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# Strategies for Securing the Unity of the Self in Augustine and Certain Modern Psychologists

by

Robert Neil Innes

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for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy  
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# Abstract

## **Strategies for Securing the Unity of the Self In Augustine and Certain Modern Psychologists - Robert Neil Innes**

My thesis explores what is involved in attaining an integrated sense of self, a question which is both interesting in its own right and which can also provide one enlightening means of comparing the disciplines of theology and psychology.

The first two chapters establish the theological method to be followed and provide an ideological context. I describe why the relationship between theology and psychology is a particularly problematic one and outline why I think some of the methods so far proposed for relating them are unsatisfactory. I suggest instead that in some respects the two disciplines may be seen as providing alternative strategies for securing the unity of the self. With the aid of Charles Taylor's philosophy of personhood, I set out what I mean by the self and what constitutes the unity of the self. I describe how the modern self has developed historically through the relation of individuals to sources of value, and I suggest that theology and some forms of psychology can be understood as offering expressions of complementary sources of such value and hence can be related to one another. I consider postmodern attacks on the unified self and conclude that our contemporary context is one which demands less strongly ordered forms of integrating the self than those which have come down to us in the Western intellectual tradition.

The next four chapters focus on the work of key representatives of the theological and psychological traditions. From the side of theology, I describe Augustine's conviction that an individual might move from a state of fragmentation to a state of wholeness through being remade in the image of the one God (chapter 3). From the psychological side, I consider Freud's methods for enabling us to move from a state of neurosis to limited self-mastery (chapter 4), and Jung's suggestion that wholeness is attained through discovery and acceptance of the natural realm lying within the psyche (chapter 5). I then review the proposals for uniting the self behind the project of self-actualisation that have been developed by the humanistic psychologists, in particular Fromm, Maslow and Rogers (chapter 6).

In conclusion (chapter 7) I suggest some ways in which Augustine's theology needs to be revised if it is to be relevant to our contemporary self-understanding, and show how the most promising strategy for unifying the self is likely to arise from a combination of an Augustinian theistic outlook with the insights of these modern psychologists.

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# Abbreviations

## **I. Augustine's Works**

The abbreviations for the titles of Augustine's works follow the internationally agreed conventions set out in Augustinus-Lexicon and are as follows:

Acad.	Against the Academics
beata u.	The Happy Life
ciu.	The City of God
conf.	Confessions
corrept.	On Rebuke and Grace
doctr. chr.	On Christian Doctrine
en. Ps.	Enarrations on the Psalms
ep.	Letters
ep. Io. tr.	Homilies on the First Epistle of John
c. ep. Pel	Against Two Letters of the Pelagians
Gn. litt.	The Literal Meaning of Genesis
gr. et pecc. or.	The grace of Christ and Original Sin
Io. eu. tr.	Homilies on the Gospel of John
c. Iul.	Against Julian
c. Iul. imp.	Unfinished Work Against Julian
lib. arb.	On the Freedom of the Will
nat. et gr.	On Nature and Grace
ord.	On Order
orig. an.	The Nature and Origin of the Soul
pecc. mer	The Merits and Remission of Sin
reg.	The Rule of St Augustine
sermo.	Sermons
s. dom. m.	Sermon on the Mount
Simpl.	To Simplician - on Various Questions
sol.	Soliloquies
spir. et litt.	The Spirit and the Letter
trin.	The Trinity



## **2. Foucault's Works**

AK	The Archaeology of Knowledge
FCR	The Foucault Reader
GE	Genealogy of Ethics
HS1	The History of Sexuality Volume 1
HS2	The History of Sexuality Volume 2
HS3	The History of Sexuality Volume 3
TS	Technologies of the Self

## **3. Freud's Works**

SE	The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works
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## **4. Jung's Works**

CW	Collected Works
MDR	Memories, Dreams, Reflections

## **Other Abbreviations**

ANCL	Ante-Nicene Christian Library
EDNT	Exegetical Dictionary of the New Testament
JTS	Journal of Theological Studies
Nic. Eth.	Nichomachean Ethics
TDNT	Theological Dictionary of the New Testament

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# 1

## Introduction: A Dialogue Between Theology and Psychology

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In this thesis I set out what I hope is a fruitful and suggestive way of conceiving the relationship between theology and psychology. My proposal is that in certain respects theology, and some forms of psychology, can be seen as alternative and to some extent complementary strategies for securing the unity of the self. Using Charles Taylor's philosophy of personhood as a framework, I argue that theological and psychological systems are alternative means of conferring a sense of psychic wholeness.

This introductory chapter has a number of aims. To begin with, I wish to explore why the relationship between theology and psychology is a particularly problematic one, to explain why I find unsatisfactory some of the ways of conceiving this relationship that have so far been proposed, and to introduce the method for relating the two disciplines that I will use in the present work. This last requires me to justify my use of Charles Taylor's work, to describe Taylor's notion of the self and to set out what, on his view, is required to integrate the self. My work focuses on St. Augustine, from the theological side and Freud, Jung and the humanistic psychologists from the side of psychology, and I want to explain here the reasons for my choice of these figures. I also want to explain something of the scope and method of the work, and to discuss whether the integration of the self is a goal that we ought to pursue.

### **1. The Problem of Relating Theology and Psychology**

There appears to be a much larger literature on the relationship between theology and psychology than between theology and any of the natural sciences, or between theology and social sciences such as economics or even sociology. For example, a bibliographic essay on the relation between just one psychologist, Carl Jung, and theology, cites 450 references which between them offer a bewildering

array of approaches and perspectives.<sup>1</sup> There seem to me to be three principal reasons why there should be so much confusion and controversy in the relation between these two disciplines.

Firstly, there is a considerable overlap in the entities which theology and psychology take as their central object of study. Strictly, theology is the study of God (from the Greek *theos*) whilst psychology is the study of the mind (from the Greek *psyche*). But, unfortunately, the matter is not quite so simple as that. Christian theologians have taken it that human beings are made in the image of God, and that image has most often been supposed to reside in the human soul. Thus it has seemed that we might learn about God most especially from knowing the human soul. For example, Augustine took it that the twin objects of interest in his theological philosophy were "God and the soul"<sup>2</sup>. Augustine's dictum is "may I know myself; may I know thee"<sup>3</sup>. In theology there is a close relationship between knowledge of the soul and knowledge of God. From the side of psychology there is a problem in that our modern English word "psyche" can mean either the "mind" in its specifically modern sense or the "soul" following the original Greek sense. Modern psychology tries to establish itself as a discipline concerned with the study of the mind. But it is never precisely clear where the limits of this discipline lie and where the narrower study of the mind shades into a broader study of the soul, or, indeed, precisely what is the difference between the mind and the soul. Thus, in practice, theology and psychology can find themselves claiming the same territory as their rightful domain.

Secondly, theology and psychology share some common therapeutic aims. Theology is concerned with issues of human salvation, and one of the senses of the Greek word *soteria* indicates human health and well-being. In all four gospels Jesus's miraculous works constitute the central part of his public ministry, and in these works we see men and women granted physical and psychological health. One important aspect of the Christian doctrine of salvation is therefore connected with the restoration of individuals to health and wholeness. Some forms of psychology, for their part, seek to provide criteria for mental well-being and to find ways in which people can be assisted in moving from states of illness to mental health. Thus both theology and psychology offer their own models for understanding growth in mental or spiritual well-being, although it is not always clear how these understandings are to be related to one another.

Thirdly, there is a major question as to what is the appropriate method to be followed in carrying out the study of psychology. By and large the twentieth century discipline of psychology has tried to model itself on the natural sciences by following empirical methods and stating its results in terms of

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<sup>1</sup>Heisig (1973).

<sup>2</sup>sol. I.ii.7.

<sup>3</sup>sol. II.i.1.

falsifiable hypotheses. It seems that more than any other of the human sciences, modern psychology has felt the need to define and defend itself as an empirical science. This means that there is a major break between the twentieth century academic discipline of psychology and the classical psychology of, say, Aristotle or Hume. It also means that many of those whom the ordinary person considers to be the most influential psychologists, people like Freud and Jung, are not really counted as academic psychologists. The split between academic and "popular" (it is hard to find a word that is not pejorative) is reflected in a division between the kinds of scientific psychology validated by university departments and the kinds of therapeutic psychology validated by professional institutions such as the Tavistock Institute or the British Association for Counselling. This is a particular problem for theology in its relation to psychology. For it is precisely those psychologists who supply us with interpretative frameworks for understanding the human condition, and who are not counted as academic, scientific psychologists, that are generally of the most interest to theologians.

## **2. Some Ways of Conceiving the Relationship Between Theology and Psychology**

The combination of different views of the nature of the psychological enterprise combined with more "conservative" or "liberal" theological viewpoints generates a range of models for relating the two disciplines. The following alternatives are not intended to be exhaustive but they are representative of some of the main positions on offer. The first is an influential "conservative" viewpoint; the remaining three are cited because of their contemporary interest, each being propounded in a recent public lecture.

### **2.1 Psychology and Theology are Concerned with Lower and Higher Levels of the Human Person**

This is the view put forward by Malcolm Jeeves, formerly professor of psychology at St Andrews university. The cover of his book Christianity and Psychology: the view both ways<sup>4</sup> states: "This is a book about what psychologists have discovered and what Christians believe." According to Jeeves psychology is concerned with the basic facts about the human mind, facts which can be experimentally validated. Christian theology on the other hand, operates at the level of metaphysical beliefs about the person. They are true at different levels and in different ways and there is no scope for conflict. Jeeves is scathing about those forms of psychology, such as Freudian psychoanalysis, which claim to operate at higher levels. The Freudian psychoanalytic model of man is, he says, "imprecise, unscientific, and largely rejected by academic psychologists" (p52). And with the word "unscientific" he has ruled out psychoanalysis from what he thinks constitutes valid psychology.

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<sup>4</sup>Jeeves (1976).

According to Jeeves, the discipline of psychology is concerned with such things as visual perception, cognition and brain function. On his reckoning, psychology simply gives us basic facts and low level models about human mental functioning. The relation of theology to this kind of psychology would then, in principle, be no different from its relation to any other natural science such as neurology or chemistry.

The problem is that we expect more of psychology than this. We do not simply want psychology to tell us about mechanisms of visual perception. We somehow feel that a psychology which only concerns itself with brain function is ducking the real issues. We expect psychology to answer some of the bigger questions about the nature of human love, about our emotions, motivations, needs and aims. It seems doubtful that a study of the human mind at *this* level could ever be adequate if conducted solely at the level of experimental analysis. We need to allow for more interpretative, empathetic and self-involving approaches. You do not, it seems, know the nature of the human mind, in quite the same way as you know the structure of benzene or the thermodynamics of heat engines. To understand a person's mind you need a degree of *insight* that no amount of data gathering or controlled experimentation can grant.

## 2.2 Theology and Psychology Articulate Rival World-Views

A second, and very different, understanding is that psychology offers a world-view and that it is a world-view which forms an alternative to Christianity. This view is put forward by Paul Vitz, professor of psychology at New York university. The cover of his book<sup>5</sup> suggests that "modern psychology is a religion, a secular cult of the self". If Vitz is right then the appropriate relation of theology to psychology is a question of the theology of religions.

Some of the psychologists we shall be studying here (Maslow and Rogers) have indeed seen their enterprise as being about the construction of a world-view. This view has also recently been taken up by Professor Emmy Van Deurzen-Smith of Regents College London in his 1994 Hartop lecture<sup>6</sup>. Van Deurzen-Smith said: "Humanistic counselling will come into its own only if it is willing to take up its role of secular and post-scientific religion." He speaks of humanistic psychology as a "total discipline" that must "rise to the challenge of overseeing the whole of human life". (p18)

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<sup>5</sup>Vitz (1994).

<sup>6</sup>Van Deurzen-Smith (1994).

But this is surely a grandiose claim. Psychology is, after all, primarily about the human mind; it is not about nature or history or politics or any number of other areas of human interest. As a world-view humanistic psychology is woefully deficient. Even when certain psychologists claim to be writing world-views, this claim cannot be taken too seriously. Theology therefore cannot relate to psychology in quite the same way as it would relate to a religion.

### 2.3 Psychology forms part of a new and definitive world-view which theology ought to embrace

Vitz is a conservative Christian, but one sometimes hears a related viewpoint put forward by liberals. Psychology may be taken to form part of a new world-view which Christian theology ought to embrace. This was the line taken by Felicity Edwards, professor of theology at Rhodes university, South Africa in a paper presented at the 1995 conference of the Society for the Study of Theology<sup>7</sup>. Edwards' paper opened with the words: "Humankind is in the process of discovering and articulating a new world-view. The emerging world-view is arising particularly from interdisciplinary work being done on the frontiers of psychology, science and spirituality." According to Edwards this new world-view involves the key discovery that at the deepest level we do not exist as separate selves but are all part of one holistic reality. In Edwards' view, theology must base itself on the new world-view which psychology is helping to shape.

But one would want to ask Edwards just how far this new world-view she claims to have uncovered is actually true. The work of the psychologists she quotes (notably the trans-personal psychologist Ken Wilber) is highly speculative, not to say mystical in nature, and is certainly not representative of any contemporary psychological consensus. Moreover, theology has its own distinctive contribution to make to our contemporary self-understanding and should not over hastily yield to the claims of other disciplines here. Theology may, perhaps, rightfully claim a certain degree of autonomy from psychology in this instance.

### 2.4 Psychology is the Handmaid of Theology

In his 1994/95 Gilpin lectures at Durham the psychiatrist Jack Dominian argued that psychology is the "handmaid" of theology. In Dr Dominian's view the contemporary relationship between theology and psychology is analogous to that between patristic theology and Greek philosophy. Psychology forms the lingua franca of our age. It gives us the authorised language by which people understand

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<sup>7</sup>Transformation of the Self unpublished paper given at the British Society for the Study of Theology March 1995, Collingwood College, Durham.

themselves. If theology is to make sense to contemporary men and women it will have to be translated into psychological terms.

There is much truth in Dominican's claim that modern psychology forms the set of concepts by which modern people understand themselves. But should it be the only or even the main set of concepts used? If theological language is translated into psychology there is a conceptual price to pay. For example, one translation that is commonly made is the equation of the theological concept of salvation with the psychological and specifically Jungian concept of wholeness. Now, as we shall see, what Jung means by wholeness is the individual learning to accept the shadow side of the personality. But the biblical notion of salvation includes an element of deliverance *from*, of being saved *from* something that is not present in Jung. The angel says to Joseph: "You shall call his name Jesus for he shall save his people from their sins."<sup>8</sup> Moreover, the biblical notion of salvation has a corporate and political dimension that we should not expect to find in the psychologists. When God saves the Israelites from the Egyptians he transfers a whole people from a situation of bondage to a situation of freedom. So we should have to say that the Jungian notion of wholeness is a rather poor translation for the theological notion of salvation. Some of the meaning is altered and other parts of the meaning are lost in the translation.

Overall, I am not convinced that modern psychology has the conceptual breadth and depth to function as the *handmaid* to theology in the way that Neo-Platonism did for Augustine or Aristotelian philosophy did for Aquinas. Psychology is, after all, psychology not philosophy. The translation of theology into psychology will inevitably produce a theology which focuses narrowly on the mental health of the individual. This is the situation in which much contemporary pastoral theology finds itself. However, theology in general is properly concerned in the first instance not with individual mental health but with God. And modern psychology will have things to say about mental health that theology knows nothing about. Theology and modern psychology are distinct disciplines and the one cannot function as a straightforward secular translation of the other.

### **3. Theology and Psychology as Supplying Strategies for Securing the Unity of the Self**

All the above four methods of relating theology to psychology have been advanced with seriousness, but none of them is fully adequate. Part of the problem seems to be that our notion of psychology is either pitched too low or too high. Either psychology is conceived simply as a low level empirical

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<sup>8</sup>Matth 1:21.



science working on specific and technical problems of the human mind, or else it is conceived as an all-embracing world-view, a theory of everything.

But actually it seems to me that psychology, at least in its most interesting forms, is neither of these. What the most culturally influential psychologists give us, people like Freud, Jung and Maslow, are suggestive interpretations of the human condition. As Paul Ricoeur has argued in respect of Freud<sup>9</sup>, they give us a language by which we can understand ourselves. For example, after Freud we quite routinely think of ourselves as having an unconscious, and we quite readily explain someone's behaviour in terms of repression. After Jung we think of people as having a shadow side to their personality. After the humanistic psychologists we think in terms of the need to realise our own unique potential. These psychologists open up new ways in which we can conceive ourselves and make sense of our lives.

If certain influential forms of psychology operate at the level of providing us with convincing and suggestive self-interpretations then we can ask what might be the therapeutic benefits of such psychological descriptions. I suggest that one way in which a psychology might be effective is in generating an integrated sense of self, or, at least, in providing resources for increasing the possibilities of a sense of psychic wholeness. Indeed, this might be a way of drawing together in conversation various theological as well as psychological interpretations of the human person. We can ask of those self-descriptions that call themselves theological, as well as those that are psychological, what resources and strategies they offer for integrating the self.

The notion of psychic integration or wholeness has become a prominent one in recent years. Increasing numbers of people seem to be endeavouring to find ways in which they may develop a sense of being at peace with themselves. The issue of what psychological wholeness comprises and how it is to be achieved is therefore an important and interesting one in its own right. Moreover, as I indicated above, both theology and psychology have, as one of their major concerns, the exploration of questions of human mental health and well-being. A comparison of theology and psychology in terms of their ability to integrate the self should therefore prove natural and unforced. This comparison, inasmuch as it brings together the different emphases and insights of the two disciplines, should prove fruitful and enlightening, as well as being directly relevant to our contemporary context.

Whilst the aim is to establish a dialogue between theology and psychology it must be recognised that we are not dealing with completely discrete disciplines. Theological and psychological understandings

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<sup>9</sup>Ricoeur (1970).

of the human condition have mutually informed one another. Neither does either discipline articulate a single, authorised interpretation. Both theology and psychology are pluralistic enterprises which sustain a wide range of alternative and sometimes competing viewpoints and perspectives. If a dialogue between the two disciplines is to be established we will therefore, in practice, have to choose a figure or figures to represent each side. However, such choices need be far from arbitrary.

From the side of theology, St Augustine stands, as I shall demonstrate in chapter 2, in a unique position so far as our present purposes are concerned. His writing has to a large extent generated the sense of "inwardness" that is characteristic of our Western identity and which forms the precondition for modern psychological explorations of the self. In this sense, Augustine stands at the head of a whole cultural tradition. His ideas have, for better or worse, affected our consciousness of ourselves more than any other single theologian. He thus constitutes an obvious dialogue partner.

From the side of modern psychology, it seems necessary to put to one side those psychologists, such as behaviourists and cognitivists, whose interests are largely confined to giving narrowly scientific explanations of the workings of the mind, and to focus instead on those who are concerned with more general questions of human flourishing. Of the latter, and notwithstanding the great importance we must assign to Freud, no one figure has the pre-eminence that Augustine has in the theological realm. On the other hand, for my work to be kept within a reasonable scope, some limit must be set to the number of modern psychologists to be considered. In this light, it seems there are three streams of psychology that really ought to be reviewed: those due to Freud, Jung and the humanistic psychologists. Each of these brings a distinctive contribution to the question of integrating the self. Moreover, all three have deeply influenced the way we think about ourselves. Other recent psychological schools, such as British object-relations theory (Winnicott, Guntrip and Fairbairn) and American ego-psychology (Kohut, Hartmann and Rapaport) have generated ideas of theoretical significance, but they have not, I think, percolated into our culture and shaped our sense of self to the same extent as these three.

If Augustine and these three streams of modern psychology are to be compared in terms of their ability to unify the self, we shall need at the outset a clear understanding of what is meant by the "self" and to what the unity of this self amounts. It is to this major question that I now turn.

## **4. Contextualising the Comparison Between the Disciplines**

### **4.1 The Notion of the Self**

The notion of the "self" is related to a considerable degree to particular cultural and philosophical traditions<sup>10</sup>. To take one (albeit extreme) example, the Buddhist religion considers the idea of the self to be an illusion. The Buddhist teaching of not-self (*annata*) is that any belief in an individual "self" over and above the five heaps (*skandhas*) of which the stuff of human beings consists is illusory.<sup>11</sup> The imaginary belief in self is believed to produce harmful thoughts of "me" and "mine" that lead to the desire which is itself the root cause of all suffering. By contrast with Buddhism, ours is a culture in which "care for the self", in one form or another, has been a dominant concern from the time of the ancient Greeks onwards<sup>12</sup>. Indeed, in our own century the flourishing of academic and popular psychologies reflects an unprecedented interest in the development of the self.

Here I am less concerned with cross-cultural or universal notions of selfhood, than with the idea of the self as it appears in our "Western" culture, a culture that has been broadly formed out of a synthesis of Greek classical philosophy and Christianity. The theology and the three streams of psychology that I consider have arisen out of this particular culture. This "Western" culture supplies the underlying context for the notion of the self which is shared by Augustine and the psychologists and which enables a conversation between them to take place. This is true irrespective of the extent to which a great many of those who live in the "West", such as minority ethnic groups, the poor and, in certain respects, women, feel themselves marginalised from such a culture and self-understanding. In view of the kind of dialogue I am trying to establish my focus in this thesis must therefore be on the dominant Western tradition of thinking about the self.

When we say "she is only a shadow of her former self" or "I am not feeling myself today" we seem to be operating with some definite knowable picture of the self. But how is this body of knowledge to be characterised?

One approach, we may call it the *belief-based* approach, is to explore how far the notion of the self arises out of structures of belief generated through the conditions of human life in society. This line was taken by the French sociologists Durkheim and Mauss. Mauss thought that the notion of the self

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<sup>10</sup>See, e.g. Geertz (1979) p229ff.

<sup>11</sup>So Collins (1982); Conze (1951); Snelling (1987) and against Humphries (1951 p21ff).

<sup>12</sup>See, for example, Foucault's *History of Sexuality 3: The Care of the Self Part II* for a description of the widespread ideas of self-care in ancient Greece and Rome. Foucault's account needs to be qualified by Snell's argument that the notion of the *psyche* as "soul" (and hence the self as an object of concern) was not present in Homer, but was the product of pre-Socratic Greek reflection, being articulated for the first time, he thinks, by Heraclitus (1960 p17).

is tied to a structure of beliefs that arise in different societies according to their systems of "law, religion, customs, social structures and mentality"<sup>13</sup>. He thought that our own, seemingly self-evident, notions of selfhood are the product of a long social history which he traces from primitive tribal notions, through legal notions of selfhood in ancient Rome and metaphysical valuations of the self in Christianity to the "psychological" self of our century. Mauss thought that the contemporary self is one that is identified with self-knowledge and psychological consciousness, and that this self is a quite specific product of certain seventeenth and eighteenth century religious, political and philosophical movements. Mauss assigned particular importance for this development to pietistic Protestant groups who posed questions regarding such matters as individual liberty, the individual conscience and the right to communicate directly with God. From these groups it was but a short step to our contemporary notions of the fundamental value of personal consciousness.

A second approach, and the one taken by P. F. Strawson and especially Charles Taylor, is to argue that selfhood is constituted by a particular structure of sentiments that arise in the interactions of human society. We may call this an *attitude-based* approach. Whereas the belief-based approach focuses on the beliefs about the self that are generated by social institutions, an attitude-based approach focuses on the moral attitudes that arise in our human acting, one with another. Thus Strawson suggests that human selfhood arises out of a structure of sentiments, such as gratitude, resentment, forgiveness and love, that are manifested in normal inter-personal relationships.<sup>14</sup> Taylor takes the particular line that our sense of selfhood is defined by our attitude to entities, either personal or supra-personal, that have moral value for us. Taylor develops his account from an analysis of human agency which I shall now briefly explain.

Taylor argues<sup>15</sup> that what distinguishes real agents from artefacts is that the former but not the latter can be described as beings-capable-of-acting-according to purposes that are intrinsic to themselves. Thus one may enquire of a person as to whether he or she is turning the heating in their house down in order to benefit the environment or in order to save money. But one could not sensibly ask this question of the heating system itself, or at least could only find out the answer by reference to a design document and not exclusively by reference to the artefact itself. Taylor describes agents to whom one can attribute intrinsic purposes as beings for whom things can have "significance". Taylor suggests that what is distinctive about real agents as compared to artefacts is not so much that the former are conscious beings, as that they can represent to themselves different choices and possibilities which they regard as more or less valuable.

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<sup>13</sup>Ed. Carrithers et. al. (1985) p3.

<sup>14</sup>Strawson (1968) p74f.

<sup>15</sup>Ref. ed. Carrithers et. al. (1985) Ch. 12 and Taylor (1989) Part I.

Taylor contends that what distinguishes human beings from animals is that the contents of human consciousness affect and are affected by things that have *moral* significance for us. We might consider as an example the experience of shame. To be ashamed means to be conscious of what is shameful to one. Yet what is shameful is itself a function of standards set by self-aware subjects. The experience of shame is thus bound to participation in a human community in which certain things are held to be of moral significance. It would not be possible for an animal, who is not a member of such a linguistic community, to feel shame in this way. The same can be said for a host of other emotions such as pride, dignity and guilt. The move from sub-personal to personal agency is therefore not simply a matter of a greater degree of consciousness as expressed in the ability to form a wider range of representations of the world. It is rather the acquisition of a range of moral significances which are essentially those of self-aware agents. Human beings are "agents-plus" in that their actions take place in a context of significances that do not apply to non-human agents. Taylor describes human beings as "selves" inasmuch as we are beings of the requisite depth and complexity to have a moral orientation of this kind.<sup>16</sup>

Taylor's strongest claim - that selfhood is a function of one's orientation to morally significant goods - is vulnerable to anthropological criticism. Certainly, it seems difficult to specify a universal set of moral attitudes that characterise the self. For example, A.W.H. Adkins has shown that the concept of personal moral responsibility, which seems so foundational to our own ethical thinking, among the ancient Greeks "undeniably held a minor position"<sup>17</sup>; for them, shame was a much more significant motivational source. It seems difficult for us to conceive of a people whom we would recognise as human which did not have some kind of basic moral orientation but, at the limits, the nature of this ethical dimension to selfhood might be very difficult for us to recognise and define.<sup>18</sup> I am, in any case, not particularly concerned here with an anthropological defence of this most general form of Taylor's thesis, but I do wish to use his notion of the self in the less general sense of a theory of the development of our modern Western identity. Here Taylor's thesis does a very good job indeed. It is justified *historically* in the later parts (II to V) of his monumental Sources of the Self. By providing an adequate historical account of the modern sense of self, and by locating alternative conceptions of selfhood within this account, Taylor succeeds to a high degree in vindicating his own "significance-based" ontology of selfhood against its rivals. This history is on a much broader scale than, for example, the belief-based account given by Mauss.

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<sup>16</sup>Taylor (1989) p33.

<sup>17</sup>Adkins (1960) p1.

<sup>18</sup>Cf. Marlow's inability in Conrad's Heart of Darkness to comprehend the ethical nature of the natives he encounters.

Of course our attitudes to sources of significance and our position relative to a range of socio-economic institutions mutually condition one another. In this respect, Taylor and Mauss each tell complementary parts of the story. However, the four systems of thought I consider all give a degree of priority to the psychological over the social pole of our identity and, to this extent, Taylor provides a better framework for my discussion than Mauss. This is without prejudice to the issue of how far Taylor's source of significance are themselves socially determined. Moreover, it is a further question as to how this thesis could be enriched by consideration of the social dimension of the construction of our identity, for example, by reviewing the social thought of Augustine's City of God as a counterweight to the psychological thought of his Confessions.

#### 4.2 The Western "Inward" Self

One of the most salient features of our modern Western sense of self, and one that lies behind the great contemporary interest in psychology, is that of "inwardness". We have the sense that mental states and feelings are located "within" us and that the objects these bear on are located "outside" us. We perceive ourselves as having inner depths. We talk of the possibility of expressing our inner selves. We commonly say that we have inner potentials and capacities that need to be developed. We may understand our conscious self to be merely the tip of an iceberg that conceals a vast personal or even cosmic unconscious. We readily distinguish between our "persona", or what people see of us on the outside, and our "real self" that lies hidden and protected on the inside.

These features are so much a part of our identity that we find it hard to imagine that they might not be intrinsic to human nature *per se*. However, cross-cultural research indicates that we have here to do with a sense of inwardness that is particular to our own Western tradition. J.S. La Fontaine tells us<sup>19</sup> that the Taita tribe of Kenya attribute various emotions to different parts of the body. Moreover, she notes that the Gahuku-Gama tribe of New Guinea attribute particular significance to the skin, the *surface* of the individual. Moral evaluations may be expressed with reference to the skin, so that a person can be described as having a good or a bad skin. Closer to our own culture, in the psalms, one of our major sources of ancient Hebrew anthropology, the person is concretely identified with his or her flesh; the self is not "inside" the body but *is* the body. Various elements of what we would recognise as selfhood are then localised in particular parts of the body, so that the spirit is placed in the throat and the heart is identified as the site of planning and thinking.<sup>20</sup>

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<sup>19</sup>Ed. Carrithers et. al. (1985) p123ff.

<sup>20</sup>Ref. Kraus (1986) pp143-150.

Of course there is a certain sense of the distinction inner/outer woven into many different cultures besides our own. The sense that what I hold back from speaking somehow remains inner and that what I speak into the public domain is outer is a rather general feature of human experience. Thus Clifford Geertz reports on a Javan distinction between the realm of "*batin*", or subjective feeling, and "*lair*" or external action and speech.<sup>21</sup> But this does not seem to be connected to individuality in the Western sense nor does it bear on the soul/body distinction to which we are accustomed. "*Batin*" refers to the common characteristics of the emotional life of human beings in general not to the particularity of an individual soul. Or again, if we take Islam, a near relative of our Western tradition, there are discussions of the relation of the inner state of faith (*iman*) to the outer expression of submission (*islam*)<sup>22</sup>. However, the huge development of the modern Western sense of inwardness is the product of a particular tradition of thought that I shall be outlining in chapter 2, and which finds its main source in the writings of St Augustine.

### 4.3 Integrating the Self

On a significance-based account of selfhood, the possibility of developing an integrated or unified sense of self involves unifying our sources of moral significance. This possibility was initiated in a decisive way by Plato. Against a Homeric ethic of valour and glory, Plato propounded an ethic in which the individual unites his or her powers in the pursuit of the Good. For the Homeric hero different thoughts and feelings were quite naturally associated with the beating heart or the panting lungs and not necessarily with the rational mind. For the hero, the higher moral condition involves being filled with a surge of energy that grants victory on the battlefield. The Homeric *psuche* denotes something like a life-force; there are no strict Homeric equivalents to our "mind" or "soul". Plato's ideal, on the other hand, privileges a state of self-recollection in which all the individual's powers are united under the rational contemplation of the Good. This involves bringing all the powers of thinking and feeling together in the single locus of the mind (*psuche*).

Since the Good is apprehended by the intellect, the Platonic ideal involves subjugating the passions to the control of reason. Thus Plato describes the state of the properly unified self as follows:

"The just man will not allow the three elements which make up his inward self [reason, spirit and appetite] to trespass on each other's functions or interfere with each other, but, by keeping all three in tune, like the notes of a scale (high, middle and low, and any others there be), will in the truest sense set his house to rights, attain self-mastery and order, and live on good terms with

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<sup>21</sup>Geertz (1979) p230f.

<sup>22</sup>Ref. Waines (1995) Ch. 4.

himself. When he has bound these elements into a disciplined and harmonious whole, and so become fully one instead of many, he will be fully ready for action of any kind, whether it concerns his personal or financial welfare, whether it is political or private; and he will reckon and call any of these actions just and honourable as it contributes to and helps maintain this disposition of mind, and will call the knowledge which controls such action wisdom."<sup>23</sup>

It follows that the health of the mind consists in proper relations of control and subordination among its constituent parts. By contrast, Plato describes the condition where the passions are not under the control of reason as one of "civil war".<sup>24</sup> Plato initiates the dominant Western moral tradition. This is a tradition in which the possibility of unifying the self seems to be linked with achieving rational self-mastery.

Taylor argues<sup>25</sup> that, historically, people have derived their sense of self from some good, such as the Platonic Good or the Augustinian God, which transcends all others in significance, and that they have become whole persons to the extent that they are truly orientated towards this supreme source of value or "hypergood". A hypergood not only provides people with a sense of what is right, as other things are ordered in accordance with it, but love of this good also provides a powerful motivation to people to act in accordance with this sense: in Taylor's terms it acts as a "moral source", or what I shall usually refer to as a "source of significance".

Taylor argues that the source of significance which has had the most enduring influence on the Western sense of self is the Christian God, as articulated in Western, Augustinian theology. But Taylor demonstrates that, in addition to the traditional, theistic source of significance, modernity has opened up two new frontiers of moral exploration: firstly the dignity of the rational agent and secondly the realm of nature. He suggests that both these sources are derived from Christian theism but have subsequently developed independently and indeed are now frequently taken to oppose theism. This need not be the case, he suggests. Rather we should conceive of the three groups of sources (theism, the rational agent and nature) as representing three axes of moral space so that progress in accordance with one source complements rather than opposes progress in the direction of one of the others. Moreover, progress in one direction may cause us to revise our understanding of one of the other sources of significance, as for example the green movement has influenced Christian theology, so that moral progress takes a spiral form. On Taylor's account, developing an integrated

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<sup>23</sup>Republic 443.

<sup>24</sup>Republic 444.

<sup>25</sup>Taylor (1989) pp62-75.



sense of selfhood involves orientating oneself to some combination of these three groups of sources of significance.

One of the main objectives of my second chapter is to show, in outline, how the modern sense of self can be shown to be formed as the historical outworking of our interaction with these three groups of sources of significance. This chapter offers a justification of the validity of the concept of the self and its "sources" that I am working with. I hope to show in the unfolding of this account that certain modern psychologists can be located at the end of the story as offering contemporary articulations of one or other of the moral sources of rational agency and the realm of nature. By demonstrating that the psychologies may be considered as articulations of Taylor's "sources of significance" I am able to place them in conversation with the Augustinian theistic moral source. The ideological history I give in chapter two is thus an essential pre-requisite of the kind of dialogue I wish to establish.

### **5. Questions of Scope and Method**

I have chosen to bring into conversation an ancient theologian (St. Augustine, Ch. 3) and some modern psychologists (Chs. 4-6), and this decision needs some explanation. For example, would it not have avoided all kinds of possible anachronisms if I had selected a modern theologian rather than a Church Father?

My over-riding concern has been to choose figures whose ideas have permeated deeply into our culture and hence had a major influence in shaping our contemporary sense of self. As I have indicated, Augustine casts his shadow over a whole cultural tradition. It is therefore not surprising that when modern psychologists wish to take issue with theology they more typically engage (directly or indirectly) with Augustine than with some modern theologian. It is inconceivable that any contemporary theologian could achieve the degree of cultural influence that Augustine has done. The psychologists I have chosen to discuss are likewise those whom I consider to have been the most influential in cultural terms, namely Sigmund Freud (chapter 4), Carl Jung (chapter 5) and the humanistic psychologists (chapter 6).

In his Sources of the Self Taylor chooses artists, novelists and poets as those whom he sees as articulating the sources of significance in our contemporary culture. This is fair up to a point, but it may be objected that appreciation of contemporary art and literature is restricted to a rather small minority of our society. The influence of the psychologists is, I think, much wider, pervading not just "high culture" but popular newspapers, chat shows and counselling agencies of all kinds. It is the agony aunt with her psychological wisdom, at least as much as the poet, to whom people turn for

resources to make them whole. A dialogue between Augustine and the most influential modern psychologists can, I think, articulate some of the most important ideas in the contemporary moral ethos out of which (on a significance-based account) the contemporary self is formed.

Particularly in the case of Freud and Jung there is a vast secondary literature.<sup>26</sup> Precisely because of their cultural importance, these psychologists have generated a huge array of interpreters whose own views have fallen into rival schools of thought<sup>27</sup>. This has frequently led to considerable confusion as to what the psychologists themselves actually said. One of my aims, therefore, is to return to the primary sources to try to establish for myself the intentions of the founding psychologists. Likewise my purpose is not so much to engage with those Christian theologians who have drawn out the pastoral and spiritual implications of the psychologists' work, as to see what the psychologists themselves had to say about the specific question of the unity of the self. I should add that the thesis is concerned with the psychologies as theoretical systems, and I do not analyse any experimental or clinical evidence here.

I make the major assumption that psychologies and conceptions of selfhood across varying ages and outlooks are in principle commensurable. I assume, for example, that we can discern a recognisable "self" that can be used as a basis for dialogue between Augustine and the modern psychologists, and that there is a recognisable sense of inwardness whose development can be traced across centuries of thought. Some postmodernists would argue that systems of discourse are actually far more fragmented than I have allowed<sup>28</sup>. They would say that history is not continuous in the way I assume and that there are insurmountable barriers between ancient and modern ways of speaking about the self. They might further suggest that rational debate even between modern psychological communities with different commitments is problematic. If such postmodernists are right, then we have to deal with a multiplicity of psychological "sects", whether of a religious or psychoanalytic character, who can only tell persuasive stories to each other but cannot engage in meaningful dialogue. I have to admit that the contemporary, highly fragmented, psychological landscape does make this look a real possibility. On the other hand, if my assumption is correct then the language used by each tradition can, albeit with great care, be translated and understood by a different tradition<sup>29</sup>. We are then in the more promising situation of dealing with strategies for integrating the self that can be tested by those not already

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<sup>26</sup>See, for example, the bibliographic essays by Gay on Freud (1988, pp741-779) and by Heisig (1973) on Jung.

<sup>27</sup>The Jungian analyst Andrew Samuels comments: "Unlike the Freudians, post-Jungians have not yet formed *officially* recognised schools, although the process has certainly taken place informally" (Samuels 1985 p6).

<sup>28</sup>E.g. see Foucault AK (1972).

<sup>29</sup>So MacIntyre (1988) Ch. 19 "Tradition and Translation".

committed to them. Perhaps my thesis could be taken as a wager that some kind of public truth can still be salvaged from a battleground fought over by interest groups deeply committed to their own ways of speaking about the self.

In proposing that theologies and psychologies can be seen as articulating sources of significance, I am suggesting that they provide resources which help us to make sense of our thinking, feeling and acting. They confer value on us. The notion of a source of value is not the same as that of a moral code. We are less concerned here with prescriptions for behaviour than with something by means of which our lives become charged with significance. A strong source of significance is something sufficiently attractive that the different parts of our selves are drawn together and united in the pursuit of it. What I am endeavouring to do is to establish whether, for us today, any one of the sources of significance I consider is sufficient to generate an integrated self or, failing this, whether a sense of wholeness might be achieved by some combination of the different sources.

In my expositions of Augustine and the modern psychologists I endeavour to discern what it is that grants each of these systems their power for us. It seems to me that the source of this power varies considerably between the figures I consider. In the case of Augustine and Freud we are dealing with thinkers who, in their different ways, explore the workings of the mind with a high degree of analytic skill and intellectual rigour. Here it is possible to be quite precise about the means and strategies by which the authors suppose that the self is to gain a higher degree of unity. Both these figures have a high regard for the power of intellectual argument, and my exposition of both these can therefore, I trust, be correspondingly tightly argued. Jung's style, by contrast, is more mystical; his power seems to lie in the fascination we may find in the mythical world of the unconscious that he describes for us. My discussion of Jung therefore seemed to require a more general evaluation of the "feel" of this world. The humanistic psychologists are a different case again. The theoretical strength of their systems seems rather weak, yet their culture influence is very large. Here, more than with the other authors, I have found it necessary to review some of the sociological reasons why their ideas have taken hold in Western culture.

For each author, I attempt to elucidate what is meant by the self. In Augustine's case, this involves relating his Latin terms to our English words; for Freud it means discussing the relation of the ego to the self; whilst in Jung's case I have examined his quite particular understanding of the self as an archetype of the unconscious. I consider how each author proposes the self is to be united. This involves unpacking their technical vocabulary and giving some explanation of their overall psychological systems. Since my notion of the integrated self involves reference to sources of

significance, I am particularly concerned to discern the vision of the human goal found in each author's work. Each author gives us some kind of moral vision or ethos which needs to be elucidated.

In evaluating Augustine and the psychologists I shall be concerned with their ability to integrate the self, and in my concluding chapter I shall suggest some criteria by which this ability can be measured. These are what might be called "applied" criteria, that is, criteria associated with therapeutic effectiveness. Each of the figures I consider could also be evaluated according to "pure" criteria associated with his own discipline. Thus in the case of Augustine one can discuss his consonance with scripture and tradition, and I shall on occasion do this. In the case of the psychologists one could apply pure psychological criteria such as consonance with clinical and experimental data, or the fruitfulness of theories for further research. In general I avoid comments in these areas since they go beyond my field of competence as a theologian. However, where a psychologist makes claims of a theological nature, and this applies especially in the case of Jung, then I have felt able to offer some comment.

## **6. Ought we to pursue the Unity of the Self?**

I have suggested that theologies and psychologies can be evaluated in terms of their ability to supply resources for unifying the self. However, I have so far avoided the question, which I must now address, as to the nature of the integration of the self as a goal for living. Is it a goal we should pursue? If it is, how does it relate to other human goals, such as the pursuit of moral excellence?

The most radical answer to these kinds of questions comes from some of the postmodernists whom we shall meet in chapter two. They argue that the very notion of the self as an object of psychological and moral reflection works to enslave us to powerful and anonymous strategies of control operating in society. They suggest that the elemental forces of desire within the person form a creative principle of resistance to societal control. In their view the centred self must be deconstructed if these forces are to be released. For them life would at least be more pleasurable (if not happier) in the absence of the ordering of our desires which seems to be implied by the notion of a unified self. Therefore the therapy they prescribe does not serve to build up the self but to break it down.

Postmodernism forms an important part of our contemporary cultural context. However, as I hope to show, in its most extreme forms it is self-defeating. It is best taken as a protest against a tradition which, from Plato onwards, has construed the unity of the self in ways which have emphasised order and discipline. The critique of the tradition offered by the postmodernists leads me here to suggest new ways of construing the unity of the self which take seriously the less ordered parts of the self.

The arguments of the postmodernists have not led me to abandon the unity of the self as a worthwhile goal but have encouraged me to propose a less tightly bonded model of the integrated self. I suggest that one way of doing this might be to consider the biblical notion of "spirit", which comprises both ordered and "unordered"<sup>30</sup> aspects, rather than the Platonic intellect, as the highest part of the personality.

By contrast with the postmodernists, all the theological and psychological systems of thought I review in chapters 3 to 6 consider the unity of the self to be a desirable goal. Indeed, each of them, more or less explicitly, takes the integration of the self, or as much integration as is possible, as its therapeutic goal. Thus, for Augustine the spiritual journey was one in which the individual progressed from an initial state of fragmentation through a gradual restoration to unity and wholeness after the image of the one God. Freud saw the aim of psychoanalysis as being to enable the ego to extend its control over lost regions of the psyche so as to extend the individual's sense of psychic unity. The central concept of Jung's psychology, individuation, involves finding a sense of wholeness through reconciling opposites in the personality. Humanistic psychology is concerned with recovering a true sense of self (Fromm), putting people in touch with their emotions (Rogers) and enabling all parts of the self to be united in "self-actualisation" (Maslow).

Whilst all these authors agree on the desirability of the unity of the self, they differ on the question of the status of this goal against what might be taken as a plausible alternative goal, namely the pursuit of moral goodness. The differences arise largely from the differences in the "sources of significance" that empower the vision represented by each. Augustine's source of significance is the God who is perfectly good. For Augustine, as the self approaches God so it grows in moral goodness. For him, the goal of integrating the self and the goal of moral goodness coincide. Freud's source of significance, by contrast, is the dignity of the rational agent. For Freud, becoming rational involves becoming critical of traditional moral values. The goal of psychoanalysis is to become rational, not to become morally good. Jung's source of significance is the realm of nature. Jung, like Freud, is suspicious of moral goodness as a life goal. His own goal of individuation incorporates (and hence subsumes) growth in goodness as one pole in a balanced form of psychological development that is in harmony with the natural life of the psyche. The humanists, like Jung, take the realm of nature as their source of significance. But, unlike Jung, they argue that genuine moral goodness is consonant with the natural desires of human beings. For them the integration of the self coincides with growth in moral goodness. With the humanists we return, in one sense, to Augustine's position. However, Augustine

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<sup>30</sup>I will use "unorder" as a term of contrast with order so as to avoid the negative connotations of "disorder" - a distinction I owe to Hardy and Ford (1984) p96ff.

and the humanists start from opposite ends: where Augustine defines what is required to integrate the self by reference to a moral-spiritual Good, the humanists define what is good by reference to what is needed for the natural development and actualisation of the self.

What any particular person takes to be the relation of the integration of the self to the pursuit of moral goodness will depend on which of these figures speak most convincingly to him or her, that is, which of them can articulate most powerfully a source of significance by which one can live. The conclusion of this present work (chapter 7) is that whilst none of the systems of thought described, by itself, has the power fully to give us an integrated sense of self, Augustine's system seems to be the strongest. However, Augustine's thought is itself strengthened by interaction with the work of the other authors I consider. It seems that the greatest chance of gaining a unified sense of self may arise from taking the Augustinian God as one's dominant source of significance, whilst also allowing space for the other sources of significance. According to this position it would seem that the integration of the self does coincide with moral excellence. However, it envisages that our notion of moral excellence will itself need to be conditioned by the insights and criticisms of the psychologists.

# 2

## The Modern Self: Historical Development and Postmodern Critique

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### **1. Introduction**

In this chapter I wish to give, in outline, a historical justification for the notion that the modern sense of self has developed through the relation of the individual to one or more moral sources. Historically, I argue, personal identity has been gained through the relation of the individual to some powerful source of meaning, and the sense of self is strengthened and united as one orientated oneself more fully to this source. I begin by exploring the role of St Augustine in imprinting the characteristically Western quality of inwardness on our cultural tradition. I show how, with Augustine, the mode of access to our sources of moral significance became an inward one (Section 2). I next indicate some of the ways in which the sense of self developed from Augustine through to the outset of the twentieth century. I trace this development through the medieval period (Section 3.1) to the uncovering in the modern period of two new sources of moral significance: the rationality of the human subject (Section 3.2) and respect for the realm of nature (Section 3.3). I thus propose that at the opening of our present century the self was understood along three axes of inward moral sources: Augustine's traditional theistic moral source, the inner rationality of the human mind, and the natural realm lying within the human soul.

However, I also wish to show that the notion of a centred self defined by its relation to sources of moral significance is under threat. I suggest that the modern Western sense of self, was thrown into crisis by the writing of Sigmund Freud, the person who has influenced the contemporary sense of self more than anyone else in this century (Section 4). Freud's opening up of the realm of the unconscious had two effects. It hugely deepened and extended our sense of self, but it also cast doubt on the possibility of unifying the self. Freud revealed new regions of the personality which are not susceptible to rational control and which seem to be difficult to hold together with the conscious realm. After Freud we have seen numerous attacks on the unified self. The most influential have been those which form part of the contemporary cultural shift into postmodernity (Section 5.1). These have been generated especially by certain radical French readings of Freud, notably by Lacan (Section 5.2) and following him by Deleuze and Guattari (Section 5.3). These

thinkers saw in Freud's description of the unordered unconscious a resource with which to break down constructs of the unified self that they took to be oppressive.

I show that the early work of the most important of the French postmodernists, Michel Foucault, was also sympathetic to this point of view. Foucault, following Lacan, thought that a radical form of psychoanalysis could be used to undermine the self. However, in his later writing, Foucault came to see psychoanalysis as part of the very apparatus of power by which we are enslaved. His final position is not that the self should be destroyed, but that we should seek new and liberating forms of selfhood (Section 5.4). After Foucault, the critique of the postmodernists should, I think, not lead us to abandon the project to unify the self but to seek alternative and less controlling ways of unifying the self, ways which respond to the situation of flux and celebration of difference that the postmodernists have drawn to our attention (Section 5.5).

This part of the thesis deals with a whole intellectual tradition and is necessarily very general. It sets up a historical framework within which Augustine and the modern psychologists we shall meet in subsequent chapters may be brought into conversation. It allows that these authors may be understood as offering complementary means for defending the unity of the self through their articulations of the deeply established moral sources of our selfhood. It describes the postmodern critique of traditional notions of the self and suggests that our contemporary context is one in which the integrated self should be understood in a less strongly ordered manner than has hitherto been the case.

## **2. Augustine and the Roots of the Modern Western Self**

The initiation of the tradition of the Western "inward" self may be attributed largely to St. Augustine. Augustine synthesised the Judaeo-Christian faith and Neo-Platonic philosophy in a way that resulted in a tradition of thought bearing a remarkably inward notion of selfhood. Indeed our modern "psychological" sense of selfhood finds its ultimate ancestor in Augustine. This is not to say that other philosophers such as Plotinus or theologians such as Gregory of Nyssa contemporary with Augustine did not use the language of inwardness. Christian theologians of the patristic era had the sense of a spiritual interiorism born out of the pursuit of the soul towards the vision of God<sup>1</sup>. Neo-Platonic philosophy operated with a metaphysic in which, through contemplation, human beings might recognise the divine in themselves and restore it to unity with the transcendent source of all being<sup>2</sup>. But Augustine personalised the Neo-Platonic philosophy in the light of his own experiences and Christian religious convictions to a remarkable degree. He has had a far greater effect on the intellectual tradition than his contemporaries.

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<sup>1</sup>See, for example, Gregory of Nyssa's Life of Moses, to which I shall refer again in due course.

<sup>2</sup>Ref. Armstrong (1970) Ch. 14. On his death-bed Plotinus stated his aim as being "to bring back the divine in man to the divine in the All". (Quoted in Armstrong p272.)



The major change in the notion of selfhood made by Augustine to the Platonic tradition is that, after Augustine, the mode of access to the sources of moral significance is now understood to be from within the self. We can detect a topological shift in the language used of the soul's journey towards the good. Of course Plato had located moral sources in the realm of thought. But Plato did not equate access to the Ideas with a turn *inward*. Rather, as the allegory of the cave makes clear, becoming rational involved a turning around of the soul from facing what is transient to facing the light. The soul as immaterial and eternal ought to turn towards what is immaterial and eternal. Plato's moral sources are best identified not with the distinctions inner/outer but with the dichotomy transient/eternal: to be ruled by reason is to have a correct vision of the eternal rational order. But with Augustine the eternal is linked with the inner and the transient with the outer.

Plotinus forms the crucial bridge between Plato and Augustine here.<sup>3</sup> Central to Plotinus's work is the desire of the soul to return to God. Plotinus speaks equally of the soul's journey as an upward one and as an inward one. Thus:

"We must ascend again towards the Good, the desired of every soul. Anyone that has seen This knows what I intend when I say that it is beautiful. Even the desire of it is to be desired as a Good"<sup>4</sup>.

"He that has strength, let him arise and withdraw into himself, foregoing all that is known by the eyes, turning away for ever from the material beauty that once made his joy<sup>5</sup>...When you know that you have become this perfect work, when you are self-gathered in the purity of your being, nothing...can shatter your inner unity."<sup>6</sup>

Plotinus takes Plato's Sun Simile and links the turning upward to see the light with a turning inward upon oneself<sup>7</sup>. For Plotinus, any being exists in its self-identity only in the measure in which it is in immediate relationship of union with and dependence on its inner principle of origin. Introversion is in the strictest sense reversion or return upon one's principle and, since the principle is always superior to the product, introversion is therefore also elevation.

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<sup>3</sup>Plotinus certainly deserves a larger place in the history of the Western self than the two passing references to him in Taylor's account would indicate. However, his influence, though profound, is indirect. Plotinus's works were not available in the middle ages and his ideas were transmitted through the work of pseudo-Dionysius and (especially) Augustine - irrespective of the extent to which Augustine was personally acquainted with his writings.

<sup>4</sup>Enneads I.6.7

<sup>5</sup>Enneads I.6.8

<sup>6</sup>Enneads I.6.9.

<sup>7</sup>Enneads I.6.9.

Following Plotinus, Augustine held that the search for God requires a turning inward upon oneself.<sup>8</sup> Where Plato's Ideas were to be seen in the field of objects, insofar as these participated in the realm of Ideas, Augustine's God is known in the power of seeing itself. This involves what Taylor has called a "radically reflexive"<sup>9</sup> stance. God is made known in our experiencing of ourselves. The mind's true self-presence to itself, or what Augustine calls the mind's remembering of itself, must therefore emerge into the mind's remembering of God. For Augustine the inner presence of God is a fundamental theological and philosophical principle, and interiority is therefore a notion that occurs widely in Augustine's writings.

All of Augustine's early dialogues display a tendency to examine inner mental data. The Soliloquies, in which Augustine records his nocturnal meditations at Cassiacum, has Reason (*ratio*) questioning Augustine in a manner that shows some of the workings of Augustine's introspective method during his early years. Augustine's Sermons place a very special emphasis on interiority. Here one might note Augustine's detailed expositions of Luke 15:14 "He entered into himself" or Isaiah 46:8 "Return therefore to the heart"<sup>10</sup>. Among Augustine's later theological works, the psychological models of the second half of de Trinitate offer some of the most profound examples of Augustine's interiorism. Perhaps most importantly, Augustine's Confessions are the first autobiography in the ancient world written with the purpose of describing oneself, one's own character and one's inner life. This book alone marks a major contribution to the modern notion of the self as a person with definite character, complexities, motives and aims.

None of this is intended to suggest that Augustine was a solitary or what we might call an "introverted" person. He was, to the contrary, a man who did not like being alone and who was constantly surrounded by friends<sup>11</sup>. Indeed he operated at a level of sociability that most modern Westerners would find intolerable. Augustine's "inwardness" was a theological principle that emphasised the importance of attention to inner psychological states; it did not at all mark for him a withdrawal from society. Here he is to be contrasted with Plotinus, for whom the spiritual path was a "passing of solitary to solitary"<sup>12</sup>, or in its more familiar translation "the flight of the alone to the Alone".

Closely linked to Augustine's emphasis on inwardness is the central place he came to give to the problem of the desiring will in human psychology. In his early life Augustine was optimistic that

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<sup>8</sup>trin. VIII.11.

<sup>9</sup>Taylor (1989) p130.

<sup>10</sup>See Pellegrino's introduction to Sermons III/1 pp79-81 and, e.g., sermons 102.2; 104.1; 161.8; 255.6.

<sup>11</sup>Ref. Brown (1969) Ch. 6, 17. Taylor does not seem to register this important point.

<sup>12</sup>A phrase given added emphasis through being placed by Porphyry as the final statement of Plotinus's work (Enneads VI.9).

one might achieve the Platonic ideal of a perfect ordering of the passions under the control of reason.<sup>13</sup> However, in his mature years Augustine came to see the sheer difficulty of achieving the perfect life and became deeply aware of the apparent permanence of evil in human actions. This led him to a profound change in his view of humanity, a change aptly described by Peter Brown as "the Lost Future"<sup>14</sup>. Human beings could not look forward to an earthly future in which, in their old age, they might achieve the Platonic ideal of serene, rational contemplation with potentially disturbing passions fully mastered. It was precisely his meditations on the loss of the bright future he had envisaged in his earlier years that generated the subtleties of the mature Augustine's motivational theory. Augustine came to see that the human will is not entirely under the control of the individual. It is moved by external sources of "delight". A person can only act if he can mobilise his feelings, and his feelings can only be roused if they are affected by an object of delight. Delight, for the mature Augustine, is the key to human action for it alone can motivate the will and meet human desire. Moreover, the processes that prepare a person's heart to take delight in their God are not only hidden but are actually unconscious and beyond our control.<sup>15</sup> Augustine's mature psychology, as manifested in, for example, the Confessions, is therefore a complex mixture of fulfilled and unfulfilled desire, a will torn between conflicting delights and dependent on divine grace if it is to be directed aright. The problem of the will has been crucially important to human psychology to the present day with, as we shall see, different psychologists offering very different proposals for how the question should be tackled.

Augustine was deeply influenced by the Stoic philosophy which pervaded the ancient world and in which happiness was seen to reside in the proper ordering of a human being's powers. Throughout his career Augustine's key conception of humanity was the rightful authority of the mind and will over all other functions of human life<sup>16</sup>. This was not merely the dominance of the soul over the body, although Augustine frequently expresses it in this way, but the properly ordered relationship of the various aspects of the soul, of humanity's animate life as a whole. The "Lost Future" that characterises Augustine's later work does not repudiate the Stoic ideal but rather loses the hope that Stoic order might be achieved in the *saeculum*. Unfortunately, Augustine's enduring commitment to right order leaves him with little place in his psychology for any positive contribution from unordered parts of the psyche. Augustine identifies aspects of the person that escape the ordering powers of the will as evidence of human fallenness and sinfulness. This identification is made supremely in the case of human sexuality.

The implications of the commitment to Stoic order were not to be fully exposed and critiqued until Freud. A central concern of my work here is to establish how we might retain a unified sense

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<sup>13</sup>E.g. *s. dom. m.* I.ii.9.

<sup>14</sup>Brown Ch. 15.

<sup>15</sup>Ref. Brown p155; *Simpl.* I., qu.ii.22.

<sup>16</sup>See further Wetzel (1992) pp50-55; TeSelle (1970) p61ff.

of selfhood whilst doing justice to the unordered parts of the self that have, until quite recently, been neglected or deprecated in the Western tradition. Within Christian theology it is the Spirit who has been taken to represent creativity and spontaneity and might, more generally, be taken to represent unorder and diversity. Unfortunately, however, Augustine tended to focus only on the ordered and bonding dimensions of the Spirit's activity. A proper emphasis on the unordered parts of the self will therefore involve us in some re-thinking of the doctrine of the Spirit beyond what we find in Augustine.

### **3. Streams in the Formation of the Contemporary Self**

I now wish to give a very broad brush outline of how the Augustinian sense of inwardness has been transmitted to modern times and how it has informed our contemporary sense of self. At appropriate points I will indicate where the historical ideas of selfhood that I describe have a particular bearing on the specifically psychological notions that I will be exploring in later chapters. This section does not, of course, aim to chart a complete history of the modern self. Such a history, if it were possible, would need to chart the causal sequence of the practices in which human identity is embedded. Rather I aim to discuss briefly some of the leading ideas of selfhood that articulated historical practice and sometimes stimulated new practices. I will generally be leaving open the question of causality: I am not arguing (in an idealistic way) that the ideas directly caused each other, nor do I wish to say (in a Marxist way) that certain socio-economic practices directly caused the ideas. I am attempting, rather, to uncover and trace the stock of ideas which I believe form a key part of the cultural inheritance that conditions our contemporary sense of self<sup>17</sup>.

#### **3.1 Developments in the Medieval Period**

Some authors, and Taylor is an example, have too readily leapt over the one thousand years of history from Augustine to Descartes as if nothing of importance happened in between. Descartes can be seen as standing in a tradition of "inwardness" initiated by Augustine, but he received this tradition as it was refracted through medieval spirituality. In particular, the early medieval period, 1050-1200, was of great importance in the formation of our modern notions of selfhood<sup>18</sup>. In the twelfth century social changes, such as the growth of cities, increased prospects for mobility, new educational and vocational opportunities were associated with a new focus on the individual and his or her inner resources.

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<sup>17</sup>In terms of theological method my approach might be described as "traditional" rather than "liberationist". The latter approach takes the view that an exploration of the human situation must start not from our ideas about ourselves but from a politically committed analysis of socio-economic praxis. For a recent example of this genre see Pattison (1994).

<sup>18</sup>Ref. Morris (1972) esp. Ch. 4 "The Search for the Self".

Changes in patterns of confession are a particularly striking example of a general development of a sense of inwardness during this period. Up until the tenth century, the penitential system, in line with ecclesiastical canons formulated from the fifth to the seventh centuries, generally awarded fixed and public penalties according to the degree of harm done by the sinful act and irrespective of the intention of the sinner. Even the emperor Louis the Pious, could, in 822, be required to do public penance under this system. And the soldiers in the army of William the Conqueror were required to perform fixed penalties after the Battle of Hastings in 1066 despite the fact that they were acting under orders in war and that they were likely to repeat the offences as part of their duties as soldiers. Nowhere does the document which spells out the penances refer to inner intention. However, between the tenth and the twelfth centuries a system of private penance and private reconciliation that focused on the inner intentions of the sinner spread from Celtic monastic communities across the whole of Europe. Peter Lombard, writing around 1150, expressed the important theological principle that the intention of repentance was of more importance for one's standing before God than formal confession and penitential action.<sup>19</sup> The increasing emphasis on interiority culminated in Peter Abelard's insistence that God judges the gravity of a sin solely on the basis of the inner intention and irrespective of the wrong committed.<sup>20</sup>

Patterns of "inwardness" were sustained especially in the monastic movement. In twelfth century monasticism it appears that the interior way came to predominate over the sense of belonging to the wider body of believers in finding one's path towards God. The writings of authors such as Bernard of Clairvaux, William of St. Thierry and Aelred of Rievaulx are marked by a radically reflexive stance in which self-knowledge is seen as the main pathway to God. Thus Bernard writes: "Begin by considering yourself - no, rather, end by that...For you, you are the first; you are also the last."<sup>21</sup> And Aelred exclaims: "How much does a man know if he does not know himself?"<sup>22</sup> This century also witnessed a desire for self-expression, as evidenced in a huge increase in the preaching and preservation of sermons, and a flourishing of poetry in which personal emotions and experience were described. Guibert of Nogent suggested that the

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<sup>19</sup>Sentences Bk. 4 17.2, in a reference to death-bed confessions: "Accordingly, the penitent ought to confess his sins if he have time: and yet, before the confession is in his mouth, if the intention be in his heart, forgiveness is accorded him." (Quoted in Watkins p745.)

<sup>20</sup>Ref. Sikes (1932) Ch. VIII.

<sup>21</sup>Quoted in Morris (1972) p66. Although, as with Augustine, we need to be careful to distinguish a theological emphasis from what we might call an "introverted" pattern of behaviour. Bernard was not at all the remote mystic that one might surmise from a reading of Morris. He was a powerful leader and preacher who travelled widely, operated at a senior diplomatic level and maintained a vast correspondence. (ref. Hugh Martin's introduction to Bernard's On Loving God SCM 1959).

<sup>22</sup>Quoted in Morris (1972) p66.

promotion of self-understanding was the main function of the preacher, and that this had to come from the preacher's own self-analysis<sup>23</sup>.

The twelfth century desire for self-knowledge generated a keen interest in psychology. The starting point here was the work of Augustine. Augustine's psychological trinitities fitted well with the monastic concern to find through self-knowledge the way to God. But within the broad lines of Augustine's spiritual psychology, authors such as William of St Thierry (The Nature and Dignity of Love c.1120) and Aelred of Rievaulx (The Mirror of Charity c. 1142) developed a "clinical theology" of the affections and dispositions which motivate the soul's progress towards God.

Up until 1050 there had been virtually no autobiographical writing since Augustine's Confessions. From the late eleventh century there is a great increase in the autobiographical content of books on a wide variety of subjects. The eleventh century monk Otloh of Saint Emmeron may be regarded as the first autobiographer of the new era, producing On His Temptations and Writings and The Confession of my Deeds. His sensitivity drove him into what we would now call mental illness, the episodes of which are recorded in his works. The full development of autobiography is found in two writers of the early twelfth century, Guibert of Nogent (Autobiography) and Peter Abelard (Historia Calamitatum). The autobiographies of both these men are "confessions" in the sense of a description of the writer's own sin and the just judgements of God, and are rooted in self-examination. The former, though not the latter, is modelled on Augustine's Confessions.

Sarah Coakley has argued quite plausibly that in the spiritual writing of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries we see a tendency to hark back to the inward self that was developed in the period 1050-1200.<sup>24</sup> Moreover she suggests that this later medieval period is distinguished from the earlier period by a whittling away of the traditional Augustinian plurality of mental faculties (memory, understanding and will) to a single mental entity. Thus, whereas Bernard and William of St. Thierry held a balance in theories of mystical union between intellect and will, a new sense of disjuncture between these two becomes apparent in the writings of Thomas Gallus (d. 1246). For Gallus the intellect is rendered radically unimportant in approaching God. This is continued in the great later medieval work The Cloud of Unknowing in which there is an overwhelming precedence given to the loving power over the knowing power. Furthermore, in this work the self is clearly identified with the soul and *not* with the body. In summary, by the fourteenth century the self has been distinguished from the body and has typically been narrowed down to a single

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<sup>23</sup>Guibert: "No preaching seems to me more profitable than that which reveals a man to himself...Whoever has the duty of teaching, if he wishes to be perfectly equipped, can first learn in himself, and afterwards profitably teach to others, what the experience of his inner struggles has taught." (Quoted Morris p67.)

<sup>24</sup>Coakley (1992).

mental faculty. This, as Coakley suggests, would seem to provide fertile ground for the Cartesian *cogito*.

### **3.2 The Development of the Modern Rational Self**

The work of Descartes is usually taken to mark the beginning of the modern Western philosophical era, and his account of the internalised self is highly important and influential. For Descartes, as for Augustine, we are at our most personal when we are at our most reflexive. On a significance-based account of selfhood, the decisive change as we move from Augustine and the mediaeval theologians to Descartes is a change in the location of the moral sources of significance: these are now no longer located outside but inside oneself. For Plato, to gain mastery over one's self, to be ruled by reason, was a matter of turning one's gaze upwards to the realm of the Ideas. One needed to be turned towards the cosmic order which is imbued with the Good. Whilst, in Augustine, the mode of access to God involved a turning inwards to find God at the base of the soul, the God one found was the Creator who transcended oneself. For Descartes, by contrast, one turns inwards to discover certainty in one's own rational thinking.

In the Platonic and Augustinian views, the world was charged with a certain moral significance. For Plato, the world was patterned on the Ideas and was imbued with the Good. For Augustine, the world was the good, though fallen, work of the Creator. Descartes, however, envisages a radical separation between God and the soul on the one hand, and the material universe as a set of "extended" things on the other hand. The Cartesian material universe is what we could call a "de-sacralised" one. Knowledge of it does not come about through the disclosure of the Ideas latent within it, nor through the revelation of God. Rather, we understand it by formulating our own rational ideas within the mind about the world and testing them empirically. Cartesian physical science proceeds mechanistically and demands no related moral vision of the world.

In classical philosophy, establishing the authority of reason over the passions was understood to mean bringing the whole person into line with the cosmic order. However, Descartes understands this mastery in a more instrumental way. The essence of Cartesian reason is the power to objectify the world, the body and its passions. The sense of the good life and the inspiration to obtain it then come from our ability to order and control the natural realm: "Instead of that speculative philosophy which is taught in the Schools, we may find a practical philosophy by means of which...we can...render ourselves the masters and possessors of nature."<sup>25</sup> This notion foreshadows our contemporary ethical and political ideas about the dignity of the individual self as rational agent. The self is of value inasmuch as its rational powers contrast with the non-rational natural world in which it acts.

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<sup>25</sup>From Descartes' Discourse on Method VI (In trans. Haldane and Ross p119).

There is no reason to think that Descartes' professions of religious belief were insincere<sup>26</sup>. Descartes' Meditations are explicitly written to defend theism and establish the idea of God clearly and distinctly present within the soul. Of course Descartes would have said that his ultimate moral source was God. But the procedure of the *cogito* opens up a second moral source within the human mind itself. Augustine's journey inward led him to greater awareness of his own imperfection in the light of God's perfection. Descartes, by contrast, moves from radical doubt to certainty about his own existence. Only then does he proceed to the idea of God, and thence to certainty about the existence of the material world. In Descartes' procedure the existence of God is one step on a chain that is concerned with establishing one's *own* certainty about one's self and the world. Following Descartes, the rational self becomes a source of moral significance in its own right.

Locke is best known as the founder of modern empirical philosophy and his philosophical method is typically contrasted with that of Cartesian rationalism. However, he shared with, and in his Essay on Human Understanding further developed, Descartes' high view of the rational, thinking subject. His work marks a further step in overturning the classical and medieval view of the cosmos, as imbued with ontic reason, in favour of a self-responsible subject who acts on a de-sacralised world. Like Descartes, Locke's stance is radically reflexive. It involves disengaging from spontaneous and customary beliefs in order to submit them to first-person scrutiny<sup>27</sup>. But Locke goes further than Descartes in rejecting the notion of innate ideas - including moral ideas (Essay Bk. 1). Our inward journey no longer discloses the idea of God but merely supplies us with the empirical data from which we may build up a reliable base of knowledge. Locke's central thesis (Essay Bk. 2) is that we get all our ideas from experience, either from experience of the world or from reflection on our inner states. Thus our ideas about perception, thinking, believing, doubting and so on come from reflection on the operation of our own minds<sup>28</sup>. The mind "turns its view inward upon itself and observes its own actions about those ideas it has [and] takes from thence other ideas"<sup>29</sup>.

For Locke, the two principle actions which characterise and ennoble the mind are those of thinking and willing<sup>30</sup>. The activity of thinking is one of building up knowledge through connecting together the ideas given in experience. The activity of willing is the highly reflexive one of beginning, continuing or ending the actions of our minds or the motions of our bodies<sup>31</sup>.

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<sup>26</sup>So Bernard Williams in Descartes trans. Cottingham p ix; despite Williams comment that "theories that ascribe to him complex strategies of deceit have a strange capacity to survive".

<sup>27</sup>Essay I.i.2; cf. I.iv.23: "Some, taking things upon trust, misemploy their power of assent, by lazily enslaving their minds to the dictates and dominion of others, in doctrines which it is their duty carefully to examine...".

<sup>28</sup>Essay II.i.4.

<sup>29</sup>Essay II.vi.1.

<sup>30</sup>Essay II.vi.2.

<sup>31</sup>Essay II.xxi.5.



The will is, in fact, a faculty concerned with a particularly intimate form of self-mastery: "*Volition*, it is plain, is an act of the mind knowingly exerting that dominion it takes itself to have over any part of the man, by employing it in, or withholding it from, any particular action"<sup>32</sup>. Locke opposes earlier teleological accounts of selfhood. He thought that the will is not moved by a longer term view of the good but by immediate pleasure and pain - or what Locke calls sensations of "uneasiness". "Good and evil, present and absent, it is true, work upon the mind. But that which *immediately* determines the will, from time to time, to every voluntary action, is the *uneasiness of desire*."<sup>33</sup> Uneasiness may *secondarily* reflect good and evil, for an external law ordained by God rewards good action with pleasure and punishes evil action with pain. Locke's corresponding ontology of personhood is what Taylor terms the "punctual self", the self as a punctuated series of states of consciousness: "For it is by the consciousness it has of its present thoughts and actions that [the self] is self to itself..."<sup>34</sup>. This attempt to divorce the self from considerations of long term moral significance leads in our own century to the questioning by Derek Parfit of the very notion of selfhood that I mention in Section 5.1 below.

Locke's hedonistic theory of motivation appears at first to be leading him to a form of determinism, in which the will is under the control of external sources of pain and pleasure. But it becomes clear that Locke thought that we have the power to alter to a remarkable extent the associations we make between degrees of internal uneasiness and external goods.<sup>35</sup> We do this by *choosing* which items to pursue. When we have attained the desired item the pleasure it gives generates further desire for such goods and sensations of uneasiness at our lack of them<sup>36</sup>. We can thus modify our habits of behaviour. The rational human being will choose to cultivate appetites and habits that make for the rewards of eternal life and that hence coincide with the good.<sup>37</sup> The cultivation of habit is now not understood in the classical sense of perfection of a given form of nature. Rather, habit links elements between which there are purely instrumental connections. Locke's self actually has an unprecedented power to objectify itself, for it can form and make traits of character so that they make for pleasure/good in line with the choices of the individual. The self now turns inwards to impose order not merely upon the body, but upon its very self. This Lockean self is a forerunner of the Freudian ego, which in its turn seeks to impose order on the elements of the mind (see further chapter 4).

Immanuel Kant's understanding of the self may be regarded as a later descendant of both the Cartesian *cogito* and the Lockean empirical self. Kant's philosophical system distinguishes sharply between the self which is given through empirical introspection and the self in itself. It is

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<sup>32</sup>Essay II.xxi.15.

<sup>33</sup>Essay II.xxi.33.

<sup>34</sup>Essay II.xxvii.10

<sup>35</sup>Essay II.xxi.53.

<sup>36</sup>Essay II.xxi.56.

<sup>37</sup>Essay II.xxi.70.

the latter, the self as pure subjectivity, that Kant is most concerned with. In the terms of Kant's philosophy this self (*das Ich*) is the thinking subject which accompanies all our perceptions of the world. This self can only be *thought*. It exists outside the chains of physical cause and effect; it experiences freedom and is the basis of the practical reason of Kant's ethics. It is disclosed in moments of moral obligation. However, it lies beyond the self given to us in experience and is not perceived by us as an object of perception in space and time. Therefore this self cannot be placed under one of Kant's Categories and *known* either through self-awareness or, still less, by empirical observation. Of this self Kant says: "I am conscious not of how I appear to myself, or of how I am in myself, but only *that* I am."<sup>38</sup> As with the Cartesian self one is at one's most personal when one is at one's most reflective. For Descartes this was achieved in conscious thought; for Kant it occurs when one is consciously acting according to the dictates of the categorical imperative of practical reason. Kant's relation of the self to the categorical imperative foreshadows the Freudian relation of the ego to the super-ego (chapter 4). However, whereas it was of the essence of Kant's categorical imperative that we consciously and willingly submit to it, Freud thinks our submission to it is more typically a matter of unconscious compulsion.

### 3.3 The Development of the Modern Natural Self

There is a second kind of journey inward that is radically different from that initiated by Descartes and continued by Locke and later by Kant. It is a search which aims not to find a self that operates according to clear and distinct rational principles, but to find a self that is distinguished by its originality and particularity. An early exemplar of this search is the sixteenth century French essayist Michel Montaigne. Montaigne goes inward not so as rationally to disengage himself from himself but so as to immerse himself in himself: "The world always looks outward, I turn my gaze inward, there I fix it, and there I keep it busy. Everyone looks before him; I look within."<sup>39</sup> The object of such immersion is not, as for Augustine, to discover God, but to discover oneself. Through engaging with his own particularity it seems that Montaigne felt he could, in the face of self-depreciating moral demands to the contrary, learn self-acceptance. "I have no business but with myself, I unceasingly consider, examine and analyse myself."<sup>40</sup>

For Montaigne, the only safe way of establishing a pattern of life was by means of knowledge of one's own self.<sup>41</sup> Where Descartes understood the self as the rational, responsible self, Montaigne saw it as the *natural* self. "I have...quite simply and crudely accepted for my own use the ancient rule that we cannot go wrong in following nature, and that the sovereign precept is to conform to her...I let myself go on as I come; I struggle against nothing; my two dominant parts live, of their

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<sup>38</sup>Trans. Körner (1987) p67.

<sup>39</sup>*Essais* II.17 (trans. Cohen p219).

<sup>40</sup>*op. cit.*

<sup>41</sup>So Holyoake (1986) p24.

own accord in peace and amity."<sup>42</sup> Montaigne offers an early example of a third source of moral significance, that of the realm of nature. Where the Cartesian/Lockean self numbers among its descendants the Freudian ego, Montaigne's self leads in our century to the immersion in, and the acceptance of opposing parts of, the self recommended by Carl Jung (see further chapter 5).

The notion of the natural order as a source of moral significance was considerably developed in the late 17th and 18th centuries by Shaftesbury and Hutcheson. Shaftesbury was Locke's pupil but strongly opposed Locke's theory of an external law which motivates us to the good. Shaftesbury held instead that we have an inherent tendency towards the good. In part, Shaftesbury's ethic of a natural life lived in accordance with the whole order of things reflects a return to classical, and especially Platonic and Stoic themes. However, we find a new subjectivity in Shaftesbury. The classical philosophers considered what was natural in terms of a rational understanding of human growth in virtue or towards an apprehension of the Good.<sup>43</sup> In Shaftesbury's work there is a much greater emphasis on analysing the sentiments in isolation from rational analysis of the good. This is reflected in his preference for speaking about the "natural affection" by which he thought that we love the whole. Shaftesbury thought, in a characteristically modern way, that the affections we feel for those who are close to us might carry over into a disinterested benevolence towards humanity in general. (See, for example, my analysis of Erich Fromm in Ch. 6.)

Hutcheson relied on Shaftesbury's psychology for his moral sense theory. Our internal moral sense motivates us to act benevolently. To be good now requires attention not to an external law but to the sources of goodness we find inside ourselves, albeit that these derive ultimately from God. As MacIntyre points out<sup>44</sup>, the key change made by Hutcheson to the moral tradition is his assertion that we do not reason about our ultimate ends but that our ultimate ends are given by prior dispositions or desires. Shaftesbury and Hutcheson—articulate a crucial component of modern subjectivity, and one which is important for the humanistic psychologists (Ch. 6), namely that an analysis of our own sentiments and intuitions provides us with the most convincing account of the human good.

In 17th and 18th century Deism nature (or, increasingly, Nature) was understood as a beneficent harmony. The way to be good was now not, as in the classical view, by a rational grasp of the Good, but by discerning how to act according to Nature. Nature remained the rational product of a divine Author, but one's mode of access to Nature was now not necessarily through the intellect. The mode of access to the design *might* be through reason, and this is the route advocated, for example, by Locke. According to Locke, we must rationally reflect on our own inclinations, on

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<sup>42</sup>Essais III.12 (trans. Cohen p338).

<sup>43</sup>E.g. see Sandbach (1989) p31ff on the Stoic view of the natural life and Aristotle Nic. Eth. 1114a 27.

<sup>44</sup>MacIntyre (1988) p272.

what brings us pain and pleasure, in order to attain to our highest good. But, alternatively, the mode of access might be through sentiment, and this is the path explored by Hutcheson. In Hutcheson's form of Deism the sentiments become normative. It is not our reason but our deepest sentiments that move us towards the highest good. The sentiments yield insights that cannot be independently discovered through reason. Taylor suggests<sup>45</sup> that this latter form of Deism tended to become predominant over the course of the eighteenth century. Whilst Taylor's contention should not divert us from the essentially rationalistic temper of Deism, a heavy access on sentiment was certainly reflected in many aspects of 18th century culture including literature, attitudes to the family, feeling for the countryside and religious piety.

Jean-Jacques Rousseau offered a statement of nature as a source of moral significance which has been particularly influential in modern educational theory and modern psychological notions of self-exploration<sup>46</sup>. Rousseau thought that evil arose through the corruption of individuals in a depraved culture. People became too easily dependent on the misleading opinions and wishes of others. Goodness was to be recovered by regaining contact with the original impulse of nature as it is disclosed either privately in the dictates of conscience or publicly in a pure and undistorted social contract. The ideal education that Rousseau proposed for "Emile" was one in which the child was reared close to nature and preserved for as long as possible from the harmful effects of society.

Rousseau's Confessions share many similarities with Augustine's book of the same name, not least an intense exposition of the subject's sexuality. But Rousseau marked a fundamental objection to the Augustinian theological tradition by his rejection of Augustine's doctrine of original sin in favour of his own notion of natural goodness: "Let us set down as an incontestable maxim that the first movements of nature are always right. There is no original perversity in the human heart"<sup>47</sup>. Where Augustine turned inward in recognition of his inadequacy and dependence on God, Rousseau's inward turn hoped to make contact with the innate goodness of the human soul.

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<sup>45</sup>Taylor (1989) p283.

<sup>46</sup>For the purposes of this exposition I follow Taylor (also articles on "Romanticism" in the Encyclopaedia of Philosophy and Encyclopaedia Britannica) in placing Rousseau as a pre-cursor of the Romantic movement rather than as a proper member of this movement. Other authors take Rousseau as a Romantic, or even as the leading Romantic (so Irving Babbitt in his important Rousseau and Romanticism). The argument depends on the notoriously difficult question of how we define Romanticism, whether, for example, it is identified with a reaction against the French radical enlightenment (so Babbitt p39 "Romanticism...is all that is not Voltaire") or whether it is identified with predominantly German and English nineteenth century developments in art, literature and music. My argument here is that the notion of nature as a moral source is a larger phenomenon than Romanticism, and that Rousseau and the Romantics can be seen as earlier and later exponents of this idea.

<sup>47</sup>Emile p92.

Rousseau identifies goodness with self-responsible freedom. The mature Emile is a man who can find reasons for action from within himself, who acts autonomously. He is capable of relationships of deep friendship and love, and he feels a general sense of benevolence towards humanity, but he does not fall into unhealthy relationships of dominance and dependence. Rousseau's quest for autonomy through regaining contact with the natural, inner self has been taken up in our century by the humanistic psychologists, whom I discuss in chapter 6.

The notion of nature as a source of moral significance leads to a view that we may call "expressivism"<sup>48</sup> and that is articulated in different ways by Herder, by the Romantic movement and by Hegel. By this term, is meant the sense that the self and the natural realm are not fully known until they are expressed and, more than this, that the very act of articulation itself decisively shapes the content of self and nature. In the Romantic movement, the mode of access to the realm of nature is through one's feelings, not through Cartesian disengaged reason. Nature is now not studied in an objective and instrumental way, but is *produced* in imaginative art and literature. So too, the self becomes an object which is uniquely created as one searches to express it. Thus, whereas in the tradition of Aristotle one could speak of human nature tending towards some complete form, Herder sees growth as the manifestation of an inner power seeking to realise itself externally, a power which is expressed differently by each individual. Once we see life in this way we are obliged not merely to live up to some general notion of humanity but to tread our own unique path. In Herder's words: "Each human being has his own measure, as it were an accord peculiar to him of all his feelings to each other"<sup>49</sup>. As we shall see (chapters 5 and 6), this is developed in the modern psychological notions of individuation and self-actualisation.

The expressive view goes with the important modern idea that human beings have inexhaustible psychological depths. The sense of depth arises when we have the feeling of going inward to bring psychological material to the fore so that it can be articulated. The depth gains the feeling of inexhaustibility when we sense that however much we retrieve there is further material there waiting to be discovered and expressed. It is not, as with Augustine, that the move inward actually takes us outside of ourselves - to God. Rather as we move more and more deeply into ourselves we (merely) penetrate more closely to (although perhaps never quite reaching) the natural roots of our own selfhood. The point is not to arrive at some complete form, but to move to ever more profound expressions of our inner selves.

Hegel offers us one important formulation of human subjectivity as the expression of nature. For Hegel human consciousness is the locus in which "Spirit" comes to consciousness of itself. In their reasoning about the world human beings participate in truth. As their reasoning progresses

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<sup>48</sup>A term I owe to Taylor (1989) Ch. 21.

<sup>49</sup>Herder *Ideen* vii.1 quoted in Taylor (1989) p375.

from abstractions to higher degrees of concretisation human beings express the universal development of the reason with which nature is imbued. Hegel thought that the essence of religion is the rise of the human spirit above itself towards God. From God's perspective this is seen as the return of his own Spirit to himself. In this way religion unites spirit with Spirit, and in the practice of worship humanity becomes conscious of its unity with God's being. The human self is thus the site in which nature finally realises itself and is reconciled with itself<sup>50</sup>. I will explore the possibilities offered by the language of spirit for uniting the self in subsequent chapters.

Human life is at its most expressive in the field of art. For those whose sense of moral significance comes mainly from nature, art may therefore come to replace religion as fulfilling the spiritual dimension of life. For such people, it is the creative imagination rather than disengaged reason which is taken as granting access to the deepest reality. We shall see that the artist is an important example of the fully actualised person for the humanistic psychologists (chapter 6).

A final twist to this stream in the making of the modern self comes with the questioning by some in the 19th century of the goodness of nature and the rejection of nature as a source of moral significance. One mode of response to the disenchantment of nature, and that taken by Schopenhauer, is to affirm *art* despite nature. Another response is to affirm the *self* independently of nature. This latter is exemplified in different ways by Dostoevsky, Nietzsche and Kierkegaard. According to Kierkegaard, in choosing ourselves we, for the first time, become true selves. Through self-choice we sense ourselves for the first time as loved and worthy to be chosen, and attain self-love and self-affirmation irrespective of conditions in the external world. Kierkegaard stands at the head of twentieth century existentialist philosophy and those contemporary therapies that emphasise the healing possibilities of self-choice (see further my description of Rogers in chapter 6).

### Summary

Let me briefly summarise the argument of the last two sections. I have suggested that the modern Western notion of selfhood is distinctively characterised by a sense of inwardness, and I have argued that this sense was inaugurated by Augustine. I have indicated how Augustinian inwardness percolated medieval spirituality and suggested that this provided the context for the Cartesian *cogito ergo sum* - the reflexive statement that is frequently taken as a marker for the starting point of modern Western philosophy. I have suggested a certain continuity of ideas through Descartes, Locke and Kant in the notion of a self constituted by rational norms. As an alternative and competing viewpoint, I have traced the development of a "natural self" that is discovered through being in touch with nature and with one's own feelings. I cited Montaigne, Rousseau and the Romantic movement as expressions of this natural self.

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<sup>50</sup>See further "Introduction to the History of Philosophy" in Q. Lauer (1983).

At the end of the nineteenth century we therefore have a self defined along three axes of inwardness: the original Augustinian journey inward to discover God; the self-consciousness of the Cartesian rational or Kantian moral self; and the natural, expressive self of the Romantics. Each Western individual draws on some combination of these three streams for our own self-identity. I want now to suggest that, in this century, the modern "inward" self has been both hugely deepened and at the same time seriously threatened by the work of our most important modern psychologist, Sigmund Freud.

#### **4. Freud and the Twentieth Century Crisis of Selfhood**

It seems to me Sigmund Freud has had more influence on our contemporary sense of self than any other twentieth century figure. His critic, the sociologist Philip Rieff, comments that Freud has left us with "the most important body of thought committed to paper in the twentieth century"<sup>51</sup>. I believe that Freud has generated more secondary literature than any other author this century<sup>52</sup>. Freud's influence has arisen because his ideas have percolated deeply into our culture. He has given modern Western men and women a language by which they can interpret themselves to themselves. As Ricoeur says, Freud has given us "a monument to our culture...a text in which our culture is expressed and understood"<sup>53</sup>.

With a deliberate sense of occasion Freud published what he took to be his most important work, The Interpretation of Dreams, in 1900. This was the same year that Joseph Conrad completed his influential novel Heart of Darkness. The two works together were to set the context for a great deal of thinking about the self in this century. We now perceive ourselves as creatures with inner depths, with partly unexplored and dark interiors. Freud was not the *discoverer* of the unconscious: references to the existence of mental processes that escape conscious control go back beyond Augustine to Plotinus and St Paul. But the high degree of contemporary interest in the unconscious is largely due to Freud. Freud's conception of the unconscious was sufficiently powerful that he was able to give us depth-psychological explanations for a wide range of hitherto unconnected aspects of human behaviour such as human sexuality, slips of the tongue, jokes and neuroticism. Freud provided a theoretical scheme that opened up the unconscious as a field of interest and investigation to an unprecedented degree.

Freud massively deepens the sense of inwardness that was initiated by Augustine. Augustine had wondered about the caves and caverns of the mind<sup>54</sup>. Freud actually goes down into the caves and attempts to map them. To change the metaphor very slightly to a deliberately psychoanalytic

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<sup>51</sup>Rieff (1959) p x.

<sup>52</sup>So Masson (1985) p12.

<sup>53</sup>Ricoeur (1970) page xi.

<sup>54</sup>conf. X.xvii.26.

one<sup>55</sup>, it is as if in previous centuries we had conscientiously explored the different levels of the house of the mind, thinking that we were well on the way to putting everything in its place. Then Freud comes along, opens a trapdoor and invites us down into the basement. He finds a myriad of passages and tunnels that are, in fact, much more extensive than the house that is visible above the ground. Disturbingly, things in the underground are far from in order. He finds snakes and skulls down there. It appears to be animated by strange and unknown powers.

In the terms of Conrad's imagery, as we explore the dark interior the ego is perceived as a small and uncertain steamboat penetrating deep into the heart of the unknown jungle of the Belgian Congo. The small river along which the boat plies its course is surrounded by dark, impenetrable forest. In the forest live people who speak languages we do not understand and who seem not to share some of our most basic moral sensibilities. Our relationship with the forest is ambivalent, for whilst the forest is a continual source of threat, yet it is also the indispensable source of the boat's fuel. The journey contains little sense of excitement or prospects for the joy of discovery. Rather the atmosphere is one of foreboding and threat.

Once the trapdoor has been opened the self can never appear the same again. Indeed, does the opening up of these vast depths actually signal the end of the self or does it, at least, mean the end of an *integrated* sense of self? Does it still make sense to talk of the self if the centre of gravity of this entity lies buried deep beyond our comprehension? Even if we can chart its depths, how can the orderliness of the house be held together with the unseemliness of the cellar? Can the centre still hold?

The answer to these questions will depend on exactly what our conception of the unconscious is. Is it completely impenetrable or merely relatively-so? Can it ultimately be conquered, or at least domesticated? Are the creatures who inhabit the jungle's interior entirely 'other' than us, or might they be sympathetically comprehended? To begin to answer these questions we shall need to return to Freud. Since his work has been so susceptible to misinterpretation and to development by competing schools, it will be important to try to discover exactly what was Freud's conception of the mind. I do this in chapter 4. Whatever the results of our investigation, it seems that, after Freud, the original Platonic project of uniting the self under the hegemony of conscious reason can never be quite so straightforward again.

I have described some of the background to and history of our modern sense of self. I now wish to spend some time exploring our contemporary situation. I take this to be one of crisis for the self.

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<sup>55</sup>Ref. Carl Jung's *MDR* (Fontana) p182 for a discussion of the significance of this image for Jung and Freud.



## **5. The Postmodernists: The End of the Modern Self?**

### **5.1 Contemporary Attacks on the Self**

The late twentieth century is marked by a profound uncertainty as to whether and how the modern sense of self can be held together. Thus Stephen Frosh, senior lecturer in psychology at Birkbeck college comments: "Perhaps the most generally accepted characteristic of the modern mind is that it is a condition in which the 'struggle to be a self' is nearly impossible"<sup>56</sup>. In a similar vein the American psychologist Kenneth Gergen suggests that "the very idea of individual selves is now threatened with eradication"<sup>57</sup>. The questioning of our traditional Western view of unified selfhood arises from a number of sources and disciplines, for example: philosophical attacks on the usefulness of the notion of personal identity (Parfit, 1984); "functionalist" explanations of the mind as sophisticated computer software (Dennett, 1991); and biological reduction of the mind to a system of neurones (Crick, 1994).

However, rather than analysing these philosophical and scientific criticisms of the self, I wish to consider the line of attack on the self put forward by the postmodernists, and for two reasons. Firstly, postmodernist understandings of the self are part of a general cultural shift into postmodernism that has wide influence in the Western world. Secondly, this line of thinking stems from certain radical readings of Freud and thus has a particularly psychological focus. Where "orthodox" Freudians, following Anna Freud, had developed Freud's doctrines so as to defend the ego, French psychoanalysis developed in a direction we could call "ego-critical" and was used to undermine the unity of the self.

The leading figures in this movement are the psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan and the philosopher-come-psychologist-come-historian of ideas Michel Foucault. Lacan was the father-figure who inspired much recent French psychoanalytic theory, and I explore some of his "ego-critical" theories below (Section 5.2). One of Lacan's more important disciples was the psychoanalyst Félix Guattari. After the Parisian upheavals of May 1968 Guattari collaborated with the philosopher Gilles Deleuze in producing a radicalised version of Lacanian psychoanalytic theory published in 1972 as Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. This book gained a certain iconic status in postmodern French thought, and I discuss its argument in Section 5.3. Lacan also influenced the early writing of Foucault. Whilst Foucault's professorial chair was in the "History of Systems of Thought", the young Michel Foucault trained in psychology and psychopathology at the hospital of St Anne (the institution at which Lacan gave his weekly "seminars") and a large proportion of his work either directly or indirectly relates to psychology and psychoanalysis. Foucault is probably the most influential of all the French postmodernists. The unfolding of his position on the self is particularly interesting and I describe it in Section 5.4.

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<sup>56</sup>Frosh (1991)p5.

<sup>57</sup>Gergen (1991) p x.

## 5.2 Jacques Lacan

Jacques Lacan was born in 1901 to a family belonging to the Parisian *haute bourgeoisie*. He studied medicine and then psychiatry as a student of Clerambault, one of the masters of traditional psychiatry. In 1932, Lacan received his doctorate in psychiatry with a thesis on the relationship of paranoia to personality structure. Through the 1930s, Lacan's literary productions oscillated between studies in classical psychiatric journals, and essays and poems in surrealist publications. He was interested in paranoia, language, fantasy and the formal character of symptoms, all concerns shared by the surrealists. In 1934, after undergoing his own analysis, he joined the Paris Psychoanalytic Society. He presented his theory of the "mirror stage" to the 14th Congress of the International Psychoanalytic Association in 1936, where he first made public his belief that the ego does not exist as a coherent entity. During the 1950s he initiated and subsequently steered a movement to reinterpret Freud's theories in the light of structuralist theories of linguistics, focusing on the human subject as he or she is defined by social and linguistic pressures. His lectures and articles were published as Écrits in 1966. Lacan's relations with Freudian "orthodoxy" were fraught, and in the early 1960s he was removed from the French and International psychoanalytic societies. His commentator, Malcolm Bowie, says that "Lacan is the only psychoanalyst of the twentieth century whose intellectual achievement is in any way comparable to Freud's"<sup>58</sup>. Lacan died in 1981.

Lacan's psychology may be read as a sustained attack on the modern notion of the centred ego or "I". Thus the opening paragraph of Écrits reads: "I think it worthwhile to bring [the mirror stage] again to your attention...for the light it sheds on the formation of the *I* as we experience it in psychoanalysis. It is an experience that leads us to oppose any philosophy directly issuing from the *Cogito*". In this way, Lacan marks his psychology with a strongly post (or anti) modern character. Lacan goes behind the Freudian Oedipal stage, where the child's ego is constituted out of relations to its mother and father, to the pre-Oedipal infant of 6 to 18 months who sees its gestures reflected in those of an adult or in a mirror. Lacan holds that it is this experiencing of the mirror image that establishes the notion of the ego. The child is temporarily held captive by the image. Instead of continuing with its play the infant briefly fixes its identity. Lacan's point is that such identity making is fundamentally deceptive. The mirror image was actually a mirage, and the ego which is constructed on the basis of it is destined to be tragically alienated from reality. In Lacan's words, the mirror stage leads to "the assumption of the armour of an alienating identity, which will mark with its rigid structure the subject's entire mental development"<sup>59</sup>.

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<sup>58</sup>Bowie (1991) p203.

<sup>59</sup>Écrits p4.

Lacan draws his inspiration from the early Freud, whose notion of the unconscious had served to destabilise the Cartesian ego. But Lacan criticises the later (post-1923) Freud for failing to carry through what Lacan takes to be a project to unseat the ego. In Freud's later work, says Lacan<sup>60</sup>, by identifying the perception/consciousness system with the ego, Freud had suddenly seemed to fail to recognise all that the ego neglects and misconstrues. Freud had now started to value the rational, ordering powers of the ego too highly. What had begun, we may surmise Lacan as saying, as a project to decentre the self ended in conferring self-mastery at an even deeper level. Lacan strives to re-present the earlier, more subversive Freud. According to Lacan, the ego's rational will for mastery is nothing but the misguided attempt by man to impress his carefully nurtured self-image on reality. Far from bolstering the ego, Lacan's treatment aims to fracture the ego, for "the ego represents the centre of all the *resistances* to the treatment of symptoms"<sup>61</sup>. Just how far all this is fair to Freud I hope will become clear in my fourth chapter.

Where the Platonic tradition had envisaged a primal harmony, and Freud had, less optimistically, spoken of a battle between a life-force and a death-force, Lacan pessimistically envisages a primal aggressivity. Lacan finds ancient precedent for his notion of basic Strife in the Greek Heraclitus whom he cites (mistakenly<sup>62</sup>) as having proclaimed the primacy of Discord over harmony. Switching to a botanical metaphor, he speaks of the "vital dehiscence that is constitutive of man"<sup>63</sup>. "Dehiscence" refers to the bursting open of a seed pod. We are to understand that the primal nature of the human psyche is one of fragmentation and splitting apart. Against this background human beings have derived a "peculiar satisfaction from the integration of an original organic disarray"<sup>64</sup>. According to Lacan, the healthier attitude is that shown by the paranoiac personality who throws back onto the world the disorder of which his being is composed<sup>65</sup>.

Lacan cites Augustine's description of the jealous infant<sup>66</sup> as an "exemplary image"<sup>67</sup> of what he means. The infant forges his identity, his ego, in the context of a gaze at a foster-brother that is filled with primordial aggression, rage and bitterness. Lacan says that Augustine in this way "foreshadowed" psychoanalysis, and that he was able to do this because "he lived at a similar time" to ourselves. What Lacan appears to mean here is that Augustine pre-dates the modern construals of selfhood by which, until now, we have been ensnared. The postmodern and the

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<sup>60</sup>Écrits p22.

<sup>61</sup>Écrits p23.

<sup>62</sup>Lacan may have got this notion from a fragment of Heraclitus: "One should know that war is common, and justice strife; and that everything comes about in accordance with strife and what must be." (B 80) But this does not refer to the *primacy* of strife. Rather, it is an example of Heraclitus' theory concerning the Unity of Opposites. Justice and strife are always found together. Heraclitus' position is actually nearer to Freud than Lacan. See further Barnes (1979) Ch. IV.

<sup>63</sup>Écrits p21.

<sup>64</sup>Écrits p21.

<sup>65</sup>Écrits p21.

<sup>66</sup>conf. I.vii.11.

<sup>67</sup>Écrits p20.

premodern are united in their opposition to an intervening Cartesian tradition. Of course there is a fundamental difference between Augustine and Lacan, which Lacan does not go into, in that the former regards the jealous infant as a manifestation of a fallen nature, a state of sickness from which it is possible to recover, whereas Lacan takes him as indicative of the true nature of things. Augustine believes in an underlying harmony where Lacan holds to a state of primary discord.

In his later work Lacan sees the human thought-world as constituted out of three orders: the imaginary, the symbolic and the real.<sup>68</sup> In a move not unlike that made in Buddhism, Lacan's imaginary order is said to consist of much of what we usually take to be most real. It is the order of perceptions and images. For Lacan, these are all derivatives of the ego's primal "mirror" experience and as such have a basically mistaken, mirage quality. The symbolic order is the realm of language and of the unconscious. Lacan takes it to be this order that is constitutive of the human subject. Our subjectivity is formed out of a chain of linguistic signifiers. It is at this level - the level of language - and not the level of the ego, that psychoanalysis does its work. The third order, the real, is the ineffable, the underlying substructure that may be approached but never grasped. The real indicates humanity's "being for death"<sup>69</sup>. The symbolic order provides a temporary space for flying in the face of the real. The goal of psychoanalysis, for Lacan, is not so much affirming life in the face of death, still less trying to find some coherent sense to our lives, as exploring the expressive plenitude of speech, of mapping the possibilities of the second, symbolic order. In the brief breathing space provided to us before we are swallowed up by the real, we can, at least, talk.<sup>70</sup>

For Lacan, desire is not energetic or biological as it was for Freud, but the dynamo which propels all acts of speech, which keeps the chain of signifiers going.<sup>71</sup> Understood in this linguistic, non-biological sense, desire is not something-intrinsic to the individual that the individual might be able to control, but something trans-personal to which the individual is subjected. Lacan makes an interesting distinction between desire and need. He thinks that "need" refers to particular biological lacks, whereas "desire" goes beyond needs in referring to the "unconditional element of the demand for love"<sup>72</sup>. However many needs are satisfied the individual still lacks an unconditional "Yes"<sup>73</sup>. In Lacan's scheme this demand can never be satisfied since it is addressed to other human beings who themselves have their own lacks. Since the other is himself divided and wounded he can never give one the complete and unconditional affirmation that one craves. Desire is now understood as "pure loss"<sup>74</sup>. Human life is characterised by an unbreachable "split"

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<sup>68</sup>Ref. *Écrits* p ix f. and Bowie (1991) Ch. 4,

<sup>69</sup>*Écrits* p104.

<sup>70</sup>Bowie p66f.

<sup>71</sup>Bowie p122.

<sup>72</sup>*Écrits* p286.

<sup>73</sup>Bowie p135.

<sup>74</sup>*Écrits* p287.

between the meeting of needs and unmet desire. As a result, says Lacan, "man cannot aim at being whole (the 'total personality' is another of the deviant premises of modern psychotherapy)..."<sup>75</sup> We might agree with Lacan that a sense of wholeness is linked to the meeting of an unconditional demand for love. But Lacan's view that this cannot in principle be met is a *theological* viewpoint that is susceptible to a different answer, as our analysis of Augustine in chapter 3 will make clear.

### 5.3 Deleuze and Guattari

In their Anti-Oedipus Deleuze and Guattari offer us a radicalised Lacan in which the attack on the self is further intensified. This work is accurately described by Mark Seem in his introduction as, "an attack on the ego, on what is all-too-human in mankind, on oedipalized and oedipalizing analyses and neurotic modes of living...for we are sick, so sick, of our *selves!*"<sup>76</sup> Deleuze holds that not only the school and the nation, but also - and especially - the family unit of father, mother, child are structures of control. Traditional psychoanalysis, inasmuch as it has focused on the Oedipal relation of the family unit, has itself become an agent of control rather than liberation. Beneath the Oedipalised self, however, there exists the "desiring-machine" that provides a means of escape from the self. Anti-Oedipus thus provides a psychoanalytic rationale for the aspirations to obtain political and social freedom from control that found expression in the Parisian events of 1968.

Anti-Oedipus opens with a graphic and disturbing account of the human being as a machine built up from smaller machines. When all is reduced to machinery there is no place for higher level descriptions of humanity: "There is no such thing as either man or nature now, only a process that produces the one within the other and couples the machines together. Producing-machines, desiring-machines everywhere...the self and the non-self, outside and inside, no longer have any meaning whatsoever"<sup>77</sup>. The energy on which the machines run is libido, sexual desire. The human subject is to be understood as a series of intensity states beginning at level zero and increasing with the building up of desire. According to Deleuze, "individuations are brought about solely within complexes of forces that determine persons as so many intensive states"<sup>78</sup>. Society exerts an oppressive influence on the desiring-machines, attempting to "codify" the flows of desire, to see to it that no flow exists that is not properly dammed up, channelled and regulated. The libido is made to repress its flows in order to contain them within the narrow confines of societally specified types such as "couple", "family", "person" or "object".<sup>79</sup>

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<sup>75</sup> Écrits p287.

<sup>76</sup> Anti-Oedipus pxxi.

<sup>77</sup> Anti-Oedipus p2.

<sup>78</sup> Anti-Oedipus p86.

<sup>79</sup> Anti-Oedipus p293.

The therapy prescribed by Deleuze and Guattari is a radicalised kind of psychoanalysis that they call "schizoanalysis". The task of schizoanalysis is to decode the codes and hence to liberate desire. Schizoanalysis has a negative and a positive moment. In its negative moment it constitutes a virulent assault on everything that would constrain or unite or unify elements of the human self. "Destroy, destroy. The task of psychoanalysis goes by way of destruction - a whole scouring of the unconscious, a complete curettage. Destroy Oedipus, the illusion of the ego, the puppet of the superego..."<sup>80</sup> Schizoanalysis proceeds to a point where "the connections are always partial and nonpersonal, the conjunctions nomadic and polyvocal, the disjunctions always included..." The individual must be wrenched free from all the relations and self-images that constrain him or her. Even, indeed especially, the basic relations of mother, father, child must be eliminated. At the limit distinctions between basic gender types male/female and sexual orientations homosexual/heterosexual are obliterated.

At this point we might detect a superficial resemblance between the aims of schizoanalysis and the Buddhist spiritual path. Both regard the self as an illusory and oppressive construct which must be broken down. However, whereas, for the Buddhists the therapy of no-self is a means to liberating us *from* desire, the therapy of schizoanalysis aims to liberate us *for* desire. The *telos* of the programme to deconstruct the self is the opposite in Buddhism from what we find in postmodernism. Thus the positive moment of schizoanalysis consists in discovering the elemental "desiring-machines" independent of superimposed interpretations. The individual regains touch with the basic flows of libidinal energy out of which he or she is constituted.

Deleuze and Guattari posit a direct opposition between basic human desire and the ordering of modern society. Using an analogy from physical chemistry they describes the former as "molecular" and the latter as "molar". Molar society, they say, effects a "unification, a totalisation of the molecular forces through a statistical accumulation obeying the laws of large numbers"<sup>81</sup>. Culture, according to Deleuze and Guattari, is a heavy, aggregate phenomenon that tends to smooth out and regularise the particular characteristics of individual human beings. Schizoanalysis aims to enable the individual formations of desire to master the molar aggregate. Individuals are freed insofar as they are broken down to the point where the discrete quanta of desire out of which they are constituted recover their primitive randomness over and against the ordering and averaging processes of society.

Now whilst this might have been the experience of those reacting against the formality and bureaucracy of French culture in 1968, it is, of course, far from being our universal experience of culture. Classical social and political theory has more usually assumed that culture is of positive

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<sup>80</sup>Anti-Oedipus p311.

<sup>81</sup>Anti-Oedipus p342.

therapeutic value to the individual. For example, Aristotle thought that only within the *polis* is a man able to exercise those gifts and powers that make him fully human and not a being crippled or arrested in his humanity.<sup>82</sup> In the classical tradition the healthy person is, in fact, the good citizen. If culture is experienced as overwhelmingly oppressive this might indicate a problem with a particular form of culture, not with human culture *per se*. The protests of Deleuze and Guattari are best taken, in the light of their political context, as demands for a more flexible, more heterogeneous, more informal pattern of social relations. If Deleuze and Guattari's programme were pursued as far as they suggest they would saw off the platform on which they stand: there would be no presses to print their books and no money to pay the schizoanalysts' fees.

The authors' analogy from physical chemistry is, at first sight, appealing. There is the suggestion that, in line with developments in natural science at the beginning of this century, what had appeared to be basic stable laws are, in fact, approximations imposed on an underlying randomness. However, assuming we allow the validity of such analogies from lower physical to higher psychological orders, a more contemporary understanding of physical science might suggest a variation on the analogy. For, as the distinguished physical chemist Ilya Prigogine has made clear, disorder is *not* a more fundamental reality than order. The basic chemical systems of the biological universe are in states of non-linear disequilibrium in which a small input may lead either to an increase in disorder or, equally, to an increase in order. Two of the most interesting physical examples of the latter are: the emergence of highly ordered hexagonal patterns of molecules (the so-called Bénard cells) when a thin film of liquid is heated; and the so-called "chemical clocks" in which millions of molecules switch state simultaneously. The bio-chemical world is, more than the inorganic world, characterised by non-linear (e.g. catalytic or enzyme-based) reactions which lead to spontaneous irruptions of order. As Prigogine suggests, human life is not imposed upon the natural realm in an alien or "heavy aggregate" manner, but appears as the supreme example of self-organising processes occurring *within* nature.<sup>83</sup> Thus, if the chemical analogy is pursued, whilst a contemporary account of the self will, I believe, need to account for a higher degree of unorder within the human being than previously allowed for, this will not exclude or delegitimize ordering processes within the self. The question of how the self can be both be made up of both ordered and unordered elements has, as we shall see in chapter 5, been addressed especially by Carl Jung.

Deleuze and Guattari agree with Lacan's distinction between desire and need. But whereas Lacan said that desire was different from ordinary need in that it went beyond need, these authors wish to separate the concept of desire from the concept of need altogether. They think<sup>84</sup> that we have actually been misled into associating desire with lack. Lack is created, planned and organised

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<sup>82</sup>Politics I.i.12.

<sup>83</sup>Prigogine (1984) p141ff.

<sup>84</sup>Anti-Oedipus p25ff.

through economic social systems. The dominant classes link our desire to these organised lacks so as to subjugate and control us. Desire should, instead, be seen as something productive, indeed, "desire produces reality"<sup>85</sup>. Following Freud we have thought that desire produces only fantasies, but according to Deleuze and Guattari desire produces real objects. "What is missing is not things a subject feels the lack of somewhere deep down inside himself, but rather the objectivity of man, the objective being of man."<sup>86</sup> It is not human persons that lack things and hence desire, and maybe even create fantasies to make up for what they lack, but the flows and currents of desire that create reality<sup>87</sup>.

Deleuze and Guattari's notion of desire forms a kind of analogy to the role of energy in physics. Indeed they sometimes refers to desire as libidinal energy, thus: "We use the term *libido* to designate the specific energy of desiring-machines"<sup>88</sup>. The idea that desire is primarily a matter of the basic energy of human beings, and only secondarily about satisfying lacks is, I think, a suggestive one. It emphasises that desire is not simply a matter of the building up and release of tension, but that desire is a fundamentally creative force in human life.

## 5.4 Michel Foucault

Michel Foucault is of especial interest to me here because of his somewhat dialectical relationship with psychoanalysis. Foucault's work falls broadly into three periods. In the first, his archaeological period, Foucault saw psychoanalysis as a tool for destabilising the constructions of "man"<sup>89</sup> by which we have been imprisoned. In this period he continues the stance taken by Lacan, Deleuze and Guattari. However, in his second, genealogical phase, psychoanalysis becomes part of the problem, a part of those very power relations in which we are trapped. Finally, in his third, ethical phase, Foucault seems to leave psychoanalysis behind in favour of a renewed attempt at self-making. I think that with Foucault the logic of the postmodernist view of the self unfolds to the greatest degree.

### 5.4.1 The Archaeological Period

Whilst Foucault's earliest papers, such as the 1954 Maladie mentale et personnalité, concerned the positive search for a true psychology, during most of Foucault's writing career he adopted a critical approach to psychology. This critical attitude arose no doubt in part because of his own sense of being classified as psychologically deviant, and his experience of living on the psycho-

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<sup>85</sup>Anti-Oedipus p30.

<sup>86</sup>Anti-Oedipus p27.

<sup>87</sup>We might compare Augustine (Ch. 3 *infra*.) for whom desire is likewise a primal and positive feature of human psychology that leads one on to deeper forms of reality. Both see desire as a creative force, although they perceive this creativity as achieving opposite psychological results. Augustine thinks that desire (properly conceived) builds up the self; Lacan thinks it shatters the self.

<sup>88</sup>Anti-Oedipus p291.

<sup>89</sup>A term used here in a quasi-technical sense to refer to modern descriptions of ourselves.



social margins of society as a homosexual<sup>90</sup>. Thus his 1961 Folie et déraison (ET Madness and Civilisation 1965) attacks our modern psychological notions of madness, and his 1963 La Naissance de la Clinique (ET The Birth of the Clinic 1973) relativises psychological knowledge to particular structures of discourse arising in the modern hospital. But his critique of psychology and the human sciences in general (what he frequently refers to as "the sciences of man") reached its most theoretically intense form in his 1967 Les Mots et les Choses (ET The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences 1971).

This book is a dense study of the conditions of the possibility of the human sciences. It can be read as a psychoanalytically inspired attempt to destabilise the human sciences and their object "man". Foucault takes it that continuous history is the indispensable correlative to the founding of the modern subject. It unites past, present and future in a way that mirrors the unification and centring of the subject: a total history corresponds with a total human being. His "archaeology" works to break down the myth of historical continuity. It celebrates discontinuity. Its task is "to operate a decentring that leaves no privilege to any centre...to *make differences*"<sup>91</sup>. Foucault gives two examples of what this means. In terms of world history, Archaeology stays with the decentring operated by Marx - the historical analysis of relations of production and class struggle - against Hegelian attempts to impose a rational *telos* on humanity. In terms of the psychology of the individual it stays with the unknown and unregulated character of the unconscious and sexuality. It resists attempts to make the unconscious the object of a consciousness. It thereby hinders the self from grasping its deepest conditions and constructing a comprehensive history for itself.<sup>92</sup> At this stage, Foucault is clearly influenced by a Lacanian psychoanalytic outlook in which the subversive qualities of the Freudian unconscious are stressed. The existence of the unconscious prevents a rational description of total selfhood such as is sought by the human sciences. Psychoanalysis may therefore contribute to our liberation from these objectifying disciplines. Foucault's archaeology sides with psychoanalysis in freeing us from the unified self that is the object of the human and specifically psychological sciences.

#### 5.4.2 The Genealogical Period

Following the events of May 1968 and through the 1970s Foucault's interests shifted from theory to practice, from analysis of structures of discourse to analysis of the mechanisms of power. Indeed he makes the retrospective comment: "When I think back now, I ask myself what else it was that I was talking about in *Madness and Civilisation* or *The Birth of the Clinic*, but power?"

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<sup>90</sup>See, for example the biographies of Foucault by James Miller (HarperCollins 1993) and Didier Eribon (Faber 1993).

<sup>91</sup>AK p205.

<sup>92</sup>AK p13.

Yet I'm perfectly aware that I scarcely ever used the word and never had such a field of analyses at my disposal."<sup>93</sup>

For Foucault, power is not a "thing", the control of a set of institutions or the implicit rationality of history. Rather, "it is the name that one attributes to a complex strategical situation in society."<sup>94</sup> The aim is "to move less towards a 'theory' of power than towards an 'analytics' of power"<sup>95</sup>. This means identifying and analysing the web of unequal relationships that are set up by political technologies. Power relations are "both intentional and nonsubjective"<sup>96</sup>. We can thus envisage people caught up in networks of power but would be mistaken to search for controlling subjects. Indeed Foucault wants to insist that in a certain sense power constitutes the subject. "The individual is an effect of power, and at the same time, or precisely to the extent to which it is that effect, it is the element of its articulation."<sup>97</sup>

The most important example of Foucault's genealogy of power is his 1976 Volonté de Savoir (ET History of Sexuality 1 (HS1) 1978). HS1 addresses the question: "Why do we say, with so much passion and so much resentment against our recent past, that we are repressed?"<sup>98</sup>. The answer that unfolds reveals a new conception of power. Power is not a judicial concept experienced as negation and repression. Rather it induces pleasure, forms knowledge, produces discourse. "It needs to be considered as a productive network which runs through the whole social body."<sup>99</sup> Foucault's declared interest in sex is that it joins together two kinds of power interests: the state macro-interest in securing the health, fertility and productive force of its people, and the micro-interest in classifying and controlling the behaviour of the individual.

His argument is that rather than see the 18th and 19th centuries as a history of increasing repression of sex (what Foucault calls "the repressive hypothesis") they in fact disclose a regulated incitement to discourse about sex. The roots of inducement to talk about sex lie in the monastic Christian confession. In the seventeenth century regular confession was decreed as an ideal for every Christian. Towards the beginning of the eighteenth century there arose a public interest in sex. Governments became concerned not merely with subjects but with a "population", with its birth and death rates, fertility and states of health. The sexual behaviour of the population became an economic and political problem.

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<sup>93</sup>"Truth and Power" in FCR p57.

<sup>94</sup>HS1 p93.

<sup>95</sup>HS1 p82.

<sup>96</sup>HS1 p94.

<sup>97</sup>From "Two Lectures" in Gordon (1980) p98.

<sup>98</sup>HS1 p8.

<sup>99</sup>"Truth and Power" in Gordon (1980) p119.

In the nineteenth century discourse on sex was medicalised. With Charcot sex was granted a general and diffuse causal power. (Foucault's omission of Freud in this genealogy is part of his rhetorical technique.) The questionnaire, hypnosis, free association were developed as ways of proceduralising confession in a clinically acceptable way. The notion of latency suggests that sex is obscure, that energy is needed to track it down. The truth is only partially revealed by the one who spoke it. A skilled interpreter is needed to complete the act of truth telling. Sex thus becomes a crucial locus for subjectivity, truth, power, knowledge and pleasure. One is induced to discover the delightful - and perhaps painful - pleasure of telling the truth about oneself. By submitting to the knowledge and power of the other one knows oneself and constitutes oneself as a subject. The irony is that in confessing one's sexuality one believes one is achieving one's liberation<sup>100</sup>.

There can be little doubt that Foucault has psychoanalysis in mind here; indeed at one point he remarks that his enterprise could be considered as the archaeology of psychoanalysis.<sup>101</sup> Clearly a marked change has occurred: instead of conceiving psychoanalysis as a principle of criticism with which to lay bare the epistemic assumptions of the human sciences, psychoanalysis has now itself become one element in the entire apparatus of knowledge-power. No longer the privileged critic, psychoanalysis now has a place, perhaps the central place, in the new apparatus of power. This change in the function of psychoanalysis is bound up with Foucault's innovative understanding of power. If power is understood to be repressive of sexual pleasure, as it had been in Freud, Lacan, Deleuze and Guattari, then the discourse of sexuality may be taken to oppose power. But if power *produces* pleasure, then the practice of psychoanalysis is a manifestation of power.

The psychoanalyst would have us believe that sexuality is some deep mysterious essence hidden under societal repression. Rather, says Foucault, it is "a great surface network in which the stimulation of bodies, the intensification of pleasures, the incitement to discourse, the formation of special knowledges, the strengthening of controls and resistances, are linked to one another, in accordance with a few major strategies of knowledge and power"<sup>102</sup>. The "few major strategies" are very simple: firstly the contract between analyst and analysand in which the latter agrees to pay the former to listen for some fixed time; secondly the rule that the analysand says whatever comes into his or her head. Psychoanalysis is now revealed as the purest and most economical of all the strategies of domination.<sup>103</sup>

### 5.4.3 The Ethical Period

Towards the end of his life, Foucault's analysis developed into a third stage. Writing in 1982 he said:

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<sup>100</sup>HS1 p159.

<sup>101</sup>HS1 p138.

<sup>102</sup>HS1 p106.

<sup>103</sup>So Forrester p297ff.

"Maybe the target nowadays is not to discover who we are, but to refuse who we are. We have to imagine and to build up what we could be to get rid of this kind of political "double bind" which is the simultaneous individualisation and totalization of modern power structures... We have to promote new forms of subjectivity through the refusal of this kind of individuality which has been imposed on us for several centuries."<sup>104</sup>

This third period, then, is a phase of self *construction*. It is concerned with "the kind of relationship you ought to have with yourself, *rappor à soi*, which I call ethics, and which determines how the individual is supposed to constitute himself as a moral subject of his own actions"<sup>105</sup>. Foucault's late work is a history of "ethics" or, what is now for him the same thing, a history of the modern identity. Perhaps to our surprise, the postmodernist Foucault now aspires to an understanding of selfhood not unlike that which we have found in Taylor.

Foucault develops his ethical history in Volumes 2 and 3 of the History of Sexuality. Volume 2 covers classical Greece and Volume 3 the Graeco-Roman period. The fourth volume which was entitled "Confessions of the Flesh" and covered the early Christian centuries was, unfortunately, not published. However, we can gather the argument of Foucault's history of the early Christian period from the published record of his 1982 seminar "Technologies of the Self" and from the overview of work that Foucault had in progress at the very end of his life recorded by Paul Rabinow as "On the Genealogy of Ethics" (1983). This last article also gives us a valuable late summary of the whole of Foucault's genealogical argument.

I shall omit the details of Foucault's ethical genealogy here, suffice to say that his overall aim is to demonstrate the possibility of an ethic which assigns a significant role to *pleasure*, to show that an ethic solely based on *desire* is not some kind of anthropological necessity. What this amounts to, however, is unclear. Whilst he seems to reject a return to the ethics of classical Greece<sup>106</sup>, he is, nevertheless, sympathetic to the Greek "aesthetic of existence". Overall, it is difficult to escape the impression that Foucault is searching for a way back over the bridge of Christianity to something similar to what he took to be a less repressive Greek ethic. Certainly his preferred "mode of formation" is similar to the artistic *telos* he identifies in classical Greece. He expresses the hope that the creativity which has now been restricted to the specialised work of artists be practised by everyone. "From the idea that the self is not given to us, I think that there is only one practical consequence: we have to create ourselves as a work of art...couldn't everyone's life become a work of art?"<sup>107</sup>

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<sup>104</sup>"Afterword" in Dreyfus and Rabinow (1983).

<sup>105</sup>From "On the Genealogy of Ethics (GE)" FCR p352.

<sup>106</sup>"GE" p347.

<sup>107</sup>"GE". p350f.

### 5.5 The Contribution of the Postmodernists

The postmodernists raise important questions concerning the notion of the self. They present us with a spectrum of views ranging from the highly intellectualised psychoanalysis of Lacan, through the radical critique of Deleuze and Guattari to the genealogy of the self suggested in the later Foucault. Their final contribution is, I think, a mixed one.

Lacan offers us a radical reading of Freud. He is less interested in Freud's positive proposals than in his power of critique. Bowie comments: "Where other Freudians appoint themselves as explainers, emendators, or continuators of the original theoretical texts, Lacan wants to keep on feeling their initial shock"<sup>108</sup>. Yet Freud's efforts to root his psychology in clinical practice gave Freud's work at least some rootedness and verifiability that Lacan lacks. When Lacan tells us that our human world is constituted by the imaginary, the symbolic and the real why should we believe him? According to Lacan, it would seem that we have to see if we are convinced by the power of his rhetoric: "I truth will speak"<sup>109</sup>. Actually Lacan turns all our usual understandings of truth on their heads, "I [truth] wonder about in what you regard as the least true in essence: in the chain, in the way the most far-fetched conceit, the most grotesque nonsense of the joke defies sense, in chance, not in its law, but in its contingency"<sup>110</sup>. Lacan's work is aptly summarised by Bowie as "an outstanding feat of literary imagination"<sup>111</sup>.

Nonetheless, we will need to return to a number of Lacan's points. How can a notion of integrated selfhood take account of the primal aggressivity that Lacan has discovered in the human soul? What are we to make of Lacan's suggestion that psychological wholeness is related to the unconditional demand for love? Must we really abandon all hope of making sense of our lives and resign ourselves to playful discourse without end?

So far as Deleuze and Guattari's Anti-Oedipus is concerned, we see here a tendency towards breaking down the personality structure and exalting the schizophrenic that is one of the most problematic aspects of postmodernism. Things have now been taken too far. What began as an emphasis on difference, on the fragmentary, the unordered, and the small-scale, risks ending in a collapse into nihilism. The rise of this radicalised form of psychoanalysis was deeply bound to the social and political turbulence of May-June 1968. It seemed that psychoanalysis might forge an alliance with Marxism in effecting a transformation of French society<sup>112</sup>. However, the self which is completely shattered cannot be the alienated self of Marxism, and it is therefore difficult to see

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<sup>108</sup>Bowie (1991) p196.

<sup>109</sup>Écrits p121.

<sup>110</sup>Écrits p122.

<sup>111</sup>Bowie p200.

<sup>112</sup>See, e.g., the sociological analysis of French postmodernism given by Turkle.

how the post-1968 alliance of Marxism and psychoanalysis could be sustained. In carrying through a ferocious attack on the self the radical psychoanalyst is left with no place on which organised resistance to perceived reactionary forces in society might take its stand. Far from being instrumental in freeing the individual, radical psychoanalysis might now be taken to collude with oppression and actually facilitate the slide into fascism. In its guise of "schizoanalysis", postmodernism becomes self-defeating.

This is the logic that unfolds in the middle and later Foucault. Foucault's genealogical period shows a fundamental shift in which psychoanalysis moves from being a tool for subverting the powers to itself being at the very centre of an apparatus of power. Foucault came to the realisation that power does not oppose basic human desire, so that psychoanalysis in unlocking desire might oppose the powers, but that power is rather constitutive of desire. Power, desire and pleasure all form one single mesh. Thus, in Foucault's final "ethical" period he moves to a concern for self-making: how may we constitute ourselves so as to achieve liberation from the mesh in which we are ensnared?

The final appeal from this, the most significant of the postmodernists is, then, *not* for the dissolution of the self but a demand for a new (or, perhaps, ancient?) mode of selfhood. We should notice, moreover, that nowhere in his ethical account does Foucault reject the basic notion of self-mastery. His quarrel seems to be, rather, with the norms according to which one is supposed to master one's self and the aims towards which this mastery is directed. In which case, I suggest that Foucault, at the end of his life, returned to an appreciation of the desirability of the project to unify the self. His disagreement with the modern self is not that of the other postmodernists we have reviewed, who have argued that the very existence of a centred self is oppressive. Rather, Foucault sought a mode of-being-a-self which could be liberating in the context of contemporary culture.

I do not think that Foucault found this mode. His limited positive proposals for an "aesthetic of existence" were certainly not very inspiring. He seems to have in mind a kind of self-related freedom and pure pleasure seeking of the least morally worthwhile kind. In any case, I think Foucault's harking back to classical Greece is misplaced for two reasons. Firstly, Foucault's "genealogy" of Greek ethics is, on its own terms, a very particular and selective reading of the Greek situation. Foucault tells the story in such a way that the "Use of Pleasure" becomes the central ethical concern rather than the more usual pursuit of the Good. But can one really claim to give a fair representation of the Greek ethic when goodness is dropped from the picture entirely? Secondly, even if one were to adopt Foucault's pleasure-centred reading of Greek ethics, "desire" cannot, realistically, be eliminated from our *rapport a soi*. Our understanding of ourselves as desiring, willing, creatures is just too deeply impressed on our historical consciousness. Foucault

seems to want to go back beyond the entire stream of "inwardness" that we have seen developed from Augustine onwards into the modern era. I think that in trying to do this he simply underestimates the weight and cultural power of the transmitted sense of identity.

The final challenge of postmodernism is then, it seems to me, *not* that of abolishing the self. It is, rather, to find new and liberating ways of constituting the self, ways which Foucault sought for but did not find. Postmodernism, I wish to suggest, does not mark the end of the self. Instead it marks a radical questioning of selfhood, a demand for new ways of uniting the self which take account of the flux, fragmentation and non-order that characterise late twentieth century life. As my historical account of the evolution of the modern self has shown (Sections 2 and 3) our contemporary sense of self has very deep roots indeed. The option of simply jumping out of it is not one that is, realistically, open to us. Rather, the task we are set is to see how our historically conditioned sense of self might be developed to meet the demands of our present context. We will do this in the following chapters with reference to Augustine, who initiated the Western psychological self, and by considering some of the modern psychologists whose work seems to have articulated most strongly the contemporary sense of self.

# 3

## Augustine: Integrating the Self through the Desire of God

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### **1. A Theological Programme for Uniting the Self**

I have suggested that Augustine is of fundamental importance for the formation of the characteristic inwardness of the Western identity. I have also indicated that Augustine expounds one of the three major moral sources by which, on a significance-based understanding of selfhood, the modern self is constructed, namely the theistic source of moral value. In this chapter I wish to describe and evaluate how Augustine understands that the self is unified through its relation to God. This proposal, however, seems to raise an initial difficulty in relation to modern psychologically orientated descriptions of selfhood.

Modern psychologists, conceiving their discipline as a strictly empirical one and especially insofar as they are still influenced by behaviourism, are frequently inclined to bracket out theological beliefs from the data they consider relevant to their study of the human subject. For Augustine, by contrast, theology was inseparable from psychology. He thought that the highest function of the human mind was contemplation of eternal truth (*sapientia*). Mental well-being was, therefore, bound up with a theological attitude. Thus at the end of what is possibly his most profound work Augustine exclaimed to God: "Let me seek your face always...Let me remember you, let me understand you, let me love you. Increase these things in me until you restore me to wholeness (*ad integrum*)"<sup>1</sup>. Personal transformation was always, for Augustine, a function of one's relationship with God. Augustine's *Confessions*, for all its psychological insight, describes a *spiritual* journey that begins with the soul's restlessness without God and ends with the soul's hope of the heavenly Jerusalem. For the modern psychologist, theological beliefs are usually of only secondary interest, and may actually distract one from the empirical data, whereas for Augustine psychology was derivative of theology.

One possible approach to this dilemma would be to focus on the human pole of the divine-human relationship proposed by Augustine, that is, to try to isolate what Augustine has to say about human flourishing from what he has to say about God. This would, however, do violence to Augustine's intentions and treat as primary data what Augustine would have regarded as consequences of deeper realities. An alternative approach, and the one I adopt here, is to treat the

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<sup>1</sup>*Conf.* XV.51. My translation on this occasion. Translations in this chapter are henceforth taken from the versions cited in the bibliography.



theological tenets themselves as providing a means for some definite psychological end, namely the integration of the self, and to evaluate how far they help do this. Such an approach is consistent with the significance-based view of selfhood that I have adopted.

Of course if one could show on independent empirical grounds that the theological tenets were true or untrue this would be of decisive importance. However theological statements are not usually open to independent empirical falsification in quite the same way that scientific psychological statements are. Indeed, I am inclined to follow Vincent Brummer's line that questions of the truth of ultimate theological assertions are bound up with an assessment of the whole forms of life in which they are embedded. A belief system would be expected to lose its psychological effectiveness if and when the believer came to discover that it possessed less truth than some other system available to him. The highest degree of personal integration might be expected from a system which was believed by the adherent to possess more truth than any of the other belief systems he had encountered. By contrast, on a significance-based view of selfhood, the attempt to live according to a belief system which one knows to be untrue cannot lead to psychological wholeness since it involves a basic act of moral self-deception. Thus the reader cannot evaluate the psychological effectiveness of Augustinian (or any other) theology without, indirectly, also coming to some view of its truth-value.

My approach is difficult to reconcile with psychologies which see our beliefs as mere epiphenomena that arise out of primary emotional states. It may, however, correspond with more cognitive styles of modern psychology that see our beliefs as having a determinative effect on our behaviour and feelings. Major reviews of the empirical evidence relating the effect of religious belief on psychological health have been carried out in the USA by Batson, Schoenrade and Ventis<sup>2</sup> and in the UK by Kate Loewenthal<sup>3</sup>. I am concerned here with theoretical considerations such as the extent to which the belief system has the rational coherence and power to give one a unified sense of self, although there is no reason in principle why the empirical effects on mental health of this particular belief system could not be investigated as a separate exercise.

## **2. Augustine and the Notion of the Self**

In considering the success of Augustine's theology in integrating the self we are faced with an immediate difficulty in terminology. There is no one-to-one Latin equivalent of our English word "self", with its connotations of the individual as the object of his or her own reflection and introspection. The Latin *ego*, for example, was only used as a term of emphasis to indicate contrast or distinction between individuals. In Augustine, the two words *animus* and, especially, *mens* probably give the closest equivalents. These words are usually translated as soul and mind

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<sup>2</sup>Batson et. al. (1993).

<sup>3</sup>Loewenthal (1995).

respectively, but may equally be used to refer to what we would call the "self".<sup>4</sup> Nonetheless, Augustine's language nuances what is taken to be the self in a particular way.

Augustine takes from Neo-Platonism the notion of soul (*anima*) as an immaterial and unextended substance. Soul in its broadest sense is the principle of life in things. *Anima* may be used in connection with animals as well as human beings. The mind or self (*animus*) is then said to be a "part" of the soul, namely its best part<sup>5</sup>. *Animus* is the human principle of life precisely as rational and spiritual. *Animus* is never used with reference to animals. Augustine does use *animus* to refer to the emotional and volitional aspects of the human being, but only insofar as these are viewed from a rational perspective. The alternative *mens*, is a somewhat narrower term than *animus*, referring to the mind in its specifically inward and upward orientations of rational judgement about things given by sense-perception (*scientia*) and contemplation of eternal truth (*sapientia*). It is thus clear from his Latin terminology that Augustine's "self" will tend to be equated with the "rational self".

*Mens* and *animus* are terms that developed out of several centuries of Greek and Roman anthropological reflection, and it is worth pausing to notice how the conceptual framework might have been assembled differently if Augustine had had access to the older biblical Hebrew category of spirit (*ruach*). Augustine is aware of, and allows, a range of meaning to *spiritus*<sup>6</sup>. But he tends to oppose "spirit" to the material and bodily. Indeed, a Platonic interpretation of the Pauline spirit/flesh pair allows him to find biblical support for such a polarity: "We know that the law is spiritual but I am of the flesh [Rom 7:14]; spiritual in mind, of the flesh in body"<sup>7</sup>. Sometimes he identifies *spiritus* with *anima*<sup>8</sup>, sometimes with the rational part of *anima*, the *animus* or *mens*<sup>9</sup>. He will equally describe man as body and soul, or as body and spirit<sup>10</sup>. By contrast the biblical Hebrew *ruach* word signifies, at root, the power or energy in breath or a gust of wind enabling it to move and is not in any sense opposed to the body or corporeality. It always refers to a life-energy, to what acts and causes to act. Frequently *ruach* is used in the Old Testament to refer to strong emotions, such as anger, grief, sadness, bitterness and longing (e.g. Gen. 26:35; Num. 5:14; Judg. 8:3). One would obviously obtain a quite different sense of self, not least one which celebrated the non-rational aspects of the person, if one took *ruach* as the individual's highest principle compared with taking *mens* as the highest part of the human being.

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<sup>4</sup>So Hill (Introduction to *trin.*) p25.

<sup>5</sup>*Acad.* 1.2.5.

<sup>6</sup>*trin.* XIV.2-4.

<sup>7</sup>*sermo.* 154.8. Although he can also give a much more nuanced interpretation of the Pauline "flesh" (*ciu.* XIV.2).

<sup>8</sup>*Gn. litt.* 12.9.20

<sup>9</sup>*trin.* XIV.22, *orig. an.* 4.36

<sup>10</sup>*trin.* XIV.22

### **3. Augustine and The Desire of God**

For Augustine the "desire of God" is the basic drive which draws the self on to maturity and integration. The whole of one's life can be seen as either the outworking or the frustration of this principle.<sup>11</sup> The term "desire" embraces the multitude of terms and expressions, including but not restricted to "love", and - most importantly - "will", by which Augustine designates the fundamental drive of human beings towards God.<sup>12</sup>

The background to Augustine's notion of the desire for God comes, in large part, from Neo-Platonic philosophy, in which the concept was of dominating importance. Augustine had access to the Neo-Platonic thought-world through his reading of what he enigmatically refers to as "the books of the Platonists"<sup>13</sup>. Whilst we cannot be sure of the identity of these books, it is very likely that they included several treatises by Plotinus.<sup>14</sup> In Plotinus's cosmology, the whole world was charged with potentiality, movement and desire. Even plants and inanimate objects were said to be striving after contemplation.<sup>15</sup> For Plotinus the human soul desired to escape entrapment in the realm of the material world, so as to obtain a vision of the supreme spiritual beauty. As the soul drew closer towards the Supreme principle, so it would become more and more like this principle. At the limit it would merge into the divine simplicity.<sup>16</sup> Thus Plotinus says: "And one that shall know this vision - with what passion of love shall he not be seized, with what pang of desire, what longing to be molten into one with This, what wondering delight!"<sup>17</sup>

However, Augustine's conversion to Christianity required him to conceive the notion of desire of God in a new way. Human beings according to Neo-Platonism had a natural tendency to return to the One from whom they had originally emanated. According to the Christian doctrine of creation *ex nihilo*, human beings are ontologically distinct from God. They do not, therefore, simply return to God by natural processes nor may they autonomously attain to God by their own efforts. The Christian God is not only the end of the soul's journey but also supplies the way.<sup>18</sup> We must therefore properly speak not simply of desire for God but rather desire *of* God. God is both the object of our desire and he who places this desire for himself within us<sup>19</sup>.

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<sup>11</sup>Cf. *ep. Jo. tr.* 4.6 "The whole life of a good Christian is a holy desire".

<sup>12</sup>Such terms include *amare, appetere, concupiscere, cupere, delectare, desiderium, diligo, extensio, intentio and quarere*. The actual phrase "*desiderium Dei*" does not occur in Augustine as far as I am aware. This could possibly be because Augustine is anxious to avoid any suggestion of predicating "lack" (one of the senses of *desiderium*) of God as subject (so Bochet p4).

<sup>13</sup>*conf.* VII.ix.13.

<sup>14</sup>So Brown p94 (following Hadot) who places Plotinus rather than Porphyry at the centre of Augustine's reading in 386.

<sup>15</sup>*Enneads* III.8.1.

<sup>16</sup>*Enneads* III.8.8.

<sup>17</sup>*Enneads* I.6.7.

<sup>18</sup>*conf* VII.xvii.23f; cf. *trin* XV.31.

<sup>19</sup>Much theological comment on Augustine has been influenced by Anders Nygren's book *Agape and Eros*. Nygren argued that Augustine's synthesis of the love which comes from God with the love which people feel towards God marked the corruption of a supposedly Christian *agape*

The range of terms that Augustine uses for love (notably, *amor*, *dilectio*, *caritas*) envisage both desiring, questing elements and also static, fulfilled components. A Christian notion of love could not solely be defined in terms of desire, a quality that connotes lack, since God himself is love (1 Jn. 4:16) and God lacks nothing. However, after the fall human love for God takes the form of desire. It is the desiring aspects of love that dominate Augustine's work<sup>20</sup>, and this is one reason why I have chosen to take desire rather than love as my theme for explicating Augustine. In addition, desire is a dynamic notion which is suggestive for comparisons with the modern psychologies we shall meet in subsequent chapters.

For Augustine, the desire of God is, to a certain extent, one desire amongst a multitude of other desires present in the human soul. In this respect it shares the volitional and affective characteristics of human desire in general. However, it is radically different from the other desires in that its object stands to other objects as creator to creation. Augustine argues that God alone is truly able to satisfy our desire and grant us genuine happiness. Therefore only God is to be desired and *enjoyed* for his own sake. None of the other objects which may excite our desire can make us truly happy. These temporal and material objects should be *used* as means to the enjoyment of God, not desired as objects of enjoyment in themselves.<sup>21</sup>

In Augustine's terms, the desire for God in a human being is none other than the grace of God working within him. Desires and actions that lie outside this realm of grace are simply doing what is evil. Those in whom the fundamental desire of God has not been uncovered are living in a state of disorder and sin. We might say, in Taylor's terms, that the desire for God is a powerful and exclusive moral source. It confers on us our basic moral identity and is of determinative significance for all our other desires.

## **4. The Desire of God Mistaken**

### **4.1. The State of Sickness**

For Augustine, the great mass of humanity lives in a state of radical fallenness. Fallen humanity is characterised by a neglect of its basic orientation towards God. People live in the mistaken belief that fulfilment of desires for material objects would be sufficient to bring them happiness. Augustine gives an important autobiographical statement of this kind of mistake in a description of his youth. He says:

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(which descends on human beings from God) by the admixture of a Greek *eros* (the human quality by which people aspire upwards towards God). However, Nygren's thesis has been strongly contested and, I think, refuted by numerous authors including (in English) Burnaby (1938) and, in a different vein, O'Donovan (1980).

<sup>20</sup>E.g. *trin.* XII.22 "What is the worship of [God] but the love of him by which we now desire to see him (*desideramus eum videre*)...?"

<sup>21</sup>*doctr. chr.* I.3.3-5.5.

"I came to Carthage, where a cauldron of illicit loves leapt and boiled about me. I was not yet in love, but I was in love with love, and from the very depth of my need (*secretiore indigentia*) hated myself for not more keenly feeling the need...For within I was hungry, all for the want of that spiritual food which is Thyself, my God; yet [though I was hungry for want of it] I did not hunger for it: I had no desire whatever for incorruptible food, not because I had it in abundance but the emptier I was the more I hated the thought of it. Because of all this my soul was sick..."<sup>22</sup>

This account may be read on three levels<sup>23</sup>. At the first level it is a straightforward account of the 17 year old Augustine arriving in a big city and feeling an intense desire to love and be loved. At a second, symbolic, level the account introduces the leading psychological effects of desire which has gone astray. In substituting carnal desires for the desire of God, human beings experience a state of self-division - hungry/not hungry, loving/hating. At this level it is not Augustine but everyman who is the subject. At a third level, Augustine's account has ontological implications. The notion of poverty (Augustine's *indigentia*) is Neo-Platonic and connotes not just material deprivation but also a more general, insatiable, spiritual desire. Thus Porphyry spoke of the poverty of that part of the soul which, in turning away from Being and dispersing itself among sensible objects, loses its own being. Read on these upper two levels the account tells us how the mistaking of the desire of God leads to psychological and ontological fragmentation of self. It shows why the condition of humanity in the mistaking of the desire of God is to be summarised as one of "sickness".

Whilst the image of sickness has roots in both Greek thought and scripture<sup>24</sup>, in Augustine it assumes central importance. He uses the term "sickness" to designate a global state affecting the whole of a person: the body is subject to death, the will is enfeebled, the spirit is blinded. Even small children are afflicted.<sup>25</sup> For Augustine the image of sickness conveys the normative and existential character of the situation of humanity.

Augustine's growing understanding of the *comprehensive* nature of humanity's disease was a key factor in his disillusionment with the Manichees, and led him to a radically different understanding of selfhood from them. According to Mani, weakness and sickness were identified with darkness and materiality. Through attending to Mani's teaching one might attain to true self-knowledge, and by ascetic practice one might then liberate the light, spiritual self from the

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<sup>22</sup>conf III.i.1 (Sheed).

<sup>23</sup>Bochet pp23-27.

<sup>24</sup>E.g. (i) Plato's *Timaeus* 86 suggests excessive sensual desire is caused by a sickness of the soul; (ii) Math 9:12 "those who are well have no need of a physician but those who are sick".

<sup>25</sup>conf. I.vii.11.

darkness of materiality.<sup>26</sup> The authentic self might thus be *discovered* if one could only strip away the darkness that clung to it.<sup>27</sup> But Augustine found that Mani's doctrine did not properly account for his sense of inner conflict. "I liked to excuse myself and to accuse some identifiable power which was with me and yet not I. But the whole was myself and what divided me against myself was my impiety."<sup>28</sup> He could not simply write off those warring elements of his being as "other" than his true self. The condition of sickness afflicted the very core of his self. On Augustine's understanding, if one stripped away materiality one would not so much discover a true self as a sick self.

Augustine's revised understanding of selfhood was bound up with a profound difference from the Manichees over the question of the location of evil. The Christian Augustine held, against the Manichees, that evil resides neither in the body, nor in the passions through which desire for objects is experienced, nor in the desired material objects themselves. In humanity's fallen condition, evil is not something which is external to the true self. Rather, evil springs from a disorder of the will, the core of the self. Humanity wilfully neglects God in favour of lower, sensible and material goods as desired ends. For Augustine, recovery of a good and true sense of self could, therefore, never be simply a matter of self-discovery but had to be a matter of a re-orientation of the will leading to the self's transformation.

Augustine expresses humanity's disordered desire using three terms with similar meanings: *cupiditas*, *concupiscentia* and *libido*. *Cupiditas* is occasionally used in a neutral sense, as, for example, when Augustine refers to the four Stoic passions of joy, fear, gladness and desire, but it usually carries the pejorative sense of covetousness - the exact opposite of *caritas*.<sup>29</sup> *Concupiscentia* can have a positive usage in the sense of ardent desire but mostly refers to an immoderate attraction to earthly things, particularly in the case of sexual attraction. *Libido* refers to all appetites that contradict the essential order of human nature, but especially to sexual desire inasmuch as it escapes the control of the will.<sup>30</sup>

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<sup>26</sup>Cf. Assmusen's article on Manichaeism in eds. Bleaker and Widengren (1969).

<sup>27</sup>cf. Quispel's comment in Segal (1992) p245 that: "The discovery of the self is the core of both Gnosticism and Manichaeism".

<sup>28</sup>conf. V.x.18.

<sup>29</sup>E.g. conf. VIII.v.12 "I was sure it was better to render myself up to your *caritas* than to surrender to my own *cupiditas*". See also the discussion of Augustine's terms for love in O'Donovan Ch. 1. O'Donovan comments that whilst Augustine can sometimes use *delectio*, *amor*, and *caritas* as synonyms, *caritas* alone of these three is never used with reference to evil or worldly things but is always contrasted with *cupiditas* (p11).

<sup>30</sup>E.g. *ciu.* XIV.15 "Pleasure... is preceded by ...the feeling normally called lust [*libido*], when it is concerned with the sexual organs, though lust is the general name for desire of every kind... Thus we have the lust for vengeance, called anger; the lust for possession of money, called greed; the lust for victory at any price, called obstinacy; the lust for boasting, called vanity."

Unfortunately, Augustine's account of disordered desire leaves him with no ways of saying anything good about sexuality as we experience it. For Augustine, sexual desire was experienced in a morally good form before the fall when it was fully ordered, fully under the control of the will. But Adam's punishment was to have the link between the will and sexual desire weakened<sup>31</sup>. As a result sexual desire became a source of shame, present when one did not want it and, sometimes, not present when one did want it. Since, after the fall, sexual desire seems inevitably to be tinged with "un-order", Augustine thinks it is necessarily marked by sin and shame<sup>32</sup>. He is left with, what seem to us, some very strange conclusions, such as that the ideal form of Christian marriage is one in which the partners abstain from intercourse. Augustine never found a way of articulating any possibility that sexual pleasure might, in itself, enrich the relations between husband and wife. Augustine's opponent Julian of Eclanum rightly argued that sexual desire, understood as humanity's natural tendency to seek satisfaction for its animal desires, is morally indifferent. For Augustine, on the other hand, *concupiscentia* or *libido* is already disorderly and perverted. For Augustine human sexuality is intrinsically opposed to the moral demands of the will. Much later, as we shall see, Freud develops a model of the mind which is also based on an opposition between libido and the demands of morality but which grants to the libido a legitimacy that it could never have had for Augustine.

For Augustine the healing of the self's sickness involves the ordering of desire, and we can detect in Augustine two kinds of ordering principles. The first, and simpler, is the eudaimonist principle whereby one posits a right end to "enjoy" and uses everything else as a means to this end.<sup>33</sup> On this understanding the substance of disordered desire is the positing of a goal which ultimately fails to satisfy. The things of the world are loved and enjoyed for their own sake, rather than being loved as gifts of the Creator and as means to the enjoyment of the divine Giver.<sup>34</sup>

Augustine's eudaimonist scheme sharply preserves the ontological difference between God and his creation. It may, for example, form a valid principle of criticism of those therapeutic forms of Christianity which would see the development of the self as the chief goal and the notion of God as little more than a means to this end. However, it leads to two major kinds of problems.

In the first place, it is difficult to accommodate love of neighbour within this dual scheme. Are neighbours to be used or enjoyed, or what? In his discussion in On Christian Doctrine I Augustine repeatedly insists that only God is to be enjoyed for his own sake. As a result he is forced into the

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<sup>31</sup>*gr. et pecc. or.* II.36.41.

<sup>32</sup>It is the lack of order in sexual desire, not its physicality, which disturbs Augustine. In this respect he is markedly different from Christian contemporaries such as Jerome and Gregory of Nyssa who took it as axiomatic that in a state of paradise there would be no physical relations.

<sup>33</sup>Cf. O'Donovan's discussion of "positive love" (p24ff.)

<sup>34</sup>*Io.eu.tr.* 2:11-14.

scandalous suggestion that we should use our neighbours in order to enjoy God.<sup>35</sup> Faced with the scriptural injunction that we are to "enjoy one another in the Lord"<sup>36</sup> he suggests that this is merely a rather loose way of indicating "use with delight". What we are really doing when we enjoy a neighbour, he says, is not enjoying the neighbour in himself but using our relationship as a means of enjoying the God who is in him.<sup>37</sup>

Secondly, and more generally, this use/enjoyment scheme reinforces a Platonic division between time and eternity, the present realm of the mutable and the realm of the changeless. It suggests that things on our temporal plane are merely of utility value whilst only God is of real and lasting value<sup>38</sup>. The pleasures and pains of the current life are now all relativised by the overriding commitment to a future hope. But this may not so much unify and strengthen the self as give it a sense of utter provisionality.

In psychological terms, Augustine urges a drive towards personal transformation that devalues the experience of inner peace in the present. Augustine's doctrine of the fall would not, of course, have allowed him to recommend any kind of acceptance of the self in its current temporal condition. This limits the therapeutic effectiveness of his theology for our modern age in which the need for self-affirmation seems to be dominant and where low self-esteem is one of our most prevalent neuroses.

However, we can also discover another ordering principle in Augustine beyond the eudaimonist scheme. Here things are to be loved not in accordance with their subjective usefulness for meeting one's chosen end but in accordance with the objective divine value placed on them. Augustine explicitly compares the two schemes in City of God XI.16 entitled: "The distinctions among created things; and their different ranking by the scales of utility and logic". By way of example, he suggests that we might want to have food in our house more than fleas, but that the animate flea has a higher intrinsic value than the inanimate food. Again, a slave might be sold for less than a horse, but a human being has a higher rational value than any animal. According to Augustine there is a deeper, natural order of things which questions of human utility and convenience may obscure. According to Augustine's rational order things are to be valued and desired in the ascending sequence: inanimate objects, animals, human beings, angels, God. The suggestion seems to be that only when we move beyond what seems superficially attractive and useful to an appreciation of things that is consistent with the natural order will we find that our desires are truly fulfilled.

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<sup>35</sup>doctr. chr. I.22.20.

<sup>36</sup>Philemon v20.

<sup>37</sup>doctr. chr. I.33.37.

<sup>38</sup>Cf. his quotation of Timaeus 29c: "As eternity is to that which has originated, so truth is to faith." (trin. IV.24). Plato's original Greek reads: "As being is to becoming, so is truth to faith."



Despite some significant differences of approach, Augustine's "hierarchy of desires" can be taken as prefiguring to a certain extent the "hierarchy of needs" propounded by Maslow and which we shall encounter in chapter 6. Augustine thinks his hierarchy is given objectively by theological science, whilst Maslow thinks his is given objectively by psychological science. Both suggest an "ordering" for our desires which ranks material goods lowest, goods connected with our fellow human beings at an intermediate level, and spiritual goods highest.

Augustine's rational order suggests an improved approach to the question of love for neighbour<sup>39</sup>. Neighbours are now not to be "used" but to be loved in accordance with the value placed by God upon them. According to Augustine's rational order of love, human beings are granted value inasmuch as they have been created in the divine image. Even where this image has been seriously defaced by the effects of the fall they are still to be loved insofar as they have the potential to regain it. Human beings are thus to be loved both in their essential nature *qua* human beings and for the potential they have to fulfil this nature. Correct rational love of a person discerns what is truly loveable in him. The opposite of this kind of love, for Augustine, is to love a person without reference to God. In this case one sets the other up as his own source of value, making the mistake of thinking that he has value independently of the God who created him. The risk of this kind of love would be that one loves the other *qua* sinner and thus confirms him in his sin rather than loving him in such a way as to lead him on to God.<sup>40</sup>

Augustine's concept of love for neighbour has a creative element, in that it wills the neighbour to aspire to that place in the divine order from which he has fallen.<sup>41</sup> It is not, now, that the individual uses the other as means to his own enjoyment of God. Rather the individual wishes the other to enjoy the God who alone can bring the other true happiness. For Augustine, this purpose for the other is not something that one posits for oneself and then imposes on the other. Rather, it is something that is disclosed by the divine order of things.

When we come to consider the humanistic psychologists (chapter 6) we shall discuss a modern protest against this Augustinian model of neighbour love in the name of human autonomy. The idea that any individual (or church) might have a fully reliable insight into the divine order of things is now regarded with suspicion. The potentially manipulative or even coercive implications of this kind of love are now viewed with concern by many, including the humanistic psychologists.

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<sup>39</sup>Cf. O'Donovan's discussion of "rational love" (p29ff).

<sup>40</sup>*doctr. chr.* I.27.28.

<sup>41</sup>Cf. O'Donovan's discussion of "benevolent love" (p32ff).

In the light of Augustine's reflection on the rational ordering of desire, it is fruitful to examine the condition of disordered desire that he describes at length in Confessions X.30ff. Here he expounds one of his favourite texts, 1 Jn 2:16, under the heads of the lust (*cupiditas*) of the flesh, the lust of the eyes and the pride of life. The first, he says, refers to the delight gained by the senses in eating, drinking and sex by which one may be enslaved. The second, the lust of the eyes, refers, analogically, to the knowledge acquired about the objects of sense-perception for its own sake - what Augustine calls "vain inquisitiveness" or "curiosity"<sup>42</sup>. But Augustine confesses it is the third temptation - worldly ambition or the desire for praise - that is "the main reason why I fail to love and fear You in purity"<sup>43</sup>. The three form a progression in Augustine's thought, from the more fleshly to the more spiritual, from the more exterior to the more interior<sup>44</sup>. This reveals the essence of *cupiditas* to be pride. For the mature Augustine the sickness of mistaken desire is not, in essence, the Neo-Platonic dispersion of the self in a multitude of desirable objects, although he can still speak in these terms, but the subtle search of the self whereby it falsely overvalues itself and desires to take *itself* as the object of its desire. Sexual compulsion and the vain attachment to physical and intellectual objects, are symptoms of this deeper sickness.

It seems clear that, in Confessions X.30ff, rejection of the divine ordering of things in favour of an unjust order is at stake. It is not human praise *per se* that Augustine fears<sup>45</sup> but praise which neither properly refers its object to the divine Giver nor praises what genuinely deserves to be praised. The effect of this on the recipient is to encourage him to appraise himself according to a standard which is not God's and is hence inherently defective. "You have commanded us not only continence -that is, that we should restrain our affections from certain things - but also justice - by which we must bestow love on certain things."<sup>46</sup> Augustine's response to the third temptation is to run through all aspects of his abilities and interior life to try "to make distinctions and to evaluate each entity according to its proper rank"<sup>47</sup>. The fundamental cause of the state of sickness, for the mature Augustine, is the abandonment of the divine order in which one loves things justly and truly, and loves God above all else, in favour of a disordered and unjust state in which the self is loved above all else. Thus Augustine insists that the root of all sin is preferring oneself to God and hence rejecting the divine order.<sup>48</sup> The person who does this gathers material possessions to build up the self and loves these rather than God. The turn from the material to the spiritual may now

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<sup>42</sup>conf. X.xxxvi.54f.

<sup>43</sup>conf. X.xxxvi.59.

<sup>44</sup>So Bochet p39ff.

<sup>45</sup>conf. X.xxxvii.60: "But how can we live so as to be indifferent to praise...Are we to live evil lives, so abandoned and depraved that no one who knows us does not detest us?...If admiration is the usual and proper accompaniment of a good life and good actions, we ought not to renounce it any more than the good life which it accompanies."

<sup>46</sup>conf. X.xxxvii.61 (Sheed).

<sup>47</sup>conf. X. xl.65.

<sup>48</sup>e.g. ciu. XIV.13.

be understood as symptomatic of fallen humanity's proud rejection of the divine order and its attempt to impose its own order.

## 4.2 Fragmentation of the Self

Augustine holds that fallen humanity's inability to order its desires under God produces debilitating psychological consequences. Augustine describes the drama of the fall and redemption of humanity as one in which the divine image in human beings is deformed and must then be reformed (De Trinitate XII-XV). In psychological terms, the fall is manifested in the fragmentation of the self, whilst the process of redemption is worked out in the self's slow healing and ultimate integration. The perfection of the self is the attainment of that unity which consists in being the image of the perfect divine unity.<sup>49</sup> To show how the loss of the divine image takes effect psychologically it will be necessary to examine a little more deeply Augustine's understanding of the make-up of the self.

Augustine views the human *animus* as a structure of functions. The lower and outward functions of the soul are concerned with the sense faculties and appetites that belong to humanity's animal nature whilst the higher and inward functions are concerned with the mind's relations with itself and with God. Augustine argues that the trinitarian image in human beings consists in what he takes to be the three core functions of the *mens*, the higher aspect of the soul, namely: self-memory, self-knowing or understanding, and self-willing or loving<sup>50</sup>. Each of these refers not to a part of the *mens* but to the whole of the one *mens*, just as the names Father, Son and Holy Spirit refer to one God and not three Gods. Self-remembering, knowing and willing are three distinct but consubstantial activities of *mens*<sup>51</sup>.

Augustine therefore does not describe the loss of the self's unity as being experienced in terms of tensions between different regions of the self, as we shall see that Freud does (chapter 4). Augustine's basic commitment to the oneness of God could not allow him to envisage that there might be parts of the *mens* that have the capability to function in very different ways from each other. Rather, the deformation of the divine image is manifested as an overall impairment of the three core functions by which the whole self relates to itself, as I shall now describe.

### 4.2.1 Faulty Memory of Self

Augustine's *memoria* includes what we should call memory; he thought that in the *memoria* were preserved traces of past experiences as in a kind of storehouse or stomach. But *memoria* includes very much more than this. In his discussion in Confessions X he extends its scope to include knowledge of moral values, truths of reason, of ourselves and of God. Augustine is troubled by

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<sup>49</sup>trin. XV.51.

<sup>50</sup>trin. Bks. IX-X.

<sup>51</sup>trin. X.18

the awareness of his memory as "a profound and immeasurable multiplicity"<sup>52</sup>. He is confident that at the eschaton the vision of God will illuminate the whole of the memory<sup>53</sup>, but in his earthly, fallen state the person seems to lack the power of making the whole contents of his memory present to himself.<sup>54</sup> Self-memory fails in three particular ways.

Firstly, the mind "forgets" God. God is always intimately present to the mind, whether this presence is acknowledged or not. According to Augustine's metaphysics God's presence pervades everything. To this principle the human mind is no exception. However, in their fallen condition human beings have deliberately turned away from God, causing them to forget God's intimate presence to them. Augustine's *memoria* functions in a somewhat similar way to the Platonic *anamnesis*: the mind has an implicit knowledge of God which it may or may not acknowledge. However, there are two important differences. Firstly, Augustine's *memoria* never refers to things seen by the soul in a previous existence. Secondly, the effects of the fall mean that human beings may not autonomously turn around to face the divine light but must be empowered to do this through divine grace, and specifically through the mediatorship of Christ<sup>55</sup>. In post-Freudian terms we might say that the knowledge of God is buried so deeply within the mind that it requires the assistance of the divine Other for this knowledge to be recalled.

The Christian Augustine saw his earlier life as a period of self-contradiction in which this intimate presence of God had been denied, in which God had been forgotten. For Augustine the problem of forgetting God was not a form of atheism; Augustine had never ceased, deep down, to believe in God. It was, rather, a moral failure of the self to recall itself in the light of divine truth, a denial of the self's basic moral orientation. Using Taylor's language, we might say that, for Augustine, forgetting God involves a basic act of self-deception in which the self attempts to live according to a different set of values from those which it implicitly, if only dimly, knows to be its highest values. It is thereby plunged into what we might call an "identity crisis".<sup>56</sup>

Secondly, the mind becomes aware of images in the memory which sometimes escape the control of the conscious will. The celibate Augustine is troubled by dreams containing images from his sexually active past. He can control and suppress these images while he is awake but they recur when he dreams. Augustine does not feel that he himself has committed the acts that occurred in

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<sup>52</sup>conf. X.xvii.26.

<sup>53</sup>trin. XV.26.

<sup>54</sup>orig. an. 4.10.

<sup>55</sup>So Bourke (p144) who argues, against O'Connell, that Augustine's theory of divine illumination *supplants* the doctrine of the *Meno*.

<sup>56</sup>The problem raised for us in Augustine's later works, and which I do not intend to discuss here, is how human beings can have any personal moral responsibility at all if they are born into a radically fallen condition from which they can only be rescued by grace.

his dreams. They were rather, "done to him". Yet, he says, "surely I am myself in sleep"<sup>57</sup>. Past disordered desires have created the impression of a split self. Augustine struggles to reconcile his certainty that he is "one" self with the experience of memory traces that elude the control of this self<sup>58</sup>. Here Augustine seems to demonstrate an awareness of unconscious realms but assumes that because the images produced do not conform to the dictates of his conscious will they are pathological. The implication is that Augustine's ideal self would be so strongly unified that even its dreams were consonant with its daytime ideals. As we shall see in chapter 4, Freud will propose that nocturnal dreams operate according to essentially different rules from the rational will, and Carl Jung (chapter 5) will offer a rather different solution from Augustine to the problem of integrating these kinds of desires and images into the self.

Thirdly, a person's imperfect ability to recall his total life experience seems to lead to a gap between that self which is the sum of his historical experiences and the self which is the sum of his remembered experiences. This applies, in the first instance to the state of infancy, of which Augustine says:

"This period of my life, Lord, I do not remember having lived, but I have believed what others have told me and I have assumed how I behaved from observing other infants. Despite the high probability of this assumption, I do not wish to reckon this as part of the life that I live in this world; for it is lost in the darkness of my forgetfulness, and is on the same level as the life I lived in my mother's womb...I feel no sense of responsibility now for a time of which I recall not a single trace."<sup>59</sup>

It also applies to the experience of something being forgotten and subsequently remembered. It feels as if when I forget something the item is subtracted from "me" and when I recall something this item is added to "me". Augustine wonders how the effort to recall an item temporarily forgotten feels like a search "outside" the self:

"Why is it, then, that we are somehow withdrawn from and denied to ourselves and likewise somehow revealed and restored to ourselves, as if we were other persons and were elsewhere, when we seek and do not find what we have deposited in our memory, and as if we ourselves could not reach ourselves when we have, as it were, been deposited elsewhere...For where do we search, if not in ourselves?"<sup>60</sup>

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<sup>57</sup>conf. X.xxx (Sheed).

<sup>58</sup>conf. X.xxx.41.

<sup>59</sup>conf. I.vii.12.

<sup>60</sup>orig. an. 4.10 quoted in O'Daly p149.

Yet something that has been forgotten and is subsequently remembered must have been located, after all, somewhere within the memory.<sup>61</sup> It is this sort of experience which leads Augustine to wonder at the "profound multiplicity" of memory<sup>62</sup> with its deep and scarcely accessible caverns.

It is, I think, a little too simple to say, as O'Daly does, that Augustine thinks that our personal identity as historical individuals is constituted by our remembered experiences.<sup>63</sup> Augustine is aware, for example, that deposited in the mind are half-forgotten experiences that can only be recalled if someone else prompts us.<sup>64</sup> Our identity consists not just of fully recalled experiences, but also of a twilight zone of experiences that we can only partially recall.

However, I think O'Daly is right in highlighting the *absence* of a theory of the *unconscious* here.<sup>65</sup> Two factors are decisive. Firstly, Augustine assumes that both the commitment of sense-impressions to memory and their recall from memory are efforts of the will. Thus, referring to recall, he says: "I can request whatever I wish (*quidquid volo*) to be brought forward."<sup>66</sup> He does not suspect, as modern psychoanalysts have demonstrated<sup>67</sup>, that a whole range of impressions may be captured by the memory irrespective of the intentions of the will, and that the will may, in principle, only have limited power in choosing whether to admit the images of such sense impressions to consciousness. In other words, he does not (nor could he) allow that there could be a whole region of the mind that functions independently of the will. Secondly, he does not allow that memories that a subject genuinely believes himself to have forgotten could still be a part of one's identity.<sup>68</sup> One of the characteristics of the psychoanalytic understanding of the unconscious (as opposed to the *pre* or *subconscious*) is precisely this kind of *radical* inaccessibility to consciousness.

Augustine indicates that the inability of the self to be fully present to itself is a consequence of humanity's fallen nature.<sup>69</sup> It seems that in the world to come this failure of memory would be healed and the gap between our remembered identity and our historical identity would be overcome.<sup>70</sup>

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<sup>61</sup>conf. X.xix.28.

<sup>62</sup>conf. X.xvii.26.

<sup>63</sup>O'Daly p148 and p135.

<sup>64</sup>conf. X.xix.28.

<sup>65</sup>O'Daly p150.

<sup>66</sup>conf. X.viii.12 (trans. Bourke). Cf. trin. XI.15 "Just as it is the will which fastens sense to body, so it is the will which fastens memory to sense and the thinking attention to memory."

<sup>67</sup>For example with reference to the phenomenon of hypnosis.

<sup>68</sup>conf. X.xvi.25 and my discussion of infant experience above.

<sup>69</sup>orig. an. 4.10; O'Daly p149.

<sup>70</sup>conf. X.v.7; ciu. XXII.30.

#### 4.2.2 Faulty Knowledge of Self

Augustine links misplaced desire with faulty knowledge of self<sup>71</sup>. The self should have observed the command to "know itself"<sup>72</sup>, that is, it should have formed a true estimate of itself as being above the material realm but beneath God. Instead, thinking itself to be its own god, it seeks to derive from itself the being that is only God's to give. It takes material objects and enjoys them as if they were the self's own possessions rather than being the gifts of the Creator. Abandoning interior knowledge it attempts to build itself up through an insatiable desire for the knowledge of sensible things. Where desire should have been concentrated on the One who alone could properly satisfy it, desire is instead scattered amongst a multiplicity of lower goods.<sup>73</sup>

Augustine took it that knowledge of God and knowledge of self are closely linked. On this point he was influenced both by the Neo-Platonist notion that introspection corresponds with contemplation of the One<sup>74</sup> and by the Christian doctrine of the *imago Dei*. Thus in an early work he says simply, "May I know myself, may I know thee" (*noverim me, noverim Te*).<sup>75</sup> In an exploration of the problem of self-knowledge (*conf. X.5*) he contends that a person can only truly be said to know himself through divine illumination. When a person finally sees God face to face all of the hitherto dark parts of the self will be illuminated and known. "For what I know of myself I know because you grant me light, and what I do not know of myself, I do not know until such time as my darkness becomes like noonday before your face".

What Augustine has in mind is not the idea of a supportive relationship within which the self comes to knowledge of itself, as in modern counselling, but the self's correct apprehension of itself in the light of divine standards of truth and justice. As these standards are more correctly discerned and contemplated so the self will grow in interior knowledge of itself.

We should not, however, assume that Augustine thought that growth in knowledge of self was a lonely spiritual task. Friendship with others was of central importance to Augustine. In her work on patristic views of friendship, Caroline White comments: "With Augustine we reach the culmination of fourth century Christian theories of friendship, for it is he who provides the most profound views, touching on many areas of Christian life and doctrine and according a crucial role to friendship in each Christian's progress towards salvation"<sup>76</sup>. Augustine held that by loving a friend we see the love which is the bond between two friends, and this love is none other than

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<sup>71</sup>*trin* X.7.

<sup>72</sup>Cicero's intellectualised version of the Delphic oracle, viz. "*Cum igitur: 'Nosce te' dicit, hoc dicit 'Nosce animum tuum'*". (Hill on *trin*. p301 n9)

<sup>73</sup>*trin*. XII.ix.14.

<sup>74</sup>So Plotinus, "knowing itself [mind] will also know its source" (*Enneads* 6.9.7) and conversely "looking towards the Good it will know itself" (*Enneads* 5.6.5). O'Daly's translation (p1).

<sup>75</sup>*sol.* 2.1.1

<sup>76</sup>White p218.

God the Holy Spirit. In loving the love between friends we love God.<sup>77</sup> Augustine's stress on interiority is thus complemented by a stress on sociability which would not always be maintained in later thought.

Augustine came to see the monastic life as the best means of gaining knowledge of God, since God himself, as love, is present in this community of Christians loving one another intimately in God<sup>78</sup>. The sharing of property among the members of the community creates suitable conditions for spiritual unity and mutual love.<sup>79</sup> Within this context of love, Christians have the duty to encourage each other in the life of faith. A true love of neighbour is, in Augustine's terms, always one which will strengthen the other's knowledge and enjoyment of God. Life in the community involves a high degree of mutual responsibility for one another so that, for example, if one member acts in a way that is inconsistent with the spiritual goal the other members have a duty to bring this to his attention.<sup>80</sup>

The strongly social context envisaged by Augustine provides one strategy for controlling against the risk of self-deception that introspective attempts to unify the self otherwise run. In our own time, we are highly aware of the possibility of someone leading an apparently deeply spiritual life and yet shutting off knowledge of certain aspects of the self from himself. Thus one may discover clergy with long histories of child abuse. In the absence of the intensive friendships advocated by Augustine, other ways must be found of guarding against self-deceit. The tradition of confession to a priest that developed in the medieval church and which, in certain respects, anticipates the expert/analysand relationship of Freudian psychoanalysis, is one option. A second option, which seems closer to the Augustinian ideal, is the peer relationship of counsellor/client in modern humanistic counselling.

### 4.2.3 Faulty Self-Willing

We may distinguish two kinds of affliction of the will in Augustine. The first, and more straightforward, is the voluntary willing of something less than God, or directly against God, as the self's final end. Augustine's cites his youthful theft of *poma*<sup>81</sup> (the same word is used in the Vulgate for the fruit eaten by Adam) as paradigmatic of this kind of failure. Here Augustine discerned a deliberate attempt by the self to set up its own norms and ambitions in the place of the divine order. This is, for Augustine, the essence of pride, or wrongful self-love.<sup>82</sup> One takes oneself, rather than God, as the object in which one hopes to satisfy one's deepest desires. And

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<sup>77</sup>e.g. *ep. lo. tr.* 5.7; *lo. eu. tr.* 17.8; *trin.* VIII.v.12.

<sup>78</sup>*en. Ps.* 132.

<sup>79</sup>*reg.* I.2.

<sup>80</sup>*reg.* IV.6ff.

<sup>81</sup>*conf.* II.iv.9.

<sup>82</sup>*ciu.* XIV.13.



the result of turning away from the source of being to one's own self, says Augustine, is that one's own being is attenuated.<sup>83</sup>

Augustine traces this kind of voluntary sin to human descendency from Adam. Adam had been created rational so that he could understand the commandment not to eat the apple, but he had yet to develop the wisdom which comes through the practice of living righteously.<sup>84</sup> By disobeying the commandment Adam had rather turned aside from wisdom to a morally culpable state of "vicious folly". Subsequent generations are born into this state of ignorance. They lack a sufficiently motivating knowledge of the *summum bonum*, so that they can only voluntarily will inferior goods: "Because of his ignorance man has not free choice of will to choose what he should rightly do."<sup>85</sup> Augustine says of those who sin voluntarily that they have a free will but not a *freed* will; that is; they voluntarily choose to sin but they lack the freedom not to sin.<sup>86</sup>

The second, and psychologically more subtle affliction of the will, is characterised by a person finding himself divided against himself in carrying out what he knows to be good. He does what he does not will and does not do what he wills. The will seems estranged or alienated from itself. In his earlier, Manichaean, days Augustine had explained this phenomenon in terms of the presence of two souls within the person, one good the other bad. Having rejected the Manichaean notion of a principle of autonomous evil, however, Augustine came to see the true reason for the will's alienation as being its enslavement to the law of sin<sup>87</sup>. The original sin of Adam, whereby man chose in accordance with his own pride and against God, had set up a contradiction in human nature whence the will became enslaved. In this condition, even when supplied with knowledge of the good, a person might find himself unable to respond to it.

Augustine describes the psychological mechanism by which voluntary sin leads to the involuntary sin of a divided will as follows:

"The consequence of a distorted will is passion. By servitude to passion, habit is formed, and habit to which there is no resistance becomes necessity. By these links, as it were, connected one to another (hence my term chain), a harsh bondage held me under restraint."<sup>88</sup>

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<sup>83</sup>ciu. XIV.13: "A man is diminished when he elects to be self-sufficient and defects from the one who is really sufficient for him."

<sup>84</sup>lib. arb. III.xxiv.

<sup>85</sup>lib. arb. III.xviii; cf. lo. eu. tr. 5.1.

<sup>86</sup>corrupt. 42; c. ep. Pel. 1.5.

<sup>87</sup>So Rom 7.23 cited in conf. VII.xxi.27.

<sup>88</sup>conf. VIII.v.10.

Sin brings about its own punishment in fostering, through *habit*, the compulsion to sin. Augustine's term *consuetudo* connotes something stronger than our usual understanding of habit. Habitual action is normally thought of as unreflective. *Consuetudo* can be unreflective, but it does not have its source so much in unreasoned activity as in the co-ordination of judgement and desire that enables us to act intentionally. Weakness of will comes about through a mismatch between past and present constellations of reason and desire. To identify past desires alone as the problem would be to adopt a form of Manichaeism in which present enlightened reason is set against the past darkness of desire. On the other hand past erroneous judgements of the good can be straightforwardly shown to be wrong in the light of present knowledge and so in themselves have no hold over us. It is, rather, the past approval of reason to an unworthy object of delight combined with the practice of a desire for this object which leaves its traces in the memory in the form of habit and so enchains the person<sup>89</sup>.

Weakness of the will does not, therefore, indicate a "spatial" division in the self between light and darkness, reason and passion, as the Manichees thought and, as we shall see, Jung indicates. Rather there is a temporal dislocation (*distentio*) between present and past selves. "We are dealing with a morbid condition of the mind which, when it is lifted up by the truth, does not unreservedly rise to it but is weighed down by habit. So there are two wills. Neither of them is complete, and what is present in the one is lacking to the other."<sup>90</sup> The sinner finds that, even when he knows the good, he is unable to perform it. He has lost that freedom which is constituted by his knowledge, will and feeling being wholeheartedly united in the object of his desire. He has become a slave to sin. He is divided against himself.

Augustine's reflections on the weakness of the will led him to an important reassessment of the nature of human motivation. He concluded that a person cannot move himself to action merely through his own self-willing, nor can he autonomously respond to what is given by his intellect. Rather, a person can only be motivated through the supply of an external source of attraction. *Delight*, concluded Augustine, is the only possible source of action, nothing else can move the will.<sup>91</sup> A person can act only if he can mobilise his feelings, only if he is "affected" by an object of delight.<sup>92</sup> "It is not *enough* to be drawn by the will...give me one that is travelling in this wilderness and thirsting and panting after the fountains of his eternal home; give me such a one

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<sup>89</sup>See further Wetzel p135ff.

<sup>90</sup>*conf.* VIII.ix.21.

<sup>91</sup>*Simpl.* I, qu. ii.21: "The will can by no means be set in motion unless an object be presented which delights and attracts"; cf. *spir. et litt.* III.5: "When the right action and the true aim has begun to appear clearly, unless it also be delighted in and loved, there is no doing, no devotion, no good life. Even after his duty and his proper aim shall begin to become known to him, unless he also take delight in and feel a love for it, he neither does his duty, nor sets about it, nor lives rightly."

<sup>92</sup>*Simpl.* I, qu. ii.21 "Who can welcome in his mind something which does not give him delight?"

and he will know what I mean."<sup>93</sup> Yet the processes which enable a person in this state to take delight in God are now not only hidden from him but they are actually unconscious and beyond his control: "The fact that those things that make for successful progress towards God should cause us delight is not acquired by our own intentions, earnestness and the value of our own good will - but is dependent on the inspiration granted us by God."<sup>94</sup>

Augustine's psychology now becomes a subtle interplay of the conscious will with a source of motivation that lies beyond the control of the will, and it was this subtlety that was to find expression in his Confessions. In our century, the idea that the sources of human motivation lie in part beyond our conscious control has been taken up, as we shall see, in a somewhat analogous way by Freud in his suggestion that human motivation is determined by the spontaneous response of certain regions of the psyche to sources of pleasure.

## **5. The Desire of God Uncovered**

### **5.1 The Negative Work of Unfulfilled Desire**

For Augustine man in his fallen state is a being subject to disparate unfulfilled desires. His sexual desire seems "insatiable"<sup>95</sup>. His desire for material possessions seems to lead merely to an ever increasing desire for more goods rather than to satisfaction. The self tends to be pulled apart by attraction to a multiplicity of objects. The state of those whose desires are dispersed amongst temporal and sensible things is above all one of "restlessness".<sup>96</sup>

But this state of restlessness has a salvific function. Firstly, it draws attention to the infinite size of the desire that requires satisfaction. Secondly it performs the "negative work" of moving a person on in search of that which will truly satisfy his desire. Ultimately, his restlessness spurs the unconverted person on to seek God, in whom alone true happiness may be found.

It is in such terms that Augustine describes his own Platonic ascent towards God. Unsatisfied by material pleasures he turned inward from the desires of the body to the life of the soul. He ascended from the lower part of the soul, that region which deals with sense-perception and imagination, through the soul's power of judging temporal things, to the highest part of the soul which deals with the contemplation of eternal truths.<sup>97</sup> At length he received a momentary, mystical experience of Being.<sup>98</sup>

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<sup>93</sup>ep. Jo. tr. XXVI.4.

<sup>94</sup>Simpl. I qu.ii.21 (trans. Brown (1967) p155).

<sup>95</sup>conf. VI.xii.22.

<sup>96</sup>conf. I.i.1 "Our heart is restless..."; conf. V.ii.2 "Let the restless and wicked depart from you".

<sup>97</sup>Cf. the ascent of eros described by Socrates in Symposium p92f.

<sup>98</sup>conf. VII.xvii.23.

This transient experience did not, however, mark the end of his quest and the satisfaction of his restlessness. He found he lacked the strength to remain in this mystical state. His "weakness" reasserted itself and he tumbled back down into the material realm. But he now carried with him, as a trace in his memory, an experience which he took to be truly satisfying. The desire for God had been aroused. His appetite had been whetted even if he did not yet have, as he puts it, the strength to eat.

## 5.2 The Positive Work of Strengthening The Desire for God

Having been awakened, the desire of God must now be fostered and strengthened. Thus Augustine exhorts his readers in many different figures to desire God more intently. A recurring model in his commentary on the Psalms is the legendary Idithun who "leaps beyond" earthly things towards the vision of God.<sup>99</sup> At three key points in de Trinitate he quotes Psalm 105:3-4: "Seek his face always."<sup>100</sup> For Augustine "the whole life of a good Christian is a holy desire"<sup>101</sup>.

Augustine talks of the movement towards God as an "extension" and contrasts this with the "distension" of a life which is scattered amongst numerous temporal and sensible desires.<sup>102</sup> He suggests that the person who loves the world is like a man who immerses himself in the river of temporal things and finds himself hurried along and swept away by it. The person who loves God, on the other hand, clings fast to the tree, which is Christ, planted by the river<sup>103</sup>. The desire of God both extends and unifies the soul, whilst desire for the world overwhelms and disperses the soul.

Augustine's notion of the "extension of desire" has two senses<sup>104</sup>. Firstly, he refers to the extension of the mind through godly desire. The image Augustine uses here is of stretching the opening of a sack to make it capable of holding more: "For just as, if you would fill a bag, and knowing how big the thing is that shall be given, you stretch the opening of the sack or skin...so God by deferring our hope stretches our desire; by the desiring, stretches the mind; by stretching makes it more capacious."<sup>105</sup> Secondly, he refers to the extension of desire itself. The picture here is of the athlete straining to attain the prize<sup>106</sup>. "Holy longing" is like exercise - the more it is undertaken the more the person is capable of. The two forms of "extension" are bound together: when someone extends himself through the desire of God his desire is itself strengthened, and in

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<sup>99</sup>en. Ps. 38, 61, 76.

<sup>100</sup>trin. I.5, IX.1, XV.2.

<sup>101</sup>ep. Jo. tr. IV.6.

<sup>102</sup>"Not stretched out in distraction but extended in reach, not by being pulled apart but by concentration." conf. XI.xxix.39. Relying on the Plotinian imagery of the fall from the One as a scattering and dispersion.

<sup>103</sup>ep. Jo. tr. II.10.

<sup>104</sup>ep. Jo. tr. IV.6

<sup>105</sup>ep. Jo. tr. IV.6.

<sup>106</sup>Phil. 3:13,14.

desiring more he further extends the 'capacity' of his soul. Thus a virtuous circle operates linking the desire of God with the growth of the self. Albeit in very different terms, Augustine prefigures Lacan's insight that desire is a positive and creative force in human life.

In summary, the desire for God is at work in both a negative and a positive manner to transform the self. In its negative aspect, the desire of God engenders that restlessness which, ultimately, drives us to ascend from the physical to the spiritual. In its positive aspect, the desire of God brings that fulfilment and happiness which incites our further desire and enjoyment of God. In the first case we may speak of the lack of the desired object; in the second case we may speak of the further enjoyment of an object already in part possessed.

### 5.3 Desire from God and for God

These two aspects of desire take us to the central paradox in the concept of the desire of God, a paradox connected with the immanence and transcendence of God. On the one hand, Augustine argues<sup>107</sup> that an individual could not desire something of which he was totally ignorant. He can, in fact, only seek God because deep in his memory he already knows God. God is invariably immanent within human beings whether they recall this presence or not. But, on the other hand, the search for God does not end with the simple awareness of God, for God transcends a human being's memory. There is always more of God to be laid hold of. People are in a state of continually seeking and continually finding there is more to be sought.<sup>108</sup>

Augustine wrestles with the problem of relating to God using the image of the soul as a house to which God is invited as a guest<sup>109</sup>. Augustine's dilemma is that, much as he desires God's presence with him, his soul is too small for so great a guest. The solution to this impasse is that God himself enlarges Augustine's house. God works from within to enable Augustine to invite God in to his soul. To change the metaphor, where Augustine wanted to love God but was unable to, God nonetheless "commands" Augustine to love him. God himself overcomes the disproportion between himself and humanity by stimulating humanity's desire for God and by enabling this desire to be fulfilled. Thus we may speak of a desire which both comes from God and is for God. It is from God inasmuch as God is already immanent to the soul, and for God inasmuch as God remains transcendent to the soul.

Questions of the immanence and transcendence of God seem to the modern reader rather removed from the problem of integrating the self. However, in Augustine's thought they are vitally connected. As O'Connell comments: "Intellectually, Augustine was convinced, one of man's most decisive exigencies, if he was to arrive at any just idea of himself...was to think rightly

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<sup>107</sup>conf. X and trin. X

<sup>108</sup>trin. XV.2, IX.i.1 and Jo. eu. it. LXIII.1.

<sup>109</sup>conf. I.v.6.

about God.<sup>110</sup> Augustine reminds us throughout the first seven books of the Confessions that the key to his earlier error was his failure to conceive God in spiritual terms. The Manichee notion of a material principle of light bounded on one side by darkness was reflected at the level of anthropology by a division in humanity between light and dark components. Through reading the "books of the Platonists" Augustine came to conceive of God as an undivided, spiritual reality, wholly present to each element of the lower, material world in each place.<sup>111</sup> It was this whole presence of God to human beings which could, he now realised, confer on human beings both being and unity, "You are not scattered but reassemble us. In filling all things you fill them with the whole of yourself"<sup>112</sup>. The ubiquitous presence of the one God was the condition for the unity of the self. The desire of God is to be understood equally as that which we enact in reaching out to what lies transcendentally beyond ourselves and as the fundamental immanent principle of our own being. Attaining to God is therefore manifested psychologically by a true attaining to oneself. Where Lacan will reject the possibility of wholeness as predicated on an unrealistic demand for unconditional love, Augustine proposes an ontology in which a completely fulfilled love is bound to the achievement of an integrated self.

#### 5.4 The Integrating Power of the Desire of God

The Augustinian principle of the desire of God is embedded in an ontology and a cosmology that make for a very strongly unified structure and which, correspondingly, maximise the power with which the human desire of God is able to integrate the self. Fundamental to this scheme is the doctrine of the divine simplicity: God is he whose being is identical with his attributes.<sup>113</sup> This means that as one draws closer to God, and is conformed more closely to his image, so all the attributes of the self are bound increasingly tightly together.

Particularly important consequences arise from Augustine's belief that God is at the same time the one sole Good and the one changeless Wisdom.<sup>114</sup> This allows Augustine on the one hand to transform the classical virtues into aspects of the human desire for God so that, for example, temperance becomes the triumph of the desire for God over carnal desire and justice becomes the ability to order the soul and body under God.<sup>115</sup> The pursuit of virtue is now none other than the pursuit of God considered from an ethical point of view. On the other hand, it allows him to see rational learning as a process whereby one seeks to reduce "to a simple, true and certain unity"<sup>116</sup> all the various branches of study and so proceed from an understanding of the physical realm,

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<sup>110</sup>O'Connell p31.

<sup>111</sup>trin. XIV.iv.21 "He is everywhere in his wholeness; so that in him the mind lives and moves and has its being." (Burnaby's translation.) Cf. Plotinus Enneads VI 4-5 whose title states, "Being is integrally everywhere, one and the same".

<sup>112</sup>conf. I.iii.3

<sup>113</sup>e.g. ciu. XI.10.

<sup>114</sup>ciu. XI.10.

<sup>115</sup>ciu. XIX.4.

<sup>116</sup>ord. II.16.44.

through a grasp of the principles of reason to a vision of the divine intellect<sup>117</sup>. The desire of God thus serves to unite the intellectual and ethical with the religious parts of the self behind a common aim.

To be sure, the mature Augustine slackens somewhat the very strong unity of learning and ethics with spiritual progress that he had maintained in his early works. For example, he retracted his early suggestions that the wise scholar must at the same time be a person committed to living a virtuous life, and that God reveals himself only to the virtuous.<sup>118</sup> It became clear to Augustine that, on the one hand, many saintly people were ignorant of the liberal arts, and that, on the other hand, many of those who were conversant with the arts were not saintly. Again, the priority he later granted to divine grace would not allow him to make a straightforward equation between a virtuous life and the reward of the vision of God. Nonetheless, the form of spiritual progress demonstrated in a central work such as de Trinitate is one in which understanding, piety and virtue are positively related to one another.<sup>119</sup>

The Augustinian universe is strongly unified. It is the product of the one Creator. Whereas in Platonism the physical world was patterned on the ideas, and in Neo-Platonism the world emanated from the world-soul and thence from the second entity, the *nous*, Augustine takes the ideas into the mind of God and identifies them with the Divine Wisdom, the second person of the Trinity. The divine mind, omnipresent yet undivided, is the focal centre and first cause of the entire cosmic process<sup>120</sup>. There is nothing in existence which is not fundamentally related to God.<sup>121</sup> The universe thus has a fundamental unity and intelligibility, indeed it is a "uni-verse" precisely in deriving from the one God.<sup>122</sup> There is therefore a close relationship between right knowledge of the self, of God and of the external world. The closer one draws to God the more the external world makes sense and may be grasped as a whole.

Augustine's strong doctrine of creation, together with his assumption of the goodness of God, rules out any autonomous principle of evil in the universe or the self. "There is no such entity in nature as 'evil'; 'evil' is merely a name for the privation of good"<sup>123</sup>. Moreover, even allowing for the damaging effects of the fall, there can be no *fundamental* conflict in the universe; there are merely regions in which God's order is temporarily disturbed by human sin. John Milbank goes so far as to suggest that the ontological priority of peace over conflict is the key theme in Augustine's

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<sup>117</sup>ord. II.9.26.

<sup>118</sup>Retractions to De Ordine Fathers of the Church Vol. 5 ed. Schopp p331f.

<sup>119</sup>E.g. trin. XII.21: "It is clear that when we live according to God our mind should be intent on his invisible things and thus progressively be formed from his eternity, truth and charity."

<sup>120</sup>ord. I.2.3.

<sup>121</sup>trin. IV.3.

<sup>122</sup>ord. I.2.3.

<sup>123</sup>ciu. XI.22.

entire thought<sup>124</sup>. The assumption of an underlying harmony is obviously a major positive factor in a theological system that would hope to unify the self. Once we allow for real, autonomous evil in the self we must either aim at a unity that involves disowning parts of the self, as the Manichees did, or else try to attempt some negotiated compromise or "symbolic" unity as we shall see that Jung does.

Augustine shared his rejection of what we would call "natural evil" with the Stoics. Again, like the Stoics, he identifies the pursuit of happiness with the pursuit of virtue. Augustine thought that the only real evil is what we should call "moral evil". If things that we would think bad, such as sickness and death, can be seen as only a part of some wider divine purpose, then our true happiness does not reside in the avoidance of these misfortunes but in ethical conformity to the divine will.<sup>125</sup> Augustine's quarrel with the Stoics is not that their single-minded pursuit of virtue is misguided but that their goal cannot be achieved without the assistance of divine grace.<sup>126</sup> Augustine would agree with the Stoics that one should pursue moral good and flee moral evil in disregard of adverse bodily consequences. But he claims his ethic to be superior to the Stoic ethic firstly in that God works within the person to enable virtue to develop, and secondly in that God offers the hope that the virtuous life will indeed be rewarded with happiness in the world to come.<sup>127</sup> Whereas the Stoics claimed to unite happiness with virtue but (according to Augustine) failed, Augustine succeeds in uniting happiness with virtue in God's future<sup>128</sup>.

Some parts of this ontology and cosmology may be transported to a modern, secular outlook whereas others may not. Augustine's conviction that the world is fundamentally a good place and that virtue and happiness are related in some way still carries weight. Again, modern science proceeds from the fundamental assumption that the universe is an intelligible, ordered place. At present the search for unifying "theories of everything" in physics is fashionable and the notion of relating everything to a first cause fits well with current cosmology. But we would generally want a looser relationship between theology and the other disciplines than Augustine envisaged. Sometimes developments in science have proceeded in the teeth of theological opposition. We would also agree with the later Augustine against the earlier Augustine that the most learned people are not necessarily the most virtuous. Overall, our century allows for more diversity and for a less tightly ordered scheme than Augustine envisaged.

Whatever we make of Augustine's ontology, if we ask what it is about his "desire of God" that makes it a successful force for uniting the self, we may identify at least five of its leading

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<sup>124</sup>Milbank p390.

<sup>125</sup>Contrast Aristotle's ethics (Nic. Eth. p84) which argues that happiness resides in some combination of virtue and good fortune.

<sup>126</sup>sermo. 150.9.

<sup>127</sup>ciu. XIV.25; XIX.20.

<sup>128</sup>ciu. XIX.4.



characteristics that, in any case, survive transportation to a modern, secular world-view. Firstly, it is a single, fundamental drive and is not set in opposition to any other equally powerful drives. Secondly, it is a principle that is capable of being sustained. It is not exhausted by a conclusion early in life, nor as it applicable only to those at a certain stage in life or in certain situations, but it envisages a life-long project. Thirdly, it explicitly addresses many aspects of the self including the affections, the intellect and the moral sense. Fourthly, it is other-directed and therefore does not risk narcissism. Fifthly, it assumes the underlying, if damaged and fallen, harmony of the natural order and regards conflict as a secondary rather than a primary facet of reality.

## **6. The Desire of God Fulfilled in the Order of *Caritas***

In Neo-Platonic fashion, Augustine describes how the coming to be of humanity in the image of God has three moments<sup>129</sup>. Firstly, people are created out of matter. In this state humanity is formless. To the extent that humanity has being it is good, yet to the extent that it lacks form it tends to dissolution and darkness. Form is imposed through, secondly, humanity being recalled to God. The person must undergo *conversion*, understood as a turning around to face God. Only as someone responds to the call of the divine Word does he receive coherence and unity. So begins the third moment, the *formation* of the image of God in humanity.

Augustine describes this threefold movement in explicitly scriptural terms in Bk. XIV of de Trinitate. Humanity was made in the image and likeness of God (Gen 1:26), but this image has been deformed through inordinate desire for worldly goods. The image is "re-formed" in those who turn back to God and away from the world (Rom 12:2). Renewal does not happen in this single moment but is a matter of continual formation, of "daily advances whereby the soul is made anew" (2 Cor 4:16). Progress consists in the transfer of love from temporal things to the eternal, from the visible to the intelligible, from the carnal to the spiritual. In all this, success depends on divine assistance (Jn 15:5). Full transformation will only be achieved in the world to come (1 Jn 3:2).

Transformation is more particularly a matter for the rational mind or inner self. Human beings discern the divine image in their remembering, understanding and loving of themselves. However, in fallen humanity these functions have been disturbed. The fallen self has lost the capacity to value itself truthfully and justly. This capacity cannot be regained from within the self's own resources. Rather, to regain true relations with itself, the mind must look beyond itself to God who is the source of right standards of truth and justice. Through an increased understanding and

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<sup>129</sup>conf. XII and XIII. The threefold process is summarised in XIII.ii.2 and XIII.iv.5: "Formless things are dependant on your Word. It is only by that same Word that they are recalled to your Oneness and receive form. From you, the One, the supreme Good they have their being and are all 'very good'... You made [the creation]...from the fullness of your goodness, imposing control and converting it to receive form."

loving of God the self may regain knowledge of the divine standards of truth and justice and so learn how to value and love itself properly. At the eschaton a person will see God face to face, that is he will remember, understand and love him perfectly. The mind will then know what it is to remember, understand and love in perfect accordance with divine truth and justice. This state will correspond to the perfection of the divine image in humanity, that is the self's truthful and just remembering, understanding and loving of itself. "We shall be like him because we shall see him as he is" (1 Jn 3:2).<sup>130</sup>

The long and slow positive transformation of the mind corresponds to the progressive degradation of the body through ageing. This might have tempted the earlier and more strongly Platonist Augustine to regard the body as a mere hindrance to the formation of the self. But the mature Augustine of de Trinitate Bk. XIV makes the point that, insofar as a person is conformed to the image of the divine Son<sup>131</sup>, he shares in the death and resurrection of the body.<sup>132</sup> The person who has kept faith in Christ, who has continued to make steady progress in inner renewal, will get back his body at the end of the world, "not for punishment but for glory"<sup>133</sup>. The present mortal body which is subject to weakness, corruption and dishonour will be transformed into a strong, incorruptible and glorious body.<sup>134</sup>

Importantly, the mature Augustine also took a positive view of the passions. Here he disagreed strongly with the Stoics. Augustine could not recommend *apatheia*; indeed he says "who would not judge this insensitivity to be the worst of all moral defects?"<sup>135</sup> It is not desire which Augustine rejects but only disordered forms of desire. Where the Stoics took the passions to be a kind of intellectual sickness, Augustine takes them to be expressions of the will. Evil resides not in the passions as such but in the faulty orientation of the will. "[The] right kind of life exhibits all [the]-emotions in the right-way, and a misdirected life in a misdirected-way."<sup>136</sup> Brown aptly reflects Augustine's "high" view of the emotions in his comment that for Augustine "the life of feeling was what really counted in personal growth."<sup>137</sup> The person who has attained a relatively high level of growth will be one who *desires* eternal life, *fears* sins and temptation, feels *gladness* in good works and experiences *grief* in his own shortcomings and failings.<sup>138</sup> Augustine goes on, in City of God XIV, to list a whole range of emotions with examples of how they are to be approved inasmuch as they spring from a love of the good and from holy charity.

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<sup>130</sup>trin. XIV.21ff.

<sup>131</sup>Notwithstanding that the general argument and originality of trin. lies in its preference for a trinitarian over a Christic *imago Dei*.

<sup>132</sup>trin. XIV.24.

<sup>133</sup>trin. XIV.23.

<sup>134</sup>trin. XIV.25.

<sup>135</sup>ciu. XIV.9 (p565).

<sup>136</sup>ciu. XIV.9; cf. Aristotle Nic. Eth. p101.

<sup>137</sup>Brown (1969) p170.

<sup>138</sup>ciu. XIV.8 and 9.

There is, however, a disjuncture between the kind of "emotional wholeness" that can be achieved on this earth and that to be experienced in the world to come. In the latter there will be nothing to cause grief or pain and these emotions will cease, but in this world grief and pain may reflect praiseworthy charity towards our fellow human beings. So Augustine says: "Complete exemption from pain, whilst we are in this place of misery, is certainly as one of the literary men of this world expressed it, 'a piece of luck that one has to pay a high price for; the price of inhumanity of mind and insensitivity of body'"<sup>139</sup>. The morally praiseworthy person will exhibit not just those emotions which are to be found in heaven but also those which are symptoms of the brokenness of the world. Here Augustine may be contrasted with the humanist psychologists we shall meet in chapter 6, where the darker human emotions seem to find little place in the life of the healed individual.

Augustine thus describes the resurrection life as one in which the desire of the mind is fulfilled in eternal contemplation of God, the desire of the body is fulfilled in incorruptibility, and the emotions are each experienced in appropriate ways. This will be a state of supreme order, with the soul ordered under God and the body ordered under the soul. God is accorded the supreme rank, the self and other human soul's are ranked equally below God, whilst the body and external material goods are ordered under the soul. An attitude of mastery over the body was seen by Augustine as a necessary and good component of the divine order.

Whilst the fulfilment of the desire of God seems to entail the fulfilment of all the person's other legitimate desires, Augustine has a less than full-blooded commitment to fulfilling the desires of the body. Undoubtedly his notion of "ordering" the body does grant the body real value. In his mature writing he is far from the active dislike of the body preached by the Manichees and has moved beyond the austere tolerance of the body characteristic of Neo-Platonism. One could not say of the later Augustine, as Porphyry said of Plotinus that he "seemed ashamed of being in the body"<sup>140</sup>. But he was sufficiently influenced by a doctrine of the fall and by Stoicism as to grant a very low value to bodily pleasure. Burnaby comments that, whilst he could sometimes maintain a more liberal view as a teacher, Augustine had, for himself, "a profound distrust of all natural pleasures which he was little concerned to disguise"<sup>141</sup>. This is, I think, well illustrated by his attitude to the use of music in the worship of God.

At one point in his Confessions Augustine recalls how he was profoundly affected by the antiphonal hymnody at Milan: "How I wept during your hymns and songs! I was deeply moved by the music of the sweet chants of your church. The sounds flowed into my ears and the truth was

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<sup>139</sup>civ. XIV.9.

<sup>140</sup>"On the Life of Plotinus and the Arrangement of his work" in Introduction to the Enneads p1.

<sup>141</sup>Burnaby (1938) p115.

distilled into my heart. This caused the feelings of devotion to overflow. Tears ran, and it was good for me to have that experience."<sup>142</sup> Yet he later expresses suspicion about uninhibited delight in sacred music. He thinks that the power of music is only legitimate when it is used in conjunction with appropriate words. Moreover, he is anxious not to give more honour to the melody than to the words. Music, he thinks, reflects all the diverse emotions of the soul. But because it acts as a mirror to all the different parts of the person it carries the possibility of the lower sensual parts of the person gaining precedence over the higher rational parts. So he says: "But my physical delight, which has to be checked from enervating the mind, often deceives me when the perception of the senses is unaccompanied by reason, and is not patiently content to be in a subordinate place. It tries to be first and to be in the leading role, though it deserves to be allowed only as secondary to reason. So in these matters I sin unawares, and only afterwards become aware of it."<sup>143</sup> He now thinks that he has made moral progress by allowing himself to be moved by the words and *not* by the melody<sup>144</sup>. He contrasts the "danger" of pleasurable enjoyment of music with music's "use" value in leading one to appreciate the words. Sensual pleasure is of no value in its own right, and may even be harmful, but is only of value inasmuch as it points beyond itself to a higher rational delight. Augustine is suspicious of sensual pleasure in even as spiritual an activity as praising God.

When Augustine's desire of God is completely fulfilled it loses its element of lack and becomes pure *caritas*. Love as pure *caritas* is not a striving, dynamic quality but is characterised by repose, contemplation and changelessness<sup>145</sup>. Pure *Caritas* represents a state of bonding to God in which the human substance takes on the characteristics of the divine substance: "When it [the self] totally cleaves to him it will be one spirit"<sup>146</sup>. Augustine sometimes spoke of this state in terms of deification, but in the carefully considered argument of *de Trinitate* he maintains a clear distinction between the nature of God and the nature of humanity. God is eternally fully formed divine substance. Humanity in a state of perfection is also fully formed, and to this extent like God. But it was formed within history and to this extent is less than God. People may enjoy the simplicity and unity of the divine state but, in view of their past histories, are not thus divine.<sup>147</sup>

Augustine is not afraid to describe the state of perfect *caritas* in strikingly physical imagery:

"Let there spring up in you this affection...let it come to such strength that you also may say from the whole heart 'My soul has been glued on behind thee'. Where is that same glue? The

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<sup>142</sup>*conf.* IX.vi.14.

<sup>143</sup>*conf.* X.xxiii.49.

<sup>144</sup>*conf.* X.xxxiii.50.

<sup>145</sup>*ciu.* XIV.9; XII.30.

<sup>146</sup>*trin.* XIV.20.

<sup>147</sup>*trin* XV.26.

glue itself is love. Have thou love, wherewith as with glue thy soul may be glued on behind God. Not with God, but behind God; that he may go before, thou mayest follow."<sup>148</sup>

In this condition the will of the individual is perfectly submitted to the will of God. It is not that either, on the one hand, the individual loses his identity in God or that, on the other hand, the individual becomes divine. Rather the individual is fixed in a perfectly ordered state of dependence upon God. His sole activity is the praise of God, and he lives in a state of delight arising from the rational contemplation of the divine beauty. In contrast to his earlier restlessness he enjoys an eternity of perfect rest<sup>149</sup>. For Augustine the "glue" which binds the individual to God is the Holy Spirit. He thought that the self reaches its goal inasmuch as it is completely fused into the unity conferred by the divine Spirit.<sup>150</sup> Augustine identifies the order of *caritas* with the order conferred by the Spirit<sup>151</sup>.

However, I want to quibble with the strong identification that Augustine makes between the order of *caritas* and the order conferred by the divine Spirit. Augustine's notion of a static, "adhesive" goal for our spiritual development is unattractive to modern readers, and does not accord very well with the insights of the psychologists that we shall meet in the following chapters. Moreover, a biblical understanding of what it might be to be filled with the divine Spirit reveals that there could be dimensions to this state which are not envisaged by Augustine's static order of *caritas*. For the biblical understanding of Spirit is rooted in the Old Testament *ruach*, a word whose basic meaning is the power inhering in breath or a gust of wind.<sup>152</sup> The opening reference to *ruach* in Genesis 1:2 describes the Spirit as "moving" or "hovering" over the face of the waters, and the verb used is from an Ugaritic root that describes the soaring of an eagle<sup>153</sup>. *Caritas* is hardly an equivalent for this kind of Spirit, not least because *caritas* is a static quality whereas *ruach* is essentially dynamic. Moreover, one of the main theological senses of *ruach* is "the inexhaustible power of the divine life"<sup>154</sup>, and the effect of the divine *ruach* on people is to raise them to new levels of strength, either literally (Judges 14:6) or metaphorically (2 Chron. 2:29; Isaiah 11:2). To be filled with *ruach* might suggest a condition of increasing energy rather than an approximation to a more perfect state of rest. A modern understanding of the self's goal might do well to take up

<sup>148</sup>en. Ps. LXII.13.

<sup>149</sup>ciu. XXII.30.

<sup>150</sup>So he speaks of "the Holy Spirit who dwells in the saints, in those, namely, whom the glowing flame of love has fused together into the one Dove whose wings are covered with silver..."<sup>150</sup> (ep. XCVIII.5.)

<sup>151</sup>Cf. Burnaby's comment (p173): "No part of Augustine's trinitarian doctrine has had a more profound effect or more lasting influence upon Christian thought than his 'appropriation' of the divine love to the Holy Spirit."

<sup>152</sup>See EDNT Vol. III p118 on *ruach* as background to NT *pneuma* and cf. Daniélou's comment: "What do we mean when we speak of 'spirit' and that 'God is spirit'?...If we are speaking Hebrew we are saying that God is a storm and an irresistible force." (Quoted in Congar 1983 Vol. 1 p4.)

<sup>153</sup>Westermann (1984) p107.

<sup>154</sup>Eichrodt (1961) p215.

the view of Augustine's Cappadocian contemporary Gregory of Nyssa that the soul does not so much aspire to a state of beatific changelessness as find itself ever rising beyond itself in perfection to discover new goods.<sup>155</sup> We might thus take the unity conferred on the self by this kind of Spirit to be a more dynamic form of unity than the static order of *caritas*, and I shall explore this in my final chapter.

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<sup>155</sup>Life of Moses 1,5-10.

# 4

## Freud: Achieving Limited Self-Mastery through Psychoanalysis

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### **1. Introduction**

In the previous chapter I described the sense of self given to us by Augustine, the theologian who inaugurated some of the most distinctive aspects of the modern identity. I have suggested that Augustine's thought contributes to the first of the three moral sources by which the modern self is constructed, namely the theistic source. In this chapter I turn to Sigmund Freud, who stands within a tradition of thought that sees the self as constituted by its adherence to rational norms, the second of the "sources of significance" by which our modern identity is formed. Here I describe how the sense of self given to us by Augustine is deepened and enlarged by Freud's model of the psyche. I attempt to show how Freud's theory of the unconscious poses difficult questions for the task of uniting the self through rational self-mastery and discuss how far Freud thought that these problems could be overcome.

A central argument of this chapter is that Freud does not lend unambiguous support either to those, like Lacan, who see in psychoanalysis a means of freeing us from the centred self, or to those, like the later Foucault, who see psychoanalysis as a means for increasing the possibilities for controlling and mastering the self. On the one hand, and particularly in his early work, Freud sees the unconscious as a region with its own non-rational rules and its own needs that the conscious self can only tame to a small degree. On the other hand, and particularly in his later work, he sees psychoanalysis as offering real, though never total, possibilities for gaining control over one's self. Again his basic conception of the psyche as a battleground between a pair of competing instincts militates against the possibilities of feelings of psychological peace and wholeness. However, he also operates with a single notion of a psychic energy that underlies the instincts and which, if he had developed it further, could have given a firmer psychological basis for securing the unity of the self.

### **2. Freud: Physiologist or Psychologist?**

It has often been assumed that Freud's properly *psychological* theories date from his contact with Charcot, whom he studied under in Paris in 1885, or from Breuer, the physician with whom he

published Studies in Hysteria in 1895.<sup>1</sup> However, as Ernest Jones insists<sup>2</sup>, the principles on which Freud constructed his psychological theories were essentially those he had acquired as a medical student under the physician Ernst Brücke. Freud said of Brücke that he was "the greatest authority that worked upon me"<sup>3</sup>. A proper understanding of Freud's psychology must therefore begin with his earlier more medically-orientated work in neurology and physiology.

Freud set out his own neurophysiological and partly neuroanatomical model of the mind in his 1895 Project for a Scientific Psychology, referred to hereafter as the Project. In this work Freud attempts to ground psychological processes directly in "quantitatively determinate states of specifiable material particles"<sup>4</sup>. Freud's material particles are the neurones discovered by Waldeyer in 1891. These, however, are of less interest than the "quantitative states" which Freud labels "Q". He describes Q in two main ways. Firstly, he talks of Q in a state of flow; for example "neuronal excitation in a state of flow" (SE I p296), "current" (p298) or "passage of excitation" (p300). Secondly he talks of a more static form of Q, for example, "a cathected neurone filled with Q" (p392). Q is the direct forerunner of what Freud will later call "psychic energy".<sup>5</sup>

Freud proposes that the psyche works according to a "principle of inertia". According to this principle, which is similar to what biologists call the law of homeostasis, the organism reacts to an external stimulus by endeavouring to return to a state of equilibrium in which Q falls to zero. The simplest means by which the organism can eliminate an external stimulus is through flight. There are, however, internal stimuli (what Freud will later call instincts - *Trieben*), such as hunger, respiration and sexuality, which originate in the needs of the body itself. The organism cannot flee from these latter but must act on external reality to satisfy them. For this it requires an internal supply of Q. His (modified) principle of psychic inertia therefore states that the organism reacts to maintain Q at that constant, low level which is consistent with meeting bodily needs.

The science of physiology has, of course, developed enormously since the late nineteenth century and Freud's simple model of a brain which attempts to reduce stored Q to a minimum is largely obsolete. Nonetheless, within the context of his own life-work, Freud's physiology remained of abiding significance. As the SE editors comment, the Project "haunts the whole series of Freud's theoretical writings to the very end"<sup>6</sup>. Freud was, in due course, forced to give up his relation of

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<sup>1</sup>See, for instance, the rather too clear distinction made by Peter Gay between Freud's early "psychology for neurologists" and his main "psychology for psychologists" (Gay 1988 p80 et. al.).

<sup>2</sup>Jones (1964) p65.

<sup>3</sup>Quoted in Gay (1988) p33. Brücke's influence has not always been fully recognised. Thus, for example, Alasdair MacIntyre's entry on Freud in Encyclopaedia of Philosophy does not mention Brücke's name.

<sup>4</sup>SE I p295.

<sup>5</sup>So Wollheim (1991 Ch. 2) and Solomon's contribution to Ed. Wollheim (1977), and somewhat against the SE editors (SE I "Appendix C: The Nature of Q".)

<sup>6</sup>SE I p290.



psychology to brain structure because of lack of progress in the latter, but he never renounced the connection between the two. He always hoped that research into brain function might ultimately vindicate his psychology.<sup>7</sup> Freud's physiology would obviously not be taken seriously by contemporary neurologists, but it remains the implicit theoretical structure within which the later Freud interprets his clinical data.<sup>8</sup> His physiology therefore remains important for a proper understanding of his later psychology - the work for which he *is* still taken seriously.

### **3. Freud's Theory of Instincts**

Freud repeatedly emphasised that instinct was the most important element in psychological research.<sup>9</sup> Yet he also found the instincts difficult and obscure<sup>10</sup>, and Freud's theory of instincts remains one of the most problematic aspects of his work. The difficulty is compounded by the inadequacy of our English word "instinct" as a translation for Freud's *Trieb*. The English word, in its biological sense, means something like "fixed and innate determinant of behaviour"<sup>11</sup>. By contrast, it was of the essence of Freud's *Trieben* that they were dynamic and suffered learned modifications. Moreover *Trieb* has an energetic quality, as Freud says: "Every instinct is a piece of activity"<sup>12</sup>. We can best understand Freud's instincts if we consider them to be forms of psychic energy rather than innate responses to environmental demands. They are, I suggest, in succession to, and find their physiological grounding, in the description of energy or Q given by Freud in his Project.

An instinct makes itself felt through an increase in psychic tension. Successful meeting of an instinctual need corresponds to a flow of energy which is experienced by the ego as a source of pleasure. We might say that instincts are forms of stored energy - a notion that was literally true for Freud but might still be a useful analogy for us. Like the electrical energy stored in a battery, they set up a potential difference or tension in the psyche. The response of the psyche to this tension is to initiate an activity which drains the energy from the instinct and reduces psychic tension.

Freud runs into trouble in his attempt to classify the instincts. In his most sustained attempt at explaining the instincts, the 1915 paper "The Instincts and their Vicissitudes" (SE XIV), he suggests and then discounts the idea that the instincts might be distinguished according to the mental qualities (sensations or affects) that they generate. Instead he proposes, though as "merely

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<sup>7</sup>Cf. his comment in the centrally important paper on The Unconscious (XIV 120) that he had given up discussions of brain structure "for the present".

<sup>8</sup>So Solomon op.cit. p28.

<sup>9</sup>XVIII, 34; XIV, 118; XXI, 117.

<sup>10</sup>XIV 118, XXII 94.

<sup>11</sup>So de Sousa in ed. Wollheim (1977) p200.

<sup>12</sup>XIV 122.

a working hypothesis"<sup>13</sup>, that they fall into two groups, the ego instincts and the sexual instincts. He suggests that biological grounding for the distinction may be found in the former's reference to self-preservation and the latter's reference to the trans-personal continuance of the species. Freud's tentativeness presumably arises because he himself had already undercut this distinction between personal and trans-personal instincts in his 1914 paper "On Narcissism", where he had proposed that the sexual libido could be directed inwards towards the self in the form of "ego-libido".

In his post World War I work Freud remained committed to a dualistic theory of instincts for clinical and theoretical reasons. The cases of his patients convinced him that conflict is endemic to the mind; and the basic psychoanalytic concept of repression seemed to require a duality in mental functioning. But Freud now found that the form of this conflict was better expressed by opposing the erotic drive not to an ego-drive but to aggression. Freud had always been aware of forces of aggression within his own psyche. For example, his letters to Fliess disclose his own childhood death wishes towards his brother and his cruel treatment of his niece<sup>14</sup>. An interesting autobiographical comment reveals his awareness of the opposed forces of love and aggression within his own self: "My emotional life has always insisted that I should have an intimate friend and a hated enemy. I have always been able to provide myself afresh with both of them..."<sup>15</sup>. Moreover, in his 1905 Three essays on sexuality he had explored the phenomenon of sexual cruelty<sup>16</sup>. But the carnage of the war and the death of his favourite daughter Sophie greatly heightened his awareness of destruction and death.<sup>17</sup> He would later wonder how it was that he had taken so long to grant a stronger role to primary aggression: "I can no longer understand how we have overlooked the unambiguity of non-erotic aggressivity and destructiveness and can have failed to give it its due place in our interpretation of life."<sup>18</sup>

Freud worked out the concept of the death drive in his 1920 Beyond the Pleasure Principle. He sets out there his evidence that human behaviour is sometimes motivated by a desire which is "beyond" simple satisfaction of erotic desire. In particular he was struck by forms of behaviour, notably compulsive repetitive actions, which seemed to him to indicate a pressure for the restoration of an earlier, organic state of things. He saw this drive towards death manifested psychologically in phenomena such as masochism, guilt and the need for self-punishment<sup>19</sup>. When turned outwards he saw it satisfied in sadism, wanton destructiveness and war.<sup>20</sup> Freud's

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<sup>13</sup>XIV 124.

<sup>14</sup>Masson (1985) p268.

<sup>15</sup>V 483.

<sup>16</sup>VII 192ff.

<sup>17</sup>Ref. Gay (1988) pp390-403.

<sup>18</sup>XXI 120.

<sup>19</sup>XXIII 243.

<sup>20</sup>XXI 121 and his letter to Einstein entitled "Why War?" in Penguin Freud Library 12 p349ff.

final picture (as given, for example, in the posthumous Outline of Psychoanalysis) is one of a psyche charged with the "total available energy of Eros" pitted against the destructive tendencies of the thanatos instinct.<sup>21</sup>

But the clinical evidence for the death instinct was, frankly, slim and has failed to convince many in the psychoanalytic community.<sup>22</sup> Whilst human aggressiveness, whether turned inwards towards the self or outwards towards others is not in doubt, it is unclear what it means to talk of an instinct towards death that is directly comparable to the erotic drive. Freud indeed concedes that "we are without a term analogous to 'libido' for describing the energy of the death instinct"<sup>23</sup>. It might be better to conceive of the tendency of things to return to inorganic states as a kind of background against which the various manoeuvres of the erotic drive are played out, not as a drive which is directly opposed to eros. In this case, if eros is pictured as an energetic principle, the tendency towards death is better described not as an energetic principle but as an entropic principle. The triumph of death marks a final reduction of psychic energy (or Q) to zero and a maximisation of psychic entropy. On this basis, human life may be understood as a play between the possibilities of positive energy on the one hand and the tendency to a levelling of energy on the other.

Freud thus always ostensibly operated with a duality of instincts, whether the duality was the ego and libido instincts of his early work, the ego-libido and object-libido of "On Narcissism", or the Eros and Thanatos of his later work. His final position on a duality of instincts was unambiguous: "Only by the concurrent or mutually opposing action of the two primal instincts - Eros and the death instinct - never by one or the other alone, can we explain the rich multiplicity of the phenomena of life."<sup>24</sup> However, his attempt to classify the instincts into two fundamental kinds was always problematic, and he was never able to develop the non-libidinal pole of his instinct pairs (be it ego or Thanatos) to anything like the extent he developed the libido instinct. The reason for these difficulties, I think, is that Freud's model, though he never conceded it, was in essence a monistic one. His model of the psyche is an energetic one, and he envisaged, at bottom, only *one* kind of psychic energy of which all the instincts are varying manifestations.

Freud's insistence on a duality of instincts can, I think be traced to two motives. Firstly, Freud's theory assigned primary importance to psychic tension, repression and so on. Freud rightly thought that these phenomena pre-supposed the existence of opposing instincts. But it does not follow that such instincts should be *fundamentally* opposed. For, if this were true, it is difficult to see what would hold the self together.

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<sup>21</sup> XXIII 149.

<sup>22</sup> Ref. Gay (1988) pp390-403 op. cit.

<sup>23</sup> XXIII 150.

<sup>24</sup> XXIII 243.

The second motive is the polemical one shared by Freud and his supporters<sup>25</sup> against those who, following Carl Jung, charged Freud with "pan-sexualism". The easiest way of responding to this charge was, and is, to point to Freud's enduring duality of instincts. Freud could say that he always allowed that some phenomena were caused by non-sexual factors; he did not reduce everything to libidinal attachments. But it was always a weak duality in which only one pole was seriously explored. Jung broke away from Freud in 1913, championing a single non-sexual libidinal energy, and the two men became bitter enemies. One can only speculate that had Jung not broken away on this issue Freud might have responded to the crisis in his instinct theory depicted in the 1914 "On Narcissism" in a different way from the dualistic proposal of an ego-libido and an object-libido. Freud might have developed the notion of libido as psychic energy more thoroughly had his rival Jung not made this idea his own and used it as a central means of distinguishing his position from Freud's.

The generation and release of psychic tension is better understood, and consistent with Freud's own underlying theoretical framework, by analogy with the storage and flow of energy. The opposing forces present in the psyche are best taken as consequent on this. One can envisage some form of psychic energy, not necessarily understood in Freud's literal sense, but perhaps in a more metaphysical or spiritual way, as providing the basic quality that engenders psychic unity. Certain configurations of this energy (what Freud refers to as stored energy) could generate the phenomena of psychic tension. The fullness of human life might be represented by the possibilities of the play of flows of energy, whilst the inverse of this - the cessation of energy flows - corresponds to the absence of possibilities manifested in death.

#### **4. The Libido Instinct**

The libido is far and away the most important instinct Freud deals with and the only one he explores at length. In the bulk of Freud's work, and up to around 1920, he describes the libido instinct in rigorously and explicitly sexual terms. Wollheim<sup>26</sup> very plausibly suggests Freud granted fundamental importance to sexuality amongst the instincts for four main reasons: its antiquity, traced by Freud back to infancy; its strength; its plasticity - the tendency for a wide range of human activities to become sexualised; and its proneness to maldevelopment. But Freud surely also had polemic and rhetorical intentions. For he saw sexuality as, "the humiliation of the highest possessions of civilisation"<sup>27</sup>. Talk of sex conveyed, and still conveys, a certain shocking honesty. Freud would continue to speak of sex where, he conceded, he could equally well have spoken about Eros. It was, he said, a matter of avoiding "faintheartedness"<sup>28</sup>.

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<sup>25</sup>E.g. Hall (1985) p58; Glover (1950) p56f; Wollheim (1991) p179ff.

<sup>26</sup>Wollheim (1991) p123.

<sup>27</sup>From "The Resistances to Psychoanalysis" quoted in Rieff (1959) p148.

<sup>28</sup>"Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego" (in Penguin Vol. 12) p120.

In his early writings, Freud understood sexuality in a fairly traditional, narrow, sense, but greatly expanded the range of its causal effects. Thus in 1895 he made the shocking discovery that hysteria is caused "in every case" by premature sexual experience.<sup>29</sup> Then, in 1897, in a move which remains controversial, he rejected the idea of child sexual abuse in favour of what would come to be his mature position that neurosis has its roots in infantile sexuality.<sup>30</sup> He discovered that the perverse details of his own adult dreams related to forgotten memories from early childhood - a fact he was able to check by consulting those who could remember his childhood home. One theme revealed itself as having determinative significance for his adult dream life, namely his childhood love for his mother and jealousy of his father. This phenomenon, the "Oedipus complex", enabled him to understand the compelling psychological power of literature such as the Greek Oedipus Rex and Shakespeare's Hamlet, and he took it to be a universal feature of early childhood. The Oedipus complex, with its highly charged configuration of sexual desire, and ambivalence towards the same sex parent would become the central problem around which the psychoanalytic encounter would revolve.

The discovery of the Oedipus complex paved the way for a significant extension of Freud's concept of libido. Once sexuality is understood to be rooted in childish desires of a perverse kind, it may now be seen as much more diverse than merely the normal genital relations between adults. Freud developed his concept of sexuality especially in The Three Essays on Sexuality of 1905 where he introduced the distinction between the sexual "aim" and the sexual "object". Sexuality may deviate in terms of object (as with homosexuality or bestiality) or in terms of aim (as in sadism or fetishism). Sexuality in the infant is associated with a succession of particular parts of the body - the "erotogenic zones" - first the mouth, then the anus and then the genitals. Freud took it that the mother's breast was the first sexual "object", meeting the infant's need for oral pleasure.<sup>31</sup> A much wider range of behaviour than previously suspected could now be seen to be a manifestation of the libido instinct. As Freud says, "in psychoanalysis the concept of what is sexual...goes lower and also higher than its popular sense."<sup>32</sup>

A further crucial extension to Freud's concept of the libido instinct came with his discovery (explained in the 1914 paper "On Narcissism") that a person may take himself as his own sexual object. He suggests that the infant exists in a state of "primary narcissism" with all his or her energy invested in the self. As the child develops, he or she invests energy in external objects at the expense of the self. The picture Freud uses is of an amoeba temporarily putting out

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<sup>29</sup>Masson (1985) p141-155.

<sup>30</sup>Letter to Fliess of 21 Sep. 1897 in Masson p264f.

<sup>31</sup>XVI 314 and XIV 87.

<sup>32</sup>XI 222.

pseudopodia.<sup>33</sup> We may understand that the psyche consists of a finite quantity of energy which may be invested in some balance between itself and external objects. In the former case Freud talks of ego-libido and in the latter case of object-libido. Freud says that the highest phase of development of which object-libido is capable is seen in the state of being in love, when a person's psychic energy is fully invested in another person.<sup>34</sup> The highest stage of psychological development, what Freud terms the genital personality, is thus only achieved in relationship with another.

After the first world war Freud recast his psychoanalytic theory with the publication of the three important works: Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920), Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego (1921) and The Ego and the Id (1923). Freud now saw sexuality as an aspect of a more general life-force which he termed "Eros". The counterpart to the libido was no longer the instinct of self-preservation but the destructive Thanatos instinct. He now defined libido as follows:

"Libido is an expression taken from the theory of the emotions. We call by that name the energy, regarded as a quantitative magnitude (though not at present actually measurable), of those instincts which have to do with all that may be comprised under the word 'love'...In its origin, function, and relation to sexual love, the 'Eros' of the philosopher Plato coincides exactly with the love-force, the libido of psychoanalysis..."<sup>35</sup>

This definition has a double aspect. On the one hand it represents an extension of the libido concept to include all the phenomena of love. Freud lists here self-love, love for parents and children, friendship and love for humanity in general, and finally devotion to concrete objects and abstract ideas. In this sense the libido is now quite far from what we ordinarily think of as the sexual drive; it is the much broader life-force of the Platonic-Eros. But on the other hand, Freud also thereby redefines love in terms of sex. So, for example, he takes it that the "nucleus" of love is sexual love with sexual union as its aim. Psychoanalysis, he says, gives the love instincts the name of sexual instincts, "by reason of their origin".<sup>36</sup>

How are we to take this? In its negative aspect Freud's equation could be taken as a reduction of love to sex. Such a reduction does not make sense of our experience of the rich and variegated aspects of love. Love may have sexual components, but we surely do not experience all love as, in essence, sexual. Admiration, self-sacrifice, loyalty, patriotism, religious duty, are other components of love and will sometimes be the dominant components. If Freud wishes seriously to allege that all these are at root sexual then he will indeed find it difficult to escape the charge of

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<sup>33</sup>XIV 75.

<sup>34</sup>XIV 76.

<sup>35</sup>Penguin edition of "Group Psychology" (Vol. 12) p119.

<sup>36</sup>ibid. p120.

pan-sexualism.<sup>37</sup> I think the negative element of the equation is better seen as part of Freud's continuing polemic against human pretensions to a respectable, civilised, order. Freud was unremittingly critical of his own society: "We can only regard the highest civilisation of the present as disfigured by a gigantic hypocrisy"<sup>38</sup>. He never celebrates sexuality in the manner of D.H. Lawrence or even de Sade. Sexuality is simply the brute and unlovely reality of human existence: "the position of the genital organs - '*inter urinas et faeces*' - remains the decisive and unchangeable factor"<sup>39</sup>. Freud is deliberately attempting to humiliate human nature and human society by bringing it down to its biological basics.

In its positive aspect, the equation continues the exercise in correlating human psychology with physiology begun in the Project. The Platonic Eros is now related to the libidinal energy of the human psyche. Thus Freud will say that libido is the "manifestation" of the force of Eros.<sup>40</sup> Love itself can now be understood as having an analogue, or even as having its roots, in the physiological and physical notion of energy. In theological terms, we may compare the traditional, Augustinian, notion that God the Holy Spirit is the principle of love, with the older Hebrew conception of the Spirit as energy. In both psychology and theology there are fruitful parallels between energy and love as the fundamental principles that build up life.

Where Freud's final statement of the libido instinct is weak is in the moral levelling effect he introduces into all its manifestations. His libido is actually *not* the same as Plato's Eros, for Plato's Eros had more and less noble forms depending on its object. Plato's Eros, and following it, Augustine's desire, admits of moral distinctions. But all forms of Freud's libido are morally indifferent; we can merely say of them that they are more or less aim-inhibited, more or less sublimated.

Now I think it is highly questionable whether anyone could construct a sense of self in the absence of any moral distinctions between different kinds of desire - and Freud himself certainly held to rigorous moral distinctions in his own life. Thus he once wrote in a personal letter, "I stand for an incomparably freer sexual life, although I myself have made very little use of such freedom: only in so far as I myself judged it to be allowable"<sup>41</sup>. This sentence is hard to understand on Freud's own terms since it is not clear how his libido theory allows for any basis on which one could determine sexual activity as "allowable" or not. One could only make a rational, calculated decision as to what kinds of activity would result in the most pleasure. Yet this was clearly not how Freud lived. In his own life Freud exemplified a much higher level of moral

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<sup>37</sup>For a full refutation of this reductionist position see Dilman (1983) Ch. 3 "Love and Sexuality".

<sup>38</sup>Jones (1964) p429.

<sup>39</sup>XI 215.

<sup>40</sup>The Question of Lay Analysis" XX 265.

<sup>41</sup>Letter to Putnam of 1915 quoted in Jones p473.

conduct than his own theory seems to dictate. His letter continues, "Why I - and incidentally my six adult children also - have to be thoroughly decent human beings is quite incomprehensible to me." Indeed! His self-understanding could surely only be completed if he were to admit to some moral ordering of the different manifestations of libido. Freud's levelling of the forms of desire serves well his polemic against what he took to be a morally hypocritical society. But if his theory is to be adequate to meet the demands of life it will have to be strengthened through allowing some such moral ordering of desire as we saw in Augustine.

## **5. The Evolution of Freud's Structure of the Psyche**

Thus far we have focused on Freud's psychology from the perspective of what may be termed "energetics". We now turn to consider his model of the psyche from the perspective of structure. Freud is best known for his tri-partite psychic structure of id, ego and super-ego, and it is this which I intend to concentrate on. However, he did not arrive at this structure until his late 60s, with the publication in 1923 of The Ego and the Id, and it will be important for us first to trace the main steps by which his thought reached this final form.

### **5.1 The Unconscious**

The unconscious was always linked in Freud's thought to the concept of repression<sup>42</sup>. An idea is repressed; it remains in the mind removed from consciousness and yet still operative; it may at some future time be readmitted to consciousness. This cycle enabled Freud to explain not merely neurotic forms of behaviour, but also a wide range of apparently unconnected psychic phenomena, such as dreams, slips of the tongue and jokes, that form part of what Freud called "the psychopathology of everyday life"<sup>43</sup>.

Freud's first, neurological, attempt at distinguishing-consciousness and unconsciousness was given in his 1895 Project. The next, still neurological, development of his theory is found in a letter to Fliess of 1896<sup>44</sup>. Whilst the phenomenon of unconscious psychic processes was fundamental for Freud's subsequent Interpretation of Dreams (1900), it was not until 1912 that Freud presented a systematic account of the unconscious in a paper given to the London Society for Psychical Research. An expanded version of this statement is given in his 1915 paper "The Unconscious" as part of a series of "Papers on Metapsychology". The series on metapsychology may well be the most important of all Freud's theoretical writings<sup>45</sup>, and the paper on the unconscious is the culmination of this series. Its contents bear directly on my theme, and I will therefore now discuss some of its leading arguments.

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<sup>42</sup>XIV 15.

<sup>43</sup>Cf. his 1901 work of the same name.

<sup>44</sup>Masson (1985) p207ff.

<sup>45</sup>So SE editors.



Metapsychological paper on "The Unconscious"

Freud begins the paper<sup>46</sup> by rhetorically asking whether I should infer the existence of my own unconscious in the same way as one infers the existence of consciousness in other people. This would involve me saying that all the acts and manifestations which I notice in myself but do not know how to link up with the rest of my mental life must be judged as if they belonged to someone else: they are to be explained by a mental life ascribed to this other person. This procedure would, it seems, lead to the assumption of another, second consciousness which is united in my self with the consciousness I know. Freud offers three specific criticisms of this assumption. Firstly, the notion of an unconscious consciousness seems to cause even more philosophical confusion than the postulate of an unconscious *per se*. Secondly, since the psychic processes we infer seem to enjoy a high degree of mutual independence we must logically be prepared to assume the existence of a third and a fourth consciousness, and so on without limit. Thirdly, the attributes of the psychic processes which analysis reveals are not at all the same as the attributes of consciousness with which we are familiar. Freud therefore concludes that the process of inferring the existence of the unconscious is *not* the same as inferring the existence of consciousness in an other person. Nor does the phenomenon of the splitting of consciousness, as in schizophrenia, militate against Freud's view. For in this case we do not have the existence of a second consciousness but a splitting of the mental activities of the one consciousness into two groups, to each of which consciousness turns its attention in turn.

Freud's proposal of an unconscious realm of the psyche clearly discounts the assumption of "multiple selves" in the psyche. The Freudian unconscious cannot be considered as "another self" whose existence is to be inferred in the same way that one infers the existence of the selves of other individuals. Freud would rather say that within the one mind there exists a region that is conscious and a further region that mind is not conscious of. The unconscious does not function according to the rules that I normally associate with my conscious self. But it is still a part of my own self, for it is associated with my own brain and my own body. It covers aspects of myself to which I stand in a special relation, such as a chip on the shoulder or an obsessive desire. It can frustrate my conscious goals. It may be experienced as a pull towards a centre in myself that I do not recognise. But there is nothing in me which stands in the same, clearly distinct, relation to my self as the selves of other people do. In this central work Freud thus does not envisage the *radical* de-centring of the self or the existence of multiple selves in the ways suggested by Lacan and his followers.

The question then arises as to how I may know about the unconscious if I cannot infer its existence in the same way as I infer the existence of my own or another's consciousness. The answer, says Freud, is that knowledge of it is gained empirically. I use my sense organs to gather

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<sup>46</sup>XIV 169ff.

data about the unconscious in the same way as I gather data about the external world in general. This suggests it will be easier for me to gain information about the unconscious of other people than about my own unconscious. For the ability to treat my own psyche in a completely empirical way would seem to require an extraordinary degree of mental reflexivity and detachment. Freud's own self-analysis, carried out after the death of his father and whose results are recorded in his Interpretation of Dreams, is a feat of this kind. But psychoanalysts have taken it that only Freud himself was capable of such an achievement; all his successors would need to be analysed by an other.

Freud next returns to the description of the psyche as a set of systems that he had proposed in a letter of 1896 to Fliess. He suggests the psyche consists of two, or possibly three systems: the unconscious (the "Ucs."), the conscious ("Cs.") and possibly also the preconscious ("Pcs"). He raises the question of whether the transition of an idea from the unconscious to the conscious really involves the writing out of a duplicate record in the mind, as he had suggested to Fliess (the "topographical hypothesis"), or whether it is represented by the idea moving from one region of the mind to another (the "functional hypothesis"). It is a question, he says, that could only finally be resolved anatomically. But unfortunately brain anatomy was not yet sufficiently developed to help. Therefore, he says, "our psychical topography has *for the present* nothing to do with anatomy...In this respect, then, our work is untrammelled and may proceed according to its own requirements"<sup>47</sup> (italics in the original). His systems of the mind will now be "no more than graphic illustrations", that is to say, they are now explicitly *psychological* rather than *neurological*. They cohere with neuroanatomy insofar as it was known to Freud, but now quite explicitly draw their evidence from psychoanalytic practice rather than brain science.

He now attempts to answer his question concerning the movement of ideas from the unconscious to the conscious with reference to psychoanalysis. He notes that the lifting of a repression is never achieved by the analyst merely *telling* the patient the content of the idea, even when the analyst is certain that the idea is present in the patient's unconscious. This would, at first sight, support the "functional" model of psychic functioning. We might suppose that what has happened is that a second record has been placed in the patient's consciousness but that the original record remains in the unconscious. What must, rather, be accomplished is the lifting of the repression and the moving of the original record into consciousness. But, says Freud, closer consideration shows that the "topographical" model might be equally valid. To have heard something and to have experienced it are two quite different things. According to this model, what has happened is that a second, conscious, record has been inserted into the patient's consciousness, but it is not a faithful translation of the unconscious record.

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<sup>47</sup>XIV 175.

According to either model we have an interesting extension of the Augustinian notion of remembering oneself. Bringing an idea into consciousness which has been deliberately forgotten or repressed is not simply a matter of understanding some previously known concept or recollecting a piece of mislaid information about oneself. It is also a matter of bringing to mind the context and the feelings involved, in other words of "re-living", as we say, the experienced event. If I had access to a videotape that had recorded my life so far this would still not amount to a remembering of self. I would rather have to have to be able to recapture the emotions and relationships implicated in the recorded events; this would mean becoming an actor in the story rather than being a mere observer. In psychoanalysis this "re-living" is carried out by "transferring" the emotions from the original relationships onto the analyst. The transference facilitates a powerful form of remembrance in which emotions felt towards others, notably parents, are "worked through".<sup>48</sup>

Freud says that the Ucs is made up of two components. Its nucleus consists of inherited mental formations - something analogous to instinct (*instinkt*) in animals. The Ucs represents the primitive element of the human psyche and in this respect may be compared with "an aboriginal population in the mind"<sup>49</sup>. The second component is made up of what is repressed or discarded by consciousness. Freud lists four characteristics of the system Ucs which distinguish it from consciousness<sup>50</sup>, each of which mark a significant increase in the range of psychic functioning compared with what we have observed in Augustine:

1. Its contents exist side by side without being influenced by each other and are exempt from mutual contradiction. When two unconscious impulses whose aims appear to be contradictory become simultaneously active, they do not cancel each other out but combine to form an intermediate aim or compromise. Where Augustine had supposed that the mind was, in its natural state, an ordered realm, Freud suggests that there are areas of the mind that do not operate according to even the most basic ordering principles. The unconscious is not a realm in which order has been overcome by disorder, so much as a region that is in principle what we might call "non-ordered".
2. Its processes are timeless; they are not ordered temporally and are not altered with the passage of time. Where Augustine had supposed that the phenomenon of time was integrally linked to processes of thought, Freud suggests there are regions of the mind which do not distinguish the present from the recent or distant past.
3. Its contents are highly mobile. In dreaming, for example, its contents are typically altered ("displaced") or combined ("condensed"). Where Augustine supposed that his dreams were quite

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<sup>48</sup>XII 155f; XX 159f.

<sup>49</sup>XIV 195.

<sup>50</sup>XIV 187.

straightforwardly linked to earlier sexual experience Freud proposes that the contents of dream-life are fluid and related to their causes in highly convoluted ways.

4. Its functioning is governed by the internal psychic demand for the reduction of tension (or demand for pleasure). It typically operates according to "wish-fulfilment" and not by the demands and constraints of external reality. Introspective though Augustine was, he never located psychical processes that were so interior as to operate without any reference to extra-psychic conditions.

## 5.2 Early Notions of the Ego

"Ego" is the SE editors' - and now the standard - translation for Freud's "*das Ich*". The Editors inform us<sup>51</sup> that Freud uses *das Ich* in two senses, meaning:

- a) The person as a whole, including perhaps the body, in distinction from other people. This they suggest is equivalent to our word "self".
- b) A particular part of the mind characterised by special attributes and functions.

In the 1895 Project, and in the developed ego-psychology that is initiated with the 1923 Ego and the Id, Freud normally uses the word in the second sense. In some intervening works, however, he uses it in the first sense. Self is, of course, a notoriously difficult word to define, but I take it that Freud's ego, in its much more common sense (b) refers to only a part of what we ordinarily mean by "self"<sup>52</sup>. Freud's ego refers to the self in its rational aspects; we might compare it with Augustine's *mens*. For Freud the ego is the "real me" or "true self".

After 1895 the ego is left unmentioned for 15 years while Freud focuses his efforts on explicating the unconscious regions of the psyche and on charting the progress of the libido instinct. It reappears in 1910<sup>53</sup>, when Freud begins to explore the phenomenon of narcissism, in connection with the "ego-instincts" or self-preservative instincts (ego used in sense (a) above). In the important 1915 paper on "The Unconscious" what had been the ego became the system Cs and (possibly) the system Pcs. This system is the progenitor of Freud's developed conception of the ego. It is very unfortunate that the paper in the metapsychological series entitled "On Consciousness" has been lost. We therefore lack an equivalent conceptual statement of the system Cs to that given by the paper "The Unconscious" on the system Ucs. Nevertheless the paper on "The Unconscious" gives some brief hints at its characteristics. He says the system Cs (or Pcs) is responsible for setting up logical relations between different ideas, for giving ideas order in time, for testing ideas and wishes against the reality principle and for repressing wishes that fail to meet

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<sup>51</sup>Introduction to The Ego and the Id S.E. XIX.

<sup>52</sup>*pace* Dilman (1984) p106 who thinks it is more or less equivalent to our everyday notion of the self.

<sup>53</sup>XI 214.

this principle.<sup>54</sup> Thus the system Cs might be characterised above all as an ordering principle within the psyche.

In this connection Freud re-iterates the distinction between the two states of psychic energy that he first made in the Project. He suggests that energy may either be bound or freely mobile, and that this distinction "represents the deepest insight we have gained up to the present into the nature of nervous energy"<sup>55</sup>. He says a metapsychological presentation is "most urgently" called for on this point but does not yet feel able to engage in it. Whilst Freud does not quite explicitly say so, we could take it that the fundamental distinction between the system Cs and the system Ucs is that between bound and free energy. The latter is a realm of available energy, the former a realm in which energy is held within an ordered structure.

The self may now be pictured as a dynamic disequilibrium between energy and structure. If it were entirely *structure* or maximum order, the Augustinian ideal, then the possibility of movement and change would be frozen out. On the other hand, if it were entirely free energy, or disorder, which seems to be the post-modernist position, this would in Freud's terms be nihilism and death.

### 5.3 The Ego-Ideal

In his 1914 paper "On Narcissism", Freud came to ask how it was that normal adults were not imbued with the high level of narcissistic self-love which characterised infants. One possible answer, which he considered but rejected, was that the whole of the child's self-directed ego-libido was transferred onto external objects as the child grew. Instead he proposed a new psychic entity, the ego-ideal, and suggested that the ego-libido was transferred on to this. The ego-ideal consists of those cultural and ethical ideas that the subject has taken as his or her own. The ego may now be said to love itself not for its own sake, but to the extent that it meets the ethical ideal. Freud suggests there is an "agency", equivalent to our notion of conscience, that exists within the psyche to watch over the ego, to monitor how far it meets the ideal and to punish it for its failures. The ego-ideal and the monitoring "agency" together form what Freud will, in the 1923 Ego and the Id, call the "super-ego".

The notion of the ego-ideal invariably has negative overtones in Freud's writing. It is intimately linked to repression, for repression proceeds from the ego's attempts to preserve its own self-respect in the light of the demands of the ideal. Freud would not have said that the ego should have no ideals. He was aware that if the ego remained charged with infantile narcissism the result in the adult would not be health but megalomania.<sup>56</sup> He advocated a middle way between

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<sup>54</sup>XIV 188.

<sup>55</sup>XIV 188.

<sup>56</sup>XIV 93.

libertarianism and an over-rigid moral code.<sup>57</sup> But, since Freud perceived his context as one of moral hypocrisy and not as one of unrestrained sexual license, it is unsurprising that his coverage of the ego-ideal is predominantly negative.

The notion of an internal agency that watches over and disciplines the ego is one that gains powerful support from Foucault. It could be seen as voicing a deep criticism of certain forms of Augustinian self-love, where the self may only be loved insofar as it matches up to God's ideal, or where it is loved only for what it can become. But Augustine did also talk of a natural self-love, whereby the self loves and cares for itself on account of its natural goodness. This last kind of self-love would correlate with Freud's primary narcissism. The failure of the self to set itself within some wider moral context is Augustine's sin of "pride", and corresponds with Freud's megalomania.

However, whatever comparisons we may draw between Freud and Augustine, they differ fundamentally on the relation of natural instinct to morality. Augustine thought that our bodily needs would be perfectly fulfilled if the body were properly subject to the soul and the soul were subject to the divine moral order. Freud opposed instinct to morality and supposed that greater obedience to the moral order meant less fulfilment for the instincts. Freud thought that this divide could partly be overcome through the sublimation of instinct in pursuit of higher moral goals, but sublimation could, he thought, only be tolerated to a limited extent. By proposing an intrinsic opposition between the demands of the ego-ideal and the instincts, Freud complicates the achievement of a unified sense of self. We can no longer unify the whole of the self behind some goal, whether the goal is the pursuit of pleasure or the moral good, for any goal is always achieved at the expense of some aspects of the self.

## **6. Freud's Final Model of the Psyche**

Freud's final model of the psyche, and the one for which he is best known, is set out in his 1923 Ego and the Id and is further developed in the third of his 1932 New Introductory Lectures. It then remains broadly the same right through to his posthumous Outline of Psychoanalysis. There were two significant conceptual developments that caused Freud to revise his 1915 metapsychology. The first, and more important, was the realisation that the ego could act *unconsciously* as an agent of repression. In other words the ego had unconscious components. The second, was the bringing together of the ego-ideal and the monitoring "agency" in the single psychic region of the super-ego. "The super-ego, the ego and the id - these, then, are the three realms, regions or provinces into which we divide an individual's mental apparatus."<sup>58</sup> I will begin

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<sup>57</sup>See Introductory Lectures (Penguin Vol. 1) p485f.

<sup>58</sup>XXII 72.

by describing Freud's conception of each of the three parts of the psyche, and then attempt to show how the self is created out of the interaction of the three.

### 6.1 The Id

Freud's description of the id<sup>59</sup> is in substantial continuity with his 1915 description of the system Ucs. The id is a region governed by the four principles of freedom from contradiction, timelessness, mobility of energy, and obedience to the pleasure principle. It is the "dark, inaccessible part of the personality" known only indirectly through its manifestation in dreams and neurotic symptoms. Moreover, the person experiences the id as something, a set of impersonal impulses and energies, to which he or she submits: the id escapes the rule of the will. Significantly, whereas for Augustine any part of the mind or body that was not subject to the will was defective and an indication of human fallenness, Freud tells us that independence from the will is a quite natural, morally neutral quality of parts of the mind. This is an obvious point in the light of modern physiological understandings of hormonal responses, reflexes, and so on.

Freud says that the relation of the id to the ego is that of the untamed passions to reason and good sense.<sup>60</sup> This leads Dilman to suggest that Freud's concept of the id partly coincides with older notions of "the flesh" or "the body".<sup>61</sup> Dilman gives, as an example of an instinct taken up from the id into the ego, the transformation of lust into sexual love. There is some mileage in Dilman's comparison; the id is indeed closer to the bodily instincts than the ego. However, he risks lending Freud's id a negative moral evaluation which is not Freud's. For example, when Augustine considers the various meanings of "the flesh", he concludes that its psychological sense indicates moral "faults of the mind"<sup>62</sup>. But Freud's id, by contrast, "knows no good and evil, no morality"<sup>63</sup>.

Freud's id is the reservoir of psychic energy, instinct and passion. For Freud, the will gains its power only by being charged with the id's emotional energy. For Augustine, by contrast, the emotions were expressions of the conscious will. He thought that the will was at the very centre of the human being, partaking of the life-force of the *animus*. But Freud's model fits better than Augustine's the contemporary self-identity. Modern people, with Freud, generally suppose that our emotional life has a certain autonomy with regard to the will, and that our emotions spring from our "deep self".

Augustine conceived of lower and higher portions of the mind according to the objects dealt with, not according to the divide between emotion and reason. Freud, by contrast, locates reason and

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<sup>59</sup>XXII 73-80.

<sup>60</sup>XXII 76.

<sup>61</sup>Dilman (1984 p105).

<sup>62</sup>ciu. XIV.2.

<sup>63</sup>XXII 74.



emotion in different parts of the psyche. Freud does not, however, go so far as Jung will do in proposing a complete dualism of reason and emotion. For Freud insists that the emotions *as such* do not exist within the id, only the passionate energy out of which they are formed. The discrete emotions are defined only by the ego's structuring of this energy.

The notion of the id allows us to give form to the widespread, and characteristically modern, impression that the self has psychic "depth". To take just one example, we may now be able to articulate a deeper level of meaning in a well-worn phrase such as "the deceits of the heart". If we say that a preacher "speaks from the heart" we mean something to the effect that he or she speaks out of deeply ingrained convictions that are not conditioned by a sense of duty connected with the occasion of the delivery of the sermon. "Speaking from the heart" is belied by slips of the tongue or gestures that do not accord with the spoken message and which indicate to the attentive listener that the preacher's message does not accord with his or her deepest beliefs and feelings.

Now this might indicate, at one level, a simple case of insincerity: the preacher's words are not a true reflection of his consciously held beliefs. But suppose the preacher steadfastly protests his sincerity? After Freud we would recognise a deeper level of psychic functioning explicable with reference to the id. The preacher may genuinely believe that he is wholly behind his message and yet still be wrong in this belief; there are, in fact, unconscious aspects of his personality that dissent from his conscious demeanour. We should not say that he is insincere but that he is self-deceived; his ego is not in line with his id. Insincerity is a relatively simple phenomenon concerning the ego alone. But self-deception is explained in terms of the deeper disjunction between ego and id. Freud's model of the psyche enables us to picture the difference between simple insincerity and more complicated self-deception in a powerful way. After Freud, the attainment of the unity of the self must involve not merely the alignment of all the conscious aspects of the mind but must also include strategies to identify and correct deeper and unconscious levels of self-deception.

## 6.2 The Ego

Freud says that the ego is "that portion of the id which was modified by the proximity and influence of the external world"<sup>64</sup>, a factor which is decisively important in its functioning. Firstly it defines the ego as the agent of perception. Secondly, it means that the ego is the region in which consciousness arises, although Freud will now say that *not all* of the ego is conscious. Thirdly, as the subject of intentional action in the world, it is that part of the psyche which attempts to act on the world to meet the individual's needs. Fourthly, it is the (only) region of the psyche which operates according to the reality principle. Fifthly, unlike the id, it registers contradictions and is characterised by a strong tendency to reconcile, unify and organise the forces acting upon it.

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<sup>64</sup>XXII 75.



Where the id's orientation is entirely to the present, the ego is especially concerned with calculating likely *future* consequences.

Many of the functions of the ego arise in connection with the ego's relation to itself and to other parts of the mind, which I shall now discuss in turn.

1. The ego may bestow libido on itself. This is the primary narcissism or self-love of the infant. As the child grows the ego projects its ego-libido on to the super-ego or onto ideal others<sup>65</sup>. The adult ego now gains self-esteem through behaviour in conformity with the ideal or through identification with an ideal figure or leader. Nonetheless, Freud indicates that the healthy ego must retain a certain degree of love for itself. We could see this as corresponding to the natural love of self commended by Augustine.

2. Freud held that in relation to the super-ego the ego stands as the object of guilt and shame. Freud speaks of the ego as being driven, threatened and punished by the super-ego. Whilst this kind of self-punishment is no doubt a component of certain kinds of neuroses, his overwhelmingly negative construal of the ego's relation to its moral values is seriously inadequate as a description of mentally healthy people. On a significance-based view of selfhood our values *constitute* us as persons; they do not so much punish us as "call us back to ourselves" or "put us in our right mind". At least part of the tension between the ego and the super-ego must therefore be taken as benevolent in character. Moreover, the experience of an overwhelmingly condemnatory set of moral values set over and against our rational selves is evidence, on a significance-based account, of a moral identity crisis. It is, perhaps, not so much the existence of the super-ego that engenders neurotic guilt as the super-ego's undue separation from the ego. Under normal conditions we experience moral promptings as "our own", not merely as the voice of some internalised other. Our standards and values routinely enter into all our actions and cannot, as Freud, thought, be neatly allocated to a separate component of the psyche. I suggest that, in line with Augustine's psychology, it is the *separation* of the ego from its moral values that is pathological. A distinct super-ego can only be thought of as a feature of neurotic personalities not of healthy ones. If Freud means to say that we are all more or less neurotic then we may agree with him.

3. In relation to the id, the ego stands as the recipient of impulses, desires and dreams. What is in the id can only find its expression in consciousness through the ego. Occasionally the ego may find its autonomy limited though id-ic urges leading to actions that are impulsive, compulsive or unintended. A complete take-over of the ego by the id is manifested in the serious mental illnesses that we term psychoses. In these cases the person loses contact with reality in favour of an inner

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<sup>65</sup>Ref. especially "Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego" (Penguin Vol. 12).

world. But in non-psychotic states, the ego may influence the id, either through normal self-control or through unhealthy repression of id instincts.

### 6.3 The Super-Ego

The super-ego, says Freud in a number of places, is "the heir to the Oedipus complex"<sup>66</sup>. It derives from a reversal of the little boy's hatred of his father into an identification with the father. Or, more precisely, the child attempts to conform to the moral standards laid down by the father and thus identifies with the father's super-ego. The super-ego in this way acts as the vehicle of moral tradition and authority. Where the id is orientated towards the present and the ego towards the future, the super-ego is orientated towards the past.

In view of its aetiology in the Oedipus complex, Freud argues that the super-ego is closer to the id than is the ego. Diagrammatically, he pictures it lying to the side of the ego, not above it, and having its roots stretching down into the id.<sup>67</sup> This means that it has its own supply of energy independent of the ego and enjoys a certain degree of autonomy from the ego.

The super-ego rarely carries positive connotations in Freud's work, although, in one place at least<sup>68</sup>, he does refer to the "normal development" of the super-ego, and says it is characterised by the super-ego's having become "sufficiently impersonal". This would seem to be a pre-figuration of Kohlberg's notion of a universal principle of justice as the highest stage of moral development. But this goal sits rather uneasily within Freud's psychology. For an impersonal norm is likely to be experienced as every bit as judgmental and condemnatory as a childhood father-figure. Surely a better goal for the super-ego's development, in Freud's terms, would have to involve a more flexible, perhaps more relational, conception of moral growth. Moral sense is not necessarily more developed by being more impersonal.

In general Freud saw himself developing a theory of instinct, not a theory of ethics. He felt the latter had received ample attention from others. One result of this is that his portrayal of the super-ego as the moral agency within the self is very limited. If we are to gain a convincing account of the self's moral dimensions we shall need to look beyond Freud.

### 6.4 The Question of the Self

As we noted above (Section 5.2), there is a certain ambivalence in Freud as to whether what we mean by "self" corresponds to the ego in particular or to the whole of the psyche in general. This ambiguity (amongst other problems) has led Irving Thalberg to conclude that Freud's work is

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<sup>66</sup>E.g. XXII 79.

<sup>67</sup>XXII 78.

<sup>68</sup>"The Question of lay analysis" XX 223.

riddled with, "deep conceptual snags"<sup>69</sup>. Thalberg thinks it makes no sense to talk of an ego that is addressed by a quasi-personal super-ego or that acts against a quasi-autonomous id. There is only *one* self that we may speak of, says, Thalberg, and all attempts to partition the psyche lead to confusion. However, I think that Thalberg suffers from a lack of philosophical imagination. For we experience ourselves as driven by instincts and moved by moral imperatives which, whilst they originate from within our own minds, sometimes feel as if they come from beyond the conscious acting subject. Freud's subdivisions of the psyche express the sense we have of inner dividedness. Seen from the perspective of another, or from the perspective of society at large, Freud would say that there is no question but that I am this one particular self. But as I know and experience myself internally, I may perceive myself as a battleground of competing forces. My self as acting subject is in tension with my self as moral censor and my self as reservoir of impulse and feeling. Of these three it is the first, Freud's ego, which, in situations of inner conflict, I perceive as my true self. (Although, as I indicated above, I think there are stronger links between the "true" and the "moral" self than Freud allows.)

It is important to notice that Freud is concerned with the "self" only in what we might call the psychological sense of the term, that is, with a sense of oneself as an integrated, self-controlling and self-determining person. As far as I am aware, Freud never addresses the notion of self in the narrow philosophical sense of oneself as the subject of predication. To think, as Lacan does, that Freud somehow undoes the Cartesian *cogito* is therefore a confusion.<sup>70</sup>

Freud gives a particularly interesting description of the relation between the self as ego and the self as the whole personality in a short paper written in 1925 entitled "Moral Responsibility for the Content of Dreams"<sup>71</sup>. We may recall that Augustine did not hold himself responsible for the content of his dreams since they escaped the control of his will. Freud, however, says that one must hold oneself responsible for the evil impulses of one's dreams. For, as he says, unless the content of the dream is inspired by alien spirits, it is a part of one's own being. Against those who think Freud's work is fundamentally a-moral<sup>72</sup>, Freud actually signals an extension of Augustine's notion of moral responsibility. Freud explains what he means with reference to the two different senses of the word ego.

"If, in defence, I say that what is unknown, unconscious and repressed in me is not my ego [*Ich* - wider sense (a)] then I shall not be basing my position on psychoanalysis...It is true that in the metapsychological sense this bad, repressed content does not belong to my 'ego'

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<sup>69</sup>Ed. Wollheim (1977) p170f.

<sup>70</sup>See further Gardner p205ff.

<sup>71</sup>XIX.

<sup>72</sup>E.g. Forrester (1990 p72): "[The] very existence [of psychoanalysis] stems from an a-moralism, a refusal of ethical positions".

[*Ich* - narrower sense (b)] but to an 'id' upon which my ego is seated. But this ego developed out of the id, it forms with it a single biological unit...for my vital purpose a separation of the ego from the id would be a hopeless undertaking...The physician will leave it to the jurist to construct for social purposes a responsibility that is artificially limited by the metaphysical ego. It is notorious that the greatest difficulties are encountered by the attempts to derive from such constructions practical consequences which are not in contradiction to human feelings."

Freud is saying that whilst I can separate the different parts of the psyche internally and metaphysically, so that I can distinguish a true self (ego) from forces that seem to act upon my self, these distinctions are of only secondary significance in the social world. The point is of merely academic interest in respect of dreams, but it is clearly of practical import in a case, for example, where a criminal claims to be acting "under the influence", as we say, of drugs, or perhaps where he claims that in a moment of passion he "lost control of himself". At the limit, a criminal might be a Jekyll and Hyde personality, where a law-abiding part of the psyche claims to have no knowledge of what a criminal part of the psyche does. According to Freud, a court might argue about how far the defendant in such cases might receive a lighter sentence owing to diminished responsibility, mitigating circumstances or insanity. But there is no question that the law could or should recognise a different moral self as having carried out the crime from the one that is in the dock.

## **7. Achieving Limited Self-Mastery**

### **7.1 The Ego's Struggle With Other Parts of the Psyche**

During his life Freud had offered numerous different proposals on the essential nature of psychic neurosis, but the final position of his Outline of Psychoanalysis was that neurosis was "a disorder of the ego"<sup>73</sup>. The roots of neurosis lay in the first six years of childhood when the ego was weak and only partially formed. The immature ego was unable properly to balance the competing demands of instinct, the parental super-ego and external reality. Unable to cope properly with developmental tasks, and most notably with resolving the Oedipus complex, the ego took refuge in repressions. None of us, thought Freud, escape such developmental trauma, and we are all, as a result, more or less neurotic. Psychopathology thus forms a basis for normal psychology.

The adult ego is the slave of "three tyrannical masters": the external world, the super-ego and the id.<sup>74</sup> Its aim must be to balance and harmonise the conflicting demands of each party. Failure to do so leads to the development of neurotic symptoms. The three parts of the psyche are engaged

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<sup>73</sup>XXIII 184.

<sup>74</sup>XXII 77.

in a "civil war"<sup>75</sup> in which the ego too frequently finds itself embattled and vulnerable. The task of psychoanalysis is no more or less than enabling the different parts of the psyche to compete on a level playing field. In practice this means strengthening the ego, since power is naturally loaded in favour of the "three harsh masters". Normal psychic life is thus a matter of maintaining balanced relationships between the three regions of the psyche and the outside world.

In relation to the id, Freud says the task may be compared to the draining of the Zuider Zee.<sup>76</sup> Freud suggests that the ego must be "enlarged" at the expense of the id. Portions of psychic reality that were hitherto unordered must be brought within the structure of the ego; "where id was, there ego shall be". This is, in effect, an extension of the conscious self. Psychic "land" that was hitherto mysterious and submerged, is now rendered fit for productive use. The "draining" is a lengthy process. It could be said to be "artificial"; the natural psychic landscape has been deliberately modified and enhanced. Thus Freud describes the process as, "a work of culture"<sup>77</sup>. Finally, it involves the building of secure dikes to prevent the flooding of the reclaimed land by the watery unconscious. The problem with repression is that it is an ultimately unsatisfactory way of dealing with the chaotic forces of the id. Maintenance of repression saps energy from the ego, as the repressed forces continually threaten to break through into the ego. Freud suggests that the ego can and must instead defend itself by constructing strong, reliable and efficient defences against these forces.

If the above image stresses the oppositional nature of the ego and the id, another of Freud's images, that of the ego as rider and the id as the horse, draws attention to their symbiotic relationship.<sup>78</sup> The id provides the psyche's motive power whilst the ego's privilege is to decide the goal and to guide the movement towards the goal. But there are limits to the rider's influence over the horse. In some circumstances, suggests Freud, the rider may be obliged to guide the horse along the path which the horse itself wishes to go. Freud here marks something of a mid-point in our analysis between Augustine and Jung. For Augustine, in the ideal case the higher parts of the soul would perfectly order the lower parts. By contrast, for Jung (*infra*. Ch. 5), the unconscious in principle escapes the ordering of consciousness. Here Freud is suggesting that the ego may negotiate a compromise with the id such that the ego sets a goal and direction that the id agrees to. The ego, governed as it is by the reality principle, can deduce what is in the long term interests of the psyche as a whole. But the motive power lies with the id, whose immediate interests cannot be completely disregarded.

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<sup>75</sup>XXIII 173.

<sup>76</sup>XXII 80.

<sup>77</sup>XXII 80.

<sup>78</sup>XXII 77. Cf. "The Question of Lay Analysis" XX 201ff.

In relation to the super-ego, Freud is more ambivalent. He says in the New Introductory Lectures that the aim is, "to strengthen the ego, to make it more independent of the super-ego"<sup>79</sup>. This would accord with Freud's deeply held instinct of adopting a critical perspective towards traditional morality. However, it would be to concede nothing positive at all to the role of the super-ego in the healthy individual's psychology. Such a view would be problematic from Freud's evolutionist perspective, for, if the ultimate goal of humanity is independence from the super-ego, it is strange that the most developed societies have the strongest super-ego manifestations. Moreover, if the super-ego was originally a part of the ego, as Freud's earlier work on the ego-ideal implies, then striving for an attitude of independence to the super-ego is surely a perpetuation of an unhealthy division in the self.

It may have been considerations like these that led Freud, in his later Outline, to suggest that the ego ought not to seek independence from the super-ego so much as to seek to integrate it. "Normal, stable, states", he says, are those where, "the super-ego is not distinguished from the ego, because they work together harmoniously"<sup>80</sup>. A fully integrated super-ego, or ego-ideal, would presumably be one on which the person had "owned" the moral ideals passed down through cultural tradition. The conscience would now not be experienced primarily as an agent of punishment but as a reliable guide for living. Such a transformation of the super-ego would be equivalent to the Lutheran distinction between living according to the law and living according to the Spirit.

Freud seems to give conflicting signals as to how much integration the self might hope to achieve from psychoanalysis. On the one hand, Freud describes the outcome of successful psychoanalysis in terms that indicate the ego as having increased its degree of mastery over the self. In treating a patient the psychoanalyst aims "to give his ego back its mastery over lost provinces of his mental life."<sup>81</sup> Success is marked by an extension of the compass of the ego<sup>82</sup>. On the other hand, Freud had earlier said that his science aimed precisely "to prove to the ego that it is not even master in its own house, but must content itself with scanty information of what is going on unconsciously in its mind"<sup>83</sup>. In this latter case psychoanalysis appears as a therapy to counter the ego's delusions of grandeur. Where Copernicus had dethroned humanity from its place at the centre of the physical universe, and Darwin had destroyed humanity's privileged place in the animal kingdom, Freud claims to have dealt the third and heaviest blow to the ego's pretension to mastery. The ego finally learns that it could *not* master the self.

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<sup>79</sup>XXII 80.

<sup>80</sup>XXIII 165.

<sup>81</sup>XXIII 173.

<sup>82</sup>XXIII 179.

<sup>83</sup>Introductory Lectures (Penguin Vol. 1) p326.

These comments raise sharply the question of how much mastery over the self the ego can and should achieve. The answer to this question will be of fundamental importance to our assessment of Freud's conception of the self. I will now briefly describe two opposing interpretations. The first, that of Richard Rorty, claims Freud as a forerunner of post-modern ethical pragmatism and of the deconstruction of the centred self. The second, that of Ilham Dilman, takes Freud to have the more conventional aim of deepening our sense of personal moral autonomy and bolstering the modern sense of self.

## 7.2 The Question of How Much Mastery Over the Self

### 7.2.1 Richard Rorty: Freud as Advocate of the Fragmented Self<sup>84</sup>

Rorty takes his stand on the "Copernican revolution" wrought by Freud. He sees this as completing both the decentring and the mechanisation of the human being. No longer can we consider humans as an Aristotelian "natural kind" with a central essence and built-in purpose. Freud has "partitioned" the self into a conscious and an unconscious. If being a person is a matter of having a coherent set of beliefs and desires then both the conscious and unconscious may be considered as persons. The human body can play host to both persons. Knowledge of both is necessary to predict and control human behaviour, but only one of these persons will be available at any given time to introspection. The human being is not to be seen as a hierarchy of elements under the direction of the psyche but as a set of equal conversation partners. Moreover those beliefs and emotions (including the moral) that we hold are to be seen as resulting from particular events in our own childhood and the childhood of the race. We may now see ourselves, in Deleuzian terms, as a "machine that requires much tinkering, rather than as a substance with a precious essence to be discovered and cherished"<sup>85</sup>.

Rorty distinguishes two forms of private morality (or "the development of character"), namely a search for purity and the search for self-enlargement. The former, he suggests, was held by Plato and Kierkegaard, the latter by de Sade, Byron, Hegel, Nietzsche and Freud. (Rorty would, presumably, have listed Augustine with Plato and Kierkegaard, although Augustine actually held that the self was enlarged precisely through its pursuit of purity.) Rorty's thesis is that the former has become much more difficult since Freud. We can no longer easily ask "Which is my true self?" or "What is human nature?" And there are now too many selves for "selflessness" to seem a useful notion.

Rorty urges that we stop using overarching narratives which describe our lives as, e.g., "the search for perfection". Instead, following Freud we should use piecemeal ad hoc narratives which describe *all* the actions one performs, including the silly, cruel and self-destructive actions. The

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<sup>84</sup>Ref. Smith and Kerrigan (1986) Ch. 1.

<sup>85</sup>In Smith & Kerrigan p10.

mature self will give up the need to "see things steadily and see them whole"<sup>86</sup>. Maturity will rather consist in an ability to seek out re-descriptions of one's past, and to let the dialogue between different parts of the person be an instrument for change in the future. Such an approach renounces appeals to moral philosophy and metaphysics when faced with a practical moral situation. Thus Rorty suggests, if I am being tortured I may not try to appeal to something deep inside my torturer - his rationality. Rather I should content myself with asking: "If I do this rather than that now, what story will I tell myself later?"<sup>87</sup>

### 7.2.2 Ilham Dilman: Freud as Advocate of the Centred Self

By contrast, Dilman argues<sup>88</sup> we should not give undue weight to Freud's statements that the ego is "a mere servant" of three harsh masters. Dilman suggests that Freud is here attacking the "popular naiveté" that the ego has absolute autonomy over the person; he is not challenging a "metaphysical assumption" about the autonomy of the self. By way of illustration, Dilman suggests we compare Freud's conception of the ego to that of the place of the president of the United States. The view Freud is attacking is then similar to the naive view that people may have, as seen in their expectations and disappointments, about people in high places who wield power and influence. One might say to them that they are wrong to think that the President can get anything done that he likes without a great deal of convincing and persuasion of Congress, of Senate, etc.

A weak president is at the mercy of his backers, supporters and fellow politicians. He may be able to do little more than balance the conflicting claims and interests of the groups on whose support he depends. But a strong president, with a mind of his own and with the courage of his own convictions, will do much more than this. He will act so as to win the agreement and enlist the support of those whom he governs. To say that the president cannot do anything without the co-operation of the Senate and the Congress is not to deny his autonomy; it is to characterise it as a relative autonomy. It is not to deny that he can lead with vision and independence, that he can lead those from whom he derives his power rather than be led by them. The ego may lead or be led by the horse it rides; but when it leads it still depends on the horse's "locomotive energy" as the autonomous president depends on his "power base".

Dilman thus argues that psychoanalysis, in its concern with the strengthening of the ego, widens the domain of the will and enlarges the sphere of personal responsibility and autonomy. Where Rorty sees psychoanalysis as pointing to the fragmentation of the self, Dilman sees it leading to a more centred, more integrated self.

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<sup>86</sup>op.cit. p9

<sup>87</sup>op.cit. p18

<sup>88</sup>Dilman (1984) p109.



Both Rorty and Dilman represent, I think, partial insights into Freud's work. Rorty and his fellow post-modern pragmatists are not being completely faithful to Freud since, whatever else he said, Freud never - as we have seen - allowed for the presence of multiple selves within the psyche. However, Rorty does take seriously the permanent presence of unordered elements within the psyche. Dilman, on the other hand, correctly recognises that selfhood is centred on the single ego. But he is inclined to give the ego too much authority over the rest of the psyche. Following Dilman's presidential analogy, Freud might have said that if the ego is an American president some aspects of the psyche are not Americans; they follow different customs and obey different rules.

Freud would, I think, want to say *both* that there is no question of which self "I" refers to *and* that "I", can only hope for *limited* mastery over my self. Rorty is wrong insofar as he suggests Freud would not have allowed for all one's actions to be seen as the responsibility of a single self. In fact, as we have seen, Freud had a strong notion of personal responsibility, even to the point of suggesting that I am responsible for my dreams. On the other hand, Freud insists that there are large portions of the psyche that the ego did not form, and can do little to influence. Freud insists that the shape of the psyche is determined in large part by the events of early childhood, while the ego is still weak; in his memorable phrase, "the child is psychologically father to the adult"<sup>89</sup>. In the adult, physiological factors such as puberty, the menopause and physical illness may overcome the ego.<sup>90</sup> Finally, the ego must contend with the death instinct, a factor which is totally beyond any possibility of control.<sup>91</sup>

Freud's picture of the self has a tragic quality that we may miss, perhaps because we too easily read Freud through his more optimistic successors. Freud's therapy offers unremitting honesty and insight into our situation. It proposes to bring our psychic battles to light in order that they may be fought openly rather than covertly. But it does not suggest that all the battles can be won<sup>92</sup>. It offers, at best, internal compromises with the human condition, not its basic transformation.

Freud's pessimism is in substantial continuity with Augustine. Both Augustine and Freud agree that the roots of human unhappiness result not merely from conflicts between a human being and society but derive from within the human being him or herself. Indeed, Freud, reveals a new depth to our unhappiness by ruthlessly explicating these conflicts. But where Augustine can offer a religious hope for the future, Freud dispels all such hope as "illusion".

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<sup>89</sup>XXIII 187.

<sup>90</sup>XXIII 224ff.

<sup>91</sup>XXIII 242ff and editorial comment on p212.

<sup>92</sup>On this point see especially Freud's 1937 essay, "Analysis terminable and Interminable" in XXIII. Note especially p243: "We must bow to the superiority of the forces against which we see our efforts come to nothing."

### 7.3 The Psychoanalytic Process

Having discussed the limited aim of psychoanalysis, it is necessary to describe briefly how Freud thought analysis should proceed towards its aim. I shall describe this with reference to the three Augustinian categories of self-memory, self-knowledge and self-willing.

#### 7.3.1 Self-Memory

In a phrase reminiscent of Augustine's Confessions, Freud described his own self-analysis in terms of reaching into the "storerooms" of the mind to take out what was needed.<sup>93</sup> Memory was always central to Freud's analysis, although his conception of its role in creating neuroses developed over time. In his earliest work with Breuer, as set out in their joint 1892 "Preliminary Communication", Freud believed that neurotic symptoms were caused by traumatic events, notably child sexual abuse, that remained as traces in the memory. Indeed the central discovery during his work with Breuer was that, "hysterics suffer mainly from reminiscences"<sup>94</sup>. Freud thought that hysteria arises when a painful event is experienced, and the memory of it does not fade or lose its affective power in normal ways such as emotional discharge or plain forgetting. The memory survives either because the person attempts to repress it, which is a way of preserving it, or because at the time the person experienced the event she or he was in a hypnoid state. On this hypothesis the memory of the event is the direct cause of neurosis. Neurotic symptoms may then be eliminated by, for example, getting the patient to recall the memory under hypnosis and "talking" it out.

Freud abandoned this hypothesis owing to his clinical experience that people would not or could not bring out facts from their memories that Freud felt were relevant to their case. This led Freud to propose that mechanisms of defence and repression were at the heart of neurosis. Moreover, he concluded that it was not memories of real events that were troublesome but the presence in the unconscious of impulses repressed in childhood.<sup>95</sup> According to his revised hypothesis, adult neurosis arises when the individual forbids him or herself the expression of a libidinal desire repressed in childhood.<sup>96</sup> The neurosis thus has its roots in childhood conflicts that have not been properly resolved. Analysis must now involve something much more sophisticated than merely bringing to the surface painful memories. It requires the analysand to acquire a particular *knowledge* of the relation between repressed and repressing parts of the self.

#### 7.3.2 Self-Knowledge

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<sup>93</sup>Letter to Fliess Oct. 31, 1897 (Masson); cf. conf X.viii.12: "When I am in this storehouse I ask that it produce what I want to recall."

<sup>94</sup>II 7.

<sup>95</sup>Letter to Fliess May 2 1897 (Masson p239).

<sup>96</sup>See 1916 Introductory Lectures (Penguin Vol. 1) Part III "A General Theory of the Neuroses".

Augustine had taken the term "self-knowledge" in the classical sense of the requirement to form a true estimate of oneself and one's position in the cosmos. By contrast, Freud has in mind a particular kind of empirical knowledge about one's psyche. By disclosing the contents of dreams and by adopting the technique of free association, the neurotic provides factual, but coded, information about the regions of the unconscious which the skilled analyst can decode. The process of interpreting dreams follows certain defined rules which we can deduce from Freud's case histories and from his work called The Interpretation of Dreams. However, the competent analyst does not simply follow the rules, rather he must first have been analysed himself. This enables the analyst to acquire, as Freud puts it, the right "convictions"<sup>97</sup>. Whatever we make of Freud's claim of natural scientific status for analytic knowledge, we must add that it is knowledge of an experiential rather than a merely objective kind. In submitting to analysis one is participating in a tradition of convictions and technical knowledge that claims to offer true insight into the deepest secrets of one's mind.

For both Augustine and Freud self-knowledge is a matter of discovering the truth about oneself. But the content of this knowledge reflects the different "sources of significance" by which each believes the self to be constituted. For Augustine, self-knowledge was linked to knowledge of God and had a necessarily moral component. Self-knowledge involved growth in one's knowledge of God. The more one knew and loved God the more one would understand oneself in terms of the truth and justice which were God's attributes. For Freud, self-knowledge is a matter of gaining critical distance from the self so that one can learn to act rationally. Locke had thought that our selfhood is constituted especially by our capacity to objectify ourselves. Freud provides us with a comprehensive programme for achieving this self-objectification. It is a programme that includes moral values among the psychological data that must be put under scrutiny. Freud's psychological man is, in Rieff's language, "anti-heroic, shrewd; carefully counting his satisfactions and dissatisfactions, studying unprofitable commitments as the sins most to be avoided"<sup>98</sup>.

For Freud, self-knowledge is a matter of ruthless honesty about oneself: "Analysis is entirely founded on complete candour"<sup>99</sup>. It is a complete telling of the truth about oneself that is supposed to lead to power over oneself. Such truth telling is, recognises Freud, similar to the Catholic practice of confession to a priest. But confession should only be regarded as a prelude to analysis, for: "In confession the sinner tells what he knows; in analysis the neurotic has to tell more."<sup>100</sup>

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<sup>97</sup>XX 199.

<sup>98</sup>Rieff (1959) p356.

<sup>99</sup>XX 207.

<sup>100</sup>XX 189.

The context of such truth telling is a strong, albeit expedient, relationship to one's analyst. For during analysis it is not just information but also emotion which is transferred from analysand to analyst. Freudian self-knowledge is less concerned with records of events than with basic impulses and instincts. Analysis involves the patient unconsciously transferring onto the analyst his or her repressed, Oedipal feelings towards parental figures. This brings the feelings and impulses out into the open and enables the analyst to work with them. By developing appropriate insight into the impulses he or she experiences in the analytic situation, the patient may come to a clear and distinct knowledge of the infantile conflicts lying at the base of the personality.

There is a strong power dynamic involved here. The analyst, says Freud, comes as an ally to aid the embattled ego in its civil war.<sup>101</sup> The analytic situation is therefore set up to maximise the power of the analyst. He (Freud's circle were all men), the doctor, sits whilst the patient (at least in Freud's early career most likely female<sup>102</sup>) reclines. The doctor's authority and the patient's submission are thus emphasised. The doctor is positioned behind the patient so that the doctor can see the patient but not vice versa. "Analysis...presupposes...a situation in which there is a superior and a subordinate."<sup>103</sup> The wisdom of psychoanalysis holds that parts of the ego may have strong motives for not getting well<sup>104</sup> and that the patient may be expected to resist the insights offered by the analyst. The analyst must, therefore, break down the resistance to analysis that the patient displays as treatment progresses. All this is quite intelligible within the terms Freud set for himself. For in analysis the patient's authority relations with parents are exchanged for an authority relationship with the analyst as a means of gaining critical distance from these primal relationships. But after Foucault, we must surely interpret this remarkable constellation of power, knowledge and truth-telling with deep suspicion. It looks very much as if the analysand is not so much gaining power over him or herself as surrendering power to the analyst. Within the psychological tradition, the neo-Freudianism of Erich Fromm and the humanistic counselling movement is to be understood in part as a reaction against this imbalance of power between "doctor" and "patient".

### 7.3.3 Self-Willing

Freud offers two main accounts of the phenomenon of the divided will, the first in terms of a division between the unconscious system and consciousness, and the second in terms of a divided ego. The psychic model used is different but the principles of psychic functioning are essentially

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<sup>101</sup>"Outline" in XXIII 173.

<sup>102</sup>There is, of course, a massive gender/power dynamic involved which I leave to others to discuss. Rieff comments: "The therapy is really constructed, whatever the neutrality of role professed, in the image of the masterful and male analyst and the docile, co-operative female patient." (1959 p175n)

<sup>103</sup>XIV 49; cf. XXIII 248.

<sup>104</sup>E.g. XX 221.

the same in the two accounts. The first account, in the (1915) Introductory Lectures<sup>105</sup>, comes in the context of a discussion on parapraxes (faulty acts or mistakes). Freud argues that parapraxes arise from a clash between two opposing intentions in the mind. The leading, conscious, intention is partially forced back by an unconscious intention so that the resultant action is flawed. A surprisingly large range of human behaviour can be explained by this psychological mechanism. To take just one of Freud's examples, the case of a person failing to keep an appointment can be understood as a clash between an intention to meet and a counter-intention to avoid the person, or perhaps a counter-intention to avoid the place proposed for the meeting. Counter-intentions are unconscious and are motivated by the pleasure principle. The person or place concerned is associated with some painful experience from the past which the unconscious wishes to avoid repeating. The counter-intention is not strong enough to force a new willed action, such as the deliberate cancellation of the appointment. Instead, the counter-intention achieves its aim by subverting the intention to meet: the appointment is forgotten.

More controversially, Freud extends his analysis to cases where the agent explicitly denies a counter-intention. Suppose a person forgets to pay a bill. This may be explained by the will to pay being opposed by a counter-will that does not wish to pay. The person may protest that they merely forgot; there was no intention to avoid payment. However, says Freud, the analyst may yet insist that the person *did* have an unconscious intent not to pay; the evidence that the person did actually forget is sufficient, says Freud, to prove the point.

This case indicates, I think, both the strengths and the weaknesses of the analytic method. On the one hand there is an objective piece of behaviour that invites explanation, and the hypothesis of an unconscious counter-will succeeds in providing an explanation of a rather ingenious kind. In some cases it may be the right explanation. However, the explanation may fail precisely by not being ingenious enough. There could be a myriad of other factors involved in forgetting to pay a bill. A complete description of all these might be extremely complicated, if it were possible at all. The person's protest that he merely forgot to pay may actually be a better description of this complexity than the analyst's proposal of a counter-will. The case takes on an unacceptable element of power-play when the analyst now insists on the rightness of his own explanation against the account given by the analysand.

In Freud's post-1923 ego-psychology, he describes phenomena associated with a divided will not in terms of a battle between consciousness and unconsciousness but in terms of a split within the ego itself. Thus, in a discussion of his favourite theme of the ambivalence of the patient towards being cured of his or her neurosis, he suggests this ambivalence is caused by a split in the ego and

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<sup>105</sup>Introductory Lectures (Penguin) pp 99-103.

hence a split in the will.<sup>106</sup> For example, a malingerer soldier may repress his desire not to fight into the unconscious part of the ego and then exhibit neurotic symptoms. Under analysis the desire to avoid fighting expresses itself as a resistance to proceeding with treatment. Part of the ego wills to become healthy but another part wills to remain sick. Treatment involves strengthening the conscious ego so that it can master the repressed material and so that the will can be re-united.

Freud's accounts deal with cases where the will is divided or subverted as a result of unconscious processes. His analysis does not really deal with cases where the will is divided at the level of conscious moral choice - the level which Augustine was mainly concerned with.

Interesting in this respect is his identification of Luther's statement at the Diet of Worms 'Here I stand I can do no other' as an utterance issued out of psychical compulsion.<sup>107</sup> By contrast, we would normally recognise this as a statement expressing assent to a moral demand freely recognised as such. Freud's attempt to apply deterministic psychoanalytic categories to this kind of statement is, I think, confusing. There is a major difference between moral compulsion of the kind experienced by Luther and the psychological compulsion that is Freud's real concern. The former is a desirable thing, for it is the experience of someone who is able to give himself wholeheartedly to his conception of the good, whereas the latter is undesirable, for it represents a loss of control over the self. If the self is to be properly unified both levels must be addressed; psychoanalysis addresses the latter but not the former.

#### 7.3.4 Lifting the Mechanisms of Defence

Freud's most enduring contribution to therapeutic practice has probably been his notion that healing requires the recognition and removal of internal "defences" present within the psyche. The concept of defence refers to a more or less unhealthy process whereby the ego seeks to avoid a legitimate conflict with another part of the psyche. Freud thought that defensive strategies were a common theme in all the neurotic conditions that he studied and were therefore a crucial element of psychic distress<sup>108</sup>. Freud discusses defence mechanisms directly in his 1923 Ego and the Id and, especially, in his 1926 Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety. Whilst Freud himself did not develop a formal scheme for the defence mechanisms, this task was undertaken by his daughter Anna, who listed 10 different types of defence.<sup>109</sup>

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<sup>106</sup>XX 221.

<sup>107</sup>VI 253.

<sup>108</sup>XX 159.

<sup>109</sup>Namely (1966 p47): regression, repression, reaction formation, isolation, undoing, projection, introjection, turning against the self, reversal and sublimation.

For both Freud and his daughter the most significant and pervasive of all the defence mechanisms is "repression"<sup>110</sup>. Impulses which are in some way disturbing are shut out of consciousness. The ego invests energy to form what Freud calls an "anti-cathexis", a kind of psychic road block, that prevents an unwanted impulse reaching consciousness and achieving its aim through action in the external world. In the short term repression alleviates an inner conflict and assuages the ego's anxiety concerning some emotion or impulse that it perceives as undesirable. However, the impulse does not merely disappear. Failing to achieve satisfaction through normal expression, the impulse may obtain a substitute form of satisfaction by finding expression as a "symptom". Freud suggested that a range of neurotic behaviours, such as compulsive actions, obsessions and phobias, could be understood in this way as the symptomatic response to a repressed impulse.

Freud argues that repression is damaging both for the id and the ego. The id is inhibited from expressing an instinctual impulse in a healthy manner. The ego, whilst it has avoided conflict with the id, has at the same time, given the id some independence and has renounced some of its own sovereignty. "The repressed is now...an outlaw; it is excluded from the great organisation of the ego and is subject only to the laws which govern the realm of the unconscious."<sup>111</sup> This loss of control may be manifested physically, for example, as a nervous tic or as the urge to repeat a certain action inappropriately. Such symptoms maintain their existence "outside the organisation of the ego and independently of it"<sup>112</sup>. The result of a defensive process, says Freud, is "an extremely restricted ego which is reduced to seeking satisfaction in the symptoms"<sup>113</sup>. In extreme situations this may lead to a paralysis of the will in which everything the ego attempts is drawn into the conflict with the id.

Freud believed that once a process of repression has been initiated it is generally impossible for the ego to remove it by its own power<sup>114</sup>. Moreover, even with the assistance of a skilled analyst, the task of uncovering repression is not straightforward, since the ego tries to protect itself from anxiety by clinging on to the symptom and refusing to face the original source of conflict. The action the patient takes to protect a repression whilst he or she is undergoing analytic treatment is termed "resistance"<sup>115</sup>. Freud lists five types of resistance<sup>116</sup>, of which the most interesting example for our present purposes is what he terms resistance due to "gain from illness". Here the

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<sup>110</sup>In his early work Freud could use the terms repression and defence interchangeably. Between 1897 and 1926 he preferred to use the term defence instead of the term repression. In Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety (S.E. XX) he reintroduces the term defence and makes the formal distinction between it and the more specific concept of repression. (See further the SE editors' comments in Inhibitions Appendix A.)

<sup>111</sup>XX 153.

<sup>112</sup>XX 97.

<sup>113</sup>XX 118.

<sup>114</sup>XX 153.

<sup>115</sup>XX 157.

<sup>116</sup>XX 160.

patient's ego obtains a substitutionary satisfaction from the symptom which motivates it to hold onto the symptom. The ego and the id thus form a pact in which instinctual satisfaction is gained, but at the expense of optimal mental health. In structural terms, the ego's desire to "bind together and unify"<sup>117</sup> leads to a kind of fake integration of self. The ego has, so to speak, papered over underlying splits in the self.

Psychoanalysis aims to undo resistance in the context of a therapeutic relationship with the analyst. The analyst tries to discover the source of the underlying repression. The ego is empowered so that it can gain the courage to lift its repressions. Emotions that were originally experienced in relation to other people, notably parents, are transferred onto the analyst and "worked through". The repressed material is thereby made conscious. The analyst then conceives various logical arguments against the repression, promising the ego various rewards and advantages if it will give up its resistance. Once this has been done it is expected that the ego will give up its attachment to symptoms and that the id will find healthy outlets for its instinctual drives.<sup>118</sup>

In his 1926 work Freud defines the psychoanalytic goal as an extension of the power of the ego over the hitherto lost regions of the id.<sup>119</sup> He argues against those who had taken his earlier work as indicating the ego to be *radically* powerless against the id.<sup>120</sup> (This is the position taken, in different ways, by Jung and later by Lacan.) Rather, he now suggests that visible splits between the ego, id and super-ego are primarily a sign of pathology. In conditions of strength the ego is bound up with the other parts of the self and indistinguishable from them.<sup>121</sup> Whilst Freud's final position would be that such a goal of wholeness was in practice unattainable<sup>122</sup>, the emphasis in some of Freud's later work on the relative strength of the ego proved sufficient to generate schools of psychology that would take the autonomy of the ego rather than the power of the unconscious as its focus.<sup>123</sup> Melanie Klein, for example, developed (or, a classical Freudian might say, "modified") Freud's work in this direction. Thus she states: "As we all know, the ultimate aim of psychoanalysis is the integration of the patient's personality. Freud's conclusion that where Id was, there shall Ego be, is a pointer in that direction."<sup>124</sup> Kleinian psychoanalysis

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<sup>117</sup>XX 98.

<sup>118</sup>XX 159.

<sup>119</sup>XX 97ff.

<sup>120</sup>XX 95.

<sup>121</sup>XX 97.

<sup>122</sup>XXIII Analysis Terminable and Interminable.

<sup>123</sup>Notably: (1) The British Object Relations school, following Melanie Klein and (2) the American Ego-Psychologists following Anna Freud. Both these are regarded as "heterodox" by classical Freudians. Kleinians and Classical Freudians formed as separate parts of the British Psychoanalytic Society and developed their own forms of training.

<sup>124</sup>Klein (1957) p85.



aims quite explicitly at the ego's rational mastery over the self. Klein identifies rational self-mastery with personal integration and the subjective feeling of wholeness<sup>125</sup>.

We can see in Klein the beginnings of a shift from the pessimistic Freudian sense of a self that is endemically in conflict with itself, to a rather more optimistic vision of personal autonomy. This shift becomes highly pronounced in the "neo-Freudianism" of Erich Fromm and, beyond him, in the ideas of Maslow and Rogers, psychologists whom we shall meet in chapter 6. The focus on the ego represents one direction in which Freud's thought has been developed. But of equal importance has been a development in the opposite direction. Carl Jung expanded further the Freudian conception of the unconscious and argued strongly against any pretensions the ego might have to order the whole of the self. Jung suggested a quite different strategy for unifying the self from Kleinian self-mastery. It is his work that I address next.

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<sup>125</sup>Klein says (p88) that the psychoanalytic process leads to "considerable relief in feeling more of a whole person, in gaining control over one's self, and in a deeper sense of security in relation to the world in general."

# 5

## Jung: Discovering the Self through Individuation

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### 1. Introduction

In the previous two chapters I described the work of Augustine, one of the most important exponents of the theistic source of moral significance, and Freud, the psychologist who proposes an unprecedented deepening of the task of constructing the self according to rational norms, in line with our second source of significance. In this chapter I turn to the work of a psychologist who proposes a radical change to the ways in which the formation of the self had been viewed by both these authors. Carl Jung contributes in a remarkable way to the third of the sources of moral significance by which the self constitutes itself, namely that of the realm of nature. Jung argues that our primary source of moral orientation and value lies in the natural symbols and images produced from within our own minds. So far it has been assumed that the self is developed by ordering the lower parts of the self under a higher spiritual desire (Augustine) or by draining the unconscious of its power so that one could act rationally (Freud). Jung argues that the self is to be integrated neither by strategies of ordering, nor by control, but by a strategy of acceptance. Jung argues that our moral power for living, or what he terms the drive to individuation, has its roots in the unconscious. We must therefore seek to discover, learn from and reconcile ourselves to the natural inner core of our being.

Jung professed a dislike for *a priori* theories about the mind<sup>1</sup>. He preferred to start from certain empirical facts, namely the images produced in dreams and fantasies and echoed in the imagery of the world's mythologies and religions. By grouping these images into patterns he hypothesised particular "archetypal" ways of mental functioning. Jung's data is not of a kind that lends itself to controlled, repeatable experimentation, and the empirical material could be arranged in other ways from those selected by Jung. Jung's theories are not, therefore, deductive principles open to straightforward scientific falsification. But they are valuable and suggestive as metaphors or myths by which we can attempt to understand ourselves.

Our task is, as one prominent Jungian analyst has put it, to try to enter into "the imaginative conspiracy that all Jungians share with each other and with their patients"<sup>2</sup>. This will involve, at a

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<sup>1</sup>CW 17 p7.

<sup>2</sup>Stevens (1990) p28.

number points, paying close attention to Jung's *own* psychology, for it was his own extraordinarily fertile unconscious that provided the primary material for his psychological system.<sup>3</sup> We shall endeavour to see how far Jung can offer us new ways of conceiving our selves that have the power to give unity and coherence to the self. In an age which, as we have seen, gives particular emphasis to the "un-ordered" parts of the self, Jung's strategy of accepting the less ordered parts of the self would seem to be an avenue well worth exploring.

## **2. Individuation and its Relation to Augustinian Desire and Freudian Libido**

I showed in chapter 3 how according to Augustine the self is unified by the integration of our desires within an overarching spiritual desire for God. In chapter 4 I indicated how Freud reduces desire to libido, a quality that is essentially sexual in nature and which is properly fulfilled in genital attachments to sexual objects. For Freud, the balancing and holding together of the different components of the self is a function of the proper channelling of the libido. In Jung's work neither desire nor the libido play such a central role. For Jung it is the need to make explicit and hold together opposing qualities within the psyche, or what he terms the drive to individuation, that is of first importance. Where Augustine emphasised the spiritual desire of God, and Freud emphasised physical sexuality, Jung argues that only the two-sided process of individuation can lead to psychic wholeness. Individuation is the "central concept"<sup>4</sup> of Jung's system. Jung saw both Augustinian theology and Freudian psychoanalysis as offering, in different ways, unbalanced accounts of the human psyche, and he proposes that his own two-sided psychology offers a more rounded picture of our mental life.

We may recall that Augustine's thought is monistic inasmuch as he rules out the existence of any independent principle of evil. Augustine therefore cannot allow that any God-given human desire or external object can be evil of itself, but insists that desires are only made evil insofar as they are improperly ordered. For Augustine a desire is set up by a combination of the attractiveness of the object and the psychological make-up of the subject. Desires are good or defective in accordance with the extent to which their objects truly satisfy and bring delight to the subject. The moral tone of the desire is thus independent of the quality of the desire but depends on the appropriateness of the object in meeting the real needs of the subject. The self is integrated when each of the desires of the person is fulfilled in an appropriate object and there remain no internal conflicts between the desires.

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<sup>3</sup>"I speak chiefly of inner experiences, amongst which I include my dreams and visions. These form the *prima materia* of my scientific work." MDR (Fontana) p18. Cf. Stevens' remark (p4) that: "To speak of Jung's psychology is...to use an innocent *double entendre*, since the analytical psychology devised by Jung in all important respects grew out of his own psychology."

<sup>4</sup>MDR (Fontana) p235.

Jung's outlook, by contrast, involves a dualism of good and evil.<sup>5</sup> Perhaps his most deeply held disagreement with the Augustinian tradition is his insistence that what we call evil is not merely a deprivation of the good but that it is equally as real as what we call good<sup>6</sup>. Jung consequently divides our desires into two basic types which tend to pull in opposite directions but which must both be fulfilled if the self is to be integrated.<sup>7</sup> The first type of desire, associated with the conscious part of the psyche, is rational, reflective, co-ordinated and ethical. The second type of desire, associated with the unconscious part of the psyche, is irrational, instinctual, uncontrolled and sensual. The first type is exemplified by desire for God, the second by sexual desire. Jung thinks that people tend to class external objects as good or evil depending on the type and quality of the human desire they attract. So, for example, sex is typically labelled "bad" because it is the subject of instinctual desire, but God is typically labelled "good" because he is the subject of rational desire. Whereas for Augustine, the self is integrated through a proper ordering of our desires under the desire of God, Jung thinks that the spiritual desire for a good God merely forms one half of a pair of psychological opposites, and that taken as a supreme principle such a desire produces a somewhat lop-sided kind of psychological development. The formation of the whole self must involve the balancing of spiritual and sensual desires with their associated attachments to good and "bad"<sup>8</sup> objects.

Jung's disagreement with Freud involved a methodologically similar positing of opposites. Jung alleged that Freud had mistakenly attempted to derive all human behaviour from the sexual drive. Jung felt that this could not do justice to the full range of human experience and, in particular, that it did not properly account for human religiosity.<sup>9</sup> Freud had attempted to remedy the imbalance in later years, says Jung, when he proposed the thanatos drive as an opposing force to the libido, but Freud's strange notion of a death instinct was unsuccessful<sup>10</sup>. Instead of libido balanced by thanatos, Jung argues that the libido itself has two-opposing orientations. It may be directed outward towards objects, in the form of the sex drive, in which case it yields the Freudian psychology. On the other hand, it may be directed inwards towards the self, in the form of the will-to-power, in which case an Adlerian psychology is produced. These types of psychology correspond to the character types extrovert and introvert. Having consigned both Freud and

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<sup>5</sup>Thus when accused by his friend Fr. Victor White of Manichaeism Jung pleaded guilty to being a heretic. (Ref. correspondence cited in Charet p425).

<sup>6</sup>CW11 para. 247.

<sup>7</sup>CW5 page 84ff.

<sup>8</sup>Unfortunately Jung does not use terms in a precise way. He tends, unhelpfully, to elide the distinction between moral evil (what we might call "badness") and sensuality (what we might call "naughtiness") as my argument here indicates.

<sup>9</sup>e.g. MDR (Fontana) p191. Their growing disagreement over the nature of the libido is well documented in the Freud/Jung Letters and came to a head with Jung's publication of Symbols of Transformation (CW5).

<sup>10</sup>CW7 para. 33f.

Adler's systems to particular psychological "types" Jung proposes that his own psychology, with its core principle of individuation as the union of opposites, underlies both.<sup>11</sup>

Jung conceived libido in a more general way than Freud. Where Freud rigorously insisted that the libido drive was sexual in nature, Jung considers it to be a more diffuse kind of psychic energy that includes higher emotions such as spiritual longing, hope, glory and love. But even in this general form, the libido still cannot be, for Jung, the fundamental principle of his psychology. For although "every process is a phenomenon of energy", yet, "all energy can only proceed from the tension of opposites"<sup>12</sup> and "life is born only of the spark of opposites"<sup>13</sup>. It is the encounter and union of opposites that provides the energy of libido and life.

### **3. The Components of the Psyche and their Place in the Individuation Process**

I now set out the major components of the psyche in Jung's system. They are presented in the order in which they typically appear in life. Most of us are, according to Jung, only aware of the first, the persona. Those rare individuals who complete the task of psychological growth will, on the other hand, become aware of all of these components. The last component to appear is what Jung calls the Self, an entity which is seen, in retrospect, to contain all the other components. "Self" here is a technical term that I shall indicate by capitalisation. The person who completes the task of psychological growth, or what Jung terms "the individuation process", will have integrated all the other entities within the Self.

#### **3.1 Persona**<sup>14</sup>

The persona is that part of consciousness that deals with the adaptation of the individual to life in society. It consists of those psychic facts that are felt to be personal. The basic elements of the persona derive from what Jung calls the "collective psyche"<sup>15</sup> and are not unique to the individual. However, the way in which a person selects and combines these aspects of the psyche into the persona is, says Jung, genuinely individual<sup>16</sup>. This very selection and differentiation, of course, marks a division of the psyche.

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<sup>11</sup>CW7 Two Essays in which the first two chapters of Essay I deal with Freud and the third with Adler. The fourth chapter opens with the comment that, "the incompatibility of the two theories discussed in the preceding chapters requires a standpoint superordinate to both in which they could come together in unison".

<sup>12</sup>CW7 para. 34.

<sup>13</sup>CW7 para. 78.

<sup>14</sup>See especially CW7 Two Essays essay two Ch. III "The Persona as a segment of the Collective Psyche" and the original version of this chapter in CW7 Appendix 2.

<sup>15</sup>CW7 para. 486.

<sup>16</sup>CW7 para. 486.

The principles on which a person constructs his or her persona are governed by the need to present an acceptable face to the world. The persona involves names, roles and job functions. These are all necessary for civilised life, yet they also represent an unavoidable compromise between what a person really is, in his or her genuine individuality, and what society expects of him or her. The persona is literally a mask, a semblance, a two-dimensional reality<sup>17</sup>.

In Two Essays Jung indicates that a person's role accentuates one of the four functional types for relating to reality of feeling, thinking, sensing and intuition.<sup>18</sup> Elsewhere, however, Jung associates relating to external reality with the particular mode of thought that he calls "directed thinking"<sup>19</sup>. Such thinking uses verbal concepts to link the person in with a community of rational thought and shared moral judgements. This kind of thinking is relatively hard work for the psyche. It is to be contrasted with the fantasy and picture thinking which is the spontaneous and effortless activity of the unconscious. It is the task of education to force the human mind from its more natural subjective, individual sphere to the objective and social sphere. Directed thinking is enormously valuable for the development of a shared morality and for the technological exploitation of nature, but it comes with a psychological price-tag. It is particularly in the arena of morality that the strain of sustaining the persona is borne and the presence of the persona's psychological counterpart begins to be felt. For Jung, gaining a whole and integrated self involves allowing proper scope for the "fantasy thinking" that he thinks is the natural mode of the psyche's operation when it is unconstrained by social or moral norms.

### 3.2 Shadow

The shadow is the complement to the persona; it contains within it all that we have chosen not to accept as part of our persona. The shadow is that part of our psyches that is inferior, primitive, unadapted and awkward.<sup>20</sup> As Jung defines the term the shadow is not necessarily evil, for one could envisage a criminal type who presents a thoroughly immoral face to the world yet has a heart (or shadow) of gold. The shadow contains mistakenly rejected good parts of ourselves as well as evil parts. However, for the ordinary non-deviant person living within a framework of moral norms in society, the shadow contains all the immoral impulses that are unacceptable to society. As Jung's close colleague Toni Wolff put it, the shadow contains all that one "rejects from moral, aesthetic or whatever grounds and keeps in suppression because it stands in contradiction to our conscious principles"<sup>21</sup>.

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<sup>17</sup>CW7 para. 246.

<sup>18</sup>CW7 para. 487.

<sup>19</sup>CW5 Ch. 2.

<sup>20</sup>CW11 para. 134.

<sup>21</sup>Wolff quoted in Jacobi (1943) page 102f.

The first step in the therapeutic process is the dissolution of the persona and the attempt to come to terms with the shadow. Incorporation of the shadow adds "depth" to the personality.<sup>22</sup> Acceptance of the shadow is not, however, to be identified with a commitment to engage in immoral action. At least in his later (1958) Psychology of Religion Jung attempts to distinguish between repression and suppression of elements of the shadow. Repression is an unhealthy activity which he takes to refer to tendencies which are not so much antisocial as merely unconventional and socially awkward. Suppression, on the other hand, is the conscious and deliberate disposing of by consciousness of antisocial elements in our nature.<sup>23</sup> According to this account, the bringing of the shadow to consciousness is intended to enable one to make a conscious decision about what one is to do with its components. Repression of the elements of the shadow leads to neurosis; suppression may lead to worry, conflict and suffering, but not to neurosis. For Jung, neurotic repression is therefore a substitute for legitimate suffering<sup>24</sup>. To this extent, Jung follows the aims of Freud's psychoanalysis.

Notwithstanding the above, it should not be supposed that the encounter of the persona with the shadow would leave our moral outlook unchanged. For what Jung calls the "problem of our time" is a serious imbalance between the moral demands of our society and the religious mechanisms available to deal with the resulting shadow-side.

"Here is the source of most of our ethical conflicts. The urge to freedom beats upon the weakening barriers of morality: we are in a state of temptation, we want and do not want. And because we want and yet cannot think out what it is we really want, the conflict is largely unconscious, and thence comes neurosis. Neurosis, therefore, is intimately bound up with the problem of our time and really represents an unsuccessful attempt on the part of the individual to solve the general problem in his own person. Neurosis is self-division. In most people the cause of the division is that the conscious mind wants to hang on to its moral ideal, while the unconscious strives after its - in the contemporary sense - unmoral ideal which the conscious mind tries to deny."<sup>25</sup>

For Jung, as for Augustine and Freud, self-division is essentially a problem of morality. However, Jung conceives the nature of the moral problem differently from the authors we have met so far. Augustine thought that moral self-division could be healed by empowering the will, whilst for Freud moral tension was a problem to be addressed by strengthening the rational ego. Both these are seen by Jung as misguided strategies of control. In Jung's psychology the conscious person cannot correct his self-division by willing or by reason, for he really does not possess the

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<sup>22</sup>Cf. Jacobi p102.

<sup>23</sup>CW11 para. 129ff.

<sup>24</sup>CW11 para. 129.

<sup>25</sup>CW7 para. 428.

unconscious impulses. Thrust out from the conscious psyche these impulses have become "autonomous complexes"<sup>26</sup>. Our selves are more deeply divided than either Augustine or Freud had allowed. As we shall see later, Jung's solution to the self-division of "modern man" cannot be at the level of mere consciousness or rationality. It must be through a profound acceptance of ourselves mediated at the level of symbol, which Jung considered to be deeper than both of these.

### 3.3 Ego

Unfortunately the majority of modern people, whom Jung disparagingly calls "mass man", do not make it even this far on the psychological journey to maturity.<sup>27</sup> Mass man does not face up to his need to assimilate the unconscious and integrate his personality. He is happy to identify himself with his persona. He lives according to the dictates of "the State" or "Society". He can happily project his own shadow onto society at large so that he has no problems of his own; society alone has problems and is responsible for the malaise of the world. However, there are a few who do attempt to come to term with the shadow. In the process these people differentiate and becomes aware of an ego that is distinct from the persona.

The ego is the focal point of consciousness. It is that part of the mind that is able to form representations of the external world. It is what we refer to when we use the words "I" or "me". The ego carries our conscious awareness of existing, together with our continuing sense of personal identity. It is the conscious organiser of our thoughts, intuitions, feelings and sensations, and it has access to those memories that are unrepressed. The ego is also the bearer of personality. It mediates between external reality and the inner world, the objective and the subjective realms of experience. Whereas the persona is a somewhat inauthentic representation of the person that is moulded to fit the expectations of others, the ego is truly "me" insofar as I am a conscious, rational being.

However, the ego is by no means either the entirety or the essence of the psyche. It was born out of the unconscious and stands to the unconscious as "the moved to the mover, or as object to subject".<sup>28</sup> The ego lies near the surface of the personality, rather distant from the deep centre within.<sup>29</sup> The ego-personality is only a part of the whole person, and its life does not represent the total life of the psyche. Indeed the more one is merely, "I", the more one risks splitting the ego from the collective unconscious. Whereas for Freud becoming whole is a matter of becoming rational for Jung it is a matter of integrating one's ordinary rationality within a higher symbolic goal.

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<sup>26</sup>CW7 para. 435.

<sup>27</sup>CW8 para. 409f.

<sup>28</sup>CW11 para. 391.

<sup>29</sup>Jacobi (1943) p108f.



Jung equates the ego with the realm of consciousness. This, unfortunately, makes it difficult for him to conceptualise unconscious components of the ego. There is therefore no formal equivalent in Jung's system to the important Freudian notion of the mechanisms of defence, whereby the ego unconsciously colludes in repression.

### 3.4 The Archetypes of the Unconscious

Further psychological growth involves meeting and coming to terms with additional aspects of the unconscious, manifested to us in certain archetypal ways. In his later works Jung spoke of "archetypes" as genetically transmitted predispositions to perceive and order experience in particular ways. The archetypes may, in this sense, be considered to be to the unconscious mind what Kant's categories are to the conscious mind.<sup>30</sup> But in his earlier works Jung did not distinguish between the archetypes themselves and the images they produced, and I will follow this earlier, popular usage.<sup>31</sup> Jung thought that the images tend to manifest themselves in a particular order as follows.

#### 3.4.1 The Anima (Animus)

The first archetype to arise<sup>32</sup> is the anima for men or the animus for women. Jung suggests that men and women carry with them an ideal image of the opposite sex. They experience this image as a semi-autonomous or even completely autonomous "personality" within their unconscious. Failure to attend to the anima (animus) may lead to the male being caught out by unexpected "female" behaviour and vice versa. Moreover, the person will unconsciously project this ideal onto members of the opposite sex who will be implicitly judged in accordance with it. The person must therefore engage in dialogue with the anima (animus) so as to neutralise its power. In so doing he or she further expands and unites his or her personality. After Jung we perhaps accept more readily the idea that "whole" men or women will contain and will value qualities within themselves that have traditionally been associated with the opposite sex.<sup>33</sup>

#### 3.4.2 The Mana Personality<sup>34</sup>

In Jung's scheme a "mana" personality is one who possesses extraordinarily effective power. The mana may take the form of the chief, the magician, the medicine-man or the saint, but especially

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<sup>30</sup>CW8 para. 342.

<sup>31</sup>Jung made the distinction to defend himself against charges of Lamarckism. (Ref. Stevens 1990 pp36-38.)

<sup>32</sup>Alternatively one may, and Jung sometimes did, take the shadow as the first archetype. However, the shadow is a rather special case and does not possess the "personality" of the other archetypes. On the role of the anima and animus see especially Ch. 2 of Part 2 of the Second of the Two essays in CW7 pp186-209.

<sup>33</sup>Jung's notion of the animus/anima has been subject to severe criticism from feminists. His critics rightly point out that Jung fails to notice how far ideals of manhood and womanhood are culturally conditioned rather than genetically or archetypally determined. See, e.g., Naomi Goldenberg "A Feminist Critique of Jung" in eds. Moore and Meckel (1990).

<sup>34</sup>See especially Two Essays CW7 pp225-239 and Jacobi pp115-117.

the form of the Wise Old Man (for men) or the Great Mother (for women). The mana represents a kind of primordial image for one's personality. In the encounter with the anima (animus) one came to terms with the contrasexual components of the unconscious; now one encounters the same sex elements. To deal with these successfully is to achieve liberation from one's psychic parentage, and with this comes the first genuine sense of true individuality.

The person here faces a serious risk of what Jung calls "inflation", that is an identification of the ego with the mana, leading to delusions of grandeur and godlike pretensions. In this case the ego has effectively been subsumed by the mana. Rather, the ego must meet the forces of the mana, assimilate and draw strength from them, and yet also differentiate itself from the mana. If this is done successfully, the way lies open for the final step of the way, the formation of the Self, the "central archetype"<sup>35</sup>.

### 3.4.3 The Self<sup>36</sup>

The assimilation of the contents of the mana personality leads to the discovery of "an actual, living something, poised between two world-pictures...strange to us and yet so near, wholly ourselves and yet unknowable, a virtual centre..."<sup>37</sup> This deep inner centre is what Jung calls the "Self". Lying largely outside the realm of consciousness, the Self cannot be grasped by the rational understanding of consciousness. Realisation of the Self is our destiny, the most complete expression of our individuality. Seen from the end-point of the journey we also realise that the Self is our beginning; it is that voice that all along had been calling us along the way of individuation. Perhaps the Self is best expressed by the notion of vocation<sup>38</sup>, for the Self is what nature initially intends us to be, the inner voice that guides our life journey, and the fulfilment of that journey.

The Self is not merely the deep centre of the psyche, but it is also its totality. In Jung's words, "When we now speak of man we mean the indefinable whole of him...I have chosen the term "Self" to designate the totality of man, the sum total of his conscious and unconscious contents."<sup>39</sup> In everyday language we frequently distinguish the two concepts of centre and totality, using "self" to mean the essence of a person accessible only to reflexive introspection, and "person" to refer to the fullness or whole of the individual.<sup>40</sup> Jung's notion of the Self

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<sup>35</sup>CW18 para. 1158.

<sup>36</sup>See especially Two Essays CW7 paras. 398-406.

<sup>37</sup>CW7 para. 398.

<sup>38</sup>Integration of the Personality p291ff.

<sup>39</sup>CW11 para. 140.

<sup>40</sup>See for example the distinction made by Michael Carrithers in "An alternative social history of the self", Ch. 11 of ed. Carrithers et. al. (1985).

embodies both these aspects of the psyche. His concept of the Self may be likened to a circle that may be defined either by the location of its centre or by the area within its circumference.<sup>41</sup>

But there appears to be a problem here, for if the Self is a largely unconscious entity how can the ego know where the boundary of the Self lies? Jung replies to this objection:

"Since this growth of personality comes out of the unconscious, which is by definition unlimited, the extent of the personality now realising itself cannot in practice [sub. 'in theory?'] be limited either. But unlike the Freudian superego it is still individual. It is in fact individuality in the highest sense, and therefore theoretically [sub. "practically"?] limited, since no individual can possibly display *every* quality."<sup>42</sup>

We might take this to mean that, viewed from the perspective of the collective unconscious, or the collective human gene pool, the individual Self is theoretically without limit, for any person might, if he or she lived long enough, develop the whole potential of the human genome. However, viewed from the perspective of an individual, the Self does have definite practical limits that are determined by those elements of the genetic inheritance that the individual ego fosters over a finite life span. But the ego could never know even what the practical limits to the Self are, since it is unaware of the totality of the genetic inheritance. The boundary to the Self might therefore best be conceived, from the point of view of the ego, as an asymptote to which the individual tends. It remains transcendent to the ego, but in the highly individuated person, the ego can get a "fix" on the Self to a good degree of accuracy.

The ego's relation to the Self stands, says Jung, as the relation of the earth to the sun.<sup>43</sup> The ego came into being from the Self. It is of a smaller degree of magnitude than the Self. Whilst the ego is the only portion of the totality that is intelligible to us, the ego finds its orientation in relation to the Self. For Jung the integration of the Self means bringing the ego into a proper relation with the Self. The ego must "sacrifice" its claims to be the entirety of the person.<sup>44</sup> If it does this a proper balance and harmony is achieved between the conscious and the unconscious. Failure to do so means the impoverishment of the ego and the risk of autonomous "complexes" developing in the unconscious as a compensation for the neglect of the unconscious regions of the psyche. The ego and the Self are listed in the General Index to Jung's works as "opposites" and their relation cannot, consequently, easily be stated in unambiguous terms. Jung wants to say both that the ego is the object of the self (*supra.*) and also that the healthy ego has some autonomy from the self -

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<sup>41</sup>CW9(i) para. 634; CW 12 para. 44.

<sup>42</sup>CW11 para. 390.

<sup>43</sup>CW7 para. 405.

<sup>44</sup>The theme of sacrifice is a favourite of Jung's. See for example, Ch 8 of *Symbols of Transformation* (CW5) and the essay "Transformation Symbolism in the Mass" (CW11).

for the collapse of the ego into the self is psychosis. Later Jungians have attempted to describe the relationship between the two in terms of an ego-Self "axis".<sup>45</sup>

Since the Self is essentially transcendent to understanding, formal description of it is difficult. Stevens describes it as the "organising genius behind the personality" <sup>46</sup> but the term "organisation" connotes more rationality than Jung wants to ascribe to the Self. Following Jacobi we should note that the unconscious is "purest nature without intention, with merely a 'potential directedness'"<sup>47</sup> Insofar as it participates in the unconscious the Self has an "invisible, inner order of its own"<sup>48</sup>, but this is not the moral or rational order of consciousness.

Jung's notion of the Self throws an interesting perspective on a number of Christian theological categories that relate to the growth of the human person. According to Jung each individual is psychologically deeply related to others through their common participation in the trans-personal unconscious. This would be one way of making sense of corporatist elements in the Christian understanding, including the Augustinian doctrine of original sin. Indeed Jung describes original sin as "an emotional fact"<sup>49</sup>; "of profound therapeutic significance"<sup>50</sup>; a "salutary dogma...which is yet so prodigiously true"<sup>51</sup>. Jung understood that the identity of the individual self is bound up with the identity of humanity (cf. Hebrew "Adam"). The re-creation or redemption of an individual would thus seem to require that the person can re-image him or herself as part of a new humanity. Christian baptism and incorporation into Christ might, following Jungian categories, be envisaged as operating at the level of the corporate unconscious. Baptism, for example, might be conceived as a sacrament that offers, through a shared archetypal experience, ways of being human by which a whole people can learn to remember and understand itself in a new light. The process of spiritual and psychological growth would at the same time involve growing into one's unique Selfhood and also drawing increasingly on the shared inheritance of the "corporate self". As we shall see in due course this provides a useful way of thinking about the Christian notion of life in the Spirit (Section 8 and Chapter 7 below).

#### **4. Individuation as an Evolutionary Process**

Heavily influenced, as Freud had been, by Darwin's theory of evolution, Jung liked to link the psychological development of the individual to the evolution of the species as a whole. He saw the psychological growth of the individual as a small-scale reflection of the psychic development of humanity. We may distinguish within this history four stages: the primitive, the ancient, the

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<sup>45</sup>Samuels (1985) p90.

<sup>46</sup>Stevens (1990) p41.

<sup>47</sup>Jacobi (1943) p115.

<sup>48</sup>Jacobi p115.

<sup>49</sup>CW16 para. 186

<sup>50</sup>CW 16 para. 186

<sup>51</sup>CW 7 para. 35.

modern and the contemporary<sup>52</sup>. The passage from one stage to another reflects the inexorable process of individuation working itself out in the manner that I shall now describe.

1. The earliest, "primitive", state is discussed widely by Jung.<sup>53</sup> Jung takes it that in its earliest condition humanity lacked firm boundaries between the self and the outside world. (This is consistent with the argument I put forward in chapter one that the notion of the self only arises within particular cultural traditions.) Jung suggests that the primitive tribesman lacked a sense of individuality but acted together with other members of his tribe as part of a "herd"<sup>54</sup>. He projected himself onto external reality, endowing the realm of nature with divine or demonic powers. Like Rousseau's "natural man", Jung's primitive has a high degree of native psychological wholeness. This state corresponds with human infancy in which, as babies, we do not yet have a sense of self independent of the mother.<sup>55</sup>

2. To illustrate his second phase, Jung groups together the great pre-modern human civilisations from the Mesopotamian to the Christian and Muslim eras. In this "ancient" state the conscious ego emerges and the person becomes aware of himself as a conscious "I". The ancient state corresponds to our childhood. The emergence of the ego entails a division within the psyche between a region of consciousness and the wider unconscious. This division is, however, as yet not problematic, for the sacred images and ritual of religion (or the fantasy worlds of the child) provide a safe way of satisfying the irrational forces of the unconscious.<sup>56</sup>

3. The modern era corresponds not, interestingly, with our adulthood but with our adolescence<sup>57</sup>. The modern person develops a high degree of rationality, but purchases this at the expense of the neglect or even the rejection of the unconscious and emotional parts of the self. Religion, which had previously satisfied the irrational components of our selves, now becomes hardened into dogma and can no longer meet the natural needs of the unconscious. The person may become isolated from the inner world of irrationality, subjectivity and emotion.<sup>58</sup> Our failure to accept these elements in ourselves may lead us to project them onto others in disastrous ways.<sup>59</sup>

4. The remedy for our modern condition is the evolution of a fourth level of psychic functioning, the "contemporary"<sup>60</sup>. Contemporaries are not satisfied with the somewhat flat, two-dimensional

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<sup>52</sup>So Segal (1992) p11ff.

<sup>53</sup>Especially the essay "Archaic Man" in CW10.

<sup>54</sup>CW10 para. 160.

<sup>55</sup>CW8 para. 757.

<sup>56</sup>So, e.g., CW11 para. 82.

<sup>57</sup>CW8 para. 756.

<sup>58</sup>E.g. CW5 Ch. 2, "Two ways of Thinking".

<sup>59</sup>Preface to First Edition of Two essays in CW7.

<sup>60</sup>My distinction between "moderns" and "contemporaries" is similar to Homans' distinction between "modern" and "Jungian" man (1979 p185f).

way of living that characterises the modern period. Yet they do not wish to return to the sterile dogmas of the religions. Instead they are turning inward to discover the resources available to them from within the depths of the psyche. These people are willing to use and reinterpret the symbols of the traditional religions in the light of analytical psychology.<sup>61</sup> They may thus discover a new level of psychic wholeness in which the unconscious and conscious are reunited in the formation of the Self. Contemporaries attain to psychological adulthood.

Jung posits a model of the human psyche in which consciousness evolves out of a generic unconsciousness and then returns to it. The evolutionary stages of the psyche correspond to the development of the healthy individual, although Jung believed that only a few attain to psychic health. Human development involves the differentiation or division of consciousness from the unconscious and their reuniting at a higher level. The process is dialectical in that, while consciousness first needs to differentiate itself precisely in order to be consciousness, it must also return to the unconscious to draw energy and, so to speak, find its proper place in the collective world. For Jung, there is a natural tendency to wholeness in the evolution of the species that reflects on a macro scale the attainment of a unified self in each person.

In the important work Symbols of Transformation Jung illustrated the process of individuation with the powerful image of the rising and setting sun. At sunrise the baby begins life with an unconscious identity that is bound up with the mother. In the morning of life the young man leaves his parents and makes his own way in the world. In mid-life he may experience a crisis as the instincts of youth give way to cultural and religious interests. The sun's descent marks the return of the individual to the unconscious mythical "land of the mothers". Much of Symbols of Transformation is taken up with the ambivalent attitude towards the unconscious, the symbolic mother, which characterises this leaving and return.

The sun image conveys the physical, biological, inevitability of the process. Jung later wrote on this, "Whatever man's wholeness, or the Self, may mean *per se*, empirically it is an image of the goal of life spontaneously produced by the unconscious, irrespective of the wishes and fears of the conscious mind. It stands for the goal of the total man...with or without the consent of his will. The dynamic of this process is instinct..."<sup>62</sup> Individuation is therefore the fundamental instinctive drive springing from our unconscious. It is formally analogous to Augustine's desire of God or Freud's libido drive. Our attitude to it is of determinative significance for our psychological health,

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<sup>61</sup>CW5 para. 340: "The medical psychotherapist today must make clear to his more educated patients the foundations of religious experience, and set them on the road to where such an experience becomes possible...my sole purpose is to conserve, through understanding, the values [religious symbols] represent and to enable people to think symbolically once more."

<sup>62</sup>CW11 para. 745.

The individuation drive works itself out whether we attend to it or not. Consciousness will inevitably return to unconsciousness in death. But a person whose life is marked by ignorance or repression of the unconscious will be altogether less complete or whole than someone who is reconciled to and lives in harmony with the unconscious. Jung wrote: "The difference between the 'natural' individuation process, which runs its course unconsciously, and the one which is consciously realised, is tremendous. In the first case consciousness nowhere intervenes; the end remains as dark as the beginning. In the second case so much darkness comes to light that the personality is permeated with light, and consciousness necessarily gains in scope and insight."<sup>63</sup>

The sun image highlights the importance of the second half of life, for it is this stage when the person must try to make some accommodation between consciousness and the demands of the unconscious. Jungian psychology can thus be seen as complementary to Freudian psychology which, with its emphasis on sexuality, would seem to be more relevant to the first half of life. But there are a number of problems with Jung's image that he never fully resolves, and that reduce the power of his psychology to unify the self. These arise from his talk on the one hand about a psychological life characterised by continuous growth and progress and his attempt on the other hand to illustrate this life with an image that is symmetrical about its mid-point.

We may ask what strategy Jung's young man setting out on life should adopt in order to find a unified sense of self. He might attempt an immediate reconciliation of his ego with the unconscious. But if he does this will he will short-circuit the process of psychological growth and enter a period of pre-mature psychological old-age. He might, alternatively, attempt to develop the strongest possible ego and neglect the unconscious. He might reason with himself that this gives him the best possible long-term outcome consisting of a strong ego reconciled with its unconscious. But, if he is a good Jungian, he will know that this involves a very considerable short and medium term loss of psychic wholeness. He must deliberately precipitate the largest possible mid-life crisis. But he may not know the level of psychological crisis he can withstand without breaking down. And how far can he reasonably be expected to act against his own medium term interests in favour of a long-term interest? Will he not experience a considerable amount of self-division as he contemplates these unenviable alternatives?<sup>64</sup>

Turning to Jung's older man, we may similarly enquire as to the strategy he should adopt. How, exactly, is the sunset of his life distinguished from the sunrise? When the old man feels he should

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<sup>63</sup>CW11 para. 756.

<sup>64</sup>Some Jungians, perhaps aware of this kind of problem have followed E. Edinger (Ego and Archetype Penguin 1972) in arguing that rather than see the ego's parting from and return to the Self as a life-project, the ego should be seen as *continually* separating from and reuniting with the Self as it maintains the tension of the ego-Self axis.

surrender part of the ego to the demands of the unconscious how can he know whether this marks a return to infantilism or an advance into wholeness? Jung once remarked that "the way up and the way down are the same"<sup>65</sup>. But it cannot be precisely the same if it is to be an advance. Jung did not regard the state of infantile or "primitive" wholeness as something to which we should aspire.<sup>66</sup> But he was never able to give a fully satisfactory description of how our final state of wholeness differs from our initial state and of what means we should adopt to arrive at one rather than the other. These problems derive, ultimately, from Jung's inability to give much rational precision to what he means by the coincidence of opposites within the personality.

To press Jung's psychology to this degree is to ask rational questions of it which, I admit, seem ill-suited to its ethos. Jung was not a philosopher and we may violate his insights by expecting too much philosophical precision from him. What I am trying to do is to point to the limits of the validity of Jung's way of describing the development of the self.

### **5. Individuation as the Process of Becoming an Individual**

The realisation of the Self marks, in certain respects, the antithesis of the persona. A person who is conscious only of his or her persona lives according to the norms, conventions and rules imposed by the collective conscious or society. The fully individuated person, by contrast, lives in harmony with the deep, inner collective unconscious. He does not live according to shared laws but according to his own law. "He has cancelled the validity of all other ways for himself. He has placed *his* law above all conventions and so has shoved aside, as far as he is concerned, all those things that not only failed to prevent the great danger but actually brought it on."<sup>67</sup> Individuation shatters the persona and the norms of society in favour of the Self and individual vocation. The obvious example to illustrate Jung's point here would be Nietzsche's Superman. Jung, prefers, no doubt for rhetorical reasons, to choose Christ as his leading-example of this phenomenon. Christ, on this account, was the solitary genius who took on the tyranny of the Roman empire and fought with it, in spiritualised form, in the wilderness temptation story.<sup>68</sup>

Fulfilling one's need to become an individual is a major theme in Jung's psychology. It is most helpfully explicated by looking at how this need developed and was resolved in Jung's own relationship with Freud. Jung's relationship with Sigmund Freud was of decisive importance for the development of his psychology. In his autobiography (MDR) Jung discusses only three personal relationships at any length: those with his mother, his father and Freud. His relationship with Freud merits a whole section in MDR, and Jung describes him as the first man of real

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<sup>65</sup>CW6 para. 708 in a reference to Heraclitus.

<sup>66</sup>CW11 para. 264 "There is nothing particularly admirable about it [the primitive's wholeness]". It is the same old unconsciousness, apathy and filth."

<sup>67</sup>The Integration of the Personality p295.

<sup>68</sup>The Integration of the Personality page 297.



importance that he met in life.<sup>69</sup> What Jung means by individuation is illuminated by reviewing how Jung's own identity was formed through attachment to and later breaking away from Freud.<sup>70</sup>

#### Jung's Differentiation of his own Self from Freud's Self

In the initial stages of their relationship Jung seemed to derive his sense of identity predominantly from his attachment to Freud. Jung's first meeting with Freud took place in February 1907 and, if the aged Jung's memory is to be believed, lasted 13 hours.<sup>71</sup> The relationship rapidly became an extraordinarily intense one<sup>72</sup>. Freud quickly assumed the role of a father figure for Jung<sup>73</sup>. Freud's greeting in correspondence to Jung progressively warmed from "Dear colleague", through, "Dear friend", to "My dear friend" and "My dear friend and heir". The climax of their relationship was a seven week trip to the United States during which they were together every day and analysed each others dreams.<sup>74</sup> This must have been a remarkably concentrated experience in which each encountered himself in the other over a prolonged length of time.

Jung's natural father had been a weak man, someone whom Jung regarded himself as compensating for, rather than imitating. In Freud, Jung found the powerful father figure he had previously lacked. From 1907-1911 Jung's written work was strongly Freudian in character. Jung was content to identify professionally with Freud as a psychoanalyst and to be groomed as Freud's successor in the psychoanalytic movement. He learned to see himself as Freud saw him, in the language of Freudian psychoanalysis. During this period he gained his own identity, to some considerable extent, from a kind of psychological merger with Freud.

Jung's break with Freud has usually been portrayed as either the refusal by a rebellious "Son" to accept the disciplines of psychoanalysis or else as the inability of a doctrinaire "Father" to accept the junior man's insights. The latter is the picture Jung himself paints in MDR, in one of his last letters to Freud<sup>75</sup> and in his recently released correspondence with Jolande Jacobi<sup>76</sup>. However, it may be that the break is better seen as the outcome of Jung's attempts to transfer his idealising tendencies from Freud to his own self. Instead of finding esteem from his intimate relationship with Freud, Jung began to seek esteem from the realm of his own thoughts and psychic images. The value he had placed on Freud was transferred to his own psyche. In other words he romanticised and absolutised his own thoughts. Jung's need for heightened self-esteem took the form of a fusion between his own ideas and religious mythology - the language of ultimate

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<sup>69</sup>MDR (Fontana) p172.

<sup>70</sup>Homans (pp38-43) offers a particularly interesting account of this process with reference to Heinz Kohut's psychology of narcissism.

<sup>71</sup>MDR (Fontana) p172.

<sup>72</sup>Letters 17J, 39J, 49J, 87F.

<sup>73</sup>Letter 72J

<sup>74</sup>MDR (Fontana) p181.

<sup>75</sup>Letter 330J dated December 1912.

<sup>76</sup>Hitherto unpublished collection of letters sold at Sotheby's in May 1994.

concerns. This provides a highly plausible explanation of the form of Symbols of Transformation. This work is to be understood, as Emma Jung noted in a letter to Freud dated November 1911, as Jung's own self-analysis.<sup>77</sup> Its rambling, almost unreadable style, results from Jung's grandiose transposition of his own thoughts onto a cosmic level.

Freud's failure to give his approval to Jung's mythological work was a deep blow to Jung's self-esteem. Jung now determined to cut himself free from Freud and rebuild a sense of self independently of Freud. The period 1913-18 is therefore marked by Jung's most intense concentration on the self. Jung continued here the process he began with Symbols of Transformation of encountering mythological images, struggling to avoid being taken over by them, and finally establishing appropriate distance from them. The most important means by which he did this was to designate the figures thrown up by his unconscious as archetypes. In so doing he was able to "place" his self relative to these figures and so drain them of their power over him. By coming to terms with the grandiose myths Jung established his own self-identity. The dangers Jung experienced during this period were of either identifying himself with the myths and so producing a grandiose sense of self, what he called "inflation", or else of abandoning the attempt to build a self, what he called living as a mere persona.

The individuation process can be regarded as having its origins in Jung's struggle to establish a sense of self after he had broken with Freud. Individuation is thus primarily a matter of developing a sense of individuality vis-a-vis some significant "other". The task is prototypically one of coming to terms with some "other" with whom one has merged, although the method has more general application to the task of differentiating oneself from the mass. The process involves working out one's conflicts at the level of a dialogue with internal objects such that one can build a proper sense of "otherness" from them and hence form a coherent and independent sense of self. Jung suggests that the unity of the self is attained by both, on the one hand, acknowledging the psychic inheritance we share with others and also, on the other hand, by establishing boundaries between self and others.

Whilst Jung denies that individuation is an *individualistic* enterprise<sup>78</sup>, the focus of Jung's psychology was on establishing the individual's proper relation to internal objects rather than on maintaining relationships in society. One can take this as offering a valuable complement to contemporary post-Freudian object relations psychologies which focus on the person's relations with "external objects". However, by itself I think Jung's method does not take the social aspects of personhood sufficiently seriously. Jung's "Self" is not a construct that is intended primarily to enable one to participate actively in society but rather aims to give one a sense of invulnerability

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<sup>77</sup>McGuire (1991) p247.

<sup>78</sup>CW7 para. 267f.

in the face of threatening others, in Jung's words, "an attitude that is beyond the reach of emotional entanglements and violent shocks - a consciousness detached from the world"<sup>79</sup>. It is appropriately symbolised, as Jung said, by the Tower he built himself at Bollingen: a secluded, enclosed fortress.<sup>80</sup> This seems to me an unattractive symbol of the unity of the self: the form of wholeness which we should seek is, I think, more appropriately pictured as open and dynamic, rather than self-enclosed and static. If we are social beings then, whilst boundaries are important, wholeness is more likely to arise from a readiness to enter into relationship rather than from an attitude of detachment.

## **6. Individuation as Union of the Opposites of Good and Evil**

Jung held that individuation comprises the reconciliation of opposites, and of particular interest to me is his important but problematical contention that this includes reconciling the opposites of good and evil. Jung's view of evil was extensively explored in his correspondence with the Dominican theology professor Victor White: eventually the two friends found their perspectives irreconcilable<sup>81</sup>. In large part this aspect of Jung's thought stems from his negative childhood experiences of Christianity and from his negative experience of the Christian sexual ethic insofar as it related to his own married life. These experiences seem to have convinced him that the one-sided pursuit of spiritual goods could be psychologically harmful.<sup>82</sup>

Jung, like Freud, complained that the Christian sexual ethic was repressive and that psychological health required a more permissive ideal. But whereas Freud thought that greater freedom might be achieved by reducing the power of religion, Jung thought that only a transformation of religion could have the desired effect.<sup>83</sup> Whereas Freud envisaged a battle between the libido and the demands of morality that would tend to pull the self apart, Jung aimed to find a new religious ethic that would draw together morality and sensuality and hence unify the self.

Jung sought for a new myth that did not exalt goodness and virtue as its highest ends but would, by contrast, allow for a high degree of sensual enjoyment. He worked out this myth during a series of psychotic-like visions and dreams over the period 1913-17. This interval is generally regarded as his most important and creative period. Jung himself says of it: "The years when I was pursuing my inner images were the most important in my life - in them everything essential

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<sup>79</sup>CW13 para. 68.

<sup>80</sup>MDR Ch. VIII pp250-252 (Fontana).

<sup>81</sup>Ref. Charet.

<sup>82</sup>For the former see MDR Chs. I-III and Storr (1973) Ch. 1; for the latter see the Freud/Jung correspondence, especially letters 175J and 178J.

<sup>83</sup>"I think we must give [psychoanalysis] time to infiltrate into people...ever so gently to transform Christ back into the soothsaying god of the vine...A genuine and proper ethical development cannot abandon Christianity but must grow up within it..." (Letter 178J).

was decided...All my works, all my creative activity, has come from those initial fantasies and dreams"<sup>84</sup>.

I want here to focus on just one of these episodes, the strange composition of the "Seven Sermons to the Dead", which offers what I think is Jung's strongest mythological statement of individuation as a union of good and evil. The Sermons contain a good deal of Gnostic imagery and allow Jung to situate his own ethic in a venerable tradition of thought<sup>85</sup>. The myth was composed in 1916 but Jung, fearing that it would condemn him as a "mystic", barred its inclusion in the Complete Works, and it was not publicly available until 1962. Perhaps because of their bizarre imagery Jung's commentators have not always given the Sermons the attention they deserve<sup>86</sup>. In fact they are of considerable importance in understanding Jung's central concept of individuation. Jung himself credits this episode with nothing less than being a key to his life's work.<sup>87</sup>

The "Sermons" are of interest not just because of their content but also because of their form. Jung was convinced that if people were to become whole they needed a myth by which they could make sense of their lives. Rational philosophical (or Freudian analytical) principles are not enough, for they do not speak to the non-rational and a-moral parts of the self. If these aspects are to be properly integrated into the self, we need to be addressed by religious or mythological symbolism which resonates with the products of the unconscious. Jung's criticism of Christian orthodoxy was that its imagery had become hardened into dogmatic and moral norms, and that Christianity had hence lost its power to address and integrate the whole self. In the "Sermons" we have Jung's own attempt to create a myth which regains contact with primitive religious symbolism and which overcomes the allegedly one-sided emphasis on rationality and morality to which Christianity had fallen prey.

### The Seven Sermons to the Dead

The Seven Sermons are Jung's interpretation of a highly dramatic "haunting" of Jung's household that happened in 1906 and that is graphically recorded in his autobiography<sup>88</sup>. Jung came from a family which had a history of parapsychological experience, and he wrote his Ph.D on the basis of his observations of seances conducted by his cousin Helene Preiswerk, a spiritualist medium. That Jung himself should be the subject of parapsychological experience is, therefore, not surprising. The main characters in the episode are "the dead", the ghosts of dead Christians who

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<sup>84</sup>MDR (Fontana) p225 & 217.

<sup>85</sup>Although Jung mis- (or re-) interprets the Gnostic tradition in a number of ways. Most notably, Jung takes the psychological goal to be the reconciliation of the light and dark parts of the self, whereas, for the Gnostics, the goal was the liberation of the light from the darkness.

<sup>86</sup>Homans (1979) and Storr (1973) fail to mention them, and Stevens (1990) only cites them as evidence of Jung's mental instability (p173).

<sup>87</sup>MDR (Fontana) p217.

<sup>88</sup>MDR p215.

are haunting Jung's household, and the Alexandrian Gnostic Basilides. The Sermons are to be understood both parapsychologically and psychologically<sup>89</sup>. Parapsychologically Jung is either channelling Basilides or using Basilides to address the dead. Psychologically, it is not Basilides but Jung who is talking, and the dead are not other persons but Jung's own unconscious. The dead come from Jerusalem, the birthplace of Christianity, where they "found not what they sought". They are Christians who lived and died according to a myth that did not answer their real needs. They have sought out Basilides (Jung) because he is able to answer their questions. Basilides' response takes the characteristically Gnostic form of a creation myth.

In the beginning was the godhead, or pleroma, which stands for primordial unconsciousness. We created beings have an ambivalent relationship with the pleroma. On the one hand we "are the pleroma itself" (Sermon 1), for we never break wholly from our origins. On the other hand we "are from the pleroma infinitely removed" (Sermon 1), for we do gain autonomy. Psychological growth requires both independence from the unconscious, attained in the first half of life, and reconnection with the unconscious - the goal of the second half of life. The task of the creature is to differentiate itself from the Pleroma. Differentiation is synonymous with individuation, the "PRINCIPIUM INDIVIDUATIONIS" (Sermon 1). In the first half of life this involves differentiation of the external world from the unconscious and in the second half it requires differentiation of the parts of the unconscious.

The Pleroma comprises latent and undifferentiated pairs of opposites, notably "good and evil" (Sermon 1). Whilst the initial task of the creature is to separate out the sides of each opposite, our final task is to integrate both sides of all opposites. Integration means neither effacing the differences between each quality, nor cultivating only one side of each pair, but cultivating a sense of balance between the opposites. This applies especially in the moral life: "When we strive after [only] the good or [only] the beautiful, we thereby forget our own nature" (Sermon 1). Our task is not to strive for one-sided moral virtue but to realise all the qualities that are latent within us. "At bottom, therefore, there is only one striving, namely, the striving after your own being" (Sermon 1). The realisation of being involves a full acknowledgement and integration of moral and aesthetic opposites. "We labour to attain to the good and the beautiful, yet at the same time we also lay hold of the evil and the ugly, since in the Pleroma these are one with the good and the beautiful" (Sermon 1).

The all-good god of the Christians comprises one half of a pair of opposites within the Pleroma. He exists together with his moral opposite the devil: "To god, therefore, always belongeth the devil" (Sermon 2). The highest god "Abraxas" encompasses both the all-good god of the

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<sup>89</sup>Following Segal (1992) p 37.

Christians and the devil (Sermon 2). Jung offers a lengthy and bewildering description of Abraxas (Sermon 3) of which the following is a representative sample:

"From Abraxas LIFE, altogether indefinite, the mother of good and evil...

Abraxas is the sun, and at the same time the eternally sucking gorge of the void, the belittling and dismembering devil.

The power of Abraxas is two-fold; but ye see it not, because for your eyes the warring opposites of this power are extinguished....

It is splendid as the lion...

It is the monster of the under-world...

It is holy begetting.

It is love and love's murder.

It is the saint and his betrayer..."

Whereas in the Pleroma the opposites are latent, in Abraxas they are fully realised. Where the Pleroma represents the psychological starting point, Abraxas represents the psychological goal of the Self.<sup>90</sup> As an image of the Self, Abraxas is supremely life and power. Evidently Abraxas includes not merely the "naughty" (holy begetting) but also the really evil (love's murder). Jung does not claim that this image is an attractive one, merely that it is our inevitable destiny. We do best by reconciling ourselves to it: "To fear it is wisdom. To resist it not is redemption." (Sermon 3)

The Sermons express in mythical language some of the central themes of Jung's conception of the fully integrated Self, which he expounds in "scientific language" in those formal works written about the same as the Sermons; namely the two essays (1916 and 17) that were to become the Two Essays on Analytical Psychology and an article entitled "The Transcendent Function". In these wholeness is said to be the principle duty of humanity and the endpoint of the fundamental principle of individuation. Wholeness consists in the union of opposites, most notably in the union of good and evil. The pursuit of wholeness is a higher duty than the pursuit of the Good. Our "perfection" does not lie in moral goodness but in being more fully our (morally ambiguous) natural selves. Wholeness is not the acquisition of health, but is learning to live with a balance of health and sickness. The individuation principle works itself out irresistibly; our wholeness consists in not resisting this process. Ultimate reality is not good and beautiful but is mixed.

Jung's insistence on the reconciliation of the opposites of good and evil in the Self is highly problematic and paradoxical, and I shall return to this logical problem in his work in my final chapter. Nonetheless, there is an important strain of Christian theology which suggests, as Jung

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<sup>90</sup>So Segal p41.

does, that the pursuit of moral goodness may, by itself, be inadequate or even harmful. Augustine's theology of grace insisted that the starting point for the spiritual life is the realisation that human beings are unable to achieve goodness by their own efforts. Following Augustine, Protestant theology has given a higher degree of emphasis to the response of faith to divine grace than it has to the pursuit of moral righteousness. Paul Tillich, who was strongly influenced by Jung, suggested that faith is the acceptance that we are accepted<sup>91</sup>. Faith, for Tillich, has a Jungian form of self-acceptance as its psychological correlate. Recently the theologian James Forsyth has written that "faith begins with repentance for the sin which is revealed in one's striving for moral perfection"<sup>92</sup>. In common with Jung, these theologians remind us that strategies to unify the self must start from the point of recognising and accepting ourselves as we are, rather than disowning and denying the parts of ourselves that we do not like or which do not match up to our ideal selves. The natural moral ambiguity of the self must be fully acknowledged if attempts to unify the self under some guiding moral ideal are not to lead merely to hypocrisy or self-deception.

However, Jung underestimates the extent to which moral progress is both desirable and possible. Thus, except in its extreme forms, Protestant theology has always insisted that the response of faith to grace leads, and must lead, to good works.<sup>93</sup> Jung's psychology, by contrast, so stresses self-acceptance that moral growth and virtuous action are given too little prominence. Moreover, the existence of tension between the self we feel we ought to be and the self we actually acknowledge ourselves to be does not of itself lead to hypocrisy<sup>94</sup> but can engender growth in moral goods such as endurance, perseverance and courage. I suggest that growing in wholeness is a matter of living with this tension. Growth is arrested if, on the one hand, the actuality of what we are is denied (Jung's insight) or, on the other hand, if the moral ideal is abandoned (Jung's weakness).

## 7. Becoming an Individuated Self through Symbolism

Since individuation involves bringing together entities in the personality that are essentially unlike each other, some medium must be found whereby these entities can be related. Ordinary language and rationality are clearly inadequate since they are identified with only the *conscious* side of the psyche. Freud's method, the reduction of the workings of the psyche to erotic desire is also inadequate since, according to Jung, this kind of desire is associated more closely with the *unconscious* side of the psyche. Jung's proposal is that we attend to the faculty of *imagination*, for

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<sup>91</sup>Tillich (1952) esp. Ch. VI "Courage and Transcendence".

<sup>92</sup>Forsyth (1989) p129.

<sup>93</sup>See, for example, the Meissen Agreement between the Anglican and Lutheran churches par. 15, with reference to older Protestant confessions.

<sup>94</sup>Thus Loewenthal's careful review (1995 Ch. 6) of the empirical evidence indicates that whereas religious ideals can be *abused* to sanction the kind of undesirable character traits about which Jung is worried, there is no direct association between such traits and genuine religiosity.

here both conscious and unconscious components are brought together. "Imagination holds in itself an irreducible value, for it is the psychic function whose roots ramify at the same time in the contents of the conscious mind and of the unconscious."<sup>95</sup> The psychologist makes use of the imagination by working with the *symbols* that the imagination throws up in its fantasies and dreams.

The significance of the symbol is quite different for Jung compared with Freud. Jung accuses Freud of mistaking symbols for mere signs. In Freud's analysis the dream symbols were taken to be products of the "censor", which needed to be decoded so that the unconscious contents to which they referred could be discerned. For Jung the symbol does not simply point to something else, but embodies within itself something that is transcendent to consciousness. Freud's dream symbols could only point to some psychic antecedent. Jung's symbols, on the other hand, embody something that is in the process of "becoming" in the future. Freud's symbols had a past *causal* significance; Jung's symbols have a future *teleological* significance.

The meaning of the mind's symbols must be deduced by two levels of exploration or what Jung calls "amplification". Firstly one must follow the intuitive leadings and associations made to the symbol by the patient him or herself. Secondly, the trained therapist must draw in associations and possible meanings from his or her expert knowledge of world religions and myths. According to Jung's theory of archetypes, these meanings are not random but fall into certain archetypal classes. The appropriate symbolic meaning is termed by Jung the "transcendent function"<sup>96</sup>. Once this has been disclosed the patient must consciously act upon it. "He is obliged in truth to take the way of individual life which is revealed to him."<sup>97</sup> The transcendent function brings together conscious and unconscious so as to offer the patient a new orientation to life.

As I have indicated, the meaning of the symbols cannot be deduced from rational criteria. Rather, their meaning is associated with what Jung calls their "intense value for life"<sup>98</sup>, that is, their value in furthering individuation. Their truth-content is, quite pragmatically, linked to the power and "sense of rightness" of the individuated life that they lead to. Discerning the meaning of a symbol is therefore more a matter of intuition and feeling than rational logic. The symbol carries with it archetypal power and significance. Once the symbol is correctly discerned, consciousness is seized by its power. In believing the symbol the personality is charged with energy. The release of libido deriving from the symbolic union of the opposites of consciousness/unconsciousness and

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<sup>95</sup>CW7 para. 492.

<sup>96</sup>"The transcendent function" (1916) in CW8.

<sup>97</sup>CW7 para. 497.

<sup>98</sup>CW7 para. 495.



reason/emotion grants a new power for living. The symbol unites both "sides" of the self in a new orientation to life.<sup>99</sup>

The way of individuation involves a whole series of such re-orientations until the Self is fully realised and integrated. Jung's psychotherapy is in no sense a one-off "cure" but a continuous project. It provides the "contemporary" with insight into his own unconscious from which he may draw strength to resist the pressures to conform that he experiences in society. Only then will he be able to forge a persona that is authentic to his own individuality. The capacity for inner dialogue, learned in becoming aware of and responding to the archetypal symbols, provides the touchstone for a clear and objective relationship with the outer world.<sup>100</sup>

Jung offers a highly suggestive psychological extension of the ideas about the creative imagination and the symbolic realm that were developed by Romantic writers such as Schelling, Goethe and Coleridge. As I indicated in chapter 2, these authors felt that the imagination was capable of privileged access to the life-giving resources of the natural realm. For them, nature was not simply the passive object of reflection but was actually produced in imaginative art and literature. They conceived of the self as an object that was uniquely created as one sought to express it. In like manner, Jung argues that the Self produces itself as the ego encounters, and makes imaginative associations with, the symbols thrown up by the unconscious. The uniquely personal interaction of an individual conscious ego with archetypal symbols that are common to humanity yields an individualised pattern of personal growth. Access to the realm of nature is now available from the creative possibilities of one's own psyche.

However, I would wish to qualify Jung's account in two ways. Firstly, symbols do not have to be and ought not to be radically inaccessible to reason in the way Jung envisaged. Schelling, Goethe and Coleridge all supposed that symbols gained their power by representing the transcendent in a finite medium.<sup>101</sup> The symbol thus transcends human reason but is not thereby in conflict with it. An *apparent* contradiction (such as the symbol's reconciliation of universal and particular reality) is the necessary result of the limitations of the finite mind. But a symbol which contains deliberate logical paradoxes, such as the reconciliation of good and evil or rationality and irrationality is another matter. Coleridge, for example, believed strongly that symbols are of two kinds: the legitimate and the illegitimate.<sup>102</sup> The former transcend reason but the latter contradict reason.

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<sup>99</sup>CW7 para. 492.

<sup>100</sup>CW8 para. 187.

<sup>101</sup>Schelling talks of symbols as having the quality of "representation with complete indifference, so that the universal is wholly the particular, and the same time the particular is wholly the universal". So Goethe: "That is true symbolism, where the more particular represents the more general, not as a dream or shade, but as a vivid, instantaneous revelation of the Inscrutable"; and also Coleridge who says that the symbol "partakes of the Reality which it renders intelligible".

Quoted in Perkins (1994) p48.

<sup>102</sup>Perkins (1994) p56.

My view is that Jung's symbols lose adequacy and power to the extent that they tend to contradict reason. In terms of therapeutic value, whilst one might allow that such symbols would satisfy the non-rational parts of the psyche, it is hard to see how they could satisfy the rational aspects of ourselves.

Secondly, we need to recognise that Jung stood quite consciously within a tradition of symbolic interpretation informed primarily by Gnostic and Alchemical texts. Other traditions, such as Christian Orthodoxy, may (and do) interpret the same symbol differently, and hence recognise the self to be unified in different ways. Jung argues for the validity of his own mythical tradition on grounds of psychological effectiveness. Whether or not this claim could be justified empirically, we should, at least, register the point that his tradition is but a tradition, and a somewhat arcane one at that. The Christian should not feel constrained by Jungian psychology to abandon interpretations of Christian symbols according to rules arising from within his or her own tradition. This would apply especially to cases where Christian interpretations have a greater degree of logical coherence than the ones supplied by Jung. If I may give just one example, Jung draws on considerable mythological evidence to suggest that there is an original identity between the figure of the hero and the image of the snake.<sup>103</sup> He follows an esoteric (Ophite) reading of Jn. 3:14 to suggest that the Christian scriptures fall within this pattern by showing the snake to be a symbol of Christ. His inference is that there is a primal unity between good and evil, between Yahweh and Satan. But taken within the broader context of Johannine typology it seems clear that Jn. 3:14 is primarily concerned with the salvific power of Christ and that the point of the comparison is not the snake but the "exaltation". St John, and Christian orthodoxy in general, indicate a primary opposition between darkness and light, good and evil. There seem to be few good reasons why Christians should abandon their traditional reading of such a verse in favour of a Jungian reading which is not only less consonant with the context but which also yields the paradox that good and evil are essentially united. Both the Christian and the Jungian interpretations recognise that the religious symbol of the exalted Christ has the power to save and heal, but whereas the latter sees this as referring to the union of good and evil in the self, the former sees it as achieved through a joining of the person to Christ, the source of goodness (so Jn 3:15).

## **8. The Spirit as Symbol of Integration**

In Jung's psychology religious symbols provide the crucial bridge between consciousness and the powers of the unconscious. They do this without prejudice to the question of whether the entities they purport to represent have any existence outside the psyche.<sup>104</sup> Jung finds that the God-image

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<sup>103</sup>CW5 para 575ff.

<sup>104</sup>E.g. Jung's reply to a certain Robert Smith concerning his bitter disagreement with Martin Buber began, "Buber and I start from an entirely different basis; I make no transcendental

is a traditional symbol of the Self, albeit that it is better suited to "ancients" than to "contemporaries".<sup>105</sup> Unfortunately Jung finds that the primary Christian symbols of the Trinity and of the Christ-figure are inadequate inasmuch as he feels that they do not take sufficiently seriously the irrational and morally dubious components of the self.<sup>106</sup> Jung's proposals for revising the Christian doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation so that God includes an evil component are unpromising for orthodox Christians. Christians may, however, be able to do more with Jung's positive assessment of the doctrine of the Holy Spirit. For Jung, the symbol of spirit is a "psychic complex that contains the seeds of incalculable possibilities"<sup>107</sup>; it is a living symbol par excellence. Jung thinks that the truth of the Christian doctrine of the Spirit, in psychological terms, corresponds to the final stage in the growth of the psyche. The relation of the individual believer to the mysterious divine Spirit may be taken as a means of "articulating one's ego-consciousness with a superordinate totality"<sup>108</sup>. Christian talk of "life in the Spirit" is to be understood psychologically as referring to the realisation of the Self.

Jung's most sustained exploration of the notion of spirit is contained in his essay "Spirit and Life"<sup>109</sup>. He suggests that the experienced power of a spirit (or the Spirit) over an individual arises from its roots in the affective unconscious, for "an ideal which lacks emotional force can never become a life-ruling factor"<sup>110</sup>. This power may be experienced negatively or positively. A spirit might be "the image of a personified affect"<sup>111</sup>, that is, a part of the unconscious might split off into a complex capable of acting autonomously from the ego. In this case the person feels himself oppressed by some external force which causes him to behave in an irrational manner. More positively, we might use the term spirit to refer to "those sayings or ideals that store up the richest experience of life and the deepest reflection"<sup>112</sup>. Spirit is now experienced as an empowering ideal stimulating the ego to worthwhile activity. On this account a spirit is felt to be malign and oppressive if its demands are felt as a reaction against the rational parts of the self. On the other hand, a spirit (or the Spirit) is felt to be good and beneficial inasmuch as its demands are consonant with the rational will.

If we pursue the positive sense of "spirit", we find that in its strongest manifestations the power by which the individual is gripped may go beyond a maxim or an idea that can be formulated and

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statements. I am essentially empirical, as I have stated more than once...I am not concerned with the truth or untruth of God's existence." (Quoted in Segal p173f)

<sup>105</sup>For contemporaries: "There is no deity in the mandala, nor is there any submission or reconciliation to a deity. The place of the deity seems to be taken by the wholeness of man." (CW11 para. 139.)

<sup>106</sup>See his Psychological Approach to the Dogma of the Trinity in CW11.

<sup>107</sup>CW 8 para. 644.

<sup>108</sup>CW11 para. 276.

<sup>109</sup>In CW8.

<sup>110</sup>CW8 para. 642.

<sup>111</sup>CW8 para. 628.

<sup>112</sup>CW8 para. 633.

"named". In certain forms of experience it displays a peculiar life of its own in which it is felt as an independent being. So long as the spirit can be reduced to a rational rule it will not, of course, be experienced in this way. But, says Jung, "when the idea or principle involved is inscrutable, when its intentions are obscure in origin and in aim and yet enforce themselves, then the spirit is necessarily felt as an independent being, as a kind of higher consciousness, and its inscrutable, superior nature can no longer be expressed in the concepts of human reason"<sup>113</sup>.

Jung thinks that a life lived in the power of such a spirit would be wholly desirable and is, indeed, a necessary requirement of personal fulfilment. "A mere ego-life, as we well know, is a most inadequate and unsatisfactory thing. Only a life lived in a certain spirit is worth living... The fullness of life requires more than just an ego; it needs spirit, that is an independent, overriding complex, for it seems that this alone is capable of giving vital expression to those psychic potentialities that lie beyond the reach of ego-consciousness."<sup>114</sup> In Jung's view, the striving for individual autonomy is an "adolescent" phenomenon characteristic of the emergence of the ego. Psychological adulthood involves our relinquishment of exclusive independence and our acknowledgement of the realms of the unconscious. In "adulthood" the ego renounces its claims to be the master of the Self. Life according to the Spirit is one in which the need for autonomy is balanced with equally important psychological needs for receptivity and dependence.<sup>115</sup>

Unfortunately Jung's conception of spirit is somewhat marred, from a dogmatic point of view, by his insistence that it reconciles in itself good and evil.<sup>116</sup> Nonetheless, at its best, his description of the psychological mechanisms by which the notion of spirit integrates the self represents a real advance. Jung rebels against the Platonic (and Freudian) insistence that the self is best united under the hegemony of reason. "The intellect does indeed do harm to the soul when it dares to possess itself of the heritage of the spirit."<sup>117</sup> He insists that "[intellect] is in no way fitted to do this, for spirit is something higher than intellect"<sup>118</sup>. Spirit is superior to reason not because it opposes and triumphs over reason but because "it embraces the latter and includes the feelings as well"<sup>119</sup>. Spirit gains its power in virtue of its resonance with the affective and pre-rational parts of the self. It is experienced as benign inasmuch as it is consonant with the rational will. It is called "holy" insofar as it has an inscrutable quality that transcends our ability to rationalise it

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<sup>113</sup>CW8 para. 643.

<sup>114</sup>CW8 para. 645.

<sup>115</sup>Ref. CW11 para. 273.

<sup>116</sup>In his Psychological Approach to the Trinity CW11 para. 260 and graphically illustrated in the quaternity symbol shown on page 175. See also his strange account in Answer to Job (CW11) of the Holy Spirit as a wrathful avenger who initiates an era in which the dark elements of God, which have hitherto been repressed by the one-sided Christ symbol, are unleashed.

<sup>117</sup>CW13 The Secret of the Golden Flower para. 7.

<sup>118</sup>ibid.

<sup>119</sup>ibid.

down to a definable maxim or law. In Jungian terms the self can only be truly integrated if it surrenders itself to the power of such a spirit.

# 6

## The Humanistic Psychologists: Actualising the Self

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### **1. Introduction**

I now turn to the third of the main modern psychological schools that have influenced our contemporary sense of self, that of humanistic psychology. The concerns of humanistic psychology go beyond a strict science of the mind into the wider concerns of human flourishing. As a leading humanistic psychologist comments: "Humanistic psychology encompasses a philosophy - a view of what life is about and what life can be, if lived constructively".<sup>1</sup> Insofar as it quite explicitly addresses general issues of human motivation and conceptions of the human good it opens out into theology and moral philosophy. Insofar as it offers descriptions of and prescriptions for the wider society, it borders on sociology. Humanistic psychology is thus a pervasive cultural force that interprets and shapes the way we conceive ourselves in psychological, theological, moral and sociological terms. In particular it has, since the 1960s, been one of the most important influences on what are sometimes called "the helping professions", such as social work, teaching and church pastoral care<sup>2</sup>.

The leading humanistic psychologists are all Americans, either by birth or by naturalisation, and the optimistic ethos of this form of psychology contrasts quite sharply with the attention to the darker side of human nature that characterises the continental European psychology of Freud and Jung. There is no single figure within humanistic psychology of comparable stature to Freud or Jung. Therefore, whereas previous chapters considered the thought of just one individual psychologist, here I begin by identifying the central emphases of humanistic psychology as a whole, before discussing the work of the three people I think are of most importance in this movement, namely Erich Fromm, Abraham Maslow and Carl Rogers.

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<sup>1</sup>Charlotte Bühler in Bühler and Allen (1972) p2.

<sup>2</sup>Cf. Pattison (1994) p5: "Such theories and techniques which have informed contemporary pastoral care have tended to be drawn from one major domain, that of humanistic psychology." Browning (1991) p245ff gives a critical American perspective on the impact of humanistic psychology on pastoral care.

## **2. The Nature of Humanistic Psychology**

A psychological viewpoint that might be described as humanistic could be traced back to William James (1842-1910), who advocated a psychology that left intact the wholeness of the feelings and experiences of the subject. This emphasis was renewed in the 1930s by personality theorists such as Goldstein, Allport and Maslow. However, humanistic psychology as an identifiable movement really dates from the early 1960s. The trend of thought established in the 1930s was made concrete by the setting up of the American Journal of Humanistic Psychology in 1961. The following year (1962) Maslow, Charlotte Bühler, James Bugental and others founded the American Association for Humanistic Psychology (AAHP). This latter became an international organisation, the Association for Humanistic Psychology, which held its first international conference in Holland in 1970. Also in 1970 the Division of Humanistic Psychology was formed within the American Psychological Association.

The Articles of Association of the AAHP describe the field as follows:

"Humanistic psychology is primarily an orientation toward the whole of psychology rather than a distinct area or school. It stands for the respect for the worth of persons, respect for differences of approach, open-mindedness as to acceptable methods, and interest in exploration of new aspects of human behaviour. As a "third force" in contemporary psychology, it is concerned with topics having little place in existing theories and systems: e.g., love, creativity, self, growth, organism, basic need-gratification, self-actualisation, higher values, being, becoming, spontaneity, play, humour, affection, naturalness, warmth, ego-transcendence, objectivity, autonomy, responsibility, meaning, fair play, transcendental experience, peak experience, courage, and related concepts."<sup>3</sup>

This description is best understood not as delimiting a new field of study but as opening up the existing discipline of psychology to new approaches which better preserve the worth of the person and attend to the higher and more valuable capabilities of the human mind. As a "third force" it represents a reaction against the dominant approaches of behaviourism and psychoanalysis. Humanists regard behaviourism as offering too mechanistic a view of humanity and instead draw attention to the freedom of the individual. They regard psychoanalysis as too concerned with human pathology and basic drives, and stress instead the higher human motives and abilities. However, humanism has much more in common with psychoanalysis than behaviourism. It has particular affinities with Jungian notions of growth, and of discovering meaning and spiritual significance in life.

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<sup>3</sup>Quoted in Shaffer (1978) p2.

Humanistic psychology was popularised and disseminated through the human potential movement. This movement is associated particularly with the Esalen Institute founded in Big Sur, California in 1962. Esalen is probably best known for its development of Encounter Groups. The notion that people might experience personal growth of some kind in a warm and supportive group is now widely held in psychological therapy, education and in the churches. But Esalen also developed and practised a myriad of other techniques, from the fairly respectable Gestalt therapy to Wilhelm Reich's bizarre Bioenergetic Analysis. These techniques have in common a stress on bodily sensation, on expression of emotion, and freedom from conventional moral constraints. They endeavour to counter the feeling that people have become alienated from their bodies, their emotions and from each other. They are concerned with the restoration of the wholeness of the person, the incorporation of "bad" (i.e. socially or morally unacceptable) feelings into the person, and a new depth of inter-personal encounter. Human potential dispersed the values of humanistic psychology across the USA and into Western Europe. In the 1960s these techniques were perceived as strongly counter-cultural. Whilst they have now entered into the mainstream of Western culture they have nonetheless retained the somewhat subversive feel associated with protest against conventional societal norms.

We may discern four central emphases within the movement, which I shall now discuss in turn.<sup>4</sup>

Firstly, humanistic psychology is strongly experiential. It takes conscious experience rather than empirical analysis of physiology or prior causes as its basic datum. Here it is clearly opposed to the positivism of behaviourism. But it is also opposed to psychoanalysis, for the psychoanalyst will give an explanation for some mental state in terms of unconscious processes that the analysand is not aware of. The strength of the humanistic approach is that it agrees with our common-sense perception that reports of conscious experience are of the first importance in understanding another person. It also confers a valuable "sacredness" on personal experience. My everyday sense that my felt experience is not simply a product of conditioning or unconscious mechanisms is confirmed. Moreover, if someone takes my experience seriously I feel they are taking *me* seriously and my sense of being a particular and unique self is enhanced. The corresponding weakness of the humanistic approach is that it may devalue physiological and psychic causes. Certain kinds of mental states, manic depression for example, are generally agreed to be caused by physiological imbalances. Again deception and self-deception may lead an observer to be misled by a report of conscious experience. In general terms, an approach that starts with conscious experience gains in value to the extent that the person concerned is trustworthy, "in touch" with him or herself and psychologically healthy

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<sup>4</sup>Cf. Shaffer p10ff.



Secondly, humanistic psychology respects the wholeness of the individual. Over and above my physical perceptions or pains, or my mental functioning and personality characteristics, I am a unique self striving to unfold my capabilities and potentials. The sense of being *me* lends a particular quality to all my personal characteristics, such that *my* extroversion or *my* arthritis is not to be regarded as precisely the same as my neighbour's extroversion or arthritis. This is a powerful notion that has born considerable fruit in medical and psychological practice and is an important counterbalance to medical technologies that would treat people in an overly analytic or objectifying way.

Thirdly, humanistic psychology insists that autonomy is of the essence of our humanity. I am most authentically myself when I am freely choosing my future and refusing to be bound by my past or by convention. Humanism, unlike behaviourism or psychoanalysis provides a psychological model that correlates with my common-sense perception that I do have free choice. In this it provides a valuable corrective to the more deterministic strands within contemporary psychology. However, it can work out therapeutically in an over-valuation of the possibilities of present freedom to choose or a devaluation of the past. Humanists may find it difficult to help someone whose present freedom of choice is limited by real environmental constraints. They can tend to see historical relations with parents as the source of all our problems. Finally humanists often work with too limited and negative a conception of freedom as freedom from constraint.

Fourthly humanistic psychology resists reducing human behaviour to basic drives. Humanists take the higher human capabilities, such as love and creativity, as essential to humanity and not as merely sublimated versions of more basic drives. In this respect we might compare them with Augustine, for whom the highest desire, the desire for God, was the most distinctively human capability and therefore the subject of dominating interest. Unfortunately, however, humanism recovers the higher human capabilities at the expense of neglecting the unconscious and shadowy regions of the psyche. This can produce a one-sided understanding of the psyche in which the ease with which personal autonomy can be achieved is over-estimated.

The religious roots of humanistic psychology lie in American Protestantism. There are some interesting similarities between the humanists' encounter groups and therapy sessions and certain forms of eighteenth and nineteenth century Protestant piety. Both are concerned with the honest sharing of present experience within an intimate small group.<sup>5</sup> In this century, two of the most important precursors of the humanist psychologists were the prominent, if intellectually lightweight, Protestant ministers - Harry Emerson Fosdick and Norman Vincent Peale. Both men

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<sup>5</sup>Ref. Thomas Oden The Intensive Group Experience Philadelphia Westminster 1972 and Vitz p103ff. Although he has not demonstrated a historical continuity between the two, Oden argues quite convincingly that the contemporary encounter group can be understood as a "demythologised" version of the pietistic group.

developed their idea in New York City during the 1930s and 40s, the formative place and period for much humanistic psychology. Fosdick, moreover, had close links with Union Theological Seminary in New York, at which the leading humanist psychologists Rollo May and Carl Rogers both studied. The title of Fosdick's third work On Being a Real Person (1943), a book which ran to thirty printings, foreshadows Rogers' most popular book On Becoming a Person (1961). In his book Fosdick proposes, in terms that would become basic to the humanistic psychological outlook, that the goal of human life is personal integration or wholeness, a goal that will be reached through self-discovery, self-acceptance and self-love.<sup>6</sup> Peale wrote in a similar vein in 1937: "The greatest day in any individual's life is when he begins for the first time to realise himself."<sup>7</sup> The opening of his best-selling The Power of Positive Thinking sets a tone that would be echoed in a great deal of later humanistic psychological writing: "Believe in yourself! Have faith in your abilities!...self-confidence leads to self-realisation and successful achievement."<sup>8</sup>

The development of humanistic psychology seems to reflect a profound religious-cultural shift in America in the middle and later parts of this century. Fosdick articulated this well: "The basic urge of the human organism is towards wholeness. The primary command of our being is, Get yourself together, and the fundamental sin is to be chaotic and unfocused".<sup>9</sup> Wholeness thus began to supersede salvation as the human goal. The fundamental sin was no longer pride, but the failure to realise one's potential<sup>10</sup>. In an era of increasing doubt and debate over metaphysical commitments, the realisation of each self was a psychological ideal that all could agree on. It was an ideal eminently suited to the increasingly pluralistic American liberal democracy. The religiously inclined might follow Peale in advocating the benefits of divine power in assisting the achievement of this goal, but the mainstream humanists could follow Rogers in disavowing the need for such divine assistance.

Having discussed humanistic psychology as a whole, I now turn to consider three of its leading proponents, beginning with Erich Fromm.

### **3. Erich Fromm**

#### **3.1 Fromm's Life and Work**

Erich Fromm (1900-80) studied sociology and psychology at the universities of Heidelberg and Munich. He received psychoanalytic training at Berlin and subsequently studied and taught at the Frankfurt Psychoanalytic Institute and the Institute for Social Research at Frankfurt University.

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<sup>6</sup>Fosdick On Being a Real Person Ch. 2 quoted in Vitz (1994) p100.

<sup>7</sup>Peale The Art of Living (Abingdon-Cokesbury, New York 1937) p10 quoted in Vitz p102.

<sup>8</sup>Peale The Power of Positive Thinking (Prentice-Hall, New York, 1952) p1.

<sup>9</sup>Fosdick On Being A Real Person (Harper New York 1943) Ch. 2 quoted in Vitz p100.

<sup>10</sup>Cf. Bühler and Allen (1972) p46: "Humanistic psychology points to a personal guilt aside from socially conditioned guilt feelings. Self-guilt may arise in an individual who squanders his life, failing to fulfil or develop his own best potentials."

He was deeply influenced by his experience of the collapse of German culture in the 1920s and of the rise of Nazism in the 1930s. Fromm emigrated from Germany to the United States in 1933, becoming a lecturer at the Chicago Psychoanalytic Institute and then working in a private psychological practice in New York City. He subsequently wrote and lectured extensively. His interests centred on psychology, although he also wrote on philosophy, ethics, religion and sociology. His most important books are The Fear of Freedom (ET 1942), which deals with his theory of personality, Man for Himself (ET 1949), in which he tries to establish a psychological basis for ethics, The Sane Society (ET 1955) which explores the relation between mental health and socio-economic conditions, and The Art of Loving (ET 1957), in which he sets out his theory of love. Fromm may be regarded alternatively as a humanistic personality theorist<sup>11</sup> or as a neo-Freudian analyst<sup>12</sup>. He refers to his own work as "humanistic psychoanalysis"<sup>13</sup>. He thus forms an important and interesting bridge between the psychoanalytic perspectives I have discussed earlier and the perspective of humanistic psychology dealt with in this chapter.

### 3.2 Fromm's Approach to Psychology

Fromm begins from the premise that "the understanding of man's psyche must be based on the analysis of man's needs stemming from the conditions of his existence"<sup>14</sup>. The unique predicament of humanity, he maintains, is that it both belongs to nature and yet transcends nature. Humanity is a "freak"<sup>15</sup> of nature, passively bound to obey the laws of nature at one level but emancipated from nature at another level. Humanity has a range of instinctual needs corresponding to those of the animals, yet in virtue of its distinctively human capacities for self-awareness, reason and imagination, humanity remains unsatisfied if its purely animal needs are met. Fromm is concerned to delineate a set of distinctively human needs (in addition to animal needs such as those for food, sleep and sex) which must be met if we are to become fulfilled individuals.

Since his starting point is the situation of humanity in the most general sense, Fromm is willing to accept evidence from all possible sources not just or indeed not even principally from the laboratory. Psychology as a science, he argues, is strictly limited in its possibilities<sup>16</sup>. Its proper role is not to tell us what man *is* but what man *is not*. Its proper aim "is the *negative*, the removal of distortions and illusions, *not the positive*, full and complete knowledge of a human being"<sup>17</sup>. Fromm argues that complete knowledge of a human being can never be knowledge "about" him

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<sup>11</sup>Cf. Hall and Lindzey (1957) p130ff; Shaffer (1972) p32.

<sup>12</sup>So J.A.C. Brown (1964).

<sup>13</sup>Sane Society p70.

<sup>14</sup>Sane Society p25.

<sup>15</sup>Sane Society p23.

<sup>16</sup>Art of Loving p33.

<sup>17</sup>"Man is not a Thing" Saturday review of literature March 16, 1957 pp9-11 quoted in Schaar (1964) p37.

but must be a direct, self-involving knowledge "of" him. The theoretical knowledge of science, insofar as it objectifies human beings, sets a limit to its own power of knowing. The highest form of knowledge of a person is the union experienced in love. Objective knowledge merely clears the way for this higher subjective experience of love. Only in love may I know a person in his or her ultimate essence<sup>18</sup>.

A comparison with Augustinian theology may be helpful at this point. Augustine held that God is both eternal wisdom and eternal *caritas*. Knowledge and love are therefore intimately related to one another. The spiritual journey consists of the mutually reinforcing growth of both knowledge and love of God.<sup>19</sup> Fromm, however, is more sympathetic to the later medieval mystical path to God in which love takes priority over knowledge<sup>20</sup>. So he says: "In mysticism, which is the consequent outcome of monotheism, the attempt is given up to know God by thought, and it is replaced by the experience of union with God in which there is no more room - and no need - for knowledge *about* God."<sup>21</sup>

The view that establishing a warm, loving relationship with a person is of more significance psychologically than gaining knowledge about him, is characteristic of humanistic psychology. The strengths of this approach lies in taking seriously the other as a whole person and in attending closely to the feelings of the other. However, it may under-rate the extent to which genuine love involves a meeting of minds and engagement with the beliefs and values of the other. It tends to assume there is an underlying "natural self" who is a bundle of feelings and emotions, whilst cognitive components are a relatively superficial part of the person. Moreover, it seems to me that we must preserve an element of understanding the other, of reasoning about what it is that I find loveable in the other, so that love does not slide into mere sentimentality.

The priority Fromm gives to love over knowledge suggests an important new strategy for integrating the self. Augustine, Freud and Jung all argued, in their different ways, that becoming a whole person depends on gaining some kind of knowledge about the self, whether this be knowledge of one's place in the divine order or knowledge of one's unconscious depths. Fromm's approach suggests that the crucial thing is to develop a certain attitude to oneself. Wholeness is a matter of developing a certain quality of loving appreciation of the whole of the person, body and emotions as well as thought processes. One needs not so much to think about oneself in a certain way as to feel appropriately towards oneself. Thus humanistic therapy involves a helping relationship in which one can learn to develop a loving acceptance of the whole of oneself. Such a relationship is concerned primarily with the exploration and expression of feelings. Of course

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<sup>18</sup>Art of Loving p32.

<sup>19</sup>trin. XV.5.

<sup>20</sup>supra. Ch.2 §3.1.

<sup>21</sup>Art of Loving p32.

such an emphasis on "feeling good" about oneself can degenerate into narcissism, but it need not do, for the ability to feel appropriately towards ourselves is related to, and perhaps is even a precondition for, the ability to feel appropriately towards others.

### 3.3 Fromm and Freud

Fromm is frequently grouped together with Harry Stack Sullivan and Karen Horney as a neo-Freudian. They form the "left-wing" of the post-Freudians, in contrast to more "orthodox" developments following Melanie Klein and Anna Freud. Where the latter intensified Freud's biological and instinctual emphasis, the former lessened the emphasis on instinct, preferring to stress the influence of social and cultural forces on human nature. The term "neo-Freudian" can mislead us into over stressing the similarities between Freud and Fromm; to replace or modify Freud's instinct theory with a theory of societal influence is to remove the central plank of Freud's system. Nonetheless, Fromm was deeply influenced by Freud, frequently quoted him, and spent much of his career trying to come to terms with him.

Fromm's attempt to "place" Freud<sup>22</sup>, and hence relativise him, involved locating him and his psychology in a particular social context. Freud's *homo sexualis*, alleged Fromm, was none other than a variant on the capitalist *homo economicus*. Capitalism produced human beings who were isolated individuals requiring each other for the satisfaction of economic needs, and Freud had interpreted this situation in terms of individuals requiring each other for the satisfaction of libidinal needs. Freud's theory was not wrong as such, it was merely limited to bourgeois relations under capitalism. In view of its capitalist context, Freud's theory was naturally enough a manifestation of an economics of scarcity involving the meeting of needs, the satisfaction of "unpleasure" and the reduction of tension. Having identified this abnormal context, Fromm thought he could now offer a psychology based on the normal economics of abundance that one would find in a healthy society. Under "normal" conditions, when basic human needs were properly met, the essentially human instincts would be seen to be those of love and creativity, not sexual lust and aggression.

In his earlier work Fromm subordinated Freud's instinct theory to socio-economic factors to a high degree<sup>23</sup>. Thus he says: "In certain fundamental respects the instinctual apparatus is a biological given; but it is highly modifiable. The role of primary formative factors goes to the economic conditions."<sup>24</sup> Psychoanalysis was now reduced to being the agent of dialectical materialism: it showed the psychic mechanisms by which economic relations are transformed into ideologies.<sup>25</sup> At this early stage (1932) Fromm had merely replaced Freud's psychic determinism

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<sup>22</sup>"Freud's model of man and its social determinants" Fromm (1971a) Ch. 2.

<sup>23</sup>E.g. in "Analytic Social Psychology" (1932) given as Ch. 8 of Fromm (1971a).

<sup>24</sup>ibid. p148.

<sup>25</sup>ibid. p155.

with Marx's economic determinism. But his mature attitude was somewhat more sympathetic to Freud. Freud had correctly discerned that humanity has a nature that is not entirely the product of socio-economics, but Freud had simply, through the influence of his own economic context, mistaken this nature. Fromm, through his attention to the existential situation of humanity, had now discerned this essential nature. Thus in his 1955 The Sane Society Fromm argues that there are a range of human needs that are to a considerable extent independent of culture which a healthy human society should try to meet. Fromm does not now offer a prescription of the healthy human being derived from a Marxist understanding of healthy economic relations. Rather, by analysing the needs of human beings Fromm can offer a prescription for the healing of society.

Fromm indicates a decisive shift away from Freud's attention to the unconscious and to infant experience. Fromm dismisses the Oedipus complex as being specific merely to the culture Freud studied.<sup>26</sup> For Fromm, the family is merely the agent of the socialising forces of the wider society. Socialisation is continued especially through the economic relationships of work. It is these relations, formed publicly and consciously, not the infant's relations with his or her parents, that Fromm thinks have the largest impact on human character.<sup>27</sup>

The later Freud thought that human life is formed in the tension between the equal and opposite instincts of Eros and Thanatos. In Fromm's view, by contrast, the negative and aggressive instincts are secondary derivatives of the positive and creative instincts. Evil and destructiveness only arise when the primary potential for good and creativity is blocked. Fromm denies a naive belief in humanity's natural goodness.<sup>28</sup> Rather, his position is that destructiveness exists as a "potentiality" in man's nature.<sup>29</sup> But it is a potentiality which will not necessarily come to fruition; indeed it will only develop in the case of abnormal, pathogenic external conditions. In other words, "man is not necessarily evil, but becomes evil only if the proper conditions for growth and development are lacking."<sup>30</sup>

This, however, amounts to the same thing as an assertion of natural goodness. Fromm is not merely saying that human beings have the potential to develop in good or bad ways. He is arguing that human beings only develop evil potentials if their society is defective. Under optimal environmental conditions Fromm's human beings would be perfectly good. Fromm thus shifts all the blame for evil from the individual to forces at work in society. It is this move which, I think, marks out Fromm, and the humanists in general, most decisively from Freud and, indeed, from Jung and Augustine. Doubtless Fromm is right to draw to our attention the extent of societal

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<sup>26</sup>Fromm (1971a) p146.

<sup>27</sup>Fear of Freedom p239ff.

<sup>28</sup>Sane Society p37.

<sup>29</sup>Man for Himself p217.

<sup>30</sup>Man for Himself p218.

influence on our moral behaviour. But unless we are to assume that human beings are completely determined by their environment, and Fromm would certainly not want to say this, then we must allow at least some personal responsibility for evil.

The humanistic distinction between a "natural self" that is purely good, from acquired characteristics that may be evil, makes it difficult for us to deal properly with any aspect of our true self that we consider to have tendencies to moral error. Evil within the self cannot be "named" as such. Traditional mechanisms for dealing with sin, such as confession, repentance and forgiveness are therefore not available. We can only attempt to transfer responsibility for our own sin onto others, such as parents, whom we may claim have adversely affected our personality. Of course sometimes we are right to do this; we may be more sinned against than sinning. But there will be other occasions when we are aware of moral conflict within the self that arises from us doing things we know we ought not to do. In these cases we are, like Augustine, aware that conflict is located deep within the self. If we cannot own our morally mixed nature in these situations it seems to me that we cannot properly deal with tendencies to wrongdoing and so be restored to a proper sense of psychic unity.

### 3.4 The Self in Fromm

Fromm's analysis of the human situation, as being both within nature and yet transcending nature, leads him to propose that the human subject is defined in terms of a cluster of five basic desires or needs, which can be expressed in a healthy or a pathological form, as follows<sup>31</sup>.

Firstly, human beings have a need for relatedness. In gaining self-awareness a person perceives himself as having been torn away from nature. He is conscious of aloneness and separateness, and of the contingency of his existence in the face of death. His existential loneliness drives him towards an experience of union with other people. Such an experience is frequently achieved neurotically through relations with others that compromise the independence and integrity of the individual by introducing unhealthy dependence and inequality of power. In "masochistic" relations the individual surrenders part of himself to someone or some entity larger and more powerful than himself. In "sadistic" relations the individual gains esteem through the domination and incorporation of others. In both cases the sense of being an individual self is corrupted. By contrast, the need for relatedness may be satisfied healthily through love. Only in loving relationships do the parties retain the proper separateness and integrity of their individual selves whilst also being held in union with others. Fromm holds that the self-actualised person will be one who achieves a loving "mode of relatedness" to the world. This mode covers emotional responses to others and also, significantly, to oneself.<sup>32</sup>

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<sup>31</sup>Sane Society Ch. 3.

<sup>32</sup>Man for Himself p82ff; Art of Loving p43f.

Secondly, human beings desire transcendence from nature. In its primary manifestation the drive for transcendence is expressed in creativity, and results in cultural products such as art and religion. Through creativity human beings raise themselves above the givenness of their existence into the realm of purposefulness and freedom. If the drive for transcendence is frustrated it may be expressed in destructiveness.

Yet, thirdly, human beings retain a need for rootedness in nature. This is expressed in the infant as an attachment to the mother and then later as an attachment to the natural family or race, and to the land. When this desire is fully realised it leads to an experience of oneness with the world, with all people and with the divine. But if frustrated it leads to racism and nationalism.

Fourthly, human beings are driven by the need to establish a sense of identity. Fromm holds that a proper sense of identity is gained only through the subject's direct experiencing of himself as the bearer of his own powers. "The sense of self stems from the experience of myself as the subject of *my* experiences, *my* thought, *my* feeling, *my* decision, *my* judgement, *my* action..."<sup>33</sup>. If the need for identity is frustrated an individual may attempt to define himself in terms of some socio-economic role. But playing a role, says, Fromm, demotes the individual from the status of a person to a mere thing. "*Things* have no self and men who have become things can have no self."<sup>34</sup>

Finally, human beings have a desire to find meaning. They try to locate themselves within the wider order of reality and to find an appropriate object of devotion. Fromm thinks that primitive expressions of this desire lead to irrational religions and objects of devotion that impede humanity's development, whilst mature expressions are characterised by their rationality and their personal psychological benefit.

The self as subject thus comprises five primary desires. The person realises himself insofar as these desires are properly satisfied. Fromm's self is orientated towards the future. It is firmly located in the domain of consciousness, the realm of the Freudian ego. The primitive, "animal" desires of the Freudian id are not Fromm's major concern, for these are not, in his view, what account for the distinctiveness of the human being. We might observe that Fromm's self is defined in quite different terms from the Jungian Self. The former is realised through action in the interpersonal world, whilst the latter emerges through attentiveness to the promptings of the unconscious.

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<sup>33</sup>Sane Society p143.

<sup>34</sup>Sane Society p143.



Fromm thinks that modern people are trapped in a vicious circle that erodes the sense of self. Under capitalism a person is alienated from his work, from others and from himself. Primary economic relations encourage a dissociation between the sense of identity (self as object) and the true self (self as subject). In his lostness, a person may sacrifice a genuine sense of identity for the security of belonging to a larger group<sup>35</sup>. The person now starts to act in obedience to some external authority, carrying out actions which are not authentically his, but belong to a role that he has been ordered to carry out.<sup>36</sup> These lead eventually to the replacement of the original self-identity by a pseudo-self (analogous to Jung's "persona"). The pseudo-self is only an agent who represents the role a person is supposed to play.<sup>37</sup> Having lost the correspondence between self-identity and true self the person now feels even more alienated from himself. He tries to make up for this by striving even harder to conform to the group, thereby becoming increasingly alienated from the true self.

For Fromm the task of therapy is to recover the true self from its alienated state. Fromm thus conceives the process of psychoanalysis quite differently from Freud. It is primarily concerned with work on the conscious self, not with the repressed unconscious. For example, the importance of free association for Fromm is not - as Freud held - that it allows expression of unconscious contents that had been repressed by the ego, but that it allows the ego to express itself free of societal pressure.<sup>38</sup> In the privacy of the psychoanalytic encounter the person can truly be him or herself. In psychoanalysis the analysand "tells the truth", not in the sense that he confesses the hidden contents of the mind, but that he produces something that is not adapted to what others expect him to say.

For Fromm, one is truly and authentically oneself when one is at one's most spontaneous. One realises one's self through "spontaneous activity"<sup>39</sup>. Such behaviour is undertaken of one's own free will, is unforced, and is not "the uncritical adoption of patterns suggested from the outside"<sup>40</sup>. Fromm thinks that those who best exemplify spontaneous behaviour are the artist and the small child. These people, he suggests, are able to think and feel what is really *theirs*.

Fromm's concern with spontaneity may be illuminated by seeing it within the tradition of thought that we have called "expressivism" and which may be traced back through the Romantic period and ultimately to Rousseau<sup>41</sup>. On this account our primary sense of "significance" for living is held to come not from moral or rational norms disclosed in society but from the expression of our

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<sup>35</sup>Fear of Freedom p116.

<sup>36</sup>Fear of Freedom p177.

<sup>37</sup>Fear of Freedom p177.

<sup>38</sup>Fear of Freedom p177n.

<sup>39</sup>Fear of Freedom p219ff.

<sup>40</sup>Fear of Freedom p223.

<sup>41</sup>*supra* Ch. 2 §3.3.

own natural selves. If we see ourselves in this way then spontaneity may be understood as providing a crucial enclave where we can be free of societal norms and be truly ourselves. Spontaneous action frees us from the expectations of others and allows us to give genuine expression to our own feelings. The artist is, *par excellence*, the person who is able to give creative expression to his own feelings. He is in touch with himself, and *is* himself, in a way that those who are merely fulfilling productive roles within the socio-economic system are not. Spontaneity tends to oppose conscious role-playing, for often doing what comes naturally is different from doing what conforms to the expectations of others.

Here Fromm helpfully articulates and develops one important component of our modern identity: our sense of significance comes from within ourselves and we feel particularly in touch with ourselves when we are being spontaneous. However, I think he tends to over-estimate the extent to which spontaneity necessarily grants us freedom from external authorities and groups. He fails to realise just how far *all* our thinking and acting takes place within a communal context and some authoritative tradition. For example, the analysand associating freely is still using a form of language learned from others. Moreover, he does not appreciate that in some situations being spontaneous and playing a role amount to the same thing. The analysand who associates freely thereby meets the expectations of the analyst. He is being authentically himself at the same time that he is playing a role.

It is important not to expect too much from the notion of spontaneity and to appreciate that some forms of spontaneity are better than others. Children may be spontaneously nice or spontaneously horrible. The spontaneity of the child is not something we should encourage in adults simply because part of its attractiveness lies in its immaturity. Desirable adult spontaneity is a quality that has been acquired through certain kinds of habitual behaviour. The spontaneity of the great artist is one that has been disciplined through practice in such a way that its expression leads to the production of beautiful art. The saint may, likewise, learn by habitual practice to be spontaneously good. By contrast the S.S. guard may have learned to be spontaneously nasty. All of which is to say that the notion of spontaneity cannot be completely separated from moral judgements. Spontaneity is not, as Fromm can sometimes indicate, desirable in itself, but is only desirable when given appropriate expression within some moral framework.

## **4. Abraham Maslow**

### **4.1 Maslow's Life and Work**

Abraham Maslow (1908-1970) was an American psychologist and philosopher who is best known for his Self-Actualisation theory of psychology. Maslow studied psychology at the University of Wisconsin and Gestalt Psychology at the New School for Social Research in New York. He spent some time at Columbia Teachers College before joining the faculty of Brooklyn College in New

York City in 1937. In 1951 he was appointed head of the psychology department at Brandeis University Massachusetts where he remained until 1969. Together with Carl Rogers, Rollo May and Charlotte Bühler, Maslow founded the American Association of Humanistic Psychology in 1962. He is now widely regarded as the intellectual father of humanistic psychology. Maslow was made president of the American Psychological Association in 1967-68. His ideas have been influential in the USA and internationally through the counselling and human potential movements, as well as through educational, business and management practice.

Maslow's major works are Motivation and Personality (1954 and 1970) and Towards a Psychology of Being (1962). Towards the end of his life he became interested in Trans-Personal psychology, what he called "the fourth force" in psychology. In 1969, having moved to California and developed links with the Esalen Institute, he helped found the Journal of Transpersonal Psychology (JTP). Papers he wrote in this area were published posthumously as Towards the Farther Reaches of Human Nature. However, I note the psychologist Paul Vitz's comment that the transpersonal discussions of spiritual experience and consciousness raising in JTP constitute a whole new realm of discourse that bears little relation to humanistic psychology or indeed to modern psychology as it is generally conceived<sup>42</sup>, and I do not consider these late explorations of Maslow here.

#### 4.2 Maslow's Approach and Intellectual Influences

Maslow was concerned to develop a psychological description of human nature, particularly in its motivational and ethical aspects. One of the major differences that marks out Maslow from the earlier psychologists of this century is that he believed such a description must be based primarily on a study of the healthiest examples of humanity. Maslow felt that psychology had been mistaken in focusing its researches on neurotic and sick individuals. He felt that if one wanted to learn about the full range of human attributes, including the brighter elements of human nature, such as love, joy and creativity, one must start with the healthiest human specimens. One might then learn what it was that contributed to the health of these individuals and hence what the neurotic individuals lacked.<sup>43</sup>

Maslow followed an iterative method for defining the characteristics of mental health as follows. He proposed a crude definition of psychological health and then found a large set of subjects who seemed to meet the definition. He applied a range of standard tests to his subjects, eliminating those subjects who did not attain to the highest levels of psychological performance. The remaining subjects were interviewed to sharpen the definition of health. The revised definition was then used to generate tests for health that could be used to eliminate a further proportion of

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<sup>42</sup>Vitz (1994) p118f.

<sup>43</sup>Motivation p180.

subjects. By this technique Maslow arrived both at a working definition of psychological health, or normal human nature, and a small set of subjects, self-actualisers, who exemplified his definition. Much of Maslow's writing is a description either of the needs that he has discovered must be met for a person to become a self-actualiser or of the characteristics of self-actualising life as a guide to normal human behaviour.

Maslow defends his method as *scientific*, according to his generous definition of science as "a search for truth, insight, and understanding, and as a concern with important questions"<sup>44</sup>. He does, however, recognise that it is hard for him to meet two standard requirements of scientific work, namely repeatability and public access to his clinical data - most of his subjects supplied data confidentially. We might, more importantly, press the objection that he provides insufficient control against personal and cultural biases. He chooses many of his subjects from his own friends and acquaintances. The public and historical self-actualisers he lists number a suspiciously high proportion of Americans and the great majority are 'Western'.<sup>45</sup> It is more accurate to suggest that Maslow's self-actualiser does not so much give us an objective standard of mental health as a culturally conditioned, if widely influential, ideal.

Maslow claims his work is the synthesis of three intellectual influences<sup>46</sup>:

- i) The "functionalism" of James and Dewey
- ii) The holism of Gestalt psychology
- iii) The dynamism of the psycho-analytic school (Freud, Jung, Adler, Horney, Fromm, Reich).

i) By "functionalism" I take it that Maslow means the notion that human beings are true to their nature insofar as they act or function in characteristically human ways. If I am right then he stands in a tradition going back far beyond James to Plato. His specific debt to James lies not so much in "functionalism" but rather in a pragmatic approach to scientific enquiry. Maslow follows James in believing that science should be directed towards those areas that potentially yield the most benefits, rather than those which best exemplify a particular understanding of scientific method<sup>47</sup>. Perhaps Maslow's most important debt to Dewey is the latter's attempt to establish a morality based on the observed facts of human nature.<sup>48</sup> Like Dewey, Maslow felt that morality must be pragmatically based on what human beings are like, rather than on some externally imposed code of what they ought to be like. However, there are two notable differences between the approaches of Dewey and Maslow. Where Dewey was more interested in the social factors

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<sup>44</sup>Motivation p14

<sup>45</sup>Motivation p152

<sup>46</sup>Motivation p35

<sup>47</sup>Motivation Ch. 2: "Problem centring vs. means centring in science"

<sup>48</sup>Dewey (1922) p12

determining behaviour Maslow focused on instinct, and where Dewey scorned teleological accounts of human nature Maslow's psychology made teleology central.<sup>49</sup>

ii) The Gestalt movement in psychology dates back to work done by Wertheimer, Koffka and Köhler prior to the first World War<sup>50</sup>. This movement was originally concerned with perception, suggesting that people learn figures through recognition of the figure as a whole rather than by building it up from its parts. Maslow broadens the idea of Gestalt from the realm of perception to the personality in general. From Gestalt psychology Maslow draws the notion that the individual is an organised, integrated whole. It follows that a person's needs cannot be considered in isolation from who the person is in him or herself. Thus Maslow says, "when John Smith is hungry, he is hungry all over; he is different as an individual from what he is at other times."<sup>51</sup> This is a powerful idea that is of central importance to humanistic psychology.

iii) From the psychodynamic tradition Maslow claims to derive the notion that a person is not only what he appears to be on the surface, but also comprises unrealised potentialities that are in the process of "becoming". Psychoanalysis gives his thought what Maslow claims is its "dynamic" character. However, Maslow's claim to be influenced by psychodynamics must be heavily qualified. He hardly refers to the unconscious at all: there is, for example, no entry under "unconscious" in the index to Motivation and Personality. Moreover Maslow retains little of the psychic tension and conflict characteristic of Freud's psychodynamics. Insofar as Maslow is influenced by psychodynamics it is generally only in the so-called neo-Freudian form exemplified by Fromm.

Maslow fuses Gestalt and psychodynamic theory into what he calls a "holistic-dynamic" view of human nature. At his most ambitious Maslow seems to suggest that he has thereby updated Aristotle's teleology; thus he says: "I suppose that if I had to put into a single phrase the contrast between the Aristotelian theory and the [humanistic] theory...I would maintain that we can see not only what man is, but what he may become...We know better what lies hidden in man..."<sup>52</sup> But this is much too grand a claim. For, on the one hand, Aristotle's theory was about nothing if not "becoming" and, on the other hand, Maslow's psychology hardly reveals anything that is "hidden" in human beings in the manner of orthodox Freudianism.

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<sup>49</sup>Dewey p224 describes ultimate ends such as "perfection or self-realisation" as "a view foisted by Aristotle upon Western culture and endured for two thousand years". Instead he says (p232): "Ends are, in fact, literally endless, forever coming into existence as new activities occasion new consequences."

<sup>50</sup>See Hall and Lindzey (1957) p299.

<sup>51</sup>Motivation p20

<sup>52</sup>Motivation p271.

If "holistic-dynamism" represents an advance, we might suggest, less ambitiously, that where Gestalt therapy focuses on a realisation of wholeness in the immediate present of the individual, Maslow charts a growth into wholeness that takes into account needs in the individual's past, present and future. Where psychodynamic theory concentrates on primitive instincts Maslow returns to Aristotle in emphasising that the higher aspects of human nature must be taken into account if human beings are to realise themselves. Overall the methods of pragmatic enquiry enable Maslow to elucidate those higher and most distinctively human aspects which other modern (though not ancient) psychological schools had neglected.

### 4.3 Maslow's Theory of Motivation

Maslow takes it that human beings have an essential psychological structure that can be treated and discussed analogously to their physical structure. This structure consists of genetically based needs, capacities and tendencies. These needs are good, or at least neutral, and not evil. Normal and desirable development consists in actualising this nature, which is to say fulfilling the needs. However, whereas in animals the instincts are strong, humanity is characterised by the weakness of its instincts. The good instincts are therefore easily obscured and overridden by the demands of society. The task of the psychologist is to uncover humanity's essential instinctual nature, and this will best be done with reference to those who are our healthiest specimens, those for whom all the needs have been properly articulated and met.<sup>53</sup>

Maslow thus identifies what he considers a set of "basic needs" that characterise humanity. Moreover, by analysing these needs he concludes that some are more "prepotent" than others. That is to say, he finds that if a fundamental need is left unmet it comes to dominate the whole of a person's thinking and acting to the exclusion of all the other needs. A person who is hungry, for example, is so driven by the need to find food that the whole of the self is united by and identified with the need. Once this need is fully or even partially met other needs begin to present themselves. Human behaviour is now motivated by fulfilling these slightly less fundamental needs. The tendency for a more fundamental needs to dominate the person if it is not met leads to the postulation of a "hierarchy" of needs, which Maslow concludes has seven elements<sup>54</sup>:

1. Physiological needs for food, drink and sex.
2. Safety needs such as security, structure, law and order.
3. Belongingness and love needs such as friendship, affection, and a sense of rootedness.
4. Esteem needs such as achievement and confidence, status and dominance.
5. Cognitive needs for knowledge and understanding.
6. Aesthetic needs for beauty and art.

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<sup>53</sup>Motivation Ch. 6 and summary on p273.

<sup>54</sup>Motivation Ch. 4

7. The need for self-actualisation.

At each level of psychic functioning, thinks Maslow, behaviour is motivated by fulfilling unmet needs. However, the seventh type of need, self-actualisation, is different in kind from the other six. It refers not to needs which must be met from the wider environment, but to the need the individual has to express whatever is inside him or her self. It is the desire "to become everything that one is capable of becoming"<sup>55</sup>. At the highest level of functioning the individual is not involved in drawing on external resources but in producing from within the self. The first six levels are states of deprivation of various kinds whilst the seventh level is a state of abundance. Like Fromm, Maslow says that the highest level of functioning, or - what is the same - of psychic health, is exemplified by the artist<sup>56</sup>. However, unlike Fromm, he thinks that this highest level of functioning is generally not achieved by children.<sup>57</sup> Maslow's self-actualiser is not simply someone who can spontaneously express what is within but someone who has "grown" to the point where this expression is held by others to be of value.

The theory as it stands has two obvious problems. Firstly, it fails to account for certain kinds of self-discipline. What of the artist who lacks food or friends yet is not distracted from working at his or her craft into meeting these lower level needs? Maslow is able to remedy this problem by observing that people who have had their basic needs properly satisfied at an early stage of their development are then able to function, if necessary, in conditions where there is relative deprivation of the lower level goods. Thus an artist might be able to survive quite happily with little esteem or friendship from others if he already has a high degree of emotional resilience and self-confidence. Psychologically healthy people are not, as Freud thought, ultimately motivated by basic needs, but are freed to pursue the higher goal of self-actualisation.

The second problem arises when Maslow makes the concept of self-actualisation stand for both psychological health and the end-point of human psychological growth. When Maslow notes that children cannot be self-actualisers does this mean that they cannot be psychologically healthy? We surely have to take the self-actualisation concept to stand for the end-point of human growth and *not* for psychological health. In Maslow's scheme, psychic health would now have to be something like the achievement of as high a level of growth as is consistent with one's physiological development.

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<sup>55</sup>Motivation p46

<sup>56</sup>Motivation p148.

<sup>57</sup>Motivation p150.

#### 4.4 The Concept of Self-Actualisation

Maslow identified some 15 characteristics of self-actualising people, which may be summarised as follows<sup>58</sup>:

- In relation to themselves they are spontaneous, self-accepting, in touch with their own feelings and freely creative.
- In relation to other people, they are capable of achieving deep relationships with a few, and towards humanity in general they have a warm, benevolent, democratic attitude similar to the "brotherly love" described by Fromm. Nonetheless, they remain essentially detached from others; they guard their privacy and resist conformity.
- In relation to the world, self-actualisers clearly distinguish objective reality from human projection onto reality. We might say they have a scientific outlook or, in Freud's terms, that they have moved successfully from motivation by the pleasure principle to the reality principle.
- In relation to the transcendent, they are capable of mystical or spiritual "peak" experiences, though these are not necessarily of a traditionally religious nature.

As I have already indicated, this description is of less interest as an "objective" measure of mental health than as providing a concise description of a cultural ideal. The widespread popular acceptance of Maslow's views indicates that the goods he talks of are generally highly prized within American and Western European societies. They may be regarded as criteria for a fulfilled life in our contemporary, Western, capitalist context.<sup>59</sup>

What is more noticeable in Maslow's psychology than in Fromm's is serious reference to ends beyond oneself. The self-actualiser refrains from deep commitments of any sort, whether to people or to God. One of the leading characteristics of self-actualisers is their independence of culture and environment. Self-actualisers "do not need others in the ordinary sense"<sup>60</sup>. Even in the closest partner relationships "one has the feeling that they enjoy each other tremendously but would take philosophically a long separation or death"<sup>61</sup>. The self-actualiser's "peak experience" is not a high point in the continuing relationship with a personal God but a purely self-related moment of aesthetic wonderment of which Maslow says: "It is quite important to dissociate this experience from any theological or supernatural reference"<sup>62</sup>. This does not square well with our common experience that the best examples of humanity (as well, admittedly, as some of the worst) have been those who have been committed to some higher goal, whether the service of others, the service of some ideal or the service of God.

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<sup>58</sup>Motivation Ch. 11.

<sup>59</sup>Whether one regards a high-level of psychological adjustment to such a society as a sign of health or sickness is a further question, not considered by Maslow.

<sup>60</sup>Motivation p161.

<sup>61</sup>Motivation p199.

<sup>62</sup>Motivation p164.



Maslow would derive our ethical systems from a study of the self-actualisers. Maslow argues that, if human beings are essentially good, then those examples of humanity who have developed as healthily as possible, when behaving in as unconstrained a way as possible, will provide us with reliable guidelines for ethical action. He proposes that we derive our values not from reasoning about the human condition, still less by reference to divine commandments, but by "observing whatever our best specimens choose, and then assuming that these are the highest values for all mankind"<sup>63</sup>.

However, I am not convinced that such a procedure, which allows no place for deliberation about generally agreed maxims, can be adequate. It cannot, for example, deal properly with examples of behaviour that are generally regarded as good and yet which do not conform to the kind of life exemplified by the self-actualisers. Martyrdom for the sake of truth is a case in point. Maslow is unwilling to grant such an act any special ethical value. According to his theory there is no difference in principle between someone who risks his life for food, thus satisfying his hunger need, and someone who risks his life for the truth, thus satisfying some range of higher needs.<sup>64</sup> Indeed, if all human behaviour merely reflects personal fulfilment of needs there is, as Maslow himself observes, really no difference between eating something myself and watching someone else eat, for these two activities merely give me pleasure at a lower or a higher need level<sup>65</sup>. Such an argument might soothe the consciences of the opulent but is unlikely to convince the hungry.

Maslow offers a rather different vision for what is involved in unifying the self from older, ethically-based ideals such as Augustine's. According to Maslow's view, the Augustinian denigration of bodily needs in favour of obligations to others actually poses a threat to the unity of the self. For if I do not attend first to my own lower level needs then I am not genuinely able to meet those social demands which correspond to my own higher level needs. For most of us, our identity is likely to be formed by some synthesis of Augustine's and Maslow's positions. We will recognise the importance of fulfilling our own needs, yet we will also be aware of duties to others which seem to exist independently of our own needs and which, from time to time, demand that our own needs be set aside. One way of drawing together the two models, admittedly a way which grants a higher value to the Augustinian view, is by means of a distinction between an "*ordo bonorum*" and the Augustinian *ordo caritatis*<sup>66</sup>.

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<sup>63</sup>Being p169.

<sup>64</sup>Motivation p101.

<sup>65</sup>Motivation p101.

<sup>66</sup>I owe the distinction between the *ordo bonorum* and the higher moral *ordo caritatis* to Browning (1991 p160ff) who himself follows the Catholic moral theologian Louis Janssens.

We might suggest that Maslow's description of the self-actualiser is valuable, not so much at the level of ethics, but in articulating the range of what we might call "pre-moral" goods, or those goods belonging to the *ordo bonorum*. Premoral goods are not directly moral goods because we do not attribute to them moral qualities as such. But we do see them as objects or experiences that are good to pursue. Some of these goods, such as food and shelter, derive solely from our nature as human beings. Others, such as the need for autonomy, are shaped by culture. Maslow's work helps to clarify the order of such goods. Some goods are more urgent or "prepotent" than others; for example, health must be restored and bodies fed before learning can proceed. But these premoral goods are not good or evil in themselves. Too little food is evil as is too much food. My self-esteem may be a moral good, but it may be a moral evil if purchased at someone else's humiliation. Maslow's list is not the last word in defining the range of premoral goods. He may be wrong, for example, to suggest that food is more fundamental than love, for a baby requires a mother's love before anything else and receives food only as a consequence of this: if the newborn baby is not picked up and cared for by the mother it will quickly die<sup>67</sup>. Nonetheless, his hierarchy of needs has achieved a certain paradigmatic significance as a starting point for defining the premoral goods.

In order to move from the realm of psychological description to ethics, this range of goods must be placed within a higher moral order, for example an Augustinian *ordo caritatis*. This order defines how the premoral goods are to be loved and distributed. The *ordo caritatis* requires that we love our neighbours as ourselves and above material possessions, and that we grant more love to God than to anything else. Goods are therefore to be distributed on the principle of equal regard and individuals are to be encouraged to act sacrificially to restore equality of regard where it is lacking. On these grounds my needs may legitimately be satisfied to the point where this is consistent with the endeavour to meet my neighbour's needs. Risking my life for the truth, where the question of my love for God and the just treatment of many others may be at stake, is now clearly seen as of higher moral worth than risking my life for my own food, where only my love of self is at stake. Similarly, my own self-esteem may be obtained ethically to the point where it is consistent with the esteem I grant to others but not where I seek more esteem than my neighbours. Contemporary attempts to unify the self may, perhaps, require to pay attention both to an *ordo bonorum* which expresses our natural needs and to an *ordo caritatis* which sets these needs in a broader moral context.

## **5. Carl Rogers**

### **5.1 Rogers' Life and Work**

Carl Rogers was born in 1902 in Chicago, the fourth of six children. He came from a family that could trace its ancestry back 300 years within America. Rogers was not, then, a recent European

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<sup>67</sup>So Vitz (1994) p38.

emigrant, like many of his colleagues in the world of American psychology, but from a family deeply identified with the culture of Midwestern America. When Rogers was 12 his family moved to a large farm 30 miles west of Chicago. Reflecting on the move later, Rogers saw it as motivated by two different factors. Firstly, his father, a successful and prosperous businessman, wanted a farm for a hobby, but Carl came to believe that a second and more important reason was a desire on the part of his parents to protect their children from the "temptations" of suburban city life.<sup>68</sup> Rogers describes his family in the following terms: "I was brought up in a home marked by close family ties, a very strict and uncompromising religious and ethical atmosphere, and what amounted to a worship of the virtue of hard work. My parents...were in many subtle and affectionate ways, very controlling of our behaviour. It was assumed...that we were different from other people...We had good times together within the family, but we did not mix. So I was a pretty solitary boy."<sup>69</sup> Rogers' family embodied the traditional values and close family ties of conservative, Puritan, American religion.

In due course Rogers left home to study Agriculture at the University of Wisconsin. However, he felt a calling to Christian ministry and changed his course to History which he felt would give him a better preparation for ordination. At the age of 20, four years after the close of World War I, he was chosen to attend a World Student Christian Federation conference in Peking. This conference involved a six month tour and marked a watershed in Rogers' personal and spiritual development. To begin with his friendship with Helen Elliot blossomed into a deeply felt romance conducted by letter. He also experienced the constant company of an intelligent and stimulating group of peers. And lastly, he was brought face to face with the power and hostility of rival national feelings. Rogers recalls: "This was a most important experience for me...I saw how bitterly the French and Germans still hated each other...I was forced to realise... that very sincere and honest people could believe in very different religious doctrines. In major ways I for the first time emancipated myself from the religious thinking of my parents... Looking back on it, I believe that here, more than at any other one time, I became an independent person."<sup>70</sup> Rogers' experience that, through the supportive relationship of his peers, and especially through his relationship with Helen, he was enabled to throw off the constricting religious values that his parents had imposed on him, was to be of central importance to his later counselling theory and practice.

Having completing his studies at Wisconsin Rogers was accepted to train for ordained ministry at Union Theological Seminary in New York City. But Rogers came to feel deeply unhappy at the prospect of being *required* to believe a particular religious doctrine. After two years study he abandoned his vocation to the ministry and continued his studies across the road at Columbia Teachers College where he now decided to train as a psychologist. He was appointed as a

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<sup>68</sup>Becoming a Person p6.

<sup>69</sup>Becoming a Person p5.

<sup>70</sup>Becoming a Person p7.

counsellor at Rochester Clinic New York, a post which offered him the opportunity to work out his own, distinctive, non-directive approach to counselling. He moved via a teaching position in psychology at Ohio State University to Chicago University, where he was invited to initiate and direct a student counselling centre. His final university appointment was a rather unhappy post at Wisconsin, where he found that his counselling methods met with only modest success when used with seriously disturbed clients and where his work did not gain the respect of his fellow psychologists and psychiatrists. In 1963 he left the university system, moved to California and became closely involved with the Encounter Group movement. Towards the end of his life, and stimulated not least by Christian attacks on his work, he became increasingly hostile towards Christianity, regarding it as essentially hostile to human nature and caught up in guilt-inducing judgmentalism.

Rogers' theory was deeply related to his life experience: escape from traditional religion, disillusion with academic psychology and academia in general, and the finding of peace and wholeness in therapeutic relationships.

Rogers wrote 12 books and 200 articles. His work has been translated into 12 languages. He has been hugely influential. A survey of American therapists carried out by the journal American Psychologist revealed him as, for them, the most influential figure in twentieth-century psychotherapy, surpassing even Freud.<sup>71</sup> In Britain, the British Association for Counselling, which is dedicated to a basically Rogerian framework for counselling, now numbers some 13,000 members. Yet he is generally held in low esteem by academic psychologists, a fact of which Rogers himself was keenly aware<sup>72</sup>. The British counsellor Brian Thorne sums up his influence nicely: "It may be that Rogers and client-centred therapy are looked at askance in academia and in some professional circles but in countless self-help groups, in counselling skills courses in colleges, churches and evening institutes, in human relations programmes within educational and institutional settings, it will be more often than not the work of Rogers which underpins the enterprise."<sup>73</sup>

## 5.2 Rogers' Psychological Theory

In general Rogers professed a dislike for theory and claimed that his own writing was grounded directly on the practical experience of his extensive clinical work. The theoretical elements of his work are effectively a synthesis of Maslow's self-actualisation theory with certain existential themes and some "self theory" that is original to Rogers.

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<sup>71</sup>Kirschenbaum and Henderson 1990a pxiii.

<sup>72</sup>ibid. See also Rogers attack on academic psychology in American Psychologist May 1973 p379ff and the later reply to Rogers by Hans Strupp in American Psychologist August 1976 p561ff under the combative title: "Clinical Psychology, Irrationalism and the Erosion of Excellence".

<sup>73</sup>Thorne (1992) p78.

Rogers' scheme has three principal components: the *organism*, which is the total individual; the *phenomenal field*, which is the totality of the individual's experience; and the *self*, which is a differentiated portion of the phenomenal field and consists of a pattern of conscious perceptions and values of the "I" or "me". Rogers frequently refers to the first of these as the "organismic self", with the sense of self-as-subject, and to the third element as the "self-concept", with the sense of self-as-object. Rogers holds that the organismic self is motivated by the sole criterion of realising or actualising itself. This self-as-subject is relatively uninfluenced by the environment. The self-concept, on the other hand, is formed by the interaction of the individual with the environment. It may introject values from the environment which distort its perception of the organismic self and which impede the latter's actualisation. The goal of therapy is to align the self-concept with the organismic self so as to maximise the conditions for self-actualisation. We may compare Fromm's notion of aligning the self-identity with the true self.

Rogers holds that the person operates within his or her own uniquely perceived field of experience. This field includes perceptions of both the self and the external world. The perceptual field can only be known in any genuine or complete sense by the person themselves. The person reacts to this field and not to reality itself. Whatever he thinks is true forms his subjective reality, and it is this subjective reality not any supposedly objective state of affairs that determines how the person behaves. Rogers' radical subjectivism undercuts objective psychological approaches to the person, whether of a behavioural or psychoanalytic kind, which rely on empirical, scientific descriptions. For, according to Rogers, in human psychology "there is no such thing as scientific knowledge. There are only individual perceptions of what appears to each person to be such knowledge."<sup>74</sup> It follows that the only valid kind of knowledge about the self is the knowledge that the person himself brings. Self-knowledge is a matter of the person-reflecting clearly and accurately upon himself without contamination from external values. The role of the counsellor is limited to providing the conditions under which the client can attain to an undistorted self-knowledge and self-love.

According to Rogers the organism is motivated by a single drive which is "to actualise, maintain and enhance"<sup>75</sup> itself. In the absence of parental and societal values the organismic self would develop healthily and behave in a totally unconstrained way. However, in the course of growing up the child forms a concept of itself which is a compromise between the real organismic self and the expectations of family and society. The child will then attempt to disown aspects of the organismic self that do not conform to the self-concept. Suppose, to quote one of Rogers examples, that a little boy torments his sister and is punished by his parents. He may react to this

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<sup>74</sup>Rogers "A Theory of therapy, personality and interpersonal relationships" (1959) quoted in Thorne p42.

<sup>75</sup>Client Centred Therapy p487.

situation by telling himself "I do not like to tease my sister", thereby denying his real feelings. The child then internalises the conflict between the spurious, introjected values of the parents and his own "true" values. The more the infant is made to take on the parents' values the higher the level of self-division. Rogers recommends instead that parents should accept the natural values of the child, though not necessarily approving of them. In this way the child can develop "a soundly structured self in which there is neither denial nor distortion of experience"<sup>76</sup>.

The aim of therapy is to enable clients to re-adjust the self-concept so that it reflects a true appreciation of the self. Through the warm, accepting, non-judgmental attitude of the counsellor the client is enabled to explore and own feelings and aspects of behaviour that had previously been denied. The counsellor's main function is to listen. He can contribute no information or knowledge since "the best vantage point for understanding behaviour is from the internal frame of reference of the individual himself."<sup>77</sup> The client learns to replace harsh, static, introjected values with natural, flexible values deriving from his own organismic self. An external value system is thus replaced by an internal valuing process. One's values are now continually modified to reflect new experiences that contribute to one's self-actualisation. The result is psychic autonomy and a completely individualised value system. Rogers describes the healthy ideal as a "fully-functional" person. Such a person is characterised by an increasing openness to their own experience, the ability to live fully in the present, a trust in their own intuition as a guide to action, a high degree of autonomy and a freedom from conventional norms.<sup>78</sup>

### 5.3 The Significance of Rogers

Rogers' theory is open to numerous objections as follows.

1. Freudians, Jungians and Augustinian Christians are united in their view that Rogers' insistence on the original goodness of human beings simply fails to square with the facts of human experience. Even the psychologist Rollo May, who stands broadly within the humanistic psychological tradition, commented to Rogers that "the issue of evil - or, rather, the issue of not confronting evil...is the most important error in the humanist movement."<sup>79</sup> No-one who has ever brought up small children could reasonably suppose that selfishness is not at least as natural a part of our make-up as benevolence.

2. As I commented with regard to Fromm, the suggestion that the deep self is pure goodness leads to problems in naming, owning and dealing with the darker parts of the self.

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<sup>76</sup>Client Centred Therapy p503.

<sup>77</sup>Client Centred Therapy p494.

<sup>78</sup>Becoming a Person p184ff.

<sup>79</sup>"Open Letter to Rogers" quoted in Ed. Kirschenbaum 1990b p240.

3. The notion of an "essential" organismic self that has its own (benign) values quite independently of the (harmful) values of society does not match our experience of the process of moral education. Ethical values are acquired and learned in communities not by mere introspection.<sup>80</sup>

4. The rather artificial relationship envisaged in pure Rogerian counselling promises more in terms of "becoming a person" than it can deliver. The essence of an encounter between persons is a sharing of perspectives, values, and frames of reference<sup>81</sup>. Yet in Rogerian counselling the client encounters only his own frame of reference. There is no "I-thou" relationship, merely a self-confirming reflection of the I. The client gains the impression that he is being accepted by another, when he is merely learning to accept himself. If following the therapeutic encounter the client now has doubts about his own worthiness he has no firm grounds for self-acceptance. Rogerian counselling does not so much produce *persons*, securely constituted by I-thou relationships, as *individuals* related only to themselves. A Rogerian counselling relationship may well have definite therapeutic benefits, perhaps mainly because it provides a safe place where feelings and thoughts can be expressed without fear of rejection. But it is only a parody of real encounters with others and cannot substitute for the real acceptance conferred, for example, by a friend.

5. Rogers assumes that clients are the only source of reliable self-knowledge. He has no mechanisms for bringing to light unconscious knowledge nor of dealing with self-deceit. Our common experience is that we sometimes need to see ourselves as others see us before we can accurately know ourselves.

Yet, despite the weaknesses of his theory, Rogers ideas have taken hold in a remarkable way. Rogerian counselling is, as Rogers was fond of saying, "an idea whose time has come"<sup>82</sup>, and it is worth reflecting why this should be so.

Rogers' own life, geographically symbolised by his journey from the American mid-West via a liberal education in New York and thence to California, has a paradigmatic significance in twentieth century Western culture. Growing up in a strict religious atmosphere, rebelling against the parental religion, learning tolerance and self-acceptance, and searching for some kind of self-chosen ethical basis for life independent of Christianity have been and to some extent still are culturally typical experiences. Rogers offers a means of coping in the absence of the traditional supports of family, community and faith. His central values of self-choice and personal autonomy are highly consonant with late twentieth century capitalism. The popular influence of his work in contrast to its low academic standing reflects a perception that academic psychology, and perhaps academia in general, fails to answer the questions people are asking. His suggestion that each of

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<sup>80</sup>So MacIntyre (1988) and cf. Kohlberg (1976) p50.

<sup>81</sup>Following Martin Buber; see, for example, Buber's comments in Ed. Kirschenbaum 1990b Ch.

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<sup>82</sup>E.g. American Psychologist No. 29 p116 Carl Rogers "In Retrospect: 46 years".

us may supply our own values reflects a society where common values systems are breaking down. Finally, his stress on the significance of the individual and of personal experience, answers to the needs of people who feel increasingly anonymous and unsure of themselves in a fragmented world.

## **6. Summary**

Against the deconstruction of the self by the postmodernists, the humanists offer many important and positive ways of defending and commending the concept of the self. Their insistence on a holistic approach to psychology provides an antidote to the dissecting techniques of conventional science. They suggest that we have a whole self that is more than the sum of its parts. This self may only be properly known through loving relationship, not through analysis. They testify to an essential self that is more than the product of social forces and that has the capability of realising itself in unique and creative ways. The humanistic psychologists give us ways of taking the higher elements of human nature seriously, showing that these do not have to be reduced to manifestations of primitive instincts. They testify to the sacredness of personal experience. They define and conceptualise for us the basic needs that must be satisfied if our full humanity is to be actualised. They are respectful of personal autonomy and the uniqueness of the individual. Humanistic counselling provides us with a safe place where feelings may be explored and where we may try to develop an appropriate attitude towards ourselves. The widespread acceptance of humanistic psychology in education, social work and pastoral care suggests that its values ring true in contemporary experience.

Humanistic psychology offers us the possibility of unifying the self under the project of self-actualisation. The stress it places on self-love and self-realisation seem relevant to a culture in which narcissistic neuroses prevail. However, my main criticism of it is that it lacks depth and weight. Its refusal to take evil seriously means it is unable to account for the complexities of our character or the downright nastiness of much of human life. Finally, as critics of American culture such as Rieff, Bellah, Lasch and MacIntyre, have argued, it is not clear whether its counsels are a remedy for our narcissism or whether they merely perpetuate it.



# 7

## Conclusions

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### **1. Review**

In the first chapter I suggested that our Western sense of self might best be understood as a function of our orientation to morally significant goods. We are selves to the extent that we are beings of the requisite mental sophistication to possess sensitivity to sources of value. On this account the possibility of unifying the self is a matter of integrating all one's various sources of significance. Following Plato, this has typically been seen as a matter of uniting all one's powers in the service of rational pursuit of the good.

I suggested that the Western sense of self is especially characterised by the sense that our mode of access to sources of significance is an inward one. This has been worked out in three major directions. Firstly, Augustine suggested that the self gained coherence through its pursuit of the Trinitarian God. Secondly, following Descartes, Locke and Kant, the subject might take his or her own capacity for rational thought as a source of significance. Freud stands within this school of thought. For Freud, the individual moves from neurosis to health insofar as the rational ego is able to gain mastery over the whole of the personality. Thirdly, following Montaigne, Hutcheson, Rousseau and the Romantic movement, the self might take its own natural sentiments and feelings as a source of significance. Jung and the humanistic psychologists stand within this tradition. Selfhood, for these psychologists, consists in reaching within to retrieve and express our own unique, inner nature. The modern "psychological self" is, I have suggested, defined by its orientation to these three sources of significance. Each source has an inward quality: the inner light of God, our self-consciously rational thought, our innermost feelings and sentiments. The contemporary self gains wholeness insofar as it succeeds in constructing an identity relative to some combination of these three inner sources of significance.

The Platonic ideal of rational self-mastery has, as I showed, come under particular attack in the last twenty years with the cultural shift to postmodernism. According to the postmodernists, the attempt at self-mastery is nothing other than the internalising within the self of societal repression of the individual. This assertion has led the most radical of the postmodernists, such as Lacan and Deleuze, to argue that the self must not be unified but must rather be deconstructed and destroyed. The more temperate position of the later Foucault is that new and liberating forms of

the self must be found. Foucault's own attempt at doing this involved a rejection of the whole post-Augustinian Western identity which I have judged unrealistic. What I am attempting to do here, instead, is to work within our historically conditioned sense of identity to see how it might be developed to meet the demands of our present context, one which places considerable stress on what I have called "unorder".

### **2. How should these systems of thought be evaluated?**

I have examined four major psychologists or psychological movements - Augustine, Freud, Jung and the humanistic psychologists - who between them articulate the three axes of moral space within which the contemporary self orientates itself. The question now arises as to how these systems should be evaluated. Three options suggest themselves.

#### **2.1 Empirical Testing**

Within Anglo-American culture at least, the highest respect is accorded to theories which are capable of being empirically tested. Insofar as each of the theorists I have considered make definite claims about the working and integration of the psyche one might hope that they could be susceptible to some sort of empirical verification. One can envisage three forms that empirical verification might take, as follows.

Firstly, one could try to verify or falsify the psychologies by reference to lower-level neurological or physiological evidence. This was the approach taken by the early Freud in his attempts to link the pleasure principle to systems of neurones. However, Freud found that the neurological evidence would not take him very far and his later work was based, instead, on clinical and theoretical considerations. This is still broadly the case with respect to each of the psychologies I have considered. We do not have any neurological evidence for entities such as the Oedipus complex, the animus archetype or the drive to self-actualisation. Neither, on the other hand, has brain science advanced to the point where it might offer definitive disproof of the theories we have considered. The psychologies are not immune from developments in brain science: if, for example, an account of the brain could be given which showed human beings to be heavily determined by genetic and chemical factors this would lend support to Freud's conception of the mind and tend to discredit the humanistic theories. But at present the psychologies I have discussed seem to be generally neutral with respect to lower level scientific theories.

Secondly, one might attempt clinical testing to see how far human psychological functions (such as sublimation) and products (such as dream imagery) conform to the theories propounded by the psychologists. In some limited areas, for example the verification of an order of needs such as

that given by Maslow, a degree of clinical verification is possible.<sup>1</sup> But, more typically, the generality of the theories means this attempt is beset by problems. As Freud's own case studies demonstrate, his scheme is capable of the most ingenious explanations to cater for new and unexpected psychological phenomena. Again, the categories of the Jungian archetype are so flexible that it is quite difficult to envisage dream imagery that could not be accommodated within the scheme. Finally, it is hard to imagine how one would produce an empirical proof or disproof of an avowedly metaphysical construct such as the Augustinian "desire of God". The long and still unresolved controversy over how far Freud's clinical evidence counts as "scientific" indicates the difficulty of collecting universally acceptable clinical evidence for or against these kinds of psychological theories.

Thirdly, one might attempt to evaluate the therapeutic effectiveness of the psychological theories. That is to say, one might ask how far a person who lives according to one of the schemes I have presented, or who is treated with or helped by techniques that follow from this scheme, is thereby made psychologically "healthier". A great deal of work has been done, for example, to evaluate how far counselling helps people. But, unfortunately this kind of research has not so far generated simple conclusions of the kind we would need here, but indicates rather that psychological therapies can work for some people in some circumstances.<sup>2</sup> The most soundly based research involves carefully defined studies of limited scope which measure how far a particular belief system or therapeutic process correlates with one particular measure of psychological health or disease, such as anxiety levels or suicide rates. This kind of research can be applied equally to the therapeutic effectiveness of a life lived according to religious ideals as well as to an evaluation of the more specifically therapeutic ideals and techniques advocated by the modern psychologists.<sup>3</sup>

Whilst these "outcome studies" may offer some help in evaluating our psychological theories, empirical science does not seem to offer the whole, or even most of the answer. This result should not strike us as surprising. The usual method of empirical science is to break down a problem into small parts so that controlled experiments can be run with manageable sets of data. However, the systems of thought we have considered tend to run in the opposite direction. They are intent on making broad statements about human flourishing. They are much less concerned with specific testable theories than with overall conceptions. They do not so much provide us with hard facts as

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<sup>1</sup>Although even here it remains controversial: see, for example, the criticisms of the empirical basis of Maslow's work made by Vitz (1994) pp37-40.

<sup>2</sup>Ref. a statement by the American Psychiatric Association Commission on Psychotherapies (1982): "Although research in psychotherapy is still plagued by many problems connected with assignment of patients, use of statistics, outcome measures, and experimental design, the data have shown empirically that psychotherapy is effective with some populations with some problems." (quoted in Egan 1990 p10f.)

<sup>3</sup>For example Loewenthal (1995) summarises the results of research carried out into the relative mental well-being of a number of religiously inspired communities including the Hutterites, Hebridean islanders and Jewish Hasidim. (Ch. 3)

with tools with which we may think about ourselves. In summary, they do not have a concrete and specific impact on psychological science so much as a general and pervasive influence on the whole culture within which psychological science operates. It therefore seems that their truthfulness is best evaluated at a higher, meta-scientific level.

## 2.2 Philosophical Adequacy as World-Views

If the systems I have discussed are of a more general nature than what we normally consider to be scientifically testable theories, perhaps they should be evaluated at the most general level of all, that of world-views. The development of a coherent world-view is indeed to a certain extent the obverse of the possession of a unified sense of self. For, on the account of selfhood I have given, in coming to an understanding of who we are as selves we by implication come to an understanding of how things in the world have significance for us. The construction of a total self involves considering matters of ultimate significance including, for example, what significance, if any, God might have for us. A true understanding of ourselves is therefore a mirror image of a true understanding of the world and of God.

Whilst there would be little doubt that Augustine was intent on developing a world-view, the suggestion that the modern psychologies constitute world-views seems more difficult to sustain. To be sure, Jung did claim for his psychology a certain metaphysical significance<sup>4</sup>, and the important commentator on Jung's work, Jolande Jacobi, quite definitely saw Jung's work as suggesting a world-view.<sup>5</sup> Moreover, the humanists have been more than willing to claim world-view status for their systems.<sup>6</sup> Freud, however, was reticent about describing psychoanalysis in such terms: he preferred to see himself as extending another world-view, the scientific view, into the domain of the mind.<sup>7</sup>

Despite the enthusiasm of some Jungians and humanists, the modern psychologies I have discussed are better considered, in the manner of Freud, as only a part of larger world-views. The difficulty of seriously evaluating the psychologies as world-views becomes apparent when we try

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<sup>4</sup>CW8 para. 525: "I always think of psychology as encompassing the whole of the psyche and that includes philosophy and theology...For underlying all philosophies and all religions are the facts of the human soul which may ultimately be the arbiters of truth and error.."

<sup>5</sup>Jacobi (1967) p vii: "The way of individuation...the keystone of Jung's widely ramifying work...amounts to a comprehensive view of life which embraces the all-too-human as well as the personal and the suprapersonal."

<sup>6</sup>Maslow (1970) px: "This new 'humanistic' *Weltanschauung* seems to be a new and far more hopeful and encouraging way of conceiving any and every area of human knowledge: e.g., economics, sociology, biology, and every profession: e.g. law, politics, medicine, and all of the social institutions: e.g., the family, education, religion, etc."

Rogers (1980) pix: "I am no longer talking simply about psychotherapy but about a point of view, a philosophy, an approach to life, a way of being, which fits any situation in which growth...is part of the goal."

<sup>7</sup>XXII "New Introductory Lectures" Lecture 35, "The Question of a *Weltanschauung*" p159.

to rank them against philosophical criteria. One such standard set of criteria for examining the adequacy of alternative world-views is that given by Vincent Brummer<sup>8</sup>: (1) freedom from contradiction, (2) relevance, (3) impressiveness, (4) unity and (5) universality. Some of these criteria do seem to have a place here. We can, certainly envisage checking the psychologies for freedom from contradiction, and relevance. But it would seem misplaced to expect them to have a universal impressiveness. They are fundamentally concerned with the workings of the mind, not with politics, social ethics, history, nature or any one of a number of other areas of human interest which would fall within the ambit of a proper world-view.

### 2.3 Fitness for Purpose

Since it does not seem entirely appropriate to evaluate the psychologies either at the lowest level of empirical testing or at the highest level of adequacy as philosophical world-views, I suggest as a third option that they may be evaluated in terms of their fitness for the particular purpose of generating an integrated sense of selfhood or, at least, of contributing to whatever sense of wholeness may be feasible for us. This is to say, I shall consider how far it would be possible and realistic to "keep whole" one's sense of personal identity through adhering to one or other of these psychologies. In this case the theoretical criteria against which the psychologies should be evaluated seem to form a sub-set of the more general criteria for evaluating a world-view. This is to be expected in view of the "mirror" relationship between the sense of self and the sense of significance of things in the world for us that I pointed to above. However, rather than look for a world-view that expresses unity and impressiveness on a universal scale, we shall instead be interested in the narrower capability of power to integrate the self. The theoretical criteria are then as follows:

1. Integrative Power. In order to generate a unified sense of self, the system must be able to refer me to something or someone (or to a co-ordinated plurality of entities) which impresses me as being determinative of meaning and which can pull together all aspects of my selfhood within a coherent structure. On a significance-based understanding of selfhood, if a person is not inspired by anyone or anything he or she will not be able to form a strong sense of self.

2. Freedom from Contradiction. A system cannot enable us to maintain a unified sense of self if it contains basic contradictions. Paradoxes are allowable only if we can make it clear that they are only "apparently" contradictory. Real paradoxes, that suggest opposing prescriptions for behaviour, will tend to pull apart the sense of self.

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<sup>8</sup>Brummer (1981) p139ff.

**3. Relevance.** The system must have relevance to our lives as they are lived here and now. That it is to say, it must bear directly on the modern Western sense of identity. If its tenets have no direct bearing on our lives then these tenets are of merely speculative interest.

My analysis here is limited to these theoretical criteria. However, it would seem possible (at least in principle) for empirical tests to be devised using questionnaires and interviews which would evaluate how far a person who claimed to be living according to one of these systems actually achieved the kinds of psychological benefits one would expect to be associated with a unified sense of self. Positively, one might expect evidence of a sense of purpose and meaning in life, a sense of inner peace, a strong sense of personal identity and evidence of a coherent set of moral values. Negatively, one might expect to find lower than average levels of anxiety and neurotic depressions. Empirical tests might then corroborate or modify what we would expect from a theoretical analysis of the systems, although, as I indicated earlier, the systems are probably too complex and metaphysical to be susceptible only or even mainly to empirical analysis.

I will now evaluate each of the four systems in turn against the above theoretical criteria.

### **3. Augustine**

#### **3.1 Integrative Power**

Augustine sets the one God as the strong centre to life. The quest for God is an over-riding life goal that serves to order all other needs and desires. The self is united through increasingly lining up its powers behind this single desire. The goal is a vision of eternal bliss and totally fulfilled delight which, provided it can be given a more dynamic interpretation, is a powerfully impressive one.

The limitation with Augustine's thought, in this respect, is that it is *too* strongly unified. Our modern context is one in which we live within a plurality of moral sources and life goals. If Augustine's thought is to meet our present demands it may need to be adapted to allow for a greater space and freedom for the individual to pursue goals which are not automatically referred to and brought into line with the divine centre. One way in which this might be done is to give a greater emphasis than Augustine does to the Spirit who, in theological terms, is the principle of diversity.

#### **3.2 Freedom from Contradiction**

My treatment of Augustine suggests two apparent paradoxes which, though theological in origin, contain important psychological implications. (I will leave aside discussion of more purely theological paradoxes, such as the doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation, which have

usually been defended as "mysteries", that is, as truths above reason but not contrary to reason, as these bear only a secondary relation to my present psychological purposes.)

### a) The problem of the immanence and transcendence of God

The presentation of Augustine's thought that I have given is built on the supposition that the God who is utterly transcendent is also wholly immanent. The God whom one desires is also the immanent principle of desire.

However, this does not, I suggest, amount to a logical antimony or real paradox. Augustine explains his doctrine of God to his own satisfaction in terms of Neo-Platonic ontology. God belongs to a spiritual order which is wholly present at each point that it touches the lower physical order. If God is present at all he is present equally in each place. Should the categories of Neo-Platonic philosophy fail to convince us, the same point can be made by an analogy from modern physics. The magnetic field set up by two electrically charged parallel plates is such that a small iron object placed between the plates will experience the same magnetic force irrespective of its physical location within this area. In other words, the magnetic force, if it exists at all, has the same value at all points between the plates. The iron object might be said to experience the field as wholly immanent to itself, whilst at the same time the field transcends the object. As with magnetic fields, so with God, immanence and transcendence may be conditions of one another.

### b) The problem of Grace and Freedom

A second and more serious theological problem arises from Augustine's conception of the immanence of God. It can seem that the nearness of God's grace to man leaves no space for human freedom. An antimony seems to be set up between irresistible divine grace on the one hand and human freedom on the other. Thus John Rist has commented that Augustine's doctrine of grace poisons his whole theology.<sup>9</sup> However, and as I shall now show, Augustine's theology does not rest on a paradox here so much as on a particular understanding of human freedom.

We have been accustomed, at least since the time of Aristotle, to highlighting the necessity of *choice* in any action that could count as voluntary or free.<sup>10</sup> The question raised by Augustine is how far choices directly against God's will count as free choices. Whilst the early Augustine allowed that the will may freely choose against the good<sup>11</sup>, Augustine's mature position is that choices against God are not to be described as "free" but as "evil". A choice against God, says Augustine, could not be regarded as a "natural" function of the will; it is to the contrary profoundly "unnatural"<sup>12</sup>. Indeed the perfection of humanity involves a reduction of this kind of

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<sup>9</sup>JTS 1969 N.S. 20 pp420-7.

<sup>10</sup>Nic. Eth. 3.i-iii.

<sup>11</sup>Cf. the argument of the anti-Manichaean Freedom of the Will Bk. 1.

<sup>12</sup>E.g. ciu. 12.3.

choice: people will no longer be able to sin.<sup>13</sup> In Augustine's theology for a person to sin voluntarily is like an archer missing his target. It does not provide evidence of the archer's freedom to miss but of his faulty aim. It is not the *freed* will that makes such choices but the *faulty* will. The fact that people choose in accordance with some standard which falls short of the Good, i.e. voluntarily sin, is not a witness to their freedom but to their participation in fallen Adamic humanity. If asked why Adam first sinned Augustine would say that this was in no sense an act of freedom but an inexplicable defection from Being to unreality.<sup>14</sup>

Rist identifies freedom with autonomy in our relations with God<sup>15</sup>, but this is precisely *not* Augustine's understanding. Augustine dissociates freedom of the will, at least in the question of moral action, from the having of more than one possible course of action. Augustine's understanding of the freedom of the will is not a rationale for voluntary sin. Augustine's doctrine is better understood with reference to the phenomenon of *involuntary* sin. People lack freedom of the will inasmuch as they find their will is divided. They are unable to will the good wholeheartedly and therefore cannot escape involuntary sin. The later Augustine<sup>16</sup> insisted, against the Pelagians, on our inability to will the good wholeheartedly, even when we are *sub gratia*. The restoration of freedom is therefore not so much the restoration of choice as the restoration of wholeness to the will.

When freedom of the will is understood in this way, the apparent antinomy that commentators such as Rist have found in Augustine's thought between irresistible grace and human freedom disappears. Human freedom, far from being opposed to grace, is conditional upon the receipt of grace. Unless the will is restored to wholeness through the action of divine grace it cannot be free. The Pelagians held that we are free to accept or reject grace. Augustine's response to this would not be so much to deny that we can resist grace as to regard such denial as pathological. The will is unfree to the extent that it is chained by habit to sinful patterns of behaviour. Past bad choices (both our own and those of our predecessors) therefore lie at the root of both our felt resistance to grace and our lack of freedom. Grace heals the action of fallen humanity in restoring us to wholeness of will and freedom.

### 3.3 Relevance

Augustine's theological psychology fails to be relevant to our modern sense of selfhood in several important respects, as follows.

#### a) A Narrow Conception of Human Freedom

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<sup>13</sup>corrupt. 33.

<sup>14</sup>ciu. 12.7.

<sup>15</sup>Rist (1969) p424.

<sup>16</sup>E.g. in *nat. et gr.* 50-58.



Whilst Augustine's doctrine of grace and freedom is logically coherent, it is another matter as to whether it is psychologically adequate for our present needs. Augustine describes freedom in terms of obedience to the divine order. His account is an important corrective to that strand of contemporary thought, exemplified here by the humanists, which defines freedom purely negatively as "freedom from constraint". Augustine offers a positive account of freedom as a psychological condition of the will. However, we cannot, as Augustine did, separate the ideal of freedom from the notion of personal choice altogether. The Church that summons us to a form of slavery which is perfect freedom may, after all, be summoning us only to a form of slavery. Augustinian freedom may rightly be accused of authoritarianism. Indeed from the time of the Donatists onwards it has provided a convenient rationale for compelling a uniformity of religious belief. Modern people prize individual rights, autonomy and freedom to choose in a way that is quite foreign to Augustine's thought-world. Augustine's conception of freedom must be broadened to include the element of personal choice if it is to meet our modern needs.

### b) Too strong a concern with order

It is understandable that, as the *pax Romana* began to crumble around him, Augustine should have been deeply concerned for order. However, in our time, we want to grant appropriate space for spontaneity and have a deeper appreciation of the value of the non-ordered parts of the person. In relation to sex his desire for control reached a level that we would not only regard as unhealthy but also physiologically impossible. Under conditions of maximum health and integrity we now know that the body is *not* in every function subject to the soul's commands. Moreover, we should want to place a higher value than Augustine on unordered aspects of the personality such as the spontaneous expression of emotion, playfulness and bodily pleasure.

### c) A limited awareness of the realms of the unconscious

Augustine thought that any of his memories that were radically inaccessible and genuinely forgotten no longer formed a part of him. This meant that, in principle, the whole of the self could be open to the control of the will. We would now be suspicious of this claim. There may be parts of ourselves that are hidden from consciousness and yet are still very much a part of ourselves. Augustine's psychology needs to be deepened to allow for the mysterious and pervasive effects of unconscious processes upon the conscious self.

### d) A failure to appreciate the positive dimensions of conflict within the self

Augustine invariably saw conflict within the self in a negative light. It was, he thought, an indication of the failure of the rational mind fully to order the passions. He thought that the very existence of conflict was in itself a symptom of divine punishment of human sin. Of course Augustine never advised people to avoid conflict; he would rather say that awareness of the state of war between reason and passions was a mark of holiness. But he regarded the state of warfare

as something wholly regrettable and thought that insofar as we could detect progress in this life it would be manifested in a lessening of the unruly force of concupiscence within us.<sup>17</sup>

Augustine thought that the only valid objective of internal conflict could be its cessation through moral victory. By contrast, his opponent Julian of Eclanum saw the battle between the rational mind and the passions as having the additional objective of enabling people to develop moral strength.<sup>18</sup> We shall want to side with Julian against Augustine here. It is unclear how we would develop certain moral qualities, such as endurance and courage, in the complete absence of temptation and the inner conflict that results. Moreover, after Freud, we understand more than ever before that the mind is characterised by the interplay of conflicting forces. The complete eradication of conflict seems to us unrealistic. The proper question is, rather, how such conflict can be used in the most creative ways. Whilst excessive tension is indicative of mental distress, a moderate degree of tension is good for us, acting as a spur to higher levels of moral endeavour and human performance. Indeed, the complete absence of tension might be a mark not so much of fulfilment as morbidity. Augustine's psychology requires a more nuanced understanding of internal conflict.

e) An emphasis on rest to the exclusion of dynamism

For Augustine, changelessness and motionlessness were necessary components of the divine perfection. His goal for human psychological development is, consequently, a motionless Platonic *telos*. Our modern view of psychology, as of cosmology, is much more dynamic and energetic than Augustine's. Whereas Augustine's cosmology assumed that motionlessness equated with maximum order, for us it represents a state of maximum entropy or maximum *disorder*. We understand that order is something which must be positively created and actively sustained. Absence of change in a person is primarily a condition of stagnation. If the state of "perfect rest" is said to be a state of perfect peace, then we can only be talking of a cold, inactive form of peacefulness. A more dynamic understanding of the human goal is needed than that given by Augustine.

f) An inadequate understanding of love for God as *caritas*

Augustine's notion of human love for God is made up of desiring *eros* and static *caritas* components. Perfect love, for him, would be a state of contemplation in which the desiring components of love were fulfilled in pure *caritas* and the individual's will adhered perfectly to the divine will. The individual is "glued on behind" God.

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<sup>17</sup>Sermo 151.6.

<sup>18</sup>c. Jul. IV.2.9ff.

However, this image does not stress adequately that love for God is primarily a relationship of persons. Augustine has not fully broken free of the Neo-Platonic idea that the state of perfection would be a condition in which the individual merged with the divinity. This deficiency might have been remedied if Augustine had meditated on the biblical notion of friendship (*philia*) with God.<sup>19</sup> *philia* with God implies a mutual relationship in which both parties are free agents with respect to one another and may affect one another. It does not mean that an individual can autonomously enter into a relationship with God; as Augustine rightly insisted we are dependent on the initiative of divine grace. But the possibility that we may turn our backs on his gracious initiative must always be there, or else we lose our personhood and become mere channels of grace. A revised model of love is needed which takes due account of the modern insistence on the value of human autonomy.

### g) Religious Exclusivity

According to Augustine's theology the possibility of integrating the self is limited to those who explicitly confess the Christian gospel and commit themselves to seeking the Trinitarian God. Augustine envisaged a sharp divide between the city of the saved and the city of the lost. Whilst he firmly maintained that the identity of members of the former was known only to God, he would not have allowed that unbaptised members of pagan religions could have numbered amongst the saved or make any real spiritual progress. In our time it is quite clear that the possibility of psychological growth is not exclusively limited to those who are adherents of the Christian religion. Some theological means is therefore needed for allowing either that God is at work in those who are not explicitly Christian, or for allowing that the self may be unified with reference to goals other than the Trinitarian God.

### h) A tendency to devalue temporal and material goods

Augustine struggled to be enthusiastic about the value of temporal and material goods. His use and enjoyment scheme of ordering, in particular, sharply relativised all our present temporal goods in favour of the one Eternal Good. As we have seen, even in so spiritual an activity as worshipping God, he remained suspicious of sensual enjoyment. Particularly in his later life, Augustine's assessment of the amount of happiness one could expect in this life was low. By contrast in our century, whilst we have certainly witnessed unprecedented levels of suffering, many in the West enjoy extremely high standards of living and suffer very little at all. Many of us have become accustomed to high levels of expectation for earthly happiness. Moreover, the inability to take pleasure in material and sensual goods is now more usually regarded as a psychological weakness rather than a strength. A more adequate scheme for ordering material and psychological goods is needed than Augustine gives us.

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<sup>19</sup>Ref. Burnaby (1938) p256ff.

#### i) Remoteness from Contemporary Context of Helping Relationships

Augustine assumed that spiritual and psychological progress was most likely to be made in a strongly social context where one's thoughts, emotions, and ideally one's possessions, would be shared with friends. Our contemporary context is one in which, especially for men, this level of friendship is not a reality. Moreover, the kinds of problems which people today experience as most deeply troubling at a psychological level, such as past childhood relationships with parents or present sexual difficulties, are not of a nature that most of us would feel comfortable discussing even with good friends. For many today, it seems that a particular relationship with a counsellor, therapist or spiritual director is required where these kinds of issues can be addressed. This form of relationship does not take the place of friendships, although it may be needed more in our contemporary postmodern context in which deep friendships seem more difficult to sustain than they have done in the past. Its main purpose is supplementary to friendship. It offers a privileged space in which problematic feelings can be worked through. It may supply an environment where damaging experiences that occurred in dysfunctional relationships can be rehearsed and dealt with, so that these relationships may be maintained and strengthened.

### **4. Freud**

#### **4.1 Integrative Power**

Freud argues that the task of integrating the self is much more difficult than had previously been thought. He charts for us a new realm of the psyche, the unconscious, whose activities escape the ordering powers of the will. According to Freud, we simply cannot voluntarily line up all aspects of the self in pursuit of some ideal or goal. The unconscious has its own goals which it pursues whether we like them or not. Freud's picture of the self is a frankly pessimistic one. The self is composed of the fundamentally dissimilar elements of ego and id. Furthermore it is driven by a duality of instincts, the creative Eros and the self-destructive Thanatos, which continually tend to pull the self in opposing directions.

In therapeutic terms we must recognise the limited scope of psychoanalysis. Melanie Klein, for example, assumes a bit too much in thinking that the goal of psychoanalysis is the integration of the self. Psychoanalysis is a set of strategies for addressing one particular class of failures of integration, namely that concerned with the irrational phenomena generated through intra-psyche conflict. The technique of analysis does not aim to bring complete unity and harmony but merely to ensure that the battle between the instincts is fought on a level playing field. In commenting on what might be expected from psychoanalysis, Freud aptly said: "Much will be gained if we succeed in transforming your hysterical misery into common unhappiness. With a mental life that has been restored to health you will be better armed against that unhappiness."<sup>20</sup>

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<sup>20</sup>II 305.

The re-arming of the ego involves draining the unconscious of some of its power, so that the ego is not bound by irrational neuroses. Here Freud is able to offer us an enviable range of therapeutic techniques. Of central importance is the process of lifting repression. By working through his or her emotions in the context of a relationship with the analyst, a patient gains the courage to abandon his or her defensive strategies. The repressed contents of the unconscious may now be brought to consciousness and expressed normally. The ego is thus persuaded to give up its attachment to neurotic symptoms, and the id may find healthy outlets for its instinctual drives. The ego is thereby enabled, to some extent, to impose a rational order on the other parts of the psyche, and the person gains a limited degree of self-mastery and psychic unity.

Psychoanalysis leaves untouched issues of personal integration that occur at the level of ordinary psychology and ethics, such as finding fulfilment in life or deliberating about moral values. Indeed Freud quite deliberately maintained a steady agnosticism here. In his view one must simply apply the analytic calculus of the reality principle and get on with the interminable warfare of normal human life.

We must, of course, face the possibility that Freud was right here. It may be that only a limited degree of personal integration is possible, that we are not able to unify our lives behind meaningful goals. But most of us at least hope that there is more to life than this, as is indicated by the great contemporary interest in psychologies of the kind suggested by Maslow which hold out the possibility of self-fulfilment. If orientating ourselves to some higher goal is merely what Freud would have called "illusion", then it still remains, for most of us, a more attractive way of living than the "reality" to which Freud bids us be reconciled. We may, perhaps, agree with Wollheim<sup>21</sup>, that the question of whether or not we ought to hope that there is more to our existence than the psychopathology of everyday life is one of the things that most sharply divides Freud from the spirit of the late twentieth century.

On a significance-based account of selfhood, the self can only be integrated with reference to one or more powerful moral sources. Unfortunately, Freud's overwhelmingly critical attitude to morality does not allow him to give a proper exposition of any moral sources by which the self might orientate itself. The closest he gets to a positive ethic is the occasional hint that the ego might be able to integrate the super-ego successfully. This would seem to amount to the ego synthesising the moral ideas passed down through culture into a fully rational morality. But Freud offers no help in sorting out better or worse moral values. Thus, whilst psychoanalysis can give one clarity about one's inner conflicts, it gives little guidance for action once one has become fully self-aware. We are supposed to act rationally, but it is unclear what this rational action amounts

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<sup>21</sup>Wollheim (1977) p220.

to. Freud can help us to be honest about ourselves, but he does not resolve specific issues of choice.

Overall, Freud's system acts as a valuable critical tool against too-easy attempts to unify the self. Freud forces us to take seriously the un-orderly unconscious. But his own positive proposals, quite deliberately, do not take us very far in conferring personal integration. If a strong degree of unity is possible for the self we shall need to look beyond Freud to find it. Psychoanalysis help us clear away some of the obstacles lodged in the unconscious and so to achieve a limited degree of self-mastery. But if we want more than this we shall also need a stronger statement of the underlying harmony of the mind, a more compelling goal for the self's development and a stronger moral framework within which the different powers of the self can be drawn together.

### 4.2 Freedom from Contradiction

Freud's writing is so vast, intricate and original that it would be surprising if it were completely free of internal contradiction. Criticism of Freud on these grounds has included, for example: the coherence of his notion of the unconscious as a realm which is in principle unknown yet about which we can gain empirical knowledge; the coherence of a model that involves partitioning the psyche; and the question of how his deterministic account of the mind can be compatible with the experience of human freedom. The first point has usually been countered in terms of the wide explanatory power of the concept of the unconscious and the second by insisting that Freud's divisions of the mind are not fixed anatomical boundaries but a flexible interpretative device. Freud's determinism is usually moderated by arguing that his description of the way human beings may be subject to prior psychological causes does not entail acceptance of a more general deterministic philosophical theory nor does it mean the self can never gain freedom from its psychological bonds<sup>22</sup>. Whilst none of these issues is finally settled I do not think any constitutes a fundamental paradox.

### 4.3 Relevance

Freud's insights into the nature of the psyche will undoubtedly have an enduring significance. His conception of the unconscious, for example, is now widely held and forms an important part of contemporary Western self-consciousness. Nonetheless, Freud developed his psychology in the particular context of *fin de siècle* Vienna. His patients were typically neurotic middle class women suffering from sexual repressions of one kind or another. Moreover, his ideas took root in a particular intellectual context, that of rebellion against nineteenth century bourgeois religion and morality. The question of Freud's continuing relevance must be viewed against a contemporary, and somewhat different, social and intellectual context.

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<sup>22</sup>See. e.g. Dilman (1984) Ch 10; ed. Wollheim (1977) pp271-285.

### a) Psychoanalysis is suspected of being a disciplinary technique

The Freudian demand for freedom from an allegedly repressive Christian religion and morality has now been met to a considerable extent. On the other hand, incitements to discourse about sex have never been more widespread. Schools are now required to teach sex education. Stories about sex form a large part of the content of the popular newspapers. The question is now much less how we may be liberated from authoritative religion and morality. It is, rather, whether the entire discourse about sex is not itself a particularly powerful way of enslaving us. After Foucault, Freud - the great master of suspicion - is himself suspected of furthering the disempowerment of the individual. His analytics of sexuality may now be understood as greatly increasing the possibilities for supervising and disciplining the individual. The psychoanalytic "experts" are now increasingly seen as part of a network of societal controls from which we must gain liberation. At a therapeutic level, the dominant paradigm for "helping relationships" is increasingly the parity of status aimed at in humanistic counselling rather than Freud's authoritarian doctor-patient model.

### b) Psychoanalysis fails to address contemporary neuroses

It seems that the dominant neurosis of our time is no longer hysteria induced by sexual repression but narcissism induced by a crisis of meaning. But, as Freud himself admitted, psychoanalysis is unable to treat narcissistic disorders as they are characterised by a withdrawal of libido into the self and are therefore not susceptible to the transference method. The quest for meaning might, for example, be better answered by Jungian psychotherapy. Moreover, psychoanalysis is a severe discipline requiring patients who are capable of a tough psychological journey. Neuroses concerned with low self-esteem and self-regard may be better treated with the more empathetic humanistic psychologies.

## 5. Jung

### 5.1 Integrative Power

Jung offers us a way of becoming whole which does not refer us to a transcendent God, nor to the ordering power of reason, but to the natural resources available within the mind. He suggests that, if we would only pay attention to it, the unconscious will supply us with symbols that are capable of holding together parts of the self which we usually take to be opposed. These symbols are understood to be manifested in the products of the world's religions but are available most immediately in our dream and fantasy life. Through an encounter with a succession of these symbols we gradually discover and learn to accept an increasing number of hitherto neglected aspects of ourselves. We also learn what qualities distinguish us from humanity in general. The integrative power of Jung's therapy seems to lie in the possibility it offers for us to affirm the whole of ourselves, and in this affirmation to discover that we are both fully at one with nature and also unique individuals.

The two main limitations I observe are, firstly, the extent to which the goal Jung proposes is fully coherent (for which see the discussion in the next section) and, secondly, the question of whether Jung's scheme has strong enough roots in the inter-subjective world. It seems to me that, in addition to the symbols thrown up by its own mental life, the self is likely to require some point external to itself by which to orientate itself. Few of us have such a vivid awareness of our own mental states that these could, by themselves, form a secure datum around which the diverse powers of the mind could be arranged and held together. In any case, human beings are both personal and social and, as Lacan observes, in order to achieve wholeness they seem to require unconditional affirmation from another person. Of course, Lacan may be right in thinking that such unconditional affirmation cannot be obtained from other individuals who are as psychologically divided as we are ourselves. If so, the strategies of self-affirmation that Jung proposes may succeed in generating a certain degree of wholeness. But Jung's claim that the symbol of the Self offers a completely satisfying goal, or, in other words, that the Jungian way is by itself a fully sufficient source of significance for us is, I think, overstated.

### 5.2 Freedom from Contradiction

Jung's way is founded on the notion that the human goal is the reconciliation of opposites. But this notion requires considerable clarification. To begin with, Jung does not properly define the field of opposites he is concerned with. Does he mean *all* opposites? But this would be immediately self-contradictory. For any goal has its own opposite that is not included in itself. Wholeness, for example, has its own opposite, namely fragmentation, that is excluded from the psyche if wholeness is pursued. We cannot pursue the reconciliation of all opposites, but only the reconciliation of some limited class of opposites. We may, I think, reasonably take it that Jung is principally concerned with reconciling the moral opposites of good and evil. Furthermore we may distinguish a strong and a weak form of this reconciliation.

In its strong form Jung's thesis argues that wholeness is found in the synthesis of qualities he takes to be real, logical opposites, notably good and evil, rationality and irrationality. Jung supposes that this frankly paradoxical notion can be expressed in symbolic form. Symbols, he maintains, are capable of transcending the normal limitations on our rational thinking founded, as this is, on Aristotelian non-contradiction.

However, I find Jung's argument stated in this form unsatisfactory. I allow that symbols, like metaphors, can sometimes bring together opposing qualities. For example, we might say that Christ is a rock (hard) and also a vine (soft). Here we have two metaphors in which incidental attributes, when brought together are opposed. But I am not sure what to make of a symbol which, in its essence, unites real opposites. Following Coleridge (see Chapter 5) I am inclined to regard such a use of symbolic expression as illegitimate.



Even if we allow that such symbols retain some meaning, it is not clear what kind of psychological attraction an expression of wholeness that united good and evil would have for us. For the moral status of wholeness is now unclear. Presumably wholeness cannot be good in itself, for then evil would not so much have been reconciled as defeated. Should we say that wholeness merely includes the good? But if wholeness is not unambiguously good why should we pursue it?

Perhaps what Jung is proposing is some kind of aesthetic which subsumes both morality and rationality to a higher, artistic, goal. But even this notion is not stated unambiguously. For the notion of the shadow would seem, essentially, to include the ugly and the aesthetically unacceptable. Indeed Jung's description of Abraxas, the end-point of reality, includes ugliness as one of its attributes.

Jung's "coincidence of opposites" finds precedent within the Christian tradition in the mystical theology of Nicholas of Cusa<sup>23</sup>. Nicholas argued that if we are to set out on the spiritual path towards God we must acknowledge that both:

- a) We do not yet know God and that we therefore love what we do not know, and
- b) We do know God since we cannot love what we do not know.

In the love of God there is thus a coincidence of knowledge and of ignorance, or of what he calls "learned ignorance". This paradox is not, thought Nicholas, contrary to the nature of God, since at infinity the principle of non-contradiction does not hold. Things which seem absurd and contradictory can be held together in God.

However, the point being made here is that God is above finite reason, that at the limit human reason may be absorbed into something greater. Reason may approach God to a certain extent but must yield to the realisation that, ultimately, it does not comprehend God. "God", for Nicholas, is a symbol that we cannot fully grasp with the intellect. Jung goes further than Nicholas in insisting that ultimate reality, the symbol of God or the Self, unites reason with unreason. The Self, for Jung, is a symbol which, in its essence, contains elements that are fundamentally opposed to reason. When it is stated in this form, I find it hard to know what to make of Jung's goal.

Jung's argument is of more value in its weaker form, when we take his *coincidentia oppositorum* at the level of qualities that are only conventionally opposed. For Jung sometimes means by evil not "real" evil but only what we "call" evil, we might say the naughty or the socially unacceptable or the awkward. Here we can appreciate that the "whole" person is someone who has fully come to terms with and accepted the less desirable and presentable parts of the personality. Jung helps us to see that the extrovert person might become more rounded by acknowledging the

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<sup>23</sup>Christian Spirituality Vol. 2 ed. Jill Rait SCM 1988 p170ff.

## Conclusions

undiscovered introvert aspects of his personality or (to use the terms loosely and colloquially) that a "spiritual" person might benefit from attention to the "sensuous" parts of his nature. Jung offers us an important statement of what becoming whole means if we feel the force of that part of the Romantic tradition (*supra*, Ch. 2 §3.3) which urges us to find meaning in the natural self. Jung shows us in an unprecedented way what it means for us to explore and celebrate the whole of our natural selves.

In his concern to reconcile opposites, Jung's thought might better be understood with reference to Hindu patterns of thought than in the context of traditional Western patterns of spirituality (even those like that of Nicholas of Cusa which are concerned with opposing qualities). Hinduism can be read as giving precedence to a triad of gods: Brahma, Vishnu and Shiva.<sup>24</sup> Vishnu expresses goodness and order (cf. the Jungian "consciousness") whilst Shiva expresses libido and destruction (cf. the Jungian "unconscious"). Brahman, as ultimate reality, may be taken as a synthesis of the qualities of both (cf. the Jungian "Self").

Jung's suspicion of predicating only good and not evil of the "God" or "Self" symbol was grounded in his fear that it might lead us to strive for an unhealthy form of goodness. Jung finds a partial ally here in the Dominican philosopher of religion Brian Davies<sup>25</sup>. Davies argues that there is an intimate connection between being a moral agent and being able to succeed or fail. He suggests that since God is not merely "a being" but the source of all being it makes no sense to talk of him having either a historical background or a social context against which he might be construed as "failing" or "succeeding"; he just "is". Since God cannot be described as "successful" it makes no sense to say that he is "good".

Davies and Jung both alert us, in different ways, to the need to define goodness rather carefully so that it does not carry undesirable connotations of success. We may "succeed" in becoming good in ways that unhealthily repress the shadow sides of the person. But, unfortunately Jung goes too far when he asserts, unlike Davies, not merely that God is beyond human categories of good and evil but that he embodies both good and evil at the same time. Were we to allow that ultimate reality has this basically confusing moral structure it would be very difficult for the self to orientate itself within any meaningful moral framework.

Jung is afraid that strict codes of morality only lead to the denial of evil in our actual lives. Striving after perfection may result simply in self-deception. Thus far Jung's argument has a good deal of truth in it. But Jung then concludes that the Christian ethic must be abandoned. However,

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<sup>24</sup>Hindu Theology A Reader ed. Jose Pereira Image Books, Doubleday and Co. New York 1976, p34. We should note, however, that Hinduism allows for a huge variety of beliefs: it is extremely difficult to fabricate a consistent Western-style theology out of the classical Hindu sources.

<sup>25</sup>Davies (1982) p22ff.

the Christian tradition has been aware of the problem of self-deception (cf. 1 Jn. 1:8) and suggests a different conclusion, namely, that we must maintain the moral standard whilst confessing the limits to our own claims to righteousness (1 Jn. 1:9). Jung thinks the Church has downplayed the presence of evil within human beings, whereas, at least in the Augustinian tradition, it has emphasised the universality of human sinfulness. In Augustinian theology human sinfulness and the *imago Dei* (cf. the Jungian Self) are continually held in tension, not with the former included in the latter but with the two in contrast. In replacing the moral imperative with the notion of acceptance it is Jung not the Church that is minimising the sinfulness of sin.

In summary, Jung directs us to symbols which he believes have the power to integrate the self. These symbols aim to accommodate not just the conscious, rational and moral aspects of ourselves but also the unconscious, emotional and amoral parts of our nature. Jung reminds us that questions of ultimate meaning may lie beyond the grasp of the intellect. He reminds us of the presence of evil within the self and shows that this is sometimes best dealt with through being accepted and then transformed.

In its strong form, Jung's "coincidence of opposites" is expressed in just too paradoxical a way for it to function effectively as our goal. It is very difficult to see how symbols which do not merely claim to transcend logical opposites but also actually embody these opposites could really hold together the different parts of the self. In particular it is not clear how a symbol that is both good and evil could act as a "moral source" according to which we may order our desires and actions. Jung's argument is better taken in its weaker form as providing us with resources for learning a healthy form of self-acceptance and helping us to affirm the whole of our natural selves.

### 5.3 Relevance

#### The Problem of Individualism

Jung thought that his myth would be relevant only to a few. Those "ancients" who are committed to a religion would have no need of it. They would be satisfied with the, albeit questionably scientific, healing metaphors of their own faiths. Amongst the "moderns", most would be content to live at the superficial level of the persona and would lack the courage necessary to build an integrated Self. There would remain just a few "contemporaries" who realise the nature of their predicament and dedicate themselves to psychotherapy as a healing way. Yet his manner of understanding the self has proved more widely accepted in our society than he might have envisaged. For the problems Jung experienced in his own life are in some ways paradigmatic of modern life, viz., the problem of building self-esteem; the need to avoid becoming a "mass man" in a mass society; and the struggle to find meaning for life amidst unbelief. In an age when traditional, religious commitments have lost their power for many, and when ties between the individual and society are largely rational and instrumental, Jung's radical inward turn to find

healing resources from within one's own psyche seems a real option for large numbers of people. Jung's thought thus feeds into a range of contemporary "spiritualities", both neo-pagan and Christian, which accord a leading role to exploration of one's own psyche.

However, we are more aware now than when Jung was writing of the extent to which the self is constituted not merely by its self-relations but by its relations with others. Jung minimises the extent to which the self is affected by either social or economic conditions. We find it hard to imagine that the self could be made perfectly whole simply by internal psychic readjustment. Few would regard Jung's symbol of the "tower" as a fully adequate goal of psychic unity. A large proportion of contemporary mental distress has social or economic causes. Here Jung's thought is of relatively limited relevance. Indeed insofar as it encourages an excessive preoccupation with one's own self it may tend to exacerbate such problems.

## **6. The Humanistic Psychologists**

### **6.1 Integrative Power**

For the humanists the self is united behind the goal of self-actualisation. All other human motivations are ordered under this goal. Self-actualisation claims a similar unitive power and function in humanistic psychology to that of the desire of God in Augustine's theology. The self-actualised person is someone who has developed and can hold together the moral and rational parts of the person with the more spontaneous and creative aspects. The self-actualiser has a strong sense of inner peace. He is not closed in on himself but is capable of forming strong relationships with others. The spiritual aspects of the person are fulfilled in a general awareness of the transcendent and an openness to religious experience. However, the goal of self-actualisation fails to integrate the self in two important and related respects.

Firstly, all responsibility for sin and evil is transferred from the individual to society. The humanists identify a true, inner self that has no morally unacceptable components. If a person finds sinful tendencies within, the humanists can only urge that these be disowned as not a part of the true self. I find this inadequate for the same reason that Augustine found Manichaeism inadequate, namely that it does not properly account for one's sense of inner conflict. A proper sense of wholeness must be able to do something with the shadowy and unacceptable parts of the self. Secondly, the humanists broadly fail to take account of the Freudian and Jungian insights concerning the unconscious. There is no sense that inner tension might be a natural part of our psychological life. The goal of self-actualisation does not allow that different aspects of the self might be fulfilled in competing and mutually exclusive ways, for example that choices will have to be made as to how much one's sexual appetites might be fulfilled vis-a-vis one's moral conscience. Overall, the goal proposed by the humanists is a superficial one which, whilst it

expresses well the values of a certain kind of youthful and optimistic American culture, does not properly account for the range and depth of our psychological life.

### 6.2 Freedom from Contradiction

The humanistic psychologies generally offer simple and straightforward accounts of human nature that do not involve paradoxes. However, there is an element of contradiction in Fromm's work, arising from his analysis of society, that is not present in Maslow and Rogers. In Fromm's neo-Freudian system the individual is not merely an instinctually motivated self, but is also the product of societal forces. By contrast, in the "purer" humanism of Maslow and Rogers the role of society is clearly limited to supplying the needs of the individual: so long as these needs are met the individual will find within himself all the resources needed to actualise himself. Fromm's system risks a basic methodological contradiction: is the individual "really" the product of social forces (following Marx), or "really" the product of instinct (following Freud), or both - and if both how and in what proportions? With Maslow and Rogers it is much clearer that society has a subsidiary role as "resource" and that the healthy individual will be relatively immune from its shaping forces. Whatever we make of the minimising of the role of socio-economic factors in Maslow and Rogers it is, at least, theoretically consistent.

### 6.3 Relevance

#### a) Limitation to higher levels of psychological need

Christopher Lasch, drawing on a wide range of clinical evidence, argues that the typical patient asking for psychological help suffers from "vague, diffuse dissatisfactions with life...purposelessness...feelings of emptiness and depression...and...violent oscillations of self-esteem."<sup>26</sup> Humanistic psychology would appear to be relevant to precisely these kinds of people. It promises to confer a feeling of self-acceptance through the experience of the counsellor's empathetic acceptance and to unite the self behind the project of self-actualisation. Humanistic counselling is relatively non-technical and inexpensive. It is therefore not confined to an elite but is widely available from voluntary agencies, self-help groups, doctor's surgeries and some clergy.

Humanism is a "psychology of abundance" and generally presupposes that the lower level physical needs have been met. Humanism is less relevant to those whose problems are of a socio-economic kind. Its optimistic faith in the innate human capability for self-improvement can do little, for example, for those so ground down by poverty that they have little capacity for self-choice. Its adherents will not be those who are working so hard to stay alive that they have little time for the luxury of worrying about their self-esteem. It does not seem to have much to say to those, such as the mentally handicapped, who might reach their full potential at a young age and for whom the notion of a lifetime of psychological growth would mean little.

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<sup>26</sup>Lasch (1985) p37.

### b) Failure to take human capacity for evil seriously

The failure of humanistic psychology to take human capacity for evil seriously must ultimately limit its relevance. A credible psychology must deal with the mysterious origins and reality of evil in a more sophisticated way than that suggested by the humanists. By relegating evil to a force that is purely external to the person, the humanists eliminate the sense of moral struggle that most of us generally recognise as intrinsic to our personality. The humanists leave us with a flat, one-dimensional picture of the human person that cannot, by itself, do justice to the complexities of human life.

### 7. Augustine or/and the Modern Psychologists?

None of the three modern psychologies that I have reviewed can succeed in offering us a powerfully integrated sense of self:

Freud helps us to be clearer about the conflicts within the psyche. He suggests ways in which we may make conscious our unconscious compulsions and so achieve a limited degree of self-mastery. However, I have argued that our notion of selfhood entails more than the mere fact of consciousness. We are selves insofar as things have "significance" for us, that is insofar as we are able to represent to ourselves different choices and possibilities that we regard as more or less morally valuable. Extending the domain of consciousness might therefore be a first step in achieving selfhood but it could never by itself ensure a unified sense of self. We need to be able to set our self-knowledge within some wider moral framework. We must ask what the significance is of the facts about ourselves that we have discovered and what they imply for our acting. Freud's "analytic attitude" is precisely a refusal to acknowledge any source for moral evaluations of this kind. Freud offers a valuable critique of systems of morality; but something more positive than critique is needed if one is to form a strong sense of self.

Jung claims to offer a means of integrating the self through the process of individuation. His goal is the symbolic "coincidence" of the opposites with the personality. But when we press the meaning of this coincidence we find it to be a paradoxical notion. We are left with an aim that is not only beyond reason but is also contrary to reason. It is very hard to see how we may unite the personality in pursuit of an end which is a mixture of good and evil. The notion of a "moral" source for our thinking and acting has been replaced by an ill-defined "symbolic" source.

The Humanists propose that we unite the self behind the project of self-actualisation. Whilst their scheme is superficially attractive, it fails to account for the depth and complexity of the human personality, particularly in respect of those parts of ourselves which are inclined towards evil. We seem to have within us potential to develop in a wide range of ways, some of which seem better

than others, and the humanists are not able to offer much guidance as to which ways we should consciously select or not.

By contrast, and despite the numerous problems of relevance to our modern era that I identified, Augustine succeeds to a large degree in offering an account of how the self may be integrated. Compared with Freud, Augustine succeeds in unifying the self because, unlike Freud, he posits one single unitive motive force, the desire for God, which underlies and may in due course order all our other motives and desires. Freud always, and rather unsatisfactorily, insisted on a duality of basic drives. Freud's self is basically a tension of opposites that can aspire to a fragile and transient unity. Augustine's self, whilst it is subject to tendencies to fragmentation, has an underlying unity which derives from its single orientation towards God.

Compared with the humanists, Augustine succeeds by offering a much more adequate account of the dark sides of the person. The humanists eliminate tension from the self by discounting the evil and sinful parts of the person. As a result their fully actualised self is superficial and lacks depth. Augustine's self is one that continually struggles with internal evil and attains unity in the face of this struggle.

Compared with Jung, Augustine meets with a broad measure of success by offering a goal which unites the moral and immoral, the rational and emotional parts of the person in a non-paradoxical way. God caters for each aspect of the self in an appropriate manner. Goodness in the soul is affirmed. Sin and evil are forgiven: the basic unacceptability of evil in the face of goodness is not merely accepted but is dealt with. The rational parts of the person are fulfilled in the contemplation of God. The emotional aspects of the self are fulfilled in the worship of God. What Augustine lacks, and where his theology must be extended, is proper attention to needs which, in the modern era have been given great emphasis such as physical desires and the quest for personal autonomy. The basic model is highly effective, even though it must be modified to meet the sense of self given to us today.

Compared with all three of the modern psychological schools, Augustine succeeds in uniting the self because he refers the self to God. The self is able to unite all its faculties in the pursuit of a powerfully attractive Other. God functions as a very strong source of value. By contrast, the modern psychologists can refer the self to nothing stronger than itself. If the self is already weak, and presumably any self that admits to its need to pursue wholeness is admitting to some degree of insufficiency, then the self is drawn only by a weak source of significance. The self vainly attempts to pull itself up by its own fragile bootstraps. The initiators of these psychological schools were remarkable men who possessed an unusually high degree of ability to draw on their own internal resources in a self-reflexive manner. The great majority of those who follow them

will be unlikely to achieve this kind of feat. Moreover, the psychological turn inwards always risks collapsing into mere fascination with the self and self-absorption. By contrast, whilst Augustine's theology involves a turn inwards it does not risk collapsing into narcissism, since its object is never the self itself, but the God who lies at the root of the self.

Finally, Augustine suggests that Christians do not merely pursue God in their own strength but that God is at work in them to draw them to himself. If (as I happen to believe) Augustinian theology is not only psychologically useful but also basically true, then it is possible to experience here a divinely given uniting force within the personality that is not explicitly available in the modern psychologies. God himself supplies the power to draw together the different strands of our selfhood into a coherent whole.

That Augustine provides a convincing account of the unified self should not, of course, come as a surprise. Our traditional Western notion of selfhood has its roots, as I have shown, in the Augustinian synthesis of Christianity and Greek philosophy, and this traditional Western self is a unified self. Following Taylor, I suggested that the modern identity was constructed in relation to three groups of moral sources: the theistic source, the rational source and the natural source. Freud is a leading exponent of the second, and Jung and the humanists are leading exponents of the third source. What my analysis tends to suggest is that if the first, theistic, source were to be dropped from our identity entirely, it could become quite difficult to safeguard the unity of the self. The desire of God, or some such notion, provides a clear focal point around which the diverse powers of the self can be united. The Augustinian desire of God offers a strong source of significance which none of the psychological equivalents I have discussed could replace. In the absence of God, our Western sense of self would be likely to be weakened. It is entirely to be expected that some of the most influential arguments for a *reduced* notion of selfhood, such as those of Parfit and Crick that I noted in chapter two, are associated with a non-theistic world-view.

Of course it may be held, as Lacan and Deleuze argued, that the centred, unified self is a construct we are better off without. In this case certain of the modern psychologists may be taken as freeing us from the strongly unified self associated with monotheism in favour of a self with partitions, or even in favour of multiple selves. This is the line taken by the neo-Jungian David Miller in his book The New Polytheism. Miller argues that monotheism, rational thought forms and the traditional Western centred self are all linked together in what he considers to be an outmoded and repressive world-view. He argues against the "fascism" (p26) of a rational self in favour of a self which understands itself by way of non-rational symbols and stories. Instead of seeing ourselves in the image of the one God, Miller thinks that we should create many different selves for ourselves in the images of a pantheon of gods and goddesses. Thus he says:



"Psychologically, polytheism is a matter of the radical experience of equally real, but mutually exclusive aspects of the self...The person experiences himself as many selves each of which is felt to have autonomous power...without regard to the centred will of a single ego"<sup>27</sup>. Here Jung is taken as the champion of a post-modern, post-rational, and post-monotheistic multiple self.

But the unified self has a great deal more going for it than these detractors seem to realise. We usually recognise the accountability of different parts of the self to each other as a criterion of psychological health and human flourishing. Thus, in literature, characters whose intellectual faculties are not harmoniously united to their emotions are generally painted as sorry individuals. For example, Jane Austen's Marianne, in Sense and Sensibility, whilst she is portrayed as an attractive model of romantic "sentiment", falls in love with a rogue. Her inability to allow her feelings to be informed by her rational judgement is her downfall, and she is the only one of Austen's heroines who is finally unable to marry the man of her choice. Charles Dickens' Bradley Headstone, in Our Mutual Friend, has the opposite problem. He is an unattractive figure who conducts his life according to a mechanical rationality. A severe schoolmaster who is unable to allow his rational thinking to be informed by feeling, his emotions nonetheless periodically break through in uncontrollable expressions of rage. In ordinary life the inability to integrate reason and emotion is indicative of weakness of character.

Moreover, a severe splitting of the self takes us from the realm of mere weakness to real mental pathology and illness. Thus the experience of multiple selves within the psyche is something we usually associate with extreme mental distress rather than with freedom. For all Deleuze's talk of "schizoanalysis", he does not seem to realise that schizophrenia is experienced by its sufferers as a disturbing and deeply unwelcome mental condition. At least in our Western culture, a strong and unified sense of self is a function of mental health rather than mental disease.

If we think the unified self is something worth holding on to, and if the Christian theism of Augustine seems to offer more promise of integrating the self than the modern psychologists, we might be tempted to opt for a straightforward return to Augustine. Perhaps the modern psychologies are nothing but the corruption of an earlier and purer truth? Perhaps our best course is simply to recapture the strong theological sense of self given to us in an earlier era?

This form of argument is suggested by the approach to the social sciences adopted by the Anglo-Catholic theologian John Milbank in his Theology and Social Theory. Milbank's book has received an almost unparalleled degree of interest in recent British theological journals and has been described by the Augustine scholar and Professor of Moral Theology Oliver O'Donovan as

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<sup>27</sup>Miller (1978) p5.

"in a class of its own"<sup>28</sup>. Whilst the detail of Milbank's book is extremely complex the basic argument is simple. Milbank sees the development of the social sciences as bound up with the modification or rejection of classical Christian positions. He sees the logical outworking of the modern human sciences as lying in the nihilism of French postmodernism. This allows him to present us with a straightforward Kierkegaardian Either/Or between the violence of the postmodernists or the ontological peace of Augustine's City of God.

It would be possible, likewise, to see the psychologies I have discussed here solely in terms of how they modify and reject basic Christian positions. Of course they sometimes do this, and I have indicated where this occurs. But they do not *merely* do this. The modern psychologies offer new insights which deepen our sense of self and which reflect a sense of self that is relevant to the conditions of contemporary life. By contrast, however profound we might regard Augustine's thought, he was writing in the fifth, not the twentieth, century. We have problems and concerns that were not his. This is reflected in the critical comments I have made of Augustine on grounds of "relevance" in my analysis of him. A straight "return to Augustine" will inevitably make too light of the fifteen centuries of time that have passed between us. Milbank has considered contemporary knowledge, dismissed it and returned to the patristic era. The usual method of Western Christian theology, and the one I adopt here, is to do the reverse: to take the work of a patristic author as a starting point and to reflect on, modify and update his work in the light of contemporary conditions and knowledge.

Milbank deserves credit for offering a powerful restatement of Augustine's social theory. I have, analogously, tried to show that Augustine's psychological theory is much more sophisticated than his more facile detractors would have us believe. But, unlike Milbank, I take Augustine's work to mark the starting point rather than the terminus of theological reflection. Therefore I pose the question of how Augustine's work needs to be further developed if it is to form the basis of a viable sense of self today.

### **8. Modifications to Augustine**

Our review of the modern psychologists suggests a considerable number of modifications and enhancements to an Augustinian framework for unifying the self as I shall shortly indicate. However, I first want to discuss one particular theological development which would address several of the points I identified. Alphabetic references throughout this section are to the weaknesses listed under section 3.3 above.

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<sup>28</sup>Studies in Christian Ethics Vol. 5 1992 No. 1 p80.

### 8.1 A More Adequate Pneumatology

A number of the weaknesses I noted in Augustine's position could be remedied by the development of a stronger pneumatology, as follows.

As I suggested in chapter 3, Augustine's identification of the Spirit with *caritas* leads to an unduly static pneumatology. By contrast, in the Old Testament Spirit (*ruach*) is an energetic notion. If God is Spirit then he is to be conceived not as changeless and motionless but as energetic and dynamic. It follows that the psychological goal to which we aspire is best understood as a dynamic not a static one. [ref. (e) Insufficiently Dynamic Goal]

In the Bible the Spirit is responsible for ecstatic phenomena (1 Sam. 10:10) and in particular for prophecy (Mic. 3:8, Amos 3:7). But he is also linked to wisdom (Wis 9:17). It is the same Spirit who imposes order on the primal chaos (Gen 1:2) as who inspires un-ordered prophetic speech. Spirit thus envisages both order and non-order. Whereas the Platonic *thumos* tended to oppose reason, the biblical *ruach/pneuma* holds together in himself the rational and the non-rational. We are now much more inclined than Augustine to understand the self as a dynamic disequilibrium of different elements. This suggests we might do better to consider the spirit rather than the mind as the highest level of the self.

Such a move involves recovering elements of an earlier anthropology. The primary sense of the biblical *ruach* is wind, and its equivalents in Greek and Latin were *anemos* and *animus*. However, by Augustine's time, these latter terms had become intellectualised and came to mean what we call "soul". Hebrew anthropology did not operate in terms of higher or lower "parts" of the human being. However, as I shall now indicate, there would seem to be considerable biblical support for an anthropology in which *ruach* or *pneuma* is conceived as the dominant principle in the healthy individual. In particular, the spirit is in general regarded as a higher principle than what we call the "soul" (biblical *nephesh* or *psyche*).

The Old Testament *ruach* refers to the divine breath which enters the world and constitutes the individual as a living being in unity and wholeness (Gen. 2:7). In anthropological contexts *ruach* is sometimes identified with the heart (*lebab*), the volitional centre of the person (e.g. Ps 32:2, 77:6). By contrast *nephesh* refers to natural human life, especially in its desiring and emotional aspects. *Nephesh* is localised in the throat and signifies human beings as needy and requiring nourishment. The German Old Testament scholar Hans Kraus comments that, in the Psalms, *nephesh* "is I in the totality of my unsatisfactory life (Ps. 31:7, 35:9, 42:5-6, etc.)."<sup>29</sup> Where *nephesh* signifies lack, *ruach* denotes power and completeness.

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<sup>29</sup>Kraus (1986) p145.

In the New Testament, St Paul uses the Greek *psuche* as an equivalent to the Hebrew *nephesh*. For Paul, *psuche* never carries the pagan Greek sense of the higher, immortal part of man. Whilst Paul's *psuche* can be the bearer of the divine *pneuma*, and the two terms are sometimes used interchangeably, Paul never identifies *psuche* with *pneuma*. When Paul wants to speak of the higher, God-related life he uses *pneuma* not *psuche*. Thus in 1 Cor. 2:14 and 15:44 Paul contrasts the truly spiritual (*pneumatikos*) with the merely "soulish" (*psuchikos*). Whereas the term *pneuma* occurs only rarely in pagan Greek literature, it is widely used by Paul and may be considered distinctive of his anthropology. Paul argues against the Gnostic view that the human person is *essentially* spirit. Rather the person is properly considered as a unity of spirit, soul and body (1 Thess. 5:23). To be sure, the Hebrew Paul would not say that *pneuma* is the highest part of the person, although by the time of Irenaeus this inference had been drawn from his writing.<sup>30</sup>

A self which has *ruach* or *pneuma* as its highest principle may be integrated in a rather different way from one that has *mens* or *animus* as its highest part. Unorder does not now have to be dominated by ordering reason but can exist in a dynamic harmony with order. This kind of harmony is well exhibited in the phenomenon of play. It may be, as Johan Huizinga has suggested<sup>31</sup>, that the essentially human element in our make up does not just lie in our capacity for thought (*homo sapiens*) but in the fact that human beings can play (*homo ludens*). Many of the activities which most distinguish human beings from animals have the free character of a game: worshipping, celebrating festivals, creating art, enjoying a jam session, loving without an object or a reason. Children learn most through play; in playing we become more fully human. Play involves a balance of rules and order with enthusiastic spontaneity and creativity.

Consider also the phenomenon of laughter. Animals do not really laugh, neither do computers. Laughter is a way of celebrating our existence and of enjoying human society. It may also be a powerful way of dealing with evil. "In humour, human beings continue to confront the evil which by definition can never really be integrated. They relativise it without trivialising it and can therefore forgive. They do not accept the situation and as a result do not allow themselves to be stopped or paralysed by it."<sup>32</sup> Genuine laughter is spontaneous, yet it is not entirely free of order. We can rule some jokes as out of order or in bad taste. We can detect a cruel laugh.

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<sup>30</sup>Irenaeus *Adv. Haer.* V.vi.1 commenting on 1 Thess 5:23 says: "But when the spirit here blended with the soul is united to [the flesh] the man is rendered spiritual and perfect because of the outpouring of the Spirit, and this is he who was made in the image and likeness of God. But if the Spirit be wanting to the soul, he who is such is indeed of an animal nature, and being left carnal, shall be an imperfect being, possessing indeed the image [of God] in his formation, but not receiving the similitude through the Spirit, and thus is this being imperfect." (In *ANCL Vol. IX "The Writings of Ironies Vol. 2"* p67ff.)

<sup>31</sup>Huizinga J. *Homo Ludens* Foreward (unnumbered) Routledge 1949 cited in Suurmond (1994) p35.

<sup>32</sup>Suurmond (1994) p81.

It is the neurotic who is unable to play or whose laughter is always forced; for him unorder in the self is a source of threat which he must attempt to control. By contrast, the healthy person is able to give himself creatively and spontaneously, to play and to laugh well. In him, order and nonorder are united together in one spirit. [ref. (b) over-ordered]

Life in the presence of the immanent Spirit has sometimes been taken as inhibiting of human freedom, but this need not be the case. Such a life can be understood as one in which a space is conferred on us in which we may flourish. Moltmann notes the etymological links between *ruach* and *rewah* = breadth. "*Ruach* creates space. It sets in motion. It leads out of narrow places into wide vistas, thus conferring life."<sup>33</sup> The Spirit offers a free space for the exercise of our freedom (cf. 2 Cor. 3:17). Life "in the Spirit" is a mode of life which we freely assent to and in which new options and choices open up before us. We have the subjective experience of being free when we freely choose to co-operate with the Spirit and when all our faculties feel content in this choice.

To be possessed by the Holy Spirit should not be understood as being taken over by some alien, heteronomous being. The biblical *ruach* is properly conceived as an energetic rather than as a substantial notion. We are not talking here about superhuman substance as opposed to human substance. The Holy Spirit is "other" than us primarily in terms of His vastly greater energy and power. Whereas we are alive, the Holy Spirit also has power to confer life and to enliven. To be filled with the Holy Spirit is actually, as Moltmann has extensively demonstrated in his The Spirit of Life, to be raised up to a new order of living. On a significance-based understanding of selfhood, the gift of the Spirit opens up a new source of moral significance that was not there previously. The whole of life may now be lived in the assured presence of the divine Spirit. Each of life's experiences takes on a significance and value that it would otherwise not have. In this form of life the subjective feeling of wholeness coincides with the experience of freedom. [Ref. (a) Inadequate Concept of Freedom]

It should not be assumed that the Spirit's activity is restricted to the organisational boundaries of the Church or to those who explicitly confess to having a Christian faith. The Spirit "blows where it wills". We may find evidence of the Spirit's work wherever human lives are being made whole. [Ref. (g) Religious Exclusivity]

## 8.2 Learning from Freud

Freud both shows the task of unifying the self to be more complex than had hitherto been realised and offers us additional methods for addressing this complexity. His major achievement is to open up the realm of the unconscious. He demonstrates how things that happened to us which we cannot recall can still form part of our psychological make-up. In particular he shows how events

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<sup>33</sup>Moltmann (1992) p43 here quoting H. Schüngel-Straumann.

in early childhood are very much a part of us and have a continuing influence on our lives. [ref. (c) Lack of Awareness of the Unconscious]

Freud draws our attention to forces within the psyche that are fundamentally unordered. He legitimates the presence of instincts and passions that operate in a pre- or non-rational manner and which find their fulfilment in spontaneous experiences of pleasure. He suggests that the healthy self is composed of both ego and id, of order and non-order, of structure and energy. He shows how there are limits to the amount of control over the self that the rational ego might hope to obtain. He helps us to see that the self is more likely to be united through some degree of compromise between the competing forces than by the complete triumph of one over the other. Finally, he provides a more finely tuned notion of self-mastery than Augustine offered by distinguishing healthy, rational self-control from neurotic forms of repression. [ref. (b) Over-Ordered]

Freud's model of the psyche suggests that conflict between different regions of the psyche is a natural part of our make-up. We make psychological progress by rendering the conflicts conscious, not by eliminating them. Whilst Freud is inclined to see our endemic state of intrapsychic conflict as one of the grounds for our state of common unhappiness, he also shows how it can produce some important benefits - not least in providing a spur for the development of human culture. [ref. (d) Negative View of Conflict]

Freud suggests that the growth in self-knowledge that is necessary to achieve a unified self may well require the help of an objective other. We may question the effectiveness of the specific psychoanalytic techniques that were recommended by Freud, but would recognise the general need for some professionally trained therapist or spiritual director or skilled friend to help us come to terms with self-conflict. In some situations, for example where individuals have been abused as children or subject to deeply traumatic events, we would be inclined to follow Freud in seeing the value of analysis of dreams and other products of the unconscious as a clue to intrapsychic conflict. We would be inclined to think that psychoanalysis, or one of its contemporary successors, could sometimes be beneficial in such cases<sup>34</sup>. [ref. (i) Contemporary Helping Relationships]

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<sup>34</sup>See, for example, Sylvia Fraser's (1989) story of coming to terms with being the victim of an incestuous relationship through a gradual revealing of forgotten memories. She comments (p252): "My life was structured on the uncovering of a mystery...I did not remember my past...until the evil was contained, until I was stable enough and happy enough that sorrow or anger or regret or pain was overwhelmed by joy at my release. To reach this state, I needed the help of friends and healers."

### 8.3 Learning from Jung

The idea which is at the heart of Jung's system, the acceptance of one's shadow, may be somewhat reinterpreted so that it is not understood as acceptance of moral evil but as the acceptance of non-ordered aspects of the psyche. This is how the large volume of Christian-Jungian spiritual writing generally takes Jung.<sup>35</sup> Jung teaches us that the "whole self" is more than the rational and moral parts of our nature. The self includes the more unseemly, instinctive and impulsive aspects of our personality. Where Freud thought the self should attempt as far as it could to *control* these parts, Jung's insight is that they should be *accepted*.

Sometimes Jung and Freud are presented as if they merely offered variants on the same psychodynamically orientated therapy. In fact, as my analysis shows, Jung offers radically different insights from Freud. Freud stands in the tradition of those who take the self's capacity for rational thought as the essence of our selfhood. Jung, by contrast, stands within an alternative tradition that sees the realm of nature as constitutive of selfhood. Where Freud sees the unconscious as a dangerous swamp to be drained Jung sees it as a source of psychological treasure to be valued. Jung signals a decisive break with the Platonic project to unify the self under the hegemony of reason. He advocates a new way of uniting the self in which equal value is granted to the moral and the sensual, the ordered and the unordered. [ref. (b) Over-Ordered, (h) Undervaluing the Material and Temporal]

### 8.4 Learning from the Humanists

The humanists challenge the Augustinian assumption that freedom is primarily a matter of obedience to the divine moral order. They rightly point out that we appear to experience the feeling of freedom not merely when we are able to will and act wholeheartedly but also when we sense an act to be uniquely our own. Our sense of dignity and value as human agents is enhanced by the perception that we are free to make choices for ourselves. This is a component of the modern identity by which few in the West are unaffected. Very often it applies to what we might call non-moral goods, for example the choice of clothes to wear or how to decorate our houses. Augustine, by contrast, did not rate this kind of choice very highly. So far as choices in the moral arena are concerned, we experience the subjective quality of freedom when our choices are in line with what we take to be our sources of moral value. But contemporary life is subject to much greater plurality and disagreement over moral values than it has been in the past. Freedom of conscience is now valued in a way that Augustine would not have recognised. An important component of the modern understanding of freedom is the absence of constraints which would prevent one from adhering to one's own perception of the morally good in favour of some communally held vision of the good. The humanists rightly emphasise the importance of

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<sup>35</sup>E.g. John Sandford "The Problem of Evil in Christianity and Analytical Psychology" in ed. Moore (1988) pp109-130.

autonomous choice for human flourishing. Freedom may now be said to involve three components: i) The freedom not to be constrained to live according to values which are not our own preferred values; ii) the ability to line up all aspects of the person in line with our values; iii) the ability to give a rational defence of our values as being the best values out of the different value-sets available to us. [Ref. (a) Inadequate Concept of Freedom]

The humanists rightly draw our attention to the range of human needs which exist below the level of moral demand, at a level I called the *ordo bonorum* (chapter 6). They give us one attempt to clarify the order in which pre-moral goods must be supplied to human beings for them to flourish; indeed Maslow's hierarchy of needs has become the classic example of such an order. As I indicated, the goods in Maslow's hierarchy are not directly moral goods because, whilst we see them as objects or experiences that are good to pursue, we do not attribute to them moral qualities as such. The definition of pre-moral goods is a task of psychological description, not ethics. We move into the realm of ethics when these goods are placed within a wider moral order, such as an Augustinian "*ordo caritatis*". This order defines how the pre-moral goods are to be enjoyed and distributed. The *ordo caritatis* requires that goods are distributed on the principle of equal regard and that individuals are to be encouraged to act sacrificially to restore equality of regard where it is lacking. On these grounds my own physical and psychological needs may legitimately be satisfied to the point where this is consistent with the endeavour to meet my neighbour's needs. Maslow's hierarchy of needs shows how positive value may be attached to pre-moral goods, and provides a check on Augustine's tendency to value only goods which lie in the ethical and spiritual realms. [Ref. (h) Undervaluing the Material and Temporal]

The humanists suggest that the self-actualised person will be one who has achieved a particular "mode of relatedness" to the world. At its best this mode is a form of love which stresses friendship components (*philia*). Loving relationships in which one person loses him or herself in a dominating other or, conversely, relationships in which the person seeks to control another, are regarded as pathological. In the ideal loving relationship the parties retain the separateness and integrity of their individual selves whilst also being held in union with others. This notion of love seems more adequate as a means of describing our relationship to others and to God than the Augustinian *caritas*. [ref. (f) Love as *caritas* is inadequate]

The ideal of equality envisaged in a reciprocal relationship of love is the starting point for the humanistic understanding of the relationship between counsellor and client. The counsellor offers to be an Aristotelian "other self" through whom the client can gain a proper relationship with his or her own self. Within this context subjects can be aired and emotions expressed that an individual may not be able to deal with in ordinary friendship relationships. [ref. (i) Contemporary Context of Helping Relationships]



## **9. Attaining to the Unity of the Spirit**

I have suggested (8.1 above) that if we are to take with proper seriousness the contemporary stress on unordered parts of the personality we may do better to conceive of the highest part of the person as the spirit rather than the intellect. Rather than aiming in Platonic fashion to unite the self by subjugating the emotions to the mastery of reason<sup>36</sup> we need to envisage a co-operative harmony of reason and affection in which proper space is granted to the spontaneous and pre-rational elements of the self. This may be denoted theologically as a "unity of the spirit". It is understood to be conferred by the divine Spirit who inspires and unites all parts of the self in their common pursuit of God.

Augustine understood that the re-modelling and integration of the self after the image of God could not be achieved either solely through response to what was given by one's intellect nor merely through self-willing.<sup>37</sup> Only the strangely unpredictable pre-conscious response of the individual to sources of delight could move the will. This might be understood in terms of an encounter of the divine Spirit with the individual's spirit through which the individual is granted the ability to take delight in those things which make for true spiritual and psychological progress.

Augustine's doctrine of the Spirit was deficient in many respects and I have indicated how it ought to be revised if it is to be more accurate theologically and more effective for us psychologically.<sup>38</sup> Of particular importance is the recovery of the biblical notion of Spirit as pre-rational energy. The divine Spirit unites in himself both the non-rational and the rational; he is therefore able to act as the agent for securing this form of unity in human beings.

Freud did not, as far as I am aware, refer to the Christian doctrine of the Holy Spirit, but we may, with great caution, take his notion of psychological "energy" or libido as an analogy for the Spirit.<sup>39</sup> The Spirit, like Freud's psychic energy, is the fundamental force at work to build up life in the face of forces of chaos and destruction. Spirit is at work equally in the psychic depths of the id, as in the conscious realms of the ego. It is manifested both in our primal, unordered and inarticulate strivings as well as in the mature and ordered expressions of love.

As we have noted, Carl Jung made extensive reference to the spirit as a symbol for the integration of the self.<sup>40</sup> Jung thought that the domination of the emotions by the intellect would lead to a necessarily one-sided psychology. Only if both "sides" of the person could be given equal scope

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<sup>36</sup>Ch. 1 §4.3 *supra*.

<sup>37</sup>Ch. 3 §4.2.3 *supra*.

<sup>38</sup>§8.1 *supra*.

<sup>39</sup>Ch. 4 §4.

<sup>40</sup>Ch. 5 §8.

for development would the person be made whole. He saw the Christian notion of life in the Spirit as one way of expressing this. In Jung's terms possession by the Spirit may be understood as the surrendering of oneself to some power which is able to draw on the energy of the unconscious and which is consonant with the ideals of the rational mind. The latter gives the Spirit the sense of being a "good" spirit (rather than demonic) whilst the former confers a sense of otherness and ineffability. In a life lived according to the Spirit there is a balance between individual autonomy and the sense of being dependent on some greater, trans-personal reality. The person who is "possessed" by the Spirit feels "compelled" to act in a way which yet agrees with his or her own deepest longings. Jung thought that only through such a life could the self be properly integrated and healed.

Whilst the humanistic psychologists are not especially concerned with the Christian doctrine of the Spirit their whole programme emphasises what might broadly be termed the "spiritual" in the face of various kinds of psychological reductionism.<sup>41</sup> Maslow in particular thought that the self-actualised person was someone who enjoyed "peak experiences" when the whole self was temporarily lost in a sense of wonderment in which the person experienced a rare moment of harmony with himself and with the world.<sup>42</sup>

Hitherto some of the most important attempts to express the unity of the self in ways which do not take discursive reason as the highest principle of the mind have made reference to the place of art, and especially music, in human life.<sup>43</sup> We have seen that Fromm and Maslow both cited the artist as the exemplar of the self-actualised person. Foucault's final position was that the self itself ought to become an aesthetic production.<sup>44</sup> The "aesthetic" or "musical" self can, perhaps, be seen as a partial metaphor for the self which has attained to the unity of the spirit.

Music is frequently held to have a much stronger capability than ordinary language for representing the depth and range of our emotional life.<sup>45</sup> Yet music is not merely a form of sheer emotionalism; our emotional reaction to music necessarily has a cognitive component.<sup>46</sup> Indeed Storr cites some experimental evidence to show that a full response to music requires the active involvement of both the left ("rational") and right ("intuitive") hemispheres of the brain.<sup>47</sup> It appears that music demands of us a particularly wide-ranging level of mental response. Moreover,

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<sup>41</sup>Ch. 6 §2.

<sup>42</sup>Ch. 6 §4.4.

<sup>43</sup>E.g. Nietzsche (ET 1910); Langer (1963); Storr (1992).

<sup>44</sup>Ch. 2 §5.4.3.

<sup>45</sup>E.g. Nietzsche (ET 1910) para. 810; Langer p222.

<sup>46</sup>Raffman (1993) p27.

<sup>47</sup>Storr (1992) p38f.

some elements of this response go beyond what can be expressed in words. For certain technical but well substantiated reasons we are able to recognise in music more than we can say.<sup>48</sup>

It thus seems that in our full response to a moving piece of music we may be able to attain to a profound level of psychic unity which has much in common with what I have called the "unity of the spirit". Both intellect and emotion are harnessed together in a manner which transcends both but does not nullify either. This seems to be a more adequate way of describing the form of psychic unity to which we should aspire than, for example, the paradoxical notion of *coincidentia oppositorum* given by Jung.<sup>49</sup> The unity of the spirit, like the psychic unity we experience in the appreciation of music, goes beyond rational linguistic expressions without lapsing into irrationalism or mysticism.

### **10. The Spirit and the Corporate Context of Selfhood**

I have noted that each of the three main sources of the modern identity is an *inward* one. Positively this means that the modern Western sense of self has a high degree of depth and individuality. But, negatively, this may foster tendencies to individualism and excessive introspection, as has actually happened over the course of the twentieth century. The problem of individualism has become extremely pressing in our time with the growing realisation that many of our most urgent and important problems are social in nature. We face a rapidly deteriorating ecological situation which governments seem unable to tackle effectively. Linked to this, is the wide and growing level of inequality between peoples in the north and south of the planet. At a national level we are finding it increasingly difficult to retain a common moral basis for institutional and political life. We are experiencing the fragmentation of local communities and increasing levels of breakdown in marriages and disruption of family life. The array of dislocation at every social level from the married couple to world-wide ecology indicates that a theory of human selfhood which focuses on the individual in isolation from his or her relationships will prove seriously inadequate to current demands.

The social nature of human personhood is reflected in Freud's work and, more especially, in Fromm and Maslow. Freud stressed the importance of attachment to an other for proper psychological development; this insight has been developed and given a less directly sexual reference by the post-Freudian "object-relations" school. Fromm wrote of the primary need of relatedness that must be fulfilled if the self is to develop satisfactorily. In Maslow's hierarchy, the third (belongingness and love) and fourth (esteem) level of needs refer to our place in the wider

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<sup>48</sup>See Raffman (1993) on structural, feeling and nuance ineffability in music.

<sup>49</sup>Indeed Storr aptly comments (1992 p155): "Jung's lack of aesthetic appreciation is a serious limitation of his thought, as it is of Freud's...Had he been musical, a poet, a painter, or even a better writer, I think his psychology would have been more soundly based and would also have won greater acceptance."

society. In Maslow's scheme, one could not approach the degree of unity of self indicated by self-actualisation without proper attention to relationships with others.

The relational character of human personhood that is highlighted by contemporary psychologists may be interpreted theologically through a reflection on the place of the Spirit in our make-up. The Spirit is given in baptism, an event which sets the individual in new relationships with other members of the body of Christ and with God. St Paul maintains what Robert Jewett calls "a fluid frontier" between the idea of spirit as divine power and as an anthropological element.<sup>50</sup> For Paul, the *pneuma* is the gift of God poured out on human beings which completes them and sets them in relation to God. Thus Paul can sometimes speak of this *pneuma* as God's and sometimes as his own (cf. I Cor 12:3; 14:14). Paul thinks of *pneuma* as the apportioned divine spirit which becomes the centre of the human being.<sup>51</sup> "The *pneuma*, though always God's Spirit...is also the innermost ego of the one who no longer lives by his own being but by God's being for him."<sup>52</sup>

The spirit of the individual is thus at one and the same time a sharing in the common divine Spirit. Any attempt to define the individual in isolation from others and from God will, therefore, always be incomplete. In scriptural terms a discussion of the human *psuche* (cf. Heb. *nephesh*) can only give a partial description of the human self. From the perspective of *psuche* the self is seen as desiring and needy. By contrast, from the perspective of *pneuma* the self is seen as fulfilled by its participation in an entity greater than itself. The Pauline picture of the pneumatic body of Christ is that of a set of "overlapping selves" constituted by their sharing in one Spirit. Since the Spirit is both the innermost ego or "true self" of the individual and also the common Spirit of the whole body, one is understood to become more deeply oneself precisely as one becomes more fully integrated into the life of the whole.

The sense that one becomes more oneself at the same time that one becomes part of a larger body is experienced by Christians in their sharing in a common mission and, perhaps especially, in their participation in corporate worship. In the activity of worship I am most intensely myself and yet may simultaneously "lose myself" in the company of others. It is in corporate worship that the personal and social "unity of the spirit" is most deeply experienced and known.

### **11. The Spiritual and Psychological Goal**

Each of the four psychological streams I have considered suggests a different goal for mental development:

- Augustine envisages a condition of perfect rest, in which disorderly forces within the personality are stilled

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<sup>50</sup>Jewett (1971) p185.

<sup>51</sup>Jewett (1971) p197 (cf. Phil. 2:1).

<sup>52</sup>TDNT ed. Kittel Vol. VI Eerdmans Grand Rapids 1968 p436.

- Freud suggests the creation of a level playing field within the mind so that the opposing mental forces can compete on equal terms
- Jung talks of a profound act of self-acceptance
- The humanists envisage a condition of inner strength and autonomy such that the individual is preserved from damaging external forces in society.

Augustine is right to the extent that he envisages our goal as an ordered one, but unhelpful in insisting that it is a static order. Freud rightly restores the sense of dynamism to the self, but is unhelpful insofar as he sees conflict within the self as more fundamental than peace. Jung helpfully shows us that we must learn to accept rather than repress or master the un-ordered parts of the self, but unhelpfully takes this to the point of suggesting that we must accept positively evil parts of the self. The humanists rightly insist on the preservation of human autonomy but have an unduly negative view of relationships with God and an over-optimistic view of human nature.

I suggest that, drawing on all four of these streams, the psychological goal ought to be conceived as a situation of "dynamic ordering" of the self. This would take full account of the need to develop the non-ordered parts of the person, such as creativity, sexuality, capability for spontaneity, feeling and the expression of emotion. It recognises that there is a natural tension between these parts of the person and our rational, intellectual and moral components but it envisages that both "sides" of the person may grow in tandem. Our rationality may be more accurately deployed if informed by feeling and our emotions may be more finely tuned if guided by the intellect. The self is united through its desire for a God whose moral order is discerned and uncovered by the self through exploration and discovery with others. The self does not achieve its unity through merely taking its place in the divinely ordered cosmos. Rather, it achieves its unity through richer configurations of moral excellence, creativity and joy.

The goal is not to be conceived as a life lived under the domination of the intellect, but a life lived in the power of the Spirit. The following passage from Moltmann sets out a vision for what uniting the self in the Spirit might amount to. This vision may be compared and contrasted with the Platonic ideal of uniting the self under the hegemony of reason with which I started.

"The life [that] we say has been "born again" or "born anew" from God's eternal Spirit also wants to grow, and to arrive at its proper form, configuration or Gestalt. Our senses are born again too. The enlightened eyes of the understanding wake to the awareness of God, to knowledge of the glory of God in the face of Christ. In the dictates of life the liberated will explores its new energies. The beating heart experiences God's love, is warmed by it into love for life, and comes alive from its source. The experience of God's Spirit is like breathing the air: God is continually breathing, as it were, upon the soul, and the soul is breathing unto God.

## Conclusions

God's Spirit is life's vibrating, vitalising field of energy: we are in God, and God is in us. Our stirrings towards life are experienced by God, and we experience God's living energies. In the open air of the eternal Spirit, the new life unfurls. In the confidence of faith we plumb the depths of the Spirit, in love we explore its breadth, and in hope its open horizons. God's Spirit is our space for living."<sup>53</sup>

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<sup>53</sup>Moltmann (1992) p161.

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## **7. Conclusions**

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