



<b>Title</b>	<b>Does export dependence imply more political support in Sino-Africa relation since 2000?</b>
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香港大學

THE UNIVERSITY OF HONG KONG

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**Title:**

**Does Export Dependence Imply More Political Support in Sino-Africa Relation since 2000?**

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**Capstone Project Report Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the Master of International and Public Affairs**


**Department of Politics and Public Administration**

**The University of Hong Kong**

2016


**Declaration**

I declare that this Capstone Project Report, entitled “Does export dependence imply more political support in Sino-Africa Relation since 2000?”, represents our own work, except where due acknowledgement is made, and that it has not been previously included in a thesis, dissertation or report submitted to this University or any other institution for a degree, diploma or other qualification. (Signed by all)



## I. Acknowledgements


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## II. Abstract

China has been allegedly expanding its influence on Africa through capitalising trades with African countries, which has been on notable rise since 2000s. In line with export dependence theory, this paper aims at testing the relationship between China's export and its political influence to the dependent African countries between 2000 and 2011. Export will be analysed through the dimensions of export amount, market share and the disaggregation of commodities. The latter two aspects in the Sino-African relations are comparatively less mentioned in previous literatures. Voting alignment with export dominant country in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) will be utilised to measure influence. Three resources exporting countries namely Angola, Nigeria and South Africa are chosen for case studies.

Contrary to the presumption, our finding shows that influence of export amount is not directly proportional to the voting coincidence in UNGA between export dominant and dependent countries. Instead, influence from market share to voting alignment is largely valid in Angola and partially valid in South Africa (i.e. only invalid in Nigeria). This result may carry policy implication that countries attempt to augment its political influence in UNGA may also need to enlarge market shares rather than solely expanding the export amount.




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
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
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


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
## Abbreviation List

ANC	African National Congress
BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
EXIM Bank	Export-Import Bank of China
FDI	Foreign domestic investment
FNLA	National Liberation Front of Angola
FOCAC	Forum on China-Africa Cooperation
ICBC	Commercial Bank of China
IMF	International Monetary Fund
MPLA	Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
ODA	Official development assistance
OECD	Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development
PAC	Pan Africanist Congress
PLA	People's Liberation Army
PRC	People's Republic of China
SSA	Sub-Saharan Africa






UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference On Trade And Development
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNITA	National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
US	United States
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WTO	World Trade Organization
WW2	Second World War



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## 1. Literature Review

Over the past almost 70 years, China has started to transform its diplomatic relations from countries all over the world. China introduced the remarkable Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence, which includes mutual recognition on: (1) territorial sovereignty, (2) non-aggression; (3) non-interference on internal affairs, (4) mutual benefits through cooperation, and (5) peaceful co-existence, which sets a foundation for China's diplomatic relations.<sup>1</sup> Adhering to these principles, China achieved new diplomatic ties with 22 Asian countries, 23 Western Asian and North African countries, 44 African countries, 12 European and Central Asian countries, 41 European countries, 12 North American and Oceania countries, and 21 Latin American countries, a total of 175 countries all over the world.<sup>2</sup>

The relationship between China and Africa is always seen as significant, as China and Africa shared the status of third world countries, and as well as their shared ideology of anti-US and anti-imperialist.<sup>3</sup> Since the failure of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) regime, China's leader Mao Zedong had been putting forward the 'Three Worlds' policy, which includes Asia (except Japan), Africa and Latin America.<sup>45</sup> At that time, Mao Zedong proposed that China would firmly support

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
<sup>1</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, n.d.

<sup>2</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, n.d.

<sup>3</sup> Maswana, n.d.

<sup>4</sup> Alden, 2007

<sup>5</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, n.d.



countries from the third world and fight against hegemonism from the US and the USSR, so to deter from being exploited or bullied.


### *1.1 History of the Sino-African Relations*

The Sino-African relations started after the Second World War (WW2). It can be broadly divided into four periods, (1) the normalization period (1949-1977); (2) the transitional period (1978-1994); (3) the rapid development period (1995-2000); and lastly (4) the post establishment of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) period (2000 onwards).<sup>6</sup> After the WW2 and China's Cultural Revolution, the Chinese government eventually shifted its focus on economic development. The first significant move of the Sino-African relations happened in 1955, where the first bilateral conference, Bandung Conference was held in Bandung, Indonesia. Another milestone occurred in the late 1970s, where the Communist Party of China had started to build close relations with African parties. Where in 1982, Premier Zhao Ziyang introduced the "Four Principles on Sino-African Economic and Technical Cooperation", which consisted of equality, bilateralism, effectiveness and co-development.<sup>7</sup> In 2000, the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation held their first ministerial conference in Beijing. Up till now, 6 ministerial conferences were held, and the Sino-African relation has rapidly grown.

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<sup>6</sup> Li, 2006 in Li, 2008

<sup>7</sup> Li, 2008



## *1.2 Influence of FOCAC*

This essay focused on the post 2000 period because 2000 was the year when China and Africa held their first FOCAC meeting. And since then, Africa-China trade increased rapidly since then. As mentioned in Danchie (2011), trade between China and Africa increased rapidly between 2000 and 2009, by a rise of 750%.<sup>8</sup> Their economic and trade cooperation improved drastically because of the agreements signed between China and African countries. By the end of 2009, China signed economic and trade agreements with 45 countries in Africa.<sup>9</sup> For instance, since 2005, China has signed zero-tariff agreements with African countries, hoping to encourage African countries exporting to China. At the 2012 FOCAC ministerial meeting, China also promised to impose zero-tariff to 97% of the tariff items.<sup>10</sup>

## *1.3 Trends in Sino-African Economic Relations*

According to the World Bank's World Integrated Trade Solution, in 2014, China being the largest export receiver, contributed to 8.58% (equals to US\$13,138,650.27) of Sub-Saharan Africa's (SSA) exports.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> Tralac in Danchie, 2011

<sup>9</sup> FOCAC, 2011

<sup>10</sup> FOCAC, 2012

<sup>11</sup> World Integrated Trade Solution, 2014






Figure 1: China's export amount from SSA and export share in SSA

(Source: Data extracted from World Bank's World Integrated Trade Solution)<sup>12</sup>

China is also the largest importer to SSA, its share has increased from 7.63% to 14.31% (equivalent to US\$28,810,593.74) from 2005.<sup>13</sup>

<sup>12</sup> World Integrated Trade Solution, 2014

<sup>13</sup> World Integrated Trade Solution, 2014






Figure 2: China's import amount and import share in SSA


(Source: Data extracted from World Bank's World Integrated Trade Solution)<sup>14</sup>

From figure 1 and figure 2, we can see that there are general growing trends in both export and import amount and share between China and the African continent.

#### 1.4 Trends in UN Voting

Since the People's Republic of China (PRC) replaced Taiwan at the United Nations in 1971, China has been heavily relied on UN to promote its international

<sup>14</sup> World Integrated Trade Solution, 2014




position.<sup>15</sup> Before China joined the UN, it was recognized as a communist country, and is being excluded in the international arena. In 1978, with Deng Xiaoping being the new leader, China has gradually turned to the capitalist road. Together with China's participation in the UN and becoming one of the five permanent members in 1971, UN has been providing legitimacy to China, and it is the only way China can transform into a recognized global power.

All 54 African countries are members of the UN, out of the 193 UN member states, contributing to 28% of the membership, in contrast to Eastern European region, Latin American region, Asian region and Western region's 9%, 21%, 23% and 19% respectively.

According to figure 3, it shows that the voting alignment between China and US diverged between 1983 and 1991 and since 1996, the voting affinity is generally lower than 0.1. Thus, this paper chooses to focus on the post 2000 period, where voting affinity remains low for over a decade. This paper hopes to draw a core focus on the between political affiliation and economic ties between China and African countries, which has been accelerated since the formation of the FOCAC.

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<sup>15</sup> Tieh, 2004








Figure 3: Voting alignment of China with US


(Source: Data from Ellis, 2013: 11)<sup>16</sup>

### 1.5 Trade Dependency Theory

Hirschman (1969) wrote on introducing the relationship of dependence that can arise out of trading activities.<sup>17</sup> According to this dependency theory, through trade both countries could benefit, and thus, can on one hand alleviate military pressure and war occurrence, and on the other hand, it can also be a source of national power. Hirschman uses Germany as an example, where it “said to have unintentionally created a strong dependence amongst European countries during the

<sup>16</sup> Ellis, 2013: 11

<sup>17</sup> Hirschman, 1969



inter-war years as a result of concentration of their trade towards the German market.”<sup>18</sup>

Under the dependency theory, it can be understood that through trade and various dependent factors, such as treaties, arms sales, etc., could demonstrate associations with voting behavior, and this essay mainly focuses on United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) voting.<sup>19</sup> Dependency theory hypothesizes that strong trade relations can highly alter the foreign policy behavior of the weaker state which is dependent on the stronger state. It is basically an international version of Marxism, for instance, “the incorporation of a national elite into an bourgeoisie produces decisionmakers who, owing not only to the economic interests they share with American elites through economic transactions but also to their shared values and perspectives, produce policy virtually indistinguishable from that which would be generated by American elites.”<sup>20</sup>

In the similar scenario, in China and Africa relations, China being the more powerful state and African countries as weaker states, as African countries highly dependent on exporting goods to China, China has a loftier bargaining power over African countries, which it can use for its political purposes.<sup>21</sup> Although China always emphasizes on mutual autonomy, under this dependency theory, it is believed


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<sup>18</sup> Ellis, 2013: 20

<sup>19</sup> Moon, 1983

<sup>20</sup> Singer, 1972 in Moon, 1983: 321

<sup>21</sup> Hirschman, 1980



that it would undermine African countries' autonomy when it comes to political decision-making.

### *1.6 Why focusing on export?*

According to Richardson (1976), nonindustrial countries, which are economically smaller in size, are relatively dependent upon foreign trade.<sup>22</sup> Richardson (1976), Richardson and Kegley (1980) and Alam (2012) are examples experimenting how trade dependence is impacting nonindustrial countries' voting alignment with US or the former USSR.<sup>232425</sup>

Similarly, as most of the African countries are highly reliant on exporting minerals, few of them are industrial countries. Hence, the places that these African countries export to are usually economic giants who are in dominant position in the trade relations. Political compliances are usually developed through such kind of trade relations.


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<sup>22</sup> Richardson, 1976

<sup>23</sup> Richardson, 1976

<sup>24</sup> Richardson and Kegley, 1980


<sup>25</sup> Alam, 2012



In addition, the US government has been keeping tracks on the effectiveness of utilizing economic tools on the UNGA voting behavior of countries that benefited; however, the Chinese government has yet initiated similar researches. As a result, this paper would like to explore into the relations of the Sino-African relations from this perspective.

## **2. Hypothesis and Methodology**

The most practical way to measure political support between two countries is the degree of political coalition at multilateral forums, such as the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), UNGA, World Trade Organization (WTO), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), etc. Determining the political support between China and African countries, the UNGA would be the best measurement, as it is the only organization that includes 193 members all over the globe. Unlike the UNSC, which only includes five permanent members, namely China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, UNGA includes China and almost all African countries, thus looking at the patterns of voting at the UNGA could highly reflect the political affiliations and interests between countries. One might argue that UNGA resolutions are mostly non-binding, therefore is not the most valid way to render the degree of political support between China and African countries. However, UNGA is the only international organization that comprises most of the countries and the UNGA resolutions handle global issues. Hence, the voting of UNGA resolutions are a virtuous index in echoing political alignment and orientation.



This paper aims at analysing the influence of economic ties on political support since 2000s, i.e. whether African countries vote with China. Economic ties include several variables, such as export, import, foreign domestic investment (FDI) and aid etc. Yet, in order to narrow down our analyses, the **key hypothesis of this paper** is to test the export dependency theory:

*“A higher level of exports to China will significantly influence Africa’s voting convergence with China at the UNGA.”*

In order to test the above hypothesis, the two main factors involved are (1) export change and (2) voting alignment. In reference to Ellis (2013), she tested export volume against voting alignment at UNGA between China and African countries.


### 2.1 Hypothesis (1)

*“A higher level of export amount to China, this African country is more likely to vote with China at the UNGA.”*

This paper therefore wishes to go beyond previous research, through reinterpreting the definition of export dependency.<sup>26</sup> Not only testing export amount with UNGA votings, this paper will look into export in three different aspects, (i)

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<sup>26</sup> Ellis, 2013



export amount, (ii) export market share and (iii) disaggregation of export items. Other than the export amount that would affect African countries' voting alignment, as mentioned in Ellis (2013), whether China is the major export receiver of African countries can also be a determinant to voting alignment.<sup>27</sup> This paper would also test the hypothesis of:

## 2.2 Hypothesis (2)

*“The higher the export market share of China in an African country, the African country is more likely to vote with China at the UNGA.”*

Furthermore, the major export item of the African country can also be an influential factor. As China is a major oil importer of the Africa continent, for countries exporting oil could have greater voting alignment with China.


This paper uses the votings on UNGA resolutions as the measure of political support. Similar to Dreher, Nummenkamp and Thiele (2008) and Ellis (2013), this paper uses a UNGA voting index: when African countries vote in agreement with China an index 1 will be given, votes with disagreement will be given 0, and abstentions or absences will be regarded as 0.5.<sup>28,29</sup> Abstentions and absences are also

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<sup>27</sup> Ellis, 2013

<sup>28</sup> Dreher, Nummenkamp and Thiele, 2008

<sup>29</sup> Ellis, 2013



crucial in calculating African countries political support towards China. For resolutions that are for China and against their national interests, or vice versa, in order to show political affiliation with China, African countries would vote abstain or absent.

In addition, in order to examine the significance of influence of export on political convergence, only China and US non-consensus resolutions at the UNGA were counted, so to testify African countries' "loyalty".


Due to limited data and quantitative skills, this paper borrows the average voting alignments from Ellis (2013), where these data are compared against export amount, export share and export items of the various African countries respectively.

### 3. Case Studies

This paper would like to test the above three hypothesis through three case studies, namely **Angola**, **South Africa** and **Nigeria**. These three countries are used to test the hypothesis as they are ranking highest in the Elcano Global Presence Index 2010-2014.<sup>30</sup> With the highest global presence, these three countries are believed to be able to provide a more accurate picture on whether the level of exports to China will highly influence the political tie between them and China. These three countries

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<sup>30</sup> Elcano Global Presence Index, 2014



are also China's top ten two-way trading countries in Africa and China's top ten exporting countries in Africa.<sup>31</sup>


In addition, these three countries also have more comprehensive data and literature as compared to other African countries, which also ranked highly in the Elcano Global Presence Index, for instance Algeria; hence, Angola, South Africa and Nigeria are considered as more effective in providing an inclusive picture in experimenting the export dependency theory.

#### 4. Limitations

Although this essay has tried to address how economic dependency affects countries' UNGA votings, through extensive data analysis, it also has various limitations. First, due to limited information, this essay fails to identify the key UNGA resolutions to China. Second, due to limited knowledge on quantitative analysis, this essay mainly borrows existing quantitative data from Third, this essay shows the correlation between variables such as export amount and political votings at UNGA, but it fails to explain the causal relationship. In order to explore the causation, the writers tried to reach out to China-African academics, such as Howard French. Yet, due to limited time and access, the writers are not able to seek advice from him. (*see Annex A*)

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<sup>31</sup> Danchie, 2011






## 5. Relation between China and Angola

### 5.1 Brief Summary of the relationship

Angola and China are currently important trading partners to each other with substantial import and export volumes. The start of the bilateral relationship dated back to 1960, where the relationship that time was more complicated and volatile. During 1960's when Angola was not yet independent, China strongly supported Angola's war of national liberation. China coordinated with the US to support two political parties in Angola, namely the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) and the National Liberation Front of Angola (FNLA), which on one hand was to counter the influence from Soviet Union, as it massively supported the other political party, Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA).


On the other hand, the different stances of other China's African allies also embarrassed China. South African troops joined the FNLA/UNITA offensive in 1975. China's other allies, such as Zaire, Zambia, and Tanzania, respectively supported FNLA, UNITA, and MPLA. This had put China in a difficult position, and China's policy in Angola had tarnished Beijing's reputation in Africa. Making the matters worse, the pro-Soviet MPLA prevailed militarily and established an independent Angola near the end of 1975. The Soviet Union quickly recognized the independence. China severed its ties to MPLA and UNITA but its longstanding support to MPLA's enemy inevitably hindered the development of Sino-Angolan ties. The two nations established diplomatic relationship in 1983 and took a more pragmatic approach.



In 1984, the two countries entered into different trade and loan agreements and relation developed. In 1988, Angola's President Eduardo dos Santos visited Beijing. The two state leaders entered in a joint committee for cooperation in economics, technology, and trade and agreed to cooperate in culture, education, science, sanitation, sports, and the press. The Tiananmen Square incident did not hinder the bilateral relationship. Angola did not criticize China's actions after the two countries signed three new agreements at the end of 1989, including a feasibility study for building an MPLA party school. In 1990, the two nations signed an implementation accord for cultural and educational cooperation, and China offered a \$121 million credit to buy Chinese goods. When the conflict between the Angola's political parties emerged, China remained aloof.

In desperate need of external financing and in defiance of Beijing's "One China" policy, Angola failed to establish relation with Taiwan in the early 1990s. Following that, high-level visits emerged with Vice Premier Zhu Rongji visiting Luanda in 1995 and President dos Santos visiting in reciprocal to Beijing in 1998. The MPLA general secretary visited China in 1998 and 2000. Sino-Angolan relations developed exponentially in the twenty-first century as a result of trade. Amongst those, energy resources has been the focus of China.

When Angolan civil war ended in 2002, Angolan government requested to hold a major donor conference, hoping to rebuild the war-torn Angola. Western powers, which dominated the petroleum sector, showed little interest in rebuilding the




country and the conference never took place. China filled the void. Its intervention and financial aid was tantamount to Angola but interlocutors commented that China's intention was not altruistic.

One distinctive character of China's investment in Angola is the so-called 'Angola Model'. It refers to a bilateral arrangement wherein African countries effectively repay infrastructure loans extended by the Export-Import Bank of China (EXIM Bank) with natural resources, more specifically oil. Of note, Angola broke off the negotiation with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which was on demands for transparency regarding oil revenues in 2004 and accepted a \$2 billion line of credit from EXIM Bank to be repaid with oil.<sup>32</sup> In 2005, vice Premier Zeng Peiyang visited Angola.; over the trip, he signed nine cooperation agreements, which most of were energy-related.

Yet, China's expansion of its presence in oil sector was not as successful as expected. The oil sector of Angola is still mainly controlled by Western powers and Angola drew into more involvement in the economy from Europe, North America, and Brazil to avoid tying too close to any country. In 2007, negotiations about building a \$4-billion oil refinery in Lobito by Chinese company was broken off due to the disagreement on the refinery size and the ultimate destination of the refined product. Beijing wanted the oil to go to China, whereas Angola wanted more flexibility. In 2009, Angola's state oil company, Sonangol, awarded the contract to the US company Kellogg, Brown, and Root to design the refinery and the right to

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<sup>32</sup> Lee and Shalmon, 2008




choose companies to build it. Yet, as oil prices tanked and the world economy began to deteriorate, dos Santos made two trips to Beijing in 2008 to ensure Chinese funding to Angola.

Compared to trades, military cooperation between the nations was relatively modest. One possible reason is that Angolan government had heavy reliance on Russian equipment, therefore chinese assistance mainly focused on training. After the People's Liberation Army (PLA) general staff chief's visit to Luanda in 2010, China suggested an increase in high level military exchanges, training, and supply of military equipment.

China has strengthened cooperation with Angola in education and training. Between 2007 and 2008, around two hundred Angolan officials and professionals underwent training in China. During Vice President Xi Jinping's visit to Angola in 2010, he signed 19 protocols and increased the number of scholarships annually to Angolan students to 60.

In short, China and Angola need each other and ties between them are strong.




## 5.2 Analysis of Angola's Export

Angola is a resource-rich country and its major export product is crude petroleum, which accounted over 99% of the export product to China. Angola's crude petroleum provided 13% of China's import oil market. In fact, Angola's main export to the world is over 90% crude petroleum.

Angola's export market could be a rivalry ground between China and the US. In 2014, China is the biggest export destination of Angola accounting for 51% in the overall export volume. Figure 4 summarized the Angola's export data and showed that the amount of Angola's export increased gradually across the years.<sup>33</sup> In 2000, the total amount of Angola's export was \$6.17b and it rose to \$54.6b in 2014. The top five largest markets for Angola's products were, in descending order, China, US, India, Spain, South Africa and Portugal. The top five list varied over times, but the largest two markets remain to be China and US between 2000 and 2014.

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<sup>33</sup> The Observatory of Economic Complexity. n.d.







Figure 4 (Source: The Observatory of Economic Complexity)<sup>34</sup>

Back to 2000, US was the leader of the export market and accounted for 52%. While the export volume did not change much, the share dropped gradually to 9% in 2014 and was gradually replaced by China. In 2008, China overtook US and became the biggest export destination of Angola, totalling over 50% of the share. In all, US, although with similar export volume, became less dominant in Angola's export market. The whole Angola market increased its export amount and diversified its export destination. Contrary to what other interlocutors believed that China dominated Angola's export market, Angola was in fact more diversified and less dependent on one single economy.

<sup>34</sup> The Observatory of Economic Complexity. n.d.







Figure 5 (Source: Ellis 2013)<sup>35</sup>

Comparing Angola’s export volume to China with their voting alignment in UNGA, we find that that the pattern is not in line. While the export volume to China was on the rise, the the voting alignment did not wax with the volume. From this example, we can summarize that ‘export volume’ might not be the determining factor for the voting alignment. Hypothesis 1 is not supported in Angola’s case.

<sup>35</sup> Ellis, 2013








Figure 6 (Source: The Observatory of Economic Complexity)<sup>36</sup>

Although no trend was found from the export volume and voting alignment, the perspective of Angola's export market share showed a different picture. The total amount of Angola's export to China increased significantly in these years from \$1.58b in 2000 to \$27.7b in 2014. China and US remained the most important markets of Angola in the past ten years. The share of other big markets including Spain, India, France and Portugal are averagely 3% and more or less negligent. Of note, some African countries such as South Africa and India have gained its market share in recent years. In 2000, the US and China amounted to 80% of the market, whereas the two amounted to 60% in 2014, showing that the export market is more diversified in 2014 than in 2000. But still, the US and China are primarily the most important partners dominating Angola's export market.

<sup>36</sup> The Observatory of Economic Complexity. n.d.








According to the analysis of Charlotte Ellis, Angola was one of the SSA countries manifested that export reliance on China is positively correlated to its voting affinity with China in UNGA.<sup>38</sup> Figure 7 showed the Angola's voting alignment index with China largely followed the trend of its export share to China and they fluctuated in a similar pattern.

<sup>37</sup> Ellis, 2013

<sup>38</sup> Ellis, 2013




The similar pattern of voting alignment and export share of China largely support the hypothesis (2) that “The higher the export market share of China in an African country, the African country is more likely to vote with China at the UNGA.”

According to Robert Keohane, trade relations affect a country’s responsiveness to pressure from the international arena, and voting compliance with allies would be resulted.<sup>39</sup> China’s export share appears to be a determining factor of Angola’s voting behavior. To Angola, the US and China are the two major partners in the export market, cumulated to 70% averagely of the whole export market, and can be analogized as a bipolar environment. Given that the US and China always take different sides on UNGA issues, Angola’s voting behavior clearly indicates its stance and changes according to the export market share of China. Yet, the findings do not conclude whether the voting alignment is a motivation by China’s large export share or a reward for the export share.

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<sup>39</sup> Keohane, 1967




## 6. Relation Between China and South Africa

### 6.1 *Brief Summary of the relationship*

China and South Africa established their official tie in 1998. Before that China had assisted the nationalistic movement groups, in particular the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) against the White-ruled government of South Africa such as financial and military support. Perhaps, more importantly, China contributed in excluding the white-ruled South Africa government from UN in 1970s.

In 1980s, however, with ameliorated tension between China and USSR, China expanded its assistance to cover the USSR backed nationalist group, that is, African National Congress (ANC), one of the former rivalries of PAC.

In 1990s, the white-ruled government was superseded with an elected government and the badly accused apartheid policy was also terminated in South Africa, China and South Africa began to mutually set up official offices and kicked off states visits. Nevertheless, the “Taiwan issue” clouded their relationship as South Africa had attempted to maintain relationships with both China and “Taiwan”. Indeed, from the perspective of South Africa, both China and “Taiwan” offered assistance




throughout its nationalistic movement for years.<sup>40</sup> Eventually, Mandela decided to side with China by establishing an official diplomatic relationship with China in 1998.

From 2000 onwards, high level visits remarkably increased. In particular, JIANG Jia-min, the former president of China, visited South Africa in 2000 and signed the Pretoria Declaration and an agreement to set up a Bi-national Commission. Nevertheless, in spite of growing trade volumes, the relationship of the two states fluctuated as South Africa announced that it suffered from trade deficit. One of the serious challenges to their relationship, therefore, was the perception of China's influence in the African Continent was a kind of "neo-colonialism".<sup>41</sup>

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<sup>40</sup> Shinn and Eisenman, 2012

<sup>41</sup> Shinn and Eisenman, 2012



## 6.2 Overview of Export Volume from South Africa

Figure 8: South Africa's top five export destinations and the export volume (2000 to 2011) (Source: The Observatory of Economic Complexity)<sup>42</sup>

Major Markets/ Year	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
<b>South Africa's overall export (\$billion)</b>	36.7	33.4	37.5	44.3	55.3	63.4	73	90.1	106	77.3	96	128
<b>UK</b>	6.23	2.89	5.71	6.83	8.33	9.66	9.67	9.68	9.99	6.01	7.68	9.13
<b>US</b>	4.6	4.29	4.38	4.95	6.14	6.16	8.32	9.68	10.7	6.62	8.63	10.6
<b>Japan</b>	3.06	2.59	2.86	3.41	4.29	5.28	6.74	7.36	8.39			
<b>Germany</b>	2.79	3.07	2.92	3.13	3.83	4.18	5.17	6.18	7.18	5.23	6.94	7.59
<b>Italy</b>	2.32	2.59			2.63		3.19					
<b>China</b>	0.717	0.732	0.646	1.31	1.62	2.25	2.73	5.27	6.56	5.31	7.27	14.8
<b>India</b>			2.02	2.05		2.68				5.45	8.04	10.5

<sup>42</sup> The Observatory of Economic Complexity. n.d.





Figure 9: South Africa's top five export destinations and the market share (%) (2000 to 2011) (Source: The Observatory of Economic Complexity)<sup>43</sup>

Market Share / Year	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
<b>UK</b>	17%	8.70%	15%	15%	15%	15%	13%	11%	9.40%	7.80%	8%	7.10%
<b>US</b>	12%	13%	12%	11%	11%	9.70%	11%	11%	10%	8.60%	9%	8.30%
<b>Japan</b>	8.30%	7.80%	7.60%	7.70%	7.80%	8.30%	9.20%	8.20%	7.90%			
<b>Germany</b>	7.60%	5.60%	7.70%	7.10%	6.90%	6.60%	7.10%	6.90%	6.80%	6.80%	7.20%	5.90%
<b>Italy</b>	6.30%	9.20%			4.80%		4.40%					
<b>China</b>	1.9%	2.2%	1.7%	2.9%	2.9%	3.5%	3.7%	5.80%	6.20%	6.90%	7.60%	12%
<b>India</b>			5.40%	4.60%		4.20%				7%	8.40%	8.20%

## 6.21 Export Volume

From figures 8 and 9, we note that US became the largest market for South Africa's commodities in 2007 but were subsequently replaced by China in 2011.

<sup>43</sup> The Observatory of Economic Complexity. n.d.




With regard to the overall export volume from South Africa, in 2007, \$90.1 billion of export items were sold overseas, with an annual increase to \$106 billion in 2008. The amount then plunged to \$77.3 billion in 2009. The possible reason of the dramatic decrease was the global economic crisis in 2008. In 2010, the export situation recovered and the volume went up again to \$96 billion and jumped to \$128 billion in 2011.

## 6.22 Export Items

Figure 10 South Africa's exported items (Source: The Observatory of Economic Complexity)<sup>44</sup>

2007	%	\$ (b)	2008	%	\$ (b)	2009	%	\$ (b)	2010	%	\$ (b)	2011	%	\$ (b)
Platinum	12%	10.8	Platinum	12%	12.4	Platinum	12%	8.99	Platinum	10%	9.94	Gold	14%	18.5
Diamonds	8.80%	7.94	Diamonds	8.10%	8.61	Coal Briquet	7.80%	6.05	Diamonds	7.70%	7.39	Platinum	9.20%	11.7
Gold	6.20%	5.55	Coal Briquet	7.20%	7.65	Diamonds	6.50%	5.04	Coal Briquet	7.50%	7.19	Iron	7.40%	9.91
Coal Briquet	5.70%	5.1	Ferrous	6%	6.32	Gold	5.70%	4.44	Gold	6.30%	6.07	Diamonds	7.80%	9.41
Ferrous	4.40%	3.97	Gold	5.30%	5.61	Cars	4.30%	3.36	Ferrous	5%	4.79	Coal Briquet	6.80%	8.1

<sup>44</sup> The Observatory of Economic Complexity. n.d.



Machines	3.20%	3.2		Cars	4.50%	4.77		Ferroally	3.90%	2.99		Iron	4.60%	4.39		Ferroally	3.90%	4.97
Iron	3.10%	2.8		Iron	3.50%	3.72		Iron	3%	2.33		Cars	4.40%	4.23		Cars	3.80%	4.87
Cars	2.70%	2.48		Machines	2.80%	2.92		Machines	2.20%	1.7		Machines	2.20%	2.11		Machines	2.20%	2.77


Figure 10 presents the picture of export items of South Africa from 2007 to 2011. The major export items from South Africa throughout this period included precious metals such as platinum, gold, diamond, minerals and metal like coal briquettes, iron ore, ferroalloy etc.

*6.3 Analysis of Alternative Markets for South Africa*

6.31 Breakdown of Market Share

Figure 8 and 9 indicate the top five markets for South Africa’s exports between 2000 and 2011.

In a nutshell, US, three European countries including UK, Germany and Italy, three Asian countries including Japan and two BRICS countries namely India and China, were included.






South Africa, therefore, had a number of possible alternatives of export markets such as the conventional trading partners US, UK and Germany and the newly emerged market India and China, in particular from 2007 to 2010.

UK, US, Germany and Japan had been the dominant markets for South Africa before 2007 whilst US (10.7b or 8.6%) marginally superseded UK (9.99b or 9.4%) and became the largest export trading partner in 2008.

Japan merely remained its top-five position prior to 2009. It was removed from the top-five list of foreign markets in 2009. Instead, both China and India, on the first occasion, were counted as the top five markets.

In 2008, Japan still ranked the third (7.9% of the total export) among the top five markets in terms of market share. South Africa exported platinum (\$3.45 billion), iron ore (\$1.14 billion) as well as ferroalloys (\$843 million) respectively accounting for 41%, 14% and 10% of the total export to Japan.

In 2009, platinum (\$2.42b or 47% of the export to Japan), iron ore (\$760m or 15%) and ferroalloy (\$355m or 6.9%) continued to be the major commodities being exported to Japan from South Africa. The export amount, however, decreased compared to the previous year.




In contrast, the emergence of China as an alternative market may illustrate for the decline of export to Japan, which was exhibited by the fact that the top three export items from South Africa to China were also iron ore (\$775m or 15% of export to China), ferroalloys (\$739m or 14%) and platinum (\$517m or 9.7%).

Apart from Japan, we can also see that the variation of market share narrowed down from 2007, in particular between 2009 and 2010, but widened again in 2011 with China became the largest export trading partner of South Africa.

Since 2007, most importantly, China managed to attain growing market shares in South Africa while export shares of both UK and US, the previous leading markets of South Africa, were decreasing.

**China appeared on the top five market list since 2007. Nevertheless, US maintained its leading market role** whilst the market share possessed by China was still incompatible with US between 2007 and 2008. Thus, this fact may help explain why the voting affinity to China of South Africa continued to decline during this period.


Figure 12 indicated South Africa's the voting alignment with China slightly went up from 2009 to 2011 and during this period China's market share increased sharply:-



- Increased in 0.7 percentage point from 6.2% to 6.9% (2008-9)
- Increased in 0.7 percentage point from 6.9% to 7.6% (2009-10)
- Increased in 4.4 percentage point from 7.6% to 12% (2010-11)

In contrast, during the abovementioned period, decline in US' market shares were recorded:-

- Down 1.4 percentage point from 10% to 8.6% (2008-9)
- Marginally up 0.4 percentage point from 8.6% to 9% (2009-10)
- Decreased 0.7 percentage point from 9% to 8.3% (2010-11)






Figure 11 (line chart) also indicated the difference in both countries' market shares were further narrowing down between 2009 and 2010 (Source: The Observatory of Economic Complexity)<sup>45</sup>


#### 6.4 Analysis

##### 6.41 Applicability of export dependence theory on South Africa's support to US and China in UNGA

Ellis (2013) examined the voting pattern of ten SSA countries in UNGA from 2000 to 2011.<sup>46</sup> She selected this period after taking into account of the rise of China and the corresponding increase in export from SSA countries to China. **Due to the**

<sup>45</sup> The Observatory of Economic Complexity. n.d.

<sup>46</sup> Ellis, 2013



historical voting divergence between China and US, Ellis analysed how the ten SSA countries sided with US or China when the duo had disagreements on the motions.

Ellis' research indicated that exports from South Africa to China strikingly went up from 2000 to 2011 whilst exports to US from South Africa simultaneously dropped.<sup>47</sup> In particular, China surpassed US in 2011 becoming the largest market for South Africa's products. Hence, from the perspective of the conventional export dependence, South Africa was postulated to vote for US rather than China in UNGA.





Figure 12: Voting alignment with China in UNGA (non-consensus motions between US and China) and export dependence on China<sup>48</sup>

<sup>47</sup> Ellis, 2013

<sup>48</sup> Ellis, 2013



The finding on South Africa, however, contradicted to the hypothesis, although eight out of the ten SSA countries tended to support China in lieu of US alongside the increase in exports to China.


Figure 12 further showed that voting alignment of South Africa with China and the volume of exports from South Africa to China, at least, was not entirely direct proportional. The export to China from South Africa went up incrementally from the early 2000s to 2008 and the export surged between 2009 and 2011. However, **its voting alignment with China in the decade gradually declined from 2004, despite the rise of export.**

The abovementioned result deviated from the hypothesis. One of the possible reasons, Ellis argued, was that South Africa may have perceived China's expanding clout on South Africa as the corollary of neo-colonialism.

In fact, as Alam (2012) already highlighted, in SSA region, countries exporting resources had a lower degree of voting alignment with US regardless variation of the export volume to China while non-resource exporting countries tended to have a lower level of voting alignment with US with increasing exports to China.<sup>49</sup> Thus, South Africa, amongst other resource-exporting countries in SSA,

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<sup>49</sup> Alam, 2012




tended to support China instead of US may be attributed to other factors, not only export dependence.

Previous studies may have reached a different result if a systematic breakdown of export items had been added. In addition, this paper will examine the number of possible markets for South Africa in the decade in a bid to answer whether or not South Africa, having diversified export destinations, could mediate the influence of export dependence.

Apart from the above, to provide a more accurate assessment to the hypothesis, even Ellis acknowledged the necessity to study how the bonding of China and South Africa, with increasing connections through the platform of BRICS, may have influenced on the voting alignment with China in UNGA.

Taken into account of the above, in this section, the paper will first present the analysis of South Africa's export volume, share of markets, coupled with the breakdown of export items in order to measure the explanatory capacity of export dependence theory on the sample of South Africa. Thereafter, the paper will focus on other factors impacting South Africa's voting alignment with China in UNGA. Of course, BRICS' influence will be studied.




## 6.42 Validity of hypothesis

First, hypothesis (1) of this essay assumed that higher level of exports to China will result in higher level of voting convergence with China at the UNGA was invalid in the case study of South Africa. At least, the available data indicated that the voting alignment index of 2011 was lower than the index of 2004.

Second, regarding hypothesis (2), that is, market share is positively correlated with voting alignment, the case study of South Africa partially reflected the validity of the hypothesis. China was by no means the largest market for South Africa before 2011. From 2007 to 2010, despite the narrowing down of difference in market shares (please refer to Figure 12), US maintained its largest market status and this implied the validity of the export dependence theory to a certain extent. However, from 2009 to 2010, the differences in market shares decreased among US and China whilst notable rise in China's market share was recorded which may attribute to the slight increase in South Africa's voting affinity to China in UNGA from 2009 to 2011.

## 6.43 Breakdown of exported products

From 2000 onwards, major exported items from South Africa included precious metal and metal such as platinum, diamonds, iron ore, ferroalloy etc. As the difference in terms of market shares reduced between 2007 and 2010, the paper will disaggregate the exported items in this period.





In 2007, China, UK, US and Germany were the major buyers of South Africa's platinum, iron ore and ferroalloy.


In 2008, except China, South Africa sold substantial amount of diamonds to UK and US as well.

In 2009, again, China, UK, US and Germany were the markets purchasing heftier amount of exported platinum and iron ore from South Africa.

In 2010, the major purchasers of South Africa's platinum continued to be UK, US, Germany and China. It is worth to highlight that India and China were also the major buyers of manganese from South Africa.

In 2011, exports to China from South Africa accounted for 12% of the total export and China became the largest market of South Africa. The major export items continued to be minerals like iron ore, coal briquettes and platinum.

Nevertheless, the major exported item of South Africa (in terms of amount) was platinum from 2007 to 2010 and ranked as the second exported item in 2011. US, rather than China, was the major market purchasing South Africa's platinum during this period. Even in the year of 2011, US remained to be the top buyer of platinum



from South Africa and imported \$2.31 billion of platinum. On the contrary, China merely bought 667 million of platinum in the same year.


To US, importation of platinum is “critical” because this kind of metal will be utilised in defence system building and the prerequisite for new technology development. Platinum is particularly important to be used as auto catalysts in automobile industry and is in fact a kind of jewelry.<sup>50</sup>

Of significance, US perceived that China was competing with US to secure the supply of the metal. The potential rivalry and tension among the two big powers provides rooms for leverage to South Africa mediating the export dependence on China.

In addition, in 2011, coal briquettes accounted for 6.8% of the total export of South Africa in that year (i.e. ranked the fifth exported item in terms of export amount). In the same year, China and India respectively ranked the top and the third market of South Africa. It is worthwhile to accentuate that India had bought \$2.39 billion coal briquettes from South Africa, in contrast to China’s purchase of \$1.27 billion of the same resource. It is widely understood that coal, given its low price, is one of the strategic resources supporting the industrialisation and rapid economic development of China. Hence, the availability of an alternative place for South Africa to sell coal briquettes may have reduced South Africa’s export dependence on China.

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<sup>50</sup> Marc, 2015




### *6.5 Insight from disaggregation of exported commodities*

Ellis' research presumed that South Africa, in terms of voting coincidence in UNGA, should be at least more inclined to support US in lieu of China in 2011, given China superseded US and became the top buyer of South Africa's products.

Nevertheless, the voting alignment index of South Africa supporting China (and against US) was apparently not directly proportional to the export amount from South Africa to China.

One of the possible factors distorting Ellis' assumption was the presence of alternative markets. Platinum was undoubtedly the major export items and US, instead of China, was the top buyer, even in the year of 2011. Similarly, India consumed more coal briquette, another major export item of South Africa, than China.

Apart from the availability of other market options, China's reliance on South Africa's export should not be overlooked. In fact, since mid-1990s, coal represented more than 70% of primary energy supply in China, and coal was particularly important to China's electricity generation. Coal industry of advisory board of IEA also estimates that China's demand to coal and high usage of coal will continue going




up in the foreseeable future despite the surging attention that burning of coal leads to serious pollution problem.<sup>51</sup>

Thus, China, to a certain extent, relied on South Africa's export of coal to sustain its rapid economic growth and difficult in exercising control to South Africa. This phenomenon may have weakened the validity of the presumption that countries possessing a higher level of export dependence on China are more likely to have voting cohesion with China in UNGA (i.e. hypothesis 1).

For future research, contemplation can be given to testify whether or not UK's export to South Africa was direct proportional with the latter's voting alignment with UK. UK had been one of the leading markets for South Africa and shall therefore have the capacity to exercise control to South Africa, as suggested by the export dependence theory. If the above presumption is found valid, export dependence shall have certain degree of explanatory power to elucidate the voting behaviour of South Africa in UNGA and vice versa.

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<sup>51</sup> Coal Industry Advisory Board. n.d



## 6.6 Other Factors Affecting South Africa's Voting Behaviour in UNGA

### 6.61 Influence of BRICS

Ellis suggested future research should examine how the effect of export dependence on China to the voting alignment with China was distorted by the influence of BRICS, given both China and South Africa are the members of BRICS group.<sup>52</sup>


In a nutshell, BRIC(S) group, originally, refers to a number of newly emerging markets in the global level in early 2000s. In 2007, the G8 invited Brazil, China, India and South Africa (also Mexico) to attend some sessions of annual summit with a view to consulting these “developing countries” on a variety of global issues on the one hand and encouraging co-operation between developed and developing countries on the other.<sup>53</sup>

Nevertheless, attention should be paid to the fact that South Africa only joined the annual joint summits of BRICS in 2008. Moreover, many cast doubt on the solidarity of BRICS members and in turn their consistency of foreign policies given the existence of distinctive differences such as size, polity and possession of nuclear

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<sup>52</sup> Ellis, 2013

<sup>53</sup> Ferdinand, 2014



weapons etc.<sup>54</sup> In particular, variations of polity (i.e. level of democracy) and possession of nuclear weapons also apply to China and South Africa.

**Figures 13: Cohesion figures of Groups in terms of voting alignment in UNGA**  
**[1 represents perfect cohesion and 0 represents a complete lack of cohesion]**

	1994-1999	2000-2008*	2009-2011*
<b>BRICS</b>	0.75	0.82	0.82
<b>India, Brazil, and South Africa (IBSA)</b>	0.82	0.82	0.89
<b>Russia and China</b>	0.7	0.84	0.83
<b>Permanent members of Security Council</b>	0.57	0.53	0.54


*(Source: Ferdinand, 2014)*<sup>55</sup>

*\* South Africa joined annual summits of BRICS in 2008*

Ferdinand (2014) presented the cohesion of different political groups with reference to the voting records in UNGA and thereby constructed an index. “1” means a perfect cohesion whilst “0” represents a complete lack of cohesion. In this paper, we specifically focus on three special periods namely (a) 1994 to 1999 as South Africa returned to UN completely after apartheid came to an end, (b) 2000-2008 and (c) 2009-2011 because South Africa official participated in BRICS’ annual summit in 2008.

<sup>54</sup> Ferdinand, 2014

<sup>55</sup> Ferdinand, 2014



As Ferdinand (2014) pointed out, South Africa's participation in BRICS' annual conference did not increase BRICS' cohesion in terms of voting coincidence but a notable rise of the index can be seen in IBSA group.<sup>56</sup> The result somehow contradicted with Ellis' prediction.

And we can also see that the voting score of IBSA (BRICS without Russia and China) was greater than the whole BRICS after South Africa took part in the BRICS annual summit in 2008.


Other than the factor of export dependence, Ferdinand (2014) suggested that voting behaviour of South Africa hinged upon its own foreign policy.<sup>57</sup> In UNGA, both China and India never voted for any resolutions criticising human right issues given their support to the principle of "non-interference" to internal affairs. South Africa, subject to the variation of its own foreign policy, voted differently in UNGA with regard to the human right issues.

At the early post-apartheid period, South Africa to a more or less extent showed support to human right issues. However, from 2000 onwards, South Africa under the leadership of Mbeki and later Zuma changed its proclivity. Mbeki appeared

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<sup>56</sup> Ferdinand, 2014


<sup>57</sup> Ferdinand, 2014



to have attempted to strengthen South Africa's leadership in Africa and sidestepped to support human rights issues given the general polity situation in the continent.<sup>58</sup>

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<sup>58</sup> Ferdinand, 2014





## 7. Relation between Nigeria and China


### *7.1 Brief Summary of the Relationship*

In February 1971, Nigeria and China signed a Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations and established formal diplomatic relations but the bilateral economic relations did not flourish in the following 30 years. As time elapsed, the demographic giant of Asia developed gradually and transformed into a world economic power whereas a series of military coups took place in the most populous country in Africa in 1980s and 1990s.

Until the re-emergence of democratic rule of President Olusegun Obasanjo in 1999, Nigeria's economy started to make a turn and flourished. Nigeria's return to democracy coincided with China's new orientation to Africa since late 1990s. During the visit in Africa in 1996, President Jiang Zemin announced five principles of guidance, i.e. common development, cooperation and solidarity, equality, sincere friendship and being oriented to the future, for establishing a long-term cooperative relationship between China and African countries. Other various Chinese leaders, for instance Premier Zhu Rongji, Vice Chairman Hu Jintao, etc. paid visits to Africa successively. In October 2000, a program based on equality and mutual benefit for the creation of a new strategic partnership between Africa and China was adopted in Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) – Ministerial Conference.<sup>59</sup> In 2001,

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<sup>59</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 2004




the two countries signed the Agreement on Trade, Investment Promotion and Protection with the establishment of Nigeria Trade Office and Trade Promotion Centre in China and Nigeria respectively. Following this major agreement, numerous agreements covering taxation, consular affairs, tourism, economic cooperation, etc. were signed in 2000s. In the second term of President Olusegun Obasanjo between 2003 and 2007, an increase was seen in the bilateral ministerial-level visits between these two giants. China had a strategy focused on its economics interest toward Nigeria. Beijing on one hand would like to expand the Nigerian market for its domestic manufactured products and on the other hand to secure the fuel supply for its own economic development. Nigeria, being a resource-rich country, took an approach of offering oil contracts to China with favourable terms as a reward for the China's investment and commitment in infrastructure projects.<sup>60</sup>

China increased its investment in commercial and political terms in Nigeria and Nigeria became an emerging strategic partner for China. However, the emerging presence of Chinese products in domestic market in Nigeria brought an ambivalent result. On one hand, the cheap Chinese products were made available to Nigerians. On the other hand, the influx of those products was perceived as hazardous for the home-grown economy in Nigeria. The political economy of Nigeria was another import aspect in Sino-Nigeria relations. Even Nigeria had a democratic presidential election in 1999 but it was described as a circus. Poor governance and corruption were seen in the government. Although China invested heavily in Nigeria's oil industry, Chinese's increasing investment was seen in fixed infrastructure assets and

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<sup>60</sup> Egbula and Zheng, 2011



other areas. It implied that China was not an opportunist targeted on short-term benefits and it therefore needed acceptable governance, stability and security so that its investment could flourish sustainably in Nigeria. Taylor asserted that Beijing had to start engaging Nigeria's polity for better governance and stability or otherwise Chinese investors would readjust pragmatically and retreated back to short-term investment.<sup>61</sup> It was contradictory to China's non-intervention philosophy which refrained from interfering domestic politics of other states. In the future, China would face a dilemma in choosing an appropriate foreign policy towards Nigeria.

### 7.2 Nigeria's Export





Figure 14 (Source: The Observatory of Economic Complexity)<sup>62</sup>

According to the analysis of Ellis, Nigeria was one of the SSA countries manifested that the greater export reliance on China positively influenced its voting

<sup>61</sup> Taylor, 2007

<sup>62</sup> The Observatory of Economic Complexity, n.d.




affinity with China in UNGA.<sup>63</sup> Figure 14 showed the Nigeria's voting alignment index with China largely followed the trend of its export share to China.

It was argued that the export reliance on China might not be the most determining factor, amongst others, for the official of Nigeria to vote alike China. In term of overall export share, the influence of China did increase. What is the extent of such impact? Figure 16 summarized the Nigeria's export data and showed that the amount of Nigeria's export increased gradually across the years.<sup>64</sup> In 2000, the total amount of Nigeria's export was \$23.7b and it rose to \$125b in 2011, increased over 400%. The top five largest markets for Nigeria's products were, in descending order, the US, India, Spain, Brazil and France. This order remained largely the same throughout the years. Of note, China has never been in the top five Nigeria's export markets.

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<sup>63</sup> Ellis, 2013

<sup>64</sup> The Observatory of Economic Complexity, n.d.






Figure 15 (Source: The Observatory of Economic Complexity)<sup>65</sup>

From the perspective of market share, the US has always been the leader and even once took over 50% of the whole Nigeria's export market. A gradually decrease trend was observed. The US share once accounted for 53% in 2005 and dropped to 24% in 2011. India maintained more or less that same at about 10%. Spain, Brazil and France accounted for less than 10% throughout the years. Of note, less fluctuation was observed in the latter four countries and they in fact maintained a consistent and similar market share. It was observed that US became less dominant in Nigeria's export market while, bearing in mind, the whole Nigeria's export amount kept increasing. Therefore, Nigeria's export destination became more diversified and was less dependent on one single economy.

<sup>65</sup> The Observatory of Economic Complexity, n.d.






Figure 16 (Source: The Observatory of Economic Complexity)<sup>66</sup>

The total amount of Nigeria's export to China increased significantly in these years and it increased from \$0.26b in 2000 to \$2.15b in 2011. Despite a ten-fold increase was recorded, China's share in Nigeria export market maintained at a similar level and fluctuated between 0.5% and 1.7%. According to the analysis of the export in value and percentage share, Nigeria expanded its export market globally and the export market in China just followed such trend. China did not gain the market share which was lost by the US or other countries. China was just more or less influential in export market of Nigeria across the years.

<sup>66</sup> The Observatory of Economic Complexity, n.d.






Figure 17 (Source: The Observatory of Economic Complexity)<sup>67</sup>

Nigeria was a resource-rich African country and the majority of its export was crude petroleum, which accounted between 80% and 90% of its total export to the world. China, as one of its export destinations, was no exception. Figure 18 showed that crude petroleum remained as the major product to be exported to China. It accounted between 70% and 90% of the total export to China. In 2011, there was a one-off ‘Special Purpose Ships’ (i.e. floating docks, fire-floats, dredgers, floating cranes, dredgers) amounting to \$0.63b exported to China and crude petroleum dropped to 56% of the total export in that year.

<sup>67</sup> The Observatory of Economic Complexity, n.d.







Figure 18 (Source: The Observatory of Economic Complexity)<sup>68</sup>

### 7.3 Validity of hypothesis

Nigeria increased continuously level of export amount to China from 2002 to 2011. There was, however, no increasing voting alignment to China can be observed. The amount of export was apparently not the driving factor for the decrease of the voting alignment between 2004 and 2008.


Furthermore, the voting index of 2002 and 2011 were more or less the same despite a ten-fold increase of export amount was recorded. Hypothesis (1) failed to explain the aforementioned phenomenon and was invalid in the case of Nigeria.

<sup>68</sup> The Observatory of Economic Complexity, n.d.





As for hypothesis (2), the export market share of China in Nigeria maintained at a consistently low level (i.e between 0.5% and 1.7%). It was far less influential than country, e.g. US, in term of export market share. Thus, hypothesis (2) also failed to explain (i) a high voting alignment index with 0.9 or above and (ii) the fluctuation of such index for Nigeria in the material time period.




## 8. Other Factors Affecting Voting Behaviour in UNGA

### 8.1 Import

#### *8.12 Angola's Import*

Figure 19 summarized the Angola's import data and showed that the amount of Angola's export increased gradually across the years. In 2000, the total amount of Angola's import was \$81.85b and it rose to \$16.1b in 2011, increased over 800%. The top five largest import origins of Angola were, in descending order, Portugal, China, South Africa, Brazil and the United Kingdom. Portugal was the largest import origin of Angola. **In other words, US was not one of the important suppliers of Angola in terms of import amount.**







Figure 19 (source: The Observatory of Economic Complexity)<sup>69</sup>

A trend is noted for China to overtake Portugal to become the biggest import origin of Angola. In 2000, Angola imported products amounting to \$0.03b (1.8%) from China to \$5.96b (17%).

The products imported by Angola from China were of diversified nature. Figure 20 showed that import value of the top six China's products, in descending order, were Machines, Metals, Transportation, Textiles, Plastics and Rubber and Stone. They accounted around 70% of total import from China. In terms of the percentage of the aforementioned top six product categories in the overall import from China to Angola between 2000 and 2011, Chemical Products and Plastic and

<sup>69</sup> The Observatory of Economic Complexity, n.d.



Rubber maintained at similar percentage. Some categories such as machines and metals, transportation all increased with times.





Figure 20 (source: The Observatory of Economic Complexity)<sup>70</sup>

### 8.13 South Africa's Import

Regarding South Africa, import from China may be a collaborative factor shoring up the effect of “neo-colonialism” given South Africa’s trade deficit (i.e. reason for less support China in UNGA).

<sup>70</sup> The Observatory of Economic Complexity, n.d.




Admittedly, import of South Africa, in terms of amount, was on the rise in general, save the year of 2009 which may be accounted by the latent effect of economic recession in 2008.

Since 2001, China, amongst Germany, US, UK and Saudi Arabia, has become one of the top-five markets for South Africa's products.

US\$ Billion	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Import Total (South Africa)	27	25.2	26.3	33.5	46.7	54.6	69.1	80.3	91.5	70.2	91.1	112
Export Total (South Africa)	36.7	33.4	37.5	44.3	55.3	63.4	73	90.1	106	77.3	96	128
To China (Export)	0.717	0.73 2	0.64 5	1.31	1.64	2.25	2.73	5.27	6.56	5.31	7.27	14.8
To US (Export)	4.6	4.29	4.38	4.95	6.14	6.16	8.32	9.68	10.7	6.62	8.63	10.6
From China (Import)	1.07	1.15	1.53	2.39	3.79	5.12	7.14	8.9	10.4	8.96	12.2	15.4
From US (Import)	3.46	3.19	3.15	3.37	4.14	4.29	5.13	6.06	7.24	5.28	6.08	8.7

Figure 21 Comparison of the amounts of import and export situation of South Africa 2000-2011 (Source: The Observatory of Economic Complexity)<sup>71</sup>

<sup>71</sup> The Observatory of Economic Complexity, n.d.




Having disaggregated the imported items, we explored that the major imported items to South Africa was crude petroleum, followed by cars, planes, computers and vehicle parts etc. Saudi Arabia was the key supplier of crude petroleum to South Africa. US, amongst Germany and UK, was also an important source for South Africa's planes and cars. China was the major supplier of computers and of course textile to South Africa. It appears that the top five markets purchased different items from South Africa.

It is however worth to underline that South Africa received trade deficit from the trading with China between 2000 and 2010 and first gained surplus in 2011. And this was manipulated by the South Africa Authority as an indication of developing “unequal relationship” which will be further explained in the below section.

#### *8.14 Nigeria's Import*

Figure 22 summarized the Nigeria's import data and showed that the amount of Nigeria's import increased gradually across the years. In 2000, the total amount of Nigeria's import was \$8.68b and it rose to \$63.7b in 2011, increased over 600%. The top five largest import origins of Nigeria were, in descending order, China, the US, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Germany. Whilst China was the largest import origin of Nigeria, US was also an important supplier.







Figure 22 (Source: The Observatory of Economic Complexity)<sup>72</sup>

China became the largest import origin for Nigeria. Figure 23 showed that China's products accounted for 14.5% of total Nigeria's import in 2011. An increasing trend was also observed in the products of the Netherlands. US maintained at a similar level. Nigeria decreased the products imported from the United Kingdom and Germany gradually. Figure 24 showed that Nigeria imported more China's products and the proportion of China's product in Nigeria's overall import also increased.

<sup>72</sup> The Observatory of Economic Complexity, n.d.







Figure 23 (Source: The Observatory of Economic Complexity)<sup>73</sup>



Figure 24 (Source: The Observatory of Economic Complexity)<sup>74</sup>

<sup>73</sup> The Observatory of Economic Complexity, n.d.






Nigeria has increasingly imported products from China over the years. In 2000, Nigeria imported products amounting to \$0.5b from China. In 2011 the import amount increased to \$9.2b. The products imported by Nigeria from China were of diversified nature. Figure 25 showed that import value of the top six China's products, in descending order, were Machines, Transportation, Metals, Textiles, Chemical Products and Plastics and Rubber. They accounted about 80% of total import from China. Figure 26 showed the percentage of the aforementioned top six product categories in the overall import from China to Nigeria between 2000 and 2011. Chemical Products and Plastic and Rubber maintained at similar percentage. The percentage of textiles decreased. Transportation once increased and then decreased. Machines and Metals were on a rising trend. Machines were the largest product category and accounted for just over 30%. For Metals and Transportation were just above 10%.

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<sup>74</sup> The Observatory of Economic Complexity, n.d.






Figure 25 (Source: The Observatory of Economic Complexity)<sup>75</sup>





Figure 26 (Source: The Observatory of Economic Complexity)<sup>76</sup>

<sup>75</sup> The Observatory of Economic Complexity, n.d.

<sup>76</sup> The Observatory of Economic Complexity, n.d.




Amongst the three selected countries, throughout the concerned decade, the overall import amount was on the rise and China became the largest exporters to Nigeria and South Africa since mid 2000s whereas China was ranked the second important supplier to Angola.

However, in Nigeria and South Africa, the increase in import from China was paid at the expense of US' import. Regarding Angola's case, US was not a crucial exporter.

Thus, relevancy of import volume to voting alignment in UNGA may be valid in Nigeria but was found not strongly correlated in South Africa. No obvious link was observed in Angola, too.

Combining the analysis of the amount of export and import together, of interest is that South Africa suffered no overall trade deficit throughout the decade under study. South Africa had no trade deficit against US. In contrast, South Africa received trade deficit from China, which echoed the accusation of "an unequal relationship" remarked by the president of South Africa as mentioned above.

Nevertheless, throughout the period under study, regarding the trade relation with China, Nigeria also suffered from trade deficit whilst Angola received surplus,



trade relation as a whole is not a conclusive factor determining voting behaviour in UNGA.

## 8.2 Colonialism

The perception that surging Chinese influence in the African continent would constitute neo-colonialism may have hindered the development of Sino-African relationship, which in turn may have affected the voting behavior.


In essence, neo-colonialism implies dominance and control. Tukumbi (2011:246) depicts the definition of “neo-colonialism” as follows,

*“The simplest definition of neo-colonialism refers to the economic and political policies by which a powerful nation-state or any other political institution for that matter indirectly maintains or extends its influences, which are essentially negative, over other areas or people.....the neo-colonial economy is geared towards the promotion of the interests of foreign capital that dominates a particular location.”<sup>77</sup>*

This notion might have been a consideration for the voting of Angola, South Africa and Nigeria in UNGA. Between 2000 and 2011, the annual trade volumes between the three nations and China have become multi-fold and cooperation in

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<sup>77</sup> Tukumbi, 2011:246




commerce, agriculture, tourism and security aspects was exponentially strengthened. Along that, China stressed its adoption of a non-interventional policy. Zheng (2010) argued that China, which repeatedly emphasized the importance of “non-intervention” to African’s local affairs, was an alternative to counter-balance the European and American’s neo-colonialism.<sup>78</sup>

Despite so, a number of scholars criticised that China actually followed the footsteps of its western counterparts. To Tukumbi, for instance, China’s neo-colonialism was embodied by China’s intent to maximize and secure resources or energy extraction in Africa and the allegation that African states suffered from trade dependence on China because China, on the one hand, acted a strategic consumer who incessantly purchased raw materials from Africa, and, on the other hand, exported a bulk of cheap products to Africa which caused negative influence to local African economies and thereby the close-down of local firms. As a result, African countries’ heavy reliance on China’s products consolidated China’s control and dominance through economic policies.

South Africa, no matter under the leadership of Mbeki or Zuma, in 2000s is seeking “African Renaissance” in a sense that Africans should jointly defeat global poverty, inequality and empowerment of blacks in the south to confidently upgrade their status from subjugation. Thus, South Africa has been attempting to expand its

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<sup>78</sup> Zheng, 2010



influence in global affairs through participation in international institutions like UN, AU, or more African-based platforms like African Peer Review Mechanism.<sup>79</sup>

To strive for African Renaissance, South Africa has been well aware China's possible "neo-colonialism", which can be interpreted as an underlying factor ratcheting up tension between China and South Africa. In fact, before 2010, despite the growing export to China, South Africa had been running trade deficit with China. South Africa exported minerals to China and imported manufactured goods and textiles from China. Although textile industry was the country's sixth largest one, its inefficient production and the influx of China's products which were generally cheap but relatively better in terms of quality dealt a severe blow to South Africa's counterpart.<sup>80</sup>


It was not surprising, therefore, that Mbeki, during the Beijing FOCAC in 2006, called for removal of "an unequal relationship" being established by Beijing, alongside other colonial powers. In 2007, Mbeki warned China of the danger to repeat in building colonial tie with Africa. In 2009, targeting Chinese merchants, South Africa refused to provide licences for selling certain types of textile.<sup>81</sup>

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<sup>79</sup> Landsberg, 2011

<sup>80</sup> Shinn and Eisenman, 2012


<sup>81</sup> Shinn and Eisenman, 2012



For Angola, the overwhelmingly large Chinese presence also resulted in growing resentment from Angolans and even increasing personal attacks. Crime that targeted at Chinese business persons had been a problem. In 2009, the Chinese embassy issued warning to its nationals on its website on the safety risks and violent crimes targeting Chinese. Moreover, a few interlocutors in Angola complained that Chinese products and quality of work were substandard, although some insisted the quality was at least satisfactory. They commented that the Chinese work hard, usually finish projects on time, and cost less than competitors. Some Angolans criticized that China is not obeying Angolan laws that require a certain percentage of workers to be Angolans and certain percentage of subcontracts to be handled by Angolan companies. The Angolan government responded that the percentage of Angolan workers was below the requested percentage as Chinese managers could not find enough skilled Angolans.

Compared to South Africa and Angola, Nigeria has a more positive view and recognize China's growing presence as more beneficial than harmful. To them, the Western powers who claim to help Nigeria in developing the country are often insincere. Their aid was viewed as an infringement on Nigeria's sovereignty, as it often comes with strings attached. In this respect, China is seen as non-hypocritical and more respectful of the African people's aspirations to manage their own affairs without fear of meddling by a foreign power.

In short, the negative impression on China's neo-colonialism is still debatable. The perceived drawback of Chinese's neo-colonialism may be one of the factors



preventing the three nations to side with China, on the contrary, it can also be seen as a counter-balance of Western powers' neo-colonization. The perception of the nationals' of South Africa, Angola and Nigeria on this are mixed. The validity and magnitude of this argument shall be further explored in future research, especially how the perception affected the three nations' voting behaviors in UNGA.


### 8.3 Foreign Aid and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)

A country's aid policy intertwined with its foreign policy. Traditional donors gave out its aids for a bunch of purposes including its economic and strategic objectives and the needs of the recipient countries. Study found that aid allocation was dictated by political and strategic some countries gave more weight in political factors, like political alliance and the colonial history of the recipients. France allocated more aid to its former colonies which was tied by political alliance and considered less about other factors, for example the poverty level of the recipient countries of their political regimes. The US' aid was given in a way largely influenced by its national interest in Middle East. While other countries responded more only recipient's need and policy performance. Of note, the Nordic countries considered more on the good institution and democratic situation of the recipient.<sup>82</sup>

Foreign aid was considered as an economic factor which affects other nation's foreign policy. Under President Reagan's administration of the US, Washington set

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<sup>82</sup> Alesina and Dollar, 2000






up a linkage policy by manipulating the aid allocations and gave the aid recipient countries a signal that they should vote in favour of US in the UN or faced aid cut. Under the Reagan's linkage policy, the US reduced its aid allocation since 1986 in response to the foreign policy behaviour of the recipient countries. The US government recorded that the recipient countries' UN voting coincidence on important issues was commensurate with the aid allocated to them. Wang concluded that US successfully utilized foreign aid program as an incentive to induce foreign policy compliance in UN on the issues considered to be important to the national interests of Washington.<sup>83</sup> The US manipulated the amount of foreign aid as a reward or punishment for political deference or defiance respectively.<sup>84</sup>

Some literatures studied the relations between the voting behaviour and total aid flow. Dreher asserted that the heterogeneity of different aids made some certain types of aid more capable to induce political supports by the recipient countries and studied which category of aid was more effective in bribing the recipient countries to vote in line with donor. After analysing the empirical data of bilateral aid and voting behaviour, ample evidence concluded that US utilized bilateral aid to buy voting compliance in UNGA. The study specifically identified that two aid categories, i.e. general budget support (a type of program aid according to the DAC sector codes of the Creditor Reporting System presented by OECD) and grants were more influential

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<sup>83</sup> Wang, 1999

<sup>84</sup> Wang, 1999




in affecting the recipient countries to vote in line with US. The general conclusion was aid with less restriction imposed were more efficient in inducing voting affinity.<sup>85</sup>

China was no exception and allocated its aids for different economic, political and strategic objectives. According to Taylor, China's foreign aid policy toward Africa could be grouped into three different periods. The first period started few years after the establishment of Chinese government in 1949 and lasted till about 1978.<sup>86</sup> During this period, Chinese government provided economic support to the newly independent African countries from the colonial powers. They shared the ideology of opposition of imperialism and colonialism. China's foreign aid policy was driven to secure the support of African countries, among others, in the international arena because of its deteriorating relation with Soviet bloc. Of note, 26 out of 76 countries voted in favour of China to get a permanent seat in the UN Security Council in 1971 was African countries. The second period was from 1979 to 1999 during which China shifted from ideological pragmatism to economic pragmatism. China underwent an economic reform and built a closer economic relationship with its commercial partners, i.e. Japan and US and paid less attention to Africa. Still, China broadened its aid programs for Africa and would like to make Africa more self-reliant. After Tiananmen incident in 1989, China once again increased its aid flow to Africa for their either supportive or silent reactions. It further

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<sup>85</sup> Dreher, Nummenkamp and Thiele, 2008

<sup>86</sup> Taylor, 1998




reaffirmed the Sino-Africa relations.<sup>87</sup> The third period was after the establishment of the Forum on China-Africa Co-operation (FOCAC) in 2000. China continued to increase the economic pragmatic. It expanded the aid programs including debt cancellation, training of personnel, technical co-operation, etc. It was emphasized that aid was just one part of Chinese's broader foreign policy and was difficult to single out the effect of aid from other forms of economic cooperation. In the Beijing Summit of the FOCAC held in November 2006, Chinese government announced eight steps to enhance the China-Africa relations of which three steps were related to its official development assistance (ODA). It included raising the aid to, providing vast amount of preferential loans and preferential buyer's credits to Africa and cancelled all interest-free loans owed by some particular African countries.<sup>88</sup>

For the aspect of FDI, with increasing attention to the African continent, China has been widely perceived as a major investor to Africa aiming at natural resource extraction. However, Chen et al. (2015) argued that the volume of Chinese's investment in Africa should not be exaggerated. They examined the industries that China invested in between 1998 and 2012 through analyzing the data released from China's Ministry of Commerce. During the mentioned period, roughly 2000 Chinese firms made investments in the continent. Even in early 2010s, China's FDI to the African continent was still incompatible with France and UK or even South Africa. The only exception occurred in 2008 when the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), an important state-owned bank in China, spent US\$5.6 billion on

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<sup>87</sup> Taylor, 1998

<sup>88</sup> Embassy of The People's Republic of China in The Republic of South Africa, n.d.




purchasing 20% share in South Africa's Standard Bank. This acquisition indicated a comparatively new tactic for Chinese investment in Africa in which Chinese investors directly bought shares in experienced firms with renowned reputation and thereafter worked in partnership to explore new business opportunities. Notwithstanding this, if we count out this single purchase, Chinese FDI in Africa remained constantly less significant compared to UK and US.<sup>89</sup> Most importantly, although both South Africa and Nigeria are the major recipients of Chinese's FDI and in particular South Africa is the top receiver, coupled with the fact that Chinese's investments are generally characterized with its "non-string", the former voted for US whilst the latter voted for China when the two superpowers had disagreements in UNGA.<sup>90</sup> Interestingly, moreover, Chen et al. found that these investments, in terms of sectors, were mostly made in service and surprisingly not solely in resource extraction. Therefore, FDI alone may not be sufficient to account African countries' voting alignment with China, given the possible influence of the Western countries.

China was not an OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) member and was not required to report its aid figures. Chinese authority did not disclose its aid figures for different political reasons. Furthermore, China did not have a centralized aid agency to oversee its aid disbursements. The aid system was very complicated and involved different actors to deliver the aids, e.g. the Ministry of Commerce, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, etc. Thus, there was no official time series aid figure from China to Africa. Western donors opined China's aid associated

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<sup>89</sup> Pigato and Tang, 2015

<sup>90</sup> Pigato and Tang, 2015



with non-interference policy was actually ignored the labour, environmental issues, human rights and genocide in the Darfur region. China's aid programs were non-transparent, non-democratic and toxic. It was hard to conclude the intentions of China's aid policy.<sup>91</sup>


Some previous literatures asserted the importance of foreign aid and FDI of influencing a country's foreign policy and political alignment while others suggested that those effects should not be exaggerated. Akin to the logic of export dependence, it is estimated that African countries receiving aid and FDI tended to have stronger voting alignment with the investing countries.

Although Chen et al. mentioned that the China's investment in Africa should not be exaggerated because China's FDI was insignificant when compared to those of Western countries, the FDI figure provided by United Nations Conference On Trade And Development (UNCTAD), although it was not entirely comprehensive and based on the information provided by the country concerned, may provide an indicator of the significance of China's FDI in Africa continent. According to UNCTAD, between 2001 and 2012, China contributed US\$0.6 billion FDI in Angola whilst US's FDI was US\$3.8 billion.<sup>92</sup> The total China's FDI between 2001 and 2012 in South Africa amounted to US\$5 billion while US's FDI was US\$4.4 billion. The United Kingdom was the largest investor of South Africa, which was a former British colony,

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<sup>91</sup> Yiagadeesen, 2010

<sup>92</sup> UNCTAD, 2014




and contributed US\$47 billion within the same time period.<sup>93</sup> Between 2001 and 2012, China contributed FDI amounted to US\$5.7 billion in Nigeria while US's FDI in Nigeria was US\$4.9 billion. Nigeria, a former British colony, received US\$104 billion, the largest total amount of FDI, from the United Kingdom.<sup>94</sup> According to the figures, Chen's assertion may not be valid to all countries in the African continent. It was observed that China, in fact, contributed more or less same amount of FDI as US did in South Africa and Nigeria.

With the US's experience, it was worth looking into if China had utilized its foreign aid program to secure favourable voting in UN. Although there was no official figure of China's aid to Africa, AidData made the information of Chinese development finance flow to Africa available by collecting relevant data from diverse sources. Figure 27 showed that the foreign aid given by China to Nigeria between 2002 and 2010. The aid covered various industries, including mining, construction, communication, transportation, education, health and etc. It was observed that China was most interested in providing aid in the Industry, Mining and Construction area. A wave-like trend was observed. Peaks were observed in 2006 and 2010. The voting affinity of Nigeria, yet, did not increase accordingly in Figure 1 provided that Ellis.

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<sup>93</sup> UNCTAD, 2014

<sup>94</sup> UNCTAD, 2014







Figure 27 (Source: China.aiddata.org)<sup>95</sup>

Figure 28 showed that the foreign aid given by China to South Africa between 2001 and 2011. The aid covered a wide range of industries. It was observed that China was most interested in providing aid in the Industry, Mining and Construction and Banking and Financial Services. Peaks were observed in 2007 and 2008. And, again, the voting affinity and the FDI trend was not directly proportional.

<sup>95</sup> AidData, n.d.







Figure 28 (Source: China.aiddata.org)<sup>96</sup>

Figure 29 showed that the foreign aid given by China to Angola between 2001 and 2011. It was observed that China was most interested in providing aid in the Industry, Mining and Construction and Transport and Storage. Peak was observed in 2001.

<sup>96</sup> AidData, n.d.









Figure 29 (Source: China.aiddata.org)

According to the available data of AidData, about 68% of China's aid flowed to Nigeria in the form of FDI and Joint venture and about 15% was in the form of grant and loan, which was supposed to be more influential in buying the voting of recipient countries. In South Africa, about 81% of China's aid was in the form of FDI and Joint venture and about 12% was in loan. In Angola, about 65% of China's aid was in the form of FDI and Joint venture and about 25% was in loan and grant.

The efficiency of China's aid to affect Nigeria's voting affinity in the UNGA could be assessed by understanding the aid type received by Nigeria from China. According to the data provided by AidData, large portion of China's aid flowed to Industry, Mining and Construction and majority of the aid was in the form of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) or Joint Venture with the state-owned company, for example




Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation in this sector.<sup>97</sup> The aid strategy of China's aid in this sector was commensurate with the norm of oil industry in Nigeria. According to OPEC, Nigeria remained as the leading oil producer and produced 1,911 tb/d in 2014.<sup>98</sup> Nonetheless, Nigeria was different from other OPEC countries. Its oil industry relied on Joint Venture heavily which accounted for about 95% of the national crude oil production. At the earlier stage, it was seen that western company, for example Shell, dominated the field. Later, Chinese companies like Sinopec and CNOOC was seen in the market.<sup>99</sup> The Chinese's aid in this sector obviously had specific strategic objective, i.e. energy security, and was not used to bribe Nigerian's voting.

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<sup>97</sup> AidData, n.d.

<sup>98</sup> OPEC, 2016

<sup>99</sup> Taylor, 2007




## 9. Conclusion

The primary purpose of presenting this research is to examine how export dependence affects a country's voting behaviour in UNGA.

This paper finds that market share (as one of the export dependence dimensions) could be a factor affecting a country's voting behaviour in UNGA. Among the three case studies, except Nigeria, the effect of market share appear to have explanatory power on the voting affinity in UNGA between the export dominant and dependent countries. Basically, from the case study of Angola, such claim is found to be valid. And, at least, the slight rise of South Africa's voting alignment with China from 2009 to 2011 may be attributed to the augmented market share of China at the expense of US' dominance during this period.

This finding, therefore, carries policy implication. If China wants to secure African countries' support in UNGA, one possible avenue is to increase its market shares (not only the export amount).

Regarding studies on disaggregation of exported goods, the relatively significant observation is derived from the study of South Africa. Having reviewed the disaggregation of the exported commodities of South Africa, the paper notes that China, indeed, is never the largest market consuming its exported platinum, the biggest exported item from South Africa, although export to China from South Africa




continued to go up and eventually China surpassed US becoming the largest market for South Africa in 2011. Instead, US sustained its status as the largest consumer purchasing South Africa's platinum and this finding partially and indirectly supported the claim of export dependence because of South Africa's tendency to support US in UNGA.

In addition to the effect of export dependence on the selected countries' behaviour in UNGA, this paper also considered the possible influence from other factors. For example, this paper applies the finding of Ferdinand (2014) to review whether the bonding of BRICS, as Ellis argued; strengthened South Africa's voting support to China in UNGA. The result was negative to Ellis' postulation.

The possible effect of Chinese FDI, besides, has also been discussed. This paper echoes Chen et al. (2015) that the amount of Chinese FDI is comparatively limited and incompatible with US and UK. Nonetheless, a quantitative research examining the correlation between FDI from China and voting behaviour would be more preferable and more conclusive.

Last but not least, this paper has also explored how the perceived Chinese neo-colonialism may have hindered the relationship between African countries and China. A more comprehensive study should be commenced to testify this arena. Meanwhile, China shall also work on eliminating the effect of such accusation and efforts should be made to help the African countries to sustain development of local firms so that both Chinese imports and local products could co-exist in the local markets.



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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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# Annex A

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Dear Professor,

I am Rosanna Cheung, year 2 student from Master of International Public Affairs of the University of Hong Kong. I and my three classmates are compiling a capstone essay with the topic 'Does export dependence imply more political support in Sino-African Relation since 2000?'.  
Advised by professor [Reyes Alejandro Trinidad](#), we learnt that you good self is an expert on Siro-African relation. Therefore, we hope to seek your expertise on the following:-

1. What are the key determining factors of African countries' voting behavior on United Nations General Assembly (UNGA)?
2. Is the financial support, ie financial aid, FDI and export volume, of the US or China a crucial factor that impact African countries' voting on the resolutions in UNGA?

Your advice on this area is much appreciated. We look forward to hearing from you soon!

Yours sincerely,  
CHEUNG Wai-shan Rosanna

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