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Non-Technical Skills in the Intensive Care Unit

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Summary

In high-risk industries such as aviation, the skills not directly related to technical expertise, but crucial for maintaining safety (e.g. teamwork), have been categorised as non-technical skills. Recently, research in anaesthesia has identified and developed a taxonomy of the non-technical skills requisite for safety in the operating theatre. Although many of the principles related to performance and safety within anaesthesia are relevant to the ICU, relatively little research has been done to identify the non-technical skills required for safe practice within the intensive care unit. This review focuses on ICU critical incident studies in order to examine whether the contributory factors identified as underlying critical incidents are associated with the skill categories (e.g. task management, teamwork, situation awareness and decision making) outlined in the Anaesthetists' Non-technical Skills (ANTS) taxonomy. The review found that a large proportion of the contributory factors underlying critical incident can be attributed to a non-technical skill category outlined in the ANTS taxonomy. This is informative both for future critical incident reporting, and also as an indication that the ANTS taxonomy may provide a good starting point for the development of a non-technical skills taxonomy for intensive care. However, the ICU presents a range of unique challenges to the practitioners working within it. It is therefore necessary to conduct further non-technical skills research, using human factors techniques such as root-cause analyses, observations of behaviour, attitudinal surveys, studies of cognition, and structured interviews to better understand the non-technical skills important for safety within the ICU. Examples of such research highlight the utility of these techniques.

The Department of Health's report on patient safety has encouraged healthcare providers in areas such as anaesthesia and intensive care medicine to emulate high-risk industries, for example aviation and nuclear power, in the application of human factors research to enhance safety⁹. In aviation, pilots' skills not directly related to technical expertise, but crucial for maintaining safety are called non-technical skills, and include interpersonal skills such as communication, teamwork and leadership, and cognitive skills such as task management, situation awareness and decision-making^{2, 16}. Within the nuclear power and aviation industries, the specific non-technical skills important for protecting against errors have been empirically identified and trained through Crew Resource Management courses⁴¹. During the last 20 years, the importance of non-technical skills for delivering safe and high-quality medical care has been increasingly recognised, if not explicitly addressed in medical training³¹. More recently, research has begun to identify the specific non-technical skills important for safety in medical domains such as Anaesthesia and Surgery^{15, 21, 25, 45}. Each working environment has its own unique non-technical requirements. Although the principal skill categories may be generic and relatively transferable across domains¹⁹, the component behaviours that demonstrate proficiency in those skills within a particular environment (e.g. the operating room) will be specific to the needs and characteristics of a domain^{27, 31}. Rall and Gaba³⁴ have pointed out that many of the principles related to performance and safety within anaesthesia are also pertinent to the ICU. The current article reflects on the relevance to the intensive care environment of the non-technical skills identified as being important for anaesthetists in the operating theatre.

The Anaesthetists' Non-Technical Skills (ANTS) behavioural marker system

Within anaesthesia, a taxonomy of the non-technical skills important for safety in the operating theatre, called the Anaesthetists' Non-Technical Skills (ANTS) behavioural marker system, has been produced. This was developed from an analysis of data from critical incident reporting systems, attitudinal surveys, theoretical models, observations and the judgements of consultant anaesthetists^{13, 35}. The ANTS taxonomy has 15 skill elements in four categories with observable examples of good and poor behaviours that demonstrate non-technical skill proficiencies or deficits (See Figure 1). This can be used to structure non-technical skills training for anaesthetists¹⁷, and the ANTS behavioural rating form can be used to assess anaesthetists' non-technical skills in theatre or in the simulator. For example, Yee *et al*⁴⁴ have shown, using the ANTS rating system in Canada, that taking part in anaesthesia crisis management courses results in an improvement in the non-technical skills of anaesthesia residents. While many anaesthetists are involved in intensive care medicine, the ANTS system was specifically designed to represent their non-technical skills in an operating theatre environment. To date, relatively little research has focussed upon identifying the non-technical skills important for protecting against human error in the ICU. However, studies examining human performance in the ICU have indicated the importance of non-technical skills such as teamwork and communication for safety and effective functioning^{12, 22, 39}.

Within the intensive care literature there exist a number of data sources identifying common causal factors underlying critical incidents in the ICU. Frey *et al*²⁰ highlight the fact that ICU critical incident reporting systems provide a source of information

that can be used for quality improvement. However, a recent patient safety report ¹ points out that although lessons are learnt at a local level from UK incident monitoring systems, these improvements do not tend to be shared more widely. By using critical incident reporting data to identify behaviours that are commonly found to contribute to a critical incident, some insight can be gained into the non-technical skills important for safety in the ICU. The current article provides a summary of the non-technical skill factors commonly associated with critical incidents in published ICU studies. The emerging factors were compared to the non-technical skills categories and elements identified by the ANTS behavioural marker system to see if this provided a suitable fit. As the principles related to performance and safety within anaesthesia and the ICU are similar, the generic skill categories (e.g. teamwork) identified as being important for anaesthesia may also be important for the ICU, even though the setting and work tasks are different.

Method

The identification of research articles involved a comprehensive search of the Medline, Biomed Central and Web of Knowledge Psychology databases for English language papers related to critical incidents and errors in the intensive care unit (see figure 2 for a flow diagram of the review methodology). Search terms were: Intensive care / non-technical skills / ICU / critical incidents / errors / adverse events. The search was limited to article titles and abstracts. Articles initially found (n=754) were scrutinised for possible inclusion through the relevance of their titles, and then abstracts. This left a total of 24 possible articles. The remaining articles were then filtered for inclusion if they met the criteria of: i) using data collected exclusively in the ICU; and ii) allowing for contributory factors referring to non-technical skills (as specified by the ANTS taxonomy) to be documented in the analysis of critical incidents. A total of 11 articles met these criteria, and were then analysed using the ANTS taxonomy¹³. The ANTS behavioural marker system identifies four core categories of non-technical skills (see figure 2), each comprised of several elements, and for each element, exemplar component behaviours relevant to actual practice in anaesthesia^{13, 14, 16}. The four core non-technical skill categories include:

Task Management: ‘Managing resources and organising tasks to achieve goals...’

Team Working: ‘Skills for working in a group context, in any role, to ensure joint task completion and team satisfaction...’

Situation Awareness: ‘Developing and maintaining an overall dynamic awareness of the situation based on perceiving the elements in the environment... understanding what they mean and thinking ahead...’

Decision Making: ‘Making decisions to reach a judgement or diagnosis about a situation, or to select a course of action, based on experience or new information...’

Each article was reviewed in order to identify the contributing factors underlying incidents that were associated with non-technical skills. This was done by examining the individual contributing factors identified in each article, and then assessing whether they could be clearly identified as belonging to a particular non-technical skill category, as outlined in the Anaesthetists’ Non-Technical Skills (ANTS) handbook ¹⁶. Each contributory factor was classified according to the overall skill category to which it was found to refer. For example, contributory factors such as ‘inadequate assistance’ would be classified as being indicative of teamwork skills, ‘distraction or inattention’ would be classified as indicative of situation awareness skills, ‘errors of judgement’ as decision making skills, and ‘failure to check equipment’ as task management skills. If suitable numerical data were included in the article, the total number of contributory factors associated with non-technical skills was calculated, as was the proportion that each individual factor contributed (see table 1). Furthermore, for all of the studies reviewed, the proportion of contributory factors that each of the four non-technical skill categories accounted for was calculated. To avoid a bias towards studies reporting large numbers of contributory factors, percentage data was used instead of raw data. This involved a 2-stage process; where for each study the total percentage of non-technical skill contributory factors that each skill category accounted for was calculated. These percentages were then aggregated, with the mean percentage of contributory factors identified as belonging to each non-technical skill category being shown in figure 3. Lastly, the percentage of contributory

factors, out of all possible contributory factors, associated with non-technical skills was calculated (49%). The non-technical skill classification process was conducted by three applied psychologists familiar with the non-technical skills literature. The contributory factors underlying incidents were independently classified in terms of the non-technical skills outlined in the ANTS handbook. For all of the factors in Table 1, there was a 91% level agreement by at least 2 assessors for the underlying ANTS category, and 71% agreement by all 3 assessors. For factors where there was no initial agreement, the assessors collaboratively referred to the ANTS handbook in order to reach a final agreement on the underlying ANTS category. It is notable that the contributory factors documented in the critical incident studies do not document one single practitioner role in the ICU (i.e. the role of both nurses and doctors are considered), and thus at this stage, the analysis is not role specific. Furthermore, each factor does not refer to one incident, and thus a combination of factors may be underlying any single critical incident.

Results and Discussion

It can be seen from table 1 that a wide range of contributory factors associated with critical incidents can be accounted for by the non-technical skill categories outlined in the ANTS taxonomy. Overall, out of 2677 incidents and 5610 total contributory factors, 50% can be attributed to some form of non-technical skill deficit. These figures do not include the Hart et al ²⁴ study as it does not provide numerical data on the contributory factors underlying incidents. Across all of the studies, Task Management was found to account for the greatest proportion of non-technical skill contributory factors (figure 3). The second greatest was Situation Awareness, the third greatest was Team Working, and the fourth greatest was Decision Making. However,

this breakdown is entirely constrained by the type of data the reviewed critical incident studies were designed to capture. For example, critical incident studies tend to vary in the different categories and types of data they collect, with some studies collecting very minimal non-technical skills related data. This may explain the high proportion of incidents associated with task management, as critical incidents studies tend to show a bias for capturing technical contributory factors related to task management skills, e.g. checking equipment, following protocols, inadequate preparation of patients. However, less provision may exist for capturing contributory factors associated with non-technical skills such as decision-making, e.g. failing to consider options, not asking others for suggestions, or being unwilling to revise courses of action in the light of new information.

A further limitation of critical incident studies is that they lack a fine-grained analysis of the non-technical factors underlying incidents. In the current review, although contributory factors such as ‘errors of judgment’ and ‘failure to follow protocol’ may show face validity with skills such as ‘decision making’ and ‘task management’, the precise details underlying those factors cannot be ascertained. For example ‘errors of judgment’ may arise due to deficiencies in recognizing and understanding information (i.e. situation awareness), ‘and failure to follow protocol’ might arise due to a lack of supervision (i.e. teamwork/leadership). Also, a considerable number of contributory factors identified in the study were not possible to classify due to the underlying non-technical skill not being obviously apparent. For example, factors such as ‘insufficient staff’ might be associated with task management, or may be more indicative of staffing policies. Lastly, it can be seen that although the Hart et al.²⁴ study does not include numerical data, it does provide some supporting evidence for the relevance to

the ICU of the non-technical skills described in the ANTS taxonomy, as well as highlighting the utility of including numerical data when analysing accident causation.

Despite the above issues, the current review does demonstrate that even though a variety of different contributory factors are captured by ICU critical incident studies, a large proportion of these can be attributed to the non-technical skill categories outlined in the ANTS taxonomy. This is both informative for the future development and use of data from critical incident reporting systems, as well as being indicative that the ANTS taxonomy may provide a good starting point for the development of a non-technical skills taxonomy for intensive care. However, it is also apparent that further research, using a range of techniques, is required for better identifying the non-technical skills necessary for maintaining safety in the ICU. The ANTS system used several techniques to collect data regarding practice in anaesthesia in order to generate a non-technical skills taxonomy tailored for the anaesthetists' role in the operating room¹⁴.

The techniques for gathering the basic skill set can include root-cause analyses, observations of behaviours in real-time and simulated environments, attitudinal surveys, studies of cognition, and structured interviews^{2, 15, 26, 36}. Each technique provides different forms of data. For example, root-cause analysis describes in detail the precise factors underlying critical incidents but can be limited to a specific scenario or procedure as well as the analysis procedure used to assess the incident. Observational approaches record behaviour as it occurs in a variety of conditions, for example during an emergency procedure, although it is difficult in real-life studies for

observers to capture all the events that occur within an environment, furthermore there is the potential for participant behaviours to be altered by the presence of a researcher. Attitudinal surveys highlight opinions on the importance of skills such as teamwork, and are informative about the social and organizational factors that affect perceptions of error and rule compliance, though generally do not provide specific information about the non-technical skills underlying good performance. Studies of cognition use experimental methods to model and understand the factors that affect cognitive processes (e.g. decision-making) within a particular environment, but are also susceptible to participant behaviours being altered by the experimental paradigm, e.g. the use of a low fidelity simulator. Structured interviews utilize the knowledge and experience of domain experts in ascertaining the non-technical skills required for coping with emergency and routine situations, although perceptions of confidentiality, and the relationship between the interviewer and interviewee, can affect the data obtained.

The techniques described above could provide a rich source of non-technical skills information for the ICU, as well as providing useful examples for developing training materials. Although research focussing on non-technical skills in the ICU is still very much in its infancy, there are examples of research within both the critical care and psychology literatures that have used the human factors techniques described above. Examples of such studies were found during the earlier literature search, and whilst not containing suitable data for inclusion in the critical incident review, are potentially informative and are therefore discussed below. Included in the following four sections are examples of human factors research using root-cause analysis, observational studies, studies of cognition, and attitudinal surveys, that have been found to yield

information regarding the non-technical skills required for safe practice in the ICU. Although the findings of such research does not explicitly describe in detail the non-technical skills required for the intensive care environment, and are insufficient for developing a taxonomy of non-technical skills in the ICU, they do provide informative data with respect to validating and describing the relevance to the ICU of the non-technical skill categories outlined in the ANTS taxonomy.

Root-cause analysis of ICU adverse events

Root cause analysis identifies the fundamental causes of more serious critical incidents, and distinguishes the technical and non-technical contributory factors that originated from both the local and organisational environment. In particular, root-cause analyses of adverse events in US ICUs published by Pronovost and colleagues^{32, 33} underlined the importance of the non-technical skill category of team working, and specifically communication processes that support good team working, in the prevention of incidents. For example, in a case where a patient suffering hospital-acquired pneumonia was accidentally given an undiluted medication³², a lack of communication and understanding between an ICU doctor and trainee nurse for the medication handover procedure was identified as one of the main contributory factors. In another case, where a patient being treated for heart and renal failures suffered an air embolism after a large central venous catheter was removed whilst the patient was sitting up³³, one of the main contributory factors identified as underlying the incident was the reluctance of a nurse, who recognised that the catheter removal was being done incorrectly, to speak up and correct the trainee doctor conducting the procedure. Thus, root-cause analyses can provide non-technical skills information relating to both a particular situation, such as a lack of shared understanding for team member

roles in a specific procedure, or a more general aspect of teamwork, such as the need for open communication between doctors and nurses.

Observational studies of ICU teams in real-life and simulators

Non-technical skill competencies in the ICU can be further investigated through observational studies, which involves either observations of real-life environments, or of videotaped ICU scenarios that take place in medical simulators. Lighthall *et al*²⁸ observed the performance of ICU staff on a training course which realistically simulates the intensive care environment and presents cases which challenge both medical and non-technical skills. Their analysis identified commonly occurring types of errors relating to the non-technical skill categories of situation awareness, decision making, teamwork and task management, and their specific impact upon the provision of care. Vigilance and fixation errors such as failing to recognise changes on monitors, not responding to ventilator alarms, and failing to periodically check patient status whilst placing a line, resulted in unrecognised deteriorations in the simulated patient condition. Judgement errors such as placing a catheter in a deteriorating patient, and being complacent with abnormal vital signs, resulted in inappropriate delays of therapy and clinical deterioration. Communication and task management errors such as failing to communicate priorities, overloading nurses with requests, and not following up inquiries on lab results resulted in insignificant tasks being done instead of key tasks, tasks not being done in a timely manner, and forgotten requests not being identified.

A real-life observational study conducted by Donchin and colleagues¹² has also underlined the importance of detailing team competencies required for safe practice in

the ICU. The study investigated the nature and causes of errors in an Israeli ICU collected data over a period of 4 months, and involved observers noting all activities, interactions and errors that occurred around patient bedsides. Out of the 8178 activities recorded, approximately 1% were erroneous, with doctors being found to commit around half of all errors despite being involved in just 4.7% of activities. In particular, team working problems were highlighted as being an important factor in the occurrence of errors, with verbal communication between nurses and doctors being reported in 37% of errors, despite being observed in only 2% of activities. Donchin and colleagues hypothesized that this may have occurred due to informal communication exchanges, and misunderstandings and misperceptions during communication. Therefore, observational studies in real-life and simulators can associate certain non-technical skills (e.g. team working) with measurable outcomes (e.g. errors), as well as understanding the causes and environments in which behaviours and errors occur.

Attitudes towards non-technical skills in the ICU

Attitudinal studies in the ICU have also focussed upon non-technical skills, with surveys in the US examining the attitudes of ICU staff with respect to teamwork and error. These studies have shown that the majority of both nurses and doctors feel that junior team members should be able to question senior members, and that decision-making should include more team member input³⁸. However, it has also been found that more nurses than doctors report finding it difficult to speak-up in the ICU, and that fewer nurses than doctors report feeling that their input about patient care is well received, that disagreements in the ICU are properly resolved, and that teamwork between nurses and doctors is well coordinated⁴⁰. Furthermore, whilst the majority of

ICU staff acknowledge the importance of medical errors, they also report having difficulty in openly discussing mistakes due to factors such as the expectations of other staff members and negative personal implications³⁸. Thus, attitudinal studies can be useful in that they highlight the fact that a number of organisational factors may influence the use of non-technical skills such as teamworking in the ICU. For example a lack of perceived communication openness between nurses and doctors may make nurses reticent to become involved in patient care decisions, and the negative personal implications associated with discussing errors may result in the root causes behind errors not being identified and addressed.

Studies of cognition in the ICU

Studies of cognition in the intensive care unit have described the processes underlying decision making by ICU staff during their provision of care to patients. Decision-making is a non-technical skill that has been researched by a number of psychologists, with studies examining whether expert decision-making in the ICU relies on similar cognitive processes to other complex work domains. Patel and Arocha²⁹ have studied decision-making processes by consultants in US surgical and medical ICUs, where caregivers face different problems. An analysis of audiotape transcripts from the morning rounds revealed that in the medical ICU (where it is necessary to diagnose patient conditions and then make treatment decisions) there was a tendency for decisions to be made using 'backwards driven reasoning'. This involved developing a hypothesis about a situation and then testing and refining it against the available data before coming to a solution. By contrast, in the surgical ICU (where patients were recovering from a surgical procedure, and thus their diagnosis was better understood), decisions were found to be made through 'forwards driven reasoning'. This involved

first gathering information about a situation and then recognising the solution from the perceived data. Likewise, Cesna and Mosier asked nurses how they would react to an emergency situation in the ICU¹⁰. Expert nurses tended to immediately recognise the best solution for the situation. In contrast, less experienced nurses were shown to have a tendency to generate several options, with the best option not being generated first. In both studies, decision making was found to be consistent with recognition primed decision-making³⁰, a form of naturalistic decision making where an expert relies on their experience and knowledge to ‘pattern match’ or recognise a situation, and then recall a viable course of action without having to consider all the alternatives.

Studies of cognition can be highly useful for understanding the processes underlying non-technical skills such as decision making, and whilst not providing a direct relationship between non-technical skills and safety, insight can be gained with regards to training and enhancing non-technical skills. For example, as expert decision makers are found to focus their attention on identifying situational features rather than choosing between options, training could focus on situation awareness skills such as altering scanning behaviours in accordance with patient conditions, and improving communication and cross-checking amongst team members so that information necessary for decision-making is shared immediately. Alternatively, less experienced decision makers could be trained to develop the mental models and patterns they require for recognising situations and associated solutions⁴³.

Conclusion

The current review of contributory factors underlying critical incidents demonstrates an overlap between the non-technical skills requirements of the ICU and anaesthesia, with both domains having a need for good teamwork, situation awareness, task management and decision-making skills. This is consistent with other high-risk domains, such as aviation, where non-technical skill competencies for the same skills are recognised as being crucial for safe practice, and are taught through tailored training packages. Furthermore, to teach and reliably assess non-technical skills within a particular domain it is necessary to identify the component behaviours that demonstrate proficiencies of these skills within the domain³¹. Each work environment has its own particular needs and characteristics, and the behaviours that demonstrate non-technical skill competencies within the ICU will be specific to the demands of intensive care medicine, as well as the roles and responsibilities of caregivers.

Therefore, it can be concluded that it is necessary to further research the non-technical skill proficiencies required for safe practice in the ICU, and to describe them in sufficient detail so that they can be taught and reliably assessed. Ideally, as non-technical skill training programmes are integrated with the technical aspects of a domain, training packages are implemented once professionals have an adequate level of technical competence. This also reduces the cognitive load of having to learn both technical and non-technical skills simultaneously. The current review demonstrates that the framework of non-technical skill categories identified in the ANTS taxonomy is also pertinent to the ICU, and thus provides a useful foundation for future investigations. Research using other investigation techniques, including root-cause analysis, attitudinal surveys, structured interviews, observational studies, and studies

of cognition, could facilitate a greater understanding of the non-technical skills required for supporting safety in the ICU. Although research focussing specifically on non-technical skill competencies for the ICU is limited, examples of research in the ICU using human factors techniques can be found to both support the importance of the non-technical skill categories outlined in the ANTS taxonomy, as well as providing examples of how such research can aid in identifying the non-technical skill competencies required for intensive care. Through using a combination of all the research techniques described, future work can better understand the nature and key challenges of the ICU environment, its' non-technical skill requirements, the behaviours that demonstrate non-technical skill proficiencies, and the organizational factors that affect the quality of non-technical skills demonstrated by nurses and doctors in the ICU.

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Figure 1. Anaesthetists Non-technical Skills Taxonomy^{13, 14, 16}. For more details please see the ANTS website

(www.abdn.ac.uk/iprc/ants.shtml).




Figure 2. Literature review flow diagram




Table 1: Non-technical skill contributory factors (as detailed by the ANTS taxonomy) identified in ICU critical incident studies*Published as: Reader, T., Flin, R., Lauche, K., & Cuthbertson, B. (2006). Non-technical skills in the Intensive Care Unit. British Journal of Anaesthesia, 96, 551-559.*

Non-technical skill contributory factors					
Paper	Identification Method	No. of factors	%	Contributory factors	Associated ANTS Category
Wright et al., 1991 (42)	Anonymous questionnaires (137 incidents and 97 contributory factors reported)	38	63%	Inexperience with equipment	Task Management
			13%	Failure to check equipment	Task Management
			10%	Failure to perform hourly checks	Task Management
			8%	Poor communication	Team Working
			3%	Not documenting changes	Task Management
			3%	Forgetting	Situation Awareness
Hart et al., 1994 (24)	Anonymous questionnaires (390 incidents)	NA		Deficiencies in communication	Team Working
				Failure to accept or adhere protocols	Task Management
				Attention	Situation Awareness
				Distraction	Situation Awareness
				Reduced vigilance	Situation Awareness
Beckmann et al., 1996 (3)	Incident reporting forms (610 incidents and 1896 contributory factors)	701	23%	Error of recognition or anticipation	Situation Awareness
			18%	Failure to follow protocol	Task Management
			13%	Communication	Team Working
			13%	Error of judgement	Decision Making
			13%	Distraction / inattention	Situation Awareness
			12%	Failure to check equipment	Task Management
			8%	Inadequate training	Task Management
Buckley et al., 1997 (8)	Incident reporting forms (281 incidents and 658 contributory factors)	454	19%	Inadequate assistance	Team Working
			17%	Deviation from standard techniques	Task Management
			17%	Inexperience	Task Management
			16%	Error of judgement	Decision Making
			14%	Distraction	Situation Awareness
			6%	Inadequate communication	Team Working
			6%	Failure to check	Situation Awareness
			2%	Unfamiliar environment	Task Management
			2%	Unfamiliar procedure or equipment	Task Management
			1%	Wrong technique chosen	Decision Making
Beckmann et al., 2001 (5)	Incident reporting forms of reintubations (143 incidents and 258 contributory factors)	165	54%	Error of judgement	Decision Making
			20%	Problem recognition	Situation Awareness
			18%	Inadequate patient assessment	Situation Awareness
			8%	Inadequate training	Task Management
Bracco et al., 2001 (8)	Incident reporting forms (777 incidents and 777 contributory factors)	241	37%	Failure to execute plan as intended	Task Management
			32%	Surveillance errors	Situation Awareness
			31%	Application of inappropriate plan	Decision Making
Beckmann et al., 2003 (4)	Incident reporting forms and medical chart review (211 incidents and 224 contributory factors)	83	17%	Communication problem	Team Working
			14%	Inattention or absent mindedness	Situation Awareness
			12%	Failure to check equipment	Task Management
			10%	Poor teamwork	Team Working
			10%	Inexperience or Inadequate training	Task Management
			8%	Inappropriate behaviour or action	Task Management
			8%	Pressure to proceed	Team Working
			8%	Lack of supervision	Team Working
			7%	Taking short cuts or breaking rules	Task Management
			6%	Failure to provide/enforce protocol or policy	Task Man. / Team Wk
			Beckmann et al., 2004 (6)	Incident reporting forms identifying cases of intra-hospital transfers (191 incidents and 900 contributory factors)	355
14%	Error of judgement	Decision Making			
13%	Communication problem	Team Working			
12%	Failure to follow protocol	Task Management			
9%	Inadequate training	Task Management			
9%	Patient preparation inadequate	Task Management			
7%	Patient assessment inadequate	Situation Awareness			
7%	Failure to check equipment	Task Management			
6%	Inexperience	Task Management			
4%	Lack of supervision	Team Working			
3%	Distraction / inattention	Situation Awareness			
Graf et al., 2005 (23)	Incident reporting forms (50 incidents and 81 contributory factors)	69	19%	Disregard of standards, rules and orders	Task Management
			16%	Communication insufficiency, misunderstanding	Team Working
			15%	Drug given but not prescribed	Task Management
			10%	Wrong, incomplete or / delayed echocardiographic assessment	Sit Aware / Task Man.
			10%	Delayed intervention	Task Management
			10%	Wrong dose	Task Management
			9%	Lack of experience	Task Management
			4%	Wrong, incomplete or / delayed electrocardiographic assessment	Sit Aware / Task Man.
			4%	Wrong diagnosis	Situation Awareness
			3%	Order illegible	Team Working
Rothschild et al., 2005 (30)	Observations, incident reporting forms, computerised ADE detection monitors and medical chart review (277 incidents 329 contributory factors)	295	57%	Medication error in ordering or execution of treatment	Task Management
			17%	Failure to take precautions or follow protocol to prevent accidental injury	Task Management
			13%	Inadequate reporting/communication	Team Working
			4%	Avoidable delays in diagnosis	Task Management
			3%	Inadequate patient assessment	Situation Awareness
			2%	Inadequate training / supervision	Task Man. / Team Wk
			2%	Inadequate reporting or communication	Team Working
			1%	Avoidable treatment delay	Task Management
			1%	Failure to check equipment or defective equipment	Task Management
Total	2677 incidents (5610 contributory factors)	2401			

Figure 3. The proportion of contributory factors across all studies (see table 1) that each of the four non-technical skill categories accounts for.

