Young Adults' Conceptions of 'Good' Citizenship Behaviours: A Latent Class Analysis

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Abstract

Democracies need an active civic society, and early adulthood is a significant period in life for becoming an engaged citizen. The research reported here categorised young Australians according to their conceptions of good citizenship using latent class analysis. Half of the sample were characterised as either 'engaged' or 'duty-based,' suggesting that there is more to consider when talking about citizenship norms and value change, as the other half comprised 'enthusiastic' and 'subject' citizens. Prior participation was almost unrelated to those citizenship norms. The findings provide implications for an active citizenry, and the discussion addresses limitations and directions for future research.

Keywords

Introduction

It is commonplace that a participatory citizenry is essential for the quality of democracy and civil society. Yet whether citizens engage in politics may depend on their norms of citizenship, because these 'should shape the political behavior' (Dalton, 2008, p. 84). Research indeed suggests that norms, such as what constitutes the 'good' citizen, are strong predictors of the behaviour of citizens of Western societies (Bolzendahl & Coffé, 2013; Jasso & Opp, 1997; Jennings, 2015; Raney & Berdahl, 2009; van Deth, 2012). Since norms related to the civic and political realm primarily develop in adolescence and early adulthood (Sears & Valentino, 1997; Jennings, 2015), it is no surprise that younger cohorts have been identified as drivers of a value change in contemporary democracies (Dalton, 2008; Martin, 2012). It is therefore important to understand young people's perceptions of the 'good' citizen and their correlates.

The present research focusses on young adults for this group being under-researched, and specifically on young Australians, who have been addressed by public policies over the previous decades to raise the levels of political literacy and participation. This study aims to examine kinds of good citizenship in a person-centred statistical approach, as this type of analysis accounts for population heterogeneity and has a greater potential to inform policy and practice (Torney-Purta & Barber, 2011). Furthermore, it intends to identify characteristics of the explored kinds of good citizenship, which may help indicating possible ways to tackle the potential withdrawal from politics.

'Good' Citizenship: Theoretical and Empirical Perspectives

Philosophically, the concept of 'good citizenship' is highly contested, though most democratic theories incorporate some kind of participation as a significant element of the good citizen (e.g. Denters *et al.*, 2007). The kind of behaviour a 'good' citizen should perform varies substantially on the active/passive continuum, however (Denters *et al.*, 2007): Law-abidingness appears as the most passive form of good citizenship behaviour and is primarily suggested by a traditional-

elitist view. Liberal conceptions incorporate the relationship between individuals and the government and make a case for instrumental participation, where citizens participate in institutionalized ways. Communitarian and republican conceptualisations focus on the relationships between community members and demand participation in other spheres such as social life. It is beyond the scope of this study though to go in-depth into the discussion of how much participation makes a good citizen.

Empirically, Almond and Verba's (1963) seminal study on the civic culture was probably the most influential work in this field. Building on surveys in five Western democracies, they identified people who were unaware of the political system; passive subjects who were yet aware of political institutions and rules; and active participants who contributed to political decision making. Based on that work, Dalton (2008, p. 78; italics removed) defined 'citizenship norms as a shared set of expectations about the citizen's role in politics.' He further argued that the 'duty-based citizen' would support norms of social order and the responsibility to vote, while the 'engaged citizen is willing to act on his or her principles, be politically independent and address social needs.' (Dalton, 2008, p. 81) This scholar also claims that the younger cohorts of Americans are driving a change from duty-based to engaged citizenship values, and that this may be an ongoing development in many advanced industrial democracies (Dalton, 2008, pp. 77/84). A recent revisitation of the *Civic Culture* also indicated a change from allegiant towards assertive and critical citizenries across the globe, mainly driven by younger cohorts that keep a greater distance to authorities than older cohorts (Dalton & Shin, 2014; Nevitte, 2014; Welzel & Dalton, 2014).

This aligns quite well with recent research on non-electoral forms of political participation. Specifically, some scholars have argued that the change from materialist to post-materialist values that can be identified among younger cohorts also affects their choices of political participation. That is, younger citizens are more prone to engage in more direct political

activities instead of merely voting in elections, and these individuals are more likely to support post-materialist values, and they tend to be more liberal and less trusting of the political elites and traditional political institutions than those who are older and support materialist values (Copeland, 2014; Oser, 2016). Furthermore, it has been pointed out that such changes in civic participation, which are likely to go along with changes in citizenship norms (e.g., Oser, 2016), are likely to be a result of young people's situation, i.e. owing to the failure of traditional labour organisations and political institutions to provide adequate political solutions to current challenges, and due to the rise of new technology, these young individuals experience less duty and obligation, identify less with political parties and lose trust in traditional political institutions and authoritative sources of political information (Wells, 2014; Wells *et al.*, 2015). Thus, 'demands for expression, individuality, personalization and flexibility in the acting out of civic identity' (Wells *et al.*, 2015, p. 203) replace duty-based norms and lead to 'lifestyle politics' (e.g., political consumerism, volunteering in non-political organisations), which 'blurs the boundaries between the public and private spheres' (Copeland, 2014, p. 262; Wells *et al.*, 2015). In fact, the study by Martin (2012) provides some indication for the development from duty-based to engaged citizenship values may apply to Australia, too. Yet Martin did not examine different norms of citizenship but primarily relied on Australian's participation in different political activities, which is already a step ahead of the examination of values and citizenship norms.

Research on young people's citizenship norms was carried out using the international Civic Education Study (CIVED) (Amadeo *et al.*, 2002; Torney-Purta *et al.*, 2001) and the International Civic and Citizenship Education Study (ICCS) (Schulz *et al.*, 2011). Both studies conceptualized good citizenship in terms of students' perceived importance of conventional (e.g., learning about the country's history, discussing politics) and social movement-related behaviours (e.g., participating in a protest or community organisation) for being a good citizen.

CIVED found that lower and upper-secondary students consider participation in social movement-related activities more important for good citizenship than political party membership. Similarly, students in ICCS were less positive about the significance of joining a political party and engaging in political discussions while they valued social movement-related behaviours.

Although the concept of conventional citizenship is not exactly identical to what Dalton (2008) has labelled norms of civic duty, the distinction between a more traditional, conventional versus a more engaged, community-related understanding of citizen participation can be identified in all studies. In this connection, recent research utilized the ICCS database and employed latent class analysis, revealing five groups of students with distinct perceptions of good citizenship behaviours (Hooghe *et al.*, 2016; Hooghe & Oser, 2015). Two of them were quite similar to what Dalton (2008) has described as engaged versus duty-based citizens, while a small minority showed low support for all citizenship norms and was labelled 'subjects,' referring to Almond and Verba (1963). The largest group – 'all-around citizens' represented roughly one third of the sample – perceived all behaviours to be important for being a good citizen, similar to 'respectful citizens' who were less positive about discussing politics though. Hooghe *et al.* (2016) found strong variations of the group sizes across countries, and they showed that while higher status and lower political trust are associated with engaged norms of citizenship at the student level, engaged norms are not as prevalent in highly developed and stable democracies, questioning the generalizability of Dalton's thesis. Yet that research also suggested that engaged norms of citizenship might be on the rise, while an overall decline in duty-based norms was found among secondary school students between 1999 and 2009 (Hooghe & Oser, 2015).

Torney-Purta (2009) used the CIVED database and incidentally examined students' norms of citizenship. Using various indices of attitudinal measures, she studied Eastern European

countries and Western democracies – including Australia – and explored five clusters of students using a two-step cluster approach. Only students in the *conventionally political cluster* had above average scores of the importance of conventional *and* social movement-related citizenship behaviours. Students in the *social justice cluster* had 'below average beliefs in the importance of citizens participating in action' (p. 829), and *indifferent students* mainly wanted to meet basic civic requirements such as voting in elections. *Disaffected students* were similar to indifferent participants with regard to conventional citizenship, but put less emphasis on social and community activities as an indicator of good citizenship. Finally, *alienated students* were low on all attitudinal scales, but they represented only a small proportion of the total sample. Different group sizes also emerged between countries.

Similar to those studies, intercultural research with adult populations also found that socio-cultural context matters (Conover *et al.*, 1991), as most of the Americans in their study thought of good citizenship in a liberal sense and described a citizen as a person with civil rights and duties. On the other hand, their British respondents emphasized a more communitarian interpretation of good citizenship and focused more on social rights and the maintenance of a civil community. Other research on the norms of citizenship explored four perspectives on good citizenship using a mixed methods design and an adult population (Theiss-Morse, 1993): The representative democracy perspective emphasized the importance of being an informed voter. Those involved in all important collective decisions, including protest activities, were labelled political enthusiasts and are similar to Hooghe *et al.*'s (2016) all-around citizens. Theiss-Morse (1993) further explored citizens who were active in interest groups (pursued interests) and indifferent citizens who rejected the idea that good citizens need to be involved in politics, and the latter might be similar to 'subjects' in other research (Hooghe *et al.*, 2016; Almond & Verba, 1963).

Finally, particular attention should be paid to a US panel study that examined intergenerational attitudes towards good citizenship over time (Jennings & Niemi, 1974; Jennings, 2015). Four major norms appeared, and these were quite comprehensive for all waves:

> 'The involvement norm includes both references to purposive participation as well as attentive behaviour. The allegiant norm includes both loyalty and obedience components. […] Civility norms refer essentially to interpersonal qualities and behaviours of the good citizen. Morality norms, on the other hand, place more emphasis on intra-personal characteristics.' (Jennings, 2015, p. 95; emphasis removed)

These clusters could represent Almond and Verba's (1963) participant, subject, and parochial orientations, though the involvement norm allowed for an additional differentiation between rather general versus local participation (Jennings & Niemi, 1974).

Developmental Perspectives

Longitudinal analyses of the latter study suggested a curvilinear development: The good citizen may become more political in adolescence as a formative period, with a drop in young adulthood, followed by an ongoing decline (Jennings, 2015). Theiss-Morse (1993) also found that those committed to political enthusiasm were younger than those who rejected this understanding of good citizenship, but she did not identify significant differences in age with respect to the other three perspectives in her study. It is noteworthy though that Jennings's (2015) 'involved citizens' were more likely to report participation in politics, and that this correlation became stronger the older the study participants got. Adding to that, Oser (2016) found that US American adults who supported engaged norms of citizenship while showing low levels of duty-based norms were most likely to be active in any kind of political behaviour, whereas adults who supported neither kind of norms were politically inactive. Hence, examining the citizenship norms of young individuals is indeed relevant.

That dramatic change occurs in early adulthood has been argued by the impressionable-years hypothesis (Sears & Valentino, 1997): According to this thesis, political orientations such as the perceptions of good citizenship are more susceptible to influences such as political events or life turns when people are young. However, these orientations crystallize in early adulthood and become more stable with increasing age. It is therefore that the present study examines young adults' perceptions of good citizenship, as these have been identified as the drivers of a value change and a shift in civic participation in advanced democracies (Copeland, 2014; Dalton, 2008; Martin, 2012; Wells *et al.*, 2015), and since substantial changes may occur in early adulthood (Jennings, 2015).

Australian Context

Turning the focus on Australia, it needs to be mentioned that the national goals for schooling demand that 'young Australians should become active and informed citizens' (MCEETYA, 2008, p. 9). Hence, Australian politicians agree about the participatory dimension of good citizenship, and the *National Assessment Program: Civics and Citizenship* (NAP-CC) has been monitoring secondary students' perceptions of good citizenship behaviours lately. Employing the same concepts as the CIVED and the ICCS, NAP-CC finds quite high support for all activities measured on both dimensions (ACARA, 2014). Furthermore, younger students endorse such norms more strongly, and support for conventional citizenship norms has increased slightly between 2010 and 2013 (ACARA, 2014, p. 76).

Earlier research was concerned that secondary school students in Western Australia characterized the 'good citizen' as a very passive, obedient and somewhat apolitical individual (Phillips & Moroz, 1996). Prior (1999) reported teachers, students and parents supported values of diversity and moral behaviour as indicative of the good citizen, while students' support for an action orientation of good citizenship was in decline. Support for civic understanding and knowledge was low, and legalistic aspects of good citizenship received moderate support in his

research. Eventually, CIVED found Australian ninth graders' support for conventional and social movement-related citizenship norms of good citizenship to be below the international average (Mellor *et al.*, 2002). This was attributed to various potential causes, such as the negative image of political parties in the Australian media, Australia's conflictual past relationships with indigenous people, potentially contentious immigration issues, the (non-r)evolutionary development of democracy, and the 'reflection of a broader political culture in which voting is compulsory and therefore voluntary engagement is not a strong value.' (Kennedy *et al.*, 2008, p. 70)

It comes without surprise then that Australian scholars have been arguing for a more extensive understanding of citizenship and participation (e.g., Harris *et al.*, 2008; Manning & Ryan, 2004; Vromen, 2003). Indeed, recent studies suggest that young Australians attribute more relevance to social movement-related citizenship behaviours compared with conventional activities (ACARA, 2014). Vromen (2003), for instance, studied adults aged 18 to 34 years. Her analysis suggested that a range of political activities reflects four different components of participation: Party-related activities (e.g., campaigning), activities with a communitarian focus (e.g., volunteering), individualistic participation, and a variety of more social movement-related activities ('activist;' e.g., protesting, participating in a human rights organisation).

A comprehensive survey study examining adult populations showed that duty-based norms of citizenship were substantially more important to Australian adults than engaged citizenship norms (Bean & Denemark, 2007), however, providing some indication for Dalton's (2008) hypothesis that young people are the drivers of a value change. Similarly, Martin (2012) found that Australians were more engaged in electoral participation the older they got, whereas younger cohorts were more active in non-electoral forms of political participation, which may reflect the shift to non-electoral forms of political behaviour that international research has described for younger cohorts (Copeland, 2014; Wells *et al.*, 2015).

Other research building on NAP-CC examined both conventional and social movement-related norms of citizenship separately using latent class analysis (Reichert, 2016a). That study found four groups for both kinds of citizenship norms. About one third of all students were 'political enthusiasts,' as they were likely to endorse all citizenship behaviours ('all-around' in Hooghe *et al.*, 2016), and one in twenty respondents were labelled 'alienated' as they did not support any activity (similar to 'subjects' in Almond & Verba, 1963; Hooghe *et al.*, 2016) (see also Theiss-Morse, 1993). Two of the conventional citizenship groups fell in-between, with 'passive conventionalists' perceiving the good citizen as someone who would only acquire certain politics-related knowledge, and 'national conventionalists' whose understanding of the good citizen was coined by activities that related Australian political parties and learning about Australia. Among the social movement-related kinds of citizenship, two that fell in-between full and no support deserve mentioning, too: Similar to 'engaged' citizens (Hooghe *et al.*, 2016), 'non-protesters' endorsed postmodern sensitivities except for protesting, while 'local community participants' perceived the good citizen as someone who would only participate in environmental organisations and help to benefit the local community (Reichert, 2016a). All response patterns were stable across cohorts, but some group sizes varied between 2010 and 2013.

Yet no research has examined the perceptions of good citizenship among Australians in early adulthood. In a country where voting is mandatory and enrolment of people before their mid-twenties remains significantly below the electoral participation of other adults (AEC, 2015, pp. 26ff.), norms of engaged citizenship may be increasingly more relevant in the conceptualisation of the good citizen that shape political participation. The present research therefore aims to examine young Australian adults' perceptions of good citizenship.

Research Questions

The main research question asks whether we can categorize Australians in early adulthood according to their perceptions of good citizenship behaviours. More specifically, can we identify young adults who support duty-based and conventional norms versus those who reflect engaged citizens? What other perceptions of the good citizen do these young Australians hold? Building on recent claims for a change in young cohorts' approaches towards citizenship (Dalton, 2008; Martin, 2012; Harris *et al.*, 2008), this study expects that engaged citizens who support all or at least non-traditional forms of participation dominate among young adults. Conversely, fewer may be solely supportive of conventional and duty-based norms.

In addition, this research aims to examine the characteristics of young adults with distinct perceptions of the good citizen. This is important for addressing the different kinds of citizens and to encourage them actually to participate in activities they think they should engage in. Their characterisation may also be helpful to promote certain activities among those who are less prone to participate, which can be useful for raising the levels of participation. On the one hand, the study thus asks what the socio-demographic characteristics of those young adults are, as those may be relevant predictors of perceived norms of citizenship (Hooghe *et al.*, 2016; Oser & Hooghe, 2013; Reichert, 2016b; Straughn & Andriot, 2011). On the other hand, this research wants to know how distinct perceptions of good citizenship relate to actual civic and political participation. This aim builds on the rationale according to which the kind of norms that an individual supports should correspond to the activities one engages in (Bolzendahl & Coffé, 2013; Jasso & Opp, 1997; Jennings, 2015; Raney & Berdahl, 2009), assuming that citizen participation may as well affect citizenship norms.

Data and Methods

A Person-Centred Statistical Approach

Common (variable-oriented) approaches aim to describe the relationships among variables and to identify significant predictors of outcomes assuming that the population is homogenous with regard to these relationships. Person-centred statistical research conversely focuses 'on the relationships among individuals, and the goal is to classify individuals into distinct groups or categories based on individual response patterns so that individuals within a group are more similar than individuals between groups.' (Jung & Wickrama, 2008, p. 303) This means that person-centred statistical approaches are an alternative to variable-oriented analyses of survey data as the former describe similarities and differences among individuals based on the underlying assumption that the population is heterogeneous with respect to how variables relate to each other (Masyn, 2013).

Yet only few studies have examined profiles of good citizenship by employing a person-centred quantitative approach, and all with an exclusive focus on school students (Hooghe *et al.*, 2016; Hooghe & Oser, 2015; Reichert, 2016a, 2016b; Torney-Purta, 2009), that is, before entering the workforce and building a family. However, the latter may significantly affect their attitudes (Jennings, 2015). The advantages of such person-centred approaches are obvious: Instead of comparing mean differences between variables, they make the individual the unit of analysis and 'take on a comparative perspective within a sample to explore both commonality and difference in persons' various characteristics simultaneously.' (Chow & Kennedy, 2014, p. 473) Employing a person-centred analytical procedure to examine the norms of good citizenship therefore contributes to our knowledge about the characteristics of persons that support engagement (Torney-Purta *et al.*, 2010). It helps better to understand the samples under investigation, makes the findings easier to grasp for policy makers, educators and the public (Torney-Purta & Barber, 2011) and, hence, facilitates the development of respective

recommendations. As the present study aims to categorize young adults into different groups that reflect distinct perceptions of good citizenship, an innovative, person-centred design is preferred over variable-centred analysis, as the latter is obviously less suitable to identify whether duty-based and engaged citizens are distinct types of citizens (i.e. the research by Dalton (2008) or Vromen (2003) merely grouped variables, but they did not examine types of individuals).

Data

The data for this research were collected across Australia in April and May 2015 by means of an online survey. Most questionnaire items were based on the Australian NAP-CC (ACARA, 2014) and the Australian Election Study (Bean *et al.*, 2014), asking questions about respondents' political attitudes, knowledge, and their participation in politics. Based on our financial capacities and the aim of obtaining a sample that allows for more than basic analyses, we utilized the access panel of MyOpinions, a commercial market research institute, targeting a medium-sized sample of Australians between 19 and 24 years. Selection and screen out criteria were an equal distribution of age and gender, as well as responses from all states and territories reflecting their relative population.

The targeted sample size was reached after 11 days and the survey was closed subsequently. The sample of 452 individuals corresponds to a response rate of 14.11% (incidence rate: 65.24%), of which 34.24% valid questionnaire completions were obtained (remainders dropped out; were screened out; or were excluded after data quality checks, e.g., due to incorrect responses to validation questions etc.). Respondents aged 19 (12%) or 24 (8%) were less likely to complete our questionnaire, as were male respondents (41%). While we only received one valid response from the Northern Territory, where we had expected it would be very difficult to obtain responses, most of the other states and territories were adequately represented in our sample. Hence, for a more appropriate analysis of the actual dataset, sampling weights were

calculated based on the Australian 2006 and 2011 Censuses of Population and Housing, adjusted for the expected population in 2015 using a linear growth function. The weighted sample has an average age of 22 years, consists of 51% women, and 44% of these respondents or their parents were not born in Australia. About one quarter has already obtained their first university degree (26%), while 27% hold a lower tertiary degree (i.e. diploma or vocational degree). Remainders have no more than a secondary school degree.

Good Citizenship Behaviours

Citizenship norms were measured following the prompt: 'How important do you think the following are for being a good citizen in Australia?'[1] The survey measured five conventional citizenship behaviours: supporting a political party; learning about Australia's history; learning about political issues in the newspaper, on the radio, on TV or on the Internet; learning about what happens in other countries; and discussing politics. Four items represented social movement-related norms: participating in a peaceful protest; participating in activities to benefit the local community; taking part in activities promoting human rights; and taking part in activities to protect the environment. The importance of obeying the law as a norm of compliance was included to reflect duty-based norms of citizenship.

For the purpose of latent class analysis (LCA), all items are converted from a four-point scale to a binary scale (very important/quite important versus not very important/not important at all). These changes seem appropriate because the response labels suggest that respondents either endorse an activity or not. In order to yield easily interpretable results and to avoid potential difficulties in the course of the cluster estimation, which are more likely to occur the more categories exist, in particular given our relatively small sample, less complex estimations are preferred and processed by binary items (see also Hooghe *et al.*, 2016; Reichert, 2016a).

LCA is utilized to identify different groups (i.e. 'latent classes') of young adults that represent different patterns of the importance of various citizenship behaviours. LCA is the

method of choice, because this study focusses on the item level to identify individual response patterns. When dealing with single items that are not interval-scaled, LCA is specifically powerful and it is superior to approaches that use manifest measurement constructs (Eid *et al.*, 2003).

The fit indices used for examination are manifold. While absolute fit indices are not always reliable, relative fit indices are more common nowadays. A model with more classes is usually accepted if it performs better than a model with fewer classes, which is indicated by lower values in the frequently utilized Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC). The Lo-Mendell-Rubin adjusted LRT test (aLMR) tells the researcher whether a model with c classes performs better than a model with $c - 1$ classes, and the first model for which aLMR yields an insignificant *p*-value may be appropriate to describe the sample (Nylund *et al.*, 2007). Masyn (2013) also recommends the approximate correct model probability (*cmP*), which is calculated for each of the models based on a transformation of their BIC values. All *cmP* values of the chosen set of models sum up to one, and any model with $cmP \geq 0.10$ indicates a candidate model.

Predictors of Latent Class Membership

Besides collecting socio-demographic information, the questionnaire asked about respondents' participation in conventional politics, socio-political activities, and community organisations prior to the survey (all binary) to examine the predictors of latent class membership. Additional predictors, or confounders, are political knowledge, news media exposure, political self-efficacy, and trust in civic institutions, for which mean indexes are calculated (see Appendix 1 for more details). A three-step regression approach is utilized to examine the value of those variables for predicting latent class membership, based on respondents' most likely latent class membership whilst accounting for the classification uncertainty rate.

Results

Extraction of Latent Classes

Figure 1 (percentages below activities) shows that respondents endorse most of the citizenship behaviours, though support for political parties, discussing politics and protest marches is comparatively low. On the other hand, respondents do not vary much with respect to their appreciation of law-abidingness, which obtains the highest support.

Table 1.   Relative fit indices for different latent class models.

No. of classes	LL	BIC	cmP	aLMR
1	-2627	5315	0.00	N/A
2	-2228	4584	0.00	786.62^{**}
3	-2132	4460	0.00	188.08^{*}
4	-2083	4430	1.00	96.52^{ns}
5	-2056	4441	0.00	54.69^{ns}
6	-2037	4470	0.00	37.59^{ns}
7	-2022	4509	0.00	28.44^{ns}

Note: Model with eight latent classes not identified.

$^{ns}p \geq .05$, $^{*}p < .05$, $^{**}p < .01$

The LCA uses all ten indicators of good citizenship. Table 1 clearly suggests the solution with four latent classes: This model yields the lowest BIC and the comparison of all BIC values supports only this solution (*cmP*). Furthermore, the first insignificant aLMR appears for the four-class solution, suggesting that no more than four latent classes are required to describe the entire sample. A similar conclusion stems from the log-likelihood values and their changes.

Figure 1. Latent class profiles of the citizenship norms (numbers from 1.0 to 0.0 and from 0.0 to 1.0 relate to the estimated conditional probability to respond 'quite / very important' to the respective item).

The Entropy (0.85) of the four-class solution, of which the response patterns are shown in Figure 1, indicates an overall high reliability. In addition, the mean assignment probabilities, which inform us about the reliability of the specific assignment of an individual to a specific latent class, are also high (ranging from 0.89 to 0.96). This suggests that the four-class solution and respectively the assignments of individuals to those latent classes are very reliable (i.e. assignments with only little error).[2]

Of the four latent classes, one can be described as 'engaged,' representing 42% of the entire sample. This group is very likely to associate good citizenship with local engagement, i.e. participation in the community, promoting human rights, and helping the environment. At the same time, members of that group are unlikely to perceive the good citizen as someone who supports a political party or discusses politics. The smallest group is labelled 'duty-based,' though it warrants mentioning that their response pattern varies a bit from what Hooghe *et al.*

(2016) have described. In the present study, duty-based citizenship reflects conventional norms and support for the community, but less so postmodern sensitivities such as protesting, promoting human rights or participating in an environmental organisation.

Yet those two groups represent only half of the sample. A third group (30%) has very high probabilities on all items, except supporting a political party. This could be labelled 'all-around citizens' (Hooghe *et al.*, 2016), though other scholars have labelled that kind of citizen 'political enthusiasts' (Reichert, 2016a; Theiss-Morse, 1993). Eventually, the fourth group rejects the importance of almost all behaviours, except obeying the law, and can be labelled 'subject' (Hooghe *et al.*, 2016; Almond & Verba, 1963), 'alienated' (Reichert, 2016a; Torney-Purta, 2009), or 'indifferent' (Theiss-Morse, 1993). This group accounts for one fifth of the sample and therefore comprises a higher percentage of individuals than what person-centred studies using student samples have found (Hooghe *et al.*, 2016; Reichert, 2016a, 2016b; Torney-Purta, 2009), for which the different sampling strategy might be accountable though.

Referring those findings back to the first research question, we indeed identify young adults who support duty-based and conventional norms versus engaged citizens (see also Hooghe & Oser, 2015; Hooghe *et al.*, 2016). Those account only for one half of the sample, whereas enthusiasts who endorse all forms of participation and subject citizens together represent the other half. On the one hand, this provides some evidence for the claim that younger cohorts may drive a value change from duty-based to more engaged norms of citizenship (Dalton, 2008; Martin, 2012), since duty-based citizens represent the minority in our sample. On the other hand, the findings also suggest that citizenship norms may change significantly in early adulthood once young people come of age and leave school (Jennings, 2015; Reichert, 2016a). Yet we need to be modest about such conclusions since the present study is neither longitudinal nor may it claim full representativeness of young Australians, i.e. although the latent class profiles very likely reflect the distinct perceptions of good citizenship among Australian young

adults, a different – e.g., a larger, not online-based – sample might yield different latent class sizes.

Predictors of Latent Class Membership

The LCA shows that different kinds of citizenship norms can be distinguished empirically. Next, this study aims to examine the characteristics of the members of those distinct latent classes. Building on the literature, the study assumes that higher educated Australians are more likely to support engaged norms of citizenship. It is also claimed that women are more likely to be engaged, since they generally seem to endorse non-institutionalized forms of political participation (Hooghe *et al.*, 2016). Based on the formative years-hypothesis (Sears & Valentino, 1997) and other research (Jennings, 2015; Theiss-Morse, 1993), it is furthermore expected that age influences the citizenship norms held among young Australian adults, with younger Australians being more engaged. Eventually, compared to other Australians, the study assumes that young people with an immigration background are more likely to endorse engaged norms (Straughn & Andriot, 2011), given that more institutionalized forms of participation may be less common among immigrants.

Since news exposure can contribute to political sophistication, it should promote membership in the engaged group (Hooghe *et al.*, 2016). Owing to its positive relationship with news exposure (Sotirovic & McLeod, 2004), political knowledge is also expected to be a positive predictor of being an engaged citizen. From a social capital perspective, trust in civic institutions could also influence the norms individuals hold towards citizenship and could hamper becoming engaged (Putnam, 2000; Dalton, 2008). Furthermore, political self-efficacy should be associated with citizenship norms (Dalton, 2008; Hooghe *et al.*, 2016; Reichert, 2016a). While Dalton (2008) claims that engaged citizens are more efficacious, Hooghe *et al.* (2016) have provided evidence for the converse relationship.

Table 2. Explaining citizenship types (regression model).

	Enthusiastic		Duty-based		Subject	
	B	(SE)	B	(SE)	B	(SE)
Gender (male/female)	0.89[†]	(0.52)	-2.06[*]	(0.87)	-0.90[*]	(0.37)
Age	0.11	(0.15)	0.38[†]	(0.20)	0.12	(0.14)
Advanced degree (no/yes)	-0.18	(0.55)	0.30	(0.68)	-0.50	(0.44)
University degree (no/yes)	-1.00[†]	(0.56)	-3.42[*]	(1.42)	-0.41	(0.48)
Immigrant (no/yes)	-1.29[**]	(0.39)	-0.76	(0.73)	0.13	(0.39)
Political self-efficacy	1.92[**]	(0.53)	2.39[**]	(0.67)	-0.35	(0.36)
Political knowledge	-0.26	(0.85)	-0.95	(1.18)	-1.38[†]	(0.80)
Civic trust	0.24	(0.35)	0.53	(0.38)	-0.73[*]	(0.33)
News exposure	0.49[*]	(0.22)	0.33	(0.27)	-0.05	(0.20)
Conventional participation	0.05	(0.49)	-0.04	(0.86)	-2.94[*]	(1.27)
Socio-political participation	-0.43	(0.50)	0.03	(0.80)	-0.35	(0.43)
Community participation	0.83[†]	(0.44)	-0.93	(0.73)	0.12	(0.41)
Constant	-6.42[†]	(3.84)	-12.81[**]	(4.78)	-0.72	(3.06)

Note: Reference category: engaged citizens. †$p < .10$, *$p < .05$, **$p < .01$

Of particular interest is, finally, the role of participation in politics prior to the survey. Following Jennings (2015), those who are more likely to endorse conventional norms of

citizenship should be more active in institutionalized and conventional ways of participation, i.e. engaged citizens should be less active in conventional forms of participation. On the contrary, it can be assumed that community participation as well as socio-political activities are particularly predictive of being an engaged or enthusiastic citizen (see also Oser, 2016).

The expected relationships are examined by regressing latent class membership on the predictor variables, accounting for the classification quality (i.e. the classification uncertainty rate in a three step approach; Muthén & Muthén, 1998-2015). The analysis uses the largest group – engaged citizens – as the reference group, as most assumptions refer to this group anyway.

Comparing enthusiasts and engaged citizens, Table 2 shows that not being born or having parents being born outside Australia, news exposure in the media as well as higher levels of political self-efficacy facilitate political enthusiasm. In addition, there is a tendency for women and for those not holding a university degree to be more enthusiastic than being engaged. Previous participation in community organisations also tends to be positive for being a political enthusiast.

Looking at the coefficients for duty-based citizenship, it appears that political self-efficacy promotes this kind of citizen, while highly educated and female Australians in our samples are less likely to hold dutiful norms of citizenship. There is also a tendency for older individuals to be members of this group, as indicated by a marginally significant regression weight.

Finally, the comparison between engaged and subject citizens yields that the latter are more likely to be men, but less likely to having participated in conventional political activities in the two years prior to the survey. Trusting civic institutions also reduces the likelihood of being a subject citizen, while political knowledge is a marginally significant predictor, suggesting that political knowledge promotes engaged rather than subject norms of citizenship.

In sum, the expectations are partly met. While the coefficients of the socio-demographic variables indeed seem to support the hypotheses, the remaining effects are not always as clear. Similar to what Hooghe *et al.* (2016) report, political self-efficacy is not associated with engaged citizenship. Neither news exposure nor political knowledge yields convincing effects, though the former is associated with political enthusiasm, and the latter at least tends to prevent becoming a subject citizen (which also applies to trust in civic institutions). Most surprising though may be that political participation prior to the survey is almost unrelated to latent class membership in our sample. While conventional forms of participation also prevent subject citizenship, community participation is rather associated with enthusiasm – neither of which reflects the expectations exactly. That is, unexpectedly conventional participation does not promote duty-based norms of citizenship and participation in the community does not stimulate engaged citizenship.

Discussion

The present article contributes to the debate about citizenship norms and does so with respect to a population that is specifically susceptible to influences (Sears & Valentino, 1997), while person-centred research on this group is absent. On the one hand, half of the Australians in our sample can be described as duty-based or engaged, yet duty-based young Australians are the minority in the present study. On the other hand, the determinants of being an engaged citizen versus endorsing other citizenship norms only partially follow theoretical expectations from the literature.

What is noteworthy is the amount of duty-based individuals in the present study (8%), which seems to be substantially lower than what Hooghe *et al.* (2016) have found for secondary students (20%) (although the latter study found substantial variation between countries), whereas engaged citizens are far more common (42% versus 25%). It is not clear why this is, but we can speculate about possible explanations. The most reasonable explanation could be

development in early adulthood. Young people may adjust their life perspectives and their views on politics after they leave school, when they enter the workforce and build families. In turn, their perceptions of the good citizen may become less conventional, less political in a narrower sense, while norms of morality (being a moral person) and civility (helping others, volunteering etc.) become more relevant (Jennings, 2015). Such a development makes sense, as young adults are still quite open to influences that may change their opinions and political attitudes (Sears & Valentino, 1997; Jennings, 2015).

Another reason might be traced in the specific Australian context where voting in elections is mandatory. However, looking at the results by country in Hooghe *et al.* (2016, Appendix, Table 2A), this seems less likely. On the one hand, in Belgium, where voting is mandatory, too, 23% of all students were described as duty-based. On the other hand, rather countries from Latin America as well as a few Asian and Eastern European countries yielded small proportions of duty-based student citizens. Thus, it may seem rather implausible to assume a huge impact of the societal context, as Australia is influenced largely by Western values, though this cannot be ruled out assuming an increasing influence from Asia, and from China in particular.

Yet apart from those aspects of the Australian context, other specific contextual features have been mentioned earlier and deserve a brief discussion in relation to the study results. Immigration still is a contentious issue in contemporary Australian politics, and so are Australia's relationships with indigenous people. Although Australia does not have a strong culture of political protest owing to the evolutionary development of democracy (Kennedy *et al.*, 2008), especially the immigration issue has recently mobilised Australians and specifically young Australians. While participation in organised protests is rare not only among Australian youth but among young people in general (Wells *et al.*, 2015), other forms of social movement-related participation, such as in human rights organisations or in the community, may reflect

not only a general trend that can be witnessed across industrialised countries. It might also be due to specific factors in Australia that could encourage non-electoral participation.

More specifically, Vráblíková (2014) has shown that political competition in a decentralised political system is a positive stimulus for motivating non-electoral participation, but this also requires a certain degree of political mobilisation through political discussions and volunteering activities. As the media tend to report very negatively about Australian political parties and specifically in the context of the recent turmoil in Australian Government – three party leadership ballots of the governing political party over the previous six years that resulted in three changes of the Australian Prime Minister before official elections were held – there clearly is limited consensus not only between Australian political parties, but also within them. In this kind of situation in a decentralised political system such as the Australian, individuals may be driven to participate in non-electoral political activities instead of merely favouring duty-based citizenship, as the mass media do provide many opportunities to discuss what is going on in Australian politics (Vráblíková, 2014). However, it bears mentioning that there is an ongoing debate about factual centralisation in Australia (e.g., Fenna, 2007; Saunders & Crommelin, 2015; Spiller, 2014), and such a process might diminish the opportunities for young people to participate (Vráblíková, 2014). While this cannot be ruled out as potential explanation for the larger number of 'subject' citizens in the present study compared to international research (Hooghe et al., 2016), it shall be noted that also only a small amount of Australian secondary students can be assigned to such a group of 'subject' individuals (Reichert, 2016a), while a study examining self-reported participation yielded a large percentage of disengaged US American adults (Oser, 2016).

Sampling is a third possible explanation. Of course, the present study relies on a relatively small sample compared to large-scale assessments and surveys that are common nowadays. However, we put much effort in obtaining a sample that is representative, and if it is only for

those individuals who are more open to new technologies and to using the internet. Rather than the sample size – which is quite acceptable for such a short age range, in particular if we account for lower response rates that apply to young people and that we deliberately closed the survey after 11 days – the online method and self-selectivity may be the actual limitation of the present study. Yet it needs to be noted that no similar research on young adults has been conducted yet, and the present online survey was but a tool to obtain data given specific constraints (esp. funding). Thus, we may need to restrict the conclusions of this study to young adults who are more active on the internet, though the study design accounted for various selection criteria. The identified response profiles do reflect actually existing perceptions of good citizenship among Australian young adults, and the correlation patterns between latent class membership and predictor variables should also hold in larger samples, even though a different sampling strategy might result in different latent class sizes. In particular, the duty-based group might be underrepresented, as more active and engaged people could be more prone to participate in an online survey.

If we account for that limitation, we may modestly conclude that the present research provides further evidence for Dalton's (2008) hypothesis that younger generations are driving a value change (see also Copeland, 2014; Dalton & Shin, 2014; Nevitte, 2014; Welzel & Dalton, 2014). This has been found for various countries (Hooghe *et al.*, 2016), and in Australia a study also showed how younger generations are more prone to participate in less traditional civic and political activities (Martin, 2012), which may justify claims for a more inclusive understanding of citizenship and civic participation (Harris *et al.*, 2008; Vromen, 2003). This holds in particular as younger cohorts prefer direct, non-electoral forms of political participation, engage in 'lifestyle politics' and may be better approached via youth-friendly channels of communication (Copeland, 2014; Harris *et al.*, 2008; Wells, 2014; Wells *et al.*, 2015).

The present study could easily tune in this chorus, as it provides further evidence that Dalton's thesis is only one part of the story. Similar to Hooghe *et al.* (2016), the present research finds more than just engaged and duty-based citizens. About one fifth can be described as 'subject,' which could suggest an increasing relevance of morality norms in early adulthood (Jennings, 2015), especially knowing that only around 5% of Australian tenth graders yielded a similar pattern (Reichert, 2016a, 2016b). Furthermore, 30% of the sample can be described as 'enthusiasts' or 'all-around citizens' who are supportive of all citizenship norms (though less so for party-related support), which comes close to the 36% which earlier research has found for Australian secondary students (Reichert, 2016a, 2016b). Again, the limitations with respect to sampling and sample size need to be accounted for, however.

For the determinants of citizenship norms, the expectations are partly met. On the one hand, the coefficients of the socio-demographic variables indeed seem to support the hypotheses. In particular, highly educated respondents and women are more likely to endorse engaged norms of citizenship, and age seems to predict membership in the duty-based group. Similar, those who themselves or whose parents immigrated to Australia are less likely to endorse conventional norms of citizenship, but are rather supportive of engaged norms.

The effects of other measures are not as clear, however. Similar to another study (Hooghe *et al.*, 2016), political self-efficacy is not positively related to engaged citizenship. Although this contradicts Dalton's (2008) expectations, it does not seem implausible given that some of the activities endorsed by the members of the engaged group tend to require less effort and skills than those associated with all-around and duty-based citizens (i.e. supporting a political party, discussing politics). Although the zero-effects of political knowledge surprise at first, a closer inspection of the response profiles may clarify this relationship: Figure 1 shows that engaged, duty-based and enthusiastic citizens are likely to find learning about politics-related topics important. Hence, we should not expect too much an effect of political knowledge – in

particular accounting for scholarly work that suggests a recent decoupling of knowledge and action (cf. Wells et al., 2015) –, while political knowledge tends to differentiate between subject and engaged citizens. On the other hand, learning about political issues in the media is the least important 'learning' item among engaged citizens. Thus, news exposure obviously explains the difference between engaged and enthusiastic citizens, and it is somewhat in line with the expectations since those who are supportive of all norms of citizenship benefit when compared with those who primarily endorse social movement-related norms. The relationships might be different though if political information would explicitly connect citizens to political activities (Wells, 2014). Finally, trust in civic institutions works as a preventive force against the withdrawal from political realm, which aligns with the claims made by the social capital approach (Dalton, 2008; Putnam, 2000).

Surprising are the relationships between political participation and latent class membership. While conventional forms of participation also prevent subject citizenship but do not promote duty-based norms, community participation is rather associated with enthusiasm instead of also promoting engaged citizenship. Neither of both findings reflects the expectations exactly. One explanation for this result may be that young adults do not participate much at all, as some of them are still quite young. It may therefore be of more benefit to inspect how citizenship norms impact upon future participation, as positive relationships can be expected here (Bolzendahl & Coffé, 2013; Jasso & Opp, 1997; Jennings, 2015; Raney & Berdahl, 2009). Another potential explanation could be that only political enthusiasts also discuss politics, which has been found a mobilising factor (Vráblíková, 2014) and may consequently stimulate all other norms. It is difficult to disentangle these findings using cross-sectional data though. Furthermore, the measure of conventional participation that was utilised here may not perfectly match the pattern that characterises duty-based citizens in the present study. In any case, there is a need to expand our understanding of how participation and citizenship norms work together (Oser, 2016),

though other factors such as post-materialist values, civic communication and the political opportunity structure may also play a role (Copeland, 2014; Vráblíková, 2014; Wells, 2014).

What is clear from this discussion is that we urgently need longitudinal research to examine developments, trajectories and attitude change as well as the precise relationships between citizenship norms and future behaviour more closely.[3] Such research needs to be intercultural as it is important to account for differences in democratic culture, polity, and cultural values, and that research should include many measurements across time to allow for explanations and predictions that are more precise. Studying the norms of citizenship is particularly relevant, as it clearly has implications for participation in democracy and how to prevent political disaffection. One conclusion for citizenship education, for instance, may be that it might be especially beneficial in the promotion of the endorsement of conventional citizenship if it is provided in late adolescence and early adulthood (e.g., in vocational training or at university). Furthermore, motivating young citizens to participate in non-electoral or online forms of political behaviour, which may be more attractive to younger generations, can also be useful as such engagement is unlikely to occur at the expense of electoral or offline participation and, hence, has the potential truly to stimulate civil society (Copeland, 2014; Oser, 2016; Wells *et al.*, 2015).

While some limitations related to survey mode, sample and the cross-sectional study design have been mentioned, we should not gloss over another constraint. That is, the present study relies on a slightly smaller number of items than other research in particular with respect to duty-based norms and norms that may be described as 'subject' or 'norms of morality' (Dalton, 2008; Hooghe *et al.*, 2016). Despite this limitation, however, it does not seem very plausible to assume that this would strongly affect the findings stemming from the present research, though the study might certainly be stronger if it had included further norms of citizenship.

On a final note, the present study has utilized a person-centred quantitative approach to examine citizenship norms. Such an approach has advantages as it accounts for population heterogeneity and thus can complement variable-oriented research. In particular, the study by Dalton (2008) relied on a variable-centred approach, while his thesis may be best supported through person-centred analysis (Hooghe *et al.*, 2016). What can we learn from the findings of such an approach? Person-centred statistical research does not merely look at average levels of political enthusiasm or subjectivism, but, for example, it enables us also to identify how much of an 'issue' political disaffection actually is, based on the amount of individuals allocated to each of the distinct groups. Knowing that a huge majority of our sample is in the engaged group which does not endorse conventional citizenship norms, that finding might suggest that young people need spaces for participation outside of formal, institutionalized and party-related politics (Harris *et al.*, 2008), in particular if we consider the missing consent in recent Australian governments. At the same time, being aware of 80% who think that some kind of participation is important might make us cautious not to overstate the 'problem' of subject citizens, though our study might have oversampled politically more motivated individuals (see above). Clearly, further research is needed to illuminate the relationships between the norms of citizenship and actual participation (see also Oser, 2016).

Such longitudinal research could also clarify transitions between the distinct groups and help explain the (alleged) rise of political subjects, i.e. who is at risk of becoming a subject citizen? Why and when does that transition occur? Who are the individuals that contribute to the (supposed) larger group of subject citizens in early adulthood, compared to late adolescence (Reichert, 2016a)? In such a way, the combination of both person-centred and variable-oriented quantitative research could truly inform public policy and help to improve citizenship education and to establish an active civil society by generating insights that enable politicians and educators to address specific target groups.

Notes

[1] Since voting is mandatory in Australia, voting-related measures were excluded, as it would be illegal not to vote. Instead, the questionnaire only asked about the importance of obeying the law. It is also noteworthy that voting did not differentiate very well between engaged and dutiful norms of citizenship in Dalton's (2008) study.

[2] The class assignment statistics and the conditional probabilities shown in Figure 1 are also presented in Table A1 in Appendix 2.

[3] Although longitudinal research on political participation and political attitudes has been conducted in Europe (e.g., Hooghe *et al.*, 2015; Kim *et al.*, in press), only one study has examined citizenship norms over time, yet with long intervals between measurements (Jennings, 2015).

Acknowledgments

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Appendix 1: Measures[2]

Participation Prior to the Survey

All respondents were asked to indicate whether they had participated in any of fourteen political activities in the past or not, following the question 'Over the past two years or so, have you done any of the following things to express your views?' In addition, the questionnaire measured respondents' previous participation in four social movement-related organisations. As participation was rather rare, three binary indexes were computed, reflecting whether a participant had engaged in any of the respective activities (the structure was confirmed using factor analysis: RMSEA = 0.03, CFI = 0.97, WRMR = 0.95). One index reflected participation in the community and social movement-related organisations, i.e. 'an environmental organisation,' 'a human rights organisation,' 'a voluntary group doing something to help the community,' or 'collecting money for a charity or social cause' ($\alpha = 0.70$). The second index comprised participation in more conventional political activities: 'stood as a candidate in local council or shire elections,' 'contacted a government official or a member of parliament or local council,' 'helped a candidate or party during an election campaign,' 'joined a political party,' 'worked in a political committee or working group,' and 'joined a citizens' initiative' ($\alpha = 0.83$). Less institutionalized, socio-political participation comprised eight activities: 'found information about candidates before voting in an election;' 'signed a petition or online petition;' 'collected signatures for a petition;' 'worn a badge, hat or t-shirt expressing your opinion;' 'taken part in a peaceful protest, march, rally or demonstration;' 'chosen not to buy certain products or brands of product as a protest;' 'written a letter or an email to a newspaper;' 'written your opinion about an issue on the internet (e.g. on a blog or web-forum)' ($\alpha = 0.82$).

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[2] Indexes include only items with acceptable item-index correlations ($r > 0.2$).

News Exposure

Respondents also indicated how frequently they utilized the media to get news about current events. 'Outside of your employment / studies, how often do you …:' '… read about current events in the newspaper;' '… watch the news on television;' '… listen to news on the radio;' '… use the internet to get news of current events' (never or hardly ever, at least once a month, at least once a week, at least three times a week, at least once a day). The four items were condensed to one index ($\alpha = 0.71$).

Political Knowledge

Knowledge about polity and politics was measured using a set of nine items. Respondents either indicated whether a statement was correct or incorrect (e.g., 'The Constitution can only be changed by the High Court.') or they had to choose the correct answer out of a list of four options with three distractors (e.g., 'In the Australian parliaments, what is "the Opposition"?'). After data collection, all responses were coded into correct and incorrect answers and a political knowledge score was computed as the percentage of correct answers ($\alpha = 0.68$).

Political Self-Efficacy

Political self-efficacy as an individual's sense of its capacity to get involved in politics was measured by asking how well respondents thought they could do each of five things (e.g., 'discuss news about a conflict between countries;' very well, fairly well, not very well, not at all). In addition, their agreement with two statements was measured (e.g., 'I know a lot about politics and political issues;' strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree). These seven items were combined as a mean score ($\alpha = 0.91$).

Trust in Civic Institutions

Although the survey did not measure social or interpersonal trust, six items accounted for individuals' trust in civic institutions (completely, quite a lot, a little, not at all). These

institutions included the Australian Parliament, the state or territory parliament, law courts, the

police, Australian political parties, and the media (i.e. television, newspapers, radio) ($\alpha = 0.87$).

Appendix 2: Supplementary Table

Table A1. Latent class membership statistics for the four-class solution.

	Estimated conditional response probability			
	Enthusiastic	Engaged	Duty-based	Subject
Obey the law	**0.91**	**0.98**	**0.82**	**0.90**
Support a political party	0.51	*0.14*	0.60	*0.00*
Discuss politics	**0.87**	*0.12*	**0.78**	*0.00*
Learn about politics	**0.99**	0.56	**0.86**	*0.14*
Learn about history	**0.94**	**0.75**	**0.85**	0.42
Learn about other countries	**0.98**	0.69	**0.75**	*0.26*
Peaceful protests	**0.79**	0.38	0.36	*0.00*
Human rights	**1.00**	**0.80**	*0.13*	*0.00*
Environmental	**1.00**	**0.91**	*0.20*	*0.03*
Local community	**0.99**	**0.83**	**0.71**	*0.17*
Average latent class probability	0.93	0.89	0.89	0.96
Classification probability	0.88	0.93	0.82	0.98
Class size	30%	42%	8%	20%

Notes: High conditional probabilities (> 0.70) are in bold font, and low conditional probabilities (< 0.30) are in italics. The latent class and classification probabilities refer to the probabilities that the actual latent class matches the most likely latent class membership of individuals. The class sizes in the last row are based on the estimated model.