and Arabic speaker who studied in London, secured British consular protection during his travels, was part of a British expedition in Central Africa, and subsequently published in English five-volumes of 3,500 printed pages in Britain. His editor believes neglect that Barth's work received was because of the work's length, anti-German feeling, stylistic problems, and a lack of interest in Western Africa. However, it was read by subsequent travellers, and highly regarded. **(132)**

It was on his second visit to Africa, in 1849, that Barth joined James Richardson's Central African expedition. Barth wore hybrid Arab-Sudanese dress, and stained himself with indigo to provide an appearance he felt was suitable to the country. According to location, his disguise would be adapted: his interest in an perceived authentic Islamic identity was such that his colleagues were concerned that he might convert to Islam. Disguise alone did not protect the expedition: disease was to decimate

its European membership, and poverty was to cause its surviving leaders to split up along different routes.

Barth's importance is based in an acquistion of a high level of knowledge about Africa's geography, history, and linguistics: he read Bornu history - diwan (133), and studied several local languages, producing a dictionary containing references to at least ten languages (134). Certain themes discussed by earlier chroniclers re-appear; the conversion of West Africans from animistic 'pagan' religions, the co-existence of Islam with other religious beliefs, the physical characteristics of peoples encountered, and sensuality and sexuality within Islamic cultures.

Barth saw much to admire in a learned Muslim he encountered - 'Vizier al-Haj Beshir ben Ahmed Tirab' in Bornu, whose biography is provided. Beshir 'collected' wives from different tribes "as a sort of ethnological museum" (135), and Barth reinforced the image of Muslim sensuality in describing the harem. Barth's interest in Islam led to him carrying a copy of the Qur'ān, which he presented to a Sheikh in Kukawa. He notes that his contemporaries might criticise him for such an action, although in Katsina he was to present an Arabic New Testament to a local chief. Barth suggests that the Sheikh's acceptance

of his Qur'ān was "a sign of an unprejudiced mind, and of the very high esteem in which he held me, that, although knowing me to be a Christian, he did not refuse to accept from my hands that which was most holy in his eyes." (136)

In Bornu, Barth finds the local women generally ugly, according to his value system: "...they are certainly quite as coquettish, and, as far as I had occasion to observe, at least as wanton also, as the more cheerful and sprightly Hausa women..." (137) There is a certain sympathy or even an appreciation with Islam in its cultural and sociological manifestations, especially in the area of sexual relations. Links were made and recorded by Barth which opened up the region in subsequent generations. Like earlier chronicles, there is greater sympathy in Barth's text for West and Central African indigenous Muslims than for Arabs - who were hostile because they feared losing the slave trade. In use of primary local historical sources, there is a new dimension within Barth's work which had later importance in the school of African history.

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The latter half of the nineteenth century, especially after the 1880's, saw the European powers 'scramble' within Africa - partially "inspired by genuine concern for African welfare and sympathy for African aspirations." (138) The exploitation of Africa was not simply a case of 'Europeans against Africans'. African parties were not passive: they played an active part in trying to secure the most advantageous deal, to the detriment of their tribal and local enemies. Islam was able to expand in certain areas, and was protected from Christian missionaries' influence. It is important to attain balance between obvious imperial abuses of individuals, groups, and regions; and those sectors of communities where Africans were better off for the presence of European powers: there is no reason to think the fact that territories were Islamic played any major part in the initial European decision-making process. The presence of Islam _did_ have an overall impact on how a territory or protectorate was governed: uprisings might fall under the banner of Islam. The sheer diversity and number of contacts between British individuals and Muslims would have increased after imperial incursion - especially when advances in medical knowledge made it possible for Europeans to travel and survive. African regions with large Muslim populations became part of the British Empire:

members of these populations were later to assert affinity with a British identity, whilst Britain could engender paternalism towards its citizens.

A large number of nineteenth century sources based on travels in Arabia and the Levant offered formative contacts with previously undocumented areas of the Islamic world. Some writers express a fascination in and romanticise Bedouin life, seeing few differences between the region then and Biblical times. Ottoman domination meant that accounts provide information about Turks as well as different indigenous Arab tribes. Interest is expressed in Wahhābi Muslims, whose spread of influence within Arabia is charted. Additional dangers of travelling to Mecca and Madina are brought out in the writings of Burckhardt and Richard Burton (1829-1890), who disguised themselves to go on ḥajj. Charles Doughty (1843-1926) joined Bedouin tribes, and travelled the desert. These accounts introduced to the readers diversity in Islam based upon eyewitness sources, but did not prevent a number of old archetypes and misconceptions about Islam emerging.

Burckhardt's journal is edited from the manuscript that survived his demise: he continued the policy of disguise on his 1813 journey in Arabia, although

doubts regarding its efficiency are referred to, and at times he has difficulty travelling. Fear of detection led to changes in appearance: "...the assumption of a false character is frequent among all eastern travellers, and especially at Mecca, where every one affects poverty in order to escape imposition, or being led into great expenses." (139) Burckhardt consulted several Arabic books to provide extensive textual detail. In undergoing the ḥajj, he is keen to follow every stage and explain it thoroughly, noting transgressions in practice which indicate the depth of his knowledge. For example, he stops to put on iḥrām at Hadda and describes the rituals: "... an ablution, or, if the pilgrim choose, an entire purification, an audible avowal of the act of investment, a prayer of two rikats, and the recital of pious exclamations called telbye..." (140) Burckhardt's journal resembles a ḥajj 'manual', scientific in its exactitude, linking ḥajj to the pre-Islamic era: every rite and prayer is detailed. It would be interesting to determine the accuracy of the information provided.

Burckhardt encounters several different forms of Islam in Mecca; Ismaili Indians suffered local prejudice "...from a general opinion that they are idolaters, who comply in outward appearance only with

the rites of Mohammedism..." (141) Central Asian Hanafis "..appears to be men of a much better and more vigorous character than the generality of Indians." (142) Burckhardt notes different beliefs of Yemenite Zaidi Shi'is, seen by Meccans as heretics. He admires Tekroury Negro African Muslims for "respectable character for industry" (143); personal experience of Malays - British subjects from Sumatra - leads Burckhardt to see their scrupulous adherence for Islamic precepts contradicting to their uncharitability. The Malays also had a low opinion of the British: "...although they bestowed upon the British the same opprobrious epithets with which the fanatical Moslims everywhere revile Europeans, they never fail to add, 'but their government is good'." (144) Burckhardt admires Bedouin he sees, and offers extensive details on them in other journals. (145)

Hedjazis come in for criticism, especially Meccan hajj guides (metowaf/delyl), although he believed Meccans had many admirable qualities. He discusses different class-structures in Mecca and Madina, and notes contradictions between perceived Muslim ideals and what he observes. Male Meccans are seen as taking mistresses and slavegirls. Women are discouraged from religious observance, because men feared it brought them closer to God and enhanced their status. He

notes the numbers of prostitutes following the hajjis: "Mecca abounds with the frail sisterhood, whose numbers are increased during the Hadj by adventures from foreign countries. They are somewhat more decorous than the public women in Egypt, and never appear in the streets without veils." (146)

The impression of superstitious practices within Islam is reinforced throughout this journal. This is contrasted with admiration for more 'orthodox' aspects of Islam, such as an _'alim_'s _tafsīr_:

"On Fridays, after prayer, some Turkish olemas explain to their countrymen assembled around them a few chapters of the Koran, after which each of the audience kisses the hand of the expositor, and drops money into his cap. I particularly admired the fluency of speech of one of the olemas, although I did not understand him, the lecture being delivered in the Turkish language. His gesticulations, and the inflections of his voice, were more impressive; but like an actor on the stage, he would laugh and cry in the same minute, and adapt his features to his purpose in the most skilful manner." (147)

Although Burckhardt does not understand the contents of the _tafsīr_, he admires the _'alim_'s presentation.

The implication here is of a 'performance' rather than sincerity in the _'alim_'s motives - if he is an actor, then his Islamic material itself could be fictional. The idea of monetary gain for such wisdom might conflict with religious motives. Elements of cynicism break through within the journal, as Burckhardt describes his perceptions of the _ka'bah_, immorality and corruption, fanaticism of _hajjis_, and perceived inflated pride and hypocrisy of Meccans:

"... the cities forbidden to infidels abound with forbidden things... the Muselmans most negligent in performing the duties of their religion are the most violent in urging its precepts against unbelievers; and that the grossest superstition is generally found among those who trifle with their duties, or who, like many Osmanlys (Ottomans) even deride them, and lay claim to free thinking... If fanaticism has somewhat decreased within the last twenty years throughout the Turkish empire, the circumstance, I think, may be ascribed solely to the decreasing energy of the inhabitants, and the growing indifference for their own religion, and certainly not to a diffusion of more philanthropic or charitable principles. The text of the Mohammedan law is precise in inciting its followers to unceasing

hatred and contempt of all those who profess a different creed." (148)

Double standards are a common theme in the journal, where the pious rub shoulders with the fradulent or the heretic. Lack of sensibility or madness is seen as a form of dervish piety: "... many of them are mad men, or at least assuming the appearance of insanity, which causes them to be much respected by the hadjys and fills their pockets with money. The behaviour of some of them is so violent, and at the same time so cunning, that even the least charitably disposed hadjys give willingly something to escape from them." (149) The concept of 'mad', devious and violent Muslims has contemporary currency.

Burckhardt believed that many European observers making quick visits to the region were deceived:

...by the dignified deportment of the Turks, their patriarchal manners, and solemn speeches... For my own part, a long residence among Turks, Syrians, and Egyptians justifies me in declaring that they are wholly deficient in virtue, honour, and justice; that they have little true piety, and still less charity and forebearance; and that honesty is only to be found wither paupers and idiots. Like the Athenians

of old, a Turk may perhaps know what is right and praiseworthy, but he leaves the practice to others..." (150)

These are very negative images of Islam from an individual who had studied Islamic cultures in detail. Its British publication cannot have contributed to entirely positive perceptions. Amidst the scientific data and learned prose are Burckhardt's scathing value-judgements. He believes the importance within Islam of hajj diminished due to indifference and expense of the journey, and because of a lack of facilities enabling the poor a passage to Mecca. He believes that some hajjis lost religious zeal because of the "nefarious and shameful practices in some measure legitimatised by their frequent occurrence in the holy city..." (151)

Burckhardt's views were to influence later travellers, notably Richard Burton (1821-1890), who went to the Hejjaz in 1853 via "...the most difficult and the most dangerous point by which a European can enter Arabia." (152). Unlike Burckhardt, he has an opportunity to edit and re-evaluate his text with greater hindsight. Burton, who had been an Indian Army officer, was "... curious to see with my eyes what others are content to hear with

ears, namely, Moslem inner life in a really Mohammedan country..." (153). Burton disguised himself as a dervish, and compared what he saw directly with Indian experience (seeing them as the same people?). He endeavours to portray what he saw as picturesque Islamic scenes, but also represents the severe dangers of reaching Mecca. This suggests a conception of Arabia as an exhibit: for example, Burton wants to see scenery rather than avoid the heat by travelling at night. He has a romantic view of many Arabs encountered, and particularly admires poetic use of Arabic. Burton compares and updates the information provided by Burckhardt. Reaching Mecca, he saw the scene as:

"...strange, unique - and how few have looked upon the celebrated shrine. I may truly say that, of all the worshippers who clung weeping to the curtain, or who pressed their beating hearts to the stone, none felt for the moment a deeper emotion than did the Haji from the far-north." (154)

Self complementary, but emotional at reaching the focus of Islam, Burton's motives have been questioned by many. The impression is that Islam appeals, but its practitioners generally did not. He describes aspects of Mecca unfavourably, and suggests that the

rigours of the journey there exalted the imagination to religious frenzy. The disorder and confusion of participating in Muslim rites are a constant theme, implying Islam was chaotic and even irrational. There is much he admires, for example a sermon at Mecca: "I have seen the religious ceremonies of many lands, but never - nowhere - aught so solemn, so impressive as this." (155)

Burton details every rite, believing:

"Of the pilgrimage ceremonies I cannot speak harshly. It may be true that 'the rites of the Kaabah', emasculated of every idolatrous tendency, still hand a strange unmeaning shroud around the living theism of Islam.' But what nation, either in the West or the East, has been able to cast out from its ceremonies every suspicion of its old idolatry?... Far better to consider the Meccan pilgrimage rites in the light of Evil-worship turned into lessons of Good than to philosophise about their strangeness, and to blunder in asserting them to be insignificant. Even the Bedawi circumambulating the Kaabah fortifies his wild belief by the fond thought that he treads the path of 'Allah's friend.'" (156)

It could be argued that there are implicit criticisms of Islam within this paragraph, and that Burton in his texts is himself guilty of transgressions. In 1865, he saw Islam as being derived from a form of fanaticism:

"It may here be stated that 'Islam', which in England is popularly called 'Mohammedanism', means 'the covenant in virtue of which men earn eternal life by good works in this world'. The system began with Mohammed and was matured by his followers - men generally set down as hot-headed fanatics, but in whose case fanaticism is synomymous with wisdom and perseverence. As remarked by a modern Christian author: 'We find that in all their actions they were guided by cool reflection and by consumate prudence: their objects were in most cases noble, and the means which they employed were rarely objectionable.'" (157)

Burton emphasises Muhammad's piety, and the nobility of his followers: he is, however, dismissive of certain aḥādīth which are described as "...many fond silly stories (which) grew into a mass of splendid absurdity..." (158) - such as Muhammad's journey to Jerusalem.

Burton was not the first European to visit Mecca, although he may have acted like it, and has been heavily criticised: "His prejudices, his social outrages and preoccupations with sexual customs and deviations only added to the dark and profitable eminence." **(159)** His later translations of "Arabian Nights", incorporating knowledge acquired in the Islamic world, acquired notoriety: his wife Isabel - herself a writer - burnt many manuscripts and censored later texts after his death. Burton is synonymous with Arabia, and influenced subsequent generations' interpretations of Islam - and later travellers. He provided a mass of material, requiring detailed textual analysis.

Generally, the evocative style of his writing could be accused of reinforcing the perception of Islamic sensuality, and intensifying archetypes of Muslim irrationality and disorder. Although he reflected certain (but selected) values of his age - what would be seen today as racist views of peoples encountered - there is an underlying respect for Islamic society and beliefs; he recognises - but perhaps over-romanticises - the diversity of Muslims encountered on ḥajj. Burton is keen to defend Islam and Muhammad, for example at accusations that the Prophet was an imposter, and in emphasising the role for women on

hajj and in Islam: "The women do the same as the men: this alone disproves the world-wide calumny against Mohammedans - namely, that half humanity has no soul, and consequently no future." **(160)**

It could be said that, if Burton really respected Islam, he would not have gone on the hajj as a Christian - although there is dispute as to whether he embraced Islam. Ultimately, his presence was an insult, which he himself recognised: "And here I may observe that though neither Koran nor Sultan enjoin the death of Jew or Christian intruding within the columnns that note the sanctuary limits, nothing could save a European detected by the populace, or one who after pilgrimage declared himself an unbeliever." **(161)** Such an intrusion suggests Burton has a mixed role as a formative contact providing knowledge of Islam. Said believes Burton was a success, with flawless Arabic and his disguise, at being "able to penetrate to the heart of Islam..." **(162)**, acquiring a depth of knowledge which made him the most successful writer on the 'Orient' of his era. Widely circulated and fêted in Victorian Britain, Burton was an individualist whose perceptions of Islam were not afraid to transgress 'official lines' of supposed socio-religious morality. Although indebted to Burckhardt's precedent

in many ways, he does not simply perceive himself as an 'explorer', and Burton sees himself in many ways as being amongst his own people. Later British chroniclers could not reproduce his insight and attention to detail.

There are diverse other sources on Islam in the Levant and Arabia during the nineteenth century, especially about Bedouin Arabs, romanticised and idealised by many as a true link with a perceived Biblical past. Burckhardt was certainly an admirer, and noted that the Wahhābis had attempted to change Bedouin perceptions of Islam. Bedouins are seen as lax Muslims, whilst Wahhābis are believed to be over-zealous. It is interesting that there is a differentation between the two groups (Bedouin Wahhābis ceasing to be deemed Bedouin?):

"The Bedouins throughout Arabia have very just notions of the Deity, but are little addicted to the precepts of their religion. The Wahabys have endeavoured in vain to render them more orthodox. The dread of punishment might induce some tribes who were under the immediate control of the Wahabys to observe the forms of religion with more regularity; but it was a forced compliance, and as soon as the Wahaby power had suffered a diminution... all the

Bedouins relapsed into their former religious indolence." (163)

Burckhardt believes that Bedouin "..are certainly the most tolerant of Eastern nations." (164), which is a generalisation based upon experience with several tribes encountered. Wahhābism could have been seen at this stage as a threat to the status quo, a form of fanaticism which might endanger European interests within Arabia, and a loss with the connection of the ancient Biblical past. A history of Wahhābism is provided amongst Burckhardt's prolific writings - again first-draft notes edited after his death.

Burckhardt's observations were criticised by a later traveller: William Gifford Palgrave (1826-1888), a convert from Judaism to Catholicism, who resigned his Indian Army commission to become a Jesuit priest. He wanted to establish Christian missions in Arabia, attaining proficiency in Arabic, before travelling in disguise with a companion as a doctor. He saw Bedouins as having little respect for Islam, unchanging for two thousand years, and representing human nature at its lowest stage: they were still "...one of the noblest races of earth..." (165) - upon whom Wahhābism was forced. In terms of "the Arab race" in general (an extremely wide group with

whom Palgrave's experience only amounts to a limited knowledge over a short period), Palgrave believed they were:

"...generally speaking, rather a believing than a religious nation... Christian, Jewish, Mahometan, or Pagan creeds and forms, - the Arab, when left to himself, does not see why they should not all be equally true, equally estimable, while at the same time he does not either see any very cogent reason for following one rather than the other... he is fond of ease and impatient of restraint; stated prayers annoy him, long prayers tire him, ablutions are inconvenient, and fasting, especially in presence of a fat sheep... this immense latitude of belief has led to an equally or even a more logical consequence, namely, entire scepticism, and a settled resolution to prefer the certain to the uncertain, the present to the future." **(166)**

These views were coloured by Palgrave's own religious aims and ardent beliefs. It might suggest a possibility of future Christian missions to his readership, although Palgrave did not see "much probability of serious moral or religious change being brought about in Arabia or in any Asiatic elsewhere by European agency, unless indeed for the

worse", because "... so little is the East and its inhabitants understood by the West..." (167) It was Palgrave's intention to improve this situation through publication of his work, which represents Islam as a problem, "the Mahometan drug which paralyzes whatever it does not kill out right." (168) Palgrave sees Turks as particularly destructive. Shi'i Muslims incorporate the perceived worst aspects of Islam. Wahhābi Nejed is seen "...as the stronghold of fanatics who consider every one save themselves an infidel or a heretic, and who regard the slaughter of an infidel or a heretic as a duty, or at least a merit." (169) Despite this, Palgrave travels extensively through the region.

He describes a fear of Wahhābis by other Muslims, and is quick to put down aspects of Arab cultures he encounters. He believes that "no Mahometans are more neglectful of the precise exactitude required in the acquittance of religous duties than the Arab Wahhabees themselves, for all their Islamic fervour in other respects..." (170) His understanding was that many professed orthodoxy externally, whilst pursuing other beliefs secretly (he thought Christian Arabs were within this category). Palgrave sees Islam as a blasphemous conception by Muhammad: Wahhābism is "the restoration of this primaeval image

of Islam... the true, the unerring, the heaven-revealed path..." (171) He sees Abd-el-Wahhāb as wrong, but "honest in his aim" (172), and Islam a 'dead' religion, unlike Christianity:

"Islam is in its essence stationary, and was framed thus to remain. Sterile like its God, lifeless like its first Principle and supreme Original in all that constitutes true life - for life is love, participation, and progress, and of these the Coranic Deity has none - it justly repudiates all changes, all advance, all development." (173)

Palgrave provides a mixed narrative, containing fragments of different elements (e.g. history, theology, travelogue, linguistics, individualistic). The view of Wahhābism is important, as Islam in the Hejaz was to be seen as representative of Islam as a whole during the twentieth century, because of the holy cities, and Saudi Arabian policies. The view of a nineteenth century Christian theologian would be surprising if it was completely supportive and sympathetic towards the Islamic world. As a fluent Arabic speaker, Palgrave is useful, because of the extent of his route (overland: Lebanon-Palestine-Hejaz-Nejed-Persian Gulf to Muscat) and his contacts with individual Muslims.

Similar qualities are apparent within Charles Doughty's (1843-1926) "Arabia Deserta" (174), which charts journeys between 1875-78 from Damascus into Arabia on a hajj caravan, and subsequent travels with various Bedouins. Doughty spoke good Arabic, and used various disguises, although many were suspicious or knew his true identity: "'Oho! who is here?' cries one of them with an ill-counternance, 'is it I guess some Nasrany (Christian); auh, is this one, I say, who should go with the Haj?'" (175) Doughty is idiosyncratic in his use of peculiarly ornate language, particularly when recounting dialogue, and incorporates Arabic terms without immediate explanation (although an appendix is provided). It took him ten years to write the book, regarded as a 'classic' by some travellers, notably T E Lawrence, who saw Doughty as "Arab in manner and European in mind". (176).

Doughty has a romanticised view of Bedouins, although he recounts their hardships in detail, whilst hajjis are believed to be fanatics (an opinion based partially on local proverbs). His views on Islam could probably be seen as those of the disguised 'expert' who dislikes Islam intently, rather than opinions shaped in the necessity of defending views in front of a domestic audience:

"Enormous indeed has been the event of Mohammed's religious faction. The old Semitic currencies in religion were uttered new under that bastard stamp of the (expedite, factious, and liberal) Arabian spirit, and digested to an easy sober rule of human life (a pleasant carnal congruity looking not above men's possibility). Are not Mohammed's saws today the mother belief of a tenth part of mankind? What had the world been? if the tongue had not wagged, of this fatal Ishmaelite! Even a thin-witted religion that can array an human multitude, is a main power in the history of the unjust world. Perilous every bond which can unite many of the human millions, for living and dying! ...the pleasant contagion of the Arabs' religion has spread nearly as far as the pestilence:- a battle gained and it had overflowed into Europe. The nations of Islam, of a barbarous fox-like understanding, and persuaded in their religion, that 'knowledge is only the Koran,' cannot now come upon any way that is good." **(177)**

His experiences in Arabia colour his perception of Islam as a whole - singular experiences are believed representative. Doughty conceives Bedouin religious beliefs as simplistic but devout. Doughty did not see many women pray - and assumed they were less religious under "...that male tyranny of the

Mohammedan..." (178). It seems likely that Doughty's access to the women and their thoughts was more restricted under cultural-religious considerations. Bedouins believed Doughty did not take a Muslim wife, because of fear that Islam would subsequently be propagated in Britain. Although he admires certain groups of Muslims, and their lifestyles, there is an underlying theme of contempt about Islam contrasting with a love of Arabia. This might be seen as contradictory, although Doughty was one of many who saw Bedouin society primarily as a product of an ancient pre-Islamic culture, Islam being either superficial or a dangerous adjunct to a romanticised ideal.

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Burton, Burckhardt, Palgrave, and Doughty are four examples of writers about Islamic society - who influenced subsequent generations' view of Islam, and British policies within the region. They provided new information about Islam, and supplemented other sources. The fact that Arabia was where Islam was established could suggest that reports on the region had an added credibility in providing insight into Islam as a whole - although in practice no one form of Islam or part of the Islamic world is necessarily

more representative than another. It would be a striking Western value judgement for this thesis to claim otherwise. The sources provide a useful insight into nineteenth century perceptions of Islam, and continue to be used in some quarters as representative of the Islamic world today. Many of the perceptions are ingrained in contemporary images of Islam: themes of fanaticism, simplicity, ignorance of faith, violence, and Christian superiority over Islam are common-place. Whilst contributing to the general body of knowledge about Islam, and being useful as eyewitness accounts, the prejudices of the writers' age continue to be applied in modern British views of Muslims - and therefore have repercussions on how the British Muslim communities are comprehended by other sections of the population. If knowledge is on a lineal path, and has to 'progress', these and other sources should be applied in contemporary situations with caution if they are to be of value. They can allow a re-evaluation of how Islam was seen, and as formative contacts were one conduit of information which led towards a more complete - if flawed - conception of the Islamic world in the nineteenth century. Not all sources were 'mainstream', ideas filtered through into other conceptions of Islam - and provided a basis (not necessarily sound) for future travellers in Arabia.

They were not necessarily written as texts to impart a full knowledge of Islam: but Islam is a component in the writers' interpretations of their travels. These were not academics on a field-trip as much as voyagers with a natural curiosity - if not a love - of the Islamic world, and a sense of purpose recorded with (imagined) accuracy what they saw, for the benefit of a domestic audience which sought to be entertained and informed.

CHAPTER THREE

REPERCUSSIONS OF FORMATIVE CONTACTS ON CONTEMPORARY BRITISH MUSLIM COMMUNITIES

Causes of Non-Muslim Prejudice against Islam and Muslims in Britain

Many of the impressions about Islam conveyed by formative contacts retain a currency today. The confusion of issues linking non-Islamic cultural and political factors with Islam remains a common theme in contemporary interpretations of Islam. In terms of the British communities, this confusion also manifests itself when interpreting forms of prejudice and discrimation against Muslims. Prejudice (Latin: Prejudicum - 'a preceding judgement') is not a new phenomena. It has been aimed at other ethnic and/or religious communities throughout British history, including: Roman Catholics, Jews, East Europeans, and Afro-Caribbeans, all being:

"...non-dominant groups in a population which possess(ed) and wish(ed) to preserve stable ethnic, religious or linguistic traditions or characteristics markedly different from those of the rest of the population." (1)

Prejudice can be because an individual, family, or community is Muslim - or because of

other factors (on conscious and sub-conscious levels), including:

(i) 'race': perceived differences based on skin and hair pigmentation, differentation of physical features, etc. The concept of dividing mankind into racial types is itself contentious, not necessarily based on any scientific rationale. Muslims might be discriminated against for belonging to an ethnic-group, and not necessarily identified as Muslim, simply identified as 'different' from an idealised, perceived 'norm'. They might be described as 'Black', 'Asian', 'Arab', 'Coloured', or by other terms perceived as derogatory. Goulbourne highlights the inadequacy of the term 'race', which is equated with biological deterministic theories (i.e. cranology) and fascism. The term 'ethnicity' is preferred:

"Ethnicity may be taken to refer to the awareness of groups of people and/or individuals who believe that they are bound together by one or more factors such as colour, 'race', common culture or destiny, and who are living with, or surrounded by, one or more numerically and/or culturally small group (and) feels that it must hold fast to, and cherishes, whatever it

believes marks it off from the other larger groups." (2)

(ii) <u>culture</u>: perceived differences based on factors including different customs not necessarily religiously based, including dress, social habits, family values, or diet.

(iii) <u>politics</u>: discrimination based on the affiliation or identification (perceived or otherwise) of an individual, group, or community with a cause, incident, or international issue not necessarily directly relevant to them.

(iv) <u>discrimination</u> based on stereotypical views of 'foreigners'.

(v) <u>language</u>: linguistic problems and mis-understandings.

(vi) <u>gender archetypes</u>: confusion of religious practices, customs and cultures.

(vii) manifestations of perceived superiority i.e. cultural, class, religious, or nationalistic - demonstrated through activities attacking, or excluding participation by, Muslims.

(viii) personal disputes.

(ix) jealousy: i.e. of economic success and wealth, or through competition of resources.

(x) ignorance: a fear of the 'unknown', based on hearsay and ignorance about Islam.

(xi) state legislation and discrimination: i.e. government acts preventing or limiting immigration or entry into Britain, acts preventing asylum or refugee entry, acts preventing the obtaining of citizenship, limitations of freedom of movement, legislation prejudiced towards one ethnic, cultural or religious group in favour of another; policies encouraging or legislating erosion of (Muslim-perceived) Islamic principles, or preventing fulfilment of obligations in sharī'ah.

(xii) media misinformation distorting Islamic issues, encouraging prejudice, or providing an inaccurate impression of Islam (in Britain and abroad).

(xiii) patriotism can be misplaced and applied against those people who do not 'belong' to the mainstream of culture: "...belongingness and non-

belongingness in Britain are states of group consciousness which are not easily reconciled with the formal, legal notion of citizenship." (3). Patriotism can be a manufactured concept, designed to create or maintain allegiance and 'solidarity', and often can (mis)apply history and symbols in a potent mix of indoctrination:

"'Invented tradition' is taken to mean a set of practices, normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behaviour by repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the past." (4)

(xiv) <u>education</u> (at all levels) not providing an accurate interpretation of Islam, perpetuating archetypes, and not challenging views of Islam rooted in Euro-centric or orientalistic thought - failing to provide a syllabus fully incorporating all religions and ethnicities represented in Britain.

Several of these factors are familiar from formative contacts (i.e. xi-xiv). The list is not exhaustive, and the categories can be interlinked. The factors are not 'static', but constantly evolving and changing - as are the Muslim communities in Britain.

Certain of these issues will be discusssed below. Many require further extensive research.

British Non-Muslim Opinions about Islam

The contemporary issues affecting Islam in Britain are linked to British non-Muslim opinions about aspects of Islam and the Islamic world - both as it is represented nationally and internationally. An improvement of knowledge about Islam could improve non-Muslim perceptions about Islam, increasing tolerance and understanding if it does not exist already. Identification of British Muslims with international issues concerning Muslims - even if not directly concerning religious matters - colours perceptions of Islam in Britain. Perceptions by non-Muslims of the Islamic world can evolve, and within mainstream public opinion can be linked to prevalent media images contrasting with historical images. British non-Muslim perceptions of Islam can only be discussed generally, as they vary according to a number of basic factors, including:

(i) contact types (if any) with Muslims - perhaps linked to age, workplace, place of residence, place of education, family ties, or travel to Islamic countries.

(ii) <u>education</u>: whether information has ever been imparted (and absorbed) about Islam and Muslim issues, through formal education or access to other sources.

(iii) <u>ethnicity</u>, culture, and religion (if any) of respondent.

(iv) <u>media</u> most regularly accessed.

(v) <u>political values and affiliations</u>.

(vi) <u>variation</u> between publically given opinions (which may be in keeping with - for example - peer opinion or pressure), and privately-held personal views (which may be different).

Survey on Islam in Britain

Data about Islam in Britain from non-Muslims should be approached cautiously, as it can only provide a most basic-indication of general opinions. With these points in mind, in December 1990 a MORI poll was conducted on behalf of the IQRA Trust - a Muslim educational body: a cross-section of people over the age of fifteen were interviewed throughout Britain, to provide an assessment of "the overall

level of knowledge and understanding of Islam among the general public." **(5)** **<u>(see appendix)</u>.** Its results can be incorporated into a discussion of perceptions of Islam, examining values and their perpetuation, although there are no comparative past surveys on similar issues with which data can be compared (together with surveys for other religions).

Many of the questions asked could be challenged, especially in strong differentials between "the Muslims" and "the British" expressed in the findings by MORI/IQRA (i.e. the British public does include Muslims - their setting apart from the rest of the population might be seen as problematic. To take this further, a British way of life could be seen by Muslims - inside and outside of the United Kingdom - as incorporating Muslim practices). Determination of topics including 'Knowledge of Islam' and 'Attitudes to Islam' is subjective: for example, analysis of knowledge levels suggesting an individual knew "a fair or great amount" about Islam. Does this incorporate knowledge of the Qur'an or the Islamic world? No indication is given as to who made the judgement as to whether they knew a great deal about Islam (academic, Muslim, interviewer, interviewee?). It is difficult to know exactly what is meant by these categories.

Similarly, a "very favourable" attitude to Islam might mean simply tolerance, or an actual enthusiasm (even embracing) Islam: to Muslims, a "very unfavourable" response to Islam from non-Muslims could range from patronisation to tolerance to prejudice (in its various forms) or violent action against Muslims. There is no distinguishing whether Muslims encountered were British, resident, non-resident, or foreign. A 59% majority of the quota sample of 1957 people interviewed did not know any Muslims, whilst 19% knew of Muslims (although they did not know them personally): 256 of the people surveyed had not heard of Islam. Only 11% of those surveyed had Muslim friends. 45% of those surveyed who had heard of Islam clearly recognised it as a religious faith. 44% saw it as a distinct way of life. 30% saw Islam as a cultural identity. 18% believed Islam was a racial identity (respondents could select more than one category). This response was more prevalent amongst people aged sixty-five or over, and amongst those who held an unfavourable view of Islam. The concept of Islam as a racial identity is incorrect (and dependent on definitions of race): it would have been illuminating to obtain a deeper indication of which 'racial' groups were linked specifically to Islam by the respondents. The survey suggests that 29% of the 202 people who had a

favourable attitude towards Islam gave the reason that it was a sense of respect for other people's faith that motivated this view. Another reason was "that Muslims seem nice people/(a) decent race and that they have allegiance to their faith." (The issue of defining 'race' is raised again).

25% of the 423 people with an unfavourable attitude towards Islam gave the reason of "fanaticism/blind faith"; other reasons included strictness and inflexibility in religious views - linked to religiously motivated warfare. Views of Islam also incorporated 'repression' of women, incidents in the Middle East, Far East and Iran (survey is non-specific), and linkage with Arabs and Arabic. In terms of religious activities, the image of Islam included: mosques, facing Mecca, kneeling of prayer mats, close communities, women covered up, the wearing of "turbans", and food restrictions. Certain of these images are problematic, whilst others have familiarity with themes discussed in the previous chapter. Some indicate a confusion with other ethnic/cultural or and/or religious minorities. The idea of Islam as fanatical or intolerant, for example, or inflexible and unwilling to change: many Muslims might suggest that some of these impressions were not inaccurate (depending on their particular

religious interests). Others might not care how they were portrayed or perceived, and have equally stereotypical views about non-Muslims (this might apply equally to converts views about non-Muslims). Some might be flattered by interpretations that Muslims are seen as devout, closely following religious practices, and unsusceptible to change.

The survey also provided respondents with a list of "Potential areas of Conflict with the 'British Way of life'". There are no questions regarding blasphemy to Islam, or provision of Muslim schools. Instead, the most contentious issue on the list chosen by respondents was slaughter of animals for _ḥalāl_ meat: the research findings do not suggest whether _ḥalāl_ processes were explained to respondents, or if comparisons with other methods of slaughter were provided. 48% saw _ḥalāl_ slaughter as having the greatest potential for causing conflict to the 'British way of life': this is despite _ḥalāl_ butchery occuring amongst the earliest Muslim communities in Britain, similar methods of slaughter being facilitated by _kosher_ butchers (and generally unchallenged), and clear examples of barbarous raising and slaughter of animals in non-Muslim meat production. The separation of men and women in health care was the second area of conflict (45%):

requirements of daily prayer (36%), the need for modest dress (23%), dietary prohibitions (18%) and observance of Islamic holidays (15%) are all important issues. However, they do not necessarily cause major conflicts with an idealised or hypothetical 'British Way of Life': each case is different. It might have been useful for MORI to discuss issues including: mosque building in residential areas, education, media representation, and Islam and the British legal system.

It is possible to distinguish a continuity of themes and attitudes from the formative contacts discussed earlier - despite greater sources of accurate primary information being available. Events during the twentieth century reinforced these archetypes - although these events were not generally 'formative contacts'. Many are reinforced through education, media and other sources (whose perceptions are based on archetypes, and are not separate from or free from distortion): they embrace the rest of the non-Islamic world, although there are multiple variations in interpretations of Islam. Research might be provided on a larger scale to discover more about opinions towards Britain's largest 'minority'. It is proposed to examine issues raised by this survey, together with other factors which influence Muslims in

Britain. These factors can be combined with the impressions of Islam acquired in the earlier chapter, and the features of 'orientalism' and academic study of 'the East'.

'Fundamentalism'

There is no precise word in Islam for 'Fundamentalism', which can involve traditional and counter-traditional Islamicization. Ulamā' may have a role, or be eliminated; fundamentalism is not necessarily revolutionary, and "can be another form of modernism" - humanistic or rationalist in form. Nasr suggests fundamentalism can make "use of the language and symbols of the Islamic religion while adopting some of the most negative and spiritually devastating aspects of the modern West." (6) There is frequently confusion between defining fundamentalism and 'traditional Islam', which also applies sharī'ah law, seeks spiritual and intellectual Islamic revival, and applies tradition to challenge other Islamic forms. The varied interpretations and theories about 'Islamic Fundamentalism' are further compounded when the term 'fundamentalism' is applied without definition or explanation in the media, to encompass a wide range of religious and political movements (including Islamic). It makes a number of

assumptions upon the reader - and has been applied to describe British Muslims in a derogatory fashion.

Contemporary images of Islam in Britain can be linked to the so-called 'fundamentalist' Islam - as articulated by Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran in 1979. The term was raised in the survey as being equated with fanaticism(s). Some of the formative contacts saw Muslims as 'fanatics' within their devotion, implying irrationality or fervour which within a British Christian context might be deemed 'devotion' or 'piety'. The term 'fundamentalist' seems to have a similar role to that of 'fanatic' in contemporay interpretations of Islam.

The fundamentals of Islam can vary within the Islamic world, but in the final analysis, Muslims would suggest that judgement ultimately rests with God: in the absence of divine intervention, and given that Muhammad was the Final Prophet, there is no single earthly authority within contemporary Islam which could determine the legitimacy of one Muslim's fundamental principles over another. The aspiration towards tawḥīd requires concensus amongst all Muslims, and a single legitimate (divinely inspired) leader or body with responsiblility and authority over them.

There is conflict between desire to return to roots of Islam (idealised or otherwise) and maintaining Muslim identity. This is an important issue allied with so-called 'fundamentalism' within Islam in Britain. The encouragement of modernisation in Islamic societies, especially during colonial ascendency, saw a change in values as Muslims saw Western thought and methodology as a means towards matching or reproducing colonial cultural and materialistic 'success'. This modernist approach, frequently accompanied by a compromise in the fundamental values of Islam, changed to disillusion when idealistic ambitions were not realised by many Muslims. Many Muslims perceived that the loss of religious values - coupled with adoption of 'Western systems' - caused many of the problems which they faced.

The 'politicization' of Islam is itself a complex issue: man is no longer khalīfa - vice regent of God - alone. He is a citizen of a political and economic entity, (perhaps) with rights and responsibilities which may be based on non-Islamic systems. Questions arise regarding conflicts between qānūn and Qur'ānic and Islamic ideals. Such legal values are based upon the Qur'ān and Sharī'ah: if a Westernised system is to ignore or change them, then the legitimacy of

fundamental values of Islam is also implicitly challenged. Any contemporary Islamic values might be deemed modernist, even if their roots lie in the Qur'ān.

Following 'fundamentals' with no sense of purpose and by 'going through the motions' may be worse than being a sincere 'modernist'. The term 'fundamentalism' is problematic in interpreting Islamic issues, and specifically dangerous for Britain's Muslim communities - it continues to be loosely applied without explanation. Many of the contemporary issues affecting Islam in Britain are closely linked to problems of language and terminology when interpreting and translating aspects of religion.

The contemporary perception of Islam in Britain is centred to an extent around the 'fundamentalist' Iranian Revolution in 1979. Imām Khomeini did not feel the need to justify or explain himself to the West. Violent retributions for decades of oppression, high-profile trials, the US Embassy Siege, and misunderstandings as to how a religious leader could acquire power over the American-backed Shah caused Khomeini (the personification of fundamentalism) to become a figure of confusion and fear to the British:

a 'Mad Mullah', satirised on television as a irrational, sinister, psychopathic puppet. Media-coverage of the Iranian Revolution ignored historical factors, and turned from a phenomenon of Shi'i Islam in Iran, to be representative of all fundamentalists (whatever their methods, and including Muslims that do not belong in that artificial category), to represent the entire Middle East, every Islamic nation, all Islam (Sunni and Shi'i) past, present, and future - including every Muslim in Britain. The problem is a misunderstanding of terms and ideals.

An article on a murder of a Muslim woman by her brothers for adultery was accompanied by an illustration of a Muslim wiping a dripping sword with the British flag, over the body of a woman. **(see appendix)**. The headline was "One law for the Muslims", and the article suggested that British Muslims wanted a completely separate legal system - even for acts of murder. Islam through association again suffers:

"Yet we must remember that Islam is a worldwide tree of faith, and beneath some of its branches very ugly things may shelter. Let us not fall into the trap of sentimentality disguised as admiration. There are many people in Britain who applaud, publicly or

covertly, those who cleave to the most rigid fundamentalist Muslim teaching and behaviour. Would that Christians, they say, were as assidious and serious about their own religion... The world has taken a very long time to get out of barbarism as far as it has, and it will take much longer to complete the process. That longed for day will only be postponed once more if wickedness is clothed in holiness and bloodlust is mistaken for sacramental oil." (7)

Here, a single act by Muslim individuals is used to attack Islam, and especially the violent connotations associated with it - represented in formative contacts. This secular stance is equally violent in its attack on Islam, in which the author believes that devotion is applied as a rationale for 'barbarian' violence, and that he feared Christianity would follow the same path. Many of the archetypes about Islam clearly have contemporary currency.

The Satanic Verses

The fundamentalist tag has been applied to a diverse number of issues, including the most dominant recent issue to concern Muslims in Britain: the 1988 publication of Salman Rushdie's "The Satanic Verses"

(8) was deemed blasphemous by some Muslims for its assertions regarding the Prophet Muhammad. At the level of non-Muslim popular consciousness, it drew attention through demonstrations at Bradford by Muslims, and outrage through the issue of a _fatwā_ against Rushdie by Imām Khomeini - which caused Rushdie to go into permanent hiding. The Rushdie Affair raised the profile of the Muslim communities in Britain, asserting an identity based upon Muslim values. Protracted debate has continued as to whether an author has the right to publish material which is deemed blasphemous; whether British society should support that author; the recourse the offended parties have within British Law (if any); and in what way Rushdie's offence against Islam was different from other erroneous or offensive material about Islam published or broadcast. The nature of the offence of apostasy (_riddah_) was based on a _ḥadith_ that some Muslim scholars had doubts upon. The demonstration of a diversity of Muslim opinion was often sacrificed for an association of all Muslims with the _fatwā_. Disapproval of Rushdie by Muslims did not mean that there was support for the _fatwā_.

Rushdie's multiple defences, and retractions, have been supported by many who have not comprehended the depth of feeling religious offence can cause.

Rushdie's cause was applied as a means of expressing disquiet or hatred against Islam and/or migrant centred communities, rhetoric thinly veneered as liberal intellectualism or support of freedom of expression - ignoring the attendant responsibilities such rights entail. The _fatwā_ death sentence caused consternation and confusion, and it was not understood that shariah only allows the issue of a valid _fatwā_ in _dār al-Islām_.

It is pertinent to consider that the actual book-burning was a minor event within a peaceful demonstration - but through television editing, compression of facts and information, and transmission of the selected images throughout varied media was taken out of context and proportion (9). Media (mis)representation is not exclusive to Islamic issues, although it is a prevalent theme in representation of Muslims. The distance of issues concerning Islam for many observers - such as the wars in Afghanistan, the _intifāḍa_, wars in Lebanon, and the Iran-Iraq war - was lost, because the Rushdie Affair directly concerned a significant minority of people in Britain. Rushdie was even adopted by English fascist groups, in order to antagonise Muslim communities. Some British politicians saw it as a reason why there should not have been Muslim

immigration into Britain - and associated the protest as an attack against world civilisation. It raised questions of what was meant to be British, implicitly challenging the rights of British Muslim communities; a challenge to British law in the area of blasphemy by some Muslims was seen as a challenge to all British law and interests by some panic stricken commentators. It is interesting to consider how prejudice filters down the 'chain', from government to intellectuals to thugs:

"'Me and my mates were just walking up here and there were six or seven lads walking down. As we got to them they started chanting this Rushdie stuff - "Salman Rushdie is our leader." We walked past them and they started shouting "You black so-and-sos." One of the guys pulled a knife on me... Racism was inside them. Salman Rushdie just brought it out. If they hate blacks why don't they say so rather than making excuses about Rushdie? If white guys walk past you now, your eyes are on them all the time...". (10)

The Rushdie Affair has not finished: in 1992 a paperback edition of "Satanic Verses" was published. A large number of pro- and anti-Rushdie works have been written, some attempting impartiality; others

not betraying their roots either in the defence of Rushdie, or in Islam (in various forms and perspectives). Some contain what could be described as 'orientalist' or 'occidentalist' language, or data-inaccuracies which challenge the credibility of arguments contained within them. If any 'benefits' were acquired by the British Muslim community, it is in a heightened awareness of Islam and Muslim issues in Britain; improved coverage and accuracy (in some areas) in interpretations of Islam by media and other commentators; a growth in academic material of Muslim issues of direct concern to British Muslim communities; renewed discussion on blasphemy law. Even so, the majority of Muslims would have preferred that "The Satanic Verses" had not been published - or had been withdrawn from circulation. Muslim communities need to assess their responses when attacked, and perhaps to compare them to other communities' management of blasphemous works. Damage to Britain's Asian Muslim communities was seen as how:

"...the UK offers its Muslims a formal equality but it is not yet willing to acknowledge in its institutional and legal arrangements the existence of a Muslim community which for instance can be deeply hurt and provoked to violence by forms of literature

that the majority of citizens have become used to tolerating. The question of the inter-relationship between equality and pluralism lies I believe at the heart of future British race relations and it is one on which Muslim thought will and ought to focus." (11)

This opinion might also embrace other British Muslim communities. The notion of Britain's tolerance towards minorities was challenged: any notions of support for the fatwā were attacked fiercely, even if individual Muslims had no intention of carrying out the act. British Muslim feelings are mixed: some believe the response was correct, others would wish for ignoring such a publication in the hope that attendant publicity and sales would not result (along with anti-Muslim feeling).

There was clarification both of the nature of anti-Muslim feeling, and of the support Islam might obtain from non-Muslims (some church leaders and rabbis agreed with the Muslim protests against Rushdie - if not the fatwā). It demonstrated how confusion of Islam as a 'racial' phenomena continued: how support of Muslim issues and Islam might be seen as irrational or fanatical; that despite knowledge of Islam existing, its diffusion was extremely limited

in media commentary and coverage of the Rushdie Affair. As well as illustrating deep rooted prejudice against Islam and the Muslim communities of Britain in certain quarters, "The Satanic Verses" distracted from other issues, of equal or greater importance to Muslim communities in Britain.

Some believe rules (in the context of blasphemy) were designed only for Christian British citizens, and that Muslims (and other minorities) did not have the same recourse to the British Law. This has been felt in issues of political representation and education, leading to a sense of impotence and anger amongst many levels of Islamic society in Britain, believing flexibility in the Law was essential. This was not a challenge to every hostile work about Islam or Muhammad: the offence lay in the specific contents of Rushdie's writing, its basis in Islamic texts and tenets, and the feeling that he was aware (as a Muslim and a scholar of Islam) of the nature of the offence he was causing. With all the talk of Rushdie's rights as an author, few commentators considered the rights of Muslims in Britain to peacefully express disdain or disgust. The linkage of the issue with Khomeini - who was considered irrational and insane (few considering his status as a legal authority) - only confirmed the prejudices of

critics. The *fatwā*, which some interpreted as a political tool to detract pressure from Iranian domestic problems, was enforced as much by Khomeini as by the varied media-forces which carried it around the world: in Britain, its potence was derived from fear of Islam and the 'unknown', compounded by centuries of misinterpretations. The 1992 publication of books by Norman Mailer and A N Wilson, strongly against traditional views of Jesus, will provide parallels with the Rushdie Affair - and raise again the profile of Islam in Britain.

British Muslim Communities' Representation and Leadership

Reference cannot be made here to every form of Muslim leadership, or determine how representative community leaders are (which would assume certain value-judgements). There is a need to differentiate between spiritual leadership, for example from *imāms* and *pirs*, and other community representatives on political and social platforms. The nature of local leadership, and its tendency in some areas towards application of financial 'patronage', need to be considered. Acceptance by non-Muslims of a community's leader has in the past been compounded by communication difficulties, when a limited number of

a community spoke English, or had knowledge of the appropriate channels within Britain for the access of assistance or representation. In a discussion on a Pakistani community, it was noted that:

"Most English people do not question the representatives of the urban-educated Pakistani, speaking on behalf of the majority who profess very different values and priorities." **(12)**

Challenges to leadership validity may be linked to religious and/or social background of a 'leader'. (It should be stressed that there have been disputes regarding the legitimacy of religious leadership in mosques.) The Rushdie Affair did illustrate that spokesmen emerged for Muslims, not necessarily representative of the majority within communities. The media did not always distinguish, or failed to understand, exactly how representative a Muslim point of view was - making assumptions as to the authenticity or legitimacy of a 'spokesman'. These impressions are reinforced with other 'problems':

"Why is it that the media and TV always seem to interview Muslims who cannot express themselves well enough to get their point over tactfully and accurately? How often are elderly Muslims who can

barely speak English or who have no understanding of British culture preyed upon by journalists to put Islam across as a religion of foreigners... The Media deliberately distorts Islam, presenting it to the public at large in the blackest of images..." (13)

Several attempts have been made to form national Muslim platforms in Britain, which have failed to find common ground or become accepted authorities by British government and British Muslims. There have been organisational success stories at a local level, including mosque-building activities, social welfare, and educational activities. British-born Muslims have felt alienated and distanced from some imported religious leaders who are not familiar with contemporary British issues affecting younger Muslims - in effect a generation and communication gap. The limited number of British imāms means it has been necessary to use others - often with links to home communities - but the development of British training has provided opportunities for a British-born imamate to prosper.

It is not possible here to discuss all Muslim organisations, but in terms of receiving a high profile and challenging many archetypes of Islam, the Muslim Parliament has been an important development.

Its critics say that Muslims should gain access to normal channels of power, rather than form separatist platforms - whilst others believe that leadership has been effective in preserving Islamic values. Its leader Dr Kalim Siddiqui - director of the Muslim Institute - was described, not as:

"...one of those gaunt, austere alien mullahs one sees on television preaching hatred at Friday prayers in Qom or Tehran... He (Siddiqui) delighted in the confusion his outrageous remarks have sown in the massed ranks of English liberalism and those who run the race relations industry..." (14)

The Muslim Institute has issued a Muslim Manifesto, which was interpreted as:

"... a charter to turn bits of Britain into mini-Islamic republics... Moderate Islamic leaders dismiss Siddiqui as an 'Iranian stooge' or a 'fanatic', and even the Council of Mosques in Bradford... considers him an embarrassment. But his extreme utterances have made him a favourite with TV producers and have given him a following among a section of the militant British-born Muslims." (15)

Siddiqui is considered within sections of the British media a figure of curiosity and ridicule, with sinister implicit Iranian links, influential in the issue of the Rushdie fatwa. The 'Englishness' of Siddiqui is contrasted with how 'British' values are threatened by his assertations. Coverage of Siddiqui raises the issue of leadership of the Islamic Community, Siddiqui being by no means supported by all Muslims. His success lies in the fact that he has created a platform, which functioned effectively enough to convey its views to British Muslims and the media. It is developing representation at grass-roots level, actively recruiting members from all sectors of British Islam, male and female (a higher female representation than British Parliament). As yet, it has no competition.

Siddiqui has cultivated through clever media use an image which endorses in many ways the archetypal Muslim fundamentalist. Muslims that do not consider themselves 'represented' by Siddiqui feel taken advantage of by him, and by the media, causing further alienation. Others would prefer a more moderate approach, which would not receive the attendant publicity. Such an approach could be developed either by establishing another platform, or through influencing the existing platform through

membership. The Muslim Parliament has been criticised, not only by non-Muslims, as not being a fully representative body. Its name itself is contentious to some, seen as a challenge to British 'values' and a monopoly of the term 'Parliament' (Jihad and Hizbollah were other options), although Siddiqui claimed it was a press description (applied now in all publications produced by the Institute). In terms of creating a positive image of Muslims in Britain amongst non-Muslims, or providing a representative body of thought, it might be too early to pass judgement. In several years time, it will be possible to gauge fully the role of the Muslim Parliament (if it survives) - with which it would be useful to compare the roles of other Muslim organisations.

Members of the Lower House pay a small contribution for becoming an MMP (Members of the Muslim Parliament), whilst the Upper House has members who raise a significant financial contribution. The manifesto seeks to act "... as the representative body of Muslims in Britain... (to) develop and mobilize the economic and political power of Muslims in Britain." **(16)** Its Agenda includes the withdrawal of Satanic Verses:

"To define 'no go' areas where such freedoms as those of speech will not be allowed at our expense... To secure a distinctive Muslim presence in Britain... To set up a Law Commission to find ways of deciding some issues of Muslim Personal Law according to the Sharī'ah... (to) prepare computerized lists of Muslim households and visit them as frequently as possible..." (17)

The Parliament encourages women MMPs, and links with The Muslim Women's Institute, which "...believes that Muslim women are an equal and important part of the Muslim community in Britain and must play a full role in all aspects of the community's affairs." (18) It seeks to create specialist professional groups, and to promote Islamic educational and welfare programmes.

Certain of these issues might be seen by many Muslims as intrusive, overtly authoritarian, or beyond the remit of a non-legislative body: critics might disagree with the provision of a perceived "equality" for women (depending on context, definition, and in relation to sharī'ah). Critics feel uneasy by a potentially abrasive Muslim voice (singular) 'representing' them. Demarcation or prioritising the separate areas of influence between sharī'ah and

qānūn can be a contentious issue in Islamic states - and the issue extends to Muslim communities in Britain: critics argue that the choice of living in Britain implies acceptance of law within the state - although laws are not necessarily inflexible. A sense of separation is created by the Parliament, and the Parliament suggests that British political parties have no interest in issues concerning Muslims. Although the Parliament says it cannot legislate, it hopes to exert "enormous moral authority within the Muslim community." (19)

Siddiqui cannot be surprised at the hostility the Manifesto received, from Muslims and non-Muslims. When the Parliament is more fully representative of Britain's Muslim communities, its legitimacy and influence may be greater - especially if it attracts a large middle class educated membership. Some Muslims in Britain might agree with Siddiqui stating: "Our first and most urgent task is to build the Muslim community in Britain into a goal-achieving political community with consolidated human and material resources..." (20)

The Parliament's first meeting in January 1992 led to attacks by British media on Siddiqui's assertion that British law should be defied if it contravenes with

Muslim interests. This received extensive coverage, and many general assertions regarding Muslim communities in Britain re-emerged. The Sun ran a feature: "If you don't like us, get out": "Siddiqui's hateful manifesto makes a sickening attack on the British way of life." It quoted Siddiqui's non-Muslim neighbours, who had previously had good relations with him, telling him to "Sod off back home..." It cites: "One angry Asian yesterday slammed Siddiqui as the 'Arthur Scargill of Muslims.'... And publisher Aman Crewai claimed young Asians regarded Dr Siddiqui as the Screaming Lord Sutch of Muslim politics. Grewal insisted: 'He is totally out of touch.'" The article cites Sir Nicholas Fairburn suggesting Siddiqui move to Iraq: "Go to his Muslim wonderland and see how wonderful it is. Go to Baghdad." Questions might be asked as to how veiled these comments are, and whether they constitute views regarding British Muslim communities in general.**(21)**

A second Muslim Parliament session was used to describe Siddiqui as "The Muslim firebrand and pragmatic card player." **(22)**. In an article in The Guardian, Siddiqui's apparent idealisation of Iran is featured heavily; responses to Muslim critics, such as 'moderate' Zaki Badawi of the Muslim College, were seen as "spoilers" or jealousy (Badawi opposes the

Parliament, and described Siddiqui as having a hidden agenda to establish apartheid). Siddiqui dismisses this. He describes his liberality, admiration for British (non-Muslim?) culture, suggests women's rights in Islam were superior to those of non-Muslim Britain, and criticised Amnesty International as "an instrument of Western propaganda." His opinions of other British Muslims was low:

"Muslims who came to Britain were mainly peasants seeking work in factories. A lot of doctors, too, but they aren't really thinking people; very few academics and journalists. It was the Rushdie affair that got us going." (23)

The Rushdie Affair is commented on as being seen by Siddiqui as a victory, in keeping the author "in his rabbit hole for the rest of his life." Siddiqui admits that the issue was now "a dead horse", and wants to get involved with other issues of concern to Muslims in Britain. (24)

The third Muslim Parliament session, in August 1992, called for British Muslims to assist, through provision of volunteers, Muslims in the former Yugoslavia. Siddiqui used events in Yugoslavia to warn of persecution of Muslims in Europe:

"Muslims now living in Europe would have to be very naive if they were to believe that they live among a civilised, decent and liberal people." (25)

This is seen by critics as unrealistic, another quest for publicity itself with potential dangers for British Muslims. The Muslim Parliament is embryonic, the attacks upon it vitriolic, applying many of the myths about Islam seen in formative contacts: it is perceived by critics as being irrational or dangerous, with sinister motives, and anti-Western in its form. The Parliament may encourage its critics to establish rival bodies, radicalise other Muslims, or develop into other directions (more 'moderate' or 'radical'). Clarification of its intended role in British non-Muslim society, and establishment of credibility and status, will only come in time - if it is truly going to become democratic and representive of British Islam. At the moment, it is perceived as Siddiqui's vehicle, a correlation seen as dangerous by the majority of non-Muslims. By moderating its image and backing rhetoric with positive action for British Muslims, the Parliament will attract more Muslim credibility nationally - and could encourage reassessment of Islam in Britain by detractors.

British Muslim Women

Whilst all issues concerning Islam in Britain have implications for Muslim women in Britain, there are a number of separate concerns of specific relevance to them. Chapter 2 demonstrated several formative contacts portraying Muslim women generally in a poor light: some would say that these archetypes have not improved for Britain's Muslim women. They are frequently portrayed as powerless, subservient to men, victims of polygamous and/or arranged marriages, and restricted by Islam:

"In this view, all families are extended, children respect their elders, religious faith is total and unquestioning and women are veiled creatures living in the shadows." (26)

These images are not specific, of course, to Muslim women in Britain - but can be found within Islamic and non-Islamic societies throughout the world - especially the conflict between modernist and/or feminist elements against patriarchially-dominated societies. It is not proposed here to engage in value judgments as to relative freedoms and restrictions between Muslim and non-Muslim women - especially as there are so many extreme variations

between different Muslim societies in Britain, that it is impossible to generalise. Much of what is perceived as Islamic suppression of women often has a cultural root with no connection to Islamic teachings, whilst aspects seen as suppressive by outsiders are deemed liberating by Muslim women; theological teachings that are perceived as suppressing women can be interpreted as having no basis in Islam:

"...the sources on which the Islamic tradition is based, mainly the Quran, the Hadith literature..., and Fiqh... have been themselves interpreted only by Muslim men, who have arrogated to themselves the task of defining the ontological, theological, sociological, and eschatological status of Muslim women." (27)

Muslim women in Britain might disagree with such impressions, which introduces wider issues regarding women within Islam. It would be true to say that the non-Muslim perception of Muslim women is low, and linked with cultural conflicts or confusion (especially regarding the status of 'Asian' women). Some see Islam as instrumental in creating stereotypes about women. The image many Muslim women themselves might wish to portray can be challenged by

assimilative or 'Westernising' tendencies amongst some Muslims, through close interaction with non-Muslim culture, or residues of pre-conversion culture. Some of these tendencies have included taking on _harām_ non-Islamic practices: consuming alcohol, co-habiting with partners, clandestine relationships, or having children outside of marriage. In terms of Muslims with origins in the Indian sub-continent, the creation of second or third generation communities has seen acquisition of new traditions: these include registry office weddings, growth of dowry systems, changes of dress, and the potential growth in 'mixed-marriages' if linguistic and cultural barriers are removed. (28) Practices seen by elders as 'non-traditional' might have parallels thoughout the Islamic world, not just in British Muslim societies.

Stereotypical views of restricted women can be contrasted with the occasional reverberations of portraying Muslim women as sexually alluring or wanton - perhaps most recently in Britain through media-coverage of "the Muslim strippers", which raised multiple issues within Britain's Muslim communities. It was a New Statesman cover story, under the banner "Skin sisters", presenting an 'alluring' image of two women behind a curtain (see

appendix). Some familiar themes emerged in the article, expressed by dancer Zarina Ramzan:

"'We need somebody on our side; the white press finds us exotic. We're their fantasy come true, especially for those whose relationships with Asian women have ended in heartache. The media can handle our exoticism, but not our feminism. Asian men object to us, yet they keep us in business.'" **(29)**

The article, written by a Muslim, notes that the dancer carried a copy of the Qur'ān with her. (Its use of terms such as 'white press' is itself problematic). Her statement might be an extreme and unrepresentative example of assimilative tendencies, disagreeable to a majority of Muslims in Britain, despite Ramzan's articulation of Muslim pride.

There is clearly no uniform identity for Muslims in Britain, a factor which is especially true of Muslim women, faced with the (potential) disadvantage of belonging to a minority in a nation which can express hostility towards Islam, being seen as suppressed within their own society, and as a woman encountering further prejudice. These negative images could be linked to Muslim expressions as well as portrayal within different media forms. Asserting an Islamic

identity can involve wearing _hijāb_, even if it is not part of an individual's culture. It has been challenged as being part of Islam itself:

"Muhammad, I modestly but passionately believe, would be shocked to encounter certain ludicrous and alien aspects that have come to be identified with Islam. At Sainsbury's the other day, I was outraged at the sight of a Muslim sister hardly able to load her trolley because she could not see to do it, covered as she was from head to foot in thick black fabric.

"Where did she think it said that _chadors_, face veils, masks, long coats, gloves, rings, are part of Islamic worship?" (30)

There are multiple variations in Muslim women's dress and interpretations (if any) of _hijāb_ and/or _chador_. Some individuals may fear adverse comments from wearing _hijāb_, especially in areas where there are few other women similarly dressed. Others see distinct advantages, applied to assert Muslim or cultural identity, or as a form of protection:

"When men give me lustful looks, I want to be covered. I never want to be seen only as a sexual object; it is degrading. Western dress excites and frustrates men; it is designed to excite them - why?" (31)

Critics might claim it detracts from freedom of dress, and that it is a fault of male society (including Muslim men) if they are unable to control their 'lustful looks' or passions in the presence of women: wearing hijāb might not suppress these feelings, merely divert them onto other women. Observers might also claim that the veil (in its multiple variations) is caused by the suppressive rigours of a patriarchal society. It certainly is not universal throughout dar al-Islām, nor is it directly specified within the Qur'ān. Islamic women's dress codes were not only central in many early interpretations of Islam, but have considerable currency today. Attacks on the hijāb can also be used for generalistic attacks on Islam, when it is seen as restricting "progress".

Conflicts regarding hijāb are particularly noted by some converts to Islam, who can face prejudice from within Muslim society as well as from outside. Islamic education and upbringing of children is seen

as a specific problem for converts, if they are themselves within a process of learning about Islam (a process which might never end!):

"For the British women it is an uphill struggle, first to educate herself, then pass on the knowledge successfully and convincingly to the children. In Islam, responsibility to ensure the education of the children as Muslims is as much that of the mother as it is that of the father..." (32)

Further research is required on contemporary perceptions of British Muslim women, from within communities, and through analysis of non-Muslim opinion. It would be useful to compare experiences with other 'minority' women, and within different Muslim communities. Muslim women can face oppression as women in British society, discrimination based upon their ethnic group, and suppression within communities and families. Many, however, assert their Islamic identity in a positive way to counter prejudices aimed against them: this can include demanding religious rights within mosques, political assertion through Muslim bodies, and creation of social welfare infrastructures (i.e. through the Muslim Women's Organisation). This can only challenge archetypes, and may in the future reduce

non-Muslim dependence on certain formative images of Muslim women. Identities which are particular to Muslim Britain might contribute to this, although there will always be variations, reflecting the diverse origins, centres, and principles of belief of British Muslim communities.

Europe and Islam

The increasing role of Britain within Europe has implications for British Muslims: many perceptions of Islam in Britain are common throughout Europe. In determining implications of the changing structure of Europe on Muslims in Britain, reference should be made to problems of defining 'Europe' - which is not a single entity, and can be viewed in a variety of ways and with diverse shapes and structures: geographically, linguistically, culturally, politically, historically, and/or economically. Just as there is no single, homogenous group of British Muslims, there is no single 'Europe': equally (or even more emphatically) the diversity of European Muslims (including British Muslims) means that discussions on issues affecting them are prone to massive generalisations.

Legislative changes in Europe to be discussed are those that _specifically_ affect Muslims in Britain. Muslims - like all Europeans - will be affected by more general changes in Europe. Muslims _outside_ of Europe will also be affected by changes (post-1992), and these could have implications on Muslims within Europe, especially those with close ties to countries of 'origin' and/or places of political or religious influences. Despite considerable religious and ethnic diversity between European Muslims, there are class distinctions, often betraying urban or rural origins. Migrants withstand burdens, including: not receiving state benefits; living in cheap, poor housing; operating within clandestine labour markets; living within a social hierarchy dominanted by fellow countrymen/co-religionists with a longer history of settlement. Some immigrants see lack of decent-housing as their greatest grievance, rather than the hostility of 'natives'. A lack of information, incapacity to cope with administration, bad landlords, lack of State Aid, difficulties in obtaining quality health care, and limited access to financial channels are all perceived as grievances. (33) 'Indigenous' Europeans can also share some of these problems.

Pieterese sees a border-zone developing between the EC and its Southern neighbours "...a European Mexico syndrome - a border zone where economic, political, cultural, religious and democratic differences accumulate to create a gap between worlds, a zone of confrontation." (34) Policing the borders could be an autonomous pan-European force instigated by the TREVI group (1976), independent of the EC, and beyond EP scrutiny. An MEP noted the implicit dangers of equating: "...immigration policy and free movement of people with the same level of imperative secrecy as they are saying it is necessary to have for counter-terrorist activities and counter-drug activities" (35). Muslims in Britain could increasingly be made the subjects of inquiries, by an organisation with powers greater than - and perhaps independent from - the domestic police force. The Schengen Accords (1985 & 1990) created a harmonised visa and crime prevention policy - with special regard for information exchange on new arrivals and asylum seekers (Britain is not a member yet). A centralised bureau would limit options for potential immigrants and asylum-seekers, sealing borders and restricting movement. A EP/ESC conference condemned the Schengen Accord, for its independence from EC policy, for promoting a racist approach towards immigration issues, and contradicting EC social obligations. (35)

It is important to distinguish immigration from asylum issues: in the latter, physical safety and lives can be at risk, not just economic well being. Between 1979-1989, the United Kingdom granted asylum to 12,665 people (excluding 21,260 South East Asian refugees, statistically dealt with separately): of these, at least 66% were probably Muslims (44% from Iran, 13% from Somalia, 5% from Iraq, 4% from Turkey). Refusals of asylum also increased, whilst the number of decisions reached in 1989 (9,700 compared with 3,800), was indicative of new working practices and accelerated administrative procedures (36). The British government has proposed a new Asylum Bill to stop legal-aid for asylum-seekers, creating a 'fast track' to rapidly deal with them. The recent influx of Bosnian Muslims; Kurds from Iraq, and Kuwaitis and Iraqi nationals, fleeing Saddam Hussein; Iranians escaping from post-'Revolutionary' changes; and Bangladeshis and Pakistanis seeking refuge from civil war - all are examples of the belief that Muslim groups and individuals held in finding safety in Britain. Such a reputation is tempered by the knowledge that a certain number of refugees and asylum-seekers (Muslim and non-Muslim) were refused entry.

EC Legislative changes during and after 1992 may reduce the numbers of Muslims entering Europe: as a relatively 'young' population, the European Muslim population is bound to increase in numbers, even with anticipated returns to county of origin of certain immigrants/seasonal workers/refugees. Opposition to Muslims is frequently manifested in the form of fascist groups. Attention is drawn to the two European Parliamentary Reports on Racism and Xenophobia, produced in 1986 (37) and 1991 (38), stimulated by MEPs concerned both by the increase in extreme right-wing political representations in the European Parliament, and by increasing outbreaks of violence, discrimination, fascism, and racism in various parts of Europe: these activities incorporate direct attacks against Muslims (individuals and communities) and Islam. As Europe becomes closely integrated, the increasing interchange of political ideas and ideologies will occur at all political levels. As fascists and right-wing extremists form closer links throughout Europe, so British Muslims might encourage contact with other European Muslims: through an emphasis of their mutual religious, cultural, and social interests (at the cost of ignoring traditional prejudices).

Many of the recommendations within the Report would improve the position of all minority groups, including Muslims in Britain: for example, in the improvement of education "to eliminate the seeds of racism and intolerance" (39); in the encouragement of minority cultural study; and the development of a European policy on inter-communal relations which would become part of any genuine policy for European Union. Conclusions are valid in both reports, but their influence is negligible. In the absence of an Islamic lobby, or Muslim political representation, a campaign would have uses in promoting a positive approach to Islam from the European Community. Common interests between various Muslim communities throughout Europe could be pursued through a collective forum, if differences between communities could be transcended. An improved profile - and perhaps the breaking down of barriers between Muslims and other European minorities - could strengthen the position of Muslims in Europe. Lack of an initiative towards 'dialogue' strengthens the hand of those individuals and groups seeking to oppress the position of minorities (including Muslim communities).

Muslims in Western Europe offer culturally enriching benefits, and a dedicated workforce anxious to grasp 'Western' opportunities: their presence also provides Western Europe with a chance to forge closer economic, social, and cultural links with Islamic nations - by applying the linguistic skills and specialised knowledge available. Potential changes in the structure and systems of Europe during '1992' and beyond could have significant impact on Britain's Muslims: specifically in the areas of access for themselves and their families to Europe through immigration, asylum-seekers may find it even more difficult to enter Britain. Effective limitation is required, through democratic or legal means on a collective EC basis, of right-wing manifestations of hatred towards ethnic minorities. Greater input is necessary, both from Muslims and other concerned parties, to promote a 'positive image' of European Muslims. This requires effective application of media techniques, political channels, and - on a primary level - improved education. The presence of an increasing Muslim population in Europe could strengthen the position of British Muslims, particularly if a form of representation is acquired to guarantee rights of residence,

movement, and employment for all. '1992' is a crossroads for Britain and for its Muslims.

Representation of Islam in the Media

The media has a critical role to play in disseminating images of Islam to a wide audience: just as the formative contacts cited in chapter 2 provided essential basic information about Islam to their audience, contemporary electronic media can provide and distribute an immediate portrayal of the Islamic world. Many of the archetypes that have been previously discussed emerge - Islam as violent, irrational, a challenge to the 'West', inferior to Christianity, fanatical, and/or a threat to 'civilisation'. The media is essential in the creation of perceptions of Islam in Britain, both for Muslims and non-Muslims. It is cited at all levels of society, to prove 'points' about Islam. The manifestation of stereotypes, the authoritative power of the media, and the lack of any alternative sources of information mean an incredible reliance on a form that can be innacurate, biased, or otherwise susceptible to the frailties that dogged the formative contacts in their analyses of Islam. The term 'media' in this context refers to sources including newspapers,

magazines, and television/radio programmes. The media represents and is formed by its culture, and reflects various interests.

The sheer variety of coverage on Islamic issues from diverse media sources means that only limited reference to them can be made here. It would be incorrect to determine that the entire media system in Britain is biased or one-sided: however, the proportion of material which implicitly, deliberately or inadvertently attacks Islam is higher than that presenting a more favourable portrayal. Negative images are not merely pedantic examples of simple errors, but join a growing catalogue of distortions and misrepresentations which the Muslim communites in Britain must challenge. Subjective opinions are offered, with little opportunity to reply.

It is possible to provide examples of the varied portrayal of Muslims from all areas of the British media; for this section, images representing ancient archetypes have been selected from print media - which represent Islam in a wholly or partially negative light. Cartoons have been chosen, because their impact is immediate; their images can convey a 'shorthand'

where assumptions can be made without recourse to text or other influences; they represent a common language; many of the images contain several messages; they can all reflect on British Muslim communities; they do not differentiate between specifically religious and other issues. Only brief interpretations can be provided here **(copies of the cartoons are contained in the appendix)**:

(i) 'Islam is violent'

Muslims carrying weapons, usually swords, provide a universal archetype:

- "The Sword of Islam" **(a)** shows a Muslim about to strike the India-Kashmir border with a sword - marked Islam: this dispute has many implictions which go beyond religious differences, and it is simplistic to base the crises on Islam. The impression: Muslims are violent.

- "How did your inquiry go?" **(b)** shows an Inland Revenue inspector walking away from an Arab with a sword, after being beheaded. Implication: Muslims only respond to challenges or criticism with violence.

- "Halal butcher" **(c)** shows a trader holding a sword, deciding to respond with violence to the next comparison he receives with 'the Butcher of Baghdad' - a reference to Saddam Hussein. Drinkers in the pub around the corner consider the insults amusing: a policeman listens to the enquiry with apparent bemusement. Implication: British Muslims are easy targets, and can be (inappropriately) linked with every other Muslim.

(ii) "Islam is demeaning to women and immoral"

- "One in three wives" **(d)** shows an oil-rich Sheikh in bed with twelve wives, criticising the sexual morals of Britain - not noticing that his wives have other partners in bed with them. Implication: Muslims are polygamous, have huge sexual appetites, and are hypocritical in their behaviour.

(iii) "Islam is a threat to the West/civilisation"

- "Rights of man" **(e)** - Imām Khomeini is shown throwing "The Rights of Man" onto a bonfire, alongside "The Satanic Verses".

- "Crusade" **(f)** - President Bush, in armour, confronts Saddam Hussein in a scene using the

crusades as inspiration. The use of this historical analogy recalls Christianity confronting Islam, rather than a regional conflict in which 'the allies' included Islamic nations.

(iv) Islamic values can be derided

- "Camel" (g) - Muslims perform salat before a defecating camel, with the ka'bah in the background; Muslims put wealth before religion.

- "Pigs" (h) - Security guard seems surprised that pigs object to being called Arabs. This follows previous associations in the Sun between Arabs and pigs (offensive on several counts). The Sun's record on portrayal of Muslims and other minorities has been described in detail by Searle (40).

(v) The Rushdie Affair

- "I'm sorry, Ayatollah..." (i) - Bedridden Imām Khomeini issues a fatwa against children's author Enid Blyton: his bed is surrounded by other books, presumably on his 'hitlist'. The assumption is that the fatwā was non-specific and irrational.

- "I told you..." **(j)** - two elderly people pursued by weapon welding Muslims, for reading "The Satanic Verses". Here there is confusion - the fatwā was against Rushdie, not his readers.

These examples are illustrative of some print-media: they might be seen as symbolic of British media as a whole. The appendix contains other selected images, some of them showing positive portrayal of Muslims. "I shot an arrow" **(k)** demonstrates an awareness that issues in the Muslim world can damage British Islamic communities. Yet much of the print-media continues to attack Islam - regardless of implications. Media images integrate attacks on Islam with racism: attacks on individual Muslims can be decoded to incorporate attacks on Islam. It is not the place here to make value-judgements, but in certain cases there should be awareness of potential repercussions. There is no denial in the right to portray Muslims in the media, but aspects and themes within that portrayal - such as traditional Muslim dress, minarets, and religious leaders - inevitably can be damaging through unfortunate association. Recognisable differences between Muslims and non-Muslims when applied effectively (if not deliberately) caricature Islam or Muslim issues. Integration or

belonging to society does include inevitable criticism (ask any politician); portrayal of Islamic issues in the Muslim press incorporate similar motifs.

Some of the more negative impressions of Islam might be reduced in the future - especially if a positive image of Islam is put across by the media (perhaps instigated by Muslims). Muslim media has a role to play within Islamic British communities: the number of newspapers in English and other languages is increasing. There is limited Muslim representation within broadcast-media, with tendencies for it to be bracketed generally under 'ethnic' or 'Asian' programming - which ignores special needs both of Muslims in general and specific communities in particular. When bridges are built both from the non-Muslim dominated media to Muslim communities, and vice versa, potentially problematic images might decrease.

There are examples of relatively balanced, informed coverage of Islam within the media which might counter Muslim views that the British media is completely hostile. Admittedly, these examples are rare, but they are worth commenting on: a 1989 Daily Mail series "The New Traditionalists" (41)

was positive about British Muslims, admittedly within the context of reflecting 'British' ideals:

"Devout, hard-working, disciplined, they have all the qualities that made us a great nation. There are people in Britain who are happy to work 14 hours a day. Who abhor sex before marriage. Who dedicate themselves to family life. And who are totally committed to the moral code of their ancient religion. These people embody many of the 'old fashioned' values which helped to forge this country's greatness.

"They are the New Traditionalists. The one and a half million Muslims who have made their home in Britain relatively recently, but personify much that was once 'typically British'."(42)

The article contains several interviews with notable Muslims, demonstrating that Muslims in Britain include converts, British-born Muslims, as well as people from the Indian subcontinent and "West Indies, Nigeria, Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kenya, Uganda and Malaysia." (There are some notable omissions here - such as Somalia, Sudan, and Yemen). The article explains shari'ah, ramadān, and the role of madrasas and mosques in

many Muslim lives. It demonstrates levels of integration and assimilation, concentrating on contrasts between Islamic and British values, notably in "Passion and the Models of Propriety" (43) - demonstrating differences between women who have completely "cast off religious restrictions" and those maintaining beliefs. In a special feature on children, it discusses the identity crises facing British-born Muslims: "True Brits, but they are still treated as outsiders..." states a headline. It describes how some children show greater loyalty to their 'root country' than to Britain:

"I've always felt myself to be Pakistani. Even though I was born in England, that's where my ultimate loyalty lies'... 'I'd like to be Iranian, I don't want to be British.'... 'In the end, I shall stay here, but sometimes I feel I'd like to be back in my own country.'" (44)

It is also possible to demonstrate positive impressions of Islam from Muslim writers in the British press, notably Rana Kabbani, Yasmin Alibhai-Brown, and Akbar Ahmed. In terms of broadcast media, many of the negative images discussed apply equally. There have been several films sympathetic

to Islamic issues and communities - some of which are used in this thesis, providing valuable primary information about British Muslims: these programmes are often but not exclusively by Muslims.

Broadcasters have built reputations (for and by themselves) as (relatively) independent news-gatherers and programme-makers. However well intentioned, there are occasions when they provide derogatory out-of-context images of Islam and Muslims which (inappropriately) reflect on British - and world - Islamic communities. As principal providers of the British perceptions of Islam, there should be a means by which media could be further assessed to prevent problems occurring, not through blatant censorship or more media watchdogs, but through an increase in the 'technical' advice provided by the Islamic community. Criteria applied in making such a judgement might include deep knowledge (or experience) of Islam.

'The Gulf Crisis'

Many of the archetypal non-Muslim British views of Islam re-emerged with ferocity during the period of the 'Gulf Crisis' in 1990-91. Certain issues remain unresolved: the full ramifications are as

yet unknown, and insufficient distance from the events means that only an initial discussion of its implications for British Muslim communities is possible at this stage. Islam was seen on all sides as an integral component (or even a cause) of the conflict(s). Muslims were victims on both sides - the 'West' was seen by some as interfering in Muslim issues. Islamic values were violated - according to some sources - through the presence of Western troops in dar al-Islām. There was association of British Muslims with 'the enemy', at all levels, from government internment and deportation of 'suspect' Muslims (even committed opponents of Saddam Hussein) in Britain, to violent physical attacks on mosques and Muslims. The position of British Muslims was undermined, and progress made in improving community positions and status destroyed. The damage caused was psychological and physical:

"Britain is our home, but that doesn't mean we will put up with aggression. Jihād, to me, means striving to change public opinion so that people will understand our point of view. I will not be the aggressor, but I will defend my rights." (45)

"Young Muslims are part and parcel of the British

services, yet our holy places lie in the Middle East... We condemn the invasion of Kuwait and we do not support Saddam, but we are fearful that Muslim holy places will be trampled on. We didn't have to be the first ones to jump into the lap of America. Before we sent the forces, she could have consulted...." (46)

A Yorkshire mosque was firebombed as an easy Islamic target in 1991; the government sought to reassure the nation that British Muslims' loyalty to the nation was unquestioned - and that they had the freedom of religious (and political) expression guaranteed by the constitution. The role of the media was particularly acute throughout the Gulf War, as the only source of information for the majority of people worldwide (from leadership downwards). The immediacy of images presented made distinguishing the reality extremely difficult, if not impossible, from the webs of propaganda presented on all sides (47) (48). This had detrimental effects on the portrayal of Muslims and Islam, both internationally and within Britain. "Smart" missiles took the pain out of warfare. "Target overspill" became a euphemism for inaccuracy or carelessness. Frustration was felt during Allied bombing of Baghdad, in the high

civilian fatality rates sustained in Iraq, and after the post-ceasefire destruction of retreating Iraqi forces and fleeing civilians on the Basra Road and at Mutla Ridge - reduced to an anomaly: 'collateral damage'. Subsequent deaths due to the collapse of the Iraqi infrastructure because of this damage have frequently been ignored.

British Muslims have been caught in the crossfire, with mixed views:

"'Saddam is bad. None of us approve of him,' said Mr Ahmed... 'But who armed him to the teeth? It's the West's very own pill which is being swallowed." (49)

"'If Saddam is right, God will help him' said Mr Mohammed Hani. 'If not, God will finish him.'...

"'Saddam is wrong; he took over a small country. America is right to get involved, or he will get Saudi Arabia or the United Arab Emirates.'" (50)

These views, made at the commencement of hostilities, may have altered during and after the war. They also reflect the demands of the newspapers in which they appear. The damage for

British Muslims was intense, particularly those with close connections with the Arab world (especially in Iraq). In particular, with the direct association of Iraq directly with Islam, with Saddam fighting an Islamic cause or even a jihād: for example, when Allied forces bombed Baghdad for the first time, reports on BBC TV telephoned whilst bombs fell were captioned with a photograph of the Baghdad Mosque. This image did not change in subsequent reports. This may have been a suitable landmark, or implicit symbolism of Islam, connecting **all** of Islam with the affairs of one Islamic nation - even if that was the 'enemy'. In a filmed bulletin, men were shown praying in a mosque in Baghdad, before criticising the West. This was not necessarily 'natural' footage, but provided implicit correlation between Islam and the Gulf War. It was not explained whether prayers were for Saddam Hussein, and/or part of the normal responsibilities of a Muslim. **(51)** Subsequent stock footage of Saddam included him on ḥajj at Mecca and in a mosque whilst comments were made about the war. A report regarding British Muslims was accompanied by film of a mosque and prayers. The centrality of mosques to Islam may have made such images inevitable, but nevertheless damaging.

Damage caused to British Muslims through such association - however implicit - was difficult to rectify. During, the first week of war, one newspaper headline was "Prayers answered as jets howl the hymns of war":

"At about 3.30 am the sirens started whining in the streets of Dhahran... Half an hour later came the slap of sandals on the pavement as two Arabs with headdresses flying sprinted for the Mosque door. "Allah created us, Allah will save us, 'Allahu Akbar'... Even in this land of religious fanaticism, the resident gods could have been forgiven for feeling swamped by the profusion of prayers being offered early yesterday, as jet engines began howling the hymns of war." (52)

The implications include that religion is strange, primitive, and often used only in adversity. Saudi Arabia is seen as full of 'fanaticism': normal Islamic expressions of submission and faith in Allah is seen as somehow ridiculous, equated with being a fanatic, which in idiomatic English has immediate connections with being "filled with misplaced enthusiasm." The same report mentions an American Colonel "saying prayers since we got

here." There is no talk of this being at all strange or 'fanatical'. (53)

The image of Islam in Britain is seen in microcosm in coverage of the Gulf War: there are many similarities with perceptions of Islam represented in 'formative contacts'. The difference being that now there is a resident British Muslim community, which has to contend (but cannot always counter) such representations that: Islam is irrational, a subject for curiosity, fanatical, amusing, inferior, warmongering, and 'the enemy':

"By the power of repetition these stereotyped images become realities, creating new images having controlling powers and generating political decisions... Violence in Islam is just a revolt against these stereotyped images, a rejection of the image of the self made by the other.'"(54)

CHAPTER 4

CONCLUSION

Formative contacts contributed to the (mis)representation of Islam, the Islamic World, and Muslims. Some of these early perceptions have similarities with contemporary non-Muslim views of Islam: this suggests that an increase in knowledge about Islam does not necessarily lead to a more accurate assessment of Islam or Muslims - prevalent archetypes with several hundred years' currency being difficult or impossible to erode. Whilst it is not feasible to suggest schematically a direct continuity between formative contacts and contemporary British Muslim issues - because of other factors, influences, and contacts - contemporary British Muslim issues discussed demonstrated that themes linked to distorted impressions of Islam (orientalistic thought, misunderstandings, and/or ignorance) are maintained or reintroduced. This indicates that, even if not always stated directly, anti-Muslim thought is frequently beneath the surface of any discussion about Islamic issues in Britain by non-Muslims.

Colonial attitudes towards all communities of predominantly migrant origin have not diminished,

although some migrants/migrant descendants have assimilated into society and do not receive the prejudice directed against non-whites. It is wrong to ascribe this purely as a 'black and white' racist issue: not only are the terms anachronistic and unscientific, but examples can be produced to challenge simplistic theories: for example, 'white' Jews can have an appearance relating to religious values (i.e. dress, hair) which can cause prejudice in the public arena - although without those more obvious factors, prejudice is reduced. There should be no need to assimilate - it should be a matter of choice not survival. Some ethnic groups cannot assimilate into what is perceived by predominantly white society as 'the norm' - even if they discard or keep hidden all religious and cultural values that are a part of their sense of being. The formative contacts demonstrate opinions towards Islam and Muslims based on racist values, applied to demean what was perceived as a non-Christian non-white religion. Despite the regional origins of Christianity, Jesus and God have been - and are still - seen as white by Western Europeans (not elsewhere in the Christian world). Islam was seen as a threat on the borders of European Christian 'civilisation', which had to be conquered (i.e. in Spain, Palestine) in order to protect certain value-systems (and

promote the position of leaders in that system). The expansion of Western European interests into the Islamic world meant that Islam became the threat to colonial plans and affairs. The decline of colonialism and the growth of Muslim communities within Western Europe (especially Britain) - together with the decline of the Communism and the Soviet Bloc as The Enemy - means that the old enemy has re-emerged to satisfy armament industries and politicians seeking a focus for militarism and anger: the presence of Muslim communities within Britain has led to equations of a 'Fifth Column' existing - ignoring differences between Muslims, and choosing to define them all as The Other, and The Enemy. The impresion provided in formative contacts of Islam as a threat is now articulated through state and media systems - or by racists on all sides of the political equation.

Prior to the twentieth century, many of the components incorporated in contemporary assessments of Islam were in place: interpretations of events between Britain and the Islamic World that occurred in the twentieth century generally reinforced old archetyes, whilst the presence of Muslim communities in Britain has generally not challenged these archetypes. The difference is that now there is a

substantial Muslim population in Britain, which suffers from comparison and equation with issues and incidents concerning Muslims abroad: whereas any offence towards Islam previously would have gone generally unnoticed and unchecked within Britain, with no direct ramifications for British subjects, now there are possibly two million inhabitants whose status and well-being can be directly linked to factors beyond their control abroad. Whereas, for example, a formative contact would discuss Arab Muslims in a derisory fashion without that affecting British subjects - now if Arab Muslims are portrayed unfavourably, a significant British Arab Muslim minority (perhaps with roots going back several generations) will suffer. This was demonstrated in the Gulf Crisis - which had severe implications for British Arab Muslims. (1) (2) (3)

Representation of Islam in the media, for example, has illustrated accounts of Muslims being fanatics, following an irrational religion, violent, denying women their 'rights', and/or poorly led by corrupt individuals furthering personal aims. Whilst not implying that any of these factors are true, the tendency has been not to isolate what is strictly Islam, from cultural, ethnic, political and other factors. This may be because Islam is as a way of

life, rather than 'just' a religion whose function can be compartmentalised within daily life, and because Islam can cover all aspects of living. At least, the 'Medina ideal' dar al-Islām ruled by sharī'ah and uninfluenced by external factors would be like that. However, the reality of Islam today is that societies are Islamic in varying degrees. This is true throughout the Islamic world. British Muslims are members of Islamic society, although they live in dār al-ḥarb: theoretically they also belong within the wider British society, with rights as subjects, and affected by issues in the same way as non-Muslims. If observers were able to distinguish what was Islam from other factors and influences which are Islamic, then Islam as a religion ideally might not come under such attacks that have been demonstrated in Chapter 2 and 3 - although Muslims themselves would still suffer.

A more complete non-Muslim British knowledge of Islam, promoted by the education system and the media, is perhaps an ideal: it would not necessarily be effective, because on a pessimistic level a more complete knowledge might not engender tolerance or understanding, although it could challenge some basic prejudices and ignorance. The high level of knowledge about Islam demonstrated by some writers

was not as influential as it could be. Filtered by academic and other prejudices, the knowledge might be interpreted or perhaps distorted with an orientalistic viewpoint within academic circles, or kept within an exclusive minority who had no inclination or interest in diffusing a more accurate impression of Islam.

The formative contacts demonstrate that, despite distortions, there was a basis of correct information about Islam available which has not reached the mainstream of society. There are many reasons for this, including: a desire to keep Muslims (and others) oppressed; a need for an enemy; a desire to promote 'Western' and Christian superiority; racism; failure or inability of accurate information about Islam to be circulated. This raises a key issue of education, through school systems and other sources (especially the media), where a chain of anti-Islam thought has to be broken if prejudice is going to cease. A foundation of accurate knowledge not only has to be available, but it must be instilled into people, if an improvement in perceptions of Islam is to occur. Muslim communities in Britain have a role in presenting Islam, together with their issues and beliefs, in such a way that challenges the archetypes - without compromising their faith or being seen

directly as promoting an aggressive _da'wa_ campaign. The development of _British_ Muslim communities, with identities rooted in the United Kingdom rather than in Islamic countries, will encourage this promotion. This will not solve the problem, especially as prejudice against Muslims is not always against Islam - but because of skin colour and cultural factors. There is no rapid solution to improving perceptions of Islam in Britain, but an effort to promote a favourable image using tools of education and media would be useful. Considerable effort goes into attempting to ensure that Muslim values are instilled from generation to generation, to prevent assimilation: the insularity of communities - frequently caused through fear of hostile responses when moving out of spheres of influence - would have to be challenged. This dissertation has demonstrated that British Muslim communities do not have a single platform or body which might co-ordinate such activities in an appropriate way.

It would be negative to say that there has not been any effort. Inter Faith dialogue has provided some common ground between different religious representatives in Britain - but in a predominantly secular society has a limited effect. Several text-books for school-children examined during

dissertation research indicated gross distortions and innaccuracies about Islam and Muslim values; including its immediate association only with Pakistan and India (including Urdu Islamic spellings throughout the text), sectarian issues being seen as fully representative of all Islam, no indication of diversity in the Islamic world - and perpetuation of stereotypes about 'Asians' (4). A text on Islam illustrated with a 'terrorist' and Muslims on demonstration, problematic usage of 'Allah' rather than God; failure to define Islam, and its development into a quasi-Christianity. (5)

It seems unfortunate that, when accurate information about Islam is available, greater effort is not put into explaining Muslim values to a wider audience. When they are explained, frequently they come shrouded in cultural, political, and sectarian influences. The Islam of the Prophet Muhammad is surrounded by fifteen hundred years of Islamic thought: when the presentation of Islam is not uniform, but has multiple interpretation representing sect and/or political issues - then Islam can appear confusing. Muhammad is merely another character in Islam's portrayal, joining a line of Imāms, Sheikhs, terrorist/freedom fights, and world leaders. The

continuity of Islam with Judaism and Christianity is hardly mentioned.

Prejudice against Islam has meant that Muslims in Britain have not had full access to the rights allowed as subjects, or as members of minorities. The wide issue of Muslim Education cannot fully be discussed here, but a fear of Islam and 'fundamentalist' schools generated through the ignorance of Muslim issues, has contributed to preventing creation of state-funded Muslim schools in the same way as other religions' schools (i.e. Roman Catholic, Church of England, Jewish). Active campaigning is continuing in order that state-funded Muslim schools, allowing incorporation of Islamic values within the infrastructure of a national syllabus, can be established. The Islamia Trust have made particular progress in this field (6). The option of privately funded Islamic schools (at all levels) is available only to a minority. Other Muslims may wish their children to take full advantage of the existing state-funded education-systems - which was one incentive for some Muslims coming to Britain. They feel that the lack of facilities for Muslims in many state-schools - especially in terms of religious obligations - can be compensated for in extra-curricular madrasas where

the Qur'ān and Arabic are taught. The quality of teaching within these mosque-schools is itself an issue in Muslim communities. At the moment, the right to choose schooling for Muslim children does not exist. Going to a state-school can involve having to attend Christian assemblies (with no Muslim option), being subjected to non-Muslim values (i.e. in diet, modesty, sex-education, mixing of male and female pupils), and suffering Euro-centric education which reinforces many values which subject Muslims (and others) within Britain today. The establishment of the Muslim College in London offers postgraduate education in an Islamic environment, together with Imām training - other organisations plan similar facilities. Attempts to assert perceived rights of equality by Muslims in the field of education have met with opposition which has been couched in racist and orientalistic language - both from the education-bodies and from parents of non-Muslim pupils.

In terms of social welfare, Muslims have suffered because many arrived in poor regions of Britain - where communities have developed, but the state welfare structures (especially health and accommodation provision) have remained sub-standard, unresponsive to specific needs, and unwilling to incorporate active Muslim participation within their

infrastructure: for example, from the needs of extended families, to health-care according to religious requirements or even basic provisions for healthy living). Prejudice of the state extends to denial of immigration rights to one ethnic group in favour of another, or not recognising different marriage systems - themes with currency within proposed EC legislation too. Discrimination perpetuates low status and high unemployment, creating impressions of immigrant welfare dependent people in Europe, which spirals into resentment which can be of a violent nature. (7)

In today's predominantly secular British society, profane national flags, emblems and anthems may have taken the place of the sacred symbols and rites of the past. Concessions towards 'being British' have to be made to join this group, concessions which many Muslims are unwilling to make, fearing assimilation and a loss of identity. The choice is individuality, freedom to express Islamic values fully, **and** status within a Islamic community - or the sacrifice of elements of Islamic faith, loss of culture and status, 'converse discrimination', and potential ostracism from the rest of the Islamic 'community'; secularisation does not guarantee freedom from prejudice or discrimination. The Qur'ān encourages

the following of certain local practices and laws in dār al-ḥarb, as long as this does not involve compromising the sharī'ah. Some British Muslims seek to maintain tradition, although non-Islamic concepts can be welded onto social and religious structures and functions:

"We can never compromise the basics of our faith which we are often asked to do in a back-door kind of way. The basics... are quite extensive, so effectively there is little room for manoeuvre, but whatever we can do, I'm sure we'd bend over backwards to do" (8)

Syed Mutawalli ad-Darsh, a British Imām, believes no compromises should take place:

"We as Muslim communities in Britain must preserve our Islamic identity whatever it takes to do so, otherwise there really is no justification for the presence of a Muslim community in a non-Islamic environment. One of the first questions which Muslims must ask themselves before thinking of dwelling in non-Muslim lands is whether they will be able to exercise the right to freely practice their way of life. The moment they are not allowed to do that, then there is no justification for them staying...

"To be a Muslim or not be a Muslim, that is the question. Do we start compromising or do we protect our identity? If we start compromising, then this will be the end of the presence of Muslims in this land. Whoever takes the road of compromise will then never be able to justify his presence in a non-Muslim land, as a legitimate presence." (9)

This can be compared with a government view: in 1989, the Home Office Minister of State, John Patten, wrote specifically to British Muslim communities "On Being British", encouraging: "integration or active participation in the mainstream", which he believed did:

"...not imply forgetting cultural roots or cutting adrift from long-established faith and custom. Those things can and should be preserved. But alongside them we should be ready to accept new ideas and to draw a proper balance between being ourselves and being British." (10)

Islam is seen as belonging to antiquity, rather than playing a central role in Muslim lives, an observation reflected in sources cited in Chapter 2. Patten believes observation of British laws, use of English, and knowledge of British history "..is vital

to living in and understanding the complexities of Britain today." (11) Whether such knowledge includes 'pride', considering the negative implications of Britain's presence in many Islamic nations, is a point of possible discussion. A common non-Muslim reaction to Islam is that Muslims refuse to conform to the standards of the nation, in the era of 'the classless society'. Patten discussed toleration of Islam, a term which suggests putting up with Islam, rather than going beyond a basic [grudging?] support, to one of fully assisting Muslim communities and supporting or appreciating their values. This raises issues, when values clash, of to what level criticism of Islam (or any other religion) can go before it becomes offensive.

Muslims are not the only minority in Britain, and their position, problems and strengths could be compared with other minorities and social groupings: in Britain, abroad, and throughout history. Dr Zaki Badawi sees inner strengths and reslience within British Muslim communities, and generally compares migrant origin community situations favourably with those within places of origin. He is optimistic about the future of Muslims in Britain, with a strong British Muslim identity and increasing professional classes, slowly developing the 'tricks of democracy'

to succeed in Britain through normal channels of power. (12) Badawi is unfavourable towards the Muslim Parliament, which sees the future of Islam in Britain linked to a strong representative Muslim body outside of existing structures.

The formative contacts between Britain and Islam created archetypes with contemporary implications for British Muslims. It would be naive to suggest that countering these through creation of a power base - within or outside existing structures - would either create a favourable impression of Islam or stop prejudice. There are no Muslim MPs (although there were several candidates in the 1992 election). There is no single figurehead, or established bodies with the representational influence required to be effective within British society. Illusions about an 'equal society' are shattered when Islamic issues are raised - such as the Gulf War - which demonstrate an underlying prejudice which can discourage Muslims from taking a full and active role in British society. The prejudice, of course, prevents many opportunities from opening up. Assertion of Muslim identity raises barriers and misconceptions.

The polarity between Muslims and non-Muslims can be acute in many regions, especially when linked to

ethnicity and cultural archetypes. The background and experiences of many migrant-origin Muslims in Britain has not engendered a favourable general impression of non-Muslim 'indigenous' white people - prejudice exists on both sides which needs to be overcome. Muslim converts can be rejected from the mainstream of society. Problems also exist within Muslim communities, feuds and sectarian differences preventing progress towards the ideal of Muslim unity and leading to marginalisation of Muslim issues in Britain. Accusations that a secular society cannot understand religious matters and needs are made by some critics, disregarding historical precedents when British society was more 'Christian' in its outlook, and could be equally or more intolerant and discriminatory to religious minorities ('Christian' being based on varied interpretations). The assertion of Christian identity by many of the formative contacts as a means of asserting superiority over Islam has been replaced by contemporary assertion of secular identity over the religious in Britain. It would be true to say that Muslims suffer greatly from this assertion, in the form of attacks on Islam. However, Islam is part of British society: whilst Muslims may have links of origin elsewhere, now they have British roots and identity within a society in which attempts are being

made to play a more significant role. Any loss of direct linkage with cultural, regional or sect identity may have the effect of making Islam more attractive to potential converts - although such a loss is not desirable or natural: for example, Yemeni Muslims in Britain have sustained very close links with Yemen - British Yemeni communities go back several generations.

From Robert of Ketton onwards, the formative contacts would have been surprised at the existence - let alone the size and sophistication - of Muslim communities in Britain. Many would have been intrigued that descendents of societies visited by travellers were now British subjects. Some who received hospitality and friendship in dār al-Islām would have been alarmed at the hostility expressed towards Muslims in Britain. Those who acquired and diffused knowledge about Islam would have been disturbed at the levels of ignorance expressed in contemporary non-Muslim society - whilst those of a more orientalistic disposition might have felt that their job had been well done and their legacy preserved.

British society believes itself to be advanced and tolerant towards minorities. If this is true, it

should discard the ancient archetypes, and reinterpret Islam and Muslims according to facts rather than fantasy. This does not mean discarding 'British' identity, or embracing Islam. It does mean recognising the contribution and the potential of Muslim communities within Britain - who themselves should emerge assertively on a common platform to acquire rights and status - and become more involved in <u>all</u> contemporary issues concerning British people, where an Islamic perspective would prove valuable to all society. Archetypes should be challenged on **both** sides, and structures within British Islam reassessed for effectiveness. More research is required on Islam in Britain - both within and outside of Muslim communities - especially in ensuring that more accurate perceptions of Islam as a religion and way of life are diffused. Only then will the image of Islam improve, and the role of the derogatory formative contacts become truly historical, rather than still having an important but subversive and subliminal role within contemporary issues affecting Muslims in Britain.

END NOTES

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(i) IQRA Trust - "Research on Public Attitudes to Islam Research Report Number 1" 1991

CHARTS:

1. Contact with Muslims
2. Knowledge of Islam
3. Attitude to Islam
4. Attitude to Knowledge of Islam
5. Ideas or Impressions
6. View of Islam
7. Values of Islam
8. Potential Areas of Conflict with 'British Way of Life'

(ii) New Statesman & Society - 25.10.91 cover: "Skin sisters" illustration

ILLUSTRATIVE MATERIAL CONTAINED IN APPENDIX

Cartoons discussed in Chapter 3

(a) The Independent - 29.1.90, untitled.

(b) The Sun - 21.6.88, "How did your inquiry go?" by 'Franklin'

(c) The Mail on Sunday - 5.8.90, "The next one to ask if I'm the Butcher of Baghdad gets their ears hanging up alongside the kebabs", by 'Jak'.

(d) The Daily Mail - 27.2.85, "Disgusting! - Haven't the men over here got any control over their womenfolk?", by 'Mac'.

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(f) The Observer - 6.1.91, untitled, by Grant Robinson.

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(i) Today - 16.2.89, "I'm sorry, Ayatollah, it seems Enid Blyton's already dead", by 'Gaskill'.

(j) The Daily Mail - 16.2.89, "I told you to stick to Barbara Cartland", by 'Mac'.

(k) The Independent - 24.2.89 "I shot an arrow into the air... It fell to earth I know not where." by 'Garland'

(l) The Times - 13.1.91, "One law for the Muslims"

LEXICON

Islamic Terms used in dissertation

Allāh	God (one of ninety-nine names)
arkān al-Islām	the Five Pillars of Islam
dār al-ḥarb	land of war (lit.); land of unbelievers (non-Muslims)
dār al-Islām	land of Islam (a Muslim country run according to Islamic principles)
da'wa	a claim, allegation, law suit, case (Q); missionary activity for Islam
dhimmi	the free non-Muslim subjects living in Muslim countries who, in return for paying the capital tax, enjoyed protection and safety (W)
dhikr	(invocation of) or remembrance of the name of God
dīn	the normative or perfect religion which Allah ordained for humanity, including faith, ethics, law, devotions, institutions and judgment.(F)
farḍ	compulsory prayers
fatwā	a juristic opinion given by an 'alim on any matter pertinent to Islamic law (F)
faqīh	an Islamic learned man, a lawyer or theologian who can give religious verdicts (Q) (pl fuqahā)
fiqh	jurisprudence
ḥadīth	the traditions of the Prophet, his sayings (pl. aḥādīth)

ḥalāl	lawful, permissible, legal, sacrificed with the name of Allah (Q)
ḥajj	the fifth pillar of Islam... acts performed at Makkah al Mukarramah on the ninth and tenth days of Dhū al Ḥijjah, the last month of the lunar year (F)
ḥaram	sacred, sanctuary of Mecca, of al-Medina (Q); also of Jerusalem
ḥijāb	partition or curtain, veiling or concealing (Q)
iḥrām	prohibiting. A state in which one is prohibited to practice certain deeds that are lawful at other times (Q)
imān	faith, belief
imām	religious leader (of prayers)
jihād	striving in the name of God: (i) personal 'greater' jihād (ii) 'lesser' jihād i.e. warfare, social action
ka'bah	the cube. A cube-like building built by Ibrahim and Ismail, in the centre of the great Mosque in Mecca towards which all Muslims turn their face in prayer (Q).
khalifah	deputy of God on Earth
pirs	spiritual leaders
qānūn	secular state law
Qur'ān	the book revealed to Muhammad by Divine Relelation, via the Angel Jibrail

ramaḍān	the ninth month of the Islamic calendar - the month of fasting
raka'ah	the movement of kneeling or bowing as required in prayer
riddah	apostasy
shahādah	Pillar of Islam: declaration of faith. "There is no God but God, and Muhammad is His Prophet"
sharī'ah	Islamic Law based on the Qur'ān
ṣalāh	Pillar of Islam: prayer
ṣawm	Pillar of Islam: fasting during ramaḍān
sūrah	chapter of the Qur'ān
sūrat al-fātiḥah	First Surah in Qur'ān
tawḥīd	Unity of God
ulamā'	scholars, learned men, knowledgeable men (Q)
ummah	a nation, a people, a sect usually used to describe the Muslims (Q)
zakāh	Pillar of Islam: obligatory charitable contributions

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APPENDIX

1.



2.

Knowledge of Islam



	%
A fair or great amount	7
Just a little	33
Heard but know nothing about	46
Never heard or no opinion	14

3.

Attitude to Islam



	%	
Very favourable	2	Favourable
Fairly favourable	10	
Neither	56	Neutral
No opinion	8	
Fairly unfavourable	16	Unfavourable
Very unfavourable	8	


4.
Attitude by Knowledge of Islam
Great deal
Fair amount
Just a little
Heard of/
know nothing
0
10
20
30
40
50
Respondents (%)
Very favourable
Fairly favourable
Very or Fairly Unfavourable


5.
Ideas or Impressions
Don't know / No opinion
Devout / Dedicated
Fanatics / Intolerant
Strict / Inflexible
Face Mecca
Repression of women
Middle / Far East / Iran
Mosques / Temples
Kneel on prayer mats
Close communities
Arabs / Arabic
Women covered up
Wear Turbans
Restrictions on food
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
Respondents (%)
Respondents with
Favourable attitude
Unfavourable attitude

6.

View of Islam



Respondents (%)

Respondents with

Favourable attitude

Unfavourable attitude

7.



8.

Potential Areas of Conflict with 'British Way of Life'



NEW STATESMAN
SOCIETY
25 October 1991
UK £1.50
US $3.50
IR £2.05
C $4.95

Skin sisters

Saeeda Khanum meets the Muslim strippers

Misha Glenny: tall stories in the Balkans
John Silverman: cops, hacks and drugs
Malachi O'Doherty with the Unionist gunmen

PLUS: Marjorie Thompson: can the peace movement survive peace?; Alison Fell: cities unfit for women; David Widgery on Orwell; Angela McRobbie on fifties design

(a)

(b)



"HOW DID YOUR INQUIRY GO?"

(c)



'The next one to ask if I'm the Butcher of Baghdad gets their ears hanging up alongside the kebabs'

(d)



'Disgusting !—Haven't the men over here got any control over their womenfolk ?'

(e)

(f)



"TROUBLE, NOW THE PIGS OBJECT TO BEING CALLED ARABS!"

(i)



"I'm sorry, Ayatollah, it seems Enid Blyton's already dead"

(j)

mac

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'I told you to stick to Barbara Cartland!'

(k)

"I SHOT AN ARROW INTO THE AIR ...

IT FELL TO EARTH I KNOW NOT WHERE."